Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives (3 volumes Set)

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Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century

ADVISORY BOARD FOR THIS SET Bruce Hoffman Rohan Gunaratna James S. Robbins PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Th´er`ese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, co-founder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES VOLUME 1: STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Edited by James J. F. Forest

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

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London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century : international perspectives / edited by James J. F. Forest. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–275–99034–3 (set : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99035–0 (vol 1 : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99036–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99037–4 (vol 3 : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—Prevention—Cross-cultural studies. 2. Terrorism—Government policy—Cross-cultural studies. 3. Counterinsurgency—Cross-cultural studies. I. Forest, James J. F. HV6431.C69183 2007 363.325
17–dc22 2007007938 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. C 2007 by James J. F. Forest Copyright 

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007007938 ISBN-10: 0–275–99034–6 (set) ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99034–3 (set) 0–275–99035–4 (vol. 1) 978–0–275–99035–0 (vol. 1) 0–275–99036–2 (vol. 2) 978–0–275–99036–7 (vol. 2) 0–275–99037–0 (vol. 3) 978–0–275–99037–4 (vol. 3) First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Editor’s Note Preface Acknowledgments 1 Strategic and Tactical Considerations: An Introduction James J. F. Forest

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Part I: Strategic and Policy Dimensions 2 U.S. Grand Strategy for Countering Islamist Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century Bradley L. Bowman 3 Thinking Strategically: Can Democracy Defeat Terrorism? Douglas A. Borer and Michael Freeman

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4 Twenty-First Century Insurgencies: Understanding the Use of Terrorism as a Strategy Leonard Weinberg and William L. Eubank

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5 Developing and Implementing a Counterterrorism Policy in a Liberal Democracy Jennifer S. Holmes

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6 Morality, Ethics, and Law in the Global War on Terrorism (The Long War) Harvey Rishikof

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7 The Critical Role of Interagency Cooperation in Countering Suicide Bombings James D. Kiras

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8 The U.S. Government’s Counterterrorism Research and Development Programs Michael Kraft

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Part II: Hard Power 9 National Objectives in the Hands of Junior Leaders Amos N. Guiora and Martha Minow 10 Engaging Military Contractors in Counterterrorism and Security Operations James Jay Carafano and Alane Kochems 11 Manhunting: A Process to Find Persons of National Interest Steven M. Marks, Thomas M. Meer, and Matthew T. Nilson 12 Guerilla Warfare and Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st-Century Terrorist Cell within the United States Richard J. Hughbank 13 Combating Terror in U.S. Communities: The SWAT Mission Peter N. Spagnolo and Chadd Harbaugh

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Part III: Soft Power 14 Denying Terrorists Sanctuary through Civil Military Operations Robert J. Pauly, Jr., and Robert W. Redding 15 Battlefronts in the War of Ideas James S. Robbins 16 The Centrality of Ideology in Counterterrorism Strategies in the Middle East Maha Azzam-Nusseibeh 17 Public Diplomacy as Strategic Communication Bruce Gregory

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18 Cyber Mobilization: The Neglected Aspect of Information Operations and Counterinsurgency Doctrine Timothy L. Thomas

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19 The Key Role of Psychological Operations in Countering Terrorism Jerrold M. Post

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Part IV: Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20 The Contemporary Challenges of Counterterrorism Intelligence Jennifer E. Sims

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21 Multinational Intelligence Cooperation Tom Lansford

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22 Intelligence Coordination and Counterterrorism: A European Perspective Magnus Norell

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23 Coping with Terrorism: Lessons Learned from the Israeli Intelligence Community Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger

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24 Facilitating Interagency Communication and Open Source Intelligence for Counterterrorism Orion A. Lewis and Erica Chenoweth

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25 Al Qaeda’s Surveillance Offensive against America, 2000–2003: Implications for U.S. Homeland Countersurveillance Aaron A. Danis 26 Forecasting Terrorist Groups’ Warfare: “Conventional” to CBRN Joshua Sinai

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Appendix A: The National Security Strategy of the United States

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Appendix B: The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism

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Bibliography

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Index

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About the Editor and Contributors

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EDITOR’S NOTE

Governments have been countering the threat of terrorism and insurgency since the establishment of the Westphalia system of nation-states. However, the rapid evolution of science and technology over the past 100 years—from the invention of dynamite to commercial air travel and the Internet—has enabled new forms of terrorist and insurgent activity. It is thus likely that further technological advances over the next 100 years will yield similar results, as today’s terrorist and insurgent groups have proven to be adaptable, learning organizations. This three-volume set, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, seeks to encourage the development of learning organizations among national security professionals by examining what we currently know about the strategic application of hard and soft power in countering the sources and facilitators of terrorism. As a collection, the thematic essays and focused case studies represent an ambitious effort to capture existing knowledge in the field of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and draw lessons (from successes as well as failures) that will inform new, adaptable strategies to counter the new threats that—judging from historical trends—will no doubt emerge over the next century. At the outset, it is necessary to address why this publication covers both terrorism and insurgency, as there is confusion about these terms among many in the academic, media, and policymaking communities. In some countries that have faced the threat of violence for many years—including Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey—societies have grappled with additional terms like “paramilitaries” and “freedom fighters,” but the general view reflected throughout the chapters of this publication is that all groups or individuals (including insurgents) who engage in the act of terrorism can be considered terrorists. In essence, the act of terrorism defines its perpetrator as a terrorist, regardless of the ideological motivation behind such acts. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit

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of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological,” while insurgency is defined as “an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. . . . [and which] seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.” In teaching my classes on these topics to future U.S. Army officers at West Point, the distinction I make is that insurgents can and do use terrorism (among other forms of violence), but insurgents are but one type of violent nonstate actors who may choose to use terrorism. In other words, not all insurgents use terrorism, and not all terrorists are part of an insurgency. Further, while the use of violence by insurgents to target governments is driven by a particular ideology, terrorists use violence against a range of targets (including governments) to advance their ideology. While such distinctions may seem academic to most readers, they are actually quite important when formulating strategic, tactical, and policy responses to the threat posed by terrorism and insurgencies. As described in Volume 1 of this publication, strategies and tactics for countering insurgency are an important aspect of our knowledge base on countering terrorism, and vice versa. In both cases, experts have emphasized that the use of force to counter an organization whose objectives resonate with a larger disaffected population yields limited (if any) success. Instead, it is argued, the ideology, political, and socioeconomic aspects of an organization— through which it derives its financial support, recruits, and sympathizers from amongst the local population—must be addressed. In other words, the use of hard power in countering terrorism (including insurgencies that employ terrorist tactics) must be complemented by elements of soft power. The link between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is also informed by recent analyses which suggest that the al Qaeda movement can be described as a global insurgency, seeking to replace the existing Westphalia-based system of nation-states with a global caliphate in which Islamic law reigns supreme. Recent terror attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, and Cairo, as well as disrupted terror plots in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, are all seen as examples of how individuals and groups around the world have been inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology to commit violence as part of a strategy to change the policy and behavior of these nation-states. In other words, it is argued, al Qaeda uses terrorism tactically and operationally to advance its global insurgent strategy. When described in these terms, the U.S.-led global effort against al Qaeda can be considered to be fighting both terrorism and insurgency. Thus, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses the many challenges that stem from both types of threats to our security. Another source of confusion in the study of terrorism and insurgency involves disagreement over the proper spelling of certain groups (or, rather, the spelling of the transliteration from the original language into English). For example, a brief survey of the literature reveals that a certain Lebanese militant group can be spelled Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hizbullah,

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Hezballah, and Hizbollah. For these volumes, we have standardized the spelling of certain common names across all the chapters, such as al Qaeda (because this is how several agencies of the U.S. government are now spelling it), Hizbollah (because this is how the group spells it on their English language Web site), and Osama bin Laden (rather than Usama). Finally, it is important to note that while many chapters discuss aspects of the “global war on terrorism (GWOT),” we recognize that this term has fallen out of favor among many in the academic and policy communities. However, there currently is a worldwide effort to reduce the capabilities of globally networked terror movements like al Qaeda, and in the absence of an equally useful short-hand reference for this effort, GWOT serves an important role. At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism effort, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism and insurgencies? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do these things more effectively? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, and in doing so contributes to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the common threat and how it can be defeated. Chapters of this publication address many different aspects of the unconventional warfare puzzle, examining the most important diplomatic, information, military/law enforcement, and economic/financial dimensions to regional and global cooperation in countering terrorism and insurgency, and providing specific examples of these dimensions in practice. Authors in the first volume address issues of important strategic and tactical concern, organized around the primary instruments of power through which nations pursue their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. These instruments can generally be described as either hard power (the use of force by military and law enforcement) or soft power (including diplomacy, information, and intelligence). The second volume provides a variety of insights on how to assess and combat the sources and facilitators of political violence, including state sponsors of terror, authoritarian regimes, criminal network activity, border insecurity, and the global struggle for influence among societies. As highlighted by several authors in this volume, the community of responsibly governed democracies faces uniquely complex challenges in combating terrorism and insurgencies while maintaining civil freedoms. And contributors to the third volume offer in-depth analyses of historical events and lessons learned in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Each volume contains a preface and introductory chapter, describing the contributed essays and providing an intellectual background for the discussions that follow.

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This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy published by Praeger Security International. The first of these—the three-volume The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published in 2005)—intends to help readers understand the nature of the threat by exploring what transforms an ordinary individual into a terrorist. This was followed by the three-volume Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (published in 2006), which explored the ongoing efforts in the United States to secure our borders and ports of entry, and to protect our public spaces and critical infrastructure from future terror attacks. The volumes of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century complement these earlier publications by focusing our attention on the broad, worldwide effort to actively confront those who threaten or use political violence against our communities. Together, these nine volumes are meant to provide a central, authoritative resource for students, teachers, policymakers, journalists, and the general public, as well as stimulate new ideas for research and analysis. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

PREFACE

The chapters of this first volume of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century advance our understanding of national security strategy challenges, as well as raise important questions and issues for further research. Fighting terrorists and insurgents effectively requires a variety of strategies and tactics, and their success or failure is largely dependent on context. After an introductory chapter, the volume addresses the use of hard power, soft power, and intelligence, and the strategies that guide these efforts. PART I: STRATEGIC AND POLICY DIMENSIONS The first section of the volume begins with a thoughtful examination of strategy and grand strategy by Brad Bowman, a U.S. Army officer and a faculty member at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He argues that the current U.S. grand strategy overrelies on military operations, misidentifies the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda, ignores the struggle’s true “center of gravity,” and neglects major sources of radicalization. After defining the terms “grand strategy” and “strategy,” Bowman describes their theoretical and practical relationship to one another, and suggests that strategy—which is essentially military operations—often usurps the nation’s grand strategy and political interests. He then explores the nature of the current conflict with al Qaeda, arguing that a misdiagnosis of the nature of the struggle has encouraged the United States to neglect the central role of Muslim popular opinion. He concludes by offering a set of strategic recommendations for addressing sources of Muslim radicalization. Next, Douglas Borer and Michael Freeman of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School provide a thoughtful discussion of strategy and establish a framework for the analysis of U.S. performance in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). At its essence, they explain, strategy is an iterative or dynamic process, one that is shaped by a given context and defined by the relational environment between various actors. As such, a successful strategy in one situation will most likely be different than a successful

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strategy in another. They note that while democracy and democratization is the primary strategy by which the United States has chosen to defeat the scourge of terrorism, military force has thus far proven inadequate for democratizing either Afghanistan or Iraq. Further, democracy is an inherently risky method for organizing U.S. grand strategy in the GWOT. It may be legitimate to the average American, but it is not likely to be effective or practical. Democratization has brought into elected governments organizations such as Hizbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas in Palestine, yet neither group has given up terror. Even though many might contest the notion that Iran is democratic, the government there is chosen by the people in hotly contested multiparty elections, yet Iran remains the single most important sponsor of terror in the world. Overall, it seems that democracy—rather than security—has become an end in itself. This unjustified faith in the deterministic power of democracy to produce peace has channeled U.S. strategy away from alternative approaches that might prove more effective. The next chapter, by Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank of the University of Nevada, explores the impact of terrorism on the success or failure of armed insurgencies the United States is likely to encounter during the twenty-first century. They begin with a brief review of 50 years’ worth of insurgency, and conclude that terrorism used in isolation from other types of violence and other forms of political activity rarely succeeds. However, when combined with other forms of armed struggle and an adroit political strategy, terrorist violence may become an important device in convincing foreign forces and foreign audiences that the costs of their continued involvement outweigh the potential benefits. They conclude with a few observations of the future. First, guerrilla warfare, as in Iraq, is likely to be an increasingly city-centered activity. Second, American forces should only be committed to armed conflicts in the Third World when a vital interest is clearly at stake, one that is clear not merely to key decision makers but also to the general public (whose members, after all, will be asked to absorb the costs involved). And finally, if there is an interest to be defended but not a vital one, and political means do not succeed, the United States and the other advanced democracies would appear to be better off cultivating proxies who, in turn, would be able to act as surrogates. The next chapter explores the unique challenges of developing and implementing counterterrorism policy in a liberal democracy. Here, Jennifer Holmes of the University of Texas at Dallas observes the tension between an aggressive, preemptive investigative response to terrorism and a response that restricts government activity to safeguard individual liberties, and argues that the state needs to be strong enough to have a functioning judicial system, discourage the emergence of violence, mount a vigorous defense, and maintain citizen support. However, good

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intelligence, effective coordination, and a competent police and judiciary cannot alone squash internal terrorism with a significant domestic source of support. In this case, the political realm of the conflict is extremely important. Moreover, being responsive to understandable grievances may increase the government’s popular support and decrease overt and tacit support for terrorists. Overall, creating an effective intelligence community, increasing security, and maintaining principles of good governance are essential to democracies confronting terrorism. The greatest threat to progress is impatience, which increases the temptation to emphasize one aspect of a strategy in the short term. Lopsided efforts will not bring longterm success, she concludes, and may undermine the chances of a longterm, comprehensive peace. Similar challenges are addressed in the next chapter—by Harvey Rishikof, a professor at the National War College—on the moral, ethical, and legal aspects of the Bush administration’s current “global war on terrorism.” He argues that waging a war against terrorism challenges conventional norms of national security operations, and requires the state to rethink the measures, practices, and instruments used to prosecute against the “tactic of terrorism.” Projection of force, clandestine activities, law enforcement cooperation, diplomacy, and covert actions are part of the arsenal in the fight against terrorism, and thus individual soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, special forces, and other government agents are forced to rethink what “moral, ethical, and legal” orders mean. But there are a number of controversial challenges for just war theory and international law that Rishikof raises in his chapter. For example, How does one deal with the issue of “targeting” terrorists? What is the process due to “unlawful” combatants in detention? What is torture and what is lawful coercive interrogation? Thoughtful responses to these important challenges will determine how history judges U.S. actions and success (or failure) in the global war on terrorism. This discussion is followed by a chapter on the importance of interagency cooperation in combating suicide bombings. Authored by professor James Kiras at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, at Maxwell Air Force Base, the chapter calls for greater cooperation between agencies in developing and implementing potential solutions to suicide terrorism. The discussion begins by looking at the peculiar challenges that suicide bombing presents to those charged with preventing terrorism, and suggests that irregular adversaries will always seek to exploit systemic and other vulnerabilities in order to carry out their attacks successfully. On the basis of those challenges, Kiras argues that greater interagency cooperation can interdict or disrupt suicide bombing throughout its life cycle. The ultimate result of seamless cooperation ideally is the prevention of all future suicide bombing attacks. Sadly, this state of affairs will remain the ideal for some time, as the concluding section of this chapter suggests.

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Thus potential reformers face a particularly troublesome choice: change the mechanisms (and consequently, the nature) of democratic government in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness, or accept marginal change that leaves exploitable vulnerabilities in place. In the final chapter of this section on strategy and policy issues, Michael Kraft describes the U.S. government’s counterterrorism research and development programs. Dozens of federal agencies are working to develop a wide variety of equipment and tools, and millions of dollars go into developing devices and methods to detect conventional explosives (as well as biological, chemical, and radiological weapons) before they can cause mass casualties. These initiatives are intended to save lives by either helping prevent terrorist attacks or minimizing the damage if they do take place. Kraft provides an overview of the development of the government’s testing and evaluation programs, describes the major coordinating groups—particularly the interagency coordinating body, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)—and offers an illustrative sampling of some of the individual agency programs. He observes a need for research in new subject areas, such as detecting improvised explosive devices, as well as improvements in older systems, including airport X-ray machines and scanners. Further, the organizational framework for these initiatives has changed and continues to evolve, most markedly since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and there is a significant need for more effective coordination and working relationships between TSWG and DHS. Overall, the chapters of this section provide an interesting review of important strategic and policy challenges for countering terrorism in the twenty-first century. PART II: HARD POWER The next section of the volume explores the use of so-called kinetic or hard power in combating terrorists and insurgents. The first chapter of this section examines the specific role of junior officers in contemporary military engagements. Here, Amos Guiora of the Case Western University School of Law and Martha Minow of Harvard University explain that when considering the training and preparation of junior military leaders for fighting terrorism and insurgency, there are three areas in which improvements can be made: the use and gathering of intelligence, clear articulation of the mission, and awareness of legal responsibilities. In today’s conflicts, special focus must be given to the needs of the junior leader—typically, it is the platoon leader and his noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are charged with translating mission and strategy into tactics. Based on lessons learned from the Israeli experiences with countering terrorism, this chapter reveals that more can be done to prepare our junior leaders adequately for their missions. A focus on counterterrorism

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puts into stark relief the kinds of real-time and accessible intelligence, advanced training in law, and clear articulation of mission that junior leaders demand. The next chapter, by James Carafano of The Heritage Foundation and Alane Kochems of CENTRA Technologies, addresses the role of private contractors in assisting militaries and civilian government agencies throughout the world in such areas as planning, training, logistics, and security. Employing contractors in the war on terror, or for that matter any national security purpose, has both distinct advantages and disadvantages. Military contractors are seen as having inherent advantages over militaries with regard to cost, flexibility, and responsiveness. Relying on military contractors, though, does have its share of risks, including safety and liability issues, performance, force management, compliance with international and domestic laws, and lost resources because a capability is outsourced rather than retained. With this increase in contractor use and the advent of privatized military firms (PMFs), the question is now how to determine the right mix of forces to most effectively and efficiently complete a task or mission. In some cases, military contractors may be the best choice; however, they are not the perfect fit for every mission or the right solution for all skill or manpower shortages. Instead, governments should assess the risks of employing various options and then choose the best one. They conclude that government agencies should adopt comprehensive guidelines for making these decisions on the role of private military firms using a risk-based approach. Next, Steven Marks, Thomas Meer, and Matthew Nilson—three U.S. military officers—describe a manhunting process based on law enforcement investigative methods, which can aid military forces in the hunt for terrorist fugitives in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. They begin by noting that commonalities exist among all types of manhunting, whether the hunter is pursuing a common criminal, international fugitive, or a terrorist. Then they describe methods that have yielded success for U.S. Marshals in hunting fugitives. Fugitives typically engage in “risk management” strategies, trying to reduce the risk of being captured, based on four criteria: familiarity, survivability, safety, and vulnerability. They will try to minimize their level of risk by relocating to suitable areas with access to food and water, or at least areas that are favorable for survival. In tracking fugitives, the most important aspect in investigative work is identifying and analyzing the nature and depth of relationships with friends, family members, and business associates. The authors then describe a five-step manhunting process: (1) conduct an initial background investigation via research; (2) build a social profile; (3) identify the support network; (4) analyze the hunter’s constraints and limitations; (5) and conduct analysis of competing hypotheses. This manhunting process is iterative and structures the problem so as to remove certain biases from the search operation.

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This analytical process provides better resolution as to the fugitive’s possible locations by limiting pre-established beliefs about the fugitive’s behavior or hiding location. In the next chapter, U.S. Army officer Richard Hughbank provides an analysis of law enforcement challenges in confronting terrorist cells in the United States. He begins by describing how both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. Terrorism, by its nature, seeks out and exploits its opponents’ weaknesses. Thus, the ability to identify and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their infrastructure, and disrupt their financial resources lies in an understanding of modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within the United States. Terrorist operations have become more prevalent in the United States and are creating new challenges for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. After reviewing the origin and nature of these challenges, this chapter offers some suggestions for countering guerilla warfare in twenty-first-century America. The final chapter of this section, by Peter Spagnolo and Chadd Harbaugh of the Government Training Institute in Boise, Idaho, highlights the role of SWAT (an acronym which originally stood for Special Weapons Assault Team, but over the years has changed to the universally accepted Special Weapons and Tactics) in countering terrorism in America’s communities. Nationwide, the focus for SWAT took a new direction on September 11, 2001; while the SWAT team has been the unit called in when specialized equipment and unconventional tactics are needed in situations such as hostage takings, barricaded armed criminals, and high-risk search warrants and arrests, their mission is again evolving, with SWAT teams becoming the first line of defense in the face of an armed ground assault on a target within the United States. One of the reasons for the change in direction is the fact that the terrorist is generally far better armed and trained than other types of criminals, and more likely to fight it out with the authorities. This chapter describes how the Department of Homeland Security has recently made it easier for law enforcement agencies to train their officers in critical areas of counterterrorism, antiterrorism, and SWAT tactics and techniques, and is working to bolster this vital counterterrorism organization in communities throughout the United States. PART III: SOFT POWER The next section of the volume explores the use of so-called “soft power” in the fight against terrorism. The first chapter of this section— coauthored by Robert Pauly, Jr., of the University of Southern Mississippi and U.S. Army Special Forces officer Robert Redding—demonstrates how the use of civil military operations and confidence-building measures among villagers at the local level can assist the United States and its

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domestic allies in minimizing support for al Qaeda and its affiliates in a given state under reconstruction. There are many examples across the world that demonstrate the growing role of U.S. military special forces (active duty and reserve units alike) in micro-level civil military operations designed to achieve progress in the GWOT one village or town at a time, in places ranging geographically from Iraq and Yemen to Mongolia and the Philippines. This chapter examines these types of operations and the grand strategy upon which they are based. The first part of their discussion provides a conceptual overview of the use of civil military operations to achieve strategic objectives. This is followed by an analysis of civil military operations in the context of the GWOT in particular. The third section examines case studies of U.S.-led civil military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, followed by an examination of the insights that U.S. policymakers should draw from these case studies. The concluding section provides some observations on the prospects for the future of the use of civil military operations by the United States and its allies. Next, Professor Jim Robbins of the National Defense University examines the so-called War of Ideas concept. He notes that the battlefronts in the war of ideas are not the only ways in which the civilized nations may confront terrorist ideology, nor is confrontation on the ideological plane alone a sufficient means of defeating the threat posed by armed extremism. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to believe that ideas cannot be suppressed using force. The terrorists in particular know this to be the case, and it has been demonstrated when proponents of their ideology take power. For example, an Afghani liberal reformer who lived under the Taliban regime would be at great risk of life and limb were he to have spoken out. Overall, Robbins argues, the War of Ideas is an important supporting aspect of the overall war on terrorism, but cannot replace nor is more important than the efforts of the military, intelligence community, and other agencies in disrupting and defeating terrorism. The role of ideas and ideologies is also addressed in the next chapter, by Maha Azzam of Chatham House, London. She examines the unique histories of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in countering radical Islamic terrorism, with particular focus on the core thinkers who shaped the militant ideology that has fueled violent group recruitment and attacks. In looking at how a state in the Middle East has dealt with the problem of terrorism, it is imperative to examine the way in which the revolutionary theory of the radical Islamists was countered and to a large degree discredited by the establishment. Finally, her chapter also explores the main issues that form the core of public disaffection in the region. Radical Islamist terrorism has occurred because of a confluence of a new revolutionary theory combined with widespread public disaffection toward the state. The problem the state faces is that it may be able to physically suppress these groups; it may, more fundamentally, counter and discredit their ideology. But so

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long as these issues remain unresolved, she argues, the region will remain unstable and the wider populations will continue to provide a pool from which new radicals might evolve. The discussion of ideas and ideologies is extended further by Bruce Gregory of the Public Diplomacy Institute in Washington, DC, whose chapter provides a brief historical overview of public diplomacy and strategic communication in American foreign policy. He then describes how the Bush administration has until recently failed to demonstrate a sustained commitment to public diplomacy or give it a prominent role in the struggle against terrorism. Five years after 9/11, U.S. political leaders have just begun to recognize the need for change. Experts in the academic and private sectors, meanwhile, have all agreed: public diplomacy is vital to national security; it is broken and strategic level change is needed. A flurry of reports have been commissioned, and the appointment of Karen Hughes as the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (a position that was filled by a Senate-confirmed appointee for only 18 months during the Bush administration’s first 41/2 years in office) are promising signs of movement in a new direction. However, he notes, “transformational public diplomacy” requires political will and a presidential directive on strategic communication that is reinforced and made permanent with bipartisan congressional support and legislation. Finally, Gregory offers a set of recommendations for the future of America’s public diplomacy and strategic communication efforts. The next chapter of this section explores the role of the Internet in mobilizing new recruits for terrorist organizations. Timothy Thomas, of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, observes that the cyber mobilization capabilities (mobilization enabled by computer-chip-driven devices such as cell phones, the Internet, CDs, etc.) of these organizations are designed to conduct psychological warfare activities, to propagandize insurgent successes and counter coalition allegations, and to recruit, finance, and train more fighters. Thus, he argues, a “counter cyber mobilization” strategy should be developed in order to assist in controlling the environment. His chapter discusses the precedents to the current use of the Internet in Iraq and Afghanistan; the U.S. information operations (IO) paradigm problem and its extension into understanding the virtual aspect of an insurgency; the use of the Internet by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan; and coalition countermeasures to insurgent efforts. The chapter then concludes with some relevant recommendations for U.S. IO and counterinsurgency doctrine. Finally, Jerrold Post—Director of the Political Psychology Program at the George Washington University and a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency—concludes this section on soft power with a chapter on the role of psychological operations in countering terrorism. Terrorism, he notes, is a vicious species of psychological warfare waged through the

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media, “a war for hearts and minds.” If one accepts this premise, then the war against terrorism will not be won with smart bombs and missiles. One does not counter psychological warfare with high-tech weapons; one counters it with psychological warfare. And in this so-called war for hearts and minds, tending to overly rely on our technological superiority, we have fallen far behind our terrorist adversary. In his chapter, four elements of an integrated information operations program designed to counter terrorism are presented. A fifth element of a comprehensive security strategy, promoting societal resilience, is also discussed. In addition to these five general elements, Post gives special attention to countering suicide terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. PART IV: INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE The final section of the volume explores the crucial role that intelligence services play in countering terrorism and insurgency, and the challenges they face in “getting it right” 100 percent of the time. The section begins with a chapter by Jennifer Sims of Georgetown University, in which she examines the requirements and future challenges of the intelligence profession. She begins with a discussion of what history can tell us about the core features of past counterintelligence missions that have been successful against transnational groups. Sims then discusses the new features of the modern conflict that are changing the nature of the tradecraft needed to defeat terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and associated groups. A key premise of her chapter is that one cannot evaluate an intelligence effort without identifying the nature of the competition, including the adversary and his strategy. This is because intelligence, at its core, is less about getting facts right or wrong than providing competitive advantages in foresight and situational awareness to decision makers. To some extent, she notes, the techniques that have worked in the past will remain important, including human intelligence from infiltration agents, all-source data fusion (phone intercepts and human agents, for example), and collaboration with law enforcement worldwide. The ability of the federal government to conduct double agent and deception operations should be improved and will necessarily have to be coordinated with overseas partners. Finally, she advocates for greater collaboration between the federal government and local agencies, intelligence liaison with foreign governments, and outreach to universities. Tom Lansford of the University of Southern Mississippi furthers the discussion on multinational intelligence cooperation in his chapter. He notes that one of the most significant successes of the war on terror has been the substantial increase in intelligence cooperation between the United States and a range of countries and other international nonstate actors. Because of the dominant position of the United States in global antiterror efforts,

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his chapter places the United States at the center of current international efforts in intelligence cooperation. No other state currently has the military and intelligence capabilities of the United States, which makes the world’s remaining superpower integral to multinational counterterrorism efforts. Concurrently, however, the United States has deep deficiencies in certain areas, especially human intelligence. Thus, he argues, only through multilateral cooperation and collaboration can the capabilities of the United States and other states be harnessed to successfully prosecute the global campaign against terrorism. Multinational intelligence cooperation is also the topic of the next chapter, by Magnus Norell of the Swedish Defense Research Agency, who provides a detailed analysis of the benefits and challenges of this from a European perspective. While there has been considerable discussion after 9/11 about what roles various national agencies should have (the police vs. the military, for example), within the EU it is still the police force who is identified as the “lead” agency in regard to counterterrorism operations, largely because both the Union and its members have preferred to see terrorism—conceptually and legally—as a form of serious and organized crime. Norell argues that the underlying premise for this state of affairs is flawed, and does not take into account the fact that other agencies might have knowledge—unbeknownst to the police, due to a lack of coordination and the flow of necessary intelligence—that can be of critical value to any counterterrorism operation. Moreover, the structures of the EU make it inherently difficult to overcome the limitations and bureaucratic obstacles that make intelligence coordination among several actors—that is, on a Union level—so difficult. The chapter argues that as long as certain structural flaws in the system remain, nothing fundamental will change in the way the EU is trying to deal with the issue of intelligence coordination concerning counterterrorism policy. He calls upon the EU to critically examine the underlying structures in the Union, identify a “lead” agency, and provide new resources, and concludes with some recommendations that can be of value in countering these flaws in the EU’s structure. Another comparative perspective on intelligence is provided in the chapter by Ami Pedahzur of the University of Texas and Arie Perliger of the University of Haifa, who draw lessons from the experiences of the Israeli Secret Services in countering terrorism over the last four decades. They note that the Israeli intelligence community failed to forecast the rise of Shiite terror in southern Lebanon in 1982 and the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank territories in 1987, among other events. In addition, despite the imaginative stories told of the long arm of the State of Israel able to reach terrorists all over the world, reality teaches that apart from some high-profile operations where relatively low-level terrorists or those already out of operational circles were captured or assassinated, the number of terrorists targeting Israel has only increased with the years, their

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capabilities have improved, and the number of victims is immeasurably higher than in the past. In the end, the wide majority of special hostagerescue operations have ended in partial or complete failure. In their chapter, Pedhazur and Perliger examine the gap between the aura of invincibility surrounding the Israeli intelligence community and the continual deterioration of the Israeli security situation. They first describe the challenges placed before intelligence organizations charged with coping with terrorism, and then analyze how the Israeli intelligence agencies operate under such conditions, and conclude with lessons to be learned from Israel’s long history of struggle with terrorism. Next, Orion Lewis of the University of Colorado and Erica Chenoweth of Harvard University examine the sometimes overlooked value of open source information for informing intelligence analysis. In particular, they note, many Washington insiders—including CIA analysts and 9/11 Commission members—have recently argued for an expansion of open source intelligence (OSINT) capabilities. Indeed, a unit at the CIA is now dedicated specifically to OSINT collection. While these activities are a step in the right direction, they argue, the government should further develop an organizational strategy in which academic and private professionals can supplement intelligence-gathering efforts. Their chapter offers new policy ideas to improve both the technical infrastructure of government communications as well as the organizational infrastructure of U.S. intelligence that allows the United States to prevent future terrorist attacks. They suggest applying the methods of open source production to the existing intelligence infrastructure, and nurturing a broad-based “national anti-terrorism intelligence forum” (or “virtual community of experts”) who would supplement the process of intelligence gathering by incorporating the collective knowledge of the terrorism research community into the government’s OSINT program. This approach would help to overcome budgetary and human resource constraints that plague current OSINT efforts, and presents a mutually beneficial arrangement that would benefit government, first responders, academia, and the broader public alike. OSINT is also addressed in the next chapter, by Aaron Danis of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission—but from a much different perspective. He provides a unique analysis of al Qaeda’s use of many sources of information (including the Internet) in gathering intelligence throughout the 1990s on potential targets worldwide, as part of a long-range plan to attack the United States, the West, and “apostate” Middle East regimes. He describes how al Qaeda surveilled targets in Europe, Africa, Indonesia, the Middle East, and America, and analyzes how successful it was in penetrating American homeland security. He also examines three key questions: “Could al Qaeda attempt to do this again? What would such an attempt look like? and How could U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence, and law

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enforcement organizations defeat domestic terrorist surveillance and prevent an attack?” He concludes that a domestic countersurveillance center would be a good idea, though it would require the integration of domestic and foreign immigration expertise and databases, and information on daily immigration, among other elements. Based on the haphazard (and not always successful) bureaucratic counterterrorism efforts attempted by the U.S. government since 9/11, particularly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center-to-NCTC evolution, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. government can formulate a coherent and effective terrorist countersurveillance strategy and organization in the U.S. homeland. The final chapter of this volume, by Joshua Sinai of The Analysis Corporation, offers a model that can be used by intelligence agencies to forecast the spectrum of warfare that a terrorist group is likely to conduct against a specific adversary. He suggests that to adequately assess the likelihood and magnitude of the types of threats posed by contemporary terrorism, three issues need to be addressed. First, threat assessments need to focus on three types of warfare that characterize this spectrum of terrorist operations: conventional low impact (CLI), conventional high impact (CHI), or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) warfare, also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Second, one needs to focus on the characteristics of terrorist groups that shape and define the type of warfare that they are likely to employ to achieve their objectives, starting with the nature of their leadership, motivation, strategy, supporting constituencies, and other factors such as capabilities, accelerators, triggers, and hurdles that are likely to propel them to pursue CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare (or a combination of the three). Third, we must focus our efforts on determining the disincentives and constraints that are likely (or not) to deter terrorist groups away from CBRN warfare, which is the most catastrophic (and difficult) form of potential warfare, particularly when these groups can resort to conventional explosives which have become increasingly more lethal and “catastrophic” in their impact. Analytically, therefore, terrorist groups currently operating on the international scene (or newly emergent ones) need to be viewed as potential CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare actors (or a combination of the three), based on an understanding of the factors likely to propel them to embark on such types of warfare against their adversaries. CONCLUSION Together, these chapters address an impressive breadth of topics related to our nation’s security. As noted earlier, success in countering terrorism and insurgency requires the effective application of hard power, soft power, and intelligence, as well as comprehensive strategies that unite these in a concerted effort. However, there are obviously other issues to

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explore beyond what is covered in this volume. Thus, this collection will hopefully also stimulate the reader to pursue further research on their own, in order to expand our collective understanding of how our military, law enforcement, diplomacy, and intelligence professionals can most effectively counter terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy, which began with The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published by Praeger in 2005) and continued with Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (in 2006). Together, these volumes are meant to provide a central resource for understanding the global threat of terrorism, how America is working to defend against it, and how the international community is actively seeking to disrupt, deter, and defeat those who seek to conduct terror attacks. I would like to thank Hilary Claggett at Praeger Security International for her vision and encouragement throughout this effort. Each of these multivolume projects has required significant coordination, and Hillary and her staff have been enormously professional and helpful collaborators during the past three years. Also, the Advisory Board members for this project—Bruce Hoffman, Rohan Gunaratna, and James Robbins—have been extremely helpful in identifying authors and topics to be addressed, in addition to serving as outstanding guest lecturers to the cadets in my terrorism studies courses at West Point. New contributions to the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have never been more urgently needed. Each of the chapters in these three volumes is the product of thoughtful research and analysis, and I offer my sincere thanks to the authors for their hard work and commitment to excellence. The insights and suggestions they have provided in these pages will undoubtedly inform discussions and debate in a variety of policymaking and academic settings for the foreseeable future. For their continued support and encouragement, I extend my gratitude to the faculty and staff of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. General (R) Wayne Downing, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Felter, Dr. Jarret Brachman, and Brigadier General (R) Russell Howard have been especially important sources of mentorship and guidance. Colonel Kip McCormick, Major Rick Wrona, Mr. Brian Fishman, Mr. Clint Watts, Mr. Jim Phillips, and Ms. Lianne Kennedy Boudali have also contributed significantly to my understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. I would

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also like to thank the leadership of the Department of Social Sciences— Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb—along with the Dean of the Academic Board, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, and the former Dean, Brigadier General (R) Daniel Kaufman, all of whom have been supportive of my publishing efforts over the last several years. I am also sincerely grateful to Mr. Tom Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, for his role in sustaining and expanding the CTC’s educational mission. And of course, the CTC would not exist without the generous commitment, support, and vision of Mr. Vincent Viola, USMA Class of 1977. My faculty colleagues throughout West Point continue to be a source of inspiration as both academic mentors and members of the U.S. armed forces. I joined West Point as a civilian faculty member and assistant dean in early fall 2001, and the attacks of September 11 had a tremendous impact on my personal and professional life. The U.S. Military Academy is a very unique place to work as an academic, particularly given the current global security challenges. Upon graduation, the students I teach are commissioned as officers in the U.S. Army, and very soon find themselves on the front lines of the global counterterrorism effort. Some have been injured, some have been killed. Many of the officers who serve on the faculty and staff at West Point have also been deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; some of them have fallen as well. I have never before encountered such a willingness to sacrifice, and I am continually awed by so many men and women (and their families) who are committed to a life of service to our nation. I offer them my deepest gratitude and best wishes for a long and successful military career. Finally, my wife and daughter—Alicia and Chloe Lynn—have been sources of great motivation and support, and I thank them sincerely for their patience and tolerance during my scholarly adventures. James J. F. Forest January 15, 2007

CHAPTER 1 STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION James J. F. Forest

In June 1995, Chechen separatists attacked the Russian town of Budyonnovsk, 100 miles from the Chechen border, and held over 1,000 Russian hostages in the town hospital for a week in what became the single largest hostage-taking event of the twentieth century. Initial Russian attempts to resolve the situation resulted in a public relations disaster and hundreds of civilian casualties, and President Boris Yeltsin’s bellicose statements on the need to annihilate the Chechen rebels did not help the situation. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin eventually agreed to the terrorist’s conditions: he sent a peace delegation to Grozny, ordered a ceasefire in Chechnya, and guaranteed safe passage back to Chechnya. (Of course, Chernomyrdin was removed from his position shortly afterward). This was a pivotal episode of the war between the Chechens and Russia. Law enforcement agencies were shown to be incapable of protecting the population from terrorism, while an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe report criticized Russia’s use of disproportionate and indiscriminate military force in this situation. And the terrorists succeeded in their goal of gaining publicity for the Chechen cause, hoping that pressure from Russian society and other countries would force a policy change in Russia’s leadership.1 Unfortunately, the last 200 years are filled with similar examples of terrorist activity and government responses (both successes and failures), as demonstrated by many of the chapters in this book (particularly in Volume 3). What we have learned from this history is that terrorism is a

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complex phenomenon, which requires a complex and comprehensive response. Military force and a robust security apparatus are necessary but insufficient components of that response. Instead, countering terrorism and insurgency requires a holistic approach that incorporates all the elements of national power. Volume 1 of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses the formulation of policies, strategies, and tactics for countering unconventional threats to national security, which are organized around the primary elements of a nation’s hard power (the use of force by military and law enforcement) and soft power, including diplomatic, economic, information, and intelligence activities (with special attention given to the latter). Clearly, as Korb and Boorstin argue, the integration of these elements is critical.2 This chapter serves to introduce central concepts and summarize some of the key points from current literature on the application of hard and soft power in countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN THE UNITED STATES Despite what is commonly portrayed in the media, security strategy documents of the United States from the last decade reflect an understanding that the terrorist threat to our nation is far greater than a single extremist group led by Osama bin Laden, and that our response to terrorist threats must be global and multidimensional. For example, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, signed on June 21, 1995, by President Bill Clinton, declared: It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks. We shall work closely with friendly governments in carrying out our counterterrorism policy and will support Allied and friendly governments in combating terrorist threats against them. Furthermore, the United States shall seek to identify groups or states that sponsor or support such terrorists, isolate them and extract a heavy price for their actions. It is the policy of the United States not to make concessions to terrorists.

PDD 39, which emphasized foreign terrorist captures, terrorist financing, and weapons of mass destruction, complemented two other PDDs issued in 1995: PDD 35, which designated terrorism as an intelligence priority, and PDD 42, which focused on combating both criminal and terrorist

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organizations abroad.3 In 1998, this administration issued further guidance in combating terrorism—PDD 62, which established the first agreed designation of which agencies had lead responsibility for the range of activities involved, and PDD 63, which called for the first plan to protect our nation’s critical infrastructure, with a new emphasis on cyber security and a new budgeting mechanism that provided for cross-cutting review of all counterterrorism budgets.4 Shortly after President Clinton took office, the nation was confronted with several new forms of terrorism, with the fatal attack on CIA employees at Langley five days after the inauguration, the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, the Iraqi plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush in April of that year, and a plot against historic New York City landmarks such as the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels in June.5 These terrorist threats came from disparate sources—including Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, who was eventually captured, prosecuted, and put in prison for life. Islamic extremists had already been recognized as the most pressing terrorist threat: during the 1980s, nearly 500 Americans had been murdered in terrorist attacks abroad by Hizbollah, Islamic Jihad, and others. Osama bin Laden’s declaration of war against the United States in 1996 and 1998, and his role in the subsequent bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, eventually brought al Qaeda to the forefront of the national counterterrorism effort. However, when President Bush took office in January 2001, al Qaeda as an organization was stronger than ever before and had already put in motion a plot that on September 11 of that year proved to the entire nation just how serious the threat of terrorism is to our security. Amid the flurry of military activity, federal reorganization, and investigative reports that followed, the U.S. government also produced its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002 and then the first National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) in 2003. In the introduction to the NSS, President Bush noted: Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal—military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror, including those who harbor terrorists—because the allies

4

Strategic and Tactical Considerations of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn.6

Because the NSS was written to address the full spectrum of possible or potential threats to the nation, including (but clearly not exclusively) terrorism, the document articulates how the United States will “champion aspirations for human dignity,” “work with others to defuse regional conflicts,” and “ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade,” among several other goals and objectives. Those seeking a more specific discussion of how the United States intends to confront the global threat of terrorism must turn to the NSCT. According to this document, “the United States’ strategy for combating terrorism focuses on taking the fight to the terrorists themselves. We are using all elements of our national power and international influence to attack terror networks; reduce their ability to communicate and coordinate their plans; isolate them from potential allies and from each other; and identify and disrupt their plots before they attack.”7 While the NSS provides the strategy framework for the NSCT, both are supplemented by additional strategic documents, including the National Strategy for Homeland Security (published July 2002),8 the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (December 2002),9 the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (February 2003),10 the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (December 2003),11 the National Drug Control Strategy (February 2002),12 and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005).13 More recently, many of the themes addressed in these documents were sustained and expanded in the new 2006 versions of the NSS and the NSCT (both of which are provided in the Appendix). As President Bush articulates in the document’s introduction, the 2006 NSS is founded upon two pillars. “The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. . . . Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.” The second pillar involves “confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we face—from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems.”14 Multinational cooperation is also a key component of the new NSCT, which states, “Today, we face a global terrorist movement and must confront the radical ideology that justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion. . . . Our Muslim partners are speaking out

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against those who seek to use their religion to justify violence and a totalitarian vision of the world. We have significantly expanded our counterterrorism coalition, transforming old adversaries into new and vital partners in the War on Terror.”15 The strategy is also multidimensional, in keeping with the approach articulated in the earlier strategic documents described above. According to the 2006 NSCT Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive.16

Overall, the United States has been working to counter terrorism for several decades. However, the events of 9/11 and its aftermath brought new focus and public attention to these efforts, as well as several government agency reorganizations and a flood of new resources. While debate continues on the effectiveness of the Bush administration’s current approach to the terrorist threat, a global review of counterterrorism strategies informs our understanding of the challenges ahead. For example, according to a recent U.S. Institute of Peace report, “Decades of experience indicate that the most effective counterterrorist efforts are ultimately stealthy, incremental, pragmatic, and defensive, and they may only marginally affect the terrorists’ perceived payoff.” In other words, as mentioned earlier, the integration of hard power and soft power is paramount to the success of any strategy for combating terrorism and insurgency, and it requires nuance, patience, and a comprehensive understanding of the threat and the operating environment, as well as how a government’s actions can impact either of them (positively or negatively). Counterterrorism strategies must also incorporate knowledge of the terrorist enemy, and a large and growing body of research and analysis in terrorism studies is contributing to this goal. In particular, several publications since 9/11 have helped us understand a variety of important aspects about terrorist organizations, including methods of recruitment and training, as well as the political, ideological, and socioeconomic rationales used to justify their use of terrorist tactics. Important books by authors such as Bruce Hoffman, Cindy Combs, Martha Crenshaw, Walter Reich, Jessica Stern, David Rapoport, Brian Jenkins, and Paul Wilkinson are used

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in university classrooms across the country, while several recent highprofile government reports produced by the 9/11 Commission, Downing Commission, Bremer Commission, and others have expanded our understanding of specific terror attacks in (and of the continuing threat to) the United States.17 An array of new books and reports by think tanks and research organizations, such as the Rand Corporation, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, and the Council on Foreign Relations, are continually expanding the range and deepening the quality of research and analysis in this field. Scholarly journals such as Terrorism and Political Violence, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Democracy and Security are also helping us deepen and broaden our understanding of key counterterrorism challenges and effective responses. And the three-volume The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (Praeger, 2005) provides a central resource on many of these important issues. In short, there is an impressive and growing body of knowledge that students, scholars, policymakers, and the media can draw upon in developing a solid understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. A particularly useful area of research in this field of study has focused on identifying and exploiting a terror group’s vulnerabilities. For example, the faculty of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point recently examined a collection of al Qaeda documents captured during recent operations in support of the Global War on Terror and revealed a range of organizational issues, particularly regarding the internal structure and functioning of the movement as well as the tensions that have emerged within the group’s leadership. Drawing on organization and agency theory, the report predicts where we should expect terrorist groups to face their greatest challenges in conducting operations. In particular, organizations such as al Qaeda face difficulties in almost any operational environment, particularly in terms of maintaining situational awareness, controlling the use of violence to achieve specified political ends, and, of course, preventing local authorities from degrading the group’s capabilities. But they also face problems common to other types of organizations, including private firms, political parties, and traditional insurgencies. For example, political and ideological leaders—the principals—must delegate certain duties to intermediaries or low-level operatives, their agents. However, differences in personal preferences between the leadership and their operatives in areas such as finances and tactics make this difficult and give rise to classic agency problems. Agency problems created by the divergent preferences among terrorist group members present operational challenges for these organizations, challenges that can be exploited as part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Thus, the theoretical framework described in this report helps us identify where and under what conditions organizations can expect the greatest challenges in pursuing their goals and

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7

interests. Understanding a terrorist organization’s internal challenges and vulnerabilities is key to developing effective—and efficient—responses to the threats they pose and to degrade these groups’ ability to kill.18 Overall, this study provides an important example of how research on terrorists can inform our own counterterrorism strategy, a strategy that must integrate the carefully measured application of hard and soft power. Hard Power Operation Enduring Freedom, the world’s first multinational military response to a terrorist organization, was launched in October 2001 and was highly successful in disrupting al Qaeda and its state sponsor, the Taliban regime. Just 2 weeks after the 9/11 attacks, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, obligating all 191 UN member states to take far-reaching domestic legislative and executive actions designed to prevent and suppress future terrorist activities. At that time, the U.S. permanent representative to the Security Council, Ambassador John Negroponte, called the UN “a unique partner in troubled times” and described Resolution 1373 as the UN’s “single most powerful response” in the war on terrorism. New UN resolutions took the unprecedented steps of legitimizing military action against terrorism and globalizing the ban on it. However, as the recent conflict between Israel and the Lebanese militant group Hizbollah aptly demonstrated, military force is often of limited use against a well-armed, disciplined, and well-supported nonstate actor. In fact, military action may sometimes be even counterproductive. For example, on July 30, 2006, Israeli air strikes killed more than 60 civilians, many of them children, in the village of Qana, Lebanon.19 Many nations throughout the world condemned Israel for this act, while scholars of terrorism were quick to point out that never in the history of humankind has a terrorist group of Hizbollah’s size and local support been destroyed by military force, particularly by air strikes. As a classic asymmetric conflict, Israel was clearly at a disadvantage despite its overwhelming military superiority. Hizbollah was operating within its own territory, where they enjoyed a much greater familiarity with the rocky terrain than the Israeli soldiers. They have been aided by a passive regime and external state sponsors (Syria and Iran). Hizbollah is also well equipped, armed, and trained, and it offers an ideology that appeals not only to local Lebanese citizens but to millions of Muslims throughout the Arab world. As a result of these factors, the Israeli military was forced to modify its main objectives. When launching the campaign, the country’s leaders declared that they would destroy Hizbollah. However, when a few weeks of heavy bombardment of Lebabon’s roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure targets produced no reduction in Hizbollah’s capability to fire rockets indiscriminately into Israel, the focus of the campaign changed to

8

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

pushing the militants north of the Litani River and out of the border region. Eventually, however, a UN-brokered ceasefire led to Israel ending the blockade and pulling its troops out of Lebanon without accomplishing any of its primary objectives. Even the two Israeli soldiers, whose kidnapping in June had initiated this conflict, remained in Hizbollah hands as of mid-September. Turner Stansfield, a former chief of the CIA, argues that punitive military attacks are a remedy we should use but sporadically.20 Clearly, as described in many of the cases offered in Volume 3, kinetic aspects of counterterrorism are an important part of the solution to terror threats, particularly in terms of attacking valid enemy targets, when they become available. But terrorists and insurgents—by the very nature of the asymmetric warfare tactics they employ—tend not to offer easy targets for conventional military strikes. For this reason, nations throughout the world have developed special military units to fight terrorism, such as the Israeli Sarayat Matkal, British SAS, German GSG9, and U.S. Delta Force. Some observers have argued that because of the special forces expertise the U.S. military has developed, we must be poised to take on a larger role in counterterrorism missions abroad, especially given the presence of friendly but “weak” allies attempting to fight terrorism.21 According to terrorism expert Cindy Combs, however, states must grapple with finding a delicate balance between providing enough commitment and resources to ensure the operational capability of these groups, while also imposing sufficient constraints to prevent an overuse of their skills.22 And yet, the imposition of constraints can also lead to new problems. For example, according to Richard Schultz, a number of “mutually reinforcing, self-imposed constraints” prevented the use of U.S. special mission units in hunting down and destroying the al Qaeda terrorist network before the attacks of September 11, 2001.23 He notes that defining terrorism as a crime made it the responsibility of the Justice Department, rather than the Department of Defense, and with the resulting lack of legal authority few Pentagon officials were willing to see terrorist attacks as grounds for war (and the deployment of military forces). The “Somalia syndrome” and other dimensions of risk aversion led Pentagon leaders to obstruct and intimidate civilians who promoted a more aggressive military response to terrorism. Further, essential intelligence requirements were defined so narrowly as to make pre-positioning and other counterterrorism operations virtually impossible.24 Military force also has limitations when confronting a state sponsor of terrorism. For example, during the early 1980s, Libya was implicated as a sponsor of several terrorist attacks against Western interests. In 1985, simultaneous attacks in Rome and Vienna by the Abu Nidal group, which Qaddafi called “heroic acts,” killed 20 people—five of them Americans, including a 9-year-old girl. The Reagan administration responded with a

An Introduction

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policy that would utilize escalating political, economic, and military pressures in an attempt to end Qaddafi’s sponsorship of international terrorism. There were three phases to this strategy: peaceful pressure (including economic sanctions), a show of force (in January 1986, Reagan ordered the Navy to begin a week of extensive flight operations in the vicinity of Libya), and, finally, the use of force (a bombing raid on April 14, 1986, in response to a series of terrorist attacks directly linked to Qaddafi). However, as Tim Zimmerman notes, this attempt at coercive diplomacy did not significantly change Qaddafi’s support for international terrorism. Indeed, as the case of Libya demonstrates, the literature on terrorism and counterterrorism indicates that there are significant limitations on the use of military force as an instrument of coercion, particularly in confronting terrorism.25 In truth, the law enforcement agencies of a nation play a more important role than the military in identifying and confronting terrorist threats, as recently thwarted terror plots in the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the United States demonstrate. Before 9/11, as noted above, U.S. counterterrorism efforts were mainly the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), because terrorist acts (of both foreign and domestic origin) against American targets were viewed as crimes to be investigated and prosecuted under U.S. law. Since 9/11, according to their own analysis, the FBI has (1) shifted its counterterrorism culture and organization from reactive to proactive and “threat-based”; (2) developed a nationally driven, fully integrated Intelligence and Investigative Program; (3) improved information sharing with other federal agencies, state and local governments, and international counterterrorism partners; (4) enhanced operational capabilities within FBI headquarters and the field; and (5) evaluated lessons learned to better equip the nation in preventing terrorism.26 Other changes in America’s domestic legal and policy environment— most notably the USA PATRIOT Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security—have also had a dramatic impact on the statutory capabilities and responsibilities of the FBI. In some cases, the FBI must forge relationships with new or reorganized agencies in order to achieve its counterterrorism mission. According to the FBI’s Strategic Plan 2002– 2009,27 this mission is organized around five strategic objectives, each with its own set of priorities (see Table 1.1). As reflected in this document, the FBI recognizes that a broad spectrum of activities are necessary to combat terrorism effectively—a theme that is also reflected in the national strategy documents described earlier. Of course, the FBI is also expected to meet its traditional responsibilities of investigating and prosecuting those who commit significant violent crimes (such as serial killers), transnational crimes, hate crimes, cyber crimes, public corruption, and white-collar crimes. Thus, it has often been

10

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

Table 1.1 FBI Strategic Objectives in Combating Terrorism. 1. Prevent terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests. Limited windows of time exist for penetration of terrorist planning, and terrorists limit their exposure to insulate themselves. The FBI will increase its ability to uncover potential terrorist plots through analysis of information from the Intelligence Community coupled with robust human source reporting in field offices, as well as intelligence derived from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Newly established threat protocols at FBI Headquarters provide rapid warning of threats and threat mitigation for successful disruption by JTTFs. Recognizing that creating an inhospitable terrorist environment within the United States is the best way to prevent attacks, the FBI will enhance local law enforcement first responders’ and stakeholders’ awareness of terrorist profiles and methodology through training and our enterprise-wide Intelligence Program. Priority Actions – Expand the intelligence base on terrorist groups and their supporters. – Establish effective partnerships through the JTTFs. – Expand the scope and breadth of human source reporting on terrorist groups and their supporters. – Provide timely and accurate intelligence and analysis to the Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement, and senior policy makers. – Engage in vigorous and effective information sharing initiatives both nationally and internationally. 2. Deny terrorists and their supporters the capacity to plan, organize, and carry out logistical, operational, and support activities. The FBI will protect the United States from terrorist attack by disrupting terrorists’ ability to conduct an attack. Training, financing, recruiting, logistical support, and pre-attack planning and preparation are all required components of terrorist operations and these interdependencies create vulnerabilities. As the centerpiece of its counterterrorism national strategy, the FBI will focus on exploiting intelligence developed by Special Agents and others working in the United States and overseas, and integrating Intelligence Community products into actionable information targeting those terrorist vulnerabilities. Priority Actions – Identify and disrupt leaders, actors, and facilitators/supporters. – Enhance operations and intelligence gathering by developing and using emerging investigative techniques. – Bolster international participation through foreign government liaison and enhanced Legal Attach´e operations. 3. Pursue appropriate sanctions against terrorists and their supporters. Prevention of a terrorist attack requires neutralizing members of a terrorist organization before their actions lead to a terrorism-related prosecution. To successfully neutralize terrorists, the full range of available and appropriate government sanctions must be used.

An Introduction

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Table 1.1 (continued) Priority Actions – Work with other Law Enforcement and Intelligence Community partners to fully and appropriately apply criminal and non-prosecutorial sanctions. – Deny terrorists access to financial resources, using both civil and criminal actions, to disrupt critical support for terrorist organizations. – Provide information that denies foreign terrorists and their supporters entry into the United States, or leads to their exclusion, removal, surveillance, or prosecution. 4. Provide incident response and investigative capability. Just as the terrorists targeting the United States and its interests abroad operate with adaptability and flexibility, so too must the FBI. The FBI maintains a robust incident response capability, as well as an ability to adjust to emerging and evolving circumstances provided by the new threat environment. The FBI is poised to respond immediately to any threat, both domestically and internationally, with all necessary resources to pursue terrorism investigations and intelligence operations with specially trained investigators using a wide array of tools, including state-of-theart forensics. Priority Actions – Expand the capability to immediately deploy, both domestically and abroad, elements such as the FBI “Flying Squad” and Rapid Deployment Teams to emerging terrorism investigations and incidents. – Ensure the readiness of each field office to provide crisis management. – Develop training courses and competency baselines needed for maintaining the effective investigative capability of counterterrorism personnel. – Establish an operational management training program for select counterterrorism personnel, ensuring ongoing management and leadership expertise. 5. Identify and respond to WMD threats and fully coordinate the investigative response of the U.S. Government to a WMD threat or attack. Recent findings indicate that terrorist organizations are showing an increasing interest in the acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction. As proven by the anthrax attacks following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the plot by Jose Padilla to detonate a radioactive “dirty bomb,” the use of WMD by terrorists is a very real possibility. The FBI must be prepared to mitigate the threat from a WMD attack through training and cooperation with state and local law enforcement partners, as well as federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities. Priority Actions – Each division will support a specially trained WMD coordinator to manage the preparedness and response effort in that division. – Each division will establish and maintain a WMD Working Group with state, local, and federal first responders in the division’s area of responsibility. – Each division will conduct incident response exercises with members of the WMD Working Group and other community partners.

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Strategic and Tactical Considerations

remarked that a state’s local law enforcement personnel are now “on the front lines” of the war on terror. As the International Association of Chiefs of Police noted in 2005: In the aftermath of these attacks, as the nation struggled to comprehend the new menace confronting our society, our nation’s law enforcement agencies realized that they now had a new and critically important mission. No longer could they focus their energies solely on traditional crime fighting efforts. Now they would be asked to confront a new threat to their communities, perpetrated by individuals and organizations that had vastly different motivations and means of attack from traditional criminals. Accepting this challenge required law enforcement agencies to reassess their operations and reevaluate their priorities.28

Responding to these challenges requires new strategies and tools as well as a redeployment of existing capabilities. According to Chief Deputy Jose M. Docobo of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office in Tampa, Florida, “Many of the objectives of terrorism prevention parallel current law enforcement policies with respect to local crime issues.” In his recent analysis of the intersection between terrorism, homeland security, and community policing initiatives, Docobo observed: Traditional crime and terrorism are inextricably linked. International and domestic terrorist groups are well-organized and trained, and demonstrate the sophistication of other traditional organized crime groups. Terrorist groups commit ancillary crimes like fraud, money laundering, drug trafficking, and identity theft to provide the resources for their criminal activities. The investigative approach to a terrorist event is similar to that of a traditional crime incident. Creating external partnerships, citizen involvement, problem solving, and transforming the organization to take on a new mission are all key elements of community policing which must also be part of a comprehensive homeland policing strategy. Community policing, which builds trust between the community and law enforcement and gives officers knowledge of the community and resident activity, is essential to providing actionable intelligence relating to potential terrorist actions.29

Overall, the United States currently maintains an unparalleled dominance of military power on the global stage, and law enforcement capabilities that few other countries can match. This dominance can easily translate into seeing military and law enforcement solutions to all sort of problems, including those for which the use of force may be entirely inappropriate. However, while hard power is indeed necessary, anticipating future threats and securing our communities from political violence requires more than a military lens of policymaking and analysis. As many

An Introduction

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of the chapters in these volumes illustrate, countering terrorism and insurgency requires the provision of governance and institutions that serve the people, not just the elites. Thus, in helping other countries develop the capacity to deter and defeat the terror threat, the United States provides them with expertise in law enforcement, economic development, the rule of law, and judiciary mechanisms. Efforts such as these illustrate the important role of a nation’s so-called soft power instruments, such as diplomacy, economic leverage, information, and intelligence. Soft Power According to Joseph Nye, former dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, the term “soft power” encompasses the realm of economics—where the United States, Europe, Japan, and China are major players—and the nuanced world of negotiated relationships among nations and transnational actors (e.g., multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational regimes such as NATO, the European Union, and OPEC).30 In confronting the threat of terrorism, the United States draws on its soft power to convince nation-states and other entities to help counter the threat posed by globally networked terror groups. While economic and financial incentives (or in some cases, sanctions) are important, the most common forms of soft power employed daily include basic diplomacy, information efforts (including public diplomacy), and intelligence. Diplomacy Diplomatic efforts are obviously important for dealing with state sponsors and safe havens of terror groups. According to CIA veteran Paul Pillar, “Most of the issues underlying terrorism are to be found overseas, as are most things the U.S. can do to combat terrorism.” Further, he notes, “most progress in the fight against terrorism ultimately depends on the perspectives and behavior of foreign governments, groups, publics and individuals.”31 Phillip Heymann agrees, noting that the United States can most effectively stem the tide of terrorism through a combination of military threats, economic and political incentives, and moral imperatives to pressure states to act against terrorist groups within their borders.32 And when diplomatic measures fail to resolve conflicts, as they did when confronting the Taliban in Afghanistan, military force may become necessary. Unfortunately, however, al Qaeda operatives are dispersed throughout the world, and most of those countries are not willing (or perhaps, even knowing) providers of safe haven to these terror operatives. While the United States excels at fighting countries with whom we are at war, how do we counter a security threat that stems from within countries we

14

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

consider friends (e.g., Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia)? This is one of the more daunting challenges of countering terrorism today and involves state-to-state diplomacy less and “public diplomacy” more. Clearly, public diplomacy has an important role to play in shaping perceptions of the United States and its policies.33 Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr describe these efforts using the term “strategic influence” and borrow from social and cognitive psychology studies to suggest how the environment in which such activities are conducted, along with the methods used, are essential to the success of any effort. At the same time, an ineffective strategic influence campaign can be counterproductive and may lead a population to distrust (and even grow in animosity toward) the entity conducting the campaign.34 In his analysis of these challenges, Hassan Abbas argues that the war of ideas and the battle for the “hearts and minds” of Muslims is only beginning. He draws on analyses of U.S. public diplomacy in Pakistan and Iran to illuminate lessons learned for consideration—for example, he notes, “Closing the channels of communication and dialogue has never proved to be a productive measure.”35 His recommendations for U.S. policymakers include acknowledging past mistakes, understanding the limitations of public diplomacy, employing efficient feedback mechanisms to assess the impact of specific policies, establishing and encouraging forums for people-to-people interaction, framing important issues in more constructive ways than “you are either with us or against us,” and supporting reform of the education sector in Muslim countries, especially where madrassa networks are entrenched.36 The relationship between foreign policies and strategic influence (or public diplomacy) is particularly important in the areas of the world from which much of the Islamist extremist threat originates. In one of the more thoughtful analyses of this issue, West Point professor Ruth Margolies Beitler highlights how American policy toward Israel remains a particularly potent source of discontent and reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Indeed, it is commonplace in the Middle East to hear comments espousing the view that if only the United States would modify or cease its support for Israel, hatred against the United States would end. Her analysis reveals that while the United States has supported Israel’s existence, it has not always supported its policies; yet, she notes, the overwhelming assessment in the Muslim and Arab world is that the United States retains little objectivity when dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In reality, whether or not the United States is even-handed when it comes to the Arab world and Israel is almost insignificant, she argues—the key factor fostering resentment in the Middle East is the perception that the United States maintains a double standard. Thus, given the prominent role this issue has come to play in public statements of Osama bin Laden and others calling for a global jihad, it is imperative for the United States to lessen al Qaeda’s appeal to discontented populations in the Middle East

An Introduction

15

by ensuring a greater balance—or perception of balance—with regard to its policies toward the Arab world.37 Information As part of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, information efforts involve the communication of compelling ideas and visions to various audiences around the world in the hopes of influencing their behavior—often called, “winning hearts and minds,” or “winning the war of ideas.” Soft power is the primary means by which a state can combat the ideology of a violent group, which is typically based upon a vision of the future that the group’s members believe cannot be achieved without the use of violence. Historically, ideas and visions have rarely (if ever) been defeated purely by kinetic force. In fact, the use of hard power in many cases may actually strengthen the appeal and perceived validity of a group’s ideology. Most terrorist groups engage in their own form of strategic influence— through images, words, videos, and so forth—in order to gain support and recruits. They seek to connect with an individual on an intellectual and emotional level in order to provide a rationale for using violence. Religious ideologies are of particular concern, as illustrated by the contemporary threats of al Qaeda, Hizbollah, Jemaah Islamiyah, and a host of other extremist groups.38 Marc Juergensmeyer notes that religion gives radicals moral legitimacy to employ violence in the name of cosmic war.39 According to Steve Simon, religious ideology and devotion provides the lens through which a group’s members see their purpose in life, and thus traditional strategies of deterrence are unlikely to work, given the group’s willingness to die in the process of fighting and given the messianic beliefs associated with the members of these groups.40 Brian Jenkins describes the ideological nature of al Qaeda’s threat as a global call to jihad, in which they try to convince ordinary Muslims that Islam is in mortal danger from the West and that the principal source of this threat is the United States. Thus, armed struggle is needed to drive out the infidels from Muslim lands, topple “apostate regimes” such as the House of Saud and the Egyptian government, foster religious revival, expand the Islamic community, and ultimately reestablish the Caliphate. Through its strategic communications efforts—particularly using the Internet—al Qaeda’s goal is to build a following and develop a global commitment to action, including (but not necessarily) violence.41 As British terror expert J. P. Larsson has observed, there are several reasons that religious ideologies provide a uniquely powerful challenge for counterterrorists. First, these ideologies are often theologically supremacist, which means that all believers assume superiority over nonbelievers, who are not privy to the truth of the religion. Second, most are exclusivist—believers are a chosen people, or their territory is a holy land.

16

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

Third, many are absolutist; in other words, it is not possible to be a halfhearted believer, and you are either totally within the system or totally without it. Further, only the true believers are guaranteed salvation and victory, whereas the enemies and the unbelievers—as well as those who have taken no stance whatsoever—are condemned to some sort of eternal punishment or damnation, as well as death. Overall, religious ideologies help foster polarizing values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, light and dark—values that can be co-opted by terrorist organizations to convert a “seeker” into a lethal killer.42 From this perspective, the defeat of al Qaeda must involve winning the hearts and minds of the religious many in the Muslim world, not the secular few. Today, a central battleground in this war of ideas (or ideologies) is the Internet. The struggle for influence taking place online between liberal democracies and extremists involves various forms of strategic communication. Members of the global salafi-jihadist network use the Internet to provide motivational/ideological and operational information to potential recruits and supporters. They offer a simple, clear message to all kinds of “seekers”: join the global jihad. Further, there are multiple ways in which an individual can participate, such as providing funds, safe havens, or encouragement. The spectrum of participants can thus range from Web site designers to financiers to weapons experts and combat veterans. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have launched a public diplomacy effort to dissuade these same individuals from supporting the terrorists’ agenda. Unfortunately, in an age of universal access to the means of providing information online, citizens of a liberal democracy like ours have the power to undermine our own strategic communications and public diplomacy efforts, largely through ignorance and irresponsibility. This problem is particularly acute when communicating with many corners of the Muslim world, where there is no frame of reference for understanding the implications of a free and open press, or a society that enjoys the legal protection of free speech. Thus, whether the messenger is Condoleeza Rice, Howard Stern, Pat Robertson, or the 14-year-old Web blogger down the street, messages put forward online are often given equal credence in terms of representing American policy, culture, and ideas. Thus, an effective public diplomacy agenda requires a commitment to educating our own citizens for world comprehension and responsible communication, as well as motivating a grassroots campaign to develop and disseminate an effective anti-jihad message.43 Overall, as several chapters of this volume describe, the United States is engaged in a global war of ideas and perceptions that fuel radical groups, some of whom resort to violence in pursuit of their ideological objectives. Our success in the strategic communications battlespace is perhaps the second most important determinant of whether or not the global war on

An Introduction

17

terror strategy will produce victory for the United States and its allies; the first and most important, though, is intelligence. The Critical Role of Intelligence It can be argued that among a nation’s soft power instruments, none are more vital to the success or failure of countering terrorism than accurate intelligence. On June 2, 2006, over 250 police officers in London— including 15 wearing chemical, biological, and radiological protection suits—stormed a house in Forest Gate, a large Muslim community in a multicultural area where men and women in traditional Islamic dress mingle with people of all hues and shapes, against a backdrop of buildings draped in British flags. Two suspects were arrested: Mohammed Abdul Kahar, 23, who was shot in the shoulder during a struggle to apprehend him, and his 20-year-old brother, Abul Koyair. However, they were released days later without charge when the police realized that the information they had received about a chemical bomb in the house proved faulty. While a subsequent investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission cleared the police of any wrongdoing (including the shooting), the community reacted with outrage. Local leaders claimed that a combination of “hysterical” media reporting and the approach taken by police reflected a suspicion of young Muslims that breeds resentment and only encourages communities to isolate themselves from wider society.44 Clearly, intelligence plays a critical role in effective strategies and tactics for determining where, when, and how to apply both hard and soft power in responding to terrorist threats. And yet, absolute accuracy in all intelligence gathering and analysis efforts is a Herculean task, if not an altogether impossible expectation. Good intelligence can disrupt potentially catastrophic terrorist plots, such as the one uncovered in August 2006 in which over 25 British Muslims were preparing to detonate liquid explosives on board transatlantic flights. Bad intelligence can make matters worse, as seen in the Forest Gate incident described earlier. But worst of all, ignorance resulting from a lack of accurate intelligence can be lethal, as proven by the 9/11 attacks. According to the 2000 National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission), good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism.45 In addition to ensuring the highest quality and accuracy of information obtained through intelligence activities, the report also highlighted a need for eliminating bureaucratic barriers to the recruitment of informants as well as encouraging greater flow of information between law enforcement, policymakers, and analysts. Indeed, the lack of interagency cooperation at all levels has been a key criticism of the U.S. intelligence community over the past several years, including the many investigations into the attacks of September 11, 2001. The 9/11 Commission Report was also

18

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

highly critical of the U.S. intelligence community for what it called a “failure of imagination” and highlighted 10 crucial mistakes by the intelligence community that may (according to some views) have contributed to the inability of the CIA or FBI to prevent the attacks (see Table 1.2). Another aspect of effective intelligence gathering and analysis involves language translation. It has often been cited that the lack of Arabic speakers in the FBI and CIA led to an enormous backlog of untranslated audio recordings, which contributed to our nation’s inability to counter the 9/11 plot. But similar examples have been seen in other countries as well. For example, as Rogelio Alonso observes in his chapter in Volume 3, the small number of professional translators in Spain’s security and police services led to a severe intelligence shortfall that hampered several terrorist-related investigations, including the attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Many other nations have grappled with similar intelligence failures as well. For example, Mossad—Israel’s intelligence service—has achieved a near mythical reputation worldwide for its effectiveness and precision, particularly in on-the-ground operations. However, as Ephriam Kahana has recently noted, several analytical failures and intelligence operations gone awry (rooted in both underestimation and overestimation of threats) have cost the country both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.46 For example, on September 6, 2003, Israeli intelligence reported a meeting of eight Hamas leaders allegedly gathering in a three-story Palestinian house in the Gaza Strip to plan terrorist attacks.47 The group included Sheik Ahmed Yassin (the Hamas spiritual leader), Andan al-Ghoul (a major weapons manufacture), Ismail Haniyeh (a future prime minister of the Palestinian Authority), and Mohammed Deif (a master bomb maker). Earlier in the conflict, because of the viciousness of the Hamas attacks, both military and political leaders of Hamas had been determined to be legitimate targets—bombers, bomb manufacturers, and bomb planners were all now on the approved targeted lists. The private house was in a crowded neighborhood, and the local children were out of school. A decision had to be made about whether to use an F-16 jet to bomb from 10,000 feet and about what size bomb to use. Computer engineers ran simulations to predict how the house could be destroyed, assessing the cement, the structure, and the size of the rooms. It was determined that a half-ton bomb would not totally destroy the home and a one-ton bomb would demolish a nearby apartment building housing dozens of families. The risk of collateral damage was considered too high, and the plan was rejected by the political leadership. But at the last moment, it was decided that since the curtains were drawn on the top (third) floor, the meeting was taking place in a vulnerable location in the house and a quarter-ton bomb could be used take out the third floor. Thus, the third floor was bombed with a precision missile. However, the leaders, family, and four children all survived since they had been meeting on

An Introduction

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Table 1.2 Intelligence Community Mistakes Highlighted by the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission identified ten crucial mistakes by the intelligence community that may (according to some views) have contributed to the inability of the CIA or FBI to prevent the attacks. These include: 1. January 2000: the CIA does not watchlist Khalid al Mihdhar or notify the FBI when it is learned that Mihdhar possessed a valid U.S. visa (see the document “The Nineteen Hijackers” in chapter 6 of the 9/11 Report). 2. January 2000: the CIA does not develop a transnational plan for tracking Mihdhad and his associates so that they could be followed to Bangkok and onward, including the United States. 3. March 2000: the CIA does not watchlist Nawaf al-Hazmi or notify the FBI when it learned that he possessed a U.S. visa and had flown to Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. 4. January 2001: the CIA does not inform the FBI that a source had identified Khallad, or Tawfiq bin Attash, a major figure in the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, as having attended the meeting in Kuala Lumpus with Khalid al Mihdhar. 5. May 2001: A CIA official does not notify the FBI about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa, Hazmi’s U.S. travel, or Khallad’s having attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting (identified when he reviewed all of the relevant traffic because of the high level of threat). 6. June 2001: FBI and CIA officials do not ensure that all relevant information regarding the Kuala Lumpur meeting was shared with the Cole investigators at the June 11 meeting. 7. August 2001: the FBI does not recognize the significance of information regarding Mihdhar and Hazmi’s possible arrival in the United State and thus does not take adequate action to share information, assign resources, and give sufficient priority to the search. 8. August 2001: FBI Headquarters does not recognize the significance of the information regarding Zacarias Moussaoui’s training and beliefs and thus does not take adequate action to share information, involve higher-level officials across agencies, obtain information regarding Moussaoui’s ties to al Qaida, and give sufficient priority to determining what Moussaoui might be planning. 9. August 2001: the CIA does not focus on information that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is a key al Qaida lieutenant or connect information identifying KSM as the “Mukhtar” mentioned in other reports to the analysis that could have linked “Mukhtar” with Ramzi Binalshibh and Moussaoui. 10. August 2001: The CIA and FBI do not connect the presence of Mihdhar, Hazmi, and Moussaoui to the general threat reporting about imminent attacks. Source: The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: Norton, 2004), pp. 355–356. Also available online at http://www.911commission.gov.

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Strategic and Tactical Considerations

the ground floor and the family had been on the second.48 Instead, the attack reinforced the widely held perception throughout the Arab world that Israel was pursuing a campaign of indiscriminate and irresponsible bombing. Further, this action certainly did not help achieve the overall goal of improving the country’s security. From an operational level, intelligence successes or failures often determine whether or not the terrorists are captured or killed. But from a strategic level, intelligence failures can exacerbate the terrorist threat, more so than failures in any other instrument of national power. In the United States, the report of the 9/11 Commission (and other entities) underscored the critical nature of “getting it right, always,” in the intelligence community and led to a new National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) released in October 2005. This document identifies several important strategic objectives, separated into two categories: mission objectives and enterprise objectives. The first category draws from the NSS to highlight how the U.S. intelligence community will 1. Defeat terrorists at home and abroad by disarming their operational capabilities and seizing the initiative from them by promoting the growth of freedom and democracy. 2. Prevent and counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction. 3. Bolster the growth of democracy and sustain peaceful democratic states. 4. Develop innovative ways to penetrate and analyze the most difficult targets. 5. Anticipate developments of strategic concern and identify opportunities as well as vulnerabilities for decision-makers.49

In the second category, the NIS describes how intelligence agencies will improve their “capacity to maintain competitive advantages over states and forces that threaten the security of our nation.”50 These objectives emphasize integrating agencies, improving workforce initiatives (e.g., analytical expertise and diversity), providing greater access to intelligence to those who need it, exploiting new scientific and technological developments, and strengthening foreign intelligence relationships. The latter objective bears particular emphasis. According to Michael Sheehan, former deputy commissioner for counterterrorism for the New York City Police Department, the most important counterterrorism activity since the fall of the Taliban has been the close cooperation of the CIA with foreign intelligence services. Powerful American technologies identify names, locations, phone numbers and computer addresses of suspicious people. Local intelligence services operate informant networks. The CIA station chief works with intelligence officials to follow up and coordinate hundreds of leads generated by these joint collection efforts. The connections often cross national boundaries, and periodically they “connect the dots,” identify a key terrorist and have the local

An Introduction

21

services execute a nighttime raid against a terrorist safe house. Such coordinated efforts have led to the captures of key al Qaida operatives including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind; Hambali, the planner of the Bali bombings; and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, who oversaw the attack on the Navy destroyer USS Cole.51

Throughout the past decade, the United States has established a broad array of bilateral and multilateral relationships to facilitate intelligence gathering and sharing, as applauded by the 9/11 Commission Report.52 As Tom Lansford notes in his chapter of this volume, states such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Pakistan have been especially important in providing intelligence to the United States in exchange for a variety of incentives, including foreign or military aid.53 Much of the intelligence provided has been in response to specific requests from the United States or in instances when the security services of these states discovered information about current threats to the United States. The CIA has also established more than 25 Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTICs) in foreign host countries to coordinate U.S. and allied intelligence operations. The CTICs are modeled on CIA facilities established in Latin America, and the first of these counterterrorism sites was created in the 1990s.54 By 2005, according to a Washington Post report, more than 3,000 terrorists had been killed or captured as a result of foreign intelligence cooperation.55 Overall, while domestic intelligence (which is under the purview of local law enforcement and the FBI) is critical in effectively combating terrorism, the need for accurate and robust international cooperation on intelligence gathering and analysis has never been greater. The United States and its allies face a globally networked movement of clandestine groups with the intention and capabilities of killing innocent men, women, and children. Thus, as reflected throughout this chapter, our ability to confront this threat in a globally networked, multifaceted fashion will surely determine our eventual success—or failure—in countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. CONCLUSION: STRATEGIES TO CONTAIN THE TERRORIST THREAT In sum, a combination of hard power and soft power instruments— particularly intelligence—is needed to counter terrorism and insurgency. When these elements are brought together under a comprehensive strategy, the chances for success increase dramatically. However, as many authors have noted, containing terrorism is the only feasible objective of such a strategy. As Martin and Walcott observed in 1988, “the best laid diplomatic, economic, legal, and even military plans will only contain terrorism, not defeat it.”56 A group of Rand terrorism experts agreed in a report published a decade later, in which they argued that unlike other security

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challenges such as nuclear deterrence or defense of borders, terrorism can neither be stopped nor absolutely prevented, only contained.57 Further, scholars have increasingly drawn our attention to the need to contain the underlying conditions that facilitate terrorism. For example, noted political theorist Benjamin Barber recently argued, “As globalization has led to increasing interdependence, we must learn to contain and regulate the anarchy that foments both the destructiveness of terrorists and the injustices of global capital.”58 And terrorism expert Steven Simon echoes these sentiments when he observes, “Traditional strategies of deterrence are therefore unlikely to work, given the groups’ willingness to die in the process of fighting, and given the messianic beliefs associated with the members of these groups. Instead, the United States must adopt a strategy of containment and address the underlying causes of discontent.”59 The development of strategies and tactics for the containment of terrorism, then, is the framework to which the chapters of this volume now contribute. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. NOTES 1. Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, “Terrorism and Talks,” in Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 256–288. 2. Lawrence Korb and Robert Boorstin, Integrated Power: A National Security Strategy for the 21st Century (New York: Center for American Progress, June 2005). 3. Samuel R. Berger, “Ten Elements of a Counterterrorism Strategy,” Testimony provided to the 9/11 Commission Hearing, March 24, 2004. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 7. The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 14, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html. 8. The White House, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 16, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html. 9. The White House, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 11, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/ WMDStrategy.pdf. 10. The White House, The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/.

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11. The White House, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, February 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/ physical.html. 12. The White House, The President’s National Drug Control Strategy, February 2002, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/03ndcs/ index.html. 13. The White House, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 20, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html. 14. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States, March 13, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006. 15. The White House, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, September 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/. 16. Ibid. 17. For more on these and other recommended publications in the study of terrorism and counterterrorism, please see the CTC Annotated Bibliography of Research on Terrorism and Counterterrorism, http://www.teachingterror.net. 18. Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, “Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al Qaida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities,” U.S. Military Academy, February 14, 2006, http://ctc.usma.edu. Other research and analysis by the CTC, including the internationally acclaimed “Stealing al Qaida’s Playbook” and a translation of the strategic manual “The Management of Savagery” are also available at this Web site. 19. “Israel Halts Airstrikes for 48 Hours,” CNN, July 30, 2006, http://www. cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/30/mideast.main/index.html. 20. Stansfield Turner, Terrorism and Democracy (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1991). 21. David Ochmanek, Military Operations against Terrorist Groups Abroad (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2003), http://rand.org/pubs/monograph reports/ MR1738/index.html. 22. Cindy C. Combs, “Counterterrorism: The Use of Special Forces,” in Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 167–179. 23. Richard Schultz, “Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations Forces After al Qaida Before 9/11,” Weekly Standard, January 26, 2004 25–33. 24. Ibid. 25. Tim Zimmermann, “Coercive Diplomacy and Libya,” in The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 201–228. 26. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Strategic Plan 2002–2009, August 9, 2004, http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm. 27. Ibid. 28. International Association of Chiefs of Police, “From Hometown Security to Homeland Security: IACP’s Principles for a Locally Designed and Nationally Coordinated Homeland Security Strategy,” May 17, 2005, http://www. theiacp.org/leg policy/HomelandSecurityWP.pdf. 29. Jose M. Docobo, “Protecting America’s Communities from Terrorism: A Law Enforcement Perspective,” in Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 202.

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30. Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Superpower Can’t Go it Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 31. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001). 32. Phillip Heymann, “Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview,” International Security (Winter 2001–2002): 24–48. 33. Paul R. Pillar, “Superpower Foreign Policies: A Source for Global Resentment,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 31–44. 34. Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle against Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2005). 35. Hassan Abbas, “A Failure to Communicate: American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 60. 36. Ibid. 37. Ruth Margolies Beitler, “The Complex Relationship between Global Terrorism and U.S. Support for Israel,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 62–73. 38. E.g., Paul Pillar, “Counterterrorism after Al Qaida,” Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 101–113.; Stephan P. Lambert, “Y: The Sources of Islamic Revolutionary Conduct,” Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Washington, DC, 2005. 39. Mark Juergensmeyer, “Holy Orders: Religious Opposition to Modern States,” Harvard International Review 25 (Winter 2004): 34–38. 40. Steven Simon, “The New Terrorism,” Brookings Review 21, no. 1 (Winter 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/winter2003/simon.htm. 41. Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Jihadists Operational Code,” in Three Years After: Next Steps in the War on Terror, ed. David Aaron (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2005). 42. J. P. Larsson, “The Role of Religious Ideology in Terrorist Recruitment,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 43. James J. F. Forest, “The Democratic Disadvantage in the Strategic Communications Battlespace,” Democracy and Security 2, no. 1 (2006): 73–101. 44. Alexis Akwagyiram, “Community Reacts to Terror Raid,” BBC News, June 6, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/5053542.stm. 45. National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission), “Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 5, 2000), http://www.access.gpo.gov/nct. 46. Ephriam Kahana, “Mossad,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 262–279. 47. The following account of this event appears in Chapter 6 of this volume, by Harvey Rishikof. 48. This account of the event appears in Chapter 6 of this volume, by Harvey Rishikof. 49. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America, October 2005, http://www.odni.gov. 50. Ibid.

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51. Michael E. Sheehan, “Walking the Terror Beat,” New York Times (September 10, 2006). 52. 9/11 Commission Report, p. 127. 53. See Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (2006): 200. 54. Dana Priest, “Foreign Network at the Front of CIA’s Terror Fight,” Washington Post, November 18, 2005, A1. 55. Ibid. 56. David C. Martin and John Walcott, Best Laid Plans: The Inside Story of America’s War against Terrorism (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), xviii. 57. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, Countering the New Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Project Air Force, 1999). 58. Benjamin R. Barber, “Terrorism, Interdependence and Democracy,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 216. 59. Steven Simon, “The New Terrorism,” Brookings Review 21, no. 1 (Winter 2003), http://www.brookings.edu/press/review/winter2003/simon.htm.

PART I STRATEGIC AND POLICY DIMENSIONS

CHAPTER 2 U.S. GRAND STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING ISLAMIST TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE 21ST CENTURY Bradley L. Bowman

Despite some important successes in the struggle against al Qaeda since 9/11, the United States is not winning the “war on terrorism.” Since that tragic September day, the United States has destroyed al Qaeda’s safe haven in Afghanistan, killed or captured a large proportion of al Qaeda’s leaders, and cracked down on international terrorist financing. Despite these important achievements, however, the al Qaeda threat has adapted, representing as much of a danger to the United States today as it did on 9/11. The relatively traditional insurgent al Qaeda organization of the 1990s has been replaced by an international movement of like-minded, violent “jihadists” for which Osama bin Laden serves as little more than an ideological inspiration. The threat represented by al Qaeda and its legion of sympathizers continues to persist—if not expand—primarily because of four shortcomings in the current U.S. grand strategy. The current U.S. grand strategy overrelies on military operations, misidentifies the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda, ignores the struggle’s true “center of gravity,” and neglects two major sources of radicalization. If the United States takes comprehensive and aggressive steps to address these shortcomings, the “Long War” could be surprisingly short. If it does not address these shortcomings in the current U.S. grand strategy, “bin Ladenism” may represent the scourge of the 21st century instead of the “last gasp of the radical Islamists.”1

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This chapter will examine these issues in four sections. The first section will define grand strategy and strategy, explore their theoretical and practical relationship with each other, and suggest that strategy—which is essentially military operations—often usurps the nation’s grand strategy and political interests. The second will explore the nature of the current conflict with al Qaeda, arguing that a misdiagnosis of the nature of the struggle has encouraged the United States to neglect the central role of Muslim popular opinion. The third will evaluate the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) and argue that the current U.S. grand strategy dangerously neglects two major sources of radicalization: the Arab-Israeli crisis and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. The chapter concludes by providing broad recommendations for eliminating these two sources of radicalization. GRAND STRATEGY AND STRATEGY: SO WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE? Before exploring the nature of the current conflict with al Qaeda and associated movements and evaluating current U.S. grand strategy, it is essential to define key terms. In the post-9/11 deluge of commentary regarding the U.S. response to al Qaeda and its affiliated movements, the precise definitions of many terms have been blurred and confused. A prime example of this confusion has been the widespread misuse of the terms “grand strategy” and “strategy.” Analysts and commentators often employ these two words interchangeably, but grand strategy and strategy actually represent distinct concepts and levels of stratagem. While some may view this as a trivial semantic distinction, confusing these concepts engenders negative consequences that extend well beyond semantics. Confusing a strategy for a grand strategy often leads to an overemphasis and overutilization of the military element of power. While various components of the current U.S. approach are certainly grand strategic in scope, the almost reflexive manner in which the United States resorts to the use of military power springs partly from the inability to distinguish between strategy and grand strategy. Therefore, in an effort to optimize the use of military power in U.S. grand strategy, it is necessary to define grand strategy and strategy, explore their ideal relationship with each other, and discuss the tendency for military operations to undercut a nation’s grand strategy and political objectives. A grand strategy is defined as a nation’s (or a group of nations’) comprehensive plan of action that coordinates and directs all political, economic, and military means and their associated factors in order to attain large ends. The political, economic, and military elements of power are each influenced in varying degrees by associated social, psychological, demographic, and technological factors. An effective grand strategy is derived

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from a methodical and objective analysis of a state’s interests, the leading threats to those interests, and the means available to secure the interests. Strategy, on the other hand, involves the application of a particular element of national power in support of its grand strategy. From a national security perspective, strategy can be seen as the “art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”2 An effective strategy employs military resources and personnel in such a way as to support the grand strategy and secure the nation’s interests. While grand strategy and strategy are ultimately employed in the service of the same national interests, national security strategy narrowly focuses on the military element of power. Two critical axioms define the optimal relationship between grand strategy and strategy. First, as the terms imply, strategy should function as the subordinate tool of grand strategy in the pursuit of the nation’s objectives. Just as means should be subordinate to ends, strategy should be subordinate to grand strategy. In other words, strategy and the military operations that represent the essence of strategy must never be allowed to undercut or counteract the grand strategy and the nation’s interests that the grand strategy attempts to secure. Carl von Clausewitz’s description of the relationship between policy and war basically parallels the relationship between grand strategy and strategy. Approximately two centuries ago Clausewitz wrote, “Subordinating the political point of view to the military view would be absurd, for it is policy that has created war. Policy is the guiding intelligence and war only the instrument, not vice versa. No other possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view to the political.”3 This may seem like a rather noncontroversial and obvious point, but history demonstrates that the subordination of strategy to grand strategy—or military operations to policy—has not always been a reality. Frequently, what appears prudent or necessary on the military (strategic) level may actually undercut the nation’s grand strategy and endanger that nation’s interests. In nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe, many commanders often dismissed political considerations as something that impeded the tactics essential to victory on the battlefield. This was particularly true in Germany during World Wars I and II. For example, neglecting Otto von Bismarck’s grand strategic thinking and maneuvering that gave birth to Germany in the first place, senior military commanders of the Reich became infatuated with the operational and tactical achievements ¨ that led to victory at Koniggr¨ atz, Sedan, and Metz.4 When the German officer Erich Ludendorff was asked about the political and operational aspects of the 1918 Michael offensive, he replied, “We will punch a hole in [their line]. For the rest, we shall see.”5 This elevation of the tactical and strategic above greater political considerations of grand strategy would prove costly to the Germans in both world wars. The Schlieffen Plan of

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World War I (WWI) and Hitler’s plan for unrestricted submarine warfare during World War II (WWII) both arguably represent strategically sound decisions that proved disastrous on the grand strategic level. The Schlieffen Plan of WWI attempted to achieve rapid strategic success, but in the process it violated Belgian neutrality, precipitating Britain’s entry into the war. Similarly, during WWII, Hitler recognized British dependence on open sea lanes, and in a “purely operational recipe for victory,” Hitler decided to initiate unrestricted submarine warfare.6 This decision virtually guaranteed U.S. entry into the war against Germany and represented a grand strategic blunder that would ultimately result in Hitler’s defeat. German leaders during WWI and WWII are not the only leaders that have tended to elevate strategy above grand strategy. In fact, prominent American examples during WWII and the Vietnam War demonstrate a predilection in the American military to question the grand strategic thinking of presidents in favor of strategic considerations. During WWII, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made several grand strategic decisions that engendered passionate opposition from the U.S. defense establishment. In 1940, Roosevelt divested American units of desperately needed weapons in order to bolster the British military. In 1943—at the expense of U.S. military services—Roosevelt increasingly diverted U.S. shipments to redress critical shortages in British shipping.7 These decisions were unpopular within the defense establishment, but they demonstrated Roosevelt’s great foresight as a grand strategist. Roosevelt knew that the United States would have little chance of defeating Hitler if Britain were to fall to the Nazis. The United States would later rely on the British Empire to provide the jumping off points with which to attack Germany. More succinctly, a successful D-day landing would not have been possible if the Nazis had defeated Britain in the preceding years. Although Roosevelt’s actions may have appeared unwise and counterproductive on the strategic level, they were prudent and far-sighted on the more important grand strategic level in 1940 and 1943. The Vietnam War provides another interesting example of the all-toocommon myopic desire to achieve strategic objectives at the expense of the greater and more important grand strategy. As many American veterans recount with disgust, during the Vietnam War, President Lyndon B. Johnson periodically reviewed lists of targets in Hanoi and Haiphong, imposing limits on the numbers of sorties and setting rules of engagement. For many, this presidential behavior came to epitomize the political meddling that handicapped U.S. military effectiveness and ultimately lost the war despite overwhelming U.S. military superiority.8 From a strategic perspective, it was difficult to conceive why the United States would not subject Hanoi and Haiphong to a full onslaught of U.S. bombing. However, from a grand strategic perspective, Johnson moderated the bombing for political purposes that transcended short-term strategic considerations in

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Vietnam. Johnson believed that an incremental bombing campaign would be more successful in inducing the North Vietnamese to negotiate than would an all-out terror bombing.9 More importantly, Johnson was keen to ensure that the U.S. bombing did not induce a Chinese military intervention. One must not forget that the 1965–1968 Rolling Thunder bombing campaign took place only 15 years after the traumatic Chinese intervention in the Korean War. It was perfectly reasonable for Johnson to consider Chinese intervention as a possibility if the United States were to conduct full-scale bombing campaign just south of the Chinese border. As important as the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong may have been to the U.S. strategy in Vietnam, the potential strategic gains were not worth the grand strategic risks of a Chinese intervention. These three examples demonstrate what B. H. Liddell Hart observed in his classic work titled Strategy. Hart writes, “While grand strategy should control strategy, its principles often run counter to those which prevail in the field of strategy.”10 When strategy and grand strategy contradict, political leaders must alter the strategy. The vast majority of military officers recognize—at least theoretically—that the military operations representing the essence of strategy should be subordinate to the grand strategy and the nation’s policy objectives. However, as history demonstrates, this theoretical recognition does not always translate to submission of military operations (strategy) to grand strategy (policy) in practice. While this first axiom enjoys at least tacit approval, the second axiom, which defines the optimal relationship between grand strategy and strategy, enjoys no such consensus. The second axiom of stratagem is that grand strategy and strategy are not autarkic, autonomous spheres operating independently and in each other’s isolation. Rather, grand strategic considerations must pervade every aspect of military operations. Thanks to the longstanding U.S. tradition of military subordination to civilian authority enshrined in the U.S. Constitution, the vast majority of U.S. military officers at least theoretically recognize that military operations (strategy) must subordinate itself to policy (grand strategy). However, many American military officers believe that political leaders should establish the political objectives of military operations and step aside, allowing military leaders to plan and conduct military operations in almost complete autonomy.11 In other words, political leaders should establish the “what” and the military leaders should be given the freedom to determine the “how.”12 Ironically, Clausewitz has often been cited to support such a point of view. However, nothing could be more contrary to his actual view or the optimum relationship of grand strategy and strategy. Clausewitz writes, “War should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy.”13 He suggests that grand strategic policy and the political leaders who develop and implement it should not just occasionally

34

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intervene in strategy; rather, the grand strategy (policy) should “make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.”14 Many members of the defense establishment consciously or subconsciously refuse to accept this second axiom because of an understandable desire to seek maximum authority and freedom to achieve military success. This reasonable but misguided desire was endowed with theoretical legitimacy by Samuel Huntington’s enormously influential 1957 book, The Soldier and the State. This widely read book still shapes perceptions in the defense establishment regarding the relationship between grand strategy and strategy. Huntington asserted that a clear demarcation should exist between policy (grand strategy) and strategy. Huntington argued that “the line of demarcation must be drawn between politics and strategy, supply and operations. Having found this line, all sides must abstain from trespassing.”15 In other words, there should be an “autonomous military profession” in which military officers plan and execute military operations unfettered by counterproductive and dangerous civilian meddling. This theory of civil–military relations—known as the theory of “objective control”—enjoys widespread support in the defense establishment. However, “objective control” does not describe the actual or ideal relationship between grand strategy and strategy. Many of history’s leading wartime civilian leaders understood the optimal relationship between grand strategy and strategy and rejected the notion that these concepts represent autonomous spheres separated by a clear line of demarcation. In his book Supreme Command, Eliot Cohen describes four of the most effective wartime leaders in recent history. Examining the wartime leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion, Cohen concludes that “mastery of military detail is essential” for a successful grand strategist. Whether it was Clemenceau speaking with soldiers on the front line in the face of enemy fire, Churchill “ceaselessly probing and interrogating his chiefs of staff,” Lincoln “poring over every telegram coming in to the War Department,” or Ben-Gurion methodically recording in his diary “every detail to the last bullet,” effective grand strategies are guided by political leaders that do not hesitate to probe into the most minute military details. This is not to suggest that politicians can or should micromanage every strategic detail. However, the great grand strategists can identify key details and do not hesitate to interrogate military subordinates regarding the status of these details. Clausewitz summarizes the second axiom of the relationship between grand strategy and strategy as follows: We can now see that the assertion that a major military development, or the plan of one, should be a matter for purely military opinion is unacceptable and can be damaging. Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many

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governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for purely military advice. But it makes even less sense for theoreticians to assert that all available military resources should be put at the disposal of the commander so that on their basis he can draw up purely military plans for a war or a campaign. It is in any case a matter of common experience that despite the great variety and development of modern war its major lines are still laid down by governments. . . . This is as it should be. No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors; and when people talk as they often do, about harmful political influence on the management of war, they are not really saying what they mean. Their quarrel should be with the policy itself, not with its influence.16

Analysts should conceive of strategy as a subordinate—and by no means autonomous—component of grand strategy. Senior military officers are strategy’s subject matter experts, but generals and admirals must never practice their profession in ignorance, isolation, or defiance of the grand strategy or the nation’s political aims. There does not exist an autonomous sphere of strategy that is only the domain of generals. Grand strategy and the national interests it seeks to secure should govern the “when,” “what,” and “how” of strategy. The nation’s desired political ends should “permeate all military operations” and serve as the “supreme consideration in conducting” them.17 The grand strategy defined by the political leaders should in every respect govern the strategy employed by the generals.18 In short, the disproportionate reliance on the military element of power in current U.S grand strategy springs partly from a misunderstanding of the ideal relationship between grand strategy and strategy. It also derives from a common tendency for military operations to escalate and expand, often to the detriment of the nation’s grand strategy and political objectives. Another major reason that military operations assume a counterproductive and disproportionate role in grand strategy relates to a misdiagnosis of the nature of a given struggle. The next section will explore how the misdiagnosis of the nature of the United States’ current struggle with al Qaeda has led to a U.S. grand strategy that neglects the role of Muslim popular opinion in defeating or sustaining al Qaeda. THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.19 —Sun Tzu

In addition to understanding the foundational principles of grand strategy, a successful U.S. grand strategy for the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements also depends on a correct understanding of the

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enemy and the nature of the conflict. The United States and its allies currently confront a global Islamist insurgency that “seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict, and terrorism.”20 Al Qaeda constitutes a decentralized threat, consisting of a diffuse global movement with varying regional objectives. While al Qaeda represents a global Islamist insurgency, the struggle against it has most commonly been referred to as the “war on terrorism.” As others have suggested, terrorism represents a tactic, and declaring war on a tactic is illogical. Terrorism represents a prominent tool that the “jihadists” use to wage their global insurgency. Mischaracterizing the struggle with al Qaeda as a “war on terrorism”—as opposed to a counterinsurgency—has encouraged the United States to rely too heavily on the military element of power in its grand strategy. As David Kilcullen writes, defining the threat as “terrorism” leads to a case-based approach emphasizing a law enforcement and military response. However, viewing the conflict as a “counterinsurgency” leads to a “whole of government” or strategic approach that emphasizes “the hearts and minds” of the respective publics and primarily utilizes a nonmilitary or less “kinetic” approach.21 Undoubtedly, the United States should strive to kill or capture the leadership of al Qaeda. However, the United States must do so using methods that minimize innocent death, while mitigating the sources of radicalization for succeeding generations.22 Rather than characterizing the current struggle as a “war on terrorism,” the United States should accurately identify the struggle as a global counterinsurgency. This understanding will highlight the need to scale back the role of the military to its optimal level within a broad and comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. A military capability represents an important component of a counterinsurgency strategy, but the military is only one of many components. Counterinsurgency scholars often refer to the “80/20” ratio between nonmilitary and military approaches in a successful counterinsurgency strategy. To its credit, the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Operations manual recognizes that the military represents only one of many tools in an effective counterinsurgency strategy: [Counterinsurgency] is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. . . . Generally, the preferred methods are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency.23

Despite this reality, the current U.S. grand strategy for confronting this global insurgency—as reflected in the U.S. federal budget and the U.S.

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government’s posture in the Middle East—is overwhelmingly military in character. For example, in Iraq, the only U.S. government actors consistently present and actively confronting the insurgency to any significant degree have been the U.S. military and the CIA.24 Beyond Iraq, in the broader struggle against al Qaeda, the overreliance on the military element of power in U.S. grand strategy is dramatically revealed by the relative allocation of resources to the Department of Defense versus the Department of State. The president’s fiscal year 2007 budget allocated almost 14 times as much money to the Defense Department as the Department of State and associated programs. The Pentagon is scheduled to receive $439 billion as opposed to $32 billion for the Department of State. This $32 billion for the Department of State includes funding for programs such as education and cultural exchange, international peacekeeping, international organizations, international narcotics and law enforcement, nonproliferation, antiterrorism, de-mining, foreign military financing, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) operating expenses, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.25 This comparative neglect of the nonmilitary elements of power has encouraged the United States to counterproductively and disproportionately overmilitarize its approach to dealing with al Qaeda. This overreliance on the military in a counterinsurgency actually aids the insurgents. Insurgents utilize tactical-level violence such as a suicide bombing or strategic-level grand terrorism such as 9/11, hoping to provoke a harsh military response or an oppressive host nation security crackdown. Insurgents hope that these responses kill or alienate large numbers of citizens, swing public opinion, and weaken the host government or the United States.26 The overmilitarized nature of the U.S. grand strategy in response to 9/11 springs also from an inaccurate diagnosis of al Qaeda’s “center of gravity.” Popularized by Carl von Clausewitz over two centuries ago, this term describes the “point of decision” at which “all energies should be directed.”27 The center of gravity represents the factor that must be addressed in order to achieve victory; it is the factor “on which everything depends.” In traditional warfare, the center of gravity usually consists of the enemy’s capital city or the enemy’s armed forces.28 However, public opinion represents the center of gravity for a counterinsurgency. Insurgencies require sympathetic populations in order to recruit members and conduct operations. An insurgent without a sympathetic population recruits only with great difficulty and can be quickly identified, isolated, and killed. Thus, if the U.S. struggle against al Qaeda and affiliated movements can be accurately characterized as a counterinsurgency, then the United States must develop and implement policies that will promote less negative perceptions of the United States among Islamic populations.29 Moreover, these policies should turn Islamic public opinion against al Qaeda

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and its acts of terrorism. Failure to identify the enemy’s center of gravity will lead to the expenditure of finite resources in pursuit of secondary objectives that will not achieve victory.30 While the current U.S. grand strategy has failed to properly identify the center of gravity in the struggle with al Qaeda, senior al Qaeda leaders fully appreciate the central role of Muslim popular opinion in this global insurgency. In a 2005 letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab alZarqawi, intercepted by U.S. forces in Iraq, Zawahiri demonstrates a nuanced understanding of the central role of Muslim popular opinion in the struggle against the United States and its allies. He writes, “The strongest weapon which the mujahideen enjoy . . . is popular support from the Muslim masses in Iraq, and the surrounding Muslim countries. . . . Therefore, the mujahed movement must avoid any action that the masses do not understand or approve.”31 In other words, the United States is currently engaged in a struggle against an enemy that thoroughly understands the struggle’s center of gravity. The United States could kill or capture every major leader in al Qaeda, but this will not end the threat to the United States and its interests. The al Qaeda threat has grown from a relatively traditional counterinsurgent organization predominantly located in the wider Middle East to a global counterinsurgent movement that relies more on ideology than the leadership of particular individuals. While U.S. successes in Afghanistan after 9/11 account for some of this change, the U.S. failure to identify the center of gravity in this struggle represents the primary reason for al Qaeda’s evolution from a regionally based counterinsurgency organization to an international movement. In the global counterinsurgency campaign against al Qaeda and associated movements, popular Muslim opinion represents the center of gravity. The United States continues to infuriate and estrange Muslim populations so central to the eventual defeat of al Qaeda by neglecting to address the major sources of radicalization. GRAND STRATEGY AND COMBATING THE SOURCES OF RADICALIZATION The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) provides a list of “what does and does not give rise to terrorism.” The NSCT argues that “Terrorism is not the inevitable by-product of poverty . . . terrorism is not simply a result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq . . . not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian issues . . . [and] not simply a response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks.” Instead, the NSCT points to “political alienation,” “grievances that can be blamed on others,” “subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation,” and “an ideology that justifies murder.” These two lists provide a revealing glimpse into what is right and what is dangerously wrong with the current U.S. grand strategy for winning the “war on

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terrorism.” The formation of a successful U.S. grand strategy in the counterinsurgency against al Qaeda requires a detailed analysis of the sources of radicalization that lead to terrorism directed against the United States and its allies. What the Current Grand Strategy Gets Right The NSCT correctly argues that poverty plays little to no role in causing terrorism. Interestingly, the 12 most economically destitute countries in the world were not associated with a single suicide terrorist attack between 1980 and 2003.32 The argument that poverty has little role in terrorism is also supported by the anecdotal evidence provided by the demographics of the al Qaeda leadership and the 9/11 hijackers. It is widely known that Osama bin Laden inherited $5 billion, that Ayman Zawahiri was a surgeon in Cairo, and that Mohammed Atta’s father was a lawyer, his sister a doctor, and his other sister a professor.33 Some might respond that the leadership of al Qaeda does not provide a representative sample of the membership of al Qaeda. However, as Fareed Zakaria points out, even the lower-level al Qaeda recruits seem to be predominantly educated and middle class. In summary, economic and public health factors may play a vague or indirect role in setting the conditions for radicalization, but the most dedicated jihadists are usually not poor, and they consistently originate from countries that rate relatively well in terms of GNP per capita and life expectancy.34 Therefore, arguments that call for the United States to spend more money on poverty in the developing world in order to “win the war on terrorism” should be approached with great skepticism. From a humanitarian perspective, alleviating poverty is an unambiguous good; however, evidence suggests that efforts to alleviate poverty may have little impact in the U.S. struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements. The NSCT is also partially correct in arguing that “political alienation” serves as a source of terrorism. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. interests related essentially to oil and anticommunism.35 The United States needs reliable access to Middle Eastern oil, and the only way to ensure that access was to promote the existence of anticommunist regimes in oil-rich countries. It was through the lens of these two interests that the United States viewed Middle Eastern regimes throughout the Cold War. The United States did not generally concern itself with the domestic character of its allies unless they began to drift into the Soviet sphere of influence. Moreover, throughout the Cold War, all of America’s allies in the region were authoritarian. In 1953, the United States overthrew a democratically elected Iranian government because the United States believed that Mohammed Mossadeq had become too favorably disposed to the Soviets. In short, the United States ignored the democratic deficit in the region for

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almost five decades in order to ensure U.S. access to oil and U.S. victory in the Cold War. After September 11, many scholars and Bush administration officials came to view this Cold War policy as a major contributor to the frustration and radicalization that led in part to the tragic events of 9/11. It is this belief that provides the basis and justification for the Bush administration’s calls for democratization throughout the Middle East. The NSCT lists “political alienation” as the first cause of terrorism. The document declares, “Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse political vision based on violence and destruction.”36 The Bush administration reasons that if U.S. support for authoritarian allies helped create the conditions in which al Qaeda could form and thrive, then changing course and aggressively promoting democratization should ultimately extinguish Islamic radicalism.37 It is not unreasonable to believe that the availability of democratic means to change policy and rulers would reduce the tendency for many to resort to violence. Furthermore, the availability of secular venues for opposition would eliminate the situation in many countries in which the only means of regime opposition is often in the mosque at the feet of a radical cleric. However, the 2006 victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections demonstrates that voters in the Middle East may not always exercise their right to vote in a way that supports American interests or values. Past U.S. support for authoritarian governments served as a major source of anti-Americanism because of a widespread perception of dissonance between what the United States says and does. As the United States increasingly presses for democratization and liberalization, antiAmericanism may decline.38 However, democratization is not likely to reform current terrorists or end the struggle with al Qaeda in the short term. Al Qaeda opposes the regimes in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states not because of their authoritarian nature, but because they perceive them to be insufficiently Islamic. According to the Salafi ideology that dominates al Qaeda, key elements of liberal democracy—such as a “man-made” constitution and separation of church and state—represent violations of the Koran and the hadith, and therefore constitute idolatry.39 As these secular Islamic regimes become more democratic, it will do little to satisfy al Qaeda’s demand for sharia-based, Taliban-style governments. In fact, there is little scholarly evidence that democracy or even liberal democracy will reduce funding, shrink recruitment, or prevent terrorism.40 The vast discrepancy between America’s rhetoric and actions in the Middle East during the Cold War may explain the enduring anti-American sentiment that indirectly creates an environment in which al Qaeda can operate. However, it does not fully explain why many

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educated, middle-class men (and increasingly women) are willing to leave their families and commit suicide in order to kill Americans. What the Current Grand Strategy Gets Wrong The NSCT correctly argues that poverty plays little to no role in radicalization, and the NSCT is also partially correct in its diagnosis regarding “political alienation” as a source of radicalization. However, the NSCT is dangerously misguided in minimizing the radicalizing impact of the Arab-Israeli crisis and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. While the NSCT’s repeated use of the words “not simply” in reference to “U.S. policy in Iraq” and “Israeli-Palestinian issues” seems to begrudgingly acknowledge that these factors have some sort of role in causing terrorism, the document quickly points to political, psychological, sociological, and ideological maladies in the Middle East as the real sources of terrorism. It is interesting to note that three of the four factors dismissed as sources of terrorism relate to U.S. policy, while all of the factors cited as the actual sources of terrorism relate to conditions in the Arab or wider Muslim world. By arguing that terrorism springs almost entirely from political, psychological, sociological, and ideological maladies in the Arab and Muslim world, the United States conveniently avoids the uncomfortable necessity of analyzing the impact of U.S. policy. Unfortunately, two false dichotomies dominate the debate regarding the sources of radicalization and terrorism. The first dichotomy relates to the causes of terrorism. Terrorism does not need to spring entirely from U.S. policy or the problems of others; both can provide powerful explanations. Undoubtedly, the political, psychological, sociological, and ideological maladies present in some Muslim societies contribute significantly to terrorism. However, if the United States neglects the impact of U.S. policy—especially the radicalizing influence of the Arab-Israeli crisis and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East—the U.S. grand strategy will ultimately fail. The second false dichotomy consists of the argument that one either favors killing and capturing hardened terrorists that are beyond redemption, or one seeks to win the “hearts and minds” of the “Arab street.” Much of the debate centers on this “hawk” versus “dove” divide, but clearly, neither of these approaches can independently defeat al Qaeda and its associated movements. The fact is that some terrorists cannot be reformed and must simply be killed or captured. Ignoring this fact dangerously exposes the United States to future attack. At the same time, exclusively focusing on killing and capturing terrorists is akin to the man that continues to mop up the water in his living room without fixing the hole in his ceiling. A successful U.S. grand strategy must be comprehensive, eliminating immediate threats and shutting down the engines of

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radicalization that create the next generation of terrorists. In terms of these two false dichotomies, the current U.S. grand strategy decidedly blames terrorism on widespread maladies in the Muslim world (instead of U.S. policy) and attempts to address the threat utilizing an overwhelmingly “hawkish” military-dominated approach. While this approach has some important merits, its critical shortcoming is that it neglects the role the Arab-Israeli crisis and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East have played in negatively swaying Muslim opinion. If the United States hopes to isolate al Qaeda by turning popular Muslim opinion decisively against al Qaeda and its tactics, the United States must comprehensively address both of these perceived grievances. If the United States does so, it will be able to more effectively identify, isolate, and eliminate today’s terrorists, while curtailing the radicalization of tomorrow’s terrorists. Since the mid-1990s, bin Laden and his deputies have utilized the angst generated by the Palestinian crisis as a means to recruit members and inspire existing members to conduct terrorist attacks.41 Contrary to widespread “Western” perception, bin Laden did not belatedly and shrewdly adopt the Palestinian cause after 9/11 to gain broader appeal. Bin Laden has consistently and publicly spoken out on behalf of the Palestinians since 1994. Bin Laden’s first public pronouncement intended for a wider audience consisted of a December 1994 letter titled “The Betrayal of Palestine.” In this letter to the chief Islamic authority in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden—seven years prior to 9/11—called attention to Palestinian suffering in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.42 While the Palestinian cause did not initially play as prominent a role in bin Laden’s call to arms as the U.S. troop presence in Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian crisis was by no means tangential to bin Laden’s thinking or his call to “jihad.” Bin Laden told CNN correspondent Peter Arnett in a 1997 interview: We declared jihad against the U.S. government, because the U.S. government is unjust, criminal, and tyrannical. It has committed acts that are extremely unjust, hideous, and criminal whether directly or through its support of the Israeli occupation of the Prophet’s Night Travel Land (Palestine). And we believe the U.S. is directly responsible for those who were killed in Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq.43

In the wake of 9/11, bin Laden increasingly cited the suffering of Palestinians in order to gain Muslim support, recruit and inspire al Qaeda operatives, and justify attacks against the United States. One year after the 9/11 attacks, he utilized a letter posted on the Internet to respond to Western media stories exploring the causes of the 9/11 attacks. Answering his own rhetorical question, he wrote to Americans: Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple: Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. You attacked us in Palestine. Palestine, which has foundered under military occupation for more than

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80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with your help and your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it for more than 50 years; years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing, expulsion, destruction, and devastation.44

Bin Laden’s second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, echoed bin Laden’s emphasis on the Palestinian crisis in his December 2001 book Knights under the Prophet’s Banner. In this autobiography, Zawahiri demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of al Qaeda’s center of gravity and reveals the central radicalizing effect of the Palestinian crisis. He writes: The jihad movement must come closer to the masses. We must win the people’s confidence, respect, and affection. . . . The one slogan that has been well understood by the [Muslim] nation and to which it has been responding for the past 50 years is the call for the jihad against Israel. The fact must be acknowledged is that the issue of Palestine is the cause that has been firing up the feelings of the Muslim nation from Morocco to Indonesia for the past 50 years. In addition, it is a rallying point for all the Arabs, be they believers or non-believers.45

These assertions regarding the Palestinian crisis do not represent the isolated views of a few al Qaeda leaders. While the majority of Muslims appear to oppose bin Laden’s tactics and see them as inconsistent with Islam, his support for the Palestinian cause and opposition to the Israeli presence in the Palestinian territories coincide with the majority of popular Muslim opinion.46 In fact, a 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project research poll found that solid majorities in the Palestinian authority, Indonesia, and Jordan—and nearly half of those in Morocco and Pakistan—expressed at least some confidence that Osama bin Laden would “do the right thing regarding world affairs.”47 There exists a widespread perception in the Arab and wider Muslim world that Israel unjustly and violently persecutes Palestinians in the occupied territories. Many Muslims believe this persecution continues because of the support or at least the inaction of the United States. The United States is widely viewed in the Muslim world as the only country with the ability to coerce Israel to permanently end the “persecution” of Palestinians, yet the United States chooses not to exercise this influence over Israel. While the United States often attempts to present itself as an honest and neutral broker in the Arab-Israeli crisis, Arab publics view the United States as neither. A 2003 Pew Global Attitudes Project discovered pluralities or majorities in 20 of 21 populations (the United States was the only exception) that believe that the United States favors Israel over the Palestinians too much.48 Even worse, from the perspective of many Muslims, U.S. foreign aid and military sales to Israel directly enable the persecution of Palestinians. The fact that Israel utilizes American-supplied weapons, helicopters, and fighters against Palestinians is a fact not lost on most Muslims.49

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The salience of the Palestinian crisis for Muslims around the world has increased dramatically because of 24-hour news networks, the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, and the distribution of propaganda videos capitalizing on Palestinian suffering. In August 2001, al Qaeda circulated a two-hour, professionally produced “documentary” on Internet chat rooms highlighting the persecution of Muslims at the hands of the Israelis. The film featured Israeli soldiers lashing out at Palestinian women and shooting a young Palestinian boy. These emotionally charged images played over and over again in the video for dramatic effect.50 Al Qaeda has also used videos of the Palestinian crisis to recruit and motivate “jihadists.” Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian who became an ardent disciple of bin Laden and traveled to Afghanistan in 2000, received and viewed a videocassette and two CDs focusing on Muslim suffering around the world. A particularly poignant section of the video showed a four-month-old baby being shot in her abdomen by Israeli soldiers while in her mother’s arms. Trabelsi said, “I was deeply struck by these images and I was convinced to increase my commitment toward the [Afghan] people I loved.” The consistent statements of bin Laden and his deputies, as well as the public opinion statistics and a multitude of anecdotal evidence, strongly suggest that the Palestinian crisis is an important source of radicalization that engenders popular Muslim sympathy for al Qaeda’s objectives and produces the next generation of terrorists.51 The U.S. military presence in the Middle East represents the second— and perhaps the most significant—source of radicalization. Following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States deployed more than 500,000 military personnel to Saudi Arabia.52 This introduction of thousands of U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia represented a dramatic turning point in U.S. strategy and military posture in the region. Throughout the Cold War, the presence of U.S. troops in the Middle East was limited and infrequent.53 For nearly five decades before the Persian Gulf War, the United States worked through regional allies to effectively protect U.S. interests, conducting few military interventions and maintaining almost no permanent bases in the Middle East. As late as 1989, the United States had less than 700 military personnel in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE combined.54 As of 2006, the United States maintained over 200,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the Middle East. While permanently stationed U.S. troops in the region arguably provide some strategic benefits, evidence suggests that the negative impact of the large U.S. “footprint” in the Middle East may far exceed the benefits. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia represents the primary reason that bin Laden and al Qaeda began to target the United States in the 1990s. As early as 1994–1995, bin Laden publicly decried the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia. He followed these initial public condemnations with a message in 1996 titled “Declaration of Jihad,” in which he states:

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The greatest danger to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad is the occupation of Saudi Arabia, which is the cornerstone of the Islamic world, place of revelation, source of Prophetic mission, and home of the Noble Ka’ba where Muslims direct their prayers. Despite this, it was occupied by the armies of the Christians, the Americans, and their allies.55

Two years later, in February 1998, bin Laden joined Ayman al-Zawahiri and three other Islamist leaders from Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh in issuing a formal declaration regarding the religious duty of Muslims to wage jihad against American military personnel and civilians. After a paragraph of the requisite salutations and religious formalities, the authors immediately cite the preeminent reason for the jihad against the Americans: Firstly, for over seven years America has occupied the holiest part of the Islamic lands, the Arabian peninsula, plundering its wealth, dictating to its leaders, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases there into a spearhead with which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.56

The 2006 NSCT notes that “terrorism is not simply a result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq. The United States was attacked on September 11th and many years earlier, well before we toppled the Saddam Hussein regime.” While it is true that 9/11 occurred before the U.S. military invasion of Iraq, it must not be forgotten that the U.S. military was in Saudi Arabia—and had been there for a decade. The U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia certainly does not justify al Qaeda’s tragic and immoral slaughter of almost 3,000 innocent Americans, but it does help explain the motivations of those who participated in the attack. Not only did bin Laden consistently cite the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia as the preeminent justification for jihad in the years leading up to 9/11, but 15 of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, two from the adjacent UAE, one from Egypt, and one from Lebanon. In a poll of Saudis taken after 9/11, 95 percent of Saudis agreed with bin Laden’s objection to American forces in the region.57 These facts demonstrate that bin Laden’s message reflected the overwhelming consensus in the Saudi Kingdom. Bin Laden and the average Saudi citizen could not contend with American military might, so they utilized terrorism to compel the United States to depart Saudi Arabia. While the war against al Qaeda has grown more complex in the intervening years, one must not lose sight of the war’s relatively straightforward origins. From bin Laden’s perspective and a large segment of the Arab world, the United States was an occupying power in Saudi Arabia and the only way to compel it to leave was for al Qaeda to use the only effective tool at its disposal: terrorism. Some acknowledge that the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia explains al Qaeda’s initial decision to target the United States, but argue that

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the current U.S. military presence plays a less significant role in souring Muslim popular opinion and motivating many to support or join movements such as al Qaeda. It is certainly accurate to suggest that bin Laden has adopted a much longer list of grievances in recent years in order to broaden his appeal. However, it would be erroneous and unwise to minimize the continuing radicalizing impact of the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and especially in Iraq. While it is not the purpose of this chapter to argue the wisdom or folly of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Rohan Gunaratna’s 2002 warning that an invasion of Iraq “will create the conditions for a fresh wave of support for Islamists” seems to have been born out.58 Saddam Hussein is dead and Iraq will not threaten its neighbors with conventional military forces for at least 10–15 years, but these positive developments have come at significant cost. The continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq appears to be serving as a major source of radicalization and recruitment for al Qaeda within Iraq and throughout the region.59 A poll of 4,000 Iraqis found majorities in Mosul, Kirkuk, Tikrit, and the mid-Euphrates regions who responded that the United States “should leave immediately.” The numbers in non-Sunni or mixed regions echoing this sentiment, while not majorities, were still substantial.60 Outside of Iraq, 8 out of 10 respondents polled in 2004 in Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt characterized U.S. coalition operations in Iraq as “terrorist.”61 While these statistics do not represent proof of radicalization, at a minimum they reveal a widespread opposition to the U.S. military presence in Iraq that most likely provides fertile soil for radicalization to thrive.62 Pictures of U.S. military missteps in Abu Ghraib and Haditha, and images of U.S. soldiers lounging in Iraqi mosques prominently displayed on jihadi Web sites, only exacerbate the impact of the U.S. presence. In the minds of susceptible populations, these pictures likely provide powerful confirmation of the jihadi story: “The enemy invaded the land of our umma, violated her honor, shed her blood, and occupied her sanctuaries.”63 While it is difficult to measure the negative impact of the U.S. military presence in Iraq or the recruitment successes this has enabled, early indications seem to suggest that the U.S. military presence in Iraq may well be creating deeper and wider pools of recruitment for al Qaeda. Some may use these unfortunate developments precipitated by the U.S. invasion of Iraq as an argument to rapidly withdraw from Iraq. However, at this point, a rapid U.S. withdrawal before Iraqi security forces are selfsufficient would inflict long-term damage on U.S. credibility and its ability to deter enemies. This would also facilitate al Qaeda’s objectives. Bin Laden and other jihadists would declare the U.S. retreat from Iraq as another example of U.S. cowardice in the face of determined resistance.64 There exists a compelling argument that U.S. withdrawals from Lebanon in 1983–84 and Somalia in 1993–94 emboldened jihadists and increased the

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likelihood of attacks. Bin Laden refers to the U.S. withdrawals from Lebanon and Somalia, saying, “The Americans ran away from those fighters who fought and killed them. . . . So America left, dragging behind its tail in humiliation, defeat, and loss, without looking back. . . . So America and its allies fled in the dark of the night.”65 In Iraq, the United States has demonstrated that it will stand and fight in the face of adversity when it believes that its core interests are at stake. U.S. determination in Iraq has done much to counter previous jihadists’ perceptions of the United States as a “paper tiger” that appears invincible in the media but cannot endure casualties or sustained combat. If the United States leaves prematurely, these gains will be lost and Iraq will join Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, and Somalia in the jihadi mantra regarding U.S. weakness. A premature withdrawal from Iraq would also directly facilitate al Qaeda’s objectives. In the previously mentioned letter to Zarqawi intercepted by U.S. forces in Iraq, Zawahiri lays out al Qaeda’s four-stage strategy in Iraq. He argues that al Qaeda in Iraq should first “expel the Americans from Iraq.” Once the Americans are gone, al Qaeda in Iraq should establish an Islamic authority or emirate, and eventually a caliphate. Third, once this is achieved, the “faithful” should extend the “jihad wave to the secular countries neighboring Iraq.” Finally, al Qaeda in Iraq would prepare for a clash with Israel.66 This extraordinary glimpse into al Qaeda’s strategy reinforces the notion that the United States must make every effort to equip the Iraqi government to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq after the United States departs. Some might cite this al Qaeda strategy as a reason for the United States to stay in Iraq indefinitely. After all, if al Qaeda’s objective is to drive the United States out of Iraq, why should the United States leave any time soon? The United States should leave Iraq as soon as the Iraqi government can operate independently because nothing will undercut the “jihadist” message more successfully, or salvage U.S. credibility in the Middle East more effectively, than a complete, unambiguous, and properly timed U.S. departure from Iraq. Once the United States departs Iraq, al Qaeda in Iraq will be forced to target fellow Muslims in order to implement the second and third stages of Zawahiri’s strategy. Overthrowing the Iraqi government will require a large number of attacks on Iraqi (Muslim) security forces and political leaders. This will dramatically undercut al Qaeda’s popularity in the world, depriving them of the popular Muslim support that Zawahiri recognizes as essential to al Qaeda’s success.67 If the United States departs Iraq—leaving behind a self-sufficient moderate Islamic government—it will place al Qaeda on the horns of dilemma. If al Qaeda attacks the moderate Muslim government in Iraq, al Qaeda’s popularity will plummet, allowing the Iraqi government—with U.S. weapons, intelligence, financial assistance, and training—to ultimately defeat the al Qaeda insurgency. If al Qaeda decides that it cannot attack the

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Iraqi government for fear of estranging popular Muslim opinion, then al Qaeda’s entire strategy will have been undermined. Zawahiri’s letter demonstrates serious concern over popular Muslim perceptions of al Qaeda. In this letter, Zawahiri warns Zarqawi against “slaughtering the hostages” and attacking Shia Muslims and their mosques because these activities will turn popular Muslim opinion against al Qaeda. Zawahiri reiterates his point, saying, “I repeat the warning against separating from the masses, whatever the danger. . . . I say to you that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.” This analysis of the Arab–Israeli crisis and the U.S. presence in the Middle East demonstrates that both factors incite popular hostility against the United States, which in turn empowers and sustains al Qaeda. The United States wisely seeks to kill or capture the leaders of al Qaeda and associated movements. However, if the United States does not simultaneously address the engines of radicalization that are transforming many of today’s Muslim children into tomorrow’s terrorists, U.S. political leaders will unnecessarily bequeath this struggle to our children. THE WAY FORWARD Identifying a problem constitutes an essential first step in developing a solution. The current U.S. grand strategy misdiagnoses the causes of radicalization and terrorism. Consequently, the NSCT proposes the wrong prescriptions. While some political, psychological, sociological, and ideological maladies prevalent in much of the Muslim world may contribute to radicalization and terrorism, they do not serve as the primary catalysts. A virtually unlimited supply of “jihadi” interviews and statements, as well as public opinion polls, demonstrates that the Arab-Israeli crisis and the U.S. military presence in the Middle East serve as preeminent catalysts for radicalization and terrorism.68 While political authoritarianism, sociological shortcomings, and perversions of the Islamic faith may exacerbate the impact of these causes of radicalization, there is little evidence to suggest that these factors would independently lead to radicalization and terrorism. Without the existence of the Arab-Israeli crisis and the U.S. military presence, many of these factors would fade into virtual irrelevance. Furthermore, the United States has minimal ability to significantly or precisely alter the cultural characteristics or the religious interpretations of the Muslim world. Persuasive speech requires that the audience perceives the speaker to be credible. In the view of many Middle Eastern Muslims, the United States has virtually no credibility. Thus, U.S. public diplomacy efforts to “sell” tremendously unpopular U.S. policies in the Middle East or U.S. efforts to “reform” Islam inspire more contempt than

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progress. Cultural and religious evolution takes generations, not one or two presidential terms. The United States cannot contribute, in any significant way, to short-term cultural or religious progress in the Middle East. What it can do is dedicate all of its available resources to resolving the Arab-Israeli crisis and reducing the U.S. military presence in the Middle East to the absolute minimum. Peace in the Middle East As a sovereign nation, Israel has a moral and legal right to live in peace and security within its borders. The persecution of Jews throughout history and the horrific events of the Holocaust increase the legitimacy and necessity of a Jewish state. Recent statements by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, asserting that Israel should be “wiped off the map” and that the Holocaust is a “myth” demonstrate that severe threats to Jews and the state of Israel persist.69 Furthermore, Israel is an important and valuable friend of the United States. However these truths must not obscure the fact that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories represents a major source of radicalization. Admittedly, Israel does not occupy the Palestinian territories out of territorial ambition. The repeated attacks on Israel—whether in the form of suicide bombings of innocent Israelis on buses or the indiscriminate and terrorizing rocket attacks lobbed from Gaza or southern Lebanon—have necessitated and justified an Israeli response. However, as many Israelis and international observers are beginning to recognize, it is not in the long-term interest of Israel or the United States for the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories to continue.70 An Israeli departure from the Palestinian territories will not satisfy the most radical members of al Qaeda and its associated movements who seek to wipe Israel completely off the map. A permanent Israeli departure from the Palestinian territories will also not eliminate international terrorism in the short term. However, a permanent Israeli departure from the Palestinian territories and a final return to the 1967 borders will allow Israel to reclaim the moral high ground and shift popular Muslim opinion in a positive direction. This step will not eliminate the short-term threat presented by al Qaeda and its associated movements, but it will represent an enormously significant step in reducing the radicalization of future generations. The United States must commit itself rhetorically and substantively to the viability of Israel—an Israel living in peace and security within its 1967 borders. At the same time, the United States must apply increasing pressure on Israel to leave the Palestinian territories. While this act will mollify much of Muslim public opinion, radicals will continue to terrorize and attack Israel. Terrorist groups and radical “jihadist” leaders will attempt to completely destroy Israel, and some terrorist leaders will

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attempt to retain their mass popularity and solidify their leadership positions atop terrorist organizations by conducting attacks to entice Israel to reoccupy the territories. Therefore, the United States must work with Israel and moderate Muslim governments to minimize the ability of radicals to undercut a permanent peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Until the Palestinian government can properly police its own territory, the United States should work with moderate Muslim governments to identify capable Muslim peacekeeping forces. These forces would patrol the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to minimize and eventually eliminate terrorist attacks on Israel from these territories. Unnecessary and Counterproductive As this chapter argues, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East serves as a preeminent source of radicalization and terrorism. However, if U.S. interests required a robust military presence in the region, the United States would simply have to manage and mitigate the negative effects of the necessary U.S. presence. Fortunately, this is not the case. The United States has three vital interests in the Middle East, and none of them requires a large U.S. military presence. Unimpeded access to Persian Gulf oil, counterproliferation, and counterterrorism do not require a large network of U.S. bases or a large number of U.S. troops.71 As the United States departs Iraq in the coming years, the United States should avoid the temptation to maintain an unnecessarily large network of bases throughout the region. For nearly five decades, the United States protected its vital interests in the Middle East, with virtually no permanent military presence in the region; in the wake of 9/11, the United States should rediscover the wisdom of this strategy. While the robust forward presence of U.S. troops is often necessary and helpful in some regions, it is neither in the current setting in the Middle East. By building the military self-sufficiency of Gulf Cooperation Council countries, developing a Gulf security architecture, expanding existing U.S. pre-positioned stocks, increasing low-visibility military-tomilitary training, holding regular joint and combined Persian Gulf military exercises, and improving the U.S. nonmilitary counterinsurgency capacity, the United States can dramatically reduce the “footprint” of the U.S. armed forces in the Middle East, while still protecting U.S. interests. Following these steps will dramatically weaken the appeal and resonance of al Qaeda’s message to prospective recruits. CONCLUSION In short, an effective U.S. grand strategy must aggressively seek to resolve the Arab-Israeli crisis and must dramatically reduce the U.S. military

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“footprint” in the Middle East. Addressing these engines of radicalization will not eliminate terrorism in the short term. However, restoring military operations to their optimal role in U.S. grand strategy, correctly identifying the nature of the conflict with al Qaeda, swaying Muslim popular opinion, and addressing the two majors sources of radicalization will ensure that the United States does not bequeath this struggle to succeeding generations. The road ahead will undoubtedly be rough and uncertain, requiring strong political leadership and determination. However, what is certain is that the status quo will continue to create the next generation of terrorists unless bold steps are taken to correct the shortcomings of current U.S. grand strategy. If the United States pursues al Qaeda’s leadership while extinguishing the sources of radicalization, the “last gasp” of “bin Ladenism” will come sooner than most expect. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), 390–391. Hereafter, The Osama bin Laden I Know. 2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Penguin Books, 1967), 321. Hereafter, Strategy. 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 733. Hereafter, On War. 4. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3. Hereafter, The Making of Strategy. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 11. 7. Elliot Cohen, “The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920–1945,” in The Making of Strategy, 453. 8. Elliot Cohen, Supreme Command (New York: Free Press, 2002), 175. Hereafter, Supreme Command. 9. The benefit of hindsight makes it clear that Johnson’s belief that measured bombing would extract tangible political concessions from the North Vietnamese was based on a habitual American underestimation of the North Vietnamese determination and willingness to endure long-term hardships in order to achieve victory. This fact does not suggest that strategy should have trumped Johnson’s grand strategy. Rather, it suggests that the U.S. grand strategy in Southeast Asia was built on faulty assumptions. 10. Strategy, 353. 11. Supreme Command, 225–229.

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12. The Making of Strategy, 458. 13. On War, 100, 731. 14. On War, 700. 15. Supreme Command, 228. 16. On War, 734 17. On War, 98–99. 18. This is not to suggest that the relationship between political leaders and generals should be a one-way dictation from politician to general. Political leaders should consistently and assiduously solicit and generals should assertively and privately offer the professional military advice that is essential to strategic success. If the military lacks essential resources or personnel to achieve military victory or to support the grand strategy, military officers have a responsibility to inform their civilian superiors. Yet, in the final analysis, political leaders and the grand strategy they develop must govern in every respect the generals and the strategy they pursue. 19. Sun Tzu, On War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 84. 20. David J. Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (August 2005): 603. 21. Ibid. 22. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 23. Hereafter, Dying to Win. 23. Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004), vi, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/ fm/3-07-22/. Hereafter, COIN manual. 24. Barry R. McCaffrey, “Academic Report—Trip to Iraq and Kuwait,” April 25, 2006. 25. Office of Management and Budget, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ budget/fy2007/state.html. 26. Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, Stealing al-Qa’ida’s Playbook (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), http://www.ctc.usma. edu/research reports.asp. Hereafter, Stealing al-Qa’ida’s Playbook. The COIN manual states, “Specific insurgent tactical actions are often planned to frequently elicit overreaction from security force individuals and units . . . such action can create a perception of HN [host nation] and foreign military forces as oppressors rather than as liberators” (pp. 1–4). 27. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973). 28. John Gooch, “The Weary Titan: Strategy and Policy in Great Britain, 1890— 1918,” in The Making of Strategy, 301. In the American Civil War, the Confederacy’s center of gravity was the Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. The Union army could occupy and plunder the Confederate capital and Sherman could cut a path of destruction across the South, but neither of these actions broke the back of the Confederacy and ended the Civil War. Abraham Lincoln understood that the center of gravity of the Confederacy was Lee’s army. That is why Lincoln tirelessly sought a general who would aggressively pursue Lee’s army in order to destroy it. Military commanders often reflexively assume that the enemy’s center of gravity is either its capital city or its army. However, in a counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is neither.

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29. For more on this, please see the chapters by James Robbins, Maha Azzam, and Bruce Gregory in this volume. 30. For an informative discussion of means and ends, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press: New York, 2005), 54, 58, 77, 86. 31. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 366. 32. Dying to Win. 33. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2003), 136–137. Hereafter, The Future of Freedom. 34. Admittedly, GNP per capita does not provide a complete picture of the economic health of a nation. A tremendous amount of wealth concentrated in the hands of a small aristocracy can distort a nation’s GNP per capita. However, the income disparity in Egypt, for example, is better than France and almost every country in Latin America. Countries in the Persian Gulf, which do not release such data, probably have higher income disparity than Egypt, but the levels in the Gulf states most likely do not approach the income disparity found in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, or Nigeria. The Future of Freedom, 137– 138. 35. Bradley L. Bowman, “Realism and Idealism: U.S. Policy toward Saudi Arabia, from the Cold War to Today,” Parameters (Winter 2005/06), 91–105. 36. The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (September 2006), 9. Hereafter, The NSCT. Please see Appendix B of this volume. 37. For speeches by President George W. Bush on this topic see his November 19, 2003, speech at Whitehall Palace in London and his November 6, 2003, speech at the National Endowment for Democracy. Both speeches are available at www.whitehouse.gov. 38. “American Character Gets Mixed Reviews: U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 23, 2005, http://pewglobal. org/reports/pdf/247.pdf (accessed June 14, 2006). 39. Michael S. Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2002): 76. Bin Laden refers to “man-made laws” in his March 1997 interviews. Hadith are the traditions related to the words and actions of Muhammad. 40. F. Gregory Gause, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September–October 2005), 62–76. 41. Shadi Abdalla, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent, who served as bin Laden’s bodyguard in Afghanistan in 2000, described propaganda movies shown to al Qaeda recruits highlighting Muslim suffering in Palestine, as well as in Chechnya, Bosina, and Somalia. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 264. 42. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (London: Verso, 2005), 3–14. Hereafter, Messages to the World. 43. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 183. 44. Messages to the World, 162. 45. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 389. 46. The Pew Global Attitudes Project surveyed Muslim publics, asking whether the individual had sympathy for Israel. In none of the following countries did more than 6 percent express sympathy for Israel: Indonesia (4%), Egypt (2%), Jordan (1%), Turkey (5%), and Pakistan (6%). “America’s Image Slips, But

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Allies Share U.S. Concerns Over Iran, Hamas,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 13, 2006, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=827. 47. “Views of Changing World 2003: War with Iraq Further Divides Global Publics,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 3, 2003, http://pewglobal.org/ reports/display.php?ReportID=185. 48. Ibid. 49. The U.S. provides roughly $2.5 billion in military and economic aid to Israel each year. This represents approximately $394 per Israeli and roughly 2 percent of Israel’s annual GDP (PPP). “Rep. Rothman Helps Secure $2.46 billion in U.S. Aid for Israel,” Congressman Steve Rothman’s Web site, http://www. house.gov/rothman/news releases/2006/june26.htm. “Dobbs: Not So Smart When It Comes to the Middle East,” CNN.com, July 25, 2006, http://www.cnn. com/2006/U.S./07/18/dobbs.july19/index.html. Statistics derived from the CIA fact book, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html#Econ. 50. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 291. 51. Suleiman Abu Ghaith, a Kuwaiti spokesman for al Qaeda, echoed bin Laden’s views in an essay that appeared on the Internet in June 2002 cataloging the alleged atrocities of the Israelis. He writes, “For fifty years in Palestine, the Jews—with the blessing and support of the Americans—carried out abominations of murder, suppression, abuse, and exile. The Jews exiled nearly 5 million Palestinians and killed nearly 260,000. They wounded nearly 180,000, and crippled nearly 160,000.” On the basis of these alleged Israeli atrocities and the American support that made them possible, Abu Ghaith argues that Muslims are justified in killing millions of Americans, even using chemical or biological weapons to exact revenge on the Americans. He asserts, “The Americans have still not tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. . . . We have the right to kill four million Americans—two million of them children—and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and biological weapons, so as to inflect them with the fatal maladies that have afflicted the Muslims because of the [Americans’] chemical and biological weapons. America knows only the language of force. America is kept at bay by blood alone.” The Osama bin Laden I Know, 346. 52. “Gulf War Facts,” CNN.com, www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/ facts/gulfwar/index.html (accessed June 14, 2006). 53. The United States deployed troops to Lebanon for a few months in 1958 and provided international peacekeeping forces in Lebanon (1982–1984) and the Sinai (1981–present). The U.S. Navy also patrolled the waters of the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf throughout the Cold War, with the navy’s most significant operation consisting of a 1987–1988 “reflagging” of 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers in order to protect them from Iranian attack. 54. Defense Manpower Data Center, Statistical Information Analysis Division, http://siadapp.dior.whs.mil/index.html (accessed June 13, 2006). 55. Messages to the World. 56. Messages to the World, 59–60. 57. Dying to Win, 82. 58. Despite this worrisome development, this is not to suggest that the U.S. intervention was necessarily a mistake or that the U.S. endeavor will fail. On the

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contrary, in a decade or two, historians may view the U.S. intervention in Iraq as the catalyst that sparked positive change throughout the region. At this point, it is too early to tell. 59. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 350–352. 60. In Baghdad and the South of Iraq, 44 percent and 45 percent agreed, respectively. Office of Research, Department of State, April 2006. 61. Office of Research, Department of State, April 2006. 62. According to news reports, an April U.S. National Intelligence Estimate acknowledged to some degree that the U.S. military presence in Iraq had “invigorated Islamic radicalism and worsened the global terrorist threat.” Philip Shenon and Mark Mazzetti, “Study of Iraq War and Terror Stirs Strong Political Response,” New York Times, September 25, 2006, A10. 63. These are the words of Osama bin Laden in which he is actually referring to the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia. However, this seems to be a concise summary of the broader jihadist indictment of American activity in the region. Messages to the World, 15. 64. While bin Laden will attempt to characterize any U.S. departure from Iraq as a cowardly withdrawal in the face of victorious “jihadist” resistance, the facts on the ground will decisively support or undercut bin Laden’s spin in the view of most Muslim populations. 65. Messages to the World, 15. 66. The Osama bin Laden I Know, 366. 67. As the November 2005 bombing in Jordan reveals, “jihadist” popularity plummets when they attack fellow Muslims. 68. The Osama bin Laden I Know; Messages to the World. 69. “Iran Leader’s Comments Attacked,” BBC News, October 27, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle east/4378948.stm. “Iranian leader: Holocaust a ‘Myth,’” CNN.com, December 14, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ WORLD/meast/12/14/iran.israel/. 70. Barry Rubin, “Israel’s New Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 85 (July–August 2006). 71. Bradley L. Bowman, “After Iraq: U.S. Military Posture in the Middle East” Parameters (expected summer 2007).

CHAPTER 3 THINKING STRATEGICALLY: CAN DEMOCRACY DEFEAT TERRORISM? Douglas A. Borer and Michael Freeman

The outcome of the United States’ global war on terrorism (hereafter GWOT) is yet to be decided. In this chapter we assert that defeat or victory in nearly all wars, including the GWOT, can be traced directly to the strategy on which they were fought. We begin this chapter with a brief discussion of strategy to establish a framework for the analysis of U.S. performance in the GWOT. At its essence, strategy is an iterative or dynamic process, one that is shaped by a given context and defined by the relational environment between various actors. As such, a successful strategy in one situation will most likely be different than a successful strategy in another. In this chapter we present a simple analytical framework, based in large part on that developed by faculty members at the U.S. Army War College. We then turn to a discussion of democracy and democratization as the primary strategy by which the United States has chosen to defeat the scourge of terrorism. This approach, first defined in the 2002 National Security Strategy1 (NSS), and later reiterated in the 2006 NSS,2 provides the basis for our discussion. As such, the unifying question for our analysis in this chapter is, can democracy defeat terrorism? THINKING STRATEGICALLY: E ≈ W + M Strategy is a weighty word that carries significant influence in any discourse. If something is termed “strategic,” our society deems it to be of essential importance. A “strategic plan” is one that will either ensure the success of a Fortune 500 company’s wealth—or seal the fate of a

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nation-state. In the realm of international politics, things strategic are most often related to grim matters of life and death, peace and war. A brief review of the literature reveals that strategy means many different things to many different people.3 Practitioners of military operations may favor Clausewitz’s view that “strategy is the use of engagements for the object of war.” For students of international relations, Gregory Foster’s description, “strategy is ultimately about effectively exercising power,” might suffice; unless Bernard Brodie’s “strategic theory is a theory of action” is preferred. Military officers, physicists, economists, business leaders, mathematicians, historians, political scientists, and members of other professions have made contributions to the rich body of literature on the subject of strategy. For lack of a demonstratively superior definition, we have chosen to adopt and adapt the comparatively rigorous approach that is taught to senior officers at the U.S. Army War College.4 Richard Yarger provides the following succinct summary: “Strategy is all about how (ways or concepts) leaders will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve objectives (ends) that support state interests.”5 As such, “grand strategy” is fundamentally comprehensive. The strategist must have an all-inclusive vision of what else is happening in the world and a good grasp of the potential interconnected “ripple” effects of various choices. As Fred Charles Ilk´e notes, “Strategy is not a vocation for stunted minds.”6 Strategists must think holistically, being cognizant of the fact that strategy is never developed in isolation.7 The army framework, derived from the realist school of international relations,8 sees all states as having national interests that they will pursue to the best of their abilities. Vital interests include such things as survival, economic well-being, and the dissemination of national norms and values into the international system. Each state uses its power to promote or advance its national interests, either in cooperation with or in competition against other state actors. Power can be summarized by the “DIME” model, which consists of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of statecraft. As such, strategy is the pursuit, safeguarding, or advancement of national interests through the application of the DIME instruments of power.9 An important antecedent to thinking strategically in the international realm is that some clearly identified political purpose must dominate all strategy. Thus, Clausewitz’ famous dictum “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means” is of very real importance. Policy, which is the chief progeny of each state’s political intercourse, is where political purposes are embodied. As Yarger notes, Political purpose is stated in policy. Policy is the expression of the desired end state sought by the government. In its finest form it is clear articulation

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of guidance for the employment of the instruments of power towards the attainment of one or more end states. In practice it tends to be much vaguer. Nonetheless policy dominates strategy by its articulation of the end state and its guidance. The analysis of the end state and guidance yields objectives leading to the desired end state. Objectives provide purpose, focus, and justification for the actions embodied in a strategy. National strategy is concerned with a hierarchy of objectives that is determined by the political purpose of the state. Policy insures that strategy pursues appropriate aims.10

Finally, to have a good chance of success, strategy must maintain an appropriate balance among the objectives sought, the methods chosen to pursue those objectives, and the resources available to achieve the methods. In other words, for the strategist, a simple formula must always be manifest in the mind’s eye: ends must be in roughly stable equilibrium with ways and means, or E ≈ W + M. The difficulty here is that ends and ways are usually not quantifiable, and even means (the number of tanks, quantity of money, etc.) often do not equate to absolute measures of power in terms of predictable outcomes. In other words, the nation with the most tanks, planes, ships, and soldiers does not necessarily have the greatest power. Thus, even though we have presented here what appears to be a precise and simple equation for strategizing, precision is lacking, thus making strategy a very difficult endeavor. Indeed, most attempts to quantify the E, W, and M variables will most likely end in failure; however, not all is lost. To help us gauge the likelihood of our strategy’s success, we propose three standards of evaluation: practicality, effectiveness, and legitimacy.11 Although these standards are intrinsically subjective, they do provide a starting point for calculating strategic risk, and risk assessment is a critical component of any strategic planning process. Accordingly, Yarger observes, “risk explains the gap between what is to be achieved and the concepts and resources available to achieve the objective. Since there are never enough resources or a clever enough concept to assure 100% success in the competitive international environment, there is always some risk.”12 Hence, to evaluate risk, a prudent strategists should ask themselves three basic questions based on these standards while developing a plan. First, the means test: Is the strategy practical? Are the basic material resources available to achieve the goals? This question is one that military leaders are normally schooled in appraising because the answer is partially quantifiable, and it is one that deals with force ratios and military “science” when war is being considered. For instance, at different points in history, both Napoleon and Hitler ultimately decided that they possessed sufficient ground forces, but lacked adequate naval assets (in terms of sea lift and force protection) to invade Great Britain. The risk of failure was not in defeating the British Army on British soil, but rather

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in getting those ground forces from continental Europe to the island of Britain through the protective screen of the Royal Navy. Both Napoleon and Hitler determined that sufficient naval resources were not available, thus neither attempted a crossing of the channel. The risk of failure was judged as being too high. In short, invasion of Britain did not pass the means test for either tyrant. What if, however, sufficient material means are deemed to be available? The second, (and often much more difficult) question for the strategist is the “ways” test: Are the concepts (ways) likely to be effective? Are the methods under consideration for marshalling state resources likely to produce the desired outcome? Also, is it the best way? As illustrated by hindsight on the Cold War, George Kennan’s concept of “containment” ultimately proved successful at defeating the very serious threat to the United States posed by the threat of Soviet-based communism. Even though successive U.S. presidents emphasized the elements of DIME to different degrees during their respective administrations, the fundamental concepts and methods outlined in George F. Kennan’s famous 1946 “long telegram”13 provided the intellectual continuity, or the central “way,” for organizing and directing American efforts for every administration from 1947 to 1991, Republican or Democrat. In retrospect, “containment” will ensure Kennan’s membership among history’s small pantheon of truly elite grand strategists. The question today for American strategic thinkers is, can democractization serve as the best concept, or the correct “way,” to defeat terrorism? We will explore this in depth below. Finally, the strategist must always ask, Are the ends, ways, and means legitimate? This third standard for evaluation, or the “political litmus test,” is an especially important concern for leaders of democracies, whose right to lead is embedded in—and ultimately dependent on—the approval of their citizens. One can imagine that shortly after the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks, discussions in the administration of George W. Bush included a broad scope of options available for responding to al Qaeda. One available option was going nuclear. Indeed, if the desired end was the physical destruction of Osama bin Laden and the main elements of al Qaeda’s leadership cadre, dropping two nuclear bombs on Afghanistan— one in Kabul and one in Kandahar—would have had a very high probability of success. However, because of the indiscriminate nature of these weapons, and the very likely high casualty toll among innocent Afghans, it is clear that such a U.S. response would have been deemed highly illegitimate not only by the international community but also by the vast majority of the citizens of the United States. The United States would have quickly morphed from being the victim of a horrendous crime to being the perpetrator of an even greater act of cruelty. Maintaining the moral high ground, and passing the legitimacy test, is a vital imperative for the broad-thinking strategist.

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DEMOCRATIZATION: A GRAND STRATEGY OF TRANSFORMATION? In the turbulent wake of the 9/11 attacks, policymakers in the inner circle of President George W. Bush’s national security team were faced with the immediate task of responding to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network. As a result of its partnership with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the decision to invade Afghanistan was a relatively straightforward one.14 However, what was remarkable about Afghanistan was how smoothly the entire military operation went, how quickly the Taliban collapsed, and how the “American model” of government seemed exportable even to the far reaches of the Hindu Kush. As the eminent historian of U.S. foreign policy John Lewis Gaddis observes, “The Bush administration got a taste of Agincourt with its victory over the Taliban at the end of 2001, to which the Afghans responded by gleefully shaving their beards, shedding their burkas, and cheering the infidels—even to the point of lending them horses from which they laser-marked bomb targets. Suddenly, it seemed, American values were transportable, even to the remotest and most alien parts of the earth.”15 As the Bush administration saw it, the problem was not, however, simply Afghanistan. Rather, terrorism itself had morphed into an entirely new and dangerous phenomena. Even though murder, bombings, and various other forms of political violence have been in existence since ancient times, the actions of individuals and small groups had rarely been able to undermine the security and well-being of entire states and societies. In contrast, September 11 had convinced Bush that today’s superempowered individuals had the ability to deliver levels of destruction hitherto unheard of in the annals of terrorism.16 If 18 men armed only with box cutters and a clever plan could shake the foundations of American capitalism and government, imagine what they might do with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons? To prevent another 9/11, the scourge of terrorism had to be cut off at its roots, and the root cause of terrorism, as the president saw it, were the reactionary/authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. These regimes—which included both America’s traditional allies and its sworn enemies—were perceived to be the crucibles of terror and terrorists, because they produce generation after generation of citizens who, being both underemployed and unrepresented by governments characterized by cronyism and corruption, are easily radicalized by the likes of bin Laden. As such, an audacious and ambitious strategy was formulated by the Bush White House, one that Gaddis describes as “a grand strategy of transformation.”17 Bush’s approach was nothing less than “a plan for transforming the entire Muslim Middle East: for bringing it, once and for all, into the modern world. There’s been nothing like this in boldness,

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sweep, and vision since Americans took it upon themselves, more than half a century ago, to democratize Germany and Japan, thus setting in motion processes that stopped short of only a few places on earth, one of which was the Muslim Middle East.”18 Certainly we concur with Gaddis that, in terms of “sweep and vision,” President Bush has laid out a commendable “end” for American strategy in the GWOT. Nevertheless, we are determined to ask, How does the present U.S. strategy fare when evaluated by a rigorous risk assessment? Does Bush’s “grand strategy of transformation” pass the practicality, effectiveness, and legitimacy tests, or is there an imbalance between ends, ways, and means? If an imbalance exists, can it be corrected? PRACTICALITY We begin by asking the means test question. Is democratization practical as a strategy? If states can actually influence the regime type of other states, what means can they or would they use? Within academic and policymaking circles, there is a large body of literature on the topic of democracy promotion, with most experts focusing on the use of diplomatic, informational, and economic means. These means can be used to promote civil society, support an independent media, strengthen the rule of law, reduce corruption, promote decentralization, advance civic education, and promote public-interest advocacy.19 The question is whether any of these approaches work; or more accurately, do these efforts make democratization more likely than it would have been otherwise? Thomas Carothers, an expert on democracy promotion, is noticeably sanguine in observing, “By the late 1990s . . . it was increasingly evident that many of the efforts to achieve positive political change around the developing and post-communist worlds were proving much harder and more problematic than expected.”20 A gradualist democratic opening is “attractive to Western policymakers, [but] it is difficult and has been only rarely achieved around the world.”21 Under the Bush administration, military force has been the primary means by which democratization is expected to take place. The invasion of Iraq (and Afghanistan to a lesser degree) has been justified in part by the need to transform the regime into a democracy, in order to ensure that terrorists based from those territories do not attack the United States. At the core of this strategy is the assumption that political change can be achieved under conditions of military occupation; history lends some support to this claim. After all, the Allied powers successfully transformed the defeated powers of Germany and Japan into liberalized democratic states. Nevertheless, some scholars suggest the prospects for successfully using military force to occupy a country and then establish a democratic regime are not good. Eva Bellin argues that the cases of Germany and

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Japan should be seen more as exceptions than the norm, and so should not be used as models for Iraq or elsewhere. She posits that Iraq lacks eight characteristics that were present in Germany and Japan and were important factors in the implementation of democracy: economic development, ethnic homogeneity, effective state institutions, historical precedents, national leaders, a psychological state of defeat, the full commitment of the occupying state, and a free hand for the occupier.22 She argues that a more analogous model to Iraq is Haiti, in which the United States militarily intervened to restore democracy, but which “is still characterized by chaos and instability.”23 Is Bellin correct? Alternatively, it can be argued that the use of military force might be beneficial for regime change and democratization, because this process requires the security and stability that military forces can provide. Indeed, for democracy to take hold in a highly divided society, the citizens of a country must be free from violence and intimidation before they will engage in the political process. If a government cannot protect its own populace, the population will turn to local power brokers or warlords to provide security, and democracy will be stillborn. The ravages of unchecked violence not only hinder democracy, but also undermine any sort of national collective identity upon which consensus and peaceful conflict resolution can take hold. Unfortunately, in Iraq, thus far military occupation has apparently destabilized the country. While living under Saddam Hussein’s regime was undeniably brutal, stability did exist under the threat of an iron fist. Iraqis have unwillingly traded the predictable violence from their government for unpredictable violence from their neighbors. Civil war is now occurring. From the very beginning, the only options for providing security and stability in Iraq were U.S. military personnel, other international forces, or by Iraq’s own troops and police. The question of how many troops would be enough is always a matter of debate. While serving as CENTCOM’s leader in 2000, Marine General Anthony Zinni had put together OPLAN 1003-98 for the invasion of Iraq. This plan called for a minimum of 380,000 troops and foresaw an occupation that would last as long as 10 years.24 Zinni’s estimate of the necessary troops was in sharp contrast to that of Doug Macgregor, a retired army colonel (and Rumsfeld favorite), who argued that Baghdad could be attacked with as few as 30,000 troops and taken within two weeks.25 Eventually, under constant pressure by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Zinni’s successor at CENTCOM, General Tommy Franks pared the number of U.S. forces that would be used to launch the war in 2003 to between 150,000 and 200,00026 —a number that, in retrospect, has proven inadequate for the task, especially after Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, made the misguided decision to disband the Iraqi

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Army, which had been part of both Zinni’s and Franks’ presumed security forces. Secretary Rumsfeld’s position on Iraq was clearly influenced by the relatively tiny “footprint” of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, where a very small number of special operations troops directing air strikes, combined with indigenous ground forces of the Northern Alliance, worked in perfect concert to overthrow the Taliban. Afghanistan seemed to confirm Rumsfeld’s notions of military transformation, which envisioned lighter, faster, and technologically enabled troops whose increased lethality would more than compensate for their small numbers. This vision of future warfare, which had been promoted by defense intellectuals like Doug Macgregor, had been resisted by much of the conventional army. In retrospect, the intellectual disconnect between various analysts here is a remarkable one. For military planners like General Zinni, OPLAN 1003 was based on the assumption that it would take significantly more troops to secure peace than it would to overthrow the regime and defeat Saddam’s available forces. In other words, Zinni did not necessarily question the lethality of today’s American forces, but he did clearly understand Clausewitz’s most fundamental concept: war is the extension of politics my other means. As such, the old concept of mass, or large number of troops, remains relevant—not to win the clash of arms on the battlefield, but to win the peace afterward. Even though the final chapter in the story on Iraq is yet to be told, it is now clear that the Bush administration’s choice of conventional military means was drastically underresourced in terms of troop numbers—not in terms of those required to destroy Iraq’s conventional military capacity, but in the number required to provide security and stability afterward. A secure and stable environment is required for democracy to emerge. In addition, one must recall that the practical financial and human costs of the war in Iraq are not insignificant: the United States has spent over $432 billion since September 2001,27 with around $200 million being spent every day.28 On the human side, as of May 15, 2006, U.S. military casualties numbered over 2,500 dead and 18,000 wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.29 These costs have thus far been tolerated by the American populace and their representatives in Congress, but came under renewed scrutiny after the 2006 elections. However, without clear successes to show the masses, any prudent American strategist considers public support as fickle. The longer the war continues, the greater the risk incurred. President Richard Nixon—who, despite his other flaws, often demonstrated a keen insight into the American body politic—once astutely observed, “When a president sends American troops to war, a hidden timer starts to run. He has a finite period of time to win the war before people grow weary of it.”30

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EFFECTIVENESS Is spreading democracy likely to be effective as a way of reducing the threat of terrorism? In this section we argue that democratization is unlikely to be an effective method because (a) it will not undermine the root causes of terrorism, (b) it will create more targets for terrorists, (c) it will weaken the response of states, and (d) it might produce fewer willing allies for fighting terrorism. How would democracy be effective at undermining the causes of terrorism? For al Qaeda and like-minded groups, their openly articulated grievances are to restore sharia (Islamic law) and eventually the historic caliphate in the Islamic world. To do so, they wish to change existing governments, who they view as illegitimate and apostate. They have recognized their inability to defeat the “near enemy” (their own governments) before first defeating the “far enemy” (the United States) that has been propping up illegitimate regimes. According to bin Laden, “Every one agreed that the situation can not be rectified (the shadow cannot straighten when its source, the rod, is not straight either) unless the root of the problem is tackled.”31 The United States, and West more broadly, has become a target not just because of its support for countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel, but also because it has (in the minds of al Qaeda) physically occupied places such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and now Afghanistan and Iraq. In 1996, bin Laden declared that “the latest and greatest of these aggressions . . . is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places [Saudi Arabia] . . . by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies.”32 Would spreading democracy to these regions somehow ameliorate al Qaeda’s complaints against the United States and its “moderate”33 Islamic allies? It is hard to imagine how this would be true. At best, the spread of democracy would be irrelevant to al Qaeda’s grievances over real or perceived occupation, and at worst, it would be counterproductive. If Saudi Arabia or Egypt suddenly became more democratic overnight, this by itself would not change the relationship between these countries and the United States and, much to the consternation of the jihadists, may actually strengthen those close relationships, which is the source of their complaint. The spread of democracy, moreover, may actually be counterproductive in terms of ameliorating the causes of terrorism, if this strategy requires the concomitant deployment of U.S. military forces to effect “regime change” as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whatever one thinks of al Qaeda’s “perception” of occupation in Saudi Arabia, the actual presence of hundreds of thousands of foreign military personnel removes any ambiguity in Iraq. Not surprisingly, the U.S. invasion of Iraq has become a ready symbol tailor-made for al Qaeda recruitment. In general, some proponents of democratization argue that democracies are better (i.e., less violently) able to resolve nationalist disputes over

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perceived occupations because they have mechanisms such as plebiscites and referenda through which minority populations might achieve some level of confederation, autonomy, or even independence.34 In the case of al Qaeda, these “democratic” assets would be irrelevant, though, because al Qaeda does not represent an irredentist or nationalist minority seeking independence from a state, but rather, they act as the vanguard of the entire Islamic religion, and not an isolated ethnic group. Likewise, spreading democracy would probably do nothing to mitigate al Qaeda’s grievance over the insufficiently devout regimes in the region. Some might argue that potential jihadists would be less likely to turn to terrorism if they could achieve their aims through peaceful, democratic means. While some Islamic reformers would accept democracy as a legitimate political system, and would be willing to work within that system, the jihadists do not accept the legitimacy of democracy, because it gives sovereignty to the populace rather than to God.35 In all likelihood, the spread of democracy would further enrage jihadists, because it is a move even farther away from the establishment of sharia. While democracy would probably do little to mitigate the expressed grievances of al Qaeda (and would more likely make things worse), perhaps democracy can alter the underlying systemic conditions that act as permissive (rather than explicit) causes of terrorism.36 Within the literature on terrorism causes, two of the most frequently mentioned conditions that make terrorism more likely are poverty and political frustration. As President Bush has argued, “we fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.”37 On closer scrutiny, however, the link between poverty and terrorism is weak.38 In his pathbreaking study of the demographics of Islamic terrorists, Marc Sageman found that most of them are generally well-off compared with their own populations, and that “three-fourths of global Salafi mujahedin were solidly upper or middle class.”39 Likewise, Alberto Abadie found that “terrorist risk is not significantly higher for poorer countries.”40 Even if poverty was a permissive cause of terrorism, it is unclear how spreading democracy would alleviate poverty. Whether regime type or economic growth are even related causally or correlatively is also debatable, with Przeworski et al. finding that “political regimes have no impact on the growth of total income,” nor that economic development leads to democracy.41 Another permissive condition that is frequently noted as a contributing factor to terrorism is political frustration. When a state is ruled by a corrupt or illegitimate authoritarian regime, citizens might be frustrated by their inability to fairly participate in the political process.42 The conventional wisdom is that when citizens have no way to peacefully voice their dissent and achieve political change, they will resort to violence to do so. With the spread of democracy, it is assumed that new, peaceful avenues of dissent will be opened up and make violence less necessary. The

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problem with this argument is that it may misrepresent the core problems of authoritarianism. It is easy for those in the West to point to the lack of liberty as the fundamental issue with authoritarian governments; yet for extremists, the problem with authoritarianism is its injustice—injustice that can be remedied by the only just legal code, the sharia. In other words, as Olivier Roy has argued, extremists (and others) seek justice from the political domain, rather than individual liberty.43 Moreover, anything other than sharia—whether democracy or godless authoritarianism—is equally unjust and therefore illegitimate. In sum, the spread of democracy might alleviate some generalized feelings of political frustration, but for those that see only sharia as a legitimate system of justice, democracy would be no better than authoritarianism. Are terrorists more likely to attack a democracy than an authoritarian state? There are two reasons to think that democracies make easier targets. First, operations within democracies are easier to plan and undertake. As many scholars have noted, carrying out terrorist strikes are facilitated by democracy’s freedoms of speech, movement, and association and are further enabled by such legal constraints as the presumptions of innocence and rights of due process that limit the power of the state.44 Taken together, these features of democracy make it easier for terrorists to mobilize their supporters, gain awareness for their cause, organize their operations, plan and train for an attack, and resist the coercive powers of the state if captured. This argument is supported by the work of Eubank and Weinberg, who have looked extensively into the connection between terrorism and democracy (as a target of it). They have found that “the likelihood of terrorist groups occurring in democracies is three and one half times greater than their occurrence in non-democracies.”45 As Audrey Kurth Cronin puts it, “The weight of the available evidence, as presented in descriptive historical reviews and quantitative studies, leads to the disappointing and unexpected conclusion that terrorism has been more predominant in democratic states than in states with other types of regimes.”46 In terms of specific examples, Robert Pape makes the point that Kurds, who live in both Turkey and Iraq, have exclusively targeted only democratic Turkey and not authoritarian Iraq. While this may be because democracies are seen as more susceptible to coercion (more on this shortly), it also highlights the greater ease with which they can operate in a democracy.47 A second reason democracies would be more likely to be targeted by terrorists is that democracies are seen as more coercible and less resilient, making their capitulation to terrorists’ demands more likely. Pape claims that terrorists “often view democracies as ‘soft,’ usually on the grounds that their publics have low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy.” He notes that whether this perception of democracies is true or not does not really matter; it is this “image” or perception of

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democracy in the minds of terrorists that will lead them to focus their campaigns against democratic states.48 Are democracies better or worse than authoritarian states at responding to terrorism? There are two reasons to think that democracies are worse. First, there is the widespread view that the freedoms and liberties in democracies constrain how they fight terrorism. This argument is the natural justification for the measures undertaken by the United States since 9/11—measures such as the use of military tribunals, the designation of individuals as enemy combatants, and the loosening of restrictions on communications surveillance. The logic is that if the country was just a little bit less democratic, then it would have a better chance of defeating the terrorists. Doing this, though, could be a permanent infringement of civil liberties; the solution (that dates back to the Roman Republic), then, is to suspend or modify these liberties temporarily, or only for as long as the emergency persists. Emergency powers are a compromise that allows the government to ensure the security of the state while limiting the damage to liberty and democracy. However, when democracies do become slightly more repressive (by being less concerned with liberties), they may actually make terrorism worse because of the relationship between repression and violence. At both high and low levels of repression, violence is minimized, but at the middle, violence is at its worst. In fact, Abadie draws from empirical evidence to conclude that “countries in some intermediate range of political freedom are shown to be more prone to terrorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes.”49 It is this intermediate range where states will not use enough repression to eradicate terrorists, but will use enough to provoke a negative reaction to their policies that will serve to further mobilize support for the terrorists. As Wilkinson observes, “If the government is provoked into introducing emergency powers, suspending habeas corpus, or invoking martial law . . . there is always the risk that by using heavy repression to crush the terrorist campaign the authorities may alienate the innocent majority of citizens caught up in the procedures of house-to-house searches and interrogations.”50 A second reason that spreading democracy may also be ineffective is that it might weaken the state in relation to society and therefore make its response to terrorism less coherent and less effective. The apparatus of the state is often weaker in a democracy than in an authoritarian regime because democracies govern more on the basis of rule of law than on the basis of the state’s inherent power. This, of course, is a broad generalization, which may not be true in many cases. Nevertheless, the evidence from Afghanistan and Iraq, at least, supports this notion. In Afghanistan, the Taliban was effective in establishing law and order in a way that previous regimes and the current, democratic ones have not been able to do. The journalist and author Jason Burke compares driving from Kabul to

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Kandahar in 2003 to the late 1990s. In 2003, there were kidnappings, bandits, and aid workers being shot along the road, all of which led him to choose to fly between the cities instead of driving. He writes, “The contrast with the security under the Taliban . . . was strong.”51 The case of Iraq provides an even more striking example of the weakness of democratic states in projecting the power of the state throughout the country. Even with the presence of U.S. soldiers and a (somewhat) reconstituted Iraqi police and army, Iraqis now are less safe and secure than they were under Hussein, with constant bombings, attacks, and general lawlessness throughout much of the country.52 Indeed, by June 2006, Iraqis were dying at the rate of over 3,000 a month, with over 50,000 killed since 2003.53 How would the democratization of the Middle East affect the United States’ generally positive relationships with the countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, etc.) in the region? There are three reasons to think that the United States will have better alliances with the current regimes than with future democratic ones. First, democratically elected regimes might not view the United States in as positive a light as do the current regimes, and new democratic governments would be less likely to work with us as allies. As Gregory Gause points out The problem with promoting democracy in the Arab world is not that Arabs do not like democracy; it is that Washington probably would not like the governments Arab democracy would produce. . . . Further democratization in the Middle East would, for the foreseeable future, most likely generate Islamist governments less inclined to cooperate with the United States on important U.S. policy goals, including military basing rights in the region, peace with Israel, and the war on terrorism.54

The recent democratic rise to power of Hamas in Palestine provides an illustrative case. Already, there are issues over how Hamas will work with Israel in terms of the peace process, and how the international community will deal with Hamas diplomatically and in terms of financial assistance. Second, democratically elected regimes (e.g., Hamas, Hizbollah’s elected representatives in the Lebanon’s parliament) might actually support and sponsor terrorism. In other words, not only might they not be U.S. allies, they may actually become enemies. Islamic extremist parties may come to power and change the foreign policies of their country— much like the Iranian revolutionaries did in Tehran after 1979—and then fund, support, and use terrorists as proxies for their political battles with other countries, including the United States. On the other hand, the constraints of actually being in power, rather than being in opposition, may actually moderate the extremism of radical Islamists. Having to work with other states and provide social and

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political goods for an entire citizenry, rather than just their narrow constituency, may make extremist regimes act much like moderate ones (just as structural theories of international relations argue that the international system makes all states, regardless of their internal characteristics, act in similar ways). Once again, the recent empowerment of Hamas in Palestine will provide an interesting test for the powers of extremism versus the powers of democracy.55 Third, authoritarian allies in the region, especially the ones not committed to human rights, do provide a useful function for the United States by doing some of its “dirty work” for it. This is in no way meant to condone torture or other violations of human rights, but if viewed strictly through the lens of what is seen by some as required for fighting terrorism, the ability to send uncooperative suspects to various allied, authoritarian regimes in the Middle East is useful. With the spread of democracy, liberal states would be more committed to human rights and civil liberties, but less useful to the United States in this strictly utilitarian (albeit morally unpleasant) way. LEGITIMACY The final test for strategy, the legitimacy test, is one that reveals the intricate and often irreconcilable political complexities of international relations. Some strategies that might be effective and practical, thus passing the ways and means tests, might not be seen as legitimate. These kinds of concerns over legitimacy are often even more pronounced in the realm of counterterrorism strategy. After all, states could more easily and effectively defeat domestic terrorism if they became highly authoritarian and repressive police states. But when nations have moved even slightly in this direction—as the United States arguably did after 9/11 with measures such as secret surveillance, military tribunals, and enemy combatant detainees—the acceptability or legitimacy of these actions is quickly challenged. For strategies that are directed outward, such as democratization, similar issues arise. Issues of legitimacy boil down to the perceptions of what is acceptable, and as such, they depend on who is doing the perceiving. In this case, there are three relevant audiences: the domestic U.S. populace, thirdparty states (such as traditional American allies), and those foreign states that may be the target of a democratization strategy. For the U.S. domestic audience, the strategy of democratization seems to be widely accepted, with 70 percent of Americans agreeing that spreading democracy is generally seen as a good idea (although half of them think it will not succeed).56 The idea that democracy is a morally and ethically just political system that best embodies human desires for freedom and equality

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goes almost without questioning in Western civilizations, in which liberal ideals predominate.57 Therefore, spreading democracy to other states is seen as largely legitimate and has been a long-running theme in U.S. foreign policy. Even during the Cold War, when democratization often took a back seat to fighting communism, everything else being equal, democracy promotion was still a desirable goal (just not when it conflicted with more important goals). Clearly, President Bush’s “grand strategy” of democratization passes the political legitimacy test for the majority of Americans. For third-party states—such as France and Germany—the legitimacy of democratization very much depends on the means, processes, and institutional arrangements used to achieve it. In general, democratization is seen as acceptable, especially if it happens organically within a country or through the exercise of soft power (economic, diplomatic, informational, etc.). However, when it is attempted through military means, a strategy of democratization may lose its legitimacy, as witnessed by the reaction of many European (and other) states to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.58 Democratization by force may be illegitimate because it violates the norm of state sovereignty. Additionally, some of the heavy-handed American tactics used in the “war” on terrorism—such as the use of Guant´anamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, and the allegations of torture at both facilities— have eroded the legitimacy of democratization, because the United States is seen as hypocritical in its commitment to liberal norms.59 This opposition to the use of military force in the name of democratization is not absolute among Europeans, however. Its legitimacy also depends on the perceived need to transform a state’s political system. In Afghanistan, the threat of state-protected terrorism was sufficiently high that all member states of NATO accepted not only that al Qaeda needed to be eliminated, but that the Taliban regime needed to be changed so that future Afghan governments would no longer harbor terrorists. What is of critical importance to many countries, especially those in Europe, is that the invasion of Afghanistan was made legitimate because it was first vetted, approved, and supported by multilateral institutions, including both the United Nations and NATO. The ends can be justified, but only if the means are proper. However, for states that are the direct or indirect targets of democratization, the legitimacy of America’s strategy is by definition problematic, even for those states have been traditionally aligned with the United States. To the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Pakistan, and other Muslim states, democratization is seen as a direct threat to their rule. Not surprisingly, even though many leaders in pro-U.S. authoritarian states have undertaken some steps toward democratization in the face of renewed international pressure, they have limited the extent of these reforms and sometimes reversed them after a short time.60 On the other hand, the citizens of

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these countries desire more freedom and thus would see democratization as a legitimate process.61 Most modernist and secularist movements would welcome increased democratization in places such as Egypt, Syria, or Jordan.62 Even many Islamist parties have engaged in the political process and would support democratization if it means that they would have a better chance of wielding more political power. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hizbollah have enjoyed increased political success in democratic elections.63 Their long-term commitment to democracy, though, is questionable. Are they truly committed to democratic norms, or—as history taught us with the rise of Fascism in the 1930s— are today’s Islamists merely using the democratic process instrumentally to gain greater political power?64 Despite their acceptance and even desire for democracy, though, these groups might still see a U.S.-supported democratization as illegitimate. As Thomas Carothers puts it, “[Americans] fail to realize how much the United States is perceived in the countries in which it is engaged as taking sides in historical power struggles rather than advancing the abstract principles of democracy.”65 The radical jihadists, more so than any other group, would see democratization as illegitimate. Unfortunately, it is these radical jihadists, not the mainstream Islamists, who use violence and terrorism to achieve their goals. So, while democratization may be legitimate for peaceful groups, it will not be seen as legitimate for those engaging in violence. Moreover, the illegitimacy of democracy is one of the grievances of al Qaeda and other groups, and so democracy’s illegitimacy also makes U.S. strategy ineffective in the ways described earlier. A common refrain heard in the last few years is that the way to defeat the Islamic extremists is to do more to support the moderates and their ideology of compromise and accommodation. Cheryl Benard has written that it “seems judicious to encourage the elements within the Islamic mix that are the most compatible with global peace and the international community and that are friendly to democracy and modernity.”66 The logic behind this argument is that there is an ideological debate within the Islamic world between secularists and modernists on one hand and fundamentalists and traditionalists on the other, with opposing views over “political and individual freedom, education, the status of women, criminal justice, the legitimacy of reform and change, and attitudes toward the West.”67 Unless there is a clear ideological victory for the moderates, the extremists will find fertile ground for recruiting people into terrorism from within the fundamentalist or traditionalist camps. The hope in the West is that if the moderates win, it would “drain the swamp” of the ideological support for the extremists willing to use violence and terror to achieve their reactionary aims. While this idea of supporting the moderates against the extremists sounds promising, it is in fact far from being practical or legitimate, and

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calls for a healthy dose of humility by Westerners. Engaging in the “war of ideas” within the Islamic world is an undertaking far more complicated than many people appreciate for several reasons.68 First, what authority does the West have in the Islamic community to participate—even indirectly—in Islamic theological issues? One might consider a hypothetical situation in reverse.69 We assert there would be significant nationalistic “blowback” in the United States if outside forces were even indirectly seen as influencing domestic ideologies. American Christians would not take kindly to Jews, Hindus, or Muslims explaining to them just what a “good Christian” should be. Recall the domestic uproar over the real case of the alleged Chinese influence in U.S. elections in the mid-1990s.70 A second reason that an American-led attempt to win the war of ideas is both impractical and illegitimate is that other groups that are much better situated to actually fight this war of ideas have not been successful. There are two main actors that would be far more likely to win this war of ideas. First, the existing Islamic state governments (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc.) have all engaged in various measures to deal with Islamic extremists, ranging from repression (Turkey) to ambivalence (Pakistan) to accommodation (Egypt) and cooptation (Saudi Arabia). While some of these measures have achieved a certain degree of success, there still remains a large enough minority of Islamic extremists coming out of these countries who subscribe to ideologies that justify using terrorism to threaten the West. It would be imprudent to think the United States would have any greater success against extremist ideologues than the existing regimes in the region, which are at least equally (if not more so) threatened by extremist ideologies. Ironically, an additional actor that might help win the war of ideas against extremist ideologies is, surprisingly, fellow jihadists. While many people in the West think of the extremists as a monolithic actor, they are in fact far from it, with tensions and outright conflicts between many of the groups. Who are the extremists, and what are their distinctions both internally and from moderates? First, within Sunni Islam (Shia Islam is a whole different story), there are mainstream moderate Muslims who, like the majority of people who practice other religions, go about their daily lives, practicing their religion as they see fit, without much thought on changing the relationship between religion and society or politics. In contrast, the Salafis seek a return to a more puritanical version of Islam based on a stricter interpretation of Islam’s original texts and seek the implementation of sharia. Quintan Wiktorowicz has divided the Salafis into three groups: purists, who wish to spread their message through propagation and education; politicos (or Islamists), who wish to engage in the political process to change the laws of the state; and jihadists, who argue that violence is necessary.71 The acceptance of violence as legitimate means for

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change is a useful distinction between moderates (politicos and purists) who eschew violence and extremists (jihadists) who accept it. However, even within the jihadists, there are large disagreements over the legitimate targets of their violence. According to Fawaz Gerges, the jihadists come in three types (which sometimes overlap).72 Irredentist jihadists fight against foreign occupiers of Islamic lands and would included the mujahideen in 1980s Afghanistan, many of today’s Iraqi insurgents, many of the Palestinian groups, and anti-Russian Chechen fighters. The internal jihadists believe in targeting their own governments (the near enemy) and would include groups in Algeria and Egypt that were prominent in the 1990s. The global jihadists have made the strategic decision to target the West (the far enemy) because they believe they cannot defeat their own governments unless the far enemy withdraws its support. Al Qaeda is, so far, the only transnational or global jihadi movement. Note that al Qaeda is best thought of as a decentralized network consisting of both hardcore and loosely affiliated groups, but also as an ideology of global jihad that has inspired otherwise disconnected individuals to engage in terrorism targeted against the West.73 Importantly, the global and internal jihadists fought their own war of ideas during the 1990s. As Gerges shows, the internal jihadists had been essentially defeated by the repressive measures of states such as Egypt and Algeria during the 1990s. As a result, they declared a cease-fire and abandoned the conflict. Osama bin Laden, with the later support of Ayman al-Zawahiri (the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad—an internal jihadi group that joined al Qaeda to become a global group74 ), argued that attacking the far enemy was justifiable and legitimate according to their readings of Islamic texts. This reorientation of the targeting strategy caused a rift within the jihadi community, with global and internal jihadists alike condemning their rivals’ strategies as illegitimate.75 The most interesting point that comes out of this jihadi “civil war” is the inability of any side to win the war of ideas. Despite the condemnations of the internal jihadists, they were never able to entirely discredit the global jihadists. Likewise, the global jihadists were never able to mobilize their potential constituents to the degree that the internal jihadists had in Egypt and Algeria.76 This should be enormously instructive. For the West to think that it can turn people away from global jihad through an informational campaign, when the jihadists’ closest ideological brethren could not, smacks of hubris. In sum, American-led democratization is legitimate to Americans, possibly legitimate to Europeans, depending on the means, and essentially illegitimate to many Muslims, depending on their outlook. As such, a democratization strategy may work in a specific target country with a given set of conditions, but may be ill-suited for most Muslim countries.

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CONCLUSION: REBALANCING THE EQUATION One of the critical requirements for policymakers is the willingness to conduct periodic assessments that answer a simple question: is my strategy working? The important point here is to remind ourselves that the strategy equation, E ≈ W + M, must continually be adjusted by decision makers. As such, some policy objectives (ends) may not be achievable if a working combination of ways and means to achieve those ends cannot be fashioned. If the existing elements and the configuration of strategy are not working, then three choices present themselves to decision makers: (1) strategic ways and means must be reordered and used more creatively and effectively (a new strategic mix with the same ways and means); (2) additional or alternative ways and means must be generated by policymakers to buttress the execution of strategy (it should be noted that ways and means are not always finite—new resources and methods can be obtained or formulated); and (3) policy goals must be abridged to fall within the constraints of the available ways and means. Given that the United States has now been fighting its GWOT for five years, we conclude with a number of recommendations, none of which will be easy for the Bush administration or its successors in the White House (of either party) to implement. We are confident in observing that military force has thus far proven inadequate for achieving the administration’s objective of democratizing both Afghanistan and Iraq. As such, a number of possibilities come to mind. First, reconsider the means. If there are insufficient military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, one option (in theory) would be to drastically increase the number of U.S. troops. The United States decided in World War II to mobilize the entire country behind the war effort; as a result, from 1941 to 1945, it drafted, organized, trained, and deployed well over 16 million soldiers. A similar option was available to the U.S. government following the September 11 terror attacks, but the Bush administration decided not to take that route, even though, from the outset, it clearly had decided that the governments of both Afghanistan and Iraq would have to be overthrown.77 However, five years later, it would now be very difficult if not impossible for the Bush administration to change course and radically increase the number of U.S. troops committed to the war. This is not to say that the United States does not have the requisite population, industrial base, and wealth-generating capacity to field a much, much larger military force, but it is highly unlikely any successor president would attempt to do so. Indeed, it is safe to say the country has the capacity, but presently lacks the will, to drastically augment its military troop strength. Unless some catastrophic new event (such as a terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction) were to change the existing climate, the option of throwing more troops into the GWOT does not pass the domestic legitimacy test. Certainly, however, the country

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does have the option of increasing the use of its diplomatic, informational, and economic elements of national power. Likewise, the Bush administration should seriously reconsider a drastic change in the forces it is using to fight the GWOT. Putting the conventional “big Army” in charge of Afghanistan and Iraq has proven to be ineffective at fighting insurgencies in both countries. One problem is that the senior U.S. commanders all come from the conventional side of a force structure that is trained to meet regularly conceived military threats. These individuals are honorable and patriotic men who are operationally brilliant when facing large formations of Soviet-built tanks, infantry divisions, and attack helicopters. Regrettably, this sort of enemy structure was last seen in Iraq more than a decade ago. The first axiom of military strategy is the need to understand the type of fight you are in. If you have a heart problem you don’t go to a dentist; you go to a cardiologist. If you have an insurgency problem, you must appoint an expert in irregular war to call the shots. America has now spent as much time in the GWOT as it did in all of World War II, and not a single high-ranking general has been replaced for lack of progress on the battlefield. Putting the U.S. Army’s Special Forces in charge of both Afghanistan and Iraq would be a step in the right direction of rebalancing the strategic equation.78 Second, reevaluate the ways. It is clear from our preceding analysis that democracy is an inherently risky method for organizing U.S. grand strategy in the GWOT. It may be legitimate to the average American, but it is not likely to be effective or practical. Democratization has brought into elected governments organizations such as Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, yet neither group has given up terror. Even though many might contest the notion that Iran is democratic, the government there is chosen by the people in hotly contested multiparty elections; yet Iran remains the single most important sponsor of terror in the world. As such, the emerging wisdom for democracy advocates might be summarized by the statement “Be careful what you wish for.” Third, review the ends. What exactly are the ends of U.S. strategy in the GWOT? In the early days following 9/11, President Bush declared that he would do “whatever was necessary” to protect the security of the United States, and he has since repeatedly restated that most noble and necessary aspiration. However, despite the president’s clear articulation that security of the United States is his number one priority, we suggest that his choice to pursue a “grand strategy of democratization,” as John Gaddis coined it, has inadvertently muddied the strategic waters significantly and has subsequently made maintaining the rough equilibrium of the E ≈ W + M equation nearly impossible. Indeed, the U.S. government seems to have focused on democracy as the only viable, long-term means for achieving security from terrorism. As such, democracy, rather than security, has become an end in itself. This unjustified hope in the deterministic

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power of democracy to produce peace has channeled U.S. strategy away from alternative approaches that might prove more effective. Hope is not a viable approach for the making of strategy. NOTES 1. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 2. http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf. 3. See Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (London, Oxford University Press, 1999). 4. The U.S. Army War College is located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. It is the U.S. Army’s senior service school. It claims to be “the most prestigious institution for the education of strategic leaders and for the study of the development and employment of landpower in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.” See http://www.carlisle.army.mil/about/mission.shtml. 5. Ibid. 6. Fred Charles Ikl´e, “The Role of Character and Intellect in Strategy,” in On Not Confusing Ourselves: Essays on National Security Strategy in Honor of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter, eds. Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). 7. Ibid. 8. For the foundational text on realism, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nation, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968). 9. See H. Richard Yarger, Towards a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model, http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm. 10. Ibid. 11. In the strategy approach developed by Art Lykke at the U.S. Army War College, these terms are presented as “suitability,” “feasibility,” and “acceptability.” We will use these terms synonymously, but please note that our paraphrasing (especially of acceptability) provides greater clarity to the reader than that provided by Yarger, http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm. 12. Yarger, http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm. 13. http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode1/kennan.htm. See also George Kennan (X), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701faessay25403/x/ the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html. 14. This is not to say executing the plan was easy or simple. 15. John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation,” Foreign Policy, November–December 2002. Bold and emphasis added. 16. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-7.html. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 243, 244. 20. Carothers, Critical Mission, 145. 21. Carothers, Critical Mission, 241.

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22. Eva Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Political Science Quarterly 19, no. 4 (2004–2005): 595–608. 23. Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention,” 604. 24. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York. Pantheon Books, 2006), 26– 54. 25. Ibid, 33. 26. Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, chaps. 1–6. 27. Congressional Budget Office, “Estimated Cost of U.S. Operations in Iraq Under Two Specified Scenarios,” July 13, 2006, http://www.cbo.gov/ ftpdocs/73xx/doc7393/07-13-IraqCost Letter.pdf. 28. Jonathan Weisman, “Projected Iraq War Costs Soar,” Washington Post, April 27, 2006; Martin Wolk, “Cost of Iraq War Could Surpass $1 Trillion,” http:// www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11880954/, downloaded on 7/6/2006. 29. Congressional Research Service, United States Military Casualty Statistics: Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, June 8, 2006, Order Code RS22452. 30. Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 1985), 88. 31. Osama bin Laden, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” 1996, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/ terrorism/international/fatwa 1996.html, 8. 32. Bin Laden, “Declaration of War.” 33. Meaning pro-U.S. 34. See Jennifer Windsor, “Promoting Democratization Can Combat Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly 26, no. 3 (Summer 2003): 46–47, for a list of democratic mechanisms that might reduce the likelihood of political violence. 35. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 44. 36. Martha Crenshaw uses this language in “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (July 1981): 379–399. 37. Quoted in Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleˇckov´a, “Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?” New Republic, June 24, 2002. 38. See Krueger and Maleˇckov´a, “Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?” and Daniel Pipes, “God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?” National Interest, Winter 2001–2002. 39. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), 74. 40. Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 10859, www.nber.org/ papers/w10859. 41. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 270. 42. See Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 383, who offers many other situational, strategic, and individual level causes of terrorism; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 79; James Forest, “Exploring Root Causes of Terrorism,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 3, Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT:

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Praeger Security International, 2006), 5; Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 273; Alex Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” in Alex Schmid and Ronald Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism (London: Frank Cass, 1993), 15, 17; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002–2003): 52; Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “Nasty, Brutish, and Long: America’s War on Terrorism,” Current History 100, no. 650 (December 2001): 407; Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War against America (New York: Random House, 2003), 480. 43. Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, 11. 44. See Alex Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” in Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten, eds., Western Responses to Terrorism (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 18–19; Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 23; Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan Press, 1977), 103; Lawrence Hamilton and James Hamilton, “Dynamics of Terrorism,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 1 (March 1983): 40–41. 45. William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 4 (Winter 1994): 426, and “Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 155–164. Quan Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 278–297, summarizes the recent debates centered on these works by Eubank and Weinberg. 46. Cronin, “Sources of Contemporary Terrorism,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James Ludes (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 34. 47. Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 (August 2003): 350. 48. Robert Pape, Dying to Win (New York: Random House, 2005), 44. 49. Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.” 50. Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy, 23. 51. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 257. 52. According to a British-run poll, 67 percent of Iraqis feel less secure because of the occupation. See report by Sean Rayment, “Secret MoD poll: Iraqis support attacks on British troops,” Sunday Telegraph (October 23, 2005). 53. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), “Human Rights Report: 1 May–30 June 2006,” http://www.uniraq.org/documents/HR%20Report% 20May%20Jun%202006%20EN.pdf. 54. F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, September–October 2005. 55. See Michael Herzog, “Can Hamas Be Tamed?” Foreign Affairs, March– April 2006. 56. Pew survey from October 2005 summarized at http://pewresearch.org/ obdeck/?ObDeckID=3. 57. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Avon Books, 1992).

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58. See Philip Gordon, “The End of the Bush Revolution” Foreign Affairs, July– August 2006. 59. Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs, March–April 2006, 56. 60. Hassan Fattah, “Democracy in the Arab World, a U.S. Goal, Falters,” New York Times, April 10, 2006. 61. See http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=185. 62. Cheryl Benard, “Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, and Strategies,” RAND, 2003. 63. For more on the shift to a less violent strategy, see Roy, The Failure of Political Islam; Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002); and Gerges, The Far Enemy. 64. Carothers, Critical Mission, 239. 65. Carothers, Critical Mission, 152. See also 238. 66. Benard, “Civil Democratic Islam,” ix. 67. Ibid., x. 68. Please see the chapter in this volume by James S. Robbins. 69. See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), for an account of the Christian extremist movement in America. 70. Bob Woodward, “Finding Links Clinton Allies to Chinese Intelligence,” Washington Post, February 10, 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ politics/special/campfin/stories/cf021098.htm. 71. Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 29 (2006): 207–239. 72. Gerges, The Far Enemy. 73. See Burke, Al-Qaida. 74. For more on the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, please see the chapter by Sherifa Zuhur in volume 3 of this book. 75. See Gerges, The Far Enemy. 76. Gerges, The Far Enemy, 162, 164. 77. See Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, for an analysis of the Bush adminstration’s early focus on Iraq. 78. Douglas A. Borer, “The Clock is Ticking in Iraq,” San Francisco Chronicle, October 7, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/ 10/07/EDGPFF3EBA1.DTL.

CHAPTER 4 TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY INSURGENCIES: UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF TERRORISM AS A STRATEGY Leonard Weinberg and William L. Eubank

This chapter explores the impact of terrorism on the success or failure of armed insurgencies that the United States is likely to encounter during the twenty-first century. The best way to begin this exploration is by a brief review of the historical record. The record we have in mind is that of the half century following the end of World War II. If we consider the role of terrorism and terrorist campaigns over this period, we discern three patterns. The first is one in which terrorism is the exclusive type of violence by which insurgents seek to achieve their objectives. For example, in Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, the IRA and ETA waged long-term campaigns aimed at achieving, respectively, the unification of Ireland and an independent Basque homeland. Despite the protracted nature of these struggles, in neither instance did the challengers succeed in raising the level of violence beyond that of clandestine attacks carried out by small groups against unsuspecting targets.1 The second pattern is that of an armed insurgency without the use of terrorism. Particularly during national independence struggles against the European colonial powers and the revolutions elsewhere in the Third World in the three decades following the end of the war, guerrilla warfare (as employed by Mao and his followers in China, and Castro and his “bearded ones” in Cuba) was the widely accepted models. In these conflicts, the outposts or representatives of government authority were legitimate targets, but by and large, indiscriminate attacks on noncombatants

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remained out of bounds, if for no other reason than it was thought that they did more harm than good. In some instances, revolutionary-minded military officers seized power—as in Egypt and Iraq—and either forced the deposed pro-Western rulers into exile or simply executed them. In neither case, though, did terrorism play a major role. The third pattern we are able to identify is one in which terrorism is simply one weapon, one arrow in the quiver, at the disposal of an armed insurgency. Examples of these “combined operations” are not hard to come by. The struggle for Vietnam offers two of them.2 French colonial control over the country was successfully challenged by the Viet Minh in the decade following the end of World War II. The result of this conflict was the temporary division of the country into two parts, North and South, on the basis of the 1954 Geneva treaty. The second conflict, really an extension of the first but with different participants, began in 1960 as a conflict between the Saigon-based and pro-Western government of South Vietnam and its revolutionary challenger, the Viet Cong. The latter received continuous and substantial support from the Communist government of North Vietnam in Hanoi. The United States, under a succession of administrations, made what became an all-out, protracted, and ultimately unsuccessful effort to defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. The latter achieved the unification of Vietnam in 1975 by defeating the armed forces of the Saigon regime (after the departure of American forces). Descriptions of these Vietnam conflicts usually depict the struggles as involving two phases. The first is that of a guerrilla war, with initially the Viet Minh and then the Viet Cong launching well-planned, smallscale attacks on French, American, and South Vietnamese forces from rainforests and remote mountainous locales, where the terrain itself could offset the insurgents’ ostensible disadvantages. The second phase is usually depicted as that of the “endgame”—the 1953 battle of Dien Bien Phu for the French, and the rapid advance of the regular North Vietnamese Army toward Saigon in 1975. In other words, the conflicts involved guerrilla war followed by the use of conventional military forces against a demoralized enemy. What role, then, did terrorism play in the fighting over Vietnam? For Mao Tse-tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and other theorists of revolutionary insurgencies in the Third World, terrorism is an attention-gaining tactic— one to be employed, along with other publicity-seeking measures, in the early “agitation-propaganda” phase of the struggle.3 Once this task is accomplished and the consciousness of the masses is raised sufficiently, the struggle can move to a newer, higher level, producing a more serious challenge to the incumbent regime. Terrorism is then superseded by guerrilla operations. The fighting over Vietnam did not follow this particular choreography. The Viet Minh continued to use terrorism against the French throughout their unsuccessful attempt to retain control of the country. Terrorism was

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Strategic and Tactical Considerations Table 4.1 U.S. Mission Reports of Viet Cong Assassinations and Abductions, 1966–1969

Government Officials Government Employees General Populace

Assassinations

Abductions

1,153 1,863 15,015 18,031

664 381 24,862 25,907

Total = 43,938 Source: Stephen Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future (Lexington, MA: Heath Lexington Books, 1970), 44.

used to persuade French civilians and off-duty members of the armed forces that there were no safe places where they could relax and enjoy periods of rest and recuperation from the fighting in the hinterlands. Accordingly, Viet Minh agents threw and planted bombs in restaurants, bars, bordellos, and theaters in Hanoi, Saigon, and other cities.4 The same may be said in regard to the fighting over South Vietnam both before and during the American presence. In fact, the Viet Cong did go through an “agitation-propaganda” phase. For instance, as Walter Laqueur reports, “Bernard Fall [a French-American Southeast Asia specialist] relates that he returned to Vietnam in 1957 after the war had been over for two years and was told by everyone that the situation was fine. He was bothered, however, by the many obituaries in the press of village chiefs who had been killed by ‘unknown elements’ and ‘bandits.’ Upon investigation, he found these attacks were clustered in certain areas and that there was a purpose behind them.”5 But the Viet Cong hardly stopped after it became widely known who the “unknown elements” and “bandits” really were and what they intended to achieve. In fact, the pace of Viet Cong terrorism escalated along with the insurgency itself. No systematic data are available, but the U.S. Mission estimated that the Viet Cong carried out approximately 9,700 assassinations of pro-Saigon civilians from 1960 through 1965.6 The mission did compile a systematic record of Viet Cong terrorist attacks between 1966 and 1969, the period of maximum American involvement in the conflict (see Table 4.1). Not only are the figures displayed in Table 4.1 extraordinarily high, comparable to or exceeding the levels of terrorism in Algeria during the 1990s or the present situation (2003–2006) in Iraq, but the vast majority of Viet Cong assassinations and kidnappings were carried out against members of the general South Vietnamese public, a type of psychological warfare intended to weaken whatever bonds existed between the Saigon government and its nominal citizens.

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Viet Cong and North Vietnamese terrorism was of utmost importance in persuading the American public that the war was unwinnable. For example, consider the January 1968 “General Offensive and General Uprising” (i.e., the Tet offensive), in which Viet Cong forces invaded South Vietnam’s major cities and attacked crucial American and South Vietnamese civilian installations and military bases. The most spectacular of these assaults was the suicide attack on the American Embassy compound in Saigon. Viet Cong sappers in civilian dress (some of whom had been working undercover as taxi drivers to disguise their intentions and also become familiar with the city) invaded the compound in the hope of assassinating the American ambassador, Elsworth Bunker. The attack failed in the sense that the ambassador was elsewhere at the time, but the Viet Cong did manage to seize control of a section of the compound and kill a number of guards and civilian personnel, until they were themselves killed in the course of a firefight that lasted several hours.7 This terrorist attack, carried out by Viet Cong cadres dressed in civilian clothing in the middle of Saigon, struck at the very heart of the American presence. The attack on the embassy compound was covered extensively by American reporters, whose dramatic television and newspaper accounts of the invasion helped persuade Americans that there was, in fact, no light at the end of the tunnel. As with terrorist operations in general, there was an element of theater, of show business, in this event. The attack on the compound was a failure in the sense that Ambassador Bunker was not harmed and a small unit of American forces was able to restore complete American control over the compound. However, the Viet Cong clearly achieved a theatrical success: Thanks to the mass media, their audience back in the United States became persuaded of the long-term futility of American involvement. In other words, in Vietnam the weak had defeated the strong. David had slain Goliath in an asymmetric conflict. As Ivan Arreguin-Toft notes, “When U.S. Marines came ashore at Dan Nang in 1965, the U.S. population was about 194 million, while North Vietnam’s was approximately 19 million. U.S. and North Vietnamese armed forces totaled approximately 2.5 million and 256,000 respectively. . . . Multiplying population and armed forces, and dividing the strong actor’s total by two results in a relative force ratio of 53:1 in favor of the United States.”8 Furthermore, the outcome of the struggle over Vietnam is hardly unique. On the basis of data derived from the Singer and Small Correlates of War data set, Arreguin-Toft reports that in a little under 30 percent of 202 asymmetric armed conflicts fought between 1816 and 2003, the weaker side (measured in terms of population magnitude and military size) defeated the nominally stronger one. In addition, the closer in time we get to the present, the better chances the weaker opponent has of defeating the stronger.9

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The ability of the weak to defeat the strong compels us to ask two questions. Why do the weak defeat the strong in armed conflicts? And why do they appear to be getting better at it? Observers provide us with a number of answers to the first question. Let us review some of them, bearing in mind, as we do, that these answers are not necessarily incompatible with one another. The duration of the conflict may be worth considering as at least a contributing factor. In an early effort to systematically examine the outcomes of “internal wars” over the first 60 years of the twentieth century, George Modelski came to the conclusion that the challengers’ chances of prevailing over an incumbent regime improved as the conflict persisted. If groups fundamentally opposed to the government are able to transform their opposition from rhetoric into armed struggle, and if this struggle persists over time, the opposition has—according to Modelski’s calculations— about a 50/50 chance of achieving an outright victory.10 (Some may detect an element of circularity in this reasoning. The duration of the conflict may be simply a reflection of the strength of an insurgency, or the weakness of the incumbents relative to the challengers.) The outcome of the Vietnam War calls our attention to another explanation for the defeat of the strong at the hands of the weak. Gil Merom thinks that the nature of the “strong” government or political regime makes a difference. He argues that “democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory. They are restricted by their domestic structure, and in particular by the creed of some of their most articulate citizens and the opportunities their institutional makeup present such citizens.”11 Democracies, then, often lack the ability to defeat insurgencies because of domestic opposition to the conflict. Mass media portrayals of civilian deaths (i.e., atrocities) along with accounts of mounting casualties suffered by the democracy’s armed forces create an antiwar opposition on the home front. It is distressing, but probably true nevertheless, that defeating an insurgency (whose own fighters rarely abide by Marquis of Queensbury Rules or the Geneva Convention) may require engaging in tactics incompatible with the humanitarian values possessed by the besteducated and most articulate citizens of the democracy. These citizens give “voice” to their opposition and encourage others to do likewise. If the domestic opposition to involvement in the insurgency, particularly when the conflict is fought on foreign soil, becomes sustained and widespread, a democracy may lose by essentially defeating itself. Authoritarian regimes do not suffer from these inhibitions. Because open opposition is repressed and the mass media tightly controlled, dictatorial regimes are better able to defeat armed insurgencies, both those waged at home and abroad. In fact, in Argentina, Uruguay, Turkey, and elsewhere during the 1970s, democracies were toppled by the military

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precisely because they had failed to repress armed insurgencies. The new military juntas wasted little time in eliminating these challenges (as well as the challengers themselves) to the existing order. The increased ability of the weak to defeat the strong in recent decades may be in part a consequence of worldwide democratization. The number of democracies has grown significantly since the mid-1970s, as what Huntington identifies as the “Third Wave” of democratization has swept over regions of the world where this form of rule was unknown or had been tried and failed at earlier times.12 If democracies suffer from squeamishness and the kinds of inhibitions mentioned above, it follows that the more democracies there are, the better the record of the weak in defeating the strong. The relationship, though, between regime type (democratic versus authoritarian) and the outcome of armed conflicts does not approach a completely linear type of association. A few examples provide us with grounds for skepticism. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Portuguese dictatorship, whose armed forces were equipped with modern weapons, tried and failed to defeat armed independence struggles waged by groups active in its then colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, the effort to prosecute these struggles led directly to the overthrow of the Lisbon government. The most obvious and notable example is the Soviet Union’s 1988 withdrawal from Afghanistan, a defeat inflicted by local Afghan fighters supported by “holy warriors” from elsewhere in the Muslim world. Andrew Mack, Richard Snyder, and others answer the question of why big nations lose small wars in a somewhat different way.13 As in the case of Merom’s contention about regime type, the focus is on the domestic situation in the big or strong nation. In many instances the latter will only have limited interests in the outcome of the conflict. When these interests come to be outweighed by the costs—human and material—of sustained involvement, the government at home becomes politically vulnerable. In democracies, this vulnerability typically involves growing support for opposition political parties and the formation of an antiwar movement. In “strong” countries ruled by authoritarian governments, opposition to further participation in the conflict will typically emerge from within the ruling elite. Factions within the ruling elite may very well come to clarify the limited interests at stake and the diminished benefits to be derived from further involvement. The result is often in-fighting among members of the ruling elite, resulting in a decision to reduce involvement in the conflict by those in power—or, if they refuse to change course, their replacement by members of the oppositional faction. There is also the matter of the weaker side’s level of interest to consider. If the “weak”—for example, North Vietnam, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, Hamas—regard the outcome of the conflict as affecting their fundamental interests, they will be willing to bear very

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high costs in continuing its armed struggle. As in Vietnam, the weak participant’s stake in the result of the conflict may be so high (anything short of annihilation) that “cooler heads” within the strong nation with very limited interests at stake will devise and then seek to implement an “exit strategy.” Another way of explaining why the weak defeat the strong is based on strategic considerations, what Arreguin-Toft labels “strategic interaction.”14 In this understanding, the outcome of the armed conflict may very well be based on the type of approach each actor employs in its effort to defeat its enemy. Arreguin-Toft identifies two ideal strategic approaches: direct and indirect. The direct approach to the conflict involves conventional attack and defense. These conventional approaches “feature soldier on soldier contests along with codified rules as to their conduct and a shared conception of what counts as victory and defeat.” For Arreguin-Toft, unconventional approaches may also be reduced to two types: “barbarism” and guerrilla warfare. Both forms of unconventional fighting are aimed at sapping the enemy’s will to fight rather than its physical capacity to fight. Guerrilla warfare probably does not need much by way of explanation, but “barbarism” does. “Barbarism targets an adversary’s will by murdering, torturing, or incarcerating noncombatants.”15 The behavior of the Bosnian Serb military and the Milosevic regime in Belgrade visa` -vis Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo during the 1990s over the fate of Yugoslavia may serve as an example. Arreguin-Toft’s generalization is that when the weak employ conventional approaches in their fight with the strong, they almost always lose. On the other hand, when the weak adopt the unconventional warfare approach, their prospects for success improve substantially. Thus, guerrilla warfare and “barbarism” appear to work. The weak tend to prevail when they rely on unconventional means, especially guerrilla warfare, while the strong persist in using conventional means of fighting. In some circumstances—for example, Russia in its recent struggle with Chechen rebels—”barbarism” was employed by the strong contestant, but in the United States and other Western democracies, this approach is normally regarded as criminal conduct. And, at first glance, the ability of the “weak” side to practice “barbarism” is limited by its ability to attack the strong one’s civilian population (more on this later in the discussion). At this point we might add a corollary. In contemporary asymmetric conflicts, the armed forces of the strong are usually composed of soldiers from the advanced industrialized countries—individuals trained, for the most part, to engage in conventional approaches to armed conflict. This training may be supplemented these days with some instruction in unconventional warfare.16 However, these First World “soldiers” (usually

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sworn to uphold a code of conduct based on the Geneva Conventions) frequently confront “warriors” from tribal and clan-based societies (e.g., Somalia), for whom the unconventional is the conventional, and fighting a normal part of the life cycle.17 The code of conduct governing the behavior of these “warriors” (which may include, for example, the mutilation of the bodies of those slain in battle) rarely has anything to do with the rules stipulated by the Geneva Convention. The result may often bear a close resemblance to the events depicted in Mark Bowden’s volume Black Hawk Down and the popular film based on it. The “weak” may also be able to overcome the “strong” because of the types of weapons possessed by the former. According to Eliot Cohen, “The enormous increase in the quality and quantity of arms in the hands of Third World nations, coupled with increased organizational competence in the handling of such weapons, renders many local conventional balances far more even than before.”18 In 1936, for instance, the Ethiopian military sought to defend its country against the invading Italian army by using spears, bows and arrows, and a handful of primitive rifles, and the outcome was predictable. In the years leading up to 1988, the Afghan mujahideen made adroit use of grenade launchers and handheld stinger missiles to convince the Soviets about the benefits of withdrawing from this trouble-plagued region of Dar al-Islam. In other words, the types of weapons available to the nominally weaker side in internal or civil wars and other armed conflicts have improved dramatically since the Fascist dictator Mussolini’s military defeated Emperor Haile Selassie’s forces in the lead-up to World War II. The weaker side, as in the cases of the Afghan mujahideen and the Viet Cong, may be the beneficiary of material support—typically in the form of small arms—from third parties (e.g., the Americans and Soviets during the Cold War) who have an interest in seeing the strong defeated. In short, the diffusion of modern weapons serves as an equalizer; as a result, the gap in strength between the “weak” and the “strong” narrows, as do the odds of the former’s ability to defeat the latter.19 This brings us to the role of terrorism in current and future armed conflicts. We should begin by noting that modern terrorism began in Europe during the last third of the nineteenth century, specifically following the repression of the Paris Commune in 1871. Up to that defeat, many social revolutionaries had believed that a working-class revolution would resemble the French Revolution of 1789–1792, with Parisian crowds armed with primitive weapons simply overwhelming the ancient regime’s armed forces. The defeat of the commune persuaded many revolutionaries that the model of 1789 was no longer appropriate, and that the gap between the weapons at the disposal of the modern military and mobs equipped with shovels, pitchforks, and crowbars had grown too wide.20 For at least some of these disappointed revolutionaries, terrorism—or “propaganda

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by deed” (e.g., assassinating monarchs, political leaders and industrialists, and setting off bombs in public places)—seemed an effective way of once again narrowing the odds and fomenting revolution. However, despite creating widespread fear throughout much of Europe over the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century, terrorism as a tactic proved eminently unsuccessful in igniting revolutionary upheavals. Lenin and Trotsky, rivals of terrorism’s Russian practitioners, understood the sources of the failure. Instead of inspiring the masses to action and terrifying the country’s rulers, terrorism produced two results: on the one hand, it acted as a narcotic by persuading the masses that the terrorism was the revolution, rather than a tactic to spark it; on the other hand, it was a kind of “adventurism” that invited the repression of all revolutionary elements by the authorities.21 The experience of the terrorist campaigns waged by revolutionary bands in Western Europe—for example, the Red Brigades, Red Army Fraction, and Direct Action—from the late 1960s through the early 1980s is much the same. The violence of these terrorist organizations caused widespread apprehension, revulsion, and some political backlash, but nothing vaguely resembling a revolution. Terrorism used in isolation from other types of violence and other forms of political activity rarely succeeds. Terrorism or “barbarism” as a tactic used in conjunction with other means of violence and political activity by the weak against the strong is another matter. In fact, we would hypothesize that one of the major reasons the “weak” have improved their ability to defeat the “strong” in recent decades has involved their willingness to employ terrorism both at the immediate site of the conflict and in the homeland of the “strong.” Along with easier access to sophisticated small arms, the natural squeamishness of democracies to the practice of barbarism by its representatives, the differences in levels of interest and motivation, and the other factors mentioned above, terrorist activity has enhanced the capacity of weak insurgents in their struggles with foreign forces. During the 1980s, for example, India became involved in the ethnicreligious conflict in Sri Lanka, a conflict between the Sinhalese (Buddhist) dominated government in Colombo and the secessionist Tamil (Hindu) Liberation Tigers seeking to achieve national independence.22 The Indian government sought to help negotiate a compromise peace agreement between the two sides. It sent troops to enforce a cease-fire, and they quickly became embroiled in fighting the Liberation Tigers, who were willing to carry out terrorist attacks against Indian forces there to help achieve an equitable peace. The violence—a combination of guerrilla warfare and terrorism—became sufficiently intense by the end of the decade that the Indians withdrew. And for his efforts in pursuing a negotiated settlement,

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the Tamil Tigers assassinated the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the middle of his 1991 reelection campaign. The value of terrorism to enhance the chances of insurgent success is recognized in the writings of various contemporary salafist advocates of jihad. For example, in his online work The Management of Savagery, Abu Bakr Naji provides readers with an account of what the movement hopes to achieve and how its jihadists intend to achieve it.23 The replacement of the apostate regimes in the Muslim world and the expulsion of the “Crusaders” and Jews from it requires the “vexation and exhaustion” of the enemy through operations (e.g., Tunisia, Bali, and Turkey) carried out by groups and cells in every region of the Islamic world. The goal of these terrorist operations is to disorient and weaken the enemy to create the conditions for the next stage in the struggle: the administration of savagery. In those regions of Dar al-Islam where the vexation and exhaustion of the apostate regimes has had the greatest effect, the holy warriors are able to engage in the “administration of savagery.” That is, the jihadists are able to engage in a sustained, wide-scale insurgency against the weakened incumbent regimes and their American and other Western supporters. As in Somalia presently (2006), the tactics of urban guerrilla warfare and mass protest, combined with terrorism against elements in the civilian population, will certainly lead to the collapse of the old order and the coming of the new one. This leads us to Afghanistan and Iraq. In the first decade of the twentyfirst century, the United States, along with sympathetic governments in Kabul and Baghdad and a handful of Western allies, will confront insurgencies whose forces combine both types of unconventional warfare, guerrilla operations, and terrorism (or barbarism). In Afghanistan, the Taliban conducts hit-and-run attacks against overstretched or thinly defended outposts of government authority as well as against American and NATO installations. These attacks are coupled with periodic terrorist attacks against government officials and other high-profile targets in Kabul and other cities. The situation in Iraq is more complex. The conflict combines a struggle for dominance between Sunni and Shiite organizations; some religious, some secular (Baathist) (in the case of the former), and some supported by the Iranian theocracy (in the case of the latter). In addition, al Qaeda in Iraq has succeeded in recruiting “holy warriors” from other parts of the Middle East and Western Europe to enter the country to carry out suicide bombing attacks on Shiite, Kurdish, American, and various other foreign targets. In terms of tactics, then, Iraq’s insurgency, like Afghanistan’s, combines guerrilla warfare with terrorism. But there are obvious differences. In Iraq, guerrilla operations are largely urban, involving attacks on police stations and recruiting centers for the Iraqi Army and American military

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installations. The terrorism has become indiscriminate, with daily bombing attacks on virtually all places where large numbers of people may be expected to assemble. (In 2007 the country may be on the verge of what Naji describes as “the administration of savagery.”) There is another difference between Afghanistan and Iraq. Since the initial defeat of the Taliban regime in December 2001, following the 9/11 attacks, the terrorism surrounding the subsequent struggle for control in Afghanistan has been confined to the country itself, with some spillover in Pakistan. In the case of Iraq, on the other hand, groups and cells emanating from (or inspired by) al Qaeda have carried out terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). The objective of these bombings was a kind of coercive diplomacy. Beyond seeking revenge for the sufferings of fellow Muslims in Iraq, the bombers wanted to persuade the Spanish and British governments to withdraw their forces from Iraq. CONCLUSION What lessons may we derive from the Vietnamese, Afghan, Iraqi, and other experiences we have discussed that will inform our understanding of the character of insurgencies that the United States is likely to confront over the balance of the twenty-first century? At the risk of being repetitive, a brief summary is worthwhile. For reasons expressed earlier in this discussion, insurgents appear to be improving, getting better at achieving their aims. By itself, terrorism is rarely or never a winning tactic for its practitioners. When combined, though, with other forms of armed struggle and an adroit political strategy, terrorist violence may become an important device in convincing foreign forces and foreign audiences that the costs of their continued involvement outweigh the potential benefits. Television and the Internet may accelerate the decision making in this direction. Also, these channels of communication help insurgents learn from one another at a progressively faster pace. Techniques that work in one place will be emulated by insurgents elsewhere and quickly.24 Armed insurgencies now and in the foreseeable future are likely to be fought in Third World countries, areas whose populations are becoming increasingly urbanized but not necessarily less tribal in structure or less divided by ethnic and religious affiliation. This means that guerrilla warfare, as in Iraq, is also likely to be an increasingly city-centered activity. The distinction between urban guerrilla attacks on enemy combatants and representatives of government authority and terrorist violence directed against members of the general public seems likely to get blurrier. Likewise, in combating city-centered insurgencies, the United States and other Western democracies that become involved in these conflicts will find it harder to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants in carrying

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out their counterinsurgency operations. Reactions of domestic public opinion to accounts of “barbarism” will therefore prove predictable. In fact, the squeamishness and inhibitions of democracies mentioned earlier may reduce the ability of the United States and other “strong” democracies to successfully wage counterinsurgency campaigns. Two lessons follow, if this account represents a reasonably accurate description of the situation confronting the United States and the other Western democracies in the twenty-first century. First, American forces should only be committed to armed conflicts in the Third World when a vital interest is clearly at stake, one that is clear not merely to key decision makers but also to the general public (whose members, after all, will be asked to absorb the costs involved). Second, if there is an interest to be defended but not a vital one, and political means do not succeed, the United States and the other advanced democracies would appear to be better off cultivating proxies that, in turn, would be able to act as surrogates. Whatever the outcome of the struggle, the costs to the American and other democracies are likely to be far less than those incurred by direct involvement. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The authors would like to express their appreciation to Professor Derek Kauneckis for his help in the preparation of this manuscript. NOTES 1. By terrorism we mean “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Title 22, United States Code, Section 2656f(d)). 2. For a history of the conflict see Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking Press, 1983), esp. 279–283. 3. See, e.g., Brian Crozier, The Rebels (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 159–191; Thomas Thornton, “Terror as a weapon of Political Agitation,” in Internal War, ed. Harry Eckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), 92–95. 4. Douglas Pike, Viet Cong (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), 31–565. 5. Walter Laqueur, Guerrilla (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 271. 6. Stephen Hosmer, Viet Cong Repression and Its Implications for the Future (Lexington MA: Heath Lexington Books, 1970), 42. 7. James Arnold, Tet Offensive 1968: Turning Point in Vietnam (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 85–91; Victoria Pohle, The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives during the Tet Offensive (RMS5799-ISA/ARPA) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp.), 8–22. 8. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 144. 9. Arreguin-Toft, 43–47.

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10. George Modelski, “International Settlement of Internal War,” International Aspects of Civil Strife, ed. James Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 122–153. 11. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15. 12. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3–30. 13. Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 175–200. 14. Arreguin-Toft, 28–47. 15. Arreguin-Toft, 34. 16. For more on the education of officers and soldiers for combating terrorism, please see the chapter by Stephen Sloan in volume 3 of this publication. 17. See, especially, Richard Schultz and Andrew Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 57–100. 18. Elliot Cohen, “Constraints on America’s Conduct of Small Wars,” International Security 9, no. 2 (1984): 162. 19. For more on the global proliferation of small arms and light weapons, please see the chapter by Christopher Carr in volume 2 of this publication. 20. James Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men (New York: Basic Books, 1980), 346–349. 21. See, Walter Laqueur, ed., Voices of Terrorism (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 196–206. 22. See, e.g., Martha Crenshaw, “Democracy, Commitment Problems and the Managing of Ethnic Violence,” in The Democratic Experience and Political Violence, ed. David Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 135–159. 23. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, trans. William McCants (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), http://ctc.usma.edu. Funding for this translation was provided by the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. 24. For more on these issues of organizational learning and knowledge transfer, please see Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), particularly chaps. 1–6.

CHAPTER 5 DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING A COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY Jennifer S. Holmes

Order without liberty and liberty without order are equally destructive. —Theodore Roosevelt1

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGY In counterterrorism, the general guide to success is to catch or kill as many terrorists as you can—without creating more. Although it sounds simple, in a democracy this requires both the guarantee of security and the maintenance of broad public support. When crafting a response to terrorism, different policy aims may be prioritized at one time or another. However, long-term goals should not be undermined for short-term gain. Given political pressures to act and act expeditiously, it is necessary to take sufficient time to craft a comprehensive strategy that achieves efficacy and accountability and that balances security and political integration. Most importantly, fundamentally, do no harm. Sometimes, there are no good options. Actions need to be strategically chosen with proximate and ultimate goals in mind. Otherwise, according to Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “individual application of selected tactics and policies without a comprehensive national plan can prolong a conflict or even lead to complete failure.”2 Before crafting an appropriate counterterror policy, it is important to properly identify the threat. Is the group domestic or international? Is it an ethnically or religiously driven group? What is the motivating factor behind the group? One of the priorities of counterterror is to minimize

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support for terrorist groups. In order to do so, it is important to understand the motivating and relevant recruitment factors. Additionally, it is important to understand the strategic importance of labeling groups terrorist or something different, such as guerrillas or revolutionaries. Martha Crenshaw, one of the nation’s foremost experts on terrorism, observes that governments don’t negotiate with terrorists, but do with revolutionaries. The groups may have similar actions, but the response differs: “Calling actions terrorism may dictate a military, not political response and justify exceptional measures.”3 This statement contrasts with British terrorism expert Paul Wilkinson’s first principle: “no surrender to the terrorists, and an absolute determination to defeat terrorism within the framework of the rule of law and the democratic process”4 It must be remembered that terrorism is a political term. Although some scholars believe it is a simple term to define,5 others recognize a conceptual haziness, making it difficult to differentiate among different types of violence.6 Nonetheless, the label frames the debate and influences policy choices. DEMOCRACY AS A LIABILITY OR SOURCE OF RELATIVE IMMUNITY? Although clich´es assert that democracy is more vulnerable to terrorism than authoritarian regions, history provides examples of both authoritarian and democratic regimes plagued by terrorism. Some scholars recognize a deterrent value of democracy to domestic political violence7 and to international terrorism.8 Democracies may have unique strengths in maintaining support, and this strength is relative to how unified the population remains. For example, according to Sir Robert Mark, “the social conditions on the British mainland heavily favor the security forces in countering terrorism, because they are democratically accountable and enjoy almost universal support in discharging that particular task, a support which would be, of course, less certain if the task was more controversial. That is the essential condition for countering terrorism, without which the most efficiently organized, trained and led security forces could not succeed.”9 It must be remembered that it is difficult for terrorists to operate without safe houses and sources of local support. Some find that democracies facilitate terrorist activities because of their concern for protecting political and civil liberties.10 Other studies stress the destabilizing influence of uncontrolled violence, regardless of regime type.11 How much of a threat is terrorism to democracy? According to Ted Gurr, “On the basis of the record to date, the revolutionary potential of political terrorism is vastly overrated. Where it has had any impact at all, other powerful political forces were pushing in the same direction.”12 Others have found indirect effects of terrorism to be destabilizing, through the coups they provoke to counter it. Despite the lack of academic consensus about the relative immunity or vulnerability

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of democracies to terrorism, successful counterterror policies in democracies provide security and maintain popular support, without sacrificing the democracy that is to be defended. SECURITY Rising, unchecked violence can quickly become a concern that trumps other priorities. The hope for “the right to life, liberty and security of person” is fundamental and remains so, regardless of the source of the threat. Spanish terrorism expert Fernando Reinares recognizes that “systematic and sustained terrorist activity not only recurrently violates human rights, it also impedes the free exercise of civil liberties, alters the normal functioning of official institutions, hinders the management of public affairs by elected authorities or disrupts the autonomous development of civil society.”13 Terrorism creates fear, a desire for safety, and a hunger for vengeance. If the government does not successfully respond to violence, fear and a lack of safety can overwhelm the public and undermine government support. At this point, citizens may even surrender their democracy in return for hopes of increased security, which may or may not occur. According to the former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, “In this regard, there is apparently a moment of truth in the life of many modern democracies when it is clear that the unlimited defense of civil liberties has gone too far and impedes the protection of life and liberty.”14 Risk of Underreaction and the Possible Emergence of Militias, Death Squads, and Vigilante Justice Democracies face risks from underreaction to terrorism. First, they can lose credibility in terms of the public’s evaluation of the government’s provision of the basic need for security. Wilkinson notes that “if the government, judiciary and police prove incapable of upholding the law and protecting life and property, its whole credibility and authority will be undermined.”15 Even worse, if terrorism is not sufficiently controlled by the government, popular support for a dictatorship may emerge or vigilante or death squads may form. “On the other hand,” according to security researcher Richard Clutterbuck, “if a government fails to protect its citizens, those citizens may take the law into their own hands by forming, first, vigilante groups and then, as law and order breaks down, their own private armies.”16 Mistakes will lead to either state terror or clandestine terror. Popular support and justification for vigilante justice can occur when there is widespread belief that the government cannot protect the populace. However, the emergence of paramilitary groups also poses a threat if they begin to usurp control and support from the government.17 Widespread exposure to violence results in support for

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paramilitary movements, such as in Northern Ireland18 and Colombia, creating an increased cycle of violence. POPULAR SUPPORT AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION Maintaining popular support and a unified political community is essential to successfully combat terrorism. The political scientist Max Manwaring believes that the outcome of any counterinsurgency effort will be determined by the legitimacy of the state, the unity of effort, the type of support for the targeted state, the ability to reduce outside aid to the insurgents, intelligence, and, finally, discipline and capabilities of the armed forces. He believes the single most important factor is legitimacy.19 Crenshaw stresses that the crucial issue for democratic states to understand both the consequences and causes of terrorism “is the relation between terrorism and political legitimacy.”20 To do so, both a long- and short-term perspective is necessary. There are two main ways in which the maintenance of popular support and an inclusive political community lead to security: through facilitating success in the “hearts and minds” battle and by avoiding long-term damage to the political community through an overreaction to terrorism. Necessity of Popular Support for Hearts & Minds The classic hearts and minds approach to internal counterinsurgency is dependent on popular support for long-term success. After separating the civilians from the insurgents, according to O’Sullivan and Miller, it is necessary to win popular support through “protection and the prospect of economic and social progress.”21 However, the military task of rounding up the insurgents or terrorists is extremely difficult to do without accurate local intelligence. This information is much more likely to be obtained if the government enjoys popular support. However, without sufficient security, it will not be possible to gain support. This highlights the dual priorities of maintaining support and providing security, as opposed to conceptualizing them as two items in balance. In the words of security experts Ian Beckett and John Pimlott, “The outcome, as far as the security forces are concerned, depends on the security of the civilian population and their separation from the insurgent, this being an absolute requisite for the essential task of ‘winning hearts and minds’.”22 Repression and the Risk of Overreaction Just as there is a severe risk to democracies of underreaction, there are also serious risks of overreaction. From the terrorist’s perspective, popular support and the democratic process are prime targets to destabilize and

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to undermine support. “Most terrorist groups realize that public support for democratic values and institutions is a major obstacle to their schemes. Hence the democratic process is a key target.”23 In terms of terrorist propaganda, overreaction helps their case politically and facilitates operations and recruitment. Clutterbuck counsels that “over-reaction would not only poison our way of life, it would also play into the terrorists hands, by building more public sympathy for them, and by increasing what is now only a tiny trickle of recruits to their ranks.”24 Similarly, Adrian Guelke warns that repression provides “evidence of the effectiveness of their campaign and therefore a reason to persist.”25 Terrorists typically hope for indiscriminate crackdowns and repressive, heavy-handed responses. Their hope is to “alienate the public from the government.”26 A recent analysis of the Uruguayan and Peruvian experiences concluded that “an indiscriminate, repressive state response undermines citizen support and harms the democracy that the state is supposedly acting to protect.”27 The result can be a loss of democracy. In the case of domestic groups that fear the government, but have not yet turned to violence, increased scrutiny can be counterproductive by causing a security dilemma. Active investigation and infiltration reinforces the belief of many in these organizations that the government is out to get them. For example, in the United States, the organized militia groups that fear federal government power are mostly reactive, instead of proactive. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) explains: These militias may indeed believe that some type of NWO [New World Order] scenario may be immanent in the year 2000, but they are more inclined to sit back and wait for it to happen. They will stockpile their guns and ammunition and food, and wait for the government to curtail their liberties and take away their guns. When the expected NWO tragedy does not take place, these reactive militias will simply continue their current activities, most of which are relatively harmless.28

This is an especially salient point, since only the most extreme category of militia group maintains an “openly offensive posture.” The others are of a defensive nature, and their plans for “violent action are contingent upon perceived government provocation.”29 Too much investigation may confirm their beliefs about excessive authority, increase their recruitment, and radicalize their activity. Another problem with increased scrutiny is that it would take excessive amounts of surveillance to separate the truly violent from the truly passionate. In the words of the Harvard professor Philip Heymann, looking for terrorists in extremist groups is like “looking for a needle in a haystack of ‘mere talk.’”30 Allocating sparse intelligence resources to nonviolent domestic groups can distract agencies from other more pressing security needs.

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Moreover, overreaction by a government can cause a diplomatic backlash, especially among nations that have commitments to human rights, as in (for example) the European Convention. Significant deviations from general human rights standards may negatively affect international cooperation, in addition to causing domestic dissent.31 The loss of international cooperation can be harmful, especially when it comes to the sharing of intelligence, which is essential in countering international terrorism or domestic terrorist groups that have significant external support. Maintain Tolerance In order to avoid overreaction, commitment to an inclusive political community must be maintained. Clutterbuck notes that a “civilization which can accommodate dissent has a better prospect of prolonged survival.”32 Creeping authoritarianism is a danger, as people start equating dissent with subversion. This problem is particularly important in terms of domestic intelligence. Heymann warns that “unless there are substantial efforts to be clear, the lines separating mere opposition or permissible dissent in politics from a real internal danger are likely to be crossed by whoever controls intelligence capabilities. It is therefore critical to define a very clear line to quiet public insecurity and the fears held by political opponents.”33 These lines have been crossed both in established, advanced democracies and in developing countries. For example, in the United States, during the 1950s through the 1970s, the FBI counterintelligence group COINTELPRO actively investigated and infiltrated numerous domestic groups that it considered seditious, such as the Socialist Workers Party, the Black Panthers, antiwar activists, civil rights groups, and women’s liberation groups.34 The FBI later admitted that it placed wiretaps on federal offices, members of Congress and their aides, and journalists in the 1970s.35 These examples typify a case in which passionate political opposition to government policy can create deep suspicion of the patriotism of the opposition, triggering an exhaustive investigation of that group and its members. In Peru, the head of the Peruvian intelligence service, Vladimiro Montesinos, manipulated the media, infiltrated the judiciary, and bribed members of Congress. Eventually, the intelligence scandals and electoral fraud ended the regime and rule of President Fujimori, although there were efforts to reform the intelligence services.36 The Democratic Process and Human Rights A perceived trade-off between security and the protection of civil liberties, the constitution or human rights may have fundamentally destabilizing long-term effects. According to Cynthia McClintock, terrorist violence affects legitimacy because

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Government officials perceive a contradiction between respect for human rights and the defeat of the subversives. Civilian and military officials argue over the correct policy response. The democratic state loses its legitimacy both by reacting aggressively, without concern for the constitution, and by reacting more cautiously, and thereby possibly appearing ineffectual.37

In terms of restrictions on civil liberties, this may create future grievances and may affect other rights, through a cumulative, debilitating effect. Instead, the security researcher Laura Donohue proposes thinking “in terms of a constellation of short- and long-term tradeoffs that consider the risks imposed on the state by the suspension—and maintenance—of complex and interconnected rights.”38 Another important decision is whether to conceptualize the main counterterror campaign as either military or law enforcement. Again, the decision of how to craft an appropriate response to terrorism depends on the type of terrorism that threatens the regime and its capacity to inflict harm. The renowned terrorism expert Brian Jenkins identifies the dilemma between treating terrorism as war or as a criminal matter. He acknowledges the difficulties in treating it as a criminal matter, especially when the group operates abroad. In treating terrorism as a war, the evidence “need not be of courtroom quality; intelligence reporting will suffice.” However, he also notes the drawbacks of this approach, including the deaths of innocents, the creation of martyrs, and the provocation of retaliation.39 The calculus may be different for a strictly domestic conflict. Heymann highlights the tension between an aggressive, preemptive investigative response to terrorism and a response that restricts government activity to safeguard individual liberties. In particular, he is concerned about changing the rules in relation to the use of deadly force, which differ greatly between military and police forces. He concludes that “it would be a foolish gamble with deeply respected civil liberties to make changes in the protective practices of decades or centuries . . . cases of terrorism should be investigated and tried with the same procedures that we use for trying cases of organized crime and other more familiar criminal matters.”40 However, he believes that it makes sense to investigate peaceful groups that substantively agree with groups that practice terrorism. There are risks of a nonjudicial process in combating terrorism domestically, as is exemplified in the case of Northern Ireland. Even though in the short-term more terrorists may be jailed, the process typically involves the loss of due process. In order to avoid creating more division and suspicion among a divided populace, according to David Bonner, exceptions to due process “ought to be subject to binding review by a judicial body, rather than merely to reference to an adviser or advisors.”41 These considerations need to be balanced given the type of terrorism and how much capacity for harm they have. Particular deviations from

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due process need to be carefully evaluated in terms of effective intelligence yield and the cost of civil liberties to avoid “pain for no gain.”42 Some scholars question the overall effectiveness of a “get tough” approach to terrorism. For example, Christopher Hewitt concludes that “no relation is discernible between the imposition of such powers and the subsequent level of terrorist activity; nor does terrorism decline as the emergency legislation is made more severe.” In addition, he finds that the two “most common counter-insurgency tactics, patrolling and indiscriminate mass searches, produce only meager results.”43 Heymann and Nayyem stress the necessity of a long-term strategy that contains accountability and the importance of an informed citizenry. They do not deny the need for extraordinary measures, but stress the “need to ensure that systems of oversight are robust” and the necessity of assessment “with some transparency, the effectiveness of new measures to combat terrorism.”44 In general, one recent study has addressed the consequences of repression. Will Moore finds that dissidents will substitute violent protest for nonviolent protest, and vice versa, when faced with government repression. He found no evidence that contextual factors of authoritarian or democratic regimes affect this relationship or that there is a difference in effectiveness of repression in the short or long term.45 Increasing State Capacity The state needs to be strong enough to have a functioning judicial system, discourage the emergence of violence, mount a vigorous defense, and maintain citizen support. Especially when countering domestic terrorism, state competence matters. “No matter how hard insurgents try, they will be frustrated if the government has a competent and capable administration that dispenses services, controls the population, and effectively coordinates a multitude of political, economic and security policies.”46 Strength, democratic accountability, impartiality, and strong public support would facilitate the work of counterterrorism forces. In a domestic conflict, even peace settlements with newly demobilized groups will fail without a strong state, “specifically in the areas of preserving public order, administering justice, and executive control over the military.”47 The intelligence agencies also need to be strong and accountable. General studies have pointed to the importance of judicial control to counter domestic terrorism, despite the fact that the terrorists do not act within constraints of humanitarian or other guidelines. However, democracies such as West Germany and Italy generally succeeded in their internal domestic terrorist conflicts with such judicial control and oversight of both the police and the intelligence services.48 Errors and mistakes are costly, particularly if procedures are not followed or shortcuts are taken that result in providing terrorists with propaganda gains. “To foster

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corruption is always a prime terrorist aim,” allowing the government to lose credibility and support.49 To discourage violence, the state needs defensive measures such as special counterterrorism forces, increased policing, and public awareness campaigns.50 To provide security, state capacity needs to be increased. The security strategist Gabriel Marcella notes that “counterinsurgency is expensive business; it cannot be done on the cheap and requires the full mobilization of a nation’s resources over a relatively long period of time.”51 This general principle applies to both domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Military and police strength need to be increased and professionalism maintained (or increased). The process of intelligence involves collecting, analyzing, and sharing information with policymakers and other relevant agencies. As Richard Millett notes, “good intelligence can’t guarantee success, but bad intelligence can guarantee failure.”52 Ideally, the aim of intelligence reform is to create accurate and timely intelligence; foster close cooperation among intelligence, military, and law enforcement agencies; maintain informational security; and remain accountable to civilian authorities. This aim can be undermined by interagency distrust and politicization of the intelligence community (among other factors). To avoid the politicization of the intelligence community, it is better not to mix intelligence or counterintelligence with domestic law enforcement. Democracies such as Canada, Britain, France, and Germany have had success with separate domestic intelligence agencies, which are subject to oversight but remain able to act covertly.53 Similarly, separation should be maintained between the military and the police forces. In his review of security and democracy in Latin America, J. Samuel Fitch warns that “at a minimum, democratic governments must clearly delineate the lines between police and military roles in internal security. Insofar as possible, the armed forces should be removed from primary responsibility for internal security, without denying the need for trained counterinsurgency forces to intervene when antidemocratic forces attempt to establish a territorial base.”54 Reducing Grievances Good intelligence, effective coordination, and a competent police and judiciary cannot alone squash internal terrorism with a significant domestic source of support. In this case, the political realm of the conflict is extremely important. Wilkinson recognizes that “democratic authorities need to defeat the terrorist leadership at the political level by showing that the government is capable of responding imaginatively to the legitimate demands and aspirations of the very social groups the terrorists seek to mobilize.”55 Moreover, being responsive to understandable grievances may increase the government’s popular support and decrease overt and

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tacit support for terrorists. However, concessions are not a panacea. In the scenarios of a polarized society with domestic terrorism, as Bonner points out, even reasonable “concessions to one side tend to alienate or antagonize the other, and such problems have bedeviled the political negotiations of the peace process”56 —for example, this is what has occurred in Northern Ireland. Wilkinson recognizes another limitation to this option when a group lacks a base of mass support but instead looks for validation from a “religious or ideological agenda which so totally rejects the existing political and social order that there is no basis for negotiation with democratic government on political, social and economic demands.”57 CONCLUSION To successfully counter terrorism, a primary (but clearly not the only) goal is to catch or kill as many of the enemy as you can—without creating more. To do so, a comprehensive campaign that increases security, builds broad public support, and maintains international support will be more successful. Creating an effective intelligence community, increasing security, and maintaining principles of good governance are essential to democracies confronting terrorism. According to Wilkinson, “The trick is to harmonize strategy on both the security and political fronts: this is the only basis for a winning strategy.”58 The greatest threat to progress is impatience, which increases the temptation to emphasize one aspect of a strategy in the short term. Lopsided efforts will not bring long-term success and may undermine the chances of long-term achievement of a comprehensive peace. Advancement in one area does not eclipse the need to progress on the others. Democracy poses both challenges and strengths in combating terrorism. To be successful, both security (including avoiding overreaction and underreaction) and political integration (including political support, tolerance to the loyal opposition, and maintenance of human rights) must be prioritized. To do so, the state must be strengthened, and transparency and accountability increased. NOTES 1. Theodore Roosevelt, “The Great Adventure” (1918), in National Edition of the Works of Theodore Roosevelt, vol. 19 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 342. 2. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” in European Democracies against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2000), 8. 3. Martha Crenshaw, “Introduction: Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1995), 11.

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4. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (London, U.K.: Frank Cass, 2001), 233. 5. Michael Radu, “Terrorism after the Cold War: Trends and Challenges,” Orbis 46, no. 2 (2002): 275–287. 6. Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and S. A. Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 4 (2004): 77–94. 7. Alex Schmid, “Terrorism and Democracy,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1993): 14–25; Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Terrorism: Toward a Causal Model,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 3 (1993): 317–329. 8. Quan Li, “Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 2 (2005): 278–297; Joe Everman, “Terrorism and Democratic States: Soft Targets or Accessible Systems?” International Interactions 24, no. 2(1998): 151–170. 9. Sir Robert Mark, “Policing a Britain under Threat,” in The Future of Political Violence, ed. Richard Clutterbuck (New York: St. Martins Press, 1986), 161. 10. William L Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?” Terrorism and Political Violence 6, no. 4 (1994): 417–463; William L. Eubank, “Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (2001): 155–164; William L. Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Terrorism and Democracy: What Recent Events Disclose,” Terrorism and Political Violence 10, no. 1(1998): 108–118. 11. Jennifer S. Holmes, “Political Violence and Regime Stability in Argentina, 1965–1976,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (2001): 134–154. 12. Ted Gurr, “Some Characteristics of Political Terrorism in the 1960s,” in The Politics of Terrorism, ed. Michael Stohl (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, 1988), 51. 13. Fernando Reinares, “Introduction,” in European Democracies against Terrorism, vii. 14. Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorists (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1998), 33. 15. Paul Wilkinson, “Maintaining the Democratic Process and Public Support,” in The Future of Political Violence, 177–178. 16. Richard Clutterbuck, Living with Terrorism (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1975), 149. 17. H. Ron Rosenbaum, “Vigilantism: An analysis of Establishment Violence,” Comparative Politics 6, no. 4 (1974): 541–570, 542. 18. Bernadette Hayes, “Sowing Dragon”s Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 49 (2001): 901– 922, 902. 19. Max Manwaring, “The Threat in the Contemporary Peace Environment: The Challenge to Change Perspectives,” in Low Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Edwin Corr and Stephen Sloan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 12. 20. Crenshaw (1995), 7. 21. Patrick O’Sullivan and Jesse W. Miller, The Geography of Warfare (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), 116–118.

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22. Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, “Introduction,” in Armed Forces and Modern Counter-insurgency, ed. Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 10–11. 23. Wilkinson (1986), 177. 24. Clutterbuck (1975), 149. 25. Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (London: Taurus Press, 1995), 180. 26. Wilkinson (1986), 177–178. 27. Jennifer S. Holmes, Terrorism and Democratic Stability (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2001), 197. 28. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Project Megiddo,” 1999, 22, www.fbi. gov. 29. James E. Duffy and Alan C. Brantley, “Militias: Initiating Contact,” Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 1997. 30. Philip Heymann, Terrorism and America: A Commonsense Strategy for a Democratic Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 143. 31. David Bonner, “The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism: The Impact of Decisions of European Judicial Institutions and of the Northern Ireland ‘Peace Process,’” in European Democracies against Terrorism, 51. 32. Clutterbuck (1975), 149. 33. Heymann (1998), 147. 34. David Cole, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties for National Security, 3rd ed. (New York: New Press, 2005.) 35. Government Executive 27/7, July 1995. 36. Ernesto Garcia Calderon, “Peru’s Decade of Living Dangerously” Journal of Democracy 12, no. 2 (2001): 46–58. 37. Cynthia McClintock, “The Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in a ‘Least Likely’ Case: Peru,” Comparative Politics 21, no. 2 (1989): 127–149, 129. 38. Laura Donohue, “Security and Freedom on the Fulcrum,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (2005): 69–87, 84. 39. Brian Jenkins, “Preface,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfelt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Jenkins (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1999), xii. 40. Heymann (1998), 127. 41. Bonner (2000), 47. 42. Gregory Treverton, “Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons,” Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (2003): 121–140, 135. 43. Christopher Hewitt, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), 88–89. 44. Philip Heymann with Juliette Nayyem, Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 109. 45. Will Moore, “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context and Timing,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 3 (1998): 851–873. 46. O’Neil, 154. 47. Marc Chernick, “Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30, no. 4 (1988–1989): 53–88, 56.

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48. Wilkinson (1986), 178–179. 49. Clutterbuck (1975), 148. 50. Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (2000), 18. 51. Gabriel Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 46. 52. Richard Millett, “Millett’s Laws,” Law 17, Version 2005, unpublished manuscript. 53. Treverton (2003), 136–137. 54. J. Samuel Fitch, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 132–132. 55. Wilkinson (2001), 228. 56. Bonner (2000), 49. 57. Wilkinson (2001), 230. 58. Wilkinson (1986), 177.

CHAPTER 6 MORALITY, ETHICS, AND LAW IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (THE LONG WAR) Harvey Rishikof

THE CHOICE AMONG LESSER EVILS The Global War on Terrorism (or the GWOT) has overwhelmingly defined the “brave new world” of U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the terrorist attack by Islamic extremists on September 11, 2001, shattered the previous foreign policy paradigms of containment, mutually assured destruction, collective security, and the doctrine of massive retaliation1 — in essence, the end of the Cold War doctrines that had shaped the international law of armed conflict. On one level nuclear war required us to “think the unthinkable to remain unthinkable” and be “rational about the irrational” for in the end, state annihilation would be the final outcome. The “old” world order had also established clearly defined views on the morality, ethics, and laws for limited armed conflict. Critical to this world were the distinctions between “combatants” and “non-combatants,” the doctrine of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the concept of prisoners of war, and interrogation limits. The new world order is regrettably characterized as a regime of international terrorism, international criminal networks, humanitarian disasters, failed and rogue states, and indigenous political insurgencies that have combined to create “a fluid mass of anarchy” in different regional areas.2 This new world order has spawned threats that have strained rooted doctrines of self-defense that clash with the international Cold War regimes established by of the United Nations Charter under Article 51 and the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The concept

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of “preemption” has become a doctrine of U.S. foreign policy and collapsed the distinction between prevention and preemption. The new environment for “homeland security” has blurred traditional domestic divisions among criminal law, national security law, immigration law, and the law of armed conflict. And a new age of technology has produced a threat of nonstate actors with international networks that have access to weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN)—sometimes based in failing or failed states. The CBRN threat in the hands of stateless enemies poses new challenges to the concept of national security. Whereas deterrence was a rational option when threats were state based, traditional deterrence doctrine appears to be weak when retaliation has no “return to sender” address. Terrorism confronts the state with a different set of challenges. Harm can only be prevented with timely information. Prevention requires access to information or intelligence to stop an event before it happens, which places a new vital emphasis on gathering information that is timely and that can be acted upon. In short, a “Prevention Paradigm,” can only be successful if relevant information is placed in a timely manner in the hands of those who can take action to stop the threat. In contrast, the “Deterrence Paradigm” was based on a calculated, measured, rational response to a potential threat. Although some forms of terrorism may be containable by deterrence, all terrorism is not. When information becomes the center of gravity for prevention, the focus on acquiring accurate information becomes the critical factor. Timely information can be characterized as tactical, operational, and strategic. Tactical information is the most perishable and has the most immediate impact. Imagine a captured enemy soldier or officer on the battlefield who possesses information on where a biological or chemical attack is planned for later that afternoon. For operational information, imagine a captured senior officer from the enemy’s planning directorate who has participated in drawing up the battle plans to respond to an attack, and knows the secret hiding places of caches of WMD as well as when and which units are to be deployed according to a series of triggering events (e.g., when city X falls, we will do X; when city Y falls, we will do Y). Strategic information involves knowledge of the master plan of how the enemy intends to use all the instruments of power at its disposal to achieve its strategic objectives—or when a strategic compromise can be achieved. Strategic information contains the bottom line for state negotiations. “Lawful” combatants may hold any or all three types of information. Terrorist information, however, involves civilian targets, illegitimate targets, and unprepared targets. When the holders of information are characterized as “unlawful” combatants or belligerents, or outside the lawful regime of jus in bello, what lethal actions can be taken against them? What due process is required for “unlawful” combatants? What types of

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interrogation or procedures should be permitted to gather information? What are the appropriate moral, ethical, and legal constraints? These are critical strategic and policy questions, and frame an important discussion on our current understanding of the law of armed conflict. QUESTIONS OF MORALITY, ETHICS, AND LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMED CONFLICT The projection of force by a state is a collective action that involves the individual, the institution or profession of the military, the state, and the international community. At the individual level, motivations of the soldier are the moral foundation of conflict. Why does one fight? There are individuals who, regardless of the stakes involved, will never bear arms because at its heart the taking of a life can never be justified as moral or religious. This category of citizens is the classic “conscientious objector” or pacifist. There is no conflict, regardless of the authorization of the state or the international community, that can ever justify killing to them. Some conscientious objectors are unwilling to serve in the military in any capacity, while others accept noncombatant roles. The state, when confronted with those who will not participate, can offer civilian service, and if refused, it can ultimately impose imprisonment or other types punishment for refusing to serve. In this chapter, the formulation of the issue of ethics for those who choose to fight can best be associated with the institution or the profession of the military. Military professionals are “managers of violence” who have their own ethical code, the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),3 which provides the ethical framework for an individual’s roles and responsibilities in armed conflict. Over the last 50 plus years, building on the Leiber Code of the Civil War, the UCMJ has established the standards and behaviors that are accepted as “ethical” by modern warriors. The code provides the basis for when a soldier can kill and under what circumstances, so that either a medal is awarded or a general courts martial panel is convened. The UCMJ and its process of adjudication make this determination for the professional soldier, and over time these determinations have established a “professional ethic.” The code establishes the types and forms of punishment that are just and fair for a particular offense and necessary to maintain order and discipline. On the basis of this professional ethic, a soldier can refuse to follow an order that does not meet the professional ethical standards as created by the UCMJ. For example, for centuries the victorious warrior would “rape and pillage” the defeated enemy as a form of humiliation, triumph, and greed in a form of “guerre mortelle.”4 In many parts of the world “rape and pillage” are still conducted by men fighting wars of genocide and “ethnic cleansing.” Any U.S. soldier ordered to rape and pillage would refuse not only because

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of a matter of law but a professional ethic—warfighting is different from blatantly criminal activity.5 This ethical code, sanctioned by the state and with governmental authority, is primarily administered by military officials and only occasionally by the highest civilian judicial authority—the United States Supreme Court. Finally, the most powerful regulator of armed conflict is the federal law. But there are two sources for law: the domestic state and the international community. Domestic law is governed by the Congress, the president, and the Supreme Court. International law is governed by international bodies but lacks an enforcement mechanism. A perfect example where domestic law and international law meet is in the arena of covert operations and the role of pardons. The U.S. domestic structure has created a process of legitimacy for covert operations under the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments (e.g., the Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974.) Moreover, in the event that the operation runs afoul of domestic or international law, the president has the authority to pardon the individuals involved. The IranContra affair, and the pardoning of those involved, is a perfect example of this conflict between policy, prosecution, and pardon. The pardon issue is an old state problem identified by Niccolo` Machiavelli in his classic work on politics and morality, The Prince. Private morality at times stands in stark contrast to public state requirements or necessity. In war, state managers are required to do things to save the republic that are, at times, immoral by private standards. In Machiavelli’s discussion on public necessity in his section “On the Reasons Why Men Are Praised or Blamed—Especially Princes,” he warns the prince that he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a reproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with difficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found that something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin; whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him security and prosperity.6

But like the prince, the U.S. president’s moral, ethical, and legal authority does not extend to the international community. The international community is governed by different international norms that have different enforcement mechanisms and values. UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW: IT IS MORE THAN JUST REALISTS VERSUS IDEALISTS International law is a body of customs, principles, rules, conventions, and treaties promulgated to create binding legal obligations for sovereign states and international actors.7 State sovereignty forms the basis of our international system. State foreign policy is based on, and constrained by,

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the intertwining of domestic and international law. Traditionally in the United States, the executive branch—in consultation with the legislative branch—has conducted our foreign policy. But the modern world system is not an open playing field. In fact the modern world system is characterized by a set of dominant structural constraints: decentralization, selfhelp, and asymmetry. This anarchy has led to a highly competitive international system with each state jockeying to enhance its interests. The system, despite the emergence of a number of international institutions, has retained a “self-help” component that relies on military force.8 And finally, the international system has been (and remains) hierarchical, in the sense that some states are more equal than others and exercise greater power—economically, politically, and militarily. As the twenty-first century begins, the United States stands atop the international system as a colossus. American values stand for free markets, human rights, and democracy. America is viewed by its friends and foes as a hyperpower, a hegemon, and a modern empire.9 A long-time strain of American culture, the strain of isolationism, has clearly retreated in the face of the nation’s contemporary responsibilities and capacities. From its inception, America has stood alone. The first president, George Washington, in his farewell address in 1796 advised against foreign entanglements and “interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe.”10 This approach was the luxury of a new, small, and emerging country. Today’s America cannot ignore the affairs of other countries, and it cannot avoid international law as if it does not play a role in the affairs of the world. The post–World War II international system involves key multinational organizations—including the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—in which the United States has been a chief architect. Although in recent history these institutions have come under severe strain, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the creation of the World Trade Organization, international law continues to be a force for the legitimization of state action. Often when discussing American foreign policy, the debate is framed as “realists versus idealists.” As first understood by Max Weber, what makes the international state system different from individual state power is that there is no legitimate monopolization of the use of coercive force.11 Realists and idealists both grapple with the Weberian problem of lack of international authority. Realists focus on power as the dominant feature of international relations. For realists, the defining feature of international politics is that, unlike domestic politics where state power is constrained, there are few restraints in the international system.12 When the state loses the legitimate monopolization of force, civil war or revolution ensues. A state with no legitimate monopolization of force is in a state of anarchy until order is restored. Because of the anarchic nature of the international

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system, states need power to prevail. In the end, some form of a balance of power is the only guarantor of stability. But stability for realists is an elusive goal because each state actor is constantly striving for advantage. The neo-realists of today stand for unilateral action in the international system.13 As Mark R. Amstutz noted, realism “is distinguished not by amorality or immorality but by a morality of a different sort, one that differentiates political ethics from personal ethics and judges actions in terms of consequences.”14 One is held accountable for acts of commission and omission. For this strand of thought, the Munich Compromise by the allies in the early 1930s allowed fascist Germany to garner power—and was a failed immoral act. In this view, “preemption” as a doctrine is a moral act by a public statesman. Idealists, on the other hand, emphasize the ideal of constraints on the exercise of power and the importance of world cooperation.15 The idealist solution for the Weberian problem of no legitimate monopolization of force is the establishment of international institutions to promote civilizing, internationally agreed-upon norms. This is not to say that Idealists are opposed to the use of force. Idealists contemplate force, as long as the force is employed in a cooperative manner sanctioned by international norms and institutions.16 Idealists believe in the power of big ideas to shape the world and make it a better place.17 Recently, Michael Mandelbaum has argued that reliance on the ideals of peace, democracy, liberty, and free markets are key reasons for the current dominance of American power.18 Modern idealists, the heirs of the Wilsonian League of Nations, are multilateralists who believe in the power of many, or at least of a small coalition of the willing who are not part of a larger, institutionally sanctioned action.19 But the “realist versus idealist” debate does not fully capture the rich strands of thought that compose the foundations of the American approach to international law, individual morality, and state managers acting to protect the republic. Given the international competing structure that the Weberian problem identified, four basic ideologies or schools have competed to define the appropriate approach that should dominate our foreign policy with relation to international law, morality, and state action: the exceptionalists, the legalists, the human rightists, and the pragmatists. By teasing out these key foundational core values, one can establish the impulses that have animated the debates over morality, ethics, law, and rights. Exceptionalism Foreign Policy Exceptionalist foreign policy is based on the assumption that the United States is different from, and superior to, all other states in the international system; thus our foreign policy should advance our national interests,

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which are (we believe) in the world’s interests as well. International law, when it impedes our view or interest, should be ignored. We have a unilateral right to act, since we have a unilateral imperative based on our values. An early manifestation of this approach is reflected in the Monroe Doctrine, whereby we announced to the world that our sphere of influence was clear and paramount.20 This former “balance of power” or sphere of influence doctrine has now morphed into a pure power doctrine. Our motives are based on “Americanism,” a combination of noble and honorable aspirations and motives that are unique unto themselves. The exceptionalist basis is the justification for our action and stands above the concept of international law. Needless to say, this view is reinforced by the capacity to act and project our will with force. Therefore our laws, our approach to rights, our views on just remedies can be, and may have to be, projected onto the world. The world cannot be counted on to bring “evil-doers” to justice, but we can, and we therefore should. To carry out this mandate is to teach the world the American (or the “correct”) way to enforce the law—our law, our ethics, and our morality. The latest manifestation of this approach to power was the original creation of the “military commissions” to try terrorists under U.S. custody and law, regardless of international norms. Subsequently, with the involvement of the Supreme Court, this manifestation has been curtailed, though the jury is still out as to the next institutional solution. International Legalist Foreign Policy The legalist foreign policy group bases its legitimacy in international law. A number of existing, nascent, and proposed international judicial bodies (e.g., the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights), quasi-judicial entities (e.g., the United Nations Commission on Human Rights), dispute settlement tribunals (e.g., the International Labor Organization Administrative Tribunal), permanent arbitral tribunals (e.g., the Permanent Court of Arbitration), claims and compensation bodies (e.g., the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission), inspection panels (e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Asian Development Bank Inspection Policy), and regional integration agreements (e.g., the Court of Justice of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) constitute a patchwork of conventions and treaties that comprise international law.21 The United Nations and its component units constitute only part of the world forum for international law. A guiding principle of these forums is that the respective governments voluntarily commit to, and follow, the agreements. This legal tradition is particularly important for the use of military force in the international arena. Although the right of “self-defense” is a recognized international principle under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the concepts of casus

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belli (an act regarded as a reason for war) or jus ad bellum (the law for war) or jus in bello (the law in war) enforce restraint. Moreover, under Article 51, although the charter does not impair the inherent right of self-defense in an armed attack, that right exists “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”22 The Geneva Conventions make naked aggression an unacceptable form of behavior and constitute the basis of international humanitarian law. Since America has been a fundamental pillar of these bodies, its support and recognition of the systems’ logic are essential for its maintenance. When does the use of domestic courts undermine or negate the efficacy of the international tribunals? When America chooses not to ratify a treaty, protocol or convention, but its traditional allies and friends do, what is the effect on international legalism? The latest manifestation of this approach has been the U.S. rejection of the International Criminal Court and the policy decisions to sign individual Article 98 agreements with individual nations. This U.S. approach has created a “disturbance in the force” of international law as norms for violations of the law of armed conflict become less universally accepted. Rights-Based Foreign Policy The third major strand of America’s approach to international law is based on its particular brand of liberalism. The Constitution and the Bill of Rights privilege individual rights over the government (although this is not the only way the individual is protected, since checks and balances, the separation of powers, and federalism also constrain governmental power). The politics of rights play a special role in American consciousness and in recent decades have played an increasingly prominent role, intermittently, in the nation’s approach to international politics. Some trace this tenet to Article III of the Constitution, which specifically described federal jurisdiction as “arising under the Constitution . . . and . . . the Laws of the United States,” which included international law claims based on treaty and custom.23 Naturally, other theorists argue that customary international law does not have the status of federal law until authorized by the appropriate political authority. International agreements are always scrutinized by powerful interests, whether governmental or private, to ensure that individual rights are protected. But American liberalism also has a deep commitment to self-determination. The tension of liberalism to define how far the duties of human rights stretch beyond borders has been a constant source of debate and strain within the foreign policy community.24 During the Cold War, the rights of citizens of our allies were often sacrificed if our ally’s government was significantly anticommunist.25 This realist approach to rights often stood at odds with the liberal promotion of universal rights.

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Another example of this tension is the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA) and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, which place human rights front and center as a key component of American foreign policy and international law. As stipulated by the ATCA and codified by 28 USC, §1350, “The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” When combined with domestic rules of evidence involving class action, these acts and procedures produce a powerful tool that has generated claims of a “legal imperialism” by some critics that potentially surpass the claimed universal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.26 Pragmatic Foreign Policy The final strand of thought in the foreign policy realm is pragmatism. Rather than having a grand design, an integrated philosophical approach, or privileged principle, pragmatists deal with issues or questions on an ad hoc basis. Meeting short-term goals that deal with each issue on its own merits is the essential approach. Pragmatists tend to focus more on integrating national and international interests without overly emphasizing consistency over time—a “that was then, this is now” reasoning predominates. Sometimes this is a reflection of a change in political administrations or a recalibration of the costs and benefits in each policy. Decisions for military intervention are often subject to this form of scrutiny. Each time, the case has to be made for why we are putting our soldiers in harm’s way. This form of analysis is analogous to the classic “case by case” approach of the common law legal process, which is a perfect example of how a pragmatic reasoning approach, loosely guided by general principles, can produce a variety of results until the Supreme Court speaks.27 Such an approach is a form of instrumentalism, the science of muddling through that can be guided by a philosophy of minimalism. (The concept of taking one case at a time with a general overarching principle emerging from the individual cases is an approach that creates reform as minimalism in the legal realm.) In the international world, however, the types and forms of reaction to the pragmatic case-by-case approach are more multifaceted and more potentially deadly (e.g., the counterreaction to the idea of “preemption” may result in the promotion of nuclear proliferation to avoid a “preemptive” strike by a greater power). JUST WAR THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS The four schools of thought—the exceptionalists, the legalists, the human rightists, and the pragmatists—each have had to respond to the question as to what is a just war. Much of the legal debate has been over the Roman maxim “Inter arma silent leges,” or “In war the law is silent.” For

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the classic “realist” critique, “all is fair in love and war,” and in the end, only victory establishes justice. For the exceptionalists and pragmatists, any restraint on the carrying out of war can be removed by the victorious state through its use of sovereignty as a matter of law to justify, or pardon, any action in the name of self-defense or raison d’ e´ tat (or reason of state). For the legalists and the human rightists of “just war” theory, war is best analyzed in the jus ad bellum (the justice of going to war) and jus in bello (justice in conducting war) tradition. As pointed out by Michael Walzer, “just” is a term of art meaning justifiable, defensible, and perhaps morally defensible given the alternatives—a lesser evil. The jus ad bellum tradition usually analyzes the decision to go to war under the following six norms28 : 1. just cause (e.g., to deter aggression, to defend against unjust attack); 2. competent authority (e.g., authorized by legitimate governmental authority); 3. right intention (e.g., a goal to restore a just peace); 4. limited objectives (e.g., an unlimited war of attrition is unacceptable); 5. last resort (i.e., all nonviolent measures—diplomacy, multilateral negotiations, sanctions—must be exhausted); and 6. reasonable hope of success (e.g., good intentions are not sufficient).

As for jus in bello, two norms dominate: discrimination (i.e., one must distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, soldiers and civilians, and minimize civilian deaths and targets such as hospitals and schools) and proportionality (i.e., minimize the level of violence to achieve the stated aims of the war). A third international norm is starting to gain recognition in this tradition of just war theory—jus post bellum—justice after war, the victor’s postforce obligations for settlements.29 As stressed by Lindell Hart, since an objective of war is a better state of peace, how wars end and how peace is established and justice institutionalized are critical questions for evaluating interventions. The GWOT raises two particular jus post bellum issues. First, since the GWOT is now understood to be the long war, and the ending is unclear, what is our end state for the regions we have “acted” upon? Second, in any “traditional” warfare, the United States is believed to have full spectrum domination and will triumph in any kinetic “clash of arms;” hence victory in this sense must be assumed. Therefore, again, what is the “occupation” or “trusteeship” or “protectorate” plan? Audrey Cronin has argued that terrorist organizations “decline or end” as a result of one or more of seven ways30 : 1. the leaders are captured or killed (e.g., Aum Shinrikyo in Japan)31 ; 2. there is an unsuccessful generational transition (e.g., the Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany)32 ;

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3. the cause is achieved (as seen in the case of Irgun, which saw the establishment of the State of Israel); 4. there is a transition to legitimate political process or negotiations (e.g., the Front de Lib´eration du Quebec in Canada); 5. popular support is lost (as in the case of the Basque separatist group ETA in Spain); 6. the state uses repression against the group (as Turkey as done to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party)33 ; and 7. there is a transition out of terrorism to criminality (e.g., the FARC in Columbia) or full insurgency (e.g., the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia).

These examples, however, are of a single state “dealing” with an internal threat. The terrorism of al Qaeda and its affiliate members poses a different threat as both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate. Traditional armed conflicts usually conclude with a cease-fire, armistice or surrender, with conditions or unconditionally. The rules of occupation are governed by the Geneva Conventions. But in a “trusteeship,” the victorious powers rule the country acting in a “trust” for the inhabitants and seek to establish a stable consensual politics. For some, Rwanda and Sudan are candidates for such action. In a “protectorate,” the victor facilitates and continues to support the coming to power of a group or coalition that works to restore a new political order and blocks the return to power of the former regime.34 Some observers have suggested that Iraq may become a U.S./UN protectorate. For other theorists, the protectorate phase should be followed by two more phases: a “partnership phase”, with an interim political authority to rebuild the “defeated society” or “state-build;” and an “ownership phase,” when sovereignty is restored and all institutions are in the control of the indigenous population.35 The new regime, though, must safeguard the innocent, protect minorities, respect the environment, and prosecute violations of jus in bello by the former regime. However, for purposes of legitimacy, international prosecutorial fora may be preferable to domestic courts in order to avoid the charge of “victor’s justice.” But conflict endings are sometimes not so neat. Korea was a war or “police action” during the Cold War with an ending that left unresolved issues. Post Cold War conflicts—including Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, East Timor—are conflicts in which major hostilities have ended and yet problems still fester. Waging the war against terrorism challenges these norms and requires the state to rethink the measures, practices, and the instruments used to prosecute against the “tactic of terrorism.” Individual soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, special forces and other government agents are forced to rethink what “moral, ethical, and legal” orders mean. Projection of force, clandestine activities, law enforcement cooperation, diplomacy and covert actions are part of the arsenal in the fight against terrorism. Three of the more

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controversial challenges for just war theory and international law will be the focus of the rest of this chapter: How does one deal with the issue of “targeting” terrorists? What is the process due to “unlawful” combatants in detention? What is torture, and what is lawful coercive interrogation? Fighting the War on the Margins of Moral Space: Targeting Terrorists and Assassination It’s not an eye for an eye. It’s having him for lunch before he has you for dinner . . . . They deserved a bomb that would send the dream team to hell. I said, “If we miss this opportunity, more Israelis will die.” . . . There is no fair fight against terrorists. Never has been. Never will be. —Avi Dichter, Head of Shin Bet, Israel’s Internal Security Agency, 2003 We won’t get to the bottom of the barrel by killing terrorists. We’ll get there through education. Dichter [Shin Bet] . . . thinks we’ll kill, kill, kill, kill. That’s it—we’ve won. . . . I don’t accept that. You need strength to defend Israel and on the other hand, to be human. —Lt. General Moshe Yaalon, Military Chief of Staff IDF, 2002–2005

Israel has been fighting terrorism and terrorists for decades. Placing “warheads on foreheads” has become a tactic of antiterrorism that the Israeli Air Force has often been called upon to perform. As the United States increasingly wages the long war, targeting terrorists in locations where ally support is limited will become an issue and a challenge. Where allies are willing and cooperative in the fight against terrorism, the prosecution of terrorists will be more of a “law enforcement matter,” since sovereignty and culture will dictate how force is applied by our allies. England’s arrest of indigenous terrorists cells after the attacks of July 7, 2005 are classic examples of domestic law enforcement preventing further acts. But where there is no cooperation, counterterrorist operations will require either special forces on the ground or missiles. Israel has confronted the issue of targeting terrorists and has produced the following guidelines.36 A number of conditions are required before a targeted killing of a terrorist is authorized by the state: arrest is impossible; the targets are combatants; senior cabinet members approve each attack; civilian casualties are minimized; operations are limited to areas not under Israeli control; and the targets are identified as a future threat. The position of the state is that these killings are not for “revenge” but for “deterrence” against future terrorist attacks. Shin Bet authorities estimated that for every suicide bomber or terrorist caught, between 16 and 20 lives would be saved and 100 other people would not be injured. The authorities, nevertheless, still struggle with the moral and ethical problem of how many civilian casualties are acceptable when killing a terrorist, since minimizing civilian casualties is a criterion for targeting

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under just war theory. According to reports, the committee charged with the task failed to create a standard, but some suggested a ratio of 3.14 civilian deaths per terrorist; a smaller ratio was suggested if the civilians were children. This utilitarian approach reflects the moral and ethical dilemma of combating an enemy imbedded in the civilian population where the use of force entails civilian deaths. Although the domestic law sanctioned the action, how will the world react to the defense of raison d’´etat? This theoretical problem became concrete on September 6, 2003, when Israeli intelligence reported a meeting in a three-story Palestinian home in the Gaza Strip of eight Hamas leaders allegedly gathering to plan terrorist attacks. The group included Sheik Ahmed Yassin (Hamas spiritual leader), Andan al-Ghoul (a major weapons manufacture), Ismail Haniyeh (a future prime minister of the Palestinian Authority), and Mohammed Deif (a master bomb maker). Earlier in the conflict, because of the viciousness of the Hamas attacks, both military and political leaders of Hamas had been determined to be legitimate targets—bombers, manufacturer of bombs, and bomb planners were all now on the approved targeted lists. The private home was in a crowded neighborhood, and the local children were out of school. The decision had to be made about whether to use an F-16 jet to bomb from 10,000 feet and about what size bomb to use. Computer engineers ran simulations to predict how the house could be destroyed, assessing the cement, the structure, and the size of the rooms. It was determined that a half-ton bomb would not totally destroy the home and a one-ton bomb would demolish a nearby apartment building housing dozens of families. The risk of collateral damage was considered too high, and the plan was rejected by the political leadership. But at the last moment, it was decided that since the curtains were drawn on the top (third) floor, the meeting was taking place in a vulnerable location in the house and a quarter-ton bomb could be used take out the third floor. Thus, the third floor was bombed with a precision missile. However, the leaders, family, and four children all survived since they had been meeting on the ground floor and the family had been on the second. Eventually, the sheik and al-Ghoul were killed by Israeli attacks, and Deif is hiding as of this writing. Ismail Haniyeh is the current prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority and a senior political leader of Hamas. He was nominated as the candidate for prime minister in February 2006, following the Hamas “List of Change and Reform” victory in the Palestinian legislative election of January 25, 2006, and was sworn in as prime minister on March 29, 2006. One can argue that the attack’s failure only cemented Haniyeh’s political appeal. Israel continues to use targeted killing, and by some estimates has reduced in 2005 one civilian death for every 25 terrorists killed. The Israelis are currently working on warheads the size of soda bottles for even more efficient and controlled killings.

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This new professional ethic for war reinforced by the Israeli military code will trump any personal moral objections to the contrary. What is the appropriate civilian to combatant ratio? The answer is more of a political decision than a moral or ethical one. How the domestic political structures will understand the ways in which the hearts and minds of their own public, the targeted public, and the world public will appreciate the calculation will in the end be the final answer. U.S. Executive Order 12, 333 states that “no person employed by, acting by, or on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” Since this is an executive order, the president has the power to make an exception. He may justify such action under the doctrine of self-defense and may choose to define the band narrowly, so that legitimate military targets might include the assassination of individuals.37 Moreover, if the act was part of a covert action, under the 1947 law, the president is required to make a finding that the action is necessary for a foreign policy objective and important for national security. Congress must be informed of the action, under the phrase “in a timely manner,” which has been given broad legal definition. In the military context, wide discretion has been given to the military under the concept of “preparation of the battlefield,” and no notification of the Congress is required if Congress has already authorized the use of force. Government-sponsored assassination within another sovereign state is a violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a signatory, unless the host state has taken steps to actively harbor the individual. One might argue that the invasion of Afghanistan was such a case, whereby the Taliban refused to take steps to incarcerate Osama bin Laden and the United States served a warrant for his arrest. The difference is that Afghanistan is a sovereign state not under the authority of the United States. The world community supported the U.S. action and lent support. The subsequent relation of the United States and the United Nations to Afghanistan is one of a protectorate or trusteeship, and raises the jus post bellum norm. Clearly the “opium/Taliban” problem will continue to be an issue for some time. The act of “taking down” a government to “serve” an arrest warrant has “nation-state” building consequences. The issue of targeted killing under these circumstances raises much larger moral, ethical, and international law issues usually associated with the empire, the balance of power and collective security questions. Terrorism cuts across these traditional categories and requires new approaches to the idea of “intervention.” On an individual level, the new technology and war fighting will raise hard questions for the future. In November 2002, an armed Predator drone was employed to destroy a car and kill Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a senior al Qaeda leader, and five of his fellow passengers (including a U.S.

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citizen) in Yemen. For U.S. purposes, the next generation for the projection of force may become armed drones being flown from bases in the United States. A “pilot” may break for lunch at the local MacDonald’s with coworkers and end work at 4:30 p.m. to make sure she is at her son’s soccer practice. Earlier in the day she may have been performing flying missions to fight terrorism in far away ungoverned spaces dropping precision guided missiles. Is this “pilot” a combatant who is a viable target when she is watching the soccer game? Could operatives argue that the battlefield has expanded to the continental United States and that it is moral, ethical, and lawful as a matter of the law of armed conflict to target the pilot on the sidelines of the soccer game? Is this the new battlefield for our world of technology and terrorism?38 The Geneva Conventions: What Process Is Due to the “Unlawful” Combatant? Under the Geneva Conventions (GCS), all that can be asked of any lawful prisoners of war who possess information—tactical, operational, or strategic—is name, rank, age, and serial number. Such a regime of interrogation was premised on the concept that prisoners of war (POWs), professional soldiers, were carrying out the will of their political masters and were following the rules or conventions as proscribed by the international order of conflict. For fellow professional warriors to torture or humiliate these individuals, who followed the jus in bello tradition, was to subject themselves to similar treatment if captured. The potential benefit of information to be gained by torture was outweighed by the potential for the increasing spiraling down of civil order that would result from mistreatment of POWs. One feared the eventual retaliation on oneself and the decomposition of the rules of war if revenge and bloodlust took over. Civilians, hospitals, places of worship would all become legitimate targets and the descent into the pre-Westphalian hell of total war, total targets, and total destruction would ensue. Fear of a world where crimes against humanity become the coinage of war lies at the heart of the Geneva Conventions. But what are the rules for those who have decided not to follow the jus in bello regime, who have chosen to target civilians in large numbers and have made the killing of civilians a strategic objective? In short, once one chooses to stand outside the tradition of the laws of armed conflict—what process is due this detained unlawful combatant? Under the GCS there are two articles that are relevant to those who fall outside the category of lawful combatants: Common Article 3 and Article 75 of the Third Convention. Each requires the Detaining Power to treat prisoners humanely and provide them with basic amenities. Moreover, at the very least, unlawful combatants must be treated by the dictates of customary international law.

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Common Article 3, which is in all of the four conventions, reads as follows: In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. (2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict. The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

Article 75 of the Third Geneva Convention deals with Detaining Power obligations concerning communications with the outside world, and reads as follows: Should military operations prevent the Powers concerned from fulfilling their obligation to assure the transport of the shipments referred to in Articles 70 (write family), 71 (receive letters), 72 (receive foodstuffs, clothing, medical supplies and articles of a religious, educational or recreational character which may meet their needs, including books, devotional articles, scientific equipment, examination papers, musical instruments, sports outfits and materials allowing prisoners of war to pursue their studies or their cultural activities) and 77 (instruments, papers or documents intended for prisoners of war or dispatched by them, especially powers of attorney and wills), the Protecting Powers concerned, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other organization duly approved by the Parties to the conflict may undertake to ensure the conveyance of such shipments by suitable means (railway wagons, motor vehicles, vessels or aircraft, etc.). For this purpose, the High Contracting Parties shall endeavor to supply them with such

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transport and to allow its circulation, especially by granting the necessary safe-conducts. Such transport may also be used to convey: (a) correspondence, lists and reports exchanged between the Central Information Agency referred to in Article 123 and the National Bureau referred to in Article 122; (b) correspondence and reports relating to prisoners of war which the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross or any other body assisting the prisoners, exchange either with their own delegates or with the Parties to the conflict. These provisions in no way detract from the right of any Party to the conflict to arrange other means of transport, if it should so prefer, nor preclude the granting of safe-conducts, under mutually agreed conditions, to such means of transport. In the absence of special agreements, the costs occasioned by the use of such means of transport shall be borne proportionally by the Parties to the conflict whose nationals are benefited thereby.

Common Article 3 and Article 75 provide for some basic protections to all detained parties regardless of status—lawful or unlawful. Interestingly, “customary” international law has so rarely confronted such a category of detainees, it is unclear what obligations are due; the United States, as it acts, is helping to define what is “customary” and what is “cruel, inhuman and degrading” behavior. As for “unlawful U.S. citizen combatants,” such as Jose Padilla, captured in the United States and placed in military custody, the Supreme Court, in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) held that some “due process” is required other than a presidential determination of terrorist activity or affiliation. In a stinging dissent in the case, Associate Justice Scalia, joined by Associate Justice Stevens, argued that as an American citizen, the appropriate prosecutorial approach for Padilla is to charge the defendant with treason in criminal court. For the majority in Padilla, some form of adjudication and rights for a U.S. “citizen unlawful combatant defendant” are required. The dissenters would place the defendant in the criminal law system—lawyers, rules of evidence, and multiple appeals would determine the final judgment of the citizen as unlawful combatant defendant or traitor. In June 2006, a majority of the Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld held that the president in establishing military commissions had exceeded his authority without specific Congressional authority, and had not complied with the UCMJ or the law of war as embodied by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Currently, legislation is being debated about how to “remedy” the statutory problems identified by the Court. Should the Congress adopt the commissions in a new Code for

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Military Commissions or reinstate the UCMJ procedures? What due process should be accorded to a noncitizen unlawful combatant? How far can captors go in acquiring vital information from noncitizens terrorists who have stepped outside the jus in bello regime? Are unlawful combatants terrorists who target civilians and noncombatants subject to reduced protections? Should unlawful combatants have testimony from “coerced interrogations” be admissible at trail and how should defendants have access to the evidence presented against them? These questions have sparked an international debate on the lawfulness of coercive interrogations and the due process “due” for unlawful combatants under Common Article 3. What Is Torture, and What Is “Coercive Interrogation”? Torture is defined by the United States under its definition for ratification of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT/CID) (1994) as follows: [I]n order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality. [emphasis added]

Under Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention, a war crime is defined as follows (this definition is incorporated in our War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 2441): Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.

Under Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “No one shall be subjected to torture, or to cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The Uniform Code of Military Justice and U.S. domestic criminal law39 have similar penalties for violating these norms. Passed by the Congress in 2005, the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) specifically

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prohibited cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment of person under the custody and control of the U.S. government and adopted the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation as the standard for questioning. In short, if the United States does not conduct itself appropriately, the stakes are high for U.S. personnel in the opinion of the world community and domestic law. However, noncitizen unlawful combatants who use the tactic of terror have critical information that coercive interrogation techniques may produce. The president, when approving the DTA, issued the following signing statement presenting his interpretation of the law: The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.

To some, the president was stating that as a matter of law he retained the power to go beyond the U.S. Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation if “protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks” required it. If “stress techniques” or “water-boarding” are not permanent or shortlived, should they not be used if sanctioned by executive order under strict supervision regardless of the DTA?40 The arguments that oppose “torture” fall into three categories: pragmatic, political and moral.41 The pragmatic argument is that torture or stress techniques do not work. Extreme torture yields false confessions. The pragmatist’s argument weakens if individuals do not confess to everything but in fact reveal valuable information. As a matter of decency, no country has performed scientifically controlled experiments to establish this fact. Mark Bowden, in a rare article exploring this area, defines torture as “the intentional infliction of severe pain to force information and confession” but emphasizes that the key to successful interrogation is the manipulation of “fear and anxiety,”42 not torture. When using fear and anxiety as the tools of manipulation, the issues become which techniques result in permanent versus temporary pain, psychological versus physical damage, and effective versus counterproductive procedures. Recent articles have explored those soldiers who “fight it out in the shadows” and the coercive techniques that have been used.43 Anecdotal stories reveal the unsettling possibility that certain techniques, although unlawful under the GCS, can be effective. There is an example of rendition of an al Qaeda lieutenant, Abu Hajer al Iraqi, as described in the New York

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Times by Michael Scheuer, a former CIA official who ran the bin Laden desk. Scheuer defends the results of the “Extraordinary Rendition,” program whereby individuals were sent to countries where valuable information was obtained that led to, as described by the 9/11 Commission Report, the “greatest number of terrorist arrests in a short period of time that we have ever arranged or facilitated.”44 The “interrogation process” of Abu Hajer al-Iraqi is never described, only the fruits of it. It appears, therefore, the pragmatic opposition to the use of coercion may require more elaboration. As for “political opposition” to a technique that may prove effective, this debate turns on the trade-off of short-term protection for long-term political advantage in the war of ideas. What does it say to those to whom we argue that “rule of law” is essential to the world we are trying to create if the United States, in the eyes of world opinion, violates the norms of the Geneva Conventions and the other treaties and conventions to obtain critical information? Defenders of coercion contend that it is good politics. Democracies are willing “to take the gloves off” when the enemy will not follow the rules. Taking severe action will force the participants to return to the legitimate playing field. Under this approach, democratic values will not be used against democracies; the rules should not be “a suicide pact” whereby following the rules will result in the destruction of the very citizens of the regimes themselves—hence the aforementioned Latin phrase inter arma silent leges.45 Necessity becomes the state managers’ defense. According to Michael Walzer, “supreme emergency” fosters “emergency ethics” and creates a paradox whereby moral communities make great immoralities morally possible—this is how he explains the bombing of German cities in World War II. Finally, to the moral defenders of jus in bello, any technique that distinguishes between lawful and unlawful combatants to conduct coercive interrogations is immoral; no pragmatic or political justification will ever suffice. The cure is worse than the disease. Any parsing of the interrogation technique that strays from the GCS or domestic law will lead down the road to self-destruction and undermine the very values of the democratic state based on due process and the rule of law. How does one balance religious rights against political rights—for example, if a female interrogator intentionally touches a praying male Muslim to gain his attention has she violated the Geneva Conventions? CAN AND WILL TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE CHANGE THE CHESSBOARD OF NORMS? Can technological advances create a new set of questions and norms for interrogations? If America’s armed forces use precision-guided munitions and “smart bombs” to minimize civilian casualties, America’s

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interrogation methods may rely upon new technologies to decrease the risk of “illegal abuse.” What if interrogators were able to secure reasonably reliable information from their detainees without stress positions, harsh sleep deprivation, physical threats, or sexual humiliation?46 The past decade has seen revolutions both in brain-scanning technologies and in drugs that affect the brain’s functions. The tools that may radically transform tomorrow’s interrogations can be found in hospitals worldwide. They help to painlessly diagnose Alzheimer’s, dyslexia, epilepsy, schizophrenia, insomnia, and brain tumors. These techniques may have uses in the interrogation room that will render moot debates about the excesses of Abu Ghraib-style treatment of prisoners. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging brain scans, for example, have improved so dramatically that they can now produce high-resolution movies of brain activity. Functional MRIs can measure how the brain reacts when asked certain questions, such as, “Do you know Mr. X?” or “Have you seen this man?” When you ask someone a question, the parts of the brain responsible for answering will cause certain neurons to fire, drawing blood flow. The oxygen in the blood then changes the brain’s magnetic field so that a neural radio signal emitted becomes more intense. Functional MRI scanners detect and calibrate these changes. And by comparing the resulting images to those of the brain at rest, a computer can produce detailed pictures of the part of the brain answering or not answering the question—in essence, creating a kind of high-tech lie detector. Engineers are also using less expensive technologies such as electroencephalography to track blood flow in the brain’s prefrontal cortex, the region associated with decision making and social inhibition. Electroencephalography, which is painless and noninvasive, has dramatically improved in the last 10 years so that it is now able to detect, for example, where the ability to speak a second language resides in the brain. And when electroencephalography data are read alongside Functional MRI scans, we can gain even richer insight into how the brain is functioning. Concurrent with these strides in brain imaging, scientists are learning more about how drugs influence the brain. Pharmaceuticals like Paxil, Zoloft, and Prozac have now been in general use long enough that neuroscientists are beginning to observe how they affect brain behavior and individual responses to conversation and questions. It now appears that there are safe drugs that reduce conversational inhibitions and the urge to deceive. If prisoners were wired to electroencephalographs or noninvasively examined by functional MRI scanners to see whether they were telling the truth, the images would not have turned into emblems of degradation and humiliation. Would most Americans honestly consider this torture or abuse?

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More important, these new technologies may also prove more effective than traditional interrogation techniques. Such an approach would counter the pragmatic opposition to coercion, as the new technologies may minimize false confessions by monitoring involuntary responses and indicating when such fabrications occur. Under the current Geneva Conventions, any such approach would be a violation. Politically, though, would the high-tech pharmaceutical American-style interrogation approach be unacceptable? Surely we would have to be prepared to see such techniques used on U.S. citizens and soldiers. Naturally, the moral objection would still stand. The advent of painless and temporary new drugs and brain-scanning techniques doesn’t remove the moral questions about whether they should be used on any detainees. Consider a hypothetical pill, whose only side effect is slight nausea and a headache, that makes anyone who takes it tell the truth for 90 minutes. Should military and intelligence interrogators be able to force POWs or unlawful combatants to take the pill? Human rights advocates argue that forcing the pill on prisoners would violate their rights to be free from selfincrimination. Would such minimally invasive interrogation options cross a legal line? In American criminal proceedings, the state can legally draw blood, take fingerprints, and obtain DNA for testing. POWs and unlawful combatants are not in the criminal system but one where less stringent protections are typically afforded. Would this be torture or abuse? Even if torture and abuse were effective interrogation tactics, they intrinsically undermine the values American society says it stands for. By contrast, using minimally invasive technologies explicitly designed not to be harmful represents values that can be defended both at home and abroad. CONCLUSION Where does this leave the debate, and what are the rules for the war in the shadows? For a large part of the Global War on Terrorism, Congress largely remained silent on the issues of targeted killing, due process and interrogation. Recently, with the passage of the Military Commission Act of 2006 (MCA), Congress has entered the fray. The MCA though will probably still be subject to future litigation over the controversial passages dealing with the definition of an unlawful combatant, the restricted right of habeas corpus, and how evidence resulting from coercive interrogation is placed into the record. The executive branch has conducted a number of investigations and charged a few lower ranking soldiers with interrogation abuses, but has avoided any open debate of executive power in these investigations. There has been an understandable reluctance to engage in an open debate about the issue of coercive interrogation techniques. However, a recent Harvard University study on highly coercive interrogation techniques, detentions, renditions, and other related issues has challenged

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the Congress to become more involved in the debate on detainees and draft legislation to regulate the use of these instruments in the war on terrorism.47 Michael Ignatieff concludes that necessity may require actions that stray from our commitments to human dignity. But the best way in his view to “minimize harms” or choose the lesser evil is to maintain a clear distinction in our minds between what necessity can justify and what the morality of dignity can justify, and never to allow the justifications of necessity—risk, threat, imminent danger—to dissolve the morally problematic character of necessary measures. Because the measures are morally problematic, they must be strictly targeted, applied to the smallest number of people, used as a last resort, and kept under the adversarial scrutiny of an open democratic system.48

This set of restrictions resonates with the Israeli guidelines for targeted killing. On the issue of “torture” some leading civil rights advocates such as Alan Dershowitz have called for “torture warrants” and judicial review. Other respected commentators have called for a meeting of the principal G-8 allies to consider revisions to the Geneva Conventions and to develop a new set of rules and procedures to govern targeted killings, prisoner of war rights, interrogations and renditions.49 For others, this is a policy area where the less said the better. It should remain in the world of the shadows, the world of covert action where executive power uses “dirty hands” to protect the innocent. In the world of just war theory, if the uses of these interrogation methods are in a just cause, only in the last resort for an emergency situation, and are proportional in utilitarian terms, what is allowed? For those theorists who reluctantly advocate harsh methods of interrogation, the state needs to develop laws, institutions, and procedures to authorize, monitor, and control coerced interrogations and punish severely any unauthorized acts. One has even called for judicial procedures that need to be independent of government, the armed services and the intelligence services; the judges must have continuous and sustained authorization, observation, and control; and these judges should have the ability to impose severe criminal sanctions against any officer who authorizes, engages in or acquiesces in illegitimate acts not authorized.50 Would U.S. soldiers contend that their moral and ethical codes allow them to participate in these actions? Ironically, this approach would remove the President from the calculus and redistribute the pardon power to the new authority. Unfortunately, the world of the shadows has crept into the world of light, as the war on terrorism continues to capture terrorists and the process of interrogation for prevention has leaked into the press. A more open international debate may demonstrate how different and isolated the U.S. approach is to the war on terrorism, and may prove to be counter productive for the United States, while a more open domestic debate may focus

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on how hard it is to regulate the unlawful without denigrating the rule of law. Or perhaps science and technology over the next several decades will advance to the point that brain imaging, drug innovation, and gene development will enable the next generation to “crack” open the secrets of the mind when done under court order in the name of national security and prevention. How such power will then not migrate over to the domestic arena to ensure “guilt” will be a test of our rights under the Constitution. In the end, the court of history will judge Congress’ silence, the executive’s actions, and science’s race to unlock the secrets of the mind. The moral, ethical, and legal debate and the GWOT will shape the norms of our new century. T. H. Marshall, in his 1950 classic essay on citizenship in Britain, Citizen and Social Class, argued that civil rights were established in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth, and universal social rights under the welfare state by the mid-twentieth century. As we enter the twenty-first century, many of Marshall’s insights are under attack by the war on terrorism, as the concepts of citizen and rights are redefined by both politics and science. How we understand rights, privacy, and citizenship in this new brave world will be shaped by how we fight the war on terrorism and how we use the law to define the debate on how to fight. To paraphrase Heraclitus, “Much is in flux.” The war in the shadows must be brought into the light but what will be the costs of doing so and choosing the lesser evil?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the following individuals for their comments and thoughts: Kelly Ward, James Forest, Bernard “Bud” Cole, Brian Collins, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Bernard “Bard” O’Neill, Trudi Rishikof, and Gebhard Schweigler. The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the National War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. See Harvey Rishikof and Patrick Bratton, “11/9-9/11: The Brave New World Order: Peace Through Law—Beyond Power Politics or Peace through Empire—Rationale Strategy and Reasonable Policy,” Villanova Law Review 50, no. 3 (2005): 655–683. The following paragraphs are drawn from this article. 2. Quoting a senior Pentagon official describing the situation in Ivory Coast in November 2004. See Douglas Farah, “Road to Violence,” Washington Post, November 22, 2004, A19. 3. The classic text for the military as a “profession” is Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957).

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4. See Robert C. Stacey, “The Age of Chivalry,” The Laws of War, ed. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark Shulman (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 33–34. 5. Michael Walzer, Arguing About War, Yale Nota Bene (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005), 8. 6. This point is made by Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 15, citing Isaiah Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli,” in Against the Current (New York: Viking, 1980). 7. See Christopher J. Joyner, s.v. “International Law, 2,” Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., at 259 (New York: Scribner’s, 2001), presenting an indepth definition of international law). 8. This is most clearly demonstrated in recent times by the stated willingness of the United States to undertake an invasion of Iraq by itself if necessary. See the National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002, discussing the need for “preemption” (chapter V: “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction”). 9. This is growing into an extensive literature. Some of the popular points are made by Michael Ignatieff, “American Empire (Get Used to It),” New York Times Magazine, January 5, 2003, 22; Michael Mandelbaum, “The Inadequacy Of American Power,” Foreign Affairs, September–October 2002. 10. George Washington, Farewell Address, http:www.yale.edu/lawweb/ avalon/washing.htm. 11. Max Weber, Economy and Society, vol. 1, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California 1978), 58, 82, passim. 12. See, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th ed. (New York: Random House, 1978), 5. 13. Mark R. Amstutz, International Ethics: Concepts, Theories and Cases in Global Politics (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999). Traditional realists such as John J. Mearshimer opposed the U.S. intervention in Iraq on the realist grounds that it would not lead to stability and order. For this traditionalist view, see The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). 19. See The National Security Strategy. 20. The Monroe Doctrine in 1825 asserted that the Western Hemisphere was closed to colonization and aggressive actions by European states. See Ernest R. May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 21. For a full chart of the myriad of bodies, see The Project on International Courts and Tribunals, http:www.pict-pcti.org. 22. Article 51, The Charter of the United Nations, http:www.un.org/aboutun/ charter/chapter7.htm. 23. Ugo Mattei and Jeffery S. Lena, “United States Jurisdiction over Conflicts Arising Outside of the US: Some Hegemonic Implications,” Global Jurist Topics 3,

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no. 2 (2001): 1 quoting US Constitution, Art III; and Harvey Rishikof, Framing International Rights with a Janusism Edge–Foreign Policy and Class Actions–Legal Institutions as Soft Power (The University of Chicago Legal Forum, 2003). 24. See Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981), discussing the pros and cons of human rights policies. 25. Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders. 26. Mattei and Lena, “United States Jurisdiction” at 2. 27. Cass Sunstein, One Case at Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). 28. For the discussion of jus in bellum and jus in bello, see Amstutz, International Ethics, 101–102. 29. See Louis V. Iasiello, “Just Post Bellum: The Moral Responsibilities of Victors in War,” Naval War College Review 57, no. 3/4 (Summer/Autumn 2004): 33–52. 30. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7–48. 31. For a detailed account, please see the chapter by James Smith in volume 3 of this publication. 32. For a detailed account, please see the chapter by Joanne Wright in volume 3 of this publication. 33. For a detailed account, please see the chapter by Lydia Khalil in volume 3 of this publication. 34. See Walzer, Arguing about War, 76. 35. See Louis V. Iasiello, “Jus Post Bellum,” 42–45. 36. Laura Blumenfeld, “In Israel, a Divisive Struggle over Targeted Killing,” Washington Post, August 27, 2006, A1, A12, A13. The following paragraphs are drawn from the article describing the September 6, 2003, incident. 37. See Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem, “Targeted Killing in Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism.” In Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005). 38. This example grows out of a conversation with Brian Collins, who has just completed a PhD thesis on the air force and professionalism. 39. See 18 USC, §2340. 40. See Heather Mac Donald, “How to Interrogate Terrorists,” City Journal, Winter 2005. 41. The debate has become so extensive that collections of readings have been produced. See Sanford Levinson, ed., Torture: A Collection (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Karen J. Greenberg, The Torture Debate in America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); also Jerome Slater, “Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism: Should We Try to Regulate and Control Torture,” Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 191–215. 42. See Mark Bowden, “The Dark Art of Interrogation,” Atlantic, October 2003, 53. 43. Joseph Lelyveld, “What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk about Torture,” New York Times Magazine, June 12, 1995, sec. 6, p. 36; Adam Zagorin and Michael Duffy, “Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063,” Time Magazine, June 20, 2005, 26. 44. Michael Scheuer, “A Fine Rendition,” New York Times, March 11, 2003, A23; The 9/11 Commission Report, 127.

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45. “In war, the law is silent.” 46. The following paragraphs are drawn from an article the author recently wrote with Michael Schrage, a senior adviser to the MIT Security Studies Program in Slate: “Technology vs. Torture: Psychopharmaceuticals and Brain Imaging Could Make Prisoner Interrogation More Humane. Should We Use Them?” Posted August 18, 2004, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2105332. 47. Philip B. Heymann and Juliette N. Kayyem, “Preserving Security and Democratic Freedoms in the War on Terrorism.” In Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terrorism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2005), 59–69. 48. Michael Ignatieff, 8. 49. Jeffrey H. Smith, “Regaining Respect,” Washington Post, June 27, 2005, A15; Thomas P.M. Barnett, “The New Magnum Force,” Wired, February 2005, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.02/start.html?pg=2. 50. Jerome Slater, “Tragic Choices in the War on Terrorism: Should We Try to Regulate and Control Torture,” Political Science Quarterly 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 215.

CHAPTER 7 THE CRITICAL ROLE OF INTERAGENCY COOPERATION IN COUNTERING SUICIDE BOMBINGS James D. Kiras

The phrase “interagency cooperation” has become one of a number of catch phrases for those seeking to make widespread change in, and reform of, government in the United States. Such calls often result from the perceived failure of government to adequately protect the health and welfare of its citizenry after particularly traumatic or catastrophic incidents. Suicide bombings are almost always noteworthy but have been particularly traumatic in Western countries when this tactic has been employed against targets domestically. Examples of recent suicide bombings that have spurred calls for greater cooperation between governmental agencies include the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the United States, the March 2004 bombings on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, and the July 2005 attacks on the London transportation system. Yet, calls for reform of processes can be based more on a need for government to be seen to be reacting to the concern of its citizens. In other words, there is a temptation for leaders to take action for action’s sake without considering what those reforms are intended to achieve realistically. In a highly charged political environment, and particularly, one in which divisive partisan politics and threat inflation may be driving the agenda, does such reform make sense? Particularly keen readers may have already divined the answer to this question based on the title of this chapter. The goal of this chapter, however, is not to build an ironclad case in support of interagency cooperation as the answer to suicide bombing. Rather, this chapter outlines how the requirement for greater cooperation between agencies in developing

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and implementing potential solutions is anything but certain. The discussion begins by looking at the peculiar challenges that suicide bombing presents to those charged with preventing terrorism, and suggests that irregular adversaries will always seek to exploit systemic and other vulnerabilities in order to carry out their attacks successfully. On the basis of those challenges, this chapter argues that greater interagency cooperation can interdict or disrupt suicide bombing throughout its lifecycle. The ultimate result of seamless cooperation ideally is the prevention of all future suicide bombing attacks. Sadly, this state of affairs will remain the ideal for some time, as the concluding section suggests. As an example of the paradoxical logic of strategy,1 potential reformers face a particularly troublesome choice: change the mechanisms (and consequently, the nature) of democratic government in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness, or accept marginal change that leaves exploitable vulnerabilities in place. THE PROBLEM OF SUICIDE BOMBING Well before the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, terrorism specialists and counterterrorism experts recognized disturbing indicators that terrorist groups were turning more frequently to suicide bombing as a method of attack globally. Although the United States had only been targeted infrequently by suicide bombers, other nations— including Israel, Turkey, and Sri Lanka—had suffered the effects of sustained campaigns of suicide bombing by secular and religious terrorist and insurgent groups, including Hamas, Hizbollah, Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). According to one source, there were at least 275 documented acts of suicide terrorism from 1983 until 2000.2 The increase in frequency was only one disturbing aspect of suicide bombing; another was the growth in the lethality of terrorist attacks in general, which correlated broadly to the increasing use of suicide bombing as a tactic.3 The leaders of terrorist groups appeared to care little for the destruction among noncombatants that their attacks caused. For example, in the twin 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, only 5 percent of the casualties in both attacks were citizens of the target state—the United States.4 Over 200 Kenyans and Tanzanians were killed, and more than 5,000 were injured as a result of two suicide bombings using trucks loaded with explosives. The use of suicide bombing by terrorist groups, however, raised significant questions about the ability of governments to combat the phenomenon. If terrorists were willing to kill others and die in the process, what possible incentive and threats could governments use to dissuade them from doing so? The worst-case scenario for any government would be the acquisition of nuclear material by a terrorist group with a demonstrated history of conducting suicide bombing. The potential situation in which such a group

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obtains materials to conduct a suicide bombing attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), but cannot be discovered in time due to lack of coordination among government agencies, adds a sense of urgency to attempts to improve interagency coordination. Definitions and Methods of Suicide Terrorism A significant part of the problem in tackling suicide bombing lies in defining what it is: ranging from the various methods that are used to conduct suicide bombings; coming to terms with the purpose for which they are used; and comprehending the component elements that support an attack. One problem in particular that has impeded efforts to better understand the phenomenon is spotlighting the actor rather than the purpose of the act. In looking to combat the problem, some scholars and journalists have focused exclusively on the motivation behind the act of suicide bombing, to the exclusion of its purpose. This approach has led to significant effort being placed on developing a psychological profile of a “typical suicide bomber” in order to assist law enforcement and other agencies in identifying individuals prior to attacks.5 For the purpose of this chapter, suicide bombing is defined as a unique form of political violence, distinguishable from other forms of violence— including hijacking, kidnappings, and non–suicide bombings—by a number of attributes, as part of an ongoing campaign of terrorist or insurgent violence to achieve political objectives through revolution or the capitulation of their adversary.6 The form of conflict in which suicide bombing occurs, including terrorism and insurgency, is superfluous to this discussion. A number of scholars have spent considerable effort attempting to develop unifying explanations for why groups utilize suicide terrorism across different forms of conflict. In essence, terrorist and insurgent groups use suicide terrorism because it is an effective, low-cost, low-risk form of attack that is difficult to stop. In addition, suicide bombing generates fear disproportionate to the actual damage that it inflicts. This does not mean that the purpose for which suicide bombing is used is not important, but for the government facing a substate opponent who is prepared to use this specific form of violence, the distinction may be an academic one. Suicide bombing as a tactic of violence does possess a number of attributes, some of which are unique. One unique attribute is contained in the label “suicide bombing” itself. From a functional perspective, terrorists or insurgents undertaking the act purposefully set out to sacrifice their life as part of the attack. A more recent trend has been to characterize such attacks as “homicide bombings.”7 The rationale for changing the term is twofold. By shifting focus on the results of the attack, as opposed to the characteristics of the individual committing it, the term “homicide

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bombings” attempts to delegitimize the act. Homicide denotes that a crime has been committed and there are victims. “Suicide bombing,” in contrast, suggests a depth of conviction and even nobility of cause—after all, what cause is worth giving one’s own life and killing others in the process? Most terms associated with terrorism have subjective and even pejorative connotations, but the term “suicide bombing” offers a key qualifier that “homicide bombing” does not: the perpetrator dies in the act and does so to increase the chance of success and the psychological impact of the operation. The second attribute of the phenomenon of suicide bombing, but one that is not unique to it, is the destructive component—the bomb itself. Although the popular depiction of suicide bombers is one of wild-eyed fanatics strapping explosives to their bodies and detonating it at a selected moment, the reality is that the only common element in the range of attacks that have been conducted is the use of chemical explosives, fuel-air mixtures, or flammable materials, individually or in coordination, to damage or destroy their intended target. The sheer variety in the size and types of suicide bombs used to date is astounding. Explosives used in suicide bombs have ranged from military munitions rigged with personal initiators to commercial and even homemade explosive compounds based on fertilizers or other readily available chemicals.8 Anecdotal (but ultimately unconfirmed) evidence suggests that al Qaeda has tried to purchase radioactive elements for potential use in a WMD attack.9 Some devices are transportable by individual bombers and include belt bombs carried by an individual beneath their clothing, or contained in personal items such as briefcases or knapsacks. The latter method was used by the fundamentalist Islamic cell that conducted their attacks on the London transport system on July 7, 2005. Bombs carried by individuals are generally limited in size to less than 50 pounds, in order to prevent excessive fatigue of the bomber and possible discovery before delivery. In order to carry a larger weight of explosives on land, in some cases up to several thousands pounds of explosives, terrorist and insurgent groups have used a variety of means of transportation including bicycles and motorcycles (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or PIJ, and the LTTE), wagons (Hamas), cars (Egyptian Islamic Jihad), vans (Jemaah Islamiyyah), and trucks (al Qaeda, Hizbollah, and LTTE).10 Terrorist and insurgent groups have used with increasing frequency secondary materials such as acetylene tanks, nails, and ball bearings, to enhance the blast and fragmentation effects of the bomb and improve their lethality. Suicide bombings at sea have not been as frequent, but groups such as al Qaeda and the LTTE have demonstrated remarkable tenacity and technical innovation. For example, the cell that committed the attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor, Yemen, had originally targeted the USS The Sullivans during an earlier port visit. The common harbor skiff used in the attack,

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which is believed to have carried an explosive payload to maximize the effect of the explosion, originally sank before the attack could be carried out. The skiff, however, was retrieved, repaired, and used successfully against the USS Cole on October 10, 2000, killing 17 sailors, wounding 39 others, and causing an estimated $243 million in damage to the warship.11 Other seaborne suicide bombings include a number of attacks conducted by the LTTE against vessels of the Sri Lankan Navy, some of which employed relatively sophisticated boats that incorporated features designed to mask their radar signature.12 Al Qaeda also conducted a seaborne suicide bombing attack away from shore, in more open water, against the oil tanker MV Limburg in the Gulf of Aden on October 6, 2002. Like seaborne attacks, aerial suicide bombings are rarer than attacks on land, for a number of pragmatic and technical reasons. Aerial suicide bombings to destroy commercial aircraft in flight, however, have been planned and/or committed by Chechen female “Black Widow” volunteers as well as al Qaeda and those inspired by its message, as recent events and captured documents suggest. Two examples of those inspired by fundamentalist Islamic messages include the foiled plot in England to smuggle liquid explosive components onto trans-Atlantic flights in August 2006, and the attempt by the so-called “Shoe Bomber,” Richard Reid, to destroy an American Airlines flight from Paris in December 2001. Although these attempted suicide bombings were planned to take place in the air, the delivery method was nevertheless limited to the amount of explosives that the individual could carry onto the aircraft without detection. The attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon can be classified as suicide bombings for an entirely different reason. Although they did not use explosives in the conventional sense, the aircraft themselves became the bombs. The Twin Towers were engineered to withstand strikes by contemporary commercial aircraft, in particular the Boeing 707, during the design phase in the late 1960s.13 The building’s designers, however, may have only considered the kinetic energy of the impact and not the secondary effect that the burning jet fuel would have on the structure in the impact area.14 The aircraft used for the attacks on September 11, 2001, had almost full fuel loads for cross-country flights. Although the precise effects could not be calculated in advance, there is some evidence that Osama bin Laden expected the destruction to be significant, but not necessarily catastrophic, as the transcript of a videotaped conversation suggests: We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy, who would be killed based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all. [. . . Inaudible . . .] due to my experience in this field, I was

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thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the floors above it only. This is all that we had hoped for.15

Terrorists and insurgent groups that plan suicide bombing attacks will make use of those means that are at hand, or that can be acquired with relative ease or as resources permit, in order to thwart detection and protection measures and best guarantee the success of their attack. The goal is to keep security forces guessing as to which method of attack the terrorist or insurgent group will try next and to compel the former to stretch their resources thin by trying to defend everywhere. A particular hallmark of al Qaeda and the groups it inspires was an ability to plan nearly simultaneous attacks or detonations regardless of the distance between targets, using cellular telephones to coordinate or initiate the bombings. The targets have been within the same vicinity, as occurred during the Madrid train bombings, or in separate countries, as in the 1998 embassy attacks in East Africa. In some cases, the threat to conduct suicide bombing is more important than actually conducting the attacks. During the Chechen hostage taking of a Moscow theater during October 23–26, 2002, the leader of the group, Movsar Barayev, threatened the use of suicide bombings using belt bombs and rigged munitions. He backed the threat by video statements that showed some of the group’s munitions and offered statements that the group was willing to die for their cause. Barayev presumably did this to demonstrate the group’s resolve in order to improve their bargaining position, strike fear into the heart of the Russian population, and dissuade any potential rescue effort. The fact that Baseyev was the nephew of slain Chechen leader Arbi Barayev lent additional credibility to the threat that the group was willing to commit suicide. Another unique attribute of suicide bombing lies in the ability of the bomber to initiate the attack, alter its trajectory, or abort it, in order to improve the likelihood of the attack’s success. The chances that an attack will be more successful are improved when a suicide bomber or team disguises the method of attack until just before detonation. But this is not always the case, as any weapon is only as effective as the intelligence that guides its use. The unpredictability of the method of attack and the range of potential targets, in combination with the guidance system of the weapon, makes suicide bombing a thorny security problem. The guidance system and detonation of the suicide bomb—the mind of the suicide bomber(s)— utilizes human judgment, intuition, and ingenuity for success, and is limited only by protective measures that potentially deter or deny the suicide bomber access to their target. One advantage of using humans is their ability to seek out other approaches to the target or to adapt to unanticipated circumstances during device placement and detonation. Only in the rarest of conditions are individual terrorists thwarted and captured alive

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once they are prepared, committed, and equipped to attack. No method of attack involving human beings, however, is infallible. The confession of Sajida al-Rishawi, who participated in the al Qaeda in Iraq suicide bombing of three hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, suggests that she may not have been as committed or prepared to deal with the initial failure of her detonator.16 Other suicide bombers have preferred to detonate their device somewhere other than the designated target, in order to kill someone rather than being captured. For example, according to Russian sources, Chechen suicide bomber Roza Nagayeva observed police carrying out security checks on people before entering Moscow’s Rizhskaya metro station on August 31, 2004. She subsequently targeted passers-by on a nearby busy street and exploded her device, killing 10, injuring 51, and causing damage to surrounding buildings.17

The Purpose of Suicide Terrorism At the tactical level, the suicide bomber is concerned with not failing in his or her effort to conduct the attack successfully. How a specific attack fits as part of a strategy of revolutionary violence over a period of time is often not known to the individual suicide bomber. Terrorist and insurgent group leaders are rational actors that dictate when the use of violence begins and when it stops. In other words, the political violence is harnessed for a purpose as part of a campaign to achieve objectives. Suicide bombing is one method that allows terrorist and insurgent leaders to achieve one or a combination of objectives. These objectives can include: r achieving national liberation or freedom from occupation, which can encompass a drive for ethnic and/or religious autonomy;

r “awakening” a national, ethnic, and/or religious consciousness as the first step in a revolution;

r consolidating power by killing rival group leaders and supporters; r competing with rival groups for popular support; r provoking a disproportionate response that discredits their opponent in the arena of popular perception;

r raising the morale of an oppressed population; and r demonstrating a group’s power and reach, by striking at targets symbolic of a state’s power and prestige.18

The last objective suggests to targeted citizens that the state is unwilling or unable to defend itself or protect them. Such organizational objectives underpinning the use of violence, however, must be separated from individual motivations. The specific reasons that inspire individuals to make the decision to become suicide bombers vary widely—from revenge to self-loathing—making it very difficult to determine which is the primary

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factor, and is the subject of a broad range of sociological, psychological, and social science scrutiny. Overall, though the broad category of motivation and justification for suicide terrorism is important only to the extent that government agencies should coordinate their efforts to decouple the organizational rationale for the violence from the recruiting pool of future suicide bombers. The purpose for which suicide bombing is used as a form of political violence is related to the primary audience it is intended to influence. Scholars disagree on precisely who is intended to be influenced, although they agree on the reasons why the violence is used. Robert Pape, for example, suggests that the primary audience to be influenced by suicide bombings is external. He posits that terrorist groups use suicide bombing rather than other types of terrorism because of the unique fear and costs they impose. Fear and costs translate into coercive leverage at the strategic level by threatening the targeted states with even more violence in the future.19 According to Pape, democracies are the most susceptible to coercion by terrorist suicide bombing campaigns because of their vulnerability to attack and the ability of the populous to influence elected leaders. There is little that democratic states can do to stop suicide bombing, given the openness of their societies. What they can and should do, he argues, is to address the root cause of terrorist anger. Pape determines that the root cause of terrorist anger against the United States is the American military presence in the Middle East. In its stead, he argues, the United States should return to a foreign policy of “offshore balancing” that minimizes its risk to future attack.20 The shortcomings in Pape’s methodology and analysis, including the susceptibility of civilian will to episodic terrorist violence, have already been critiqued in detail elsewhere.21 Overall, focusing on the effects that suicide bombing have on external audiences, in this case, leads to an exclusive foreign policy solution. Mia Bloom and others who have studied the use of suicide bombing by Palestinian groups suggest that terrorist groups are attempting to influence a domestic audience instead.22 Bloom suggests that the United States should utilize its soft power to address the root causes of terrorism. These core motivations, stemming from local grievances—including political and economic inequities—are only exacerbated by American military efforts to kill or capture terrorist leaders globally.23 In a sense, delineating the effect of suicide bombing among internal and external audiences is academically interesting, but the resulting conclusions have practical implications. Some of those implications, however, can be dangerous in the sense that they may sway policymakers to choose responses optimized to counter the problem by trying to mitigate the effects on either a domestic or an external audience. It is not surprising that there are proponents for each approach within policy circles who are blindly pursuing a simple solution to a complex problem.

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The Support Structure of Suicide Bombing The various means of terrorist attack suggest protective or defensive measures that can be taken to make such attacks more difficult to conduct and to mitigate their consequences if successful. Understanding the organizational purpose behind suicide bombings provides potential opportunities to counter the ideological message and underlying grievance(s) of— and strategic rationale for—violence. The last attribute of suicide bombing that offers insights for governments and coalition partners looking to counter the threat is the support structure that enables attacks. In all but the rarest cases, individual martyrs are only one link in a chain that allows organizations to conduct sustained suicide bombing campaigns over time. Trying to stop the individual during the course of an attack is extremely difficult, and puts the state in a defensive and reactive posture. Grasping the sequence of events in the life cycle of a suicide bombing attack can offer insights into the organizational structure that supports it, and can help us identify key links in the chain against which more proactive measures can be taken. A number of contextual factors—including the nature of terrain, population density, economic conditions, appeal of the group’s cause, the legitimacy of the government, and the nature of the government’s response to the threat—have shaped whether or not previous terrorist and insurgency groups achieved their revolutionary objectives.24 There is no shortage of models that describe the planning for and conduct of terrorist attacks. A summary of three of these models is contained in Table 7.1. As the models suggest, terrorist and insurgent groups, no matter what their size or ideological bent, require a number of basic elements in order to conduct their operations—leaders, facilitators, operators, resources, time, space, communications, and information. Individual suicide bombers are difficult to identify among the larger population prior to their attack, and stopping them once they are equipped and en route is problematic for reasons identified above. The leaders of terrorist groups, in contrast, are elusive and adopt active and passive security, mobility, and deception measures. These measures include crossing borders, limiting communications to prevent interception, and changing locations frequently in order to protect themselves from being located and attacked. The success of al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in avoiding death or capture immediately after the September 11 attacks, and for several years after the Taliban regime fell in Afghanistan, is a striking example.25 If terrorist leaders are elusive, and suicide bombers are difficult to identify beforehand and prevent executing their mission, then the potential weakest links in the chain that lead up to one or more suicide bombings are the facilitators of the attack. The more sophisticated that a suicide

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Table 7.1 Phases/Steps of Terrorist/Suicide Operations Tactical Stages of a Terrorist Operation26

Suicide Attack Model27

Phases/ Setting up a steps logistical network

The decision to execute an attack

Model

Selecting potential targets

Intelligence gathering

Gathering information on potential targets

Basic Steps of a Suicide Operation28 Target selection

Location of the “shahid”

Intelligence gathering

Spiritual indoctrination

Recruitment

Operational training

Training

Reconnaissance of potential targets

Preparation of the explosive device

Planning of operation

Purification

Rehearsal

Insertion of weapons into area of operations

Departure to the target

Preparation of explosives

Insertion of operators into area of operations

Execution of the attack

Transportation of the suicide bomber to the target area

Execution of the operation Withdrawal of operational team Issue of communiqu´es

bombing is, especially if it involves large numbers of operatives to conduct attacks simultaneously or converge on a single location, the greater time and resources that are required to conduct the attack. The Madrid bombings, as an example of an attack limited in scale, geography, and resources, took just eight weeks to plan and execute.29 The Moscow theater siege by Chechen rebels mentioned above, in contrast, was conducted only after a number of rehearsals of the plan (according to captured video evidence).30 Large-scale, coordinated terrorist attacks suggest that an organizational structure supports the suicide bombing prior to attack. A recently published analysis of al Qaeda documents captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere suggests that the larger the group became, the more it suffered

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from the same bureaucratic maladies and friction among its terrorist facilitators that plague state governments.31 These afflictions are symptomatic of a wider organizational problem—how do geographically and operationally dispersed elements operate together in an effective and efficient manner? According to the authors of this report: Terrorist groups, and other covert organizations, face two fundamental tradeoffs. The first is between operational security and financial efficiency. Here problems of trust and control—agency problems—create inefficiencies in resource allocation. Strategies to mitigate these problems all entail security costs. The second tradeoff is between operational security and tactical control. Here agency problems and other group dynamics lead to counterproductive violence. Strategies to mitigate these problems through greater control entail security costs for groups as a whole.32

Terrorist and insurgent group facilitators comprise the middle management between leader and operator. They perform a variety of roles, including functional planning, acquisition and provision of logistics, technical expertise, financing, and couriering, among other roles.33 The global chain that supported the September 11 attacks included facilitators who provided finances, safe houses, travel arrangements, and documentation from Afghanistan through Pakistan, Dubai, and possibly Iran.34 The actions of such facilitators, however, provides government agencies with an opportunity to identify individual links in the chain, develop a picture of the network, and cripple it by removing key elements individually or simultaneously. The intelligence cues of terrorist facilitators are provided as a result of surveillance and analysis that identifies established patterns of behavior, preferred operating methods, specific technical signatures, and potentially limited sources of supply, as these facilitators continue to go about their business. For example, individual bomb makers often leave telltale signs in terms of the types of suicide bomb made, components used in the manufacture, and how the device is constructed.35 State agencies, working together and with their foreign counterparts, can exploit these intelligence cues, provided they are identified, assessed, and acted upon before the suicide bomber support network has a chance to disperse. INTERAGENCY COOPERATION TO COUNTER SUICIDE BOMBING Few doubt the need for resource and information sharing between those agencies and departments with responsibilities for countering and combating terrorism and insurgency in all its forms, including suicide bombing. The members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) concluded that there were at

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least 10 potential opportunities in the 21 months preceding the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon that were squandered because “the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating the foreign and domestic agencies of the government.”36 The costs of the September 11, 2001, attacks in human and economic terms, as well as the threat of potential suicide bombings by al Qaeda or similar groups using WMD, suggests that governments cannot afford bureaucratic inflexibility and dithering between agencies and departments in the face of such a catastrophic threat. Perhaps the most important questions associated with interagency cooperation are not whether is should occur, but rather, what this is, what ultimate purpose it serves, and at what level cooperation is most effective. Although the term “interagency cooperation” is relatively new, some of the concepts underpinning it also relate to the character of democratic governance. The concepts influencing the drive toward interagency cooperation are the principles of responsibility, accountability, efficiency (which can be read in a number of ways, including economy), and effectiveness. Individuals in nations other than the United States and some of its coalition partners prefer to call such collaboration “intergovernmental cooperation”; the wording may be different, but the intent is still the same. Behind the words is a desire to force government organizations to combine their resources and use them in a coordinated fashion, make each other aware of new developments, and prioritize and focus energies against threats and emergencies that cross-organizational authorities and responsibilities. The discussion here will focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of government response as the purpose behind interagency cooperation. Before September 11, 2001, terrorism (and suicide bombing in particular) was considered a problem that requires an interagency response. For example, the State Department maintained diplomatic pressure on state sponsors, supporters, and terrorist groups. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in contrast, was the lead agency in the U.S. government for bringing terrorist suspects to justice, and led all investigations into terrorist groups domestically and terrorist acts committed against U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the office of primary responsibility for overseas intelligence collection against, analysis of, and reporting on terrorist groups and individuals through its Counterterrorist Center (CTC) and Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). The Department of Defense maintained capabilities that largely supported other agencies, although its primary contribution against terrorism was in the form of measures to mitigate the effects of terrorist attacks overseas by conducting security assessments and establishing defensive force protection measures on U.S. government facilities.37 Despite a well-understood need for greater collaboration between agencies, and the establishment of a number of committees and working

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groups for that expressed purpose, progress in the United States toward meaningful interagency collaboration at the national or strategic level remains elusive. The reasons for this lack of success can be ascribed to a number of organizational and bureaucratic factors. It should be noted that these factors are not unique to the United States. Rather, they are common to almost all democratic governments with large bureaucracies. From an organizational perspective, departments and agencies compete to establish or maintain primacy for roles and specific missions under established law, as this determines who has leadership and (to some extent) command over other agencies. Command gives an agency the authority to task or request resources from other agencies and departments in support of missions and control (to a certain extent) over the directions of policy and actions operationally. Primacy is almost always linked to the fiscal resources available to perform the mission, which is an element whose importance cannot be overstated. The executive agent for a particular mission also sets the functional standards and operating conditions within its own organization to conduct its affairs more effectively and efficiently. Inefficiencies include wasted time, missed opportunities, incompatible databases, exclusive information classification and data sharing systems, and squandered resources. These inefficiencies occur in government as a result of personality clashes, competition between different departments and agencies for resources (especially when those resources are shrinking), suspicion over the motives and agendas of other agencies, the spreading of authority among numerous agencies and departments, and friction between agencies when they possess similar or overlapping capabilities, among others.38 An example of the latter is contained in the observation by the 9/11 Commission on the ability of U.S. government agencies and departments to conduct offensive clandestine or covert operations against terrorist groups globally. Their recommendation to transfer responsibility to conduct such missions from the CIA to the Department of Defense’s Special Operations Command was based on a number of the inefficiencies outlined above: “Before 9/11, the CIA did not invest in a robust capability to conduct paramilitary operations with U.S. personnel. It relied on proxies instead. . . . Whether the price is measured in either money or people, the United States cannot afford to build two separate capabilities for carrying out secret military operations, secretly operating standoff missiles, and secretly training foreign military or paramilitary forces. The United States should concentrate responsibility and necessary legal authorities under one entity.”39 Since September 11, 2001, the impetus within the United States has been to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness in combating terrorism at all levels of government. At the lowest level, the tactical domain, the United States has made great strides in establishing interagency cooperation in response to local

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conditions. In the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the Combatant Commander (U.S. Central Command) established a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) in order to streamline the planning and information sharing between departments and agencies, ranging from local law enforcement in New York to the National Security Agency.40 The JIACG facilitated the formation of interagency teams, but their efficiency and effectiveness was improved by theater-level planning and tactical information sharing. As Matthew Bogdanos has noted, “[the situation report’s] real value lay in its dissemination by each member to each member. Such JIACG-wide situational awareness avoided duplication of effort and generated collaborative, multiagency solutions to every initiative.”41 The JIACG model was repeated in Iraq and other task-oriented variants related to suicide bombs and other explosives devices, such as the Combined Exploitation Cell (CEXC) and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force.42 CEXC has operated in Iraq as the local hub that coordinates a range of coalition and interagency capabilities including explosive ordnance technicians, forensic investigators, explosives labs, and technical intelligence personnel to speed the process of identifying trends in bomb making and delivery.43 Although the barriers to tactical-level interagency coordination have been overcome on the basis of leadership and personality, the impetus to overcome has been largely in response to immediate needs. Once the need is over, the local interagency cooperation model has a tendency to dissipate as priorities change and resources are reallocated, including experienced personnel.

CONCLUSION Interagency coordination, even if perfected and seamless, is not a magic bullet that will prevent suicide bombings from occurring. No matter how effective or efficient government departments and agencies are in coordinating their activities, the suicide bomber will always find a way to get through.44 This is not to say that interagency collaboration should not be attempted or that defensive measures are futile. Rather, it stems from the following realizations: targets for terrorists to strike—including those hardened by protective measures, and “soft” targets that are difficult to defend or are indefensible—are plentiful; governments have a limited resource pool from which to draw in responding to all challenges, and optimizing to defeat suicide bombing will almost certainly open up new vulnerabilities that terrorists and insurgents can and will exploit; and finally, terrorist and insurgent groups and cells have shown remarkable ingenuity in devising suicide bombing attacks against targets of opportunity within the limitations of the resources at their disposal.

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The preceding realizations are not designed to suggest that interagency coordination is useless, but rather that there are realistic limits to how much organizations can or should share with one another. One of the keystones of democracy is deliberately engineered inefficiencies that can prove remarkably frustrating to those seeking greater efficiency and effectiveness in government. Checks and balances in the system at all levels, or distribution of power among departments and agencies, spread authority throughout the system in order to prevent the consolidation of power into an oligarchy or tyranny. Interagency coordination should be undertaken with these considerations in mind. Although suicide bombings will never be entirely prevented, they can be mitigated through interagency coordination to the extent that their effects are localized. Much of this interagency work should not focus on the suicide bomber, but rather, should connect the dots between terrorist or insurgent leaders and suicide bombers, through their facilitators who provide the key support for attacks to take place. Interagency and/or coalition coordination has facilitated a number of proactive local successes against terrorist and insurgent groups and cells in Germany, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Iraq, Singapore, and elsewhere. Interagency coordination is effective and efficient, and therefore worth the effort, so long as terrorist and insurgent groups are rendered incapable of conducting catastrophic or strategically significant suicide bombing attacks. ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to thank Dr. John Sheldon for reviewing and commenting on the draft of this chapter. The views expressed here are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Air Force. NOTES 1. This concept forms the basis of the unsurpassed Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2001). A noteworthy addition is the discussion contained in Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 5–51. 2. Yoram Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics,” in Countering Suicide Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002), 87. 3. An assessment of the increasingly lethality of terrorism from the 1970s until the late 1990s is contained in Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 92–94, 206–207. 4. Casualties figures are from Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), 258, and “Attacks on US

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Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,” accessed via the following URL: http://www. globalsecurity.org/security/ops/98emb.htm. 5. An example of tactical indicators derived from behavioral profiles to tip off law enforcement officials is contained in Robert L. Bunker, “Suicide (Homicide) Bombers: Part 1,” Training Key #581 (Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005), 5. 6. On the question of the overall political objectives desired by terrorists and insurgent leaders, see James D. Kiras, “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency,” in Strategy in the Contemporary World, ed. John Baylis, Eliot Cohen, Colin Gray, and James Wirtz, rev. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 163–191. 7. See, e.g., Bunker, “Suicide (Homicide) Bombers: Part 1.” 8. Homemade and improvised explosives used in attempted or successful suicide bombings include ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO) and peroxidebased compounds such as triacetylene triperoxide (TATP) and hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD), which require little expertise to mix together. ANFO is a relatively stable explosive compound; a sizable amount of this compound is required to cause significant damage. TATP and HMTD are extremely volatile and sensitive to heat and shock. 9. See, e.g., Nick Fielding, “Bin Laden’s Dirty Bomb Quest Exposed,” Sunday Times, December 19, 2004, http://ebird.afis.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20041219342395. html (accessed December 21, 2004). Fielding’s source is a book allegedly penned by al Qaeda insider Abu Walid al-Misri. 10. Schweitzer, “Suicide Terrorism,” 88. 11. Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke, “Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress RS20721 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 2001), 1–3. 12. Martin Murphy, “Maritime Threat: Tactics and Technology of the Sea Tigers,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 18, no. 6 (June 2006): 9. 13. An exhaustive simulation of the impact of Boeing 767 on the tower, including references to initial engineering impact assessments, is contained in Fahim Sadek, Baseline Structural Performance and Aircraft Impact Damage Analysis of the World Trade Center Towers, draft report, NCSTAR 1-2 (Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, September 2005), http://wtc/ nist.gov/pubs/NISTNCSTAR1-2Draft.pdf. 14. A point made in a news release by Eduardo Kausel, a professor of civil and environmental engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See “Inferno at the World Trade Center, NY,” September 2001, http://web.mit.edu/ newsoffice/nr/2001/skyscrapers.pdf. 15. “Transcript of Usama Bin Laden Videotape,” December 13, 2001, 3. The statement appeared in transcript from a videotape of a conversation between Osama bin Laden and Khaled al-Harbi, among others, which was recovered from a house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom. 16. Associated Press, “Iraqi Woman Confesses to Role in Jordan Blasts,” November 13, 2005, http//www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9979747. 17. Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) Briefing, “(U) Terrorism Strikes Russia: Summary of the Attacks from August 24 to September 3, 2004,” September 2004, slides 10–12.

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18. Ibid.; Pape, Dying to Win, 27; Luca Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 1981–2003,” in Making Sense of Suicide Missions, ed. Diego Gambetta (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 99; Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 78–79. 19. Pape, Dying to Win, 28–29. 20. Ibid., 246–250. 21. See, e.g., James D. Kiras, “Dying to Prove a Point: The Methodology of Dying to Win,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 2 (April, 2007). 22. This assertion is the central thesis of Bloom, Dying to Kill, and is one of the hypotheses subjected to assessment in Ricolfi, “Palestinians, 1981–2003,” 77–129. 23. Bloom, Dying to Kill, 190–192. 24. For a discussion of the interplay of the elements, see Kiras, “Irregular Warfare,” 167–183. 25. The killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (al Qaeda in Iraq, June 2006) and Shamil Baseyev (Chechen separatists, July 2006), as well as the capture of Abdullah Ocalan (PKK, February 1999) and Abimael Guzm´an (Sendero Luminoso, September 1992), suggest that with enough time, patience, and resources terrorist leaders can be reached. 26. C. J. M. Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 54–72. 27. Boaz Ganor, “Suicide Attacks In Israel,” in Countering Suicide Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Herzliya, Israel: International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002), 147. 28. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Suicide Bombing in the COE, DCSINT Handbook 1.03 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, TRADOC, August 15, 2005), V-1-V-2. 29. Please see the chapter by Rogelio Alonso in volume 3 of this book. 30. “Videotape of Theater Seizure ‘Rehearsal’ Found in Chechen Warlord’s Cache,” Moscow Times, June 30, 2005, http://www.osac.gov/News/story.cfm? contentID=31630&print. 31. The “Harmony” documents offer insights into the infighting, bickering, and surprising banality of organization and day-to-day administration of al Qaeda. Combating Terrorism Center, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting alQa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, February 2006). 32. Ibid., 12. 33. The attention to detail of logistics and support is evident in the manual captured during and translated after a raid on a Manchester flat in May 2000. For details, see “Declaration of Jihad Against the Country’s Tyrants: Military Series,” UK trans., Government Exhibit 1677-T (undated), pp. BM-21BM-67. 34. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 240–253. 35. “Experts hail ‘forensic goldmine’,” BBC News, July 22, 2005, http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4705939.stm. 36. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 353, 355–356.

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37. Department of Defense (DoD) authorities for force protection and defensive measures against terrorists are limited technically to DoD personnel and facilities, as well as civilian contractors, as the circumstances warrant. Other U.S. facilities, such as embassies and consulates, are legally the purview of the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service and the Overseas Security Advisory Council. DoD elements augment the Department of State resources as required. See, e.g., Department of Defense, “DoD Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program,” April 13, 1999, and Secretary of Defense Memorandum U13362 / 98, “Delegation of Outside Continental United States Force Protection Responsibility and Authority to Geographic Combatant Commanders,” September 28, 1998. 38. To gain an appreciation for the number of agencies and departments involved in combating terrorism in the United States, and the way in which authorities are spread among them, see Government Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Problems to Address the Overseas Threat, GAO-03-165 (Washington: Government Accounting Office, May 2003). 39. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 415. 40. Matthew F. Bogdanos, “Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 37 (2005): 11. 41. Ibid., 13. 42. For a survey of suicide bombings in Iraq from the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom to just after the capture of Saddam Hussein, see Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Suicide Bombings in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Land Warfare Paper 46W (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, September 2004). 43. See Noah Schachtman, “The Baghdad Bomb Squad,” Wired, November 2005, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.11/bomb pr.html, and Australian Ministry of Defence, “Explosive Specialists Return Home from Iraq,” Media Release MIN130/05, September 3, 2005, http://www.defence.gov.au/ minister/Hilltpl.cfm?CurrentId=5076. 44. My apologies to the late Stanley Baldwin for altering a famous line from his speech about the futility of defense against modern air power. See Stanley Baldwin, “The Bomber Will Always Get Through,” in The Impact of Air Power: National Security and World Politics, ed. Eugene M. Emme (New York: D. van Nostrand and Co., 1959), 51–52.

CHAPTER 8 THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS Michael Kraft

“Better things for better living” was a major advertising slogan of the DuPont Company during the 1980s.1 A variation of this might be “better things for staying alive” as a goal of the U.S. government’s multibillion dollar program for research and development (R&D) of better equipment to counter terrorists at home and abroad. Dozens of federal agencies are working to develop a wide variety of equipment and tools. Millions of dollars go into developing devices and methods to detect conventional explosives and biological, chemical, and radiological weapons before they can cause mass casualties. Millions more go into equipment to help first responders and law enforcement or military personnel cope with an attack or to defeat hostage takers or mitigate the effects of an attack that could not be prevented. The extensive counterterrorism R&D (CT R&D) programs are intended to save lives by either helping prevent terrorist attacks or minimizing the damage if they do take place. U.S. R&D evaluation and testing programs also involve projects to help other governments recover from a terrorist attack and assist investigators in bringing the perpetrators to justice. For example, improved first responder equipment can be useful for foreign as well as American fire departments and rescue units. The general public sees little of these efforts except when airline passengers and their hand baggage are screened or visitors have to pass through a metal detector when entering some government buildings and museums. Most of the equipment is not readily visible, such as monitoring devices tucked inside buildings that can detect biological,

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chemical, or radioactive agents. Many kinds of special equipment are usually stored away of out sight until needed—for example, protective suits for first responders, and robots used to safely render harmless suspected bombs. This chapter will provide an abbreviated overview of the development of the U.S. federal government’s counterterrorism research and development testing and evaluation (CT R&DTE) programs, describe the major coordinating groups, and provide an illustrative sampling of some of the individual agency programs. Obviously, a detailed picture of all the nearly 100 agencies and subagencies involved in one form or another of the U.S. government’s counterterrorism programs is beyond the scope of this chapter. In recent years, and especially since 9/11, the CT R&D effort in the United States has become a growth industry, growing in stages from about $10 million in the mid-1980s (for the primary interagency R&D program), to nearly $5 billion projected for fiscal year (FY) 2007.2 While the R&D efforts have evolved over the years, and are still evolving, the types of terrorist problems have also changed, leading to the need for research in new subject areas such as detecting improvized explosive devices (IEDs) as well as improvements in older systems, such as airport X-ray machines and scanners. The organizational framework has also changed and continues to evolve, most markedly since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Because so many government agencies are involved to one extent or another in counterterrorism-related research projects (and some of the research has applicability to nonterrorism situations), it is difficult to provide a complete and precise organizational and budget chart of all the nation’s efforts in this realm. For example, while the FY 2007 budget request for homeland security CT R&DTE was estimated at $5.1 billion by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a White House Office of Science and Technology fact sheet uses a figure of “over $4.8 billion.”3 As a recent CRS report for Congress noted, “Coordination of federal counterterrorism R&D is a particular challenge because relevant programs exist in many different agencies and accurate information about their activities can be difficult to obtain.”4 The DHS receives about one-fifth (or 23%) of federal funding for R&D. Because of concerns over bioterrorism, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and primarily the National Institute of Health (NIH), receives about 40 percent of the counterterrorism-related research budget. The Department of Defense (DOD), which is the largest source of funding for the interagency coordinating body, the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), receives about 21 percent of the CT R&D funding. Not all of it goes to the TSWG, however. The Departments of Energy, Agriculture and other agencies also receive funding for CT R&D.

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The budget and bureaucratic structure, however, is not the full picture. The working relationships between mid-level career government officials from different agencies are extremely important. Several of these professionals, from different agencies, have often worked together for years and serve on overlapping committees or working groups. This has been an important element in avoiding duplication and preventing potentially good projects from falling between the cracks. In general, there are currently three types of organizational frameworks for CT R&D by the federal government: r projects coordinated and funded on an interagency basis, primarily but not exclusively through the TSWG, a coordinating body established two decades ago;

r projects under the auspices of the DHS, which was established in 2003 and has become a hub for selecting and funding research projects previously selected and conducted by some of the individual agencies; and

r individual agencies conducting specialized research, such as the Department of Energy (DOE), the Justice Department’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ), and elements of the DOD.

After a brief history of the national R&D effort, this chapter will review each of these three frameworks, focusing only on federal government programs. However, it must be acknowledged that a considerable amount of R&D is also conducted by industry, universities, and nonfederal government agencies (although often funded by federal sources). BACKGROUND Although individual agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the NIJ have conducted limited CT R&D for many years, in some cases since the 1970s, their efforts were not always coordinated with other agencies until the 1990s. Proposals to develop a coordinated federal government R&D program began materializing in 1982, when the Reagan administration’s National Security Directive 305 established an interagency coordinating committee to develop U.S. government policies on terrorism. The Department of State (DOS) was made the lead agency for countering international terrorism, and chaired the group known as the Interdepartmental Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (IWG/CT). The group consisted of officials at the Assistant Secretary level from several agencies, such as the Departments of Defense, Justice and State. The DOS representative was the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Robert Oakley, a career Foreign Service officer with Ambassadorial rank.

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In turn, various specialized subgroups were established, including an interagency group to coordinate R&D on equipment to counter terrorism. This was named the TSWG and brought together representatives of a dozen agencies, such as the DOS, DOD, DOE, NIJ, FBI, CIA, and the FAA. The intent was to make sure there was no duplication between the agencies and to fund worthwhile research that “is needed but not being carried out by any the agencies because it falls into the gaps between adjacent missions and jurisdictions.”6 THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP The TSWG is the U.S. national forum that identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency and international R&D requirements for combating terrorism.7 The TSWG is responsible for rapidly developing technologies and equipment to meet the high priority needs of the combating terrorism community, and for addressing joint international operational requirements through cooperative R&D with major allies. The DOS was selected to chair the organization because it was considered to be an “honest broker” with no vested interest in a particular line of research. The TSWG’s establishment was endorsed by a high-level commission headed by then Vice President George H.W. Bush after the bombing of the U.S. Embassy and Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983 by Islamic radicals. The 1991 Vice President’s Report on Combating Terrorism recommendations supported the TSWG, still in the embryonic stage, to “ensure the development of appropriate counterterrorism technologies.”8 The program began relatively modestly, with a $10 million appropriation in the DOS budget for FY 1987, initially authorized in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986.9 Although the DOS chaired the organization, it did not have an existing office for administratively handling these R&D contracts. Therefore, in order to save operating and personnel costs, the DOS worked out an agreement to transfer the funds to the DOD, which already had specialists experienced in handing R&D contracts, for the purposes of executing the program under State’s policy oversight. This effort to save time and money, however, soon backfired in Congress when a key Senate Appropriations Committee staffer handling the DOS’s budget asserted that the DOS was merely acting as a front for the DOD. He persuaded his subcommittee chairman, then Senator Rudman, a New Hampshire Republican, to zero out the CT R&D request in the Senate version of the DOS FY 1990 appropriations bill. This touched off a heated discussion behind closed doors between Senator Rudman, the Senate staffer and L. Paul Bremer, then the DOS coordinator for counterterrorism.10 The final compromise bill with the House of Representatives provided only $2 million in FY 1990—barely enough to keep a handful of projects going and leaving virtually no new money to start new ones.

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Finally, at the DOS’s urging, the National Security Council (NSC) requested that the DOD and other agencies kick in more funding. By FY 1995, the budget was back up to $11 million, and in FY 1997 it was up to $18 million. After the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the TSWG budget grew to $70 million, and after 9/11 the TSWG’s budget grew to $180 million in FY 2003. By FY 2005, the TSWG budget reached its current funding level of $207 million, as a result of additional funds added by Congress and inclusion in a supplemental appropriation bill. The TSWG budget comes from three basic components: (1) the so-called “core funding,” which comes primarily from the DOD; (2) the Congressional add-ons as a result of appropriations incorporated by Congressional appropriations committees or floor amendments; and (3) “leveraged” funding from other agencies. For example, the FBI, FAA, and other agencies put money into specific TSWG projects of particular interest to them. In FY 2006, the core funding for TSWG was $55 million from the DOD, $1.5 million from State, $65 million from Congressional add-ons, and $25 million from the Iraq War Supplemental Appropriations Bill. The rest came from a variety of other departments and agencies, including the DHS, the NIH, and even $2 million from the DOS Bureau of Diplomatic Security, which is responsible for embassy protection. For FY 2007, the core funding request to Congress was $65 million, but as of this writing, it is too early to determine the potential amounts of Congressional add-ons or the leverage funding. As indicated earlier, the DOD provides the bulk of the core funding for the TSWG. The DOS’s contribution, however, has remained static and even declined in recent years, a product of Congressional cuts in the overall DOS budget. Nonetheless, the DOS’s contribution, though small compared to the other agencies, has been important in providing policy guidance on some key issues, which are described later in this chapter. Technical Support Working Group Grows The TSWG has grown and evolved over the past two decades. It began with no full-time staff—the officials from State, Defense, and other agencies contributed their time to the interagency process while attending to their duties within their home agencies. About 60 persons, some of them contractors, now work on the TSWG program, helping evaluate projects and handling the research and contract paperwork. Some 100 federal agencies and their component offices are now represented within the TSWG. Their representatives contribute their time as well as operational and technical insight in the prioritization, management, operational testing, and ultimate use of the systems developed. The contributions of these experts are one of the major reasons for the success of TSWG.

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The TSWG cochairs are provided by the Departments of State and Defense. The DOE and the FBI provide technical cochairs who advise on project selection and technical approaches to addressing the requirements and gaps in existing research. Policy oversight is provided by the DOS’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism, until recently Ambassador Henry Crumpton. The executive secretary is currently Michael Jakub, the counterterrorism offices’ director of technical programs and a senior civil servant who has been with the TSWG program since its inception. Program execution is conducted through the DOD’s Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Warfare (ASD/SO/LIC), Tom O’Connell. The umbrella group for the TSWG core staff in its day-to-day operations is headed by Ed McCallum, director of the DOD’s Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office.11 The TSWG balances its program development investments across four pillars of combating terrorism:12 r Antiterrorism: Defense measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts; r Counterterrorism: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism;

r Intelligence Support: Collection and dissemination of terrorism-related information taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum; to include terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or highyield explosive devices; and

r Consequence Management: Preparation for and response to the consequences of a terrorist event.

To carry out its mission, the TSWG currently has 11 specialized subgroups (it began with six), chaired by various agency representatives, and typically including members from half a dozen agencies: r Blast Effects and Mitigation, chaired by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF);

r Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures, DOD and r r r r r r r

FDA; Explosives Detection, DHS Transportation Security Administration (TSA); Improvised Device Defeat, FBI; Infrastructure Protection, DOD, FBI; Investigative Support and Forensics, DHS (U.S. Secret Service [USSS]); Physical Security, DOD and DOE; Surveillance, Collection, and Operations Support; Intelligence Community Tactical Operations Support, DOD, DOE;

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r Training Technology Development DOD, DHS Office of Grants and Training (OGT); and

r VIP Protection, DHS (USSS). These subgroups develop requirements that may come from a variety of sources: suggestions made by law enforcement or federal officials, the private sector or academic community, or from the needs perceived by the experts in each subject area. The subgroups frequently meet to evaluate the proposals and nominate the ones that they conclude are the most worthy of funding. The proposals are then examined and approved or disapproved by the TSWG Executive Committee at their annual review meetings. Priority is given to projects that could be useful to more than one agency or end user. Many of the equipment items are useful in dealing with nonterrorist events, such as chemical spills or ordinary crimes, as well as terrorist attacks, and civilian as well as military end users. Because the officials who are members of the subcommittees are also the experts within their own agencies, this consultative process helps prevent duplication and promotes joint projects.13 Depending on the budget projections, a number of proposed initiatives may not make the cut and are deferred to following years, or funding might be initially provided at a lower level than originally proposed, stretching out the research an additional year or two.14 The TSWG focuses on relatively short-term projects that usually can be finished in two or three years, and then transitioned to one or more interested agencies before completion and testing, and then moved to the private sector for production. The actual R&D is conducted by a variety of government labs, universities, and private sector companies. As John Reingruber—who recently retired as the DOD cochair of TSWG—described in a briefing several years ago, “Our mission is to conduct a national interagency R&D program, for combating terrorism, primarily through rapid research development and prototyping. By ‘rapid,’ I mean that we identify a requirement, and then within two years, field that capability.”15 The TSWG has a large-scale outreach program to the private sector, using websites and conferences to advertise its requirements. Although TSWG had funded private sector projects earlier, the large-scale outreach effort began in 1999, through meetings with private sector representatives to explain the TSWG’s requirements. The interest was enormous, with thousands of proposals submitted—17,000 in the first year following the 9/11 attacks. A conference for defense contractors in 2006 drew some 800 persons. Within four weeks after requirements are issued each year, thousands of proposals are received. Some come from major companies and universities, others from small businessmen or inventors, sometimes two- and

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three-person companies. Only a relative handful of the proposals meet the requirements and survive the review and selection process. As for the success rate of projects that are funded, one TSWG official compared it to mutual funds—there may be some that have a relatively high chance of working out, but bring a relatively low payoff, while others have a lower chance of succeeding but offer greater benefits if they succeed. Meanwhile, some difficult problems—such as detecting explosives at a distance—are being tackled simultaneously by a variety of research approaches.16 Projects A project’s costs may range from $100,000 to $10 million—a far cry from the early days when projects would typically be funded at $300,000 to $400,000. Currently funded projects range from small hand-held devices for detecting weapons to improved materials for strengthening the walls and ceilings of embassy and other buildings to withstand large blasts. About 400 projects are in the works. Some of the research is aimed at developing new concepts and products. Funds are also allocated to develop the next generation of old concepts, such as a lightweight mask that will provide up to 20 minutes of protection against biological and chemical agents (an earlier model was developed in the early 1990s). The current version has been distributed to thousands of government workers in Washington and to Congressional offices. The TWSG allocates about 10 percent of its funding for the development of countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear measures. By its own account, the DHS has funded more than 40 projects in this area through TSWG. About 16 percent of the funding is allocated for surveillance, collection and operations support. This is a highly sensitive area, and the TSWG describes its work in this area only in general terms. Smaller allocations go to such areas as VIP protection and mitigating the effects of explosions. Largely because of the increasing use of IEDs against American and coalition troops (as well as civilians) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the largest percentage of TSWG funding (about one fifth) is going toward projects to detect and defeat these devices. Other projects include improvements in radio controlled robots that move on small tractor treads close enough to a suspected device to fire a small water charge into it to disable the explosive. Another project includes a small tent-like structure that shields a suspected bomb from radio waves, thus providing more safety for the bomb disposal technicians. This type of equipment can be useful for local or state police departments as well as in military zones. The Explosive Detection subgroup has also been funding projects to detect large volumes of explosives from a distance. One of the complications

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in this endeavor is the pollutants in the atmosphere of most major cities. Research is being conducted along several avenues, and with at least one foreign partner. In another approach to the problem of detecting explosives, a research project developed a van equipped with equipment that can surreptitiously drive past other vehicles or cargo containers and scan for explosives and other contraband. More than 60 such vans are now in operational use and the van is commercially available.17 Joint Research A prominent feature of the TSWG program has been its ability to leverage and coordinate the U.S. government’s CT R&D projects with allied countries. For example, after Pan Am 103 was blown up over Lockerbie Scotland in December 1988, killing 270 persons by bomb using plastic explosives hidden in a radio, the TSWG quickly provided funding for the American part of an international effort to identify chemical markers to help locate plastic explosives that might be hidden in luggage. The markers were listed in the 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection. Later, after the FY 1993 DOD Authorization Bill approved $3 million for cooperative projects with NATO countries and major non-NATO allies, joint research agreements were established with Britain, Canada and Israel. The U.S conducts these projects on a bilateral basis. Trying to conduct joint research on the same project with three or more countries at once would be too complicated. However, sometimes different lines of research are conducted with one or more countries in order to try and address a common problem. These joint research efforts have the advantage of preventing duplication as well as gaining an additional professional perspective on a problem. In addition, research costs are sometimes lower in the other countries. The U.S. share of the joint research program has averaged about $8 million a year per country, but this varies from year to year. In 2006, Australia and Singapore joined the program. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE NEW ACTOR Meanwhile, a major new R&D player emerged with the establishment of the DHS in January 2003.18 However, as with other aspects of the major reorganization involved in the creation of DHS, the evolution of the R&D machinery has had its teething problems. Organizations that were used to making their own decisions and priorities and working with TSWG are now part of a huge bureaucracy. Problems also arose in potential overlapping and duplication with TSWG. Early in the creation of the DHS program, for example, a DOS official described how he received a call from a puzzled British counterpart informing him that DHS wanted to set up

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cooperative research arrangements, even though such British–American agreements already existed through TSWG. The Homeland Security Act established four directorates (or in effect, four divisions) within DHS: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response Information Analysis, Infrastructure Protection, and the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T Directorate). The latter of these is headed by an undersecretary, and is the primary R&D arm of the department, with a mandated goal of providing federal, state and local officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland. Although the bulk of the DHS CT R&D activities are conducted under the Directorate for Science and Technology, other components—such as the Coast Guard—kept their separate budget lines as a result of Congressional action. Other R&D components, such as those in the TSA were being integrated into the directorate in 2006. The directorate’s budget goes not only for counterterrorism projects; it also is concerned with all types of catastrophic threats. Some of the DHS-funded equipment can be used for both countering terrorist attacks and, for example, a spill of dangerous chemicals. The S&T Directorate receives the largest amount of R&D funding and is becoming the coordinating body within DHS. According to the Directorate’s official statement, its mission is “to protect the homeland by providing Federal and local officials with state-of-the-art technology hand other resources. The directorate fulfills its mission through strategic objectives” including the following:19 r Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance, low-operating-cost systems to prevent, detect, and mitigate the consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive attacks;

r Develop equipment, protocols, and training procedures for response to and

recovery from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive attacks;

r Enhance the technical capabilities of the Department’s operational elements and other Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies to fulfill their homeland security related missions;

r Develop methods and capabilities to test and assess threats and vulnerabilities, and prevent technology surprise and anticipate emerging threats;

r Develop technical standards and establish certified laboratories to evaluate homeland security and emergency responder technologies, and evaluate technologies for SAFETY Act20 certification; and

r Support U.S. leadership in science and technology.

The directorate has four primary offices responsible for managing technologies by portfolios across a broad spectrum.21 The Office of Plans, Programs and Requirements (PPR)22 partners with operational end users

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to identify requirements, create strategic initiatives to address these requirements, prioritize investments, and ensure both short-term and longterm goals are met in accordance with national policies. The Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA)23 works primarily with nonfederal performers, such as the private sector and academia, in innovative R&D, rapid prototyping, and technology transfer to meet operational needs. The Office of Research and Development (ORD)24 executes research, development, test and evaluation programs within the national and federal laboratories, establishes the University Centers of Excellence, and maintains the nation’s enduring R&D complex dedicated to homeland security. And the Office of Systems Engineering and Development25 executes the transition of large-scale and pilot systems to the field through a project management process. The DHS FY 2006 S&T research funding is currently appropriated to the following major categories: Biological Countermeasures; Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures (this specific work is now accomplished in the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office [DNDO] at DHS); Threat Awareness; Chemical Countermeasures, and Explosives Countermeasures; Critical Infrastructure Protection, Cyber Security, Emergent and Prototypical Technology; Support to Components (Border and Transportation, Preparedness and Response, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service); CounterMANPADS (man portable air defense systems); University and Fellowship Programs; the Office of Interoperability and Compatibility; and Standards.26 The DHS involvement in CT R&D programs has grown from less than $300 million in programs in 2002 to nearly $1.3 billion in FY 2006.27 According to Maureen McCarthy, then director of the ORD—whose office executes the Directorate’s research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) of programs within the national and federal laboratories and thus plays a key role in the R&D process—the effort “basically started from scratch.”28 During the next several years, DHS CT R&D appropriations rose rapidly to nearly $1.28 billion in FY 2006. However, the Administration’s FY 2007 request to Congress reduced the budget by 10.3 percent, down to roughly $1.15 billion, and in June, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee made further cuts in the FY 2007 DHS appropriation, reducing the figure to $974 million. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided only slightly more, approving just under $1.05 billion.29 According to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, “DHS R&D after a rapid ramp-up phase, now appears to be a mature R&D portfolio and subject like other R&D funding agencies to cuts because of the tight budget situation facing domestic programs.”30 Meanwhile, in unusually strong language, the Senate Appropriations Committee report language accompanying the DHS Senate Appropriations Bill for FY 2007 criticized the DHS S&T Directorate, which is under an acting head, as a “rudderless ship without a clear way of getting back on course.” The

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Senate Committee directed the DHS to develop a detailed five year research plan.31 Both the Senate and House withheld funds until DHS provides more detailed budget accounting. The House Bill provided $668,million for the DHS S&T Directorate in FY 2007 and the Senate $712 million, a little more than half of what the Directorate received for FY 2006.32 DHS officials have indicated that more changes are likely in the future, now that Secretary Michael Chertoff has completed a second stage review of the agency’s organization. One key consideration in DHS activities, according to McCarthy, is keeping the “customer” in mind—that is, focusing R&D on the needs of the DHS operational agencies, such as the TSA, the Coast Guard and U.S. Secret Service, and through them, local officials and first responders. As of mid-2006, the Science and Technology Directorate is in the process of realigning its functions to provide a more consumer-focused approach to the R&D mission. McCarthy notes that proposals for projects and suggestions for equipment improvement often come up from the field, from local and state governments, police, fire chiefs, and through the DHS officials involved with the emergency preparedness portfolio.33 Another consideration is the cost and maintenance factor. While the DHS helps develop and evaluate equipment, it is basically up to the local and state governments to decide what to purchase, either with their own funds or with federal grants. Thus, there is an incentive to develop products that are affordable by state and local governments. Training is becoming an increasingly important part of the R&D efforts—the development of modules, simulators, videos and other tools to help train personnel in the use of equipment, coordination techniques and other crisis responses. McCarthy describes the focus of these efforts as “training the trainer,” as DHS cannot be in the business of training all the end users. She also notes that training seems to be the most effective when provided in the early career stages—for example, when a person is in the police academy, as opposed to later in his or her career. Counterterrorism research and development is generally perceived as dealing with tangible items, such as equipment or computer software, but funding is also going toward research in the behavioral sciences. Through its academic “centers of excellence” program,34 DHS is funding research that it hopes will help officials understand the motivations, beliefs and intentions of potential terrorists. This follows the earlier work by the Justice Department’s NIJ, which began funding research in the behavioral sciences in the late 1960s. One issue facing DHS (as well as other agencies) is setting priorities for selecting projects. About three quarters of the overall DHS R&D budget is directed toward defending against weapons of mass destruction— biological, chemical, explosive, radiological and nuclear. Within DHS,

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there is a heavy emphasis on countering large and catastrophic attacks, such as the explosion of a “dirty” radiological device in a major city, which would have an immediate and large-scale impact, or the release of biological agents that potentially could infect thousands of persons before the symptoms are recognized several days later. This emphasis reflects the impact that 9/11 had on the thinking of experts both inside and outside the government. Disturbing reports have surfaced in the media indicating that Bin Laden and those he has inspired are trying to develop WMD for future large-scale attacks. The British— as a result of the attacks in July 2005, as well as the discovery of another plot in August 2006—have been particularly concerned about small cells of militant Muslim radicals trying to develop home-brewed chemical or biological agents. There are some in the R&D community, however, who feel that despite the potential dangers of a large-scale WMD attack, terrorists are far more likely to use conventional explosives or explosives made from fertilizer, such as the one used against the federal office building in Oklahoma City or the one contemplated by the group of terrorist suspects arrested in Toronto in June 2006. Further, as one expert in conventional explosives observed about the national focus on weapons of mass destruction, “we’re spending a lot of money over possible attacks that may have high consequences but low probability.” Another government expert involved in countering attacks against transportation systems supported the view that conventional explosives are still the preferred weapon of choice because they appeal to the psychological makeup of terrorists.35 Translating these contrasting perspectives and views into decisions on funding specific lines of research and projects, the policymakers must weigh a variety of factors, including the intent and capabilities of terrorists. This requires intelligence information on the terrorists’ intent and their capabilities. Decision makers also have to take into account the fact that terrorists might have difficulty in obtaining and using the necessary materials for a WMD attack, as well as the cost to society if the terrorists overcome these obstacles and succeed. Some research projects do not present difficult choices; for example, better protective equipment that can be used by first responders in dealing with a chemical terrorist attack can also be useful in coping with an overturned railway tank car containing a dangerous chemical. As DHS Secretary Chertoff noted in a 2005 Senate committee hearing:36 We must acknowledge that although we have substantial resources to provide security, these resources are not unlimited. Therefore, we as a nation must make tough choices about how to invest finite human and financial capital to attain the optimal state of preparedness. To do this we will focus preparedness on objective measures of risk and performance.

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In the R&D arena, this approach to prioritization translates into a large array of important homeland security projects and initiatives. Projects DHS-funded R&D projects range from improving the protective suits used by firefighters, to developing performance standards for hand-held detectors of trace explosives, to a system of networked monitors to detect the release of chemical agents in the subway systems of major metropolitan areas in the United States.37 Some of the projects first originated in other agencies, and DHS took over the funding after it was created. For example, the subway protection system originated with NIJ and DOE funding. One high-profile R&D project that is nearing completion is the development of equipment to defeat MANPADS, the shoulder-fired ground to air missiles that terrorists have used to try to shoot down commercial airliners. Some military aircraft carry various types of missile counter measures, but they have not been considered feasible for large-scale use on commercial aircraft because of the cost and weight penalties and the recurring maintenance costs.38 Interest in the concept was renewed after al Qaeda terrorists tried to shoot down an Israeli passenger plane taking off from Mombassa, Kenya in November 2002. The missile came close to the plane but failed to explode and it safely landed, as did a cargo plane that was hit in one engine while departing from the Baghdad airport in 2003. In previous years, an estimated three dozen civilian planes, including five large jets, were hit in various parts of the world, including five large jets. Questions about the feasibility of installing the equipment on a large number of aircraft remain. Spending on the counter-MANPADS project went from $61 million in FY 2005 to $109 million in FY 2006, and the program is now entering the operational testing and evaluation stage of two different designs. The DHS goal is the production of equipment that would cost no more than $1 million per plane. OTHER AGENCIES As indicated earlier, many government agencies are involved in counterterrorism research development to one extent or another. The TSWG membership list includes 20 primary agencies plus their numerous component groups, such as the FBI and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), both of which are part of the Justice Department. Nearly 100 state, local and nongovernmental organizations are affiliated with TSWG, including the New York City police and fire departments, various DOD agencies, such as those dealing with chemical and biological

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warfare threats, and six Justice Department organizations, including the FBI and NIJ.39 There is also a great deal of collaboration and cooperation between the agencies. For example, although the largest portion of DHS S&T Directorate funding request is dedicated to bio research, DHS also works with the Department of Health and Human Resources and the NIH in this area. DHS has recently been given the responsibility to incorporate a newly created National Biodefense Defense Counterterrorism Center, and it has taken over responsibility for the UDSA’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center, although Department personnel will continue to conduct research there.40 Another example of the interaction between the various agencies is that nearly 100 percent of NIJ’s funded research in the area of weapons detection and through-the-wall surveillance technology is conducted with the administrative and technical support of the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).41 The AFRL engineers act as the Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTR) while the AFRL business offices handle contract paperwork. According to John S. Morgan, NIJ assistant director for science and technology, NIJ’s federal, state and local law enforcement and corrections practitioner-based technical working groups guide NIJ investment by defining the functional requirements for new systems and their relative priorities. NIJ conducts a gap analysis to determine which of those requirements cannot be met, and then it issues to the public Broad Agency Announcements (BAA) seeking proposed solutions to those requirements. Applications from the private sector and other applicants are then reviewed by panels of technical experts and practitioners as to how well they address the requirements laid out in the BAA. These review panels are another mechanism NIJ uses to coordinate its efforts. The technical experts on these panels routinely include representatives from DHS S&T and TSWG. The applications recommended for funding, and the money to fund them, are then sent to AFRL for contracting and technical monitoring. Similarly, 90 percent of the NIJ’s work in the area of explosives detection and remediation was conducted through TSWG. He said that the added benefit of working through the TSWG is that it also enables NIJ to leverage other agency funds for projects, whereas NIJ normally provides all the funding required for the work it does through AFRL. R&D AT INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES It would take a separate book to describe the work done by all the many agencies involved in CT R&D. To illustrate the variety of research efforts, the following sketches are provided of five agencies: the UDSA, the DOE, the NIJ, the TSA, and the FAA, both of which are currently part of DHS.42

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The Department of Agriculture The USDA is involved in relatively little-known CT R&D efforts as a result of recent concerns that terrorists might try to attack the food supply, perhaps through poisoning or contaminating food before it reaches supermarket shelves, or even the raw material—crops, animals and poultry. Some of the key programs included in the food defense area are: expanding the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) with participating laboratories, including implementation of the Electronic Laboratory Exchange Network (ELEXNET), an electronic laboratory diagnostic methods repository; and strengthening research on automated diagnostic methods for rapidly detecting and identifying pathogens and chemical contaminants and modeling food security and incident scenarios.43 Other Agriculture defense measures include r Strengthening research on rapid response systems to bioterrorism agents, improving vaccines and identifying genes affecting disease resistance;

r Expanding the National Plant Disease Recovery System to ensure disease resistant seed varieties are continually developed and made available to producers in the event of a natural or intentional catastrophic disease or pest outbreak;

r Expanding the sample testing capacities of the Regional Diagnostic Networks;

r Enhancing the monitoring and surveillance of pests and diseases in plants, including national wildlife monitoring and surveillance;

r Improving diagnostic methodologies and laboratory capabilities; r Increasing activities to safeguard plants from intentional threats to spread pests and diseases; and

r Strengthening the ability to safeguard and track biological disease agents. As in many areas of research that can help counter security threats, these efforts have benefits for nonterrorism problems as well. There is also an economic security factor: The incidents of mad cow disease, even though not widespread, are an example of how even a small number of infected animals can hurt food exports as well as domestic sales. There is a continual effort to develop techniques for more rapid diagnosis of plant and animal diseases, especially for new diseases such as soybean rust (which has afflicted southern states in the past couple of years), or new strains of existing diseases, like the Avian influenza (bird flu) virus. Research is also being conducted into preventive pasteurizing of food products to see if current methods can be used to provide protection against a wider number of microorganisms, and whether the pasteurization process can be made more robust without adverse affects.44

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Department of Energy The DOE is involved in counterterrorism through its focus on nonproliferation programs, and particularly efforts to protect former Soviet Union nuclear facilities and to employ Russian nuclear scientists. DOE has also funded or initiated a variety of other projects, some of them as small as simulated “flash bang” hand grenades for use in training exercises for protecting nuclear facilities. DOE CT R&D work has included work on detection of toxic agents, genomic sequencing and microfabrication techniques, DOE has also been developing virtual reality software to provide more realism for exercises in protecting nuclear facilities or other buildings from potential attackers. DOE has some 30 buildings to protect, including nuclear reactors. Another project called “Stairwell Safe Haven” turns stairwells into an area protected from dangerous chemical gas attacks. The system draws and filters air from exterior intakes and pumps it into the stairwells with sufficient pressure to block contaminants from leaking in through other entry points. The prototype was constructed and tested within a DOE facility and is available to other government agencies. This is a good example of a project that could have wide applicability. Two other interesting projects designed for use by civilian security personnel in turn are useful in Iraq or other military environments. The “Kool Suit” is basically a thin bladder shaped by the wearer’s body that fits under an armored vest. The bladder has tubes with drinking water and a solution to keep it cool. When the water gets too warm, the bladder can be replaced by a colder bladder. Although intended for DOE security personnel patrolling facilities in hot American summer weather, it is being adapted for use in Iraq. Another project modified pickup trucks by armoring them and placing a concealed machine gun in the covered cargo area. The gun can be popped up through the top and fired from within the cab, a bit like a turret on a naval ship fired from the control room below decks. As a result, it looks like a civilian vehicle, and thus less conspicuous than a humvee. National Institute of Justice The NIJ was created by Congress in 1968 as the Justice Department’s research, development and evaluation arm. It conducts R&D in many physical science and technology areas as well as in the social and behavioral sciences. Its designated mission is to enhance the administration of justice and public safety, and it is the only federal agency dedicated to improving the effectiveness of the criminal justice system through scientific research.45

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NIJ’s responsibilities include serving as the national focal point for law enforcement technology and developing standards and best practices to guide the work of criminal justice professionals in the use of technology, as well as developing and improving forensic science technologies and assisting crime laboratories to enhance their capacity to access and use new technology. Research areas include less lethal weapons, critical incident prevention and response, interoperable communications, sensors and surveillance (including long range detection of weapons), information sharing, electronic crime detection, personnel protection, and DNA forensics.46 NIJ is also mandated to conduct research on “equipment for particular use in counterterrorism, including devices and technologies to disable terrorist devices.”47 To help make commercial products available to local governments, NIJ created the Office of Law Enforcement Technology Commercialization (OLETC) to bridge the gap between the laboratory and the market. One project, the Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KDAP), has developed a set of protocols to deal with mass fatality incidents, resulting from NIJ’s response to identifying victims of 9/11.48 NIJ has also been investing in technology to extract identifiable data from degraded DNA, such as might happen in a mass disaster or terrorist attack.49 Some illustrative examples of NIJ projects include:50 Concealed weapons detection, including the Handheld Acoustic System for Concealed Weapons Detection—an inexpensive, handheld device to alert officers to the potential presence of a weapon at a greater distance than the handheld metal detectors in use today, thus providing them a greater margin of safety; the Millimeter Wave/Infrared Concealed Weapons Detector— a dual-mode (millimeter wave/infrared) camera to detect weapons hidden on individuals 10 to 40 feet away suspected of committing a crime, without the control or cooperation of the individual under surveillance; and the Passive Millimeter Wave Camera for Concealed Weapons Detection—a portable weapons detector that will be able to remotely scan groups of individuals for metallic and nonmetallic weapons using a passive millimeter wave (MMW) imager. Less-than-lethal weapons, including the Laser DazzlerTM —a handheld device that uses random, flashing, green laser light to disorient and distract a subject; and the Ring Airfoil Projectile (RAP)—a doughnut-shaped, rubber projectile used to deter a single individual at a standoff range by producing a sting when it strikes. NIJ also participates in working groups with the DHS and TSWG to coordinate its programs at the federal level and meets regularly with law enforcement officials at the state and local level. It has formal memorandums of understanding with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate and the Assistant Secretary of Defense on the transfer of military technology to homeland security and public safety applications.

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Unlike most agencies, NIJ also funds research in social and behavioral sciences—for example, studies that examine what motivates terrorists, and explore the links between terrorists and international organized crime. There are five main categories of NIJ’s social science research on terrorism: (1) database development for analysis purposes; (2) improving law enforcement responses, including developing relationships with Muslim communities; (3) hardening potential high risk targets, such as assessing the security of shopping malls; (4) vulnerabilities and emergency responses to possible attacks on the livestock industry; and (5) terrorist links to money laundering, informal financial transfer systems (including hawalas) and terrorism organization, recruitment, and motivations. NIJ began funding social science research in the late 1960s and about 15 percent of NIJ funding goes to social science research. The Transportation Security Administration The TSA was created in response to 9/11. Before its creation, airport security checkpoints were operated by private companies that had contracts with either the airlines or airport operator. The TSA was originally located within in the U.S. Department of Transportation, but was moved to the U.S. DHS in 2003. Its counterterrorism research funding, about $140 million, has also been moved over to DHS. Effective and fast screening of airline passengers is a high priority for the TSA, illustrated by the huge number of passengers—about 2 million persons a day passing through U.S. airports. As a result, some of the TSA R&D efforts are focused on developing next-generation explosives detection equipment for the screening of checked baggage.51 Currently, TSA uses two types of equipment to screen checked baggage—Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) equipment. EDS are the size of a mini-van and employ technology similar to a medical CAT scan, whereas ETD equipment is much smaller—about the size of large suitcase. Screeners working with the portable ETD use a swab on a piece of luggage; the swab is then analyzed for traces of explosives. Work continues on improving technology to increase the efficiency and speed of existing EDS machines, and TSA scientists are testing upgraded models of ETD equipment. TSA is also focusing on the use of biometric technology to further enhance security and customer service by helping identify passengers more quickly. A technology known as “backscatter” is also under review at the Transportation Security Laboratory. Backscatter signals interact with explosives, plastics and metals, giving them shape and form—and making them easier for the operator to interpret on the screen. When a passenger steps into the machine, the technology produces an outline of the passenger and allows a screener to detect explosives, prohibited items, or a weapon.

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However, there are privacy concerns about passengers feeling that they are overly exposed by the equipment, and TSA is working on software enhancements to resolve this issue.52 Federal Aviation Administration Also now part of DHS, the operational mission of the FAA, and particularly its recent R&D history, reflects the federal government’s reorganization and evolution since 9/11. The transportation security section was established in 1974, following a series of hijackings by Cubans and Palestinians. After 9/11, its functions moved from the Department of Transportation to the newly formed Transportation Security Agency, and to the DHS Science & Technology Directorate, as part of the effort to centralize most CT R&D efforts. The FAA still retains responsibility for non-R&D programs: the security of its personnel, facilities, equipment and data. FAA provides financial and other assistance to help airports meet security requirements. The agency works closely with TSA and other federal agencies to support aviation security, transportation security, and other national security matters. The FY 2007 budget request includes $173 million to “continue upgrading and accrediting facilities, procure and implement additional security systems, and upgrade Command and Control Communications equipment to meet the increased national security demands since the September 11th attacks.”53 The FAA’s Transportation Security R&D Division has divided its functions into four interrelated program areas: Explosives and Weapons Detection, Aircraft Hardening, Human Factors, and Airport Security Technology Integration. Projects focus on developing technologies to protect three major entry points to the aircraft: checked luggage, the checkpoint (passenger or carry-on bag), and cargo. The Aircraft Hardening Program has been conducting tests on ways to assess the vulnerability of commercial aircraft, strengthening the cargo hold and developing cargo containers that can better withstand explosives shocks. The efforts include both hardening the cabins as well as lining the cargo holds, using lightweight materials and fabrication techniques.54 On the ground level, equipment is being developed to X-ray shoes and also to quickly analyze the content of bottles. According to Susan F. Hallowell, Director of the Transportation Security Lab of the DHS S&T Directorate, future versions of scanning equipment must consider airport architectural design and the need to take up less space in airports where the machinery and long lines cause congestion. The FAA’s Human Factors program looks at ways to improve the selection and performance of aircraft screeners. A Screener Object Recognition Test (SORT) was developed as a selection test for hiring screeners, and

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other tests were developed to evaluate screeners when they finish their courses and for the annual assessment of the proficiency of experienced screeners. The work can be hard on the eyes and performance can drop off during a shift. The program includes electronically placing images of suspicious items into the scanning of carry-on bags in order to test the alertness of the screeners to a wide variety of potential explosives and weapons. One of the mainstays of explosives detection has been bomb sniffing dogs. Though initiated by the FAA in 1993, and later jointly funded by FAA scientists now working for TSA (along with the TSWG), very little scientific data had been garnered indicating what substances dogs have cued on or at what concentration levels. Research teams composed of scientists and research physiologists—and of course, the dogs—have produced a greatly enhanced understanding of how canines find bombs, and how to optimize their training procedures. CONCLUSION A number of officials involved in the U.S. government’s CT R&D efforts note some confusion about the scope of the programs. With the emergence of the DHS as the “800 pound gorilla” and the transition of some research efforts to DHS and various reorganizations within the department, it is harder to keep up on who is doing what. Many congressional and other observers believe that the DHS as a whole (and not only its research components) continue to be in a transition stage, and it will take a few more years to work out the transition problems, partly because so many disparate agencies with their own cultures were thrown together quickly into a huge new agency. The coordination and working relationships between TSWG and DHS is another area that has yet to be fully worked out. For many years, the TSWG has functioned effectively as the coordinating group among the many federal agencies that are involved in the nation’s CT R&D efforts. But TSWG officials, and even some of the foreign partners, suddenly found DHS—an agency that was intended to deal with domestic terrorism—taking steps to become involved on the international scene and establish its own foreign partner working arrangements even though TSWG had long-established programs with the same countries. For example, in February 2006, just as the DOS and DOD were in the final stages of concluding the agreement they had been working out with Australia to join their R&D partnership efforts, the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology, testified to the House of Representatives Science Committee55 that DHS was the lead agency for the umbrella joint R&D agreements with other countries. TSWG officials were not aware of the DHS testimony when asked about it several months later, and indicated

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that it apparently had not been thoroughly circulated to other agencies for advance comment in accordance with usual operating procedures. DHS officials also note that while TSWG (and hence the DOS and DOD) played a significant role in the past in “filling the gap” for civil security technology collaborations before a major domestic organization like DHS existed, that mission responsibility has been given to the DHS through the Homeland Security Act of 2002. In fact, DHS officials see TSWG as oriented more towards security needs overseas, such as embassy protection or military and intelligence considerations. However, TSWG officials note that ever since the interagency group’s inception two decades ago, many of their projects have had a dual use, providing benefits for civilian law enforcement officials and first responders as well as potential overseas use. Privately, they say some of the DHS R&D efforts are simply reinventing the wheel. Resolving these different issues and developing a stronger collaborative partnership between DHS and TSWG will be vital for improving America’s CT R&D efforts at home and abroad. Finally, although the nation’s R&D efforts have reached a level of nearly $5 billion, challenges remain. Post-9/11 apathy towards research spending appears to be on the rise. R&D does not typically produce quick results, and sometimes lines of research do not pan out altogether. Furthermore, when budgets are tight, officials in the White House and Congress tend to put more priority on short-term issues, and funding for longer term R&D usually suffers. It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict in advance which particular R&D project may result in deterring a possible major terrorist bombing, WMD attack or aircraft hijacking. However, the investment that prevents one catastrophic attack can at the same time save many lives as well as head off a huge economic impact. Effective R&D is an investment that requires patience and persistence, not only from the scientists and engineers involved but also from those who control the budgets. NOTES 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Better Living Through Chemistry. 2. Genevieve J. Knezo, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Research and Development: Funding, Organization and Oversight, Congressional Research Service Report, updated April 28, 2006, RS21270, provided courtesy of CRS. 3. A figure of “over $4.8 billion” is used in Press release, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President, HOMELAND SECURITY, Research and Development in the President’s 2007 Budget, undated but issued in early Calendar Year 2006. http://www.ostp.gov/html/budget/2007/1pger HomelandSec.pdf and http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3856. 4. Ibid. Indeed, the FBI turned down repeated requests to describe its programs on an unclassified basis, even though it was pointed out that other agencies had publicly described their programs. 5. http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/nsdd30.pdf.

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6. Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Against Terrorism: The Federal Effort (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991). The report by the OTA, which has since been dismantled by Congress, was the first assessment of the U.S. government’s growing counterterrorism reach and development. Similar descriptions were used by Department of State Counterterrorism officers, including the author, in preparing talking points for Congress. 7. Per the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) website: http://www. tswg.gov/wg/home/home.htm. 8. http://www.population-security.org/bush report on terrorism/bush report on terrorism 3.htm # Toc536414950. See appendix section on interagency programs. 9. P.L. 99–399 22 USC, §2711. 10. Recollections of the meeting by the author and other Department of State officials who were present. 11. TSWG Review 2005, page 4. http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/news/2005 TSWG ReviewBook-ForWeb.pdf. 12. TSWG web site page introduction http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/about/ about.htm. 13. Author’s interviews with TSWG officials, May 2006. 14. Author’s discussions of past funding allocations with TSWG officials and briefings with Congressional staff. 15. Transcript Department of Defense briefing, Nov. 29, 2001. http://www. defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/t12012001 t1129ct.html. 16. Interviews with TSWG officials and representatives of individual agencies. 17. TSWG REVIEW 2005, p. 49. http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/news/2005 TSWG ReviewBook-ForWeb.pdf. 18. The new cabinet-level agency was authorized by The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107–296, signed into law Nov. 25, 2002. A summary description is available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/NMREC/report67/drpt67c2.pdf. 19. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0530.xml. 20. The Homeland Security Subtitle G of Title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002 SAFETY ACT) is designed to encourage private sector R&D participants by providing liability protection. See https://www.safetyact.gov/ DHS/SActHome.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset&67AB24. 21. For more on the organizational structure of the S/T Directorate, see the following http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0530.xml. 22. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0532.xml. 23. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0534.xml. 24. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0533.xml. 25. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0535.xml. 26. Drawn from CRS Report to Congress Research and Development in the Department of Homeland Security, June 20, 2003 RL 31914, p. 2, by Daniel Morgan. http://www.chemistry.org/portal/a/ContentMgmtService/resources?id= c373e9f64a6167b38f6a4fd8fe800100. This, in turn was extrapolated from the Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief, FY2–4, 15–16. http://www. dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY 2004 BUDGET IN BRIEF.pdf

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27. Congressional Research Service Report Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Research and Development: Funding, Organization and Oversight, by Genevive J. Knezo April 19, 2003, RS21270. http://www.chemistry.org/portal/a/ ContentMgmtService/resources?id=c373e9f64a61647a8f6a4fd8fe800100. For an interesting overview of the Federal funding before the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, read Ms. Knezo’s September 19, 2001 report Counterterrorism Research and Development: Funding, Priority-setting, and Coordination http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21270.pdf. 28. Personal interview with Dr. Maureen McCarthy, July 2006. 29. American Association for the Advancement of Science report DHS R&D Falls Steeply in House Plan, P1 http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs07h.htm. and AAAS report on DHS Spending http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs07s.htm. The Administration’s Budget in Brief FY 2007 Page 82 http://www.dhs.gov/ interweb/assetlibrary/Budget BIB-FY2007.pdf uses a slightly lower figure for the S/T request, $1.002 billion but this does not include some R&D in other parts of the DHS budget. The earlier AAAS analysis of the Administration FY 2007 budget when it was submitted to Congress in early 2006 said its tables differ from the Administration’s budget documents because “AAAS has corrected inaccurate codings of non-R&D programs as R&D, added back some R&D funding left out of the Budget, and removed some non-R&D programs from the R&D data after examination of DHS Budget documents.” DS R&D Falls in 2007 Budget, 1–2. http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/dhs07p.htm. 30. Counterterrorism R&D is not alone in this. The OMB and the House Appropriations Committee also cut FY 2006 and FY 2007 funds for the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Training and other programs that help counter terrorism overseas by training foreign law enforcement officials. See Congressional Quarterly article Terror Funds May Be Reduced by House Appropriators, June 6, 2006. http://public.cq.com/public/20060607 homeland.html. Quoting from the author’s story on the counterterrorism blog regarding reporting funding cuts made in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance Program. Online at: http://counterterrorismblog.org/2006/06/house likely to stumble into c.php. 31. Senate Report 101–223, by the Senate Appropriations Committee on the DHS FY 2007 appropriation. 32. AAAS report Senate Cuts DHS R&D, July 2000. http://www.aaas.org/ spp/rd/dhs07s.htm. 33. For more details on the on the emergency preparedness and response portfolio see: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0546. xml. 34. For a description and list of universities involved see: http://www. dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3856. 35. “Things that go bang “have more testosterone, are considered more manly,” said one official, Dr. Susan F. Hallowell, Director of the Transportation Security Lab of the DHS S&T Directorate. 36. Statement of Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Department of Homeland Security Before the United States Senate Committee On Commerce, Science and Transportation, July 19, 2005. Online at: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ display?theme=45&content=4643.

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37. A detailed description of DHS R&D activities is contained in February 15, 2006 testimony to the House Science Committee by Dr. Charles E. McQueary, the DHS former Under Secretary for Science and Technology. For full text and description see http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full06/Feb15/mqueary.pdf, 4–10. 38. See a summary of the issue in “Moving Target”, GovEXEC.com magazine article June 1, 2006 by Zack Philips : http://www.govexec.com/features/060601/0606-01adti.htm and a detailed 2005 study by Rand which estimated it would cost $11 billion to equip each of America’s 6,800 commercial planes with a single laser jammer and that operational costs could run to more than $10 Billion over 10 years: Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat, Summary, online at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional papers/2005/ RAND OP106.sum.pdf. 39. TSWG Review 2005, 76–79. Online at: http://www.tswg.gov/tswg/ news/2005 TSWG ReviewBook-ForWeb.pdf. 40. Plum Island web site: http://www.ars.usda.gov/main/site main.htm? modecode=19400000. 41. Interviews and email exchanges with NIJ officials. 42. (The FBI was the only organization to turn down requests for interviews with its officials. Although the author has security clearance, a press spokesman said FBI officials considered the subject “too sensitive,” even after it was pointed out that the TSWG and other agencies had publicly described some of their projects on the internet. By contrast, the other agencies were willing to discuss their unclassified work.) 43. FY 2007 Agriculture Department Budget Summary and Annual Performance Plan, 18. Online at: http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/ 2007/FY07budsum.pdf. 44. For more on this topic, please see Lee M. Myers, “Agriculture and Food Defense,” Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (Vol. 3), ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006). 45. Testimony by Dr. John S. Morgan NIJ’s Assistant Director for Science & Technology, to the House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, April 25, 2006. http://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyMorgan.pdf. 46. See NIJ Web Site, technology section http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/ sciencetech/welcome.html. 47. Sec. 231, Homeland Security Act of 2002, P. L. 107–296. 48. http://www.genome.gov/17515637. 49. http://www.cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/NIJprojects.htm also. 50. http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/technology/research statistics/officer protection.htm. 51. http://www.tsa.gov/public/display?theme=70. 52. Ibid. Also see Electronic Privacy Information Center article on backscatter issue. http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/backscatter/. 53. Federal Aviation Administration FYI 2007 Budget in Brief Document http://www.faa.gov/about/office org/headquarters offices/aba/budgets brief/ media/bib2007.pdf.

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54. This is an example of the type of specialized research and development that traditionally has been conducted by one agency, in this case the FAA alone, without the TSWG mentioned earlier in this chapter. 55. http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full06/Feb15/mqueary.pdf, 25.

PART II HARD POWER

CHAPTER 9 NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE HANDS OF JUNIOR LEADERS Amos N. Guiora and Martha Minow

What does the nation owe those who fight on our behalf? It would not seem too much for members of the armed services to expect sufficient preparation, equipment, and planning to avoid needless exposure to harm. This chapter seeks to encourage debate on an issue of enormous importance to the achievement of the nation’s military objectives: are we giving adequate intelligence, articulation of mission, and legal awareness to prepare platoon-level leadership to make complex decisions? Debates over adequate preparation leave more questions unanswered than resolved. Protective gear to guard against enemy weaponry is one example. The Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner reported earlier this year (2006) that between March 2003 and June 2005, in 74 of the 93 fatal wounds experienced by the marines, bullets or shrapnel hit parts of soldiers’ bodies not covered by torso protective gear. Many experts disagree over whether the U.S. fighters are adequately equipped or alternatively whether they are overburdened, as North Carolina State University Professor Don Thompson suggested in a recent National Review Online article.1 This example illustrates one important debate over how the nation prepares its soldiers. When it comes to the complex decision-making skills that allow soldiers to effectively execute their missions, there is even broader disagreement. Some military leaders will insist that the training and preparation of junior leaders is adequate, while others—including many junior leaders—will suggest that they don’t feel adequately prepared. This chapter will focus the debate on the three areas in which improvements can be made: the use and gathering of intelligence, clear articulation of the mission, and awareness of legal responsibilities.

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Once deployed in the field, military personnel must be properly trained to maximize safety and effectiveness. Rightly, recent years have seen the development of increasingly sophisticated strategic planning and rules of engagement. As the central concern now is counterterrorism, special focus must be given to the needs of the junior leaders—typically, it is the platoon leaders and their noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are charged with translating mission and strategy into tactics. Based on lessons learned from the Israeli experiences with countering terrorism, this chapter reveals that more can be done to prepare our junior leaders adequately for their missions. A focus on counterterrorism puts into stark relief the kinds of real-time and accessible intelligence, advanced training in law, and clear articulation of mission that junior leaders demand. JUNIOR LEADERS: WHY THEY ARE CENTRAL AND WHO THEY ARE Political leaders make key foreign policy decisions, and senior commanders develop military strategies, so it is not surprising that they become the primary focus for debate and evaluation. Yet, in the context of modern warfare and armed conflicts short of war (such as counterterrorism), the critical fights are not conducted on vast battlefields between standing armies or even air-delivered strategic bombings. Instead, critical fights are often led by junior leaders. Modern armed conflict unfolds in the marketplace of Nablus, the streets of Grozny, and the back alleys of Mosul. Counterterrorism played out in these settings does not lend itself to the grand sweeping battlefields of the past. Key decisions are made not by generals strategically deploying battalions, fleets, and aircraft, but by junior leaders who are on the ground, organizing checkpoints, arrests, and raids while motivating and guiding soldiers under their command. These junior leaders, whom General Charles C. Krulak referred to as “The Strategic Corporal,”2 make tactical decisions that have strategic effects; properly training them is thus crucial. Junior leaders do not decide strategies of counterterrorism or matters of high state. Nevertheless, ultimate implementation of any counterterrorism plan depends on them. Not strategists, junior leaders are perhaps the most important tacticians. How a particular checkpoint in Baghdad will be manned reflects their leadership. The conduct of a firefight in Nablus reflects their skill level. The initial treatment of a wanted terrorist just arrested mirrors their moral compass and communications to their soldiers. Who is the junior leader? In the U.S. context this is a soldier or Marine from the fire team level up to the platoon leader or commander. The junior leader can be an NCO or a lieutenant. Typically, a junior leader will

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be responsible for as few as four and as many as seventy soldiers. With the exception of the platoon sergeant, a junior leader likely has less than ten years of military experience, yet is faced with the most critically challenging decisions on the battlefield. Does the United States provide junior leaders with the decisionmaking tools necessary to fulfill their missions? If not, we do them—and ourselves—an enormous disservice. We must promise them that we “have their back,” meaning we not only back up the tactics they adopt to pursue the ends we assign them, but we also provide them the critical skills necessary to achieve their mission. Before the fight against terrorism warrants the banner of “Mission Accomplished,” the junior leaders—the eyes, ears, hands, and heart of the initiatives—must be equipped with the capacities and resources to do their job. These days, that requires more than sophisticated military training. Today’s junior leader needs sufficient understanding of the intelligence, mission articulation, and legal parameters to determine sensible and effective tactics in order to motivate and guide the troops. Well before any particular moment of decision making, the junior leaders must be assured that they have a clearly articulated mission that can be translated into tactics; cogently and comprehensibly defined moral parameters; political and military superiors who are accountable for their actions and responsible enough not to hide behind a junior leader when the going gets tough; operational grounding in international law; rules of engagement that the junior leaders—and not a lawyer—can explain fully to their soldiers; sophisticated training in operations and leadership; and reliable intelligence habits. Most of these are so obvious that they speak for themselves. It is useful, though, to examine some of the less obvious ones in detail, such as mission, intelligence, and legal preparation. Mission We owe the junior leader clear and realistic mission guidelines and an understanding of the strategic objectives. The guidelines must enable completion of the mission, consistent with international law and protection of the troops. After the administration’s acknowledgment that no weapons of mass destruction were found, articulating the United States’ mission in Iraq became more complicated. A central purpose now is to promote the development of a stable democracy and to resist the risk that Iraq becomes (or continues to be) a ground for breeding and training terrorists. Yet troops on the ground, like the rest of us, have heard the charge that the U.S. invasion has made Iraq the likely home of terrorists and their recruits. For junior leaders to comprehend and believe in the mission, they need more cogent and accurate statements of the vision both from civilian and military leaders.

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Without a believable and clear statement of strategic objectives, troops may be too demoralized for junior leaders to motivate. From the Israeli experiences with counterterrorism, we have learned that soldiers have greater confidence in their junior commanders when those leaders are able to explain, both to themselves and their men, why they are in harm’s way. Without a clearly articulated and consistent policy to implement, soldiers will feel as though they are merely fighting for survival rather than for a higher purpose. Of course, fighting for survival is vital, but it does not contribute to confining or overcoming enemies. During the course of Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon, a national public debate erupted among Israelis over whether soldiers were dying for an unknown cause and an unclear mission. Ambiguity in mission undermines the effectiveness of command. Military operations are doomed to fail when the mission is not articulated effectively on a strategic or tactical level. As a result, junior leaders end up sending their increasingly incredulous forces into battle against local, largely unseen enemies who are defending their homeland against outside forces. The local enemies enjoy significant advantages when they know the terrain and the local culture is their own. Protecting “the homeland” motivates local inhabitants to justify the supreme sacrifice of their own lives. Against this enemy, the junior leaders—armed with an unclear understanding of the strategic objectives—increasingly lose the confidence of their troops, who may fear their superiors recklessly endangering them. Junior leaders are the representatives of the senior commanders, yet they cannot articulate a clear purpose coming down from the top; they are the voice of command but cannot give a compelling justification for putting the soldiers’ lives and well-being at risk. Combat effectiveness, motivation, and lack of initiative are all examples from Israeli military experience of what can happen when junior leaders cannot articulate the strategic objectives. Even if the mission is clear and articulable, the junior leaders risk losing the confidence of their platoons if asked to sustain illusions about actual practices, such as “Americans never torture,” or “America does not engage in indefinite detention.” We owe the junior leaders a clear mission that comports in both means and ends with the nation’s values and honor. Intelligence Even with a clear mission, a junior leader cannot do the job without upto-date intelligence—including access to language skills and information about local mores and customs, enabling meaningful use of the information. A junior leader must gain three kinds of intelligence: (1) what human sources tell their interlocutors; (2) what analysts learn from intercepted communications; and (3) what is observed by patrol. The first two are the

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direct responsibilities of senior commanders; they must ensure that the junior leader’s daily briefing contains the most up-to-date material and interpretations. The third component is a joint responsibility of junior and senior leaders. The junior leader directs the patrol, while the senior command establishes the conditions under which the junior leader interprets the reports from the patrol. Consider the challenge of managing a checkpoint in an occupied land. This may be the most sensitive point between occupiers and the occupied. It is the point of friction between an angry local population, forced to respond repeatedly to the same questions, and the soldiers, who fear that the approaching individual is a human missile waiting to detonate. If intelligence information is current and comprehensive, it may alert those manning the checkpoint to heightened risk or kinds of persons deserving special scrutiny. If the intelligence information is not accurate and up-todate, the results can be tragic. Two years ago, at the Erez checkpoint in territory occupied by Israel, the soldier manning the post had no particular reason to suspect a woman in her twenties. The woman explained that the metal plates in her leg would make the scanner go off. She then detonated herself and killed four Israelis. Intelligence information should have been obtained to challenge the presupposition that only men could be suicide bombers. On the basis of known intelligence information, a junior leader manning a checkpoint would not have assumed a woman to be potential suicide bomber. Indeed, the intelligence at the time directed those at the checkpoint to closely scrutinize young men. The lack of operational intelligence about actual or potential recruitment of women as suicide bombers directly resulted in a lack of operational readiness and the deaths of four Israeli soldiers. Junior leaders are dependent on intelligence in determining their tactical decisions. Senior commanders must ensure that the most up-to-date information regarding terrorists’ strategic and tactical decisions is made available in real time to the junior leaders. Intelligence is not only the gathering of information, but also the interpretation and evaluation of both what is known and what could be true. Intelligence activities require explicitly considering and preparing for what had previously been considered unfathomable. It requires senior commanders to think outside of the box in order to prepare the junior leader to do so. Judgment about Orders: The Duty to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders Because it is increasingly the junior leaders who define or carry out specific tactics, they are critically situated to assess whether a particular order or plan—when turned into operations—will or will not comport with the

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law. In many ways, junior leaders are the last checkpoint between the order given and the results in the field. Ever since the Nuremberg trials, soldiers have been told that simply obeying orders is no defense against charges of violating international law. Yet the first duty of any soldier is to learn to obey orders, even those that run against civilian sensibilities. Junior leaders should expect that orders received from superiors are lawful, and yet remain mindful that they bear responsibility, personally, for assessing the lawfulness of commands. Perhaps more palpably than any other figure in the military chain of command, the junior leaders experience potential tensions among responsibilities to their superiors, to their own soldiers, and to those enemies, civilians, and fellow countrymen who count on the observance of international norms of war. A junior leader cannot be expected to be a lawyer. Nor should the junior leader let concerns about the law justify delay in a moment of emergency. Nonetheless, with the incidents at My Lai and Abu Ghraib in mind, the junior leader must remember that how commands are carried out (or miscarried) can make the difference between adherence to and violations of binding law. This means that the junior leader must have sufficient training long before a moment of difficulty to know what to look for in assessing orders, to know when and how to seek clarification for ambiguous orders, and to know how to proceed if orders appear to be manifestly illegal. An episode well known to all Israelis is illustrative. Now known as the “black flag” incident at Kfar Kassem, at the onset of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, Israeli authorities imposed a curfew on Arab villages in Israel. The curfew was set to begin while villagers were in the fields, tilling the land. A border police unit was to enforce the curfew. During the preparatory briefing, a member of the force asked about the fate of those returning from the fields after the curfew was in effect. The commanding officer replied briefly: “God have mercy upon them.” No one asked for further clarification. The unit interpreted his response as calling upon them to shoot anyone returning after the curfew. As a result, they killed 56 innocent men, women, and children returning from the fields. In subsequent trials arising from the incident, the Israeli courts concluded that an order to shoot curfew violators was blatantly unlawful, and those who followed such an order were to be court-martialed. Obviously, a junior leader needs thorough training to deal with this kind of situation. Rules and regulations can offer guidelines, but crucially, the junior leader needs experience working with detailed examples in order to identify when a vague command is illegal, how to question superiors without insubordination, and what to do in the case of an apparently illegal order. Consider what a junior leader needs to know in advance when faced with ambiguity over precisely what kinds of interrogation techniques

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have been authorized by Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s decision in the aftermath of 9/11.3 The administration denies having authorized any techniques that violate the Geneva Convention or the Convention Against Torture, as ratified by the United States. Yet human rights advocates charge that the administration has approved the illegal use of psychological techniques designed to break a person’s inner strength.4 How are junior leaders to know what is legal and what is illegal as they organize detention or interrogation? Junior leaders are conditioned to follow orders, unless they believe that the orders are a “black flag” as articulated in the Kfar Kassem trial. In order to make that decision, they must rely on their moral compass, best judgment, and training. Should the junior leaders conclude that the order is blatantly illegal and therefore must not be followed, they must be able to explain to senior command their rationale. In the case of interrogations, when junior leaders conclude that the methods they are asked to either implement or facilitate violate international law or military regulations, they must disobey them. A junior leader is under the direct command of neither civilian intelligence officials nor independent contractors. It is the obligation of senior command to organize operations so these different actors coordinate. Similarly, it is the obligation of the junior leader to consult with senior command if uncertainty exists. In either case, the junior leader is obligated to disobey and prevent others from obeying clearly unlawful orders. At this moment, U.S. troops face acute difficulties in even knowing what legal framework applies. The president and his lawyers have announced that the Geneva Conventions do not govern the war on terror; if that is to be the case, then what rules do apply? Uncertainty about the legal status of enemy combatants, putative terrorists, or civilians who might be associating with terrorists may invite departures from any articulated rules. At best, such uncertainty exposes the junior leader to ex post determinations, through court martials or war crimes tribunals, without fair advance notice or clarity about the governing law. It should be the duty of those who hold higher authority to articulate and legitimate the rules governing the contemporary initiatives, whether they are deemed war, armed conflict, or criminal law enforcement. Practical Application: The Junior Leader Commanding a Checkpoint Although there remains plenty of room for improvement in the Israel Defense Force (IDF), there may be some lessons to be learned from some of its approaches to training and supporting junior commanders. For example, in response to recurring occurrences of misconduct by soldiers at West Bank checkpoints, the IDF responded in two ways. The IDF created

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the position of checkpoint commander and developed an intensive twoday course to prepare the junior commander for this critical posting. The IDF School of Military Law, in conjunction with junior and senior commanders, developed an interactive video designed to teach soldiers an eleven-point code of conduct based on international law, Israeli law, and the IDF’s ethical code.5 The video incorporates snippets from Hollywood movies and high-tech graphics intended to address the critical issues of contemporary combat. A variety of scenes from movies, including “The Siege,” “Apocalypse Now,” “Platoon,” “The Year of Living Dangerously,” “Rules of Engagement,” and “The English Patient,” are used to teach IDF junior commanders the eleven codes that senior commanders and officers from the IDF School of Military Law thought were operationally relevant. The interactive video taught junior commanders a number of important principles, including the absolute requirement to treat the Palestinian population in a dignified fashion, to distinguish between innocent civilians and terrorists, and to respect religious symbols. The video also taught junior commanders to refuse to obey unlawful orders, to not interrogate captured combatants unless specifically authorized to do so, and to report violations of military law committed by fellow soldiers to their commanders. Furthermore, international legal principles—including proportionality and the obligation to minimize collateral damage and seek alternatives— were emphasized. Commanders choose the checkpoint commanders for this posting on the basis of the following criteria: (1) the soldier was identified as possessing a strong moral compass and (2) the soldier was perceived to be tolerant and perceptive. The two-day course encompassed a number of different subject areas, including operational aspects of checkpoints and instruction in basic Arabic, thus enabling the junior commander to request documents and to communicate with the Palestinian population seeking to pass through the checkpoints. In addition, the future junior commanders received an hourlong lecture from officers in the IDF School of Military Law regarding morality in armed conflict and international law. Though the available instruction time was limited, senior commanders opined that a worrisome number of unfortunate incidents at checkpoints justified the resources allocated for this effort. Strong command influence and structure is critical to the conduct of junior commanders and the soldiers under their command. Senior commanders must be able to “talk the talk” and “walk the walk” with respect to issues that had, in the past, not been considered the core of operational considerations. In the context of “armed conflict short of war,”6 operational considerations have expanded to include subject areas not traditionally associated

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with military operations and training. However, the reality of modern combat is that states will rarely be engaged in warfare with other states. Rather, states will be engaged in combat with nonstate entities comprising individuals dressed like innocent civilians. Accordingly, the toolbox of contemporary junior commanders must include skills not critical to the operational success of their predecessors forty years ago. These skills must include an understanding of local cultural mores, an ability to communicate on a basic level with the local population, an understanding of morality in armed conflict and of international law, and an appreciation for the power of the media. Furthermore, the junior commanders are required to integrate these skills in stressful conditions in a foreign land while facing a hostile, local population. Two vignettes, based on experiences in Israel and Iraq, highlight the importance of training, identifying the most appropriate individuals for particular positions and creating command structures appropriate for conflict in the post-9/11 world. Furthermore, it is incumbent that junior commanders be provided logistical support that extends beyond the traditional concept of supplies and material. As demonstrated in these vignettes, not only must the junior commander have open lines of communication with senior commanders, but there is also a clear need for developing both linguistic skills and an understanding of the local population’s cultural mores. Otherwise, the junior commander’s intelligence gathering ability will be severely hampered. In “armed conflict short of war,” where terrorists are embedded with innocent civilians, insufficient intelligence combined with deficiencies in the areas discussed above will not only affect the commander’s operational capability, but will potentially lead to unnecessary human tragedy. Two Instructive Vignettes 1. When a Palestinian vehicle arrived at an IDF checkpoint, the soldier manning the position noticed a bottle containing liquid in the car. The soldier’s order that day stated that, for security reasons, Palestinians may not cross through checkpoints while carrying bottles. In response to the soldier’s ordering her to drink from the bottle (presumably to ensure that the contents were nonflammable fluids) the elderly Palestinian in the vehicle attempted to explain to the young soldier that the bottle contained liquid soap hazardous to human consumption. The tragic ending to this confrontation was that the Palestinian drank the liquid and suffered severe injury. While the soldier was court-martialed, the training and subsequent application of the tools recommended above may have prevented this human tragedy. 2. On a patrol in Iraq, a U.S. unit suffered causalities as a result of an improvised explosive device (IED). In the immediate aftermath, one of the soldiers spotted a shepherd holding a cell phone. Suspecting that the shepherd was involved in the attack, the soldier aimed his rifle at the individual’s head. The commander, a lieutenant, ordered the soldier to lower his rifle, which he promptly did. When asked why the soldier immediately responded to the order, the commander

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explained that the unit’s training had emphasized that not all Iraqis are the enemy and that there was an absolute intolerance on his part of referring to the local population in a derogatory fashion.

These two vignettes juxtaposed side by side are instructive for a number of different reasons. Without doubt, the conduct of the IDF soldier is reprehensible; nevertheless (and without excusing it), context is important. The stresses and strains of military service at checkpoints combined with an inability to communicate with the local population are a reality of occupation. The dual response of the IDF senior command, described earlier, represents an effort to address the complexity “head on.” While the two-day training and interactive video do not guarantee that violations will not occur in the future, it is noteworthy that the International Red Cross, which participates in the checkpoint commander course, publicly commented that fewer complaints were filed after the course’s implementation. Similarly, a substantial number of IDF units requested instruction with the interactive video. The junior commanders responded extremely positively. However, without strong command influence, the video will not be an effective instructional tool and will not affect the operational conduct of its intended audience. Command influence and structure is the most significant determinant of a soldier’s behavior. However, as exemplified above, junior commanders must be significantly assisted through a variety of creative measures. CONCLUSION It is no exaggeration that the success of operational counterterrorism depends on junior leaders. In this chapter, we address three important issues facing the junior commander: real-time and accessible intelligence, advanced training in law, and clear articulation of mission that junior leaders demand. Our success in the war on terror depends on the knowledge, skills, and abilities of these junior commanders. We must equip the junior leaders to do the vital jobs we assign them. This means acknowledging both the limits on what their broad shoulders can carry and our duty to assist. They “have our back,” but do we have theirs? ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors would like to thank the Institute for Global Security, Law & Policy Research Fellows, Ms. Erin Page, J. D., for her editorial comments, Mr. Greg McNeal, J. D., and Mr. Matt Ezzo (CWRU School of Law, J. D., expected 2007) for so graciously agreeing to draw on their military careers in commenting on previous drafts of this article.

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NOTES 1. See Don Thompson, “Researcher: Optimal Armor Not Just a Matter of Adding More,” National Review Online (January 13, 2006), http://media. nationalreview.com/post/?q=OTUxZmViOGJmZmFjZWEzODE5OTFlMTJhMD EyYmRiNmU=. 2. See General Charles C. Krulak, “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War,” Marines Magazine (January 1999), http://www.au.af.mil/au/ awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic corporal.htm. 3. See Jane Mayer, “The Experiment,” New Yorker (July 11, 2005), http:// www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/050711fa fact4. 4. Ibid., (quoting Leonard Rubenstein). 5. One of the co-authors of this article, Prof Amos N. Guiora, had command responsibility for the development of the video described here; see “Teaching Morality in Armed Conflict: The Israel Defense Forces Model,” Jewish Political Studies Review 18, no. 1–2 (Spring 2006): 3 6. The Israel Defense Forces’ term-of-art for Palestinian terrorism, beginning in September 2005.

CHAPTER 10 ENGAGING MILITARY CONTRACTORS IN COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OPERATIONS James Jay Carafano and Alane Kochems

Currently, military contractors are assisting militaries and civilian government agencies throughout the world and across the mission spectrum, including planning, training, logistics, and security. Their use in support of a range of counterterrorism and homeland security-related activities is growing. Employing contractors in the war on terror, or for that matter any national security purpose, has both distinct advantages and disadvantages. Military contractors are seen as having inherent advantages over militaries with regard to cost, flexibility, and responsiveness. Relying on military contractors, though, does have its share of risks—including safety and liability issues, performance, force management, compliance with international and domestic laws, and lost resources because a capability is outsourced rather than retained. With this increase in contractor use in general, and the rise of privatized firms that are specifically organized to provide security services, the question is now how to determine the right force mix to most effectively and efficiently complete a task or mission. In some cases, contractors may be the best choice; however, they are not the perfect fit for every mission or the right solution for all skill or manpower shortages. Instead, governments should assess the risks of employing various options and then choose the best one. As this chapter will explain, government agencies should adopt comprehensive guidelines for making these decisions using a risk-based approach.

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WHAT ARE PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS? WHAT CAN THEY DO? Contractors on the Battlefield—A Brief History Military contractors on the battlefield are nothing new. They have been around in various forms throughout history. Most empires from the Ancient Egyptians to the Victorian British have used contracted troops in some form. In some cases, these were individual fighters, while in others, a power could hire a highly organized entity to fight on its behalf. It was only in the 1600s, when states became the dominant organizing force (instead of princes and kings), that the military began to be under control of the political realm and became a public sector entity. As Peter Singer notes, “[T]he monopoly of the state over violence is the exception in world history, rather than the rule.”1 It was only with the rise of the modern nation-state in Western Europe that governments began to supplant the private sector in providing the preponderance of security and law enforcement services. By the dawn of the twentieth century, particularly among developed nations in the West, security-related services were viewed primarily as an inherently government function. That said, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, contractors provided services for wartime and homeland security services in order to supplement state defense and law enforcement assets. Within the United States, one of the most well known was the Pinkerton Detective Agency, founded in 1852. The agency collected intelligence for the Union Army during the Civil War, investigated the Molly Maguires (a secret organization that fermented labor unrest in the Pennsylvania coal mines during the 1870s), pursued the Jesse James Gang, and were employed as strikebreakers. Within the United States, the use of private law enforcement declined with the advent of federal law enforcement agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and because of a backlash against the excesses of corporations employing private security companies to harass labor unions, following an armed confrontation between strikers and Pinkerton agents in Homestead, Pennsylvania, in 1892 that resulted in a dozen deaths. In 1893, Congress passed the Anti-Pinkerton Act, which prohibited the federal government from employing “the Pinkerton Detective Agency, or similar organization.” The backlash against the Pinkerton company diminished the practice of employing private security firms to deal with labor unrest. Nevertheless, the United States and other Western governments continued to use contractor support for a myriad of defense and law enforcement support needs in the areas of logistics and administration. Within the United States, despite the passage of the Anti-Pinkerton Act, there is no comprehensive prohibition employing private sector security agencies. In 1978, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the prohibition

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to include hiring the services of any “mercenary, quasi-military forces as strikebreakers and armed guards.” The court, however, defined “quasimilitary forces,” and as a result today the law has little practical effect in the employment of contemporary security service companies or military support contractors. The use of contractors, particularly in support of military operations, has been unprecedented in recent years. From 1990 to 2000 the market in contractor services almost doubled to about $100 billion. The employment of contractors for military and security services is not uniform. The market is overwhelmingly dominated by the United States and Great Britain, both in terms of service providers and the use of contracted services. Contractors and Civil Society Though contractors have throughout modern history remained a face on the battlefield and in the frontlines of security and law enforcement activity, their character has changed over the centuries. The private actors of the past, and even the mercenaries of today, differ from the current private military firms. Today’s organizations operate as businesses, and are structured according to conventional business models. In addition, many of them have ties to—or are openly part of—broader, multinational corporations. The resurgence of the use of contractors today for what traditionally in the recent past have been considered inherently governmental functions differs both in the scale of contracting and the diversity of tasks and missions performed. On the other hand, there is good reason for liberal, developed states not to fear the reemergence of a prominent role for the private sector in war, homeland security, and counterterrorism. There is little likelihood that the private sector’s place in war will lead to the rise of a new “Middle Ages” with sovereigns losing their capacity to manage violence. “Capitalism,” as Fareed Zakaria cogently argues, is not “something that exists in opposition to the state . . . [A] legitimate, well-functioning state can create the rules and laws that make capitalism work.”2 Unlike medieval kings, modern nations can use the instruments of good governance to bind the role of the private sector in military competition. The example of the United States illustrates the means that modern, liberal states have to both enable and harness the commercial capabilities of warfare that may remain partially, or even entirely, in the private sphere. The means available to moderate interaction between the public and the private sphere include the following: r a well-established judicial system; r an activist legislative branch with its own investigatory instruments (such as the Government Accountability Office [GAO]);

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r an independent press— the “60 Minutes” factor; r public interest group proliferation, which provides a wealth of independent oversight and analysis; and

r an enabled citizenry with ready access to a vast amount of public information. These assets offer unprecedented means to balance the public and private spheres—not just to constrain government conduct, but also to limit the excesses of the commercial sector.3 In fact, these capabilities might support the argument that in the long term, liberal, free market democracies will prove far more effective at mastering the capacity of the private sector in the twenty-first century than authoritarian states with managed economies. That said, however, the role of the private sector in war raises innumerable legal, ethical, and practical issues that must be dealt with.4 Marrying the private sector’s capacity to innovate and respond rapidly to changing demands with the government’s need to be responsible and accountable for the conduct of operations is not an easy task. It will require militaries to think differently about how best to integrate the private sector into public wars. Nor can generals do this thinking in isolation. Modern military operations are an interagency activity that requires the support of many elements of executive power. The judicial and legislative branches of the government have important roles to play as well. Indeed, many of the most important instruments for constraining the role of the private sector in war lay in their hands. On the other hand, nations that lack good governance and transparency have far greater difficulty employing contractors within the rule of law. Strong governance institutions are a prerequisite for using contract support for defense and homeland security in a manner that enhances rather than undermines the protection of society. Types of Organizations Military contractors—or privatized military firms (PMFs)—today constitute the largest component of the private services companies in the security sector. These contractors can be classified on the basis of the types of services they provide. The types of contractors include military provider firms (MPFs), military consultant firms (MCFs), and military support firms (MSFs). MPFs focus on the tactical environment. These firms engage in actual fighting, either as line units or specialists, as well as in direct command and control for field units. Examples of MPFs include Executive Outcomes, Sandline, SCI, and NFD, which have run combat operations in places such as Angola, Sierra Leone, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia. Clients will typically use an MPF if they have comparatively low military

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capability and are facing an immediate, high-threat situation. MPFs are the most controversial type of privatized military industry and often receive unfavorable publicity. MCFs give advice and training necessary for operations and to restructure a client’s military. Levdan, Vinnell, and Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) are all considered to be MCFs. Their clients are usually restructuring their militaries or want to dramatically increase their capabilities. For example, MPRI lists its core competencies as security sector reform, institution building, leader development, military training and education, and emergency management. MCFs can further be divided into those firms that offer pure analysis and those which will also provide training and consultation in combination with recommendations. “The line between advising and implementing, however, sometimes can be quite fuzzy; often, if a trained soldier has been hired to teach, it is difficult to duck out of the way when the opportunity comes to put training into practice.”5 Support firms provide supplementary military services such as logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, and transportation. These contractors allow their clients to focus on fighting and their core mission areas while the contractors handle the support work. Clients tend to rely on MSFs where they are involved in immediate but long-duration operations (e.g., standing forces that need surge capacity). While these contractors do not directly participate in executing or planning military operations, they fulfill needs necessary for combat operations. MSFs comprise the largest component of the privatized military industry and have the most subcomponents. Most of these firms rely on having large, accurate databases of experts that allow them to put together the types of support called for in their contracts. For instance, “MPRI maintains and draws its workforce from a carefully managed and current database of more than 12,500 former defense, law enforcement, and other professionals, from which the company can identify every skill produced in the armed forces and public safety sectors.”6 All of them tend to have minimal infrastructure, with MPFs having the least. In addition, they often incorporate where there are favorable laws but can usually change name and business structure in response to negative press (e.g., Executive Outcomes). HOW DO CONTRACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS? Supporting Military Operations One of the most dramatic and significant uses for contractor support in counterterrorism operations is in support of direct military operations,

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particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. The growth of contractor support since the end of the Cold War, particularly in support of U.S. military operations, has been remarkable. According to a 2004 study by David Isenberg, “During the first Gulf War in 1991 for every one contractor there were 50 military personnel involved. In the 2003 conflict the ratio was 1 to 10.”7 In Iraq, for insistence, a Coalition Provisional Authority report listed 60 private military companies totaling about 20,000 personnel. Direct security operations involved personal security details for senior civilian officials, security for buildings and infrastructure, and nonmilitary convoy security. Most of these comprised the 14,000 Iraqi guards contracted to protect the country’s oilfields.8 In addition to security firms, companies provided a wide range of logistical and support staff for military operations and construction. This support, in terms of dollars expended, accounted for the bulk of the contractor support for U.S. operations. According to an analysis conducted for the Center for Public Integrity in 2004, approximately 20 companies accounted for the overwhelming majority of the $5.8 billion allocated to these tasks, with Kellogg, Brown, and Root receiving contracts worth about $4.7 billion of the total.9 Contractor Support for Security Operations Contractors are also heavily engaged in a range of security activities that support governments and the private sector, and in some cases these include domestic counterterrorism support operations. The most prevalent use of contractors is in the area of physical security and screening, though they also conduct a number of other support activities, including risk assessments, staff support, and consulting. As a global trend, reliance on security contractors is growing. The United States, for example, is fairly unique in employing government workers to screen commercial aviation passengers and cargo. When countries first tried to thwart plane hijacking in the 1970s, most nations initially used government employees to beef up airport security, either through a government transportation or justice agency. Beginning in the 1980s, European airports began developing a performance-contracting model in which the government set and enforced high performance standards that airports then met by hiring security companies or occasionally using their own staff. Belgium was the first to adopt this model in 1982, followed by the Netherlands in 1983 and the United Kingdom in 1987. The 1990s saw a new wave of conversions to the public–private partnership model, with Germany switching in 1992, France in 1993, Austria and Denmark in 1994, Ireland and Poland in 1998, and Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland in 1999. Israel and a number of other nations in the Caribbean and the Far East also use this model.

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In the case of commercial aviation, contract security has proven generally worthwhile. In 2001, the GAO examined the security-screening practices of Canada, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.10 Its report focused on the superior performance of the European airports, all of which use the performance-contracting model. The GAO reported significant differences between their screening practices and that of U.S. airports (pre-9/11) in four areas: r better overall security system design (allowing only ticketed passengers past screening, stationing law enforcement personnel at or near checkpoints, and so on);

r higher qualifications and training requirements for screeners (e.g., 60 hours in

France versus 12 hours as then required by the Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]);

r better pay and benefits, resulting in much lower turnover rates; and r screening responsibility lodged with the airport or national government, not with airlines.

No country has emulated the United States and federalized its passenger-screening system. Instead, contract security in the aviation field (and many other areas of critical infrastructure protection) has become ubiquitous. Contractor Support for Disaster Response Contractors may also play a significant role in responding to a terrorist attack. Response assets provided by contractors could run the gambit of services from needs assessments to logistics, medical support, and construction. For example, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the World Trade Center site required about 10,000 skilled support personnel (heavy equipment operators, truck drivers, iron workers, carpenters, and laborers) per day during the initial search and cleanup period.11 Increasingly, contractors have also been used to provide security at disaster scenes. In the aftermath of Katrina, for example, private sector firms augmented security for commercial businesses as well as local, state, and federal entities. In addition to providing security services, these companies conducted damage assessments and contributed to search and rescue operations. TRENDS AND ISSUES IN SECURITY CONTRACTING Contractors have become a significant factor in government security operations, and future challenges to our nation’s security suggest that their role will become even more prominent.

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Why Are Contractors Increasing? Several factors contribute to the growing phenomenon of employing security contractors. They include: r The world changing. During the Cold War, a government’s security and defense needs were large, but largely predictable. Standing behind NATO forces in Europe was a massive logistical base, well established and supplied. On the home front, security concerns in the West primarily regarded the threat of espionage by the Warsaw Pact. In contrast, in the post-Cold War era most military operations are “expeditionary,” where militaries deploy without established lines of communications or bases of support. As a result, there is a greater need for commercial support or administration, logistics, and other support services as well as the need to manage “host-nation” support activities.

r Post–Cold War downsizing. After the Cold War, the United States and its Euro-

pean allies reduced the size of their military forces and intelligence services. Homeland security also received less emphasis, particularly with the decline of “state-sponsored” terrorism in the wake of the Cold War. Europe, for example, also reduced its emphasis on borders. The European Union moved toward eliminating border controls between member states. The dramatic increase in security resources with the outbreak of the war on terror generally found Western military and security resources inadequate for combating the challenge of transnational terrorism and protracted combat operations overseas.

r Business practices changing. In the wake of the Reagan and Thatcher “revolu-

tions,” strong arguments were made for reducing the size of government and (where practical) outsourcing functions to the private sector. A common assumption of modern business practices is that the private sector is more efficient, cost effective, and flexible than the government in providing goods and services.

r The world becoming a complex place. Modern weaponry, information technology,

and integrated systems dominate many of the military and security capabilities of the West. Routinely, commercial off-the-shelf technology provides the best and most cost-effective answers to many military and security needs. Governments are thought to lack the private sector’s capacity to understand and exploit complex systems and modern technology.

Together, these trends have increased the propensity for the most advanced Western economies to increasingly turn to contractors to provide security and defense-related services. What Are the Issues? Outsourcing of what had been considered inherently governmental functions has not occurred without criticism and controversy. Critiques of using private sector companies for security-related functions include the following: r Outsourcing is done not because it is more effective or inexpensive, but because governments increasingly have an ideological bias that favors the private sector.

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r Outsourcing does not necessarily save money. Governments cannot outsource the cost of providing oversight and accountability. When these overhead costs are factored in, critics argue, there may be little if any real savings in overall costs.

r Employing contractors will always face an insolvable tension between contractors who must make a profit and the government, which is solely focused on the outcome of enhancing security. This is a problem that does not exist in exclusively government-provided services.

r Governments lack the capacity to determine what activities should be inherently governmental functions, or the means to determine whether operations can be more efficiently and cost-effectively performed by contractors or government employees.

In brief, critics conclude that outsourcing defense, counterterrorism, and security functions to the private sector incurs significant financial and operational risks. LESSONS LEARNED In the years since the September 11 attacks, the government has taken on two of the largest private contracting efforts in history: the rebuilding of Iraq since the 2003 invasion by U.S. troops and the continued assault by insurgents and the rebuilding of the U.S. Gulf Coast from the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These efforts highlighted both the advantages and the limitations of providing contract support for largescale operations and offered significant lessons learned. Challenges posed by these rebuilding efforts resulted in studies on management by agencies involved, including the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the GAO. These studies presented recommendations and lessons learned for how to manage private contracting on a large scale and in a short time frame: choose the right business model, define specific and accurate requirements, know the situation on the ground, train personnel, and set up effective mechanisms for oversight and liability mitigation. Requirements The first lesson learned when creating contracts is that one must know the requirements. When starting large-scale private contracting, it is important to prioritize projects and identify the necessary requirements to complete them. It is easy to get caught up in those projects that “would be nice to complete” rather than the basic projects that must be completed. Furthermore, though necessary projects should be completed at a high

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level of quality, projects may not require high-scale materials, designs, or personnel. Developing the requirements for large contracting calls for qualified people to ask the right questions and understand the goals of the project, its technical aspects, and the process itself. Good developers will know what the customer wants and be able to create a process that is capable of producing that outcome. Developing the requirements may be a process that includes constant review and updates. It is important to define what types of roles and responsibilities may be contracted out. A distinction should be made between allocating and administrating justice; the power of law enforcement currently lies with the state and not with private companies, but private companies may carry out the administrative functions of enforcement to ensure that the allocation of justice follows the law and due process.12 In the past, private investigation and security company employees have secured law enforcement powers of arrest and the right to use deadly force through state and local legislation.13 Agencies should clearly define the roles that contractors will play and the resulting legislative consequences that those roles might have. In addition to the projects, the agency contracting to a PMF must have a clear idea of the risks that may be encountered on the ground. Before securing contracts, authorities should know what to expect at the contract site. Will the contractors need to provide a base for operations, and if so, how will that fit into the project’s costs? Being prepared for security risks and having appropriate contingency plans in place is also necessary. Operations must be ready to start running immediately upon staff arrival, whether the staff is a contract manager or a contractor. Management and Oversight The second lessoned learned in private contracting from Katrina and Iraq is that orchestrating the right contracts for the right projects lays the foundation for a successful contracting endeavor. Even before contracting begins, agencies should identify what type of contracts they will be awarding and then what resources are necessary to complete the contracts. Options include (1) cost plus, in which a contractor names the cost of the operations of the contract plus a mark-up, and (2) fixed fee, in which the contractor is ensured the contract for one year at a fixed price but has opt-out options the following years. Cost plus is often used when time is of the essence or when technology must be deployed as quickly into the field as possible as part of a design-build contract in which technology is deployed and tested in real-world operations, cutting the time necessary for field testing. A smart tactic to avoid skyrocketing costs through cost plus and still reap the benefits of design-build is to set up a contract that has one year

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of fixed fee followed by a set number of years where either party may back out and not renew for the following year. If needed, the agency may want to start with a short-term contract that may involve months or weeks until requirements are defined more clearly. In the process, agencies should consider the business arrangement, including (1) whether the contract should be sole source or competitive and (2) what the mix of publicprivate resources should be. Throughout this process, private and public bidders for a contracted service should be able to bid against one another rather than choosing one track or another.14 Whatever mix of public and private resources is formulated, the most important part of privatization is ensuring proper structure and accountability in the process.15 An auditing system should be in place to oversee contract management from the beginning. This responsibility may be placed under an Inspector General (IG). Such oversight should enable real-time auditing, in which management authorities can act immediately on recommended changes suggested by auditors in the contract management process. The main responsibility of the IG would be to investigate possible fraud and abuse in the form of criminal activities and continually review whether the contract performance meets the government’s requirements and is executed economically and efficiently.16 However, to ensure that the IG oversight does not become too much for either the IG or the contractors in large-scale contracting, another option to consider is to create a special position or board for such tasks. In the case of the Katrina response, for example, the Department of Homeland Security created a “procurement review board” that acted as an IG and conducted due diligence over all FEMA contracts. Taking recommendations, FEMA was able to respond and implement appropriate changes.17 Some analysts suggest that an auditor should be present in meetings throughout the entire contracting process to help agencies avoid personal interest conflicts, as well as unequal treatment of bidders, and to assure both agency and contractor that the integrity of the contract is unquestionable. Such an addition may actually hinder the contract processing and should not be necessary when working with reputable companies. Finally, public access to contract information is crucial in accountability for the contractor and government agency, as well as part of the oversight process before Congress and citizens.18 Human Capital The third lesson learned, beyond requirements and contract guidelines, is that contract management success or failure, defined by the final product delivery and level of wasteful spending, hinges on the skill of the personnel managing the awards. To start, managers must have a clear launch plan for the office in order to be ready to receive, train, and deploy staff.

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Hired personnel that will manage the contracts must have a clear understanding of what their job is so that they are able to execute that job adequately. Staff rotation must create some overlap for new staff to be fully trained and ready for current staff to depart. In addition, the number of staff must be high enough to execute the job from the very beginning of the project. Finally, contractors who will subcontract, which can cause at least 50 percent of the cost of the contract to go to overhead, must be avoided. Abuses of subcontracted workers by contractors may also arise and be difficult to track down and eradicate. Liability and Procedure The fourth lesson learned is that knowing the rules, procedures, and programs that are available for technology should be a priority for any agency managing contracts in order to take advantage of available resources. The government should have a statutory and regulatory framework in place before contracting is considered, both for the protection of the contractor as an incentive to bid and as a protection for the government agency. It is also important to understand that cooperation and collaboration among different government agencies at the local, state, and federal levels may be necessary, and private contracting efforts depend on the leveraged needs, skills, and strengths in that process.19 A GAO report on Katrina contracting noted that excessive time was spent coordinating with other agencies—time that could have been saved if a framework for collaboration was already in place. Such a framework should include plans for communications, common definitions of contract terms, and alignment of responsibilities among key officials.20 CASES OF SUCCESS: FINDING THE RIGHT BUSINESS MODEL As in any public–private partnership, employing contractors in support of homeland security or counterterrorism will work best if the market forces are played to their advantage. Market testing is an integral part of finding the right business model. A market test will enable contractors and agencies to see pricing and performance for the services they wish to make available or of which they wish to take advantage.21 If private contractors are used for security without a good business model backed by investment, the initiative will fail—as will the mission to secure the border from illegal entrants and international threats. Different missions may require different business models. Agencies should look beyond contracting in Iraq and at the Gulf Coast to gain a broader perspective. Airport security policymakers, for example, explored more efficient ways to implement airport security by allowing airports to

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contract out certain aspects of security to private screeners as long as security standards were being met. A few airports are now able to contract out the screening of cargo and passengers, as well as perimeter security.22 In this case, airport security officials are able to focus on risk assessment, regulation, and oversight for the security at their respective airports rather than on building and managing a minifiefdom of screeners, perimeter security enforcers, and so forth. It is important to select the right business model for utilizing private contractors at the border in ways the government has not considered before—such as detention. A small but growing number of communities across the United States are already using private companies to run prison operations on behalf of the federal, state, or local government. These prisons are not their own entities with special authority; instead, the operations of prison management are run under appropriate jurisdictions. The proliferation of private prisons reemerged in the late 1970s after a century of state-run regimes. The government began to lease the operations of juvenile detention facilities to private companies; over 20 years later, private companies run two-thirds of this particular population. Privatization of adult prisons began around the same time in the form of halfway houses, then holding houses for illegal immigrants, and after 1988 spread to medium-security prisons. Today, nearly 200 privately run prisons house incarcerated populations in the United States. The reasons behind privatizing prison operations include rapid accommodation of a growing prison population; restrictions in federal, state, and local budgets for building and operating new prisons; and improvements in prison management in general.23 The government recognized the flexibility that private contractors had to offer, and a similar model for private contractors at the border should be considered. Out of a prison population of 1.5 million, 100,000 state and local prisoners were held in privately run prisons in 2005. As crackdowns on illegal immigration continue, more beds will be needed in detention facilities. Private companies claim that the private sector could easily provide upward of 4,000 beds for detention operations.24 As officials consider the cost of transporting the detainees, as well as facilities for holding detainees, they should also consider increasing the utilization of beds that privately run prisons can provide with more flexibility in the changing environment of detention needs. As the successful privatization of prisons demonstrates, the use of private contracting for a wide range of counterterrorism and homeland security tasks could be very broad. For example, private sector service companies could play a prominent role in border and transportation security or counterterrorism investigations. Surveying what has been done in the recent past reveals the government has done large-scale private contracting before, and it can do it again even

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more cleanly and efficiently. Studies and lists of lessons learned are helpful only if the lessons learned are actually applied and if measures are taken to reevaluate progress and the level of services along the way. Learning the fundamentals of large-scale private contracting gleaned from Iraq and the Gulf Coast, reconstruction in these areas has the potential to enhance other large-scale private contracting in the future, both abroad and in our backyards. These and other lessons learned from the private sector, when applied, could improve the way business is done in the public sector and make for a more effective government overall. The key lesson to be learned for private contracting is to plan. Planning is an essential task that requires significant attention before engaging in a contract. The ability to execute any large-scale private contracting effort lies with choosing the right business model, defining specific and accurate requirements, knowing the situation on the ground, training personnel, and setting up effective mechanisms for oversight, response to oversight, and liability mitigation. In the end, the success or failure of large-scale private contracting lies within this strong framework and the ability of the government to make good choices. Taking cues from other contracting endeavors, private contractors could enable the Department of Homeland Security to meet the security mission at the border with speed, flexibility, and low cost. WHEN SHOULD GOVERNMENT USE CONTRACTORS? Assessing the Value Added by Contractors A sensible starting point for a discussion on when governments should contract with outside entities to support military operations is to evaluate the risks (and benefits) of each decision. A risk-based approach is beneficial because it helps to avoid unnecessary risks as well as incorporates both financial and intangible benefits and drawbacks into the calculation. Risk-benefit analyses are not new in the defense world. For instance, the Joint Field Manual on Risk Management contains a standardized approach to assessing and managing risk, which can be applied to all activities. This risk-based approach should be applied to contractor sourcing decisions. The process consists of five steps. They are (1) identify hazards; (2) assess hazards to determine risk in terms of probability, severity, and risk level; (3) develop ways to mitigate the risks and make decisions about risk; (4) implement the mitigation processes; and (5) supervise and evaluate. To understand these steps, it is necessary to know the field manual’s definitions of “risk” and “hazard.” A “risk” is “the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.”25 A “hazard” is “a condition or activity with potential to cause damage, loss, or mission degradation and any actual

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or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment and property; or mission degradation.”26 Risk and Risk Controls The sourcing question raises some residual concerns. They include (1) the degree to which possible contractor shortfalls could hinder mission success; (2) the safety implications for contractor employees and equipment as well as the presence of contractors during U.S. military operations; (3) resource trade-offs or the effect that money spent on contractors offsets or consumes funds needed to pursue other goals in a resourceconstrained environment; and (4) the impact that using contractors may have on the military’s ability to comply with laws, regulations, and highlevel policy guidance as well as to collect information. Obviously the greater the hazards and risks, the greater the scrutiny and attention is applied to the decision-making process. In making a sourcing decision, it is also important to consider what impact mitigation strategies may have. Some considerations that are likely to affect any sourcing decision include the type of activity; the type or identity of the contractor; the nature of the contingency; the location and the battle phase for the contractor; and the quality of the government oversight of the contractors. When Should the Risk Assessments Occur? If one agrees that a risk-based approach is the correct one for answering the question of when the U.S. government should use contractors, the next question is when should the assessment occur? One answer is that such assessment should support decisions that significantly affect the use of contractors “wherever those decisions occur.”27 A recently published RAND report focusing on Army decision making and contractors suggests that there are five distinct organizational venues where or when the assessments should occur. They include: r Outside the military. Decisions to use contractors are often influenced by Congress’ and the administration’s determination of the appropriate size and operational tempo of military forces.

r Acquisition venues. Policies “the Army uses to choose contractors, design con-

tracts and quality assurance plans, and oversee and support contractors in theater heavily affect the residual risk associated with their use.”28

r Force design and management issues. For instance, when there is a small reserve

component capability, contractors may be used more heavily to avoid continually mobilizing the same group of people.

r System requirement plans. Program planners and leadership may encourage dependence on long-term contractor support, depending on the vision and the

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need for highly skilled support personnel. “More generally, officials use spiral development to field systems early and collect operational data on them from the battlefield to refine their designs over time. This encourages the presence of contractors on the battlefield.”29

r During specific contingencies. Where the government requires a quickly assembled force, it may also require greater contractor support.

The framework articulated in the RAND report has applications for a wide range of defense, homeland security, and counterterrorism programs. Contractor Oversight Once government leaders have determined through a risk-based process that contractors have a role to play in a mission, the IG should become involved. Large-scale government contracts—as the experiences of Iraq and Katrina demonstrated—are often lucrative, and charges of waste, fraud, and abuse are common. By having the IG involved at the beginning of the process, there is a ready oversight body there to report problems while there is time to correct them. In addition, government agencies should consider creating a corps of reserve contracting officers. Such an organization ideally would be identified, recruited, trained in advance, and regularly exercised to meet contracting needs in the aftermath of the crisis or conflict to assist in reconstruction. Having a dedicated reserve component would allow for effective monitoring of contracts, better document execution, and accurate data collection during contingencies and crises. This component would have been useful both in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in Iraq. For instance, “SIGIR found that the shortage of personnel (and the widespread lack of required skill and experience among those available) affected all facets of reconstruction assistance.”30 Dedicated contracting officers and an IG’s presence would also provide greater transparency regarding where contractors are and what they are doing—important things to know for contingency planning and effective management. CONCLUSION Today, policymakers either ignore how their decision making in an area such as end strength will increase the dependence on support from contractors for security missions, or they realize the impact of their decisions on the presence of contractors but do not use a risk-based model for making their decisions. Neither situation is a good one. Contractors often provide vital support in a vast number of ways, including training, logistics,

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and security. In many situations, the decision to use contractors is the correct one. However, these decisions should be made with great care using a process that forces an examination of the risks, mitigation techniques, and benefits provided. Furthermore, when policymakers decide to use contractors, the IG should be involved from the beginning so that there is oversight and transparency in the contracting process, and a reserve contracting corps should manage the contracting. NOTES 1. P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press, 2003), 19. 2. Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2003), 76. 3. The list was adopted from James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2005), 88–89. 4. See, for example, T. Christian Miller, “Where Guarding a Life Hinders Doing the Job,” Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2005, A1. 5. Ibid., 97. 6. L-3 MPRI, “MPRI Our Team,” March 18, 2005, www.mpri.com/site/ our team.html. 7. David Isenberg, “A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq,” September 27, 2004, British American Security Information Council, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/ Research/2004PMC.htm. 8. Ibid. 9. Valerie Bailey Grasso, “Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions About Contracting,” Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2005, 5–6. 10. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation’s Airports, Testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, September 20, 2001. 11. Council on Foreign Relations, Emergency Responders: Dangerously Underfunded, Drastically Unprepared: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), 35. 12. Richard Harding, “Private Prisons,” in Crime and Justice, A Review of Research, ed. Michael Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 275. 13. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., “Police Organization in the Twentieth Century,” in Modern Policing, ed. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 65. 14. Harding, “Private Prisons,” 310. 15. Ibid., 271. 16. Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Hearing on Contracting Issues in Iraq, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, February 7, 2006, 2.

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17. Gregory D. Rothwell, “Statement before House Select Bipartisan Committee,” Testimony before the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, U.S. House of Representatives, November 2, 2005, 8. 18. Harding, “Private Prisons,” 297, 307. 19. Bowen, Hearing on Contracting Issues in Iraq, 10. 20. William T. Woods, “Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts,” Testimony before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 10, 2006, 8. 21. Harding, “Private Prisons,” 299. 22. Robert W. Poole, “Airport Security: Time for a New Model,” Reason Foundation Policy Study 340, January 2006, www.reason.org/ps340.pdf (accessed July 19, 2006). 23. For an excellent historical summary, see Harding, “Private Prisons,” 269. For a more exhaustive history, see Stephen Davis, “The Private Provision of Police During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society (Independent Institute, 2005), 151–181. 24. Meredith Kolodner, “Immigration Enforcement Benefits Prison Firms,” New York Times, July 19, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/07/19/business/19detain. html?hp&ex=1153368000&en=be2dc3fdbe7c848d&ei=5094&partner=homepage (accessed July 19, 2006). 25. U.S. Army Field Manual, “FM 3-100.12: Risk Management,” U.S. Army, 2001, Glossary-4 to Glossary-6. 26. Ibid. 27. Frank Camm and Victoria A. Greenfield, “How Should the Army Use Contractors on the Battlefield?” RAND Arroyo Center, 2005, xx, www.rand.org/pubs/ monographs/2005/RAND MG296.pdf (accessed March 23, 2006). 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., xx–xxii. 30. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Lessons in Human Capital Management (SIGIR, January 2006), 25, www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/ Lessons Learned Feb16.pdf (accessed April 3, 2006).

CHAPTER 11 MANHUNTING: A PROCESS TO FIND PERSONS OF NATIONAL INTEREST Steven M. Marks, Thomas M. Meer, and Matthew T. Nilson

Over the past four years, the U.S. government has drastically shifted its priorities to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Billions of dollars have been spent setting up various counterterrorist centers. Academics and analysts alike have written on the perplexing issues surrounding terrorism and terrorists. Most of this work focuses on how to attack and dismantle networks, the root causes of terrorism, and the psychology behind suicide bombers, resource protection, and the like. However, one of the most important aspects of the war on terror—finding and apprehending Persons of National Interest (PONI)1 , who in the GWOT case are Islamic terrorists—has received virtually no serious strategic thought. This, in part, is because the U.S. government has not effectively analyzed the manhunting paradigm. Although the U.S. government saw initial successes in Afghanistan, the senior al Qaeda leadership—namely Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri—have avoided capture. With all the resources available to the U.S. government and its allies, they still have had only limited success in locating and capturing these men. One reason why these terrorists remain at large stems from the government’s inability to adapt and understand its enemy. For a variety of reasons, U.S. governmental agencies continue to rely on traditional cold war methods. But these rules do not necessarily apply to the nonconventional threats posed by terrorists. Thus, new doctrines, processes, and methodologies must be developed and

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implemented if the United States is going to make headway in defeating this new enemy. The following chapter creates a formalized framework and a manhunting process based on law enforcement investigative methods, which is traditionally developed during on-the-job training (OJT). APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS For the past four years, intelligence analysts have carefully reviewed incoming intelligence messages for clues that could reveal the location of the world’s most infamous terrorists. These analysts conduct detailed link and social network analysis (SNA) on the basis of available classified information and closely analyze messages to determine who is talking to whom, how long they converse, and what is discussed. This information is used to gain additional insights into the al Qaeda terrorist network’s structure. The hope is that analysis of known or suspected terrorist links will reveal an informal hierarchy, enabling the targeting of key personnel in the network, which could disrupt current and future al Qaeda operations. With that in mind, an examination of the intelligence community’s current framework is necessary to identify any shortcomings in the intelligence analysts’ methodology. The first step in understanding why a new methodology is needed involves an understanding of how the U.S. counterterrorism community currently maps fugitive networks and the problems with that method. Since the September 11 attacks, the U.S. intelligence counterterrorism community has shown a great deal of interest in the applications of SNA for tracking and targeting terrorists. Managers within the intelligence community have aggressively sought out experts and developed software tools to conduct SNA, while at the same time instructing their subordinates to build large databases of information to analyze. Unfortunately, this approach creates an organizational chart based on a predetermined template. Given this outdated approach, analysts construct and implement message filters that seek out specific information from intelligence messages to create a picture of the enemy and his organization. This system usually involves taking incoming classified message traffic and filtering out clues as to which individuals are subordinate to whom and how the organization interacts operationally. Although intelligence analysts are attempting to capture all the information about fugitives, they are coming up short for four reasons. First, the system used by intelligence analysts is rooted in a cold war mentality, which lacks the flexibility for dealing with the current asymmetric and dynamic nature of terrorists.2 Terrorists generally operate in cellular networks, which are more likely to be flat and horizontal rather then vertical organizations.3 Horizontal structures negate the value of looking for

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specific chains of command, which are either not present or ambiguous in nature. Also, horizontal structures grant the fugitive a greater degree of flexibility in interacting with other collaborators. Specifically, the fugitives will interact with those individuals who can help them with a particular problem. Therefore, the fugitives’ decisions are contextually based upon their needs at a given time and place and under circumstances that prevent them from following traditional hierarchal patterns such as those used by standard military commands. Since these patterns are irregular, they are not likely to be captured by a hierarchical construct. Second, analysts often ignore open-source information. The bias toward classified information likely stems from the days when the little information known about the Soviet Union was collected through official government assets. As a result, analysts depended on classified intelligence collection assets to fulfill almost all information requirements. However, analysts can now access a great deal of information about PONIs from online sources such as Web sites, blogs, and chat rooms. Furthermore, journalists can provide useful information because they have greater access to a broad range of different individuals, groups, and organizations, many of whom use the media to spread propaganda. Unfortunately, most analysts continue to ignore open sources for information on fugitives. Third, the current fugitive framework concentrates only on the operational network and does not capture the fugitives’ entire social network, built over the course of their lifetime. Given this situation, a large amount of information is typically missing on the fugitives’ religious, educational, political, military, criminal, and economic associations. In Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks, Brinton Milward and Joerg Raab highlight this point for al Qaeda, stating, “Unlike the drug smuggling networks, the membership of al Qaida seems to be quite diverse in terms of ethnic, national, and social background. Operatives are from a variety of countries, born Muslims and converts, highly educated men from middle class or upper class families to petty criminals with only limited education.”4 Given these wide-ranging differences, the current system fails to capture the complex nature of these relationships. Also, as terrorism researcher Valdis Krebs recently observed, “Conspirators don’t form many ties outside of their immediate cluster and often minimize the activation of existing ties inside the network. Strong ties between prior contacts, which were frequently formed years ago in school and training camps, keep the cells linked. Yet, unlike normal social networks, these strong ties remain mostly dormant and therefore hidden to outsiders.”5 Therefore, analysts have no way of knowing if the fugitives have developed strong relationships through their past activities, since these bonds do not appear in recent intelligence reports. As mentioned before, the horizontal structure of terrorist networks allows fugitives to

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activate latent relationships, which baffles intelligence analysts and prevents collection assets from identifying additional associates. Fourth, social network analysis suffers from an inherent flaw due to reliance on complete information. Specifically, traditional SNA relies on an a priori knowledge of relationships, but without complete information social network analysis is limited in its effectiveness. Most fugitives who are members of transnational criminal groups—such as terrorist organizations, drug traffickers, and illegal arms dealers—operate in an opaque environment. Their clandestine network’s cellular structure is developed to prevent information from being gathered on the organization. As a result, any type of useful analysis must be conducted with incomplete information. Consequently, what intelligence analysts need most is a map to identify areas of missing information, which will enable analysts to construct a more complete picture of the fugitive’s support network. The key to developing such a map requires an integrated framework, process, and methodology specifically designed to identify missing information. As described later in this chapter, we call this integrated approach Nexus Topography (NT). INVESTIGATIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES In April 2005, the largest national fugitive dragnet ever, code-named Operation Falcon, arrested nearly 10,500 fugitives in the space of just a week, the result of a massive push by the U.S. Marshals service, the oldest of the federal law enforcement agencies. Although the U.S. Marshals average over 100 fugitive arrests each week, the agency wanted to see how much further it could go. By closely collaborating with the police from all 50 states—with more than 3,000 law enforcement officials from 206 state law enforcement agencies, 302 county sheriff’s departments, and 366 city police departments—the U.S. Marshal service increased its apprehension rate by nearly eight times its usual weekly record. Officials said fugitives were tracked in every state, including Puerto Rico and Guam.6 Several factors explain the success of the U.S. Marshals. First, the ability to coordinate a massive manhunt of this size requires thorough planning and exceptional intra-agency coordination across local, state, and federal levels. Second, of those apprehended during Operation Falcon, 70 percent had prior arrests for violent crimes, meaning the marshals already had a booking sheet filled out on each felon, detailing the arrestee’s name, address, biometrics, aliases, and so on. Furthermore, the standard operating procedure for first-time felons prior to entering a detention facility is to have them fill out a questionnaire to determine which prison cells should be off limits, given certain ethnic, gang, and religious affiliations. Firsttime offenders consider this questionnaire necessary to their survival because it is supposed to guarantee that they do not share a cell or floor with

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rival gang members. The questionnaire is quite specific and probes about information on ethnicity, gang affiliation, languages, relatives, business acquaintances, girlfriends, wives, and children. All answers also require a last-known address. No less critical to the U.S. Marshals’ success has been the fact that their dedicated hunter teams are granted the authority to pursue a fugitive across jurisdictional boundaries. The team is thus able to build intimate knowledge of the fugitive’s behavior at levels not possible for jurisdictionally limited law enforcement agencies. These three significant factors provide the U.S. Marshals the capability to apprehend fugitives at the local, state, and federal levels. The U.S. Marshals’ best practices, therefore, are worth attention. So, too, are those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), bounty hunters, and private investigators. By studying an array of tactics, techniques, and procedures used by the most successful manhunters, an overall manhunting methodology emerges. Such an investigative process includes identifying possible hiding locations or pinpointing individuals in the fugitive’s support structure who can help locate wanted felons. As Bob Burton, the United States’ leading and most feared bounty hunter notes, “Ultimately, your search will lead you to the two stars of this trade: the fugitive and the Judas who betrays him.”7 Commonalities seem to exist among all types of manhunting, whether the hunter is pursuing a common criminal, an international fugitive, or a terrorist. Fugitives tend to choose one of three types of places to avoid capture. The fugitives’ first choice is to typically ask friends or family to hide them and provide them money and support. Second, they gravitate to areas that are culturally familiar and to people among whom they feel comfortable. Third, fugitives sometimes settle down in a dense urban area where they can hide in plain sight. There are also two general fugitive scenarios. The first is planned flight—the fugitives know that they are being pursued by authorities because they have committed a crime, jumped bail, or escaped from prison. Often, these types of fugitives have coordinated support and have access to identification cards, driver’s licenses, and passports. The second is unplanned flight—those fugitives who are given an unexpected opportunity to escape or who have committed an extemporaneous crime. In this situation, the fugitives have not coordinated a support mechanism to facilitate their escape. The second situation does not allow the fugitives to consciously plan an escape. For this reason it is imperative that the search begin immediately before the fugitives have time to access any support. Putting immediate pressure on the fugitives causes stress, allows the hunter team to capitalize on the fugitives’ mistakes, and improves the chances of capture. The fugitives will try to minimize their level of risk by relocating to suitable areas with access to food and water, or at least areas that are

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favorable for their survival. They will try to assimilate into the community by either blending in or making themselves invisible. Often, fugitives engage in “risk management” strategies, trying to reduce the risk of being captured. Several case studies reveal fugitives who have avoided contact with friends, relatives, and associates, thereby changing their behavioral patterns and decreasing their predictability. Of the fugitives that do get captured, some are usually caught because they have a bad habit that can be exploited or they leave an easy-to-follow signature. Understanding the basics of investigative work allows the investigator to ask the right questions of an intelligence analyst and of potential sources. Coordinating and conducting investigations through detecting and collecting physical evidence and identifying, locating, and interviewing witnesses, victims, targets, and other third-party sources of information to compile facts, evidence, and opinions pertinent to the investigation sounds like a lot of work, but this ultimately leads to locating the fugitives. However, even the first step, understanding what is in a name, can help narrow the scope of the search. For instance, the Asian Gang Task Force Commander for the San Francisco police department must know the proper spelling of a fugitive’s name and the way the full name is arranged (first and last name) prior to beginning an investigation in order to accurately search both U.S. and Chinese databases for possible leads. Collecting information to build a fugitive’s profile, to include names and aliases, date of birth, a physical description, pictures or sketches, and documentation (passports, social security numbers, birth certificates, driver’s licenses, voter registration card, etc.) points the investigator in the right direction. An investigator will start with the fugitive’s last-known location and work backward, interviewing friends, relatives, and neighbors, making sure to ask questions about the fugitive’s personal preferences, especially relating to women and favorite hangouts. By asking questions about the fugitive’s personal habits, routines, and preferred locations (home, office, and bars) the investigator is determining “comfort zones.” Fugitives tend to return to these comfort zones or places of familiarity because they feel safe and at ease. If the fugitive rides a Harley Davidson, frequents biker bars, and is covered in tattoos, then there is a reasonable chance the fugitive will not be found in an upper middle-class section of town or playing golf at the local country club. For a fugitive from the Middle East or Southwest Asia, understanding the tribe, clan, and village where the fugitive is from helps the hunter narrow the search. In his book, Hunting the Jackal, former Special Forces Sergeant Major and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative Billy Waugh shares his 55 years of experience hunting international fugitives, including Carlos the Jackal (aka Illich Rameriz-Sanchez). Key lessons Waugh conveys are as follows: Know the environment better than your prey, and know your fugitive, the fugitive’s operational profile, and behavioral patterns.

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Pinpoint areas that are suitable for the fugitive, while establishing surveillance points to detect activity. Establish positive identification of the fugitive, and detect and observe enabler activities and patterns. After observing the fugitive’s activity patterns, determine where the fugitive has established safe houses and hide sites. Begin surveillance on the fugitive’s safe houses, hide sites, and the fugitive’s enablers’ activities and homes. Recognizing what habits and addictions the fugitive has may help identify how and where the fugitive is vulnerable. It was, in fact, Carlos the Jackal’s excessive drinking that helped Billy Waugh and his team find Carlos. During a drinking binge, Carlos waved a pistol at a shopkeeper, and Sudanese authorities were forced to detain him for disorderly conduct. After Hassan al-Turabi agreed to Carlos’s release, Carlos made a phone call to his bodyguard Tarek, who was then directed to come to Khartoum to protect or prevent Carlos from getting into any more trouble. When Carlos’s bodyguard arrived at the Khartoum airport, he was whisked away by the government’s secret police. Unfortunately, the CIA team conducting surveillance at the airport was unable to follow the bodyguard. The team then began searching places where foreigners were known to stay and, as luck would have it, the CIA team located Tarek in a hotel. The team immediately began surveillance on Tarek and identified the car that he drove. The other major break in the search occurred when Tarek’s car was spotted near a hospital. The team immediately began surveillance on the hospital, which is where Carlos was finally spotted. Unknown to the CIA team at the time, Carlos had genital warts, which required frequent treatments.8 In this case, it was a string of events brought about by the fugitive’s addictive behavior, which enabled the team to successfully locate the fugitive. Essential in finding Carlos was identifying his means of transportation. Determining certain modes of travel available to fugitives and which ones they prefer allows the investigator to identify possible locations and patterns of movement. Technology can assist by providing a physical description of the fugitives even five, ten, and fifteen years after they have been sighted. Often fugitives lose or gain weight on the basis of their comfort level. Carlos, for instance, gained 30 to 40 pounds in Khartoum and grew a thick moustache. But image enhancement technology enabled investigators to anticipate these changes in his appearance. It seems paramount to build the behavioral profile of the fugitives before deciding to spend millions of dollars moving personnel to investigate and before shifting collection assets to increase spying capability. Figuring out what terrifies or worries the fugitives and what their normative versus adaptive behavior is will also assist, when the time comes, to apply some external pressure to influence their decision making. Databases such as Choice Point or AutoTrack are an inexpensive way to begin the process of locating a PONI inside the United States, but

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the same kind of information can be found overseas. What makes these two systems unique is their ability to search public records nationwide and link together their many scattered bits and pieces of information into an electronic dossier, or profile, of an individual. Just by searching for a name, the investigator can obtain current and past addresses, telephone numbers, social security number, date of birth, and, more importantly, information regarding friends and neighbors. Local law enforcement officers will usually not only conduct an investigation on a suspected criminal, but also run background checks on the individual’s neighbors. Most likely, the neighbors are aware of the individual’s criminal activity and may even be affiliated with this criminal behavior. Law enforcement databases cross-reference a massive amount of publicly available data, including addresses, driver’s licenses, property deed transfers, and corporate information.9 Most private investigators and bounty hunters use databases like these as a starting point for most searches because they are short-term solutions, given limited amounts of time and money. In most cases, especially in countries ruled by authoritarian governments, there are court houses or places where important documents and records are kept. In remote areas, the village chief will often maintain these records in order to settle land disputes or family feuds. Likewise, if an international fugitive ever attended a university, there should be a record of the fugitive’s attendance, along with rosters of fellow classmates. Getting to this information is easier than expected because most universities have faculty from other countries that might provide this information for a small fee. Finally, the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which is a database that collects and discloses information from other law enforcement agencies about crimes and criminals, is a popular source of information for those in law enforcement. The data contained in the NCIC is supplied by the FBI and the local, state, federal, and foreign criminal justice departments.10 Every application, database, or piece of paper may hold a critical missing piece to the puzzle. The most important aspect in investigative work is identifying potential sources, analyzing the nature and depth of their relationships with the fugitives and their relationships with other family members and business associates. According to the Los Angeles U.S. Marshals Task Force Commander, Chief Inspector John Clark, it is all about knowing “who’s who in the zoo.” Key tasks include locating and interviewing a fugitive’s spouse, children, significant others (current and past), parents and siblings, friends, business and criminal associates, neighbors, vendors, and, most important, enemies. Capitalizing on weaknesses or character flaws of those in the “zoo,” the investigator can pit one against another. Many times a fugitive’s wife has no idea she is not the fugitive’s only love. She may have much to disclose once she is told she is not the only one he slept with. The same can be said about business partners or criminal

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associates; often they are unaware the fugitive has fled or even committed a crime. It is also important to adapt investigative techniques and approaches to circumstances, on the basis of who is being interviewed or put under surveillance. Prior to interviewing a witness or informant, the questions need to be prepared and likely responses anticipated. Along with this it is critical to have counterresponses that can be supported with facts. Because it is possible to give more than they will get, investigators must be mindful to direct the questions and stay focused and on track. It helps to know the answers to as many questions as possible before they are asked. Once the interview is over, it is then vital to conduct surveillance on financial transactions and voice intercepts and review physical tracking to identify responses to contact and changes in patterns. Questioning witnesses and informants may require some aggressive behavior from the investigators. This includes checking to see whether there is an existing warrant for the fugitive’s arrest, which can lead to parole and probation searches, and if enough probable cause exists, then this could yield a search warrant, which would enable the investigators to gather still more personal information. A common error for the investigators is to allow a preconceived theory about a case to dictate the direction of the investigation. Everyone has a tendency to allow cognitive biases to creep into the way a problem is perceived instead of analyzing all the information and discounting none. For instance, because everyone has been saying for years that Osama bin Laden is in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, we ignore all other evidence suggesting anything different. Another mistake is to allow external actors such as informants, media, and other law enforcement agencies to dictate the direction of the investigation. Relying too much on intelligence that has been over-diluted or over-filtered by other investigators and analysts tends to lead the pursuer down the wrong path. It is imperative for the lead investigator to know all the details and behaviors of the fugitive and to understand who are potentially involved in hiding and abetting the fugitive—who they are and what they do—in order to look for patterns and changes in their behavior. The investigators should never discount or overlook the obvious. An informant with the correct answer could be staring you in the face, even though the informant may not look the part, speak the language, or meet the criteria normally associated with knowing important things. Individuals such as this represent the “golden nuggets” that can change the entire direction of the pursuit. Persistence, patience, resilience, adaptability, and creativity are the keys to successfully pursuing a fugitive. Quickly recognizing the fugitive’s avoidance strategies and capitalizing on mistakes made by the fugitive’s associates can help in closing in on the fugitive’s location. Maintaining a

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level of awareness, keying in on patterns and changes to patterns allows the investigators to be more aggressive in their search. Effectively using traditional investigative techniques and manipulating witnesses and informants, while also understanding and using technology to their advantage, can only increase the level of success for the investigators. Taking a proactive approach to pursuing a fugitive and applying intense pressure will often force the fugitive into the open. The best investigators anticipate the fugitive’s mistakes—the pursuer may make many mistakes, but the fugitive need only make one mistake to be caught. A MANHUNTING FRAMEWORK The U.S. government’s effectiveness in manhunting overseas calls into question the government’s ability to learn from its domestic manhunting successes. The apparent lack of a suitable framework may be one reason why the U.S. military only achieves occasional successes in manhunting operations. That is, without a framework to properly conceptualize the problem, most of the pertinent information that impacts manhunting could be easily overlooked or mislabeled. Further, the military’s development of systems and tools, which are thought to assist in solving the manhunting problem, could in fact exacerbate the situation—leading to excessive costs, misleading information, and false conclusions. Only with a proper framework can a problem be properly identified. The following example serves to illustrate this point. In Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richard Heuer explains how judgment is affected by the lack of a proper framework.11 Heuer describes an experiment in which experienced mechanics were given a diagram (“fault tree” in psychology) that showed them all the reasons why a car would not start. “The tree had seven major branches—insufficient battery charge, defective starting system, defective ignition system, defective fuel system, other engine problems, mischievous acts or vandalism, and all other problems—and a number of subcategories under each branch.”12 The first group of mechanics was shown a complete tree and asked to identify 100 reasons for the car not starting. The mechanics were then asked to associate each one of the 100 causes with one of the seven major branches of the fault tree. The second group of mechanics, meanwhile, was shown a partial fault tree with only four major branches (to include a branch labeled “all other potential causes”). The goal of the experiment was to determine how sensitive the test subjects were to incomplete information. The theory behind the experiment was that if the mechanics were sensitive to the missing information, then the second group would choose the “other problems” category for faults associated with the three missing branches. But, the results of the experiment showed that the “other problems” category was chosen only half as often as predicted, indicating that

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the mechanics who were shown the incomplete tree were unable to fully recognize and incorporate into their judgments the fact that some of the causes for the car not starting were missing. When the same experiment was run with nonmechanics, the effect of the missing branches was even greater.13 This experiment illustrates how the lack of a framework can prevent an accurate in-depth analysis of a problem, suggesting that the lack of a framework for finding fugitives may also prevent military planners from adequately addressing the unique problems associated with capturing fugitives. For example, take the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) hunt for Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) leader Khadaffy Janjalani. On July 5, 2003, Janjalani and 30 Abu Sayyaf members on board two outrigger boats arrived in Barangay Libua, Palimbang Town, Sultan Kudarat, in Southern Mindanao. The AFP immediately dispatched the 601st Infantry Brigade to the area to capture Janjalani. Yet, during the 601st’s five-month deployment to the region, Janjalani was able to avoid capture while operating in a very narrow and limited zone (a 10-km-by-6-km zone). Even though the 601st made careful plans and developed friendly courses of action to apprehend Janjalani, the AFP still failed to apprehend him.14 The AFP framed the problem in conventional military terms and relied too heavily on technology-based intelligence collection platforms provided by the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). Upon receiving U.S. intelligence information, the AFP began its planning cycle, arrayed its units, determined likely avenues of approach, and maneuvered its forces to engage the target. However, the 601st brigade and the JSOTF-P never fully understood the fugitive’s strategies to avoid being captured and never looked to the ASG’s possible deception techniques. These oversights were contributing factors in the AFP’s failure to apprehend this rebel group. Further, the absence of a manhunting framework led the 601st brigade to the incorrect conclusion about why the AFP was unable to capture Khadaffy Janjalani—the lack of timely actionable intelligence. Although U.S. and Philippine military planners blamed their failures on slow intelligence, closer examination reveals that key planners did not understand fugitive apprehension strategies. The 601st brigade was never able to operate inside the fugitive’s decision cycle and predict Janjalani’s next move.15 The lack of a framework or the wrong framework often leads planners, decision makers, and analysts down avenues that fail to resolve the problem or accomplish the mission. Two fundamentally different problems exist in hunting PONIs: (1) finding and apprehending known PONIs and (2) identifying and apprehending unknown criminals, terrorists, or their supporters. However, in the case of unknown criminals or terrorist elements, what becomes essential is finding latent perpetrators and facilitators who are found in fixed locations but who strive to conceal their relationships and activities. These

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clandestine networks may be difficult to track and identify using technical collection means, primarily because these technical systems are designed to detect observable signatures. Yet, these systems can be easily deceived by false signals or overwhelmed by excessive signals. Further, for these technical collection means to work, they must be able to detect patterns of behavior and interactions between individuals. Few technical systems are designed to identify how relationships are formed between individuals, when these relationships are formed, or how strong these relationships are or have been. Meanwhile, if these relationships are unobservable using technical means, the network is able to function below the surface, which offers it still greater freedom of movement. To gain a better understanding of the specific fugitive being sought, one needs a system of categorization. Through our analysis of numerous case studies, we have developed three preliminary categories: Type A— individual criminals; Type B—persons who are members of an organization; and Type C—deposed government leaders. For instance, fugitives such as Eric Rudolph, the 1996 Olympic bomber, or Mir Amal Kasi, the individual who fired upon CIA headquarters, are characteristic Type-A fugitives. These individuals are not part of any nefarious organization or government entity. Yet, they can destroy infrastructure and disrupt governmental functions. They may or may not fall under the responsibility of the local police or federal authorities but are generally a responsibility of law enforcement. The interesting phenomenon behind Type-A fugitives is that they can find sanctuary from prosecution in foreign countries. Type-A PONIs usually do not pose a direct threat to national security, but as technology evolves, these same individuals may become better positioned to challenge national security in the near future. The key thing that separates Type-A from either Type-B or Type-C individuals is that Type-A individuals don’t have an organization or robust support structure supporting or guiding their activities. Unless they are independently wealthy, their resources tend to be limited. They are predominantly concerned with survival, not with achieving any strategic objective or maintaining power. Type-B PONIs are individuals associated with a nefarious nonstate organization or network. Type-B individuals include members of crime syndicates or mafias, insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and drug cartels. Individuals who operate in organizations or networks of this type can be further subdivided into those who belong to the leadership core, operators, and supporters. Hunting individuals who belong to criminal organizations, terrorist networks, or insurgent groups may be considered both a law enforcement activity and a mission to protect national security. Manhunts for such individuals may fall within the scope of multiple government agencies. What truly separates Type-B individuals from the Type-A lone actor is that organizations have objectives and a robust support structure, whereas individuals have limited support structures and

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the finite goal of survival. Group survival is important for Type-B PONIs, but to be successful the group must recruit members and must have an objective besides pure survival. Type-C individuals are government leaders, their cronies, and their supporters. Saddam Hussein, Radovan Karadic, and Manuel Noriega are classic examples of Type-C PONIs. What differentiates a Type-C from a TypeA or Type-B individual is that Type-C persons have recently been in power and can utilize government resources. Also, prior to becoming fugitives, these individuals typically have armed forces and government assets at their disposal to protect them and their regime. Although these individuals may be indicted, law enforcement is usually unable to make an arrest without the help of larger national assets—law enforcement does not have the military might to bring these individuals to justice. The Type-C person typically requires manhunts conducted by military or paramilitary units, and executive-level approval must be secured before this type of operation is conducted. The nature of the Type-C individual also differs in an important regard from Type-A or Type-B PONIs and is exemplified by Saddam Hussein. That is, individuals in power do not want to lose power. Leaders tend to hold on to their status well after their regime has fallen, and fortunately for the manhunters, the leader’s decision to evade is often made well after the invading military has gained significant area control. The comparison between these three different categories of PONIs accentuates another factor that affects the location and apprehension of individuals—control of the search space. Type-A, Type-B, and Type-C individuals interact differently with their environment. In some cases, the PONI has sovereign control; in others the hunter has control. The ability to control the search space is critical. In Iraq, for instance, the environment went from not being controlled by coalition forces to being semi-controlled. An environment can be considered permissive, semipermissive, or nonpermissive for the hunter. The same applies to the PONI. It is often difficult to measure or quantify how permissive an environment is, and for the purposes of manhunting this may not be necessary. What is more important is to understand the relationship between the hunter, the evader or PONI, and the environment. That is to say, who controls the search space? If the hunters conduct a search that is external to their area of responsibility, then they may be at a disadvantage. On the other hand, if they control the area of search, their chances of success increase. In many of the most pressing cases, the United States does not have jurisdiction over the area where PONIs are hiding, which means these individuals live and operate in a country that may or may not assist the U.S. government with their apprehension. Sometimes the U.S. government has an extradition treaty with the country where the fugitives are, and extraditions serve as a useful means for law enforcement agencies to apprehend

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Table 11.1 Manhunting Characterization Table (Case Study Examples) Manhunting Categories Type-A: Individual Type-B: Organizational I. Core Leadership II. Operators III. Supporters Type C: Government Leaders

Nonpermissive (not-controlled space) Mir Amal Kasi al Qaeda Osama bin Laden Muhammad Atef Yassin al-Qadi (financier) Radovan Karadic

Permissive (controlled space) Eric Rudolph Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) Donald DeFreeze William Harris / Patty Hearst Miki & Jack Scott, rented a house to the SLA Saddam Hussein

individuals who flee. But, for extraditions to be successful, the individual must be caught, and this often assumes that the foreign government has the resources, dedication, and political will to find and apprehend the fugitive. In some situations, the political context is such that a foreign government may actually assist in a rendition—the informal transfer of a prisoner to another country. In some cases, and especially in Type-C manhunts, the U.S. government chooses a course of action that changes the rules of the game. For instance, the hunt for Saddam Hussein would normally be characterized as a nonpermissive manhunt, but after the U.S. invasion and defeat of the Iraqi military, the United States gained military control of Iraq. Hence, the U.S. military had internal control of the search space where Saddam was hiding, which increased the likelihood of capture. In comparison, Radovan Karadic, former leader of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb Army general wanted for war crimes, are believed to be living in southeastern Bosnia or Serbia. According to a BBC report, Carla Del Ponte, the United Nation’s chief war crimes prosecutor, believed in September 2001 that Mladic was in Serbia,16 and this was later confirmed by a high-ranking Serbian government official who remains anonymous. If, in fact, these former Bosnian Serb leaders are in Serbia, then SFOR—the stabilization force in Bosnia-Herzegovina—cannot be said to fully occupy the search space and this search has to be considered a nonpermissive search. Table 11.1 offers an illustration of different types of manhunts. The table shows the type of person being pursued and the type of control the U.S. government had in each case. Type-B individuals are further labeled as leaders, operators, or supporters, since their operational characteristics impact the manhunt differently.

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A MANHUNTING PROCESS Understanding the fugitive’s strategy to avoid capture creates the foundation for understanding the fugitive’s decision-making process. The fugitive’s decisions are based on four apprehension avoidance criteria: familiarity, survivability, safety, and vulnerability. When the fugitive asks, “Where do I go to hide?” these four criteria help to frame the fugitive’s choices. Familiarity, the first criterion, refers to the level of comfort or intimacy a fugitive feels when in a particular geographical area. This familiarity can be based on prior visits to a location, close associates who live in an area, or a shared ethnolinguistic identity. The premise here is that every individual has a cognitive bias toward “comfort zones.” For instance, persons who have spent their entire lives in an urban area may find it difficult to live in a jungle because they have not developed the necessary skills to operate effectively in that environment. This cognitive bias may or may not be cultural; a cultural bias is one by which individuals interpret information according to their cultural orientation. Fugitives may well suffer from a phenomenon termed “location familiarity effect” (LFE). LFE is a cognitive bias where people express a propensity to go to places where they have been before. Therefore, the LFE would predict that fugitives will prefer to hide in locations that are familiar. When PONIs make a decision about where to go, their decision is limited by their experiences, to include the sum of the locations they have visited. Yet, how do PONIs know whether they will be safe or have the necessary life support to survive? Again, the LFE likely plays an important role. Fugitives should choose locations where they already know or feel they can survive and be safe. When fugitives go to a location where they have limited or no knowledge, then their level of uncertainty is bound to be high. As the fugitives’ level of uncertainty increases so, too, does the level of risk that they must be willing to accept. If they go to a location about which they have limited knowledge, their level of uncertainty is higher, and hence their level of risk will also be higher. Although different individuals have varying degrees of risk tolerance, fugitives should always try to minimize their uncertainty, ergo the LFE. Essentially, the PONIs’ mental map constrains their potential hiding locations. These constraints or cognitive biases are greatly influenced by the number and varying types of places they have previously visited. On rare occasions, certain fugitives are able to disassociate themselves from their previous life. However, this takes a tremendous psychological toll on the fugitives. Few fugitives are able to break all contacts from their previous life because of the immense psychological strain. For example, when Eric Rudolph was finally apprehended after five years on the run, he was very cooperative with local law enforcement—not something you would expect from such a notorious fugitive. According to Kathleen Walls, the

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author of Manhunt: The Eric Rudolph Story, “The jail administrator, Joe Morris, was surprised at the prisoner’s good manners.”17 A possible reason why Rudolph was so well behaved could have to do with his psychological state and the impact severing his social ties had; this may well have weakened his resolve. It is important to note that severing social ties is difficult for most fugitives. Most fugitives tend to maintain some type of contact with members of their social network, even if this is only limited. So long as fugitives are unwilling to depart from their previous relationships and normative behaviors, their cognitive biases will help delimit their decisions. In addition, a fugitive’s decisions are also restricted by a survivability criterion. Survivability is the ability of a fugitive to operate and live in a certain geographical space. For instance, a fugitive must have food, water, medical supplies, and shelter to survive. Without these basic necessities, a fugitive will be forced to move to another location to fulfill these basic survival requirements. However, survivability expands past simple life support when we consider fugitives who belong to organizations—members of terrorist groups, drug cartels, gangs, and mafias who attempt to avoid capture and prosecution while maintaining a link to the organizations. Organizational fugitives require, and can acquire, other types of support. For instance, they need a means to communicate and coordinate activities, transportation to conduct business, personnel and equipment to support operations, and a financial infrastructure for requisitions. In other words, both Type-A and Type-B PONIs tend to access support networks to receive different types and degrees of support. Consequently, Type-A and Type-B PONIs will not choose locations where they cannot live and operate. Support networks not only provide physical goods, but can also provide early warning and physical security. Security is another term used to describe safety, which is the condition of being free from danger or risk. For fugitives, safety includes the degree or likelihood of apprehension avoidance. What helps to mitigate high levels of risk is the support of a trusted network that provides the PONIs with protection. The trust network is comprised of individuals who reside inside the PONIs’ larger support network and have intimate knowledge of the PONIs’ exact location and provide them with the necessary safety to avoid being captured. Generally speaking, fugitives are more likely to trust an individual with whom they have long-standing ties, which have been tested in moments of danger, and ties with a considerable moral component. If the fugitives’ trust network is neutralized, then their ability to evade decreases significantly. For instance, as Saddam Hussein’s trusted associates were apprehended, Saddam’s trust network began to dissolve, which forced him to rent protection.18 By identifying a PONI’s trust network, the investigator or intelligence analyst can potentially correlate individuals to locations, which can potentially reveal the fugitive’s hiding location.

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The final criterion is vulnerability. Vulnerability is slightly different from safety in that safety is a condition provided by a trust network, whereas vulnerability is more a measure of the hunter’s access—a subject discussed previously. Some fugitives gravitate toward areas where they don’t feel vulnerable to capture. They may not have a robust support or trust network, but the lack of accessibility by the hunters ensures their freedom. Vulnerability, basically, is dictated by where the hunters operate. Certain legal and political constraints limit the physical space where the hunters can look for the fugitives. These constraints limit the time, location, and manner of a search. Furthermore, vulnerability can be geographically represented on a map. While vulnerability may seem easy for the hunters to map because they have perfect knowledge of where and how they operate, they must try to map the fugitives’ assumptions about their (the hunters’) locations and methods. That is, the hunters must make estimations on the basis of the level of information they believe the fugitives have on their (the hunters’) capabilities and accessibility. The four criteria mentioned above are the product of a five-step manhunting process, which is represented in the input-output model in Figure 11.1 below. The five steps of the manhunting process are as follows: (1) conduct an initial background investigation via research; (2) build a social profile; (3) identify the support network; (4) analyze the hunter’s constraints and limitations; and (5) conduct analysis of competing hypotheses. This manhunting process is iterative and structures the problem so as to remove certain biases from the search operation. This analytical process provides better resolution as to a fugitive’s possible locations by limiting preestablished beliefs about the fugitive’s behavior or hiding location. Step 1, the initial background investigation, enables the analyst or investigator to identify facts and assumptions about the fugitive. During the initial investigation, the analyst develops a historical timeline listing dates and locations where the fugitive has been. During this step, the analyst also builds an initial social network to include a family tree of the fugitive and a list of classmates. Certain assumptions can be made about the fugitive, but these assumptions will need to be verified. Step 1 concludes with developing an information request list to solicit information missing from the initial investigation. Step 2 then develops the fugitive’s identity by asking several questions: Who is the fugitive? What are the fugitive’s “communities of interest” and “communities of locality”? “Communities of interest” include affiliations based on hobbies, skills, and interests, while “communities of locality” define fugitives according to where they are from or where they have lived. These communities can be represented on a map as a social profile distribution overlay. Mapping these communities can also suggest other areas to search for more information about a fugitive’s potential social networks.

Apply Nexus Template

Step 1.

Develop Initial Historical Timeline

Familiarity (Place or Person)

Conduct Initial Background Investigation / Research

Build initial Social Network

•
•
Communities of Identity

Profile Distribution Overlay “Comfort Zones”


Step 2.

Identify Build Social Profile (Nexus Topography)

Identify Potential Trust Network

•
•
Communities of Locality Information & Intelligence Requests

Information & Intelligence Requests

Types of Support

Step 3. Network Support Overlay

Type A ID Support Network ID Type of Fugitive

Type B (I, II, III)

ID Support Requirements

“Who can provide this support and Where”


Type C

Identify Support Network Information & Intelligence Requests

Familiarity

Step 5.

Safety Analysis Of Competing Hypothesis

Step 4. ID Composition & Disposition of Assets

Accessibility Overlay

Vulnerability

Identify Hunter’s Constraints & Limitations

ID Asset Capabilities

Figure 11.1 The Manhunting Process

Survivability

Detectability Index

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Identifying the support network is the third step in the manhunting process. Step 3 considers the different types of PONIs—for example, Type-A (individual), Type-B (organizational), or Type-C (deposed state leaders). Each PONI type will require different forms of support to survive, conduct operations, and avoid capture. After identifying the various support requirements, the analyst can identify specific individuals from the fugitive’s social network who are likely to fulfill the fugitive’s support requirements. The fourth step in the process requires hunters to analyze their own capabilities and leads to the development of an accessibility overlay and detection index. The accessibility overlay graphically represents the hunter’s area of operations, and the detection index identifies what the hunter can observe. The detection index examines different types of intelligence collection platforms and identifies what the hunter can or cannot detect with those collection assets. This analysis provides a better framework for understanding how a fugitive could operate in a given region without being detected. By analyzing both the accessibility and the hunter’s ability to detect fugitive-related activities, the analyst can determine where the fugitive is most vulnerable to capture and, conversely, the PONI’s optimal hiding location. The final step is to take the objective analysis and apply a subjective set of metrics to identify the most likely areas where the fugitive will hide. By using a technique called the “analysis of competing hypotheses,” described in Richard Heuer’s book, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, intelligence analysts can greatly reduce certain cognitive biases that they may have when trying to determine the fugitive’s potential hiding location.19 Once given a list of these locations, the commander can then direct assets to search for the PONI and collect critical information. Once the information collection is complete, we have cycled through the first iteration of the five-step process. If the individual is located then the necessary apprehension operation can be initiated. If not, additional iterations should be conducted until the individual is found. However, we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge two fundamental problems associated with this five-step process. First, this manhunting process has never been validated against a case study or realworld scenario. Unfortunately, limited academic research currently exists, and any information that is available only draws from bounty hunting and skip tracing. Most of the pertinent details behind successful and unsuccessful U.S. government efforts remain classified. Due to the lack of information available on the subject, validating this process may prove difficult until it has actually been tested in the field. Second, there is no standardized metric to measure or compare processes. The current manhunting metric compares numbers of apprehensions to numbers of outstanding warrants. The U.S. government’s success rate in finding and apprehending terrorists is sporadic, to say the least.

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For every terrorist who has been killed or captured, there is an example of an individual who has avoided apprehension. Since no formalized manhunting process exits in the U.S. government, the above process can at least serve as a starting point. NEXUS TOPOGRAPHY A key step in building a social profile is the mapping of the PONIs nexus. While Social Network Analysis (SNA) documents the connections or links in a social group, Nexus Topography (NT) describes the universe of potential relationships in different social environments and cultures. The word “nexus” comes from the Latin word nectere, which means “to bind.” So, NT maps social forums or environments that bind people together. The advantage of NT is that it facilitates identification of missing information, which further allows intelligence analysts to redirect collection assets. In developing a picture of a PONI’s clandestine social network, one must move from the known to the unknown. In the development of a social network, there are two constants: all social interactions occur at a specified place and at a specified time. If two individuals never occupy the same time and space, they are not likely to develop a direct link. Conversely, the likelihood of an interaction occurring increases if two individuals do occupy the same time and space, referred to from here on as spatial coincidence. The exception to spatial coincidence involves the ability to create virtual relationships over the Internet in places such as chat rooms (something beyond the scope of this chapter). Therefore, the primary focus of NT is to show when, where, why, and how relationships form. NT’s aim is to understand the intricacies of relationship development to forecast the PONI’s complete social network. For instance, the initial social environment where relationships are formed is in the family unit. The first bonds are those formed between parents and children, brothers and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren, cousins, and aunts and uncles. These family ties are often considered the strongest social bonds developed between people. In many cultures, generations of family members live together in the same household and maintain close ties. The next most common set of social interactions occurs between teachers, students, and classmates. These bonds can last for generations, but the social interaction itself occurs at specific schools and universities. Upon completion of academic study, most people transition straight into the marketplace, which is another common location where social interactions occur. Yet another area where social interactions take place includes religion (i.e., churches, mosques, and temples). Social interactions occur within communities of identity. There are two types of communities of identity important to the development of relationships: communities of locality and communities of interest. The

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community of locality is the district or geographic region in which people live and interact or under which they are governed. An example of a community of locality is a neighborhood, village, city, town, or province. A community of interest, on the other hand, is a community formed around a common interest or shared experience. For example, prisoners or inmates, members of the military, scientists, sports enthusiasts, and hobbyists comprise communities of interest. The underlying assertion is that relationships are always developed within communities, whether these are of locality or of interest. By examining a fugitive’s identity, an analyst can create the PONI’s social profile, which can aide in mapping the PONI’s affiliation network. At this time, it is important to introduce the concepts of diversity, redundancy, and adaptability. Diversity of identity refers to the fact that individuals often have multiple identities: a familial identity, an employment identity, a religious identity, an academic identity, and so on. Each identity is different and helps define the individual’s social networks. Redundancy refers to individuals sharing multiple identities across networks. For instance, two individuals could attend the same church, graduate from the same university, and work in the same office building. In this case, these two individuals have a redundant relationship on the basis of multiple shared identities (location, religion, education, and employment). The byproduct of redundancy is that some links between sets of individuals may be disproportionately strong. Finally, relationships have the characteristic of changing over time. That is, the fugitives’ social network may alter as their interests change, they move to another community, or their position within that community shifts. These changes directly influence the nature of their relationships, which will further affect their informal network. Diversity, redundancy, and adaptability are what make informal social networks, and especially clandestine terrorist networks, so powerful and why military commanders have a hard time disabling these networks. The concepts of redundancy, diversity, and adaptability expand the understanding of affiliation networks and time analysis. In Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust describe affiliation networks as “two-mode networks, consisting of a set of actors and a set of events.”20 Affiliation networks illustrate or map ties developed at events or activities. Such events could include sporting events, clubs, or religious meetings. These events may serve as a catalyst to unite two or more individuals into a group or clique. Unfortunately, affiliation networks are currently modeled according to traditional node and link diagrams. That is, the event serves as the central node, and individuals are linked together through attendance at such an event. This type of static analysis has limited uses in the analysis of clandestine networks. One of the major problems with traditional network analysis is measuring and depicting time or longitudinal data. Unfortunately, longitudinal

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analysis typically concentrates on how networks change and adapt over time but rarely focuses on how networks are created. This type of analysis is also depicted in only two dimensions. As Wasserman and Faust state, “Network analysis and network models have often been criticized for being static. Although much work has been done on longitudinal models, applications of this methodology are sorely lacking.”21 However, time— and the timing of relationships—is extremely important in unraveling small-world terrorist networks. More useful is strand analysis. Traditional SNA graphically depicts nodes and links, but strands represent the life span of individuals. Strands are linked together by ties formed through various affiliations. Strand analysis is three-dimensional (3-D) analysis with individuals, time, and events, each representing a different dimension in 3-D space. The advantage of strand analysis is that it depicts where potential social links can develop. Using both strand analysis and the NT template can effectively build a picture of the PONI’s potential associates that were previously unobservable. Relationships develop inside specific regions or communities on the basis of the concepts of identity and locality. These specific regions can be categorized and used to template a range of bonds, which should help analysts investigate key areas of possible interaction. These regions of nexus are religious, political, educational, criminal, military, familial, cultural, and economic. It is important to note that many of these overlap. For instance, Islamic fundamentalist groups use religion as a source of political power, economic exchange, and cultural identity. To determine familial relationships, analysts must identify paternal and maternal genealogy. This is especially important in tribal societies, where family lineage is extremely important, and analysts need to look for bonds or alliances created at the tribe, clan, lineage, and family levels. Social affiliations have so far received the most attention in network analyses. These affiliations include not only ties of friendship, but even more importantly, familial relations. The investigator must not only ask, “Who are the fugitive’s closest friends now, and who were his closest friends when he lived or worked in such-and-such place?” but also, “What is the fugitive’s family tree: is his matrilineal side more dominant than the patrilineal side? Do both sides of his family accept him? What about his wife’s family (or wives’ families)? What about siblings who might be married to people who show up as political or military associates?” While records about this may be difficult to construct, birth, marriage, divorce, and death records are usually available in the public domain or can be obtained by persuading or coercing local administrators or even village elders. HUMINT collection—by the CIA, Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), or thirdcountry intelligence sharing—can provide additional information in this arena.

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Educational bonds are relationships developed during the sharing or exchange of knowledge. For instance, a PONI who attended a specific university at a certain time should have developed a social network at that university. Therefore, an intelligence analyst can develop a target list on the basis of all the students and teachers who attended that university during that time. This does not mean that all individuals who attended that university are terrorists, but it does expand the fugitive’s potential social network and may reveal important information on the network’s infrastructure. Also, it is important to remember that education and how it is imparted to a person varies according to culture and socioeconomic status. For instance, people who live in third-world Islamic countries and who come from poor families are unlikely to attend governmentsponsored schools. In contrast, families are more likely to send their sons to madrassas to gain a rudimentary education. With this in mind, analysts must understand and focus on the specific characteristics of the PONI’s background so that they can gather relevant educational data for analysis. Political bonds are bonds based on the manifestation of social power in a society. This power is based on the ability to mobilize group members in support of an idea, belief, or cause. Political affiliations may often link a fugitive to a government official or to individuals who can mobilize popular support. To begin analysis of the political nexus, an intelligence analyst must identify those direct and indirect relationships between the PONI and the individuals who hold government positions, such as town or village council members. These associations can transcend the locallevel government and manifest themselves at the national level. The analyst should develop a list of political parties and politicians who hold ideological beliefs similar to those of the PONI and who may be indirectly linked to the PONI through others. Often, the line between politics and religion is blurred. This is particularly true when discussing Islamic fugitives, since Islam recognizes no distinction between the two.22 The fugitive’s affiliations can be found, again, in open sources such as propaganda pieces, party registration records, newspaper columns, and the records of political proceedings. It is vital to understand what organizations the fugitive has belonged to. For example, Osama bin Laden’s affiliations with members of the Muslim Brotherhood, certain Salafi groups, and Wahabbi clerics all helped him expand his popular support base and lent him a certain level of political power within the Islamic world. Who a fugitive associated with, campaigned with, or sponsored legislation with can also be telling. Equally important is to pay attention to those persons whom the fugitive opposed or had caustic relations with. Religious bonds are relationships developed inside a religion. Usually these relationships begin at the local church, mosque, or temple. Yet,

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religious bonds and affiliations can transcend national boundaries. Since religion is so frequently a source of identification (among those of like religion) and friction (among those of different religions), this category merits careful attention. For instance, knowing whether a PONI professes to be Muslim, Christian, or Hindu is very important since the PONI is less likely to find refuge among people of a different religion. Within the major religions it is important to distinguish whether the fugitive is loyal to a particular denomination, such as being a Sunni, Shiite, or Sufi. Within the denomination, knowing whether the PONI belongs to a sect, subsect, or splinter group with a particular ideology can be extremely helpful to an analyst. Economic affiliations are the relationships created through economic exchange, such as business ventures or charitable organizations. One should build a list of businesses that are either funded by the fugitive or where the fugitive may find work. For example, if a fugitive is a carpenter, the fugitive will probably try to find work as a carpenter. Similarly, if a fugitive is a philanthropist and enjoys doing charity work for people, the fugitive will probably be affiliated with other individuals who do similar charity work. This makes it important to ask questions such as who has the fugitive been in partnership with, been employed by, or made significant or numerous transactions with? Another critical component involves tracking the flow of money. In the case of al Qaeda, the “Golden Chain” has become a common term to describe the network’s financial supporters in the Middle East.23 Again, open-source reporting offers a tremendous amount of information. HUMINT can also yield valuable information, whether from interrogations of captured members of the fugitive’s network or intelligence sharing among countries that have cooperative agreements in place. If a fugitive’s network does business or is associated with charitable organizations within the United States, tax records and legal documents can provide valuable information about the fugitive’s connections. Criminal bonds are relationships formed through involvement in criminal enterprises as well as within the prison system. When men serve time together in prison, extremely close relationships may develop. Sometimes these bonds can be tighter than those in a family or tribe. With this in mind, analysts should ask questions such as was the fugitive incarcerated, where was the fugitive incarcerated, and when was the fugitive incarcerated? Additionally, are there any countries that have outstanding warrants for the fugitive’s arrest? By developing a picture of the fugitive’s criminal ties and history, one can map a network of people whom the fugitive relies on or that the fugitive may feel indebted to, or vice versa. Military bonds are built through shared combat experiences or military training. It is easy to locate those who served in combat together, because there is usually a list of veterans that can be retrieved through databases

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or records. A tightly knit group is developed through different military experiences with varying levels of commitment to each other on the basis of those experiences. Past military affiliations, such as training received, special skills studied, or unit membership, can be used to suggest a fugitive’s current relationships Discovering what campaigns a fugitive fought in (such as Afghanistan in the 1980s), and alongside whom, is useful information. This information is most likely to be found on propaganda Web sites, during interrogations, or perhaps in U.S. military or CIA archives that maintain databases on political and military leaders. This type of data can also be extracted from foreign government records or local knowledge. Ethnolinguistic and cultural bonds form because individuals share a common language or ethnic and cultural background. For example, if a fugitive only speaks Arabic, then it would be difficult for the fugitive to have close ties with anyone who does not speak Arabic. Not all ethnolinguistic and cultural ties are strong, but some are crucial to a person’s cultural identity. In Afghanistan, where tribal loyalties are fundamental, a Pashtun is far more likely to find refuge in Pashtun-dominated parts of the country than in areas populated by Turkomen or Azeris. Similarly, if propaganda Web sites retelling the exploits of a PONI indicate that the PONI, as a foreigner, established a lasting alliance with a warlord of a certain ethnicity, this information could prove critical in narrowing the field of investigation. The investigator must seek to understand the relative strength of such bonds. Books, reports by investigative journalists, and propaganda are useful open sources for such information. Although NT is a simple and straightforward concept, its strengths are multiplex. First, NT identifies key social terrain—defined as social elements that tie individuals together—that can be used to narrow areas of investigation. Developing as complete a template as possible for a PONI’s potential network should be invaluable given the high turnover rate in analysts and the constant effort of maintaining continuity in analysis. Additionally, NT can be used against a variety of PONIs, thereby providing analysts with a very flexible tool. It does not matter if a PONI is a member of a drug cartel, terrorist organization, or weapons-smuggling outfit, since the model provides a standard approach that can be tailored to a specific individual or group simply by identifying how individuals are connected. A by-product of this model is increased efficiency in collection, especially when collection resources are scarce. As mentioned before, the current framework tends to focus mostly on classified information since it deals with operational connections. But nexus regions can be researched in the open-source realm even before classified collection begins. This, too, can serve to better focus limited collection assets to free up resources from other intelligence taskings.

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CONCLUSIONS Manhunting is about identifying and locating known and unknown PONIs. Although current events have much of the public thinking about manhunting in terms of identifying and locating terrorists, it is important to bear in mind that manhunting encompasses much more than just hunting terrorists. It can range from finding war criminals, as in BosniaHerzegovina, to finding deposed leaders such as Saddam Hussein. Taken a step further, some of the greatest threats to U.S. national security in the future will come from small groups of nonstate actors or even individuals who will move quickly and act independently of governments or large-scale organizations. To counter such threats, the U.S. government will need to have the capability to quickly and efficiently identify and find these targets globally. The manhunting process presented here offers a foundation on which to build a more in-depth manhunting capability, which will only help strengthen the U.S. government’s capacity in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The future of the GWOT, to an unprecedented degree, involves identifying and locating the next generation of terrorists. To be successful, the U.S. government must understand the manhunting paradigm and synchronize interagency capabilities and operations. Furthermore, a manhunting policy is necessary to coordinate efforts at local, national, and international levels. At the moment, no one government agency has taken the lead. No single agency has brought together the key components of an interagency manhunting program: doctrine, training, organizational structure, and strategy. These areas need to be researched in greater depth, developed, and then implemented to ensure that a seamless and proactive manhunting system is available to U.S. decision makers. As a result, the U.S. government’s ability to prosecute the war on terrorism today and to find and apprehend PONIs in the future depends on its ability to develop and institutionalize a comprehensive manhunting program now. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. A PONI is any individual designated by the president of the United States or the Secretary of Defense as an individual that poses a direct threat to national interest. PONIs include, but are not limited to, persons indicted for war crimes, terrorists, enemy combatant leadership, and insurgents.

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2. Fellman and Wright, Modeling Terrorist Networks-Complex Systems at the Mid-Range, http://www.psych.lse.ac.uk/complexity/Conference/ FellmanWright.pdf (September 6, 2004), 5. 3. Baraba’si, Linked: How Everything is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life (New York: Plume, 2003), 223. 4. Milward and Raab, “Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks,” Paper presented at the International Conference on the Empirical Study of Governance, Management, and Performance, September 6, 2004, 10, http://www.iigov.org/ workshop/pdf/Milward and Raab.pdf. 5. Valdis Krebs, “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks,” First Monday 7, no. 4 (March 25, 2002), http://www.firstmonday.org/issues7 4/krebs/ (November 25, 2005). 6. “Dragnet Nabs 10,000 Fugitives,” CNN.COM, April 15, 2005, http://www. cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/14/fugitive.arrests (April 15, 2005). 7. Bob Burton, Bail Enforcer: The Advanced Bounty Hunter (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1990), 30. 8. Billy Waugh and Tim Keown, Hunting the Jackal (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004), 156–177. 9. About AutoTrackXP (n.d.), AutoTrack.com, http://www.autotrack.com/ about.htm (April 14, 2005). 10. “Federal Bureau of Investigation: National Crime Information Center,” Federation of American Scientists, April 6, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/ doj/fbi/is/ncic.html (April 14, 2005). 11. Richard Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, http://www.odci.gov/ csi/books/19104/index.html (August 29, 2004). 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. E. Espejo, “Yano Confirms Janjalani’s Presence in Palimbang,” Sun Star General Santos, October 2, 2003, http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/gen/2003/ 10/02/news/yano.confirms.janjalani.s.presence.in.palimbang.html (September 6, 2004). 15. The discussions addressing the 601st Infantry Brigade’s operations are based on the author’s personal observations. 16. “Where Are Karadzic and Mladic?” BBC News, March 1, 2002, http:// news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1847691.stm (April 5, 2005). 17. Walls, 77. 18. Robin Moore, Hunting Down Saddam: the Inside Story of the Search and Capture (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 237–257. 19. Heuer. 20. Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 291–298. 21. Ibid., 730. 22. Gary Sick, Islamic Fundamentalism (New York: Conference Board, 1993). 23. “Afghanistan–The Taliban,” Eurolegla Services, June 13, 2005, http://www. eurolegal.org/neoconwars/arabafghan.htm (August 25, 2005).

CHAPTER 12 GUERILLA WARFARE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: COMBATING THE 21ST-CENTURY TERRORIST CELL WITHIN THE UNITED STATES Richard J. Hughbank

The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more importance than the bodies of his troops. —Samuel B. Griffith II, On Guerrilla Warfare, 1961

Domestic and international terrorism has increasingly plagued the United States over the past few decades, yet this country has actually been confronted with acts of domestic terrorism for much longer. Dating back to the days of John Brown and his actions at Harper’s Ferry, Virginia, in 18591 and attacks perpetrated by anarchists in the early 1900s, terrorism has existed in the United States for over 150 years. Today, various forms of domestic terrorism have been conducted by hate groups—such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), Aryan Nations, Neo Confederates, and Black Panthers—and, to a lesser degree, by activist groups such as the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF).2 But perhaps more worrisome to policymakers and law enforcement professionals—in this post-9/11 security environment—is the current threat from international terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, Hizbollah, and Hamas. These groups have a known presence in the United States and are targets of concern for cities and municipalities of many sizes. Both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures.3 Thus, the ability to identify and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their

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infrastructure, and disrupt their financial resources lies in the understanding of modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within the United States.4 The forms of asymmetric warfare5 adopted by domestic and international terrorist groups alike is no longer intended to gain simple media exposure or governmental manipulation; they want to make an overpowering impact by causing massive loss of life and severe damage to infrastructure and are often motivated by religious imperatives and political goals.6 As terrorism analyst Stephen Flynn has observed, “Throughout the 20th century [Americans] were able to treat national security as essentially an out-of-body experience. When confronted by threats, [America] dealt with them on the turf of our allies or our adversaries. Aside from the occasional disaster and heinous crime, civilian life [in the United States] has been virtually terror-free.”7 With the turn of the twenty-first century, terrorist operations have become more prevalent in the United States and are taking shape in the form of modern guerrilla warfare, thus creating new challenges for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. After reviewing the origin and nature of these challenges, this chapter will offer some suggestions for countering guerilla warfare in twenty-first-century United States. TERRORIST OPERATIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES According to a recent book by Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Islamic extremist groups have been plotting within the borders of the United States for decades, originating with an exclusive network of educated leaders eventually known as “Mullahs.”8 They note that this “secret Islamic network” was formed during the mid-1980s “when a tightly knit group of Islamic radicals attended the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University in Greensboro.”9 After years of planning, recruiting, and training in decentralized terrorist cells located throughout the country, “[t]he founding members of the secret Islamic terror network executed a long-range plan: raise money to fund terrorist activities; support Arab and Muslim demonstrations against our government’s foreign policy and its support for Israel; infiltrate our political, economic, and military system to conduct espionage and to buy influence; and use our universities to set up fronts for terrorist organizations, because our academia’s commitment to Free Speech and tolerance of diversity will protect them.”10 Meanwhile, three dramatic events since the early 1990s have illustrated to most Americans the threat of terrorism from both foreign and domestic origins. First, on February 26, 1993, a group of Islamic extremists (led by Palestinian Ramzi Yousef and inspired by Egyptian Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman) parked a van loaded with explosives in the garage of the World Trade Center in New York City. The explosion resulted in 6 deaths, 1,041

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injured, and $1 billion in damages. Then, on April 19, 1995, the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City was destroyed by Timothy McVeigh (a U.S. citizen motivated by a radical right-wing extremist ideology), who conducted the attack using a truck containing approximately 5,200 pounds of Ammonia-Nitrate and Fuel Oil (ANFO). This bombing resulted in 168 deaths, hundreds of injuries, and the destruction of an entire building. And, of course, on the morning of September 11, 2001, Islamic extremists hijacked four planes and subsequently flew two of them into the World Trade Center, flew another into the Pentagon, and crashed the fourth into a field in Pennsylvania when it became clear to the terrorists that they would not be able to successfully reach their target in Washington, DC. To date, this was the most organized and sensational series of international terrorist attacks ever experienced on U.S. soil. In an effort to gain a more thorough understanding of terrorism, recognize who the terrorists are, and contend with why Americans have been attacked in their own sanctuaries, a growing cadre of academics and security professionals have recently begun developing the field of terrorism and counterterrorism studies. However, one of the challenges that is yet to be overcome in this field is the need for a common definition. As one scholar has observed, “[W]e seek to define terrorism so as to be better able to cope with it, [but we] cannot begin to counter effectively that which we are unable to fully comprehend or agree on as to its nature.”11 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines domestic terrorism as the unlawful use, or threatened use, of violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States (or its territories) without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.12

Meanwhile, international terrorism is defined as involving violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. Acts are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government, or affect the conduct of a government. These acts transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate, or the locale in which perpetrators operate.”13

While these definitions are useful, from a law enforcement perspective, it is important to note that other federal and political organizations maintain (and operate under) their own definitions. This lack of a universal definition poses issues in identifying, defending against, and ultimately defeating terrorist acts in the war on terrorism.

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Not only is it imperative that commonly accepted definitions of domestic and international terrorism exist, it is equally important to understand both the methods of terrorist warfare as how it’s actually conducted and what type of individuals—even among U.S. citizens—would join a cause that uses terrorism to achieve seemingly unobtainable objectives. As Benjamin Netanyahu—a former soldier in an elite antiterror unit in the Israeli Army and a former prime minister of Israel—has noted, “The current breed of interlocking domestic and international terrorists is certainly not to be taken lightly. They know the West well and have developed strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses.”14 Identifying the enemies’ tactics and their motivational means for executing such heinous acts of political- and religious-based violence against an innocent civilian population will prove invaluable in the fight against domestic and international terrorism within the United States. Guerrilla Warfare Tactics Tactics that have been successfully employed by small guerrilla-fighting forces for centuries are quickly becoming a serious problem, as domestic and international terrorist groups are utilizing standoff, overt (highprofile), and covert (low-profile) tactics to accomplish their endstate with little regard for those outside their organizations. This type of terroristoriented asymmetric warfare is currently used all over the world, even though such a strategy rarely leads to the type of complete victory envisioned by its adherents. Understanding guerrilla warfare requires the recognition of how terrorist cells operate within their political and religious ideologies and within their varying environmental battlefields. According to historians Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, guerrilla warfare has historically been viewed as “a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band [has been] an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws great force from the mass of the people themselves. Guerrilla warfare [has been] used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression.”15 During the early nineteenth century, Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula forced the Spanish landsmen to protect their countryside with what ultimately popularized guerrilla warfare in modern military history.16 Since then, guerilla leaders, such as Mao Tse-tung in China, Ernesto “Che” Guevera in Latin America, and Carlos Marighella in Brazil, have revolutionized the art of small-unit warfare against larger and more adequately resourced opponents. Their decentralized campaign tactics have led to many victories over mighty armies and have eventually been adopted by many terrorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (later known as the Red Faction Army) operating in West Germany.17 Guerrilla warfare has become the principal design from which terrorist cells are shaping their operations

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from preparation to recruitment to execution. It has historically been a proven blueprint for various levels of tactical success and always provides the terrorist an opportunity to launch “himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular moment and dedicate himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit to breaking the mold of these institutions.”18 As Mao Tse-tung wrote many years ago, “A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated . . . homemade bomb. His indoctrination begins even before he is taught to shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal and politically alert fighting man.”19 21ST CENTURY TERRORISM AS GUERILLA WARFARE Domestic and international terrorist groups located within the United States are demonstrating the various guerrilla warfare techniques of old as they are setting out to achieve their political and religious objectives. From the development of the organization through the execution of their attack, these groups are organized in a manner and utilize tactics, techniques, and procedures consistent with the operational phases of a traditional insurgency. These offensive measures are initiated whenever the opportunity for power, control, and socioeconomical influence favor the aggressor. Other operational fundamentals include influencing the need to defend multiple potential targets, the massive consumption of critical resources, sacrificing counter (offensive) measures, and the loss of political and law enforcement initiatives. In essence, insurgents seek to reduce resources and diminish any willingness to protect civilian communities through attrition and exhaustion.20 One last and extremely critical impact could include the alienation of (local) communities toward law enforcement officials and local and federal governments. Guerilla warfare groups organize their activities generally around seven areas, as described below. Preparation Terrorist groups look for a location from which to base their operations and begin recruiting. Location is critical as they require an environment conducive to recruiting as well as privacy for planning their attacks. Community selection and socioeconomic structure are two critical factors in their choice of location. Like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland, terrorist groups form decentralized cells that consist of a select few individuals who can blend into an urbanized community and begin their recruiting process. This community may have easily accessible public transportation and communication, thereby providing for a solid command and control structure. The members of these sleeper cells21 will blend into their chosen society by obtaining jobs, paying bills, and acting

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and speaking like the indigenous populations within the neighborhood for months and years while preparing and recruiting for their next attack. The socioeconomic structure of a community is crucial to a cell’s intelligence preparation in a given area of operation. Understanding the sociological elements of a given city, along with its economical structure, is critical for terrorists attempting to exploit and undermine a social system while recruiting for their cause. People from every level of the social strata, from the educated to the unschooled, and from the social elite to the criminal derelicts, are potentially subject to the recruitment techniques of these local cells. As Daniel Pipes notes, although most would expect the militant Islamic to entice those individuals from the lower end of the social strata, “research finds precisely the opposite [to be] true. To the extent that economic factors explain who becomes Islamic, they point to the fairly well off, not the poor . . . Those who back militant Islamic organizations also tend to be well off. They come more often from the richer city than the poorer countryside.”22 Initial Contact Over time, the organizational structure begins to take shape, and positions within the cell are filled with recruits from the local community. In order to recruit locals to meet their specific needs, cell members set clandestine operations in motion to begin identifying those who meet the special needs within a particular cell. As Mao observed, guerrilla warfare’s “basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his machines.”23 While looking for those individuals who might meet their strategic and tactical needs for future terrorist operations, cell members integrate themselves into the daily lives of their target population with absolute discretion, giving the appearance of the average U.S. citizen residing in “Anytown, USA.” Carlos Marighella believed that urban guerillas would have neither the means nor the capability to maintain a job for very long, forcing them to begin expropriation tactics over long periods of time. He also spoke of the importance for guerilla insurgents to learn how to live among the indigenous people in their operational area, employing extreme discretion as they gradually integrate into their new environment. Once they have comfortably maneuvered themselves into the everyday events of their chosen community, then, and only then, will they begin their initial contact. Infiltration Infiltration is defined as complete submersion into a society. In places such as Dearborn, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Hancock, New York; and Buena Vista, Colorado (the last two cities refer directly with cells of

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the Jaamat ul-Faruqa movement), Islamic jihad extremists have infiltrated and begun recruiting, training, and plotting their next terrorist attack against the United States—all in the name of Islamic purification through violence and destruction. A critical factor for the development of the cell’s structure in this stage is the process of isolating promising recruits in U.S. society who may harbor ill feelings toward either the current government or Christians and Jews. They begin to quietly spread their religious and political beliefs as a more acceptable alternative to the democratic governments in the evil empire of the Western world. Christianity is dismissed in their eyes as a lesser religion, or no religion at all, and the Islamic faith is praised as the only righteous path to Allah (Arabic for God), as revealed through the last prophet Muhammad and his universal and timeless message. Militant Islamic terrorist cells are building mosques and other infrastructures designed to quietly train U.S.-born Muslims and others throughout the United States to engage in a continuing jihad (holy war) against the U.S. way of life in order to impose Islamic rule. Additionally, these groups engage in criminal acts such as fraud, burglary, racketeering, and illegal use and distribution of drugs (narcoterrorism) in an effort to financially provide for future training and tactical operations. Other methods of gathering funds to further facilitate their jihad are through their production and selling of militant Islamic propaganda during their teachings, training, and prayer meetings. Organization Once the infiltration phase has been established in an area of operations deemed satisfactory to the needs of the newly formed insurgent group, the terrorist cell’s organization begins to take shape. The traditional guerrilla forces of Afghanistan, Brazil, China, and Vietnam grew in size equaling 200–1,000 person units, but terrorist cells forming in the United States are significantly smaller and “stove-piped” in design, mostly due to the urban terrain and environments in which they have chosen to conduct their operations. A stove-pipe organization simply implies that each section of the cell is more or less oblivious to what other sections exist and who is involved within the other sections. Furthermore, each section is channeled through a section leader, and the leaders speak with usually one other representative of the main cell. This organizational technique is better known as decentralization, or networked decentralization. With decentralized cells working toward a common objective, those caught during the commission of an illegal act are unable to give any operational intelligence on other sections of their cell or on the existence of other cells. A terrorist cell evolves in both size and sophistication as new recruits enter their training and progress to any of the cell’s three organizational forces:

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auxiliary, intelligence, and operational. A cell’s organizational structure can vary from this suggested configuration but will have similar characteristics, regardless of the structural framework. Auxiliary Force: This consists of those members who conduct daily covert operations in the local environment that they have infiltrated. They are able to blend in with the current geopolitical schema and are made up of those members truly dedicated to the jihad, not those who have been recruited from the local areas. They obviously must maintain a false front and not offer any information about their organization to those who are not willing participant-recruits to their political and religious movement. Another function of this group lies in its resourcefulness to provide logistical support to the cell. The structure would most likely consist of a cell leader, with assistant leaders directly controlling and maintaining communications with cell members. As noted earlier, cell members will not know how many other members exist or who they are, and they will report directly to the assistant leader. In turn, assistant cell leaders will typically not know how many other subcells exist and will only report to their assigned cell leader. Intelligence Force: These members are organized in the same decentralized manner and are charged with gathering critical information, conducting surveillance operations, and identifying and emplacing early warning systems so as to prevent detection and subsequent disruption of the cell’s plans and operations. This part of the cell also conducts other reconnaissance operations in its area of operation to facilitate further recruiting—by providing the screening processes necessary to evaluate, filter, and process potential recruits—and identify potential future targets. Operational Force: These members will usually remain in a covert status until the time comes for them to execute an attack and will consist of a small section of specially prepared individuals ready to conduct asymmetric warfare through clandestine operations designed to be both passive and extremely violent in nature. As with other cell parts, their structure will consist of a leader and members. The members might know each other as they work in a centralized environment out of sight from the general population they plan to ultimately attack. When this cell executes the terrorist attacks, they will be quick to act against their target when the parent cell is convinced it has an operational advantage of both power and influence over its potential environment. Buildup Although the name of this phase implies there is a massing or increase in size of the cell, the size will vary with each location (and sociological environment), organization, and intended mission. As stated earlier, unlike the traditionally sizable guerrilla forces dating back to Che, Carlos,

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and Mao, twenty-first-century terrorist cells located within the United States are organized in much smaller and more illusive elements in order to suit their needs for covert operations at every phase of their insurgency. Furthermore, recruits with special skills are also examined more heavily when considered for recruitment, unlike the average guerrilla fighter in previous wars. As Loveman and Davies observe, drawing on the doctrine originally espoused by Che Guevara, “Guerilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has diverse characteristics, different facets, even though the essential liberation remains the same.”24 Understanding this philosophy is critical for law enforcement agencies throughout the country who must identify and disrupt terrorist cells within their jurisdictions. Guevara’s teachings still hold true in the forming and training of both domestic and international terrorist organizations located in the United States. On the basis of its beliefs, leadership, teachings, training, and geographical and social conditions, each organization will adapt to its natural surroundings and begin take its own shape over time. Another important parallel between guerrilla warfare of old and today’s terrorist cells is that this form of war “is a war of the masses, a war of the people.”25 While terrorist cells will utilize this phase to further develop their organizations, they will only have a select few who are deceived by their fatwa to attack and kill other Americans in their own country. Combat Employment Once a cell has determined that it’s time to conduct “combat” operations, plans will become actions set into motion with finite precision, leaving little room for identification or interception by first responders. The asymmetric actions of typical guerilla warfare are a product of months of detailed planning, resourcing, organizing, and rehearsing. Although there are varying social strata levels joining and participating in terrorist acts, make no mistake that the delivery platform of this horrific weapon of terrorism will result from highly trained and dedicated militant Islamic jihadists who truly believe their actions are righteous and for the betterment of the Islamic nation. Once this phase has begun, law enforcement agencies and other first responders enter a mode of emergency management, while the perpetrators—if not killed in the attack themselves—take measures to avoid capture or any lasting damage to the remaining terror network members. Demobilization Although the term demobilization infers that terrorist forces are maneuvering from wartime to a peacetime position through the disbanding of their organization, this is not the posture referenced here. Demobilization

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during guerrilla warfare is more likely to occur in the form of a dismembering of the operational cell responsible for the actual terrorist attacks— that is, if the members do not die for their cause (e.g., homicide bombings) or are caught during the commission of their criminal act. It could also be concluded that the parent cell itself could stand down and relocate to another area or region if the situation proved dangerous to its existence and execution of bin Laden’s fatwa. The organization’s decentralized operational control allows the separate cells to function independently, providing uninterrupted and continuous operations. In order to successfully terminate a local cell’s operational status, a way must found to demobilize the actual base facilities (e.g., mosques, school, and training camps) where they recruit, train, plan, and project terror against their intended targets. Ultimately, the act of demobilization is a tactic used by terrorist cell leaders as a last resort to prevent law enforcement agencies from locating and capturing cell leaders or members and, more importantly, planning future jihadist attacks. This key cell adjustment will not be undertaken lightly by terrorist organizations, as it involves several critical moving pieces not only in terms of the destruction of its current base of operations, but also in the process of executing the first five operational phases over what could prove a lengthy and costly amount of time. Therefore, if a cell cannot be identified and totally eradicated by a country’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies, the next best option may be to cause its members to believe that they must demobilize and move to another location. While the option of capture and prosecution of terrorists is the more desired endstate, forcing a cell to move from one location to another is a tactic that could prove beneficial as it will provide more time and opportunities for law enforcement professionals to plan, train, and respond to the next viable intelligence report. STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERING GUERILLA WARFARE Over 200 years after the first Spanish guerrillas, terrorist groups are still thriving on the principles that have made guerrilla warfare such a tremendous and potentially successful tactic of fighting more with less. However, there are several critical differences in how modern guerrilla warfare is executed in the United States today, as compared with other countries in the past: 1. The foundation of modern terrorist cells could be either domestic or international in nature (i.e., not always “homegrown”). This might appear irrelevant at first, but while most domestic terrorist groups are discontented with the government, they are not necessarily looking to cause massive loss of life (Timothy McVeigh’s terrorist attack of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is clearly an exception). International cells consisting of militant Islamic groups

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conducting guerrilla operations in another country are not only looking to have an impact on the government; they are also plotting to attack soft targets with the intent of destroying critical economic infrastructure and cause enormous loss of life in order to carry out the following fatwa26 issued by Osama bin Laden on February 23, 1998: “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies— civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”27 2. While the cause is against a perceived oppressive government, it is not, nor will it ever be, supported by a trained, professional army constituted of U.S. citizens. Guerrilla armies in other countries have always depended on a “regular” army to sustain their governmental opposition, and the lack of popular local support will ultimately minimize the opportunities for guerrilla style warfare to win the wars of either attrition or annihilation, especially in a foreign country. 3. Terrorists are fighting for “religious ideologies” rather than for “civilizations.” In a fight for religious ideological pursuits, the identified battlefield must contain multiple supporters in these perceived ideologies in order to successfully sustain the cause and have any hope for long-term success. While there are over 1,200 mosques with some two million American Muslim participants located throughout the United States,28 clearly very few members have the desire to express their religious and political beliefs through bin Laden’s fatwa. 4. As Therese Delpeche notes, terrorist acts will “contribute to reshaping international relations,”29 and not just in the immediate area in which they are conducting operations. If terrorism was to successfully manipulate U.S. citizens and subdue or defeat the government of the United States, every other country in the world would feel the ripple effect of the most powerful nation in the world collapsing to a weaker enemy, and other economies would ultimately face unrecoverable losses as well as an onslaught of follow-on terrorist attacks. The world will not stand by and watch terrorism erode the United States to the point of defeat. 5. According to Delpeche, “The boundaries between military and civil defense are being blurred. The increasing need to protect civilians from terrorists attacks . . . will lead the most-developed countries to give a new priority to civil defense, making it harder for the terrorist[s] to strike in the middle of cities and easier for [the] government to deal with limited unconventional attacks.”30 Governments today are better equipped with intelligence-gathering techniques and technological defense mechanisms to fight modern guerilla fighters. The freedom of movement within a city or state has been limited by these modern counterinsurgency techniques, causing terrorist cells to move at a slower pace and spend more time planning and training for their next attack. The greater degree of precision placed on terrorists increases the opportunity for local law enforcement agencies and other first responders to act or react to their attacks and potentially prevent an attack from occurring.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES Benjamin Netanyahu has recently noted how important it is to consider the threats of both domestic and international terrorist groups as their

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efforts become intertwined: “[Terrorists] know the West well and have developed strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses. An effective battle against terrorism must of necessity require a shift in the domestic and international policies that enable terrorism to grow and the intensification of those efforts that can uproot it.”31 There are several challenges in defending against terrorism, and the question must be asked whether it is possible to actually provide deterrence against future terrorist attacks. In an interview between Meir Dagan, the former head of the Israeli Counter-Terrorism Bureau, and terrorism analyst Boaz Ganor, Dagan “differentiates between two types of deterrents against terrorist organizations—the ‘tactical deterrent’ and the ‘strategic deterrent.’”32 Although a strategic plan must be present and clearly defined by governmental hierarchies, it’s the tactical deterrents upon which law enforcement agencies in the United States can have a crucial impact and need to focus their attention. Providing the necessary general and specific deterrents is critical when dealing with an unknown and unpredictable attack against any number of ideal targets. However, deterrents are only as effective as they are perceived to be by those we seek to deter. The focus of a general deterrence is ambiguous at best. Attempting to deny or disrupt a terrorist attack against a broad spectrum of potential targets is a daunting task, but when you factor in that a terrorist has nothing to lose, deterrence almost seems impossible.33 Thus, as Boaz Ganor argues, anticipating future attacks by identifying potential economic and political targets becomes a critical element in the decision-making process. Further, intelligence collection of local cells will assist agencies in “becoming familiar with the terrorist organizations, their ideology, their heritage, culture, motives and objectives, their decision-making processes, and their cost-benefit considerations, in such a way that will enable that [agency] to assess and project in advance the outcomes of the organization’s costbenefit considerations, and plan its [antiterrorism and] counter-terrorism strateg[ies] on the basis of these assessments.”34 Not unlike the populace in countries such as Israel, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Lebanon, citizens of the United States are quickly adjusting to the new reality of terrorist attacks within its borders by demonstrating short memories and hotly debating relevant security measures emplaced to deter and prevent future attacks. The United States’ greatest strength— freedom—has become a foundation for its greatest weakness in this new age of terrorism. Furthermore, television and big-screen motion pictures have begun advertising and producing more shows about terrorist acts that further acclimatize the U.S. people and their views of the past, eliminating the mystery of future attacks. As Cooper argues, “This has made the terrorist’s task increasingly difficult: How do [they] recapture and refocus the jaded attention of such an audience? The possibilities are really quite limited. [They] can strive to increase the toll in terms of the body

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count; compared to conventional warfare, deaths resulting from acts of terrorism have been numerically insignificant.”35 Closing the Training Camps, Mosques, Compounds, and Schools While militant Islamism has been a force to contend with throughout the world for many years, it is also becoming more prevalent in the United States. According to Kushner and Davis, It isn’t an accident that many U.S. mosques have become appendages of worldwide jihad against the West. The number of Muslims coming here rose rapidly after the United States revised immigration laws in the mid1960s. The number of mosques and Islamic community centers grew over that time, by some estimates from about fifty at the end of World War II to more than twelve hundred today. The role of the mosque has also changed— from Americanized “cultural clubs” of earlier immigrants to conservative, religion-oriented institutions that manipulate the national and cultural identities of new immigrants in an effort to avoid their inclusion in mainstream America.36

These terrorism analysts also point to a common thread that emerges from recent cases brought against confirmed or alleged Islamic terror cells in the United States—the connection between the terror cells’ members and a local mosque.37 State and federal law enforcement agencies must initiate and maintain aggressive intelligence-gathering operations with varying profiles, specifically targeting those individuals and organizations where militant Muslims teach others to execute bin Laden’s fatwa. “Islamberg,” a training camp utilized by the Jamaat ul-Faruqa movement in Hancock, New York, is a prime example of how militant Islamic teachings have penetrated the fabric of the United States’ society and begun the recruiting and transformation of Islamic Americans against their democratic government. As Cooper notes, “The youngest members of Islamic society are being exposed to intolerance and hate in the Islamic religious schools from the earliest grades on.”38 Managing Terrorism Therese Delpeche recently observed that having the ability to contain violence has always been the key to security.39 Stephen Flynn agrees, arguing that the threat is ongoing, and [the United States] must be doing more right now to limit the consequences of future acts of terror. It will take time to implement well-conceived, layered security measures that protect the critical foundations of [the American] society. [Americans] have to make judgments

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about [their] most immediate vulnerabilities, identify what stop-gap protective measures [they] can implement in a hurry, and develop and exercise plans to guide [their] response when the next attack materialize.40

One of the first counterterrorism measures any law enforcement agency could set into motion in the war against terrorist guerilla warfare is the most basic in nature, “community policing.”41 It could be utilized as a critical tool in countering every operational phase of terrorist cell insurgency. Patrol cars simply conducting random drive-bys in their assigned neighborhoods or patrol sectors have rendered local law enforcement organizations limited—if not totally incapable—in their ability to seek out, identify, and apprehend terrorists. Police departments must remove their officers from the disassociated comfort to which they have grown accustomed and have them interact and converse more with the public they have sworn to protect. Another proactive mechanism that should be mentioned is the necessity for patrol officers to take the time to know the people on their “beat” so they can more readily identify “abnormal” behavior. Meeting smallbusiness owners and inquiring into their business practices as an interested observer will assist in learning who the “community leaders” are and will afford them the opportunity to feel comfortable in the interaction process with the policing agencies responsible for the protection and well-being of their businesses and families. Interpersonal communication skills are invaluable, as police officers need to make themselves more visible to and approachable by those who need and want to trust them. Ultimately, they should be striving to become proactive instead of reactive. Properly organized and utilized local civic and neighborhood watch programs are another effective tool, as they become extended eyes and ears for local law enforcement agencies. Private industry could also aid in the early detection process by establishing its own antiterrorism measures— for example, camera systems and closed-circuit television (CCTV)—and reporting any unusual activity to the police through projects such as the Highway Watch Program. Another highly effective approach is to establish and utilize counterintelligence units within law enforcement departments and interact with other law enforcement agencies. All of these aforementioned (and many other) counterterrorism or antiterrorism measures serve an invaluable service to local law enforcement agencies as they continue to hone their skills in deterring, identifying, and apprehending local terrorists. SUMMARY Terrorism, by its nature, seeks out and exploits its opponents’ weaknesses. Terrorist cells will only execute when they believe the tactical

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advantage is clearly theirs and that, as Mao dictates, “chances for victory are weighted heavily in their favor.”42 The asymmetric warfare tactics practiced by domestic and international terrorist organizations have achieved some success over the years in various countries throughout the world. Arguably the most powerful and influential nation in the free world, the United States must refuse to concede to such heinous acts of violence, as its second- and third-order impacts could prove detrimental to the political and economic status of nations throughout the world. As Stephen Flynn observes: The reason that catastrophic terrorism holds such potential as a means to wage war on the United States is not simply because these attacks can inflict damage to systems we depend on; it is because our enemies have good reason to believe that a successful act of terror on American soil will trigger a reaction which the U.S. government exacerbates localized destruction with substantial self-inflicted national and even global costs.43

In order to pursue a successful counteroffensive against terrorism, the United States must analyze previous defense strategies in overseas areas of operation and begin to concentrate on the varying phases of a terrorist organization’s movement within its own borders, as well as on its understanding of what Kushner and Davis describe as “the terrorist’s language, culture, history, methods, and psychology.”44 Furthermore, the leaders of this democratic nation should consider how they can prevent others from joining these militant Muslim organizations as willing participants by improving the socioeconomic welfare of those subject to easy recruitment. We are at a point in our history where “timidity” will prove an undesirable and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation. The days of Americans feeling safe within their geographical borders has come to an end, as militant Islamic jihadists penetrate the United States’ societal footprint and live among their prey. Outdated security against the average criminal element will neither prevent nor protect against modern-day criminal attacks by a well-funded and highly trained terrorist cell. According to Flynn’s analysis, “[Americans] must create the kind of structure that widens the breadth and quality of civic participation in making America safe. The nation, not just the federal government, must be organized for the long, deadly struggle against terrorism.”45 The War on Terror has forced the United States to face its enemies on its own soil for the first time since the Civil War, thus forcing its strategies of defense to alter as it considers the long-term effects of both massive wartime damage to infrastructure and loss of civilian life. The world is anxiously standing by to see just how effective the United States is in handling terrorism inside its own borders as well as in other foreign countries, as its actions (or lack thereof) will forever shape the diplomatic and economic policies sustained between

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itself and other governments around the world. The United States cannot afford to lose this war. NOTES 1. John Brown has been called the father of American Terrorism as he and his 18 men took several citizens hostage and captured the federal arsenal in Harper’s Ferry, Virginia. His intent was to free slaves from the surrounding territory, form them into an army, and continue to free the rest of the slaves in the South. Brown was seen as a fanatic and murderer by the slaveholders against whom the uprising was aimed. Stephen B. Oates was referenced in Pamela L. Griset and Sue Mahan, “Homegrown Terrorism in the United States,” Terrorism in Perspective (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003), 85. 2. These are examples of some of the terrorist groups listed on the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB) as terrorist groups operating within the United States. Online at http://tkb.org/Country.jsp?countryCd=US (March 13, 2006). 3. Tactics, techniques, and procedures in terminology utilized in the United States Army to describe doctrinal concepts that units apply in combat, tactics that small units, crews, or individuals apply to a given set of circumstances, and courses or modes of action that describe how to perform certain tasks. 4. Portions of this chapter have appeared previously in Richard J. Hughbank, “Policing America’s Streets: How to Fight and Win the War on Terrorism in Anytown, USA,” On Point: A CounterTerrorism Journal for Military and Law Enforcement Professionals, a multi-installment column that was published in the February 24 through June 2, 2006, issues. Online at http://www.uscav.com/ uscavonpoint/FeatureArticles.aspx?CatID=6510. 5. Asymmetric warfare deals with unknowns, with surprise in terms of ends, ways, and means. The more dissimilar the opponents, the more difficult it is to anticipate [their] actions. One way to look at [it] is to see it as a classic action-reactioncounteraction cycle. See Clinton J. Ancker III and Michael D. Burke, “Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare” Military Review (July–August 2003), 18. 6. Adam Dolkin, “All God’s Poisons: Re-Evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment (Guilford, CN: McGraw/Hill Dushkin, 2004), 160–162. 7. Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism” (New York, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2004, 2005), 2–3. 8. Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Holy War on the Home Front: The Secret Islamic Terror Network in the United States (United States: Sentinel, 2006), 1. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid., 4. 11. H.H.A. Cooper, “Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited,” The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings, ed. C. Gus Martin (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 59. 12. Testimony of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division, FBI, before the Senate Select Committee on

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Intelligence, “The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States” (February 6, 2002), http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/watson020602.htm. 13. Ibid. 14. Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network, 2001 ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), 5. 15. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Che Guevara: Guerrilla Warfare, 3rd ed. (New York: SR Books, 2004), 52. 16. Ibid., 3. 17. Nico Armstrong, “International Studies Review,”Carlos Marighella: Walking a Line between Terrorism and Revolution, 42. This publication noted the impact Marighella’s book Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla had on the Baader-Meinhoff Gang. Online at http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:7-GED5oVXpAJ:students. washcoll.edu/isr/vol1/article3-nico.pdf+carlos+marighella&hl=en&gl=us&ct= clnk&cd=1. 18. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Che Guevara, 52. 19. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 8. 20. For more on the goals and objectives of insurgents, please see the many case studies presented in volume 3 of this publication, particularly those by Thomas A. Marks and Adam Dolnik. 21. Sleeper cells are a small group of individuals that belong to a larger terrorist organization. The cell “sleeps” (lies dormant) inside a population until it decides to act. 22. Daniel Pipes, “God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?” The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 113–114. 23. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 7. 24. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Che Guevara, 51. 25. Ibid, 52. 26. A “fatwa” is a legal pronouncement in Islam, issued by a religious law specialist on a specific issue. Usually a fatwa is issued at the request of an individual or a judge to settle a question where “’fiqh,’’ Islamic jurisprudence, is unclear. The overwhelming majority of fatwas are on mundane matters. Several have declared war or pronounced death sentences. Because Islam has no centralized priestly hierarchy, there is no uniform method to determine who can issue a valid fatwa and who cannot and upon whom such fatwas are binding. Some Islamic scholars complain that too many people feel qualified to issue fatwas. 27. The text of Fatwah Urging Jihad Against Americans was published in Al-Quds al-’Arabi on February 23, 1998. Statement signed by Sheikh Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin; Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of the Jihad Group in Egypt; Abu-Yasir Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, a leader of the Islamic Group; Sheikh Mir Hamzah, secretary of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan; and Fazlul Rahman, leader of the Jihad Movement in Bangladesh. Online at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/ fatwah.htm. The complete passage cited here reads as follows: “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the holy mosque (in Makka)

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from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together, and fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.” 28. U.S. State Department, 2001. 29. Therese Delpeche, “The Imbalance of Terror,” The New Era of Terrorism: Selected Readings (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 52. 30. Ibid, 50 31. Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network, 2001 ed. (New York, Ferrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), 5. 32. Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 75. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid, 76. 35. H.H.A. Cooper, “Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited,” 59. 36. Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Holy War, 68–69. 37. Ibid., 60–61. 38. H.H.A. Cooper, “Terrorism: The Problem of Definition Revisited,” 61. 39. Therese Delpeche, “The Imbalance of Terror,” 64. 40. Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 111. 41. For a detailed description and analysis of community policing, please see Jose Docobo, “Protecting America’s Communities: A Law Enforcement Perspective,” in Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, vol. 2, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 191–221. 42. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 23. 43. Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 8–9. 44. Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Holy War, 163. 45. Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable, 155.

CHAPTER 13 COMBATING TERROR IN U.S. COMMUNITIES: THE SWAT MISSION Peter N. Spagnolo and Chadd Harbaugh

The acronym SWAT originally stood for Special Weapons Assault Team but over the years has changed to the universally accepted Special Weapons and Tactics. The role of SWAT has evolved since the first team was formed by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in the late 1960s. The scope of the local SWAT mission has evolved to include not just law enforcement activities, such as serving high-risk warrants and dealing with hostage situations, but also responding and reacting to a terror attack. The terror threat to U.S. cities of all sizes is greater now than at any time in our nation’s history. The threat is so great, in fact, that the U.S. government saw the need to establish a new cabinet-level agency: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Realizing the terrorist threat to the United States exists on multiple levels, DHS has launched a new initiative to prepare and equip local SWAT teams to assist the federal government in countering this menace. The rationale for this is clear—it is no longer a matter of Osama bin Laden threatening us from a hiding place on the Afghan-Pakistan border but, rather, of al Qaeda evolving from an organization to an idea or movement, a loose confederation of “homegrown terrorists” who live in Western communities (and in many cases are native-born citizens). There are significant populations of Arab and non-Arab Muslims in many U.S. cities, most of whom are peaceful and patriotic people. However, just as we have seen among the Muslim diaspora in Europe, some members of these communities are developing

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Table 13.1 DHS SWAT Typing Matrix Type I—A dedicated full-time team designated to handle high-risk situations requiring specialized weapons or extraordinary special operations. Team capable of operating in rural and urban environments. Team capability includes dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) events. Teams should be capable of working in a CBRN environment absent of vapors. Type II—A full-time or part-time team designated to handle high-risk situations requiring specialized weapons or extraordinary special operations. Team capable of operating in either rural or urban environments. Teams should be capable of working in a CBRN environment absent of vapors. Type III—A team designated to handle high-risk situations requiring specialized weapons with limited resources and capabilities. Teams should be capable of working in a CBRN environment absent of vapors and liquids

a feeling of disaffectedness due to real or perceived unfairness they may have experienced throughout life. These disaffected individuals are susceptible to being inspired by al Qaeda’s goal of establishing a worldwide Islamic theocratic institution, and they are out there in many U.S. cities today, possibly plotting attacks in their “own backyards.” Indeed, as recent high-profile arrests have demonstrated, there is not one U.S. community today that can claim “It’s not going to happen here.” As part of the global war on terror, and to establish consistency in police SWAT teams across the nation, DHS has made it easier for law enforcement agencies to train their officers in the critical areas of counterterrorism or antiterrorism or SWAT tactics and techniques. DHS is accomplishing this by first categorizing—or “typing”—SWAT teams into one of three levels, with Type III being the most basic level of the DHS typing system (although more highly trained than many active SWAT teams) and Type I being the most advanced, highly trained, and extensively equipped (see Table 13.1). The first significant deployment of a SWAT team took place on December 9, 1968, when—according to a founding member—the LAPD was involved in a four-hour confrontation with a group of Black Panthers. Since then, many have considered the SWAT team’s role as dealing with situations that patrol officers and investigators cannot handle. The perception that SWAT picks up where a patrol and investigation end has caused some ill feelings in some agencies, as an “us versus them” atmosphere has developed between officers assigned to SWAT and those who are not. While it’s true that SWAT teams have historically been more heavily armed than general patrol units, it is also true that many patrol cars are now equipped with assault rifles and the officers are trained to use them. It must also not

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be forgotten that in many instances where SWAT might be called upon, the patrolman still plays a vital role—for example, a shooting spree in 1966 at Texas University ended when a patrol officer shot the perpetrator, Charles Whitman, with a .38 caliber revolver. The focus for SWAT took a new direction on September 11, 2001; while the SWAT team has been the unit called in when specialized equipment and unconventional tactics are needed in situations such as hostage takings, barricaded armed criminals, and high-risk search warrants and arrests, the mission is again evolving into the teams becoming the first line of defense in the face of an armed ground assault on a target within the United States. One of the reasons for the change in direction is the fact that the terrorist is generally far better armed and trained than other types of criminals and more likely to fight it out with the authorities, a concept that will be covered in more detail later in this chapter. THREE TYPES OF SWAT To fully appreciate what these changes mean to a police department head, SWAT team commander, administrator, SWAT operator, or other official, an explanation of the types of teams, the differences between them, and the equipment and training necessary to each team is needed. Level III Teams According to the DHS typing system, a Level III team is designated to handle high risk situations requiring specialized weapons with limited resources and capabilities. Teams should be capable of working in a Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) environment absent of vapors and liquids.1

A Level III team is, at a minimum, manned with two long-rifle (sniper) teams equipped with day-scoped weapons for engaging at ranges of less than 500 yards; a four-officer entry team (not including the team leader); an eight-officer containment team (to include grenadiers) for securing the perimeter; and a tactical commander. It is recommended by DHS that a tactical medic and a liaison officer (to department administration, outside agencies, etc.) be added to the team, but we must take into account the fact that there are agencies out there whose size will not allow fielding a team of sufficient numbers, since doing so might require the membership of their entire force plus any reserve or auxiliary officers they may have. It’s unfortunate but true that the vast majority of U.S. police agencies are significantly restricted by budget and manpower issues.

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The Level III team must be trained in the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) up to levels B and C, and the entire team must be issued this equipment as well as other types of protective clothing, including tactical body armor, helmet with ballistic shield, and fire-resistant gloves and hood. Also required by DHS for a team to be qualified as Level III are soft body armor, a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)-approved protective mask, safety glasses or goggles, hearing protection, adverse-weather gear, a personal hydration system (a Camelback water carrier or similar device), mechanical breaching equipment, shotgun breaching equipment (recommended), chemical agents and a delivery system for those agents, portable ladders, handguns, assault weapons (lighted), Noise Flash Distraction Devices (NFDDs), and handheld ballistic shields. The Level III SWAT team is almost always a part-time team, with the officers serving on it carrying out other responsibilities within their agencies that are generally considered their primary duties. Thus, SWAT is usually a secondary or additional assignment in this type of team. The vast majority of agencies are in this category due to the limited number of officers employed. The size and needs of the communities they serve also play a large role in determining what level team is required. Level III is the most basic of the SWAT training programs under the new DHS typing system. The Level III qualification course is an intensive 15day program of instruction in which the operator is tested physically in various skills as well as with written and practical exams throughout the course. Successful completion of an approved basic SWAT course (usually five days in duration) is a prerequisite for DHS to fund attendance to this level of training. Level II Teams In the DHS typing system, Level II is described as a full-time or part-time team designated to handle high risk situations requiring specialized weapons or extraordinary special operations. Team [is] capable of operating in either urban or rural environments. Teams should be capable of operating in CBRN environment absent of vapors.

A Level II SWAT team has all of the capabilities of a Level III with the additional recommended ability to conduct explosive entries. In the explosive entry, a door, window, or other portal is opened using a small, carefully placed explosive charge, or if the tactical situation calls for it, a breach point or loophole (a hole blown in a wall or other barrier) may be produced using an explosive charge, provided this may be accomplished

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with an acceptable degree of safety for citizens, innocents (hostages, etc.), officers, and suspects. The skills necessary to conduct explosive breaching operations require a great deal of training. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has approved local agencies to purchase, use, and store explosive materials if those agencies have adequate storage facilities. The Level II team must be equipped with at least two night vision observation scopes, electronic listening and video equipment, rappelling equipment (and the training to rappel into an objective area), and a six-officer entry element. Recommended at Level II are a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), PPE suits, and robot systems with tactical options. Additional personnel recommended by DHS for the Level II team include one or more canine elements with handlers, an electronic technician, trained explosive breachers, and a robot technician. DHS also recommends an armored personnel carrier for Level II teams. The sniper elements for Level II must be capable of engaging targets at ranges up to 500 yards with day or night capabilities. While ballistic breaching capabilities were recommended for the Level III team, they are a requirement for a team to be counted as Level II, and while the Level III team must be capable of operating in a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) environment absent liquids and vapors, the Level II team must be able (by training and equipment) to accomplish the same tasks in the presence of liquid hazards. Level II teams are often full-time teams but may be part-time or on call. Due to the additional skill and equipment requirements, Level II teams must have the time and assets to conduct significantly more training than Level III teams and are mostly found in mid-sized police forces serving communities in the approximate range of a principal regional city. Level I Teams The final and most advanced category of SWAT teams under the new typing system is Level I, which is a dedicated full time team designated to handle high risk situations requiring specialized weapons or extraordinary special operations. Team capable of operating in urban or rural environments. Team capability includes dealing with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear events. Teams should be capable of operating in a CBRN environment absent of vapors.

A Level I team has all the capabilities of Level II and III teams, with the additional ability to perform Fast Rope Insertion and Extraction System (FRIES)2 operations as well as long-range marksmanship capabilities

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beyond 500 yards, day or night. Additionally, to be considered Level I, a team must be able to employ robotic equipment for conducting searches and handling potentially hazardous objects such as explosive devices, objects that are biologically or chemically contaminated, and radiological items, among other items this team may encounter that may be too hazardous for a living officer to approach. While the robotic equipment, armored personnel carrier, and SCBA for all team members are recommended for the Level II team, they are required for Level I. Also required for Level I are night vision capabilities for the entry team (for use in both the entry and containment phases), fiber optic equipment, and transmitting equipment to include wireless and hard line. In addition, Level I requires infrared capabilities, a communications officer, two explosive breachers (one is recommended for Level II), and a robot technician (which is only recommended for Level II). Generally, only the largest of U.S. cities will field a Level I team; these are cities with populations well in excess of 1 million or with a particularly high-value target. ISSUES OF TRAINING AND PREPARATION DHS has developed this “typing” of SWAT teams in order to standardize training and capabilities across the United States and territories. In the past, SWAT training varied widely throughout the U.S. law enforcement community, from a virtually untrained and loosely organized parttime team to a highly trained and organized full-time team, whose entire duty was to train for and handle emergency situations beyond the scope of training and equipment of the patrol or investigations officer. Before the typing system, a team considered fully trained and capable in one region could be seen as untrained and nondeployable in other areas or could even be perceived as such by departments in its same area. Under the old system, incident commanders could not always be sure of the capabilities of their own teams, much less of teams or elements sent from another department to assist them in an emergency. This problem often created a condition that opened many agencies up to significant liability and could be exacerbated if the overall incident commander had expertise in a first-responder area, such as fire, or some critical skill other than law enforcement. As previously noted, in order for a team to qualify for training in one of the levels, its members must attend an approved basic SWAT qualification course. This requirement led to yet another problem; if there was no consistency among teams, how could there be standardization among the various training programs? And even with standardization, how could commanders or administrators be certain that their officers actually completed the training satisfactorily while still avoiding duplication between the schools offering training?

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In order to answer this question, DHS established a standard of training for SWAT classes, which must contain, at a minimum, the following: r Level of training: b Is the training performance-defensive (operational)? b Is the training performance-offensive (technician)? b Does the training include planning or management (incident command)? r Program of instruction or syllabus: b An outline or matrix of the course content that addresses the scope of the training, course learning objectives, and duration of training (organized by module, session, and lesson)

b Resource requirements b Student-instructor ratio b Evaluation strategy

r Training support package—all of the materials associated with the delivery of a training course, including:

b Instructor guide or instructor outline or instructor lesson plan


Published instructor material that contains the course text and special instructor notes that provide the information to deliver the material

b Participant (student) manual or guide or workbook


Published student material that contains the supporting information booklet or handout form that the participant has available for reference

As mentioned earlier, most police agencies must be driven in their activities and capabilities by budgetary realism. Unfortunately, the cost of all the equipment and training needed for an effective SWAT program is beyond the financial reach of all but the largest departments. Indeed, the cost of an approved training and qualification course runs between $4,000 and $6,000 per officer, while to properly equip a Level III team could cost in excess of $250,000 (with the equipment expenses rising as the team progresses from Level III to Level I). To enable agencies to send their officers to an approved qualification course, DHS has allocated funding designed to offset the considerable costs. Through the Office of Grants and Training, DHS is offering agencies funding in the form of tuition and fees, travel expenses, meals and lodging while in training or transit, and ammunition and other expendables, as well as paying the cost of overtime for the students and that of the backfill officers who must work additional shifts while their colleagues are away in class. Training SWAT for a New Role in Combating Terrorism In addition to providing consistency across the United States, the development of this DHS typing system has put into motion a program to orient the local officer to a new role in responding to (and countering) a

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terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In preparing officers to respond to terrorist incidents, it appears that DHS has realized that we cannot hope to defeat a determined terror attack using traditional police tactics. The local SWAT officer must adopt the mindset that we are in a state of war and must act more along the lines of a soldier than a police officer. The government has the responsibility to ensure the security of its citizens, and DHS is the proponent agency to oversee that task within the constraints of legal and budgetary reality. To this end, the department recognizes the need for armed and trained people to provide a response to a terror strike as well as for agencies to recognize a strike while it’s in the planning phase and intervene to prevent it. Most states have a Joint Terrorism Task Force made up of federal, state, and local assets to interdict these attacks in the planning stages. These task forces are usually organized under the Department of Justice and are performing well in that function. An armed, federally commanded, trained, equipped, and funded professional force would be ideal to truly secure all critical infrastructures within the United States, but such a force would be cost-prohibitive. In addition to the costs of such a federal force, many states may not want large numbers of federal agents in every city and town. The Department of Defense cannot possibly station a contingent of trained special operations soldiers in every city to combat a terror threat, not only because of laws such as the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, but also because we simply don’t have that many troops available for such duties. Even with the lack of military presence, every city in the United States has some form of law enforcement protection, and many of those agencies have SWAT teams (or at least the ability to form such teams). The day may come when the local department is all that stands between a major terror attack on its community and a group of determined terrorists. Given the problems and legality with stationing federal agents or troops in every city, DHS has opted to train and equip local police departments and sheriff’s offices—specifically these agencies’s SWAT teams—to react to terror incidents. This program offers the advantage of providing training and equipment for the local agencies so their officers may competently perform all elements of SWAT operations in addition to their primary responsibilities (patrol, investigations, etc.), while serving as antiterror or counterterror elements when the need arises. A police unit operating against terrorists will certainly be at greater risk than that same unit going against civil criminals. The reason for this additional risk is that the terrorist is generally better trained and armed and more determined than the civil criminal. Civil criminals are often committing their crime for financial purposes and will be much more likely to surrender in the face of overwhelming odds, while terrorists are motivated by social, political, or religious issues and are more likely to fight to the death. It has become common knowledge that the Islamist terrorist

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believes that dying in an act of martyrdom guarantees immediate entry into heaven. We can’t afford to lose sight of the fact that we may find ourselves fighting to save lives against people who are fighting to die. The terrorist task is made simpler by the fact that the terrorist has no illusion of survival and needs no escape plan, whereas the civil criminal hopes to live and needs an opportunity to escape; the escape or exfiltration is almost always the most challenging part of any operation. At the onset of the crisis, the local commander must quickly determine if the situation is a terrorist strike or a civil crime, and in order to properly make this decision, the commander must be educated on the essence of terrorism and how it differs from other types of crime. A local commander may recognize an act of terrorism by the actions of the perpetrators at the beginning of the incident: Do the suspects make a list of political, social, religious, ideological, or special interest demands or declarations? Do the suspects make financial demands absent any connection to one or more of the terror act indicators mentioned above? According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), other indicators that an incident is terror related are: r Occupancy or location: b Does the target have some significant historic or symbolic value? b Is the target a public building or assembly area, which would give the actor the ability to inflict mass casualties?

b Is the target involved in a controversial activity such as animal or crop research?

b Does the target represent a major infrastructure that would have a serious adverse effect on the population?

r Type of event: b Have explosives been used or threatened? b Are firearms involved?


Firearms, in conjunction with other indicating factors, point to a terrorist incident.

b Are there nontrauma mass casualties?


Typified by many casualties with no immediately apparent reason




Increases as terrorist abilities become more sophisticated

r Timing of the event: b April 19 is the date of the Waco standoff and the Oklahoma City bombing, April 20 is Adolph Hitler’s birthday, and so on.3

r On-scene warning signs: b Unexplained mass casualties b Substances with strange odors b Presence of chemical containers, bombs, and so on

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While DHS has approved training programs and has agreed to fund the training and equipment needs of the three levels of SWAT, training is still driven by four inescapable items: case law, after-action reviews (AARs) from live operations, technology, and local funding considerations. Case Law While not of major concern to military special operations communities, case law can severely affect what SWAT teams can and cannot do and the way they perform certain operations. The study of case law can be overwhelming to some officers and supervisors. It can seem to be an insurmountable task to keep track of the decisions made in the courtroom daily that can affect the way officers operate. However, because of “stare decisis,”4 courts are slow to interfere with principles announced in former decisions. While some circuit court cases seem to set decisions way outside the “norm” for the courts, if the decisions make it to the appellate or Supreme Court levels, those decisions rarely stand; therefore, the true changes in tactics caused by existing case law are not as common as some would like to believe. AARs from Live Operations AARs from live operations can profoundly change a team’s tactics and techniques, and rightfully so. If a team makes a critical mistake, it needs to learn from the mistake and make changes in order to ensure that the mistake does not occur again. While teams are typically very good about learning from their own mistakes, they are not as good about learning from others’. One reason teams do not often learn from the mistakes of others is out of their control—specialized teams (including SWAT) do not like to “air their dirty laundry.” That is to say, if a team makes a mistake, it doesn’t want to go public with it. There are probably several reasons that teams do not want to share their mistakes with others. One reason is fairly obvious: they pride themselves on being professional, precise, and able to handle whatever is thrown at them; therefore, mistakes are often viewed as failures. Another reason is that mistakes made in the field of law enforcement often lead to lawsuits. Lawsuits do not lend themselves to open forums in which law enforcement agencies can talk with others about how they could have done something different or better that would have had a positive effect on the outcome of the operation. SWAT teams and officers need to have a better vehicle in which they can talk about previous missions, whether they were completely successful or left some room for improvement. They need to learn not only from their own operations but from those performed by others. Operations involving SWAT teams are occurring daily in jurisdictions throughout the United States, and if all teams could share the details of those operations—what they encountered, what mistakes they made, what they did great, and so

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on—then those operations would serve as an informational force multiplier for all SWAT teams to learn from. SWAT teams also need to think more globally and learn from AARs coming from operations overseas. What happens in other countries can— and perhaps will—occur in the United States. The perpetrators of the attacks in Russia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Iraq, and Afghanistan are affiliates or full-fledged members of groups that seek to cause destruction in the United States. We need to learn how they operate, as they are conducting missions in other parts of the world continually. If we take into account that SWAT operations are conducted daily (if not hourly) inside the United States and believe that we can learn from events outside the United States as well, information gleaned from operations is moving very quickly, much quicker than the speed in which changes in case law progresses. Technology While AARs from operations around the world move substantially quicker than case law, technological advancements that improve equipment and capabilities of SWAT teams and terrorists alike are moving even more rapidly. Consider the changes in technology that have occurred in the last ten years. We have equipment and computers that many of us would never have dreamed of. Now, imagine the advances that will occur within the next ten years. It is almost unfathomable. Right now, technological advancements are occurring at such a rapid pace that if you buy the latest “top-of-the-line” computer today, it will be replaced by a smaller yet more powerful and capable one within the next few months. Advancements in weaponry, surveillance equipment, sensors, and so on are occurring so quickly today that some people hesitate to commit to purchases unless they have the capabilities of adding quick upgrades that will, no doubt, be available in the upcoming months. While these technological improvements can add incredible capabilities to specialized teams, they can only do so if the agency “bites the bullet” and procures the items and supplies the necessary training to the operators. These same capabilities, unfortunately, can also aid the terrorists who will gladly pay the money for the enhancements if it furthers their cause. Many new pieces of equipment require hundreds of hours of training to become proficient in their use, but once properly trained, implementing some of these items places those who posses them in an incredibly advantageous position—a bad proposition for a SWAT team that lacks the equipment, going up against a terrorist who has the latest equipment and the training. Local Funding Considerations For most U.S. law enforcement organizations, budgets determine training. More often than not, when dollars get tight for a law enforcement

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agency, the first thing on the chopping block is its training budget. It often comes down to this: training or equipment procurements. While equipment is no doubt essential (particularly self-protection equipment), it does little good if you do not know how to use it. An argument to the contrary can certainly be made—training on equipment does little good if you don’t have the equipment—so what it amounts to is this: SWAT teams need both training and equipment. Quality training programs can and will change the way SWAT teams operate. Teams will pick up tactics, techniques, and information from instructors and other students in the training from other jurisdictions. A quality training program for today’s SWAT teams encompasses all of the aforementioned items that “drive the train” in changing specialized team tactics: 1) case law, 2) AARs, and 3) technology. When addressing case law, SWAT teams need to be made aware of cases that affect their job directly (cases involving SWAT tactics and or equipment), but they also need to be cognizant of those cases that indirectly affect them—case law that was generated by a patrol officer or detective. First and foremost, SWAT operators are police officers and need to be aware of how all major cases affect them. Quality training programs examine AARs from everyone in the fight against criminal elements (especially terrorism) in the United States and abroad, as well as incidents that have occurred at the hands of these criminals. Regardless of the suspect’s motivations, the situation must be dealt with aggressively if it is to be brought to a successful conclusion, but the perpetrators of a terror strike are usually more likely to be better armed and trained as well as willing to fight it out to the death. In the event of a confirmed terror attack, the decision must be made whether or not federal troops may be deployed. In view of the current state of the war on global terrorism, it is possible that federal troops may be deployed if the perpetrators are foreigners, since we could view such an attack as a form of foreign invasion. If the actors are U.S. citizens, it is probable that federal troops may not be deployed in a direct role. Good faith, sound judgment, and education are the best ways to determine what type of threat faces the local commander. While DHS has approved funding for this advanced SWAT training, the actual allocation of funds is determined at the state and county levels, and it appears that many officials at those levels see the next terror strike as being much like the 9/11 strikes: aircraft purposely crashing into major targets. In an attack such as this, a well-trained SWAT team is not nearly as useful as a well-trained fire or rescue or Emergency Medical Services (EMS) vehicle manned by a trained crew of paramedics. Given this reasoning, local officials have demonstrated a tendency to fund fire or rescue and EMS more readily than police agencies. The problem with this type of thinking is that the next major attack will probably be nothing like

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the last; we have tightened up the security on commercial airlines to the extent that our enemies are probably planning different—albeit equally devastating—attacks. A SWAT Scenario The potential for a ground-based terror attack is significant because the terrorist goal is to inflict as many casualties as possible, with a large number of people watching. This may certainly be accomplished if properly planned. Consider the following scenario: You are a DHS-trained SWAT team in a western state. Your jurisdiction contains the following facilities that could present a target to a terrorist organization: a community college, several large department or discount stores, two hospitals, numerous schools, movie theaters, churches, and stadiums and event centers where large numbers of people gather. There is also a nuclear power and research facility, as well as a major chemical plant that produces large amounts of agricultural products such as fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides. Your jurisdiction includes some 131,000 citizens, with an additional 40,000 in nearby unincorporated areas. Terrorists have been conducting reconnaissance of your jurisdiction for some time but have been able to maintain a low enough profile such that the antiterrorism task forces and other security agencies have not detected their efforts. The terrorists had originally identified the nuclear facility as the target that would best suit their needs; nothing strikes fear into U.S. policymakers and citizens like the threat of a nuclear incident, especially one that is terrorist initiated. However, the nuclear facility has a superb guard force and an excellent security plan in operation; the force and plan are in constant training and review, which makes this facility a very hard target. Historically, terrorists have chosen easier targets over hard ones, unless there is a particular and overriding reason to strike the hard target. In this case, the terrorists have determined to strike the chemical plant. The terrorist group’s planners have made the decision to attack the chemical plant for a number of reasons: 1. This plant produces materials that have highly toxic chemicals—chemicals that can be used as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) if released into the atmosphere, river, or groundwater. 2. The plant is less well guarded than the nuclear facility and can be overrun by a determined attack force with relative ease. 3. This plant is operated by a major U.S. corporation. An attack on it (whether successful or not) will have a dramatic, negative impact on the nation’s morale and economy.

It must be remembered that terrorism isn’t so much about killing large numbers of people as it is about having large numbers of people watch

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other people die. In the opening stages, the terrorists take over the plant, killing a number of employees to show their resolve. At this point, the terrorists want the word to get out that they’ve taken the plant. As police units arrive, they make contact with the terrorists, who begin to issue demands such as withdrawal of all “crusader forces” from all Muslim lands, cessation of U.S. support of Israel, release of all political prisoners held by all western powers, and so on. All the while, news outlets are hurriedly sending correspondents to the scene and will soon be broadcasting the event on live, international television. It is likely that the terrorists don’t really expect their demands to be met but are waiting for the media to arrive and begin their broadcasts so they can release the chemicals in the full view of the world. When terrorists assassinated Idaho Governor Frank Steunenberg in 1905, it took a significant amount of time before the news spread across the nation and longer still before it got out to the world. When President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, the news spread across the world in a matter of hours, and the film was available on international news within a day. When al Qaeda attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in 2001, the world watched live as the incident unfolded. The impact of immediate worldwide attention to the September 11 attacks cannot have been lost on our enemies, and they must surely desire to capitalize on that asset again. This terrorist desire for worldwide attention (waiting for the media to arrive) may give the authorities the opportunity to “enter into negotiations” while planning and mounting a response. Presidential Decision Directive 39 of June 21, 1995, designates the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the agency with jurisdiction to handle terrorist incidents and activities on U.S. soil: It is the policy of the United States to deter, defeat and respond vigorously to all terrorist attacks on our territory and against our citizens, or facilities, whether they occur domestically, in international waters or airspace or on foreign territory. The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt, apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks. . . . The Director, FBI, as head of the investigative agency for terrorism, shall reduce vulnerabilities by an expanded program of counterterrorism.5

While the FBI is the proponent agency for dealing with terrorism on U.S. soil, its Hostage Rescue Team (HRT)6 will require time to assemble and deploy, while the local SWAT team may already be on scene. Even if HRT arrives in time to assume primary responsibility, the local team will certainly have a vital role in any operation, and we must take into account

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the fact that HRT may not be available in the event of several simultaneous attacks. Discussion In the above scenario, the authorities must first consider whether the demands are real ones or just measures to stall for time in order to cause greater panic. Then, the authorities must decide if they will enter into negotiations with the terrorists or make an immediate attempt to retake the plant. Whether the terrorists have a genuine goal of having their demands met or not, negotiation is a method for gaining time before mounting a SWAT operation, as well as an effort to convince the terrorists to give themselves up (if appropriate). If the command determines that the demands are merely a terrorist ploy to gain time in order to allow the media to arrive (or some other predetermined event) before the real purpose of their strike (worldwide attention to their cause) is carried out, the command may opt to enter into negotiations or some other dialogue to gain time while the SWAT operation is being prepared. In any event, the strike must be planned and executed in a timely manner. In many cases, only the leadership of the terror group may be aware that theirs is a suicide mission, while the other terrorists actually believe that their goal is to have the demands met and that their survival is part of that plan. Whatever the terrorist intent, it is the policy of most governments that they do not negotiate with terrorists and never concede to their demands; this is also the official U.S. policy. If the decision is made that the terrorist demands are simply a ruse to gain time, the command must develop a plan to retake the facility very quickly. This plan must be aggressive enough to successfully neutralize the threat to the community, rescue any hostages, and secure the facility— all while sending a strong message to the world that we are prepared and capable of defeating terrorism decisively. Because of the haste needed in executing the operation, a well-trained team with strong standing operating procedures (SOPs), state-of-the-art equipment, and an aggressive, warrior mindset is absolutely critical. Not all jurisdictions are able to afford high-end state-of-the-art equipment. To counter this shortfall, DHS has initiated the funding programs mentioned previously, which are designed to supplement the equipment needs of a modern SWAT team as well as the team’s training. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS Training and equipment are far less valuable if the team doesn’t have the correct mindset, one that says, “I will put my life on the line to prevent

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these terrorists from killing large numbers of Americans; I am prepared to sacrifice myself to accomplish this mission.” In many departments, the SOP is to withdraw if the team takes casualties, and (depending on the situation) when confronted by civil criminals, this is a reasonable course of action. In the terrorist incident, withdrawal is simply not an option; the team must maximize surprise, speed, and violence of action and aggressively continue the operation in the face of casualties because once the assault has begun, the terrorists must not be given a chance to regroup. The terrorists in our scenario must not have a chance either to think about what has happened or to plan a response, since that response will almost certainly be the release of the WMD into the populated areas. Authorities in Israel have adopted more of a warrior mindset than one of law enforcement. Howard Linett, a counterterrorism operator in Jerusalem, states that when dealing with terrorists, one must put aside the concept that “we’re police officers” and take on the mindset of soldiers: “It’s not a matter of arrest and prosecute; it’s a matter of kill or be killed.”7 The United States is certainly not in a position where we must adopt this philosophy on a daily basis, but we may well already be in one where we must be prepared to adopt it in extraordinary circumstances. The mission is to neutralize the ability of the terrorists to release a WMD or to execute their plan and carry out their threats. This mission is paramount and must be completed. Since most facilities such as the one in the above scenario are very large, manpower is going to be critical. The doctrine of staying with a perpetrator who has been shot must be set aside in a case such as this. Instead, the officer who did the shooting must restrain the subject and report the shooting and its location so the command can record it and medical personnel can be dispatched when the situation permits. A downed officer must, as soon as the tactical situation permits, be given immediate care and moved to a covered area and then the officer’s location and condition must be reported to the command center. The team must then continue the mission, while medical personnel are dispatched to the officer immediately.8 Remember that terrorists views themselves as soldiers, commandos. Islamic extremists call themselves Fedayeen (commando) and consider themselves servants of God who are at war with you. Many home-grown terrorists consider themselves servants of God at war with a government that is serving the devil. If our enemy believes this to be a war, we must also adopt that view in order to prevail. This is not to say that every SWAT operation is a case of war or that any of them are free-fire zones, where we can indiscriminately shoot anybody who is not a law enforcement officer, but in the event of a terrorist incident, on a case-by-case basis, appropriate action is needed when

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civilian lives are at great risk. In a terrorist attack, we must adopt the warrior perspective and mindset of kill or be killed, rather than capture, arrest, and prosecute. What is needed is training on the part of law enforcement officers everywhere to be aware of the terror threat to their jurisdiction, no matter how remote the possibility of an attack may seem, and the ability to recognize a terror strike when they see one. This recognition may come while the strike is in the planning stages (the best time to detect) or in the operational phase (the easiest time to recognize the threat but often so late in the game that the only option is the tactical one). The law enforcement administrator and local official must be educated on the terror threat in order to fully appreciate the responsibility they have in doing all within their power to protect their citizens from an attack by thwarting it in the planning and preparation stages (at best) or (at the very least) by aggressively and violently overcoming it after the assault has begun. NOTES 1. The DHS SWAT typing system contains a number of acronyms; here is a brief glossary of key terms: CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear PPE: Personal Protective Equipment APR: Air-Purifying Respirator SCBA: Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Level-B PPE: Nonencapsulated or encapsulated chemical-resistant suit with SCBA Level-C PPE: Nonencapsulated chemical-resistant suit with APR NIOSH: National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health APC: Armored Personnel Carrier

2. In FRIES, a very thick rope is attached to a helicopter, and the unattached end is dropped to the ground. Operators reach out of the hovering helicopter, grab the rope, and slide to the ground much as a fireman might on a pole in the firehouse. Using this technique, multiple operators may exit a helicopter into an area of operations with the aircraft never touching the ground. 3. A list of significant dates can be obtained from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism at http://www.mipt.org. 4. Latin for “to stand by that which was decided.” 5. The White House, Presidential Decision Directive 39, June 21, 1995. 6. HRT is the FBI’s SWAT team; it is a world-class unit with superb skills and abilities, but the local agencies must be able to react and handle a major terror event on their own or at least hold and develop the situation until HRT can arrive. 7. Howard Linett, Living with Terrorism: Survival Lessons from the Streets of Jerusalem (Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press, 2005), 47.

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8. This idea will certainly be an anathema to many police officers who vow never to leave a fallen comrade, but this is an extraordinary situation. Soldiers also never leave a fallen comrade but realize they must continue the mission, often returning to assist the friendly wounded only after the operation has been successfully concluded.

PART III SOFT POWER

CHAPTER 14 DENYING TERRORISTS SANCTUARY THROUGH CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS Robert J. Pauly, Jr., and Robert W. Redding

Maryem had heard that the new Afghan National Army (ANA) was coming to her village to provide medical services. While she was not sure she could trust any men with guns anymore, she knew she could use a doctor’s services for Wakil, her two-year-old son, whose sickly body made him look like he was less than a year old. The khan who controlled the lands south of the village, as well as her tribal malik (essentially, a spokesman, as the Pashtun recognize no chieftains), had told her oldest son, Masud, that everyone should show up at least to see what they could get. Maryem was familiar with that concept, since her husband had been killed in a dispute as a result of bedal, one of the Pashtun codes of conduct that demands revenge and retribution for any wrong committed. The cousin whose bedal debt had been paid by her husband’s blood had been kind enough to bring her and her six children under his roof, but he had limited resources that were first distributed to his two wives and their children. Maryem was desperate and knew that when the day came, she would get whatever she could as fast as possible. On the day of the clinic to provide medical services, the ANA arrived before dawn and set up several large tents on the village’s soccer field. Into and out of each of these tents was a path outlined with stakes and marking ribbon. Maryem brought Wakil, wrapped against the morning chill, to an area below the field and huddled with the other women from the village, all of whom had come to see the doctors and get whatever supplies they could get. From her vantage point (and through the mesh of her burqa), she

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could see many Afghan soldiers unpacking boxes of supplies and getting organized. There were a few other people on the soccer field that she could see. Some were clearly Westerners in civilian clothing. After a few minutes of waiting, she heard a man speaking in Pashtun over a loudspeaker. He said that on behalf of the government in Kabul, the ANA was providing free medical care and other supplies to the people of her village. He said that everyone present would be able to see a doctor, so be patient. Then the loudspeakers began playing the song that goes with the Afghan national dance, after which some of the soldiers and some of the village men formed a circle and began to dance. To Maryem, it was all somewhat pleasant, but at the same time odd—unlike her past experiences, these soldiers were mostly pleasant and helpful; they were not stealing; and they were organized. As she was thinking about that, a soldier came to the waiting area and said for the next group (which included Maryem and Wakil) to come with him. Other soldiers and leaders from the village ensured that the waiting area remained calm and orderly. She was first taken to a tent where there was a table with several Afghan soldiers, who were gathering information about them. They were mostly asking questions about what the villagers’ chief medical complaints were, as well as their names and where they lived. After that, the group was queued up in another tent, waiting for the doctors. While they were there, another set of Afghan soldiers talked to them about good habits that would keep them healthy, including washing their hands and keeping bodily wastes away from where they lived. As Maryem chuckled about that with another woman from the village, her name was called to see the doctors. Immediately a knot came to her throat, as she never saw men from outside her family in a private setting. As she went into the treatment tent, however, her concern for Wakil overcame any doubts about social appropriateness. Inside the tent, the soldier who guided her there left as another Afghan man greeted her in the traditional fashion. He said his name was Wasil and that he was a doctor. He also introduced a Western woman who was from a group of Western doctors called Mercy Relief. There was also another Westerner in the room who wore a thick beard and was dressed in Afghan clothing. Wasil asked Maryem to put Wakil on the treatment table and asked what she thought was wrong with him. After a couple of minutes of taking vital signs from Wakil, the Westerner and Wasil spoke briefly. Then Wasil told Maryem that, while she was a good mother, her son was sick because of some worms inside of him that come from the human excrement that sometimes collects in the street and in the ditch where they get their water. The doctor gave her some pills and instructions on how to give them to Wakil and sent her on her way. As she was leaving, she was given a new washbasin to take home with her. While still somewhat confused about what was going on, she knew one thing: The

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ANA, and thereby the government in Kabul, had probably saved the life of her son. As she was walking home and thinking about her experiences that morning, she had no idea that she had been a willing participant in a carefully scripted operation that was planned, resourced, and executed primarily by a 12-man U.S. Army Special Forces detachment. And that was the way it was supposed to be.1 The above example is illustrative of the centrality of the use of civil– military operations to achieve progress in the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In particular, it demonstrates the importance of using confidence-building measures among villagers at the local level in order to assist the United States and its domestic allies (in this case, the ANA) to minimize support for al Qaeda and its affiliates in a given state under reconstruction, in this case Afghanistan. The Afghan example is just one of many such cases across the world that demonstrate the growing role of U.S. military special forces (active duty and reserve units alike) in microlevel civil–military operations designed to achieve progress in the GWOT, one village or town at a time, in places ranging geographically from Iraq and Yemen to Mongolia and the Philippines. The balance of this chapter examines these types of operations and the grand strategy upon which they are based. The first part of this discussion provides a conceptual overview of the use of civil–military operations to achieve strategic objectives. This is followed by an analysis of civil–military operations in the context of the GWOT in particular. The third section examines case studies of U.S.-led civil–military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, followed by an examination of the insights that U.S. policymakers should draw from these case studies. The concluding section provides some observations on the prospects for the future of the use of civil–military operations by the United States and its allies. CIVIL–MILITARY OPERATIONS AS A STRATEGIC TOOL Since the end of the Cold War, generally, and specifically after the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has placed a progressively greater emphasis on the use of nation- or state-building projects to achieve its strategic objectives in places such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.2 One of the most indispensable tools available to achieve progress in those projects, in turn, is the use of civil– military operations.3 In order to best explain how civil–military operations are employed by the United States in the contemporary international system, it is first important to review some commonly used definitions as a means to ground the reader in the terminology of the field. At its core, humanitarian and civil assistance is defined as assistance provided to the local populace in a given state or locality therein by U.S.

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military forces in conjunction with their operations and exercises. Authorized under the auspices of Title 10, United States Code, Section 401, such assistance is limited to “(1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.”4 Each of these types of assistance has been provided by U.S. forces in a variety of nation- or state-building operations since the 1990s. One component of humanitarian and civil assistance is military civic action (MCA), which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) defines as the “use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.”5 The introductory section of the chapter, for instance, offers a clear example of MCA, designed to afford the ANA an opportunity to establish a favorable rapport with the local population, one likely to reduce the potential for support for al Qaeda and Taliban fighters within the region where the medical clinic was administered. The conduct of civil–military operations, whether by U.S. forces alone or in collaboration with indigenous actors in a particular state or region therein, is one method U.S. military officers employ in order to achieve the broader goal of successful counterinsurgency. In short, such operations are considered one of the many different kinds of “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”6 Civil–military operations can also be used to complement broader means of unconventional warfare, which the DOD described as “military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and often direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence gathering, and escape and evasion.”7 These conceptual definitions articulate the ways in which civil–military operations are expected to unfold in theory. In practice, carrying out such operations falls to individual military servicemen and women, who—as the case studies provided later in the chapter demonstrate—often face unanticipated circumstances on the ground in many kinds of operating environments. In general terms, an officer engaging in civil–military operations must establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of

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operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may also include the performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of the local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of military operations. Ultimately, tasks as wide-ranging as providing for the basic survival needs of the residents of a village or town in the aftermath of a conflict to cobbling together a rudimentary political system—and, in some cases, serving (either formally or informally) as an official within that system—all fall under the aegis of civil affairs. While civil–military operations have been an indispensable part of U.S. participation in nation- or state-building operations since the end of the Cold War and thus received considerably more attention in the academic and policymaking communities than was previously the case, they are by no means a new concept in the history of the U.S. military. The conduct of civil–military operations by U.S. forces dates to the nineteenth century, with the United States’ occupation of and development of governmental institutions inside the Philippines following its victory in the brief Spanish-American War of 1898 serving as the most notable example. The United States spent much of the quarter-century preceding the Spanish-American War establishing military bases across the globe, a process that brought U.S. forces into contact with a range of cultures in both war-fighting and civil capacities. The first U.S. base in the Pacific, for instance, was established on the atoll of Midway, which Washington annexed in 1867. The United States also secured the right to use the harbor of Pago Pago on the Samoan island of Tutuila in 1877, two years after signing a free trade treaty with the eight-island chain of Hawaii that represented the first step toward the eventual colonization and annexation of that entity.8 These Pacific bases added a greater sense of permanence to the global reach of U.S. sea power, which was itself already manifested in the formation of permanent squadrons in the Mediterranean (1815), West India and the Pacific (1822), Brazil and the South Atlantic (1826), East India (1835), and West Africa (1843). Each of these developments demonstrated the depth of the U.S. commitment to enhancing domestic power and security through expansion during a period when the United States was considered by its rivals abroad as more of an isolated Westernhemispheric state rather than a challenger for global economic, military, and political influence. As U.S. scholar Walter Russell Mead, an expert on the history of U.S. foreign policy, asserts, “In other words, during the period of American innocence and isolation, the United States had forces stationed on or near every major continent in the world; its navy was active in virtually every ocean, its troops saw combat on virtually every continent, and its foreign relations were in a perpetual state of crisis and turmoil.”9

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After occupying the Philippines in May 1898 and assisting the natives in overthrowing the Spanish colonial regime, the United States set about establishing a U.S.-style democratic government over the islands. The process did not proceed smoothly. Instead, an insurgency erupted in 1899, which the United States spent nearly three years subduing at the cost of the lives of 4,234 U.S. servicemen.10 The insurgency—which was instigated and carried out primarily, if not exclusively, by the Muslims inhabiting the southern half of the archipelago—served as a lesson that U.S. expansion, while generally beneficial for U.S. domestic security, would always entail costs. The challenge for U.S. forces—one that they struggled to meet successfully—was to cultivate conciliatory relations with remote villages in the south through civil–military operations designed to increase access to medical care and opportunities for economic growth while combating the insurgents militarily. The strategy was effective in the short term; however, maintaining the necessary presence to follow through on such civil–military projects proved impractical over the long term. Perhaps the most significant example of the successful use of civil– military measures to build enduring democratic institutions following a devastating conflict came with the U.S.-led nation- or state-building efforts in the aftermath of World War II in Germany and Japan. Most significantly, the United States spent four years after the war helping to rebuild the West German economic and political systems under liberal democratic and capitalist economic auspices that culminated in the establishment of an independent Federal Republic of Germany in May 1949.11 The U.S. military, and specifically General Lucius D. Clay, played critical roles in orchestrating the process, providing an example of the potential for civil–military operations in the modern era—albeit one that, as demonstrated later in this chapter, has not yet been replicated in the context of the GWOT. Civil–Military Operations and the War on Terrorism In March 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush delivered a speech before members of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, in which he discussed his administration’s central foreign policy theme: enhancing the prospects for the liberal democratization of the Greater Middle East and specifically Iraq. In his address, Bush emphasized his administration’s strategy to protect the United States: [This] strategy to protect America is based upon a clear premise: the security of our nation depends on the advance of liberty in other nations. On September 11, 2001, we saw that problems originating in a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could bring murder and destruction to our country. We saw that dictatorships shelter terrorists, feed resentment and radicalism, and

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threaten the security of free nations. Democracies replace resentment with hope, democracies respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, democracies join the fight against terror. And so America is committed to an historic long-term goal: To secure the peace of the world, we seek the end of tyranny in our world. We are making progress in the march of freedom— and some of the most important progress has taken place in a region that has not known the blessings of liberty: the broader Middle East.12

The administration reiterated the president’s point in the context of its second formal National Security Strategy (NSS), which was released the same month. In particular, the NSS states: It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. . . . Achieving this goal is the work of generations. The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War.13

The Bush administration’s focus on the need for liberal democratic reform across the Greater Middle East grew initially out of al Qaeda’s devastating attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on the outskirts of Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. In short, Bush believes that creating opportunities for freedom of expression and economic growth within the states of the Greater Middle East will reduce the support for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda therein, especially over the long term. The first step toward achieving that end, in the administration’s view, was to remove repressive regimes controlled by the Taliban in Afghanistan and then President Saddam Hussein in Iraq through the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom in the fall of 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in the spring of 2003, respectively. The second (and ongoing) step is to help create conditions for the development of enduring liberal democratic institutions, albeit ones that accommodate domestic cultural and religious norms through the conduct of nation- or statebuilding operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Regrettably, although predictably, progress in each of those projects has been limited and has proceeded at a rather glacial pace, most notably so because of a lack of security—particularly in the heart of Iraq, where the vast majority of that state’s previously powerful (and now economically and politically marginalized and embittered) minority Sunni community is situated. Central to the administration’s strategy is the use of nation- or state-building projects—with an emphasis on civil–military operations therein—to reduce the number of “failing” and “failed” states in the international systems, especially in the Greater Middle East, as a means to

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decrease the pool of recruits and potential bases of operation for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda.14 The administration places an emphasis on the use of civil–military operations and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. Department of State (DOS) therein in its NSS. In particular, the NSS points to the importance of the establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the DOS, characterizing it as an institution that “draws on all agencies of the government and integrates its activities with our military’s efforts” and one that coordinates its activities with U.S. allies and international organizations such as the European Union (EU) and United Nations.15 Further, the NSS points to the DOD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which calls for expansion of U.S. Special Operations Forces.16 Such forces have been indispensable to the conduct of civil–military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, specifically in the past five years. The administration’s approach, which has been employed with varying degrees of success in both Afghanistan and Iraq, is part of the broader transformation of the U.S. military that was launched by the DOD at the start of Bush’s first term in January 2001 and has continued, albeit at a rather glacial pace, in the years since. The initial calls for that transformation came concurrent with (and, to an extent, as a result of) the end of the Cold War, which left the United States and its European allies to deal with interrelated instability and intra-state conflict in places ranging from the Caribbean and the Balkans to sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. The result was the emergence of a concept known in military parlance as “Fourth Generation Warfare.” This concept is important to understanding the effects of civil–military operations on the modern battlefield. In a 1994 article in the Marine Corps Gazette, William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale, Capt. John F. Schmitt, Col. Joseph W. Sutton, and Lt. Col. Gary I. Wilson presented a description of this type of warfare, noting that beginning with Mao’s initial concept that political power was more decisive than military power and progressing to the intifada’s total reliance on the mass media and international networks to neutralize Israeli military power, warfare has undergone a fundamental change. The fourth generation has arrived. Strategically, it attempts to directly change the minds of enemy policymakers. This change is not to be achieved through the traditional method of superiority on the battlefield. Rather, it is to be accomplished through the superior use of all the networks available in the information age. These networks are employed to carry specific messages to enemy policymakers. A sophisticated opponent can even tailor the message to a specific audience and a specific strategic situation.17

In their article, Lind, Nightengale, Schmitt, Sutton, and Wilson suggested that this new generation of war would: (a) be fought in a complex

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arena of low-intensity conflict; (b) include tactics and techniques from earlier generations; (c) be fought across the spectrum of political, social, economic, and military networks; (d) be fought worldwide through these networks; and (e) involve a mix of national, international, transnational, and subnational actors. Building on that approach in a subsequent piece, Lt. Col. Thomas X. Hammes stressed that the United States’ national security capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they have great difficulties. The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traffic has no nation-state base, it is very difficult to attack. The nation-state shields the drug lords but cannot control them. We cannot attack them without violating the sovereignty of a friendly nation. A fourth-generation attacker could well operate in a similar manner, as some Middle Eastern terrorists already do.18

One example of these efforts involves the use of Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Used initially in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and composed of U.S. military and civil government representatives to support regional reconstruction and development, these teams are now being run by other OEF partners with comparable composition. The concept has also been utilized in nationor state-building operations in Iraq over the past three years. PRTs are intended to provide a security umbrella under which other member of civil society (e.g., relief and development nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) can operate and bring their resources to bear. They have also been the main effort in developing closer ties to local Afghan political and religious leaders, officials, and others of significance and executed unilateral operations to support health, education, and general living condition improvement. At the broader strategic level, the DOD has incorporated civil–military measures through the use of PRTs in particular into its own doctrine, most recently through the release of The National Defense Strategy of the United States in March 2005, which calls for U.S. forces to develop “ways to strengthen their language and civil affairs capabilities as required for specific deployments.”19 However, in order to function effectively, PRTs must be utilized selectively with due consideration given to the cultural norms in the area in which they are deployed. Consider, for instance, the timeless advice provided by Englishman T.E. Lawrence in his classic treatise The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, which was written concurrent with Britain’s efforts to maintain control over its colonial possessions in the Middle East in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the

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Red Sea Parts, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed. It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts. It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy.20

Lawrence’s advice is particularly well taken when one examines the challenges American forces face in combating precisely the types of insurgent movements to which one of Britain’s most famous Arabists refers. The following section of this chapter will discuss the civil–military side of the struggle against such foes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines since the events of 9/11. Civil–Military Operations in Practice: Three Case Studies The cases of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines help to illustrate both the utility of the civil–military operations to achieve progress in the GWOT and the many daunting challenges associated with such efforts. These cases show that not only are civil–military operations necessary to fulfill international obligations (such as the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, articles 47–79 concerning the protection of civilians during conflict), but that they are used as part of efforts to achieve operational objectives on the battlefield. Moreover, civil–military operations are more effective in achieving the desired effects when they are the main effort as opposed to being a supporting effort. Afghanistan Just under two months after al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on the outskirts of Washington, D.C., the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The operation was designed to eliminate the Taliban regime that had played host to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and to capture or kill as many of the leaders of both groups as possible. While OEF did not result in the capture or death of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, it did remove the Taliban from power, which helped to set the stage for the development of a democratic electoral system and government in Afghanistan.21 The conduct of civil– military operations by a range of U.S. special operations forces units has been central to continuing efforts to both root out the remaining al Qaeda and Taliban fighters and create the necessary conditions for the establishment of enduring democratic governance and viable and trustworthy national military and policing institutions across Afghanistan’s ethnically disparate and geographically remote—and often inhospitable—regions.

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The United States’ approach to the interconnected hunt for bin Laden and his supporters, and the development of liberal democratic governmental institutions and capable domestic security forces in Afghanistan, is demonstrative of an ongoing DOD transformation that favors relatively small deployments of highly trained special operations forces numbering in the thousands, as opposed to the large-scale deployments in the hundreds of thousands of servicemen and women that was the norm prior to the events of 9/11. U.S. force levels in Afghanistan have hovered around 8,500 over the past three years, with U.S. units often deployed to forward operating “firebases” in remote regions, where they use collaborative patrols with ANA units and humanitarian projects, such as the medical clinic described in the introduction to this piece, to generate goodwill and gather useful intelligence at the village level. Ultimately, the strategic thinking at work is that by creating such goodwill, the United States and the Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai can reduce grassroots support for al Qaeda and the Taliban and eventually liquidate the remnants of both, to include bin Laden and his chief deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.22 At its core, the U.S. strategy is one that will take time and patience to produce results, especially if judged at the macro level, where such results are not easy to discern in the short term. Most of the criticism of the Bush administration’s performance in Afghanistan to date, for example, has grown out of its failure to capture or kill bin Laden or create enduring stability throughout that state. That criticism, however, does not take into account myriad examples of success in reconstruction projects and humanitarian operations at the micro level. Consider, for example, the efforts of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) within Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180, which is headquartered at Baghram Air Base just north of Kabul and accounts for approximately one-tenth of the total U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Composed primarily of U.S. Army Special Forces units, the JSOTF operates a series of forward firebases in the Afghan countryside, most notably in the southeastern region of the country bordering Pakistan, where al Qaeda and Taliban forces are most active. Its operators typically have thick beards and wear the Afghan kerchiefs common among natives of the region. Put simply, they do whatever possible to adapt to and, ideally, become a part of the cultural environs in which they are deployed, which proves beneficial in building a measure of trust through repeated interactions with Afghan villagers over time.23 Regarding current military operations in Afghanistan, there are two general categories of supporting civil–military operations that can be examined to extract some details of previously executed civil–military operations. The first category encompasses those operations conducted by special operations forces other than civil affairs units. The other category includes those civil–military operations that emanate from the provincial

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reconstruction teams found throughout the Afghan countryside, usually conducted or otherwise facilitated by civil affairs units. During the normal course of operations in Afghanistan, U.S. Army Special Forces units routinely provide humanitarian assistance, interact with the local government, or otherwise conduct civil–military operations. While there are many types of operations being conducted there by special forces, the overarching type of operation being conducted is called unconventional warfare (UW). According to the DOD, UW is “a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.”24 During the course of UW, U.S. Special Forces units conduct (either unilaterally or with the support of civil affairs units) various operations that support the overall objectives of supporting the Afghan government, all the while seeking out the enemy wherever they are and destroying them. One specialized tactic employed by U.S. Special Forces is that of MCA, defined in the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.401—Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures as the “use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, etc., contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.”25 Basically, U.S. Special Forces conduct an operation where all the good outcomes appear to be the result of the efforts of the Afghan government. An example of this tactic being used in the field is in the training of the Afghan National Army. During the training, U.S. Special Forces “used military civic action missions (MCA) in order to support the legitimacy of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA), provide non-combat leadership opportunities prior to confidence missions, as well as to provide training in handling the Afghan civilian populace.”26 One technique that was often used to accomplish this was the Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP). During the course of the training program for newly established Afghan army units, a MEDCAP was planned to be executed by the Afghan unit in an area that was relatively pacified. In conjunction with U.S. forces and nongovernmental relief organization partners, U.S. Special Forces facilitated and ensured the success of what appeared to the public to be an Afghan event to provide healthcare, public sanitation education, and similar support to a remote village, a needy neighborhood, or other like entity. During the course of deployment, the 5th Battalion, 19th Special Forces unit used this tactic frequently with impressive results in improving the legitimacy

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of the Afghan government and its army.27 Another specific example of this occurred at the Kabul Children’s Hospital. The Afghan National Army’s 3rd Brigade regularly visits the hospital to provide needed supplies and toys for the children.28 One of the emerging tactics from OEF is the use of PRTs. Typically based in the capital of the province they are supporting, these military teams provide the coalition and the Afghan government the ability to “extend the authority of the Afghan central government, promote and enhance security, and facilitate humanitarian relief and reconstruction operations”29 PRTs are critical to removing internal hiding places and sanctuaries for the insurgents; this is particularly true concerning the PRTs located in the provinces neighboring Pakistan. The nature of the conditions of the border region, particularly noncentrally governed Pakistani border provinces, makes these areas more important because of the transit of people, money, and supplies that are intended to support the insurgency. As is typical of any insurgency, the auxiliaries of the insurgency usually live undercover (and sometimes in the open) within the general population and run the “underground” support structures of the insurgency, such as “ratlines” (surreptitious networks of routes and safe houses used by the insurgents to support operations). The PRTs in Afghanistan are typically staffed with military and civilian reconstruction specialists. Additionally, the PRTs are staffed with combat soldiers who secure the PRTs’ base, as well as provide force protection for the reconstruction specialists when they are performing their duties “outside the wire.” When appropriate, PRTs support tactical units’ mission objectives within their operating area, but are essentially the main effort for nonlethal supportive effects for the province. In large part because of civil–military operations carried out by special operations units, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have made some progress in creating a more stable and democratic Afghanistan. For instance, the state now has a democratically elected president (Karzai) and parliament, which were put in place by way of national votes in the fall of 2004 and 2005. Yet, it is also clear that much work remains to be done. Above all, the problem is that maintaining order in ethnically and tribally diverse regions is a difficult task, one that demands a commitment that may last decades and is best measured locally in a particular region or village rather than at the broader national level, where any manifestation of violence in one place or another tends to trump more positive but less sensationalistic success stories elsewhere. Iraq In March and April 2003, the United States prosecuted one of the most effective wars in its history, eliminating the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in less than a month through the conduct of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).30 In terms of war-fighting, the operation was nearly

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flawless. The challenges faced by U.S. forces in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Baghdad and in the context of U.S.-led nation- or state-building operations in Iraq in the years since then, on the other hand, have been considerably more daunting. As with Afghanistan, the conduct of civil– military operations has been indispensable to the progress achieved in terms of economics, politics, and security at the local level in towns and villages across Iraq. However, unlike the situation in Afghanistan, especially in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the regime, civil–military tasks fell in many cases to servicemen and women who lacked the training to carry out such tasks and thus simply adapted to the circumstances they faced on the ground. The U.S. military “footprint” in Iraq is markedly larger than that in Afghanistan, and organized resistance to the U.S. occupation has been considerably greater in Iraq. In short, both the challenges faced by U.S. forces and the stakes associated with success and failure in Iraq have increased at a proportionally higher rate than in Afghanistan. Two of the most significant reasons for this are the emphasis placed on pursuing nation- or state-building operations in Iraq by the Bush administration and countering efforts by domestic insurgents and foreign fighters aligned with al Qaeda to undermine those operations. Collectively, these factors have raised the relative costs of the U.S. presence in Iraq, which has resulted in the deaths of 2,376 U.S. servicemen and women there between March 2003 and April 2006.31 The extent of the troop presence in Iraq—and consistent calls by some critics of the Bush administration to increase that presence—grow out of a broader debate within the DOD over the manner in which military forces should or should not be utilized in nation- or state-building projects. Generally speaking, one side of this debate does not think the military should play a central role in nation- or state-building projects; its proponents suggest, instead, that U.S. forces should focus much more on traditional war-fighting tasks, which those forces carried out quite effectively in OIF. Those on the other side of the debate recognize the importance of using nation- or state-building projects—and civil–military operations therein—to reduce the number of failing and failed states in the Greater Middle East and diminish the capabilities of terrorist groups in that region.32 As is true of Afghanistan, the conduct of civil–military operations has resulted in a great deal of progress in terms of the development of physical infrastructure and political institutions in selected cases at the local level, but projects such as the reconstruction of schools and negotiation of power-sharing arrangements on village councils are typically overshadowed by the daily violence generated by the insurgency. Regrettably, regardless of how many schools one builds or public works projects one

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launches, these types of endeavors simply do not generate the same extent of media coverage as the detonation of improvised explosive devices and commission of homicide bombings by insurgents with roots inside and outside of Iraq. For example, although hundreds of new schools have been opened in Iraq over the past three years, 26,496 insurgent attacks were carried out therein in 2004 and 34,131 in 2005.33 Not surprisingly, the latter figures tend to draw much more public attention than the former. If one examines the situation in Iraq closely enough, there are certainly signs of progress that have been achieved primarily as a result of the actions of U.S. servicemen and women in the contexts of civil–military operations at the local level. Consider, for instance, the example of Army Maj. James A. Gavrilis, whose 12-man special forces team established a functioning municipal democracy in Ar Rutbah, a Sunni city of 25,000 in the Anbar province of Iraq near the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Working closely with civil administrators, policemen, and tribal leaders, Gavrilis’ unit orchestrated the development of representative political institutions and public services that were staffed and administered by the citizens of the town.34 It is an example that has been replicated in locales across Iraq. Yet, until similar successes are achieved at the national level, such examples are more likely to be overlooked than lauded as indicators of the potential for a positive future for Iraqis. The Philippines Roughly concurrent with the prosecution of OEF and its aftermath in Afghanistan, U.S. forces were also carrying out a Southeast Asian component of the GWOT several thousand miles to the east in the Philippines. In the days and weeks following the events of 9/11, Bush and the members of his national security team emphasized repeatedly that the GWOT was indeed a global struggle and would be approached as such by the United States. The United States’ efforts in the Philippines were one of the first examples of the application of the administration’s “global” approach in practice.35 Similar to its strategy in Afghanistan, the United States sought to minimize terrorist threats to U.S. interests emanating from the Philippines by using civil–military operations to reduce support for al Qaeda affiliate Abu Sayyaf in the jungles of southern islands of that Asian archipelago.36 Since January 2002, on Mindanao—the largest of the Muslim majority islands in the Philippines—and neighboring Basilan island, U.S. Army Special Forces units have led the effort in using various types of civil–military operations as part of a campaign to reduce the strongholds of Abu Sayyaf by isolating the terrorists from the civilian population that they need for logistical support and a pool of recruits. As noted earlier, the Muslims of the south—culturally and religiously isolated from the Roman

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Catholic majority in the northern half of the Philippines—mounted a fierce insurgency against U.S. forces in the aftermath of the U.S. victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, one that was not fully quelled until 1913. Nearly a century later, the United States faces a comparable challenge— one, as is the case in Afghanistan, it has confronted collaboratively with the Philippine military over the past four years. Originally administered by Joint Task Force 510, U.S. operations in the Philippines in the context of the GWOT now come under the umbrella of the JSOTF, which is headquartered in the town of Zamboanga, just across a narrow strait from Basilan Island. OEF-Philippines commenced in January 2002 with a “force cap” of 600, negotiated by officials in Washington and Manila. While substantially smaller than the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, some of the methods used by special operations units in Zamboanga and on Basilan Island are comparable. Most significantly, U.S. units have worked with troops from the Philippine Army in conducting MEDCAPs designed to improve sanitation and related health concerns in villages situated in the thick tropical jungles on Mindanao and Basilan. The problem, as in Afghanistan, is that building confidence among villagers fearful of reprisals from Abu Sayyaf is a time-consuming task that requires persistent follow-up on behalf of Philippine forces. The extent to which that will occur over the long term remains open to debate.37 As Robert Kaplan—a correspondent at The Atlantic Monthly, who has spent much of the past three years living and working with U.S. military units stationed in places as wide ranging as Colombia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, Yemen, and Mongolia—explains: The ostensible mission was to help Philippine troops kill international terrorists. But that was accomplished by orchestrating a humanitarian assistance campaign, which severed the link between the terrorists and the rest of the Muslim population—exactly what successful middle level commanders had done in the Philippines a hundred years before. . . . [But] America could not change the vast forces of history and culture that had placed a poor Muslim region at the southern edge of a badly governed, Christian-run archipelago nation, just as America could not clap its hands and give governments in the mountains of Colombia and Yemen complete control over their lawless lowlands.38

Different from both Iraq and Afghanistan, civil–military operations in the Philippines are almost all under the auspices of the Coalition JSOTF and U.S. Army Special Forces. As part of the counterinsurgency campaign being conducted there, civil–military operations are integral, albeit supporting efforts in the Philippines.39 civil–military operations in OEFPhilippines have been conducted in order to build government legitimacy and control, which is a significant effort (if not the main effort) as part of

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any counterinsurgency campaign. It is important to note that in the Philippines, the feedback from postoperational assessments led to different techniques being used in different locations, even though those locations were only a few miles apart. For example, in one village on Basilan Island, the provision of better education best supported the effect of promoting government legitimacy. Meanwhile, in a village close by, that effect was best achieved by the construction of a well. Similar observations have been made in Iraq and Afghanistan and reinforce the tactic of gathering information at the lowest level for the purposes of operational assessment. As with the two other theaters, MEDCAPs are an important component of the overall strategy for promoting government legitimacy and thereby removing safe havens for insurgents and terrorists. As a “carrot” in the carrot-and-stick approach to nation building, MEDCAPs and other forms of humanitarian aid are essential to establishing (or reestablishing) the power of the central government and circumventing other forms of authority in a particular area. As with previously described programs in Afghanistan and Iraq, MEDCAPs are excellent opportunities for military civic action projects, where the host nation (in this case, the government of the Philippines) receives most, if not all, the credit for any humanitarian aid or development project. Strengths and Weaknesses of Use of Civil–Military Operations in the War on Terrorism Above all, U.S. policymakers can draw several insights from the United States’ participation in and use of civil–military operations in the conduct of nation- or state-building projects since the end of the Cold War generally and in the context of the GWOT on terrorism in particular—each of which is discussed in the following section of this chapter. First, nationor state-building projects are at present (and will remain) central to U.S. efforts to reduce the number of failing and failed states in the international system. Second, the military will continue to play an indispensable role in such operations, most notably so through the deployment of special operations teams with capabilities in the interconnected issue areas of security, civil affairs and humanitarian crisis management, and intelligence gathering. Third, at the broader strategic level, the military must accept—if not embrace—the need for adaptation in dealing with the complex blend of war-fighting and civil affairs tasks conducted in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Fourth, achieving success in nation- or state-building operations will demand more effective coordination between U.S. military officers and civilian officials—as well as between those actors and representatives of international and NGOs—in the planning and implementation of those operations. Fifth, U.S. leaders and policymakers will need to do a better job of selling nation- or state-building projects and civil–military

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operations therein to the general public as essential means to securing U.S. interests in the future. Centrality of Nation or State Building to the Pursuit of U.S. Interests In the aftermath of the Cold War and subsequent victory of U.S. and coalition forces over Iraq in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, U.S. civilian and military policymakers faced an uncertain situation in terms of the types of threats and resultant operations they would have to plan for and implement in the succeeding years. The 1992–1995 civil war in BosniaHerzegovina and ensuing use of NATO forces in postconflict reconstruction operations therein served as a preview of what was to come. In short, intervention in Bosnia demonstrated to the William J. Clinton administration that nation- or state-building projects are time-consuming undertakings that do not lend themselves to concrete exit strategies but are necessary to minimize the dangers of failing and failed states in regions deemed vital to the interests of the United States and its allies. For their part, the events of 9/11—which were planned and orchestrated by al Qaeda from bases of operations in the failed state of Afghanistan—forced the Bush administration to recognize that, despite its earlier misgivings about the use of military forces in nation- or state-building operations, such projects would be essential to making progress toward its vision of political reform in the Greater Middle East. With the United States now committed to nation- or state-building projects in both Afghanistan and Iraq and the number of failing and failed states in the surrounding region rising rather than falling, it is equally clear that such projects will continue to be the rule rather than the exception in the formation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy and strategy in the future. Role of the Military in Nation- or State-Building Operations Notwithstanding differences of opinion among military leaders over whether U.S. forces should play a major role beyond the provision of security in the contexts of nation- or state-building projects, their participation in a range of civil and traditional war-fighting tasks on the ground in the years since the prosecution of OEF and OIF is already a fact on the ground in both Afghanistan and Iraq. On balance, the military has done well in performing those tasks, particularly when one examines the efforts of individual officers and units in local contexts rather than focusing on the lack of effective preinvasion planning in the Pentagon that complicated the management of the occupation and administration of occupied Iraq, following the successful elimination of Saddam’s regime. The ongoing debate in the DOD over the transformation of the military is one that will necessarily focus on the increasing importance of civil–military operations as a tool to achieve progress in the physical reconstruction and economic and political transformation of failing and failed states such as

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Afghanistan and Iraq. Ultimately, military policymakers must recognize that the postconflict stages of the wars of the twenty-first century will be as important as (or perhaps more than) the operations that created the opportunity for economic, political, and social reforms through regime change in the first place. The Need for Operational Adaptation in the Transformation of the Military One of the most daunting challenges U.S. servicemen and women— whether officers or members of the enlisted ranks—face when conducting civil–military operations is the need to adapt as circumstances dictate while dealing with the bureaucratic minutiae of an often complex chain of command. Such difficulties are most problematic when decisions at the level of an individual unit or forward operating base must be sent on to headquarters for approval in a given area of operations (say Afghanistan, Iraq, or the Philippines). Without greater freedom of action, operations in a particular village in an isolated region can be much more difficult to carry out expeditiously and effectively. As a general rule, it is prudent to afford special operations forces as much flexibility as possible in planning and carrying out civil–military strategies in the localities where they have been deployed and have thus developed an expertise often lacking at the higher levels of command in the theater in which the U.S. military has established a larger footprint. The more interaction U.S. forces have with the indigenous population in a village or town, the better. Unfortunately, sometimes the rules of engagement set by commanders at the more overarching strategic levels limit that type of interaction as a result of the inherent security risks involved. Above all, it would be useful to move toward a culture in which U.S. servicemen and women are afforded more freedom of action to adapt to local circumstances rather than being forced to wait for specific orders of precisely what to do and when to do it. Additionally, it is essential that they receive the requisite training to adapt to the cultural environment within which they are operating at a given juncture. Collaboration and Coordination between Military and Civilian Officials and Organizations While it is essential that the U.S. military play a significant role in the conduct of nation- or state-building operations, it is also clear that U.S. civilian agencies, such as the DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development, must contribute a great deal as well. The same is true of international organizations and NGOs. Carrying out an effective civil–military operation, whether building a school or setting up a clinic to provide medical treatment in a remote mountain town in Afghanistan or jungle village in the Philippines, typically demands contributions from several, if not

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all, of the above actors. Collaboration and coordination among those actors, on the other hand, is often difficult to achieve, both at the policymaking level and in practice on the ground in a given state. Both the DOS and DOD have placed increasing emphasis on the issue area of postconflict reconstruction and nation or state building since the events of 9/11. They must continue to focus on that issue area and encourage interaction among representatives of government agencies, the military, international organizations, NGOs, and the academic communities to develop ever-better strategies for the humanitarian and civil–military components of nation or state building in the future. Selling an Evolving Approach to the Public One of the greatest challenges associated with nation or state building in general, and civil–military operations specifically, is in promoting those concepts to the U.S. public with a limited attention span for foreign and security affairs unless directly threatened at home. The events of 9/11 led to a greater awareness of the international system broadly and of failing and failed states in the Greater Middle East in particular. However, it is much more difficult to transform that interest into support for concepts such as nation- or state-building and civil–military operations, with which the public is not familiar and unwilling to advocate if it is perceived to entail a substantial financial cost to the government (and thus the taxpayers). In short, unless there is a sense within the U.S. public that the threats posed by terrorists are as significant as was the case in the aftermath of al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and also that creating an atmosphere conducive to economic growth and democratic reforms through nation or state building in foreign lands will reduce those threats, apathy and disinterest (if not outright opposition) toward such concepts is likely to be the prevalent sentiment among Americans. Consequently, above all else, nation- or state-building and civil–military operations must be linked to security in order to achieve even a measure of support within the U.S. population. CONCLUSIONS During the Cold War, most dangers the United States had to counter grew out of its adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union. Since the end of that bipolar struggle, by contrast, U.S. presidents have had to respond to challenges related to the emergence of failing and failed states that threaten military security, economic vitality, and political stability in regions deemed vital to the interests of the United States and its allies. These entities have been of particular concern to U.S. policymakers since the 1990s. The Clinton and Bush administrations both intervened militarily in states that could be defined as either failing or failed in terms of

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governmental maintenance of, control over, or humane treatment of their populations. The former took action in Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 and the latter in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In each case, the use of force was followed by the conduct of postconflict civil–military operations that have since been defined as nation- or state-building endeavors. The use of civil–military tools in the conduct of nation- or state-building projects is, by no means, a new concept. It was, for example, employed effectively in the transformation of Germany and Japan from dictatorships to democracies in the aftermath of World War II. However, both the frequency of the application of nation- or state-building operations and the threats such projects are designed to counter have changed markedly over the past decade. The primary purpose of the Clinton administration’s participation in nation- or state-building operations in the Balkans was to ensure political stability in a region adjacent to the borders of member states of NATO and the EU. The Bush administration, on the other hand, has supported the reconstruction and democratization of Afghanistan and played the lead role in nation- or state-building operations in Iraq in order to reduce the threats posed to U.S. interests by terrorists and their sponsors in two ways: first, by replacing regimes that supported al Qaeda either directly or indirectly and, second, by improving the standard of living of—and affording political freedom to—the people of the Greater Middle East. Above all, the physical and economic reconstruction and political liberalization of Iraq is absolutely indispensable to the broader transformation of the Islamic world. That much Bush and his advisors have emphasized repeatedly since the elimination of Saddam’s regime in April 2003 and the commencement of reconstruction operations the ensuing month. In April 2004, for instance, Bush stressed that “a free Iraq will stand as an example to reformers across the Middle East. A free Iraq will show that America is on the side of Muslims who wish to live in peace, as we have already shown in Kuwait [by way of the conduct of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War] and Kosovo, Bosnia and Afghanistan. A free Iraq will confirm to a watching world that America’s word, once given, can be relied upon, even in the toughest of times.”40 Bush’s remarks opened a nationally televised press conference addressing the many challenges associated with nation or state building in Iraq. The president’s comments were demonstrative of two underlying points. First, Bush recognized at that juncture that the transformation of Iraq continued to present economic, military, and political roadblocks that would take years, rather than weeks or months, to overcome. Second, he emphasized the importance of seeing the Iraqi nation- or state-building project through to completion, implying that subsequent administrations should maintain the commitment to the broader liberalization and democratization of the Greater Middle East over the long term.

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At the core of insurgent efforts to undermine nation-building operations in Iraq is the fear that the United States will establish an enduring free market economy and representative government there. That outcome could eventually lead to two developments that dictatorial regimes and terrorist groups alike would abhor: an improved standard of living for members of the lower classes of society and the creation of a political atmosphere in which individuals are free to elect—and, if they choose, criticize—those in power. With Iraq as a model, other countries possessing autocratic characteristics comparable to those of Saddam’s former regime (examples range from Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, to more secular-oriented states such as Egypt and Syria) could be the next candidates for economic and political transformation. U.S. efforts to promote democratic change in Afghanistan and Iraq scare the leaders of both autocratic states and terrorist organizations, including, but not limited to, al Qaeda. There are two reasons why. First, those groups thrive on discontent, if not outright desperation, to recruit members willing to sacrifice their lives to battle the adversaries they blame for the dearth of economic growth and political freedom prevalent across much of the Arab world. One such adversary (the United States) is perceived by many Muslims to be responsible for the majority of these shortcomings. Should Bush—or, for that matter, any other U.S. president— manage to use a successful transformation of Iraq to start the engine of reform at the broader regional level, the pool of terrorist recruits would decrease substantially. Second, while bin Laden and his cohort also seek the elimination of the present governments in control of states throughout the Middle East, they would prefer that those changes come under their auspices. That would, of course, allow them to take control and install equally repressive regimes, which they could then administer in a style similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The establishment of representative democracies, by contrast, would encourage the free expression of dissent to prevent the development of any type of autocracy, whether Islamic or secular in character. Putting forward the effort to overcome these hurdles—and accepting the requisite economic, military, and political costs that accumulate along the way—will provide an opportunity to alter the broader relationship between Islam and the West in an equally favorable manner. The United States has embraced comparably daunting challenges in the past, most notably its commitment in the aftermath of World War II to the idea of a Europe whole and free. That project is now nearly 60 years old and gradually nearing completion, with the EU and NATO both moving forward with their most recent enlargement processes in 2004. Lacking the economic, military, and political sacrifices the Americans and Western Europeans made during the Cold War, the European continent, too, might

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still lack the freedom the Bush administration now hopes to spread to the Greater Middle East.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. This account is based on the personal experiences of U.S. Army Special Forces Maj. Robert Redding, who was stationed in Afghanistan in 2002–2003. 2. For a detailed examination of nation or state building in the post-Cold War world, please see Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) and Francis Fukuyama, StateBuilding: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 3. For a detailed examination of the role of the U.S. military in nation- or state-building operations in the context of the GWOT, please see Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (New York: Random House, 2005). 4. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 12, 2001 [As Amended through November 30, 2004] (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2004). 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 45–46. 9. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002), 26. 10. Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 99–128; Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, 136– 142. 11. For a detailed examination of U.S.-led nation- or state-building efforts in post-World War II Germany and Japan, please see Robert Wolfe, Americans as Proconsuls: American Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944–1952 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984). 12. “President Discusses Iraq to Foundation for the Defense of Democracies,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, March 13. 2006, http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/print/20060313-3.html. 13. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006), 1. 14. For a detailed discussion of “failing” and “failed” states in the contemporary international system, please see “The Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy

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(May/June 2005), 50–58 and Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 15. Bush, National Security Strategy, 16. 16. Ibid., 43. 17. William S. Lind, Col. Keith Nightengale (U.S. Army), Capt. John F. Schmitt (U.S. Marine Corps), Col. Joseph W. Sutton (U.S. Army), and Lt. Col. Gary I. Wilson (U.S. Marine Corps, Ret.), “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” Marine Corps Gazette (October 1989): 22–26. 18. Lt. Col. Thomas X. Hammes, “The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 1994). 19. U.S. Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/ d20050318nds1.pdf. 20. T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York: Anchor Books, 1926). 21. For an in-depth examination of OEF, please see Tom Lansford, All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2002). 22. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, 192–255. 23. Ibid. 24. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006). 25. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3-05.401– Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006). 26. Robert W. Redding, “19th SF group utilizes MCA missions to train Afghan National Army Battalions,” Special Warfare (February 2005). 27. Ibid. 28. “Afghan Army Soldiers Support Children’s Hospital, Special to American Forces Press Service,” Pol-e-Charkhi (November 29, 2004). 29. U.S. Institute of Peace, Special Report, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, September 2005). 30. For an in-depth examination of the planning and conduct of OIF, please see Tom Lansford and Robert J. Pauly, Jr., Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second Iraq War (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2004). 31. “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in PostSaddam Iraq,” The Brookings Institution (April 2006), www.brookings.edu/fp/ saban/iraq/indexarchive.htm. 32. For in-depth examinations of U.S.-led nation- or state-building efforts in Iraq, please see L. Paul Bremer III and Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006) and Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005). 33. Ibid. 34. James A. Gavrilis, “The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy (November/ December 2005).

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35. For a sampling of President George W. Bush’s speeches on the GWOT in 2001–2002, please see We Will Prevail: President George W. Bush on War Terrorism and Freedom (New York: Continuum, 2003). 36. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts, 131–183. 37. Ibid., 150–183. 38. Ibid., 167, 170. 39. Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special Warfare (September 2005). 40. George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation in Prime Time Press Conference,” White House Office of the Press Secretary, April 13, 2004.

CHAPTER 15 BATTLEFRONTS IN THE WAR OF IDEAS James S. Robbins

The United States has launched an ambitious undertaking to encourage liberal democratic development in the Middle East. In what President Bush has called a “forward strategy of freedom,” the administration has placed promoting democracy at the center of U.S. national strategy.1 More expansively, the administration’s June 2004 “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative” seeks to encourage regional social, political, and economic development to promote stability and stave off potential future outbreaks of violence.2 Likewise the G-8 nations’ Greater Middle East Partnership plan seeks to promote freedom, knowledge, and women’s empowerment in the region. Underlying the strategy is the idea that “the advance of freedom will increase chances for peace and security for Americans as well as for the people of the Middle East.” Nevertheless, there is another, older peace theory, as enunciated by Egyptian Islamist and member of the Muslim Brotherhood Sayyid Qutb in 1964: Obedience to the Shari’ah [revealed law] of God is necessary for the sake of harmony. . . . Total harmony between human life and the law of the universe is entirely beneficial for mankind, as this is the only guarantee against any kind of discord in life. Only in this state will they be at peace with themselves and at peace with the universe, living in accord with its laws and its movements.3

Both the United States and the radical Islamists seek peace but through very different means. The enemy sees peace developing not through societies adopting democratic systems of government but through universal

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subjugation of all people to a preexisting set of divine laws. Thus, the radical Islamist movement presents a distinct ideological challenge; it does not object to the manner in which the West seeks to promote freedom and democracy but to the liberal ideal itself. RESISTANCE TO GLOBALIZATION The radical Islamists’ war on liberalism is the political component of general resistance to the wide-scale changes caused by globalization or westernization, which they diagnose as a form of imperialism.4 Their critique of democracy is an echo of the early resistance to colonial influences from over a century ago. For example, the following early twentieth century passage from Egyptian Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad Shakir has contemporary relevance to radical Islamists challenging the legitimacy of western-style democracy: Is it then lawful with this in the Shari’ah of Allah that he judge the Muslims in their lands by the legislation of pagan, atheistic Europe? On the contrary, the legislation comes from false and fabricated opinions. They change it and replace it according to their whims. . . . Thus in these clearly invented laws, as clear as the sun, it is clear kufr [blasphemy], no doubt about it. There is no persuasion and there is no excuse for any one who is affiliated to Islam, being whoever it may, in acting on it, submission to it or establishing it.5

The contemporary Islamist resistance to Western incursion is manifested not only in politics but also in the economic, social, and cultural spheres. In an October 2001 interview, Osama bin Laden was asked whether a Huntingtonian “clash of civilizations” was inevitable, and he responded, “I say there is no doubt about that.”6 He offered a comprehensive indictment of the U.S. way of life in his October 2002 “Letter to the American People,” in which he declares, “We regret to inform you that you are the worst civilization in the history of mankind.”7 Bin Laden’s deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri effectively summarized the group’s litany of grievances about U.S. culture and its impact on the region in his preelection message of January 2005 to the Iraqi people. He stated that Muslims should “confront America in the sphere of principles” in order to “expose its polytheism, immorality, and hypocrisy.” The freedom we seek is not the low and despicable freedom of America. It is not the freedom of the banks of usury, giant companies, and misleading media. It is not the freedom of destroying others for material interests. It is not the freedom of AIDS, prostitution, and same-sex marriage. It is not the freedom of gambling, alcohol, and family disintegration. It is not the freedom of using women as a commodity to lure customers, sign deals, draw travelers,

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and promote goods. . . . Genuine freedom is to acquiesce to Shari’ah, which rises above ambition, hostility, or heretic tendencies.8

In the opinion of al Qaeda and most other radical Islamist groups, none of the governments in the Middle East has adequately resisted the incursion of Western values, practices, and attendant moral corruption. The regimes are either overtly and shamelessly secular or hypocritically sectarian, claiming to be Islamic but not enforcing Shari’ah. Of the two, the latter are worse because they pretend to be something they are not. The Saudi regime in particular has been singled out for bin Laden’s ire.9 In this respect, al Qaeda is following in the tradition of many previous insurgent movements claiming to be better protectors of the faith.10 THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN TERRORIST MOVEMENTS Religiously oriented terrorist and insurgent groups operate in many respects like any other such groups. They use similar tactics and follow the same organizational principles as secular violent political movements. In contemporary Islamic terrorist movements, religion is operationalized as ideology and plays the same role as other more familiar ideological frameworks such as various forms of Marxism, socialism, or nationalism. Kwame Nkrumah, African revolutionary and founder of modern Ghana, said the role of ideology in a revolutionary movement is to clarify, denounce, explain, solve, and mobilize.11 This is also true of the role of religion as ideology, which serves the same functions with respect to organization, propaganda, operations, recruitment, and training. Religious ideology plays an important role on several levels: r At the individual level, religion can motivate, inspire, and mobilize. r At the tactical level, religion can inform means of attack and targeting, such as suicide bombing, and provide justification for killing innocent people.

r At the operational level, religion can guide campaign planning against theater-level targets.

r At the strategic level, religion can provide explanation, justification, legality, and legitimacy. It can be used to establish strategic goals and objectives and provide an overall framework for the revolutionary insurgency.

Religion seeks to inspire the faithful, persuade the hesitant, and intimidate the adversary. Like any good revolutionary dogma, it is not just a description of the world or justification for specific attacks but a selfsanctifying program of comprehensive action that helps recruit, motivate, mobilize, and direct the activities of the group. It is the primary framework within which the insurgency communicates to the outside world,

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whether through communiqu´es or violence. Above all, ideology legitimates the struggle—it converts brute power to rightful authority. As J. P. Larsson observes, religious ideologies are a uniquely powerful mobilizing force because they are theologically supremacist—meaning that believers assume superiority over nonbelievers, who are not privy to the truth of the religion—and absolutist (you are either totally within the religion or totally outside). Overall, religious ideologies help foster polarizing values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, light and dark—values that can be co-opted by terrorist organizations to convert a “seeker” into a lethal killer.12 Radical Islam therefore does very well as a mobilizing and legitimizing ideology. It espouses a consistent worldview that reaches deep into historical consciousness and adequately explains all the troubles of the region by blaming its chief foes: the United States, Israel, the West generally, the United Nations, capitalism, globalization, and the local “apostate” regimes. Like Marxism, any new event can be neatly folded into the model, and it is noteworthy that many Islamic radical thinkers are former Marxists.13 This demonstrates the nonlinearity of ideology taken on its face as a collection of ideas. Those seeking to wage ideological war must understand that to many adherents of radical ideologies, the primary attraction is to radicalism per se, and the content of the ideology serves principally as a vehicle to express and justify this psychological and emotional predisposition.14 Thus simply coming up with a good counterargument to their viewpoint will not shake them from their path. Fortunately, vast numbers of people are not particularly vulnerable to the blandishments of the truly radical. Unfortunately, given the destructive power of modern weapons, not many radicals are required to generate a threat to global stability and peace. Attacking the Link between Islam and Violence The radicals with whom civilization is at war are not all people with salafist beliefs or tendencies but only those who seek to impose these beliefs on others by force—to overthrow the local regimes, establish a caliphate, and export their revolution abroad. Thus, combating the radical Islamist ideology need not and should not involve a broad campaign against all aspects of their program. This would necessarily involve a critique of Muslim thought per se, which in fact is what the enemy desires; this approach would serve to justify the enemy’s claim that the West is at war with Islam and provide a pretext for unifying and mobilizing the entire Muslim world in a defensive struggle. A more focused approach is to seek the critical nodes and junctures in the ideological schema that transform faith into threat. The most important ideological juncture is that that creates a link between Islam and

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violence (in their parlance, jihad) in an attempt to use the former to legitimize the latter. Thus a critical objective of the battle of ideas is to isolate those aspects of the terrorist ideology that seek to use Islam to encourage, justify, and sanctify acts of violence and drive wedges between proponents of terrorist violence and the religion as a whole. It is characteristic of adherents to the jihadist salafist ideology that they see Islam as a universalizing force that is legitimately spread through violence. That is, it is an offensive doctrine. Sayyid Qutb, one of the most noted progenitors of contemporary radical thought in the Muslim world, wrote that the mere defense of Muslim lands “is not the ultimate objective of the Islamic movement of jihad, but it is a means of establishing the Divine authority within it so that it becomes the headquarters for the movement of Islam, which is then to be carries throughout the earth to the whole of mankind, as the object of this religion is all humanity and its sphere of action is the whole earth.” The Ayatollah Khomeini, speaking in 1942, stated that the universalizing tendency of Islam is for the good of the conquered, since “all the countries conquered by Islam or to be conquered in the future will be marked for everlasting salvation.” Furthermore, the expansion of the faith is necessarily linked to violent action, since “Islam says: Whatever good there is exists thanks to the sword and in the shadow of the sword! People cannot be made obedient except with the sword! The sword is the key to paradise, which can be opened only for holy warriors!”15 This belief that violence is necessary, obligatory, and offensive in nature is reflected in this definition of jihad from the current party program of the radical Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir: Jihad originally is fard kifayah (a collective duty to be fulfilled by a sufficient number of Muslims), but when the enemy attacks it becomes an individual duty for all Muslims. The meaning that jihad is fard kifayah originally is that we begin fighting the enemy even if he did not start fighting us. If no one from the Muslims begins fighting in any period of time, all Muslims then would have committed a sin by leaving jihad. And therefore jihad is not a defensive war; it is in fact a war to raise the Word of Allah (swt), and it is compulsory originally in order to spread Islam and to carry its message even if the disbelievers did not attack us.16

Jihadist salafists also appeal to self-defense as a legitimizing agent for armed struggle, since defensive war is recognized as rightful in most “just war” frameworks. As Osama bin Laden wrote in 2002: In our religion, Allah, The Lord of the Worlds, gave us the permission and the option to take revenge and return to you what you gave us. Anyone who tries to destroy our villages and cities, then we are going to destroy their

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villages and cities. Anyone who steals our fortunes, then we must destroy their economy. And anyone who kills our civilians, then we are going to kill their civilians.17

The last point is controversial and one of the most important levers for delegitimizing terrorist violence. Most terror attacks explicitly target civilians, which is generally recognized as an illegitimate and unsanctioned activity. In an interview published shortly after 9/11, bin Laden himself said, “Islam strictly forbids causing harm to innocent women, children, and other people. Such a practice is forbidden ever in the course of a battle.”18 However, a year later, after having taken credit for the attacks, bin Laden felt it necessary to come up with justifications for killing innocents. “You may then ask why we are attacking and killing civilians because you have defined them as innocent,” he wrote. “Well this argument contradicts your claim that America is the land of freedom and democracy, where every American irrespective of gender, color, age or intellectual ability has a vote.” Through the act of electing leaders, he reasoned, Americans became complicit in the “crimes” being committed against Muslims. They also share guilt by paying taxes and being eligible to volunteer for military service. “This is why the American people are not innocent,” he concluded. “The American people are active members in all these crimes.”19 This argument is no more than a rationalization but provides a useful fig leaf for those who are predisposed to violence. However, bin Laden did not address the fact that his and other terror attacks more often than not result in the deaths of innocent Muslims with no links to the U.S. government, tax system, or military. The 1998 U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, for example, resulted in few U.S. casualties but killed or wounded many Muslims and other locals. More recent attacks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq have killed many innocent Muslims. The November 2005 hotel bombings in Jordan, for example, could not in any way be rationalized as targeting U.S. citizens or officials. The impact on the hearts and minds in Jordan was not what al Qaeda may have expected; Jordanian public opinion swung from mild sympathy to the terrorists’ aims to hard opposition. In particular, the negative symbolism of bombing a wedding party solidified the image of al Qaeda as heartless savages.20 In May 2005, al Qaeda sought to address the problem of Muslims killing Muslims. In an audio tape released on a Web site, al Qaeda’s former Emir in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi appealed not to recognized Koranic principles or the precedents set by Mohammed but to simple utility and practicality. “The shedding of Muslim blood . . . is allowed in order to avoid the greater evil of disrupting jihad,” he stated. “God knows that we were careful not to kill Muslims, and we have called off many operations in the past to avoid losses . . . but we cannot kill infidels without killing some Muslims. It is unavoidable.” Zarqawi claimed that this balancing test

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approach “has been sanctified by many scholars” without going into specifics, and the actual theological support for the proposition is highly questionable. As consolation, the jihadists consider innocent Muslims killed in the course of their operations to be “holy martyrs,” though public opinion is decidedly against the claim that “we had to martyr them in order to save them.” This line of argument, while necessary to justify the terrorists’ tactical needs, does them more harm than good. It is the kind of argument that bears repeating in order to demonstrate the ad hoc, opportunistic nature of their thinking. Furthermore, it fails to explain attacks, such as the Jordanian hotel bombings, in which innocent Muslims were not merely caught in the crossfire but were the primary targets.21 Despite Zarqawi’s claim that killing innocents is legally sanctioned in Islam, a substantial body of argument exists to the effect that it is not, and from much more respected authorities. For example, on April 21, 2001, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abdallah Aal al-Shaykh, said that Islam forbids suicide terrorist attacks. “What you call suicide bombings in my view are illegitimate and have nothing to do with jihad in the cause of God. I am afraid it is another form of killing oneself.” He also later denounced the 9/11 attacks in strong terms and said it was obligatory for clerics to explain that such actions were never permissible. In November 2003, Saudi Imam Sheikh Nasser Al-Fahd, who had previously issued rulings supportive of the use of violence for purposes of “resistance,” and was a major figure to whose views terrorists would appeal to justify their actions, retracted his rulings in the wake of al Qaeda bombings in Riyadh. “Such suicide operations do not result in martyrdom,” he wrote. “How can those responsible kill innocent Muslims and non-Muslims and destroy property in the home of Islam? We did not think that matters would reach this extent. My message is: Fear God and stop shedding blood. Fear God and repent your mistakes. It is not shameful to admit mistakes.”22 A very useful and well-reasoned fatwa was issued by the Islamic Commission of Spain on March 17, 2005, in response to the al Qaeda bombings of commuter trains in Madrid a year earlier in which 191 people were killed and 2,050 injured.23 The fatwa is a rigorously logical and meticulously sourced document that takes on the various aspects of the terror ideology that link religion to violence. The fatwa is grounded on the Koranic verse that states, “Do good unto others as God has done unto you; and do not wish to plant the seeds of corruption upon Earth, for God does not love those who sow corruption” (28:77). The term “corruption” is interpreted to include “all forms of anarchy and terrorism that undermine or destroy peace and Muslim security.” The fatwa marshals numerous Koranic verses and sayings from the Hadith to demonstrate that non-Muslims should be treated with respect, that murder is the chief of all sins, that paradise is reserved for those who

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do good, that war may only be just when it is strictly defensive in nature and conducted within limits, and that even in times of war, it is always a crime to kill innocents, especially women and children. The authors of the fatwa come to five conclusions, summarized as follows: r Islam rejects terrorism in all its manifestations. r Islam is the main victim of terrorist attacks made by groups that falsely call themselves “Islamic,” by both killing Muslims and giving the faith a bad image.

r Such groups manipulate interpretation of the sacred texts in an attempt to gain support among Muslims or to recruit new followers.

r Those who commit terrorist acts violate Koranic teachings and thus become apostates.

r It is the duty of every Muslim to fight actively against terrorism, in accordance with the Koranic mandate that establishes the obligation to prevent corruption from overtaking the Earth.

The fatwa from the Islamic Commission of Spain is a model for reasoned argument, supported by sacred texts and other legitimate authorities, in the campaign to delegitimize the terror tactics of the jihadist salafists. Promoting Education Reform One longer-range effort in the battle against the radical Islamist ideology is on the education front. If this is in fact a “long war” as many believe, a long-term, sustained approach is required, and education reform should play a key role. The enemy has long sought control over the sinews of educational and religious institutions. For example, 50 years ago the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood focused its attention on achieving influence in the al-Azhar Secondary School, which among other things certified the muezzin (those who call to prayer) at Egyptian mosques. Radical groups have also traditionally sought to wield power at universities, which are prime breeding grounds for revolutionary cadres. Perhaps mindful of this, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has called for a purge of liberal and secular professors from Iranian universities. In a speech to student activists, Ahmadinejad sated that “our academic system has been influenced for 150 years by secularism. We have started to make change happen but we need special support for it. . . . Today, students should shout at the president and ask why liberal and secular university lecturers are present in the universities.”24 Much attention has been given to the problems of the religious schools known as madrassas or, more properly, madaris.25 There has been particular focus on religious schools in western Pakistan that have been linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda.26 Granted, neither are all such schools

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“laboratories of hatred,” nor is the problem limited only to certain parts of the world. However, it would be wrong to conclude that just because madaris do not contribute to the ideological support for terrorism in all cases, they can safely be ignored.27 Furthermore they function as a useful example of what can go wrong in an education system. The growth in madaris in western Pakistan was originally a response to the lack of educational opportunity in the region. Literacy rates in Pakistan are around 62 percent for men and 35 percent for women, on average, and in the rural areas these rates are much lower. Education efforts in rural areas are hampered by lack of money and expertise. Furthermore, money from the central government sent to the frontier areas for education is frequently skimmed by local sardars (local chieftains) and projects diverted to their own ends (a school under construction being turned into a mansion, for example). The madaris also proliferated during the 1980s in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, particularly among the Afghan refugee population. Schools were funded by the United States, various European countries, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states in order to create a motivated, educated group of young mujahedin to fight the Soviets. Curricula and textbooks were devised with religious themes explicitly supporting jihad and anti-Soviet violence generally. For example, a fourth-grade math problem asked, “The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahed, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead.”28 Such books were distributed by the Education Center for Afghanistan, which was funded by the Education Program for Afghanistan at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The effort was funded under a $50 million grant from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1986 and 1994.29 This was a very successful program, unfortunately too much so; once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, the propensity for jihadist violence remained. The Taliban (i.e., students) movement began among young men attending madaris in Pakistan. The madaris continued to flourish in the 1990s on the basis of funding from two sources. One is zakat, or charity, an obligation of the Muslim faith. People give zakat to religious groups to meet this obligation, and some of it underwrites the schools. A second, and perhaps more powerful influence, is foreign money. For example, Saudi Arabia sends funds to support the efforts of groups of the Wahabbist tendency. Because of their independent funding bases, it is difficult for the government to exert influence over the schools. The madaris serve an important social function. There are many families in the frontier areas with large numbers of children and little money. The parents send their children to these schools where they not only get

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an education but are also fed, clothed, and protected. Said one Pakistani, “It keeps them off the streets.” Thus, the root impulse of the parents is not to turn their children into raving ideologues but to give them better opportunities than they might have otherwise. In many cases, this is the only chance they have to enjoy a formal learning environment. Nevertheless, those who receive purely religious education may find it does more harm than good. “They are of no use to the society,” said one Pakistani. “They have no skills. They can only go out and become Imams. And we already have enough of them.” Simply closing the schools down would be the worst solution to this problem because it would leave many children completely uneducated and drive the efforts of the religious teachers underground, where it will be even more subversive. Education reform is an important policy issue in the Muslim world generally. The December 2005 Mecca Declaration of the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit called for a ten-year program of action in which education would play a leading role. A Saudi editorial noted: At the heart of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) discussions being held in Makkah is a simple formula: Education breeds tolerance and tolerance breeds peace. Its antithesis is that poverty breeds ignorance and ignorance breeds violence. . . . Religious education, in which the Kingdom has played such a leading role globally, is only part of the story. Muslims also need to be equipped with a general education which will also enable them to improve the lives of their families and their communities.30

A comprehensive, broad-based, and long-term plan for education reform would contain several elements:31 r Increase aid for education in the Muslim world. Money spent on education is an inexpensive way to have a large impact. Yet, these efforts are greatly underfunded. USAID has budgeted $100 million in a five-year plan to improve educational opportunities in Pakistan, or $20 million per year.32 The Middle East Partnership Initiative funding for its “education” pillar amounted to $8 million in 2002; $25 million in 2003; $22 million in 2004; and $14.4 million in 2005. By contrast, the war in Iraq costs on average about $10million/day. This represents a significant resource mismatch in the overall effort to combat global extremism.

r Pursue curriculum reform. At many of the religious schools, subjects other than

religion are neglected or completely absent. Schools should be required to adhere to more standardized and mainstream curricula—teaching history, science, language, arts, mathematics, civics, and other topics, in addition to religion. This would require a major effort to strengthen the education bureaucracies in these countries. For example, in Bangladesh an effort has been under way to impose accreditation standards on local religious schools. Students who graduate from unaccredited schools will not be considered to have valid diplomas and will thus be cut off from many employment opportunities, particularly in

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the government. This creates pressures from parents and students for madaris to meet the accreditation requirements. Pakistan has undertaken a registration initiative for the thousands of religious schools under the purview of the Ittehad-e-Tanzeemat Madaris-e-Deeniya (ITMD), an alliance of five religious boards (Wafaqs), which in this capacity functions as the accreditation agency. In return, the ITMD promises to help modernize syllabi.33 According to President Musharraf, “All of [the Wafaqs] are on board to teach subjects that we are demanding, to take examinations of all the boards so that the children can be mainstreamed into life and not become only the clerics.”34

r Reform finances. Countries should seek tighter reporting requirements on char-

itable giving and religious expenditures. Pakistan has already undertaken an effort to reform the collection and distribution of zakat. As well, countries should seek to regulate money from foreign sources not regulated by the government. A third effort would seek to fight corruption in the education system and make sure money allocated for education is actually spent on students.

r Promote the education of women. Some have theorized that promoting opportu-

nities for women is the central struggle in the war against Islamic extremism. Efforts to provide educational opportunities for women and girls should be encouraged and supported in all possible ways. The United Nations and G-8 nations have both undertaken literacy programs that target women and girls. A key element of this effort would also be the training of female teachers and the construction of separate girls’ schools. It is worth noting that such efforts have been the subject of fierce denunciation by the enemy, and girls’ schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been repeatedly subjected to attacks and intimidation.

r Supply textbooks and other reading material. Modern, secular, up-to-date textbooks are needed throughout the Muslim world. A program similar to the effort undertaken during the Soviet period should be implemented but with more benign content. It would also be useful to translate into local languages the classics of Western literature and books that promote the general freedom agenda.

r Expand access to digital knowledge. The Middle East region has among the lowest rates of Internet connectivity in the world. Giving more access to the Web will improve educational opportunities as well as future employment prospects. Access to the Web would give students an entr´ee into a much wider world, in which they will see and learn about things they cannot imagine.

It may be considered a measure of the effectiveness of current efforts to reform education that Osama bin Laden has objected to them. “The Americans’ intentions have also become clear in statements about the need to change the beliefs, curricula, and morals of the Muslims to become more tolerant, as they put it.”35 A Pakistani editorial that is pro-education reform but against certain changes in the curriculum noted that “it is a desire of the Jews and Christians to purge the Pakistani curriculum of its jihadi contents. They want to eliminate the spirit of jihad from Pakistani Muslims. Therefore, if the objective of the government is to bring changes in the curriculum with a view to introducing new research in modern

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sciences, it will undoubtedly be a good step and it should have been taken much earlier. But if it is aimed at excluding the verses of the Koran relating to jihad to please foreign masters, the entire nation will oppose such attempts.”36 More ominously, in January 2006, some radical Pakistani religious schools reached an agreement with their counterparts in Iran to “launch a joint struggle to resist global pressure” to reform them.37 Encouraging a Climate of Openness in Combating Terrorism The war on terrorism has largely been a secret war. The government has shown little inclination to increase the visibility of its efforts to combat terror networks and has rarely released information about victories in the war against extremism. In some respects, a degree of confidentiality is necessary; sources and methods need to be kept secret in order to remain useful. Yet, the bias toward secrecy has been so extreme as to be counterproductive in other areas. The public needs to be kept informed about the war in order to maintain its support; yet the government has done a very poor job at communicating how the war is being conducted. The result has been to create an environment of cynicism; the only time people hear about successful antiterrorist programs is when details are leaked in major newspapers, with the implication of abuse and scandal of one form or another. This has made it difficult to maintain the level of public support necessary to prosecute the war effort in the long run. Public opinion is a critical vulnerability that the terrorists recognize and attempt to influence. It can neither be ignored, nor does the public find repeated government reassurances that all is well to be in any way compelling. By contrast, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan under the leadership of King Abdullah II has adopted a very constructive approach to the issue of informing the public about his government’s efforts in the war against terrorism.38 The Jordanians have sought to be as open and responsive to the public as possible, under the theory that citizens will be more involved, more invested, and more trusting when government channels are open. When such channels are closed, the citizens are more likely to believe terrorist propaganda because their charges will be left unanswered. An example of this openness policy in action took place in April 2004, when Jordanian security forces broke up a plot to attack the military intelligence headquarters, the prime minister’s office, and the U.S. embassy with chemical weapons. The bombings, had they been successful, could have left tens of thousands dead. Within a few weeks of the takedown, Jordanian television carried interviews with captured members of the attack teams, including the leader of the group, a Jordanian named Azmi alJayousi, a long-time member of al Qaeda, who was ordered to undertake the attack by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The televised interviews revealed many details of the plots, sometimes in the terrorists’ own words. Later, at

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his trial, Jayousi defiantly denounced the court and the King, among others. “Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi will chop off your heads and stuff them in your mouths, you enemies of God!” he pledged from the dock, throwing his shoes at the judge. In response, security services released a video of the counterterrorist operation in progress, including close-in tactical footage of confrontations with the terrorists, some of whom fought to the death. Most telling was the video showing the capture of Jayousi and his on-thespot dealing with security forces to sell out his comrades in exchange for leniency. He had revealed the location of every safe house in his network. Video footage of this nature clearly undermines the perception of jihadi terrorists as noble warriors and serves an important role in countering recruitment and support activities of groups such as al Qaeda. However, the United States has been unwilling to engage in this type of information operation. Prisoners apprehended during the war on terrorism are kept in conditions of extreme secrecy, which has the negative effect of allowing those who wish to mischaracterize prison conditions to have free reign in harnessing public imagination. Adopting a degree of transparency would raise the credibility of the U.S. antiterrorism effort. Some may worry that putting terrorists on television gives them a platform for their ideology, but their views are likely not going to attract widespread approval outside of the narrow confines of their own violent communities. For example, the trial of Zacarias Moussaoui produced a number of bizarre statements and tragicomic moments that did not help al Qaeda’s cause and engaged audiences in the United States and around the world. As well, the public is interested in terrorist plans and techniques, and exposing the details of terror plots is educational as well as dramatic and entertaining. Operational security is important, but it is subject to risk balancing like any other aspects of warfighting. The reflexive secrecy that has characterized the U.S. approach to the war on terrorism damages the effort to keep the public engaged. The public wants and needs to hear stories about the conduct of the war effort; stories that inform, explain, and entertain. Lacking this, we cede the information domain to both terrorists and disgruntled former government officials pursuing personal agendas, either publicly or through leaks.39 Above all, the government should facilitate releasing information that shows what it does right, and does well, to keep the U.S. people secure. Highlighting Humanitarian Support Efforts There is growing awareness of the value of humanitarian relief in the war or ideas. For example, the February 1, 2006, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism lists humanitarian operations as one of the means whereby ideological support for terrorism can be undercut.

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Its authors stated, “The American military’s efforts to aid tsunami victims in Indonesia [in 2004] and to assist victims of Pakistan’s [October 8, 2005] earthquake did more to counter terrorist ideology than any attack mission.”40 A poll conducted by ACNielson Pakistan in November 2005 showed that U.S. favorability among Pakistanis doubled from 23 percent in May to more than 46 percent, while the percentage of Pakistanis with very unfavorable views declined from 48 percent to 28 percent. For the first time since 9/11, more Pakistanis were favorable to the United States than unfavorable. Eighty-one percent said that earthquake relief was important for them in forming their overall opinion of the United States. Seventy-eight percent of Pakistanis had a more favorable opinion of the United States because of the U.S. response to the earthquake, with the strongest support among the critical group of young people under 35. Of note, even 79 percent of those with confidence in Osama bin Laden had a more favorable view of the United States because of U.S. earthquake aid. The tsunami relief effort also improved the U.S. image worldwide, particularly in countries, such as Indonesia, that benefited from the majority of U.S. assistance.41 The point is that “hearts and minds” operations need not be dogmatically ideological. Humanitarian operations can win over as many people (if not more) as abstract appeals to freedom. Insurgent groups such as Hizbollah have had noteworthy success in swaying local populations by providing the social services that the Lebanese government has been unable to supply. People who have been assisted in meeting their basic needs will be more open to the ideas and appeals of those who have assisted them. This is a playing field in which the United States has substantial advantages, since the U.S. economy is the largest in the world. Kinetic solutions to terrorist and insurgent challenges are much more expensive and less effective in swaying local populations. In some cases, we should consider purchasing less bang for the buck. Continuing to Pursue a Broad Freedom Agenda In the long run, the freedom agenda being pursued by the United States and other countries will be successful. The effects of globalization to which the radicals are responding are demand-driven—people in the region, especially young people, want to buy Western products, live a Western lifestyle, and enjoy the benefits of liberal freedoms. A 2002 Gallup poll of the Islamic world showed that while many people in the region are opposed to specific U.S. policies, U.S. technology and culture fare much better. One example of the popularity of Western influences is the Lebanese Broadcasting Company’s reality show “Star Academy,” a talent contest featuring 16 young men and women living in a house north of Beirut. The program aired throughout the region and was denounced by the Higher

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Ulema Committee in Saudi Arabia, which issued a fatwa outlawing the show. The ruling stated that “Star Academy” was banned for showing mingling between the sexes and lewdness and for “killing shame and honor in the hearts of Muslims by letting them get used to these shameful scenes.” Yet it was the most popular show on television in any country in which it aired, and in Lebanon the weekly broadcast drew 80 percent of the 15–25-year-old demographic. One should note in this regard the difference between promoting democracy in the region and promoting freedom. The former implies specific changes in regimes and political systems that implicitly or explicitly threaten almost all the established governments. As well, recent local elections in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and especially the Palestinian Authority demonstrate that free, fair, democratic elections can result in victories for well-organized radical parties seeking to impose a revolutionary agenda. However, promoting the norm of freedom (as opposed to the institution of democracy) is a much less threatening approach that can be adapted better to governments and societies already in place. Such an approach could be accompanied by a greater emphasis on civil society building in areas, such as combating corruption, promoting rational legal frameworks that protect property rights, rationalizing tax systems, and generally lowering tax rates in order to promote the development of a healthy middle class. Generally speaking, the views of the radicals are decidedly unpopular among most Muslims.42 Sometimes radical leaders do well in polls, such as the June 2004 Zogby poll that showed Hizbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah and Osama bin Laden ranking third and fourth respectively among the most admired world leaders. But the second most admired leader was long-deceased Egyptian secularist ruler Gamel Abdel Nasser (who ordered the execution of Sayyid Qutb and is despised by the Muslim Brotherhood), and first ranking was French President Jacques Chirac, who had recently banned wearing Muslim head scarves in schools and hospitals.43 What a poll like this demonstrates is not a particular affinity for the radical agenda but admiration for people who stand up to the United States. Specific opinion polling on the radical program reveals little support for a Shari’ah-based theocracy. Polls in Iraq, for example, have shown support for the role of religion in politics in general terms but not for the program touted by the extremists. The National Voter Attitudes and Awareness poll, conducted in August 2004 by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies, asked, “Which of the following would be the most important in regards to the status and role of religion in Iraq?” Only 7.27 percent of Iraqis gave as their first response, “Islam and the Shari’ah form the basis of all laws and legislation.” A slightly smaller percentage (6.46%) responded, “Iraq maintains a separation between religion and government.” The

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plurality response, 44.44 percent, was for “All religions and sects can practice freely.” In an April 2004 poll, when asked what the most appropriate system for an Iraqi government would be, 63.6 percent chose a parliamentary, mixed parliamentary, or presidential system, while 22 percent chose a system based on religion. In the Oxford Research International National Survey of Iraq of June 2004, 24 percent of those surveyed “agreed strongly” that Iraq should have a government made up of religious leaders, but 70 percent supported having a democracy. When asked about the top priority for the next 12 months, only 2 percent listed “Ensuring that religious ideals are followed;” 70 percent said “regaining public security in the country.” When asked what country could serve as a model for Iraq, 3 percent listed Iran, and an equal number listed Saudi Arabia, either of which might be seen as an example of some form of Shari’ah-based government. Yet 5 percent chose the United States as a model, and 5 percent chose Japan. The comparatively liberal United Arab Emirates was noted by 26 percent, coming in second to “Iraq needs no model” at 35%. An IRI poll in SeptemberOctober 2004 found that 52.3% of Iraqis believed that “religion and government should respect one another by not impeding on the rights, roles and responsibilities of the other,” while 37.9 percent felt that “religion has a special role to play in the government.” Yet, of the latter group, strong majorities believed that the special role would not impede freedom of worship by all faiths; it was not an endorsement of Shari’ah as the dominant force in the new government.44 It is important to distinguish between those who want elected governments to pass laws reflecting Muslim values and those who seek to establish an Islamist state. The former approach could be interpreted as a mechanism for the government to limit itself by obeying Muslim precepts. Proponents of liberalism should not be alarmed by those who seek to have what they see as a good and moral government, particularly given the recent history. Furthermore, voting shows the people’s desire to have input, to have checks, and to allow their voices to be heard. Simply because people want Koranic law to influence legislation does not automatically place them in the radical camp or mean that they wish to see the creation of a theocracy. Yet, these popular views are irrelevant to al Qaeda. To the radicals, it does not matter that the people would not choose the form of government they espouse. Al Qaeda has no interest in social preference; they want to give people the government they need for their own good, whether a majority chooses it or not. Zarqawi noted that “absolute right—which should be obeyed and grabbed with the teeth even though the masses of people disagree with you—is the right written in the Koran and Sunnah . . . even if the masses agree otherwise. The rule is for God alone, and not for the human race or the majority.”45 Even having a democratic polity with laws

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based on Shari’ah is illegitimate. The entire radical program must be implemented as a whole, because all is equally important, and there is no human basis (or legitimate power) for deciding which aspects of Shari’ah should apply and which should not. Bin Laden said, “If we suppose, for the sake of argument, that 90% of the laws and regulations are derived from the Islamic Shari’ah and 10% are derived from man-made legislation, then this constitution, according to Islam, is a constitution of infidelity.”46 In addition, the radicals are not under the illusion that the Islamic utopia can be built by consensus. Rather, it will be arrived at by coercion. “There is no doubt,” Zarqawi declared, “that the Imamate [universal authority in all religious and secular affairs] is established by means of fealty from the proponents of valor—in other words, force.”47 He decried the people who voted for “those who claim they are Islamists in parliamentary elections” but would not join the jihad, asking, “What valor do these people have when the power of armies is with infidels? The state is for those who possess power, and power is men, weapons, and supplies.” For these and other reasons Zarqawi was skeptical that an Islamic government could be established any time soon. “Our countries cannot be purified from the filth of occupiers and their lackeys of apostate traitors except by valor, or force.”48 In any case, given his timely demise, such a state will not be established by Zarqawi. CONCLUSIONS The above-mentioned battlefronts in the war of ideas are only some of the ways in which the civilized nations may confront terrorist ideology. Furthermore, confrontation on the ideological plane alone is not a sufficient means of defeating the threat posed by armed extremism. The expression “war of ideas” or “battle of ideas” has a long provenance; was used in the American Civil War, World War I (by both sides), World War II, the Cold War, and now in the war on terrorism. It has yet to be demonstrated that the “idea” portion of those wars played the decisive role in concluding them, or in settling the outstanding ideological issues. In all these cases, other elements of national power, especially military power, either used directly or as a deterrent force, played a critical role. (It is said that when asked why the Italian Communist Party did not come to power following the Second World War, Josef Stalin replied, “No Red Army.”) Furthermore, it would be a mistake to believe that ideas cannot be suppressed using force. Terrorists, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, and other proponents of illiberal belief systems, have demonstrated their willingness to use violence and coercion to stamp out manifestations of free thought. Afghani liberal reformers who lived under the Taliban regime were at great risk of life and limb, particularly when they expressed their views openly. Proponents of change in Iran or Syria face official harassment, arrest or imprisonment. Christians and Jews in many countries

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face persecution, or are relegated to second-class status. Even today in Afghanistan, Christian converts face the death penalty.49 John P. Roche used to illustrate the efficacy of official suppression of ideas by suggesting that students write a brief history of Protestant Spain from 1478 to 1834 (the period of the Spanish Inquisition). Thus while the war of ideas is a critical requirement for the successful prosecution of the war against terrorists and their sate sponsors, it cannot stand alone but must work along side and be integrated with the efforts of the military, intelligence community, and other agencies in disrupting and defeating terrorism.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. NOTES 1. “President Bush Calls for a ‘Forward Strategy of Freedom’ to Promote Democracy in the Middle East,” Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC, November 6, 2003. 2. “Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative,” Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, Washington, DC, June 9, 2004. 3. Sayyid Qutb, Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq (Milestones or Signs Along the Road), trans. Mohammed Moinuddin Siddiqui (Salimah Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1980), Chapter 6. Qutb (1906–1966) is the spiritual and intellectual godfather of the modern radical Islamist movement. He was hanged in Egypt for antiregime activities in 1966. His brother, Muhammed Qutb, became a professor of Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia, and among his students was Ayman al-Zawahiri, who participated in the plot to assassinate Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat and later became the major intellectual force and number two man in al Qaeda. 4. For a good general discussion of the implications of globalization in the region, see Fareed Zakaria, “Islam, Democracy and Constitutional Liberalism,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004): 1–20. A more in-depth treatment is in Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 5. Quoted in Abu Hamza al-Masri, Ruling by Man-Made Law: Is it Minor or Major Kufr? Explaining the Words of Ibn Abbas, trans. and ed. Ibn Umar, Supporters of Shari’ah Publications (no date). In October 2004 al-Masri was arrested in the United Kingdom and charged with various offenses, including incitement to murder Jews and non-Muslims. 6. Interview with Osama bin Laden conducted October 21, 2001, Jihad Online News Network, www.jehadonline.org, January 21, 2003. 7. “Letter from Osama bin Laden to the American People,” www.Waaqiah. com, October 26, 2002.

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8. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “The Emancipation of Mankind and Nations under the Banner of the Koran,” posted to the Usamah’s Memo forum, www.almjlah. net/vb, January 30, 2005. 9. See for example bin Laden’s December 16, 2004 74-minute audio recording posted to the Jihadist Web site Al-Qal’ah [The Fortress], www.qal3ah.net, in which he chastises the Saudi regime at length for its hypocrisies. Bin Laden’s epiphany regarding the heretical nature of the House of Saud occurred in 1990–1991, when the self-styled “Defenders of the Land of the Two Holy Places” allowed U.S. and other “Crusader” forces to launch Operation Desert Storm from Saudi soil. 10. C.f. “Message From Osama Bin-Muhammad Bin Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics From the Arabian Peninsula,” London Al Islah, September 2, 1996, 1–12. 11. Kwame Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (New York: International Publishers, 1969). 12. J. P. Larsson, “The Role of Religious Ideology in Terrorist Recruitment,” in The Making of a Terrorist, vol. 1, Recruitment, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 13. This thesis is developed in Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). 14. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper and Row, 1951). 15. Khomeini continued: “There are hundreds of other psalms and hadiths urging Muslims to value war and to fight. Does all that mean that Islam is a religion that prevents men from waging war? I spit upon those foolish souls who make such a claim.” 16. From the party program of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Section 9.19, “Jihad.” See also an extensive discussion on the nature of Jihad from the Islamist perspective by Moulana Mohammed Masood Azhar, The Virtues of Jihad (Ahle Sunnah Wal Jama’at). 17. “Letter from Osama Bin Laden.” 18. “‘Exclusive’ Interview With Usama Bin Ladin on 11 Sep Attacks in US,” Karachi Ummat, September 28, 2001, 1, 7. Note that this was before bin Laden publicly took credit for the attacks. 19. “Letter from Osama Bin Laden.” 20. A week after the bombings, al Qaeda released an audio tape claiming that the bombings were actually aimed at U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies using the hotels, a weak explanation that the Jordanian public rejected. 21. For an analysis of the decline of al Qaeda’s legitimacy because of attacks on Muslims, see Maha Azzam, “Al-Qaida Five Years On: The Threat and the Challenges,” Chatahm House, September 2006. 22. Ain al Yaqeen, weekly Arab political magazine, November 28, 2003. Al Fahd had been detained after the bombings, and initially there was some question whether his views were coerced. In time these concerns were shown to be unfounded. In fact al Fahd was coming to grips with the fact that his original logic train regarding armed resistance, formulated to support Palestinian and other action against Israel, could as easily be utilized to justify resistance against the Saudi government, which in the view of the terrorists is an illegitimate apostate regime.

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23. “Fatwa Declared Against Osama Bin Laden,” issued by the Islamic Commission of Spain, March 17, 2005. See also the “Religious Decree in Response to the London Bombings,” issued by the British Muslim Forum in July 2005 in response to the attacks on the London transit system. It is less detailed than the Spanish fatwa but comes to similar conclusions. 24. “Iranian president calls for purge of universities,” Daily Telegraph, September 5, 2006. Note the manner in which Ahmadinejad orders the students to have secular professors removed. 25. The term madaris is the plural of madrassa and is used in favor of the colloquial “madrassas.” 26. Christopher M. Blanchard, “Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background,” CRS Report, February 10, 2005. 27. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey, “The Madrassa Scapegoat,” Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006): 117–125. 28. Craig Davis, “‘A’ Is for Allah, ‘J’ Is for Jihad,” World Policy Journal (Spring 2002): 90–94. 29. Ibid. 30. “A Simple Formula,” Arab News, December 8, 2005. 31. K. Alan Kronstadt, “Education Reform in Pakistan,” CRS Report, December 23, 2004. 32. Pakistan has 18.2 million primary students. It is one of twelve countries in the world that spend less than 2% of GDP on education. A U.S. level of education ($8,300 per student in 2002) would cost $151.2 billion dollars. 33. Mohammad Imran, “9,300 seminaries registered so far: Ejazul Haq,” Lahore Daily Times, February 15, 2006. 34. Address by Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf at the International Seminar on Global Terrorism in Islamabad on August 30, 2005. 35. “Bin Ladin Warns of ‘Grand Plots’ Against Arabs, Criticizes Gulf Rulers,” Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television, January 4, 2004. 36. “Decision to Change Curriculum,” Islamabad Ausaf, November 29, 2005. 37. “Pakistani, Iranian Seminaries Agree on ‘Joint Struggle’ Against Global Pressure,” Rawalpindi Jang, January 3, 2006, 3, 5. 38. King Abdullah has shown himself to be an enlightened, progressive monarch who is committed to a program of economic and social modernization— just the kind of ruler al Qaeda despises. He has been a strong partner in the antiterror coalition and has traveled the world, seeking to build coalitions of like-minded moderate Muslims who abhor violence. The king was in Central Asia promoting this vision when the attacks took place. At a speech in September 2005 at Catholic University in Washington, DC, King Abdullah discussed the “Amman Message,” a program launched in November 2004 seeking to “articulate Islam’s essential social values: compassion, respect for others, tolerance and acceptance and freedom of religion. And it rejects Muslim isolation from the global movement of human history.” 39. The lure of the large advance book contract should be recognized as a major challenge in the information domain. It may be countered by selective information releases designed to steal the thunder from the prospective author. Such contracts are negotiated primarily on the value of “insider knowledge” possessed by the author; if such knowledge is made public before the fact, it will give the government more control over shaping perceptions as well as short-circuit the profit

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mechanism, since publishers will be less disposed to pay large amounts of money for information already in the public domain. 40. Kenneth Ballen, “War on Terror Needs More Humanitarian Efforts,” Christian Science Monitor, March 2, 2006, 9. 41. “U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative,” Pew Global Attitudes Project Report, June 23, 2005. Such effects on the hearts and minds should not be over estimated, since their durability remains to be seen. 42. The following section is derived in part from James S. Robbins, “Al Qaida Versus Democracy,” The Journal of International Security Affairs (Fall 2005): 53–59. 43. Dafna Linzer, “Poll Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.,” Washington Post, July 23, 2004, A26. Note also that Saddam Hussein tied bin Laden for fourth place. 44. See also Audra K. Grant and Mark A. Tessler, “Palestinian Attitudes Toward Democracy and its Compatibility with Islam: Evidence from Public Opinion Research in the West Bank and Gaza,” Arab Studies Quarterly, Fall 2002, 1–20. The authors found that even among those who consider themselves religiously observant, Islam is not the barrier to democracy that some have asserted. 45. “Legal [Islamic] Judgment Regarding Democracy, its Proponents,” Statement issued by the Legal Committee of Al-Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, posted at the Usamah’s Memo Forum, www.almjlah.net/vb, January 27, 2005. 46. Bin Laden, “To Muslims in Iraq,” audio tape posted to www.yaislah.org, December 28, 2004. 47. Zarqawi, “Legal [Islamic] Judgment.” For a discussion of the Imamate, see Sayyid Sa’eed Akhtar Rizvi, Imamate: The Vicegerency of the Prophet[s], Teheran: World Organization for Islamic Services (1985), Part I, 1. 48. Zarqawi, “Legal [Islamic] Judgment.” 49. The case of Christian convert Abdul Rahman received global attention. Rahman was able to avoid trial on charges of apostasy and fled into exile. See Roger Cohen, “In Afghan Christian, Story of a Larger Conflict,” New York Times, March 25, 2006.

CHAPTER 16 THE CENTRALITY OF IDEOLOGY IN COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST Maha Azzam-Nusseibeh

In the aftermath of 9/11, but increasingly in the context of the democratization initiative in the Middle East, it becomes imperative to better understand the counterterrorism strategies of states against their Islamist opponents. These strategies of engagement are part of a complex picture of political and religious radicalization in the region. The experience of Egypt provides interesting insights, not only because in many ways, it was the Egyptian Islamist groups that formed the core of the thinkers who shaped militant Islamic ideology, but also because it offers an example of a state able to substantially suppress the terrorist threat domestically (although some would argue that this success came at the price of exporting the problem to the rest of the world). However, one should also keep in mind that there are some peculiarities to the Egyptian example, not least of which is related to the Islamist groups themselves. It might therefore be worthwhile to draw some comparisons with Saudi Arabia, which is seen by some analysts—given the nationality of the majority of terrorists involved in 9/11—as another main front in the fight against terrorism. In looking at how the state has dealt with the problem of terrorism, it is imperative to examine the way in which the revolutionary theory of the radical Islamists was countered and to a large degree discredited by the establishment. The true threat that the jihad in Egypt—and its offshoot al Qaeda—presented to governments in the Middle East was not that jihadists were a group of radicals practicing random violence against the state; the real threat they posed was fundamentally based on the political

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theory they developed and provided a roadmap for confronting the state (as well as other enemies). Although they themselves would greatly resent the analogy, one can draw some parallels with the importance of MarxistLeninist theory to the development of communist revolutionary movements. Since this revolutionary theory was essentially couched in theological language, the debate, by necessity, involved theological discourse. Finally, this chapter will briefly touch on the main issues that form the core of public disaffection in the region. Radical Islamist terrorism has occurred because of a confluence of a new revolutionary theory combined with widespread public disaffection toward the state. The problem the state faces is that it may be able to physically suppress these groups; it may, more fundamentally, counter and discredit their ideology. But so long as these issues remain unresolved, the region will remain unstable and the wider populations will continue to provide a pool from which new radicals might evolve. SHADES OF THEOLOGY A major plank of the attack on Islamist extremists by governments in the Middle East has involved a theological counterargument to the theory put forward by the Islamists to help legitimize both their political agenda and their operational methods, notably the use of terror. However, there is a tendency among some Western analysts to oversimplify the theological debate by seeing a divide between “traditional” theological interpretations, exemplified by the Wahhabi school of thought (which is believed to be backward looking, anti-Western, and illiberal), and, what some hope to see develop, a more “modernist” interpretation of Islam, at ease with democracy, modernity, and women’s rights and which it is believed will act as a counterweight to traditional Islam, which in turn is blamed for the extremist views held by Islamists. This viewpoint is particularly reflected in the European search for “European-educated” Islamic clergy to serve the Muslim immigrant community and can be clearly seen in the comments made by Mr. Blair during a recent news conference in California.1 This view has two main repercussions. First, it blinds these analysts to a major theological debate that has been raging with increasing intensity for over 15 years in the region about the legitimacy of the use of terrorism. Second, it can lead to a serious misunderstanding of the ideological battle lines as seen from within the Muslim community itself. In fact, the main opponents—from a theological standpoint—of the extreme Islamists have so far been the traditional or orthodox Islamic hierarchy. One can see this in the active involvement of the al-Azhar2 in issuing fatwas against these Islamists (as explored later in this chapter) as well as the stance of the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi Arabia, which had taken a position against suicide bombings even before 9/11. However, that is not to say

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that the traditional Islamic establishment, because it is opposed to the Islamists methodology, entirely disagrees with either their world view or their aspirations. Both parties, the traditional clerics and the Islamist activists, share and reflect the aspirations and views of their societies at large. One could go further and say that among Muslims in the Middle East, there is a growing consensus for the need for a greater degree of Islamization, for political reform, and for a more robust attitude toward Israel and U.S. involvement regionally. Therefore, the ideological debate waged by the Egyptian or Saudi states is not about moving the region closer to Western principles or Western interests, but rather it involves discrediting the methodology of the Islamists as a means of weakening and eventually eliminating their appeal among the public. It may also be worthwhile to look at another issue related to understanding the nuances of secularism in the context of the Middle East. In the Middle East, the term has connotations that arguably involve not only a separation of religion and state, but also an element of excessive antagonism toward religion. Secularism as an ideal in the Middle East was usually held by a small Western-educated elite who saw religion as part of a culturally and politically backward past. The problem is that because they have command of Western languages and contacts with Western institutions, they manage to convey the view that the secular trend is deeper than is the reality, and they fail to see the separation of their world view from that of the majority. Ultimately, the defeat of terrorism must involve a winning of the hearts and minds of the religious many in Middle Eastern society, and not the secular few. Egypt: The Cradle and Grave(?) of the Extremist Islamist Movement In many ways, Egypt is where it all started. The Muslim Brotherhood, considered by many to be the ideological forefather of the modern Islamist movements, was born in parliamentary Egypt, was suppressed under Nasser, and evolved into a nonviolent (albeit essentially repressed) main opposition party under Mubarak. Likewise, the Sadat era saw the birth of both extremist violent movements, such as the jihad and the Gama’a, as well as the more cult-like Takfir wal-Hijra. That Egypt produced and ultimately exported these political trends is significant. This was not only a reflection of a perhaps more active dissident political scene in Egypt than elsewhere in the Arab world, but rather the result of a more active ideological debate waged by the Egyptian Islamic opposition, which gradually developed into a more ruthless theory of revolution. The significance of the assassination of Sadat was not that he was assassinated by an officer (indeed political assassinations were not uncommon either in modern Egyptian political history or in that of the wider Arab arena), but that the assassin secured a fatwa by Sheikh Omar

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Abdul-Rahman3 legitimizing the assassination. The well-documented alFarida al-Gha’iba4 provided the theory for active physical opposition to both the corrupt state and external enemies (which eventually extended not only to Israel but also to the United States). In many ways, the attempts of Ayman al-Zawahiri (yet another Egyptian from the jihad movement of the 1980s) at developing the theory for justifying suicide bombings and the targeting of soft targets is simply a continuation of the development of this “revolutionary” theory.5 It is therefore particularly significant that in Egypt, we have recently seen the main Islamist group, the Gama’a al-Islamiyya, essentially renounce the main aspects of this theory—aspects that legitimized terrorism especially against the state whose personnel qualify as fellow Muslims and even against noncombatant U.S. civilians. It did this both by renouncing terrorism in the media6 and by publishing its own “revisionist” theory in Nahr al-Zikrayat (River of Memories) and more critically in Tafjeerat alRiyadh-Al-Ahkam wal Athar (The Riyadh Explosions—Judgments and Effects) in 2003.7 The path that led to such a fundamental revision was neither direct nor particularly clear. In fact, one could argue that the Egyptian government’s policy toward the Islamist groups was riddled with inconsistencies, notably the difference between a more accommodative phase prior to 1992 and a more robust prosecution of the war against terrorism post-1992. Despite the emergency laws in force since Sadat’s assassination, and the continued government clampdown on any form of opposition, there is evidence that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, at least in some areas— typically very poor slums in Cairo or remote regions in upper Egypt—the authorities and the Gama’a seemed to have arrived at some kind of modus vivendi where, provided the Gama’a stayed on its patch, the authorities let it be. Examples of this can be found in Minya, where both the police and the Gama’a seemed to cooperate in combating a Copt-run prostitution ring in March 1990,8 or in Manfalout, where again the police and the Gama’a seemed to gang up on the Copts.9 The Gama’a also seemed to control certain slums in Cairo, such as Imbaba or Ain Shams, where according to one account, until 1988 “you would feel right away you were in Afghanistan. All men were bearded, wearing short galabiyas (traditional Arab dress, the shortened length denoting a salafi commitment) and women were in niqabs (full face cover, as opposed to the more common head-scarf).”10 Moreover, the Gama’a could in certain cases show a public profile in the sense of holding book fairs, at least in Asyut University, or Eid prayers in mosques where they would fly their banners openly.11 What is not clear is how much this reflected an official policy, as opposed to local commanders simply keeping out of areas (slums and the remote countryside) where they knew government writ was hard to enforce without a serious resort to force. In one confrontation in 1988, in the

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Adam mosque in the Cairo slum of Ain Shams, the residents cheered as members of the Gama’a murdered a police officer named Essam Shams.12 Similarly, the remote areas of Upper Egypt are often a haven for groups operating outside the law, including common criminals, precisely because of the remoteness of the area, the difficulty for the local constabulary to gain local information and support, and the paucity of manpower and resources available to them. It may also have reflected a degree of uncertainty among the security apparatus about the best method to tackle the problem. There is some evidence to suggest that the security apparatus considered three distinct policies. The first was an all-out confrontation proposed by General Zaki Badr, the ruthless Minister of the Interior (1986–1990). The second involved a process of dialogue and theological counterargument proposed by Hassan Abu Basha, former head of the security department under Sadat (1975– 1982) and Minister of the Interior after Sadat’s death (1982–1984), who acknowledged that the Islamist extremism was founded on faith. Finally, the third involved “clipping the tails and chopping the heads.” In other words, the policy envisioned concentrating the security attack on the support base through a campaign of mass arrests and “persuasion,” while assassinating the leadership. This is combined with a polemical assault via the media as well as a total media clampdown on any elucidation of the Gama’a ideology.13 It is clear that from the passing of Law 97 in 1992, known as the counterterrorism law (which in fact was a modification of existing legislation but allowed the security forces more powers and was supplemented by Presidential Decree No. 375 that allowed for the trial of terror cases by military tribunals),14 the security forces increased the vigor of their prosecution of the counterterrorism campaign. This is reflected in the increase in the number of militants killed by the security forces (from 7 in 1991, to 37 in 1992, to 59 in 1993, to 134 in 1994, then peaking at 193 in 1995 before dropping again to only 4 in 1999).15 This is also reflected in the perception of the Gama’a itself. Despite the assassination of its spokesman Dr. Ala Mohiedeen by the security forces in 1990, and its retaliatory assassination of Refaat el-Mahgoub, the Speaker of Parliament, it did not see the situation as particularly confrontational at that time.16 This is not necessarily as bizarre as it may sound. It is clear that in the interaction between the security forces and the Gama’a, and especially violent interaction, both parties incorporated the Upper Egyptian traditional concept of Tar (or vendetta), which formed part of their shared cultural worldview. It is only post-1992 that the Gama’a felt a shift in government policy, starting with the roundup of many Gama’a and jihad members in 1992 and 1993 and then members of the Muslim Brotherhood from 1995 onward. The security forces then followed up with a policy of liquidation from 1994 onward, where all fugitives were targeted for assassination on sight,

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including members of the “preaching” (as opposed to the “military”) wings. One case was cited where the security forces entered the home of a cell in al-Zawiya al-Hamra in 1994 and killed all seven occupants of the house. At the same time, relatives and friends of the suspects were also rounded up and interred for long periods, essentially used as hostages until the suspects gave themselves up.17 This iron-fist approach seemed to work, with confrontation between the state and the group calming post1995 and culminating in the ceasefire announced by the Gama’a leadership (from jail) in 1997. While this strategy adopted by the security forces seems to echo the policy advocated by Colonel el-Sawah and Captain el-Hegawi,18 it was nonetheless combined with a concerted effort at countering the theology used as the basis for the militants’ revolutionary theory. This started with debates between members of the al-Azhar clergy and preachers of the Gama’a in various mosques during the 1980s19 but then expanded to a much wider campaign conducted in the mass media. This theological debate has been ongoing since the Sadat era, but it appears that it gathered momentum in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Secular commentators and Islamists alike have both made the assumption that the views of the clerics from the Azhar simply reflected government wishes and policies. Indeed, a discrediting of mainstream theologians as lackeys of the state was started by the Muslim Brotherhood much earlier and has been maintained by the various Islamist factions today. However, such assertions need to be seen for what they are, that is, an attempt to win the argument before engaging in debate by negating the “academic purity,” if you will, of the other side. To accept this view (in essence that senior theologians simply follow state directives) hinders an understanding of the dynamic of this debate. The point is that for both parties—the traditional religious establishment and the Islamists—the centrality of faith is a given, and arriving at the correct interpretation of Islam leads to saving one’s soul. To assume that senior Muftis—such as Sheikh Mohammad al-Ghazzali or Sheikh Tayyib al-Naggar—issued fatwas that they did not wholly and fully believe in is to claim that they did not care about their immortal soul, which seems highly improbable. The mainstream theological establishment’s view is that the use of violence against civilians and fellow Muslims is incorrect theologically. That such a position simply buttressed the arguments of the government looks as if it was incidental to their conviction. The best way to support this argument is to look at one of the many fatwas used by the government during the 1980s against the Gama’a. As discussed previously, by 1989 the Gama’a had control of certain areas within Cairo and in the countryside. Within those areas, the Gama’a appears to have applied Islamic Law (all Islamists, moderate and radical alike, call for the application of Islamic

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law) including punishment (Hudud). In part, this was an attempt by the Gama’a at embarrassing the Egyptian government (whose legislation, although based on the Napoleonic code, claims to be founded on Islamic law) by showing that it had taken the initiative to apply God’s law where it could. Clearly, all Muslim clerics believe that the Shari’a should be applied, and yet a council of senior clerics—including Sha’rawi, Ghazali, al-Naggar, and Qaradawi—announced in 1989 that individuals could not apply the Hudud and thus denounced the Islamists’ practice as Islamically unsound.20 Later fatwas by the Azhar include one against assaults on tourists21 and one against terrorism in general.22 The interesting point is that Qaradawi was a co-signatory of the 1989 edict. This is the same man seen by many in the Western media as a supporter of terrorism because of his refusal during the late 1980s to condemn suicide bombings in the West Bank as un-Islamic. He argued that the West Bank was a special case (all Israeli civilians were part of the military, he said, and therefore they do not come under the protection of civilians provision in Islamic law, and the Palestinians had no other weapon of significance available; therefore they could commit suicide during combat). But one cannot simply draw a line and state that Qaradawi represents extremist ideology while those who condemn suicide bombings are moderates. Both sides share a large area of theological agreement. For Qaradawi, the debate about suicide bombing in the West Bank was specific, and his view reflects a divide among Muslim theologians about that issue. Some, such as the head of the Saudi Commission of senior Islamic scholars, oppose it (as did the Shiite Lebanese scholar Fadlallah—hardly a moderate—in the 1980s, eventually leading to Hizbollah abandoning the tactic), while others, such as Sheikh Sayyid Wafa, secretary-general of the Islamic Research Centre at the al-Azhar, supported it, as did Sheikh Tantawi, the Mufti of Egypt.23 It is precisely because this is a theological debate conducted among believers that the counterattack by the Azhar on the “theory” of the Gama’a was eventually so effective. Qaradawi’s view that they could not enforce the Hudud in the slums had resonance partly because it was known that he believed suicide bombing in the West Bank was legitimate. It was clear that he was no government lackey, and so his view added to the weight of the argument against the Gama’a. Likewise, the constant rulings by the senior Azhar clerics that attacks on tourists and general terrorist acts were un-Islamic eventually made a deep impact, not only on the general population who would move away from the extremists’ interpretation, but also on the Islamists themselves, who must have begun to doubt their position, especially if they and their Azhar opponents agreed on many other issues such as Shari’a, Palestine, and so on. That this is in large part a debate about theology can be seen in the contorted way Zawahiri tries to extend

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the opinion allowing suicide bombings in the West Bank further to justify 9/1124 from a theological standpoint. It is also significant that his view has not been accepted by any mainstream theologian. The Egyptian government used other weapons in its arsenal in its propaganda war against the Gama’a, including soap operas in the 1990s that depicted Gama’a members as sex-engrossed deviants in an attempt to strip away public sympathy. However, neither the iron-fist policy used by the security apparatus nor the propaganda war can fully explain the decision of the Gama’a leadership to revise its view on the use of terror. After all, the Egyptian state continued (in Islamist perceptions) to be autocratic, unwilling to apply Islamic law and subservient to U.S. interests. Moreover, previous attempts at an iron-fist approach had failed in the past, producing ever more extremist movements. Nonetheless, the main extremist Islamist movement in Egypt appears to have renounced a major pillar of jihadist ideology. It is not that the Gama’a moved in terms of its aims; it is simply that it became convinced that its revolutionary theory was theologically flawed; and while the argument could be made that this epiphany happened after many years in detention (an argument put forward by London-based Yasser al-Sirri25 ), it is notable that this revisionist stance was adopted by Gama’a members not in detention (in part because of their particularly disciplined structure, which had made the ceasefire of 1997 possible. This disciplined structure meant that the rank and file accepted the views of their imprisoned leadership). In other words, the government in Egypt won a significant battle not by instigating political reform, or through security measures, but primarily through a shift in the theological stance of the Gama’a members (irrespective of whether this was the result of their deprivation in prison or the proselytization of their fellow Muslim Brotherhood inmates). That is not to say that the threat of terrorism was lifted from Egypt—as indeed recent events in Sharm elSheikh in July 2005 and the resort of Dahab in April 200626 demonstrate that it has not—but the Gama’a’s new position fundamentally weakens the position of any Islamist terrorist not only in the eyes of the public at large but more importantly in the eyes of Islamist sympathizers in particular. Saudi Arabia: The New Frontier The nationality of the hijackers in the 9/11 attack pushed Saudi Arabia into the limelight as the new hotbed of radicalism, and much was made in the West of both its Wahhabi heritage and previous tacit support of a radical Islamic agenda abroad, especially vis-`a-vis Israel and Afghanistan. However, from a Saudi perspective, 9/11 posed four main problems. First, how could the regime repair its relationship with its main sponsor, the United States? Second, how did al Qaeda—which, notwithstanding the

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leadership of bin Laden, is seen as an offshoot of the Egyptian jihad— manage to infiltrate so deeply in Saudi society without the knowledge of the security forces? Third, how much was the House of Saud at risk? And finally, how could the ruling family face down this threat without appearing to lose its Islamic credentials in front of its own population? The argument that the House of Saud derives its legitimacy from supporting and applying the Wahhabi doctrine has been well rehearsed. Indeed, Saudi Arabia differs in one essential aspect from Egypt in that it applies Islamic law. Islamist opposition to the regime had therefore concentrated its attack on aspects of corruption, acquiescence to U.S. policy, and the general lack of respect for the rule of law (manifesting itself as a lack of accountability). However, the Gulf War had resulted in one major policy that all parties (including the religious authorities supporting the state) had agreed might be in breach of Islamic practice—namely, the stationing of Christian troops (i.e., U.S. troops) on Arabian soil. The regime realized that before it could mount an effective ideological counterattack, it had to remove this one policy that it knew it could not defend theologically in the Wahhabi-dominated kingdom. Its problem was squaring that requirement with its need for U.S. protection and its continuing efforts at countering the damage done to its image in the United States by 9/11. The eventual solution found benefited all parties concerned. The removal of U.S. troops to Qatar in May 2003 allowed the United States to maintain its military presence in the region while relieving the pressure from the Saudi regime, by removing the one issue that the regime found indefensible before its population at large. Once free of this burden, the Saudi regime could pursue its ideological campaign with more vigor than the Egyptian regime, precisely because of its strong religious credentials. What is interesting is that it chose to follow a slightly different tack to that of Egypt. While in Egypt the Islamists’ ideology was attacked with the heavy guns of the Azhar clerical opinion often attacking their methodology and practice, the Saudis went out of their way to win back the hearts and minds of Islamist supporters, especially among the younger Saudi population, by “wooing” them back to the fold. They did this, among other means, through television programs essentially designed for this purpose. One good example of this methodology can be found in a Saudi TV special aired in November 2004, titled “Dakhil al-Khaliyya” (inside the cell). A panel of experts discussed the structure of al Qaeda cells in the kingdom, the difficulties in tracking them, and the damage they were doing. What was noticeable was how little time was spent in a direct discourse against the ideology of al Qaeda. Instead, the program focused (with the help of a couple of ex-members) on conveying how the cells essentially operated as a cult. Much was made of the fact that the ex-members were forbidden to contact their relatives and were isolated from the outside world. Specifically, the point was made that the

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ex-members were unaware of the carnage the terrorist attacks wreaked among Muslim Saudi citizens. The impression was given that gullible but well-meaning Saudi youngsters were being manipulated by “foreign” forces to operate “outside” society. In a final twist, the panel played on Saudi society’s xenophobia by asking why all the leadership of these cells was Egyptian and remained safe as finance directors and planners, while the troops—who essentially became suicide fodder—were Saudi citizens. In other words, while the regime in Egypt essentially engaged over several years in a debate with the Islamists (with the help of the mainstream theologians) to fundamentally discredit the foundations of the extremists’ ideology from a religious standpoint, the Saudi regime chose to side-step the issue, effectively refusing to accept that the extremists had any valid argument to rebut. One should remember that the position of the Mufti of Saudi vis-`a-vis suicide bombings preceded 9/11 and was part of a general (as opposed to a particular or national) theological debate. This was probably because Saudi Arabian society sees itself as orthodox not only in terms of personal faith but also in terms of civic makeup. Therefore, the regime felt confident that it could present this issue as one of an enemy political entity using cult-like methodology to entrap and use insecure Saudi youngsters. In this way, the regime enlisted the help of society at large, but particularly older members, to tackle what was being presented as a youth problem, while sending out the message that the regime was willing to help youngsters who had mistakenly strayed into al Qaeda if they gave themselves up. This “paternalistic” approach seems to have been mainly a propaganda campaign, as evidenced by the very tough security measures the government undertook against all Islamist operatives on the ground. In May 2003, the Saudi government released the names of 19 fugitives. Following the suicide bombings against Western housing compounds in Riyadh, all nineteen were tracked down and killed,27 with apparently no attempt at deprogramming any of the Saudi youngsters. In December 2003, a further 26 names were published by the security forces. Following the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah on December 6, 2004, and the suicide bombing of the Ministry of the Interior on December 29, all 26 were captured or killed. As a result of information gathered from those captured, a further list of 36 was published in June, and by December, ten of these were either killed or captured. The security forces then widened their net, arresting a much wider circle of sympathizers and supporters.28 By the end of 2004, some 48 Saudi security officers had been killed in the various showdowns with al Qaeda supporters, so that the government felt the need to provide special financial compensation to their families. Furthermore, notwithstanding the propaganda campaign of a paternalistic government seeking to help its misguided youth, the government resorted to offering

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rewards of up to $1.87 million for information leading to the arrest of any al Qaeda operatives.29 In terms of a security campaign, there are clear parallels with the vigorous Egyptian security campaign against the Islamists between 1992 and 1995. However, the nearest the Saudi Arabian government got to anything like the theological debate seen in Egypt was the call of the Grand Mufti for all clerics who supported violence through unlicensed fatwas to be investigated in September 2005.30 The Saudi Arabian government pursued an additional avenue to attack the Islamists namely, a concentrated attack on the various financial avenues and resources used by the Islamists to bankroll their activities. In 2003, the government chartered the Financial Investigations Unit, which became operative in 2005. This and the Financial Action Task Force went after the financing of the Islamists. First, they required all banks to report any suspicious transactions to them. The year 2003 also saw a ban on the collection of cash donations in mosques for charities, which remains in place. In this way, they made it difficult for the Islamists to bankroll their activities from the donations of either active supporters or unwary charity donors in mosques. They further tightened the control of the government on the free flow of capital, with the application of a law in fall 2005 restricting the transportation of cash (or equivalent assets) in or out of the Saudi Kingdom to $16,000. This was clearly a copy of the U.S. law requiring the reporting of the transfer of cash over $10,000, and indeed U.S. customs officers helped train the Saudi officers to enforce these restrictions.31 These measures in combination effectively, slowly starved the Islamist operatives from the financing needed to carry on their activities or to send money to help other al Qaeda operatives in other countries. Finally, in terms of repairing the damage done to its relationship with the United States, the Saudi Arabian government pursued two main strategies. First, it cooperated fully with the U.S. government in terms of sharing information through initiatives such as the U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue and by providing information on terrorists wanted by the U.S. government, such as a Jordanian American man named Abu-Ali who was arrested in Mecca in 2003 and handed over to the U.S. authorities. He was later convicted in 2005 of plotting to assassinate President Bush.32 Second, the Saudi regime tried to take the initiative to mount a movement among Muslim regional governments to combat terrorism. They held an emergency meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Mecca in December 2005 and an “International” Counterterrorism Conference in Riyadh in the same year. The final report of that conference, published on the Internet, demonstrates the extent to which these conferences were public relation events aimed at showing the U.S. government and media what a good global citizen the Saudi regime was. Judging by a nonempirical observation on the comments made by the U.S. media on Saudi Arabia, the regime had failed to repair the damage done to its image there, even

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if it has done much to convince the U.S. authorities of its sincerity and commitment. However, in its other aims, the Saudi regime seems to have been as reasonably successful as the Egyptian government. The regime has effectively prosecuted its campaign on the al Qaeda network in the Saudi Kingdom by assassinating its main personnel, arresting its supporters, and restricting its financial lifeblood. Ideologically, it could attack the theology of these groups as deviant because of the Wahhabi nature of the state as a whole. Meanwhile, the spike in oil prices over the last two years has reversed a decline in per capita GDP experienced by the Saudi Kingdom over the previous twenty years and has allowed the House of Saud to pump more money into the state to bolster its popular support. THE GORDIAN KNOT The problem for both regimes is that notwithstanding these advances, all they manage to do is suppress, but not eliminate, the problem. In some ways, major strides have been made in the war against terrorism, and not all were due to successful government policy. The attack on Dahab in Egypt and on the Interior Ministry in Riyadh, which resulted in the loss of Muslim civilian lives, were huge tactical mistakes on the part of al Qaeda in that they helped bolster the argument being put forward by orthodox Muslim clerics that the tactics of suicide bombing and the targeting of civilians were un-Islamic practices. While the majority of the public in the Muslim world chose to ignore the civilian toll of the 9/11 attack, there is now a growing conviction among that public that no matter the political justification, such acts are unacceptable religiously (although an exception is still made for attacks on Israel). This has also been helped by the repulsion felt at the activity of al Qaeda (where it involves Iraqi civilians but not the U.S. military) in Iraq and the attacks in Jordan, especially the bombing of a wedding party and the resulting death toll. In some ways, the satellite TV network al-Jazeera has helped in this transformation by widely broadcasting pictures of the carnage resulting from these attacks. The issue for the counterterrorist policies of the Egyptian and Saudi governments is that while the methodology of the extremists has been effectively discredited in the eyes of the majority in the region, their general aims have gained greater credence among the population at large. This is because the terrorist groups represent the extreme end of widespread popular disaffection with the regimes, so that while the extreme element can be cauterized, the underlying tension in society remains unresolved. In essence, there is a consensus among the vast majority in Middle Eastern societies for three general aims, although the degree of support for each specific aim might vary. First, there is clearly an ever-growing demand

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for an increasing Islamization of all aspects of society, even if it is fiercely resisted by the secular minority. This is not, as Tony Blair recently stated in a speech in July 2006, an attack on modernity but simply a choice to adopt a different worldview, possibly related to issues of identity, but certainly rooted in an increasing religiosity. Thus, counterterrorist initiatives aimed at radical Islamists are being conducted against a background of a strengthening current of Islamization. Second, there is a general demand for political reform, whether through parliamentary democracy or an Islamic system with greater accountability. This in itself weakens the foundations of the regimes in the region, who realize that reform by necessity means the end of their monopoly on power. The U.S. administration has taken the view that furthering democracy will help stabilize the region and has pressured its regional allies to instigate some steps in that direction. The problem for both the United States and its local allies is that the less extreme Islamists have taken the lead as the main political opposition and have clearly capitalized on this and the trend for increasing religiosity to gather a large degree of popular support. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Egypt, where the secular, Western-friendly Kifaya movement and the more traditional opposition parties failed to make any real political impact, while the Muslim Brotherhood became the main opposition party and, in any normal democratic setup, the government in waiting. In other words, the ideological and physical setback suffered by the extremist Islamist movements as a result of effective government counterterrorist campaigns have not resulted in the retreat of Islamist ideology; rather, it has benefited the moderate Islamist faction, which has regained lost ground among the grassroots and boosted its political position in society as a whole. Finally, there is a general consensus that in terms of regional politics, Middle Eastern governments have consistently failed in their duty to uphold the interests of their citizens. The United States is often cited as the main enemy of the Islamists, especially in light of the ongoing fallout from the Iraq War, but the root of the problem remains the Arab-Israeli issue. Whatever the perception in the West, the overwhelming majority in the Middle East see Israel as the last of the European settler or colonial states. Its very existence on what is seen as Arab soil—which involved a displacement of the indigenous population—is perceived as a grave injustice perpetuated by military might and the unquestioning support of the United States, hence the antagonism toward the United States. Moderates and extremists in the region alike agree on this view. The moderates take the position that one has to accept the reality that the state is now established (the famous Israeli principle of facts on the ground) and work toward seeking the best possible terms for the indigenous Arab population. The extremists believe that to accept the legality of Israel simply because it has superior force of arms is morally unacceptable and thus turn their

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ire on Israel’s main sponsor, the United States—without whom, they erroneously believe, Israel could not survive. In terms of regional politics, as long as the regimes are seen as at least trying to achieve the best outcome for the Palestinian people, the moderate element within society can be convinced to support their governments, which in turn helps bolster their counterterrorism initiatives. However, all factions within society become more antagonistic when the process is stalled or when they see, courtesy of al-Jazeera, daily pictures of Palestinian suffering. At times when the situation deteriorates, as it has done recently in southern Lebanon, many in society tend to move closer to the extremist camp, and that in turn bolsters the Islamists, who are seen as the only political party standing for what is perceived as “right” in this situation, as well as the extremists whose anger appears to be vindicated by events. The Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon has backfired in another way. The orthodox clergy might have won the battle for convincing the majority in the region that attacks on civilians are un-Islamic, thus bolstering the government’s counterterrorism drive. However, the resulting casualty list from this war—with the heavy loss of civilian life in Lebanon as a result of what is seen as a legitimate attack on an army unit—is contrasted against a primarily military casualty list on the Israeli side. The position of the Arab governments, given their perceived impotence, becomes untenable precisely because of the unacceptability of civilian casualties. While the Arab-Israeli issue is only one among several factors that feeds into support for the Islamists, it provides at times of heightened crises the impetus for increasing the support base of the Islamist movement at large, so that no matter what advances they make elsewhere, Middle Eastern governments inevitably lose ground whenever the crisis flares up. CONCLUSION Looking back at images of celebration on the Arab streets following 9/11, it seemed for a while that al Qaeda had managed to take the politics of the jihad from the fringe to the mainstream and from its original Egyptian milieu to a much wider arena. Al Qaeda seemed to represent more than simply a terrorist organization. Its main weapon was a new revolutionary ideology that rejected, first, the traditional political system in the region; second, the traditional compromise arrived at between religion and the state in Middle Eastern society (especially outside the Gulf); and third, the restriction imposed on the avenues open for confrontation with the “enemy” by traditional Islam, specifically the legitimacy of the use of terror. The counterattack undertaken by Arab governments, at least in the case of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, has largely been successful particularly in

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countering this last point. “Traditional” Islam seems in the process of effectively winning back much of the lost ground in the hearts and minds of Muslims by rebutting the attempts at reinterpreting Islam by the extremists. Al Qaeda had indirectly started a reformation in Islam in that it has attempted to take away the business of expounding on theology from trained clerics, believing that those clerics chose not to see their viewpoint out of fear or personal interest. Yet those same clerics, who might share much of the political concerns of al Qaeda, managed to hit back with their well-argued religious reasoning. This was a battle of ideology between traditional Islam and revolutionary Islam, and traditional Islam seems to have won. Moreover, the extremists lost out physically in that in both these countries, their ability to operate and expand their “war” has been severely restricted with the incapacitation of many of their senior operatives, as has their ability to attract a wider grassroots base. To borrow an imperfect but useful analogy from nineteenth-century Europe, al Qaeda has been relegated from becoming a Bolshevik movement into becoming merely an anarchist movement. However, in other crucial aspects, the regimes have lost ground. The extremists’ loss of the theological argument has not resulted in the retreat of the Islamist trend as a whole; rather, it has resulted in exactly the opposite outcome, with moderate Islamists gaining momentum and support in society at large, partly because the emphasis on traditional Islam bolstered their own position and partly because they represented a popular trend toward a greater Islamization of society. Thus the rejection of the traditional compromise between religion and the state in the Middle East, one of the general aims of the radicals, became a wider trend among a larger component of society. This is also partly because separately from the activities of extreme Islamists, the moderates had long worked through nonviolent politics and charitable activity on winning the hearts and minds of the population at large.33 Likewise, the radicals’ wish to see fundamental change to the political system in the region seems to be gaining momentum. In this they have been aided by the United States in that any democratization initiative simply allows the moderate Islamists, who are the most popular opposition group, to gain in power and prestige. The understandable reluctance of the regimes to move further in this direction (which is ultimately a form of political suicide) simply adds to the resentment of the population and consequently to the support for the moderate Islamist movement. Similarly, the impotence of these governments to achieve any form of regional redress for perceived wrongs further bolsters the position of the moderate Islamist movement. That is not to say that al Qaeda is totally eliminated as a political player. It is clear from the continuous stream of its statements that it is desperate

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to remain relevant in the political equation in the region. Moreover, the bombings in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005 as well as the foiled plot in London in August 2006 demonstrate that it is able to mobilize small cells of fanatical adherents to devastating effects. However, the indications are that while al Qaeda can still cause carnage, it has, partly as the result of a concerted attack by traditional Islam and partly because of the success of the security measures adopted by governments, failed as a revolutionary movement. The problem for the West and the Arab regimes is that this failure seems to have led to the increasing entrenchment and success of the moderate Islamist movement. NOTES 1. Newscorp conference (July 29/30, 2006). 2. Al-Azhar is a university in Cairo, which received its charter in a.d. 971 and has become over time the main theological centre of Sunni Islam. 3. Currently in U.S. custody, he was sought out by the radical Islamists in the 1970s for his theological opinion because of his openly antagonistic stance toward the Sadat regime. His kudos was partly based on the fact that he was a Ph.D. in theology from al-Azhar. 4. Abd al-Salam Faraj. member of al-Jihad. Published his text in 1981. 5. For a discussion of Zawahiri’s evolving political theory, see Maha Azzam, Al Qaida: The Misunderstood Wahhabi Connection and the Ideology of Violence, The Royal Institute of International affairs (Chatham House), Briefing Paper, No.1, February 2003. 6. For an English reference, see Reuters report by Tom Perry, Cairo, November 23, 2003. 7. Glossy edition, no publisher, but dated 2003 and reportedly distributed by the security forces. These were a culmination of a series of revisionist ideological books published in the previous year. For the earlier books, see Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy (Chicago University Press, 2005), 200. 8. Hisham Mubarak, al-Irhabiyoun Qademoun, Kitab el-Mahroussa (Cairo: ElMahroussa Centre, 1995), 382–383. 9. Ibid. 10. Interview with a former member of the Gama’a’s preaching wing and who was a fugitive between 1992 and 1997, conducted by the freelance journalist Hossam Hamalawi, July 23, 2006, in Cairo. The interviewee requested that he not be named. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. As an aside, the interviewee also made the point that in the 1980s, the security forces actively encouraged members of the Gama’a to go to Afghanistan because, in his opinion, they hoped they would die there. 13. An undated study supervised by Ain Shams University’s Crises Research Unit by Security Colonel Mohammad Ali el-Sawah and Captain Ihab Foad elHegawi. I understand that it was written in the early 1990s, and the internal evidence supports that view. Namely, the disparaging treatment of Abu Basha’s ideas suggests the passage of time since his control of the ministry. Second, the policy

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envisioned by the authors is essentially the one carried out by the security apparatus from 1992 onward. The section quoted is from pp. 55–67. 14. Hala Mustafa, Al-dawla wal Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Mo’arida (Cairo: ElMahrussa Centre, 1996), 392. 15. Human Rights Centre for the Assistance of Prisoners (HRCAP) reports (this organization later changed its name to Human Rights Association for the Assistance of Prisoners [HRAAP]) at www.hrcap.org/A Reports/report16/ report.htm. 16. Hisham Mubarak, al-Irhabiyoun Qademoun, Interview with ex-Gama’a member. See note 9. 17. Ibid. 18. Colonel el-Sawah and Captain el-Hegawi. See note 12. 19. Hisham Mubarak, al-Irhabiyoun Qademoun, Interview with ex-Gama’a member. See note 9. 20. Hala Mustafa, al-Dawla wal Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Moarida, 393. 21. Al-Ahram, November 2, 1993. 22. Ibid., April 1, 1993. 23. A summary of the background to the debate on suicide bombings and the fatwa by the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abd al Aziz ibn Abdullah, against the practice on April 21, 2001 (although there is a debate whether it was a fatwa or a less binding opinion) was published by Peacewatch, the Washington Institute’s Special Reports on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process No. 323, May 2, 2001, and reprinted by the Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzlia, Israel, on their Web site, May 16, 2001. 24. Maha Azzam, The Wahhabi Connection and the Ideology of Violence. 25. Reuters report by Tom Perry, Cairo, November 23, 2003. 26. Maha Azzam, L’Islamisme Militant en Egypt et le Nouveau Jihad, in Les Fabriques du Jihad, ed. Jean-Luc Marret (Univercite Presse France, 2005). 27. The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base, 2005 report on Saudi Arabia. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. For a discussion of the Islamist charitable activity in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen, see Janine A. Clark, Islam, Charity and Activism (Indiana University Press, 2004).

CHAPTER 17 PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION Bruce Gregory

Americans “discover” public diplomacy in wartime. Seeking allies and loans for the American Revolution, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams worked as hard to gain support from the citizens of France and Holland as they did to persuade their governments. In the twentieth century, U.S. international information and cultural agencies came and went with two world wars and the Cold War. Combating terrorism is having a comparable impact in the twenty-first century. Political and military leaders are transforming instruments of national security in response to new threats and opportunities. Again they are finding it necessary to understand, engage, and influence what publics think and do, not just their governments. Public diplomacy is not the instrument to combat terrorists directly. This is work for coercive instruments of power. Public diplomacy is a means to challenge ideas that give rise to terrorism. Importantly, public diplomacy must also be an adaptive and resourceful way to engage global publics on consequential issues other than terrorism. Although turning to public diplomacy in times of conflict is not new, the conditions in which public diplomacy instruments are used today are radically different. First, there are differences on the level of ideas. Twentiethcentury wars were state-sponsored contests between democratic and authoritarian visions of society rooted in secular worldviews. The Cold War was fought by competing heirs to the Enlightenment traditions of reason and science—and the legacies of Karl Marx and Thomas Jefferson. Ideas are no less influential in today’s conflicts. But they compete in multiple public spheres on a broader range of diverse and complex issues. Much attention justifiably is given to contending views within Islam and to mindsets of extremists who use violence and utopian visions in support of

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political and religious goals.1 Fixation on terrorism, however, risks missing public diplomacy’s relevance to contested ideas about democracy, global governance, the distribution of public goods, and many other crossborder challenges. Second, there are differences on the level of political process. Central governments are less powerful relative to nonstate and substate actors. Vertical, state-centric models matter less. Horizontal, network models matter more. Diplomats still act as gatekeepers between states, but more often they are what Brian Hocking calls “boundary spanners,” mediators between states and nonstate actors on multiple issues in changing patterns of interaction.2 There are many more democracies in the world. Scholars debate the problems democratization creates in fragile societies and the benefits of “efficiency gains” ranging from zones of democratic peace to collaboration on common concerns.3 Coinciding with these changes are sustained high levels of anti-Americanism based on policy disagreements and resentment of U.S. power, which have been documented by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project and other surveys.4 Declines in favorable attitudes also reflect what one analyst calls a “secession of elites,” meaning a loss of support from opinion leaders, driven by generational change. These trends have immediate and long-term costs.5 When global publics—elites and masses—become more powerful and hold negative opinions at the same time, public diplomacy becomes more important and more difficult to execute. Third, there are differences on the level of media and information technology. Fifty years ago, much of the world lacked access to credible news and information. Today, information saturation is the norm. This creates, in Joseph Nye’s words, a “paradox of plenty.” Attention is the scarce resource, and “those who can distinguish valuable signals from white noise gain power.” When there is too much information, “political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of credibility.”6 Thomas L. Friedman tells us the “world is flat,” by which he means a new generation of software applications linked to fiber-optic networks is enabling many more groups and empowered individuals, especially non-Westerners, to collaborate and compete globally.7 Media coverage, and rapid public reactions to that coverage, occur in relentless 24/7 news cycles. Public diplomacy must adapt to an environment shaped by greater transparency and by greater opacity. Multiple state and nonstate actors gain access to public spheres made more transparent by the Internet, satellite television, and an array of low-cost communication technologies. Transparency creates advantages for those skilled at shaping perceptions with credible narratives. It creates disadvantages when tactical events, such as prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, become a global strategic problem at the touch of a keyboard. Public spheres are opaque as well. Individuals and terrorist groups hide their identities on the Internet. Web-based

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content (text, audio, and video) is detached—to a greater degree than content in earlier media—from the social contexts that provide meaning and credibility. The significance of mediating technologies in shaping thoughts and actions is not new. Nearly a century ago, Walter Lippmann diagnosed problems arising from the influence of industrial-age information technologies in the space between a complex world “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” and the “pictures in our heads.”8 The hot and cold wars of the twentieth century became meta-narratives for citizens, the media, and political leaders looking for ways to simplify and frame national security issues. Presidential speeches—including Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” (1918), Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” (1941), and Truman’s “Campaign of Truth” (1950)—were emblematic of these metanarratives and used by policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders to set agendas, explain threats and opportunities, advocate policies, and shape public diplomacy strategies. The absence of a comparable meta-narrative after the Cold War created two problems for strategists. First, it deprived them of a way to frame national security issues simply, powerfully, and advantageously. Second, as political scientist Robert Entman points out, it gave citizens and the media more power to frame the national security environment independently.9 Recognizing this, the Bush administration settled on terrorism as a new meta-narrative immediately after 9/11. “Our war on terror . . . will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated,” President Bush stated a week after the attacks.10 Five years later, the National Security Strategy of the United States, began with the words “America is at war” and outlined a strategy grounded on two “inseparable priorities—fighting and winning the war on terror and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair.”11 There are reasons for skepticism about the “war on terror” as a dominant narrative. Its adequacy is challenged by its oversimplification in a multi-issue, multipolar political environment and by the National Security Strategy’s own description of many other problems and cross-border challenges. Its appropriateness is questionable on the grounds of rhetorical excess and misunderstanding by the global publics that political leaders seek to persuade.12 Because public diplomacy faces very different conditions on the levels of ideas, political process, and mediated information, its instruments and institutions must change. Five years after 9/11, U.S. political leaders have begun to recognize the need for change, and they are looking critically at legacy tools and structures. They promise “transformational public diplomacy,” by which they mean both increased resources for “programs we know work” and “fundamentally changing the way we do business.”13 Questions occur on the scope, durability, and scale of their reforms.

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AFTER 9/11 A few forward-looking practitioners and scholars wrote thoughtfully about public diplomacy’s new strategic environment in the decade after the Cold War.14 Their efforts were largely ignored. The attacks of 9/11, however, turned this analytical trickle into a fire hose of reports, articles, and opinion columns. In contrast, most political leaders on a bipartisan basis did little more than lament “Why do they hate us?” or “Why can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?”15 Some useful early initiatives did occur. In October 2001, the State Department created a 24/7 Public Diplomacy Task Force with links to agencies, embassies, and U.S. combatant commands to coordinate participation in a “strategic information campaign.” Secretary of State Colin Powell led a stream of White House officials and cabinet secretaries in appearances on Al Jazeera and other global media. The White House, adapting methods used in U.S. and British political campaigns and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo, created a Coalition Information Center network linking Washington, London, and Islamabad. For a few months, the United States and the United Kingdom used this network to respond to breaking news and communicate messages within news cycles. These efforts had merit, but they were tactical and were discontinued following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the departure of key players, and the inability of executive branch organizations to turn temporary measures into durable institutional changes. Attempts were also made to transform public diplomacy at the strategic level. The House of Representatives passed bills that would require the State Department to develop a public diplomacy strategy. No counterpart measures passed the Senate. In 2002, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice created an interagency Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee to develop “strategic communications capabilities throughout the government.” The committee met twice. By executive order, the White House created an Office of Global Communications in 2003 to develop a strategic approach to public diplomacy among “appropriate agencies” of the government. It failed to do so, and the office closed in 2005. The Department of Defense (DOD) created an Office of Strategic Influence for its “strategic information campaign in support of the war on terrorism.” Opposition from U.S. government public affairs officials and widespread negative press coverage forced Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to dissolve the office in February 2002. Until the appointment of Karen Hughes in August 2005, the position of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was filled by a Senate-confirmed appointee for only 18 months during the Bush administration’s first four and one-half years in office.16

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While the government was dithering, the private sector was paying attention. Driven by 9/11 and surveys showing widespread antiAmericanism, public diplomacy became part of a national and global conversation in the media, on college campuses, and in research organizations and advisory panels. Journalists and opinion writers found much to criticize in the United States’ information, cultural, and international broadcasting activities. Universities in the United States and abroad added courses on public diplomacy. Task forces and advisory panels wrote reports. There was a consensus among the experts: public diplomacy is vital to national security; it was broken and strategic-level change was needed. Opinions about what to do, however, varied widely. For some, the rearview mirror was the best optic. Public diplomacy is what Foreign Service Officers, cultural diplomats, and international broadcasters had done well in the past, often very well, usually in separate competing organizations. By focusing on past accomplishments, advocates could justify priorities and budget increases advantageous to the tribal cultures in which they were comfortable. Others, however, want to retain what is best from the past, but view public diplomacy as an instrument that requires new thinking and new tools. Some are turning to networking and strategic direction models.17 Reports of the Defense Science Board, Council on Foreign Relations, and U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy recommended a presidential directive to advance a variety of implementing strategies. An advisory group led by former Ambassador Edward Djerejian urged “a new strategic direction” for public diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports addressed deficiencies in the strategic approach of U.S. international broadcasting, the absence of a State Department public diplomacy strategy, and the lack of a “national communication strategy.” By the summer of 2005, these and other studies had offered a rich tapestry of recommendations for reform, leading some observers to suggest “report fatigue” and call for moving beyond recommendations to business plans and action.18 Exogenous events and the outpouring of private sector interest had an impact on government. Rhetorically, the United States’ leaders no longer neglect public diplomacy. The time for public diplomacy reform is “now,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated emphatically when she announced the appointment of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld argued, “We are engaged in a test of wills, and it will be won or lost with our publics and the publics of other nations.”19 The need to engage publics and the ideas that are underlying sources of threats and opportunities is reflected in actions as well as speeches. U.S. leaders show greater concern about “listening” to others and “understanding” their opinions and cultures. There have been modest gains in public diplomacy

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resources. A “Strategic Language Initiative” encourages professionals and U.S. citizens to learn foreign languages. New public-private partnerships are emerging with the United States’ universities, corporations, and media industries. There is greater emphasis on recruiting and training public diplomacy professionals. Government agencies pursue imaginative efforts to leverage the Internet and other communication technologies. As Hughes summarized, “There were 30-plus reports that had made very sound recommendations about what we should do, and I view my job as trying to get it done.”20 Defining Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication Definitions are a first step in “getting it done.” Beginning in the 1960s, a few practitioners and scholars used the term public diplomacy to describe information and cultural activities of U.S. missions, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Voice of America, and other U.S. broadcasting services. During the next 40 years, public diplomacy came into widespread use in the United States and abroad through its use in congressional hearings, reports of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, and increasing acceptance of the term by practitioners. Recently, the term strategic communication has gained traction primarily in national security circles. The position of Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications and Global Outreach was added to the National Security Council staff in March 2005. On April 8, 2006, President Bush established a Policy Coordination Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications led by Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes.21 The Joint Chiefs of Staff updated the U.S. military’s information operations doctrine in 2006 to define strategic communication as “focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives.”22 These labels prompt analytical questions. Are the terms public diplomacy and strategic communication interchangeable? Or is strategic communication an umbrella concept that embraces distinct components such as public affairs, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, democratization, international broadcasting, and open military information operations? Organizational missions and structures provide no easy answers. For example, when remarks by a military commander at a Pentagon press briefing are carried on global media platforms, is it public affairs, public diplomacy, or a military information operation? These activities are distinguished less by audience and conceptual differences than by doctrines, budgets, and bureaucratic turf. Should strategic communication, as one scholar suggests, be used to describe short-term instrumental activities as

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a subset of public diplomacy, separating them from long-term exchanges of people and ideas?23 Do public diplomacy and strategic communication describe only what governments do, or do they also describe global governance activities of nonstate actors? What is the meaning of related terms such as advocacy, propaganda, spin, branding, and perception management, and how are understandings shaped, positively or negatively, by their use? These are not trivial questions. Naming is part of a struggle over meaning. In naming, we judge as well as describe. I propose defining public diplomacy and strategic communication as analogous terms that can be used separately and synonymously to describe activities by governments, groups, and individuals, intended to understand attitudes, cultures, and mediated environments; engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions; advise political leaders, diplomats, and soldiers on public opinion and communication implications of policy choices; and influence attitudes and behavior through communication strategies and messages. These are core components of an instrument of statecraft that embraces a variety of means: diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting, political communication, democracy building, and open military information operations. Analytically, these components and means comprise one instrument among a range of persuasive, cooperative, and coercive instruments available to strategists. At another level, public diplomacy and strategic communication cut across all political, economic, and military instruments of statecraft and are critical to their use and success. Public diplomacy is instrumental and essential to governance. Its purposes are broadly political. It serves interests and values. Public diplomacy differs from education, journalism, advertising, public relations, and other ways groups communicate in societies apart from governance. To succeed, public diplomacy imports discourse norms from society and depends greatly on private sector partnerships. Education norms matter in Fulbright scholarship programs. Peer review ensures that scholars funded by government grants are chosen on the basis of academic merit, not for partisan reasons or their policy views. International broadcasters value journalism norms and institutional shields that protect them from interference by policymakers in news gathering and reporting. Public diplomats and military public affairs officers know they cannot operate effectively unless they are truthful and credible. Institutional firewalls are needed to separate what they do from deception techniques used legitimately in war. Firewalls are not appropriate, however, as shields against strategic direction, management, and oversight. Choosing to fund more exchanges in Pakistan and fewer exchanges in Germany or trade-offs among broadcasting languages and technologies, for example, are strategic decisions to be made by political leaders.

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Public diplomacy operates in three time frames. One is the news cycle. Policymakers and communication strategists cannot ignore the relentless demands of 24/7 news and media relations. If diplomats, soldiers, and political leaders do not get inside news cycles, others will, often with disadvantageous perspectives. A second time frame relates to communication campaigns on high-value policies that may last months and years. Here strategists need to make choices. Not all policies require public diplomacy campaigns. Nor are resources available to carry them out effectively on all policies. Choices raise questions. What policies are most important? What are the best narratives? How should consistent themes be tailored to different countries and regions? When is an ambassador the best messenger? A cabinet secretary? A combatant commander? A credible third party? What themes, messages, messengers, symbols, and communication tools are best suited to persuade, tap favorably into emotions, mobilize alliances, and serve political objectives? A third time frame is long-term engagement—the development of relationships between people, groups, and institutions—in the realms of ideas, culture, shared knowledge, common ground, discourse norms, reasoned dialogue, and vigorous debate about issues. Here, investments must be made for years, decades, and generations. Each time frame is essential to a comprehensive understanding of public diplomacy and strategic communication, whether the policy issue is combating terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation, bilateral relations between countries, or many other important national security concerns. Public diplomacy in each time frame has limits. Public diplomacy does not trump flawed policies or weak political leadership. Shared understandings may not overcome deep disagreements or interests in conflict. Cross-cultural experiences may reinforce hostilities and competing values. Governments are constrained because much of what their citizens and societies project—and much of what global publics perceive—is beyond government control. Results can take years to achieve or may never be achieved. Success is difficult to measure, although not impossible with appropriate methods and sufficient resources. Without longitudinal studies of U.S. civilian and military exchanges in Indonesia, it is difficult to draw sturdy conclusions. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that years of investment in academic exchanges and International Military Exchange and Training programs have contributed positively to civil society and democratization in the world’s largest Muslim country. Public diplomacy agencies could not function without private sector partnerships. Most government-sponsored international exchange and democratization programs are administered by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Many exchange programs receive funding from corporations as well as foreign governments. Foreign opinion research is

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done though contracts with commercial polling organizations. Increasingly, public diplomacy seeks to leverage private sector talents and creativity to enhance operational capacity in knowledge domains, product identification and development, services and skills, and evaluative feedback. Public diplomacy is also used by nonstate and substate actors and by international organizations when they act in ways that further regional and global governance. Political party institutes, labor unions, and corporations conduct public diplomacy when they support civil society and democratization programs. The governor of Washington engages in public diplomacy when she proposes a Chinese cultural center in Seattle and a Washington state educational center in China. It is public diplomacy when the European Union influences citizens in member states on trade and monetary policies and when the United Nations shapes perceptions on its governance activities in Kosovo. Institutions and Tribal Cultures The goals of public diplomacy are well established and relatively noncontroversial: comprehending other cultures, encouraging dialogue about ideas on issues of common concern, fostering mutual understanding, expanding democracy, reducing anti-Americanism, and influencing attitudes and actions in support of interests. These goals have deep historical roots; Ben Franklin would recognize each. The institutional means to achieve these goals, however, are diverse, changing, and contested. There is consensus that public diplomacy includes legacy activities of the USIA, distributed throughout the Department of State: press briefings, ambassadors’ media interviews, foreign opinion research, conferences, book translations, embassy Web sites, and exchanges. Most observers also include U.S. international broadcasting services directed by the independent Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), although many broadcasters are not comfortable with the public diplomacy label. The BBG directs a suite of federal and corporate international broadcasting services that include the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Sawa and Al Hurra (Arabic language radio and television networks), Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty, (broadcasts to Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran), Radio Free Asia, Radio Farda (radio and television broadcasts to Iran and other Farsi-speaking areas), and Radio or TV Marti (broadcasts to Cuba). Public diplomacy institutions have multiplied since USIA and VOA were the primary actors. Press officers in the White House, National Security Council, DOD and other cabinet departments, and the military’s combatant commands focus increasingly on global publics in briefings and outreach activities. Many U.S. agencies fund educational and professional

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exchanges. According to the U.S. General Accountability Office, “An interagency working group meets quarterly to coordinate the exchange and training activities of 12 federal departments and 15 independent agencies.”24 The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), in addition to funding democratization programs, funds Fulbright scholarships in Pakistan, VOA broadcasts in Africa, and Sesame Workshops in Egypt. More than 100 USAID “Development Outreach and Communications Officers” work side by side in U.S. missions with the State Department’s public diplomacy officers. The National Endowment for Democracy and other publicly funded private entities engage in democracy building. The Center for Disease Control (CDC) consults on ways to put health-related narratives in the entertainment programs of U.S. and foreign media. The DOD provides Military Information Support Teams to assist with outreach in some embassies and contracts with U.S. private sector companies to fund projects intended to improve foreign public opinion about the United States. The U.S. Central Command seeks to communicate its regional vision “to a global audience” in “winning the war of ideas.”25 The proposition that these departments and agencies engage in public diplomacy is contested. Not all diplomats agree that the CDC, USAID, and U.S. combatant commands can be said to carry out public diplomacy activities. Soldiers and civilians in the DOD debate whether they “execute” or “support” public diplomacy. Another way of looking at public diplomacy is though its tribal cultures—groups whose identity and behavior are associated with particular norms, rules, and skills.26 These include: 1. Foreign service officers in embassies and foreign ministries who emphasize face-to-face communication, the priority of “the field” over headquarters, language skills, opinion elites, and the importance of dialogue; 2. Cultural diplomats and professionals in academic institutions and NGOs who privilege exchanges, educational norms, fostering of private cultural connections, deep knowledge of other cultures, and long-term results that are difficult to predict or measure; 3. International broadcasters who stress mass audience communication, journalism norms, audience research, gaining of market share, and media channels (radio, television, and the Internet in descending priority); 4. Communication strategists and public affairs advisors to presidents, cabinet secretaries, and agency directors, who focus on press relations, messages and talking points, occupation of space advantageously within news cycles, the relevance of political campaign strategies, and building of domestic consent (a priority) and foreign consent for policies; 5. Military officers who specialize in strategic communication defined to include public affairs, defense support for public diplomacy, and open information operations and who value communication strategies, doctrine, training and

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education, media tools, innovative technologies, leveraging of NGOs, and information as an instrument of national power; and 6. Democracy-building professionals in government and private sector organizations who give priority to civil society initiatives, partnerships with NGOs, training, and working with indigenous groups.

Each group has a distinct self-identity and operational preferences. Each competes for resources and freedom of action. Each tends to exclude rather than include: members of different groups seldom attend the same conferences, participate on the same task forces, or value interagency assignments. Some relationships do exist. The Secretary of State sits ex officio on the BBG, and the State Department hosts useful interagency fusion teams that share information. Foreign Service Officers carry out press and cultural activities sequentially and simultaneously. Diplomats are assigned to military units; soldiers serve in embassies. Overall, however, public diplomacy is executed by a maze of diverse institutions and competing tribal cultures. Expertise, experience, and focused effort are strengths of this specialization. Homogeneity is both impossible and unwise. But laissez faire has its price: missed collaborative opportunities, weak interactive networks, and the absence of overall strategic direction. Transforming Public Diplomacy How should we think about transforming public diplomacy and its role in combating terrorism? First, it is important to recognize that these are separate questions. Transformation matters because public diplomacy supports not only counterterrorism, but other important interests. Second, it is prudent to consider that strategic transformation may not be achievable. Karen Hughes during her first year in office as under secretary accomplished more than her predecessors in institutionalizing public diplomacy reforms in the State Department and at U.S. missions abroad. These reforms are important, especially if they help to transform the State Department’s traditional diplomacy culture. Reforms in one organization, however, will not achieve changes on the scale required for a public diplomacy instrument comprised of diverse actors, each of whom is facing complexity in a world of states and networks. The United States’ tradition of episodic commitment to public diplomacy and preference for military and economic instruments of power are reasons for prudence. Other reasons are grounded in the U.S. political system. University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), political scientist Amy Zegart has voiced doubts about achieving reforms in the intelligence community. Her reasons are instructive for public diplomacy. Organizations, especially government agencies, seldom adapt from within to changes in their external environment.

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Separation of power in the federal government makes reform legislation rare and difficult. Presidents and lawmakers value effective organizations. Nevertheless, with limited time, finite political capital, and few electoral benefits to be gained, they seldom take on the hard work of institutional reform.27 These barriers are not insurmountable. Public diplomacy transformation has occurred, but only when presidents and congressional leaders, driven by war and the inability of institutions to adapt to their external environment, made transformation a personal priority. Studies of public diplomacy recognized the need for presidential leadership in achieving reform long before 9/11.28 Recent studies have done so as well. Seldom if ever, however, have these studies offered roadmaps leading from general recommendations to outcomes that could prevail over political and bureaucratic obstacles. Detailed roadmaps are beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is possible to identify four characteristics essential in their construction. First, map change in three convergent dimensions. Public diplomacy actors at all levels—in embassies, in regional networks, and in national departments and agencies—have three strategic communication requirements. They must listen. They must choose. They must adapt. Transformation roadmaps must connect and strengthen all three. Listening means comprehending cultures, attitudes, memories, beliefs, demographics, media trends, and social networks at a very high level. This means more than just a rich appreciation of others. It means seeing ourselves the way others see us rather than through the “looking-glass perceptions” of our own views and beliefs.29 It means recognizing that countries, cultures, subcultures, tribes, religions, influence structures, and virtual communities are extraordinarily diverse and require a variety of interpretive tools. It means investing much more in penetrating cultural analysis, ethnographic studies, hard languages, social network analysis software, media analysis, and polling—and sharing what is learned from these efforts among agencies and coalitions. It also means anticipating: the United States has strong ties with elites in Pakistan, for example, but not with millions in Pakistan’s successor generation who will determine its future.30 Stakeholders in public diplomacy minimize both the difficulty and the desirability of listening. Diplomats tend to think they understand indigenous cultures sufficiently through their own perceptions. Military doctrine only recently has begun to include the need to “understand” others in strategic communication and information operations. Political leaders spend large sums on opinion and media research to win elections; then, when in office, they routinely ignore these tools in their public diplomacy. The State Department’s paltry annual worldwide budget for foreign opinion surveys was estimated by the GAO in fiscal year 2005 to be $4.4 million.31

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Choosing means deciding where to concentrate effort. With finite resources and political capital, policymakers, diplomats, soldiers, democratizers, and broadcasters cannot be everywhere and do everything. The United States’ buffet of issues—nuclear proliferation, counterterrorism, China’s projection of hard and soft power, famine, genocide in Africa, global pandemics, trade, energy, science, climate change, and much more—may not exceed the nation’s appetite, but it surely exceeds its capacities. The challenge in determining priorities is two-fold: first, to avoid preoccupation with one thing (e.g., combating terrorism and the war in Iraq) while consigning everything else to checklists of threats and opportunities and, second, to concentrate resources effectively in time horizons that range from news cycles to generations. Adapting means using approaches, narratives, messengers, technologies, and instruments tailored to situations and linked to listening and choosing. What works well in Mexico may not work in Egypt. NGO partnerships may be just the thing in South Africa but not in North Korea. Shortwave broadcasting may reach publics in parts of Africa but not young people in Russia occupied with video games. Political leaders, ambassadors, and combatant commanders play different roles in adapting actions to situations. Each needs talented strategic communication advisors with something useful to say when options are considered, decisions are made, and policies are communicated. Second, design roadmaps that connect hierarchies and networks. Scholars and forward-leaning practitioners have been clear for some time: networks are dominant social structures in information societies. In Manuel Castells’ pathbreaking account, all societies are “penetrated, with different intensity, by the pervasive logic of the network society, whose dynamic expansion gradually absorbs and subdues pre-existing social forms.”32 Networks, Castells argues, are flexible and better than hierarchies in adapting to interactive complexity in human relationships. NGOs (good and bad) have adopted network structures more quickly than governments. Doctors Without Borders and al Qaeda are emblematic of networks capable of adapting to complexity and using information technologies to their advantage. Recent organizational changes in U.S. national security agencies consist almost entirely of establishing new hierarchies (e.g., the Department of Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence) and making changes in old hierarchies (such as the DOD’s emphasis on Special Operations Forces and the State Department’s transformational diplomacy). Flexibility, shared knowledge, and adaptability are stated goals of these changes. Achieving these goals in new and old hierarchies is far from certain. Missing in the U.S. government’s organizational changes are robust networks that connect government and civil society, diplomats and soldiers, and public diplomacy’s institutions and tribal cultures. Eliminating

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hierarchies in governance is neither desirable nor possible. Changing organizations so they act more like networks and less like hierarchies, however, is both desirable and possible. In public diplomacy this means knowledge sharing and operational collaboration. Broadcasting research should be made available routinely to diplomats. Cultural analyses by the military’s foreign area officers should be shared with broadcasters. Embassy analyses of social networks are useful to military public affairs officers. Knowledge products developed by civil society NGOs can help all government entities. Bright lines between career paths for political and public diplomacy officers matter less, because much more of what ambassadors and political officers do involves outreach beyond government ministries. Canada’s diplomats are merging these career paths. U.S. diplomats could learn from their example. Adapting hierarchies to networks means more interservice, interagency, and private sector assignments. Diplomatic career systems could achieve this by making such assignments career enhancing and by emulating military personnel practices in which senior officer promotions have long been contingent on experience in cross-service assignments. Changes in recruitment and training are needed if organizational cultures are to blend the strengths of networks and hierarchies. Strategic communication networks require more than coordinating committees and fusion teams. Indeed, the case against mere coordination is strong. Public diplomacy coordination committees occasionally worked well for short periods of time with presidential interest and strong leadership, but they were never effective on a sustained basis. This is not to say teamwork and information sharing are not desirable. Clearly they are. But successful networks require strategic direction as well. There must be authority to direct and task, to assign operational responsibilities to departments and embassies (but not to manage the execution of their programs), to concur in the appointment of senior public diplomacy officials, to set priorities, and to move resources. In embassies, the chief of mission must provide strategic direction. Whether the “quarterback” for today’s multiagency, multi-issue public diplomacy should be placed over time in a subcabinet position in the Department of State is a question that needs to be addressed. Cabinet departments typically do not think and act in interagency terms. Departments are organized around preferences, outputs, and constraints that make it difficult for them to set interagency priorities and move resources. Reformers need also to guard against reorganizations as panaceas driven by frustration. Moises Naim, in his analysis of countering global criminal enterprises, talks about defragmenting government: This is what defragmenting means: bring together scattered efforts in order to be more effective. But just as an overreliance on technology can create the illusion of a solution, integrating government efforts by just moving

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organizational “boxes” around and placing them under the authority of a “czar” can be an equally dangerous illusion . . . Defragmenting government can work only if there are clear plans, multiyear budgets that extend the time horizons beyond the most immediate emergencies, and solid, competent leadership.33

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, concerned that the United States’ enemies have adapted more skillfully to the global information environment, argues the United States will need “new institutions to engage people across the world.” What, he asks, “should a U.S. Information Agency, or a Radio Free Europe for the 21st century look like?”34 Structures that answer the secretary’s question should look more like networks than hierarchies. Roadmaps are needed that bridge hierarchies and networks, provide strategic direction, avoid reorganization for the sake of doing something, and map public diplomacy to interests, values, and policies. Reformers clearly have more intellectual and practical work to do. Third, institutionalize private sector collaboration. Much of what public diplomacy needs to know and to be successful lies outside the government. Academic and research communities offer untapped resources for education, training, area and language expertise, and planning and consultative services. The commercial sector has a competitive edge in multimedia production, opinion and media surveys, information technologies, program evaluation, and measuring of communication impact. Most recent studies of public diplomacy recommend that government agencies do more to leverage private sector talents, creativity, and best practices. A few also recommend that agencies adopt sophisticated private sector strategies used in planning and integrating complex communication efforts involving multiple actors. There are two basic approaches to collaboration. One is for each department and agency to continue to contract with private sector organizations as needed for program support and ad hoc projects. This is business as usual. The second approach would be to create an independent, nonprofit, and nonpartisan center to serve as a magnet for knowledge and skills in the academic, business, media, and NGO communities. This approach has been recommended by the Defense Science Board, the Council on Foreign Relations, and others.35 Beyond general agreement that such a center should not duplicate what governments do best, proponents differ on questions relating to structure, funding, and purpose. Some focus on attracting creative imagination in developing media products and communication technologies. Others emphasize research and analysis. Still others accentuate a center’s role in crisis response and providing supplementary skills and credible voices. It is possible to imagine a single multipurpose public diplomacy center—related to but outside the government—that would harness expertise on foreign cultures and languages, education and

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training, media creativity and skills, consultative services, and opinion and media analysis. It would serve embassies and multiple government departments in four areas: r Knowledge: cultural influences (values, religion, entertainment, education), demographics, global public opinion, and media trends;

r Products: support for communication strategies, plans, themes, messages, and media products;

r Services: support for cross-cultural exchanges of ideas and people, deployment of temporary communication teams, language and skills databases, and technology development; and

r Evaluation: studies of changes in attitudes and public diplomacy metrics.

Effective partnerships between the government and society in the conduct of public diplomacy are not new. Government grants to private organizations have long been a way to carry out exchanges, foreign opinion polling, democratization programs, and media training. An independent public diplomacy center would institutionalize the relationship in areas that go beyond traditional program support and take collaboration to a new level. Whether it is developing video games that support public diplomacy objectives, analysis of Web-based networks that present threats and opportunities, understanding cultures in strategically important areas, or maintaining databases of language-qualified participants for crisis response teams, a public diplomacy center has the potential to leverage more effectively the knowledge in U.S. universities, the skills of NGOs, and the imagination of its corporations and media industries. The initiative to build flexible, adaptive networks within the government must come from the president and Congress. The initiative to create flexible, adaptive public diplomacy institutions outside the government must come from the private sector. Governments often fund private sector entities. They seldom build them. A roadmap to a successful partnership requires receptive government agencies and collaboration by private sector groups in developing a business plan that will build on the best ideas of those calling for increased support for public diplomacy. Fourth, engage the political will of the president and Congress. Transformation occurs in public diplomacy when presidents and lawmakers provide strong personal leadership. VOA, Radio Free Europe or Radio Liberty, the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, USIA, the Fulbright program, and the National Endowment for Democracy would not have become cornerstones of twentieth-century public diplomacy without the efforts of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Reagan; Senators Karl Mundt and J. William Fulbright; and Congressman Dante Fascell. Presidential and congressional leadership are needed in two areas: connecting actions

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and words and building a durable strategic communication structure at the White House level. Analysts have long recognized that deeds count more than words in public diplomacy. As President Eisenhower’s “Jackson Committee,” established in 1953 to examine the State and Defense Departments and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “information and propaganda activities,” put it: The United States is judged less by what it says through official information outlets than by the actions and attitudes of the Government in international affairs and the actions and attitudes of its citizens and officials, abroad, and at home.36

A half century later, opinion polls correlate anti-Americanism to U.S. policies such as the war in Iraq, to actions such as rendition and prisoner interrogation tactics, and to attitudes such as resistance to management of the nation’s harbors by an Arab-owned company. Conversely, opinion research suggests a positive correlation between actions such as the United States’ tsunami relief efforts and favorable attitudes in Indonesia. It is no accident that Under Secretary of State Karen Hughes made working with U.S. CEOs to raise millions for earthquake relief in Pakistan an important part of her work. In combating terrorism and other threats, U.S. strategic communicators face two quite different strategies: emphasize better communication in hopes of improving the United States’ image and focus on actions, anticipating favorable attitudes as a long-term by-product. Both are important. Geography, time to react, and military dominance are no longer sufficient to ensure national security. Nor is the episodic pattern by which public diplomacy instruments are permitted to rust after wars—only to be “rediscovered” when the next challenge occurs. There has been no presidential directive on public diplomacy since President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive 68 in 1998. Other than appropriations bills, which provide funding and some policy direction, there has been no legislation on public diplomacy authorities and structures since the merger of USIA with the State Department in 1999. Americans are combating terrorism by using and transforming instruments of hard power on a scale comparable to national security initiatives taken in the 1940s and 1950s. Military, intelligence, and law enforcement instruments are changing in response to leadership from the White House and Congress. In contrast, the transformation of public diplomacy has been subcontracted to departments and agencies. Reforms within organizations are not substitutes for the kind of public diplomacy transformation that can only occur when led at the presidential level. Nor are organizational reforms substitutes for enduring networks that connect policies and public diplomacy, departments and agencies, and the government and the

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private sector. Transformation of this kind requires political will and a presidential directive on strategic communication that is reinforced and made permanent with bipartisan congressional support and legislation. NOTES 1. For a comparison of today’s strategic environment and “the Cold War paradigm,” see Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication (Washington, DC, 2004): 33–37. Some analysts find roots of al Qaeda’s worldviews in twentieth-century totalitarian ideologies as well as in radical interpretations of Islam. See Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 52–76. 2. Brian Hocking, “Diplomacy: New Agendas and Changing Strategies,” in Netdiplomacy I, Beyond Foreign Ministries, ed. Barry Fulton (U.S. Institute of Peace, Virtual Diplomacy Series, pt. 2, no. 14, 2002), http://www.usip.org/ virtualdiplomacy/publications/ reports/14b.html. 3. John M. Owen IV, “Democracy, Realistically,” The National Interest 83 (2006): 35–42. 4. For example, see the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude’s Project Web site http://pewglobal.org. 5. For an assessment of global anti-Americanism based on the Pew Research Center’s surveys, see Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America Against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked (New York: Times Books, 2006). The “secession of elites” argument is advanced by Walter Russell Mead in Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America’s Grand Strategy in a World at Risk (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 150–151. Richard N. Haass discusses costs of anti-Americanism in The Opportunity: America’s Moment to Alter History’s Course (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 29–30, 202–203. 6. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 67–68. 7. Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 8. Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922; New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997). 9. Robert M. Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004), 95–122. 10. George W. Bush, Address to Congress, September 20, 2001. On terrorism as a primary frame after 9/11, see Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, eds. Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public (New York: Routledge, 2003), 14–15. 11. The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ nss2006.pdf. 12. Francis Fukuyama argues that “The rhetoric about World War IV and the global war on terrorism should cease. We are fighting hot counterinsurgency wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against the international jihadist movement, that we need to win. But conceiving the larger struggle as a global war comparable to the world wars or the Cold War vastly overstates the scope of the problem, suggesting

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that we are taking on a large part of the Arab and Muslim worlds.” See America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 184. 13. Numerous speeches by Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen P. Hughes on “transformational public diplomacy” are available on the Department of State’s Web site. See, for example, “Remarks at the Shell Distinguished Lecture Series” (Baker Institute for Public Policy, March 29, 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/us/64106.htm. For an assessment of the State Department’s public diplomacy reforms, see U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges, GAO-06-535 (Washington, DC, May 2006), http://www.gao.gov/ cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-535. 14. On public diplomacy strategies and reform in the decade before 9/11, see annual reports of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy; Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination (Washington, DC: 2001); a report of an independent Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age directed by Barry Fulton, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age (Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 1998); reports and speeches on the U.S. Institute for Peace’s Virtual Diplomacy Initiative Web site http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/index.html; and Jarol Manheim, Strategic Public Diplomacy and American Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Influence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 15. George W. Bush, “Address to Congress,” September 20, 2001; Richard Holbrooke, “Getting the Message Out,” Washington Post, October 28, 2001. 16. For a discussion of these and other public diplomacy efforts after 9/11, see Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, 20–25. The Task Force noted that achievements did occur at the tactical level: creation of the U.S. government’s Arabic language Radio Sawa and Persian language Radio Farda broadcasting services, the embedded media policy of the Department of Defense, and extraordinary amounts of personal time devoted by the president, cabinet secretaries, and other senior leaders to “advocating policies and shaping perceptions at home and abroad.” 17. The literature on network paradigms and strategic assessments of public diplomacy is large. See Bruce Gregory, “Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms” (paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict, Washington, DC, August 31, 2005), http://www8.georgetown. edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf; Jeffrey B. Jones, “Strategic Communication: A Mandate for the United States,” Joint Force Quarterly, 39 (2005): 108–114; Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) 99–125; Barry Fulton, ”Taking the Pulse of American Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18, 2004); R.S. Zaharna, “The Network Paradigm of Strategic Public Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy in Focus, Policy Brief, vol. 10, no. 1, April 2005, www.fpif.org; Jamie Metzl, “Network Diplomacy,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2001): 77–87; David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla, What If There is a Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs? (U.S. Institute of Peace,

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2000) http://www.usip.org/vdi/vdr/ronarqISA99.html; and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999). 18. For a list of reports and a summary of their recommendations, see Susan B. Epstein and Lisa Mages, Public Diplomacy: A Review of Past Recommendations (Washington, DC: Congressional Reference Service, 2005). 19. Condoleezza Rice, “Announcement of Nominations of Karen P. Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and Dina Powell as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs,” March 14, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43385.htm; Donald Rumsfeld, “New Realities in the Media Age” (speech, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, February 17, 2006), http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2006/ sp20060217-12574.html. The secretary also urged “embracing new institutions to engage people across the world,” although he neglected to suggest what such institutions might look like. 20. Quoted in Glenn Kessler, “Hughes Tries Fine-Tuning To Improve Diplomatic Picture,” Washington Post, April 19, 2006. 21. U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies (Washington, DC, May 3, 2006): 6–7, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt? GAO-06-707T. According to State Department officials, the GAO observed, one of the Policy Coordinating Committee’s tasks is to issue a formal interagency public diplomacy strategy, adding, “It is not clear when this strategy will be developed.” 22. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, February 13, 2006: 1–10. DOD Public Affairs (DOD PA), defense support for public diplomacy, and Information Operations (IO) are identified as “distinct functions that can support strategic communication.” See also John P. Abizaid, Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 2006 Posture of the United States Central Command (Washington, DC, March 14, 2006): Section X.I; Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication: 11–13. 23. Joseph Nye uses the term “strategic communication” to mean one of three “dimensions” of public diplomacy: “a set of simple themes, much like what occurs in a political or advertising campaign . . . over the course of a year to brand the central themes, or to advance a particular government policy.” Nye’s other two dimensions are “daily communications,” which explain “the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions,” and the “development of lasting relationships with key individuals, over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels.” His dimensions are distinguished by two central characteristics: time and “different relative proportions of government information and long-term cultural relationships.” Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 107–110. 24. U.S. General Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy, GAO05-323 (Washington, DC, April 2005): 8, http://www.gao.gv/c/bin/getrpt?GAO05-323.

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25. Abizaid, “2006 Posture of the United States Central Command,” Section X.I. 26. Here Graham Allison’s account of how individuals behave in “organizational cultures” is helpful. Their identity is tied to a particular mission, to a set of beliefs and norms, and to “rules for matching actions to situations,” which they “have inherited and pass on to their successors.” Given public diplomacy’s multiple institutions, its functional distribution in larger organizations (e.g., State and Defense), and its operational dependence on the private sector, I prefer to capture Allison’s logic with the term “tribal cultures.” Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 145–158. 27. Amy B. Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11,” Political Science Quarterly 121 (Spring 2006): 58–60. 28. For more than fifty years, reports of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy and its predecessors routinely called for presidential direction in public diplomacy and systematic consideration of the implications of foreign public opinion in formulating and communicating policies. Recently the Defense Science Board, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World led by former Ambassador Edward Djerejian have also urged strong presidential leadership. The Defense Science Board recommended that the president issue a directive to establish a permanent strategic communication structure within the National Security Council and work with Congress to create legislation for a Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and a permanent interagency Strategic Communication Committee. Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication: 62–64. The Council on Foreign Relations called for a presidential decision directive that would “outline America’s new [public diplomacy] strategy and provide a coordinating structure to harness the government’s civilian and military public diplomacy assets.” Finding America’s Voice: A Strategy for Reinvigorating Public Diplomacy, Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (New York, 2003), 10, 34–35. Stating “There can be no success without the seriousness of purpose and interagency coordination provided at the direction of the President of the United States,” Ambassador Djerejian’s group concluded that the president “must be considered the ultimate director of public diplomacy and urged appointment of a Cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for Public Diplomacy.” Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World, Report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World (Washington, DC, October 2003): 58– 61. Following the appointment of Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes, however, Ambassador Djerejian backed away from this recommendation, saying, “With Karen in there, I don’t think we need that anymore.” Quoted in Neil King, “A Diplomatic Challenge: Bush Confidante Takes On a Tough Job at the State Department,” Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2005. 29. On “looking-glass perceptions,” see James M. Fields and Howard. Schuman, “Public Beliefs About the Beliefs of the Public,” Public Opinion Quarterly (1976) 40: 427–448. The U.S. writer Tom Wolfe suggests, “Virtually all people” live

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by what he calls “fiction absolutes” meaning that individuals adopt “a set of values which, if truly absolute in the world – so ordained by some almighty force – would make not that individual but his group . . . the best of all possible groups, the best of all inner circles.” Wolfe cites examples in which scholars and politicians failed to appreciate the impact of this phenomenon on social and political outcomes in New York City and southwest Ohio. The difficulties are greater of course in understanding value sets in Cairo and northwest Pakistan. “The Human Beast” (National Endowment for the Humanities Jefferson Lecture, Washington, DC, May 10, 2006), http://www.neh.gov/whoweare/ wolfe/lecture.html. 30. Barry Fulton, “Taking the Pulse of American Public Diplomacy in a Post9/11 World.” Paper, Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18, 2004. 31. A roundtable of experts assembled by the GAO in 2003 “estimated that State would need to spend up to $50 million to conduct adequate opinion research and performance measurement given the size of its public diplomacy budget and scope of operations.” The GAO, State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences, 2006: 24. 32. Manuel Castells, End of Millennium, vol. 3 of The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 350. In various studies, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have argued the utility of networks advocating changes in diplomacy. See especially The Emergence of Noopolitik. 33. Moises Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 249–250. 34. Rumsfeld, Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, 2006. 35. Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication: 48–59; Council on Foreign Relations, Finding America’s Voice: 11, 37–39. Although the GAO is silent on the idea of institutionalizing a public diplomacy center outside the government, its recent reports have strongly urged greater private sector focus in the public diplomacy activities of the State Department and other U.S. agencies. See State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences, 2006:18–30. 36. The President’s Committee on International Information Activities, “Report to the President,” June 30, 1953. The so-called “Jackson Report,” named for the committee’s chairman, William H. Jackson, is available in the manuscript collection of the Public Diplomacy Institute at George Washington University.

CHAPTER 18 CYBER MOBILIZATION: THE NEGLECTED ASPECT OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE Timothy L. Thomas

For over two years, the U.S. armed forces have focused on seeking ways to counter insurgent use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Less attention has been paid to countering the mobilization process that produces the seemingly unending line of insurgents willing to (1) become suicide bombers (walking IEDs, or WIEDs), (2) prepare the IEDs, and (3) fight street battles. The insurgents use the Internet’s “cyber mobilization” potential to fuel and supply this line of volunteers. They have been particularly successful in recruiting volunteers from other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.1 This success has forced coalition forces to continually react to the environment instead of controlling it. According to U.S. Army publications, two types of offensive actions are key components of the insurgency doctrine: armed conflict and mass mobilization. It is clear that the insurgents use IEDs as their main instrument to conduct armed conflict. It is just as clear that they have learned how to mobilize and conduct conflict-related cognitive activities using cyber capabilities. Coalition forces have reacted to the former with speed and money. IED study groups have proliferated. Coalition forces have responded to the latter mobilization concept with an ill-equipped concept, information operations (IO). Fighting IEDs with artillery is akin to fighting cyber mobilization with U.S. IO paradigms.

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Insurgent cyber mobilization capabilities are designed to conduct psychological warfare activities, to propagandize insurgent successes and counter coalition allegations, and to recruit, finance, and train more fighters. Insurgents designate public affairs specialists to be their spokespersons and establish video production centers to promote their cause. During congressional testimony in early May 2006, one report noted that “al Qaida has advertised online to fill jobs for Internet specialists, and its media group has distributed computer games and recruitment videos that use everything from poetry to humor to false information to gather support. The media group has assembled montages of American politicians taking aim at the Arab world.”2 IO, on the other hand, doesn’t even recognize the cyber mobilization concept. In fact, IO is devoid of cyber terminology in general, other than the term cyberspace, and it nearly ignores the concept of counterpropaganda. If an insurgency’s strength is predicated on the support of the local population, then coalition IO and counterinsurgency efforts must take cyber mobilization (mobilization enabled by computer chip-driven devices such as cell phones, the Internet, compact discs [CDs], and so on) into account.3 A “counter cyber mobilization” strategy should be contemplated to assist in controlling the environment, and a new doctrinal section on cyber mobilization should be developed for U.S. IO and counterinsurgency manuals. Cyber mobilization is a problem that will be with us for a long time. This chapter will discuss the precedents to the current use of the Internet in Iraq and Afghanistan; the U.S. IO paradigm problem and its extension into understanding the virtual aspect of an insurgency; the use of the Internet by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan; and coalition countermeasures to insurgent efforts. The chapter will then conclude with some relevant recommendations for U.S. IO and the counterinsurgency doctrine. PRECEDENTS Communication devices have long been an important means of facilitating an uprising. The French Revolution witnessed the radicalization, education, and organization of the populace in large part due to the power of journals, newspapers, pamphlets, printers, and publishers. The latter communication devices were particularly effective at the time of the deregulation of the French press, when there were no rules on copyright, no rules on publications, and no libel laws. Today, gangs, terrorist groups, insurgents, and other hate groups use the Internet and cyberspace under similar conditions.4 Audrey Kurth Cronin notes that blogs are today’s revolutionary pamphlets, Web sites are news dailies or TV stations, list servers are broadsides, images are projected like caricatures or symbolic pictures of the past, and every item is passed faster than ever before and is available 24/7. The Internet is creating identity and a sense of unity, building a

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cause-driven conscience, and returning segments of the populace to mobdriven feudal forms of warfare.5 Cronin adds that the Internet is different from past propaganda methods in that it can demonstrate the ruthlessness and power of an insurgency in ways not available to former communication devices. By crafting their version of events, insurgents can inspire more violence. Videos showing insurgent attack successes and the publication of fiery speeches impart a tremendous emotional appeal to potential insurgents. Ben Venske, a specialist in jihadi videos, has noted that such videos can be divided into seven divisions or purposes: production videos (1–2 hours in length, with a wide range of source material); operational videos (short, quick clips of attacks, typically 1–8 minutes); hostage videos (tools in ongoing operations, which increase attention on a group); statement videos (featuring mid to senior tiers of a group and intended for morale boost, recruiting, fundraising, and political positions, often released to media as well as the Internet); tribute videos (when significant group members or large numbers are killed); internal training videos (usually not intended for the public); and instructional videos (how to accomplish a specific skill).6 The videos as a whole impart a type of follow-on psychological attack on viewers, since they amplify attack effects and demonstrate success, according to Venske.7 Cronin and Venske’s comments indicate that the warning signs of the advent of the cell phone and Internet mobilization of the population were evident long before the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. They were even evident in the United States. In December 1999, the Internet was used to organize resistance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle. Internet-recruited protestors converged on Seattle from all directions. They frustrated well-designed police control plans by using cell phones to move crowds to areas left unattended or to focus on other advantageous spots. Both television and the Internet picked up coverage of these successful efforts that encouraged similar demonstrations elsewhere utilizing the same technologies to champion various causes. Thus the Internet, and to a lesser degree CDs and cell phones, have become key insurgency tools due to their ubiquity, cyber mobilization potential, and anonymity. Women can participate on the Internet at little risk, even in male-dominated societies, since they appear anonymous. There is even an Internet site hosting a madrasa (Islamic school).8 Web sites associated with jihadist movements reportedly have grown from 20 to over 4,000 in just five years. Today, the spin on Arab specialist T. E. Lawrence’s 1920 idea that “the printing press is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern commander”9 would be that “the Internet is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern jihadist.” Gabriel Weimann, one of the most well-known authors on the use of the Internet by terrorists and insurgents, noted that the Internet allows groups

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to challenge a state’s media domination of political discourse and even its political culture. It also permits interaction among elements to an extent never before contemplated (via e-groups, chat rooms, forums, online magazines, message boards, and online manuals), and it allows for extensive targeting (potential supporters, enemies, international public opinion, and journalists).10 Internet broadcasts also have a tremendous psychological appeal that is often overlooked. Videos or statements have generated a stimulus and response pattern among insurgents and audiences, according to Weimann, that includes both supporters and nonsupporters alike. A conditioned reflex is generated when statements are made about potential violent actions that cause anxiety in the audience.11 Further, From a psychological perspective, two of the greatest fears of modern times are combined in the term “cyberterrorism.” The fear of random, violent victimization blends well with the distrust and outright fear of computer technology. An unknown threat is perceived as more threatening than a known threat. Although cyberterrorism does not entail a direct threat of violence, its psychological impact on anxious societies can be as powerful as the threat of terrorist bombs.12

Weimann notes that the biggest obstacles to our understanding the actual threat of cyberterrorism are a fear of the unknown and a lack of information or, worse, too much misinformation.13 It should be highlighted that the Internet is also fostering future generations of insurgents through the spread of hate propaganda aimed primarily at Jews and Christians. For example, the Web site www.memritv.org has hosted cartoons from Hizbollah14 TV that show Jews turning into animal forms. The computer game Special Forces was developed by the Hizbollah Central Internet Bureau. It places players in operations against Israelis, based on actual Hizbollah battles with Israeli forces.15 It is a violent game that praises martyrs and gives credit to players who shoot Israeli politicians and others.16 The Hamas site al-Fateh (The Conqueror) discusses jihad, science, and tales of heroism. The site also posts messages promoting suicide terrorism.17 Other sites, which host photos and videos of jihadi summer camps for kids, display images of young Arab children dressed as suicide bombers, while others conduct mock beheadings. Such programs for children are very likely to produce at least a few future insurgents because of their contribution to what Stanford psychologist Albert Bandura refers to as “moral disengagement.” In order for individuals to become lethal terrorists, according to Bandura, they must acquire an ability to sanctify harmful conduct as honorable and righteous, which is achieved by moral justification, exoneration of comparison with graver inhumanities, sanitization of language, displacement of responsibility, and dehumanization.18

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Similarly, psychologist Anthony Stahelski’s research led him to develop a model of social psychological conditioning through which individuals are conditioned to identify a group’s enemies as evil subhumans or nonhumans who should be killed.19 Al-Arabiya, an Arabic language television news channel located in Dubai, offered a view of the Internet’s impact on youth from director Abd al-Rahman al-Rashed. He noted that the videos of Iraq’s former al Qaeda insurgent leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, have been “broadcast directly over the Internet to hundreds of thousands of youth who see and hear and read most of their information from it . . . Most of the terrorist crimes are tied to the Internet as the preferred theater.”20 Al-Rashed’s comments are frightening if true. U.S. PARADIGM PROBLEM The U.S. military would label most of these insurgent activities that involve the use of the Internet as “information operations.” The U.S. Armed Forces Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations (published February 13, 2006) defines IO as “the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”21 It is important to note that the Joint Publication only defines one cyber-related term—cyberspace. This relative lack of attention toward cyber-related terms, and their absence from IO and the counterinsurgency doctrine, is a secondary focal point of this chapter, close behind the emphasis on cyber mobilization as an overlooked modern phenomenon. Other armed forces publications reflect much the same attitude. The U.S. Army’s November 2003 Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations declares that the term information operations has five categories of activity: PSYOP, operational security, computer network operations, military deception, and electronic warfare. The term also includes specified supporting and related capabilities. A newly contemplated U.S. Army definition of IO states that it is “actions taken by forces and individuals to affect attitudes, behaviors, information systems, and information, while protecting one’s own through the integrated employment of the capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, PSYOP, military deception and operational security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities throughout the information environment.”22 The focus of both the Joint Publication and the Field Manual on attitudes, behavior, and decision making indicates that their emphasis is clearly not on developing the capabilities required to offset an insurgent’s cyber mobilization process. In fact, in the Joint Publication, the term “counterpropaganda” is used only

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twice (in an appendix and not the main text), and it is not included in the glossary. The terms counterintelligence and countermeasures, on the other hand, are used often. The Internet has clearly become a weapon of mobilization that is interactive, fast, and cheap, with few (or, as in the insurgent’s case, zero) regulations or laws to control it. To put it more bluntly, the Internet has allowed a group of insurgents, without any formal theoretical and doctrinal information operations background, to successfully confront a colossal U.S. and coalition IO force that is not only well organized (the United States has an IO Corps, IO doctrine, IO magazines, IO courses in military institutions, and so on) but also well financed. With thousands of IO personnel, former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld sounded mystified when observing that “the extremist groups are able to act quickly on the information front, with relatively few people, while the U.S. government bureaucracy has yet to keep up in an age of e-mail, web logs and instant messaging . . . We in the government have barely even begun to compete in reaching their audiences.”23 This is quite a damming statement for a country that invented the Internet. The overwhelming implication is that U.S. PSYOP and computer network operations need refinement or greater elucidation to take into account cyber-related terms, a concept that is ubiquitous in civil society. Why cyber-related terminology hasn’t made its way into the military lexicon is a mystery. There are now hundreds of cyber-related terms and concepts in online dictionaries. One surmises under such circumstance that the military is a prisoner of sorts to its own IO paradigm and sound bytes. Including cyber terminology in IO and the counterinsurgency doctrine is now a necessity, since the military and civilian worlds have been drawn much closer together by the Internet. The interaction of the military and civilian worlds is inherent in the idea of insurgent warfare. Such was not the case in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm, when two military forces confronted one another. At that time, CNN was the only comprehensive news outlet available worldwide. Now, just 15 years later, in addition to a much broader range of international news services, the battle for influence rages in numerous cities between militaries, insurgents, and civilians. There are a multitude of insurgent Web sites taking advantage of this environment, offering images, directives, and testimonials that compete for the minds and emotions of the local populace and world opinion. These Web sites take advantage of the prejudices and beliefs of a respective society and espouse disadvantaged or extremist points of view. For the most part, these sites are anticoalition and try to drive a wedge between legitimate local police or military forces and the international coalition supporting these forces. Insurgents have used the Internet to cyber-mobilize primarily in two ways. First, the Internet is used to respond to unfolding events before

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coalition forces have a chance or opportunity to respond. As a result, coalition forces are often blamed for actions the insurgents commit. Second, the Internet is used to post influential information items to include jihadi training materials, an ideological rationale for actions, instructional manuals, propaganda, and agitation materials online. Some creative methods have been used. For example, a recent posting to a jihadi Web page announced a competition to design a new Web site for an Iraqi militant group. The motivating prize was the chance to fire missiles by remote control at a U.S. military base.24 Insurgent Web sites have created, to some degree, a paperless environment in which insurgents can operate. Other cyber-age developments are also of tremendous value to an insurgent. For example, the CD is one such device. CDs, with messages from suicide bombers (or more likely with just extremist songs or music), have been found in places as far apart as Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and Lansing, Michigan. Thus it is not always necessary for potential Middle East recruits to possess a computer or Internet connection to obtain insurgent propaganda—just access to some device that plays a CD. Insurgents are also using some traditional forms of PSYOP. For example, in April 2006, insurgents in Iraq firebombed several bookstores, news kiosks, and distribution points and scattered leaflets that read, “All who associate with these newspapers will be the legitimate target of the mujahideen wherever they are, and the mujahideen will not waver in targeting them and killing them.”25 Further, insurgents use many other old propaganda techniques. They distort facts and sequences of events, they place blame on the innocent, they make comparisons that are favorable only to them, and they berate their enemies. The difference between old uses of propaganda and new uses, of course, is that the Internet can quickly spread insurgent claims around the world with speed, clarity, and efficiency. In some regions of the world, even the wildest insurgent claims are accepted at face value. U.S. Terminology: Does It Neglect the Virtual Insurgency Aspect of Conflict? The terms insurgency and insurgent are used throughout this chapter, but each term carries with it a traditional utilization that has no virtual association. This is clear from both formal and informal explanations of the terms. It is important for planners to develop and elucidate virtual insurgency terminology, as the cyber world begins to influence operations and summon insurgents to the front much like radio transmissions once did. Both U.S. President George Bush and former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld shied away from the term insurgent and its virtual implications.

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Rumsfeld, speaking at a press conference in 2005, said he was a little reluctant to call the people the coalition is fighting in Iraq “insurgents.” He preferred the words “enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government.”26 In response, language expert William Safire noted that “insurgent, from the Latin insurgere, ‘to rise up,’ means ‘a rebel, one who revolts against an established government.’ The insurgent in rebellion does not have the status of a belligerent, rooted in Latin for ‘waging war,’ and thus does not have the protections in law of a member of a state at war.”27 It appears that when Secretary Rumsfeld speaks of enemies of the legitimate government, he is indeed talking about an insurgent, since Safire’s definition (which corresponds closely with the dictionary definition) is so similar (an insurgent is a rebel who revolts against an established government). One who revolts is often considered an enemy—or can turn into one when the “revolt,” as in Iraq, lasts for a period of time and involves brutal slayings. Safire believes that Rumsfeld does not like the term insurgent for two reasons: it is often applied to a group seeking to oust the leadership of a political party or a union (acting much like an underdog and attaining the sympathies of the population), and it unifies disparate elements into an “insurgency.”28 These factors are cause for concern. For example, a Jihad Academy video showed operations carried out by the Mujahideen Army, the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Ansar al-Sunnah Army, and al Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, indicating that several insurgent groups do exist and their unification could make them even more difficult to handle. President Bush, in his 2005 commencement speeches at the Naval Academy and at Kansas State University, also avoided the term insurgent. He defined the coalition’s enemy in Iraq as “a combination of rejectionists, Saddamists and terrorists.” The president believes rejectionists are resentful Sunnis who can be brought into the Iraqi democratic folds, Saddamists are those wanting to return to power, and terrorists are foreigners fighting freedom’s progress in Iraq, according to an explanation by Safire. By not lumping these three together into the term “insurgents,” the president hopes to keep them from uniting in the minds of Iraqis (keep the violent factions separate from the rejectionists).29 Again, no mention is made of the virtual arena in which these groups operate. Joint Publication 1-02: The U.S. Armed Forces Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, last updated in March 2006, defines an insurgency and an insurgent as follows: r Insurgency: an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict

r Insurgent: member of a political party who rebels against established leadership30

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Again, as expected, there is no mention of a “virtual” insurgent. There would also appear to be a disconnect, however, between these definitions and others previously noted. In fact, the “official” Joint Publication 1-02 descriptions can serve as a source of confusion. An insurgency, according to the Joint Publication definition, does not necessarily have to be an organized “political” movement, yet an insurgent is defined as one who is a member of a political party. This is odd and inconsistent. The definitions also do not conform to the Webster’s Dictionary definition of the terms either. As with other terms31 , it is clear that more precision is needed in U.S. military terminology. Such imprecision may be the impetus that motivates presidents and defense secretaries to start interpreting the meaning of words, which generates further confusion in society and among the armed forces as to what or whom our forces are fighting. British military expert John Mackinley, whose recent work has centered on a concept called “the virtual arena of war,” sees a new type of insurgency emerging—one that neither President Bush nor Secretary Rumsfield nor JP 1-02 have mentioned. According to Mackinley, “The global insurgents that oppose the international coalition can be characterized as a complex insurgency; they grow organically and exist in considerable depth beyond the operational area.32 A complex insurgency grows organically like a virus and acts intuitively. To defeat it may require reorganized security structures and an unfamiliar modus operandi.”33 The idea of a complex insurgency and the concept of organic growth much like a virus would complement nicely Secretary Rumsfield’s fears that the disparate units could integrate forces intuitively and spread. One must be careful, however, not to overlook the virtual aspect of this complex, growing virus. The virtual arena can operate in considerable depth beyond the operational area (in fact, it can operate all over the globe) while simultaneously resting in the palm of an insurgent as a cell phone at the tactical level. Mackinlay adds that “the virtual dimension should not be confused with information warfare and must be regarded as an arena of activity that no single party controls; it is not, therefore, a special weapon exclusively in the hands of any particular user. Just as friendly and enemy forces act against each other in the strategic and operational spaces, so they do in the virtual dimension.”34 Mackinley believes that the virtual dimension’s proliferation of actors has created another theater of war with key objectives and tactical areas that can be seized by either side, and that a counterstrategy must contain interconnected strategic, operational, and virtual dimensions.35 This arena is turning PSYOP into CYOP, a cyber-enabled psychological mobilization and recruitment factor of which coalition defense planners must be aware. Joint Publication 1-02 defines a counterinsurgency as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN.”36 Once again, no

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virtual element is noted. The closest definition in Joint Publication 1-02 to a counter cyber mobilization capability would be the term “cyber counterintelligence,” which is defined as “measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions.”37 This focus relates more to conventional computer network operations than it does to any mobilization activity. Overall, one is left with the feeling that the mobilization aspect of the insurgency and counterinsurgency doctrine has received short shrift and that IO has ignored the cyber element so prominent in civil society. To counter the impact of these mobilizing Web sites and devices in theater, U.S. brigade commanders and other coalition leaders—in the absence of an adequate information operation “quick response” template (IO is one of the designated concepts to counter insurgent information actions)—have developed IO actions “on the fly.” This fact alone indicates that something is at work in the cyber domain that current IO policy and strategy cannot address. Such actions are deemed more appropriate and conducive for the insurgency environment. Lieutenant General David Petraeus, former commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth (and now the commanding officer of the troops in Iraq), noted at a recent IO conference that the key is speed.38 Coalition forces need to respond to a situation by providing information to the population before the insurgents can act. While coalition forces admittedly did not receive much training (if any) on this issue in the past, the actual problem may lie elsewhere in the formulation of IO and the counterinsurgency doctrine. Insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan: How They Use Cyber Capabilities Insurgents interpret and use cyber-generated information and actions differently than U.S. operators. This is because the insurgents’ context for decision making (no need to adhere to any law other than their own interpretation of the Koran), jihadist prism for viewing the environment, and indifference to killing innocent people allows them to intimidate, influence, and mobilize their believers in ways unacceptable to civilized commanders. Insurgents use the Internet to mobilize, recruit, manipulate, respond, and exploit modern conflicts faster than their opponents. Recently, Abu-Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the former al Qaeda leader in Iraq, used the Internet to speak about U.S. casualties, the Iraqi elections, Israel, and other issues. He also used the Internet to show the preparation and execution of an attack on a hotel complex in Baghdad. Meanwhile, the so-called Mujahideen Army posted a video titled “The Sniper of al-Fallujah.” Such multimedia messages are often the persuasive and convincing element

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that influences the ideological or religious fence sitters to adopt their cause. The Web facilitates the recruitment of suicide bombers from amongst these fence sitters. Terrorism researchers Scott Atran and Jessica Stern note that jihadist Web sites have played a key role in forging the mindset of a suicide bomber. The Internet provides a way to bond individuals and give them direction as they surf jihadi Web sites. Efforts are needed to provide a positive counter to them on the Internet, whether it be positive alternatives for those who might succumb to the recruiters or simply counters to these negative influences.39 Insurgent use of the cyber element has introduced an operating pattern different from a well-known U.S. military procedure, the OODA loop—a concept based on former U.S. pilot John Boyd’s observe, orient, decide, and act paradigm. Boyd’s paradigm determined a method for identifying and targeting an opposing force that worked well in the Cold War environment. Even while in flight there was time for Boyd to utilize all four elements. The paradigm works in Iraq or Afghanistan when coalition forces take the initiative, such as in the fight for Fallujah. In Iraq and Afghanistan, however, it is often the invisible enemy that takes the initiative. Where (or who) they may be is often unknown. Insurgents hide and may initiate confrontation by remote control—as seen with IEDs—without ever confronting coalition forces. Only after an insurgentgenerated incident does, or can, the coalition react. Coalition forces, given this scenario, cannot observe and orient—they must decide and act (or react). The invisible enemy has stolen the key elements of observation and orientation from them. Coalition forces must process the action that has taken place and coordinate it with policy before acting in many instances. Insurgents use a different paradigm. A physical action occurs at their initiative and then they cyber-respond. The physical action, information response (PAIR) loop allows them to be the first to provide a version of a story to an audience with whom they have some credibility—one which offers them influence and support. The virtual dimension allows them to manipulate how an event is perceived before coalition forces can react. U.S. Colonel Rob Baker, a former brigade commander in Iraq, recently provided a battlefield example of the PAIR paradigm by describing how an insurgent suicide bomber detonated his belt too early and killed a number of Iraqis, narrowly missing his intended target, a U.S. installation. Baker noted that it was vital for U.S. forces to immediately distribute suicide bomber or IED “handbills” that told Iraqis what had happened.40 However, in this case, before information could be sent up the line to create the handbills, the insurgents beat U.S. forces to the information punch, spreading word that the U.S. had carried out a missile strike on

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the Iraqi populace (to cover up the insurgent’s failed suicide mission). An anti-American crowd soon appeared, threatening to riot. Perhaps the crowd was not a result of an immediate Internet assemblage, but its actions would be reported there nonetheless. Meanwhile, our forces were properly running the incident through channels and awaiting word on what to do next. That is, the insurgents used the PAIR paradigm to perfection to gain advantage even from a failed operation. Press reports indicate that coalition forces are now less concerned with an insurgent’s use of viruses and other malware than with these cyberrelated issues of mobilization and manipulation. Even the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) noted that terrorist groups lack the ability to damage the United States via an Internet-based attack.41 Thus the incredible force the United States has assembled to protect its information security is working well. But we have not done nearly as well at anticipating the insurgent’s use of other cyber capabilities. A Washington Post article of August 9, 2005, described several ways in which the Internet can serve as a weapon for insurgents, such as: r r r r r r

intertwine real-time war with electronic jihad, immortalize suicide bombers, taunt the U.S. military, release tactical details of operations many times each day, publish a monthly Internet magazine, and negotiate with bin Laden.42

By utilizing the Internet in this manner, the insurgents have become very effective, with a far smaller staff and effort than that which is employed by its coalition opponents. Jihadi Web sites now compete with global news agencies for media attention in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is no need for rationality or balanced news coverage on their sites. Insurgents are interested in attracting true believers to their cause as well as in convincing a broader audience of their political objectives.43 Some insurgent audiences may not be as large as others, but they can be far more committed. It is estimated that over the past five years, jihadi Web sites have increased from fewer than 20 to more than 4,000.44 In this manner, the insurgency grows like a virus and acts intuitively. The Web sites enable insurgents to discuss their tradecraft and to exchange jihadist justifications for actions, both accomplished and planned. To add veracity to their claims, they often include video clips as an integral part of their online activities. To jihadists, the Internet is not merely a place to publish open-source material; it is a place to conduct open-source war.45 The Internet battle for influence and persuasion is second only to physical confrontation, some

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jihadists believe. A November 28, 2005, posting on the al-Safinat forum site noted the following: There is no doubt that the jihadi forums play a critical role in providing aid to the mujahideen on the battlefield. Who could have thought that it would break the ring of steel that the Crusaders and Jews have attempted to erect in order to conceal the voice of the jihad, and cover up their humiliations on the battlefield?46

A March 2005 statement on the jihadi forum Minbar Ahl al-Sunna walJama’a noted that an Information Jihad Brigade had been formed—not an IO brigade, just an information brigade. The brigade’s aim is to conduct a full-scale propaganda war to “influence the morale of our enemies.” It is composed of design, language, and publication divisions. In December 2005, the Middle East Media Research Institute reported that insurgents are using Yahoo.com as a gateway for indoctrination and incitement of aspiring insurgents.47 Perhaps this gateway is a product of the information brigade. Web sites also allow jihadists to spread tactical and targeting information. An individual known as “al-Mohager al-Islami” (“The Islamic Immigrant”) has been posting messages to dozens of jihadist e-group forums, both public and password protected, about the locations and equipment of U.S. and British sites in Kuwait, Qatar, and other areas. The postings include photos of embassies and living areas. Besides posting the introductory message, “Al-Mohager al-Islami” provides logistic information about several bases in Iraq and calls upon the mujahideen to target these sites. Thus, the Internet serves as an intelligence and reconnaissance asset for jihadists even in the planning stages of armed conflict. “Al-Mohager al-Islami” also provided a nearly 40-page pamphlet on “The Art of Kidnapping—The Best and Quickest Way of Kidnapping Americans.” The manual includes information for planning raids, the composition of support crews, general rules for these crews to follow, observation points, kidnapping suggestions, and methods of capturing Americans.”48 On other Web sites, insurgents have actually placed warning orders to their subordinates when aware of future coalition activities. In one case, subordinates were warned to hide all papers and weapons because coalition troops would be searching their houses soon. Music and speeches can be uploaded on Web sites and forums as well. Insurgent Targets Insurgents have different targets in mind when developing Internet messages. In some cases, the main cyber mobilization targets appear to be the minds of humiliated or resentful Muslim emigrants. A January 23, 2006, video produced by the Global Islamic Media Front, entitled “Jihad

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Academy,” demonstrates this point more vividly. A voice at the start of the video recites, “The roots of humiliation cannot be removed except with the showers of bullets. Without the spilling of blood, dishonor cannot be wiped off the forehead.”49 Once recruited, insurgents offer new recruits actual targets on the Internet against which action can be taken. For example, a review of Internet documents reveals a jihadist interest in targeting U.S. economic assets, especially oil installations or infrastructure in the United States.50 Insurgent use of the Internet for such targeting purposes represents a significant change in how warfare is perceived and understood, especially amongst the general population. One conclusion is that the Internet and associated Web sites, to put this in “army speak,” may be the second most important insurgent force multiplier (improvised explosives remain number one). It enables insurgents to shape and influence local popular opinion and thereby manipulate the perceived outcome of coalition operations via the Web. No such resource was ever afforded insurgents in the past. Counterinsurgency plans to limit this capability will require extreme coalition sensitivity to local customs, values, and beliefs, as well as an understanding of both insurgent Internet operating procedures and methods to counter them. American and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan: How They Use Information Operations As explained earlier in this chapter, the U.S. military would label most of these insurgent activities that involve the use of the Internet as “information operations”—an area of activity in which the military already has significant operational capacity and a strategic doctrine. Before U.S. forces entered Iraq in March 2003, they methodically prepared the proposed “information battlefield” based on nearly identical IO principles. This phase of the IO plan ended shortly after coalition forces arrived in Baghdad. Then a new phase of intensive IO planning ensued. Not unexpectedly, U.S. forces did not know completely what was being broadcast on the city’s 15 radio stations, satellite TV networks, and the pages of newspapers that were still operating. The battle for Baghdad ended abruptly, and little planning, understandably, had been conducted for such an eventuality. It was more important to prepare for extended city fighting. Further, this was the first time our forces had encountered an information environment in an enemy city of this size. IO planners set about attacking this challenge, one that grew quickly once insurgent activities proliferated. Army Captain Bill Putnam, a U.S. Army reservist who headed the coalition’s Open Source Intelligence effort in Iraq for a period of time (which included the publication of the “Baghdad Mosquito,” a document that reports on the latest street rumors in Baghdad), commented on this early

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effort. He noted that U.S. IO and the public affairs doctrine in Iraq were focused on making the Iraqi information environment conform to its doctrine. That is, the focus was on how things should be done (according to the doctrine), rather than allowing the environment to determine how IO should be conducted.51 This is a huge problem according to Putnam, since he believes that “it is virtually impossible for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful without some level of the local population’s support.”52 Putnam therefore identified “how” the Iraqis receive information and formulate opinions as the most important issue for IO professionals to consider. Iraqis do so, he wrote, via satellite television channels, one’s family and friends, the street (rumors), religious figures, and newspapers. It was this “circle of influence” that must be targeted if successful IO were to be conducted, Putnam believed. The IO template based on the doctrine did not correspond to the reality on the ground, a reality strongly influenced by cultural factors. But the U.S. armed forces have since responded aggressively to this oversight. Cultural factors are now an intense focus of armed forces time and planning, and IO strategy is showing renewed creativity. At Fort Leavenworth’s December 2005 IO conference, Colonel Baker confirmed the necessity of developing practical solutions to the IO challenges they faced and not relying solely on doctrine. He stated that intelligence and IO were the two most important aspects of the fight from his perspective. He felt it necessary to bypass the IO doctrine on several occasions and use his staff’s creativity when the situation required. Baker noted that “information operations have to be more than a plan on a piece of paper. You have to have the ability to operationalize it and make it important to all of your leaders so they embrace it and integrate it into everything they do.”53 Colonel Baker developed an “information battle rhythm” matrix that forced him and his staff to perform specific information-oriented events on specific days of the week (meetings with the media, local leaders, and so on). This matrix enabled him to not only keep his finger on the information pulse of the insurgency but integrate the local media and culture into his IO plan. He also became a strong proponent of the quick-reaction handbill that would offer a coalition explanation of an action. This often allowed his forces to beat the insurgents to the information punch.54 There have been other coalition information successes in the war against the insurgents. For example, Iraqi state TV has publicized police hotline numbers for people to call to turn in potential or actual insurgents. There are also popular shows where captured insurgents confess to their crimes on TV under the tearful questioning or threats of those whose relatives the insurgent killed. Thus, traditional IO ways of conducting business in Iraq were helpful but had to be supplemented with other measures. Commanders who were

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focused on maintaining an influence advantage had to create responses on the fly due to the situations they encountered. They were not focused on cyber mobilizing because they had all of the other resources (radio, TV, and news outlets) available to them in addition to the Internet. Perhaps this operating paradigm has inhibited our ability to get inside the insurgents’ “cyber skin” and think or manipulate as they do. As mentioned earlier, a major event involving our forces required a vetting process to understand what occurred before responding. This slow response mechanism is necessary, because it helps ensure that coalition forces aren’t being manipulated by the insurgents. Too slow a response, however, gives insurgents time to develop a virtual force multiplier by providing the populous with a culturally astute version of an event modified to the insurgents’ benefit. This enables a group of insurgent Web site designers and Internet responders to influence the population much to the same extent as the coalition’s highly organized and financed IO effort. Coalition forces need to develop an insurgent-oriented “countercyber capability” for their IO lexicon and action portfolio. They need to get outside their IO think box and into the insurgent’s cyber think box. Learning from the Two Lawrences Lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan are being spread amongst coalition forces, and they are adapting to the insurgent’s operating environment. Those studying the cultural aspect often note that in order to better understand how to deal with insurgent behavior, one should read the work of T. E. Lawrence that describes his dealings with Arabs in the 1920s. The London Times on May 22, 2005, wrote that General John Abizaid, CENTCOM commander, quotes Lawrence on a regular basis. The cultural lesson most often cited from the work of T. E. Lawrence, it seems, is reflected in his oft-cited advice: Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.55

However, if the Internet, as stated earlier, “is the greatest weapon in the armory of the modern jihadist,” then this is because the civilized world has provided jihadi commanders with both the infrastructure and means to run their “modern printing press.” Meanwhile, modern armies appear unprepared to handle the consequences of this fact—that is, the development of a proper counterinsurgent or other suitable neutralizing capability. The topic of jihadist Internet usage was hardly mentioned at the December 2005 IO conference.

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Insurgents are using the Internet more effectively than coalition forces due to their lack of moral or legal restrictions and due to the situational context (particularly the coalition presence in a Middle East country). Many disaffected Internet surfers believe what is written on jihadi Web sites and want to support their cause. Further, the irrational tenth tactic that Lawrence discussed (that tactic “not taught but ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought”) also has an insurgent application. Their tactics are developed in a context void of laws and mercy but with a deep cultural and instinctive understanding of what their messages will mean (both factual and implied) to their audience. Coalition forces do not possess this instinct for connecting with the population. This insufficiency should embolden further cultural studies in the U.S. armed forces to develop a higher degree of proficiency in this area. Another Lawrence whose sayings also have tremendous applicability to the current insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan is an unlikely source— that being Lawrence “Yogi” Berra. Berra, a tremendous New York Yankee catcher in the 1950s and 1960s, is well known for his sayings of counterintuitive malaprop value. Of relevance here is his saying that “in theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.” That is, one can read about insurgencies and stability operations and IO, but one cannot foresee the context in which these operations are conducted or interpreted. One can read about IO, but its application in practice, as Colonel Baker pointed out, requires an entirely different type of thinking, one tied to the environment and the target set to be affected. Coalition forces are finding this out as they confront insurgent forces that have access to an information means (the Internet) that enables them to cyber-plan, finance, recruit, mobilize, and exploit faster than their opponents in the virtual theater of war. They are able to exploit a cyber echo effect through a multitude of Web sites today and do so with one-tenth or less of the coalition’s IO infrastructure. This is a key observation of which all coalition IO experts should take note. CONCLUSION Noted author Hans Magnus Enzenberger stated over a decade ago that the nature of war was changing from “purposive, ideologically driven enterprises undertaken by highly organized industrial powers” to “molecular civil war.”56 Insurgent tactics worldwide appear to fit Enzenberger’s description. The Internet offers a new spin, however, on Enzenberger’s molecular civil war theory. Insurgents have gained an ideological and motivating force multiplier with the Internet, as it communicates insurgent-generated interpretations of events via images and messages. Insurgents are often

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more culturally attuned to the needs and desires of the local population than an occupying force and are able to adapt their messages to these sensitivities. Coalition forces, on the other hand, have a limited frame of reference for understanding the world around them. They are not closely associated with the populations with whom they are interacting in many cases and thus have difficulty associating with cultural sensitivities as well as monitoring and analyzing the plethora of Web sites available to insurgents and their potential sympathizers. The Internet allows jihadists to produce a cacophony of culturally related responses (both messages and pictures) to actions they take or mistakes the coalition makes. Insurgents apply no ethical standards to their Internet use. They utilize hate propaganda and one-sided interpretation of events to generate support. Coalition forces must do as much as possible to counteract this capability. Demonstrating how insurgent Web sites differ in content based on their target language is an example of one counterpropaganda possibility. That is, coalition forces could translate serious disparities in content between Arabic and English sites back into the original Arabic for Iraqi domestic political consumption. This would allow them to see the two-sided linguistic game the insurgents are playing. The civilian community offers some other optimistic developments. Recently, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which purportedly includes Muslims, Christians, Jews, and secular organizations in its membership, started the “Coalition against Terrorist Media.” Its Web site57 has several interesting sections such as “What is Terrorist Media?” “Terrorist Media in the News,” and “View Terrorist TV.” Weimann offers other possible countermeasures in his study. These are some of the first steps toward the counterpropaganda mechanism that needs to be developed by coalition forces for contemporary and future conflicts. Further, the civilized world must continue to closely watch the impact of jihadist propaganda on children, particularly in the Middle East, where poverty and alienation make the Internet messages more alluring. Children under the influence of this virtual arena of the insurgent’s cognitive warfare, whether it be video games or Internet cartoons, could turn out to be tomorrow’s IED specialists. Coalition commanders recognize the fact that they need to act more creatively when attempting to manage the cyber-information problem. They have implemented plans on their own in many cases, as Colonel Baker’s experience indicates. Noted military journalist Ralph Peters agrees, writing, “Counterinsurgency warfare is the realm of the officer who can think beyond the textbook, who thrives in the absence of rules.”58 If Colonel Baker is correct, that intelligence and IO are the two most important aspects of the environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, then more

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attention must be paid to them. This probably requires a different IO tool or mindset than that currently available within the Department of Defense. U.S. IO specialists must study the Internet’s use by insurgents and learn to focus on “how” the circle of influence works in a particular culture, what the images are that matter, and so on.59 They must learn how to develop “countercyber” plans and actions and how to manage the consequences of these actions. As a result, both the elements of the IO doctrine and the term counterinsurgency as currently defined should be expanded. As noted above, counterinsurgency is officially defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN.” The definition should also add some form of the “cyber mobilization monitoring or destruction tool” concept. The IO list of core capabilities requires similar refinement. Jihadi worldwide cyber mobilizing and recruiting activities do not stop at U.S. borders, according to the Web site of Laura Mansfield. Mansfield, who has appeared as a guest speaker on CNN with talk show host Anderson Cooper, notes that there is an emerging danger unfolding on the Web pages of MySpace, the social networking site for teenagers. Her analysis indicates that there are several sites on MySpace advocating jihadist activities,60 which, if true, indicates that jihadist cyber activities are truly now in “our space.” One of the functions that MySpace performs is to list the number of “friends” that a certain site attracts. These “friends” of jihadist sites on MySpace indicate that, while not of any particular danger at the present (some subscribers advocating jihadist activities list friends in the low hundreds), MySpace is developing as a potential local recruitment tool for insurgents. The conclusion drawn from this discussion is that virtual elements are the agitators and propagandists of today’s insurgency much like pamphlets, journals, and leaflets were at the time of the French Revolution. These virtual or cyber elements mobilize the population much like leaflets and pamphlets once did. However, the effect of the virtual arena is more effective in that it is incredibly responsive and dramatic, offering videos, testimonials, and other images often directly from the site of some significant operation. Cyber elements are immediately responsive to breaking news and are available 24/7. The U.S. IO doctrine will have to take this fact into account, as will the counterinsurgency terminology and doctrine, if both want to stay engaged and productive in the information field. With warfare changing from armies massed against one another to high-tech local wars in which insurgents can play a primary role, the virtual arena becomes very important. Armies cannot stand between cyber-generated stories and the interpretations and fears of the local populace. Past insurgencies did not rely on the Internet’s power to cybermobilize as do today’s insurgencies.

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Fine-tuning our IO counterinsurgency definitions and enhancing our understanding of cyber mobilization is required if we are to be more aware and adept at handling this emerging cyber challenge. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. “Most Foreign Fighters in Iraq Come from Egypt: U.S. Military,” AFP, Yahoo News, June 30, 2006. 2. Katherine Shrader, “Pentagon Surfing Thousands of Jihad Sites,” Associated Press, May 4, 2006, http://www.forbes.com. 3. It is hard, if not impossible, for Internet viewers to make distinctions among insurgent groups. All insurgent anticoalition propaganda sounds much the same. Neither the Internet source nor the Web creator’s attributes are often known with certainty in the virtual arena of war. 4. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Cyber-Mobilization: The New Levee en Masse,” Parameters (Summer 2006): 77–87. 5. Ibid. 6. Ben Venske, “Evolution of Jihadi Video (EJV) V1.0,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International 12, no. 1, 50–51. 7. Ibid., 50. 8. Injy El-Kashef, “Islam Dot Com,” Al-Ahram Weekly, October 20, 2005. 9. T. E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” in The Army Quarterly and Defense Journal (October 1920): 55–69, as cited in The Foreign Area Officer Association’s Internet publication, http://www.faoa.org/journal/telawl.html, quote taken from “T. E. Lawrence and the Establishment of Legitimacy during the Arab Revolt,” by Kevin J. Dougherty, downloaded March 1, 2006. 10. Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2006), 6–7. 11. Ibid., 30. 12. Ibid., 150. 13. Ibid. 14. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah; however, it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 15. The game is offered via its own Web site http://www.specialforce.net/ english/indexeng.htm. 16. Ibid., 92. 17. Ibid., 91. 18. Albert Bandura, “Training for Terrorism through Selective Moral Disengagement,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes,

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vol. 2, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005) 34–50; Also, see Albert Bandura, “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. by Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 161–191. 19. Anthony Stahelski, “Terrorists are Made, not Born: Creating Terrorists Using Social Psychological Conditioning,” Journal of Homeland Security (March, 2004), available online at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/ stahelski.html. 20. Marc Lynch, “Al-Qaeda’s Media Strategy,” National Interest (Spring 2006): 54. 21. Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, February 13, 2006, GL-9. 22. Jeff Crawley, “Proponent Hosts Info Ops Gathering,” The Lamp, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 22, 2005. 23. Neil Doyle, “Digital Gap Seen in War on Terror,” Washington Times, February 18, 2006, as posted in the Information Operations Newsletter, vol. 6, no. 9, February 17–March 9, 2006, 13. 24. Sebastian Usher, “Militants’ New Tack in Cyber War,” BBC News, downloaded at http://news.bbc.co.uk (December 5, 2005). 25. “Analysis: Insurgents Target Newspaper Vendors, Distributors,” Open Source Center Internet Site, April 8, 2006. 26. William Safire, “Mideastisms,” New York Times Magazine, January 15, 2006, 16. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Joint Publication, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 12, 2001, 127, 264. 31. For example, consider the term information war or IW: JP 1-02 does not define war, so how can it define IW? Similarly, the term asymmetric warfare is used worldwide today, but JP 1-02 does not define it either. 32. John Mackinlay, “Defeating Complex Insurgency,” The Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Paper 64, 2005, xii. 33. Ibid., vi. 34. Mackinlay, “Defeating Complex Insurgency,” 13. 35. Ibid. 36. Joint Publication JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 12, 2001, 137, as updated through March 20, 2006. 37. Ibid., 138. 38. Crawley, “Proponent Hosts Info Ops Gathering,” 1. 39. Scott Atran and Jessica Stern, “Small Groups Find Fatal Purpose through the Web,” Nature 437, September 29, 2005, downloaded from http://www.nature. com/nature/journal/v437/n7059/full/437620a.html. 40. Crawley, “Proponent Hosts Info Ops Gathering.” 41. ZDNet News, December 7, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com. U.S. information expert John Arquilla disagrees with this assessment, noting that “the terrorists are preparing to mount cyberspace-based attacks, and we are ill prepared to deal with them.” See http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi, January 15, 2006.

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42. Susan B. Glasser and Steve Coll, “The Web as Weapon,” Washington Post, August 9, 2005, downloaded from the Internet (October 28, 2005). 43. For example, several insurgencies—such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka— offer several Web sites in different languages, reflecting what they believe will appeal most to particular targeted audiences. Thus, the Tamil version of their Web site is radically different from their Hindu or English versions in the images and words used to portray their group and the means by which they seek to achieve their political objectives. 44. For example, see Gabriel Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, vol. 1, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005), 53–65; See also Gabriel Weimann, Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenges (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2006). 45. Term used by John Robb to describe the insurgent’s use of the Internet. 46. Stephen Ulph, “The Global Jihad’s Internet Front,” Terrorism Focus 2, no. 23 (The Jamestown Foundation, December 13, 2005). 47. “Terrorists Using Yahoo.com,” WorldNetDaily.com, posted December 6, 2005. 48. SITE Institute, December 22, 2005, www.siteinstitute.org. Some examples of other jihadi manuals on a variety of issues are at: http://www.geocities.com/ tadrebatfialjihad10/COLT-45.zip http://www.geocities.com/tadrebatfialjihad10/ katem00721.zip http://www.geocities.com/algazairiyat 00768/dawrat.zip 49. www.jaami.com/vb/showthread.php, downloaded from the FBIS Web site and reviewed on January 25, 2006. 50. Stephen Ulph, “Internet Mujahideen Intensify Research on U.S. Economic Targets,” Terrorism Focus 3, no. 2 (Jamestown Foundation), http://www. Jamestown.org. 51. Bill Putnam, “Winning Iraqi Hearts and Minds,” Army (January 2005): 7. 52. Ibid., 8. 53. Crawley, “Proponent Hosts Info Ops Gathering.” 54. Author’s understanding of Colonel Baker’s operational concept at the December IO conference. 55. T. E. Lawrence, from Wikiquote, downloaded from http://en.wikiquote. org/wiki/Thomas Edward Lawrence. 56. Hans Magnus Enzenberger, Civil Wars: From LA to Bosnia (New York: New Press), 1994. 57. See http://www.stopterroristmedia.org. 58. Ralph Peters, “No Silver Bullets,” Armed Forces Journal (January 2006): 39. 59. For a description and analysis of the most common jihadi images, please see the report “The Islamic Imagery Project,” published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, available online at http://ctc.usma.edu/imagery.asp. 60. See http://blog.lauramansfield.com/2006/05/18/teen-terror-on-the-webjihadi-and-islamist-activities.htm

CHAPTER 19 THE KEY ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM Jerrold M. Post

Terrorism is a vicious species of psychological warfare waged through the media.1 It is “a war for hearts and minds.” If one accepts this premise, then the war against terrorism will not be won with smart bombs and missiles. One does not counter psychological warfare with high-tech weapons; one counters it with psychological warfare. And in this so-called “war for hearts and minds,” tending to overly rely on our technological superiority, we have fallen far behind our terrorist adversary. In this chapter, four elements of an integrated information operations program designed to counter terrorism are presented. A fifth element of a comprehensive security strategy, promoting societal resilience, is also discussed. In addition to these five general elements, special attention is given to countering suicide terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. According to Chinese strategist Sun Tzu, whose The Art of War continues to inform political-military strategy after 2,000 years, “What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy. . . . Next best is to disrupt his alliances. . . . The next best is to attack his army. . . . The worst policy is to attack cities.” Sun Tzu also observed that of the five fundamental factors affecting war, the first is moral influence: “that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.” Elsewhere, he observes that “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” In effect, Sun Tzu is advocating psychological undermining of the enemy, a prescription still valid today.

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Psychological operations (PSYOP) have been defined as “the planned use of communications to influence human attitudes and behavior. PSYOP consist of political, military and ideological actions conducted to induce in target groups behavior, emotions, and attitudes that support the attainment of national objectives.”2 The term “psychological operations,” especially when combined with political warfare, denotes “operations, whether tactical or strategic, on the battlefield or in the theater, in peacetime or in war, directed primarily at our adversary’s mind rather than his body.”3 Yet historically, PSYOP have for the most part only been employed tactically, in wartime. There has been little attention given to the potential of strategic PSYOP in undermining the enemy to prepare the battlefield. Properly conducted, they should “precede, accompany, and follow all applications of force”4 and be an integral component of the overall strategic plan. Yet, because planners too often overrely on technological superiority and pay insufficient attention to an enemy’s psychology, they either are omitted or are a late afterthought. But mapping the information battlespace, and preparing the information battlefield, must be integrated with battle planning from inception and involve PSYOP, not only at the tactical level but also at the strategic level. Enemy resistance is not undermined with the turn of a switch; it is a long process. Influencing attitudes requires deconstruction of the enemy, which involves identifying the constituent elements—and audiences—of its power base and the sources of its influence. Research on the effects of retaliation on terrorist behavior has demonstrated that the major goal of retaliation was to convey to the public that the government was strongly defending it.5 However, there is no statistical evidence in several cases—including Israeli retaliation against the Palestinian terrorist campaign in the 1970s and U.S. retaliation against Libya for the Berlin disco attack on U.S. troops in 1986—that retaliation deterred future terrorist actions. To the contrary, in some cases there is evidence suggesting that it reinforced the terrorist group. Thus, instead of a primary focus on the role of PSYOP in a retaliation campaign (e.g., Afghanistan in 2001), this chapter argues that the way to counter psychological warfare is with psychological warfare, and thus PSYOP should be not only an important weapon in the war against terrorism, but the principal weapon. Four major elements of a psychological program designed to counter terrorism are: r r r r

inhibiting potential terrorists from joining the group in the first place, producing dissension within the group, facilitating exit from the group, and reducing support for the group and its leaders.

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These elements are components of a strategic PSYOP program that must be conducted over decades, for these attitudes are not easily changed “when hatred is bred in the bone.”6 Vladimir Lenin once stated that “the goal of terrorism is to terrorize.” This suggests a fifth element of a sustained campaign of strategic PSYOP: insulating the target audience (the public) from the intended goals of the terrorist (to terrorize). These five elements of a sustained strategic PSYOP campaign deserve a closer look. INHIBITING POTENTIAL TERRORISTS FROM JOINING THE GROUP It has been observed that for every terrorist killed or captured, there are ten more waiting to take that terrorist’s place. Thus, the first element of the strategy articulated in this chapter—inhibiting potential terrorists from joining terrorist organizations in the first place—is the most important and complex of the five. It is designed to slow down the terrorist assembly line. Once an individual is in a terrorist group or organization, especially an underground group, a variety of group dynamics will reinforce the individual’s psychological commitment to its goals.7 From childhood, there is a normalization and social value attached to joining a terrorist group, especially in the constituencies of particular concern to Israel. In one recent study,8 35 incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists in Israeli and Palestinian prisons were interviewed: 21 radical Islamist terrorists from Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Hizbollah and 14 secular nationalists from Fatah and its military wing, as well as from the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.9 It was clear from these interviews that the major influence behind an individual’s decision to become a terrorist was the social setting. Individuals from strictly religious Islamic backgrounds were more likely to join Islamist groups, while those with no religious background might join either a secular or a religious group. Peers were of great influence and often recruited these individuals. For the secular groups, the social environment centered on schools and clubs, while for Islamists the mosque, religious organizations, and religious instruction dominated. Some 64 percent of secular members, but only 43 percent of Islamist members, reported that their group was the most active in their community. Over half of the secular group members interviewed cited their community or a youth club as the primary influence. For Islamist groups, almost half cited the mosque, Muslim Brotherhood, or other religious influence as central, and another 20 percent cited a university or professional school. Only 30 percent of the secular group members and 20 percent of the Islamist group members reported their families as a vital influence. Although introduction to the terrorists’ cause varied, almost all subjects grew up in villages or refugee camps that were active in the struggle. Some 80 percent of the secular group members were raised in communities that were radically involved,

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compared with 75 percent of the Islamist members. Less than a tenth of each group of interviewees came from communities that were not particularly active. The following quotes reflect the types of perspectives encountered among the Islamist group members during this research project: — Religion played a powerful role: I came from a religious family which used to observe all the Islamic traditions. My initial political awareness came during prayers at the mosque. That’s where I was also asked to join religious classes. In the context of these studies, the sheik used to inject some historical background in which he would tell us how we were effectively evicted from Palestine. . . . The sheik also used to explain the significance of the fact that there was an [Israeli] military outpost in the heart of the camp. He compared it to a cancer in the human body which was threatening its very existence. At the age of 16, I developed an interest in religion. I was exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and began to pray in a mosque and to study Islam. The Koran and my religious studies were the tools that shaped my political consciousness. The mosque and the religious clerics in my village provided the focal point of my social life.

— Community support was important to the families of the fighters as well: Families of terrorists who were wounded, killed, or captured enjoyed a great deal of economic aid and attention. And that strengthened popular support for the attacks. Perpetrators of armed attacks were seen as heroes. Their families got a great deal of material assistance, including the construction of new homes to replace those destroyed by the Israeli authorities as punishment for terrorist acts. The entire family did all it could for the Palestinian people and won great respect for doing so. All my brothers are in jail, and one is serving a life sentence for his activities in the Izz a-Din al-Qassam battalions. My brothers all went to school and most are university graduates.

— The emir blessed all actions: Major actions become the subject of sermons in the mosque, glorifying the attack and the attackers.

— Joining Hamas or Fatah increased social standing: Recruits were treated with great respect. A youngster who belonged to Hamas or Fatah was regarded more highly than one who didn’t belong to a group and got better treatment than unaffiliated kids.

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— It was the social norm to join: Everyone was joining. . . . Anyone who didn’t enlist during [intifada] would have been ostracized.

— The hatred toward the Israelis was remarkable, especially given that few reported any contact with them: You Israelis are Nazis in your souls and in your conduct. In your occupation, you never distinguish between men and women, or between old people and children. You adopted methods of collective punishment, you uprooted people from their homeland and from their homes and chased them into exile. You fired live ammunition at women and children. You smashed the skulls of defenseless civilians. You set up detention camps for thousands of people in subhuman conditions. You destroyed homes and turned children into orphans. You prevented people from making a living, you stole their property, you trampled on their honor. Given that kind of conduct, there is no choice but to strike at you without mercy in every possible way.

Secular influences also had an impact, beginning with family background and early life. As with other Palestinian terrorist organizations, there is a dichotomy between how families felt in theory and how they felt in reality. Publicly, families supported the organization and were proud of their sons for joining. Privately, they feared for their sons and often for what the security forces might do to the families. Families who had paid their dues to the war effort by allowing the recruitment of a son tried to prevent other sons from enlisting too. One mother who lost a son to a martyrdom operation, and feared that her second son was embarked on the same path, reported that if possible she would “cut open her heart and sew her remaining son inside for safety.”10 While most Fatah members reported that their families had good social standing, their status and experience as refugees were paramount in developing self-identity: I belong to the generation of occupation. My family are refugees from the 1967 war. The war and my refugee status were the seminal events that formed my political consciousness and provided the incentive for doing all I could to help regain our legitimate rights in our occupied country.

— Enlistment was a natural step for the secular terrorists as well: In a way, [enlistment] can be compared to a young Israeli from a nationalist Zionist family who wants to fulfill himself through army service. My motivation in joining Fatah was both ideological and personal. It was a question of self-fulfillment, of honor, and a feeling of independence. . . . The goal of every young Palestinian was to be a fighter. . . . After recruitment my social status was greatly enhanced. I got a lot of respect from my acquaintances and from the young people in the village.

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Combating such deeply ingrained attitudes will be difficult. Yet, failing that, there will be a growing stream of terrorists to replace those killed or arrested. Particularly problematic is schooling. The virulent anti-Western brand of Islam being taught in the radical madrasas of Pakistan and other countries is a case in point. What steps might ameliorate the poison being dispensed? How can moderate clerics be encouraged to temper the curricula? The U.S. Department of Labor recently funded a $25 million program in Pakistan to combat child labor. For $80, a student can receive a year’s education at a secular school. Each child enrolled is one not exposed to the anti-Israel, anti-West propaganda found in the radical madrasas. In contrast to the bleak despair in which they live, there is something empowering about taking action—power to combat powerlessness, action to combat passive helplessness—as suggested by the following quote from a member of Fatah: I regarded armed actions to be essential, it is the very basis of my organization and I am sure that was the case in the other Palestinian organizations. The aim was to cause as much carnage as possible. The main thing was the amount of blood. An armed action proclaims that I am here, I exist, I am strong, I am in control, I am in the field, I am on the map. An armed action against soldiers was the most admired. . . . The armed actions and their results were a major tool for penetrating the public consciousness.

This passage makes clear how difficult it is to leave the path of terrorism, and emphasizes why this will indeed be a “long war.” It is also indicative of the requirement to provide alternate pathways for youth, taught by hatemongering leaders, who see a bleak future and are drawn toward violence out of despair. What can be done to open pathways for ambitious young people within their society? Support for programs that encourage economic development and opening of societies—be it Pakistan, the West Bank, or Gaza—can shrink the reservoir of dispirited youngsters. Both measures—educational support and economic programs—require funding by government agencies or nongovernmental organizations, but the investment would go a long way toward reducing the population that sees no path other than terrorism. Producing Dissension within the Group The second element of a robust PSYOP strategy is to produce dissension within the group. Terrorist organizations are often hothouses of tension. When they are attacked, internal tensions disappear and it becomes them against the world. What would magnify tension, sow distrust, recast the image of the leader or pretenders to the throne, or worsen the already stressed climate and paralyze the group? Injecting such influences into a closed body is by no means easy but would reduce group cohesion and effectiveness.

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This is a central theme of a recent important monograph by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the United States Military Academy.11 Based on an analysis of papers, manuals, and other documents, which al Qaeda leaders have written to guide and discipline their organization, the report—titled Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al Qaida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities—demonstrates how al Qaeda is indeed a learning organization that studies its successes and failures and continually attempts to examine itself and profit from lessons learned. Insofar as these documents identify organizational vulnerabilities, they provide a valuable guide for actions that will magnify these organizational clefts and create internal disharmony. For any secret criminal enterprise, be it organized crime or a terrorist organization, there will be an inherent tension between security and secrecy, on the one hand, and organizational efficiency, control, and morale on the other. The authors of the CTC monograph recommend the following 12 actions to exploit al Qaeda’s organizational vulnerabilities: 1. Disrupt al Qaeda’s control of operations and limit its financial efficiency. 2. Constrain al Qaeda’s security environment. 3. Prioritize efforts based on subgroup vulnerabilities. 4. Conduct an aggressive study of jihadi strategy and foreign policy. 5. Deny jihadi groups the benefit of security vacuums they seek to create and exploit. 6. Turn the jihadi vanguard back on itself. 7. Confuse, humiliate, demoralize, and embarrass the jihadi rank-in-file. 8. Subvert the authority of senior commanders. 9. Facilitate misunderstandings as well as an understanding of the United States’ intentions and capacity. 10. Force jihadi propagandists back on their heels. 11. Understand and exploit the ideological breaks in the jihadi movement. 12. Anticipate al Qaeda’s transformation from an organization to a social movement.

Clearly, there are many implications for policies and practices of PSYOP among these recommendations.12 Facilitating Exit from the Group The third element, facilitating exit from the group, emphasizes the dangers of becoming a terrorist: once one has made that choice, there is no turning back, for an early hurdle for full acceptance by the group is often a requirement to carry out a terrorist action, which in turn leads to a

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criminal sanction. Indeed, it has become almost ritualized not only to demonstrate one’s commitment to the group, but also to ensure against defection. This of course poses a major problem for intelligence agencies seeking to penetrate a terrorist group. A number of governments countering terrorism, recognizing this impediment to leaving the group, have instituted creative amnesty programs, akin to the U.S. protected witness program, in which amnesty is given in return for cooperation and information. The bargain includes financial support for a new life and can extend to resettlement in other countries and even plastic surgery, as Spanish authorities provided Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) defectors. The Italian pentiti program was instrumental in breaking the back of the Red Brigades.13 Moreover, information developed by defectors can be fed back to the group to strengthen option two, producing internal dissension. Reduce Support for the Group and Its Leader The fourth element is information operations directed against the group in order to reduce public support. An exemplar of this goal is al Qaeda. For years, Osama bin Laden has been unchallenged in the arena of marshalling support for his view of Islam and the West. The virulent brand of Islam he has championed and the violence he has justified with his extreme interpretation of the Koran are consistent with those of Hamas and Islamic jihad leaders and have not been countered. Al Qaeda has attracted alienated Muslim youth sensitized in the madrasas and mosques. Testimony from the 2001 trial of the al Qaeda bombers of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Nairobi, in federal court in New York, highlights the roles of the madrasas and the mosque in this radicalization process.14 In the madrasa in Zanzibar, the future bombing participant was taught never to question learned authorities, especially those with religious credentials. In the mosque in Dar es Salaam, where he felt welcomed as a member of the umma (the community of observant Muslims), he learned of the obligation to help other Muslims wherever they were. He was shown films of Serbian soldiers and Muslim mass graves in Bosnia, and of Russian soldiers and the bodies of Muslim women and children in Chechnya. Alone and isolated except for the mosque, he vowed (in his words) to become a soldier for Allah and defend these innocent victims against the soldiers of Serbia and Russia. When he gave voice to these sentiments, he was informed by a spotter for al Qaeda that to be a soldier for Allah he must get training; so, using his own money, he went to Pakistan to be screened, and was then sent to a training camp in Afghanistan. After seven months there, when he was offered only participation in the Kashmir conflict rather than fighting soldiers in either Bosnia or Chechnya, he returned to Dar es Salaam and was again isolated in the community, working as an assistant grocery clerk. Still participating at the mosque—the one

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place he felt he belonged—he eventually received the call to take part in a “jihad job” three years later, to which he responded immediately. His pious wish to defend Muslim victims was bent into participating in an act of mass casualty terrorism. As he was confronted with the consequences of the bombing, in contrast to other terrorists, he was overwhelmed with the death of innocents, which he saw as inconsistent with his views of jihad: “Their jihad is not my jihad.” Nor is it the jihad of the majority of mainstream Muslims; yet, they have been remarkably mute, giving free rein to the extremists to steer alienated youth into violence in the name of Islam. Osama bin Laden’s justifications, as spelled out in al Qaeda terrorism manuals and other documents,15 are inconsistent with the Koran, and yet to the alienated youth, they are justification for killing in the name of God. What can counter these religiously based arguments? This will take moderate Islamic clerics and leaders reclaiming the focus of their religion and depicting Osama bin Laden and his ilk as distorting the meaning of the Koran and violating the spirit of Islam in the service of selfaggrandizing motivations. The goal is to make the group not a mainstream path for alienated youth but a deviant path, and to not have the leaders seen as romantic heroes but as preachers of a perverted and distorted version of Islam. This requires activating voices not currently heard, for these changes must come from within Islam, and at present the extremist view is uncontested. Insulating the Public Thus far, this chapter has offered a fourfold approach to countering terrorism by reducing the attraction to the group, undermining internal cohesion, facilitating exit from the group, and reducing support for the group and its leader. But of equal importance is the fifth element: defending against the central goal of terrorism—to terrorize. If the act of one extremist youth can derail the fragile movement toward dialogue and reconciliation, terrorism is being rewarded. Sustained public education is needed. Israel has come a long way in this direction, but the United States—as witnessed during the paralyzing effects of the Washington area snipers—has far to go. The need for a strategic information campaign includes a coordinated information policy, so statements from the White House or the office of the prime minister are in sync with the messages coming out of the operational units in a combat theater. Indeed, public diplomacy statements designed to reassure the domestic constituency too often undermine the information goals of those conducting PSYOP. It is difficult in a large bureaucracy to integrate and coordinate information campaigns among key elements of the government, for many of the targets of influence will

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require pressure and inducements for which the Department of State or foreign ministry might take the lead. To inject destabilizing information within the inner circle may require the sophisticated and covert techniques of the Central Intelligence Agency or Mossad. And to undermine the legitimacy of the group leaders will require moderate Muslim clerical and political leaders to counter the extremists in their midst and try to regain the focal point of their religion. To develop nuanced PSYOP programs requires a nuanced understanding of the adversary, for the messages must be tailored to the target. One cannot deter an adversary one does not understand. This is particularly true for two problems of special concern: utilizing psychological operations to counter suicide terrorism and to counter WMD terrorism. Countering Suicide Terrorism The Koran, in fact, prohibits suicide. Whoever kills himself with an iron weapon, Then the iron weapon will remain in his hand, And he will continually stab himself in the belly with it, In the fire of hell eternally, forever and ever.

But in fact, when interviewing suicide bomb commanders,16 one commander asked how he could justify suicide terrorism (since he claimed that they are carrying out these acts in the name of Allah, and the Koran proscribes suicide) he responded angrily, “This is not suicide. Suicide is weak, it is selfish, it is mentally disturbed. This is istishad” (martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah).17 Perhaps the most famous leader of suicide bombers, Hassan Salame—now serving 46 consecutive life sentences in Israeli prisons for the wave of suicide bombings he orchestrated in the spring of 1996 during the run-up to the Israeli election that year— explained the use of this tactic as follows: “A martyrdom operation bombing is the highest level of jihad, and highlights the depth of our faith. The bombers are holy fighters who carry out one of the more important articles of faith.” Another suicide bomb commander stated that “it is martyrdom bombing attacks which earn the most respect and elevate the bombers to the highest possible level of martyrdom.”18 In a quote revealing the “normalcy” of these actions in the minds of the operators, a commander now serving 26 consecutive life sentences recounted his disappointment when he was not asked to join a martyrdom bombing operation squad: I asked Halil what it was all about, and he told me that he had been on the wanted list for a long time and did not want to get caught without realizing his dream of being a suicide bomber. He was completely calm and explained

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to the other two bombers, Yusuf and Beshar, how to detonate the bombs, exactly the way he had explained things to the bombers in the Mahane Yehuda attack. I remember that besides the tremendous respect I had for Halil and the fact that I was jealous of him, I also felt slighted that he had not asked me to be the third suicide bomber. I understood that my role in the movement had not come to an end and the fact that I was not on the wanted list and could operate relatively freely could be very advantageous to the movement in the future.

For several years, the Israelis have conducted “suicide postmortems” (i.e., reconstructions of the lives of suicides).19 In one study (conducted during the early 1990s), the perpetrators were young men, ages 17–22, unemployed (the unemployment rates in the refugee camps were running at 40–70%), uneducated, and unmarried. They were unformed youth who, when they entered the safe house, were told by the suicide bomb commander something like the following: You have a worthless life to look forward to. By carrying out his act of martyrdom, you will be doing something significant with your life. You will be enrolled in the hall of martyrs. Your parents will be proud of you. This will give them prestige. And they will get a large financial benefit.

And once they entered the safe house, they were never left alone. On the night before the operation, a staff member slept in the same bedroom to make sure they didn’t backslide, and they were physically escorted to the pizza parlor or shopping mall. More recent demographic profile studies suggest a much wider age range, and now women too are carrying out these “martyrdom operation” bombings. The demographic profiles of the 9/11 suicidal hijackers differ significantly from those of Palestinian suicide bombers. They were older—28–33 in age; Mohammad Atta, the alleged ringleader was 33. And they were well educated; indeed Atta and two of his colleagues were enrolled in master’s degree programs in the Technological University in Hamburg. Moreover, they were economically comfortable, with the majority coming from middle-class families in Saudi Arabia or Egypt. (There was a younger group, brought in late to provide “muscle,” who probably were not aware this was not a conventional hijacking.) These terrorists can be seen as fully formed adults who had subordinated their individuality to the group identity. They had subordinated their individuality to the destructive charismatic leadership of Osama bin Laden, and what he declared was moral and just was indeed moral and just. They believed that on 9/11, they were carrying out a sacred act for the cause of the Muslim people. Demographic data are not yet available for the suicide bombers in Iraq, but they, too, would seem to be inspired by charismatic leadership to give their lives for the cause.

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Terrorism scholar Mohammad Hafez has observed that there are three requisite conditions for a suicide bomb campaign: a culture of martyrdom, a strategic decision by the organization to employ this tactic, and a willing supply of recruits.20 He also notes that there are actually three prohibitions against such acts in the Koran—not just the prohibition against suicide, but also prohibitions against killing innocents and against killing Muslims. These prohibitions provide a useful foundation for a PSYOP campaign against suicide terrorism. What is necessary is to reframe these attacks not as noble acts of martyrdom, but as murderous acts that violate the three prohibitions found in the Koran. But this requires that Muslim clerics challenge those misrepresenting Islam in the name of their cause, something we have not yet seen on a global scale. Countering WMD Terrorism Although a major goal of terrorism is to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims, for most terrorist groups, WMD terrorism would be counterproductive. One exception to this is radical Islamist terrorists, who are not interested in influencing the West but in expelling the West (along with our corrupt, secular, and modernizing values) from any interaction with the Muslim world.21 Interviews with incarcerated Muslim terrorists on the subject of mass causalities and WMD for the most part did not show a reluctance to consider WMD, but for most, a typical response was “just give me a good Kalashnikov.” However, several thought it would be a good idea to have a weapon that could kill thousands. According to one interviewee: The more an attack hurts the enemy, the more important it is. That is the measure. The mass killings, especially the suicide bombings, were the biggest threat to the Israeli public and so most effort was devoted to these. The extent of the damage and the number of casualties are of primary importance.

Another, when asked if there are any limits on the extent of violence, responded simply, “In a jihad, there are no red lines.” However, two themes did emerge from this study, which has potential application for a PSYOP campaign. One was the fear of “silent death.” In effect, these weapons were scary, and not everyone was seeking instant martyrdom. Personally I made do with a pistol. But I would like the organization to have arms that could wipe out a village or a neighborhood. Atomic and chemical weapons, and things like that, though, frighten me, and I would worry about their impact and consequences of using them.

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And several remarked on the Koran’s prohibition against poisoning the Earth: As for the question of weapons of mass destruction or non-conventional weapons, the question never arose. All I wanted was a pistol. But we did discuss the subject once. Islam wants to liberate, not kill. Under Islamic law, mass destruction is forbidden. For example, chemical, biological or atomic weapons damage the land and living things, including animals and plants, which are God’s creations. Poisoning wells or rivers is forbidden under Islam.

These themes, as well as the themes prohibiting the killing of innocents and Muslims, could be important to emphasize in an information operations campaign. CONCLUSION In sum, coordinated information operations are seen as an underutilized but critical weapon in combating terrorism. A five-pronged strategy has been offered here for strategic PSYOP, with particular attention given to the challenges of combating suicide terrorism campaigns and WMD terrorism. As powerfully demonstrated by internal al Qaeda documents in the CTC monograph, al Qaeda and the global Salafi jihad are not a monolithic well-coordinated organization. They are not only prey to the disconnections and cleavages that affect any large organization, but because they are a secret organization, these vulnerabilities are magnified. A sophisticated information operations program should be informed by and focus on these vulnerabilities. But this will require a sustained campaign. It will take years to alter the extremist attitudes that lead alienated youth onto the path of terrorism, for “when hatred is bred in the bone,” it does not easily yield. Indeed, many terrorist experts believe that the current generation has already been lost, and the goal must be to gradually affect psychocultural attitudes of the next generation. How can we mobilize parents to impede their children’s entrance onto the path of terrorism? For the United States to attempt directly to counter the extreme negative image that is portrayed on the radical Islamist Web sites is doomed to failure, for any such efforts will automatically be suspect as U.S. propaganda. But how can we mobilize moderate Muslim clerics to counter the extremists in their midst, to mobilize modernizing Muslim political leaders to challenge the extremists who in fact are targeting them? This will be a difficult challenge. Thus it will indeed be a “long war,” as identified in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review, and information programs need to be instituted than can be sustained over decades.

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NOTES 1. This chapter draws on an earlier article by the author, “Psychological Operations and Counterterrorism,” which appeared in the Joint Force Quarterly, no. 37 (Spring 2005): 105–110. 2. Alfred Paddock, Jr., “Military Psychological Operations,” in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations, ed. Carnes Lord and Frank R. Barnett (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1989), 45. 3. Alvin H. Bernstein, “Political Strategies in Coercive Diplomacy and Limited War,” in Lord and Barnett, in Political Warfare and Psychological Operations, 145. 4. Ibid., 45. 5. This research was conducted by the author and Ariel Merari, with support from the U.S. Institute of Peace. For more information, please see Jerrold Post, “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, vol. 2, ed. J. Forest (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 13–33. 6. See Jerrold Post, “When Hatred is Bred in the Bone,” 2005. 7. In addition to Post, 2005, please see Albert Bandura, “Training for Terrorism through Selective Moral Disengagement,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, vol. 2, ed. by J. Forest (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 34–50. 8. Jerrold Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laurita Denny, “Terrorists in their Own Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 171–184. 9. These results were published in Political Violence and Terrorism in March 2004. 10. Hassan, Nasra, “Talking to the Human Bombs” New Yorker, November 21, 2001. 11. Combating Terrorism Center, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, February 14, 2006, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting alQa’ida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities. This important monograph for the first time presents in unclassified form 29 captured al Qaeda documents, which are then painstakingly analyzed with important recommendations deriving from this analysis. 12. Other recent analyses have also emphasized the role of producing dissension among a group’s members in order to degrade their operational capabilities. Many of these are summarized in the newly published Annotated Bibliography of Research on Terrorism and Counterterrorism (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), http://www.ctc.usma.edu. 13. Please see the chapter by Erica Chenoweth in Volume 3 of this publication. 14. The author served as an expert witness during the death penalty phase of this trial and spent many hours with one of the lower-level participants of the bombing in Dar es Salaam as well as one of his seniors. 15. In The Al Qaida Terrorism Manual, ed. J. Post, US Air Force Counter Proliferation Center, 2004, an edited version with commentary of the document introduced at the Spring-Summer 2001 trial of the perpetrators of the al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, I observe how many of the verses from the Koran used in the manual to justify acts of violence are in fact taken out of context and prohibit the very acts they are cited as justifying.

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16. Post, Sprinzak and Denny, 2003. 17. Please see the chapters by Chris Brown and Magnus Norell in Volume 2 of this publication. 18. Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, 2003. 19. A. Merari, Personal communication, Fall 2001. 20. Mohammad Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers, United States Institute of Peace (Washington, DC, 2006), 14–29. 21. For an extended discussion of the psychological incentives and constraints for WMD, see J. Post, “Prospects for Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Psychological Incentives and Constraints,” in Bioterrorism: Psychological and Public Health Interventions, ed. R. Ursano, A. Norwood, and C. Fullerton (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

PART IV INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER 20 THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE Jennifer E. Sims

In August 2006, U.S. officials applauded as British officials nabbed terrorists planning to bring down transatlantic airliners. It was, at least in part, victory by association. In fact, as U.S. counterterrorism officials have fought to stay ahead of deadly enemies, their intelligence system has been in crisis. In May 2006, John Brennan—the former director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center—called the intelligence community “flawed”; he blamed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 for sewing confusion about roles and responsibilities, and warned that U.S. intelligence was left without a “strategic blueprint.”1 Other experts have argued that the structural defects in U.S. intelligence are decades old and have predicted lengthy repairs.2 Nowhere have the repairs seemed more pressing than in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Recently, the CIA has shuffled bosses, lost its former access to the White House, and been plagued with low morale and high attrition among its most experienced officers. Rightly or wrongly, CIA employees have been accused of leaking, political preference, and—in the case of former director Porter Goss’s subordinates—possible criminal activity. The Pentagon, witnessing the weaknesses at CIA, has expanded its human intelligence missions—arguably at CIA expense. Ambassadors and chiefs of station have lost their purchase on the overseas operations of the U.S. government, arguably increasing the kinds of risks in the field that improved

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coordination by the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was meant to reduce. As predictable as the Pentagon’s apparent grab for power might have been to critics of the 2004 intelligence reforms, the attendant political defeats for the DNI have not been welcomed by any intelligence professional. As one former clandestine officer observed, it took five years to defeat Hitler; in about the same amount of time, a supposedly modernized U.S. intelligence apparatus seems still to be floundering.3 It thus would appear that recent U.S. intelligence reforms have failed in their purpose—to enhance the performance and coordination of multiple agencies in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks—even as the number of employees working under the new Director of National Intelligence has increased from two to almost 1,500 in just one year. But, appearances aside, the most important question remains: is the counterterrorism intelligence mission truly in trouble? After all, the U.S. government has claimed impressive successes, including 253 convictions against 435 defendants in terrorism-related cases with a “clear international connection.”4 And the British victory against the airline plotters did presumably involve American intelligence cooperation. The absence of declassified information on the daily performance of intelligence agencies makes the evaluation of intelligence reforms difficult. Excessive attention to arrest numbers or squabbles among intelligence bureaucracies may distract from the true measures of success for intelligence systems: whether intelligence is improving decision making against adversaries attempting to put American and allied lives in jeopardy. Critics of the 2004 reform legislation who have argued that reshuffling, reorganizing, and creating new bureaucracies will do little to improve intelligence performance, ought not fall into the trap of judging U.S. intelligence performance now by the number of employees or bureaucratic brawls at the top of these same institutions. Instead, they should consider what constitutes sound counterterrorist intelligence, compare current practices to it, and recommend improvements wherever the fit is imperfect. This chapter will, therefore, focus less on the tactics of counterterrorist intelligence—such as how Khalid Sheik Mohammed was tracked and eventually caught—than on broader requirements and future challenges.5 It begins with a discussion of what history can tell us about the core features of past counterintelligence missions that have been successful against transnational groups. It then discusses the new features of the modern conflict that are changing the nature of the tradecraft needed to defeat terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and associated groups. A key premise of the study is that one cannot evaluate an intelligence effort without identifying the nature of the competition, including the adversary

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and his strategy. This is because intelligence, at its core, is less about getting facts right or wrong than providing competitive advantages in foresight and situational awareness to decision makers.6 SOME THINGS OLD . . . Despite occasional suggestions to the contrary, the intelligence challenge posed by a global network of terrorists—one that seeps across state boundaries for the purpose of sabotage and disruption—is not all that new.7 Following the French Revolution—and especially after Napolean’s defeat at Waterloo—France became the central hub for a network of frustrated revolutionaries and anarchists. As a result, nascent French security services built chambers noirs focused on intercepting domestic mail. With the police in the lead, France successfully tracked anarchists and radicals through expanded police powers.8 In contrast, the elaborate intelligence institutions of the Dual Monacrchy of Austria–Hungary were famously challenged by Serb nationalists later in the century; their ineffectual counterterrorists efforts were punctuated by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand.9 Some years later, intelligence-gathering tools were used by the left against monarchists in Russia. After the Bolshevik revolution, Lenin faced a counterrevolutionary movement dedicated to reversing what he and his cohorts had accomplished. The government’s enemies were particularly worrisome because they were indistinguishable from Bolshevik loyalists. “Now the enemy is here, in Petrograd, at our very hearts,” said Felix Dzerzhinsky, Lenin’s chief spy and the founder of the Cheka (the Soviet Secret Police).10 The Cheka proceeded to terrorize the recalcitrant monarchists so effectively that they fled, establishing a network and operatives throughout Europe. The organization and methods that Dzerzhinsky created to locate, dupe, and eventually defeat them stood, for most of the twentieth century, as one of the most successful transnational counterintelligence endeavors ever undertaken.11 Called simply The Trust, its techniques became an example—albeit an extreme one—for post–World War II counterintelligence chiefs seeking to defeat international communism, another transnational twentieth century threat.12 For this reason, and because it is still influential in modern counterintelligence practice, The Trust is worth considering in greater detail. The Trust This counterintelligence operation began in 1921 and ended about a year and a half after the entrapment and death of Sidney Reilly in late 1925. Reilly was a British citizen who, since at least 1918, had associated

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with officers of the British Secret Intelligence Service and conceived of himself as a master spy and anti-Bolshevik conspirator.13 During this time, the Cheka carefully infiltrated the White Russian e´ migr´e community in Europe, including the Supreme Monarchist Council and the Russian Combined Services Union. As it did so, it spread the fabrication that a counterrevolutionary organization called the Trust was working underground to overthrow the Bolsheviks. In this way it not only uncovered the monarchist network but lured its ringleaders to their deaths. There were four keys to the Trust’s success against its adversary—a transnational network of operatives: double agents, doubled logistics, deception, and data fusion. According to Jeffrey Richelson: Through the Trust, the Cheka and its successors were able to thoroughly penetrate the main White Guard e´ migr´e groups and identify their sympathizers in Russia, the Baltic states, Poland, Britain and France. Estonian and Polish diplomats even permitted the Trust to send its messages via their diplomatic bags.14 . . . The e´ migr´es were assured that the best chance of achieving their goals was to let the Trust operate quietly to undermine the Soviet regime. It was also employed to feed false information to British and Polish intelligence and to encourage them to send agents to attempt to subvert the Bolsheviks. The Trust also siphoned funds from White e´ migr´es, funds that might have been used to support insurrections. Additionally, it was employed to expose and entrap the remaining anti-Soviet underground.15

By preempting the monarchists’ operations and going after them in their sanctuaries, the Cheka avoided being thrown on the defensive. The techniques employed, however, were brutal. Reilly, like many of the captured operatives before him, was harshly interrogated, forced to reveal details of the intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities of Moscow’s adversaries and ultimately murdered. The Trust offers, therefore, a highly controversial model for modern democratic states attempting to defeat transnational, ideologically driven networks. Countering Soviet Interwar Espionage Of course, democracies had their own counterintelligence successes against transnational adversaries during the twentieth century. The British developed a highly intrusive counterespionage effort that weeded Soviet agents—including some born and raised in Britain—out of British party politics during the period between the two world wars.16 Domestic intelligence, spearheaded by MI5, ultimately disrupted Soviet cells and exposed their links to a network of communist operatives within many democracies—a wide and tightly controlled web that became apparent only gradually.

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The key to MI5’s success was data fusion: domestic signals intelligence (SIGINT) combined with human reporting (HUMINT) and defensive counterintelligence operations, such as surveillance of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Nigel West describes the importance of data sharing in detail in his recent and comprehensive book on the subject: Once the address from which the illicit transmitter had been operating . . . had been ascertained, the sole occupier was watched, and his identity established . . . MI5’s B3 watchers, led by Harry Hunter, noted that he regularly met Alice Holland, another CPGB [Communist Party of Great Britain] member who was also placed under surveillance. Neither realized that their mail and telephones were being intercepted, nor that they were followed wherever they went. Anyone they met was also watched, and over a period of months MI5 was able to build a comprehensive picture of the CPGB’s underground network . . . an apparatus that existed sub rosa and in parallel to the overt Party . . . MI5’s task was to infiltrate the clandestine organization, identify its membership, monitor its activities and assess the degree to which it was engaged in sedition or espionage. The undertaking was of enormous sensitivity.17

West’s story is about the successful defense of a liberal democracy using illiberal means—albeit, means far less offensive than those employed by the Trust—which, in defense of Bolshevism, massacred about 200,000 people. Other democracies have, however, gone further than the British did in this case. For example, France at least temporarily defeated terrorist insurgents during the Battle of Algiers by demonstrating a capacity for ruthlessness, including torture, for intelligence ends.18 And the British have apparently used their own agents as pawns or bait—even allowing them to torture and be tortured in order to gain intelligence on the evolving conflict in Northern Ireland.19 Victors in battles with clandestine networks, including democracies, have used lying, fabrication, and intrusive domestic methods to corral, arrest, and finish off their adversaries. But in doing so, they have sometimes put their own societies, including the fabric of morals, culture, and respect for individuals on which they are based, at risk in other ways. Democracies have successfully fought transnational groups but, in doing so, they have had to balance gains against their adversaries against losses to their own cultural and political integrity. Implications and Lessons Learned? Indeed, these and other historical examples offer lessons for modern counterterrorist intelligence operations, four of which are worth noting here. First, past successes against transnational groups have required close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence. When

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intragovernmental cooperation has been poor or bureaucracies highly competitive, success has been elusive at best.20 Second, communications have often been the Achilles heel of transnational operations, making signals intelligence (SIGINT) and decryption at least as important as human intelligence (HUMINT) for tactical counterintelligence. Third, the intrusive measures taken during the periods of highest threat have generally been scaled back after threats have subsided. In democracies in particular, the need to balance intrusiveness with public accountability in domestic counterintelligence operations has proven to be a competitive disadvantage—one that smart adversaries can exploit. This vulnerability is vexing because it is so critically tied to the way of life democracies are defending. Yet, it may also be one reason the United States in its current counterterrorism endeavors, has not drawn as bright a line as some critics would like in separating cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment from acceptable intelligence gathering practices. Proponents of a fuzzy line note that, given the stakes involved, it may be important to keep some of the more extreme options open—such as secret detentions, renditions, and perhaps even harsh interrogations bordering on torture—because they intimidate and deter. However, others note that terrorists seek to sway public opinion for strategic gain, and fuzzy lines can be used to mischaracterize American intentions. Insofar as defeating transnational networks requires liaison with other governments, one country’s use or threatened use of extreme methods can implicate all of its partners, jeopardize important intelligence exchanges, and get in the way of good relations with domestic communities whose cooperation is needed to fight domestic terror. Baltasar Garzon, a well-known investigative magistrate in Spain, has argued forcefully for the shutting down of the U.S. terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, calling it “an insult to countries that respect laws” and a place that “delegitimizes us” and that “needs to disappear immediately.”21 Britain’s attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, and Italy’s prominent jurist, Armando Spataro, have made similar statements.22 Herein lies the fourth lesson and central conundrum for liberal democracies fighting global terrorist networks: although the mission is not new, past models for success have often involved bloody or politically offensive intelligence practices.23 Yet, we entered the post–Cold War era optimistic that the United States could reasonably promote democracy and the rule of law worldwide. Do the illiberal requirements of fighting terror inevitably sabotage this larger vision of helping societies embrace individual rights, freedoms, and self-determination? Or is it possible to render the intelligence aspects of fighting terror part of the solution to the conundrum itself? While the issues involved in reconciling ethics, law, democratic culture, and counterterrorism cannot be explored in depth in this chapter, it is

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worth noting that neither the United States nor most of its allies wish to win the conflict at the expense of their civil societies; yet they are tempted to do so because these methods have seemed to work in the past and the consequences of failure seem so high.24 The question that will be explored at least minimally in this chapter is whether some of the ingredients of these past successes can be combined with something new, in strategy or in intelligence practice, that can make what is likely to be a protracted war a successful and tolerable one as well. . . . SOME THINGS NEW The modern conflict with terrorism, including intelligence operations, involves five aspects that suggest some departures from past intelligence practices may not only be possible but necessary. These five aspects will affect counterterrorism operations in the future and should, therefore, be considered when building today’s intelligence architecture. They include the information revolution; the standardization of intelligence practices; the changing nature of warfare; the increasing role of the private sector in espionage, surveillance, and intelligence analysis; and, perhaps most important, the nature of the modern terrorist adversary.25 The implications of these developments for intelligence operations generally, and counterterrorism operations in particular, are potentially profound and are likely to adjust—at least at the margins but possibly to the core—the balance that past counterintelligence efforts have struck between data fusion, state intrusiveness, and civil liberties. The Information Revolution Tired as the phrase is, the “information revolution” is real, ongoing, and deeply affecting international politics, including the operations of transnational terrorists. It concerns more than the increased capacity of computers and software, which have in turn increased the volume and speed of communication. It is as much about individual access both to ideas and to worldwide audiences. With the advent and growth of the Internet, people now have the opportunity to acquire “actionable” knowledge, to interact across international boundaries, and to make choices based on their personal research much more quickly than in the past. For example, the terrorist attacks at Sharm-el Sheikh and in London during 2005 were facilitated by training that was available electronically. Terrorists have been quick not only to adopt the latest communications technologies, such as cell phones, but also to exploit the highly competitive market by finding vendors willing to sell to purchasers that refuse to give their names.26 Given the ease with which terrorists assimilate new technologies into their organizations, counterterrorism officials must also anticipate next

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steps and prevent them. For example, cyberterrorism, which received some attention prior to 9/11, appears to have slipped off the public agenda. But as governments increasingly rely on databases of terrorists and inferencing engines to sort data, the vulnerability is arguably getting worse. Of greatest concern are not the apocalyptic scenarios of Internet collapse some once predicted; transnational organizations such as al Qaeda probably rely too much on the Internet for logistical purposes to plot its collapse.27 Rather, terrorists are more likely to use the Internet as an adjunct to terror in its more traditional form. They may penetrate databases to gain visas and tamper with security systems and even electrical grids for instrumental purposes known in military jargon as “preparation of the battlefield.” Scott Borg, the director and chief economist of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit (CCU), an organization that advises the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, reportedly worries principally about Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.28 Control systems are a particular worry, because these are the computer systems that manage physical processes. They open and shut the valves, adjust the temperatures, throw the switches, regulate the pressures. . . . Think of the control systems for chemical plants, railway lines, or manufacturing facilities. Shutting these systems down is a nuisance. Causing them to do the wrong thing at the wrong time is much worse.29

Vulnerabilities to cyberterrorism arise as industries and governments automate their operations, acquiring low-cost products for their encryption and information processing needs. In the first instance, this demand generates an ever-growing market for more data processing tools available to the public and private sectors. As James Gosler of Sandia Labs has shown, this rising demand has created new and sometimes surprisingly complex vulnerabilities in modern, industrial economies.30 Advanced technology firms have been hiring more foreign companies to assist in creating components for complex information systems. Years ago, national security experts saw this coming. One commented on a computer part sent to him by a friend: “On the back was written: ‘This part was made in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, China, Mexico, Germany, the U.S., Thailand, Canada and Japan.’”31 There is little “made in America” about the nation’s critical infrastructure. The distributed nature of the information industries, a by-product of globalization, has thus created new avenues for malicious tampering or “sleeper” sabotage of critical infrastructure.32 Put simply, commercial technology may be a Trojan Horse—a welcome gift bearing unwelcome surprises. The best way to counter such sleeper technologies may be to embed countermeasures in critical systems that can identify the sleeper technologies before, or as, they act.

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In any case, a corollary to the new intimacy between the individual and the state is the enhanced role individuals play in making national news. As Thomas Friedman has noted, one feature of globalization is that we are all now broadcasters.33 The national media find themselves chasing stories first revealed by local reporters or Internet bloggers. Not only can a cartoon published in the Netherlands or a Koran mishandled at Guantanamo offend Muslims in Turkey, Pakistan or Indonesia within hours or minutes, but the information received is often laced with gossip and conspiracy theories. Reactions to the distorted picture can in turn quickly affect decision making back in Washington or within Bin Laden’s inner circle. Whether stories are apocryphal or not, they spread. This phenomenon underscores the importance of open source intelligence for both intelligence and counterintelligence purposes.34 Deception—a technique of intelligence masters of the past—can become a much more widely used instrument today. In the hands of terrorists, deception creates at the very least more “noise” for counterterrorism analysts to sift through; at worst, it could mask tomorrow’s strategic surprise. For this and other reasons, it is not clear that an increasingly bloated information environment improves international discourse or that more connected citizens make decisions any more wisely than their less connected forbearers. In fact, research suggests that people tend to use their improved access to information, and the Internet in particular, less for learning than for finding and interacting with those with similar biases and viewpoints.35 In any case, the information revolution would seem to render individuals and the civil societies they populate more empowered in relation to their governors, for better or for worse. This circumstance does not suggest that state-run intelligence systems have been eclipsed by the information revolution; it suggests only that they must adjust to the information environment and, in particular, the new ways in which competitors, adversaries, and potential nongovernmental allies are organizing. Social Organization, Politics, and the Standardization of Intelligence Operations Changes in the information environment affect social organizing and all forms of political competition—often in surprising ways. In the realm of national security policy and terrorism in particular, the most discussed effects have been the rise of networked organizations that rely on distributed decision-making and semi-independent cells for flexible operations, clustering, and “swarming.”36 Sociologists have developed a literature that describes these new organizational modalities in some detail—a body of work that can only be summarized in the briefest terms here. Networks rely on distributed

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decision-making and semi-independent cells for flexible and compartmented operations. In their modern form, these cells emerge and connect particularly efficiently. The Internet enables extremists to find each other quickly and within these “clusters” reinforce each other’s views. “Swarms” can be thought of as clusters on the move—or, more accurately, clusters forming on the move. A swarm resists preplanning.37 It just emerges as a result of individualized communications. Howard Reingold, author of Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, has called the phenomenon (less simply but perhaps more accurately), “cybernegotiated public flocking behavior.”38 What is important about swarming for intelligence and counterterrorism is its sociological substructure. Collective action comes about quickly as a result of very rapid decision making by a gradually forming, self-identifying group that may melt as fast as it forms. Once recognized, swarming can be adopted as a deliberate technique and used for operations in which the speed of decision making is more important than security. The CIA has allegedly used swarming techniques when conducting renditions (apprehending a subject on foreign soil and bringing him to face justice in the United States or a third country). After the imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr was seized as he walked to his mosque on February 17, 2003, the Italian police identified the suspected kidnappers by examining all cell phones in use near the abduction, and then tracing the web of calls placed. The forensics used by the police helped them to identify a form of swarming behavior among thirteen alleged CIA officers, but the kidnapping was so quickly accomplished that the technique was recognized only after the imam had disappeared.39 If this had been a terrorist attack, the bomb would have already gone off. In the modern age of terrorism, swarming, clustering, and networking reflect how the enemy can and will behave; they will be making decisions on the move. The Italian case, though a possible example of counterterrorist swarming, nonetheless shows how tactical defense can fail if employing traditional law enforcement techniques, whether among special operations forces or within civil societies threatened by attack. It illustrates the tactical challenge modern operations pose for those trying to defeat terrorism before it occurs.40 The second, more political effect of the information revolution has been what might be termed the “standardization” of intelligence operations alluded to above. As intelligence services increasingly exploit open source information available on the Internet, share sources and methods, and conduct joint operations, the more they are learning from each other and the greater the stakes they have in how each other performs. The popularization of the intelligence business began with the end of the Cold War and picked up momentum in the early 1990s as budget pressures led the U.S. intelligence community to disclose more of what it did to a skeptical Congress and the public. The National Reconnaissance Office was formally acknowledged; the existence of aerial surveillance

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and early satellite imagery programs was disclosed; and professionals from once secretive agencies granted authorized interviews to historians such as James Bamford, Christopher Andrew and Amy Zegart, who wrote detailed histories.41 It was not just declassified information on past intelligence activity and terminology that became available, but also musings on best practices derived both from the historical record and from theoretical work. By the end of the 1990s, an international spy museum had even opened in Washington, DC. By 2001, mid-career intelligence officers pursuing master-level degrees were expressing surprise at the quality and breadth of material available to the public, including foreigners, and covered in unclassified intelligence classes at the graduate level.42 On the one hand, this growing public awareness of intelligence has arguably been a good thing; terrorists and criminals should not be the only ones using modern communications to learn from each other. Intelligence is now part of local and state governance as well as national politics, it affects citizens’ daily lives, and it is practiced by businesses that train their employees in skills very similar to those employed by national intelligence officers. Intelligence is, in short, no longer an obscure business. But its greater public visibility leads to legitimate concerns about protecting sources and methods and the proper limits to public dialogue on intelligence matters, including the proper relationship among scholars, historians, and intelligence practitioners. The emergence of intelligence as a discipline of study will likely improve and standardize its practice among organized intelligence services, businesses, and, unfortunately, criminal organizations. The study of intelligence, including theoretical work that develops rigorous metrics for success, offers a historical “lessons learned” literature that could soon surpass that available within the U.S. government. The question is not whether this process is happening or can be stopped, but which intelligence services will learn—and learn faster—from it. If counterintelligence officials focus on leaks from formal intelligence institutions to the public at the expense of exploiting the learning and innovation being transferred within the private sector itself, they may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the future. This is not just because foreigners are reading books on intelligence and taking university courses; it is because the new intelligence scholarship is building on lessons from business intelligence and the criminal record as much as from government and, in some cases, deriving unique insights as a result. The Role of the Private Sector and the Changing Nature of Warfare The foregoing discussion has suggested that private sector developments have already had a profound effect on how modern intelligence services operate. Firms specializing in advanced technologies have brought powerful data management and processing tools—including

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extraordinarily strong encryption—to individuals worldwide at a steadily diminishing cost. And, as discussed briefly above, as the capacity of individuals to learn from and report to others has increased, so have the vulnerabilities of complex information systems designed and built by a highly distributed information industry. But the impact of the private sector on modern intelligence and counterterrorism extends much broader and deeper than this. Private sector surveillance has increased sharply as owners of information—such as cell phone purchasers, patients in hospitals or online shoppers—cede their control of it in order to increase the efficiency and quality of their transactions. Commercial holders may then combine what they know into databases that they can sell for a profit or share for a larger public good. As citizens have adjusted to both the benefits and risks of this private sector data sharing, they have become more inured or perhaps complacent with the notion that the government has occasionally been on the receiving end of their largesse. This change in public attitude is most striking in the United States. American political culture has long been heavily seasoned with distrust of the federal government and distaste for its intrusion in private matters43 ; yet Americans, so instinctively entrepreneurial and receptive to new technologies, are taking advantage of the speed and scope of individual transactions made possible by the Internet. Consumers are gradually and incrementally forfeiting their privacy for small but copious goods: quick purchases on E-Bay, the accumulation of airline miles, and tailored reading lists from Amazon.com. Reading the fine print of commercial contracts might trigger worries, but the consequences of giving up one’s information seem more remote than the gains achieved through faster decision making. Time is money; people are choosing to make more by selling bits of themselves. Yet, if this were just a profit-driven phenomenon, the accumulation of data in private hands would mean little beyond the marketplace. In fact, the larger push toward data aggregation is coming from institutions and corporations responsible for managing risk, such as insurers, and providing for the public’s safety, such as law enforcement. Here, the digitization of data has allowed the compiling of such diverse “inputs” as video, still photos, voice recordings and temperature measurements into consolidated or linked databases that, properly analyzed and mined, can provide complete pictures of private sector environments. Whether looking at human bodies or the “health” of buildings made of concrete and glass, digital databases are permitting individuals at key nodes within civil society to develop the kind of situational awareness within their domains that the military seeks on the battlefield. Operations centers that once inspired awe among civilians on State Department or Pentagon tours are now springing up in hospitals and

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skyscrapers. And certain cities are getting the idea that lashing these centers together—along with the surveillance cameras of, say, local delicatessens—could not only track perpetrators of crimes, but signal patterns of urban activity that might presage the crimes. After the terrorist bombings in London in 2005, press stories rolled in from across the United States about the wiring of Chicago, Baltimore, and New York City for the purpose of surveillance. In a small town in Vermont, citizens voted to install surveillance cameras on their streets for security reasons; when reporters asked if privacy was a concern, the residents said, in essence, that security was a greater one. This deepening and broadening of private sector surveillance, together with its public acceptability, represents a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the prospective reach of national intelligence is increased for the purpose of warning and crisis management; on the other hand, terrorists have at hand a society prewired for their own purposes, such as threats and crisis creation. A wired society, especially one with its guard down, could become a resource for criminals and terrorists. In fact, this circumstance is changing the nature of crime and espionage faster than federal intelligence systems are able to keep up. Terrorists achieve their purposes best when they are able to infiltrate civil society, lying in wait among noncombatants in order to inflict maximum damage. A wired private sector not only provides a logistical treasure trove for terrorists in the form of accessible databases for identity theft and more rapid and encrypted communications, it also offers new weapons: subway systems, ships, and buildings that, increasingly centrally controlled, can become hijacked in a similar manner as planes were on 9/11. Combined with a stated intention of pursuing weapons of mass destruction, such as biological, chemical, and nuclear devices, terrorists are acquiring a disturbing arsenal from which to choose—an arsenal largely constructed, maintained, and improved by the superior powers that they are fighting. Of course, from a larger perspective, the cumulative effect of all the changes brought about by the spread of technology may be to change the nature of warfare.44 But whether these changes turn out to be fundamental or at the margins, their impact is disproportionately felt in the counterterrorism domain. One reason is that counterterrorism hinges on transnational cooperation, which, in turn, is communications dependent. Because of the speed with which terrorists can act, state governments must not only learn from their own police, businesses, and citizenry, they must exchange or barter for information and work with other governments and their local authorities to stop the planning of cross-boundary attacks. In fact, the importance today of such liaison operations to all source collection may be greater than at any time in the past. Of course, for reasons elaborated elsewhere, liaison can never be a substitute for unilateral collection efforts.45

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A second reason counterterrorism operations are disproportionately affected by technological change is that the larger conflict between Islamists and Western states is shaped, as Lawrence Freedman has so aptly pointed out, by the contending narratives offered by both sides.46 With information spreading fast and free, the winning over of public opinion is vital to preventing the long-term recruitment and cohesion of jihadist cells and to establishing the legitimacy of interventions against states believed to be facilitating them. Third, terrorists—who are preferentially tactical in orientation—can nonetheless plot on a global scale when necessary. Connecting via the Internet, they can regroup and retool. Newer cells can locate and integrate with established ones exploiting local battles, such as in Chechnya or Iraq, for the purposes of hardening and sharpening their operatives. Although this gives modern terrorism the appearance of an international insurgency, it is one that is loosely organized at best, and rides on a splintered criminal underworld that masks sharp divisions among its perpetrators.47 This last point warrants emphasis. Even with a more comprehensive discussion of the technological and political environment than is presented here, a sound intelligence strategy against the threat of Islamist terrorism cannot be designed without deep appreciation of what the adversary is and is not. This is because intelligence must, as its primary objective, provide advantages to decision makers operating on the offense, defense, and at all levels of engagement with the adversary. If the principal test of an intelligence service is whether it develops information that helps beat competitors, the pursuit of such an advantage necessarily entails a thorough understanding of the adversary’s strategy, tactics, organization, and mindset—as well, of course, as one’s own. Although the nature of the present adversary is covered at length elsewhere in these volumes, a somewhat specialized summary is appropriate here; this is because understanding Islamist terrorists’ diversity as well as the divisions in the societies and cultures from which they spring, is the fifth and perhaps most important ingredient of designing an optimized intelligence system against modern terrorism. Such a sophisticated understanding should ideally permeate all levels of national security decision making, including arguably at the level of the foot soldier, because terrorism often rides opportunistically on the back of insurgency. As Max Boot has observed: To defeat this Islamist insurgency we must be able not only to track down and capture or kill hard-core terrorists but also to carry out civil affairs and information operations to win the “hearts and minds” of the great mass of uncommitted Muslims. We are very good at eliminating top terrorists, once they have been found (witness Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s death); less good at finding them (Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are still at large);

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and less skilled still at changing the conditions that breed terrorism in the first place.48

Islamist Terrorism as an Intelligence Target A sound intelligence enterprise knows its adversary. Indeed, it identifies the critical decision makers on both sides—those who must be served and those with whom they will engage—and the nature of the competitive game they are playing.49 In the post-9/11 world, the strategic dimensions of this question have competed, often unsuccessfully, with the objective of getting intelligence on the next attacks. The reasons for this imbalance are not hard to fathom. Yet, an emphasis on current intelligence at the expense of strategic intelligence puts counterterrorist strategists on the endless defensive, seeking to block a tactical weapon rather than the adversary himself. Imagine if the Cheka had defined its objective as stopping assassinations and sabotage at home rather than rooting out the network that was sponsoring these attacks. To do the latter, Felix Dzerzhinski had to understand his enemy and develop a long-term strategy to defeat him strategically—not just tactically. As experts on the subject remind us, terrorism is a weapon; its use does little to describe the adversaries who wield it other than that they are ruthless, violence prone, and generally less powerful in traditional terms (arms, money, and legal or institutional resources) than those they are fighting. Even national security experts are prone to lumping terrorists together on the presumption that the tool binds its users into a cohesive set for targeting and planning purposes. For example, many U.S. officials still use—and an otherwise well-informed public still accepts— terms such as the “Global War on Terror.” Prior to the 2003 Iraq War, the implicit assumption that terrorists were allied, and that fighting one required fighting all, seemed to require skeptics to disprove Saddam’s links to Bin Laden’s network rather than the other way around. If this assumption was ever valid, it is no longer so, and acting on it would be a mistake. As Bruce Hoffman has observed, “we have to reconceive of this as something more akin to a global insurgency or a global counterinsurgency” in which “kill and capture” is no longer the chief measure of success. Instead, Hoffman believes we should gauge success by our ability to disrupt “the cycle of terrorist recruitment and replenishment that we have seen unfold . . .”50 Intelligence cannot contribute to this strategic competition unless it can develop a reserve capacity to solve more than the man- and bomb-hunt aspects of the enterprise The problem is not just that spurious links may be made between antiAmerican leaders such as Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Islamist extremists, but that Islamist extremists will be regarded as more cohesive than they

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are. Conflation of terrorist plotting with a movement may lead to strategic error if it throws al Qaeda’s opponents into a defensive crouch while allowing minor criminals, insurgents, and extremist Muslims to augment their prestige by claiming roles grander than they in fact play in global affairs. Remembering the earlier discussion of the importance of strategic narrative, such conflation enhances the enemy and may lead national decision makers to expend excessive intelligence resources on ad hoc actors best left to traditional law enforcement. The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui threw such issues into relief as the prosecution claimed, to the defendant’s apparent delight, Moussaoui’s complicity in 9/11, while the defense argued the contrary. Bin Laden himself publicly denied any connection between Moussaoui and the 9/11 plotters, which means little except that the issue has propaganda value for the wrong side. CONCLUSION: OPTIMIZING U.S. INTELLIGENCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM For these reasons, constructing strategies for post-9/11 conflicts based on generalizations about the adversary can be misleading and perhaps even dangerous. But they are also necessary and useful when done with care. If, in fact, the competition is at least in part about the future of Islam, then the terrorists may act instrumentally—to trigger U.S. and allied moves that will help the extremists solidify their case against moderate trends and secular regimes in the Muslim world. If this is the case, intelligence analysis and collection efforts that focus principally on how Islamists are likely to shape their next attacks may be describing asymmetric threats while overlooking important asymmetric opportunities that more powerful states have available for outmaneuvering the terrorists at the strategic level.51 Intelligence of this type would then be skewing choices in the adversaries’ favor, playing into their hands and making matters worse. Intelligence, done well, must not only avoid falling into such traps, but provide decision makers with the capacity to see the traps coming and spring them ahead of time. Emphasizing this strategic point is not meant to suggest that tactical intelligence and the decision makers it supports are unimportant. At this level, modern Islamist terrorists operate similarly to transnational threats decades ago—albeit in swarms and clusters that act at much faster speed. To some extent, the techniques that have worked in the past will remain important: human intelligence from infiltration agents, all-source data fusion (phone intercepts and human agents for example), and collaboration with law enforcement worldwide. The ability of the federal government to conduct double agent and deception operations should be improved and will necessarily have to be coordinated with overseas partners.

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However, the changes in the technological landscape outlined above suggest that the most far-reaching tactical challenges may be domestic. First responders at the state and local level—including private citizens and businesses—may be the first to receive warning and indications of an attack. These individuals, many of whom may have never been exposed to national intelligence institutions or their products, will be first line collectors as well as decision makers as the crisis unfolds. The federal government needs to develop ways to connect with first responders prior to crises so that protocols for information handoff from the local to the federal level will be smooth should an emergency unfold. The federal intelligence system must begin by identifying who the decision makers are likely to be in a crisis and what information systems they are most likely to use. Then federal intelligence agencies, with the Department of Homeland Security in the lead, should figure out how to support and learn from them at the same time. For example, hospitals that make arrangements to compile, analyze, and share information during emergencies could include protocols in their data sharing systems to ensure that any indicators of a biological attack are rapidly handed off to the national intelligence system so that other cities worldwide could be placed on alert. Since these protocols, likely based on automated inferencing technologies, could be put in place ahead of time, citizens’ privacy could be protected. The federal government urgently needs to map these emerging solutions to information sharing at the local level and (rather than regulate them) adapt them to meet federal needs wherever possible in a “plug and play” system that can be taken apart and reconfigured as needed. In the meantime, the federal government should help sponsor civilian industries’ research and development of technologies that can help first responders manage crises, archiving technological solutions that may help other localities trying to get up to speed at home and abroad. Of course, given the transnational nature of terrorist networks, tactical success will depend on other governments adopting similar approaches and the use of diplomacy, overseas military support, and intelligence liaison with foreign governments. Indeed, from the tactical perspective, the urgent need to provide support to field-based operations suggests that the U.S. Department of Defense’s move to organize intelligence support to special operations forces engaged in counterterrorist operations is not only wise but essential, and hardly a sign of weakness at the top levels of civilian intelligence agencies. If such military support is not, however, coordinated with embassy and civilian intelligence operations, it may create more problems than it solves. Civilian tactical intelligence operations will continue to be vital and will touch on matters in which the Department of Defense has a stake. As Dan Byman reminds us, states can also be adversaries, sponsoring terrorism in either the active or passive sense and using liaison to influence U.S. actions in debilitating ways.52 Whether

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active, passive or part-time sponsors, these governments will necessarily be intelligence targets even if they occasionally cooperate on tactics from time to time or are otherwise considered liaison “partners.” The Pentagon will want and need to know what civilian intelligence learns and will not want its operations conflicting with civilian ones. In any case, the conventional wisdom that human intelligence against terrorist adversaries must operate principally outside traditional diplomatic circles is wrong. Classic modes of collection, including official cover, are crucial to detect and counter state sponsorship of terrorism and to work with foreign agencies engaged in domestic intelligence and law enforcement at the local level. Passive sponsors and liaison partners may coexist in one country’s government. Just as when targeting terrorists, intelligence must discern the differing motivations and roles within and among these governments if it is to help with plans to engage, coerce, pressure, manipulate, cajole or trick them while at the same time avoiding blowback or other unintended consequences.53 As Byman points out, France had a defensive “sanctuary doctrine” until 1986 that allowed terrorists to operate within its borders so long as French interests were not jeopardized. While France was not successful in preventing terrorist attacks against its citizens, and it slowly changed course, U.S. efforts to influence a state making similar choices today would necessarily differ radically from one taken toward, for example, a state providing sanctuary of the kind the Taliban offered to Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Finally, the strategic requirements of countering terrorists are particularly critical in an era of globalization. Thomas Friedman, in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, discusses the need for generalists who can make connections among disciplines and track ripple effects from one domain, such as genetic engineering, to other domains, such as international organized crime or finance.54 At the strategic level, counterterrorism intelligence demands this kind of cross-disciplinary analysis. For this reason, the formation of counterterrorism centers focused on current operations and threat reporting may not be enough. Driven by today’s agenda, these centers are likely to show preference for current operations over the bigger picture. To augment the centers’ efforts, the U.S. intelligence system needs to strengthen its strategic capabilities, ideally under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council, dedicated to understanding the conflict with Islamist extremism at a deeper level, including who the parties are and how their interests are evolving. This strategic unit should nonetheless provide policy support to the diplomats and narrative builders— principally public relations officers and ambassadors—who can articulate the themes most likely to influence opinion in countries of concern. Because stories and deceptions build and dissipate quickly, these strategic analysts will have tactical roles to play from time to time. But their principal concern will be to paint the larger picture of the conflict in which we

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are engaged, distinguishing the networks from the ad hoc actors and the big wins from the small. Such strategic analysis cannot, however, be accomplished without strategic collection to accompany it. This will require a long-term investment in deep cover human intelligence officers and open source collectors whose purpose will be to sense the deep cultural shifts Friedman has described. These collectors should also be encouraged to be analysts as well, so steeped in the societies and subjects they explore that they understand them intuitively and are able to generate their own, flexible and focused requirements. In this way, strategic warning can smoothly lead to tactical anticipation and ultimately actionable intelligence. These should be seamlessly connected, not artificially separated by the walls of intelligence centers or the artificially distinct career paths of “analyst” and “collector.” It will also be necessary to forge a constructive working relationship with universities where programs are offered in the intelligence domain— either the art and practice of the profession itself or the substantive areas that future intelligence and national security analysts are absorbing. On university campuses, the public dialogue is already engaged; it concerns how democratic societies might best adjust to a world of much more intrusive surveillance and dispersed threat. This should be received as good news among intelligence professionals. Without this informed and disciplined dialogue, the politics of intelligence would likely continue to be affected by cultural bias, anecdotal evidence, and suspicion. At a time when the intelligence community has been criticized for risk aversion, it would seem that this would be one area where the risk would be worth the gain. NOTES 1. John Brennan, former chief of staff to CIA Director George Tenet and former director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, now president and CDO of the Analysis Corporation, quoted in David Bjerkfie and Coco Masters, “How the CIA Can Be Fixed,” Time Magazine, May 22, 2006, 40–41. 2. Ibid., quoting Robert Baer, former CIA field officer. 3. “Not for attribution” comment made at Georgetown University’s Counterintelligence Roundtable, 26; April 26, 2006. 4. The Washington Post reported in June 2005 that, according to a computer analysis of an earlier version of the same Department of Justice records, most defendants were charged with minor crimes unrelated to terrorism and nearly half had no demonstrated connection to terrorism or terrorists. See Dan Eggen, “Officials Tout U.S. Anti-Terrorism Record,” Washington Post, May 25, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/ 24/AR2006052402423 pf.html. 5. Several examples of intelligence in action, including its role in capturing Khalid Sheik Mohammed, are provided in volume 3 of this publication. 6. The theory of intelligence that underlies this approach, including definitions and indicators of success and failure, will not be discussed at length here.

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However, its essential features will become apparent in the course of the discussion. 7. The idea that the challenge is “new” stems from institutional and official preoccupation with shifting from Cold War adversaries to the post–Cold War international environment. Thus, accompanying calls for a Revolution in Military Affairs have come, and so has much discussion of the meaning and purpose of “transformation.” That intelligence systems have to shift targets from the “old” state-centric approach to the “new” focus on transnational groups does not mean, however, that transnational challenges have not confronted states in the past. 8. Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995), 18–38. 9. Lawrence LaFore, The Long Fuse: An Interpretation of the Drigins of World War I, 2nd ed. (Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1977) esp. 49–73. 10. Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 49. 11. Ibid., 48–53. 12. For more on the Trust, see Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty’s Secret Service (New York: Viking Penguin, 1986) 313–317. For suggestions of its impact on James Jesus Angleton and thus American counterintelligence practice post WWII, see Andrew’s later volume, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 195, 313, 401–402. According to Jeffrey Richelson, the Trust was just one of many successful counterintelligence operations run by the Cheka. Another was known as SINDIKAT, and it targeted one monarchist in particular, the former terrorist and revolutionary, Boris Savinkov. The Cheka regarded him as a hub of the monarchist network and plotted traps for him—ones with good bait and delayed springs. First, they sent an operative to his base in Poland carrying documents establishing his bona fides as deputy chief of staff of Internal Service Troops and a secret counterrevolutionary. Savinkov believed him, recruited him, and used him as a trusted agent. The Bolsheviks quickly wrapped up the Polish network when they had enough evidence and Savinkov fled to Paris. Surprisingly, he remained vulnerable to the ploy and was eventually lured to Russia where he was arrested. It was never clear whether he fell, jumped or was pushed from a window in Moscow’s Lubyanka prison. See Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995),) 59–60. 13. This summary of the Trust relies heavily on Jeffrey T. Richelson’s account in A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 61–62. 14. Ibid. 61. 15. Ibid. 16. See Nigel West, MASK: MI5’s Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain (London: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2005). 17. Ibid., 5. 18. Bruce Hoffman, “A Nasty Business,” Atlantic Monthly, January 2002, 50– 51. 19. Matthew Teague, “Double Blind: The Untold Story of How British Intelligence Infiltrated and Undermined the Irish Republican Army,” Atlantic, April 2006, 53–62.

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20. See Porch, The French Secret Services, for a discussion of the effects of bureaucratic infighting on intelligence performance in France before WWI, especially 39–78. 21. Elaine Sciolino, “Spanish Judge Calls for Closing U.S. Prison at Guantanamo,” New York Times, June 4, 2006. 22. Ibid. 23. For an excellent discussion of this dilemma, see Lawrence Freedman, Adelphi Paper 379: The Transformation of Strategic Affairs (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), 39–44. 24. Interestingly, European critics, including the Spanish who have fought domestic terrorism for years, argue that extreme methods do not work well against terrorists and cause more problems than they solve. See Elaine Sciolino, “Sparnish Judge Calls for Closing U.S. Prison at Guantanamo.” 25. The following discussion summarizes ideas expressed at greater length in the author’s chapter, “Understanding Friends and Enemies,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 14–31. 26. These insights were provided by Daniel Byman, reporting on the techniques used by German authorities against al Qaeda. Private conversation and Byman’s unpublished manuscript, May 31, 2006. 27. See Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Linked: The New Science of Networks (Cambridge: Perseus, 2002). According to Babarasi, “A few well-trained crackers could destroy the net in thirty minutes from anywhere in the world.” This could be done by “attacking a few key routers to launching denial of service attacks against the busiest ones. Code Red worm (summer of 2001) burrowed into hosts and then launched traffic at whitehouse.gov. Automated virus. Cascading failure of other routers resulting from the redirection of traffic smaller nodes would finish the job. Destruction of the Internet is likely to be the goal of only terrorists or rogue states. Real hackers and crackers wouldn’t want the collapse of their “toy.” Barabasi, Linked. 154. 28. Jimmy Lee Shreeve, “The new breed of cyber-terrorist,” Independent, May 31, 2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/science technology/ article622421.ece. 29. Ibid. 30. James R. Gosler, “The Digital Dimension,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 96–114. For the best theoretical examination of the difficulties predicting the ripple effect of minor change on complex systems, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 31. Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999), 33. 32. Not all experts agree with Gosler’s thesis. James Simon, of Microsoft Corporation, has argued that the redundancies built into the high-technology manufacturing and software design make significant product tampering virtually impossible (Author interview, 15 October, 2005). Gosler disagrees, noting that Microsoft often fails to discover benign problems with its software until it is introduced commercially and tested by millions of users.

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33. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 45. 34. For more on open source intelligence, please see the chapter by Orion Lewis and Erica Chenoweth in this volume. 35. I have discussed clustering briefly in “Understanding Friends and Enemies,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 14–31. This discussion is based on the research and writings of, among others, Steven Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and Software (New York: Scribner’s, 2001). 36. For more on swarming, clustering, and the Internet’s impact on war, see, in addition to Steven Johnson’s work cited above and Reingold’s book, Smart Mobs, cited below, and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Washington, DC: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 1996). 37. Similarly, young people used text messaging and the Internet to energize the Democratic Party’s base during the last presidential election. Though the campaign that spearheaded the innovation was Howard Dean’s, an early loser in the primaries, his recognition of the potential political impact of instant communication and swarming catapulted him to the head of the party nonetheless. 38. Howard Reingold, Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (Cambridge: Perseus Books, 2002). 39. Stephen Grey and Don Van Natta, “13 With the CIA Sought by Italy in a Kidnapping,” New York Times, June 25, 2005. 40. CIA counterterrorist operations in Italy had some of the characteristics of swarming because cell phones were apparently used to coordinate the last tactical maneuvers before capture; in this case CIA decision making was less quick and agile than Italian law enforcement and the U.S. effort was disrupted. See Stephen Grey and Don Van Natta, cited above. 41. See James Bamford, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (New York: Doubleday, 2001). 42. Although traditional scholars have been slow to accept intelligence within the disciplines of political science or international relations, their resistance is gradually giving way to student demand. Many universities now offer intelligence courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Specialized schools also advertise professional intelligence training and have begun to organize nationally to promote private sector training for prospective and mid-career intelligence officers. The intelligence products generated by these schools, including current intelligence digests derived from open source information, are read within the U.S. government. This productivity is hardly surprising; open source intelligence firms started springing up in the private sector over 15 years ago as private firms recognized that competitive intelligence was useful to businesses competing in the marketplace and began hiring former intelligence professionals to conduct research, improve decision making and protect their proprietary information. 43. For an extended discussion of this point, see Jennifer E. Sims, “Understanding Ourselves,” in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 32–59. 44. See, e.g., Bruce Berkowitz, The New Face of War: How War Will be Fought in the 21st Century (New York: Free Press, 2003). 45. See Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals and Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (Summer

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2006): 195–217. Also, for a European view on this, please see the chapter by Magnus Norell in this volume. 46. Freedman, 90–91. 47. This insight has been provided to me by several of my students, including John Douglas who wrote a masters thesis on the global insurgency of which Iraq might be a part, and Sara Moller, whose masters thesis, “Coalitions of Terror: Rethinking the al-Qa’ida Network,” explored whether al Qaeda is truly a transnational network or rather more closely resembles an alliance or set of liaison relationships among contending Islamist groups. 48. Max Boot, Statement before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and Capabilities, June 29, 2006. 49. Intelligence seeks decision advantage: to provide better information about the decisive aspects of the competition to one’s own decision makers than is available to their opponents. This advantage is gained by gathering and analyzing the best information possible for one’s own side while degrading the other side’s efforts to do likewise. 50. Karen J. Greenberg, ed., Al Qaeda Now: Understanding Today’s Terrorists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 12. 51. This idea of exploiting asymmetric advantages comes from a conversation with William Nolte, the then deputy to the associate director of Central Intelligence for Analysis, for which I am most grateful. 52. See the chapter by Daniel Byman in volume 2 of this publication. Also, see Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 53. Ibid., 273–274. 54. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, 18–22.

CHAPTER 21 MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION Tom Lansford

The key to successful counterterrorism is accurate and timely intelligence. Effective intelligence capabilities provide states with the ability to interdict terrorists before they conduct strikes. Intelligence resources provide the first line of defense against both domestic and international terrorists and are the main tool by which governments can be proactive in their efforts to disrupt terrorist organizations and planning. Through history, most terrorist groups were substate and not transnational. Organizations such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) or the Basque Homeland and Freedom group (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or ETA) carried out attacks and operations against specific national governments (the IRA against the United Kingdom and the ETA against Spain). However, by the waning days of the twentieth century, the most potent terrorist groups had developed transnational capabilities that gave them a truly global reach. The rise of groups such as al Qaeda dramatically underscored the need for increased intelligence cooperation and collaboration. During the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies had institutionalized various degrees of cooperation. The post–September 11 war on terror reinforced the need for continued, and even expanded, intelligence-sharing and joint operations. One of the most significant successes of the war on terror has been the substantial increase in intelligence cooperation between the United States and a range of states, as well as other international actors. Because of the dominant position of the United States in global antiterror efforts, this chapter places the United States at the center of current international efforts in intelligence cooperation. No other state currently has the military and intelligence capabilities of the United States, which makes the world’s remaining superpower integral to multinational counterterrorism efforts.

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The 9/11 Commission even declared that “without question, the United States has the most capable intelligence apparatus of any county in the world.”1 Concurrently, however, the United States has deep deficiencies in certain areas, especially human intelligence. Only through multilateral cooperation and collaboration can the capabilities of the United States and other states be harnessed to successfully prosecute the global campaign against terrorism. INTELLIGENCE AND COOPERATION Intelligence includes a range of activities such as espionage or spying, covert planning, and counterintelligence operations. Jeffrey Richelson offers a general definition of intelligence as “the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning.”2 Stephen Sloan developed a more narrow and more U.S.focused definition, in which he asserts that intelligence at the national level “is primarily with providing information for ‘planning,’ that is, it is essentially intended to assist the national government in developing the diplomatic, economic, and military policies and strategies to defend or enhance United States international objectives.”3 Both definitions affirm the utilitarian nature of intelligence as a tool with which policy- and decision-makers craft strategies and make choices. There are a range of agencies involved in intelligence in the United States. Collectively, these bodies are formally described as the “Intelligence Community,” which, according to a recent U.S. Commission report, comprises 15 federal agencies, offices, and elements of organizations within the Executive branch that are responsible for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. These include 14 departmental components—eight in the Department of Defense, two in the Department of Homeland Security, one each in four other departments (State, Energy, Treasury, and Justice) and one independent agency, the Central Intelligence Agency.4 Intelligence can be broadly divided into three broad categories: signal intelligence (SIGINT); imagery intelligence (IMINT); and human intelligence (HUMINT). SIGINT involves gathering information through intercepting signals sent over the airwaves, including radio, broadcast and other forms of telecommunications such as emails or encrypted messages.5 IMINT is the use of aerial and satellite photography to secure intelligence.6 HUMINT is the most common form of intelligence gathering. It is based on the use of people to collect information. Many consider HUMINT to be the most important of the three categories. A publication by the Czech government describes HUMINT as the “oldest method of information gathering and it is the queen of intelligence activity.”7 U.S.

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Senator Saxby Chambliss underscored the importance of this traditional form of espionage when he noted that HUMINT, “relative to the other intelligence disciplines, can tell us what the enemy is thinking. The strength of good HUMINT is that it can answer this key question: What are the enemy’s intentions about when, where, and how to strike?”8 Imperatives for Cooperation Compared with other states, the United States has enormous advantages in SIGINT and IMINT. Some of these comparative advantages are because of scale. For instance, in 2005, the intelligence budget of the United States was $44 billion.9 In comparison, the UK spent $2.57 billion.10 The United States also enjoys a range of technological advantages in terms of satellite and other sophisticated SIGINT and IMINT capabilities.11 Nonetheless, SIGINT and IMINT have clear limitations, as was famously demonstrated in the failure of the U.S. intelligence community to predict the detonation of nuclear weapons by India in 1998.12 To maintain effective information gathering capabilities, technological intelligence resources must be balanced with robust HUMINT assets. U.S. HUMINT capabilities were constrained by a series of restrictions put in place beginning in the 1970s.13 These limitations were expanded in 1995 by new prohibitions on the ability of the CIA and other intelligence agencies to recruit or work with people who may have committed human rights violations.14 Former CIA Director James Woolsey criticized the restrictions in the following manner: “It’s like telling the FBI they can recruit informants inside the mafia, but they can’t recruit crooks.”15 The result was an “overly cautious approach” in reviews of applications from field agents for electronic surveillance against suspected foreign terrorists prior to September 11.16 Clifford Beal, the editor of the prestigious security paper, Jane’s Defence Weekly, highlighted the HUMINT failures of the U.S. intelligence community in 2001 when he summarized some of the more spectacular pre-9/11 lapses: U.S. intelligence about terrorist activities, particularly in the Middle East, has experienced shortfalls for many years. In 1983, two suicide bombers eliminated the U.S. military presence in Lebanon. In August 1998, the destruction of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania also took the U.S. intelligence community by surprise. In August 2000, the USS Cole was taken out of action by terrorist action in Yemen.17

Further, in writing about the intelligence failures surrounding the possibility of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction initiatives, Chambliss points out that “the fact remains that the CIA did not have a single agent inside Iraq to verify the true state of these programs before coalition forces, led by

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the United States, attacked Iraq in 2003.”18 The restrictions on HUMINT were dropped following the terrorist attacks; however, U.S. intelligence agencies have still faced a range of obstacles. It takes considerable time and effort to develop the networks necessary to successfully infiltrate foreign governments and terrorist organizations.19 As a result, the U.S. intelligence community has increasingly come to rely on data and information from allied states. Intelligence cooperation is often prompted by the need or desire to pool resources. Especially when states face a common enemy, burden sharing among the allies becomes an important goal. Burden sharing is a means to better allocate assets and reduce redundancy and duplication of effort. Examples of this phenomenon include Anglo-American programs during World War II that led to the decryption of both German and Japanese codes.20 Collaboration under such circumstances improves transparency among allied states and leads to closer cooperation in other areas.21 In the twentieth century, such patterns of cooperation became a common component of U.S. intelligence policy, as programs were initiated to share information and engage in joint intelligence gathering with other states, such as Israel, and multilateral institutions, including NATO.22 The perceived menace of the Soviet Union created a high threat quotient, which prompted the United States and its allies to engage in a range of collaborative behavior, including policies to promote joint defense and multilateral intelligence gathering.23 The result was that the United States developed a series of intelligence-sharing agreements. These arrangements existed on both a bilateral and multilateral level. Hence, the United States had individual accords with states such as the United Kingdom and with international institutions such as NATO. The demise of the Soviet Union did not substantially alter the patterns of cooperation established during the Cold War. Furthermore, the rise of global terrorism created renewed incentives for closer collaboration. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, new initiatives created additional forums to facilitate information exchanges and monitor common enemies. Impediments to Cooperation While states have a variety of incentives to cooperate on intelligence matters, there are also a number of disincentives that constrain collaboration. Intelligence cooperation is often undertaken as much for political reasons as to enhance or bolster capabilities. Such collaboration becomes part of broader linkage strategies that bind states to one another; however, the political basis of the partnership may lead to less than full compliance with the spirit of intelligence agreements.24 In addition, intelligence is by its very nature secret, and sharing data or information may compromise

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a nation’s HUMINT and expose the capabilities of its SIGINT or IMINT. Furthermore, sharing intelligence can reveal deficiencies in a state’s resources, since data can show both what information a state has and what it does not have.25 The greatest fear of all intelligence services is that a state that is currently considered an ally will become an enemy or adversary and use information or data—or even knowledge about a former ally’s capabilities—against it. For instance, the fall of the pro-U.S. regime of the Shah of Iran in 1979 led to the loss of significant U.S. HUMINT capabilities in the Persian Gulf.26 Also, while the CIA developed a good working relationship with Pakistani intelligence during the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, elements within those same intelligence assets later supported the Taliban regime. Pakistani intelligence officials were even suspected of protecting Taliban leaders after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan.27 A nation’s intelligence community often has institutional biases against revealing data. Critics of the U.S. intelligence community point out that agencies such as the CIA and the FBI did not cooperate well with each other prior to the September 11 attacks.28 The tendency among intelligence agencies is to limit the flow of information, rather than accelerate the distribution of hard-won data. One enduring reason for the reluctance by intelligence communities to cooperate is the fact that even close allies spy on each other. This uncomfortable aspect of national intelligence was highlighted for the United States by the case of Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard, a U.S. citizen who passed classified materials to Tel Aviv and whose capture and trial placed a severe strain on U.S.–Israeli relations.29 Twentieth-Century Patterns of Cooperation One long-standing reason for intelligence collaboration is reciprocation, the belief that contemporary cooperation will be rewarded by future interactions with one’s allies.30 Another side to this phenomenon is known as the “shadow of the future”: the fact that a state’s actions in the present will be either rewarded or punished at a later time by other actors.31 The United States has a history of intelligence cooperation that dates back to World War I. Cooperation with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand became particularly close during World War II and remained so in the Cold War period.32 In 1947, the United States and the United Kingdom signed an intelligence-sharing treaty, which was subsequently expanded to include the three other states. The accord regulated the exchange of SIGINT and divided the world into geographic zones. Each country was given responsibility for the collection of information in particular zones. Multinational committees were established and liaison officers were stationed with the intelligence services of their counterparts. The United States also expanded its bilateral collaboration. For instance,

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U.S. intelligence collaboration with Germany became increasingly formalized in the 1960s.33 As time progressed, the United States provided an increasing amount of the funding and technological resources for the partners; however, the participation of the allied states meant that the United States did not have to pay for 100 percent of the costs of the intelligence (and meanwhile, the allies gained access to information and intelligence that they otherwise would not have been privy to).34 As the initially bilateral system became a multilateral forum, information began to be shared with states outside of the signatory group, including close allies such as NATO partners Norway and Turkey, and even South Korea.35 U.S. intelligence cooperation with its allies was institutionalized through NATO. There were a range of bodies established in NATO to facilitate intelligence sharing—for example, the Current Intelligence Group was assigned a staff and tasked to distribute information to the Alliance’s smaller members that might otherwise not have the ability to monitor actions by the Soviet bloc.36 The withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated command system diminished the overall utility of the Alliance’s intelligence groups, but these bodies continued to disseminate information and facilitate cooperation.37 However, with the French estrangement from the Alliance, intelligence collaboration became increasingly ad hoc and managed through working groups that were established to deal with specific threats or events. A second multilateral forum was TRIDENT. Organized in 1958, TRIDENT was an intelligence cooperation group that included Israel, Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia. TRIDENT was established by the Treaty of the Periphery. The informal organization was backed by the United States and the United Kingdom as a means to counter growing Arab nationalism, especially in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis. TRIDENT established regular contacts between the various intelligence agencies and provided a conduit to disseminate data gathered by the United States and other Western intelligence agencies. The TRIDENT members also deployed liaison officers with their counterparts. TRIDENT disbanded after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.38 Throughout the twentieth century, the United States shared its own and allied intelligence with various multilateral bodies, such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization of American (OAS). The 9/11 Commission summarized U.S. interaction with multilateral bodies in the following manner: Information derived from intelligence also forms an important element of U.S. participation in international organizations, such as the United Nations. The United States frequently uses such information to alert organizations to impending crises or to motivate action in appropriate circumstances. When

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international bodies do act, for example, by sending in peacekeeping forces or by imposing sanctions on a “rogue” state, the United States often provides information derived from intelligence to protect the forces or detect violations of sanctions.39

However, the United States has been accused of selectively presenting information so as to unduly influence decisions and shape policy. For instance, the United States was widely criticized for presenting what was perceived to be misleading and selective intelligence to the UN and its inspectors in Iraq prior to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.40 POST–COLD WAR INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND THE WAR ON TERROR By the 1990s, cooperation between the United States and its allies could be classified into three broad levels.41 These levels are often overlapping, and not mutually exclusive. First, there is the macro level. This is the most formal level and involves government-to-government accords and international agreements. At the macro level, cooperation is multifaceted and extends across several areas. Cooperation is also long-term and usually ongoing. The 1947 U.S.–U.K. Treaty and the Treaty of the Periphery are examples of frameworks that created macro-level interactions. Second, there is the meso level. The meso level revolves around bilateral or multilateral agreements that govern day-to-day operations or collaboration on intelligence matters. Meso accords can be either short- or long-term and are usually limited to one issue area of intelligence, such as terrorism or nacro-trafficking. Examples of meso-level activity include agreements on communications systems or regular meetings or the exchange of liaison personnel. Finally, the micro level centers on specific and short-term cooperation. Most often, micro interactions involve a specific case and are commonly in response to requests by governments or international bodies for assistance.42 In the aftermath of the Cold War, SIGINT and IMINT continued to be shared widely between the United States and other allies, and the United States and its partners even operated joint facilities and equipment as a form of burden sharing.43 NATO provided the main U.S. intelligence interaction at the macro level. These facilities were known as joint intelligence centers. In addition, the Joint Analysis Command (JAC) at Molesworth Royal Air Force base was created to provide not only multinational intelligence, but also multiservice and multisource information. The operational section of JAC offered 24-hour, real-time intelligence to a range of NATO operations, most notably for the Alliance members participating in the NATO-led peacekeeping missions in the Balkans.44 At the core of JAC is the Multinational Intelligence Coordination Cell, created in 1995

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to manage the flow of data between the Untied States and its NATO partners.45 In order to provide secure information to the allies, NATO has its own communications system, the Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE). LOCE is an example of meso interaction. LOCE provides a gateway for allies to gain access to secure information and joint intelligence. Eileen Mackrell, the chief of the operations division of JAC summarizes LOCE in the following fashion: From a systems standpoint, the backbone of theater intelligence sharing within NATO is the LOCE network, the only secure voice and data system common to all NATO allies. There are over 283 networked terminals worldwide; most of these terminals are deployed in support of theater operations, including Operation Joint Guard in the former Yugoslavia. LOCE provides users with connectivity among NATO and U.S. operational units and decision-makers in the form of gateways such as the Allied Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation (BICES) Initiative, SHAPE’s [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] CRONOS network and . . . SACLANT’s [Supreme Allied Command Atlantic] Maritime Command and Control Information System (MCCIS), as well as such features as bulletin boards and electronic mail.46

An example of micro-level cooperation would be U.S. intelligence cooperation with Kenya and Tanzania in the aftermath of the 1998 terrorist bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam. The United States lacked HUMINT in the region and was forced to rely on Kenyan and Tanzanian systems, as well as the capabilities of other allies, particularly the British, who had HUMINT resources in the area.47 Other countries also aided the United States in the investigation. For instance, Albanian officials raided the offices of suspected terrorist groups with links to al Qaeda, while Pakistani provided information about bin Laden and al Qaeda’s ongoing operations.48 Cooperation, including law enforcement interaction, allowed the U.S. government to identify suspects in the attacks. Eventually, 11 individuals, including bin Laden were indicted in the strikes.49 Micro-level interactions can serve as the basis to expand cooperation. For instance, in the aftermath of the Cold War, Russia provided intelligence to the United States and its allies during the first Gulf War.50 NATORussian intelligence cooperation expanded throughout the 1990s, rising from the micro to the meso to the macro level. Areas that prompted expanded Russian intelligence cooperation included terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—for instance, in 2000 the United States and Russia agreed to exchange information on weapons proliferation and the threat of ballistic missiles.51 By 2003, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson acknowledged that the Alliance regularly exchanged information and intelligence with its former Cold War nemesis, Russia.

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In describing the interaction in an interview, Robertson declared “We [NATO and Russia] are on the level with one another. We exchange information we have never exchanged before. We even share classified intelligence information.”52 Russian intelligence cooperation has been particularly useful in tracking terrorist groups in Central Asia.53 The September 11 Attacks On the eve of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States had a range of bilateral and multilateral intelligence agreements, which ranged from the macro to the micro level. In fact, the U.S. intelligence community’s heavy reliance on SIGINT and IMINT led it to depend on HUMINT provided by other countries prior to 2001.54 George Tenet, then CIA Director, reported that before the September 11 attacks, the CIA relied on foreign sources for HUMINT and that the agency “worked with numerous European governments, such as the Italians, Germans, French, and British to identify and shatter terrorist groups and plans against American and local interests in Europe.”55 Following the 2001 attacks, the Bush administration enacted a range of reforms to the intelligence community, including the 2002 creation of the Office (later Department) of Homeland Security, and then the establishment in 2004 of the office of the Director of National Intelligence as a means to overcome interagency problems.56 In addition, a new emphasis on HUMINT was mandated.57 Furthermore, the director of the CIA was appointed as the National HUMINT Manager tasked with the “facilitation, coordination and deconfliction of clandestine HUMINT across the [Intelligence] Community” and to “draft standards, doctrine, and guidelines for training, tradecraft, and general conduct of clandestine HUMINT operations.”58 The administration and various government and Congressional bodies also broadly called upon the nation’s intelligence community to transition from a “passive gatherer” to a “proactive hunter” in terms of counterterrorism.59 Meanwhile, the general patterns of cooperation with other states were greatly expanded after the attacks of September 11. The administration of George W. Bush sought to develop a “coalition of the willing,” which included states and international institutions that provided varying levels of support and resources depending on the individual capabilities and preferences of the actor. Mirroring the broader diplomatic and military effort, the Bush administration enhanced intelligence cooperation in a manner that resembles concentric circles. The inner circle included those states with which the United States already had macro patterns of cooperation (and an increasing number of states with which the United States significantly increased cooperation), while the outer circles were made up of states with meso and micro levels of engagement.

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As part of the intelligence offensive, Bush signed an executive order that froze the assets of several terrorist organizations and directed the Treasury Department to aggressively seek out the financial assets of known terrorist groups in conjunction with allies and international institutions. Specifically, Bush ordered the department to make all relevant efforts to cooperate and coordinate with other countries, including through technical assistance, as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, to achieve the objectives of this order, including the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism, the denial of financing and financial services to terrorists and terrorist organizations, and the sharing of intelligence about funding activities in support of terrorism.60

Then National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice emphasized that the main component of the U.S.-led global war on terror was not the nation’s military action in Afghanistan, but rather the multifaceted intelligence and law enforcement operations. Rice stated in 2001 that while everybody understandably wants to focus on military contributions, this is not the Gulf War. . . . If you imagine that there are cells out there in 60-plus countries that could be continuing to plot, continuing to look for ways to wreak havoc, the intelligence and law enforcement efforts that have resulted in over 300 arrests of known and suspected al Qaida operatives is as important to this war on terrorism and to trying to avoid another attack, either on ourselves or on others, as is the war in Afghanistan. And so I think that’s what the president will say to this coalition. It’s financial assets; it’s intelligence and information sharing.61

The U.S. counterterrorism effort was aided at the macro level when the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1373, which required all states to take action against terrorists and their financial networks. Within a few months after the attacks, more than 100 countries had offered intelligence or information on terrorist groups. Concurrently, the Bush administration bolstered counterterrorism operations with 200 different intelligence or security services throughout the world. More than 30 countries agreed to collaborate with the United States in criminal investigations, while 27 states offered varying degrees of military support. One immediate result of the cooperation was that the U.S. Treasury Department was able to freeze 20 foreign bank accounts linked to al Qaeda, and more than 200 people were arrested in other countries because of ties to al Qaeda.62 In addition, bilateral intelligence collaboration had forestalled a number of potential attacks, including one on the American Embassy in the Netherlands in 2001.63 By the end of the year, U.S.-backed forces had overthrown the Taliban regime and al Qaeda’s global organization had been weakened.

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CONTEMPORARY MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION The 9/11 Commission found that the United States gained significant benefits from ongoing intelligence collaboration. In its final report, the Commission declared that “the United States is deriving great benefits from these [international] cooperative relationships.”64 However, the report also acknowledged that such cooperation sometimes places additional burdens on the U.S. intelligence community, especially in regards to the need to “sanitize” some information before presenting it to foreign entities and the risk that U.S. interests could be harmed by involvement with unsavory regimes or individuals.65 U.S. intelligence cooperation has increased at all levels. For instance, at the macro level, new ties have been initiated between the United States and the EU, including the establishment of regular (annual) meetings on counterterrorism at the cabinet level between the U.S. secretaries of State, Justice, and Homeland Security and their European counterparts. The United States and the EU have also created a “high policy dialogue” on border and transport security, as well as groups that study and make recommendations on combating terrorism financing. In 2001 and 2002, the United States and Europol signed new agreements to facilitate the sharing of information ranging from “threat tips, crime patterns, and risk assessments” to “personal information” such as “names addresses, and criminal records.”66 These agreements were followed by a new extradition treaty in 2003. One ongoing challenge to multilateral intelligence cooperation remains differences in the scope of national law and civil liberties among allied states.67 For example, EU privacy laws had to be addressed as part of the 2002 U.S.-Europol agreement.68 In addition, Germany currently only shares data on individual terrorists and groups on a case-by-case basis with the United States because the government believes that the U.S. use of sensitive information conflicts with German privacy laws.69 Intelligence cooperation has also increased at the bilateral level. For instance, in spite of the constraints on U.S.–German cooperation, the two nations worked together to identify and seize a ship bound for Libya in 2003 that contained banned nuclear materials, believed to be destined for a terrorist organization.70 Also, despite highly publicized differences over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the United States and France have particularly close intelligence relations.71 Franco-American intelligence collaboration extends across a range of areas, including a multilateral, secret counterterrorism facility in Paris that includes French, U.S., British, German, Australian, and Canadian personnel.72 The center serves as a clearinghouse for data sharing among the allies. France is also one of a number of countries that provides HUMINT to the United States for regions in which the United States lacks significant assets. In the war on terror, states such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Pakistan have been especially important in providing intelligence to the

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United States in exchange for a variety of incentives including foreign or military aid.73 The majority of intelligence provided has been in response to specific requests from the United States or in instances when the security services of these states discovered information about current threats to the United States. The CIA has also established more than 25 Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTICs) in foreign host countries to coordinate U.S. and allied intelligence operations. The CTICs are modeled on CIA facilities established in Latin America and the first of these counterterrorism sites was created in the 1990s.74 By 2005, according to a Washington Post report, more than 3,000 terrorists had been killed or captured as a result of foreign intelligence cooperation.75 In some cases, intelligence collaboration has steadily matured among the states in the outer bands of the U.S. coalition of the willing. For instance, in 2002 U.S. law enforcement agencies began assisting Pakistan with counterterrorism intelligence and technical aid and the two countries established the U.S.–Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement.76 The FBI and the CIA played a prominent role in the campaigns to capture high-level al Qaeda figures such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.77 Pakistani security forces have conducted operations against at least 185 of the 247 “entities” that the United States has designated as terrorist figures or groups.78 In return, the United States has provided Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid, equipment and assistance, and the U.S. intelligence community was shared data with Pakistan on antigovernment groups. Criticisms of U.S. Cooperation The example of Pakistan highlights a criticism of the one of U.S. intelligence community’s tactics in its antiterror campaign. Critics charge that U.S. agencies routinely use foreign facilities to conduct interrogations and torture prisoners using methods that would be illegal in the United States. For example, Human Rights Watch asserts that prisoners suspected of terrorism, and many against whom no evidence exists, have been mistreated, humiliated, and tortured. But perhaps no practice so fundamentally challenges the foundations of U.S. and international law as the long-term secret incommunicado detention of al Qaida suspects in “undisclosed locations.” “Disappearances” were a trademark abuse of Latin American military dictatorships in their “dirty war” on alleged subversion. Now they have become a United States tactic in its conflict with al Qaida.79

These prisoners have been held at “black sites”—CIA facilities in foreign states, separate and distinct from the CTICs. According to a British news report, black sites have been run in at least eight foreign countries in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.80 The interrogation techniques used at

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the black sites have subjected the United States to criticism from both international and domestic groups and undermined the credibility of the American cause, especially among Muslims.81 The U.S. intelligence community has also faced the same sort of criticism that it confronted during the Cold War for its support for dictatorial regimes. The community has engaged in meso and micro levels of cooperation with states such as Syria and Yemen, as well as the monarchies of the Persian Gulf and antidemocratic regimes in Central Asia. Critics of U.S. policy contend that intelligence collaboration with these regimes provides aid and assistance to undemocratic forces, and undermines the broader goals of U.S. policy, including the promotion of democracy. CONCLUSION The United States has a long history of intelligence cooperation with other countries and international institutions. This cooperation has occurred at a variety of levels and has involved varying degrees of formality. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had institutionalized collaboration with a range of bilateral and multilateral entities. By the 1990s, such relationships helped offset deficiencies in HUMINT, but also reinforced the U.S. intelligence community’s overreliance on technical means of intelligence gathering, SIGINT and IMINT. The war on terror has reaffirmed the utility of intelligence cooperation and added new imperatives for expanded collaboration. As with the military and law enforcement components of the U.S.-led war on terror, the intelligence campaign has centered on the development of a coalition of the willing. This coalition included an inner band of states with which the United States has long-standing and formal intelligence arrangements, and states in the outer bands that collaborate on a more ad hoc, case-by-case basis. By working with foreign intelligence services, the United States has been able to expand its capabilities and assist allies in counterterrorism activities. While the intelligence coalition has scored a range of successes, it has also opened the U.S. intelligence community to criticism over tactics such as the black sites. Nonetheless, continued intelligence cooperation will remain a cornerstone of international counterterrorism strategies. NOTES 1. The Commission went on to assert that “the information produced by this apparatus [the U.S. intelligence services] gives the U.S. a substantial advantage when it comes to understanding world events, predicting and preparing for unsettled times, fielding military forces, and making a host of other political and economic decisions;” United States, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), 127.

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2. Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1989), 1. 3. Stephen Sloan, “Meeting the Terrorist Threat: The Localization of Counter Terrorism Intelligence,” Police Practice and Research 3, no. 4 (2002): 340. 4. The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, “Report to the President,” March 31, 2005, http://www.wmd.gov/report/. The Commission notes that the purpose of the U.S. Intelligence Community is clear-cut: “to collect and convey essential information needed by the president and other members of the U.S. policymaking, law enforcement, and military communities for the performance of their duties and responsibilities. This includes collecting and assessing information concerning international terrorist and narcotic activities; other hostile activities by foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents; and foreign intelligence activities directed against the United States. The president also may direct the Intelligence Community to undertake special activities, including covert action, as needed to support intelligence collection activities and to protect against foreign threats to U.S. security interests” ibid. 5. SIGINT is itself usually divided into three broad areas: communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). For a deeper examination of SIGINT, see James Bamford, Body of Secrets: How America’s NSA and Britain’s GCHQ Eavesdrop on the World (London: Century, 2001), or Matthew M. Aid, “The Time of Troubles: The US National Security Agency in the Twenty-First Century,” Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 3 (Autumn 2000): 1–32. 6. IMINT is also known as geospatial intelligence (GEOINT). In the United States, IMINT is the primary domain of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). 7. Czech Republic, Office for Foreign Relations and Information, “Petr Zeman: Lectures, Trainings and Public Speeches,” http://www.uzsi.cz/index. php@lang=2&show=001001003022.html. 8. Saxby Chambliss, “We Have Not Correctly Framed the Intelligence Debate,” Parameters, Spring 2005, 6, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/ Parameters/05spring/chamblis.htm. 9. Stephen Losey, “Intelligence Budget is $44 Billion,” Federal Times, November 8, 2005, http://federaltimes.com/index2.php?S=1227613. 10. The UK figures include the country’s main security services, including the Security Service or MI5 (domestic intelligence) and the Secret Intelligence Service or MI6 (foreign intelligence); United Kingdom, MI5, “About MI5: Funding,” http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page67.html. 11. For an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. SIGINT and IMINT programs, see Richard Best, Jr., Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report RL32508, February 22, 2005. 12. Clifford Beal, the editor of Jane’s Defence Weekly summarizes the failure of the U.S. intelligence community in 1998 in the following manner: “Indeed even US technical means have been ‘fooled’ by those determined to avoid them. India’s nuclear detonations in June 1998 were timed to escape detection by US surveillance satellites through a sophisticated deception programme. The timing of India’s arrival as a new nuclear power caught the intelligence community

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by surprise”; Clifford Beal, with Andrew Koch, “Chronic Underfunding of US HUMINT Plays a Role in Intelligence Failures,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 11, 2001, http://www.janes.com/security/international security/news/jdw/ jdw010911 1 n.shtml. 13. In 1999, the National Commission on Terrorism (also known as the Bremer Commission after its chair, L. Paul Bremer, III), recommended eliminating the restrictions: The guidelines set up complex procedures for seeking approval to recruit informants who may have been involved in human right violations. In practice, their procedures have deterred and delayed vigorous efforts to recruit potentially useful informants. The CIA has created a climate that is overly risk aversive. This has inhibited the recruitment of essential, if sometimes unsavory, terrorist informants and forced the United States to rely too heavily on foreign intelligence services. The adoption of the guidelines contributed to a marked decline in Agency morale unparalleled since the 1970s, and a significant number of case officers retired early or resigned. National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, http://w3.access.gpo.gov/nct/. 14. The limitations (commonly known as the “scrub order”) were put in place in the 1990s and followed negative press about the CIA’s actions in Guatemala. A White House panel found that “since 1984, several CIA assets were credibly alleged to have ordered, planned, or participated in serious human rights violations such as assassination, extrajudicial execution, torture, or kidnapping while they were assets—and that the CIA was contemporaneously aware of many of the allegations”; White House, Intelligence Oversight Board, Report on the Guatemala Review, June 28, 1996. 15. Michael Kilian, “Breaks Urged for CIA’s Spy Recruiters,” Chicago Tribune, September 16, 2001. 16. The Bremer Commission also highlighted the problems of limited analysts and translators; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Government Information, Statement of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III, Chairman, National Commission on Terrorism, June 28, 2000. 17. Beal and Koch. 18. To support the statement, Chambliss cites U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (Washington: GPO, July 2004), http://intelligence.senate.gov/ iraqreport2.pdf; Chambliss, 6. 19. Former CIA director John Deutch and J. H. Smith argue that these impediments are the reason that the U.S. has not been able to successfully infiltrate al Qaeda; John Deutch and J. H. Smith, “Smarter Intelligence,” Foreign Policy, January–February 2002, 66. 20. See Bradley F. Smith, The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940–1946 (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993); and Timothy Mulligan, Ultra, Magic and the Allies (New York: Garland, 1989).

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21. These linkage strategies are examines at length in Ernst B. Haas, “Why Collaborate? Issue Linkages and International Regimes,” World Politics 3 (1980): 357–405. 22. On Israel, see Bernard Reich, Securing the Covenant: United States–Israeli Relations after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995). On NATO, see Donald C. Daniel and Leigh C. Caraher, NATO Defense Science and Technology (Washington, D.C.: NDU, 2003). 23. Bamford, 394–405. 24. Jennifer E. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19 (2006): 202. 25. A. Denis Clift, “Through the Prism of National Security: The Challenge of Intelligence Sharing,” Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (2002): 98. 26. See David Harris, The Crisis: The President, the Prophet and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2004); or Charles Phillipe David, Nancy Ann Carrol and Zachery A Selden, Foreign Policy Failure in the White House: Reappraising the Fall of the Shah and the Iran-Contra Affair (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993). 27. See Tom Lansford, A Bitter Harvest: U.S. Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 2003). 28. A congressional oversight committee charged that the nation’s intelligence agencies suffered from: “the lack of a coordinated Intelligence Community response. The main intelligence agencies often did not collaborate. In particular, the absence of an effective system for ‘handoffs’ between the FBI, the CIA and NSA led to a gap in coverage with regard to international threats to the United States itself, an area that should have received particular attention. . . . The walls that had developed to separate intelligence and law enforcement often hindered efforts to investigate terrorist operations aggressively” U.S. Congress, Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement: Hearing on the Intelligence Community’s Response to Past Terrorist Attacks against the United States from February 1993 to September 2001, October 8, 2002, 14. 29. On the Pollard incident, see Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies: The Exclusive Story of Jonathan Jay Pollard: The American Who Spied on His Country for Israel and How He Was Betrayed (New York: HarperCollins, 1989); or Mark Shaw, Miscarriage of Justice: The Jonathan Pollard Story (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 2001). 30. Reciprocation may be formally defined as the “belief that if one helps others or fails to hurt them, even at some opportunity cost to oneself, they will reciprocate when the tables are turned”; Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 158. 31. On the shadow of the future, see D. M. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson, “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory 27, no. 2 (1982): 245–252; or J. K. Murninghan and A. E. Roth, “Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner’s Dilemma Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 2 (1983): 279–300. 32. See Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries—The United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin, 1985).

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33. St´ephane Lefebvre, “The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16 (2003): 533. 34. While the United States entered into a number of intelligence agreements with other states, these accords were generally kept secret and not made public (in fact, the existence of the 1947 U.S.–U.K. treaty was denied by the signatories throughout the Cold War). For an overview of the U.S.–U.K. agreement and the intricacies over funding and access to the intelligence collected (including disagreements over the scope of access), see David Leigh, The Wilson Plot: How the Spycatchers and Their American Allies Tried to Overthrow the British Government (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 232–233. 35. These outside partners were granted access to intelligence in exchange for informal sharing arrangements; Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, 2nd ed (Ballinger, 1989), 283. 36. Shlomo Shpiro, “The Communication of Mutual Security: Frameworks for European-Mediterranean Intelligence Sharing,” NATO Academic Fellowship Program, 2001, 14, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/shpiro.pdf. 37. Ibid. See also Michael M. Harrison and Mark G. McDonough, Negotiations on the French Withdrawal from NATO, FPI Case Studies 5 (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). 38. Shpiro, 15–16. Shpiro cites U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Israel Foreign Intelligence and Security Services, ed. Yossi Melman (Tel Aviv, 1982), 56–57. See also Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990). 39. 9/11 Commission, 127. 40. For a critical view of U.S. intelligence about Iraq, see David Ensor, “Fake Documents ‘Embarrassing’ for U.S.,” CNN.com, March 14, 2003, http://www. cnn.com/2003/US/03/14/sprj.irq.documents/; or Mark Phillips, “Inspectors Call U.S. Tips ‘Garbage’,” CBS News, February 20, 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/ stories/2003/01/18/iraq/main537096.shtml. 41. The three levels of cooperation model was developed by John Benyon to examine European collaboration broadly, and adapted to apply to intelligence collaboration by Shpiro. See John Benyon, “Policing the European Union,” International Affairs 70, no. 3 (July 1994): 497–516; and Shpiro, 13–14. 42. Micro level interaction often centers on a single case or incident; ibid., 13. 43. Stephen Lander, “International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (October 2004): 491. 44. JAC also provided intelligence for all of NATO’s major commands and a range of other operations as noted in the NATO journal, NATO Review: “the combined operations of Northern Watch enforcing the no-fly zone in northern Iraq; coalition forces operating in Albania under Operation Sunrise; US and allied planning efforts in support of potential non-combatant evacuation operations from Zaire; and the coalition Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia”; Eileen Mackrell, “Combined Forces Support: The Evolution in Military (Intelligence) Affairs,” NATO Review 45, no. 6 (December 1997), 21–22, http://www.nato.int/ docu/review/1997/9706-06.htm. 45. The Multinational Intelligence Coordination Cell (ICC) includes 12 officers from six NATO member states and the body manages requests for information

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from Alliance entities (the ICC processed 500 such requests during the NATO mission in Bosnia); ibid. 46. Ibid. By 2000, LOCE had been expanded to 500 sites. Mackrell discussed other LOCE capabilities, including the: “Tactical Ballistic Missile Launch Early Warning system, which provides warning of ballistic missile launches to all system users through graphic displays. Multinational users of the LOCE system can also access order of battle databases maintained by the various members of NATO. The JAC LOCE Division provides the supporting infrastructure for LOCE. LOCE Division personnel deploy, operate and maintain the system theaterwide, providing a seamless flow of intelligence information to US and NATO commands. The LOCE system provides a flyaway capability to deploy to contingency areas with a variety of satellite communications equipment tailored to suit the requirements of the crisis or contingency” ibid. 47. The U.S. commission charged to investigate the attacks roundly criticized the nation’s intelligence community. John Mintz notes that the “the commission said that U.S. officials have been too reliant on such ‘warning intelligence,’ and tended to relax their guard in the absence of intelligence reports describing specific dangers. This has left the country ill-prepared to face ‘transnational’ terrorists such as Osama bin Laden”; John Mintz, “Panel Cites U.S. Failures On Security for Embassies,” Washington Post, January 8, 1999, A1. 48. R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Probe Blasts’ Possible Mideast Ties,” Washington Post, August 12, 1998, A19; Kamran Khan and Pamela Constable, “Bomb Suspect Details Anti-U.S. Terror Ring,” Washington Post, August 19, 1998, A1. 49. John Mintz, “Five Fugitives Indicted in Embassy Bombings,” Washington Post, December 17, 1998, A10. 50. See Celeste Wallander, Mortal Enemies, Best Friends: German Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999); or Charles A. Meconis and Boris N. Makeev, U.S. Russian Naval Cooperation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996). 51. Under the 2000 U.S.–Russian Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative, the United States agreed to “brief Russia on the update of the National Intelligence Estimate of the ballistic missile threat that has just been completed, and Russia will provide its latest assessment,” among a range of other cooperative measures; U.S.–Russian Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative, September 6, 2000, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000 10/dococt00.asp. 52. Lord Robertson, “Interview With Yevgeny Verlin,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 18, 2003; reprinted in Russia Weekly, no. 245/18 (2003), http://www. cdi.org/russia/245-18.cfm. During the interview, the interviewer asked Robertson, “Some in Russia think this country gives you more by way of information than it gets in return.” In response, the secretary general stated, “No. I am told by the president and defense minister of Russia that the information exchange is carried out on equal terms. Moreover, President Bush told me that the documents he gave to President Putin in Crawford were highly classified, the sort of documents meant for the president’s eyes only. In other words, we have never had so high a level of trust in each other”; ibid. 53. Brian Michael Jenkins, “Countering Al Qaida: The Next Phase in the War,” San Diego Union Tribune, September 8, 2002, http://www.rand.org/ commentary/090802SDUT.bmj.html.

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54. U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, December 2002), 92. 55. George Tenet, “Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee,” October 17, 2002, http:// www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/2002/dci testimony 10172002.html. 56. For a critical overview of the new office, see Fred Kaplan, “You Call That a Reform Bill?” Slate, December 7, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2110767/. 57. The U.S. intelligence community was tasked to pursue a renewed emphasis on HUMINT; K. M. Campbell and M. A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2001), 87. 58. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, “Fact Sheet: The Creation of the National HUMINT Manager,” CIA Press Release, October 13, 2005, https://www. cia.gov/cia/public affairs/press release/2005/fs10132005.html. 59. U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security (HSTHS), Report to the Speaker of the House and Minority Leader from the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 17 July 2002, Executive Summary, 2–3. 60. U.S. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order: Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism, September 24, 2001. 61. Condoleezza Rice, Press Briefing, Washington, DC, November 8, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011108-4.html. 62. U.S. White House, “Operation Enduring Freedom Overview: Campaign against Terrorism Results, Period Covered 14–30 September 2001,” Fact Sheet, October 1, 2001. 63. Rob Schoof and Jos Verlaan, “AIVD Does Not Even Talk about Successful Actions,” NRC Handelsbad (Rotterdam) November 17, 2004, www.opensource.gov. 64. 9/11 Commission, 128. 65. Ibid., 129–130. 66. Kristin Archick, U.S.-EU Cooperation against Terrorism, CRS Report RS22030, July 12, 2005, 3. 67. For more on the challenges faced by the transatlantic states, see Richard J. Aldrich, “Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation,” International Affairs 80, no. 4 (2004): 731–753. 68. Archick, U.S.-EU Cooperation against Terrorism, 3. 69. Francis T. Miko and Christian Froehlich, Germany’s Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for U.S. Policy, CRS Report RL32710, December 27, 2004, 13. 70. Wolfgang Ischinger, “Fighting Terrorism—International Cooperation as a Strategy of Prevention,” Journal of Homeland Security (April 15, 2004). http://www. homelandsecurity.org; cited in ibid., 13. 71. Jean Guisnel, “Americans and Frenchmen Hand in Hand,” Le Point (Paris), July 7, 2005, www.opensource.gov. 72. Dana Priest, “Help from France Key in Covert Operations,” Washington Post, July 3, 2005, A1. 73. Sims, “Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details,” 200.

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74. Dana Priest, “Foreign Network at the Front of CIA’s Terror Fight,” Washington Post, November 18, 2005, A1. 75. Ibid. 76. K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, CRS Report RL31624, March 28, 2003, 7. 77. “Al Qaida Suspect ‘Under Interrogation’,” BBC, March 2, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south asia/2812181.stm. 78. Kronstadt, Pakistan-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, 9. 79. Human Rights Watch, The United States’ “Disappeared”: The CIA’s LongTerm “Ghost Detainees” (October 2004), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/ usa/us1004/index.htm. 80. Jamie Wilson, “Torture Claims ‘Forced US to Cut Terror Charges’,” Guardian, November 25, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/ 0,12469,1650418,00.html. 81. Ibid.

CHAPTER 22 INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION AND COUNTERTERRORISM: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE Magnus Norell

All it takes for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing. —Edmund Burke

The purpose of this chapter is to examine key issues of intelligence coordination and counterterrorism (CT) from a European perspective.1 The backdrop behind this analysis is the debate in Europe over how the leading political actor, the European Union (EU), should handle the post-9/11 world in which we find ourselves. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the EU proposed several plans and put forth proposals for new laws to tackle the scourge of terrorism.2 Underlying much of the discussions at that time were issues such as what roles various agencies should have (the police vs. the military, for example) and how the EU’s executive power could be enhanced in the area of CT. Overall, within the EU it is still the police force that is identified as the “lead” agency in regard to CT operations. Before the kind of mass-casualty terrorism witnessed in the United States on 9/11, and despite the EU’s long history of fighting an older, politically motivated terrorism, the Union did not really pay a lot of attention to terrorism as a matter of national security. It has traditionally been viewed mainly as a matter of criminal activity, albeit of a serious kind, and therefore a matter handled first and foremost by the police and/or civil intelligence agencies. In other words, both the Union and its members have preferred to see terrorism—conceptually and legally—as a form of serious and organized crime.

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This chapter argues that the underlying premise for this state of affairs (and for the related discussion about CT issues) is flawed, in that it does not question the notion of the necessity of a “lead” agency (who, therefore, has the sole responsibility of deciding what help, if any, might be needed). Furthermore, this underlying basis (of a lead agency) does not take into account the fact that other agencies might have knowledge— unbeknownst to the police, due to a lack of coordination and the flow of necessary intelligence—that can be of critical value to any CT operation. Finally, the discussions within the EU do not critically examine the underlying structures in the Union that both identify a “lead” agency (as opposed to topic and/or event-centered crisis-management operational centers, based on, for example, National Crisis Management Centers), and at the same time—when that lead agency can’t cope by itself—want to add resources on an “ad-hoc” basis. Adding to the structural flaws within the EU is the lack of executive power with respect to regulating member states’ behavior in responding to common threats such as terrorism. This raises the question of whether the Union is the right vehicle in Europe to combat terrorism, or whether an alternative body or forum would be more appropriate for effectively confronting the threat of terrorism in Europe. The chapter argues that as long as these structural flaws in the system remain, nothing fundamental will change in the way the EU is trying to deal with the issue of intelligence coordination concerning CT policy. An underlying tenet of this discussion is that enhanced intelligence coordination is paramount for the EU’s ability to effectively combat terrorism. Over the years, the EU has proposed and tried to implement several action plans, laws, and legal initiatives (on a multilateral level) to achieve a more robust capacity in this regard. Looking back over the 12 years since the Union was established, it is clear that intelligence coordination and intelligence sharing has worked best on a bilateral level—that is, when the intelligence concerns operations and actions, and not only intelligence sharing. Moreover, as will be explained later in this chapter, the structures of the EU make it inherently difficult to overcome the limitations and bureaucratic obstacles that make intelligence coordination among several actors—that is, on a Union level—so difficult. Finally, the chapter will conclude with some recommendations that can be of value in countering these flaws in the structure.3 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND REGIONAL EUROPEAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY When the Soviet bloc collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was widely assumed that a new era of heightened prosperity and peace would come about in the international system. Democracy had “won,” and this was seen as a starting point for a new world order, based on parliamentary

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democracy and an integrated, free-market economy. It was also assumed, as this new world order extended its influence, that disruptive elements to international stability would become increasingly marginalized. Since the collapsed Soviet Union had been a major contributor—financially and ideologically—to the various groups and organizations that had posed a terrorist threat against the West, the prediction was that these groups would wither away. To a certain extent this did happen. For the many left-wing, ideologically committed groups from all over the continent, the demise of the Soviet empire in effect dealt them a severe blow. However, the initial euphoria soon gave way to a growing sense of unease, and even despair, when conflicts over territory, economics, ethnic belonging, and religious and political issues increasingly occurred as a result of the lifting of the “totalitarian lid” that had hitherto kept these sentiments capped. These concerns were heightened by an increased fluidity in the international system, a fluidity that now characterizes international politics, and in which it is much more difficult to attribute exactly who is doing what to whom. The establishment of a “new security order” might have reduced the danger of interstate conflict, but at the same time it has raised the risks of increased substate, subnational forces being used, thereby making low-intensity conflicts—including terrorism—much more common. Today, the underlying root causes for many of the world’s most protracted conflicts are still unresolved, either because they predated or remained unaffected by the East/West struggle, and thus these conflicts remain as complex and irritating as ever. As a result, the number of terror attacks has not declined since the fall of the Iron Curtain—on the contrary, there was an increase during the 1990s (even before 9/11) of incidents of this particular mode of violence. The potential for terrorism is obviously still present, but it has, to a large extent, taken new roads by using religion as an imperative and bringing a globalized struggle to the fore of these long-standing conflicts. There are many differences between the politically and socially motivated terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s and today’s religiously motivated terrorism. First, the motives behind religious terrorists are a mixture of seemingly inseparable political and religious ideas. This is fuelled by a zealous and grave sense of doing God’s work, or at least protecting His work. The people committing these crimes also see themselves as acting on God’s command, thus making them immune to moral or ethical objections about their acts. God’s command is not to be questioned. Since the victims are seen as enemies, often by simply being where they are at the time of the terrorist act, the perpetrators can also justify their killings. Another difference concerns the “modus operandi” of the religious terrorists. Since the killing of “enemies” is the main objective in the first place, the higher the death toll the “better,” from the terrorist viewpoint.4

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This makes terror attacks carried out by religiously motivated terrorists potentially more lethal than the former, politically motivated terrorists, in the context of which every act was calculated against a political goal, and where one aim was to gain public support for a cause—however twisted the reasoning behind that was. Violence, often leading to death, in the name of religion and sanctioned (even mandated) by God thus has the hallmark of being lethal and indiscriminate at the same time. A third difference concerns the mixture, conscious or not, of religious and sociopolitical issues referred to as a cause, or excuse, of the violence applied. Today’s terrorist may also pursue a nationalist/separatist agenda, in which the religious component is tied into a complex web of cultural and linguistic factors. This makes combating this kind of terror even more difficult. The lack of any clear-cut “cause” is not only a break with the picture from earlier years, but it also makes political remedies hard to come by. Attempts by Western European governments to follow a two-tiered track (the stick and the carrot) to fight terror is of very little use if the perpetrator in question is more interested in killing you than to reach a compromise aimed at changing a perceived political or social injustice. This is, of course, not to say that social and/or political grievances cannot serve as a cause for some religiously motivated terror. But this is not enough to explain it, or to remedy the causes behind the terror. Finally, a fourth difference is the phenomenon of suicide terrorism (first used to a larger extent by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka during that country’s civil war in the 1980s). When people are not afraid of the (hitherto) ultimate deterrent that society has to offer, and sometimes even want to die, the difficulties of preventing a terrorist act increases considerably. These problems remain today, even though changes in the methodology of those who combat terror can be detected. The capture of some terrorists, both before and after 9/11, illustrates both the new and current trends in today’s terrorism, as well as the attempts at interstate coordination in combating a threat that has become increasingly global. Until the 1990s, the above-mentioned attempts to combat terror had been mostly intrastate affairs, with specific cases sometimes providing means for more international cooperation. With the new threat, it is apparent that this intrastate approach is no longer sufficient. All these changes have affected the way in which we must combat terror today. This shift forced law enforcement agencies to rethink some of their strategies and tactical procedures when dealing with the terrorist threat. As the insight started to sink in that enhanced cooperation—and one that transcended the “specific-case kind”—was a necessity to handle the “new” kind of terrorism threat appearing, several initiatives were taken at both governmental and intergovernmental levels. At the beginning of the 1990s, the major international tools that existed for this kind of law enforcement were international treaties concerning

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flight security (including airport control), extradition treaties, and yearly conventions where various law enforcement representatives assembled to (in theory at least) share information. For countries like the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Israel—all of whom had first-hand experience with various kinds of terrorism—these tools did not add much to what they already had, by necessity, been forced to develop. For years, the most affected governments, or at least their law enforcement agencies, had built up channels for emergencies in specific cases. There was, however, no central body at the EU level or any other transnational level to coordinate the struggle against terror. Neither was there any attempt by countries more or less unaffected by terrorism—for example, Sweden—to build up a capacity in this regard. What the new kind of terrorism—religiously motivated and without any clear, discernible political goals other than the destruction of one’s enemies (at least, that was how it appeared to many in the West)—brought with it was an awareness that this threat was different, in that it had its origins outside Europe, while at the same time many of its perpetrators got their final orders (and sometimes ideological injections) in the West. This, of course, made it more difficult to combat. As is so often the case, this awareness did not really evolve into practical initiatives until it became politically impossible not to. The external event that connected the terror threat, emanating from the Middle East with a European and American context was the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), and the political changes this process brought with it. Because so many aspects of the conflict were included in the peace process, among them the threat of terrorism, it became possible to seriously engage in efforts to increase international cooperation. Several states now had a new interest in suppressing terrorism, and this brought to the fore the possibility of using military forces and intelligence agencies in a struggle that so far, for the Europeans at least, had been primarily a police issue. Countries in the Middle East region, like Israel, Egypt, and Jordan had long reached the conclusion that without full intra-agency cooperation, success was not possible in fighting terror. In Israel, this understanding has led to—at least on the face of it—a rather successful tactic in combating terrorism.5 In various operations, a certain “job-sharing” practice has developed, where undercover units from elite forces within the army are employed when heavy firefights might erupt, or for hostage rescue operations where their particular skill is needed. The police or border police are in charge of overall security, and have their own undercover units to employ when a more low-key operation is asked for. When it comes to intelligence, there is constant information sharing. For the EU, looking from the outside and getting increasingly drawn into the Middle East conundrum through the MEPP, this model became more feasible, as the political stakes in the MEPP were also raised back

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home. This was easier in countries like the United Kingdom and Spain, where there already existed a structure that could be used, with some modification. The so-called dirty war between the British and the various groups in Northern Ireland had given the forces employed in this “war” a solid experience in this kind of unconventional combat. The new component was that the enemies of the MEPP—more often than not, basing themselves on religious imperatives—took the struggle to the countries seen as supporting the “enemy.” This brought home the need to be more efficient in the cooperative efforts to fight terror, and it also helped carry the discussion about CT measures over to a post-9/11 context. However, it appears that Europe’s long history and past experience with terrorism and CT is getting in the way of it adapting to this new threat. The fact that the EU, first and foremost, still views combating terrorism as a police matter, makes the so-called justice model the preferred tool in this regard. This carries with it the structural problems with intelligence coordination which such a system brings with it. This is all the more glaring considering that the division between the “justice model” and other approaches—up and including the so-called war model of combating terrorism—is not so Manichean. And, even though the policymaking bodies within the EU, judging by recent efforts at integrating of intelligence resources for CT purposes on various levels, have been considering other means than classical police work in the fight against terrorism, that approach is still a far cry from any “integral model” that combines law enforcement and intelligence with military muscle as well as public information operations. In addition, the problem is exacerbated by some foot dragging by several EU members with reference to some of the measures supposedly adopted according to the EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism.6 At the same time, the “globalization” of terror—as well as globalization in other, more peaceful ways—makes Europe a potentially interesting region to use as a base for propaganda, fundraising, and as a resting place for violent groups. And, of course, there are already active networks that also propagate violence and use terrorist attacks within the EU. To be sure, there was some rather hectic activity in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (the so-called month of transformation), and there was a rather rushed enactment of reasonably coherent CT policy measures along with a more outspoken acknowledgement that more had to be done in the areas of CT and coordination (and not only concerning intelligence coordination). Nevertheless, it cannot be taken for granted that the EU is necessarily the best vehicle in Europe when it comes to the multilateral struggle against terrorism. This is mainly due to structural flaws in the way the Union is shaped. As mentioned above, the lack of EU’s executive powers, as opposed to the constituent members, begs the question of whether the

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Union itself is really suited to initiate, drive, and coordinate CT measures in Europe. If the ambition is also to assume the leading role as the political leader concerning CT policy in Europe, it is questionable whether the Union at present has the ability to devise and facilitate a comprehensive and robust CT policy, and to do so within a common CT jurisdiction. Thus, an overhaul of the structure might be needed—an overhaul that includes the preparedness of the proper public authorities, and other public bodies, to prevent, combat, and generally deal with large-scale terrorist attacks. A major problem that the post-9/11 EU encountered was the lack of capacity for cooperation between the various agencies that might get involved in case of a major terrorist attack. In this regard, it is worth bearing in mind that even though a plan and model for cooperation may look good in theory, it may not work that well “when push comes to shove.” Furthermore, the EU “justice model”—with very clear lines between various agencies and authorities—may not be entirely suitable and efficient enough to counter a serious terrorist threat, should it arise.7 It might work in peacetime, and during a small crisis, but the weaknesses and shortcomings of this approach for a global war on terror have already shown themselves.8 Examples of this are lack of coordination and difficulties in cooperation between various agencies. These regional difficulties are borne out when compared with the visible trends concerning international CT policy. During the 1970s, when terrorism became more international (for example, through hijackings of planes and hostage-taking), the need for international conventions and laws resulted in various initiatives.9 At the national level, terrorism was (and is still mostly) a question for national police forces. This follows the general idea that terrorism is a crime and therefore a task for the police. During the 1970s, most Western countries developed special units for combating terrorism. Not surprisingly, this development went furthest in countries where terrorism became a real problem, like in the United Kingdom and West Germany.10 Mainly, this development took place within the police and paramilitary units, while there was also a realization that better intelligence was needed. It was a reactive rather that proactive approach to combating terrorism. Military units, on the other hand, have been used more sparingly in CT operations (with Israel as a notable exception), and research and development has been most marked within paramilitary and police forces. The changes in international terrorism (often branded as “new”) and the heightened perceptions of a threat have accentuated the need to develop new tactics and strategies to combat this threat. This includes both a renewal of traditional methods, such as an emphasis on human intelligence sources (HUMINT), as well as using new technologies (such as newly developed listening and communication devices) in fighting these truly global terrorist threats.11

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Internationally, attempts to classify some cases of terrorism as “acts of war” will probably force changes to international law and, as a consequence, force changes in national laws as well.12 In cases where military units have been used for CT operations in other countries, it has been based on some important principles that could possibly be relevant for the EU in the future: 1. The clear and present transnational profile of international terrorism demands a greater scope of international cooperation, from interoperability to intelligence cooperation on a scale we haven’t seen so far. 2. Of the few units adapted and available (in countries where they exist), various kinds of Special Forces (SF) are the most versatile and suitable to further develop for use in current and future operations against international terrorism.13 3. There is an urgent need for enhanced intelligence gathering and analysis within a system that can combine various tools such as HUMINT and Technical intelligence (TECHINT). 4. There is a shared understanding that all relevant political actors need to coordinate and cooperate more, in order to reach a common threat perception. Combating terrorism is always, at the end of the day, a political decision. Active operations are, and should continue to be, the result of a political decision-making process.

The lessons to be learned from the last decade—when combating the type of international terrorism that dominates today—is that a “honing of the tools” is necessary for success. For this to work, it is also paramount that police and military operations, whether international or domestic, are tailor-made to suit the specific threat at hand. In this regard, it deserves to be underlined that the political and transnational dimension of CT today, as well as current cross-border forms of terrorism, demands an international cooperation that we are not yet equipped to handle. It is a dimension constantly mentioned in the political rhetoric, but one that is very difficult to translate into practical political steps. This is even more difficult when countries that are not used to cooperate in such sensitive areas as CT are forced by circumstances to cooperate against a common threat. The risk for unilateral actions will be there as long as different perceptions, actions, and policies are applied. FUNDAMENTALS OF A EUROPEAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY As early as in the 1980s, more people in Europe with ties to the Middle East and North Africa were beginning to forge ties with—and work actively to promote—the global Islamist movement. Today, scores of people living in several EU countries are claimed by various national security

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services to have visited militant Islamist camps in Pakistan (and also Afghanistan before the war that removed the Taliban regime in late 2001). Some of these activists are also claimed by the security services to have ties with the “hard core” of al Qaeda. As a consequence, there has been a growth of new, younger cadre of extreme Islamic activists living in EU countries, many with EU citizenship and often well integrated in society, and with religious education from countries such as Pakistan, SaudiArabia, and Yemen.14 All in all, the EU structure for dealing with international terrorism went unchallenged until 9/11.15 After that, however, and due to the fact that the EU decided to take part in cooperating with the larger international community in the struggle (“war” was never a suitable word to use in European vocabulary), a debate on the pros and cons of the structures in the EU has surfaced. A broader debate also emerged in the public domain, with two components. First, 9/11 triggered a debate that sometimes brought with it inflated risk scenarios and worst-case scenarios that hardly fit the European context at all. Second, complaints were heard from inside the security services, that outsiders (meaning people from outside the service) stepped into their territory and without the proper experience and knowledge, passed judgment on Europe’s performance. Furthermore, it was argued by the security services, that people outside the service were not in a position to properly assess activists’ motivations and capabilities. The first complaint, with exaggerated threat assessments coming from some strange directions, certainly had some merit to it. In particular, the media showed some innovative scenarios in this regard.16 The second complaint, however, is more serious, since it demonstrates a clear unwillingness to realize the importance of a wider study of the phenomenon of terrorism—that is, studies conducted outside traditional police channels. This is serious, because it also points to the heart of the debate in Europe about whose responsibility it is to examine the issue of terrorism, suggesting an inability to understand that the problem is too big to be the sole responsibility of one agency, be it the police or someone else. To assess motivations and capabilities of activists and potential terrorists, it is more often than not a clear advantage of being free of any police or (even more important) security service connection, in order to get people to talk. The argument has probably more to do with various national debates on whose main responsibility terrorism should be. As noted elsewhere in this chapter, 9/11 triggered a discussion in Europe on whether agencies other than the police (including the security services) should have a larger role to play in combating terrorism, and, if so, what kind of role. Tied into this discussion is a very relevant argument about risk and threat analyses. When a broader discussion about terrorism does occur (in itself a good thing in a democracy), there is always a necessity to correctly

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assess what the stakes are—that is, what are the relevant threats and risk (and their consequences for society) that terrorism can pose? In this regard, it is paramount to remember that a threat of terrorism comes from a combination of factors, including intent as well as an operational capability and motivation to activate an operation/attack. In addition, factors such as vulnerability and negative consequences need to be assessed. After the terrorist attacks in Spain in March 2004 and in the United Kingdom in July 2005, there can hardly be any doubts that this kind of terrorism is already inside the EU. Since 9/11, there have been several “close calls” (whereby planned attacks have been avoided), showing that the threat is real in Europe and that the issues discussed here will not go away anytime soon. It seems that at the core of the problem with the structural flaws within the EU’s CT capability and its intelligence coordination is the absence of a robust (i.e. executive) mandate for the Union to really build a leadership role for combating terrorism in Europe. In addition, a major problem is that as of today, the EU’s coordination activity is largely shaped by intergovernmental, not supranational, consultation. In other words, instead of being a decision maker in its own right, the Union—even in its coordinating capacity—is acting more like a multilateral forum for consultation between individual governments. Herein lies some of the basic problems for the Union in regard to a more coordinated CT policy. Initially, the EU was intended as a full-fledged political union (1952). But by the Treaties of Rome (1957), it was reduced to an economic union (the European Economic Community, the EEC). Currently, the EU is more of an organic economic juggernaut that is flowing into other areas such as internal and external security.17 As of today, the EU lacks both a mandate and the legitimization required to become a truly collective security organization with a security mandate for Europe. Therefore, and due to the member states’ concerns about “supranational” tendencies in Brussels as well as fear of infringement on national sovereignty, the EU’s role in the security sphere must remain confined to nonexecutive tasks. Therefore, in the final analysis (and more than a decade after the Union was established), the EU ambition and stated objective to be a “force multiplier” in the area of CT remains a remote possibility. This is not to say that important achievements have not been forthcoming. But the often coherent and highly relevant CT measures taken by member states have not been translated onto the European level. THE BASICS OF A EUROPEAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY DISCUSSION The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought to the fore the questions of when and how society’s different tools for combating terrorism should be used.

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Within the EU, there was never a coherent CT policy as such; terrorism has always been regarded, if at all, as something exclusively for the national police to deal with, meaning that no one else needed to get involved. To some extent 9/11 did change this. Questions started to be asked about the best way to combat international terrorism, and if something should happen, whether Europe was really sufficiently prepared. The very sensitive issue of whether (in extreme circumstances) military forces could be used within member states or (and even more sensitive) regionally, as a consequence of collective security measures, was not really raised. These issues are of course not new, as the EEC focused for several years on multilateral cooperation against terrorism.18 With the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreement (especially Schengen II of 1990), many of these multilateral CT tools were placed under the so-called third pillar (judicial and home affairs cooperation). Since “modern” terrorism was born in the 1960s and 1970s, the role of the police, the military, and the intelligence and security services have been constantly debated. The major dividing line is between those who claim there should be a continued clear “division of labor” between what the police and those on the military and intelligence/security services may do, and those who argue for extending the role for the military and intelligence/security services into “traditional” police activities. It should be emphasized that this discussion is more pronounced in countries with a constitutional democratic order and market-oriented economies. In countries where problems of violent terrorism have been constant for a prolonged time, and/or where democracy has been under pressure (or has never gained a foothold), this discussion hardly exists. This is important because it touches upon the nature of the society that we claim to defend in this “war” against terrorism now being fought on a global scale. It is also possible to find distinct differences in how countries in the EU have dealt with these problems. In countries where terrorism has not been a real problem, it has for obvious reasons been easier to adopt the approach that the police and the military have clear and separate tasks. In democracies such as the Scandinavian countries, it is clearly of great importance that these clear lines exist and are respected. Problems arise, however, when the threats (real or potential) are found in the “gray” zone between “ordinary” criminality and full-scale war, or at least a war-like situation. International terrorism can very often be found in precisely this “gray” zone. In countries which have had serious problems with terrorism—like the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain—even if it hasn’t been of the international, global type we saw in the United States on 9/11, there has been a greater understanding that the armed forces, under certain specific circumstances, can be used within the country.

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The “division of labor” notion described earlier is also mirrored in the ongoing debate within the European Union, where members are constantly trying to find a common line in the fight against terrorism, something that certainly began prior to 9/11. As there are considerable differences between various countries within the Union, this task will hardly be finished in the near future. Hence, the guidelines that have been produced are relatively general in character. Even if this doesn’t have to be an insurmountable obstacle to finding a common policy (a less specific policy outline can leave room for more unconventional solutions), it does pose a problem when one is trying to find more concrete policy recommendations on a wider scale. The new and enhanced information system introduced by Europol is, if fully implemented, an important step toward a more comprehensive and common tool to deal with cross-border crime, such as terrorism.19 If one then looks at how different European countries have been handling the challenge of terrorism, one can discern some patterns in those cases where this struggle has been successful—when the terrorist “infrastructure” (organization, training, and modus operandi) has been destroyed—and some sort of solution to the underlying causes have been found. For example, in the cases of (then) West Germany, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom—cases where the scope of the conflicts have been considerably reduced, if not entirely eliminated—the fight led by the military and police was followed by some sort of political processes. These strategies can work where there are underlying conflicts of a type that can be remedied by political means, and where there is support for such actions among a large part of the general population. However, and this is the important part, in all these cases it was necessary to use a combination of tools in order to succeed; military, judicial, and political. How these tools were used differed, of course, depending on the country in question. In France and Italy, for example, there was in fact a tool already available when the threat of terrorism appeared in the earlier mentioned “gray” area between the civilian and military areas of responsibility—namely, in the form of paramilitary forces (the “Gendarm´erie” and the “Carabinieri” respectively). These represent a type of force not readily available in the EU at large. These European conflicts have also shown the stability of a liberal, constitutional, and democratic society. In none of the cases mentioned above was the democratic structure seriously threatened. In the case of Spain, on the contrary, a democratic development could contribute to solving the conflict successfully, and through this leave room for a process of conflict resolution. In the United Kingdom and in West Germany, limited restrictions on civil rights were periodically implemented, but they were not permanent, and those measures were intensively and continuously discussed and debated. This is, of course, in itself no guarantee that such

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actions may not in the future lead to serious disturbances in the structures of democratic countries were they to be implemented. Furthermore, there will always be a risk that limited changes can be made permanent. Nevertheless, the outcome indicates that an open and democratic society can handle comparatively serious challenges during a rather extended period of time. In this context it is also appropriate to clarify (yet again) that the kind of international terrorism we witnessed on 9/11 is of another kind than the above-mentioned terrorism in Europe. In these European cases, the terrorists were politically and ideologically motivated. In the case of 9/11, it was a religiously motivated terror that showed its face. Moreover, it is this latter form of terror that has been dominating the scene for the last decade or so. Because the objectives for these groups or networks are considerably more diffuse in shape, and the attackers view themselves as warriors at war, it becomes much more difficult to counter with traditional means. In all of the cases above, intelligence cooperation, sharing, and coordination was a critical tool for ensuring success. But this was done on a bilateral or domestic level. And yet, during these years, the EU was fully aware of the transnational ramifications of the problem, and showed a willingness to treat terrorism as a multilateral problem that ought to be dealt with on a (at the time) EEC level. As the process toward a Union progressed, the issue of terrorism was tacked onto various legal and judicial initiatives, and by the time of the Amsterdam treaty (signed in 1997 and ratified in 1999), terrorism was clearly acknowledged as an item in the context of police and judicial cooperation.20 Since then, however, terrorism has been put at the top of the list of the Union’s defense and security priorities, where it has remained despite the massive enlargement from fifteen to twenty-five countries on May 1, 2004. A key notion of putting CT competencies within the third pillar was the insight that terrorism was no longer exclusively a domestic criminal issue of each member state, but an internal security problem for the Union as a whole. Since the model that the Union adopted for handling terrorism is a criminal justice CT model, the nature of the third pillar—in regard to the justice model—reflected two fundamental notions of a majority of the member states. First, there was a shared belief that issues such as drug trafficking and illegal immigration, as well as other types of organized crime, were closely linked to terrorism. From that followed the understanding that dealing with each of these criminal activities separately made little sense. Secondly, member countries were generally deeply suspicious of allowing external agencies or organizations to interfere in sensitive domestic internal security matters (this as opposed to criminal justice affairs). These notions acted as powerful impediments toward a more multilateral approach in regard to CT, as borne out of the

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necessity of the Dublin agreement—that is, “apolitical” criminals could be extradited, but not terrorists, which were one’s own affair.21 THE DYNAMICS OF THE EUROPEAN DEBATE ON COUNTERTERRORISM This aspect of international terrorism, of the religiously motivated kind, ties in with another key feature of the European discussion on terrorism— namely, the difficulty in maintaining the hitherto developed rules and regulations driving various agencies’ capabilities and powers when it comes to domestic and regional distinctions respectively. This distinction between what is domestic and regional terrorism is becoming more and more difficult to clarify, with immediate consequences for the Union’s policy to combat this threat. The dramatic changes within the EU brought forth after 9/11—for example, the Anti-Terrorism Action Plan contained close to 150 measures— showed the inherent weaknesses in the EU structure and the difficulty in overcoming those obstacles raised through these structures. And while the issue of intelligence coordination comes up in several of the measures initiated, the pitfalls of not having a pan-European CT coordination tool available is at the same time acknowledged by the EU itself.22 The Action Plan also envisaged the introduction of an EU strategy for the suppression of terrorists financing, as well as a common and comprehensive definition of terrorism, a definition that could be used as a tool for the Union in a multilateral sense. Of special interest here were suggestions for facilitating greater coordination and cooperation in intelligence between police and security services throughout the Union. To ease this process, the Europol–Eurojust cooperation agreement (signed June 9, 2004) was intended to establish a link between the EU law enforcement agency and the EU judicial cooperative agency. It is beyond doubt that the EU needs to carry out this struggle against terrorism within the democratic and constitutional parameters that the liberal, democratic EU societies have developed, but with the addition that these parameters must be defended. These last few years have yet again underlined the enhanced need for extended regional (and international) cooperation. This is nothing new, but what is “normal” and uncontroversial in peacetime can become much more difficult in times of crises.23 For the member states of the Union this carries with it the need for new and enlarged judicial tools, as well as an understanding that when faced with a threat—even if it isn’t of the “clear and present kind”—that does not fit into the present structure, changes might be necessary. The challenge will be to do this without in any way endangering the democratic and liberal constitutional structure that the EU is rightly proud of having developed.

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The need to develop well-trained units with broad competencies is clear and will not be any less needed in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the global threat presented by religiously motivated terrorists will most likely only demand a better and swifter “rapid response mechanism” to counter it. Furthermore, this heightened global dimension of international terrorism will also demand more in areas of interoperability and a more developed capacity to operate in different geographical and political contexts. In this regard, it is also important to point out that these new resources must be developed before “push comes to shove.” When the need for these new resources appears, it is already too late to develop and construct them. Furthermore, in times of stability and peace, these resources are questioned, not the least because they do carry costs and the use of them which is not clearly apparent during peacetime. In some EU countries, there is also a reluctance to divert or add new means to develop a capacity for which there is no perceived need. In addition, there is a need to develop, and perhaps change, certain legal parameters for military resources to be used in peacetime inside the country and within the legal framework of a constitutional democracy. These changes must not come easy and should be worked through the system properly to make them acceptable both to the populations at large as well as to the polity. It is, again, necessary to point out that no changes should of course be instituted unless they are deemed necessary. This is especially true when it comes to legal changes. Changes ought to be considered only if there is a de facto threat (either at present or in the future); if current legislation is deemed ineffective, eventual restrictions on civil liberties are judged to be acceptable, and existing countermeasures are deemed insufficient. To properly understand the current debate on CT in the Union, it is necessary to look also at the present legal framework. As noted earlier, Union responses to terrorism are based on the criminal justice model. As is the case with most Western democracies, terrorism is regarded as a crime, and thus responsibilities for CT rest on ministries such as Justice and Home Affairs.24 Criticism against both older (pre-9/11) laws and the new terrorist laws and initiatives discussed, suggested, and (in some cases) implemented since then, have been focusing on aspects that are, the critics say, violating basic human rights and lacking in parliamentary transparency. Criticism has also been leveled against international efforts to combat terrorism and its effect on European legal proceedings, saying, in effect, that different legal and political cultures within the EU are being disregarded in favor of very broad and loose definitions of terrorism—definitions that would mean that an individual EU country would loose its right to try evidence before responding to demands from other EU countries for extradition.25

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What all this adds up to is a picture in which the EU is trying to cope with a widening policy gap between taking part in the fight against international terrorism and how this fight is being structured at the regional and national level within the Union. Therefore, a key question in regard to the Union’s CT efforts is what has been achieved over and above the EU acting as a facilitator, coordinator and, more generally, a political platform. The scope of the Union’s CT policy looks ambitious, particularly when it comes to intelligence matters. Within the framework of the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) Conceptual Framework, CT was introduced as a major issue and in order for intelligence to be more streamlined within various agencies, there is a vital need for interoperability between military and civilian capabilities. This is a sensitive issue that raised the temperature of the domestic debate (within the EU) on the roles of the military and civilian police vs. terrorism. On a more practical level, the Action Plan wants to ease cooperation and coordination for member states’ defense intelligence organizations by creating a Joint Situation Center. However, implementation of all these ambitious initiatives seems to be a far bigger problem. The relevant follow-up question is whether the Union’s operational and legal CT tools have been robust enough (i.e., democratically endorsed and operationally efficient) to really impact international terrorism beyond what member states already do on an individual level. It is therefore relevant to look at the various tools that the Union has developed for combating terrorism, bearing in mind that not all of them were designed for CT purposes specifically, but for more general purposes. This question is especially pertinent in regard to intelligence. There exist outside the EU several hubs where individual EU member states participate. Examples include the Club of Berne, the PWGOT and, more clouded in a shroud of secrecy perhaps, the Kilowatt Group.26 The problem is that these efforts are not necessarily coordinated within the Union, and as long as there is a prevailing suspicion among many EU countries to share—or, even more sensitive, cooperate—on anything more than a bilateral level, it is difficult to see this changing in the near future. ASPECTS OF A REGIONAL EUROPEAN COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY IMPLEMENTATION Today it is very likely that the EU, pressed by demands for changes concerning CT policy both by the wider international community, as well as by domestic demands of better protecting its citizens, will have to adapt to an international approach stressing more offensive CT (as opposed to more defensive antiterrorism mechanisms) capabilities. This adaptation should of course not be implemented due to pressure from abroad, nor

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if there is no visible need for making these changes. On the other hand, if there is such a need, it is far better that these changes and adaptations come as a result of a planned, thorough, and balanced debate inside the Union, than as the result of imposed changes forced through international pressure and/or through terrorist attacks. After the attacks in Spain and the United Kingdom in 2004 and 2005, this issue is obviously even more relevant. Thus, looking at the international scene concerning CT capacity building there are reasons to believe that the near future will, if anything, demand even more international cooperation in the “war against terrorism.” On the face of it, there seems to be two main development channels internationally for CT, both with repercussions for the Union. 1. An extreme multilateral approach, with standing units including both police/paramilitary and military forces. This would be developed in combination with an international legal framework, evolving into a rather “federal” system where terrorists can be both apprehended and put behind bars internationally. 2. A continued development of CT capacity at the national level, with a political will to use developed resources on an ad hoc basis. In this case, this would have to be combined with new judicial tools (where necessary), but with the emphasis at the national level.

Both of these alternatives will bring demands at the regional, Union, level: 1. A new and supplementary legislation where authorities are given the means to use, if necessary, military CT resources in peacetime, on a regional level. Through this, society would also show a willingness to stand up for the constitutional democratic system of the EU, and to use resources more economically. 2. Establishing, if necessary, a “European Union Security and Crisis Council/ Center” that could have, in a democratic and acceptable way, powers to deal with extreme threats and/or extraordinary events. These regulations should be put in place during peacetime in the event that, in an emergency, time is not available to wait for a Council decision. 3. Continued development of military and police resources to CT threats, both regionally and internationally. 4. Enhanced possibilities for the police to cooperate more at the counterintelligence level with military and nonpolice intelligence agencies.

In addition to the above proposal, there is of course a third path of development that might be more pronounced—namely, that the so-called great powers (and not only the United States) use unilateral means more frequently to deal with what might be viewed as clear and present threats.

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Such an evolution, however, will hardly diminish the need for smaller countries to develop their own capacity to act. Today, with the “movers and shakers” within the EU (i.e., the G5) already doing this, it is again difficult to see how these changes can and/or will be brought about. This need for enhanced capacity concerning CT competence becomes even clearer when one takes into account the importance of both the political and military component in combating international terrorism. To be successful, the whole toolbox must be used. To develop such a toolbox is a priority for any serious attempt to formulate a comprehensive CT policy, regionally as well as internationally. There are (as of today) five major weapons in the Union’s legal and judicial arsenal that can be viewed as paramount in the fight against terrorism, and especially in regard to CT measures. These are the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the Joint Investigations Teams, the European Judicial Cooperation/Eurojust, the European Police Office/Europol, and finally, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The European Arrest Warrant is intended to ease extradition requests between member states. It also dispenses with the rule of “dual criminality,” which is the principle in which the crime has to be a crime in both the requesting and the requested state. A complementary project, the European Evidence Warrant—whereby a requesting state can obtain relevant evidence from another member state—is currently under way. The Joint Investigation teams are very much a brainchild of the conceptual Union model of the preferred “justice model” as applied to combat terrorism. These teams can be set up at the request of any member state and are not limited to CT, but are also applicable to any criminal case. The European Union Judicial Cooperation/Eurojust. This is the Union’s judicial network. The Eurojust mandate is to enhance cooperation and effectiveness between various legal and judicial bodies within member states in regard to serious cross-border and organized crime. It is not only concerned with CT per se, but under the Action Plan, member states were actually asked to abrogate their right to refuse any Eurojust request if the investigation involved terrorism. The European Police Office/Europol. Europol is arguably the most operative of the various EU initiatives launched so far. Its principal mandate is to ease cooperation between member states and to facilitate the exchange of information, including intelligence, between member states. Europol is also tasked with several CT measures on a multilateral level. Resistance from several Union members to share intelligence and to give Europol a more serious CT role on a supranational level have been clear from the outset. In this, Europol mirrors the larger problems that the Union has with different CT efforts. Despite the obvious need for more and better multilateral cooperation, national security and interests still take precedence.

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The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. This office is a direct outcome of the March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid. The office is one of the more tangible results of the 9/11 and (so-called) 3/11 (Madrid) attacks, and it was hoped by many within the Union that the office would be given some real muscle to be an efficient CT player on the Union level. However, this did not come about, as some of the “movers and shakers” in the Union (most notably within the G5 group) vetoed the idea of a “CT czar” and a kind of pan-European Intelligence Agency.27 In the end, to effectively utilize the CT capacities of the Union, the Coordinator would have to be given the same powers on the Union level as that of interior ministers on the national level. CONCLUSION It is probably safe to say that terrorism, in its various shapes and forms, will continue to be a feature of the “brave new world” that evolved after the demise of the Soviet empire. Political violence is not a new phenomenon, nor is there a lack of “causes” for using indiscriminate violence, either to underline a political, religious, or social point of view, or to kill infidels (or enemies of the “Faith,”), whoever they are, in the name of “God.” Combating terrorism involves two sets of action: antiterrorism, which is taking defensive measures, and CT, which deals with the offensive measures taken. Antiterrorism is defined as defensive measures taken in order to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property, including limited responses and containment by local forces, which can be both police and military forces. CT is defined as involving those offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. For obvious reasons, programs for CT are classified, whatever country one is looking at, and therefore information about them is limited and difficult to assess. At the same time, where the military and intelligence play an important role (and sometimes the most important role) is precisely in the area of CT. Within countries that have gone through periods when terror, for different reasons, has been a real threat and a cause for concern, there has been progress in regard to the way terror is combated. In such cases, the conventional terror-fighting agency, the police, has sometimes borrowed the “modus operandi” from the military. The creation of special anti- and counterterrorist squads or special assault teams bears this out. More often than not, these units are trained by the military, and very often the personnel recruited have a military background. In countries in the Middle East, Asia, or Africa, these forces are grouped together under the heading “security forces.” The certain lack of distinction that this term embodies, as well as a slightly derogatory taint sometimes, overshadows the fact that this is precisely what a number of Western democracies have created, and very often for the same reasons; namely, to combat terrorism.

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The creation of special forces within the police, backed up by resources from the military, are perhaps the most vivid expression of the seriousness with which the target of these forces, the terrorists and their organizations, are seen. As stated above, the internal conditions responsible for domestic initiatives like the creation of special forces, built up exclusively to combat terrorism, have been difficult to “translate” into other fields of operations. Again, the various national agendas, specifics, and different areas of responsibility are formidable obstacles to a more unified approach to fight terrorism. All this is evident within the European Union as well, but more on a national level than on a multilateral level. As is clear from the discussion above, national interests and security concerns still trump any attempts to form a more comprehensive Union CT body with enough muscle to really make a difference. One major trend in today’s terrorism involves fewer28 but deadlier attacks, as well as a shift to a tactic by the terrorists, where the intent is not so much an attempt to use terror as a tool to bring home a “political point,” but rather to provoke as much damage, human or otherwise, as possible. This trend has also brought the question of who has the responsibility for combating various terrorist attacks to the fore. One of the main problems in this regard is when various agencies, police and/or the military have overlapping jurisdictions and charters. When this happens, friction is bound to occur. Another trend in today’s international terrorism, creating additional problems for law enforcement agencies, is the evolution of terror networks, as opposed to more “classical” terrorist groups and organizations with clear hierarchies. In their major work on networks and netwar, Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini29 argue the following points: – Hierarchies have a difficult time fighting networks. – It takes a network to fight another network. – Whoever masters the network form first and best will gain major advantages. – As a consequence, it will take more effective and better interagency approaches in a more networked structure to fight radical and/or extremist networks.30

An additional problem for Western democracies in this context is the different “ethos” of the police on one hand, and of the military on the other. For the police, in theory at least—and in consequence with the liberal tradition which should guide the conduct of the police—they operate according to the principle of “minimum force.” In essence, this means using only the minimum level of force necessary to deter, restrain, or contain violence. It is a true defensive, antiterrorist line of operation. The military, on the other hand, are taught to apply the maximum level of force from the beginning in order to reach a stipulated goal as soon

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as possible. When these two roles come in proximity, and perhaps even overlap, problems and tensions occur. The concept of “minimum force” is used for the protection of the individual and his/her rights within society. It is probably for this reason that in the cases where the police forces have undergone a certain “militarization” (in the shape of special paramilitary antiterrorist units), it has been done with the goal that the operational fight against terrorism should continue to be shouldered mainly by the police, but with better tools, tools that can be provided by the military.31 These units occupy a position somewhere between the police and the military, and therefore help to blur the distinctions between the army and the police. Since terrorism is seen as a direct challenge to the state and its monopoly of coercive violence, the principle according to which they act has been extended from one of minimum use of force to one of sufficient force. All this has had the effect of transforming the traditionally defensive, antiterrorist-oriented role of the police to a force that has a more overt offensive capacity. And when that capacity is there, it is of course tempting to use it, even when it might not be necessary. It can hardly be overestimated how important solid, “hard” intelligence is in the war against terrorism. This has been evident all along. The novelty is that it has been easier to use the whole gamut of resources within the intelligence agencies in the fight against terror. The necessity of using intelligence in its wider aspects (since the threat is truly international) is, on the other hand, quite evident. The challenge for the EU (and the West in general) is similar to the challenge of integrating military components in police work: the danger to the individual and his/her rights within society. Taken together, these changes in the way terrorism is combated— integrating tactics and strategies from the police, the military, and the intelligence agencies in the light of the terrorist threat—demonstrate that there is an awareness of the fact that the threat posed by terrorism can be a very real one. This awareness, however, has not been translated into a more general and truly transnational approach to the problem. Without such an approach, it is doubtful whether the countries concerned can develop successful strategies to combat terrorism on an international level. Not because the know-how is lacking, or the will, but because a more narrow, nationalist agenda, is still “when push comes to shove,” the dominating factor in creating policies to face up to the threat of terrorism. And also, on the national level, there remains a consistent problem with intraand inter-agency rivalry within concerned agencies, as well as a lack of communication between law enforcement agencies It seems clear that for the fight against terror to be effective and successful, the various actors involved need to, in a sense, “square the circle” in combining efficient transnational cooperation (using “all the necessary means at one’s disposal”) with a framework that is safeguarding

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the democratic structure and does not infringe, unnecessarily, on the civil liberties (of the citizens) that the struggle against terror is supposed to protect. In order to do this properly, it is paramount to analyze carefully and plan ahead before changes (legal and other) to the structure are implemented. Debate and discussion about these changes must have a role, and the fact is that participation in the fight against terrorism has forced the EU to adapt to new international legislation faster than otherwise would have been the case. At the same time, it is equally clear that the current state of affairs in the Union is that many of the CT tools in the arsenal still seems to suffer from the same flaws, including a lack of democratic robustness as well as enough muscular impact to efficiently utilize the Union’s quite extensive capacities. Compounding this problem is that these weaknesses are effects of structural components within the Union. To overcome this, it seems that some of the very basic tenets of the Union have to be changed, that is, a much more thorough supranational CT competence, with the accompanying powers, is required. As of today, with the “justice model” as the sole model in combating terrorism, and a continued division between internal and external security on the conceptual level (with citizens and polity alike), considerable difficulties exist which challenge a more integrated and multilateral approach. Despite several legal and judicial initiatives and ambitious policy measures in the area of CT, it is clear that many Union members lack the will to truly make the Union the main vehicle to combat terrorism. It is still viewed as a national rather than a transnational issue. On the political level, the Union still lacks the powers to devise and implement a coherent, robust, and comprehensive CT policy. On the legal level, the problems with enacting a more coherent and comprehensive role for the Union are also evident. For example, the EU’s list of terrorist organizations makes a distinction between the organization itself and the individual members, making it perfectly legal for individual members to apply for and receive visas for EU countries at the same time as the organizations they belong to are banned.32 Finally, on the operational level, Europol lacks both the means and personnel resources to tackle CT issues. This runs the gamut from budgets to the sharing of intelligence, the last point being a constant source of friction and something that renders much of what is done insufficient. The Union’s criticism of its own members in regard to Europol bears this out loud and clear.33 In the final analysis, therefore, it seems right to ask the question whether the EU is really the best vehicle to combat terrorism in Europe at the beginning of twenty-first century, or whether it is time to discuss an alternative. If, as is argued here, the inherent structures of the Union make it

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impossible to create a necessary multilateral body to tackle the challenges of terrorism, maybe a quest for a different multilateral fora to combat terrorism in Europe should be put on the table. NOTES 1. Europe is of course much more than only the European Union. But for the purpose of this study, and since the EU is the most important political, economic, and military player in Europe, “Europe” in the context of this study is really synonymous with the EU. 2. For an overview see Doron Zimmermann, “The European Union and Post-9/11 Counterterrorism: A Reappraisal,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, no. 2 (2006): 123–145. 3. It is important to note that this discussion limits itself to the issue of intelligence coordination in relation to CT. This does not mean that other issues related to CT will not be dealt with at all. But it does mean that the focus is on CT and, more specifically, on its policy implications for the EU. Furthermore, the purpose from a methodological point of view is first and foremost to shed light on the problems related to the issue of intelligence coordination concerning CT policy within the EU today—that is, the limitations on what can be done within the present policy structures. 4. It should be pointed out here that the fact that the “killing of enemies,” in no way means that other criteria does not matter. Behind the killing might lie, and very often does lie, social and political factors as well. But it must be underlined that the religious dimension and motivational factors are the main ones. Reaching the ultimate goals of “cleansing one’s society from enemies” or “creating justice for one’s people” means, in the context of the religiously motivated terrorists, death and destruction of one’s enemies. 5. The failed attempt to kill one of Hamas’ leaders in Jordan in September 1997 (The Maashal affair), points to the fact that no one is completely immune to interagency rivalry. On the whole though, Israel still presents a picture where the intelligence agencies are careful to pool resources and information, if for no other reason than to dilute the blame if things should go wrong. The Maashal-affair will probably only bring this point home more forcefully. 6. This much was even reported by the union itself. See Council of the European Union, Report on the Implementation of the Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, Brussels, October 12, 2004, pp. 6–7. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Some of the best-known conventions include the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (1973), the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977), and the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979). 10. One of the first events to mark the beginning of this development, was the terror attack against the Israeli Olympic team at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

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11. A case in point is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’s (UAV) as a way of killing terrorist leaders. It’s been used in Yemen as well as in Afghanistan. 12. Two agencies, Europol and Eurojust—operational from 1999 and 2002 respectively—have been set up to help the member states to cooperate in matters of international crime, including terrorism (i.e., the so-called third pillar of the EU). 13. Paul Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter Terrorism (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001), 141. 14. Magnus Norell. “Islamic Militants in Europe: a growing threat,” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 8 (April 21, 2005), http://www.jamestown.org/publications.php. 15. This is of course not to say that there were no national debates on CT policy. As an example, one can look at the sometimes very loud discussions in the United Kingdom concerning the way Britain handled the Irish “troubles” (as they were euphemistically called for a long time). 16. As a case in point, and as a rather odd example, one can look at the debate in Sweden after the murder of then Swedish Foreign Secretary of State, Anna Lindh, in September 2003, when wild speculations about connections to terrorism were made in a case that evidently had nothing to do with any kind of terrorism. 17. Justice and Home Affairs/Third Pillar; Common Foreign Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy/Second Pillar. 18. Examples are the TREVI (terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violence Internationale) established on the ministerial level in 1976. PWGOT (Police Working Group on Terrorism) from 1979. 19. Ny teknik, no. 50, December 8, 2004. 20. Monica den Boer, “The EU Counterterrorism Wave: Window of Opportunity or Profound Policy Transformation?” in Confronting Terrorism. European Experiences, Threat Perceptions and Policies, ed. M. van Leeuwen (The Hague: Kluwer, 2003), 185–206. 21. For a comprehensive overview see Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counterterrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1996), and Peter Chalk, “The Third Pillar on Judicial and Home Affairs Cooperation, Anti-terrorist Collaboration and Liberal Democratic Acceptability,” in European Democracies Against Terrorism, Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot, 2000). 22. Gijs de Vries (appointed EU CT coordinator) in Financial Times, November 30, 2004. 23. The “war against terrorism” is of another kind and should be viewed more as a concept that must include all aspects of a longtime struggle. Every attempt to see this struggle as only a war is bound to fail. 24. For a more comprehensive discussion on CT framework in democracies, see Peter Chalk and William Rosenau, Confronting the “Enemy Within” (Washington, DC: Rand Corp., 2004). 25. Of special concern is the European Arrest Warrant, whereby the country asking for extradition also has the right to define the crime. See also Chapter 6. 26. The Kilowatt Group was really only revealed in 1982, after material seized at the U.S. embassy in Teheran was made public by Iranian authorities.

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27. For an overview of this discussion see Anthony Brown and Rory Watson, “EU Divided Over Proposal for New Anti-Terror Czar,” TimesOnline, March 17, 2004. 28. It is important to note that in the year after 9/11, international terror attacks increased, and then slumped again, compared to the decade before. It is too early to say whether this change is long term or short term. 29. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information Age Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1999). 30. Ibid., pp. 55–56. 31. The one major exception to this rule of having the antiterrorist units located within the police is the United Kingdom, where the principal antiterrorist commando unit is located within the military—the Counter Revolutionary Wing (CRW) of the Special Air Service (SAS). 32. As an example see the commotion around the visit to Sweden and Germany of Hamas (an organization banned as terrorist by the EU) minister of Refugees Atef Adwan in May 2006. He applied for, and received a visa from the Swedish consulate general in Jerusalem. 33. Justice and Home Affairs Council/Article 36 Commitee, “Interim Report on the Evaluation of National Anti-Terrorist Arrangements,” http://ue.eu.int/ uedocs/cmsUpload/Interim Report.pdf.

CHAPTER 23 COPING WITH TERRORISM: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger

On the night of July 3, 1976, an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) commando unit gained control of the old terminal of the Entebbe airport in Uganda and freed ninety-eight Jews and Israeli citizens being held hostage there. These were the passengers of Air France flight 139, which had been hijacked the week before during a flight from Israel to Paris. The hijackers, two Germans from the Red Army Faction and two Palestinians from the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who had joined the flight during a stopover in Athens, forced the pilots to land in Benghazi, Libya, where ten more Palestinians joined the group. From there they had flown to Entebbe.1 Three days after the hijacking, the terrorists freed all passengers not carrying Israeli passports or suspected of being Jewish. The remaining hostages were concentrated in the transit hall of the old airport terminal. The hijackers, with support from Uganda’s leader at that time, Field Marshall Idi Amin, announced that if fifty-three of their comrades imprisoned in countries around the world were not released by July 1, the hostages would be executed. Following intensive negotiations between Israel and the hijackers (with Amin acting as middleman), the terrorists agreed to extend the deadline by three days, a decision that was to prove fateful. Two days after the original deadline, four Israeli Air Force Hercules C-130 transport aircraft took off from Sharm el’Sheikh (at that time

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under Israeli control) for Entebbe. The planes carried forces belonging to the elite General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (GSRU or Sayeret Matkal) as well as from the Paratrooper and Golani Infantry Divisions. At 11:00 p.m. Uganda time, the planes landed at Entebbe airport. Within seconds the cargo bay doors opened and soldiers and vehicles spilled out. Thirty-two soldiers advanced toward the terminal in two Land Rovers and an official-looking black Mercedes that were to have fooled the Ugandan soldiers into thinking Idi Amin was paying a visit. According to Mooki Betzer, commander of the assault on the terminal, the soldiers were on high alert, their eyes trained on the terminal. But they had miscalculated. Two Ugandan sentries signaled them to approach and identify themselves. Betzer was familiar with this routine from his experience as military advisor to Amin2 and implored Yoni Netanyahu, sitting next to him, to ignore the two. Netanyahu opened fire and soldiers in one of the Land Rovers followed suit.3 Thus, the element of surprise was lost. Heavy fire poured from the control tower on the assault team. The Israelis abandoned their original plan and stormed the entrances to the terminal, sometimes creating bottlenecks. Luckily, the terrorists never imagined Israeli forces were responsible for the chaos outside the terminal, and the Israelis surprised and quickly eliminated them. Three hostages were also killed during the attack.4 The rescue was lauded throughout the world as a heroic undertaking; the IDF units involved were accorded the highest prestige and the operation even spawned three feature films. However, this was a glorified version of reality. From statements made by some participants, it is clear that the line between success and failure had been very fine indeed.5 The real success story of Operation Entebbe actually occurred during the preparatory stage—that is, during the time intelligence was collected and analyzed. It is in the nature of things, however, that such work is secret and remains in the shadows. Accordingly, even though it was critical to the success of the operation, that part of the operation has remained far from the limelight. Until the day of the hijacking, Israeli intelligence activities in central Africa had been negligible.6 From the moment the hijacked plane landed in Entebbe and until the hostages were freed six days later, the Israeli intelligence community was able to gather the detailed information necessary to carry out an unprecedented operation, including maps, aerial photographs, and detailed blueprints of the building where the hostages were being held. The first intelligence was gathered by debriefing officers and pilots who had served in Uganda during the period Israel had collaborated with Amin’s government and trained his army. They handed over photos and films they had in their possession from their time spent in the country. In addition, Mossad agents in Paris interviewed the non-Jewish hostages who had been freed soon after the hijacking, who provided information

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on the hijackers and described the scene in the terminal. Israeli Air Force Intelligence possessed photos and maps of Jefferson-type airports, which provided important background material since Entebbe airport had been built on this model.7 At 8:00 p.m. the second day after the hijacking, representatives of all sectors of the Israeli intelligence community met at General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv. They distributed the materials in their possession and after evaluating them, identified the incomplete parts of the picture and decided to focus their efforts on tactical intelligence in preparation for the operation.8 Their efforts met with success. Interviews with pilots who had flown to Uganda, Foreign Ministry personnel who had been stationed there, and employees of Solel Boneh, the Israeli construction company that had built the airport,9 made it possible to draw a blueprint of the terminal. Burning questions regarding the location of rooms, exits, and stairwells were answered.10 In order to confirm the information, Mossad agents were sent to Uganda. They were able to get close to the area the morning of the planned operation and sent up-to-date photos of the airport and its surroundings. They also identified and mapped out alternative escape paths in case the rescue units would be forced to leave the area by land.11 Simultaneously, intelligence operations were carried out to prepare flight paths to the objective. Military Intelligence was given the task of supplying upto-date information on the Ugandan air force and its anti-aircraft capabilities, as well as on weather conditions in the six countries the C-130s needed to cross. This information made it possible to find relatively safe flight paths, especially above the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean. As noted above, the Entebbe rescue mission accorded the Israeli intelligence and commando units a reputation of rare capabilities in the fight against terrorism. However, this reputation raises a thorny question. The success of organizations in general, and intelligence and military organizations in particular, is usually measured by the outcome of their operations. Consequently, success in the fight against terrorism should be defined as a decrease in the number of terrorist events and their victims, and even the complete eradication of terrorism. A close look at intelligence operations carried out by Israel against terrorist organizations indeed reveals impressive tactical accomplishments ranging from infiltration of terrorist networks in the far corners of the globe to effective gathering of intelligence and prevention of high profile attacks before they could get off of the ground, together with not a few failures. However, if the camera is aimed higher, at the strategic level, the picture, at the very least, is one of scathing failure. Among other events, the Israeli intelligence community failed to forecast the rise of Shiite terror in southern Lebanon in 1982 and the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank territories in 1987.12 It also underestimated the ability of the Hizbollah to continue functioning in the face of

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Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon in August 2006.13 Because of this failure, military readiness was at a low and an arsenal of effective tools to deal with the threat had not been developed. Israelis, Palestinians, and Lebanese alike paid the price. In addition, despite the imaginative stories told of the long arm of the State of Israel able to reach terrorists all over the world, reality teaches that apart from some high-profile operations where relatively low-level terrorists or those already out of operational circles were captured or assassinated, the number of terrorists targeting Israel has only increased with the years, their capabilities have improved, and the number of victims is immeasurably higher than in the past. In the end, the wide majority of special hostage rescue operations have ended in partial or complete failure. In this chapter we will deal with the gap between the aura of invincibility surrounding the Israeli intelligence community and the continual deterioration of the Israeli security situation. The chapter is structured as follows: In the first part we will present the challenges placed before intelligence organizations charged with coping with terrorism. We will then describe and analyze how the Israeli intelligence agencies operate under such conditions. We will end the chapter with lessons to be learned from Israel’s long history of struggle with terrorism. INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORISM Quality intelligence is the first step up the slope of effective response to the threat of terrorism.14 It eliminates the aspect of surprise that allows terrorists to circumvent security measures and prevents them from using the tactical methods of their choice. When effective intelligence is available, security forces can be prepared to face actual threats and need not spread themselves thin defending targets that are not under immediate threats.15 Three main stages characterize the work of the intelligence services: In the first, objectives are set out; in the second, information is gathered and evaluated; and in the third, conclusions are drawn on the basis of the accumulated information and disseminated to the political echelons.16 To those a fourth should be added: the operational stage in which the threat is confronted and terrorist operations are averted. During the first stage, security services identify and define crucial objectives. Information cannot be collected in a vacuum. Intelligence agencies have limited resources and there is therefore great importance in setting out a clear list of priorities that undergo periodic review. In other situations, like the Entebbe hijacking, intelligence agencies must respond quickly to unexpected developments,17 an ability that should be inherent in all intelligence organizations. At the same time, this is an especially difficult demand to make, even from intelligence bodies that are considered flexible in comparison to other types of organizations.18

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Gathering takes place during the second stage.19 Compiling quality intelligence on enemy nations is not a simple task. In most cases use must be made of a combination of agents and operatives (HUMINT),20 intensive use of electronic monitoring methods (SIGINT),21 and visual intelligence (VISINT),22 in addition to information taken from open sources (OSINT).23 Gathering quality intelligence about terrorists is more difficult by far. In contrast to nations, groups of terrorists are especially evasive entities—appearing, changing their form, and disappearing quickly. They are frequently supported by sympathetic countries or take advantage of the freedom of movement inherent in democratic regimes. Intelligence agencies are responsible for collecting information regarding the capabilities of these groups while simultaneously assessing their intentions and frustrating their plans.24 This is an ongoing and nerve-wracking struggle that requires the intelligence branches to constantly improve their methods of collection and surveillance.25 Many countries, especially the United States, have developed extremely sophisticated SIGINT technologies.26 It is thus possible to intercept and decipher telephone conversations or computer communications from almost all corners of the world. VISINT has undergone such dramatic technological advancement in the last 20 years that it is now possible to follow the movements of players in real time on the other side of the globe, using satellite technologies and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) controlled from intelligence headquarters, eliminating the need for traditional informants.27 But there is a catch. Armies are large organizations possessing distinct structures and clear command channels. Intelligence agencies can study them for years using monitoring and surveillance techniques and discern changes in their daily routine, consequently estimate their capabilities and even their intentions. Any similarity between this organizational model and that of terrorist groups is coincidental at best. Here, the ability to use VISINT techniques effectively is contingent on having intelligence that can target a small group of terrorists hidden in a one-room apartment in a crowded Middle East metropolis, in Europe, or even in the United States or a cave in some Asian country.28 Dependence on this initial intelligence necessarily places HUMINT—agents, spies, soldiers, and investigators—on the front line.29 Despite its many advantages, HUMINT is very problematic. First of all, most terrorist cells are small and close-knit. Infiltrating such a cell or recruiting an agent from its membership are extremely complex operations.30 Secondly, such agents run the risk of being exposed and turned into double agents.31 Third, most terrorist organizations strictly compartmentalize their cells and members. Most information is in the hands of a few leaders who take extraordinary security precautions.32 Compartmentalization is inherent to terrorist networks; their groups act independently on a local basis and frequently are not tied to any one

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central command.33 These problems force intelligence agencies to meticulously sift through the information arriving from HUMINT sources,34 to constantly control their activities, and to make every effort to transfer responsibility as much as possible from collaborators onto field agents and especially onto the less vulnerable surveillance and monitoring units.35 During the third stage, gathered materials are turned over to the analysis and dissemination units. These include subunits that deal with longrange planning and providing routine support to operational bodies dealing with the terrorist threat. In the case of special operations, there is great importance to close coordination in real time between the bodies that collect the information, those who evaluate it, and the forces in the field.36 There are a number of components critical to effectual effective evaluation and dissemination of intelligence. One of the most important is the existence of pluralistic thought within assessment units. In order to encourage such thought, intelligence agencies around the world retain a number of evaluation bodies to analyze raw intelligence simultaneously. Four such bodies officially exist in Israel:37 the research unit of the IDF Intelligence Branch (Military Intelligence), the research unit of the Mossad, and two smaller units belonging to the General Security Service (GSS) and the Foreign Ministry.38 Further, intelligence agencies may occasionally employ a “devil’s advocate” to present assessments that run counter to those accepted by other units and so challenge the thinking of agency heads and prevent them from becoming set in their outlook.39 Moreover, intelligence bodies must refrain from drawing conclusions regarding the intentions of adversaries based only on their capabilities. Frequently, agencies afraid of intelligence failures and consequent criticism tend to present gloomy pictures of reality based more on enemy operational capabilities that are relatively easy to monitor, and less on direct information regarding their real intentions. This is even more the case with terrorist groups, where even collecting operational capability intelligence about them is a difficult task. The inclination here is to present a bleak canvas that can lead to inefficient allotment of resources and even implementation of unnecessary preventative measures. In summary, intelligence analysis and evaluation is an unceasing process that attempts to put together a jigsaw puzzle with only a limited number of pieces. In most assessment units, the process begins when junior analysts formulate their evaluations individually and present them to their supervisors. At this point, each of the analysts must defend his or her evaluation during joint deliberations; the unit head then decides to which he gives the most weight. In the end, responsibility for formulating the final assessment for the political echelon is his.40 Disseminating intelligence is largely a matter of marketing. Evaluation unit heads are first of all responsible for ensuring their assessments reach the upper echelons of the agency without being blocked or diverted.

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Secondly, it is of extreme importance that an assessment, in all its complexity, be understood by those at the decision-making level. In order for this to take place, the decision-makers must be made available to the directors of the intelligence agencies. Informal relations and mutual trust are the keys to the success of their mission.41 The existence of a number of intelligence evaluation agencies opens the way for competition between the intelligence branches. This may bring pressure to bear at the decisionmaking level and cause confusion.42 The fourth stage is operations. On the basis of information provided by the intelligence community, decision-makers determine which courses of action to take. There are a wide range of operations available against terrorist groups, including striking their organizational and financial infrastructure, detention or assassination of their leaders, foiling attacks, and reaction to crisis situations such as hostage-taking. Though the operational branches of the intelligence organizations are involved in all these activities, they are extremely small units and most of the burden falls on the shoulders of the army and the police. While it is possible to use infantry forces in antiterrorist operations, striking terrorist infrastructure and leaders is usually the preserve of Special Forces belonging to the Army, Air Force, and Navy. When surgical strikes are in order, intelligence agency units usually carry out the mission. During crisis situations, assault units specializing in terror-event response are activated, especially when hostages are involved. Since these units may require a few hours to organize and deploy, until their arrival the site is usually under the command of local intervention teams for whom fighting terror is only secondary. These teams are responsible for preventing the situation from escalating and collecting intelligence for the assault teams. ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERTERRORISM The State of Israel has a large and resource-rich intelligence community which devotes a great proportion of its efforts to counterterrorism. Once a year, the directors of the various intelligence services meet in order to set out intelligence objectives for the following year.43 In preparation for the meeting, the research branches of each of the agencies carry out background work and make suggestions as to what they consider should be the critical objectives. The final decision is in the hands of the service directors, who examine the previous years’ objectives and update them in accordance with changing circumstances and assessments received from their research units.44 The process is entirely under the leadership of the director of the IDF Intelligence branch with minimal political interference.45 The critical objectives defined during the meeting are binding on the three agencies. The agencies, however, are accorded a large

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measure of freedom regarding the operational dimension of the intelligence information gathering.46 Gathering Intelligence Any attempt to define the boundaries of the activities of each of the Israeli intelligence agencies is from the start doomed to failure. On paper there is a clear separation based on geographical boundaries. The GSS is in charge of intelligence within the State of Israel and the territories under its control (that is, the West Bank); the IDF Intelligence branch is in charge in Arab states and the Middle East, and the Mossad in the rest of the world.47 The operational maps of terrorist organizations, however, are not as cutand-dried. Palestinian groups frequently operate simultaneously in the occupied territories and in Arab and other countries, especially in Europe and Africa, and may indeed cooperate with groups and governments within those countries. This may cause one or another of the Israeli intelligence agencies to expand its operations and encroach on the territory of another.48 The operational spheres of the agencies are similarly differentiated on paper. The role of the IDF Intelligence branch in collecting and assessing intelligence on terrorist groups should be marginal in comparison to that of the GSS and Mossad, since by definition it generally operates in the military realm49 and its methods of gathering intelligence derive from that task. The IDF Intelligence branch specializes mainly in SIGINT through its 8200 Signals Intelligence Unit50 —which is a small Israeli equivalent of the American National Security Agency (NSA)—and through VISNIT, using an array of unmanned aerial vehicles, special units responsible for aerial photography of enemy facilities, and satellites.51 In addition, it operates on-the-ground forces whose task is collecting tactical intelligence. During 2000, the Field Intelligence Corps was formed to incorporate all these units together with the Corps’ radar units. As a result of sophisticated monitoring and reconnaissance methods, it is possible to follow enemy troop movements, monitor military and political communications, and assess the intentions of the enemy. The IDF Intelligence branch is the largest organization within the Israeli intelligence community and the one with the most resources. One of its most important assets is quality human resources. Because of Israel’s compulsory military service, the Intelligence branch enjoys a constant pool of talented young people available to it in the computer and electronics fields. Arabicfluent recruits who have specialized in Middle Eastern studies serve in its field intelligence units. The main drawback is that these soldiers serve for a relatively short period of time and only a few remain in the regular army; new waves of inductees must be constantly trained.52 Within the secret services, whose main tasks are collection and assessment of intelligence that is more elusive, such as following political

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leaders and counterintelligence, HUMINT has historically held a pivotal position.53 The GSS, with its counterterrorism and political subversion functions, has enjoyed considerable success in extending its intelligence net in the West Bank and Gaza. The intelligence coordinators of the agency are divided into defined sectors and are responsible for enlisting collaborators and collecting information regarding the current situation in their sector. The interrogation unit of the GSS also plays its part in HUMINT. Its agents use sophisticated methods of interrogation in the field and in detention facilities to extract intelligence on the structure and intentions of terrorist organizations.54 Their methods are based on psychological stress and until the early 1980s included the use of physical force. The Route 300 Affair55 brought about a significant decrease in the ability of interrogators to bring physical pressure to bear on detainees. Since the late 1960s, the Mossad has also been entrusted with many tasks involving counterterrorism. Its HUMINT methods are somewhat different. Besides the officers stationed around the globe who recruit agents or collaborators from within terrorist groups or on their fringes, the agency also controls a network of citizens in various countries who supply information out of a variety of motives that may include identification with the State of Israel and a feeling of obligation toward it. In the forefront of Mossad HUMINT intelligence gathering activities are its agents, the regular spies who take on false identities and infiltrate enemy countries or terrorist networks.56 The process of training these agents is especially long and during their missions they are supported by a network that provides them logistic support and ensures they are not exposed.57 In addition, the IDF Intelligence branch operates the relatively small HUMINT Unit 504, made up mostly of soldiers in the standing army. In addition to special agents, this unit mainly recruits intelligence sources in border areas, such as shepherds, enemy soldiers, and residents.58 The officers are called “special purpose officers,” and are trained to be either handlers or detainee interrogators. The unit’s position within the army is problematic: on one hand, it is a small, elite unit that resembles its brothers in the GSS and Mossad. On the other, it is frequently considered the black sheep of the IDF Intelligence branch. In contrast to most of the intelligence gathering units of the Intelligence branch that have no direct contact with their targets, Unit 504 officers carry out the “dirty work” of handling agents and interrogation. The unit is most active in the southern Lebanon sector, where it established networks of locals to supply information. As a result of the outbreak of the Al-Aksa Intifada, the unit was also given the task of controlling HUMINT among Palestinians, a sphere that had previously been almost entirely the province of the GSS.59 Today, both organizations act independently in the West Bank and as far as can be discerned, operate independent and separate networks of agents. While the GSS focuses almost completely on aspects of prevention—that is, specific information that will thwart terrorist

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attacks during the preparation and operational stages—Unit 504 focuses on information dealing mostly with activities of the military in the West Bank.60 Subsequently, despite what has been said regarding intelligence gathering by the State of Israel in general and counterterrorism in particular, there are no clear demarcations between the various organizations. Occasionally, cooperation between the services leads to results, but at other times competition and concealment of information leads to intelligence failures. It is therefore appropriate to mention that resources are frequently budgeted for units in the various agencies that possess similar specialties. The question is whether Israel, a country with limited financial resources, can afford such duplication of services. Research, Evaluation, and Dissemination Jurisdictional boundaries for the analysis and evaluation of raw intelligence are similarly blurred. The GSS and Mossad were traditionally responsible for analyzing terror-related intelligence materials and presenting their assessments to policymakers. In contrast to the IDF Intelligence, however, these two agencies are civilian bodies with an extremely limited pool of human resources. Over the years, it became involved in evaluating terrorism-linked intelligence and established its own section (Arena). This section operates within the research division and is a cross-command entity alongside regional sections such as those dealing with the Syrian– Lebanese and Iranian sectors.61 The section was established as a result of the intensification of Palestinian terrorist activities in the West Bank and those of Shiites along the borders, at a time when Military Intelligence came to recognize the need for a body that would constantly analyze the methods of operation, thought processes, and organization of terrorist groups. The result was the establishment of an independent section for terror-related intelligence that supplies information to the regional sections and makes assessments as part of the regular threat-evaluation process.62 Like the gathering apparatus, during the early years of the State research within the Israeli intelligence community focused largely on the capabilities and intentions of the Arab states to attack Israel. The intensification of terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets that began during the mid-1960s caused the GSS and the Mossad to devote more resources to basic research—that is, to understanding the background, structures, leadership, and tools the terrorist groups have at their disposal—and to operational research that can immediately process information brought in from the intelligence gathering units. In the Mossad, this takes place within the research unit, which is a part of the administrative division of the agency. This unit underwent a period of accelerated development

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after the Yom Kipper War of 1973, and since then has been constantly involved in processing raw intelligence materials and converting them to independent assessments for the political echelon, as a counterbalance to those of the IDF Intelligence branch. Regarding terrorism, the intelligence unit of the Mossad focuses on alliances between the Arab states and terrorist groups,63 charting the geographic deployment of terrorist groups and identifying their operational networks. The GSS’s research unit focuses mainly on events in the West Bank and Gaza, and identifying networks and central players within the Palestinian terrorist arena and keeping track of their methods.64 After the murder of the Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympics in 1972, the government of Israel, led by Golda Meir, initiated the establishment of a new entity—the Prime Minister’s Advisor on Counterterrorism.65 The first advisor was the former head of the Military Intelligence branch, Aharon Yariv. Over the years the position expanded and was replaced by the Counterterrorism Bureau, a branch of the National Security Agency, formally established in 1999. One of its functions was to define the areas of jurisdiction of the bodies dealing with terrorism and to raise the level of cooperation between them.66 Another objective of the council, through the NSA director, is to coordinate with the prime minister.67 Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister at the time the agency was formed, declared that “This entity coordinates between the branches. It has no authority. The coordinating body can rectify a situation by reporting to the prime minister. The coordinating body frequently made successful efforts that solved disputes, brought up issues, and decisions were made. This framework is essential in Israel . . .”68 According to Netanyahu, the Counterterrorism Bureau is at the most a coordinating group with no influence over counterterrorist intelligence activities. The former head of the GSS, Yaakov Peri, was even more derisive: “ . . . none of these [apparent coordination problems], in my opinion, harm the strength, initiative, or intelligence-gathering and prevention measures of the State of Israel against terrorism, and so I believe both the advisor and the council are superfluous; they were never needed. They were solutions to personnel problems and did not provide any professional assistance.”69 The fact that cooperation between the research divisions of the various security agencies exists only serves to bolster Perry’s view. This cooperation usually occurs when the intelligence picture of a certain subject must be completed. Thus, for example, during the Wrath of God70 operation, a direct and uninterrupted channel of communications was opened between the Mossad and Military Intelligence. Rapid communication between the research and operations departments of the intelligence services and those of the army and police are also critical. During the Al-Aksa Intifada, such channels between the GSS and the IDF helped to foil suicide terrorists on the way to their targets, and to zero in on terror network

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leaders by way of aerial attacks—known as the “surgical strikes” policy. In the age of international terrorism there is also great importance to quick dissemination of information to intelligence services around the world. In Israel, this is the function of the international division of the Mossad. The Mossad began to cooperate during the 1960s with foreign, especially Western, intelligence agencies, chiefly by passing information.71 In recent years, this cooperation has expanded to include thwarting attacks, particularly when foreign intelligence agencies began to see the increased threat of terrorism to Western democracy. Of all the above points, the most significant is that coordination between the evaluation units of the various services depends mainly on informal relations between them and the good will of their directors, while formal mechanisms are secondary and sometimes even devoid of content.72 The personnel aspect is therefore of critical importance. As long as good relations reign between the agency directors and they put national interests above all else, the intelligence community operates effectively. In the absence of effective formal controls, disputes between agency directors can bring about intelligence failures.73 Prevention During its first years, as mentioned, terrorism was of marginal importance in comparison to the strategic challenges faced by the young State of Israel. Consequently, the intelligence branches devoted only limited efforts to terrorism. By August 1953, however, the IDF had already established “Unit 101,” a small commando unit whose objective was to raid military and civilian bases in Jordan and Egypt from which terrorists were sent to infiltrate Israeli territory. The unit’s goals foreshadowed Israeli policy in the following years: to fight terrorism through aggressive means with the aim of eradicating it completely or at least minimizing the damage it causes and consequently its influence on the citizens of Israel.74 Despite the superior military capabilities shown by the unit, it was merged with the Paratrooper Division a short time after it was established. This was partly the result of the criticism hurled at Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and unit commander Ariel Sharon because of the characteristic excessive cruelty of its operations, especial after the massacre of five Palestinian citizens from the village of Quibya in the West Bank on October 14, 1953. Four years later, in late 1957, the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (GSRU or Sayeret Matkal), now under the direct command of the IDF Intelligence branch, was formed. This unit—with its mythic reputation resulting from its successful assault on a hijacked Sabena plane at Lod Airport in 1972, as well as the Spring of Youth operation (in which its soldiers, some dressed as women, assassinated three PLO commanders in the heart of Beirut), and of course, the rescue of Israeli hostages in Entebbe—was actually established to improve the intelligence gathering

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capabilities of the IDF Intelligence branch. The GSRU, known simply as “The Unit,” cloaked in secrecy and hidden from the Israeli public for many years, was formed to supply quality intelligence on the Arab states.75 Its commanders modeled the unit on the British Special Air Service (SAS). Its members were trained to work in small teams, to penetrate enemy territory and plant eavesdropping and monitoring devices in strategic locations. One of the characteristics of the unit was (and remains) finding unconventional solutions to unconventional problems76 using camouflage and advanced technological instrumentation. It is possible to describe the GSRU as the muscle of the collection arm of the Intelligence branch. Structurally, the unit is divided into several outfits under the direct command of the unit commander and his deputy. They are charged with training and with managing the unit’s headquarters, which includes the officers in charge of intelligence, operations, weaponry, and other functions. These outfits include operations, training, hostage rescue operations, and weaponry and explosives.77 The daring and creativity of the GSRU soldiers who specialize in close quarter battles, navigation, and the use of technological resources brought them to spearhead the IDF assault units when Palestinian terrorism intensified during the 1960s. While there is no argument concerning their effectiveness in carrying out special intelligence operations such as the kidnapping of Sheikh Abdul-Karim Obeid, and later Mustafa Dirani, from their homes in Lebanon, when a hostage rescue situation arises, there is always controversy as to whether they should be dealing with it at all, since it is only their secondary raison d’etre. In 1975, the YAMAM (Acronym in Hebrew of “The Police Unit for Counter Terrorism Operations”), part of the Border Police, was established to take on just such responsibilities in light of the failure of the GSRU to successfully rescue a group of school children held hostage in the town of Ma’alot. One of the proposals made by the Horev Commission, established following that event, was to transfer responsibility for antiterrorism activities within Israeli territory, especially hostage rescue operations, to the YAMAM.78 Its troops, in contrast to those of the GSRU, are not conscripts who leave the unit after 31/2 -year tours of duty. Most join the force in their early 20s after compulsory military service in combat units and stay until retirement at age 40.79 Besides the YAMAM, the Border Police has other intervention units—the tactical YAMAG countercrime and counterterror rapid deployment unit; the MATILAN intelligence gathering and infiltrations interception unit; the Jerusalem-based Gidonim Unit; and the Lebanese Border Unit. Members of all these units receive intensive antiterrorist training. Despite the many resources allocated to YAMAM and its high level of professionalism, preference is usually given to the GSRU during hostagerescue situations. In fact, 13 years passed before the YAMAM was given its first opportunity to prove its military talents during the “Mothers’ Bus”

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attack.80 This was due in no small measure to the fact that many leaders in top political and security spots are GSRU veterans and have loyalties to the unit.81 During its assault operations, the GSRU receives logistic support from other elite units, foremost among them the Israeli naval commando unit Shayetet 13 (Hebrew name for Flotilla 13),82 whose members also receive intensive antiterror training. Thus, during the “Spring of Youth” operation in Beirut, Flotilla personnel landed the GSRU soldiers on Lebanese shores. Mossad agents were waiting there and brought them to their targets in rented vehicles. A similar operational pattern was used during the assassination of Yassir Arafat’s deputy Khalil al-Wazir in Tunis on April 16, 1988. Mossad agents working with the GSRU were part of the Massada Unit (its name has been changed several times), the operational unit of the Mossad which includes a smaller unit, called Kidon. This unit was trained intensively in close combat and was responsible, among other operations, for an earlier version of pinpoint assassinations within the framework of Operation Wrath of God.83 Most antiterrorist operations, however, take place close to the borders of the State, especially within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The dominant operational bodies in this arena are the Operational Branch of the GSS, which has at its disposal agents who are veterans of IDF combat units,84 the elite IDF units discussed above, and other units that have received antiterror training as a secondary function, including several infantry units. The original task of these units was to provide their brigades with tactical intelligence regarding field conditions in areas the troops would be fighting during a war. Their soldiers received intensive training in close combat, and after the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip they were natural candidates to reinforce the antiterrorism specialty units. During this time, most terrorist cells operated within the occupied territories. Consequently, the IDF decided to put in place local antiterrorist units that would combine extensive knowledge of their territory with high close-combat capabilities. In 1970, Ariel Sharon, then commander of the IDF Forces in Southern Israel (Southern Command), ordered the establishment of the Rimon Unit. For a short time it was active against terrorist cells in the Gaza Strip. Its members would infiltrate the Strip dressed up as local villagers and attack and kidnap terrorist operatives. Years later, some of the members confessed that at least some of them could not follow basic ethical standards and frequently harmed innocent citizens. A decade and a half later the Duvduvan, Shimshon, and YAMAS counterterrorism undercover units were formed. Duvduvan operated in the West Bank and Shimshon (which has since been disbanded) in the Gaza Strip. Besides receiving intensive training in close combat, their members were taught to

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blend in with the local Arab population. They were trained to disguise themselves as Palestinians, to speak Arabic, and learned the habits of the local population. Both the units worked closely with the GSS.85 In Hebrew they are collectively called “mistarvim,” a word that has its origins in the pre-State Palmach militia. The IDF also adopted this model for its anti-Hizbollah operations in South Lebanon, when in 1995 it established the EGOZ Unit (Acronym in Hebrew for Anti-Guerilla and Micro-Combat). The framework of the unit’s training was dictated by Lebanon’s distinct terrain and Hizbollah activities, which were different from those of the Palestinian terrorist organizations—it was engaged in a successful guerilla war against military targets. EGOZ was largely trained in camouflage and open-field warfare. When the IDF pulled out of Lebanon in May 2000, EGOZ’s mission changed and then integrated into the West Bank and Gaza antiterrorist campaigns. An additional unit formerly active in Lebanon and now operating in the West Bank is MAGLAN—formed in the mid-1980s and at first made up of soldiers transferred from other such units. It specializes in the use of antitank weaponry and antiterrorist activities. Since the outbreak of the first Intifada it has been reinforcing difficult missions such as detaining fugitives under especially dangerous conditions.86 Since the end of the 1990s, the Air Force—in particular its helicopter squadrons—has taken a key roll in antiterrorist activities. When detailed tactical intelligence is available pinpointing the location of targets, precision-armed helicopters are a very effective tool. They are usually able to carry out surgical strikes with minimal danger to fighting forces and then to immediately leave the scene. The use of helicopters is not a new idea. According to Aharon Klein, during the 1980s there had already been an attempt to assassinate Yassir Arafat using a helicopter. The plan was scrubbed, however, due to poor visibility.87 On February 16, 1992, Apache helicopters attacked a convoy of vehicles belonging to Hizbollah General Secretary Abbas Musawi, killing him, his wife, his son, and five bodyguards. This was a portent of the role the Air Force would take in the coming years. Since the outbreak of the Al-Aksa Intifada, the GSS and Air Force have maintained close contact, sharing tactical intelligence in real time and collaborating on surgical strikes. The Air Force usually uses Apache AH-64 helicopters or AH-1 Cobras fitted with precision weaponry. Surgical strikes have evoked criticism on both ethical and judicial grounds. During the “Wrath of God” operation, voices were already asserting that this type of action is devoid of any benefit and only escalates the cycle of violence.88 In fact, despite the extensive use of this method during 2001, the number of suicide terrorist attacks almost doubled in 2002. In any case, it is difficult to point to direct proof linking the use of this tactic with any real decrease in the ability of terrorist groups to carry out

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suicide attacks. More criticism, no less profound, arose after the assassination of Hamas operative Salah Shahade, when a 16-ton bomb was dropped on his house from an F-16 aircraft. Besides Shahade, his wife, three of his children, his personal assistant, and ten other neighbors were killed. Since then, the Air Force has tried to avoid carrying out such strikes, but hasn’t stopped entirely. Among other such operations was the March 22, 2004 assassination of Hamas leader Ahmed Yassin by helicopter fire and the similar elimination a month later of his replacement, Abad el-Aziz el-Rantisi. In any case, it is important to note that surgical strikes make up a relatively small portion of available antiterrorist preventative measures. Most of the weight falls on the assault and intervention units of the IDF and the Border Patrol to carry out defensive prevention—that is, interception of terrorists after they have already set out on their missions, and capture of their controllers. The crucial objective is to stop them before they reach Israeli territory. If this fails, the last line of defense is the Yoav, Horev, and Nitzan Units, whose job it is to protect public transportation. As can be deduced from this discussion, Israel is near the top of the list of nations possessing numerous antiterrorist Special Forces units. In this case, however, there is no safety in numbers. For example, interservice rivalry between the GRSU and YAMAM regarding hostage rescue has existed for years. Even though as far back as the 1970s, the advantage of having a police unit responsible for such events within Israeli territory was recognized, and YAMAM officers are considered specialists in such situations, political and security leaders—many of whom are linked one way or another with the GRSU—tend to prefer handing such operations over to the GRSU. Even its long series of failures hasn’t weighted the scales in favor of YAMAM. It should be apparent that the existence of so many units increases the importance of having a central coordinating body that reaches decisions following established and acceptable procedures. Interservice rivalry between the units would be avoided and the division of work among them would be clearer. Such a body would also solve the problem of readiness for an attack that has already begun. At this stage, the question that should be asked is whether—during this age of suicide terrorism and high-trajectory weapons—there is still room to invest so many resources on antiterrorist assault and intervention teams specializing in the hostage situations of the 1970s and 1980s. THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM—CONCLUSIONS A comprehensive look at the issues explored in this chapter reveals that the responsibility for Israel’s strategic failure in its fight against terrorism lies in the gap between the flexibility of terrorist groups that constantly change shape, place, and tactics, and the inflexibility of most established

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and conservative intelligence agencies. An additional problem is the tendency of the agencies to be fixated on certain conceptions, the result of a combination of too little information and too much pressure to produce assessments. Gaps between existing information and assessments are frequently filled with guesswork, dependence on superficial knowledge of the subject, and past experience. Failure to predict the first Intifada, the rise of the Shiites, and suicide terrorism reminds us how problematic the situation really is. The tendency to ignore formalities, if such formalities exist at all, is deep-rooted in the Israeli intelligence community. Informal relationships between agency directors are widespread, as are those between the lower echelons. As long as these relations are good they can be a real asset, with each side putting the good of the whole intelligence community before its own. When relations are troubled, however, information may be withheld, one agency may encroach on the activities of another, and it may be difficult to set clear counterterrorism intelligence objectives. Considerable duplication of responsibilities exists among the units belonging to the various agencies. The fact that only limited resources are available to the Israeli intelligence community only serves to strengthen the conviction that each of the agencies should specialize in a certain field of intelligence gathering, research, and operations and then share its intelligence with the other agencies. In actuality, each agency collects HUMINT, VISINT, and COMINT, and engages in research and operations. While there is a positive side to this situation—a variety of sources and assessments can help policymakers come to more rational conclusions—it is also problematic. It is reasonable to suppose that a clearer division of roles and a central intelligence body following well-defined regulations would bring about more effective administration overall and more widespread information sharing. Though we have not discussed the political echelons in this chapter, policymakers play a major role in both strategic and tactical failures. At the strategic level, the nation’s leaders make the decisions that to a large extent shape reality. Consequently, they frequently are the origin of changes in the constellation of strategic threats that are the raison d’etre of the intelligence agencies. Agency directors may be pleased that policymakers tend not to interfere with their decisions, but autonomy brings with it responsibility—as well as another most important by-product, politicians are distanced from blame in case of failure. From the tactical aspect, policymakers sometimes tend to buy into the Superman myth of the intelligence and the Special Forces units and be blind to their inherent limitations. As a result, they may have them carry out operations that have little chance for success. The unit commanders, for their part, find it difficult to refuse. They do not want to tarnish the reputation of their unit when another one does take on the mission. The

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result: flawed operations resulting from poor planning because of limited time and the absence of quality tactical intelligence. Competition between the elite units is an affliction. When a multiplicity of elite units are in a state of constant training and readiness and strive for ever-larger pieces of the resource pie—not to mention fame—their wish to execute missions is strong and sometimes overshadows good judgment. NOTES 1. Hagai Hoberman, “We Gathered Intelligence from the News Agencies,” Hazofe Daily News Paper, July 9, 2006, Available at http://www.hazofe.co.il/ %5Cweb%5Cnewsnew%5Ckatava6.asp?Modul=24&id=47084&Word=&gilayon =2796&mador=(Hebrew). 2. O. Sharon Roffe, 2006. “The Mossad Took the Photos and the Operation Hit the Road,” Ynet. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3267808,00.html. (Hebrew) (January 7, 2006). 3. O. Sharon Roffe, 2006. “Mota Said that Yoni Was Killed because of his own Fault; Bibi was Furious,” Ynet. http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L3268080,00.html.(Hebrew) (February 7, 2006). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.; Hoberman, “We Gathered Intelligence”; Roffe, “The Mossad Took the Photos.” 6. Hoberman, “We Gathered Intelligence.” 7. Ibid. 8. Sharon Avigdor, “Operation Thunder Ball Is Entebe Operation” (Tel-Aviv: Masada, 1993), 100–101 (Hebrew); Hoberman, 9.7.2006. “We Gathered Intelligence”. 9. Avigdor, “Operation Thunder Ball Is Entebe Operation.” 10. Roffe, “Mota Said that Yoni Was Killed”; Avigdor, “Operation Thunder Ball Is Entebe Operation.” 11. Hoberman, “We Gathered Intelligence.” 12. Interview with Hezi Kallo, Former Commander in the GSS (General Security Service), Tel-Aviv, August 15, 2006; Gad Shomron, The Mossad and the Myth (Jerusalem: Keter, 1996), 145–147. 13. Ibid.; Interview with Ya’akov Amidror, Former Head of the research division in the IDF Intelligence, Jerusalem, August 14, 2006. 14. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 145–146; R. Paul Pillar, “Intelligence” in Attacking Terrorism, ed. M. James Ludes and Audrey K.Cronin (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 115–139; Eli Karmon, “The Role of Intelligence in Counter Terrorism,” Korean Journal of Defence Analysis 14, no. 1 (2002): 119–139. 15. Karmon, “The Role of Intelligence”; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, pp. 145– 146; R Joyal, “Conference Report: Legal Aspect of Terrorism,” Terrorism 12 (1989): 297–319. 16. Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 131–134; Joyal, R. 1989 “Conference Report.” 17. Karmon, “The Role of Intelligence,” 119–139. 18. Ibid.

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19. Pillar, “Intelligence,” 115–139; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, 131–134. 20. Intelligence information which is obtained from human sources. According to NATO HUMINT is defined as “a category of intelligence derived from information which has been accumulated and supplied by human sources.” HUMINT includes information accumulated by both confidential sources, such as secret agents, and from public sources, such as interviews, when the individual supplying the information may be hostile, neutral, or friendly. See Yitzhak Ben-Israel, The Philosophy of Intelligence (Tel-Aviv: Broadcast University Series, 1999). 21. General name for Intelligence information which is obtained from radio sources and other electronic transmits. It include COMINT—Communications Intelligence (listening to a variety of radio and other wireless transmits) and ELINT—Electronic Intelligence (interception of enemy electronic signals). See Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz, “Introduction” in Part II: Intelligence Collection, in Strategic Intelligence, Windows Into a Secret World: An Anthology (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004). 22. General name for Intelligence information which is obtained from visual information (satellite photos, reconnaissance aircraft, and special infantry units patrols). See Johnson and Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence. 23. General name for intelligence information which is obtained from open source (mainly media sources). See Johnson and Wirtz, Strategic Intelligence. 24. Ya’akov Amidror, Intelligence—From Theory to Practice (Tel-Aviv: Ministry of Security, 2006), 79–91. 25. Ya’akov Amidror, “Intelligence and National Security, The Special Case of Counter Terrorism Intelligence,” in Introduction to National Security (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing, 2002). 26. See NSA Web site: http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/. 27. Moshe Yaalon, “Principals in Countering Terror Threats,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006. See www.washingtoninstitute.org/ pdf.php?template=C07&CID=282. 28. Amidror, “Intelligence and National Security,” 120. 29. Interview with Dani Rothschild, Former Head of the Research Sector in the IDF Intelligence Branch, Interview held in Kfar-Saba, August 15, 2006; Interview with Shabtai Shavit, Former Head of the Mossad, August 16, 2006. Interview held in Herzlia, Israel. 30. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006; Interview with Hezi Kallo, August 15, 2006. 31. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006. 32. Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, “The Changing Nature of Suicide Attacks: A Social Network Perspective,” Social Forces 84, no. 4 (2006): 1996. 33. Ibid. 34. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006; Amidror, Intelligence. 35. Amidror, Intelligence, 30–33. 36. Aaron Yariv, “The Role of Inteligence in Counter-Terrorism,” in Intelligence and National Security, ed. Zvi Offer and Avi Kober (Tel-Aviv: Maarchot, 1987), 535. 37. Halevi Ephraim, Man in the Shadow—The Middle East Crisis through the Eyes of the Head of the Mossad (Tel-Aviv: Matar, 2006), 194; Interview with Rafi Malka, Former Commander in the General Security Service, August 16, 2006. Interview held in Kfar Saba, Israel.

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38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Ephraim, Man in the Shadow, 196. 41. Interview with Ze’ev Livne, Former Military Secretary of the Israeli prime minister, August 17, 2006. Interview held in Herzlia, Israel. 42. Shlomo Gazit, “Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker,” in Strategic Intelligence, Windows into a Secret World. An Anthology, ed. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz (Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004), 129. 43. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006. 44. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006; Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006. 45. Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006. 46. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006. 47. Ibid.; Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006. 48. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006; Protocol of Security and Foreign Policy Subcommittee for interrogation of Intelligence Activity before the War in Iraq, Volume A (Tel Aviv: Knesset, March 2004), 45–46. 49. Interview with Samuel Goren (Former Commander in the Mossad and IDF Intelligence). August 16, 2006. Interview held in Ramat-Gan, Israel; Michael Herman, “ Intelligence and the Assessment of Military Capabilities: Reasonable Sufficiency or the Worst Case?” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (1989): 765–799; Everett Carl Dolman, “[US] Military Intelligence and the Problem of Legitimacy: Opening the Model,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 11, no. 1 (2000): 26–43. 50. Shomron, The Mossad and the Myth, 131–132; “IDF Response to Palestinian Terror and Post-Saddam Region: Structural Change, New Tactics and Weapons,” See http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/ categoryid/164/documentid/2471/history/3,2360,656,164,2471 51. See NSA Web site: http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/. 52. Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid.; Interview with Hezi Kallo, August 15, 2006. 55. The Route 300 affair involved the killings by General Security Service agents of two Palestinian terrorists (involved in the kidnapping of the Bus on Route 300) after they were caught alive. Moreover, the GSS leadership tried to deceive a committee that was constructed in order to investigate the affair. 56. Shomron, The Mossad and the Myth. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid., 127. 59. Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006. 60. Aviv Lavi, “What Is Going on Inside the Secret Detention Camp 1391.” Ha’arez, August 22, 2003. 61. Interview with Dani Rothschild, August 15, 2006; Interview with Ya’akov Amidror, August 14, 2006. 62. Interview with Dani Rothschild, August 15, 2006. 63. Ibid. 64. Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006. 65. Interview with Ze’ev Livne, August 17, 2006. 66. Ibid.

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67. Interview with Danni Arditi, Former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Bureau, August 18, 2006. Interview held in Tel-Aviv, Israel. 68. Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (Herzliya: Interdisciplinary Center, 2003), 64 (Hebrew). 69. Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 64–65. 70. “Wrath of God”—Mossad agents and special military forces were deployed to assassinate members of the Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Europe and Lebanon. See Interview with Samuel Goren, August 16, 2006. 71. Interview with Rafi Eitan, Former Commander in the Mossad and currently a minister in the Israeli Government, August 17, 2006. Interview held in Tel Aviv, Israel; Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006. 72. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006. 73. Interview with Shabtai Shavit, August 16, 2006. 74. Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, 46–47. 75. David Eshel, “Israel Refines its Pre-emptive Approach to Counterterrorism,” Janes Intelligence Review 14, no. 9 (2002): 21; Moshe Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000) (Hebrew). 76. Shomron, The Mossad and the Myth, 133–134. 77. Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel. 78. For more information about the unit, see http://police.gov.il/ al hamishtara/machozot v agafim/01yamam mach.asp. 79. Ron Shiovitz, 2004 “The Yamam,” Police Sites, 204 (October 2001), 24–27. 80. The name given to a terrorist attack that occurred on July 7, 1988, when three PLO terrorists took hostage a bus loaded with working mothers on route from the southern city of Dimmona. They demanded the release of the PLO prisoners in reward to the release of the bus passengers. After almost three hours of negotiations, the YMAM stormed into the bus and killed all three terrorists. 81. Interview with Gabi Zohar, Former Commander in the IDF intelligence, August 17, 2006, Interview Held In Kfar-Saba. 82. Shayetet 13 (Naval Commando) is the elite unit of the Navy whose mission is to carry out naval operations over the borders of the enemy, such as attacks on naval vessels in enemy ports and on important facilities during wartime, and to collect intelligence information on enemy operations. The unit is divided into four subunits: military foragers, sailors, divers, and a secret fourth subunit. Shayetet 13 operations have included taking part in the attack on Green Island (20.7.1969) and the “Spring of Youth” operation (April 9–10, 1973). Since the beginning of the Al-Aksa Intifada, the unit has also operated in Judea and Samaria, in activities which include detaining terror activists. See Ed Blanche, “Israel Intelligence Agencies under Fire,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10, no. 1 (1998): 20; Samuel M Katz, “Incident at Ansariya,” Janes Intelligence Review 10, no. 1 (1998): 26–28; The Israeli Special Forces Database, “Shayetet 13,” http://www.isayeret.com/content/ units/sea/shayetet/article.htm. Retrieved August 21, 2006, 11:19 a.m. 83. Haver Eitan and Bar-Zohar Michael, The Chase after the Red Prince (Tel-Aviv: Zmora Bitan, 1984). 84. Interview with Rafi Malka, August 16, 2006; Interview with Hezi Kallo, August 15, 2006. 85. Ibid.

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86. Greenberg Hanan, 2006. “Two Soldiers Killed in the Northern Borders,” Bambila News, see http://www.bambili.com/bambili news/katava main. asp?news id=19062&sivug id=1. 87. Aaron Klein, An Open Bill: Israel Target Assassination Policy after the Munich Massacre (Tel-Aviv: Miscal, 2006), 1763 (Hebrew). 88. Daniel L Byman, “Do Targeted Killings Work?” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 95–113; Mohammed M Hafez and Joseph M Hatfield, “Do Targeted Assassination Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel’s Controversial Tactic during Al-Aqsa Uprising,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 4 (2006): 359–382.

CHAPTER 24 FACILITATING INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION AND OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM Orion A. Lewis and Erica Chenoweth

The most common assessment of U.S. intelligence prior to the September 11th attacks is the oft-cited failure to “connect the dots.”1 This was the principal finding of the 9/11 Commission, and it has since been echoed by pundits and policymakers alike to justify various reforms. However, despite progress in some areas, barriers to “information sharing” across agencies and between various levels of government remain an obstacle to a more effective counterterrorism strategy. To be sure, the creation of a new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as well as a National Counterterrorism Center are unifying steps forward, but some critics are skeptical as to the efficacy of the government’s actions to create “incentives for information sharing.”2 This chapter attempts to offer new policy ideas to improve both the technical infrastructure of government communications, as well as the organizational infrastructure of U.S. intelligence that allows the United States to prevent future terrorist attacks. Different forms of open source media offer potential solutions to some of the problems faced by U.S. counterterrorism agencies. “Open source” is a general term that describes a particular form of production and development. It refers to practices that are based in part on information sharing between producers and users. This allows for access to a final product, in terms of contribution, distribution, and communication.

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Most importantly, the product development benefits from the voluntary contributions of a “community” of experts. While this term originated as a way to describe computer software with flexible program codes, it can be used more generally to describe various information networks and production in knowledge-intensive industries. With respect to intelligence, public media, Internet sources, and academic articles in the public domain could all be considered “open source” media. The argument is based on two lines of analysis. First, open source software (OSS) provides a technical solution that improves communication across government agencies. As the 9/11 attacks and the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina have demonstrated, communication horizontally across federal government bureaucracies and vertically to state and local first responders is a key impediment to crisis response. OSS is constructed to be “interoperable,” thereby allowing various technological standards to work together. Thus, its widespread adoption can serve to streamline technology standards and facilitate efficient communication between bureaucracies. Moreover, because OSS is often free or requires minimal licensing fees, it is often far more cost-effective and accessible than other types of software. Thus, local governments and first responders can maximize their budgetary dollars and contribute to a more seamless communications network. Second, “open source” is an organizational strategy that can be applied to intelligence gathering operations. Open source intelligence (OSINT) is not a new concept for intelligence agencies. Indeed, OSINT has been an important foundation for intelligence analysis; as Allen Dulles, former director of the CIA, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1947, “a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by these overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy.”3 Thus, even at the birth of the CIA, emphasis was placed on the value of open sources for intelligence analysis. Many Washington insiders, including CIA analysts and 9/11 Commission members, have recently argued for an expansion of OSINT capabilities.4 Indeed, a unit at the CIA is dedicated specifically to open source intelligence collection.5 While these activities are a step in the right direction, the government should further develop an organizational strategy in which academic and private professionals can supplement intelligence gathering efforts. This policy proposal would apply the methods of open source production to the existing intelligence infrastructure. While open source methods of production originated in the software industry, it is increasingly viewed as a methodology that can be applied to other “knowledge-intensive” industries, of which intelligence is the perfect example. For example, the key factor in the success of open source software companies is their ability to utilize the knowledge, time, and voluntary contributions of the broader

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“community” of software engineers. In a similar fashion, the U.S. intelligence network must learn how to exploit the reservoir of knowledge and expertise of its citizens, particularly those working in academia, the media, and the private sector. Information infrastructure and the Internet present new challenges to the collection and analysis of open source intelligence, but they also provide potential solutions in that they allow counterterrorism researchers from all professions to gather and share information on a previously unimaginable scale. Thus, a “national anti-terrorism intelligence forum” would be incorporated into the existing intelligence structures. This public forum would provide additional outer layers of OSINT to the intelligence community at little or no cost. This virtual community of experts would supplement the process of intelligence gathering, by creating a mechanism to incorporate the collective knowledge of the terrorism research community into the government’s OSINT program. Because it is based in part on the voluntary contributions of the broader research community, this program would help to overcome budgetary and human resource constraints that plague current OSINT efforts. Such a policy presents a mutually beneficial arrangement that would benefit government, first responders, academia, and the broader public alike. THE FAILURES OF 9/11: THE NEED FOR AN INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM SHIFT The 9/11 Commission Report determined that the main problem with preparation was an inability of the U.S. intelligence community to “connect the dots” regarding volumes of critical intelligence pouring in from various sources. They argue that government agencies prior to the attacks were analogous to specialized physicians, each working on the same problem, but without an attending physician to coordinate activities and ensure that everyone works as a team.6 The results made it clear “how hard it is for the intelligence community to assemble enough of the puzzle pieces gathered by different agencies to make some sense of them and then develop a fully informed joint plan.”7 These findings highlight two main problems in intelligence gathering operations during this period. First, agencies were either unable or unwilling to communicate with each other. This may be due principally to different bureaucratic specializations, but part of the problem may also be attributed to structural barriers in the communication infrastructure of agencies. Different government bureaucracies often adopt different technology standards and may not in fact have the capacity to communicate even if they wanted to.8 Second, it is apparent that the intelligence community remains mired in a “cloak and dagger” cold war paradigm. Prior to 9/11, intelligence

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agencies were plagued by a bias for “clandestine” information, aversion to interagency cooperation due to rivalries, and a decentralized institutional arrangement that exacerbated these existing tensions. In sum, the intelligence community continues to emphasize “secrecy” as the best means to measure the value of information. This is due in part to the fact that cold war intelligence relied heavily on classified data from clandestine sources.9 Yet, this also created the commonly held perception that information has to be “stolen” and classified for it to be considered valid intelligence. This point is underscored by analysts, such as J.F. Holden-Rhodes, who argues that the Gulf War made it “painfully clear that the intelligence community had chosen to rely on highly classified, sensitive material, which is very narrow in perspective, while ignoring for the most part that information which could have come from the judicious use of open source intelligence.”10 Indeed, this bias for secrets continues today. As Stephen Mercado, an analyst in the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology, argues, “too many people still mistake secrets for intelligence.”11 The problem with mistaking secrecy for intelligence is that such a view fails to recognize the important role that open sources can play in intelligence gathering—particularly in dealing with a transnational organization like al Qaeda, where human intelligence is very hard to come by. As one analyst commented, “It is virtually impossible to penetrate a revolutionary terrorist group . . . The responsibility falls on the intelligence community’s overt collectors and analysts.”12 Thus, the majority of what the United States knows about the organization comes from open sources. Terrorist groups themselves are now able to exploit a wide array of open sources of communication on the Internet. As many authors and journalists have pointed out, al Qaeda’s core organization uses the Internet to communicate and recruit. For example, Al-Jazeera interviews with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin al-Shibh revealed that the terrorists communicated openly in online chat rooms using code words.13 Analysts at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point have noted that the salafi jihadi movement has been particularly adept at using the Internet to communicate with its followers. There are certainly risks to using the Internet as a source of intelligence. For one, the Internet has vastly expanded the opportunities for “noise” to exist in cyberspace. Thus, information gleaned from Internet sources may be unreliable or, at worst, counterproductive. Terrorists could use an overreliance on open source intelligence to thwart and confuse U.S. intelligence agencies. On the other hand, information technology presents opportunities for the intelligence community as well, provided that its resources are properly harnessed. Returning to the 9/11 Commission Report, two main suggestions highlight the potential relevance of open source for counterterrorism. First,

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with respect to horizontal information sharing across bureaucracies, they recommend a “decentralized network model, the concept behind much of the information revolution.”14 This would mean that agencies still have their own databases, but they are in fact integrated in a network that can be accessed by other agencies. Such technological integration removes barriers to communication across agencies, thereby providing the foundation for reform of U.S. intelligence. In this regard, the Commission argues, “a ‘smart’ government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence.”15 Given the fact that open source intelligence is the foundation of “all-source analysis,” this statement implies that it should be expanded to help the government get a full picture of its terrorist adversaries. Indeed, the Commission recommended greater support for OSINT, and the Director of National Intelligence recently established an “open source center.” While these are important steps, they should be extended to their logical conclusion—adding an outer layer of OSINT to further supplement the nation’s intelligence capabilities. Such changes require the intelligence community to abandon some of the cold war biases for secrecy and clandestine methods, and recognize that OSINT is an increasingly prevalent and important source of intelligence that supplements traditional forms of intelligence gathering. This is particularly true when confronting a transnational terrorist threat. This form of networked threat, which utilizes the tools of technology and constantly adapts to counterterrorist measures, requires a similar networked response. There are two potential responses: (1) the integration of open source standards and software for improving horizontal communication across agencies as well as vertical communication between levels of government; and (2) creation of an open source intelligence forum with a greater capacity for information gathering, sharing, and analysis. TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS: OPEN STANDARDS AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE Homeland security and counterterrorism require the coordination of multiple stakeholders with a wide array of standard operating procedures—including all levels of government, the private sector, critical infrastructure, and individual citizens. However, such coordination is often constrained by technical and other difficulties.16 For instance, the investigation of the events leading up to 9/11 demonstrated that the intelligence community was quite dispersed in its collection and analysis of information, with some agencies neglecting the efforts of others. More recently, the U.S. response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was fraught with miscommunication about the nature of the situation at all levels of

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government, as well as confusion concerning the proper response agency. The result of these difficulties was wasted time, increased transaction costs, and poor performance. Such problems are not unique to the U.S. intelligence community. For example, after the Asian tsunami struck in 2004, the Thai government found it difficult to coordinate a response with nongovernmental organizations, since different organizations used different file formats and communication standards.17 It is thus necessary to recognize how open source solutions can integrate IT systems, thereby promoting efficiency of communication and overcoming the types of communication breakdowns seen on September 11 and during Hurricane Katrina. The Open Source Method of Production Lack of technological standardization is an important barrier that must be overcome. Given the federal system, IT policy throughout the government is highly compartmentalized, with different bureaucracies often having different technology standards and tools. This chapter focuses on two types of “open” outcomes: standards and software. Standards Open standards refer to the technological infrastructure that supports collaboration within and between organizations, and they provide the basis for an information economy by ensuring the interoperability and access by the broadest community possible. An “open” IT ecosystem is defined as one that is “capable of incorporating and sustaining interoperability, collaborative development and transparency.”18 This focus on standards emphasizes the importance of the broader policy environment in which technology is employed. Indeed, a discussion of open standards highlights the actors, policies, technologies, and norms that comprise an IT environment. At this point, it should be noted that an open IT environment is not based exclusively on a single type of software—open source or proprietary—but may be comprised of a variety of technologies and software. One type of software alone will never meet the needs of organizations and the IT environment as a whole. What is clear, however, is that an IT environment will maximize efficiency, productivity, and transparency if it is based on open standards. Software In contrast to the broader environment of open standards, open source software refers to software whose source code is open for viewing and modification. While there is a broad array of licenses under which OSS is distributed, the basic tenets of this software development model are

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based on the concept of transparency. Anyone can view and modify the source code. This set of rules regarding the transparency of the software engineering means that OSS is often developed by a “community” of developers, many of whom volunteer their time and effort playing two roles: developers and users. As developers, the community may contribute new solutions to the project, and as users they provide feedback regarding problems with the software, which helps the core developers improve their work more quickly. Red Hat and IBM are two companies that have benefited from such a community. While Red Hat employs about one thousand engineers, their product development is greatly bolstered by the broader Linux community, which is estimated at about ten thousand developers.19 Dr. Albert Spector, an executive at IBM, points out that his company supports OSS development because IBM benefits greatly from the efforts of many smart people and views it as a very effective development methodology.20 Executives at companies like Red Hat and IBM have emphasized how vitally important the maintenance of good relations with this broader community is to their business.21 Not only do companies benefit from the voluntary contributions of the community, but this user-driven interaction is seen as the main reason why OSS is often viewed as more stable and reliable than its proprietary counterparts. The Benefits of Open Standards and OSS Returning to the technical aspects of open standards and OSS, there are two widely perceived benefits that are important for interagency communication: interoperability and cost-effectiveness. One of the primary strengths of OSS is the efficiency gained by having interoperable technology and standards that allow a variety of bureaucracies and organizations to communicate with one another easily. This is due to the fact that OSS is often designed in a modular fashion and engineered to work with other software, something that is not guaranteed with proprietary software. Interoperability is particularly appealing for governments, which often need to communicate across a wide range of bureaucracies. Moreover, interoperability leads to increased network effects, where larger networks are able to tackle various challenges. Thus, OSS and open standards incorporate the ideals of the networked information economy, where ease of communications leads to large-scale collaboration and improved innovation. Second, one of the main concerns for most IT strategists and the government in particular is to maximize the cost-effectiveness of their procurement decisions. While OSS often requires licensing or subscription fees, it is usually far less costly than proprietary alternatives. In addition the use of OSS prevents vendor lock-in, which can become problematic if organizations are dependent on a single vendor. Indeed, this consideration is

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found in a survey of public institutions, where cost savings was cited as the second most important motivation behind the use of OSS.22 This combination of interoperability and cost savings could have an important effect on information sharing within the government. In effect, the more widespread use of OSS and adoption of open standards could serve to create a much more integrated and larger network. Technological interoperability facilitates efficient horizontal communication, while cost savings make it easier for local governments and first responders to vertically integrate their systems. To be sure, this is not a panacea for some of the major communications breakdowns, such as the lack of emergency frequencies, but it is nevertheless an important step in improving government communications and crisis response. Policy Prescription: Open Source Standards and Software for Counterterrorism and Homeland Security In light of the potential benefits of open source technology, agencies engaged in counterterrorism and homeland security should adopt open source standards and software to increase interoperability between units. The benefits of adopting such a strategy are numerous, whereas the risks are few. Adopting open standards and OSS would allow the integration of existing criminal offender databases, immigration lists, and terrorist watch lists from a wide array of agencies from federal, states, county, and local law enforcement to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Moreover, such databases could increase information sharing between different levels of government, so that those responsible for responding to terrorist attacks can share strategies for success. In sum, as Linus Torvalds—the creator of the Linux operating system has often argued—all software problems are small when there are numerous pairs of eyes looking for them. Indeed, this community-based model of production can serve as a useful framework for the collection of intelligence as well, where one might assume that networks of individuals in the community might be more effective at turning up problems than a few specialists. This approach also complements a second policy suggestion— the creation of a public forum for the collection and distribution of open source intelligence. ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS: OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE Efforts should be made to further exploit open source intelligence. To clarify, OSINT is “open source” because it is based on materials that are often available to the public, such as news broadcasts, academic analyses, etc. Thus, while there are similarities with the concept of open standards

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and open source software, OSINT refers explicitly to the gathering and analysis of such information for intelligence purposes. As indicated, the threat of transnational terrorism presents new challenges because groups have utilized information technology to communicate and network with one another. Given this proliferation of terrorist activities online, it is clear that the United States must respond with a new emphasis on OSINT. While the “clandestine” mode of intelligence is still important, there are new opportunities to exploit OSINT, which can serve to supplement other forms of intelligence, thereby helping to present a more complete picture of security threats. Given the common “cloak and dagger” perception of intelligence, some may be surprised to know that intelligence agencies have long utilized OSINT. For example, during the cold war, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) was instrumental in discovering tensions between the USSR and China.23 Moreover, as Stephen Mercado points out, OSINT is often the only form of intelligence that the United States has on closed regimes or organizations, such as the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea or al Qaeda.24 In addition, OSINT is widely known to be the foundation upon which all other intelligence analysis takes place. Most analysts agree that it forms the vast majority of what we call intelligence.25 Numerous analysts and surveys have found that OSINT in fact makes up around 70–80 percent of U.S. intelligence.26 However, while OSINT is an old form of intelligence gathering, information technology has revolutionized its impact. This has a number of important implications for the field of OSINT. First, open sources have proliferated dramatically. Second, they are much more readily available to all members of society—including CIA analysts and private citizens alike. Finally, the cost of collecting this information has decreased dramatically. Each of these changes illustrates the benefits of OSINT and how they help to address the needs of the United States. The Benefits of OSINT The Internet has produced a proliferation of open sources of information. Different analysts have taken different positions as to whether this is a beneficial or problematic phenomenon. Some see the proliferation as beneficial because the variety of media online can essentially provide the analyst with a large number of informal surrogates that aid the collection and aggregation of information.27 However, John Nokimos, Director of Research at the private International Security and Research Agency, argues that “the greatest problem is the excess of open sources now overwhelming the ability of analysts to sort through it.”28 Thus, it would seem that the proliferation of open sources online can be viewed as a doubleedged sword, where harvesting information can be quite beneficial for

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its content, but also overwhelming to intelligence agencies due to its volume. Second, the information revolution has made the tools of intelligence gathering much more accessible to the broader population. The fact that more people are able to access, disseminate, and share information online creates “network effects,” where the collection and dissemination of information has become virtually costless. This enables ever-larger networks of people to engage in the process of information creation and sharing, which at times will produce important intelligence. What do these changes mean for OSINT? First, it means that it is now far more cost-efficient to conduct some OSINT operations. Whereas the CIA was formerly forced to send analysts to China to monitor radio broadcasts, they can now do so from anywhere in the world. Now, with minimal technology investments, analysts can access foreign media sources online. As J.F. Holden-Rhodes argues, “OSINT is the power of knowledge at a cost that nearly anyone can afford.”29 Second, as Mercado’s position (described earlier) indicates, there are far more people engaged in information collection and dissemination than once existed. Citizen journalists, bloggers, academics, pundits, and the media are breaking down the traditional hierarchies of information, all of which present new opportunities for OSINT analysts. To summarize, there are many potential benefits of OSINT. Not only is it increasingly cost-effective for intelligence agencies, but also information technology brings together into a network increasingly complex groups of individuals that study similar phenomena. These groups of people present an opportunity for intelligence agencies to benefit from the efforts of the broader society. Finally, as Eliot Jardines—president of Open Source Publishing Inc—points out, the unclassified nature of OSINT makes it very useful for Homeland Security, because it can be shared extensively with local governments and first responders without eroding national security.30 Clearly, OSINT is recognized as increasingly important to counterterrorism efforts. However, Stephen Mercado highlights two important constraints on the ability of the United States to leverage it effectively. The first is budgetary, where he states that despite its significance to government operations, OSINT only receives roughly 1–2 percent of the overall intelligence budget.31 The second constraint is human resources, where he argues “the United States lacks the education base upon which to develop tomorrow’s intelligence officers.”32 In this regard, Americans’ general aversion to international studies and foreign languages hurts the U.S. capacity to access the available open sources of intelligence. What is needed, therefore, in order for U.S. intelligence agencies to fully exploit the knowledge and expertise of their citizens, is an expansive effort to integrate the

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terrorism research community into existing open source intelligence frameworks. Policy Prescription: A National Anti-Terrorism Intelligence Forum Clearly the intelligence community faces new challenges and opportunities in the collection of OSINT. The primary challenges center around the availability of resources, both financial and human. The government is trying to fix some of these problems by creating new bureaucracies, such as the DNI Open Source Center. However, these efforts can be extended a step further by allowing the broader terrorism research community to participate in information sharing in a more direct and durable fashion. Consequently, the U.S. government should create a “national antiterrorism intelligence forum,” which would provide an additional, declassified outer layer to existing information infrastructure of the intelligence community. This concept has already been applied within the intelligence community. Joseph Markowitz, director of the CIA’s Community Open Source Program Office, has argued that the existing Open Source Information System (OSIS), the network created to make OSINT more available to all intelligence analysts, “should serve as the unclassified outer-most layer of Intellink” (i.e., the online intelligence sharing system within the government).33 While the creation of the OSIS and the DNI Open Source Center demonstrate the government’s efforts to improve the collection and dissemination of OSINT, these efforts can certainly be streamlined and expanded. For example Eliot Jardines recommends that the CIA’s OSIS be extended to the Department of Homeland Security, and the 9/11 Commission has also recommended an integrated bureaucracy to oversee OSINT. While such measures are certainly valuable, they should be taken a step further to extend beyond the intelligence community itself. The DNI Open Source Center should establish an additional public open source forum, which would serve to supplement the gathering of OSINT and perhaps at times in its analysis. This network would allow academics, journalists, and the private sector to contribute to the collection of OSINT. Academics, for example, often have extensive information regarding terrorists and their leaders due to their access as researchers. However, there is often a disconnect between academic researchers and government policymakers. Recent efforts have attempted to bridge this gap, such as the Homeland Security Centers of Excellence program, in which academic institutions provide research to the government on terrorism, homeland security, and threat forecasting in exchange for research funds. Some think tanks and research organizations have devoted nearly all of their time and energies

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to the study of terrorism and counterterrorism, such as the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Moreover, Internet blogs have developed out of a need for counterterrorism experts to communicate information more immediately.34 Some individual researchers have devoted their entire life’s work to the study of terrorism and its processes. While such sources are invaluable to the gathering and analysis of intelligence, an institutionalized forum for their engagement could greatly benefit the nation’s efforts to counter terrorism. The logistics of such a proposal may appear somewhat complicated. However, the organization of such a forum would apply the methods of open source software production to intelligence, which is another knowledge-intensive industry. As described earlier, OSS companies are not simply a decentralized network of engineers. Each successful organization has a hierarchy to oversee production. However, as mentioned earlier, the key to successful open source software development is the fact that the hierarchy benefits from the voluntary contributions of the broader software development community. Online forums allow community members to submit new code or information that aids in the development of the product. Those contributions are sometimes rejected and discarded by the production hierarchy, but sometimes valuable pieces of code are incorporated into the product. In this way “network effects” are achieved, because the end product is greater than what the production hierarchy could have created on its own. These same methodologies can be applied to the production of intelligence. Following from the OSS metaphor, the Director of National Intelligence would head the hierarchy, and the OSINT analysts would be the ones tasked with filtering and assimilating available information. This community-based model of intelligence gathering would not supplant existing intelligence structures, but instead it would supplement them. To be sure, this may imply that the intelligence hierarchy direct more resources and analysts to collecting and filtering OSINT, but this proposal is a logical extension of efforts to meet the goals of the 9/11 Commission. In the intelligence world, concerns naturally arise regarding sensitive information. Certainly, some information would, by necessity, be restricted only to those with certain security clearances. It is true that some intelligence requires the most sensitive handling and dissemination. However, the U.S. government could best prepare itself against a networked adversary by exploiting its own knowledge base in a systematic fashion. By creating an OSINT forum, the United States would be tapping into an information resource that has previously been underutilized. In order to address concerns of intelligence sensitivity, however, the forum could require varying degrees of expertise to obtain membership. For example, the first additional outer layer could be limited to those focused on terrorism research, such as private specialists, academics, and media. A

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second layer might be completely unrestricted and available to the general public. Most importantly, this policy would help to overcome many of the constraints that plague existing efforts to produce OSINT. First, because the contributions of the terrorism research community would be voluntary, it would help to overcome the budget constraints faced by OSINT. Second, given the fact that academics specialize in the type of transnational expertise that is so difficult to come by, this program would help to overcome human resource shortfalls. Indeed such a forum makes sense, because the academic community already works in the realm of open source information. Finally, this program would be an important step toward what Robert Clark has called a “target-centric approach” to intelligence gathering, which is more effective because of the iterative and collaborative approach.35 Indeed, understanding the importance of collaboration and the network effects that are achieved from it is the foundation of the open source method of production. CONCLUSION: OPEN METHODOLOGIES AND A MORE EFFECTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY In sum, the methods of the open source software community can enhance the production of intelligence. Adopting open source standards and software can enhance the interoperability of different agencies engaged in terrorism prevention and response. The national open source intelligence forum recommended here is based on a similar premise and represents the logical extension of many of the government’s efforts already underway. This mode of collective information sharing and collaboration would help to improve the big picture analysis of the terrorist threat. Moreover, it can be viewed as mutually beneficial for everyone involved. The intelligence community would benefit from the voluntary contributions of the research community, while academics would benefit from a forum in which to share and discuss knowledge. First responders would also benefit from the broader array of OSINT that is produced, and the general public would benefit from having better information available to them regarding the threats they face. A combination of developing open technology standards within the government as well as open standards of intelligence gathering would work together to create virtuous cycles of information sharing. This collaborative method of OSINT will help to construct a more complete picture of current and emerging threats. To be sure, it requires a rethinking of Cold War intelligence paradigms, but as the growing body of literature on the topic—including the 9/11 Commission Report—indicates these methods are much needed in an age where the U.S. must “connect the dots” of a transnational terrorist threat.

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NOTES 1. This is the most prominent critique of the 9/11 Commission. See Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton (co-chairs). The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). 2. For example, the Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations, gives the U.S. government a “D” in both of the categories: “Incentives for information sharing” and “Government-wide information sharing.” Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, Final Report of 9/11 Commission Recommendations. December 5, 2005. Retrieved on May 18, 2006, from http://www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-1205 report.pdf. 3. Allen Dulles, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25, 1947. 4. For example, Stephen C. Mercado, “Reexamining the Distinction between Open Information,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 2 (2005), https:// www.cia.gov/csi/studies/Vol49no2/reexamining the distinction 3.htm; and Rob Simmons, “Letters to the Editor,” The Hill September 14, 2005. 5. Timothy J. Burger “Opening Up the CIA,” Time Magazine, August 15, 2005. 6. Kean, Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 353. 7. Ibid., p. 355. 8. See, for instance, Louise Comfort, Kilkon Ko, and Adam Zagorecki, “Coordination in Rapidly Evolving Disaster Response Systems: The Role of Information,” American Behavioral Scientist 48, no. 3 (2004): 295–313. 9. John Nomikos, “The Role of Open Sources in Intelligence,” International Security Research & Intelligence Agency, 2006, p. 2. 10. J.F. Holden-Rhodes, Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence in the War on Drugs (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997). 11. Stephen C. Mercado, “A Venerable Source in a New Era: Sailing the Sea of OSINT in the Information Age,” Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004), http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no3/article05.html. 12. Ibid., 8. 13. Tom Zeller, “On the Open Internet, a Web of Dark Alleys,” The New York Times, December 20, 2004. 14. Kean and Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 418. 15. Ibid., p. 401. 16. For a discussion of the governance difficulties faced in dealing with homeland security, see Susan E. Clarke and Erica Chenoweth, “The Politics of Vulnerability: Constructing Local Performance Regimes for Homeland Security,” Review of Policy Research 23, no. 1 (2006): 95–114; see also Brian Gerber, David Cohen, Brian Cannon, Dennis Patterson, and Kendra B. Stewart, “On the Frontline: American Cities and Homeland Security Preparedness,” Urban Affairs Review 41, no. 2 (2005): 182–210. Also, the 9/11 Commission Report details the difficulties of coordination between counterterrorism agencies at length; see especially Chapters 3, 8, and 11. 17. Open ePolicy Group, “Roadmap for Open ICT Ecosystems,” Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School. 18. Ibid. 19. Charles Ferguson, “How Linux Could Overthrow Microsoft,” Technology Review 108, no. 6 (2005), 66.

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20. Thomas Rosen and Peter Svennson, Interview with Dr Albert Spector, IBM, 2005. 21. Ibid. 22. Thorsten Wichmann, “Use of Open Source Software in Firms and Public Institutions,” FLOSS Final Report, Berlecon Research, 2002. 23. Harold P. Ford, “Calling the Sino-Soviet Split,” Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998). 24. Mercado, “A Venerable Source in a New Era,” 4–8. 25. See for example, Mercado, “A Venerable Source in a New Era.” Also see Nomikos, “The Role of Open Sources in Intelligence.” 26. Nomikos, “The Role of Open Sources in Intelligence.” 27. Mercado, “Reexamining the Distinction between Open Information,” 2. 28. Nomikos, “The Role of Open Sources in Intelligence,” 2. 29. Holden-Rhodes, Sharing the Secrets, 21. 30. Eliot A. Jardines, “Written Testimony,” Hearing on “Using Open-Source Information Effectively,” House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, 2005. 31. Mercado, “Reexamining the Distinction between Open Information.” 32. Mercado, “A Venerable Source in a New Era,” 7. 33. Holden-Rhodes, Sharing the Secrets, 21. 34. See, for instance, http://counterterrorismblog.org, http://www.mountain runner.us, http://lawandterrorism.com, and http://www.terrorismunveiled.com, all last accessed May 29th, 2006. 35. Jardines, “Written Testimony,” Hearing on “Using Open-Source Information Effectively,” 3.

CHAPTER 25 AL QAEDA’S SURVEILLANCE OFFENSIVE AGAINST AMERICA, 2000–2003: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. HOMELAND COUNTERSURVEILLANCE Aaron A. Danis

In the 1990s, al Qaeda collected intelligence on potential targets worldwide as part of a long-range plan to attack the United States, the West, and “apostate” Middle East regimes. Al Qaeda surveilled1 targets in Europe, Africa, Indonesia, the Middle East, and America. The targeting of the United States continued even after the 9/11 attacks, to prepare for potential follow-on “second wave” attacks still in the conceptual stage when 9/11 mastermind and senior operational planner Khalid Sheik Mohammed (KSM) was captured in March 2003.2 KSM has emerged as a key figure in this centralized targeting effort against the United States. This chapter will outline how al Qaeda conducted this surveillance offensive, and how successful it was in penetrating American homeland security. More importantly, it will examine three key questions: Could al Qaeda attempt to do this again? What would such an attempt look like? and How could U.S. intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement organizations defeat domestic terrorist surveillance and prevent an attack? As noted terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman observed soon after the 9/11 attacks, “Relatively sophisticated terrorist groups do not attack people or places without a basic level of planning and reconnaissance. Therefore, arguably the greatest return on investment is in the identification

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and disruption of pre-attack planning operations. It is crucially important to intercept the terrorists’ own intelligence-gathering processes.”3 AL QAEDA’S WORLDWIDE COLLECTION PLAN Surveillance is the first—and arguably the most important—step in a terrorist group’s attack cycle. Even if a group knows the types of targets it would like to attack as part of its operational goals, it will usually rely on active surveillance to determine whether a target is within the group’s operational capabilities. Such was the case with al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attacks. The group taught and used a four-part attack cycle, each carried out by a distinctly different group or cell for operational security purposes: surveillance and information gathering (surveillance cell), target selection (al Qaeda leadership), logistics preparation (logistical cell), and the attack itself (attack cell).4 While al Qaeda senior leadership generally knew what type of targets it wanted to hit, direct ground surveillance drove final target selection. For example, as early as 1993, when Osama bin Laden was still located in Sudan, the nascent al Qaeda network began to surveil targets in East Africa at his direction. Former U.S. Army Sergeant Ali Mohammed stated in his plea agreement with the U.S. government that in late 1993, bin Laden asked him to conduct surveillance of American, British, French, and Israeli targets in Nairobi. He described how he prepared detailed targeting packages (including photos and diagrams) of the American Embassy, the USAID Building, the U.S. Agricultural Office, the French Cultural Center, and the French Embassy, all in Nairobi. These targets were selected as a way to retaliate against the United States for its involvement in Somalia. He brought the packages to bin Laden in Khartoum, where bin Laden personally selected the placement of the truck bomb used in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi.5 Note that while many targets were surveilled, only two were attacked. Ali states that he subsequently conducted surveillance in Djibouti and Senegal in 1994, as well as trained other al Qaeda operatives in surveillance techniques while in Sudan.6 Other evidence exists of al Qaeda’s centralized, methodical surveillance effort. After U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in late 2001, a targeting video and diagrams of a public train station were found in the rubble of former al Qaeda military leader Muhammed Atef’s house, which had been hit by a U.S. air strike, killing Atef. Singaporean authorities, who had just started rounding up suspected Jemaah Islamiya (JI) operatives—many whom had trained in al Qaeda camps—linked the materials to plans for attacking U.S., British, Israeli, and Singaporean government and military targets (an original copy of the video was recovered during these arrests). Authorities discovered that in 1999, al Qaeda leaders had watched the video, narrated by JI operatives, and gave the go-ahead for an operation that was

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never conducted, for reasons that are currently unknown. The al Qaedato-Jemaah Islamiya link ran through a JI leader named Hambali, who was a confidant of KSM.7 The 9/11 Commission Report describes additional cases of centrally directed surveillance before 9/11. In late 1998, al Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri proposed attacking a U.S. vessel, which bin Laden approved. He reportedly directed al-Nashiri to start the planning and send operatives to Yemen, and he later provided funding. Al-Nashiri reported directly to bin Laden, and when al-Nashiri had difficulty finding U.S. naval vessels to attack along the western coast of Yemen, bin Laden allegedly instructed him to surveil the Port of Aden instead. In January 2000, al Qaeda operatives tried and failed to attack the USS The Sullivans when their explosives-laden boat sunk; it was followed 10 months later by the successful attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.8 In December 1999, KSM directed Walid Muhammed Salih Bin Attash (aka “Khallad”) and another operative to observe security measures on U.S. aircraft flying southeast Asian routes, in order to hijack and crash several aircraft there as an adjunct to the original 9/11 plan. The surveillance flights occurred in January 2000, and on one leg from Bangkok to Hong Kong, Khallad tested security by carrying a box cutter in his toiletries kit. While it was searched and he was questioned, he was allowed to continue travel. This part of the 9/11 plot was later cancelled by bin Laden because it added too much complexity to the core 9/11 operation.9 More recently, an al Qaeda document captured in Afghanistan and released by the U.S. government indicates that the group had, at least up to the 9/11 attacks, a Surveillance Committee as part of its command structure in Afghanistan, strongly suggesting a centralized collection program. The document, titled “Interior Organization,” is undated and gives no details of the duties of this committee, or who is assigned to it. However, based on the other committees co-listed (Military, Political, Administrative and Financial, and Security), there is little doubt that the Surveillance Committee was considered important in the al Qaeda command structure.10 This, along with the numerous surveillance training texts promulgated through the years, indicate the importance the group placed on this facet of its attack cycle.11 A chapter in the well-known Manual of Afghan Jihad found in Afghanistan by the media in February 2002 was titled “External Pressure,” and contained a laundry list of potential terrorist targets. “There must be plans in place for hitting buildings with high human intensity like skyscrapers, ports, airports, nuclear power plants and places where large numbers of people gather like football grounds,” the chapter said. It also recommended major public gatherings such as Christmas celebrations.12 This general list must carry some weight within extremist circles since al Qaeda associates have attacked or plotted against nearly all of the targets on it at one time or another.13

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CENTRALIZED COLLECTION AGAINST THE UNITED STATES In October 2005, the White House released a list of thwarted terrorist plots. While the list is clearly incomplete,14 it included five “Casings and Infiltrations” that were uncovered and presumably thwarted as a result of U.S. and allied law enforcement or intelligence counteraction. An analysis of known counterterrorism cases,15 combined with this list of thwarted plots, reveals the following: – 2001 Tasking: In 2001, al Qaeda sent Ali Saleh al-Marri to facilitate postSeptember 11 attacks in the United States, but law enforcement authorities arrested the individual. – The Gas Station Tasking: In approximately 2003, Majid Khan was tasked to collect targeting information on U.S. gas stations and their support mechanisms on behalf of a senior al Qaeda planner. – Iyman Faris and the Brooklyn Bridge: In 2003, and in conjunction with a partner nation, the U.S. government arrested and prosecuted Iyman Faris, who was exploring the destruction of the Brooklyn Bridge in New York. Faris pleaded guilty to providing material support to al Qaeda and is serving a 20-year sentence in a Federal correctional institution. – 2003 Tasking: In 2003, an unidentified individual was tasked by an al Qaeda leader to conduct reconnaissance on populated areas in the United States. – The U.S. Government and Tourist Sites Tasking: In 2003 and 2004, an unidentified individual was tasked by al Qaeda to case important U.S. government and tourist targets within the United States.16

The cases highlighted by the White House, along with others outlined in this chapter, all have common threads: the operatives were directed personally by KSM, met with or were hand-selected by al Qaeda senior leadership (bin Laden and Atef), and the potential targets were considered for attack on or well after 9/11. These cases do not represent the first time that Islamic militants conducted surveillance and operations in the United States. In the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993,17 the New York Landmarks Plot (Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, the United Nations, and 26 Federal Plaza) in 1994, and in the Ahmed Ressam case (Los Angeles International Airport), Islamic militants conducted—or were planning to conduct—surveillance of U.S. targets. In December 1999, Ahmed Ressam, an operative run by senior al Qaeda “emir” (leader) Abu Zubayda, planned on his own to go to Los Angeles from Canada and surveil one of three airports in Los Angeles with an associate until he found “a good one” in which to conduct a suitcase bombing during the millennium celebrations.18 Fortunately, he was caught crossing the border into Washington on December 14 before he could scout any targets. Abu Zubayda, who Ressam testified was a “talent

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scout” for al Qaeda, was also responsible for bringing American Jose Padilla to KSM for possible use in a future terrorist attack.19 Khalid Sheik Mohammed While one of Abu Zubayda’s operatives came close to infiltrating the United States on his own, KSM was successfully recruiting a variety of operatives for multiple, parallel U.S. missions to collect potential targeting information. KSM himself had lived in the United States from 1986 to 1987 in North Carolina while attending college. Being familiar with life in the United States, and having traveled extensively around the world, he personally taught most of his operatives to communicate, travel, and survive in the West.20 He had a good feel for who would make a successful operative. He was involved in the selection and vetting of at least four compartmentalized groups of operatives who would operate in the United States surveilling potential future targets, as well as an additional operative who would manage a way station to resettle future al Qaeda members arriving in the United States (see Figure 25.1). KSM reportedly told interrogators that he believed that New York City was the economic capitol of the United States.21 The purpose of the 9/11 attack was to “wake the American people up,” and this could not be done by hitting strictly military or government targets.22 This explains his preoccupation with hitting financial or economic targets, particularly in the New York area, and his operatives were tasked accordingly. Group 1: The 9/11 Hijackers The first and most successful group KSM worked with was the 9/11 pilots, who not only surveilled their targets, but attacked them as well.23 The initial target selection was done by bin Laden, Muhammed Atef, and KSM in the spring of 1999, and included the White House, the U.S. Capitol, the Pentagon, and the World Trade Center.24 While bin Laden personally communicated this targeting preference to lead pilot Muhammed Atta in early 2000 in Afghanistan, ultimately, the final decisions on which targets to hit rested entirely in the hands of the hijacker pilots. Atta would not finalize them until late August 2001, after surveillance was complete.25 Once they entered the United States in May and June 2001, Atta, the other three pilots, and muscle hijacker Nawaf al-Hamzi (who had been designated second-in-command to Atta) conducted a number of transcontinental surveillance flights in the United States to determine passenger screening, aircraft internal security, the best places to sit, and attack timing and coordination. They encountered no problems bringing box cutters aboard the flights, and determined that the best time to take over the

AQ External Operations

AQ Leadership Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

Usama bin Ladin and Mohammed Atef

Ammar al-Baluchi

Iyman Faris

Majid Khan

Uzair Paracha

Nuradin Abdi

Mustafa al-Hawsawi

Ali Saleh al-Marri

Dhiren Barot Also: Nadeem Tarmohammed Qaisar Shaffi

Jose Padilla

Binyam Muhammed

Adnan el-Shukrijumah

Aafia Siddique

Figure 25.1 Al-Qaeda Surveillance Operatives in the United States, 2000–2003.

9/11 Hijacker Pilots

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cockpit was 10–15 minutes into the flight, when the cockpit doors were open for the first time.26 Training and practice flights to hone pilot skills clearly played a role in refining the group’s preparation for the attack. Hani Hanjour and Ziad Jarrah both flew the Hudson Corridor along the Hudson River which passes New York landmarks like the World Trade Center. Hanjour and al-Hamzi also flew from New Jersey to Maryland, which would have allowed him to fly near Washington, DC. Atta reportedly stated that these two operatives also had rented a small plane and flown reconnaissance flights near the Pentagon, Hanjour’s ultimate target. Atta stated to an intermediary at a meeting in Spain that he had considered targeting a nuclear facility—which had been on KSM’s original ten-plane target list—he had seen during familiarization flights near New York, but dropped it because the other pilots thought the airspace around it would be restricted, making reconnaissance flights impossible and increasing the possibility that the jet would be shot down prior to impact.27 Additionally, according to KSM, Atta used a computer program to locate a nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, which bin Laden initially agreed to add to the target list, but which was later scratched.28 The 9/11 pilots benefited because they did not have to do close-in, on-the-ground surveillance of their targets, reducing their exposure to local security and law enforcement scrutiny, minimal as it was prior to the 9/11 attacks.29 They were utilizing large weapons against large targets, and flying over whatever security existed on the ground. Their primary barriers were at the airports and on the planes themselves, and they devised simple, effective workarounds based on their cross-country surveillance flights. Their travel document and communications tradecraft worked well in the pre-9/11 world, and only one muscle hijacker, Mohammed al-Qahtani, currently held in the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, was unable to enter the United States when he arrived in Orlando, Florida, on August 4, 2001.30 Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi, KSM’s moneyman located in the United Arab Emirates, kept the hijackers well supplied with cash for their training and expenses.31 After 9/11, however, things were to get more difficult for operatives entering the United States. Group 2: Dhiren Barot and Financial Targets KSM reportedly told his debriefers that he was always working on more than one operation at a time. KSM claimed to anticipate “some residual effects from September 11. He knew he would no longer be able to use operatives from the Middle East,”32 but he apparently never counted on the security dragnet that occurred in the United States and elsewhere, nor the international cooperation. KSM started adapting prior to 9/11 by trying to find operatives who already lived in the United States, or at least in

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countries with preferential access to the United States, such as the United Kingdom. Therefore, at bin Laden’s direction, he sent operative and British citizen Issa al-Britani to the United States in early 2001 to case potential economic and “Jewish” targets in New York City.33 Issa, whose real name is Dhiren Barot, is a Hindu convert to Islam born in either the United Kingdom or India, and British-educated. He allegedly had been an instructor at an extremist training camp in Afghanistan in 1998, and claimed that he fought in Kashmir, writing a book about his experiences titled The Army of Madinah in Kashmir.34 Barot, using a student visa, reportedly applied to a New York area college in June 2000, and even though he was admitted to that school in 2000–2001, he never enrolled or attended any classes at that college. He flew to the New York area twice from the United Kingdom: first from August 17 to November 14, 2000, with conspirator Nadeem Tarmohamed, and again from March 11 to April 8, 2001, with Tarmohamed and Qaisar Shaffi. According to a Department of Justice indictment, during this time they visited and conducted surveillance . . . on buildings and surrounding neighborhoods in the United States, including the International Monetary Fund World Headquarters and the World Bank Headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Prudential Corporate Plaza and World Headquarters Building in Newark, New Jersey, and the New York Stock Exchange Building and the Citigroup Center in Manhattan, New York. This surveillance allegedly included, among other things, video surveillance conducted in Manhattan in or about April 2001. The indictment alleges that the surveillance was part of the conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction.35

Barot reportedly lived in New Jersey, using his student status as a cover.36 This cover apparently worked well, for the surveillance plans he outlined reportedly were very detailed, according to press accounts. They included descriptions of what vehicles would be able to enter the basement of the Prudential building, potential getaway routes (implying they were not suicide attacks), and notes on a visit to Newark City hall to (unsuccessfully) gather blueprints.37 However, Barot was not arrested in the United States, but in the United Kingdom in early August 2004, soon after the July arrest of alleged al Qaeda operative and computer expert Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan in Pakistan, who reportedly had copies of the surveillance plans on his computer and compact discs. The discovery led U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials to declare an “orange alert” for the financial sector on August 1, 2004, even though the casing reports were old.38 Little else is known about these plans, such as whether Barot was going to be responsible for carrying them out, or if they

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were meant to be tasked to another team of al Qaeda operatives; perhaps more will come to light when Barot is put on trial in the United Kingdom or extradited to the United States. Group 3: Iyman Faris and Bridges, Cargo Planes, Gas Stations, and Malls The fact that Barot remained at large for almost a year after KSM’s arrest in March 2003 made him an anomaly. Most of KSM’s operatives in the United States were rounded up soon after his capture. Iyman Faris, his relative Majid Khan, and associate Nuradin Abdi were arrested within weeks or months of KSM’s capture, as was Khan associate Uzair Paracha (see Figure 25.2, shaded area). Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir and living in Columbus, Ohio, is known as the operative who admitted in his plea bargain to surveilling the Brooklyn Bridge for KSM, as well as researching the types of means necessary to destroy it. Faris was a cross-country truck driver, an occupation that could afford him many opportunities to surveil almost any U.S. target al Qaeda wished. As part of his plea bargain, he described meeting bin Laden while at a training camp in Afghanistan, and in early 2002 met “the number three man” to bin Laden, clearly a reference to KSM.39 KSM asked him what he could do for the group, and Faris volunteered information on his occupation as a truck driver, his trucking routes, and deliveries for airport cargo planes, in which KSM said he was interested because cargo planes would hold “more weight and more fuel.”40 Faris was eventually tasked with the Brooklyn Bridge surveillance, obtaining “gas cutters” to sever the suspension cables, and tools to derail trains. Faris traveled to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge, and concluded that the plot to destroy the bridge by severing cables would fail because of the bridge’s security and structure. In early 2003, he sent a coded message that “the weather is too hot”—an indication that the bridge plot was unlikely to succeed.41 In March 2003, he reportedly turned himself over to U.S. authorities.42 Little is known of Faris’ associate, Nuradin Abdi. He reportedly owned a cellular telephone business in Columbus, Ohio, where he lived for two to three years and has a family.43 While he was accused by the Justice Department of plotting to blow up an area mall, he was formally charged with immigration fraud. The indictment alleges that on April 27, 1999, Abdi applied to immigration officials for a travel document, allowing him to leave the United States and later return. Abdi indicated in the application that he intended to visit Germany and Saudi Arabia. The FBI alleges that Abdi’s true destination was to attend a military-style terrorist training camp in Ethiopia. According to a detention motion, Abdi sought training

Operative

1st Half, 2000

2nd Half, 2000

1st Half, 2001

9/11 Hijacker Pilots

2nd Half, 2001

1st Half, 2002

2nd Half, 2002

1st Half, 2003 (KSM Captured Mar 03)

2nd Half, 2003

1st Half, 2004

2nd Half, 2004

9/11 Attacks

Iyman Faris

Arrested Nuradin Abdi Majid Khan

Arrested

?

?

Arrested

Uzair Paracha

Arrested

Dhiren Barot Cell

Arrested

Ali Saleh AlMarri

Arrested Jose Padilla/ Binyam Muhammed

Arrested

Adnan ElShukrijumah

Figure 25.2 Timeline of AQ Operatives in the US, 2000–2003.

Fled U.S. Location Unknown

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in guerilla warfare and in using radios, weapons, and explosives. The FBI stated in a detention motion that Abdi’s purpose in seeking training was to ready himself to participate in violent Jihad conflicts overseas and to lend support to activities that his al Qaeda co-conspirators might ask him to perform in the United States. In March 2000, Abdi reentered the United States from Africa, using a fraudulent immigration document. According to the FBI, Faris picked him up at an airport, and upon their return to the Columbus area, Abdi, Faris, and other unnamed conspirators allegedly initiated a plot to blow up a Columbus-area shopping mall. It is also alleged that in pursuit of this plot, Abdi received explosives training from one of the conspirators. Abdi was arrested on November 28, 2003. Since the plot apparently was disrupted in the early planning stages, it is unclear how much, if any, formal surveillance had been accomplished against potential targets. A soft target like a mall could be surveilled at the operative’s leisure, while conducting normal and legitimate business. Finally, after the 9/11 attacks, KSM reportedly revived plans that he had previously been contemplating to attack a series of gas stations in the United States. He reportedly tasked a former resident of Baltimore and relative of Faris named Majid Khan to “move forward” on Khan’s plan to destroy several U.S. gas stations by “simultaneously detonating explosives in the stations’ underground storage tanks.”44 Khan traveled at least briefly to the United States, where he tried unsuccessfully to seek asylum. His family members reportedly are longtime Baltimore residents and own gas stations in that city. When Khan reported that the storage tanks were unprotected and easy to attack, KSM wanted to be sure that explosive charges would cause a massive eruption of flame and destruction. KSM told interrogators that he and Khan discussed a plan to use a Karachi-based import–export business run by the father of convicted operative Uzair Paracha to smuggle explosives into the United States. Paracha agreed to help Khan obtain a travel document that would allow Khan to reenter the United States. According to U.S. prosecutors, in February and March 2003, Paracha posed as Khan during telephone calls with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, called Khan’s bank, and attempted to gather information about Khan’s immigration paperwork via the Internet. Paracha also agreed to use Khan’s credit card to make it appear that Khan was in the United States, when in fact Khan was in Pakistan. In addition, KSM reportedly told interrogators that a woman named Aafia Siddiqui, a U.S. visa holder who lived in the United States for a decade, rented a post office box to help Khan establish his U.S. identity. Siddiqui was supposed to support “other AQ operatives as they entered the United States,” according to a description of the plot. Siddiqui reportedly fled to Pakistan, and is the subject of an FBI “Seeking Information” notice.45

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Group 4: Jose Padilla and Apartment Buildings The story of alleged “dirty bomber” Jose Padilla is well known, and the subject of a lengthy Department of Defense (DOD) statement previously cited in this chapter.46 It is now alleged that he and his accomplice, U.K. resident Binyam Muhammed, were en route to the United States to bomb apartment buildings in New York (and possibly gas stations), not to conduct a radiological attack, as first stated by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft.47 They were both arrested—Padilla on May 8, 2002, at Chicago O’Hare airport, and Muhammed on April 10, 2002, at a Pakistani airport, where he was traveling on a forged passport—before they could conduct surveillance. However, Padilla, as a U.S. citizen, would already know the ins and outs of renting an apartment in the United States, which is clearly a “soft” target. He allegedly was to conduct Internet research once he arrived in the United States to locate apartments using natural gas heating. The gas was to be trapped in the apartment and detonated with an explosive device, destroying the building.48 His original partner in this plot, Adnan el Shukrijumah, allegedly trained with Padilla in Afghanistan. Padilla recognized him from the United States (el Shukrijumah had lived in Pembroke Pines, Florida, when Padilla attended a mosque there), but the mission was abandoned when the two could not get along, and eventually Muhammed was substituted for el Shukrijumah.49 El Shukrijumah, like Padilla, would have already known how to rent rooms in targeted apartment buildings. He reportedly lived in the United States for six years and received an associate’s degree from a Florida college. He reportedly surveilled targets in New York, as well as the Panama Canal, although this cannot be confirmed by official sources.50 All three met previously defined criteria for a U.S. mission: they were hand-selected and trained by al Qaeda senior leadership, and two were tasked directly by KSM. Binyam Muhammed and Padilla were both apprehended shortly after senior facilitator Abu Zubayda’s arrest on March 28, 2002, in Pakistan, implying that his arrest subsequently led to theirs.51 El Shukrijumah is still at large and the subject of an FBI manhunt. The Lone Wolf: Ali Saleh al-Marri Little was known publicly about Qatari national Ali Saleh Kahlah alMarri until April 2006, when a declassified DOD document was filed in a South Carolina federal court.52 Al-Marri, who was designated as an enemy combatant by the United States in June 2003, was arrested in December 2001. The initial indictment against al-Marri charged him only with making false statements to FBI agents, banks in Illinois, identity fraud, and access device (credit card numbers) fraud. Al-Marri was asked if he had ever called a telephone number in the United Arab Emirates that the FBI

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believed was associated with KSM financial facilitator Mustafa Ahmed alHawsawi. Al-Marri allegedly told the agents he had not called the number when, in fact, he had called the number on several occasions. He entered the United States on September 10, 2001, purportedly to pursue a graduate degree in computer information systems from Bradley University; when asked by the FBI if he had visited the United States previously, he stated that he had in 1991, when in fact he had been in the United States as recently as the summer of 2000.53 The declassified DOD statement paints a fuller picture of his alleged activities. Al-Marri is alleged to be a “sleeper agent” of sorts, specifically tasked by KSM to travel to the United States because, as a married father of five who had no criminal record and had studied in the United States, he could blend in more easily than a bachelor. The DOD statement against him claims that he was sent to the United States for “the purpose of engaging in and facilitating terrorist activities subsequent to” 9/11. He reportedly met personally with bin Laden, and was asked to explore computer hacking methods to disrupt the U.S. financial system. He was also trained in the use of poisons, and authorities discovered detailed information concerning poisons on his computer. He reportedly had bookmarks in an almanac, marking entries for dams, reservoirs, and railroads.54 Al-Marri’s profile fits the stated desire of KSM to have a new type of operative in the United States post-9/11. He does not appear to be a surveillant in the traditional physical sense, but more of a “cyber surveillant” who would look for financial targets to attack. More importantly, his ability to set up a “way station” in the United States and resettle follow-on operatives would make him more valuable for facilitating future operations. As he admitted, KSM underestimated the post-9/11 security environment in the United States, the sudden suspicion by average Americans of all Muslims, and the retooled capabilities of the FBI and the broader intelligence community. His operatives also didn’t suspect that KSM apparently would provide key clues leading to their arrests so soon after his own.55 DEFEATING TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. HOMELAND Having looked at KSM’s effort, although only partially successful, to conduct terrorist intelligence and reconnaissance activities in the United States, three basic questions come to mind: – Could al Qaeda attempt another surveillance effort against the United States again? – What would such an attempt look like? and – How can the United States detect and disrupt such an effort?

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Could al Qaeda Attempt It Again? Certainly, al Qaeda still has operatives—such as Adnan el Shukrijumah, Aafia Siddique, and U.S. citizen Adam Gadahn—who are available to try and infiltrate the United States, but they are now well known and the subjects of FBI “Seeking Information” bulletins.56 Surveillance attempts in the future would thus likely rely more heavily on non-Arabs with “clean” backgrounds. KSM, as part of this Southeast Asia plotting, was looking for operatives from that area of the world. Europe has discovered the perils of having large, poorly documented Pakistani, North African, and African Muslim populations, as attested by the Madrid and London subway bombings, as well as several thwarted attacks. The revelation in November 2005 that a Belgian female convert to Islam, Muriel Degauque, conducted a suicide attack in Iraq increases the range of potential Western operatives exponentially. What Would Such an Attempt Look Like? Such a surveillance operation in the future will likely be without the central direction that KSM attempted. The ongoing, relentless destruction of the pre-9/11 “core” al Qaeda senior and mid-level leadership by the United States and its allies makes it more difficult to conduct KSM’s “hands-on” management style. KSM and his two reported replacements as al Qaeda #3, Abu Faraj al-Libi and Hamza Rabia, have been captured or killed, as has been the group’s “emir” in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is undoubtedly more difficult, if not impossible, for bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri to handpick future U.S. operatives. In this case, the globally inspired, locally directed, decentralized operational model seen in the Madrid and London subway attacks, and the June 2006 arrests in Toronto, will be the norm. These operatives can directly surveil any soft target easily, probably in the course of their daily routine, and supplement it with innocuous Internet and library research. While future operatives probably will not be formally trained in surveillance techniques, there is certainly enough jihadist and other training material available on the Internet— along with readily available commercial technologies such as digital cameras and satellite imagery—to create useful targeting packages. One recent example is the case of Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed, two Atlanta-area men arrested in an international terrorism investigation. In April 2006, federal prosecutors alleged that they reportedly videotaped the U.S. Capitol, the Masonic Temple, the World Bank, and a fuel storage facility a year earlier, and were preparing to send the casing videos to “overseas brothers,” a possible reference to fellow jihadists. They also allegedly traveled to “the mountains of Georgia to

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conduct military-style training exercises.”57 There are also numerous press accounts linking the two men to the June 2006 Toronto arrests previously mentioned.58 How Can the United States Detect and Disrupt Such an Effort? Returning to Bruce Hoffman’s premise (offered at the beginning of this chapter), he also usefully suggested that the United States “establish a dedicated counterintelligence center to obstruct terrorist reconnaissance.” Given the highly fluid and transnational nature of the threat faced by the United States, a separate counterterrorism unit should be established within the U.S. intelligence community. This unit should be dedicated specifically to identifying and targeting the intelligence-gathering and reconnaissance activities of terrorist organizations.59

The first and most effective use of such a counterintelligence center (or perhaps, “countersurveillance center”) would be to aggressively investigate and “run-to-ground” the most serious or suspicious of the many “suspicious activity” reports received by the U.S. government on a daily basis through a variety of channels.60 This includes cross-referencing them with known threat reporting or ongoing terrorism cases. While this is a basic law enforcement and counterintelligence function, it is more difficult than it looks, and to date, there are no known cases in the United States where terrorists have been detected or caught while in the act of surveilling U.S. targets, including all of the cases previously cited in this chapter. Recent case history suggests that even the most apparent and welldocumented cases of alleged preoperational surveillance are not always what they appear at first blush, and demonstrate some of the limitations of this approach. For example, in July 2004, Pakistani national Kamran Akhtar—accused of living in the United States illegally—was arrested while videotaping skyscrapers in Charlotte, North Carolina, including one that held the local FBI office. A subsequent FBI review of other videos taken by Akhtar reportedly found footage of the Bank of America building, the Texas governor’s mansion, and the public transit systems in Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, and New Orleans. He ultimately was deported in early 2005 on immigration violations, but background checks turned up no links to terrorism, and his lawyer claimed he was just a video buff.61 Similar suspicious filming activity by three men around the Sears Tower (considered by both bin Laden and KSM for 9/11 and post-9/11 attacks62 ) and the Boeing Corporate Headquarters in Chicago in March 2006 made the news, but has not been linked to actual terrorist activity.63

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Realistically, the probability of detecting and catching a terrorist in the act of surveilling a target, particularly a target without a dedicated countersurveillance team assigned to it, is extremely low. Consider the potential probabilities for each of the following steps to be accomplished in order for a suspected surveillance incident to be witnessed, reported, and acted on: – Step 1: Probability that someone sees an individual(s) carrying out possible surveillance – Step 2: Probability that the eyewitness accurately records pertinent information – Step 3: Probability the eyewitness reports the incident to the proper authorities in a timely manner – Step 4: Probability that the authorities conduct a timely and thorough investigation before the operatives leave the target area

If one assigns a very optimistic probability of a 90 percent success rate to each of these four steps, then the overall probability of a successful interdiction is about 65 percent. If the probability of success of any of the steps drops, then the overall probability of detection drops with it. For example, if the probability of initially seeing a suspected surveillance incident drops to a more realistic 50 percent (taking into account any effective tradecraft on the part of the surveillant), then the overall interdiction success rate drops to 36 percent, and so forth with a reduction in each of the four simple variables listed here (each of which can have its own subvariables in more complicated formulations). Factoring in that there may only be a handful of al Qaeda surveillance operatives active in the United States at any given time (a judgment based on the KSM-directed cases outlined in this chapter), then the probability of catching a particular operative in the act of conducting surveillance against a narrow set of “soft” targets such as malls or gas stations is lower still. Moreover, practical experience suggests that trying to track and correlate all reported suspicious incidents is unlikely to produce much actionable intelligence either, especially considering the manpower that would be needed to collect, catalog, and analyze thousands of such incidents every year, many of which lack sufficient detail (such as name(s), drivers license information, license plate number, etc.) to properly investigate. Such a “needle in a haystack” approach, taking into account the thousands of possible targets in the United States, is counterproductive. For example, if there are five incidents in a week at a single tourist site involving an unidentified blue car possibly videotaping the site, is it indicative of preoperational planning, or is it just a popular site to visit and perhaps local car rental agencies rent a lot of blue cars to tourists? It is impractical for local law enforcement agencies to chase around blue cars and question

518

Strategic and Tactical Considerations

every tourist at every popular tourist site; it is also dangerous to make threat predictions based on such unconfirmed data. A key component of a successful countersurveillance center will be the integration of domestic and foreign immigration expertise and databases, and information on daily immigration “stops” at U.S. ports of entry. An excellent study published on the fourth anniversary of 9/11 revealed that out of 94 foreign-born terrorists who operated in the United States, the study found that about two-thirds (59) committed immigration fraud prior to or in conjunction with taking part in terrorist activity.64 Out of 59 terrorists who violated the law, many committed multiple immigration violations—79 instances in all. Most notably, 20 out of 21 foreign terrorists became naturalized U.S. citizens, demonstrating that the “homegrown” terrorism problem is not a new phenomenon in the United States. Many of the terrorists cited in the report had telltale indications of illegal activity that, at a minimum, should have resulted in detention and further investigation, if not outright deportation or jail time. The report concludes that “strict enforcement of immigration law—at American consulates overseas, at ports of entry, and within the United States— must be an integral part of our efforts to prevent future attacks on U.S. soil.”65 Finally, as seen in the KSM surveillance network, a countersurveillance center will have to be proactive in the questioning of newly captured terrorist planners, financiers and facilitators, and exploiting documents and other media seized with them. Preparing a standing list of questions for interrogators would be useful. How many of KSM’s operatives would still be at large if he did not play a role in turning them in? As Figure 25.2 illustrates, most were caught soon after KSM’s arrest, while others—notably Jose Padilla and Binyam Muhammed—were caught only weeks after Abu Zubayda’s arrest. The rapid exploitation of information from newly detained terrorists has been at the heart of good investigative work throughout the history of modern counterterrorism, and is no different today in protecting the United States from al Qaeda surveillance teams. A domestic countersurveillance center, while a good idea, will have to be carefully constructed to include the measures discussed here. In addition, the U.S. government will have to determine in which agency it will reside—the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), DHS, or the FBI. It will clearly have to be interagency in nature, integrating experts from a number of disciplines, and have counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and law enforcement capabilities and databases. Based on the haphazard and not always successful bureaucratic counterterrorism efforts attempted by the U.S. government since 9/11, particularly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center-to-NCTC evolution, it remains to be seen whether the U.S. government can formulate a coherent and effective terrorist countersurveillance strategy and organization in the U.S. homeland.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government. NOTES 1. I use the word “surveillance” as opposed to the word “reconnaissance.” The first word implies a more passive collection of information, usually through long-term observation, whereas the second implies a more proactive probing of target security. For the purposes of this chapter, the two concepts are interchangeable. The verb “case” or “casing” also is sometimes used. 2. For a profile of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and an account of how he was captured, please see the chapter by Robert Wesley in Volume 3 of this publication. 3. Bruce Hoffman and Kim Cragin, “Four Lessons from Five Countries,” Rand Review 26(2) (Summer 2002): 43. 4. This cycle was revealed during the East Africa Bombing trials in New York in 2000. See the author’s article, Stefan Leader and Aaron Danis, “Tactical Insights from the Trial,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 13(8) (August 2001): 48–49. 5. For a detailed analysis of this terror attack, please see the chapter by Sundara Vadlamudi in Volume 3 of this publication. 6. United States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Ali Mohamed, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS), New York, October 20, 2000, pp. 27–28.; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), p. 68. 7. The best source for this plot and how the surveillance was conducted is Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Singapore, White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, January 7, 2003, pp. 26, 29. A good synopsis is available in the Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (April 2002), pp. 24–25. For more on Hambali’s links to al Qaeda, see The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 151–153. 8. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 152–153. For a detailed analysis on the USS Cole attack, please see the chapter by Ruth Margolies Beitler in Volume 3 of this publication. 9. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 158–159. 10. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, AFGP-2002-000080 and AFGP-2002-000078, found at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq 000080.asp and http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq 000078.asp. AFGP-2002-000078 is merely a continuation of the other document, outlining the details of all the committees except for the Surveillance Committee. 11. The most accessible training manual is the so-called Manchester Manual, which was originally published by the U.S. Department of Justice on its Web site but has since been pulled down. The same version is available at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Web site at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/ para/manualpart1.html. See Chapters 11 (Espionage: Information-Gathering Using Open Sources) and 12 (Espionage: Information-Gathering Using Covert Methods). Other surveillance training information has been published on jihadist bulletin boards since the beginning of the Iraq insurgency.

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12. Hamza Hendawi, “Terror Manual Advises on Targets,” The Associated Press, February 1, 2002; see also Ahmad Musa, “Cairo Paper’s ‘Exclusive’ of ‘10 Episodes’ of ‘Handwritten’ Al-Qa’ida Documents,” Cairo Nahdat Misr in Arabic, FBIS GMP20040913000140, September 11, 2004, p. 3; Ahmad Musa, “Cairo Paper Carries 4th of ‘10 Episodes’ of ‘Handwritten’ Al-Qa’ida Documents,” Cairo Nahdat Misr in Arabic, FBIS GMP20040914000099, September 14, 2004, pp. 1, 5. 13. Skyscrapers (9/11 attack), ports (USS Cole attack), airports (LAX), nuclear power plants (9/11 plot), and places where large numbers of people gather like football grounds (Madrid and London subways, Bali attacks) and major public gatherings such as Christmas celebrations (Strasbourg, France outdoor market plot in December 2000). 14. Sara Kehaulani Goo, “List of Foiled Plots Puzzling to Some,” Washington Post, October 23, 2005, p. A06. Richard Reid, the infamous “shoe bomber,” is one such case that was left off the White House list. 15. New York University School of Law, “Prosecuting Terrorism: The Legal Challenge,” The NYU Review of Law and Security 7 (April 2006): 16–21. 16. The White House, Fact Sheet: Plots, Casings, and Infiltrations Referenced in President Bush’s Remarks on the War on Terror, October 6, 2005, http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-7.html. 17. For an analysis of this attack, please see the chapter by Daniel Baracskay in Volume 3 of this publication. 18. Testimony of Ahmed Ressam, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Mokhyar Haouari, S(4) 00 Cr. 15 (JFK), New York, July 3, 2001, p. 573; The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 176–179. 19. Department of Defense, “Summary of Jose Padilla’s Activities with al Qaida,” released May 28, 2004, pp. 3–4. This was presented to the public as part of a press conference by Deputy U.S. Attorney General James Comey on June 1, 2004, http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm. The summary, minus the DOD coverletter, is available at the FAS Web site at http://www.fas.org/ irp/news/2004/06/padilla060104.pdf. 20. See The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 145–148 for a thumbnail biographical sketch of KSM, and pp. 157–158 on his personal training of key terrorist operatives; see Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2003) or Terry McDermott, Perfect Soldiers (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005) for more detailed accounts of KSM’s early career as a terrorist. 21. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 153. 22. United States v. Moussaoui, Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (58 pages), introduced by prosecutors at the Zacarias Moussaoui trial on March 28, 2006, p. 11. This amazing document contains additional details about the 9/11 plot not found in The 9/11 Commission Report. It can be downloaded from http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX-0941.pdf. 23. The author assumes that the reader is familiar enough with the 9/11 plot that he will not use space recounting the planning and execution in its entirety, but focus on the surveillance aspects. 24. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 155; see also Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, op.cit., pp. 27–28. KSM claimed that he allegedly had a

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ten-aircraft plot in mind, which included all the 9/11 targets, plus the CIA and FBI headquarters, nuclear power plants, and the tallest buildings in California and the state of Washington. This idea was deemed too grandiose by bin Laden; see The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 154. 25. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 243; Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, op. cit., p. 28. 26. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 242, 245. 27. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 242, 244–245, n148. 28. Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, op. cit., p. 13. 29. An interesting side story to the 9/11 attacks is the infamous alleged casing video shot inside the World Trade Center by Ghasoub al-Abrash Ghalyoun, a Syrian living in Spain who claimed to be vacationing in the United States. Ghalyoun was an alleged member of a Spain-based al Qaeda cell led by Eddin Yarkas. The video came to light during the Spanish investigation into the cell, and also reportedly showed a number of other U.S. landmarks, including the Statue of Liberty, the Brooklyn Bridge, the Sears Tower, the Golden Gate Bridge, the Hollywood sign, and Disneyland, shot in five cities over 21 days in August 1997. The Spanish believe the video exceeds basic tourist curiosity and was passed to an al Qaeda courier and sent to Afghanistan, but could offer no proof. Ghalyoun was ultimately acquitted. See The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 530, n145; Giles Tremlett, “Court Told Man Filmed US Sites for 9/11 Terrorists,” The UK Guardian, April 28, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/september11/story/ 0,,1471839,00.html; the original Spanish indictment (in Spanish) from 2002 can be found at http://www.trackingthethreat.com/genBinaries/1024 entity.pdf; the relevant sections are pp. 160–166, 441–447. 30. For the numerous reasons why al Qahtani was not allowed to enter the United States (none of which had anything to do with being a terrorist), see United States v. Moussaoui, Substitution for the Testimony of Mohammed Manea Ahmad alQahtani, March 28, 2006, pp. 4–5; The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 248 (last name is rendered as Kahtani), p. 235, n107. 31. Al-Hawsawi was not the only facilitator. Ammar al-Baluchi was an important “jack of all trades” logistician, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh became KSM’s cutout for direct communications with Atta. See Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, op. cit., p. 26, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, United States of America v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Alexandria Division, “Stipulation Regarding Culpable Conspirators,”April 20, 2006, pp. 1–4; and Richard A. Serrano, “Al Qaida Agent’s 9/11 Role Comes into Focus,” Los Angeles Times, May 21, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-nabaluchi21may21,1,6708051,full.story?coll=la-headlines-nation. 32. Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, op. cit., p. 40. 33. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 150. 34. Chidanand Rajghatta, “Dhiren Barot: India-born Jihadi in 9/11 Net,” The Times of India Web site, August 18, 2004, http://timesofindia.indiatimes. com/articleshow/818941.cms; Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Bin Laden’s Mystery Man—British Authorities Provide Details of a Terror Plot Narrowly Averted—and the Al Qaida Operative at Its Center,” Newsweek Web exclusive, August 20, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5738292/site/newsweek/;

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Evan Kohlmann, “Federal Indictment Unsealed against Trio Accused of Targeting Citigroup, NYSE for Terror Attacks,” The Counterterrorism Blog, April 12, 2005, http://counterterror.typepad.com/the counterterrorism blog/2005/04/ federal indictm.html. 35. United States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of America v. Dhiren Barot, Nadeem Tarmohamed, and Qaisar Shaffi, Sealed Indictment 05CRIM.311, New York, April 12, 2005, pp. 2–4. 36. Mitchel Maddox, “FBI Says Al-Qaida Scout Used N.J. as Base,” Bergen County (New Jersey) Record, October 14, 2004, p. 1. 37. Ibid., pp. 1–2; Guy Martin, “Al-Qaida’s New York,” New York Magazine, May 9, 2005, http://newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/features/11896/; former New York City Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism Michael Sheehan is directly quoted on several aspects of Faris’ reports. 38. Daniel Klaidman and Evan Thomas, “Al-Qaida’s Pre-Election Plot,” Newsweek, August 16, 2004. 39. Department of Justice, “Ohio Truck Driver Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to al-Qaida,” Press Release, June 19, 2003; Department of Justice, “Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft—Pleas Agreement Announcement,” June 19, 2003; United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, United States of America v. Iyman Faris, “Statement of Facts,” June 19, 2003, pp. 1–4. 40. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 42. Kelli Arena and Terry Frieden, “Ohio Trucker Joined al Qaida Jihad,” CNN, June 19, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/19/alQaida.plea/. 43. Kimball Perry, “Mall Terror Plot ‘Serious’,” The Cincinnati Post, June 15, 2004, http://www.cincypost.com/2004/06/15/terr061504.html; Kevin Mayhood, “Government Appeal of Ruling on Arrest Likely to Delay Trial,” The Columbus Dispatch, September 16, 2005, http://www.dispatch.com/newsstory.php?story=dispatch/2005/09/16/20050916-B9-01.html&chck=t. 44. This section on Majid Khan draws heavily on the excellent early article on this topic, Daniel Klaidman, Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff, and Evan Thomas, “Al Qaida in America: The Enemy Within,” Newsweek, June 23, 2003, http://www.msnbc.com/news/926691.asp?0cv=KA01; also, FBI Director Mueller identified a former Baltimore resident, undoubtedly Khan, as “an al Qaida operative with direct associations” to KSM in his testimony on counterterrorism successes. See “Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Untied States Senate,” February 24, 2004. Finally, statements from Khan admitting to the gas station plot were introduced at the trial of fellow conspirator Uzair Paracha, and reported in various press accounts. 45. “Al Qaida in America: The Enemy Within,” Newsweek, op. cit.; United States Attorney Southern District of New York, “U.S. Convicts Pakistani of Providing Support to Al-Qaida,” Press Release, November 25, 2005; FBI, Aafia Siddiqui, “Seeking Information” Notice, http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/siddiqui.htm. 46. “Summary of Jose Padilla’s Activities with al Qaida,” op. cit. 47. Ibid., pp. 3–5; U.S. Military Commission, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, United States of America v. Binyam Ahmed Muhammed, no date, p. 4.

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48. “Summary of Jose Padilla’s Activities with al Qaida,” op. cit., p. 6. 49. Dan Eggen and Manuel Roig-Franzia, “FBI on Global Hunt for Saudi Al Qaida Suspect,” Washington Post, March 21, 2003, p. A7; “Summary of Jose Padilla’s Activities with al Qaida,” op. cit., pp. 3–5. 50. “Al Qaida in America: The Enemy Within,” op. cit.; for a video of el Shukrijumah in a class, see the FBI Web site, Adnan G. El Shukrijumah, “Seeking Information” Notice, http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/elshukrijumah.htm. As of the date of this writing, the video was disabled, but a transcript was available at http://www.fbi.gov/terrorinfo/adnan-text.htm. 51. Jason Burke, “How the Perfect Terrorist Plotted the Ultimate Crime,” The Observer, April 7, 2002, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/waronterrorism/story/ 0,1373,680320,00.html. 52. Declaration of Mr. Jeffrey N. Rapp, Director, Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism, 2:04-cv-02257-HFF-RSC, filed April 5, 2006 (declassified). 53. U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of Illinois, “West Peoria Man Charged in Central Illinois with Making False Statements in Investigation of September 11th Terror Attacks,” Press Release, May 22, 2003, http://www.usdoj .gov/usao/ilc/press/2003/may/052203almarri.html; United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Peoria Division, United States of America v. Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, Indictment, May 16, 2003; “Al Qaida in America: The Enemy Within,” op. cit. 54. “Al Qaida in America: The Enemy Within,” op. cit. 55. Ibid. 56. FBI, Adam Yahiye Gadahn, “Seeking Information” Notice, http://www.fbi. gov/terrorinfo/gadahn.htm. For more information on this individual, suspected of being al Qaeda spokesman “Azzam al-Amriki (Azzam the American),” see Amy Argetsinger, “Muslim Teen Made Conversion to Fury,” Washington Post, December 2, 2004, p. A3; the first of the two videos he is suspected of appearing in is posted on the FBI Web site at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct04/seekinfo103004.htm. 57. Jeremy Redmon and Bill Torpy, “Feds Trace Metro Atlanta Pair to D.C. in Terror Case,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, April 29, 2006, http://www.ajc. com/news/content/metro/atlanta/stories/0429mettech.html. 58. For example, see Bill Torpy, “Trip to Canada Fateful for Georgians: Authorities Say 2 Men Traveled to Toronto to Meet With Terror Plotters,” The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, June 11, 2006, http://www.ajc.com/search/content/metro/ stories/0611mettoronto.html. 59. “Four Lessons from Five Countries,” op. cit., p. 43. 60. See Walter Pincus, “Corralling Domestic Intelligence,” Washington Post, January 13, 2006, p. A5, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2006/01/12/AR2006011201852.html. 61. Ron Chepesiuk, “Pakistani Man Arrested While Videotaping Buildings May Stand Trial,” The New Standard, September 27, 2004, http:// newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/1043; Ariel Hart, “North Carolina: Deportation for Pakistani Who Taped F.B.I. Office,” New York Times, January 25, 2005, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 9E07E6D81F38F936A15752C0A9639C8B63&sec=&pagewanted=print. 62. Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, op. cit., pp. 13–14.

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63. Frank Main, “Activity at Sears Tower, Boeing Probed,” Chicago SunTimes, March 17, 2006, http://www.chicagoredstreak.com/output/news/cstnws-terror17.html. 64. Janice L. Kephart, Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, Center for Immigration Studies, September 2005, p. 5, http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/kephart.html. This study discusses how almost all of the operatives mentioned in this chapter entered the United States. 65. Ibid.

CHAPTER 26 FORECASTING TERRORIST GROUPS’ WARFARE: “CONVENTIONAL” TO CBRN Joshua Sinai

To forecast the spectrum of warfare that a terrorist group is likely to conduct against a specific adversary, this chapter proposes an indications and warning (I&W) methodology to comprehensively and systematically map all the significant indicators (as well as subindicators and observables) that need to be examined and correlated. The methodology presented in this chapter is intended to enable the counterterrorism community to forecast a terrorist group’s general warfare proclivity, as opposed to predicting an imminent attack. Forecasting is not the same as prediction. Predicting terrorism, in which individual actors act covertly, is vastly different from anticipating attacks by hostile conventional militaries which operate from conventional formations. Unlike conventional militaries, most terrorists do not use elaborate command and control infrastructures or mobilize large numbers of troops and equipment in their operations, which are typically small scale and surprise attacks.1 Moreover, prediction entails anticipating through the acquisition of tactical intelligence about an imminent terrorist attack. This involves uncovering a plot, identifying a group’s operatives and the attack’s timing, location, tactics, type of weapon, and target. For those tasked to predict imminent attacks, acquiring such tactical I&W is extremely difficult, and requires covert means, such as continuously surveilling a group’s activities or acquiring and using informants.

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Forecasting, on the other hand, involves determining at a more general level what a group’s modus operandi is likely to be, such as whether it is likely to conduct “conventional” versus “suicide” attacks (whether or not operatives will seek to stay alive or blow themselves up when conducting an operation), to be conservative or innovative in its tactics, or to resort to conventional low impact (CLI), conventional high impact (CHI) or chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) warfare,2 also known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).3 It is also difficult to predict future terrorist operations, because in most cases such operations are “rare” events due to a number of factors, including the difficulty of executing an operation against a more powerful state adversary or the ability of security services to thwart potential operations. Further, predicting imminent terrorist attacks is made more complicated because of the organizational learning nature of these groups, reflected in the continuous shifting of their modes of operation in order to exploit new vulnerabilities in their adversaries’ defenses.4 Moreover, the organizational formations of modern-day terrorism have been transformed from highly hierarchical to loosely affiliated and network-based, making it difficult to identify or track the activities of such less structured groupings. In addition, unlike the controlled environment of a scientific laboratory where scientific prediction is possible, the past is not always the best predictor of future terrorist operations. In the natural sciences, for example, meteorologists, have used sophisticated tools to attain a relatively high degree of accuracy in monitoring weather conditions, allowing them to predict the likelihood of rain or snow over a short-range period. Similarly, scientists can forecast months in advance the likelihood of hurricanes in a specific geographic region. This is due to the capability of “hindsight” projections based on previous historical data, or predictive projections based on the relatively constant nature of tropical weather and the ability of satellite and radar technologies to track hurricanes at the earliest phases of their development and paths. Similarly, early prediction of potentially damaging earthquakes is made possible by studying previous historical frequency patterns in a specific area, locations of fault systems, or the rate at which strain accumulates in the rock.5 However, even though it is possible to estimate where earthquakes are likely to occur, as Ruth Ludwin observes, “there is currently no reliable way to predict the days or months when an event will occur in any specific location.”6 Although not yet attaining the reliability level of predicting natural disasters, it is possible to forecast at a more general level the type of warfare likely to be launched by a terrorist group (or loosely affiliated grouping of individuals). For example, computer-based analyses of incident chronology databases can generate knowledge about terrorist incidents—whether aborted, thwarted, or successful—in order to map the likely geographical location and distribution of attacks and identify regions of greatest risk.

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Thus, for each terrorist group, the data produced by details and characteristics of previous attacks and “unsuccessful” operations can generate warning signals to predict the likelihood, frequency, and geographical locations of future attacks. It is still unknown, however, whether such data-driven trend analyses can attain the predictive validity of comparable analyses in the natural sciences. For example, can mathematical algorithms be incorporated into such tools, with appropriate weighting properties, to generate predictions of an imminent terrorist attack’s date, location, tactics, weapons, and targets? At the very least, the social sciences can provide a rigorous framework to forecast such data in more general terms—for example, by assigning the components of a group’s modus operandi as independent variables and the level or magnitude of terrorism as the dependent variable, in order to project likely future trends (as opposed to tactical information about imminent attacks). Thus, forecasting methodologies and tools can help us understand the evolution, patterns, and trajectory of terrorist activity conducted by an individual group or multiple groups, including changes in the profiles and characteristics of their operatives, and warfare trends such as “conventional” versus suicide attacks, or CLI, CHI, or CBRN operations. Due to these considerations, a key proposition in this chapter is that to adequately assess the likelihood and magnitude of the types of threats posed by contemporary terrorism, three issues need to be addressed. First, threat assessments need to focus on three types of warfare that characterize this spectrum of terrorist operations: CLI, CHI, and CBRN. Second, one needs to focus on the characteristics of terrorist groups that shape and define the type of warfare that they are likely to employ to achieve their objectives, starting with the nature of their leadership, motivation, strategy, supporting constituencies, and other factors such as capabilities, accelerators, triggers, and hurdles that are likely to propel them to pursue CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare (or a combination of the three). Third, we must focus our efforts on determining the disincentives and constraints that are likely (or not) to deter terrorist groups away from CBRN warfare, which is the most catastrophic (and difficult) form of potential warfare, particularly when these groups can resort to conventional explosives which have become increasingly more lethal and “catastrophic” in their impact. Analytically, therefore, terrorist groups currently operating on the international scene (or newly emergent ones) need to be viewed as potential CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare actors (or a combination of the three), based on an understanding of the I&W factors likely to propel them to embark on such types of warfare against their adversaries. To forecast the type of warfare that a group is likely to choose, we must first gain an understanding of terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic of warfare involving premeditated, politically motivated violence by subnational

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groups or clandestine agents against citizens of a state, whether civilian or military, in order to influence, coerce, and (sometimes) cause mass casualties and physical destruction upon their targets. This definition is a crucial component of forecasting, because one must consider whether future attacks will be carried out against civilian and military targets, as well as future trends in warfare such as mass casualty attacks. The type of warfare chosen by a terrorist group is also motivated by psychological considerations. Thus, terrorism is not only a form of physical warfare, as discussed above, but also a form of psychological warfare by nonstate actors against their more powerful state adversaries. In the terrorists’ decision-making calculus, the localized incident of the physical attack is intended not only to cause casualties and structural damage, but also to spread fear and anxiety throughout the larger society. Terrorists generally calibrate their warfare to maximize these objectives. The simultaneous suicide attacks by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 and the poisonous anthrax letter campaign later that year by a still undetermined perpetrator ushered in a new era of catastrophic terrorist warfare. Since then, reports in the media about training by al Qaeda operatives in chemical and biological warfare, as well as the group’s interest in acquiring radiological and nuclear weapons, are strong indicators that of their intention and potential capability to carry out catastrophic warfare involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and devices against their adversaries. For example, captured al Qaeda documents and training films demonstrate the magnitude of its interest and training in employing chemical weapons. Moreover, media reports about black market transactions by Russian and other organized criminal groups involved in trafficking various CBRN components are additional indicators that CBRN represents the next phase in catastrophic terrorist warfare. With the growing availability of CBRN weapons and devices, the final indicator to drive such catastrophic warfare is motivation. Leaders such as Osama bin Laden and his coterie of top advisers are considered most likely to engage in such warfare because of their ambition to propel their group and its affiliates on the international arena as a first order of magnitude technological destroyer and menace. Thus, the threat of terrorist CBRN catastrophic warfare is real and imminent. It is also based on several historical cases where at least some of the factors necessary to conduct such warfare have coalesced: r The 1984 Rajneeshee salmonella poisonings of the salad bars of several restaurants in Oregon;

r The 1990 Tamil Tiger’s chlorine gas attack on the Sri Lankan military; r The 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack against the Tokyo subway system; r The post 9/11 poisonous anthrax letter campaign;

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r The May 2002 arrest at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport of Jose Padilla, an al Qaeda operative, charged with plotting to detonate a radiological “dirty” bomb in the United States; and

r The January 2003 plot by an al Qaeda cell to employ ricin to lace the food supply at a British military base.

Whether actually executed, thwarted, or nascent plots, these efforts by terrorist groups have cumulatively crossed the threshold from “conventional” to CBRN terrorism, about which terrorism experts have been warning with increasing frequency since the mid-1990s. As a result, governments around the world have been spending billions of dollars annually in homeland security-related protective training, technologies, new organizational structures, preemptive strategies, and emergency response preparation. Nevertheless, “conventional” warfare still represents the predominant form of attacks by contemporary terrorist groups. In fact, “conventional” warfare can produce a large impact on the targeted adversary with minimal forces,7 as exemplified by the attacks against the transport sector in Madrid in March 2003 and London in July 2005. PREDICTING TYPES OF TERRORIST WARFARE In order to forecast the types of warfare most likely to be engaged in by terrorist groups, a trichotomous outcome (CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare) approach is hypothesized. The pre-incident activities by terrorist groups are the independent variables (X), while the trichotomous outcome is the dependent variable (Y). As discussed later in this chapter, the independent variables are related to each other, so they need to be correlated simultaneously. The premise is that if one can collect this type of intelligence information about terrorist groups, it will be possible to attain a sufficiently predictive accuracy, while recognizing that there will always remain a certainamount of “real world” uncertainty built into any I&W forecasting system. As demonstrated in Table 26.1, there are 31 I&W indicator categories that many analysts generally consider important for influencing and shaping a terrorist group’s warfare proclivity. Figure 26.1 illustrates the ordered grouping of these 31 I&W indicators by phases along the lethality and propensity axes (the phased ordering of the indicators is for analytic purposes only). Developing an accurate, timely, and actionable I&W indicators system to forecast a terrorist group’s warfare proclivity involves several steps. First, a threat assessment needs to be formulated that will generate warning “flags” that indicate a terrorist group’s “attack potential.” Several formulas can be used to derive a group’s “attack potential” (see Figure 26.2).

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Table 26.1 The Pre-Incident Four Phases of Terrorism’s 31 I&W Indicator Categories Group Formation


Plan


(1) Societal conditions (2) Radical subcultures (3) Types of groups

(14) Decisive (17) Acquisition (22) Tactics meeting (15) Recruitment (18) Development/ (23) Security production (16) Training (19) Testing (24) Communication (20) Weaponization (25) Logistics (21) Storage (26) Surveillance facilities (27) Targeting (28) Accelerators (29) Triggers

(4) Leadership (5) Motivation (6) Strategy (7) Agenda (8) Front organizations (political, economic, religious/charity) (9) Organization (10) Funding

Develop


Execute

(30) Internal hurdles (31) External hurdles

(11) Constituency (12) Foreign group linkages (13) State sponsor

Second, a terrorist group’s attack potential is derived from formulating hypotheses, which are broad explanatory statements that generate factors, which are more specific indicators suggesting a type of terrorist warfare proclivity. Indicators need to be considered in combination because no single factor is likely to indicate a particular warfare proclivity. Indicators can be combined to generate a group’s warfare proclivity by performing four tasks: r Task 1: Identifying the key observable CLI/CHI/CBRN characteristics concerning the 31 I&W indicator categories (i.e., information available to analysts from various sources) regarding terrorist group motivations and capabilities, and access to weapons, devices, and delivery systems, as well as accelerators, triggers, and internal and external hurdles, that would indicate a proclivity or disinclination to engage in “catastrophic” warfare.

r Task 2: Determining how to properly weight those indicators/observables in order to assign higher weights to potential CLI/CHI/CBRN proclivities that indicate a group is likely to pursue a particular type of warfare. For example, the

Forecasting Terrorist Groups’ Warfare

31

Terrorism “Attack Indicators”

Plan

Boom

29 30 27 28

Execute Develop

531

25 26 23 24 21 22

19 20 17 18 15 16 13 11 14 9 12 10 8

Group Formation

2

7

5

3

1

4

6

Figure 26.1 A Model of Terrorism Attack Indicators indicators might be weighted by a rating system on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest threat potential, indicating the presence of the necessary motivation and operational capability by a terrorist group to carry out a particular type of attack.

r Task 3: Providing a quantifiable system for aggregating the weights assigned to the

observable characteristics in order to arrive at an overall CLI/CHI/CBRN threat rating, which accurately indicates the likelihood that a group is planning an attack exhibiting the characteristics of a particular type of warfare.

r Task 4: Setting an appropriate numerical threshold for those aggregated weights

in order to indicate a probability that a group will resort to CLI or CHI or CBRN warfare, thus reaching a point at which it would be prudent to issue an appropriate warning concerning that group. The warning may take the form of distinct colors to indicate the spectrum of warfare, such as green, yellow, or red warnings. •

Intention + Capability = Threat

•

Threat + Indicators (activities/observables) = Warning

•

Warning + Adversary Vulnerability = Risk Assessment

•

Intention + Capability + Accelerators/Triggers + Overcoming Hurdles + Adversary Vulnerability = Attack Indicators/Attack Potential

Figure 26.2 Formula for Determining a Group’s “Attack Potential”

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Strategic and Tactical Considerations

However, unlike an I&W system for “conventional” terrorism that must effectively warn about a “conventional” type attack (for which there would also be a much higher probability), a CLI/CHI/CBRN-oriented I&W system must be customized to focus on the likelihood that a particular terrorist group has attained any of these three types of warfare operational capability and that it intends to carry out a CLI-, CHI-, or CBRNtype attack. Here, there is a spectrum of probabilities ranging from low to high, including lower to higher consequences in terms of casualties and panic throughout society caused by one of the three types of attack. Moreover, there are significant differences between “conventional” and CBRN warfare in terms of their types of weapons, devices, and delivery systems that will affect the way an I&W system will be designed. For example, the lead time needed by a terrorist group to develop the capability to launch a nuclear attack is much greater than the time needed to prepare for a biological, chemical, radiological, or conventional attack. Therefore, the I&W indicators for the former will probably be based on a much more comprehensive list of factors, developed over a longer period of time, than for the latter weapons, devices, and delivery systems. Similarly, the threshold for warning about a possible terrorist nuclear attack is probably lower than that for a biological, chemical, radiological, or “conventional” attack, because the consequences of a nuclear attack (and, therefore, the probable reactions of law enforcement agencies and military forces) are likely to be much more severe than for most terrorist attacks. Thus, the I&W system for CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare should be based on a series of databases and attributes for each of the CLI, CHI, or CBRN weapons and devices that the terrorist group under examination may be considering. As a result, one database of I&W attributes could examine the characteristics regarding motivations and operational capabilities by the terrorist group to determine which kinds of CLI, CHI, or CBRN weapons, devices, and delivery systems they are most likely to employ. The second database of I&W attributes would identify the key characteristics that an analyst should look for in determining whether a group is becoming more or less likely to actually launch an attack for which they have the theoretical capability. The objective of developing such an I&W methodology is to provide the intelligence and security community with a toolkit to chart as many significant indicators (including subindicators and observables) as possible. Focusing on these indicators provides an analytical framework in which to collect information and data that, once correlated, would provide the necessary aggregation to issue warnings (at the earliest as possible time frame) that a group is likely to pursue a “worrisome” type of warfare. Such an objective, however, is inherently limited in several respects. First, without penetrating a group with one’s own operatives or debriefing defectors, it is difficult to obtain tactical intelligence about a terrorist

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group’s intentions, capabilities, and targeting. Thus, without such optimal counterintelligence conditions, any predictive analytic tool can only raise a warning flag based on secondary—not “primary”—indicators about a certain terrorist group, generating a spectrum of potential “worrisome” scenarios, as opposed to pinpointing the time frame for an actual attack. Second, as mentioned previously, contemporary terrorist groups tend to be loosely affiliated, ad hoc groupings that coalesce for a single operation, leaving few “footprints” or “signatures” of their activity, thus making it difficult for an analyst to monitor their activities and intentions.8 Third, additional limitations include (1) the difficulty of monitoring CLI-, CHI-, or CBRN-associated activities by groups that engage in clandestine activities; (2) the need for significant lead time in tracking high-technologybased terrorist attacks; and (3) the problem of aggregating all the indicators (even once information is gathered about a group’s activities), because the likelihood of a group turning to CLI, CHI, or CBRN terrorism will probably be more a function of the interaction of several indicators than the force of any single indicator alone. Nevertheless, despite these inherent shortcomings, an effective I&W methodology can provide analysts and counterterrorism planners with a conceptual approach “to collate diverse sources of information and to understand complex relationships and data.”9 To display the pre-incident’s processes, paths, and links involved in the likelihood that a terrorist group will resort to CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare, this analysis groups the I&W indicators into four phases, as shown in Table 26.1 and Figure 26.1. These four phases are distinguished for analytical purposes and, in reality, some of the indicators or phases could be carried out contemporaneously or bypassed altogether. Moreover, within these four phases, the thirty-one I&W indicators should be considered in combination, because no single factor has sufficient independent explanatory value. r r r r

Phase I—the Group Formation phase Phase II—the Planning phase Phase III—the Developmental phase Phase IV—the Execution phase

These four phases of the pre-incident process can be broken down further into eleven levels of analysis: r First, which geographic areas/states require monitoring for precipitating societal conditions (#1) and the proliferation of radical subcultures (#2), from which terrorist groups emerge?

r Second, which particular terrorist groups (#3) are inclined, in terms of their

leadership (#4), motivation (#5), strategy (#6), and agenda (#7) to transition from

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Strategic and Tactical Considerations

conventional to CBRN warfare, and why would they choose CBRN “catastrophic” warfare when “conventional” warfare might be sufficiently lethal?

r Third, what is the nature of the terrorist group’s core constituency (#11) and how would it react to mass casualty/CBRN-type attacks, as opposed to “low casualty” attacks with conventional weapons (although certain CBRN weapons might result in few casualties but cause mass panic throughout society)?

r Fourth, what kinds of accelerators (#14) and triggers (#15) are likely to drive

terrorist leaders to plan a “high casualty” (as opposed to a “low casualty”) type attack?

r Fifth, what kinds of organizational (#8), funding (#10), recruitment (#17), acquisition (#19), development (#20), and logistical (#27) capabilities will a terrorist group need to attain in order to have the operational capability to execute either a “conventional” or CBRN attack?

r Sixth, will “conventional” or “martyrdom” suicide tactics be employed to carry out CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare? This has a bearing for both motivation and capabilities of a group.

r Seventh, in terms of the terrorist group’s targeting options, what vulnerable “key targeting (#29) points” are they most interested in attacking, and are there certain key anniversaries around which they are likely to attack?

r Eighth, how does a terrorist group’s decision to attack a particular target affect their choice of CBRN weapons, devices, and delivery systems?

r Ninth, can the terrorist group conduct terrorist warfare on its own or with the support of a state sponsor (#13)?

r Tenth, what internal (#30) and external (#31) hurdles must terrorist groups overcome in order to execute a CBRN attack?

r Finally, what can the targeted adversary do during the pre-incident process to harden its defenses against the spectrum of potential terrorist attacks?

Applying these 31 indicator categories to currently operating or emerging terrorist groups will reveal whether a group is planning an attack, its motivation and strategy, the type (or types) of weapons it plans to use (particularly “conventional” or CBRN), and its likely targeting. In such a way, this methodology enables an analyst to correlate along the preincident’s four phases a terrorist group’s internal factors (such as the nature of its leadership, motivation and strategy, organization, funding, recruitment, training, front organizations, constituency, logistical network, and surveillance of potential targets), with external factors (such as linkages with foreign groups, state sponsors, and foreign suppliers), as well as potential accelerators and triggers (such as access on gray or black markets for acquiring needed components or devices, or a dramatic event that would precipitate a group to take drastic action), and a group’s capability to overcome various internal and external hurdles (such as defections, breakdowns in security, testing failures or accidents with devices, or monitoring or penetration of a group by external intelligence or counterterrorism

Forecasting Terrorist Groups’ Warfare Tier 1 (CBRN/CHI)

Alert

1–3?

Tier 2 (CHI)

Suspect

4–7?

Tier 3 –

Possible

8–10?

Tier 4 –

Potential

11–15?

535

Figure 26.3 Multitiered Approach to Identify Terror Groups

organizations), in order to ascertain a group’s “attack potential.” Thus, if these indicator categories and their subindicators and observables could be correlated—recognizing that some indicators are more significant and have higher quantifiable weighting properties than others—such analysis might indicate increasing threat possibilities, including the possible resort to conventional or single or multiple CBRN weapons and devices, as well as their likely targeting. Once this methodology yields the appropriate I&W information concerning a terrorist group’s warfare proclivity, then an analyst would utilize a multitiered approach to develop a spectrum of warnings. Filter sets can be used to focus attention on current or emerging terrorist groups most likely to embark on CLI/CHI/or CBRN-type warfare. A multitiered approach can be used to identify groups likely to embark on CLI/CHI/or CBRN warfare, with increasingly “tight” filters for moving a group from CLI to CHI, and to the higher-tier CBRN warfare (see Figure 26.3). Once sufficient “attack indicator” information and data coalesce into a thorough forecast, leading authorities to issue warnings about a group’s imminent warfare proclivity, then other agencies or personnel would be tasked to operationally preempt or prevent that terrorist group from carrying out an attack (if such a governmental preemptive capability existed). In such a way, a robust I&W methodology can be made sufficiently comprehensive and systematic, allowing the analyst to exhaust all possible relevant indicators involved in the pre-incident process, and yet avoid becoming too general or abstract to be of practical use. CONCLUSION In conclusion, the analytical approach offered in this chapter is intended to highlight some of the internal and external factors, requirements, and hurdles that need to be considered in assessing a terrorist group’s current and future development status and operational capability for conducting CLI, CHI, or CBRN warfare. Correlating these internal and external factors and hurdles would make it possible to assess which terrorist groups and state sponsors are likely to pursue any of these types of warfare, the adaptations and changes that are required to transition from simple to complex warfare, the types of weapons and targeting that a group is likely

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Strategic and Tactical Considerations

to pursue (including the possible resort to single or multiple weapons and devices), the timelines for such attacks, and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by a government’s intelligence and counterterrorism agencies to constrain terrorist groups—and, when applicable, state sponsors—from doing so. Hopefully, such a conceptual approach will make it possible for the counterterrorism community—whether policymakers, warfighters, or analysts—to efficiently calibrate their resources in order to intervene at the earliest possible phases in ways that will influence, preempt, deter, prevent, and defeat terrorist actions, whether CLI, CHI, or CBRN. NOTES 1. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006), 130. 2. In this approach, CLI refers to “low impact” attacks involving relatively “few” casualties or physical damage, such as detonating explosives or shootings; CHI refers to the use of conventional means to inflict massive casualties, such as 9/11 type attacks; while CBRN refers to the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons and devices. 3. For more, please see the chapter by Gavin Cameron in this volume. Also, please see Russell Howard and James Forest, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007). 4. For more on terrorists’ organizational learning, please see James J.F. Forest, ed., Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 5. U.S. Geological Survey, “Predicting Earthquakes,” http://pubs.usgs.gov/ gip/earthq1/predict.html. 6. Ruth Ludwin, “Earthquake Prediction,” http://www.geophys. washsington.edu/seis/pnsn/info general/eq prediction.html. 7. Ibid. 8. Stephen R. Bowers and Kimberly R. Keys, “Technology and Terrorism: The New Threat for the Millennium,” Conflict Studies 309 (May 1998): 18. 9. Ibid., 19.

APPENDIX A THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 2006 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ INTRODUCTION My Fellow Americans, America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people. America also has an unprecedented opportunity to lay the foundations for future peace. The ideals that have inspired our history—freedom, democracy, and human dignity—are increasingly inspiring individuals and nations throughout the world. And because free nations tend toward peace, the advance of liberty will make America more secure. These inseparable priorities—fighting and winning the war on terror and promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair—have now guided American policy for more than 4 years. We have kept on the offensive against terrorist networks, leaving our enemy weakened, but not yet defeated. We have joined with the Afghan people to bring down the Taliban regime—the protectors of the al Qaeda network—and aided a new, democratic government to rise in its place.

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We have focused the attention of the world on the proliferation of dangerous weapons—although great challenges in this area remain. We have stood for the spread of democracy in the broader Middle East—meeting challenges yet seeing progress few would have predicted or expected. We have cultivated stable and cooperative relations with all the major powers of the world. We have dramatically expanded our efforts to encourage economic development and the hope it brings—and focused these efforts on the promotion of reform and achievement of results. We led an international coalition to topple the dictator of Iraq, who had brutalized his own people, terrorized his region, defied the international community, and sought and used weapons of mass destruction. And we are fighting alongside Iraqis to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq—a new ally in the war on terror in the heart of the Middle East. We have seen great accomplishments, confronted new challenges, and refined our approach as conditions changed. We have also found that the defense of freedom brings us loss and sorrow, because freedom has determined enemies. We have always known that the war on terror would require great sacrifice—and in this war, we have said farewell to some very good men and women. The terrorists have used dramatic acts of murder—from the streets of Fallujah to the subways of London—in an attempt to undermine our will. The struggle against this enemy—an enemy that targets the innocent without conscience or hesitation—has been difficult. And our work is far from over. America now faces a choice between the path of fear and the path of confidence. The path of fear—isolationism and protectionism, retreat and retrenchment—appeals to those who find our challenges too great and fail to see our opportunities. Yet history teaches that every time American leaders have taken this path, the challenges have only increased and the missed opportunities have left future generations less secure. This Administration has chosen the path of confidence. We choose leadership over isolationism, and the pursuit of free and fair trade and open markets over protectionism. We choose to deal with challenges now rather than leaving them for future generations. We fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country. We seek to shape the world, not merely be shaped by it; to influence events for the better instead of being at their mercy. The path we have chosen is consistent with the great tradition of American foreign policy. Like the policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, our approach is idealistic about our national goals, and realistic about the means to achieve them.

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To follow this path, we must maintain and expand our national strength so we can deal with threats and challenges before they can damage our people or our interests. We must maintain a military without peer—yet our strength is not founded on force of arms alone. It also rests on economic prosperity and a vibrant democracy. And it rests on strong alliances, friendships, and international institutions, which enable us to promote freedom, prosperity, and peace in common purpose with others. Our national security strategy is founded upon two pillars: The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity— working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free governments are accountable to their people, govern their territory effectively, and pursue economic and political policies that benefit their citizens. Free governments do not oppress their people or attack other free nations. Peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom. The second pillar of our strategy is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies. Many of the problems we face—from the threat of pandemic disease, to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown that only when we do our part will others do theirs. America must continue to lead. GEORGE W. BUSH THE WHITE HOUSE March 16, 2006 I. OVERVIEW OF AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people. Achieving this goal is the work of generations. The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different

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from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression. Like those who came before us, we must lay the foundations and build the institutions that our country needs to meet the challenges we face. The chapters that follow will focus on several essential tasks. The United States must: r Champion aspirations for human dignity; r Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;

r Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; r Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);

r Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade; r Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;

r Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power;

r Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and

r Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization. II. CHAMPION ASPIRATIONS FOR HUMAN DIGNITY A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 The United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. These nonnegotiable demands of human dignity are protected most securely in democracies. The United States Government will work to advance human dignity in word and deed, speaking out for freedom and against violations of human rights and allocating appropriate resources to advance these ideals. B. Successes and Challenges since 2002 Since 2002, the world has seen extraordinary progress in the expansion of freedom, democracy, and human dignity: r The peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq have replaced tyrannies with democracies. b In Afghanistan, the tyranny of the Taliban has been replaced by a freely elected government; Afghans have written and ratified a constitution guaranteeing rights and freedoms unprecedented in their history; and an elected legislature gives the people a regular voice in their government.

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b In Iraq, a tyrant has been toppled; over 8 million Iraqis voted in the nation’s first free and fair election; a freely negotiated constitution was passed by a referendum in which almost 10 million Iraqis participated; and, for the first time in their history, nearly 12 million Iraqis have elected a permanent government under a popularly determined constitution.

r The people of Lebanon have rejected the heavy hand of foreign rule. The people

of Egypt have experienced more open but still flawed elections. Saudi Arabia has taken some preliminary steps to give its citizens more of a voice in their government. Jordan has made progress in opening its political process. Kuwait and Morocco are pursuing agendas of political reform.

r The “color revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan have brought new hope for freedom across the Eurasian landmass.

r Democracy has made further advances in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, with peaceful transfers of power; growth in independent judiciaries and the rule of law; improved election practices; and expanding political and economic rights.

The human desire for freedom is universal, but the growth of freedom is not inevitable. Without support from free nations, freedom’s spread could be hampered by the challenges we face: r Many governments are at fragile stages of political development and need to consolidate democratic institutions—and leaders that have won democratic elections need to uphold the principles of democracy;

r Some governments have regressed, eroding the democratic freedoms their peoples enjoy;

r Some governments have not delivered the benefits of effective democracy and prosperity to their citizens, leaving them susceptible to or taken over by demagogues peddling an anti–free market authoritarianism;

r Some regimes seek to separate economic liberty from political liberty, pursuing prosperity while denying their people basic rights and freedoms; and

r Tyranny persists in its harshest form in a number of nations. C. The Way Ahead

The United States has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests. It reflects our values because we believe the desire for freedom lives in every human heart and the imperative of human dignity transcends all nations and cultures. Championing freedom advances our interests because the survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad. Governments that honor their citizens’ dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct toward other nations, while governments that brutalize their people also threaten the peace and stability of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible members of

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the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective longterm measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity. To protect our Nation and honor our values, the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy. 1. Explaining the Goal: Ending Tyranny Tyranny is the combination of brutality, poverty, instability, corruption, and suffering, forged under the rule of despots and despotic systems. People living in nations such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe know firsthand the meaning of tyranny; it is the bleak reality they endure every day. And the nations they border know the consequences of tyranny as well, for the misrule of tyrants at home leads to instability abroad. All tyrannies threaten the world’s interest in freedom’s expansion, and some tyrannies, in their pursuit of WMD or sponsorship of terrorism, threaten our immediate security interests as well. Tyranny is not inevitable, and recent history reveals the arc of the tyrant’s fate. The 20th century has been called the “Democracy Century,” as tyrannies fell one by one and democracies rose in their stead. At midcentury about two dozen of the world’s governments were democratic; 50 years later this number was over 120. The democratic revolution has embraced all cultures and all continents. Though tyranny has few advocates, it needs more adversaries. In today’s world, no tyrant’s rule can survive without the support or at least the tolerance of other nations. To end tyranny we must summon the collective outrage of the free world against the oppression, abuse, and impoverishment that tyrannical regimes inflict on their people—and summon their collective action against the dangers tyrants pose to the security of the world. An end to tyranny will not mark an end to all global ills. Disputes, disease, disorder, poverty, and injustice will outlast tyranny, confronting democracies long after the last tyrant has fallen. Yet tyranny must not be tolerated—it is a crime of man, not a fact of nature. 2. Explaining the Goal: Promoting Effective Democracies As tyrannies give way, we must help newly free nations build effective democracies: states that are respectful of human dignity, accountable to their citizens, and responsible towards their neighbors. Effective democracies: r Honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press;

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r Are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government;

r Exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption; and

r Limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business, and a market economy.

In effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. Political, religious, and economic liberty advance together and reinforce each other. Some regimes have opened their economies while trying to restrict political or religious freedoms. This will not work. Over time, as people gain control over their economic lives, they will insist on more control over their political and personal lives as well. Yet political progress can be jeopardized if economic progress does not keep pace. We will harness the tools of economic assistance, development aid, trade, and good governance to help ensure that new democracies are not burdened with economic stagnation or endemic corruption. Elections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But elections alone are not enough—they must be reinforced by other values, rights, and institutions to bring about lasting freedom. Our goal is human liberty protected by democratic institutions. Participation in elections by individuals or parties must include their commitment to the equality of all citizens; minority rights; civil liberties; voluntary and peaceful transfer of power; and the peaceful resolution of differences. Effective democracy also requires institutions that can protect individual liberty and ensure that the government is responsive and accountable to its citizens. There must be an independent media to inform the public and facilitate the free exchange of ideas. There must be political associations and political parties that can freely compete. Rule of law must be reinforced by an independent judiciary, a professional legal establishment, and an honest and competent police force. These principles are tested by the victory of Hamas candidates in the recent elections in the Palestinian territories. The Palestinian people voted in a process that was free, fair, and inclusive. The Palestinian people having made their choice at the polls, the burden now shifts to those whom they have elected to take the steps necessary to advance peace, prosperity, and statehood for the Palestinian people. Hamas has been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union (EU) because it has embraced terrorism and deliberately killed innocent civilians. The international community has made clear that there is a fundamental contradiction between armed group and militia activities and the building of a democratic state.

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The international community has also made clear that a two-state solution to the conflict requires all participants in the democratic process to renounce violence and terror, accept Israel’s right to exist, and disarm as outlined in the Roadmap. These requirements are clear, firm, and of long standing. The opportunity for peace and statehood—a consistent goal of this Administration—is open if Hamas will abandon its terrorist roots and change its relationship with Israel. The elected Hamas representatives also have an opportunity and a responsibility to uphold the principles of democratic government, including protection of minority rights and basic freedoms and a commitment to a recurring, free, and fair electoral process. By respecting these principles, the new Palestinian leaders can demonstrate their own commitment to freedom and help bring a lasting democracy to the Palestinian territories. But any elected government that refuses to honor these principles cannot be considered fully democratic, however it may have taken office. 3. How We Will Advance Freedom: Principled in Goals and Pragmatic in Means We have a responsibility to promote human freedom. Yet freedom cannot be imposed; it must be chosen. The form that freedom and democracy take in any land will reflect the history, culture, and habits unique to its people. The United States will stand with and support advocates of freedom in every land. Though our principles are consistent, our tactics will vary. They will reflect, in part, where each government is on the path from tyranny to democracy. In some cases, we will take vocal and visible steps on behalf of immediate change. In other cases, we will lend more quiet support to lay the foundation for future reforms. As we consider which approaches to take, we will be guided by what will most effectively advance freedom’s cause while we balance other interests that are also vital to the security and well-being of the American people. In the cause of ending tyranny and promoting effective democracy, we will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and other tools at our disposal, including: r Speaking out against abuses of human rights; r Supporting publicly democratic reformers in repressive nations, including by holding high-level meetings with them at the White House, Department of State, and U.S. Embassies;

r Using foreign assistance to support the development of free and fair elections,

rule of law, civil society, human rights, women’s rights, free media, and religious freedom;

r Tailoring assistance and training of military forces to support civilian control of

the military and making military show respect for human rights in a democratic society;

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r Applying sanctions that are designed to target those who rule oppressive regimes while sparing the people;

r Encouraging other nations not to support oppressive regimes; r Partnering with other democratic nations to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights in specific countries and regions;

r Strengthening and building new initiatives such as the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative’s Foundation for the Future, the Community of Democracies, and the United Nations Democracy Fund;

r Forming creative partnerships with nongovernmental organizations and other civil society voices to support and reinforce their work;

r Working with existing international institutions such as the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the African Union (AU), and the Organization of American States (OAS) to help implement their democratic commitments, and helping establish democracy charters in regions that lack them;

r Supporting condemnation in multilateral institutions of egregious violations of human rights and freedoms;

r Encouraging foreign direct investment in and foreign assistance to countries where there is a commitment to the rule of law, fighting corruption, and democratic accountability; and

r Concluding free trade agreements (FTAs) that encourage countries to enhance the rule of law, fight corruption, and further democratic accountability.

These tools must be used vigorously to protect the freedoms that face particular peril around the world: religious freedom, women’s rights, and freedom for men, women, and children caught in the cruel network of human trafficking. r Against a terrorist enemy that is defined by religious intolerance, we defend the First Freedom: the right of people to believe and worship according to the dictates of their own conscience, free from the coercion of the state, the coercion of the majority, or the coercion of a minority that wants to dictate what others must believe.

r No nation can be free if half its population is oppressed and denied fundamental rights. We affirm the inherent dignity and worth of women, and support vigorously their full participation in all aspects of society.

r Trafficking in persons is a form of modern-day slavery, and we strive for its total abolition. Future generations will not excuse those who turn a blind eye to it.

Our commitment to the promotion of freedom is a commitment to walk alongside governments and their people as they make the difficult transition to effective democracies. We will not abandon them before the transition is secure because immature democracies can be prone to conflict and vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists. We will not let the challenges of

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democratic transitions frighten us into clinging to the illusory stability of the authoritarian. America’s closest alliances and friendships are with countries with whom we share common values and principles. The more countries demonstrate that they treat their own citizens with respect and are committed to democratic principles, the closer and stronger their relationship with America is likely to be. The United States will lead and calls on other nations to join us in a common international effort. All free nations have a responsibility to stand together for freedom because all free nations share an interest in freedom’s advance. III. STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM AND WORK TO PREVENT ATTACKS AGAINST US AND OUR FRIENDS A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 Defeating terrorism requires a long-term strategy and a break with old patterns. We are fighting a new enemy with global reach. The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run. To succeed in our own efforts, we need the support and concerted action of friends and allies. We must join with others to deny the terrorists what they need to survive: safe haven, financial support, and the support and protection that certain nation-states historically have given them. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges The war against terror is not over. America is safer, but not yet safe. As the enemy adjusts to our successes, so too must we adjust. The successes are many: r Al Qaeda has lost its safe haven in Afghanistan. r A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq.

r The al Qaeda network has been significantly degraded. Most of those in the al Qaeda network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s mastermind, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed.

r There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate killing of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause.

r Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.

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r Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution—and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.

r The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt and implement key reforms like the Patriot Act, which promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties.

The enemy is determined, however, and we face some old and new challenges: r Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure.

r While the United States Government and its allies have thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to stop them all. The terrorists have struck in many places, including Afghanistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. And they continue to seek WMD in order to inflict even more catastrophic attacks on us and our friends and allies.

r The ongoing fight in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.

r Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad.

C. The Way Ahead From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and against their murderous ideology. In the short run, the fight involves using military force and other instruments of national power to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven or control of any nation, prevent them from gaining access to WMD, and cut off their sources of support. In the long run, winning the war on terror means winning the battle of ideas, for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims. While the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions. The transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion of Islam to serve a violent political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. These terrorists distort the idea of jihad into a call for murder against those they regard as apostates or unbelievers—including Christians, Jews, Hindus, other religious traditions, and all Muslims who disagree with them. Indeed, most of the terrorist attacks since September 11 have occurred in Muslim countries—and most of the victims have been Muslims.

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To wage this battle of ideas effectively, we must be clear-eyed about what does and does not give rise to terrorism: r Terrorism is not the inevitable by-product of poverty. Many of the September 11 hijackers were from middle-class backgrounds, and many terrorist leaders, like bin Laden, are from privileged upbringings.

r Terrorism is not simply a result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq. The United

States was attacked on September 11 and earlier, well before we toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, countries that stayed out of the Iraq war have not been spared from terror attack.

r Terrorism is not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian issues. Al Qaeda plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an active period in the peace process.

r Terrorism is not simply a response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks. The al Qaeda network targeted the United States long before the United States targeted al Qaeda. Indeed, the terrorists are emboldened more by perceptions of weakness than by demonstrations of resolve. Terrorists lure recruits by telling them that we are decadent and easily intimidated and will retreat if attacked.

The terrorism we confront today springs from: r Political alienation. Transnational terrorists are recruited from people who have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse vision based on violence and destruction.

r Grievances that can be blamed on others. The failures the terrorists feel and see

are blamed on others, and on perceived injustices from the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorists’ rhetoric keeps wounds associated with this past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.

r Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation. Terrorists recruit more effec-

tively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and selfserving propaganda.

r An ideology that justifies murder. Terrorism ultimately depends upon the ap-

peal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. A proud religion—the religion of Islam—has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused.

Defeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed. The genius of democracy is that it provides a counter to each. r In place of alienation, democracy offers an ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one’s own future.

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r In place of festering grievances, democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through compromise.

r In place of a culture of conspiracy and misinformation, democracy offers freedom of speech, independent media, and the marketplace of ideas, which can expose and discredit falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda.

r In place of an ideology that justifies murder, democracy offers a respect for human dignity that abhors the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians.

Democracy is the opposite of terrorist tyranny, which is why the terrorists denounce it and are willing to kill the innocent to stop it. Democracy is based on empowerment, while the terrorists’ ideology is based on enslavement. Democracies expand the freedom of their citizens, while the terrorists seek to impose a single set of narrow beliefs. Democracy sees individuals as equal in worth and dignity, having an inherent potential to create and to govern themselves. The terrorists see individuals as objects to be exploited, and then to be ruled and oppressed. Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states. This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of homegrown terrorists such as were responsible for the bombings in London in July 2005 and for the violence in some other nations. Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits. The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists’ ideology is to empower the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam. We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful Muslims to practice and interpret their faith. The most vital work will be done within the Islamic world itself, and Jordan, Morocco, and Indonesia have begun to make important strides in this effort. Responsible Islamic leaders need to denounce an ideology that distorts and exploits Islam for destructive ends and defiles a proud religion. Many of the Muslim faith are already making this commitment at great personal risk. They realize they are a target of this ideology of terror. Everywhere we have joined in the fight against terrorism, Muslim allies have stood beside us, becoming partners in this vital cause. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have launched effective efforts to capture or kill the leadership of the al Qaeda network. Afghan troops are in combat against Taliban remnants. Iraqi soldiers are sacrificing to defeat al Qaeda in their own country. These brave citizens know the stakes—the survival of their own liberty, the future of their own region, the justice and humanity of their own traditions—and the United States is proud to stand beside them.

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The advance of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today. To create the space and time for that long-term solution to take root, there are four steps we will take in the short term. r Prevent attacks by terrorist networks before they occur. A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The hard core of the terrorists cannot be deterred or reformed; they must be tracked down, killed, or captured. They must be cut off from the network of individuals and institutions on which they depend for support. That network must in turn be deterred, disrupted, and disabled by using a broad range of tools.

r Deny WMD to rogue states and to terrorist allies who would use them without hesita-

tion. Terrorists have a perverse moral code that glorifies deliberately targeting innocent civilians. Terrorists try to inflict as many casualties as possible and seek WMD to this end. Denying terrorists WMD will require new tools and new international approaches. We are working with partner nations to improve security at vulnerable nuclear sites worldwide and bolster the ability of states to detect, disrupt, and respond to terrorist activity involving WMD.

r Deny terrorist groups the support and sanctuary of rogue states. The United States

and its allies in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them, because they are equally guilty of murder. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace. The world must hold those regimes to account.

r Deny the terrorists control of any nation that they would use as a base and launching pad for terror. The terrorists’ goal is to overthrow a rising democracy, claim a strategic country as a haven for terror, destabilize the Middle East, and strike America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence. This we can never allow. This is why success in Afghanistan and Iraq is vital, and why we must prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned areas.

America will lead in this fight, and we will continue to partner with allies and will recruit new friends to join the battle. Afghanistan and Iraq: The Front Lines in the War on Terror Winning the War on Terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the successes already won must be consolidated. A few years ago, Afghanistan was condemned to a premodern nightmare. Now it has held two successful free elections and is a staunch ally in the war on terror. Much work remains, however, and the Afghan people deserve the support of the United States and the entire international community. The terrorists today see Iraq as the central front of their fight against the United States. They want to defeat America in Iraq and force us

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to abandon our allies before a stable democratic government has been established that can provide for its own security. The terrorists believe they would then have proven that the United States is a waning power and an unreliable friend. In the chaos of a broken Iraq the terrorists believe they would be able to establish a safe haven like they had in Afghanistan, only this time in the heart of a geopolitically vital region. Surrendering to the terrorists would likewise hand them a powerful recruiting tool: the perception that they are the vanguard of history. When the Iraqi Government, supported by the Coalition, defeats the terrorists, terrorism will be dealt a critical blow. We will have broken one of al Qaeda’s most formidable factions—the network headed by Zarqawi—and denied him the safe haven he seeks in Iraq. And the success of democracy in Iraq will be a launching pad for freedom’s success throughout a region that for decades has been a source of instability and stagnation. The Administration has explained in some detail the strategy for helping the Iraqi people defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency in Iraq. This requires supporting the Iraqi people in integrating activity along three broad tracks: Political: Work with Iraqis to: r Isolate hardened enemy elements who are unwilling to accept a peaceful political process;

r Engage those outside the political process who are willing to turn away from violence and invite them into that process; and

r Build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis.

Security: Work with Iraqi Security Forces to: r Clear areas of enemy control by remaining on the offensive, killing and capturing enemy fighters, and denying them safe haven;

r Hold areas freed from enemy control with an adequate Iraqi security force presence that ensures these areas remain under the control of a peaceful Iraqi Government; and

r Build Iraqi Security Forces and the capacity of local institutions to deliver services, advance the rule of law, and nurture civil society.

Economic: Work with the Iraqi Government to: r Restore Iraq’s neglected infrastructure so that Iraqis can meet increasing demand and the needs of a growing economy;

r Reform Iraq’s economy so that it can be self-sustaining based on market principles; and

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r Build the capacity of Iraqi institutions to maintain their infrastructure, rejoin the international economic community, and improve the general welfare and prosperity of all Iraqis.

IV. WORK WITH OTHERS TO DEFUSE REGIONAL CONFLICTS A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 Regional conflicts are a bitter legacy from previous decades that continue to affect our national security interests today. Regional conflicts do not stay isolated for long and often spread or devolve into humanitarian tragedy or anarchy. Outside parties can exploit them to further other ends, much as al Qaeda exploited the civil war in Afghanistan. This means that even if the United States does not have a direct stake in a particular conflict, our interests are likely to be affected over time. Outsiders generally cannot impose solutions on parties that are not ready to embrace them, but outsiders can sometimes help create the conditions under which the parties themselves can take effective action. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges The world has seen remarkable progress on a number of the most difficult regional conflicts that destroyed millions of lives over decades. r In Sudan, the United States led international negotiations that peacefully resolved the 20-year conflict between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement.

r In Liberia, the United States led international efforts to restore peace and bolster stability after vicious internal conflict.

r Israeli forces have withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank, creating the prospect for transforming Israeli-Palestinian relations and underscoring the need for the Palestinian Authority to stand up as an effective, responsible government.

r Relations between India and Pakistan have improved, with an exchange of highlevel visits and a new spirit of cooperation in the dispute over Kashmir—a cooperation made more tangible by humanitarian actions undertaken following a destructive earthquake.

r The cooperative approach to the relief effort following the tsunami that hit In-

donesia resulted in political shifts that helped make possible a peaceful settlement in the bitter separatist conflict in Aceh.

r In Northern Ireland, the implementation of key parts of the Good Friday Agreement, including the decommissioning of weapons, marked a substantial milestone in ending that longstanding civil conflict.

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Numerous remaining regional challenges demand the world’s attention: r In Darfur, the people of an impoverished region are the victims of genocide arising from a civil war that pits a murderous militia, backed by the Sudanese Government, against a collection of rebel groups.

r In Colombia, a democratic ally is fighting the persistent assaults of Marxist terrorists and drug traffickers.

r In Venezuela, a demagogue awash in oil money is undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region.

r In Cuba, an anti-American dictator continues to oppress his people and seeks to subvert freedom in the region.

r In Uganda, a barbaric rebel cult—the Lord’s Resistance Army—is exploiting a regional conflict and terrorizing a vulnerable population.

r In Ethiopia and Eritrea, a festering border dispute threatens to erupt yet again into open war.

r In Nepal, a vicious Maoist insurgency continues to terrorize the population while the government retreats from democracy.

C. The Way Ahead Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, tribal rivalries, and ethnic or religious hatreds. If left unaddressed, however, these different causes lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists. The Administration’s strategy for addressing regional conflicts includes three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. Effective international cooperation on these efforts is dependent on capable partners. To this end, Congress has enacted new authorities that will permit the United States to train and equip our foreign partners in a more timely and effective manner. Working with Congress, we will continue to pursue foreign assistance reforms that allow the President to draw on the skills of agencies across the United States Government. 1. Conflict Prevention and Resolution The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy. Effective democracies may still have disputes, but they are equipped to resolve their differences peacefully, either bilaterally or by working with other regional states or international

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institutions. In the short term, however, a timely offer by free nations of “good offices” or outside assistance can sometimes prevent conflict or help resolve conflict once started. Such early measures can prevent problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming wars. The United States is ready to play this role when appropriate. Even with outside help, however, there is no substitute for bold and effective local leadership. Progress in the short term may also depend upon the stances of key regional actors. The most effective way to address a problem within one country may be by addressing the wider regional context. This regional approach has particular application to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and the conflict within Nepal. 2. Conflict Intervention Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability. Recent experience has underscored that the international community does not have enough high-quality military forces trained and capable of performing these peace operations. The Administration has recognized this need and is working with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to improve the capacity of states to intervene in conflict situations. We launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative at the 2004 G-8 Summit to train peacekeepers for duty in Africa. We are also supporting United Nations (U.N.) reform to improve its ability to carry out peacekeeping missions with enhanced accountability, oversight, and results-based management practices. 3. Postconflict Stabilization and Reconstruction Once peace has been restored, the hard work of postconflict stabilization and reconstruction must begin. Military involvement may be necessary to stop a bloody conflict, but peace and stability will last only if follow-on efforts to restore order and rebuild are successful. The world has found through bitter experience that success often depends on the early establishment of strong local institutions such as effective police forces and a functioning justice and penal system. This governance capacity is critical to establishing the rule of law and a free market economy, which provide long-term stability and prosperity. To develop these capabilities, the Administration established a new office in the Department of State, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, to plan and execute civilian stabilization and reconstruction efforts. The office draws on all agencies of the government and integrates its activities with our military’s efforts. The office will also coordinate United States Government efforts with other governments building similar capabilities (such as the United Kingdom, Canada, the

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EU, and others), as well as with new international efforts such as the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission. 4. Genocide Patient efforts to end conflicts should not be mistaken for tolerance of the intolerable. Genocide is the intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. The world needs to start honoring a principle that many believe has lost its force in parts of the international community in recent years: genocide must not be tolerated. It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless America does its part. We must refine United States Government efforts— economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement—so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices. We must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of “genocide” to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace. V. PREVENT OUR ENEMIES FROM THREATENING US, OUR ALLIES, AND OUR FRIENDS WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 The security environment confronting the United States today is radically different from what we have faced before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American principle that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. There are few greater threats than a terrorist attack with WMD. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary actions

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succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Countering proliferation of WMD requires a comprehensive strategy involving strengthened nonproliferation efforts to deny these weapons of terror and related expertise to those seeking them; proactive counterproliferation efforts to defend against and defeat WMD and missile threats before they are unleashed; and improved protection to mitigate the consequences of WMD use. We aim to convince our adversaries that they cannot achieve their goals with WMD, and thus deter and dissuade them from attempting to use or even acquire these weapons in the first place. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges We have worked hard to protect our citizens and our security. The United States has worked extensively with the international community and key partners to achieve common objectives. r The United States has begun fielding ballistic missile defenses to deter and protect the United States from missile attacks by rogue states armed with WMD. The fielding of such missile defenses was made possible by the United States’ withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which was done in accordance with the treaty’s provisions.

r In May 2003, the Administration launched the Proliferation Security Initiative

(PSI), a global effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related material. More than 70 countries have expressed support for this initiative, and it has enjoyed several successes in impeding WMD trafficking.

r United States leadership in extensive law enforcement and intelligence coop-

eration involving several countries led to the roll-up of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network.

r Libya voluntarily agreed to eliminate its WMD programs shortly after a PSI interdiction of a shipment of nuclear-related material from the A.Q. Khan network to Libya.

r The United States led in securing passage in April 2004 of United Nations Se-

curity Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, requiring nations to criminalize WMD proliferation and institute effective export and financial controls.

r We have led the effort to strengthen the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to detect and respond to nuclear proliferation.

r The Administration has established a new comprehensive framework, Biodefense for the 21st Century, incorporating innovative initiatives to protect the United States against bioterrorism.

Nevertheless, serious challenges remain: r Iran has violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards obligations and refuses to provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

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r The DPRK continues to destabilize its region and defy the international community, now boasting a small nuclear arsenal and an illicit nuclear program in violation of its international obligations.

r Terrorists, including those associated with the al Qaeda network, continue to pursue WMD.

r Some of the world’s supply of weapons-grade fissile material—the necessary ingredient for making nuclear weapons—is not properly protected.

r Advances in biotechnology provide greater opportunities for state and nonstate actors to obtain dangerous pathogens and equipment.

C. The Way Ahead We are committed to keeping the world’s most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world’s most dangerous people. 1. Nuclear Proliferation The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security. Nuclear weapons are unique in their capacity to inflict instant loss of life on a massive scale. For this reason, nuclear weapons hold special appeal to rogue states and terrorists. The best way to block aspiring nuclear states or nuclear terrorists is to deny them access to the essential ingredient of fissile material. It is much harder to deny states or terrorists other key components, for nuclear weapons represent a 60-year-old technology and the knowledge is widespread. Therefore, our strategy focuses on controlling fissile material with two priority objectives: first, to keep states from acquiring the capability to produce fissile material suitable for making nuclear weapons; and second, to deter, interdict, or prevent any transfer of that material from states that have this capability to rogue states or to terrorists. The first objective requires closing a loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that permits regimes to produce fissile material that can be used to make nuclear weapons under cover of a civilian nuclear power program. To close this loophole, we have proposed that the world’s leading nuclear exporters create a safe, orderly system that spreads nuclear energy without spreading nuclear weapons. Under this system, all states would have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civilian nuclear power reactors. In return, those states would remain transparent and renounce the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities that can produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In this way, enrichment and reprocessing will not be necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for strictly peaceful purposes. The Administration has worked with the international community in confronting nuclear proliferation. We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear

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efforts from the international community. Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian regime’s true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to “be wiped off the face of the earth.” The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided. As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has broader concerns regarding Iran. The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom. The nuclear issue and our other concerns can ultimately be resolved only if the Iranian regime makes the strategic decision to change these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. This is the ultimate goal of U.S. policy. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. The problems lie with the illicit behavior and dangerous ambition of the Iranian regime, not the legitimate aspirations and interests of the Iranian people. Our strategy is to block the threats posed by the regime while expanding our engagement and outreach to the people the regime is oppressing. The North Korean regime also poses a serious nuclear proliferation challenge. It presents a long and bleak record of duplicity and bad-faith negotiations. In the past, the regime has attempted to split the United States from its allies. This time, the United States has successfully forged a consensus among key regional partners—China, Japan, Russia, and the Republic of Korea (ROK)—that the DPRK must give up all of its existing nuclear programs. Regional cooperation offers the best hope for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of this problem. In a joint statement signed on September 19, 2005, in the Six-Party Talks among these participants, the DPRK agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons and all existing nuclear programs. The joint statement also declared that the relevant parties would negotiate a permanent peace for the Korean peninsula and explore ways to promote security cooperation in Asia. Along with our partners in the Six-Party Talks, the United States will continue to press the DPRK to implement these commitments. The United States has broader concerns regarding the DPRK as well. The DPRK counterfeits our currency, traffics in narcotics and engages in other illicit activities, threatens the ROK with its army and its neighbors with its missiles, and brutalizes and starves its people. The DPRK regime

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needs to changes these policies, open up its political system, and afford freedom to its people. In the interim, we will continue to take all necessary measures to protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct. The second nuclear proliferation objective is to keep fissile material out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists. To do this we must address the danger posed by inadequately safeguarded nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. The Administration is leading a global effort to reduce and secure such materials as quickly as possible through several initiatives including the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). The GTRI locates, tracks, and reduces existing stockpiles of nuclear material. This new initiative also discourages trafficking in nuclear material by emplacing detection equipment at key transport nodes. Building on the success of the PSI, the United States is also leading international efforts to shut down WMD trafficking by targeting key maritime and air transportation and transshipment routes, and by cutting off proliferators from financial resources that support their activities. 2. Biological Weapons Biological weapons also pose a grave WMD threat because of the risks of contagion that would spread disease across large populations and around the globe. Unlike nuclear weapons, biological weapons do not require hard-to-acquire infrastructure or materials. This makes the challenge of controlling their spread even greater. Countering the spread of biological weapons requires a strategy focused on improving our capacity to detect and respond to biological attacks, securing dangerous pathogens, and limiting the spread of materials useful for biological weapons. The United States is working with partner nations and institutions to strengthen global biosurveillance capabilities for early detection of suspicious outbreaks of disease. We have launched new initiatives at home to modernize our public health infrastructure and to encourage industry to speed the development of new classes of vaccines and medical countermeasures. This will also enhance our Nation’s ability to respond to pandemic public health threats, such as avian influenza. 3. Chemical Weapons Chemical weapons are a serious proliferation concern and are actively sought by terrorists, including al Qaeda. Much like biological weapons, the threat from chemical weapons increases with advances in technology, improvements in agent development, and ease in acquisition of materials and equipment. To deter and defend against such threats, we work to identify and disrupt terrorist networks that seek chemical weapons capabilities, and seek to deny them access to materials needed to make these weapons. We are

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improving our detection and other chemical defense capabilities at home and abroad, including ensuring that U.S. military forces and emergency responders are trained and equipped to manage the consequences of a chemical weapons attack. 4. The Need for Action The new strategic environment requires new approaches to deterrence and defense. Our deterrence strategy no longer rests primarily on the grim premise of inflicting devastating consequences on potential foes. Both offenses and defenses are necessary to deter state and nonstate actors, through denial of the objectives of their attacks and, if necessary, responding with overwhelming force. Safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. We are strengthening deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and passive defenses, including missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all bound together by enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence systems. These capabilities will better deter some of the new threats we face, while also bolstering our security commitments to allies. Such security commitments have played a crucial role in convincing some countries to forgo their own nuclear weapons programs, thereby aiding our nonproliferation objectives. Deterring potential foes and assuring friends and allies, however, is only part of a broader approach. Meeting WMD proliferation challenges also requires effective international action—and the international community is most engaged in such action when the United States leads. Taking action need not involve military force. Our strong preference and common practice is to address proliferation concerns through international diplomacy, in concert with key allies and regional partners. If necessary, however, under longstanding principles of self-defense, we do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption. The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same. We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just. Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction This Administration inherited an Iraq threat that was unresolved. In early 2001, the international support for U.N. sanctions and continued

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limits on the Iraqi regime’s weapons-related activity was eroding, and key UNSC members were asking that they be lifted. For America, the September 11 attacks underscored the danger of allowing threats to linger unresolved. Saddam Hussein’s continued defiance of 16 UNSC resolutions over 12 years, combined with his record of invading neighboring countries, supporting terrorists, tyrannizing his own people, and using chemical weapons, presented a threat we could no longer ignore. The UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, calling for full and immediate compliance by the Iraqi regime with its disarmament obligations. Once again, Saddam defied the international community. According to the Iraq Survey Group, the team of inspectors that went into Iraq after Saddam Hussein was toppled and whose report provides the fullest accounting of the Iraqi regime’s illicit activities: Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the intellectual capabilities. As U.N. sanctions eroded there was a concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever. Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion of activity that would have the effect of supporting future WMD reconstitution.

With the elimination of Saddam’s regime, this threat has been addressed, once and for all. The Iraq Survey Group also found that prewar intelligence estimates of Iraqi WMD stockpiles were wrong—a conclusion that has been confirmed by a bipartisan commission and congressional investigations. We must learn from this experience if we are to counter successfully the very real threat of proliferation. First, our intelligence must improve. The President and the Congress have taken steps to reorganize and strengthen the U.S. intelligence community. A single, accountable leader of the intelligence community with authorities to match his responsibilities, and increased sharing of information and increased resources, are helping realize this objective. Second, there will always be some uncertainty about the status of hidden programs since proliferators are often brutal regimes that go to great lengths to conceal their activities. Indeed, prior to the 1991 Gulf War, many intelligence analysts underestimated the WMD threat posed by the Iraqi regime. After that conflict, they were surprised to learn how far Iraq had progressed along various pathways to try to produce fissile material.

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Third, Saddam’s strategy of bluff, denial, and deception is a dangerous game that dictators play at their peril. The world offered Saddam a clear choice: effect full and immediate compliance with his disarmament obligations or face serious consequences. Saddam chose the latter course and is now facing judgment in an Iraqi court. It was Saddam’s reckless behavior that demanded the world’s attention, and it was his refusal to remove the ambiguity that he created that forced the United States and its allies to act. We have no doubt that the world is a better place for the removal of this dangerous and unpredictable tyrant, and we have no doubt that the world is better off if tyrants know that they pursue WMD at their own peril.

VI. IGNITE A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH THROUGH FREE MARKETS AND FREE TRADE A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 Promoting free and fair trade has long been a bedrock tenet of American foreign policy. Greater economic freedom is ultimately inseparable from political liberty. Economic freedom empowers individuals, and empowered individuals increasingly demand greater political freedom. Greater economic freedom also leads to greater economic opportunity and prosperity for everyone. History has judged the market economy as the single most effective economic system and the greatest antidote to poverty. To expand economic liberty and prosperity, the United States promotes free and fair trade, open markets, a stable financial system, the integration of the global economy, and secure, clean energy development. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges The global economy is more open and free, and many people around the world have seen their lives improve as prosperity and economic integration have increased. The Administration has accomplished much of the economic freedom agenda it set out in 2002: Seizing the global initiative. We have worked to open markets and integrate the global economy through launching the Doha Development Agenda negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States put forward bold and historic proposals to reform global agricultural trade, to eliminate farm export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting support programs, to eliminate all tariffs on consumer and industrial goods, and to open global services markets. When negotiations stalled in 2003, the United States took the initiative to put Doha back on track, culminating in a successful framework agreement reached in Geneva in 2004. As talks proceed, the United States continues to lead the world in advancing bold proposals for economic freedom through open markets. We also

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have led the way in helping the accessions of new WTO members such as Armenia, Cambodia, Macedonia, and Saudi Arabia. Pressing regional and bilateral trade initiatives. We have used FTAs to open markets, support economic reform and the rule of law, and create new opportunities for American farmers and workers. Since 2001, we have: r Implemented or completed negotiations for FTAs with 14 countries on 5 continents, and are negotiating agreements with 11 additional countries;

r Partnered with Congress to pass the Central America Free Trade Agreement— Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR), long sought by the leaders of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Dominican Republic;

r Called in 2003 for the creation of a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013 to bring the Middle East into an expanding circle of opportunity;

r Negotiated FTAs with Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman to provide a foundation for the MEFTA initiative;

r Launched in 2002 the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, which led to the completion of a free trade agreement with Singapore, and the launch of negotiations with Thailand and Malaysia;

r Concluded an FTA with Australia, one of America’s strongest allies in the AsiaPacific region and a major trading partner of the United States; and

r Continued to promote the opportunities of increased trade to sub-Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and extended opportunity to many other developing countries through the Generalized System of Preferences.

Pressing for open markets, financial stability, and deeper integration of the world economy. We have partnered with Europe, Japan, and other major economies to promote structural reforms that encourage growth, stability, and opportunity across the globe. The United States has: r Gained agreement in the G-7 on the Agenda for Growth, which commits member states to take concrete steps to reform domestic economic systems;

r Worked with other nations that serve as regional and global engines of growth— such as India, China, the ROK, Brazil, and Russia—on reforms to open markets and ensure financial stability;

r Urged China to move to a market-based, flexible exchange rate regime—a step that would help both China and the global economy; and

r Pressed for reform of the International Financial Institutions to focus on results, fostering good governance and sound policies, and freeing poor countries from unpayable debts.

Enhancing energy security and clean development. The Administration has worked with trading partners and energy producers to expand the types and sources of energy, to open markets and strengthen the rule of law,

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and to foster private investment that can help develop the energy needed to meet global demand. In addition, we have: r Worked with industrialized and emerging nations on hydrogen, clean coal, and advanced nuclear technologies; and

r Joined with Australia, China, India, Japan, and the ROK in forming the AsiaPacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate to accelerate deployment of clean technologies to enhance energy security, reduce poverty, and reduce pollution.

Several challenges remain: r Protectionist impulses in many countries put at risk the benefits of open markets and impede the expansion of free and fair trade and economic growth.

r Nations that lack the rule of law are prone to corruption, lack of transparency, and poor governance. These nations frustrate the economic aspirations of their people by failing to promote entrepreneurship, protect intellectual property, or allow their citizens access to vital investment capital.

r Many countries are too dependent upon foreign oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world.

r Economic integration spreads wealth across the globe, but also makes local economies more subject to global market conditions.

r Some governments restrict the free flow of capital, subverting the vital role that wise investment can play in promoting economic growth. This denies investments, economic opportunity, and new jobs to the people who need them most.

C. The Way Ahead Economic freedom is a moral imperative. The liberty to create and build or to buy, sell, and own property is fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society. Economic freedom also reinforces political freedom. It creates diversified centers of power and authority that limit the reach of government. It expands the free flow of ideas; with increased trade and foreign investment comes exposure to new ways of thinking and living which give citizens more control over their own lives. To continue extending liberty and prosperity, and to meet the challenges that remain, our strategy going forward involves: 1. Opening Markets and Integrating Developing Countries While most of the world affirms in principle the appeal of economic liberty, in practice too many nations hold fast to the false comforts of subsidies and trade barriers. Such distortions of the market stifle growth in developed countries, and slow the escape from poverty in developing countries. Against these short-sighted impulses, the United States promotes the enduring vision of a global economy that welcomes all participants

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and encourages the voluntary exchange of goods and services based on mutual benefit, not favoritism. We will continue to advance this agenda through the WTO and through bilateral and regional FTAs. r The United States will seek completion of the Doha Development Agenda negotiations. A successful Doha agreement will expand opportunities for Americans and for others around the world. Trade and open markets will empower citizens in developing countries to improve their lives, while reducing the opportunities for corruption that afflict state-controlled economies.

r We will continue to work with countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,

and Vietnam on the market reforms needed to join the WTO. Participation in the WTO brings opportunities as well as obligations—to strengthen the rule of law and honor the intellectual property rights that sustain the modern knowledge economy, and to remove tariffs, subsidies, and other trade barriers that distort global markets and harm the world’s poor.

r We will advance MEFTA by completing and bringing into force FTAs for

Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates and through other initiatives to expand open trade with and among countries in the region.

r In Africa, we are pursuing an FTA with the countries of the Southern African Customs Union: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.

r In Asia, we are pursuing FTAs with Thailand, the ROK, and Malaysia. We will also continue to work closely with China to ensure it honors its WTO commitments and protects intellectual property.

r In our own hemisphere, we will advance the vision of a free trade area of the

Americas by building on North American Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA-DR, and the FTA with Chile. We will complete and bring into force FTAs with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama.

2. Opening, Integrating, and Diversifying Energy Markets to Ensure Energy Independence Most of the energy that drives the global economy comes from fossil fuels, especially petroleum. The United States is the world’s third largest oil producer, but we rely on international sources to supply more than 50 percent of our needs. Only a small number of countries make major contributions to the world’s oil supply. The world’s dependence on these few suppliers is neither responsible nor sustainable over the long term. The key to ensuring our energy security is diversity in the regions from which energy resources come and in the types of energy resources on which we rely. r The Administration will work with resource-rich countries to increase their openness, transparency, and rule of law. This will promote effective democratic governance and attract the investment essential to developing their resources and expanding the range of energy suppliers.

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r We will build the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to work with other nations to develop and deploy advanced nuclear recycling and reactor technologies. This initiative will help provide reliable, emission-free energy with less of the waste burden of older technologies and without making available separated plutonium that could be used by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons. These new technologies will make possible a dramatic expansion of safe, clean nuclear energy to help meet the growing global energy demand.

r We will work with international partners to develop other transformational

technologies such as clean coal and hydrogen. Through projects like our FutureGen initiative, we seek to turn our abundant domestic coal into emissions-free sources of electricity and hydrogen, providing our economies increased power with decreased emissions.

r On the domestic front, we are investing in zero-emission coal-fired plants; revolutionary solar and wind technologies; clean, safe nuclear energy; and cuttingedge methods of producing ethanol.

Our comprehensive energy strategy puts a priority on reducing our reliance on foreign energy sources. Diversification of energy sources also will help alleviate the “petroleum curse”—the tendency for oil revenues to foster corruption and prevent economic growth and political reform in some oil-producing states. In too many such nations, ruling elites enrich themselves while denying the people the benefits of their countries’ natural wealth. In the worst cases, oil revenues fund activities that destabilize their regions or advance violent ideologies. Diversifying the suppliers within and across regions reduces opportunities for corruption and diminishes the leverage of irresponsible rulers. 3. Reforming the International Financial System to Ensure Stability and Growth In our interconnected world, stable and open financial markets are an essential feature of a prosperous global economy. We will work to improve the stability and openness of markets by: r Promoting Growth-Oriented Economic Policies Worldwide. Sound policies in the United States have helped drive much international growth. We cannot be the only source of strength, however. We will work with the world’s other major economies, including the EU and Japan, to promote structural reforms that open their markets and increase productivity in their nations and across the world.

r Encouraging Adoption of Flexible Exchange Rates and Open Markets for Financial

Services. The United States will help emerging economies make the transition to the flexible exchange rates appropriate for major economies. In particular, we will continue to urge China to meet its own commitment to a market-based, flexible exchange rate regime. We will also promote more open financial service markets, which encourage stable and sound financial practices.

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r Strengthening International Financial Institutions. At the dawn of a previous era six decades ago, the United States championed the creation of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These institutions were instrumental in the development of the global economy and an expansion of prosperity unprecedented in world history. They remain vital today, but must adapt to new realities:

b For the World Bank and regional development banks, we will encourage

greater emphasis on investments in the private sector. We will urge more consideration of economic freedom, governance, and measurable results in allocating funds. We will promote an increased use of grants to relieve the burden of unsustainable debt.

b For the IMF, we will seek to refocus it on its core mission: international finan-

cial stability. This means strengthening the IMF’s ability to monitor the financial system to prevent crises before they happen. If crises occur, the IMF’s response must reinforce each country’s responsibility for its own economic choices. A refocused IMF will strengthen market institutions and market discipline over financial decisions, helping to promote a stable and prosperous global economy. By doing so, over time markets and the private sector can supplant the need for the IMF to perform in its current role.

r Building Local Capital Markets and the Formal Economy in the Developing World. The first place that small businesses in developing countries turn to for resources is their own domestic markets. Unfortunately, in too many countries these resources are unavailable due to weak financial systems, a lack of property rights, and the diversion of economic activity away from the formal economy into the black market. The United States will work with these countries to develop and strengthen local capital markets and reduce the black market. This will provide more resources to helping the public sector govern effectively and the private sector grow and prosper.

r Creating a More Transparent, Accountable, and Secure International Financial System. The United States has worked with public and private partners to help secure the international financial system against abuse by criminals, terrorists, money launderers, and corrupt political leaders. We will continue to use international venues like the Financial Action Task Force to ensure that this global system is transparent and protected from abuse by tainted capital. We must also develop new tools that allow us to detect, disrupt, and isolate rogue financial players and gatekeepers.

VII. EXPAND THE CIRCLE OF DEVELOPMENT BY OPENING SOCIETIES AND BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEMOCRACY A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 Helping the world’s poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative. Economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected. Past foreign assistance to corrupt and ineffective governments failed to help the populations in greatest need.

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Instead, it often impeded democratic reform and encouraged corruption. The United States must promote development programs that achieve measurable results—rewarding reforms, encouraging transparency, and improving people’s lives. Led by the United States, the international community has endorsed this approach in the Monterrey Consensus. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges The United States has improved the lives of millions of people and transformed the practice of development by adopting more effective policies and programs. r Advancing Development and Reinforcing Reform. The Administration pioneered a revolution in development strategy with the Millennium Challenge Account program, rewarding countries that govern justly, invest in their people, and foster economic freedom. The program is based on the principle that each nation bears the responsibility for its own development. It offers governments the opportunity and the means to undertake transformational change by designing their own reform and development programs, which are then funded through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The MCC has approved over $1.5 billion for compacts in eight countries, is working with over a dozen other countries on compacts, and has committed many smaller grants to other partner countries.

r Turning the Tide Against AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases. The President’s

Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is an unprecedented, 5-year, $15 billion effort. Building on the success of pioneering programs in Africa, we have launched a major initiative that will prevent 7 million new infections, provide treatment to 2 million infected individuals, and care for 10 million AIDS orphans and others affected by the disease. We have launched a $1.2 billion, 5-year initiative to reduce malaria deaths by 50 percent in at least 15 targeted countries. To mobilize other nations and the private sector, the United States pioneered the creation of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. We are the largest donor to the Fund and have already contributed over $1.4 billion.

r Promoting Debt Sustainability and a Path Toward Private Capital Markets. The Ad-

ministration has sought to break the burden of debt that traps many poor countries by encouraging international financial institutions to provide grants instead of loans to low-income nations. With the United Kingdom, we spearheaded the G-8 initiative to provide 100 percent multilateral debt relief to qualifying Heavily Indebted Poor Countries. Reducing debt to sustainable levels allows countries to focus on immediate development challenges. In the long run, reducing debt also opens access to private capital markets which foster sound policies and long-term growth.

r Addressing Urgent Needs and Investing in People. The United States leads the world in providing food relief. We launched the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, using science, technology, and market incentives to increase the productivity of

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African farmers. We launched a 3-year, $900 million initiative to provide clean water to the poor. We have tripled basic education assistance through programs such as the Africa Education Initiative, which will train teachers and administrators, build schools, buy textbooks, and expand opportunities inside and outside the classroom.

r Unleashing the Power of the Private Sector. The Administration has sought to multiply the impact of our development assistance through initiatives such as the Global Development Alliance, which forges partnerships with the private sector to advance development goals, and Volunteers for Prosperity, which enlists some of our Nation’s most capable professionals to serve strategically in developing nations.

r Fighting Corruption and Promoting Transparency. Through multilateral efforts

like the G-8 Transparency Initiative and our policy of denying corrupt foreign officials entry into the United States, we are helping ensure that organized crime and parasitic rulers do not choke off the benefits of economic assistance and growth.

We have increased our overall development assistance spending by 97 percent since 2000. In all of these efforts, the United States has sought concrete measures of success. Funding is a means, not the end. We are giving more money to help the world’s poor, and giving it more effectively. Many challenges remain, including: r Helping millions of people in the world who continue to suffer from poverty and disease;

r Ensuring that the delivery of assistance reinforces good governance and sound economic policies; and

r Building the capacity of poor countries to take ownership of their own development strategies.

C. The Way Ahead America’s national interests and moral values drive us in the same direction: to assist the world’s poor citizens and least developed nations and help integrate them into the global economy. We have accomplished many of the goals laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Many of the new initiatives we launched in the last 4 years are now fully operating to help the plight of the world’s least fortunate. We will persevere on this path. Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies. Improving the way we use foreign assistance will make it more effective in strengthening responsible governments, responding to suffering, and improving people’s lives.

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1. Transformational Diplomacy and Effective Democracy Transformational diplomacy means working with our many international partners to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Long-term development must include encouraging governments to make wise choices and assisting them in implementing those choices. We will encourage and reward good behavior rather than reinforce negative behavior. Ultimately it is the countries themselves that must decide to take the necessary steps toward development, yet we will help advance this process by creating external incentives for governments to reform themselves. Effective economic development advances our national security by helping promote responsible sovereignty, not permanent dependency. Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress. 2. Making Foreign Assistance More Effective The Administration has created the new position of Director of Foreign Assistance (DFA) in the State Department. The DFA will serve concurrently as Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), a position that will continue to be at the level of Deputy Secretary, and will have, consistent with existing legal requirements, authority over all State Department and USAID foreign assistance. This reorganization will create a more unified and rational structure that will more fully align assistance programs in State and USAID, increase the effectiveness of these programs for recipient countries, and ensure that we are being the best possible stewards of taxpayer dollars. And it will focus our foreign assistance on promoting greater ownership and responsibility on the part of host nations and their citizens. With this new authority, the DFA/Administrator will develop a coordinated foreign assistance strategy, including 5-year, country-specific assistance strategies and annual country-specific assistance operational plans. The DFA/Administrator also will provide guidance for the assistance delivered through other entities of the United States Government, including the MCC and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator. To ensure the best stewardship of our foreign assistance, the United States will: r Distinguish among the different challenges facing different nations and address those challenges with tools appropriate for each country’s stage of development;

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r Encourage and reward good government and economic reform, both bilaterally and through the multilateral institutions such as international financial institutions, the G-8, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC);

r Engage the private sector to help solve development problems; r Promote graduation from economic aid dependency with the ultimate goal of ending assistance;

r Build trade capacity to enable the poorest countries to enter into the global trade system; and

r Empower local leaders to take responsibility for their country’s development. Our assistance efforts will also highlight and build on the lessons learned from successful examples of wise development and economic policy choices, such as the ROK, Taiwan, Ireland, Poland, Slovakia, Chile, and Botswana. VIII. DEVELOP AGENDAS FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION WITH THE OTHER MAIN CENTERS OF GLOBAL POWER A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 Relations with the most powerful countries in the world are central to our national security strategy. Our priority is pursuing American interests within cooperative relationships, particularly with our oldest and closest friends and allies. At the same time, we must seize the opportunity— unusual in historical terms—of an absence of fundamental conflict between the great powers. Another priority, therefore, is preventing the reemergence of the great power rivalries that divided the world in previous eras. New times demand new approaches, flexible enough to permit effective action even when there are reasonable differences of opinions among friends, yet strong enough to confront the challenges the world faces. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges The United States has enjoyed unprecedented levels of cooperation on many of its highest national security priorities: r The global coalition against terror has grown and deepened, with extensive cooperation and common resolve. The nations that have partnered with us in Afghanistan and Iraq have developed capabilities that can be applied to other challenges.

r We have joined with other nations around the world as well as numerous multilateral organizations to improve the capability of all nations to defend their homelands against terrorists and transnational criminals.

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r We have achieved extraordinary coordination among historic rivals in pressing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear program.

r We have partnered with European allies and international institutions to pressure Iran to honor its nonproliferation commitments.

r The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is transforming itself to meet current threats and is playing a leading role in stabilizing the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as training the Iraqi military leadership to address its security challenges.

r We have set aside decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world’s most populous democracy, on a new and fruitful path.

At the same time, America’s relations with other nations have been strong enough to withstand differences and candid exchanges of views. r Some of our oldest and closest friends disagreed with U.S. policy in Iraq. There are ongoing and serious debates with our allies about how best to address the unique and evolving nature of the global terrorist threat.

r We have disagreed on the steps to reduce agricultural subsidies and achieve

success in the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations. We have also faced challenges in forging consensus with other major nations on the most effective measures to protect the environment.

C. The Way Ahead The struggle against militant Islamic radicalism is the great ideological conflict of the early years of the 21st century and finds the great powers all on the same side—opposing the terrorists. This circumstance differs profoundly from the ideological struggles of the 20th century, which saw the great powers divided by ideology as well as by national interest. The potential for great power consensus presents the United States with an extraordinary opportunity. Yet certain challenges must be overcome. Some nations differ with us on the appropriate pace of change. Other nations provide rhetorical support for free markets and effective democracy but little action on freedom’s behalf. Five principles undergird our strategy for relations with the main centers of global power. r First, these relations must be set in their proper context. Bilateral policies that ignore regional and global realities are unlikely to succeed.

r Second, these relations must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them.

r Third, we cannot pretend that our interests are unaffected by states’ treatment of their own citizens. America’s interest in promoting effective democracies rests

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on an historical fact: states that are governed well are most inclined to behave well. We will encourage all our partners to expand liberty, and to respect the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, as the surest way to advance the welfare of their people and to cement close relations with the United States.

r Fourth, while we do not seek to dictate to other states the choices they make, we do seek to influence the calculations on which these choices are based. We also must hedge appropriately in case states choose unwisely.

r Fifth, we must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of our allies and partners.

1. The Western Hemisphere These principles guide our relations within our own Hemisphere, the frontline of defense of American national security. Our goal remains a hemisphere fully democratic, bound together by goodwill, security cooperation, and the opportunity for all our citizens to prosper. Tyrants and those who would follow them belong to a different era and must not be allowed to reverse the progress of the last two decades. Countries in the Hemisphere must be helped to the path of sustained political and economic development. The deceptive appeal of anti–free market populism must not be allowed to erode political freedoms and trap the Hemisphere’s poorest in cycles of poverty. If America’s nearest neighbors are not secure and stable, then Americans will be less secure. Our strategy for the Hemisphere begins with deepening key relationships with Canada and Mexico, a foundation of shared values and cooperative policies that can be extended throughout the region. We must continue to work with our neighbors in the Hemisphere to reduce illegal immigration and promote expanded economic opportunity for marginalized populations. We must also solidify strategic relationships with regional leaders in Central and South America and the Caribbean who are deepening their commitment to democratic values. And we must continue to work with regional partners to make multilateral institutions like the OAS and the Inter-American Development Bank more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region’s stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress. Together, these partnerships can advance our four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people. 2. Africa Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration. It is a place of promise and opportunity, linked to the United States by history, culture, commerce, and strategic significance. Our goal is an African continent that knows liberty, peace, stability, and increasing prosperity.

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Africa’s potential has in the past been held hostage by the bitter legacy of colonial misrule and bad choices by some African leaders. The United States recognizes that our security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of effective democracies. Overcoming the challenges Africa faces requires partnership, not paternalism. Our strategy is to promote economic development and the expansion of effective, democratic governance so that African states can take the lead in addressing African challenges. Through improved governance, reduced corruption, and market reforms, African nations can lift themselves toward a better future. We are committed to working with African nations to strengthen their domestic capabilities and the regional capacity of the AU to support postconflict transformations, consolidate democratic transitions, and improve peacekeeping and disaster responses. 3. Middle East The Broader Middle East continues to command the world’s attention. For too long, too many nations of the Middle East have suffered from a freedom deficit. Repression has fostered corruption, imbalanced or stagnant economies, political resentments, regional conflicts, and religious extremism. These maladies were all cloaked by an illusion of stability. Yet the peoples of the Middle East share the same desires as people in the rest of the world: liberty, opportunity, justice, order, and peace. These desires are now being expressed in movements for reform. The United States is committed to supporting the efforts of reformers to realize a better life for themselves and their region. We seek a Middle East of independent states, at peace with each other, and fully participating in an open global market of goods, services, and ideas. We are seeking to build a framework that will allow Israel and the Palestinian territories to live side by side in peace and security as two democratic states. In the wider region, we will continue to support efforts for reform and freedom in traditional allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Tyrannical regimes such as Iran and Syria that oppress at home and sponsor terrorism abroad know that we will continue to stand with their people against their misrule. And in Iraq, we will continue to support the Iraqi people and their historic march from tyranny to effective democracy. We will work with the freely elected, democratic government of Iraq—our new partner in the War on Terror—to consolidate and expand freedom, and to build security and lasting stability. 4. Europe The NATO remains a vital pillar of U.S. foreign policy. The Alliance has been strengthened by expanding its membership and now acts beyond its borders as an instrument for peace and stability in many parts

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of the world. It has also established partnerships with other key European states, including Russia, Ukraine, and others, further extending NATO’s historic transformation. The internal reform of NATO structures, capabilities, and procedures must be accelerated to ensure that NATO is able to carry out its missions effectively. The Alliance’s door will also remain open to those countries that aspire for membership and meet NATO standards. Further, NATO must deepen working relationships between and across institutions, as it is doing with the EU, and as it also could do with new institutions. Such relationships offer opportunities for enhancing the distinctive strengths and missions of each organization. Europe is home to some of our oldest and closest allies. Our cooperative relations are built on a sure foundation of shared values and interests. This foundation is expanding and deepening with the ongoing spread of effective democracies in Europe, and must expand and deepen still further if we are to reach the goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. These democracies are effective partners, joining with us to promote global freedom and prosperity. Just as in the special relationship that binds us to the United Kingdom, these cooperative relationships forge deeper ties between our nations. 5. Russia The United States seeks to work closely with Russia on strategic issues of common interest and to manage issues on which we have differing interests. By reason of geography and power, Russia has great influence not only in Europe and its own immediate neighborhood, but also in many other regions of vital interest to us: the broader Middle East, South and Central Asia, and East Asia. We must encourage Russia to respect the values of freedom and democracy at home and not to impede the cause of freedom and democracy in these regions. Strengthening our relationship will depend on the policies, foreign and domestic, that Russia adopts. Recent trends regrettably point toward a diminishing commitment to democratic freedoms and institutions. We will work to try to persuade the Russian Government to move forward, not backward, along freedom’s path. Stability and prosperity in Russia’s neighborhood will help deepen our relations with Russia, but that stability will remain elusive as long as this region is not governed by effective democracies. We will seek to persuade Russia’s government that democratic progress in Russia and its region benefits the peoples who live there and improves relationships with us, with other Western governments, and among themselves. Conversely, efforts to prevent democratic development at home and abroad will hamper the development of Russia’s relations with the United States, Europe, and its neighbors.

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6. South and Central Asia South and Central Asia is a region of great strategic importance where American interests and values are engaged as never before. India is a great democracy, and our shared values are the foundation of our good relations. We are eager to see Pakistan move along a stable, secure, and democratic path. Our goal is for the entire region of South and Central Asia to be democratic, prosperous, and at peace. We have made great strides in transforming America’s relationship with India, a major power that shares our commitment to freedom, democracy, and rule of law. In July 2005, we signed a bold agreement—a roadmap to realize the meaningful cooperation that had eluded our two nations for decades. India now is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power. Progress with India has been achieved even as the United States has improved its strategic relationship with Pakistan. For decades, outsiders acted as if good relations with India and Pakistan were mutually exclusive. This Administration has shown that improved relations with each are possible and can help India and Pakistan make strides toward a lasting peace between themselves. America’s relationship with Pakistan will not be a mirror image of our relationship with India. Together, our relations with the nations of South Asia can serve as a foundation for deeper engagement throughout Central Asia. Increasingly, Afghanistan will assume its historical role as a land-bridge between South and Central Asia, connecting these two vital regions. Central Asia is an enduring priority for our foreign policy. The five countries of Central Asia are distinct from one another and our relations with each, while important, will differ. In the region as a whole, the elements of our larger strategy meet, and we must pursue those elements simultaneously: promoting effective democracies and the expansion of free-market reforms, diversifying global sources of energy, and enhancing security and winning the War on Terror. 7. East Asia East Asia is a region of great opportunities and lingering tensions. Over the past decade, it has been a source of extraordinary economic dynamism and also of economic turbulence. Few regional economies have more effectively harnessed the engines of future prosperity: technology and globalized trade. Yet few regions have had greater difficulty overcoming the suspicions of the past. The United States is a Pacific nation, with extensive interests throughout East and Southeast Asia. The region’s stability and prosperity depend on our sustained engagement: maintaining robust partnerships supported

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by a forward defense posture supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights. Forging new international initiatives and institutions can assist in the spread of freedom, prosperity, and regional security. Existing institutions like the APEC forum and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum, can play a vital role. New arrangements, such as the U.S.–ASEAN Enhanced Partnership, or others that are focused on problem-solving and action, like the Six-Party Talks and the PSI, can likewise bring together Asian nations to address common challenges. And Asian nations that share our values can join us in partnership to strengthen new democracies and promote democratic reforms throughout the region. This institutional framework, however, must be built upon a foundation of sound bilateral relations with key states in the region. With Japan, the United States enjoys the closest relations in a generation. As the world’s two largest economies and aid donors, acting in concert multiplies each of our strengths and magnifies our combined contributions to global progress. Our shared commitment to democracy at home offers a sure foundation for cooperation abroad. With Australia, our alliance is global in scope. From Iraq and Afghanistan to our historic FTA, we are working jointly to ensure security, prosperity, and expanded liberty. With the ROK, we share a vision of a prosperous, democratic, and united Korean peninsula. We also share a commitment to democracy at home and progress abroad and are translating that common vision into joint action to sustain our alliance into the 21st century. With Southeast Asia, we celebrate the dynamism of increased economic freedom and look to further extend political freedom to all the people in the region, including those suffering under the repressive regime in Burma. In promoting greater economic and political liberty, we will work closely with our allies and key friends, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. China encapsulates Asia’s dramatic economic successes, but China’s transition remains incomplete. In one generation, China has gone from poverty and isolation to growing integration into the international economic system. China once opposed global institutions; today it is a permanent member of the UNSC and the WTO. As China becomes a global player, it must act as a responsible stakeholder that fulfills its obligations and works with the United States and others to advance the international system that has enabled its success: enforcing the international rules that have helped China lift itself out of a century of economic deprivation, embracing the economic and political standards that go along with that

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system of rules, and contributing to international stability and security by working with the United States and other major powers. China’s leaders proclaim that they have made a decision to walk the transformative path of peaceful development. If China keeps this commitment, the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutual interests. China can make an important contribution to global prosperity and ensure its own prosperity for the longer term if it will rely more on domestic demand and less on global trade imbalances to drive its economic growth. China shares our exposure to the challenges of globalization and other transnational concerns. Mutual interests can guide our cooperation on issues such as terrorism, proliferation, and energy security. We will work to increase our cooperation to combat disease pandemics and reverse environmental degradation. The United States encourages China to continue down the road of reform and openness, because in this way China’s leaders can meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Chinese people for liberty, stability, and prosperity. As economic growth continues, China will face a growing demand from its own people to follow the path of East Asia’s many modern democracies, adding political freedom to economic freedom. Continuing along this path will contribute to regional and international security. China’s leaders must realize, however, that they cannot stay on this peaceful path while holding on to old ways of thinking and acting that exacerbate concerns throughout the region and the world. These old ways include: r Continuing China’s military expansion in a nontransparent way; r Expanding trade, but acting as if they can somehow “lock up” energy supplies around the world or seek to direct markets rather than opening them up—as if they can follow a mercantilism borrowed from a discredited era; and

r Supporting resource-rich countries without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes.

China and Taiwan must also resolve their differences peacefully, without coercion and without unilateral action by either China or Taiwan. Ultimately, China’s leaders must see that they cannot let their population increasingly experience the freedoms to buy, sell, and produce, while denying them the rights to assemble, speak, and worship. Only by allowing the Chinese people to enjoy these basic freedoms and universal rights can China honor its own constitution and international commitments and reach its full potential. Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.

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IX. TRANSFORM AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS TO MEET THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY A. Summary of National Security Strategy 2002 The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different challenges. They must be transformed. B. Current Context: Successes and Challenges In the last four years, we have made substantial progress in transforming key national security institutions. r The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security brought under one authority 22 federal entities with vital roles to play in protecting our Nation and preventing terrorist attacks within the United States. The Department is focused on three national security priorities: preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks that do occur.

r In 2004, the Intelligence Community launched its most significant reorgani-

zation since the 1947 National Security Act. The centerpiece is a new position, the Director of National Intelligence, endowed with expanded budgetary, acquisition, tasking, and personnel authorities to integrate more effectively the efforts of the Community into a more unified, coordinated, and effective whole. The transformation also includes a new National Counterterrorism Center and a new National Counterproliferation Center to manage and coordinate planning and activities in those critical areas. The transformation extends to the FBI, which has augmented its intelligence capabilities and is now more fully and effectively integrated with the Intelligence Community.

r The Department of Defense has completed the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, which details how the Department will continue to adapt and build to meet new challenges.

b We are pursuing a future force that will provide tailored deterrence of both state and nonstate threats (including WMD employment, terrorist attacks in the physical and information domains, and opportunistic aggression) while assuring allies and dissuading potential competitors. The Department of Defense also is expanding Special Operations Forces and investing in advanced conventional capabilities to help win the long war against terrorist extremists and to help dissuade any hostile military competitor from challenging the United States, its allies, and partners.

b The Department is transforming itself to better balance its capabilities across four categories of challenges: Traditional challenges posed by states employing conventional armies, navies, and air forces in well-established forms of military competition.







Irregular challenges from state and nonstate actors employing methods such as terrorism and insurgency to counter our traditional military advantages,

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Catastrophic challenges involving the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD by state and nonstate actors; and deadly pandemics and other natural disasters that produce WMD-like effects.




Disruptive challenges from state and nonstate actors who employ technologies and capabilities (such as biotechnology, cyber and space operations, or directed-energy weapons) in new ways to counter military advantages the United States currently enjoys.

C. The Way Ahead We must extend and enhance the transformation of key institutions, both domestically and abroad. At home, we will pursue three priorities: r Sustaining the transformation already under way in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Intelligence Community.

r Continuing to reorient the Department of State towards transformational diplomacy, which promotes effective democracy and responsible sovereignty. Our diplomats must be able to step outside their traditional role to become more involved with the challenges within other societies, helping them directly, channeling assistance, and learning from their experience. This effort will include:

r Promoting the efforts of the new Director for Foreign Assistance/Administrator to ensure that foreign assistance is used as effectively as possible to meet our broad foreign policy objectives. This new office will align more fully the foreign assistance activities carried out by the Department of State and USAID, demonstrating that we are responsible stewards of taxpayer dollars.

r Improving our capability to plan for and respond to postconflict and failed-state situations. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization will integrate all relevant United States Government resources and assets in conducting reconstruction and stabilization operations. This effort must focus on building the security and law enforcement structures that are often the prerequisite for restoring order and ensuring success.

r Developing a civilian reserve corps, analogous to the military reserves. The civilian reserve corps would utilize, in a flexible and timely manner, the human resources of the American people for skills and capacities needed for international disaster relief and postconflict reconstruction.

r Strengthening our public diplomacy, so that we advocate the policies and val-

ues of the United States in a clear, accurate, and persuasive way to a watching and listening world. This includes actively engaging foreign audiences, expanding educational opportunities for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in the United States; empowering the voices of our citizen ambassadors as well as those foreigners

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who share our commitment to a safer, more compassionate world; enlisting the support of the private sector; increasing our channels for dialogue with Muslim leaders and citizens; and confronting propaganda quickly, before myths and distortions have time to take root in the hearts and minds of people across the world.

r Improving the capacity of agencies to plan, prepare, coordinate, integrate, and execute responses covering the full range of crisis contingencies and long-term challenges.

b We need to strengthen the capacity of departments and agencies to do comprehensive, results-oriented planning.

b Agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad.

Abroad, we will work with our allies on three priorities: r Promoting meaningful reform of the U.N., including: b Creating structures to ensure financial accountability and administrative and organizational efficiency.

b Enshrining the principle that membership and participation privileges are earned by responsible behavior and by reasonable burden-sharing of security and stability challenges.

b Enhancing the capacity of the U.N. and associated regional organizations to

stand up well-trained, rapidly deployable, sustainable military and gendarme units for peace operations.

r Ensuring that the U.N. reflects today’s geopolitical realities and is not shackled by obsolete structures.

r Reinvigorating the U.N.’s commitment, reflected in the U.N. Charter, to the promotion of democracy and human rights.

r Enhancing the role of democracies and democracy promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions, including:

b Strengthening and institutionalizing the Community of Democracies. b Fostering the creation of regional democracy-based institutions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere.

b Improving the capacity of the U.N. and other multilateral institutions to advance the freedom agenda through tools like the U.N. Democracy Fund.

b Coordinating more effectively the unique contributions of international financial institutions and regional development banks.

r Establishing results-oriented partnerships on the model of the PSI to meet new challenges and opportunities. These partnerships emphasize international cooperation, not international bureaucracy. They rely on voluntary adherence rather than binding treaties. They are oriented towards action and results rather than legislation or rule-making.

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X. ENGAGE THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CONFRONT THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION In recent years, the world has witnessed the growing importance of a set of opportunities and challenges that were addressed indirectly in National Security Strategy 2002: the national security implications of globalization. Globalization presents many opportunities. Much of the world’s prosperity and improved living standards in recent years derive from the expansion of global trade, investment, information, and technology. The United States has been a leader in promoting these developments, and we believe they have improved significantly the quality of life of the American people and people the world over. Other nations have embraced these opportunities and have likewise benefited. Globalization has also helped the advance of democracy by extending the marketplace of ideas and the ideals of liberty. These new flows of trade, investment, information, and technology are transforming national security. Globalization has exposed us to new challenges and changed the way old challenges touch our interests and values, while also greatly enhancing our capacity to respond. Examples include: r Public health challenges like pandemics (HIV/AIDS, avian influenza) that recognize no borders. The risks to social order are so great that traditional public health approaches may be inadequate, necessitating new strategies and responses.

r Illicit trade, whether in drugs, human beings, or sex, that exploits the modern era’s

greater ease of transport and exchange. Such traffic corrodes social order, bolsters crime and corruption, undermines effective governance, facilitates the illicit transfer of WMD and advanced conventional weapons technology, and compromises traditional security and law enforcement.

r Environmental destruction, whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic mega-

disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to respond, and may even overtax national militaries, requiring a larger international response.

These challenges are not traditional national security concerns, such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left unaddressed they can threaten national security. We have learned that: r Preparing for and managing these challenges requires the full exercise of national power, up to and including traditional security instruments. For example, the U.S. military provided critical logistical support in the response to the Southeast Asian tsunami and the South Asian earthquake until U.N. and civilian humanitarian responders could relieve the military of these vital duties.

r Technology can help, but the key to rapid and effective response lies in achiev-

ing unity of effort across a range of agencies. For example, our response to the Katrina and Rita hurricanes underscored the need for communications systems

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that remain operational and integrated during times of crisis. Even more vital, however, is improved coordination within the Federal government, with state and local partners, and with the private sector.

r Existing international institutions have a role to play, but in many cases coali-

tions of the willing may be able to respond more quickly and creatively, at least in the short term. For example, U.S. leadership in mobilizing the Regional Core Group to respond to the tsunami of 2004 galvanized the follow-on international response.

r The response and the new partnerships it creates can sometimes serve as a cat-

alyst for changing existing political conditions to address other problems. For example, the response to the tsunami in Southeast Asia and the earthquake in Pakistan developed new lines of communication and cooperation at a local level, which opened the door to progress in reconciling longstanding regional conflicts in Aceh and Kashmir.

Effective democracies are better able to deal with these challenges than are repressive or poorly governed states. Pandemics require robust and fully transparent public health systems, which weak governments and those that fear freedom are unable or unwilling to provide. Yet these challenges require effective democracies to come together in innovative ways. The United States must lead the effort to reform existing institutions and create new ones—including forging new partnerships between governmental and nongovernmental actors, and with transnational and international organizations. To confront illicit trade, for example, the Administration launched the Proliferation Security Initiative and the APEC Secure Trade in the APEC Region Initiative, both of which focus on tangible steps governments can take to combat illegal trade. To combat the cultivation and trafficking of narcotics, the Administration devotes over $1 billion annually to comprehensive counternarcotics efforts, working with governments, particularly in Latin America and Asia, to eradicate crops, destroy production facilities, interdict shipments, and support developing alternative livelihoods. To confront the threat of a possible pandemic, the Administration took the lead in creating the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza, a new global partnership of states committed to effective surveillance and preparedness that will help to detect and respond quickly to any outbreaks of the disease. XI. CONCLUSION The challenges America faces are great, yet we have enormous power and influence to address those challenges. The times require an ambitious national security strategy, yet one recognizing the limits to what even a

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nation as powerful as the United States can achieve by itself. Our national security strategy is idealistic about goals, and realistic about means. There was a time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems in other lands, leaving America to lead by example alone. That time has long since passed. America cannot know peace, security, and prosperity by retreating from the world. America must lead by deed as well as by example. This is how we plan to lead, and this is the legacy we will leave to those who follow.

APPENDIX B THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM

September 2006 http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/

OVERVIEW OF AMERICA’S NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement fueled by a radical ideology of hatred, oppression, and murder. Our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, first published in February 2003, recognizes that we are at war and that protecting and defending the Homeland, the American people, and their livelihoods remains our first and most solemn obligation. Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations, and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive. We have broken old orthodoxies that once confined our counterterrorism efforts primarily to the criminal justice domain. This updated strategy sets the course for winning the War on Terror. It builds directly from the National Security Strategy issued in March 2006 as well as the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,

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and incorporates our increased understanding of the enemy. From the beginning, we understood that the War on Terror involved more than simply finding and bringing to justice those who had planned and executed the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Our strategy involved destroying the larger al Qaeda network and also confronting the radical ideology that inspired others to join or support the terrorist movement. Since 9/11, we have made substantial progress in degrading the al Qaeda network, killing or capturing key lieutenants, eliminating safehavens, and disrupting existing lines of support. Through the freedom agenda, we also have promoted the best long-term answer to al Qaeda’s agenda: the freedom and dignity that comes when human liberty is protected by effective democratic institutions. In response to our efforts, the terrorists have adjusted, and so we must continue to refine our strategy to meet the evolving threat. Today, we face a global terrorist movement and must confront the radical ideology that justifies the use of violence against innocents in the name of religion. As laid out in this strategy, to win the War on Terror, we will: r Advance effective democracies as the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism;

r Prevent attacks by terrorist networks; r Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; r Deny terrorists control of any nation they would use as a base and launching pad for terror; and

r Lay the foundations and build the institutions and structures we need to carry the fight forward against terror and help ensure our ultimate success.

TODAY’S REALITIES IN THE WAR ON TERROR The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were acts of war against the United States, peaceful people throughout the world, and the very principles of liberty and human dignity. The United States, together with our Coalition partners, has fought back and will win this war. We will hold the perpetrators accountable and work to prevent the recurrence of similar atrocities on any scale – whether at home or abroad. The War on Terror extends beyond the current armed conflict that arose out of the attacks of September 11, 2001, and embraces all facets of continuing U.S. efforts to bring an end to the scourge of terrorism. Ultimately, we will win the long war to defeat the terrorists and their murderous ideology. Successes r We have deprived al Qaeda of safe haven in Afghanistan and helped a democratic government to rise in its place. Once a terrorist sanctuary ruled by the

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repressive Taliban regime, Afghanistan is now a full partner in the War on Terror.

r A multinational coalition joined by the Iraqis is aggressively prosecuting the war against the terrorists in Iraq. Together, we are working to secure a united, stable, and democratic Iraq, now a new War on Terror ally in the heart of the Middle East.

r We have significantly degraded the al Qaeda network. Most of those in the al

Qaeda network responsible for the September 11 attacks, including the plot’s mastermind Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, have been captured or killed. We also have killed other key al Qaeda members, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the group’s operational commander in Iraq who led a campaign of terror that took the lives of countless American forces and innocent Iraqis.

r We have led an unprecedented international campaign to combat terrorist financing that has made it harder, costlier, and riskier for al Qaeda and related terrorist groups to raise and move money.

r There is a broad and growing global consensus that the deliberate targeting of innocents is never justified by any calling or cause.

r Many nations have rallied to fight terrorism, with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military, and diplomatic activity.

r We have strengthened our ability to disrupt and help prevent future attacks in the Homeland by enhancing our counterterrorism architecture through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center. Overall, the United States and our partners have disrupted several serious plots since September 11, including al Qaeda plots to attack inside the United States.

r Numerous countries that were part of the problem before September 11 are now increasingly becoming part of the solution – and this transformation has occurred without destabilizing friendly regimes in key regions.

r The Administration has worked with Congress to adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the USA PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also protecting our fundamental liberties.

Yet while America is safer, we are not yet safe. The enemy remains determined, and we face serious challenges at home and abroad. Challenges r Terrorist networks today are more dispersed and less centralized. They are more reliant on smaller cells inspired by a common ideology and less directed by a central command structure.

r While the United States Government and its partners have thwarted many attacks, we have not been able to prevent them all. Terrorists have struck in many places throughout the world, from Bali to Beslan to Baghdad.

r While we have substantially improved our air, land, sea, and border security, our Homeland is not immune from attack.

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r Terrorists have declared their intention to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to inflict even more catastrophic attacks against the United States, our allies, partners, and other interests around the world.

r Some states, such as Syria and Iran, continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad.

r The ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a rallying cry.

r Increasingly sophisticated use of the Internet and media has enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.

TODAY’S TERRORIST ENEMY The United States and our partners continue to pursue a significantly degraded but still dangerous al Qaeda network. Yet the enemy we face today in the War on Terror is not the same enemy we faced on September 11. Our effective counterterrorist efforts, in part, have forced the terrorists to evolve and modify their ways of doing business. Our understanding of the enemy has evolved as well. Today, the principal terrorist enemy confronting the United States is a transnational movement of extremist organizations, networks, and individuals – and their state and nonstate supporters – which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends. This transnational movement is not monolithic. Although al Qaeda functions as the movement’s vanguard and remains, along with its affiliate groups and those inspired by them, the most dangerous present manifestation of the enemy, the movement is not controlled by any single individual, group, or state. What unites the movement is a common vision, a common set of ideas about the nature and destiny of the world, and a common goal of ushering in totalitarian rule. What unites the movement is the ideology of oppression, violence, and hate. Our terrorist enemies exploit Islam to serve a violent political vision. Fueled by a radical ideology and a false belief that the United States is the cause of most problems affecting Muslims today, our enemies seek to expel Western power and influence from the Muslim world and establish regimes that rule according to a violent and intolerant distortion of Islam. As illustrated by Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, such regimes would deny all political and religious freedoms and serve as sanctuaries for extremists to launch additional attacks against not only the United States, its allies, and partners, but the Muslim world itself. Some among the enemy, particularly al Qaeda, harbor even greater territorial and geopolitical ambitions and aim to establish a single, pan-Islamic, totalitarian regime that stretches from Spain to Southeast Asia.

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This enemy movement seeks to create and exploit a division between the Muslim and non-Muslim world and within the Muslim world itself. The terrorists distort the idea of jihad into a call for violence and murder against those they regard as apostates or unbelievers, including all those who disagree with them. Most of the terrorist attacks since September 11 have occurred in Muslim countries—and most of the victims have been Muslims. In addition to this principal enemy, a host of other groups and individuals also use terror and violence against innocent civilians to pursue their political objectives. Though their motives and goals may be different, and often include secular and more narrow territorial aims, they threaten our interests and those of our partners as they attempt to overthrow civil order and replace freedom with conflict and intolerance. Their terrorist tactics ensure that they are enemies of humanity regardless of their goals and no matter where they operate. For our terrorist enemies, violence is not only justified, it is necessary and even glorified—judged the only means to achieve a world vision darkened by hate, fear, and oppression. They use suicide bombings, beheadings, and other atrocities against innocent people as a means to promote their creed. Our enemy’s demonstrated indifference to human life and desire to inflict catastrophic damage on the United States and our friends and allies around the world have fueled their desire for weapons of mass destruction. We cannot permit the world’s most dangerous terrorists and their regime sponsors to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. For the enemy, there is no peaceful coexistence with those who do not subscribe to their distorted and violent view of the world. They accept no dissent and tolerate no alternative points of view. Ultimately, the terrorist enemy we face threatens global peace, international security and prosperity, the rising tide of democracy, and the right of all people to live without fear of indiscriminate violence. STRATEGIC VISION FOR THE WAR ON TERROR From the beginning, the War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas—a fight against the terrorists and their murderous ideology. In the short run, the fight involves the application of all instruments of national power and influence to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven and control of any nation, prevent them from gaining access to WMD, render potential terrorist targets less attractive by strengthening security, and cut off their sources of funding and other resources they need to operate and survive. In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battle of ideas. Ideas can transform the

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embittered and disillusioned either into murderers willing to kill innocents, or into free peoples living harmoniously in a diverse society. The battle of ideas helps to define the strategic intent of our National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. The United States will continue to lead an expansive international effort in pursuit of a two-pronged vision: r The defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and

r The creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

STRATEGY FOR WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR Long-Term Approach: Advancing Effective Democracy The long-term solution for winning the War on Terror is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through effective democracy. Elections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But elections alone are not enough. Effective democracies honor and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, conscience, speech, assembly, association, and press. They are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people. Effective democracies exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their own borders, address causes of conflict peacefully, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law, and resist corruption. Effective democracies also limit the reach of government, protecting the institutions of civil society. In effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. They are the long-term antidote to the ideology of terrorism today. This is the battle of ideas. To wage the battle of ideas effectively, we must recognize what does and does not give rise to terrorism: r Terrorism is not the inevitable by-product of poverty. Many of the September 11 hijackers were from middle-class backgrounds, and many terrorist leaders, like bin Laden, are from privileged upbringings.

r Terrorism is not simply a result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq. The United

States was attacked on September 11 and many years earlier, well before we toppled the Saddam Hussein regime. Moreover, countries that did not participate in Coalition efforts in Iraq have not been spared from terror attacks.

r Terrorism is not simply a result of Israeli-Palestinian issues. Al Qaeda plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the 1990s, during an active period in the peace process.

r Terrorism is not simply a response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks. The al Qaeda network targeted the United States long before the United States targeted

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al Qaeda. Indeed, the terrorists are emboldened more by perceptions of weakness than by demonstrations of resolve. Terrorists lure recruits by telling them that we are decadent, easily intimidated, and will retreat if attacked.

The terrorism we confront today springs from: r Political alienation. Transnational terrorists are recruited from populations with no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse political vision based on violence and destruction.

r Grievances that can be blamed on others. The failures the terrorists feel and see are

blamed both on others and on perceived injustices from the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorists’ rhetoric keeps wounds associated with this past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.

r Subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation. Terrorists recruit more effectively

from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and selfserving propaganda.

r An ideology that justifies murder. Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal

of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. Islam has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused.

Defeating terrorism in the long run requires that each of these factors be addressed. Effective democracy provides a counter to each, diminishing the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit. r In place of alienation, democracy offers an ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one’s own future.

r In place of festering grievances, democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through compromise.

r In place of a culture of conspiracy and misinformation, democracy offers freedom of speech, independent media, and the marketplace of ideas, which can expose and discredit falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda.

r In place of an ideology that justifies murder, democracy offers a respect for human dignity that abhors the deliberate targeting of innocent civilians.

Democracy is the antithesis of terrorist tyranny, which is why the terrorists denounce it and are willing to kill the innocent to stop it. Democracy is based on empowerment, while the terrorists’ ideology is based on enslavement. Democracies expand the freedom of their citizens, while the

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terrorists seek to impose a single set of narrow beliefs. Democracy sees individuals as equal in worth and dignity, having an inherent potential to create, govern themselves, and exercise basic freedoms of speech and conscience. The terrorists see individuals as objects to be exploited, and then to be ruled and oppressed. Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such groups can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states. This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of homegrown terrorists—even among second- and third-generation citizens. Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits. We will continue to guard against the emergence of homegrown terrorists within our own Homeland as well. The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists’ ideology and deny them future recruits must empower the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam. We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful Muslims to practice and interpret their faith. We will work to undermine the ideological underpinnings of violent Islamic extremism and gain the support of nonviolent Muslims around the world. The most vital work will be done within the Islamic world itself, and Jordan, Morocco, and Indonesia, among others, have begun to make important strides in this effort. Responsible Islamic leaders need to denounce an ideology that distorts and exploits Islam to justify the murder of innocent people and defiles a proud religion. Many of the Muslim faith are already making this commitment at great personal risk. They realize they are a target of this ideology of terror. Everywhere we have joined in the fight against terrorism, Muslim allies have stood beside us, becoming partners in this vital cause. They know the stakes—the survival of their own liberty, the future of their own region, the justice and humanity of their own traditions—and the United States is proud to stand beside them. Not only will we continue to support the efforts of our Muslim partners overseas to reject violent extremism, we will continue to engage with and strengthen the efforts of Muslims within the United States as well. Through outreach programs and public diplomacy we will reveal the terrorists’ violent extremist ideology for what it is—a form of totalitarianism following in the path of fascism and Nazism. Over the Short Term: Four Priorities of Action The advance of freedom, opportunity, and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terror movement of today. To create the space and time for this long-term solution

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to take root, we are operating along four priorities of action in the short term. Prevent Attacks by Terrorist Networks A government has no higher obligation than to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. The hard core among our terrorist enemies cannot be reformed or deterred; they will be tracked down, captured, or killed. They will be cut off from the network of individuals, institutions, and other resources they depend on for support and that facilitate their activities. The network, in turn, will be deterred, disrupted, and disabled. Working with committed partners across the globe, we continue to use a broad range of tools at home and abroad to take the fight to the terrorists, deny them entry to the United States, hinder their movement across international borders, and establish protective measures to further reduce our vulnerability to attack. r Attack terrorists and their capacity to operate. The United States and our partners continue to take active and effective measures against our primary terrorist enemies and certain other violent extremist groups that also pose a serious and continuing threat. We are attacking these terrorists and their capacity to operate effectively at home and abroad. Specifically, through the use of all elements of national power, we are denying or neutralizing what our terrorist enemies need to operate and survive:

b Leaders, who provide the vision that followers strive to realize. They also offer the necessary direction, discipline, and motivation for accomplishing a given goal or task. Most terrorist organizations have a central figure who embodies the cause, in addition to several operational leaders and managers who provide guidance on a functional, regional, or local basis. The loss of a leader can degrade a group’s cohesiveness and in some cases may trigger its collapse. Other terrorist groups adapt by promoting experienced cadre or decentralizing their command structures, making our challenge in neutralizing terrorist leaders even greater.

b Foot soldiers, which include the operatives, facilitators, and trainers in a ter-

rorist network. They are the lifeblood of a terrorist group – they make it run. Technology and globalization have enhanced the ability of groups to recruit foot soldiers to their cause, including well-educated recruits. We and our partners will not only continue to capture and kill foot soldiers, but will work to halt the influx of recruits into terrorist organizations as well. Without a continuing supply of personnel to facilitate and carry out attacks, these groups ultimately will cease to operate.

b Weapons, the tools of terrorists and the means by which they murder to ad-

vance their cause. Terrorists exploit many avenues to develop and acquire weapons, including through state sponsors, theft or capture, and black market purchases. Our enemies employ existing technology – explosives, small arms, missiles, and other devices – in both conventional and unconventional ways

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b Funds, which provide the fungible, easily transportable means to secure all

other forms of material support necessary to the survival and operation of terrorist organizations. Our enemies raise funds through a variety of means, including soliciting contributions from supporters; operating businesses, NGOs, and charitable fronts; and engaging in criminal activity such as fraud, extortion, and kidnapping for ransom. They transfer funds through several mechanisms, including the formal banking system, wire transfers, debit or “smart” cards, cash couriers, and hawalas, which are alternative remittance systems based on trust. Effective disruption of funding sources and interdiction of transfer mechanisms can help our partners and us to starve terrorist networks of the material support they require.

b Communications, which allow terrorists the ability to receive, store, manipu-

late, and exchange information. The methods by which terrorists communicate are numerous and varied. Our enemies rely on couriers and face-to-face contacts with associates and tend to use what is accessible in their local areas as well as what they can afford. They also use today’s technologies with increasing acumen and sophistication. This is especially true with the Internet, which they exploit to create and disseminate propaganda, recruit new members, raise funds and other material resources, provide instruction on weapons and tactics, and plan operations. Without a communications ability, terrorist groups cannot effectively organize operations, execute attacks, or spread their ideology. We and our partners will continue to target the communication nodes of our enemy.

b Propaganda operations, which are used by terrorists to justify violent action

as well as inspire individuals to support or join the movement. The ability of terrorists to exploit the Internet and 24/7 worldwide media coverage allows them to bolster their prominence as well as feed a steady diet of radical ideology, twisted images, and conspiracy theories to potential recruits in all corners of the globe. Besides a global reach, these technologies allow terrorists to propagate their message quickly, often before an effective counter to terrorist messages can be coordinated and distributed. These are force multipliers for our enemy.

r Deny terrorists entry to the United States and disrupt their travel internationally.

Denying our enemies the tools to travel internationally and across and within our borders significantly impedes their mobility and can inhibit their effectiveness. They rely on illicit networks to facilitate travel and often obtain false identification documents through theft or in-house forgery operations. We will continue to enhance the security of the American people through a layered system of protections along our borders, at our ports, on our roadways and railways, in our skies, and with our international partners. We will continue to develop and enhance security practices and technologies to reduce vulnerabilities in the dynamic transportation network, inhibit terrorists from crossing U.S. borders, and detect and prevent terrorist travel within the United States. Our efforts will

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include improving all aspects of aviation security; promoting secure travel and identity documents; disrupting travel facilitation networks; improving border security and visa screening; and building international capacity and improving international information exchange to secure travel and combat terrorist travel. Our National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel and our National Strategy for Maritime Security will help guide our efforts.

r Defend potential targets of attack. Our enemies are opportunistic, exploiting vul-

nerabilities and seeking alternatives to those targets with increased security measures. The targeting trend since at least September 11 has been away from hardened sites, such as official government facilities with formidable security, and toward softer targets – schools, restaurants, places of worship, and nodes of public transportation – where innocent civilians gather and which are not always well secured. Specific targets vary, but they tend to be symbolic and often selected because they will produce mass casualties, economic damage, or both. While it is impossible to protect completely all potential targets all the time, we can deter and disrupt attacks, as well as mitigate the effects of those that do occur, through strategic security improvements at sites both at home and overseas. Among our most important defensive efforts is the protection of critical infrastructures and key resources – sectors such as energy, food and agriculture, water, telecommunications, public health, transportation, the defense industrial base, government facilities, postal and shipping, the chemical industry, emergency services, monuments and icons, information technology, dams, commercial facilities, banking and finance, and nuclear reactors, materials, and waste. These are systems and assets so vital that their destruction or incapacitation would have a debilitating effect on the security of our Nation. We will also continue to protect various assets such as historical attractions or certain highprofile events whose destruction or attack would not necessarily debilitate our national security but could damage the morale and confidence of the American people. Beyond the Homeland, we will continue to protect and defend U.S. citizens, diplomatic missions, and military facilities overseas, as well as work with our partners to strengthen their ability to protect their populations and critical infrastructures.

Deny WMD to Rogue States and Terrorist Allies Who Seek to Use Them Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists is one of the gravest threats we face. We have taken aggressive efforts to deny terrorists access to WMD-related materials, equipment, and expertise, but we will enhance these activities through an integrated effort at all levels of government and with the private sector and our foreign partners to stay ahead of this dynamic and evolving threat. In July 2006, the United States and Russia launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to establish an international framework to enhance cooperation, build capacity, and act to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism. This initiative will help drive international focus and action to ensure the international community is doing everything possible to prevent nuclear weapons, materials, and knowledge from reaching the hands of terrorists.

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With regard to our own efforts, our comprehensive approach for addressing WMD terrorism hinges on six objectives, and we will work across all objectives simultaneously to maximize our ability to eliminate the threat. r Determine terrorists’ intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD. We need to understand and assess the credibility of threat reporting and provide technical assessments of terrorists’ WMD capabilities.

r Deny terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop WMD. We have an aggressive, global approach to deny our enemies access to WMD-related materials (with a particular focus on weapons-usable fissile materials), fabrication expertise, methods of transport, sources of funds, and other capabilities that facilitate the execution of a WMD attack. In addition to building upon existing initiatives to secure materials, we are developing innovative approaches that blend classic counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism efforts.

r Deter terrorists from employing WMD. A new deterrence calculus combines the

need to deter terrorists and supporters from contemplating a WMD attack and, failing that, to dissuade them from actually conducting an attack. Traditional threats may not work because terrorists show a wanton disregard for the lives of innocents and in some cases for their own lives. We require a range of deterrence strategies that are tailored to the situation and the adversary. We will make clear that terrorists and those who aid or sponsor a WMD attack would face the prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such weapons. We will seek to dissuade attacks by improving our ability to mitigate the effects of a terrorist attack involving WMD – to limit or prevent large-scale casualties, economic disruption, or panic. Finally, we will ensure that our capacity to determine the source of any attack is well known, and that our determination to respond overwhelmingly to any attack is never in doubt.

r Detect and disrupt terrorists’ attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and personnel. We will expand our global capability for detecting illicit materials, weapons, and personnel transiting abroad or heading for the United States or U.S. interests overseas. We will use our global partnerships, international agreements, and ongoing border security and interdiction efforts. We also will continue to work with countries to enact and enforce strict penalties for WMD trafficking and other suspect WMD-related activities.

r Prevent and respond to a WMD-related terrorist attack. Once the possibility of a

WMD attack against the United States has been detected, we will seek to contain, interdict, and eliminate the threat. We will continue to develop requisite capabilities to eliminate the possibility of a WMD operation and to prevent a possible follow-on attack. We will prepare ourselves for possible WMD incidents by developing capabilities to manage the range of consequences that may result from such an attack against the United States or our interests around the world.

r Define the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device. Should a WMD terrorist attack occur, the rapid identification of the source and perpetrator of an attack will enable our response efforts and may be critical in disrupting follow-on

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attacks. We will develop the capability to assign responsibility for the intended or actual use of WMD via accurate attribution – the rapid fusion of technical forensic data with intelligence and law enforcement information.

Deny Terrorists the Support and Sanctuary of Rogue States The United States and its allies and partners in the War on Terror make no distinction between those who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor terrorists. Any government that chooses to be an ally of terror has chosen to be an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace. The world will hold those regimes to account. To break the bonds between rogue states and our terrorist enemies, we will work to disrupt the flow of resources from states to terrorists while simultaneously working to end state sponsorship of terrorism. r End state sponsorship of terrorism. State sponsors are a critical resource for our terrorist enemies, often providing funds, weapons, training, safe passage, and sanctuary. Some of these countries have developed or have the capability to develop WMD and other destabilizing technologies that could fall into the hands of terrorists. The United States currently designates five state sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba. We will maintain sanctions against them and promote their international isolation until they end their support for terrorists, including the provision of sanctuary. To further isolate these regimes and persuade other states not to sponsor terror, we will use a range of tools and efforts to delegitimate terrorism as an instrument of statecraft. Any act of international terrorism, whether committed by a state or individual, is reprehensible, a threat to international peace and security, and should be unequivocally and uniformly rejected. Similarly, states that harbor and assist terrorists are as guilty as the terrorists, and they will be held to account. Iran remains the most active state sponsor of international terrorism. Through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the regime in Tehran plans terrorist operations and supports groups such as Lebanese Hizbollah, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Iran also remains unwilling to account for and bring to justice senior al Qaeda members it detained in 2003. Most troubling is the potential WMD–terrorism nexus that emanates from Tehran. Syria also is a significant state sponsor of terrorism and thus a priority for concern. The regime in Damascus supports and provides haven to Hizbollah, Hamas, and PIJ. We will continue to stand with the people of Iran and Syria against the regimes that oppress them at home and sponsor terror abroad. While Iranian and Syrian terrorist activities are especially worrisome, we are pressing all state sponsors to take the steps that are required to have state sponsorship designation rescinded. Each case is unique, and our approach to each will be tailored accordingly. Moreover, we never foreclose future membership in the coalition against tyranny and terror. The designation of Iraq as a state sponsor was rescinded in 2004 as it transitioned to democracy, ceased its terrorist support, and became an ally in the War on Terror. Similarly, the United States

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in June 2006 rescinded the designation of Libya, which has renounced terrorism and since September 11 has provided excellent cooperation to the United States and other members of the international community in response to the new global threats we face. Libya can serve as a model for states who wish to rejoin the community of nations by rejecting terror.

r Disrupt the flow of resources from rogue states to terrorists. Until we can eliminate

state sponsorship of terror, we will disrupt and deny the flow of support from states to terrorists. We will continue to create and strengthen international will to interdict material support, akin to our efforts in the Proliferation Security Initiative—a global effort to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related material. We will build international cooperation to financially isolate rogue states and their terrorist proxies. We also will continue to expose the vehicles and fronts that states use to support their terrorist surrogates.

Deny Terrorists Control of Any Nation They Would Use as a Base and Launching Pad for Terror Our terrorist enemies are striving to claim a strategic country as a haven for terror. From this base, they could destabilize the Middle East and strike America and other free nations with ever-increasing violence. This we can never allow. Our enemies had established a sanctuary in Afghanistan prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, and today terrorists see Iraq as the central front of their fight against the United States. This is why success in helping the Afghan and Iraqi peoples forge effective democracies is vital. We will continue to prevent terrorists from exploiting ungoverned or undergoverned areas as safe havens—secure spaces that allow our enemies to plan, organize, train, and prepare for operations. Ultimately, we will eliminate these havens altogether. r Eliminate physical safe havens. Physical sanctuaries can stretch across an entire sovereign state, be limited to specific ungoverned or ill-governed areas in an otherwise functioning state, or cross national borders. In some cases the government wants to exercise greater effective sovereignty over its lands and maintain control within its borders but lacks the necessary capacity. We will strengthen the capacity of such War on Terror partners to reclaim full control of their territory through effective police, border, and other security forces as well as functioning systems of justice. To further counter terrorist exploitation of undergoverned lands, we will promote effective economic development to help ensure long-term stability and prosperity. In failing states or states emerging from conflict, the risks are significant. Spoilers can take advantage of instability to create conditions terrorists can exploit. We will continue to work with foreign partners and international organizations to help prevent conflict and respond to state failure by building foreign capacity for peace operations, reconstruction, and stabilization so that countries in transition can reach a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and prosperity. Where physical havens cross national boundaries, we will continue to work with the affected countries to help establish

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effective cross-border control. Yet some countries will be reluctant to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities to combat terrorist-related activities within their borders. In addition to cooperation and sustained diplomacy, we will continue to partner with the international community to persuade states to meet their obligations to combat terrorism and deny safe haven under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373.

Yet safe havens are not just limited to geographic territories. They also can be nonphysical or virtual, existing within legal, cyber, and financial systems. r Legal safe havens. Some legal systems lack adequate procedural, substantive, and international assistance laws that enable effective investigation, prosecution, and extradition of terrorists. Such gaps offer a haven in which terrorists and their organizations can operate free from fear of prosecution. In the United States, we have developed a domestic legal system that supports effective investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities while preserving individual privacy, the First Amendment rights of association, religious freedom, free speech, and other civil rights. We will continue to work with foreign partners to build their legal capacity to investigate, prosecute, and assist in the foreign prosecution of the full range of terrorist activities—from provision of material support, to conspiracy, to operational planning, to a completed act of terrorism.

r Cyber safe havens. The Internet provides an inexpensive, anonymous, geograph-

ically unbounded, and largely unregulated virtual haven for terrorists. Our enemies use the Internet to develop and disseminate propaganda, recruit new members, raise and transfer funds, train members on weapons use and tactics, and plan operations. Terrorist organizations can use virtual safe havens based anywhere in the world, regardless of where their members or operatives are located. Use of the Internet, however, creates opportunities for us to exploit. To counter terrorist use of the Internet as a virtual sanctuary, we will discredit terrorist propaganda by promoting truthful and peaceful messages. We will seek ultimately to deny the Internet to the terrorists as an effective safe haven for their propaganda, proselytizing, recruitment, fund-raising, training, and operational planning.

r Financial safe havens. Financial systems are used by terrorist organizations as a

fiscal sanctuary in which to store and transfer the funds that support their survival and operations. Terrorist organizations use a variety of financial systems, including formal banking, wire transfers, debit and other stored value cards, online value storage and value transfer systems, the informal hawala system, and cash couriers. Terrorist organizations may be able to take advantage of such financial systems either as the result of willful complicity by financial institutions or as the result of poor oversight and monitoring practices. Domestically, we have hardened our financial systems against terrorist abuse by promulgating effective regulations, requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, and building effective public–private partnerships. We will continue to work with foreign partners to ensure they develop and implement

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similar regulations, requirements, and partnerships with their financial institutions. We also will continue to use the domestic and international designation and targeted sanctions regimes provided by, among other mechanisms, Executive Order 13224, USA PATRIOT Act Section 311, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 and subsequent resolutions. These tools identify and isolate those actors who form part of terrorist networks or facilitate their activities.

INSTITUTIONALIZING OUR STRATEGY FOR LONG-TERM SUCCESS The War on Terror will be a long war. Yet we have mobilized to win other long wars, and we can and will win this one. During the Cold War we created an array of domestic and international institutions and enduring partnerships to defeat the threat of communism. Today, we require similar transformational structures to carry forward the fight against terror and to help ensure our ultimate success: r Establish and maintain international standards of accountability. States that have sovereign rights also have sovereign responsibilities, including the responsibility to combat terrorism. The international community has developed a compelling body of international obligations relating to counterterrorism. Twelve universal conventions and protocols in force against terrorism have been developed under the auspices of the United Nations as well as various U.N. Security Council Resolutions related to combating terror. These include UNSCR 1373, which imposes binding obligations on all states to suppress and prevent terrorist financing, improve their border controls, enhance information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, suppress the recruitment of terrorists, and deny them sanctuary. The Group of Eight (G-8) along with other multilateral and regional bodies also have been instrumental in developing landmark counterterrorism standards and best practices that have been adopted by international standardsetting organizations. But our obligations are not static. We will collaborate with our partners to update and tailor international obligations to meet the evolving nature of the terrorist enemies and threats we face. We also will work to ensure that each country is both willing and able to meet its counterterrorist responsibilities. Finally, we will not just continually monitor whether we and the community of nations are meeting these standards but will evaluate if we are achieving results both individually and collectively.

r Strengthen coalitions and partnerships. Since September 11, most of our important

successes against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have been made possible through effective partnerships. Continued success depends on the actions of a powerful coalition of nations maintaining a united front against terror. Multilateral groups such as the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, as well as regional organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Organization of American

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States, NATO, the European Union, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, among others, are essential elements of this front. We will ensure that such international cooperation is an enduring feature of the long war we will fight. We will continue to leverage the comparative advantage of these institutions and organizations – drawing on what each does best in counterterrorism, from setting standards to developing regional strategies to providing forums for training and education. Indeed, a significant part of this effort includes expanding partnership capacity. We are building the capacity of foreign partners in all areas of counterterrorism activities, including strengthening their ability to conduct law enforcement, intelligence, and military counterterrorism operations. Through the provision of training, equipment, and other assistance, the United States, along with a coalition of willing and able states and organizations, will enhance the ability of partners across the globe to attack and defeat terrorists, deny them funding and freedom of movement, secure their critical infrastructures, and deny terrorists access to WMD and safe havens. Ultimately, it will be essential for our partners to come together to facilitate appropriate international, regional, and local solutions to the challenges of terrorism.

r Enhance government architecture and interagency collaboration. In the aftermath of

September 11, we have enhanced our counterterrorism architecture and interagency collaboration by setting clear national priorities and transforming the government to achieve those priorities. We have established the Department of Homeland Security, bringing under one authority 22 Federal entities with vital roles to play in preventing terrorist attacks within the Homeland, reducing America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and facilitating the recovery from attacks that do occur. We have reorganized the Intelligence Community. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created to better integrate the efforts of the Community into a more unified, coordinated, and effective whole. The DNI also launched a new Open Source Center to coordinate open source intelligence and ensure this information is integrated into Intelligence Community products. In addition, a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established to serve as a multiagency center analyzing and integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism, including threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. NCTC also is responsible for developing, implementing, and assessing the effectiveness of strategic operational planning efforts to achieve counterterrorism objectives. We similarly established a National Counterproliferation Center to manage and coordinate planning and activities in those areas. The transformation extends to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which, with the help of legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, is now more fully integrated with the Intelligence Community, has refocused its efforts on preventing terrorism, and has been provided important tools to pursue this mission. The CIA also has transformed to fulfill its role to provide overall direction for and coordination of overseas human intelligence operations of Intelligence Community elements. In addition, the Department of the Treasury created the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence to arm ourselves for the long term with

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the intelligence and tools to undercut the financial underpinnings of terrorism around the world. The Department of Defense also is preparing to meet a wider range of asymmetric challenges by restructuring its capabilities, rearranging its global posture, and adapting its forces to be better positioned to fight the War on Terror. This includes significantly expanding Special Operations Forces, increasing the capabilities of its general purpose forces to conduct irregular warfare operations, and initiating the largest rearrangement of its global force posture since the end of World War II. The Department of State is implementing a new framework for foreign assistance to establish more integrated and coherent strategic direction and tactical plans to meet our current and long-term challenges, including terrorism. The State Department also is repositioning its domestic and overseas staff to better promote America’s policies and interests and have more direct local and regional impact. This transformational diplomacy positions State to work with partners around the world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. We will sustain the transformation already under way in these and other departments and agencies. Moreover, we will continue to build and strengthen a unified team across the counterterrorism community, and a key component of this effort will be fostering “jointness.” Where practicable, we will increase interagency and intergovernmental assignments for personnel in counterterrorismrelated positions. This will help to break down organizational stovepipes and advance the exchange of ideas and practices for more effective counterterrorism efforts.

r Foster intellectual and human capital. To better prepare ourselves for a genera-

tional struggle against terrorism and the extremist ideologies fueling it, we will create an expert community of counterterrorism professionals. We will continue to establish more systematic programs for the development and education of current professionals in counterterrorism-related fields. We will substantively expand our existing programs with curricula that includes not only training in counterterrorism policies, plans and planning, strategies, and legal authorities, but continuing education in appropriate area studies, religious philosophies, and languages. We also will ensure that personnel throughout all levels of government and in all fields related to combating terror are invited to participate. Yet such development and education programs must not be restricted to current counterterrorism personnel. We will support multidisciplinary studies throughout our educational system to build a knowledgeable pool of counterterrorism recruits for the future. The recent National Security Language Initiative is an essential step forward. It will help to expand U.S. foreign language education beginning in early childhood and continuing throughout formal schooling and into the workforce. Our efforts to foster intellectual and human capital also will extend beyond our borders – to academic and nongovernmental forums with our international partners to discuss and enhance our knowledge about the critical counterterrorism challenges we confront.

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r In the War on Terror, there is also a need for all elements of our Nation – from Federal, State, and local governments to the private sector to local communities and individual citizens – to help create and share responsibilities in a Culture of Preparedness. This Culture of Preparedness, which applies to all catastrophes and all hazards, natural or man-made, rests on four principles: a shared acknowledgement of the certainty of future catastrophes and that creating a prepared Nation will be a continuing challenge; the importance of initiative and accountability at all levels of society; the role of citizen and community preparedness; and finally, the roles of each level of government and the private sector in creating a prepared Nation. Built upon a foundation of partnerships, common goals, and shared responsibility, the creation of a Culture of Preparedness will be among our most profound and enduring transformations in the broader effort to protect and defend the Homeland.

CONCLUSION Since the September 11 attacks, America is safer, but we are not yet safe. We have done much to degrade al Qaeda and its affiliates and to undercut the perceived legitimacy of terrorism. Our Muslim partners are speaking out against those who seek to use their religion to justify violence and a totalitarian vision of the world. We have significantly expanded our counterterrorism coalition, transforming old adversaries into new and vital partners in the War on Terror. We have liberated more than 50 million Afghans and Iraqis from despotism, terrorism, and oppression, permitting the first free elections in recorded history for either nation. In addition, we have transformed our governmental institutions and framework to wage a generational struggle. There will continue to be challenges ahead, but along with our partners, we will attack terrorism and its ideology, and bring hope and freedom to the people of the world. This is how we will win the War on Terror.

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INDEX

“i” indicates an illustration; “n” indicates a note; “t” indicates a table Abadie, Alberto on poverty-terror link, 65 on terrorist targets, 67 Abbas, Hassan, 14 Abdi, Nuradin, al Qaeda surveillance, 507i, 510, 511i, 512 Abdullah, Grand Mufti Sheikh Abd al Aziz ibn, 329, 335n.23 Abdullah II, King of Jordan, 309, 317n.38 Abizaid, General John, 373 Abu Ghraib, misstep of, 46 Abu Nidal group, 8 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) civil-military operations, 287–88 in the Philippines, 218 Academic “centers of excellence” programs, 162, 497 Accountability, 100 Adams, John, 329, 335n.23, 336 Adaptability, 228 Aerial attacks, 137 Affiliation networks (PONI), 228 Afghanistan al Qaeda surveillance, 504 asymmetric conflicts, 85 civil military operations, 273–75, 282–85 contractor support, 194–95 Internet use, 368 invasion of, 60 Iraqi invasion force, 62

JIACG model, 146 jus post bellum norm, 119 madaris (religious schools), 306 and modern terrorism, 89, 90 PRTs, 281 state transformation, 70 After-action reviews (AARs), 262–63, 264 Agency theory, 6 “Agitation-propaganda,” 81, 82 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud on Israel, 49 on purging educational institutions, 305 Ahmed, Syed Haris, 515–16 Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 165 Aircraft Hardening Program, 170 Airport X-ray machines, 152 Akhtar, Kamran, 516 al Qaeda (al Qaida) attack planning, 142–43 background of recruits, 39 conflict nature, 29, 30, 35–38 cyber mobilization, 359 decline in influence, 333–34 disruption of, 7, 29 domestic threat of, 236 financial network, 231 four-stage Iraqi strategy, 47–48 future surveillance attempts, 515–16 internal vulnerabilities, 6

628

Index

al Qaeda (al Qaida) (cont.) and Middle Eastern democratization, 64–65 Muslim public view of, 330 Palestinian “documentary,” 44 pre-attack mission against, 8 prominence of, 3 recruitment efforts, 387–88 religious ideology, 15 Salafi ideology, 40 sources of radicalization, 29 suicide bombing, 136–37, 138 surveillance offensive, 502, 503–4 surveillance operatives, 505–6, 507i, 508–10, 511i threat assessment, 528 transformation of, 29 Al-Arabiya, 362 al-Azhar University clerical fatwas of, 320, 324, 325 theological debate, 324–25, 334n.2 al-Farida al Gha’iba, opposition to state theory, 322 “al-Mohager al-Islami,” 370 Algeria French counterintelligence, 401 recent terrorism in, 82 Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789 (ATCA), 114 “All-source analysis,” 491 Alonso, Rogelio, 18 American Association for the Advancement of Science, 161 “American model,” 60 “Americanism,” 112 Amin, Adi, 465 Ammonia-Nitrate and Fuel Oil (ANFO) explosive, 237 Amstutz, Mark R., 111 “Analysis of competing hypotheses,” 226 Andrew, Christopher, 407 Animal Liberation Front (ALF), 235 Anthrax letter campaign, 528 Anticommunism, 39 Anti-Pinkerton Act, 191–92

Anti-Terrorism Action Plan (EUCT), 453 Antiterrorism, European definition of, 458 “Apostate regimes,” 15 “Arab street,” 41 Arab-Israeli crisis grand strategy, 30, 41, 48. See also Palestinian crisis problem of, 332 resolution of, 49–50 “Armed conflict short of war,” 186–87 Armed insurgency, modern, 80–81, 90–91 Army of Madinah in Kashmir, The, 509 Arnett, Peter, bin Laden interview, 42 Arreguin-Toft, Ivan on asymmetric conflicts, 83 on “strategic interactions,” 86 “Art of Kidnapping: The Best and Quickest Ways of Kidnapping Americans,” 370 Art of War, The, 380 Article 51 (UN), 106, 112–13 Article 75 (UN), 120, 121–22 Article 98 (UN), 113 Aryan Nation, 235 Assassinations policy (U.S.), 119 Asymmetric conflicts duration of, 84 guerilla tactics, 236, 249, 250n.5 victories in, 83 Asymmetric world system, 110 Atef, Muhammed, surveillance, 503, 506, 507i Atran, Scott, 368 Atta, Mohammad (Attah, Muhammed) background of, 390 father’s profession, 39 pre-attack surveillance, 508 target selection, 506, 507i Aum Shrinrikyo, 528 Austria-Hungarian terrorism, 399 Authoritarianism asymmetric conflicts, 84–85 poverty-terror link, 65–66

Index “Autonomous military profession,” 34 AutoTrack investigation tool, 214–15 “Backscatter,” 169–70 Bader-Meinhoff Gang tactics, 238–39 Badr, General Zaki, 323 Baggage screening, 169 “Baghdad Mosquito,” 371 Bahrain, 44 Baker, Colonel Rob IO matrix, 372, 374 on PAIR loop, 368–69 “Balance of power” exceptionalism, 112 Bamford, James, 407 Bandura, Albert, 361 Barayev, Arbi, 138 Barayev, Movsar, 138 Barbarism, 86, 88, 91 Barber, Benjamin, 22 Barot, Dhiren, surveillance, 508–10, 511i Baseyev, Shamil, killing of, 149n.25 Basha, Hassan Abu, 323 Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) defectors, exits support, 387 post-WWII terrorism, 80 substate terrorism, 420 “Battle of ideas,” 314 Beal, Clifford, 422, 433–34n.12 Beckett, Ian, 96 Bedal, 273 Beitler, Ruth Margolies, 14–15 Bellin, Eva, 61–62 Ben-Gurion, David, 34, 476 Bernard, Cheryl, 71 Berra, Lawrence “Yogi,” 374 “Betrayal of Palestine, The,” 42 Betzer, Mooki, 466 “Big army,” 75 Bin Attash, Tawfiq, 19t Bin Attash, Walid Muhammed, 504 Bin Laden, Osama avoidance of capture, 208 “Declaration of Jihad,” 3, 44–45 “Letter to the American People,” 299

629

1998 fatwa, 245, 251–52n.27 and the Palestinian crisis, 42–43 personal fortune, 39 success of, 141 surveillance offensive, 503 target selection, 506, 507i as terrorist leader, 2 in the Zogby poll, 312 Bin Laden, Osama on “clash of civilizations,” 299 on educational reforms, 308–9 on the “far enemy,” 64, 73 on Lebanon/Somalia troop withdrawals, 47 on role of Shari’ah, 314 on self-defense, 302–3 on September 11 attack, 137–38 on targeting civilians, 303 on Zacarias Moussaoui, 412 “Bin Ladenism,” 29, 51 Bismark, Otto von, 31 “Black flag” incident, 184 Black Hawk Down, 87 Black Panthers CIINTELPRO, 98 domestic terrorism, 235 SWAT teams, 254 Black sites,” 431–32 “Black Widow” attacks, 137 Blair, Tony, 331 Blast Effects and Mitigation, 156 Blog sites, 359 Bloom, Mia, 140 Bogdanos, Matthew, 146 Bombs dog sniffing, 171 lethality of, 136, 148n.8 transporting, 136 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 58–59 Bonner, David on concessions, 102 on judicial review, 99 Boot, Max, 410–11 Border Patrol (Israel), 477, 480 Borg, Scott, 404 Bosnia-Herzegovina nation-building, 290

630

Index

Bowden, Mark, 87, 124 Boyd, John, 368 Brain scans interrogation techniques, 126 Brave new world, 106 Bremer Commission. See National Commission on Terrorism Bremer, L. Paul CT R&D funding, 154 Iraqi invasion force, 62–63 Brennan, John, 397 Britain antiterrorist military units, 8 Forest Gate incident, 17 Interwar counterintelligence efforts, 400 law enforcement responsibilities, 9 “Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative,” 298 Brodie, Bernard, 57 Brookings Institution, 6 Brooklyn Bridge al Qaeda surveillance, 510 “Casing and Infiltrations” list, 505 Brown, John, 235, 250n.1 Bunker, Elsworth, 83 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) Level II SWAT teams, 257 TSWG collaboration, 164 Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 155 Burke, Jason, 67–68 Burton, Bob, 212 Bush, George H. W. Iraqi assassination plot, 3 TSWG role, 154 Bush, George W. Middle Eastern democratization, 40, 278–79, 293–95 nation-building policies, 292–93 post 9/11 policy, 60–61, 70, 428–29 and September 11 plot, 3 Bush, George W. on fighting poverty, 65 on “forward strategy of freedom,” 298 on initial NSCT policy, 3–4

on insurgency, 364, 365 on NSS two-pillar policy, 4 Byman, Dan, 413, 414 Caliphate reinstitution, 64 “Campaign of Truth,” 338 Capture policy (PPD), 39, 2 Carlos the Jackal. See Rameriz-Sanchez, Illich Carothers, Thomas, 61, 70 “Case by case,” 114 “Casing and Infiltrations” list, 505 Casus belli (cause of war) law, 112–13 Cell phones, 360 Center for Disease Control (CDC), 345 Center for Public Integrity, 195 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 6 “Center of gravity,” 29, 37–38, 107 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “black sites,” 431–32 CTICs, 21 HUMINT failures, 422–23 need for reform, 397 9/11 Commission, 19t pre-September 11 role, 144 open source information, 488 swarming techniques, 406 Chambers noir, 399 Chambliss, Saxby, 422–23 Chechen hostage-taking, 1, 138. Check Point investigation tool, 214–15 Cheka (USSR), Soviet secret police, 399, 400 Chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) operations I&W system, 532 Level II SWAT teams, 257 recent incidents, 528–29 tactics, 526 threat assessment, 527, 536n.2 TSWG subgroup, 156 WMD, 107, 526 Chertoff, Michael, 162, 163 Chirac, Jacques, 312 Chlorine gas attack, 528 Churchill, Winston, 34

Index Citizen and Social Class, 129 Civil assistance definition, 275–76 Civil liberties violations, 98, 99–100 Civil society, private contractors, 192–93 Civil-military operations Afghanistan, 273–75, 282–85 brief history of, 277–78 counterinsurgency activities, 276–77 evaluation of, 289–92 Greater Middle East, 279–80 Iraq, 286–87 Philippines, 287–89 PRTs, 281 Civil-military relations, 34, 52n.18 Clark, John, 215 Clark, Robert, 499 “Clash of civilizations,” 299 Clausewitz, Carl von on grand strategy and strategy, 33–35 on policy and war, 31, 57, 63 Clay, General Lucius D., 278 Clemenceau, Georges, 34 Clinton, William J. nation-building policy, 290, 292–93 new terrorism, 3 PPD 39, 2 public diplomacy, 352 “Cloak and dagger” paradigm, 489–90 Clutterbuck, Richard on overreactions, 97 on toleration of dissent, 98 on vigilante groups, 95 “Coalition against Terrorist Media,” 375 Coalition Information Center, 339 “Coalition of the willing,” 428 Coalition Provisional Authority, 195 Coast Guard, CT R&D, 160 Cognitive bias, 222, 223 Cohen, Eliot on availability of weapons, 87 on wartime civilian leaders, 34 Cold War absence of metanarrative, 338 British counterintelligence, 400–401

631

end of, 441–42 Enlightenment tradition, 336 foreign policy elements, 106 intelligence cooperation, 423 Soviet counterintelligence, 399–400 U. S. interests, 39–40 U. S. military presence, 44 “ways” test, 59 Collective security policy, 106 Combat employment, 243 “Combatants,” Cold War era, 106 Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) West Point disrupting al Qaeda, 386 terrorism studies, 6, 497–98 Combined Exploitation Cell (CEXC), 146 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), 283 “Combined operations,” 81 Combs, Cindy, 5–6, 8 “Comfort zones,” 222 Commercial aviation contractors, 196 Common Article 3 (Geneva Convention), 120, 121, 122 Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), 401 Communities of identity (PONI), 227–28 Communities of interest (PONI), 224, 227, 228 Communities of locality (PONI), 224, 227–28 “Community policing,” 248 Community support study, 382, 383 Compact disks (CDs), 360, 364 Concealed weapon detection projects, 168 Concession problems, 102 Congressional add-ons, 155 Congressional Research Service (CRS), 152 “Connect the dots,” 487, 489, 499 “Conscientious objector,” 108 Containment Cold War policy, 106 counterterrorism policy, 21–22 strategy of, 59

632

Index

Contracts, 199 Convention on the Marketing of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection, 159 Conventional high impact (CHI) operations I&W system, 532 tactics, 526, 536n.2 threat assessment, 527 Conventional low impact (CLI) operations I&W system, 532 tactics, 526, 536n.2 threat assessment, 527 Conventions against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT/CID), 123 Cooperation position, 111 “Core funding,” TSWG, 155 Corruption terrorist aim, 100–1 Spanish fatwa on, 304–5 Council on Foreign Relations, 6 Counterinsurgency civil-military operations, 276 definition of, 366–67 expensive business, 101 global threat, 36–38 military-nonmilitary ratio, 36 Counterintelligence competitive mission, 398–99 core features of, 398 lessons learned, 401–3 new factors, 403–12 optimizing, 412–15 Counterintelligence Center, 517–18 Counterterrorism (CT) European perspective, 440 European definition of, 458 Israeli guidelines, 117, 128 Israeli intelligence services, 471–80 junior leaders, 180 military contractor use, 190, 194–96 recent intelligence changes, 397–98 successful policy, 93 U. S. policy, 2–3

Counterterrorism agencies, PDD 62, 3 Counterterrorism Bureau (Israel), 475 Counterterrorism research and development (CT R&D) challenges of, 172 DHS, 159–64 DHS-TSWG relationship, 171–72 emergence of, 151 as growth industry, 152–53 independent agencies, 165–71 organizational frameworks, 153 TSWG, 152–59 Counterterrorism studies, 237 Counterterrorist Center (CTC), 144 Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTICs), 21, 431 Covert operations, 109 Cragin, Kim, 14 Crenshaw, Martha, 5–6, 94 Criminal bonds (PONI), 231 Criminal organizations, PDD 42, 2–3 Cronin, Audrey Kurth on blogs, 359–60 on terrorist organizations, 115–16 on terrorist targets, 66 Crumpton, Henry, 156 Cultural bonds (PONI), 232 Cyber counterintelligence definition, 367 Cyber mobilization counterinsurgency strategy, 359 definition of, 359 insurgent, 359, 363–64 insurgent targets, 370–71 term, 358 Cyber security, PDD 63, 3 “Cyber skin,” 373 “Cyber surveillant,” 515 “Cybernegotiated public flocking behavior,” 406 Cyberterrorism fear of, 361 information revolution, 404 Dagan, Meir, 246 “Dakhill al-Khaliyya” (inside the cell), 327–28

Index Dark Networks: The Structure, Operation, and Performance of International Drug, Terror, and Arms Trafficking Networks, 210 Data fusion British counterintelligence, 401 Soviet counterintelligence, 400 Databases, 214–15 Davis, Bart on Islamic extremists, 236, 247 on terrorist culture, 249 Davis, Thomas M., 238, 243 Death squads, 95 Decentralization, 110 Deception technique, 405 “Declaration of Jihad,” 44–45 Degauque, Muriel, 515 Deif, Mohammed, 18, 118 Del Ponte, Carla, 221 Delpeche, Therese, 245, 247 Delta Force antiterrorist unit, 8. See also United States Special Forces Demobilization tactics, 243–44 Democracies deterrent value, 94 intrusive measures, 402 overreaction to terrorism, 96–98 responses to terrorism, 67–68 as terrorist targets, 66–67 underreaction to terrorism, 95–96 Democracy American values, 110 GWOT strategy, 56 NSS two pillar policy, 4 radical Islam’s rejection of, 299 terrorist target, 97 Democracy and Security journal, 6 Democratization asymmetric conflicts, 85 effectiveness of, 64–69 extremist successes, 75 GWOT strategy, 56, 60–61, 278–79 legitimacy test, 69–73 means test, 61–63 NSCT, 40–41

633

Denmark, 9 Department of Agriculture (DOA) CT R&D funding, 152 CT R&D programs, 165, 166 Department of Defense (DOD) budget allocations, 37 civil-military operations, 280 CT R&D funding, 152, 154, 155 CT R&D organizational frameworks, 153 pre-September 11 role, 144, 150n.37 public diplomacy, 339 TSWG role, 154, 155 on UW, 284 Department of Energy (DOE) CT R&D funding, 152 CT R&D organizational frameworks, 153 CT R&D programs, 165, 167 Department of Health and Human Resources (HHS) CT R&D funding, 152 TSWG collaboration, 165 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) CT R&D organizational frameworks, 153 CT R&D programs, 161 establishment of, 159, 171, 428 impact on FBI, 9 procurement review board, 200 projects, 164 R&D funding, 162–63 S&T research funding, 161–63 surveillance detection, 518 SWAT teams, 253–55, 254t, 269n.1 TSWG, 171–72 Department of Justice (DOJ) CT R&D organizational frameworks, 153 TSWG collaboration, 164–65 Department of State (DOS) budget allocations, 37 CT R&D, 153 pre-September 11 role, 144, 150n.37 TSWG funding, 154–55

634

Index

Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication and Global Outreach, 341 Dershowitz, Alan, 128 Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 123–24 Deterrence Israeli policy, 117 modern terrorism, 246 weakness of, 107 “Deterrence paradigm,” 107 “Development Outreach and Communications Officers,” 345 Dien Bien Phu, 81 DIME model of strategy, 57 Diplomacy, soft power, 13–15 Diplomats, “boundary spanners,” 337 Dirani, Mustafa, 477 Direct Action, 88 Direct approach strategy, 86 Director of National Intelligence (DNI) coordination role, 397–98 creation of, 428, 487 Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T Directorate) budgetary cutbacks, 161–62 divisions, 160–61 establishment of, 160 funding categories, 161 mission, 160 “Dirty bomb,” 11t “Dirty work,” 69 Disaster response (private), 196 “Disturbance in the force,” 113 Diversity (PONI), 228 “Division of labor” approach, 450, 451 Djerejian, Edward, 340 Docobo, Jose M., 12 Domestic signals intelligence (SIGINT) British counterintelligence, 401 intelligence category, 421 lessons learned, 402 Domestic terrorism FBI definition, 237 guerilla warfare tactics, 239–44 threat of, 235, 253–54 Donohue, Laura, 99 “Doves,” 41 Downing Commission, 5–6

“Drain the swamp,” 71 Drug interrogations, 126 Dulles, Allen, 488 Duvduvan unit (Israel), 478–79 Dzerzhinsky, Felix, 399 Earth Liberation Front (ELF), 235 Economic affiliations (PONI), 231 Education (PONI), 230 Educational reform, 305, 307–9 EGOZ Unit (Israel), 479 Egypt insurgent recruitment, 358 intelligence assistance, 21 legitimacy of democratization, 70 militant Islamic ideology, 319 opposition to terrorism, 321–26, 332–33 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 352, 357n.36 8200 Signals Intelligence Unit (Israel), 472 Electroencephalography technique, 126 Electronic Laboratory Exchange Network (ELEXNET), 166 “Endgame,” 81 Ends, GWOT observations, 75 Entman, Robert, 338 Enzenberger, Hans Magnus, 374 Ethics, 106, 108–9 Ethiopia, 87 “Ethnic cleansing,”108 Ethnolinguistic bonds (PONI), 232 EU Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, 445 European terrorism trends, 459, 464n.28 European Arrest Warrant (EAW), 457 European counterintelligence (CT) policy debate dynamics, 453–55 discussion of, 449–53 evaluation of, 458–62 fundamentals of, 447–49 regional implementation, 455–58 European Judicial Cooperation/ Eurojust, 457, 463n.12

Index European Police Office/Europol, 457, 463n.12 European Union (EU) anti-terrorist military role, 446–47, 450 combating terrorism limitations, 445–46 division of labor,” 450, 451 “lead agency,” 440, 441 view of terrorist threats, 445 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). See Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Exceptionalism foreign policy, 111–12 and just war theory, 114, 115 Executive Order 12333, 119 Executive Outcomes, 193 Explosives Detections, 156 Explosives Detection Systems (EDS), 169 Explosives Trace Detection (ETD), 169 “Extraordinary Rendition,” 125 al-Fahd, Sheikh Nassar, on suicide terrorism, 304 Failed states Greater Middle East, 279–80 new world order, 106 Familiarity, 222–23 Family incarcerated terrorist study, 382, 384 PONI social nexus, 227, 229 “Far enemy,” 64, 73 Faris, Iyman al Qaeda surveillance, 507, 510, 511i “Casing and Infiltrations” list, 505 Fast Rope Insertion and Extraction System (FRIES), 257–58, 269n.2 Fatah, 383, 384, 385 Fatwa description, 251n.26 Faust, Katherine, 228, 229 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) CT R&D, 153, 165, 170–71 reorganization of, 170 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) CIINTELPRO, 98 domestic terrorism definition, 237

635

Internet safety, 369 9/11 Commission, 19t on organized militia groups, 97 PDD 39, 266 pre-September 11 role, 144 “Seeking Information” bulletins, 515 Strategic Plan 2002–2009, 9, 10t-11t surveillance detection, 518 terrorism responsibilities, 9 TSWG collaboration, 164 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) private contractors, 198 terrorism indicators, 261 Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria-Hungary, 399 Field Intelligence Corps (Israel), 472 Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations, 362 Financial Action Task Force, 329 Financial arrangements, PPD 39, 2 Financial assets, 429 “Firebases,” 283 First responders, 413 Fitch, J. Samuel, 101 “Flash bang” hand grenades, 167 Flynn, Stephen on civic participation, 249 on domestic terrorism, 236 on managing terrorism, 247–48 on terrorist potential, 249 Food Emergency Response Network, 166 “Footprint,” 44, 50–51, 63 Force monopoly, 110 Forecasting threat assessment, 527–28 trichotomous outcome approach, 529–30, 530t, 531i, 532–35 warfare spectrum, 525, 526 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) plan, 10t Foreign Ministry (Israel), 470 Foreign policy exceptionalism, 111–12 legal constraints, 109–10 legalist, 112–13 pragmatists, 114

636

Index

Foreign policy (cont.) rights-based, 113–14 on “strategic influence,” 14 Forest Gate incident, 17 Foster, Gregory, 57 Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 278–79, 375 “Four Freedoms,” 338 “Fourteen Points,” 338 “Fourth Generation Warfare,” 280–81 France modern counterintelligence, 401 nineteenth-century terrorism, 399 “sanctuary doctrine,” 414 Franklin, Benjamin, 336 Franks, General Tommy, 62–63 Free markets values, 110 Freedom promotion, 311–12 French Revolution, 359, 376 Friedman, Thomas L. on globalization, 405 on the need for generalists, 414 “world is flat,” 337 Fugitive networks mapping, 209, 210 Fugitive profile information, 213, 214–17 Fugitives Decision-making process, 222–23 flight scenarios, 212–13 locations of choice, 212 PONI categories, 219–21, 221t Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (FMRI) scans, 126 Gadahan, Adam, 515 Gaddis, John Lewis, 60–61, 75 Gama’a al-Islamiyya Egypt, 321, 322–24, 325 Islamic law debate, 324–25 renunciation of terror, 322, 326 Gandhi, Rajiv, 88–89 Ganor, Boaz, 246 Garzon, Baltasar, 402 Gas stations surveillance, 505 Gause, Gregory, 68 Gavrilis, Major James A., 287 Gaza Strip attack, 18, 20, 118

General Accounting Office (GAO), 198 “General Offensive and General Uprising,” 83 General Security Service (GSS) intelligence evaluation, 474, 475–76 intelligence gathering, 473–74 Israeli intelligence service, 470 General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (GSRU) Entebbe hostage rescue, 466, 476–77 formation of, 476–77 terrorist prevention, 477–78, 480 Geneva Conventions (GCS) asymmetric conflicts, 86–87 Cold War era, 106 on naked aggression, 113 new interrogation techniques, 127 POW treatment, 120 unlawful combatants, 120–23 on war crimes, 123 Genocide, 108 Gerges, Fawaz, 73 Germany antiterrorist military units, 8 civil-military operations, 278 democratization strategy, 61–62 nation-building, 293 WWI/WWII military strategies, 31–32 Gerwehr, Scott, 14 Ghaith, Suleiman Abu, 54n.51 Ghalyoun, Ghasoub al-Abrash, 521n.29 al-Ghazzali, Sheikh Mohammad, 324, 325 al-Ghoul, Andan, 18, 118 Giap, Vo Nguyen, 81 Gidonim Unit (Israel), 477 Global Islamic Media Front, 370–71 Global war on terror/terrorism (GWOT) al Qaeda documents, 6 civil-military operations strategy, 289–92 climate of openness, 309–10 jus post bellum, 115 observations on, 74 recent foreign policy, 106

Index shifting priorities, 208 strategy of, 56 Globalization resistance to, 299–300 strategic intelligence requirements, 414 “Golden Chain,” 231 Gosler, James, 404 Goss, Porter, 397 Grand strategy Bush administration policy, 70, 75 comprehensiveness of, 57 counterinsurgency struggle, 36–37 definition of, 30–31 description of, 29–35 NSCT formulation, 38–45 relationship to strategy, 30, 31, 33–34 shortcomings of, 29–30 World War II, 31–32 “Grand strategy of transformation,” 60–61, 75 “Gray zone,” 450, 451 Greater Middle East Partnership, 298 Grievance reduction, 101–2 Grozny, Chechen hostage-taking, 1 GSG9 unit (Germany), 8 Guantanamo Bay detention facility, 402 Guelke, Adrian, 97 Guerilla leaders, 238 Guerilla warfare brief history of tactics, 238–39 domestic/international terrorists, 235–36 modern challenges, 244–45 seven areas of, 239–44 as unconventional strategies, 86 in Vietnam, 81 “Guerre mortelle,” 108 Guevera, Ernesto “Che,” 238, 243 Gulf War contractors, 195 Gunaratna, Rohan, 46 Gurr, Ted, 94 Guzm´an, Abimael, 149n.25 Haditha, 46 Hafez, Mohammad, 391 Hague Convention, 106

637

Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, 87 Haiti, democratization strategy, 62 Hamas domestic threat of, 236 incarcerated terrorist study, 383 Internet site, 361 Israeli attack on, 18, 118 suicide bombers, 134 victory of, 40, 69 Hambali, 21, 504 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 122 Hammes, Col. Thomas X.,” 281 al-Hamzi, Nawaf, 506, 508 Haniyeh, Ismail, 18, 118 Hanjour, Hani, 508 Hard power counterterrorism strategies, 5, 21 definition of, 2 strategic parameters, 7–8, 12–13 al-Harethi, Qaed Salim Sinan, 119–20 Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al Qaida’s Organizational Vulnerabilities, 386 Hart, Liddell, B. H on grand strategy, 33 on jus post bellum, 115 “Have our back,” 188 “Have their back,” 181 “Hawks,” 41 al-Hawsawi, Mustafa Ahmed, 507i, 508, 513–14, 521n.31 Hazard definition, 203–4 al-Hazmi, Nawaf, 9/11 Commission, 19t “Hearts and minds,” 41, 96, 311, 380 Heraclitus, 129 Heritage Foundation, 6 Heuer, Richard, 217, 226 Hewitt, Christopher, 100 Heymann, Philip aggressive/restrictive investigations, 99 on accountability/informed citizenry, 100 on combating terrorism, 13 on dissent, 98 on extremist groups, 97

638

Index

Higher Ulema Committee, 311–12 Highway Watch Program, 248 Hitler, Adolph means test, 58–59 unrestricted submarine warfare, 31–32 Hizb ut-Tahrir, definition of jihad, 302 Hizbollah attack against, 7–8 domestic threat of, 236 Internet site, 361 religious ideology, 15 suicide bombers, 134 terrorist attacks, 3 Hocking, Brian, 337 Hoffman, Bruce on combating terrorism, 411 on comprehensive plans, 93 on pre-attack planning operations, 502–3, 516 terrorism studies, 5–6 Holden-Rhodes, J. F., 490, 496 Holland tunnel plot, 3 “Holy martyrs,” 304 “Home grown terrorists,” 253 Homeland security blurred legal distinctions, 107 open standards/OSS, 494, 496 Homeland Security Act, 160, 172 Homeland Security Centers of Excellence programs, 162, 497 “Homicide bombing,” term, 135–36 Horev Commission, 477 Horev uni (Israel), 480 Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), 266–67, 269n.6 Hostage-taking Chechen separatists, 1 Israeli rescue failures, 467 Operation Entebbe, 466–67 Hostage videos, 360 House of Saud, 327 Hughes, Karen, 339, 340, 342, 346 Human Factors program, FAA, 170 Human intelligence/Human reporting (HUMINT) counterintelligence, 401

intelligence category, 421–22. intelligence services, 469–70 Israeli intelligence gathering, 472–73 legislative restrictions, 422, 434n.13 lessons learned, 402 NATO definition, 483n.20 post-September 11 attacks, 428 Human rights and American values, 110 and just war theory, 114, 115 and security, 98–100 Human Rights Watch, 431 Humanitarian aid definition, 275–76 Humanitarian disasters, 106 Hunting the Jackal, 213 Huntington, Samuel asymmetric conflicts, 85 on grand strategy/strategy, 34 Hurricane Katrina communication problems, 488, 491–91 private contractors, 198, 200, 201 private security firms, 196 Hurricane Rita, 198 Hussein, Saddam Kuwait invasion, 44 removal of, 279 safety network, 223 type C fugitive, 220, 221 IBM software, 493 Idealists, 111 Identity (PONI), 227–28 Ignatieff, Michael, 128 Illegal orders, 183–85 Imagery intelligence (IMINT) intelligence category, 421, 433n.6 post-Cold War cooperation, 426–28 September 11 attacks, 428 U.S. investment in, 422 Improvised Device Defeat subgroup, 156, 158–59 Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) CT R&D detection, 152 terrorist use of, 358 Incarcerated terrorist study participants, 382

Index Incident response (FBI), 11t Independent Police Complaints Commission, 17 India, Sri Lanka conflict, 88–89 Indications and warnings (I&W) methodology four phases, 533, 534 indicators, 529–30, 530t, 531i, 532 levels of analysis, 533–34 limitation of, 532–33 terrorist organization, 534–35, 535i warfare spectrum, 525 Indirect approach, 86 Infiltration definition, 240 “Information battle rhythm” matrix, 372 Information center of gravity, 107–8 private sector gathering of, 408 soft power, 13, 15–17 Information Jihad Brigade, 370 Information operations (IO) current operations, 358, 363, 376–77 military definitions, 362–63 Information revolution accessibility of information, 496 new counterintelligence factors, 403–5 Information sharing, 413 Information technology, 337 Informed citizenry policy, 100 Infrastructure, PDD 63, 3 Infrastructure Protection subgroup, 156 Instructional videos, jihadi, 360 Instrumentalism, 114 Insurgency definition of, 365, 366 doctrine components, 358 new world order, 106 reluctance to use term, 364–65 Insurgents definition of, 365 Internet use, 367–68, 371 PAIR loop, 368–69 Intelligence definitions of, 421

639

impediments to multinational cooperation, 423–24 junior leaders, 179, 182–83 open source media, 488–89 process of, 101 soft power, 13, 17–18, 21 stages of, 468 three categories of, 421–22 Intelligence analysis intelligence services, 468, 470 Israeli intelligence services, 474–76 Intelligence community NIS objectives, 20 term, 421 Intelligence cooperation during Cold War, 423 multinational, 420, 423 post-Cold War levels, 426–29 post-September 11, 430–32 purpose of, 423 twentieth-century pattern, 424–26 Intelligence coordination EU difficulties, 446–49 European perspective, 440, 262n.3 Intelligence dissemination intelligence services, 468, 470–71 Israeli intelligence services, 474–76 Intelligence gathering intelligence services, 468, 469–70 Israeli intelligence services, 472–74 junior leaders, 182–83 Intelligence operations, Intelligence operations intelligence services, 468, 471 “standardization of, 406, 407 Intelligence profession new counterintelligence factors, 403, 405–7 popularization of, 406–7 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 397 Inter arma silent leges (in war the law is silent), 114 Interagency cooperation limits of, 146–47 paradoxical logic of, 134 suicide bombing, 143–46 term, 133, 144

640

Index

Interagency coordination, 153 Internal jihadists, 73 Internal training videos, jihadi, 360 International Association of Chiefs of Police, 12 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 119 International criminal networks, 106 International Criminal Court, 113, 114 International law definition of, 109 legalist foreign policy, 112–13 rights-based policy, 113–14 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 110 International system key multinational organizations, 110 structural constraints, 110 International terrorism. See Terrorism definition of, 237 domestic threat of, 235 guerilla warfare tactics, 239–44 terrorism, new world order, 106 “International” Counterterrorism Conference, Riyadh, 329 Internet anti-Jewish/anti-Christian sites, 361 hate group use, 359–60 information revolution, 403–4, 405 Iraqi insurgents of, 367–68 jihadist use of, 374–75 mobilization weapon, 363 modern terrorism, 90 open source intelligence, 490 war of ideas, 16 weapon for insurgents, 369 “Interoperable,” 488, 493, 494 Investigations FBI Strategic Plan, 11t manhunting, 213–17 Investigative Support and Forensics subgroup, 156 Iran, 68 Iraq civil-military operations, 286–87 contractor support, 194–95, 198 democratization strategy, 61, 62

interagency cooperation, 146 Internet use, 363–64, 368, 371–73 modern terrorism, 89–90 OIF, 285–86 PRTs, 281 suicide bombing survey, 150n.42 troop withdrawals, 46 Iraq War costs of, 63, 286 nation-building, 279–80 Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 155 withdrawal of troops, 46–47 al-Iraqi, Abu Hajer, rendition of, 124–25 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 80, 240 Irredentist jihadists, 73 Islam delegitimation of violence, 301–2 ideological divisions, 72 violence against civilians, 324 Wahhabi doctrine, 329 “Islamberg,” 247 Islamic Commission in Spain, 304–5 Islamic extremists, 240–41. See also Radical Islam Islamic Jihad, terrorist attacks, 3 Islamic popular opinion. See Muslim public opinion Israel Air Force activities, 479–80 antiterrorist military units, 8 counterterrorism community, 471 counterterrorism policies, 117–19, 128 Gaza Strip attack, 18, 20, 118 incarcerated terrorist study, 382, 384 intelligence analysis services, 470 intelligence evaluation, 480–82 intelligence failures, 467–68 intelligence services, 471–80 “job-sharing” practice, 444 Middle Eastern views of, 331–32 and Palestinian territories, 49 suicide bombers, 134 U.S. policy on, 14–15, 49–50, 54n.49 Israel-Hizbollah conflict, 7–8

Index Israeli Defense Force (IDF) checkpoint command course, 185–86 counterterrorism leadership, 471 Entebbe hostage rescue, 465–66 Intelligence Branch, 470 intelligence evaluation, 474, 475–76 intelligence gathering, 472, 473–74 terrorism prevention, 476–77, 478–79, 480 “Jackson Committee,” 352, 357n.36 Jakub, Michael, 156 Jamaat ul-Faruqua, 247 Janjalani, Khadaffy, 218 Japan civil-military operations, 278 democratization strategy, 61–62 nation-building, 293 Jardines, Eliot, 496, 497 Jarrah, Ziad, 508 al-Jayousi, Azmi, 309–10 Jefferson, Thomas, 336 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 15, 503–4 Jenkins, Brian on al Qaeda, 15 terrorism studies, 5–6 war/law enforcement dilemma, 99 Jesse James Gang, 191 Jihad Egyptian movement, 321 and U.S. military presence, 44–45 “Jihad Academy” video, 370–71 Jihad, Hizb ut-Tahrir definition, 302 Jihadi videos, types of, 360 Jihadi Web sites danger of, 373–74 growth of, 360, 369–70 Jihadist salafist ideology, 302–3 Jihadists Salafis group, 72–73 three types of, 73 term, 29, 36, 44, 49 Johnson, Lyndon B., 32–33 Joint Field Manual on Risk Assessment, 203

641

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force, 146 Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), 146 Joint Investigative Teams (EU CT), 457 Joint Publication 1-02: The U. S. Armed Forces Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms on counterinsurgency, 366–67 on cyber counterintelligence, 367 on insurgent/insurgency, 365, 366 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, IO definition, 362–63 Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Afghan civil-military operations, 283 Philippine civil-military operations, 288 Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P), 218 Joint Terrorism Task Force, 260 Jordan al Qaeda attack, 303 intelligence assistance, 21 legitimacy of democratization, 70 suicide bombers, 139 Judicial control, 100 Juergensmeyer, Marc, 15 Junior leaders description of, 180–81 mission guidelines, 181–82 new skills, 187 preparation of, 179 Jus ad bellum (law for war) international law, 112–13 just war theory, 115 Jus ad bellum, 106 Jus in bello (law in war) Cold War era, 106 international law, 112–13 just war theory, 115 Jus post bellum (justice after war), 115 Just war theory, views of, 114–17, 128 Justice, Islamic extremists, 66 “Justice model,” EU CT, 445, 446 Kabul Children’s Hospital, 285 Kahana, Ephriam, 18

642

Index

Kahar, Mohammed Abdul, 17 Kaplan, Robert, 288, 289 Karadic, Radovan, 220, 221, 221t Karzai, Hamid, 283 Kasi, Mir Amal, 219, 221t Kellogg, Brown, and Root, 195 Kennan, George F., 59 Kenya embassy bombing, 3, 303 Khan, Majid al Qaeda surveillance, 507i, 510, 511i, 512 “Casing and Infiltrations” list, 505 Khan, Mohammed Naeem Noor, 509 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 302, 316n.15 Kidon unit (Israel), 478 Kilcullen, David, 36 Kinship and Data Analysis Panel (KDAP), 168 Klein, Aharon, 479 Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, 43 ¨ Koniggr¨ atz, Battle of, 31 “Kool suit,” 167 Koran. See Quran Korean War, 116 Koyair, Abul, 17 Krebs, Valdis, 210 Krulak, Charles C., 180 Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 235 Kushner, Harvey on Islamic extremists, 236, 247 on terrorist culture, 249 Kuwait invasion of, 44 legitimacy of democratization, 70 U.S. military presence, 44 Landmark Plot, 505 Langley attack, 3 Language translators, 18 Lansford, Tom, 21 Laqueur, Walter, 82 Larsson, J. P., 15–16 Laser DazzlerTM , 168 Latin America, CTICs, 21, 431 Law enforcement “community policing,” 248 cooperation with intelligence, 402

counterterrorism policy, 99 EU approach, 445–46, 452–53 international terrorist tools, 443–44 Lawrence, T. E. on colonial control, 281–82 as intelligence source, 373, 374 Lawrence, T. W., 360 Lead agency, 440, 441 Lebanese Border Unit (Israel), 477 Lebanon Israel-Hizbollah conflict, 7–8 sympathy for, 332 withdrawal of troops, 46–47 “Legal imperialism,” 114 Legal regulation, 109 Legal responsibilities, 179, 183–85 Legalists, 114, 115 Legitimacy, 59, 69–73 Leiber Code, 108 Lenin, Vladimir counterrevolutionary terrorism, 399 on terrorism, 381 “Letter to the American People,” 299 “Leveraged” funding, 155 Lexus and the Olive Tree, The, 414 Liberalism, 113–14 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), suicide bombers, 134, 136, 137. See also Tamil Liberation Tigers al-Libi, Abu Faraj, al Qaeda, 515 Libya, 8 Lincoln, Abraham, 34, 52n.28 Lincoln tunnel plot, 3 Lind, William S., 280–81 Linett, Howard, 268 Linked Operations-Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE), 427, 437n.46 Lippman, Walter, 338 Liquid soap vignette, 187 Location familiarity effect (LFE), 222 London suicide bombers, 133 “Long telegram,” 59

Index “Long War,” 29 Loveman, Brian, 238, 243 Maastricht, Treaty, 450 Macgregor, Doug, 62, 63 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 109 Mack, Andrew, 85 Mackinley, John, 366 Mackrell, Eileen, 427 Madaris (religious schools) educational reform, 305–6 funding/support, 306 Internet site, 360 social function, 306–7 Madrassas. See Madaris Madrid bombing attack plan, 142 suicide bombers, 133 MAGLAN unit (Israel), 479 el-Mahgoub, Refaat, 323 Making of a Terrorist, The: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, 6 Management of Savagery, The, 89 “Managers of violence,” 108 Mandelbaum, Michael, 111 Manhunt: The Eric Rudolph Story, 222–23 Manhunting commonalities of, 212 fugitive decision process, description of, 222–24 investigation techniques, 214–17 Manhunting framework fugitive categories, 219 PONIs, 218–19 value of, 217–21 Manhunting process five steps, 224, 225i, 226 limitations of, 226–27 Manhunts, Operation Falcon, 211–12 MANPADS research project, 164 Mansfield, Laura, 376 Manual of Afghan Jihad, 504, 519n.11 Manwaring, Max, 96 Mao Tse-tung guerilla warfare tactics, 238 on guerilla warfare, 240 on the guerilla warrior, 239

643

revolutionary insurgencies, 81 on terrorist cells, 248–49 Marcella, Gabriel, 101 Marighella, Carlos, 238, 240 Mark, Sir Robert, 94 Markowitz, Joseph, 497 al-Marri, Ali Saleh al Qaeda surveillance, 507i, 511–14 “Casing and Infiltrations” list, 505, 507 Marshall, T. H., 129 “Martyrdom operations,” 389, 390 Marx, Karl, 336 Massada Unit (Israel), 478 Massive retaliation doctrine, 106 MATILAN unit (Israel), 477 McCallum, Ed, 156 McCarthy, Maureen on “customer” service, 162 on S&T RD growth, 161 on “training the trainer,” 162 McClintock, Cynthia, 98–100 McVeigh, Timothy, 237 Mead, Walter Russell, 277 Means test democratization strategy, 61–63 GWOT observations, 74–75 strategy, 58–59 Mecca Declaration of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 307 Media information revolution, 405 open source, 488 public broadcasting services, 344 public diplomacy, 337 Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) Afghan civil-military operations, 284 Philippine civil-military operations, 288 Meir, Golda, 475 Mercado, Stephen on open source intelligence, 495, 496 OSINT constraints, 496 on secrecy bias, 490 Mercy Relief, 274 Meron, Gil, 84, 85

644

Index

Metanarratives, 338 Metz, Battle of, 31 Middle East Cold War interests, 39–40 Islamization of, 330–31 public dissatisfaction, 320 U.S. military presence, 30, 41, 44–46, 48 Western occupation, 64 Middle East Media Research Institute, on Internet use, 370 Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), 444–45 Midway Island bases, 277 al-Mihdhar, Khalid, 19t Military action counterproductive examples, 7–8 Resolution 1373, 7 Military bonds (PONI), 231–32 Military casualties, 63 Military civic action (MCA) Afghan civil-military operations, 284 definition of, 276 Military commissions, 122 Military consultant firms (MCFs) 193, 194 Military contractors brief history of, 191–92 evaluation of, 190 modern character of, 192 types of organizations, 193–94 Military forces (Europe), 446–47, 450, 459–60 Military Information Support Teams, 345 Military operations contractor support, 194–95 counterterrorism policy, 99 democratization strategy, 61–63 GWOT observations, 74–75 legitimacy of democratization, 70 shortcomings, 29, 30, 31–32, 35, 36–37 Military presence, 30, 41, 44–46, 48, 50, 55n.62 Military profession ethics, 108–9 Military Professional Resources, Inc. (MPRI), 194

Military provider firms (MPFs), 193–94 Military support firms (MSF), 193, 194 Military training, asymmetric conflicts, 86–87 Militias reactivity of, 97 unchecked violence, 95 Millennium Challenge Corporation, 37 Millett, Richard, 101 Milward, Brinton, 210 Minbar Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a, 370 Mission, junior leaders, 179, 181–82 Mistarvim unit (Israel), 479 Mladic, Ratko, 221 Modelski, George, 84 Moderation support, 71–72 Mohammed, Ali, 503 Mohammed, Khalid Shaikh (KSM) al Qaeda surveillance operatives, 504, 505, 507i, 508–10 background of, 506 capture of, 21, 431, 502 9/11 Commission, 19t open source intelligence, 490 target selection, 506, 507i Mohiedeen, Ala, 323 “Molecular civil war,” 374 Molly Maguires, 191 Monroe Doctrine, 112 Montesinos, Vladimiro, 98 Moore, Will, 100 “Moral disengagement,” 361 Morality armed conflicts, 108–9 Cold War era, 106 warfare, 380 Morgan, John S., 165 Morocco, 21 Morrison-Taw, Jennifer, 93 Moscow theater siege, 142 Mosque culture of, 247 incarcerated terrorist study, 382, 383 Mossad intelligence evaluation, 474–75, 476 intelligence gathering, 473 Israeli intelligence service, 470

Index reputation of, 18 terrorist prevention, 478 Mossadeq, Mohammed, 39 “Mother’s Bus” attack, 477–78, 485n.80 Moussaoui, Zacarias bizarre statements of, 310 9/11 Commission, 19t trial of, 412 Muezzin, Muslim Brotherhood, 305 Muhammed, Binyam, 507i, 511i, 513, 518 Mujahideen Army, 367 “Mukhtar,” 9/11 Commission, 19t “Mullahs,” 236 Multilateralists, 111 Multinational cooperation, NSS two-pillar policy, 4–5 Multinational intelligence cooperation during the Cold War, 423 increase in, 420 post-Cold War levels, 426–29 post-September 11, 430–32 twentieth-century pattern, 424–26 Multinational Intelligence Coordination Cell, 426–27, 436–37n.45 Munich Compromise, 111 Murrah Federal Building attack, 237 Musawi, Abbas, 479 Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian education, 305 Islamic radicalism, 321, 324 popularity of, 331 Muslim popular opinion al Qaeda conflict, 30, 37–38 Palestinian crisis, 43 U.S. military presence, 46 Mussolini, Benito, 87 Mutually assured destruction policy, 106 MV Limburg, 137 Nagayeva, Roza, 139 al-Naggar, Sheikh Tayyib, fatwas, 324, 325 Nahr al-Zikrayat (River of Memories) theory, 322

645

Naim, Moises, 349–50 Naji, Abu Bakr, 89 al-Nashiri, Abdul al-Rahim al Qaeda surveillance, 504 capture of, 21 Nasr, Hassan Mustafa Osama, 406 Nasrallah, Hasan, 312 Nasser, Gamel Abdel, 312 Nation-building civil military operations, 275, 277, 279–80 creating support for, 292 GWOT strategy, 289–91 “National anti-terrorism intelligence forum,” 489, 497–99 National Biodefense Defense Counterterrorism Center, 165 National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission) on human rights violators, 434n.13 on intelligence, 17 terrorism studies, 5–6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States on bilateral/multilateral cooperation, 21, 425–26, 430 on covert activities, 145 intelligence mistakes, 17–18, 19t, 20 interagency divide, 143–44 principal finding of, 487, 489 recommendations, 490–91 terrorism studies, 5–6 on U.S. capability, 421, 432n.1 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) creation of, 487 surveillance detection, 518 National Crime Information Center (NCIC), 215 National Defense Strategy of the United States, The, 281 National Drug Control Strategy, 4 National Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), 465 National Institute of Health (NIH) CT R&D funding, 152 TSWG collaboration, 165

646

Index

National Institute of Justice (NIJ) CT R&D, 153, 165, 168 establishment of, 167 social science research, 169 TSWG collaboration, 165 National Intelligence Council, 414 National Intelligence Strategy (NIS), 20 National Military Strategy Plan for the War on Terrorism, 310–11 National Reconnaissance Office, 406 National Security Act of 1947, covert operations, 109 National Security Council (NSC), 155 National Security Directive 30, CT R&D, 153 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS-2003) GWOT strategy, 56 initial formulation, 3 initial goals, 4 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS-2006) expanded version, 4 GWOT strategy, 56, 279 terrorism metanarrative, 338 text, 537–84 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) evaluation of, 30, 38–41, 45, 48–50 expanded version, 4 initial formulation, 3, 4 multidimensional approach, 5 text, 587–603 National Strategy for Homeland Security, 4 National Strategy for Maritime Security, 4 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, 4 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, 4 National Survey of Iraq, 313 National Voter Attitudes and Awareness poll, Iraqi public opinion, 312–13

“Near enemy,” al Qaeda view of, 64 Negroponte, John, 7 Neo Confederates, 235 Netanyahu, Benjamin on civil liberties, 95 on Counterterrorism Bureau, 475 on current terrorists, 238, 245–46 Netanyahu, Yoni, 466 New world order post-Cold War, 441–42 vocabulary of, 106 Nexus topography (PONI), 227–32 Nightengale, Col. Keith, 280–81 9/11 Commission. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 9/11 Commission Report al Qaeda surveillance, 504 “Extraordinary Rendition,” 125 Nitzan unit (Israel), 480 Nixon, Richard, 63 Nokimos, John, 495 Noriega, Manuel, 220 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Afghan civil-military operations, 285 HUMINT definition, 483n.20 multinational institutions, 110 multinational intelligence cooperation, 425, 426–28, 436n.44 North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, 236 Northern Ireland, 80, 401 Nye, Joseph “paradox of plenty,” 337 on soft power, 13 “strategic communication,” 355n.23 O’Connell, Tom, 156 Oakley, Robert, 153 Obedience, 187–88 Obeid, Sheikh Abdul-Karim, 477 “Objective control” theory, 34 Observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) paradigm, 368 Ocalan, Abdullah, 149n.25 “Occupation,” jus post bellum, 115, 116

Index Office of Global Communication, 339 Office of Law Enforcement Technology Commercialization (OLETC), 168 Office of Strategic Influence, 339 Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, 179 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (EU), 457, 458 Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 280 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), 198 “Offshore balancing,” 140 Oil, 39 Oman, 44 Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act, 154 Opacity, 337 “Open source center,” DNI, 491, 497 “Open source” term, 487–88 Open source information, absence of, 210 Open source intelligence (OSINT) benefits of, 495–96 constraints, 496–97 DNI center, 491 intelligence services, 469 proliferation of, 495–96 promotion of, 488–89, 494–95, 397 Open source software (OSS) benefits of, 493–94 homeland security/counterterrorism, 494 intelligence organizations, 492– 93 “interoperable,” 488 Open Source Information System (OSIS), 497 Open standards benefits of, 493–94 description of, 492 homeland security/ counterterrorism, 494 Operation Desert Storm, 363

647

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) civil-military operations, 281, 282–85 interagency cooperation, 146 launch of, 7 Operation Entebbe, 465–67 Operation Falcon, 211–12 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 285 Operational videos, jihadi, 360 OPLAN 1003-98, 62, 63 Organization for Security and Cooperation, 1 Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), 329 Organization of the Americas (OAS), 425 Organization theory, 6 Outsourcing, 197–98 “Ownership phase,” protectorate plan, 116 Padilla, Jose al-Qaeda surveillance, 507i, 511i, 513, 518 CBRN operations, 529 “dirty bomb,” 11t and KSM, 505–6 legal treatment of, 122 Pakistan educational reform, 308–9 intelligence assistance, 21, 431 legitimacy of democratization, 70 madaris (religious schools), 305–6 Palestinian crisis al Qaeda use of, 42–43 Muslim popular opinion, 43–44 Palestinians sympathy for, 332 suicide bombings, 140 Pape, Robert on suicide terrorism, 140 on terrorist targets, 66–67 Paracha, Uzair, 507i, 511i, 512 Paramilitary movements, 95–96 Pardons, 109 Paris Commune, 87 Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), 134 “Partnership phase,” protectorate plan, 116

648

Index

“Passive gatherer,” 428 Paxil, 126 Peers, 382 Pentagon bombing attack, 137, 279 intelligence activities, 397–98 Peri, Yaakov, 475 Periphery, Treaty of, 425, 426 Persons of National Interest (PONI) categories of, 219–21, 221t definition of, 233n.1 hiding locations, 222 Islamic terrorists, 208 nexus topography, 227–32 Peru, 97, 98 Peters, Ralph, 375 Petraeus, Lt. Gen. David, 367 Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project anti-Americanism, 337 Muslim view of Bin Laden, 43 Muslim view of Israel, 53n.46 Philippines ASG leader search, 218 civil-military operations, 287–89 occupation of, 277, 278 Physical action, information, response (PAIR) loop, 368–69 Physical Security subgroup, 156 Pillar, Paul, 13 Pimlott, John, 96 Pinkerton Detective Agency, 191 Pipes, Daniel, 240 Plum Island Animal Disease Center, 165 “Point of decision,” 37 Policy, and war, 31 “Political alienation,” NSCT, 38, 39, 41 Political bonds (PONI), 230 Political frustration, 65–66 “Political litmus test,” 59 Political violence, 139–40 Pollard, Jonathan, 424 Popular opinion, Muslim/Islamic world, 37–38, 42, 43 Portugal, 85 Posse Comitatus Act, 260

Poverty NSCT assessment, 39, 41, 53n.34 and terrorism, 65 Powell, Colin, 339 Power DIME model, 57 realists position, 110–11 Pragmatists, 114, 115 Predator drone technology, 119–20 Prediction, 525, 526–27 “Preemption”doctrine, 106–7, 111 “Preparation of the battlefield,” 119, 404 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 35, 2 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, 2, 266 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 42, 2–3 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 62, 3 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63, 3 Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68, 352 Presidential Decree No. 375, Egypt, 323 “Prevention paradigm,” 107 Prime Minister’s Advisor on Counterterrorism (Israel), 475 Prince, The, pardons, 109 Prisoner of war (POW) Cold War era, 106 GCS norms, 120 Private contractors business model, 201–3 employment trends, 197 issues, 197–98 lessons learned, 198–201 new counterintelligence factors, 403, 407–11 oversight of, 205 prisons, 202 risk-benefit assessment, 203–5 Privatized military firms (PMFs), 193–94 “Proactive hunter,” 428 Production videos, jihadi, 360 “Propaganda by deed,” 87–88

Index Protective gear, 179 “Protectorate” plan, jus post bellum, 115, 116 Provision Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), 281 Prozac, 126 Psychological operations (PSYOP), definition of, 381 Psychological operations (PSYOP) program facilitating exit from group, 381, 386–87 inhibiting group affiliation, 381, 382–85 insulate public, 382, 388–89 major elements of, 381, 382 producing group dissension, 381, 385–86 reduce group/leader support, 381, 387–88 Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 217–18, 226 Public diplomacy definition of, 342 discovery of, 336 goals of, 344 major institutions, 344–45 post-September 11, 338, 339, 340 private sector partnership, 343–44 road maps, 347–53 strategy creation, 339 term, 14 time frames, 343 transformation of, 346–47 during the twentieth century, 336–38 Public Diplomacy Task Force, 339 Public support, 93, 96, 07 Putnam, Captain Bill, 371–72 Qaddafi, Muammar, 8, 9 al-Qahtani, Mohammed, 508, 521n.30 Qatar, 70 Quadrennial Defense Review, 280 Quibya massacre, 476 Quran on killing the innocent, 391 on killing Muslims, 391

649

on poisoning the environment, 392 on suicide, 389 Qutb, Sayyid brief biography of, 315n.3 on obedience to Shari’ah, 298 universalizing force, 302 Rabb, Joerg, 210 Rabia, Hamza, 515 Radical Islam. See also Islamic extremists discrediting of, 319–20 resistance to globalization, 299–300 role of religious ideology, 300–301 Radicalization, 41–42, 49 Rahman, Abdul, 318n.49 Rahman, Sheikh Omar Abdel imprisonment of, 3 Islamic extremists, 236 Sadat assassination fatwa, 321–22 Rameriz-Sanchez, Illich, 213–14 Rand Corporation, 6, 21–22 “Rape and pillage,” 108 el-Rantisi, Abad el-Aziz, 480 Rapoport, David, 5–6 al-Rashed, Abd al-Rahman, on Internet impact, 362 Reagan, Ronald, 8–9, 153 Realists just war theory, 114–15 power relations, 110–11 “Realists versus idealists,” 110, 111 Reciprocation, 424, 435n.30 Red Army Faction, 88, 465 Red Brigades, 88 Red Hat software, 493 Redundancy (PONI), 228 Refugee camps, 382 “Regime change,” 64 Regimes, asymmetric conflicts, 84–86 Regional conflicts policy, 4 Reich, Walter, 5–6 Reid, Richard, 137 Reilly, Sidney, 399–400 Reinares, Fernando, 95 Reingruber, John, 157

650

Index

Religion incarcerated terrorist study, 382, 383 modern terrorism, 245 new terrorism, 442–43, 453 PONI social nexus, 229, 230–31 strategic influence, 15 Religious ideology Islamic debate, 320–21 role of, 300–301 “Report fatigue,” 340 Repression, 97, 100 Resolution 1373, 7, 429 Ressam, Ahmed, 505–6 Retaliation, 381 Rice, Condoleezza on law enforcement/intelligence cooperation, 429 public diplomacy, 339, 340 Richelson, Jeffrey intelligence definition, 421 on the Trust, 400, 416n.12 Ricin plot, 529 Rimon unit (Israel), 478 Ring Airfoil Projectile (RAP), 168 Al-Rishawi, Sajida, suicide bomber, 139 Risk, definition of, 203 Risk assessment venues, 204–5 Roche, John P., 314–15 Rogue states, 106 Rolling Thunder campaign, 33 Rome, Treaties of, 449 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 32 Route 300 Affair, 473 Roy, Oliver, 66 Rudman, Warren, 154 Rudolph, Eric, 219, 222–23 Rumsfeld, Donald Iraqi invasion force, 62, 63 on insurgency, 365 on IO power, 363 public diplomacy, 339, 340, 350 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 122 Russia, Chechen hostage-taking, 1 Russian Combined Services Union, 400 Russian Revolution, 88 Sadat, Anwar, 321–22 Sadequee, Ehsanul Islam, 515–16

Safety, 222, 223 Safire, William, 365 Sageman, Marc, 65 Saigon, 81 Salafists al Qaeda ideology, 40 radical Islamists, 301 three divisions of, 72–73 use of terrorism, 89 Salame, Hassan, 389–90 Salmonella poisonings, 528 Sanctions (FBI), 10t-11t “Sanctuary doctrine,” 414 Sandline, MPFs, 193 Sarayat Matkal unit (Israel), 8 Sarin gas attack, 528 SAS (Britain), 8 Saudi Arabia insurgent recruitment, 358 legitimacy of democratization, 70 opposition to terrorism, 319, 320, 327–30, 332–33 post-September 11 problems, 326–27 support of Islamic radicalism, 326 support of madaris, 306 U. S. military personnel in, 44, 45–46 Savagery, Salafist terrorism, 89 Sayeret Matkal unit. See also General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (GSRU) Entebbe hostage rescue, 466 formation of, 476 Scalia, Anthony, Rumsfeld v. Padilla dissent, 122 Scanners, 152 Schengen Agreement, 450 Scheuer, Michael, 124–25 Schlieffen Plan, 31–32 Schmitt, Capt. John F., 280–81 Schultz, Richard, 8 Screener Object Recognition Test (SORT), 170–71 Seaborne attacks, 136–37 “Secession of elites,” 337 Secrecy, 490 “Secrete Islamic network,” 236 Security,

Index Security counterterrorism policy, 93, 95–96 and human rights, 98–100 Security contractors, 190, 195–97 Security forces (EU), 458–59 Sedan, Battle of, 31 “Seeker,” 16 Self-defense law, 112–13 Self-help, 110 September 11 attack. See also World Trade Center Arab view of, 332 Bush presidency, 5 counterterrorism policy, 5 description of, 237 hijacker surveillance, 506, 507i, 508 IMINT capacity, 428 intelligence failures, 489–90 interagency cooperation, 133 invasion of Afghanistan, 60 military presence in Middle East, 45 organization of, 143 SIGINT capacity, 428 Seven Pillars of Wisdom, The, 281–82 “Shadow of the future,” 424 Shaffi, Qaisar, 509 Shahade, Salah, 480 Shakir, Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad, 299 Shari’ah al Qaeda goal, 64 failure to enforce, 300 Iraqi opinion, 312–13 peace theory, 298 and Salafi ideology, 40 Sharon, Ariel, 476, 478 Shayetet 13 (Israel), 478, 485n.82 Al-Shaykh, Shaykh Abd al Aziz bin Abdallah Aal, on suicide terrorism, 304 Sheehan, Michael, 20–21 al-Shibh, Ramzi bin, 490 Shimshon unit (Israel), 478–79 “Shoe Bomber,” 137 el-Shukrijumah, Adnan, 507i, 511i, 513, 515 Siddiqui, Aafia, 507i, 512, 515

651

Signal intelligence (SIGINT) intelligence category, 421, 433n.5. intelligence services, 469 Israeli intelligence gathering, 472 post-Cold War cooperation, 426–27 September 11 attacks, 428 U.S. investment in, 422 “Silent death,” 391 Simon, Steve, 15, 22 “Sleeper agent,” 514 Sleeper cells, 240–41 “Sleeper” technologies, 404 Sloan, Stephen, 421 Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution, 406 Snyder, Richard, 85 Social network analysis (SNA), 209–11, 227 Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications, 228 Social norms, 384 Social setting, 382–84 Socialist Workers Party, 98 Soft power common forms of, 13 counterterrorism strategies, 5, 21 definition of, 2 Software, OSS, 488, 492–93 Soldier and the State, The (Huntington), 34 Somalia modern terrorism, 89 withdrawal of troops, 46–47 “Somalia syndrome,” 8 Soviet Union asymmetric conflicts, 85 collapse of, 441–42 counterrevolutionary terrorism, 399–403 Spain, translators, 18 Spanish-American War, 277, 287–88 Spataro, Armando, 402 “Special purpose officers,” 473 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT), mission scope, 253 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams AARs, 262–63, 264

652

Index

Special Weapons and Tactics (cont.) case law, 262 DHS matrix, 254t, 254–55 funding, 262, 263–65 Level I, 254t, 257–58, 269n.1 Level II, 254t, 256–57, 269n.1 Level III, 254t, 255–56, 269n.1 mindset of, 267–69 post-September 11 role, 255 responder’s role, 259–61 technology, 262, 263 terrorist scenario, 265–67 training of, 258–59 “Spring of Youth” Operation, 476, 478 Sri Lanka, 88, 134 Stahelski, Anthony, 362 Stairwell Safe Haven, 167 Stansfield, Turner, 8 “Star Academy,” 311–12 “Stare decisis,” 262 State defensive measures, 101 division of security forces, 101 strength of, 100 State sovereignty, 109 State sponsored terrorism, 8–9 State transformation, 70 State-building civil military operations, 275, 277, 279–80 GWOT strategy, 289–91 protectorate plan, 116 Statement videos, jihadi, 360 Stern, Jessica, 5–6, 368 Steunenberg, Frank, 266 Stevens, John Paul, Rumsfeld v. Padilla dissent, 122 Stove-pipe organization, 241 Strand analysis (PONI), 229 Strategic approaches, 86 Strategic communication definition of, 342 public diplomacy, 341, 355n.23 Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, 339 “Strategic Corporal, The,” 180

“Strategic deterrence,” 246 Strategic equation adjustment of, 74 elements of, 58 maintenance difficulty, 75 “Strategic influence,” 14–15 “Strategic Language Initiative,” 341 “Strategic plan,” importance of, 56–57 Strategic Plan 2002–2009 (FBI), 89, 10t–11t Strategy assessment of, 74 definitions of, 31, 56 description of, 57–59 Strategy (Hart), 33 Strategy-grand strategy relationship, 30, 31, 33–34 “Stress techniques,” 124 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism journal, 6 Suicide bombers interagency cooperation, 133–34 Internet recruitment, 368 problem of, 134–43 recruitment of, 358 Suicide bombing campaign requisites, 391 definition, 135 Grand Mufti condemnation, 329, 335n. 23 PSYOP counterprogram, 389 term, 136 Suicide bombing attack life cycle, 141–43, 142t Suicide terrorism purpose of, 139–40 Tamil Tigers, 443 Sun Tzu, 380 Sunni Islam, 72 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, 404 Supreme Command (Cohen), 34 Supreme Monarchist Council, 400 “Surgical strikes,” 476, 479 Surveillance al Qaeda post-attack, 508–10, 511i, 512–14

Index al Qaeda pre-attack, 502, 503–6, 507i, 508, 511i, 521n.29 Collection, and Operations Support, TSWG subgroup, 156 future al Qaeda, 514–18 jihadist texts, 504, 519n.11 private sector, 408–9 term, 519n.1 Survivability, 222, 223 Sutton, Col. Joseph W., 280–81 “Swarming,” 405 Swarms, 406 “Tactical deterrence,” 246 Tactical Operations Support subgroup, 156 Tafjeerat al-Riyadh-Al-Ahkam wal Athar (The Riyadh Explosions-Judgment and Effects), 322 Takfir wal-Hijra, Egypt, 321 Taliban regime, 7, 282 Tamil Liberation Tigers. See also Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chlorine gas attacks, 528 Sri Lanka conflict, 88–89. suicide bombing, 443 Tantawi, Sheikh, 325 Tanzania embassy bombing, 3, 303 Tar (vendetta), 323 “Target-centric approach,” 499 Tarmohamed, Nadeem, 509 Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) agency collaboration, 164–65 budget elements, 155 CT R&D funding, 152 CT R&D organizational frameworks, 153 DHS, 171–72 establishment of, 154 expansion of, 155–56 funding of, 154–55 joint research, 159 large-scale outreach, 157–58 programs, 156

653

projects, 158–59 subgroups, 156–57 Technology interrogation techniques, 125–27, 129 predator drone, 119–20 SWAT training, 262, 263 Television, 90 Terrorism Chechen hostage-taking, 1 definition of, 91n.1 democratic liability/immunity, 94–95 democratic Middle Eastern regimes, 68 false dichotomies, 41–42 globalization of, 445 Harvard study, 127 law enforcement approach, 117 law enforcement responsibilities, 9 modern European, 87–88 new counterintelligence factors, 403, 411–12 new metanarrative, 338 misidentification of conflict, 36 as overrated threat, 94 overreaction to, 96–98 post-WWII world, 80–90 prevention strategy, 476–80 public diplomacy, 336 as psychological warfare, 380 social/political vs. religious, 442–43 sources of, 39 special military units, 8, 75 study programs, 5–6, 237 underreaction to terrorism, 95–96 Terrorism and Political Violence journal, 6 Terrorist/terrorists insulate public from, 382, 388–89 mobilization process, 358 Soviet support for, 442 Terrorist information, 107–8 Terrorist operations life cycle, 141–43, 142t, 149n.31 Terrorist organizations cellular networks, 209–10 contending narratives of, 410

654

Index

Terrorist organizations (cont.) “decline or end,” 115–16 facilitating exit from group, 381, 386–87 inhibiting group affiliation, 381, 382–85 open source intelligence, 490 pre-attack surveillance, 503 producing group dissension, 381, 385–86 reduce group/leader support, 381, 387–88 retaliation campaign, 381 strategic influence, 15 terrorist cells, 241–43 threat assessment, 527 tradeoffs of, 143 vulnerabilities of, 6–7 warfare spectrum, 525–26, 535i Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), 144 Tet offensive. See “General Offensive and General Uprising” Thailand, communication problems, 492 “Third Wave” democratization, 85 Thompson, Don, 179 Threat, 93–94 Time analysis (PONI), 228–29 Tolerance policy, 98 Torture arguments against, 124 junior leaders, 185 legal definitions, 123–25 Torture Victim Protection Act, 114 “Torture warrants,” 128 Torvalds, Linus, 494 “Totalitarian lid,” 442 Trabelsi, Nizar, 44 Training, 162 Training camps, 247 Training Technology Department subgroup, 157 “Transformational public diplomacy,” 338 Transparency, 337

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 165, 169–70 Tribal cultures, 345–46 Tribute videos, jihadi, 360 TRIDENT, 425 Trust, The, 399–400, 416n.12 “Trusteeship,” jus post bellum, 115, 116 Tunisia, 21 Turkey, 134 Tutuila bases, 277 U.S. Marshals success, 211–12 Uganda, 465–66 Unconventional warfare (UW) definition, 284 Unilateralism, 111 “Unit, The,” 477 Unit 101 (Israel), 476 Unit 504 (Israel), 473–74 United Arab Emirate (UAE), 44, 70 United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations multinational institutions, 110 multinational intelligence cooperation, 425 United Nations Charter Article 98, 113 Cold War era, 106 self-defense, 112–13 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1373, 7, 429 United States antiterrorist military units, 8 Arab-Israeli conflict, 49–50 “Casing and Infiltrations” list, 505 CIINTELPRO, 98 counterterrorism policy, 2–5 current grand strategy, 36–37 and democratic Middle East, 68–69 foreign policy ideas, 111–14 GWOT policies, 106 intelligence community agencies, 421 IO paradigm, 358, 362–64 law enforcement responsibilities, 9, 12 modern world system, 110

Index Muslim view of, 43, 311 open standards, 492 organized militia groups, 97 policy toward Israel, 14–15, 49–50, 54n.49 premature Iraqi withdrawal, 46–47 SIGINT/VISINT development, 469 Vietnam War strategy, 32–33 WWII strategy, 32 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 341, 356n.28 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) budget allocations, 37 public diplomacy, 345 support of madaris, 306 United States Army Counterinsurgency manual, 36 United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation, 124 United States Army War College analytical framework of, 56 description of, 76n.3 strategy, 57 United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). See Department of Agriculture (USDA) United States Department of Defense. See Department of Defense (DOD) United States Department of State. See Department of State (DOS) United States Institute of Peace, 5 United States military adequate preparation, 179 assassinations, 119 civilian authority, 33 GWOT observations, 75 Iraqi invasion force, 62–63 Middle Eastern presence, 30, 41, 44–46, 48 nation-building role, 290–92 United States Special Forces Afghan civil-military operations, 283, 284–85

655

civil-military operations, 280. See also Delta Force Philippine civil-military operations, 287–89 United States Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) ethical framework, 108–9 torture penalties, 123 United States-Saudi Strategic Dialog, 329 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 123 Unlawful combatants, 120–23 Uruguay, 97 USA PATRIOT Act, 9 USS Cole al Qaeda surveillance, 504 suicide bombing, 136, 137 USS The Sullivans al Qaeda surveillance, 504 suicide bombing target, 136–37 Venske, Ben, 360 Vice President’s Report on Combating Terrorism, 154 “Victor’s justice,” 116 Videos Global Islamic Media Front, 370–71 IDF course, 186, 188 type of jihadi, 360 Viet Cong, 81, 82t, 82–83 Viet Minh, 81–82 Vietnam War “combined operations,” 81–83, 82t grand strategy, 32–33, 51n.9 Vigilante justice, 95–96 Violence, and religious ideology, 15 VIP Protection subgroup, 157 “Virtual arena of war,” 366 Visual intelligence (VISINT) intelligence services, 469 Israeli intelligence gathering, 472 Vulnerability, 222, 224 Wafa, Sheikh Sayyid, 325 Wahhabi doctrine, 320, 327 Walls, Kathleen, 222–23

656

Index

Walzer, Michael, 115, 125 “War of ideas,” 72, 314 “War on terrorism” See also Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) failure of, 29 misidentification of, 36 U.S. grand strategy, 38–39 Warfare new counterintelligence factors, 403, 409 and policy, 31 “Warheads on foreheads,” 117 Washington, George, 110 Wasserman, Stanley, 228, 229 “Water boarding,” 124 Waugh, Billy, 213–14 “Ways” test, 59, 75 al-Wazir, Khalil, assassination of, 478 Weapons, asymmetric conflicts, 87 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) CBRN, 107, 526 countering, 391–92 FBI Strategic Plan, 11t research concentration, 163 PPD 39, 2 Weber, Max, 110 Weimann, Gabriel, 360–61, 375 West, Nigel, 401 West Point study, 6 Whitman, Charles, 254–55 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, 72–73 Wilkinson, Paul on democratic constraints, 67 first principle, 94 on reducing grievances, 101, 102 terrorism studies, 5–6 on undermined government authority, 95 on a winning strategy, 102 Wilson, Lt. Col. Gary I., 280–81 “Winning hearts and minds,” 14, 15 “Winning the war of ideas,” 14, 15 Women’s liberation groups, 98 Woolsey, James, 422 Working Group on Counter-Terrorism (IWG-CT), 153 World Bank, 110

World Trade Center contractor support, 196 1993 al Qaeda surveillance of, 505 1993 attack, 3, 236–37 September 11 attack, 237, 279 suicide bombing attack, 137 World Trade Organization (WTO), 110, 360 World War I (WWI), 31–32 World War II (WWII), 31–32 “Wrath of God” Operation, 475, 478, 479–80 YAMAG (Israel), 477 YAMAM establishment of, 477 Israeli terrorism prevention, 477–78, 480 YAMAS (Israel), 478 Yarger, Richard on political power, 57–58 on risk, 58 on strategy, 57 Yassin, Ahmed assassination of, 480 Israeli attack on, 18, 118 Yeltsin, Boris, 1 Yemen, 70 Yoav unit (Israel), 480 Yousef, Ramzi, 236 Youth clubs, 382 Zakaria, Fareed al Qaeda recruits, 39 on capitalism, 192 Zakat, support of madaris, 306 al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab al Zawahiri letter, 38 Jordanian terror attack, 309 killing of, 149n.25, 515 al-Zawahiri, Ayman avoidance of capture, 208 declaration of jihad, 45 four-stage Iraqi strategy, 47–48 Internet use, 367 success of, 141 surgeon, 38

Index al-Zawahiri, Ayman on American culture, 299–300 on killing Muslims, 303–4 on Muslim popular opinion, 38 on Palestinian crisis, 43 on Shari’ah, 313–14 on use of force, 314, 322

657

Zegart, Amy, 346–47, 407 Zimmerman, Tim, 9 Zinni, General Anthony, 62–63 Zoloft, 126 Zubayda, Abu al Qaeda surveillance, 505–6, 513 arrest of, 518

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

JAMES J. F. FOREST is Director of Terrorism Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he teaches undergraduate courses on terrorism, counterterrorism, and information warfare, and directs research initiatives for the Combating Terrorism Center. His recent publications include Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (2006); Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (2006); and The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (2005). His research has also appeared in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, the Journal of Political Science Education, and Democracy and Security. Dr. Forest received his graduate degrees from Stanford University and Boston College, and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University and De Anza College. MAHA AZZAM-NUSSEIBEH is an Associate Fellow in the Middle East Program at Chatham House, London. She has written and commented extensively in the media on political Islam. Her recent publications include “Al-Qaeda—Five years on” Chatham House Briefing Paper, London, September, 2006; “Militant Islamism in Egypt and the New Jihad,” in Jean-Luc Maret (ed.) Jihadism (2005); and “Political Islam and the Ideology of Violence,” in James Forest (ed.) The Making of a Terrorist (2005). Maha Azzam received her doctorate from Oxford University. DOUGLAS A. BORER is Associate Professor in the Department of Defense Analysis, and a member of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, at the Naval Postgraduate School. His professional research has focused on the topic of political legitimacy and warfare, nation-building, and strategic thought. He is the author of Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared (1999) and over 30 journal articles, book chapters, and reviews. In 1998, he served as Visiting Fulbright Scholar in Malaysia, and in 2004 he was the recipient of the Superior Civilian Service Medal for his service at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Boston University in 1993.

660

About the Editor and Contributors

BRADLEY L. BOWMAN is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy at West Point and an officer in the U.S. Army. Major Bowman has taught courses in grand strategy, American foreign policy, and American politics. His recent work focuses on the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, democratization, energy policy, and grand strategy. JAMES JAY CARAFANO is a Senior Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. He is the coauthor of Homeland Security: A Complete to Understanding, Preventing and Surviving Terrorism (2006). A graduate of West Point, Dr. Carafano also has a master’s degree and a doctorate from Georgetown University and a master’s degree in strategy from the U.S. Army War College. ERICA CHENOWETH is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado at Boulder and a fellow at Harvard University. Her primary research emphases are terrorism and counterterrorism in democracies. She has presented her research nationwide, having published articles and book reviews in venues such as the Review of Policy Research, Terror and Conflict Monitor, the International Criminal Justice Review, and e-Extreme. Her work has also appeared in several edited volumes, including The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes (2005) and Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (2006). AARON A. DANIS is a career terrorism threat analyst with the U.S. government, having worked for five different agencies in that capacity over the past 17 years. WILLIAM L. EUBANK is an Associate Professor at the University of Nevada, Reno. His Ph.D. is from the University of Oregon, and his research interests include topics of terrorism, parties and elections, and research methods. MICHAEL FREEMAN is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey. His research interests focus on the causes of terrorism, the relationship between democracy and terrorism, and U.S. foreign policy. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 2001 and is the author of Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terror (2003). Before joining NPS, he was a lecturer at the University of Chicago, a postdoctoral fellow at Dartmouth, and an analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency.

About the Editor and Contributors

661

BRUCE GREGORY is Director of the Public Diplomacy Institute and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington University. His research interests include public diplomacy and national security, and the development of public diplomacy as a field of academic study. He received a State Department Superior Honor Award for his service on the National War College faculty, 1998–2001. AMOS N. GUIORA is Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security, Law and Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. He served for 19 years in the Israel Defense Forces, Judge Advocate General Corps. He had command responsibility for the development of an interactive video teaching soldiers an eleven-point code of conduct. CHADD HARBAUGH is President and General Manager of The Government Training Institute in Boise, Idaho. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice from Boise State University and has served 5 years as an adjunct instructor in the Continuing Education Department at Boise State University and 8 years instructing with the Idaho State Peace Officer Standard Training. He has over 14 years of law enforcement service in patrol, investigations, command, and administration. He has over 10 years experience on active SWAT teams, and is a certified Critical Incident Task Force Investigator. JENNIFER S. HOLMES is an Associate Professor of Political Economy and Political Science at the University of Texas at Dallas. Her major area of research is political violence, terrorism, and political development with an emphasis on Latin America and Southern Europe. She is the author of Terrorism and Democratic Stability (2001, 2006) and the editor of New Approaches to Comparative Politics: Insights from Political Theory (2003). Articles by Dr. Holmes have been published in Terrorism and Political Violence, Latin American Politics & Society, Bulletin of Latin American Research, International Journal of Social Economics, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, International Journal of Public Administration, and Revista de Estudios Colombianos. RICHARD J. HUGHBANK is a Major in the U.S. Army Military Police Corps with over 19 years of military service. He is currently assigned to the U.S. Air Force Academy as an instructor, and has served as a Tactical Officer at the United States Military Academy. He was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan, during Operation Enduring Freedom as a liaison officer with the CIA, FBI, and Special Operations Command for the theater detainee facility, and served in Operation Iraqi Freedom as a company commander for the task force assigned to train the Free Iraqi Forces prior to and during the initial ground invasion in Iraq. He conducts research

662

About the Editor and Contributors

on domestic and international terrorism and its effects on the law enforcement and emergency response communities, and is currently a featured columnist for OnPoint: A CounterTerrorism Journal for Military and Law Enforcement Professionals. JAMES D. KIRAS is an Assistant Professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, where he directs the course on terrorism and insurgency. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Reading in the United Kingdom in 2004, and has worked extensively in various defense policy and consulting fields. Dr. Kiras is the author of Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism (2006), and has published a number of articles and book chapters on terrorism, insurgency, and special operations. He also serves as an Associate Senior Fellow of the Strategic Studies Group for the Joint Special Operations University, Hurlburt Field, Florida. ALANE KOCHEMS is a Research Analyst for CENTRA Technology, Inc. Currently, she works on activities related to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. MICHAEL KRAFT is a counterterrorism consultant and retired Department of State Counterterrorism Office Senior Advisor. While at the Department of State, his duties included providing support for the counterterrorism research and development program. TOM LANSFORD is an Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Letters and an Associate Professor of political science at the University of Southern Mississippi. Dr. Lansford is a member of the governing board of the National Social Science Association, an associate editor for the journal White House Studies, and an associate editor for Politics and Ethics Review. He has published articles in journals such as Defense Analysis, The Journal of Conflict Studies, European Security, International Studies, Security Dialogue, and Strategic Studies. Among Dr. Lansford’s most recent books are All for One: NATO, Terrorism and the United States (2002), A Bitter Harvest: U.S. Foreign Policy and Afghanistan (2003), and, with Robert J. Pauly, Strategic Preemption: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Second War in Iraq (2004). ORION A. LEWIS is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado at Boulder. His primary research interests include information technology and its impact in authoritarian countries, the role of open source methodologies in economic development, and the importance of the news media for democratization. His forthcoming article “Chinese Nationalism 1949– 1980” will be published in Nations and Nationalism in Global Perspective: An Encyclopedia of Origins, Development and Contemporary Transitions.

About the Editor and Contributors

663

STEVEN M. MARKS is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He has a Bachelor of Science in Political Science from the University of Missouri, Columbia, and a Master of Science in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. THOMAS M. MEER is a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer. He has a Bachelor of Science in Political Science from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, and a Master of Science in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. MARTHA MINOW is the Jeremiah Smith Jr. Professor at Harvard Law School where she has taught since 1981. During 1999–2001, she served on the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 1999–2001. She is the coeditor of Imagine Coexistence: Restoring Humanity After Violent Ethnic Conflict (2003) and author of many books, including Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History After Genocide and Mass Violence (1998). Her work has also appeared in many scholarly journals and law publications, including the Boston College Law Review and Moral Education. MATTHEW T. NILSON is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He has a Bachleor of Science in Mechanical Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY and a Master of Science in Defense Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. MAGNUS NORELL is a faculty member in the Center for the Study of Low Intensity Conflicts and Terrorism at the Swedish Defense Research Agency. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Stockholm, and has degrees from the University of Uppsala (Sweden) and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel). Dr. Norell has written extensively about politics in the Middle East as well as religiously motivated terrorism and is a well-known lecturer and often consulted by the media on matters related to terrorism and the Middle East. ROBERT J. PAULY, JR., is Assistant Professor of International Policy and Development and Associate Director of the International Development Program at The University of Southern Mississippi in Gulfport. He focuses on the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. foreign policy toward the states of the Greater Middle East, and political and security issues in that region. His most recent books are To Protect and Defend: U.S. Homeland Security Policy (2006) and U.S. Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf: Safeguarding American Interests through Selective Multilateralism (2005). AMI PEDAHZUR is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Government and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas at Austin. He is

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About the Editor and Contributors

also a senior fellow at the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa, Israel. His main fields of interest are terrorism, intelligence, and national security. Pedahzur serves as Associate Editor of the journals Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Democracy and Security. He is also the book review editor of the Civil Wars journal. ARIE PERLIGER is an Instructor at the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa Israel and Assistant Fellow at The National Security Study Center, University of Haifa. His published works include “Altruism and Fatalism: The Characteristic of Palestinian Suicide Terrorists” (with Ami Pedahzur and Leonard Weinberg) in Deviant Behavior (July–August 2003) and “The Making of Suicide Bombers: A Comparative Perspective” (with Ami Pedahzur) in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (2005). JERROLD M. POST is Professor of Psychiatry, Political Psychology and International Affairs and Director of the Political Psychology Program at the George Washington University (GWU). He came to GWU after a 21year career with the Central Intelligence Agency, where he was founding director of the Center for the Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior. He has been conducting research and publishing on the psychology of terrorism since the late 1970s. ROBERT W. REDDING is a Major in the U.S. Army and the Bilateral Affairs Officer within the Office of Defense Cooperation for the Republic of Slovenia. His previous assignments include Scout Platoon Leader, 1st Squadron, 124th Cavalry; Service Detachment Commander, S-5; and Support Company commander for 5th Battalion, 19th SF Group. A graduate of the Civil Affairs Course and the Command and General Staff Officer Course, he received his ROTC commission upon graduation from Texas A&M University in 1990. HARVEY RISHIKOF is Professor of Law and Chair of the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College. He is author of numerous law reviews and essays on policy, law, and national strategy. JAMES S. ROBBINS is Professor of International Relations at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, and Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council. Dr. Robbins is a former Special Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and frequent commentator on national security issues for National Review, The Wall Street Journal, and other publications. He holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. His research interests include terrorism and national security strategy, political theory,

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and military history, and he is the author of Last in Their Class: Custer, Pickett and the Goats of West Point (2006). JENNIFER E. SIMS is a Visiting Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a consultant on intelligence and homeland security for private corporations and the U.S. government. Dr. Sims has served in several leadership positions in the U.S. government, most recently as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence Coordination (1994–1998) and Intelligence Advisor to the Undersecretary for Management and Coordinator for Intelligence Resources and Planning at the U.S. Department of State (1998–2001). She is a recipient of the intelligence community’s highest civilian award, the National Distinguished Service Medal. JOSHUA SINAI is Program Manager for counterterrorism studies and education at The Analysis Corporation, in McLean, VA. His areas of specialization focus on developing curriculum, methodologies, and tools to conduct research on terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as regional studies. In addition to publishing articles in academic publications, he writes a regular Terrorism Books column for The Washington Times book review section. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science/Comparative Politics from Columbia University. PETER N. SPAGNOLO teaches counterterrorism/antiterrorism and SWAT tactics at The Government Training Institute in Boise, Idaho. He holds a Master of Arts in Diplomacy from Norwich University and served over 20 years in the U.S. Army. For his last 11 years of service, he was a member of the 5th Special Forces Group, where he worked closely with militaries and governments of states throughout the Middle East and Africa. After retirement from military service, he served 6 years for the Payette County (Idaho) Sheriff’s Office as a patrol deputy, criminal investigator, and SWAT team member. TIMOTHY L. THOMAS is an analyst at the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. One element of Mr. Thomas’s work has focused on insurgent or terrorist use of the Internet. He also writes extensively on Chinese and Russian information warfare practices and on the war between Chechens and Russians. LEONARD WEINBERG is Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Reno, and a Senior Fellow at the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City. He is the senior editor of the journal Democracy and Security.

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century

ADVISORY BOARD FOR THIS SET Bruce Hoffman Rohan Gunaratna James S. Robbins PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Th´er`ese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth, Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, cofounder and member, Board of Trustees, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES VOLUME 2: COMBATING THE SOURCES AND FACILITATORS

Edited by James J. F. Forest

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

r

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century : international perspectives / edited by James J. F. Forest. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–275–99034–3 (set : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99035–0 (vol 1 : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99036–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99037–4 (vol 3 : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—Prevention—Cross–cultural studies. 2. Terrorism—Government policy—Cross–cultural studies. 3. Counterinsurgency—Cross–cultural studies. I. Forest, James J. F. HV6431.C69183 2007 363.325
17–dc22 2007007938 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. C 2007 by James J. F. Forest Copyright 

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007007938 ISBN-10: 0–275–99034–6 (set) ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99034–3 (set) 0–275–99035–4 (vol. 1) 978–0–275–99035–0 (vol. 1) 0–275–99036–2 (vol. 2) 978–0–275–99036–7 (vol. 2) 0–275–99037–0 (vol. 3) 978–0–275–99037–4 (vol. 3) First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Editor’s Note Preface Acknowledgments 1 Combating the Sources and Facilitators of Terrorism: An Introduction James J. F. Forest

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Part I: Governments and the International System 2 Combating State Sponsors of Terrorism Daniel Byman

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3 The Democratic Deficit: The Need for Liberal Democratization Paul R. Pillar

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4 The Role of Democratization in Reducing the Appeal of Extremist Groups in the Middle East and North Africa Francesco Cavatorta

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5 Authoritarian and Corrupt Governments Lydia Khalil

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6 The Failed State Matthew H. Wahlert

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7 Borders and State Insecurity Michelle L. Spencer

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Part II: Criminal and Economic Dimensions 8 Combating the International Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons Christopher Carr

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9 Terrorism Finance: Global Responses to the Terrorism Money Trail Paul J. Smith

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10 Organized Criminal Networks and Terrorism J.P. Larsson

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11 The Global Drug Trade and Its Nexus to Terrorism Gregory D. Lee

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12 Afghanistan’s Transformation to a Narco-Terrorist State: An Economic Perspective Jonathan C. Byrom and James Walker 13 The Shadow Economy and Terrorist Infrastructure Shahdad Naghshpour, Joseph J. St. Marie, and Samuel S. Stanton, Jr.

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14 International Energy Dependence: Facilitator and Vulnerability Sumesh M. Arora and David Butler

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15 Red Sky in the Morning: The Nexus between International Maritime Piracy and Transnational Terrorism Kent Baumann

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16 Understanding and Countering the Motives and Methods of Warlords Brian Hanley

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Part III: Society, Technology, and Strategic Influence 17 Responding to Psychological, Social, Economic, and Political Roots of Terrorism Bard E. O’Neill and Donald J. Alberts

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18 Suicide, Homicide, or Martyrdom: What’s in a Name? Christopher L. Brown

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19 Understanding and Combating Education for Martyrdom Magnus Norell and Eli G¨ond¨or

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20 Terrorism and New Media: The Cyber-Battlespace Maura Conway

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21 Cry Terror and Let Slip the Media Dogs Randall G. Bowdish

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22 Terror TV? An Exploration of Hizbollah’s Al-Manar Television Maura Conway

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23 Sociocultural, Economic, and Demographic Aspects of Counterterrorism Christopher Jasparro

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Part IV: U.S. Responses to the Global Security Environment 24 Terrorism, Insurgency, and Afghanistan Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason 25 Fighting Al Qaeda: Understanding the Organizational, Ideological, and Financial Aspects of a Global Network of Terror Joseph L. Trafton 26 Iraq in the 21st Century Robert J. Pauly, Jr., and Jeff Stephens 27 The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership: America’s New Commitment to Africa Lianne Kennedy Boudali 28 Values, Emotions, and the Global War on Terror John B. Alexander

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Appendix : The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

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Bibliography

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Index

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About the Editor and Contributors

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EDITOR’S NOTE

Governments have been countering the threat of terrorism and insurgency since the establishment of the Westphalia system of nation-states. However, the rapid evolution of science and technology over the past 100 years—from the invention of dynamite to commercial air travel and the Internet—has enabled new forms of terrorist and insurgent activity. It is thus likely that further technological advances over the next 100 years will yield similar results, as today’s terrorist and insurgent groups have proven to be adaptable, learning organizations. This three-volume set, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, seeks to encourage the development of learning organizations among national security professionals by examining what we currently know about the strategic application of hard and soft power in countering the sources and facilitators of terrorism. As a collection, the thematic essays and focused case studies represent an ambitious effort to capture existing knowledge in the field of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and draw lessons (from successes as well as failures) that will inform new, adaptable strategies to counter the new threats that—judging from historical trends—will no doubt emerge over the next century. At the outset, it is necessary to address why this publication covers both terrorism and insurgency, as there is confusion about these terms among many in the academic, media, and policymaking communities. In some countries that have faced the threat of violence for many years—including Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey—societies have grappled with additional terms like “paramilitaries” and “freedom fighters,” but the general view reflected throughout the chapters of this publication is that all groups or individuals (including insurgents) who engage in the act of terrorism can be considered terrorists. In essence, the act of terrorism defines its perpetrator as a terrorist, regardless of the ideological motivation behind such acts. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological,” while

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insurgency is defined as “an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. . . . [and which] seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.” In teaching my classes on these topics to future U.S. Army officers at West Point, the distinction I make is that insurgents can and do use terrorism (among other forms of violence), but insurgents are but one type of violent nonstate actors who may choose to use terrorism. In other words, not all insurgents use terrorism, and not all terrorists are part of an insurgency. Further, while the use of violence by insurgents to target governments is driven by a particular ideology, terrorists use violence against a range of targets (including governments) to advance their ideology. While such distinctions may seem academic to most readers, they are actually quite important when formulating strategic, tactical, and policy responses to the threat posed by terrorism and insurgencies. As described in Volume 1 of this publication, strategies and tactics for countering insurgency are an important aspect of our knowledge base on countering terrorism, and vice versa. In both cases, experts have emphasized that the use of force to counter an organization whose objectives resonate with a larger disaffected population yields limited (if any) success. Instead, it is argued, the ideology, political, and socioeconomic aspects of an organization— through which it derives its financial support, recruits, and sympathizers from amongst the local population—must be addressed. In other words, the use of hard power in countering terrorism (including insurgencies that employ terrorist tactics) must be complemented by elements of soft power. The link between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is also informed by recent analyses which suggest that the al Qaeda movement can be described as a global insurgency, seeking to replace the existing Westphalia-based system of nation-states with a global caliphate in which Islamic law reigns supreme. Recent terror attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, and Cairo, as well as disrupted terror plots in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, are all seen as examples of how individuals and groups around the world have been inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology to commit violence as part of a strategy to change the policy and behavior of these nation-states. In other words, it is argued, al Qaeda uses terrorism tactically and operationally to advance its global insurgent strategy. When described in these terms, the U.S.-led global effort against al Qaeda can be considered to be fighting both terrorism and insurgency. Thus, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses the many challenges that stem from both types of threats to our security. Another source of confusion in the study of terrorism and insurgency involves disagreement over the proper spelling of certain groups (or, rather, the spelling of the transliteration from the original language into English). For example, a brief survey of the literature reveals that a certain

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Lebanese militant group can be spelled Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hizbullah, Hezballah, and Hizbollah. For these volumes, we have standardized the spelling of certain common names across all the chapters, such as al Qaeda (because this is how several agencies of the U.S. government are now spelling it), Hizbollah (because this is how the group spells it on their English language Web site), and Osama bin Laden (rather than Usama). Finally, it is important to note that while many chapters discuss aspects of the “global war on terrorism (GWOT),” we recognize that this term has fallen out of favor among many in the academic and policy communities. However, there currently is a worldwide effort to reduce the capabilities of globally networked terror movements like al Qaeda, and in the absence of an equally useful short-hand reference for this effort, GWOT serves an important role. At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism effort, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism and insurgencies? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do these things more effectively? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, and in doing so contributes to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the common threat and how it can be defeated. Chapters of this publication address many different aspects of the unconventional warfare puzzle, examining the most important diplomatic, information, military/law enforcement, and economic/financial dimensions to regional and global cooperation in countering terrorism and insurgency, and providing specific examples of these dimensions in practice. Authors in the first volume address issues of important strategic and tactical concern, organized around the primary instruments of power through which nations pursue their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. These instruments can generally be described as either hard power (the use of force by military and law enforcement) or soft power (including diplomacy, information, and intelligence). The second volume provides a variety of insights on how to assess and combat the sources and facilitators of political violence, including state sponsors of terror, authoritarian regimes, criminal network activity, border insecurity, and the global struggle for influence among societies. As highlighted by several authors in this volume, the community of responsibly governed democracies faces uniquely complex challenges in combating terrorism and insurgencies while maintaining civil freedoms. And contributors to the third volume offer in-depth analyses of historical events and lessons learned in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Each volume contains a preface and introductory chapter, describing the contributed essays and providing an intellectual background for the discussions that follow.

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This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy published by Praeger Security International. The first of these—the three-volume The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published in 2005)—intends to help readers understand the nature of the threat by exploring what transforms an ordinary individual into a terrorist. This was followed by the three-volume Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (published in 2006), which explored the ongoing efforts in the United States to secure our borders and ports of entry, and to protect our public spaces and critical infrastructure from future terror attacks. The volumes of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century complement these earlier publications by focusing our attention on the broad, worldwide effort to actively confront those who threaten or use political violence against our communities. Together, these nine volumes are meant to provide a central, authoritative resource for students, teachers, policymakers, journalists, and the general public, as well as stimulate new ideas for research and analysis. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

PREFACE

The chapters of this second volume of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century examine the sources and facilitators of political violence. A wide variety of topics can be explored within this general category, and there is also a considerable diversity of opinion about what the terms “source of terrorism” and “facilitator of terrorism” mean. The themes chosen for this volume are meant to represent this diversity, rather than encompass the entire spectrum of possible topics. The chapters are organized into four general areas. In the first, chapters explore topics within the realm of governance and the international system. The second section examines a variety of criminal and economic dimensions. The third section addresses a few dimensions of society and technology in facilitating terrorist recruitment and operations, and defines the arena of strategic influence. And in the final section of the volume, chapters examine various aspects of the U.S. response to the global security environment. As a collection, the chapters advance our understanding of national security strategy challenges, as well as raise important questions and issues for further research. PART I: GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM The first section of the volume begins with a chapter by Dan Byman, Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, in which he notes that state sponsorship of terrorism is a complex problem that cannot easily be solved. Despite diplomatic protests, economic sanctions, and even military pressure, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria have supported numerous terrorist groups for decades. Their persistence in the face of pressure suggests that cutting the deadly connection between states and terrorist groups is difficult at best and impossible at worst. However, careful policymakers can design better solutions and avoid many common mistakes that can make the problem of state sponsorship worse. To begin with, he observes, it is easier to stop state support for terrorism before it starts than to halt backing after it begins. Thus, one of the greatest challenges to the international community is preventing

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the rise of new Talibans or other regimes that see supporting terrorism as ideologically vital. Creating a strong norm against the sponsorship of terrorism both makes states less likely to engage in it in the first place and enables the victim state to respond more easily. Diplomatically, this requires engaging both allies and other states on these issues before the support for terrorism becomes well established. In addition, it demands that the United States and other countries offer would-be sponsors alternatives to terrorism, such as giving them options at the negotiating table. Also, he concludes, creating standards is vital with regard to the problem of passive state sponsorship of terrorist organization. The nation-state is also the focus of the next chapter by Paul Pillar, a visiting professor in the Security Studies Program of Georgetown University and long-term veteran of the U.S. intelligence community. He begins by describing various arguments in favor of democracy as a superior system of government in general. The most fundamental point in favor of democracy is that when rulers are answerable to the ruled and must compete for the people’s favor to gain or retain office, they are more likely than in autocracies to govern in the people’s interests and not exclusively in their own. One of the most attractive features of democratization as a counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tool is that expansion of democracy and associated political rights is a value in its own right. Far from compromising or treading upon other ends, democratization represents the advancement of an important end, in addition to whatever benefit it has in curtailing terrorism. However, this does not imply that democratization should always—or even in any one case—take precedence over other counterterrorist instruments. Like the other tools, it has major limitations—most notably, the long time required for beneficial effects to become apparent, and the very long time required to develop political cultures needed for democracy to work well. Overall, he concludes, there are significant pitfalls associated with the transition of bringing new democracies into being. Much depends not on democracy itself, but on the widespread establishment of liberal attitudes and norms required to support it. The next chapter furthers this analysis of democratization’s impact on countering terrorism, with a particular focus on reducing the appeal of extremist groups in North Africa and the Middle East. Authored by Francesco Cavatorta of Dublin City University, Ireland, this chapter begins by noting that “any analysis of this region today concludes that the salient trait is the complete absence of democratic governance in all the Arab countries. While this authoritarianism in the different countries varies in terms of intensity, few doubts exist about its persistence and pervasiveness.” He then examines in some detail the relationship between democratization and political violence in the region and analyzes several different but interrelated aspects of such a complex relationship. First, he argues that processes of democratization in the region have largely failed due to

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the controversial nature of the principal opposition to the authoritarian elites in virtually all of the countries. Second, he challenges the assumption that democratization will inevitably reduce the appeal of extremist groups, if we equate extremism with the use of violence. The relegitimization of state authority in the Middle East and North Africa through the adoption of democratic procedures is certainly a necessary first step to stem the wave of radicalism that is engulfing the region. However, he argues, it would probably only be effective in moderating those groups that have “extremist” ideas, but are already committed to pursuing their goals through nonviolent means. Finally, his chapter offers some recommendations on how the international community could help bring about not only a more democratic region, but also a more “just” international system. The next chapter, by Lydia Khalil, a Counterterrorism analyst for the New York Police Department, furthers these discussions by examining the multifaceted connections between authoritarian governance and terrorism. She argues that no matter how benign their intentions, authoritarian governments usually succumb to the accumulation of power for power’s sake. They also routinely stifle civil liberties in order to maintain their hold on power and keep society in check. Further, more often than not, authoritarian governments are also corrupt governments. Resources, privileges, and advantages are reserved for a select group of the people or ruling elite. Corruption encumbers the fair distribution of social services and adds another layer to the resentment caused by the lack of political participation. The rest of society, because they have no voice, is ignored or placated. This corruption further erodes the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. She argues that we can no longer reluctantly tolerate authoritarian governments because they say they will cooperate in the international terrorist effort. Authoritarian states are “bad citizens” that do not and cannot help the international effort against international terrorism. On the contrary, authoritarian and repressive government are themselves a cause of terrorism. Authoritarian states may have the tactical capability and even the will to cooperate, but their assistance is tainted and their longterm usefulness is doubtful. Instead, she concludes, the United States and the international community must put these authoritarian, corrupt, and illegitimate governments that foment terrorism in a negative spotlight. Mobilizing the international community against authoritarian regimes in the name of effective long-term counterterrorism efforts is needed to put a check on authoritarian governments that breed this threat. Matthew Wahlert of Miami University follows with a chapter on the relationship between state failure and terrorism. Many political scientists and security analysts have turned to an examination of the failed state phenomenon in their research on counterterrorism. Furthermore, the Bush administration—in recognition of the serious nature of the problem—dealt with the issue in the National Security Strategy of 2002 and

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the National Security Strategy of 2006, both of which specifically pointed to the importance of addressing both failed and failing states as a component of our overall counterterrorism effort. A variety of factors contribute to the usefulness of failed states as bases for terror groups. First, failed states lack any semblance of law enforcement. In addition, a failed state also offers a population of ready-made recruits who are promised basic amenities (food, security, etc.) that the state is unable to provide. Finally, the levels of poverty and corruption typically associated with failed states makes the viability of bribes more compelling—again, allowing terrorist or criminal organizations the freedom to behave in any manner they wish. Overall, Wahlert provides a useful introduction to many of the issues concerning state failure as they relate to the broader effort to fight terrorism. A state’s inability to control its borders is the focus of the final chapter of this section, by Florida-based security consultant Michelle Spencer. She examines the factors related to borders that frame the current threats and our ability to address them, the primary threats that must be addressed by the international community, and the role border security can or cannot play in addressing those challenges. Her analysis suggests that border security is not a panacea and will not win the war on terror, and that there is no single model that can be instituted worldwide to secure every border under any circumstance. Indeed, methods and means of border security are governed by national security interests and, thus, are different for each country. Further, there are many things border security cannot do—for example, it cannot stop knowledge, funding, or violent ideology from spreading. Border security can, however, be a part of a comprehensive response to terrorism. Security can only be effective in layers. Terrorists must be forced to clear hurdle after hurdle, country after country. It is this type of international cooperation that will gradually, but forcefully increase the opportunity costs for terrorist groups. Thus, the United States and the international community should assist partner countries in improving their border security capabilities. PART II: CRIMINAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS The second section of this volume explores the role of criminal networks and other violent nonstate entities which facilitate global terrorism. The first chapter of this section, by Chris Carr of the U.S. Air War College, addresses the international proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). He begins by observing that in sufficient numbers and in the context of weak states, SALW can create an architecture of insecurity which fosters the very circumstances that protect and sustain the culture of terrorism. In Yemen, in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, in the slums of urban Jamaica, and in the Caucasus mountains, the proliferation of small arms has allowed armed groups to challenge the primacy

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of the state and to create conditions of instability which provide aid and comfort to criminal and terrorist communities. In such places, the traffickers in drugs, humans, and weapons cohabit with the warlords, militia leaders, and political opportunists in an environment which precludes good governance and judicial oversight. After addressing the origins of this problem, Carr offers some suggestions for countering the proliferation of SALW, including multilateral agreements, regional and bilateral arrangements, and partnerships with nongovernmental organizations for gathering data on the locations and movements of these weapons. Next, professor Paul Smith of the U.S. Naval War College examines the financial aspects of terrorism and counterterrorism. During the past decade, and particularly since 1999, a flurry of regulations and laws have been implemented throughout the world that focus primarily on terrorism financing. In fact, some observers might suggest that the “financial oxygen” that sustains terrorist activity is nearly depleted. Unfortunately, however, terrorists are extremely versatile and creative. They are reverting to more fundamental methods of transferring money, such as enlisting informal value transfer systems, engaging in bulk cash smuggling, or simply transferring “value” anonymously via e-cash (or e-gold) on the Internet. Further, as money laundering regimes become more advanced in rich, developed countries (and even moderately wealthy developing countries), terrorist organizations always have the option of turning to “less governed spaces”—in other words, operating in those areas of the world outside the purview of governments and financial regulators. Smith concludes that since terrorism is a complex, political phenomenon that cannot be simply eliminated by starving terrorists of their money, countering terrorism in the long term will require that governments honestly and forthrightly take on those sensitive questions or issues that provide the “political oxygen” of international terrorism. Unless that reality is confronted honestly, terrorists will always find a way to fund their operations. His analysis is followed by a chapter from British counterterrorism expert J.P. Larsson, who examines the conceptual intersections of terrorism and organized criminal networks. Despite the common means and methods shared by terrorists and criminal organizations, the traditional view of law enforcement has been to treat the two as completely distinct and separate, and this has in turn led to two disparate responses by government bodies, law enforcement agencies, and academic scholarship. However, the way to combat both terrorism and organized crime may be to treat them as very similar concepts. Larsson begins by offering a brief overview of organized crime, taken quite separate from terrorism, and then explores some of the similarities between them, how the two interact, and what the law enforcement response is and can be. Finally, he provides some thoughts about how both terrorism and organized crime can be countered in the twenty-first century.

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Organized crime is also a prominent theme of the next chapter, by Florida-based criminal justice consultant (and former DEA Supervisory Special Agent and U.S. Army soldier) Gregory D. Lee. He examines the global drug trade and its nexus to international terrorist organizations, as well as the traits these organizations share, noting that numerous terrorist organizations have been funded for years by the profits of drug traffickers, and this is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, especially when state-sponsored support is eroded by political or military action. Terrorists use drug production and trafficking profits to meet their overhead, and to destabilize governments around the world, including the United States. The methods they use to achieve their goals are strikingly similar to those used by drug trafficking organizations. He concludes by observing that the DEA is about to join the “intelligence community” and it is long overdue. The DEA has a large reservoir of human intelligence that surely can be beneficial to those charged with conducting terrorism investigations. This is especially true when one considers the frequent interaction between drug and terrorist organizations. Conversely, the intelligence community needs to understand the nexus between drugs and terror, and should readily provide information to the DEA to enable them to dismantle these organizations. Further analysis of the intersection between terrorism and the global drug trade is provided in the next chapter, by U.S. Army officers James Walker and Jon Byrom. Their case study of Afghanistan offers unique insights into the history of terrorism financing, state sponsorship, and charitable organizations as well as licit and illicit activities, and suggests that the global attack against terrorist financing has shifted financial reliance to illicit activities, primarily drugs. Further, they argue, this shift will cause terror groups to find opportunities to enter the global supply chain of drugs. Unfortunately, no place offers a greater opportunity than Afghanistan, where the environment is too tempting for terrorists not to carve out a piece of the action—after all, because of its comparative advantage in the production of opium, this country provides 87 percent of the world’s heroin supply. In fact, they argue, Afghanistan’s macroeconomic dependence on opium will ensure its continued production for years to come. Overall, Afghanistan is on the brink of becoming a major narco-terrorist state, and the United States and its allies must be appropriately concerned about its vast terrorism financing potential. To prevent this from occurring, the world community and the new Afghan government should focus on increasing all costs of the drug business. From an economic perspective, a direct effort to increase opportunity costs of growing poppies, while decreasing opportunity costs of alternatives, is what is needed. The economic dimensions of global terrorism are also addressed in the next chapter, by Shahdad Naghshpour and Joseph St. Marie of the

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University of Southern Mississippi, and Samuel Stanton, Jr. of Grove City College. They examine the role of the “shadow economy” (economic activities that are underground, covert, or illegal) in the global spread of terrorism; specifically, the theory behind the shadow economy and the effects it can have on terrorist organizations with regard to financing. Their analysis indicates that the shadow economy can provide an infrastructure for terrorist organizations to operate in, whereby financing becomes easier and detecting it becomes more difficult. The irony for most nations’ decision makers is that public policy decisions intended to create a better quality of life—such as a social security system which collects contributions through taxes and then provides a basic human security “safety net” for all its citizens—may actually create an infrastructure where terror organizations can operate, finance themselves, and carry out attacks against the very sociopolitical system that unwittingly supports them. A comprehensive approach to combating terrorism thus requires significant monitoring of the shadow economy. Next, Sumesh Arora and David Butler of the University of Southern Mississippi provide an analysis of the relationship between global terrorism and a nation’s dependence on energy resources outside its borders. After defining the term energy security and addressing its geopolitical nuances, the chapter examines the vulnerabilities of the global system of trade and transportation of fossil fuel energy resources (primary oil and natural gas). They note that the possibility of terrorist attacks on energy installations today is a legitimate concern, validated by several incidents that have been reported by the news media in the recent months and years. Arora and Butler then review several attacks that have been made against this system, particularly in places like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Colombia, and Iraq, as well as threatening statements made by al Qaeda warning of attacks against oil facilities in the Middle East. Overall, they conclude, international energy dependence can be viewed as both a facilitator and vulnerability of terrorism, and thus demands our utmost attention in formulating a comprehensive, global counterterrorism response. Another example of the intersection between global trade and terrorism involves maritime piracy, according to U.S. Army officer Kent Baumann. His chapter begins with an illustration of how contemporary piracy is proving more and more dangerous as technology and globalization continue to advance and spread. The motivations influencing various terrorist groups to engage in piracy vary from their geographic proximity to strategic waterways to their particular ideological and political goals. There are also economic reasons: successful acts of piracy can help fund and supply future terrorist operations, and hostage-taking for ransom, as well as the theft of ocean going vessels, can prove very lucrative for raising funds. Overall, he suggests, terror-piracy may pose a potentially catastrophic threat on the contemporary geostrategic stage. In particular,

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transnational, ideologically focused groups pose the greatest threat when associated with international maritime pirates. Finally, his chapter concludes by proposing several short- and long-term countermeasures for combating global piracy (whether or not it is related to terrorism), and highlights the importance of consequence management in the case that global terrorism begins to take greater advantage of the maritime vulnerabilities he describes. The final chapter of this section addresses the need to understand and counter the motives and methods of a particular type of violent nonstate actor: warlords. Here, Brian Hanley of KonnectWorld, Inc., provides a categorization of different types of warlords (including resource warlords, proxy warlords, and development bandits), and then provides recommendations for countering each type. He suggests that the primary method of dealing with a resource warlord is to take physical control of his resource assets and manage them on a fair and equitable way for the nation. This type of military-development action could be legitimized on the international scene. He recommends imprisoning or killing proxy warlords (who are supported by external entities), while negotiating with their supporting power(s). And regarding development bandits, he recommends taking steps to allow prosecution for major crimes committed in developing nations in the home country of the funding organization (where legal systems are presumed stronger). Finally, he notes, a key to opposing warlords is not so much how draconian the threat is against them, but their perception, and that of a potential successor, that they will reliably be caught or killed. Because of the prevalence of warlords in failed or failing states—the same “ungoverned spaces” where we find terrorist groups and training camps—Hanley’s analysis of warlords contributes an important dimension to our understanding of countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. PART III: SOCIETY, TECHNOLOGY, AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCE The third section of this volume explores various dimensions of society that facilitate radicalization, mobilization, and other operations of insurgencies and terrorist organizations. The first chapter of this section, by National Defense University professor Bard O’Neil and former U.S. Air Force Academy professor Donald J. Alberts, offers a thoughtful analysis of the psychological, social, economic, and political roots of terrorism, and particularly the use of terror tactics by insurgent organizations, and considers remedies for mitigating them. They describe how effective insurgent organizations proffer a blend of ideological and material incentives that meet an individual’s need for belonging, identity, and rectifying perceived injustice. Once individuals have joined or otherwise

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actively supported terrorist groups for ideological reasons, it is difficult to win them back, because of the psychological and emotional investments they have made. This is especially true when religious ideas are involved. Moreover, their analysis highlights the need for governments to recognize the social, economic, and political problems that need to be resolved, at least partially, if the potential for terrorism is to be diminished. Particularly, they must take a close look at the political culture and system as part of their strategic assessment and draw relevant conclusions from it. Understanding the salience and interconnections of these psychological, social, economic, and political causes requires a careful and systematic analysis in every situation. This should precede the articulation and implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy. In the next chapter, Chris Brown of the Center for Security Policy examines the means and message of Islamic extremists. He argues that because suicide bombings have become an increasingly pervasive tactic, in addition to their popularity among multiple Islamist organizations around the world, there must be an ideological foundation for them. Therefore, the key to an effective counterstrategy can only come from understanding and exploiting the foundational vulnerability of the ideology of the suicide operation. The war in which the world is currently engaged is an ideological war. Thus, he concludes, without a comprehensive strategy to engage in and win the war of ideas in ways that have cultural resonance, military operations alone will provide only a limited respite. Al Qaeda and those that share its ideology must not just be destroyed, but discredited within their own communities. This in turn will undermine their theo-ideology, which is the key to both their global reach as an organization and their ability to recruit for suicide bombings on a level that threatens America and the Western world’s vital interests. Without their foundation of theoideology, they will fall. The nature of Islamic extremist ideology is also addressed in the next chapter, by Magnus Norell of the Swedish Defense Research Agency. In his analysis of education for martyrdom, he notes that one does not have to work particularly hard in order to find Islamic texts that support the idea of martyrdom. At the same time, groups of frustrated young Muslim men (and some women) with a feeling of purposelessness, and disenfranchised by a Muslim world in transition, are seeking lofty goals to pin their existence on. The combination of the situation of the aspiring martyrs and individuals with the aim of channeling the frustration of these young men to their benefit can produce devastating results, particularly in the form of suicide terrorism. Further, according to Norell, the claim that those who aspire to become martyrs suffer from mental illnesses as a result of a traumatic childhood or poverty is disputed by practically all available facts. As well, bad education and substandard social conditions do not explain why a person decides to become a suicide murderer. Rather, he points to

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the combination of personal frustrations, sociopolitical context, and local influences in small groups of like-minded people, where a feeling of belonging is regained. In these small groups, a mental state develops were emphasis is put on loyalty and commitment to a common cause, which ties the individuals together into a new family. When infused with an ideology that ties limited personal opportunities with an extremist interpretation of the Koran, these groups can become powerful sources of suicide bombers. Next, Maura Conway of Dublin City University describes the role of new media—particularly the Internet—in spreading the ideological messages, strategies, and tactics of terrorism. Her chapter addresses a variety of ways in which terrorists use the Internet, including psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, recruitment and mobilization, networking and information gathering, and planning and coordination. She notes that terrorists seek political and social change, and their objective is to influence populations in ways that support that change. To accomplish this, they engage in physical attacks and information operations, as well as the integration of these. The case of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi provides a useful example of this. Obviously, the Internet is not the only tool that a terrorist group needs in order to “succeed.” However, the Net can add new dimensions to existing assets that groups can utilize to achieve their goals as well as providing new and innovative avenues for expression, fundraising, recruitment, etc. At the same time, there are also trade-offs to be made. High levels of visibility increase levels of vulnerability, both to scrutiny and security breaches. Nonetheless, the proliferation of official terrorist sites appears to indicate that the payoffs, in terms of publicity and propaganda value, are understood by many groups to be worth the risks. Next, Randy Bowdish—a retired Navy Captain and faculty member of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College—provides a detailed look at the relationship between terrorism and the media in a liberal democracy. He argues that the media must take a more active, formal role in guarding the people against the cognitive harm and unwitting complicity toward terrorists’ ends associated with news of terrorism. Long a watchdog against governmental abuse of power, the media must also stand sentinel against the tyranny of extremists who would manipulate the media and society to their own malevolent ends. Terrorism strikes at the soft underbelly of democracy by bypassing a nation’s means of resistance and attacking its will to resist through the media. While censorship is one option to defend media vulnerability, it is a bad one compared to self-regulation through media codes. He acknowledges that the “cry of terror” is newsworthy and reason to “let slip the media dogs.” It does not mean, however, that the news must be reported in a manner conducive to terrorists.

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This discussion of terrorism and media is furthered by a case study of Al-Manar (Hizbollah’s TV station), by Maura Conway of Dublin City University. She first examines the range of media products offered by Hizbollah, and then offers a brief overview of the Lebanese television scene and the establishment of Al-Manar. The third and fourth sections of the chapter describe the station’s mission and financing, respectively. Section five, which describes and analyzes the station’s programming, is divided into three parts: the first explores the type of programming prevalent in the station’s early years; the second describes the station’s contemporary format; and the third is devoted to a description of the type of viewing offered by the station to women and children. Conway also describes the station’s viewership and explores the recent banning of the station in Europe and the United States. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the role of the station in the 2006 crisis in the Middle East. And in the final chapter of this section, Christopher Jasparro of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College illustrates how analyses of sociodemographic and geographic trends can yield important insights for countering terrorism. He writes that “the application of geographic perspectives provide a means for visualizing, organizing, and assessing real world data (that can otherwise inundate essential information with a deluge of detail) thereby elucidating important spatial patterns and structures.” In other words, he suggests that by knowing what areas produce the most terrorists and their supporters, combined with an understanding of where sociodemographic factors play particularly significant roles in facilitating terrorism (and how terrorist organizations exploit these factors from place to place), “we can more precisely and efficiently focus our resources and approaches instead of being constrained by ‘one-size fits all’ responses geared to addressing broad issues (poverty for instance) whose effectiveness is difficult, if not impossible, to measure.” He also suggests that countering an ideology requires determining where a message originates from, along what paths it has diffused, and the conditions by which it resonates. More specifically, precision in reducing the effect of sociocultural and demographic “root causes” that give extreme ideologies their resonance demands that we distinguish between universal and place-specific forces of radicalization. PART IV: U.S. RESPONSES TO THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The final section of this volume provides five chapters exploring various ways in which the United States is responding to the challenges of terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. First, Tom Johnson and Chris Mason of the Naval Postgraduate School describe the U.S. strategy and actions in Afghanistan. They observe that today—almost six years

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into America’s military engagement in Afghanistan—the United States is mired in an insurgency of escalating violence and lethality which has already claimed thousands of lives. The twin insurgent movements of a resurgent Taliban (backed by al Qaeda) and the Hizb-i-Islami party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG) are growing steadily in strength and influence (particularly in the east and south of the country), while the Afghan government’s control over a broad swath of the country is rapidly diminishing. According to their analysis, three fundamental problems in Afghanistan have allowed for the emergence of the insurgencies: (1) the inability of the national government since 2001 to establish a politically significant presence throughout the country; (2) the failure of the international community to create a secure rural environment in the south conducive to development and reconstruction; and (3) the virtually complete lack of meaningful improvement in the lives of the great majority of the people in the southern half of the country. They also suggest that a complete change in counterinsurgency strategy is required, involving greater cultural education for all U.S. soldiers and serious changes in the Afghan National Police and conclude that abandoning Afghanistan would allow the country to once again become a refuge for terrorist groups to recruit, train, and wage war against the West. A similar conclusion is drawn in the next chapter, by Robert Pauly and Jeff Stephens of the University of Southern Mississippi, in which they examine the current U.S. strategy in Iraq. Their discussion begins by providing an overview of the role of American military forces in nation/statebuilding operations in Iraq since 2003, followed by an examination of the socioeconomic, judicial, political, and security components of those operations. The chapter then offers several insights that U.S. civilian and military leaders should draw from America’s efforts in Iraq to date, and concludes with an assessment of the prospects for the future. Above all, they argue, the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq is absolutely indispensable to the broader transformation of the Islamic world. The conflict in Iraq continues to present economic, military, and political roadblocks that will take years, if not decades, to overcome. However, it is essential to see the Iraqi nation/state-building project through to completion. Thus, subsequent administrations, whether Republican or Democratic, must maintain America’s commitment to economic and political reform across the Greater Middle East over the long term. Failing to do so will only further embolden Islamic extremist groups, including (but by no means limited to) al Qaeda. The next chapter of this section, by Joseph Trafton of the University of Rhode Island, highlights the need to understand the organizational, ideological, and financial aspects of al Qaeda in order to defeat this global network of terror. To date, he notes, the Bush administration has relied heavily on the military to deal with the al Qaeda threat, which is reflective

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of the anachronistic way in which the administration views its contemporary adversary. And yet, despite organizational and leadership setbacks in the wake of September 11, al Qaeda continues to be a credible threat to the security of the United States. There is much to be done, particularly in the realms of “soft power” described in the previous volume of this publication. For example, he argues, little has been done by the United States or the international community to deal with the ways in which individual al Qaeda cells obtain large sums of money, for example, including the underground banking networks mentioned earlier. As well, a “strategic communications” campaign is necessary to confront the al Qaeda ideology and its influence throughout the Muslim world. Overall, he concludes, understanding the evolution of al Qaeda’s organizational structure, the role ideology plays in uniting the al Qaeda network, and al Qaeda’s new financial structure is critical for our success in defeating the threat posed by Osama bin Laden and those he inspires. The next chapter describes one of the most recent and forward-looking U.S. initiatives in countering terrorism in the twenty-first century: the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Authored by Lianne Kennedy Boudali of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, this chapter examines how the United States is addressing the many security challenges that pervade this strategically important region of Africa, where borders are porous, economies are fragile, and while some states have stable though undemocratic governments, a few are fledgling democracies, and others have been plagued by ongoing violence and instability. In response to this regional environment, the Department of Defense has recently collaborated with the Department of State to develop the TSCTP, which supports African states’ efforts to improve border security and enact counterterrorism measures, while also facilitating regional cooperation, promoting democratic governance, and improving relations with the United States. After examining the connection between security and development in Africa, and describing the details and current status of TSCTP, Kennedy concludes her chapter with a discussion of the potential benefits and risks of the initiative. And in the final chapter of this section, terrorism consultant John Alexander argues that the current global conflict is much more complex than the uncompromising and invidious duality reflected in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), and is fraught with paradoxes. Precipitated by emotional issues juxtaposed with competing and incompatible values, the execution of counterterrorism programs become severely hampered by obvious contradictions. Further, these efforts are exacerbated by strenuous efforts by senior leaders to remain politically correct. Four theoretical approaches are most prevalent in the literature on countering terrorism. These are: enhance security (keep us safe); eliminate the terrorists (remove the cancer); attack the support infrastructure (cut their funding); and

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alter the conditions that breed discontent and terrorists (drain the swamp). However, he argues, efforts to counter the conditions supporting terror must address ideological differences that drive terrorists to commit acts of extreme violence. CONCLUSION Together, these chapters address an impressive breadth of issues related to the global security environment. However, there are obviously other sources and facilitators of terrorism to explore beyond what is covered in this volume. Thus, this collection will hopefully also stimulate readers to pursue further research on their own, in order to expand our collective understanding of how to counter terrorism and insurgency in the twentyfirst century. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy, which began with The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published by Praeger in 2005) and continued with Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (in 2006). Together, these volumes are meant to provide a central resource for understanding the global threat of terrorism, how America is working to defend against it, and how the international community is actively seeking to disrupt, deter, and defeat those who seek to conduct terror attacks. I would like to thank Hilary Claggett at Praeger Security International for her vision and encouragement throughout this effort. Each of these multivolume projects have required significant coordination, and Hilary and her staff have been enormously professional and helpful collaborators during the past three years. Also, the Advisory Board members for this project—Bruce Hoffman, Rohan Gunaratna, and James Robbins—have been extremely helpful in identifying authors and topics to be addressed, in addition to serving as outstanding guest lecturers to the cadets in my terrorism studies courses at West Point. New contributions to the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have never been more urgently needed. Each of the chapters in these three volumes is the product of thoughtful research and analysis, and I offer my sincere thanks to the authors for their hard work and commitment to excellence. The insights and suggestions they have provided in these pages will undoubtedly inform discussions and debate in a variety of policymaking and academic settings for the foreseeable future. For their continued support and encouragement, I extend my gratitude to the faculty and staff of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. General (R) Wayne Downing, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Felter, Dr. Jarret Brachman, and Brigadier General (R) Russell Howard have been especially important sources of mentorship and guidance. Colonel Kip McCormick, Major Rick Wrona, Mr. Brian Fishman, Mr. Clint Watts, Mr. Jim Phillips, and Ms. Lianne Kennedy Boudali have also contributed significantly to my understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. I would also like to thank the leadership of the Department of Social Sciences— Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb—along with the Dean of

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the Academic Board, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, and the former Dean, Brigadier General (R) Daniel Kaufman, all of whom have been supportive of my publishing efforts over the last several years. I am also sincerely grateful to Mr. Tom Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, for his role in sustaining and expanding the CTC’s educational mission. And of course, the CTC would not exist without the generous commitment, support, and vision of Mr. Vincent Viola, USMA Class of 1977. My faculty colleagues throughout West Point continue to be a source of inspiration as both academic mentors and members of the U.S. armed forces. I joined West Point as a civilian faculty member and assistant dean in early fall 2001, and the attacks of September 11 had a tremendous impact on my personal and professional life. The United States Military Academy is a very unique place to work as an academic, particularly given the current global security challenges. Upon graduation, the students I teach are commissioned as officers in the U.S. Army, and very soon find themselves on the front lines of the global counterterrorism effort. Some have been injured, some have been killed. Many of the officers who serve on the faculty and staff at West Point have also been deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere; some of them have fallen as well. I have never before encountered such a willingness to sacrifice, and I am continually awed by so many men and women (and their families) who are committed to a life of service to our nation. I offer them my deepest gratitude and best wishes for a long and successful military career. Finally, my wife and daughter—Alicia and Chloe Lynn—have been sources of great motivation and support, and I thank them sincerely for their patience and tolerance during my scholarly adventures. James J.F. Forest January 15, 2007

CHAPTER 1 COMBATING THE SOURCES AND FACILITATORS OF TERRORISM: AN INTRODUCTION James J.F. Forest

In 2005, a predecessor to this publication—entitled The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes—was released as a three-volume set by Praeger. In retrospect, however, perhaps the third volume should have been give the title of “root facilitators” instead of “root causes,” as this more accurately describes the role that failed states, drugs, criminal networks, political ideologies, and sociodemographic trends play in contemporary manifestations of global terrorism. Further, the national debate has shifted away from a focus on so-called “root causes of terrorism” like poverty and oppression, and instead a growing number of scholars and policymakers recognize that the primary cause of terrorism is a human being’s decision whether or not to commit a terrorist act. A variety of factors influence that decision and facilitate the terrorist act, from ideology to weapons proliferation and criminal networks. The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism recognizes the need to address these and other factors as part of a comprehensive response to the terrorist threat and the global environment that enables it. As described in the first volume of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, policymakers in the United States and other nations are continually seeking to apply the appropriate mix of hard and soft power in confronting the global terrorist threat. This second volume expands this discussion by highlighting various dimensions of the global security environment which require robust soft power responses—particularly in the realm of diplomacy, politics, and finance—in addressing the need to build

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a nation’s capacity to eradicate the terrorism-facilitating elements within its own borders. GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM A number of themes are addressed in the literature on governance and the global system of nation-states which have some relationship to terrorism and insurgency, including weak or failing states, border insecurity, authoritarian regimes, and economic issues like globalization. For example, renowned political theorist Benjamin Barber argues that the contemporary struggle against terrorism can be seen as the collision between two forces: one, an integrative modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization, which can be called McWorld; and the other, a fragmentary tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism, which can be called Jihad. As globalization has led to increasing interdependence, he argues, we must learn to contain and regulate the anarchy that foments both the destructiveness of terrorists and the injustices of global capital. Only the globalization of civic and democratic institutions is likely to offer a way out of the ongoing war between Jihad and McWorld, and this requires a new understanding of global democratic interdependence.1 However, according to Michael Mousseau, globalization and greater interdependence may also exacerbate existing tensions between various states and cultures. Indeed, his research illustrates how two distinct norms of economic integration—contracting and reciprocity—give rise to two distinct political cultures that legitimate, respectively, liberal democracy and collective authoritarianism. In liberal democracies, economic transactions are based on contracting, which requires a recognition of the equal rights of strangers, as well as religious and cultural tolerance. In contrast, economic environments where reciprocity is the norm—as is the case for many developing nations—trust and cooperation is based more on in-group beliefs and values, loyalty to in-group leaders, and distrust of outsiders. From this perspective, one begins to see how globalization has exacerbated conflicts between these two worlds—particularly when free trade between the developed and developing world hurts the local economy and worsens the conditions of the urban jobless, increasing the dependency of millions who blame the foreigners for their conditions.2 Other dimensions of the global economy that may facilitate terrorism include the developed world’s enormous dependence upon fossil fuels (oil and gas), much of which is imported from the Middle East. According to Michael Klare, there are at least three key aspects of the relationship between energy dependence and terrorism: the intersection of European colonialism and the early years of oil production in the Middle East; the nature of U.S. ties with the leaders of oil-producing nations; and the strategic role of oil infrastructure in the war between terrorists and their

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opponents. From the extremists’ perspective, he notes, the extraction of Middle Eastern oil is but the latest chapter in a long drive by Western nations to overpower Islamic societies, occupy their lands, and steal their precious resources. Further, these communities are largely devoted to an ancient religious tradition that is thought to be under attack by the West, and it does not help matters that the pursuers of oil are mostly adherents to a different religious tradition that they closely associate with centuries of invasion and conquest.3 As John Daly observes, al Qaeda knows how important Saudi Arabian oil is to the rest of the world, and its leaders have alluded to targeting this industry as an attack against America and its allies. Any strike against the country’s oil facilities and related energy industries would clearly have a crippling effect on the rest of the world. Because of the possibility of a potential attack by al Qaeda, Saudi Arabia has increased security for people employed in the oil industry, as a good number of them are foreign workers and possible targets for terrorists. Indeed, recent attacks at Yanbu (in June 2004) and Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia’s largest oil complex (in February 2006) illustrate the threat to the global energy economy. Osama bin Laden has stated that it is only a matter of time before al Qaeda attacks against the oil industry cause a worldwide recession.4 Under these circumstances, Klare argues, it will probably take the demise of petroleum as the world’s leading source of energy to sever the relationship between oil and violence altogether.5 In addition to these and other geopolitical and economic factors, researchers have also suggested that terrorist hot spots can be identified by analyzing data on geography and political development.6 For example, according to Peter Liotta and James Miskel, the physical landscape in which terrorists live—including environment and geography—provide both context and opportunity for terrorist group formation and mobilization, particularly in numerous locations across the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi– Jakarta arc of megacities where jobs and educational opportunities are increasingly unavailable, resulting in discontent, crime, and urban instability. Other locations of concern within this arc include the slums to which tens of millions of refugees have come from other (primarily rural) parts of the developing world. To combat the potential for these locations to serve as breeding grounds for terrorism, they argue, more focus must fall on internal public sector reform and public security improvements in states where governance is currently failing or where urban population growth is likely to induce failure at the municipal level.7 Research by Paul Ehrlich and Jack Liu supports the assertion that persistent demographic and socioeconomic factors can facilitate 9/11type terrorism and make it easier to recruit terrorists. In particular, their analysis highlights the important and complex relationship between demographic variables and political instability in the developing world. For

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example, increased birth rates and the age composition of populations in these countries affect resource consumption, prices, government revenues and expenditures, demand for jobs, and labor wages. Differences between developing countries and the developed world are striking—especially in terms of birth rates—and suggest that without dramatic action, the demographic and socioeconomic conditions in Islamic nations in the Middle East and South, Central, and Southeast Asia could continue to support terrorism and terrorists for many decades to come.8 These and other studies represent the macro level of analysis, where global trends and patterns help explain the growing problem of terrorism. A more comprehensive understanding incorporates studies of the relationship between regime type and terrorism, particularly those that address issues of state sponsorship, weak or failing states, and authoritarian or repressive regimes. State-Level Sources and Facilitators of Terrorism To begin with, state sponsorship is a particularly important aspect to any discussion on facilitators of terrorism. One of the most authoritative studies of this, by Daniel Byman, defines state sponsorship as “a government’s intentional assistance to a terrorist group to help it use violence, bolster its political activities, or sustain [its] organization.”9 His research identifies six areas in which states provide support to terrorists—training and operations; money, arms, and logistics; diplomatic backing; organizational assistance; ideological direction; and (perhaps most importantly) sanctuary.10 Byman argues that terrorist groups which receive significant amounts of state support are far more difficult to counter and destroy than those which do not.11 However, it is also important to note that there are several types of state sponsorship of terrorism: “strong supporters” are states with both the desire and the capacity to support terrorist groups; “weak supporters” are those with the desire but not the capacity to offer significant support; “lukewarm supporters” are those that offer rhetorical but little actual tangible support; and “antagonistic supporters” are those that actually seek to control or even weaken the terrorist groups they appear to be supporting. Another category Byman examines is passive support, whereby states “deliberately turn a blind eye to the activities of terrorists in their countries but do not provide direct assistance.”12 A state’s tolerance of or passivity toward a terrorist group’s activities, he argues, is often as important to their success as any deliberate assistance they receive. Open and active state sponsorship of terrorism is rare, and it has decreased since the end of the Cold War. Yet this lack of open support does not necessarily diminish the important role that states play in fostering or hindering terrorism. At times, the greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorist’s cause is by not policing a border, turning a blind eye to fundraising, or even

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tolerating terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive. Passive support for terrorism can contribute to a terrorist group’s success in several ways. It often allows a group to raise money, acquire arms, plan operations, and enjoy a respite from the counterattacks of the government it opposes. Passive support may also involve spreading an ideology that assists a terrorist group in its efforts to recruit new members.13 Perhaps one of the most prominent examples of state sponsorship in recent history has been Afghanistan under the Taliban regime. According to Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya, the training camps established by al Qaeda and its associates became the lifeblood for a broad array of Islamic militant groups, providing indoctrination and training for foot soldiers, go-betweens, planners, document forgers, communications specialists, scouts, technicians, bombers, and even hijackers. According to some estimates, many militant Muslims from more than 50 countries passed through the camps, spending from 2 weeks to more than 6 months learning the general and specific skills that modern terrorism requires.14 Learning materials (manuals, notebooks, lesson plans, and reference books) recovered from guerrilla training schools in Afghanistan indicate that there were two tiers of courses, one for standardized, basic guerilla skills like cleaning and firing a rifle, using a rocket-propelled grenade, reading maps and dealing with explosives. Recruits deemed to have special skills were given additional training in either advanced infantry techniques or in specific tactics of terrorism. Military experts who reviewed these captured materials agreed that there was a high level of training on everything except in some of the more advanced terrorism skills, and that much of the instructions provided in these manuals had been borrowed from similar training materials used by the military in the United States and the former Soviet Union.15 Thus, Afghanistan under Taliban rule played a key role in creating the global terrorist threat now faced by the West. Direct (active of passive) state sponsorship of terrorism, however, is less common than plain negligence or inability to properly secure one’s national borders—a problem faced by dozens of weak or failing states throughout the world. Indeed, as Chester Crocker recently argued. In much of the transitional world . . . there is a footrace under way between legitimate governmental institutions and legal business enterprises, on the one hand, and criminal networks, often linked to warlords or political factions associated with security agencies, on the other . . . When state failure sets in, the balance of power shifts ominously against ordinary civilians and in favor of armed entities operating outside the law (or with tacit approval).16

The challenge of state weakness is now explicitly recognized in U.S. national security circles as a strategic problem almost equal in importance

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to state competitors. As the current National Security Strategy of the United States notes, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”17 Weak central governments also facilitate what Forest and Sousa refer to as “zones of competing governance” within their borders, where the government’s authority is routinely challenged and undermined by a variety of violent nonstate actors.18 Erica Chenoweth has argued that the political stability of a state is the most significant factor affecting the existence of terrorism. Her analysis indicates that politically unstable regimes—regardless of regime type— are more likely than stable regimes to provide hospitable environments for terrorist organizations to develop. The “permissive conditions” of politically unstable regimes inhibit domestic institutional mechanisms that could potentially prevent terrorist organizations from taking root in particular countries. Therefore, she argues, the international community should seek to provide multilateral, legitimate support to transitioning states in order to provide the institutional framework by which a transitioning state can develop.19 In essence, states in which a weak central government is unable to provide adequate human security to all segments of its population can serve as a conduit for radicalization and terrorism.20 Such is the case with the Palestinian territories, as reflected in Matthew Levitt’s research on Hamas—a group that is known not only for perpetrating suicide attacks in Israel, but for providing extensive and much-needed social services to Palestinians.21 Because of the notion that Hamas has independent “wings,” its political and charitable fronts are allowed to operate openly in many European and Middle Eastern capitals. In these cities, Islamic social welfare groups tied to Hamas are given free passes for their support of terror simply because they also provide critical humanitarian support. Hamas logistical and financial support activity is often tolerated when conducted under the rubric of charitable or humanitarian assistance. However, Levitt argues, Hamas grant making is largely determined by a cold cost-benefit analysis that links the amount of aid awarded to the extent of support that aid will buy. Individuals tied to Hamas receive more assistance than those unaffiliated with the organization, while members linked to terrorist activity receive even more.22 The results for Hamas recruitment are striking—according to an April 2001 survey conducted by the Islamic University in Gaza, 49 percent of children aged 9–16 claimed to have participated in the intifada, and 73 percent claimed they hoped to become martyrs.23 Further, the recent electoral victories by Hamas reflect the local support that the terror group now enjoys in the Palestinian Territories—support which they would not have if a strong central government, able to provide adequate human security for all Palestinians, had been established by the former ruling Fatah party.

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Cases like this point to the need for robust capacity-building efforts in nations where the combination of socioeconomic, political, and ideological factors can produce an environment hospitable to terrorist recruitment. Sebastian Mallaby contends that the United States must take the lead in nation-building initiatives in order to counter the growing danger of failed states to our national security. He notes that there is a wide gap between nation builders’ aspirations to create stable democratic states and what global institutions (including the World Bank and the United Nations) can deliver, and thus America should actively work to fill this gap. In a recent study by the RAND Corporation, Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk suggest specific ways in which development policies can be used to inhibit the resurgence of terrorist activities and discourage local support for political extremism. Drawing on lessons from three countries—Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom—that have enacted social and economic development policies to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions, they offer six policy suggestions: (1) social and economic development policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities; (2) real policy achievements in these areas can discourage terrorist recruits; (3) inadequately funded development policies are likely to inflate expectations and renew support for terrorism; (4) the ability of these policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation; (5) social and economic development policies can be used as a “stick” to discourage terrorism; and (6) these policies do not eliminate terrorism, but can reduce its presence.24 Finally, researchers have also focused on another aspect of regime type that is even more problematic than state sponsors or weak central governments: governmental oppression. Throughout history, as many scholars have noted, a significant amount of political violence has emerged in direct response to authoritarian, repressive, or corrupt regimes, and it is perhaps no coincidence that contemporary regimes of this type are common in the developing world—especially in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia, corresponding to the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc of instability described by Liotta and Miskel’s research discussed earlier in this chapter.25 Understanding the relationship between oppressive governments and political violence is thus an important aspect to developing comprehensive strategies for countering terrorism and insurgency. Recent studies by Mohammed Hafez have sought to determine why some Islamic movements turn to rebellion and why previously nonviolent militants turn to violence. While an array of Islamic opposition movements have adopted a variety of strategies to affect social and political change, some have turned to violence as a direct result of institutional exclusion and indiscriminate state repression, he argues, particularly following an extended period of Islamic mobilization. Drawing on the political histories of Algeria and Egypt, he concludes that the choice between moderation and violence in Islamic movements during a

8

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democratization process is shaped by state policies, especially the degree of system accessibility and the nature of state repression. If the democratic process grants Islamists substantive access to state institutions, the opposition will be channeled toward conventional political participation and shun violence. If, on the other hand, the state denies Islamists access and if the state applies repression indiscriminately—punishing both moderate and radical proponents of political opposition—Islamists will tend to resort to militancy.26 Similar studies have focused on the unique case of Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally and (increasingly) a target of al Qaeda attacks. Anthony Cordesman recently argued that Saudi security is best protected through social, religious, and economic reforms, and not by their current security-only approach.27 Sherifa Zuhur agrees that the future security of Saudi Arabia is contingent on its reforms, and recommends that the United States encourage the Saudi government to increase political participation, improve the intelligence services, urge responsiveness to human rights, and increase multilateral discussions relating to antiterrorism. She concludes that the benefits of enhanced security and democratization in Saudi Arabia will lead to a better relationship with the United States and allow the two countries to be more open to each other’s viewpoints and insights; it will also help in the fight against global terrorism.28 In sum, there are many aspects to the role that governance and the international system play in contemporary terrorism, including sociodemographic trends, energy dependence, state sponsorship, weak states, and repressive regimes. In many cases, these factors contribute to a host of political grievances which are incorporated into a radical group’s ideology, providing a rationale and justification (in the eyes of their members and potential recruits) for the use of violence. Beyond political grievances, however, scholars have also explored a variety of criminal and economic dimensions that facilitate the activities of terrorist networks. A majority of studies in this area have focused on money laundering, weapons proliferation, and the global drug trade. CRIMINAL AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS In April 2006, an alleged ring of passport forgery that supplied documents to Pakistanis, Egyptians, and Iraqis was broken up by Colombian authorities, who claim there was a connection with al Qaeda. While U.S. authorities have remained skeptical about this, based on limited evidence of any significant Islamist militant presence in Colombia, the event nonetheless served as a reminder of the global nature of al Qaeda’s financial support and logistics network.29 Indeed, as Mark Basile notes, al Qaeda has a strong network of business savvy financiers who can disguise money and other assets. The terrorist network has also learned how to

Combating the Sources and Facilitators of Terrorism

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operate through the world’s financial markets, especially by moving money through underegulated markets, and has international Islamic charities in Saudi Arabia which can thwart the international attempts to eradicate the organization.30 Unfortunately, a growing body of research has also begun to shed light on a new, far more worrisome phenomenon involving the intersection of organized criminal networks and Islamic terror groups. For example, Thomas Sanderson notes that because the U.S.-led global war on terrorism has had some success in constricting the flow of financial support to terror groups, these organizations are moving deeper into criminal activity. He describes a “lethal cocktail” that is emerging, “consisting of one part criminal, one part terrorist, and one part weak or corrupt state.” He concludes that as terror groups transform into hybrid criminal/terror entities and partner with criminal syndicates, the threat to the United States and other nations rises in complexity, demanding a highly flexible, tailored response. Law enforcement and intelligence officials will have to be more agile and adaptable in responding to the amorphous tactics adopted by terrorist groups.31 In a similar analysis, Tamara Makarenko proposed a model for explaining the contemporary security threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC), a model she calls the crime-terror continuum. She suggests that there are seven different relationships between terrorists and TOC, from strategic cooperation to complete integration of motivations. The continuum establishes that the traditional differences assumed between terrorist and TOC are no longer valid; rather, it has become difficult to distinguish between ideological/terrorist and criminal motivations. In fact, based on her research, Makarenko suggests that there is a point where a single entity could have both criminal and terrorist characteristics: this is called “convergence.”32 One example of this convergence, according to Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, is seen among members of al Qaeda who are involved in Afghanistan’s opium trade, particularly in the form of protecting heroin laboratories and trafficking caravans.33 However, while there is some debate over just how deeply al Qaeda is engaged in drug trafficking, it is widely agreed that its ideological partners in the Taliban draw a great deal of revenues from this activity. In fact, Mirwais Yasini, the head of Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics Directorate, estimates that the Taliban and its allies derived more than $150 million from drugs in 2003—nearly 2 years after being driven from power by coalition forces.34 According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, understanding and responding to the intersection of terrorism and the global drug trade is an increasingly critical aspect of any counterterrorism strategy. Her analysis of the Taliban, the Peruvian insurgent group Sendero Luminoso, and the Colombian insurgent group FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) reveals how drug cartels have used terror to protect their profits, while

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the demand for (and cultivation of) drugs supports terrorism. Specifically, terrorist groups derive three sets of gains from their involvement with the illicit economy: increased physical capabilities (money and weapons); increased freedom of action (the ability to optimize tactics and strategies); and increased political capital (legitimacy, relationship with the local population, the willingness of the local population to withhold intelligence on the terrorist organization from the government, and the willingness to provide intelligence about government units to the terrorist organization). In essence, as long as a global drug trade exists—in which there is high consumer demand and lucrative rewards for production and trafficking— terrorist groups will continue to profit from this trade, and can be expected to commit violent acts in order to protect these profits.35 As described earlier in this chapter, both criminal organizations and terrorist networks are prominently found in weak or failing states. Thus it is unsurprising to find that these states play a key role in the global trade in drugs and weapons, which is facilitated by critical security vulnerabilities—porous borders, corruption, inadequate law enforcement, and an environment of extreme scarcity in which any means to make a profit is seen as better than none. The global proliferation of weapons is a particularly worrisome aspect of the contemporary global security environment. As Peter Singer recently observed, “individuals and small groups can now easily purchase and wield relatively massive amounts of power.”36 Indeed, the number of small arms throughout Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia has been growing for decades, in part due to the various struggles for independence that have taken place within each of these regions. When hostilities ended, many of these weapons were left in the hands of civilians or in arms caches whose locations were forgotten or deliberately not identified so that they could be reused in any possible future conflict.37 In many of the weak or failing states described earlier in this chapter, small arms are the main weapons used in armed robberies, intra- and intercommunal feuds, local wars, armed insurrections, armed rebel activities, and terrorism.38 They are also used to facilitate drug trafficking, smuggling, and other such crimes. Small arms and light weapons are used to grossly violate human rights, to facilitate the practice of bad governance, to subvert constitutions, to carry out coup d’´etats, and to create and maintain a general state of fear, insecurity, and instability.39 The ensuing culture of violence and lawlessness that is spawned by the use of these weapons hinders economic, political, and social development and frustrates efforts to reconstruct societies afflicted by conflicts.40 Interstate conflict and internal insurgencies—fueled by the spread of small arms— destroy the physical and human resources needed for an economy to grow. Armed groups systematically block or damage transit routes, disrupt natural resource development or divert it for their own use, and

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attack key national industries as part of their combat strategy. Longstanding conflicts also divert human and economic resources away from agriculture, education, industry, and other constructive activities.41 Recognizing the severity of this challenge, the United Nations has become increasingly involved in trying to stem the flow of small arms and light weapons.42 Recent attempts have focused mainly on border security, with some success. For example, the Nigerian Customs Service reported that it had intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than US$30 million at border posts in a 6-month period in 2003. In a single haul in November 2003, it took in a consignment of 170,000 rounds of ammunition.43 However, the challenges of stemming the flow of weapons is much larger than mere border security: for example, the companies and countries from which these weapons originate must be pressured to avoid exacerbating global insecurity for short-term profit. Overall, there are a variety of criminal and economic conditions which facilitate an environment conducive for terrorist recruitment, training, and operations. But while criminals are (and terrorists can be) motivated by a variety of economic concerns, many scholars have argued that the primary motivating force behind a good portion of the global terrorist threat is rooted in radical ideologies that justify (in the minds of a group’s members) the use of violence in the pursuit of their vision of the future. The intersection of beliefs and ideologies, the media, and global communications technologies is thus an especially important arena for analysis and policymaking in countering terrorism and insurgency. THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY, THE MEDIA, AND TECHNOLOGY As described in Volume 1, political ideologies have played a prominent role in rationalizing violence throughout the history of revolutionary movements and terrorism. According to Leonard Weinberg, both leftand right-wing ideologies have furnished small terrorist bands and their members with an exaggerated sense of their own importance, which led them to commit dramatic acts of violence in order to make their objectives known to wide audiences. Further, these ideologies have offered groups a perceived pathway to power, through which terrorism was meant to raise the level of awareness and trigger a violent uprising, from proletarian insurrection to racial holy war, by a vast pool of supporters previously too victimized to act on their own.44 The source of this victimization, according to many of these ideologies, is government oppression. Indeed, as described earlier in this chapter, many of today’s terrorist groups have formed in response to an authoritarian or repressive regime, hence the heavy focus on democratization that is found in the current U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. Ultimately, as President Bush proclaimed in his 2006 State of the Union

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Combating the Sources and Facilitators

speech, “the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change.”45 The rationale behind this approach, he argues, is that democracies “replace resentment with hope, respect the rights of their citizens and their neighbors, and join the fight against terror. Every step toward freedom in the world makes our country safer, so we will act boldly in freedom’s cause.”46 Certainly, democracy (or lack thereof) is an important element of the current global environment in which terrorism breeds. However, a strategy built on the idea that democratization will solve the terrorism problem is incomplete at best, especially since our primary adversary’s ideology (i.e., that of al Qaeda) is focused on issues of justice and divine influence, not civil liberties or personal freedoms. For adherents of this ideology, the core tenets of Islam are seen to provide a more effective means for the type of justice envisioned by the likes of bin Laden, al-Zawahri, and alZarqawi. According to Maha Azzam, the rise of militant political Islam is rooted in the global spread of Wahhabism—an interpretation of Islam which places its doctrinal emphasis on the absolute unity of God and a return to the pure and orthodox teachings of Islam according to the Koran.47 Islamist extremists breed on the politics and policies that are perceived by them as detrimental to Muslim interests, and which have remained unaltered for generations. A growing number among them believe they can influence this situation through a strategy of terror. Adherents of Wahhabism, with its anti-Jewish and anti-Christian overtones, have pressured their government leaders (for example, in Saudi Arabia) to maintain a puritanical and strict attitude toward any form of liberalization in either the social or political arenas, and they have been responsible for numerous acts of terrorism in pursuit of their ideological goals. Further, Wahhabism has played an essential role in the recruitment and training of members of al Qaeda because it frames the beliefs and values of the organization’s leaders, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri.48 Central to the ideology of radical Islamic fundamentalism is the concept of “jihad.” According to Jarret Brachman, there are differing interpretations of this term, but it is widely used in reference to the struggle to defend religious ideals against destructive forces. For others, jihad refers to a command by God to all Muslims to fight against the aggressors who seek to corrupt Islam—embodied and globally perpetuated by the West. Jihad has served as a rallying cry for those who see themselves suffering under the draconian policies of governments; for those in a struggle with corrupt imperial overlords for the right to establish a national homeland; and for those who see themselves fighting to stave off advanced stages of cultural corruption. Muslims both volunteered and were recruited from around the world to aid Osama bin Laden and the mujahideen in Afghanistan, and were united under the call of jihad

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against foreign (Soviet) aggressors.49 Clearly, while jihad remains a contested term, it does hold deep and powerful religious significance within Islam. Therefore, Brachman argues, whoever is able to wield the reigns of its meaning will have great power in drawing new recruits into that ideological abyss.50 While Islamic radicalism receives a great deal of attention in the contemporary global security debate, it is just one of many religious ideologies of concern to serious scholars of terrorism studies. A recent study by J.P. Larsson helps illuminate the role of ideology in the recruitment of individuals by particularly violent religious groups. His analysis begins by explaining how many young people are “seekers” who are trying to find their own answers of how to make sense of the world around them. Religious ideologies, he argues, are often able to explain the state of the world, and in particular why believers are continuously persecuted, oppressed, or discriminated; further, they can also explain how and why violence may be condoned and necessary. Several dimensions of these ideologies are important to consider when examining terrorist recruitment: first, these ideologies are often theologically supremacist—meaning that all believers assume superiority over nonbelievers, who are not privy to the truth of the religion. Second, most are exclusivist—believers are a chosen people, or their territory is a holy land. Third, many are absolutist—it is not possible to be a halfhearted believer, and you are either totally within the system, or totally without it. Further, only the true believers are guaranteed salvation and victory, whereas the enemies and the unbelievers—as well as those who have taken no stance whatsoever—are condemned to some sort of eternal punishment or damnation, as well as death. Overall, religious ideologies help foster polarizing values in terms of right and wrong, good and evil, light and dark—values which can be co-opted by terrorist organizations to convert a “seeker” into a lethal killer.51 This religious-based “us-versus-them” mentality is not exclusive to militant Islamists. In fact, similar ideological elements are found among members of Christian militia groups in the United States, according to a recent study by Cindy Combs, Elizabeth Combs, and Lydia Marsh. Their analysis illuminates three important aspects of the relationship that continue to shape the training of the Christian militia today: the Biblically based theology that seeks to rationalize the preparation for violence by members of militia groups; a fervent belief in the Bill of Rights, particularly the right to bear arms and the right to generate an “unorganized militia”; and a commitment to a loose, virtually leaderless membership structure, with members trained to act alone or in small groups to “take back” the government, through force if necessary. They note how members of militia groups are often well trained in the use of arms and explosives, and some are adept at guerrilla-warfare techniques. Among their conclusions, the authors note that Christian militia groups in the United

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States—while not directly responsible for the actions of their members (like Timothy McVeigh’s April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City52 )—may offer social and psychological support that will enable individuals to carry out lethal acts on their own. James Aho has also highlighted the polarizing nature of extreme ideology in his research on the Christian Fundamentalist movement in the United States, in which religiously oriented extremists engage in violent activities, from cross-burning to bank robberies and targeted assassinations, while believing that they are “God’s battle axe and weapons of war.”53 Similarly polarizing values are also prominent in the Jewish extremist ideology known as Zionsim, according to Allan Brownfeld. Adherents of this ideology, nurtured within Israel’s far-right religious institutions, have been responsible for several prominent acts of violence—including the assassination of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995, by Yigal Amir, an ultraorthodox religious zealot. Brownfeld notes that religious Zionists have adopted the notion that God demands not so much devotion to the Torah as to the land that Israel’s army has conquered, and this emphasis on land—particularly the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—has underscored an extremist view toward any attempt at negotiating peace agreements with the Palestinians. He concludes by arguing that Zionist terrorism is an effort by a militant minority to impose itself upon an unwilling majority, yet because the majority has been hesitant to identify and isolate such extremists, their influence has been far out of proportion to their numbers. Operating under the cover of religion has been useful in expanding their following and muting criticism. Thus, if Israel and its neighbors are to move in the direction of a lasting peace, he argues, the majority of Israelis—particularly Israel’s mainstream religious institutions—must act to neutralize those voices that have distorted Judaism’s moral mandate and replaced it with worship of physical territory.54 In addition to issues of religion, radical militant ideologies may also seek to convince audiences of broad injustices, political or social grievances, and other secular issues which in their eyes justify the use of violence. For example, as Paul Pillar recently illustrated, a superpower’s foreign policies can engender resentment on the part of certain aggrieved populations, and particularly by members of the Muslim world. U.S. policies that Muslims perceive as being on the wrong side of a conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims are resented both for the policy itself and for the U.S. motives that they are deemed to demonstrate. A second attribute that makes certain U.S. policies more likely than others to evoke resentment is that they play to other negative stereotypes or preconceptions about the United States. A third ingredient of a policy particularly suited for incurring resentment is in its potential for vivid events that by their very nature may carry emotional impact—especially people dying and suffering as a result of military action in a predominantly Muslim

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country. From his analysis, it is clear that public diplomacy has an important role to play in shaping perceptions abroad of the United States and its policies.55 Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr describe such efforts using the term “strategic influence,” and borrow from social and cognitive psychology studies to suggest how the environment in which public diplomacy is conducted, along with the methods used, are essential to the success of any effort. At the same time, an ineffective strategic influence campaign can be counterproductive, and may lead a population to distrust (and even grow in animosity) toward the entity conducting the campaign.56 In his analysis of these challenges, Hassan Abbas argues that the global war of ideas and the battle for the “hearts and minds” of Muslims is only beginning. He draws on analyses of U.S. public diplomacy in Pakistan and Iran to illuminate lessons learned for consideration—for example, he notes, “closing the channels of communication and dialogue has never proved to be a productive measure.”57 His recommendations for U.S. policymakers include acknowledging past mistakes; understanding the limitations of public diplomacy; employing efficient feedback mechanisms to assess the impact of specific policies; establishing and encouraging forums for people-to-people interaction; framing important issues in more constructive ways than “you are either with us or against us”; and supporting reform of the education sector in Muslim countries, especially where madrasa networks are entrenched.58 The relationship between foreign policies and strategic influence (or public diplomacy) is particularly important in the areas of the world from which much of the Islamist extremist threat originates. In one of the more thoughtful analyses of this issue, West Point professor Ruth Margolies Beitler highlights how American policy toward Israel remains a particularly potent source of discontent and reverberates throughout the Arab and Muslim world. Indeed, it is commonplace in the Middle East to hear comments espousing the view that if only the United States would modify or cease its support for Israel, hatred against the United States would end. Her analysis reveals that while the United States has consistently supported Israel’s existence, it has not always supported its policies, and yet the overwhelming assessment in the Muslim and Arab world is that the United States retains little objectivity when dealing with the Israeli– Palestinian issue. In reality, whether or not the United States is evenhanded when it comes to the Arab World and Israel is almost insignificant, she argues—the key factor fostering resentment in the Middle East is the perception that the United States maintains a double standard. Thus, given the prominent role this issue has come to play in public statements of Osama bin Laden and others calling for a global jihad, it is imperative for the United States to lessen al Qaeda’s appeal to discontented populations in the Middle East by ensuring a greater balance—or perception of balance—with regard to its policies toward the Arab World.59

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In sum, U.S. foreign policies—and the perceptions of intent behind certain foreign policies—contribute to the current global conflict between liberal democracies and radical groups, some of which are resorting to violence in pursuit of their ideological objectives. A central battleground in this war of ideas (or ideologies) is the Internet. The struggle for influence taking place online between liberal democracies and extremists involves various forms of strategic communication. Members of the global salafi jihadist network use the Internet to provide motivational/ideological and operational information to potential recruits and supporters. They offer a simple, clear message to all kinds of “seekers”—join the global jihad. Further, there are multiple ways in which an individual can participate, such as providing funds, safe havens, or encouragement. The spectrum of participants can thus range from Web site designers to financiers to weapons experts and combat veterans. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies have launched a public diplomacy effort to dissuade these same individuals from supporting the terrorists’ agenda. Some observers have argued that the media—both global and local—can and should play a central role in developing and disseminating messages that effectively counter the appeal of the violent jihadist groups. As Brigitte Nacos observes, print and electronic media Sware important means to spread the terrorist “propaganda by deed” and inform, indoctrinate, and prepare some individuals for recruitment.60 Further, she notes, terrorists learn much from other terrorists through daily news reports, video clips, and Web sites. Thus, when terrorists use the media effectively, other terrorists learn from and follow their example. In 2003, a proliferation of videotaped beheadings—which began in Iraq but spread rapidly to Saudi Arabia and other parts of the world—is but one of many examples of this phenomenon of mediated terrorism.61 Cindy Combs agrees that the media provide a forum for knowledge transfer in the terrorist world, offering a “showcase” through which those carrying out terrorist acts can impress and threaten an audience, recruit and train new members, and support and coordinate an emerging network of followers.62 According to Alex Schmidt, violence polarizes and forces audiences to take part by choosing either the side of the victims or that of the terrorist. Therefore, the media provide “identification mechanisms” since “the terrorist’s invitation to identification is brought home to us by the public and the private media.”63 Combs notes that a symbiotic relationship exists between terrorists (who seek attention from an audience) and news organizations (which seek dramatic stories to increase their readership and ratings).64 Because of their unique role in the global strategic communications battlespace, the media have a unique set of opportunities and responsibilities in combating the threat of terrorism. Indeed, Combs suggests implications for better media self-regulation.65

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But self-regulation is clearly not the answer for what has become the most important conduit for the modern-day dissemination of radicalizing messages: the Internet. As Steve Coll and Susan Glasser recently observed, the Internet is playing an increasingly prominent role in the spread of al Qaeda’s ideology and the growing number of self-organized terror cells. They write that “al Qaida has become the first guerrilla movement in history to migrate from physical space to cyberspace. With laptops and DVDs, in secret hideouts and at neighborhood Internet cafes, young codewriting jihadists have sought to replicate the training, communication, planning, and preaching facilities they lost in Afghanistan with countless new locations on the Internet.”66 Uses of the Internet include training, support, and communications. Thousands of Web sites in all parts of the world reflect a growing virtual community of individuals linked indirectly through association of belief, and who celebrate al Qaeda and its ideas. In this sense of utopian ambition, the Web has become a gathering place for a rainbow coalition of jihadists.67 A recent study by Gabriel Weimann examined how terrorist organizations use the Internet to communicate with various audiences, including potential new recruits. Web sites are only one of the Internet’s services used by modern terrorism: there are other facilities on the Net—e-mail, chat rooms, e-groups, forums, virtual message boards—that are increasingly used by terrorists. Drawing on the findings of a recent study he and his colleagues conducted for the United States Institute of Peace, Weimann notes how the Internet can be used to recruit and mobilize supporters to play a more active role in support of terrorist activities or causes. In addition to seeking converts by using the full range of Web site technologies (audio, digital, video, etc.) to enhance the presentation of their message, terrorist organizations capture information about the users who browse their Web sites. He concludes that the Internet has become a more popular apparatus for early stages of recruitment and mobilization, challenging governments, security agencies, and counterterrorism services all over the world. Moreover, it also challenges the future of the Internet, since any attempt to limit or minimize the Net’s use by terrorists implies imposing restrictions on the Internet’s free flow of information, free speech, and privacy.68 Weimann also examined the terrorists’ use of the Internet as virtual training camps, providing an online forum for indoctrination as well as the distribution of terrorist manuals, instructions, and data. His book examines how terrorist organizations and their supporters maintain hundreds of Web sites, exploiting the unregulated, anonymous, and easily accessible nature of the Internet for various purposes. Clearly, it is important for us to become better informed about how terrorists use the Internet, and from this knowledge find better ways to monitor and counter their activities—particularly in terms of our strategic communications and public diplomacy efforts to counter

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the role that extremist ideologies play in radicalizing new agents of terrorism.69 Unfortunately, in an age of universal access to the means of providing information online, citizens of a liberal democracy like ours have the power to undermine these efforts, largely through ignorance and irresponsibility. This problem is particularly acute when communicating with many corners of the Muslim world, where there is no frame of reference for understanding the implications of a free and open press, or a society that enjoys the legal protection of free speech. Thus, whether the messenger is Condoleeza Rice, Howard Stern, Pat Robertson, or the 14-yearold Web blogger down the street, messages put forward online are often given equal credence in terms of representing American policy, culture, and ideas. Thus, an effective public diplomacy agenda requires a commitment to educating our own citizens for world comprehension and responsible communication, as well as motivating a grassroots campaign to develop and disseminate an effective anti-jihad message.70 CONCLUSION In sum, there are a wide variety of facilitators and sources of today’s global terrorist threat. Thus, our understanding of how to respond effectively to this threat must move beyond the application of instruments of hard and soft power discussed in Volume 1 of this publication, and address the underlying conditions which enable terrorist groups to recruit and mobilize support for their use of violence. Terrorism may thrive in places where central governments are weak, or as a response to an authoritarian regime. Criminal and economic factors play an important role in facilitating and enabling terrorist group operations, and there are many different types of ideologies that fuel political violence, although the most compelling (or dangerous) are commonly grounded in religious justifications for the use of violence. The media and the Internet play a vital role in the spread of the global “join the jihad” message, and the power of these conduits for convincing mass audiences must be harnessed to put forward a compelling “anti-jihad” message to counter the appeal of the jihadists. Clearly, we must learn how to “drain the swamp,” dry up the resource base, and tackle the motivations behind a group’s use of terrorism to achieve its objectives. This is the goal to which the chapters of this volume now contribute. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

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NOTES 1. Benjamin R. Barber, “Terrorism, Interdependence and Democracy,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 2. Michael Mousseau, “Terrorism and Export Economies: The Dark Side of Free Trade,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 3. Michael T. Klare, “Fueling the Fires: The Oil Factor in Middle Eastern Terrorism,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 4. John C. K. Daly, “Saudi Oil Facilities: Al Qaida’s Next Target?” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 4 (March 23, 2006). Available at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/ news/article.php?articleid=2369910. 5. Klare, “Fueling The Fires.” 6. Alex Braithwaite and Quan Li, “Terrorism Hot Spots and Transnational Terrorist Incidents.” Prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2004. 7. P.H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, “Digging Deep: Environment and Geography as Root Influences for Terrorism,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 8. Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Socioeconomic and Demographic Roots of Terrorism,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 9. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (London: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Daniel L. Byman, “Confronting Passive Sponsors of Terrorism.” Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Analysis Paper No. 4. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, February 2005. 14. Rohan Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya, “The Al Qaida Training Camps of Afghanistan and Beyond,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 2: Training, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 15. C.J. Chivers and David Rohde, “Turning Out Guerrillas and Terrorists to Wage a Holy War: The Jihad Files—Training the Troops,” The New York Times, March 18, 2002, A1. 16. Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign Affairs (September/ October 2003): 36–37. 17. See the Appendix of Volume 1. 18. See James J.F. Forest and Matthew V. Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006), particularly Chapters 3, 4, and 9. 19. Erica Chenoweth, “Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed States,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 20. For more on the relationship between human security and terrorism, please see Cindy R. Jebb and Madelfia A. Abb, “Human Security and Good Governance:

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A Living Systems Approach to Understanding and Combating Terrorism,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 21. Matthew A. Levitt, “Hamas Social Welfare: In the Service of Terror,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 22. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); See also, Levitt, “Hamas Social Welfare”; Matthew A. Levitt, “Hamas from Cradle to Grave,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2004); and Matthew A. Levitt, “Untangling the Terror Web: The Need for a Strategic Understanding of the Crossover between International Terrorist Groups to Successfully Prosecute the War on Terror,” Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United State Senate. Published by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Available at http://www.senate. gov/∼banking/ files/levitt.pdf. 23. Jamie Tarabay, “Islamic Militants Gain Influence through Philanthropic Work,” Associated Press, March 2, 2001. 24. Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development: Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2003). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph reports/ MR1630/index.html. 25. Liotta and Miskel, “Digging Deep.” 26. Mohammed M. Hafez, “Political Repression and Violent Rebellion in the Muslim World,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 27. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Saudi Security and the War on Terrorism: International Security Operations, Law Enforcement, Internal Threats, and the Need for Change.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2002. Available at http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/saudiwarterr030302.pdf. 28. Sherifa Zuhur, “Saudi Arabia: Islamic Threat, Political Reform, and the Global War on Terror.” Strategic Studies Institute, March 2005, 1–65. Available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm? pubID=598. 29. Chris Zambelis, “Al Qaida in the Andes: Spotlight on Colombia,” Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 7 (April 6, 2006). Available at http://jamestown.org/terrorism/ news/article.php?articleid=2369952. 30. Mark Basile, “Going to the Source: Why Al Qaida’s Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War of Terrorist Financing,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004): 169–185; See also, William F. Wechsler, “Strangling the Hydra, Targeting Al Qaida’s Finances,” in How Did This Happen? Terrorism and the New War, ed. James Hoge Jr. and Gideon Rose (New York: Public Affairs, 2001) 129– 143; and Michael Lauber, “Financing Terror: An Overview,” Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 20 (October 21, 2004). 31. Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review 26, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2004): 49–61. 32. Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: The Emerging Nexus,” in Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the AsiaPacific: Linkages to Global Terrorism, ed. Paul J. Smith (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Centre

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for Security Studies, Forthcoming). Available at http://www.ladlass.com/intel/ archives/files/Terrorism transnational crime.pdf. 33. Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy, “Drugs and the Financing of Terrorism,” Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 20 (October, 21, 2004): 27 34. Cited in Chouvy, “Drugs and the Financing of Terrorism.” 35. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 36. Peter W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security,” International Security (Winter 2001/2002): 196. 37. “African Struggle over Smuggled Weapons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (November 23, 1999). 38. West Africa Action Network on Small Arms. “Foundation Document.” Available at http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/waansa.htm. 39. Ibid. 40. Monica Juma and Aida Mengistu, The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa (New York: The Ford Foundation, 2005) 12. Also, for information on the impact of small arms and light weapons, visit the UN Development Program’s Emergency Response Division Web site, http://www.undp.org/erd/small arms.htm. 41. Small Arms Working Group, “Small Arms and Development,” briefing paper, International Action Network on Small Arms. Available at http://www.iansa. org/documents/factsheets/small arms and development.pdf. 42. For example, see the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Also, see UN General Assembly resolutions 58/58 and A/59/181. 43. Lisa Misol, “Small Arms and Conflict in West Africa,” Testimony before the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus, May 20, 2004; cited in the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, “Crime and Development in Africa,” June 2005. Available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/index.html. 44. Leonard Weinberg, “Political and Revolutionary Ideologies,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 45. George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address by the President,” January 31, 2006. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov. 46. Ibid. 47. Maha Azzam, “Political Islam: Violence and the Wahhabi Connection,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 48. Ibid. 49. Gunaratna and Acharya, “The Al Qaida Training Camps of Afghanistan and Beyond.” 50. Jarret Brachman, “Jihad Doctrine and Radical Islam,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 51. J.P. Larsson, “The Role of Religious Ideology in Terrorist Recruitment,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005).

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52. Please see the chapter on this attack by Daniel Baracskay in Volume 3 of this publication. 53. James Aho, “Christian Fundamentalism and Militia Movements in the United States,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 54. Allan C. Brownfeld, “Zionism and the Pursuit of West Bank Settlements,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 55. Paul R. Pillar, “Superpower Foreign Policies: A Source for Global Resentment,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 56. Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 2005). Available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG184/index.html. 57. Hassan Abbas, “A Failure to Communicate: American Public Diplomacy in the Islamic World,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 58. Abbas, “A Failure to Communicate.” 59. Ruth Margolies Beitler, “The Complex Relationship between Global Terrorism and U.S. Support for Israel,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 3: Root Causes, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 60. Brigitte L. Nacos, “Communication and Recruitment of Terrorists,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 61. Brigitte L. Nacos, “Mediated Terrorism: Teaching Terror through Propaganda and Publicity,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 2: Training, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 62. Cindy R. Combs, “The Media as a Showcase for Terrorism,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J.F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 63. Alex Schmid, “Terrorism and the Media: The Ethics of Publicity,” Terrorism and Political Violence 1 (1989) 539–565. 64. Combs, “The Media as a Showcase for Terrorism.” 65. Ibid. 66. Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “e-Qaida From Afghanistan to the Internet: Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base Of Operations,” Washington Post, August 7, 2005. 67. Ibid. 68. Gabriel Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,” in The Making of a Terrorist, Vol. 1: Recruitment, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2005). 69. Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Training Camps: Terrorists’ Use of the Internet,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J.F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 70. James J.F. Forest, “The Democratic Disadvantage in the Strategic Communications Battlespace,” Democracy and Security 2, no. 1 (2006), p. 73.

PART I GOVERNMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

CHAPTER 2 COMBATING STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM Daniel Byman

State sponsorship of terrorism is a complex problem that cannot easily be solved.1 Despite diplomatic protests, economic sanctions, and even military pressure, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria have supported numerous terrorist groups for decades. The Taliban persisted in its support of al Qaeda until U.S.-backed forces toppled it from power. Such persistence in the face of pressure suggests that cutting the deadly connection between states and terrorist groups is difficult at best and impossible at worst. Yet the picture is not entirely bleak. Although there are no perfect solutions, careful policymakers can design better ones and avoid many common mistakes that can make the problem of state sponsorship worse. WHAT INSTRUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE TO POLICYMAKERS? The United States and other powers usually employ several means to coerce state sponsors: political pressure, economic sanctions, and military force. As an alternative (or, more rarely, a complement), states may try to engage sponsors of terrorism. Each of these instruments has its flaws. Engagement Victims of terrorism may try to engage a sponsor, offering concessions in order to reduce the likelihood of further terrorism. Regardless of the morality of “giving in to terrorists,” such engagement is often based on a ruthless strategic judgment: by conceding on what a government may deem as a minor issue, it can free itself from the scourge of terrorism. Engagement may prove particularly attractive if the victim regime has few

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alternatives with which to press the sponsoring state, is not the victim of state sponsorship itself, or does not see the terrorism as a serious threat. For example, until 1986, France had a “sanctuary doctrine,” essentially giving terrorists considerable freedom to operate within French borders in the hopes of minimizing international terrorism on French soil. France allowed various Palestinian groups to operate as well as the Basque separatist group ETA. France also adjusted its foreign policy to win over state sponsors and their proxies. Some groups, such as the PLO, abided by the bargain and did not conduct attacks in France. Paris was also able to maintain relations with several state sponsors of terrorism.2 France suffered several problems with this approach. Most important, several groups did not keep their side of the bargain and began not only attacking in France, but attacking French targets (as opposed to U.S. or Middle Eastern ones). In addition, the accommodation with groups and sponsors created both diplomatic and political problems for Paris. Relations with victim countries, such as Spain, suffered considerably. Moreover, domestic audiences in France did not support appeasement. After 1986, France slowly began to move to suppress terrorist groups, recognizing that its efforts to engage were a failure.3 As the French experience suggests, engagement produces several problems. Naturally, the victim state and its allies are often furious at what they see as appeasement and use considerable diplomatic pressure to stop this. Moreover, appeasement is unpopular politically. Despite government efforts to downplay terrorism, European states repeatedly had to temporarily cut ties with Iran or otherwise take confrontational steps in response to public outrage over Iranian involvement in terrorism. Engagement, of course, also indicates that the government in question will indeed be blackmailed, thus encouraging additional threats or actual attacks. Not only can this encourage the particular state sponsor, but it also sends a message to all potential sponsors that using terrorists can pay off. Engagement also does not always provide protection from all terrorists. It is far more effective with a group like the PLO, which had little interest in attacking France, than it would be with an Algerian terrorist group that saw France as an enemy. Engagement is particularly difficult if the state sponsor is driven by ideology. U.S. attempts to engage the Taliban before the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were often viewed as unwanted meddling rather than as a gentle alternative to confrontation. Finally, engagement often requires painful policy choices that a state might not otherwise make. Partly in response to terrorism, Israel has engaged Syria over the Golan Heights, and India has engaged Pakistan over Kashmir. For both Jerusalem and New Delhi, the fact of negotiations— to say nothing of the possibility of ceding land or accepting limits to sovereignty—was a painful concession.

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Despite these many problems, engagement is at times necessary as long as it is part of a broader effort that involves coercive forms of pressure. Engagement, by itself, tends to make the problem of terrorism worse. However, coercion without any promise that the pressure will relent is not really coercion in the true sense: there must be an incentive to stop the support for terrorism, and the promise of engagement is thus often necessary. Political Pressure State efforts to halt support for terrorism almost always involve some form of political pressure. The U.S. state sponsor list’s “name and shame” power is one means of getting state sponsors to abandon their support for terrorism. As Edmund Hull, the former acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism contended about regimes on the list, “Most of these governments are extremely uncomfortable with the stigma that comes attached to being accused of sponsoring terrorism, and they will over time seek ways to escape that stigma.”4 Another common form of pressure is an official demarche meant to discourage a particular act in support of a terrorist group. At times, states may attempt to make a rival regime an international pariah, shunned by its neighbors and the world. After the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Mubarak in 1995, the United States worked with Sudan’s neighbors and the United Nations (UN) to isolate Khartoum, which was linked to the attackers. By itself, however, political pressure is a weak instrument. The “punishment” of a damaged reputation, the lack of diplomatic support on other issues, or even near-complete isolation usually pales before the broader strategic objectives, domestic concerns, or ideological agenda that led to the support of terrorism in the first place. Isolation may also prove ineffective or difficult to establish because of the supporting state’s importance for a host of other issues not related to terrorism. The United States, for example, has made relations with Syria a diplomatic priority because of its importance to an Arab-Israeli peace, leading to hundreds of high-level contacts during the 1990s that undermined any efforts to isolate Damascus. Iran, a major player in a vital region, is similarly hard to shun, as many European powers and Japan see it as a major trade and investment opportunity and have felt that its critical geostrategic position made engagement a better option. Libya and Cuba, in contrast, were far easier to isolate, as they lack the strategic or economic importance of other sponsors. Other states also have different threat perceptions, making it harder to present a unified front to a state sponsor. Iran and Hizbollah,5 for example, pose little threat today to the interests of most western European states. As a result, U.S. calls for these countries to press Tehran often fall on deaf ears.

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In addition, many states favor dialogue and engagement over political pressure, believing this is the best way to moderate a hostile regime. Despite these many limits, political isolation offers several advantages for policymakers over other options. Most important, it is low cost: it demands few sacrifices and carries few risks. In addition, political isolation is almost always part and parcel of a larger coercive campaign involving economic and military measures. Political pressure can be seen as a first step, or a reinforcing measure, for other forms of coercion. Former Secretary of State George Shultz, for example, argued that “Diplomacy could work these problems [those related to terrorism] most effectively when force—or the threat of force —was a credible part of the equation.”6 Even if the use of massive military force is contemplated, political pressure must be used to signal the adversary as to what is desired. Moreover, obtaining multilateral support for these measures often makes them far more effective. Economic Pressure Economic pressure is another common means of trying to persuade sponsors to stop supporting terrorism. States can limit trade, withdraw investment, punish foreign companies, and otherwise use economic means to convince other countries not to support terrorism. Many of the penalties linked to the U.S. list of state sponsors, for example, involve restrictions such as bans on critical technologies and U.S. foreign assistance, including U.S. opposition to support at international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Perhaps wrongly, such pressure is often seen by the public and policymakers as a middle ground between an empty demarche and a full-scale invasion in terms of coercive power. Economic pressure can be unilateral, multilateral, or, more rarely, comprehensive. Unilateral sanctions are the most common and are often initiated by the stronger, victim state. India has restricted trade with Pakistan, but few other countries have followed New Delhi’s lead. The United States has long had a variety of sanctions on Iran, but it has had little success in persuading other countries to go along. Indeed, some countries have rushed in to fill the economic void created by a lack of a U.S. presence. At times, the United States has orchestrated multilateral sanctions, working with several allies to limit investment, the sale of arms, or other forms of economic punishment. After Iran took 66 Americans hostage in 1979, for example, most Western European countries joined the United States and imposed a range of economic penalties (most of which were far stronger on paper than in practice) on the clerical regime. More rarely, near-universal sanctions have been imposed. Examples of near-universal

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sanctions related to terrorism are the 1996 UN Security Council resolution that imposed limited punishments on Sudan because of its support for radical groups and the 1992–1993 sanctions placed on Libya for its noncooperation with the Pan Am 103 bombing investigation. In theory, governments may back down in the face of economic pressure, fearing that the loss of trade or other benefits would hurt tourism, hinder economic growth, prevent a military rearmament, or otherwise harm objectives not related to terrorism. This logic suggests that the economic costs to a regime (i.e., how much money would it lose) and its vulnerability (i.e., whether it can replace the lost trade or investment) would be key concerns.7 Such a decision is strictly a cost-benefit calculation: sanctions work when the strategic, ideological, or domestic rewards of backing a terrorist group are outweighed by the economic pain outsiders inflict. Economic pressure may also affect elite or popular support for a regime, another theoretical potential point of leverage. A regime that fails to deliver economically might be voted out of power or lose the support of key interest groups keeping it in power. A travel ban, for example, undermines one of the prerequisites of wealth and power. Leaders and other elites are not given a place on the world stage and worse, for some, no spot on the Riviera. Some policymakers have even argued that sanctions will foster widespread popular unrest due to economic problems. The unrest, in turn, will either compel the regime to make concessions or possibly even lead to its collapse. Sanctions, however, have several profound limits on their effectiveness. Studies of sanctions have determined that, in general, they succeeded only 17 percent of the time when imposed unilaterally and only slightly more when imposed multilaterally.8 What explains this dismal success rate? The biggest problem for coercers is that it is difficult to use sanctions to increase the level of pain sufficiently to affect a hostile regime’s decision making. Most state sponsors of terrorism are autocratic regimes and, as such, are less sensitive to the needs of their population than are democracies. The people may grumble, but the ruler can safely ignore them. Popular revolutions have never occurred in response to sanctions.9 Indeed, one widely noted effect of sanctions is that they backfire politically, and adversary leaders are able to use them to increase their hold on power. Sanctions, by cutting off trade and other channels outside the formal state apparatus, often increase a regime’s ability to channel goods to its favorites and weaken potential rivals. Sanctions’ poor success rate is also explained in part because they are often imposed unilaterally, a less effective form of pressure. Gaining multilateral support, however, is often exceptionally difficult. The United States has long tried to convince European states and Japan to back its attempts to sanction Iran with little success. As with political isolation, other states

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may not forego the lost trade and investment opportunities, either because they do not share the same sense of threat as the victim state or because of the state sponsor’s political and economic importance on issues not related to terrorism.10 At other times, they may genuinely believe that sanctions would only backfire and make the supporting regime more hostile or create a humanitarian disaster. The result is often a weak compromise: multilateral sanctions whose breadth and bite are limited. The UN-mandated sanctions on Libya and Sudan, for example, were limited in scope. For Sudan, they focused primarily on restricting travel and reducing official contact with Khartoum. Libya, too, was isolated through sanctions, and it faced additional punishments such as having its assets frozen and restrictions on Libya’s purchases of oil and gas equipment. Sanctions are particularly ineffective when a regime is motivated by ideological reasons. Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran famously scorned the importance of economics, declaring that the Islamic revolution was not about “the price of watermelons.” The Taliban also cared little about the material well-being of ordinary Afghans in comparison to what they saw as their religious duty to support a range of radical groups, including al Qaeda. Limits to economic growth is a price such regimes often willingly pay. Not until Khomeini died did economic growth become a priority for the regime in Tehran, and thus only then did it become sensitive to economic punishments and incentives regarding its support for terrorism. Unsuccessful sanctions do not always simply fail: they can backfire and make a regime more intractable. In Iran, the clerical regime has used sanctions to persuade its people that the United States is hostile to Iran and seeks to destroy the regime there. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein’s regime used the comprehensive sanctions to punish parts of the population that did not support his rule. Thus, sanctions can at times increase the supporting regime’s popularity, weaken the opposition to it, and raise the overall level of hostility directed at the coercer. The humanitarian impact of sanctions is another major drawback, both due to the inherent suffering they cause among innocents and because this suffering makes it harder to sustain them. Sanctions on Iraq, for example, were roundly condemned as doing little to shake the Baath regime while devastating innocent Iraqis. Death tolls of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians were widely reported, including, famously, a flawed UNICEF report that claimed that sanctions killed 500,000 Iraqi children.11 John and Karl Mueller lambasted the humanitarian effects of sanctions as “Sanctions of Mass Destruction.”12 Even if these critics overstated the humanitarian impact of sanctions or wrongly pinned responsibility for the suffering on the United States, the sanctions proved a political disaster for Washington. Much of the world saw the United States as deliberately supporting a policy that killed hundreds of thousands of children while doing

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nothing to harm Saddam’s regime—a perception that tarnished America’s image worldwide. The Use of Force When political and economic pressure does not lead to promising results, states often use their military forces to respond to terrorism. At the most extreme levels, this may involve invading another country and trying to change its government by force. A recent example is the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, where the United States worked with local Afghan allies to overthrow the ruling Taliban because of its support for al Qaeda. (The United States also invaded Iraq in 2003, with Iraq’s support for terrorism frequently stated as a reason for the attack—a rationale that before the war was strained and afterward seems ever weaker.13 ) Far more common are limited uses of force to punish a regime for supporting terrorism and, ideally, deter it from backing future attacks. The United States bombed Libya in 1986 because of Libya’s use of terrorism; in 1993, the United States struck Iraq in response to its attempted assassination of former President George H.W. Bush; and in 1998, the United States attacked Afghanistan and Sudan after al Qaeda bombed U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The United States, of course, is not the only country that uses force in response to terrorism. Iran repeatedly struck at MEK bases in Iraq, and Egypt sought to attack Sudan in 1995 after Sudanese-based Egyptian terrorists tried to kill President Mubarak in Ethiopia. Turkey used the threat of invasion to compel Syria to end its backing of the PKK. India has long threatened military retaliation for Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri groups. Most prominently, Israel has conducted military strikes at various points in its history against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia either at Palestinian targets directly or against regime targets in order to dissuade them from backing various Palestinian groups. In these attacks, the coercing governments usually tried to focus on the terrorist group itself or on targets related to its activities—a problematic set of targets. Thus, in 1998, the United States bombed an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, while Israel’s attack in Tunisia focused on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters there. The reasons for these limits are simple. Military strikes on terrorists based in a sympathetic country face many difficulties. In contrast to conventional militaries, terrorist groups themselves have few assets worth bombing. The “infrastructure” of supporting terrorism is often not destroyable through bombing: training camps are rudimentary, and the weapons systems involved are small and easy to replace. Terrorists themselves can easily disperse, making them difficult to strike—especially by air strikes or other “standoff” means. Even worse, terrorists often melt back into the civilian population,

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increasing the likelihood of significant civilian casualties. Many terrorists are also part of a broader insurgent movement. As such, it is relatively easy for the group to replace the cadre lost in a limited military strike with other dedicated recruits. Military force in limited quantities seldom affects a regime’s ability or willingness to support terrorism and often makes the problem worse.14 Strikes may harden the supporting regime’s attitudes for several reasons. Capitulation in the aftermath of a military attack would be a grievous political blow to most governments. For the Taliban to have surrendered Osama bin Laden after the 1998 U.S. strikes on Afghanistan, for example, would demonstrate that the movement was abandoning the tradition of Pashtun hospitality for an honored guest. More generally, it would have demonstrated to a highly nationalistic people that the regime caved in the face of outside pressure. Military strikes may even increase the popularity of a group, making it more attractive as a partner. For example, many Israeli attacks on Lebanon actually increased support for Hizbollah. The devastation caused by the Israeli attacks made the group’s claim that it was only defending Lebanon from an invader more credible. Military strikes often have little support abroad. Because the terrorist attacks often inflict relatively few casualties, military force is often viewed as a disproportionate response. In addition, the military strikes are often seen as destabilizing and thus jeopardizing a host of other strategic and economic interests. States and terrorists can also retaliate in response to military attacks, further decreasing international support for the attacks and often leading decision makers to avoid the use of force in the first place. When Israel attacked several targets in Lebanon, Hizbollah shelled Israeli settlements near the borders. The 1986 U.S. air strike on Libya led to the Pan Am 103 bombing as well as a host of smaller attacks. LESSONS FOR COERCERS States can be coerced into halting or reducing their support for terrorists, but the process is arduous and lengthy. Although there are no simple steps that can guarantee that a state will cease its support for terrorism, there are several guidelines that coercing states should recognize when seeking to halt the sponsorship of terrorism or, more realistically, to reduce it. Understanding the Adversary The first set of lessons involves understanding the nature of the adversary. Both support for terrorism and efforts to stop it are embedded issues, part of a regime’s overall political trajectory. Revolutionary Iran and the

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Taliban’s Afghanistan backed other radical groups as part of their overall efforts to spread their interpretation of Islam, a goal that was apparent in their domestic as well as foreign policy. However, if it is possible to reintegrate the state so it seeks the goodwill of the international community, counterterrorism pressure is more likely to succeed. It is no coincidence that Libya began talks regarding ending its support for terrorism at the same time that it proposed giving up its weapons of mass destruction programs—both stood as obstacles to the regime’s reacceptance as part of a “normal” member of the international community. Undifferentiated pressure almost always fails. The motivations of the supporting state, the type of support provided, and the dynamic of the group it supports all will affect whether coercion succeeds or fails. Nor can pressure be divorced from the broader strategic context. What worked to turn Libya away from terrorism in the 1990s would probably have failed in the 1970s, when the regime was more ideological and faced fewer problems at home. Efforts to halt sponsorship must recognize, and ideally capitalize on, the reasons why sponsors support terrorism. For example, Pakistan’s support for militants in Kashmir is largely (though not entirely) driven by a strategic ambition to gain what Islamabad believes to be its lost territory and to weaken India. During the Kargil crisis, the U.S. threat to realign strategically with New Delhi if Pakistan did not withdraw its forces thus had a tremendous impact. Economic sanctions that increased Pakistan’s economic pain for much of the 1990s, in contrast, were far less effective. The domestic importance of the Kashmir issue, moreover, made it impossible for Musharraf to completely cut off support, placing limits on any progress. Because ideological regimes are so difficult to coerce through the imposition of standard costs or persuade by offering common benefits, it is often necessary for the revolution to wane before these regimes agree to abandon terrorism. Over time, the fervor of all revolutions decreases. Charisma is “routinized” and the petty corruption and ambitions that characterize most politics eventually overcome the initial ardor for a cause. Revolutionary behavior also is punished by other states, which try to weaken, undermine, and contain those that threat their power and position. Iran today is often described as “post-revolutionary,” and Sudan is far less radical. Qaddafi too has abandoned his revolutionary pretensions. All three have reduced their support for terrorism. This process, however, takes years if not decades. In essence, the best policy when confronting an ideological regime may be a form of containment.15 That is to say, coercers should try to limit the spread of the revolutionary ideology by building up vulnerable states, both politically and militarily. Reducing their vulnerability to terrorism may require bolstering the victim states’ intelligence services, helping

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reduce government corruption, targeting regime largesse to groups or areas most susceptible to the terrorists’ appeal, or otherwise reducing opportunities for radicals to exploit. A Way Out . . . Conditionally One reason states often support terrorism is they have few if any other options for achieving their strategic ambitions. Demanding that a state end its support for terrorism thus involves far more than the state jettisoning a small group of unsavory thugs. In reality, the coercer is asking the supporting state to abandon a strategic objective or a vital domestic concern. Pushing Syria to unconditionally end its support for Hizbollah and Palestinian rejectionists would leave Damascus with few effective means of pressing Israel on the Golan Heights and other disputes and would leave it vulnerable to charges of selling out at home. If Pakistan abandoned Kashmiri militants, its rival India would emerge far stronger. Providing state sponsors with a diplomatic way out thus may make the path to halting sponsorship easier. The promise of negotiations can offer states another means of achieving their objective that does not require terrorism. This approach was the U.S. “answer” to the problem of Syrian terrorism: by forging a Syrian–Israeli peace, Syria would achieve its objectives at the bargaining table rather than through the use of terrorism. Once again, however, this diplomatic “out” may easily backfire. If they are not careful, outside powers are rewarding the use of terrorism, suggesting to other states that its use pays off diplomatically. Moreover, the supporting state has an incentive to encourage terrorists to step up its activities when talks stall or when it deems the concessions insufficient, at times increasing the incidence of terrorism. Their motives are not linked to the benefits that the victim state or others can provide—often their own politics must change before progress can be made. If a way out is offered, it must be balanced with strong coercive leverage, ensuring that the state in question does not see support for terrorism as beneficial on the whole. Engagement is at times necessary, but its costs can be considerable if it is unconditional. States must not only recognize there is a penalty for continuing to support a terrorist group, but also that support for terrorism in general is foolish and can only backfire. The U.S. handling of Libya represents an almost perfect balance of coercion and engagement. Without the constant U.S.-led campaign, Qaddafi would have not come to the bargaining table. But without the promise of relief, he would never have made concessions. Setting Priorities Too often, the United States makes counterterrorism one goal of many, failing to set priorities. When pressing the Taliban in the 1990s, narcotics

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trafficking, human rights, and ending the civil war often took precedence over counterterrorism. Libya is again instructive. When beginning talks with Libya, in contrast, the U.S. agenda was appropriately limited. The United States did not press Qaddafi on human rights, elections, or other internal issues despite Libya’s dismal record on these scores. Washington initially even held back on Libya’s offer to end its weapons of mass destruction program, recognizing that terrorism should be the top priority. Counterterrorism, of course, should not always be the top priority. For U.S. relations with North Korea, counterproliferation is a far more important goal, and any lingering concerns about Pyongyang’s involvement in terrorism should be subordinate to this objective. The key is not always to make counterterrorism a top priority, but rather to have priorities. Even with regard to a state’s consistent support for terrorism, establishing “red lines” and other priorities is essential. Mass casualty attacks, of course, are of far more concern than less deadly violence. A clear priority should be preventing a state’s transfer of weapons of mass destruction (particularly any material for nuclear weapons or viral biological agents) to a terrorist group. Various WMD-armed states have so far refrained from such transfers, probably because they fear escalation from potential victims. Reinforcing such a concern among all potential proliferators is vital. Enemies versus Terrorists One obvious step is to reform the process of designating state sponsors of terrorism. Currently, U.S. definitions of terrorism conflate the difference between attacks on combatants and attacks on noncombatants rather than highlight it. It is ironic that the majority of the states on the U.S. State Department sponsorship list have only minimal involvement in terrorism today. Cuba and North Korea had long ago ceased to support terrorist groups in any meaningful way. Sudan and Libya, both of which were at times major sponsors of terrorism, have also largely ended their support for terrorist groups. Unfortunately, by lumping them in the same category as Syria and Iran (and by excluding such egregious sponsors as Pakistan), any “name and shame” power of the list is reduced. In addition, the penalties that go with the sponsorship status remain considerable, making it hard to offer incentives for states that are moving in the right direction already. Politics now dominates policy. Those seeking change must recognize the political risks they run as they try to create more coherent definitions and categories. Changing the listing of who is a sponsor and what constitutes terrorism, for example, would be criticized as legitimating Castro’s noxious regime in Cuba or attacks on U.S. or other soldiers. Continuing the current set of definitions, however, reduces the potency of U.S.

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political measures such as the state sponsorship list and gives terrorist groups few incentives to avoid attacks on true noncombatants. Ideally, there would be more than a simplistic black or white categorization—in other words, each year states would be placed somewhere along a spectrum between “sponsor” and “non-sponsor” as an indication of progress from one to the other. In addition, the sponsorship list would be focused on terrorism, not on broader U.S. concerns about a rogue regime. Changing the Rules of the Game The international community can make several changes in how it responds to state support that would make coercion more likely to succeed. One change is to end the fiction of deniability. Pakistan’s links to Kashmiri militants, the Taliban’s connections with al Qaeda, Iran and Syria’s ties to Hizbollah, and other relations between states and major terrorist groups are usually well known and often publicized by the supporting state itself. Nevertheless, there is often a Talmudic debate over responsibility for a particular attack. For example, former National Security Advisor Samuel (“Sandy”) Berger noted about the Khobar attack that, “We know it was done by the Saudi Hizbollah. We know that they were trained in Iran by Iranians. We know there was Iranian involvement. What has yet to be established is how substantial the Iranian involvement was.”16 Such hair-splitting gives a sponsor an incentive to offer sanctuary and logistical support to a group while avoiding a direct role in the final decision to strike a particular target. Instead, the burden should be on the accused state to demonstrate it has worked against the terrorist group and did not support its operations in any way, no matter how indirect. Another fiction serving state sponsors is the respect given to sovereignty in cases where it is not exercised. Syria hid behind Lebanon, and Pakistan hid behind Afghanistan, using these ostensibly sovereign states for their own ends. Again, even though their dominance of these countries is (or was) widely recognized, they were able to exploit the narrow rules of the system to avoid responsibility for their actions. A related change is for the international community to lower the bar on legitimate escalation on state sponsors. If states believe that only massive terrorist attacks will provoke international backing for a response, they have fewer reasons to withhold support. On the other hand, if the victim state believes that international support for a response would be forthcoming, it is far more likely to take advantage of its conventional military superiority. The October 2003 Israeli attack on Syria, which has long sponsored a range of rejectionist groups against Israel, was roundly condemned in Europe as escalation, while Syria’s continued backing of violent groups was taken in stride.

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The Effectiveness of Multilateralism When possible, pressure should be multilateral. Multilateral policies have many problems: they are cumbersome, require concessions to allies, and at times lead to a lowest common denominator effect.17 These problems make it difficult to increase pressure on state sponsors. Despite these weaknesses, gaining the support of allies often means the difference between success and failure. In large part, multilateral support for coercing a state sponsor limits sponsors’ options, both in terms of avoiding pressure and with regard to its other objectives. In short, they have no “plan of victory” that enables them to achieve their goals. U.S. unilateral efforts for years had failed to move Tripoli. UN sanctions and international isolation of Libya after the Lockerbie and Air France bombings, however, gave Qaddafi few options for gaining much needed foreign investment or for playing the leading role he sought to play in the Arab and broader world.

Reducing Passive Support State sponsorship goes beyond actively arming and training terrorist groups. For some groups, particularly jihadist ones, state inaction is often vital. Governments that do not crack down on terrorist fundraising, recruitment, and transit are vital for anti-U.S. jihadists today. Reducing such passive support can transform the struggle against nonstate actors like al Qaeda. If al Qaeda were hounded wherever it tried to set up shop, it would be far harder for the organization to recruit, train, raise money, purchase weapons, protect its leadership, and otherwise survive and prosper. Ironically, the key to success against these nonstate actors lies in engaging or coercing their inadvertent hosts to move against them—and helping them gain the capacity to do so. Imposing new or increasing existing costs is a time-honored tactic in diplomacy. In general, however, such threats must be part of a broader effort or else they cease to be meaningful. The United States, for example, did not make stopping support for jihadist causes a priority in the U.S.– Saudi relationship, giving Riyadh few additional incentives to crack down on this activity. Once this became a priority, simple embarrassment proved effective to lessen passive support. The spotlight held on Saudi Arabia after September 11 humiliated the Al Saud regime, making them scramble to at least appear cooperative. Another key is to diminish popular support for the terrorist group, as many regimes hesitate to clamp down if the terrorists are seen as Robin Hoods. Efforts to play up the terrorist group’s missteps and atrocities should be done at the popular level as well as at the governmental level. Propaganda campaigns are notoriously difficult, however, and U.S. efforts

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to demonize al Qaeda have conspicuously failed. Working indirectly to diminish support may be essential. Given the deep unpopularity of the United States in Saudi Arabia, U.S. efforts to diminish al Qaeda’s luster may only burnish it. It would be more effective if respected Muslim authorities would criticize the organization, as these voices have credibility with the key audiences. Bolstering capacity so governments have the power to crush terrorists is a more straightforward task. This can range from technical assistance, such as helping improve databases or information systems that track terrorists and their activities to advice on intelligence reorganization and legal reform. Training can be particularly important, as many skills related to shutting down passive support—such as financial tracking—are relatively rare in government circles, particularly in the developing world. Money can also be provided to boost the size and skills of security and intelligence services. Many regimes in the developing world, however, have only a limited capacity to absorb U.S. or other outside assistance meant to shore up their ability to fight terrorism. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the myriad new programs the Kingdom has introduced in cooperation with the United States suffer from a lack of skilled and experienced personnel. As a result, even the most dramatic turnaround in the regime’s intentions to crush terrorism will produce only modest results for many years. Realistic Expectations Coercing state sponsors is difficult even during the best of times, and success requires anticipating problems and recognizing the possibility of failure. Even modest progress can take years. Libya, for example, suffered unilateral sanctions, a direct military strike, and finally broad (if limited) UN-mandated sanctions before agreeing to end its support for terrorism— a process that took years. Power shifts that led to the purging of ideologues were necessary for Iran to reduce, and Sudan to end, their support for terrorism, and in Tehran’s case the level of activity still remains high. In part, the significant amount of time necessary for success stems from the very nature of coercion. Most forms of coercive pressure will initially strengthen a regime, producing a rally “round the flag” effect.18 The punishment inflicted, in contrast, may take years to sink in. Coercing states must also be wary of limited uses of force. Often, such gestures are politically necessary, fulfilling a desire to “do something.”19 Ironically, though military force is often depicted as a strong response, its use in a limited way may signal weakness. The 1993 U.S. strike on Iraq’s intelligence headquarters after the attempted assassination of former President George H. W. Bush was roundly depicted as a “pinprick”

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that demonstrated only America’s aversion to a strong response. Moreover, in terms of their counterterrorism effectiveness, limited strikes often make the supporting state more recalcitrant. The U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986, the 1998 attack on Afghanistan, and the various Israeli forays into Lebanon all made the target regime more enthusiastic in its backing of the terrorists. In addition, such attacks can lionize the terrorists among potential supporters, increasing their ability to raise money and recruit. At times, states will have to settle for progress rather than for complete success. Cases such as Qaddafi’s Libya are rare. Far more common are instances where outside pressure leads states to cut ties to particular groups or reduce their activities. Iran’s reduced support for terrorists operating against the United States and the Gulf states, for example, is a step forward, even though Iran still has a long road to walk. Demanding an all-ornothing standard, however, reduces supporting states’ incentives to place limits on their proxies or to cut support to certain terrorist groups while retaining ties to others. THINKING AHEAD TO FUTURE SPONSORS It is easier to stop state support for terrorism before it starts than to halt backing after it begins. The back and forth between the coercing state and the state supporter can generate a cycle of hostility and make it difficult for the supporter to back down and lose face, even when the stakes involved are not high. Thus, one of the greatest challenges to the international community is preventing the rise of new Talibans or other regimes that see supporting terrorism as ideologically vital. Similarly, states must be discouraged from following the path of Pakistan, which found strategic advantage by supporting terrorism. Creating a strong norm against the sponsorship of terrorism both makes states less likely to engage in it in the first place and enables the victim state to respond more easily. Diplomatically, this requires engaging both allies and other states on these issues before the support for terrorism becomes well established. In addition, it demands that the United States and other countries offer would-be sponsors alternatives to terrorism, such as giving them options at the negotiating table. Creating standards is vital with regard to the problem of passive sponsorship. Passive support today is a grey area in international relations, in part because the international community is reluctant to confront the difficulties of state capacity building and of demanding a higher standard for regime accountability. Passive sponsors have quite different motivations than do active sponsors, and the solutions to this problem differ in turn. Nevertheless, passive support remains vital for many terrorist groups, particularly al Qaeda and its affiliates.

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Such preventive diplomacy, however, is exceptionally difficult. Often, the bloodshed and carnage terrorists inflict must be manifest before any response occurs. In addition, states inevitably have different interests and different strategies for influencing would-be sponsors of terrorism, making it difficult to forge a common approach. The problem of passive sponsorship in particular will prove difficult to solve. Nevertheless, addressing these issues in advance offers one of the few long-term hopes for reducing the problem of state sponsorship. NOTES 1. This chapter draws on material from Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections, Copyright Daniel Byman 2005, published by Cambridge University Press, extracts reproduced with permission. 2. Jeremy Shapiro, and Benedicte Suzan, “The French Experience of Counterterrorism,” Survival 45, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 69–73. 3. Shapiro and Suzan, “The French Experience,” 70–74. 4. Edmund Hull, “Briefing upon the Release of the Report,” Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (April 30, 2001). Available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/2001. 5. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 6. George P. Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993) 650. 7. This concept emerged in the work of Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977), 12–16. 8. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffery J. Schott, and Barbara Oegg, “Using Sanctions to Fight Terrorism.” Institute for International Economics, November 2001, electronic version. 9. Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 90–136. 10. As Stuart Eizenstadt argues about Iran, for example: “Iran is simply too important a country in the region to isolate, and U.S. sanctions efforts such as ILSA (unilateral in nature and with no international backing) have been ineffective.” Stuart E. Eizenstadt, “Do Economic Sanctions Work? Lessons from ILSA & Other U.S. Sanctions Regimes.” Washington, DC: Atlantic Council (February 2004) 12. 11. Amatzia Baram’s review argues that the total children’s death toll from sanctions numbered well over 100,000, a far smaller but still staggering number of deaths. See Amatzia Baram, “The Effects of Iraqi Sanctions: Statistical Pitfalls and Responsibility,” Middle East Journal 54, no. 2 (Spring 2000). 12. John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 3 (May/June 1999): 43–53. 13. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, (the “9/11 Commission”) found: “We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaida

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cooperated on attacks against the United States.” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “Overview of the Enemy,” 5. 14. For an interesting assessment of this issue that draws primarily on cold war era data, see Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John A. C. Conybeare, “Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion,” American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994), 196–210. 15. For an excellent review of containment’s variations and difficulties, see Robert S. Litwak, Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2000). 16. As quoted in Elsa Walsh, “Louis Freeh’s Last Case,” The New Yorker, May 14, 2001. 17. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 162. 18. Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 34–35. 19. Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001) 101.

CHAPTER 3 THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: THE NEED FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRATIZATION Paul R. Pillar

Terrorism is a political act. It is thus unsurprising that the political environment in which potential terrorists live is important in determining whether they become real terrorists. It further follows that the political character of a state helps to explain the amount of terrorism arising within it, and that political reform of a state can reduce such terrorism. Among the most basic and relevant political characteristics of a state is the degree to which the rulers are accountable to the ruled, which is to say the degree to which it is democratic. Besides being a political act, terrorism is an extreme and dangerous act. Angry and aggrieved people are less likely to resort to such extreme behavior if they see other, less extreme, political channels available to them. A democratic deficit is a source of terrorism insofar as it leads people strongly impelled toward political action to conclude that there are no alternative, peaceful means of political expression or of trying to influence public policy. Even in democratic states, of course, there is often intense dissatisfaction with public policy and with the political order itself, which is one reason terrorism sometimes arises in democracies. The leftist terrorists who were active in the West during the 1970s—such as the Weather Underground in the United States or the Red Army Faction in West Germany— had just as many opportunities as their fellow citizens for peaceful expression and the use of legal means to try to influence politics and policy. They were dissatisfied and unable to change politics and society to their liking, not because of any lack of such opportunities, but instead because

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their views (as well as their methods) were extreme and anathema to most citizens. Another reason terrorism sometimes arises in democracies is that it has multiple roots and causes, and therefore does not correlate perfectly with any single cause. However important the political environment is as a determinant of terrorist behavior, it cannot always be expected to trump every other determinant. For example, the psychology and family circumstances of individual terrorists have explanatory value, as does the political system in which they live. These represent different levels of analysis, each of which contributes to the understanding of why a terrorist group emerges and why individuals join it. Moreover, democracy (or the lack thereof) is not the only important variable at the level of the state. Most references to democracy are really references to liberal democracy, and the liberalism half of the formula may be at least as important as the democratic half as an influence on terrorism. Free political expression and avoiding the yoke of an all-pervasive state— both hallmarks of political liberalism—may be more significant than the principle of majority rule in discouraging a group from resorting to extreme and violent measures. The degree of economic—as distinct from political—liberalism is yet another determinant of terrorist behavior. Getting into the difficult and dangerous business of terrorism can be an alternative not only to other forms of political behavior, but also to other life paths altogether. The allure of prosperous pursuits in the private sector has sidelined many legitimate politicians; it can be expected to do the same for at least some would-be terrorists. THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF DEMOCRACY Democratic theory offers more than one argument in favor of democracy as a superior system of government in general. Corresponding multiple arguments link democracy, or its absence, to common sources of terrorism. The most fundamental point in favor of democracy is that when rulers are answerable to the ruled and must compete for the people’s favor to gain or retain office, they are more likely than in autocracies to govern in the people’s interests and not exclusively in their own. The corresponding point regarding terrorism is that, other things being equal, democracies are less likely than alternative systems of government to generate perceptions of oppression or of conflicts of interest between rulers and ruled that are strong enough to motivate people to resort to terrorism. Rebellion against established authority amid such perceptions has been a recurrent feature of modern international terrorism, dating back to anarchist terrorism against the Russian empire in the late nineteenth century.

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Although opposition to an authority that is perceived as not governing in the interests of the governed has continued to be a major feature of terrorist campaigns, the conflicts involved have often revolved less around the undemocratic nature of a political system than around issues of ethnic self-determination. Terrorist opposition to Israel, for example, is a campaign not against the Israeli political system—which is the most democratic in the Middle East—but against Israeli control of territories inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. The same could be said about most of the terrorism that was conducted as part of the independence campaigns against European powers in lands such as Algeria or Kenya. Some current ethnic separatist movements—although they may couch their struggles in terms overthrowing oppression—have nothing to do with democracy or its absence. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam exemplify a very undemocratic movement, ruled in dictatorial fashion by its ruthless leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, which engages in terrorism (as well as open warfare) against a Sri Lankan state that, despite its warts, is reasonably democratic. Since the days in which Russian czars were terrorist targets, the long global expansion of democracy has reduced the instances in which terrorism is used or contemplated primarily as a weapon for overthrowing an undemocratic regime. But such instances still exist. They may be found in the Middle East, which features democracy deficits in monarchies (notably Saudi Arabia) and nominal republics (notably Egypt)—states that have been targeted by terrorists who, whatever other motives may drive them, confront regimes that largely deny them and their fellow citizens any significant say in governance. The connection between democratic deficits and terrorist threats is particularly pertinent to these and some other states in the Middle East, because the most significant potential opposition in either peaceful or terrorist forms comes from Islamists. Some of the most ardent proponents of democratization in the Middle East are Islamists, which is unsurprising because they would be among the biggest winners in any free elections in the region.1 The more that Islamists’ electoral ambitions and hopes for influencing policy are frustrated, the more one can expect to find sympathy and support for extreme and violent ways of trying to realize that hope, including the use of terrorism. Classic arguments in favor of democracy go beyond the principle of keeping rulers accountable to the people. They also include the idea that democracy, given how it directly involves the people in public affairs, fosters more desirable traits among the people themselves than do alternative forms of government. As one theorist puts it, a justification for democracy is that it serves “as a means to producing certain states or attitudes of mind in the citizens, independence of mind, respect and tolerance for others, interest in public affairs, willingness to think about them and discuss them, and a sense of responsibility for the whole community.”2 Several

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of these qualities are the antithesis of the typical terrorist mindset. Certainly, intolerance and a lack of respect for opposing opinions are central characteristics of that mindset. Disdain for free discussion—a preference for blowing up negotiating tables rather than sitting at them—is another. And within most terrorist groups, there typically is not only a lack of independent thinking but also assiduous efforts by group leaders to quash any hint of it. This condition reaches its extreme in some groups’ premission indoctrination of suicide bombers.3 A sense of responsibility for the community is also important. An alternative way to express the point that is directly pertinent to sources of terrorism is that individuals need to have a sense that they are part of the community. This means not just a mythical or longed-for community, such as the umma or community of believers in Islam, which Islamists often invoke as one of their reference points. It means the political system and nation-state (and province, and town) in which the individual lives. Alienation from one’s community is a thread that runs through the sources of extremism in much of the Middle East and to a lesser degree in other parts of the Muslim world. People see themselves as having little or no stake in the states and political systems in which they live. They are subjects of a political order, but do not feel a part of it. Because of this, there is little to dissuade them from turning violently against that order. To the extent that democracy—by directly, peacefully, and meaningfully involving citizens in the political process—imparts a sense of belonging to the political system, it becomes a disincentive against such violent rejection. EMPIRICAL PATTERNS The relationship between terrorism and an absence of democracy has been challenged, usually through interpretation of statistics on terrorist incidents. Comparing the U.S. government’s statistics on terrorism with scorecards on political freedom reveals no such correlation.4 Such comparisons must always be taken with a large grain of salt, given that statistics on terrorism are subject to major questions about definition and to severe skewing by large numbers of incidents or casualties associated with a few cases or conflicts. While it is possible to use these statistics to demonstrate almost anything through casual comparisons, it is virtually impossible to isolate any one variable—be it democracy or anything else—from others, or to reach statistically sound conclusions about its effect. One country, Iraq, accounts for a very large proportion of the world’s terrorist incidents and casualties reflected in the most recent annual statistical compilation, but this is not a commentary on either the total absence of democracy under Saddam’s dictatorship or the still quite incomplete efforts to turn Iraq into something worthy of the label of democracy. Instead, it has much

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more to do with postinvasion disorder, resistance to foreign occupation, and acute ethnic and sectarian divisions. Two more basic analytic flaws typically characterize statistically based efforts to debunk the counterterrorist value of democratization. One is confusion between where terrorism arises and where terrorist acts are carried out. Statistics about terrorist incidents reflect the latter, but the impact of democracy on the roots of terrorism concerns the former. For example, the deadliest and most spectacular international terrorist attack ever—in September 2001—took place inside a democracy, the United States. But the perpetrators of that attack came from undemocratic countries in the Middle East, and it is there that the origins of that terrorism are to be found. The other flaw, related to the first one, is a failure to consider where terrorists’ operational opportunities lie. It is easier to conduct terrorist attacks (and many other activities) in a free society than in a police state. Free societies tend to be democracies. It should be no surprise if the greater physical vulnerability of democracies to terrorist attacks—part of the price paid for enjoying a free society—offsets whatever statistical patterns might otherwise have arisen from the impact democratization has on the likelihood of individuals becoming terrorists, or of terrorist groups forming in the first place. This last point suggests that in a narrow, short-term sense, there is something to be said for police states, as far as counterterrorism is concerned. Repression works, at least for a while and at least within a limited context. Egypt is an example. By the late 1990s, Cairo had almost eliminated what had become during the previous two decades a major terrorism problem. It did so not by democratizing or enlarging freedoms (although its partial toleration of the Muslim Brotherhood has directed into peaceful political channels opposition that otherwise may have partly assumed violent forms), but instead through harsh measures to eliminate the major terrorist groups and to cow their supporters. Extend the frame of reference in space and time, however, and the limits of repression become more apparent. Egypt’s offensive did not crush its homegrown terrorism altogether, but instead pushed some of it abroad. The faction of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad led by Ayman al-Zawahiri merged with Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda, and became part of the transnational jihadist movement whose animus is directed not only at Middle Eastern regimes but also the United States and the West. (For years, Saudi Arabia had a different sort of policy aimed at exporting its homegrown extremism, particularly by encouraging Saudi jihadists to burn their excess energy in Afghanistan.) Moreover, it is questionable how long repression will continue to work even within Egypt. Opposition that is not exported is bottled up, and what is bottled up can spill out in the future. Repression may appear to rulers as a more promising counterterrorist strategy than democratization in the short run, but the long run is a different matter.

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More revealing than comparisons using annual statistics on terrorist incidents is a simpler comparison of regions. Think of the Middle East and some key characteristics come to mind: a disproportionate share of the world’s petroleum, and Islam as the dominant religion. Two other characteristics are especially important: the Middle East is the origin of a disproportionate amount of the most worrisome forms of international terrorism; and it is the most undemocratic region of the world. This pattern of traits is not coincidental. The Middle East’s democratic deficit is hardly its only trait linked to terrorism. The aforementioned alienation of many citizens in the region involves their lack of a perceived stake not only in political systems but also in economies, which in the Middle East tend to be state-controlled, petroleum-centered, and providing few opportunities for advancement and an improved standard of living. Specific conflicts, notably that between Israelis and Arabs, also play a large role in terrorism originating in the Middle East. The Arab–Israeli dispute has been the direct target of much terrorism, a cause celebre for radicals, and—one respect in which it relates to democratization—an excuse for Arab rulers to postpone reforms in their own states. The victory of Hamas in Palestinian legislative elections in January 2006 brought the issues of democracy and terrorism much closer together. Hamas has made extensive use of terrorism against Israel, but is also a political movement representing a major strain of Palestinian public opinion. Its winning of what was widely regarded as a free and fair vote posed difficult issues, particularly for Jerusalem and Washington, and presented in especially stark form the alternatives of peaceful and violent political expression mentioned at the outset of this chapter. Political pressures and emotions make it difficult for Israeli or American leaders to follow any policy toward Hamas other than trying to starve it out of office. And yet, the more that Palestinians (whose views Hamas represents) see that peaceful political channels are closed—even after winning a fair election—the more likely they will resort to, or at least support, violent means of expression. Negation of the Palestinian election result would probably have additional radicalizing effects elsewhere in the region, by suggesting that a proponent of democracy such as the United States is quite willing to reject democracy if it yields an electoral result that is not to its liking. Although it is difficult to separate the effects of democracy from other variables that may affect the origins of terrorism, the respects in which the Middle East tends to differ from other regions suggest a connection. Beyond the observations about the Middle East, the empirical link between degree of democracy and extent of terrorism is not a matter of some grand statistical correlation that is applicable throughout the world. The issue is important not as the basis for a new social scientific law but rather as one consideration for how counterterrorism should enter into foreign

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policy and into the postures that the United States or other outside powers should take toward individual states. Each state presents a different case. For each, a question to be posed is whether an increase in the democratic character of the state might at least marginally decrease the propensity toward extreme views and violent tactics among some of its subjects. THE ROLE OF DEMOCRACY IN TERRORISTS’ DOCTRINE AND GOALS Not only must each state be considered individually in order to assess the potential impact of democratization; so too must each terrorist group. Organizations that have used terrorism and appropriately bear the label “terrorist group” (including membership on the official U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations) span a very wide range of beliefs and characteristics. The effectiveness of any particular counterterrorist measure, including democratization, as a way to defuse the threat from a specific group must be analyzed with that group’s individual characteristics, orientation, and situation in mind.5 The clearest applicability of democratization to defanging or pacifying terrorist groups is with those organizations that have good prospects of winning support and even power through democratic means. This is especially true of groups for which, despite their use of terrorism, there is reason to believe that in changed circumstances they would accept and abide by democratic norms. Hamas exemplifies such a group. Its formal refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist and its use of terrorism against Israel have defined Hamas for most outsiders, but its most consistent goal—as measured by its behavior—has been to wield political power in a Palestinian state. In pursuit of that goal, it has cultivated support among the Palestinian people not only by standing up to Israel but also by providing an array of much-needed social services. It has nurtured an image of clean and effective government at the local level, gaining a positive image which proved useful when campaigning against its political opponent Fatah and the latter’s dominance of the corruption-ridden Palestinian Authority. The internal workings of Hamas appear to be anything but democratic. Its internal governance is an opaque process involving unelected leaders either in exile or in hiding. But this is clearly a direct consequence of its working environment, in which Israel has done everything it can to impede the functioning of Hamas, including killing its leaders. In any event, numerous examples of political parties in Western democracies show there is no incompatibility between undemocratic internal procedures and a willingness to abide by democratic rules and procedures in competing against other parties. Hamas is, in effect, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and some inkling of how it would operate in a less deadly environment

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can be gleaned from the behavior of its counterparts in the neighboring states of Jordan and Egypt. In Jordan, the Brotherhood functions openly as one of several political parties, albeit one in which the legislature where it has seats can always have its power limited by the monarch. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is legally banned, but its candidates run as independents or under other party labels, and it is now the largest and most organized political opposition in Egypt, both in the legislature and overall. A further question (unanswered by these examples) about a group like Hamas concerns its willingness not only to gain power through democratic means but also to lose it through the same means. The biggest test of any process of democratization is not the first free election but rather the first subsequent election in which an incumbent party is defeated and surrenders power peacefully. Hamas, despite its sweeping victory in 2006, has given some indication of a willingness to accept less than a monopoly of power, such as through its efforts to persuade Fatah to join it in a coalition. But in the Palestinian Authority, which is a peculiar less-than-a-state entity, heavily dependent on the sufferance and support of the international community, this indicator has at most limited value. The same question can be posed about numerous other movements that have used terrorism, particularly ones that have sought independence or self-determination. The question can be raised about the African National Congress (ANC), despite South Africa’s admirable—in comparison with many other countries on the same continent—record of democracy since apartheid ended over a decade ago. The ANC, whose continued popularity so far has enabled it to stay in power through democratic means, has not yet had to deal with the prospect of being voted out of office. One can hope that when that day comes, enough postapartheid time will have passed and democratic norms will have become sufficiently engrained in the South African political culture for power to transfer as smoothly as it did in Mexico in 2000, when the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)— which had governed Mexico for decades as something close to a one-party state—finally lost a presidential election. Those questions are very long term. The more immediate issue for counterterrorism is how involving a group in a democratic process, or enhancing the scope or strength of that process, can reduce terrorism in the nearor midterm. With regard to Hamas, another instructive comparison in its own Middle Eastern neighborhood is with Lebanese Hizbollah. Hizbollah has not been defanged by participating in the political process; it retains a capable terrorist apparatus under its longtime security chief Imad Mughniyah. But its relative inactivity in terrorism over the past 10 years (apart from some assistance to Palestinian operations against Israel) contrasts starkly with its record during the previous 15 years. Part of the difference concerns specific issues and grievances—particularly the American and French presence in Lebanon, which some of Hizbollah’s most spectacular

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terrorist operations in the early 1980s were designed to end. The main difference, however, is the large and respected role that Hizbollah has come to play in the Lebanese political and social order. It is a political party with seats in the Lebanese parliament, a social services organization, and a broadcasting network with a large audience, as well as a security presence in south Lebanon. Leaders across the Lebanese political spectrum and in much of the rest of the Middle East accept Hizbollah as a legitimate player. Success and respect in one of the more democratic systems in the Middle East have made terrorist options appear less useful or necessary to Hizbollah. And with a lot now to lose, the downsides of resorting to terrorism appear greater. Another instructive case is the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the form it takes as a political party, Sinn Fein. Intrinsic to the group’s commitment to leave the terrorist path, under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, is its full participation in a democratic process for governing Northern Ireland (as well as participating in national politics at Westminster and Dublin). The fits and starts of the Northern Ireland peace process, and particularly the difficulties in getting the PIRA to give up its arms, are illustrative of the problems to be expected in getting a group to make any such transition. The central fact, however, is that a major terrorist group is substituting peaceful, democratic political competition for violence, even though it has not attained its central goal (in this case, a united Ireland with no British rule). In cases such as the ones just mentioned, the role of democracy in counterterrorism goes beyond a shaping of the political environment in which individuals decide whether or not to join a terrorist group. It provides a direct alternative route through which a group can pursue its interests. Accordingly, democracy should be a large part of any strategy for dealing with such groups. A different sort of challenge comes from groups that are as significant as Hamas, Sinn Fein, or the ANC and that represent communities of interests but that seem unlikely to abide by democratic rules and norms. The Tamil Tigers are a prime example. This group has ferociously eliminated all alternative aspirants to leadership of the Tamil community, and it is hard to imagine it accepting any political arrangement requiring it to compete fairly with other Tamil parties or movements. Current prospects for crushing the Tigers militarily are slim, and so a negotiated settlement appears to hold the most hope for ending the terrorism and other violence in Sri Lanka. Unlike the negotiations that created frameworks within which Sinn Fein or the ANC practice peaceful politics, however, democracy may be antithetical to prospects for a negotiated peace in Sri Lanka. Over the long term, a liberal democracy that provides for political freedoms and minority rights for all Sri Lankans would be the best foundation for peace and an absence of terrorism. But in the meantime, the vicious nature of

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the LTTE means the choice is more likely to be between holding out for democracy or reaching an agreement with the Tigers that would accept the group’s very undemocratic rule over Tamil-inhabited portions of Sri Lanka. Yet another different challenge comes from terrorist groups with which no settlements, democratic or otherwise, are feasible or desirable. They include the radical jihadists, including Bin Laden and his followers, whose only political objective besides the destruction of existing orders is the medieval one of reestablishing a Caliphate. The jihadists make no pretense of favoring or even accepting democracy. The most prominent jihadist who has fought in Iraq—the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—explicitly denounced it. In a speech attributed to Zarqawi shortly before elections for the Iraqi constituent assembly in January 2005, he declared a “fierce war” against the “evil principle of democracy and those who follow this wrong ideology.”6 With such statements, Zarqawi became the poster child for counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, waged in the combined name of suppressing terrorism and expanding democracy. He also was the perfect illustration for the theme—which President George W. Bush has repeatedly sounded—that terrorists opposing the United States “can’t stand freedom. They hate our values. They hate what America stands for.”7 Setting aside issues of what else may drive anti-U.S. terrorism, the juxtaposition of the themes of promoting democracy and of fighting terrorists who abhor it raises a further question about the usefulness of democratization as a counterterrorist tool. If terrorists do conduct terrorist attacks because they hate democracy, wouldn’t more democracy mean more hatred and more terrorism? (And might this be a reason for some of the statistical patterns referred to by those who debunk the value of democratization in combating terrorism?) An immediate response could be that this is why those who have the appalling views of an extremist like Zarqawi must be stamped out. But this places too much emphasis on specific individuals and begs the question of how many other Zarqawis—albeit less famous—are out there. Instead, the correct response is that democracy’s value in countering terrorism is not a matter of placating terrorists or respecting their views. Zarqawi and others like him already are a lost cause; the only appropriate response is indeed to eliminate them. The value of democracy lies in reducing the inclination of others to become terrorists in the first place, and in reducing the sympathy and support for terrorists among larger populations, along the lines of the logic articulated at the outset of this chapter. The idea that democracy is not a matter of appeasing terrorists or accepting their political views applies as well to terrorist groups that are, or could become, part of peace processes or negotiations. If the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland takes hold, it will not be because it appeals to a democratic sense in the hearts and minds of PIRA leaders. Similarly,

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if democracy in a Palestinian entity or state helps to wean Hamas from terrorist methods, it will not be because Hamas leaders have been reading John Locke or John Stuart Mill and are eager to apply the principles of a liberal democracy. The political goals of the groups, revolving around attaining power in Northern Ireland or Palestine, may have little to do with democracy as an end in itself. But evolving circumstances and properly structured incentives may make democratic competition a more attractive means than terrorism for pursuing those goals. A final issue about terrorists’ objectives and beliefs concerns the Islamists. Zarqawi couched his diatribe against democracy partly in religious terms, saying that an objectionable feature of democracy is the free choice of religion, which is contrary to his understanding of the will of God. Even recognizing that Zarqawi occupied a radical fringe of political Islam, a legitimate question concerns the compatibility between democratic principles and political Islam in general. Islam is a revealed religion that de-emphasizes division between the spiritual and temporal (including political) spheres, and emphasizes the applicability of sacred texts and Islamic law to all facets of life. There is, at the least, a tension between the concepts of God-given law and man-made law, the latter of which is central to democracy. This tension may be an additional reason for the relative paucity of democracy in the predominantly Muslim Middle East. The question of Islam and democracy is subject to debate, however, and what matters is who within the Islamic world will win that debate. “Political Islam” is not a single ideology, but rather a label applicable to a wide range of views that claim to apply principles of Islam to politics. In many Muslim countries, a small but potentially influential element of “Islamic modernizers” has argued that democracy and liberalism are compatible with Islam. The more that debates over interpretations of Islam run in favor of the modernizers, the less support there is for the extremists. Successful implementation of democracy would be, in most milieus, the best support the modernizers could receive. PRINCIPLES AND PITFALLS Democratization matters in countering terrorism, but so do the manner and circumstances in which it is implemented and the preparations for offsetting possible negative effects that could, in certain times and places, encourage more terrorism. What is understood to constitute “democracy” matters a great deal as well. Democracy is not just majority rule. It also involves minority rights, including the right to compete freely to increase one’s votes and power in the future. This point is important for undercutting extremism and terrorism, because the emotions and resentments that drive elements of a community toward terrorism are often those of a minority fearing subjugation

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by a majority. That has been the case with the Catholic republican terrorism of the PIRA, and it is true of Sunni Arab violence in post-Saddam Iraq. Democracy is also not simply understood as the existence of an electoral process. Successful democracy of the sort enjoyed by the industrialized West requires a well-developed civil society that blurs and attenuates lines of conflict by giving citizens multiple stakes in a larger community, and cross-cutting ways in which they define their interests. It also requires habits and attitudes that foster restraint, mutual respect, and the concepts of loyal opposition and alternation in power. All these attributes require time, usually much time, to develop. Moving quickly to establish elections and the other outward forms of democracy without having developed these inward attributes is apt to accentuate (rather than diminish) the fears and insecurities that breed extremism, which in turn can mean an increase in terrorism. This is taking place today in Iraq. Elsewhere in the Middle East, the United States—motivated in large part by the goal of cutting the roots of terrorism—has initiated programs designed to encourage the long-term growth of civil society and the other attributes needed for a healthy democracy. Many of these efforts come under the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) administered by the Department of State. MEPI involves funding for a variety of programs in politics, economics, education, and the empowerment of women.8 Political programs, for example, have included support for the development of political parties, media coverage of parliamentary sessions, and enhanced dialogue among activists and nongovernmental organizations. Although it is difficult to see effects in the short run, such efforts will help in the long term to make terrorism seem less attractive than alternative forms of political action. These points about the attributes of democracy needed to reduce terrorism parallel well-established principles about the conditions needed for overall stability and moderation in a democracy. There is a similar parallel regarding the downside of democracy. A key finding of the voluminous research that relates different types of political systems to the outbreak of war is that, although democracies rarely fight other democracies, new democracies are among the most warlike states of all.9 Some of the same attributes of states that encourage externally directed aggression—such as the insecurities of old elites seeking new sources of support—also make for internal extremism, with terrorism sometimes chosen as a tool by elements afraid of how they will fare in a new era. So, whatever the long-term benefits of democratization, the short term may be bumpy. That is particularly true of a state, such as Iraq today, that undergoes democratization at a forced-draft pace. A more specific transitional problem is that political settlement of a long-running conflict—perhaps providing for democratic procedures as

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part of an agreed-upon new political order—may be the occasion for terrorist groups that oppose the settlement to step up their operations in an effort to derail it. Examples include attacks by splinter groups in Northern Ireland as the peace process there moved forward. Similarly, any reviving of an Israeli–Palestinian peace process could be expected to stimulate terrorism by rejectionists determined to stop the process. In such a situation, the two Islamist Palestinian groups, Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—whose respective terrorist operations often have appeared to complement each other—would take different paths. Hamas, with its popular support, would see a major role for itself in a democratic process that was truly open. The PIJ, a smaller group without such broad support, would more likely be among the rejectionists happy to see a peace process fail. The Palestinian question raises a final principle about democratization, which is the importance of consistency—even though every conflict and every terrorist group is different—in promoting democracy and respecting its results. Particularly in the Middle East, suspicions about the motives of promoters of democracy can be a significant handicap. Many in the region associate liberal democratic forms and procedures with past western domination. Any western policies that appear to place more weight on specific political outcomes than on respect for democracy itself would add to such cynicism, with a resulting encouragement of extremism elsewhere in the region. DEMOCRACY AS BOTH END AND MEANS A reduction in terrorism is not the only public interest that counterterrorist tools affect. There are always trade-offs with other values and interests. Compromises must be made when the effects on other values are negative, such as with expanded investigative powers that infringe on personal privacy or with military operations that cause collateral casualties among innocent persons. One of the most attractive features of democratization as a counterterrorist tool is that expansion of democracy and associated political rights is a value in its own right. Far from compromising or treading upon other ends, democratization represents the advancement of an important end, in addition to whatever benefit it has in curtailing terrorism. This does not imply that democratization should always, or even in any one case, take precedence over other counterterrorist instruments. Like the other tools, it has major limitations, most of which have been mentioned above. Its chief limitation is the long time required for beneficial effects to become apparent and the very long time required to develop political cultures needed for democracy to work well. What the congruence with other political ends does mean, however, is that the burden of proof ought to be less for those arguing in favor of making democratization an element

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of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy. Even if the correlations with terrorism are hard to prove, the side effects are apt to be more positive than negative. And even if, in a particular case, democratization does not curb terrorism, it will not be a wasted effort because other ends will have been served. In sum, democracy—or rather its absence—is connected to some of the most basic roots and sources of terrorism. The effects of democratization on the incidence of terrorism vary from case to case. There are significant pitfalls, especially associated with the transition of bringing new democracies into being. Much depends not on democracy itself but on the liberal attitudes and norms required to support it. A failure to appreciate the potential contribution of democracy would be shortsighted, however, with regard to both counterterrorism and other important values. NOTES 1. Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 29. Islamists are defined in this chapter as political actors who frame their objectives and identity largely in Islamic terms, regardless of whether they use violent or peaceful methods. 2. G. C. Field, Political Theory (London: Methuen, 1963) 125. 3. Ariel Merari, “The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1990) 199–200. 4. F. Gregory Gause III, “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 66. 5. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 130–140. 6. Jackie Spinner and Bassam Sebti, “Militant Declares War on Iraqi Vote,” Washington Post, January 24, 2005, A1. 7. Remarks by President George W. Bush to New York Mayor Giuliani and New York Governor Pataki, September 13, 2001. Available at www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-4.html. 8. See the State Department’s summary of MEPI. Available at at www. mepi.state.gov. 9. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 5–38.

CHAPTER 4 THE ROLE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN REDUCING THE APPEAL OF EXTREMIST GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA Francesco Cavatorta

The topic of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has preoccupied scholars and policymakers for a number of decades, and has come to the forefront of the international scene following the 9/11 attacks. Since then there has been a “reappraisal” of the political violence stemming from the region, which has been explained as the obvious outcome of the persistence of authoritarianism at a time when most other areas of the world have gone through a process of transition to democracy. Any analysis of the region today concludes that the salient trait of the MENA is the complete absence of democratic governance in all the Arab countries. While this authoritarianism in the different countries varies in terms of intensity, few doubts exist about its persistence and pervasiveness. A number of explanations have been offered to account for the lack of progress of democratic governance, ranging from Arab political culture to the authoritarian nature of Islam, from the failure of economic liberalization to the absence of particular social institutions. A number of scholars and policymakers argue quite convincingly that the principal reason for the emergence of terrorist groups in the region is precisely the absence

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of democratic procedures in societies that have not changed since at least the 1970s. The closed nature of the existing political systems has been identified as the primary cause of “terror” due to the fact that political groups unable to access the system and influence public policy were driven to violence as the only means to assert their political project. Once the link between authoritarianism and political violence is established, the straightforward idea that democratization would solve the problem of political violence is also accepted. The successive policy initiatives of democracy promotion launched by both the United States and the European Union have to be understood in this context. However,contrary to what conventional wisdom holds about the MENA, the region has not been entirely bypassed by the third wave of democratization. In fact, liberalizing trends in countries such as Tunisia and Algeria preceded the rapid political transformations of Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s and rapidly spread to most of their neighbors. In addition, and again contrary to conventional wisdom, these MENA societies have gone through a significant number of changes ranging from the introduction of market-oriented reforms to the spread of new technologies, and from the emergence of new social classes to an increase in transnational political activism. However, in spite of these early promising trends and these enormous societal changes, liberal democracy did not take hold in the region, and over the course of the 1990s authoritarianism reasserted itself fully. The role of political violence emanating from the region has to be understood in this context of authoritarian persistence and social change. This chapter examines in some detail the relationship between democratization and political violence in the region and analyzes four different, but interrelated, aspects of such a complex relationship. First of all, this study argues that processes of democratization in the region have largely failed due to the controversial nature of the principal opposition to the authoritarian elites in virtually all of the countries. In this context it is imperative to analyze the role of Islamist groups in the democratization process, because it is in the name of Islam that many terrorist groups also operate. Secondly, this study challenges the assumption that democratization will inevitably reduce the appeal of extremist groups, if we equate extremism with the use of violence. By drawing on the literature that deals with the link between democracy and terrorism, it will be argued that democratic governance per se cannot defeat terrorism, particularly its international manifestations. This is because the nature of terrorism emanating from the area is not simply linked to the domestic issue of an absence of meaningful representation. The relegitimization of state authority in the Middle East and North Africa through the adoption of democratic procedures is certainly a necessary first step to stem the wave of radicalism that is engulfing the region. However, it would probably only be effective

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in moderating those groups that have “extremist” ideas, but are already committed to pursuing their goals through nonviolent means. The fact that democratization and violence might not be directly linked poses a problem for the international community, which is involved—at least on paper—in promoting democracy in the region. A closer analysis of the international community, chiefly the United States and the European Union, will in fact reveal that commitment to democracy is suspect and lacks regional credibility, particularly among ordinary citizens. This further fuels a sentiment of injustice that feeds the extremist views of the radical, violent groups. Finally, this chapter will offer some recommendations on how the international community could help bring about not only a more democratic MENA region, but also a more “just” international system. THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRATIZATION A cursory look at the leaders currently in power seems to confirm the assertion that the region is still stuck in its authoritarian past and that the enormous political transformations that led to the demise of many authoritarian regimes elsewhere have completely bypassed the Middle East and North Africa. Such an analysis is only superficially correct. There is very little doubt that the entire MENA is still in the grip of authoritarian rule, if we discount Iraq and the non-Arab countries of Turkey and Israel from the analysis. The authoritarian systems are different, ranging from monarchies (Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States) to military juntas in disguise (Algeria) to police states (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) to “hereditary” republics (Syria) and to Islamic Republics (Iran), but they all share the common trait of being led by the same leaders or same ruling cliques that have been in power since the end of colonialism. Thus, those who argue that nothing has changed in the Middle East and North Africa since the 1970s may seem correct. The reality, however, is quite different—indeed, the region has not been immune to the liberalizing trends that have characterized world politics since the mid-1970s. Although Samuel Huntington1 omits the Arab world from his study of democratization, all countries in the region—with the exception of Iraq—have experimented with some form of liberalization and/or democratization. Tunisia became the first country in the region to relax its authoritarian system when current president Ben Ali took power in 1987 after a coup that relegated former leader Bourguiba to the sidelines. The initial democratic openings that Ben Ali implemented included the signing of a political pact between all Tunisian political parties, Islamists included, which would underpin the construction of a plural political system.2 Ben Ali quickly reverted to authoritarian rule, however, when he managed to secure complete control of the security services and some sort of popular legitimacy.3

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Algeria was, however, the very first country in the region that did not simply stop with the liberalization of the political system but proceeded on the road to democratization, allowing for free and fair elections—both local and legislative—which saw the emergence of the Islamist FIS as the most popular political party. This experiment in Arab democracy took place between February 1989 and January 1992, when a military coup ended the electoral process after the FIS won a stunning majority in the first round of the December 1991 polls.4 In the meantime, other countries had introduced a degree of liberal reforms. There is no doubt that, like in most other cases of transitions to democracy, most of these liberalizing reforms were introduced by the ruling elites as simply cosmetic changes that would not alter the domestic balance of power. However, once introduced, such reforms had unforeseen effects. The ruling elites quickly realized how much legitimacy to govern they actually lacked and how popular Islamist movements were among ordinary citizens. The cancellation of the Algerian elections coupled with the brutal civil war that followed buried any chance that the liberalizing trend would continue in the region. The “Algerian scenario” became the nightmare scenario for both the domestic ruling elites and the international community. It follows that many of the early reforms were rolled back, and while the ruling elites devised a new network of support among key constituents that would allow them to remain in power, the authoritarian nature of the state did not change.5 In Morocco, the process of reforms initiated by the late King Hassan II and known as alternance is considered a failure, and the current King is still the supreme decision maker.6 In Libya, Qaddafi made some cosmetic changes to the institutional setup of Libya’s government, in order to give the impression of popular involvement in decision making, but power still rests with him.7 The same can be said for both Egypt8 and Syria.9 Mubarak in Egypt still rules without any sort of democratic legitimacy, while in Syria power passed from father to son in what is now a “hereditary republic.” The last 15 years have therefore been characterized by the “persistence of authoritarianism.”10 The absence of democracy in the region has been explained through a number of variables over the course of the last three decades. A first group of explanations sees the centrality of Islam in the life of the majority of the citizens in the region as the main obstacle to democratization.11 It is argued that Islam demands submission to the ruler and this leads to political “quietism,” whereby citizens should remain passive and refrain from questioning the legitimacy of those who govern. This passivity is not conducive to democratic change, because democracy requires confrontation and discussion, while Islam actively discourages both. This explanation is quite weak and does not take into account the fact that Islam as a political reference can certainly lead to quietism in certain situations, but can also lead to political rebellion in other contexts. The case of the Iranian

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revolution, framed in religious references and led by a cleric, and the radical zeal of many Islamist groups demonstrate that Islam as a set of beliefs can be suited to support any political system, including procedural democracy.12 Another set of explanations centers on the traits of Arab culture and its political manifestations.13 The authoritarian nature of Arab culture with its emphasis on the tribal leader distributing both social and economic benefits leads to political ramifications that support authoritarianism. Thus, the leader of the state utilizes state resources to reward those who belong to his tribe or clan rather than setting up a system based on equal citizenship. Rival tribes and clans are therefore in constant conflict over the possession of the state. Other scholars still focus their attention on the absence of an active civil society and argue that without this dimension it is virtually impossible to democratize and support democratic institutions once established.14 The passivity of Arab civil society has however been thrown into question and does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation.15 In addition, an active civil society is not a necessary condition for democratization, as many cases in Eastern Europe demonstrate. With the possible exception of Poland and Czechoslovakia, the other former communist countries transitioned to democracy even in the absence of an active and wellorganized civil society.16 Others have gone to the opposite extreme to argue that there is in fact too much civil society17 in the region and that it is too Islamicized to be positive for democratization,18 pointing to the problem of its inability to articulate political demands, which would be the natural role of parties. The problem with this approach is that it does not take into account that political parties in the region are largely discredited19 and that some civil society actors would become parties if allowed to. Scholars more concerned with structural explanations focus on the interrelationship between economics and politics. The rentier state theory20 argues that the leaders of countries relying on external rents can afford to separate themselves from the political demands of ordinary citizens because they are able to offer services and buy off potential dissent through redistribution. The absence of taxation and the independence of the productive apparatus from the political system allow for authoritarian forms of rule. Oil and gas would constitute the core of external rents, and most countries in the region have these resources available to them while the countries that do not could still be considered semi-rentier due to the spillover effects of the regional rent.21 While this explanation is quite popular, it fails to be entirely convincing. First of all, even when rents plummeted due to global markets, authoritarian leaders managed to remain in power. Secondly, rentier states exist also outside the Middle East, and a number of them are democracies.

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Explanations focusing on institutions and political actors are more convincing than cultural or structural ones, and it is necessary to turn to these if the persistence of authoritarianism in the region and its relationship to political violence is to be understood. The failure of democratization and the ability of authoritarian leaders to remain in power despite their lack of popular legitimacy can only be convincingly explained by referring to the “nature of the opposition.” An interesting aspect of the Middle East and North Africa is that all regimes in the region, despite their enormous social, economic, and ideological differences, face an opposition that frames its political discourse in religious terms. Thus, both Saudi Arabia (a rentier monarchy with very solid ties to the West and an orthodox conservative brand of Islam) and Syria (a socialist secular republic with a “bad” reputation in the West) face domestic political challengers that draw references for their political demands in Islam. The term Islamism “refers to the rise of movements and ideologies drawing on Islamic referents—terms, symbols and events taken from the Islamic tradition—in order to articulate a distinct political agenda.”22 The vast majority of Islamist movements across the region have been able to mobilize popular support through a combination of social activism and populist discourse, with the objective of providing a clear alternative to the regimes in place. These regimes are all accused, irrespective of their ideological nature, of being “unjust” and of having failed the communities they rule over. To a certain extent, all groups that embrace Islamism can be considered revolutionary because their fundamental objective is indeed to revolutionize the societies they live in by radically transforming the political (both domestic and international), social, economic, and cultural relationships that currently exist. The demands that such groups make on the political systems they operate in are “radical” because they generally entail the dismantling of the current structures of power. This is not a novelty per se in processes of democratization, where some opposition groups are indeed determined to make a clean break with the authoritarian past, while the ruling elite strives to hold on to its privileges and position. This has not impeded the ability of certain countries to successfully move away from authoritarian rule. The problem in the MENA region, however, is that a combination of domestic and international factors have conspired to make democratization virtually impossible for the moment. The current ruling elites have been able to reshape their authoritarian stranglehold on state structures through a combination of repression and co-optation.23 This dual strategy has been hugely successful because there is a fundamental mistrust of Islamist movements in both domestic and international circles. Radical Islamism, irrespective of its many variants, is perceived to be a danger for democracy, and opening up the political system to their participation would consign all these countries to another form of authoritarian rule, which would be even more intense than the

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current one. Thus, the international community has—since at least the Algerian case—supported the repression of Islamists, decreasing the costs of repression for the regimes in power for fear that such movements, once in power, would undermine the advantageous stability of the international system.24 If widespread abuses do not lead to international isolation, but instead to praise and access to international resources, current regimes have no incentive to truly democratize. In addition, current regimes have been able to utilize the fear of Islamism in secular sectors of their domestic societies to secure support and legitimacy for the regime. This support has been obtained largely thanks to economic rewards, particularly in rentier states where crony capitalism reigns. Does the nature of Islamism justify such fears? It is very difficult to determine whether Islamist movements are democratic or authoritarian if they are analyzed in isolation from their environment.25 It seems, however, that assuming a priori that they are not and cannot be democratic actors, by virtue of their Islamist ethos, is more the product of a purely political agenda rather than an objective examination. This is in fact the crux of the problem. Radical Islamist groups have a set of both domestic and international policy objectives that fundamentally clash with the interests of the current ruling elites and the international community, particularly the United States and the European Union. The problem therefore is not really the lack of democratic credibility these movements have (there is no empirical evidence to tell us whether or not Islamist parties elected to power through free and fair elections would abolish the system that brought them to power), but the very real political consequences that their arrival to power would entail: a challenge to the domestic, regional, and international status quo that favors selected Arab elites and Western countries. The attitude of the international community to the problem of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa is clearly summarized by Zakaria: “the Arab rulers . . . are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them.”26 POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND ABSENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA The relationship between the type of political regime and the degree of political violence present in a country has always been a rather complex one.27 Three different schools of thought can be identified in this respect.28 One argues that democratic societies are indeed much more prone to experience political violence directed against the political system due to the “openness” of democracy itself, which by its very nature finds it very difficult to deal with groups operating in the shadows through violence. This

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would lead to the assumption that violence does not stem from a lack of access to the political system, but from a perception of “illegitimacy” in terms of the rules of the game, irrespective of how democratic they might appear to be. This is particularly the case when fundamental identity values appear to be threatened. It follows that authoritarianism might be more capable of dealing with this type of dissent through repression. Others have argued that the absence of democracy in itself is the primary generator of political violence because authoritarian regimes do not allow for the free expression of political demands and this leaves disaffected groups no other choice than to resort to violence to promote their views. A third school of thought argues that such clear-cut distinctions based on theoretical assumptions about the nature of democracy and the nature of authoritarianism are not possible. Instead, the argument goes, we should concentrate on the degree of political violence that occurs. Thus, on the one hand, democracies may experience more episodes of political violence, but usually they are of reduced intensity and are eventually eliminated, particularly if the political system remains open and abides by the procedures of democracy. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes may experience fewer episodes of political violence through “pre-emption by repression,” but when such violence occurs it is usually on a very large scale, bordering on insurrection. Empirical evidence is mixed and largely depends on the definitions of democracy, authoritarianism, and political violence that one uses. What is interesting, however, is that in the current post-9/11 world the second school of thought seems to have prevailed among policymakers and security experts. This has led to the largely unquestioned belief among some observers that the absence of democracy in the Middle East and North Africa is the cause of terror. The obvious outcome of such an understanding about the nature of political violence and terrorism is the assumption that if democracy were to triumph across the region, then such violence would disappear. This is certainly the logic behind two major diplomatic initiatives that the Bush administration launched following a comprehensive review of American foreign policy in the Middle East and North Africa: the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA) undertaken under the auspices of the G8. Both are based on the assumption that democratization in the region will reduce and, possibly, eliminate the threat of political violence.29 This approach—sincerity and credibility notwithstanding—is laudable in itself because it offers the opportunity for the United States to radically alter its long-standing policies toward the area in favor of the establishment of accountable governments. However, the objective of defeating political violence through democratization does not take into account the complexity of local national politics, the diverse nature of Islamist radicalism, and

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the international nature of political violence stemming from the region. The linkage between democratization and political violence might in fact be much more tenuous than what both MEPI and BMENA entail. The degree of political violence that some of the countries in the region have known is, with the exception of Algeria, not necessarily linked to the issue of democratic governance and needs to be examined through the specific aspects of national politics, given the enormous political, social, and economic differences that characterize these countries. A broad overview of the countries in the region is helpful in highlighting how the issue of democratic governance might not be so central in understanding political violence. As mentioned earlier, Algeria is the only exception to the general pattern in the region. In the Algerian case, the cancellation of the electoral results in January 1992—which had swept the Islamist movement to victory—and the imprisonment of thousands of members of the party had a very clear impact on the decision of the Islamist group to choose armed struggle in order to have the party reinstated to power. The brutal civil war that followed spun out of control with the emergence of mindless Islamist violence and the setting up of governmental death squads, but it should not be forgotten that the cancellation of the elections is what triggered the civil war. Even in this rather clear-cut case, however, it should be noted that the FIS was involved in violence for a relatively short period of time and that the party participated in peace talks with other Algerian political entities in order to arrive at a negotiated solution to the war as early as 1995. The Algerian military, however, dismissed this attempt and did not even participate in the talks. The type of Islamist extremist violence that began to emerge after 1995 and that was carried out by groups such as the Groupes Islamisques Arm´es (GIA) is more in line with salafism and would hardly be appeased by the reintroduction of democratic governance. The violence that swept through Egypt during the 1990s was quite different from the type of widespread political violence that characterized Algeria during the same period. It was in fact the product of a salafi ideology that certain small terrorist groups (Jamaat al-Islamiyya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad) subscribed to, and was not necessarily a reaction to the authoritarian Mubarak’s regime, but had much more to do with the wider problem of the legitimacy of the ruler to govern without making specific references to God’s authority. The absence of democratic procedures to determine the direction of the country was not the primary motivator for choosing violence, as a democratically elected leader, even one belonging to the Islamist camp, would have faced such a violent challenge to his legitimacy to rule. It is doubtful that these armed groups would have welcomed democratic rule, which in their ideology is equated with a form of government that bestows authority upon the people rather than to God, making such a government illegitimate. Specific references to this issue are

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made in the writings of the radical ideologue, Sayyid Qutb, to whom these groups look for ideological inspiration.30 It should be noted that some of the imprisoned leaders of both groups called for a cessation of hostilities and admitted that the armed struggle was not the “appropriate” means to make political demands,31 while other leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri have become involved in transnational terrorism.32 The same can be said for the very small violent minority groups that are active in Jordan and Morocco. The opening up of the political system to pluralism leading to the election of a leadership enjoying a popular mandate would not solve the problem of legitimacy and authority to rule, which is what these extremist groups are concerned about. The countries in the Arabian Peninsula face the same type of problem. In addition to this general point about extremist violent groups, it should be noted that countries in the region do not have the same authoritarian intensity and, while some scholars dismiss the idea of partial or semidemocracies,33 the degree of liberalism that is present seems to positively correlate with the increase of violent actions by extremist groups. This follows quite precisely from the assertion that more “liberalized” states are more easily targeted due to their relative openness. This would explain why Morocco and Egypt, which are considered to be less authoritarian than Tunisia and Syria, have experienced more political violence over the last decade. In this context, it should be emphasized that the very popular and more mainstream radical Islamist movements in most countries of the region do not subscribe any longer, and some never did, to the idea of overthrowing the current regimes through armed struggle. Most of the current Islamist leadership across the region has come to terms with the need for electoral democracy in order to get to power and transform society, having witnessed the catastrophic effects of the use of violence on the fabric of society. Through a combination of social activism and political demands for reform, such groups seem to have made the strategic decision to pressure their own governments to open up without resorting to the use of violence, which they routinely condemn.34 This is the case, for example, of the two largest Islamist movements in Morocco—the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and the Justice and Spirituality Group. It is also the case for the Muslim Brotherhood in both Egypt and Syria. In Syria, the Brotherhood attempted to remove Hafez Assad from power through an open armed rebellion in the early 1980s, but the uprising failed. Furthermore, such large groups have a very diverse supporting constituency, which includes the disenfranchised youth, as well as a relatively wealthy middle class, and they need to reconcile the diverging interests that arise.35 This “catch-all” characteristic makes these movements more moderate, as multiple influences have to be collated.

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However, the formal subscription of these movements to the procedures of democracy does not make them necessarily less radical in terms of the policies they would wish to implement once in power, particularly in terms of economic redistribution, foreign policy, and social behavior. This is an important aspect of the story of radical Islamism because participation in the construction of a democratic society is not synonymous with the abandoning of their “revolutionary” goals. It is, in fact, the fear that the electorate would mandate the implementation of such policies that prevents all the regimes and their international allies (if they have any) from undertaking the necessary reforms. The nature of radical Islamism is very complex, and if we are to understand the reasons why certain groups decide that only armed actions will deliver their political objectives, we have to be aware of the enormous differences that motivate Islamist groups to act. This has important repercussions on the relationship between democracy and political violence. A number of clusters of “Islamisms” can be identified in the current period. First of all, there are those Islamist groups that combine their political and social actions with what they perceive to be a national liberation struggle. This is the case of the Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hizbollah.36 Their armed struggle has not had much to do with issues of democratic legitimacy of the political space they operate in, and is instead the product of military occupation from outsiders.37 What is almost paradoxical about these two movements is that they operate on a rather democratic national political stage. Both Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority have systems that permit political pluralism and ensure a certain protection for individual rights and freedoms. The violence that stems from both Hamas and Hizbollah is not linked to the perception that violence is the only option to force the national arena open to their demands. The national space is in fact accessible to them, as the presence of Hizbollah Ministers in the Lebanese government and the Hamas victory in the January 2006 Palestinian elections illustrate. Their “violent extremism” is inextricably linked to what they regard as Israeli expansionism and colonialism, and the end of violence in this context is entirely independent from the democratization of Lebanon and Palestine. The second cluster of Islamism that can be identified is the one that makes references to the salafi tradition. Groups belonging to this cluster, as mentioned above, are not interested in “democratic politics” and would question the legitimacy of any ruler, even if it came to power through free and fair elections. To a large extent, the members belonging to these groups are not motivated to act through violence because their respective national political systems do not offer the means to express their demands, but are motivated by a wider sense of injustice that characterizes their outlook on the society they belong to. If national governments in the region were held accountable to their citizens, they would implement some of

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the policies that these groups approve of, but the fundamental problems of “divine authority and sanctioning” would remain. What would also remain is the possibility that such elected governments would implement polices that the electorate mandates, but are contrary to the perception of true Islam that these groups are attached to. This would once again drive them to fight, in their eyes, an illegitimate government. The third cluster of Islamism, to which the majority of movements belong to, can be labeled “the Brothers’ Islamism” and does not condone the use violence to replace the current regimes (at least, not any more). These groups have not abandoned their radical demands and policies, but by rejecting the use of violence they have made it clear to both supporters and rivals alike that they have already bought into the possibility and necessity of democracy in their respective countries. Those militants who follow such a path are unlikely to be attracted by more extremist groups, particularly if we take into account that the attempts to overthrow regimes in the past failed miserably and only brought increased repression on the movement itself. The varied nature of Islamism seems to indicate that the absence of democracy is not the primary motivator for extremism. Most violent groups would probably remain committed to the armed struggle even in the event of an opening up of the political system because of the problematic nature of the legitimacy to rule and the confrontational nature of the international situation between the West and the world of Islam. Radical Islamist groups that made the choice of nonviolence seem simply to be biding their time until the system collapses from within, and are certain that they already control society and need only to wait for the political system to formally acknowledge that. Finally, the two MENA regional movements that are truly committed to large-scale violence direct it against an external enemy rather than using it to contest the legitimacy of their own national political systems. There is a third aspect to violent Islamist extremism that must be examined: its international manifestations. French scholar Olivier Roy emphasizes that “it is the neo-fundamentalist international networks”38 which constitute a threat when they espouse violence in order to re-Islamize Muslim societies and when they espouse the Huntingtonian belief of a clash of civilizations based on irreconcilable cultural differences. The presence and activism of transnational Islamist terrorism based on such “cultural” premises is also unlikely to be the product of “national authoritarianism” and therefore it is unlikely that its disappearance will be achieved by democratizing the national political space. The ideological underpinnings of radical international Islamism is linked to the salafi ideology that would question democracy as the method through which leaders should be selected. Moreover, transnational extremist groups have the objective of recreating the Caliphate, which inevitably bypasses the national

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political stage. These groups largely attract people who are not necessarily disaffected by the absence of democracy in their respective countries, but are motivated by their belief that they are witnessing a cosmic struggle between injustice (the West and its policies) and justice.39 The democratization of the national political space would not diminish the appeal of such an outlook in the presence of Western activities that go beyond the mere support for local authoritarian regimes to include perceived military, cultural, and economic dominance and expansionism. DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY The literature on transitions to democracy has traditionally marginalized international factors from its explanations for the collapse of authoritarianism and the initiation of a democratic transition. Such an approach focusing exclusively on domestic explanatory factors has recently been challenged and, currently, it has become accepted that processes of democratization cannot be understood without making reference to the surrounding international environment.40 In particular, the focus is on the most important political actors in the system which have placed democracy promotion at the top of their foreign policy agenda. This is the case of both the United States and the European Union (both as a single entity and in its constituent members). It is assumed that such a prodemocracy international environment is particularly beneficial for those domestic actors who are pursuing the objective of democratization because they will increase the amount of resources (in terms of finances, diplomatic support, and legitimacy) available to them in their struggle to overcome those who resist democratization. Thus, the very positive role of the European Union in bringing about change in Eastern Europe is often highlighted,41 as is the role of the United States in contributing to the democratization of Latin America. However, such a positive role of the international community needs to be reassessed in light of the policies implemented in the Middle East and North Africa.42 In this region of the world, the international activism of both the United States and the European Union has been aimed at stopping processes of democratization when the outcome of it is perceived to be unfavorable to the stability of the international system and detrimental to their own interests. Starting with the transition to democracy in Algeria between 1988 and 1992, it is quite easy to demonstrate that the priority of ensuring a move away from authoritarianism in the country shifted quite considerably once it became clear to the international actors concerned—and particularly France—that the main beneficiary was going to be an Islamist party that was committed to radical policy changes. The rise of political Islam across the region had been identified by the late 1980s as the new menace that would affect the stability of the

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international system43 and both the EU and the United States began to undertake policies that would ensure the survival of the current friendly authoritarian regimes in the region, while at the same time, isolating the unfriendly authoritarian ones without pushing for their demise. The strategy of support for authoritarian regimes rested on diplomatic, military, and economic pillars. From a diplomatic point of view, the international community provided inclusion in international forums (for instance the Euro–Mediterranean strategy put in place by the EU) and ensured that these regimes would not suffer the political consequences of their authoritarianism by having sanctions placed on them due to their human rights abuses. From a military point of view, most of the authoritarian allies were gradually brought into the military structure of the United States and key European countries through joint maneuvers, training of officers, sales of weaponry, and access to military expertise. From an economic point of view, some countries—such as Algeria—were granted the rescheduling of debt, so that the government would have the necessary resources to fight the insurgency, while others signed free trade agreements with the EU (Morocco and Tunisia) and the Unied States (Morocco) that would permit the ruling elite to reap enormous economic benefits from the “crony” liberalization of trade. Egypt was virtually bankrolled by the United States as a reward for its role in Gulf War I, as was Jordan for the role it played in trying to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. All these benefits increased the amount of resources available to the regimes, which were then used to withstand the domestic pressures for democratization, allowing the ruling elite to reshape and renew the domestic constituencies upon which they could rely for political support. The evidence clearly points to the “anti-democracy” role that the international community played in the region for fear that the democratization process would reward parties that planned to reverse many of the policies of the regime they would be replacing. This policy of support for authoritarian but friendly regimes has not changed much after 9/11 despite the rhetoric emanating both from Washington and Brussels. The belief, which probably corresponds to the reality, that Islamist parties would sweep to power if free and fair elections were held does not allow the international community to decisively shift its support away from authoritarian rulers in favor of other domestic constituencies. There have been some attempts to put pressure on certain regimes like Egypt to become more accountable, but this has yielded very few results. The search for a liberal secular alternative to both the current regimes and to the Islamist parties has also failed to be successful because, at the moment, such an alternative simply is unavailable. The polarization of the political discourse between Islamists and regimes in power is what characterizes the region at this very moment, and the “third party” that Western powers would like to

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see emerge is not a viable option. Its potential representatives are usually intellectuals that have very little connection to the reality of the masses in terms of lifestyle and beliefs and whose discourse does not deal with the most important issues that ordinary citizens are preoccupied with. While openly or indirectly supporting friendly authoritarian regimes, the United States in particular has targeted unfriendly authoritarian regimes both diplomatically and militarily. One of the most often cited reasons for “targeting” regimes such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq is the absence of democracy in these countries, which in turn is the reason given for making them bear the responsibility of regional instability through the supporting of terrorism, through their anti-Israeli rhetoric and through the attempts to acquire sophisticated weaponry. It follows that very harsh measures ranging from economic sanctions to military invasion have led to surprising outcomes. The belief that by “forcing” such countries open to democracy, they would adopt more conciliatory international policies seems misguided. Evidence shows that diplomatic isolation and economic sanctions have paradoxically strengthened the authoritarian and conservative elites of both Syria and Iran, whose populations have rallied around the leadership once the country fell under the scrutiny and the pressure of the “international community.” The military invasion of Iraq, far from smoothing the road to Jerusalem and to democracy in the Middle East, has become the symbol of the cosmic struggle between the West and Islam, drawing wider support for salafi Islamism, a cause that enjoyed only limited appeal across the region. When all this is accounted for, the U.S.-sponsored initiatives and the EU-led Euro–Mediterranean partnership to promote democracy in the region lack, at best, credibility; at worst, they are hypocritical and specifically designed to continue the status quo. A NEW INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE REGION The promotion of democratic governance in the region by Western powers should certainly be an integral part of a strategy aiming at reducing national and international tensions and therefore reducing the appeal of violent political activity emanating from the region. The successful democratization of the Middle East and North Africa would be an important stabilizing factor, as the new regimes in power would enjoy electoral legitimacy and would be accountable to the electorate. The democratic process, by virtue of its pluralism, ensures that all sectors of society would have the possibility to influence public policymaking, which would be removed from the currently unaccountable leaderships. The democratization of the Middle East and North Africa, however, can only be successful if it meets the expectations of the local population and “respects” the choices of the

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electorate. When the end goal of democracy is subsumed to other strategic interests, it loses value and appeal. The inability of the United States and Europe to accept Islamist parties and movements thus far as potential democratic actors has fundamentally undermined the international efforts to encourage democracy. Thus, despite the rhetoric, material support has been granted to those friendly authoritarian regimes who are engaged in satisfying the economic and security interests of the West (broadly defined) in exchange for token liberalizing gestures that have created fac¸ade democracies through the region. The supposed post-9/11 policy changes with respect to how the theme of democracy in the region should be approached are, at closer scrutiny, quite disappointing and have not yet altered the suspicions of the West vis-`a-vis Islamist parties. This leads to a lack of credibility and further emboldens those who “speak out” against the hypocrisy of the West. Unless there is a real shift away from the preconceived notions that Islamist parties are bad for democracy, and there is a realization that a “third force”—which would be secular and liberal—is unlikely to emerge in the short term, the persistence of authoritarianism will be continually facilitated. Accepting Islamist parties as “partners” would likely entail a willingness to sacrifice certain interests in the short term and would entail accepting that new regimes would not be as close to the West as they are now. So far, such willingness does not exist. In addition, the attempt to reshape the “governance” map of the region through economic, diplomatic, and military pressure exercised against unfriendly regimes, in the absence of similar strategies adopted against “friends,” will continue to backfire. This is turn will only strengthen the extremist fringes pointing to double standards and their discourse will become increasingly compelling. What is even more worrying is that there seems very little given to the very real possibility that the issue of democratization in the region might be quite separate from the issue of political violence. Thus, the main problem for international strategies aimed at reducing political violence is that there might not necessarily be a strong link between democratization and terrorism. For instance, many current authoritarian regimes do not face violent extremist threats to their existence. The more popular opposition movement, the Islamists, seem to be quite content at the moment to be the dominant force in society and simply wait for the regime to fold and collapse. The main enemy for the West seems to be transnational terrorism, which derives legitimacy from a number of perceived Western “sins” separate from their support for authoritarian rulers. Democratization in this context is certainly a positive outcome in itself because it can help to ensure a degree of legitimacy that current rulers do not enjoy, but might not be the panacea that some expect it to be. In order to reduce the appeal of political violence, it might be necessary for the United

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States and the European Union to take into account other issues that are probably closer to explaining the violence emanating from the region. First of all, a reduction in political violence might stem from an equitable solution to the Palestinian issue. In this respect, it would be necessary to come to terms with the fact that the Oslo peace process is dead and buried. Palestinians do not believe in it any longer because of the lack of progress on key issues such as settlements, right of return for refugees, and the status of East Jerusalem. In this context, new actors have managed to come to the fore precisely by rejecting the structure of the agreement. This does not imply that Hamas is against peace per se and that its ideological goals cannot be pragmatically toned down. Much research in effect suggests quite the opposite,44 but in order for Hamas to be able to renounce violence, Israel needs to do more in terms of concessions and only the international community, specifically the United States, can force them to do that. As long as the United States is perceived in the region not to be an honest broker, but a backer of Israel, the plight of the Palestinians will be a mobilizing factor not only for local groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, but also a rallying cry for transnational terrorist groups pointing out that Israel enjoys the backing of the West in its attempt to put down the “Arab World.” A second policy shift that Western countries should make has to do with military and economic pressure on what they consider unfriendly regimes in the region. While economic and diplomatic sanctions can be a useful policy tool to send a signal to unfriendly authoritarian regimes that they need to modify their behavior and open up their political system if they are to fully participate in the international game and reap the benefits of constructive engagement, this cannot be done in the absence of a general policy that applies to all countries that are undemocratic. Western countries should adopt a policy of “equal treatment for equal dictators” because the continuation of a regional policy based on double standards can be easily used to highlight the hypocrisy of Western states and feeds into the belief that the real goal of the powerful West is to crush those states that stand up to its dominance and not the creation of more democratic societies. A third policy shift has to do with the war in Iraq, which, far from contributing to the stability of the area, is widely perceived as the new episode in the struggle between the crusading West and the world of Islam, and it constitutes a powerful recruiting tool for the international neofundamentalist movement. Opposition to the military incursion into Iraq by the vast majority of political actors in the region, be they secular or Islamist, had stemmed from the knowledge that such an undertaking would be detrimental to the cause of democracy and to the cause of civilizational dialogue. The current reality of the conflict bears witness to the fears that were expressed before the intervention. Military intervention should not

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be the default option for United States and some of its allies, because the legacy of its interventionism has profound negative repercussions on a region and on a public opinion that are already unfavorable to U.S. policies for both historical and present reasons. Devising a schedule for speedy withdrawal and giving up on the presence of military bases might be the signal that the United States is prepared to sacrifice short-term interests in favor of long-term stability, but this is unlikely to happen. If we add to this the credibility gap in promoting democracy that the West generally suffers from, it emerges quite clearly that, in isolation, democratization in the region might not solve the problem of political violence. The “war on terror” might be very long indeed. NOTES 1. Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). 2. Lisa Anderson, “Political Pacts, Liberalism and Democracy: The Tunisian National Pact of 1988,” Government and Opposition 26, no. 2(1991): 244–260. 3. Nicolas Beau and Jean-Pierre Tuquoi, Notre Ami Ben Ali. L’Envers du Miracle Tunisien (Paris: La D´ecouverte, 1999) and Larbi Sadiki, “The Search for Citizenship in Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy versus Unity,” Political Studies 50 (2002): 497–513. 4. On the Algerian democratic experiment, see William Quandt, Between Ballots and Bullets (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1998). 5. Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, “Waiting for Godot: Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review 25 (2004): 371–392. 6. Michael Willis, “After Hassan: A New Monarch in Morocco,” Mediterranean Politics 4 (1999): 115–128. 7. For reforms in Libya see Dirk Vanderwalle, “Qadafhi’s ‘Perestroika’: Economic and Political Liberalisation in Libya,” Middle East Journal 45 (1991): 216–231. 8. For reforms in Egypt in the late 1980s see Mona Makram-Ebeid, “Political Opposition in Egypt: Democratic Myth or Reality?” Middle East Journal 43 (1989): 423–436. 9. For reforms in Syria, see Volker Perthes, “Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation” in Contemporary Syria. Liberalisation between Cold War and Cold Peace, ed. Eberhard Kienle (London: British Academic Press, 1994) 44–71. 10. Jason Brownlee, “. . . And yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes,” Studies in Comparative International Development 37 (2002): 35–63. 11. Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Responses (London: Phoenix Press, 2002). 12. John Esposito, Unholy War. Terror in the Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 13. Adam Garfinkle, “The Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy,” The National Interest 70 (2002), 18–30. 14. Ali Abootalebi, “Civil society, Democracy and the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 2 (1998): 46–59.

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15. Augustus Norton, Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 1995/1996). 16. Clive Tempest, “Myths from Eastern Europe and the Legend of the West,” Democratization 4 (1997): 132–144. 17. Vicki Langohr, “Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics,” Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 181–203. 18. Sheri Berman, “Islamism, Revolution and Civil Society,” Perspectives on Politics 1 (2003): 257–272. 19. Michael Willis, “Political Parties in the Maghrib: The Illusion of Significance,” The Journal of North African Studies 7 (2002): 1–22. 20. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987). 21. Rex Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25 (1992): 69–97. 22. Guilain Denoeux, “The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam,” Middle East Policy 9 (2002): 61. 23. See for instance Holger Albrecht, “How Can Opposition Support Authoritarianism? Lessons from Egypt,” Democratization 12 (2005): 378–397; Ellen Lust-Okar, “Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition,” Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 159–179; and Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” Comparative Politics 36 (2004): 139–157. 24. Francesco Cavatorta, “The Failed Liberalisation of Algeria and the International Context: A Legacy of Stable Authoritarianism,” Journal of North African Studies 7 (2002): 23–43. 25. Daniel Brumberg, “Islamists and the Politics of Consensus,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 109–115. 26. Fareed Zakaria, “Islam, Democracy and Constitutional Liberalism,” Political Science Quarterly 119 (2004): 2. 27. Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions under Which Political Parties Turn to Terror Activities,” Comparative Politics 23 (1991): 423–438. 28. For an overview see William Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, “Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (2001): 155–164. 29. Katerina Dalacoura, “US Democracy Promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: A Critique,” International Affairs 85 (2005): 963–979. 30. An overview of Qutb’s political philosophy in Rocxanne Euben, Enemy in the Mirror. Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 31. Mustapha Kamel al-Sayyid, “The Other Face of the Islamist Movement,” Carnegie Papers 33 (2003). Available at http://www.ceip.org/pubs. 32. Montasser Al-Zayyat, The Road to Al Qaeda (London: Pluto Press, 2004). 33. Oliver Schlumberger, “The Arab Middle East and the Question of Democratization: Some Critical Remarks,” Democratization 7 (2000): 104–132. 34. Vickie Langohr, “Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamism and Electoral Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 591–610.

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35. See Gilles Kepel, Jihad. The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 36. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 37. For Hamas see Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) and for Hizbollah see Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah. The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004). 38. Olivier Roy, G´en´ealogie de l’Islamisme (Paris: Hachette, 2001) 93. 39. On this point see Jason Burke, Al Qaeda. The True Story of Al Qaeda (London: Penguin Books, 2004). 40. Jeffrey Haynes, “Comparative Politics and ‘Globalisation,’” European Political Science 2 (2003): 17–26; Mustafa Hamanreh, “Democratisation in the Mashreq: The Role of External Factors,” Mediterranean Politics 5 (2000): 77–95; and Hakan Yilmaz, “External–Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change,” Democratization 9 (2002): 67–84. 41. Laurence Whitehead, “Democracy by Convergence: Southern Europe” in The International Dimensions of Democratization, ed. Laurence Whitehead (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Geoffrey Pridham, “The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice and Inter-Regional Comparisons” in Building Democracy? The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe, ed. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring, and George Sandford (London: Leicester University Press, 1997). 42. Francesco Cavatorta, “Geopolitical Challenges to the Success of Democracy in North Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco,” Democratization 8 (2001): 175–194. 43. Michael Salla, “Political Islam and the West: A New Cold War or Convergence?” Third World Quarterly 18 (1997): 729–742. 44. See Jeroen Gunning, “Peace with Hamas? The Transforming Potential of Political Participation,” International Affairs 80 (2004): 221–231.

CHAPTER 5 AUTHORITARIAN AND CORRUPT GOVERNMENTS Lydia Khalil

Egypt, governed for over a quarter of a century by a perpetually renewable emergency law, is one of the most bureaucratically inefficient, unresponsive, and corrupt governments in the world. Its apathetic and weary citizenry toil within a stagnant economy and restrictive society. Recent attempts at government sponsored political reform were merely stopgap measures against the impetus for real reform called for by the opposition. Nigeria, under military rule for most of its history after independence, is seething with ethnic tension fueled by a fight over the control of its vast natural resources. Freedom of religion and expression are constitutionally guaranteed but not regularly practiced. Election tampering is commonplace, rendering results inconsequential. Touted as a key ally in the war on terror, Uzbekistan also has the dubious distinction of being included in Freedom House’s 2005 “Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies” list. The culmination of Uzbekistan’s repression came in May, 2005 during which hundreds of protesters were injured or killed in Andijon by military troops. The Uzbek government maintains that it was merely conducting an antiterrorism operation. Pakistan has come under the increasing influence of militant Islamists who criticize the government’s corruption and association with the United States. The Pakistani government, where security services wield total control, has an uneasy relationship with militant forces and tolerate the presence of dangerous Taliban holdouts inside their country. The absence of

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an independent legislature and viable economy prospects allow Islamic extremism to flourish.1 All of these states have two things in common. One, they are authoritarian in structure and corrupt in practice, deteriorating the legitimacy of their governments; and two, they all have “terrorist problems” or contribute to the widening international terrorist threat. These two common threads, authoritarianism and terrorism, are connected in a network of various cause and effect linkages. The cause and effect linkages between authoritarianism and terrorism can be broadly divided in three ways. 1. Authoritarian and corrupt governments are a causus belli for terrorist organizations. In other words, they are a reason, although not the only reason, for why terrorist organizations exist. 2. Authoritarian and corrupt governments enable terrorists. They can do this knowingly by sponsoring or tolerating terrorist groups, or unknowingly through ineffective and illegitimate governance. 3. They also inhibit an effective response against terrorism. Authoritarian governments are at their core weak governments. Weak governments are insecure, tend to overreact to internal threats, and are ineffective partners in the international fight against terrorism.

Research conducted by Freedom House found a direct correlation between terrorism and levels of freedom in societies. In studying the 5-year period between 1999 and 2003, Freedom House researchers found that 70 percent of all deaths from terrorism were caused by terrorists and terrorist groups originating in “Not Free” societies. In contrast, only 8 percent of all terrorist fatalities were generated by terrorists with origins in “Free” societies.2 This chapter will examine in more detail the multifaceted connections between authoritarian governance and terrorism. But first, one must start with some basic definitions and assumptions on what it means to be an authoritarian government. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, authoritarianism is the “principle of unqualified submission to authority, as opposed to individual freedom of thought and action. As a political system, authoritarianism is antidemocratic, in that political power is concentrated in a leader or small elite not constitutionally responsible to those governed. It differs from totalitarianism, in that authoritarian governments usually lack a guiding ideology, tolerate some pluralism in social organization, lack the power to mobilize the whole population in pursuit of national goals, and exercise their power within relatively predictable limits.”3

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In theory, authoritarian governments can be benevolent. But no matter how benign their intentions, authoritarian governments usually succumb to the accumulation of power for power’s sake. As James Madison famously phrased, “The essence of government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in human hands, will ever be liable to abuse.”4 Authoritarian governments, no matter what their intention, quickly lose touch with their citizenry. Authoritarian governments may or may not have been brought to power by the people, but once in power they tend to disregard the will of the people. The elite who govern arrogantly presume they know what is right or wrong for their country. They govern without input, leading to systematic resentment and dysfunction between state and citizen. Anyone who expresses a different view on the best interests or direction of the country is not only ignored but is believed to be plotting against the government or ruling party. Dissenting voices are dealt with harshly and often violently. Authoritarian governments routinely stifle civil liberties in order to maintain their hold on power and keep society in check. There is little to no recourse for the average citizen against abuses by the government. As such, authoritarian governments lack legitimacy among their population and in the eyes of the international community. Unchecked and uncontrolled, authoritarian governments are free to use whatever repressive means are necessary to stay in power. In authoritarian states, brutal enforcement of the regime trumps the rule of law. Any challenge to the status quo is perceived as a direct threat, therefore authoritarian governments will engage in reform only when necessary to stay in power, and only on their own terms. Recent reform activity in the Middle East, for example, has been limited and adaptive, enacted not necessarily to expand public participation in governance, but to ensure the regime’s survival.5 More often than not, authoritarian governments are also corrupt governments. Resources, privileges, and advantages are reserved for a select group of the people or ruling elite. Corruption encumbers the fair distribution of social services and adds another layer to the resentment caused by the lack of political participation. This corruption further erodes the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. AUTHORITARIANISM AS A CAUSUS BELLI As we expound upon the definition of authoritarianism, it is easy to see why authoritarian governments are resented by citizens who are not part of the elite few which the system sustains. But why and how does this resentment leads to terrorism?

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Terrorism manifests itself when resentment of the authoritarian state reaches a breaking point in an individual, often after many attempts to change it non violently. Because of its very structure, the state cannot be changed politically, thus leaving terrorist, and other subversive activity as the only option. There is no other way to affect change other than asymmetric, violent action. The country of Uzbekistan is a prime example. According to an International Crisis Group report on Uzbekistan, President Karimov has consolidated “immense power to the regime but [closes] off avenues of advancement for most people . . . the independent local NGO sector in Uzbekistan is on the verge of being wiped out, and even apolitical NGOs—associations of librarians and beekeepers—have been shut down. Of 273 NGOs registered in the province of Ferghana, over 100 closed between July and January, 2005.”6 Such repressive pressure has deepened dissatisfaction and increased social unrest, culminating in the Andijon massacre. In May, 2005 supporters of 23 local businessmen accused of being members of Akramiya, an Islamic extremist group, stormed the prison where they were being held. Uzbek security forces moved in to suppress the protesters and in the process fired upon anyone in the vicinity. The entire violent incident occurred because those who tried to defend the accused had no political recourse and had to resort to violent action. Citizens turn to terrorism instead of peaceful opposition politics in an effort to change their system, either because political efforts did not work in the past, or because they believe it could never work as the authoritarian government’s hold over the country is so strong. Often, there is simply no room in an authoritarian structure for political participation. Such action would either be entirely ineffective to effect change or it would invite suspicion, or worse, repression by political authorities. In Egypt, recent attempts at political reform generally failed to generate political freedom but invited further repression by the authorities. Ayman Nour, a leading political figure who tried to run in the presidential election, was not only harassed by the authorities but jailed under dubious charges that he forged signatures in support of his election bid. There were numerous accounts of peaceful demonstrators being harassed and beaten by the police merely for attempting to congregate.7 The failure of peaceful attempts at political change has fueled popular frustration and strengthened violent Islamist groups. Essam al Arian, spokesman for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood—a group that was part of the political coalition for change—stated, “If you support absolute power and prevent people from expressing their grievances, its like giving permission for them to take their grievances (to extremist groups.)”8

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To prove this point, new groups like Tawhid wal Jihad, one of the main groups implicated in the April attacks in Egypt’s Sinai resort areas, are gaining strength among certain segments in Egypt, especially within the long neglected Bedouin tribal areas. Their rise is fueled by deep-seated grievances toward the government that have not been allowed any other outlet. Tribal groups resent Cairo’s alternating interference and neglect and harsh security measures against their members.9 Taking up arms and engaging in acts of terrorism are not easy decisions for most. An individual engages in terrorism against an authoritarian state because they have become so disaffected and disillusioned that they have lost all hope for political change through other means. Radicalization is a gradual process. Many activists start out seeking an accommodation or understanding with those at the helm of the authoritarian system. Many times they start out seeking moderate changes. But their efforts are often for naught and they are heavily punished for their efforts. Osama bin Laden is the most prominent example of this dynamic. Since its founding, Saudi Arabia has been controlled by the al Saud royal family through a strict system of Wahhabi Islam. No other body or individual has the ability to affect the government in any significant way. Unevenly distributed wealth, its importance as the world’s leading oil producer, and limited freedoms is a combustible mixture affecting Saudi society. After years of petitioning the Saudi Arabian government to change its corrupt policies and reverse its alliance with the United States, Osama bin Laden openly declared jihad on the Saudi government and America in 1996. He wrote, “I, myself, have offered my advice to the rulers two decades ago through grand scholars but nothing has changed. I have also addressed the problem directly with the deputy interior minister . . . but I got no response there as well . . . The Saudi interior minister made it very clear that if the reform activists do not accept the king’s legislation and policies, then the only dialogue the Saudi Arabian government will have with them will be with the sword and rifle.”10 Terrorism, with its secretive, violent, and sensationalist character, is a perfect anecdote to the difficulties of more peaceful political methods. Its secretive nature allows its proponents to operate in a repressive society. The unexpected timing of terrorist attacks jars an authoritarian government’s perception of its own power, control, and awareness of its own society. Security is destabilizes to the point where the authoritarian government’s only legitimate claim, the ability to provide security for its society, is denied. It also serves to motivate support among the population for the

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terrorists because the perception of the government’s invincibility is shattered. Once people see the government can be challenged and threatened, terrorist tactics are justified by their results. To be sure, terrorists are motivated by other factors besides repression or lack of political representation under authoritarian governments. The chaos of a failed state and lack of economic opportunity are alternative or additional motivators. Terrorists can be motivated by religious and ideological factors that could just as easily manifest themselves under democratic societies. But autocratic or authoritarian governments are the political systems most likely to breed terrorism. A recent study by Alan Krueger and David Laitin concluded that, contrary to common one thesis, lack of economic opportunity could not alone explain the emergence of terrorism. After analyzing U.S. State Department databases on terrorism attacks, they found no evidence to suggest poorer countries generate more terrorism.11 Alberto Abadie, professor of public policy at Harvard University, expanded upon their research when he analyzed reports by the World Markets Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index, which evaluates the level of terrorist risk of 186 countries around the world. His findings corroborated Krueger and Laitin’s analysis, but also revealed that incidents of terrorism relate to a country’s level of political freedom. Abadie concluded that democracies enjoyed the lowest levels of terrorism and that autocratic regimes suffer higher levels of terrorism than democracies.12 AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS ENABLING TERRORISTS Unknowingly Authoritarian governments are not only a cause for terrorism, but they also knowingly and unknowingly enable terrorist violence in their own societies and spread it regionally and internationally. Terrorist organizations tend to mimic the authoritarian structure and tactics of the governments that inspired their formation, the very governments they are trying to fight against. Like authoritarian governments, terrorist organizations believe that the end justifies the means. As Kenneth Roth observes, “Their political or social vision justifies the deliberate taking of civilian lives in violation of the most basic human rights.”13 Terrorist violence can be characterized as another form of repression. Just as societies under authoritarian governments are under the mercy of the capricious use of violence by their governments, so too do terrorist organizations inflict the same sense of uncertainty. Because terrorists and would-be terrorists have lived under an authoritarian mode of organization and structure, they absorb this way of

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thinking into their mindsets, philosophies, and administration. Citizens who want change in a freer system usually can accomplish this through non-violent political methods. That option is not available to those living under an authoritarian system, thus they adopt the violent, strong-arm tactics of the governments they have lived under. Moreover, research finds that the more repressive the state of origin, the more brutal the terrorist. According to a Freedom House report, “terrorists from dictatorial and repressive societies that brutalize their inhabitants are themselves significantly more brutal than terrorists born and acculturated in democratic societies . . . If we exclude 9/11’s fatalities, terrorists from closed societies are over twice as lethal as their counterparts from less repressive states.”14 Terrorist groups—although they may enjoy the support of a wide subset of the population because they are challenging the government when no one else is—practice the same hubris of authoritarian governments. They claim to speak for the masses and inflict violence onto their societies and sometimes the international community, to accomplish what they believe is best for the people. Authoritarian governments can also enable terrorists by serving as a uniter of disparate groups, making the violent opposition that much stronger. Anger and frustration against the government can serve as the motivating factor for otherwise unrelated or even competing groups to come together to fight against the government. We have seen terrorist or insurgent groups with contradictory ideologies come together to fight an authoritarian government, even if one group believes that the other is almost as bad as the authoritarian government in power; the operative phrase being, almost as bad. The repression and severe retaliation by authoritarian governments against groups that are a threat to their rule pushes groups to form alliances of convenience. Authoritarian societies also tend to be corrupt societies. Corruption goes hand in hand with criminality, and criminal networks facilitate the logistics of terrorist operations. Black market networks used by both criminals and terrorists allow terrorist groups to obtain weapons, channel funds, communicate and plan outside the government’s purview.15 Many countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, are havens for terrorist financing activities. They have lax banking regulations, corrupt bureaucracies, lagging law enforcement, and porous borders.16 The Southeast Asian financial sector has a notorious reputation for money laundering, and the region has long been a center for transnational criminal activity. International terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have exploited these facts in order to distribute and transfer funding and supplies throughout the region and internationally.

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For example, Jamal Ahmed al Fadl, a former al Qaeda member, testified that bin Laden frequently used Islamic banks in Malaysia to move money. Malaysia is known to be one of the world’s preeminent Islamic banking centers, with deep ties to Middle Eastern businesses, banks, and charities. Al Qaeda first began channeling funds through Southeast Asia in the early 1990s. Bin Laden’s brother-in-law was responsible for the Islamic International Relief Organization in the Philippines, a fund that was used to funnel arms and money. JI established companies and received contracts and business from its supporters; they then returned the proceeds back into the organization through a special fund called Infaq Fisbilillah.17 Knowingly Authoritarian governments also knowingly enable terrorist groups either by sponsoring them or tolerating them on some level. Insecure governments realize the threat terrorist organizations pose to their rule and ability to stay in power. Some governments believe that by accommodating terrorist groups in a limited way they can influence their behavior or co-opt their members. The Pakistani government, knowing full well it has little control over vast swaths of territory in its own state, has tried to seek an accommodation with Pashtun militants and the foreign fighters they harbor through the “Shakai Agreement” in April, 2004. This agreement allows foreign fighters to remain in Pakistan if they renounce terrorism and turn in their weapons. The accommodation did little good, inviting instead further attacks on government interests.18 Rumors of “special relationships” between Pakistani militants and members of Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence (ISI), the country’s intelligence and security service, are rife. Despite Pakistan’s public commitment to the war on terror, international counterterrorism officials are finding increasing evidence to suggest that Pakistani militants and Taliban members continue to receive assistance from elements of Pakistan’s intelligence services. ISI has hosted many terrorist training camps on Pakistani soil and supports such groups as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the Harkat-ulMujahideen, the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-Islami, the Tehreek-e-Jehadi-Islami, the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and the Jaish-e-Mohammad. These groups wage holy war on India, Pakistan’s main rival, but they are also a destabilizing element for Pakistan itself.19 Pakistan is not the only authoritarian government to tolerate, or even encourage the actions of a terrorist group that may be destabilizing to a rival neighbor. The most recent example is Iran’s sponsorship of Hizbollah, a Lebanese political party cum militia responsible for spreading terrorist violence inside Lebanon and into Israel.

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When Hizbollah first formed in the 1980s it was a weak, disheveled Shia militia overshadowed by the more powerful Amal movement that supported American and Israeli policy in Lebanon.20 Now, Hizbollah is powerful enough to spark a regional war, thanks to support from such state sponsors as Iran and Syria. As Daniel Byman notes, “Iran hoped to export its Islamic revolution to Lebanon, and both Syria and Iran sought to use the Shiites as a proxy force against Israel. With support from Damascus, Tehran helped organize, arm, train, inspire, and unite various Shiite groups into the movement that became known as Hizbollah”21 AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENTS INHIBITING EFFECTIVE RESPONSE AGAINST TERRORISM The methods used by authoritarian governments to deter terrorist violence can actually contribute to it. Since authoritarian governments have little restriction on their means and methods, they can take swift, unchecked action against terrorist groups. While this may seem good for counterterrorism efforts, it usually leads to irresponsible and disproportionate behavior by the security services.22 Terrorism is a complex phenomenon, but authoritarian governments address their security problems only by flexing more of their power. Authoritarian governments, although they may project strength, are very insecure and easily overreact to internal challenges. Shows of force after a terrorist incident can end up having the opposite effect. In an effort to demonstrate their hold on power after a challenge, they demonstrate their weakness. An authoritarian government’s hold on power does not come from any legitimacy but from force and coercion. When they demonstrate that force is their only answer to addressing their terrorist threat—instead of, say, enacting political reforms—they erode their legitimacy further. Terrorist attacks are an attempt to demonstrate this weakness. Egypt’s counterterrorism policies clearly demonstrate this dynamic. Georgetown professor Samir Shehata writes that “Political reform and democratization are directly related to the problem of terrorism in Egypt. In order to effectively reduce terrorism, the government must open up more political space rather than further restrict it. Genuine political reform, resulting in better governance, the enhanced rule of law and increasing transparency will prove much more effective over the medium to long term in reducing political violence than restrictive legislation, coercion and a narrow focus on security. Greater political freedom will not only result in better governance . . . it will create an Egypt where no one feels the need to resort to political violence because everyone has the opportunity to effect peaceful political change.”23

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Authoritarian governments are not encumbered by human rights regulations or considerations when responding to security threats or challenges to their power. When an attack occurs, the typical response is an indiscriminant and severe crackdown against suspicious groups and sympathizers. For terrorist organizations, this can serve as a boon to their cause. Terrorists hope to elicit an overreaction to emphasize their point against the government and generate greater animosity from the general population, as the general population is greatly affected by authoritarian government crackdowns. Civil liberties of ordinary citizens are further eroded in the name of security. They could also very well be mistakenly caught up in indiscriminant security sweeps. Government overreaction justifies the terrorists’ cause and can serve as a recruiting tool for more supporters and fighters. While a severe security response after an attack occurs is a decent short-term solution, in the long term it only serves to broaden and accelerate the resistance against authoritarianism. They inspire others to join the terrorists’ ranks and they broaden the wider circle of sympathizers who shelter and indirectly support terrorist organizations. Government security crackdowns in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region have prompted legislators to challenge the powerful executive government’s strategy. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force have waged a violent campaign for greater local control of oil wealth, and is responsible for a spate of kidnappings of oil workers for ransom. Indiscriminant security crackdowns of their region have only led to an increase in violent activity and greater support for the militant groups. As Nigerian legislator Anthony Aziegbemi has observed, “Outright criminals . . . have to be separated from the normal and appropriate agitation of people of the Niger Delta for more developmental projects. Those people have to be dealt with separately.”24 The case of Nigeria represents a complex problem throughout the African continent. In their analysis of West Africa’s security challenges, James Forest and Matt Sousa note that “Authoritarian regimes are often correlated with a history of conflict, political violence, and endemic insecurity. In many of these cases, the government of a resource-rich nation aligned itself with foreign companies and governments willing to pay handsomely for these resources, even at the expense of those citizens who have entrusted these government leaders with their well-being. The wealth derived from these natural resources has thus fueled corrupt, authoritarian regimes in several countries of the region, whose citizens come to view their national institutions as ‘prizes’ to be won and exploited, rather than as forums for national government.”25 In essence, as noted African scholar George Ayittey once observed, “What keeps Africans poor is their powerlessness to rid themselves of predatory governments or force

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existing ones to adopt the right policies in a peaceful way.”26 As a result, many groups are able to rationalize the use of violence—including terrorism—as a means for confronting these authoritarian regimes, and can draw on local support for their efforts. As the circle of support grows around terrorist organizations, the circle of cooperation for the government shrinks. Any government fighting terrorists needs the support of its citizens, but the antiterrorism policies of authoritarian governments serve to alienate the population further, rendering the counterterrorism policies counterproductive. Although repressive security crackdowns may yield arrests and stifle the actions of one particular organization, repression’s long-term result is the generation of replacements. Brutal and indiscriminant tactics also serve to further radicalize those who were already dabbling in violent opposition. Killings, jail time, and reprisals against a terrorist’s family—all common responses of authoritarian governments against terrorists—radicalize individuals further and strengthen the resolve of terrorist organizations. One prominent example of this is Ayman al-Zawahiri. He had always been religiously conservative and politically aware. As a teenager he joined the Muslim Brotherhood, which was an outlawed organization in Egypt due to its antiregime activities. When his challenges to the regime became too much, he was thrown in jail and mingled with more radical militant Islamic groups. It was in an Egyptian jail that he joined the more violent Egyptian Jihad, eventually rising to head the organization.27 It did not take long for Zawahiri to link up with bin Laden, a citizen of a neighboring autocratic regime, and expand their spite of origin to the whole international system led by the United States that they believed supported the existence of such regimes. Zawahiri was radicalized to a point where he has publicly denounced the Muslim Brotherhood, the source of inspiration for many militant salafists, for participating in state sponsored elections.28 The argument that authoritarian governments enable terrorists and are in and of themselves a cause for terrorist formations is a controversial one. Even the notion that the particular form of government is as significant as the actions of the government is not an automatic assumption. Some analysts would even argue the opposite point, that democracies, instead of autocracies, are more conducive to terrorist activity. The argument is that it is easier for terrorist organizations to organize in democracies, and that terrorism is more likely to be used against the state as an agent for change. Many experts cite Iraq as an example. During Saddam’s repression, terrorism was nonexistent due to the highly repressive nature of the society and the severe consequences associated with challenging the regime.

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Since the American-led military invasion unseated him from power and set in motion Iraq’s democratic transition, terrorism has mutated into a full-blown insurgency and is now on the verge of civil war. Juan Cole has argued that it is democratic openings coupled with foreign military occupation that has led to increased instances of terrorism, not authoritarian regimes.29 While American military occupation of Iraq is certainly a factor in terrorist insurgency waged in Iraq, there is another factor related to its political transition and lack of political opportunity for many of its citizens. Not all Iraqis have benefited from the democratic opening, and believe that Iraq under occupation today is more authoritarian than under Saddam. It turns out that the picture is more complicated than this. Interestingly, Abadie’s research also reveals that it was countries with transitioning levels of political freedom that experienced the most terrorism. Iraq falls into this category. Abadie’s analysis is consistent with the earlier work of Mansfield and Snyder. Their widely accepted theory supports the democratic peace thesis that established democracies do not fight each other and are involved in less violent conflict. But it also added an interesting twist that it was democratizing states that were most prone to violence.30 According to Abadie, “. . . intermediate levels of political freedom are often experienced during political transitions. It is when governments are weak that conditions are favorable for the appearance of terrorism. This is consistent with the observed increase in terrorism in countries transitioning from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, like currently in Iraq, and previously in Russia and Spain.”31 Not long ago, it was thought that authoritarian governments would serve as bulwarks against terrorism. As long as the government was secular and pro-Western, U.S. policymakers believed that these regimes served international and regional security interests. They kept religious extremism and communism in check. However, since September 11th, this practice has been called into question. As Thomas Carothers observes, “The fact that the 9/11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and Egypt provoked many American observers to ask whether such regimes are instead breeding grounds for terrorism.. . . In the two years since, the U.S. policy establishment has come to believe that promoting democracy in the Middle East should be a component of the war on terrorism—part of a broader effort to go beyond the active pursuit of terrorist groups to address the underlying roots of terrorism.”32 Saudi Arabia has come under intense scrutiny and criticism since the September 11th attacks 5 years ago and has launched an international public relations campaign to restore its image. Despite its public relations

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efforts, Saudi Arabia remains both a source and target of (Islamic) terrorists. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are not the poorest countries in the world; in fact Saudi Arabia has many extremely wealthy citizens. And although they are not the most efficient states, nor are they failed states. The 9/11 hijackers were in fact upper- to middle class and well educated. Their problem was not economic depravation; rather, it was political depravation. They lacked the ability and the opportunity to advance their political and social goals through the political system. The countries that make up our world today are a composite of established democracies, democratizing states, and autocratic governments. Authoritarian states are incompatible with the democratic trend sweeping the international system. When you have a democratic trend and holdout autocratic states, it is a potent mixture that fuels terrorist activity. The Middle East, an area of special concern to counterterrorism analysts, is particularly unique because in this era of globalization, it had become increasingly unfree. As Fareed Zakaria notes, “The region was breeding terror because it had developed deep dysfunctions caused by decades of repression and an almost total lack of political, economic, and social modernization.”33 In the age of globalization citizens of these autocratic states are no longer isolated in today’s world, and the relative disparity between their freedom and others in the world generates resentment. Unfortunately, it is not just the problem of these particular governments. Terrorism stemming from local grievances translates into international terrorism. We can no longer ignore the domestic character of states whose actions foment terrorism. Bluntly stated, authoritarian states are contributing to the international terrorist threats. Terrorists are originating from these countries and while their grievances may be local in nature, their anger is easily redirected toward powerful countries, namely in the west, who terrorists believe allow the authoritarian states to continue. Bin Laden and those he inspires identify the United States and the Western world as the core enablers of authoritarianism. Their own domestic societies may not be authoritarian, but they are the backbone of the international system that acquiesces to and sustains authoritarian governments for their own geopolitical interests. Although al Qaeda encompasses this definition, its goals and methods clearly go above and beyond this traditional characterization of terrorism. Al Qaeda does not have finite political ends. Rather, it seeks to impose an alternative worldview to the one founded, led, and spread by the United States and the Western world. Al Qaeda is unlike any other terrorist group—so much so that it is not necessarily accurate to label al Qaeda as merely a terrorist organization. It is much bigger than that. It is a wider movement, formed

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as a response to America’s primacy and a desire to establish an Islamic alternative. Richard Betts states in his analysis “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: The Tactical Advantages of Terror,” that American global primacy is one of the causes of this war. It animates both the terrorists’ purposes and their choice of tactics. To groups like al Qaida, the United States is the enemy because American military power dominates their world, supports corrupt governments in their countries, and backs Israelis against Muslims; American cultural power insults their religion and pollutes their societies; and American economic power makes all these intrusions and desecrations possible.34

We can no longer accept that authoritarian states are a bulwark against terrorism. We can no longer reluctantly accept the presence of authoritarian governments because they say they will cooperate in the international terrorist effort. Authoritarian states are “bad citizens;” they do not and cannot help the international effort against international terrorism. On the contrary, authoritarian and repressive governments are themselves a cause of terrorism. Authoritarian states may have the tactical capability and even the will to cooperate, but their assistance is tainted and their long-term usefulness is doubtful. As Edward Marks observes, “Weak states, even when desirous of doing so, are unable to undertake effective efforts to deter, disrupt and respond to terrorist attacks.”35 Instead, the United States and the international community must put these authoritarian, corrupt, and illegitimate governments that foment terrorism in a negative spotlight. This will allow us to put the focus back to states. Terrorism is an asymmetric threat that states are little equipped to fight, but by returning the focus back to states, this will make our arsenal more effective. Diplomacy and state-to-state relations are more effective against fighting the core causes of terrorism than dispatching Special Forces and intelligence personnel on a wild goose chase through hostile territories. Numerous studies now indicate that stable democracies generate fewer and less lethal terrorists than autocracies. “In order to successfully wage a war of ideas against a such a lethal enemy, the human benefits of greater political, civil and economic freedom must be consistently encouraged . . . Even if the war on terror scores significant intelligence, security and military achievements, long term success can be best secured if it is accompanied by democratic reform and liberalization of the world’s most repressive and politically closed regimes.”36 Mobilizing the international

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community against authoritarian regimes in the name of effective longterm counterterrorism efforts is needed to put a check on authoritarian governments that breed this threat.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the New York Police Department. NOTES 1. See Freedom House, Freedom in the World publications, available at www.freedomhouse.org, and United States State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism and Country Reports on Terrorism, available at www.state. gov. 2. Aili Piano and Arch Puddington, eds. Freedom in the World 2005: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Liberties (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers and Freedom House, Inc., 2005). 3. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, available at http://www.britannica. com/. 4. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, The Federalist: A Collection of Essays in Favour of the New Constitution (New York: Mentor, 1999 [1788]). 5. Mona Yacoubian, “Fostering Democracy in the Middle East: Defeating Terrorism with Ballots,” In Congressional Testimony U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, May 17, 2005. Available at http://www.usip. org/congress/testimony/2005/0517 yacoubian.html. 6. “Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 45, February 16, 2006. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/ home/index.cfm?id=3952&l=1. 7. Ahdaf Soueif, “A Confrontation to Hold of Collapse and Revolution,” The Guardian May 26, 2006; “Islamists Say Egyptian Police Block Them from Voting,” Kuwait Times, May 29, 2006. 8. T. Christian Miller, “Arab Regimes Breed Discontent and Anger at U.S., Analysts Say,” Los Angeles Times, October 8, 2001. 9. Chris Zambelis, “Egypt Attacks May Indicate Rising Sinai Bedouin Insurgency,” Terrorism Focus- Jamestown Foundation 3, no. 19 (May 17, 2006). Available at www.jamestown.org. 10. Osama Bin Laden, “Statement to Saudi Rulers,” December 16, 2004. 11. Alan Krueger, David Laitin, and Jitka Maleˇckov´a, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 4 (Winter 2003), 119-144. 12. Alberto Abadie, “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism,” American Economic Review 96, Issue 2, (2006), 50–56. 13. Kenneth Roth, “Counterterrorism and Human Rights: An Essential Alliance.” (Paper presented to the Princeton Project on National Security Conference,

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The Nexus of Terrorism and WMDs: Developing a Consensus, December 12–14, 2004, Princeton University.) 14. Piano and Puddington, Freedom in the World 2005. 15. Louise Shelley, “The Globalization of Crime and Terrorism,” EJournalUSA—The Challenges of Globalization 11, no. 1 (February 2006). Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/pub/ejournalusa.html. 16. Sheldon Simon, “Southeast Asia” in Strategic Asia, 2002-2003: Asian Aftershocks, eds. Richard Ellings and Aaron Friedberg (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), 309–350. 17. Zachary Abuza, “The War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” Strategic Asia, 2003–2004: Fragility and Crisis, eds. Richard Ellings and Robert Scalapino (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002), 321–354. 18. Francis T. Miko, coordinator, “Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Report and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 10, 2004). 19. Tunku Varadarajan, “America’s Allies for the Long Haul,” The Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2001. 20. For a detailed analysis of Hizbollah, please see the chapter by Rick Wrona in Volume 3 of this publication. 21. Daniel Byman, “Should Hezbollah Be Next?” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003), 54–66. 22. Roth, “Counterterrorism and Human Rights: An Essential Alliance.” 23. Samir Shehata, “Authoritarian Mechanics,” Al Ahram Weekly Online, May 24, 2006. Available at www.weekly.ahram.org.eg. 24. Gilbert Da Costa, “Nigerian Lawmaker Seeks Review of Crackdown in Delta,” Voice of America News, August 30, 2006. 25. James J.F. Forest and Matt Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006) 103 26. George B.N. Ayittey, Africa in Chaos (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999) 21. 27. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Hisad Al-Murr (The Bitter Harvest) (Amman, Jordan: Dar al-Bayareq, 1991). 28. Lydia Khalil, “Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood: United By Strategy, Divided by Tactics,” Terrorism Monitor-Jamestown Foundation 4, no. 6 (March 23, 2006), 7–9. Available at www.jamestown.org. 29. Juan Cole, “Don’t Stop With Syria’s Occupation,” Antiwar.com (March 8 2005). Available at http://www.antiwar.com/cole/?articleid=5106. 30. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War,” International Organization 56, no. 2. (2002), 297 337. 31. Alberto Abadie, “Breeding Terror,” New York Post, December 22, 2004. ‘ 32. Thomas Carothers, “Democracy: Terrorism’s Uncertain Antidote,” Current History (December 2003), 403–406. 33. Farid Zakaria, “Freedom’s March: The President Has Been Right on Some Big Questions. Now if He Can Get the Little Stuff Right, He’ll Change the World,” Newsweek, March 14, 2005. 34. Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: The Tactical Advantages of Terror,” in September 11, Terrorist Attacks, and U.S. Foreign Policy,

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ed. Demetrios James Caraley. (Washington, DC: Academy of Political Science, 2002). 35. Edward Marks, “The War on Terrorism: The Critical Role of Governments,” American Diplomacy IX, no. 4 (2004), 43–49. 36. Piano and Puddington, Freedom in the World 2005.

CHAPTER 6 THE FAILED STATE Matthew H. Wahlert

Many political scientists and security analysts have turned to an examination of the failed state phenomenon in their research on counterterrorism. Furthermore, the Bush administration—in recognition of the serious nature of the problem—dealt with the issue in the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the National Security Strategy of 2006, both of which specifically pointed to the importance of addressing both failed and failing states as a part of U.S. national security.1 Failed states have become an important research agenda for academics as well as a topic of discussion for security specialists. This chapter will attempt to serve as an introduction to many of the issues concerning state failure as they relate to the broader effort to fight terrorism. In common parlance and everyday usage, the idea of a state entails a government’s ability to maintain a monopoly of power over recognizable borders. As a result, a failed state would consist of a government unable to maintain their monopoly over force. That is, other actors—nonstate actors, often in the form of terrorists and criminal organizations—enjoy the ability to project force in competition to the state. In short, the failed state argument maintains that the inability of a state to control its own territory creates a vacuum of power from which the nonstate actor can usurp state power and enjoy a freedom of action within that state. Indeed, one may point to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda as a clear example of the role of failed states during an era of terrorism. Bin Laden utilized the freedom of activity inherent to Sudan and, later, Afghanistan in order to create a global terror organization. Despite efforts from many countries, including the United States, bin Laden remained unmolested in other sovereign states. Any attempt to kill or capture bin Laden would have involved (and did involve) a violation of Sudan’s sovereignty, in the case of a Saudi attempt to assassinate bin Laden, or Afghanistan’s sovereignty,

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as the United States did during the Clinton administration after the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa. More importantly, the ability of bin Laden to fade into the countryside and continuously evade capture or elimination and move about without concern for government law enforcement officials points to the haven provided by failed states for terrorists and other criminals. HISTORICAL LESSONS Although the failed state may have been a recent image of political scientists, the reality of failed states as important variables in a state’s security is really not a new development. In the United States, during the presidential administrations of William Howard Taft (1908–1912) and Woodrow Wilson (1912–1920), Mexico was a state in turmoil—and, perhaps, embodied many of the characteristics of a failing state. Mexico’s erstwhile corrupt dictator Porfirio Diaz had been overthrown in 1910 by the populist Francisco Madero. Although Madero offered a policy with a number of democratic reforms, he soon wore out his welcome with American business interests. With the encouragement of the United States, Madero was soon overthrown by Victoriano Huerta. Huerta represented a more pro-U.S. and pro-business perspective than Diaz. However, Huerta’s government murdered Madero and in doing so forced the United States to withhold recognition of the Huerta regime for image reasons—the United States did not want to be closely aligned with such a violent regime. A power struggle inside Mexico ensued, lasting for several years and, ultimately, impacting the national security of the United States. In 1914, a leading opposition figure, Venustiano Carranza seized control of Mexico. Wilson, upset over Carranza’s failure to accept American advice in the creation of a new Mexican government, considered supporting another potential leader—Pancho Villa. Villa was a former aide and lieutenant to Carranza who had created his own army. By late 1915, Wilson finally decided on preliminary recognition for the Carranza regime. However, Villa now became angry at what he perceived as a betrayal by the United States, and a series of attacks followed. In January 1916, Villa seized 16 American miners from a train in northern Mexico and murdered them. Two months later, Villa and his army raided Columbus, New Mexico and killed 17 more Americans. The United States, under General John J. Pershing and with the permission of Carranza, entered Mexico in pursuit of Villa. Villa, of course, was never captured. However, U.S. forces and Mexican forces loyal to Carranza clashed twice. The situation stood perilously close to war. Wilson’s withdraw of American troops and a formal recognition of Carranza eased tensions. The story of Pancho Villa illustrates the importance of failed states. A failing state—or at least a chaotic state—on the immediate southern

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border certainly had broader national security implications. In the long term, the results may have been even more problematic. Indeed, Germany recognized the strain in Mexican–U.S. relations and, on the eve of World War I, attempted to push Mexico into a war with the United States with the promise of regaining territory lost during the Mexican–American War in an offer made in what is now simply called the Zimmerman telegram. Although it may be impossible to prove or disprove, one could argue that the experience of Pancho Villa and Carranza were part of the impetus for the so-called Zimmerman Telegram and Germany’s attempt to widen World War I. In this case, the failing state had security implications well beyond the direct results of Villa’s attacks. But also, the story of Villa indicates the importance of maintaining a state’s ability to deal with challenges to its authority. In fact, another lesson of state strength was learned even earlier in the early history of the United States. After the War for Independence with Great Britain, the Articles of Confederation were established to serve as a road map for governance, but they created a very weak and decentralized form of government. Subsequently, war veteran Daniel Shays (and others)—behaving as a nonstate actor—challenged the government’s foreclosure and sale of farms during the summer of 1786, eventually taking up arms in what became known as Shays Rebellion. The lack of a strong central government and the inability of the Articles to create a counterforce to Shays eventually led to the hiring of a state militia by wealthy businessmen. The Rebellion was defeated in January 1787, but at the same time, elites learned a valuable lesson about the ability of nonstate actors to challenge the government’s monopoly on the use of force. A direct result of these events was the push for a stronger government. In fact, while a 1786 meeting in Annapolis to discuss the Articles drew only five state delegates, after Shays Rebellion the 1787 Constitutional Convention boasted participation of 55 delegates from all states except Rhode Island. While Shays Rebellion serves as an analogy for the weak and ineffective centralized government which resulted from the Articles of Confederation, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 illustrates how a stronger centralized government can deal effectively with threats to the state’s monopoly on the use of force. In 1794, farmers in western Pennsylvania refused to pay new excise taxes on whiskey—often used as a means of currency in the region. George Washington responded by calling on the militias of three states and personally marching an army of approximately 15,000—a force larger than he had ever commanded in the Revolutionary War—in order to meet the threat. Needless to say, the Whiskey Rebellion was quickly quashed. Thus, both events ultimately illustrate the importance of a state maintaining a monopoly over the use of force. Whether 1794 or 1914, the most important lesson from these examples is that a state’s national security relies to a considerable extent on its power to govern its people,

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as well as the power of its neighbors to govern their own people effectively. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt realized the importance of what we would later call failed and failing states, when he issued the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine closed the Americas off from European colonization in 1823. Roosevelt reasoned that European aggression in the region of the Americas could come due to a state’s instability—very close to what we would currently define as a failing state. Hence, Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States could interfere with neighbors unable to maintain their own sovereignty. The only modern difference is that globalization has made all states virtual neighbors. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES The discussion over failed states results in a number of theoretical and policy questions, however, that must be addressed in order to more fully understand the role of such states. The most obvious question is how do we measure a failed state? Certainly, every government has a section of territory where the state lacks a monopoly on power. Particular areas of the United States feature rival power centers in the form of gangs or other criminal organizations. In fact, police are often reluctant to enter such areas—does that make the United States a failed state? In addition, the United States clearly lacks control over its southern borders. Again, should we consider that lack of control as defining a failed state? To be sure, the United States would not, under even the strictest measures, be considered a failing or failed state. The point is, however, that the obvious examples of a failed state are somewhat easy to point out. At some level, moreover, the action becomes somewhat subjective and open to a great deal of discussion. Portions of Colombia are under the exclusive control of the narco-terrorist group FARC; large portions of Afghanistan—especially outside of Kabul—remain in the control of warlords; the Baluchistan portion of Pakistan certainly lacks a government monopoly of power; and many other germane examples exist worldwide. So, we are left with the difficult question of appropriately defining a failed state. Another important question would be how exactly to handle the failed state. Does the danger of the failed state call for the United States to be a world guarantor of states? What can be done as part of the effort to fight terrorism in order to address the failed states of the world? Finally, how significant a variable is the failed state when examining the roots of terrorism? The international system has, for hundreds of years, consisted of states interacting as unitary actors in a way to maximize their relative power within the international system. Although some may claim that the above realist interpretation is open to debate, and may offer alternative

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explanations of global politics, most would agree that historically the state was (and still remains) the primary actor within the international system. In times past, the paths of states may have never crossed. Hence, a failed or weak state in Asia may have had very little impact in Europe. To borrow a phrase from the former U.S. Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill—“all politics is local.” In essence, the strength or ability of a state to govern— say El Salvador—mattered little to another—for example, Greece, the two states having little in common in terms of culture, history, and policy interaction, and lacking any significant rivalry within the international system. Globalization, however, has changed the distant relationship between all states. For example, a nonstate actor dedicated to regime change in Greece may take refuge in El Salvador and direct both rhetorical and physical attacks toward the Greek leadership. Greece would be forced to rely on El Salvador’s ability to enforce laws and, ultimately, protect the Greek regime from attacks emanating from inside El Salvador. As this hypothetical narrative illustrates, the strength of one state—especially because of globalization—now matters to other states. Hence, states unable to maintain a monopoly on power or the use of force within its own borders are perceived to be less likely to address other vital issues, such as poverty, disease and, especially, terrorism. DEFINITIONS At this point, it is appropriate to make several comments with regard to definitions—in order to more clearly identify failed versus failing states. Specifically, a failed state is the end point of failing states.2 Typically, a weak state may be failing—for example, Sri Lanka, embroiled in the third decade of its struggle against the Tamil Tigers, or Indonesia, unable to fully control areas of Aceh and Papua—but not pass the threshold to a collapsed state.3 A failed state is one that is unable to perform its duties on several levels—when, as Robert Rotberg observes, “violence cascades into an all-out internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings.”4 In more direct terms, a recent State Failure Task Force defined state failure as “instances in which central state authority collapses for several years.”5 The number of completely collapsed states is historically small (see Table 6.1), but the number of collapsing states is somewhat more troublesome. As a result, the Task Force purposely extended its definition of state failure to encompass a more inclusive list of “civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human-rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown.”6 From 1955 to 1998, according to the Task Force report, 251 events and 136 cases of state failure can be identified.7

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Combating the Sources and Facilitators Table 6.1 State Failures/Near State Failures, 1955–1998 State Afghanistan Argentina Bangladesh Bosnia-Hercegovinia Burundi Chad Congo Congo Cyprus Dominican Republic Guinea-Bissau Iran Lebanon Liberia Nigeria Rwanda Sierra Leone Somalia Tajikistan USSR Yugoslavia

Year 1992–1995 1975–1976 1974–1975 1992–1996 1992–1996 1978–1983 1960 1997–till date 1964 1965–1966 1998 1978–1981 1975–1990 1990–1996 1966 1994 1997–till date 1990–till date 1992 1991 1991

Milliken and Krause have also studied the evolving definition of state failure, and offer a thesis addressing the prescient issue of what exactly composes a “failed state.” They advance the argument that the state cannot be merely classified as a static entity, but instead as an everchanging work in progress. As such, part of the contemporary analysis of states must necessarily include the discussion of failed and/or collapsed states. Furthermore, state failure and its measurement utilize two distinct contexts—a state may “institutionally” fail or “functionally fail.”8 As a result, state failure refers to “dashed expectations” of a state or of what the citizens expect the state to accomplish. In addition, the failure remains more subjective. Thus, the numbers of states that have recently collapsed institutionally remain relatively low—the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Haiti, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Instead of state collapse, Milliken and Krause suggest a better measure —functional failure—which offers a more useful policy tool.9 POLICY IMPLICATIONS Robert Cooper, former European Union diplomat and advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, argues the threat posed by failed states is so

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great that it offers a clear rationalization for a new form of colonialism— aimed at interventions in failed or failing states.10 As renowned political scientist Francis Fukuyama noted, “weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism.”11 Chester Crocker, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, has observed that “state failure affects a broad range of U.S. interests . . . It contributes to regional insecurity, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.”12 Within the context of new world geopolitics, the balance of power system has become outdated and not useful in formulating policy, and attention must be paid to the concept of failed states. Cooper contends that the system is best summarized as one consisting of interdependence among state actors. It is the interdependence factor that moves politics past the local level and to the system level. Hence, failed states do matter and impact other states throughout the international system.13 Thus, the context of world politics and the careful stability inherent to an anarchical system become threatened very clearly with the phenomenon of “failed states.” To be sure, a failed state is representative of chaos—a chaos removing the state from the global political and/or economic community. Once removed from the economic benefits inherent to the interdependent structure of the contemporary global system, a “failed state” turns to narcotics, terrorism, and other criminal activities in order to compensate for its disconnection from the global community. In both failed and failing states, a number of nonstate actors fill the void left by the state to provide products of government, and prey on the state of chaos in order to increase their own power and wealth. As noted earlier in this chapter, these issues are reflected in the current U.S. national security strategy doctrines and actions. The relation between terrorism and state failure is a particularly important dimension of the current global security environment. Bin Laden’s use of Sudan as a base for militant Islam allowed for the necessary space and freedom to grow organizationally and provides an excellent illustration of the impact of a failed or failing states in a far away region on the rest of the world. Although not a failed state at the time, Sudan certainly fit many of the definitions for a failing state. Thus, bin Laden’s organization was able to expand in terms of scope and operations. Indeed, without Sudan as a base of operations, bin Laden’s Afghani mujahideen would have extended all over the Arab world—and made a less concentrated threat. According to one analysis, “over time, their [Afghani mujahideen] strength would have waned and they would have had difficulty communicating and coordinating their efforts . . . without Sudan, bin Laden could have not incubated the networks that have caused such devastation.”14

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In 1991, after bin Laden arrived in Sudan, a group trained by bin Laden launched the first attacks in a renewed Algerian conflict, and fighters were trained for use in Kashmir. Dr. Hassan al-Turabi—a Sudanese adherent of the militant Islamic movement, bin Laden, and Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri all constructed close relationships. Eventually, alZawahiri would manage the international finances of bin Laden and Turabi as they engaged in a series of terrorist attacks. In 1994 alone, bin Laden and his colleagues, trained 5,000 mujahideen in Sudan’s terror training camps. And at the same time, bin Laden worked to gain organizational legitimacy by providing financial help and assistance in rebuilding Sudanese infrastructure: a highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan; a repaving of a 500-km highway from Sudan to Shendi and Atbara; construction on the Rusayris hydroelectric dam; a million dollar capitalization effort for the Shamali Bank; a 1993 loan of $8 million to finance imports; $1 million in contributions to the Pan Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC); a $2 million expense in resettling Afghan mujahideen from Pakistan to Sudan; and the construction (“at his own expense”) of 23 terrorist camps. The terror partnership of Turabi and bin Laden produced a litany of attacks. Agents were trained to assassinate Qaddafi; Hamas operatives were trained—as early as 1995—for suicide bombings in Israel; Egyptian militants used Sudan as a base of operations to attack the Mubarak regime; and the Sudanese counsel in Beirut was involved with the assassination of a Lebanese politician as well as an attempted bombing of the Egyptian Embassy. This list also includes a 1993 attempted attack on U.S. troops in Yemen en route to Somalia. The Sudanese government supplied weapons to Somali warlord General Muhammad Aidid and bin Laden provided reinforcements with the movement of 3,000 mujahideen to assist Aidid— at a cost of $3 million. The PAIC, through Turabi and bin Laden, agreed in 1993 to supply fighters to Bosnia. In 1996, the PAIC authorized a plan to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and at least five attempts were made to fulfill the obligation. Mujahideen were sent to fight in Chechnya and Tajikistan, while al Qaeda operatives in Sudan trained members of the Filipino Moro Front, and a jihad office was opened in Baku, Azerbaijan.15 Only in 1996 did cooperation between bin Laden and Sudan begin to wane. Bin Laden moved to Afghanistan, the policy of a Sudanese “open door” immigration policy for all Arabs ended, and Egyptian militants were ordered out of the country. Bin Laden’s network, however, had grown to a point of self-sufficiency and stood primed to utilize its next host state—Afghanistan. Not only did bin Laden construct a network of terror during this period, but he also created the necessary organizations to finance his efforts.16 In fact, bin Laden acquired a significant business empire while in Sudan. He

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organized an international trading company; owned—with the government of Sudan—a construction company; held title to the Al-Themar Agricultural Company, which employed 4,000 and harvested a 1-million-acre farm; gained exclusive monopoly over major Sudanese exports, including gum arabic, corn, sunflower, and sesame; claimed a fruit and vegetable concern called Blessed Fruits, Inc.; sold sweets and honeys through his Al-Ikhals enterprise; owned a trucking company named Al-Qudrut; and also, owned both a leather tannery and furniture making company. Finally, bin Laden provided $50 million funding for the Al-Shamad Islamic Bank. In addition to the economic consolidation of the bin Laden network, Sudan also allowed for a political consolidation of al Qaeda.17 Turabi organized the Islamic People’s Congress in 1995, and it was at this meeting that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda aligned with Imad Mugniyeh and Hizbollah.18 As a result, the historic disagreement of Sunni versus Shiite Islam took a back seat to the more international struggle against Israel and the United States. Iran began to ship explosives to al Qaeda and bin Laden’s “terrorist corporation” formed links with Egypt’s Islamic Group, Egyptian Jihad, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, the Libyan Fighting Group, the Yemeni Saif Islamic Jannubi, and the Syrian Jamaat e-Jihal al-Suri. Hassan al-Turabi and Osama bin Laden held many of the same beliefs at a time when Sudan was perilously close to being a failed state. President Bashir was ultimately forced to reign in both Turabi, who is currently in prison, and bin Laden, who moved with his entourage to Afghanistan.19 Why, then, does a state begin to fail? Can we see any warning signs or trace the failing or failed state to a moment when intervention would be helpful? A number of varied explanations for state failure offer somewhat of a glimpse into the broad complexity of the issues involved. Fukuyama suggests that the end of the cold war led to increased incidents of the failed state, and left “a band of failed or weak states stretching from the Balkans through the Caucasus, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia.”20 At the same time, international organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund pushed for less government involvement in the economy. Fukuyama notes that this “Washington consensus” was an effort to reform the economy but, ultimately, it spilled over into the overall structure of the state. In addition, the reforms came at a critical time when many states were emerging from authoritarian rule. Hence, the Washington consensus placed very little emphasis on overall institutional development and state building. The already existing poor institutional framework—with the added pressure of the Washington consensus— resulted in an overall reduction of state strength.21 Crocker takes a longer and more general view in defining the process of state failure.22 First, the process of state failure is one of a complex and

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lengthy process of state devolution. Furthermore, a variety of inputs result in the concept of a failed state: (1) rulers may corrupt the vehicles of governance; (2) corrupt elites may act with criminal networks in order to claim the material resources of a state; (3) specific regions may feature the general lack of governmental authority and, often, illegal trade results; (4) a transition from authoritarian government results in the state’s loss of monopoly on power; and finally, (5) large sections of the state feature the loss of power.23 Hence, a cycle of state failure is quite often easy to view. This raises at least three difficult questions: whether powerful states should intervene, when in the process they should intervene, and how such an intervention should be conducted. Also of note in an examination of state failure is the impact of external support. That is, according to Crocker, “states with shallow domestic legitimacy tend to fail when they lose foreign support . . .”24 He notes that part of the equation of failed states, is the number of transitions to democracy during the 1990s. Specifically, a number of these transitions would simply fail. Some may result in the reemergence of an autocratic leader, some may simply become very weak, failing states, and others “will descend into chaotic warlord struggles.”25 In fact, Crocker argues “In much of the transitional world—those at-risk societies concentrated in Africa, the Middle East, and southwestern Asia—there is a footrace underway between legitimate governmental institutions and legal business enterprises, on the one hand, and criminal networks, often linked to warlords or political factions associated with security agencies, on the other.”26 Milliken and Krause maintain that legitimization is a process of function within a state—charged with providing “security, representation, and welfare.”27 In the race toward legitimization versus state failure, the legitimate networks must outdistance and outperform the networks of corruption. As Crocker observes, “Those who lead the cells and networks that hollow out failing states focus with a laser like intensity on exploiting opportunity and creating facts on the ground. Whether loosely arrayed in symbiotic relations or more closely coordinated by a central brain, they find space to operate in the vacuums left by a declining or transitional state—and they eat what they kill.”28 Susan Woodward has also examined the impact of failed states upon the international system. In short, a failed state represents the undermining of a key assumption in international politics—the primacy of the state actor. Furthermore, Woodward points to the fact that globalization is already challenging the power of the state. Yet, ironically, globalization “requires states that function—governments capable of giving sovereign guarantees, exercising sovereign power and responsibility, and controlling their sovereign borders.”29 Milliken and Krause considered the concept of “economic globalization” a primary influence in the fall

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of the state. In fact, economic globalization tends to accentuate the societal cleavages in conjunction with inefficient and uneven distribution of government resources.30 Woodward suggests “there is a powerful association between internal disintegration, fragmentation, massive civil violence, and the rise of warlordism, on the one hand, and states’ lack of strategic significance for major powers and the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms since the end of the Cold War, on the other.”31 Indeed, the lack of state power effectively eliminates a key limiting mechanism on internal politics.32 The nonstate actor emerges from or makes a home in the remains of a state in order to operate unmolested from any form of legal authority. Certainly, the model of drug trade in areas of Colombia, Afghanistan, and Myanmar—in addition to relative lawlessness in Liberia, Southern Sudan, and most of Somalia—illustrate the ability of nonstate actors to freely operate in failed states or regions. Crocker argues that the U.S.-led war on terrorism is incomplete, as it is only targeting the current manifestations of terror. Hence, the long-term terror implications are not addressed. To wit, primary among the unaddressed concerns are the role of failed states. In addition, the rhetoric of the War on Terror is necessarily misleading, because an enemy does not exist— enemies exist. Terrorism, according to Crocker, is merely a “tool.”33 Indeed, the work in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the targeting of al Qaeda, are simply the “first steps” toward global security.34 To be sure, Washington also must concentrate on “sustaining regional security, leading coalitions and institutions to help failing and threatened states, and winning the struggle after wars and regimes change.”35 Furthermore, Crocker contends State failure directly affects a broad range of U.S. interests, including the promotion of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, religious tolerance, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors and exporters . . . unless the United States and its principal partners engage proactively to prevent and contain state failure, rogue regime may seize power in additional failed or failing states, raising the specter of fresh adversaries that seek WMD and harbor terrorists. Moreover, the United States must learn to rebuild states after overturning their regimes, or the whole enterprise will backfire.36

In explaining what needs to be done in order to prevent the rise of “failed states,” Crocker points to the fact that the number of sovereign states in 1945 was 51, while almost 200 exist today.37 In addition, although the failed state is typically a poor state, the economy does not provide a complete answer.38 A look at civilizations also comes up short in attacking “failed states.” That said, Crocker argues (with relevant empirical data) that “weak democracies” and “reforming autocracies” are “highly

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prone to state failure.”39 In the end, national boundaries as well as ethnic cleavages are not the sole sources of the problem of “state failure.” Instead, Crocker looks at “ethnic imbalance between a dominant majority and a large minority” and “contested natural resources and separatist movements supported by well-heeled expatriate communities” as important antecedents to a failed state.40 Be that as it may, Woodward provides several convincing arguments as to why the United States should be concerned over the existence of failed states. First, she notes, the constraints of the cold war era—the threat of nuclear attack—are largely nonexistent in the contemporary era of global politics. The cold war’s competition of superpowers acted as a limiting factor on worldwide behavior, yet no other natural limiting factor of behavior has emerged to replace the cold war equilibrium. That is, should the Soviet Union or United States have gone too far with a foreign policy directive, both risked a war with the other and the corresponding threat of escalation to the point where the virtual existence of the planet was threatened. In addition, the cold war led to the use of foreign aid to “purchase” a state’s friendship and loyalty. In contemporary global relationships, aid packages—which Woodward notes are essential for some states to maintain authority—are more often tied to neoliberal “policies of liberalization, privatization, budgetary cuts and devolution, and overall fiscal conservatism.”41 Thus, the end result includes “increasing regional inequalities and grievances, social polarization and abandonment, and a power vacuum that open the door to movements for regional autonomy or secession, to alternative elites who aspire to total power through ethnic and nationalist appeals, and to vicious cycles of public protests, police repression by weak governments, communal violence, and local insurgencies.”42 A second argument Woodward provides to justify the need to intervene in failing states involves the end results of failed states. She argues that, “what seems to matter about failed states are the consequences,” including political violence, refugee problems, and mass humanitarian emergencies. As a result, international actors contemplate action only when the state has failed. Thus, Woodward argues that the response is more humanitarian than political—which, by definition, suggests a quick end to emergency conditions and not the political negotiation required for longterm solutions. She believes that “violence [is] being caused by ethnic hatred [and we must] begin to treat such differences and presumed hatreds as essences rather than as contingencies produced by alterable conditions. This is especially the case if interveners organize in terms of “enemies” and “victims” and thus take sides; by doing so they harden lines of conflict rather than reinforce instances of cooperation and the capacity for it.”43 The breakdown of governance, which produces a power vacuum, is also a key difficulty in dealing with failing states. Instead of traditional

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forms of governing power, authority in such a state is claimed by others based upon their possession of some territory and some weapons by individuals who are taking advantage of fear in order to capitalize upon the insecurities inherent to such a breakdown of state power. Furthermore, such arrangements are reciprocal by nature—the “legitimacy” must be returned by some form of government services. In the failed state, the reciprocal service is often looting and/or criminal activity, which leads to further state failure. Woodward posits that “ethnic, religious, linguistic, or clan differences” within a society are significantly exacerbated by the failure of a state’s governance and economic functions. These dividing lines often become magnified by the influx of resources internationally from groups or individuals sharing loyalties and offering sympathy to a particular cause.44 CONCLUSION How does this discussion of failed and failing states directly impact concerns over terrorism? Much has already been said and alluded to in this effort, focusing on the ability of nonstate actors—for the purposes of this chapter, terrorist groups—to usurp some of the space inherent to statehood in order to operate freely. Rotberg characterizes globalization as the intervening variable between “failed states” and terrorism. That is, the past strategy of isolating failed states simply has become immaterial in the era of globalization. The realities of international relations demand effectual states, and the continuation of failed states endangers security at a global level. He further argues that failed states grow to be both “reservoirs” as well as “exporters of terror.” Essentially, the literature suggests a failed state is marked by levels of rising corruption at the hands of leaders who use the rule of force to establish legitimacy. All the while, government services become benefits enjoyed by only a select few. Legitimacy is finally attacked by the masses within a final stage of state failure. At that point, reinforced societal cleavages—ethnic, religious, linguistic, and more—become more pronounced. Finally, the inequities of history become fresh memories in the minds of mass society, and historical grievances become part of the contemporary political agenda of settlement by force. A state, at that point, becomes perilously close to state failure—which becomes a threat to world security. Rotberg’s solution involves four elements: (1) improve economic conditions, (2) reintroduce the rule of law, (3) reestablish political institutions, and (4) offer a new chance for civil society.45 Rotberg’s premise gains in expediency when seen through the perspective provided by Takeyh and Gvosdev. In their recent essay, these researchers speak both of the role of failed states as well as smaller failures within states (cities, geographical areas, etc).46 The importance of

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investigating sovereign states and governments facing potential failure is paramount, as both are linked to the reality that a group like al Qaeda is much different from the IRA or the PKK, which have “limited, irredentist claims.” Conversely, al Qaeda is “not confined territorially or ideologically to a particular region.” Al Qaeda is more advanced and boasts its own “infrastructure” and is “self-sufficient.” As a result, al Qaeda—and future organizations based similarly on global geographical realities—look for failed states into which to move their organization. Indeed, the state’s sovereignty becomes host of (and used by) nonstate actors, including terror organizations, to achieve their own goals. The failed state theory is evident in many instances of terror organizations around the world. Key, too, are geographic areas or cities or villages that can be classified as “failed” because of the lack of coherent central government control. A good example is the Bosnian village of Bocinja Donja—a village which is widely described as lawless and a haven for radical Islamic movements. In addition, Italy (among other states) remains quite concerned of the security threat posed by Albania and its links to both criminal networks and Osama bin Laden. In fact, the Port of Durres, Albania has played a prominent role as a center of transit for smuggling and for Osama bin Laden-related activities. In short, Takeyh and Gvosdev argue, terror groups “have gained control over territory in a failed state through a Faustian bargain with authorities, usually by offering its services to the failed state during times of conflict.” Other factors also contribute to the usefulness of failed states as bases for terror groups. First, failed states lack the infrastructure of any semblance of law enforcement. In addition, a failed state also offers a population of ready-made recruits—as Takeyh and Gvosdev observe, “failed states create pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups who can use their resources and organizations to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of civil society.”47 Finally, the levels of poverty and corruption typically associated with failed states makes the viability of bribes more compelling— again, allowing terrorist or criminal organizations the freedom to behave in any manner they wish. What has been offered in this chapter obviously does not offer a complete answer to the basic questions of how to define a failed versus failing state, the role of failed states in terrorism, the importance or the method for intervention, or any other of a number of relevant policy questions. These and other related questions are addressed amply throughout the political science and security studies literature.48 Instead, the chapter is meant to offer an analysis of the current debate over state strength and state failure, and how these concepts apply to concerns of national security with regard to counterterrorism efforts. Obviously, not every failed state will produce an Osama bin Laden. What also should be obvious, however, is that failed states do matter—not only for humanitarian

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reasons, but also for basic issues of national security. The concept of a strong state is one as old as the republic itself, and concern over stability in other states has a historical precedent. What remains clear is that the shrinking of the world—through globalization—should offer pause for consideration on how to deal with the failing or failed state. NOTES 1. Chester A. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” Foreign Affairs (September/ October 2003): 32–44. 2. Please see Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2002): 85–96. 3. Ibid., 91–92. 4. Ibid., 86. 5. State Failure Task Force: Phase III Findings. Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Accessed March 1, 2007 at http:// www.cidcm.umd.edu/project.asp?id=19. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 4. 8. Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons, and Strategies,” Development and Change 33, no. 5 (2000): 754. 9. Ibid., 753–756. 10. From Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twentyfirst Century. (London: Atlantic Books, 2003). 11. See Francis Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State Building,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 2 (April 2004): 17–31. 12. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” 34. 13. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. 14. Found in Ann M. Lesch, “Osama bin Laden’s ‘Business’ in Sudan,” Current History (May 2002), 203–210. 15. See Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002). 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 19. Ibid. 20. See Fukuyama, “The Imperative of State Building.” 21. Ibid. 22. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” 34–35. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., 35. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid., 36.

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27. Milliken and Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction,” 756. 28. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” 37. 29. See Susan Woodward, “Failed States,” Naval War College Review 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 56–68. 30. Milliken and Krause, “State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction,” 761–762. 31. Woodward, “Failed States.” 32. Ibid. 33. Crocker, “Engaging Failed States,” 32. 34. Ibid., 33. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 34. 37. Ibid., 37. 38. Ibid., 38. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., 39. 41. Woodward, “Failed States.” 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure.” 46. Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdav, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2002): 97–108. 47. Ibid. 48. A number of datasets are available to those interested in exploring the ideas of state failure and state strength. One of the most often used datasets is Freedom House. Freedom House measures states in terms of freedoms and civil liberties with historical data for comparative purposes (www.freedomhouse.org). Transparency International publishes a Corruption Perception index that offers quantitative measures of a state’s level of corruption—available at www. transparency.org. The World Bank, located at www.worldbank.org, publishes a number of measures to use in investigating state failure, as well. The International Country Risk Guide, produced by an independent firm accessible at www.prsgroup.com, also measures corruption, the effectiveness of law, and the quality of bureaucracy. Phase III of the State Failure Task Force Report—cited in this chapter—offers an analysis of a 5-year study attempting to quantify variables of state failure. Hence, a great deal of raw quantitative data exists from which to study and draw further conclusions.

CHAPTER 7 BORDERS AND STATE INSECURITY Michelle L. Spencer

Sovereignty and identity have been a source of conflict since the existence of man; however, our current view of statehood—which tied together both concepts—was formalized by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Little has affected these ideals (held by democratic nations as unalienable)—even two world wars—until the advent of globalization and the growth of terrorism from a domestic problem into a global threat. The leaders of the states comprising the international community are now faced with many existential questions: Has the concept of the nationstate been replaced by a supra-state structure as represented by the European Union? Can we protect our societies from the constant threat of terrorism? What role does border security play in countering the global threat of terrorism? Can free trade coexist with a secure state? Further thought on these philosophical questions raises others regarding the current state of international relations. Are the threats we face today the challenges of tomorrow? Is the potential for terrorist acquisition and use of WMD the greatest challenge for the international community today? This chapter will not attempt to answer all of the above questions but will consider how we got here, the factors related to borders that frame the current threats and our ability to address them, the primary threats that must be addressed by the international community, and the role border security can or cannot play in addressing those challenges. BORDER SECURITY: A SOLUTION OR A PROBLEM? The concept of border security is a complex one with many challenges. It includes a range of operational aspects, such as monitoring people and cargo at legal points of entry and monitoring the spaces in between whether by land or sea. Management of a nation’s border requires

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customs, port security, border guards, transportation security officials, and law enforcement. All of these agencies have to work together to create a seamless web of governance and control which no single individual or piece of cargo can slip through. That is the challenge of securing a border; terrorists must find only one weakness in the system to exploit—one customs officer in need of a little extra cash, or the one border post overcome with traffic on a given day. The border is only as secure as the integrity of those protecting it. Must borders be protected 100 percent to be considered secure? Total security is inconsistent with democratic values and free trade. Given that the odds are against keeping every determined terrorist out while maintaining the required level of trade for a bountiful economy, nations are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. Regardless of how tempting it is to consider the futility of the border security mission, the border is the first line of defense against terrorism and the last line of a nation’s territorial integrity. THE ROLE OF GLOBALIZATION AND OTHER FACTORS Many definitions of globalization exist. According to a source enabled by this phenomenon—the online editable encyclopedia, Wikipedia— globalization is “an umbrella term for a complex series of economic, social, technological, cultural and political changes seen as increasing interdependence, integration and interaction between people and companies in disparate locations. . . . The concept has been referred to as the shrinking of time and space.”1 If time and space are smaller, how is it that our problems seem bigger? Globalization has become the whipping boy of the modern age. It causes great turmoil, but brings with it economic opportunity. In relation to border security, there is a tendency to relax security in order to reap globalization’s economic benefits. However, global jihad groups are making democracies pay a price for choosing facilitation of trade over security, and the issue is coming to a head in the United States, the European Union, and for almost every country who favors freedom. The question is how democracies strike the balance. While globalization plays a significant role in how countries manage their borders, it is not the defining factor. In addition to globalization, four interrelated factors contribute to a country’s ability to secure its borders. The factors include history, geography, demographics, and political stability, though no single factor is dominant. Some change, some are permanent, and some evolve, but all are interrelated. Two additional factors exist, but vary from state to state: political will and capability. A country can have both, one or the other, or none. Without both the capacity to monitor and protect national borders and the willingness to use the tools at hand, borders and the national sovereignty they represent will remain at risk.

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History. The history of a nation is its collective memory and the experience of its citizenry woven together like a tapestry. It provides the foundation for a national perspective on sovereignty, the political inclination of a state, a country’s role in the international community as well as relations with its neighbors. The history of borders is one of the most varied and interesting aspects of international relations, as most boundaries have not been drawn on the basis of ethnicity or national unity, but rather to divide loyalties and disengage identification of distinct ethnic groups from territory. Most borders in conflict areas today were drawn by the victors of wars of yesteryear, in the creation of empires or simply in discussion between “gentlemen.” Joseph Stalin was perhaps the most notorious for forcefully uprooting entire ethnic groups and replanting them thousands of miles from their homes. Generations lived in homelands disconnected from ancestry. Stalin believed this would prevent any desire for secession, but he could have never imagined the ramifications for independence 60 years later. Geography. Geography is the factor that does not change. Borders may move, but neighboring states are like relatives—you do not get to choose them. The geography of a border can benefit national security—for example in the case of a high cliff or impassable mountain range—but it can also aid foes if a country is required to monitor miles of unmarked desert or open plain. Maritime geography, too, can have an impact. Italy faces daily incursions by small Albanian vessels sailing across the Adriatic, many smuggling illicit goods into the EU. Small boats can avoid major ports, even exchanging goods without ever docking. Indonesia, a country with thousands of islands, faces enormous border security challenges. Given the difficult nature of monitoring every inch of shoreline or mile of land, countries are forced to prioritize, focusing on most likely points of entry. For democratic nations, 100 percent coverage of the border is an idealistic but ultimately unattainable goal. One can argue that even the most stable of democratic republics in a bad neighborhood can have great difficulty managing its borders. The nature of democracy requires nations to trust in shared security goals with neighbors. When this trust breaks down due to instability or conflict in one country, surrounding nations can suffer. Terrorist groups have continually taken advantage of unrest in a country or region to move personnel or material alongside throngs of refugees, combatants, and civilians. The porous nature of the Afghanistan–Pakistan border is clearly an important factor in the survival of the Taliban. President Karzai has repeatedly reprimanded his Pakistani counterpart on his unwillingness to prevent Taliban supporters from receiving aid and shelter in Pakistan and crossing the border at will. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has claimed that his government is doing what it can to root out insurgents and police the 1,400-mile unmarked border that follows through deserts

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and mountains.2 Iraq faces a similar situation given its geographic neighborhood. Open borders cannot be blamed for every ill suffered by Iraq, but the greatest asset of the insurgency is its ability to build, regenerate, and supply itself from Syria and Iran.3 The geography of Afghanistan and Iraq present significant challenges to border security. The governments of the two countries must make hard choices concerning resources and manpower and must obtain the political will to use their capabilities effectively. Demographics. The demographic nature of a country is the most diverse variable. No two countries have identical demographics. Ethnic composition, median age of a population, and relations between ethnic groups are all defining aspects of a government’s ability to maintain stability and control its borders. Demographics encompass both social and economic indicators and can change over time. They include such indicators as ethnic homogeneity, refugees, and displaced persons. The ethnic homogeneity of a population can have a positive effect on political stability, but once challenged by immigrant groups—as is occurring in the Netherlands, France, and Germany—it can alter the political landscape when ethnic groups are unwilling or unable to assimilate. Ethnic identification is often stronger than a national one, especially in states that encourage multiculturalism over integration. Another challenge is displaced populations, immigrants, refugees, and economic migrants. These can place a significant strain on national resources and political life. Often these transitory populations can provide terrorists a place of shelter, sometimes unknowingly. As a recent 2003 Library of Congress Report concludes, “Foreign communities resident in a given country may form networks that often control legal commerce, but they may also protect well-established trafficking networks that channel illegal commodities between the host country and the home country abroad.”4 The linkage between legal and illegal commerce aids the terrorist in that the communities are less likely to be highly scrutinized by a government, given the difficulty of doing so. The fact that populations are not confined within nor identify themselves solely by statehood or borders is a concept that is played upon by al Qaeda and its affiliates in global jihad groups. As Muslim populations around the world were caught up in wars of ethnic cleansing or territorial disputes, jihadis heeded the call of imams (spiritual leaders of Islam) to fight alongside their brethren. Thousands fought in Afghanistan in 1979– 1989 and again in 2001; Bosnia during the 1990s; Chechnya since 1994; and Iraq since 2003. Significant support provided to conflict areas, both financial and logistical, plays an important role in cross-border crime and terrorist acts. The ethnic composition of the Balkans has worked in opposition to political stability in the region. Only the authoritarian regimes of the

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Austro–Hungarian Empire and communism under Joseph Tito were able to rein in highly independent and often rebellious ethnic minorities. Tito was able to capitalize on the strengths of the ethnic groups, and during his lifetime Yugoslavia etched out a peaceful coexistence. Upon his departure from the political scene, less visionary politicians chose divisive tactics to inflame long-held ethnic rivalries. This type of irresponsible governance imposed a great deal of hardship on the region, from civil war and ethnic cleansing to poverty and estrangement. Now the states of the former Yugoslav union are picking up the pieces of their shattered lives and trying to build a political process where none existed. The stability of the region depends upon the ethnic groups’ ability to work in unison, cooperating and compromising within the democratic process. Political Stability. The final element, political stability, is also complex as it is affected by the preceding three factors. Political stability is intangible. It is a combination of elements including the ability of a government to satisfy the basic needs of the people; creation and maintenance of a conducive environment for economic well-being; and the ability to instill and maintain the rule of law. A solid legal foundation includes legislation that is regularly reviewed in light of constantly changing threats. Most important is the political will to enforce the legislation from arrest to prosecution. As one security analyst recently noted, “While state collapse, civil conflict and widespread lawlessness are long-term problems in some countries, they are more often transitional phases.”5 It is in this period when countries are most susceptible to terrorist exploitation. Authoritarian regimes tend to view border security as a control mechanism for their own population. The Berlin Wall and the “Iron Curtain” were constructed to prevent emigration. Of greatest concern was the departure of the educated middle class from East Germany during the 1960s.6 The fragile democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan are facing a similar dilemma now—as insurgency and political instability threaten civil society, many elites choose to leave with their families rather than face the daily mortal risk. TEST CASES: POST-COMMUNIST STATES Lack of democratic experience has left many post-authoritarian governments unprepared to manage their newfound freedom and responsibility in light of current threats. Nations often desire freedom, but creating and maintaining effective bureaucratic structures democratically is another matter. Effective institutions are the key. Post-authoritarian societies are rife with corruption and social inequalities, if only during transition to democracy or stable political environment. These factors affect not only the civil society of a nation, but also the formation and maintenance of government.

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Successor states of the Soviet Union have been at a particular disadvantage due to the nature of border control under Soviet rule. After 1957, national border units were abolished at the republic level and border control was administered by the KGB from Moscow.7 Thus, upon breakup of the union few of the post-Soviet countries had experience with monitoring their own borders. Starting from scratch has its advantages, in that some of the problems faced by entrenched bureaucracies do not exist; however, just because border control is a newer government responsibility does not mean that fewer agencies want the responsibility. As Soviet control faded into the sunset, political battles raged over which agency or ministry would gain control. Few post-communist countries have followed the same model. While most nations have demilitarized their borders at the insistence of Western powers, many agencies have been given nominal responsibility with little budgetary or physical capability to back it up. A second element of the communist legacy is the fact that most borders were guarded by intelligence rather than security forces or law enforcement. The goal was to keep the population in and spies out. Changing this ingrained bureaucratic ideal is a slow process. In many countries, border guards are not held in high regard, partially due to the suspicion remaining from the legacy mission of those manning the border. Creating a security force that gains the trust of the population and plays an integral role in national security must be a primary goal of post-communist states. Without trust and cooperation of the population, effective border security will be an unattainable goal. Two case studies—the Balkans and the Black Sea—demonstrate the range of internal and external challenges that newly democratic states face in securing their borders. The Balkans and the Black Sea regions are the gateways tying North Africa and Asia to Europe and the Western Hemisphere. Trade routes through these regions have been utilized by merchants and militaries through the ages. Throughout the 1990s, instability and armed conflict in the Balkans made that region a significant destination for arms and illegal goods from the Black Sea region. Though regional violence has subsided, smuggling routes remain active and connect the Balkans to the Black Sea and Western Europe. Illegal arms trafficking routes through Ukraine and Moldova, for example, were used by both Bosnians and Croats during the UN arms embargo. They were also used to facilitate the influx of weapons into Macedonia during that country’s 2001 unrest.8 These routes have also been used to transport WMD-related materials, and there is concern that such trafficking may continue. The German Federal Intelligence Agency believes that the Balkans has become one of the most popular destinations and transshipment points for WMD and WMD-related materials coming from Ukraine and Moldova.9 The Balkans has also served as a source of WMD materials. Instability in Albania during 1997 led to the looting of chemical and radioactive agents from Albanian army depots, and Albania

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has been used as a transshipment point for WMD-related materials trafficked into Italy and Slovenia.10 All of these factors drive the importance of these regions to European security. This in turn impacts U.S. security interests in the region. Albania: The Balkan Wild Child More than four decades of paranoid Marxism left Albania the poorest country in Europe, with few natural resources or economic infrastructure on which to build. The civilian riots of 1997 caused by a collapse of government-supported pyramid schemes completely destroyed or severely damaged most government institutions, from the navy to government buildings in the capital. Of the 119 border posts that existed in 1997, 113 were looted and vandalized, leaving only shells of buildings remaining.11 Since 1997, Albanians have begun to build an institutionalized democracy. A new constitution was written and adopted on November 28, 1998. Judicial and legislative reforms are slow but continuing. Many international organizations are active in assisting Albania’s growth and revival. However, because of the collapse of the communist-supported light industry and ensuing mass unemployment, Albanians have been forced to look for new ways to survive economically. The dire economic conditions have fostered corruption and organized crime. Corruption in Albania is endemic and systemic. Border guards are paid less that $200 per month, and according to one Albanian official are highly susceptible to bribery.12 [C]ontrol of Albania’s mountainous borders is a purely civilian task under the Ministry of Public Order, but control is very poor. Typically, a pair of border guards patrols a 15 mile stretch of mountainous terrain on foot. They seldom have vehicles (and even more seldom have fuel), and lack advanced equipment such as ground motion sensors or night vision goggles . . . With arrangements for “turning a blind eye” at formal crossing points, which are institutionalized in some cases by pre-payment of bribes, corruption compounds the problem. Anecdotal evidence suggests that despite the almost open nature of the green borders, the overwhelming majority of contraband coming into the country still moves through formal border crossings with the assistance of some corrupt border guards and customs officers.13

In this environment, terrorist groups can exploit opportunities with little risk or cost to their operations. Combating this corruption and facilitation of movement must be a primary goal of border security. Many Albanians have left their homeland, moving to other areas in the Balkans and beyond. Some are simply looking for a better life, while

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others seek to expand decades-long criminal enterprises. Ethnic Albanians are popping up on virtually every European intelligence agency’s radar. Albanians are now the fastest growing ethnic criminal presence in Europe.14 The Albanians, Russians, and other aspiring criminal groups are providing logistical and financial support to terror groups simply by controlling the smuggling routes, money laundering operations, and transit options from most points of entry into Europe, including maritime routes through the Adriatic, Mediterranean, and Black Sea. Political instability, together with corrupt officials, porous borders, and inherent smuggling routes, make areas such as the Balkans, Central Asia, and SubSaharan Africa an “inviting operational environment” for terrorists and criminals.15 What is unclear is how far the criminal element will furnish its support. The question facing the international community is whether a criminal group could gain access to WMD and be willing to sell the capability to a terrorist group. Trafficking in weapons has played a significant role in destabilizing the Balkans.16 Communist Albania was a producer of Chinese-style AK-47s. Millions were manufactured during the reign of communist leader Envar Hoxha. Given his paranoid fear of invasion, Hoxha armed his population and maintained state-run arsenals containing untold amounts of ammunition and weapons. During the 1997 unrest, 1,300 state arsenals were looted. The vast majority of these weapons were never recovered, but made their way to other conflicts. For example, weapons from Albania played a direct role in the destabilization of Kosovo and Macedonia, where according to one report, “they joined weapons that had traveled to the Balkans from hotspots such as Georgia’s Abkhazia region. Many are still there, in people’s homes and hidden caches, others ended up in the hands of ethnic Albanian crime groups in Europe, but at least half have since been retrafficked, and have turned up on the Lebanese black market and in the hands of jihadists in Chechnya.”17 At home, Albanians struggle against institutional indifference. Generational bureaucratic rivalries persist, while new ones arise and states try to conform to Western standards of governance. This tension often produces lengthy battles over roles and responsibilities. The resulting uncertainty and fluctuations in agency responsibilities leave many individuals to wonder about their role and how it might change day to day. In Albania, for example, customs agents have no arrest authority, but they are responsible for inspecting cargo and pedestrian traffic at the border. Border police have arrest authority, but cannot inspect—and the two agencies do not work hand in hand, even though many are colocated at major border crossings. This is not an uncommon experience, even in Western countries. In Albania, the border is guarded by police forces within the Ministry of Public Order. As borders were demilitarized, power was transferred from

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the military to the police, but the budget and manpower did not always follow. As in many countries, included the United States, the Albanian border is manned primarily at official points of entry, while the vast areas in between go unobserved. The border between Albania and its neighbors Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro is extremely porous. During the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the 2001 Macedonia tensions, the Balkans saw most of the light arms and ammunition used by the ethnic Albanians come across the Albanian border, often in small numbers on pack animals or small carts. The cross-border movement is facilitated by the large number of ethnic Albanians that live at or near the border areas in Macedonia and Kosovo. Sympathies and relations remain strong between the neighbors, unimpeded by international borders. Albanian demography continues to play a direct role in the government’s ability to secure its borders. Bulgaria: The Black Sea Linchpin Bulgaria is at the heart of the Black Sea region that connects Europe to the Middle East and former Soviet Union. Centuries-old trade routes now dotted by oil and gas pipelines transect the area. Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the probability of WMD proliferation and terrorist attacks in the Black Sea region has increased due to many of the factors discussed earlier—history, geography, demography, and political stability. With the exception of Bulgaria, every country in the region has either a disputed or undemarcated border.18 Pockets of instability in Transnistria and the Caucasus make defending the border against such threats very difficult. The borders between Bulgaria and Turkey remain weak, and Turkish intelligence believes that the terrorists behind several of the attacks in Istanbul have established bases and weapon smuggling routes in Bulgaria.19 The Black Sea region is located on a significant illegal trade route that runs from Central Asia to Europe. Heroin from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran is shipped through Turkey, where it can then be smuggled in several directions. The most common destination for heroin from Turkey is Bulgaria. In 2003 alone, 662 kg of heroin was seized at Bulgaria’s borders with Turkey. Turkish heroin thought to have transited Bulgaria has been seized in large quantities as far north as Rotterdam and in Albania and Macedonia.20 It is estimated that 80 percent of the heroin in the EU is smuggled through Bulgaria.21 As Bulgaria joins the EU’s Schengen regime in 2007, terrorists and smugglers alike will be forced to exploit new or expanded routes. For example, a ship sailing the Black Sea from a Georgian port such as Poti to the Bulgarian port of Varna would provide maritime access to EU markets without facing the more strictly monitored EU land borders.22

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Throughout the Black Sea region, corruption is pervasive and often seen as part of the price of doing business. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, the Black Sea region as a whole is one of the most corrupt regions of the world. Out of 133 countries studied, with the ranking of 1 indicating the least corrupt country, only Bulgaria ranked above 60.23 Corruption is rampant in the region, in part because low salaries make customs officials susceptible to (and dependent on) bribes to maintain a basic standard of living. Combined with corruption and poorly defined borders, Bulgaria’s location at the center of prominent east-west and north-south trade routes makes it a major transshipment corridor for several types of illegal goods. Drugs, weapons, and humans are the predominant cargo on smuggling routes in the area. Most experts agree that the greatest threat to the international community is the possibility of terrorists gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. One survey found that 47 percent agreed that the greatest threat to U.S. national security was a state or terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear weapons or WMD.24 Preventing the transit of WMD materials from source countries, many in the former Soviet Union, is a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy and national security programs. While much of the plutonium and uranium required to build a nuclear bomb that was resident in the former Soviet Union has been secured, significant amounts of spent fuel and other materials that could be used in creating a radiological dispersal device remain in unsecured areas around the globe. The U.S. government states that it will take another 13 years to secure the remaining material, an unacceptable amount of time for most analysts.25 According the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the last 12 years there have been 20 reported incidents of WMD trafficking in Bulgaria. These have ranged from stealing from mines and research laboratories in Bulgaria to material coming from Turkey.26 In September 1994, Bulgarian police arrested 6 people with 19 containers of radioactive material, including 100 g of plutonium. The material had been stolen from Bulgarian laboratories, and law enforcement officials suspect that a Russian mafia group was attempting to smuggle the material into Western Europe. In May 1999, Bulgarian customs agents detained a Turkish citizen attempting to smuggle 10 g of highly enriched uranium into Turkey. In October 2000, two suspects were arrested in Turkey for trying to sell 150 g of uranium smuggled from Bulgaria.27 The sheer volume of interdictions raises concerns about the possibility of those not discovered. Bulgaria has received significant assistance from the United States, Germany, and the European Union to address its porous borders and to secure its nuclear facilities. Some experts might question the use of Albania and Bulgaria as primary examples of border security challenges today. Bulgaria is a recently inducted member of NATO and an EU hopeful, and will eventually take part in the EU’s Schengen border system. Albania is hopeful, but unlikely

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to reach either of its stated goals for NATO or EU membership in this decade. However, one case in particular illustrates how Spain, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, and Serbia can face the same challenges when trying to interrupt terrorists’ mobility. Moroccan-born Abdelmajid Bouchar is under arrest in Spain for suspicion of involvement in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings. The suspect fled from a Madrid suburban apartment 3 weeks after the train bombings, as police closed in to make arrests there. His tale highlights border vulnerabilities across Europe. The capture of Bouchar in July 2005 surprised Serbian police. They had thought he was just another Middle Easterner traveling illegally through the country until an Interpol fingerprint check revealed his identity. According to official reports, Bouchar had traveled to Brussels from Madrid, where he expected to obtain forged documents. However, his contacts there were either under arrest or fleeing police. He moved on and spent time in Austrian and Hungarian jails, but was freed. No one in either country checked his fingerprints. Serbian police investigators believe that he was seeking haven either in Bosnia or Kosovo and perhaps safe passage to the Middle East.28 A WAY FORWARD The role of every agency involved in protecting their nation’s border has changed. Even for customs officials, whose focus had always been (and still is in some countries) on revenue collection, responsibilities have shifted. As the U.S. Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection Robert Bonner stated, “On the morning of September 11th, 2001 . . . the priority mission of U.S. Customs had changed from the interdiction of illicit drugs and regulation of trade to a national security mission.”29 If the goal has changed, how then should border security be defined? Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff defined border security in terms of a nation’s ability to stem the tide of illegal immigrants. Border security, according to Chertoff, is “a very high likelihood that we will intercept, apprehend, and remove people illegally crossing between points of entry. . . . It doesn’t mean 100 percent, but it means getting pretty close.”30 For most governments, including the United States, it is untenable to define security in such strict terms. Most border forces have a difficult enough time maintaining constant coverage of pedestrian and cargo traffic at legal points of entry. Protection of “blue” and “green” borders—the spaces in between official points of entry on sea and land—are secondary concerns. The sheer volume of legal entry can overwhelm a country’s ability to monitor the space in between, as is the case in the United States, whose land border alone spans almost 7,500 miles.

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There are at least three elemental aspects to border security. First and foremost, all borders must be agreed upon and institutionalized. Treaties or agreements must be signed and entered into force. Second, borders need clear demarcation by those states sharing the border. Many nations have lacked the funding to adequately demarcate their national boundaries.31 Third, personnel must be skilled, motivated, and in sufficient numbers to monitor the border. Improving awareness, knowledge, and skills of those responsible for the protection of the border is essential. Two important cases against jihadist operatives illustrate this point. The first is the case of Ahmed Ressam, known as the “millennium bomber.” On December 14, 1999, a U.S. Customs inspector interviewed a man arriving on a ferry from Victoria, Canada. Ressam was asked a series of routine questions regarding his citizenship, home of record, and travel intentions. Sensing that Ressam was reluctant and uncomfortable about answering her questions, the officer asked if his vehicle could be searched. Ressam panicked and tried unsuccessfully to flee, and agents subsequently discovered bomb-making materials in the trunk of his car.32 The second case is that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was pinpointed after Jordanian intelligence officers captured one of Zarqawi’s mid-level operatives near the Iraqi border.33 The operative had worked as a customs clearance officer at a large border post between Amman and Baghdad. Although the role of luck cannot be discounted, both of these cases underscore the importance of integrity, training, and motivation of border personnel. The ability to train and maintain knowledgeable border staff must be a primary goal. Maintenance of the personnel includes teaching anticorruption strategies. Low pay and social inequities of border forces is the hallmark of a state lacking true control of its borders. Also, the uncertainty of governance on a personal level leads to job dissatisfaction and apathy, and greatly increases susceptibility to corruption. Given the varying levels of income between nations and bureaucratic levels within a country, corruption is unlikely to be wiped out, because the person at the border will always make a comparably modest salary. However, strategies exist to manage corruption at the local level and to mitigate the effects at the national and regional levels. One strategy is to link criminal acts to terror plots and jihadists goals. At the very least this will remind individuals of the linkage between terrorism and petty criminals. In new democracies, given the lack of experience in border control, police and Ministry of Interior forces often are ineffective in managing border security. With training and assistance, this can be dramatically improved, however, one option that should receive strong consideration is a support function for the military. Assistance in intelligence collection,

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analysis, and dissemination would greatly enhance the ability of border forces to detect and deter illegal activity. Given bureaucratic stovepipes, information rarely flows from the military to the border police units, even when they share space at a border post. In countries like Albania, for example, there is a pronounced need to establish a basic computer network between border enforcement agencies at the ports of entry, border police outposts, customs agencies, responsible military assets, and their respective headquarters located in the capital. In addition to these institutional linkages, information networks between government agencies and international sources are required. Even a EU-aspirant country like Bulgaria, with its future linkage to the Schengen Information System, must still create new lines of communication between agencies and organizations within the Bulgarian government. Often, countries—including the United States—are much more effective at sharing information with their international counterparts than they are with their interagency partners. In the National Counterterrorism Center in Washington, intelligence agencies sit side by side at computer terminals that are linked with their respective agencies, not with their NCTC colleagues.34 It is up to each agency representative to share information— hardly a productive process when intelligence is being collected and analyzed from thousands of sources worldwide. CONCLUSION Border security is not a panacea. It will not win the war on terror. There is no single model that can be instituted worldwide to secure every border under any circumstance. Methods and means of border security are governed by national security interests and, thus, are different for each country. The role of border security in countering terrorism is limited to the abilities of a state, which are complicated by a country’s history, geography, demographics, and political stability. There are many things border security cannot do. It cannot stop knowledge, funding, or violent ideology from spreading. It can, however, be a part of the solution. Security can only be effective in layers. Terrorists must be forced to clear hurdle after hurdle, country after country. It is this type of international cooperation that will gradually, but forcefully increase the opportunity costs for terrorist groups. The United States and the international community should assist partner countries in improving their capabilities. Best practices and standardization should be shared and encouraged. This is not altruism. The better borders are secured across the globe, the greater the cost to terrorists to move themselves and material, and to garner support across a border. While terrorists seem to have the upper hand, they live in fear of the

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border security official asking too many of the right questions at the wrong time. NOTES 1. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Globalization accessed on September 1, 2006. 2. “Afghanistan: Karzai Speaks Out Against Pakistan’s Moves,” Stratfor Global Intelligence Brief (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.stratfor.com/products/ premium/read article.php?id=268034; and Frederic Grare, “Worse than a Mistake,” Foreign Policy.com (August 2006), available at http://www.foreignpolicy. com/story/cms.php?story id=3578. 3. John F. Burns, “Iran and Iraq to Join to Seal Border against Insurgents,” The New York Times, May 28, 2006 and “Conflict and Porous Borders Open up Iraq to Drug Traffickers,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (June 1, 2006), 25-27. 4. LaVerle Berry, Glenn E. Curtis, John N. Gibbs, Rex A. Hudson, Tara Karacan, Nina Kollars and Ramon Miro, Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, October 2003) 3. See also Tamara Makarenko, “Transnational Crime and Its Evolving Links to Terrorism and Instability,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (November 1, 2001), 22–24. 5. “‘Floating Market’ In Illicit Weapons Arms Terrorists,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor (May 17, 2006). Available at http://jtsm.janes.com/public/jtsm/ international.shtml. 6. Between 1949 and 1961 East Germany lost 15 percent of its population, most of which were from the working class. The loss put a severe strain on the government of the German Democratic Republic. On August 13, 1961 the instability was permanently curtailed with the construction of the Berlin Wall. See Norman J.G. Pounds, Divided Germany and Berlin (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Norstrand Co., 1962) 111. 7. Taras Kuzio, “Border Troops Rise to Ukrainian Challenge,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 1, 1999), 23. 8. Taras Kuzio, “Ukraine’s Decade-Long Illegal Trade in Arms,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (January 10, 2002). Available at http://www.taraskuzio.net/ media/pdf/arms trade.pdf. 9. “Interim Report: The Nuclear Black Market,” CSIS Nuclear Black Market Task Force (November 25, 1995). 10. “Participation in Nuclear Smuggling Alleged,” TANJUG (June 18, 1996), FBIS Document ID: FTS1996 and author interviews with Albanian authorities, April 2002. 11. Author interviews with Albanian authorities, April 2002, January 2004, and March 2006. 12. Neil Barnett, “Albanian Traffickers Provide Back Door to Schengen Zone,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (March 1, 2004), 16–19. 13. Ibid. 14. Berry, Curtis, Gibbs, Hudson, Karacan, Kollars and Miro, Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism, 33. See also Jiri Kominek, “Albanian Organized Crime Finds a Home in the Czech Republic,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 1, 2002), 34–35.

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15. U.S. Government, International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC, 2000), 34. Available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/ documents/pub45270/45270BookWG.pdf. 16. For more on the relationship between terrorism and small arms/light weapons trafficking, please see the chapter by Chris Carr in this volume. 17. “‘Floating Market’ in Illicit Weapons Arms Terrorists,” Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, May 17, 2006. Even after numerous efforts to downsize the stockpiles, according to the United Nations Albania still has over 150,000 small arms and light weapons and 80,000 tons of ammunition in 57 storage sites. Albania is not unique in the Balkans. Romania and Serbia were and continue to be significant producers of guns and ammunition. 18. 2005 CIA World Factbook. Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ publications/factbook/geos/md.html. 19. Ibid. 20. “Dutch Customs Seize 225 Kilos of Heroin from Turkey,” Agence France Presse, May 18, 2004. 21. “Heroin Route Westwards Crosses Bulgaria,” Pari Daily, January 22, 2003. 22. Leonid Polyakov, “New Security Threats in the Black Sea Region,” Razumkov Center, European Consortium for Political Research, September 20, 2003. 23. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2005. Available at http://www.transparency.org/policy research/surveys indices/cpi/2005. Bulgaria was ranked as the least corrupt state of the Black Sea region and Georgia the most corrupt, at 55 and 130 respectively. For reference, the United States ranks 17, Afghanistan 117, Iran and Armenia 88, and Albania 126. 24. “The Terrorism Index,” Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress, accessed online September 3, 2006. Available at http://web0.foreignpolicy.com/ issue julyaug 2006/TI-index/index.html. Foreign Policy and the Center for American Progress surveyed more than 100 American foreign-policy experts for the study. 25. Charles D. Ferguson, “Preventing Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations Report #11, March 2006, 21. 26. Author interview with IAEA officials, June 2005. 27. “Turkish Police Seize 150g Uranium,” Anatolia News Agency (Ankara), October 6, 2000, FBIS Document ID: GMP20001006000168. 28. Rade Maroevic and Daniel Williams, “Terrorist Cells Find Foothold in Balkans,” Washington Post, December 1, 2005, A16. 29. Robert C. Bonner, U.S. Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection, speech before Council on Foreign Relations, November 1, 2005. 30. Angie C. Marek, “Going After Illegal Aliens,” U.S. News and World Report, November 28, 2005, 30. 31. Examples of demarcation issues abound. The Saudi–Yemeni border demarcation was finalized only in 2005 after an agreement was signed in 2000. After the 2003 terror attacks, Saudi Arabia gave the issue highest priority. “Saudi Arabia and Yemen Finally Agree Borders,” Jane’s Foreign Report, June 15, 2006. 32. Paul J. Smith, “The Terrorists and Crime Bosses Behind the Fake Passport Trade,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (July 1, 2001), 42-44.

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33. Jonathan Finer, “How U.S. Forces Found Iraq’s Most-Wanted Man,” The Washington Post, June 9, 2006, A01. In a statement broadcast by Jordanian television on May 23, the informant, Ziad Khalaf al-Kerbouly, stated that he smuggled cash and supplies for the insurgents. 34. Michele Flournoy, “Implementing the GWOT Strategy: Overcoming Interagency Problems,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, March 15, 2006, 4.

PART II CRIMINAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

CHAPTER 8 COMBATING THE INTERNATIONAL PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS Christopher Carr

The problems associated with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) appear at once to be insignificant and insurmountable.1 The very phrase “small arms” appears to relegate them to a minor role in conflicts, but their very numbers—by some measure in the hundreds of millions—appear to place them beyond control or management. However, both of these perceptions are flawed. SALW pose a far more real threat to more people than do the vaunted weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and they can—and in some cases are—being controlled and managed. Nevertheless, in the war on terrorism SALW are considered to be the loose change of a conflict in which explosives and the threat of WMD pose the principal threats. What is missing from this assumption is the reality that SALW, in sufficient numbers and in the context of weak states, can create an architecture of insecurity which fosters the very circumstances which protect and sustain the culture of terrorism. In Yemen, in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, in the slums of urban Jamaica, and in the Caucasus mountains, the proliferation of small arms has allowed armed groups to challenge the primacy of the state and to create conditions of instability which provide aid and comfort to criminal and terrorist communities. In such places, the traffickers in drugs, humans, and weapons cohabit with the warlords, militia leaders, and political opportunists in an environment which precludes good governance and judicial oversight. The impact of arms upon host societies has to be placed in context. In the United States there are an estimated 220 million firearms in private

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hands, but while they might have an impact on crime and law enforcement, the mere presence of such arms does not challenge the authority of the state.2 But a few thousand weapons injected into chronically unstable environs, such as Papua New Guinea or the pastoral communities of East Africa, can alter the very nature of these societies. In the latter cases, modern arms can destroy—within less than a generation—the delicate membranes of tradition and hierarchy. Similarly, where the state is weak, such as in Pakistan’s tribal areas or in the Central American states, the proliferation of arms can elevate criminal networks and tribal militias from their social setting up to the level of a threat to national security. There are very few strong states that can, like the United States, countenance and manage the proliferation of arms within the general population. For the most part, those states where arms have become embedded within the society, rather than in inventories and armories of the state, have been weakened and in some cases fractured by the competing authority of unmanaged armed groups. The proliferation of SALW since 1945 has many origins. In the highlands of Papua New Guinea and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, there are still deposits of arms that are left over from the Second World War.3 Military detritus from the Vietnam conflict still emerges from Indochina and flows through Burma into Bangladesh and beyond. Bequests from departing colonial regimes in Africa and South Asia continue to provide usable weaponry for local militaries, militias, criminal gangs, and poachers. But the bulk of the weapons available today are legacies from a minor chord of cold war competition. In their proxy wars against each other, the West and East used the inexpensive medium of small arms transfers as a lowrisk and low-cost instrument to support allies and undermine opponents. The fact that the Soviet Kalashnikov rifle is more common throughout the world than the American M16 rifle is one indicator that the Soviet Union supported insurgents (whose principal weapons were small arms) fighting against central governments, while the United States was, for the most part, the sponsor of states (whose needs were for larger weapon systems). These residual elements of the cold war remain in evidence today in Somalia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nicaragua, and numerous other former proxy battlefields. Gray- and black-market arms trafficking has also helped in the proliferation of SALW. The gray market, which is characterized by the active involvement of national agencies, was particularly affected by the end of the cold war. Former socialist states, thrust overnight into the free marketplace, found that they had few manufactured goods that were competitive with those of the West. But military equipment manufactured in the former Warsaw Pact countries was inexpensive and robust and was particularly attractive to the governments of poorer states, pariah administrations, and nonstate actors such as the militias that emerged in many parts

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of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak republics all exported arms in large quantities during the 1990s, and they often felt unconstrained by international law. Perhaps the most egregious of these new gray-market traffickers was Bulgaria.4 In the last decade after the end of the cold war, Bulgarians were found by UN investigators (amongst others) to be shipping arms in a profligate manner into conflict zones throughout Africa and elsewhere. It was only after external actors, most particularly the states of Western Europe, linked accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) to arms trafficking by Bulgaria did the authorities in Sofia begin to exert control over uncontrolled arms trading. Black-market trafficking in arms is certainly a global phenomenon, and there are individuals, groups, and commercial concerns that specialize in such activities. However, for the most part, illegal trafficking in arms is conducted as part of a basket of illicit and illegal activities by criminal groups or entrepreneurs who contract specialists to perform the key elements of the trade. These specialists are comprised of brokers or middlemen, who acquire the arms and bring together sellers and buyers; documentation experts, who provide such items as end-user certificates, which are required to verify the legality of the transaction; and transportation facilitators, who provide the means whereby arms are shipped from place of origin to place of destination. The clandestine nature of such activities attracts former members of national intelligence communities, veterans of armed forces and ex-law enforcement officials, many of whom were made redundant by the demise of the cold war. Each specialty requires its own type of acumen and, as with all illegal trafficking, the level of mutual suspicion between all parties is considerable. The middleman or broker in illegal arms trafficking most often attempts to remain aloof from the physical transferring of the weaponry. This distancing by brokers from the arms themselves has meant that it has been difficult to enact laws and regulations that can inhibit the actions of such individuals. Even when such laws exist, as they have since 1996 in the United States, they are almost never applied or enforced.5 The actions of the middleman are often nothing more than a series of communications, sometimes obscured by code or oblique references, which are designed to coordinate the efforts of the suppliers with the wishes of the recipients. Although such efforts at coordination can be fraught with their own perils (for example, during the French–Algerian conflict, the French authorities created a special unit to track and kill arms traffickers), most of the problems that the middlemen face are akin to those of any entrepreneur or executive.6 The only significant additional problem relates to the fact that should any party to the deal renege upon a commitment, it would not be possible to resort to the courts to achieve redress. Implicit in most black-market arms deals, therefore, is a threat that, should the agreement

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be breached, penalties—in the form of violence or intimidation—will be applied. However, the threat of an injured reputation is often enough to deter brokers themselves from overt acts of theft or fraud from the parties to the transaction. The document expert must provide the paper camouflage that allows the weapons to be bought and shipped by the traffickers. The end-use certificate (EUC) is a document which confirms that the arms will be received by a legal authority, most often by agents of a national government. This document may be in the form of a crude memorandum, signed by a designated authority, such as the official responsible for procurement for a country’s armed services. It also may be a comprehensive document bearing multiple signatures and official seals that are designed to preclude counterfeiting. Counterfeit or forged EUCs are used when it is believed that no genuine EUC can be procured to justify the transfer. They are also used when the traffickers are unwilling to pay the price for genuine but fraudulent documents that are provided by corrupt officials who are willing to provide an EUC with a false destination for the arms being trafficked. Such genuine but fraudulent EUCs may cost the traffickers fees equivalent to $50,000 or more, depending upon the size of the transaction.7 The document provider may also supply bills of lading and other papers that are needed to ship hazardous cargoes by road, sea, and air. Arms and munitions require particular handling when being transported between countries. While black-market arms may be disguised within general mixed cargoes, they are often shipped by carriers who specialize in moving dangerous goods between destinations that may have marginal facilities. These requirements, in addition to the illegal nature of the transfer, restrict the type of provider to small maritime and air shippers who have the equipment and personnel that can transcend problems associated with clandestine transportation of arms. Traditionally the Baltic fleet of the Danish maritime industry has provided much of the seaborne support for the black-market arms shippers, with their onboard cranes and shallow drafts allowing them access to unimproved ports in Africa, Latin America, and Asia.8 Transportation of small arms by air is plausible and, in the cases of landlocked conflict zones, mandatory. The collective weight of an SALW cargo, together with the volatility of ammunition and explosives, ensures that fees for transporting such cargoes are concomitantly high. Nevertheless, arms have been moved into and around Africa by aircraft almost continuously since the 1970s and increasingly since the end of the cold war. Fleets of former Soviet cargo aircraft, most prominently those of Ukrainian origin, have provided support for arms traffickers moving product into West and Central African conflict areas.9 These activities have been the subject of numerous investigations, including several by the United Nations, with

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the conclusion that the practice of uncontrolled aerial commerce is difficult to suppress and impossible to monitor. Most African airspace is not covered by radar, communications facilities are rudimentary, and the licensing of companies and aircraft is rife with fraud and deception. Companies change names and aircraft receive new identification numbers with great frequency, while airworthiness certificates are either bought from corrupt administrators or forged. In the Congo, a collection of aircraft, many with serious mechanical and electrical deficiencies, were used to provide arms to the militias who controlled the extractive mining regions, and on the return journeys these aircraft carried sacks of coltan and other minerals which enhanced the wealth of those who sponsored the militias.10 The black-market international traffickers are important because they will provide arms for nonstate actors, to states that are under sanction or embargo, and into areas where hostilities are taking place. But in terms of numbers and impact on the proliferation of SALW, the movement of arms within and between zones of conflict is a more significant phenomenon. The manner in which arms migrate from one battlespace to another may be less dramatic than clandestine shipments between continents, but the infective nature of such movements is a key element in the evolution of regional insecurity architectures. The migration of small arms is worthy of study and concern, since it is an important indicator of incipient unrest and civil conflict. The free market in arms that exists in parts of South and Southeast Asia and in Africa and Latin America is as subject to the laws of supply and demand as other commodity markets, but as the arms move they have a tendency to create ripples of instability and insecurity. In Kenya and Uganda, for example, combatants involved in the civil conflicts in Southern Sudan and Somalia often sold their weapons in border bazaars from whence they gravitated into the hands of cattle raiders, urban criminals in Nairobi, and bands of shifta robbers.11 The end result of this stealthy proliferation was to place significant areas of their national territories beyond the direct control of the governments in Kampala and Nairobi. The secondary effect was to provide enough insecurity to cloak the activities of terrorists and uncontrolled militias such as the Lord’s Resistance Army. Ironically, when peace breaks out in one area where small arms have proliferated to a high degree, this change in circumstances poses a real threat to contiguous and regional states. In West Africa, for example, arms from the Liberian conflict migrated into Sierra Leone and then into Cote d’Ivoire and into the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. In Central Africa, arms from Rwanda passed into the Democratic Republic of Congo.12 In South Asia during the 1990s, weapons from Afghanistan moved into the border areas of Pakistan and then into the city of Karachi. Weak governments were further weakened, as the arms allowed political and social divisions to develop into armed confrontations and then into endemic

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chaos. The chaos, perhaps best exemplified by conditions that have existed in Somalia since 1991, has served to create its own culture and economy that requires dysfunction and instability in order to continue.13 The lords of chaos in Somalia traffic in drugs, manufacture counterfeit goods, and conduct acts of piracy because the state (and agents of external intervention) have been unable to withstand the challenge provided by counterforces that were primarily armed with SALW. Similarly, the blowback from United States and Pakistani support for the mujahideen against the Soviet military in Afghanistan resulted in a de facto fragmentation of the state of Pakistan into enclaves that continue to sustain organized criminal communities and radical religious and political factions.14 When the supply and demand for arms has matured within zones of insecurity, the trade in weapons becomes more organized and formal. Permanent bazaars, such as the Bakaraaha in Mogadishu and Dhamar in Yemen, provide a continual and reliable source of supply. In the case of Yemen, the arms bazaars not only provide weapons for the local tribes but also are the basis for an export trade that supplies arms for the traders in the Horn of Africa. In Latin America, the arms traders that are based in the Iguacu Triangle area that conjoins Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay (also referred to as the Tri-Border Area) provide the weapons to the favela gangs in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.15 In Cambodia, the notorious Teuk Thia arms market has been the source of weapons that transit Thailand and Burma, pass through Cox’s Bazaar in southern Bangladesh and either remain in Bangladesh to arm political factions in that country or are further moved into the Indian hill areas such as Nagaland, where they fuel numerous long-term insurgencies.16 Although most of these permanent arms bazaars are illegal, they are protected by custom, economic utility, and corruption. In Yemen, where the “Kalashnikov culture” is entrenched, the arms markets serve as real and symbolic examples of tribal autonomy and antistatist sentiment.17 Another major source of proliferation of SALW are the inventories of militaries and police forces. In most parts of the developing world, law enforcement and military personnel are inadequately compensated and often remain unpaid for long periods of time. Selling arms and ammunition from official stocks helps to supplement the income of the soldiers and police officers, but the sale of these arms also places instruments of intimidation into the hands of forces that pose the greatest threat to law and order. In certain cases, as occurred in Uganda in 1979, the chaos of civil conflict allows whole arsenals to be stolen. Here, after the disintegration of the Idi Amin regime in Uganda, the military installation at Moroto was abandoned and local pastoralists acquired the weapons. This single act was the precursor to a local arms race which significantly altered the delicate balance of power among a variety of tribes and clans.18 In other cases, such as in the first Chechen war, a corrupt and

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disintegrating military supplied arms to insurgents, who in turn used them against the Russian military.19 In other cases, such as in Jamaica, Liberia, and Pakistan, politicians armed their supporters and then were unable to control the resultant deterioration into communal violence. There is one further source of arms that requires our attention, and in terms of control this last category poses a distinct set of problems. In many areas of the world, from the tribal areas of Pakistan to the townships of South Africa and to garage manufacturers in the United Kingdom, locally manufactured weapons—often crude but nonetheless effective— provide an alternative to those individuals who cannot afford (or do not have access to) factory-made weapons. In some cases, as with guns from the village of Darra adam Khel in Pakistan, these cottage industry arms have merely supplemented guns that are already available.20 In the case of the United Kingdom, where most personal firearms are now forbidden, deactivated arms (which are legal) were reactivated by criminal gunsmiths, and these weapons played a significant role in armed violence in Great Britain.21 This indicates that even strict control regimes can be subverted by creative and technologically proficient individuals. Nevertheless, for arms to pose a real threat to most societies, they must be proliferated by type and in numbers which counter the monopoly of armed force that is usually enjoyed by established militaries and law enforcement branches. Cottage industry weapons have not, on their own, provided the numbers and types of arms that might successfully challenge such a monopoly. Controlling the proliferation of SALW requires a combination of political will, instruments of enforcement, and usable intelligence. Each element must be present in order to achieve the desired objective, whether this be control or disarmament. Most of the components require bilateral or multilateral approaches in order to succeed, and all require some level of interagency coordination within states. Lack of coordination and cooperation between states and agencies is the single greatest facilitator in the proliferation of SALW. Arms traffickers exploit any confusion over laws, sovereignty, and jurisdiction to their own advantage, and without comprehensive international agreements on such matters as EUCs there is ample opportunity for the traffickers to escape detection and apprehension. Mitigating against the achievement of such comprehensive agreements is a degree of ambivalence that exists in certain supplier and recipient states. In countries where corrupt practices are endemic, the gray- and black-market trade in arms provides an attractive supplement to the incomes of venal officials. Some supplier states are also unwilling to relinquish their reputations as “reliable” sources of clandestine arms. Others, most notably the United States, have domestic and foreign policy reasons for opposing any multilateral agenda whose objectives includes the ultimate aim of disarmament. When taken as a group, these states have the

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capacity to undermine any movement toward a system of international laws that might regulate the proliferation of SALW. In 2001, the United Nations convened a Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. Although a Program of Action emerged from this meeting, the outcome of the conference was generally considered to be a failure. The 2001 conference was designed to capitalize on the success of the campaign to ban landmines, which came into force in 1997. Certain states, including the United States, Russia, and China, were not signatories to the landmine convention, but they had committed themselves to adopting unilateral moratoria on the production of such devices. The 2001 conference on SALW was designed by its sponsors to achieve the adoption of legally binding international legal statutes to mirror those of the landmine agreement, but the conference never moved beyond the stage of voluntary reporting and actions. The United States, through the office of then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, forcefully objected to a number of items that were in the proposed Program of Action.22 Among these objections were the perceptions that the United Nations would be given authority to restrict legitimate government-to-government SALW transfers; that moves to prohibit the civilian possession of arms would contravene rights enshrined in national laws (in the case of the United States, the Second Amendment to the Constitution); and that restricting the flow of arms to government-to-government transactions would preclude arming dissident groups whose causes were just and whose needs for such weaponry—perhaps in the face of genocidal assaults by government forces—were manifest. Given these objections, the conference of 2001 deteriorated into a series of discussions on nonbinding proposals for monitoring and identifying egregious trafficking behavior. A follow-up conference was scheduled for the summer of 2006, but with the United States again reluctant to accept legally binding stipulations, most observers were not sanguine about the possibility of success. Of course, the United Nations does oversee legally binding agreements through its embargo and sanctions program. Using its own staff, supplemented by experts, the United Nations monitors and reports on embargoes against state actors (for example, in 2006 the states of Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Somalia were under arms transfer bans) and nonstate actors. The monitoring groups often identify traffickers who violate these embargoes by name—for example, Victor Bout, a major transportation specialist, has been named in at least three UN investigations as a trafficker and has been the target of an Interpol warrant since 2002—but they have little power except that of embarrassing these individuals by publicizing their criminal behavior.23 In the case of Somalia, embargoed since 1992, the UN monitoring group has cataloged the evolution of a black-market economy in which the principal actors include warlords, international criminals,

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and religious extremists. Some of the UN investigations have led to indictments of foreign nationals in their home countries (for example, the Dutch government has tried several individuals for violating arms embargoes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Liberia), but most of the UN reports have simply illustrated the inadequacies of the global approach to SALW control. The one relatively successful attempt to monitor and regulate the flow of conventional arms—the Wassenaar Arrangement of 1995—was oriented more toward the export of major weapons systems to rogue states, and was still based upon voluntary compliance by its 34 signatories.24 Regional attempts to control SALW proliferation might provide greater success than the global approach, but efforts such as the Nairobi Protocol and the EU Code of Conduct remain untested. The Nairobi Protocol, signed by the representatives of 11 East African states in 2004 (but not by Somalia), was a reaction to the palpable impact that arms trafficking had upon the signatory states, and therefore the impetus was not based upon philosophical commitments but upon practical requirements. The protocol covered the activities of brokers, the necessity for information sharing, and the need for officials who flouted laws to be made accountable.25 The EU Code of Conduct, adopted in 1998, is a politically binding requirement that makes each state responsible for assessing the risk that arms might be used against allies, that weapons technology might be diverted, that arms might go to terrorists, that recipient states might reexport the arms in a profligate manner, and that any arms exports might place unreasonable economic pressures on the recipient state.26 In respect of SALW transfers, the EU has also proposed that arms and ammunition be clearly marked and that their origins be traceable; that controls over brokers be made a high priority; and that the standardization of EUCs and the verification of their authenticity be addressed. Some bilateral arrangements have provided evidence that two countries challenged by the effects of SALW proliferation can engage in mutually beneficial activities. Perhaps the most obvious of these arrangements is the “Operation Rachel” continuum that has existed between South Africa and Mozambique since 1995.27 The origin of Operation Rachel concept was in the large number of weapons from Mozambique that were moving across the border into South Africa and which were threatening the cohesion of the post-apartheid society in that country. Mozambique, debilitated by two decades of liberation and civil wars, was unable to police its borders, and millions of Mozambicans had only their weapons to trade for food and other essential items. The South African Police Service (SAPS) proposed that its personnel collaborate with Mozambican security forces in identifying arms caches adjacent to their mutual border and destroying the weapons in place when they were found. Using local informants, who identified locations with global positioning system (GPS) receivers, the joint patrols had some success in containing the arms

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moving into South Africa, and an annual operation was instituted. In 1999, as Operation Rachel sweeps moved further away from the South African border, SAPS could no longer unilaterally support the program with manpower and finances, so other organizations—including the Belgian government—helped to underwrite the program. By the 2005 operation, more than 25,000 units of SALW had been destroyed, together with more than 1.6 million rounds of ammunition. With perhaps more than a million weapons still remaining in private hands in Mozambique, this 10year total might not appear significant, but as an example of long-term bilateral cooperation between two states, Operation Rachel provides a useful template. As an adjunct to Operations Rachel in Mozambique, another local program was instituted in that country. This program employed an approach that has been attempted, with varying degrees of success, from Australia to Albania to the inner areas of U.S. cities. The approach, sometimes called “buyback” programs, offers remuneration or benefits for anyone who surrenders arms for destruction. In the case of Mozambique, arms were exchanged for bicycles, sewing machines, and other useful items.28 The Australian buyback program offered generous prices for arms that were surrendered by their owners. In Albania, a program managed and supported by the United Nations was slightly different and more ambitious, and was based upon community needs being linked to the success of a disarmament program. In the Gramsh district of Albania, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) partnered with local Albanian authorities to rid the region of thousands of small arms that remained in private hands after the looting of Albanian military installations in 1997. In exchange for the more than 6,000 weapons that were eventually collected, the UNDP underwrote improvements in infrastructure throughout the Gramsh district, including road improvement, communications upgrading, and equipping police units.29 As a pilot project, the Gramsh experiment was limited in scope and expectation, but it did appear to address one of the problems inherent in “buyback” programs based upon remuneration of individuals. In that approach, the “buybacks” encourage inflation in the value of arms and often result in the destruction of weapons that are clearly no longer functioning.30 A wealthy country such as Australia might be able to bear the fiscal burden of paying market prices for firearms, but that option is not available to most states. Even if multilateral agreements were achieved and regional and bilateral arrangements were honored, the need for useful data and intelligence would still require exceptional effort. Most states do not place a high priority on gathering information on SALW transfers, and the burden of this task has largely fallen upon nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with pedigrees or links to the anti-landmine campaign. Indeed, were it not for interested NGOs, the failure of the United Nations’ 2001 conference might

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have sounded the death knell for the SALW antiproliferation campaign. Groups such as the International Network on Small Arms (IANSA), Saferworld, and Oxfam and Human Rights Watch have provided a clearinghouse for information on SALW trafficking and the impact of small arms on the global community. Field data have been collected by the “Small Arms Survey” group at Geneva’s Graduate Institute of International Studies, the Institute for Strategic Studies in South Africa, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfer, and by the Monterey Institute of International Studies, to name but a handful. A small cadre of men and women have gathered information—often while hostilities have been ongoing— on small arms trafficking into West Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus region, East Africa, and the Great Lakes Region, and South and Southeast Asia. Even if the final objective has been advocacy toward an international control regime for SALW, much of the research has proven a fitting substitute for nonexistent governmental data. Perhaps even more useful than the data gathered by international NGOs has been provided by local organizations residing in areas that are most heavily impacted by SALW proliferation. These groups, often subject to intimidation and always underfunded, are best exemplified by “Viva Rio” and “Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence” (COAV) in Brazil, and by the Working Group for Weapons Reduction in Cambodia. The Brazilian organizations have been responsible for raising national and international awareness of the problem of firearms in the hands of criminal groups in Brazil, and particularly in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and this awareness led to a national referendum on restricting gun ownership in Brazil. Held in 2005, this referendum was, however, defeated by a substantial margin. Weighing against the reality of 38,000 gun deaths per year in Brazil was the belief that the forces of law and order in that country were unable to protect citizens from the predations of criminal gangs, and that self-protection made personal firearms ownership necessary.31 This paradox, in which guns create insecurity but gun ownership is necessary to provide protection against armed predators, provides the rationale for an unrestricted arms market in such diverse communities as Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and even in some U.S. cities. Although NGOs are very useful in terms of gathering and analyzing data on SALW proliferation, they cannot (and should not) be used as a substitute for traditional intelligence activities. However, as stated above, SALW proliferation is not a priority amongst the national intelligence agencies of developed states, and only becomes a matter of public concern when—as in the case of British merchants shipping arms into Sierra Leone, or French arms being found in Rwanda—the activities of arms traffickers initiate a scandal. Indeed, it may be that the potential for political scandal, in which the label of “Merchants of Death” is often attached to those identified as traffickers, provides the greatest degree of incentive for

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governments to maintain awareness and oversight over SALW transfers. It should also provide a cautionary constraint upon those intelligence professionals who believe that cohabiting with arms traffickers is just another way of gaining access to necessary information. Arms traffickers have a penchant for using their contacts in national intelligence communities to further their commercial aims, and this can create a web of interdependence that, if made public, would tarnish the reputation of the communities and undermine the basis for claiming any moral high ground. Even in a climate of ambivalence, inertia, corruption, and mixed motives, certain actions can be taken to further understand and impede the proliferation of SALW. Since the black market in arms has the fewest defenders and apologists, it is logical to attack that sector first, with an expectation that any success might be used to provide ways in which the grey market might be curbed. The EU approach—in which the origins of arms can be traced by stampings and markings—is useful, but such identifiers can always be counterfeited.32 Proposals for chemically degenerating primers and powder in ammunition are also interesting, but this would place a burden upon poor states which would have to renew their legal stocks of ammunition as they deteriorate. The regularization of EUCs, together with other documentation that must be provided by arms traffickers, is probably a better initiative and one which could be instituted inexpensively and quickly. The Wazan affair, which was the subject of a formal investigative commission in South Africa in 1995, contained most of the elements which continue to facilitate black- and grey-market transactions.33 One such element was the use of a crudely forged EUC that was provided by a broker, Eli Wazan, to support a shipment of arms from South Africa to Lebanon, but whose real destination was a Yugoslavia that was then embroiled in a civil war. Wazan himself had been paid $50,000 by his principals to provide a genuine but fraudulent EUC, to be acquired from an official of a foreign country. Wazan took the money, forged the EUC, and passed it to officials who were either part of the deceit or who did not adequately inspect the document. Since the EUC, nominally from a Lebanese government agency, could not be compared with any genuine article because there was no regularization of such documents, those who passed the document as genuine were able to plead ignorance of the deception. If EUCs were to assume the properties of a standardized international document, such as are found in the international transportation industry, then any confusion as to their validity might be mitigated. Ideally, modern technologies could be used to produce one standard, counterfeit-proof document, to be used by all arms-importing countries. If this was not possible, then examples of standard EUCs used by all states could be lodged in a database and accessed electronically, together with the signatures of the officials designated to authenticate the request in recipient states.

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Arms brokers have traditionally felt immune from penalties associated with their trafficking activities. Even where laws exist to control their practices, they are so seldom applied that they are flouted by the brokers. The simple solution is to create antibrokering laws where they do not exist, and to enforce them where they do. A number of well-publicized prosecutions of major brokers might have a chilling effect upon those who feel that because they are not intimate with the arms that they traffic, they are immune from responsibility. Similarly, those who transport arms into zones of conflict should be prosecuted for their transgression of international law, and their ships and aircraft should be confiscated. In order to monitor and gain evidence against these shippers, the radar coverage of areas such as Central Africa needs to be increased, possibly through the use of airborne radars such as the AWACS system. Traffickers in systems that are demonstrably destabilizing and destructive, such as shoulder-launched antiaircraft missiles, should suffer particularly harsh penalties. All efforts to control SALW require that the threat posed by an uncontrolled market in small arms is on par with that posed by terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The populations of Somalia, Karachi, Port Moresby, or Cambodia do not need to be convinced of that assertion, but those that are not directly impacted on a daily basis by the implications of an armed society may be less willing to elevate SALW proliferation to the table of high security concerns. However, the litany of those states that have devolved into the status of weak or unmanageable societies as the result of uncontrolled weaponization mirrors very closely those states that harbor or sustain the terrorists, human traffickers, and drug lords whose actions and product undermine the societies of the developed world. The arms that have undermined the authority of states in Central America have encouraged mass migration from that region to the United States. The small arms that have restricted the mandate of the central government in Yemen have provided safe havens for terrorists with international agendas. The weapons in the hands of Afghan warlords protect a poppy harvest whose end products have social and economic ramifications from Indonesia to Ireland. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons raises complex issues of culture, policy, and enforcement, but its darkest ramifications should not be disavowed because the task of control is too difficult or the threat posed by weaponized societies is too tangential. NOTES 1. Small arms and light weapons are defined as those arms that are classified as individual weapons or are crew-served but portable. Individual weapons include handguns, rifles, combat shotguns, submachine guns, light machine guns, grenade launchers, and hand-thrown grenades. Certain other weapons,

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such as rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) can also be included in this category. Crew-served weapons include medium and heavy machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and heavy antitank systems. Shoulder-fired antiaircraft systems, sometimes called Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are also included in the definition of SALW, as are portable directional mines of the “Claymore” variety. 2. U.S. Bureau of Justice, Guns Used in Crime, NCJ-148201 (Washington DC, 1995). 3. Philip Alpers and Conor Twyford, Small Arms in the Pacific (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2003), 25. 4. Human Rights Watch, Bulgaria: Money Talks, Arms Dealing with Human Rights Abusers, Vol. 11, No. 4 (D), (London, 1999). 5. Restrictions and penalties for brokering are described in US Arms Export Control Act, Title 22, Chapter 39, Subchapter 3, as amended in 1996. 6. Agence France Press, Ex-Secret Service Man Lifts Veil on Algeria War-era Death Squad, (Paris, January 25, 1996). 7. Blank EUCs without seals or signatures sold for $1000 in the 1990s. A false EUC with the signature of a Nigerian official could be acquired for $35,000 during the same period. The Independent (London, June 22 and October 10, 1992). 8. For a comprehensive report on the transportation of illicit arms see Amnesty International and TransArms Report. Dead on Time : Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human Rights. (London, Amnesty International, 2006). 9. Smuggling of arms into disputed areas of Congo are covered extensively in United Nations Security Council. Report of the Group of Experts Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (New York, United Nations, S/2004/551). 10. Ibid. 11. Joseph Ngunjiri, North Rift Awash with Illicit Arms Nairobi, Kenya: East African Standard, March 30, 2003; Musambayi Katumanga with Lionel Cliffe, Nairobi—A City Besieged (Bradford, UK: Centre for International Cooperation and Security, University of Bradford, 2005). 12. Taya Weiss, Local Catalysts, Global Reactions :Cycles of Conflict in the Mano RiverBasin (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005). 13. Sabrina Grosse-Kettler, External Actors in Stateless Somalia: A War Economy and Its Promoters (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2004). 14. Arif Hasan, “Karachi and the Global Nature of Urban Violence,” The Urban Age 1, no. 4 (1993): 1–4. 15. Rex Hudson, Terrorists and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003). 16. Bibhu Prasad Routray, “Southeast Asian Arms Trail to India’s Northeast,” Asia Times, November 15, 2002. 17. Small Arms Survey 2003, Living with Weapons: Small Arms in Yemen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 169–185. 18. Security Research and Information Center (Kenya), Small Arms Trafficking in the Border Regions of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya (Nairobi, Kenya: SRIC, 2001) section 3.1.

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19. Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995) 207–241. 20. Anonymous, “Ban on Arms Licenses Opposed in Darra Adamkhel,” Dawn, May 8, 2000. 21. House of Commons, Select Committee on Home Affairs, Imitation and Deactivated Firearms, Second Report (London 2000). 22. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, “Plenary Address to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons,” Available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/janjuly/4038.htm. 23. Bout is mentioned in UN Report S/2005/30 on the Congo; S/2002/1146 also relating to the Congo; S/2001/1015 on Liberia. 24. “The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,” established in the Hague, December 19, 1995. 25. “Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa,” signed Nairobi, Kenya, April 21, 2004. 26. “European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,” Available at http://www. fas.org/asmp/campaigns/code/eucode.html. 27. Martin Chachiua, Operations Rachel 1996–99 (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1999), Monograph 38. 28. Sami Faltas, Exchanging Guns for Tools (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2004). 29. South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), “You Have Removed the Devil from Our Door: An Assesment of the UNDP Arms and Light Weapons Control Project in Albania,” (Belgrade, Serbia: SEESAC, 2003). 30. In Mozambique, for example, this author witnessed the destruction of arms that had been exchanged for household goods, and many of these were clearly unusable. 31. “Brazil Gun Ban Referendum Misses Its Mark,” Financial Times, London, October 22, 2005. 32. European Union, EU Presidency Statement—PrepCom SALW: Cluster 11: Norms, regulations and administrative procedures. Available at http://europa-eu-un. org/articles/en/article 5582 en.htm. 33. “Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Arms Transactions between ARMSCOR and One Eli Wazan and Other Related Matters,” First Report, Johannesburg, June 15, 1995.

CHAPTER 9 TERRORISM FINANCE: GLOBAL RESPONSES TO THE TERRORISM MONEY TRAIL Paul J. Smith

In the weeks following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, media reports focused on the ease with which the hijackers had lived in the United States while simultaneously plotting their imminent suicide attacks. Much attention was focused on the method of finance, and particularly the fact that the hijackers had moved more than $325,000 into roughly 35 American bank accounts “without any of the banks’ issuing reports of suspicious activity to federal regulators.”1 Several news articles highlighted the ease with which several of the hijackers had opened bank accounts in southern Florida. Another story noted that “the coordination [of the terrorist operation] was so thorough that each of the four hijacking teams had its own ATM card.”2 Investigators would later reveal that two key hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi, received wire transfers from an al Qaeda operative based in the United Arab Emirates. F.B.I. officials said they believe that the transfers were sent by Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi, who had been identified as a “financial manager for Osama bin Laden.”3 Several years later, the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks upon the United States (“The 9/11 Commission”) would finally conclude that “the 9/11 plotters spent somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to plan and conduct their attack.”4 In subsequent weeks and months following the 9/11 attacks, as Congressional hearings began in earnest, there was little surprise that one issue that captivated lawmakers’ attention was the role and importance of money in sustaining the 9/11 operation. Representative Michael

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Oxley, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Services, perhaps captured this sentiment best when he delivered the following statement in October 2001: “The terrorists used American freedoms and American dollars against us. They executed their plans with access to our financial system, including credit cards, ATMs, local checking accounts, and wiring money overseas. The best way for our Committee to commemorate the victims’ lives is to take every step possible to ensure that the gates to the financial services system in this country are locked to terrorists.”5 Similar sentiments were expressed by other members of Congress. Senator Richard Shelby, a key expert on financial and money laundering matters, would note four years later that “money is the life blood of terrorism, and the Middle East is ground zero for much of the money raised and moved in support of terrorist activities.”6 Similarly, the link between money and terrorism was highlighted by Juan Zarate, a senior U.S. Treasury Department official, in his testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, when he stated that “the axiom now accepted around the world is that we must concentrate our national and collective power on breaking the financial ties that bind terrorist networks.”7 Clearly, since the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, attention has focused worldwide on the phenomenon of terrorist financing. Increasingly, the conventional wisdom posits that one of the keys to countering the terrorism threat is to target terrorist groups’ financial underpinnings. Moreover, this emerging conventional wisdom is reflected in an unprecedented global effort by governments around the world—but especially the United States government—to monitor, track, and document all forms of financial transactions, in the event that terrorism-support funds may be clandestinely pulsing through the international financial system. However, subsequent investigations and hearings would later reveal that terrorism finance is a complex enterprise, involving various evolving methodologies. Testifying before the U.S. Senate, Dennis Lormel—an expert on money laundering—stated that terrorism finance should not be seen as a one-dimensional phenomenon, but rather as a complex multidimensional enterprise involving both the funds as well as technical and administrative support.8 Moreover, another challenge for those who subscribe to the emerging conventional wisdom that money provides the elemental underpinning of terrorism is the fact that terrorism, as a form of political violence, is extremely cheap. Recent attacks in Indonesia, Spain, and the United Kingdom attest to the fact that the execution of a terrorist act often requires very little money at all. In fact, an individual terrorist could simply rely on his or her own funding by means of a personal salary, as was the case in the London subway bombing attacks. Nevertheless, this strategic shortcoming has not arrested or impeded a massive global

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effort to implement a financial surveillance system of unprecedented scale. HOW TERRORISTS ACQUIRE MONEY Like most organizational activities, terrorism requires money to sustain itself. Despite their antisocial predisposition and destructive tendencies, terrorists must still pay their bills, particularly if they wish to avoid unwanted attention. Throughout history, terrorists have relied on multiple pathways to acquire money and thus finance their activities. Some of these have been legal (or semilegal), and others clearly illegal. What is clear, however, is that terrorists rely on overwhelmingly diverse means of acquiring money, which suggests that curtailing terrorism from a financial dimension is probably a much more daunting challenge than many policymakers may be willing to admit. Fundraising and Solicitation Similar to a parent–teacher organization (PTO) or a local civic club, terrorist groups may turn to classic fund-raising techniques to acquire working capital. The Sri Lankan-based Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is particularly notorious for conducting fund-raising activities in Western countries among diaspora Tamil communities. These activities range from pledge drives, contribution cans located next to cash registers in convenience stores, and direct door-to-door solicitation. In Canada, these fund-raising activities are estimated to raise between $7 million to $22 million a year in direct and indirect support for the Tamil guerrillas who are seeking an independent homeland in Sri Lanka.9 Like the LTTE, the Lebanese-based group Hizbollah10 also relies on Lebanese expatriates (and others) who send money back home. In Charlotte, North Carolina, Hizbollah is famous for holding “regular parlor meetings” in members’ homes, where Hizbollah propaganda videos are shown, followed by the passing around of a collection basket.11 Similar patterns can be seen with numerous other terrorist groups. Charities and Wealthy Individuals Charities may also act as a significant source of funding for terrorist organizations. The role of charities and financial contributions by individuals is particularly important for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda. According to one terrorism analyst,” [D]angerous Middle Eastern terrorists like al Qaeda, Hizbollah and Hamas traditionally have relied largely on donations from wealthy Arab contributors, sometimes

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funneled through Islamic charities.”12 According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al Qaeda collected money from charities in two key ways, first by relying on “al Qaeda sympathizers in specific foreign branch offices of large, international charities,”13 and by controlling certain charities, such as the al Wafa organization. The 9/11 Commission found that “charities were a source of money and also provided significant cover, which enabled operatives to travel undetected under the guise of working for a humanitarian organization.”14 One key problem for officials investigating charities is that legitimate humanitarian money is often mixed with money that is either earmarked for terrorism, or is siphoned off by terrorist organizations. For example, it is widely known that the LTTE siphons “off donations to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), aid organizations and other benevolent entities that finance Tamil social service and development programs in Sri Lanka.”15 Another case of fund siphoning was highlighted recently by the U.S. tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service, which compelled the executive director of Chicago-based Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. (BIF) to plead guilty to a racketeering conspiracy for his role in diverting funds “in order to provide financial assistance to persons engaged in violent activities overseas,” including fighters based in Chechnya and Bosnia.16 In addition to charities, terrorist organizations may benefit from direct donations from wealthy individuals who share sympathies with the terrorists’ political objectives. According to the 9/11 Commission’s final report, al Qaeda derived the bulk of its financing not from Osama bin Laden’s purported vast wealth, but rather from his reliance on a key network of wealthy donors. The report noted that “Al Qaeda appears to have relied on a core group of financial facilitators who raised money from a variety of donors and other fund-raisers, primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi Arabia.”17 The phenomenon of individual contributions to terrorist organizations has been a particular challenge for Saudi Arabia. Although the Saudi Arabian government has cracked down on many charities, it has had less success with controlling individuals who have a penchant for financing violent extremism. According to Anthony Cordesman, individuals in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and Islamic countries will continue to provide financial support for extremist groups because “regional governments can only do so much to limit such funding.”18 He cites a report from the U.S. investment firm Merrill Lynch suggesting that this may become an even greater problem in the future: “Merrill Lynch’s estimates that the capital controlled by wealthy individuals in the Middle East rose by 29 percent during 2003–2004, to a level of approximately $1 trillion . . . [this raises] serious questions about how much governments can do. Much of this capital is in private accounts outside the region, terrorist operations are only moderately expensive, and

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Merrill Lynch projects a further 9 percent annual rise in such holdings from 2004 to 2009.”19 Legitimate Businesses Some terrorist organizations run their own business enterprises. Al Qaeda, under Osama Bin Laden’s leadership, was famous for its entrepreneurial tendencies. Al Qaeda reportedly owned a fishing business in Mombassa, Kenya, various trading companies in Sudan, and a ceramic manufacturing company in Yemen.20 Nevertheless, despite al Qaeda’s apparent knack for capitalist enterprise, it is not clear that these businesses substantially improved or sustained al Qaeda’s finances. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, al Qaeda’s business pursuits had only a marginal impact on the organization’s finances; according to CIA estimates, most of the $30 million that al Qaeda needed to sustain itself every year was raised almost entirely through donations.21 Other terrorist organizations running their own businesses have arguably had greater success, although not necessarily on the financial front. For example, one of the key members of the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiya (JI) ran a company, Infocus Technology, that was able to facilitate the granting of an immigration visa into the United States for Zacarias Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth September 11 hijacker.22 Another JI-affiliated company, Green Laboratory Medicine—whose director was Yazid Sufaat, a JI member—was used as a front to purchase 21 tons of ammonium nitrate for use in terrorist attacks in Singapore.23 The trading company Konsojaya, established in 1994, “ostensibly exported Malaysian palm oil to Afghanistan and imported honey from Sudan and Yemen.”24 But the company played a more sinister role, particularly as a “front for moving money and purchasing chemicals and equipment for bomb-making” for the 9/11-prototype plot known as Oplan Bojinka, which sought to destroy 11 U.S. airliners as they crossed the Pacific Ocean (among other objectives).25 Illicit Activities: Narcotics In addition to legal or semilegal activities, terrorist groups may also resort to criminal activity as a means of raising funds. On March 1, 2006, for example, the United States Court for the District of Columbia issued a superseding indictment against more than 40 individuals, primarily Colombian nationals, for violating various federal laws regarding narcotics trafficking and conspiracy. According to the indictment, “it was a part and an object of the conspiracy that All Defendants, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, would and did import into the United States . . . five kilograms and more of mixtures and substances containing a

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detectable amount of cocaine.”26 Many of the individuals named in the indictment are members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC), which was created in 1964 “as a left wing guerilla group dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Government of Colombia.”27 The indictment further states that “FARC has evolved into the world’s largest supplier of cocaine and cocaine paste.”28 Moreover, the group is directly responsible for half of the world’s supply of cocaine and “more than approximately 60% of the cocaine sent to the United States.”29 FARC has been designated by the U.S. Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization. Initially, FARC’s involvement in cocaine trafficking related to “taxes” that it imposed on non-FARC drug traffickers operating within the territory it controlled; however, beginning in the 1990s, FARC took on a more direct role in the cocaine trade by transforming itself “into a broker between the cocaine paste producing campesinos and the cocaine transportation organizations that distributed the cocaine to the United States and elsewhere.”30 Having achieved a monopoly in cocaine paste purchases, FARC was then able to set the price of cocaine paste purchased from the campesinos.31 The case of FARC and Colombian drug trafficking provides a direct example of a terrorist organization turning to narcotics to raise funds; narcotics has provided the organization with a sizable funding source of convenience and consistency. Other examples linking terrorists to the narcotics trade also exist around the world. In Turkey, the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (or PKK) has long been associated with the drug trade. Since 1985, over 300 PKK members have been arrested for drug offenses, and over half of these arrests occurred in Germany. The PKK link to narcotics is natural, given “Turkey’s position as a pivotal transit route for Southwest Asian opiates flowing into Europe.”32 In Central Asia, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and other groups in that region have also been strongly linked to the drug trade. According to Michael Sheehan, former U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Terrorist groups in Central Asia have been profiting from the drug smuggling and using it to finance their purchase of weapons and other activities.”33 In Thailand, the Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) has accused various narcotics syndicates of “helping to finance the insurgency in the southern border provinces”34 although some other officials have disputed this claim. Specifically, the ONCB alleged that “of the 17 drug gangs known to be operating in the southern provinces along the Thai–Malay border, two of the largest international syndicates were thought to be assisting southern militants and vice versa.”35 In Europe, drug trafficking has been strongly linked to terrorist organizations. The terrorists involved in the Madrid train attack were part of a major drug smuggling syndicate linking Morocco, Spain, Belgium,

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and the Netherlands.36 There is evidence that proceeds from illegal drug sales directly funded the terrorist operations. According to one report published in U.S. News & World Report, “Moroccan terrorists used drug sales to fund not only the 2004 Madrid attack but also the 2003 attacks in Casablanca, killing 45, and attempted bombings of U.S. and British ships in Gibraltar in 2002.”37 Another study published by Jane’s Intelligence Review also supports this claim: “Trading in hashish and ecstasy paid for cars, safe houses and explosives.”38 Moreover, many of the terrorist operatives involved in the Madrid operation also had records of involvement with illicit drugs.39 Other Criminal Activities Terrorist organizations have also turned to other forms of crime to raise money, including credit card fraud, kidnapping, and extortion. Historically, terrorism has often been associated with crime, and thus this phenomenon is not new. In Germany, for instance, the now defunct Red Army Faction raised money “the old fashioned way” by robbing banks.40 Contemporary terrorists have shown similar traits in terms of their criminal ingenuity and scope. In one recent case, cigarette smuggling was the preferred means of accessing capital. In March 2006, prosecutors in the United States unsealed an indictment charging 19 people (including U.S. and Canadian citizens) with smuggling cigarettes and other contraband (including counterfeit Viagra). A portion of the profits were diverted to the designated terrorist organization Hizbollah.41 Typically, a cigarette smuggling enterprise simply involves purchasing cigarettes in states where the tax is low (such as North Carolina), then transporting them on an interstate freeway north to states that impose a much higher tax. The cigarettes are then sold on the black market without having any tax imposed. With such huge profits, some police argue that “cigarette trafficking now has begun to rival drug trafficking as a funding choice for terrorist groups.”42 In another case, Mohammad Youssef Hammoud, a citizen of Lebanon, entered the United States with fraudulent documents in 1992. After being detained by U.S. immigration authorities, Hammoud applied for asylum and during this period he moved to Charlotte, North Carolina, where he had brothers and cousins. Ultimately, Hammoud gained U.S. resident alien status by marrying a U.S. citizen. Sometime in the mid-1990s, Hammoud, his wife, and one brother became involved in a cigarette smuggling operation that involved smuggling cigarettes from North Carolina (a state that imposed a minimal tax of .50 cents on cigarette packs) to Michigan (which imposed a tax of $7.50 per carton). Taxes were not paid in Michigan, and consequently that state lost approximately $3 million in potential tax revenues. More importantly, some portion of these illicit profits were funneled to Hizbollah. Moreover, the court determined that

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Hammoud and his coconspirators had engaged in sophisticated money laundering schemes by setting up fictitious entities and shell corporations which could then be used to launder the proceeds of the cigarette smuggling. Eventually, Hammoud and his brother were convicted of numerous crimes, including cigarette smuggling, racketeering, and money laundering, and Hammoud was eventually sentenced to 155 years in prison.43 Apart from more sophisticated criminal schemes, many contemporary terrorists are actively involved in petty crimes, with the purpose of raising funds. In some cases, the leadership of the organization, such as Jemaah Islamiya, will actively encourage the practice. Within certain militant Islamist movements in Southeast Asia, there exists a tradition known as fa’i—using money from crime to support religious causes.44 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, one of the cofounders of Jemaah Islamiya, reportedly told a student who had asked about the appropriateness of conducting computer hacking and online fraud, “You Can take their blood, then why not take their property?”45 In other cases, criminal activity is turned to out of necessity. In December 1999, a U.S. Customs Agent intercepted Ahmed Ressam as he was attempting to enter the United States for the purposes of bombing the Los Angeles International Airport. Ressam had built his life as a terrorist not by living on lavish support from al Qaeda or any other organization, but rather by engaging in petty crime and welfare fraud in Canada. Among other things, he sold fake passports, social security numbers, and driver’s licenses. He was also arrested four times and convicted twice. During the period from 1994 to 1999, Ahmed Ressam committed crimes ranging from “shoplifting, pickpocketing, purse snatching and stealing tourists’ suitcases.”46 In 1998, he was convicted of stealing laptop computers from parked cars, and served a 2-week sentence.47 What the Ressam case reveals is the fact that many contemporary terrorists engage in criminal activities—in a manner similar to classic organized crime syndicates— to raise money, support themselves, or purchase key weapons or other materials that are needed to conduct terrorist attacks.48 Kidnapping provides yet another criminal pathway to substantial capital inflows for terrorists. Kidnapping has emerged as a major internal security threat in many developing countries around the world, although in most cases it is an outgrowth of criminal (not terrorist) activities. However, there are examples where crime and terrorism converge. In Colombia, for instance, local criminals kidnap individuals and after receiving a ransom, simply transfer the hostage to the FARC, which then extorts additional money from families and businesses, and thus earns substantial profits for itself.49 In Southeast Asia, one of the most brazen kidnapping events occurred on April 23, 2000, when operatives from the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)—a semiterrorist, semicriminal organization— kidnapped more than 21 tourists from Malaysia, Germany, South Africa, Lebanon, Finland, and the Philippines at the Malaysian diving resort of

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Sipadan.50 With their hostages in tow, the ASG operatives raced back into Philippines waters (via their two speedboats) and ultimately reached their jungle hideouts. Subsequently, they made exorbitant financial demands for release of the hostages, including demands of U.S. $1 million per hostage. Eventually, the drama became more bizarre when Libya offered to pay $25 million in exchange for most of the hostages. Such kidnappings are not rare in the Philippines, and have been repeated often since 2000. In many cases, a complex nexus exists between criminal gangs and terrorist groups, often to the point of tactical cooperation. Crime and terrorism have traditionally been viewed as distinct activities. Organized crime gangs typically engage in crime so as to gain illicit profits; terrorists engage in “criminal acts”—murder, destruction of property, etc.—so as to bring about some sort of political change. The traditional view has been that these are distinct phenomena. However, the case of Ahmed Ressam and other contemporary examples suggest that crime and terrorism may be more related than once assumed, particularly in an era of globalization and declining (direct) state support for terrorism. One analyst has argued that “criminal and terrorist groups regularly engage in strategic alliances to provide goods or services”51 and moreover, “terrorist and criminal groups converge in territory inadequately controlled by state forces . . . to advance mutual interests and areas of potential cooperation.”52 Traditionally, it was assumed that criminal organizations eschewed terrorists, not because of any moral qualms, but because “it was bad for business; cooperation with political radicals would turn unwanted attention onto [the criminal] group.”53 Now that there is evidence to the contrary, the implications are that both terrorist and criminal groups may become more independent of state control. Thus, pressuring states to sever all financial support to terrorists may have been an effective strategy in the past (hence the recent laudatory praise of Libya), but the fact remains that many terrorist organizations have alternative ways in which to assure their financial security. The increasing convergence between crime and terrorism suggests that terrorist groups may become more private—in other words, operate to a great extent outside the constraints and controls that could have been imposed by governments and the international system. HOW TERRORISTS TRANSFER OR STORE THEIR MONEY On February 18, 2004, U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents raided the Ashland Oregon offices of Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi Arabian charity linked to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. IRS agents acted on suspicion that Al Haramain officials had filed false tax returns by omitting certain income and by mischaracterizing how their money was being spent.54 Moreover, the group was accused of

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laundering $150,000 in donations to help al Qaeda fighters in Chechnya.55 The Oregon raids revealed a key element of the U.S. strategy against terrorist financing—cracking down on charities and other organizations that funnel money to terrorist groups. In the case of Al Haramain, U.S. officials had linked this organization to a range of terrorist attacks, including the 1998 U.S. embassy attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the Bali nightclub bombings in October 2002. However, what is also significant about Al Haramain was the fact that the organization not only allegedly provided a source for funding, it also provided a global conduit through which funds could be discreetly disbursed across the world. In one case, the charity was accused of wiring a $1-million-dollar payment in 1999 to militant fighters in Chechnya.56 For this and other reasons, the group was forced to shut its offices in various former Soviet Union states, as well as Somalia and Bosnia, particularly after U.S. officials “asserted those offices used charitable donations to finance terrorist activities.”57 Officials describe the practice of diverting legitimate funds to terrorism activities as “reverse money laundering.” Reverse money laundering—unlike classic money laundering—involves the transmitting of clean money into associations or activities that are illegal in nature. An alternative definition describes reverse money laundering as an activity “where illicit funds are covertly transferred to individuals to finance terrorist operations.”58 Contributing money to a charity that promotes terrorism would thus be considered money laundering. This is important for al Qaeda since, according to a report by a Council on Foreign Relations task force, “Al-Qaeda moves its funds through the global financial system, the Islamic banking system, and the underground hawala system, among other money transfer mechanisms. It uses its global network of businesses and charities as a cover for moving funds.”59 A similar case of “charity abuse” occurred in the southern Philippines, where Mohammed Jamal Khalifa—Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law—had set up local branches of Islamic charities, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO).60 According to one analyst, “The IIRO branch [in the Philippines] was misused without its knowledge for the routing of funds to the ASG and Al-Qaeda cells located throughout the country and region.”61 Charities may use formal banking sectors, or if they face pressure, they may revert to using informal value transfer systems (IVTS), which provide another pathway for terrorists to transfer funds globally (particularly as formal transfer systems receive increased government scrutiny and surveillance). Such systems include the hawala system, the peso-exchange system, the fei-chien system, among others. These systems work by transferring value (as opposed to physical or electronic currency) throughout the world. For example, an IVTS dealer in country X contacts another dealer in country Y and instructs him to deduct a certain amount (the

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amount of the money to be transferred). This obviously creates a debt for the dealer in country Y; such debts are reconciled either by opposite financial flows, or through other means (such as false invoicing). At some point in the future, the books must be reconciled between the two dealers. The problem for government regulators is that global IVTS systems have been developed, not for terrorism financing, but rather to address the banking needs of millions of poor—often migrant—workers throughout the world. In many parts of the world, these informal value-transfer systems “represent the only financial system available.”62 According to Walter Perkel, an estimated $100 billion to $300 billion pass through the IVTS every year. The problem is that such systems, while originally created for purposes unrelated to terrorism, can be exploited by transnational terrorist organizations. Another way to transmit money is to use the services of an unlicensed or unregistered money transmitter. Indeed, as scrutiny of the formal banking sectors grows every year, terrorist organizations, their supporters, or members of classic criminal organizations may seek to transmit funds globally via informal channels, such as through unregistered money transmission businesses. As with the IVTS, unlicensed money transmitters often service immigrant—and often illegal immigrant—communities. In other words, they target groups who cannot afford traditional fees charged by banks and who wish to avoid government scrutiny for a variety of reasons (tax evasion, illegal immigrant status, etc.). Nevertheless, these money transmitting businesses are viewed by the U.S. government, and increasingly other governments, as a potential problem in terms of money laundering. According to one U.S. Homeland Security Department official, “These unlicensed [money service] businesses operate outside of the traditional banking system and governmental oversight, and have been long recognized by law enforcement as vulnerable for exploitation by terrorists and other criminals.”63 Recent legal changes, such as 18 U.S.C. 1960, Prohibition of Unlicensed Money Transmitting Business, enacted through the USA PATRIOT Act, are providing U.S. investigators with greater authority to investigate such businesses.64 A more fundamental means of transmitting money across international borders is to simply have someone smuggle it in cash. In Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiya relies on small-scale couriers who arrive with bags of cash. Personal couriers, often Indonesian migrants working in Malaysia who are not actual members of JI, helped transfer more than $15,000 in cash which was used in the first Bali bombing of October 2002.65 Indonesian police have confirmed that JI regularly uses cash couriers to smuggle cash into Indonesia to fund its operations.66 In the United States, bulk cash smuggling is traditionally associated with narcotics trafficking. As the United States has implemented stricter banking standards—resulting from requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970—narcotics traffickers

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have found it more difficult to achieve the initial “placement” stage (depositing cash; transforming cash into an electronic or bankable form) of money laundering. As a result, a vibrant cash smuggling industry has grown, particularly along the U.S.–Mexican border. According to a U.S. Treasury Department official, “Cash associated with drugs typically flows out of the U.S. across the southwest border into Mexico, retracing the route that the drugs took entering the United States. Drugs and illicit proceeds also cross our northern and other borders.”67 Finally, a new and emerging form of cross-border cash or value transfer is facilitated by the Internet, particularly the rise of “e-cash” or “e-gold” transactions. According to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) official, “Internet payment services such as PayPal, BidPay, e-gold and e-Dinar represent new methods to transfer funds globally. For example in 2004, PayPal executed 339.9 million payments totaling $18.9 billion in value.”68 E-cash is ideal for clandestine transmission of money across borders. It is particularly useful to achieve the “layering” stage of money laundering (sending money to a number of accounts in different jurisdictions so as to create layers between the money and its source). Many of these transactions can be conducted without the need for identifying information of the sender or receiver. And, according to this DHS official, “some Internet payment conveyances keep few or no records. Others with substantial record keeping may reside safely beyond the reach of U.S. law enforcement.”69 U.S. officials fear that these new and emerging technologies provide a significant window through which illicit cash can be transmitted across multiple jurisdictions, and moreover, that these technologies and methods “are not addressed by the currency and monetary instrument reporting requirements as presently structured.”70 DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AGAINST TERRORISM FINANCE As global attention focuses on terrorism and terrorism financing, governments around the world have pushed for new regulations—both international and domestic—to address the perceived legal gaps that terrorists may exploit. Indeed, multiple jurisdictions around the world— often under U.S. guidance or pressure—are transforming their financial systems in a manner as to make them inhospitable to terrorism financing. According to Gerald Feierstein of the U.S. State Department, “A number of countries have either adopted new legislation to shut down terrorist financing, or are in the process or doing so.”71 The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), which provides policy advice and technical assistance (regarding management of public finances) to governments seeking such assistance, has expanded its financial enforcement program substantially.

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Today, OTA has advisors in 43 countries, including the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.72 Notwithstanding efforts to suppress terrorism financing after the September 11 attacks, perhaps the most significant international measure against terrorism financing was introduced in 1999, when the United Nations adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which entered into force on April 10, 2002. By June 2005, the convention had been signed by 132 countries, and 117 were full parties to the agreement.73 The Convention created a number of obligations for states, such as the need to (1) create domestic laws that criminalize the financing of terrorist acts; (2) provide legal and law enforcement to other party States; and (3) require financial institutions to implement reporting and diligence requirements.74 The 1999 Convention was a powerful step within the international community to stem terrorism financing. But the impact of 9/11 made the Convention even more potent, particularly with the passage of UN Resolution 1373. Passed only weeks after the September 11 attacks, Resolution 1373 “criminalized all activities falling within the ambit of terrorist financing [and] obliged states to freeze all funds or financial assets of persons and entities that are directly or indirectly used to commit terrorist acts or that are owned and controlled by persons engaged in, or associated with, terrorism [and] obliged states to prevent their nationals (including private financial institutions) from making such funds available, in effect imposing strict client detection measures, STR procedures, and subordination to other intergovernmental institutions in order to receive the names of designated terrorist organizations or individuals; [and] imposed substantive and procedural criminal law measures at the domestic level, including an obligation to cooperate in the acquisition of evidence for criminal proceedings.”75 To implement the measures of Resolution 1373, the UN Security Council established a subsidiary organ commonly known as the Counter-Terrorism Committee. “Member states were obliged to report to the committee, within 90 days, on the steps they had taken to implement the resolution.”76 In addition to international laws, rules, or conventions, many countries have their own domestic legal regimes that focus on terrorism financing. The United States, for instance, has a number of laws that directly target terrorist financing. Under the International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA),77 passed in 1977, as well as other statutes, the U.S. government has established “sanctions programs that prohibit named foreign terrorists, foreign drug kingpins, and their fronts and operatives from using their assets within U.S. jurisdiction or engaging in business or other financial activities with U.S. persons, including companies or individuals.”78 Another law passed in 1996, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), gives the Secretary of State authority

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to designate any group as a threat to U.S. national security, and thus makes it a crime for any person in the United States to provide funds or any material support to such a group.79 In addition, the AEDPA prevents U.S. persons from “engaging in transactions with countries that support terrorism” and requires that financial institutions freeze financial accounts belonging to international terrorist organizations.80 Another way that governments around the world are cracking down on terrorism financing is to target money laundering. Increasingly, countries are enacting severe regulations against money laundering, terrorism finance, and other financial crimes. According to E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, “Seventeen countries promulgated or updated anti-money laundering and terrorist financing laws in 2005. The number of jurisdictions that have criminalized money laundering, to include other crimes resulting in money laundering beyond narcotics, increased from 163 in 2004 to 172 in 2005. Ten more countries criminalized terrorist financing.”81 One organization that is at the forefront of anti-money laundering efforts is the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body that standardizes international policies to counter money laundering. Recently, it has emphasized countering terrorism financing (including recent initiatives to counter cross-border currency smuggling) as part of its overall mandate to address international money laundering.82 The United States has also retargeted its anti-money laundering regime toward terrorism financing. The foundation of the U.S. money laundering regime is the Bank Secrecy Act, passed in 1970, which seeks to “prevent financial institutions from being used as intermediaries for the transfer or deposit of money derived from criminal activity and to provide a paper trail for law enforcement agencies in their investigations of possible money laundering.”83 The Bank Secrecy Act requires that banks generate certain reports, such as Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), on customers who exhibit unusual behavior (in the context of a financial transaction) or who satisfy certain financial thresholds. Recently, data from SARs has been used in terrorism investigations or prosecutions. In one case, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, relying on data provided by SARs, began a bank and mail/wire fraud investigation “involving a purported charity raising money for needy people in a Middle Eastern country.”84 Data from SARs has also been used in prosecuting operators of unlicensed money transmitting businesses. In one case, a defendant was prosecuted for operating a multimillion dollar money transfer business that, at its peak, “was transferring more than half a million dollars to a Middle Eastern country, out of the defendant’s store.”85 The scope of the Bank Secrecy Act was greatly expanded with passage of Title 3 of the USA PATRIOT Act, otherwise known as the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001.

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Title 3 specifically targets money laundering, considered a $500 billion per year transnational crime, and greatly expands the scope of the Bank Secrecy Act. As noted earlier, money laundering consists of three critical steps: placement, layering, and integration. The layering stage is the primary means through which money is transferred internationally; the ability to conduct layering transactions in a sophisticated and clandestine manner is a skill that is highly valued by transnational crime and terrorist organizations. However, it is also prohibited by U.S. law. For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) addresses international financial crime offenses and specifically makes it a crime to transport, transmit, or transfer [or attempt the same] a monetary instrument or funds knowing that the instrument or funds involve the proceeds of any unlawful activity (i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, (ii) knowing that such transportation, transmission or transfer is designed to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership or control of proceeds of specified unlawful activity, or (iii) knowing that such transportation, transmission or transfer is designed to avoid a federal or state transaction reporting requirement.86

For prosecutors, the significant utility of the federal money laundering statutes is that they can be applied to virtually any crime that involves any financial transaction, such as financial support for international terrorism. The predicate “specified unlawful activities” that invoke the money laundering statues have been expanded to include virtually all federal white-collar crimes. As a result, “the money laundering statutes reach virtually any type of illicit proceeds which one might obtain.”87 It is thus not surprising that the United States is encouraging other countries to adopt a similar regime. Recently, for instance, U.S. officials visited Bangladesh for the purpose of encouraging that country to beef up its anti-money laundering surveillance and prosecution system.88 As the U.S. example demonstrates, it provides a critical tool to address terrorism financing. CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS TO FOCUSING ON TERRORISM FINANCE During the past decade, and particularly since 1999, regulations and laws have been implemented throughout the world, focused primarily at terrorism financing. Even governments that once resisted global pressure to either limit terrorist financing or deter money laundering in their jurisdictions are now conforming to this trend, although sometimes reluctantly. A U.S. official recently proclaimed that the United States and other countries have “frozen more than $150 million . . . of ‘terrorist assets’

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in the global anti-terrorism fight since 2001.”89 With such seizures in mind, it could easily be asserted that global surveillance of monetary transactions—particularly of the illicit variety—is at an all-time high. This would suggest that terrorists are being squeezed of funds, and thus the “financial oxygen” that sustains terrorist activity is nearly depleted. Unfortunately, however, the reality is more complicated. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, terrorism is attractive—and has always been attractive to discontented groups—because it is a particularly inexpensive form of violence (or war). For instance, suicide bombings, which have become increasingly common worldwide since 1979, are uniquely inexpensive. “The improvised explosive devices worn or carried by a suicide bomber, for example, can cost less than $150 to produce. The bombers themselves are expendable assets.”90 The more costly part of the operation is the preexisting organization that must recruit, indoctrinate, and guide the suicide bomber through the operation. In addition, when they do require larger sums of money, terrorists are extremely versatile and creative. The 9/11 Commission recognized this fact when they stated: “Though progress apparently has been made [to attack terrorist financing], terrorists have shown considerable creativity in their methods of moving money. If al Qaeda is replaced by smaller, decentralized terrorist groups, the premise behind the government’s efforts—that terrorists need a financial support network—may become outdated.”91 The Commission also noted, as described above, that many terrorist operations can simply be self-funded without sophisticated reliance on outside contributors or elaborate money-making schemes: “. . . some terrorist operations do not rely on outside sources of money and may now be self-funding, either through legitimate employment or lowlevel criminal activity.”92 In addition, as noted earlier, terrorists are reverting to more fundamental methods of transferring money, such as enlisting informal value-transfer systems, engaging in bulk cash smuggling, or simply transferring “value” anonymously via e-cash (or e-gold) on the Internet. Further, as money laundering regimes become more advanced in rich, developed countries (and even moderately wealthy developing countries), terrorist organizations always have the option of turning to “less governed spaces”—in other words, operating in those areas of the world outside the purview of governments and financial regulators.93 However, it is also clear that increasing global scrutiny of financial transactions does have an impact. Among other things, it reduces terrorists’ functional space; it requires them to operate in less convenient areas of the world, areas where they may become vulnerable to law enforcement intervention or areas from which terrorist operations—particularly those aimed at developed countries—are much more difficult to execute. What should be recognized and acknowledged, however, is the fact that

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terrorism is a complex, political phenomenon that cannot be simply eliminated by starving terrorists of their money. Countering terrorism in the long term will still require that governments honestly and forthrightly take on those sensitive questions or issues that provide the “political oxygen” of international terrorism.94 Unless that reality is confronted honestly, terrorists will always find a way to fund their operations. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position or official policy of the Naval War College, Department of Defense, or any other U.S. governmental agency. NOTES 1. James Risen, “Traces of Terror: The Money Trail; Money Transfers by Hijackers Did Not Set Off Alarms for Banking Regulators,” New York Times, July 17, 2002. 2. Don Van Natta, Jr. and Kate Zernike, “The Sept. Hijackers’ Meticulous Strategy of Planning, Brains and Muscles,” Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada), November 5, 2001, B04. 3. Risen, “Traces of Terror.” 4. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004) p. 172. 5. Transcript of opening statement by Chairman Michael G. Oxley, Committee on Financial Services, “Dismantling the Financial Infrastructure of Global Terrorism,” reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, October 3, 2001. 6. Statement of Senator Richard Shelby, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Federal News Service, July 13, 2005. 7. Testimony of Juan Zarate, Assistant Treasury Secretary, before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, reported in Congressional Quarterly, February 16, 2005. 8. Testimony of Dennis Lormel, Senior Vice President of Money Laundering, Corporate Risk International, Hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Federal News Service, July 13, 2005. 9. Somini Sengupta, “Canadian Cash Fueling Revolt in Sri Lanka?” The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec), July 16, 2000. 10. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 11. Statement of Matthew Levitt, Senior Fellow and Director of Terrorism Studies, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, before the Committee on Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, May 25, 2005.

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12. Testimony of Rensselaer W. Lee, III, Global Advisory Service, before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, reported in Federal News Service, May 20, 2003. 13. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 170–171. 14. Ibid. 15. Steve Kiser, Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005) 35. 16. Statement of Nancy Jardini, Chief, Criminal Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, April 29, 2004. 17. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 170. 18. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror?” Middle East Policy 13, no. 1 (March 22, 2006): 28. 19. Ibid. 20. Vernon Loeb, “A Global, Pan-Islamic Network,” Washington Post, August 23, 1998, A01. 21. The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 169–170. 22. Zachary Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah,” NBR Analysis 14, no. 5 (December 2003): 36. 23. Ibid., 35. 24. Ibid., 36. 25. Ibid. For more on this, please see Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Lose and Learn Doctrine: The Trajectory of Oplan Bojinka to 9/11,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 171–188. 26. United States of America v. Pedro Antonio Marin et al. (Superseding Indictment), United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Filed in Open Court March 1, 2006, Criminal No. 04-446 (TFH), p. 6. 27. Ibid., p. 9. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., p. 21. 30. Ibid., p. 9. 31. Ibid., p. 16. 32. Stefan Leader and David Wiencek, “Drug money: The Fuel for Global Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 12, no. 2 (February 1, 2000), 49–54. 33. Prepared testimony of Michael A. Sheehan, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Federal News Service, December 13, 2000. 34. “Thailand Narcotics Board: Drug Gangs Helping to Finance Southern Insurgency” [FBIS], SEP20051117096019 Bangkok Thai Day in English, November 17, 2005, 1. 35. Ibid. 36. David E. Kaplan, “Paying for Terror: How Jihadist Groups are Using Organized-Crime Tactics—and Profits—to Finance Attacks on Targets around the Globe,” U.S. News & World Report (online edition). Available at http://www. usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm (accessed December 5, 2005).

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37. Ibid. 38. Christopher Jasparro, “Madrid Attacks Point to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 1, 2004), 30–33 [electronic edition]. 39. Ibid. 40. Prepared testimony of Michael A. Sheehan, 2000. 41. “U.S. Charges 19 with Selling Smuggled Cigarettes to Aid Hizbollah,” Agence France Presse, March 29, 2006. 42. Sari Horwitz, “Cigarette Smuggling Linked to Terrorism,” Washington Post, June 8, 2004, A01. 43. Ibid. 44. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 50. 45. Ibid. 46. Ian Mulgrew, “Ressam Gets 22 Years in Prison,” The Gazette (Montreal), July 28, 2005. 47. Ibid. 48. Chris Jasparro, “Low-level Criminality Linked to Transnational Terrorism,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (May 1, 2005), 18–21. 49. Prepared testimony of Michael A. Sheehan, 2000. 50. Paul J. Smith, “East Asia’s Transnational Challenges: The Dark Side of Globalization,” in Tiger’s Roar: Asia’s Recovery and Its Impact, ed. Julian Weiss (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001) 17–18. 51. Tamara Makarenko, “Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: Tracing the Crime-Terror Nexus in Southeast Asia,” in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, ed. Paul J. Smith (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 169–170. 52. Ibid., 170. 53. Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 238. 54. U.S. Department of Treasury, “Treasury Announces Actions against alHaramain,” Press Release (February 19, 2004). Available at: http://www.ustreas. gov/press/releases/js1183.htm. 55. “Cleaning up After Al-Haramain,” The Associated Press, October 16, 2005. 56. Sharon LaFraniere, “How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya,” Washington Post, April 26, 2003, A01. 57. Ibid. 58. Michael McGuinn, “Money Laundering; Twenty-First Annual Survey of White Collar Crime,” American Criminal Law Review 43, no. 2 (March 22, 2006): 739. 59. William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky, Project Co-Directors, Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002) 7. 60. Brian Joyce, “Terrorist Financing in Southeast Asia,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (November 1, 2002), 23-25 [electronic version]. 61. Ibid. 62. Walter Perkel, “Money Laundering and Terrorism: Informal Value Transfer Systems,” American Criminal Law Review 41 (Winter 2004): 183. 63. Statement of Kevin Delli-Colli, Assistant Director, Financial Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland

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Security, before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, April 4, 2006. 64. Ibid. 65. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia,” 20–21. 66. “Indonesia: Article Details JI Funding, Noordin’s Problem Getting Al Qaeda Funds,” SEP20060306311001 Surabaya Post (WWW-Text) in Indonesian, March 6, 2006 [Obtained from and translated by Open Source Center]. 67. Statement of Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Department of the Treasury, before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, April 4, 2006. 68. Statement of Kevin Delli-Colli, Assistant Director, Financial Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland Security, before the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, April 4, 2006. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 71. Statement of Gerald M. Feierstein, Deputy Coordinator for Programs and Plans, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Hearing of the Oversight and Investigations, Subcommittee of the House Financial Services Committee, Subject: Counterterrorism Financing, Foreign Training and Assistance: Progress Since 9/11, reported in Federal News Service, April 6, 2006. 72. Statement of William Larry McDonald, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Technical Assistant Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Committee on House Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, April 6, 2006. 73. Martin A. Weiss, “Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and InterAgency Coordination,” CRS Report for Congress, August 3, 2005, 46. 74. John D.G. Waszak, “The Obstacles to Suppressing Radical Islamic Terrorist Financing,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 37 (2004): 673–710. 75. Ilias Bantekas, “The International Law of Terrorist Financing,” American Journal of International Law 97 (April 2003): 315. 76. Ibid. 77. 50 U.S.C. § 1701-06. 78. The 2001 National Money Laundering Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Enforcement, September 2001) 9. 79. Testimony of Juliette N. Kayyem, Former Commissioner, National Commission on Terrorism, House Armed Services Oversight Panel on Terrorism, reported in Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, July 13, 2000. 80. Stephen C. Warneck, “A Preemptive Strike: Using RICO and the AEDPA to Attack the Financial Strength of International Terrorist Organizations,” Boston University Law Review 78 (February 1998): 177–228. 81. Testimony of E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, in Panel I of Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, reported in Federal News Service, April 4, 2006. 82. Weiss, “Terrorist Financing,” 46–47.

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83. “Opportunities Exist for FINCEN and the Banking Regulators to Further Strengthen the Framework for Consistent BSA Oversight,” GAO Reports, Report number GAO-06-386, April 28, 2006 [electronic Lexis-Nexis version]. 84. The SAR Activity Review: Trends, Tips & Issues 8, published under the auspices of the Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group, April 8, 2005, 26. Available at http://www.fincen.gov/sarreviewissue8.pdf (accessed on June 7, 2005). 85. Ibid. 86. Carol Van Cleef, Harvey M. Silets, and Patrice Motz, “Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?” Journal of Financial Crime 12, no. 1 (August 1, 2004): 56. 87. Frank C. Razzano, “American Money Laundering Statutes: The Case for a Worldwide System of Banking Compliance Programs,” Journal of International Law and Practice 3 (1994): 289. 88. “U.S. Asks Bangladesh to Formulate Effective Anti-money Laundering Law,” (Excerpt from report by Bangladesh newspaper, The Daily Star Web site on May 19, 2006), BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 19, 2006. 89. “More Than 150 Million Dollars of ‘Terrorist Funds’ Blocked Worldwide,” Agence France Presse, November 9, 2005. 90. Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (July/August 2004): 251. 91. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 383. 92. Ibid. 93. For a detailed analysis on the relationship between failed states and terrorism, please see the chapter by Matt Wahlert in this volume. 94. Kumar Ramakrishna, “Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia: The Need to Confront the Functional and Ideological ‘Enabling Environment,’” in Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability, ed. Paul J. Smith (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005) 157.

CHAPTER 10 ORGANIZED CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND TERRORISM J.P. Larsson

In a dark corner of Room 101 in Britain’s New Scotland Yard, behind more or less gruesome exhibits and a range of weapons used on the streets of London, is a glass cabinet dedicated to “terrorism.” True, many of the other exhibits—from forged identification documents and currency to weapons and tools of torture—have also been used for terrorist purposes, but this small exhibit is the only one dedicated purely to terrorism. Inspector Beaton’s bloodstained jacket, for example, worn by the police officer as he was shot in the line of duty protecting the Royal Family in 1974, together with other items in this dark museum—such as the exploded remains of police helmets—testifies both to the importance terrorism plays in our lives and to its links with the criminal underworld. The “tools of the trade” on display illustrate that organized criminal networks have had a long-standing flirtation with terrorism. Nail bombs and assault rifles nestle together with narcotics and blindfolds used for kidnaps and abductions. Despite the common means and methods shared by terrorists and criminal organizations, the traditional view of law enforcement has been to treat the two as completely distinct and separate, and this has in turn led to two disparate responses by government bodies, law enforcement agencies, and academic scholarship. The way to combat both terrorism and organized crime may, however, be to treat them as very similar concepts. Indeed, as the Black Museum (as this commemoration to crime in London is called) at the Metropolitan Police in London illustrates, the two have at times converged to the point of being inseparable. At other times, of course, they are quite distinct, and provision needs to be made to understand this. The move from two separate concepts to

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an inextricably linked symbiotic relationship poses a problem for law enforcement agencies, as both structures and procedures have differed depending on legal considerations. This chapter will look briefly at these issues, by first offering a brief overview of the subject of organized crime, taken quite separate from terrorism, and then exploring some of the similarities between them, how the two interact, and what the law enforcement response is and can be. Finally, some thoughts about how both terrorism and organized crime can be countered in the twenty-first century will be offered. ORGANIZED CRIME Organized crime has for a long time tickled the fantasy of the public by fictional—or semifictional—accounts of con men, gangs, mobs, and mafias. The mass media, similarly, is fond of describing the war that is being fought on our streets by organized criminals, often armed better than law enforcement officers, and the amount of money it costs society. As with any fictional accounts there are always some truths in these stories. Organized crime does exist and is big and dangerous business, estimated by some reports as having annual revenues of up to US$1,000 billion.1 Due to the very nature of organized crime, it is of course impossible to analyze its economic impact to any degree of accuracy, but some observers put money laundering alone as the third biggest revenue-producing business in the world after foreign exchange and oil. In the United Kingdom, the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) estimated at its creation in 2006 that the economic and social costs generated by organized crime varies from around £20 billion per year—or more than £300 for every person in the country—to around £40 billion (approx. US$75 billion). Although serious and organized crime defies definition (almost as much as terrorism), every society has some sort or “organized” crime, from the “Yakuza” groups in Japan to the Chinese “Triads” and the wellknown Italian Mafias. Some organized criminal networks are so well known that their name becomes synonymous with organized crime, even when not directly referring to that group. Such is the case with the Sicilian Mafia, only one of the four largest organized criminal networks in Italy (the others being the Camorra, the ‘ndrangheta, and Sacra Corona Unita), which has lent its name to a host of nonrelated organizations. It is not uncommon to hear about the “Russian Mafia” or the “Albanian Mafia,” for example. While this makes it easier for the media and the public at large, it is not helpful for practitioners, as it does not differentiate between important historical and methodological differences.2 While definitions of organized crime may elude academics and researchers, practitioners would agree that there is a range of “types” of organized crime including drug traffickers, extortion rackets, prison gangs,

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motorcycle gangs, people traffickers, arms smugglers, white-collar crime, blue-collar crime, financial or violent crime, cyber crime, pedophile networks, sexual organized crime, and, yes, terrorism (as will be explored later). There is also some consensus about what constitutes organized crime, and includes (but is not limited to) activities such as money laundering, trafficking and trade in a range of goods (including drugs, human beings, arms, art and cultural objects, animals, vehicles, and body parts), extortion, kidnapping and serious violence, prostitution and gambling, protection rackets, loan-sharking, counterfeiting and forgery of documents and currency, fraud as well as corruption of officials. The list could go on, and not all organized criminal networks are involved in all (or even most) of these. The primary motivation for all this is two-fold and interlinked— financial gain and power. This is of course the same for “ordinary” criminals, but what sets them apart from organized criminals is the group structure of such networks. That is, organized criminals are not merely individual criminals who interact with other individual criminals, but they work together in a defined structure for longer than just one crime. The precise definition of organized crime may not be necessary in this chapter, especially as the academic (primarily within disciplines such as criminology and sociology) and law enforcement literature on the subject is extensive. For further reading, one of the best recent overviews of the issues, including definitions and types of organized crime, may be Alan Wright’s Organized Crime, which also has some relevance for practitioners in the subject. Organized crime has a corrosive effect on the communities in which it happens, because it is often linked to violence, intimidation, and corruption. It can undermine legitimate business, and generates criminal capital that is likely to be used in future enterprises. In addition to this, it knows no international boundaries and is therefore sometimes known as transnational organized crime. This may, however, be a label which does not help in understanding it, as by definition it is above local level crime. In today’s shrinking world, organized criminal networks therefore do not only cross police and judiciary boundaries, but also international borders. As such networks often impact on many law enforcement jurisdictions, successfully combating them and reducing the harm they cause to society is very difficult. Both terrorism and organized crime further undermines the state structure, making them “transnational” by definition. Organized criminal networks are becoming more sophisticated, and moving away from merely being “street gangs” or mobs to being refined corporations, making informed decisions about which countries offer environments most likely to maximize their profits while minimizing their risks. A number of political, economic, and primarily technological changes have facilitated this change. Amongst these are the obvious improvements in communications and transport technology, which also

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(together with public transparency through various Freedom of Information legislations) has led to an increase in information about law enforcement methodologies and powers. Other reasons include the worldwide breakdown of totalitarian regimes and the emergence of liberal democracies, with their standards of market-oriented economies, which has led to the development of global markets, the progressive removal of border controls and free trade agreements, as well as the associated deregulation of financial systems (leading to greater ease of action by those who exploit the systems). These factors have led to a substantial increase in the economic power and political influence of organized criminal networks worldwide, which now operate globally and interact with other networks by exchanging information where mutually beneficial.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ORGANIZED CRIMINAL NETWORKS AND TERRORIST GROUPS There are, of course, both conceptual similarities and differences between terrorism and organized crime. In short, there are two main ways in which terrorism and organized criminal networks interact. The straightforward interaction relates to the involvement of international terrorist organizations in organized criminal behavior, and includes involvement in the international trade and trafficking of drugs, weapons (including weapons of mass destruction), explosives, and human beings, as well as a range of financial activities from funding to money laundering that could all be subsumed under the umbrella term “terrorist financing.” The other main strand of interaction is where no real distinction can be seen, and activities are conducted “jointly” or using the same structures.3 This relates mainly to the use of specialist professionals, such as accountants, bankers, forgers, and counterfeiters, as will be explored later in this chapter. As has been highlighted elsewhere, both in this volume and others, terrorism often eludes direct definition and conceptualization, as is the case with organized crime. Observers of terrorism, however, generally belong in either of two camps; one explains terrorism as warfare and the other as a crime.4 Depending on one’s viewpoint, therefore, terrorism is either an act of war or an illegal act. To an extent, the question of motivation and reward influences in which camp a particular terrorist act or organization fits. A political (or even a socioreligious) objective, such as the fight against an oppressive regime, would—by using Carl von Clausewitz’s oft-cited dictum that war is merely the continuation of politics by other means— make a violent act an act of war and terrorism therefore a type of warfare. Purely monetary motives, such as those pursued by serious and organized criminals, would make their violence criminal acts and as such punishable by law. Terrorists are normally motivated by political goals and objectives, and not purely by financial profit. When financial status and gain becomes

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more important to terrorists, their “special status” as terrorists is removed and they are undoubtedly organized criminals. If considering a linear spectrum of activity, with all-out war at one extreme and “normal” crime at the other extreme, a more likely interpretation of terrorism and organized crime is that they meet somewhere in the middle. This would facilitate an understanding as to the similarity between the two concepts, and why they are often confused. The crux of the matter is that the response to terrorism, namely counterterrorism, depends on whether terrorism is seen as an act of war or a criminal act. For the United States, for example, the events of September 11, 2001 might have changed terrorism from being regarded as a criminal activity into an act of war. The wider issue of whether this was a kneejerk reaction or a thought-out policy change may for the present purposes be irrelevant. Of importance, however, is the reaction this forced. While special weapons and tactics may also be used against organized criminal networks, such an armed response may appear trivial when compared to the military deployments in a war against terrorism. The tactics available to law enforcement agencies tackling the activities both of organized criminals and terrorists are further influenced by the motivation of the criminal/terrorist networks targeted. As explained later in this chapter, law enforcement priorities sometimes conflict, and whereas a “war on terrorism” may give access to unprecedented levels of resources, it might at the same time remove those resources from countercriminal activities, as has been the case since 2001 with the U.S. involvement in places like Afghanistan. Motivation is often crucial in the recruitment of individuals into terrorist groups and organized criminal networks. One type of motivation comes from intense loyalty, as both types of organizations tend to recruit individuals from the same (or known) familial or ethnoreligious backgrounds. There are many reasons for this, the strongest amongst these being the need for a high level of trust throughout any clandestine organization. It is easier to ensure the integrity of the group if everyone (or at least everyone in a position of status) speaks the same language, comes from the same country or town, or belongs to the same family. Such close unity hampers law enforcement attempts to use human intelligence, by infiltrating such groups. Beyond this dimension, however, the similarities of recruitment-related motivation end, as organized criminal networks are more likely to be driven by pure financial gains and desires of power, while terrorists may often be driven by a “higher” or altruistic goal, such as the riddance of an oppressive or ideologically different government. There may be no overarching ideology that binds organized criminals together, but trust is nonetheless of fundamental importance. However, where there are no higher motives, infiltration using greed as a bargaining chip will be easier.

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While there are somewhat “altruistic” organized criminals, their motivation is much like that of a mercenary in war: the cause is not of as much importance as the reward. Despite this, it would be too simplistic to consider motivation to be the only difference between organized criminal enterprises and terrorist networks. It is quite clear that the two enjoy a separate but mutually beneficial existence. This extends from the various links between people, activities, techniques, and methods needed as both have the need for similar resources as they operate outside of the law. Particularly in terms of counterfeit documents (for uses such as travel, identification, and shipping/transport) and in terms of money laundering and other types of financing, both organized criminals and terrorists often even use the same specialists (such as bankers, accountants, solicitors, and real estate agents), although these professionals may not be either organized criminals or terrorists, as such. While they are often criminals by virtue of what they are willing to do when they know the origin of the funds, they are not often on the sole payroll of an organized criminal network. At times such professionals may even be entirely “innocent” of crimes in that they are being used by criminals without knowing where the funds originally came from. Improvements in legislation and standards governing the “regulated sector” aim to tackle this, primarily with the use of suspicious transaction reporting to, for example, SOCA in the United Kingdom and AUSTRAC (Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre) in Australia. Such regulations ensures that banks, realtors, and solicitors are obliged to report any suspicious financial activity by their customers, and in so doing also protect themselves. Perversely, law enforcement efforts targeting the finances of terrorists, and in particular terrorist fund-raising, has forced such groups into the realm of organized crime in order to generate revenue, where criminal groups traditionally dominated. Whilst terrorists often dabble in organized crime, primarily in terms of raising funds for other activities or hiding the tracks of their acts of terrorism, it is for some groups becoming second nature at times to the extent of being their sole perceivable motivation. Where raising funds, and other criminal activities, appear to be the main goal and motivation the distinction between terrorism as a phenomenon in itself and organized crime is often inextricably blurred, as explored above. The reverse is similarly true, where organized criminals employ terrorism to get to particular goals, especially when creating fear is of importance, when recruiting or enforcing a debt. At times, organized criminal enterprises appear to exist solely to create a state of fear and uncertainty in the societies within which they operate, and profit seems to be secondary. Whilst the motivation of using fear and “terrorism” to heighten the status and power of such groups may be entirely compatible

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with criminal activities, it is nonetheless also further blurring the line between organized crime and terrorism. There are also more formal uses of terrorism by criminal networks, seen most clearly and commonly in what is frequently called “narcoterrorism.” Drug cartels (like the Mendellin and Cali cartels in South America) or traffickers (as the Afghani/Pakistani warlords) employ the methods of terrorism to run their operations which have purely criminal motivations.5 This makes it clear that motivation is often a good rule of thumb when differentiating between them. However, even this distinction is often blurred, where the mutual benefit may be the only clear motivation. For example, there have been several instances where the same training camps have been used by both types of group (for example in the Libyan desert, in South America and across Central Asia). Another example of mutual benefit can be seen in the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban, both of whom derived considerable revenues from poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. Of course, as has been noted elsewhere, methods and techniques, as well as the use of professionals, does not necessitate direct contact between terrorist networks and organized criminal networks.6 With widely accessible information on the Internet and other public media, “best practice” and intelligence sharing networks are not confined to the law enforcement community, but can be exploited by criminals, terrorists, researchers, and analysts alike. At times, seemingly contradictory liaisons are formed, such as the praise lauded on al Qaeda by American white supremacists following September 11, 2001, or al Qaeda’s approach to the Cosa Nostra of Italy to purchase counterfeit U.S. passports prior to those attacks.7 Sometimes, of course, the benefit is not explicit and organized criminals exploit the legislation and cooperation between countries aimed at disrupting both organized crime and terrorism. The introduction of a common European currency (the Euro) has, for example, facilitated the activity of laundering bulk cash across the continent,8 in particular in terms of buying real estate and thus placing and layering criminal proceeds. Many terrorist groups will also use the experience they have gained through their terrorist activities to provide support for others, and in doing this they are taking on a role more closely aligned with organized crime. The Italian Economic and Financial Police assesses that al Qaeda’s role in Europe is now primarily as a “service provider” for affiliated Islamic terrorist groups, principally in terms of providing stolen or counterfeit travel and identity documents, safe housing, recruitment (and training) of manpower, and fund-raising, often by a range of criminal activities.9 Such activities are more commonly associated with organized crime than with terrorism. At practitioners’ levels, some work has been done to investigate the extent and similarities, including direct connections, between serious

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organized crime and terrorism. To a large degree this is attempted in order to enable disruption and undermining of both types of groups by using the experiences and tactical capability of law enforcement agencies dealing with either. Researchers have also identified a number of similarities, where the two concepts are virtually indistinguishable, such as both being comprised of rational actors who use violence (often extreme) and intimidation (including threats of violence) to further their ends. Physical violence extends to kidnappings and assassination for both groups and both also use financial extortion and blackmail. The organizations are made up in cell-structures, with leaders and their deputies controlling various henchmen, some of whom have specialized roles within the networks, and who find it is extremely difficult to leave the group they are part of. Both types of network are knowledgeable and innovative, and often extremely flexible in terms of adapting to new working practices. Included in this is the resiliency of both types of organization, and their knowledge of law enforcement techniques, capabilities, and jurisdiction and their conscious efforts to avoid detection and disruption. In addition, both types of network work across international boundaries and a minority of them are even sponsored by states.10 As noted earlier, therefore, the relationship between organized crime and terrorism is often taken as implicit by observers and practitioners. It appears as a given both in academic and fictional writing, not to mention in professional knowledge, especially during the past two decades. In recent years, very little thorough analysis of the convergence between terrorism and organized crime has been attempted. Notable exceptions may be Tamara Makarenko’s efforts at analyzing this crime-terror nexus, which although being academic nonetheless provides some interesting further reading for the practitioner, and research by Chris Dishman and Thomas M. Sanderson.11 LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE In today’s world, where terrorist groups use the tried and tested methods of organized crime and organized criminal networks do not shun tactics which would be classed as terrorism, we sometimes find it difficult to see them as separate phenomena. One problem is the old issue of definition; another, that both sides consciously employ the knowledge and experience of the other for their own gains, thus blurring the distinction further. Sometimes the difficulty of differentiating the two leads to problems of how to deal with a particular event or group; should it be the antiterror police or the organized crime police that deal with the mafia, for example? This issue becomes more fundamental in countries where the judiciary sets the legal parameters within which different agencies can deal with these “different” problems.

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However, although law enforcement agencies around the world are faced with such dilemmas, the similarities and differences between terrorism and organized crime may, in fact, be used as an advantage in combating both. This argument will be highlighted at the end of this chapter, after an outline of the relationship between organized crime and terrorism, and the problems faced by law enforcement agencies in relation to this. Law enforcement response to both terrorism and organized criminality is by definition difficult. There are many reasons for this, although there are two main difficulties, both relating to structure—the structure of law enforcement and the structure of organized criminal groups and terrorist networks. In the case of the latter (the structure of the kind of networks this chapter is concerned with, as opposed to lower-level, “normal” criminals), both organized criminal networks and terrorist groups tend to be closely knit, which serves to frustrate law enforcement efforts. The closed structure of both criminal and terrorist networks often leads to a very effective cell-structure, where communication is one-way and limited knowledge is only shared to trusted contacts, in order to minimize the risk of disruption by law enforcement agencies. Working with outsiders poses a risk, but organized criminals and terrorists use similar methods to manage such risks, for example by using intermediaries, taking the advice of referees, or working only with people who share their backgrounds. Such tried and tested methods make law enforcement opportunities of infiltration, both in terms of covert human intelligence sources and undercover officers, more difficult. While organized criminals often tend to be oriented along such lines of similar background, primarily in terms of family, ethnicity, or linguistic background, terrorist groups often have a further criterion—namely, complete commitment to the cause, as highlighted earlier. This makes it extremely difficult for the law enforcement community to infiltrate these groups even if some sympathy for their cause can be feigned. On the other hand, infiltration in the opposite direction has, traditionally, also been the case, with organized criminal groups finding it easier to infiltrate law enforcement agencies and corrupting officials than their terrorist “cousins” can. Part of this is due to the power of money, with greed being a more dominating factor than sympathy for the cause in many circumstances, particularly for the “non-committed.” In addition, vetting and security clearance checks have historically focused more on terrorist links than links to the organized criminal fraternity. It must be noted, however, that terrorists are picking up some of the tricks of the trade and learning from the experiences of the organized criminal networks in terms of corrupting officials for their own purposes. In addition, the more the distinction is blurred and terrorist networks are transformed into criminal enterprises, the potential for corruption is increased, but so are also the possibilities of law enforcement infiltration. It should be stressed here, however, that

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while corruption is not essential for organized crime to exist, it has undermined much of the law enforcement effort against such crime worldwide. The second structural difficulty that makes disruption of terrorism and organized criminal networks difficult is that law enforcement agencies in these areas have traditionally been operating in two separate “silos.” This has led to a range of challenges, some of which are only recently being addressed. Between these silos there have been different mind-sets and separate processes that have led to a reluctance to share intelligence or effectively work to bridge the divide. The cultural differences between the two silos remain, which at times have had disastrous consequences where serious criminals and terrorists have not been stopped in time. The silos work in similar (albeit separate) ways, with greater attempts at trying to understand the terrorists and serious criminals by proactive and intelligence-led policing, whereas investigation of “normal” crimes (even murders) usually involves more reactive policing. The different responses in combating organized crime and terrorism are also rooted in law. This has led to the need to have separate processes which, by virtue of being enshrined in law, often have very little overlap. Law enforcement agencies set up to combat organized crime have thus had a very different legal jurisdiction from those focusing on terrorism. At times this reluctance to encroach on the other’s territory has led to serious failing, where both criminals and terrorists have slipped through the net. There is some rationale behind such separation, however, from a historic perspective. The key challenge of not wanting to share sensitive intelligence stems from the fact that in many cases police officers dealing with crime have lower security clearance than their law enforcement colleagues dealing primarily with terrorism. Keeping the two apart, therefore, minimizes the potential for compromise, as the less-cleared officers dealing with crime are considered more susceptible to bribery or other forms of corruption. In addition, the very different methods employed against terrorists and against organized criminals have been possible without infringing too much on human rights. There are, of course, instances where the two disparate law enforcement responses have traditionally converged, and relied upon the expertise of the other, and this is often seen in terms of targeting the finances of organized crime groups and terrorist groups. The lessons learned from this collaborative working may well serve as a blueprint for future cooperation. Law enforcement agencies dealing with organized criminal networks have a long and distinguished record of intelligence-led investigations. This is particularly true in terms of tracing the finances of such groups. In terms of serious and organized criminality, policing has been successful in targeting the whole range of criminal finances, from criminal funding to the transfer and laundering of profits. It is also an area where,

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traditionally, antiterrorist law enforcement has cooperated with criminal law enforcement combating serious and organized crime as mentioned earlier. In some countries, this cooperation has led to a more concerted “joint” approach, such as the multiagency Terrorist Finance Unit in the United Kingdom, which (though housed in the Serious Organized Crime Agency) combines the law enforcement expertise from both sides of the divide, as well as from the private sector. The importance of multiagency coordination in this field cannot be underestimated, and is recognized by such multilateral institutions as the European Union and the United Nations. In some countries, new and amended legislation provides for proceeds of crime and money laundering legislation to be extended to terrorist offences, particularly in terms of freezing assets. Besides the usual means of prevention and suppression of terrorism, a recent change in Italian law, for example, rules that those asset seizure measures used in the fight against the mafia can also be applied to international terrorism,12 as is the case with the antiterrorism acts and proceeds of crime legislation in the United Kingdom. Serious and organized criminality and international terrorism do not respect international borders or agreements restricting or enabling the movement of goods and people between countries. Combating the financing of these two phenomena, therefore, requires collective and coordinated international action. The main problem with this has been the reluctance to share intelligence and operational resources between countries or allow foreign agents to operate within each other’s country. The international law enforcement liaison officer networks, which are in many respects in their infancy although long-established in terms of time, may be a possible solution to sharing both information and to enable joint operational coordination. In order for these liaison networks to function successfully in denying organized crime and terrorism of their much-needed money, a three-tier approach may be necessary. First, there needs to be the capability of imposing sanctions in a foreign country, such as cutting off the money flows to individual criminals and terrorists as well as their groups. Secondly, international standards are necessary to stop such illegal financing. This may relate to money laundering regulations, where countries can assist each other with “best practice” and training. Finally, the liaison officers are in an excellent position to facilitate the technical assistance to help countries develop the measures and infrastructure necessary to root out the financing of terrorism and organized crime. Multilateral institutions for cooperation, such as Europol and Interpol, have combined legal jurisdictions for both terrorism and organized crime, and have been instrumental in getting member countries to cooperate and share intelligence and operational capabilities.

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In many countries, such law enforcement cooperation has already led to a consensus that targeting the finances of both organized criminals and terrorists may be the best way to disrupt their activities. This conclusion has been reached as the upper tiers of such networks—the leaders “mafia dons” and planners—rarely put themselves in the path of law enforcement and keep out of the limelight, merely reaping the profits of the illegal activities that their subordinates commit. Traditional law enforcement, whether reactive or proactive, has failed to reduce the harm caused by such groups, as it has targeted the lower ranks. However, by targeting the finances directly, the terrorists and organized criminals are struck where they feel the impact the most. The need for funding is the main link between the two concepts, and this is the “weakness” needed in combating both. The distinction may therefore be irrelevant for successfully disrupting their activities and reducing the harm they cause. The sooner the international law enforcement community realizes that organized criminal networks and terrorist groups use each other for financial reasons, the sooner problems of cooperation may be ironed out. The G7 (then, now known as the G8 with the permanent addition of Russia in 1998) established the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 as an independent body with the explicit aims of examining the trends and techniques of money laundering, and it was furthermore tasked to make recommendations on how to combat it. The recommendations were originally not binding on states, but many countries incorporated these into national legislation, thus making them obligatory. While the FATF, and its recommendations, has been criticized in some quarters (notably in the U.S. media), primarily on human rights and privacy grounds, its recommendations continue to provide an anti-money laundering framework. In 2001, the FATF mandate was expanded to include the monitoring of activities set up by the member states to prevent and combat the financing of terrorism. Legislation aimed at targeting the finances of both terrorism and organized criminals, whether multilateral such as the FATF or domestically like the USA PATRIOT Act (or Executive Order 13224, providing for the freezing of assets) or the Proceeds of Crime Act in the U.K., all have one major failing. Both organized criminal networks (and in particular those that traffic their goods across international borders) and terrorist organizations rely heavily on informal banking systems such as the hawala or Black Market Peso Exchange, which are unregulated networks enabling money to move between countries without leaving any tracks.13 Once the proceeds of crime, or financing for it, enters the legitimate banking system (by purchase of airline tickets, goods, or real estate), there is an opportunity to track it and thus target the perpetrators indirectly. It is at this point where money laundering and financial industry regulators, as described above, are of vital importance in highlighting when funds may be from

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illegitimate sources, such as the proceeds of crime or money being laundered. Joint working is also further complicated by differing priorities, especially noticeable between counterterrorism and counternarcotics work. Even in Afghanistan, which may be one of the most obvious contemporary examples of combined terrorism and organized crime, the U.S.-led efforts are hampered by such competing priorities. While the allied governments have pledged support for counternarcotics initiatives, much of the hardware needed (even down to helicopters) is controlled by the military, who needs to prioritize their counterterrorist undertakings. Cooperation regarding counternarcotics strangely finds itself stuck between organized crime and terrorism on the linear perspective raised above, with clashing priorities. With relation to Afghanistan, the Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC), which draws together a range of British and American military and law enforcement agencies, including intelligence agencies, may be a step in the right direction. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS We have seen in this chapter that organized criminal networks permeate every section of society throughout the world. The harm they cause to society is immense, and while organized crime may not play to the media’s and public’s imagination as much as terrorism, it may be as significant. In addition, the two phenomena are at times so similar as to defy distinction, and this may be exploited by law enforcement agencies that have traditionally been distinct entities, singing from different hymn sheets. Increased operational cooperation and intelligence sharing may be vital to combat these banes of the modern international arena. The similarities and direct links between organized criminal networks and terrorism remain important areas for research on an academic level and as intelligence gaps that need filling on a practical level. High-level agreements to cooperate— such as the joint meetings by the G8’s so-called Group of Lyon (organized crime) and Group of Rome (terrorism), which have developed a joint action plan to combat terrorism—continue to be important steps in realizing the links between organized crime and terrorism. Lower-level collaborations between law enforcement agencies themselves also continue to be important, but are sometimes hampered by bureaucracy. Moving organized crime and terrorism away from the middle of the linear interpretative spectrum, toward dealing with both as crimes (albeit rather different than street-level crime), may not only offer scope and opportunity for further cooperation and joint working between law enforcement agencies (both within countries as well as between them), but it may also reduce the harm caused by organized criminal networks. This has been attempted historically, with ambiguous success. While it has not

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solved all the problems, the decision to let the police take over from the military as the main law enforcement body in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s consciously moved many acts associated with “the Troubles” away from being war to being criminal issues. Terrorists (and insurgents who use terrorism) can sometimes muster local support, but with few exceptions organized crime usually cannot. As with terrorism, learning to understand how organized criminals operate, and how to best disrupt their activities, can only be achieved with cooperation and intelligence sharing on a practical level, and by not heightening their stature in conceptual terms. The “organized crime” label can diminish a terror group’s “legitimacy” among its support base, as was seen with the Ulster Defence Force (UDF) in Northern Ireland, after the Cook Report showed that they were primarily criminal thugs. Although terrorists rarely call themselves “terrorists,” other terms are used to legitimize them and heighten their status. If describing them as mere criminals they lose this legitimizing self-justification, and if they rely on fear sine qua non, they also lose their impact on the societies within which they operate. However, law enforcement can of course take advantage of public fear of terrorism to heighten security and therefore more successfully target such groups and individuals. Likewise, although the public perception of organized criminal networks may be inadvertently heightened if they are considered as terrorist groups (to be feared), law enforcement efforts can also capitalize on such mislabeling. If organized criminals perceive themselves as more than just profit-seeking gangs, they are more likely to seek attention for their violent and criminal acts than traditional organized criminals (with their codes of silence, such as the Mafia’s omert´a). This presents opportunities for law enforcement agencies to target them, or at least obtain leads into their organization that can be exploited by a range of techniques including covert human intelligence. Where there are direct crossovers between terrorists and organized criminals, such as the use of the same professionals (as highlighted above), law enforcement is presented with new opportunities that can be exploited in order to disrupt such networks. Any chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and law enforcement efforts could be focused on the points where the cell structure of both organized criminals and terrorists are undermined by relying more on outsiders. As organized criminals and terrorist networks continue to overlap, and as the distinction may inevitably blur to the point of the two being inextricably linked, law enforcement agencies around the world must be prepared to accept that jurisdictions may also need to overlap, and that working in silos may not be the most effective way of combating the most serious criminals (including terrorists) today. It remains to be seen whether law enforcement and intelligence officers on both sides of the divide can accept this challenge and

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develop working methods of combating organized crime and terrorism in the twenty-first century. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Friends and colleagues, new and old, have as usual been instrumental in writing this chapter. In the process friends have been found and friends have been lost; I could not have done it without them. NOTES 1. Alan Wright, Organized Crime (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing, 2006). 2. Ibid., 101. 3. Mircea Gheordunescu, “Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Romanian Perspective,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 26. 4. Alex P. Schmid, “The Problems of Defining Terrorism” in International Encyclopedia of Terrorism (London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 1997) 16. 5. For more on this, please see the chapters in this volume by Gregory Lee, James Walker, and Jon Byrom. 6. Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terrorism and Organized Crime: Blurring the Line,” SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 54. 7. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Inc.; Tracing the Money behind Global Terrorism (London: Penguin, 2004) 286. 8. Napoleoni, Terror Inc., 285. 9. Anonymous, The Funding of International Islamic Terrorism, Guardia di Finanza, 2nd Department–Analysis Unit, Guardia di Finanza Headquarters, Rome, 2002, 133. 10. Several sources including Wright, Organized Crime; Sanderson, “Transnational Terrorism and Organized Crime”; Napoleoni, Terror Inc.; Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24, no. 1 (2001): 43–58; Sanderson, “Transnational Terrorism and Organized Crime,”49–60. 11. Tamara Makarenko, The Crime-Terror Nexus (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2005); Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation”; and Sanderson, “Transnational Terrorism and Organized Crime”. 12. Anonymous, 202 ff. 13. Napoleoni, Terror Inc., 279.

CHAPTER 11 THE GLOBAL DRUG TRADE AND ITS NEXUS TO TERRORISM Gregory D. Lee

Drug trafficking is a multibillion-dollar industry that is conducted worldwide. Controlled substances are frequently used as a means to fund terrorist activities. Many of the methods of operation used by international drug cartels are mimicked by transnational terrorist organizations to further their political agendas. This chapter will examine not only the global drug trade, but also its nexus to international terrorist organizations, and the traits these organizations share. There should be no wonder why drug trafficking reaps many billions of dollars in profits. Each year, according to the United Nations Office of Drug Control, there are some 185 million illicit drug users around the world. Of that 185 million, 25 million drug users reside within the borders of the United States. Americans alone spend approximately $65 billion per year on illicit drugs1 but the costs to society from drug consumption far exceed this amount. According to a recent White House report, illegal drugs cost the U.S. economy $98.5 billion in lost earnings, $12.9 billion in health care costs, and $32.1 billion in other costs, including social welfare costs and the cost of goods and services lost to crime.2 Current seizures of drug proceeds by all law enforcement agencies combined are estimated at less than $1 billion per year, amounting to less than 1 percent of the illicit drug market. For many years heroin, cocaine, and marijuana have been the top three varieties of illegal drugs abused in consumer nations. Many other drugs have emerged over the past forty years, but these three have remained the most popular. Club drugs, such as ecstasy, katamine, and gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), have become popular in the United States and Europe

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within the past few years, and they illustrate how quickly emerging drugs can take hold of certain segments of the population. People have used drugs in one form or another for thousands of years. The reason is simple: Drugs make them feel good and alter their sense of consciousness. Unfortunately, the same drugs that provide euphoric effects can be highly physically and/or psychologically addictive. They are illegal to possess, use, or distribute because of the destruction they cause to individual users and to society as a whole. International treaties make drug trafficking a universal crime. DRUG SOURCE COUNTRIES Colombia Arguably the most prolific drug traffickers in the world are from South America’s oldest democracy: Colombia. Unquestionably the primary source of cocaine in the world, Colombian traffickers also have expanded to the heroin trade. Colombia produces the most commonly used variety of heroin found in the United States, predominately in the Northeast. Cocaine trafficking organizations initially relied heavily on Bolivia and Peru to supply coca leaves (an essential ingredient) for their cocaine processing laboratories; however, over the past decades they have stepped up production of their own coca bush to eliminate the need to rely on foreign production. The amount of cocaine produced annually in the jungles of Colombia is staggering. Several 300-ton seizures in recent years have had no impact on regional or world wholesale prices. The vast majority of the finished cocaine hydrochloride finds its way through well-established smuggling routes in both North America and Europe. Despite their best efforts, law enforcement authorities worldwide seize only a fraction of the cocaine produced in Colombia. As cocaine use declined heavily in the United States during the early 1990s, shrewd Colombian traffickers expanded their market to Europe. Until then, cocaine had been relatively unseen in Western Europe while America’s streets had been flooded with it. Multiton seizures of cocaine in Europe are now commonplace. Colombian heroin is one of the most potent and pure that can be found anywhere in the world. Using wellestablished cocaine smuggling routes, Colombian drug traffickers have successfully introduced this type of heroin into the United States. In doing so, they have expanded their drug trafficking trade and made up for lost profits due to the decline of cocaine use. Most Colombian cocaine is now smuggled into the United States through the interior of Mexico after vessels, many of them “go-fast” boats (similar to speed boats used in racing, and equipped with additional fuel

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tanks), have off-loaded their multiton cargo on its shores. Colombian traffickers for years have paid Mexican smugglers to transport huge amounts of drugs through that country and then piecemeal it into the United States by land vehicles over Southwest border crossings. Within the last 10 years, however, Mexican smuggling organizations have demanded product instead of cash for payment of their services, and they have now grown into formidable cocaine trafficking cartels in their own right. Because Mexico does not produce coca leaves to produce cocaine, the cartels must rely on Colombia for their finished product. Mexico Besides having the distinction of being the main conduit of cocaine into the United States, Mexico has been a longtime source of supply for marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine. Because of their long partnerships with Colombian drug traffickers, Mexican criminal organizations have in their own right grown into large and powerful criminal organizations. Corrupt police and government officials, including the military, have willingly aided them. Although corruption has waned in recent years, it often explains why drug traffickers have remained largely untouched by the Mexican judicial system and operate freely throughout the country. A variety of heroin known as “Black tar” is produced exclusively in Mexico and exported to the United States, where it has been popular primarily on the West Coast and in the southern border states. Most of the marijuana grown in Mexico is also smuggled into the United States, almost exclusively by land. Because the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) only has the resources to inspect approximately 2 percent of all incoming cargo, it is obvious why Mexico is the main conduit for a variety of drugs entering America. With increased emphasis on illegal immigration and terrorism prevention, ICE is improving its capacity to inspect cargo entering from Mexico. At one time, outlaw motorcycle gangs controlled the U.S. methamphetamine market; however, Mexican drug organizations undercut these gangs and now produce the vast majority of methamphetamine abused in the country. Although many clandestine high capacity methamphetamine laboratories can be found throughout the United States, they are usually manned, supplied, or somehow connected to Mexican national traffickers. Bolivia and Peru Bolivia and Peru supply almost 30 percent of the coca bush needed by Colombian traffickers to manufacture cocaine. Criminal organizations from both of these countries have always competed directly with Colombian cocaine traffickers, but they only control a small fraction of the total

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market. Much of the coca bush produced in Peru and Bolivia is used for domestic consumption. Peruvian and Bolivian nationals have chewed the coca leaf for centuries to ward off the effects of high-altitude sickness. U.S. eradication efforts in these countries have had a direct effect on the total amount of coca leaf produced annually, but recent changes in the political leadership of Bolivia may change that. Golden Triangle Thailand, Burma, and Laos comprise the Golden Triangle. Second only to Afghanistan, these countries produce an enormous number of Papaver somniferum L., or opium poppy plants, to fuel heroin laboratories in Southeast Asia. The growers are powerful enough to employ private armies to protect their fields and assets from government intervention. Thai nationals are proud of their flour-like heroin, and they place their particular multicolored brand name logos on the plastic packaging containing the drug. Double-Uoglobe, Tiger, and Lucky are a few of the established brand names. Thais sell heroin in units that are 700 grams in weight, as opposed to traditional kilogram (2.2 pound) amounts. Only about 5 percent of heroin abused in the United States now comes from Thailand. The market share was once as high as 20 percent; however, as mentioned above, Colombian heroin has captured much of the market previously held by Thailand. Thai nationals are the primary traffickers of heroin and marijuana that is produced in the Golden Triangle. A popular variety of marijuana grown and marketed in the area is known as Thai Sticks. The marijuana, however, could have actually been grown in Cambodia, Laos, or Vietnam. With the popularity of methamphetamine abuse in the United States, Thai nationals have recently begun exporting methamphetamine tablets to the United States after realizing huge sales success in Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan. Golden Crescent Region Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran make up the Southwest Asian region known as the Golden Crescent. Before the U.S. Global War on Terrorism, Afghanistan was the single largest opium-producing nation on the planet. Since the war, production has almost returned to prewar levels. Eradication efforts and crop-substitution programs have so far failed to reduce the country’s opium production. About 90 percent of the opium produced in Afghanistan is smuggled into Turkey, where Turkish heroin laboratories supply addicts in Western Europe and Great Britain. Only a small percentage of opium produced in the Golden Crescent is converted into heroin for domestic consumption in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. From 5

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to 20 percent of the heroin that makes its way to the United States and Western Europe is processed in this area, which is controlled by Pakistani traffickers. Pakistani drug lords mostly live and operate in or near the semiautonomous Northwest Frontier Province of the country. Many of these drug lords are powerful tribal leaders who have close ancestral ties to Afghanistan. Like their Thai counterparts, they also are known to employ private armies to protect them from law enforcement efforts by the Pakistan government. Afghanistan and Pakistan produce more hashish than any other country in the world. Hashish is the compressed resin of the marijuana plant that is molded into what are called plates. Because of the large hashish production, very little marijuana is left for domestic consumption and none is exported. Most of the hashish produced in the Golden Crescent is exported to Europe, Canada, and the United States. Canada According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Canada is a prominent source of pseudoephedrine, the essential ingredient of methamphetamine. Also, a relatively new variety of Canadian marijuana grown in British Colombia, known as B.C. Bud, has become extremely popular in the United States. Canadian traffickers frequently exchange equal amounts of cocaine for their premium marijuana. The tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content of B.C. Bud makes it one of the most potent varieties of marijuana produced anywhere. European Continent Weekly, millions of methylenedioxy-n-methylamphetamine (MDMA)– or Ecstasy—tablets are manufactured in Europe, primarily in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands. Most of these designer drugs are distributed throughout Europe and the United States through bars and rave parties. Ecstasy tablets, which are also known simply as X, are aspirinsized tablets that come in a variety of colors. Almost all bear a logo identifying the manufacturer. Cartoon characters, automobile trademarks, windmills, and stars are just a few of the many hundreds of logos found on seized Ecstasy tablets from Europe. Ecstasy is sold wholesale in the United States in 1,000-tablet increments known as boats. Traffickers have predominately been Caucasian, although Mexican drug traffickers have recently begun to sell large amounts of Ecstasy in an attempt to capture a portion of the market. Israeli organized crime syndicates are also heavily involved in the importation and distribution of Ecstasy in the United States and elsewhere.

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United States The United States has long been a source country for Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) and marijuana. LSD abuse has dropped significantly since the 1960s, but while it can still be found, its dose potency has dropped off significantly from its heyday in the 1960s. The drug is almost exclusively manufactured in the San Francisco Bay area of California, but it can be found throughout the country. A potent variety of marijuana known as sin semilla, Spanish for “without seeds,” is grown in northern California. Indoor marijuana growing operations can be found anywhere in the United States, as well as open marijuana fields in national forests and on private property. Domestic marijuana growers and wholesale traffickers and smugglers tend to be Caucasian, although illegal Mexican aliens are sometimes hired by the traffickers who tend to many of their fields. Phencyclidine (PCP) is a powerful animal tranquilizer that is marketed almost exclusively by Black traffickers to other Blacks in the United States. The chemicals are relatively easy to obtain, and the required laboratory operation is substantially less sophisticated than with other clandestinely manufactured drugs. The bulk of PCP production seems to take place in Los Angeles, and it is flown or driven to large urban areas throughout the country. There currently is no demand for PCP outside the United States. Katamine, a popular animal tranquilizer used at rave parties, is usually diverted or stolen from legitimate sources in the United States and sold to users who frequently also abuse Ecstasy. Another substance that is gaining popularity is the clear liquid Gamma Hydroxybutyrate (GHB). It is easily manufactured with a common industrial cleaner and is frequently sold for consumption with Ecstasy at rave parties. It is also known by the names Liquid X and Great Bodily Harm. GHB is also a known “date rape drug” that sexual predators use to render their victims unconscious. Recently, Ecstasy laboratories have been found in the United States, mostly on the east coast.

TERRORISM’S NEXUS TO DRUGS The evidence is clear that there is a direct connection between drug trafficking organizations and terrorism. Numerous terrorist organizations have been funded for years by the profits of drug traffickers, and this is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, especially when statesponsored support is eroded by political or military action. Drug users unwittingly contribute money to fund terrorist operations throughout the world every time they buy drugs. Terrorists use drug production and trafficking profits to meet their overhead, and to destabilize governments around the world, including the United States. The methods they use to

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achieve their goals are strikingly similar to those used by drug trafficking organizations, as we shall see below. In 2001, President George W. Bush made the following remarks during a speech about the nexus of drugs and terrorism before signing the Drug-Free Communities Act Reauthorization Bill: “It’s so important for Americans to know that the traffic in drugs finances the work of terror, sustaining terrorists, that terrorists use drug profits to fund their cells to commit acts of murder. If you quit drugs, you join the fight against terror in America.”3 Community leaders such as police chiefs, school principals, and civic group leaders can further the cause of drug demand reduction in their communities by emphasizing the nexus of drugs to terrorist organizations. Just as citizen groups successfully personalized drunk driving tragedies, they can place faces and experiences within the antidrug message. Credible role models and spokespersons, especially those who have personally been touched by drug use, can be instrumental in helping turn around public opinion on drug use and simultaneously educate the public on the use of drug profits to finance terror. Parents have always been influential with their children, and need to closely monitor their children’s activities to minimize their opportunity to experiment with drug usage. This nexus between drug traffickers and terrorists directly threatens the security of the United States and other nations. It has the potential of creating regional instability and threatening national security as well as the future of the world’s youth. This linkage is especially harmful to U.S. interests around the world. Of the 28 organizations identified by the U.S. Department of State’s October 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorists Organizations, 12 are known to traffic drugs to raise funding.4 These groups include – Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). An extremist separatist group operating in the Philippines that seeks an independent Islamic state. They are known to grow marijuana for resale to generate operational funding, and have close ties to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist organization. – Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). This organization is dedicated to a separate homeland apart from Spain. The group traffics in a variety of drugs to fund their activities. – Hizbollah.5 This Lebanese-based, extremely well organized and violent group is comprised of two wings, a political and guerrilla military force. Hizbollah effectively used the tactic of suicide bombing in its goal to expel Israel from southern Lebanon. The government of Iran has historically been a major financial supporter of this group, although in recent years we have seen an increased interest in drug trafficking in opium and hashish to secure funds. The group is responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against Americans and Westerners, including the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Lebanon in 1993 that killed 63 people, including 17 Americans; the truck bomb attack on a U.S. Marine Corps

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barracks outside Beirut that killed 241 servicemen in 1983; and the kidnapping and killing of William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut. It is also been tied to numerous other acts of terror throughout the world, primarily, but not exclusively against Israeli interests. – Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Involved in international opium smuggling and heroin drug trafficking. – Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Located mainly in the mountainous regions of northern Iraq and southern Turkey, this group has long used violence to achieve their goal of a separate Kurdish state. Known to traffic in Southwest Asian heroin. – Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Based in Sri Lanka, this group has fought for years to achieve an independent state. Members are known to act as drug couriers, primarily for Pakistan hashish. – National Liberation Army (ELN) of Colombia. Involved in many aspects of drug trafficking except international movement. – Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Involved in trafficking Southwest Asian heroin and hashish to achieve a Palestinian state. – Al Qaeda. Led by Osama bin Laden and is responsible for numerous attacks against Americans and Westerners, including an attack on the World Trade Center in 1993; a truck bombing of a U.S. military barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996; attacks on U.S. embassies in eastern Africa in 1998; the suicide boat attack on the USS Cole in 2000; and the commercial airline hijackings and suicide crashes into the World Trade Center and The Pentagon in 2001. Known to traffic in Afghanistan opium and heroin. – Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Primarily a Communist revolutionary movement for several decades, they traffic in cocaine and provide protection for Colombian drug cartels to raise funding to overthrow the established democratic government in Colombia. FARC members conduct kidnappings and extortion to raise funds. They are believed to earn at least $300 million annually in criminal and drug activities. – Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). Provide protection for cocaine growers and laboratories within Colombia. – United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The AUC is a right-wing paramilitary organization involved in all aspects of cocaine trafficking to counter the advances of the antigovernment FARC. Estimates are that drug trafficking accounts for 40–70 percent of its annual revenues.

AFGHANISTAN CONNECTION Throughout the reign of the Taliban, their funding for operations was derived in large part through drug cultivators and traffickers. As mentioned above, Afghanistan is a major source of heroin in the world, and in 2000 supplied 70 percent of the world’s supply of opium, which is the essential ingredient of heroin.

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By taxing farmers in the cultivation, sales, and transportation of opium, the Taliban raised an estimated $40 to $50 million to further their regime. The Taliban protected Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network while it benefited directly from the tax revenues received from opium farmers. These farmers produce opium because of a strong demand for heroin that exists throughout the world, especially in Western Europe. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has generated multiple-source information that Osama bin Laden himself has been involved in the financing and facilitation of heroin-trafficking activities presumably to raise funding for al Qaeda operations. In September 2002, two Pakistanis and an American were arrested after being indicted in San Diego for conspiring to trade 1,320 pounds of heroin and 5 tons of hashish for four Stinger shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles. The three men told undercover FBI agents they intended to sell the Stinger missiles to members of the Taliban, an organization which the defendants indicated was the same as al Qaeda, according to the indictment.6 Colombian Connection As mentioned previously, there are three groups operating within the country that have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as being terrorist organizations: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramilitary group, and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The FARC and AUC have been heavily involved in protecting cocaine laboratories and engaging in cocaine trafficking, and receive enormous funding for their causes. In November 2002, four AUC members negotiated with undercover DEA and FBI agents in Panama to purchase 9,000 assault rifles, submachine guns, sniper rifles, 300 pistols, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, shoulder-fired missiles, 300,000 grenades, and about 60 million rounds of ammunition in exchange for cash and cocaine. “This multimillion-dollar cocaine-for-arms deal is yet another example of the convergence of violence and terrorism with drug trafficking,” [then] Drug Enforcement Administration chief Asa Hutchison said. “We have demonstrated that drug traffickers and terrorists work out of the same jungle, they plan in the same cave and they train in the same desert.” The U.S. Attorney’s office in Houston, Texas described the AUC as an “umbrella organization” that consolidated local and regional paramilitary groups in Colombia. Established in 1964, the FARC is the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party. The U.S. State Department named it as the most dangerous international terrorism group based in the Western Hemisphere. In 2002, a DEA investigation led to the indictment of three members of the 16th Front of the FARC, including their coleader, on charges of conspiracy

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to transport and later distribute cocaine in the United States. This marked the first time that any members of a known terrorist organization have been indicted on drug trafficking charges.7 The 16th Front operates mostly out of a remote village in Eastern Colombia. The revenues generated from cocaine sales are used to purchase equipment, weapons, and supplies. The State Department estimates that the FARC receives $300 million annually from cocaine trafficking to finance their pursuit of a political agenda through terrorism. In 2002, the government of Colombia decided to retake a previously established demilitarized zone occupied by the FARC. When the Colombian Army arrived, they discovered two major cocaine laboratories and seized 5 tons of already processed cocaine. They also destroyed a 200-foot communications tower used by the FARC to communicate with their members. The cocaine laboratory and communications tower clearly suggest that the FARC not only provides protection to established Colombian cartels in their manufacturing and distribution activities, but, according to DEA, it is also independently involved in drug trafficking in an effort to make even more money. Since 1990, narco-terrorists in Colombia have kidnapped more than 50 U.S. citizens, and since 1995, they have murdered 12 other Americans. ´ admitted in a published book8 that his The AUC’s leader, Carlos Castano, paramilitary group used funds derived from cocaine trafficking activities to carry out its agenda. He has admitted that upwards of 70 percent of the AUC’s funding derives from the drug trade. Peruvian Connection Peru is the home of the Shining Path terrorist organization, a revolutionary Communist group. According to DEA, it has also historically benefited by taxing cocaine traffickers and providing them protection in order to generate income to further their political agenda against the established government.9 Middle Eastern Connection Middle Eastern drug traffickers operating in the United States and Canada, predominately from Lebanon, have been responsible for the distribution of multiton quantities of pseudoephedrine to supply methamphetamine laboratories operating in California and elsewhere. Many of these traffickers have known connections with terrorist groups operating in the Middle East. DEA, U.S. Customs Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police conducted a massive investigation in 2002 called Operation Mountain Express, in which over the course of three

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phases, 30 tons of pseudoephedrine was seized. This amount would have produced about 37,000 pounds of methamphetamine, predominately by Mexican laboratory operators. This is significant in that in 2001, U.S. authorities reported nationwide that they had only seized 6,000 pounds of methamphetamine.10 The vast majority of the suspects arrested were Muslims, and the monies earned through their illegal activities were sent to the Middle East and believed to be used to fund various terrorist organizations. SHARED TRAITS OF DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND TERRORISTS International terrorist organizations and drug traffickers share many similar traits that may not at first be obvious. Terrorists, specifically Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda’s network, and international drug dealers, plan, stage, and execute their crimes while shrouded in secrecy. Both have wellestablished cells around the world to achieve their goals. They heavily rely on compartmentalization for operational security, and exhibit ingenious ways of smuggling coconspirators, drugs, equipment, money, weapons, and other contraband long distances from one country to another. By virtue of their crimes, both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations are engaged in ongoing criminal conspiracies. Counterterrorism and drug agents investigate their respective crime as it occurs as opposed to the traditional reactive, after-the-fact, criminal investigation.Table 11.1 below outlines the shared traits of international drug and terror organizations. For many years DEA special agents have recognized that terrorist organizations rely on drug traffickers as a straightforward, easy source of income to finance their pursuit of a political agenda through violent means. Drug traffickers, in turn, rely on the terrorists to provide physical protection for their laboratories and drug distribution endeavors. Through protection rackets, extortion, or “taxation” of clandestine laboratory operators, growers, and drug traffickers, terrorists receive the funding necessary to carry out their violent acts and political agenda. An important distinction between the two organizations is that all terrorists may be criminals, but not all criminals are terrorists. Criminals are motivated solely by profit and they have no intention of dying in the process like a suicide bomber does. Terrorists, on the other hand, commit violent crime to make a political statement, and often make it a point to proclaim their group’s involvement. But, what distinguishes them from common criminals is that they are often willing to die for their cause, making their capture moot. Intelligence analysts need to be careful not to lump all drug and terrorist organizations into the same category since their motivation is either to reap profits or cause political change. The motivation behind their acts is always what drives these people to do what they do. They may initially appear to be terrorists to intelligence analysts and the

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Table 11.1 Comparisons of International Drug Trafficking and Terrorist Organizations Drug Trafficking Organizations

Terrorist Organizations

1. Engage in conspiracies that are investigated as they occur 2. Suspects Operate in “Cells” 3. Suspects compartmentalize information on pending operations 4. Top-down management style 5. Members use sophisticated communication devices 6. Members launder money to disguise source of income 7. Vulnerable to infiltration by informants 8. Commit crime to meet their objectives 9. Partner up with drug criminals 10. Use established drug smuggling methods of operation 11. Use forged identity documents 12. Publish training manuals for its members 13. Vulnerable to “profiling” by law enforcement 14. Flourish in corrupt countries 15. Extensive use of telephones and computers to communicate 16. Often resort to violence to achieve their goals

1. Engage in conspiracies that are investigated as they occur 2. Suspects Operate in “Cells” 3. Suspects compartmentalize information on pending operations 4. Top-down management style 5. Members use sophisticated communication devices 6. Members launder money to disguise source of income 7. Vulnerable to infiltration by informants 8. Commit crime to meet their objectives 9. Partner up with terrorists 10. Use established drug smuggling methods of operation 11. Use forged identity documents 12. Publish training manuals for its members 13. Vulnerable to “profiling” by law enforcement 14. Flourish in corrupt countries 15. Extensive use of telephones and computers to communicate 16. Often resort to violence to achieve their goals

public at large; however lacking a political agenda, a detailed analysis will expose them to be mere criminals. Organizational Structures Many terrorist organizations and large-scale international drug trafficking organizations have top-down management styles. The leaders of these organizations give the orders, expect them to be followed, and rarely delegate. They discourage innovation by their members, and will not tolerate disloyalty. Both have individual compartmentalized “cells” of their organizations in many countries throughout the world. For operational security purposes, the members of both drug and terrorism cells are not told the

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identities of the other members within the same cell. This compartmentalization provides some level of security to the organization, by preventing an arrested cell member from knowing (and disclosing to law enforcement and intelligence officers) the identities of the other members of their own and other cells operating within a particular geographic region. Often the leader of the cell is the only person who actually knows the number and identities of its members. He may know that other cells exist elsewhere, but he has purposely been excluded from this information in case he is arrested. Both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations are organized in such a way that if one cell were to be dismantled the other cells and the organization survive.11 Drug and Terrorism Source Countries It is no coincidence that drug trafficking and terrorist organizations thrive in countries that lack a strong central government, where law enforcement officials are ineffective and highly susceptible to corruption. Endemic corruption is probably the single most contributing factor in the ability of these kings of organizations to flourish. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Colombia are examples of countries that have both terrorist and drug traffickers operating within their borders. These organizations operate freely after establishing partnerships with corrupt military and police officials to facilitate their criminal enterprises. Money Laundering Drug traffickers require a way to launder their vast ill-gotten gains to give them the appearance of legitimacy, whereas terrorists—in addition to traditional money laundering—often convert seemingly honest money from donations to so-called charitable organizations and use it to finance their operations. Both go through elaborate schemes to disguise the true source of their money or its intended purpose. Terrorist “front” organizations around the world, including in the United States, sometimes play the race or religion card to gain sympathy from the general public. Colombian drug cartels have been known to build public housing and infrastructure for members of the communities they operate in for the same purpose. Drug dealers and terrorist organizations use others as “straw” purchasers to buy property, weapons, vehicles, and the like. A “straw” purchaser is someone who is paid to buy something, like real property, in place of the true purchaser, in order to disguise the true owner(s) and source of the money. Straw purchasers are also used to rent items such as apartments, cars, boats, and trucks that are used in day-to-day operations. They are never told the real intended purpose of the renting or purchase

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in order to ensure that they cannot reveal it to law enforcement. They are usually well paid for their participation and silence. Communications Drug traffickers and terrorists rely on secure communications such as encrypted e-mail and code words over unsecured telephone lines to prevent law enforcement and intelligence agencies from learning about their operations. They will often purchase off-the-shelf items at novelty spy stores that can detect radio transmitters or determine if their telephones and rooms are tapped or bugged. Some of these stores sell “voice stress analysis” machines that supposedly tell the owner if the person he is talking to on the telephone is telling the truth or is lying. Fortunately, few of these items work as advertised, but terrorists have been known to use them to thwart law enforcement efforts. However, terrorists that are state sponsored may have much more sophisticated espionage equipment at their disposal that definitely work. Many terrorist organizations and drug dealers communicate with their coconspirators throughout the world using satellite and cellular telephones, although this trend has declined in recent years. Revelations of these telephone conversations being intercepted has caused the terrorists to be more aware of operational security. Drug traffickers use satellite and cellular telephones to check on the progress of drug or weapons shipments from one part of the world to another, as well as the health and welfare of their members. To disguise the subscriber of the telephone service, both terrorists and drug dealers have been known to utilize prepaid telephones, and then discipline themselves to only telephone coconspirators when necessary by using these phones. Drug traffickers have long used prepaid telephone calling cards, Internet connections at libraries and Internet cafes, as well as disposable cellular telephones to disguise their identities and keep their plans secret. Terrorists do not want a record of phone calls or e-mails being documented either, and many such organizations have adopted these identical techniques. Training Manuals Large-scale drug trafficking organizations have provided lower-level members of their organization with detailed training manuals on how to perform their jobs and assimilate into other cultures. Documents seized by the DEA during search warrants of middle-class homes in modest neighborhoods in America revealed detailed instructions to the occupants on how not to draw attention to themselves. These occupants are hired by drug cartels to live in the residence and provide security for the multihundred kilograms of drugs stored there. Instruction manuals (which have

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been seized and reviewed by DEA and other agencies) instruct the person in charge of the stash house to cut the lawn, register their children in the local schools, have backyard barbeques and be friendly with their neighbors, as well as having a cover story to explain odd working hours and the presence of trucks delivering boxes. These manuals also instruct the occupants to be conscious of surveillance by the police, and what to do in case of emergencies. Recovered al Qaeda training manuals also instruct its members to do many of these same things. They specifically have chapters on how to perform countersurveillance operations before any planned meeting to detect and avoid police surveillance.

Immigration Fraud and False Identity Documents A large number of international drug traffickers operating in the United States and other consumer nations are foreign nationals. These traffickers want to show a legitimate reason for traveling to the country they are doing business in, so they fraudulently represent themselves to be tourists, professional athletes, students, asylum seekers, or businessmen. Once in the country, they overstay their visas and continue operating until they are either caught or ordered back home by top management of the drug cartel. Terrorist organizations do the same thing in order to plant their personnel into a particular country. Terrorists and drug smugglers often use forged passports of those countries not believed to be synonymous with terrorism or drugs. International terrorists also have the dilemma of overcoming the immigration laws of the United States and other countries. The asylum card is often played with claims of religious or political persecution. Attending school and accepting a job have been successful ruses to gain a visa. However, once in the country, terrorists and drug traffickers will obtain false documentation in another name to keep law enforcement off balance. Some of the terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, had fraudulently obtained genuine identity cards issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia. Drug traffickers also routinely use either genuine government issued identification, issued in a false name, or obtain counterfeit IDs in order to avoid detection. Both drug dealers and terrorists have long realized that having multiple identities enhance their likelihood of evading authorities.

Similar Smuggling Techniques Drug smugglers sometimes transport multiton quantities of controlled substances to the United States and Europe. Terrorists have been known

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to smuggle weapons and people from one country to another, often using established drug smuggling routes. In fact, many of the smuggling techniques used by terrorists are so identical to drug smugglers, the similarities suggest that they were taught by the latter. Smugglers often use commercial shipping to transport contraband into the United States and other nations disguised as legitimate cargo. Although it is estimated that only 2 percent of all commercial shipping to the United States is inspected by Border Security personnel, terrorists and drug smugglers still want to increase their odds of success. For example, Pakistani drug smugglers will often ship a container of hashish from the port city of Karachi to a nondrug source country where the bill of laden and seal are changed. The shipment then proceeds to another part of the world where others again change the bill of laden and seal to prepare it for another destination. This layering of bills of laden and seals disguises the country of origin and may require the container to be in transit for over a year before finally arriving at its intended destination. Once the container arrives at its intended destination, the smugglers will hire a company to have it transported it to a rented storage area where they will abandon it for a period of time to see if it has attracted law enforcement attention. They will often conduct sporadic surveillance on the container to see if it has been seized by law enforcement. Only after they are reasonably certain customs authorities have not examined the container will they finally open it and distribute the contents. This technique has proven to be highly successful for drug traffickers, and works equally well for terrorist organizations. Terrorists, many of whom work in concert with drug traffickers to earn money for their activities, have been known to be in concert with drug smugglers to transport weapons, and other contraband from one part of the world to another. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS International drug and terrorism organizations use sophisticated methods of operation to achieve their goals. In some cases they are combining their resources to further their criminal and murderous political activities. So long as the demand for illegal drugs exists, there will always be organizations willing to provide them. Drug users unwittingly provide funds that are often used to finance terrorist organizations. Eliminating illegal drug use would dry up a major source of funding for terrorist organizations. Community leaders need to educate the public more on the nexus between drugs and terrorism, and make it common knowledge that drug users indirectly fund terrorist operations. Countering terrorism depletes already limited worldwide government resources and taxes and poorly trained and ill-equipped law enforcement agencies in many drug source countries. Wealthier drug consumer nations

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can help in this regard by providing necessary supplemental wages, training, and equipment to police and judicial officers to combat corruption and ensure the rule of law. The United States and Britain have provided drug law enforcement training to other countries for decades, and this training should be expanded. A major problem in antiterrorism operations has always been selfimposed restrictions in the sharing of intelligence between concerned agencies. The sharing of intelligence between the Intelligence Community and law enforcement helps to clarify if criminal investigators and intelligence case officers are dealing with drug dealers, terrorists, or both. More needs to be done to further break down barriers between different agencies so that the free flow of intelligence can someday become routine. A major source of actionable intelligence is developed by the Department of Defense. However, due to archaic rules, DoD cannot collect or share intelligence on U.S. citizens with civilian law enforcement agencies. DoD should be compelled, rather than restricted, to share information about illegal activity being conducted by known or suspected U.S. citizens they happen to uncover during the normal course of intelligence collection and analysis. Restricting such information fails to connect the dots and jeopardizes the safety of all Americans. The Drug Enforcement Administration has 79 offices in 55 countries around the globe. The ability to launch an international drug conspiracy investigation is related directly to the agency’s ability to obtain actionable, human intelligence. Almost without exception, drug cases start with an informant telling a drug agent about a trafficking organization’s activities. DEA is about to join the “Intelligence Community” and it is long overdue. DEA has a large reservoir of human intelligence that surely can be beneficial to those charged with conducting terrorism investigations. This is especially true when one considers the frequent interaction between drug and terrorist organizations. DEA is committed to sharing their drug intelligence in order to be a team player within the Intelligence Community. Conversely, the Intelligence Community needs to understand the nexus between drugs and terror, and should readily provide information to DEA to enable them to dismantle these organizations. NOTES 1. Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs,” December 2001. 2. Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, “The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992–1998,” September 2001. 3. The White House. “Remarks by the President in Signing Drug-Free Communities Act Reauthorization Bill,” December 14, 2001. Available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011214-2.html.

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4. October 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorists Organizations, U.S. Department of State. 5. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 6. Los Angeles Times, “U.S. Officials Announce 2 Terrorism Indictments,” November 7, 2002, by Ralph Vartabedian. 7. Asa Hutchinson, Director, Drug Enforcement Administration in a speech to the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, April 2, 2002. ´ (My Confession: Carlos Castano ´ 8. Mauricio Aranguren Molina, Mi Confesion Reveals His Secrets), Bogot´a: Oveja Negra, 2000. 9. For more on this, please see David Scott Palmer, “The Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru’s Shining Path,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2001). 10. Drug Enforcement Administration. 11. For more on this, please see D. Ronfeldt and J. Arquilla, Networks and Netwars (Santa Moncia, CA: RAND Corp, 1999).

CHAPTER 12 AFGHANISTAN’S TRANSFORMATION TO A NARCO-TERRORIST STATE: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE Jonathan C. Byrom and James Walker

Following September 11, 2001, the United States formally declared war on terrorism. As the United States shifted from defending itself against terrorists to executing an offensive war against those who seek to destroy the nation, it conducted a multifront assault. One focus of the global war on terrorism has been attacking the funding of terrorist organizations. This assault on terrorism financing has exposed a complex and extensive network of money trails that has gone largely unstudied. This chapter begins with the history of terrorism financing, examining state sponsorship and charitable organizations as well as licit and illicit activities. This analysis suggests that the global attack against terrorist financing has shifted financial reliance to illicit activities, primarily drugs. This shift will cause terror groups to find opportunities to enter the global supply chain of drugs. Unfortunately, no place offers a greater opportunity than Afghanistan where the environment is too tempting for terrorists not to carve out a piece of the action—after all, this country provides 87 percent of the world’s heroin supply.1 Because drugs will continue to be a major funding source for terrorism, Afghanistan presents an imminent threat to U.S. national security because of its comparative advantage in the production of opium. Afghanistan’s comparative advantage originates from its geography and climate, the absence of rule of law, its historical war economy, and its peculiar labor market. Regrettably, this comparative advantage is not expected to

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decline anytime soon. Ineffective poppy eradication, untapped poppy productivity, lack of global attention, and Afghanistan’s macroeconomic dependence on opium will ensure its continued production for years to come. Thus, Afghanistan is on the brink of becoming a major narco-terrorist state, and the United States and its allies must be appropriately concerned about its vast terrorism financing potential. To prevent this from occurring, the world community and the new Afghan government should focus on increasing all costs of the drug business. A direct effort to increase opportunity costs of growing poppies, while decreasing opportunity costs of alternatives, is what is needed. By doing this, we can once again make it harder for terrorists to conduct their business and limit the spread of terrorism. TERROR FINANCING The 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States in 2001 brought terrorism to the forefront of American consciousness. Since this awakening, the U.S. military has prosecuted very successful combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, while others have disrupted numerous cells and plans at home. However, these successes have not led to winning the war on terror. In fact, the United States has found itself battling an enemy entrenched in ideology, supplied with disenfranchised recruits, and supported financially by third party groups and criminal activity. These aspects, specifically its ability to sustain itself financially, increase a terrorist’s capability, range, and lethality. Unfortunately, the current counterterrorism focus does very little to combat our enemy’s ability to finance itself. Without proper attention to this aspect of counterterrorism, we are surely in for a long and costly war. President Bush vowed in his September 20, 2001 speech to the American people that “[w]e will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place until there is no refuge or no rest.”2 This statement recognizes that military combat operations and their kinetic elements alone are not enough to win the global war on terror. Much like fighting a fire, the key to extinguishing the flame may not be to apply water directly but to find and extinguish the source of the flame. Likewise, suppressing terrorism financing should be one of the primary objectives in this war. Since the President’s 2001 speech, the United States has conducted a limited war to detect, deter, and dismantle the financing of terrorism. Beginning with Executive Order 13224 and continuing with the USA PATRIOT Act, the United States has made it harder for terrorist groups to raise, move, and store funds. The result has been that traditional sources of funding, especially Islamic charities and rich Saudi benefactors, have declined. New legislation has increased scrutiny, which has effectively

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increased the costs of doing business for terrorists and their supporters in the traditional sense. However, terror groups are resilient and have shown a great ability to adapt to these changes. Terrorists fund their activities in four distinct ways—state sponsorship, wealthy individuals/charities, legal businesses, and illicit activities, any combination of which may be present. The level of dependency on these sources has changed over time. Although each of these funding sources has always been present, there has recently been a shift to illicit activities as the most dominant funding source, as a result of political and counterterror pressure. The following section of this chapter will briefly discuss the evolution of these financing sources. State Sponsors State sponsorship was the funding source most dominant during the 1970s and 1980s. In fact, terrorism researcher Daniel Byman notes that during this time “almost every important terrorist group had some ties to at least one supportive state.”3 State support comes in both active and passive forms, and includes access to money, weapons, freedom of movement, documents, protection, infrastructure, tolerance, and training. States that have provided active support for terrorism are numerous, and include Libya, Iran, India, North Korea, Syria, and the Soviet Union. Although this type of support is highly beneficial to a terrorist organization, there are costs to both the states and the terrorists. One cost to terror groups is that states use them to promote national agendas without leaving the distinct footprint of being directly involved. Terrorists also benefit from this relationship by enjoying the ability to commit their acts with outside funding. As international actors, however, states are subject to political, economic, and military pressures that are imposed if the terror groups reach the “tipping point” of tolerance. In response to these pressures, states begin to exercise some control over the terror group, thus upsetting this supposed symbiotic relationship. Most often, the attempt by states to control the terror group’s actions is a cost that these groups are unwilling to pay in the long term. For this reason, terror groups have had to look for new funding sources. Also, the recent collapse of the Soviet Union, a major source of terrorist funds, has also removed a rich financing source for terrorist groups and forced them to look elsewhere for money. Some terror groups’ stopgap measures to fill this void have been charities and wealthy Muslim benefactors around the world, particularly in the Middle East. Wealthy Individuals and Charities There is no shortage of wealthy individuals or charitable organizations in the Middle East. While the vast majority of these individuals and

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groups have no connection with terrorists, many do provide active and passive support. Regrettably, these sources have provided millions of dollars to terror groups and have supported hundreds of attacks, including the horrendous attacks on 9/11.4 Terrorists have found many supporters among the rich. Much of this support comes willingly, but terrorists are not above religious blackmail to ensure the financial survival of their cause. Questioning the devotion of some Muslims is a powerful motivator to attract support. Charities are also a rich financing vein. All Muslims are required by Islamic Law, based on the fifth Islamic principle of zakat, to give 2.5 percent of their wealth to the poor. This duty provides an enormous pool of money that has been exploited. Although the majority of charities use their donations to help the poor and needy, many charities have knowingly diverted funds to terrorist organizations. Entire charities have been created for the sole purpose of acquiring, storing, and moving money for terrorists, much like the Al Wafa organization which was run entirely by al Qaida operatives.5 By their very nature, charities are a terrific source of funding given their religious and legal status. Not only do they offer large amounts of money, but charities also provide shelter and legitimate cover to terrorists as they travel.6 Prior to 9/11, authorities were very hesitant to closely examine the operations of these organizations, in fear of being accused of racial prejudice or profiling. This lack of transparency allowed charities to fund terror groups around the world. Fortunately, since 9/11, terrorists have not been able to easily use charities to finance their activities. Through legislation like the USA PATRIOT Act and unprecedented political pressure on the Saudi Royal Family, our efforts have succeeded in reducing funding worldwide. The 2004 Congressional Research Service Report Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues outlines numerous allegations of Saudi Arabian terrorist financing and the Kingdom’s counterterrorism efforts in response. Since 9/11, Saudi Arabia has taken active measures to control the flow of funds within its borders and abroad.7 All these actions have increased transparency and scrutiny of Islamic charities and rich benefactors, thus raising the cost of business. As a result, terrorists have again adapted their funding activities, this time moving to licit and illicit activities to fund their cause. Legal Operations On a limited scope, terror groups also operate legal ventures to fund and support themselves. Although these businesses do not generate massive amounts of profit that can be diverted, they do provide legitimate fronts that can help conceal terror activity. It has been reported that Osama bin Laden owned and operated a string of honey shops throughout the

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Middle East and Pakistan8 as well as boats and a fishing business in Mombasa.9 Illicit Activities The world’s illicit economy is estimated at between $1 and $1.5 trillion.10 Because of this vast source of potential funding and the pressure on questionable charities and wealthy contributors by the international community, most terror groups are turning to illicit activities as a source of funding. The U.S. Treasury Department has identified many illicit sources of funding used by terrorists. Some of these activities include the drug trade, identity theft for profit, credit car fraud, counterfeit merchandise, coupon fraud, diamond smuggling, and interstate cigarette smuggling.11 These illegal activities provide millions of dollars a year to terrorists. Many recent events have helped establish terrorist links to these illegal activities. In 1996, the FBI launched Operation Smoke Screen aimed at dismantling an interstate cigarette smuggling ring carried out by individuals tied to Hizbollah.12 In New York City, a warehouse full of counterfeit t-shirts was seized, netting over 100,000 knockoff Olympic and Nike t-shirts. The warehouse was tied to Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman (aka, the Blind Sheik).13 Additionally, terrorism analyst Douglas Farah has made a compelling case about al Qaida being involved in the diamond smuggling business in West Africa.14 Although all these activities net terrorists millions of dollars a year, no activity is as profitable as the global drug trade.15 The global drug trade is estimated to be between $300 billion to $500 billion annually.16 Imagine a well-organized terror group with international contacts, country knowledge, clandestine expertise, and transportation networks in place, which could allow them to capture a small fraction of this market share. Unfortunately, this situation already exists. Some groups have become so entrenched in every aspect of the drug trade that they are indistinguishable from the traditional criminal organizations. The terrible fear is that with more experience and time, terrorist “groups [will] become proficient at executing large, non-bank drug-trafficking operations and begin to piggyback terrorism financing on the drugtrafficking infrastructure that [already] exists. . .”17 This evolution would mean greater access to massive drug profits and therefore, more resources to plan and execute attacks. DRUGS AND TERRORISM Dennis Hastert, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, observed in 2003 that “[t]he link between drug money and terrorism should make every drug user pause, every American shudder, and our

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government redouble its efforts.”18 Unfortunately, this warning has largely gone unheeded. The global drug trade will become the funding source of choice for terror groups in the years to come. Drugs have historically been a source of income for many terrorist groups, including the FARC, Hizbollah, IRA, AUC, and the ELN.19 About half of the 28 organizations identified as terrorists by the U.S. State Department are funded by the sales of illegal drugs.20 In Colombia, the FARC initially banned drug trafficking. It began to tax the drug trade, and eventually became so enmeshed that today it earns 50 percent of its annual operating income (roughly $150 million) from the drug trade.21 In Europe, the IRA controls Dublin’s heroin market and funds the majority of its activities from these activities.22 In the United States, Mexican drug cartels have even relied on Hizbollah terrorists to supply them with large quantities of pseudoephedrine, a key component of methamphetamines.23 The link between drugs and terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Rather, this relationship is rapidly growing. Nowhere is this potential for explosive growth greater than in Afghanistan. The lucrative nature of the drug trade and the fertile environment, which Afghanistan presents, is too great a temptation for terrorists groups to ignore. Robert Charles understood this very clearly when he wrote, “[t]hough all drug traffickers are not terrorists and not all funding for terrorism comes from narcotics, the higher the revenue from narcotics, the more attractive this source will be to terrorists and the more narcotics money will flow back to terrorist groups.”24 Drug profits give malevolent groups such as terrorist organizations the ability to buy weapons, bribe officials, blow up buildings, forge documents, travel internationally, and carry on a campaign of intimidation and terror. Similarly, the affects of drug profits have been evident in Afghanistan’s recent history. Since the mid-1990s, the Taliban has relied on the opium drug trade to fund their war and keep them in power.25 Afghan warlords have also used the poppy for the same purpose since 1980.26 As the opium trade in Afghanistan continues to develop, it will become too irresistible of a financial resource for criminal and terror groups alike. Afghanistan is ripe for exploitation, especially by al Qaeda, which has a long history of operating in the country. Al Qaeda’s Afghanistan experience, its relationship with radical groups in the region, its common religion, a mature Afghan drug market, and a weak Afghan economy create a threat that cannot be ignored by the United States or its allies. As terrorists begin to expand their search for alternate funding, Afghanistan will be their most attractive source. This is the frightening reality we face—an Afghanistan that has spiraled into a narco-terrorist state providing a large, steady stream of income to terrorists. The lucrative nature of poppy, coupled with Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in its production, create opportunities for criminal and terrorist organizations

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to exploit. This is the true danger we face in Afghanistan. The next section of this chapter will focus on building a strong case that Afghanistan has a comparative advantage in the production of opium. It will also argue that this comparative advantage is becoming stronger rather than declining. AFGHANISTAN’S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE A comparative advantage is the ability of an entity to engage in production at a lower opportunity cost than another entity. Comparative advantage is useful in determining what should be produced and what should be acquired though trade.27 In Afghanistan’s case, the cost of not growing poppies, its opportunity cost, is simply too high. The positive and negative incentives that limit illegal drug production in other countries are generally absent in Afghanistan. These incentives include established markets, financial services, infrastructure, education, legislation, enforcement, and religious and social pressures. Given Afghanistan’s current environment, there is no crop, good, or service in its production possibilities that can compete with opium. The statistics are clear—Afghanistan has a comparative advantage in the production of opium. Recent opium production in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban in 2001 has been substantial. Afghanistan produced 3,400 metric tons of opium in 2002, and 3,600 metric tons in 2003, and continued to increase to 4,200 metric tons in 2004.28 The Afghan government claims that it has begun an aggressive eradication program, but this does not seem to have had a significant impact. In 2004, Afghanistan produced 87 percent of the world’s illicit opium, with all 34 provinces participating in the production.29 By 2003, Afghanistan’s opium production generated 60 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30 Thus, Afghanistan is effectively growing, processing, and trafficking opium with no real competitors, again illustrating its comparative advantage in the opium industry. How does Afghanistan maintain such a dominant comparative advantage in the production of opium? What political, social, and economic conditions exist that allow it to effectively dominate the opium industry in Western Europe and Asia and threaten the South American opium trade in the West? As identified below, there are numerous microeconomic and macroeconomic variables that allow Afghanistan to maintain a comparative advantage and produce opium with a lower opportunity cost than any other country in the world. Geography and Climate International studies scholar Jonathan Goodhand recently wrote about the opium economy in Afghanistan, noting that “borderlands” foster lawlessness in a country or region, and that these borderlands consist of

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“shadow societies, beyond the reach of the state, often with an insurrectionary tradition.”31 It is thus important to recognize, he argues, that Afghanistan is completely surrounded by six different countries, resulting in numerous “social and cultural system(s) straddling” all its borders. Goodhand also discussed how Afghanistan acts as a geographical buffer in the Central Asian region, giving it a unique geographical position in the marketing and trading corridors between Europe and Asia.32 Afghanistan is strategically positioned along historic and geographic trade routes, allowing it to easily act as a conduit for drugs to southern Asia, Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Iran. Afghanistan is also geographically distinct due to the Hindu Kush Mountains found along its eastern borders and dominating the majority of its landscape. These mountains are treacherous and provide outstanding areas for people to disappear for a long period of time. These mountains played a major role in the defeat of the Soviets, as well as the numerous invaders before them, by allowing Afghan fighters to hide, refit, and prepare for combat out of the reach of technologically advanced equipment such as helicopters, tanks, and other motorized vehicles. This geographical blessing also supports opium producers, allowing them to operate well beyond the reach of the law. The deep mountains provide excellent cover for opium laboratories and hideouts for traffickers. Any attempt by the national leadership to thwart the tribal and warlord leadership in these borderlands becomes difficult to enforce due to the geography. Rule of Law Afghanistan’s borderlands exist outside the control of the central government. In fact, the rule of law is absent in all but the largest cities in the country. A state needs to have security and the rule of law in order to have a functioning political, economic, and social system. Without any incentives or fear of punishment, illicit activity and corruption are certain to thrive. The absence of the rule of law is a contributing factor to Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in the production of opium. The production possibilities of poppy for people in these so-called “brown areas” are substantially more profitable than any other crop.33 Since the profit-to-weight ratio of opium is unrivaled, the legal economy cannot compete. The ability of the national government to enforce its legal framework becomes impossible in areas controlled by powerful warlords, thanks to the high opportunity costs. Few countries in the world have such extreme lawlessness in warlord-controlled areas that are protected by mountains. It actually becomes more attractive for warlords and lawless regional leaders to not support a focused and determined national government because of its threat to their opium livelihood, which funds their private armies and their respective power-bases.

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The establishment of President Karzai’s democratic regime, the training of the Afghanistan National Army (ANA), and the establishment of a national Islamic judicial system are bold attempts by Afghanistan to establish a rule of law. The pervasive corruption throughout the Afghanistan government, though, counters the effects of this new government, because the opium economy is entangled in the livelihoods of many of the highranking government officials. Thus, the rule of law will likely remain conspicuously absent in Afghanistan. War Economy Afghanistan is a classic example of what Loretta Napoleoni calls a “state-shell.” State-shells occur when armed organizations assemble the socioeconomic infrastructure of a state without the political infrastructure.34 Afghanistan’s long history of warfare has contributed to the deterioration of the rule of law and the creation of these state-shells. This constant warfare has created alternate systems of profit, power, and protection: a war economy. Afghanistan’s reliance on narcotics as a funding source evolved during the Soviet war in the 1980s with the help of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).35 In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and fought unsuccessfully for ten years to gain control of the country. During this war, the arms and opium trades mutually supported each other, as mujahideen commanders received support from outside countries and generated revenue internally from the opium trade. In 1989, the seven mujahideen commanders in control of Afghanistan produced over 800 metric tons of opium, thus demonstrating the income generating potential of opium.36 Following the defeat of the Soviets, the amount of foreign aid to Afghanistan declined dramatically, creating stronger incentives for the Afghan warlords to dramatically increase production of opium to 2200 metric tons per year to offset the loss in external support.37 This dependence on opium continued during the Taliban’s rule, except in 2001, when the Afghan leadership outlawed opium production (arguably to increase the price of their stockpiled opium). As the United States financially and operationally supported the drug-producing Northern Alliance in its fight against the Taliban, they indirectly endorsed the production of opium by the warlords in charge of the Afghan Borderlands. According to Goodhand’s analysis, “Although external resources are a significant factor, the opium economy has played an important and growing role in sustaining the combat economy.”38 This war economy, supported by the absence of rule of law for the past 25 years, has helped to perpetuate and expand the opium trade. Therefore, the present comparative advantage of Afghanistan’s opium industry is directly attributable to its pervasive and enduring war economy. This war economy does not look

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like it will disappear in the short term, as long as warlords attempt to hold on to power, and the Afghanistan government continues to fight Taliban insurgents who probe for signs of weakness in President Karzai’s regime. Labor Just as Afghanistan’s geography, absence of rule of law, and war economy give it a comparative advantage in the production of opium, its labor force also contributes to the efficient production of the poppy plant. First, Afghanistan already has a labor force skilled in the conversion of poppy plants into raw opium. The lancing of poppies requires precision and skilled labor, which Afghanistan already possesses. This skilled labor “can have a major impact on production. During the 1990s, a vast pool of competent workers emerged, giving Afghanistan a comparative labor advantage relative to other potential producers.”39 In addition to the skilled labor necessary to process a poppy harvest, Afghanistan also possesses a large unskilled labor pool to cultivate the poppy plants. A UN report on the opium economy cites the comparative cost disadvantage of producing opium. The labor intensity necessary to maintain a poppy harvest is approximately ten times that of cereals, such as wheat and other staples. This cost disadvantage, though, is countered by the large number of refugees, including women and children, returning to Afghanistan.40 Afghanistan possesses a rare combination of skilled and inexpensive unskilled workers to make the labor-intensive harvesting of poppy profitable. Another comparative advantage that the labor system creates for opium production is the opium debt structure. This specific financing system creates a slippery slope for poor farmers. Since many of the farmers are sharecroppers, they do not have money to live throughout the year or invest in an opium crop. This situation forces them to use the salaam system, in which they receive advance payment for a fixed agricultural product in order to allow their families to subsist through the winter. Because these money advances are approximately half the market value of opium at the time of the loan, the farmers are dependent on favorable conditions to repay their loans in the currency of choice—opium. As seen in the extreme case of the poppy harvest of 2000 and 2001, the monetization of the poppy loans led to interest rates of 1,000 percent to 15,000 percent, resulting in loan amounts that farmers could not repay. This debt further entangled the majority of farmers in future opium harvests, or face losing their daughters to repay the debts.41 The extent of poppy farming is evident in the average debt of poppydependent provinces. The average accumulated debt in Afghanistan is $1,835. While in the poppy-dependent province of Helmand, the average debt is $3,010, where the farmers are forced to continue to grow poppies

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for 2–6 years to pay their salaam debt.42 This debt is significant considering Afghanistan’s per capita GDP is barely $800.43 Afghanistan’s excellent growing environment for poppies, combined with the relative value of this illegal crop, further exacerbates debt issues for subsistence farmers. In 2003, the gross revenue per hectare of poppy returned 27 times the revenue of a hectare of wheat. In 2004, the gross revenue still remained substantial (even with the increased supply of opium) at 12 times the revenue of a hectare of wheat. The wage rates for poor farmers also incentivized opium harvesting, because the typical worker would receive 5 times the market wage for rural unskilled labor.44 The average plot of land used to grow opium by the typical poor farmer is 1/3 of a hectare, which still generates income of $4,000 per year versus the $500 per year that the same farmer would earn from other crops.45 Thus, the profitability of opium compared to other crops makes it attractive to these poor farmers. These poor farmers efficiently provide poppies to farm-gate buyers and support the efficient opium economy in Afghanistan. MAINTAINING THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE Ineffective Eradication Efforts Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in opium production does not look like it will disappear anytime soon. Many of the countries that formerly led the world in the production of opium have conducted effective eradication campaigns. For example, in 1997, Pakistan’s production of opium dropped to 24 metric tons due to pressure from the United States, and $100 million in U.S. aid contributed to help fight the problem. In the 1980s, nine countries were major producers of opium in the world. In 2000, this number had dropped to two countries—Afghanistan and Myanmar (formerly known as Burma). These two countries produced 95 percent of the world’s opium. Countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey have virtually eliminated their opium trade. Because the demand for heroin remains strong, this production moved to Afghanistan and further fuels its opium economy.46 As noted earlier, Afghanistan’s opium trade has flourished as other nations have effectively eradicated their opium production. President Karzai has recently made eradication a focus of Afghanistan’s national policy. This focus, though, has not led to a decline in production of opium, but rather, an increase. In 2003–2004, the cultivation of opium grew from 80,000 hectares to 131,000 hectares.47 This growth has continued, as production of opium has spread to all 34 provinces in Afghanistan, and is not expected to decline because of the economy’s dependence on opium production.48

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Untapped Productivity This eradication of the drug trade in Afghanistan is also not expected to decline due to the untapped opium production possibilities. In basic microeconomics, the production possibilities curve illustrates the total production possibilities of two products in a nation’s economy. For the purpose of this illustration, we will assume that the two products for Afghanistan are opium and wheat. In the case of Afghanistan, it has been producing both of these at a very inefficient point on this graph because of numerous variables such as drought and war. This inefficiency is frightening from the perspective of this paper, because of the fact that Afghanistan has a comparative advantage in the production of opium, even in its current inefficient state. As Afghanistan emerges from its state of collapse, we predict that it will become much more efficient in its production of opium, which could have a serious impact on its potential as a narco-terrorist state. The amount of potential growth in opium production is difficult to predict in Afghanistan, but a few indicators can help us see that growth is likely. First, in 2004, poppy cultivation covered only 3 percent of the arable land in Afghanistan.49 With 97 percent of the arable land available for the growth of poppy, the production of opium has the potential to explode. This explosion in poppy is also possible because of the increased confidence in the supply of wheat and the stable wheat prices.50 As long as this wheat market remains stable, farmers can diversify their risk and grow more poppy because they are confident that wheat will be available. This availability of wheat allows (and perhaps encourages) these farmers to grow the more profitable poppy crop, thus supporting the assertion that Afghanistan has substantial untapped opium productivity potential. The incentive to produce opium will only increase as Afghanistan becomes more adept at the highly profitable transformation of raw opium into high-quality heroin. Currently, Afghan opium traders have had little involvement in this aspect of the highly lucrative Western markets. Their income from opium has only involved 7 percent of the $35B world heroin market.51 However, this lack of vertical integration in the overall heroin market is changing in Afghanistan, as the traders and warlords become more sophisticated and greedier. In 2000, the proportions of exported poppy was approximately 1/3 exported raw, 1/3 exported as base morphine, and 1/3 exported as heroin.52 We predict that the heroin proportion will increase dramatically, as Afghan drug lords invest in heroin laboratories for the increased profit and the ease of smuggling heroin versus raw opium. This shift toward heroin production is already evidenced by the 2002 seizure of 5,670 tons of aceditic anhydride, the chemical necessary for processing opium into heroin, which was found in Chinese rugs enroute to Afghanistan’s rug bazaars.53

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As Afghan drug lords become more sophisticated in the profitable processing of opium into heroin, the poppy farmers will likely move to fill the increased demand for opium by tapping into the 97 percent of arable land not being used for opium production. The increased cultivation of this land into poppy fields will further cement Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in the production of poppy, raw opium, and heroin. Afghanistan’s Macroeconomic Dependence on Opium The opium economy in Afghanistan has entangled the national government in its web. President Karzai faces the daunting task of shifting his country’s comparative advantage in opium to other goods, even while his economy is dependent on this opium economy. From a macroeconomic perspective, Afghanistan is dependent on opium for a number of reasons. First, the opium economy has increased the exchange rate of currency in Afghanistan. In 2001–2002, the real exchange rate in Afghanistan increased by approximately 24 percent. While it remained static in 2002– 2003, it rose again in 2003–2004 by 13 percent.54 These increases in the exchange rate could be largely dependent on the exporting of opium, thus further tying this country’s economy to the global opium trade. Second, the opium economy has contributed to growth in Afghanistan’s GDP, which has resulted in a healthy economic increase in price levels. These price level increases have reflected an increase in the wealth of all levels of society, from the poor sharecroppers to the wealthy opium traders. The price level increases have also created a perverse economic problem: if the government eradicates the opium economy, it could result “in a $1 billion shock to the rural economy.”55 A shock of this magnitude could devastate Karzai’s progress in establishing a stable and democratic government in Afghanistan. Lastly, the opium economy has increased Afghanistan’s aggregate demand for goods, services, and investment from within and abroad. This increase in aggregate demand has fueled the recovery of the economy, which makes investment by foreigners more attractive.56 Also, 1/3 of the Afghanistan GDP in 2003 came from the opium trade and contributed to a “money multiplier” of roughly 2.57 Therefore, the opium economy has been a major conduit of the recent economic growth, which has facilitated the recovery of Afghanistan politically, economically, and socially. Each of these macroeconomic indicators illustrate that Afghanistan is dependent on the opium economy. President Karzai faces the daunting task of shifting his country’s comparative advantage in opium to other goods, even while his economy is dependent on this opium economy. This task will likely take years and possibly even decades, which supports our assertion that Afghanistan has (and will likely maintain) a comparative

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advantage in the growing of poppies and the production of raw opium both at the regional and global level. In summary, this section of the chapter argues that Afghanistan has a comparative advantage in the production of opium due to its geography, its absence of rule of law, its history of a war economy, and its favorable labor force. We have also argued that this comparative advantage will remain a problem in the future due to Afghanistan’s ineffective eradication efforts, its untapped opium productivity potential, and the macroeconomic dependence on the opium economy. The next step in this analysis is to describe how Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in opium makes it a threat to the United States’ war on terrorism, and what should be done to counter this threat. COUNTERING AFGHANISTAN’S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE We are facing a potential crisis in the war on terror. Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in opium production threatens to create an unstoppable narco-terrorist state that will be a source of terror financing. Thus, it is vital that we explore what can be done to prevent this. The concluding section of this chapter describes what is currently being done, and then offers some final thoughts on where marginal dollars should be spent. Economic Overview Afghanistan quantitatively and qualitatively has the international comparative advantage in the production of opium. The key to countering this comparative advantage is to increase the cost of participating in the opium business, while decreasing the cost of conducting legal business. In noneconomic terms, the Afghan leadership needs to make it unprofitable economically, socially, religiously, and politically for farmers to grow poppy, for farm-gate buyers to purchase poppy, for manufacturers to make opium and heroin from poppy, for shop owners to sell opium and heroin, and for bulk buyers/large scale specialist traders to ship it abroad. Furthermore, these players—and especially farmers—must have the opportunity to economically, socially, religiously, and politically profit from alternate means, if any solution is to succeed. Current Afghan Plan to Counter Opium Trade The Afghan government has drafted a plan to counter the opium economy. In May 2003, the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan issued a 5-Year Strategy for Tackling Illicit Drug Problems in Afghanistan. This plan presents a cogent strategy that identifies the opium problem, outlines the

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specific goals and objectives to counter it, and most importantly, recommends means to coordinate, resource, and monitor all efforts. More recently, the Karzai government published The 1384 (2005) Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan, which organizes the strategy into eight pillars: building institutions, information campaigns, alternative livelihoods, interdiction and law enforcement, criminal justice, eradication, demand reduction/treatment of addicts, and regional cooperation.58 The discussion below outlines each of the pillars and the specific impact of either raising the cost of participating in the drug business or lowering the cost of conducting legitimate business. Building Institutions. The first pillar for the implementation plan involves establishing central government focus on the narcotics problem. The Counter-Narcotics Ministry will take the lead role in the fight against opium. The Counter-Narcotics Minister will head a Cabinet Sub-Committee on Counter-Narcotics and will also cochair a CounterNarcotics Consultative Group working with the UK ambassador. Additionally, the Afghan government has formed a Counter Narcotics Trust Fund for international and national entities to support this implementation plan. The priority of spending for this trust fund will focus on implementation of alternative livelihood projects. The government has also formed Provincial Development Committees that approve and control the numerous development projects within each province. This focus on building institutions addresses the labor comparative advantage discussed earlier in this paper. Rather than simply eradicating the opium crop, Afghanistan has wisely decided to commit resources that lower the farmer’s opportunity cost of earning a living outside of growing opium. This alternative livelihood dimension also addresses the future threat of untapped opium productivity capabilities by focusing on the labor at the production level. Information Campaign. The second pillar of the Implementation Plan involves educating the Afghan populace on the negative aspects of an opium economy. This pillar focuses on delegating the information campaign to religious leaders in mosques and local government officials rather than conducting a national information campaign. This system would have a greater effect given the infrastructure and technological problems that exist outside major cities. This pillar also addresses Afghanistan’s comparative labor advantage, by focusing on educating the lowest level of the opium supply chain—the farmers—and thereby lowering the opportunity costs of doing other business. The Afghan government hopes to raise the opportunity cost of participating in the opium economy by increasing awareness of the narcotics problem and consequences associated with growing and trading opium. It also desires to raise the local pressure on opium farmers and traders from communities, peers, and local and religious leadership.

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Alternative Livelihoods. The third pillar is closely tied to the first, due to the Afghan Trust Fund’s priority in supporting alternative livelihoods. The Afghan government has further focused this money and effort on the seven key opium-producing regions in Afghanistan, with priority going to regions that have voluntarily made efforts to reduce opium production. Alternate livelihoods primarily center on licit crops, but could include developing its textile market. One large obstacle in alternate livelihood development is the lack of infrastructure in Afghanistan. A robust infrastructure decreases the costs of doing business, specifically in transportation. Additionally, the government also plans to address the opium indebtedness problem, although it is not sure yet how to do this and is seeking international help in tackling this problem. The focus on alternative livelihoods directly addresses Afghanistan’s comparative advantage in opium labor. It also indirectly attempts to change Afghanistan’s pervasive war economy by creating a legitimate peacetime economy not based on maintaining regional and national balance of power. Law Enforcement/Interdiction. The fourth pillar of Afghanistan’s CounterNarcotics Implementation Plan is to actively seek out narcotics producers and traders. The Afghan government, in coordination with the United Kingdom and Germany, is aggressively developing competent and aggressive law enforcement agencies that it hopes will extend influence throughout Afghanistan, even into the borderlands. The government’s Implementation Plan has provided resources for the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, which is working closely with United Kingdom advisors. This unit has achieved some success by destroying 70 drug labs and disrupting 2 opium bazaars, but should have more of an impact with the additional resourcing and training that this implementation plan promises.59 The Afghan government has also demonstrated its resolve to interdict the narcotics trade by resourcing the expansion of its Counter-Narcotics Police by 750 officers. The Afghan government hopes this investment in its law enforcement will help establish a strong rule of law throughout the country. Rather than see Afghanistan’s comparative advantage grow indefinitely, the Afghan government hopes that a strong antinarcotics police force will slow the growth in opium production and make growing, transporting, and processing opium too costly for those involved. Criminal Justice System. Afghanistan hopes to establish a robust criminal justice system, including more laws, courts, and prisons. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Afghanistan is notorious for its absence of rule of law, especially in regions outside its major cities. The Afghan government hopes to dramatically transform its inept justice system so it can punish those who participate in the opium economy. The first step in its

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implementation plan is to strengthen the recently formed CounterNarcotics Criminal Justice Task Force and also establish a new drug trafficking court in Kabul. The Afghan government is also updating its legal framework to establish explicit laws dealing with narcotics. Lastly, it is updating the infamous Pul-e-Charki prison so that it has a facility to properly secure those convicted of narcotics crimes. By establishing a justice system to punish those who violate Afghan law, the Afghan government demonstrates its commitment to reducing the country’s comparative advantage in opium production. This strengthening of the rule of law demonstrates that Karzai’s regime understands it must raise the legal cost of participating in the opium economy for all participants in the opium supply chain. Eradication. Afghanistan’s most aggressive and precarious pillar in its war on opium is eradication. The Afghan government will dramatically increase the Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) with funding and personnel. It will also deploy 15 newly trained verification teams throughout the provinces and will support them with satellite imagery to better verify the eradication process. This eradication effort is focused on reversing the trend of increasing yearly production of opium. The goal of the government is to raise the economic cost of growing opium so that farmers will grow licit crops, and opium traders will not have a product to trade and will be forced to trade legal goods. Demand Reduction. The seventh pillar of Afghanistan’s CounterNarcotics Implementation Plan involves lowering the demand for opium both in Afghanistan and the world. It plans to build new drug addiction treatment centers, regional hospitals, and community-based treatment centers. Afghanistan also calls on nations worldwide to decrease the demand for heroin so that the market declines, thereby eliminating the demand for opium. The Afghan government understands the basic principle of supply and demand. If the quantity of opium demanded declines dramatically, then the price for opium will decline, thereby eliminating the need for a supply of opium. The opportunity cost of producing opium will become much higher than producing other legal crops and goods. The reduction in the demand of opium is not practical for the Afghanistan government and requires a worldwide coordination effort. Regional Cooperation. The final pillar in Afghanistan’s plan is regional cooperation. Regional cooperation is directly tied to demand reduction and supply reduction. Afghanistan’s implementation plan is very brief on this pillar and refers readers to the framework of the Good Neighborly Relations Regional Declaration on Counter Narcotics. Regional cooperation is indirectly tied to reducing all of Afghanistan’s comparative advantages in its opium economy. This sweeping generality

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of regional cooperation does lead to a convenient segue into the final thought for this chapter. MARGINAL DOLLARS—WHERE SHOULD THEY BE SPENT? The primary national security priority for the United States since 9/11 has been the elimination of terrorist threats both within its borders and outside U.S. borders. Based on the premise that Afghanistan is ripe to become a dangerous narco-terrorist state, U.S. policymakers should be very interested in ensuring that Afghanistan’s opium economy does not become a large-scale terrorist financer. The next question becomes, Where should the United States spend its marginal dollars to fight this threat? More specifically, where should the United States spend its limited resources to decrease Afghanistan’s potential ability to fund terror groups? We will analyze this question from the demand reduction approach and the supply reduction approach. Demand Reduction Most experts in counter-narcotics agree that reducing the demand for an illegal drug is the most effective method for eliminating a market for that drug. If there is no demand, the price for the drug will decrease, thereby raising the opportunity cost of producing the drug. If drug suppliers can make more money with less risk in another livelihood, then they will grow other crops or manufacture other products. This line of reasoning for reducing the demand for Afghan-produced opium is faulty, though, because Afghanistan is not the primary consumer of Afghan opium. The primary consumers of Afghan opium are users in Europe and Asia. Thus, Afghanistan has very little influence in the demand for opium. Instead, multilateral prevention measures are necessary to reduce worldwide demand for opium. Examples of multilateral prevention measures are education at regional levels and treaties among international organizations such as the UN, NATO, and the WTO. These treaties require economic and political incentives to foster real cooperation among nations. Supply Reduction The other policy approach to preventing Afghanistan from becoming a narco-terrorist state is to reduce the supply of opium produced in Afghanistan. We believe that U.S. aid can actually have a positive impact on decreasing the opium economy and raising the opportunity cost for all its participants. Policies addressing the marginal spending of U.S. dollars are best approached through a short-term and a long-term approach.

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In the short term, U.S. aid should focus on removing opium traffickers and warlords involved in the opium economy. It should not focus on eradicating poppy production because of the farmers’ reliance on the crop for survival and their entanglement in the opium debt dilemma. How can the United States best influence the demise of these higherlevel opium bulk-buyers and large-scale specialist traders to achieve short-term results in preventing a narco-terrorist Afghanistan? First, the United States can financially support the Afghanistan government’s efforts to establish a viable rule of law throughout the country, ensuring narcotics criminals can be legally tried, convicted, and imprisoned. The United States could further focus this spending by investing in the education of policymakers, judges, and prison officials, primarily in effective criminal justice techniques. Second, the United States should help establish enforcement measures aimed at raising the cost of participating in the opium business. These interdiction and seizure measures should focus on stopping Afghan traffickers, terrorists, and warlords from producing and shipping opium and its derivatives. Recently, these players have been able to increase their profits by producing the final products (heroin and morphine) inside the country instead of storing and shipping poppies and the gum. These refined products have huge profit margins due to decreased transportation costs, lower seizure risks due to the smaller size, and reducing the number of individuals in the supply chain. These cost savings only increase the potential amount of money available to terrorists. Additionally, interdiction and seizures must occur inside Afghanistan for them to be effective against terror financing. If these actions occur outside Afghanistan, the decrease in supply drives up the price Afghan traffickers receive for their product, further incentivizing everyone involved in Afghanistan to remain in the drug business.60 This decrease in the opportunity cost is exactly what we do not want. Interdiction and seizures effectively increase the cost of doing business if conducted in Afghanistan. The key to impacting the opium trade is to cause the risk and opportunity cost of participating in the opium economy to become too high for the major players. Again, this opportunity cost does not only include economic costs, but also political, social, and religious costs. Lastly, infrastructure development and modernization must occur nationwide. In order for alternative livelihoods to have a fighting chance against the drug trade, something must be done to lower the costs of producing, transporting, and selling these preferred goods. Highways must be built. Railheads and lines must be established. Irrigation systems must be built. Permanent and mobile markets must be created. Communication networks must be formed. Financing institutions and methods must be advanced. And new technologies must be employed to lower costs.

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By increasing the costs of participating in the opium economy and lowering the costs of pursuing alternative livelihoods, the plan may succeed in moving the opium market to another country. This possibility, although not the optimal result, is definitely preferable to the current situation. In the short run, this is a success since the shift away from Afghanistan will disrupt terrorism financing. We understand that this line of reasoning is dangerous, because we cannot predict what perverse effects a transition of opium production will have in the long-run. We are confident, though, that this risk is acceptable to prevent Afghanistan from evolving into a full-blown narco-terrorist threat to the world. CONCLUSION This chapter has sketched the evolution of terrorism financing and has suggested that drugs are terrorist’s next major source of funding. We have argued that Afghanistan has a comparative advantage in the production of opium due to its geography and climate, its absence of rule of law, its historical war economy, and its expert, opium, sharecropping labor force. This comparative advantage does not appear that it will decrease in the near future due to ineffective eradication efforts, untapped poppy productivity, and the national macroeconomic dependence on opium. As a result, Afghanistan has the potential to become a major narco-terrorist threat to the world if it becomes a funding base for terrorists. Therefore, the global community has the opportunity to invest in Afghanistan’s 2005 Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan, where its marginal dollars can have an immediate impact in reducing the amount of money supplied to terrorists. Now is the time to make that investment. Failing to take this opportunity will cause a greater future investment in terms of dollars, soldiers, time, and other valuable assets. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. NOTES 1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004. Geneva: UNODC, 2004, p. 4. 2. President George Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.” Washington, DC, September 20, 2001. 3. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 1.

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4. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 170. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid., 171. 7. Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, December 8, 2004. Available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/ docs/crs/crs rl32499 01mar05.pdf 8. Eben Kaplan, “Tracking Down Terrorist Financing,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2004. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/10356/ tracking down terrorist financing.html 9. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2002) 90. 10. Moises Naim, “It’s the Illicit Economy, Stupid,” Foreign Policy November/December (2005). 11. http://www.treasury.gov/rewards/pdfs/stopthemoneyback.pdf 12. Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones (New York: Broadway Books, 2004) 162– 165. Please note: The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 13. Ibid., 167,168. 14. Ibid. 15. Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines,” SAIS Review 24, no. 7 (2004): 52. 16. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005) 205. 17. Robert Charles, Narcotics and Terrorism (Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, 2004) 81. 18. Ibid. 19. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recrutiment, Training, and Root Causes Volume III, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006) 172–188. 20. Frank Ahrens, “New Pitch in Anti-Drug Ads: Anti-Terrorism,” WashingtonPost.Com, February 4, 2002, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ ac2/wp-dyn/A18165-2002Feb3. 21. Felbab-Brown, “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade,” 176. 22. Moises Naim, Illicit (New York: Doubleday, 2005). 23. Ibid., 136. 24. Charles, Narcotics and Terrorism, 83. 25. Felbab-Brown, “The Intersection of Terrorism and the Drug Trade,” 176– 177. Also see U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Narco-Terrorism: International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism—A Dangerous Mix. May 20, 2003 and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001) 117–127. 26. Rashid, Taliban, 119. 27. N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 4th ed (Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western, 2007) 52–58.

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28. William Byrd and Christopher Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan,” Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Paper No. 18 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004). 29. Ibid. 30. Jonathan Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars: the Opium Economy in Afghanistan,” Journal of Agrarian Change 5, no. 2 (2005): 191–216 31. Ibid., 193. 32. Ibid., 192. 33. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 147. 34. Ibid., 66. 35. Ibid., 187. 36. Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars,” 198. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid, 203. 39. Ibid., 205. 40. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, Executive Summary. Geneva: UNODC, 2003, p. 8 41. Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars,” 201, 208. 42. Ibid., 209. 43. Central Intelligence Agency, World Fact Book: Afghanistan. Available at [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html]. 44. Byrd and Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan,” 2, 3. 45. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The Opium Economy in Afghanistan: An International Problem, Executive Summary. Geneva: UNODC, 2003, p. 8. 46. Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars,” 198, 200, 210. 47. This considers the eradication of opium by Karzai’s regime—2002— eradicated 16,500 hectares of poppy fields. Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy, 5-Year Strategy (1381–1386) for Tackling Illicit Drug Problems in Afghanistan (Kabul, Afghanistan, 2003). Available at www.mcn.gov.af/english/Documents. 48. Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars,” 208. 49. Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars,” 205 and Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan’s National Drug Control Strategy, p. 4. 50. Goodhand, “Frontiers and Wars,” 209. 51. Ibid., 206. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid., 201. 54. Byrd and Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan,” 9. 55. Ibid., 8. 56. Based on personal observations of both authors. International aid has played a role in this increased aggregate demand by providing money for infrastructure and other projects. 57. Byrd and Ward, “Drugs and Development in Afghanistan,” 209. 58. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan (Kabul, Afghanistan, 2005). Available at www.mcn.gov.af/ english/Documents.

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59. Ibid. 60. Military involvement in drug interdiction must be conducted at the proper point in the supply chain. If conducted too far from the producing country, interdiction will increase the prices and revenue actors in the producing country receive due to the decrease in supply to the users. This will only increase the threat that we have argued in the paper. For more on this, see Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave, Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1988).

CHAPTER 13 THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TERRORIST INFRASTRUCTURE Shahdad Naghshpour, Joseph J. St. Marie, and Samuel S. Stanton, Jr.

To what extent does the economy promote or deter terrorism? And more importantly, which of the government’s economic policies actually assist terrorists in creating an infrastructure for financing terrorism. While terrorist organizations seek various objectives, engage in a myriad of violent acts, and have diverse social and ideological backgrounds, they share one common problem—namely, how to finance terrorism. Terror must be funded, and funded in sufficient quantity to help terrorists meet their goals. In general, terrorism is a form of political violence,1 specifically; it is a deliberate violence against noncombatants for political purposes.2 The purpose of this chapter is to examine the role of the shadow economy in the global spread of terrorism. To this end, we examine the theory behind the shadow economy and the effects it can have on terrorist organizations with regard to financing. We believe that the shadow economy can provide an infrastructure for terrorist organizations to operate in, whereby financing becomes easier and detecting it becomes more difficult.

THE SHADOW ECONOMY Each economy harbors an element seldom discussed save by economists, and then only in selected circles—the shadow economy. Shadow economic activities are activities that are underground, covert, or illegal. Governments have an interest in determining the size of the shadow economy.3 First, governments need to provide accurate estimates of the size of the economy; and second, they must determine what activities

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lie outside the state’s regulatory structure in order to bring these activities into the regulatory structure and derive revenue. Once shadow activities are identified and mapped, the state can devise policies to shrink the shadow sector of the economy. The ability to reduce or eliminate the shadow economy becomes more important if it finances the terrorist organizations that are trying to overthrow the government. Western countries—especially the United States—are particularly concerned with this aspect of the shadow economy, since it also finances global terrorism. A shadow economy cannot be measured unless it is defined. The definition of the shadow economy is not uniform within the economic literature. Common definitions revolve around economic activity that is not officially calculated in the GNP, while Philip Smith defines it as “marketbased production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates.”4 Some broadly define the shadow economy as “those economic activities and the income derived from them that circumvent or otherwise escape government regulation, taxation or observation.”5 German economist Friedrich Schneider, who has conducted extensive research on shadow economies worldwide, provides a definition that encompasses those activities that may be undertaken by terrorist organizations: The shadow economy includes unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions—and so includes all economic activities that would generally be taxable were they reported to the state (tax) authorities.6

The presence of a shadow economy (all countries have a shadow economy) does not indicate that the country is poor or wealthy; a shadow economy and its magnitude merely indicates how much of the economic activity is outside the “official” sector. Nor does a shadow economy necessarily cause poverty. Causes of poverty seem to have little relationship to the size of the shadow economy. Research on a poverty/terrorism link has found no strong link between poorer nations and the propensity to generate terrorists.7 Studies also indicate that members of terrorist organizations tend to come from more affluent segments of the population of their respective countries.8 Thus, we analyze the shadow economy as an instrument that can be used by terrorist organizations for financing rather than a cause of terrorism. Building on our definition of the shadow economy, we follow the taxonomy of the shadow economy to explain how shadow activities can support terrorist financing. Table 13.1 details the various nonobservable economic activities that comprise the shadow economy. This classification of underground, shadow economic activities comprises two axes, the horizontal axis indicates monetary and nonmonetary

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Table 13.1 Taxonomy of Types of Underground Economic Activities Type of Activity Illegal Activities

Legal Activities

Monetary Transactions

Non Monetary Transactions

Trade with stolen goods, drug dealing and manufacturing, prostitution, gambling, smuggling, fraud, etc.

Barter of drugs, stolen goods, smuggling, etc. Produce or grow drugs for own use. Theft for own use.

Tax Evasion Unreported income from selfemployment, wages, salaries and assets from unreported work related to legal services and goods

Tax Evasion Barter of legal services and goods

Tax Avoidance Employee discounts, fringe benefits

Tax Avoidance All do-ityourself work and neighbor help

Source: Shadow Economies Around the World: What Do We Know? Friedrich Schneider. IZA Robert Klinglmair. Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research CESifo Working Paper No. 1167 & Institute for the Study of Labor IZA IZA Discussion Paper No. 1043. March 2004 page 5. Adapted from Lippert, Owen and Michael Walker (eds.) (1997): The underground economy: Global evidences of its size and impact, Vancouver, B.C.: The Frazer Institute.

transactions, while the vertical axis denotes the dichotomy between legal and illegal activities. For our purposes these distinctions fit well into scenarios of terrorist financing, where the power of the state to resist terrorism is at stake. To be sure, the capacity of the state to resist terrorist demands is implicit in its capacity to regulate its economy. The capacity of the state to harness its economy through various regulatory, law enforcement, or tax mechanisms can be seen in how successful the state controls legal or illegal transactions. Causes of the Shadow Economy The economics literature considers the shadow economy primarily as a result of various factors, but in particular: 1. Increasing tax burden, either direct (sales, value-added-tax, income, real estate, etc.) or through increasing social security contributions’ burden (increased withholding or surcharges). 2. An increase in the number and intensity of regulations in the official economy, especially in the labor markets.

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3. Reductions in work hours either through layoffs or work slowdowns, early retirement, and growing unemployment both in the private and public sectors. 4. Decline in the loyalty of the populace toward the government and its regulations or a decrease in the ability of the government to control the population and its economic activities. 5. The presence of ethnic/racial conflict, civil war, and terrorist organization that are not funded by other governments. After the Cold War, these groups were forced to finance most if not all of their activities themselves, which forced them into shadow economy activities for obvious reasons. 6. In the old Soviet Bloc countries, the transition from socialism to capitalism destroyed the social safety nets, thus creating unemployment and reduced or diminished health care, social security, etc. Augmented by inflation and lack of government infrastructure to curb shadow economic activities, this has increased participation in the unofficial sector.

The influence of various types of taxation denotes how rising tax rates increase the prevalence and size of shadow economies. In a study of 14 Latin American nations, Loayza found that primary determinants of the shadow economy to be the tax burden, labor market restrictions, and the strength and efficiency of government institutions.9 These findings indicate that the greater the tax burden, the greater the incentive to resort to the nonobservable economy for labor, as well as barter for heavily taxed goods. Thus, one major determinant of the shadow economy is the overall tax burden, which when increasing tends to increase the size of the shadow economy, as well as the incentive to avoid “official” work. As seen in the above table, this type of activity encompasses monetary transactions such as tax evasion or tax avoidance. Although there are numerous examples of revolutions, ethnic conflicts, and terrorist activities as a result of the overburden of taxes, present day terrorism seems to lack strong links between taxation and terrorist activities. Nowadays, ethnic conflict, social tension, and terrorism simply take advantage of the presence of (and the opportunities created by) the existing shadow economy of the country to sustain its activities. The intensity of the regulatory environment also affects the shadow economy. Economists Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton recently demonstrated how labor market regulations for both citizens and foreigners affect the incentive structure to avoid engagement in shadow economy activities.10 Furthermore, the number of laws, regulations, and license requirements has been found to limit the choices for those individuals seeking to participate in the economy. De Soto reinforces this point by asserting that increased regulation leads to increased entry costs in the official economy, thus entrepreneurs favor the unofficial economy where entry is easier.11 While technically illegal, these shadow entrepreneurs fill a void created by an excessive regulatory state.

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Increased labor regulation reduces official employment by creating incentives for firms to hire shadow workers while cutting the hours of “official” workers. Workers who have had their work hours cut are provided with incentives to engage in shadow activities thus increasing the overall size of the nonobservable economy. Hunt agues that Volkswagen workers who were limited in the hours they worked—against their wishes— provided the labor for a home reconstruction and renovation boom.12 This sort of activity is a type of tax evasion based upon barter of goods and services, or neighbors’ help, which in each instance results in lost tax revenue and an increase in the shadow economy. In the old Soviet Bloc countries, the collapse of the system created an opportunity to avoid tax payment altogether. Simultaneously, the reduced or vanished police authority and the lucrative return on illegal activities have resulted in expansion of all kinds of illegal shadow economy activities in these countries. In general, privatization in the Soviet Bloc countries has increased the size of the shadow economy in these countries substantially.13 Reduced revenues can lead to either decreased public expenditures or a higher overall tax burden for the remaining taxpayers to offset the loss. In the former case, decreased public spending can lead to loss of citizen loyalty, especially for minority groups who may rely upon income transfers or government developmental aid. Sudden drop in spending can test the loyalty of even majority groups. To be sure, once a public service is provided, restricting or discontinuing the service is difficult. While reducing public spending per person may be regime-type dependent, any reduction without an accompanying increase in replacement benefits (tangible or intangible) or security will meet resentment in most societies. This is especially important where terrorist groups operate, as they can exploit the inability of the government to provide services. Indeed the rise of Hamas in the Palestinian territories can be traced to the inability of the PLO to provide such services.14 A higher tax burden either in developed or developing nations signifies an attempt by the government to increase its power or control over the population on one hand, while also deriving revenue on the other hand. Clearly, state capacity is tied to its ability to finance its endeavors and the ability to increase taxes to an optimum level, in order to maintain control. In segmented societies, overcontrol may prod ethnic minorities to seek autonomy or rebellion. Political violence in the form of terrorism is also an outcome of an overly extractive state. For developed nations, an increase in the tax burden leads to a larger shadow economy as incentives for productive “official” employment is lessened. In developing countries, a lack of the rule of law, poor institutions, or authoritarian leaders and corruption leads to larger shadow economies. In both instances, the logic of the Laffer Curve is evident, where increasing taxes in a developing nation beyond the optimum level will lead to a

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decreased official sector and increased shadow economy.15 As taxes rise, an incentive to exit the official sector is created. Theoretically, when taxes reach 100 percent of income, employment in the official economy would be nil, while employment in the shadow economy would be full. Alienated groups will resort to shadow economy activity especially if—as is the case in many developing countries—they are economically disadvantaged vis-`a-vis the dominant group. This may also have political repercussions for state capacity and terrorism. In developed countries, the political repercussions of an increased tax burden will primarily be felt through the polls, while in developing nations rebellion, civil war, and terrorism directed against the government are common. In either instance, an increased tax burden has implications for the shadow economy, the official economy, and politics. The above discussion of the shadow economy revolves around those activities that are legal, involving either monetary transactions or nonmonetary transactions through tax evasion or tax avoidance. However, many activities of the shadow economy are based upon illegal monetary or nonmonetary transactions. Illegal activities involving narcotics, smuggling, and precious metals are especially of interest to terrorist groups due to the high value of the commodity. Usually, tax evasion is an individual act, part of which may or may not be diverted to support a cause, be it an ethnic conflict, civil war, or terrorism. On the other hand, narcotics, smuggling, and precious metals smuggling generates revenue, usually from beyond the borders of the base country. These activities have the added advantage—from the terrorists’ point of view—of hurting or damaging the afflicted countries, while generating lucrative revenue to finance terrorist activities. Transportation and distribution of these illegal products requires a higher level of sophistication and mastery of logistics that benefit the terrorist in obtaining their weapons. Monetary transactions might include the trade of stolen goods, manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs, small-scale specialized manufacturing, prostitution, gambling, smuggling, all types of fraud, and in general, all nonviolent felonious activity. Nonmonetary illegal transactions include barter for drugs, stolen goods, drug production for barter or personal use, as well as theft for one’s personal use. These are the types of activities that make the shadow economy difficult to measure, especially if it is well established and relatively dependent upon illegal activities. While not explicitly noted in the literature, the implication is that legal activities may eventually turn into illegal activities should the tax or regulatory burden of the state increase to a significant level. This is especially true in many underdeveloped economies, where the rule of law and judicial independence are absent, while onerous regulatory regimes, and corruption are present.16

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THE SHADOW ECONOMY AND TERRORISM Once the basis of a shadow economy is understood, its general effects on creating an infrastructure for the financing of terrorist organizations becomes clear. We begin with the assumption that there are social, ethnic, or religious groups under some sort of economic or political disenfranchisement. While this situation may not always be the case, we believe that most groups as such feel economic pressures or political pressures. We base part of our theoretical framework on the work of Albert Hirschman, who presents a theory based upon organizational behavior.17 We see the state and groups within the state, behaving in much the same manner as Hirschman predicts individuals would in a firm. For Hirschman, the behavioral options for individuals in the firm are divided into three aspects. One may “voice” dissent by complaining about a deteriorating condition in the firm, or if the individual sees no improvement in conditions, they may exercise the option of “exit,” thereby leaving the firm. Related to this, but in a separate category, is the notion of loyalty. Loyalty is a predictor of the likelihood of an individual using the “voice” or “exit” option. Graphically, we could see the relationship between the three concepts as a spectrum called loyalty. On the low end or far right side we would place “exit” while on the opposite end with high loyalty we would place “voice” (see Figure 13.1). In practice, Hirschman notes that there are two principle determinants of when one resorts to voice or exit.18 The first is the extent to which the person is willing to trade off the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorating organization. Second is the person’s assessment of their ability to influence the organization. These factors drive the voice/exit determination. Implicit in Hirschman’s model is the important assumption that the firm or organization is in decline. Thus, perceived or actual decline is an impetus for the person to begin making the voice/exit calculus depending on loyalty. Clearly, exit/voice and loyalty are complex interrelationships. For the purpose of this chapter, we define loyalty as good citizenship and acceptance of the current political and economic institutions. On the other hand “exit” is an option that the dissatisfied or terrorist can exercise within the economic sphere (we assume they have already exited the political sphere). One can exit the official sector for the informal or shadow

Voice

Exit Loyalty

Figure 13.1 Exit Voice Continuum

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Percent of GDP as Shadow Economy

100

Figure 13.2 Stylized Model of an Increasing Shadow Economy Source: Adopted from Dr. Dominik H. Enste. The Shadow Economy and Institutional Change in Transition Countries. Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, Koln. ¨ 2003 page 40.

sector either fully or in part. Any movement to the shadow sector creates an increase in the infrastructure available to the terrorist. Sympathizers may participate in both the official and shadow economies. Such sympathizers are the basis of the shadow economy’s infrastructure the terrorist organization depends upon for financial and material support. Having explained the shadow economy and its effects on the supporting infrastructure available to terrorist organizations, we now offer a central observation based upon the notion that a person or persons will exit the official economy to join, either in whole or in part, the shadow economy to support terrorist organizations. Our assertion is that an increase in the factors comprising the shadow economy increases the avenues for participation in the shadow economy by supporters of terror organizations or terrorist themselves. Furthermore, the larger the shadow economy the greater the potential for and avenues for the creation of an infrastructure for material and financial support for terrorist organizations. Finally, the poorer a region or a country the greater the need for a terrorist organization to engage in shadow economy activities, especially illegal activities because it is more difficult for the poor to finance terrorists. The latter situation is more applicable to organizations that lack foreign funding. In fact all the organizations financed by Soviet Union, Libya, and Saudi Arabia (in the case of al Qaeda) are now either out of operation or are engaged in some sort of shadow economic activity, especially of the illegal type. The basic logic of our argument follows Figure 13.2, which demonstrates

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how an increasingly large public sector, or more demands by the state on resources (such as higher taxes or more onerous regulations), will create incentives for individuals to defect to the shadow economy. As state revenue drops as a result of an increase in the shadow economy, the official sector is forced to increase taxes, etc., which will cause even further increase in the shadow economy. Eventually, the public sector will decline, as defections to the shadow economy make revenue collection impossible. If we look at this scenario on a linear continuum we can see how consolidation of state power and economic development creates conditions of economic prosperity. Economic prosperity leads to the expansion of the public sector, creates “institutional sclerosis” to use Mancur Olson’s terminology,19 and eventually defections to the shadow economy. Increasing defection and grievances lead to a potential terrorist infrastructure. It might be useful to distinguish between localized terrorism, for example, ETA in Spain or the Irish Republic Army in Ireland, and global terrorism such as al Qaeda. In the case of the former, at one time or another, the segment of the population of the country that has been affected by the tax burden or social injustice will choose the exit option through terrorism against the government. In the case of the latter, the root of the conflict is external. However, although the source(s) of disenfranchisement is different, there is no evidence to support the notion that the methods, procedures, or the financing means of terrorism differs in the two cases. Regardless of the origin of the terrorist movement, the organization can benefit from an increase in the shadow economy, which creates conditions where dissatisfied groups have an infrastructure to engage in political violence. Graphically, we superimpose this process on the shadow economy model, as seen in Figure 13.3. Clearly, there are limitations to our analysis. The first is the direction of causality question—does the existence of shadow economy cause terrorism or does terrorism cause a shadow economy. We believe that terrorist behavior is indeed a path-dependent process, and that while the process can be halted or redirected, certain conditions in general are necessary for terrorist activities or political violence to occur. At the same time, the processes that create an increase in the shadow economy follow a similar path and logic. We theorize that instead of attempting to determine the direction of causality, conceptualizing the co-movement of both processes is analytically useful for capturing the essence of the decision either to use voice or to exit the economic system (and by extension, the political system). Second, we acknowledge that the shadow economy is a hybrid of legal and illegal activities. The greater the share of the illegal activity in the shadow economy, the greater the harm to the society and the larger the problem for government. The problem for analysts is to determine how the ratio of each component (legal/illegal) is measured. Furthermore,

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Combating the Sources and Facilitators Increasing Economic Prosperity Expansion of Public Sector Defections to Shadow Economy Potential for Terrorist Infrastructure Created Increase in the Potential Terrorist Infrastructure Terrorism Supported by Shadow Economy Decline in State Authority Civil War—Terrorist Ascendancy Institutional Change

Figure 13.3 The Consolidation of State Power/Decrease in Shadow Economy.

it is necessary to identify the point at which, during the increase in the shadow economy (and increase in potential terrorist infrastructure), this ratio moves from majority legal to majority illegal. This legal/illegal switch may indeed occur, yet the tracking and measurement of such activities is difficult and beyond the scope of this chapter.20 However, we believe that our analysis provided below points to interesting findings and further directions for research into the infrastructure that the states inadvertently provide to terrorists.

HOW THE SHADOW ECONOMY CAN AFFECT POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM Since political violence can take many forms, the shadow economy can also affect political violence in many ways. The shadow economy can provide terrorists or others with numerous financing opportunities in both legal and illegal realms of activity, each of which requires a unique response as part of a comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism.

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Legal Legal monetary transactions can include tax evasion, where individuals who sympathize with (or are part of) a terrorist organization redirect some of their income while underreporting their total income, or engage in selfemployment to finance the organization. Unreported income can come from legal sources, but is redirected to terrorist organizations. Diverting taxes on a large scale from government to terrorists increases the overall share of the shadow economy. Another method would involve tax avoidance, if one directed fringe benefits or such things as employee discounts toward terrorist activities/organizations. Clearly, these are not violent or illegal economic activities but they do, however, provide an infrastructure for the terrorist or terror organization to operate within. A nation with a larger legal monetary shadow economy will be able to provide a more extensive infrastructure for clandestine support, as opposed to a nation with a smaller shadow economy. Legal activities of a nonmonetary nature can be in the form of barter of legal goods or services as well as helping neighbors. These activities avoid any form of taxation. Each form of shadow activity can add to an infrastructure that is conducive to terrorist organizations. Clearly, terrorist organizations do not operate in a vacuum and a nation with the potential for an extensive infrastructure would be an attractive home base for such organizations, whether they have domestic or international goals. A more important way of participation is through sheltering terrorists by providing housing, food, clothing, and logistical information to enable terrorists’ movement through a territory. Examples of this include Vietcong sympathizers in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, who enabled the insurgents to carry out numerous, extended, and prolonged attacks against South Vietnamese and American forces. A terrorist organization with access to revenue through legal or illegal activities can, and often does, reimburse the sympathizers to expand its support base. This unique aspect of the shadow economy not only applies to the terrorist activities, but to rebel groups who engage in political violence as well as social and ideologically motivated groups who seek regime change. The existence of a large legal shadow economy would provide the necessary requirements for terror organizations. Countries with such a shadow sector are primarily developed high-income countries, where high taxation and regulatory burdens create conditions for legal shadow activities. Recent terrorist incidents, such as the London bombings and the September 11 attacks, demonstrate how terror organizations can operate in developed nations that have the potential for an extensive legal shadow infrastructure. To be sure, if nations such as the Untied Kingdom and the United States have potential shadow infrastructures for terror organizations, while also having a very small shadow economy—estimated

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at 2.6 percent and 8.7 percent respectively—nations with larger shadow economies would potentially offer much greater support for terrorist organizations. Illegal Illegal activities that comprise the overall shadow economy also take the form of monetary and nonmonetary transactions. Monetary transactions include: trade of stolen goods, drug production and distribution, prostitution, gambling, smuggling of all types and fraud. The single most important link in the illegal shadow economy system is the middleman. The middlemen connect the suppliers and buyers without exposing either source, even if one of the participating groups happens to be a terrorist organization. Without this lifeline, no terrorist organization can manage to finance its survival. Trade in stolen goods or natural resources is a form of terrorist financing that has been increasingly prevalent in the post-Cold War era. Natural resources can take two forms, renewable and nonrenewable. Renewable resources such as agricultural commodities have the potential to become sources of financing for terror organizations. However, the transport and sale of commodities such as grains, sugar, or wood products requires a logistical network beyond the capabilities of many terror organizations. While on a small scale such shadow activities would provide support, they would be incapable of providing the level of income needed to support an extended organization. In major ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and sometimes in terrorists’ activities, feeding and supplying the “troops” in the field becomes a decisive component. Since terrorists are denied the regular logistical capabilities, access to a shadow economy can play a vital role. Therefore, in the case of agricultural products, the terrorists do not benefit financially; however, their survival depends on their ability to obtain enough support for larger operations. Small-scale terrorist groups can carry enough currency to allow them to obtain their needs from the market. On the other hand, nonrenewable natural resources can play a much larger role in the creation of a shadow economy supporting infrastructure for terrorists. Recent research conducted by Collier and Hoeffler conclude that the “extent of primary commodity exports is the strongest single influence on the risk of conflict” although they focus on civil war the research has implications for the study of terrorist networks.21 A refinement by Fearon notes how commodity exports used to fund civil wars tend to be confined to oil, which has high value relative to the costs of production.22 Moreover, access through a myriad of pipelines, etc., allows rebels or terrorists to skim from overall national production. Skimming is small compared to total production and the cost of policing production facilities and

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pipelines. This sort of environment allows a shadow economy to operate with relative immunity and provide prolonged and substantial financial support for the terrorist organization. To be sure, the logistics involved in shadow economy operations are important if nonrenewable resources are being used in an illicit manner. Trucks and other associated equipment would be needed for oil skimming, as well as a buyer. Other high volume commodities would necessitate greater logistical support. Two natural resources that entail less logistical preparation are diamonds and minerals. While mineral looting or smuggling can be a relatively simple process, requiring virtually no logistical support, diamonds are even easier to loot and smuggle. The logic is simple—the more transportable or value per pound the more likely terror organizations will attempt to use this portion of the shadow economy to finance their operations. While diamond or gold smuggling may be relatively simple compared to oil skimming, an important aspect of this sort of activity is the transaction cost involved in selling the stolen goods. In the same way that a thief pays a “premium” to the buyer of the stolen goods, so does the purveyor of looted gems or minerals. This premium is based upon a separate infrastructure that moves goods out of the country and the risk involved to those engaged in the smuggling. Since the total value of the smuggled goods is very high, capturing the smugglers has high payoff as well, justifying increased police and military tracking. Increased government policing can raise this premium to unacceptable levels, thereby closing off this avenue of terrorist financing and eliminating an element of the shadow economy infrastructure of terrorist organizations. Within the past few years, diamond looting has been discussed as a chief form of financing for civil wars in West Africa. For example, recent studies note how the production of diamond increases the likelihood of civil war, while also accounting for the state capacity and the propensity to use this sort of financing.23 Of particular interest for our purpose in this chapter is to understand how political leaders can alter the market or infrastructure for looting by changing modes of extraction. The shape of the shadow economy can be changed, provided leaders recognize the significance of the shadow economy and how it can be used to provide an infrastructure for terrorist organizations. These studies of diamond looting in support of civil war rebels illustrates how structural incentives of the economy can create an increased shadow economy and shadow economy elements that are amenable to a terrorist infrastructure. The illegal narcotics trade is another area of both nonmonetary and monetary transactions that can contribute to an infrastructure for terrorist organizations. As with looting of various nonrenewable natural resources, the drug trade requires an infrastructure to be profitable for terrorist organizations.24 The Taliban’s drug dealing did not operate in a

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vacuum but thrived in lawless regions where the Taliban taxed the raw opium while also funneling it to dealers outside the country, who could then place it into the global drug pipeline.25 Not controlling the drug chain makes terrorists who trade drugs price takers, as they add little value to the finished product other than the initial commodity. While terror organizations could enter the product chain and add value at multiple stages, such options would be dependent upon the structure of the shadow economy (the illegal to legal ratio or the monetary to nonmonetary ratio). Terrorist organizations can control the flow of products—both legal and illegal—by virtue of controlling a territory or by making their passage impossible without their explicit approval and/or involvement. In doing so, terrorists can obtain both the support of the masses and the poor while financing their activities. The Taliban, for example, controlled most of Afghanistan which means they could weed out the middlemen, who are usually the greatest benefactors of the narcotics trade. The Taliban could continue to pay farmers the same or even more than middlemen; take the product from farms to central distribution centers with little more than transportation costs, and create a national monopoly. They would have become heroes in the eyes of the peasants, while making more money than (nonmonopolist) middlemen at a reduced cost, because unlike the middlemen they neither had to pay bribes nor risk loss of their inventory to confiscation. As a major producer, they would increase their leverage versus international opium refiners and could affect the overall market costs. Why the Taliban failed to grasp this opportunity is unknown. Illegal monetary transactions can also take the form of manufacturing. While we have not seen any evidence of terrorist-owned firms, terrorist organizations can and do manufacture various goods for their cause. While these goods are primarily “the tools of the trade” such as explosives or guns, they also manufacture a select number of goods that can be sold on the shadow market. In this category, we can place the manufacture of illegal drugs that do not require a supply chain nor multiple processes. Methamphetamine is a perfect example of the type of “low-tech” drug manufacture that has a high value to weight ratio and is thus attractive to smugglers. Moreover, the feedstocks are readily available, as are instructions or “recipes.” Another facet of the illegal monetary shadow economy would be organized illegal activities, or what is commonly referred to as organized crime.26 In general, organized crime denotes ethnically based mafia type groups who rely upon ethnic or family ties to maintain their cohesiveness. The archetypical example is Mario Puzos’ Godfather series. Modern terrorist groups may differ in that they are more ideologically based; yet if residing in a country where there exists a sizable shadow economy, they will have the perquisite infrastructure to engage in mafia-like activities. These activities might include gambling, prostitution, fraud, or extortion.

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Such illegal enterprises may not be well suited to terrorist groups who have moral or religious injunctions against these types of social vices. Although we should note that the Taliban did issue fatwas stating that while drug use was morally wrong, supplying drugs to infidels was not a moral transgression. Even if mafia-like illegal activities were to appeal to terrorist groups, movement into such areas would be detrimental to the terrorists, as they would potentially be infringing on areas of the shadow economy occupied by established groups. We can expect established mafias to vigorously defend their “turf,” thus making forays into these areas less attractive to terrorist organizations. While terrorist groups may engage in these types of activities, we could expect that they would have only minimal involvement, as most areas would already be exploited by established organized crime groups. In sum, the various illegal activities that terrorist organization may avail themselves of in the shadow economy are diverse, each with attending risks and rewards. We would envision a terrorist group to be nimble and be able to switch from one shadow economic activity to another in short order. Movement from the illegal to legal may be more difficult. Clearly, the size of a country’s shadow economy creates ample opportunities that terrorists may exploit for financing their operations.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have examined the concept of the shadow economy and how it creates an infrastructure that may be exploited by terrorist for financing and other activities necessary to their operations. The irony for most nations’ decision makers is that public policy decisions intended to create a better quality of life—such as a social security system which collects contributions through taxes and then provides a basic human security “safety net” for all its citizens—may actually create an infrastructure where terror organizations can operate, finance themselves, and carry out attacks on the very sociopolitical system that unwittingly supports them. A comprehensive approach to combating terrorism thus requires significant monitoring of the shadow economy. NOTES 1. George W. Bush, The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington, DC: The White House, February 2002, p 1. 2. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002, p. 5. 3. Joseph J. St. Marie, Shahdad Naghshpour, and Sam S. Stanton, “A Shadow Economy Model of Ethnic Conflict.” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2006.

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4. Philip Smith, “Assessing the Size of the Underground Economy: The Canadian Statistical Perspectives,” Canadian Economic Observer, Catalogue 11-010, 3 (1994): 16–33. 5. Roberto Dell’Anno, “Estimating the Shadow Economy in Italy, A Structural Equation Approach,” discussion paper, Department of Economics and Statistics (2003), University of Salerno. Also see Edgard L. Feige, The Underground Economies, Tax Evasion and Information Distortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 6. Friedrich Schneider and Dominik Ernste, “Shadow Economies Around the World: Size, Causes, and Consequences,” International Monetary Fund working paper (2000), p. 5. 7. Alen B. Krueger and D.D. Laitin, “Faulty Terror Report Card,” The Washington Post 17 (May 2004), Editorial. Also see James A. Piazza, “Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, Issue 1 (2004): 159–177. 8. Alen B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is. There a Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17. 4 (2003): 119–144. 9. Norman V. Loayza, “The Economics of the Informal Sector: A Simple Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Latin America,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 45 (1996): 129–162. ´ “Corruption, 10. Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, Public Finances and the Unofficial Economy,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 2169 (1998). 11. Hernando De Soto, The Other Path. Translated by June Abbott (New York: Harper and Row, 1989). 12. Jennifer Hunt, “Has work-sharing worked in Germany?” Quarterly Journal of Economics H. 1, S. (1999): 117–148. 13. Yair Eilat and Clifford Zinnes, “The Evolution of the Shadow Economy in Transition Countries: Consequences for Economic Growth and Donor Assistance,” Harvard Institute for International Development CAER II Discussion Paper 83 (September 2000). 14. Tim Youngs, “The Palestinian Parliamentary Election and the Rise of Hamas,” House of Commons International Affairs and Defense Section Research Paper 06/17 (March 15, 2006). 15. Arthur B. Laffer, The Economics of The Tax Revolt. A Reader (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979). 16. This was highlighted in the recent book, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S. Policies for West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, by James Forest and Matt Sousa (Lanhman, MD: Lexington, 2006). 17. Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 18. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty; Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and State, 70. 19. Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). 20. To eliminate this theoretical clutter we start with the assumption that the legal and illegal parts of the shadow economy cannot accurately be determined

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(see Friedrich Schneider, “Shadow Economies around the World: What do we really know?” European Journal of Political Economy (2005), footnote 3, for more detail) thus we take the shadow economy as a unified concept. This approach avoids the pitfalls of calculating the legal/illegal components of the shadow economy while providing a more nuanced analysis. 21. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” World Bank Working paper Series 18 (2000). Also see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On the Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 50 (1998): 563–573; and Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005): 625–633. 22. James D. Fearon, “Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005): 483–507. 23. Paivi Lujala, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Elisabeth Gilmore, “A Diamond Curse?: Civil War and a Lootable Resource,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005): 538–562; Also, see Richard Snyder and Ravi Bhavnani, “Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005): 563–597. 24. For more on this topic, please see the chapters in this volume by Gregory Lee, JP Larsson, and James Walker and Jonathan Byrom. 25. Rashid Ahmed, Taliban Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 26. See the chapter in this volume by JP Larsson.

CHAPTER 14 INTERNATIONAL ENERGY DEPENDENCE: FACILITATOR AND VULNERABILITY Sumesh M. Arora and David Butler

Energy is one of the basic needs for the survival of mankind (in addition to food, clothing, shelter, and healthcare) since it is at the core of producing many of the materials of human consumption including food and clothing. At more than $3 trillion of annual global sales, the energy industry is the world’s largest trading sector. The food industry is a distant second, with annual sales of US$1.7 trillion. The energy trade in the United States accounts for almost a third of the global energy sales.1 The aggregate per capita consumption of total primary energy is highly disproportionate around the world, and it is not surprising that the highly industrialized nations around the world are also among the highest consumers of energy. A strong correlation is apparent between the Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and per capita electricity consumption.2 The graph in Figure 14.1 (derived from the UNDP data) shows that HDI and per capita electricity consumption have similar trends and indicate the apparent dependence of the HDI on electricity consumption. The least developed countries on UNDP’s list consume far less electricity per capita than do high-income countries. It is suggestive from these data that in order for the developing countries to improve their human development indices, per capita energy consumption will have to increase. Without an affordable and reliable supply of energy, regardless of how it is generated or distributed, it is difficult to sustain any other sector of the economy or provide an adequate level of services such as health care

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Figure 14.1 Trends for human development index and per capita electricity consumption by various regions of the world2

and education to a large number of people. Global energy security was listed as one of the three highest priority items on the agenda of the 2006 G8 Summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia. The other two agenda items were fighting infectious diseases and improving education levels around the world. This is the first time that Russia has served as president of the G8 and in his address, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated, “This year, we plan to urge our partners to redouble efforts to ensure global energy security. We believe that today, it is crucial to find a solution to a problem, which directly influences the social and economic development of all countries, without exception.”3 The Ministry of Industry and Energy of the Russian Federation hosted the International Conference on Energy Security in March 2006 in advance of the G8 summit. A declaration signed by the energy ministers of the participating countries states4 Neither global energy security, nor the millennium development goals can be fully achieved without sustainable access to fuels for the 2.4 billion people and to electricity for the 1.6 billion people currently without such access in developing countries. They cannot be forgotten or marginalized.

For the purposes of this chapter, energy supply is synonymous with fuel supply, to include renewable resources such as solar, wind, hydropower,

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geothermal, and biomass; fossil fuels such as crude oil, coal, and natural gas; and nuclear fuels. WHAT IS ENERGY SECURITY? The definitions of affordable and reliable supply of energy vary from one part of the world to another based on local economic and political conditions, and form the basis for what constitutes energy security for a country. The World Bank report5 groups countries into five groups based on their energy import and export capacity, and demand patterns measuring its market sector growth and income levels. These groups are: (1) industrialized nations that are net importers of energy; (2) largest sovereign hydrocarbon producers; (3) largest emerging markets with a fast-growing energy demand; (4) net importers of energy with medium incomes; and (5) net importers of energy with low incomes. The World Bank defines characteristics of these countries such as per capita GDP and energy consumption per capita, as well as elucidates the differences in their energy security strategies. Diversification of energy supply sources is listed as an important energy security concern for countries in groups 1 and 3, whereas meeting the population’s basic energy needs is among the energy security priorities of the medium and low income energy importers in groups 4 and 5. Countries in groups 1 and 3 are the ones most susceptible to energy supply disruptions, and countries in group 2 are most vulnerable to terrorist attacks on energy production installations. It is evident from the grouping of these countries that there is a substantial disconnect in the energy consumption and energy production patterns. Data published annually by British Petroleum show that proven reserves of oil and natural gas are distributed grossly unevenly around the globe. Crude oil distribution represents the strongest case of geographic disparity (see Figure 14.2), where the United States, with the largest oil consumption and some of the fastest growing nations (such as China and India) have the smallest known reserves.6 Generally speaking, identified or proven reserves refer to oil and gas that have been discovered and remain in the ground, but are accessible using current technology in an expedient and economical manner. Proven reserves, however, are a function not only of geology, but also economics, technology, and politics.7 While it is sufficient to look at the general distribution trend of the fossil reserves for the purposes of this chapter, the stating of such reserves is subject to political and economic forces, and the accuracy of these reserve estimates has come under question.8 Clive Crook describes energy security as the ability of a country to absorb the rise in energy prices.9 Affordability of energy can be viewed in terms of the percentage of disposable income that the citizens of a country have to spend on energy expenses. A report from the International Atomic

Thousand million barrels Middle East 742.7

Asia Pacific 40.2

North America 59.5

S. & Cent. America 103.5

Africa 114.3

Figure 14.2 British petroleum data for world oil reserves at the end of 20055

Europe & Eurasia 140.5

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Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated that in 1998 Bangladeshis spent 18 percent of their per capita private consumption as energy expenditure versus only 7 percent for the German citizens.10 Given the uneven distribution of conventional energy supplies as discussed above, countries with growing populations such as Bangladesh will have to import even more energy. Coupled with the escalating price of energy products, this will put additional strain on the purchasing power of the individuals. Higher prices can be expected to further exacerbate the percentage of energy expenditures for the poorer nations that do not have domestic reserves. And, as many scholars have noted, significant strains on a domestic population’s purchasing power can lead to political unrest. GLOBAL ENERGY DEMAND AND PRICE VOLATILITY According to the World Energy Outlook: 2005 published by the International Energy Agency, the global energy demand is expected to grow by 50 percent by the year 2030. Two-thirds of this increase will come from the developing countries creating increased competition for energy sources and an increased reliance on the oil and gas reserves in the Middle East.11 Historically the price of oil has been flat, but the increasing price volatility of crude oil over the last 35 years (presented in Figure 14.3) has been attributed in large part due to global geopolitical events.12 At current recordsetting prices of greater then US$70 per barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX Future),13 the price concern has been a mainstream discussion around the world, as evidenced by coverage provided by numerous media outlets on a regular basis. The uneven global distribution of conventional energy reserves and price volatility of fossil fuels suggest a case for exploiting indigenous energy resources in countries currently dependent on imported energy. Oil, the most common transportation fuel, has become a liability that threatens global security in multiple ways. Like other fossil fuels, oil is a finite resource, and even though the future duration of its availability is debated, it poses a threat to global economic security since there is no established substitute for it, and the gap between supply and demand is growing. Imported oil accounts for a large share of energy budgets in most industrial countries, for example 36 percent in France, 39 percent in the United States, and 49 percent in Japan. Developing countries are even more vulnerable because their imports are larger in relation to their GDP and because the additional strain on purchasing power can exacerbate the challenges faced by an already weak central government. Growing evidence suggests that rising demand, especially from nations such as China and India, will soon permanently outpace supply, leading to a long-term rise in prices.14

US dollars per barrel World events Growth of Venezuelan production

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Figure 14.3 Price history of oil (per barrel) and world events timeline5

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The current run-up in oil and other fossil fuel prices is largely due to the tight balance between supply and demand. It is widely recognized that there is very little excess capacity in the current system to produce any excess oil should any disruption occur. By some current estimates, the spare production capacity of the petroleum industry to meet the daily global demand of more than 80 million barrels of oil is only 1 million barrels per day. One of the reasons for this lack of spare production capacity is the result of inadequate investments in exploration during the previous 20 years, especially by the countries with the largest oil reserves. Maugeri explains that in the early 1980s, the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) began to worry about overproduction, resulting from the corrections instituted during the 1970s oil crisis. The price of crude oil collapsed in 1986 and again in 1998–1999, caused by overproduction and limited growth in demand, reinforcing the “determination of producers to minimize excess capacity.”15 A major factor in the increased demand in energy in the 2000s is the economic growth in China, where demand for oil rose by 40 percent between 2000 and 2004.16 China and India’s rapidly growing economies are increasing their demand for energy and are creating intense competition over international sources of supply. According to a report published by Laguna Research Partners, the Chinese Rim—comprised of 19 Southeast Asian countries—faces a deficit of 1.7 billion barrels of crude oil annually.17 China’s efforts to develop domestic fields have generally been disappointing, and efforts to pipe gas from Central Asia and Russia to the east coast have not yet materialized. Consequently, China is considering the vulnerability of its sea-lanes to the Middle East and beyond, and is now paying greater attention to potential petroleum resources in the East and South China Seas. Its need to diversify has promoted closer relations with countries throughout Central Asia and the Middle East,18 as well as the oil producing countries of Africa and Latin America. It remains to be seen whether China’s concerns for securing energy supplies will lead to international cooperation against terrorism or fuel the already heated competition for both oil and natural gas.19 With a delicate balance between oil supply and demand, any disruption in the supply can lead to price increases. The reasons for a disruption can be varied from natural events such as earthquakes or hurricanes, to politically motivated actions on the part of energy producing countries, or terrorist activities that threaten to disrupt the energy supply chain through the use of violent force. This chapter looks in greater depth at the effects of terrorism on the stability of the energy infrastructure, the rationale behind al Qaeda’s strategy to attack energy targets, and the ability of countries to absorb energy supply disruptions. The arguments presented in this chapter are that the disparity between the production and consumption of energy resources leads to geopolitical

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security tensions, and that the price of fossil fuel energy resources is closely tied to geopolitical events. It is suggested that there is a critical need for countries, especially those that consume more energy than they produce, to evaluate their long-term prospects of limiting their exposure to energy derived from locations around the world that are more susceptible to terrorist attacks; or to alternatively set up protective provisions in the countries that supply the oil and increase the security for energy products transportation such as oil tankers and natural gas pipelines. A significant volume of literature exists that discusses the new paradigm of security in general, as delineated by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. However, the history of energy security can be traced back to the World War I era, when First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill proclaimed “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.” Churchill made a key decision to switch from coal to oil for powering the British Navy, in order to make it faster than the German fleet; however, this also exposed it to the uncertainties of the oil supply from Persia. The phrase “energy independence” was first articulated by President Richard Nixon four weeks after the 1973 embargo was put in place.20 Every U.S. president throughout the last half century has had to address energy supply issues. For example, as President Ronald Reagan repealed the provisions of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA) in May of that year, he urged, “several measures to ensure our nation as a strong domestic oil and gas industry and substantial protection against supply interruptions. These measures, taken together, will result in increased energy security.”21 PIFUA was passed by Congress, effectively prohibiting the construction of oil or natural gas fired power plants in response to the shortages resulting from the oil embargo in 1973. The phrases “energy security” and “energy independence” are often used interchangeably by people in the media, politicians, and the general population, but according to Sosa and Desnyder, energy security is discussed generally in terms of the uninterrupted energy supply, whereas energy independence generally has a strong connotation for increasing the domestic production of energy products and reducing reliance on imports.22 It is important to realize that both terms, security and independence, have the same implication of achieving the goal of a stable energy supply that can adequately meet current and future demand at a price point that the market can reasonably afford. “Energy product value chain stability” thus encompasses both security and independence. The frequent use of the emotional terms of “security” and “independence” is a reflection on the lack of stability of the current global energy sector. As seen later in this chapter, a great deal of anxiety arises from the possible threat of terrorist attacks on the energy infrastructure. Proceeding from the approaches described above, this discussion views global energy product value chain stability as the long-term reliable

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supply of different types of energetic materials at prices complying with basic macroeconomic principles of supply and demand, with minimal damage to the environment to sustain the global economy. Further elucidating this definition, a common energy security strategy should encompass an uninterrupted supply of fossil fuels for the near term, as well as a diversification of the energy supply through the use and development of new renewable and nonrenewable energy sources and technologies, while improving the energy sector’s efficiency, long-term sustainability, safety and environmental responsibility. A research paper prepared for the 2006 G8 Summit states that the current energy economy largely depends on centralized power systems, and although it may be economically justified on the whole, “the concept makes large masses of people, depending on one power source, greatly sensitive to terrorism or sabotage.” In her research paper, Tatyana Mitrova recommends the solution is to diversify the energy sources and considerably increase the share of local and individual sources in overall energy supply. The share of locally supplied energy should be increased to 40 percent of the global energy consumption by 2020 from the 25 percent level in the 1990s.23 TERRORIST ATTACKS ON ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE In February, 2004, a message was posted to the al Qaeda-affiliated al Qalah (the Fortress) Web site24 entitled “Map of Future al Qaida Operations.” It stated among other things that the terrorists would make it a priority to attack oil facilities in the Middle East. According to the posting, attacking the U.S. energy base in the Persian Gulf would have three effects: Damaging the American economy; embarrassing the United States and emboldening other countries seeking to secure their own energy supplies; and forcing the United States to deploy further troops to the region to stabilize the situation. “The U.S. will reach a stage of madness after the targeting of its oil interests,” the terrorists reason, “which will facilitate the creation of a new front and the drowning of the U.S. in a new quagmire that will be worse than the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan.”25 Later that year, in mid-December, Arab satellite channels aired an audiotape message by Osama bin Laden in which he called on his cohorts to take their holy war to the oil industry and to disrupt supplies to the United States from the Persian Gulf. Two days later a follow-up statement by the Saudi branch of al Qaeda was published, calling on “all mujahideen . . . in the Arabian Peninsula” to target “the oil resources that do not serve the nation of Islam.”26 Attacks on a country’s oil infrastructure have already become common in several parts of the world, including Colombia and Iraq. In these and other countries, religious militants and secular insurgents all recognize

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the important relationship between oil and a state’s regime. A country’s oil infrastructure vulnerabilities include the following:27 – production facilities, such as petroleum fields, wells, platforms, and rigs; – refineries and gas processing plants; – transportation facilities, including pipelines and pumping stations, terminals and tank ships; – oil and gas depots; – administration buildings; – distribution centers/petrol stations; and – all personnel on or employed at these installations.

Of these, the blasting of oil pipelines is the most common form of attack, and has been the source of over 60 percent of disruptions to a country’s oil infrastructure.28 Attacks on oil pipelines are tactically easy, as there are long stretches of unguarded pipelines; since pipelines are relatively easy to repair, oil companies have often invested little in their protection.29 Overall, the possibility of terrorist attacks on energy installations today is a legitimate concern, validated by several incidents that have been reported by the news media in the recent months and years. Prugh, Flavin, and Swain30 with the World Watch Institute suggest that the oil economy is central to the threats posed by such attacks and efforts to protect and control the infrastructure have undermined peace, democracy, and human rights in many regions of the world. Many nations with oil resources have found themselves afflicted with the “natural resource curse”—the tendency of mineral wealth to support corruption and conflict rather than growth and development. Oil has recently been linked to terrorism, most obviously in the Wahhabist schools, funded by Saudi oil revenues, which helped train the Islamic radicals of al Qaeda. In the foreword to the report compiled by the World Watch Institute, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, now serving as Chairman of Green Cross International, asserted that “the dominance of the oil industry in the Middle East has undermined the economic and political development of the region while flooding it with petrodollars that have increased economic disparities and financed the rise of terrorism.” The following section briefly describes some of the specific attacks that have been carried out on energy installations and the potential for future attacks on the energy infrastructure. Iraq In February 1991, Saddam Hussein put Kuwait’s oilfields to the torch as his invading army was being driven out of the emirate by U.S.-led forces in Operation Desert Storm. More than 700 wells were set ablaze

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in the worst attack on energy infrastructure since World War II. Saddam Hussein’s act of madness and revenge in Kuwait removed 2 million barrels of oil a day from production. It took a year to extinguish all the fires in Kuwait and 3 years to rebuild the emirate’s oil infrastructure. The possibility of terrorist attacks of this magnitude is limited, but even a “couple of dozen suicide bombers, operating in unison, could do immense damage against such targets, inflicting destruction costing billions of dollars.”31 Iraq, though posting an oil production growth rate of 51 percent in 2004, the highest growth rate among oil producing nations, has suffered around 300 terrorist attacks on oil infrastructure between June 2003 and May 2005. The underinvestment in oil infrastructure and the terrorist threats make the country’s oil supply very unstable. As Mitrova observed, “Oil production was falling through the first quarter of 2005 and rising again in the second and third quarters, obviously in antiphase with terrorist activity.” According to most estimates, Iraq produced and exported 15 percent less oil than planned in 2005, which had a direct impact on global markets.32 Russia Two explosions occurred on the main branch and a reserve branch of the Mozdok–Tbilisi pipeline in the Russian border region of North Ossetia at around 3 a.m. local time. The electricity transmission line in Russia’s southern region of Karachayevo–Cherkessiya—also near the Georgian border—was brought down by an explosion a few hours later on January 22, 2006. Speaking to the BBC, Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili, said there was now “huge pressure on his country’s energy system, as it was experiencing its coldest weather in more than 20 years. We received numerous threats by Russian politicians and officials at different levels to punish us for basically not giving them the pipelines.” He said all gas supplies to Georgia were now cut off, as was 25 percent of the electricity supply. The Russians maintained that the attacks were perpetrated by terrorist groups.33 Saudi Arabia Attacks on the Saudi oil infrastructure took place in February 2006, when suicide bombers tried to detonate their bombs within the Abqaiq complex, which is the largest facility in Saudi Arabia and processes about two-thirds of the country’s export of 9.5 million barrels per day. This attack was foiled by security guards firing on the explosive-laden cars (which bore the markings of the Saudi oil company Aramco) and killing five militants.34 In May 2004, attackers stormed the offices of a Houstonbased oil company in the western Saudi oil hub of Yanbu, and subsequent

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fighting killed six Westerners, a Saudi, and the militants. Later that same year, al Qaeda-linked gunmen stormed oil company compounds in Khobar, on the eastern coast, and took hostages in a siege that killed 22 people, 19 of them foreign oil workers. And, as described earlier, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has called on militants to attack oil targets in the Middle East to stop the flow of oil to the West.35 Maritime Security In a recent analysis of maritime security, Luft and Korin36 discuss how pirate attacks on ships tripled in the decade prior to 2004, and emphasize the link between piracy and terrorism. They note that today’s pirates are often trained fighters aboard speedboats equipped with satellite phones and global positioning systems, and armed with automatic weapons, antitank missiles, and grenades. Many of today’s pirates are maritime terrorists pursuing ideological or political agendas, rather than the stereotypical pirates seeking material wealth. This convergence of piracy and terrorism makes the energy markets especially vulnerable since most of the world’s oil and gas is shipped through the world’s most “piracyinfested waters.” Luft and Korin state that the terrorists are aware that supply disruptions can have a devastating impact on oil prices, and describe some of the attacks and attempts on sea-based energy facilities. For example, Tamil Tiger separatists carried out a coordinated suicide attack by five boats on an oil tanker off northern Sri Lanka in October 2001, and a year later, an explosives-laden boat hit the French oil tanker MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen. Whereas land targets such as power plants, refineries, and pumping stations are relatively well protected, the “superextended energy umbilical cord that extends by sea to connect the West and the Asian economies with the Middle East is more vulnerable than ever, with 60 percent of the world’s oil being shipped by approximately 4,000 slow and cumbersome oil tankers.” According to Luft and Korin, the consequences of even a single burning oil tanker in the aftermath of an explosion and its associated oil spill in a narrow, strategic oil passage such as the Straits of Hormuz that connects the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea could disrupt the global oil supply for weeks. Port Security Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is an important source of energy in Japan and Korea, and its use is also on the rise in the United States. Due to the remote locations of the gas fields, large amounts of gas are transported across oceans primarily by specialized LNG shipping vessels, although pipelines are used in some locations. A dozen new LNG terminals are under consideration in addition to the four existing ones in the United

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States, and the infrastructure to supply the U.S. terminals with LNG is nearing completion in the Middle and the Far East. Prior to September 11, 2001, the technical dangers of LNG transportation were the main concerns. However, starting with an LNG tanker being denied entry into the Boston Harbor on September 27, 2001, the consideration of terrorist attacks on LNG loading and unloading facilities and tankers has entered into the LNG trade lexicon.37 EFFECT OF TERRORISM ON THE MARKETS Attacks by various terrorist groups on the energy infrastructure are something that the world governments now expect and have to guard against. Al Qaeda, which is perhaps the most recognized name among such groups, posted a video on a Web site in December 2005 in which Ayman al-Zawahri made a startling appeal: “I call on mujahideen to concentrate their attacks on Muslims’ stolen oil, most of the revenues of which go to the enemies of Islam while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries.”38 At the same time, a new range of vulnerabilities has become more evident. As described earlier, al Qaeda has repeatedly threatened to attack what Osama bin Laden calls the “hinges” of the world’s economy, that is, its critical infrastructure of which energy is among the most crucial elements. The world will increasingly depend on new sources of supply from places where security systems are still being developed, such as the oil and natural gas fields offshore of West Africa and in the Caspian Sea that are vulnerabilities to threats of terrorism, political turmoil, armed conflict, and piracy.39 The most sobering document perhaps is the recently translated work of Abu Bakr Naji, entitled The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Time Through Which the Umma will Pass, which justifies attacks on petroleum facilities and lays out a media-savvy game plan to disrupt the flow of oil. Will McCants’ translation of this text makes it clear that such threats and actual attacks in the future are designed to have a negative impact on the economies of al Qaeda’s “enemies.”40 The word “Umma” (also spelled as Ummah) refers to a community; people who are followers of a particular religion or prophet. It refers in particular to the Muslims as a religious community.41 Excerpts from Naji’s work containing references to energy and oil infrastructure include the following: The targets we must concentrate on and the reasons for that: We said that we should strike any kind of target permitted in the Sharia. However, it is necessary to focus on economic targets, particularly petroleum. One might say that we will be faced with a media campaign in which every accusation will be directed against us, beginning with (the charge that we) are working to impoverish and weaken the countries economically, and so on.42

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Naji goes on to say that the first step in the petroleum war is for an Islamic media group, who has a specialist in political-economic studies, to undertake a study to establish the true price and value of petroleum. Naji’s statements reflect his understanding that “despite frantic searching, there is no substitute for it [oil] at the present time, but this is the one commodity which is the most devalued in its prices compared to other commodities.” Naji calls the use of petroleum up to the present time an “injustice and pillaging” which the Umma has suffered for decades on account of its devalued price, and it must be corrected. Naji expects the study will include an explanation of how the oil wealth has benefited “a handful of the collaborators and agents of the West among the Arab and Islamic regimes” and not been used for building the Umma. According to Naji, the “precise economic study”—which will be distributed to political scholars and media elites in the Islamic world—will be a means to justify the attacks on the petroleum sector, and not for the sole reason that the oil is being sold to infidels, since that will “expose us to media criticism which will turn our action away from its goal.” Naji lays out the strategy of giving an ultimatum to all countries buying oil from Muslim states that they must pay the price recorded in their study. The money will be collected by “committees composed of people among the merchants of the countries and the notable of the Islamic countries who are trustworthy.”43 The purchasing countries will be given an appropriate period of time to comply with the new price . . . otherwise, the striking of petroleum plants will be carried out, especially pipelines where no humans will suffer from striking them or tankers which the infidels command and work on. Regarding the guards, if they are among forces belonging to the regimes of the collaboration and apostasy, we will deal with them as if they are traitors to their Umma who are not inviolable in our eyes. If the guards are from companies of special guards [i.e., hired security guards], we will only oppose them when they tried to kill or capture one of the mujahids to turn them over to the regimes of collaboration and apostasy.44

Naji goes further in stating that releasing such a report or giving an ultimatum is not likely to elicit a response from the West or the collaborating regimes: There will also be an attempt to ignore the threat, even though they will deal with it with highest degree of seriousness, especially if its announcement has been made by the means of a hostage-taking operation, just as we mentioned. Likewise, it is also anticipated that our limited operations, which will follow the elapse of the specified time mentioned in the statement, will not stop the pumping of the petroleum to the West. However, at least these operations will raise the price of oil, even if it is just covering the cost of the electronic security

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system and the salaries of troops and guards which will be disbursed along the paths of the pipelines and the massive factories of the petroleum sectors and their many annexes. We also anticipate a rise in the price of petroleum even before the operations (take place) solely on the account of the statement and the study which are issued. In this there is good media gain since we raise the price of oil by merely issuing a statement, then we raise it again through some of the limited operations against petroleum targets which are poorly protected.45

It is interesting to note that Naji suggests he is only using the petroleum sector as an example for “stimulating the mind.” “However, the strategy of targeting the economy of the enemy in general is a valuable strategy, both politically and militarily, and it should not be absent from the guiding movement. The leaders of the jihad have called attention to it in more than one study and in more than one statement.”46 It is apparent from a review of the current literature that there already exists a premium on the price of a barrel of crude that may be attributed to terrorist activities. In a recent interview with National Public Radio, Lord John Brown—Chief Executive Officer of British Petroleum—stated that the price of oil was about $10 to $20 higher in 2006 than in 2005 due to political risk, even though the “physicalities” did not change much. However, he added that it was difficult to quantify specific political factors that are affecting the price of oil.47 On the other hand, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ahmad al-fahd al-Sabah, speaking to reporters in India, made a direct connection between terrorism and the price of oil. He said that the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) prices include a $8–$12 per barrel “terror premium,” and any price in the $45–$55 range will be a stable price for a barrel or crude oil.48 The threat of terrorism to the energy infrastructure is not limited to specific attacks by organized groups, but fluctuations in the price of oil can also arise from the actions of nation states. For example, Nauman Barakat, Senior Vice President of Global Energy Futures at Macquarie, recently noted that “Iran is the flavor of the month in the oil markets. They are blamed for supporting Hizbollah in the fight against Israel and the Iranians are giving the UN a thumbs down as they continue to enrich uranium.”49 CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION Concerns about safeguarding key infrastructures (such as energy, communications, banking, and roads) from deliberate attacks are longstanding, but since the end of the cold war the emphasis has turned to the possible impacts of terrorism. The destruction in the aftermath of the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center in New York has raised the awareness of terrorist activities to unprecedented levels. Activities to

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address these concerns are sometimes called “Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP),” a concept that is somewhat different from the one of “ energy security,” which focuses on politically and economically motivated supply interruptions. Research conducted by Farrell, Zerriffi, and Dowlatabadi states that different elements of the energy infrastructure are characterized by distinct vulnerabilities. Breaches of security in nuclear plants can potentially lead to large-scale human and environmental disasters, but the infrastructure is concentrated and relatively easy to guard. Petroleum and natural gas production, transportation, and refining infrastructures are often spatially concentrated, and disruptions can easily lead to shortages if supply is not restored before stockpiles are exhausted. Traditional electricity infrastructures suffer from the need for systemwide integrity, in order to ensure supply reliability, with critical facilities (such as substations) spatially concentrated. Furthermore, the current power infrastructure lends itself to insignificant storage capacity for emergency supply. The concept of CIP is still relatively new and is likely to evolve over time, possibly away from a “guards, gates, and guns” defensive approach and toward a design approach that yields systems that are inherently harder to successfully attack.50 In another study, James Goodno reports that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has identified 13 elements of the nation’s “critical infrastructure” as potential targets for terrorist attack: agriculture and food, public health, emergency services, government, defense industries, banking and finance, chemical plants and hazardous materials, postal and shipping services, transportation, water, telecommunications, and energy. Clearly, protecting these assets represents an enormous challenge. The Department of Homeland Security has also noted that the high complexity of the nation’s infrastructure makes it vulnerable to cascading failure in the event of a strategically placed attack. A successful attack on one system can have a domino effect on other systems. For example, if the water supply is cut off, firefighters will be hard pressed to combat blazes. Government agencies and private or public entities that own, operate, or regulate utilities or other forms of infrastructure should focus their security efforts “on the inherent vulnerabilities of different assets and the potential consequences if the assets were attacked, rather than the likelihood of a particular event.”51 Based on such scenarios it is easy to see the debilitating effect that the loss of the energy infrastructure can have on the other 12 elements of the nation’s critical infrastructure. As evident from the UNDP data52 (Figure 14.1), the countries with the highest consumption of energy, and especially the ones that rely on imported energy, face the greatest economic risk from energy supply disruptions. Critical facilities and their services can be lost due to natural disasters or intentional strikes. An intentional strike—either by terrorist groups or an organized army—against a system can be called an “interdiction.” The

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geographical distribution of facilities in a supply or service system may be particularly vulnerable to interdiction, and the resulting impacts of the loss of one or more facilities may be substantial. Church, Scaparra, and Middleton introduced “two new spatial optimization models called the r-interdiction median problem and the r-interdiction covering problem.” Both models identify the set of facilities for a given service or supply system which, if lost, would affect service delivery the most, depending upon the type of service protocol. The researchers contend that these models can then be used to identify the most critical facility assets in a service/supply system.53 This is but one of many recent examples of how the academic community is working to support the mission of homeland security, and critical infrastructure protection. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE The key to energy security has always been diversification. Diversification now not only requires having oil from multiple sources, but also developing a variety of types of energy sources which takes into account the rapid evolution of the global energy trade, supply-chain vulnerabilities, terrorism, and the integration of major new economies into the world market.54 Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have both recently cautioned that dependence on oil makes the world more vulnerable to a terrorist attack. Addressing the Renewable Energy Conference in Bonn, Germany in 2004, Schroeder noted that “This one-sided dependence of the global economy on oil enormously raises our vulnerability to all forms of terrorism.” “The decision to [use more] renewable energy resources is not only sensible from an economic standpoint, it’s also a [decision] for greater security in the world in which we live.”55 At the same event, Blair concurred, observing that, “Increasingly, we are concerned about the security of our energy supplies. Promoting the growth of renewables and energy efficiency provides us with the means of tackling this issue as well.”56 Russian President Vladimir Putin also stated at the opening of the 2006 G8 summit that “I am convinced that our efforts towards attaining this goal should be comprehensive and must stimulate stabilization of the global energy markets, development of innovation technologies, use of renewable energy sources and protection of the environment. We believe that today, we must think very seriously about ways to bridge the gap between energy-sufficient and energy-lacking countries.”57 Jaffe and Soligo recently noted that in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, U.S. strategy in the Central Asian region has shifted from protecting the sovereignty of the southern post-Soviet states to ensuring their stability, in light of the dual impacts of energy

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development and the rising threat of Islamic terrorism. Although U.S.Russian cooperation has made strides, particularly concerning Russian acquiescence toward U.S. and NATO military engagement in the region, geostrategic rivalry and conflicting economic goals have hindered a joint approach to initiatives regarding the region’s energy development. While both agree on the goal of maximizing Russian and Caspian gas and petroleum exports, U.S. policy is increasingly prioritizing Central Asian energy prosperity as a key factor in the region’s ability to contain terrorism. Development of the region’s energy resources has therefore become a critical U.S. security concern. Jaffe and Soligo contend that by failing to engage with Russia in meaningful cooperation, which could encourage Moscow to diversify its own energy export prospects, competition between the two powers is likely to reduce, rather than improve, the effectiveness of support needed by the Central Asian states to strengthen their domestic profiles or withstand the incursion of terrorism.58 Many observers argue that individual countries should maintain a degree of domestic energy security based on their degree of energy import dependency. In the short term, increased trade and interconnection capacity can lead to a better utilization of existing capacity. In their analysis of energy security in the European Union, Jamasb and Pollit cite recent problems between Chile and Argentina—where Argentina interrupted gas exports to Chile following a shortage of gas for domestic consumption— as a reminder of how energy supply can be vulnerable to various political factors. They state that the best insurance policies against interruptions in energy supply are effective crisis management at the EU level, to allow optimal sharing of EU reserves and responsible national reserve policies.59 Jamasb and Pollit further claim that better energy market data and transparency are needed to increase cooperation between the EU member countries. For example, a shortage of data on ownership interests of companies, costs, subsidies, and measure of security of supply will hinder cooperation in protecting the energy interests. This is particularly true of data aggregated at the EU level and at the level of the emerging regional markets. Data collection requires continuity and commitment to achieve long-term benefits. Improving the quality of data requires joint effort and agreement on types of data needed, collection methods, and standard reporting formats. In some cases, commercial sensitivity and national confidentiality rules limit exchange of data between regulators and here the barriers for cooperation may need to be lowered through agreements and legislation.60 Thomas Friedman, author of the bestselling book The World Is Flat, proposes that a “crash program for alternative energy and conservation” could make the United States energy independent in 10 years. He argues that “if President Bush made energy independence his moon shot, in one fell swoop he would dry up revenue for terrorism, force Iran,

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Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia onto the path of reform . . . strengthen the dollar, and improve his own standing in Europe by doing something huge to reduce global warming.” Friedman further writes that a call for energy independence would inspire a new generation to contribute to the war on terrorism, and once again encourage them to choose professions in mathematics, science, and engineering.61 Calculating the cost of energy production should also include variables that may not be within the direct equation of production, but factors that nevertheless influence the price of delivered energy. Such factors are called externalities and “an externality arises when the utility of an economic agent is affected by the action of another agent, and there is no control over such actions because the variables involved have no market value.”62 Efforts to quantify externalities resulting from energy use are not only widely debated, but when performed, they often significantly exceed fiscal subsidy levels. An example of the externality of the current energy fossil-fuel-based economy is its cost to the ecosystem, including climate change, nutrient cycling, water distribution, and soil dynamics. The price of electricity generation using conventional pulverized coal technologies may go from less than 5 cents per kilowatt-hour (cents/kwh) to more than 50 cents/kwh if environmental externalities are taken into account. The price of electricity generation from renewable biomass resources is only 10 cents/kwh even after adding environmental externalities and solar photovoltaic electricity cost remains relatively unchanged at approximately 25 cents/kwh.63 Similarly, the external costs of guarding and protecting the energy infrastructure from terrorist threats should be included when determining the final cost to the consumer of fuels and electricity. The International Center for Technology Assessment published a report in 2005 that estimates the gasoline price externalities resulting in security and protection services between $78 and $159 billion, translating to $0.21–$0.32 per gallon of gasoline consumed in the United States. Some of the factors considered as externalities were (a) filling and maintaining the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and (b) a variety of Coast Guard services for maintaining coastal shipping lanes, clearing ice, and responding to oil spills. The largest component making up the security externality is the cost to the U.S. military for protecting the petroleum supply, and ranges from $47.6 billion to $113.1 billion in 2003 dollars.64 Anthony Owen suggests policy recommendations to internalize the cost of fossil fuel consumption and help pave the way for renewable energy technologies to become cost competitive on a life-cycle cost basis.65 CONCLUSIONS The traditional realist point of view calls for the pursuit of the least expensive form of energy, mostly fossil-fuel-based, which is in the

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best interest of each country. We have seen China take this approach most recently by forging alliances with the energy producing Middle Eastern countries as well as Central Asian nations, and there is potential for a strategic alignment between Saudi Arabia and Russia on energy matters.66 Geopolitical events may dictate at any given time how the energy markets may operate. Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana writes that we are in a different era of energy prospecting and that the “new energy realists believe that a laissez faire energy policy based solely on market evolution is a na¨ıve posture—especially when most of the world’s oil and natural gas is not controlled by market forces.”67 In light of the significant risk that is posed by the disruptions to a country’s economy that can be caused by acts of terrorism on the energy infrastructure, it is critical to identify the weak links in the energy supply chain. It is important from a policy standpoint to motivate the private sector to invest in the appropriate technologies that can help to diversify the energy portfolio as well as safeguard the existing infrastructure. In addition, the identification of the number of energy installations susceptible to terrorist attack—on domestic soil as well as foreign soil—is also important. It is clear that diversity of energy supply is one of the most important factors in ensuring reliable and reasonably priced sources of energy over the long term. The Honorable Alexander Karsner, Assistant Secretary for the United States Department of Energy Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (USDOE-EERE), stated in March 2006 during his first public address that “maximizing energy efficiency and renewable energy is the domestic epicenter in the War on Terror, and it is imperative that we maximize the partnerships between the public and private sectors in new and creative ways with the sense of seriousness, national purpose and the urgency the situation merits.” According to Secretary Karsner, President George Bush’s Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI), which was unveiled after the now famous “addicted to oil” State of the Union Address in 2006, is much more than allocating research dollars and is “nothing less than a Vision for Victory . . . Victory over reliance on unstable regimes and ideologies that are hostile to our way of life and bent on leveraging petroleum to erode our economic well-being.”68 The literature contains a vast amount of information about how the United States can lower its dependence on foreign oil from technical and policy standpoints and perhaps even totally eliminate the need to import energetic materials. Various schemes including achievable goals of energy efficiency, additional deep sea exploration and drilling of the OCS (outer continental shelf) and the ANWR (Artic National Wildlife Refuge), clean coal technologies, oil shale and tar sands, plug-in hybrid automobiles, flex fuel vehicles, and increased used of renewable and nuclear energy sources have been presented to make America independent.69

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However, we must also remember that in today’s global economy, simply ensuring an uninterrupted energy supply within the borders of United States is not enough to sustain the economy of our country. Canada is the largest exporter of energy to the United States, and a terrorist attack on the Canadian energy infrastructure can have devastating effects on the U.S. oil and gas supplies.70 A prolonged electricity or fuel interruption for certain parts of China or the small island nation of Singapore would cause a disruption in American trade and commerce. The bomb blasts in Mumbai, India, in July 2006 that killed 200 train commuters escalated the fears within the information technology industry that relies on a global network of services.71 Even though the United States is competing for the same energy supplies as China and India, causing the price of energy to escalate, it is in the best interest of these countries to work together to find long-term solutions to dependable energy supplies. Renewable energy technologies will play an increasingly important role in the future energy portfolios because of their environmental benefits and insulation from terrorist activities. Although highly controversial, President Bush’s recent discussions with the Indian government to provide India with nuclear technology for the commercial power sector development72 was also a baby step in the direction of global energy cooperation. The economies of the energy-producing countries must also be modernized and diversified to move their reliance on oil or gas revenues.73 In December 2003, Libya’s leader Muammar al-Qadhafi announced that he would terminate the country’s efforts to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction and cooperate with the international community to destroy them. According to Bhagat, Libya—considered as a “pariah state” for almost 30 years—decided to change course under multilateral economic and diplomatic pressures, and effectively leverage the country’s oil and natural gas assets for economic development.74 Several developing states with substantial energy reserves are a weak link in the energy supply chain75 and if not developed in cooperation with the energy consumers may become safe havens for terrorist groups. Overall, as this chapter illustrates, international energy dependence can be viewed as both a facilitator and vulnerability of terrorism, and thus demands our utmost attention in formulating a comprehensive, global counterterrorism response. NOTES 1. Daniel Kammen, “An Energy Policy for the 21st Century,” Policy Matters 2, no. 2 (2005): 14. 2. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Indicators: 2005 UNDP Report (HDR05). Table 22: Energy and the Environment, 289; Retrieved on March 2, 2006, from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/ pdf/HDR05 HDI.pdf.

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3. G8 Summit 2006, G8 Agenda (2006). Retrieved on June 5, 2006, from http:// en.g8russia.ru/agenda/. 4. G8 Summit 2006, G8 Energy Ministerial Meeting: March 16, 2006. Retrieved on June 5, 2006, from http://www.minprom.gov.ru/G8/eng/g8-energy/. 5. The World Bank Group, Energy Security Issues (December 5, 2005). Retrieved on July 28, 2006, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTRUSSIANFEDERATION/Resources/Energy Security eng.pdf. 6. Peter Davies, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005, 54th ed. (London: British Petroleum: June 14, 2005). Retrieved on March 24, 2006, from http://www. bp.com/genericsection.do?categoryId=92&contentId=7005893. 7. Steve Kretzmann, “Oil, Security, War: The Global Geopolitics of U.S. Energy Planning,” Multinational Monitor (January–February 2003): 11–16. 8. Matthew Simmons, “The Saudi Arabian Oil Miracle,” Presentation at Global Oil Supply: Are We Running out? (Experts analyze Saudi Arabia’s energy future) (February 24, 2004). Retrieved on June 21, 2006, from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Web site: http://www.simmonsco-intl.com/ files/CSIS.pdf. 9. Clive Crook, “Shock Absorption,” Atlantic 297, no. 5 (2004): 32. 10. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Indicators for Sustainable Energy Development [Brochure]. (Vienna, Austria, 2002). Retrieved on April 1, 2006, from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/indicators.pdf. 11. World Energy Outlook: 2005, Published by the International Energy Agency. Retrieved on July 28, 2006, from http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/ fact sheets/Global Energy Trends.pdf. 12. Davies, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005. 13. New York Merchantile Exchange (NYMEX Future) crude oil price listing, http://www.bloomberg.com/energy/. 14. Tom Prugh, Christopher Flavin, and Janet Swain, State of the World: Redefining Global Security (Chapter 6: Changing Oil Economy) (2005). Retrieved on July 5, 2006, from World Watch Institute Web site: http://www.worldwatch.org/ node/3848. 15. Leonardo Maugeri, “Two Cheers for Expensive Oil,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006): 149–161. 16. Ibid. 17. Kevin Skislock, Crisis on the China Rim: An Economic, Crude Oil, and Military Analysis (April 14, 2005). Retrieved on July 15, 2006, from Laguna Research Partners Web site: http://www.researchconnect.com/reports/ CrisisOnTheChinaRim 2005-04-14 LRP FINAL.pdf. 18. Andrei Baklanov, “Oil Giants Are Talking,” International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations 49, no. 5 (2003): 81–88. 19. Henry Kenny, “China and the Competition for Oil and Gas in Asia,” AsiaPacific Review 11, no. 2 (2004): 36–47. 20. Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (2006), 69–82. 21. Brian Schimmoller, “PIFUA Returns?” Power Engineering 110, no. 8 (August 2006): 8. 22. Luis Sosa and Daniel Desnyder, “Energy Markets, U.S. Energy Policy, and the Terrorist Attacks of 11 September 2001,” Minerals & Energy 18, no. 3 (2003): 14–24.

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23. Tatyana Mitrova, Global Energy Security: Analysis (2006). Retrieved on July 1, 2006, from G8 Summit, St. Petersburg, Russia Web site: http://en.g8russia. ru/i/eng nrgsafety.doc. 24. al Qalah Web site: http://www.qal3ah.org/vb/index.php?, cited in James Forest and Matt Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006) 114. 25. James S. Robbins, “No Blood for Oil,” National Review Online (July 12, 2005). Available at http://www.nationalreview.com/robbins/robbins200507120857.asp. 26. “Pipeline Sabotage Is Terrorist’s Weapon of Choice,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Report on Energy Security. Available at http://www. iags.org/n0328051.htm. 27. The following list is from Brynjar Lia and Ashild Kjok, “Energy Supply as Terrorist Targets? Patterns of ‘Petroleum Terrorism’ 1968–1999,” in Oil in the Gulf: Obstacles to Democracy and Development, ed. Daniel Heradstveit and Helge Hveem (London: Ashgate, 2004) 101. 28. Ibid., 104. 29. For more on oil pipeline vulnerabilities and attacks, see “Pipeline Sabotage Is Terrorist’s Weapon of Choice,” Institute for the Analysis of Global Security Report on Energy Security. Available at http://www.iags.org/n0328051.htm;Forest and Sousa, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf. 30. Prugh, Flavin. and Swain, State of the World. 31. Ed Blanche, “Oil Industry Increasingly Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack,” Middle East 347 (2004): 42–45. 32. Mitrova. Global Energy Security: Analysis. 33. BBC News, “Russia Blamed for ‘Gas Sabotage,’“ (January 22, 2006). Retrieved on May 4, 2006, from BBC News Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ europe/4637034.stm. 34. Robert McFarlane, “The Global Oil Rush,” National Interest 84 (2006): 34–36. 35. CBS News, “Saudi Cops Kill 5 Oil Attack Suspects,” (February 27, 2006). Retrieved on May 21, 2006, from CBS News Web site: http://www.cbsnews. com/stories/2006/02/25/world/main1346113.shtml. 36. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 6 (2004): 61–71. 37. Jerry Havens, “Ready to Blow?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/ August 2003): 16–18. 38. Softpedia, “Fuel Depot Explosion in London Covers the Sky with Huge Smoke Cloud.” (December 12, 2005). Retrieved on June 28, 2006, from http://news. softpedia.com/news/Fuel-Depot-Explosion-in-London-Covers-the-Sky-withHuge-Smoke-Cloud-14615.shtml. 39. Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security.” 40. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass. Translated by William McCants (2006). Retrieved on June 4, 2006, from Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Web site: http:// www.ctc.usma.edu/naji.asp. 41. The Institute of Ismaili Studies. (n.d.). Glossary. Retrieved on August 2, 2006, from http://www.iis.ac.uk/glossary list.asp?f=r&t=z&l=en. 42. Naji, The Management of Savagery.

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43. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Steve Inskeep (Radio Host), “Oil-Supply Anxiety Overblown, BP Chief says. Interview with Lord John Browne,” Morning Edition, June 16, 2006. National Public Radio. 48. Kurt Abraham, “World of Oil,” World Oil (July 2006): 13. 49. Mark Shenk, “Commodities: Oil Falls on Signs That Attacks Won’t Disrupt Deliveries,” International Herald Tribune (July 21, 2006). Retrieved on July 24, 2006, from http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/20/bloomberg/bxcom.php. 50. Alexander Farrell, Hisham Zerriffi, and Hadi Dowlatabadi, “Energy Infrastructure and Security,” Annual Review of Environment & Resources 29 (2004): 421– 469. 51. James Goodno, “Saying No to Sabotage,” Planning 71, no. 7 (2005): 10–15. 52. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Indicators: 2005 UNDP Report (HDR05). Table 22: Energy and the Environment Page, 289; Retrieved on March 2, 2006, from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/ pdf/HDR05 HDI.pdf. 53. Richard Church, Maria Scaparra, and Richard Middleton, “Identifying Critical Infrastructure: The Median and Covering Facility Interdiction Problems,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 94, no. 3 (2004): 491–502. 54. Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security.” 55. RadioFreeEurope, “German Chancellor and British Prime Minister Warned That Oil Dependence Makes the World More Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack” (June 3, 2004). Retrieved on June 25, 2006, from RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty Web site: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/06/d261dd4a-911c-451f-9731bb4b24099bcd.html. 56. Ibid. 57. G8 Summit 2006, G8 Agenda. Retrieved on June 5, 2006, from http://en. g8russia.ru/agenda/. 58. Amy Jaffe and Ronald Soligo, “Re-Evaluating U.S. Strategic Priorities in the Caspian Region: Balancing Energy Resource Initiatives with Terrorism Containment,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 2 (2004): 255–268. 59. Tooraj Jamasb and Michael Pollitt, “Electricity Market Reform in the European Union: Review of Progress towards Liberalisation and Integration” (March 24, 2005). Retrieved on April 4, 2006, from http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/2005003.pdf. 60. Ibid. 61. Thomas Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century, 1st ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 62. Daniel Kammen and Sergio Pacca, “Assessing the Costs of Electricity,” Annual Review of Environment & Resources 29 (2004): 301–348. 63. Ibid. 64. International Center for Technology Assessment (CTA), Gasoline Cost Externalities: Security and Protection Services (January 24, 2005). Retrieved on June 20, 2006, from http://www.icta.org/doc/RPG%20security%20update.pdf.

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65. Anthony Owen, “Environmental Externalities, Market Distortions and the Economics of Renewable Energy Technologies,” Energy Journal 25, no. 3 (2004): 127–156. 66. Gawdat Bhagat, “Terrorism and Energy,” World Affairs 167, no. 2 (2004): 51–58. 67. Richard Lugar, “The New Energy Realists,” National Interest 84 (2006): 30–33. 68. Alexander Karsner, Address at the PowerGen Renewable Energy and Fuels Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, on April 11, 2006. Retrieved on May 20, 2006, from http://www.eere.energy.gov/news/pdfs/karsner speech.pdf. 69. Amory Lovins E. Kyle Datta, Odd-Even Bustnes, Jonathan G. Koomey, and Nathan J. Glasgow, Winning the Oil Endgame: Innovations for Profits, Jobs, and Security (Snowmass, CO: Rocky Mountain Institute, 2004); McFarlane, “The Global Oil Rush”; and Lugar, “The New Energy Realists.” 70. Thomas Quiggin, “Cutting the Cord: Economic Jihad, Canadian Oil, and U.S. Homeland Security,” in Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets, ed. James J.F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006). 71. Stan Gibson, “Mumbai Bombings Shake Outsourcing Community,” eWeek (July 13, 2006). Retrieved on July 25, 2006, from http://www.eweek.com/article2/ 0,1759,1988941,00.asp. 72. Dana Milbank and Dafna Linzer, “U.S. and India May Share Nuclear Technology,” Washington Post, July 19, 2005. Retrieved on June 20, 2006, from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/18/ AR2005071801646.html. 73. Ugo Fasano and Zubair Iqbal, GCC Countries: From Oil Dependence to Diversification (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003). 74. Gawdat Bhagat, “Oil, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Libyan Diplomatic Coup,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies 29, no. 4 (2004): 373–294. 75. Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2006): 27–53.

CHAPTER 15 RED SKY IN THE MORNING: THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME PIRACY AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM Kent Baumann

“Red sky at night, sailor’s delight; red sky in the morning, sailor take warning!” —Old Mariner’s Proverb

THE DEWI MADRIM They approached suddenly and almost invisibly from out of the darkness. Using ropes and grappling hooks, the team of approximately 12 men quickly swarmed the target ship from their own high-powered speedboat. Dressed in black with balaclavas covering their faces, they moved like spectres under the moonless sky that shadowed the oceangoing tanker. With seemingly synchronized effort and armed with automatic weapons, machetes and VHF radios, the team quickly and efficiently secured the vessel. To the normal observer, this group might have appeared to be the crack team of any modern military force. Unfortunately, for Captain Surahmat Johar and the crew of the chemical tanker, Dewi Madrim, these raiders were something entirely different. These attackers surpassed the typical threat to be expected on the high seas, and it was clear to the captain and his crew that these armed assailants were not average pirates. As the ship’s captain was brought to the bridge, he recalls, “Up there I realized that they were completely familiar with all the equipment. Someone was expertly steering the vessel, reading

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the radar very well. I remember thinking: ‘My God, he can handle the ship better than I can.’ I’d thought pirates were just a bunch of petty robbers who jumped onto a ship, robbed the crew, then disappeared. But these pirates were totally beyond my imagination. They were professionals.”1 Certainly, they were modern day pirates. On the surface, their actions had all the ear markings of typical maritime criminal activity. When the attack was over, the armed assailants had disabled the ship’s radio and taken some cash as well as the ship’s captain and first officer, who remained hostage for some time before being released.2 However, there is more to the story that indicates that these individuals were not typical modern day pirates in search of illegal profit at the mercy of innocent oceangoing merchants. More alarming than the crimes of illegal boarding, robbery and hostage taking, was the fact that the pirates took total control of the ship’s helm, steering the tanker and altering its course and speed for approximately one hour.3 This attack, which took place during the early morning hours of March 26, 2003, seemed more like a test drive than a traditional act of piracy. It is difficult to ignore the similarities between this attack and the 9/11 terrorists who were interested in flying lessons—excluding landing instructions. INTRODUCTION—WHAT IS THIS THREAT? A DANGEROUS NEXUS In a pre-9/11 world, the attack on the Dewi Madrim would have scarcely alerted anyone beyond the fact that yet another act of piracy had occurred on one of the world’s most dangerous sea lanes, the Strait of Malacca. In a post-9/11 world, it is fair to expect that this same event should have been analyzed through the prism of a different lens. In some circles, such analysis certainly took place, but on the broader scale, the nature of this particular type of threat still may not be understood to the degree warranted. Maritime piracy is one of the oldest “professions” known to mankind. From the moment that civilized man put to the open seas in oceangoing vessels, people understood that they could profit by taking advantage of those very people who strove to make their living on the waterways of the world. While most Americans may envision such famous characters as “Blackbeard,” Henry Morgan, Captain William Kidd, or even Anne Bonny, and consider piracy a thing of the past, this particular scourge has never truly been eradicated. In fact, contemporary piracy is proving more and more dangerous as technology and globalization continue to advance and spread. Unfortunately, while both have many positive attributes, they are also having a negative effect in that they potentially bring together two of today’s most dangerous strategic threats—maritime piracy and transnational terrorism.

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As Catherine Zara Raymond has observed, “It has increasingly come to the attention of researchers of maritime terrorism that there is a possibility that pirates and terrorists could join forces. Pirates could sell assets such as maritime and littoral knowledge, stolen vessels (such as tugs), and stolen documentation to conventional terrorists, who could then employ their assets to carry out a large-scale terrorist attack.”4 Terror-piracy potentially poses the most catastrophic threat on the geostrategic stage. Given that premise, the focus of this chapter is on international maritime pirates and transnational terrorist groups. This is not to say that certain, regionally focused terrorist groups do not engage in piracy at more localized levels for specific goals with set parameters, or that these particular groups and regions do not warrant attention. Rather, transnational, ideologically focused groups pose the greatest threat when associated with international maritime pirates. With that in mind, it is important to have a generally accepted point of departure with respect to understanding both groups that make up this dangerous partnership. DEFINITIONS—PIRACY AND TERRORISM The Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) defines piracy as an “attack mounted for private ends on a ship, involving violence, illegal detention of persons or property, or theft or destruction of goods.”5 Simply put, piracy is and has always been about profit on the high seas. Historically, the level of violence associated with piracy has always been in direct correlation with what is necessary for success on behalf of the pirates. Pirates normally did not want to destroy their target. There was no profit to be gained by destroying a ship and its cargo or killing hostages who represented a potentially lucrative ransom. Therefore, pirates exacted only the violence necessary to achieve their criminal goals. A troubling departure from the past is that pirates today are becoming excessively more violent. Similar to today’s terrorists, contemporary pirates are better equipped, better armed, in some cases better trained and much more ready to leave dead bodies than they are willing to leave witnesses. A universally accepted definition of terrorism continues to elude the international community even in the wake of 9/11. That notwithstanding, three key elements are central to any bona fide act of terrorism; if the aim is political, the essence is violence or the threat of violence, and the targets are civilians or noncombatants, then the act is an act of terrorism.6 Keeping these three critical elements in mind, one of the most credible, academic definitions of terrorism comes from Israeli counterterrorism expert Boaz Ganor: “Terrorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious, etc.).”7

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This nexus between terrorism and piracy is certainly more discernable and possibly more predictable when we focus on specific groups and geographic regions, as well as the unique motivations that seem to be particular to this criminal alliance. Special attention should also be paid to potential targets that would result in the greatest impact in terms of casualties, economic loss, and long-term environmental damage. Additionally, understanding the common seams and linkages that foster this dangerous association may help in developing effective strategies to counter this growing threat. WHO? TERRORIST GROUPS INCLINED TO ENGAGE IN PIRACY As a recent Jane’s Intelligence Report observed, “The sea is not a natural place for most terrorist groups to fight, as the environment demands specialized knowledge that terrorists usually lack.”8 Nonetheless, the historical precedence for a terrorist group to use piracy in an effort to further its political agenda was set in 1985, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked the cruise liner Achille Lauro in Egyptian territorial waters taking the ship’s crew and passengers hostage.9 Certainly today, there continue to be terrorist organizations that actively engage in piracy and others that are more than willing to do so if it serves as a means to their ends. According to Raymond, “Terrorist groups that are known to have a maritime capability include Polisario, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Palestinian groups, al Qaeda, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).”10 Al Qaeda’s leadership may be hiding in the landlocked border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and planning their strategic operations from there, but they would certainly not limit themselves in imagination when it comes to tactics and methodology for carrying out even more spectacular attacks than witnessed on September 11th, 2001. While al Qaeda is not above the use of normal terrorist tactics such as assassinations and car bombings, it has proven its penchant for the spectacular—a fact that should not be underestimated. Repeated statements by Osama bin Laden and other key leaders of terrorist groups continually point to the desire to strike at the “far enemy,” or the West—and in particular, the United States. More significantly, they want the strikes to be devastatingly worse than those of 9/11. Even more worrisome are Osama bin Laden’s continued references to acquiring and employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Combine this sinister vision with the potentially catastrophic opportunities afforded by a seaborne attack, and the results could certainly be felt worldwide. Al Qaeda has already exhibited its willingness to use seaborne attacks, to include the suicide bombing of the U.S. Aegis Class Destroyer the USS Cole in Yemen’s Aden Harbor in 2000, as well as the 2002 suicide attack

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against the French tanker Limburg, also off the coast of Yemen.11 While lives were lost, neither attack was catastrophic, and both are indicators of methodological and tactical adaptability. Al Qaeda leadership and operating bases may have been degraded to a large degree over the past several years, but it continues to show that it is a resilient, agile, and flexible organization capable of regenerating itself when and where necessary. It remains one of the most dangerous terrorist organizations today. Al Qaeda’s strategic reach is empowered by its ability to franchise itself globally through its ideology and vision of Osama Bin Laden. Al Qaeda-affiliated (or affinity) groups should also be considered prime candidates for a maritime terror attack. They would explore any option allowing them to execute a terrorist strike, not only to deal a crippling blow to their enemies, but to gain the attention and prestige in the eyes of the true, hard-line Al Qaeda leadership itself. These types of attempts can be seen in the Madrid 2004 railway attacks, as well as in the more recent London subway bombings of July 2005. While certainly devastating in many respects, these “franchise efforts” were not what true al Qaeda would consider overwhelming success stories. The attacks of 9/11 set the standard, and London and Madrid fell short of that standard with respect to economic impact and numbers of casualties. With that in mind, it is not hard to imagine that some al Qaeda affinity groups will actively seek out a more imaginative option of attack that might afford them the opportunity of achieving the catastrophic success their envisioned “masters” so desire. Again, a terrorist attack through the means of piracy could potentially hold the key to a “grandiose” success. Jemaah Islamiyah, (JI), is a militant Islamic terrorist group active in several Southeast Asian countries, whose aim is to establish an Islamic republic unifying Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, southern Thailand, and Mindanao in the Philippines.12 It is, without a doubt, one of the most active and dangerous terrorist organizations today, having carried out repeated attacks in Bali and Jakarta over the last several years. While JI would appear to be a more regionally focused terrorist organization with a more localized agenda and goals, its close affiliation with al Qaeda points to a broader agenda altogether. It considers its primary targets and enemies to be the West, particularly Australia and the United States. Add together this target focus, the al Qaeda factor and the fact that the group’s geographic area of operations is essentially the seaway stretching from the Strait of Malacca to the South China Sea and encompassing everything in between, one has a breeding ground not only for terror-piracy, but something that could potentially facilitate this phenomenon on a catastrophic scale. At a minimum, a regional JI terror-piracy operation could serve as a preliminary phase and part of a much larger al Qaeda global operation.13 The Abu Sayyaf Group, (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, (MILF), both separatist groups active in the Philippines, have engaged in

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terrorism and have affiliation with al Qaeda. “Both the MILF and the ASG are known to have trained in camps in Afghanistan that provided training for al Qaeda recruits. It is believed that al Qaeda provides financial support for both groups to carry out their attacks.”14 The ASG, or “bearer of the sword,” is a splinter group of the MILF and has engaged in numerous acts of terrorism since 1991, to include terror-piracy—such as the February 27, 2004 bombing of M/V Superferry 14 as it left Manila Bay, resulting in over 100 deaths.15 Their geographic area of operation provides these groups with a freedom of movement, so to speak, in terms of engaging in effective acts of piracy. This coupled with their close association with al Qaeda places them high on the list of groups capable of facilitating terrorist attacks that utilize piracy as a tactic for potentially larger scale terrorist operations.16 Still other regionally focused groups continue to operate extensively in the maritime terrorist arena. According to Raymond, “By far the most high-profile maritime terrorist group is the LTTE, which has been employing maritime terrorist tactics since the 1980s in their ongoing war against the Sri Lankan government.”17 And, as Luft and Korin note, “uniformed members of the Free Aceh Movement, an Indonesian separatist group that is also one of the most radical Islamist movements in the world, have been hijacking vessels and taking their crews hostage at an increasing rate.”18 The danger with regionally focused terrorist groups that have exhibited a talent for executing effective terror-piracy operations is the potential that they are ready and willing to sell their talents and spoils to a more globally focused group such as al Qaeda—groups that have a far more destructive agenda. These global terrorist organizations do not want a seat at the table; they want to destroy the table. Finally, groups that should be acknowledged for their potential to exploit piracy to further their cause are what can be described as the “Dark Horses” of terrorism. These are groups that, for whatever reason, are not on anyone’s “radar screen.” Either they have not yet committed a significant act of terrorism that would attract close scrutiny by the law enforcement or intelligence community, or they have yet to resort to terrorist tactics but have the potential to do so, given the proper triggers. Groups that characterize this “Dark Horse” phenomenon include radical environmentalist organizations or apocalyptic groups (as along the lines of Aum Shinrikyu in Japan), whose ultimate goal is to bring about total global destruction. WHY TERRORISM AND PIRACY? The motivations influencing various terrorists groups to engage in piracy vary from their geographic proximity to strategic waterways to their particular ideological and political goals. As discussed earlier,

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groups like Jemaah Islamiya, the Tamil Tigers and the Moro Islamic Front often engage in terror-piracy simply as a result of ease. Because of their proximity to the sea, they have built-in targets either on the water or in ports. Other groups traditionally confined to land-based operations, where traditional targets are now becoming better protected or “hardened,” may be finding reasons to take their operations to the seas and cooperate with experienced pirates, where they can find more vulnerable high pay-off targets. A basic motivational factor that could drive traditional land-based terrorist organizations to engage in piracy is sheer economics. Successful acts of piracy can help fund and supply future terrorist operations. Hostage taking for ransom, as well as the theft of ocean going vessels, can prove very lucrative for raising funds. Additionally, raiding ships and port facilities can provide logistical supplies, and in some cases specialized equipment that could facilitate follow-on, maritime terrorist operations. While groups like al Qaeda might initially engage in piracy in an effort to bolster economic or logistical support, the potential benefit of recruitment should not be overlooked. Poor economic conditions in many regions of Southeast Asia often drive individuals to crime to include piracy. Consider an individual who is bitter toward his economic plight in life, understanding that he has already made the decision to resort to crime and piracy. Also consider that this same individual comes from a region that has a significant Muslim influence, often a radical Islamic influence— this is a person who is ripe for recruitment by an organization that has mastered the art of taking advantage of poverty, humiliation, and anger and focusing these motivations for their own terrorist agenda. The most disturbing reason that certain terrorist groups like al Qaeda are so willing to exploit pirates or utilize piracy as a tactic is in their quest for weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass effect. Gaining control over vessels with these types of materials or weapons would be extremely difficult, but not impossible. Given enough credible intelligence and fair margin for success, there would be little hesitation on the part of terrorists to seize an oceangoing vessel containing these hazardous materials or an existing weapon in transit, desiring the deadly cargo but not the vessel itself. Less difficult would be for terrorists to use a hijacked vessel or “phantom ship” as an attack platform. “Intelligence agencies estimate that al Qaeda and its affiliates now own dozens of phantom ships—hijacked vessels that have been repainted and renamed and operate under false documentation, manned by crews with fake passports and forged competency certificates.”19 With a phantom ship, terror-pirates could simply bring an existing weapon on board and navigate the vessel to the intended target area, unfortunately raising little or no suspicion.

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Finally, a combination of the previous two scenarios outlined above is a terrorist organization hijacking a commercial vessel transporting hazardous cargo and then using the ship itself as a floating weapon. Terrorists could then navigate the vessel to a specified target area and use some type of explosive devise to detonate the ship and its potentially lethal cargo. The damages—including environmental contamination, casualties, and economic loss—would vary in degree based upon the type of hazardous cargo a ship is carrying. If this attack was carried out on a tanker carrying crude oil, the damage would be measured more in terms of environmental damage and economic loss than in terms of casualties. Worse yet, if a significant amount of explosives were employed on a ship that was transporting radiological material, the result would essentially be a floating dirty bomb—probably the easiest, yet most catastrophic scenario. Almost as frightening would be the seizure of a supertanker transporting liquefied natural gas, (LNG). LNG is extremely volatile, and many sources have compared the potential explosion of a LNG tanker with that of the December 6, 1917 explosion that literally destroyed Halifax Harbor, Nova Scotia when the French munitions carrier Mont Blanc collided with the merchant ship Imo. The horrendous explosion resulted in over 1,900 deaths and another 900 serious injuries.20 A successful terrorist attack utilizing an LNG tanker in close proximity to a strategic trading port would be devastating in terms of the global economy and the natural gas industry. In terms of casualties, the cost could potentially be astronomical should the attack occur somewhere off one of the coastal areas of the United States where LNG tankers routinely navigate near residential areas via narrow channels and canals. The underlying question in these attack scenarios is whether or not today’s transnational terrorist groups consider a catastrophic strike aimed at the global economy a worthwhile tactic. From the terrorist standpoint, it is difficult to fully achieve the “terror” factor without a significant number of victims. History indicates that groups like al Qaeda desire not only a global media event as the result of an attack, but also a high body count— one which exceeds that of September 11, 2001. Because of this, soft targets such as shopping malls, sports stadiums, and subways are often the preferred targets for many terrorist groups. In light of this, the maritime environment should not be excluded from the list of potential soft targets, as is evidenced by the increasing number of attacks and attempted attacks by pirates aimed against oceangoing luxury cruise liners—a potentially “high-value” target in the eyes of terrorists. Like water, terrorism will take the path of least resistance. As soft targets on land are “hardened” against the threat of terrorism, some groups will logically seek out a vulnerability that they can more easily exploit. Ironically, the global community’s counterterrorism efforts on land and in the air may in fact drive terrorists to pursue targets at sea that have yet

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to be fully appreciated and anticipated, such as tankers, strategic waterways, oil platforms, etc. However, while the resulting media event of such an attack would certainly be spectacular, the immediate results in terms of the number of innocent lives lost may not achieve many terrorists’ goals. Nonetheless, terrorists may be starting to appreciate the value of such a strike with long-term economic impact. Similarly, there are those terrorists who recognize the value of combining terrorism and other forms of crime and violence, such as organized crime. The Taliban-linked narco-terrorist, Baz Mohammed—who is now awaiting trial in New York—hailed narcoterrorism as a viable dual tactic because he was able to take America’s money, while at the same time kill Americans with the very drugs that he was making his money from.21 With cases like this, it is not difficult to imagine that a terrorist organization would place great value on using pirates or an act of piracy as a means of achieving their objectives. HOW DO TERRORISM AND PIRACY OVERLAP? SIMILAR LINKAGES Terrorism and piracy overlap in many of the same ways that terrorism and organized crime do. While the bottom line for pirates is always profit, terrorists have a much broader agenda and more complex requirements. Not only do terrorists need to sustain and equip themselves during operational planning phases, they need to raise funds in order to finance actual attacks. That being said, the “pirate profit factor” has a definite appeal to terrorist groups needing to raise vital operating funds—funds that are needed not only for financing their next attack, but for other financial considerations including recruitment, training, and even their own information campaign efforts. Additionally, while piracy in its basic form can be an effective method for raising necessary funds, it can also serve as a means for acquiring specialized equipment necessary for maritime terrorist attacks. According to Louise Shelley, “A particular feature of organized crime in the Pacific region is piracy, some of it linked to the maritime transport of high technology.”22 The nature of their organizational structures not only facilitates but promotes overlap between terrorist groups and pirates. Similar to organized crime groups, international maritime pirates operate using flat, loosely connected networks as do most of today’s transnational terrorist organizations. The very criminal nature of these networks invites overlap, and where this overlap or intersection occurs, there is the likelihood that certain terrorists will recognize the operational utility of cooperating with pirates. At the same time, if pirates sense an opportunity for profit as a result of selling expertise or aiding in an attack, there is no reason to believe that many would not turn a blind eye to terrorist intentions in order to benefit financially from the endeavor.

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In addition to similar organizational structures, the increasing reliance on advanced technologies such as communications, weaponry, the Internet, and even Global Positioning Systems (GPS) satellite tracking creates another node of intersection or overlap where terrorists and pirates may come together either unintentionally or intentionally. Piracy becomes central when a given terrorist group lacks the necessary expertise or equipment that would be required to execute a maritime attack. “International organized crime groups and terrorists both employ specialists.”23 What the terrorists are unable to do for themselves they will certainly hire out for, and pirates having the requisite expertise would surely embrace the opportunity to make a profit. In fact, the pirates hired may not necessarily even be given knowledge of the overall plan or larger picture, but then again they might. As Shelley has suggested, “Those hired on a contractual basis may be knowing accomplices or may be hired through intermediaries, unaware who are the end users of their services.”24 Equally important for both pirates and terrorists to be effective is their operating environment. Unfortunately, several commonalities exist in many regions today that facilitate these environments. Both types of groups thrive in areas characterized by lawlessness, limited effective governance, open borders, and corrupt officials (or other individuals) who can easily be corrupted due to poor economic conditions. According to Luft and Korin, “International terrorists who want to cripple the global economy need not bother attacking countries where security is tight. They can inflict the same damage by targeting the territorial waters of countries that lack the will or the resources to police their own maritime backyard.”25 The sea, by its very nature and expanse, is difficult to police against piracy. Compound this natural challenge with countries that have limited governance, limited capability to police their own territorial waters (and often territorial waters that are near or located on strategic trade routes), and the result is a list of high-value targets that offer unique opportunities for terrorists who have the capability and desire to engage in piracy. WHERE ARE THE TERROR-PIRACY TARGETS? Possible attack scenarios can be almost limitless; however, the realistic potential target set for terror-piracy can be divided into two basic categories, geographic and physical targets. With nearly 95 percent of the world’s trade being transported by sea, there is no shortage of target areas—although some offer better and more frequent opportunities for terrorists than others. Certainly, maritime chokepoints with high volumes of sea-going traffic are the most logical target areas. Far and away the most infamous of these is the Strait of Malacca, where in 2003 alone, 42 percent of all pirate attacks took place. Virtually every piece of written work

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addressing contemporary piracy highlights the unusually high level of danger and violence found on these waters. This 500-mile corridor separating Malaysia from Indonesia sees almost one quarter of the world’s trade; approximately 600 ships pass through on a daily basis. This includes one-half of all oil shipments bound for Eastern Asia as well as twothirds of the global shipment of LNG.26 Unfortunately, other particularly hazardous straits include those that are geographically positioned in the Middle Eastern region where many of the terrorist groups discussed earlier operate. For example, the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, is approximately one and a half miles wide at its most narrow point, yet sees almost 15 million barrels of oil pass through it each day.27 Likewise, the entrance to the Red Sea, or Bab el Mandeb, is barely one-and-a-half miles wide at its narrowest point. While only about 3.3 million barrels of oil a day pass through it, the Red Sea entrance is high on the list of strategic choke points.28 An even more narrow passage is the Bosporus Strait linking the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Not even a mile wide at some points, it offers an especially plausible target area for terrorists wanting to launch an attack against a vessel sailing through it. Of special interest is the fact that 10 percent of the 50,000 ships navigating this particular waterway on an annual basis are tankers carrying Russian and Caspian oil.29 Given this fact, terrorists who might otherwise confine their activities to land may be influenced to attempt an attack on a tanker sailing under a Russian flag out of sheer desire to strike a blow against Russia and its economy. Terror-piracy is not only confined to these geographic choke points. While the Strait of Malacca certainly tops the list of high-risk areas for piracy, the South China Sea as a whole is a vast region that continues to be a threat for all manner of shipping. The sheer size of the region and number of different countries with varying degrees of capabilities for policing their territorial waters exacerbate existing security challenges vis-`a-vis piracy and terrorism in the region. Another maritime region that is rapidly becoming one of the most dangerous bodies of waters in the world is the coast of Somalia. The absolute lawlessness of Somalia and lack of any effective navy has left the gate open for piracy to flourish off its coast. As a result, not only are acts of piracy in these waters on the rise, but their growing level of audacity and violence is alarming. More and more, Somali pirates are using advanced weapons as well as high-speed attack boats launched from larger ships in order to conduct effective attacks from outside territorial waters. This increasing level of success and ease of operations may very well attract the attention of terrorist groups looking to easily raise funds, strike at the western tourist industry or even mount piracy attacks that would serve as

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training operations for future larger scale operations to be conducted in other regions. As the level of audacity and daring in piracy continues to increase, so does the expansion of the categories of physical targets that terror-pirates are willing to pursue. Pirates are now targeting any type of vessel that offers a potentially lucrative target, from cargo ships hauling humanitarian aide to smaller oceangoing recreational craft to luxury cruise liners. This is a departure from the generally acknowledged list of physical maritime piracy targets, a target set that has been traditionally confined to tankers and cargo ships, as well as recreational sailing vessels, which are particularly vulnerable when they sail through ungoverned waters. Major ports that are vital to the global economy and represent critical infrastructure to many western nations are increasingly becoming points of concern for acts of terror-piracy. Screening and monitoring initiatives are underway to secure these potential targets, to include increasing the distances out that incoming cargo ships have to communicate their estimated arrival times to a given port. Nonetheless, it is impossible to guarantee the security of a given port; just as it is equally impossible to guarantee the safety of the population associated with its location. Sources vary in their estimations, but only about 5 –10 percent of all containers that enter U.S. ports on cargo ships are inspected. This leaves a significantly weak link for terrorists to take advantage of by using a phantom ship to smuggle a dirty bomb into a major port. Oil platforms also represent particularly vulnerable targets, and while the body count after an attack on such a platform might not be significant, the economic impact to the country owning the platform would certainly be significant, if not globally catastrophic. Second and third order effects would also include short-term as well as potentially long-term impact on the environment. To certain radical left-wing environmentalist groups, the desire to achieve these types of effects (while seemingly illogical) might be especially appealing. They may feel that they can bring about a change in the petroleum industry if they can prove a “point” by exposing vulnerabilities in the security of oil platforms. Increasingly, tourism and the cruise line industry are providing terrorists with a unique maritime vulnerability that offers them a very different kind of opportunity to strike at a given country’s economy. As Joshua Sinai describes, “For example, when terrorists belonging to the Egyptian Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (also known as Islamic Group) attacked cruise ships along the Nile River on four occasions from 1992 to 1994, tourists kept away from Egypt. In the Philippines, when the Abu Sayyaf Group attacks cargo vessels or abduct foreigners from a tourist resort (as it did in 2001), it impacts on the entire country’s trade and economy. In Somalia, when militiamen hijack foreign ships sailing off the country’s coastline,

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vessels steer away from the region.”30 In addition to being able to hit a country’s “pocketbook,” cruise ships offer a lucrative and shocking target in terms of casualties. When discussing oceangoing tourism, it is almost as if maritime terrorism has come full circle. Arguably, contemporary maritime terrorism had its genesis in 1985 when Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro in Egyptian territorial waters. Today, over 20 years later, the potential for new and emerging terrorist groups to exploit this oceangoing tourist industry seems not only shocking, but inviting. In the minds of certain terrorists, a statement could certainly be made if an entire cruise ship with all passengers and crew on board disappeared in a single catastrophic attack. One of al Qaeda’s hallmarks is to execute a large-scale attack involving a series of near-simultaneous attacks sometimes in close proximity of each other—a trademark that al Qaeda-inspired groups attempt to copy on a consistent basis. As terrorism and piracy intersect, the target set expands to include those that may potentially provide the spectacular type of attack that certain terrorist groups are looking for—attacks that result in a high body count and/or a significant blow to the Western or even global economy. WHEN? TERROR-PIRACY IS ALREADY A REALITY Unfortunately, the idea of terrorists and pirates coming together for evil is not an academic question of “if” or even “when.” In fact, it is not a question at all. It is a modern day reality. Simply put, terrorism is the sum of motivation and capability. When a particular group with sufficient motivation achieves the appropriate level of capability, then the likelihood of a true terrorist attack is high or even imminent.31 This principle can certainly be applied when contemplating the nexus of terrorism and piracy. The evidence is clear that a number of terrorist groups have already firmly stated their conviction to commit acts of violence in any way they deem fit—hence, motivation is present. Given this motivation, if the targets are vulnerable and the likelihood of success is high, these same terrorists need only to acquire the requisite maritime capabilities, and they will be able to execute their acts of violence on the high seas. The potential end results are limited only to one’s imagination. A new focus on predictive analysis is required if this threat is to be better understood and hopefully thwarted. Unfortunately, there is a significant degree of disagreement as to the seriousness and reality of this threat. The facts are clear that a precedent for terror-piracy has been set. Moreover, the potential exists for even more devastating acts of terror-piracy to occur in the future. With the proper attention and analysis of events like the hijacking of the Dewi Madrim or the 1998 hijacking of the Singapore merchant ship the Petro Ranger, intelligence may be able to uncover trends

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and/or locations of potential violence that point to something more than common acts of piracy. POTENTIAL COUNTERMEASURES After acknowledging the reality of this threat and analyzing terrorpiracy trends, there are at least a few steps that can be taken to minimize its impact both regionally and worldwide. Some of these measures are focused at the operational level, while others are aimed at the strategic level, but a combination of the two is what is most warranted. Operationally, countermeasures center around the protection of ships themselves. As Luft and Korin observe, “Ultimately, only a ship can guarantee its own security. Maritime security forces cannot be present everywhere at all times (and in certain regions, the security forces themselves are the problem).”32 The initial step in helping to secure ships begins with taking a hard look at the criteria for selection and screening of crew members. Thorough background checks are crucial. Many oceangoing tankers today are crewed by as few as 15 people. With manning numbers this low, it is not hard to envision the potential for insider assistance in the seizure of a particular vessel, a fact not unheard of in past attacks. If there is safety in numbers, another step that ships might take to protect themselves would be to travel in convoys, a practice that has not been used routinely since the U-Boat scourge of World War II.33 Additionally, the concept of arming crew members may merit serious examination. In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. Congress has seen fit to allow airline pilots to carry weapons, and some would argue that the same rationale should be applied to merchant vessels on the high seas. However, as Charles Glass observes, “Only the Russians and the Israelis are known to keep weapons aboard.”34 However, there are definite concerns and issues that must be considered before taking such a step. Luft and Korin suggest that “Arming sailors is more complicated than simply giving them weapons. Officers must be well-trained, access to onboard weapons storage must be carefully controlled, and crews must be well vetted.”35 Unfortunately, strategic countermeasures are more long-term in nature and in some cases may be less realistic. These measures start with insuring that current international law appropriately addresses the continually evolving nature of this pirate and terrorist threat. One such step would be to blacklist phantom ships. “If a state cannot ensure that the ships it is flagging are legitimate, then all of the ships flying its flag should be blacklisted and prevented from entering the territorial waters of other states.”36 Other strategic steps include searching for alternate routes for cargo, even to include looking for new land routes that could potentially replace current sea-trading routes.

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Finally, and certainly not realistic in the short-term, is to look at alternate energy supplies. While the world remains dependant on oil, the volume of oil being transported by sea will remain significant. Likewise, as long as the world’s economy and energy remain targets for terrorists, ocean-going tankers will continue to top the list of vulnerable high-value targets. In addition to looking at countermeasures to combat terrorism at sea, the idea of consequence management must be addressed as well. If the likelihood of a significant terror-piracy attack has increased since 9/11, then measures for dealing with such an attack and its after effects need to be anticipated, planned for and rehearsed. Environmental cleaning operations should be pre-organized in the event of an attack against a major oil tanker. If one of the narrow straits is blocked as the result of an attack, alternate routes and emergency procedures should be identified and agreed upon in advance. Finally, authorities must plan for the possibility of a major disruption or interruption in the world’s oil flow. According to Luft and Korin, “They should, for example, expand strategic petroleum reserves so that they are sufficient to replace many weeks of lost imports.”37 The threat of transnational terrorism allying itself with international maritime piracy is real, and is only going to increase unless nations of the world come together in their fight against terrorism on land and on the high seas. Terrorists have proven their penchant for exploiting vulnerabilities. Security measures that go toward preventing another 9/11 are certainly warranted, but terrorists continue to adapt and improvise. Madrid, Beslan, London, Bali, and Egypt have all been targets, and they did not involve planes flying into high-rise office buildings. It is imperative that we anticipate where terrorists believe they are sensing and finding our vulnerabilities and where they believe they can achieve the most effect for their efforts. Only then can we effectively move to prevent the next catastrophic attack before it happens.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. Simon Elegant and Kuala Sepetang, “Dire Straits,” Time Asia Nov (2004). 2. Anonymous, “Peril on the Sea,” The Economist, Oct (2003). 3. Ibid. 4. Catherine Zara Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Threat Assessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18 (2006): 239–257.

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5. United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, New York, (1997). 6. Andrew Nichols Pratt, Colonel, USMC (Ret.). With permission from private discussions held on February 5, 2004. 7. Boaz Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers (New Brunswick, NJ and London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2005), 17. 8. “Maritime Terrorism: A Special Report,” Jane’s Intelligence Digest (January 20, 2006). 9. Catherine Zara Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Threat Assessment,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18 (2006): 239–257. For more on the Achille Lauro incident, please see the chapter by Sean Anderson and Peter Spagnolo in Volume 3 of this publication. 10. Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” 11. Ibid. Also, please see the chapter by Ruth Beitler in Volume 3 of this publication. 12. Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” 13. For more on Jemaah Islamiya, Please see the chapter by Kumar Ramakrishna in Volume 3 of this publication. 14. Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” 15. Ibid. 16. For more on the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Front, please see the chapter by Robin Bowman in Volume 3 of this publication. 17. Raymond, “Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia.” 18. Gal Luft and Anne Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea,” Foreign Affairs, 83, no. 6 November/December 2004): 61–71. 19. Ibid. 20. Charles Glass, “The New Piracy,” London Review of Books—Letters Page, (January 8, 2004). 21. David E. Kaplan, “Paying for Terror: How Jihadist Groups Are Using Organized Crime tactics and Profits to Finance Attacks on Targets Around the Globe,” U.S. News and World Report, (November 2005). 22. Louise I. Shelley, “The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism,” Paper delivered at the National Defense University Pacific Symposium “Addressing Transnational Security Threats in the Asia-Pacific Region, 2002 [document on-line]. Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/ chinaaliens/nexus.htm; accessed on November 23, 2003. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Luft and Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea.” 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Joshua Sinai, “Terrorism and Business: The Threat and the Response,” Counter Terrorism: The Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland Security International, 12, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 26–33. 31. Boaz Ganor. With permission from private discussions held on May 30, 2006.

Red Sky in the Morning 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Luft and Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea.” Glass, “The New Piracy.” Ibid. Luft and Korin, “Terrorism Goes to Sea.” Ibid. Ibid.

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CHAPTER 16 UNDERSTANDING AND COUNTERING THE MOTIVES AND METHODS OF WARLORDS Brian Hanley

With continuing development of biological, nuclear, and future technologies, warlords will be capable of waging war on a global scale more effectively.1 Casualties from al Qaeda’s attacks on the World Trade Center, Pentagon, Madrid, and London are really quite minor. It is hubris to believe that we can avoid serious acts of war against our nation forever. Thus, understanding warlords is vital in this age when they are one of the players that can carry war to our shores. This chapter will attempt to further that understanding in the context of a warlord as a violent nonstate actor (VNSA),2 oriented toward practical usability on the ground and in policy. What is most critical to understand is that being a warlord is a profitable business and a way of life dedicated to amassing power and perks. It is high risk, but the rewards are significant for the warlord, quite similar to the rewards of being a dictator or a high-powered CEO. Immense wealth, power, women, sex, and respect accrue to a warlord. Similarly, for his followers, the allure of power, sex, drugs, and upward social mobility is hard to resist. Why would a 18-year-old general3 give up his command, unlimited sex, wealth, and other perks? As a result, a warlord is very difficult to control unless his source of funds is interdicted or he dies. And if he dies, there may be a clash of rivals to replace him. Consequently, structural economic change based on control of resources and reasonably fair use and distribution of their revenues may be essential if warlordism is to be overcome.

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To truly understand a warlord, one must put oneself in his shoes. Seeing his career choice as rationally self-interested, his modus operandi becomes more understandable. Few stupid men last long as warlords, whether formally educated or not. Their rationality may be extremely violent, viciously cruel, and callous beyond imagination. Sometimes, combined with throwbacks like cannibalism,4 their actions and those of their followers are mind bending. Children conducting massacres with glee, children placing bets on the sex of an unborn child before slicing open a woman’s belly for the sport of it, cannibalism, and casual torture that turns life as a slave into a relative safe harbor have been modus operandi of some warlords.5 Such deeds can blind us to the patterns behind the scenes which give such events their shape. What warlords do is quite rational, and makes sense within the correct set of assumptions. WHAT IS A WARLORD? In common use, warlord covers a lot of ground. “One man’s warlord may be another’s freedom fighter,” and some warlords the U.S. government has been allied to. A warlord, like a dictator or a king, may have positive and negative effects on the people affected by his rule. Like garage entrepreneurs in a capitalist system like the United States, warlords make moves that can leverage a nobody into great power, wealth, and visibility. A warlord has been defined as “a strongman who maintains control of an area and its resources through his ability to wage war, who does not obey a higher or central authority.”6 This is a good starting point. However, what should we make of the relationship of warlords to sponsoring powers? How are warlords used by competing nation-states in a game of global chess? How does this fit with insurgency, or with matters of doctrine on the part of the warlord? And what of the global public relations war that is often the primary battleground between the “developing world” (i.e., second/third world) and the “developed world”? Similar to the understanding that to combat an insurgency the goodwill of the people must be cultivated, warlords also need to appeal to some segment and gain its loyalty. Warlords routinely use fear as enforcement, since a large sector of civilian populations are easily herded this way. Arguably this is the same means police agencies use to combat crime and corruption7 by making public examples of individuals, and it works.8 Warlords may operate in a like manner, and either interlock with insurgencies or comprise their core. Warlords make selective use of the principle of their “citizen” bearing arms, and warlord troops seeking to terrorize often depend on the citizenry not being armed or capable of effective response. A populace capable of chasing down agents of warlords in their midst is a serious threat to warlord leadership. Such capability changes the prevailing collective

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psychology from one of “ratting” on the warlord’s people to one of empowerment. Keeping this in mind, we shall see how warlords differ on various scales. However, this basic trait of “armed citizen” is common within warlord’s organizations just as it is with gangster organizations inside the United States. We may differentiate warlords by a combination of sources of income, politics, tribalism, doctrinal values, methods, and the scale of their operations. The methods of warlords are also practiced by dictatorships such as Myanmar or the quasi-dictatorship of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Such nations can be considered either fully acquired as warlord fiefdoms, or well on the way. The methods of warlords are also known and practiced by criminal syndicates and gangsters. Al Capone would understand Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh very well, and so would Monstah Kody.9 Thus, as a practical matter, the advice of those who grew up in a rough part of town filled with gangsters may be well worth seeking when trying to understand a warlord. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS: PROXY WARLORDS AND RESOURCE WARLORDS The foremost differentiating factor for warlords is source of income. Relative to income there are two basic types of warlord. Proxy warlords are paid by some outside power, a broadly based system of funding, or a combination, upon which they depend for support.10 Resource warlords seize some productive asset and use their control of it for income. Figure 16.1 provides a sampling of warlords by economic support system and the type of warfare engagement they have primarily pursued. Note that not all of them have been enemies of the United States. One was an ally, and others have been aligned to various degrees. Proxy Warlords Proxy warlords are probably best exemplified today by the collection plaguing the Middle East who perform proxy war against Israel. The old cold war rivals of the United States and U.S.S.R. paid for proxy wars all over the world, maneuvering to prevent each other from dominating the globe. Proxy warlordism is still extant and fluctuating with populist fundraising (i.e. payment by nonstate agencies) probably more common than during the cold war.11 The United States paid the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to make proxy war of this general type in Afghanistan12 and others in Africa, while the Soviet Union and Cuba paid for warlords in South America and Africa, as well as striking economic deals with them for valuable goods such as Angolan diamonds. Iran, and until recently, Iraq, have supported proxy warlords in the Palestinian territories in

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Resource

Warfare type versus source of funds

Osama bin Laden

Robert Mugabe

Foday Sankoh

Pol Pot

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Rashid Dostum

Proxy

Ahmed Shah Massoud

Yasser Arafat

Asymmetric

Conventional

Figure 16.1 Warlord Typologies and Examples Note: Warlords chosen for this illustration are examples, not intended to be complete. The placement of a warlord is a judgment call. In most cases information is incomplete and likely to remain so.

various ways, as have private funds from various Persian Gulf states.13 This difficult-to-deal-with type of warlord makes his money in rake-offs, embezzling funds and material provided for making proxy war on behalf of a nation or movement. He may also engage in some degree of confiscation or resource control, but it is not his primary means of support. He is difficult to deal with in part because it is very much not in his interest for the conflict to be resolved because his ability to amass a fortune will be curtailed. Depending on his source of support it is likely that his paymasters will end his life if he disobeys them, as a consequence of which it may be impossible for him to negotiate in good faith, regardless of what he might personally want at any time. The motives of those who pay proxy warlords are generally rooted in religious or political doctrine for a specific goal. However, in addition to such straightforward motives, a proxy war can focus attention outward, away from domestic problems, or it may appease some vocal constituency within the sponsoring nation or group. For the purposes of maintaining a focus outward, it is useful if the enemy of the proxy warlord supporter neither loses nor wins. Thus, an endless border war with a neighbor, such as Pakistan’s with India, is excellent for unifying the people, and gives justification for a succession of generals to keep control. Similarly, this same border war appeases a vocal and dangerous faction, keeping them

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busy. By comparison, the outstanding convenience of proxy wars is that the paymaster nation supporting the proxy transfers most of the risks and political costs to the proxy warlord and the people of another nation. And yet, proxy wars still accrue the benefits of focusing attention outward and appeasing constituencies. Thus proxy warfare appears to be pretty much all upside with little downside for the paymasters, whether they are doctrinal supporters, or shrewd politicians. The primary downside to proxy warfare is the possibility of “blowback” which is a subject that others have covered.14 For those strategizing the game of chess in which proxy warriors are the pieces on the board, attempting to turn proxy war support by an opponent into blowback for them is intriguing to consider. A proxy warlord’s organization tends to be more vulnerable to breakdown after his death than that of a resource warlord for several reasons. First, a proxy warlord is often not a natural tribal leader, nor part of the established structure of a society. A famous example of this is Yasir Arafat who hailed from Egypt. Such a warlord may travel from another country to get his start, or he may travel to take over an existing organization. It is possible that in the beginning, he may have ideals of some kind that lead him to fight. In any case, as a consequence of the way he begins, his organization is generally recruited from relative strangers who join the cause or group. Such an organization will need to be held together by a combination of doctrine, carrots and sticks, and will not have many natural loyalties. A smart warlord may establish an educational system that indoctrinates children or quite young recruits, but this takes time and effort for the crop to mature.15 Alternatively, a system of education such as the madrassas established as a long-term recruitment and political base development system can be used as a source of recruits. A proxy warlord will usually guard his connection with a foreign power carefully, for quite obvious reasons. Should he not do so, a successor can take over his position before he wants to relinquish it, an event undesirable to the proxy warlord. Consequently, it is often up to the foreign power to find a successor after his death. A proxy warlord will promote people around him that he believes will not depose him and will tend to eliminate those who make him nervous. This tendency is the Achilles heel of warlords, as it prevents them from building larger, more effective organizations with a capable officer corps since doing so is too great a risk. Consequently, those who are too smart or overly ambitious tend not to be found close to proxy war leaders. For these reasons, when such a leader dies, his organization tends to either become moribund or fall apart. Consequently, targeting a proxy warlord directly for removal is a good strategy, and warlords use this technique on each other. At the very least, iterative replacement of kingpins will stress the support pipeline both logistically and financially for the opposition.

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Generally speaking, stress on a support system for war leads to greater opportunity for exposure and error, both good things for the opposition to experience. Since the proxy warlord will probably have embezzled a large amount of money and hidden it for his family, the cycle will need to occur again and new start-up costs incurred by the proxy support nations. Additionally, if the money the proxy warlord has hidden for his family can be located and confiscated by agents of the Western allied powers, (through courts or intelligence services) this can prevent his family from reaping rewards from his actions. Should it become known that families are unlikely to reap the huge rewards a warlord can provide, this may aid somewhat in curtailing the phenomenon. However, such an accomplishment is quite difficult, and perennial, akin to fighting organized crime. A proxy warlord may not be loyal to the supporting power that backs him. Such men have their own agenda and they make use of greater powers in equal measure to the use greater powers make of them, playing their own game of chess. The example of Lenin, who was a proxy warlord backed by Field Marshal von Hindenburg and General von Ludendorff to return to Russia “like a virus” is well worth pondering. Loyalty does tend to be displayed to those more ruthless powers who will assassinate a warlord who strays off the reservation. In the case of the ISI connection to the U.S. support for Afghanistan, it appears there was probably a multilevel scheme for embezzlement that started with personnel in the ISI appropriating funds to support mujahideen in Kashmir, then more theft from such people as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar lower down the food chain. This is similar to what occurs in developing nations with large international project loans.16 Prior to locating Ahmed Shah Massoud, CIA money was embezzled at a furious rate with marginal effect on the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Turning this on its head, finding ways to encourage higher rates of embezzlement, through placement of intelligence operatives within warlord organizations, or arranging deals with warlords that require them to pay crippling levels of protection money to keep themselves or their families safe will stress the proxy warlord’s client(s) as well. However, in the ecology that is warfare, there is the distinct possibility of evolution of response to such measures. Resource Warlords This type of warlord takes control of some asset in order to milk it for money. The warlords of Congo, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Colombia’s FARC are primarily of this latter type. Some of them, such as UNITA in Angola, were once affiliated with major powers17 but have learned to support themselves. In UNITA’s case, the great powers were

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the strange bedfellows of the United States and China,18 which was justified by UNITA with the words, “take aid . . . from the devil himself.”19 A resource warlord may be associated with a tribe or ethnic group, or he may recruit his followers from scratch. Across the top, a point resource is one that has a single location that is relatively easy to control. A diffuse resource is one that is spread over a large region. A proximate resource is close to the capital of a nation, or some other center of power. A distant resource is one that is far from the capital or center of power. The type of conflict is then listed along with the resources controlled. While considering Table 16.1, the primary thing to think about is whether it is practically and politically feasible to provide sufficient control of the resource in question as an alternative to the warlord. On one end of this scale of those who control assets to receive money from them, one finds tribal leaders or heads of familial clans. A leader of a clan may be operating in a region where there is little or no rule of law, and so to survive, his people must bear arms. When dealing with this type of person, negotiation or attempted alliance is generally more appropriate. This type of warlord is more likely to have a conscience that can be appealed to, which can be judged by how he has treated the people in his region and how they regard him. His value system, however, is likely to be rather foreign to modern U.S. values. Outside of the United States, ethnicity, clan, and family are of the highest importance, and it is normal for families to act as one collective unit. Western society, particularly in the United States is much more fractured and oriented toward individualism and loyalties to organizations. Thus, our systems don’t go over well. There are no hard and fast rules for dealing with a tribal resource warlord. A dedicated opponent may be highly regarded, yet never entirely trustable in a negotiation. It may be the case that this person will desire to stand off unaligned to a great power for practical reasons. Should a great power decide to leave he could have serious problems, and he must think of the long-term survival of himself and his people. The most problematic resource warlord is one who has recruited his organization from scratch, as a gangster does—or one whose ruthless control of his group’s assets has overwhelmed his cultural mores. Both types of resource warlord can be difficult to counter. The context of the resource warlord’s organization means that if the leader dies, a new leader, or the organization of a rival who watched from the sidelines, is likely to appear. This means that the primary way to put resource warlords out of business permanently is to take over their assets and manage those assets directly as well as see to it that civil society institutions are restarted or strengthened.

Table 16.1 Examples of Resource Components of Conflicts58 Point Resource (few locations/small geographic region) Type of conflict

State control/ coup d’etat

State holds strong control

Algeria Angola Chad CongoBrazzaville Iraq-Iran Iraq-Kuwait Liberia Nicaragua Rwanda Sierra Leone

Type of conflict

War of secession

Weak state control at a distance

Angola-Cabinda Caucasus D.R. Congo

Indonesia MoroccoWestern Sahara Nigeria-Biafra Papua New GuineaBougainville SenegalCasamance Sudan

Diffuse Resource/Trade (widely distributed geographically) Rebellion/rioting

Gas Oil Oil Oil

El Salvador Guatemala Mexico SenegalMauritania

Coffee Cropland Cropland Cropland

Oil Oil Iron ore, rubber Coffee Coffee Rutile Warlords Oil Oil Copper, cobalt, gold Oil, copper, gold Phosphate

Afghanistan Angola Burma

Opium Diamonds Opium, timber

Caucasus

Drugs, weapons

Cambodia

Gems, timber

Oil Copper

Colombia D.R. Congo

Cocaine Diamonds, gold

Marijuana

Kurdistan

Heroin

Oil

Lebanon Liberia

Hash Timber, diamonds, drugs Cocaine Marijuana, timber Diamonds Bananas, camels Drugs, weapons Marijuana, timber

Peru Philippines Sierra Leone Somalia Tajikistan Former Yugoslavia

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Tribal/Ethnic

Non-aligned

Tribal/Ethnic motive versus ideological motive

Osama bin Laden

Yasser Arafat

Foday Sankoh

Robert Mugabe

Pol Pot Rashid Dostum

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Ahmed Shah Massoud

Ideological

Non-Ideological

Figure 16.2 Warlords chosen are for use as examples and not intended to be complete.

IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL AGENDA AND WARLORDS A major measure of a warlord is the degree of ideological agenda he has relative to use of his assets and methods for warfare (for example, see Figure 16.2). On the far end of this ideology scale are warlords who have relatively “pure revolutionary” motives and uses of assets. On the near end of the scale are those who appear to make war primarily as a business and to dominate others. Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda group are on the far end of this scale. They use assets to advance their doctrine though they use warlord methods such as taking advantage of, or creating, chaos to bind a populace to them. However, one may also note that the reestablishment of the Khalifa, should it be successful, would put Osama’s people either at the center of power or perhaps on the throne, so perhaps his motives are not quite as pure as they might be. Consistency of alignment is another way to differentiate warlords. A warlord may switch sides, perhaps multiple times, as did General Rashid Dostum and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar under the Soviet, Taliban, and U.S. rule in Afghanistan.20 Such have minimal allegiance to a nation or doctrine. On the other end of the alignment scale are those like Ahmed Shah Massoud of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan who fought the Soviets and then the Taliban for the entire period. A leader who has loyalty to his people and fights on the same side regardless of whether he is making

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Terrorism versus cult of person Rashid Dostum

non-cult

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

Cult of person

Robert Mugabe

Ahmed Shah Massoud

Foday Sankoh Yasser Arafat Pol Pot Osama bin Laden

Terrorism on civilians

Treat civilians with respect

Figure 16.3

money at it, should be differentiated. He may make use of resources for his cause, but the resources are not his primary cause. We can also look at the degree of terror that a warlord uses, as well as whether they create for themselves a cult of personality21 that goes beyond ordinary leadership. To some extent we have looked already at the method of terrorism in the chart regarding methods for warfare. However, embrace of terrorist tactics is not exclusive of conventional military engagements (see Figure 16.3). Foday Sankoh is a case in point. His forces consistently drove civilians out of regions of diamond mines he sought to control by using terror conducted by semi-irregular uniformed soldiery.22 A related measure of a warlord is the degree to which a warlord feathers his nest and neglects the civilians of their region and even his own supporters. This is also a measure of kleptocrats, who often become the equivalent of small nation-state warlords after they have gained power. Sometimes the level of personal greed displayed is hard to fathom. Those who make funds available to such people probably deserve what they get in return. For policymakers, collusion between disbursers of funds, “Five Star Aid” agencies and their personnel23 is something to watch carefully. The results are not necessarily desirable or intended. These features of tribalism, cult of personality, terror tactics, and greed should be measured against the historical cultural norms of a region or ethnic group. Tribal politics in many regions provides the tribal leader

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with great power, and there is significant overlap between traditional tribal politics and warlordism going back to European colonial times and prior. Tribal leaders acting in ways we in the West consider uncivilized can be part of the growing pains of certain nations.24 (It should be noted that barbaric campaigns of terror have been part of European history and colonialism as well.) However, we evolve our culture by degrees, and by most measures, such people as Foday Sankoh, who used mass murder and chopping off hands and feet25 to terrorize villagers into leaving the area so that he could steal diamond revenue in Sierra Leone, was violating historical cultural norms. CONDITIONS FOR THE GENESIS AND MAINTENANCE OF WARLORDS Warlords thrive on chaotic circumstances and breakdowns in society. An insurgency or war can be the mechanism that creates chaos. So can disease and extremes of poverty. In such instances systems of order and restraint tend to break down. Breakdown leads to the availability of young men to conduct war, and an interest by a sufficient number of young men or children to grasp at anything that will bring opportunity into their life. Warlords are the seed crystals around which such conditions coalesce. Warlords, like gangsters, are products of a milieu which grants opportunity to the ruthless. It is important to look carefully at what warlords represent to the common people of an area. In many cases, their success largely stems from acting as the conduit for perceived prosperity and order. For example, they may take it upon themselves to enforce “laws” as the IRA has done in northern Ireland, or distribute charity to families who support them. In the other cases, they make themselves the gatekeeper for perceived opportunity for prosperity. An example of this is the warlords of Western Africa recruiting orphans into armies with the opportunity to become an officer collecting diamond revenues. If they are the only alternative rule to a national government of kleptocrats, or simply city folk who don’t care about the inhabitants, this tends to be successful. The national government or ordinary citizenry may be oppressive or threaten their survival through neglect. People do what they must to survive, even if they think it is morally wrong. Thus, poverty, oppression, and neglect are a crucible that often precedes the rise of warlords and their cousins, gangsters. Pandemic disease can be a very powerful factor creating breakdown of societies. AIDS already has reshaped Africa through orphans with guns.26 The plague hit the African continent starting in the 1980s. By 1990 WHO was concerned, spurring development of models to attempt tracking of case estimates.27 In concert with the plague’s release of tens of thousands, then millions of orphans across an already poor continent, nations have

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exploded with civil wars run by resource warlords. It is estimated that there are 14 million orphans in Africa from the AIDS plague28 creating a “resource pool” that are natural cannon fodder for warlords and warlord wannabes in that region. The number of orphans is expected to rise to 18 million by 2010.29 In 2006, many African nations have HIV infection rates of 30–40 percent and that rate is not trending downward yet. The effect on the economy is significant.30 HIV, unlike other historical epidemics, attacks adults in their prime more than any other group.31 This hollows out a society by destroying those who would ordinarily provide cultural continuity, socialization, training, and support. Poor economies are hardest hit by HIV.32 While macroeconomic indicators do not support the obvious hypothesis that HIV/AIDS would cut per capita income, it does slow GNP growth, and there is alarm that the economy of Africa could unravel33 as the plague persists. However, considering the events in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and elsewhere, although economic activity still occurs, the societies of these nations have already unraveled. All of this would suggest that in addition to battling the HIV plague, to remove this foundation contextual element from the equation, good orphan care and education could be quite beneficial. Without it, the stage is set for a new warlord to step in and take advantage. Regarding the effect of chaotic breakdown on warlords, a major problem is that a smart warlord will realize their fortunes will not rise if their nation’s fortune rises—quite the reverse. This is true for warlords of a doctrinal stripe such as Osama bin Laden, and those who are nondoctrinal like Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. It can be argued that Osama bin Laden’s group learned in Sudan that they have a greater chance of imposing their doctrine on a nation if it has been seriously damaged. The experience in Afghanistan made that lesson stronger as al Qaeda attained power on a foundation of rubble. It is well understood that a terrorist goal is driving the population by terror into distrusting the government’s ability to protect its citizens.34 By extension, this same principle applies to those wanting to impose a religious doctrine unsavory to most. If a warlord is smart, and realizes that under better conditions the people would either not tolerate what they offer, or would overthrow the rule of the warlord, the solution is obvious. Hence, the intelligent warlord will maintain or create the required degree of chaos while maintaining himself as the center of relative strength. In a similar light, when viewing the actions of leaders who seem to be simply damaging their nation for no good end, think carefully about the strategic value of the moves the leader is making. A case in point is the actions of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. His moves to damage the holdings and income of the white farming class35 can be seen as a kind of redress for past wrongs, and as payback to supporters. However, it should also be

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noted that by doing so, he has destroyed the economic base of the primary group within the country capable of acting against him and his tribal affiliates in the future. Thus, his actions, while seeming to be outlandish in conventional economic terms, bankrupting his nation, are quite intelligent in terms of power at the level of Zimbabwe as a closed system. He plays a zero-sum game, by which is meant, he assumes a limited pool of “chips” which he can either obtain or destroy in order to win. If he can simply maintain a steady position while making a rival fall, he has won. A zerosum thinker will tend to not accept a win-win proposition if that win-win scenario will aid a potential rival. The only check on such destructive zero-sum power grabs is threats from outside which can remove the warlord from power. Lacking such threats, a warlord is free to turn his nation or region into a smoking ruin as long as doing so leaves him on top of the heap with enough income to maintain a high ratio between his income and that of his people. This suggests that an effective way to curb the internal overreaching of such warlords could be for the international community to allow neighbors or even more distant nations to annex parts of such regions if such can bring order. This is a controversial idea, quite impractical in some circumstances. However, in the current milieu, a warlord is free to wreck his region or nation, slaughter willy-nilly, perhaps even dine on a rival,36 take over a small nation, take a seat at the United Nations and vote, then petition the international community for loans followed by debt forgiveness. Institutional and public memories in the developed world being rather short, this is a straightforward scenario. Statistically speaking, a warlord is probably at greater risk from influenza, the common cold, and just crossing the street, than he is from the international community. The spectacle of an unrepentant war criminal like Foday Sankoh being installed by a UN peace agreement putting him in charge of the diamond mines is beyond ironic. His child army massacred his countrymen for control of Sierra Leone’s mine regions. Similarly, war criminals who served under him were hired by UNICEF to “free children” from military service.37 Such “measures” call into question those involved, and indicate extremely selective prosecution for war crimes together with a kind of reverse racism. Foday Sankoh did finally die in 2003 at the age of 65, suffering a pulmonary embolism while in custody of the Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal38 established in 2002. However this fact only clarifies how current international responses are ineffective as he essentially died of an affliction of old age. THE PROBLEM OF DEVELOPMENT BANDITRY Development banditry is a significant problem obstructing efforts to prevent the development of conditions for warlord emergence, and to

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redress such conditions in the aftermath. A development bandit is a person from the developed world whose goal is theft from the IMF, World Bank, and other aid agencies by participating in and instigating corruption to enrich themselves hugely. The problem of development banditry undermines both the legitimacy of the developed world and confidence on the part of the populace that there is actually a difference between the developed world’s system and the systemic corruption normal in developing nations. It is difficult for most Americans to comprehend what it is like to live in a nation which has never experienced the rule of law, and has no “social capital”39 to speak of upon which to base a similar economicpolitical system. Residents of developing nations are hopeful, and want to believe in something better. Thus the damage done by development bandits is quite serious, as they provide clear proof to local people that the developed world operates the same corrupt way as they do. The percentage of aid money that is corrupted on its way into developing nations is unknown, although the corruption index40 gives some guideline. Money provided by World Bank, IMF, USAID, and such large donors as the Soros Foundation, probably has a corruption level near 100 percent in many regions.41 This even extends to gifts of aid in the form of goods as simple as blankets, meals, and generators.42 Most of this is engaged in by locals. However, a key role is played by corrupted westerners, generally civilians. Unfortunately, the prosecution of Stein et al. in 200643 is a rare event because of venue problems. This suggests that the ranks of development bandits are likely to grow until their ranks regularly experience legal retribution.44 Paid-off officials are not going to prosecute a development bandit. Outside of the country in which the crimes took place, there is usually no jurisdiction. Doing something about it will require collaborative legislation and treaty between nations making it possible to prosecute such crimes in a western jurisdiction.45 Additionally, allocation of resources specialized to notice, gather evidence, arrest, and prosecute such people is virtually nil today. PUBLIC RELATIONS WAR: ACCESS CONTROL, LANGUAGE, DENIAL, AND COUNTERATTACK For some warlords, particularly proxy warlords, the public relations (PR) war is the primary arena of battle. For most it is a major element. The most successful will be quite skilled at manipulating the media. The methods used are absurdly simple, and can be mastered by virtually anybody with a bit of chutzpah. To start with, all a warlord must do is make a statement and it tends to get reported straight, with little or no commentary or analysis accompanying it. This is an odd, and hopefully passing, feature of Western press today, a case of ethics run amok into the field of

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near madness. Journalist ethics of our time dictate that when reporting, a journalist must stay out of the story, and simply report what happens or what people say. As a consequence, journalists only feel free to slant or enter their stories when dealing with that which is highly familiar to them, that has established positions within the cultural context the journalist resides, and that are part of their personal identity politics. Because of this, if a warlord announces that he is fighting for freedom, democracy, or the rights of “his people” very few will question it. Once in a while, after years blowing up buses full of civilians, or of hacking off hands and feet, there may be questions brought up as to his sincerity. However, since remarkably little about atrocities outside of the developed world gets reported, lazy or simply ignorant journalists need not account for what the public doesn’t know when they report on such people. Even where the world knows of heinous acts, with a few photo ops, the press will run to him once more if he is a famous warlord. Fame and infamy hardly matter in today’s world of media politics, they are virtually interchangeable, a fact that is probably quite dangerous to the West in this context. By the simple ruse of refusing to speak to anyone who asks inconvenient questions, a warlord can short-circuit the Western press’ questions. By another absurdly simple ruse of saying one thing to the Western press in English, and something else in their native language, a warlord can avoid being questioned by the English-only press and freely exhort his followers as he likes. There is a joke in the non-English speaking world that someone who speaks two languages is bilingual, and someone who speaks one language is American. There is much truth there, and Americans in general need to start learning what is said in languages besides English. Two other basic techniques of the PR war used by warlords are denial and bluster. When asked about child soldiers, opium, bombs, or some other matter, they may simply deny, even if evidence is in full view. If questioned in a situation in which they cannot simply murder or terrify the unpleasant journalist, they will verbally attack, act put upon, and speak of the oppression of their people or something similar. Warlords often appear adept at pushing the political correctness buttons of Western journalists. It would appear likely they make a careful study of our foibles to manipulate them. An excellent example of PR warfare is the contretemps over cartoons depicting Mohammed choreographed by Middle Eastern dictators in concert with Islamist groups.46 It is astounding how effective such methods are since the hypocrisy of it is profound.47 We have seen in Pakistan,48 followed by Iraq,49 an innovative strategy for dealing with the Western press that is working surprisingly well. By the simple method of kidnapping and murdering journalists and others, the insurgency in Iraq has virtually cut off news gathering from

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ordinary Iraqis by Western media outlets, as well as minimizing cultural exchange. The purpose of this move is obvious. Journalists were inconveniently recording for the West that Iraqis were not unhappy enough with the U.S. occupation, presenting a more complex picture than desired. In order to win the PR war, this line of communication had to be cut off or the insurgency would definitely lose. Just as the Western press does not make news out of the strategy of refusing to talk to the press, never has the motivational strategy behind the Iraq insurgency attacking journalists been questioned. Yet, it should be as obvious that insurgent leaders must have a reason for everything they do50 as it is that money paid for favors to a corrupt congressman by lobbyists is a bribe. In this context, a useful lens for understanding warlords can be found in literature that discusses the methods of cult leaders from the viewpoint of people leaving a cult and conversion.51 Reading one of the cited books could prove practically useful to those operating against a warlord since the methods and psychology are parallel. Like some cult leaders, warlords may use brainwashing techniques, a personality cult, and charisma to lead. They also like to recruit the impressionable young. Quite a few warlords, like many cult leaders, display multiple signs of sociopathic personality disorder such as superficial emotions and charm, having few or no friends only victims and accomplices (who often turn into victims), incapacity for empathy, complete lack of sense of responsibility for their actions, given to adult tantrums.52

Warlords may exemplify this with the addition of deadly force for coercion as a matter of course. ADDRESSING WARLORDS Different types of warlords require different approaches for dealing with them. When dealing with a proxy warlord, it is necessary to chart his relationships to those who fund him. Charting and interdicting his sources is generally an intelligence service exercise. It will probably have links and bank accounts across the world, much of it siphoned off for his family and personal use. Part of this siphoning is practical. A warlord cannot afford to appear weak under any circumstances. The more of a financial war chest he has, the more room to move he has around the world. However, this type of warlord and his organization are more likely to break down with his death than others. Make a map of the region controlled by a warlord in two or three levels—for example, (1) complete control, (2) partial control, and (3) frontier—in whatever way this will make sense. Map the economic resources within his territory and flag his relationship to them: coffee, cocoa,

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poppies, transport routes, diamonds, etc. Determine how he controls these resources, what his revenue is from them. An equivalent map should be made of the region of control by the legitimate government, as well as those nations surrounding. For those capable of handling the complexity, and of charting with enough accuracy to be actually useful, creating a diagram of flow of goods, money, arms, and the key players can be worthwhile. The adage, “What you don’t know isn’t nearly as harmful as what you know that isn’t so” definitely applies. There are always key players, a food chain of control and economic opportunity for all flow in the economy. But keep in mind that if one player is removed or compromised, another is likely going to take his place rapidly, perhaps within days. Make plans for where to sell the resources on the legitimate market in cooperation with development agencies and legitimate government prior to taking action. This may require creativity at times to find legitimate buyers for goods. It is imperative that the transition not consist of just wiping out the economy for the people of the area. Simply removing the economy will tend to upset them, and at minimum result in lack of cooperation.53 The object should be to either co-opt or take over control of resources, and shore up the economic prospects of the people of the region in order to help the legitimate government, cutting out those following the resource warlord. Note, for instance, that many miners in Africa have objectively greater potential for earning income (if they survive) in insurgencies like the RUF than by working for the previous owners. Risk is higher, but people have always been willing to take outsized risks for significant rewards. And people everywhere will eventually choose to die on their feet than to live on their knees. Often, it is not practical to completely interdict a warlord’s resources if the resources are too distributed. Consequently, take a divide and conquer approach. Since a military organization functions best when there is central control over payments, this is a place to target. If resources can be broken up so that benefits accrue to lesser leaders in smaller subgroups, this undermines the warlord’s military power. It may then be possible to rope in those lesser leaders, one by one, and it may be possible to punish or eliminate an uncooperative new leader. Once a competitive situation is set up within the former warlord’s territory, those looking to control it for the legitimate government may be able iteratively make deals with the best of the lot. This course is, of course, fraught with the “fog of war” and all the myriad problems of corruption. Any solution is likely to be incomplete to one degree or another. Drug supported warlords are a special problem. A great deal has been tried, to little or no effect. The invisible hand of Adam Smith wins, every time, and each temporary victory brings a new player who is willing to field more effective weapons and tactics in order to conduct trade. Thus, I believe that the only way to remove the warlord’s source of income is

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to eliminate the “risk premium” for the high demand recreational drugs as a matter of national security. This need not be a complete capitulation, restrictions on advertising, sales to minors, and such can be maintained. Social measures that target addiction, and treatment programs paid for out of “sin taxes” will maintain balance. However, there is no other way to actually eliminate the income of warlords fueled by drugs. Restrictions act as a price support system in the form of a risk premium, which creates profits so large that men will always be found willing to take the risk. Not uncommonly, a warlord’s control region will be a de facto fiefdom crossing formal national boundaries. This is an excellent strategy for a warlord to take since it allows him to retreat beyond the reach of conventional militaries that respect formal borders. Cross-border retreat is not an easy problem to solve. It is advisable that the first step in a campaign consist of efforts to seal off the border, being careful not to mistake obstacles to our forces for impenetrable walls to desperate men.54 Additionally, forces local to the region should never be counted on to actually perform as expected, even for payment. Ethnic, religious, and local economic ties will win out, and allow the warlord to escape. Guerilla warriors have often won by doing what opponents believed impossible. U.S. forces did it against the British. Ahmed Shah Massoud did it against the Soviets,55 and Osama bin Laden against U.S. forces. The only thing that really can be done about border crossing is to document it carefully and send it up the chain of command to get the attention of higher-level decision makers or the press to force action. When looking at the warlord’s territory resource map, the areas where new and perhaps more tractable leaders will emerge that have taken over a bit of the old territory, is most likely in the region of lesser control for the warlord. Thus, a move that takes possession of the most central, highest value resource of his territory, but leaves other resources available on its periphery is likely to cause the desired fracturing of his organization. If he is not dead, starving him for resources is absolutely necessary. Prioritize a warlord’s resources by income stream value, generally going after the highest value resources first. Interdict his control and take over the resource and its payment stream for the legitimate government. This should include auditing and controls on the legitimate government to ensure it is not simply another set of kleptocrats which will destabilize the nation long term. A note of caution regarding administration of former warlord- and dictator-controlled regions. It is common for those from the developed world to have little comprehension of how vicious and brutal it is or has been for a people who have lived under the administration of corrupt officials.56 Corrupt officials, however, use as their stock in trade the fact that they are much easier for an outside administrating power to deal with. Corrupt officials study very carefully those who can put them in

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a position of power from which to operate their “gatekeeper” shakedown system. A gatekeeper system is one in which a person obtains a position of power that allows them to collect payments in exchange for allowing some activity to occur. Those from outside should be wary of people who seem to fit into their system like a hand into a glove. Using such people will damage the reputation of an outside agency. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS To effectively combat a warlord, it is crucial that his financial supply system be interdicted. This requires fundamentally different strategy when dealing with a proxy warlord who is paid and supplied by a client, versus a resource warlord who is supplied by his control of assets. The primary method of dealing with a resource warlord is to take physical control of his resource assets and manage them on a fair and equitable way for the nation’s people. This type of military-development action could be legitimized on the international scene. Interdiction of the financial support of resource warlords is possible, but only by taking physical control of the resource. In some cases of diffuse resources, doing so can be functionally difficult or impossible, particularly for illegal commodities such as drugs. In the case of illegal drugs, a system of licensing and legal distribution could be considered, such as was put in place to end the prohibition era’s violence in the United States, and it is the only known method. All other methods simply increase the risk premium on the high demand commodity, resulting in even higher profits for those willing to take the risk. This attracts ever more violent and corrupt individuals to dominate the resource. Proxy warlords, who conduct war for a client who pays the bills, are rarely targeted for removal by the international community, intelligence services, or militaries of developed nations. Not uncommonly, proxy warlords may be negotiated with in good faith. However, since a proxy warlord is incapable of bargaining in good faith to eliminate what he is paid for, negotiation with him is wasted effort. Consequently, it is the supporting power(s) that must be negotiated with. Due to the organization of proxy warlord organizations in particular, imprisoning or killing the warlord himself is a good strategy of negotiation with the warlord and his supporting power(s). When a proxy warlord dies, his organization tends to either fall apart or become more peaceful. At worst, a new leader emerges, but because proxy warlords, by necessity, are usually required to carefully eliminate those too ambitious or too competent, and guard their connection to their support, underlings are unlikely to be as effective. The more often this happens, the more stressed the clientnation supporter becomes. This method is used by warlords against each other, to excellent effect, as Osama bin Laden did with Ahmed Shah Massoud leaving Osama free to conduct his attacks without fear of probable death from Massoud.

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In addition to attempting to address pandemic disease that results in breakdowns of civil society such as in Africa, programs could be instituted to deal with orphans who result. Dealing with the orphans is of higher immediate priority. Huge numbers of orphan males in particular are extremely dangerous “feedstock” into the systems that warlords construct. Housing and educating them in Africa, as well as indoctrinating them in a civilization will remove this source of personnel. If these orphans are not taken care of and provided with real opportunity, they are nearly certain to make war in the hands of warlords. Formal and publicly enunciated discussion of public relations media warfare needs to become commonplace. Public relations war is a primary form of warfare in the modern era. Bring it into the common lexicon, along with sponsoring a basic understanding in the public at large as to how it works and why. Primarily, the public and the journalistic community are able to harass the press into providing more insightful coverage of PR war events and their implications. At present, astonishingly simple-minded methods are nearly perfectly effective. Recognize the problem of development bandits and take steps to allow prosecution for major crimes committed in developing nations in the domicile of the funding organization. In addition, allocate resources to gather evidence, track, and arrest such individuals. They do serious damage to the reputation of the developed world’s democracies, and radically undermine efforts to improve conditions. As in fighting organized crime, a key to opposing warlords is not so much how draconian the threat is against them, but their perception, and that of a potential successor, that they will reliably be caught or killed. The record is clear that only in very rare instances is a warlord going to suffer at the hands of the international community, and the treatment they receive is probably going to be as pleasant as the treatment received by major financial criminal suspects in the developed world if they receive it at all. The current politics of dealing with warlords of a destructive type needs to change radically, or else we must face up to the fact that what we do helps them, and accept their existence as national and transnational political actors. Within the ontology of virtual nonstate actors (VNSAs),57 warlords are a serious challenge for the developed world to counter. In this time when technologies for mass destruction are tilting in favor of asymmetric opponents, being ineffective against them is unacceptable. The strategy and tactics of warlords are fundamentally bold tactics of barbarians against the civilized. Simple techniques of brutality, lying, and going outside the bounds are quite effective against such na¨ıve opponents as we of the developed world have collectively been. We have often been blinded by the seemingly mad brutality and outrageousness of their actions, while for many warlords rewards have been huge. The punishments and losses for the developed world to date have been miniscule, even taking into

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account the recent events of al Qaeda. However, there is little reason to believe they will remain so. This chapter has attempted to take a step toward clarifying their motives and methods so that we can shape policy, strategy, and tactics that are effective. Developing sophistication and effectiveness will not be easy in an open society that values freedom, but it must be done. NOTES 1. Col. Dave Hughes and Robert S. McNamara. “Security in the Contemporary World,” Congressional Record 112, (May 19, 1966), p. 11114. 2. Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. Kiser, and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising: Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005); Maj. Troy S. Thomas, USAF, and Maj. William D. Casebeer, USAF, “Violent Non-State Actors: Countering Dynamic Systems,” Strategic Insights 3, Issue 3 (March 2004). Available at http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/casebeerMar04.asp 3. Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World’s Most Precious Stones (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002). 4. Ibid.; and for a collection of somewhat gruesome examples from around the world, see Robert Young Pelton, ed. Hot Spots: Travel in Harm’s Way (Redondo Beach, CA: Fielding Worldwide, Inc., 1998). 5. Campbell, Blood Diamonds. 6. Philippe LeBillon, “The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts,” Political Geography 20 (2001): 561–584. 7. Joshua M. Epstein and Robert L. Axtell, Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up (Washington, DC, Cambridge, MA, London: The Brookings Institution Press & The MIT Press, 1996). 8. Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works—Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). 9. Sanyika Shakur, Monster : Autobiography of an L.A. Gang Member (New York: Grove Press, 1993). 10. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Arlington, VA: RAND Corp., 2001). 11. Ibid. 12. George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History (New York: Grove/Atlantic, Inc., 2003). 13. Byman, Chalk, et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. 14. Jonathan Boggs, Blowback: A Study of U.S Foreign Policy in Afghanistan from 1979–2004 (Harvard Graduate School of Education, 2004). Available at http:// gseweb.harvard.edu/∼t656 web/peace/Articles Spring 2004/Boggs Jonathan Afghanistan blowback.htm(accessed February 11, 2006). 15. Not enough attention has been paid to the methods of recruitment and training of such organizations as the Fedayeen. Their precursors are probably the Janissaries of the Ottoman empire. In brief, young boys around the age of 6 are taken from their families and raised to be warriors who worship the leader.

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16. Interview with author, Republic of Georgia, June 2000. In my conversation with the nephew of a KGB field officer on the commission percentages for a $25 million World Bank loan, the Loan “Agent” claimed 20–25 percent. Kickbacks were required at each step in the food chain. Roughly 20 percent of the original loan probably went to actual project work. 17. Campbell, Blood Diamonds. 18. Fred Bridgeland, “Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa,” African Affairs 86 (April 1987): 276–277. 19. Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola’s People (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1973). 20. BBC, Key Afghan Players: Who’s Who (BBC, 2005). http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/ hi/world/south asia/3706370.stm (accessed January 20, 2006). 21. Arnold M. Ludwig, King of the Mountain—The Nature of Political Leadership (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2002). 22. Campbell, Blood Diamonds. 23. Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe 1989–1998 (New York: St Martins Press, 1998). 24. Keith Laidler, Female Caligula: Ranavalona, The Mad Queen of Madagascar (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005). 25. Campbell, Blood Diamonds. 26. Staff, “A Continent Of Orphans” in Global Policy Forum—Republished from The Economist Global Agenda, London, 2002, http://www.globalpolicy.org/ socecon/develop/aids/2002/1127orphans.htm (accessed January 22, 2006); http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story id=E1 TQGVTJP (accessed January 22, 2006). 27. J Chin and S K. Lwanga, “Estimation and Projection of Adult AIDS Cases: A Simple Epidemiological Model,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 69 (1991): 399–406. 28. Staff. “World Not Doing Nearly Enough to Protect Children Affected by AIDS.” UNAIDS. UNICEF, Department for International Development. New York, (February 2006) http://data.unaids.org/pub/PressRelease/2006/pr gpf 20060209 en.pdf (accessed March 3, 2007) 29. John Stover, Neff Walker, Geoff P Garnett, Joshua A Salomon, Karen A Stanecki, Peter D Ghys, Nicholas C Grassly, Roy M Anderson, Bernhard Schwartl¨ander “Can we reverse the HIV/AIDS pandemic with an expanded responce?” The Lancet 360(9326) (July 6, 2002): 73–77. Also available without subscription: http://www.globalhealth.harvard.edu/hcpds/documents/Stover EtAl HIVInfectionsAverted Lancet2002.pdf (accessed March 4, 2007). 30. David E Bloom and David Canning, “The Health and Wealth of Africa,” World Economics Journal 5 (April–June 2004): 57–81. 31. David E Bloom, Ajay Mahal, Jaypee Sevilla, and River-Path-Associates, AIDS & Economics, ed. WHO (International AIDS Economics Network, IAEN.ORG, 2001) (accessed January 22, 2006). 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2005) (Originally published 1961); David

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Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 2005) (Originally published 1964). 35. Bob Coen, AP & Reuters, Zimbabwe President Mugabe Labels White Farmers “Enemies” (CNN, 2000), http://archives.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/04/18/ zimbabwe.land.03/ (accessed January 20, 2006). 36. For example, see Pelton, Hot Spots. 37. Campbell, Blood Diamonds. 38. Staff, Sierra Leone—Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, ed. Bureau of Democracy, H. R., and Labor (Washington, DC: U.S. State Department, 2003). http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27750.htm(accessed February 2, 2006). 39. Alejandro Portes, “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (August 1998), 1–24; Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A CrossCountry Investigation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (November 1997): 1251–1288. 40. Staff, 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index (Berlin, Germany: Transparency International—The Global Coalition against Corruption, 2005) http://www. transparency.org/policy and research/surveys indices/cpi/2005 (accessed February 18, 2006). 41. Interview with author (see earlier note about my conversation with the nephew of a KGB field officer on the commission percentages for a $25 million World Bank loan). Also, interview between author and an academic at a prominent university in the Caucasus (Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2001), who casually related that local Soros Foundation personnel would allocate grants in return for 30 percent kickbacks. Additionally, I learned how student stipends of several hundred dollars per month by the Soros Foundation, when professors were paid $25 per month, resulted in such students passing all courses in return for supporting their professors. 42. The “Generator Mafia” got its start during the aftermath of the Georgian civil war when aid agencies distributed generators, heaters, and kerosene stoves. The generators were appropriated by certain relatives and friends of Eduard Shevardnadze as theirs, since Eduard had no budget, and he had to rule by doling out opportunities for graft and corruption to supporters. To put extra money into the pockets of the “Generator Mafia” during the coldest times of the year, electricity would be shut off to large sections of the city to force generator sales to occur. (Author’s notes, Generator Mafia Investigation. Tbilisi, Georgia, in 2000). 43. James Glanz, “Funds for Iraq Spent on Real Estate and a Cessna,” in New York Times (online) 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/international/ middleeast/02reconstruct.html? r=1 (accessed February 6, 2006). 44. Epstein, and Axtell, Growing Artificial Societies.; Hokky Sutingir, Moneyscape: A Generic Agent-Based Model of Corruption. Working Paper WPC2003 (Bandung Fe Institute, 2003); Hokky Sutingir, “The Dynamics of Corruption,” Journal of Social Complexity 1 (September 2003): 3–17; and Ross Hammond, Endogenous Transition Dynamics in Corruption: An Agent-Based Computer Model (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000).

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45. It should not be construed that these suggestions apply to the usual and necessary small-time bribes and similar operating procedures necessary for operating within a corrupt regime. 46. Staff, Editorial, “Clash of Civilization—The Dictators behind Those Muslim Cartoon Protests,” Wall Street Journal (February 11, 2006), http://www. opinionjournal.com/weekend/hottopic/?id=110007956. 47. Staff, Offensive Cartoons—Media Apologize for Offending Muslims While Ignoring Anti-Semitic Cartoons in Honest Reporting—Media Critique (February 11, 2006), http://www.honestreporting.com/articles/45884734/critiques/Offensive Cartoons.asp;Tom Gross, Cartoons from the Arab World in Tom Gross—Mideast Media Analysis (February 11, 2006, circa 2005), http://www.tomgrossmedia.com/ ArabCartoons.htm; Gerald Traufetter, Interview with Hirsi Ali in Der Spiegel (February 11, 2006). http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0, 1518,399263,00.html. 48. Mariane Pearl, and Sarah Crichton, A Mighty Heart: The Brave Life and Death of My Husband, Danny Pearl (New York: Scribner, 2003). 49. Staff, From Iraq to Philippines, murder is top cause of journalist deaths in ‘05 (New York: Committee to Protect Journalists, 2006), http://www.cpj. org/Briefings/2006/killed 05/killed release 03jan05.html (accessed February 17, 2006). 50. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works. 51. Madeleine Landau Tobias, and Janja Lalich, Captive Hearts, Captive Minds: Freedom and Recovery from Cults and Other Abusive Relationships (Alameda, CA: Hunter House, Inc., 1994); Steven Hassan, Releasing The Bonds: Empowering People to Think for Themselves (Dansbury, CT: Aitan Publishing Company, 2000); William Sargant, Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and Brainwashing (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) (Originally published 1957). 52. Tobias and Lalich, Captive Hearts, Captive Minds. 53. LeBillon, “The Political Ecology of War” 54. Interview with author, September 2002. David Kline spent years with Massoud’s northern alliance as a journalist. He personally crossed the mountains from Tora Bora into Pakistan fleeing the Russian military, and hid under his dirty blanket to disguise himself as a rock. He described the crossing as very difficult, saying he would not have survived without Massoud’s men to pick him up off the ground and force him to continue. Mr. Kline now lives in San Francisco. 55. Ibid. 56. Hyder Akbar, “Come Back to Afghanistan—Teenage Embed, Part 2” on This American Life, Afghanistan/USA, WBEZ Chicago Public Radio, January 31, 2003. Available at http://www.thislife.org/pages/descriptions/03/254.html. 57. Thomas, Kiser, and Casebeer, Warlords Rising. 58. LeBillon, “The Political Ecology of War.” (Note: The table shown contains minor edits by Brian Hanley).

PART III SOCIETY, TECHNOLOGY, AND STRATEGIC INFLUENCE

CHAPTER 17 RESPONDING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ROOTS OF TERRORISM Bard E. O’Neill and Donald J. Alberts

Political terrorism is usually defined as the threat or use of physical coercion against noncombatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various long- and short-term objectives. It is a form or method of warfare that may be conducted within and/or across the borders of nation-states. The perpetrators may be individuals (so-called lone wolves), states, or insurgent organizations. This chapter focuses on the latter, since presently they are of greatest concern.1 Many insurgent groups—if not most—engage in terrorism, often in concert with other forms of violence, particularly guerrilla warfare (from hit and run attacks against the military and police to sabotage of critical infrastructure). The long-term political aims of a group may be one or more of the following: to secede from an existing nation-state, to fundamentally change the political system, to remove the ruling authorities, to compel the government to adopt social, economic, and/or political changes or to maintain the status quo. Short-term objectives are clustered in different combinations that vary according to time and circumstances. They include such things as publicizing the cause, boosting recruitment, diminishing the appeal of rival groups, maintaining the integrity of the organization, undermining the legitimacy of the government, freeing prisoners, preventing conflict resolution, being recognized as a legitimate party to peace negotiations, and exacting revenge.

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Besides goals and forms of warfare, insurgent groups vary considerably with respect to strategies, physical and human environments, popular support, organizational formats and leadership, cohesion and sources of external support. As a consequence, there can be no single, all-encompassing profile of an insurgent or terrorist. This is crucial to bear in mind as we concentrate on the psychological, social, economic, and political causes (roots) of terrorism in this chapter. Simply put, different combinations of causes explain political violence and terrorism in different cases; therefore, prejudgments, presumptions, and overgeneralizations about causes can be hazardous, misleading and, at times, counterproductive. In every situation, accurately diagnosing causes of political violence depends on an open mind and solid empirical data. The following discussion addresses possible causes of terrorism and considers remedies for mitigating them. Since information about most insurgencies is incomplete, understanding and countering them is as much an informed art as a science. THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM Psychological Some analysts focus on individuals to ascertain the cause of terrorism. Typical of this psychoanalytic approach is the notion that terrorists are born, not made. While noting that most terrorists are not insane, psychologist Jerrold Post suggests traits and tendencies that characterize a disproportionate number of individuals who are drawn to terrorism. These traits and tendencies, which create a predisposition to violence, are rooted in unresolved childhood psychological stresses that can result in a split personality that retains the perceived good aspects of the self but projects the bad on to other people, whose evil justifies the use of violence against them. In many cases, especially those involving persons of middle- or upper-class origins, inner torments and the so-called injured self are attributable to the resentment of parents, especially authoritarian fathers, while in others they are ascribed to anger at the repression parents suffered at the hands of members of other social groups. In the former situation, feelings of inadequacy are resolved by rejecting social and political values that were dominant in the family setting and directing acts of protest and/or violence at those who play key roles in upholding such values—typically, political and business leaders, who are characterized as hypocritical and corrupt.2 The attraction of left-wing groups to such individuals was evident in the United States, Europe, and Japan in the second half of the twentieth century, with the Weather Underground in the United States, the Red Army Faction in Germany, and the Japanese Red Army as cases in point. As for those whose parents were victimized, activism and violence are directed

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at the victimizers, with secessionist (nationalist) movements—like Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the Irish Republican Army (provisional wing)—being examples. More recently, some observers have speculated that childhood experiences within the family may explain the violent anger of individuals like Osama bin Laden and the principal September 11 hijacker, Muhammad Atta. In the bin Laden situation, the injured self might be traced to the second-class status of his mother in a family where his father had multiple wives, something that bin Laden would have been aware of—and no doubt reminded of—by siblings born from other mothers. Add to this the reported indifference bin Laden’s father is said to have shown toward him, and an evolving belief that everything would be resolved in the hereafter when a heroic son and religious father are rejoined, and one has the ingredients of a psychological explanation, however conjectural and heuristic, for bin Laden’s behavior. As for Atta, anger and resentment may also have had to do with father–son relations—in this case, an overbearing father who ridiculed his son as another daughter because as a youngster Atta was dressed as a girl and as a teenager still bounced on his mother’s knee.3 The speculation in both these cases is that ridicule, humiliation, neglect, failure, or some combination thereof produced a lack of self-esteem that led these individuals to join groups that could provide them with a sense of worth. As interesting as past and present psychoanalytic research into violence and terrorism may be, experts are quick to identify its limitations. First of all, there is a paucity of data for most individual cases as well as for crossnational comparative analysis. Secondly, when data is available, it often surfaces long after attacks have occurred, and may be compromised by new motivations such as prisoners wishing to ingratiate themselves with authorities. Third, even when information is available, it is normally based on interviews rather than a lengthy period of psychoanalysis. Fourth, as suggested above, it is hard to explain why some people with essentially the same background opt for terrorist violence while others choose nonviolent alternatives.4 In an excellent survey of literature dealing with psychology and terrorism, Randy Borum sums it up this way: “Personality traits consistently have failed to explain most types of human behaviors, including violent behaviors. Certainly, they have been shown repeatedly to contribute less to an explanation than situational or contextual factors.”5 Indeed, as Mark Juergensmeyer reminds us, most studies of the psychology of terrorism focus on the way people react to social circumstances that make acts of public violence possible.6 A long-standing view among sociologists, organizational theorists, and psychologists posits that for those alienated by perceived injustices and made to feel insignificant and powerless by either family members or outsiders, joining groups of like-minded peers in a noble cause can provide

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camaraderie, security, status, empowerment, opportunities for action and particularly self-esteem. In a word, individuals can enhance their ability to change their existential circumstances and acquire a sense of identity and belonging by fusing with others in a common cause.7 The idea of joining groups to alleviate injustice of some sort brings us to the social, cultural, economic, and political causes of terrorism, since it is there that we find potential sources of injustice, whether perceived or real. Environmental Explanations Although the analysis of social, cultural, economic, and political “causes” of violence has been around a long time, no one has fashioned a unified theory that somehow weights the causes (factors) with near mathematical precision, largely because their prevalence and significance varies in different situations.8 Instead, there are informed propositions and hypotheses that help us explain and, at times, anticipate terrorism and political violence. In the interests of parsimony, we will use a fourfold breakdown: cultural, social, economic, and political. Cultural causes are rooted in the salient values, attitudes, and beliefs that people manifest with respect to the cosmos, man, society, authority, and behavior. Our main focus is on those that have important implications for political terrorism. Given the tremendous diversity among cultures, it would go well beyond our purposes and competence if we tried to develop a comprehensive cross-cultural classification scheme and relate it to terrorism. A more practical approach in light of these limitations is to deal with the cultural variable on a case-by-case basis. The study of any situation involving terrorism must include a decent understanding of the major cultural and behavioral attributes of the parties to the conflict, followed by a careful analysis of the linkages between those attributes and various aspects of terrorism. Attitudes to watch out for as part of the causal mix are interpersonal and intergroup distrust and a proclivity to rely on violent means to resolve disputes. Take, for instance, terrorist violence that has afflicted Iraq and the Balkans. To fully understand the scope and intensity of regime and insurgent terrorism in Iraq, one must examine the socialization process in tribes, which in early childhood is marked by inculcation of distrust, expectation of revenge, and acceptance—if not instigation—of violence as a way to settle disputes.9 Likewise, the excessive use of terrorism by both sides in Kosovo was explicable in a culture where a high tolerance for violence against rival social groups and a dismissive attitude toward civilmilitary distinctions mixed with the high value ascribed to revenge. It should not be inferred from the preceding examples that socialization in Western cultures has not been conducive to terrorism. History, as we know from the Crusades, Religious Wars, and the Inquisition, suggests

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otherwise. In more recent times, the terror of the Holocaust was the product of one of the most civilized Western countries. Nonetheless, it would be an egregious error to allow Western sins and imperfections to blind us to cultural differences that may help us better understand terrorism in today’s world. Contemporary Western cultural values stress legal rather than violent resolution of interpersonal and intergroup conflict and the minimization of civilian casualties when force is deemed necessary. By contrast, in a place like Afghanistan, violent resolution of many issues—even trivial ones—is common, and often involves attacks and reprisals against innocent noncombatants. The point is that some cultures have a high tolerance for violence and thus are more conducive to terrorism. The slaughter of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and especially Hazaras by Pashtun-dominated Taliban (and vice versa) in Afghanistan during the 1990s illustrates the point. Social causes of terrorism are to be found in the historical interaction and structures of classes and castes, as well as ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Social classes are marked by the differentiation of the population according to income, education, and occupation and the status that is ascribed thereto. It is well understood that classes may become alienated from—and resentful toward—one another and that this may lead to violent interaction. The occurrence and extent of violence depends on a number of things. One factor that seems to preclude or moderate class antagonism is the perception that the material benefits offered by society are either fairly distributed or within reach of all classes, especially the literate ones. Such thinking underpins the common belief that a large middle class is conducive to stability. This is fine as long as most members of the middle class are either benefiting or anticipate benefiting materially. Where they are not and there is little hope that they will, the potential for trouble grows, since educated but deprived groups sometimes turn to extralegal means to remedy their situation. Sociological profiles of Islamic militants and their supporters in Egypt, for instance, reveal that they are largely underemployed lower middle class people who have come from rural areas, received some higher education, and settled in urban ghettos.10 While it may seem counterintuitive, the poorest class is often less inclined toward violence, even though it is the most deprived. In Latin America, for example, the urban and rural poor have long been among the most conservative segments of society. Elsewhere, the situation is often otherwise, as the effects of globalization—particularly the flow of information—reach the most deprived corners of the world; witness the recent evolution and tenacity of egalitarian insurgent groups such as the Maoist Naxalites in India, the New People’s Army in the Philippines, and the Maoist Front for the Liberation of Nepal, as well as reformist ones like the Front for Emancipation of the Niger Delta in Nigeria.11 While it is true

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that some previous and current insurgent groups such as al Qaeda have been composed largely of discontented and occasionally deprived but educated elements of the upper and middle classes, the historical record shows that in many others, including Islamic ones, peasants, workers, and nomads have played a key (sometimes dominant) role, albeit usually in the rank and file. A striking example is Bedouin terrorists who, acting in the name of Islam and inspired by bin Laden, carried out bombings and suicide attacks in the northern Sinai towns of Taba in 2004, Sharm el-Sheik in 2005, and Dahab in 2006. The brother of one of the bombers singled out poverty, unemployment, and misery as the core issue and asked: “Why would he go and do this if he had a decent life?” He then added: “This life isn’t worth living.”12 What all of this suggests is that given the variegated class backgrounds of terrorists, a priori assumptions about the social makeup of any terrorist group are no substitute for empirical analysis. Caste members experience deprivations similar to—and in many cases worse than—those separated by classes. However, since rigid social and economic discrimination is usually institutionalized and legitimized philosophically and religiously, it has enjoyed fatalistic acceptance and thus generated less terrorism than interclass relations. Although this may change with the advent of government reform in response to increased awareness and political activism, such change will not come easily. A case in point is India, where members of the higher and middle classes have increasingly inflicted terrorist atrocities against the lowest castes in order to preserve their privileged positions. Analyses of survey and voting data by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies in New Delhi have presented clear evidence that the apathy and lack of organization of the lowest castes has been gradually giving way to political activism. Such activism has involved violent reprisals for massacres perpetrated by upper- and middle-caste terrorists. For example, the systematic killing of 33 Dalits (untouchables or oppressed ones) in 1999 by Ranbir Sena, a group believed to be backed by wealthy landowners, led to the slaughter of upper-caste villagers by the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), a group that had been organizing deprived laborers and peasants and warning of further massacres if the killing of Dalits continued. Adding to the pessimism, author Pankaj Mishra argued in July 2006 that “The potential for conflict—among castes as well as classes—also grows in urban areas, where India’s cruel social and economic disparities are as evident as its new prosperity.”13 A situation that is especially fraught with great peril is one where class differences coincide with—and reinforce—racial, ethnic, or religious divisions that alone can give rise to violence and terrorism. Indeed, recent conflict patterns suggest that the prevalence of terrorism is greater between and among primary groups than social classes.

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If racial, ethnic, and religious groups are coterminous with nationstates, we can speak of national cultures and structures. Where two or more groups with distinct senses of identity exist within the borders of a nation-state, the term subnationalism is often used to characterize the group; where the differing identities are reinforced by major differences in social values, structures, and language, the term subculture is applicable. Differences between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, and Serbs and Croats in Bosnia are best seen as subnational, since the groups manifest many similarities in social values and organization. In Kosovo, by contrast, the clashing identities of Serbs and Albanians (Kosovars) are deepened by cultural, religious, and linguistic distinctions.14 Differentiating between subnationalism and subculturalism is not academic hair splitting, since the process of compromise and reconciliation necessary to reduce and eliminate terrorism is more difficult when groups lack shared social values and structures on which to build trust and facilitate communication. Be that as it may, as the wellpublicized and extraordinarily brutal violence between the groups noted above amply demonstrates, both subnationalism and subculturalism are conducive to horrific outbreaks of terrorism. Since, as noted above, specific subcultural traits can be contributing causes of political violence and terrorism, we need to know and comprehend the attitudes and beliefs regarding the use of coercion against both group members and outsiders, particularly occupying forces from other countries that historically have been deeply resented and thus stimulated the emergence of countless nationalist movements.15 Attitudes and beliefs will range from pacifist ones that condemn violence (e.g., Quakers), to those that justify violence under certain conditions (e.g., most major religions), to those for whom violence is taken for granted if not expected (e.g., Comanche and Apache Indians in nineteenth-century America, and previously mentioned Takriti tribes in Iraq). This raises two closely related questions. First, do groups that are more inclined to use violence receive additional impetus from expectations that vengeance must be taken against outsiders who physically attack them and/or affront their honor? Second, if this is the case, are there social mechanisms that can mitigate revenge (e.g., apologies and agreed monetary payments to the aggrieved party)? With the answers to these questions in hand, we will be better equipped to comprehend the scope, intensity, and duration of intergroup terrorism and ways it might be blunted, if not eliminated. Groups with a legacy of violent interaction and conflict are obviously of greatest concern when it comes to terrorism. Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, and Kosovars and Serbs in Yugoslavia all figure prominently here. In the case of the last two pairs, violent rivalries that had been dormant for a long time were reactivated and exploited by politicians. The savagery

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and atrocities that followed suggest clearly that even where violence may be latent, it is important to carefully assess the underlying culture and history of rival groups that live next to one another. Doing so may not enable us to predict the moment, extent, or type of violence, but it may alert us that there is greater potential for it in some situations than others. The exploitation of that potential for political violence and terrorism is linked to economic and political factors. That economic factors and trends may contribute to terrorism is, as we have discussed, well understood. Widespread poverty and misery and the perception that there is little hope of alleviating them are conducive to violence because they produce a potential pool of recruits for terrorist groups. This situation is often accentuated when a period of economic improvement is followed by precipitous decline (the so-called J curve) or where, as Ted Robert Gurr points out, there is a sense of deprivation relative to other groups or one’s own expectations.16 Whether individuals or groups that perceive themselves as deprived economically remain passive or take up arms and grow will be affected by assessments of the political opportunities available for resolving their predicament. This brings us to the political causes of terrorism. Two general considerations stand out with respect to political opportunities. The first has to do with the responsiveness of the political authorities, the second with the emergence of a viable opposition. In terms of the first, the question is whether the authorities are willing and able to convince deprived sectors of society that they are seriously listening and intend to address their grievances. This requires some autonomous mechanisms—e.g., interest groups, parties, the media, professional associations—for nonviolent interest articulation. Functioning channels of participation can buy time for authorities. If that time is used to reduce gross economic inequities, the prospects for avoiding or reducing violence may improve. However, if participation is repressed, hope can fade and some erstwhile nonviolent political activists may look for alternatives.17 The search for alternatives focuses on the flip side of the political coin. The issue is whether there are activists who combine plausible—if not compelling—ideas about how to achieve a better future with organizational skills, determination, and a willingness to use violence. When such leaders, especially charismatic ones, emerge, chances are greater that some members of politically repressed and deprived classes or groups will be enticed to join terrorist groups. Once that happens, the previously mentioned psychological benefits—self worth, security, comradeship, and so on—begin to accrue and solidify. A superb portrayal of the complex interplay of economic, political, and psychological factors that account for terrorism is provided in Jeffrey A. Nedoroscik’s analysis of Islamic militants in Upper (Southern) Egypt.

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Isolated politically, economically, and socially from the remainder of the country, Upper Egyptians found themselves in dire social and economic straits. Upper Egyptians are divided into three social groups: the ashraf, who claim descent from Mohammad, Arabs who originated in Arabia, and non-Arab fellaheen, whose ancestors can be traced to the time of the pharaohs. The fellaheen historically were at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale. Nevertheless, though they remained in poverty, their opportunities increased somewhat with respect to education and employment under the socialist regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–1970). But, this proved short-lived, as Nasser’s death in September 1970 and the gradual dismantling of his socialist policies by his successor, Anwar as-Sadat, wiped out the few gains that had been made. The economic regression produced growing disillusionment among young and newly educated fellaheen, thus rendering them vulnerable to the appeals of Islamic militants who offered a diagnosis of the problem, a guilty party, a vision for the future, and an organization that claimed it could actualize the vision. The militant appeals stood in marked contrast to the Egyptian government’s political neglect and disenfranchisement of the fellaheen. Hence, it was not hard to explain why militant Islamic groups like the Islamic Group found many recruits in Upper Egypt.18 The Dynamics of Change The Egyptian case suggests that our discussion of social, economic, and political factors is necessary but not sufficient for understanding the environmental context of insurgent terrorism. What needs to be added is an assessment of the disruptive psychological effects of the process of socioeconomic change itself. In particular, we need to look at the relationship between two things. The first is the ability of governments to meet rising material expectations stimulated by steadily growing informational awareness, elite promises, and increased education. The second is the disorientation caused by a shift from rural traditional social settings— in which one’s station in life is determined by birth (ascription), benefits depend on loyalty, and behavior is restrained by religious norms— to impersonalized urban centers where social mobility is deemed possible, advancement depends on achievement, rewards are determined by merit, and behavior is increasingly influenced by secularism and materialism. For some, this presents an overwhelming challenge and they reject modernism altogether. Others who accept the challenge often compromise their old values but end up with little material compensation. Relatively young, unemployed or underemployed, restless and psychologically cut off from the old social setting, they too become threatened and rootless in the new one. Humiliated, alienated, and hopeless, they are vulnerable to insurgent recruiters that promise to return their souls, empower them,

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give them meaning, and lead them either back to a traditional golden age of the past or forward to a future utopia.19 As the preceding discussion of social, economic, and political factors reminds us, economic deprivation is not the only cause of terrorism. Indeed, as Gurr notes, deprivation with respect to power (participation and security) and interpersonal needs (status, communality, and ideational coherence) may be more important.20

RESPONDING TO THE CAUSES OF TERRORISM In post mortems following major terrorist incidents, calls to address the root causes of terrorism rather than to rely simply on security and military measures are commonplace. This is nothing new. Students of counterinsurgency have been well aware of this truism for decades. The questions are: what and how important are the causes of violence, is there is political will to make needed changes to ameliorate the situation, and what exactly should be done on the strategic and operational levels. While it is tempting to try to produce a universal blueprint or plan for addressing root causes of terrorism, such an undertaking would be a fool’s errand and, in some instances, harmful because of situational differences, incomplete information, and our imprecise understanding of social, economic, and political change and its effects. Consequently, the best approach is a pragmatic one that emphasizes principles and guidelines based on insights gleaned from a comparative analysis of insurgencies where terrorism has been prominent. Central to this undertaking is uncovering similarities and differences among cases and their implications. Striking similarities can alert us to successes that might be emulated and failures that should be avoided. For example, since heavy-handed and indiscriminate use of force usually escalates and intensifies an insurgency, as happened in the earliest phases of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka, knowledge of this should raise immediate caution flags when the use of force is contemplated.21

Overarching Guidelines Three general guidelines should frame the response to the environmental causes of terrorism. The first is to set realistic expectations. Like crime, political terrorism will not disappear anytime soon, if ever. A realistic aim would be to reduce its incidence and impact to the point where it is a marginal phenomenon. A corollary is to understand that in particularly difficult situations, such as the current ones in Iraq, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and India, the campaign to reduce terrorism will often be a very long one marked by periodic setbacks and uneven outcomes. Such

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an understanding is more likely to produce the patience, determination, calibrated actions, and equanimity that are necessary for ultimate success. A second guideline is to concentrate on insurgency, a larger politicalmilitary phenomenon of which terrorism is but one aspect. This permits us to better understand terrorism’s connection to—and interdependency with—other factors that affect its utility and effectiveness. As important as it is, an exclusive emphasis on environmental causes of terrorism amounts to only partial analysis. At some point, it has to be integrated with assessments of insurgents with respect to their grand strategies; the effect of the physical setting; the scope and nature of popular support and the techniques for acquiring it; the structure and functioning of their organization; disunity and the exact reasons for it; and what type of external support they receive, who provides it and for what reasons.22 Keeping this bigger picture in mind will reveal that in some scenarios there may be more important things than psychological, social, economic, and political causes. It also leads to our third guideline: the need for a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. A comprehensive strategy is one that avoids the false dichotomy that argues for the use of either force or soft power. It instead calls for the use of all instruments of power—diplomacy, economics, information, military, and law enforcement—in a mutually reinforcing manner. How they will be used depends on a careful, systematic, and holistic analysis of the insurgency. Such an analysis is a prerequisite for suggesting psychological, social, economic, and political changes that may be relevant and effective in mitigating the causes of political violence. Countering Psychological Causes As we have seen, psychoanalytic explanations of terrorism are of little value, in large part because of the lack of information about most active terrorists. Moreover, even if we had accurate diagnoses, addressing psychotic, mood, and personality disorders or lesser maladies would require terrorists to give up their clandestine existence for long-term therapy, a clearly impractical and unrealistic expectation. Of more interest is the previously discussed idea that many in the terrorist underworld are there because of a need for belonging, identity, and rectifying perceived injustice. To fulfill and exploit these needs, effective insurgent organizations proffer a blend of ideological and material incentives. Since the needs will not quickly disappear, the counterterrorist response should be to dissuade and deflect vulnerable individuals from joining (or, if they have joined, to entice them to leave) by offering ideological alternatives and appropriate social, economic, and political reforms. We define ideology as an interrelated series of ideas that purport to explain the past and present and to depict, if not predict, the future. These

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ideas may be religious (sacred) or secular, and are said to represent truths about society and human behavior. Because of their metaphysical or theoretical nature, ideological appeals can be attractive to those searching for interpretative analyses that not only explain what has gone wrong, but more importantly identify friend and foe clearly and provide prescriptions for setting things right. This makes it imperative to develop persuasive and compelling alternative values, arguments, and ideas to refute theories articulated by terrorist leaders on both the left and right. In some cases, they may have the added aim of eliciting active support against terrorists. But, once individuals have joined or otherwise actively supported terrorist groups for ideological reasons, it is difficult to win them back, because of the psychological and emotional investments they have made. This is especially so when religious ideas are involved. To undercut religious appeals of terrorist groups, indigenous opinionmakers must make the case through information and education campaigns that terrorist leaders are disingenuous, selfish individuals who hypocritically violate and distort the most sacred norms of the faith for reasons of political expediency. This is exactly what the Egyptian government did when it called on mainstream Islamic preachers and renowned scholars to condemn the religious ideas of militant groups as part of its antiterrorist strategy in the 1990s. It is what the Saudi government belatedly decided to do by 2005 in response to a growing and entrenched threat by al Qaeda terrorists inside the Kingdom. In the Saudi case, the magnitude of the effort required to counter decades of teaching hatred for infidel outsiders and their perceived domestic accomplices was addressed in a remarkable study of counterterrorism strategy by Yusuf bin-Ahmad al-Uthaymayan, published in Riyadh Al-Jazirah in December 2005 and January 2006. Arguing for a comprehensive strategy, he put it this way: “We have to know accurately the intellectual atmosphere, cultural sources, social grounds, institutions, and activities that nurture terrorism within the society, reproduce it, regenerate it, spread it, propagate it, and make it glamorous and “attractive” to the hearts and minds of the youths and sympathizers.”23 The real source of danger, he argues, is the sympathizers, because they are the incubators and transmitters of the terrorism virus. Studying the intellectual milieu and social framework in which they live is the basic key to the ideal method of dealing with terrorism. Since the war on terrorism is a war of thoughts, minds, souls, and convictions, Yusuf proposes nothing less than a wide range of corrective measures that should proceed along two tracks. The first is reformation of the religious message and the institutions influenced by it in order to produce moderation, tolerance, dialogue, and recognition of others. The second is to weaken the attraction of extremist ideas, especially to the youth, through social, political, cultural, and

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economic reforms that touch all institutions involved in the socialization process.24 Countering Environmental Causes Crafting and implementing a reform package anywhere is contingent on a meticulous and unbiased assessment of the kind of social, economic, and political dynamics discussed earlier. This is essential for uncovering the causes of political violence and identifying obstacles that both sides face with regard to implementing their strategies and policies. From the counterterrorist perspective, a wide-ranging review can reveal critical and specific social, economic, and political problems that need to be resolved, at least partially, if the potential for terrorism is to be diminished; it can also provide insights into the feasibility of various antidotes. The more complete the analysis, the better, since incomplete reviews run the risk of focusing on only part of the problem and ignoring the interrelatedness of social, economic, and political factors. For example, underlying the multiple insurrections faced by the Philippine government for the last 30 years or so is a pattern of deep social and economic disparities that suggest a need for land reform. However, a careful analysis of environmental causes also reveals that land reform would not be a panacea because the high population growth rate could well render the effects of land reform inadequate, if not inconsequential. This implies that the population problem must be dealt with and that other policies would be necessary to cope with the disappointments engendered when hopes associated with land reform go unfulfilled. Making this a moot point and matters worse is the reality that devising solutions to the problems associated by interconnected demographic, social, and economic realities in the near term is severely impeded by a political system that permits entrenched wealthy elites to block reforms. That this stagnation, corruption, and immobility has played into the hands of both left- and right-wing terrorist organizations in the Philippines is obvious. To avoid undue pessimism and political paralysis when confronting daunting environmental causes of political violence, it is useful to bear in mind situations like Oman, where reform and change undermined the appeal of insurgents. During the 1960s, the human milieu in Oman was conducive to violence in the form of guerrilla warfare and scattered terrorism because ethnolinguistic differences between the jebalis (mountain people) and the coastal population were exacerbated by the relative deprivation caused by administrative neglect and unwillingness to commit resources to the mountainous regions. Under such circumstances, tribal and religious differences were exploited by a succession of militants, who escalated violence and took control of parts of the mountains in the southern

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province of Dhofar and sought to link activity there to the Green Mountain in the northern part of the country. As things turned out, a coup in 1970 brought to power a new Sultan who ended the neglect by emphasizing an administrative and military presence in the mountains, as well as providing at least some health, educational, and agricultural services in the region. These reforms helped undermine popular support for the militants, led to a steadily increasing flow of defectors and resulted in a gradual diminution of political violence. This underscores the point that governments are capable of affecting socioeconomic environment in positive ways once they understand the specific problems and opportunities it presents.25 A comparison of the Omani situation with the negative Russian experience in Afghanistan demonstrates vividly that understanding social values and structures can preclude counterinsurgency blunders. Reforms in Oman were effective, not just because they met some material needs, but also because they did not involve substantial government intrusion into local affairs that would have threatened tribal values and structures. In Afghanistan, by contrast, ambitious land, education, and marriage reforms adopted by the ruling People’s Democratic Party in the immediate wake of a coup in April 1978 played a major part in igniting violent resistance. In places like El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Philippines, such “enlightened” reforms would undoubtedly have been greeted with popular approbation; in Afghanistan, they met with scornful and violent rejection because of the threat they posed to deeply held social values and structures legitimized by tradition and religion. The lesson here is to understand the tolerance of the social system for the kinds of policy initiatives under consideration. What is suitable in some cases may be disastrous in others.26 No less important when it comes to responding to terrorism and guerrilla warfare is a consideration of the political culture and system. This comes as no surprise, since the resolution of social and economic problems that contribute to violence is contingent upon political decisions. As suggested previously, whatever the extant political system, leaders need to be sure that it functions well enough to keep them informed about the extent and intensity of popular demands, what groups espouse them and how strong the groups are. As the Shah of Iran belatedly found out, blocked channels of communication and expression can result in gross misconceptions and complacency about the popular mood. In essence, problems such as corruption, repression, and economic deprivation that are unknown are hard to solve.27 Besides the specific matter of whether social and economic demands are effectively articulated, processed, and communicated, the overall functioning of the political system itself may be a problem. A major issue here

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may be demands for participation in national decision-making by various groups. The essential question is who wishes to participate and what kind of participation they have in mind. In general, the larger and more educated the groups seeking participation, the greater the problem they can pose. Smaller groups are easier to manage. The matter of what kind of participation is also important. Not all demands for participation are for Western-style formulas. In the context of Middle Eastern political culture and style, for instance, participation is more apt to mean a role in the consultative process than “one man, one vote” open elections, political parties, and so on. Where professional middle classes increasingly demand participation, careful investigation is needed to discern whether participation is seen as adaptation of local institutions or fashioning new ones. Once demands for participation are accommodated, reversing course can be especially hazardous, as we know from the years of savage terrorism that followed a fateful January 1992 decision by Algerian authorities to terminate the second stage of national elections and circumscribe political reforms that they had previously enacted in response to social, economic, and political turmoil. The reason was the fear that the Islamic Salvation Front—which surprisingly had won victories, first in municipal elections in July 1990, then in the first stage of parliamentary elections in December 1991—was poised to take over parliament. The effect of canceling the elections was to disenfranchise and disillusion nonviolent Islamic activists, with the result that many turned to virulent terrorism that still continues.28 Holding elections, of course, is not the final word, since they can be rigged. Where this is common and unsurprising—as in, say, some African, Middle Eastern, and Asian countries, where leaders and their sons invariably obtain over 98 percent of the votes—the consequences may be negligible. Where democratic expectations are greater, trouble may ensue. India’s manipulation of the electoral process and installation of a puppet government, for example, has been cited as a major factor triggering insurgent violence among Kashmiris in the late 1980s. As Indian security expert, Praful Bidawi, put it: “There are two sides to the Kashmir problem. The first is Pakistan. The second and more important is misguided Indian domestic policy—which has led to the alienation of the Kashmir people, the brutal suppression of their rights, and popular discontent.”29 Much more could be said about the relationship between a political system and violence, since substantial literature has been devoted to the functional requisites for stability in particular cultures. An important point that many of these studies make is the same as ours: namely, that flaws in the political system can be fundamental underlying causes of instability, which are at times translated into violent behavior. Accordingly, governments dealing with terrorism must take a close look at the political

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process as part of their strategic assessment and draw the relevant conclusions from it. In some cases, the conclusion may be that what is called for is a more benign and responsive authoritarian rule that is legitimate, responsive, and acceptable to the population. In other cases, what may be called for is a radical restructuring along pluralistic lines, since that is what the people expect and desire.

SUMMARY Officials at all levels of government must be aware that various combinations of factors explain the presence, scope, extent, and nature of terrorism in different cases. Among these are psychological, social, economic, and political causes. Understanding their salience and interconnections requires careful and systematic analysis in every situation. This should precede the articulation and implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorist strategy. Studying a variety of other cases is also very important, since comparative analysis reveals similarities and differences that may suggest major mistakes to be avoided as well as strategies and policies that are transferable, at least partially.30 Above all, an open and adaptable mind-set is necessary. There is no place for rigid ideological predispositions and unexamined assumptions, because when things go badly they become the handmaidens of delusion, deception, and defeat.

NOTES 1. An excellent discussion of terrorism as a form of warfare may be found in Boaz Ganor, “Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare,” Herzliyya International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism, July 15, 2002 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Near East—Internet Edition (hereafter cited as FBIS (INE), July 15, 2002, 8 pp. (The format and regional designations for FBIS citations have changed several times in the last 10 years. Today they may all be accessed at www.opensource.gov.) Insurgency is herein defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. Legitimacy and illegitimacy are terms used to determine whether existing aspects of politics are considered moral or immoral—right or wrong—by the population or selected elements thereof. Generally, the major aspects of politics may be identified as the political community, the political system, the authorities, and policies. Insurgents may consider any or all of these illegitimate. The definition of insurgency here is similar to that characterizing civil war in J.K. Zawodny, “Civil War,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Science 7 (New York: Macmillan, 1968) 499, as cited in Sam C. Sarkesian, “Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: An Introduction,” in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed. Revolutionary Guerrilla

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Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1975) 4. The use of violence by opponents of the government distinguishes insurgencies from sociopolitical protest movements such as Solidarity in Poland. The centrality of legitimacy in insurgencies is noted by Harry Eckstein, “On the Etiology of Internal Wars,” History and Theory 4, no. 2 (1965): 133; Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel, “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Toward a New Analytical Approach,” Small Wars and Insurgencies (Winter 1992): 285–286. 2. Jerrold M. Post, “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, ed. Origins of Terrorism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998) 25–31. While the consensus among the experts is that most terrorists are not clinically insane, there are exceptions, which, if ignored, can lead to a host of problems. See, for example, the account of Abu Zubayda in Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006) 169. See also, Barton Gellman, “The Shadow War, In a Surprising New Light,” Review of The One Percent Doctrine. The Washington Post, June 20, 2006; see Jerrold M. Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone,” in The Making of a Terrorist, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006) 13–33; and Albert Bandura, “Training for Terrorism through Selective Moral Engagement,” in The Making of a Terrorist, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006) 34–50. 3. On Atta see Jim Yardley, “Portrait of a Terrorist,” The New York Times, October 10, 2001. 4. Shortcomings and problems of the psychological approach are discussed by Walter Reich, “Understanding Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry,” in Reich, p. 279. Also see Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 81–91. An example of a nonviolent and apolitical Islamic group that attracts recruits from the same socially alienated strata as the violent groups is Tablighi Jamaat—”the group that propagates the faith.” See Susan Sachs, “A Muslim Missionary Group Draws New Scrutiny in U.S.,” The New York Times, July 14, 2003. 5. Randy Borum, Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa, FL: University of South Florida, 2004) 35; Jerrold M. Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone: Psychocultural Foundations of Contemporary Terrorism,” Political Psychology 26, no. 4 (2005): 615–616. 6. Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) 8. 7. Borum, Psychology of Terrorism, 24–26; Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone,” 623–630. The idea that groups can satisfy psychological needs is, of course, well understood. In fact, much contemporary writing on the subject repeats or elaborates on insights provided by previous thinkers, most notably Eric Hoffer, author of The True Believer (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Perennial Ed., 1966) 26–32. Hoffer was not concerned with terrorism per se; rather, he focused on religious groups from times past, as well as political ones that emerged in the first half of the twentieth century: namely, communism and fascism. All represented an attempt to manage both the process of social change and its disruptive effects, regardless of the source of that change. As Hoffer saw it, disaffected individuals from all walks of life—and social classes—were susceptible to the appeals of such mass movements and included the poor, misfits, outcasts, minorities, adolescent youth, the ambitious (whether facing insurmountable obstacles or unlimited

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opportunities), those in the grip of some vice or obsession, the impotent, the inordinately selfish, the bored, and the sinners. Of course, not everyone in these categories joined mass movements. Not all of the poor were frustrated or likely to do so. For instance, the abject poor on “the borderline of starvation lead purposeful lives.” This is because they had immediate goals that had to be fulfilled to stay alive. The substrata of concern were the newly poor (as in the German Weimar Republic due to runaway inflation) and the free poor—those with time on their hands. And, that is the real key: individuals who have time on their hands and who do not lead, in their own minds, productive lives. 8. The differences among such terms as paradigm, model, theory, conceptual framework, and the like are discussed in Lawrence C. Mayer, Comparative Political Inquiry (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1972); Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (San Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964) 298ff. 9. Report by Hazim al-Amin, “There Are the Customs on Which the Iraqi President Grew Up in His Town and Tribe,” Al-Hayah (London), May 12, 2002, in FBIS—Near East/South Asia (INE), May 13, 2002, 8 pp. 10. Hamied N. Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16, no. 1 (March 1984): 123–144. 11. John Lancaster, “India’s Raging Band of Maoists Takes Root among Rural Poor,” The New York Times, May 13, 2006. 12. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 73–77 and 96; Post, “When Hatred Is Bred in the Bone,” 630–632. On the Bedouin see Michael Slackman, “Out of Desert Poverty, a Caldron of Rage in the Sinai, The New York Times, May 7, 2006. 13. Pankaj Mishra, “The Myth of the New India,” The New York Times, July 6, 2006. Also see Celia W. Dugger, “Massacres of Low-Born Touch Off a Crisis in India,” The New York Times, March 15, 1999; Celia W. Dugger, “India’s Poorest Are Becoming Its Loudest,” The New York Times, April 28, 1999; Associated Press, “Men Beheaded in Eastern India,” The New York Times, March 19, 1999. As a Marxist group, the MCC would presumably portray the situation in terms of antagonistic social classes rather than castes, a distinction that has negligible practical effects. See Associated Press, “12 Killed in India Caste Massacre,” The New York Times, April 22, 1999. 14. On Serb-Kosovar violence see Chris Hedges, “Victims Not Quite Innocent,” The New York Times, March 28, 1999; A Week of Terror in Drenica (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 1999). 15. Nationalist insurrections against outsiders are a familiar part of the insurgency landscape and involve an array of secessionist groups. Nationalist appeals may also play an important part in organizations with egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, or preservationist goals. Robert Pape, Dying to Win (New York: Random House, 2005) 187–196 and 237, argues that resentment of foreign occupation is the main motivation for suicide terrorism. 16. On the J curve see James C. Davies, “Toward a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27, no.1 (February 1962): 6; Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, “A Theory of Revolution,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 11, no. 3 (September 1967): 265. For a detailed elaboration of relative deprivation see Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). 17. The importance of political responsiveness in undercutting support for terrorism is underscored in Ted Robert Gurr, “Terrorism in Democracies: Its Social

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and Political Bases,” in Walter Reich, ed. Origins of Terrorism (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 97–99. 18. Jeffrey A. Nedoroscik, “Extremists Groups in Egypt,” TPV 14, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 47–49, 62–73; Mamoun Fandy, “Egypt’s Islamic Group: Regional Revenge,” Middle East Journal 48, no. 4 (Autumn 1994): 607–625. 19. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005) 88. For a seminal study of the effects of social change in the Middle East that was strikingly prescient, insightful, and remains relevant even today, see Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially pp. 25–118. The classic general treatment of the nexus between the dysfunctional effects of sociopolitical change and the emergence and growth of mass movements is, as noted above, Hoffer, The True Believer. 20. Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 24–30. An excellent example is the global Salafi movement, especially those who have relocated from traditional core Arab societies. See Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 95 and 97. 21. The high cost of ignoring counterinsurgency lessons and knowledge from the past and failing to teach them in professional military schools is discussed in Daniel Marston, “Force Structure for High-and Low-Intensity Warfare: The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future,” Discussion Paper (unpublished), prepared for the NIC-2020 Project. Also see Brigadier Nigel AylwinFoster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” Military Review (November–December 2005): 2–15. 22. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 15–154. 23. Yusuf’s study appeared in a five-part series. In particular, see part one in “Saudi: Paper Publishes Study of Saudi Counterterrorism Strategy,” in Riyadh AlJazirah (Internet version http://www.al-jazirah.com) in Arabic December 31, 2005, in FBIS—Middle East (INE), December 31, 2005, 13 pp.; quote p. 2 and part two in “Saudi: Paper Publishes Study of Saudi Counterterrorism Strategy” in Riyadh AlJazirah (Internet version http://www.al-jazirah.com) in Arabic January 3, 2006, in FBIS—Middle East (INE), January 3, 2006, 16 pp. 24. Ibid. 25. Bard E. O’Neill, “Revolutionary War in Oman,” in Insurgency in the Modern World, ed. Bard E. O’Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980): 225–226. 26. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 167. 27. The connection between governmental incompetence and the inability to address social and economic problems is discussed in Alan Richards, SocioEconomic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003): 24–26. A suggestive analysis of the process of radicalization that leads some members of some opposition groups to turn to terrorism, especially in a democracy that is perceived as unresponsive, may be found in Ehud Sprinzak, “The Process of Delegitimization: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence (Spring 1991): 50–68. 28. Joachim Tzschanschel, “Algeria Torn Between Fundamentalism and Democracy,” Aussenpolitik (English ed.) (January 1993): 23–29; John P. Entelis, “The Crisis of Authoritarianism in North Africa: The Case of Algeria,” Problems of

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Communism (May–June 1992): 75–81. On the complex nature of terrorism perpetrated by both the government and Islamic militants, see report by Ahmad alHawwari in Al-Watan al-Arabi (Paris), January 23, 1998, in FBIS-Near East (INE), January 26, 1998, 6 pp. The continued violence and popular resentment is discussed in Craig Smith, “Many Algerians Are Not Reconciled by Amnesty Law,” The New York Times, June 28, 2006. 29. Robert Marquand, “Civilians Entangled in Kashmir,” The Christian Science Monitor (April 5, 2000). 30. For example, see Volume III of this publication for an extensive selection of informative case studies.

CHAPTER 18 SUICIDE, HOMICIDE, OR MARTYRDOM: WHAT’S IN A NAME? Christopher L. Brown

“What martyrdom is greater than making yourself a human bomb detonating it among the enemy? What spiritualism is greater than this spiritualism in which a person loses all feeling of his body and life for the sake of his cause and mission?” —Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Spiritual Leader of Hizbollah

For many in the Western world there is a question of what kind of a war we are fighting. Is it the war on terror, the war against radical terrorism, the war against extremism, or some new phrase we come up with in the near future? There is also, of course, the ongoing political debate of where and how this war should actually be fought. Ironically, this debate is not just occurring in the Western world, but is also taking place within Islamist1 circles. Unfortunately, however, the Islamists seem to understand the general nature—and therefore the extent—of this war far better than the western world. In reality, this war is by its very nature a paradox. The enemy we face seems unlike any that the modern world has ever seen before, and yet upon closer examination there is a great deal of familiarity in the absolutist rhetoric of these enemies when compared to our previous foes.2 So the question is, what kind of war are we facing? Although the actual answer to that question is really very simple, the implications of it are not, and until we understand its nature, we will never achieve a lasting victory. In what he thought was to be his last act upon the Earth, as America brought the fight to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Ayman Al-Zawahiri— arguably the real brains behind al Qaeda—wrote a book entitled “Knights

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under The Prophet’s Banner,” which he published on numerous “jihadi” Web sites. This was meant to serve as a last bequest to what was left of al Qaeda, their allies, and future successor Islamist organizations around the world. Among the many key insights contained within the text was a single paragraph that laid out the exact nature of this war: He (Sayyid Qutub) [sic] affirmed that the issue of unification in Islam is important and that the battle between Islam and its enemies is primarily an ideological one over the issue of unification. It is also a battle over to whom authority and power should belong . . . to God’s course and shari’ah, to man-made laws and material principles, or to those who claim to be intermediaries between the Creator and mankind.3 (Emphasis added)

In other words, the war in which the world is currently engaged is an ideological war, or—as it is sometimes called—a war of ideas.4 This means that although the modern military has a significant role to play in this fight, it is also not going to be the lone (or possibly even the key) vehicle of victory on the strategic level. Instead, victory will be achieved through what is termed a political warfare strategy. Of course, many readers may be somewhat confused as to what all of this discussion has to do with an examination of the tactics of the suicide bombings. The answer to that is found in the actual nature of these types of operations within both the Islamist strategy and their ideological theology. Because these types of operations have become an increasingly pervasive tactic, in addition to their popularity among multiple Islamist organizations around the world, there must be an ideological foundation for them. Therefore, the key to a strategic counterstrategy can only come from understanding and exploiting the foundational vulnerability of the ideology of the suicide operation. Perhaps in simpler terms, once we understand the nature of the tactic we can find a means to help defeat it. When it comes to trying to understand the Islamist ideology and tactics, it is necessary to throw the proverbial dictionary out of the window. The Islamists use their own definitions, language, and ideology as the basis for their efforts in the war of ideas. The United States has faced harsh criticism from many quarters for its position that the War on Terrorism is a black and white conflict, with clear lines of distinction between the forces of good and evil, or freedom and tyranny. However, the Islamists view it the same way, only they have completely different definitions of good, evil, freedom, and tyranny. This fundamental difference in their worldview makes the terrorist a hero or freedom fighter to their compatriots and sympathizers. Furthermore, to the Islamist the war with the United States and its allies is Tawheed5 versus Shirk6 —in other words, it is their view of what God has commanded and wants versus everyone and everything else; and because they are acting as the agents of the will of God,

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they are free to pursue any tactic they choose, because only the will of God can stop them. WHY DO TERRORISTS USE SUICIDE ATTACKS? In part, the decision to use suicide attacks can be seen as motivated by simple cost-benefit analysis, and at least four dimensions of this decision can be identified. 1. It has worked in the past. The Islamist community witnessed how Hizbollah7 suicide attacks on the U.S. Marine Barracks and French paratroopers led to the withdrawal of United States and other Western forces from Lebanon, and Islamists credit these types of attack for the eventual Israeli withdrawal in 2000. 2. Terrorists and their sponsors have avoided significant retaliation for this type of attack. Just as Hizbollah and Iran were warned in the case of the Marine Barracks and the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, al Qaeda received mostly verbal warnings and a purely symbolic counterattack following the U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in 2000. 3. The terrorist leadership and their sympathizers know that their forces could not win a conventional war with the United States, or any other western power. This leads to the implementation of unconventional or asymmetrical tactics. 4. Individual attackers’ reasons can vary from religious/political convictions to coercion.

Although there has been a great deal of discussion in the popular media over the motivations, reasons, and justification for the use of suicide bombings by terrorists around the world, most of it has unfortunately failed to examine the Islamist theoideological dimension. Some, in an effort to claim academic distance, attempt to examine all suicide operations around the world as a singular phenomenon, attempting to group operations from secular groups (such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka) with the Islamists. Unfortunately, these all-inclusive theories often fail due to the same inherent logical flaw of all universal generalizations. The fact is that this approach fails to understand that each attack is a discrete event in and of itself, in which each attacker—regardless of affiliation or belief— has his/her own reasons for his/her involvement, just as each organization has its own reasons within its strategy for the use of this tactic. Now unfortunately (for any analyst) if we leave the discussion at that point, then the issue of a counterstrategy becomes moot, leaving nations, organizations, and individuals with the only choice for countering this tactic being increased physical security. As a solution, this once again ignores the theoideological factors in the motivation and justification of the individuals. In addition, from an American security standpoint, the spread of Islamist-backed suicide operations represents an actual threat to our vital (and potentially even survival) interests. For example, from 1968 to

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2005, 80 percent of all suicide operations have occurred post-September 11, 2001.8 Islamist groups claiming credit and religious justification for these suicide operations represented 31 out of the total of 35 groups who used this type of tactic.9 Therefore, it is necessary to identify the religious justification for suicide operations. ISLAMIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SUICIDE OPERATIONS One of the key documents used to justify these types of operations came to light in the mid-1990s under the title “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations” hereafter referred to as the “Islamic Ruling.”10 This text was written anonymously, although it is believed that one or more scholars in Saudi Arabia authored it, in support of suicide attacks in Chechnya.11 It should be clearly understood that this is just one of many “scholarly” opinions or fatwas that have been issued within the international Islamic community over the past several decades in support of these types of operations.12 However none appear to have had the same pervasive strength as the Islamic Ruling, in spite of the fact that traditionally, such anonymous documents would have been treated with a great deal of suspicion. Within the Islamic Ruling, the author (or authors) provide a kind of three-point disclaimer, in which they write, “Not every martyrdom operation is legitimate, nor is every martyrdom operation prohibited.”13 Note the use of the term “martyrdom operation”—this is a very important distinction within Islamic circles. For example, Hizbollah’s Deputy Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem had the following to say when he was asked during a CBS news interview about whether suicide operations where evil, and why the Islamic world would not denounce the use of young people killing themselves for the sake of killing innocent civilians: We call them martyrdom operations. We don’t call them suicide operations because suicide comes out of a loss of hope in life, while martyrdom is a love of life . . . Martyrdom operations are the only power the Palestinians have against the sophisticated Israeli military machine. Balance cannot be reached unless these operations are carried out in the heartland of the enemy.14

The Islamic Ruling goes even further, by claiming that “the name ‘suicide-operations’ used by some is inaccurate, and in fact this name was chosen by the Jews to discourage people from such endeavours” [sic]. The reason why it is so important to make a distinction between suicide and “martyrdom” is that the distinctions of these two paths of death have direct implications on both this life and the next. There is, of course, a general understanding surrounding the issue of the 72 virgins. Although interestingly, some work has been done that calls into question

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this reward.15 Then again, this is not the only reward that is promised to would-be suicide bombers. For example a “martyr” is promised: Their souls will live in green birds that live in lamps next to Allah’s throne. Forgiven of all of their sins with the first drop of their own blood that is spilled. At the time of death be shown their reward in paradise. Saved from judgment day. A crown placed on their heads with jewels more precious than life. Allowed to intercede on behalf of 70 family members who were going to hell. All the pain of their death is reduced to that of a mosquito bite. The best dwelling places in paradise. Angels spread their wings in respect over their bodies. Only ones who would wish to return to life from paradise would be allowed to do so, but only so they could be martyred 10 more times to increase their reward.16

Interestingly, the key reward that is often used in the recruitment of female suicide bombers is that of the intercession on the part of family members. After all, the rewards of 72 virgins likely has little appeal for many women. However, a promise that they can ensure the entry of their own children into paradise is an example of the twisted morality (but rational appeal) that is made in the recruitment of suicide bombers. On the more practical side of things, suicide bombers—through their “martyrdom”— often achieve less “eternal” rewards for their families and themselves. Some examples include: Large sums of money for their families. Improved social status for their families. Enhancing both their own and their families’ reputations. Their families are showered with honors and gifts following their death. A level of personal fame in which they are “immortalized” in propaganda materials.17

Between these two types of rewards, recruiters claim that: “volunteers are beating down the door to join.”18 Although that is very likely an extreme overstatement of the appeal of such operations, it cannot be ignored that both the rewards in this life and the next offer an appealing menu of items for those individuals who are recruited, indoctrinated, and used in the capacity of these suicide operations. On the opposite side of the equation if a Muslim is in fact committing suicide rather than an act of “martyrdom,” his/her reward is “hell-fire.”19 However, it does not just end there, for according to Islamic scholars the

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one who commits suicide will be condemned to a cycle of continually reliving that horrible moment and manner of death.20 So, in other words, if a suicide bomber is not engaged in actual “martyrdom,” but is instead killing oneself, then that person will spend eternity in hell, having their body ripped apart by explosives. This is in part because, as Dr. David Cook points out, “In Islamic history there is no equivalent to the ‘noble suicide’ tradition of the Bible.”21 Thus, the individual is either a glorified “martyr” or a condemned sinner. This brings us back to the issue of the Islamic Ruling, as it lays out what is required for the actions of the individual to be considered an act of “martyrdom.” The initial analysis of the Ruling centers not on what we think of as a suicide bombing operation, but more on the idea of a traditional heroic military action, such as a soldier or group of soldiers attacking a far superior force of soldiers. The author(s) concludes that such a desperate action is permissible if those engaged in it are doing any of the following by their actions: Seeking “martyrdom.” Inflicting losses [on the enemy]. Encouraging the Muslims to attack. Demoralizing the enemy, showing them that “if one man can do this, what will the totality be capable of?”22

It is interesting to note that in this case—meaning an armed conflict between two combatants—the issue of “martyrdom” is only one of the possible necessary conditions for such an act to be permissible. As will be discussed next, this is not the case for a so-called “martyrdom operation.” However, before preceding to that, it is perhaps useful to describe what qualifies one as a “martyr”—or, as it is often transliterated in Arabic “Shaheed,” which means one who dies in the name of Allah. Literally, “martyr” means a witness. In the context of religion, this has come to mean ones who will hold on to their faith until death as a witness to the world and the object of their faithful conviction. Many theological schools of thought in almost every religion also hold a special role for the “martyr” as a witness against those who do not share their faith, or the people or organizations who created the conditions under which “martyrdom” occurred. In any case, the “martyr” is seen as serving to expand the religious community, either through bringing back those who have wavered in the faith through the “martyr’s” example, or by bringing new converts into the faith. Within the Islamic Ruling, the following seven reasons articulate how a “martyr” is a Shaheed: (1) Because Allah and the Prophet have testified concerning his entry into Heaven.

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(2) Because he is alive before his Lord. (3) Because the angels of mercy witness the taking of his soul. (4) Because he will be among those who testify over nations on the Day of Resurrection. (5) Because his faith and good ending have outwardly been witnessed. (6) Because he has a witness to his death, namely his blood. (7) Because his soul immediately witnesses Heaven.23

The author(s) then goes on to provide a technical definition of a “martyr,” from the four major Fiqhs, or schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence: Hanafis: “One who is killed by the pagans, or is found killed in the battle bearing a mark of any wound, whether external or internal—such as blood emerging from an eye or [sic] the like.” [Al-‘Inayah published on the margins of Fath al-Qadeer (2/142) and Hashiyat Ibn ‘Abideen (2/268)]. Also, “Anyone who is killed while fighting pagans, or rebels, or brigands, by a means attributed to the enemy—whether directly or by consequence—is a shaheed [while] anyone who is killed by a means not specifically attributed to [an action of] the enemy is not considered a shaheed.” [Zayla‘i’s Tabyeen al-Haqa’iq (1/247). See also Al-Bahr al-Ra’iq (2/211)]. Malikis: “One who is killed while fighting warring unbelievers only, even if killed on Islamic land such as if the enemy attacked the Muslims [even if he] did not fight on account of being unaware or asleep [and even if] killed by a Muslim who mistook him for an unbeliever, or trampled by a horse, or mistakenly smitten by his own sword or arrow, or by having fallen into a well or from a cliff during the fighting.” [Dardeer’s Al-Sharh al-Kabeer (1/425)]. Shafi‘is: “One who is killed in fighting unbelievers, facing and not running away, for the raising of Allah’s word . . . and not for any worldly motive.” [Mughni al-Muhtaj (1/350) and see Fath al-Bari (6/129)]. Hanbalis: “One who dies in a battle with the unbelievers, whether male or female, adult or not, whether killed by the unbelievers, or by his own weapon in error, or by having fallen off his mount, or having been found dead with no mark, provided he was sincere.” [Kash-shaf al-Qina‘, 2/113. See also Al-Mughni (2/206)].24

Interestingly, particularly considering that this is material directly out of a justification for the use of suicide operations, one will note that only two of the fiqhs—which also happen to be the two smallest, with a combined approximate membership of 14 percent of the Sunni world—even mention the possibility of dying at one’s own hands, and both make it clear that they refer to those who die while fighting who “accidentally” kill themselves. In fact, the Hanafiyyah Fiqh—which is both the largest, with over 50 percent of the Sunni Islamic community, as well as the oldest— directly contradicts the use of suicide attacks. As quoted above, “anyone who is killed by a means not specifically attributed to [an action of] the enemy is not considered a Shaheed.” Therefore, an individual who kills

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himself/herself through a suicide attack—particularly against unarmed civilians, as these individuals have no means to cause the death of the attacker—is committing suicide. So, with these clear statements—which show a general historical opposition to any operation even closely resembling the modern use of suicide attacks—one might ask how the militant Islamists (who, after all, claim to be restoring traditional Islam), can claim justification for their tactics. After all, how can one justify actions that are obviously in opposition to the teachings of their own religion? The answer is that they do what all great students of rhetoric have done throughout time; they redefine the frameworks of the question and the meaning of words—or, in laymen’s terms, they punt. This should really come as no surprise, as Islamic scholars are a combination of lawyer and theologian, which means they are very skilled in the use of rhetoric. This particular feat of intellectual gymnastics is done by first defining suicide narrowly as one who kills oneself for “worldly motives” (as opposed to doing so for the cause of Allah—or, in their words, “for some religious benefit”). They then try to rationalize the suicide attack (for the cause of Allah) as being exactly like an attack—as discussed earlier—against an overwhelming enemy force. As a person doing this type of battlefield heroics has historically been viewed as a “martyr” so too does the suicide bomber receive the same distinction. In fact, the author(s) of the Islamic Ruling goes even further, saying: “We have arrived at the conclusion that martyrdom operations are permissible, and in fact the Mujahid [sic] who is killed in them is better than one who is killed fighting in the ranks.”25 Interestingly, this is not the opinion of some mujahideen who have fought on the frontlines in many of the arenas of the so-called Islamic “jihads” around the world over the last 20 years.26 However, the author(s) of the Islamic Ruling, after having made the logical leap from one form of warfare to another, then qualify their justification of the clear violation of Islamic law with the following criteria for delineating the differences between one committing suicide and one engaged in a “martyrdom operation:” Martyrdom operations should not be carried out unless certain conditions are met: 1. One’s intention is sincere and pure—to raise the Word of Allah. 2. One is reasonably sure that the desired effect cannot be achieved by any other means which would guarantee preservation of his life. 3. One is reasonably sure that loss will be inflicted on the enemy, or they will be frightened, or the Muslims will be emboldened. 4. One should consult with war strategy experts, and especially with the amber of war, for otherwise he may upset the plan and alert the enemy to their presence.

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If the first condition is absent, the deed is worthless, but if it is satisfied while some others are lacking, then it is not the best thing, but this does not necessarily mean the Mujahid [sic] is not Shaheed [sic].

Of these criteria, the one considered most important—as it is clearly stated in this quote—is that of the intention of the attacker. Intension is the primary factor in determining whether an operation is in fact suicide or “martyrdom.” This will be further addressed in the conclusions and recommendations section of this chapter. DA’WA An interesting but often unnoticed (or even ignored) dimension of Da’wa (spreading Islam through the words and deeds of Muslims) involves a justification for both suicide operations and “jihad” in general. As can be seen throughout the previous discussion, the idea of raising up Allah’s word, or the betterment of the Muslim community, is a continuous theme. This has carried over into the practical world, where (for example) Osama bin Laden—in an all but unnoticed statement shortly after the September 11 attack—offered the following as one of the justifications for the attack: Those youth who conducted the [9/11] operations did not accept any fiqh in the popular terms, but they accepted the fiqh that the prophet Muhammad brought. Those young men (. . .inaudible. . .) said in deeds, in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere else in the world. The speeches are understood by both Arabs and non-Arabs-even by Chinese. It is above all the media said. Some of them said that in Holland, at one of the centers, the number of people who accepted Islam during the days that followed the operations were more than the people who accepted Islam in the last eleven years. I heard someone on Islamic radio who owns a school in America say: “We don’t have time to keep up with the demands of those who are asking about Islamic books to learn about Islam.” This event made people think (about true Islam) which benefited Islam greatly.27

It may seem odd to most observers that someone might see the use of terrorism and suicide operations as a means of spreading a religion; however, in the worldview of many of the Islamists the sudden interest in Islam meant that people were possibly seeking to join. Hence, 9/11 was a “moral” or even “righteous” act (from the Islamists perspective) in that it resulted in some rumored trend of more people accepting Islam. This is opposed to what really likely happened, where people living in the West simply wanted to understand why 9/11 happened and how Islam was connected to it. So, rather than an increased interest related to a desire to

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turn to Islam, this increased attention was mostly just curiosity, which for most people faded until the next headline. That being said, those seeking to understand the enemy we face today ignore at our peril the potential power of the principle of Da’wa as a weapon that can be used both against us and for us. Some suggestions on how the West might be able to use Da’wa as a means to counter the Islamists will be discussed in the conclusions and recommendations section of this chapter. AL QAEDA An example of how central it is to demonstrate one’s true intentions, as discussed earlier, is illustrated perfectly by al Qaeda. In order to ensure that a suicide operation is a “martyrdom operation,” al Qaeda operatives must submit a formal request to the group’s leadership before they are allowed to participate in such an operation.28 This, of course, only applies to actual members of al Qaeda, as opposed to those who gravitate toward the Islamist ideology and are used as nothing more than cannon fodder by various affiliated organizations. Al-Qaeda training and ideology, in particular, is focused on preparing all members to engage in these kinds of attacks. For example, al Qaeda uses the criteria articulated by Abdullah Azzam, a cofounder of al Qaeda (and who is also reportedly involved in the founding of Hamas), in his book Join the Caravan (i.e., of “martyrs”) to establish acceptable intentions of their members before allowing them to join in “jihad.” The following are the eight specific criteria for “jihad” outlined in part one of Join the Caravan, a copy of which is given to each member of al Qaeda: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

In order to prevent the disbelievers from dominating Muslims; Due to the scarcity of men; Fear of the Hell-Fire; Fulfilling the duty of “Jihad,” and responding to the Call of the Lord; Following in the footsteps of the Pious Predecessors; Establishing a solid foundation as a base for Islam; Protecting those who are oppressed in the land; and Hoping for Martyrdom and a High Station in Paradise.29

Azzam then goes on to outline the reasoning behind each one of these criteria, and then adds an additional eight reasons why individuals should “join the caravan” of “martyrs” in their “Jihad:” 1. “Jihad” is a shield for the Ummah’s honour, and a means for lifting disgrace off them;

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2. Protecting the dignity of the Ummah, and repelling the conspiracy of its enemies; 3. Preservation of the earth, and protection from corruption; 4. Security of Islamic places of worship; 5. Protection of the Ummah from punishment, disfiguration and displacement; 6. Prosperity of the Ummah, and surplus of its resources; 7. “Jihad” is the highest peak of Islam; 8. “Jihad” is the most excellent form of worship and by means of it the Muslim can reach the highest of ranks.30

Interestingly, from a historical perspective, al Qaeda initially did not emphasize suicide operations, but instead sought to maintain a group of highly trained guerilla fighters. This has changed, to the point where “martyrdom is assigned the highest priority . . . no other group has invested as much time or effort as al Qaida in programming its fighters for death.”31 What caused this change were two very practical considerations, relating to the potential capture of their personnel during operations. First, there was the issue of what happened following the failed 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, in which members of that attack were captured, compromising future operations. Second, al Qaeda efforts to care for the family members of those individuals who were captured around the world—in particular, in the Arab World—represented a significant expense.32 So, following the failed 1993 attack, Osama bin Laden reached out for technical assistance from Iran for learning how to bring down buildings, as well as training methods to prepare individuals for suicide operations.33 This assistance came in the form of representatives sent to Sudan from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hizbollah, including Imad Mughniyah.34 These meetings in turn led to the movement of senior al Qaeda members to both Lebanon and Iran for training as well as assistance in reorganizing the existing training camps in Sudan.35 This training led to a professionalizing of al Qaeda, which dramatically increased their effectiveness and capabilities. At the same time, those involved in “martyrdom operations” no longer needed to be informed of anything other than their immediate operation, and at the same time the supposed rewards of a “martyr” relieved al Qaeda of long-term financial concerns for any surviving family. Recently, however, this continued emphasis on the use of suicide operations has begun to show signs of actually weakening al Qaeda. As mentioned previously, some veterans of previous conflicts disagree with the high status given to the suicide terrorists.36 This type of individual criticism of tactics might be directly tied to reports that Abu Musab alZarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda operations in Iraq until his death in June

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2006, was seeking to establish a more traditional guerilla-style army and move away from suicide operations.37 Part of this might also be that after years of launching these attacks and seeing no sign of any near-term withdrawal of coalition forces—together with the missing social reinforcement found in the West Bank and Gaza—a greater difficulty in the recruitment of those willing to be suicide bombers has resulted. If so, this could represent a true turning point in the Iraqi theater of the global war on terror. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Our first step toward a lasting victory against terrorism will come when we recognize that we are engaged in a war of ideas or ideologies. Hence, the most powerful weapon that we might use in this war will be one that targets the theoideological basis of our enemies. After all, the use of suicide bombings is a tactic that is part of a larger strategy. Although the bombs going off in Baghdad are wounding and killing hundreds of civilians and soldiers, their real strategic targets are the television, print, and Internet media around the world. These attacks are aimed at the hearts, minds, and resolve of both sides, seeking to build their own strength while they undermine ours. It is about time that we seek a strategy that undermines this tactic at its base. The Suicide Bomber The Individual: Appreciating that the intentions of the individual are so central in determining whether the individual is a “martyr” or has committed suicide creates an area of potential exploitation at the individual level. Through the use of effective political action, using the very justifications that are placed on “martyrdom operations,” the United States could begin to create doubts in the minds of potential attackers, using classical Islamic sources and such authoritative pronouncements as: The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia: “I am not aware of anything in the religious law regarding killing oneself in the heart of the enemy[‘s ranks], or what is called ‘suicide.’ This is not a part of Jihad, and I fear that it is merely killing oneself.”38

After all, if an attacker has some doubt in his/her mind as to why he/she is carrying a bomb, then the volunteer pool may just dry up a little faster, forcing terrorist groups to use coercion if they are going to continue this tactic. This in turn undermines the very credibility that they seek from the use of suicide bombers, as well as the support they receive from their respective societies. Also, we must remove the status of “hero” by reestablishing the stigma associated with suicide. An example of how our own ignorance might

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undermine this effort can be seen in the recent move by the Bush Administration to refer to the attackers as “homicide bombers” as opposed to suicide bombers. Although this makes sense within the Western cultural framework, by concentrating on the fact that these individuals are killers and bringing the attention to the victims, however, it has the potential to legitimize these types of attacks within the Islamic/Islamist world. It effectively removes the stigma of suicide, and draws attention to the fact that these bombers are killing those whom the Islamist/potential Islamist considers the enemy. Family/Friends: Highlight the damage done to the family, while creating societal pressure based on both religious/cultural norms of behavior, which will in turn place pressure on the parents/family members and friends to discourage those considering suicide operations. Such ideas as requiring that the family/tribe pay restitution for property damaged as well as reparations to the victims and their families, would create one such pressure. When the family cannot pay, these reparations should be required from the organizations and governments sponsoring these acts as well as those providing funds to the terrorist organizations. Organizations: There must be an effort to undermine organizations from within. Although this seems like an obvious strategy that is likely being pursued, the sad truth is that this type of strategy involves political warfare operations, which the United States has not always been that successful in implementing because of a mix of cultural and bureaucratic considerations. For instance, a group of individuals (i.e., the leaders of the Islamist movements) who claim to be so selfless, interested in serving Allah and continuously expounding the benefits of “martyrdom,” certainly invest a great deal of time and resources in their own personal safety. This paradoxical reality is perfectly illustrated by the quote at the very beginning of this chapter, in which the “spiritual leader” of Hizbollah touts the great “spiritualism” found in “martyrdom,” and yet neither he nor any members of his family are becoming “martyrs.” Another example is that many of the enemies faced by the West are actually fairly thin-skinned when it comes to criticism. This is a result of the nature of the societies that they come from, and the way in which these types of organizations and groups are led. An excellent example of an attempt at effective information warfare was the May 2006 briefing in Baghdad in which outtakes of a Zarqawi video were shown demonstrating his (and his immediate followers’) incompetence at basic military activities. Unfortunately, it wasn’t even al Qaeda that launched a counterargument but major American media outlets and even military commanders who have been or are currently in Iraq.39 Until we as a society understand what it means and create a strategic political warfare capability, we will never win the ideological war.

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Societies: By encouraging the development of modern states—with varying forms of democracy and vibrant civil society in which debate and discussion occur—we could channel the anger of disenfranchised societies away from the United States, and toward changing their own nations for the better. Part of this will have to include taking each nation on a caseby-case basis, identifying truly democratic groups/movements who can assist in the peaceful transitions of governments in the region, and who will receive aid from the major democracies, while freezing out all potential negative groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and the Baath Party. The Use of Da’wa Although Da’wa is technically not one of the five pillars within Islam, its importance and its power cannot be denied. Ultimately, the true key to winning the long-term strategic ideological battle will have to come from within Islam itself. For too long, we have effectively ceded the entire field of Islam itself to the radicals depending on proxies of both questionable intentions and/or limited impact. Don’t give up key real estate in the war of ideas: By refusing to use the Islamic theology, either from ignorance or from concerns over issues of political correctness, we effectively give that battleground to the terrorists. Rather than shunning this area, we should embrace it for our own purposes—after all, the Islamists have been doing that from the beginning, as illustrated in the early discussion on the religious justifications for suicide operations.40 Da’wa, which means “The Call” or in other words the spreading of Islam through words and deeds, is just such a potential strategic weapon. Most Muslims, both scholars and laymen, agree that one of their required obligations is to spread Allah’s message even though they may disagree over the means and methods of how it is to be done. Examples of this requirement are found in the following verses from the Qur’an: “Invite (all) to the Way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and reason with them in ways that are best and most gracious: surely your Lord best knows those who go astray from His path, and He knows best those who follow the right way.” (Qur’an 16:125) (Emphasis added) “And it is thus that We appointed you to be the community of the middle way, so that you might be witnesses before all mankind and the Messenger might be a witness before you.” (Qur’an 2:143) (Emphasis added) “Who is better in speech than one who calls (people) to Allah, works righteousness, and says, “I am of those who bow in Islam”? The good deed and the evil deed are not alike. Repel the evil deed with one which is better: Then will he between whom and thee was hatred become as it were your friend

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and intimate! And no one will be granted such goodness except those who exercise patience and self-restraint—none but persons of the greatest good fortune.” (Qur’an 41:33-35) (Emphasis added)

In other words, Muslims are required to be the carriers of the word of God to the world through their words and their deeds. Militant Islamists thrive on exploiting the quasibrotherhood of all Muslims for recruitment, fundraising, political support, logistics, etc. In essence, tying themselves to all Muslims everywhere for their own purposes. Now what if we— meaning the West/global community—use the concept of Da’wa as a means of forcing Islam to work against the Islamists, rather than rushing to Islam’s aid by countering the perception of a relatively unified Islamic community? This cannot and must not be limited to occasional statements by various leaders for the Western press in English, which they then denounce in Arabic to their own media, nor must it be limited to the various ivory towers in which academics breathe the rarified air of their own making. This must be placed on to the shoulders of the masses through the means of an overall media campaign. Shock Therapy for the Islamic World The outraged reactions in Jordan following the November 2005 attacks on the Grand Hyatt, Radisson, and Days Inn hotels in Amman provide one of the key insights into perhaps the best means of conveying the message to the masses. Most of the deaths of Iraqi civilians are being caused by the actions of the terrorists’ groups/forces in Iraq; however, America continues to get the blame. It is time that we show both the real damage being done and the real cause behind that damage. This serves both strategic-ideological and tactical military purposes at the same time. After all, most of those who either have been captured, left video messages, or speak openly in support of the terrorists we are fighting cite the deaths and suffering of Muslims as the reason for their views. Unfortunately, statements from podiums in either Washington or Baghdad will not change this perception. Instead, our arguments must be presented in a way that is undeniably pervasive and substantiated, using multiple means of distribution (i.e., print, broadcast, internet, and DVDs etc.). This effort must show in unflinching detail the death and destruction brought against innocent civilians by the terrorists, using media such as: The afterimages of suicide/car bombings inside Iraq/Afghanistan/etc. Those hospitalized by sectarian/terrorist violence. Funerals of those killed by terrorists. Actual footage of attacks in which innocents are killed

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This material must be clearly attributable to the Islamists, and must also ensure that the blame for those killed or injured rests solely at the militant Islamist leadership’s feet and cannot be justified, within the Islamic world, by any means. Responsibility without Blame In the end, any such effort must place the responsibility on the shoulders of the Islamic community; however, it must not place blame, otherwise it risks alienating the very people that we are trying to get on our side. It must also provide a challenge or obligation to act in a positive way, while at the same time undermining the foundational justifications of those engaged in terrorism and supporting terrorism. In effect, the Ummah (or community of Muslims) must be made to feel a responsibility for the actions of their members in a way that both tactically and strategically weakens the enemy. In the end, the answer to the question raised by the title of this chapter “Suicide Homicide, or Martyrdom: What’s in a Name?” is that there is a lot. An observant reader might have noticed that outside of direct quotes and the short general discussion on martyrs, the terms jihad, martyr, martyrdom, martyrdom operations, and homicide bombing did not appear without quotes. This was an intentional effort to subtly signify that these terms required qualification. Language has power, and even subtle efforts to qualify terms can potentially carry a great deal of meaning. Hence, what is in a name comes down to what we wish to convey— do we wish to undermine our enemies or support them? After all, when those in the West refer to our enemies and the war they are fighting against us as mujahiddin or jihad, we are granting them all the positives that come from those terms within their own society.41 This would be like Osama bin Laden calling American military personnel liberators or warriors. Without a comprehensive strategy to engage in and win the war of ideas in ways that have cultural resonance, military operations alone will provide only a limited respite. Al-Qaeda and those that share its ideology must not just be destroyed, but discredited within their own communities. This in turn will undermine their theoideology, which is the key to both their global reach as an organization and their ability to recruit for suicide bombings on a level that threatens America and the Western world’s vital interests. Without their foundation of theoideology, they will fall. NOTES 1. The term Islamist in this chapter denotes a radicalized and politicized version of Islam, whose proponents engage in or support the use of terrorism. This is

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separate from Islam the religion. Also, it must be understood that not all Islamists are violent or militant extremists. 2. Islamist ideology was heavily influenced by multiple sources, some of which have yet to be generally recognized, including many from outside of the Islamic world such as Nationalism, Nazism, Fascism, and Communism to name a few. This is in addition to various internal movements over the entire history of Islam. 3. Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner,” serialized in Al-Sharq al Awsat (London: December 2–10, 2001), trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, document FBIS-NES-2001-1202. 4. For more on this, please see the chapter by James Robbins in volume one of this book. 5. Tawheed is literally monotheism, within the Islamist/fundamentalist ideology it means that nothing can be placed in opposition to God (i.e., violations of Shari’a) or impinge upon his sovereignty (i.e., individual rights, representative government, etc.). One of the primary sources from which the modern ideas on the concept of Tawheed comes is from Kitaab At-Tawheed (The Book of Tawheed) by Sheikh Imam Muhammad Abdul-Wahhaab. 6. Shirk originally meant polytheist, but within the modern Islamist ideology, it has come to represent everything from representative democracy, Christianity, Shi’a Islam, Sufism, and capitalism. 7. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 8. Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 29(2) (Spring 2006): 127. 9. Ibid. 10. The text of this anonymously authored document can be found on a multitude of Web sites. Within this paper the text was retrieved from, http://journal. maine.com/pdf/martyrdom.pdf on May 10, 2006, and will be cited as “The Islamic Ruling.” 11. David Cook, “The Implication of ‘Martyrdom Operation’ for Contemporary Islam,” Journal of Religious Ethics 32(1) (March 2004): 131 12. See David Cook, “Radical Islam and Martyrdom Operations: What Should the United States Do?” 22-24, for a list of 61 Islamic scholars offering support for the use of suicide operations, http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/ DavidCook martyrdom.pdf. It is also important that the reader understand that a fatwa is more than just an opinion on Islamic teachings; it is in fact also a ruling on the interpretation of Islamic law. This duel nature is often ignored or underappreciated within the West. 13. “The Islamic Ruling,” 2. 14. Interview by Dan Rather of Hizbollah’s deputy secretary general Naim Qassem on CBS News (April 17, 2002), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/ 04/17/eveningnews/main506497.shtml (accessed October 1, 2006). 15. “Virgins? What Virgins?” The Guardian (January 12, 2002). Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/religion/Story/0,2763,631357,00.html (accessed October 1, 2006).

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16. Usaamah Khayyaat, “The Virtues of Martyrdom,” trans. Hazem Ragab,. Avaialable at http://www.alminbar.com/khutbaheng/1478.htm (accessed October 1, 2006). 17. Debra D. Zedalis, “Female Suicide Bombers.” Monograph published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (Carlisle, PA: June 2004): 9. 18. Ibid. 19. “The Islamic Ruling,” op. cit. 20. Laurie Goodstein, “A Nation Challenged: The Role of Religion; Scholars Call Attacks a Distortion of Islam,” New York Times (September 30, 2001). 21. David Cook, “Suicide Attacks or ‘Martyrdom Operations’ in Contemporary Jihad Literature” Nova Religio 6(1) (2002), 7-44. 22. “The Islamic Ruling,” 7. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., 12. 25. Ibid., 14. 26. Tom Downey “The Insurgent’s Tale: A Veteran Foot Soldier Reveals His Role in the Jihad—and Why He’s Having Second Thoughts about a Holy War That Seems to Have No End” Rolling Stone (December 5, 2005). Available at: http:// www.rollingstone.com/news/story/8898175/the insurgents tale/ (accessed October 1, 2006). 27. “Transcript of Osama bin Laden videotape” CNN (December 13, 2001). Available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/13/tape.transcript/ (accessed May 12, 2006). 28. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda (New York: Berkley Book, 2002) 80. 29. An electronic copy of the entire text can be accessed at the following Web site, http://www.islamistwatch.org/texts/azzam/caravan/caravan. html (accessed May 1, 2006). 30. Ibid. 31. Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda, 122. 32. Ibid., 51. 33. “The 9-11 Commission Report,” United States Government Printing Office (July 22, 2004) 61. 34. Gunaratna, op. cit., 195 35. Ibid. 36. Downey, op. cit. 37. Michael Smith “al-Qaeda leader plans an Iraq army,” The Sunday Times (April 30, 2006). Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,20892158068,00.html (accessed October 1, 2006). 38. Yotam Feldner, “Debating the Religious, Political and Moral Legitimacy of Suicide Bombings (1)” The Middle East Media & Research Institute Inquiry & Analysis, No. 53, May 2, 2001. Available at: http://www.memri.org/ia/lA5301.html (accessed October 1, 2006). [From the same report: Muhammad Tantawi, the leading religious authority in the Sunni Islam and in charge of the Al-Azhar Seminar and University in Egypt, “Any explosion that leads to the death of innocent women and children is a criminal act, carried out only by people who are base, cowards and traitors, because a rational man with just a bit of respect and manliness, refrains from such operations altogether.”]

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39. C. J. Chivers and David S. Cloud “Not All See Video Mockery of Zarqawi as Good Strategy,” New York Times (May 6, 2006). 40. It should be noted that many of the leading ideological leaders of the Islamist movement do not come from a traditional background for having any authority within Islam. (i.e., Wahab, Bana, Qutb, Maududi, Zawahiri etc.). 41. Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Institute offered the following terms as substitution for some of the most common Islamic terms used in the Western world jihad (holy war or struggle) becomes hirabah (war against civilization or society), mujahiddin (holy warrior) and Shaheed (martyr) becomes mufsidoon (evil doer), and paradise (with its 72 virgins) becomes jahannam (demon filled hell).

CHAPTER 19 UNDERSTANDING AND COMBATING EDUCATION FOR MARTYRDOM Magnus Norell and Eli G¨ond¨or

Terrorism in the name of Islam is on the rise. It is no longer limited to the Middle East. While the people who are targeted feel as if they have had an encounter with a mass murderer, the perpetrators see themselves as martyrs, acting in the name of God. They commit their deeds consciously and in full recognition of what the consequences are, concluding that they are justified on account of their noble goal.1 Recruitment into movements like al Qaeda happens on the initiative of the recruit. There are enough people willing to become martyrs for the recruiters not to be forced to actively seek them out. Many committed young Muslim men even find themselves seeking ways to become martyrs, without being able to figure out how to go about it. Their desire to participate is so strong that it can be likened with applicants for a highly esteemed education.2 Thus, it can be assumed that the use of various forms of forceful recruitment or brainwashing is very rare, if not nonexistent.3 A study of members of the Afghan Mujahideen (i.e., activists who fought the Soviet Union during the 1980s) concluded that the subjects, surprisingly enough, had suffered very few emotional traumas.4 It was impossible to find any trace of any emotional trauma in their past, nor could evidence be found to suggest pathological hatred or paranoia. Based on the evidence, it was concluded that many of the Mujahideen fighters were part of a search for a higher goal, worthy of their self-sacrifice.5 In the Arab world, the gap is widening between the middle class and the elite. Candidates for martyrdom are found in the cities in the Middle East and North Africa, among those who seek dignity and wait

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impatiently for the opportunity to be a part of the heroic adventure which, they believe, will help them escape the meaningless life they feel themselves condemned to lead. Martyrdom offers them the dignity and respect that they, tragically, lack in cities such as Teheran and Cairo, and this is true regardless of whether one is Sunni or Shia.6 In addition, a vast group of Muslims live as minorities in various countries throughout the West, where they struggle to find a new identity. For instance, in France (the country with the largest number of immigrated Muslims) hardly any of the French citizens with a North African background dreams of being able to return to their native land or establish an isolated Maghreb or a Muslim enclave in France. Their dream, rather, is to create a liveable zone for themselves within French society. They seek the opportunity to manage their own integration on their own terms and yet fight for their right to be different.7 Afghan Mujahideen fighters with a North African background living in France were recently surveyed,8 and the following was discovered: Lonely people search for human contact. In environments densely populated with immigrants, especially in non-Muslim western states, the mosque is often the most accessible meeting place for people with similar backgrounds. Disillusioned with a society that has turned its back on them, combined with a feeling of broken promises of support from political groups in France, second-generation immigrants (and those newly arrived) from the Maghreb found a new community in the mosque. Islam became the tool by which dignity was restored; it gave them a feeling of spiritual calling and strengthened their moral values.9 Education for martyrdom, then, is something that adjusts to the prevalent mood: An education meant to accommodate the state within which Islam finds itself, by exclusivist selection from existing systems and texts within Islam, is capable of creating the results we are witnessing today. At present, Islam is in a state that can be taken advantage of by operators with an interest in fostering martyrs. Two basic phenomena related to the state of Islam are the breakdown of structures and objectification. BACKGROUND “Therefore let those fight in the way of Allah, who sell this world’s life for the hereafter; and whoever fights in the way of Allah, then be he slain or be he victorious, We shall grant him a mighty reward.” —The Koran, chapter 4, “The Women,” “4.74,” M. H. Shakir’s translation of the Holy Qur’an

The Breakdown of Structures Like other groups, Islamic societies throughout history have lived with clear hierarchies and structures. These structures are no longer uniform.

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Various alternatives are available through Web sites and other institutions. The possibility of choosing different interpretations and develop interpretations of one’s own, weakens the influence of formally trained religious scholars. In an attempt to preserve their status, the traditional religious scholars are appearing with greater frequency on the Internet, claiming that only they possess the ability to understand the “correct” meaning of Islam.10 It has become increasingly difficult for the religious elite to preserve its monopoly and retain their seniority in matters of interpretation. In 1968, it was still common for people (for example in southern Iraq) to gather around the one person who could read, while he read aloud from the newspaper. The knowledge and extensive network of contacts gave the sheikh a clear status. All over the world the number of people who know how to read has increased manifold. In Oman, the number of people with a university degree increased from 22 in 1975 to 60,000 in 1995. In Turkey, in 1950, 65 percent of men and 85 percent of women were illiterate, and in 1990 these numbers had fallen to 10 percent and 30 percent respectively. This increases both the supply and the demand for literature. Moreover, new techniques have created new ways to distribute texts. As a result, the Syrian engineer Muhammad Sharur is able to sell his 800-page long “The Book and the Quran: A Contemporary Interpretation” in tens of thousands of copies; this is despite the fact that the book has been banned by religious authorities. Sharur’s aim is to take a closer look at the traditional interpretation of the Koran and adjust it to contemporary life. The retired officer, Nazir Ahmed, has a similar purpose with his book “Quranic and Non-Quranic Islam,” which was published in 1997. Shortly thereafter, it was released in a second edition. Another example of a person who questions the traditional interpretations of the Koran is Nasr Abuˆ Zayd, who holds the Ibn Rushd Chair of Humanism and Islam at the University for Humanistics in Holland. In 1995, he was forced to leave Egypt as a result of his writings.11 Although these developments are not universal, a clear trend can be observed, where the old hierarchies that have based their power on traditional and fixed structures are being eroded. Thus, it is becoming increasingly common that conflicting opinions are tolerated in the Muslim world. The reform movements claim independence of thought for themselves through the Internet and question the traditional structures, but the old authorities have also been able to establish themselves in the “new order,” albeit not without competition.12 Objectification The objectification within Islam questions the traditional structures. Individualization and restructuring is a result of criticism directed at

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previous authorities, communities, and attitudes toward the relationship between the self and the traditional surrounding. For most people, it was unlikely that practicing a religion could ever be put into question. At the end of the 20th century criticism was widespread throughout the Muslim world under the term “objectification.” Objectification poses basic objective questions regarding the individual’s subjective relationship to his or her faith/religion, and how faith/religion affects the individual in his or her daily life. The objectification is a conscious and active attempt to examine the meaning of Islam for the individual. He or she asks questions about his or her attitude toward Islam and what significance religion has to his or her life and identity. The phenomenon does not take into account one characteristic of Islam that certain thinkers have put great emphasis on, namely of it being something unified and impenetrable. On the contrary, it is a question of directly and clearly taking part in a discourse, which, to an increasing degree, is shaping Islamic practices in practically every social stratum. Objectification has become a tool with which to separate one’s religious belief from other faiths and develop one’s own thought.13 Furthermore, objectification has ushered in an era where those who previously were perceived as the sole legitimate authority are now forced to compete with a vast number of easily accessible texts. More and more Muslims feel justified in interpreting the older (as well as the more modern) written sources of Islam themselves.14 Several of these new interpreters claim to represent “the one and only truth” without links to the past traditions that are considered to be the cornerstones of Islam, which leads to a kind of “de-Islamization” of Islam.15 Thus, the questioning of past structures has opened up the stage for new actors to claim to represent “the one and only truth” and offer new ways to proceed. This development is at the base of the new phenomena, involving Islamists, neofundamentalists, and jihadists. Islamists, Neofundamentalists, and Jihadists These phenomena could be described by drawing up circles where different key concepts, on the one hand, overlapped and presented certain similarities, while on the other hand also holding to quite different ideas about Islam and the role it should play in present-day life. At the root we find that Islamic political parties have failed to create a workable solution for an Islamic state. After the global Islamist revolution lost its momentum, the Islamists were confronted with the choice of either adjusting to the existing political system that is, adjust to the Western concept of the nation-state or a radicalized development toward neofundamentalism, a closed and conservative view of Islam, which was opposed to the nation-state and which stressed the ummah, the universal Muslim society, based on sharia.

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Examples of Islamist movements that have slowly adjusted to the existing political system are Algerian FIS, Turkish Refah Patisi, Tunisian Nahda, and Palestinian Hamas, which has become increasingly similar to the exclusively political PLO. This can be seen as evidence that Islamic political parties increasingly have become more like regular, national parties. Neofundamentalists are gaining ground with disenfranchised Muslim youth mainly among first- and second-generation immigrants in the West. They are small groups who reach new levels of radicalization among (for instance) al Qaeda sympathizers. They call on their adherents to reject the multicultural society, avoid integration, and instead turn to a closed sectarian community. These neofundamentalists do not identify with any state, but live with the ambition of making all societies adopt Islamic norms and fight to reestablish the ummah. These groups do sometimes engage in international militant jihadism aimed at the West, something that has previously been the Islamists’ trademark. Thus, the current political radicalization of conservative Islam, embodied in the Taliban, blurred the lines between moderates, conservatives, and radicals. The spread of radical and militant neofundamentalism has developed in parallel to two other growing trends. One of them is the spread of more or less privately funded religious schools throughout the entire Muslim world, based on the Salafi or the Wahabi strain of Islam. The second is the deterritorialization of the Muslim world through large groups of Muslim emigrants. Liberal Islam and neofundamentalism have many things in common. In both cases, emphasis is put on the religiosity of the individual as a result of the erosion of the influence of the traditional socioreligious authorities. This, consequently, leads to a resurrection of strictly religious communities. Furthermore, it is a question of the individual’s own journey through the religious and social milieus, where a lot can happen and much can change on a personal level. The Muslim ummah is no longer linked to territory; rather, it should be viewed in wholly abstract terms.16 Thus, globalization becomes more an opportunity than an obstacle for the neofundamentalists. Here, one will find individuals who, because of a feeling of individualization and/or confusion about their identity are seeking a new community that is based exclusively on religion. The neofundamentalists take advantage of this weakness and use it to rebuild the ummah. The problem, however, stems from the fact that the idea of the ummah is completely devoid of anything substantial or concrete—such as culture, territory, ethnicity, or economy upon which a society could be based. Hence, the fight to reestablish the ummah amounts to little more than a fantasy in a political deadlock. At the same time, some of the goals have been fulfilled by avoiding integration into the West, while still making use of the religious and social tools that the West has to offer.

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The most effective way to differentiate between radical and conservative neofundamentalists is in their view of jihad. The traditional view is that it is a collective duty, practiced in certain circumstances. Radicals like Sayyid Qutb and Mohammed Farrag view jihad as a private matter, which reappears prominently in the texts of, among others, Osama bin Laden. The call to individual jihad complements the state of loneliness for the radical militant who has left his natural surroundings to participate in an illusory one.17 The supporters of al Qaeda fight on many different fronts for the imaginary ummah.18 Thus, the terror of al Qaeda is different from that of other terrorist groups. For example IRA, PLO, and ETA are groups that have had a clear political objective that (at least theoretically) can be achieved, and consequently, the possibility exists of their laying down their arms and coming to the negotiating table. This line of reasoning does not apply to bin Laden, because his war aim is a figment of his (and his supporters’) imagination. The conflicts in the Middle East can be used in the propaganda of recruitment officers, but is in fact unrelated to the actual struggle of the Islamists. Thus, the solution of these conflicts will not reduce the availability of new recruits for jihad, since the fundamental motivator has much more to do with the West than with the Middle East.19 Islamism is a form of modern political fundamentalism, which strives to rebuild a Muslim society not only by instituting sharia law, but also by creating an Islamic state through political means. Although the Islamic movement is undemocratic, it does not necessarily have to be violent. Examples of Islamic movements include Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan, Refah Partisi in Turkey, Hizbollah in Lebanon, Nahda in Tunisia, FIS in Algeria, NIF in Sudan, IRP in Tajikistan, and a majority of movements that originated the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, including those in Syria, Kuwait, and Jordan. These groups have not been able to create “real” Islamic states. Moreover, the many branches of the Muslim Brotherhood took a stand for their respective countries’ national interests. While they were consolidated within their respective countries, they lost their international support. Thus, a connection developed between territory and nationalism on the one hand, and deterritorialization and radical Islamism on the other.20 The neofundamentalists want to introduce sharia without having to go through government authorities, which would bring about the destruction of the nation-state. The aim is to see it through on an individual level. This stems, in part, from the problems the Muslim countries are facing and the deterritorialization of Islam, as well as its encounter with the West.21 The Muslim world no longer shares a territorial, cultural, or social base. The deterritorialization and the individualization is the starting point for the neofundamentalists. A Muslim, regardless of where he is, is a part of the imaginary ummah and therefore unconcerned with the limits of citizenship, which is based on secular legal principles, territory, and

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borders.22 Neofundamentalists are against the idea that there can be different schools, all with a claim to representing true Islam. They are neither an organization nor an exact school, but rather a trend or a mental state. They exist among defectors from the Muslim Brotherhood, Tablighi Jama’at, and Wahhabism. Included in the politically radical branch of neofundamentalism are GIA in Algeria, al Qaeda, Jayash-e-Muhammad, and Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan. All of these movements see jihad as an individual duty, and not just as a collective one. Hizb ut-Tahir, finally, is a hybrid, since it portrays itself as a neofundamentalist party with the goal of reinstating the caliphate as a regime to rule the ummah. This regime needs to be instated as soon as possible for the whole ummah, without being limited to a specific territory. Between neofundamentalists, the debate concerning the choice between takfir (excommunication) and dawah (missionary work) as a means to their end represents a central theme. Most hold the view that dawah is the right path. They reject traditional Muslim theology. They demand strict adherence to sharia in accordance with their own interpretation and without compromises with secular laws. Consequently, the modern notion of the nation-state is put into question. They do not care about social issues. Nor do they try to fill the social needs in the way of the Islamists. They refuse to take part in earthly science and philosophy. To them, only the notion of haram/hallal (forbidden/allowed) without discussion or analysis and without taking into consideration that the world has changed since the days of the Prophet, is valid. The radical neofundamentalists view the action as more important than the result. Thus, individual jihad becomes more important than victory. The goal is to serve God, not to achieve a certain political agenda. The results will come when God wills it. The fundamental difference between Islamists and neofundamentalists lie in their views of state and politics. Neofundamentalists are opposed to concepts such as democracy, human rights, and freedom, while Islamists try to prove how this can all be achieved through Islam. Neofundamentalists refuse to express themselves in terms that originate in the West.23 The neofundamentalists feel no rush in building Islamic institutions that would risk putting the validity of sharia into question. For neofundamentalists, the target is salvation, not revolution. The focus is on the individual and not on society. To be able to initiate political action, one needs first to be on the right path.24 There is coherence in the worldview of the neofundamentalists and the Islamists. Both feel that the ummah is in a critical state and that Islam is under political and cultural siege from the West. The West is the enemy. The difference lies in the view of how best to correct these wrongs. The neofundamentalists see a solution either in dawah activities or jihad, but

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never through political means. The Islamists, on the other hand, believe that the solution is the Islamic state.25 The question of what should take precedence, jihad or dawah, is what separates violent from nonviolent neofundamentalism. Adherents to Wahabism, and members of Tablighi Jama’at and Hizb ut-Tahrir do not view jihad as relevant for anything other than defence.26 To the jihadists, martyrdom is an equalizer. Regardless of social or economic status and regardless of age or education, a person is capable of becoming a martyr. Since everybody is equal in death, equality on the social and political arena during life is demanded as well.27 The social aspect of radical Islam is significant indeed. The encounter with likeminded people, burdened with the same feeling of alienation, failure, and isolation lay at the base of the education that needs neither brainwashing nor any form of coercive measures. Instead, the movement offers three things that these rootless individuals lack: friendship, kinship, and the affection between students and teachers. This way, a common social and emotional support group develops that aids in the creation of a new identity, sustained by the encouragement to rededicate one’s life to radical Islam, the glue that holds the community together. Thus, militant radical Islam is more an answer to a human need to feel a sense of belonging than a recipe for murder, although that is in fact most commonly the result.28 This makes for a convenient means of recruitment, by using what has always been a part of Islam to encourage disaffected youth to become martyrs. The breakdown of earlier structures has affected large parts of the individual’s natural surroundings. The clear-cut hierarchies both within the family and in society at large have been put into question to an increasing extent. Objectification has individualized the group or been a result of the former. New forms of Islam have developed as a result of the individualization of the group, and spreads in various surroundings. They differ in outlook and modus operandi from attempts to adjust to the Western notion of the nation-state to a complete rejection of the same. This new multitude offers new traditions of thought as a consequence of new needs. The need to find a purpose for frustrated, bored, and rootless individuals in a foreign country on the one hand, and on the other hand a purpose with a “nobler” value than what is being offered in everyday life, is a symbiosis that creates the necessary circumstances for the religious rhetoric that promulgates the glory of martyrdom. Those who follow God are above common earthly temptations. Daily life becomes a show of strength in the face of the contemptible, where the friends of the aspiring martyr are aided in reaching a state that is beyond the profane. In light of this, it is important for the organization to keep the aspiring martyr away from worldly matters.29

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A martyr seeks death because his ambitions and desires are impossible to attain in real life.30 Furthermore, death through martyrdom offers redemption and the possibility of reaching the paradise that is unavailable in this world.31 MARTYRDOM Martyrdom creates equality and erases differences between social and economic classes. It is something that anyone is able to do. All men, young or old, rich or poor, educated or illiterate, can be martyrs, and since everybody is equal in death, the same is demanded in life.32 Revolutionary martyrdom aids in hiding desperation in the face of the cruel reality of life, and at the same time, it feeds that very desperation by giving it religious underpinnings.33 Within Shiism, it is a natural part of one’s self-image. The origin of Imamitic Shiism is found in the understanding of the status of the imam. In every generation, according to this strain of Islam, there is an Imam who is chosen and strengthened by God and guides Muslim society, religiously and spiritually. The Caliph, from this point of view, is seen as a strictly political leader, lacking in the spiritual qualities demanded of an Imam. Without an Imam, enlightened by God, and able to spread His word, there is no way of abiding by His will. The status stems from a purportedly unbroken bloodline that goes all the way back to the Prophet Muhammad.34 Following the death of Muhammad, the question arose of who would be best suited to take his place.35 A group called the Mu’tazilites opposed the new caliph and criticized him for a perceived inability to do the right thing. Their much stricter interpretation of the principle of “forbidding what is wrong” and taking responsibility for making sure that people acted in a righteous manner in particular if the caliph abused his power is something that has lived on through Imamitic Shiism. Another fundamental principle, the idea that leadership should be inherited down from Ali and his descendants, rather than through ijima (consensus) was formulated in the sixth and seventh centuries.36 The story surrounding the battle at Karbala in 680 ce became central to the way Imamitic Shiism came to view itself. The disgrace suffered from not aiding Ali’s son, al-Husayn, in the battle against the Umayyads developed into a call for revenge against those who had murdered members of the family of the Prophet. This later developed into the belief that the bloodline of the Imam stemmed directly from Ali.37 The caliphate of the Abbasids, which came into being in the 7th century, and its economic affluence in cities like Baghdad, enabled the consolidation of religious texts and religious authority. During this time, many of the things that we view today as intrinsic parts of Islam were first created.38 New definitions replaced the old ones, and became solidified.

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The historical role of the Prophet, his leadership, and the principles for appointing his rightful successor all became friction points within Islam, and made the internal splits within Islam appear more clearly.39 This put pressure on the Shiite opposition, which became increasingly threatened, and whose leaders from time to time had to live out their days in prison. In this context, the principle of taqiya was developed, calling on the loyal followers of Ali to keep their faith secret in order to survive in a hostile environment.40 Several attempts were made to create a separate identity and differentiate Shiism from Sunni Islam. Among other things, this presented itself through attempts during the 7th century to create a holiday to mark the occasion when Muhammad, on his last pilgrimage, named Ali as his successor. Sunnis responded by creating a holiday to mark the escape of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, the Hijra, accompanied by Abu Bakr, to strengthen his claim as the rightful successor.41 An important figure in the shaping of the ideas propounded by Shiism was Jafar al-Sadiq, who by many was considered the rightful Imam. He was the one who brought the focus to Ali’s bloodline. Furthermore, Jafar accepted the political realities and never attempted to initiate a revolt against the Caliphate of the Abbasids.42 An argument arose later on as to whom among Jafar’s sons was his rightful heir. This resulted in a split within Shiism, and the resultant Ismaili sect has never gained the Twelver’s (mainstream Shiism) recognition. Later, Ubayd Allah, who for the Ismaili became the embodiment of the righteous Imam, laid the foundation to the Fatimid Empire in North Africa, with Cairo as its center.43 The Fatimid Empire later gained recognition as far away as Yemen and parts of Syria.44 The feeling of living under relentless oppression in an unjust world in need of saving is central to Imamitic Shiism. Out of this feeling, the idea of the hidden Imam developed. In the year 873 ce, at the young age of 29, the 11th Imam, Hasan alAskari, died in Samarra. Confusion ensued, since no one knew whether he had an heir. This developed into the belief that he did indeed have a son, Muhammad, who was being kept hidden in order to protect him from the Abbasids and other enemies. The belief soon became widespread and during the 8th century it resulted in the Imami sect, or Twelvers, who today has the largest number of adherents of all Shia sects. The twelfth Imam was identified as the son of Hassan, Muhammad, al-mantzur (the longed for).45 It should be added that there are those who are skeptical as to whether or not Hasan al-Askari even had a son.46 The one who is hidden is unreachable. An idea is immortal as long as it exists in the fantasies and faiths of people. And as long as the idea does not have to be tested against reality, it is impossible to question. Furthermore, it might be worth a lot of suffering in order to be able to reap the subsequent rewards. Imamitic Shiism has kept its secret and waited,

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convinced that the final victory will be theirs, and that suffering is an intrinsic part of the natural state of things. Because as long as Mahdi acts only in secrecy, his followers will be forced to suffer as a confirmation of the fact that the resurrection has not yet occurred. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION And reckon not those who are killed in Allah’s way as dead; nay, they are alive (and) are provided sustenance from their Lord; Rejoicing in what Allah has given them out of His grace and they rejoice for the sake of those who, (being left) behind them, have not yet joined them, that they shall have no fear, nor shall they grieve. They rejoice on account of favor from Allah and (His) grace, and that Allah will not waste the reward of the believers. (As for) those who responded (at Ohud) to the call of Allah and the Apostle after the wound had befallen them, those among them who do good (to others) and guard (against evil) shall have a great reward. —Chapter 3, The Family of Imran, “3.169”-”3.172,” M. H. Shakir’s translation of the Holy Qur’an

Submission Islam is Arabic for submission. In the relationship between the individual and the sacred, the individual’s submission to God is required for him or her to be able to reach enlightenment. It begins with the strict balance of power between the student and the teacher. The teaching of submission within Shiism is based on the idea that to be a good Muslim, it is required that responsibility be accepted for the betrayal at the battle of Karbala, when Husayn, according to tradition, asked his Muslim brothers for help and was let down. Within Shiism, a culture has developed where the guilty conscience of that betrayal is expressed through tragedy and lessened through martyrdom. In a culture where literature and urban myths are intimately linked to tragedy, martyrdom is viewed as a dramatic expression of tragedy. In such a social context, martyrdom is not an aberration, but a manifestation of a culture that revels in tragedy.47 Through a process whose goal it is to achieve the divine through submission, the individual learns to renounce the earthly and thus purify the body to disconnect it from its banality, raise it toward the sublime and, step by step, unite the soul with the spiritual, the divine. The final proof that the individual has left the banal, human state is the insight into the meaninglessness of earthly life. This way, earthly values can be disregarded and abandoned in favor of nobler values. Obsession with death leads to a mental state where death is viewed as a sensory incarnation of the ideal. The ideal has an inherent value, and living by it will bring happiness to those who believe in it.48

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This complex state of affairs is of little use to those who strive to foster martyrs if he is unable to offer the aspiring martyrs something that would appeal to them. Since Islam is based on the Koran, the power of interpretation is a decisive factor for those with the ambition to persuade the aspiring martyrs that his intentions are righteous. The Status of the Koran According to Muslim tradition, the Koran was given to Muhammad by the archangel Gabriel. It was revealed to him in Arabic and written down by him before his death in 632 ce. However, Muhammad never put all of his writings together into one cohesive text.49 The Muslim world does not deny that the Koran has gone through an evolutionary process, however the common view among Muslims is that the process was over and done with no more than 20 years after the death of Muhammad.50 Muhammad himself had very little to do with putting together the Koran. The gathering of texts and its final edition is said to have been done through the guidance of the third caliph, Uthman (644–656 ce). This edition, however, is viewed as a base on which the Koran came to continue its development during an additional 200 years. Findings in Yemen, among other places, has showed that some Koranic texts were put together in one book during the 6th century. However, this says nothing of the status of the texts among Muslims during that time.51 The Koran describes in detail the believers’ paradise and the purgatory of the sinners.52 This way, the Koran is the ultimate recipe for a good and eternal earthly life, which, furthermore, guarantees an equally satisfying existence in the “final time.” The Koran, then, became a “basic document” given by God, delivered to humanity by the archangel Gabriel who appeared before Muhammad who in turn was tasked with becoming God’s Prophet a concrete and physical piece of evidence of God’s existence and God’s will. The Koran is therefore viewed as a tool given by the almighty God to the humans in order for them, in their imperfection, to have the option of choosing a life in accordance with God’s wishes. In other words, the Koran is considered to be a gift from God to humanity. The text of the Koran could never answer all the problems with which an individual finds himself confronted in daily life. Rather, the Koran “the instruction manual” for how life is to be lead needed additional tools to be able to interpret and confirm the authenticity of the original text. For the deeply religious and God-fearing individual, it was not enough that anyone could claim to know how to interpret the Koran to find answers to current problems. Those who intended to lead their life in accordance with the Koran, and with Muhammad as a role model,

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demanded proof that the Prophet really was the source and that what they were practicing was indeed in accordance with God’s will. The ones closest to the Prophet, those who had lived with him and were able to tell about how he had lived his life, were found to be suitable witnesses. When the generation of immediate eyewitnesses died, people were forced to settle with what the next generation had been told by the first and so on through history. The reliability of the information is judged by the line of transmission. It was deemed that there were reliable lines of transmission of information about the tradition, from the original eyewitnesses and on, and this was accepted as a compliment to the Koran. These eyewitness accounts of the actions of the Prophet and the ones closest to him came to be called sunna (holy tradition), and the way in which these traditions came to be documented and collected came to be known as hadith.53 By presenting the life of the oldest of Muslim societies, the sunna is thought to be the most important tool for interpreting the Koran. In short, with the aid of sunna, the texts of the Koran become relevant and useful for later generations.54 There are, however, valid reasons to be skeptical of hadith as a historical source, in part because of the large number of contradicting accounts. For Muslims, this means that to a large degree, they are able to choose what to believe.55 Some of the sunnas are tied directly to the Koran, which could arouse the suspicion that they are created for the specific purpose of strengthening the status of the Koran. Sunna and hadith can thus be viewed as a confirmation of the unique and holy status of the Koran, but also as a tool for broadening the relevance of the Koran to new areas. Interpretation gained a large significance for the pious individual striving to lead his life in complete accordance with the Koran. But different interpretations do not necessarily produce the same result. Hence, the power of interpretation came to mean power over how other people lead their lives. Schools of Jurisprudence The status of the religious authorities came, among other things, as a result of people wanting to live in accordance with the teachings of the Koran. The Koran was not read like any other book and interpreted individually. It was read aloud and commented on by a teacher with a claim of one or more links to a long line of authorities whose origin was tied to the one who had written the text and in the matter of the hadiths, with a bloodline that could be traced back to the Prophet himself. This way, a system developed that had less to do with transmission of knowledge and more to do with transfer of authority of knowledge. Consequently, the more disciples, the greater religious authority and respect among colleagues.56

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Some of the most important schools of jurisprudence are: Hanafi (Abu Hanafi d. 767 ce), which dominated Central Asia, Turkey, parts of Egypt, and India. The school allowed a greater degree of flexibility through personal judgment. Malki (Malik ibn Anas d. 796 ce), which came to dominate North Africa and parts of Egypt. The school saw the people of Medina as a precedent to sunna. Shafi (Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi d. 822 ce), which came to dominate Malaysia, Indonesia, East Africa, and parts of Egypt. It is in its foundation comparable to Malki. Hanbali (Ahmad ibn Hanbal d. 855 ce) is the official school of jurisprudence in Saudi Arabia. They propagate for new interpretations rather than the repetition and complimenting the interpretations of older jurists.

The schools of jurisprudence developed as local centers of studies tied to geographical areas where Basra, Kufa, Medina, and Damascus developed their own traditions and affected others. The differences between the schools had little to do with method or principle, and were a matter more of strictly local circumstances. Each school developed its own sunna, which legitimized their own religious authorities and kept foreign thought at arm’s length.57 The systematic buildup of the status of the Koran led to two basic principles being formulated. First, the status of the Koran gained the status of the perfect “instruction manual” given by God via the archangel Gabriel to humanity as a sign of God’s ambition to (through sunna) establish evidence of the validity of the idea. Second, the authenticity of sunna came to be established through proof of the connection between individuals in the present time and the Prophet. Thereby, an exclusive group gained the legitimacy to be able to decide the status of the Koran and how it could and should be interpreted. By providing instructions for every detail of human life, sunna and the authorities that interpreted it gained the power to control the lives of its adherents into the most minute detail. The power of interpretation, however, is something that needs to be protected and nurtured. To be able to argue that your interpretation is the one and only that is true, it is crucial to be able to argue that all other interpretations are false. Ijima Ijima means agreement, and is the key to understanding the historical development of Islam from its political, theological, and legal aspects. The thinking behind ijima is that what is accepted by the entire Muslim society as right should also become a rule that applies to everyone. To oppose ijima is thus tantamount to turning one’s back to the orthodox

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community.58 The Koranic verse that traditionally is said to support ijima is “And whoever disobeys Allah and His Apostle and goes beyond His limits, He will cause him to enter fire to abide in it, and he shall have an abasing chastisement.”59 The hadith that supports ijima refers to a quote from Muhammad where he espoused the view that his congregation cannot agree on something that is not right. Ijima developed after the death of Muhammad as a natural consequence of relying on majority rule.60 In short, everybody cannot be wrong at the same time. From a wider perspective, however, the idea of ijima became yet another tool for the enhancement of the power of the elite and its control of Muslim tradition. To oppose ijima was to stand outside tradition and be viewed as a dissident.61 The status of the Koran was built up by an elite, whose experiences and purported relation to the Prophet could be used by future elites. Through the use of sunna, the power could gain legitimacy and preserve its power of interpretation. The schools of jurisprudence and ijima became additional building blocks in the fortress of power of the elite. The schools of jurisprudence came to be defined by claims on certain geographical territories rather than differences in their teachings. Ijima came to offer a tool to build up the idea of an “us” and a “them.” “Everyone agrees” legitimized all decisions and attitudes. Since the status of the Koran is set and the power of interpretation is fixed, the aspiring martyrs are taught the Islamic code of ethics as an idea that calls upon the followers of Islam to try to affect the lives of those with differing opinions by force. The Islamic Code of Ethics In this context, the Islamic code of ethics can be used as a means to gain the power of interpretation and foster martyrdom. The Islamic code of ethics “to forbid what is wrong” is based on the principle that there is a collective burden of responsibility. However, it is unclear who has the authority and in what situations to decide this. The principle is based on several texts from the Koran and the tradition where the Prophet is said to have called for eradicating wrongful doings by three means: by the hand, by the tongue, and by the heart. This has been the subject of lengthy discussions among religious scholars as to its exact meaning.62 The group that has come to be the most important in the discussions surrounding the call to forbid what is wrong was Mu’tazilla. The movement later split into several different groups of opposition, but their thinking lived on in the Hanafi and Hanbali schools of jurisprudence.63 The root cause of the splits into different religious groups was mainly the question of legitimacy. The question of “forbidding what is wrong” became a hotly debated issue following the death of the Prophet. The Abbasid caliphs in the sixth and seventh centuries were engaged in the debate by among other things banning alcohol and women’s singing. On

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the one hand, these caliphs had the power to “forbid what is wrong,” but were, on the other hand, in a situation where they could easily “do what is wrong.” One example is the caliph al-Qahir (r. 932–934 ce) who forbade alcohol and singing, and then ordered singing girls to be paid according to their musical talent, and then bought them for himself. What is interesting is how the rhetoric developed around the term, which changed the nature of the debate from an attempt at moral reform to something that had more to do with political opposition and to form the basis of a regime of one’s own and retain power.64 In the sixth and seventh centuries, there were regents who established special task forces to make sure that no wrongdoings were committed in, for example, the marketplace. There were even those who, during the 7th century, held the view that it was the responsibility of the regime to send out “moral guardians” into society, just like they sent out tax collectors, to make sure that all wrongdoings were, indeed, banned. One of the people reticent about allowing the authorities to decide all matters of right and wrong was Ibn Hanbal. The authorities, he felt, cannot guarantee that the wrongdoings are rectified in an adequate manner. He discussed what in terms of international law would be called the principle of proportionality. If a person is suspected of drinking alcohol and is facing punishment of death by whipping, the one who has forbidden the wrong has made an even greater wrong himself.65 Generally, religious scholars accept the responsibility of the regime “to forbid what is wrong.” During the 10th century, the responsibility of the regime toward the public and the individual was discussed in detail. In order for the regime to enforce the law, and punish people’s wrongdoings, the punishment needed to be legitimate in the eyes of the people. Thus, there are a number of scholars who claim that it is the responsibility of the individual to oppose a regime that is acting wrongfully. One of the most prominent proponents of this idea was Malik, who claimed that it is the responsibility of every Muslim to oppose power. On the other hand, Jafar al-Sadiq claimed that there are no rewards for those who have gotten into trouble for criticizing the regime. The authority’s monopoly on deciding how wrongdoings should be forbidden cannot always be taken for granted. Maliki Ibn al-Hajj (d. 1336) points out that the fact that just because a person is neither learned nor an authority, does not necessarily mean that he is unable to “forbid what is wrong.” In the matter of “forbidding what is wrong,” a discussion arose of where the line should be drawn between the public and the personal sphere. When is something “my problem,” and when does it become something that should be addressed by “others?” And if it is addressed and taken out into the public sphere, is there a risk that the consequences that such an action would bring to the individual is not proportional to the crime? And does that give “us,” who are right, an excuse to exclude from our community a person who we feel is wrong?

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In the modern Muslim state, the argument to “forbid what is wrong” has been used by regimes to institutionalize and control the society. At the same time, organizations concerned with human rights issues have been able to refer to the same principle. To interpret this code of ethics as an argument for martyrdom is indeed possible, arguing that he who dies to prevent what is wrong dies a martyr.66 CONCLUSION The Muslim world is in a transitional state, moving away from traditional structures and toward objectification. Groups of frustrated young Muslim men (and a few women) with a feeling of purposelessness are seeking loftier goals to pin their existence on. The claim that those who aspire to become martyrs suffer from mental illnesses as a result of a traumatic childhood or poverty is disputed by practically all available facts. Bad education and substandard social conditions do not explain why a person decides to become a suicide murderer. A break with one’s homeland and family creates a sense of rootlessness. In small groups of likeminded people, the feeling of belonging is regained. In these small groups, a mental state develops where emphasis is put on loyalty and commitment to a common cause, which ties the individuals together into a new family. There are no common characteristics in all of these individuals, which would allow one to know in advance who they are. They have no commonalities when it comes to social, economic, or psychological backgrounds. What ties them together is the fact that they live in a foreign country, are gravely frustrated with the world, and that they are Muslim. The interpretation of the Koran is the foundation. The power of interpretation of the texts of the Koran is attainable in the same way as it has been attained throughout the history of Islam. It should, by no means, be concluded that Islam is a religion more prone to violence than any other religion, or that Muslims are more violent than other people. It does, however, mean that one does not have to work particularly hard in order to find Islamic texts that support the idea of martyrdom. The combination of the situation of the aspiring martyrs and individuals with the aim of channeling the frustration of these young men to their benefit is devastating. In cases like this, it is sufficient to refer to preexisting ideas, focus on them, and channel the need of a higher purpose and a new structure toward a struggle against the tyranny of radical Islamism. NOTES 1. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 155.

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2. Ibid., 122. 3. Ibid., 125. 4. Ibid., 85. 5. Ibid., 97. 6. Farhad Khosrokhavar, trans. David Macey, Suicide Bombers Allah’s New Martyrs (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005) 41. 7. Samadar Lavie and Ted Swedenburg, Displacement, Diaspora, and Geographies of Identity (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996) 129. 8. Ibid. note 4. 9. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 93. 10. Leif Stenberg, “Islam, Knowledge, and ‘The West,’” in Globalization and the Muslim World, ed. Birgit Schaebler and Leif Stenberg (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004) 93–110, 107–108. 11. AsiaNews, http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=en&art=2729. 12. Dale F. Eickelman, “Inside the Islamic Reformation,” in Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East, 2nd ed., ed. Donna Lee Bowen and Evelyn A. Early (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002) 246-256, 248-253. 13. Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004) 38. 14. Ibid., 43. 15. Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam the Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) 155. 16. Ibid., 19. 17. Ibid., 42. 18. Ibid., 53. 19. Ibid., 57. 20. Ibid., 67–69. 21. Ibid., 99. 22. Ibid., 203. 23. Ibid., 247. 24. Ibid., 248. 25. Ibid., 250. 26. Ibid., 255. 27. Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers Allah’s New Martyrs, 27. 28. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 135. 29. Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers Allah’s New Martyrs, 135. 30. Ibid., 131. 31. Ibid., 133. 32. Ibid., 27. 33. Ibid., 90. 34. Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) 176–177. 35. Jonathan P. Berkey, The Formation of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 83. 36. Berkey, The Formation of Islam, 87. 37. Ibid., 83. 38. Ibid., 114. 39. Ibid., 83.

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40. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, 181. 41. Berkey, The Formation of Islam, 142. 42. Ibid., 132. 43. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, 219. 44. Berkey, The Formation of Islam, 115. 45. Ibid., 134. 46. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, 200. 47. Fred Dallmayr, ed. Border Crossing: Towards a Comparative Political Theory (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 1999) 121. 48. Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers Allah’s New Martyrs, 59. 49. Michael Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam (London: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 5. 50. Daniel Brown, A New Introduction to Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 2004) 56. 51. Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2005) 35. 52. Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 242. 53. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, 37. 54. Ibid., 38. 55. Brown, A New Introduction to Islam, 89. 56. Berkey, The Formation of Islam, 149–150. 57. Rippin, Muslims: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 90–91. 58. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, 50. 59. The Koran, chapter 4, “The Women,” “4.14,” M. H. Shakir’s translation of the Holy Qur’an. 60. John L. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2001) 7. 61. Berkey, The Formation of Islam, 147. 62. One example of the message of the Koran can be found in chapter 3, “The Family of Imran.” 63. Cook, Forbidding Wrong in Islam, 6. 64. Ibid., 66. 65. Ibid., 72. 66. Ibid., 55.

CHAPTER 20 TERRORISM AND NEW MEDIA: THE CYBER-BATTLESPACE Maura Conway

This chapter has very little to offer about so-called “cyberterrorism” (i.e., acts of terrorism carried out using the Internet and/or against Internet infrastructures);1 instead, it is centrally concerned with what David Resnick describes as “political uses of the Net”—the employment of the Internet by ordinary citizens, political activists, organized interests, governments, and others to achieve political goals that have little or nothing to do with the Internet per se.2 Specifically, the focus here is on the use(s) made of the Internet by terrorist groups. What are terrorist groups attempting to do by gaining a foothold in cyberspace? A small number of researchers have addressed this question in the past 5 years.3 Probably the best known of these analyses is a recent report by Gabriel Weimann that identifies eight major ways in which, he says, terrorists currently use the Internet: psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilization, networking, information sharing, and planning and coordination.4 Similarly, research by other scholars—like Cohen, Furnell and Warren, and Thomas5 —suggest five core terrorist uses of the Net: information provision, recruitment, financing, networking, and information gathering. This chapter offers an analysis of all of these, as well as potential responses to the increasing terrorist reliance on the Internet. Initially, however, a brief explanation as to why the Internet is viewed by terrorists as such an attractive tool is in order. WHY THE INTERNET? Thomas Friedman has argued that contemporary globalization “goes farther, faster, cheaper, and deeper.”6 He might have been describing the

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Internet. The Internet is a powerful tool, which is used and manipulated by actors to accomplish a wide variety of tasks. The globally networked nature of the Internet allows users to access a nearly limitless supply of information and data that can be shared across the network. People can use the Internet to educate themselves, to entertain themselves, to conduct business, to shop, or to engage in political action. There is no a priori reason, however, why actors should use the Internet to engage in these activities over any other potential tool that will garner the same result. As with any tool, the Internet does not exist in a vacuum; rather, actors are presented with different options and make choices based on relative advantages. If actors are to use the Internet, it must offer relative advantages over other potential tools. If no such comparative benefit exists, actors will see no utility in using the Internet, opting instead for some other, more effective, option. There are nine key properties of the Internet that render it different from traditional media and a key instrumental power source: – Volume: Far larger volumes of information can be transferred easily compared with previous modes of communication. – Speed: The ability to compress data and more space for transmitting data decrease the amount of time it takes to exchange information. – Format: The ability to combine text, graphics, audio, and video means that indepth, dynamic, and visually stimulating communication is possible simultaneously. – Direction: The possibilities for two-way interactive communication are greatly expanded on the Internet as a result of the greater space and speed, but also due to the enhanced relationships arising out of hypertext linkage between sites. – Individual Control: The opening up of control over direction in the sending and receiving of information means that power is decentralized to the individual user, who has the choice of not only what to view, but also what to publish. – Anonymity: Internet users enjoy a large measure of anonymity. There are numerous information security applications that allow customers to conceal their identity, the content of their communications, or the details of their transactions. These include free e-mail services, electronic remailers, anonymizers, and widely available encryption and steganographic tools. – Evasion of Government Control: The primary way in which actors may evade government control is through operating their Web site(s) in jurisdictions with high levels of free speech protection. The various tools identified above may also be used to avoid censorship. – Reduced Transaction Costs: Registering a Web site costs less than U.S.$50 and many Internet sites allow users to create Web sites at no cost at all. Free e-mail services are commonplace on the Internet, while newsgroups and message postings are likewise available at no cost.

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– Global Scope: Perhaps most importantly, these low-cost Internet technologies allow users to transmit and share information globally almost instantaneously. The networked structure of the Internet finds the quickest and most effective route for information flows. Web sites from anywhere in the world take only seconds to load while e-mails can circle the globe in an instant.

In summary, then, Internet-based communication has the potential to be more immediate, individual, dynamic, in-depth, interactive, anonymous, unedited, cheaper, and far-reaching than is possible in conventional media. Terrorists are well aware of these properties of the Internet and this explains why they have taken to the medium with such alacrity. THE FIVE CORE TERRORIST USES OF THE INTERNET Information Provision This refers to efforts by terrorists to engage in publicity, propaganda, and (ultimately) psychological warfare. As terrorism researcher Gus Martin has observed, “In the modern era, the truism that ‘information is power’ is very clearly understood by the media and governments; it is also understood by terrorists, their audiences, and their adversaries.”7 The Internet, and the advent of the World Wide Web in particular, have significantly increased the opportunities for terrorists to secure publicity. This can take the form of historical information, profiles of leaders, manifestos, etc. But terrorists can also use the Internet as a tool of psychological warfare through spreading disinformation, delivering threats, and disseminating horrific images, such as the beheading of American entrepreneur Nick Berg in Iraq and U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan.8 These functions are clearly improved by the Web’s enhanced volume, increased speed of data transmission, low cost, relatively uncontrolled nature, and global reach. In the past, those characterized as “terrorists” were rarely accepted by the mass media as legitimate or authoritative sources of news in their own right. Neither were they accepted as reliable commentators upon the political situation that had given rise to the violence: As Susan Carruthers has argued, “Certainly, on the few occasions when the BBC or ITV interviewed Republican paramilitaries in the 1970s and 1980s, they were emphatically not, as a matter of policy, treated as individuals whose opinions could be accorded the same respect and due consideration as others.”9 By concentrating almost exclusively on the violent dimension of terrorism, making no attempt to contextualize its causes, media reports often leave readers, viewers, or listeners mystified as to the motivation of violent acts.10 An unfortunate result of this is that many in the media audience take these

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acts to be simply the senseless, inexplicable behavior of psychotic fundamentalists or extremist lunatics.11 The establishment of dedicated Web sites, on the other hand, offers terrorist groups an unprecedented level of direct control over the content of their message(s). It considerably extends their ability to shape how different target audiences perceive them and to manipulate not only their own image, but also the image of their enemies. Although for many groups, their target audience may be small, an Internet presence is nonetheless expected. Regardless of the number of hits a Web site receives, a well-designed and well-maintained Web site gives a group an aura of legitimacy, while also seeking to advance the organization’s political and ideological agenda. The latter is a core function in and of itself, but clearly the site’s information provision role also evidences significant overlaps with the other terrorist uses of the Internet described below, particularly recruitment. Recruitment This refers to groups’ efforts to recruit and mobilize sympathizers to more actively support terrorist causes or activities. The Web offers a number of ways for achieving this: it makes information gathering easier for potential recruits by offering more information, more quickly, and in multimedia format; the global reach of the Web allows groups to publicize events to more people; and by increasing the possibilities for interactive communication, new opportunities for assisting groups are offered, along with more chances for contacting the group directly. Finally, through the use of discussion forums, it is also possible for members of the public— whether supporters or detractors of a group—to engage in debate with one another. This may assist the terrorist group in adjusting their position and tactics and, potentially, increasing their levels of support and general appeal.12 Online recruitment by terrorist organizations is said to be widespread. Harris et al. provide the example of an Iranian site that boasts an application for suicide bombers guaranteeing that the new “martyr” will take 70 relatives with him into heaven. If the recruit is unsure about joining, or if the group is unsure about the recruit, he is directed to a chatroom where he is “virtually” vetted. If he passes muster, he will be directed to another chatroom for further vetting, and finally contacted personally by a group member. This process is said to be aimed at weeding out “undesirables” and potential infiltrators.13 It is more typical, however, for terrorist groups to actively solicit for recruits rather than waiting for them to simply present themselves. Weimann suggests that terrorist recruiters may browse online chatrooms looking for receptive members of the public, particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards could also serve as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits.14

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Financing This refers to efforts by terrorist groups to raise funds for their activities. Money is terrorism’s lifeline; it is what Loretta Napoleoni calls “the engine of the armed struggle.”15 The immediacy and interactive nature of Internet communication, combined with its high-reach properties, opens up a huge potential for increased financial donations, as has been demonstrated by a host of nonviolent political organizations and civil society actors. Terrorists seek financing via their Web sites and by using the Internet infrastructure to engage in resource mobilization using illegal means. Numerous terrorist groups request funds directly from Web surfers who visit their sites. Such requests may take the form of general statements underlining the organization’s need for money; more often than not, however, requests are more direct, urging supporters to donate immediately and supplying either bank account details or an Internet payment option. For example, the IRA’s main Web site contains a page on which visitors can make credit card donations.16 At one point, the Ulster Loyalist Information Service—which was affiliated with the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)—accepted funds via PayPal, and invited those who were “uncomfortable with making monetary donations” to donate other items, including bullet-proof vests. Another way in which groups raise funds is through the establishment of online stores and the sale of items such as books, audio and video tapes, flags, T-shirts, etc. The Internet facilitates terrorist financing in a number of other ways besides direct solicitation via Web sites. According to Jean-Francois Ricard, one of France’s top antiterrorism investigators, many Islamist terror plots are financed through credit card fraud.17 Imam Samudra, sentenced to death for his part in the Bali bombing of 2002, has published a prison memoir of some 280 pages, which includes a paper that acts as a primer on “carding.”18 According to Dutch experts, there is strong evidence from international law enforcement agencies such as the FBI that at least some terrorist groups are financing their activities via advanced fee fraud, such as Nigerian-style scam e-mails. While to date, solid evidence for such claims has not entered the public realm,19 there is ample evidence to support the contention that terrorist-affiliated entities and individuals have established Internet-related front businesses as a means of raising money to support their activities. For example, in December 2002, InfoCom—a Texas-based ISP—was indicted along with its individual corporate officers on 33 counts relating to its provision of communication services, in-kind support, and funds to terrorist organizations including Hamas and its affiliate the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD). InfoCom’s capital was donated primarily by Nadia Elashi Marzook, wife of Hamas figurehead Mousa Abu Marzook.20 Terrorist organizations have a history of exploiting not just businesses, but also charities as undercover fundraising vehicles. This is particularly

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popular with Islamist terrorist groups, because of the injunction that observant Muslims make regular charitable donations. In some cases, terrorist organizations have actually established charities with allegedly humanitarian purposes. Examples of such undertakings include Mercy International, Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamiya, Rabita Trust, Al Rasheed Trust, Global Relief Fund, Benevolence International Foundation, and Help the Needy. Along with advertising in sympathetic communities’ press, these “charities” also advertised on Web sites and chatrooms with Islamic themes, directing interested parties to visit their Web sites. Terrorists have also infiltrated branches of existing charities to raise funds clandestinely. Many such organizations do provide the humanitarian services that they advertise: feeding, clothing, and educating the poor and illiterate, and providing medical care for the sick. However, some organizations, in addition to pursuing their publicly stated mission of providing humanitarian aid, also pursue a covert agenda of providing material support to militant groups. These organizations’ Web-based publicity materials may or may not provide hints as to their secret purposes. Networking This refers to groups’ efforts to flatten their organizational structures and act in a more decentralized manner through the use of the Internet, which allows dispersed actors to communicate quickly and coordinate effectively at low cost. The Internet allows not only for intragroup communication, but also intergroup connections. The Web enhances terrorists’ capacities to transform their structures and build these links because of the alternative space it provides for communication and discussion and the hypertext nature of the Web, which allows for groups to link to their internal subgroups and external organizations around the globe from their central Web site. Transforming Organizational Structures: For several years, RAND’s John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini have been pointing to the emergence of new forms of terrorist organizations that are attuned to the information age. They contend that: “terrorists will continue to move from hierarchical toward information-age network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of transnationally internetted groups than into building stand-alone groups.”21 This type of organizational structure is qualitatively different from traditional hierarchical designs. Terrorists are ever more likely to be organized to act in a more fully networked, decentralized, “all-channel” manner. Ideally, there is no single, central leadership, command, or headquarters. Within the network as a whole there is little or no hierarchy and there may be multiple leaders depending upon the size of the group. In other words, there is no specific heart or head that can be targeted. To realize its potential, such a network must utilize

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the latest information and communications technologies. The Internet is becoming an integral component of such organizations, according to the RAND analysts.22 Planning and Coordination: As Peter Margulies observes, “Many terrorist groups share a common goal with mainstream organizations and institutions: the search for greater efficiency through the Internet.”23 Several reasons have been put forward to explain why modern IT systems, especially the Internet, are so useful for terrorists in establishing and maintaining networks. As already discussed, new technologies enable quicker, cheaper, and more secure information flows. In addition, the integration of computing with communications has substantially increased the variety and complexity of the information that can be shared.24 This led Michele Zanini to hypothesize that “the greater the degree of organizational networking in a terrorist group, the higher the likelihood that IT is used to support the network’s decision making.”25 Zanini’s hypothesis appears to be borne out by recent events. For example, many of the terrorists indicted by the United States government since 9/11 communicated via e-mail. The indictment of four members of the Armed Islamic Group (Gama’a al-Islamiyya) in Algeria alleges that computers were used “to transmit, pass and disseminate messages, communications and information between and among IG leaders and members in the United States and elsewhere around the world.”26 Similarly, six individuals indicted in Oregon in 2002 allegedly communicated via e-mail regarding their efforts to travel to Afghanistan to aid al Qaeda and the Taliban in their fight against the United States.27 The Internet has the ability to connect not only members of the same terrorist organizations but also members of different groups. For example, hundreds of so-called “jihadist” sites exist that express support for terrorism. According to Weimann, these sites and related forums permit terrorists in places as far-flung as Chechnya, Palestine, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Lebanon to exchange not only ideas and suggestions, but also practical information about how to build bombs, establish terror cells, and ultimately perpetrate attacks.28 Mitigation of Risk: As terrorist groups come under increasing pressure from law enforcement, they have been forced to evolve and become more decentralized. This is a structure to which the Internet is perfectly suited. The Internet offers a way for like-minded people located in different communities to interact easily, which is particularly important when operatives may be isolated and required to “lie low.” Denied a physical place to meet and organize, many terrorist groups are alleged to have created virtual communities through chatrooms and Web sites in order to continue spreading their propaganda, teaching, and training. Clearly, as Patrick Tibbetts argues, “information technology gives terrorist organizations global power and reach without necessarily compromising their

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invisibility.”29 Timothy Thomas adds that the Internet “puts distance between those planning the attack and their targets . . . [and] provides terrorists a place to plan without the risks normally associated with cell or satellite phones.”30 Information Gathering This refers to the capacity of Internet users to access huge volumes of information, which was previously extremely difficult to retrieve as a result of its being stored in widely differing formats and locations. Today, there are literally hundreds of Internet tools that aid in information gathering; these include a range of search engines, millions of subject-specific e-mail distribution lists, and an almost limitless selection of esoteric chat and discussion groups. One of the major uses of the Internet by terrorist organizations is thought to be information gathering. Unlike the other uses mentioned above, terrorists’ information gathering activities rely not on the operation of their own Web sites, but on the information contributed by others to “the vast digital library” that comprises the Internet.31 There are two major issues to be addressed here. The first may be termed “data mining” and refers to terrorists using the Internet to collect and assemble information about specific targeting opportunities. The second issue is “information sharing,” which refers to more general online information collection by terrorists. Data Mining: In January 2003, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld warned in a directive sent to military units that too much unclassified, but potentially harmful material was appearing on Department of Defense (DoD) Web sites. Rumsfeld reminded military personnel that an al Qaeda training manual recovered in Afghanistan instructs its readers that: “Using public sources openly and without resorting to illegal means, it is possible to gather at least eighty percent of information about the enemy.” He went on to say, “At more than 700 gigabytes, the DoD Web-based data makes a vast, readily available source of information on DoD plans, programs and activities. One must conclude our enemies access DoD Web sites on a regular basis.”32 In addition to information provided by and about the armed forces, the free availability of information on the Internet about the location and operation of nuclear reactors and related facilities was of particular concern to public officials after 9/11. Roy Zimmerman, director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, said the 9/11 attacks highlighted the need to safeguard sensitive information. In the days immediately after the attacks, the NRC took their Web site entirely off-line. When it was restored weeks later, it had been purged of more than 1,000 sensitive documents. Initially, the agency decided to withhold documents if “the release would provide

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clear and significant benefit to a terrorist in planning an attack.” Later, the NRC tightened the restriction, opting to exclude information “that could be useful or could reasonably be useful to a terrorist.” According to Zimmerman, “it is currently unlikely that the information on our Web site would provide significant advantage to assist a terrorist.”33 The measures taken by the NRC were not exceptional. According to a report produced by OMB Watch,34 since 9/11 thousands of documents and tremendous amounts of data have been removed from U.S. government sites. The irony, however, is that much of the same information remains available on private sector Web sites.35 Patrick Tibbetts points to the Animated Software Company’s Web site, which has off-topic documents containing locations, status, security procedures, and other technical information concerning dozens of U.S. nuclear reactors,36 while the Virtual Nuclear Tourist site contains similar information. The latter site is particularly detailed on specific security measures that may be implemented at various nuclear plants worldwide.37 Many people view such information as a potential gold mine for terrorists. Their fears appear well founded given the capture of al Qaeda computer expert Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan in Pakistan in July 2004, which yielded a computer filled with photographs and floor diagrams of buildings in the United States that terrorists may have been planning to attack.38 SHARING INFORMATION Policymakers, law enforcement agencies, and others are also concerned about the proliferation of “how to” Web sites devoted to explaining (for example) the technical intricacies of making homemade bombs. Many such devices may be constructed using lethal combinations of otherwise innocuous materials; today, there are hundreds of freely available online manuals containing such information. As early as April 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice had concluded that the availability of this information played a significant role in facilitating terrorist and other criminal acts.39 As an example, Jessica Stern points to Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America (1995), which is described on the Internet as a book for helping readers survive a biological weapons attack and is subtitled “What Your Family Can Do Before and After.” However, it also describes the reproduction and growth of biological agents and includes a chapter entitled “Bacteria Likely to be Used by the Terrorist.” The text is available for download, in various edited and condensed formats, from a number of Web sites, while hard copies of the book are available for purchase over the Internet from major online booksellers for as little as $13.40 More recently, an al Qaeda laptop found in Afghanistan had been used to visit the Web site of the French Anonymous Society (FAS) on several occasions. The FAS site publishes a two-volume Sabotage Handbook that

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contains sections on planning an assassination and antisurveillance methods amongst others.41 A much larger manual, nicknamed The Encyclopedia of Jihad and prepared by al Qaeda, runs to thousands of pages; distributed via the Web, it offers detailed instructions on how to establish an underground organization and execute terror attacks.42 This kind of information is sought out not only by sophisticated terrorist organizations but also by disaffected individuals prepared to use terrorist tactics to advance their idiosyncratic agendas. In 1999, for instance, rightwing extremist David Copeland planted nail bombs in three different areas of London: multiracial Brixton, the largely Bangladeshi community of Brick Lane, and the gay quarter in Soho. Over the course of 3 weeks, he killed three people and injured 139. At his trial, he revealed that he had learned his deadly techniques from the Internet by downloading copies of The Terrorist’s Handbook and How to Make Bombs: Book Two. Both titles are still easily accessible.43 THE OPEN SOURCE THREAT? The threat posed by the easy availability of bomb-making and other “dangerous information” is a source of heated debate. Patrick Tibbetts warns against underestimating the feasibility of such threats. He points out that captured al Qaeda materials include not only information compiled on “home-grown explosives,” but also indicate that this group is actively pursuing data and technical expertise necessary to pursue CBRN weapons programs. According to Ken Katzman, a terrorism analyst for the Congressional Research Service, much of the material in these captured documents was probably downloaded from the Internet.44 As a result, many have called for laws restricting the publication of bombmaking instructions on the Internet. Others, however, have pointed out that this material is already easily accessible in bookstores and libraries.45 In fact, much of this information has been available in print media since at least the late 1960s, with the publication of William Powell’s The Anarchist Cookbook and other, similar titles. Jessica Stern recently observed that “In 1982, the year of the first widely reported incident of tampering with pharmaceuticals, the Tylenol case, only a few poisoning manuals were available, and they were relatively hard to find.”46 This is doubtless true; they were hard to find, but they were available. As Stern concedes, how-to manuals on producing chemical and biological agents are not just available on the Internet, but are also currently advertised in paramilitary journals sold in magazine shops all over the United States.47 According to a U.S. government report, over 50 publications describing the fabrication of explosives and destructive devices are listed in the Library of Congress and are available to any member of the public, as well as being easily available commercially.48 Despite

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assertions to the contrary,49 the infamous Anarchist Cookbook (1971) is not available online, although it is easily purchased from bookstores or online retailers. The anonymous authors of Web sites claiming to post the Cookbook and similar texts often include a disclaimer that the processes described should not be carried out. This is because many of the “recipes” have a poor reputation for reliability and safety. Perhaps the most likely “recipes” to be of use to terrorists are those related to hacking tools and activities. Such information is also likely to be considerably more accurate than bomb-making information, for example; this is because the Internet is both the domain and tool of hackers. In a testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee in 2003, Purdue University professor and information assurance expert, Eugene Spafford described how bulletin boards and discussion lists teach hacking techniques to anyone: “We have perhaps a virtual worldwide training camp,” he testified.50 Terrorists have been known to exploit this resource. In 1998, Khalid Ibrahim, who identified himself as an Indian national, sought classified and unclassified U.S. government software and information, as well as data from India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center, from hackers communicating via Internet Relay Chat (IRC). Using the online aliases RahulB and Rama3456, Ibrahim began frequenting online cracker hangouts in June 1998. In conversations taken from IRC logs, Ibrahim claimed to be a member of Harkat-ul-Ansar, a militant Kashmiri separatist group.51 Finally, it is important to keep in mind that removal of technical information from public Web sites is no guarantee of safeguarding it. In essence, this effort is akin to “closing the barn door after the horse has bolted.” Intelligence and technical data obtained by terrorist operatives prior to 9/11 can be archived, stored, and distributed surreptitiously regardless of government or private attempts to squelch its presence on the Internet today. Indeed, these materials can be loaded onto offshore or other international Web servers that cannot be affected by U.S. legislation, rendering any attempt to halt their spread outside the reach of American law enforcement.52 FIGHTING BACK In his 1996 assessment of the Internet, Charles Swett suggested that as more foreign officials, military officers, business people, and journalists got e-mail addresses, the Internet could be used as a medium for psychological operations campaigns. The Internet, he said, could rapidly convey the official government perspective on a host of important issues to a wide and influential audience.53 To date, however, most official government Web sites are limited to routine public affairs, whereas it is commonplace on the Web to see public diplomacy conducted on behalf of a host of political dissenters, including terrorists. Use of the Internet is a double-edged

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sword for terrorists, however. They are not the only groups “operating” on the Internet, which can act as a valuable tool for antiterrorist forces also. The more terrorist groups use the Internet to move information, money, and recruits around the globe, the more data is available with which to trail them. Since 9/11, a number of groups have undertaken initiatives to disrupt terrorist use of the Internet, although a small number of such efforts were also undertaken previous to the attacks. Law enforcement agencies have been the chief instigators of such initiatives, but they have been joined in their endeavors by other government agencies as well as concerned individuals and various groups of hacktivists. The Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies Intelligence Gathering: The bulk of this chapter has been concerned with showing how the Internet can act as a significant source of instrumental power for terrorist groups. Use of the Internet can nonetheless also result in significant undesirable effects for the same groups. First, unless terrorists are extremely careful in their use of the Internet for e-mail communication, general information provision, and other activities, they may unwittingly supply law enforcement agencies with a path directly to their door. Second, by putting their positions and ideological beliefs in the public domain, terrorist groups invite opposing sides to respond to these. The ensuing war of words may backfire against the terrorists, as adherents and potential recruits are drawn away.54 Perhaps most importantly, however, the Internet and terrorist Web sites can serve as a provider of open source intelligence for states’ intelligence agencies. Although spy agencies are loathe to publicly admit it, it is generally agreed that the Web is playing an evergrowing role in the spy business. According to the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement No. 11, “open sources—the systematic collection of foreign media—has always been a bedrock source of information for intelligence. Open source remains important, including among terrorist groups that use the media and the Internet to communicate leadership guidance.”55 By the 1990s, the U.S. government’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) had built a significant translation effort regarding terrorism-related media. Thus, many now believe that terrorists’ presence on the Internet actually works against them. “A lot of what we know about al-Qaeda is gleaned from [their] Web sites,” according to Steven Aftergood, a scientist at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC, and director of the nonprofit organization’s Project on Government Secrecy.56 “They are a greater value as an intelligence source than if they were to disappear.”57 For example, Web sites and message boards have been known to function as a kind of early warning system. Two days before the 9/11 attacks, a message appeared on the popular Dubai-based Alsaha.com discussion forum proclaiming that

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“in the next two days,” “a big surprise” would come from the Saudi Arabian region of Asir. The remote province adjacent to Yemen was where most of the 19 hijackers hailed from.58 Innovations such as the FBIS, while useful, do not tell the whole story, however. The problem begins with the sheer volume of information floating about in cyberspace. According to the 9/11 Commission’s Staff Statement No. 9, prior to 9/11 the FBI did not have a sufficient number of translators proficient in Arabic and other relevant languages, which by early 2001 had resulted in a significant backlog of untranslated intelligence intercepts. In addition, prior to 9/11, the FBI’s investigative activities were governed by Attorney General Guidelines, first put in place in 1976 and revised in 1995, to guard against the misuse of government power. The Guidelines limited the investigative methods and techniques available to FBI agents conducting preliminary investigations of potential terrorist activities. In particular, they prohibited the use of publicly available source information, such as that found on the Internet, unless specified criteria were present.59 These guidelines have since been modified, and terrorist Web sites are thought to be under increased surveillance since 9/11, especially by Western intelligence agencies.60 This task remains gargantuan, however; information gleaned from the Internet must be corroborated and verified before it can be added to the intelligence mix. This requires significant input of operatives and resources. Technological Fixes: Given the above, it is unsurprising that many U.S. officials and commentators are recommending that any additional funds that become available to the intelligence agencies be spent on human intelligence capabilities, rather than new technology. Others, however, are convinced that new technologies need to be developed and deployed in the fight against terrorism. They bemoan the fact that prior to 9/11, “Signals intelligence collection against terrorism, while significant, did not have sufficient funding within the NSA. The NSA’s slow transformation meant it could not keep pace with advances in telecommunications.”61 Although DCS-1000—more commonly known as Carnivore—the FBI’s email packet-sniffer system has not been employed since 2002, Bureau officials have instead employed commercially available monitoring applications to aid in their investigations. Intelligence agencies are also said to be deploying the classic spy tactic of establishing so-called “honey pots” with a high-tech twist: in this case, setting up bogus Web sites to attract those people they are seeking to monitor.62 Numerous other technological fixes are also in the works. Other Innovations It should be clear at this stage that the events of 9/11 impacted intelligence and law enforcement agencies not only in the United States, but

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also around the world. For example, in the United Kingdom, the British Security Service (MI5) took the unprecedented step of posting an appeal for information about potential terrorists on dissident Arab Web sites. The message, in Arabic, was placed on sites that the authorities knew were accessed by extremists, including “Islah.org,” a Saudi Arabian opposition site, and “Qoqaz.com,” a Chechen site that advocated jihad. The message read: The atrocities that took place in the U.S.A. on 11 September led to the deaths of about five thousand people, including a large number of Muslims and people of other faiths. MI5 (the British Security Service) is responsible for countering terrorism to protect all U.K. citizens of whatever faith or ethnic group. If you think you can help us to prevent future outrages, call us in confidence on 020-7930 9000.

The leaders of MI5 were hoping to elicit information from persons on the margins of extremist groups or communities who were sufficiently shocked by the events of 9/11 that they would want to contact the agency. The agency had intended to post the message on a further 15 sites known to be accessed by radicals, but many of these were shut down by the FBI in the aftermath of the attacks.63 The events of 9/11 prompted numerous states’ intelligence agencies to reappraise their online presence. Since 2001 MI5 has substantially enhanced its Web site, while in 2004 Israel’s Mossad spy agency launched a Web site aimed at recruiting staff. Other Agencies: Sanitizing Government Sites The U.S. government Web sites were vital repositories of information for Internet users in the days and weeks following the 9/11 attacks. The sites became important venues for those both directly and indirectly affected by the events of 9/11, members of the public wishing to donate to the relief efforts, and the various agencies’ own employees, some of whom were victims of the attacks (or later of the anthrax scares).64 While some agencies were uploading information onto the Internet, however, others were busy erasing information from their sites. To avoid providing information that might be useful to terrorists planning further attacks, federal agencies—as well as some state and private Web page operators—took large amounts of material off the Internet in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Some of the erasures were voluntary; others were carried out following requests from U.S. government departments. As mentioned earlier, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates American nuclear power plants, closed down its Web site for a period following a request from the Department of Defense that it do so. Although

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no other agency removed its entire site, pages were erased from the Web sites of the Department of Energy, the Interior Department’s Geological Survey, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety, the National Archives and Records Administration, the NASA Glenn Research Center, the International Nuclear Safety Center, the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics’ Geographic Information Service, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.65 What sorts of information was removed from the sites? The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) removed from its site thousands of chemical industry risk management plans dealing with hazardous chemical plants. Department of Transportation officials removed pipeline mapping information as well as a study describing risk profiles of various chemicals, while the Bureau of Transportation Statistics removed the National Transportation Atlas Databases and the North American Transportation Atlas, which environmentalists had used to assess the impact of transportation proposals. The Center for Disease Control and Prevention removed a Report on Chemical Terrorism that described industry’s shortcomings in preparing for a possible terrorist attack.66 Many of the agencies posted notices that the information had been removed because of its possible usefulness to terrorists. Hackers and Hacktivists Hackers also took to the Net in the aftermath of the terror attacks, some to voice their rage, others to applaud the attackers. A group calling themselves the Dispatchers proclaimed that they would destroy Web servers and Internet access in Afghanistan and also target nations that support terrorism. The group proceeded to deface hundreds of Web sites and launch Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against targets ranging from the Iranian Ministry of the Interior to the Presidential Palace of Afghanistan. Another group, known as Young Intelligent Hackers against Terror (YIHAT) claimed, in mid-October 2001, to be negotiating with one European and one Asian government to “legalize” the group’s hacking activities in those states. The group’s founder, Kim Schmitz, claimed the group breached the systems of two Arabic banks with ties to Osama bin Laden, although a spokesperson for the bank denied any penetration had occurred. The group, whose stated mission is to impede the flow of money to terrorists, issued a statement on their Web site requesting that corporations make their networks available to group members for the purpose of providing the “electronic equivalent to terrorist training camps.” Later, their public Web site was taken off-line, apparently in response to attacks from other hackers.67

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Not all hacking groups were supportive of the so-called “hacking war.” On September 14, 2001, the Chaos Computer Club, an organization of German hackers, called for an end to the protests and for all hackers to cease vigilante actions. They called instead for global communication to resolve the conflict: “we believe in the power of communication, a power that has always prevailed in the end and is a more positive force than hatred.”68 A well-known group of computer enthusiasts known as Cyber Angels, who promote responsible behavior, also spoke out against the hacking war. They sponsored television advertisements in the United States urging hackers to help gather information and intelligence on those who were participating in this hacktivism.69 In any event, the predicted escalation in hack attacks70 did not materialize. In the weeks following the attacks, Web page defacements were well publicized, but the overall number and sophistication of these remained rather low. One possible reason for the nonescalation of attacks could be that many hackers—particularly those located in the United States—were wary of being negatively associated with the events of 9/11, and curbed their activities as a result. Since 9/11 a number of Web-based organizations have been established to monitor terrorist Web sites. One of the most well known of these is Internet Haganah,71 self-described as “an Internet counterinsurgency.” Also prominent is the Washington DC-based Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Institute72 that, like Internet Haganah, focuses on Islamic terror groups. Clients of SITE’s fee-based intelligence service are said to include the FBI, Office of Homeland Security, and various media organizations. SITE’s cofounder and director, Rita Katz, has commented that “It is actually to our benefit to have some of these terror sites up and running by American companies. If the servers are in the U.S., this is to our advantage when it comes to monitoring activities.”73 Aaron Weisburd, who runs Internet Haganah out of his home in Southern Illinois, says his goal is to keep the extremists moving from address to address: “The object isn’t to silence them—the object is to keep them moving, keep them talking, force them to make mistakes, so we can gather as much information about them as we can, each step of the way.”74 CONCLUSION Terrorism is generally conceived as physical acts of violence intended to produce fear, and conjures up images of exploding bombs and mutilated bodies. The cyberterrorist threat as portrayed in the mass media builds upon this aspect of terrorism by seeking to convince the public that cyberterrorism will ultimately result in mass casualties. There is another dimension to terrorism, however: the information dimension, which terrorists exploit every bit as much as the physical. Death and destruction are not usually the terrorists’ ultimate goal; it is power and

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influence. Terrorists seek political and social change, and their objective is to influence populations in ways that support that change. To accomplish this, they engage not just in physical, but also information operations, and the integration of these. Up until very recently, cyberterrorism was presented as the sole intersection of terrorism and the Internet, even in the face of contrary evidence. The one-sided nature of the analysis only became apparent to many when, in a little over 4 weeks in April and May 2004, an Islamic extremist named Abu Musab-al Zarqawi “rocketed to worldwide fame, or infamy, by a deliberate combination of extreme violence and Internet publicity.” In early April 2004, Zarqawi posted online a 30-minute audio recording that explained who he was, why he was fighting, and details of the attacks for which he and his group were responsible. Paul Eedle has described the latter as “a comprehensive branding statement”: The Internet gave Zarqawi the means to build a brand very quickly. Suddenly the mystery man had a voice, if not a face, and a clear ideology which explained his violence . . . But what is the point of an insurgent group building a brand, establishing a public profile in this way? The answer is to magnify the impact of its violence.

Prior to the instigation of his Internet-based PR campaign, each of Zarqawi’s attacks had to involve large numbers of casualties in order to get noticed amid the chaos and mounting daily death toll in Iraq. By going online, however, Zarqawi was able to both control the interpretation of his violent message and achieve greater impact with smaller operations. By the end of April 2004, his group was regularly issuing communiqu´es online. One of these claimed responsibility for a suicide speedboat attack on Iraq’s offshore oil export terminal in the Gulf which, although the operation failed, still shook oil markets because of Zarqawi’s efforts at publicizing the attack through the Internet. In May 2004, Zarqawi took things a step further when he used the Internet’s force multiplying effect to spread a new kind of terror. Here, as Paul Eedle has described, a threshold of online horror was crossed when “he personally cut off the head of an American hostage live on video, and had the footage posted on the Internet. . . . The entire purpose of the beheading was to video it, to create images that would grip the imaginations of friends and enemies alike. It worked. Zarqawi risked almost nothing in this operation; but he started a withdrawal of foreign contractors which has paralysed reconstruction in Iraq and done as much if not more to undermine U.S. plans as a bomb that killed 100 people in Najaf. And he made himself a hero to jihadis across the world.”75 The free availability of this and other grisly “snuff movies” on the Internet today has led to a realization that the most important aspect of the

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terrorism-Internet relationship is not the much vaunted “cyberterrorism,” but those more mundane and everyday terrorist uses of the Net, from information provision to recruitment, which have a pedigree stretching back for many years before Zarqawi’s appearance on the online scene. The most popular contemporary terrorist Web sites draw tens of thousands of visitors each month. Obviously, the Internet is not the only tool that a terrorist group needs in order to “succeed.” However, the Net can add new dimensions to existing assets that groups can utilize to achieve their goals as well as providing new and innovative avenues for expression, fundraising, recruitment, etc. At the same time, there are also tradeoffs to be made. High levels of visibility increase levels of vulnerability, both to scrutiny and security breaches. Nonetheless, the proliferation of official terrorist sites appears to indicate that the payoffs, in terms of publicity and propaganda value, are understood by many groups to be worth the risks, and Zarqawi’s exit from the terrorism scene emphatically does not mark the end of the evolution of the terrorism-Internet relationship. NOTES 1. For more on cyberterrorism, see Maura Conway, “Cyberterrorism: Hype and Reality,” in Information Warfare: Hype and Reality, ed. Leigh Armistead (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2006); Maura Conway, “What is Cyberterrorism? The Story So Far,” Journal of Information Warfare 2 (2003); Maura Conway, “Cyberterrorism,” Current History 101 (2002) 436–442. 2. David Resnick. “Politics on the Internet: The Normalization of Cyberspace,” in The Politics of Cyberspace, ed. Chris Toulouse and Timothy W. Luke (London: Routledge, 1999) 55–56. 3. See Fred Cohen, “Terrorism and Cyberspace,” Network Security 5 (2002); Stephen Furnell and Matthew Warren, “Computer Hacking and Cyber Terrorism: The Real Threats in the New Millennium,” Computers and Security 18 (1999) 28-34; Timothy L. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of ‘Cyberplanning,’” Parameters Spring (2003), http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/ Parameters/03spring/thomas.htm. 4. Gabriel Weimann, http://www.terror.net:How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004). Full text at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr116.pdf, specifically, see 5–11. 5. For additional discussion see Maura Conway, “Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet and Fighting Back,” Information & Security 18 (2006) 9-30. 6. As quoted in Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 85; see also Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004) 31. 7. Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003) 279. 8. Gabriel Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 5. 9. Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2000) 191. 10. Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism, 280.

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11. George Gerbner, “Violence and Terrorism in and by the Media,” in Media, Crisis and Democracy: Mass Communication and the Disruption of Social Order, ed. Mark Raboy and Bernard Dagenais (London: Sage, 1992) 96. 12. Rachel Gibson and Stephen Ward, “A Proposed Methodology for Studying the Function and Effectiveness of Party and Candidate Web sites,” Social Science Computer Review 18 (2000): 305–306; Kevin Soo Hoo, Seymour Goodman, and Lawrence Greenberg, “Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat,” Survival 39 (1997): 140; Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 8. 13. Kathryn Fritz, Lindsay Harris, Daniel Kolb, Paula Larich, and Kathleen Stocker, Terrorist Use of the Internet and National Response [Unpublished Paper] (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2004) 9. Full text at http://www.wam. umd.edu/∼larich/735/index.html. 14. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 8. 15. Loretta Napoleoni, “Money and Terrorism,” Strategic Insights 3 (2004): 1. Full text at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/si/si 3 4/si 3 4 nal01.pdf. 16. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 7. 17. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet,” 117. 18. Alan Sipress, “An Indonesian’s Prison Memoir Takes Holy War into Cyberspace,” Washington Post (December 14, 2004): A19. Full text at http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62095-2004Dec13.html. 19. Jan Libbenga, “Terrorists Grow Fat on E-Mail Scams,” The Register (September 28, 2004). Full text at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/28/ terrorist email scams/. 20. Todd Hinnen, “The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of the Internet,” Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 5 (2004): 18, http://www.stlr.org/html/volume5/hinnenintro.html; see also Steven Emerson’s testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, “Fund-Raising Methods and Procedures for International Terrorist Organizations” (February 12, 2002): 11–12, and 16, http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/021202se. pdf. 21. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Countering the New Terrorism, ed. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Michael Jenkins (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999) 41. Full text at http://www.rand. org/publications/MR/MR989/MR989.chap3.pdf. 22. Arquilla, Ronfeldt, and Zanini, et al., “Networks, Netwar and InformationAge Terrorism,” 48–53. 23. Pater Margulies, “The Clear and Present Internet: Terrorism, Cyberspace, and the First Amendment,” UCLA Journal of Law and Technology 8 (2004): 2. Full text at http://www.lawtechjournal.com/articles/2004/04 041207 margulies.pdf. 24. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 9. 25. Michele Zanini, “Middle Eastern Terrorism and Netwar,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22 (1999): 251. 26. Indictment, United States v. Sattar, No. 02-CRIM-395, 11 (S.D.N.Y April 9, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/ussattar040902ind.pdf. 27. Indictment, United States v. Battle, No. CR 02-399 HA, 5 (D. Or. October 2, 2002), http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/usbattle100302ind. pdf.

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28. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 9. See also, Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Training Camps: Terrorist Use of the Internet,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); and Gabriel Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com: Using the Internet for Terrorist Recruitment and Mobilization,” in The Making of a Terrorist, ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). 29. Patrick S. Tibbetts, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies [Unpublished Paper] (Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2002) 5. 30. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet,” 119. 31. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 6. 32. As quoted in Declan McCullagh, “Military Worried about Web Leaks,” C/Net News ( January 16, 2003). Full text at http://news.com.com/2100-1023981057.html. 33. As quoted in Mike M. Ahlers, “Blueprints for Terrorists?” http://www. CNN.com(November 19, 2004). Full text at http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/ 10/19/terror.nrc/. 34. OMB Watch is a watchdog group based in Washington, DC. Their homepage is online at http://www.ombwatch.org. 35. Gary D. Bass and Sean Moulton, The Bush Administration’s Secrecy Policy: A Call to Action to Protect Democratic Values [Working Paper] (Washington, DC: OMB Watch, 2002). Full text at http://www.ombwatch.org/rtk/secrecy.pdf. 36. See http://www.animatedsoftware.com/environm/no nukes/nukelist1. htm. 37. See http://www.nucleartourist.com/. Also, see: Tibbetts, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies, 2002, 15. 38. Douglas Jehl and David Johnston, “Reports That Led to Terror Alert Were Years Old, Officials Say,” New York Times (August 3, 2004), 1; Dan Verton and Lucas Mearian, “Online Data a Gold Mine for Terrorists,” ComputerWorld (August 6, 2004). The full text of the latter is available online at http://www.computerworld. com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,95098,00.html. 39. U.S. Department of Justice, Report on the Availability of Bombmaking Information, the Extent to Which Its Dissemination Is Controlled by Federal Law, and the Extent to Which Such Dissemination May Be Subject to Regulation Consistent with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1997) 15-16. Full text at http://cryptome.org/abi.htm. 40. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) 51. 41. Thomas, “Al Qaeda and the Internet,” 115; Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 9. 42. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 9. For more discussion on the litany of such materials available online, please see the chapters by James Forest and Gabriel Weimann in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 43. Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 10. 44. Tibbetts, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies, 17.

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45. Anti-Defamation League, “Terrorist Activities on the Internet,” Terrorism Update (Winter 1998). Full text available online at http://www.adl.org/Terror/ focus/16 focus a.asp. 46. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, 50. 47. Ibid., 51. 48. U.S. Department of Justice, 5; the same report mentions that one Kansas bomber got his bomb instructions from the August 1993 Reader’s Digest (6-7). 49. See, for example, Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, 9. 50. See Eugene Spafford’s testimony before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities (July 24, 2003) 31. Full text at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/ has205260.000/has205260 0f.htm. 51. Niall McKay, “Do Terrorists Troll the Net?” Wired (November 4, 1998). Full text at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,15812,00.html. 52. Tibbetts, Terrorist Use of the Internet and Related Information Technologies, 17. 53. Charles Swett, Strategic Assessment: The Internet (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1995). Full text at http://www.fas.org/cp/swett.html. 54. Soo Hoo, Goodman, and Greenberg, “Information Technology and the Terrorist Threat,” 140. 55. Staff Statement No. 11, The Performance of the Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: 9/11 Commission, 2004) 9. Full text at http://www.9-11commission. gov/staff statements/staff statement 11.pdf. 56. The project’s Web site is online at http://www.fas.org/sgp/. 57. As quoted in John Lasker, “Watchdogs Sniff out Terror Sites,” Wired News (February 25, 2005). Full text at http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848, 66708,00.html. 58. John R. Bradley, “Web site Postings Give Away Terror Activities,” The Straits Times (May 5, 2004), http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=10916 59. Staff Statement No. 9, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States prior to 9/11 (Washington, DC: 9/11 Commission, 2004), 8. Full text at http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff statements/staff statement 9. pdf. 60. Dan Verton, Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyberterrorism (New York: McGraw Hill, 2003) 220. 61. Staff Statement No. 11, 10. 62. Bernhard Warner, “Intelligence Experts Comb Web for Terror Clues,” The Washington Post (November 12, 2003). Full text at http://cryptome.org/webpanic.htm. 63. Stephanie Gruner and Gautam Naik, “Extremist Sites under Heightened Scrutiny,” The Wall Street Journal Online (October 8, 2001), http://zdnet.com.com/ 2100-1106-530855.html?legacy=zdnn; Richard Norton-Taylor, “MI5 Posts Terror Appeal on Arab Web sites,” The Guardian (October 26, 2001) 1. 64. See Pew Internet and American Life Project, One Year Later: September 11 and the Internet (Washington, DC: Pew Internet and American Life Project, 2002) 33–37. Full text at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP 9-11 Report.pdf. 65. Lucy A. Dalglish, Gregg P. Leslie, and Phillip Taylor, Homefront Confidential: How the War on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public’s Right to Know (Arlington, VA: Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 2002) 25,

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http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/Homefront Confidential.pdf; Pew, One Year Later: September 11 and the Internet, 8-9; see also John C. Baker, Beth E. Lachman, Dave Frelinger, Kevin O’Connell, Alex Hou, Michael S. Tseng, David T. Orletsky, and Charles Yost, Mapping the Risks: Assessing the Homeland Security Implications of Publicly Available Geospatial Information (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004), http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG142/. 66. Dalglish, Leslie, and Taylor, Homefront Confidential, 2; Guy Gugliotta, “Agencies Scrub Web sites of Sensitive Chemical Data,” Washington Post (October 4, 2001) A29, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename= article&node=&contentId=A2738-2001Oct3;Pew, One Year Later: September 11 and the Internet, 8-9; Julia Scheeres, “Blacklisted Groups Visible on Web,” Wired News (October 19, 2001), http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,47616,00.html. 67. Dorothy Denning, “Is Cyber Terror Next?’ in Understanding September 11, ed. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer (New York: New Press, 2001), http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm; National Infrastructure Protection Center, NIPC Daily Report (December 3, 2001). 68. As quoted in Charles Hauss and Alexandra Samuel, “What’s the Internet Got to Do with It? Online Responses to 9/11,” paper presented at the American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Convention, Boston (September 29August 1, 2002). 69. National Infrastructure Protection Center, NIPC Daily Report (December 11, 2001). 70. Institute for Security Technology Studies, Cyber Attacks during the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis (Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH: Institute for Security Technology Studies, 2001). Full text at http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/ ISTS/counterterrorism/cyber attacks.htm. 71. In Hebrew, “Haganah” means defense. Internet Haganah’s homepage is at http://www.haganah.org.il/haganah/index.html. 72. The SITE Web site is at http://www.siteinstitute.org/. 73. As quoted in Lasker, “Watchdogs Sniff out Terror Sites.” 74. Ibid. 75. Paul Eedle, “Al Qaeda’s Super-Weapon: The Internet,” paper presented at Al Qaeda 2.0, New America Foundation, Washington, DC, December 1-2, 2004. Full text at http://www.outtherenews.com/modules.php?op= modload&name=News&file=article&sid=89&topic=7.

CHAPTER 21 CRY TERROR AND LET SLIP THE MEDIA DOGS Randall G. Bowdish

“And Caesar’s spirit, ranging for revenge, With Ate by his side come hot from hell, Shall in these confines with a monarch’s voice Cry ‘Havoc,’ and let slip the dogs of war; . . .” —Julius Caesar, William Shakespeare

Julius Caesar, legendary as a brilliant politician and military genius, was also the father of the Roman daily newssheet. His very first enactment after becoming consul was that the day-to-day proceedings of both the senate and the people should be compiled and published.1 On the Ides of March, 44 bc, Caesar was killed by a band of conspirators bent on protecting the people from a tyrant. While historians can only guess at the newssheet headlines following his assassination, Caesar’s death was undoubtedly the main news. In one of history’s great twists, Caesar’s progeny, the media, has evolved into the role of watchdog against tyrants. However, while the media understands its modern societal role to “cry tyrant!” when appropriate, its role in protecting the people against cries of terror is less understood. The focus of this chapter is the role of the media in a liberal democracy as it pertains to terrorism. The case is made that the media must take a more active, formal role in guarding the people against the cognitive harm and unwitting complicity toward terrorists’ ends associated with news of terrorism. Long a watchdog against governmental abuse of power, the media must also stand sentinel against the tyranny of extremists who would manipulate the media and society to their own malevolent

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ends. Decoupling “propaganda of the deed” from propaganda, proper, is critical in minimizing terrorism as a viable means to an end. As Margaret Thatcher so eloquently stated, “Democratic nations must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend.” While this objective is simply stated and well understood, the mechanics of it are problematic in the extreme, given the media’s role in a liberal democracy. FREEDOM TO INFORM AGAINST A NEED TO PROTECT The role of the journalist in a liberal democracy is to “provide citizens with accurate and reliable information they need to function in a free society.”2 Citizens of liberal democracies depend upon timely, truthful information in order to make informed decisions about self-governance. Paradoxically, while journalists are free to inform the public on just about any topic, two boundary conditions exist that on one extreme, protect the right of people to information, while at the same time protecting them from information. The first boundary is the right to free speech and a legal system that safeguards it.3 It serves to protect public discourse from government censorship. In the case of the United States, free speech is protected by the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights and upheld by the judicial branch. On its own, a constitutionally mandated free speech right is not enough. For example, as pointed out in a Freedom House study,4 “Although the Russian constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, authorities were still able to use the judicial system to harass and prosecute journalists for independent reporting.” Perhaps surprising to some, there are liberal democracies that do not constitutionally protect free speech, yet still enjoy it. A shining example of this exists in Australia. The Australian constitution does not address free speech. Over time, there have been attempts to include freedom of speech into the Australian constitution, but all have failed. Nonetheless, freedom of the press has been upheld and respected in Australian high court cases to such a degree that Australia was recently rated higher in press freedom than the United States.5 Internationally, the right to free speech was addressed in Article 19 of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.6 Born of the horrors of World War II atrocities, the United Nations’ declaration continues to this day to act as a beacon of hope for freedom and rights advocacy groups across the globe. However, it has no legally binding status in international law. Internationally, only 73 of 194 nations surveyed in 2005 were rated as having a truly free press.7 As important as free speech is to a liberal democracy, some controls are necessary. A society also requires a boundary against some types of

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information. Put simply, words (and images) can hurt. The nebulous equilibrium between free speech and words that hurt were perhaps best encapsulated in Article 11 of the French National Assembly’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen:8 The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the rights of man. Every citizen may, accordingly, speak, write, and print with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall be defined by law.

From personally damaging words of obscenity, libel, defamation, and slander, to society-damaging expressions of hate and sedition, people and the government that serves them require protection under law from words that hurt. Cunningly woven words of deceit and half-truth have the power to incite otherwise rational men and women to nefarious acts of dark passion. Protection in the form of censorship against such words is considered necessary by most people as a practical measure. Laws that protect people and the government, however, also act to suppress free speech in the form of censorship. Censorship is defined as: Official prohibition or restriction of any type of expression believed to threaten the political, social, or moral order. It may be imposed by governmental authority, local or national, by a religious body, or occasionally by a powerful private group. It may be applied to the mail, speech, the press, the theater, dance, art, literature, photography, the cinema, radio, television, or computer networks. Censorship may be either preventive or punitive, according to whether it is exercised before or after the expression has been made public.9

The problem, of course, is that the line between protection of the people and their right to speak and know is often subjective and a matter of perspective. Logically, the desire to at once protect people from information while also protecting their right to information eventually breaks down as a paradox. Censorship strikes against the very ideals and safeguards that make democracies attractive and allow them to thrive in the first place. Even with the damage that dark words and images can generate, democracies must look at any and all efforts to censor, no matter how noble the pretense, with great suspicion and an eye to the potential consequences, both intended and unintended. Of course, this must be evaluated against the harm imposed by unfettered malicious speech and images. Pragmatically, a balance must be struck. This raises a number of key questions that must be answered before a democratic media’s role in reporting terrorism can be defined. Where does news of terrorism lie within the bounds of free speech and censorship? Is

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the news of terrorism actually harmful to society? If so, why do the media report it? Is it bad enough to warrant forfeiting society’s right to know? Who would make that determination? What alternatives exist? A rational policy regarding the media’s role concerning terrorism must address these issues. NEWS OF TERRORISM CAN HARM Terrorism can harm on three levels. First-order harm from terrorism results from the physical violence done against the victims. Second order harm from terrorism is the cognitive injury done through fear and anxiety producing stimuli to those that observe the physical violence. Third order damage from terrorism consists of the negative policy and societal changes wrought to cope with it. First-order harm from terrorism is obvious, does not involve the media, and subsequently, is not the focus of this chapter. The media is instrumental, however, in the propagation of second-order effects of terrorism. A local act of violence against tens to thousands of people is vicariously shared by millions to billions of people across the globe. While the damage is greatly diminished as the violence crosses the physical to the psychological threshold through the media, the range and number of people reached increases by orders of magnitude. While this leverage is imposing, the effects are not pervasive. For example, in a survey conducted after 9/11, only a minority of Americans expressed considerable levels of fear and depression. Still, while the majority of Americans claimed that they were not psychologically disturbed by the attacks, one study reported that “almost a half reported feeling anxious or worried at least sometimes,” with “just under a third feeling scared or frightened sometimes or very often.”10 The ability to have an effect on millions of people who weren’t even at the scene of the terrorist act is largely a consequence of media reporting. The major media culprit of harm from terrorism is television news, a key second-order stimulus. Television and film media are unique as communication means, in that the viewers vicariously share two of the same sensory inputs—sight and sound—as the participants and eyewitnesses. As one might expect, fear-inducing television visuals and sounds together produce more fear than more static forms of media. A study of psychological reactions to 9/11 showed that “Individuals who reported watching a great deal of TV news were more likely to report being afraid, depressed, and viewed the future risk of terrorism as high.”11 Furthermore, although newspaper coverage provided the same amount of knowledge about terrorism as TV coverage, only TV increased fear and anxiety and perceptions of risk.12 Threatening television images and sounds can exploit evolutionary hardwired survival mechanisms meant for coping with a clear and present

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danger. Vision and hearing are the two most dominant of the five major senses when it comes to danger. Viewers see and hear the same danger stressors that initiate the “Fight, Flight, or Freeze in Fright” behavior of participants. Danger sensory input processing is instinctually biased toward action. In the fight or flight response, sensory inputs are first sent from the thalamus to the amygdala. A rough-cut evaluation of the potential threat is done in the amygdala, known as the warehouse of fear. If the amygdala determines that something might be a threat, physiological mobilization of the body begins when it signals the hypothalamus to activate the sympathetic nervous system and the adrenal-cortical system. All the while, higher-level processing in the sensory cortex continues to refine the threat, but at the cost of more time. The sensory cortex sends the signal to the hippocampus, to compare the threat to what it has in memory. The result of this more deliberate evaluation of the sensory inputs is either a confirmation or invalidation of the threat. If the sensory cortex refinements invalidate the threat, then physiological demobilization begins. While the fight or flight response is a handy short-term instinct to have when facing a clear and present danger, chronic fear, stress, and anxiety can actually have devastating long-term effects. Even small levels of prolonged stress can cause the release of hormones that, over time, can result in a shrunken hippocampus and an enlarged and overactive amygdala. A shrunken hippocampus impairs the ability to evaluate the nature of a stressor. An enlarged amygdala causes anxiety and fear out of proportion to even small stimuli. Millions of years of finely honed survival instinct can be problematic for the twenty-first century man inundated with electronic stimuli that have only been around for an evolutionary snap of the fingers. Swift, instinctual reactions that made the difference between life and death in the primitive world are often false alarms in the modern world. In 2005, over 14 million American adults suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress or Generalized Anxiety Disorders.13 According to several studies, news of terrorism was a contributor.14 FEAR APPEALS AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: THE BRIDGE TO THIRD-ORDER EFFECTS Two psychological constructs, cognitive dissonance and fear appeals, help to describe how second-order effects transform into third-order effects. Cognitive dissonance is a psychological state of discomfort felt as a result of a discrepancy between what one already knows or believes and new information or interpretation. Within this construct, an act of terror first works to get people to pay attention to the terrorist’s policy message. Terrorists seek to instill cognitive dissonance as a result of

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anxiety-producing conflict between their self-professed “reasonable” demands and the “unjust” or questionable existing policy of their oppressors. Their aim is to get people to adopt their policy in order to alleviate the anxiety of cognitive dissonance. For example, al Qaeda has a stated goal of ridding Muslim states of Westerners. A constant barrage of news about the deaths of Westerners in Muslim states through acts of terror might instill cognitive dissonance regarding the value of Western presence in Muslim states. In order to resolve the dissonance, people might come to the conclusion that Western presence is not worth American lives, and seek a policy change against U.S. presence in Muslim states. In this construct, second order effects of terrorism initiate third order policy effects. Another psychological construct, the fear appeal, also helps to explain the transition from second-order to third-order effects. A fear appeal is a persuasive message “designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends.”15 Fear appeals consist of a threat and a recommended response. A threat is an expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, or punishment. In the words of Thomas Schelling:16 It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is the latent violence that can influence someone’s choice— violence that can still be withheld or inflicted. The threat of pain tries to structure one’s motives, while brute force tries to overcome his strength. Whether it is sheer terroristic violence to induce an irrational response, or cool premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it and you may do it again, it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody’s behavior that matters.

According to Witte’s Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM),17 the first thing a person does when presented with a fear appeal is to appraise the threat. If the threat is deemed irrelevant or insignificant, there is no need for further processing and the fear appeal is ignored. On the other hand, if the threat is evaluated as severe and relevant, then another appraisal of the efficacy—that is, the power or capacity of the recommendation to yield a desired outcome—of the recommended response is required. Serious, relevant fear appeals are handled in one of two ways. An individual can choose to deal with the danger of the threat (danger control) or choose to deal with his fear of the threat (fear control). In the case of danger control, a person will concentrate on the fear appeal and look to neutralize or minimize the threat through either accepting the recommended response or by deriving an alternative response. In the case of fear control, a person will focus on how frightened he feels and attempt to reduce

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it through denial, avoidance, or reactance,18 resulting in rejection of the recommended response. The choice between danger or fear control is a function of the message efficacy. If the recommended response is relatively easy, feasible, and effective, then a person is more likely to engage in danger control and comply with the recommended action. If the fear appeal contains a serious threat but the message is ambiguous, too difficult, or ineffective, then he/she will try to control his/her fear. Fear appeals and cognitive dissonance contribute to third order effects of policy and societal changes through the media. News reports and disturbing images of terrorism impart various degrees of fear and anxiety in some people, while having little or no effect on others. Over time, news reports without a message may contribute to anxiety disorders in a small percentage of people, while others may control their fear through denial, avoidance, or reactance. Negative societal results of heightened fear in society may include a breakdown in trust, loss of civil rights for security, or repression against its own citizens. News reports with a high efficacy message may actually push some to seek a change in policy, in line with the terrorist’s demands. On the other hand, news with low efficacy messages may incite people to go after the threat in the form of counterterrorism. Similarly, threat-induced cognitive dissonance will drive people to choose between the new information in terrorists’ messages or stick with their old beliefs. Based upon the previous discussion of fear, fear appeals, and cognitive dissonance, a hierarchy of damage (from highest to lowest) from TV and newspaper terrorism news might look like the following: Film and television stories with dynamic images and high efficacy messages: Dynamic images of terror cause fear levels that initiate an efficacy check of the message. Fear appeals with high fear and high efficacy are most likely to result in message compliance. Film and television stories with dynamic images and low efficacy messages: Dynamic images of terror cause high fear levels. Over time, high levels of anxiety are damaging. Additionally, new information may confuse current policy understanding, resulting in cognitive dissonance and a shift in mindset toward the terrorist’s policy. Film and television stories with dynamic images and no message: Same as above. Film and television stories with static images and high efficacy messages: A static image is less likely to instill as much fear as a dynamic image. However, if it is enough to induce an efficacy check, then it is likely to result in message compliance Film and television stories with static images and lower efficacy messages: These are likely to result in low levels of anxiety. Over time, even low levels of anxiety can be damaging to some.

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Film and television stories with static images and no message: Same as above. Printed stories with images and high efficacy messages: These are not likely to cause fear. However, viewing dynamic images of terror on TV or film with high efficacy knowledge from print may result in message acceptance. Printed stories with images and no message: Not likely to cause fear, but may be subject to media cross-connections discussed earlier.

While these descriptions are purely hypothetical based upon the logic of fear appeals, empirical evidence supporting such a hierarchy would provide beneficial guidance to journalists. More practical guidance would include guidelines on what to avoid in order to minimize harm. These guidelines could be added to existing journalistic standards. Clearly, the media plays a significant role in the second and third order effects of terrorism. In a liberal democracy, with a free and independent media, this can be problematic if the press is: (1) complicit with the terrorist cause or unwitting dupes; (2) just doing their job; or (3) professional at journalism but naive about fear appeals. One might think that a complicit media would be the worst case, but it is so transparent and obvious that people, looking for the truth, see it for what it is. Naivet´e about fear appeals isn’t much of a problem, either, as once it is identified as an issue it can easily be addressed through training, education, and editorial policy. Far worse is a media doing harm in the name of “the job.” NEWSWORTHINESS AND TERRORISM As discussed previously, the role of the media in a liberal democracy is to provide citizens with accurate and reliable information they need to make informed decisions about self-governance and function in a free society. With this role in mind, terrorism must present a significant threat to the American way of life to garner so much attention. A look at a few statistics indicates otherwise. The worst ever year for terrorist violence against Americans was 2001, with 3,166 deaths—and of those, 2,926 deaths19 were from the 9/11 attacks. Contrast this with another measure of violence against Americans, homicides. There were 17,382 homicides in 2001. In other words, six times more people were murdered than killed in terrorist attacks. In 2005, only 56 U.S. citizens worldwide were killed as a result of incidents of terrorism, with 85 percent of those occurring in Iraq.20 Given that the homicide rate21 remained relatively the same for 2005 as it was between 1999 and 2004, then approximately 17,000 U.S. homicides22 occurred in 2005. That means that over 300 times more Americans were murdered than killed by terrorists in that year. Yet, the United States pursued a war on terrorism but only maintained a status quo policing effort against homicide, a much deadlier threat. While homicides at least make the news regularly, many more Americans die from

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nonviolent traffic accidents (43,340 deaths), poisonings (28,700 deaths), or falls (18,044), which are seldom covered in consonance with the frequency of their occurrence.23 Both terrorism and murder are newsworthy, yet news of terrorism grabs headlines out of proportion to its harm to the citizenry. What is it about terrorism that makes it so newsworthy? Journalists select news through an informal set of criteria established by an editorial hierarchy. While one would be hard-pressed to derive consensus from the media on newsworthy factors, as they vary by medium, institution, and individuals, Galtung and Ruge identified 12 factors,24 well accepted and identified below, which play in the decision-making process: – Frequency: The time span needed for the event to unfold itself and acquire meaning. – Threshold: The level an event must pass to be recorded. Amplitude is the magnitude of the event. – Clarity: One or a limited number of meanings in what is received. – Meaningfulness: Some measure of ethnocentrism will be operative; there has to be cultural proximity and relevance. – Consonance: The “expectation,” or cognitive interpretation in terms of what one “predicts” and what one “wants.” This is more commonly understood today as “cognitive dissonance”—the psychological discomfort felt as a discrepancy between what one knows/believes, and new information. – Unexpectedness: Events must be unexpected or rare, within the context of meaningfulness and consonance (above), in order to receive attention. – Continuity: The event has been covered and continues to be covered partly to justify its being covered in the first place, partly because of inertia in the system and partly because what was unexpected has now also become familiar. – Composition: Changes in thresholds occur for new events in order to “balance” coverage. – Elite nations: The actions of elite nations are more consequential than the activities of others. – Elite persons: The actions of elite persons are more consequential than the activities of others. – Personification: News has a tendency to present events as sentences where there is a subject, a named person or collectively consisting of people, and the event is then seen as a consequence of this person or these persons. – Negativity: Negative news will be preferred to positive news.

When terrorism is looked at through the prism of newsworthiness, the symbiotic relationship between terror and the media is clear. As a story of fear, death, and destruction, terrorism meets the criteria of negativity. Personification exists in the names of terrorists, victims groups, and elite

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persons. Terrorism against elite nations, such as European countries and the United States, is meaningful to their citizenry. Terrorist acts against large numbers or acts that are unexpected in their audacity (such as suicide bombers) meet threshold, unexpectedness, and consonance requirements. Subsequent acts of terrorism (continuity) are reported in the war on terror (clarity), but over time, higher threshold or unexpected events are required (composition) to make the headlines. From the perspective of a journalist, terrorism is thus quite newsworthy, and it is the job of the journalist to report it. ATTACK ON THE SOFT UNDERBELLY OF DEMOCRACY It is clearly not the job of a journalist to harm the public. Through the media, terrorists are able to strike at the soft underbelly of democracy— by bypassing a democracy’s means of resistance, its military, and instead assaulting its will to resist, residing in the people and the government. It is an attack inside the walls, with every newspaper, television, or radio a weapon in the homes of a nation’s citizenry. News of terrorism can be harmful to individuals and society, but nonetheless, it is a newsworthy event of worldwide significance. This places a liberal democracy on the horns of a dilemma. If controlling news of terrorism requires censoring free speech, then democracy loses one of its most precious and protective tools against tyranny and denies its citizenry of news of important events. On the other hand, unfettered news of terrorism is an attack that bypasses a nation’s means of resistance and strikes indirectly into the homes of its citizenry. This also confronts journalists with a dilemma. Terrorism is newsworthy, so it should be reported. But if terrorism is harmful to viewers, it should not be reported. What is needed is an option that negates the harmful elements of terrorism news while still allowing information of terrorism to flow without censor. LEASHING THE DOGS: JOURNALISM STANDARDS ON NEWS OF TERRORISM The media in a liberal democracy has a role in protecting its nation’s people from harmful news of terrorism. In order to preserve the precious gift of freedom, every effort must be made to keep government out of a censorship role. The truth of the matter is that the media can and has selfcensored some harmful aspects of terrorism news. For example, in a study of editor gatekeeping, Renee and Brian Kratzer found that 16 of 20 newspapers with circulations greater than 75,000 chose on their own accord not to publish disturbing 9/11 pictures of people jumping to their deaths from the World Trade Center in New York.25 The editors still reported the 9/11

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attack, but most censored harmful images from their stories. However, the decisions were not easy ones, with a great bit of soul-searching done between an obligation to report happenings accurately against upsetting their readers. Editors are the gatekeepers to the news. Their numbers and titles vary, with some editors acting as sole gatekeeper, while other news organizations may use many editors, management, and ownership in a gatekeeping role. Regardless, with gatekeeping already a function of editors, it makes sense that they should be at the hub of any effort to filter harmful news of terrorism. Providing editors with guidelines on terrorism news reporting will help educate those most able to do something about it. Unfortunately, a universal set of journalistic standards does not exist. While almost all journalistic standards include a responsibility to report truthfully and accurately, surprisingly few contain much guidance helpful in minimizing the harm from terrorism news. For example, the American Society of Newspaper Editors Statement of Principles,26 includes six articles entitled Responsibility, Freedom of the Press, Independence, Truth and Accuracy, Impartiality, and Fair Play. Only the Fair Play principle even obliquely addresses the issue of harm by exhorting an observation of “the common standards of decency.” Similarly, the Washington Post’s closest principle against doing harm includes the goal that, “As a disseminator of the news, the paper shall observe the decencies that are obligatory upon a private gentleman.27 “With regard to photo and graphic principles, the Los Angeles Times is representative of most respectable newspapers in that they disallow images that confuse, misrepresent events, are staged or altered, yet mention nothing about psychologically harmful photos. Some journalistic standards are actually harmful when applied to news of terrorism. For example, the Orlando Sentinel contains a principle that they will “seek to give a voice to the voiceless.” Terrorists would likely argue they are driven to violence for this very reason. The Society of Professional Journalists has one of the few codes that advocates a principle to minimize harm. This principle includes the following specific guidance:28 Journalists should: Show compassion for those who may be affected adversely by news coverage. Use special sensitivity when dealing with children and inexperienced sources or subjects. Be sensitive when seeking or using interviews or photographs of those affected by tragedy or grief. Recognize that gathering and reporting information may cause harm or discomfort. Pursuit of the news is not a license for arrogance.

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Recognize that private people have a greater right to control information about themselves than do public officials and others who seek power, influence, or attention. Only an overriding public need can justify intrusion into anyone’s privacy. Show good taste. Avoid pandering to lurid curiosity. Be cautious about identifying juvenile suspects or victims of sex crimes. Be judicious about naming criminal suspects before the formal filing of charges. Balance a criminal suspect’s fair trial rights with the public’s right to be informed.

While the principle to minimize harm acknowledges that “reporting information may cause harm or discomfort,” it doesn’t provide much guidance on specifics, but at least it demonstrates a commitment in the right direction. Radio and television standards overtly contain provisions against harm. It was realized early on that television and radio personalities were very influential as “guests in one’s home.” Initially, the industry created its own Code of Broadcasting to deal with the harmful effects of commercialization and fraudulent, deceptive, and obscene material. However, since the industry was self-regulated, enforcement of penalties was a problem. After a period (1982–1990) with no code of professional ethics, the National Association of Broadcasters issued a “New Statement of Principles and Broadcasting,” recommending caution in dealing with violence, drugs abuse, and sex.29 Specifically, the guidance on violence consisted of the following:30 Violence, physical or psychological, should only be portrayed in a responsible manner and should not be used exploitatively. Where consistent with the creative intent, programs involving violence should present the consequences of violence to its victims and perpetrators. Presentation of the details of violence should avoid the excessive, the gratuitous, and the instructional. The use of violence for its own sake and the detailed dwelling upon brutality or physical agony, by sight or by sound, should be avoided. Particular care should be exercised where children are involved in the depiction of violent behavior.

However, in keeping with First Amendment protections, this guidance remains advisory. While the National Association of Broadcasters encouraged broadcasters to write principles and policies of their own, no other recommendations were offered. The 2000 Radio-Television News Director’s Association Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct contains many of the same principles found in

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newspaper ethics: truth, fairness, integrity, independence, and accountability. Although it also contains a principle of public trust, it does not address harm. RECOMMENDATIONS The media can maintain free speech and still prevent harm from terrorism news by adopting a few additional guiding principles. Principles such as the National Association of Broadcaster’s guidance on violence31 and the Society of Professional Journalists direction to minimize harm provide good starting points. Yet, they are not enough. Television, which does the most damage, has the farthest to go. Even with the National Association of Broadcasters’ guidance on violence, drugs, and sex, TV programming contains a lot of the very content it seeks to avoid. Confronting broadcasters with the harm of terrorism news and the potential for government regulation32 if it is not addressed may be enough to illicit interest in a more robust set of codes. A few additional principle recommendations for both television and broadcaster codes include: r Avoid fear appeals. Fear appeals consist of stories with fear-inducing graphic images coupled to terrorist demands. Threatening images are bad enough on their own in that they increase fear and anxiety levels in viewers and can contribute to anxiety disorders. When fearful images are coupled to terrorists demands that are relatively easy to perform, feasible, and effective, people tend to comply with terrorist aims more so than when the images and demands are decoupled.

r Avoid threatening images and sounds. Threatening images and sounds induce fear and anxiety into viewers and can contribute to anxiety disorders.

r Avoid unwitting complicity with terrorists. Seemingly innocuous terrorist footage can contain messages for their operatives in the field.

r Use technically correct identifiers. Belligerents will want their adversary described in negative terms, such as bloody murderers, and themselves in positive terms, such as freedom fighters. Positive identifiers promote legitimacy.

r Avoid promoting terrorist’s objectives. Publicizing terrorist objectives can give them legitimacy.

CONCLUSION The media in a liberal democracy has a critical role in protecting society from the tyranny of extremists, just as it does against the tyranny of government. Terrorism strikes at the soft underbelly of democracy by bypassing a nation’s means of resistance and attacking its will to resist through the media. While censorship is one option to defend media vulnerability, it is a bad one compared to self-regulation through media codes. Yes, the cry of terror is newsworthy and reason to let slip the media dogs. It does not

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mean, however, that the news must be reported in a manner conducive to terrorists. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to thank Dr. Chris Harmon and Dr. Bill Gordon for their assistance and comments in the preparation of this chapter. NOTES 1. See Suetonius, 2 vols. trans. J. C. Rolfe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and London: William Henemann, 1920) vol. I, 3–119, http://www.fordham. edu/halsall/ancient/suetonius-julius.html Scanned by J. S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, California State University, Fullerton. Prof. Arkenberg has modernized the text. 2. From Journalism.org, Project for Excellence in Journalism, http://www. journalism.org/resources/guidelines/principles/purpose.asp. 3. Liberal freedoms are the distinguishing criteria that make a democracy a liberal democracy. 4. Freedom of the Press 2006: A Global Survey of Media Independence, Freedom House, 120 Wall Street, New York, http://www.freedomhouse.org. 5. For example, see Press Freedom Survey 2001, Freedom House, 120 Wall Street, New York, http://www.freedomhouse.org, 9. 6. Article 19. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of December 10, 1948, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 7. Freedom House press release, “Press Under Threat in Key Asian, African Countries, Study Finds Longer-Term Pattern of Decline Noted in Latin America and Former Soviet Union” (April 27, 2006), Freedom House, 120 Wall Street, New York. 8. National Assembly of France (August 26, 1789). 9. “Censorship,” The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th edition (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 2003). Answers.com (May 5, 2006), http://www. answers.com/topic/censorship. 10. Pippa Norris, Montague Kern, and Marion Just, eds. Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and the Public (New York: Routledge, 2003) 259. 11. Ibid., 264. 12. Ibid., 267. 13. K. C. Kessler, W. T. Chiu, O. Demler, and E. E. Walters, “Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of Twelve-Month Dsm-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCS-R),” Archives of General Psychiatry ( June 2005) 62(6):617–627. 14. For example, see S. Galea, J. Ahern, H. Resnick, D. Kilpatrick, M. Bucuvalas, J. Gold, and D. Vlahov (2002), “Psychological Sequelae of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks in New York City,” New England Journal of Medicine 346(13): 982–987, or M. A. Schuster, B. D. Stein, L. H. Jaycox, R. L. Collins, G. N. Marshall, and M. N.

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Elliott, et al. (2001), “A National Survey of Stress Reactions After the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks,” New England Journal of Medicine 345, Issue 20 (November 15, 2001): 1507–1512. 15. Kim Witte, “Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals,” Communication Monographs 59 (December 1992): 329-349, http://www.msu.edu/%7Ewittek/ fearback.htm. 16. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966) 5. 17. Witte, “Putting the Fear Back into Fear Appeals,” Communication Monographs 59 (December 1992): 329–349. 18. The theory of psychological reactance generally describes a situation where people believe they possess specific behavioral freedoms, and that they will react against and resent attempts to limit this sense of freedom. 19. Deaths: Injuries, 2001, National Vital Statistics Reports 52(21) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ( June 2, 2004): 1. 20. Country Reports on Terrorism, Provided by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (April 28, 2006), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/65970.htm. 21. The latest data available was data from 2003, Deaths: Final Data for 2003, National Final Statistics Report, 54(13) (April 19, 2006). It took almost 3 years for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, through the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, to compile and release the data. 22. The homicide rate since 1999 has remained between 5.5 and 5.7 homicides per 100,000 population. 23. Deaths: Final Data for 2003. National Vital Statistics Reports 54(13) (April 19, 2006): 10. 24. J. Galtung and M. Ruge, “The Structure of Foreign News: The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Foreign Newspapers,” Journal of Peace Research 1 (1965): 64-90. 25. Renee and Brian Kratzer, Photography Editors as Gatekeepers: Choosing between Publishing or Self-Censoring Disturbing Images of 9/11. Paper presented to the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Visual Communication Division, Miami Beach Convention, 2002. 26. See the ASNE Statement of Principles, American Society of Newspaper Editors, http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=888. 27. The Washington Post Standards and Ethics, last update (February 17, 1999), http://www.asne.org/ideas/codes/washingtonpost.htm. 28. See the Society of Professional Engineers Web site, http://www.spj.org/ ethics code.asp. 29. See “Ethics and Television,” The Museum of Broadcast Communications, http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/E/htmlE/ethicsandte/ethicsandte.htm. 30. Statement of Principles of Radio and Television Broadcasters issued by the Board of Directors of the National Association of Broadcasters (adopted October 1990, reaffirmed 1992). Available at http://www.nab.org/newsroom/Issues/ NAB%20Statement%20of%20Principles.html 31. Ibid.

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32. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable. Recently, Congress passed the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act, increasing the penalties the FCC can levy for programing considered obscene, indecent, or profane.

CHAPTER 22 TERROR TV? AN EXPLORATION OF HIZBOLLAH’S AL-MANAR TELEVISION Maura Conway

In his introduction to Covering Islam (1997), Edward Said refers to the “information wars that have gone on since 1948 around the whole question of the Middle East.”1 He is particularly concerned with the way in which the Lebanese-based Shi’a group Hizbollah (Party of God) “who identify themselves and are perceived locally as resistance fighters” are “commonly referred to in the American media as terrorists.”2 In an effort to thwart such assertions, Hizbollah3 instituted a savvy media strategy “to produce and articulate a conscious and forceful self-image”4 of themselves not as terrorists but as resistance fighters and statesmen. The major focus of this chapter is the way in which Hizbollah have wielded their television station, al-Manar—the “Beacon” or “Lighthouse,” in Arabic— as a weapon in their information war. The argument put forward here is that Hizbollah have met with high levels of success in this regard—to the extent that they may recently be seen to have become the victims of their own success, with the institution of multiple bans on transmission of alManar globally and the repeated targeting of the station by Israeli forces during the summer 2006 crisis. On the other hand, these difficulties may also be viewed by the organization as blessings in disguise, as they have forced the station to streamline its processes, which may, in the long term, not only ensure its continued existence, but also allow it to access a larger audience. The first section of this chapter briefly describes the range of media products offered by Hizbollah, while section two gives a brief overview of the Lebanese television scene and the establishment of al-Manar. The

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third and fourth sections detail the station’s mission and financing, respectively. Section five, which describes and analyzes the station’s programming, is divided into three parts: the first explores the type of programming prevalent in the station’s early years, the second describes the station’s contemporary format, and the third is devoted to a description of the type of viewing offered by the station to women and children. The station’s viewership figures are briefly explored in section six, while section seven explores the recent banning of the station in Europe and the United States. The final section is devoted to an analysis of the role of the station in the Lebanese crisis of 2006. HIZBOLLAH’S RANGE OF MEDIA PRODUCTS Autonomous communication has long been a paramount objective for Hizbollah. The group’s weekly newspaper, Al-Ahed (The Pledge), was launched on June 13, 1984, and was followed by the weeklies, Al Bilad, Al Wahda, El Ismailya, and the monthly Al Sabil. Hizbollah’s radio station, Al-Nour (The Light), was founded during the Amal-Hizbollah conflict in 1988, when a group of young Hizbollah fighters spontaneously began broadcasting news of the clashes. In terms of Hizbollah’s Internet presence, they first went online in early 1996. Hizbollah maintains three major Web sites (all of which are available in both English and Arabic versions): http://www.moqawama.net, known as the “Islamic Resistance Support Association,” which describes the group’s attacks on Israeli targets; http://www.nasrollah.net, the official homepage of the group’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah; and http://www.manartv.com.lb, the news and information site that is essentially the homepage of al-Manar Television.5 There is no question, however, that the “jewel in Hizbollah’s media crown”6 is the al-Manar television station itself. Live footage of Hizbollah operations appeared for the first time in 1986, with coverage of the invasion of the Israeli-occupied Sujud Fort at the top of Jabal Safi hill in South Lebanon, and was distributed to those Lebanese television stations in operation at that time. According to Naim Qassem, Hizbollah’s deputy Secretary General, “[f]ollowing the first television broadcast of this operation, the camera became an essential element in all resistance operations.”7 The establishment of al-Manar followed shortly thereafter: its first broadcast was Ayatollah Khomeini’s funeral in June 1989.8 THE LEBANESE TELEVISION SCENE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AL-MANAR A majority of the factions involved in the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) established television stations during the conflict with, at one point, some

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50 land-based stations in operation. After the war it was decided to regulate these, and the number of stations thus decreased to a dozen or so.9 In terms of the provision of licenses, “the selection was made only on sectarian grounds, and all licenses were given to members of the government or their relatives, hence privileging sectarianism over professionalism.”10 AlManar was not amongst the stations that received permission to continue broadcasting, nor was T´el´e-Lumi`ere, the station belonging to the Maronite Christian Church, but both continued to do so nonetheless. When other religiously oriented stations began to be set up, the government agreed to grant a license to both stations in order to dissuade other channels from following what Firmo-Fontan describes as “their subversive precedent.”11 Al-Manar thus became an official member of the Lebanese television community in 1996, and on April 5, 2000, the Lebanese Council of Ministers agreed to allow al-Manar Television to launch satellite transmissions. Hizbollah denies that it controls al-Manar. However, most of the station’s shareholders and staff are members of Hizbollah, which has its headquarters just around the corner from the al-Manar building in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the station is widely viewed as Hizbollah’s mouthpiece.12 Al-Manar’s Director General Abdallah Qasir insists that: Hizbollah has no direct organizational relationship with the station, but is rather its partner. Several members of the board of directors are party members, while others are not. Some channel workers might agree with the party through the general outlines of their political, religious and social principles. This, however, does not mean that Al-Manar is a party channel.13

Ibrahim Farahat, the station’s Public Relations Officer, has made similar remarks.14 AL-MANAR’S MISSION On its Web site, al-Manar is described as “a Lebanese TV station . . . motivated by the ambitions of participation in building [a] better future for the Arab and Muslim generations by focusing on the tolerant values of Islam and promoting the culture of dialogue and cooperation among the followers of the Heavenly religions and human civilizations.” Although at one time the station was also described on the site as the “first Arab establishment to stage an effective psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy,” this particular claim has since been removed,15 and today the station claims instead to be “the true reflection of what each and every Muslim and Arab thinks and believes in.”16 “Al-Manar is a Lebanese channel first of all,” reiterates Farahat.17 And indeed at the core of the station’s programing appears to be a consistent discourse constructed around the

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notion of moqawama (resistance) against occupation. Hizbollah’s mission and identity are certainly rooted in its founders’ belief that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 could only be overcome by armed resistance. The low-intensity warfare characteristic of the 1990s and the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 notwithstanding, the notion of resistance remains central to Hizbollah’s self-proclaimed mission.18 AlManar thus gears its messages toward encouraging attitudes that spur action and involvement in that resistance. According to Baylouny, these messages center on: Palestine, including American bias in the Arab-Israeli conflict; the continuing threat posed by Israel; the power and importance of community solidarity; and pride in Arab culture and the achievements of the Islamic Resistance (i.e., Hizbollah’s armed wing).

More generally, these messages have strong resonance not only amongst Lebanese but also in the Arab and Muslim worlds.19

AL-MANAR’S FINANCING In 2004, Jorisch put al-Manar’s annual budget at US$15 million, which at that time would have been approximately half the size of al-Jazeera’s budget.20 Numerous analysts contend that al-Manar receives the bulk of its funding from Iran,21 but the station’s managers deny this, saying they fully comply with Lebanese television licensing law, which prohibits foreign funding. The station is said to receive monetary support from donors and shareholders, while the station’s Director General, Qasir, claims that the channel is largely self-financed through advertising revenue and the sale of programs: “Al-Manar produces from 80 to 85% of what it broadcasts. We also receive some aid through special sponsorships of religious programs, which are sponsored by the so-called Religious Rights (AlHuquq al-Shar’iyah) [sic]. We also generate considerable revenues from the dubbing and redistribution of Iranian programs.”22 Advertising revenues are somewhat circumscribed, as al-Manar does not accept advertisements for liquor or other “un-Islamic products,”23 which allegedly results in the station turning down some 90 percent of potential advertisers.24 Until 2004, commercials only appeared on the landbased and not the satellite station. Among these advertisers were major American and European companies. However, this “support” of Hizbollah was brought to the attention of the U.S. Congress, which accused the companies of aiding terrorism, and the American and many European advertisers subsequently withdrew their advertisements. Currently, advertisements on al-Manar are infrequent and relatively few in number,

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airing mainly at prime time. The majority of these are for local and regionally based companies and products. On the land-based station, advertisements are for local clothes, shoe, and toy stores, along with other retail stores and a Lebanese mobile phone company, while advertisements for cleaning detergents, air conditioning products, and food products are also featured. Nonveiled women appear in a number of these segments. The station also airs announcements for Hizbollah-run social service organizations and schools, computer and Koran classes, and sports clubs.25 DESCRIPTION OF AL-MANAR PROGRAMMING The Station’s Early Years “Symbolism and the projection of messages to internal and external audiences have occupied a central place for Hizbollah throughout its evolution.”26 In his Inside Terrorism, Bruce Hoffman recounts how, during the crisis precipitated by the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, Hizbollah deftly manipulated the U.S. television networks: “There were graduates of media studies from American colleges at meetings at Nabih Berri’s house in West Beirut while (‘spin doctoring’) tactics were being worked out.”27 Later, during the 1990s, Hizbollah utilized its media apparatus to wage successful campaigns against both the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and South Lebanese Army (SLA) when they adopted a two-pronged military strategy, combining guerrilla and psychological warfare. According to Schliefer, “Hizbollah’s unique contribution to psychological operations (PSYOP) lay in the way it combined conventional and psychological warfare, creating a whole new PSYOP idiom.”28 Al-Manar was at the center of this campaign from its inception. In terms of Hizbollah’s offensive against the SLA, a campaign of psychological warfare was waged in conjunction with improved armed operations against SLA units. Infiltration within SLA ranks was subject to particular exploitation by the group, who capitalized on deteriorating SLA morale by regularly publicizing and distributing the names of SLA officers with promises of punishment, while at the same time televising daily broadcasts encouraging Shi’a SLA soldiers to desert and lacing these pleas with promises of financial remuneration coupled with pardons. Hizbollah even established a special information unit that highlighted SLA soldiers returning to their families.29 The group also waged an effective psychological warfare campaign against IDF soldiers serving in South Lebanon prior to their withdrawal in 2000. It utilized its own camera crews to record the efficiency of its attacks against IDF posts, which it then broadcast on al-Manar and, on a number of occasions, distributed to foreign media. The video-taping and dissemination of daring resistance operations served not only to boost the morale of Hizbollah’s own fighters and supporters, but also undermined SLA and

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IDF morale when the latter were, in a number of instances, caught on camera fleeing from advancing Hizbollah fighters. The group also regularly publicized on its television station and its Web sites the acquisition of new and upgraded weaponry in an effort to instill a degree of uncertainty into IDF units without actually having to employ the actual hardware, and broadcast messages in Hebrew to Israelis who could receive al-Manar just across the border, asking mothers of Israeli soldiers to entreat their sons to come home.30 The station was also watched by the group’s supporters, of course, and Hizbollah was determined to prove the effectiveness of its resistance against the Israeli occupation to this constituency. Al-Manar was at this time dominated by religious programs. The pictures and names of deceased fighters were regularly screened, supported by verses from the Quran that glorified martyrdom.31 The purpose, according to Hala Jaber, was “to indoctrinate the minds of young and old alike with the idea that those who seek martyrdom will be rewarded with more pleasure than can ever be achieved during this earthly lifetime.”32 Jaber goes on to dismiss the suggestion that social welfare services provided by the organization were dependent on those in receipt of such services and their families serving in the resistance, pointing out that Hizbollah’s fighters had gained the status of national heroes, and that this was underlined in TV broadcasts, thus making the latter a much more likely tool of recruitment than welfare services.33 In 1997, she reported, “with each broadcast the Party of God gained new momentum and a new influx of recruits.”34 Contemporary Programming The initiation of the Second Palestinian Intifada on September 28, 2000, came just 4 months after Israel ended its 18-year military occupation of South Lebanon with the upshot—according to numerous analysts35 —that al-Manar’s main purpose from late 2000 onward was less the demoralization of an Israeli audience and more the assistance of the Palestinians in their struggle, along with the raising of awareness in Lebanon of the need to support the Palestinians against the Israeli government: The outbreak of violence in the Palestinian territories presented the new raison d’etre the TV station managers had been looking for—and also reflected the chronic need of Hizbollah as a radical movement to re-invent its agenda and claim to legitimacy within the domestic Lebanese political mosaic. . . . Early in 2001, Hizbollah’s deputy chairman, Sheikh Na’im Qasim, said that: “Al-Manar is the television of the Intifada, in the same manner that it had been the medium of the resistance. It is now to be the television of this sacred cause.”36

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Prior to the outbreak of the Second Intifada, al-Manar was broadcasting for just 4 hours per day; with the upsurge in violence, however, station executives decided to increase airtime by 14 hours daily, reaching a total of 18 hours of programming per day.37 In terms of al-Manar’s contemporary programming, live news reports, video-clips, and “resistance” songs—including some 50 specially composed for the Intifada—are slotted between quiz shows, documentaries, and calls to prayer.38 Shows produced in-house include such programs as “Zajal Is Lebanon,” a folklore show that specializes in Zajal verse—a kind of local popular lyric verse—which spotlights distinguished Lebanese Zajal bands, while Kil Shi Ilu Shi (“Something for Everything”) is a social comedy that is composed of short sketches that comment on the contemporary political and social situation within Lebanon and the Arab world more broadly. Another home-produced show is Habbat Misk (“Musk Seed”), which is a satire by actor Wisam Sabbagh (Abu Shafiq) that deals with daily social, educational, and political issues. It has two segments: the first is filmed outside, and the second is broadcast live from the studio, where Sabbagh takes calls from the audience and answers their questions in a dramatic way and with commentary. Other popular Manar-produced programs include Al-Hal Bil-Qanun (“Legal Solution”), which is devoted to discussion of legal issues with lawyers and judges, and is presented by the lawyer Husayn Nasir and Wijhat Nazar (“Viewpoint”), a talk show presented by Mariam Karnib, who raises social, psychological, and educational problems that touch the core of people’s everyday lives.39 In addition to these, al-Manar also broadcasts programs aimed at informing viewers about the nature of Israeli and American society and politics. Harb and Leenders describe Hizbollah’s interest in the historical evolution of its main enemy, Israel, as particularly obsessive. The channel frequently broadcasts footage of Israeli politicians and journalists discussing the latest in Israeli politics, for example, while in-house commentators explain the workings of the Israeli parliament in voting for or against Israeli policies vis-`a-vis the Palestinians. One of al-Manar’s primetime game shows, al-Muhimma (“The Mission”), has contestants seek to virtually enter Jerusalem by answering a series of questions dealing with resistance operations, Islamic thought, the Palestinian cause, Western conspiracies, and Israeli plots, etc. In this show, the Israeli enemy is challenged through the audiovisual presentation of the merely virtual possibility of conquering Jerusalem, while knowledge about the “enemy” (and other oppressors) is celebrated and rewarded. This knowledge is also materially rechannelled into promoting the cause of armed resistance, since a quarter of the jackpot awarded to the winning candidate is sent to aid in the Palestinian Intifada.40 Much of the “filler” between programs is also concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it is via this “filler” that the basic character

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of the station mainly comes through, according to Baylouny.41 One such clip urges Palestinians to follow Hizbollah’s lead by standing up to Israel, as Hizbollah guerrillas did in South Lebanon, while another points out that Arab states number 300 million people while in occupied Palestine there are only 5 million Jews, and follows up with the question: “What are you waiting for?”42 A number of these transmissions are also in Hebrew; one of the most prominent of these messages is a video clip that sarcastically advises Israelis to leave for Europe and the United States, because those areas are safer for them than the Palestinian territories.43 Some clips also address the American involvement in the conflict, with one clip depicting the Statue of Liberty as a skeleton, brandishing a blade dripping with blood. Women and Children Television viewing is important to women in the Muslim world because of their relatively higher rates of illiteracy.44 Al-Manar’s female audience is clearly important to them, and women are very visible on the station, composing at least half of the announcers and program hosts. In fact, the channel’s English-language broadcasting department has a majority of women working as reporters, presenters, and political analysts. Female presenters include Safa Muslmany, Wafa Hoteit, Btoul Ayoub, Fatima Bdeir, and Myriam Karnib, all of whom have played a leading role in the development of the channel. These all wear the hijab (a scarf covering the hair) and manteau (a floor-length coat), and thus no parts of these women’s’ bodies other than hands and faces are visible to viewers. However, not all the women appearing on programs—as audience members, for example—are veiled; advertisements also show unveiled women, though all of these are conservatively dressed.45 Firmo-Fontan suggests, “the fact that women presenters wear the manteau and hejab, as opposed to the chador,46 can be interpreted as an initiative on the channel’s part to avoid antagonizing more liberal viewers and to appeal to all viewers of the Lebanese population.”47 Al-Manar has a wide following among Hizbollah women, who tune in to a range of soap operas (selected on moral grounds), talk shows, game shows, and news. Al-Manar’s following is less obvious amongst non-Hizbollah women but, according to Firmo-Fontan, is still significant, especially in the realm of news and children’s programs.48 The station’s children’s programming tends to focus on and reiterate the need for “resistance” in much the same fashion as much of the adultoriented programming. Asdiqa’ al-Manar (“Friends of al-Manar”) is a game show set as a pretend war game, with youngsters from 10 to 15 years old fighting with pretend weapons (guns, grenades, swords, and arrows) against an enemy with a “Western” appearance (which is understood to be Israeli). The children, Shi’a and Palestinians from the camps, shout

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Allah Akhbar (God is Great) as they cross over outdoor terrain to meet the enemy across a bridge. Another series, Fatat al-muqawam al-Quds (“Jerusalem Resistance Boy”), involves a young boy who wants to find his father who went missing in a war. To do so, he learns to fly planes, starting with paper airplanes and eventually graduating to lessons at a flying school. Unable to find his father, he joins Hizbollah’s military wing and tries to recruit his friends into the organization also. Although religion is not mentioned in the series, the boy’s mother is depicted traditionally dressed, and is shown praising him for his choices and advising her daughters to stay clear of Western influences and keep to the southern and rural areas instead.49 Ratings/Audience Al-Manar is one of the top-ranked stations in the Arab world, and often pointed to as being in the vanguard of a new and independent media. At the 2001 Cairo Television and Radio Festival, al-Manar won the most awards of all the competitors. The Lebanese Media Group, which includes al-Manar and al-Nour radio, won four and nine awards respectively.50 Al-Manar is one of the prime sources of news in the Arab world, particularly about Palestine. The top four news stations in the region, which capture 70–80 percent of satellite viewers, are al-Manar, al-Jazeera, LBC (Lebanese Broadcasting Company), and Abu Dhabi TV. According to the Jerusalem Media Communication Center, the majority of Palestinians watch al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi, and al-Manar, with the latter particularly widely watched in the West Bank and Gaza, where it has a number of correspondents.51 Jorisch reports a poll in 2003 that found TV viewers in Jordan turned first to al-Manar for news of Palestine (28 percent), followed closely by al-Jazeera (27.5 percent).52 In Lebanon, where al-Manar ranks fifth among the country’s nine stations, its news bulletins are popular because they are deemed to be the most reliable and balanced on local politics.53 Indeed al-Manar has been described as exceptional in Lebanese television because it displays “civic commitment,”54 in the sense that it addresses the concerns of ordinary people rather than a political elite.55 With the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000 and the launch of its satellite channel the same year, al-Manar took its message to a wider audience, both regionally and internationally. Some estimates put its audience in 2003–2004 at 10 million viewers worldwide.56 It is difficult to estimate current viewership, however, as a result of the bans on transmission of al-Manar instituted in various jurisdictions since 2004. THE BANS ON AL-MANAR The campaign to have al-Manar banned from transmitting via satellite began with an opinion piece that appeared in the Los Angeles Times

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in October 2002. The article, penned by Avi Jorisch (the author of Beacon of Hatred), accused American companies who advertised on the station of promoting terrorism. The Pepsi Company, Proctor and Gamble, Western Union, and a number of other major U.S. and European companies were named as advertisers on al-Manar’s local broadcasts (the satellite broadcast was, at that time, commercial-free).57 Jorisch followed up with a letter to the U.S. Congress asking elected representatives to put pressure on these companies, and using the opinion piece as support. The majority of U.S. advertisers duly pulled out, and pressure to ban the transmission of the station itself increased. The Coalition Against Terrorist Media (CATM), an offshoot of the U.S.-based neo-Conservative organization Foundation for Defence of Democracy (FDD), was also founded at this time in order to generate further momentum for a ban. Representatives of FDD and CATM—including Jorisch, who came on board as the latter’s Executive Director—have issued numerous statements claiming “Al-Manar runs graphic videos encouraging viewers, even children, to become suicide bombers and calls for acts of terrorism against civilians . . . Al-Manar is an operational weapon in the hands of one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations.”58 Al-Manar was, at the same time, coming under pressure in Europe. While claims about incitement to suicide bombing are contested, this is not to deny that some measure of al-Manar’s programming is objectionable by Western standards. The Washington Post has, for example, linked al-Manar to a rumor, widely spread in the Middle East, that Israel was behind the 9/11 attacks and that Jews working in the World Trade Center had been alerted not to come to work that day. Shortly after the attacks, the Washington Post reported that “As far as can be established, the story of 4,000 Jewish survivors originated with a September 17 (2001) report by the Beirutbased Al Manar television network . . . (which) cited ‘Arab diplomatic sources’ quoted in an obscure Jordanian newspaper named Al Watan.”59 The French move against al-Manar began after the station caused an uproar in October 2002 by broadcasting a Syrian-produced drama series entitled al-Shattat (“The Diaspora”), which is based on the controversial text known as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a nineteenth-century publication that depicts a Zionist conspiracy to take over the world.60 Scenes from the multipart miniseries include a dramatization of a Rabbi slaying a young boy in order to make Passover matzoh.61 Another episode includes a scene depicting a secret Jewish government allegedly plotting to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. The transmission of this series caused uproar in France, where incitement to racial hatred and anti-Semitism is a criminal offence, and led France’s higher audiovisual authority to instruct al-Manar to change the tone of its programming or face a ban. However, when in December 2004 a guest on a live show said that Zionists were deliberately trying to spread diseases, including AIDS, to Arabs, the authority decided to take the station to court. On January 6, 2005, France’s

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´ highest administrative court, the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State)—which had jurisdiction over the channel because it broadcast via a satellite based in France—decided that the programs al-Manar broadcast “were in a militant context, with anti-Semitic connotations” and banned transmission of the station, warning the satellite provider Eutelsat that if it failed to stop broadcasting al-Manar on its satellite within 48 hours of the decision it would be liable for payment of a fine of €5,000 (US$6,600) for every day it broadcast the station over the deadline.62 For its part, the station said it was unfair to ban a channel on the basis of one live caller, and denies it is anti-Semitic.63 In the event, al-Manar voluntarily stopped broadcasting several days before the ban was to take effect, a move that prevented other stations on the same satellite network from being removed from the airwaves as well, a decision that won the station praise from other networks and its international viewers.64 As regards the U.S. ban, which followed shortly thereafter: in George Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address, he mentioned Arab media outlets he claimed were responsible for disseminating “hateful propaganda” against the United States.65 Certainly al-Manar was included by the U.S. administration in these ranks. In December 2004, al-Manar was placed on an “exclusion list” by the U.S. State Department. This was followed up in March 2006 with al-Manar’s designation as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.66 As a result, no one associated with the broadcaster is allowed entry to the United States and any U.S. company found to be doing business with al-Manar will be subject to sanctions and possible prosecution with the result that al-Manar is prohibited from transmitting in the United States. Although they result in the same outcomes, it’s worth noting that the French and U.S. bans rest on different legal foundations, with the French ban focusing on constitutional issues of expression, and the U.S. ban based on laws prohibiting the material support of terrorist organizations, which, according to Yadav, means that “At least in theory, then, the U.S. is suggesting that their own struggle against al-Manar is not based on the substance of what it says, but rather on what it does.”67 In addition to being unavailable in North America, and with access being restricted in Europe, al-Manar is also no longer available for viewing in South America, nor in Australia or much of Africa; however, it is still broadcast throughout the Middle East, parts of Europe, and North Africa by Nilesat, whose major shareholder is the government of Egypt, and Arabsat, which is owned in part by the government of Saudi Arabia. Responses to Ban(s) Unsurprisingly, al-Manar officials were some of the most vociferous critics of the ban. The station responded in a statement that the U.S. action amounted to “intellectual terrorism” and an attack on press freedom.68

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They also complained about the timing of the U.S. ban, pointing out that they had been broadcasting by satellite since 2000, and Hizbollah has been categorized as a terrorist organization by the United States since 1997, and questioning why the U.S. banning arrived on the heels of events in France, and insinuating conspiracy.69 In Lebanon more widely, the mood was one of defiance. In response to the French ban, 50 cable operators in Beirut halted transmission of the French station TV5. The Lebanese Minister of Information declared the ban proof of censorship of any opposition to Israel, and students demonstrated in support of al-Manar. The then Lebanese Foreign Minister Mahmud Hammud commented, “We consider this to be against the freedom of expression that the entire world including the EU demands. We believe this attitude is not in harmony with the call for freedom of expression these countries advocate, and we believe there is a contradiction.”70 The banning was also criticized by organizations ranging from Hamas71 and Palestinian Islamic Jihad72 to Reporters Without Borders, with the latter warning against confusing anti-Israeli positions with anti-Semitism.73 In any event, the station has also all but entirely circumvented the ban(s) by providing continuous live streaming online. AL-MANAR’S ROLE IN THE 2006 CRISIS Following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, and believing itself relatively safe from the threat of Israeli aerial bombardment, al-Manar invested in high-specification antennas, which allowed it to extend its broadcasts further into Israel. As a result, residents of Haifa, Israel’s third largest city—which is located some 30 miles from the Lebanese border—are now in the range of al-Manar’s transmissions. According to Ron Schliefer, discussing the spots in Hebrew described earlier, “beyond their specific verbal messages these transmissions also seek to create in the Israeli mind a frightening connection between Al-Manar’s ability to target their television sets and Hizbollah’s ability to shell their homes; the implication being that the range of the one is equal to the range of the other.”74 Interestingly, al-Manar’s headquarters in Haret Hreik and the above-mentioned antennas—one of which was located near Baalbek, northeast of Beirut, and another in Maroun al-Ras in southern Lebanon75 —were some of the first targets of IDF air attacks when hostilities erupted between Israel and Hizbollah in early July 2006. Al-Manar’s Beirut headquarters was first struck by the Israeli Air Force on Thursday, July 13, the second day of the crisis. The complex was bombed again on July 16, resulting in the outbreak of a fire in the station and surrounding buildings. Although the station’s broadcasts continued uninterrupted during the first attack—which severely damaged the upper stories of the building— the second attack caused the station’s signal to be briefly unavailable on several occasions before returning to full strength.76 Also, on the second

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day of the crisis, the first-ever Hizbollah rocket attacks on Haifa commenced. The Israeli bombing of Hizbollah’s media outlets received harsh criticism from journalistic and human rights organizations worldwide. The Committee to Protect Journalists, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), Human Rights Watch, and others agreed that the attacks were a violation of international law, as the station’s broadcasts were not serving any direct military function (e.g., sending military communiqu´es).77 Aidan White, the IFJ’s General Secretary, said: “The bombing of Al-Manar is a clear demonstration that Israel has a policy of using violence to silence media it does not agree with. This action means media can become routine targets in every conflict. It is a strategy that spells catastrophe for press freedom and should never be endorsed by a government that calls itself democratic.”78 Human Rights Watch agreed, insisting “that Lebanese civilian opinion might influence how the Lebanese government responds to Hizbollah is not a sufficiently direct contribution to military action to render the media used to influence that opinion a legitimate military target. Rather, broadcasts should be met with competing broadcasts, propaganda with propaganda.”79 Indeed the IDF—in addition to conventional attacks on media targets in Lebanon—is also said to have broadened its psychological operations over the course of the crisis. The first reports of intercepts of al-Manar’s satellite transmissions were carried by Egypt’s Middle East News Agency, who said that on Sunday, July 23, 2006 Israel managed “to intercept the satellite transmissions of Hizbollah’s al-Manar TV channel for the third successive day, replacing it with Israeli transmissions that reportedly showed Hizbollah command sites and rocket launching pads which Israel claimed it has raided.”80 A little over a week later, al-Jazeera reported that a series of still photos with captions appeared on the screen’s of al-Manar viewers for several minutes during the evening news. Al-Jazeera attributed the interruption to “Israeli-backed hackers.” One of the images showed the corpse of a khaki-clad man lying face-down with accompanying Arabic text reading: “This is the photograph of a body of a member of Hizbollah’s special forces. Nasrallah lies: it is not us that is hiding our losses.” The al-Jazeera report is also accompanied by what appears to be a screen shot that shows a photograph of Nasrallah accompanied by the text “member of Hizbollah: watch out,” which they say also appeared on TV screens.81 CONCLUSION Al-Manar has, since its inception, been a television station devoted to prioritizing the goals of Hizbollah and although these have been subject to change over time, the overarching theme of resistance has persisted throughout. From its establishment in 1991 to the Israeli withdrawal from

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the south in 2000, the bulk of the station’s programming was aimed at sustaining and, if possible, strengthening the Lebanese public’s support for Hizbollah’s campaign of resistance against the IDF in South Lebanon, while at the same time pressuring Israeli viewers to push their government for a unilateral withdrawal. The eventual withdrawal was celebrated live on air for days, but this “triumph” came tinged with distress: what was to be the station’s purpose without the “hook” the resistance provided? The answer presented itself in the form of the outbreak of the so-called al-Aqsa Intifada. Al-Manar became “the secret weapon of the Palestinian intifada against Israeli occupation, the loyal supporter of armed resistance, devoting at least half its 24-hour-a-day satellite broadcasting to the battle between Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza.”82 In the summer of 2006, circumstances changed again, however, and al-Manar reverted to its original role as mouthpiece of the Lebanese resistance; this time around, cognizant of the role played by al-Manar in the previous conflict, the Israelis quickly sought to neutralize the station, though they had little success. Between 1991 and 2006, other changes also occurred at the station. From a small local effort, the station grew to encompass a satellite audience of millions worldwide. This success was somewhat short-lived, however, as the station came to be banned in numerous jurisdictions around the world as a result of the anti-Semitic nature of some of its content. The bans were applauded by many, but excoriated by others. The U.S. ban was likely ill advised because by blocking al-Manar’s transmission, Washington not only increased the station’s notoriety and thus popularity, but also ignored political logic that upholds interests. Unfortunately for the United States and its interest in reaching out to the “Arab street,” the likelihood is that the Chairman of Hizbollah’s Executive Committee, Hashim Safiy-al-Din, summed up the feelings of a great many people in the Arab world when he said about the ban: [T]his impudent attack against our rights, with all their media, political, cultural and economic dimensions, is not a sign of strength but a sign of the U.S. weakness and powerlessness. By doing this it has proved its tyranny and oppression, which we have been talking about . . . [T]he U.S.A. is talking about democracy and freedom of speech, but at the same time it cannot tolerate a sound or an image despite all the media it has available throughout the world.83

On a more practical level, the goal of making al-Manar unavailable to large numbers of people worldwide was translated into an own-goal when, almost immediately on the announcement of the bans, the station commenced live online streaming. Eventually, this may mean that the station will draw more viewers via their freely available Internet service than via more costly satellite connections.

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NOTES 1. Edward Said, Covering Islam (London: Vintage, 1997 [1981]), xxi. 2. Ibid., xiii. 3. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” I have chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. However, where I have employed quotation I have retained the original spelling used by the author. 4. Edward Said, Covering Islam, 66. 5. See Maura Conway, “Cybercortical Warfare: Hizbollah’s Internet Strategy,” in The Internet and Politics: Citizens, Voters and Activists, ed. Sarah Oates, Diana Owen, and Rachel Gibson (London: Routledge, 2005). 6. Ron Schleifer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on An Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 13. 7. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), 257, fn. 1. 8. Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia Press, 1997) 42. 9. Anna Marie Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” CSRC Discussion Paper 05/49 (2005): 5. Full text at http:// www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Special/csrc mpf.2005-10-17.5799702381/ 05(49).pdf. 10. Victoria Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television: A Case Study of Al-Manar TV and the Hezbollah Women’s Association,” in Women and the Media in the Middle East: Power through Self-Expression (London & New York: IB Tauris, 2004) 167. The stations that received licenses were: the eponymous Murr Television (MTV), owned by the family of a former interior minister; the National Broadcasting Network (NBN), representing the Shia community, specifically supporters of the speaker of the parliament, Nabih Berri; the Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI), the strongest wartime television station, which was originally established by the Christian militia and is now owned by a group of largely Christian businessmen-cum-politicians; and Future Television, owned by relatives and associates of the deceased Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri (FirmoFontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 167-168). 11. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 5; Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 167-168; Naomi Sakr, “Arab Satellite Channels between State and Private Ownership: Current and Future Implications,” TBS: Transnational Broadcasting Studies 9 (2002). The full text of the latter is available online at http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Fall02/ Sakr paper.html. 12. Kim Ghattas, “Al-Manar Network Feels World’s Heat,” The Boston Globe (December 21, 2004): A24. 13. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Al-Manar TV Director on Sources of Income, Viewership,” Al-Safir (Beirut) [translation from Arabic] (May 22, 2006). 14. Ibid. 15. Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 177. 16. See the “About Us” section of al-Manar’s English language Web site, http://www.almanar.com.lb/aboutUs.aspx?Language=en.

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17. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Al-Manar TV Spokesman on Channel’s Policy, French Ban,” Al-Safir (Beirut) [translation from Arabic] (March 24, 2006). 18. Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‘Terrorism,’ and the Politics of Perception,” Third World Quarterly 26 (2005): 180. 19. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 2. 20. Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004) xiii. 21. Daniel Byman, “Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah,” in Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 88; Robert Fisk, “Television News is Secret Weapon of the Intifada,” The Independent (London) (December 2, 2000), http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi qn4158/is 20001202/ai n14356264; Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred, 31–32. 22. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Al-Manar TV Director on Sources of Income, Viewership.” According to the journalist Robert Fisk, when he asked Qasir’s predecessor, Nayef Krayim “where the money comes from to run this operation—I suspect that Iran provides much of the cash—Mr. Krayim raises his hands as if invoking the generosity of God.” See Fisk, “Television News is Secret Weapon of the Intifada.” 23. Ghattas, “Al-Manar Network Feels World’s Heat,” A24. 24. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 5; Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred, 33. 25. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 6. 26. Magnus Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process,’” Mediterranean Politics 3 (1998): 109. A preprint version of this paper is available online at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/intrel/ research/cstpv/pdffiles/The%20Strategy% 20and%20Tactic.pdf. 27. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Indigo, 1998) 134. 28. Ron Schliefer, “Psychological Operations: A New Variation on an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 5. 29. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 206; Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process,’” 111. 30. Ghattas, “Al-Manar Network Feels World’s Heat,” A24; Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebanonization Process,’” 112. 31. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 60–61) provides the example of the following Quranic verse: “Certainly you will find the most violent of people in enmity for those who believe are the Jews and those who are polytheists, and you will certainly find the nearest in friendship to those who believe are those who say: ‘We are Christians.’ This is because there are priests and monks among them and because they do not behave proudly” (Surat al-Ma’idah, verse 82). 32. Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance, 89–90. 33. Ibid., 160. 34. Ibid., 42. 35. Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 177–178; Schliefer, “Psychological Operations,” 14; Daniel Sobelman, “Hizbullah Lends Its Services to the Palestinian Intifada,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 13(2001): 12; Stacey Philbrick

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Yadav, “Of Bans, Boycotts, and Sacrificial Lambs: Al-Manar in the Crossfire,” TBS: Transnational Broadcasting Studies 14 (2005). The full text of the latter is available online at http://www.tbsjournal.com/Archives/Spring05/yadav.html. 36. Sobelman, “Hizbullah Lends Its Services to the Palestinian Intifada,” 13. 37. Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 177. 38. Fisk, “Television News is Secret Weapon of the Intifada.” 39. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Al-Manar TV Spokesman on Channel’s Policy, French Ban.” (March 24, 2006). 40. Harb and Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy,” 182. 41. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 1. 42. BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV Denies US-Iranian Pressure to Close,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London) [translation from Arabic] (December 16, 2001). 43. Ibid. 44. Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 165. 45. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 10-11; Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 177. 46. A chador is a loose, usually black, robe worn by Muslim women that covers all of the body, from head to toe, and most of the face. 47. Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 177. 48. Ibid., 178. 49. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 12. 50. Ibid., 6. 51. Ghattas, “Al-Manar Network Feels World’s Heat,” A24. 52. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 15. 53. “Of importance when taking into account the television ratings for the whole of Lebanon is the predominance of Al-Manar TV as a substitution channel, not constantly watched by non-Hezbollah viewers, but frequently consulted for specific programmes, especially the news” (Firmo-Fontan, “Power, NGOs and Lebanese Television,” 178). 54. Nabil Dajani, “The Confessional Scene in Lebanese Television,” paper presented at the Carstun Niebuhr Institute of Near Eastern Studies Workshop on Islam on TV (Copenhagen, Denmark, 1999): 12. 55. Sakr, “Arab Satellite Channels.” 56. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 (Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2005) 100. The full text of the latter is available online at http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/45313.pdf. 57. The full text of the letter is available online at http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/pdf.php?template=C06&CID=453. 58. See press releases at http://www.stopterroristmedia.org/News/ DocumentQuery.aspx?DocumentTypeID=357. 59. Magda Abu-Fadil, “Al-Manar TV: No Love for U.S. but No Help from Taliban,” PoynterOnline (October 23, 2001). The full text is available online at http://poynter.org/dg.lts/id.16466/content.content view.htm.

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60. In 2002, the U.S. State Department objected, but failed, to prevent the broadcast by Egyptian television of the Ramadan miniseries Horseman without a Horse, which was also based upon The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The Protocols, which the U.S. State Department calls “racist” and “untrue,” is a work of fiction masquerading as fact, which claims to describe a Jewish plot for world domination and was used in Nazi Germany as a pretext to persecute Jews. 61. “Matzoh” is Yiddish for a brittle, flat piece of unleavened bread. 62. BBC Monitoring, “IFJ Criticizes French Ban on Al-Manar TV,” International Federation of Journalists (December 16, 2004). 63. Ghattas, “Al-Manar Network Feels World’s Heat,” A24. 64. Baylouny, “Al-Manar and Alhurra: Competing Satellite Stations and Ideologies,” 12. 65. The full text of the address is available online at http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html. 66. This was carried out pursuant to Executive Order 13224, which was signed into law by U.S. President George W. Bush on September 23, 2001 as a response to the 9/11 attacks. It describes powers designed to disrupt the financial activities of named terrorist organizations. 67. Yadav, “Of Bans, Boycotts, and Sacrificial Lambs.” 68. Ghattas, “Al-Manar Network Feels World’s Heat,” A24. 69. Yadav, “Of Bans, Boycotts, and Sacrificial Lambs.” 70. BBC Monitoring, “Lebanese Syrian Ministers Criticise European Ban on AlManar TV,” Lebanese National News Agency [translated from Arabic] (March 21, 2005). 71. BBC Monitoring, “Hamas Expresses Solidarity with Al-Manar TV After French, U.S. ‘Harassment,’” Palestinian Information Centre (online) (December 19, 2004). 72. BBC Monitoring, “Islamic Jihad Condemns U.S. Campaign against Lebanese Al-Manar TV,” Information Bureau of the Islamic Jihad Movement (online) [translated from Arabic] (December 20, 2004). 73. Federal News Service, “Interview with Robert Menard, Secretary-General of the French Group Reporters Sans Frontieres, discussing the French Ban on Lebanese Al-Manar TV Broadcasts in France,” Monday Morning Magazine (Beirut) (January 18, 2005). 74. Schliefer, “Psychological Operations,” 15. 75. These transmission stations were also used by Future TV and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC). According to the BBC, attacks on these transmitters on July 22, 2006 resulted in the death of an LBC technician. See Peter Feuilherade, “Israel Steps Up ‘Psy-Ops’ in Lebanon,” BBC Monitoring (July 26, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle east/5217484.stm. 76. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Lebanon: Israeli Forces Strike Al-Manar TV Facilities” (July 13, 2006). Full text available online at http://www.cpj.org/ news/2006/mideast/lebanon13july06na.html. The Beirut HQ of Hizbollah’s alNour radio was also attacked on July 16, 2006. 77. See Human Rights Watch, “Can Israel Attack Hezbollah Radio and Television Stations?” (July 31, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/17/ lebano13748.htm#11.

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78. International Federation of Journalists, “IFJ Accuses Israel over Pattern of Targeting After Strike on Beirut Broadcaster” (July 14, 2006). The full text of this press release is available online at http://www.ifj.org/default.asp?Index= 4064&Language=EN.The Israeli Association of Journalists withdrew from the IFJ due to this criticism, claiming that al-Manar employees “are not journalists, they are terrorists.” See Gil Hoffman, “Israeli Journalists Pull Out of IFJ,” Jerusalem Post (July 20, 2006). The full text of the latter is available online at http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull& cid=1153291961355. 79. Human Rights Watch, “Can Israel Attack Hezbollah Radio and Television Stations?” For an alternative perspective, see CATM’s press release entitled “Hezbollah’s Al-Manar Television Station Legitimate Target of Israeli Response,” http://www.stopterroristmedia.org/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID= 16668. 80. Feuilherade, “Israel Steps Up ‘Psy-Ops’ in Lebanon.” Feuilherade’s article also details the hacking, presumably by the Israelis also, of local FM radio stations and Lebanese mobile phones. 81. Agence France Press, “Israeli ‘Hackers’ Target Hezbollah TV,” Aljazeera.net (August 2, 2006), http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/1DCBA43CC892-4F02-8964-83BDA9081FC8.htm. 82. Fisk, “Television News is Secret Weapon of the Intifada.” 83. BBC Monitoring, “Hezbollah Official Criticizes Decisions against Al-Manar TV,” Al-Manar (Beirut) [translated from Arabic] (December 20, 2004).

CHAPTER 23 SOCIOCULTURAL, ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF COUNTERTERRORISM Christopher Jasparro

Sociocultural, economic, and demographic factors (henceforth referred to as sociodemographic) are among the most commonly cited suspects in debates over the “root causes” (i.e., those factors that give extremist ideologies resonance and appeal and spawn organizations willing to conduct violence on their behalf) of Islamist terrorism. The question of what the root causes of terrorism actually are, however, remains a subject of great debate.1 It is also difficult to build strategies for addressing broad and complex sociodemographic trends. For example, youth bulges in Muslim countries are a commonly cited demographic driver of extremism. Yet, how can links between youth bulges across large swaths of the planet and a global terrorist movement be realistically addressed? Lack of precision and specificity is one reason why such analysis and consequent policymaking has been problematic. This is partly because social science approaches used in terrorism research and analysis generally do not focus on place-specific contexts of seemingly widespread and generalized sociodemographic factors (e.g., youth bulges, poverty, and migration). For example, in an analysis of the 2002 Pew survey that questioned over 7,000 Muslin respondents in 14 countries about support for terrorism, Fair and Sheppard discovered that while some general variables applied across the sample, the actual effects of particular variables differed throughout the countries surveyed.2 The authors thus concluded that interventions to mitigate support for terrorism should be directed toward highly defined country-specific audiences employing creative analytical application of demographic and

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even psychographic data3 —an approach to which this chapter suggests adding geographic as well. Analyses that move beyond broad generalizations and consider the role played by particular and differing spatial factors on terrorist movements and how groups exploit physical and social spaces could potentially yield significant insights.4 Liotta and Miksell also argue that: environment and geography provide both context and opportunity for the making of a terrorist. The context springs from the objective conditions that shape the strategies and tactics that are employed in terrorist operations. The opportunity consists of objective conditions that permit the organization recruitment and training of terrorists and the continuous functioning of networks of logistics and intelligence support.5

Simply put, “geography as the study of the globe and its interaction with the people on it, provides us with the means to understand the battlefield and predict its nature as to use the elements to advantage.”6 The application of geographic perspectives allows for visualizing, organizing, and assessing real world data (that can otherwise inundate essential information with a deluge of detail), thereby elucidating important spatial patterns and structures.7 In other words, by knowing what areas produce the most terrorists and their supporters, as well as where sociodemographic factors play particularly significant roles in facilitating terrorism (and how terrorist organizations exploit these factors from place to place), we can more precisely and efficiently target/tailor resources and approaches instead of being constrained by “one-size-fits-all” responses geared to addressing broad issues (poverty for instance) whose effectiveness is difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Considering the sources of terrorism in their geographic context is especially critical for countering extremist ideologies. The potency and spread of an ideology is a function of three interrelated components: message (or story), dissemination, and resonance. All ideologies have a message to tell and stories by which to sell it. Offering counterarguments to discredit and debunk an opposing ideology is a key component of countering terrorism.8 However, this is not enough—there are many extreme ideas floating around but they cannot attain significance unless large numbers of people are exposed to them. Thus, a second element in countering extremist ideologies requires channels of dissemination to be disrupted. Nonetheless, in order for even a widely diffused message to mobilize significant support it must strike a chord that makes people gravitate to it. For example, in his book on the evolution of warfare, Thomas Hammes points out that today’s “Fourth-generation” nonstate opponents include revolutionary leaders (and ideologies) that need people who feel disenfranchised; the fewer the disenfranchised, the fewer places there are for

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movements to take root. Rupert Smith views the type of struggle we are now engaged in as part of an evolution from industrial warfare to what he calls “wars amongst the people.” Success in this type of warfare requires getting clear messages through to target audiences, but it must be recognized that the message will always be filtered through the target’s own (e.g., personal, national, and cultural, etc.) references.9 This requires knowing the audience. To prevail in this type of warfare it is essential to recognize that the primary focus should be “the people” not the enemy; however, because the enemy is amongst the people, one needs to differentiate between the two.10 It is thus important to ascertain: what people and where? Countering an ideology therefore requires determining where a message originates from, along what paths it has spread, and how the conditions by which it resonates vary from place to place. More specifically, precision in reducing the effect of sociocultural and demographic “root causes” that give extreme ideologies their resonance calls for distinguishing between universal and place-specific drivers. TERRORIST GEOGRAPHY There have been few attempts to systematically identify and analyze the geographical origins of those engaged in transnational Islamist terrorist or jihadi movements and operations and their supporters. One of the best known is Marc Sageman’s study of terrorist networks, in which he identifies four clusters based upon geographical origin of 176 terrorists as well as the pattern of interaction between them. The results of his study raise several issues of geography that need more analysis and exploration. First, at the global (macro) scale there are identifiable (but uneven) clusters and patterns in terrorist origins. For instance, al Qaeda’s constituent nationalities and ethnic groups have been given responsibilities for particular regions in which familial relationships play key roles.11 Members recruit from family, friends, and neighbors. Second, there also appears to be regional and subregional (mesoscale) variations in terrorist source areas and drivers of support.12 Indeed, while many individuals and groups may on the surface share a common ideological bent, they have their own leaders and aims, which are often parochial and localized.13 Third, locally specific factors such as place of recruitment and family networks are significant. In order to further identify such clusters and patterns as well as elucidate sociodemographic factors at play, a broader dataset must ultimately be consulted. Unfortunately, ready-to-use, open-source, geographically arranged data on transnational terrorists—data that is both precise and systematically organized—is difficult to come by. Nonetheless, a fair picture can be put together by comparing various references to and

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analyses of foreigners training or attending camps in so-called “jihad” theaters such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kashmir, and Southeast Asia. While not all fighters in these “jihads” are or have become terrorists, it is well documented that jihadi veterans have formed the core of transnational Islamist terrorist groups across the globe. Thus it is likely that by viewing the larger set of fighters, the overall geography of Islamist terrorist operators and support can be outlined. Further refinement can be obtained by examining the geographical origins of terrorists who have participated in operations in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. Afghanistan and Environs The 1979–1989 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan saw thousands of Muslims from all over the world travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan to train and fight against the Soviets. Many (if not most) were not ideological extremists and eventually returned quietly home. However many stayed and others returned home to form the foundation of today’s most radical movements. The majority of the volunteers who fought in the first Afghan war came from Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.14 Excluding Pakistanis, the most prominent group were Saudis both in terms of fighters per capita (of total national population) and nearly so in absolute terms. In 1995, according to Pakistani press reports, there were almost 5,000 foreign mujahideen registered in Pakistan (of whom many presumably fought or trained in Afghanistan or Pakistan).15 The overwhelming majority was from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan. Egyptians and Saudis (along with Algerians) also dominate a 2000 report allegedly prepared by Osama bin Laden and published by the Frontier Post, which listed the nationalities of 2,359 young men who had “lost their lives in the jihad.”16 A similar pattern is seen among non-Afghans on the U.S. Department of Defense’s official list of 522 detainees who passed through Combatant Review Process in 2004–2005 at Guantanamo Bay, where again foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia (as well as Yemen) are more common than from other countries.17 New York Times correspondent Carlotta Gall’s 2002 report from the Northern Alliance Prison at Shiberghan in Afghanistan provides a similar picture. Of the 3,500 al Qaeda and Taliban prisoners there, over 2,000 were Afghans, but of the foreigners more than 700 were Pakistanis, with the rest hailing from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Sudan, Morocco, Iraq, the Muslim republics of Russia (excluding Chechnya), and Central Asia.18 Of senior al Qaeda leadership reported killed in the Afghan-Pakistan border area in 2005 and 2006, most have been Arabs. For example, Egyptianborn Abu Hamza Rabia, thought by some to be al Qaeda’s number three, was killed in Pakistan in December 2005.19 In the January 2006 missile strike that unsuccessfully targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri in Pakistan, several

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foreign-born al Qaeda leaders are believed to have been killed. All were Arabs: Khalid Habib (aka Khalid al-Harbi), Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi (Moroccan), Mustafa Osman (Egyptian), Abu Obaidah al Masri (Egyptian), and Khalid Habib (Moroccan or Libyan). A rash of suicide bombings in Afghanistan beginning in late 2005 has set off a debate over the bombers’ origins. The Taliban claim that their bombers are locals. Afghan officials, however, insist (as evidenced by recent arrests that have included non-Pashtun Pakistanis20 ) they are mainly Arabs and Pakistanis who usually enter the country from Pakistan.21 For example, in early February 2006 Afghanistan’s Nimroz provincial governor, Ghulam Dastgir Azad, said nine foreigners were arrested in antiterrorist operations in Zaranj including: one Iraqi, two Kashmiris (from Pakistani administered Kashmir), one Pakistani, and five Bangladeshis.22 Aside from Arabs and Pakistanis, the only other foreigners that appeared in the region in significant numbers are from Central and Southeast Asia. The involvement of Central Asians in Afghanistan-Pakistan appears to be related primarily to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which some time in the late 1990s began providing fighters to the Taliban. The IMU, which has links to al Qaeda, propounds a radical jihadi ideology, operates and recruits in several Central Asian countries and receives extraregional funding; thus it can be considered a transnational group in its own right23 (albeit at the subregional, not global level) with an area of operations that includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. According to reporter Jason Burke, IMU members fighting in the fall of 2001 included Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, and Uighurs.24 By 2001, the International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated that 3,000 IMU fighters might have been in Afghanistan, with many likely to have been killed by U.S./Northern Alliance Forces or to have escaped into Tajikstan.25 However, recent estimates now place the group’s strength at less than 700.26 Although Chechens are widely reported to have fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan, what hard open-source evidence that does exist suggests their numbers were fairly small, perhaps no more than several dozens.27 Although significant numbers of Southeast Asians have trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan, their exact numbers and the extent to which they engaged in actual combat operations is unclear. It is known that Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, Thais, and Singaporeans trained together.28 Indonesians, however, appear to have been by far the most numerous with Malaysians likely second. The International Crisis Group contends that over 200 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members trained in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1995, with an upper-end estimate of several thousand.29 For instance, one Indonesian veteran claimed 3,000 Indonesians had fought in Afghanistan. A November 2005 statement by Indonesian intelligence officers claimed that about 5,000 Indonesian

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Muslims were involved in militant activities in Afghanistan, Southern Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Libya, most of whom are now thought to be living in several large cities in Java and West Sumatra.30 Many other outside analysts and insiders think the numbers were more likely in the hundreds.31 What few numbers put forward since 9/11 suggest a continuing but perhaps more limited Southeast Asian presence in Afghanistan-Pakistan. In November 2001, the Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI) claimed 300–350 Indonesians were in Afghanistan and Pakistan fighting with or preparing to fight with Taliban forces.32 In September of 2003, Indonesian Gungun Rusman Gunawan (brother of Hambali) and 18 other Southeast Asians (including 13 Malaysians) were apprehended by Pakistani and U.S. agents in Karachi “for suspected militant activities.”33 Balkans The outbreak of civil war in Bosnia occurred at a critical time for foreign fighters in Afghanistan. The “jihad” against the Soviets had devolved into internecine fighting, while in 1993 Pakistan began closing mujahideen offices and deporting illegal foreign fighters whose home countries balked at allowing them to return.34 Reliable statistics on the numbers of foreigners fighting in Bosnia are lacking. Estimates range from several hundred to about 4,000, with 3,000–4,000 the number most commonly cited by reputable sources.35 There is even less precision and information regarding their national and ethnic breakdowns. Most analyses suggest nonBosnian Muslim fighters hailed mainly from Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia. Generally most sources cite Iranians, Turks, and Arabs as the main participants. Unlike in Afghanistan, Arabs were not the majority among foreign fighters.36 However, most of the extreme ideologically driven fighters appear to have been Arabs.37 They had a disproportionate effect relative to other foreign volunteers, and are accused of committing most of the terrorist actions and atrocities committed by Muslim forces.38 The Iranian fighters, on the other hand, were largely serving under state-sponsored auspices. For example, in 1992 seven foreign fighters from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were reportedly wounded near Travnik.39 A letter sent to the U.N. Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (on the use of mercenaries) claimed that by the beginning of September 1992, 250 mujahideen had arrived in Bosnia from Turkey, Iran, Bahrain, and Qatar, and that in November 1992 an additional 43 (mainly Saudi) individuals fought against the Serbs at Teslic.40 A review of other mercenaries listed in descriptions of incidents between 1992 through 1995 (in Babina Rijeka, Dervanta, Zenica, Orzen, Prijedor, Llijas, and Cakrcici)

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identified by nationality the following foreign Muslim fighters: 31 Turks, 4 Jordanians, 7 Tunisians, 4 Egyptians, 4 Saudis, 1 Yemeni, 1 Syrian, and 1 Bahraini, plus two other Maghrebis and an unidentified Arab. Aside from the Turks, the only non-Arab Muslims specified were one Pakistani and a Georgian. Some Indonesians are believed to have fought in Bosnia but their actual number is indeterminate.41 Other than the case of Abdul Manaf Kasmuri (a former Malaysian army officer who was recruited into al Qaeda after returning to Bosnia following his service there as a peacekeeper42 ), there is little detailed evidence of Southeast Asians in Bosnia. In 1998, foreign fighters also began entering Kosovo in order to fight alongside the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).43 As in the case of Bosnia, press reports made frequent mention of Iranians, but they appear to have been there under state orders and sanction. However, most of the foreigners seem to have been Arabs. According to Fatos Klosi, then director of the Albanian intelligence service, three or four groups of foreign fighters comprised of Egyptians, Saudi Arabians, Algerians, Tunisians, and Sudanese entered Kosovo via Albania.44 Furthermore, as of November 2001 over 30 Islamic NGOs were operating in Kosovo, primarily funded by Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Gulf States’ money, a number of which are regarded by the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) as having external terrorist links.45 Chechnya and Kashmir The number of foreigners fighting on the side of the Chechen rebels has been variously estimated at anywhere from a few dozen to 200. An Internet tribute to “Martyrs of Chechnya” gives the stories of four foreigners killed between 1999 and 2000: three were Turks (one previously fought in Kosovo and two had trained in Afghanistan), the other a Yemeni veteran of Bosnia.46 Kashmir has also attracted foreign fighters, mostly Pakistani. But other nationalities have also been reported (though in lesser numbers), “Some of our Mujahideen brethren, whether Arab or (Ajam non-Arab), such as the Pakistanis and our brethren from Southeast Asia, have also helped.”47 Iraq The U.S. invasion of Iraq opened up the most recent theater for transnational “jihad.” Debate exists over the exact proportion of the insurgency made up by outsiders, but estimates generally range from 4 percent to 10 percent.48 Although the exact number of foreigners is disputed, their origins have been better studied (to the extent this is possible in such an environment) than in other cases. Several different analyses and reports

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give similar pictures of the origins of transnational fighters and terrorists operating in Iraq. Iraq’s Human Rights Minister, Bakhtiar Amin, reported that 350 foreign fighters were being held by the United States in 2004. He provided the following breakdown of prisoner origins: Egypt (61), Saudi Arabia (59), Jordan (40), Syria (56), Sudan (35), Yemen (10), Tunisians (10), Palestinians (8), and Lebanon (5).49 A Saudi National Security Assessment Project concluded that 3,000 foreign fighters were present in Iraq as of late August 2005. Of these, 600 were Algerian, 550 Syrian, 500 Yemeni, 400 Egyptian, 450 Sudanese, and 350 Saudi (plus another 150 unspecified “others”).50 Several reviews of extremist Web sites that posted tributes to foreigners “martyred” in Iraq also give similar results. An analysis by Reuven Paz of 154 foreigners killed in Iraq during February and March of 2005 (posted on Web sites associated with Abu Musab al-Zarawi’s and related groups) found that at least 94 percent were Arabs. Their particular countries of origin had the following distribution: Saudi Arabia (94), Syria (16), Iraq (13), Kuwait (11), Jordan (4), Lebanon (3), Libya (2), Algeria (2), Morocco (2), Yemen (2), Tunisia (2), Palestine (1), Dubai (1), and Sudan (1).51 A 2005 analysis conducted by NBC News of 400 militants killed in 2004 and 2005 revealed that they came from 21 countries, but with a disproportionate amount coming from Saudi Arabia (55 percent), Syria (13 percent), and North Africa (9 percent).52 Another 3 percent came from Europe, the majority of whom are likely to have been North Africans or of North African descent. Southeast Asia As indicated earlier Southeast Asians have been active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but in general (except for Indonesians), they have not played a significant role in global transnational terrorist operations. Generally, Southeast Asians operate within their home countries. Of those that do operate cross-border, most do so within the region, with Indonesians the most numerous followed by Malaysians. Amongst non-Southeast Asians operating in the region, most appear to be of Arab origin. In 1996, JI began shifting its training from Afghanistan to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) camps in Mindanao, and up to several hundred Indonesians may have participated.53 Interrogation reports indicate the existence of classes containing both mixed Indonesians and Malaysians.54 By August of 2003, over 200 JI members had been arrested in Southeast Asia, including nearly 90 each in Indonesia and Malaysia, and 30 in Singapore.55 A list of 57 identified suspects detained in Malaysia since April 2001 on charges related to JI specifies three foreigners: an Indonesian, a Filipino, and a Pakistani.56

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According to the Philippine Department of National Defense, 46 foreigners with suspected Islamist terrorist connections were arrested, detained, or “neutralized” in the country since 9/11. Among these, the following ethnic origins were reported: Saudi (5), Egyptian (2), Jordanian (5), Moroccan (2), Sudanese (3), Iraqi (10), Palestinian (3), Indonesian (12), Singaporean (1), Vietnamese (2), and Japanese (1). Of the 31 JI members and Singapore citizens detained by Singaporean authorities in 2002 and 2003, the two of non-Southeast Asians ethnic origin were of Arab and Pakistani descent.57 The rest were mainly of local Malay or Indonesian descent. One of the few confirmed cases of foreign participation in the Southern Thai insurgency was the 2006 arrest of Indonesian Sabri Amiruddin. Of Sageman’s 21 Southeast Asian subjects, the majority is from Indonesia (12), with three from Malaysia, two each from Singapore and Philippines, plus two nonethnic Southeast Asians (from Kuwait and Australia).58 Western Attacks/Plots The ethnic and geographic origins of terrorists who have crossed borders to launch attacks in western countries and of diaspora/ “homegrown” terrorists reflects the wider pattern described earlier of involving many nationalities, but with Arabs and Pakistanis the most prominent. Even though there has been much recent media and scholarly attention to the “new” threat of “homegrown” Islamist terrorism, it is not new but rather a phenomenon that took root in the western world in the 1990s as, for example, when “resident and permanent Jihadist networks emerged in Spain.”59 Likewise, in the case of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, although much attention focused upon Ramzi Yousef, an outsider from Pakistan, the core of the operational cell was comprised of men living in the greater New York City/Northern New Jersey area, and some investigators believe the original plot was homegrown.60 A review of some specific plots is illustrative of the aforementioned patterns and trends. Although Ramzi Yousef is widely regarded as the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the cell he tapped into had its genesis in a group of Arab immigrants from the Brooklyn area originally brought together by Egyptian-born El Sayyid Nosair. Among those convicted in connection with the bombing were Mohammed Salameh (born in Palestine), Nidal Ayyad (born in Jordan), Mahmoud Abouhalima (born in Egypt), Ibrahim Elgabrowny (born in Egypt) and Abdul Rahman Yasin (U.S.-born citizen, Iraqi-American). The core of the 2000 millennium bombing plot’s North American cell were three Algerian-born Canadian and U.S. immigrants Ahmed Ressam, Abdelghani Meskini, and Mokhtar Haouri. The Hamburg cell

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members who were at the heart of the 9/11 attacks leaders were Arabs who for the most part had radicalized in Hamburg, Germany, including Egyptian-born Mohammed Atta, Marwan al Shehi of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lebanese Ziad Jarrah, and Ramzi Binalshibh of Yemen. The FBI’s list of 26 most wanted alleged terrorists who have been indicted by Federal Grand Juries (related to terrorism charges against U.S. targets) is also dominated by Arabs. Twenty of the 26 are Arabs, with on overall ethnic-national breakdown of: 5 Saudis, 5 Egyptians, 2 Yemenis, 1 Iraqi-American, 1 Libyan, 1 Comoro, 2 Kenyans, and 2 Filipino (Moros). On the list are also 2 Palestinians and 4 Lebanese but who are not associated with Sunni-transnational terrorist groups.61 A survey of 38 terrorist suspects arrested and charged in the United States since 9/11 yielded a breakdown of 9 American-born converts and 28 immigrants (mainly first generation), of whom 17 were Arabs and 12 Pakistani. Of the 12 named suspects arrested in the 2006 Toronto terror plot, over half were first- or second-generation immigrants from Sri Lanka (1), Somalia (2), Egypt (1), Trinidad and Tobago/West Indies (2), and Pakistan (2). Seven of the nine primary Melbourne suspects from the Australian terror plot broken up in 2006 are of Lebanese origin, one is an immigrant from Algeria, and the other an Australian convert, while amongst the eight key Sydney suspects are a Bangladeshi immigrant, one male of Indonesian descent, a Bosnian convert, and several ethnic Lebanese. It would appear that recruitment for jihad in Europe is somewhat structured along national and ethnic lines.62 Of the individuals arrested in Spain for belonging to Islamist terror networks between 1995 and 2005, there were 83 Algerians, 40 Moroccans, 21 Syrians, 12 Pakistanis, 2 Lebanese, 1 Mauritanian, and 1 Afghan.63 According to a 2004 U.K. intelligence service list of 100 Islamist activists suspected of being involved in terrorist activities, the majority were British citizens of Pakistani descent.64 Indeed, three of the four London subway bombers were of Pakistani decent as were the majority of the first 19 suspects identified in the 2006 U.K. airline bombing plot. In the Netherlands second-generation terrorists are predominantly of Moroccan origin who were either born in the country or moved there at a very young age.65 Worldwide, in case after case, the social networks in which radicalization occurs amongst diaspora populations are highly localized with friendship, community, neighborhood, family and marriage ties playing important roles.66 Initial evidence indicates that both the Sydney and Melbourne cells fit the “bunch of guys” profile, basically a group of friends whose radical beliefs and militancy incubate, escalate, and intensify in an upward spiral over time. Most of the nine members of the Melbourne cell, for instance, were old school friends. In addition to friendship, family and community ties are another common and recurring element in cell formation and radicalization. The

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suspects in the 3/11 Madrid bombings include several sets of brothers and cousins.67 Amongst the 9/11 hijackers were several cousins (Ahmed, Hamza, and Saeed al-Ghamdi) as well as sets of brothers (Salim and Nawaf al-Hamzi, Wail and Waleed al-Sheri). Other plots in which family members participated together include the 1993 WTC bombing,68 Singapore-JI bombing plot,69 the USS Cole, and Bali Nightclub bombings.70 Families have also been found to provide both material and moral support to prospective jihadis. For example, Umer Hayat (a Pakistani immigrant arrested in the United States in June 2005 along with his Americanborn son Hamid) told investigators that he provided an allowance of $100 plus paid-for airline tickets knowing his son intended to attend a jihadi training camp in Pakistan.71 While Madrid 3/11 suspect Mohammed Alfalah—who may have killed himself in a suicide bombing in Iraq last May—is thought to have been provided a cell phone by his father so he could communicate his intent to die a “martyr’s” death.72 Several relatives (siblings and spouses) of London 7/21 suspects have been charged with helping suspects avoid arrest.73 In-laws, too, often help foster entry into terrorist circles, while alliances are often created around marriage ties.74 The act of marriage is also commonly used by terrorists for purposes of immigration, cover, and burrowing into a community.75 Alleged members of the al Qaeda Madrid cell suspected of having assisted the 9/11 attackers (and possibly the 3/11 bombers) are thought to have used marriage to help establish themselves in Madrid.76 Brothers-in-law Antonio Castro and Jose Emilio Trashorras are suspected of being the critical links in the 3/11 explosives procurement chain. Muriel Degauque, the Belgian woman suicide bomber who blew herself up while attacking American troops in Iraq on November 9, 2005, was a convert to Islam whose radical beliefs and links to terrorist circles crystallized through her second marriage to a Moroccan-born extremist.77 Toronto suspects Zakaria Amad and Ahmad Mustafa Ghany are thought to be brothers-in-law. Nearly all of the Melbourne cell members were school friends prior to their suspected radicalization and terrorist activities. Khaled Cheikho is the uncle of fellow Sydney suspect Moustafa Cheikho, while Melbourne suspects Ahmad and Ezzit Raad are brothers. Many of the Toronto suspects were also school friends from the communities of Meadowvale and Scarborough. Members of the Sydney cell have connections to an earlier terror plot against Sydney, associated with a cell led by Willie Brigitte. These linkages appear to have been built or nurtured by a combination of familial and jihad training camp relationships. French officials claim Moustafa Cheikho and Brigitte trained together with the LeT in Pakistan, while Hasan is alleged to have helped Brigitte find a flat. Brigitte, in turn, was introduced to his wife, Melanie Brown (a good friend of Khaled

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Sharrouf’s sister Miriam) by Sharrouf’s brother-in-law, Mamadou Ndaw, who has since been deported to Senegal on security grounds.78 Cells in the West have generally tended to be geographically as well as socially localized, coalescing around particular neighborhoods and/or institutions (such as mosques, schools, bookstores, prayer centers, etc.) that often serve as key nodes between local groups and wider geographic and social connections. In the United States for example, the following cities/areas (amongst others) have been persistent nodes of al Qaeda and other Sunni Islamist operations, support, and recruitment: Detroit, Boston, Brooklyn, Northern New Jersey, South Florida, Northern Virginia, Oklahoma City, Tucson, Los Angeles, and San Diego.79 In France, the area around Lille and Roubaix has long served as fertile ground for recruitment, as has the Lyon area, with the most important recruiting grounds in France appear to be the rundown suburbs of Paris and Marseilles.80 Some specific examples of cell localization include: the Madrid train bombings, 1993 World Trade Center bombing and subsequent New York City landmarks plot, 2005 Sydney-Melbourne arrests, London subway bombings, and the 2006 Toronto and Miami-based plots. Many of the Madrid bombing suspects have close ties to particular cities (such as Tangiers and Tetuan in Northern Morocco) and the Madrid neighborhoods of Lavapies and Leganes,81 while three of the four London subway bombers hailed from the Beeston neighborhood of Leeds. Thirteen of the initial 19 suspects in the 2006 U.K. airliner-bombing plot hailed from East London with nine from Walthamstow in particular. Another four came from the Buckhampshire town of High Wycombe. Most of the Melbourne 2005 suspects were school friends prior to their suspected radicalization and terrorist activities.82 At least four lived within walking distance of each other. About half the Sydney cell lived within walking distance of each other (and Willie Brigitte) in the Wiley Park area. Of the first 12 suspects named in the 2006 Toronto, Canada terror case, most came from two localized clusters. One was in the suburb of Scarborough, where four suspects lived. Five other unnamed suspects also attended high school together in Scarborough. Six other suspects lived in nearby Meadowvale and Mississagua, in close proximity to the Meadowvale High School and Ar-Rahman Islamic Center.83 Edges A more problematic situation is presented by the outliers of Islamist terrorism. Although there are clear concentrations of terrorist activity and support, it is widely accepted that groups like al Qaeda have a global presence, and as the preceding sections illustrate, individuals from many countries have participated in transnational terrorist and “jihadi” activities. There is considerable debate over the extent to which support for

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Islamist terrorism and related ideologies has spread (or is spreading) to areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, Bangladesh, and Southern Thailand. Certainly there are many countries and areas that share similar sociodemographic profiles with the core countries but yet do not make the same level of contribution to transnational terrorism. For instance, Kenya and Tanzania are permissive environments for terrorist operations, as yet these countries have remained relatively unpromising grounds for recruitment and support. Despite a rise in extremist Wahabbist ideology in the 1980s and 1990s the extremists seem to be losing ground mainly because they appear to have alienated their fellow local (more tolerant and mainly Sufi) Muslims. It is likely that sociodemographic vulnerabilities in countries such as these are being mitigated by other factors such as cultural differences (for example, in many ways the phenomena of Islamist terrorism may be as much or more a function of Arab and Pakistani culture than of Muslim religion), local religious interpretations, geographic proximity to “jihad lands” (Middle East and Central Asia, including the Balkans, Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Kashmir) and centers of ideological innovation (e.g., Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or early historic diffusion (Pakistan and Indonesia), level of global connectivity (or lack thereof) and historic as well as recent geopolitical events. However, if these countries’ deep political, economic, and social problems continue to fester, particularly amongst already marginalized Muslim communities, then they may well become more promising recruiting grounds in the future.84 Indeed, this seems to be the case in places such as Nigeria and Southern Thailand. The conflict in southern Thailand is rooted in longstanding ethnic and socioeconomic grievances. However, the influence of extreme Islamist ideology, which is not traditional, is on the rise. This suggests that deepening and unresolved sociodemographic stresses could ultimately undermine or weaken traditional checks to certain extremist ideologies. GEOGRAPHIC AND SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS AND PATTERNS The preceding discussion suggests that there are areas ranging from the macroscale (e.g., regions and countries) to microscale (e.g., cities, neighborhoods, and communities) that seem to produce a disproportionate share of people involved in (and one would assume, active and passive supporters of) transnational Islamist terrorist and related activities. The role sociodemographic factors play—and their level of significance— within these areas can vary from place to place. Therefore, addressing sociodemographic factors requires first identifying where the key geographic nodes (as well as emerging diffusion paths) are, and then how

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sociodemographic specifically influence terrorist recruiting and support in these areas. The following section seeks to illustrate this point by examining geography as well as some specific variations and patterns between places. Geographic Cores It is clear that Arabia (and the Arab diaspora) produces the most participants in transnational jihadi and terrorist activities, and is thus transnational Islamist terrorism’s geographic core. Within the Arab core, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, Morocco, and Algeria appear to be particularly prominent. There are also three important secondary cores. Of these Pakistan is arguably the most important both regionally and internationally. The other two core areas are Southeast and Central Asia, particularly Indonesia and Uzbekistan. Of course, Islamist terrorism and support for related extremist ideologies is present well beyond these cores, and may in fact be growing in some areas. These are areas where geographic cultural, political, historic, and other barriers are either limiting or at least slowing the spread of terrorist ideologies and the numbers of active domestic and transnational participants. Other studies using different methodologies reveal a similar geographic pattern. Sageman, for example, identifies four key clusters as: Central Staff (al Qaeda and global terrorist leaders, mainly Arabs), Core Arab (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and Kuwait), Maghreb Arab (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria), and Southeast Asia. Sageman also briefly mentions the importance of microscale geographic factors when he cites local “places of recruitment” as one of the circumstances that facilitates “joining the jihad” movement.85 Incident and casualty figures also provide anecdotal evidence of Arabia as a geographical core for terrorism, both domestic and transnational. According to the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) database, of the 38,464 fatalities from terrorist attacks between 1968 and June 2006, 17,279 (approx. 44 percent) occurred in the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. Of these, 14,268 were characterized as caused by “international” terrorist attacks, of which 4,508 (or about 32 percent) occurred in the Middle/East Persian Gulf Area.86 In 2005, the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center reported approximately 40,000 individuals killed or wounded in terrorist attacks for the year. Based upon a combination of demographic analysis and reporting of the countries, they concluded that 10,000-15,000 of the victims were Muslims (most in Iraq), with the Middle East and South Asia bearing the brunt. Although these are aggregate figures, including victims from attacks by all groups (not just Islamist), it is nonetheless clear that the Middle East (which is predominately Arab) is also the world’s main locus of terrorism in terms of victims.87

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General Core Sociodemographic Characteristics If we take a macroscale look at the Arab-Pakistan core and Central and Southeast Asian secondary cores (centered upon Uzbekistan and Indonesia) some shared sociodemographic characteristics in terms of level of development, demography, corruption, and environmental sustainability are visible. All of the main core countries fall in the “medium” category of the Human Development Index (HDI), ranked between 77th (Saudi Arabia) and 141st (Sudan).88 In terms of overall HDI rank, most of the major terrorist-producing countries fall in the bottom half (88th or lower) of the 177 countries ranked; Yemen is the only one characterized as “low” (151st) in the HDI.89 The only Arab countries that score in the high category are the small Gulf States of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE.90 A more striking pattern appears in terms of Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) scores, where (with the exception of Tunisia) every Arab country is ranked in the bottom half of the 146 countries surveyed, as are Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and the other Central Asian “stans.”91 The collection of indicators and variables that form the 2005 ESI provide among other things an alternative to GDP and the HDI for gauging a country’s progress.92 The ESI also provides a tool for measuring potential to achieve global-scale policy goals such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which explicitly commit the world community to making progress in achieving environmental sustainability within the context of a broader global agenda aimed at reducing poverty, malnutrition, and expanding education and health care.93 Another measure in which we see commonality is that the majority of core countries also scored in the bottom half of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI rates perception of corruption based on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). Only the small Gulf States of Oman, UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain plus Jordan scored over 5; nearly all the rest scored below 3.5.94 Demographically a distinct overall pattern also exists. According to a study by Population Action International (PAI), countries with a youth bulge (in which young adults composed 40 percent or more of the adult population) were more than twice as likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict. In this study, all Arab countries (with the exception of the small Gulf States) and Central Asian countries (including Pakistan) were assessed at “high risk” in terms of youth bulge-related instability.95 Furthermore, countries with low-availability of cropland and/or freshwater were 1.5 times more likely to experience civil conflict; of these, countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East were most at risk. Countries experiencing the overlapping demographic factors of youth bulge with rapid urbanization and/or low cropland or freshwater availability have a particularly high risk of conflict and instability. Not surprisingly, all Arab

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countries (again with the exception of the small Gulf States) plus Pakistan and Uzbekistan were also categorized in the PAI report as “very high” or “high risk” for overall demographic stress.96 The only exception amongst the core countries to these demographic profiles is Indonesia. Although general core areas can be identified that seem to exhibit certain common sociodemographic characteristics, this should not lead to the conclusion that these factors act in common or are evenly influential and distributed within and amongst a core’s regions and populations. Sociodemographic profiles of individuals also vary. Generally, most operatives seem to get involved in terror groups during their middle to late 20s,97 although this varies somewhat by region and the profile of wider nonoperational support-base may differ substantially from that of active players.98 Arab Core While Arabia is clearly the core of Islamist transnational terrorism, there are variations in operator and support patterns within and between countries and terrorist groups. In Algeria, for instance, the return of Afghan veterans and increase in popularity of religious extremism (and the ensuing civil war) occurred against the backdrop of a severe economic downturn. According to analysis by Testas of economic factors and their relationship to violence, the economic decline of 1988–1992 did not cause political violence or Islamist extremism in Algeria, but rather fuelled and magnified social discontent, the role of religion, political grievances, and ethnic hostility.99 This had an additional transnational dimension, as unemployment and conflict combined to create a dramatic expansion in the number of Algerians living and moving abroad since 1992, helping set the stage for later diaspora related terrorism. Compared to Algeria and other Arab core states, Tunisia has supplied relatively few fighters to foreign jihads, transnational terrorist operations, or foreign “homegrown” diaspora cells. During the 1960s and 1970s, living standards increased similarly between Tunisia and Algeria. However Algeria’s economic decline and ensuing civil war saw incomes decline in Algeria from 1985 through 1998, while rising substantially in Tunisia, which may help explain some of the differences in political stability and political violence between the two countries.100 Indeed in terms of HDI, CPI, and ESI, Tunisia outscores all the core Arab states (with the exception of HDI, where Saudi Arabia scores better). The influence of sociodemographic factors is not uniform and varies not only between countries but also within countries and between demographic strata and terrorist organizations. In Egypt, the Gama Islamiyya had a distinct geographical core and a bifurcated recruitment demographic.101 Upper Egypt, from al-Minya to the southern Nubian Desert—one of Egypt’s most distressed regions, with wages 30 percent

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lower than the national average and infant mortality 50 percent higher— was the birthplace and heartland of Gama Islamiyya.102 Many of its leaders were recruited from among the region’s many unemployed university graduates, while the sale of cheap food was used to draw in foot soldiers and supporters from the urban poor.103 Terrorist operatives also vary in source and background in Saudi Arabia; however, some distinct geographic clustering seems to occur. Amongst the 12 Saudi 9/11 hijackers, particular geographic, tribal, and family nodes stand out. Nine of the 12 came from two geographical clusters and over half did not have university education. Four came from a cluster of three towns in the isolated and underdeveloped al Bahah region. All shared the same tribal affiliation and none had a university degree. Another five hailed from Asir Province, a poor region in southwestern Saudi Arabia bordering Yemen, and all had begun university studies. The remaining three—al Suqami, Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi—came from various other towns and cities. Suqami had little education, Moqed was a university dropout, and al Hamzi had problems with alcohol and petty theft.104 Saudis recently engaged in terrorist and insurgent activities in Iraq come from various locations, but with the South, Hijaz, and Najd being the three main clusters.105 Most are affiliated with prominent conservative tribes, but unlike the 9/11 hijackers most are middle-class, employed, and educated.106 In Yemen as well there are varying demographic and geographic nodes of support for Islamist terrorist groups. For instance, support for al Qaeda comes from both ideologically sympathetic Islamists (including some returnees from the anti-Soviet war and training camps in Afghanistan) and from specific tribal areas. The Bakil tribes of the Marib area (in northern Yemen) are perhaps the strongest Yemeni supporters of al Qaeda.107 However, the Bakil are not necessarily motivated by ideology, but rather by tribal, political, and economic reasons, and have shown a willingness to accept support from all quarters.108 Thus in order to weaken Bakil support for al Qaeda, Katz has proposed a two-pronged approach. First, at the local scale, short-term aid should be provided to tribal leaders who do not cooperate with (or who act against) al Qaeda. This is to be combined with a long-term program to eliminate tribal grievances against the central government and develop the economy and educational system at the national level (thereby allowing the government to free tribal members from dependence upon shaykhs who require aid from outside actors such as al Qaeda).109 DIASPORAS: PATTERNS WITHIN PATTERNS Roy describes Muslim diaspora members and other Western country residents involved with terrorist networks as falling into one of three main categories:

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Students, who came from Middle Eastern countries to study in the West; second-generation Muslims, who were either born in the West or came as infants; and converts. The students (for example, the World Trade Center pilots) are usually middle or upper class, and all were educated in technical or scientific disciplines. The second-generation Muslims emanate from the working class and disfranchised urban youths. The converts are a more complex category. Most of the individuals who gravitate towards these three categories are “new Muslims,” either born-again or converts.110

In terms of ethnic origin, as discussed earlier, Arabs and Pakistanis appear to be the most active players in transnational Islamist terrorist activities amongst diaspora communities. Given that their new home countries do not fit into the same relatively grim macrolevel sociodemographic categories as their ancestral homelands, it could lead one to conclude that sociodemographic factors have little to do with diaspora involvement in terrorism. However there appears to be both supply and demand drivers, some of which are sociodemographic in nature. On the supply side, the existence of large communities with skills and backgrounds amenable to the conduct of transnational terrorism (e.g., language, experience of living and working abroad, and possession of passports, etc.) are attractive to al Qaeda and like-minded organizations.111 Meanwhile, on the demand side, disaffected communities or individuals who may be (or feel) marginalized or alienated locally, while identifying with wider narratives of grievance, may provide fertile support bases. The social roots of Islamist violence may be strengthening due to resentment of foreigners by host populations, the difficulties of coping with modernization versus traditional culture, unemployment, and unfulfilled expectations of the second and third generation of immigrants, which has been exacerbated by financial support in Muslim countries that enabled immigrants to build and promote their own communities112 as well as spread neofundamentalist ideology. This sort of ideology targets actual individuals in doubt of their faith and identity, and appeals to uprooted, disaffected youth in search of an identity beyond the lost cultures of their parents and thwarted expectations of a better life in the West.113 For example, as Roane observes, in “central Montreal more than 15,000 of its 1 million citizens are of Algerian origin” [many] who say “they are being denied jobs because of their ethnicity, and immigrants of all stripes complain of harassment by the authorities.”114 So while in absolute terms diaspora communities may be in better sociodemographic situations than their counterparts in origin countries, in relative terms they may sit in the medium zone within their host countries, where they may be subject to more corruption (or less government attention), discrimination, and hopelessness than the population at large. This

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in turn provides fertile grounds for globalist religioextremist ideologies to resonate and be applied to host countries and societies. This general pattern, with place-specific differences, can be seen in the examples of France and Spain. In France, Islamist terrorist organizations and networks have, according to Jordan and Horsburgh, “captivated young second generation immigrants on the dole or immersed in a world of crime, taking advantage of the solidarity in marginal neighborhoods of Paris and other French cities.”115 Meanwhile in Spain, members of such organizations and networks have generally been first-generation immigrants from middle-class backgrounds. However, they generally were neither highly educated nor enjoyed highly paid employment.116 According to Kaldor, a key driver of “new wars” (of which transnational Islamist terrorism would be one form) is that local particularisms, whether in the form of ethnic identity or religious affiliation, have been supported from afar by diaspora populations, through fund-raising political contacts and weapons purchases. This is a pattern that fits with events such as 9/11 with the exception that the attackers hit the United States directly rather than indirectly supporting violence in their homelands.117 This “exception” is actually quite significant, because it represents an example of a “reverse diaspora war” in which those disconnected from both land of origin and new home turn on their hosts even while the ideology that drives them may be funded by and exported from the old core. Evidence suggests, for example, that few children of Europe’s Muslim immigrants return to wage jihad in the land of their ancestors, such as Algeria or Morocco.118 So, while the ideology maybe transnational, the reasons for its resonance may in fact be more local. This indeed appears to be the case with diaspora support of Islamist terrorism, and is significant because it means that on a macrolevel there may be similarities in support, but local drivers and grievances (such as socioeconomic and demographic factors) may be quite different. Thus even amongst diaspora communities there are variations in recruiting and support patterns. This is compounded by cultural, linguistic, socioeconomic and other differences between and within diaspora communities. Because of these differences, Muslims in Western Europe, for instance, “cannot be expected to share a unique public space, nor similar geopolitical visions. Therefore it is necessary to focus on one nationally defined group in one country” rather than Muslims as a single entity.119 For example, in an analysis of Dutch Moroccan Muslim Web sites and chat rooms, Mamadouh found that “although solidarity with fellow Muslims in the Netherlands and the rest of the world is strong . . . [the label] ‘Muslim’ was used to refer mainly or exclusively to Arabs and the Arab world . . . or even more specifically the Moroccan community.”120 This further suggests that in many cases what appear to be macroscale universal grievances may actually be locally and particularly rooted.

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Across the board however, localized concentrations of crime and marginalized immigrant communities have provided fertile ground for both radicalization and recruitment, as well as community disempowerment. Incidents such as the London subway bombings and recent arrests in Sydney and Melbourne have helped propel the thesis that many diaspora terrorists are “clean skins” or “lilywhites”—in other words, people who were unknown to police and security authorities.121 Typical of this line of reasoning is Australian journalist Martin Chulov’s contention (based on the London bombings) of the threat posed by home-grown “cleanskin” terrorists who, “Like a mutant virus with no cure, they are random, unpredictable and almost impossible to stop before they wreak their havoc.”122 This, along with the fact that many Islamist terrorists have come from middle-class backgrounds, has obscured the importance of the role low-level, localized crime plays in radicalization, recruitment, networking, logistics, and operations. In fact, low-level criminality has played a role in nearly every successful attack (with the notable exception of 9/11) as well as in most of the more well known failed attempts by Islamist terrorists cells in the West since the early 1990s. About a quarter of Sageman’s subjects (all North African Arabs in Europe and North America) were involved in petty criminal activities. Other cells in Western countries have had 20-75 percent of members with some type of criminal background. While this obviously does not mean most Islamist terrorists come from criminal backgrounds or are merely criminals, it does suggest that the sociodemographic factors conducive to criminality in certain areas amongst certain demographic groups contribute to the level of vulnerability to terrorist recruitment and support. Low-level criminality and prisons played important roles in the lead up to several recent incidents. For example, several of the suspects involved in the 3/11 Madrid attacks have records of drug trafficking, while trading in hashish and ecstasy was critical to the operation and paid for cars, safe houses, and explosives. Key suspects also spent time in Spanish prisons. Criminality is also common amongst Islamist terrorists in Britain. According to the British Parliament’s cross-party Intelligence and Security Committee, the alleged leader of the London 7/7 bombings, Mohammed Sidique Khan, was known to police for suspected petty fraud.123 There has also been some speculation that fellow London bomber Lindsey Germaine had been a drug dealer.124 And at least three of the five suspects in the failed 7/21 bombing attempt had engaged in prior criminal activities such as robbery, shoplifting, gang membership, and passport fraud.125 In another example, four of the ten key suspects of the 2005 terrorist plot in Melbourne, Australia, had criminal pasts. Aimen Joud had prior convictions on firearms and theft charges, while Fadal Sayadi had also been convicted on a minor theft charge.126 Several suspects have also been

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accused of involvement in a stolen credit card number scheme.127 Several members of the Sydney cell have been linked to Janel Saleh, who is currently serving time in a Lebanon prison on weapons charges.128 In addition to its use in raising funds for terrorist attacks, crime also appears to play a role in producing sympathy for extremist ideologies and/or driving a wedge between local communities and their governments either in the form of intimidation and extortion by extremist or just by inadequate (but sometimes oppressive) policing. For instance, Saudi businessmen and wealthy Palestinians who have reportedly made large contributions to various terrorist groups in some circumstances may have done so in response to blackmail or as a subtle form of “protection payment.”129 In Italy, Islamist extremists operating out of the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) in Milan set up a collection racket whereby “a 30 percent surcharge was extracted from ‘fearful’ local Muslim businessmen.”130 And in Kenya and Tanzania, police have limited capability to provide basic law and order services to local communities and furthermore are widely hated and feared—so much so that according to one Tanzanian Muslim NGO representative, “If we saw bad people we wouldn’t go to the police.”131 Overall, as many scholars and practitioners have observed, the linkages between criminal activity and terrorism cannot be overlooked.132 STRATEGY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS While it seems clear that socioeconomic and demographic factors contribute to the resonance of extremist ideologies as well as the growth and diffusion of passive and active support of Islamist terrorism, the manner in which particular factors play a role and their significance varies across space and from place to place. Indeed, research has not surprisingly shown that social and economic development policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities, discourage recruiting, and can be used as a stick to discourage terrorism in certain contexts.133 In fact, the most popular measure cited by 2,000 Arab adults (in the United States, Egypt, Kuwait, UAE, Lebanon, and Jordan) when polled on how to win the war on terror was to “provide development aid to poor countries.”134 The ability of development polices to inhibit terrorism, however, depends upon their implementation, while inadequate policies are likely to inflate expectations and even renew support for terrorism.135 Implementing effective and efficient policies that address underlying socioeconomic and demographic issues and populations requires precision and understanding of local patterns. Because the type and influence of sociodemographic factors varies from place to place, there is no silver bullet strategy that can be applied broadly. While laudable, grand macroscale endeavors aimed at ending corruption, youth unemployment,

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or poverty in the Muslim world are not likely to bear fruit in the near future, insufficient, watered down, unsustainable efforts or even concerted ones (but in the wrong places) are likely to have little effect or even exacerbate the problem. The need to identify underlying drivers and actors at local levels will become increasingly important as the global Islamist terrorist movement (and al Qaeda) continues to atomize and decentralize. This process is compounded by the use of the Internet, which allows small groups to form, train, and bond locally. To attain this type of precision first requires more refined knowledge of the geographical and sociodemographic origins of both operators (supply) and supporters (demand). There is a tremendous amount of information and detail about Islamist terrorist operators and suspects available through open sources. Although the data is diffuse and of varying quality, painstaking data gathering and analysis of hundreds (if not thousands) of known suspects and operators should yield considerable specific geographic and related socioeconomic data. A much richer source, however, is available to government, intelligence, and law enforcement; there are thousands of names on watch-lists, detainee and prisoners lists, as well as rich biographic and demographic data from interrogations and suspect debriefings. The application of available data mining techniques to these datasets has the potential to yield enormous results. In order to identify and predict key socioeconomic and demographic factors and related vulnerable populations, more resources are needed for the support side of Islamist terrorism, as opposed to active terrorist operatives.136 However, since active terrorists are likely to hail from communities and areas where support is strong, geographic analyses of active terrorist operatives can help locate areas in which support is likely to be strong, thus helping pinpoint areas for more precise studies and policies targeted at understanding and addressing the socioeconomic and demographic support environment. Once the above steps are taken, the next phase should be to input, map, and analyze the data using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). This would allow the multiscale mapping of clusters and diffusion pathways of terrorist recruits as well as popular support. It would also enable analysts to identify, analyze, and assess underlying socioeconomic drivers at play in current as well as emerging local hotspots and key nodes. In terms of homeland security and counterterrorism, GIS is already employed for consequence management, and is finding increased use for law enforcement intelligence evaluation and threat detection, due to its ability to consolidate diverse strands of information into a comprehensive view.137 Extending the use of GIS from consequence management and threat detection to identify, analyze, and map sociodemographic drivers and populations vulnerable to recruitment (across scales from global-regionalnational-local) requires only a small leap.

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There are a number of models and methodological approaches that can be used both quantitatively and qualitatively to guide and frame GISbased analyses such as social network analyses (e.g., Sageman) and autoregressive time-series modeling (e.g., Enders and Sandler). Of particular value, especially in delineating and predicting both active and passive support (as well as fence-sitter) populations may be techniques from medical geography and epidemiology. The adaptation of techniques such as hierarchal diffusion, distance decay, stochastic diffusion, and gravity models, as well as analysis of spatial autocorrelation, can be used to help identify key node localities, and populations as well as ideological and support diffusion paths. Techniques used to analyze “transformed space” (e.g., representing distances on roads by travel time rather than distance) have application for assessing the effect of the Internet and rapid transit on terrorist geography. Medical geography approaches not only seek to assess key nodes and diffusion paths but also to identify barriers and countervailing factors. In opposition to networks, which pattern and support diffusion, barriers slow and shape processes and can have three effects: blocking, reflection, and slowing.138 Reflecting barriers, for instance, channel and intensify the local impact of a diffusion process while blocking its spread to another locale.139 For example, authoritarian crackdowns in Middle Eastern countries may have channeled and intensified diffusion of active support(ers) to diaspora communities in open Western societies, while cultural barriers may be slowing or limiting the spread in places such as East Africa. Barrier analysis combined with network and locational analysis can thus help identify which populations or communities are most vulnerable to infection (whether from a disease or extremist ideology) from those that may be somewhat inoculated by other factors. Thus appropriate countermeasures can be developed and prioritized. The aforementioned analytical tools and approaches can be used to guide the development of multiscale strategies geared at targeting and addressing underlying sociodemographic drivers in global and regional core areas and emerging hotspots, with emphasis on tailored efforts in key localities. Once the key localities and demographic groups to be targeted are delineated, there already exist a number of tried and tested approaches that can be applied. In particular there is a need to empower communities and civil society to defeat terrorism and its underlying support from within, in a manner akin to how the “movimento antimafia” helped repress the Sicilian mafia during the 1980s and 1990s.140 There are three related strategies that have particular promise for use at the local and community level and that if implemented in an integrated fashion, in key areas, and on a wider front, could contribute significantly to minimizing socioeconomic contributors to terrorism amongst key demographics.

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Grassroots Engagement and Community Development Once key local areas and populations have been identified, it is important that any socioeconomic development programs be appropriate and suitable to local conditions as well as sustainable at the local level. One way to ensure this is to start with grassroots engagement though employment of bottom of pyramid (BOP) approaches. Throughout the world, BOP approaches that have involved collaboration among the poor themselves, civil organizations, governments, and private firms have proven effective in producing sustainable economic progress.141 According to General Charles Wald, Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command, such tools are well suited to diminishing the causes of terrorism by providing investment and employment that lead to long-term quality of life improvements.142 Community Policing Community development efforts must also include a security element. Local communities often need protection from local extremists and criminals as well as from intimidation by majority populations and even corrupt police. There is also a need to identify and gather intelligence on terrorist operatives or those vulnerable to recruitment at the local level, especially in the case of so-called “homegrown terrorists.” Community policing techniques offer a way to bridge the developmental and security aspects of dealing with the socioeconomic and demographic roots of terrorism at the local level. According to Chief Deputy Joe Docobo of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office in Tampa, Florida, “The U.S. Department of Justice has defined community policing as a philosophy that focuses on crime and social disorder through the delivery of police services that include aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as prevention, problem-solving, community engagement, and partnerships.”143 Many of the practices employed in community policing are natural compliments to the type of geographic analysis and BOP approaches discussed in this chapter such as: use of GIS systems, data collection, and analysis protocols for obtaining and evaluating intelligence and assessing vulnerability, not only to the threat of terrorism, but also to underlying social, economic, and demographic drivers of support. Rehabilitation Empowering moderate voices—especially amongst the young—to engage in effective debate within their societies is an important action that Western governments could take in order to reduce anti-Western

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sentiment amongst Arabs.144 Some of the potentially most effective actors for combating terrorist support, ideology, and recruitment in this vein are former terrorists who can be sent back to their communities (similar to how former gang members and substance abusers have been used in gang and substance abuse prevention programs). One of the more notable programs is found in Singapore, which has managed to rehabilitate and reintegrate in society a significant number of JI detainees. The core of Singapore’s program is the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). The RRG was formed as an expert group to provide religious counseling to JI detainees and family members. Amongst their key aims and activities are providing “accurate” version of religious education, empowering detainees to guide their own families (away from extremist ideologies), helping former JI members adjust to living in Singaporean society, and enabling them to play a role in national security. A second pillar of Singapore’s strategy is to involve the Muslim community in public awareness and education activities designed to counter the underlying ideology of Islamist terrorism. A key component of this effort is the Asatizah Recognition Scheme, which aims to enhance the public standing of religious teachers and provide oversight and guidance to ensure responsible religious education within communities. CONCLUSION Finally, expectations for socioeconomic development strategies and community-based programs in combating terrorism must be realistic. While effective and well implemented social and economic development programs can inhibit terrorism, they cannot eliminate it. In addition to socioeconomic and demographic drivers, it cannot be forgotten that powerful political and religious grievances and motivations exist. As Cragin and Chalk observe, development “is most effective when” it is integrated into a “wider political, military, and community-relations” approach.145 However, development should not be used as a substitute for dealing with real political grievances or as a means to avoid confronting the use of religion to justify and excuse extremism and terrorism. NOTES 1. Anthony Marsella, “Reflections on International Terrorism: Issues, Concepts, and Directions,” in Understanding Terrorism, ed. Fathali Moghaddam and Anthony Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002), 33. 2. C. Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 52. 3. Ibid.

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4. Alexander Murphy, “The Space of Terror,” in The Geographical Dimension of Terrorism, ed. Susan Cutter, Douglas Richardson, and Thomas Wilbanks (New York: Routledge, 2003), 48. 5. Peter H. Liotta and James F. Miskel, “Digging Deep: Environment and Geography as Root Influences for Terrorism,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). 6. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force in the Modern World (London: Penguin 2005), 154. 7. John Marburger, “Foreword,” in The Geographical Dimension of Terrorism, ed. Susan Cutter, Douglas Richardson, and Thomas Wilbanks (New York: Routledge, 2003), xvii. 8. For more on this topic, please see the chapters by Maha Azzam-Nusseibeh, Jerrold Post, James Robbins, and Timothy Thomas in volume 1 of this publication. 9. Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press 2004), 152, 211. 10. Smith, The Utility of Force in the Modern World. 11. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda (New York: Colombia University Press, 2002), 96. 12. Fair and Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Muslim Countries,” 73; and Virginie Mamadouh, “11 September Geopolitics: A Study of Websites Run for and by Dutch Moroccans,” Geopolitics 8 (2003), 217–52. 13. Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I. B. Tauris 2003), 14. 14. Oliver Roy, Globalised Islam (London: Hurst and Company 2002), 297. 15. Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, 36 16. Oliver Roy, Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Pakistan Writenet Paper 06/2001 (Paris: UNHCR Emergency and Security Service 2002), 19. 17. Associated Press, “Official Pentagon List of Detainees” (April 19, 2006). 18. Carlotta Gall, “Fighters Were Lured to Afghanistan by Islam, Holy War, and Promise of Escape,” New York Times (January 1 2002). 19. David Ensor and Sayid Moshin Naqvi, “Al Qaeda No. 3 Dead, But How?” CNN.com (December 4, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/12/ 03/pakistan.rabia/index.html. 20. Scott Baldauf, “Taliban Turn to Suicide Attacks,” Christian Science Monitor (February 3, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0203/p01s04-wosc.html. 21. Paul Watson, “Suicide Bombings Appear Linked to NATO Deployment,” Baltimore Sun (February 19, 2006). 22. John C.K. Daly, UPI Terrorism Watch (February 3, 2006). 23. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 9 24. Burke, Al-Qaeda Casting a Shadow of Terror 172. 25. ICG, Tajikistan and Uncertain Place ICG Asia Report No. 30 (Osh, Tajikistan: ICG, 2001): ii. 26. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), 122. 27. Nabi Abdullaev, Chechens Fighting with the Taliban: Fact or Propaganda? PRISM 8 (2002); and Chechnya Weekly (September 12, 2003).

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28. ICG, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous ICG Asia Report No. 63 (Jakarta, Indonesia: ICG, 2003): 5. 29. Ibid., 2. 30. “Thousands of Militants with Foreign Experience in Indonesia,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (from Antara Internet version) (November 19, 2005). 31. ICG, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia, 2. 32. Patricia Nunan, “Indonesian Militants Still Fighting with Taleban,” Middle East News On-Line (November 16, 2001); and Amy Chew, “ Indonesia’s Muslim Fighters ‘Safe,’” CNN.com (November 20, 2001). 33. Eddie Chua, “JI Preparing Malaysian Students for Militant Activities,” The Star Online (February 2, 2006). 34. Evan Kohlman, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2004), 15, 27. 35. ICG, “Bin Ladin and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism,” ICG Balkans Report No. 119 (Belgrade: ICG, 2001), 11; and John Sray, “Selling the Bosnian Myth” (Monograph published by the U.S. Foreign Military Studies Office, Leavenworth, KS, October 1995). 36. Tawfig Tabib, “Understanding Jihad: Interview with Sheikh al-Mujahideen Abu Abdel Aziz Barabros,” Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqeem, http://www.assirat.org/mag, 33 (1994); and Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, 132; and Kohlman, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, 15, 27. 37. Kohlman, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, 16. 38. Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, 132; and Kohlman, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, 53. 39. Susan Sachs, “Muslims for Bosnia: Islamic Envoys Call for Action against Serbs,” Newsday 3 (1992): 117. 40. Letter from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations Office at Geneva Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries (July 14, 1995). 41. ICG, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia. 42. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003): 135–136. 43. Tom Walker, “U.S. Alarmed as Mujahidin Join Kosovo Rebels,” The Times (London) (November 28, 1998). 44. Chris Stephen, “U.S. Tackles Islamic Militancy in Kosovo,” The Scotsman (November 30, 1998): 7. 45. ICG, Bin Ladin and the Balkans, 20. 46. Azzam Publications, Stories of the Martyrs of Chechnya, http:// Isalmicawakening.com(accessed February 17, 2006). 47. Tawfig Tabib, “Interview with Sheikh al-Mujahideen Abu Abdel Aziz,” AlSirat Al-Mustaqeem, http://www.assirat.org/mag/, 33 (1994). 48. Jonathan Finer, “Among Insurgents in Iraq Few Foreigners are Found,” Washington Post (November 17, 2005): 1. 49. “U.S., Britain Holding 10,000 Prisoners in Iraq,” ABC News Online (December 25, 2004), http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200412/s1273053.htm. 50. Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom’s Response (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2005), 6

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51. Reuvan Paz, “Arab Volunteers Killed in Iraq: An Analysis,” PRISM Series of Global Jihad 1/3 (2005): 2. 52. Lisa Myers, “Who Are the Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” NBC Nightly News (internet version) (June 20, 2005). 53. ICG, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia, 17. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 51. 56. Alirans ISA Watch, http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2004a/6c.html (accessed February 27, 2006). 57. White Paper, The Jemaah Isalmiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003), 43–50. 58. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press 2004), 188. 59. Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburg, “ Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005): 169–191. 60. John Miller and Michael Stone. The Cell (New York: Hyperion 2003), 79. 61. FBI Most Wanted Terrorists, http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/ fugitives.htm (February 27, 2006). 62. Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives (Denmark: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2005), 36 63. Jordan and Horsburgh, “Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain,” 173. 64. Jason Burke, “British Terrorist Suspect List Deeply “flawed,” The Observer Guardian Online (August 15, 2004), available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/ uk news/story/0,6903,1283572,00.html. 65. AIVD, Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands. (Amsterdam: General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands [AIVD] 2004). 66. Sageman. Understanding Terror Networks; and Christopher Jasparro, “Madrid Attacks Point to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (August 2004): 31; and Christopher Jasparro, “Low-level Criminality Linked to Transnational Terrorism, Jane’s Intelligence Review (online to subscribers at http: //jir.janes.com), May 2005. 67. Jasparro, “Madrid Attacks Point to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” 31. 68. Miller and Stone, The Cell, 49. 69. White Paper, The Jemaah Islamiya Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism (Singapore: Ministry of Interior, 2003). 70. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 112. 71. USA v. Umer Hayat, U.S. District Court (Eastern District of California), Case No. MAG 05-1060 PAN (June 7, 2005). 72. “Two Madrid Bombers Said to Have Died in Iraq,” El Mundo, Internet version (June 16, 2005). 73. “21 July Attacks: Arrests and Charges,” BBC News (September 28, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/4732361.stm. 74. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 112. 75. Jasparro, “Madrid Attacks Point to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction,” 31; and Jasparro, “Low-level Criminality Linked to Transnational Terrorism,” 18–19.

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76. Juzgado Central de Instruccion No. 005, Madrid Sumario (Proc.Ordinario) 0000035 /2001 E (September 17, 2005). 77. Raf Casert, “Belgians Seek to Come to Grips with Fact That Suicide Bomber Was One of Them,” Associated Press (December 1, 2005). 78. Lillian Saleh and Andrew Carswell, “Four Only Live a Short Walk Apart,” Daily Telegraph (November 14, 2005). 79. Examples of Terrorism Convictions Since Sept. 11, 2001, http://www.usdoj. gov (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice 2006); and Steve Emerson, American Jihad (New York: The Free Press 2002); and Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, 101– 114. 80. Michael Taarnby, Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives (Denmark: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2005), 44. 81. Jasparro, “Madrid Attacks Point to Sustained Al-Qaeda Direction, 31. 82. Saleh and Carswell, “Four Only Live a Short Walk Apart.” 83. Ibid. 84. William Rosenau, “Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005): 9. 85. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 92. 86. MIPT Terrorism Database (June 20, 2006), database, http://www.tkb.org/ IncidentRegionModule.jsp. 87. National Counterterrorism Center, Reports on Incidents of Terrorism (NCTC: Washington, DC, 2005) 88. Human Development Report 2005 (UNDP: New York 2005): 219–222. 89. Ibid., 219–222. 90. Ibid., 219–222. 91. Daniel C. Esty, Marc Levy, Tanja Srebotnjak, and Alexander de Sherbinin, 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index: Benchmarking National Environmental Stewardship (New Haven, CT: Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, 2005) Table 1, 4-5. 92. Ibid., 1. 93. Ibid., 11. 94. Transparency International, 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, http:// ww1.transparency.org/cpi/2005. 95. R. Cincotta, R. Engleman, and D. Anatasion, The Security Demographic (Washington, DC: Population Action International 2003), 42–49. 96. Ibid., 70–77. 97. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 92–93; Fair and Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism? Evidence from Fourteen Muslim Countries,” 51–74. 98. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 92–93. 99. Abdelaziz Testas, “The Economic Causes of Algeria’s Political Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13 (2001): 141. 100. Ibid., 135–137. 101. For more on this, please see the chapter by Maha Azzam-Nusseibeh in volume 1 of this publication. 102. Geoff Winestock, “Egypt Wages War against Poverty in Attempt to Vanquish Terrorists, Wall Street Journal (January 18, 2002): 1. 103. Ibid., 1.

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104. 911 Commission Report 232 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 232. 105. Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom’s Response (Washington, DC: CSIS 2005), 8. 106. Ibid., 8. 107. Mark Katz, “Breaking the Yemen Al-Qaeda Connection,” Current History 102 (2003): 40. 108. Ibid., 41–42. 109. Ibid., 42–43. 110. Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 111. C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27 (2004): 495. 112. Reuven Paz “America and the New Terrorism: An Exchange,” Survival 42 (2000): 156–173. 113. Oliver Roy, “Radical Islam Appeals to the Rootless,” Financial Times (October 12, 2004): 19. 114. Kit Roane “North of the Border, Terror’s ‘Club Med’. In Canada, Tough New Scrutiny of Immigrants,” US News and World Report (August 7, 2000), http:// www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/000807/archive 014013.htm. 115. Jordan and Horsburgh, “Mapping Jihadist Terrorism in Spain,” 180. 116. Ibid., 180, 187. 117. Simon Dalby, “Geopolitics, Security, and America’s New War,” Geopolitics 8 (2003): 75. 118. Oliver Roy, “Radical Islam Appeals to the Rootless,” Financial Times (October 12, 2004): 19. 119. Mamadouh, “11 September Geopolitics: A Study of Websites Run for and by Dutch Moroccans,” 198. 120. Ibid., 208, 209. 121. Carlyle Thayer, Explaining ‘Clean Skins’: The Dynamics of Small Group Social Networks and the London Bombers. Paper given to “Workshop on Sacrificial Devotion in Comparative Perspective: Tamil Tigers and Beyond” (Adelaide, South Australia December, 2005), 4. 122. Martin Chulov, “Under the Radar,” The Australian (July 14, 2005): 14. 123. Thomas Wagner, “London Terror Probe Clears Intel Services,” Associated Press (2006). 124. Anne-Marie Bradley, “Bomber Was Huddersfield Drug Dealer, The Huddersfield Daily Examiner (August 8, 2005). 125. Paul Tumetly, “Reassessing the July 21 London Bombings,” Terrorism Monitor 3 (2005). 126. “Behind the Names Terror Hits Home, The Australian (November 10, 2005): 4. 127. Heath Ashton, “Owner to Name Terror Suspects,” News.com.au (November 16, 2005). 128. “Behind the Names Terror Hits Home, The Australian (November 10, 2005): 4.

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129. John Thompson and Joe Turlej, “Other People’s Wars: A Review of Overseas Terrorism in Canada” (Toronto, Canada: Mackenzie Institute, 2003). 130. Kohlman, Al-Qaeda’s Jihad in Europe, 22. 131. William Rosenau, “Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005): 4. 132. For more on this, please see the chapters by J. P. Larsson, Paul Smith, Kent Baumann, James Walker, and Jon Byrom in this volume. 133. Kim Cragin and Peter Chalk, Terrorism and Development (Santa Monica, CA: Rand 2002): x–xiv. 134. Communique Partners, Arab Perceptions of the West- Executive Summary (Kuwait: Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs 2006): 9. 135. Ibid., x-xiv. 136. Fair and Shepherd, “Who Supports Terrorism, Evidence from Muslim Countries, 52. 137. GIS for Homeland Security (Redlands, CA: ESRI Press, 2005): 21. 138. Melinda Meade and Robert Earickson, Medical Geography (New York: Guilford Press 2000): 267. 139. Ibid. 140. Jane and Peter Schneider, “The Mafia and Al-Qaeda: Violent and Secretive Organizations in Comparative Historical Perspective,” American Anthropologist 104 (2002): 776–778. 141. Miemie Winn Byrd, “Combating Terrorism a Socio-Economic Strategy,” Joint Forces Quarterly 41 (2006): 16. 142. Ibid., 16. 143. For more on community policing, see Jose M. Docobo, “Protecting America’s Communities from Terrorism: A Law Enforcement Perspective,” in Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (vol. 2) ed. James Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 191–221. 144. Chris Yalonis, Arab Perceptions of the West (San Rafael, CA: Communique Partners, 2006) 12. The complete text of this report is available at http://www. communiquepartners.com/news1.html 145. Cragin and Chalk, Terrorism and Development, xiv.

PART IV U.S. RESPONSES TO THE GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER 24 TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND AFGHANISTAN Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason

Over the last decade, Afghanistan and terrorism have become synonymous in the eyes of many analysts and policymakers.1 Afghanistan, of course, was the first campaign stop—Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)—of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and has since been viewed as a hotbed for global terrorists and jihadists. Strictly speaking, however, regional conditions—including bad governance, poverty, oppression, corruption, and radical Islamist movements—throughout Afghanistan and its neighbors are the primary source of terrorism in this country. This is not meant to suggest that Afghan groups, such as the Taliban, are not directly responsible for terrorism in Afghanistan. Rather, it is to suggest that the Taliban are encouraged, enabled, funded, and driven by foreign sources and interests and are outsourcing their logistics and suicide missions via regional networks. To view them merely as an indigenous Afghan movement is to ignore critical aspects of their organization, support, behavior, and actions—and the aforementioned conditions in South Asia. Today, after 27 years of continuous war, Afghanistan is struggling. President Karzai’s post-Taliban government is finding it extremely difficult to extend its control and mandate outside the capital of Kabul and into the country’s vast impoverished hinterland. Several forces are undermining Karzai’s efforts to build a truly national government with national control, including a rising tide of narcotics production now responsible for approximately 60 percent of the country’s economy, and a resurgent Taliban—backed by al Qaeda—who are mounting an increasingly virulent insurgency in the east and south of the country. Although then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reported in May 2003 that the war on terror in

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Afghanistan was in a “cleanup” or “mop up” phase,2 today—over 5 years into American military engagement in Afghanistan—the United States is mired in an insurgency of escalating violence and lethality which has already claimed thousands of lives. The twin insurgent movements of the revitalized Taliban and the Hizb-i-Islami party of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HiG) are growing steadily in strength and influence, while Kabul’s control over a broad swath of the country is rapidly diminishing. As demonstrated by the widespread anti-American riots in Kabul in May 2006, political volatility is even starting to reach urban areas. Three fundamental problems in Afghanistan have allowed for the emergence of the insurgencies: The inability of the national government since 2001 to establish a politically significant presence throughout the country, The failure of the international community to create a secure rural environment in the south conducive to development and reconstruction, and The virtually complete lack of meaningful improvement in the lives of the great majority of the people in the southern half of the country.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the insurgencies in Afghanistan and the foreign political and international terrorist elements that aid and abet them. The first section of the chapter will discuss the makeup and character of the Afghan insurgencies, examining the historical foundations of the Taliban and HiG. The second half of the chapter will provide a critical assessment of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts, and explore what lessons can be drawn which could inform U.S. counterinsurgency strategy and tactics. THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM On October 7, 2001, the U.S.-led coalition began its initial air campaign against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan—forces deemed responsible for the September 11 attacks on the United States. According to the U.S. Defense Department, the initial U.S. air campaign “eviscerated” the Taliban’s military capability within two weeks.3 On October 18, the U.S. “official” ground campaign began when U.S. Special Forces entered northern Afghanistan and teamed up with the Northern Alliance—a loose confederation of veteran mujahideen and warlords from non-Pashtun ethnic blocs who represented the Taliban’s primary resistance. By November 10, the strategic northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif fell to the Northern Alliance. In the following days, large swaths of the north were captured by the Northern Alliance, to include Kabul, which it occupied in defiance of international pressure not to enter the city. On December 6, the Taliban evacuated the southern city of Kandahar, turning over its last sanctuary to

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opposition forces. Four days later, after only 62 days of conflict, the United States declared victory in Afghanistan. However, the success of the campaign was marred by two serious mistakes, one diplomatic and one military, which would prove to be major strategic blunders in the War on Terrorism. In mid-November 2001, the Bush Administration permitted the Pakistani Air Force to fly out hundreds of Pakistanis encircled in the northern city of Konduz, an evacuation which turned into a mass extraction of senior Taliban and al Qaeda personnel, dubbed “Operation Evil Airlift” by appalled U.S. Special Forces personnel on the scene. Then, the following month, the failure to commit U.S. ground forces to block their escape route at Tora Bora permitted Osama bin Laden and several dozen of his best men to also escape encirclement near the border and flee into Pakistan.4 The opportunity to complete the decisive destruction of the Taliban and al Qaeda before Christmas 2001 was lost. After the withdrawal of the Taliban regime, an interim administration was quickly installed in Kabul under the terms of the UN-brokered Bonn Agreement. The temporary government was headed by an ethnic Pashtun and CIA contact, Hamid Karzai. Meanwhile, bin Laden and most of the senior al Qaeda leadership, as well as Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and the great majority of the senior Taliban cadre, are believed to have taken up residence either in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) or Baluchistan Province, where they began to regroup and rearm. While scattered attacks occurred in Afghanistan during 2002, the security situation started to deteriorate significantly in 2003 in the volatile south and east of the country. With U.S. forces now bogged down and overstretched by the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the added strain of a continuing low-intensity war in Afghanistan became evident. Many key intelligence, Special Forces, and aviation assets were withdrawn from Afghanistan and sent to Iraq. Moreover, during this same period, many Pashtuns became disenchanted with Karzai’s Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), which was widely viewed as being controlled by the Panshiri Tajik faction that held the government’s key ministries of defense, interior, and foreign affairs.5 (The situation has now significantly reversed, as many Tajik leaders have been gradually sidelined.) Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the government were further heightened by the ATA’s inability to protect Pashtuns from the wave of human rights abuses perpetrated by insurgents and warlords since the fall of the Taliban. Finally, a considerable source of discontent and fuel for the insurgency involved what were widely seen as the heavy-handed tactics of U.S. military operations in Pashtun areas of the country. Despite warnings from the State Department, such “hard-knock” operations continued to be standard procedure for several years, alienating

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much of the populace. The Pentagon continued to view the situation as one of counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency, and conducted operations in the rural areas accordingly. As one U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commander commented, “Black Ops [Special Operations counterterrorism forces] do more damage in my province in one night than I can undo in six months.” Particularly problematic was the careless use of U.S. air power, which killed scores of civilians, and the apparent lack of sensitivity by U.S. troops to local perceptions, laws, and customs. According to reports in the Afghan press, “U.S. Special Forces, during routine sweeps of Afghan villages searching for weapons and members of resistance groups, have physically abused villagers, damaged personal property, and subjected women to body searches, a major affront on a family’s honor.”6 UN officials have commented that “This doesn’t help us at all . . . the people are basically pro-America. They want U.S. forces to be here. But American soldiers are not very culturally sensitive. It’s hardly surprising that Afghans get angry when the Americans turn up and kick their doors in.”7 By mid-2003, a reemergent Taliban had begun cross-border operations from Pakistan, posing a growing security threat to eastern and southern Afghanistan, with the insurgents gradually gaining political control of significant portions of the Afghan provinces of Zabol, Kandahar, Helmand, and Oruzgan. Several NGO workers were murdered by Taliban guerillas. In November 2003, 2 years after the Taliban retreat from Kabul, the United Nations started pulling staff from large areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan and closed refugee reception centers in four provinces.8 Unable to provide a reasonable level of security for their personnel, most NGO’s, including Medicines Sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders), CARE, and Mercy Corps followed suit. An insurgency that the United States did not expect and did not understand was now in full swing. A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN Over 350 American Soldiers and Marines have been killed in action in Afghanistan since October 2001. While the overall level of violence in Afghanistan does not yet approach that experienced in Iraq, Afghanistan is actually the more dangerous place to be deployed in terms of fatalities per soldier-day in the combat zone. Furthermore, while the rate of U.S. casualties has stabilized somewhat in Iraq, it has increased steadily in Afghanistan since 2002 (see Table 24.1). Most troubling of all, the last 12 months have provided ample evidence of increasingly sophisticated insurgent tactics being imported from Iraq and grafted onto classic mujahideen-style guerilla warfare. In 2006, there was a 200 percent increase in insurgent attacks, compared to 2005. Indeed, September 2006 saw the deadliest month in the country in 5

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Table 24.1 U.S. and Coalition Military Fatalities in Afghanistan By Year

Period

U.S. Fatalities

Other OEF Coalition Fatalities

Total Fatalities

200648 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 Total

98 99 52 48 48 12 357

93 30 6 9 20 0 158

191 129 58 57 68 12 515

years. During the first 5 months of 2006, Afghanistan has witnessed numerous attacks consisting of over 50 insurgents, as compared to just one such attack during the same time period of 2005.9 Reports of insurgents massing in battalion-sized formations of 300–400 fighters are no longer rare. Lutfullah Mashal, the former Afghan Interior Ministry spokesman, has recently suggested that: “Taliban fighters no longer rely solely on hit-and-run tactics by small groups of guerrillas. Instead, the Taliban have been concentrating into groups of more than 100 fighters to carry out frontal assaults on government security posts.”10 Some analysts believe that the Taliban have at least 12,000 fighters controlling areas in the provinces of Oruzgan, Helmand, Zabol and Kandahar.11 Extremely troubling indicators—such as the relatively free movement of insurgent groups—reveal that increasingly large areas of the east and south of the country are falling under the political control of the Taliban. Said Jawad, Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United States, recently stated, “We have lost a lot of the ground that we may have gained in the country, especially in the South . . . The fact that U.S. military resources have been ‘diverted’ to the war in Iraq is of course hurting Afghanistan.”12 Taliban insurgents and their al Qaeda allies are undoubtedly gaining strength. There have been numerous attacks in recent months in areas other than the south and east, suggesting that the Taliban has expanded the scope of its operations and has begun to “take the war to the North.” Cross-border operations from Pakistan are commonplace. The implications of the escalating violence in Afghanistan are now compounded by the fact that the United States, which has been responsible for the bulk of counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan since the beginning of OEF, has ceded operational control of the war to NATO forces.13

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THE BORDER PROBLEM For decades, nearly all of Afghanistan’s neighboring states have produced disenchanted groups of Uyghurs, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other Islamists who have used Afghanistan for guerrilla training and an area from which to pursue their violent agendas. While such groups have played a role in Afghanistan, the most important foreign actors in Afghanistan’s affairs have come from Pakistan’s western border provinces, Northwest Frontier (NWFP) and Baluchistan, and especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Pakistan today has become an attractive base for terrorists and extremists. The government of Pakistan, for its part, has long sought to exert influence in Afghanistan, because of its desire for “strategic depth” on its northern border in the event of any conflict with India. Successive Pakistani governments have promoted Islamic radicalism to subvert Pashtun and Baluch nationalist movements and to further their ambitions in Afghanistan and Kashmir, through groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), Jamiat Ulemai-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF). Jihad, drugs, and gunrunning have long been the main sources of livelihood for many of the Pashtuns living near the ill-defined border. Afghan refugee camps and thousands of Islamist madrasas opened by the JUI provide a steady flow of recruits for the Taliban and other radical groups. The minimal U.S. troop presence in the south has ensured that the rugged and porous 2,450 kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan does not even constitute a speed bump to extremist groups such as the Taliban and al Qaeda seeking to expand their networks of support and increase their influence among the Pashtun tribesmen in Afghanistan. By mid-2005, in the strategically vital border province of Paktika, for example—which has a population of some 600,000 people and shares a 400 km border with Pakistan—the United States had only two companies of light infantry, and no engineers or aviation assets. Special Forces teams were drawn down. And in the summer of 2005, the fledgling Provincial Reconstruction Team (or PRT) in Paktika was dismembered due to personnel shortages, and its minimal Civil Affairs remnant (the Civil-Military Operations Center, or CMOC) was colocated with a maneuver company, a devolution that has been repeated at seven other U.S.-led PRTs, once hailed as the cornerstone of reconstruction and security. Afghanistan’s President Karzai and his new foreign minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, have recently blamed Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) for Taliban attacks in Afghanistan. Kabul rightly claims that Pakistani security forces chase al Qaeda terrorists within Pakistan but do not make any significant effort to arrest Taliban fighters or stop them from crossing the border into Afghanistan.14 Indeed, the coalition of

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Islamist political parties, which completely dominates the border region and represents it in Parliament, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (or MMA— dubbed by wags in Islamabad as the “Mullah-Musharraf Alliance”) is openly pro-Taliban. This lack of cooperation by Pakistan and the open defiance of the MMA have been extremely frustrating for the United States. As Henry A. Crumpton, the American coordinator for counterterrorism, asserts: . . . the Americans are finding the Pakistanis much more reluctant to face down the Taliban—who are brethren from the Pashtun ethnic group that dominates in Afghanistan—than they have been to confront al Qaida, who are largely outsiders. “Has Pakistan done enough? I think the answer is no. . . . Not only al Qaida, but Taliban leadership are primarily in Pakistan, and the Pakistanis know that.”15

In 2004, after negotiating with the Pashtun tribal Maliks (essentially spokesmen, as the Pashtun recognize no chieftains), Pakistan responded to U.S. pressure with an unprecedented deployment of a reported 70,000 troops to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. In Baluchistan, this force was led by the Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps and regular army elements from the Pakistan’s 12th Corps. The Pakistani campaign in the FATA, especially in the North and South Waziristan Agencies, is being conducted by a battalion-plus Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), along with elements of the Pakistani Army’s 11th Corps, aided by the indigenous local Scouts units of the Frontier Corps. While such Pakistani troop levels greatly exceed the total number of U.S and coalition forces in Afghanistan, the actual relationship between the Pakistani campaign and the U.S. GWOT is controversial and unclear, as suggested by Pakistan’s Gen Tariq Majid, the Pakistani army’s chief of general staff: We are not fighting America’s war in the FATA. It is in our own interest. We’re fighting this war because, unfortunately, there have been fallout effects in Pakistan from the instability in Afghanistan.16

Indeed, the Pakistani military activity has been aimed, for domestic political reasons, almost entirely at “foreign elements,” meaning primarily former mujahideen from Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries who settled in northern Pakistan after the Soviet-Afghan War—not the Taliban or its network of supporters in the MMA. While the perceived threat from India and fear of a two-front war has shaped Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan, the desire for “strategic depth” is not the only driver of Pakistan’s foreign policy toward Afghanistan. Afghanistan has also been influenced by Pakistan’s strategy toward India-controlled Kashmir. One veteran Pakistani observer

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suggests that: “the Kashmir issue became the prime mover behind Pakistan’s Afghan policy and its support to the Taliban.”17 Camps in Afghanistan created for training Afghan Arabs during the anti-Soviet jihad have been recycled to train guerrilla forces for fighting in Kashmir. Pakistan has used these jihadi forces as a bargaining chip with India in an attempt to gain more autonomy and even independence from India for Kashmir. IRAQ AND JIHADI NETWORKS A new source of concern is the fact that recent insurgent attacks— including the introduction of suicide bombings and the use of improvised explosive devises (IEDs)—have demonstrated an unusual level of internal coordination and a growing technological sophistication in the Afghan insurgency imported from outside the Pashtun belt. Since the summer of 2004, a variety of guerilla tactics (including assassinations and kidnappings) in Afghanistan18 and numerous reports of knowledge transfer indicate that the insurgents are importing tactics and lethal technology from Iraq.19 In the first 6 months of 2006, Afghan insurgents set off 32 suicide bombs, six more than in all of 2005.20 As Griff Whitte wrote in the Washington Post, “despite a quarter-century of war, [suicide attacks] in Afghanistan have historically been relatively rare because of a cultural aversion to suicide.”21 According to international security analysis Esther Pan, “Suicide is not a characteristic tactic of the Afghan people . . . they have a cultural aversion to it.”22 Only five suicide attacks—none of which targeted civilians—were reported during the first 31/2 years after the Taliban were driven from power. The great majority of the suicide attacks carried out during the last 11/2 years appear to have been “outsourced” to non-Afghans, most often to Punjabis from the south of Pakistan and young foreign Islamists recruited from radical groups in the Middle East. In summary, the wild and largely unregulated tribal areas on Pakistan’s northern border play an extremely important role in the Afghan insurgency, as well as in the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir and the rising internal unrest that challenges both Pakistani security forces and governmental authority all along the frontier. They provide a steady source of recruits, a safe haven for senior leadership, and a base of operations and training for the Taliban, its al Qaeda affiliates, and (to a lesser degree) the Hekmatyar faction of Hizb-i-Islami (HiG).23 Nonindigenous tactics and imported technologies indicate both al Qaeda facilitation of Jihadi networks for information-sharing and growing insurgent use of the Internet as a means of distributing lethal knowledge. The next section of this chapter will assess the Taliban and HiG insurgent groups in greater detail.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE TALIBAN “A host of wandering Talib-ul-ilums, who correspond with the theological students in Turkey and live free at the expense of the people . . . ” —Winston Churchill, 189824

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan deteriorated into a brutal civil war between rival mujahideen groups positioning for power.25 This civil war claimed thousands of lives and decimated what remained of the country’s infrastructure. The civil war intensified after one of the mujahideen groups took Kabul on April 25, 1992. Shortly afterward, Beirutstyle street fighting erupted in the city, especially between the Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Tajik Jamaat-i-Islam of Barhannudin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud. This civil war, fought with the vast surpluses of ordnance left over from the covert anti-Soviet military aid program and huge stockpiles of heavy weapons abandoned by the retreating Russians, eventually wreaked as much—if not more— havoc and destruction on the country as had the Soviet invasion and occupation. Kabul, which had remained virtually untouched during the war, was savagely bombarded with rockets, mortars, and artillery by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In Kandahar, fighting between Islamists—led by HiG— and traditionalist mujahideen parties resulted in the destruction of much of the traditional Kandahari societal power structures. In the rural areas, warlords, drug lords, and bandits ran amok in a state of anarchy accelerated by the unraveling of the traditional tribal leadership system. As the mujahideen factions and warlords were fighting amongst themselves for power in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s leading Islamist party, the JUI, built a network of religious boarding schools throughout northern Pakistan to extend the influence of the indigenous Deobandi School of Islamic thought, an investment that itself provides an insight into their temporal horizons. These madrasas were soon providing an important educational alternative for the numerous displaced refugees from the anti-Soviet jihad and the Afghan civil war, as well as for poor families along the frontier unable to afford the costs and fees of the secular schools. (Today there are some 5,900 madrasas in operation in NWFP and the FATA alone, with an estimated 600,000 students studying curricula neither approved nor observed by educational authorities in Pakistan.) With the oversight of the ISID, who had grown weary of their favorite Afghan mujahideen leader—Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—the Taliban emerged from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and FATA madrasas and the kinship networks inside the remaining Afghan refugee camps. The Taliban arrived on the Afghan scene in 1994 with little warning, and vowed to install a traditional Islamic government in Afghanistan and end the carnage of the fighting among the warlords. With massive

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covert assistance from the Pakistani ISID, Army, and Air Force, the Taliban overthrew the largely Tajik (and northern) mujahideen regime in Kabul, capturing the capital in September 1996. The country the Taliban captured soon became a training ground for Islamic activists and other radicals from the Middle East and around Asia. The war-weary Afghans initially welcomed the Taliban, because they believed that they would bring peace and stability to their ravaged country. The Taliban promoted itself as a new force for honesty and unity, and many Afghans—particularly fellow Pashtuns—supported the Taliban in hopes of respite from years of war, anarchy, and corruption. The Taliban went after the warlords responsible for the anarchy, and Afghans initially flocked to their movement. Soon after gaining control of Kabul, however, the Taliban instituted and employed a religious police force, the Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai An Munkir (Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice) to brutally uphold their extreme and often bizarre interpretations of Islam (which were not previously known in Afghanistan). The Taliban philosophy, Ahmed Rashid notes, fitted nowhere in the Islamic spectrum of ideas and movements that had emerged in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1994. . . . The Taliban represented nobody but themselves and they recognized no Islam except their own. . . . Before the Taliban, Islamic extremism had never flourished in Afghanistan.26

The initial optimism of the Afghan people soon turned to fear, as the Taliban introduced a draconian interpretation of sharia law, banned women from work, and introduced sadistic punishments that included amputations and death by stoning. Tajik resistance to the Taliban in the form of the Northern Alliance held out throughout the Taliban period and retained Afghanistan’s seat in the United Nations, but were steadily pushed back by a series of military defeats into the extreme northeast province of Badakshan. Just as the Taliban assassinated Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah Massoud and were poised to wipe them out completely, however, the tragic events of September 11, 2001 unfolded in the United States. These events, of course, led to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and the initiation of OEF on October 7, 2001.27 THE TRIBAL BASIS OF THE TALIBAN Western military analysts have consistently misinterpreted the Taliban as everything from a simple fundamentalist Islamic movement to a criminal gang. In reality, the Taliban is a social phenomenon with a tribal chassis. Its religious dimension—an extreme interpretation of Deobandi

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Table 24.2 Senior Taliban Leaders Name

Position

Tribal Affiliation

Mullah Muhammad Omar Mullah Berader Mullah Dadullah Kakar

Movement Leader Deputy Movement Leader Senior Military Commander Foreign Minister after 1997 Minister of Justice Minister of Communications Minister of Water and Power Personal Secretary to Mullah Omar Minister of Commerce Chairman of Kabul Shura Minister of Defense

Hotaki Ghilzai Ghilzai Kakar Ghurgusht

Mullah Mohammad Hassan Nuruddin Turabi Alla Dad Akhund Mohamed Essa Wakil Ahmed Sadeq Akhond Mohammed Rabbani Mullah Obaidullah

Hotaki Ghilzai Hotaki Ghilzai Hotaki Ghilzai Hotaki Ghilzai Kakar Ghurgusht Hotaki Ghilzai Kakar Ghurgusht Hotaki Ghilzai

thought—is just the steering wheel. The Taliban consists entirely of rural Pashtuns, the great majority of them from the Ghilzai tribal group, with some support from the Kakar tribe of the Ghurghusht nation. More specifically, however, although the Taliban eventually coopted other Pashtun leaders, Mullah Omar, and most of the senior members of the Taliban from 1996-2001 were from the Hotaki tribe of the Ghilzais, as shown in Table 24.2. The strength of the Ghilzais today is a direct result of the Soviet-Afghan War, during which they led three of the seven officially recognized Mujahideen groups who received massive covert military and financial support. This assistance fundamentally altered the balance of Pashtun power between the Ghilzais and their sworn enemies, the Durranis, who led none of the seven and who were deliberately sidelined by the CIA and ISID. This tribal “genetic meddling” quickly came home to roost in Afghanistan in the form of the Ghilzai Taliban. The Taliban is, at its heart, all about tribal politics. It represents a tribal power grab by Ghilzais, made possible by an order of magnitude jump in military power during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Ghilzais have historically been in conflict with the Durrani confederation of tribes, who have held political power in Kabul for most of the last 300 years (President Karzai and King Zahir Shah are Durranis.) Kandahar and Helmand provinces are Durrani lands, while the Ghilzai are concentrated in Oruzgan, Zabol, Dai Kundi, and Gardez provinces and the Katawaz region of Paktika province. In keeping with their extreme Deobandi philosophy, the Taliban are vehemently opposed to any hierarchical structure within

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Islamic society, which dovetails neatly into their hatred of the Durranis, who have always provided Afghanistan’s kings. Thus, the first instinct of the Taliban today, as in 1994, is not to drive directly on Kabul, but rather to subjugate and coopt the Durranis, which explains why most Taliban military activity today is in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, not further north and east toward Kabul. Only when the tribal grievances have been settled and their tribal flanks are secure will the Taliban move toward the capital, as they did in 1996. It also explains why, in 1996, when the Ghilzai Taliban came to power in Kabul, they did not invite the Durrani Pashtun King, Zahir Shah, back to Afghanistan, which was one of the first orders of business of the Bonn Agreement. The importance of the Ghilzai to the Taliban insurgency is illustrated byFigure 24.1. The shaded sections of the map of Afghanistan in Figure 24.1 represent those areas politically controlled by the Taliban as of this writing in May 2006 (with many other areas significantly contested). These areas include the northern districts of Kandahar Province, the northeastern districts of Helmand Province, most of Oruzgan and Zabol Provinces, and districts in Paktika, Ghazni, Wardak, and Logar Provinces. The inset map in Figure 24.1 represents a rough sketch of the tribal areas of the Durrani, Ghilzai, Ghurgusht, Karlanri, and Sarbani—the five large tribal confederations of Pashtuns. If one compares the inset of the tribal areas in Afghanistan with the large swath of Taliban political control, it is evident that the most intense area of the insurgency today is the area dominated by the various Ghilzai tribes. THE SOCIOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE TALIBAN While the tribal politics are important, however, they do not explain how the Taliban was able to mobilize socially so effectively, even with massive Pakistani support. To do this, it drew unconsciously on a universally understood cultural phenomenon among the frontier Pashtun, one which the British and later the Pakistani governments encountered over and over again: the charismatic Mullah movement. Mullah Mohammed Omar Akhund is the archetype of this charismatic Mullah phenomenon, a cyclical pattern of insurrection that manifests itself about every 30 years in the Pashtun belt. Indeed, such leaders have often gained powers on the frontier during times of social distress.28 These charismatic uprisings were so common, in fact, the British dubbed them “Mad Mullah movements.” There have been many. A similar figure to Mullah Omar, Mirza Ali Khan—a Tori Khel Waziri who was known to the West as the Fakir of Ipi— led first British and then Pakistani security forces on a frustrating chase around the frontier for 30 years.29 Protected by his Pashtun tribal supporters in the hills, much as Mullah Omar is today, he was never caught. The Mullah of Hadda, as noted by David Edwards in “Heroes of the Age,”

Figure 24.1 Pashtun tribal areas and key insurgent strongholds, 2006

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provoked the Great Pashtun Revolt of 1897 through mysticism, parlor tricks, and promises to turn British bullets to water.30 In “Resistance and Control in Pakistan,” Akbar Ahmed focuses on the emergence of a charismatic Mullah in Waziristan who, like Mullah Omar, challenged state legitimacy.31 Ahmed argues that the Mullah of Waziristan also used mysticism to gain legitimacy, much like Mullah Omar did 30 years later, and challenged Pakistan’s attempt to modernize FATA. Omar joined this rogues gallery of politicized insurgent Mullahs by means of a politico-religious stunt that is of enormous importance to the Taliban movement but that is considered insignificant by most Western analysts, if they are aware of it at all. In so doing, he became the epitome of the charismatic leader as described by Max Weber, who he defined as having: . . . a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader . . . 32

The event in question was Omar’s removal in 1994 of a sacred garment— believed by many Afghans to be the original cloak worn by the Prophet Mohammed—from its sanctuary in Kandahar, and actually wearing it while standing atop a mosque in the city. Whereas Omar had been a nonentity before this piece of religious theatre, the audacious stunt catapulted him to a level of mystical power (at least among the 90 percent of Pashtuns who are illiterate) in a manner that is almost impossible for Westerners to understand, and it resulted in his being proclaimed locally the Amir-ul Momineen, the Leader of the Faithful—not just of the Afghans but of all Muslims.33 What is known of the Taliban subsequent to this event conforms exactly to the pattern of social mobilization observed and documented as the insurgent “Mad Mullah” phenomenon. Furthermore, once in power, Ahmed Rashid notes that Taliban power was (and is) concentrated exclusively in the person of Mullah Omar, another characteristic of the phenomenon—and contrary to traditional Pashtun shura (consensus) politics. As Rashid has observed, Omar ultimately made all the decisions within the Taliban, and no one dared act without his orders.34 Today, Mullah Omar issues statements of encouragement to his field commanders, rather than operational orders, exactly as did the Mullah of Hadda as described by David Edwards.35 Thus, unlike most insurgencies, which are not centered in the personality of a single leader, the Taliban’s center of gravity, in Clausewitzian terms, is not Taliban foot soldiers or field

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commanders or even the senior clerics around Omar. It is Omar himself. Because it is, socially, a charismatic movement, if Mullah Omar dies, the Taliban, at least in its current incarnation, will wither and die, because he alone is the Leader of the Faithful. It is not a question of political or military succession: The mystical charismatic power in Islam that came from wearing the Cloak of the Prophet is not something transferable to a second in command. Unfortunately, because this entire phenomenon is so alien to Western thinking, U.S. observers and analysts have tended almost universally instead to interpret the Taliban in terms more compatible with Western logic and thought. It is thus a strategic error, we believe, to label the Taliban as an “Islamist fundamentalist movement,” or a drug gang, or any of the other revolving door euphemisms applied to it, such as “Anti-Government Militia.” Understanding the Taliban enemy more precisely could enable better information and psychological operations, for example, or a more nuanced understanding of the human terrain by U.S. and NATO forces, and would suggest a realignment of reconstruction priorities based on historical models to isolate the movement and prevent its further mobilization. HEKMATYAR AND HIZB-i-ISLAMI (HiG) On February 19, 2003, the United States designated Gulbuddin Hekmatyar a “specially designated global terrorist.”36 Hekmatyar is a prominent member of the American “most wanted terrorist list,” behind only bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and (until his death in 2006) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Hekmatyar is a seasoned veteran of the Soviet-Afghan war and has been described as “comparably wealthy, ruthless, arrogant, inflexible, [and] a stern disciplinarian.”37 Hekmatyar’s mujahideen faction, the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, was one of the major resistance groups fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The HiG received the largest share of the arms and funds that came into Afghanistan from Arab and Western countries to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was the favorite party of Pakistan’s ISID during and immediately after the Soviet-Afghan war—and, as noted earlier, was responsible for much of the death and destruction that followed the collapse of communist rule in 1992. Hekmatyar has repeatedly called for a jihad38 against the coalition forces in Afghanistan and those who cooperate with them—including the current Karzai government. Although his wanton destruction of much of Kabul by indiscriminate shelling of the city cost him any support he might still have had within Afghanistan, his call for the establishment of a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan and his condemnation of what he views as the corrupting influence of the West retains some residual appeal in northwest Pakistan. And he still has powerful friends within the ISID.

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Hekmatyar is a Ghilzai Pashtun of the Kharoti tribe. His family, however, was one of thousands of Pashtun families who were forcefully relocated to northern Afghanistan as part of “detribalization” efforts early in the twentieth century, and he is thus less able to draw on traditional kinship networks within the Kharotis of the south today. During the late 1960s, while Hekmatyar was studying at the Faculty of Engineering at Kabul University, he was introduced to radical politics. After a brief period of involvement with Afghan communists, he became a disciple of Sayyid Qutb and the Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) movement. Ever since, he has been one of the most outspoken and extreme of all Afghan leaders. He was known, for example, to patrol the bazaars of Kabul with vials of acid, which he would throw in the face of any woman who dared to walk outdoors without a full burka covering her face. His insurgency movement is built on the Ikhwan model of Islamic revolution, which stresses the establishment of a pure Islamic state and utilizes a highly disciplined organizational structure built around a small cadre of educated elites over which Hekmatyar retains strict control. It is thus closer to the foco model of Marxist revolution than the charismatic and purely rural Taliban movement, but both are essentially insurgencies built on the personalities of their leaders rather than on sustainable mass popular support. In 1994, with support of the ISID, Hekmatyar started training foreign volunteers to support Pakistan’s new covert jihad in Indian-held Kashmir.39 Pakistan decided to “out-source” the jihad in Kashmir; as a result, Hekmatyar became a major focus of this effort. In a move to increase its base of support, the Rabbani government in Kabul invited Hekmatyar to join the government, an offer that he accepted, briefly, twice. However, his overwhelming unpopularity backfired on Rabbani, whose government lost large tracts of popular support as a result of its association with the Butcher of Kabul, rather than gaining in strength. When it later became clear that not only was Hekmatyar not achieving Pakistan’s goals in Jammu and Kashmir, but also that his lack of popular support in Afghanistan ensured that he would remain a marginalized loser in any future Afghan state, the new Pakistani government of Benazir Bhutto switched its support and helped to organize the Taliban movement. Despite having similar goals in the establishment of a pure Islamic state in Afghanistan and a common Ghilzai ethnicity, Hekmatyar was a bitter enemy during the Taliban’s initial reigning years. In his educated, elitist urban worldview, the illiterate rural Mullahs of the Taliban are hillbilly bumpkins, and he regards them with a thinly veiled contempt for their lack of learning and sophistication. There are also important differences between his vision of an Islamic state and the grotesquely distorted travesty of Deobandi thought of Mullah Omar. Hekmatyar’s forces fought the Taliban until they ousted him from his power base around Jalalabad, after

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which he fled to Iran for a period before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002. Despite residual animosities, however, on the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”—at least temporarily—he has recently negotiated a truce with the Taliban and an agreement on limited cooperation in destroying the government of Hamid Karzai. It may not be too great of a stretch to imagine the hidden hand of the ISID behind this d´etente. His forces today operate in Konduz, Nangarhar, and Nuristan provinces, and he has been linked to numerous attacks on U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel, as well as to many other attacks against Afghan government and security elements.40 The few brief contacts that U.S. forces have had with the remote tribal groups of Nuristan since 2001 have provided strong evidence that HiG is using the virtually inaccessible valleys of that isolated region for training and logistics basing. The Nuristanis, for their part, want nothing to do with Hekmatyar’s Ghilzais, and have requested a U.S. PRT be established in Nuristan province, a request that U.S. authorities have declined for reasons unknown. HiG remains a dangerous and sometimes deadly guerilla opponent in the southeast, which has impeded both Afghan government efforts to consolidate control in the region, and international efforts to rebuild and develop it, but his personal inability to inspire and mobilize mass popular support suggest his insurgency will be unable to generate critical mass. As with the Taliban, if the leader of HiG were to be liquidated, his movement, based as it is on the iron will of one man to gain power, would quickly wither and die with him, as did, for example, the Sendero Luminoso movement in Peru after the capture of Abimael Guzman in 1992.41 POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN PHOENIX42 Afghanistan today is in danger of capsizing in a perfect storm of insurgency, terrorism, narcotics,43 and warlords. The nexus between them is growing and self-reinforcing. Five years of benign neglect by the United States after the installation of Hamid Karzai as President have brought Afghanistan back to the brink of state failure. Since 2001, Washington has badly shortchanged Afghanistan in men and resources. The deployment of U.S. and ISAF forces44 to the stabilization of the countryside represented the lowest per capita commitment of peacekeeping personnel to any postconflict environment since the end of World War II. The ratios of peacekeepers to citizens in the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, were 1:48 and 1:58 respectively. For the first 3 years in Afghanistan, the comparable figure hovered near 1:2000. Today, with an increase in U.S. force levels and a major reinforcement of the NATO ISAF mission, it is roughly one peacekeeper to every 1,000 Afghans (1: 1000).

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The number of security force personnel deployed after Bonn was completely inadequate to fill the security vacuum left by the retreating Taliban, a void that was quickly filled by warlords and drug lords, many of whom have since donned national police uniforms to facilitate narcotics trafficking.45 As bad as they are, however, the numbers alone do not tell the whole story. As noted previously, the bulk of the Special Forces soldiers who best understand counterinsurgency, for example, were soon pulled out of Afghanistan to serve in Iraq and elsewhere. Aviation assets have also been drawn down to minimal levels. Because of the lack of helicopter assets, “Quick Reaction Forces” throughout much of the south are forced to respond to the scene of minor Taliban attacks in Humvees. With an average overland speed of 5–10 miles an hour (over rocky trails that have not improved), Taliban guerillas are usually long gone from their “roadblock and run” attacks before U.S. forces arrive, which emboldens the insurgents, demonstrates our inability to protect the locals, and demoralizes the police, few of whom are willing to try to hold off hardened and heavily armed Taliban veterans for several hours with poor quality weapons and the standard 30-rounds of issued ammunition. Even more damaging to the effort to stabilize Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban was the shockingly low level of funding committed to rebuild a country laid waste by 25 years of war. Astonishingly, President Karzai was in office nearly 3 years before total U.S. reconstruction spending in Afghanistan reached $1 billion. During the same period, the cost of military operations in Afghanistan was approximately $36 billion, perhaps one of history’s most glaring illustrations of being “penny wise and pound foolish.” Not counting the repaving of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, U.S. aid to Afghanistan over the last 5 years has averaged just $13 per Afghan per year. Nor, despite clear and disturbing evidence that the lack of reconstruction funds is largely responsible for the rapid spread of Taliban influence in the south since 2002, has the level of this aid to Afghanistan increased; in fact, it has decreased since 2004. The total U.S.aid budget for the entire country in fiscal year 2006 is roughly $700 million, equal to the cost of operating the war in Iraq for only 36 hours. Total U.S. spending since 9/11 to rebuild an entire nation almost exactly the size of Texas amounts to less than half the cost of rebuilding just the levees in New Orleans damaged by Hurricane Katrina. On the ground, frequent turnovers of personnel, lack of local funds, a cumbersome, Bagram-driven approval process for projects, the absence of eyes-on construction oversight and quality control, inadequate vetting of contractors, and endemic corruption of Afghan officials has combined to waste much of what was spent. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) effort has provided an interesting laboratory for U.S. Army Civil Affairs experimentation, but their numbers are absurdly inadequate. With an approximate overall troop-to-task ratio of one PRT (in Pashtun areas) for

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every one million Pashtuns, the strategic impact of their presence is negligible. In lawless Paktika Province in 2005, for example, where no NGOs or IOs will operate, a total of eight American civil affairs enlisted reservists and two inexperienced mid-career transfer civil affairs officers were responsible for all rural development and reconstruction projects in an area the size of Vermont and New Hampshire combined, with a population of 600,000 people, where living conditions are largely unchanged since biblical times. With a miniscule Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) budget, what any ten soldiers can accomplish in this environment amounts at best to a few grains of sand on the beach. In 2005, the entire province of Paktika had only a handful of buildings not made of adobe, fewer than a dozen high school graduates, and no telephones or paved roads anywhere within its borders. There were two antiquated clinics (charitably called “hospitals”) and two doctors. Officially, the province has 352 elementary schools for boys, but only 40 actual school buildings. The remainder of the “schools” are simply patches of open ground in the village where the 6th-graders teach what they know to the 1st graders. Few, if any, girls attend school at all. How ten civil affairs personnel with three Humvees and a few hundred thousand dollars are supposed to change this is unclear. In fact, in the first 4 years of the Karzai government, the U.S. government had not built a single school or clinic anywhere in Paktika Province. To make matters worse, as noted previously, due to manpower shortages, the PRTs in Paktika and seven other locations have now been effectively disbanded, with their support elements redeployed to other duties. Further, the handful of Civil Affairs soldiers of the Civil Military Operations Centers (the CMOCs) have been rolled together with combat maneuver elements onto shared firebases, where they are generally the lowest priority for missions and assets. In these cases, the PRTs—originally designed as independent, freestanding civil-military affairs institutions—no longer exist as such. The stated mission of the PRT, to “extend the reach of the Afghan national government to the rural areas” is itself a gem of Kafkaesque spin, because as of 2005 there were no Afghans at all on any PRT. While there is coordination with the Afghan government at the provincial planning level, when PRTs go “outside the wire,” they almost always do so alone. Hence, at the district or village level, their presence lacks any Afghan government component that might extend its reach. The failure of the minimalist peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts to ensure rural security and effect any meaningful improvement in the lives of the people in the rural south has created an angry environment of unfulfilled expectations. As much as (or more than) the Karzai government’s inability to extend its authority beyond Kabul, this gap between expectation and reality is what has opened the door to the resurgence of the Taliban.

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ASSESSING THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY AND COALITION COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORTS The Taliban intuitively understood that the center of gravity was the satisfaction of the rural Pashtun with the results of the new government in Kabul. They knew there was a window of opportunity for Karzai to gain rural Pashtun support, and they were quick to capitalize on the failure of the Department of Defense to understand this paradigm. Indeed, the DOD saw the aftermath of the Taliban’s withdrawal south of the border as a simple matter of subtractive math: “Kill the existing terrorists until the number reaches zero and the war is over.” For the first 2 years of the insurgency, the DOD maintained a paradigm of “mopping up” and “hunting down” the “remaining bitter-enders.” For its part, the Taliban today is conducting a clever defensive insurgency at the operational level of war. They have deployed a sufficient number of low-level fighters to intimidate the NGOs and IGOs—who would normally carry out most of the reconstruction—into withdrawing all of their personnel from the south. By night, Taliban Mullahs travel in the rural areas, speaking to village elders. They are fond of saying, “the Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time.” The simple message they deliver in person or by “night letter” is one of intimidation: “The Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventually they will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill every family that has collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai government.” Such a message is devastatingly effective in these areas, where transgenerational feuds and revenge are part of the fabric of society. The combination of the lack of local protection from the Taliban’s nightly visits and the absence of any tangible reason to support either the Americans or Karzai are reason enough for the villagers to either remain neutral or provide assistance to the guerillas. But as noted previously, American forces have often accelerated the alienation through culturally obtuse behavior, unnecessarily invasive and violent tactics, and a series of tragic incidents of “collateral damage,” which are inevitable in wartime. U.S. forces deploying to Afghanistan still receive only minimal “cultural awareness” briefings, if any, and this training is usually the lowest priority on the checklist of requirements to be crossed off before deployment, sandwiched between the night navigation course and the grenade range. Few, if any, can speak a word of the Pashto language, and thus rely on primarily young, trilingual Tajik interpreters to communicate with Pashtun elders, itself often a source of friction. At the strategic level of war, the Taliban is fighting a classic “war of the flea,” largely (and unsurprisingly) along much the same lines used by the mujahideen 20 years ago against the Soviets, including fighting

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in villages to deliberately provoke airstrikes and collateral damage.46 In the latest in a long series of such incidents, in May 2006, U.S. airstrikes killed as many as 40 civilians in Panjway District of Kandahar Province. The United States views this as the tragic but bearable cost of a successful operation against the insurgents, without understanding that the Taliban has deliberately traded the lives of a few dozen guerilla fighters in order to cost the American forces the permanent loyalty of that village, under a code of Pashtun social behavior called Pashtunwali and its obligation for revenge (Badal), which the Army does not even begin to understand or take seriously. Indeed, the United States continues to fight the war largely according to the Taliban “game plan.” The priority of American effort is still what the Taliban wants it to be, the so-called “kill/capture mission,” and the U.S. Army spends much of its time on battalion-sized or larger sweep operations. In June, 2006, the United States led approximately 10,000 coalition forces in yet another large-scale sweep operation, dubbed “Operation Mountain Thrust,” in another massive demonstration of failed Vietnamera counterinsurgency tactics designed to “flush out” Taliban guerillas, most of whom simply hide until the sweep has passed by and coalition forces have left the area before resuming their activities. This plays right into the Taliban’s operational goal, which is to get American forces to do exactly what they are doing: alienating rural villages with invasive tactics, and pouring the manpower, equipment, and fiscal resources—which should be focused on improving people’s lives instead—into chasing illiterate and expendable teenage boys with guns around the countryside like the proverbial dog chasing its tail and gnawing at individual flea bites. Although few (if any) insurgencies have ever been won by killing insurgents, this still remains the primary strategy in Afghanistan. News reports of fighting in southern Afghanistan are increasingly dominated by Taliban body counts eerily reminiscent of Vietnam-era reporting. And ironically, Afghanistan is probably the country where this failed strategy of focusing on the “kill/capture mission” is least likely to work. The Taliban has a virtually infinite number of guerilla recruits growing up in the PashtunAfghan refugee camps in northern Pakistan and pouring out of the Deobandi madrasas along the border, and could sustain casualties of 10,000 or more guerillas a year for 20 years without any operational impact. Indeed, the Pashtun, who make up 100 percent of the Taliban, have a saying: “Kill one enemy, make ten.” Thus, the death in battle of a Pashtun guerilla invokes an obligation of revenge among all his male relatives, making the killing of a Taliban guerilla an act of insurgent multiplication, not subtraction. The Soviets learned this lesson the hard way. They killed nearly a million Pashtuns, and the effect this level of genocide had on the number of Pashtun guerillas in the field was that it increased it.

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Indeed, as an understanding of the true nature of the Taliban as a charismatic religious cult movement typical in Frontier history suggests, the Taliban center of gravity is Mullah Omar, the charismatic cult leader, not teenage boys or mid-level commanders, and no amount of killing them will shut the insurgency down. In the meantime, the United States is losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time, failing to rebuild the countryside, bursting into schoolyards full of children with guns bristling, kicking in village doors, searching women, driving like NASCAR racers on city streets, and putting out cross-cultural gibberish in ineffectual Information and Psyops campaigns. CONCLUSION The picture we paint in this chapter is not pretty. However, without a major change in counterinsurgency strategy and significant increase in manpower, equipment (particularly aviation assets), and especially reconstruction funding, the United States may lose this war. Today, the momentum—particularly in the counterinsurgency and the counternarcotics efforts—is running the wrong way. It is still possible to win—to create a slowly developing but stable, conservative Islamic democracy in Afghanistan generally free of terrorism—but not with the current resource status quo, and not with the current tactics. The Taliban today has numerous advantages, including comprehensive knowledge of the local culture, language, and tribal hierarchies of which U.S. forces are completely ignorant, a virtually inexhaustible supply of recruits and money, mountainous terrain that dramatically favors the insurgent, centuries of successful experience in guerilla warfare against Western powers, patience, domination to the point of supremacy in Information Warfare, and perhaps most importantly, ready sanctuary in much of northern Pakistan. Major changes in the way the United States is doing business are needed immediately, but even with them, the United States cannot do it alone. It needs not just the energetic support of NATO but a robust and sustained commitment from NATO to the brutal, hard, and often bloody business of counterinsurgency, a type of warfare for which NATO has had little training and almost no experience. The United Nations, nongovernmental organizations and the donor nations must do more as well. And Afghanistan’s northern and Western neighbors must continue to avoid the urge to excessively meddle in Afghan affairs—and, in the case of Uzbekistan, play a more positive role in supporting U.S. efforts, or risk a future of Islamic terrorism exported from Afghanistan. But the key to success or failure in Afghanistan lies below its southern border, in northern Pakistan. As long as insurgents are virtually free to cross the border at will, and Frontier Corps elements aid and abet their movements, the insurgency cannot be shut down in Afghanistan. As the

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Soviets learned between 1979 and 1989, the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot be closed from the north. President Musharraf must stop the two-faced game of appearing to be the ally of the United States in the war on terrorism, while seeking to curry political favor with its worst proponents in NWFP, Baluchistan, and the FATA. Thanks to ill-conceived policies of encouragement and appeasement, the monster of Islamic fundamentalism in the north may now be too powerful to stop, but it’s not too late to try. President Musharraf must assert national control in the north and act boldly to shut down the major insurgent movements across the border before the situation there spirals completely out of his control. For its part, the United States must begin to fight smarter and stop following the Taliban playbook. A complete change in counterinsurgency strategy is required, and all U.S. soldiers must become cultural and language warriors with months, not minutes, of training in both language and culture before deployment. Quantum improvement is required in this area; Human Rights Watch has already released a scathing report on the conduct of American military personnel and the Afghan National Police,47 which are an almost unmitigated disaster of corruption, warlord cronyism, and incompetence. Despite extreme poverty, a landmine-littered landscape, massive corruption, a fledgling government whose authority outside of Kabul is very limited, an ongoing insurgency, a shattered economy, booming opium production and a host of other daunting problems, Afghanistan remains geostrategically vital. The United States cannot repeat its post-Soviet invasion abandonment of the country or fob the mission off on NATO, or the results will be disastrous once again. By abandoning Afghanistan once, the United States allowed the country to become a refuge for terrorist groups to recruit, train, and wage war against the West. The effect on Afghanistan, the region, and the rest of the world was dramatic and terrifying. This time, if we leave—or lose—the results will be even worse.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of Defense, or Center for Advanced Defense Studies. We would like to thank Major Derrick B. Richardson for his assistance in the development of this chapter. NOTES 1. A revised version of this chapter has been published in a journal article by the same authors, as “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis, 5(1) (Winter 2007).

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2. Rowan Scarborough, “War on Terrorism in ‘Cleanup’ Phase,” The Washington Times (May 2, 2003) 2. 3. Romesh Ratnesar, “The New Rules Of Engagement,” Time (November 5, 2001), 5. 4. See, Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror’s Trail, (Washington, DC: Brassey, 2004). 5. See Thomas H. Johnson, “Democratic Nation Building in the Arc of Crisis: The Case of the Presidential Election in Afghanistan,” in Critical Issues Facing the Middle East Security: Security, Politics, and Economics, ed. James Russell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 6. Marc Sedra, “The Forgotten War Shows No Sign of Abating,” Foreign Policy in Focus (April 2003). Available at http://www.fpif.org/papers/afghan2003.html. 7. Luke Harding, “Heavy Hand of America Fans the Taliban Embers into Life,” The Guardian (June 18, 2003). 8. “U.N. Agency Cuts Back in Afghanistan,” The New York Times (November 19, 2003). 9. Interview with Senior U.S.Government military analyst. For a similar assessment see: Walter Pincus, “Growing Threat Seen In Afghan Insurgency: DIA Chief Cites Surging Violence in Homeland,” Washington Post (March 1, 2006): A08. 10. Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Upsurge of Violence Reflects New Taliban Tactics,” Eurasia Insight (May 26, 2006), http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ insight/articles/pp052606.shtml. 11. Center for International Issues Research, Daily Arabic Media Report (May 25, 2006). 12. Available at http://www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.php?id=97378. 13. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization assumption of security operations in southern Afghanistan was completed in July 2006. NATO’s multinational force increased its troop strength to about 21,000 from 9,000, and assumed security responsibility for the entire country at the end of 2006. 14. Ron Synovitz, “Afghanistan: Upsurge of Violence Reflects New Taliban Tactics.” 15. Eric Schmitt, “Springtime Killing in Afghanistan,” The New York Times (May 28, 2006). 16. Rober Karniol, “Plugging the Gaps” Jane’s Defense Weekly (March 22 2006): 29. 17. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001) 186. 18. For a chronology of suicide bombings in Afghanistan, compiled by Radio Liberty see http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/9ac36a59-d6834189-a2b9-94fe5fbf32ad.html 19. Griff Witte, “Afghans Confront Surge in Violence: Foreign Support Seen Behind Attacks that Mimic Those in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor (November 28, 2005): 1. 20. Eric Schmitt, “Springtime Killing in Afghanistan,” The New York Times (May 28, 2006). 21. Griff Witte, “Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens in Afghanistan, Violence in South Is Seen as Message to NATO,” Washington Post Foreign Service (January 17, 2006): A11.

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22. Esther Pan, “Afghanistan’s New Security Threat,” Council on Foreign Affairs Backgrounder (February 14, 2006) available at http://www.cfr.org/ publication/9851. 23. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hekmatyar as a “specially designated global terrorist.” Under this named designation, terrorists and terrorist-related institutions are subjected to financial and other U.S. sanctions. See: Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress (December 28, 2004). As of this writing, he is still at large. 24. Sir Winston S. Churchill, The Story Of The Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War (London: Green and Longmans, 1898), reprinted at http://arthursclassicnovels.com/arthurs/churchill/mkdff10.html. 25. Even during the height of the anti-Soviet jihad, various mujahideen factions spent much of their time and energy fighting each other. 26. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001) 85, 93. 27. See The 9-11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton and Co, 2004). 28. For a seminal treatment of the subject of charismatic leadership and political organizations, see: Alfred de Grazia, Political Behavior (New York: The Free Press, 1965). Also published at http://www.grazian-archive.com/politics/ PolBehavior/tabcon.htm. 29. Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980) 480, 487, 491-492. 30. David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1996). 31. Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (London: Routledge, 1991). Also see Akbar S. Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society: Order and Conflict in Pakistan (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 32. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947) 358-359, 362. 33. His title, “Commander of the Faithful,” had not been adopted by any Muslim anywhere for nearly 1,000 years. The cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, which had been folded and padlocked in a series of chests in a crypt in the royal mausoleum at Kandahar; “myth had it that the padlocks to the crypt could be opened only when touched by a true Amir-ul Momineen, a king of the Muslims.” See: Joseph A. Raelin, “The Myth of Charismatic Leaders,” March 2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi m0MNT/is 3 57/ai 98901483. 34. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001). 35. David Edwards, “Heroes of the Age.” Edwards notes that the position of the Mullah in society does not enable him to issue orders, per se, but rather this type of “public service announcement.” 36. See the U.S. Department of State Web site, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ prs/ps/2003/17799.htm (accessed September 4, 2004). 37. John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002) 47.

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38. For example see: Statement of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of April 25, 2003, posted on the Commonwealth Institute Web site, http://www.comw.org/ warreport/fulltext/0304hekmatyar.pdf. 39. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004) 292. 40. Carlotta Gall, “11 Chinese Workers Killed in Rebel Attack in Afghanistan,” The New York Times (June 10, 2004). 41. For more on this, please see the chapter by David Scott Palmer in this volume. 42. Much of the analysis presented here is based on the authors’ observations while in Afghanistan during periods in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005. During 2005, Chris Mason served as the Political Officer for the PRT in Paktika. 43. The United Nations estimates the annual income of Afghanistan’s opium industry at U.S.$2.5 billion. The opium industry represents the largest source of income in Afghanistan. And the country produces 85-90 percent of the world’s heroin. Quite simply Afghanistan is a Narco-State. See, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Government of Afghanistan’s Counter Narcotics Directorate, “Afghanistan Opium Survey, 2005,” November 2005. For more on these issues, please see the chapter by Byrom and Walker in volume 2 of this publication. 44. ISAF was one of the results of the Bonn Agreement. ISAF’s mission is to provide a safe and secure environment conducive to free and fair elections, the spread of the rule of law, and reconstruction. See United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), 1386, 1413, 1444, and 1510. 45. In November 2005, CBS news quoted a “senior U.S. drug enforcement official” at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul as saying that he believed “90 percent of the district police chiefs in Afghanistan are either involved in the production of opium or protecting the trade in some way.” 46. As Marshall Sokolov, the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet force in Afghanistan noted in 1986, “the enemy is primarily fighting in villages to provoke our air attacks and alienate the populations against us.” 47. See “Enduring Freedom Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan,” Human Rights Watch 16, no. 3 (March 2004), online at http://hrw.org/reports/ 2004/afghanistan0304. 48. Data through July 30, 2006. Data includes both killed-in-action and nonhostile casualties. Source, http://icasualties.org/oef.

CHAPTER 25 FIGHTING AL QAEDA: UNDERSTANDING THE ORGANIZATIONAL, IDEOLOGICAL, AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF A GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR Joseph L. Trafton

Hours after the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush made a public address to the nation in which he declared that, “Freedom itself was attacked this morning by a faceless coward. And freedom will be defended. Make no mistake, the United States will hunt down and punish those responsible for these cowardly acts.”1 In the months that followed, the President declared a global “war on terror,” and the public watched as the United States military toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, killed or sent running the remaining al Qaeda leadership, and ousted Saddam Hussein from Iraq (largely due to concerns that terrorists might acquire weapons of mass destruction from a notably anti-Western state— “The smoking gun will come in the form of a mushroom cloud,” warned Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice). This chapter explores a much less visible, yet equally important dimension of this war—the financial, ideological, and organizational structure of al Qaeda. The al Qaeda organization is the first truly global network of terror the world has ever seen, and as such it presents the first global terrorist threat. Thus, a working knowledge of how al Qaeda survives and operates is paramount for successfully prosecuting the global war on terror. This discussion will be devoted to understanding the evolution of al Qaeda’s organizational structure, the

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role ideology plays in uniting the al Qaeda network, and al Qaeda’s new financial structure. In order to combat an adversary like al Qaeda, the adversary must first be understood. THE ORGANIZATION OF AL QAEDA AND WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND IT Organizational Perspectives Understanding the organization of al Qaeda is of the utmost importance in today’s nebulous international environment. It dictates the ways in which we view the threat, and consequently it informs our opinions about how to best combat it. Understanding al Qaeda’s organization and getting it right is more important now than ever. To date, there is no consensus among policymakers and academics about the nature and severity of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by the al Qaeda organization. In general, attitudes about the organizational strength of al Qaeda surround three perspectives or theories. The first holds that the leadership remains intact and more needs to be done to disrupt the al Qaeda organization. Adherents to this view, called the “centralized” perspective, are not hard to come by and include top officials in the Department of Defense like Donald Rumsfeld. Increasingly, well-known personalities like Bill O’Reilly from Fox News have popularized this perspective, and warn that attacks like the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London underground transportation system are highly likely in the future. Those belonging to this camp conclude that continued use of the military, the CIA, and MI6 to take out the leadership is preferred to any other policy option. Therefore, even those who approve of most of the Bush Administration’s military endeavors to combat terror have criticized President Bush for not having caught Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 2001. Further, while taking out Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—the Jordanianborn al Qaeda leader in Iraq—was a great victory, it is not seen as enough. “We must fight the terrorists abroad so that we do not have to fight them at home” remains the motto for those individuals sharing the centralized perspective of al Qaeda. An opposite perspective holds that al Qaeda has suffered a tremendous blow since 9/11 and the Bush team has rendered it impotent. The organizational structure is far from being hierarchical, and it would be an overstatement to suggest that there is any real organization at all. Adherents to this perspective view al Qaeda only as an idea that a few petty criminals and thugs around the world use to justify their illicit behavior. This perspective of al Qaeda’s organization can therefore be characterized as “decentralized and impotent.” Academics belonging to the realist tradition of international relations theory like Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer

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embrace this perspective, as do many conservative political pundits like Pat Buchanan. In general, they conclude that more time ought to be spent on homeland security and less on combating al Qaeda directly, regardless of the countermeasure taken. To do the contrary is equivalent to squandering resources and diluting the relative power of the United States, something it cannot afford to do. The third perspective is somewhat of a hybrid between the other two perspectives. The “decentralized but potent” perspective views al Qaeda as operationally strong and a viable threat to the interests of the United States and the world. On the other hand, adherents of this perspective agree that post-9/11 countermeasures have significantly disrupted the organizational integrity of al Qaeda. This perspective also notes that al Qaeda has in many respects become an idea, but unlike others, proponents do not diminish the power of ideas. The July 7 London bombings as well as the very recent plot to hijack airplanes over the Atlantic is evidence of the inspirational nature of al Qaeda’s ideology. This perspective belongs predominantly to a growing group of academics who specialize in international terrorism, most notably Rohan Gunaratna, who describe al Qaeda as being the most unorganized organized terror network the world has ever seen. Like grapes on a grapevine, al Qaeda cells are at best loosely connected through modern technology to any form of central command. Individual cells operate, sustain, and finance themselves on a nearautonomous level, but their ability to threaten and cause damage to countries and innocent civilians is no less potent. In many ways, this style of organization makes al Qaeda an even more elusive threat. Counterterrorist measures should therefore adapt to reflect the nature of this organization, something that will be explored in detail in the following sections of this chapter. Evolution of al Qaeda’s Organization The organization of al Qaeda can best be understood as having gone through three distinct phases. The first phase begins with Osama bin Laden himself. Born in July 1957 to a wealthy Saudi family, Osama bin Laden—like many conservative Sunni Muslims—adopted his militant Islamic views while attending King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.2 Bin Laden was greatly influenced by one of his instructors, Dr. Abdullah al-Azzam, and later met with him in Afghanistan shortly after the 1979 invasion by the Soviet Union. In 1984, Azzam—the primary architect of al Qaeda—together with bin Laden established a network of recruiting and fundraising offices in the Arab world, Europe, and the United States, founded on the ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood.3 Called Maktab al-Kihdamat (MAK), “services offices” in Arabic, this network was essentially the forerunner of al Qaeda.4 During this time, the United

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States and other allied countries—in an effort to fight the Soviet Union— covertly funneled over $3 billion through Pakistan to MAK and into the hands of the mujahideen, the Islamic fundamentalist faction fighting the Soviet forces on the front line.5 At the time, neither bin Laden nor Azzam were openly known to have held aggressive intentions toward the United States, although they were both critical of the States’ support for Israel. On the eve of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1988, the leadership of al Qaeda began to fracture over what to do with the newly established organization and the 20,000 supporters it had amassed. According to Azzam, al Qaeda (translated as “the base” in Arabic) should become “a rapid reaction force” to intervene wherever Muslims were perceived to be threatened.6 On the other hand, Osama bin Laden hoped to turn al Qaeda into an activist organization, where members would return to their home countries to topple secular, pro-Western Arab leaders such as Anwar Sadat of Egypt.7 This difference intensified, and in 1989 Azzam was assassinated (allegedly by bin Laden, due to their growing power struggle). Shortly thereafter, bin Laden gained control of MAK resources and its organizational mechanisms. More importantly, bin Laden’s vision for al Qaeda as a proactive anti-Western organization was allowed to prevail. The second phase begins with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the resulting power struggle that ensued between the United States government and bin Laden over who should oust Saddam from Kuwait. Following the conclusion of the struggle against the Soviet Union in 1989, bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. In part because of the great success the mujahideen had against the Red Army, Osama appealed to his family that his mujahideen forces should be deployed to expel Saddam from Kuwait. However, the Saudi family opted instead to allow 500,000 U.S. troops to conduct operations from the Saudi border, in order to deal with Saddam. From that point forth, bin Laden painted the United States as “occupiers of sacred Islamic ground” and the Saudi royal family as facilitators of that occupation.8 Osama bin Laden abandoned his family and Saudi Arabia altogether and relocated in Sudan to begin his fight against the United States. There, bin Laden purchased land, established a construction company, an agricultural production company, and a furniture-making company, and invested $50 million in shares of a Sudanese bank, the al Shamal Islamic Bank.9 He and his followers also began to indoctrinate and train additional al Qaeda militants. In 1996, however, bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan under pressure from the United States and Egypt. This time, he relocated back to Afghanistan, where the Taliban—long-time supporters of al Qaeda—had recently taken over the capital of Kabul. This is where bin Laden would reside until the United States response to the 9/11 attacks 5 years later. The third phase actually begins a few years prior to the 9/11 attacks, although 9/11 provides a more recognizable marker for the last organizational shift of al Qaeda. In 1998 al Qaeda attacked the U.S.

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embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which were considered by the international community to be an attack on the United States itself. President Clinton responded in two ways: in 1998 he authorized cruise missile strikes against al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in an attempt to take out bin Laden; and in 1999 he imposed a ban on U.S. trade with the Talibancontrolled Afghanistan and froze Taliban assets in the United States.10 In addition, Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeline Albright was instrumental in persuading the U.N. Security Council to pass Resolution 1333, effectively banning all shipments of arms and military service to the Taliban.11 Despite these efforts, the Taliban was not defeated and Osama bin Laden was not killed. In fact, he and his al Qaeda organization were able to orchestrate the largest attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor, the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. In response, the new Bush Administration declared a “war on terror” and began by attacking the Taliban-led Afghanistan. Within 3 months, the Taliban regime was removed and replaced by a pro-U.S. government. Osama bin Laden and his coconspirator, Ayman al-Zawahiri, however, escaped the attack, apparently by traveling through the Tora Bora Mountains on their way to Pakistan. (It is believed, but not confirmed, that the two are currently in Pakistan).12 Since the massive strike against the Taliban in 2001, the United States has been dedicated to the apprehension of all al Qaeda leadership. Despite failed efforts to locate bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, even with the help of the Pakistani government, the U.S. government and its allies have successfully arrested or killed 16 of the former top al Qaeda operatives including Mohammad Atef, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (the September 11 planner), Abu Musab al-Suri, and most recently Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq.13 In total, since the 9/11 attacks, nearly 3,000 al Qaeda members have been arrested. All of this suggests that since 9/11 the central leadership of al Qaeda has been significantly disrupted, if not destroyed, by U.S. military operations. Implications for Understanding al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure Despite successful U.S. and international efforts, however, some still argue that al Qaeda leadership remains intact. It has been speculated that Iran, for example, is currently harboring three key al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden’s son, Saad. If these individuals were to be able to communicate with the outside world, some feel that they would be able to coordinate future terrorist attacks by collaborating with bin Laden and al-Zawahiri.14 In fact, evidence shows that the three al Qaeda leaders held in Iran were responsible for the May 2003 suicide attacks on a housing complex in Saudi Arabia.15 If true, adherents of this centralized perspective believe that further use of the military to hunt down leaders in Iran is the only way to win the war against

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al Qaeda. However, two problems exist when treating al Qaeda as an intact, hierarchically directed organization that can be destroyed militarily. First, it is extremely unlikely that bin Laden or al-Zawahiri would be able to establish avenues of communication with three individuals alleged to be in Iran without implicating the Iranian government, which would be disastrous for U.S.- Iranian relations. And second, the recent revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan only 5 years since their removal is evidence that the military option to shake up al Qaeda’s network is not working. The opposite view holds that al Qaeda’s leadership has been so severely weakened that it is unlikely to be able to conduct 9/11-style terrorist attacks on U.S. soil in the future. President Bush, for example, claimed partial victory in the war on terror solely because the United States has not suffered another major terror attack since 9/11. One problem with this assertion is that it is premature. One advantage all terrorist groups share is the element of time, waiting to attack until the time is right and target countries become complacent. After all, it took 8 years for al Qaeda to attack the World Trade Center a second time. To declare success only 6 years after 9/11 is premature and perhaps exactly what al Qaeda has been waiting for. The last perspective portrays an al Qaeda organization that is completely decentralized and new, while keeping intact its potential to threaten the interests of the United States. In a 2004 report on terrorism, the State Department noted that: The core of al Qaida has suffered damage to its leadership, organization and capabilities . . . at the same time, al Qaida has spread its anti-U.S., antiWestern ideology to other groups and geographical areas. It is therefore not only al Qaida itself but increasingly groups affiliated with al-Qaida, or independent ones adhering to al-Qaida’s ideology that present the greatest threat of terrorist attacks against the U.S. and allied interests globally.16

Rohan Gunaratna, representing the academic community, echoes this view of al Qaeda’s current situation. Throughout the entire lifespan of al Qaeda, the trend has been that of entropy not consolidation. Yet, attacks continue and many argue that they have indeed increased. Throughout the 1990s, for example, al Qaeda was successful in executing over ten major terrorist plots against the United States,17 and today al Qaeda is estimated to have operating cells in over 102 countries.18 Counterterrorist measures would be better spent focusing on local al Qaeda cells rather than treating al Qaeda as though it were a well-organized network. THE POWER OF IDEAS: AL QAIDA’S IDEOLOGY Given al Qaeda’s continued ability to threaten U.S. interests, Jessica Stern, an expert on terrorism at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of

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Government, asks, “What accounts for al Qaida’s ongoing effectiveness in the face of an unprecedented onslaught [to kill al Qaida leadership]?”19 Stern answers her own question by describing al Qaeda as a “protean enemy”—a highly versatile organization able to adapt to new circumstances. Rohan Gunaratna offers another, perhaps more fitting, answer to the same question: al Qaeda has “evolved into a movement of two dozen groups” in over 102 countries.20 The portrayal of al Qaeda as a movement rather than a centrally led organization is perhaps the single scariest aspect of al Qaeda and, for many, the most intriguing; it exposes the often underestimated power of ideas in international relations. Ideas are bulletproof, and thus continuing to prioritize the military over other policy options is an anachronistic way to address the new threat.21 Ideology is the binding force of al Qaeda, rather a central command, and the United States would do well by focusing more on the individual cells and the glue that holds them together. There are a variety of ways to think about ideology. Ideology can be simply “a manner of thinking characteristic of an individual, group or culture,” or it can be a theory that “constitutes a sociopolitical program.”22 The ideology of al Qaeda is political, if not solely political. In fact, bin Laden and Zawahiri have been described as ideologues determined to use their vision of “a new world order” to counter the spread of United States’ influence.23 The interpretation of the word jihad to mean a “holy war” against the infidels, for example, is deliberate in order to achieve al Qaeda’s stated political ends, as is condoning killing innocent women and children, something explicitly condemned in the Koran. Also prohibited by the Koran is the use or distribution of drugs, yet al Qaeda has increasingly worked with drug traders to satisfy its budget in the wake of 9/11. All of this reveals that the priority for al Qaeda is to achieve its political ends regardless of how the Koran is manipulated. As Gunaratna notes, “In effect, contemporary Islamists such as al-Zawahiri and Osama are engaged in an unprecedented exercise in corrupting, misinterpreting, and misrepresenting the word of God to generate support for their political mission.”24 Al Qaeda was created by bin Laden and his mentor, Azzam to combat the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. After the cold war ended, Azzam wished to turn al Qaeda into an organization responsible for training individuals to return to their home countries to free oppressed Muslims wherever Muslims were suffering. Azzam’s vision for al Qaeda was localized and personal, focused on the problems inherent within individual countries. Osama’s vision, on the other hand, is much more worldly, so to speak, and as has already been discussed, the variant that was allowed to survive after Azzam’s early death. Osama, through al Qaeda, has “directed a call to [all] Muslims throughout the world to declare a jihad against the Judaeo-Christian alliance which is occupying Islamic

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sacred land in Palestine and the Arab Peninsula (and now Iraq).”25 Thus, the distinguishing characteristic about the al Qaeda ideology is its ability to unite otherwise separate and distinct Islamic terrorist groups. As noted by Gunaratna, for example, Hizbollah recruited only Lebanese; the Armed Islamic Group only Algerians; and the Egyptian Islamic jihad only Egyptians, whereas Osama has been dedicated to rebuilding the Umma (community of believers) and “creating a multinational organization based on the idea of uniting the vanguard of the believers, irrespective of their geographic origin.”26 In order to garner the widest possible support, al Qaeda sympathizers have used the Internet to form what Jessica Stern labels a “virtual network” of a “leaderless resistance.”27 Al Qaeda has successfully targeted an audience of predominantly young and relatively affluent Arabs from places like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia to join the global fight against the “great Satan.” According to Marc Genest, an expert on terrorism at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, for example, the latest effort to popularize al Qaeda’s jihad using the internet has been to post video games on Web sites that depict al Qaeda sympathizers as “good guys” in the global struggle against the West. Allegedly, successful game players are provided with “real” recruitment information upon completion of the game.28 In addition, the “Encyclopedia of Jihad” is available online, which provides instructions for creating “clandestine activity cells, with units for intelligence, supply, planning, preparation, and implementation.”29 Young Arabs in the Middle East who are easily drawn to the momentum of the al Qaeda movement are not the only targets for al Qaeda, however. Most recently, the “virtual network” of the “leaderless resistance” has found support in somewhat unlikely places. United States prisons, especially low-level prisons, have been infiltrated by those working with al Qaeda cells to radicalize newly converted Muslim inmates. According to Warith Deen Umar, who hired most of the Muslim chaplains currently active in New York State prisons, “prisoners who are recent Muslim converts are natural recruits for Islamic organizations.”30 The reason for this is twofold; low-level prisons are relatively porous institutions in that many inmates have at least limited access to the Internet, and most are permitted religious freedoms conducive for recruitment. Further, inmates typically share one trait in common—a certain degree of animosity toward their own country. Whether inside or outside of the prison walls, many academics like Jessica Stern agree that there is increasing evidence to support the concern that the al Qaeda movement has been able generate “home grown” or “lone wolf” terrorists inside the borders of the United States and among individuals not notorious for becoming radicalized. Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, and John Walker as well as the “Lackawanna Six”—the al Qaeda sleeper cell originating out of Buffalo, New

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York—are just few of the “home grown” terrorist inspired by the al Qaeda movement.31 While the “home grown” terrorist phenomenon inspired by the al Qaeda movement poses a unique problem insofar as they are terrorists not traditionally affiliated with al Qaeda, the real challenge to U.S. security is the ability of the movement to unite otherwise separate foreign terrorist organizations under the banner of al Qaeda.32 In 1998, bin Laden created the International Islamic Front for jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders (IIF), which includes members from Egypt’s Gama’a al Islamiya, the secretary-general of the Pakistani religious party known as the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), and the head of Bangladesh’s jihad Movement, to name only a few.33 In addition to the IIF, bin Laden has forged an alliance between al Qaeda and “franchise groups” in Iraq, Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines, including Ansar al Islam, Jemaah Islamiah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.34 The most alarming of all, however, and perhaps the best example of al Qaeda’s ability as a movement to unite otherwise uncommon groups, is the connection between al Qaeda, a Sunni organization, and Hizbollah,35 a Shi’a group. Hizbollah is considered by many to be the “most sophisticated terrorist group in the world,” and it has become an increasing concern for the United States due to the fact that one of its major centers of operation is in the “tri-border region” in South America, second only to its home base in Lebanon.36 Hizbollah is backed by Iran and Syria, longtime adversaries of the United States, and this tri-border region, located where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina meet, “has become the world’s new Libya, a place where terrorists with disparate ideologies—Marxist Columbia Rebels, American white supremacists, Hamas, Hizbollah and others—meet to swap tradecraft.”37 Reports also show a growing connection between Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez and Colombian rebels, and Venezuela’s Margarita Island has recently been coined a “terrorist heaven” for Islamic militant groups.38 Most concerning of all, money raised for terrorist organizations in the United States is often funneled through Latin America via an underground banking network traditionally used by drug cartels, something that will be discussed in length in the following section of this chapter. FINANCING AL QAEDA In a speech on September 24, 2001, President Bush noted that “Money is the lifeblood of terrorist operations today,” and promised to “direct every resource at our command to win the war against terrorists: every avenue of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence. We will starve the terrorists of funding.”39 To date, unfortunately, this promise has only marginally been kept. Al

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Qaeda has not starved to death because it has changed its appetite, so to speak, to reflect its most current organizational structure. Viewing al Qaeda’s organization as an ensemble of loosely connected grapes on a grapevine rather than a snake with a head that can be severed would lead policymakers to focus on the finances of localized cells rather than the organization as a whole. Turning the grapes into raisins one by one is a more appropriate response to the al Qaeda threat than trying to starve the entire snake or chop its head off. There are essentially five sources that Islamic terrorists and al Qaeda specifically use to finance their activities. Having said this, many of the more traditional fundraisers are now outdated and are no longer reliable as primary sources for al Qaeda to raise the money it needs. The four traditional sources for financing terror, called the usual suspects, include individual donations from wealthy individuals, money channeled to al Qaeda through corrupt charities, Osama bin Laden’s own personal wealth and investments, and legitimate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that have been infiltrated or exploited by al Qaeda affiliates or bin Laden himself. The fifth category of funding relates to criminal activity, as described below. Until recently, it has been the shared common wisdom among academics and policymakers that the four traditional avenues for raising funds have been the most reliable and lucrative for many terrorist groups, including al Qaeda. According to Lee Rensselear, “Direct contributions from wealthy Arab benefactors and funds siphoned from Islamic charities are said to represent the mainstay of al Qaida’s global financial network.”40 For years, this system worked quite well, in part due to the fact that the Islamic faith requires that a portion of an individual’s income be allocated to charitable donations; of course, most people never actually knew what their money was being used for. Even as recently as 2002, Saudi Arabia was referred to as one of the largest culprits of “state sponsored terrorism” because of its policy of turning a blind eye to individuals and charities who “continue to donate $1–2 million a month to bin Laden through mosques and other fundraising avenues that also perform legitimate charity work.”41 In another example, the Pakistani office of the Kuwait-based Revival of Islamic Heritage Society allegedly “padded the number of orphans it claimed to care for by providing names of orphans that did not exist or who had died. Funds sent for the purpose of caring for nonexistent or dead orphans were instead diverted to al Qaida terrorists.”42 For years these wealthy individuals and charities have been the most important sources of funds for al Qaeda, but in recent days and months, al Qaeda has been forced to look elsewhere to raise its money. The other two traditional fundraisers on the usual suspect list, Osama bin Laden and tainted NGOs, have also been major sources of revenue for al Qaeda, especially after bin Laden first relocated to Sudan. Like

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individual donations and charities, however, Osama bin Laden and NGOs have been the primary targets for the United States and the international community in the post-9/11 era, due to their notoriety. For example, many of bin Laden’s portfolio investments in Mauritius, Singapore, and Malaysia; his bank accounts in Hong Kong, London, and Dubai; and his real estate ventures in Europe have been discovered and frozen in part due to Presidential Executive Order 13224 issued on September 23, 2001.43 As early as 2002, over 250 individuals and groups affiliated with al Qaeda had been designated under this Executive Order, and $36 million in terroristrelated funds in 92 separate accounts had reportedly been frozen by U.S. financial institutions.44 Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council issued on January 16, 2002, a consolidated freeze list of some 300 individuals and entities linked to al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and the Taliban. In so doing, $85 million of terrorist bank funds have reportedly been frozen outside the United States since September 11, 2001.45 Despite these successes, it is not appropriate for the United States to become complacent, nor is it time to march around on an aircraft carrier declaring victory. Al Qaeda is like a virus, insofar as it is able to mutate and become resistant to medicines directed its way. Adapting to financial constraints imposed by the United States and the international community reflects the “protean nature” of this enemy.46 For instance, recent trends noted by the State Department suggest that al Qaeda has been able to adapt to the new international constraints placed on its decentralized organization. One of these adaptations, according to the U.S. Department of States’ “Country Reports on Global Terrorism 2005,” is that more terrorist groups are aligning with international criminals to finance their objectives.47 Typically, terrorist networks and international criminals have eschewed becoming too intertwined.48 Some reasons for this include a desire to avoid unnecessary attention from authorities, and because each type of organization has very different objectives; terror groups have political objectives and criminals have financial ones. Given the new circumstances, however, al Qaeda members and sympathizers have found some international crime networks particularly attractive for a couple of reasons. First, a few international criminal organizations yield massive revenues, and second, these organizations have already established networks and channels through which they can conduct business. Criminals generally cooperate with terror groups so long as their operations are not in jeopardy, and because terrorists come for cheap due to their political, as opposed to financial, goals. Until now, many have acknowledged crime as a means for which al Qaeda cells support their day-to-day operations, but not something that can sustain the organization itself. Credit card fraud and kidnapping are just two of the ways that crime is understood to supply terror cells with

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money. There are two other known criminal moneymaking avenues, however, that have the potential to generate significant revenues, beyond those needed for self-maintenance. For example, an Algerian al Qaeda cell detected in Britain in 1997 reportedly raised over $200,000 in 6 months through a variety of criminal activities, according to Rohan Gunaratna.49 The illegal trade of precious stones and drugs, typically confined to the international criminal community, presents the greatest danger to the national security of the United States because it allows individuals in the United States adhering to the al Qaeda ideology to raise enough money on their own to perform 9/11-type attacks without leadership and financing from abroad. The Washington Post, citing Western intelligence officials and other informed sources, claims that bin Laden’s network “reaped millions of dollars in the past three years from the illicit sale of diamonds moved by rebels in Sierra Leone alone.”50 Another revenue source has been tanzanite, a valuable purplish-brown crystal from Northern Tanzania. According to the Wall Street Journal, two al Qaeda companies—Tanzanite King and Black Giant—recently exported quantities of uncut stones from Kenya to Hong Kong and made millions in profits.51 Despite the large sums of money that can be made through trading precious stones, the international narcotics trade is the most attractive criminal network to exploit, however, for three simple reasons. First, the demand for drugs is extremely high. Second, many countries enjoying a comparative advantage in the production of drugs share a border with the United States or have relatively easy access to the border. And third, already established networks for transferring money without a trail used by drug traders can also be exploited by terrorists. Without an avenue to transfer money, the money raised is useless. Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda relied extensively on commercial banks, shell banks, front companies, and NGOs to move funds for their global operations. Recently however, according to Rensselear, “al Qaida is relying increasingly on non-bank mechanisms to move and store funds.”52 Since 9/11, al Qaeda has been forced to depend increasingly on informal or alternative ways of manipulating and transferring funds because the formal banking systems have been targeted and regulated. Underground banking, called the hawala, hundi, or black market peso exchange, provide a means of sending money across borders anonymously and without physical transport or electronic transfer of funds.53 Money brokers (called hawaladars) in one location receive cash from a client, such as a cab driver in New York, who wants to send money to a family member or friend in another country.54 The hawaladar alerts a corresponding broker in the other country by telephone, e-mail, or fax, who then dispenses the equivalent amount of money, less fees, to the recipient. Neither the sender nor the recipient needs to identify themselves; the transaction takes place using prearranged codes much like tracking

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numbers. The client in the other country is also permitted to transmit money in the same way back into the United States at a later date. The transactions take place without any physical currency ever crossing the border. These money-transferring networks were originally conceived as a financial exchange for immigrant workers but, especially in the United States, the network has been exploited by drug traffickers and most recently terrorists. Similarly, the black market peso exchange (BMPE) has been a tool used by Colombian drug cartels to produce revenues larger than half the countries in the world.55 As noted by the State Department, “The black market peso exchange is documented as the largest known money laundering system in the Western Hemisphere . . . Tens of billions of dollars a year are said to move through such informal value transfer systems.”56 The way it works is a Colombian cocaine exporter sells cocaine in the United States for dollars and then sells the dollars to a Colombian black market peso broker’s agent in the United States. The broker then deposits the equivalent of Colombian pesos, less fees, into the exporter’s bank account in Colombia. Just as in the hawala exchange system, no currency actually crosses the U.S. and Colombian borders. The broker may then resell the dollars to a Colombian importer, who uses them to purchase U.S. goods that are then shipped back into Colombia.57 Unfortunately, current actions taken domestically and internationally to combat problems associated with the underground banking systems are weak at best. Since 9/11, for example, all hawaladars are supposed to register their operations with the state in which they reside, but there are absolutely no mechanisms to ensure that this takes place, nor are there severe penalties for noncompliance. Understandably, as Rensselear observes, “U.S. officials admit to having very little luck tracking movements of funds through these informal systems, which explains why efforts to break the terrorist financial chain have been decreasingly productive.”58 CONCLUSION To date, the Bush Administration has relied heavily on the military to deal with the al Qaeda threat, which is reflective of the anachronistic way in which the Administration views its contemporary adversary. Despite organizational and leadership setbacks in the wake of September 11, al Qaeda continues to be a credible threat to the security of the United States. The other policy option for the Administration to confront al Qaeda has been a financial one. Accordingly, the U.S. Department of Treasury has stated that the U.S. policy has been “starving the terrorists of funding and shutting down the institutions that support or facilitate terrorism.”59 Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act, for example, directly addresses the issue

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of terrorist financing. In the most simplistic sense, Title III essentially upgrades older money laundering laws like the Bank Security Act (1970s), the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, the Money Laundering Control Act (1986), the Annuzio-Wilie Anti-Money Laundering Act (1992), the Money Laundering Suppression Act (1994), and the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Act (1998) by rewording them to address terrorist money activities rather than just criminal activities.60 In addition, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—which in 1977 granted “special powers” to freeze foreign assets pursuant to a declaration of a national emergency with respect to a threat, “which has its source in whole or in part outside the United States to the national security of the United States”—was updated under Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act to grant similar powers to the Secretary of the Treasury to address terrorist finances specifically.61 Substantial funds have been frozen domestically and internationally, but “after this initial sweep [post 9/11 initiatives], the freezing of terrorist assets slowed down considerably.”62 The problem with Title III is that it (like the anachronistic legislation it is founded on) targets only the usual suspects of terrorist financing—namely, state-sponsored terrorist financing, donations from wealthy individuals, and contributions from Islamic charities. The 9/11 Commission Report even recommended that less be expected from efforts to dry up terrorist money supplies; more ought to be devoted to confronting the terrorists directly and beefing up the intelligence community to better understand the nature of new terrorist networks.63 The problem does not lie with our expectations, however, and efforts to combat al Qaeda financially can prove fruitful so long as how al Qaeda is organized and operates today is correctly understood. Little has been done by the United States or the international community to deal with the ways in which individual al Qaeda cells obtain large sums of money, for example, including the underground banking networks mentioned earlier. Fighting the al Qaeda movement itself is still another policy option not yet fully developed, and understanding that al Qaeda is glued together by its ideology is vital for success. Before leaving office, Donald Rumsfeld pioneered a “strategic communications” campaign aimed at tackling the al Qaeda ideology head on. As stated by Rumsfeld, “the war on terror is not only being fought on the battlefield, but in the newsrooms—in places like New York, London, Cairo and elsewhere.”64 Despite concerns that the Department of Defense could ignite a propaganda war that would “distort the truth” about Islam as a whole rather than target al Qaeda specifically, the campaign demonstrates that the Bush Administration is at least beginning to acknowledge that al Qaeda has become a movement, and in so doing the Administration is perhaps recognizing for the first time the power of ideas in international relations.

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NOTES 1. President George W. Bush, address to the nation (September 11, 2001). 2. Rohan.Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Kenneth Katzman, “Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment,” CRS Report (August 17, 2005). 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Lee Rennsselaer, “Terrorist Financing: The U.S. and International Response,” CRS Report (December 6, 2002). 10. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission Report) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2004), http://www. gpoaccess.gov/911. 11. The 9/11 Commission Report, 139, 203–214. 12. Katzman, “Al Qaeda.” 13. Ibid. 14. Craig Whitlock. “al Qaeda Leaders Seen in Control,” Washington Post (July 24, 2005). 15. Katzman, “Al Qaeda.” 16. Ibid., 7 17. National Counter Terrorism Center, Country Reports on Global Terrorism 2005 (April 28, 2006). 18. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. A complete list is available online at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/033104.pdf. 19. Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 82(4): 27. 20. Rohan Gunaranta, “The Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004), 91-100. 21. For more on this, please see the chapters by Brad Bowman and James Robbins in volume 1 of this book. 22. Roy Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies (New York: AddisonWesley, 2004). 23. Recent statement made by Zuwahiri in an effort to describe al Qaeda’s vision of Jihad. See Shmuel Bar and Yair Minzili, “The Zawahiri Letter and the Strategy of al-Qaeda” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology vol. 3. (February 16, 2006). Available at http://www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/pubID.40/ pub detail.asp 24. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. 25. Ibid., 91. 26. Ibid., 87. 27. Stern, “The Protean Enemy” 24–40. 28. Dr. Marc Genest, Interview at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. For more information, refer to the Naval War College Web site, http://www.nwc.navy. mil.

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29. Ibid., 34. For more on this, please see James J. F. Forest, Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 30. Cited in Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 36. See also, J. Michael Waller, “Prisons and Terrorist Breeding Grounds,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes, vol. 1, ed. James J. F. Forest (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). 31. Ibid. 32. See CRS Report RL32223 for a complete list of officially designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf. 33. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 31 34. Ibid., 32 35. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah; however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 36. Stern, in “The Protean Enemy,” refers to Hizbollah as being the “most sophisticated terror network in the world.” 37. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 32 38. Ibid. 39. Katzman, “Al Qaida,” 2, 4. 40. Rensselaer, “Terrorist Financing,” 8. 41. Ibid., 18. 42. U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Department Fact Sheet, op. cit., 13. 43. Ibid., 12. 44. U.S. Treasury Department, “Unofficial List of Terrorist Individuals and Groups Designated by the United States since September 11, 2001,” December 3, 2002. 45. Rensselaer “Terrorist Financing.” 46. See Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” and Rohan Gunaratna, “The PostMadrid Face of Al Qaida.” 47. Perl, Raphael. “Trends in Terrorism: 2006. CRS Report (July 21, 2006). 48. For more on this, please see the chapter by J. P. Larsson in this volume. 49. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaida 65—Information obtained at New Scotland Yard Interview (March 2002). 50. Douglas Farah, “al Qaida Cash Tied to the Diamond Trade, Sale of Gems from Sierra Leone; Rebels Raised Millions, Sources Say,” The Washington Post (November 2, 2001). 51. Robert Block and Daniel Pearl, “Underground Trade: Much Smuggled Gem Called Tanzanite Helps bin Laden Supporters, The Wall Street Journal (November 18, 2001). 52. Rennsselaer, “Terrorist Financing,” 11. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid; Jimmy Gurule, “The Financial War on Terrorism,” Statement before the Senate Finance Committee, Federal Document Clearing House (October 9, 2002) 7.

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57. U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Justice, National Money Laundering Strategy (Washington, DC: July 2002). 58. Rensselaer. “Terrorist Financing.” 59. Statement of Secretary Paul O’Neill on signing of Executive Order Authorizing the Treasury Department Block Funds of Terrorists and their Associates (September 24, 2001). 60. Martin A. Weiss, “Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and InterAgency Coordination,” CRS Report (August 4, 2005). 61. Ibid., 3. 62. Ibid. 63. The 9/11 Commission Report. 64. Donald Rumsfeld, speech given in front of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. See “New Realities in the Media Age: A Conversation with Donald Rumsfeld,” Council on Foreign Relations (February 17, 2006), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/9900.

CHAPTER 26 IRAQ IN THE 21ST CENTURY Robert J. Pauly, Jr., and Jeff Stephens

In March 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush released his administration’s second National Security Strategy (NSS), a document that places considerable emphasis on the prospects for the political transformation of the Greater Middle East and, specifically, Iraq. Most broadly, in its opening paragraph, the NSS explicitly states that: It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. In the world today, the fundamental character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among them. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.1

The Bush administration’s emphasis on the need for economic and political reform with capitalist and liberal democratic characteristics across the Greater Middle East grew initially out of al Qaeda’s devastating attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon on the outskirts of Washington, DC, on September 11, 2001. In short, Bush believes that creating opportunities for freedom of expression, representative democratic governance, and vibrant economic growth within the states of the Greater Middle East will reduce the support for terrorist groups such as al Qaeda, especially over the long term. The first step toward achieving that end, in the administration’s view, was to remove repressive regimes controlled by the Taliban in Afghanistan and then President Saddam Hussein in Iraq through the prosecution of Operation Enduring Freedom in the fall of 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

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in the spring of 2003, respectively. The second and ongoing stage of the process is to help create conditions that are favorable for the development of enduring liberal democratic institutions with domestic ethnic, cultural, and religious characteristics through the conduct of nation/state-building operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Regrettably, although not surprisingly, progress in each of those projects has been limited and proceeded at a rather glacial pace, most notably so because of a lack of security, particularly in the heart of Iraq—Anbar province, and the capital Baghdad—where the vast majority of that state’s formerly economically and politically powerful (and now marginalized and embittered) minority Sunni community is situated. Bush emphasized the administration’s approach in his second Inaugural Address in January 2005, and reiterated it in the NSS. In the former context, for example, he explained that: Freedom, by its nature, must be chosen, and defended by citizens, and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities. And when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.2

The NSS builds on the same theme, while stressing that the task at hand— namely, reducing the influence of extremist groups that pervert the interpretation of Islam to serve their own geopolitical aims (including, but not limited to, al Qaeda)—is one that will demand an enduring commitment by the United States, its allies and the broader international community: Achieving this goal is the work of generations. The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular ideology but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement and repression. Like those who came before us, we must lay the foundations and build the institutions that our country needs to meet the challenges we face.3

The most daunting of those challenges to date have come in Iraq, a case that will be addressed in this chapter. The discussion begins by providing an overview of the role of American military forces in nation/statebuilding operations in Iraq since 2003, followed by an examination of the

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socioeconomic, judicial, political, and security components of those operations. The chapter then reviews insights that U.S. civilian and military leaders and policymakers should draw from America’s efforts in Iraq to date, and the chapter concludes with an assessment of the prospects for the future of that state under reconstruction. NATION/STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ: AN OVERVIEW There are two interconnected reasons why nation/state-building is indispensable to the Bush administration’s policy toward the Greater Middle East—and, specifically, Iraq. First, the elimination of Saddam’s regime through the conduct of the second Iraq War from March to May 2003 created a power vacuum that had to be filled expeditiously in order to avoid the failure of the nascent postconflict Iraqi state. Without a sustained American commitment to the stabilization of Iraq and the cultivation of representative political institutions and a free market economy, that state will itself likely fail and become a base for terrorist groups in the future. As Robert I. Rotberg has asserted, “In the wake of September 11, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension. . . . The existence of these kinds of countries, and the instability that they harbor, not only threatens the lives and livelihoods of their own peoples but endangers world peace.”4 Second, any strategy must begin somewhere. With respect to Bush’s promised liberal democratization of the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East, the point of departure was—and remains— Iraq.5 As is true of most nation/state-building projects, the present U.S.-led endeavor in Iraq features interconnected socioeconomic, judicial, political, and security components. Policies associated with each of those components have been—and will continue to be—applied in distinctive (and, to some extent, overlapping) stages played out over the short, medium, and long terms. The first step in the process was (and remains) postconflict stabilization. In the case of Iraq, pursuit of that end has entailed the deployment of military forces—primarily, albeit not exclusively, those from the United States and the United Kingdom—to provide security for individuals ranging from Iraqis to humanitarian aid workers from international organizations and NGOs, in an attempt to foster political and social stability and economic prosperity, which, regrettably, has yet to occur. As evidenced by the myriad attacks carried out against proponents of (and participants in) reconstruction operations to date—including escalating attacks on coalition forces and civilians in 2004–2005 and the eruption of sectarian violence in 2006—the challenges to enduring stability in Iraq remain daunting. The Hoover Institution’s Larry Diamond,

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an expert on democratization who served as an advisor to the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad in 2004, explains that the “First lesson of America’s experience in Iraq is that the stabilization— not to mention the democratization—of a state that has collapsed or been toppled through violent conflict is an intrinsically difficult and protracted process that requires a huge commitment from both internal and international actors.”6 Similarly, former Ambassador James Dobbins notes that “[H]olding together ethnically divided societies is hardly a new or unfamiliar task. . . . What makes Iraq different and a particularly difficult case is that for the first time the United States has tried to put a society back together without securing the cooperation, however grudging, of the principal neighbors of the state in question.”7 The construction of a fully democratic and independent Iraqi state is necessarily a long-term goal. The timetable for the realization of that objective is at present—and will likely remain—at least somewhat ambiguous. But as a general rule, one need only consider the length of past and contemporary nation/state-building projects across the globe. In the aftermath of World War II, for example, 4 years elapsed between the commencement of reconstruction efforts in occupied Germany and the establishment of an independent Federal Republic in May 1949. Similarly, nation/state-building efforts in the Balkans began in December 1995 in Bosnia and are still works in progress. The socioeconomic, judicial, political, and security aspects of the reconstruction of Iraq broadly parallel many of the general characteristics of nation/state-building described in the previous section of this chapter. However, as one would expect, many of the specific details associated with the planning and implementation of those components of nation/state-building operations in Iraq reflect that state’s distinctive history, geography, and natural resources, as well as its ethnic, religious, and tribal diversity. In general terms, that diversity presents problems comparable to those faced by the United States and its allies in the Balkans. Economically, Iraq is unique in that it possesses the requisite natural resources (in the form of vast petroleum reserves) for the construction of a vibrant economy, albeit one that lacks even a measure of diversification. Yet, for that to occur, occupying forces—and, more importantly, the Iraqis themselves—must supply the security necessary to rebuild and maintain the requisite physical infrastructure to use those resources productively. Once the infrastructure is at least relatively free from the threat of sabotage by loyalists to Saddam’s now-defunct regime as well as by transnational terrorist organizations and dissatisfied Sunni insurgents, Iraqi domestic and international officials and the institutions they administer can begin instituting the deeper free-market reforms required for Iraq to compete both regionally and globally.

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Similarly, the political aspects of nation/state-building in Iraq can be compartmentalized in a series of stages. The first stage involves the administration of temporary governmental institutions by the military and civilian occupation forces of the United States, United Kingdom, and their coalition partners. Second, local and national transitional bodies must be developed and composed of Iraqis reflective of the ethnic and religious diversity of the domestic population, deemed reliable by the occupying forces, and accepted to whatever extent is feasible by neighboring Persian Gulf states. And third, a fully independent Iraq must be established with enduring democratic institutions.8 For either economic or political reconstruction to proceed in an expeditious—and ultimately successful—fashion, the long-term deployment of outside forces (most notably from America and the United Kingdom) is essential, concurrent with the continuing training and buildup of Iraqi military and police forces. Collectively, those forces have been (and will continue to be) relied upon to pursue and apprehend those insurgents determined to disrupt nation/state-building operations, and also to protect civilians attempting to carry out those operations, as well as the Iraqi general population. These are obviously daunting challenges, and ones that cannot be shouldered exclusively by the American military, particularly over the long term. As The Atlantic Monthly’s Robert Kaplan, who has spent extended periods imbedded with U.S. military units in Iraq over the past 2 years, notes, “On a landscape flattened by anarchy in 2004, the American military has constructed a house of cards. Fortifying this fragile structure with wood and cement now will require more aid—in massive amounts and of a type that even America’s increasingly civil affairsoriented military cannot provide.”9 Put simply, the conduct of nation/state-building operations in Iraq requires interaction among a variety of actors, ranging from individuals, extended families, political parties, and religious groups to states, international institutions, terrorist organizations, and NGOs. The interplay of these actors will continue to manifest itself at both the domestic and international levels within and outside of the Persian Gulf region. The strongest challenges to reconstruction efforts in Iraq have grown out of two sets of domestic-level relationships, those between representatives of the U.S.-led nation/state-building coalition and the Iraqi population, and among members of Iraq’s Kurdish, Shiite, and Sunni ethnic and religious groups. The level of stability, or lack thereof, in the former set of relationships— and within the postwar state itself—is conditioned largely by the extent to which those who suffered when Saddam was in charge believe their lives have improved since the fall of the Iraqi dictator’s regime. Building that trust hinges on the capacity of the nation/state builders (American civilian administrator L. Paul Bremer III between June 2003 and June

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2004, and since then Ambassadors John Negroponte and Zalmay Khalizad and their staffs, along with coalition military forces, and the institutions of the nascent Iraqi government) to reduce the perpetual domestic security threats posed by al Qaeda in Iraq and followers of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Saddam loyalists, and an assortment of dissatisfied Sunnis aligned with one or both those groups or acting alone on one hand, and power struggles among Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis on the other. Yet, notwithstanding the aforementioned challenges, limited hope for the eventual liberal democratization of Iraq remains, even for those such as Diamond, who have been critical of nation/state-building efforts there to date. As he concludes, “After nearly three years and a bitter cost in lives and treasure, the United States now has a real chance to help Iraq move toward stabilization. It will not be quick or easy, and real democracy may be years away. But compared with the tyranny of Saddam Hussein or the chaos since the invasion, stabilization would count as considerable progress.”10 ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN NATION/STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ U.S. military forces have played a significant role in nation/statebuilding operations in Iraq since the end of OIF in the spring of 2003. This section of the chapter examines the contributions of the military to those operations in the socioeconomic, judicial, political, and security contexts. Socioeconomic Context One of the most significant challenges in the aftermath of any conflict is to restore order as expeditiously as possible in order to begin meeting the economic needs of the citizens once a given regime has fallen. Ideally, it is best to have a detailed plan at the ready to help restore and then maintain order, one that has been developed well in advance. Regrettably, in the case of Iraq, the United States did not plan adequately for the disorder that prevailed once Saddam’s regime had fallen. American planners anticipated that U.S. forces would be welcomed as liberators and that, despite the collapse of the leadership of the regime, those individuals responsible for policing Iraq and providing public services would remain on the job. Instead, Iraq’s institutions ceased functioning and Baghdad and the surrounding Sunni-dominated region of central Iraq were subject to mass looting that damaged the infrastructure and, more significantly, left the streets unsafe and immediately fostered negative perceptions of the United States and its coalition partners among the native population.11 During the planning for OIF, the Pentagon prepared to deal with a humanitarian crisis that it anticipated would grow out of the massive

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flight of refugees concurrent with the conflict between U.S. and Iraqi forces. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner to administer the postconflict reconstruction team, but insisted on a limited military presence in Iraq, one that (in terms of soldier-to-population ratio) was markedly smaller than those in previous American nation/state-building efforts in places such as BosniaHerzegovina and Kosovo. One report issued by the RAND Corporation, for instance, recommended that ideally, the soldier-to-citizen ratio in any nation/state-building project should be approximately 1: 20. Based on Iraq’s population of 25 million, the United States would need a force presence of 500,000. However, the Pentagon ignored the report, as well as similar advice put forward from staffers on the Department of State’s “Future of Iraq Project” and the presence has never grown above 130,000.12 A higher force presence would likely have been helpful in restoring order in Iraq in April and May 2003. Bremer, who replaced Garner a month after the latter’s arrival in Baghdad, and headed the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq from June 2003 to June 2004, recommended as much repeatedly, but his requests fell on deaf ears in Washington. Yet, lack of manpower was only one of many challenges to development of the necessary foundation for a productive Iraqi economy. The state’s infrastructure, for instance, was itself in a state of disrepair long before the commencement of the second Iraq War.13 The condition of much of the equipment needed to take advantage of Iraq’s most valuable resource—petroleum—is perhaps the most significant such example. As Bremer noted in describing the condition of a typical Iraqi oil refinery in his memoirs, The control room of the Daura oil refinery on the outskirts of Baghdad reminded me of the phony rocket ship cockpits on the Flash Gordon TV shows I watched as a kid: levers, steam gauges, and hand cranks. The stifling room exemplified the difficult economic challenges we faced. The manager, a softspoken, competent engineer named Dashar Khashab, pointed out the broken windows and the acres of rusty, cracking towers and piping. “The Americans built this in 1955,” he said. “Almost nothing has been replaced . . . repaired, yes, but not replaced.”14

Building a self-sufficient—let alone prosperous—Iraqi economy is necessarily a long-term task, one the leadership of that state will have to achieve gradually, with outside assistance as necessary. Where the U.S. military has been effective over the past 3 years in Iraq is in the use of public works projects to help build rapport with the population at the municipal level in towns and villages across the state. The problem is that, despite successes at the micro level, conditions in Iraq have not improved significantly overall since the fall of Saddam’s regime.

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Judicial Context In Iraq, as is the case across the Islamic world, the concept of justice is of critical importance in the way Muslims perceive both their own governments and those of intervening (and occupying) powers such as the United States. To most Muslims, receiving treatment they believe to be just is as important—if not more so—than building institutions deemed democratic by Western standards.15 The challenge for American military forces and their coalition partners has been to give credence to Iraqi cultural and religious norms in their interactions with the citizenry broadly, and while meting out justice to members of Saddam Hussein’s regime and those domestic and foreign fighters who have participated in the insurgency over the past 3 years. To date, the results of U.S. attempts to engender a perception of just treatment in Iraq have been mixed. Where American forces have had the most success is in pursuing Saddam and the upper echelon of Baath Party leaders who served him. Tracking down and killing Uday and Qusay Hussein in July 2003, and capturing Saddam and turning him over to Iraqi officials for trial in a domestic court, for example, helped to create a sense that members of the regime would be forced to pay for the crimes they had committed over the previous quarter-century. For those Iraqis who had suffered under Saddam’s rule, the dictator’s capture was particularly satisfying. As Bremer explained in recalling the news conference he held to announce Saddam’s capture, the “effect was immediate and dramatic. Iraqi journalists were on their feet, cheering wildly, as were several Western reporters, but it was the expressions of undisguised joy among the Iraqis that were most moving. I realized that those of us born and raised in freedom could never appreciate the profound psychological impact of tyranny. As long as Saddam had been somewhere out there, Iraqis feared that he might return.”16 Regrettably, the pursuit, capture, and imprisonment of former Baathists and members of the insurgency have also had a negative side. Most notably, in the spring of 2004, in response to press reports of alleged abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S. servicemen and women and private contractors at the Abu Ghraib Prison, the same site where Saddam’s regime tortured and executed opponents over the years, the Department of Defense (DOD) revealed its own internal investigation confirming the abuses. While the abuses committed by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib were clearly not on the scale of those perpetrated by the Baathists under Saddam, the fact that such abuses occurred was itself more than enough to taint the image of the American military within the Iraqi population.17 As is also the case with terrorism, one attack is often all that is needed to create a negative perception of one ethnic or religious group within a given society.

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Political Context One of the most challenging aspects of the nation/state-building operations that have become the rule rather than the exception in the pursuit of U.S. interests since the end of the cold war is the incorporation of the military into the political component of such operations. Ideally, the planning and implementation of a given nation/state-building project should involve effective cooperation and coordination between military and civilian agencies, most notably the DOD and Department of State (DOS). As discussed earlier in the chapter, the lack of effective coordination between those two agencies was in part to blame for Garner’s failure to stabilize Iraq prior to Bremer’s arrival. Both the DOD and DOS did spend significant time planning for the aftermath of the fall of the regime; they just failed to compare notes as well as they should have. The military, on the other hand, has in practice been more effective in helping to transform Iraq politically at the local level. For instance, if one examines the situation in Iraq closely enough, there are certainly signs of progress that have been achieved primarily as a result of the actions of American servicemen and women within the context of civil-military operations at the local level. Consider, for instance, the example of Army Major James A. Gavrilis, whose 12-man special forces team established a functioning municipal democracy in Ar Rutbah, a Sunni city of 25,000 in the Anbar province of Iraq near the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Working closely with civil administrators, policemen, and tribal leaders, Gavrilis’ unit orchestrated the development of representative political institutions and public services that were staffed and administered by the citizens of the town.18 It is an example that has been replicated in locales across Iraq. Yet, until similar successes are achieved at the national level, such examples are more likely to be overlooked than lauded as indicators of the potential for a positive future for Iraqis.

Security Context The U.S. military “footprint” in Iraq is markedly larger than that in Afghanistan, and organized resistance to the American occupation has been considerably greater in Iraq. In short, both the challenges faced by American forces and the stakes associated with success and failure in Iraq have increased at a proportionally higher rate than in Afghanistan. Two of the most significant reasons for this are the emphasis placed on pursuing nation/state-building operations in Iraq by the Bush administration, and countering efforts by domestic insurgents and foreign fighters aligned with al Qaeda to undermine those operations. Collectively, these factors have raised the relative costs of the U.S. presence in Iraq, which has resulted in the deaths of more than 2,500 American servicemen and women there since March 2003.19

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The extent of the troop presence in Iraq—and consistent calls by some critics of the Bush administration to increase that presence—grow out of a broader debate within the DOD over the manner in which military forces should or should not be utilized in nation/state-building projects. Generally speaking, one side of this debate does not think the military should play a central role in nation/state-building projects; its proponents suggest, instead, that U.S. forces should focus much more on traditional war-fighting tasks, which those forces carried out quite effectively in OIF. Those on the other side of the debate recognize the importance of using nation/state-building projects—and civil-military operations therein—to reduce the number of failing and failed states in the Greater Middle East and diminish the capabilities of terrorist groups in that region. As is true of Afghanistan, the conduct of civil-military operations has resulted in a great deal of progress in terms of the development of physical infrastructure and political institutions in selected cases at the local level, but projects such as the reconstruction of schools and negotiation of power-sharing arrangements on village councils are typically overshadowed by the daily violence generated by the insurgency. Regrettably, no matter how many schools one builds or public works projects one launches, these types of endeavors simply do not generate the same extent of media coverage as the detonation of improvised explosive devices and commission of homicide bombings by insurgents with roots inside and outside of Iraq. For example, although hundreds of new schools have been opened in Iraq over the past 3 years, 26,496 insurgent attacks were carried out therein in 2004 and 34,131 in 2005.20 Not surprisingly, the latter figures tend to draw much more public attention than the former. LESSONS LEARNED FROM NATION/STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS IN IRAQ As is true of any nation/state-building endeavor, it is essential for U.S. policymakers in both the civilian and military ranks to attempt to draw some useful insights from the case of Iraq to apply to their future tasks both within and outside of that state under reconstruction. This section of the chapter identifies such insights in four issue areas—planning, civilmilitary cooperation and coordination, confronting an insurgency, and public diplomacy at home and abroad. Planning Planning is of critical importance to the successful execution of each component of any nation/state-building project, whether carried out by civilian or military actors or a combination of the two. When preparing for such operations, receiving input from both civilian and military organizations (most notable the DOD and DOS), and incorporating that input into

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a coherent plan of action is essential. Without instructive input from area experts with the requisite background understanding of a given region or state, nation/state-building is likely to prove unnecessarily complicated. Put simply, “cookie-cutter” models are problematic when dealing with regions as diverse in terms of ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and religious interpretation as the Greater Middle East. Consider the case of Iraq. On balance, the DOD failed to identify beforehand some of the most significant challenges U.S. forces were likely to face in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam’s regime (most notably, the extent to which Iraq’s police and public services would disintegrate), hurdles that were forecast by the DOS “Future of Iraq Project.” That lack of preparedness resulted in the failure to put an expeditious stop to the looting that followed the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. As a result, the first impression of American forces developed by many Iraqis who had waited decades for Saddam’s ouster was a negative one. As brutal as Saddam’s rule had been, the streets of Baghdad were perhaps more dangerous in terms of the potential for an individual to experience random violence than was the case previously. One of the shortcomings of the U.S. government in the years preceding the events of September 11, 2001, was a lack of coordination between agencies charged with safeguarding America’s national security. Comparable shortcomings hampered planning for the postconflict stage of the second Iraq War. If the United States is to succeed in the transformation of Iraq and the Greater Middle East, let alone continue to achieve progress in the war on terrorism, cooperation and coordination between agencies, including (but not limited to) the DOD and DOS, must improve considerably. Civil-Military Cooperation and Coordination While it is essential that the U.S. military play a significant role in the conduct of nation/state-building operations, it is also clear that American civilian agencies such as the DOS and U.S. Agency for International Development must contribute a great deal as well. The same is true of international organizations and NGOs. Carrying out an effective civil-military operation—whether building a school or setting up a clinic to provide medical treatment to Iraqis in a particular town or village—typically demands contributions from several if not all of the above actors. Collaboration and coordination among those actors, on the other hand, is often difficult to achieve, both at the policymaking level and in practice on the ground in a given state. Both the DOS and DOD have placed increasing emphasis on the issue area of postconflict reconstruction and nation/statebuilding since the events of 9/11. They must continue to focus on that issue area and encourage interaction among representatives of government agencies, the military, international organizations, NGOs, and the

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academic communities to develop increasingly better strategies for the humanitarian and civil-military components of nation/state-building in the future. Confronting the Insurgents The strength of any insurgent movement is contingent on the extent to which it can depend on the population of a state under occupation to support its efforts. The level of such support, in turn, depends on the impact of the occupying force on the lives of the citizens of the state involved. The more expertise members of the occupying military forces have in interacting with individuals from a culture other than their own, the more likely it is that they will be able to develop the rapport with those individuals necessary to ensure that impact is more positive than negative. The lower that level of knowledge, by contrast, the less effective an occupying force is likely to be. If a significant number of servicemen and women, for example, lack the linguistic skills to communicate with the people in the state they are occupying, it will be difficult to create a positive impression therein. In Iraq, U.S. military forces have faced challenges in dealing with multiple domestic- and foreign-supported insurgencies, and have had to do so with minimal previous training on the culture, language, and religion of the society of that state. The multipronged insurgency has at least four principal bases of support: foreign fighters associated with al Qaeda in Iraq, whose founder—the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—was killed by American forces in June 2006; loyalists to Saddam’s regime; Sunnis discontent with the nation/state-building process generally and, in particular, their lack of power in the new Iraqi political system; and Shiite militants loyal to the cleric Muqtadah al-Sadr. Three years after the end of OIF, both coalition military forces and the Iraqi police and security forces continue to suffer significant casualties on a daily basis in the struggle with these various insurgent groups. In addition, the insurgency has contributed to the eruption of sectarian violence between Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds across Iraq. Above all, such violence is demonstrative of the need for greater familiarity with the interethnic and intrareligious tensions of a state such as Iraq prior to engaging in nation/state-building efforts therein. Public Diplomacy at Home and Abroad One of the most daunting challenges associated with nation/statebuilding generally, and civil-military operations specifically, is in promoting those concepts among an American public with a limited attention span for foreign and security affairs unless directly threatened at home.

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The events of 9/11 led to a greater awareness of the international system broadly, and of failing and failed states in the Greater Middle East in particular. However, it is much more difficult to transform that interest into support for concepts such as nation/state-building and civil-military operations with which the public is not familiar and unwilling to advocate if it is perceived to entail a substantial financial cost to the government and thus the taxpayers. In short, unless there is a sense within the U.S. public that the threats posed by terrorists are as significant as was the case in the immediate aftermath of al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11, and also that creating an atmosphere conducive to economic growth and democratic reforms through nation/state-building in foreign lands will reduce those threats, apathy and disinterest (if not outright opposition) toward such concepts is likely to be the prevalent sentiment among Americans. Consequently, above all else, nation/state-building and civil-military operations must be linked to security in order to achieve even a measure of support within the U.S. population. Nation/state-building operations must also be sold to the population of the state under reconstruction—in this case, Iraq. As discussed earlier in this section of the chapter, it is essential that Americans deployed to Iraq— members of the military and civilians alike—develop a greater capacity to communicate with the local citizens in their own languages, most notably Arabic and Kurdish. Communicating in one’s native language is always helpful in communicating one’s ideas more clearly to a target audience. In Iraq, the message to be communicated is that economic and political reform will prove beneficial to the population. However, the message alone is not enough. It must be supported by progress on the ground, most significantly as pertains to the level of security in Iraq everyday. Regrettably, progress in that context is not likely in the short term, which makes convincing Iraqis to continue to make sacrifices considerably more difficult. Perhaps the best way to do so is by maintaining the U.S. commitment and making comparable sacrifices. CONCLUSION Above all, the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq is absolutely indispensable to the broader transformation of the Islamic world. President Bush and his advisors have emphasized this repeatedly since the elimination of Saddam’s regime in April 2003 and the commencement of reconstruction operations the ensuing month. In its NSS, for instance, the administration stresses that: [the] terrorists today see Iraq as the central front of their fight against the United States. They want to defeat America in Iraq and force us to abandon our allies before a stable democratic government has been established that

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can provide for its own security. The terrorists believe they would then have proven that the United States is a waning power and an unreliable friend. In the chaos of a broken Iraq the terrorists believe they would be able to establish a safe haven like they had in Afghanistan, only this time in the heart of a geopolitically vital region. Surrendering to the terrorists would likewise hand them a powerful recruiting tool: the perception that they are the vanguard of history.21

This statement is demonstrative of two underlying points. First, the transformation of Iraq continues to present economic, military, and political roadblocks that will take years, if not decades, to overcome. Second, it is essential to see the Iraqi nation/state-building project through to completion. In short, subsequent administrations, whether Republican or Democratic, must maintain America’s commitment to economic and political reform across the Greater Middle East over the long term. Failing to do so will only further embolden Islamic extremist groups, including (but by no means limited to) al Qaeda. At the core of insurgent efforts to undermine nation/state-building operations in Iraq is the fear that the United States will establish an enduring free market economy and representative government there. That outcome could eventually lead to two developments that dictatorial regimes and terrorist groups alike would abhor: an improved standard of living for members of the lower classes of society; and the creation of a political atmosphere in which individuals are free to elect and, if they choose, criticize those in power. With Iraq as a model, other countries possessing comparably autocratic characteristics to those of Saddam’s former regime could be the next candidates for economic and political transformation. Such autocratic states include Iran, which has the potential to pose significant threats to U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf in the future. There were, for example, a variety of factors behind Bush’s characterization of Iran as a member of the “axis of evil” in his 2002 State of the Union address.22 First, Tehran is in the process of acquiring and refining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) generally, and nuclear weapons in particular, along with the means to deliver them to targets throughout the Greater Middle East. Notwithstanding its status as a signatory to the NonProliferation Treaty, Iran is developing a series of nominal civilian reactors that could provide the fissile materials necessary to construct atomic weaponry. In addition, Washington suspects that Iran has broken its obligations under the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological Weapons Convention.23 Second, while Iran has not been linked directly to the events of 9/11, it remains on the DOS’s list of state sponsors of terrorism and is suspected of complicity in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers.24 Third, Tehran continues to undermine the fleeting Israeli-Palestinian peace process by providing economic, military,

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and political support to terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad.25 As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has asserted, “Iranian behavior puts it squarely in the ‘axis of evil’—whether it is weapons of mass destruction or terrorism or any of those things. It’s a complicated situation, but I think the behavior speaks for itself.”26 American efforts to promote democratic change in Iraq scare not only the Iranians, but also the leaders of terrorist organizations. There are two reasons why. First, those groups thrive on discontent, if not outright desperation, to recruit members willing to sacrifice their lives to battle the adversaries they blame for the dearth of economic growth and political freedom prevalent across much of the Arab world. One such adversary (the United States) is perceived by many Muslims to be responsible for the majority of these shortcomings. Should Bush—or, for that matter, any other American president—manage to use a successful transformation of Iraq to start the engine of reform at the broader regional level, the pool of terrorist recruits would decrease substantially. Second, while Osama bin Laden and his ilk also seek the elimination of the present governments in control of states throughout the Middle East, they would prefer that those changes come under their auspices. That would, of course, allow them to take control and install equally repressive regimes, which they could then administer in a style similar to that of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The establishment of representative democracies, by contrast, would encourage the free expression of dissent to prevent the development of any type of autocracy, whether Islamic or secular in character. Assuming that the democratization of the Greater Middle East is a realistic long-term objective, the Bush administration deserves credit for taking the initial step toward its achievement. However, it is also essential to recognize that the pursuit of such a revolutionary transformation will entail substantial costs and require a commitment that lasts for decades rather than years. Most significantly, those costs will grow out of the myriad challenges associated with the transformation Bush has suggested the United States should pursue. Broadly articulated ethnic differences between groups tend to complicate reconstruction efforts at the national level, most notably as pertains to the creation and subsequent administration of economic and financial institutions in a given domestic environment. When individuals of one ethnic persuasion are appointed to leadership positions in such institutions, their counterparts from other groups understandably demand equitable treatment that, while morally just in theory, may slow the recovery process in practice. The reluctance of members of a particular ethnic group to accept advice from—and by extension, place their trust in— foreigners is equally problematic. When those foreigners represent institutions perceived to be in business simply to do the bidding to the United States, earning that trust can be exceedingly difficult within the developing world, generally, and the Greater Middle East specifically.

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Challenges related to linguistic differences and intraethnic familial and tribal rivalries typically prove especially daunting at the local level. Even if, for instance, one ethnic group is represented on a transitional economic or political body at the national level, it is by no means certain that decisions taken by that entity will be accepted by the leaders of tribes or villages thousands of miles from the capital. And, in those cases where local leaders agree to help administer humanitarian aid in an area under their control, communications are not always smooth between starving civilians and the foreign soldiers or NGO workers distributing foodstuffs. Similarly, religious impediments to the economic and financial aspects of nation/state-building manifest themselves in interactions among individuals, states, and institutions at several different levels. Inter- and intradenominational differences, for instance, are often evident locally and nationally, as well as regionally and globally. Domestically, inter- and intradenominational religious disputes have the potential to undermine both the political and economic aspects of reconstruction projects. Some international religious impediments to nation/state-building grow out of global issues (support from a small but violent minority of Muslims for transnational terrorist organizations, as evidenced by efforts to sabotage reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, is one such example). Others are the result of the use of NGOs to spread one faith (most often Christianity or Islam) in a state or region where the vast majority of the inhabitants already adhere to another. Putting forward the effort to overcome these hurdles—and accepting the requisite economic, military, and political costs that accumulate along the way—will provide an opportunity to alter the broader relationship between Islam and the West in an equally favorable manner. The United States has embraced comparably daunting challenges in the past, most notably its commitment in the aftermath of World War II, to the idea of a Europe whole and free. That project is now nearly 60 years old and gradually nearing completion, with the EU and NATO both moving forward with their most recent enlargement processes in 2004. Lacking the economic, military, and political sacrifices the Americans and Western Europeans made during the cold war, the European continent, too, might still lack the freedoms the Bush administration now hopes to spread to the Greater Middle East. NOTES 1. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006): 1. 2. George W.Bush, “Inaugural Address,” White House Office of the Press Secretary (January 20, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/ print/20050120-1.html. 3. Bush, National Security Strategy, 1.

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4. Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror,” Foreign Affairs (July/ August 2002): 127. 5. For two particularly useful studies on the Bush administration’s efforts to democratize the Greater Middle East through a combination of the preemptive use of force followed by the implementation of nation-building operations, please see John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004) and Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 6. Larry Diamond, “Iraq and Democracy: The Lessons Learned,” Current History (January 2006): 34. 7. James Dobbins, “No Model War,” Foreign Policy (July/August 2006): 155. 8. For an in-depth account of the planning and implementation of U.S.-led nation/state-building operations in Iraq, please see L. Paul Bremer III, with Malcolm McConnell, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006); Larry Diamond, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2005); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); and George Packer, The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). 9. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Normalcy?” The Atlantic Monthly (April 2006): 80. 10. Diamond, “Iraq and Democracy,” 39. 11. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 3–23; Gordon and Trainor, COBRA II, 138–158, 457– 507; Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 149–250. 12. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 10. 13. Ibid., 1–22. 14. Ibid., 61. 15. For an in-depth examination of the relationship between freedom and justice in the Middle East, please see Bernard Lewis, “Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2005) 361–51. 16. Bremer, My Year in Iraq, 253. 17. Ibid., 279–280, 350–352; Packer, The Assassins’ Gate, 325–326. 18. James A. Gavrilis, “The Mayor of Ar Rutbah,” Foreign Policy (November/December 2005) 28-35. 19. “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in PostSaddam Iraq,” The Brookings Institution (July 2006), http://www.brookings.edu/ fp/saban/iraq/indexarchive.htm. 20. Ibid. 21. Bush, National Security Strategy, 12–13. 22. George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” White House Office of the Press Secretary (January 29, 2002). 23. “Blowing your Chances,” Economist, (August 22, 2002); “Know Thine Enemy,” Economist (January 31, 2002).

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24. “Background Note: Iran,” U.S. Department of State (December 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5314.htm. 25. “The Spectre of being Next in Line,” Economist (April 11, 2002). 26. Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks on Terrorism and Foreign Policy at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations,” White House Office of the Press Secretary (April 29, 2002).

CHAPTER 27 THE TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP: AMERICA’S NEW COMMITMENT TO AFRICA Lianne Kennedy Boudali

“Torn apart by war, disease, and poverty, and marked by vast ungoverned spaces, Africa is an emerging haven for our enemies in the Global War on Terrorism. The Trans-Sahara region . . . is becoming increasingly important as terrorists now seek out these routes for logistical support, recruiting grounds, and safe haven.” —Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, 20051 “In the absence of Congressional willingness to fund a serious engagement by other parts of the government, the Pentagon has become a major player by emphasizing the prospect of terrorism, though military planners themselves recognize the inherent dangers in a purely military counter-terrorism program.” —International Crisis Group, 20052

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government has significantly enhanced its level of engagement with African governments in response to the increasingly global nature of terrorism. The Department of Defense has been in the forefront of recent efforts to raise Africa’s profile in Washington, joining forces with the Department of State on a series of innovative interagency initiatives. This collaboration might come as a surprise to many Americans, who tend to view Africa as a distant continent afflicted with humanitarian disasters: tragic, surely, but not a threat to national security. In fact, there is a growing recognition in

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Washington policy circles that the social and economic instability plaguing much of Africa is a strategic concern for the United States. The Department of Defense has collaborated with the Department of State to develop the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which supports African states’ efforts to improve border security and enact counterterrorism measures while also facilitating regional cooperation, promoting democratic governance, and improving relations with the United States.3 This chapter examines the connection between security and development in Africa, describes the TSCTP program, and then ends with a discussion of the potential benefits and risks of the initiative.

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN AFRICA The Link between Development and Security Relative levels of modernization and development vary enormously among the countries of North Africa and the Sahel.4 All the states in this region have been affected by colonization or the interference of colonial powers, and all of them have multiple ethnic groups within their territories. A few of these states are fledgling democracies, and many have stable though undemocratic governments while others have been plagued by ongoing violence and instability. The region’s economies are fragile: most include a mix of state-owned industry and subsistence agriculture, underpinned with a significant amount of black market activity. Traditional trading economies that once moved gold, salt, marble, and slaves across the desert now supply illegal immigrants, arms, drugs, and cigarettes in addition to gold and precious stones. Large regions of the desert have never been under the control of a colonial power or a central government, and in some areas tribal authority still trumps state authority. This region is an excellent example of what the Pentagon has called “ungoverned space.” Illegal activities generate much more income than traditional occupations such as agriculture, and almost anything can be moved across the poorly watched borders with a four-wheel drive vehicle and a few bribes. For some individuals, criminal activity—particularly smuggling— has been a gateway to direct participation in terrorist actions. Smugglers’ transportation skills, criminal network associations, and knowledge of the desert make them desirable recruits for terrorist groups. North African terrorist groups often rely on criminal associates in Europe to provide logistical support, and European-based terrorist cells may generate revenue for North African groups through credit card fraud and other kinds of petty crime. Violent extremist groups target unemployed and underemployed young men in North and West Africa for recruitment into terrorist organizations. These extremist groups attract individuals who are angry or

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frustrated with their own government for failing to provide economic opportunities. Disenfranchised youth, many of whom lack a good education or competitive job skills, are vulnerable to an ideology that offers simple solutions and promises great rewards. If the economic situation in Africa continues to stagnate, association with extremist groups will become more appealing for both financial and ideological reasons. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN AFRICA The level of terrorist activity in Africa is rising, and local authorities have had little success intercepting groups scattered throughout vast areas of desert terrain that is extremely difficult to monitor. North African terrorist groups have entrenched networks in Europe, and the different groups appear to cooperate quite well with each other. The growing involvement of North Africans in international terrorism has led to a recent focus on North Africa and the Sahel as a potential “safe haven” for terrorists. In 2003, for example, 32 European tourists were taken hostage and held for several months by the Groupe Salafist pour la Pr´edication et le Combat (GSPC5 ), an Algerian Islamic militant group. They were released after the German government reportedly paid a ransom of €5 million to the terrorists. After releasing the hostages, the leader of the GSPC cell, a former Algerian paratrooper named Amari Saifi (whose nom de guerre is “El Para”) led his band of fighters on a running gun battle that began in Mali, transited Niger, and ended in Chad.6 Although the GSPC is nominally an Algerian nationalist organization, El Para’s band of jihadists included fighters from other North African and Sahelian countries. The group had roamed through the Sahel for years before the kidnapping incident drew the attention of Western security services and provoked a strong reaction from regional militaries. The United States European Combatant Command (EUCOM), which happened to be in the midst of a series of military trainings for local armies, was able to provide logistical support to regional armies as they pursued El Para across the desert. Soldiers from Mali, Algeria, Niger, and Chad participated in the manhunt, which traversed three international borders. El Para was eventually captured by a Chadian rebel group called the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad,7 which repatriated El Para to Algeria, where he remains in custody today. Other GSPC cells have trained mujahideen to fight in Iraq with AbuMusab al-Zarqawi’s organization, and they have escorted al Qaeda emissaries into North Africa with the intention of unifying the various local terrorist groups under the umbrella of al Qaeda.8 In 2004, the Moroccan security services disrupted an al Qaeda-supported plot to attack American and European ships passing through the Strait of Gibraltar. North African

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terrorists have been responsible for attacks in Madrid, Casablanca, and Algiers, and they have laid the groundwork for attacks in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom.9 The GSPC openly declared its allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2004,10 and its cells have been discovered in Italy, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Canada. GSPC cells in Europe are involved in fund-raising and logistics support for al Qaeda cells, including the al Qaeda in Iraq group that was headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.11 Other North African groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group also have connections to the global jihad. These groups’ memberships are not limited by national origin, and the GSPC in particular is increasingly filling its ranks with non-Algerian recruits.12 The countries of North Africa and the Sahel have responded aggressively to the terrorist groups’ activities, but the physical territory in question is so vast (and the underlying socioeconomic conditions so dire) that external assistance and coordination is necessary. Strategic Energy Interests The growing amount of West African oil reaching U.S. markets has complicated the debate over how to define U.S. interests in Africa. Currently, the United States imports 18 percent of its oil from West Africa, with Nigeria and Angola being the largest exporters. By 2015 that percentage is expected to grow to 25 percent of U.S. imports.13 In 2002, Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said that African oil has “become a strategic interest for us.”14 European companies currently dominate the West African oil markets, but ExxonMobil and ChevronTexaco both have interests in Nigeria, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.15 When U.S. sanctions against Libya are lifted, American oil companies will certainly look for opportunities to partner with Ghaddafi’s regime.16 Revenues from oil exports present both an opportunity and a challenge for African governments, as they must balance competing demands for the increased revenue. Local populations will expect to see some material benefit from record-high oil prices. For several years, Nigeria has suffered from civil violence resulting from local communities’ demands for a higher share of the profits that are flowing to the central government. Corruption and cronyism have been constant barriers to effective governance throughout Africa, and profits from oil exports will likely exacerbate these problems—particularly in places like Chad, Mauritania, and Equatorial Guinea—if heads of state are unable to resist pressure from elites who expect to benefit from the oil revenue. There will also be a strong temptation on the part of many regimes to bulk up military and security services as a hedge against internal instability. Such spending may in turn alienate both local populations and members of the international donor community. In

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short, Africa is facing a confluence of social, economic, and security issues that can no longer be ignored by the United States. THE TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP (TSCTP) The primary objectives of the National Strategy for Combating Terror are to preserve and promote free and open societies, defeat terrorist extremism, and create a global environment that is inhospitable to terrorists.17 Two cornerstones of this strategy are expanding the capacity of foreign partners to combat terrorism and reducing ideological support for terrorism. For the strategy to succeed in Africa, the United States will need to help African governments provide viable social and economic opportunities to their people, thereby “disaggregating” the local conditions that lead to social unrest from the extremist ideology that facilitates terrorist activity. The TSCTP addresses this challenge through a combination of militaryto-military security assistance and development programs that aim to reduce support for violent extremism. At its most basic level, the TSCTP seeks to reduce the impact of terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel, and thereby reduce the terrorist threat to the United States. The TSCTP’s military elements will increase the capacity of participating countries to identify and respond to internal security threats. Development assistance will address the social and economic issues that facilitate the spread of extremist and violent organizations and ideologies. Finally, public outreach campaigns will promote democratic institutions and values while building positive impressions of the United States. This is an ambitious program with enormous potential, but it has a great number of moving parts and a complicated budget structure. It is also a work in progress, whose success or failure rests on the ability of individuals to overcome the inherent bureaucratic hurdles described below. The TSCTP is an extension of the earlier Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which began in 2003 with a 2-year budget of $7.75 million provided by the State Department.18 The PSI allocated $6.25 million during its first year to conduct training and capacity building in Niger, Mali, Chad, and Mauritania.19 Local military companies of approximately 100 men each were trained by U.S. Marines and Army Special Forces in basic marksmanship, planning, communications, land navigation, and patrolling.20 Participating countries also received equipment such as night vision goggles and specially equipped sports utility vehicles. The PSI was judged to be a success by both U.S. officials and local participants, and EUCOM led the way in pushing for an expansion of the program.21 The next iteration, the TSCTP, added Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Senegal to the original four PSI countries, with officials leaving open the possibility that Libya could be included at a later date.

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Previous training programs sponsored by the United States included the Africa Response Force, the African Crisis Initiative, Operation Focus Relief, the African Contingency Operations Training Assistance, the Coastal Security Program, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative.22 Most of these emphasized peacekeeping operations rather than offensive capabilities. Of these, the Coastal Security Program, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, and the Global Peace Operations Initiative are still in place. The TSCTP does not indicate a policy shift away from peacekeeping operations, but rather, seeks to provide a supplementary set of skills to countries with certain kinds of internal security concerns and with populations considered “at-risk” for their potential to support terrorism. The budget for TSCTP is roughly $100 million per year, beginning in 2007 and continuing through 2013. The program budget is in fact a combination of funds requested by the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Defense. The TSCTP is supplemented by “Section 1206,” which provides the Secretaries of State and Defense with spending authority to jointly implement programs to build capacity in partner nations by providing training and equipment to foreign military forces.23 The majority of the TSCTP budget will be spent on development initiatives such as improving health and education, building community centers, providing vocational training, supporting girls’ scholarship funds, promoting transparency in governance, and providing support and training for community radio stations.24 Embassy teams are working with EUCOM and USAID personnel to determine the package of development programs that will match the goals of the TSCTP to the needs of the host country. In many cases, USAID will have the responsibility for managing the programs in the field, which may build on existing USAID programs or adapt programs that have been successful in other countries. Public diplomacy and public affairs messages are critical in ensuring that local populations recognize that the TSCTP programs are sponsored by the United States. To this end, the TSCTP will continue to field Military Information Support Teams (MIST) and Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE), two program elements that were created during the PSI. These teams’ mission is to generate support for the United States and for moderate Islamic viewpoints while reducing sympathy and support for terrorism, boosting the regional Embassies’ efforts in this area by providing additional human and financial resources.25 Each MIST has anywhere from two to six people, supplied by EUCOM, who work with U.S. Embassies to augment existing public diplomacy programs that articulate U.S. policy positions. MIST deployments begin with a survey to develop a theme, such as promoting democracy and tolerance or providing conflict management skills. Examples of products include billboards, T-shirts, backpacks, and basketballs printed with slogans such

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as “One Family, One Nation” or “Unity and Strength.” A program in Nigeria teaches nonviolent conflict resolution and provides social engagement for at-risk youth through basketball leagues. The CMSE teams work with local governments to develop humanitarian assistance plans, and they also provide facilitation and training to foster effective civil-military coordination. Specific programs range from capacity-building seminars for local militaries to the promotion of moderate authors and textbooks for local schools. These relatively low-cost initiatives are a deliberate means of showcasing American engagement in the region, and it is hoped that such programs will build lasting goodwill toward the United States. From EUCOM’s perspective, the TSCTP overlaps neatly with its own Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), the goal of which is to enable partner nations to effectively control terrorism within their borders. Under the TSCTP umbrella, EUCOM works with the local Embassies to advise and train local military units and improve intelligence and communications capacities. EUCOM will continue to coordinate with the Embassies to organize regional military exercises, and to coordinate Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Finance, and International Military Education and Training initiatives. The Ambassador and his/her team works with EUCOM to adjust these programs as needed to meet the specific goals of the TSCTP, facilitating communications with the host government. The military aspects of the TSCTP/OEF-TS include the basic infantry training described earlier, but also include more advanced counterterrorism capabilities such as improving communication systems and developing mechanisms for regional intelligence sharing. EUCOM is sponsoring regional conferences of defense ministers and military intelligence chiefs in order to build trust among them and demonstrate the advantages of cooperation. Joint military exercises are planned for most countries, and some of the units in the Sahel countries will receive equipment as part of training at the company level. EUCOM will also work to develop more effective command and control mechanisms by enhancing tactical communications capability. A key element of the military to military engagement will be promoting professionalism and deference to civilian authority while also creating positive impressions of American military personnel. AFRICAN STATES’ RESPONSE TO THE TSCTP Regional governments have their own motives for participating in U.S. policy initiatives, of course, and some critics of the TSCTP have suggested that the increased amount of dollars flowing to the region have encouraged African governments to report terrorist problems where there are

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none. For some countries, the TSCTP offers a means of creating a closer bilateral relationship with the United States, and regional militaries are keen to earn the prestige associated with joint military exercises with American troops. Underlying these complex motivations is an essential difference of opinion between the United States and the African governments over the nature of the terrorist threat in Africa. The United States is most concerned about the phenomenon of international terrorism, whereas most African officials are preoccupied with terrorism that poses a threat to domestic security. These perspectives are not incompatible, but the differences must be taken into account if U.S. policies in the region are to be successful. Each state’s needs vary enormously, and the Department of State, Department of Defense, and USAID are working closely with the host countries to determine the appropriate individualized package of training and capacitybuilding for each state. This process will be critical to the success of the TSCTP, and the final outcomes of the program will then depend on the ability of each country team to coordinate its execution with EUCOM and the host country counterparts. Initial local response to the PSI program in Mali, Chad, and Niger was positive, and these countries’ experience no doubt helped lay the groundwork for the expansion of the program. Regional governments will obviously be more interested in participating in a program that meets their needs—one with an appropriate balance of military operations and development initiatives. For example, there is a significant difference in the current internal security capacity of the North African states as compared to the Sahelian states. The state institutions of the Maghreb countries— including judicial, police, and military capabilities—are much more developed and professionalized than those of the Sahelian states. North African and Sahelian states have therefore responded differently to United States and European policy initiatives. For instance, Morocco’s response to the TSCTP/OEF-TS has been complicated by the inclusion of its historical rival Algeria. Morocco has traditionally been the United States’ closest ally in North Africa, and some in Morocco feel that the special relationship between the two countries is threatened by the United States’ recent interest in improving ties with Algeria. Additionally, the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces already possess the basic infantry skills that are the core of the OEF-TS training (moreover, some observers believe that the Moroccan military poses a greater potential threat to the survival of the current regime than do the Islamists). The Moroccan government might find greater utility in programs that would develop law enforcement capacity or support in revising the criminal code in such a way as to facilitate criminal prosecution of terroristrelated activity.26

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BUREAUCRATIC PITFALLS AND ALTERNATE APPROACHES Within the U.S. government, there is disagreement over both the sources of the instability that decreases security and the sort of policy solutions that are most suitable to address them. Some American officials and others who have been involved in the region for some time are concerned that the TSCTP’s emphasis on terrorist threats will not address the chronic problems of underdevelopment, and may in fact exacerbate anti-American sentiment by strengthening the capabilities of security services, which could then be used to quell domestic opposition to the regime in power. These critics have argued that the United States’ association with these regimes will create resentment among civilian populations while doing nothing to improve the social conditions that facilitate terrorism. Particular aspects of the TSCTP may be politically sensitive, and it will be important that the Embassies be the primary communication channel with the host country and the local media. For example, Chadian President Idriss Deby is quite unpopular at home, and the United States risks guilt by association if the TSCTP comes to be seen as a mechanism to prop up an unwanted regime (France’s unwavering support for Deby has already damaged its popularity among Chadians). It would be easy for antiAmerican elements to leverage local media to accuse the United States of training up a personal militia that will be used to keep Deby in power, and therefore it will be important for the Embassy in N’djamena to send regular, clearly articulated media messages that explain the goals and the scope of the TSCTP. This will require coordination between EUCOM personnel and Embassy personnel to ensure that individuals do not give public statements that contradict or undermine the stated program goals. In the end, the effectiveness of the TSCTP will depend on the ability of the Departments of State and Defense to cooperate both in Washington and on the ground in the TSCTP countries. The phrase “interagency cooperation” has often been considered an oxymoron, yet the success of the TSCTP depends on the presence of effective, truly collaborative working relationships among the participating agencies. Coordination on the ground between the various parts of the country teams and EUCOM personnel are currently often a matter of ad hoc coordination based on personal relationships. If the country teams believe that the TSCTP is a worthy initiative, they will leverage their local contacts to facilitate coordination with the host country. Conversely, if the Ambassador or other key players in the local embassy do not support the TSCTP, reluctant support (or outright opposition) would prevent its execution. The United States’ response to the growing concern over security in Africa is further complicated by the profusion of agencies within the U.S. government that have some responsibility for Africa, and the lack of standard geographic delineation of areas of operation. Until recently,

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the Pentagon divided responsibility for Africa among three different regional commands—European Command, Central Command, and Pacific Command—whose geographic divisions do not match the organization of the regional desks of the Department of State. Every bureaucracy has its own culture, and it should not be surprising if “cultural differences” between the Departments of State and Defense have caused friction during the PSI and the early phases of the TSCTP. The two organizations have different processes of communication and decision making, and different definitions of success. Complicating this interagency friction is the fact that military personnel are currently staffing a number of embassy positions because the Department of State has experienced difficulty in staffing such positions. There is reason to hope that the interagency relationships may improve in the years to come. The Department of State has developed a Regional Security Initiative (RSI), which is meant to help Embassies identify and address key counterterrorism concerns on a regional basis. The RSI should facilitate cooperation between regional partner nations and foster greater local collaboration with European and NATO allies. Additionally, on February 6th of 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the creation of a new geographic command for Africa that will consolidate responsibility for Africa into one organization. The idea of establishing a Combatant Command for Africa had been circulating for some time, but details about the Command’s location and staffing are not yet public, and there is a risk that the TSCTP might lose momentum during transfer of command from EUCOM to the new entity. It is far too early to judge the success of the TSCTP, but the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) provides an interesting example of a multilateral initiative that has successfully integrated security and humanitarian goals into a single mission. The CJTF-HOA was originally conceived as a U.S. Marine Corps mission to disrupt terrorism in the Horn of Africa, defined by U.S. Central Command as Somalia, Yemen, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. CJTF-HOA began in 2002, using the USS Mount Whitney, anchored near Djibouti, as a base of operations.27 In 2005, the Navy assumed operational command of the mission, and the command center was moved to permanent headquarters at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti. Camp Lemonier hosts hundreds of special operations forces and CIA personnel who conduct a range of antiterrorist activities such as the Predator strike against an al Qaeda target in Yemen in 2002.28 However, the bulk of the American personnel stationed at Lemonier—currently numbering around 1,500—work with French, British, Dutch, Romanian, and Korean partners on humanitarian missions such as digging wells, repairing schools, clinics, and hospitals, and conducting medical and veterinary clinics.29 CJTF-HOA has worked with USAID to coordinate both agencies’ efforts with local NGOs, which

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are slowly overcoming their initial mistrust of the military’s intentions in the region.30 CJTF-HOA’s strong record with multilateral interdisciplinary projects is a good indicator for TSCTP’s prospects for success. The United States has not been alone in its concern for terrorism in Africa, as European nations have also been providing counterterrorism training and assistance to African countries. European countries have traditionally had close relationships with their former colonies, providing the bulk of foreign training and arms. For example, France sponsors RECAMP—Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities—a 2-year cycle of training and exercises that focuses on peacekeeping operations. RECAMP participation is rotational, and each iteration of the program focuses on a different geographic region of Africa (such as the ECOWAS countries or the SADC countries). RECAMP is similar to TSCTP in that it focuses on regional interoperability and supplies some materiel to participating countries; however, the skill sets for peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations are fundamentally different. The United States generally participates in programs (such as RECAMP) that are sponsored by other nations or international organizations. For example, in advance of RECAMP V, the United States is funding the construction of several wells in the region. To date, none of these competing initiatives have caused conflict among the NATO members. At the same time, there could be greater effort to improve coordination of these activities to maximize their impact and reduce inefficiencies. Although European countries may be reluctant to acknowledge the growing U.S. role in Africa, it would be more efficient and effective for the NATO allies to coordinate joint security training initiatives rather than to simply participate in each other’s programs. European countries (especially those with colonial-era ties) may have a closer understanding of the subtleties of the local political and cultural contexts, and in many cases, European officials have longstanding personal relationships with senior government and security personnel in North Africa and the Sahel. Everyone—including the African partner states—stands to gain from greater coordination among interested parties. CONCLUSION The terrorist and criminal networks in Africa share a set of capabilities including money laundering, fund-raising, petty crime, forging documents, drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and human trafficking. Throughout the continent, a network of terrorist groups has acquired a wealth of operational knowledge and tactical experience acquired through combat in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq. This knowledge base is expanding as a new generation of jihadi combat veterans return to their home countries after participating in the jihad in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Reducing the current level of terrorist activity is in part a function of destroying existing terrorist networks and preventing their regeneration. Individual terrorists must be killed or captured, and their support networks of logisticians and financiers must be arrested and removed from society. However, the threat of terrorism cannot be eliminated strictly through military actions and law enforcement. Each of the countries in North Africa and the Sahel suffer to varying degrees from a similar set of problems: poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, poor governance, official corruption, and urbanization. The Sahelian countries also face problems of chronic malnutrition and disease, which affect everything from agricultural production to child mortality. A lasting reduction in terrorist violence requires changes in the current social and economic environment in Africa. Without effective governance, without legitimate regimes that operate with the consent of the people, and without opportunities for education and employment, the region will continue to slide toward instability. So long as the population believes that participation in terrorist activity is either spiritually or economically beneficial, terrorist networks will continue to regenerate despite the antiterrorist efforts of local governments. Terrorist activity will be unappealing only when the cost of participation outweighs the benefits, and this requires that regional governments provide social and economic opportunities for their people. A true measure of success for the TSCTP and future programs will be whether or not regional cooperation outlasts the program itself. Should the TSCTP be successful in improving local capacity to respond to internal and external threats, and should increased regional interaction be sustained once the U.S. advisors have returned home, then the program will have demonstrated the value of a coordinated regional approach to security and provided a model for future security policy for the United States, its allies, and partners. NOTES 1. Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, USN, Director, European Plans and Operations Center United States European Command in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation (March 10, 2005). 2. “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?” Africa Report No. 92 (March 31, 2005), International Crisis Group. 3. Rear Admiral Hamlin B. Tallent, USN, Director, European Plans and Operations Center United States European Command in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation (March 10, 2005). 4. For the purpose of this article, “North Africa” or “the Maghreb” includes Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya, while “the Sahel” includes Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad.

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5. On January 24, 2007, the GSPC issued a communiqu´e declaring that it would henceforth be known as The Organization of Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb 6. Salima Tlemcani, “The Enigmatic Case of Abderrazak the Para: Revelations about the Career of a Terrorist Leader,” Algiers El Watan (April 10, 2006), GMP200604100380006, last accessed May 10, 2006, http://www.opensource.gov. 7. Andrew Koch, “U.S. to Bolster Counter-Terrorism Assistance to Africa,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (October 6, 2004). 8. Stephen Ulph, “al-Qaeda Networks Uncovered in Morocco,” Terrorism Focus 2(23) (December 13, 2005). Last accessed January 20, 2006, http://www. jamestown.org. “Al-Hayah Cites Detainees on Moroccan Al Qaida Group that Enlists Volunteers for Iraq,” GMP20051129702002 London Al-Hayah in Arabic (November 29, 2005): 21. Last accessed December 22, 2005, http://www.fbis. gov. “Moroccan Paper on Attempt to Set Up Al Qa’ida Base in North Africa,” GMP20060214710022 Rabat al-Alam in Arabic (February 13, 2006). Last accessed March 22, 2006, http://www.fbis.gov. 9. “Italy: Three Alleged Terrorists Arrested Suspected of Planning Attack in Italy,” EUP200511170580005 Milan Il Giornale (Internet version) in Italian (November 17, 2005). Last accessed November 18, 2005, http://www.fbis.gov. 10. John C.K. Daly, “Libya and al-Qaeda: A Complex Relationship,” Terrorism Monitor 3(6) (March 24, 2005). Last accessed March 8, 2006, http://www. jamestown.org. In 2004, militant Islamic Web sites circulated a declaration that purported to announce the creation of a new al Qaeda affiliate, Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Berber (Organization of al Qaeda in the Land of the Berbers), which was followed several months later by a similar announcement for Qa’idat al-Jihad fi al-Jaza’ir (Organization of al Qaeda in Algeria). 11. “Report Details Contacts between Algeria’s Salafi Group, Syria’s Jund alSham,” GMP20051208700002 London Al-Hayah (Internet version) in Arabic (December 8, 2005). Last accessed March 21, 2006, http://www.fbis.gov. John C.K. Daly, “Libya and al-Qaeda: A Complex Relationship,” Terrorism Monitor 3(6) (March 24, 2005). Last accessed March 8, 2006, http://www.jamestown.org. 12. “Algeria’s Salafists Recruit Members in Maghreb, Sahel Regions,” FEA20060327021388—FBIS Feature—1153 GMT (March 27, 2006). Last accessed March 30, 2006, http://www.fbis.gov. 13. Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group, http://www. whitehouse.gov/energy/. For a thorough treatment of this topic, see James Forest and Matthew Souza, Oil and Terrorism in the New Gulf: Framing U.S. Energy and Security Policies for the Gulf of Guinea (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006). 14. Walter H. Kansteiner, comments during a symposium titled, “African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development,” held at the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies on January 25, 2002. Transcript, http://www.iasps.org/strategic/africatranscript.pdf. 15. Michael T. Klare and Daniel Volman, “Africa’s Oil and American National Security,” Current History 103(673) (May 2004) 226–231. 16. Assistant Secretary Kansteimer was instrumental in reestablishing diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea. Relations had been severed in 1996 after escalating international criticism over the country’s deteriorating human rights

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record and revelations of a government-issued death threat against the U.S. Ambassador. Ken Silverstein, “U.S. Oil Politics in the ‘Kuwait of Africa,’” The Nation (April 22, 2002). Last accessed June 8, 2006, http://www.thenation.com/doc/ 20020422/silverstein. 17. Online at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006. Also, see the Appendix in volume 1 of this publication. 18. First Lt. Phillip Ulmer, “Special Operations Command Europe Trains African Soldiers,” Press release, March 4, 2004, Headquarters United States European Command. Last accessed June 1, 2006, http://www.eucom.mil/english/ FullStory.asp?art=367.“Stripes’ Q&A on DOD’s Pan Sahel Initiative,” Stars and Stripes 5 (April 5, 2004). Last accessed June 5, 2006, http://www.stripes.com/ article.asp?section=104&article=20669&archive=true. Detailed figures are cited in the International Crisis Group Report “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?” Africa Report No. 92, which indicated that Congress approved $6.25 million in FY2004, with just over half of that money going to Mali, leaving $1.7 million for Niger, and $500,000 each for Mauritania and Chad. This money was distributed through EUCOM, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and contractors. 19. Donna Miles, “New Counterterrorism Initiative to Focus on Saharan Africa,” American Forces Press Service (May 16, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/ news/May2005/20050516.html. Accessed January 20, 2006. 20. It was during this series of trainings that El Para staged his kidnapping, and thus attracted the attention of U.S. forces on the ground. 21. Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “As Africans Join Iraqi Insurgency, U.S. Counters with Military Training in Their Lands,” New York Times (June 10, 2005). 22. International Crisis Group Report, “Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction,” Africa Report No. 92 (March 31, 2005). 23. The 2006 fiscal year had a much smaller budget, as it was essentially a bridge between the PSI and the TSCTP. Sebastian Sprenger, “First Phase of Sahara Anti-Terror Effort Could Wrap Up Next Summer,” Inside the Pentagon 22(17) (April 27, 2006); see also Jason Motlagh, “U.S. Seeks to Secure Sahara Desert; Terror Potential Cited In Lawless, Struggling Area,” The Washington Times (November 17, 2005); see also “U.S. looks for Deeper African Engagement,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (July 6, 2005). 24. International Crisis Group Report, “Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?” Africa Report No. 92 (March 31, 2005). 25. Comments gathered at a TSCTP conference hosted by the Department of State in June of 2006 are reflected here, without attribution, as per the conference organizers’ agreement. 26. Comments gathered during interviews with U.S. officials in Morocco in March of 2006 are reflected here, without attribution, as per the officials’ agreement. 27. “U.S. Navy to Take Over Horn of Africa Mission,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (September 28, 2005). 28. US News and World Report (September 28, 2003). Last accessed May 15, 2006, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=926&ncid=959&e=2u=/ usnews/20030929/ts usnews/paxamericana.

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29. “Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,” Global Security.org. Last accessed May 15, 2006, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/cjtfhoa.htm. Jim Garamone, “Combined Force Exhibits New Type of Warfare,” American Forces Press Services (August 18, 2005). 30. Jim Garamone, “Admiral Cites Complexity in Horn of Africa Mission,” American Forces Press Service (April 24, 2006).

CHAPTER 28 VALUES, EMOTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR John B. Alexander

In the Global War on Terror (GWOT), uncompromising and iron-fisted proclamations abound. In announcing the initiation of this campaign, President George W. Bush informed the world that “either you are for us or you are with the terrorists.”1 Other U.S. military and government leaders have made equally provocative statements that infer no quarter will be afforded to terrorists or those who might harbor them. The reality of GWOT is much more complex than this invidious duality, and it is fraught with paradoxes. Precipitated by emotional issues juxtaposed with competing and incompatible values, the execution of counter-terrorism programs become severely hampered by obvious contradictions. Further, these efforts are exacerbated by strenuous efforts by senior leaders to remain politically correct. Four theoretical approaches are most prevalent in the literature on countering terrorism. These are: – enhance security (keep us safe); – eliminate the terrorists (remove the cancer); – attack the support infrastructure (cut their funding); and – alter the conditions that breed discontent and terrorists (drain the swamp).

Each of the means to redress terrorism has advantages and significant disadvantages. Concurrently, each method engenders conflicting values within our own established way of life. Foremost in the minds of the public is ensuring personal security. Failing that, we react violently to any recent terrorist’s attack, with great emphasis on the physical elimination

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or apprehension of the perpetrators. If substantial loss of life or injury occurs, the public more or less demands decisive responses, if not outright retribution. The details and execution of counterterror operations thus become quite complex. When, where, how, and by whom these operations are conducted raise many ethical and legal questions. Additionally, tactical decisions often have strategic consequences, and may be at odds with our long-term national interests. Some geopolitical theoreticians call for the elimination of root causes of instability—namely, the inequitable distribution of wealth. However noble such humanitarian concepts may sound, our reality is bounded by finite resources. Thus, a well thought out, comprehensive, and unemotional plan is required. KEEP US SAFE When physically threatened, our first response is to erect barriers to keep those who would do us harm away. These security barriers may be physical, procedural, legal, operational, and very importantly, psychological. Many of these barriers offer little real protection, but they have a calming effect on the public and foster a sense of normalcy during difficult circumstances. Unfortunately, logic and common sense are among the first casualties during barrier erection. This can be readily observed by the pseudo-random searches at every airport security station in America. Security versus Civil Liberties The American system of jurisprudence is characterized as blind, meaning only influenced by the facts of specific cases. It is specifically designed to minimize emotion and address only issues of law. However, GWOT has severely tested that assumption and will continue to do so. In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), laws were quickly enacted that provided comprehensive authority to the Executive Branch in fighting terrorists. The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in October 2001, called for: – enhanced surveillance procedures; – countering money laundering; – border protection (with expressed concern about illegal immigration); – removal of “obstacles to investigation of terrorism,” through such actions as:

b use of DNA databases b access to educational records b offering rewards;

– strengthened criminal laws against terrorism; and – improved U.S. intelligence capabilities.2

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A few civil libertarians voiced concerns about excessive intrusion into the privacy of U.S. citizens. However, even the name of this legislation— the USA PATRIOT Act—was intentionally intimidating. In that period of national fervor, it inferred that voting against the bill would be unpatriotic. Members of both houses of Congress passed the bill by a wide majority, the Senate having only one nay vote.3 In fact, the emotion-laden vote was consistent with the will of the vast majority of the American people at that time, many of whom were still psychologically distraught over the attacks in New York and Washington. Over time, the PATRIOT Act—as well as the follow-on legislation enacted in March 2006—caused many to question whether or not too much freedom has been sacrificed in the name of security. Some writers suggested that with the Act, Congress might have assisted the terrorists in accomplishing a major goal: that of disrupting our society. The intrinsic balance between civil rights, as guaranteed in the Constitution, and physical security has given rise to many critical analyses, even in military journals.4 As a highly evolved society, the United States has served as a beacon for emerging countries around the world. Throughout most of over two centuries of history, the evolution of our democratic principles has taken place in relative security. Oceans provided comfortable barriers that ensured our national survival was rarely in jeopardy. Under those circumstances, we placed a high priority on advancing individual rights. However, the events of 9/11 changed our perception of security. To better understand the psychological impact of those events, it is useful to look at a model called the hierarchy of needs. In the 1940s and 1950s, noted psychologist Abraham Maslow created a model to describe the relativity of different needs for individuals. He suggested that the ability of an individual to evolve psychologically and function in society was based on the premise that the lower-level needs had to be fulfilled before advancing to more complex modes of behavior. Maslow’s five ascending levels were physiological needs, safety, belongingness and love, esteem, and finally self-actualization. As an example of the relative hierarchy, humans who are struggling daily for basic physiological needs such as food and shelter are rarely engaged in deep contemplative dialogues about the meaning of existence. Only after lower-level needs have been met can one advance to more complex thoughts and deeds. Prior to 9/11, few people in the United States were deeply concerned about the provision of basic physiological needs such as air, food, water, or shelter. Similarly, our collective needs for protection, security, law and order, and stability were generally met. As individuals, and as a society, people concentrated their psychological endeavors on personal relations, work groups, achievement, status, and responsibility. These efforts extended from local and national organizations to our international

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relationships. This advancement in the democratic process was possible because physiological and safety needs were perceived as adequately provided.5 The terrorist attacks in the United States changed all that. Maslow predicted that when individuals were suddenly deprived of lower-level needs, they would immediately regress and employ behaviors designed to provide those requirements. Examples include how quickly rioting has emerged following large natural disasters. One only need look to the experiences following major hurricanes such as Hugo, Andrew, or most recently, Katrina. When the availability of food, water, or personal security was threatened, well-established law and order quickly dissipated, and near-chaotic conditions reigned. This sudden shift in perception creates a paradox of values. Our legal and intellectual strictures are designed to function at the higher social levels, ones that were accommodated in the pre-9/11 world. However, 9/11 reintroduced emotions that were precipitated by lowerlevel functioning—namely, a demand for increased security. Collectively, American values in the post-9/11 world place the need for perceived personal security well above providing for individual freedoms such as a right to privacy. As a result, it is now commonplace to witness searches of personal property, greatly enhanced surveillance in public areas, and even interception of various modes of communication. The full magnitude of this paradox becomes apparent when examining the multitude of legal cases filed on behalf of people who believe their individual rights have been violated for security purposes. The real issue is competing values based on a temporal scale that mediates the state of emotional arousal. The more recent the terrorist attack, the more the public demands security. The more distant the attack, either spatially or temporally, the more likely citizens are to favor individual freedoms. REMOVE THE CANCER The Kill/Capture Paradox A cornerstone of counterterrorist operations has been the kill/capture policy designed to either physically eliminate the terrorists or confine them so that they are no longer a threat. The simplicity and logic of such a policy belies the conundrums it creates. Shortly after 9/11, President Bush announced that he had a “most wanted” list. In subsequent meetings he indicated that many of the people on that list had been killed and a few were in custody. In the tenor of the times, with the value of safety foremost in the minds of Americans, termination of terrorists was not only acceptable, but also laudable. There

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was no questioning of the construction of the list. There was little public concern about where or how the executions had been carried out. If terrorists died, the feeling went, Americans would be safer. Details surrounding the killing of isolated terrorists were seen as inconsequential. More problematic, however, was when specifically identified terrorists were located in close proximity to other people. The response in such situations was mixed, and points to the inherent problems associated with this issue. In some cases, aircraft were authorized to strike the location. Even with precision-guided munitions, collateral casualties could be anticipated. In other cases, targeteers were denied authority to fire for fear of killing innocent civilians. It appears that authority to fire is more likely to be authorized if the primary target is located in a geographically remote area, and those in close proximity are believed to be supportive of the terrorist’s efforts. The January 16, 2006 air strike in Damadola, Pakistan, is such an example. Intelligence indicated that al-Zawahri, the al Qaeda number two leader, would be attending dinner in the village. Only four miles from the Afghanistan border, the area is considered a rebel stronghold. In the attack, at least 17 people were killed, but al-Zawahri was not among them.6 Similarly, the killing of Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi in Yemen by a Hellfire missile launched from an armed Predator controlled from Djibouti exemplifies the complexity of the problem. Al-Harethi, a known terrorist and suspect in the bombing of the USS Cole, was traveling in an SUV with several other people. All were killed in the strike, as it was assumed that only other terrorists would be accompanying him. International issues abound in that al-Harethi was killed in Yemen, by an American operating from Djibouti.7 In these cases the value of security took precedence over isolating the individual and acting only then. It was decided that under the current circumstances collateral casualties were acceptable. There are many more equally complex decisions that have been made. Worth considering is under what conditions the use of lethal force to eliminate a terrorist might be authorized. Could such force be used in Africa, Southeast Asia, or other areas with limited governance? If relations with Mexico continued to decline, would a strike against a known al-Qaeda operative near the southern border (preparing to enter the United States), be authorized? At what point do our values regarding a need for security become sublimated to the values of justice for individuals? The model of eliminating terrorists as a means to solve the problem is seriously flawed as it assumes that there are a fixed number to be killed. In Afghanistan, during the 1980s, the Soviets killed more than a million people. However, each day there were more mujahideen than there were the day before. The very actions taken to kill the opponents ensured that more would join the cause.

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The enchantment of martyrdom is a powerful emotional incentive, one that overlords throughout history have not been able to defeat. Voluntarily sacrificing one’s life is counterintuitive to the most fundamental value known to human beings, that of self-preservation. Perhaps there is a primal recognition of that significance, and these ultimate selfless acts resonate so deeply that they evoke similar response in others, thus perpetuating the ideology meant for extinction. Speaking at a recent Joint Special Operations University symposium on the topic, Dr. Chris Mason noted that killing insurgents has never won a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation.8 That said, COIN operations are an effective means to ensure that the designated terrorist will not commit additional acts against society. The Prisoner Dilemma The issue of prisoners in counterterror operations is equally fraught with conundrums. In every previous war, the termination of hostilities was anticipated. Sometimes that was several years in the future, but repatriation was a reasonable expectation. Now, however, we are faced with the Long War, one that is not likely to end during the lifetime of the participants. The planning horizon of the long war is at a minimum 50 years, and that is probably a conservative estimate. How do we plan for the custody and care of those captured either on a battlefield or when involved in planning or executing terrorist acts? What can be done with detainees in an interminable conflict who openly state they will rejoin terrorist operations if released? In its 2006 report, Amnesty International again urged the closing of the prison facilities at Guantanamo, Cuba. They consider the notion that individuals can be held indefinitely without trial as constituting torture.9 On its face, this report is paradoxical. Except for war criminals, POWs are not subject to trial. Certainly the United States does not want to have our military personnel who are captured in combat become subject to civil or military trials. At the most basic level, there is no clear definition about the status of people taken into custody in GWOT. A lengthy description of detainee status can be found in Thomas Ayres article, “‘Six Floors’ of Detainee Operations in the Post-9/11 World.”10 Questions abound regarding whether they are to be considered prisoners of war (POWs), insurgents, unlawful combatants, detainees, or criminals. Some of the issues impacting their status include: – Where they are captured/taken into custody:

b A country in which armed conflict is ongoing (Afghanistan/Iraq) b In the United States

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b In a country supporting U.S. efforts in GWOT b In a country not supporting U.S. efforts in GWOT (without extradition). – What they are doing when captured:

b b b b b

Fighting on a battlefield In the proximity of a battlefield but not directly involved in fighting Involved in a terrorist attack Detained based on intelligence Civilian arrest based on warrant.

– What they were doing prior to capture:

b Involved in planning a past terrorist attack b Involved in planning a future terrorist attack b Involved in activities that might be related to terrorist attacks.

– Who took them into custody:

b b b b b

U.S. military forces Other Federal agencies State of local law enforcement agencies Foreign military/law enforcement A joint U.S. foreign military/law enforcement force.

– Nationality of the person:

b b b b

Native to the country in which they were captured Foreign to the country in which they were captured U.S. citizen is arrested in the United States US. citizen is captured in a foreign country.

The debate about the status and rights of persons taken into custody as part of GWOT-related operations rages on in courts both national and international, as well as in governmental legislatures. Again, it is our competing values that fuel the controversy. On one side of the argument are emotion-driven values that infer that terrorists should have few rights and must certainly not have access to our civilian court system. The opposing argument treats those in custody for terrorism as if they were common lawbreakers, with rights similar to U.S. citizens accused of crimes. Compounding the issues concerning the rights of those in custody even further are the limitations on activities and procedures that may be used to gather intelligence from them. The law of land warfare and Geneva Conventions clearly state the rules regarding those designated as POWs. In addition to contravening torture, even humiliating or degrading treatment is prohibited. Of course, the limitations were established for conflicts between nations in which the primary combatants were uniformed troops and engaged in open warfare. U.S. soldiers were taught to resist interrogation and all military personnel were required to provide only their name,

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rank, and serial number. Throughout history, POWs have been frequently subjected to harsher physical abuse. That has led to criminal charges being brought against those involved in violations of the laws of war. Interrogation techniques have come under intense scrutiny in recent years. Great controversy abounds concerning the limits of physical and mental duress that can be applied in attempts to extract useful information. The balance between the desire to save lives through information provided by prisoners, and techniques that may be employed to obtain critical data, is a perilous one. In an abstract or ideological environment, absolute dictums are easy to make. However, in real-world situations, practicality is more difficult than we would like to admit. At one end of the spectrum is an adage to “do whatever it takes” in order to prevent loss of life among our citizens. At the other end is to make little or no effort to obtain information, and merely warehouse the prisoners. Values become significant in determining appropriate procedures for handling prisoners. So does the emotional state of our society at various times. The United States has usually maintained the moral high ground in this area. However, as actions taken in Afghanistan and the infamous Abu Ghraib prison incidents in Iraq have come to light, that position is rightfully questioned. When the public is emotionally charged, such as immediately following an attack like 9/11, there is little sympathy for prisoners. As time passes and emotions cool, the society becomes more compassionate. CUT THEIR FUNDING Drugs versus Terror High on the list for resolution should be the inherent conflict between GWOT and the War on Drugs (WOD), which has been conducted for a longer period of time. The WOD was formally announced in 1971, when President Nixon stated that drugs were “America’s enemy number one.”11 In 1988, President Reagan created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). and WOD efforts intensified under the director, General Barry McCaffrey. Since that time, more than half a trillion taxpayer dollars have been spent fighting drugs in one form or another. Despite repeated press announcements concerning drug confiscations, the availability and street price for cocaine and heroin have remained about constant throughout these past three decades.12 Using General McCaffrey’s 1999 figures for the price of cocaine, the problem becomes readily apparent. In his Congressional testimony of that year, he estimated the production cost per gram to be $3 and the street price between $150 and $200. That means that a kilo of cocaine costs about $3,000 to make, and would sell for up to $200,000. That is a profit margin

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of 98.5 percent, and only because the product is illegal.13 There is no other product in the world that has a higher return on investment. Futility in the supply side approach to solving this problem is also reflected in McCaffrey’s Congressional testimony, where with pride he indicated that production of cocaine in Colombia and Peru had dropped by 3,000 metric tons (the street price for that amount would be about $600 million). Yet, despite this reported drop in production, suppliers could keep the price constant. It is worth considering what size an industry must be to absorb a cut of that magnitude without blinking. Balanced against the global income from illegal drugs, estimated at about $400 billion per year, that decline in production is statistically insignificant. McCaffrey’s remarks should be viewed from a cost-benefits standpoint. The 3,000 metric ton reduction was over a 4-year period. In 1999, the ONDCP budget was $17.7 billion.14 Allowing for increases each year, ONDCP expended over $60 billion in the WOD over 4 years, and accomplished a $600 million decrease in available product. Even at inflated street prices, that is a one percent return on investment. By 2001, the annual ONDCP budget had risen to $19.2 billion, with constant market prices. Obviously, there is something wrong with the math. To state “we are winning the war on drugs” is the equivalent of Saddam Hussein stating, “The mother of all battles has yet to start.” The war, if there ever was one, was lost before it began. The demand for drugs in the United States has always been greater than the desire to stop the flow. In the process, we have seen whole countries corrupted, regions destabilized, and even threats made to our own national defense through the loss of trust in selected organizational units and reallocation of resources. The scope of the problem is just too big to be stopped with conventional measures. It is easy to blame Colombia, often the butt of comedians’ jokes, for supplying cocaine to the United States. The reality is that if we had suffered the same percentage of casualties as have the Colombian military, government officials, newspaper personnel, judges, and others who have opposed the narcoterrorists, there would be a massive hue and cry for armed response and a willingness to forego protection of civil rights. Imagine what we would do if the U.S. Supreme Court were physically taken over by traffickers. Few Americans remember that it happened in Colombia in 1986, when the Medellin Cartel took over the Palace of Justice, killing 90 people—including 11 Supreme Court justices. Later, in 1989, the leader of this organization (and reportedly then seventh richest man in the world) Pablo Escobar was responsible for assassinating three of five presidential candidates.15 Before he died, Escobar was responsible for thousands of deaths in Colombia, including the bombing of an Avianca Airliner carrying 107 people.

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Such violence would be unthinkable in the United States, and if it occurred we would have responded vigorously. In short, we should be sympathetic to the Southern refrain that states, “When Yankees stop shoving it up their noses, we’ll stop sending it.” Even some of the most conservative organizations recognized that the WOD had been lost a decade ago. William Buckley, supported by others, came to that conclusion, which was published in a February 1996 issue of the National Review.16 The issue is not one of supporting drug use. In fact, there is evidence that demand reduction and treatment are likely to be more effective than interdiction. As a minimum two significant goals will be accomplished by legalization. First and foremost, a major funding source for terrorists will be cut entirely. Secondly, there should be a steep decrease in secondary crime attributed to theft and robbery to support expensive drug habits and gang wars over distribution rights of their products. There are many books and articles by prestigious authors that have made similar arguments. Economist David Henderson addressed the issue of support for terrorism through continuing the WOD.17 In that article, he noted how the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) financed their terrorist campaign to overthrow the government with drug money. The respected CATO Institute has written extensively about these problems, as have many others.18 If the terrorists’ financial base is to be attacked and eliminated, it cannot be done without removing the financial incentive of illegal drugs. Contrary to the emotional appeals from ONDCP sources, legalization is a pragmatic approach to shaping the battlefield. In fact, continuing the WOD will actually diminish the chances for success in the war on terror. It must be recognized that the fundamental disconnect is one of competing values. For politicians, it is deemed more important to be seen as antidrug than to take the actions necessary to cut drug funding to terrorists. DRAIN THE SWAMP Many political theorists believe that the best method to curtail terrorism is to eliminate the root causes that breed the perpetrators. This model usually infers that epidemic poverty and material deprivation, so widespread in the third world, fosters envy and discontent over inequitable circumstances. Thus, the theory goes, if these basic living conditions can be substantially improved, then instability would decrease and potential terrorists will turn to more fruitful activities, such as earning money and supporting their families. Extreme poverty does exist and it is useful to examine the scope of the problem. Traveling in the third world provides a glimpse of the appalling conditions under which many hundreds of millions of people live. Over 20 percent of the people in the world do not have safe drinking water, and the

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problem is getting worse. Numerically, this is over 1 billion people who are deprived of the most basic resource required for human life.19 Sanitation systems in many areas are near nonexistent. Availability of health care fluctuates widely. For instance, countries in sub-Saharan Africa have 11 percent of the population of the world, yet spend less than 1 percent of the health care dollars.20 Poverty and hunger are inextricably linked. Although the world produces enough food to feed everyone, more than a billion people are living on less than $1 per day, and thus do not have the resources to buy adequate food. In a vicious cycle, poverty causes lack of food, which in turn yields more poverty.21 Other significant problems include poor (if any) secular educational systems, inadequate communications and transportation systems, and terrible working conditions. However, to alter these conditions would require an abrupt alteration in American foreign aid policy, and one that is likely to encounter severe opposition from the public. Most Americans believe that the United States currently spends about 15 percent of the national budget on foreign aid. The reality is that it is far less than 1 percent.22 When compared with other first world nations, the United States ranks 22nd in percentage of the gross national income contributed to foreign aid. In fact, we contribute 0.13 percent, compared with the number one country, Denmark, at 0.96 percent.23 With the economic requirements to change the environment of instability so costly, it would require a dramatic shift in U.S. policy to accomplish the task at hand. That would probably be accompanied by substantial tax increases to pay for these programs. Americans are simply not as generous as we believe ourselves to be, and most U.S. citizens already think we are spending too much on foreign aid. The fundamental problem with the proposed efforts to alter the conditions that breed discontent and terrorists is that it breaks the bank. Even if the public could be persuaded to make a large investment in the strategy, the amount of funding required is unsustainable when viewed from the perspective of five decades or longer. In fact, this proposal must incorporate some extremely unpleasant fiscal realities. Even rudimentary analysis of financial trend data portends the makings of the perfect economic storm. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the public debt exceeds $8 trillion and continues climbing.24 Due to an aging population, large entitlement programs, and heavy government borrowing, bills will soon come due in excess of $53 trillion.25 Based on Congressional Budget Office figures, the direct costs of GWOT as of mid-2006 were over $286 billion.26 That figure, too, has continued to increase as the promised Iraqi oil funding for internal restructuring in that country failed to materialize.27 In fact, the burgeoning national debt is our greatest strategic vulnerability. We do not have the resources necessary to adequately alter the environment of regional instability. The paradox

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is that such change is necessary, and it would probably be cheaper in the long run to bear the burden now, rather than to respond to terrorist attacks that will probably continue for decades to come. The economically based theory that disparity in resources yields terrorism is flawed. However, those who are driven by these Western-oriented values willingly accept this thesis. They simply do not understand the new social structures that are emerging or their underlying beliefs and values. Reducing the enormous economic disparity that exists between the haves and have-nots may assuage some level of civil discontent, and may even diminish the probability of U.S.-armed interventions to some degree. However, this approach fails to account for ideologically motivated individuals and groups who actively reject our commonly held Western value system. Attempting to promote economic stability may lessen, but will not eliminate, the probability of future conflict.28 Therefore, efforts to counter the conditions supporting terror must address ideological differences that drive terrorists to commit acts of extreme violence.

SUMMARY The GWOT is stressing the fabric of American society. We are a nation that desires quick fixes and simple dichotomous solutions for the most complex problems. Terrorism does not offer such solutions. The methods of countering terror that have been discussed evoke obvious paradoxes. They make us closely examine some of our most deeply held values. Our moral compass provides a general sense of direction, not an azimuth. Analogous to the random walk of a diffusion pattern, many factors influence the direction we will take. There are spatial and temporal emotional components to terrorism that cannot be ignored. To be victorious we must insure our values are sound. We must prepare to encounter the unthinkable and predetermine what our responses will be under the most adverse circumstances. We cannot leave our servicemen and women in the untenable position of facing ambiguity and then retroactively establishing the ground rules by which they should have fought. Paradoxes, unpleasant choices, and harsh realities lie ahead. To minimize future conundrums, needed now are comprehensive plans for abhorrent exigencies. Such plans must be firmly grounded on realistic capabilities and fundamentally sound principles, and not on politically correct ideology. NOTES 1. President George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” United States Capitol (September 20, 2001).

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2. “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.” Signed as Public Law 107-56 on October 26, 2001. 3. ACLU, “USA PATRIOT Act” (November 14, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/ safefree/resources/17343res20031114.html; The House of Representatives voted 356-66 in favor on October 24, 2001. On October 25, 2001, the U.S. Senate voted 98-1 in favor, with one “not voting.” 4. Roger Dean Golden, “What Price Security? The USA PATRIOT Act and America’s Balance between Freedom and Security,” in Homeland Security and Terrorism, ed. Russell Howard, James Forest, and Joanne Moore (New York: McGrawHill, 2006). 5. Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1968). 6. Associated Press, “Pakistani Islamist Groups Decry U.S. After Strike,” January 17, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.com/id/10842035/. 7. “U.S. Kills al Qaeda Suspect in Yemen,” USA Today (November 4, 2002), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-11-04-yemenexplosion x.htm. 8. Dr. M. Chris Mason, Counterinsurgency Panel, Countering Global Insurgency Symposium (Hurlburt Airfield, FL: Eglin Air Force Base, May 3, 2006). 9. Irene Khan, Secretary General, “Amnesty International’s Repot 2006,” Press Conference, Foreign Press Association (May 25, 2006). 10. Thomas E. Ayres, “Six Floors” of Detainee Operations in the Post-9/11 World,” Parameters (Autumn 2005): 33–53. 11. “War On Drugs,” http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War On Drugs (accessed October 1, 2006). 12. John B. Alexander, Winning the War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2003). 13. Gen. Barry McCaffrey, Director of ONDCP, Drug Legalization Movement in America: Testimony before the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources (June 16, 1999). 14. National Drug Control Strategy, Budget Summary 2000 (February, 1999), http://www.ncjrs.org/ondcppub/punlications/policy/budget00/exec summ. html. 15. “Killing Pablo,” Philadelphia Enquirer (November 20, 2001). 16. William F. Buckley, Ethan A. Nadelmann, Kurt Schmoke, Joseph D. McNamara, Robert W. Sweet, Thomas Szasz, and Steven B. Duke, “The War on Drugs is Lost,” National Review (February 12, 1996), available at http://www. nationalreview.com/12feb96/drug.html. 17. David R. Henderson, Ph.D., “Ending the U.S. Role in Colombia’s Drug War Would Weaken Terrorism and Strengthen Democracy, San Francisco Chronicle (November 7, 2001). 18. Timothy Lynch, ed. “After Prohibition: An Adult Approach to Drug Policies in the 21st Century,” CATO Institute, Washington, DC (September 8, 2000), available at http://www.cato.org/special/friedman/friedman/friedman3.html. 19. Edward F. Vitzthum and William Arthur Atkins, “Drinking Water and Society,” The Water Encyclopedia (online), March 2006, available at http://www. waterencyclopedia.com/Da-En/Drinking-Water-and-Society.html.

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20. World Health Organization Fact Sheet, “The Global Shortage of Health Workers and its Impact” (April 2006), available at http://www.who.int/ mediacentre/factsheets/fs302/en/index.html. 21. World Hunger Facts 2006, (September 8, 2006), available at http://www. worldhunger.org/articles/Learn/world%20hunger%20facts%202002.htm. 22. U.S. Treasury Department, “The Debt to the Penny” (updated montly) available at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpenny.htm. 23. John Alexander, Future War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999) 173. 24. Congressional Research Service Report, Foreign Aid: An Introduction Overview of US Programs and Plans (April 15, 2004). 25. Dennis Cauchon and John Waggoner, “The Looming National Benefits Crisis,” USA Today (October 3, 2004) available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/ nation/2004-10-03-debt-cover x.htm. 26. National Priorities Program, The Cost of the War in Iraq (updated daily), http://www.costofwar.com. 27. Paul Wolfowitz, House Committee on Appropriations Hearing on a Supplemental War Regulation (March 27, 2003). 28. John B. Alexander, “The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF,” JSOU Report 06-1 (April 2006): 8.

APPENDIX THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by Member States on September 8, 2006. The strategy—in the form of a Resolution and an annexed Plan of Action—is a unique global instrument that will enhance national, regional, and international efforts to counter terrorism. This is the first time that all Member States have agreed to a common strategic approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestation but also resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it. Those practical steps include a wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating United Nations system’s counter-terrorism activities. The adoption of the strategy fulfils the commitment made by world leaders at the 2005 September Summit and builds on many of the elements proposed by the Secretary-General in his May 2, 2006 report, entitled Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Following is the full text of the Resolution and the Plan of Action:

RESOLUTION: THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY The General Assembly, Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirming its role under the Charter, including on questions related to international peace and security, Reiterating its strong condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security,

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Reaffirming the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 49/60 of 9 December 1994, the Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in particular its section oneak; terrorism, Recalling all General Assembly resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism, including resolution 46/51 of 9 December 1991, and Security Council resolutions on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, as well as relevant resolutions of the General Assembly on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Recalling also that at the 2005 World Summit Outcome world leaders rededicated themselves to support all efforts to uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect their territorial integrity and political independence, to refrain in our international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, to uphold resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the right to self-determination of peoples which remain under colonial domination or foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the equal rights of all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character and the fulfillment in good faith of the obligations assumed in accordance with the Charter, Recalling further the mandate contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome that the General Assembly should develop without delay the elements identified by the Secretary-General for a counter-terrorism strategy, with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international levels, to counter terrorism, which also takes into account the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, Reaffirming that acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, and that the international community should take the necessary steps to enhance cooperation to prevent and combat terrorism, Reaffirming also that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group,

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Reaffirming further Member States’ determination to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, including by resolving the outstanding issues related to the legal definition and scope of the acts covered by the convention, so that it can serve as an effective instrument to counter terrorism, Continuing to acknowledge that the question of convening a high level conference under the auspices of the United Nations to formulate an international response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations could be considered, Recognizing that development, peace and security, and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing, Bearing in mind the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, Affirming Member States’ determination to continue to do all they can to resolve conflict, end foreign occupation, confront oppression, eradicate poverty, promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development, global prosperity, good governance, human rights for all and rule of law, improve intercultural understanding and ensure respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs or cultures, 1. Expresses its appreciation for the report “Uniting against terrorism: recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy” (doc. A/60/825), submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly; 2. Adopts the present resolution and its annex as the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (“the Strategy”); 3. Decides, without prejudice to the continuation of the discussion at its relevant committees of all their agenda items related to terrorism and counter-terrorism, to undertake the following steps for the effective follow-up of the Strategy: a) To launch the Strategy at a high-level segment of its sixty-first session; b) To examine in two years progress made in implementation of the Strategy, and to consider updating it to respond to changes, recognizing that many of the measures contained in the Strategy can be achieved immediately, some will require sustained work through the coming few years, and some should be treated as long term objectives; c) To invite the Secretary-General to contribute to the future deliberations of the General Assembly on the review of the implementation and updating of the Strategy; d) To encourage Member States, the United Nations and other appropriate international, regional and sub-regional organizations to support the implementation of the Strategy, including through mobilizing resources and expertise;

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e) To further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy. 4. Decides to inscribe in the provisional agenda of its sixty-second session an item entitled “The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.”

ANNEX Plan of Action We, the States Members of the United Nations, resolve: 1. To consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. 2. To take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and, in particular: a) To consider becoming parties without delay to the existing international conventions and protocols against terrorism, and implementing them, and to make every effort to reach an agreement on and conclude a comprehensive convention on international terrorism; b) To implement all General Assembly resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism, and relevant General Assembly resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism; c) To implement all Security Council resolutions related to international terrorism and to cooperate fully with the counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies of the Security Council in the fulfillment of their tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing these resolutions. 3. To recognize that international cooperation and any measures that we undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with our obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.

Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism We resolve to undertake the following measures aimed at addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including but not limited to prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization, and lack of good governance, while recognizing that none of these conditions can excuse or justify acts of terrorism:

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1. To continue to strengthen and make best possible use of the capacities of the United Nations in areas such as conflict prevention, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, rule of law, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, in order to contribute to the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged unresolved conflicts. We recognize that the peaceful resolution of such conflicts would contribute to strengthening the global fight against terrorism. 2. To continue to arrange under the auspices of the United Nations initiatives and programs to promote dialogue, tolerance and understanding among civilizations, cultures, peoples and religions, and to promote mutual respect for and prevent the defamation of religions, religious values, beliefs and cultures. In this regard, we welcome the launching by the Secretary-General of the initiative on the Alliance of Civilizations. We also welcome similar initiatives that have been taken in other parts of the world. 3. To promote a culture of peace, justice and human development, ethnic, national and religious tolerance, and respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs or cultures by establishing and encouraging, as appropriate, education and public awareness programmes involving all sectors of society. In this regard, we encourage the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to play a key role, including through inter-faith and intra-faith dialogue and dialogue among civilizations. 4. To continue to work to adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and in accordance with our obligations under international law to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts and prevent such conduct. 5. To reiterate our determination to ensure the timely and full realization of the development goals and objectives agreed at the major United Nations conferences and summits, including the Millennium Development Goals. We reaffirm our commitment to eradicate poverty and promote sustained economic growth, sustainable development and global prosperity for all. 6. To pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level as goals in themselves, recognizing that success in this area, especially on youth unemployment, could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists. 7. To encourage the United Nations system as a whole to scale up the cooperation and assistance it is already conducting in the fields of rule of law, human rights and good governance, to support sustained economic and social development. 8. To consider putting in place, on a voluntary basis, national systems of assistance that would promote the needs of victims of terrorism and their families and facilitate the normalization of their lives. In this regard, we encourage States to request the relevant United Nations entities to help them to develop such national systems. We will also strive to promote international solidarity in support of victims and foster the involvement of civil society in a global campaign against terrorism and for its condemnation. This could include exploring at the General Assembly the possibility of developing practical mechanisms assistance to victims.

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Measures to prevent and combat terrorism We resolve to undertake the following measures to prevent and combat terrorism, in particular by denying terrorists access to the means to carry out their attacks, to their targets and to the desired impact of their attacks: 1. To refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, participating in, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take appropriate practical measures to ensure that our respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens. 2. To cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in accordance with our obligations under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or provides safe havens. 3. To ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in accordance with the relevant provisions of national and international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. We will endeavour to conclude and implement to that effect mutual judicial assistance and extradition agreements, and to strengthen cooperation between law enforcement agencies. 4. To intensify cooperation, as appropriate, in exchanging timely and accurate information concerning the prevention and combating of terrorism. 5. To strengthen coordination and cooperation among States in combating crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including drug trafficking in all its aspects, illicit arms trade, in particular of small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air defence systems, money laundering and smuggling of nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological and other potentially deadly materials. 6. To consider becoming parties without delay to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and to the three protocols supplementing it, and implementing them. 7. To take appropriate measures, before granting asylum, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not engaged in terrorist activities and, after granting asylum, for the purpose of ensuring that the refugee status is not used in a manner contrary to the provisions set out in paragraph 1of this section. 8. To encourage relevant regional and sub-regional organizations to create or strengthen counter-terrorism mechanisms or centres. Should they require cooperation and assistance to this end, we encourage the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate and, where consistent with their existing mandates, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization, to facilitate its provision.

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9. To acknowledge that the question of creating an international centre to fight terrorism could be considered, as part of the international efforts to enhance the fight against terrorism. 10. To encourage States to implement the comprehensive international standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force’s Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing, recognizing that States may require assistance in implementing them. 11. To invite the United Nations system to develop, together with Member States, a single comprehensive database on biological incidents, ensuring that it is complementary to the International Criminal Police Organization’s contemplated Biocrimes Database. We also encourage the Secretary-General to update the roster of experts and laboratories, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures, available to him for the timely and efficient investigation of alleged use. In addition, we note the importance of the proposal of the SecretaryGeneral to bring together, within the framework of the United Nations, the major biotechnology stakeholders, including industry, scientific community, civil society and governments, into a common programme aimed at ensuring that biotechnology’s advances are not used for terrorist or other criminal purposes but for the public good, with due respect to the basic international norms on intellectual property rights. 12. To work with the United Nations, with due regard to confidentiality, respecting human rights and in compliance with other obligations under international law, to explore ways and means to a) Coordinate efforts at the international and regional level to counter terrorism in all its forms and manifestations on the Internet, b) Use the Internet as a tool for countering the spread of terrorism, while recognizing that States may require assistance in this regard. 13. To step-up national efforts and bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international co-operation, as appropriate, to improve border and customs controls, in order to prevent and detect the movement of terrorists and to prevent and detect the illicit traffic in, inter alia, small arms and light weapons, conventional ammunition and explosives, nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons and materials, while recognizing that States may require assistance to that effect. 14. To encourage the United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to continue to work with States, at their request, to facilitate the adoption of legislation and administrative measures to implement the terrorist travel-related obligations, and to identify best practices in this area, drawing whenever possible on those developed by technical international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Customs Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization. 15. To encourage the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) to continue to work to strengthen the effectiveness of the travel ban under the United Nations sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities, as well as to ensure, as a matter

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of priority, that fair and transparent procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on its lists, for removing them and for granting humanitarian exceptions. In this regard, we encourage States to share information, including by widely distributing the International Criminal Police Organization-United Nations Special Notices concerning people subject to this sanctions regime. 16. To step up efforts and co-operation at every level, as appropriate, to improve the security on manufacturing and issuing identity and travel documents and to prevent and detect their alteration or fraudulent use, while recognizing that States may require assistance in doing so. In this regard, we invite the International Criminal Police Organization to enhance its database on stolen and lost travel documents, and we will endeavour to make full use of this tool as appropriate, in particular by sharing relevant information. 17. To invite the United Nations to improve co-ordination in planning a response to a terrorist attack using nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons or materials, in particular by reviewing and improving the effectiveness of the existing inter-agency co-ordination mechanisms for assistance delivery, relief operations and victim support, so that all States can receive adequate assistance. In this regard, we invite the General Assembly and the Security Council to develop guidelines for the necessary cooperation and assistance in the event of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. 18. To step up all efforts to improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places, as well as the response to terrorist attacks and other disasters, in particular in the area of civil protection, while recognizing that States may require assistance to that effect.

Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard We recognize that capacity-building in all States is a core element of the global counter-terrorism effort, and resolve to undertake the following measures to develop State capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and enhance coordination and coherence within the United Nations system in promoting international cooperation in countering terrorism: 1. To encourage Member States to consider making voluntary contributions to United Nations counter-terrorism cooperation and technical assistance projects, and to explore additional sources of funding in this regard. We also encourage the United Nations to consider reaching out to the private sector for contributions to capacity-building programmes, in particular in the areas of port, maritime and civil aviation security. 2. To take advantage of the framework provided by relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations to share best practices in counterterrorism capacity-building, and to facilitate their contributions to the international community’s efforts in this area. 3. To consider establishing appropriate mechanisms to rationalize States’ reporting requirements in the field of counter-terrorism and eliminate duplication of

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reporting requests, taking into account and respecting the different mandates of the General Assembly, the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies that deal with counter terrorism. 4. To encourage measures, including regular informal meetings, to enhance, as appropriate, more frequent exchanges of information on cooperation and technical assistance among Member States, United Nations bodies dealing with counter terrorism, relevant specialized agencies, relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations, and the donor community, to develop States’ capacities to implement relevant United Nations resolutions. 5. To welcome the intention of the Secretary-General to institutionalize, within existing resources, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force within the Secretariat, in order to ensure overall co-ordination and coherence in the United Nations system’s counter-terrorism efforts. 6. To encourage the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate to continue to improve the coherence and efficiency of technical assistance delivery in the field of counter-terrorism, in particular by strengthening its dialogue with States and relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations and working closely, including by sharing information, with all bilateral and multilateral technical assistance providers. 7. To encourage the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch, to enhance, in close consultation with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate, its provision of technical assistance to States, upon request, to facilitate the implementation of the international conventions and protocols related to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and relevant United Nations resolutions. 8. To encourage the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the International Criminal Police Organization to enhance cooperation with States to help them to comply fully with international norms and obligations to combat money-laundering and financing of terrorism. 9. To encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to continue their efforts, within their respective mandates, in helping States to build capacity to prevent terrorists from accessing nuclear, chemical or radiological materials, to ensure security at related facilities, and to respond effectively in the event of an attack using such materials. 10. To encourage the World Health Organization to step up its technical assistance to help States improve their public health systems to prevent and prepare for biological attacks by terrorists. 11. To continue to work within the United Nations system to support the reform and modernization of border management systems, facilities and institutions, at the national, regional and international level. 12. To encourage the International Maritime Organization, the World Customs Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization to strengthen

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their co-operation, work with States to identify any national shortfalls in areas of transport security and provide assistance upon request to address them. 13. To encourage the United Nations to work with Member States and relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations to identify and share best practices to prevent terrorist attacks on particularly vulnerable targets. We invite the International Criminal Police Organization to work with the SecretaryGeneral so that he can submit proposals to this effect. We also recognize the importance of developing public-private partnerships in this area.

Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism We resolve to undertake the following measures, reaffirming that the promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all components of the Strategy, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing, and stressing the need to promote and protect the rights of victims of terrorism: 1. To reaffirm that General Assembly resolution 60/158 of 16 December 2005 provides the fundamental framework for the “Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism.” 2. To reaffirm that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. 3. To consider becoming parties without delay to the core international instruments on human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law, and implementing them, as well as to consider accepting the competence of international and relevant regional human rights monitoring bodies. 4. To make every effort to develop and maintain an effective and rule of law-based national criminal justice system that can ensure, in accordance with our obligations under international law, that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in support of terrorist acts is brought to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute, with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and that such terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations. We recognize that States may require assistance in developing and maintaining such effective and rule of law-based criminal justice system, and we encourage them to resort to the technical assistance delivered, inter alia, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 5. To reaffirm the United Nations system’s important role in strengthening the international legal architecture by promoting the rule of law, respect for human rights, and effective criminal justice systems, which constitute the fundamental basis of our common fight against terrorism.

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6. To support the Human Rights Council, and to contribute, as it takes shape, to its work on the question of the promotion and protection of human rights for all in the fight against terrorism. 7. To support the strengthening of the operational capacity of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, with a particular emphasis on increasing field operations and presences. The Office should continue to play a lead role in examining the question of protecting human rights while countering terrorism, by making general recommendations on States’ human rights obligations and providing them with assistance and advice, in particular in the area of raising awareness of international human rights law among national law-enforcement agencies, at States’ request. 8. To support the role of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. The Special Rapporteur should continue to support States’ efforts and offer concrete advice by corresponding with Governments, making country visits, liaising with the United Nations and regional organizations, and reporting on these issues.

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INDEX

“i” indicates an illustration; “n” indicates a note; “t” indicates a table Abadie, Alberto, 81, 87 Abbas, Hassan, 15 Abbasids, 352–53 Abqaiq oil complex, 246 Absolutism, in religious ideology, 13 Abu Ghraib Prison, 503 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Philippines), 149–50, 184, 487; piracy, 264, 265–66 Accommodation, state sponsors, 26 Acharya, Arabinda, 5 Achille Lauro, 264, 273 Act of war, vs. terrorism, 166 Advanced Energy Initiative (AEI), 255 Adversary, understanding, 32–34 Advertising, al-Manar, 404–5 Affluent, in terrorist organizations, 220 Affordable energy, 238 Afghanistan, 5, 100–1, 196–97, 465i Black Ops use, 456 borderlands, 203, 458–60 corruption rank, 123n.23 countering opium trade, 209–13 drug dealing, 232 drug trafficking, 169, 175, 181, 185–86 failed state, 98t, 103 geography and climate, 202–3 insurgent attacks 2005–2006, 456–57 labor force, 205–6 low-intensity war, 455 mujahideen in, 423 nonindigenous insurgency, 460, 468

opium macroeconmic dependence, 208–9 opium production, 202, 206, 207 opium supply reduction, 213–15 Pashtun tribal areas, 465i reconstruction, 469–71 reform resistance, 318 small arms migration, 131 sociodemographic factors, 423–25 suicide attacks, 460 U.S. campaign, 31–32, 454–55 U.S. casualties, 456, 457t violent resolution, 309 war economy, 204–5 Afghanistan National Army (ANA), 204 Afghanistan–Pakistan border, 111 Afghan mujahideen, 99–100, 132, 344–45 Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA), Afghanistan, 455 Africa development and security, 515–16 international terrorism, 516–18 mujahideen, 516 sub-Saharan, 432 TSCTP response, 520–22 African Contingency Operations Training Assistance, 519 African National Congress (ANC), 48 Africa Response Force, 519 Aftergood, Steven, 374 Ahmed, Nazir, 346

580

Index

Aho, James, 14 Aidid, Muhammad (Somalia), 100 Aid money corruption, 291 Aid packages, 104 Akbar, Ahmed, 466 Akhund, Mullah Mohammed Omar, 464 Akramiya (Uzbekistan), 79 Albania, 115–17, 121 borders, 116–17 buyback arms program, 136 corruption rank, 123n.23 failed cities, 106 smuggling, 111 WMD materials trafficking, 114–15 Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt), 272 Algeria authoritarian rule, 58 ethnic separatism, 44 jihadi, 433 liberalizing trend, 57, 59 political violence, 64 terrorism, 516; U.S./ EU support, 69 “Algerian scenario,” 59 Al-Hal Bil-Qanun (Legal Solution), 407 Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, 150–51 Al Huquq al-Shar’iyah, al-Manar support, 404 Ali, bloodline, 352, 353 Al-Ikhals enterprise, 101 Ali Khan, Mirza (Fakir of Ipi), 464 “All-channel” terrorist organization, 368 Al-Manar, 401 anti-Semitic programming, 410–11 bans, 409–12 establishment, 401–2 financing, 404–5 Israeli bombing, 412–13 mission, 403–4 online streaming, 414 programming, 405–9 rating, 409

al-Muhimma (The Mission), 407 al Qaeda, 3, 37, 46, 106, 286 in Afgahanistan, 5 drug trafficking, 9, 169, 185, 188 and failed states, 93 financing, 8–9, 83, 144–45, 199–200, 487–91 ideology, 484–87 and Internet, 17, 486 martyrdom operations, 334–36 money laundering, 151 as movement, 485 oil facility attacks, 244, 247–48 organization, 480–84 piracy, 264–65 prison recruitment, 486 in Sudan, 100 al Qalah, 244 Al Rasheed Trust, 368 Al-Shamad Islamic Bank, 101 Alternance, Moroccan reform, 59 Amin, Bakhtiar, 427 Amin, Idi, 132 Amir-ul Momineen (Leader of the Faithful), Mullah Omar, 466, 477n.33 Ammunition degeneration, 138 Amnesty International, 534 Amr Bil Marof Wa Nai An Munik (Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice), Taliban police, 462 Amygdala, and fear, 389 Anarchist Cookbook, The (Powell), 372–73 Andijon massacre, 79 Angola, oil, 517 Animated Software Company, Web site, 371 Anonymity, Internet, 364 Antibrokering laws, SALW, 139 “Anti-democracy,” MENA, 69 Anti-money laundering laws, 155 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 154–55 Appeasement, state sponsors, 26 Arabs and Israelis, 311 “Arab Street,” 414

Index Arab World authoritarian culture, 60 democracy experiments, 58–59 jihadi, 433 sociodemographic characteristics, 434–36 U.S. policies toward, 15, 72 Arafat, Yasir, 282 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), 255 Arian, Essam (Egypt), 79 al “Armed citizen,” 279–80 Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, 101 Armed struggle, commitment to, 67 Arms. See also Small arms and light weapons (SALW); Balkans trafficking, 114, 116 protection paradox, 137 SALW trade, 10–11 state sponsorship, 4 Arquilla, John, 368 Ar-Rahman Islamic Center, 431 Articles of Confederation, 95 al-Askari, Hasan, 353 Assad, Hafez, 65 At-risk societies, 101 Attack platform, hijacked vessels as, 267 Atta, Mohamed, 142, 307 Aum Shinrikyu, 266 Australia free speech, 386 jihadi, 429–31 Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), 168 Authoritarianism as causus belli, 78–81 definition, 77 terrorist enablement, 81–84 US and EU support, 68–69 U.S. support, 89 and violence, 63 Authoritarian persistence, 57, 61 Avoidance, 391 Ayittey, George, 85 Azad, Ghulam Dastgir, 424 Aziegbemi, Anthony, 85

581

al Azzam, Abdullah, 334, 481, 485 Azzam, Maha, 12 Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar, 149 Baath Party, 503 Bab el Mandeb, 271 Bacteriological Warfare: A Major Threat to North America (Stern), 371 Bakaraaha, arms bazaar, 132 Bakil tribes, Yemen, 436 Bakr, Abu, 353 Balkans arms trafficking, 114 ethnic composition, 112–13 sociodemographic factors, 425–26 Bangladesh, 240, 432 Bank robbing, terrorism financing, 148 Bank Secrecy Act, 155 Barakat, Nauman, 250 Barber, Benjamin, 2 Barrier analysis, terrorist network application, 442 Barter, shadow economy, 221t, 224 Basile, Mark, 8 Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) (Spain), 184, 307 Baylouny, Anna Marie, 404, 408 Baz, Mohammed, 269 B.C. Bud, 182 Beeston, Leeds, 431 Beitler, Ruth Margolis, 15 Ben Ali, Tunisia, 58 Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. (BIF), 145, 368 Berger, Samuel, 36 Berg, Nick, 365 Berlin Wall, 113 Betts, Richard, 89 Bhutto, Benazir, 468 Bidawi, Praful, 319 Bilateral arms agreements, 135–36 bin-Ahmad al-Uthaymayan, Yusuf, 316 bin Laden, Osama, 3, 12, 46, 51, 86, 88, 106, 481–82 childhood experience, 307 and failed states, 93–94 as fundraiser, 488–89

582

Index

bin Laden, Osama (cont.) and Massoud, 296 oil facility attacks, 244, 247 and Saudi Arabia, 80 in Sudan, 99–101, 482 on suicide attacks, 333 on U.S.-Israel policy, 15 wealth, 145 Biological Weapons Convention, 509 Birth rates, developing countries, 4 Black market arms trafficking, 128–30, 138 Black market peso exchange (BMPE), 174, 491 Black Museum, London, 163 Black Sea region arms trafficking, 114 corruption rank, 123n.23 heroin, 117 WMD materials trafficking, 117–18 Blair, Tony, 252 “Blowback,” proxy warlord, 2812 “Blue” borders, 119 Bocinja Donja, Bosnia, 106 Bolivia, drug trafficking, 180 Bolton, John, 134 Bonn Agreement, 455, 464 Bookstores, dangerous information, 372 Border security, 109–13 definition, 119 post-Soviet countries, 114 training, 120 Borum, Randy, 307 Bosnia, 112 failed cities, 106 mujahideen in, 425–26 Bosporus Strait, 271 Bottom of pyramid (BOP) approaches, 443 Bouchar, Abdelmajid, 119 Bout, Victor, 134 Brachman, Jarret, 12–13 Branding statement, 379 Brazil, SALW data, 137 Bremer, L. Paul, III, 500, 502 Brigitte, Willie, 430, 431

British Security Service (M15), posted appeals, 376 Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA), 63–64 Broker, SALW, 129–30 “Brothers’ Islamism,” 67. See also Muslim Brotherhood Brownfeld, Allan, 14 Brown, Lord John, 250 Bulgaria, 117–19, 121 corruption rank, 123n.23 SALW, 129 WMD materials, 118 “Bunch of guys” profile, 429 Burke, Jason, 424 Bush, George W., 11–12, 51, 184, 479, 487, 496, 508 Business enterprises, terrorist organizations, 146 “Buyback” arms programs, 136 Byman, Daniel, 4, 84 Cali drug cartel, 168 Caliph, 352 Caliphate recreation of, 67 reinstating, 350 Camorra, 164 Canada drug trafficking, 182 energy supplies, 256 jihadist cells, 431 Capacity building, 7, 38 Carothers, Thomas, 87 Carranza, Venustiano, 94 Carruthers, Susan, 365 Cash smuggling, 152–53 Caste, and terrorism, 310 Causus belli, and authoritarianism, 78–81 Cells, jihadist, 429–31 Censorship avoiding, 394 definition, 387 Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP), Web site erasures, 377

Index Center for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, 310 Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEE), Afghanistan, 212 Chad, TSCTP, 522 Chalk, Peter, 7 Change, and terrorism, 313–14 Chaos Computer Club, 378 Chaotic state, 94 Charismatic leadership, Afghanistan, 464, 466–67 Charities, funds diversion, 145, 199 Charles, Robert, 201 Chavez, Hugo, 487 Chechnya, 112, 116 funding, 151 illegal arms, 132–33 sociodemographic factors, 426 suicide attacks, 328 Cheikho, Khaled, 430 Chemical Weapons Convention, 509 Chenoweith, Erica, 6 Chertoff, Michael, 119 Childhood experience, of terrorits, 306–7 Children, al-Manar programming, 408–9 Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence (COAV), Brazil, 137 China, energy alliances, 255 Chinese Rim, crude oil deficit, 242 Chouvy, Pierre-Arnaud, 9 Christian fundamentalist movement, U.S., 14 Christian militia, U.S., 13–14 Chulov, Martin, 439 Churchill, Winston, 243 Church, Richard, 252 Cigarette smuggling, 148–49, 200 Civil liberties, 85 Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE), Africa, 519–20 Civil society, 60 Class antagonism, and terrorism, 309 “Cleanskin” terrorists, 439 Cloak of the Prophet, Mullah Omar, 466–67

583

Club drugs, 178 Co-optation, MENA, 61 Coalition Against Terrorist Media (CATM), 410 Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, 499, 502 Coastal Security Program, Africa, 519 Cocaine, 178–79, 187 Coca leaves, 179, 181 Coercion, and incentive, 27 Cognitive dissonance, 389–91 Cohen, Fred, 363 Cold war era, 104 Cole, Juan, 87 Collapsed states, 97, 98t. See also Failed states Collier, Paul, 230 Coll, Steve, 17 Colonialism, new form, 99 Columbia, drug trafficking, 179–80, 186–87, 537 Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), 523 Combs, Cindy, 13, 16 Combs, Elizabeth, 13 Committee to Protect Journalists, 413 Communications, drug trafficking/terrorists, 191 Community, 45 Community policing, 443 Computer networks, border enforcement, 121 Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, 134 Consistency of alignment, warlords, 286–87 Containment, 33 Cook, Clive, 238 Cook, David, 330 Cooper, Robert, 98 Copeland, David, 372 Cordesman, Anthony, 145 Corruption Africa, 517 and authoritarianism, 78 Black Sea region, 118 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 434

584

Index

Corrupt officials, gatekeepers, 196–295 Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan, 1384 (2005), Afghanistan, 210–12 Counter Narcotics Trust Fund, Afghanistan, 210–11 Counterterrorism education strategy, 316 effectiveness measure, 48 kill/capture paradox, 532–34 participation strategy, 319 prisoner dilemma, 534–36 reforms strategy, 317 root causes elimination, 538–40 theoretical approaches, 529 and WOD, 537–38 Country-specific variables, 420 Covering Islam (Said), 401 Cox’s bazaar, SALW, 132 Cragin, Kim, 7, 15 Credit card fraud, terrorism financing, 148, 489 Crime-terror continuum, 9 Crime, terrorism as, 166 Criminality, terrorists, 439–40 Criminal organizations. See also Organized crime Albania, 116 in failing states, 10, 99Critical facilities/services, security, 251–52 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), 251 Critical technology bans, 28 Crocker, Chester, 5, 99, 101–2 Cronyism, Africa, 517 Crude oil distribution, 238, 239i price volatility, 240, 241i Crumpton, Henry A., 459 Cultural causes, terrorism, 308 Cyberterrorism, 363, 378, 380 Daly, John, 3 Damaged reputation, 27 Danger control, threat appeal, 390 Danger sensory input, 389 Data mining, terrorist Internet use, 370 Da’wa, 333, 338–39 Dawah, 350–51

Deby, Idriss, 522 De facto fiefdom, warlord’s, 295 Defamation, 387 Degauque, Muriel, 430 Degree of terror, warlords, 287 Demarche, 27–28 Demarkation, borders, 120, 123n.31 Democracies, terrorism in, 42–43 Democracy, 12 absence and terrorism, 45–48 absence and violence, 63 advantages, 43–45 establishment in Iraq, 510 “forcing,” 70 international environment, 68 Islamist “partners,” 71 peace thesis, 87 Democratization counterterorrist tool, 54–55 failure of, 58–62 Greater Middle East, 510 international support, 68–70 MENA, 56–58 new approach, 70–73 political violence, 62–68 Demographics and border security, 112–13 and political instability, 3–4 Deniability, 36 Denial, 391 Deobandi school, 462–63, 468 madrasas, 461 Department of Defense (DOD), 504–6 data accessibility, 370 Department of State (DOS), 504–6 Department of Transportation (DOT), Web site erasures, 377 Desnyder, Daniel, 243 DeSoto, Hernando, 222 Detainee and prisoner lists, 441 Developed countries, electricity consumption, 236, 237iDeveloping countries electricity consumption, 236, 237i energy demand growth, 240 Developmental aid, 440 Developmental banditry, 290–91, 297 Dewi Madrim, 261, 273

Index Diamond, Larry, 501 Diamond mines, resource warlord, 287, 290 Diamonds al Qaeda, 200, 490 in shadow economy, 231 Diaspora, Muslim, 436–40 Diaz, Porfiro, 94 Diplomatic backing, state sponsorship, 4 Diplomatic sanctions, policy shift, 72 Disaffected communities/individuals, 437 Disenfranchisement, 227 Dishman, Chris, 170 Displaced populations, 112 Dissemination, ideology, 421 Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, 377 Diversification, energy supply, 238, 244, 252 Dobbins, James, 499 Domestic energy security, 253 Dostum, General Rashid, 286 Dowlatabadi, Hadi, 251 Drug trafficking Bolivia and Peru, 180–81 Canada, 182 Columbia, 179–80 Europe, 182 Golden Crescent, 181–82 Golden Triangle, 181 industry, 178–79 Mexico, 180 and terrorism, 9–10, 146–48, 183–85,188–93, 189t U.S., 183 Durranis, 463–64, 465i Dying to Win (Pape), 322n.15 Dynamic images, fear levels, 391–92 E-cash/e-gold transactions, 153, 157 Economic causes, terrorism, 312 Economic globalization, and state failure, 102–3 Economic liberalism, 43 Economic migrants, 112

585

Economic pressure, state sponsor coercion, 28–31 Economic sanctions, policy shift, 72 Ecstasy, 178, 182 Editor gatekeeping, 394–95 Edle, Paul, 379 Education, counterterrorism strategy, 316 Edwards, David, 464, 466 Egypt authoritarian rule, 58 democracy deficits, 44 jihadi, 433 mujahideen in Afghanistan, 423 9/11 hijackers, 87 political violence, 64 repression, 46, 76, 79–80 U.S./EU support, 69 Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 46, 64, 101 Ehrlich, Paul, 3 Electricity, per capita consumption, 237i Electronic bulletin boards, terrorist recruitment, 366 Encyclopedia of Jihad, al-Qaeda manual, 372 End use certificates (EUCs), SALW, 130, 138 Energy consumption, 238 demand growth, 240 externalities, 254 supply distribution, 240 supply diversification, 238, 244, 252 trading sector, 236 world oil reserves, 239i Energy dependence, 2–3 Energy independence, 243, 253–54 Energy infrastructure attacks, 244–48 market effects of terrorism, 248–50 protection, 250–52 Energy, and policy, 255 Energy security definition, 238 diversification, 252

586

Index

Energy security (cont.) history, 243 production/consumption tension, 242–43 Engagement, state terrorist sponsors, 25–27 Entry costs, official economy, 222 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Web site erasures, 377 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), 434 Escobar, Pablo, 537 Ethnic identification, 112 Ethnic imbalance, 104 Ethnic self-determination, 44 Ethnicity, and borders, 111 EU Code of Conduct, arms trafficking, 135 Europe, drug trafficking, 182 European Union, democracy promotion, 68 Europol, 173 Exclusivism, in religious ideology, 13 Exit option, organizational behavior, 225 Exit/voice continuum, 225i, 225–26 Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), 390 External enemy, MENA Islamism, 67 Externalities, energy price, 254 Externally directed aggression, 53 Extortion, terrorism financing, 148 Fa’i, 149 al Fadl, Jamal Ahmed, 83 al Fahd al Sabah, Ahmad, 250 Failed states, 1, 81, 98 definition, 97 international impact, 98–99 national security, 93 prevention, 103–4 and terrorism, 93–94, 99, 103, 106 Failing state, 2, 4, 6, 98t border security, 5 criminal organizations in, 10, 99 description, 97, 101–2 intervention, 104 national security, 93

Fair, C. Christine, 420 False identity documents, 192 False invoicing, 151 Family, jihadist demographics, 429–30 Farah, Douglas, 200 Farahat, Ibrahim, 403 Farrell, Alexander, 251 Fatimid Empire, 353 Favela gangs, Brazil, 132, 137 FBI’s most wanted terrorists, 429 Fear, television news, 388–89 Fear appeal, 389–90, 392 Fear control, threat appeal, 390–91 Fearon, James D., 230 Federal agencies, Web sites, 376–77 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan, 455, 458–59 Fei-chien system, 151 Feierstein, Gerald, 153 Felbab-Brown, Vanda, 9 Fellaheen, Egypt, 313 Fight or flight response, 389 Filipino Moro Front, 100. See also Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 155, 174 Financing, Internet, 367–68 Fiqhs, martyr definitions, 331 First-order harm, terrorism, 388 Forbidding what is wrong,” 358–60 Force, government monopoly on use, 95, 102 Force, use of, 31–32, 38–39 Foreign aid, 104 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 374–75 Foreign policy interpretation, 14–16 Forest, James, 85 Fossil fuels, 240, 242, 244 Foundation for Defense of Democracy (FDD), 410 “Fourth generation” nonstate opponents, 421 France al-Manar ban, 410–11 immigrated Muslims, 345 “sanctuary doctrine”, 26 second generation Muslims, 438

Index Free Aech Movement, 266 Freedom House, 76–77, 82, 108n.48, 386 Free speech, 386; abuses, 387 French Anonymous Society (FAS), Web site, 371–71 Friedman, Thomas, 253–54, 363 Friendship, jihadist demographics, 429–30 Front for Emancipation of the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 309 Fuel supply, 237–88 Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias de Columbia (FARC), 9, 147. See also Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) Fukuyama, Francis, 99, 101 Functional failure, 98 Functionally failed state, 98 Fundraising, 144 Furnell, Stephen, 363 “Future of Iraq Project,” DOS, 506 Gall, Carlotta, 423 Gama’a al-Islamiyya, 369, 487 Ganor, Boaz, 263, 320n.1 Garner, Jay, 502 Gatekeeper system, corrupt officials, 296 Gavrilis, James A., 504 Gaza Strip, 14 Generalized anxiety disorder, 389 Genest, Marc, 486 Geographic core areas jihadi, 433 sociodemographics, 434–35 Geographic data, 421 Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 441–42 Geography: and border security, 111–12 and terrorism, 421–23, 433 Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI), 425 Germaine, Lindsey, 439 Germany, 9/11 hijackers, 428–29 Gerwher, Scott, 15 GHB (gamma hydroxybutyrate), 178, 183

587

Ghilzais, 463–64, 465i Ghilzai Taliban, 463–64 Glasser, Susan, 17 Global democratic interdependence, 2 Global drug trade, 9–10, 103 Global energy cooperation, 256 Global energy security, G8 goal, 237 Globalism, Internet, 365 Globalization, 2 and border security, 110 definition, 110 state relationships, 97, 102, 105 and terrorism, 309 Global Peace Operations Initiative, Africa, 519 Global pipeline, drugs, 232 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) satellite tracking, 270 Global Relief Fund, terrorist funding, 368 Global salafi jihadist network, 16 Global terrorism, 227 Global War on Terror (GWOT), 453, 529 Golden Crescent, drug trafficking, 181–82 Golden Triangle, drug trafficking, 181 Good Friday Agreement of 1998, 50–51 Goodhand, Jonathan, 202, 203 Good Neighborly Relations Regional Declaration on Counter Narcotics, Afghanistan, 212 Goodno, James, 251 Governance, breakdown, 104–5 Governance, failure of, 3 Government-to-government arms transfers, 134 Governmental oppression, 7 Grassroots engagement, 443 Gray-market arms trafficking, 128 Great Pashtun Revolt (1897), 466 “Green” borders, 119 Green Laboratory Medicine, 146 Group of Lyon (G8) organized crime action plan, 175 terrorism action plan, 175 Groupe Salafist pour la Pr´edication et le Combat (GSPC), 516 Groupes Islamisques Arm`es (GIA), 64

588

Index

Guerrilla tactics, Afghanistan, 460 Guerrilla warfare, 305 Gunaratna, Rohan, 5, 484–86 Gunawan, Gungun Rusman, 425 Gurr, Ted Robert, 312, 314 Guzman, Abimael, 469 Gvosdav, Nikolas, 105–6 Habbat Misk, 407 Hacking antiterrorist action, 377–78 techniques online, 372 Hadith, 356 Hafez, Mohammed, 7 al-Hajj, Maliki Ibn, 359 Halpern, Manfred, 323n.19 Hamas, 6, 52, 66, 72 financing, 144 internal workings, 48–49 legislative election, 47 Hammes, Thomas, 421 Hammond, Mohammad Youssef, 148–49 Hanafi, 357 definition of martyr, 331 Hanafiyyah Fiqh, on suicide, 331 Hanbali, 357 definition of martyr, 331 Haram/hallal, 350 Hard power, 1 Harkat-ul-Ansar (Kashmir), 373 Hashish, 186 Hassan II, King (Morocco), 59 Hawala informal banking system, 151, 490–91 Hayat, Umer and Hamid, 430 Hejab vs. chador, al-Manar programming, 408 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 286, 454, 461, 467–69 Henderson, David, 538 Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Edwards), 464 Heroin, 178, 181–82, 185 Hierarchy of damage, terrorism news, 391–92 “Hierarchy of needs,” Maslow, 531–32 High efficacy message, 391

High volume commodities, and terrorism, 231 Hijra, 353 Hirschman, Albert, 225 al-Hisawi, Mustafa Ahmed, 142 History, and border security, 111 Hizb-i-Islami (HiG), 454, 461, 467– 69 Hizbollah, 27, 49–50, 66, 84, 101, 335 and al Qaeda, 487 cigarette smuggling, 200 drug trafficking, 184–85 financing, 144, 148 media products, 402. See also Al-Manar Hizb ut-Tahir, 350–51 Hoeffler, Anke, 230 Hoffer, Eric, 321n.7, 323n.19 Hoffman, Bruce, 405 Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD), 367 “Home-grown explosives,” 372 Homemade bombs, Web sites, 371 “Homicide bombers,” 337 Honey shops, bin Laden owned, 199–200 Horn of Africa, nations included, 523 Horsburgh, Nicola, 438 Hostage ransom, 267 Hotaki Ghilzai tribe, 463t How to Make Bombs: Book Two, 372 Huerta, Victoriano, 94 Hull, Edmund, 27 Human Development Index (HDI), 236, 434 Human Rights Watch, 413 Humanitarian efforts, Hamas, 6 Humanitarian emergencies, 104 Humanitarian impact sanctions, 30 Hunt, Jennifer, 223 Huntington, Samuel, 58 Hussein, Saddam, 82, 87, 245–46, 496, 500, 503 Hutus and Tutsis, Rwanda, 311 Ibn Hanbal, 359 Ibrahim, Khalid, 373 Identification mechanisms, 16

Index Ideological direction, state sponsorship, 4 Ideological war, 326, 336 Ideology countering, 422 definition, 315 potency factors, 421 Iguacu Triange, arms bazaars, 132 Ijima (agreement), 352, 357–58 Illegal activities, shadow economy, 230–33 Illegal commerce, 112 Illegal monetary/nonmonetary transactions, 221t, 224 Imam, 112, 352 Imamitic Shiism, 352–53 Immigration fraud, 192 Improvised explosive devises (IEDs), 460 Incentive, and coercion, 27 India Pakistan economic sanctions, 28 Pakistan engagement, 26 Individual contributors, al Qaeda, 145 Indonesia Aceh and Papua, 97 border challenges, 111 jihadi, 433 sociodemographic factors, 427–28 terrorist financing, 83 Infaq Fisbilillah, 83 Infiltration, terrorism/organized crime, 171 InfoCom, terrorist funding, 367 Informal value transfer systems (IVTS), 151–52, 157 Information gathering, Internet, 370–71 Information provision, terrorist use of Internet, 365–66 Information sharing, 371–72 Injured self, terrorist, 306 Injustice, perceived, 307–8 Inside Terrorism (Hoffman), 405 Institutionally failed state, 98 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), Mexico, 49 “Institutional sclerosis,” 227

589

Insurgency definition, 320–21n.1 and force, 314 Insurgent groups, 305–6 Intelligence agencies, online presence, 376 Intelligence gathering, 374–75 Interdiction, critical facilities/services, 251–52 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 238–39 International Center for Technology Assessment, gas price externalities, 254 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 154 International Country Risk Guide, 108n.48 International Crisis Group, 79 International Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA), 154 International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), 413 International Islamic Front (IIF), 487 International Islamism, 67 International Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act (2001), 155–56 International Monetary Fund support, 28 International Network on Small Arms (IANSA), 137 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 469 International terrorism, 88 Internet antiterrorist activity, 374 financing, 367–68 Haganah, 378 information gathering, 370–71 information provision, 365–66 intelligence gathering, 374–75 jihad games, 486 networking, 368–70 policy influence, 16 properties, 364–65

590

Index

Internet (cont.) radical message dissemination, 17 recruitment, 366 Interpol, 173 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (Pakistan), 458, 461–62 militants relationship, 83 proxy war, 280 Interventionism, 73 Intifada, 6 Iran, 98t corruption rank, 123n.23 drug trafficking, 181 economic sanctions, 27, 29 Hizbollah support, 84 Islamic republic, 58 isolation attempts, 27, 70 revolution, 59–60 WMD threat, 509 Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), 335 Iraq authoritarian government, 82 borders, 112 civil-military cooperation, 406–7 democracy promotion, 510 economic sanctions, 30–31 insurgency, 507, 509 mujahideen in, 426–27 nation/state building, 498–501 oil infrastructure vulnerability, 245–46 policy shift, 72 U.S. challenges, 511 U.S. military role, 501–5 “Iron Curtain,” 113 Islamic code of ethics, 358–60 Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI), Milan, 440 Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO), 83, 151 Islamic Movement of Uzbeistan (IMU), 147, 185, 424 Islamic People’s Congress (1995), 101 Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Martyrdom Operations, The, 328–29 Islamic Salvation Front, Algeria, 319

Islamic state, 351 Islamism, 61, 349 “Islamisms,” 66 Islamist ideology, 326 Islamist violence, social roots, 437 Islamists, 347–48, 350 Islam, political, 52 Ismaili sect, 353 Isolation, state sponsor coercion, 27–28 Israel concessions, 72 ethnic separatism, 44 Syria engagement, 26 U.S. foreign policy, 15 zionism, 14 Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 54 Italy, and Albanian smuggling, 111 Jaffe, Amy, 252–53 Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), 458 Jamaat al-Islamiyya, 64 Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), 458 Jamaica, SALW, 127 Jamasb, Tooraj, 253 Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), 458 Jane’s Intelligence Review, 148, 264 Japanese Red Army, 306 Jawad, Said, 457 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (Indonesia), 83, 424, 487 financing, 146, 149, 152 piracy, 264 Jihad, 12–13, 349–51, 485 criteria, 334–35 “Jihad lands,” 432 Jihadism, militant, 348 Jihadist Internet sites, 369 Johar, Captain Surahmat, 261 Johnson, Simon, 222 Join the Caravan (Azzam), 334 Joint Narcotics Analysis Center (JNAC), 175 Jordan authoritarian rule, 58 political violence, 65 U.S./EU support, 69 Jordan, Javier, 438

Index Jorisch, Avi, 404, 409–10 Journalism standards, 395–96 Journalist in liberal democracy, 386 news selection, 393 Juergensmeyer, Mark, 307 Jurisprudence schools, 331, 356–57 Justice and Spirituality Group (Morocco), 65 “Kalashnikov culture,” 132 Kalashnikov rifle, 128 Kaplan, Robert, 500 Karbala, battle at, 352, 354 Karnib, Mariam, 407–8 Karsner, Alexander, 255 Karzai, Hamid, 453, 455, 458, 469 Kashmir Hekmatyar and, 468 Pakistan strategy, 459–60 sociodemographic factors, 426 Katz, Mark, 436 Kaufmann, Daniel, 222 Kenya ethnic separatism, 44 small arms migration, 131 Khalifa, Mohammed Jamal, 151 Khalizad, Zalmay, 501 Khan, Mohammed Sidique, 439 Khobar Towers bombing, 509 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 30 Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), 458 Kidnapping journalists, 292 terrorism financing, 149, 489 Kill/capture paradox, counterterrorism, 532–34 Kil Shi IluSi (Something for Everything), 407 King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah, 481 Klare, Michael, 2–3 Kleptocrats, warlords, 287 “Knights under the Prophet’s Banner,” 325–26 Konsojaya trading company, 146 Koran, 355–56 Korin, Anne, 247, 266, 270, 274

591

Kosovars and Serbs, Yugoslavia, 311 Kosovo, 308, 311 Krause, Keith, 98, 102 Krueger, Alan, 81 Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 147, 185 Kuwait, oilfield destruction, 245–46 Labor regulations, shadow workers, 223 Laffer Curve, 223–24 Laguna Research Partners, 242 Laitin, David, 81 Landmine agreement, 134 Larsson, J. P., 13 Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT), 458 Law enforcement agencies, terrorism/organized crime, 170–75 Law enforcement, arms sales, 132 Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), piracy definition, 263 Lebanon, 98t national liberation, 66 television scene, 401–3 Legal monetary transactions, shadow economy, 229–30 Legitimate escalation, 36 Legitimization, 102, 105 Lenin, as proxy warlord, 283 Levitt, Matthew, 6 Liaison networks, law enforcement agencies, 173 Libel, 387 Liberal secular alternative, 69 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (Sri Lanka), 44. See also Tamil Tigers drug trafficking, 185 fundraising, 144 piracy, 264, 266 Liberia, 98t, 103 Libral Islam, 348 Libraries, dangerous information, 372 Libya, 33, 35, 38–39 authoritarian rule, 58 economic sanctions, 30 U.S. bombing, 31

592

Index

Light weapons. See Small arms and light weapons (SALW) Limburg, 265 Liotta, Peter H., 3, 7, 421 Liquefied natural gas (LNG), 247–48, 268 Liu, Jack, 3 Loayza, Norman V., 222 Localization, jihadist cells in West, 431 Localized terrorism, 227 Locally manufactured weapons, 133 Local particularism, 438 Logistics, state sponsorship, 4 London jihadi, 431, 439 subway bombings finance, 143 Lormel, Dennis, 143 Low-level criminality, 439 Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), 367 Loyalty, organizational behavior, 225 LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), 183 Luft, Gal, 247, 266, 270, 274 Macroscale terrorist patterns, 422, 432, 438 Madero, Francisco, 94 Madison, James, 78 “Mad Mullah” phenomenon, 466 Madrid jihadi, 431, 439 drug smuggling support, 147–48 Mafias, 164 Mahdi, 354 Majid, Tariq, 459 Major ports, piracy, 272 Makarenko, Tamara, 9, 170 Maktab al-Kihdamat (MAK), 481–82 Malaysia, terrorist financing, 83 Malicious speech, 387 Malki, 357 definition of martyr, 331 Mallaby, Sebastian, 7 Mamadouh, Virginie, 438 Management of Savagery, The: The Most Critical Time through Which the Umma Will Pass (Naji), 248 Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), 140n.1

Mansfield, Edward, 87 Manufacturing, terrorist organizations, 232 Maoist Communist Center (MCC), India, 310 Maoist Front for the Liberation of Nepal, 309 Maoist Naxalites, India, 309 Marginal dollars, counter narco-terrorism, 213–15 Margulies, Peter, 369 Marijuana, 178, 180–82 Maritime crews, arming, 274 Maritime piracy, 262–63. See also Piracy; Terror-piracy Maritime security, 247 Marks, Edward, 89 Marriage ties, jihadist demographics, 430 Marsh, Lydia, 13 Martyr aspiring, 351–52 Fiqhs definitions, 331 as witness, 330 Martyrdom, 352–54 jihadist view, 351 recruitment, 344–45, 351 in Shiism, 354 Martyrdom operations, 328 conditions for, 332–33 rewards, 329–30 Marzook, Nadia Elashi, 367 Mashal, Lutfullah, 457 Maslow, Abraham, 531 Massoud, Ahmed Shah, 283, 286, 295, 461, 462 Maugeri, Leonardo, 242 McCaffrey, Barry, 536–37 McCant, Will, 248 McVeigh, Timothy, 14 Mearsheimer, John, 480 Medellin Cartel, Columbia, 168, 537 Media influence, 16 and second-order effects of terrorism, 388 self-censorship, 394

Index Media (cont.) self-regulation, 16 as watchdog, 385 Medical geography, terrorist network application, 442 Medicines Sans Frontiers, 456 Melbourne, jihadi, 431, 439 Mercy International, terrorist funding, 368 Merrill Lynch, 145–46 Mesoscale terrorist patterns, 422 Message content, terrorist use of Internet, 366 Message, ideology, 421 Methamphetamine, 180–81, 188 low-tech drug, 232 Methylenedioxy-nmethylamphetamine (MDMA), 182 Mexico failing state (1910), 94–95 drug trafficking, 170, 180 Microscale terrorist patterns, 432 Middle East democracy deficit, 47 democratization, 510 drug trafficking, 187–88 oil reserves, 239i terrorism core, 433 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 56–58, 63–64 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), 53 Middleman, SALW, 129 Middleton, Richard, 252 Migration, small arms, 131 Miksell, James F., 421 Military, arms sales, 132 Military Information Support Teasms (MIST), Africa, 519 Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), 434 Milliken, Jennifer, 98, 102 Minerals, in shadow economy, 231 Minority rights, 52 Mishra, Pankaj, 310 Miskel, James, 3, 7 Mitrova, Tatyana, 244

593

Mogadishu, arms bazaars, 132 Mohammed, Khalid Shaikh, 483 Mombasa, fishing, 146, 200 Monarchies, MENA, 58 Money acquisition, 144–50 regulation, 153–56 state sponsorship, 4 transfer, 150–53 Money laundering, 143, 149 drug trafficking/terrorists, 190–91, 491 Monroe Doctrine, Roosevelt Corollary, 96 Monstah Kody (Sanyika Shakur), 280, 298n.9 Mont Blanc, munitions carrier, 268 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 427, 487 piracy, 264–66 Morocco authoritarian rule, 58–59 jihadi, 433 political violence, 65 TSCTP/OEF-TS, 521 Mosque, in immigrant communities, 345 Motivation, recruitment, 167 Moussaoui, Zacarias, 146 Mousseau, Michael, 2 Movimento antimafia,” 442 Mozambique/South Africa, arms monitoring, 135–36 Mozdok-Tbilisi oil pipeline, 245 M16 rifle, 128 Mubarak, Hosni (Egypt), 59, 64, 100 Mueller, John and Karl, 30 Mugabe, Robert (Zimbabwe), 280, 289–90 Mughniyah, Imad, 101, 335 Mujahideen, 423. See also Afghan mujahideen in Afghanistan, 423 in Africa, 516 in Iraq, 425, 436 in Pakistan, 459 Mullah movement, 464 “Mullah-Musharraf Alliance,” 459

594

Index

Mullah of Waziristan, 466 Multilateral arms agreements, 136 Multilateral sanctions, 28–29, 37 Murrah Federal Building, 14 Musharraf, Pervez (Pakistan), 33, 111 Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen), 48–49, 65, 79, 86–87, 349, 468 Muslim diaspora, 436–40 Mu’tazilla, 352, 358 Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), 459 M/V Superferry 14, 266 Myanmar, opium production, 206 Nacos, Brigitte, 16 Naedoroscik, Jeffrey A., 312–13 Nahda, Tunisia, 349 Nairobi Protocol, arms trafficking, 135 Naji, Abu Bakr, 248–50 “Name and shame” state sponsor list, 27 Napoleoni, Loretta, 204 Narco-terrorism, 269 Narco-terrorist state, Afghanistan, 213 Narcotics al Qaeda trading, 490 in shadow economy, 231–32 Nasir, Husayn, 407 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 313 National Association of Broadcasters, violence code, 396–97 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), 121 National Liberation Army (ELN) of Columbia, 185 National Security Stategy (NSS), 496–97, 508 National Strategy for Combating Terror, 518 Nation-state concept, 109 destruction of, 349, 351 Nation/state building (Iraq), 498–501 civil-military cooperation, 506–7 insurgents, 507 judicial context, 503 planning, 405–506

political context, 504 promotion, 507–8 security context, 504–5 socioeconomic context, 501–2 Natural gas production, security, 251 Near-universal sanctions, 28–29 Negligence, 5 Negotiation, 34 Negroponte, John, 501 Neofundamentalists, 348, 350 Networking, Internet, 368–70 “New Muslims,” diaspora, 437 New People’s Army, Philippines, 309 Newsworthiness, 393–94 “New wars,” 438 Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, 85 Nigeria, 98t authoritanism, 76, 85 oil, 517 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 9, 375 Staff Statement No. 11, 374 on terrorist financing, 157, 492 Nixon, Richard, 243 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) al Qaeda infiltrated, 488 and CJTF-HOA), 523 in Iraq, 500–11 SALW data, 136–37 workers in Afghanistan, 456 Nonstate actors, 95, 105 Nonviolent interest articulation, 312 North Africa terrorism, 516–17 TSCTP, 518, 521 underemployment, 515–16 Northern Ireland peace process, 54 terrorism as crime, 176 North Korea, 35 Nour, Ayman, 79 Nuclear plants, security, 251 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 370–71 Nuristani, 469

Index Objectification, Islam questioning, 346–47 Obscenity, 387 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), 536–37 Oil and global security, 240, 242–43 infrastructure protection, 250–52 infrastructure vulnerabilities, 245 price history, 241i price and political risk, 250 in shadow economy, 230–31 spare production capacity, 242 supply/demand balance, 242 West Africa, 517 world reserves, 239i Oil platforms, piracy, 272 Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC), 242 Oil tanker piracy, 275 Olson, Mancur, 227 Oman, reform and change, 316–18 Omar, Mullah Mohammed, 455, 463t, 468, 474 charismatic leadership of, 466–67 OMB Watch, 371, 382n.34 Omert´a, Mafia, 176 Open source intelligence, 374 Internet, 372–73 Operation Desert Storm, 245 Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 453 Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), 520–21 “Operation Evil Airlift,” 455 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 496, 501 “Operation Rachel,” 135–36 Operation Smoke Screen, FBI, 200 Opium poppy plants, 181 Opium production, Afghanistan, 202–9 Opium trade reduction, Afghanistan, 209–13 Oppression, perception of, 43–44 Organizational assistance, state sponsorship, 4

595

Organizational behavior theory, 225 Organizational structure, drug trafficking/terrorists, 189–90 Organized crime, 164–66 and terrorism, 8–11, 163, 166–70 terrorist financing, 150 Organized illegal activities, 232–33 Oslo peace process, 72 Outer continental shelve (OCS) drilling, 255 Oxley, Michael, 142–43 Pakistan diplomacy, 34 drug trafficking, 181–82, 193 extremism, 77 India engagement, 26 ISI, 83, 280, 458, 461–62 jihadi, 433, 437 opium reduction, 206 SALW, 127 small arms migration, 131–32 Southeast Asians in, 424–25 terrorist base, 458 terrorist support, 83–84 Palestine Israel conflict, 54, 72 national liberation, 66 Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 54, 185 Pan Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC), 100 Pandemic disease, warlords, 288–89, 297 Pan, Esther, 460 Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), 518, 521 Panshiri Tajik, 455 Pape, Robert, 322n.15 Papua, New Guinea, SALW, 128 Participation counterterrorism strategy, 319 and political unrest, 312 Party of Justice and Development (PJD) (Morocco), 65 Pashtun maliks, 459 Pashtun tribes, 455, 464 Passive support, state sponsorship, 4–5, 37–38 Passivity, and democracy, 59

596

Index

Passport forgery, al Qaeda, 8 Paz, Reuven, 427 PCP (phencyclidine), 183 Pearl, Daniel, 365 Perceived opportunity, warlords, 288 Perceived prosperity, warlords, 288 Permanent bazaars, SALW, 132 Pershing, John J., 94 Personality cult, warlords, 287, 293 Peru, drug trafficking, 180–81, 187 Peso-exchange system, 151, 174, 491 Petroleum production, security, 251 Petro Ranger, 273 Petty crime, terrorism financing, 149 Phantom ships, 267 blacklisting, 274 Philippines sociodemographic factors, 428 terrorist financing, 83 Piano, Aili, 90 Pillar, Paul, 14 Piracy. See also Terror-piracy definition, 263 and terrorism, 263–66 terrorism overlap, 269–70 “Pirate profit factor,” 269 Points of entry, legal, 119 Poisoning manuals, 372 Polarization of values, in religious ideology, 13 Polisario, piracy, 264 Political act, terrorism as, 42 “Political Islam,” 52 Political liberalism, 43 Politically unstable regime, 6 Political pressure, state sponsor coercion, 27–28 Political quietism, 59 Political stability, and border security, 113 Political violence reduction, 71–72 and regime, 62–63 Political warfare strategy, 326 Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, The (Halpern), 323n.19 Pollit, Michael, 253

Poppy growing, Afghanistan, 202–3, 205–6, 208 Population Action International (PAI), 434 Port security, 247–48 Post, Jerrold, 306 Post-authoritarian societies, 113 Post-communist states, 113–19 “Post revolutionary,” 33 Posttraumatic stress, 389 Powell, William, 372 Power infrastructure, security, 251 Power, and terrorism, 314 Power vacuum, 104 Prabhakaran, Velupillai, 44 Precious stones trading, al Qaeda, 490 Primary commodity exports, and terrorism, 230 Prisoner dilemma, counterterrorism, 534–36 Prison recruitment, al Qaeda, 486 Proceeds of Crime Act, UK, 174 Project on Government Secrecy, 374 “Propaganda by deed,” 16, 386 Prophet Muhammad, bloodline, 352 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Afghanistan, 456, 458 Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 50, 307 Proxy warlords, 280–83, 296 Public diplomacy, 14–15 Africa, 519 Iraq, 510 Public relations, warlords, 291–93, 297 Public sector, decline, 227 Public spending, shadow economy, 223 Puddington, Arch, 90 Putin, Vladimir, 237, 252 Qaddafi, Omar, 33–34, 59, 100 Qasim, Na’im, 406 Qasir, Abdallah, 403–4 Qassem, General Sheikh Naim, 328 Quranic and Non-Quaranic Islam (Ahmed), 346 Qutb, Sayyid, 65, 468

Index Raad, Ahmad and Ezzit, 430 Rabbani, Barhannudin, 461, 463t Rabia, Abu Hamza, 423 Rabin, Yitahak, 14 Rabita Trust, 368 Radical Islamic fundamentalism, 12 Radical Islamism, 61–62, 66 Radical jihadists, 51 Radio-Television News Director’s Association Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (2000), 396–97 Rahman, Shiek Omar Abdul, 200 Ranbir Sena (India), 310 Rashid, Ahmed, 462, 466 Raymond, Catherine Zara, 263, 266 Reactance, 391 Recruitment Internet, 366 martyrdom, 344–45, 351 prison, 486 Red Army Faction (Germany), 42, 306 Red Sea, piracy, 271 Reesam, Ahmed, 120, 149–50 Refah Partisi, Turkey, 349 Refining infrastructure, security, 251 “Reforming autocracies,” 103–4 Reforms, counterterrorism strategy, 317 Regan, Ronald, 243 Regime type, and terrorism, 4 Regional Security Initiative (RSI), U.S. Department of State, 523 Regulatory state, shadow economy, 222, 224 Rehabilitation, former terrorists, 443–43 Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP), 524 Religious ideas, and terrorism, 315 Rensselear, Lee, 488, 490 Rentier state theory, 60 Report on Foreign Terrorists Organizations, U.S. Department of State, 184 Repression, MENA, 61 Resistance and Control in Pakistan,” 466

597

Resnick, David, 363 Resonance, ideology, 421, 440 Resource warlords, 283–84 combating, 293, 296 resources types, 285t “Reverse diaspora war,” 438 Reverse money laundering, 151 Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (Kuwait), 488 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), 9, 185, 538 cocaine supply, 147 drug trafficking, 185–87 kidnapping, 149 resource warlords, 283 Revolutionary behavior, 33 Rice, Condoleezza, 479, 510 “r-interdiction median/covering problem,” 252 Riyadh Al-Jazirah, 316 Roan, Kit, 437 Rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs), 140n.1 Ronfeldt, David, 368 Roosevelt, Theodore, 96 Root causes eliminating, 538–40 ideologies, 422 “Root facilitators,” term, 1 Rotberg, Robert I., 97, 105, 498 Roth, Kenneth, 81 Roy, Oliver, 67, 436–37 Russia energy alliances, 255 oil pipeline attacks, 246 piracy, 271 Sabotage Handbook, Web manual, 371–72 Sacra Corona Unita, 164 Sadat, Anwar, 313 al-Sadiq, Jafar, 353 al-Sadr, Muqtadah, 507 Safiy-al-Din, Hashim, 414 Sageman, Marc, 422, 433, 439 Sahel, 515–16, 518 Said, Edward, 401 Saifi, Amari (“El Para”), 516

598

Index

Sakoh, Foday (Sierra Leone), 280, 287–88, 290 Salafi Islamism, 64, 66–67, 70, 89 Sale of arms limitation, 28 Samudra, Imam, Bali, 367 Sanction limitations, 29–30 Sanctuary, state sponsorship, 4 “Sanctuary doctrine,” France, 26 Sanderson, Thomas M., 9, 170 Saudi Arabia, 37 authoritarian rule, 58 and bin Laden, 80 counterterrorism strategy, 316 democracy deficits, 44 financial support extremist groups, 145, 199 jihadi, 433 mujahideen in Afghanistan, 423 mujahideen in Iraq, 425, 436 9/11 hijackers, 87, 375, 436 oil infrastructure attacks, 246–47 reforms, 8 rentier state, 61 repression jihadists, 46 vulnerability, 3 Scaparra, Maria, 252 Schelling, Thomas, 390 Schengen Information System, 121 Schliefer, Ron, 405 Schmidt, Alex, 16 Schmitz, Kim, 377 Schneider, Friedrich, 220 Schroeder, Gerhard, 252 Search for International Terrorist Entities (SITE) Institute, 378 Second-generation Muslims, diaspora, 437 Second-order effects, terrorism, 388 Second Palestinian Intifada, 406 Security vs. civil liberties, 530–32 “Seekers,” 13, 16 Semidemocracies, 65 Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) (Peru), 9, 185, 187, 469 September 11, 2001 attack, 46, 264 deaths, 392 financing, 142–43 Israel rumor, 410

media coverage, 394 view of terrorism after, 167 Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA) (UK), 164, 168, 173 Shadow economy causes, 221–24 definition, 220 and terrorism, 225–28 and terrorism support, 220 taxonomy, 221t Shadow workers, 223 Shafi, 357 definition of martyr, 331 “Shaheed,” 330 Shaki Agreement, 83 Sharia, 347, 349, 350 Sharur, Muhammad, 346 Shays Rebellion (1786), 95 Sheehan, Michael, 147 Shehata, Samir, 84 Shelby, Richard, 143 Shelley, Louise, 269–70 Shepherd, Byran, 420 Shiism, 352 Shultz, George, on political pressure, 28 Sicilian Mafia, 164 “Silos,” 172 Sinai, Joshua, 272–73 Singer, Peter, 10 Sinn Fein, 50 Sipah-e-Sahaba, Pakistan, 350 Skimming, 230 Slander, 387 Small arms and light weapons (SALW) buyback programs, 136–37 control, 139 data gathering, 137–38 definition, 139–40n.1 migration, 131 proliferation, 127–33 regulation attempts, 134–36 trade, 10–11 transport, 130–31 Smith, Philip, 220 Smith, Rupert, 422 Smuggling techniques, drug trafficking/terrorists, 192–93

Index “Snuff movies,” Internet, 379 Snyder, Jack, 87 “Social capital,” 291 Social causes, terrorism, 309–12 Social and economic development policies, 7 Social injustice, 227 Social network analyses, 442 Societal cleavages, 105 Society of Professional Journalists, 395 Sociodemographics, 432–36 Arab core, 435–36 Western attacks, 429–31 Socioeconomic change, 313–14 Soft power, 1 Soft targets, 268 Soiros Foundation, development banditry, 291 Soldier-to-citizen ratio, RAND Corp. report, 502 Soligo, Ronald, 252–53 Somalia, 100, 103 coastal piracy, 271 SALW embargo, 134–35 small arms migration, 131–32 Sosa, Luis, 243 Source countries, drug trafficking/terrorists, 190 Sousa, Matt, 85 South Africa Police Service (SAPS), 135 South China Sea, piracy, 271 South Lebanese Army (SLA), 405 Sovereignty, 36, 109 Soviet block countries, shadow economy, 222–23 Soviet Union, breakup, 114 Spafford, Eugene, 373 Spain jihadist demographics, 428, 430 Muslim immigrants, 438 Spanta, Rangin Dadfar, 458 “Spin-doctoring,” al-Manar, 405 Sri Lanka, Tamil Tigers, 44, 97, 144 Stalin, Joseph, 111 Stamping and marking, SALW, 138

599

State Failure Task Force, 97, 108n.48 Statehood, 109 State, as primary actor, 97 “State-shell,” Afghanistan as, 204 State sponsorship, 4, 198 authoritarian governments, 81–84 economic pressure, 28–31 engagement, 25–27 political pressure, 27–28 use of force against, 31–32 State weakness, 5–6. See also Failing state Status, and terrorism, 314 Stern, Jessica, 371–72, 484–86 Strait of Hormuz, 271 Strait of Malacca, 262, 265, 270–71 “Strategic influence,” 15 Students, Muslim diaspora, 437 Submission, Islam, 354 Subnationalism, 311 Sudan, 35, 38 economic sanctions, 30 militant base, 99–101 small arms migration, 131 Sufaat, Yazid, 146 Suicide attacks, 327–28 Afghanistan, 460 countering, 336–38 reward, 329 Suicide bombers, Internet recruitment, 366 Sunna (holy tradition), 356 Sunni Islam, 353 Supply-chain vulnerabilities, 252 Suspicious activity reports (SARs), 155, 168 Swett, Charles, 373 Syria, 61 diplomacy, 27, 34, 70 hereditary republic, 58 Hizbollah support, 84 Syrian Jamaat e-Jihal al-Suri, 101 Tablighi Jama’at, 350–51 Taft, Willaim Howard, 94 Tajik Jamaat-i-Islam, 461 Takeyh, Ray, 105–6 Takfir vs. dawah, 350

600

Index

Taliban, 5, 25, 111 defensive insurgency, 472–74 drug dealing, 231–32 drug trafficking, 185–86 economic sanctions, 30 Hazaras slaughter, 309 origins, 461–62 poppy cultivation, 169 senior leaders, 463t sociological basis, 464–67 tribal basis, 462–64 U.S. engagement attempts, 26 Tamil Tigers, 50–51, 97, 307. See also Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Tamils and Sinhalese, Sri Lanka, 311 Tanzanite, al Qaeda, 490 Taqiya (secrecy), 353 Taweed vs. Shirk, 326, 341nn.5, 6 Tawhid wal Jihad, 80 Tax avoidance, 221t, 224 Tax burden and shadow economy, 221, –24 and terrorism, 227 Tax evasion, 221t, 224, 229 Taylor, Charles, 280 Television news provisions against harm, 396 second-order effects of terrorism, 388 third-order effects of terrorism, 391 “Terror premium,” 250 Terror-piracy, 263, 267 countermeasures, 274–75 motivation, 267–69 targets, 270–73 Terrorism in Africa, 516–18 and authoritarianism, 77–79, 81 and change, 313–14 cultural causes, 308–9 and diaspora, 436–40 defining, 35–36, 263 demographic factors, 3–4 and drug trafficking, 9–10, 146–48, 183–85,188–93, 189t, 200–202 economic causes, 312 and energy supply diversification, 252

environmental causes, 308–13 and failed states, 93–94, 99, 103, 106 financing, 143–56, 197–98 and geography, 421 harmful news of, 388–89 hot spots, 3 ideology, 11–15 illegal transactions, 224 international, 88 Internet use, 365–71 interplay of causes, 312–13 and low-level criminality, 439 media use, 16 newsworthiness, 393 oil infrastructure attacks, 244–48 and organized crime, 8–11, 150, 163, 166–70 and piracy, 263–66 political causes, 312 primary cause, 1 psychological roots, 306–8 secretive nature, 80 and shadow economy, 225–28 social causes, 309–12 state sponsorship, 4–5, 25–40, 81–84, 198 transnational, 65, 67, 71 understanding, 32–33 Terrorist attack death vs. homicides, 392–93 Terrorist Finance Unit, UK, 173 Terrorist financing laws, 155 Terrorist’s Handbook, The, 372 Teuk Thia, arms bazaar, 132 Thailand drug trafficking, 181 narcotics syndicates, 147 southern, 432 Thai Sticks, 181 Thatcher, Margaret, 386 THC (tetrahydrocannabinol), 182 The Book and the Quran: A Contemporary Interpretation (Sharur), 346 Theological supremacy, in religious ideology, 13 “Third party,” MENA, 69–70 Third-order effects, terrorism, 389–92 Thomas, Timothy L., 363, 370

Index Threat, definition, 390 Tibbetts, Patrick, 369, 371–72 Tito, Joseph, 113 Tourist/cruise lines, piracy, 272–73 Training manuals, drug trafficking/terrorists, 191–92 Training and operations, state sponsorship, 4 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 515, 518–20 interagency relationships, 522–23 international vs. domestic security, 521 Transnational organized crime (TOC), financial networks, 9 Transnational terrorism, 65, 67, 71 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, 108n.48, 118, 123n.23 Transportation, security, 251 Travel bans, 29 Treaty of Westphalia (1648), 109 Triads, China, 164 Tribalism, and warlords, 287–88 True Believer, The (Hoffer), 321, 323n.19 Tunisia authoritarian rule, 58 jihadi, 435 liberalizing trend, 57–58 U.S./EU support, 69 Turabi, Hassan (Sudan), 100 alTurkish heroin, 117 12th Imam, 353 Twelvers (Imami), 353 Ubayd Allah, 353 Uganda small arms migration, 131 stolen SALW, 132 Ulster Defence Force (UDF), 176 Ulster Loyalist Information Service, 367 Umayyads, 352 Umma, 45 Ummah, 347–49 Underground economic activity, 221t “Ungoverned space,” African desert areas, 415

601

Unilateral sanctions, 28 UNITA (Angola), resource warlord, 283–84 United Arab Emirates, 142 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 236 arms buyback, 136 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (September 2006) plan of action, 546–53 resolution, 543–46 United Nations, SALW monitoring, 134–35 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 386 United Self-Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), 185 United States Afghanistan casualties, 456, 457t al-Manar ban, 411 democracy promotion, 68 drug trafficking, 183 “home grown” terrorists, 486–87 jihadi, 431 military forces in nation/state-building in Iraq, 501–6 private firearms, 127–28 SALW conference objections, 134 United States European Combatant Command (EUCOM), 516, 520 United States Institute of Peace, 17 Unlicensed money transmission business, 152 UN Resolution 1373, terrorism financing, 154 USA PATRIOT Act, 152, 155, 174, 199, 491, 53031 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), 370, 504–6 U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (USDOE-EERE), 255 U.S. Department of State (DOS), 504–6 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Web site erasures, 377

602

Index

U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 186–88, 191, 194 U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 1 USS Cole, 264 USS Mount Whitney, Djibouti, 523 U.S. Treasury Department Office of Technical Assistance (OTA), 153–54 Uthman (3rd caliph), 355 Uzbekistan jihadi, 433 oppression, 76, 79 Videotaped beheadings, 16 Villa, Pancho, 94 Violence broadcasting standards, 396–97 and democratization, 58 in democratizing states, 87 and foreign policy, 14, 16 and honor, 31 insurgencies use of, 80 Kosovo, 308 and media, 16 in present-day piracy, 263 and shadow economy, 228–29 and state oppression, 7–8 Violent nonstate actor (VNA), warlord as, 278, 297 Virtual Nuclear Tourist, Web site, 371 “Viva Rio,” 137 Voice dissent option, organizational behavior, 225 von Clausewitz, Carl, 166 Wafa al-Igatha al-Islmiya, 368 Wahhabism, 12, 350–51 Waltz, Kenneth, 480 War on Drugs (WOD), 536 “War of the flea,” Taliban, 472–73 War of ideas, 326, 336 Warlords, 101, 278–79 combating, 293–96 cult of personality, 287 development banditry, 290– 91 ideological agenda, 286i, 286 pandemic disease, 288–89

proxy, 280–83, 281i public relations, 291–93 resource, 281i, 283–84, 285t use by nation-states, 279 Warren, Matthew, 363 “War on terror,” 73, 103. See also Global War on Terror (GWOT) Wassenaar Arrangement (1995), 135 Watch lists, 441 Water supply, security, 251 Wayne, E. Anthony, 155 Wazsan affair, 138 “Weak democracies,” 103–4 Wealthy individuals, terrorism support, 144–45, 198–99 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 34, 264 Iran threat, 509 materials trafficking, 114 and SALW, 127 Weather Underground, U.S., 42, 306 Weber, Max, 466 Web monitoring, 378 Web sites, terrorist network, 17 Weiburd, Aaron, 378 Weimann, Gabriel, 17, 363, 366, 369 Weinberg, Leonard, 11 West Africa oil, 517 small arms migration, 131 underemployment, 515–16 Western attacks, terrorists’ demographics, 428–31 Western belief, and salafi, 68, 89 Whiskey Rebellion, 95 Whitte, Griff, 460 Wilson, Woodrow, 94 Witte, Kim, 390 Women, al-Manar programming, 408–9 Woodward, Susan, 102–4 Working Group for Arms Reduction, Cambodia, 137 World Bank development banditry, 291 state failure measures, 108n.48 support, 28 World Energy Outlook: 2005, 240 World Is Flat, The (Friedman), 253

Index World Markets Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index, 81 World Trade Center, 1993 attack, 335, 428 Wright, Alan, 165 Yakuza, Japan, 164 Yasin, Abdul Rahman, 428 Yemen arms bazaars, 132 jihadi, 433, 436 SALW, 127 Yemeni Saif Islamic Jannubi Young Intelligent Hackers against Terror (YIHAT), 377 Yousef, Ramzi, 428 Youth bulges, 420, 434

603

“Zajal Is Lebanon,” 407 Zakaria, Fareed, 62, 88 Zakat, 199 Zanini, Michele, 368 Zarate, Juan, 143 Zarqawi, Abu Musab (Jordan), 51, 120, 335, 379–80, 480, 507 alal- Zawahiri, Ayman (Egypt), 12, 46, 65, 86–87, 100, 248, 325–26, 423, 483 Zayd, Nasr Abu, 346 Zerriffi, Hisham, 251 Zimmerman, Roy, 370–71 Zimmerman Telegram, 95 Zionism, 14 ` Pablo, 222 Zoido-Lobaton, Zuhur, Sherifa, 8

ABOUT THE EDITOR AND CONTRIBUTORS

James J. F. Forest is Director of Terrorism Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he teaches undergraduate courses on terrorism, counterterrorism, and information warfare, and also directs research initiatives for the Combating Terrorism Center. His recent publications include Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World (2006); Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (2006); and The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (2005). His research has also appeared in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, the Journal of Political Science Education, and Democracy and Security. Dr. Forest received his graduate degrees from Stanford University and Boston College, and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University and De Anza College. Donald J. Alberts is a former professor at the United States Air Force Academy. He has written and lectured widely on air power, insurgency, and the Spanish civil war. John B. Alexander is a retired Army officer, a Senior Fellow of the Joint Special Operations University, a Fellow of the Proteus Management Group of the U.S. Army War College, and a member of the Army Science Board. Dr. Alexander commanded Special Forces units in Vietnam and Thailand, and as a consultant he served briefly as a mentor to the Afghanistan Minister of Defense. His books include Future War (1999) and Winning The War (2003). Sumesh M. Arora is the Director of the Strategic Biomass Initiative (SBI) for the Mississippi Technology Alliance. He was named to the “Top 40 under 40” by the Mississippi Business Journal in 2005, and was designated by Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour to represent the state on the Governor’s Ethanol Coalition in June 2006. Sumesh is currently enrolled in the International Development doctoral program at the University of Southern Mississippi and holds a Master’s in materials engineering and a

606

About the Editor and Contributors

Bachelor in electrical engineering from the University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida. Kent Baumann is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer currently assigned to the Foreign Military and Cultural Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he serves as a seminar leader in the Army’s new Red Team Leader Course. Lieutenant Colonel Baumann recently served as the Deputy Director for the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He is a Russian speaker and has served extensively overseas and in Europe. Lianne Kennedy Boudali is a Senior Associate in the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and also serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. Professor Boudali holds a Masters of International Affairs from Columbia University, where she specialized in International Security Policy and Middle East Affairs. She served for 2 years as a U.S. Peace Corps Volunteer in Niger, and has also lived in Morocco. Professor Boudali’s research interests include terrorism in North Africa, strategic communication in terrorism and counterterrorism, and the process of political-religious radicalization. Randall G. Bowdish is a retired Navy Captain. His sea duty included tours as Commanding Officer, USS SIMPSON (FFG 56), Executive Officer, USS HAWES (FFG 53), Material Officer, Destroyer Squadron 35, Engineer Officer, USS HAROLD E. HOLT (FF 1073), and Damage Control Assistant on the USS RATHBURNE (FF 1057). He served ashore on the Joint Staff, Navy Staff, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, and as a faculty member at the USMC Command and Staff College. He was Federal Executive Fellow at the RAND Corporation and served as a Legislative Fellow in the Office of Congressman Ike Skelton (D-MO). Bowdish graduated from the Naval War College in 1995 and the Naval Postgraduate School in 1988, where he earned a Master of Science in Electrical Engineering. He earned a B.A. in Psychology at the University of Nebraska in 1981, and has recently returned to the university to pursue a doctorate in Political Science. Christopher L. Brown is currently the Director of Education and Research at the American Security Council Foundation in Washington, DC. Prior to this he served as the Director of the Menges Hemispheric Security Program at the Center for Security Policy and Assistant Director for the Program on Transitions to Democracy at the Hudson Institute. He is an expert on terrorism with an emphasis on ideological development. His other areas of expertise are the political and security issues of China, Central Asia, Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. He has contributed to a number

About the Editor and Contributors

607

of books and authored numerous articles. He is a graduate in Political Science and Philosophy from Utah State University. David Butler is an Assistant Professor in the International Development doctoral program at the University of Southern Mississippi. He received his Ph.D. in geography from the University of Cincinnati, and holds a M.S. in geography and a B.A. in history from Texas A & M University. Dr. Butler’s research interests lie in the areas of information technology, geopolitics, and social and political change around technologies. David also serves as the Director for the Call Center Research Laboratory at The University of Southern Mississippi. Dr. Butler’s research has been featured in numerous journals, books and congressional testimony, and he has appeared on news shows on CNN and National Public Radio. Daniel Byman is the Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University and an Associate Professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service. He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, and author of Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Jonathan C. Byrom is a cavalry officer in the United States Army, and has served in various military positions in Germany, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fort Irwin, and Afghanistan. Major Byrom graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1995 and received his Masters of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is currently serving as an economics instructor and International Security Seminar Executive Officer in the Social Sciences Department at the United States Military Academy. Christopher Carr is an Associate Professor of International Security at the U.S. Air War College. He has written and researched on the trade in arms and on the impact of light weapons proliferation on vulnerable societies and is the author of Security Implications of Microdisarmament (2000). He is currently completing a manuscript on “Kalashnikov Cultures.” Francesco Cavatorta is a Lecturer in International Relations and Middle East Politics at Dublin City University, Ireland. Dr. Cavatorta has written extensively on processes of democratization in the Middle East and North Africa. Maura Conway is a Lecturer in the School of Law and Government at Dublin City University. Previously, she was a Teaching Fellow in the School of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews,

608

About the Editor and Contributors

Scotland, and was awarded her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland. Her research interests are in the area of terrorism and new media. Eli Gond ¨ or ¨ is a graduate student in Islamology at the University of Lund, Sweden. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern Studies from ¨ or ¨ has dual citizenship the University of Stockholm, Sweden. Mr. Gond (Israeli and Swedish) and has served in the Israeli Defense Forces as a paratrooper. Brian Hanley is the developer of EpiFlex, a sophisticated system for discrete modeling of novel organism epidemics, and developed the Lambda latency scale mathematical model for rapid casualty estimation in modern human populations. He has provided materials and risk assessment for Senator Richard Lugar’s office and SAIC in the area of modern biological weapons scenarios. His research interests are infectious disease modeling, biodefense, and understanding terrorism/asymmetric warfare motives, organizations, and methods. Christopher Jasparro is a transnational security specialist with interests in terrorism, organized crime, environmental security, and development. His prior positions include the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (U.S. Pacific Command) and the Department of Geography at Framingham State College. Dr. Jasparro has also had experience in the areas of economic development and transportation planning and is a former U.S. Naval Reserve officer. Thomas H. Johnson is on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Security Affairs Department. For over two decades, Professor Johnson has conducted research on Afghanistan and South Asia. He has written extensively on Afghanistan and its politics, culture, and anthropology, and his articles have been published in journals such as Central Asian Survey, Comparative Strategy, American Political Science Review, the Journal of Politics, the Brown Journal of World Affairs, Strategic Review, Politikon: South African Journal of Political Science, Journal of Modern African Studies, as well as in numerous edited volumes and scholarly texts. Professor Johnson has taught at the University of Southern California, George Mason University, and the Foreign Service Institute, and frequently lectures at service academies and the National Defense University. Lydia Khalil is a counterterrorism analyst for the New York Police Department and is also affiliated with Jamestown Foundation, where she is a regular contributor to Terrorism Focus and Terrorism Monitor. She previously worked in Iraq as a policy advisor for the Coalition Provisional

About the Editor and Contributors

609

Authority in Baghdad. Prior to that Lydia was appointed to the White House Office of Homeland Security. Lydia has worked for the U.S. government, international organizations, private companies, and think tanks on a variety of Middle East and terrorism issues. Born in Cairo and raised in the United States, Lydia received her B.A. in International Relations from Boston College and her M.A. in International Security from Georgetown University. J. P. Larsson is a practitioner on issues concerning organized crime and terrorism at the U.K. Home Office. His Ph.D. examined the logic of religious violence and terrorism, and he is the author of Understanding Religious Violence: Thinking Outside the Box on Terrorism (2003) and a number of other chapters, articles, and discussion materials. Religious terrorism, organized crime, and the intelligence-led policing to combat these remain close to his heart and he works professionally, consults, publishes, and teaches in these areas. He has degrees from Keele, Aberystwyth, and Lampeter universities, and still teaches courses on terrorism, religion, and war at the latter. Gregory D. Lee has a combination of over 34 years of active and reserve service with the U.S. Army. He is a Reserve Chief Warrant Officer Five/Special Agent with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command assigned to Headquarters, 6th Military Police Group (CID). In late 2003 he retired as a Supervisory Special Agent with the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In 1995 while assigned to Islamabad, Pakistan, he directly participated in the arrest of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 NYC World Trade Center bombing, collected evidence, and testified at his trial. He is the author of Global Drug Enforcement: Practical Investigative Techniques (2004), Conspiracy Investigations: Terrorism, Drugs and Gangs (2005), and Practical Criminal Evidence (2007). M. Chris Mason is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, DC. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer with extensive experience in Afghanistan, most recently as the political officer on a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Paktika Province on the Pakistani border. Mr. Mason is an expert on Afghan history and tribal culture, and lectures regularly on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan to the four services. He recently wrote the U.S. Marine Corps’ guidebook, Afghanistan: Operational Cultural for Deploying Personnel, published in August 2006. Shahdad Naghshpour is Associate Professor of International Development at the University of Southern Mississippi. He has published

610

About the Editor and Contributors

extensively on issues of income distribution and population studies. His present research includes international development. Magnus Norell is a faculty member in the Center for the Study of Low Intensity Conflicts and Terrorism at the Swedish Defense Research Agency. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Stockholm, and has degrees from the University of Uppsala (Sweden) and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel). Dr. Norell has written extensively about politics in the Middle East as well as religiously motivated terrorism. He is a well-known lecturer and is often consulted by the media on matters related to terrorism and the Middle East. Bard E. O’Neill is Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College, Washington, DC. He has written and lectured extensively on insurgency, terrorism, and the Middle East. He is the author of Insurgency and Terrorism, revised edition (2005), which was recently referred to as a seminal work in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Robert J. Pauly, Jr., is Assistant Professor of International Policy and Development and Associate Director of the International Development program at the University of Southern Mississippi in Gulfport. He focuses on the Global War on Terrorism, U.S. foreign policy toward the states of the Greater Middle East, and political and security issues in that region. His most recent books are To Protect and Defend: U.S. Homeland Security Policy (2006) and U.S. Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf: Safeguarding American Interests through Selective Multilateralism (2005). Paul R. Pillar is a Visiting Professor in the Security Studies Program of Georgetown University and is retired from a 28-year career in the U.S. Intelligence Community. His research and writing focus on counterterrorism, intelligence, and Middle Eastern issues. Paul J. Smith is an Associate Professor in the National Security Decision Making Department of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Michelle L. Spencer is a senior policy analyst with over 10 years of U.S. national security policy, programmatic, and analytical experience. For the last 5 years Ms. Spencer has provided support to the International Counterproliferation Program, a cooperative effort between the Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security. Ms. Spencer spent 2 years in the OSD Policy-Eurasia office and 2 years on the Policy Staff of the House Armed Services Committee, where she worked on various national security issues including counterterror strategies and national security policy implementation. She

About the Editor and Contributors

611

has a Master’s Degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri State University. Joseph J. St. Marie is Assistant Professor of International Development at University of Southern Mississippi. He has publications on shadow economy, ethnic conflict, and development. His current interest is in political economy and international development. Samuel S. Stanton, Jr., is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Grove City College. His research focuses on conflict processes and ethnic conflict. Jeff Stephens is a Ph.D. candidate in International Development at the University of Southern Mississippi. He has an M.B.A. from Tulane University and a B.S.B.M. from LeTourneau University. His research interests are the development of U.S. foreign policy, international security, and the development of strategic alliances from a political and business perspective. His dissertation research is on alliance theories and the balance of power between the United States and China. Joseph L. Trafton is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Denver’s Graduate School of International Studies, and will graduate in June 2007. His specialties are in the areas of international security, terrorism, and terrorist financing. Currently, Joseph is a visiting professor at the University of Rhode Island and teaches graduate and undergraduate courses in international political theory, and U.S. Foreign Policy and Terrorism. In addition, Joseph’s dissertation manuscript, Terror’s New Narco Economy will soon be published as a book. Matthew H. Wahlert is a doctoral student at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio. He has contributed pieces in several works on security and international relations, including NATO: An Encyclopedia of International Security, Historical Encyclopedia of Military Communications, The Encyclopedia of World History, The Encyclopedia of Protest and Revolution, and Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets. His research interests include issues of terrorism, security, and warfare. James Walker is the U.S. Army Fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM). He is a career Military Police officer who has served in a variety of operational and law enforcement assignments including service in Korea, Washington DC, Johnston Island, Fort Stewart, Kuwait, and Afghanistan. Major Walker is also an associate of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and was recently an Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences

612

About the Editor and Contributors

teaching courses in Economics and Money and Banking. Major Walker holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in Criminal Justice and Psychology from Purdue University, a Master of Arts in Security Management from Webster University, and a Master of Business Administration from the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University.

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century

ADVISORY BOARD FOR THIS SET Bruce Hoffman Rohan Gunaratna James S. Robbins PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Board Cochairs Loch K. Johnson, Regents Professor of Public and International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia (U.S.A.) Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews (U.K.) Members Eliot A. Cohen, Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies and Director, Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.) Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (U.S.A.) Th´er`ese Delpech, Director of Strategic Affairs, Atomic Energy Commission, and Senior Research Fellow, CERI (Foundation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), Paris (France) Sir Michael Howard, former Chichele Professor of the History of War and Regis Professor of Modern History, Oxford University, and Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History, Yale University (U.K.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.), former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army (U.S.A.) Paul M. Kennedy, J. Richardson Dilworth Professor of History and Director, International Security Studies, Yale University (U.S.A.) Robert J. O’Neill, former Chichele Professor of the History of War, All Souls College, Oxford University (Australia) Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland (U.S.A.) Jusuf Wanandi, cofounder and member, Board of Trustees, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia) Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International (U.S.A.)

Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES VOLUME 3: LESSONS FROM THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

Edited by James J. F. Forest

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL Westport, Connecticut

r

London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Countering terrorism and insurgency in the 21st century : international perspectives / edited by James J. F. Forest. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978–0–275–99034–3 (set : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99035–0 (vol 1 : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99036–7 (vol 2 : alk. paper)—ISBN 978–0–275–99037–4 (vol 3 : alk. paper) 1. Terrorism—Prevention—Cross-cultural studies. 2. Terrorism—Government policy—Cross-cultural studies. 3. Counterinsurgency—Cross-cultural studies. I. Forest, James J. F. HV6431.C69183 2007 2007007938 363.325
17–dc22 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. C 2007 by James J. F. Forest Copyright 

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2007007938 ISBN-10: 0–275–99034–6 (set) ISBN-13: 978–0–275–99034–3 (set) 0–275–99035–4 (vol. 1) 978–0–275–99035–0 (vol. 1) 0–275–99036–2 (vol. 2) 978–0–275–99036–7 (vol. 2) 0–275–99037–0 (vol. 3) 978–0–275–99037–4 (vol. 3) First published in 2007 Praeger Security International, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Editor’s Note Preface Acknowledgments 1 An Introduction to the Comparative Study of Counterterrorism James J. F. Forest 2 Educating the Next Generation of Counterterrorism Professionals Stephen Sloan

ix xiii xxix

1

11

PART I: CASE STUDIES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AND COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS 3 “Beginning of a War”: The United States and the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847 Richard M. Wrona, Jr.

35

4 The Achille Lauro Hijacking Sean K. Anderson and Peter N. Spagnolo

52

5 The February 1993 Attack on the World Trade Center Daniel Baracskay

70

6 Insurgent Seizure of an Urban Area: Grozny, 1996 James S. Robbins

88

7 The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania Sundara Vadlamudi

103

8 The Case of Ramzi Yousef Gary A. Ackerman and Sundara Vadlamudi

128

9 The Attack on the USS Cole Ruth Margolies Beitler

145

vi

Contents

10 Capturing Khalid Sheikh Mohammad Robert N. Wesley

162

11 The Siege of Beslan’s School No. 1 Adam Dolnik

176

12 The Madrid Attacks on March 11: An Analysis of the Jihadist Threat in Spain and Main Counterterrorist Measures Rogelio Alonso 13 The London Terrorist Attacks of July 7, 2005 Tom Maley 14 The April 1995 Bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City Daniel Baracskay

202 222

242

PART II: CASE STUDIES OF THE LONG-TERM FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY 15 State Response to Terrorism in Sri Lanka Thomas A. Marks

261

16 Countering West Germany’s Red Army Faction: What Can We Learn? Joanne Wright

275

17 Countering Terrorism in Latin America: The Case of Shining Path in Peru David Scott Palmer

292

18 A Long Road to Victory: Developing Counterinsurgency Strategy in Colombia Rom´an D. Ort´ız and Nicol´as Urrutia

310

19 The Wars in Chechnya and the Decay of Russian Democratization Thomas Sherlock

334

20 Italy and the Red Brigades: The Success of Repentance Policy in Counterterrorism Erica Chenoweth

352

21 Lebanon, Hizbollah, and the Patrons of Terrorism Richard M. Wrona, Jr.

366

22 Turkey and the PKK Lydia Khalil

388

Contents

23 Israel’s Struggle against Palestinian Terrorist Organizations Joshua L. Gleis

vii 408

24 Fighting Fire with Fire: Destroying the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Brian Fishman

430

25 State Power and the Progress of Militant and Moderate Islamism in Egypt Sherifa Zuhur

443

26 Counterterrorism Policies and the Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru: The Unmasking of Peru’s National Security State Vera Eccarius-Kelly

463

27 Moro Insurgents and the Peace Process in the Philippines Robin L. Bowman

485

28 Terrorism and Uzbekistan: The Threat and the Response Joshua Sinai

508

29 India’s Response to Terrorism in Kashmir Behram A. Sahukar

514

30 Combating Terrorism in Nepal Thomas A. Marks

532

31 Japan and Aum Shinrikyo James M. Smith

549

32 The Struggle with Violent Right-Wing Extremist Groups in the United States Eric Y. Shibuya

569

Bibliography

581

Index

603

About the Editor and Contributors

639

EDITOR’S NOTE

Governments have been countering the threat of terrorism and insurgency since the establishment of the Westphalia system of nation-states. However, the rapid evolution of science and technology over the past 100 years—from the invention of dynamite to commercial air travel and the Internet—has enabled new forms of terrorist and insurgent activity. It is thus likely that further technological advances over the next 100 years will yield similar results, as today’s terrorist and insurgent groups have proven to be adaptable, learning organizations. This three-volume set, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, seeks to encourage the development of learning organizations among national security professionals by examining what we currently know about the strategic application of hard and soft power in countering the sources and facilitators of terrorism. As a collection, the thematic essays and focused case studies represent an ambitious effort to capture existing knowledge in the field of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and draw lessons (from successes as well as failures) that will inform new, adaptable strategies to counter the new threats that—judging from historical trends—will no doubt emerge over the next century. At the outset, it is necessary to address why this publication covers both terrorism and insurgency, as there is confusion about these terms among many in the academic, media, and policymaking communities. In some countries that have faced the threat of violence for many years—including Colombia, Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey—societies have grappled with additional terms like “paramilitaries” and “freedom fighters,” but the general view reflected throughout the chapters of this publication is that all groups or individuals (including insurgents) who engage in the act of terrorism can be considered terrorists. In essence, the act of terrorism defines its perpetrator as a terrorist, regardless of the ideological motivation behind such acts. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, terrorism is defined as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological,” while

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insurgency is defined as “an organized resistance movement that uses subversion, sabotage, and armed conflict to achieve its aims. . . . [and which] seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.” In teaching my classes on these topics to future U.S. Army officers at West Point, the distinction I make is that insurgents can and do use terrorism (among other forms of violence), but insurgents are but one type of violent nonstate actors who may choose to use terrorism. In other words, not all insurgents use terrorism, and not all terrorists are part of an insurgency. Further, while the use of violence by insurgents to target governments is driven by a particular ideology, terrorists use violence against a range of targets (including governments) to advance their ideology. While such distinctions may seem academic to most readers, they are actually quite important when formulating strategic, tactical, and policy responses to the threat posed by terrorism and insurgencies. As described in Volume 1 of this publication, strategies and tactics for countering insurgency are an important aspect of our knowledge base on countering terrorism, and vice versa. In both cases, experts have emphasized that the use of force to counter an organization whose objectives resonate with a larger disaffected population yields limited (if any) success. Instead, it is argued, the ideology, political, and socioeconomic aspects of an organization— through which it derives its financial support, recruits, and sympathizers from amongst the local population—must be addressed. In other words, the use of hard power in countering terrorism (including insurgencies that employ terrorist tactics) must be complemented by elements of soft power. The link between counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is also informed by recent analyses which suggest that the al Qaeda movement can be described as a global insurgency, seeking to replace the existing Westphalia-based system of nation-states with a global caliphate in which Islamic law reigns supreme. Recent terror attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, and Cairo, as well as disrupted terror plots in Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, are all seen as examples of how individuals and groups around the world have been inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology to commit violence as part of a strategy to change the policy and behavior of these nation-states. In other words, it is argued, al Qaeda uses terrorism tactically and operationally to advance its global insurgent strategy. When described in these terms, the U.S.-led global effort against al Qaeda can be considered to be fighting both terrorism and insurgency. Thus, Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses the many challenges that stem from both types of threats to our security. Another source of confusion in the study of terrorism and insurgency involves disagreement over the proper spelling of certain groups (or, rather, the spelling of the transliteration from the original language into English). For example, a brief survey of the literature reveals that a certain

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Lebanese militant group can be spelled Hizballah, Hezbollah, Hizbullah, Hezballah, and Hizbollah. For these volumes, we have standardized the spelling of certain common names across all the chapters, such as al Qaeda (because this is how several agencies of the U.S. government are now spelling it), Hizbollah (because this is how the group spells it on their English language Web site), and Osama bin Laden (rather than Usama). Finally, it is important to note that while many chapters discuss aspects of the “global war on terrorism (GWOT),” we recognize that this term has fallen out of favor among many in the academic and policy communities. However, there currently is a worldwide effort to reduce the capabilities of globally networked terror movements like al Qaeda, and in the absence of an equally useful short-hand reference for this effort, GWOT serves an important role. At this point in the development of the global counterterrorism effort, it is particularly important to pause for reflection on a number of critical questions. What do we know about effectively countering terrorism and insurgencies? What are the characteristics of successful or unsuccessful counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns? What do we need to learn in order to do these things more effectively? Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century addresses these and related questions, and in doing so contributes to national security policy as well as to our understanding of the common threat and how it can be defeated. Chapters of this publication address many different aspects of the unconventional warfare puzzle, examining the most important diplomatic, information, military/law enforcement, and economic/financial dimensions to regional and global cooperation in countering terrorism and insurgency, and providing specific examples of these dimensions in practice. Authors in the first volume address issues of important strategic and tactical concern, organized around the primary instruments of power through which nations pursue their counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts. These instruments can generally be described as either hard power (the use of force by military and law enforcement) or soft power (including diplomacy, information, and intelligence). The second volume provides a variety of insights on how to assess and combat the sources and facilitators of political violence, including state sponsors of terror, authoritarian regimes, criminal network activity, border insecurity, and the global struggle for influence among societies. As highlighted by several authors in this volume, the community of responsibly governed democracies faces uniquely complex challenges in combating terrorism and insurgencies while maintaining civil freedoms. And contributors to the third volume offer in-depth analyses of historical events and lessons learned in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Each volume contains a preface and introductory chapter, describing the contributed essays and providing an intellectual background for the discussions that follow.

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This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy published by Praeger Security International. The first of these—the three-volume The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published in 2005)—intends to help readers understand the nature of the threat by exploring what transforms an ordinary individual into a terrorist. This was followed by the three-volume Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (published in 2006), which explored the ongoing efforts in the United States to secure our borders and ports of entry, and to protect our public spaces and critical infrastructure from future terror attacks. The volumes of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century complement these earlier publications by focusing our attention on the broad, worldwide effort to actively confront those who threaten or use political violence against our communities. Together, these nine volumes are meant to provide a central, authoritative resource for students, teachers, policymakers, journalists, and the general public, as well as stimulate new ideas for research and analysis. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

PREFACE

The chapters of the final volume of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century provide dozens of case studies from which students and scholars can draw useful lessons and insights to further the study of critical challenges in the global security environment. Readers will undoubtedly note that some of history’s prominent terrorist groups are not addressed in these chapters, such as Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group and Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Indonesia’s Jemaah Islamiyah, the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain, and the Irish Republican Army (and its ideological cousins) in Northern Ireland. A number of books and articles have been published on these and other groups, and many are summarized in the new Annotated Bibliography of Research on Terrorism and Counterterrorism published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (available online at: http://ctc.usma.edu). However, in order to manage the overall size of this volume, it has proven impossible to be all-inclusive. Instead, the topics selected for the volume are meant to offer a significant amount of geographic diversity: all the major regions of the world are covered in these chapters, and each country represented in this volume has had significant experience countering terrorism and insurgency. As with the other two volumes in this book, an introductory chapter is provided in order to frame the discussions that follow. In addition to a brief review of concepts and the existing literature, this chapter also provides a discussion on the value of comparative analyses in general and specifically within the context of studying terrorism and insurgency. Next, Professor Stephen Sloan, who has studied and written about terrorism for several decades, provides his thoughts on necessary changes in counterterrorism education. He addresses the historical context of terrorism studies and why such studies had such a slow and sometimes tortuous path in finding their place as a discrete specialization within both the social and hard sciences. Based on that assessment, the chapter then examines the state of the counterterrorism art as it stands today and suggests critical questions and areas of investigation that must be addressed in order to meet both the short and longer-term evolution of the strategies and tactics

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of terrorism. The discussion then focuses more specifically on the elements necessary to evolve the new educational programs that are required to assist the counterterrorism specialist in the academic, public, and corporate sectors to not only achieve the necessary corpus of knowledge, but also disseminate it to those who are on the frontline in combating terrorism. Together, these two introductory chapters frame the case studies offered in this volume and highlight their contributions to the study of countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. The volume is then organized around two types of case studies: examinations of discrete events and discussions of a state’s multiyear struggle with terrorism and insurgency. In both sections, authors were asked to provide a brief overview of a particular terrorist event or group (including motivations, aims, organizational strength, leadership, and prominent attacks), and then address how the state responded, what successes or failures resulted, and what lessons (good or bad) we can draw from the case study that can improve our understanding (and practice) of counterterrorism in general. In their analyses of these events, authors were also asked to address topics such as intelligence gathering, surveillance, communication, hostage situations, guerilla warfare, policymaking, legal and ethical considerations, and long-term implications.

PART I: CASE STUDIES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AND COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS The section begins with a case study by Rick Wrona, a U.S. Army officer and a faculty member at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, in which he analyzes the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in June 1985. He writes that this event highlighted an atypical aspect of terrorism—instead of sowing fear among their target audience, the terrorists generally succeeded in convincing spectators to sympathize with the hijackers’ cause. After providing a brief historical overview of the Lebanese civil war, the rise of Hizbollah, and the Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah (AMAL, or “Lebanese Resistance Brigades”), as well as Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and the actions taken by Israel (particularly, the prisoner exchanges that preceded the attack on Flight 847), Wrona describes the events that transpired in June 1985 and the role played by different governments, including Algeria, Israel, Iran, and Syria. Two noticeable differences separated the TWA 847 crisis from earlier hijackings, and particularly from the contemporary hijackings by Arab factions in the Middle East. First, TWA 847 received more media attention and direct media involvement than any previous hijacking. Second, the hostages’ role in the media coverage of the hijacking was something not previously seen in similar events. Finally, Wrona highlights a number of lessons that can be

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drawn from this event that inform counterterrorism strategy, particularly in viewing terrorist acts as combat, not as crime. Another hijacking is the focus of the next chapter by Sean Anderson of Idaho State University and Peter Spagnolo of the Government Training Institute in Boise, Idaho. In October 1985, Palestinian fighters took control of the Achille Lauro, a cruise ship owned by the Italian government. Although there had been numerous aircraft hijackings during the early 1980s, the taking of a civilian passenger ship was unprecedented. Consequently, the security measures on the ship were lax: only a passport was required to buy a ticket, there were no checks of luggage, and very little observation of persons embarking other than to ensure that they were paid passengers. After describing the events that took place during this hijacking, the authors provide a brief overview of the pursuit of the culprits and the political fallout in Italy, Israel, Egypt, and the United States, and note that at the time these actual events were unfolding, disagreements over how to interpret and assess the crisis caused significant rifts and conflicts among allies both in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as in the Arab world. They conclude that it is impossible to rule out that events similar to the Achille Lauro hijacking will not be repeated in the twenty-first century. Next, Daniel Baracskay of Valdosta State University provides an analysis of the February 1993 attack on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York. He notes that this event warrants analysis for several reasons. First, it signaled a turning point in American history; where beforehand, terrorist attacks were waged primarily on foreign soil, the events of February 26, 1993 revealed that Americans no longer enjoyed immunity from this form of violence. Second, the WTC bombing indicated that foreign terrorist organizations can successfully penetrate American borders with a significant attack that embodies a political and religious plot for restitution against American presence overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Third, the attack signified the expanding nature of ad hoc terror groups that come together exclusively for violent purposes and exist as organizations that are linked together by the like-minded ideologies of their extremist members. Finally, the event in 1993 was a precursor to the September 11 attack on the two World Trade Center towers 8 years later, indicating that al Qaeda may seek to revisit targets until it succeeds in destroying them. Overall, the implications and lessons from this incident suggest that time and cooperation, both domestically and internationally, will create a more unified front to combat terrorist behavior. Attacks on a country’s major urban centers are not uncommon, as Jim Robbins—a professor at the National Defense University—observes in the next chapter. His analysis of the Chechen attack on (and takeover of) the autonomous region’s capitol city, Grozny, in August 1996 reveals the challenges that urban guerilla warfare pose to a nation’s government and

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military leaders. In one of the few cases of an insurgency prevailing in an urban takeover, Chechen rebel forces took the city in a matter of days and were able to hold it for several years. However, he notes, the reason for the Chechens’ success had less to do with their battlefield prowess than the unwillingness of the Russian government to pay the costs necessary to take the city back. Thus, Robbins concludes that the 1996 Battle of Grozny is a cautionary tale for countries involved in counterinsurgency operations under conditions of diffident leadership and weak public support at home. This analysis is followed by a case study on the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, authored by Sundara Vadlamudi of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. This event was the first major al Qaeda attack against U.S. targets that resulted in a large number of casualties. The meticulous planning, sophistication of the attack (involving near simultaneous bombings), and the number of casualties served as a significant wake-up call to the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement community. The attack brought into sharper focus the danger posed by transnational jihadists, and forced the U.S. government to readjust its counterterrorism policies. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first provides an overview of the bombing plot and lists the key individuals involved in the plot. The second section describes the immediate U.S. response to the bombing and the third section provides an overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts against Osama bin Laden from the early 1990s until the attack in August 1998. The fourth section describes the cruise missile attacks on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, launched by the United States as a response to the embassy bombings. The fifth section examines U.S. counterterrorism policies and efforts after the cruise missile attacks. And finally, the conclusion highlights some of the lessons learned from the U.S. response to the embassy bombings. The next chapter, co-authored by Gary Ackerman of the University of Maryland and Sundara Vadlamudi, describes the history, exploits, pursuit, and capture of Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York, among several other Islamist extremist terror plots. During his relatively brief career as an international terrorist, crisscrossing the globe from 1993 to 1995, Yousef succeeded in attacking one of the world’s most prominent structures, plotting the assassination of several heads of state, winning over dozens of Muslim radicals, and planning what would have been one of the deadliest and most complex terrorist attacks of all time, all the while being pursued by several nations’ law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Yousef has been variously described as a “mastermind” and—at least while he was active—as “the most dangerous man in the world,” monikers that he egotistically appreciated; yet much about this chameleon-like villain remains a mystery. This chapter describes what is known about

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Yousef’s origins and his development as a terrorist, and traces his global exploits of mayhem. At the same time, the authors examine the nature and efficacy of the ultimately successful counterterrorist effort directed toward capturing a man who quickly rose to the rank of the world’s most wanted terrorist. Lastly, the chapter draws lessons from the campaign against Yousef, lessons which can be applied to both current and future counterterrorism operations. Next, Ruth Margolies Beitler of the U.S. Military Academy provides a case study of the attack on the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer refueling in Aden’s harbor off the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000. With 17 sailors dead and more than 38 wounded, the attack shocked the United States and its allies, and brought into sharp relief the relations between Yemen and the United States. Her chapter explores the events leading to the bombing of the USS Cole, the challenges of executing an investigation on foreign soil, and the ramifications of the Cole attack for U.S. counterterrorist policy. Regarding the latter, the investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole indicated clear shortcomings on a variety of levels. First, agencies within the United States must work together to increase the effectiveness of the investigations. Second, the United States must recognize the indigenous capability of a host nation, such as Yemen, and capitalize on those areas where the host nation retains a clear advantage over American investigators. Third, the U.S. government must grasp the flexible and ever-changing tactics utilized by al Qaeda. Overall, by assessing how the Cole investigation was handled, this chapter provides lessons for future investigations and counterterrorism cooperation. Next, U.S. terrorism expert Robert Wesley describes the hunt for Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the tactical mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, who was captured on March 3, 2003, in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. This chapter highlights the complex process that led to his detainment and the lessons underlined by this process. His capture serves to emphasize how the United States will be operating in the future to ensure continued progress in disrupting both the traditional leadership and those who replace them. Mohammad’s case study allows for reflection on several counterterrorism issues likely to have an impact on the future of this global conflict. For example, governments must recognize the importance of developing strong international partnering relationships; harnessing the core competencies of joint operations, involving U.S. and host-country organizations; creating and exploiting actionable intelligence; identifying and provoking security mistakes by al Qaeda operatives; and targeting “partner organizations” of al Qaeda. The next case study by Adam Dolnik of the University of Wollongong, Australia, describes the siege of School No. 1 in the North Ossetian town of Beslan, Russia. On September 1, 2004, a group of terrorists took more than 1,200 hostages on the first day of school in what became the

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deadliest hostage crisis—and the fourth deadliest terrorist attack—in history. After a 52-hour standoff, the detonation of explosive devices inside the school triggered a chaotic rescue operation in which 31 terrorists and 331 innocent victims were killed, 176 of them children. This chapter analyzes the myths and facts of the attack, with a clear purpose of identifying the lessons learned. The central focus is devoted to the Russian response, namely, the crisis negotiation approach and management of the tactical assault. In addition, the chapter examines events that occurred before Beslan that in retrospect could have provided an intelligence picture concrete enough to prevent the attack, as well as the media management and investigation aspects of the incident. The Beslan school hostage crisis was an unprecedented terrorist attack, both in its scale and targeting. It is clear that understanding the lessons of Beslan is one of the key prerequisites of designing counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies for the twenty-first century. This is followed by a chapter from Rogelio Alonso of King Juan Carlos University in which he examines the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004, in Madrid. Although Spain had been constantly targeted by various types of terrorism since the late 1960s, violence from the ethno-nationalist Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA, or Basque Fatherland and Freedom) being by far the most intense, never before had a terrorist attack in the country been so indiscriminate and lethal. On that day, ten bombs planted in four different trains filled with thousands of commuters on their way to Madrid were detonated between 7:37 and 7:40 a.m., killing 191 people. As it would soon emerge, the killings on March 11 were carried out by a group of Islamist terrorists, some of whom were closely linked to individuals who were also part of the al Qaeda network. The chapter examines the events that led to this terrorist attack, analyzes how and why such an atrocity was perpetrated, as well as its implications for counterterrorism in the country, and concludes with an analysis of the main counterterrorism measures implemented as a response to this tragedy. Next, Tom Maley of Cranfeld University examines the terrorist attacks of July 7, 2005, in London, England. After describing in detail the events that took place and the subsequent police investigation, Maley examines the motivations of the bombers, concluding that Muslim disadvantage, under-achievement, and under-representation at the hands of Western influence and policies seem to have been key motivational themes; thus, they sought martyrdom operations in their quest to right these wrongs. He then describes the government’s response to the attacks within the context of the UK’s long-term counterterrorism strategy. Operationally, this strategy is based upon four pillars: prevention, pursuit, protection, and preparedness, known colloquially as the “Four Ps.” The first two pillars were designed to reduce the threat, whereas the remaining two pillars focused upon the UK’s vulnerabilities with respect to international

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terrorism. Overall, Maley’s analysis provides several important insights into the most likely type of self-organized and motivated terrorist attack we may see in other large Western cities, as well as how to cope with and counter the threat from local al Qaeda-inspired terrorist cells. The final chapter of this section by Daniel Baracskay examines the April 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. He notes that this was a significant event for three principle reasons. First, the bombing established that American cities are vulnerable not only to the threats of external terrorist groups, but also to the impulses of internal extremists that are willing to use violence to advance their objectives. Second, the Oklahoma City bombing was the second large-scale assault on a public building in a 2-year period. The use of terrorism as an instrument of destruction is becoming more pervasive in the United States, if not expected. Finally, trends have shown that terror groups purposefully identify large and densely populated urban centers for targets in the United States and intentionally use violence in these cities to gain media coverage. This chapter analyzes the Oklahoma City bombing incident in detail and examines several implications and lessons that have surfaced in the decade following the event. PART II: CASE STUDIES OF THE LONG-TERM FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY The second section of the volume explores the struggle between nationstates and terrorist groups operating within their borders. The first chapter of this section, by Tom Marks of the National Defense University, examines the response of the Sri Lankan government to the persistent threat posed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He notes that the LTTE is labeled “terrorist” by any number of governments, but in reality, it is an insurgency in intent and methodology. It has, however, gone from using terror as a tool for mass mobilization to using it as a strategy for insurgency. The success of the LTTE reveals the ability of a radical, institutionally totalitarian movement to recruit, socialize, and deploy manpower so rigidly indoctrinated that combatants prefer death by cyanide or selfdestruction to capture. Having gained control of certain areas early on, LTTE was able to recruit manpower at young ages and then guide them in ways that produced entire units comprising young boys and girls who had never known alternative modes of existence. Meanwhile, this case study reveals several mistakes of strategic approach and operational implementation on the part of the government. These began with a persistent failure to assess the insurgency in terms appropriate to framing a correct response, attacking the symptoms to the near-exclusion of the causes of the violence, and misinterpreting that violence once it appeared. To focus upon the tactical acts of terror, then, was precisely the wrong approach.

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Certainly repression was a necessary element of state response, but the security forces should only have been an instrument for the accomplishment of a political solution. Next, Joanne Wright, the Pro-Vice-Chancellor at Sussex University, provides a case study of West Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF, a.k.a. the Baader Meinhof Gang). Examining the RAF, its motivating ideology, and particularly the West German government’s counterterrorism policies can provide valuable lessons and insights into twenty-first-century terrorism. It can illustrate, for example, how a relatively small and seemingly irrational group can create a physical and psychological impact way out of proportion to size and threat. Perhaps even more usefully, it can illustrate that whatever sympathy terrorist groups do manage to generate among national and international audiences is largely derived from government responses to terrorism. Her chapter suggests that the RAF was able to generate some degree of success and attach some degree of credibility to its analysis of a repressive state in three areas: security force behavior, prisoners and prison conditions, and legislative changes. Overall, the West German experience highlights the need to review the impact of policies on the motivations and support of terror groups within a society. This is followed by a chapter from David Scott Palmer of Boston University in which he examines the case of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. Beginning in May 1980, the government of Peru faced the first attacks from a Maoist insurgency originating in the Andean highlands known as Shining Path, attacks that expanded dramatically over the decade. By 1990, more than 20,000 Peruvians had been killed, $10 billion of infrastructure had been damaged or destroyed, and some 9 million internal refugees and emigrants had fled their homes. This chapter offers an abbreviated account of the rise and fall of Shining Path. It discusses the conditions contributing to the initial formation and growth of the insurgency, the largely counterproductive responses by the Peruvian government and its security forces, and the key elements of the major strategic and tactical overhaul that turned the tables on the insurgents. The conclusion draws together the lessons to be learned as to how a guerrilla movement could come close to succeeding, as well as how a besieged government could overcome the threat—lessons of possible use to other governments in the formulation of their own counterinsurgency and counterterrorism policies. A similar analysis of counterinsurgency in Latin America is provided in a chapter on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), co-authored by Nicol´as Urrutia Iriarte and Rom´an Ortiz of Los Andes University (Bogot´a). Traditionally, FARC has been considered the oldest guerilla movement in Latin America, with a history of nearly 40 years. It has also proven to be one of the more adaptable movements, as an analysis of their military tactics and financial dealings reveal. The group

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had its origins in an essentially rural country with scarce social mobility and deficient political participation mechanisms. However, the longterm evolution of their attack capabilities, the multiplication of its financial resources—particularly resulting from an increase in the demand for cocaine in the new markets of Eastern Europe and the expansion of heroin production in Colombia, which provided FARC with new options to increase the volume of income from drug trafficking—and the renewed capacity to project its political message has turned FARC into a formidable threat. Their research highlights how clandestine networks for exchanging technology and military information between terrorist groups and criminal organizations have offered FARC critical channels through which they could expand their fighting capability, creating enormous challenges for the government’s counterterrorism and counterintelligence efforts. Another insurgency with a considerable history is examined in the following chapter by Thomas Sherlock of the U.S. Military Academy, which explains the origins of the Chechen crisis, assesses the costs to Russian pluralism of the Kremlin’s efforts to pacify Chechnya, and suggests what the West might do to help resolve one of Russia’s most important political problems. Throughout numerous brutal encounters with Russia, Chechen civilian casualties have been high and there is deep animosity throughout the region, rooted in decades of government repression. Sherlock notes that promoting democratization in Russia and working to resolve the crisis in Chechnya are important goals for the West, but it should not oscillate between condemnation and approval of Russian behavior in Chechnya, even in the face of dramatic intervening events, such as the terror attacks of 9/11, which led Washington to adopt generally supportive language regarding Kremlin policies in Chechnya. Putin and Russia’s political elites fear that instability in Chechnya will spread throughout the Caucasus. Meanwhile, the recent, unexpected, and tumultuous “revolutions” on Russia’s borders are viewed as threats by Russia’s ruling elites, who since Putin’s accession to power have been drawn in large part from the security services, and who worry that Russian influence is yet again receding in post-Soviet space. Such perceptions of vulnerability strengthen the desire to treat the problem of Chechnya as a completely “internal” matter. Sherlock concludes that while holding Russia publicly and privately accountable for atrocities committed in Chechnya by Russian and proRussian Chechen forces, the West should repeatedly reassure the Kremlin of its support for Russia’s territorial integrity, while promoting evenhanded proposals that may effectively compel Russia to negotiate with moderate elements to reach a final solution to the Chechen insurgency. Next, Erica Chenoweth of Harvard University examines one of the most durable and evasive terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s in Italy—the Red Brigades. Her investigation into the history of this group illuminates the successes and failures of the Italian government in confronting the Red

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Brigades, providing several observations that should inform current U.S. policy in fighting insurgency and terrorism. For example, Italian counterterrorism efforts initially failed because of shadowy complicity between elements of the state and right-wing terrorism; refusal of the government to acknowledge the destructive potential of the Red Brigades; knee-jerk reactions resulting in undemocratic policies that raised some ethical considerations; and a failure to appreciate the escalatory effects of intergroup rivalries among terrorist groups. However, according to Chenoweth, the eventual successes of Italian counterterrorism included a unification of intelligence units and a coordination of their activities; creation of special commando forces with training in hostage crises; and finally, the introduction of policies that exploited internal divisions within the Red Brigades and led to the defection of many members. Rick Wrona follows with a case study on the Lebanese terror organization Hizbollah. After describing the origins of Hizbollah, he examines the group’s ideology and its sponsorship by Iran and Syria. Today, he notes, the organization acts as a political, economic, social, and military leader in Lebanese society. Responding to such an organization is a daunting challenge for the United States and its allies in the region, most notably Israel. As a case study, Hizbollah demonstrates the lack of American consistency when dealing with organizations that resort to terrorism. America’s focus on Hizbollah has been sporadic and, in many instances, poorly timed. Further, American support of the Lebanese regime in the early 1980s had the unintended consequence of turning the Shi’a population against the United States, because support of the regime equated to support of the Maronite factions controlling the government. Likewise, American support of Israel, particularly after the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, came to be viewed by Hizbollah as both an indirect attack on the Lebanese people and direct support for Israeli regional expansion. Hizbollah’s history demonstrates that integration into the political process has simply given the organization more tools by which to achieve its goals, raising questions about the role of democratization in countering terrorism. Finally, the example of Hizbollah demonstrates the power of organizations that combine national, religious, and class appeal successfully. While some terrorist organizations (most notably several European groups of the 1970s) have been unable to expand beyond a small core of radicalized supporters, Hizbollah is the textbook case of an organization that has built a constituency that guarantees the group’s longevity and importance for the foreseeable future. The next chapter by Lydia Khalil of the New York Police Department examines the Partia Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK, or the Kurdistan Workers Party). Founded by a small group of communist Kurdish students of the University of Ankara and led by Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK was originally a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist group attempting to establish socialism

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in the Kurdish populated areas of the Middle East. In the late 1980s, the PKK came to focus more on promoting Kurdish nationalism and the establishment of a Kurdish nation-state. Turkey’s fight against the PKK is a good example of how a military defeat of a terrorist insurgency does not automatically translate into permanent peace. Although the group is currently not operating with the full military and political force it had before Ocalan’s arrest, the lack of a political settlement on Turkey’s Kurdish question allowed the PKK to continue hit and run operations against Turkish forces and civilian targets. Clashes between PKK rebels and Turkish security forces have increased since the PKK called off their unilateral ceasefire in the summer of 2004. After a study of Turkey’s different counterterrorism policies toward the PKK, this analysis highlights lessons learned from Turkey’s successes and failures in dealing with the PKK. This is followed by a chapter from Joshua L. Gleis of Tufts University on counterterrorism measures adopted by Israel in its fight against terrorist organizations. His description of Israeli tactics is particularly interesting. For example, narrow alleys require infantry to move house to house, blowing holes through walls in order to limit the danger to them from snipers and explosives planted in the entrances. His chapter also addresses issues of doctrine, education, preemption, targeted assassinations, and technology, including civilian antiaircraft missile systems, counterterrorism measures implemented on buses, and long-range explosives detectors. He notes that the U.S. armed forces, and particularly the Marine Corps, have joint training exercises with Israeli forces and are learning from Israel’s urban warfare tactics. However, in the intelligence field there is still an extreme lack of trust toward the Israeli intelligence and security agencies. Overall, he concludes, there is much that can be learned from Israel’s long experience in combating insurgency and terrorism. Next, Brian Fishman of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point provides a case study of Syria’s struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s. This chapter examines the efforts of Syrian President Hafez al-Asad to defeat several armed groups operating in the streets, many of whom were associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (Brotherhood). Although the focus is on Asad’s campaign against the militant Islamic opposition, it is impossible (and would be entirely improper) to separate Syria’s counterinsurgency policies from Asad’s efforts to build a social and political system that would enable him to dominate the Syrian state. Asad’s strategy for defeating the Brotherhood contained four elements employed by all governments fighting counterinsurgencies: (1) strengthen and legitimize the government, in this case Asad himself; (2) target the insurgent’s support networks domestically and internationally; (3) de-legitimize the insurgents; and (4) use violence to eliminate the insurgents and deter sympathizers. In order to understand Asad’s approach to counterinsurgency, one must understand the social bases

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of both the Ba’th party in Syria and the Brotherhood. The chapter begins by reviewing the rise of Asad’s Alawite-dominated Ba’athist regime in Syria and the Sunni Brotherhood-associated movement that violently challenged his authority. This leads naturally into a discussion of the struggle for legitimacy between Asad and the Brotherhood. Overall, this case study is an excellent example of how counterinsurgency in an autocratic state represents the struggle of an individual or party to fend off challenges to its power and legitimacy. Militant Islamism is also the focus of the next chapter, by Sherifa Zuhur of the U.S. Army War College, in which she provides a detailed history of Egypt’s long (and recently resurgent) conflict with several Islamist groups, some of which have proved more violent than others. For much of this history, Egypt’s leaders have sought to contain Islam as a political force and suppressed an array of Islamist groups. While officials disagree that their stringent counterterrorist actions could encourage further jihad, she argues, torture and imprisonment of Islamists in the 1960s produced several results in the 1970s: uncompromising radicalism and aims to immediately overthrow the state; or accommodation and commitment to a gradual Islamization of the state, this being the path of the Muslim Brotherhood. Torture and imprisonment in the late 1970s and 1980s led to further organizational development in prisons themselves, including the forming of new radical groups and the spread of “global jihad” or the quest for sanctuary somewhere outside of Egypt. She notes that in recent years, Egypt has accepted moderate Islamism in other dimensions (intellectual and social), but recent acts of religious violence (including attacks in Cairo, Sharm alShaykh, and Dahab) have renewed the state’s efforts to counteract the rise of moderate Islamism in its political form. In the next chapter, Vera Eccarius-Kelly of Siena College provides another case study in which a nation-state’s counterterrorism policies and tactics may have contributed to the strength of a violent insurgency. Her analysis of Peru’s response to the Movimiento Revolutionario Tupac ´ Amaru (Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru, or MRTA) reveals a repressive and corrupt national security state. This chapter examines the government’s management of the media, its collusion with corrupt military and police, and its embrace of tactics of intimidation, abduction, torture, and a series of other horrific human rights offenses. She describes several of the major confrontations between the Peruvian government and the MRTA, and offers a detailed analysis of the counterterrorism policies employed during the 1996–1997 hostage crisis at the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in the capital city Lima. Several significant insights can be gained from investigating the measures utilized to defeat the MRTA during both the Garc´ıa and Fujimori presidencies between 1985 and 2000. Overall, an evaluation of the Peruvian government’s handling of the MRTA is an important case study of counterinsurgency

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and counterterrorism measures in a society with fledging democratic institutions. A similar case of a fledging democracy battling a terrorism-inclined insurgency can be found in the Philippines, as Robin Bowman of the U.S. Air Force Academy describes. Her chapter addresses the “whys”—goals, motivations, and leadership—and “hows” (including organization and tactics) behind the violent Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines, and their well-documented connections with foreign jihadists, as well as Manila’s responses to its home-grown insurgencies and international terrorism. The country is considered highly vulnerable to foreign terrorist penetration and prolific domestic attacks due to its abundant Christian and Western targets, its fluid borders, weak political institutions and responses, and general lack of governmental reach into the Muslim regions. Bowman begins the chapter with a look at the formation of Moro identity, and how and why this community turned to violence and militancy in order to assert their goals of a distinct and independent Muslim homeland. She then profiles each of the violent separatist movements (particularly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group) before describing the government’s response. Overall, this chapter offers an interesting case study of political violence. The struggle for a distinct and independent Muslim homeland is also a centerpiece of the next chapter by Johua Sinai of The Analysis Corporation in which he describes the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its struggle with the secular regime of President Karimov. Uzbekistan is the former Soviet Union’s largest Muslim nation, with a population of 25.1 million people. The government believes that its counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies will enable it to avoid the fate of its smaller southern neighbor Tajikistan, which has been engulfed in a civil war since independence. So far, these strategies have not succeeded in rooting out Uzbekistan’s extremist Islamic insurgency because its military campaign has been ineffective and solutions still need to be provided to tackle the country’s internal problems, particularly the lack of full political participation in the form of free, fair, and competitive elections. Sinai notes that an effective response to the radical Islamic insurgency in Uzbekistan must be found and implemented, because this insurgency is part of a wider series of insurgencies facing the Central Asian states that pose a major threat to regional stability, democratization, and economic well-being. However, until Uzbekistan adopts a more democratic course, he argues, there will be few internal or external allies to help it defeat the IMU’s insurgency. The next chapter addresses another critical insurgency/separatist movement in this region: Kashmir. Authored by retired Indian Army officer Behram A. Sahukar, the chapter examines the origins of the Kashmir issue and the role of Pakistan in sponsoring or supporting Islamic militant groups engaged in terrorist attacks. He explains how the Soviet invasion

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of Afghanistan in 1979 made Pakistan a frontline state in the United Statesfunded jihad against the Soviet Union, and the infusion of CIA-funded arms, equipment, and other forms of support into Pakistan legitimized the use of Islam to fight an Islamic holy war. The end of the Afghan jihad in 1989 left Pakistan flooded with surplus arms and equipment, as well as a cadre of fighters with experience in a prolonged low intensity conflict. Mujahideen who had completed their successful mission against the Soviets were diverted to Kashmir to continue their fight for Islam in Kashmir against “infidel” Hindu India. Since 1989, separatist violence in Kashmir has been backed by a radical Islamist ideology that aims to annex Kashmir to Pakistan and extend Islamic rule over India. Pakistan considers the issue of Kashmir as the “unfinished agenda of partition,” and remains in occupation of one third of the Indian state. It has tried to take the rest of the state by force several times in the past and failed. However, both sides have now realized that continued hostility and acrimony is counterproductive to the peace and stability of the region. This realization led to the beginnings of a comprehensive dialogue and peace process in April 2003, and a series of confidence building measures. Unfortunately, the jihadi factor and the anti-India military in Pakistan has been a hindrance to any lasting peaceful solution to Kashmir. Sahukar concludes that unless Pakistan abandons its fixation with Kashmir and returns to a democracy, the military and the Inter Services Intelligence agency will continue to fuel a proxy war against India. Nearby this troubled region, another insurgency has grown in strength and prominence since 1996, led by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), in which more than 13,000 Nepalis have lost their lives, many to insurgent torture and murder. The chapter by Tom Marks of the National Defense University describes the socio-political roots of the insurgency and the influence on the CPN(M) by other communist movements, notably Sendero Luminoso in Peru and Maoists in India. In Nepal, the Maoists seized territory over a period of years, enlisting a growing number of recruits until by 2003 the government estimated the movement’s strength to be roughly 5,500 combatants, 8,000 militia, 4,500 cadre, 33,000 hardcore followers, and 200,000 sympathizers. Marks then describes the government’s response to this “people’s war” as anything but adequate. Patrols sent to the scenes of incidents were ambushed, while numerous small police stations were overrun, attacked in the dead of night in assaults initiated with homemade explosives, then overwhelmed by human wave assaults. The police then abandoned outlying stations and consolidated their forces in a defensible mass, and by early 2003, half of all police stations nationwide had been abandoned. Once the police presence was eliminated, the insurgents became the state. Marks also criticizes the Nepalese government for the lack of a political component to its counterinsurgency strategy. He concludes that counterterrorism should be

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an important element, but only one element of many in a comprehensive approach, a blend of the violent and the nonviolent that addresses the roots of conflict and creates good governance. The next chapter examines a unique form of terrorism with roots in Japan, but affiliations in other Asian countries as well. As James Smith of the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Institute for National Security Studies writes, the case of Aum Shinrikyo—a Japanese “new religion” and cult that also embraced and practiced chemical and biological terrorism—and of the restrained and delayed Japanese government response provides significant lessons for those seeking to better understand and respond to terrorism, domestic religion-based terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The chapter also illustrates the utility to terrorism of “sanctuary under national law,” and of the acquisition of chemical and biological materials and production equipment under the sanctuary of legitimate business operations. Smith explores important issues of—and consequences from—governmental restraint and the persistent challenge of balancing civil liberties and national security. Finally, the case of Aum Shinrikyo also illustrates the utility of a culturally based analytical framework in examining terrorist groups and political violence, terrorist decisions and actions regarding WMD acquisition and use, and government response options and constraints. The final chapter of this volume brings us back to the United States, where Eric Shibuya of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College examines the struggle with violent right-wing extremist groups. After describing several different types of groups, he identifies three trends as most significant when considering the threat these groups pose to the United States. The first is that the use of a WMD in a terrorist attack is clearly not beyond the scope of possibility for violent right-wing actors, in terms of motivation or in (growing) capability. The second trend is the increasing value of the Internet in putting the leaderless resistance form of operation into practice. The Internet has been a boon to the movement by allowing for the creation of virtual communities of interest that are more anonymous and physically disconnected, making investigation and surveillance much more difficult. The third and perhaps most significant trend is the growing statements of common cause between the violent right-wing movement and other terrorist movements. It may be an exaggeration to consider groups like al Qaeda and the Aryan Nations to be part of a single “movement,” but it is certainly true that both groups find common cause in their hatred for the U.S. government. While strategic alliances may be less likely, tactical relationships may increase as both groups find areas of mutual benefit to work together. Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the threat from violent right-wing groups must be included in our national strategies for countering insurgency and terrorism in the twenty-first century.

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CONCLUSION As a collection, these chapters demonstrate the truly global challenge of combating terrorism and insurgency. Further, there is unfortunately a wealth of additional case studies worth exploring beyond what is covered in this volume. Clearly, there is much that any country can learn from the experience of others in how to meet these challenges in new and increasingly successful ways. Thus, this collection will hopefully stimulate the reader to pursue further research on their own, in order to expand our collective understanding of countering terrorism and insurgency in the twenty-first century. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This project is the final installment of an ambitious trilogy, which began with The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training and Root Causes (published by Praeger in 2005) and continued with Homeland Security: Protecting America’s Targets (in 2006). Together, these volumes are meant to provide a central resource for understanding the global threat of terrorism, how America is working to defend against it, and how the international community is actively seeking to disrupt, deter, and defeat those who seek to conduct terror attacks. I would like to thank Hilary Claggett at Praeger Security International for her vision and encouragement throughout this effort. Each of these multivolume projects required significant coordination, and Hilary and her staff have been enormously professional and helpful collaborators during the past 3 years. Also, the Advisory Board members for this project—Bruce Hoffman, Rohan Gunaratna, and James Robbins—have been extremely helpful in identifying authors and topics to be addressed, in addition to serving as outstanding guest lecturers to the cadets in my terrorism studies courses at West Point. New contributions to the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency have never been more urgently needed. Each of the chapters in these three volumes is the product of thoughtful research and analysis, and I offer my sincere thanks to the authors for their hard work and commitment to excellence. The insights and suggestions they have provided in these pages will undoubtedly inform discussions and debate in a variety of policymaking and academic settings for the foreseeable future. For their continued support and encouragement, I extend my gratitude to the faculty and staff of the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point. General (R) Wayne Downing, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Felter, Dr. Jarret Brachman, and Brigadier General (R) Russell Howard have been especially important sources of mentorship and guidance. Colonel Kip McCormick, Major Rick Wrona, Mr. Brian Fishman, Mr. Clint Watts, Mr. Jim Phillips, and Ms. Lianne Kennedy Boudali have also contributed significantly to my understanding of terrorism and counterterrorism. I would also like to thank the leadership of the Department of Social Sciences— Colonel Mike Meese and Colonel Cindy Jebb—along with the Dean of

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the Academic Board, Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan, and the former Dean, Brigadier General (R) Daniel Kaufman, all of whom have been supportive of my publishing efforts over the last several years. I am also sincerely grateful to Mr. Tom Harrington, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, for his role in sustaining and expanding the CTC’s educational mission. And of course, the CTC would not exist without the generous commitment, support, and vision of Mr. Vincent Viola, USMA Class of 1977. My faculty colleagues throughout West Point continue to be a source of inspiration as both academic mentors and members of the U.S. armed forces. I joined West Point as a civilian faculty member and assistant dean in early Fall 2001, and the attacks of September 11 had a tremendous impact on my personal and professional life. The United States Military Academy is a very unique place to work as an academic, particularly given the current global security challenges. Upon graduation, the students I teach are commissioned as officers in the U.S. Army, and very soon find themselves on the front lines of the global counterterrorism effort. Some have been injured, some have been killed. Many of the officers who serve on the faculty and staff at West Point have also been deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere; some of them have fallen as well. I have never before encountered such a willingness to sacrifice, and I am continually awed by so many men and women (and their families) who are committed to a life of service to our nation. I offer them my deepest gratitude and best wishes for a long and successful military career. Finally, my wife and daughter—Alicia and Chloe Lynn—have been sources of great motivation and support, and I thank them sincerely for their patience and tolerance during my scholarly adventures. James J. F. Forest January 15, 2007

CHAPTER 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COUNTERTERRORISM James J. F. Forest

The primary goal of this volume is to distill lessons and insights from past conflicts involving terrorism or insurgency that will help inform new approaches to fighting current and future counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns. Volumes 1 and 2 of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century address important themes in a mostly international and comparative perspective. The chapters of this third volume provide a more detailed analysis of the experiences of many countries and regions, adding greater qualitative depth to the comparative perspectives offered in the other two volumes. A comparative perspective helps us identify phenomena that, while framed by different political and social arrangements, lead to a better understanding of a complex world and our place within it. In the study of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, we are so often bound by the constraints of national thinking that a comparative perspective becomes especially valuable, because the security challenges facing the global community of responsible nations have many common characteristics. As a collection, these chapters complement each other in highlighting important themes and issues that transcend the many differences in history, culture, and experience that occur among nations. Lessons learned in counterterrorism policies and practices in different countries can offer valuable insights to those officials responsible for setting policy.1 Further, while it is important to review cases where governments have had success, it is also vital to examine instances where things did not go so well for the

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government, or the terrorists actually succeeded in carrying out their deadly mission. A SAMPLING OF SUCCESSFUL COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS On January 7, 2005, a group of suspected Islamic militants were arrested in Manila, the capital of the Philippines. The group was discovered in the process of assembling bombs for what was intended to be an attack on the Christian festival of the Black Nazarene, an annual event that attracts tens of thousands of devotees. When police examined the improvised explosive devices and bomb components, including timing gadgets and cables, they realized that the death toll of the explosions, had they occurred, would have been considerable.2 On November 9, 2005, state and federal police forces in Australia raided dozens of properties in Melbourne and Sydney, arresting 17 men and seizing large quantities of alleged precursor chemicals, laboratory equipment, instruction manuals on the production of the explosive triacetone triperoxide (TATP), and maps and photographs of potential targets. Police and political leaders declared that the operation had foiled an imminent attack of enormous magnitude.3 In June 2006, London police conducted a series of arrests after uncovering a plot to explode up to 12 aircraft in mid-flight between Britain and America. Authorities said that the would-be terrorists planned to carry the explosive material and detonating devices onto aircraft disguised as drinks (or other liquids that appeared innocuous on their own but could be potentially deadly when mixed) and seemingly harmless electronic devices. Subsequently, it was revealed that authorities had been monitoring the meetings, movements, travel, spending, and the aspirations of a large group of people since December 2005, and it was this surveillance effort that led to the disruption of the plot and arrest of the cell’s members.4 Clearly, as described at length in Volume 1 of this book, intelligence plays a critical role in countering terrorism. For example, in September 2006, a sting operation conducted by authorities in Odense, Denmark, resulted in the arrest of nine men charged with suspicion of plotting to carry out a bomb attack on Danish soil. Police uncovered chemicals used to make bombs, along with computers, telephones, and CD-ROMs suggesting that a radical Islamist-inspired terror attack was imminent.5 Similar counterterrorism investigations conducted in the United States have resulted in arrests and convictions that, in the end, help make our nation safer. For example, on September 13, 2002, the FBI arrested five U.S. citizens near Buffalo, New York (Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, Yahya Goba, Shafal Mosed, and Yasein Taher), charging them with “providing, attempting to provide, and conspiring to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization.” In addition,

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Mukhtar Albakri, also a U.S. citizen, was arrested in Bahrain on the same charges. All six individuals were indicted on these charges on October 21, 2002. The arrests and indictments were based on information indicating that these individuals traveled to an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan in 2001, where they received military training and were visited by Osama bin Laden. All six pled guilty to terrorist related charges and received prison sentences ranging between 7 and 10 years.6 In Portland, Oregon, six individuals (Ahmed Bilal, his brother Mohammad Bilal, Habes Al-Saoub, Patrice Ford, Jeffrey Battle, and October Lewis) were indicted on October 3, 2002, and subsequently arrested on federal charges, including conspiracy to levy war against the United States, conspiracy to provide material support and resources to a terrorist organization, conspiracy to contribute services to al Qaeda and the Taliban, and possessing firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence. With the exception of Al-Saoub, these subjects have pled guilty to terrorism related and money laundering charges and have received federal sentences ranging from 3 to 18 years. The only subject who has not been brought to justice, Al-Saoub, is believed to have been killed in Pakistan, by Pakistani military authorities.7 In Los Angeles, an investigation led by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force discovered that Irving Rubin and Earl Krugel—active members of the Jewish Defense League (JDL), a known violent extremist Jewish Organization—were planning to attack the Islamic Muslim Public Affairs Council (IMPAC) office in Los Angeles, or possibly the California office of United States Congressman Darrell Issa. Statements made by Krugel indicated that the motivation for the attack was to serve as a “wake up call” to the Muslim Community. Rubin and Krugel were arrested for conspiring to build and place an improvised explosive device at the IMPAC office.8 These cases, as well as those developed by Philip Heymann and his colleagues for use at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, offer important learning opportunities in courses on terrorism and counterterrorism.9 But in addition to examining successful examples of counterterrorism, it is also important to explore situations in which authorities made mistakes that could have—or did—prove lethal for those people whom they intended to protect. EXAMINING QUESTIONABLE “SUCCESSES” IN COUNTERTERRORISM Sometimes intelligence fails, and luck is all that prevents a terrorist attack. For example, in August 2006, German authorities disclosed a botched plot to bomb two trains. In this case, two men left suitcases stuffed with crude propane-gas bombs on trains heading for the western cities

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of Hamm and Koblenz, but the explosives failed to detonate because of a “technical defect,” according to the German federal prosecutor. If they had detonated as intended, the police said, they would have killed a “high number” of passengers.10 A more dramatic example of questionable success in countering terrorism is drawn from the recent siege of a theater in Moscow. At 9 p.m. on October 23, 2002, 41 Chechen separatists calling themselves the Islamic Suicide Squad took more than 800 Moscow theatergoers hostage.11 This precipitated a 57-hour crisis that captured the world’s attention. The Chechens were armed with small arms and machine guns. They also carried a large amount of explosives, much of which was strapped to their bodies to ward off attempts by Russian authorities to take the theater by force. They sought negotiations with Russian authorities in a quest to meet their demands for an end to the war in Chechnya, withdrawal of Russian forces, and Chechen independence. On October 26, they set a deadline of 12 hours for the Russian government to comply with their demands before they would “start shooting the captives.” A second deadline (7 days) demanded “to bring an end to the war . . . or they would blow up themselves, the hostages and the theater.”12 But the Russian government was never willing to cooperate or negotiate, as evidenced by the lack of official government negotiators at any point in the process. In the early morning hours of October 27, the hostage crisis ended when Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) special forces (Spetsnaz) pumped an aerosol version of a potent, fast-acting opiate named fentanyl into the theater and then stormed it by force.13 The gas prevented the Chechens from mounting any resistance to the assault. The fentanyl, however, had a stronger effect than expected. By the end of the incident, 129 hostages and 41 hostage-takers had died—all but two of the hostages’ deaths were due to the effects of gas inhalation. As Adam Dolnik recounts in his chapter of this volume, the Russians faced a similar hostage-taking challenge a year later at a school in Beslan, with similarly disastrous results. Naturally, the authorities in Russia have little interest in “hanging out their dirty laundry” for the rest of us to see, but in cases like these the counterterrorism community would gain tremendously from a critical, introspective analysis from the strategists, tacticians, and policymakers involved about what mistakes might have been prevented, and what other countries might do to avoid similar mistakes when faced with their own terrorist hostage crisis. LEARNING FROM INSTANCES IN WHICH THE TERRORISTS SUCCEEDED Unfortunately, there are far too many instances where the terrorists succeed with their deadly mission, and evidence collected during post-attack

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investigations offer important insights for the counterterrorism community. Thus, it can be argued that authorities need to provide as much detail as possible to members of the academic community (without, of course, jeopardizing their case for possibly prosecuting the perpetrators) who are responsible for teaching the next generation of national security professionals. A recent example from Indonesia is particularly instructive.14 In October 2005, three men walked into separate restaurants in Bali and blew themselves up, killing 15 Indonesians, 4 Australians, and a Japanese tourist. In the course of their investigation, Indonesian police discovered the step-by-step plan of the attack, a 34-page document startling in its scope and detail. Even the smallest aspects of the attack were carefully choreographed. For example, the author identifies the intended targets as “foreign tourists from America and its allies,” but recognizes that the bombers would have trouble determining the native country of many tourists. “So,” he notes, “we will consider all white people the enemy.” A few weeks before the attacks, the three men who would carry out the operation were sent to Bali to do a “survey” of possible targets for themselves. Beforehand, they were told to learn what they could about Bali (a popular tourist island) on the Internet, and to get tourist brochures and a map. As part of their surveillance, the men were told to “pay attention to clothes worn by local tourists” and note what kind of day packs or shoulder bags they carried and whether they carried more than one. The document, titled “The Bali Project,” was found on the computer of Azhari Husin, a Malaysian-born engineer educated in Australia and Britain who became a master bomb maker and was one of the most dangerous terrorists in Southeast Asia until he was killed in a shootout with the police in November 2005. His co-planner was Mohammad Noordin Top, who has narrowly escaped capture several times and remains on the run. Documents like these serve an important purpose beyond their primary investigative purposes—they shed light on the strategic mindset and capabilities of modern terrorist groups who have embraced the tactic of suicide bombing. For example, the author describes how the group decided that discos and nightclubs offered potential targets because most of the patrons were foreigners, and there was “no security to speak of, easy to enter.” But those sites were ultimately rejected, because backpacks would be suspicious at the time of night when the clubs got crowded, after 9 p.m. That led the men to consider restaurants in Kuta, one of the most popular tourist districts, as well as the seafood restaurants on the beach at Jimbaran. “Of all the places,” the document says, “this may be the easiest, God willing.” The team explained how the tables at Jimbaran were arranged in the sand, about a yard apart with three to seven diners at each. “Almost 80 percent of the patrons are white,” they said. Others were Chinese or Japanese, they noted, using a derogatory term. The best time to attack would be around 7:30 p.m., when the restaurants were the most

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crowded and a backpack would not be suspicious. There was also a further reason for choosing the restaurants at Jimbaran: many of the patrons were businessmen. “The death of foreign businessmen will have a greater impact than that of young people,” the document says. The backpack bombs were to be assembled by Mr. Azhari, and the team determined that the backpacks should not be mountaineering backpacks, but student day packs, in order to avoid suspicion. For that reason, Mr. Azhari constructed relatively light bombs, weighing roughly 22–26 pounds. He devised two elaborate detonating systems that the report explains in detail, including schematic diagrams of the wiring system and drawings of a man with the wired backpack. The first system was “direct” and connected to the explosives in the backpack. The other was on “delay,” for explosives in a fanny pack worn by the bombers, with a delay time of 30 seconds; the bomber would flip the switches for that one as he approached the restaurant. That way, if he were stopped by a guard and could not set off the main bomb, the fanny pack would still explode. Within the last 10 years, the number and lethality of terrorist attacks like this has increased worldwide. In the Palestinian Territories, a young woman by the name of Wafa Idris—a paramedic who lived in Ramallah— entered a shopping district in Jerusalem on January 27, 2002, and detonated a 22-pound bomb filled with nails and metal objects, killing an 81year-old man and injuring more than 100 bystanders. Idris, a member of the Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade, was the first known istish-hadiyat (female martyr) of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in the Middle East—but others soon followed, including Dareen Abu Aisheh, who wounded two Israeli policeman when she detonated her bomb at a roadblock near Maccabim on February 27, 2002; Aayat al-Akhras, who strolled into a supermarket in the neighborhood of Kiryat Yovel in Jerusalem and killed two Israeli civilians and wounded 22 more on March 29, 2002; and Hanadi Jaradat, a 29-year-old lawyer who calmly entered a highly popular restaurant on October 4, 2003, and killed 21 Israeli and Arab men, women, and children.15 Of course, while extreme militant Muslims have been a primary source of terrorism in the past decade (and are the main source of suicide bombings worldwide), they are by no means alone, as terror attacks from Sri Lanka to Ireland to Colombia demonstrate. For example, on August 15, 1998, a car bomb packed with 500 lbs. of explosives detonated in the popular shopping district of Omagh, a small town in county Tyrone, Northern Ireland (about 70 miles west of Belfast).16 The entire front wall of SD Kells clothes shop was blasted into the building, and the roof collapsed onto the top floor. At the Pine Emporium, a furniture shop, the blast was such that furniture could later be seen sticking out the windows at the back of the building. A water main under the road was exposed by the blast, and this began pouring gallons of water over the wreckage, washing bodies down

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the hill. All in all, 28 people were killed by the blast, and hundreds more were injured. We can learn much from studying what transpired to make these and other terrorist attacks successful in order to prevent new ones. This is the primary goal of the chapters in this volume. Counterterrorism professionals in the military, law enforcement, intelligence, diplomacy, and policymaking communities must all have a comprehensive understanding of the issues addressed in the first two volumes of this book, and must draw lessons from the application of hard and soft power (both successful and unsuccessful) reflected in the cases provided in this volume. As the world’s superpower and leader of the global war on terrorism, the United States has a particular responsibility to learn from the successes and avoid the failures of other nations in countering terrorism and insurgency. CONCLUSION Studying the history of terrorism—using case studies to examine a diverse array of groups including anarchists, ethnic separatists, and religious extremists—helps us recognize that the global threat is not new, but rather, presents itself in new forms, partly due to the evolution of transportation and communications technologies. It is also important to explore the organizational strategies of terrorist groups and the individual motivations of their members, as well as specific dynamics such as recruitment, training, ideology, and communication. As demonstrated by the chapters of Volume 2, we must examine various facilitators of terrorism— such as transnational financial and criminal networks—as well as the local circumstances that support terrorism, including the political, economic and social conditions that existed before political violence erupted. Throughout history, as Yonah Alexander observes, governments challenged by terrorism have responded in different ways. Politically, one response was to seek political means of conciliation to resolve underlying issues in an effort to undermine popular support for terrorist acts. Another response was widespread repression, not only of terrorists but of innocent civilians as well. Other responses included military attacks and police raids on supposed terrorist sites, freezing the financial assets of individuals believed to be connected to the terrorists, arranging for training in counterterrorism practices, and rallying international support, to name but a few.17 In formulating counterterrorism strategy and tactics for the twenty-first century, it is obviously necessary to reflect on historical examples of what has worked and what has not. Unfortunately, there are many such examples to choose from, as the diverse case studies in this volume demonstrate. The chapters of this volume provide a significant amount of geographic diversity: all the major regions of the world are covered in these

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chapters, and each country represented in this volume has had significant experience countering terrorism and insurgency. New security environments and new roles and expectations require new forms of education for the counterterrorism profession. In addition to appreciating the enemy’s strategies, motivations, goals, and tactics, we must develop an understanding for how complex, networked, decentralized, loosely organized groups operate. From this understanding, we can identify the political, cultural, organizational, and financial seams within those networked organizations, so that ways can be found to exploit these seams in order to degrade their operational capabilities. And equally important, we must understand the nonkinetic dimensions of today’s conflicts. An insurgency is conducted in numerous locations simultaneously, including the information battlespace. Counterterrorism professionals must think in terms of influence and combined actions, as well as the impact that military and law enforcement operations will have on local perceptions. They must have a full appreciation of many forms of technology and understand what skill sets are needed for conducting strategic communications and cyber-warfare. To some degree, the lessons contained in the chapters of this volume mirror a set of observations produced by a Rand study of counterinsurgency published in April 1962, which highlighted the need to: r Identify and redress the political, economic, military, and other issues fueling an insurgency;

r Gain control over and protect the population, which the counterinsurgent must see as the prime center of gravity in any counterinsurgency conflict;

r Establish an immediate permanent security presence in all built-up areas cleared of enemy forces;

r Accumulate extensive, fine-grained human and other intelligence on insurgent plans, modes of operations, personnel, and support networks;

r Avoid actions that might antagonize the population; and r Convince the population that they represent the “winning side” and intend to prevail until complete victory is secured.18

The salience of these observations for the current global security environment—45 years later—is striking, and hopefully not reflective of our inability to learn important lessons from our own history. Overall, a predominant theme in the literature on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, both old and new, highlights the need to have more situational awareness and strategic understanding than the enemy. The case studies provided in this volume, combined with the chapters of the previous two volumes of Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century, thus provide a comprehensive understanding at the strategic and

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policymaking level of challenges faced by the United States and its allies, and illustrate how an appropriately integrated strategy can help lead to eventual victory in what some are now calling “the long war.” As we work together to combat the global terror threat, it is clear that the ways in which we do so—particularly in the realm of soft power—will largely determine our success in the long war. Throughout the world, we are relying on a highly educated force of counterterrorism professionals to succeed, guided now by lessons drawn from the chapters of this volume. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. NOTES 1. Yonah Alexander, “Introduction,” in Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries, ed. Yonah Alexander (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002) 13. 2. “Police arrest militants planning bomb attack at Catholic Festival,” The Christian Post, January 8, 2005, http://www.christianpost.com/article/asia/613/ section/police.arrest.militants.planning.bomb.attack.at.catholic.festival/1.htm. 3. Trevor Stanley, “Australian Anti-Terror Raids: A Serious Plot Thwarted,” Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 23 (December 2, 2005), 3. 4. Stewart Tendler, Jenny Booth, and Adam Fresco, “Foiled Transatlantic Bomb Plot ‘Was Ready to Go in Days’,” The Times (London), August 10, 2006. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,29389–2306721,00.html; and Mark Henderson, “Science Briefing: Chemical Mix Could Create Deadly Flight Blast,” The Times (London), August 10, 2006. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2– 2306994,00.html 5. “9 Arrested in Denmark in Reported Terror Plot,” International Herald Tribune, September 5, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/05/news/ denmark.php. 6. John S. Pistole, “Statement of the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation” before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, April 14, 2004, http://www.9–11commission.gov/hearings/hearing10/ pistole statement.pdf. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. For example, see: Philip Heymann and David Kennedy, “Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei,” Case Studies in Public Policy and Management, #835, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, http:// www.ksgcase.harvard.edu/case.htm?PID=835; and Heymann, Philip, and Vlad Jenkins, “Bringing Terror to Justice: The Extraterritorial Arrest of Fawaz Yunis,” Case Studies in Public Policy and Management, #960, John F.

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Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, http://www.ksgcase. harvard.edu/case.htm?PID=960. 10. Mark Landler, “Germans’ Sense of Safety Punctured by Terror Case,” The New York Times, August 21, 2006. 11. The following account of this incident is from John J. Donahoe, “The Moscow Hostage Crisis: An Analysis of Chechen Terrorist Goals,” Strategic Insights II, Issue 5 (May 2003). http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/may03/russia.asp 12. BBC News, “Moscow rebels ‘threaten executions“ (accessed October 25, 2002). 13. See “Fentanyl: Situation Report,” U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center (June 5, 2006) online at: http://www.streetdrugs.org/ fentanyl.htm 14. The following story is from Raymond Bonner, “A Terror Strike, Choreographed on a Computer,” New York Times, July 3, 2006. 15. See “Women and Suicide Bombing Attacks,” http://www.intelligence. org.il/eng/sib/6 04/women.htm. 16. A vivid, detailed account of this event is available online at http://www.wesleyjohnston.com/users/ireland/past/omagh/main.html; Also, see the BBC news Web site, http://news.bbc.co.uk. 17. Yonah Alexander, “Introduction,” 13. 18. Stephen T. Hosmer and Sybylle O. Crane, “Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16–20, 1962” (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1963) iv.

CHAPTER 2 EDUCATING THE NEXT GENERATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM PROFESSIONALS Stephen Sloan

The “war against terrorism” has taken central stage in the dynamics of international politics. From global leaders to commentators in the media and the general public, the challenges created by the threat of terrorists and the impact of their acts are a major concern on the international, national, local, and personal level. While the concern may be temporarily lessened over time, following major incidents, the threat is always present, a result of the instability, political violence, and transformation of warfare as well as the profound influence of technology that marks the present “New World Disorder.” Neither the threats nor the acts will dissipate, for terrorism is not only a form of protracted conflict, but a type of conflict in which its practitioners have the motivation and capability to engage in mass terrorism that was not recognized until the events of 9/11 brought the reality home to a global consciousness. Confronted with these concerns, academics, operators, and policymakers face the daunting task of understanding and —of equal importance—educating a new generation of counterterrorism professionals to not only react but take the initiative against dedicated, skillful, and creative adversaries who have declared their own “war against all.” Such a task is challenging given the often slow response of academics to recognize the danger of terrorism as a modern form of political violence and warfare and their inability or unwillingness to engage in meeting a “real world” threat and to assist those who

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are directly responsible to preventing, deterring, and countering acts and campaigns of terrorism. Yet concomitantly, those in the operational and policy area have also at times failed to grasp the dynamics and outcomes of modern terrorism and draw on the expertise in academia where it has existed. This chapter will help provide a basis for the very necessary integration of knowledge on terrorism and the operational and policy dimensions of counterterrorism. It will seek to address the historical context of terrorism studies and why such studies had such a slow and at times tortuous path in finding their place as a discrete specialization within both the social and hard sciences. Based on that assessment, the chapter will then examine the state of the counterterrorism art as it stands today and suggest what critical questions and areas of investigation must be addressed to meet both the short and long-term evolution of the strategies and tactics of terrorism. The discussion will then more specifically focus on the elements necessary to evolve the new educational programs that are required to assist the counterterrorism specialist in the academic, public, and corporate sectors to not only achieve the necessary corpus of knowledge, but also disseminate it to those who are on the frontline in combating terrorism.

THE GLACIAL PROCESS OF RECOGNIZING THE THREAT: THE POWER OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM OVER UNCONVENTIONAL CREATIVITY While terrorism comes from an ancient lineage, its history and evolution were never central to any particular field of study in the social sciences, much less the physical sciences. Despite the fact that its practitioners could be traced from both biblical and ancient times, terrorism did not have its own intellectual home of inquiry. Granted, there were studies on its earliest manifestations as perhaps best illustrated by the accounts of the activities of the Zealots, who practiced psychological warfare through the use of the dagger, the Assassins who hired themselves with murderous efficiency, and the Thugs—a long-enduring criminal group who used terrorism as a major instrument of coercion.1 But such studies often existed in isolated academic universes. In addition, the accounts of the mass brutality of groups ranging from the Romans to the Huns, the absolute kingdoms of the Middle Ages and the Inquisition underscored that while the terms “enforcement” or “state terrorism” or “terrorism from above” were not used, there were many examples of mass terrorism practiced by ancient regimes. But it would not be until the French Revolution—where the emergence of modern state terrorism had its genesis—that terrorism would become a topic of systematic inquiry. Indeed, the Reign of Terror became a very fruitful area

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of study particularly in the discipline of history, where the resort to violence was closely examined within the context of revolutionary dynamics. Certainly, pioneering works such as Crane Briton’s The Anatomy of Revolution and others provide the basis to see where violence, coercion, terrorism, and other forms of threats and actions fit within the complex and not fully understood processes of fundamental social, economic, and political change.2 The development of this historical tradition would further maturate with the specific analysis of where violence—and even more specifically terrorism—fits in the period leading up to, during, and after the Russian Revolution. Contemporary specialists in history and political science often cite the behavior of the Narodnya Volya (People’s Will), for example, as one important hallmark in the emergence of modern antistate terrorism. But even in these earlier studies, the specific inquiry of terrorism was an intellectual orphan subsumed under the broader topics related to revolution. The purges in post-Revolutionary Russia and the accompanying rise of modern totalitarianism in Europe did indeed place a major emphasis on understanding how the threat or action of mass violence or terrorism were utilized as instruments through which a modern state could assert its control over a population and engage in repression that could culminate in genocide.3 Yet, when terrorism was studied or taught within the discipline of political science—and the subdiscipline of comparative politics—it was taught under the heading of a “problem topic.” In a sense, modern totalitarianism and later terrorism were intellectually quarantined, since they were not viewed to be within the mainstream of the discipline. Somehow, they were perceived to be forms of political pathology that did not fit within an idealized view of what was considered to be “normal” behavior between or among states. However, a sharper focus on terrorism, especially in the social sciences and particularly in political science, evolved with the various studies on what was either called guerilla warfare, insurgency, counterinsurgency, dark wars, unconventional war, and other terms in the late 1950s and into the 1960s.4 The experience of the “wars of national liberation” against the colonial powers underscored the key role of terrorism as both a tactic and a strategy in revolutionary warfare. Furthermore, the experiences—especially in what was then the Federation of Malaya as well as the “Battle for Algiers”—provided lessons to be learned both within academia and the operational world in regards to both successful and failed counterinsurgency doctrines, strategies, and policies. This focus in what would become the counterinsurgency decades would be intensified as the United States pursued its policies in Vietnam and also sought to apply them as an aspect of “surrogate warfare” during the Cold War. The role of terrorism as part of an unconventional conflict increasingly became a focus of

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inquiry within the social sciences. However, terrorism was still primarily relegated to an aspect of unconventional, protracted warfare. Moreover, despite the heated debates regarding U.S. policies in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, neither insurgency nor terrorism were recognized as a particularly legitimate discrete subject of inquiry within the conventional halls of academia. This lack of recognition was also a manifestation of the tensions between the academic community and policymakers over Washington’s policies, particularly in regards to Vietnam. Far too many scholars did not wish to be “tainted” by using their knowledge to pursue foreign policies they objected to. This marginalization of insurgency—and especially terrorism—as an area of intellectual inquiry and associated operational arts would continue well into the late 1960s and early 1970s despite the numerous skyjackings, bombings, seizures of hostages, and other forms of violence that were taking place around the world. Moreover, in the United States, international terrorism, as contrasted to terrorism as an aspect of insurgency or state repression, was not considered to be a strategic threat. Therefore, the combination of the conventional thinking within academia—which placed it on an intellectual backburner—and the reality that there was neither the funding nor accompanying public concern of the threat acted as impediments to the recognition of the importance of studying terrorism. Indeed, it was not until the mid-1970s that courses specifically for terrorism were finally offered at some universities, and even then a specialization in this still nonfield would certainly not assist those new professors who were just stating out or those seeking tenure. The same career constraints, to a degree, also applied within a still nascent counterterrorism operational community. Until the abortive Iranian hostage rescue, those within the community mainly came from the then-financially starved special operations forces. Here, while one tour might be acceptable, a dedicated career in special ops could literally place an iron ceiling on promotion to colonel, much less flag rank. A long-term commitment to the study of terrorism or counterterrorism operations was viewed as marginal and therefore a liability in the quest for academic title or military promotion. The same applied to research and programs. When one considers the proliferation of counterterrorism programs of very varying quality today, it is difficult to recognize that with the exception of the pioneering work of the Rand Corporation under Brian Jenkins and Bruce Hoffman and the equally groundbreaking books by such luminaries as Paul Wilkinson—who ultimately established the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at St. Andrews—those who chose terrorism as a specialization could find neither an academic home nor like-minded colleagues for their work.5 In a very real sense these pioneers were a small “band of brothers and sisters” that had to look beyond their institutions and organizations to find like-minded individuals who

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would pursue what was viewed to be an unconventional path. The fact that terrorism was not recognized to be of strategic importance or a threat to U.S. national security—coupled with the inherent inertia and generally conservative aspects of curriculum development at all universities, as well as the bureaucratic inertia within the civilian and military bureaucracies— in large part accounted for the slow pace of the evolution of terrorism as a systematic, identified field of study. These impediments continue to slow the evolution that continues today. The fact is that conventional members of the academy, as well as the military establishment (with their focus on the Soviet threat during and at the end of the Cold War and their continuing emphasis on conventional warfare), failed to grasp a new reality— namely that while terrorism may have come from an ancient tradition, it was as Brian Jenkins succinctly and very insightfully noted “A New Mode of Conflict.”6 That is, the modernization of terrorism could be seen as a result of two profound changes, notably the introduction of commercial jet aircraft as the primary means of international travel and the maturation of television as the rapidly growing dominant medium for global communication. As a result of these interrelated developments terrorists could literally strike at global targets in a matter of hours, and in the conduct of their operations they could ignore the arbitrary boundaries of nation-states as they seized aircraft flying at over 500 miles an hour. In effect, the terrorists were engaging in what could now be called low intensity aerospace warfare; a form of warfare that would be refined with murderous efficiency with the events of 9/11. Moreover, they could use the television and its profound visual impact to have an instantaneous and international form of “armed propaganda” or “propaganda by the deed” that would greatly exceed the wishes and capabilities of the most dedicated terrorists that preceded them. The first generation of new terrorists was transforming their operational art by engaging in what some refer to as “non-territorial terrorism—a form of terror not confined to a clearly delineated area.”7 This first generation would be replaced by a second one, who further amplified their capabilities of spreading fear and intimidation to a global audience through the use of the Internet. Unfortunately, while the terrorists very effectively utilized technology to greatly enhance their capabilities, the lack of flexibility and imagination that characterized the academic response to the threat was mirrored in what could be called the doctrinal response of a counterterrorism community that was only beginning to understand and organize to meet a new challenge. Both the civilian bureaucracies responsible for national security and especially the military still thought and relied on a spatial approach to countering a nonterritorial, nonspatial threat and adversary. In effect, they were unwilling to “think out of the box,” a term that that has been used so much that is has too often become an empty slogan. Those involved in doctrinal, policy, and

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operational developments in combating terrorism stayed “in the box” because they either could not or would not let go of the restraints created by organizational, legalistic, or operational boundaries in meeting the nonterritorial nature of the threat. Organizationally, the terrorists increasingly relied on the use of compartmentalized cells that provided them with security as well as considerable operational flexibility, and cost them the ability to coordinate their attacks—a cost that would diminish in the anonymity of cyberspace with the coming of the Internet.8 Moreover, counterterrorism organizations and forces relied on traditional top-down hierarchies where there was not a lateral sharing of information and there were often cumbersome divisions between line and staff functions. Instead of the flat organizations that could develop cadres of counterterrorism professionals to mirror the terrorists and have the necessary flexibility, conventional organizational doctrine acted as a serious barrier to the creation of new types of organizations to meet an increasingly decentralized adversary who did not suffer from the impediments caused by administrative “stove piping.” Admittedly, there were (and still remain) valid issues about having the necessary oversight and accountability, but that concern was employed at times as one of the ways of justifying and protecting existing bureaucratic turfs. The situation was excerbated by the fact that the turf battles often led to bureaucratic and legalistic boundaries. While the terrorists were transnational and transorganizational, existing governmental organizations even lacked the capacity and willingness to achieve a unity of command that is essential in combating those who are not limited in their operations by physical, legal, or bureaucratic boundaries. As in the case of academia, the governmental response to terrorism—where it existed— during this period was fragmented, as each civilian and military entity defined its mission based on achieving its own bureaucratic place under the sun. The concept, for example, of “the lead agency” had more to do with affecting a bureaucratic compromise than achieving a unity of purpose and operational capability in combating terrorism.9 The military’s organizational emphasis on having a physically delineated bureaucratic field of operations even when confronted with the nonspatial nature of nonterritorial commands could also be readily seen in the geographically defined commands and the unfortunate continuing interservice rivalries, despite the calls for “jointness.” The problem was also manifested within the intelligence community that, while it did recognize terrorism as a global issue like narcotics and organized crime, still emphasized a traditional Cold War geographic approach in meeting such threats. In addition, the agencies unfortunately did not share even the limited information they had with other community members prior to the very costly lessons that perhaps have been learned in the post-9/11 period.

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In the 1970s and into the 1980s, bureaucratic warfare often took precedence over the war on terrorism, as the forces of inertia led to a situation where the United States at the federal level (and even much more so at the state and local level), failed to adjust to the truly international challenges created by nonterritorial terrorism. Moreover, especially in the area of operational doctrine, the traditional focus on placing terrorism as a subset of tactics under the general term insurgency also reinforced the spatial orientation. For example, “the hearts and minds approach” applied to a territorially based insurgency might be appropriate; but how could it be implemented when the nonterritorial terrorists operated beyond the boundaries of a particular geographical conflict arena? Whose government could be strengthened under Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Programs and what psychological techniques could be used to win over populations when the conflict was in the fullest sense global in nature? Moreover, the “battle for hearts and minds” has now been changed with the rise of religious extremism to become “the battle for hearts and souls,” creating yet another new development to challenge existing doctrine. FINALLY RECOGNIZING THE THREAT: THE 1990S AND BEYOND: REACTION AND THE LACK OF INTEGRATION In assessing developments within the terrorism studies academic, policy, and operational areas since the 1970s and 1980s, one sees a pattern of responses to the threats and acts of terrorism ranging from reluctant awareness, very cautious incremental responses, a failure to recognize the growing strategic threat, and above all a failure—which has aptly been called “a failure of imagination”—to recognize the profoundly changing nature of terrorism.10 While there were a number of events that finally led to the recognition of the changing nature of the threat and the concomitant requirement for innovative programs, three incidents tend to stand out. The first was the initial bombing of the World Trade Center on February 26, 1993. That event should have been a wake-up call that other attacks would follow— a warning that was confirmed by a perpetrator who, when caught, stated that his accomplices would seek the complete destruction that they failed to achieve that day. But, while there was public shock and concern that (in a sense) terrorism had come home to the United States, there nevertheless was the view that any other major attack would somehow not take place in the interior of what was called “the heartland” of the country. Terrorism may have spread to the urban centers on the coasts, but the sense of insularity remained. Somehow, people believed, terrorism would remain an urban, coastal affair. This insularity would change with the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. The myth of insular safety was

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destroyed as the shock waves of fear generated outwardly from the very center of the country. If a major bombing happened in Oklahoma City, what other Midwestern city would be safe? Ironically, while there was a forced recognition that there were no safe havens against terrorism in the United States, the recognition led to an overreaction, as officials and the public assumed the bombing was the result of Middle Eastern terrorists. It would take time for them to recognize that terrorism is not limited to various boundaries or nationalities. The perpetrators forced the public to accept the reality that American terrorists were quite capable of killing their fellow Americans. However, the bombing of the Murrah Building was not (despite claims made to the contrary) the end of American “innocence in the heartland,” but the end of American insularity. Those two bombings and other incidents did initiate a plethora of legislative action and training programs to prepare the national government and state and local communities for effectively responding to terrorist incidents. The primary focus of these was the training of first responders. As a result, such entities as the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) in Oklahoma City—supported by federal funding— developed a variety of programs to enable fire and police departments, medical personnel, and others involved in disasters to respond, contain, and lessen the impact of terrorism and natural disasters. Clearly this was an important first step. But there would also be a need to develop programs where the research would, through the effort to achieve a degree of integration within academia and with the government, take the initiative in preventing and deterring incidents. There was, and still is, the need to develop the specializations required to understand, forecast, and ideally go on the academic, operational, and policy offensive in regards to short-, mid-, and long-term threats. This focus on reactive measures and the training of field personnel and emergency managers, however laudable, took precedent over the broader types of research and analysis required in both the academic and intelligence community to effectively engage in strategic assessments of future dangers and how to prevent them. The events of 9/11 would unfortunately affirm the danger of such a gap in research.11 It was, of course, the tragedies of 9/11 that finally mobilized the United States as the major superpower to take the initiative both within its homeland and overseas to address terrorism as a major threat to national and international security; a threat that had been recognized by a number of countries who were forced how to learn to live with terrorism. The response to the attacks on the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the United Airlines Flight 93 were a manifestation after a major incident to “do something now,” instead of also developing an integrated strategy and approach between governmental departments, the military, and academia to acquire the capability to systematically encourage the development and refinement in the chaotically growing field of terrorism,

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where instant expertise was often the rule and real knowledge the exception. There was, and more than ever now is, a vital requirement to educate and train highly qualified terrorism professionals. Not only at the national level, but also increasingly at the state and local levels, governmental authorities have been heavily involved in establishing funding and research for programs on terrorism. The funding for the Department of Homeland Security Centers of Excellence illustrates the current focus on developing a research agenda and operationalizing preventing and responding to terrorism. As of now there are six major Centers that are initially funded for three years, each headed by a university in partnership with other institutes of higher education and outside organizations. These include The John Hopkins University, with the creation of its Center for the Study of High Consequence Event Preparedness and Response; the University of Southern California’s Homeland Security Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE); Texas A&M University’s Homeland Security National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease Defense; the University of Minnesota’s Center for Homeland Security for Food Protection and Defense; the University of Maryland and its Homeland Security Center of Excellence for Behavioral and Social Research on Terrorism and Counterterrorism; and Michigan State University’s Center for Advancing Microbial Research Assessment (CAMRA). While it is difficult to make generalized observations about the aims and activities of these Centers and other governmental programs and how they may impact on the present and future educations of counterterrorism professionals, a number of observations are nevertheless in order.12 In the first place, while the Centers’ activities relate to governmentsponsored research and not the development of undergraduate and graduate programs leading to a degree, it is interesting to see that the major research problems involve addressing the challenges created by terrorism that reflect concerns primarily based on current threat assessments. In a sense, these are the threats de jour, and while each of them are certainly important, one does not see a broader, longer-term integrated research strategy that takes into account those strategic threats that, as the Duke of Marlborough said, “May be over the horizon.” Certainly, topics ranging from defense against agro-terrorism to understanding suicide bombers are important, but they are (in a sense) an expression of “conventional wisdom.” What should also have been—and must in the future be— considered is promoting the understanding of future longer-term threats that may not presently be recognized. Just as the slow growth of Islamic Fundamentalism was not perceived to be important until after the fall of the Shah and the seizing of the hostages in Iran, will academics, policymakers, and operators be blindsided by other emerging threats? The understandable government sponsored “do something approach” certainly

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has validity in meeting present threats, but does it continue a reactive short-term response to what is a long-term protracted conflict? Secondly, while there certainly is a broad scope of research topics that will be carried out by each Center, that broad scope creates difficulties in developing a wide variety of programs to, in the fullest sense, educate a new generation of counterterrorism professionals. That is, there does not appear to be a central core of areas, a canon on terrorism studies that can provide a more integrated approach to fully developing the discrete field of terrorism studies and subspecializations that emerge from the canon within what could be viewed as an emerging new academic discipline. The lack of integration is further seen with the emphasis on separate Centers of Excellence. This is not to suggest that such an approach may not be needed to focus on particular problem areas, but as in the case of bureaucracies, we may be emulating the development of intellectualacademic “stove piping,” something that unfortunately has already taken place in government organizations. “Stove piping” acts as a barrier to lateral integration of effort. Moreover, such an approach may also emulate the type of turf battles that have too often characterized organizational responses to terrorism. Thirdly, the lack of integration may also be seen in the absence of a Center whose task is to act as an overarching coordinator of research agendas and efforts. Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that at a time when there is a need to educate terrorism professionals in the state of the art, there is, in a sense, no basic uniform requirement—something that would be similar to the core courses in a college or university. Perhaps there should or will be new centers established both in and out of government to address the issues raised here—centers for the development and advancement of terrorism studies. Moreover, the specializations— with the two exceptions of the John Hopkins’ program and the University of Maryland’s—tend to favor technological innovation in regards to preventing or countering terrorism. Unquestionably the technological threats are there, but does this approach rely too much on scientific and technological fixes to address the at once complex and yet human intensive terrorists threats? There may be a lesson to be learned from the experience of the intelligence community in combating terrorism. That is, it is widely understood that the United States has relied too heavily on technical intelligence (TECHINT) and not enough on human intelligence (HUMINT) in combating terrorism. Recent changes, including the newly established Director of National Intelligence, are committed to addressing this problem. In the organization of academic research on terrorism, are we running a similar risk of becoming technologically muscle-bound against an emotional and often value- or religious-driven, highly committed asymmetric adversary?

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THE ACADEMIC ARENA: SEEKING TO FIND A PLACE FOR TERRORISM RESEARCH AND TEACHING—THE QUEST FOR IDENTIFYING DISCIPLINES If the governmental response to addressing the challenges engaging in research on terrorism is characterized by the lack of a central direction—or an intellectual core—the problem is also manifested in academia, where there is still no agreement on where terrorism “fits” and therefore what type of organization of knowledge should be used in establishing the boundaries and direction of terrorism studies. As noted earlier, prior to the 1970s there was a body of literature on the history of terrorism, but only as part of a broader examination of the French Revolution and the development of terrorism as an aspect of regime repression before and during the Russian Revolution. There was also a focus on the role mass terrorism played as an integral part of the rise of modern totalitarian governments. But one of the first treatments of terrorism as a potential field in itself took place within political science, especially in reference to those who were addressing a new area of investigation in reference to comparative politics and international relations. This focus could be expected, since the pioneering studies of modern terrorism primarily addressed the political purposes of terrorism in the conduct of international affairs, and especially the challenges democratic states face in reconciling the need for security with the traditions of due process and individual rights. In the 1980s, the emphasis on the political aspects of terrorism would slowly grow within the discipline of political science in the United States, as there was recognition of how such threats and acts could influence the conduct of foreign affairs and broader issues of national security. By the same token, there were relatively early studies in the discipline of psychology that explored the motivation behind terrorism. In addition, as a result of the hostage-takings of the 1970s that culminated in the Iranian hostage crisis, there was a growing emphasis on hostage behavior. This emphasis on hostage behavior, both academically and operationally, was carried over to the field of law enforcement, where there was growing literature—and concomitantly, training courses—dealing with hostage negotiation and what (at the time) was referred to as “siege management.” This emphasis was not solely the result of acts of terrorism; rather, it was necessitated by the increasingly rapid response of police forces arriving on scene before the perpetrators could escape. As a result, there were more hostage-barricade situations, ranging from domestic disputes to bank robberies to terrorist’s incidents, which required skilled negotiators. At the same time, operationally, there was also an increased concern for learning how to train, equip, and deploy special weapons and tactical teams to be activated and take action as required; especially if negotiations failed. The

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development of the literature in the tactical arena was also seen with the emergence of highly trained national counterterrorism forces, including the U.S. Delta Force, the British SAS, and other specialized units. But, it would take time before those involved in the discipline of law enforcement and the administration of justice, particularly in the United States, would begin to systematically address the whole spectrum of challenges created for police and other security forces at all levels—from national, to state and local. The reason for this slow evolution was that—with the exception of various extremist groups in the 1960s (for example the Weathermen)—the long-enduring attacks by Puerto Rican separatist groups and the existence of various right-wing extremists, domestic terrorism were not viewed to be a major threat to the maintence of law and order. Moreover, law enforcement studies did not address the then-psychologically “distant” threat of international terrorism, which was still viewed to be “what happened to other people in other countries.” Certainly, there were other disciplines that had emerging specialists who drew on their expertise in regards to violence as a means of beginning to understand the comparative and interdisciplinary aspects of both domestic and international terrorism, but such approaches were largely individual and not part of a large coordinated research agenda. Within the hard sciences, there were indeed pioneering studies on (for example) early concerns over what was in the 1970s and early 1980s often called “super terrorism,” before the term “weapons of mass destruction” became popular, but such studies languished in the face of the continuing resort to more conventional bombings by terrorists.13 Nevertheless, there were particular advances in the fields of engineering, where there was a recognition of the need to “harden targets,” especially those with symbolic meaning as well as those considered a part of the “critical infrastructure,” whose destruction could greatly disrupt the social, economic, and political order of a community or a country. However, such studies were not part of the academic program in engineering schools. Finally, while there certainly were a wide variety of courses at medical schools and health science centers related to threats to public health, there were virtually no courses that specifically focused on terrorism as a potentially major threat. Such events as the Aum Shinrikyo attack, where sarin gas was used, would help change the traditional orientation that did not take into account the impact on health (and indeed literally life or death) within a community. Therefore, in looking back to the early days, while historians and political scientists may have dominated terrorism studies, their efforts were often not recognized as a legitimate field within the discipline; at the most they were on the intellectual edges.

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WHERE DOES TERRORISM FIT WITHIN ACADEMIA: SHOULD THERE BE A SEARCH FOR A HOME? It is ironic that whereas at one time terrorism studies were an academic orphan, today so many disciplines want the subject to be a member of their family. One wishes this desire was primarily the result of a genuine intellectual interest in the topic; and perhaps to a degree it is. But the realities of the long-coming recognition, especially in the United States, is based on the combination of funding and empire building as universities—like government organizations and the corporate sector— try to find their place in what tragically has now become a new market. Moreover, whereas in the past a specialization in terrorism was viewed to be an esoteric skill, now reputations, tenure grants, and promotions can be acquired from research and publication on a myriad of terrorism-related topics. In discussing where terrorism “fits” in academia, it would be useful to assess the areas based on requirements in general undergraduate education, possible majors, or courses of study, and then focus on graduate education. There obviously is no clear fix, but there are alternatives that should be considered when creating curriculum and programs to educate the next generation of counterterrorism professionals. At the outset, more than ever the requirement for a solid liberal arts education is important to the potential counterterrorism professional. First and foremost, the ability to engage in critical thinking, as well as having an excellent ability to express oneself in written and oral form, is absolutely vital. The requirement for critical thinking is especially important given the need for the ability to identify and separate significant information from the growing mass of unimportant data, information, and misinformation that surrounds the current avalanche of material on terrorism. The ability to engage in critical thinking is also important in order to develop the imagination and accompanying creativity to discern future trends and outthink (and outcreate) those who, in their own nefarious way, have developed their own arts of destruction and carnage. The benefits and requirements of a good liberal arts education provide a fundamental contribution to the education of the would-be counterterrorism professional. Moreover, a broad-based understanding of the social and behavioral sciences coupled with the requirement for international studies would provide the foundation that could be readily applied to terrorism studies on both the undergraduate and graduate level, as well as applied in the field. It might also be advisable to have a required undergraduate liberal arts course on terrorism that would assist the students in developing an appreciation of the changing security environment they will be working in, irrespective of their profession, with particular emphasis on a solid overview of what is, and where, terrorism would fit in their potential careers.

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This course, much like other survey courses, could serve not only as an introduction to terrorism per se, but be a gateway for students who have or might become interested in terrorism studies as a rapidly expanding area of educational, professional and policy concern. Such a course could also be offered in schools of engineering, business, and other professionally oriented colleges as a means of providing a basis through which students might consider applying their newly found knowledge to an important field of specialization. Candidly, it is troublesome to see, for example, that schools of business that are training the executives of the future, or those now involved in continuing education do not require at least one basic course on security and terrorism. It is, and will increasingly be, a vital skill-set in the conduct of doing business both domestically and overseas. As far as specific undergraduate programs on terrorism studies, there are various alternatives to be considered, developed, and implemented for the would-be professional in counterterrorism. At the outset, political science will continue to be a major focal point for the study of terrorism, not only because a number of pioneers came from the field but also as a result of the fact that ultimately there has been an agreement over the years that one of the major elements of terrorism is its political nature. Moreover, the study of terrorism as a political phenomenon may fit well into the subfields of comparative politics and international relations; the former because it provides the foundation for developing comparative analytical analysis and the latter because of the increasing significance of terrorists as major international actors. In addition, political science programs that offer courses on national security with a particular emphasis on the application of military power and the basics of intelligence could readily be adjusted to meet the unique educational challenges in these areas caused by the requirements necessary to combat terrorism. A second, readily identifiable discipline involves programs associated with criminal justice and the administration of justice. Particularly in regards to domestic terrorism—which is still first and foremost viewed to be a criminal act—it is indeed essential that those who will be involved in law enforcement are knowledgeable about the nature of terrorism and the means to combat it through the legal system. The emphasis on this approach has of course accelerated as a result of the Murrah bombing, the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the emerging recognition that other incidents and possibly campaigns of terrorism— including those from abroad—will increase in the years to come. One may also suggest that, given the increasingly international dimensions of terrorism, any new or extant program on terrorism would have to have a comparative/international scope to assist in educating those who are working with foreign countries or stationed overseas. This requirement can be readily seen, for example, with the greatly expanded effort of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s operations

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throughout the world in its new role of combating terrorism. Certainly the behavioral sciences, most notably psychology, have a key role to play and a specialization on the motivation and behavior of terrorists is necessary. While there are impressive strides being made in the systematic longterm study of individual and group behavior among terrorists and their supporters, such studies need to be intensified by addressing the psychological impact on individuals and the sociological and economic impact on the community at large. In addition, other disciplines within the social and behavioral sciences can also make major contributions ranging from understanding the historical roots and perceptions of terrorists to anthropological examinations of how terrorism and terrorists evolve and are conditioned through the complex processes of acculturation. Still other disciplines, such as economics and finance, also have their contributions to make, ranging from the cost of the impact of terrorism on the economy and the existing financial order. One may, of course, suggest that other departments could independently create ad hoc interdisciplinary entities, collaborating across their departments to advance research and educate a new generation of terrorist professionals. However, it is important to have an integrated core of areas of investigation along with those yet to exist, a canon of knowledge that can lead the way to achieving a unified field, as contrasted to the often-fragmented approach to addressing terrorism. Achieving a meaningful degree of intellectual unity of action that can compete with what unfortunately has characterized terrorists operations will not be easy, especially since, as noted, the field of terrorism studies is certainly not (and should not be) the monopoly of any particular discipline. The comments of one particularly thoughtful authority in the field have relevance to the requirements for interdisciplinary studies on the undergraduate and graduate level: The field of terrorism does not neatly fit into one discipline. Terrorism is truly a multidisciplinary subject, and I believe future terrorism specialists need to know this from the very beginning. I was very grateful in my BA and MA programs and policy analysis Ph.D. program that allowed me to take courses relevant to the field of terrorism and political violence in the fields of political science, history, sociology, forensic science, political psychology, public health, peace studies, emergency management, religion and area studies. . . . I also benefited from course work in communications, which I found highly relevant since terrorism is communication.14

The author’s points are quite well taken and one can emphasize, starting on the undergraduate level, that the importance of participating in the interdisciplinary area-studies approach is especially valuable, since there remains a paucity of terrorists “specialists” who are trained in the language and culture of a society based on extensive study and, especially in

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the graduate arena, field work. The authors’ concern of overspecialization in one department also has validity in that: What worries me is that a new generation of “terrorism specialists” will be birthed out solely of political science departments and have a concentration of Middle Eastern studies. This will create a bias in understanding. Much like the vast generation of Sovietologists who never saw the Soviet collapse and would not offer assistance in the post-Cold War world full of ethnic and asymmetric warfare/terrorism.15

The observer’s point is also especially well taken since, as noted earlier; the focus on funding programs tends to be on current, not future threats. We need an off-the-shelf capability to constantly monitor the global threat environment based on overarching area programs and an ability to have experts immediately available before and when a new threat location becomes significant. The current reliance of an academic “surge approach” may be useful as an aspect of short-term crisis management in the academic and operational arena, but it does not provide the scope or consistency of effort needed to monitor, prevent, and respond to future threats from areas where terrorists plan and launch regional or international operations. The importance of the interdisciplinary approach is readily apparent, but as in previous programs there will continue to be problems associated with coordination and communication between and among different disciplines. Moreover, in regards to such real concerns to the academic such as tenure, promotion, and funding, the importance of having an academic department or home cannot be dismissed. But a creative approach to integration can and should take place. As in the case of bureaucracy, academic administrators cannot afford to engage in turf battles when addressing terrorism. At the graduate level, there certainly can and should be more narrowly based specializations in regards to combating terrorism both on the MA and Ph.D. levels as well as postdoctoral studies. Flexibility is key. For example, one may envision a 3-year intensive terrorism studies program that would include a 1-year general overview of the field followed by 2 years of specializing in the social, behavioral, or hard sciences ranging from history to public health. Perhaps one could consider developing a professional terminal degree entitled the MA or MS in Terrorism Studies (M.A.T.S., M.S.T.S.) similar in length and recognition to a Masters in Public Administration (M.P.A.) or a Masters in Fine Arts (M.F.A.). Programs for the Ph.D. could be offered as a continuation of the specialized M.A.T.S./M.S.T.S., with a very heavy emphasis placed on original and applied research. In addition, one may suggest that—especially at the graduate level—an internship or residency should be required in the

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public or private sector to begin a vital process of creating the necessary interconnectivity to the academic, bureaucratic, operational, and policy sectors. All of these programs can also benefit by the use of distance education and continuing education. The traditional campus setting would remain important, but there are so many other alternatives available to deliver the necessary knowledge. It is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the issue of accreditation must also be addressed. Unfortunately, there has been a massive growth of terrorism programs without the establishment of appropriate standards and requirements. In part, this is because of the rapid emergence of the field and the lack of a body of prior knowledge and sufficient authorities to evaluate a growing field. The accreditation can ultimately take place at the university-wide association level, the respective schools and disciplines, and other agencies. Moreover, one could also model accreditation of a degree based on such certification programs as the American Society for Industrial Security’s CPP Program (Certified Professional Program), which includes core courses on security and terrorism. The developing standards is absolutely essential, especially now in a period of often chaotic change, when anyone can “put up a shingle” that they are a terrorism specialist. In addition to these civilian programs, there is (and will be) a growing need to educate a new generation of uniformed terrorism specialists in the respective military academies, as well as the staff and war colleges. While the need for present courses of studies will most certainly be required, as in all things it will be necessary to finally move beyond the verities of traditional military thinking as well as the strategies and doctrine associated with the Cold War. Innovation is required to address and understand the transformation of warfare, in which the changing nature of terrorism is but one manifestation. Positive advances are taking place in this arena. The privately funded Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the United States Military Academy is clearly an advance, along with the announcement that the academy’s first minor’s program will be on terrorism studies.16 In addition, the Department of Defense’s Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, with selected universities and overseas partners, has provided a venue in which future leaders can learn the arts and sciences, tactics and strategies of terrorism early in their careers, instead of essentially learning how to combat terrorism on the battlefield with occasional short courses in professional military studies.17 This approach to training and education should also be utilized by the intelligence community, whose members are often on the forefront of combating terrorism. As noted earlier, there are no quick fixes in educating the next generation of counterterrorism professionals, but one thing is clear: civilian and military educators, institutions, and programs do not have the luxury of engaging in a slow, incremental process of curriculum-building to meet a very real threat. Yet, by the same token, those educators face the daunting task of

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bringing rigor and standards to a field of study that may be drawn from many traditional disciplines but is as new as the next incident. THE NEED FOR A BODY OF KNOWLEDGE: THE QUEST FOR A CANON ON TERRORISM In the final analysis, it is important to recognize that despite attempts at academic organization and funding, it will be very difficult to achieve the recognition of terrorism as a field of study until there is an extensive body of knowledge ranging from general theory to classic works. The development of a canon on terrorism will take time, since it is still such a recent specialization, much less a formally recognized and academically sanctioned field of study. As one authority astutely notes: The blunt truth is that we have failed as a community to create or identify a ‘canon’ of counterterrorism theory which would represent a foundation for new research and policy recommendations. While . . . the strategist can resort when in trouble to the almost eternal verities of Sun Tsu or Clausewitz, there are no essential writings which illuminate all potential challenges in the field of counterterrorism.18

It is not that studies do not exist. Indeed, they have vastly proliferated since the 1970s where one could have a core library of the major academic works on terrorism numbering no more than 200–300 books. The problem now, of course, is there has been a massive proliferation of books, articles, monographs, and other publications as well as databases on the Internet. There certainly are excellent sources, but quite candidly the would-be specialist is confronted with material of very uneven quality. In a real sense, the problem today, as in other areas, is that there is too much information and data, and therefore the scholar and the professional face the very demanding task of information handling and, more traditionally, engaging in a critical evaluation of source material. It would be beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a bibliography of terrorism source material. Such bibliographies are numerous and readily available.19 Rather one can suggest areas where those who would develop a canon to guide professionals should address. In part this gap is the result of the fact that terrorism still lacks an academic home. But more specifically, there are other gaps that are a manifestation of the failure of institutions of higher education to recognize the need for an emerging specialization in one or field or in an interdisciplinary arena. Firstly, there is an absence of overarching theories that can provide integrative conceptualizations to achieve a level of unity and direction in the field. This does not mean to suggest that there needs to be plethora of grand or general theory, but the field must acquire what could be called

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its own “intellectual center of gravity.” Secondly, one can readily draw on theories, especially in comparative politics, to develop the necessary foundation for the analysis of terrorists groups and movements from international politics to place such an analysis in a broader context. These, coupled with the existing and growing sophistication of political methodology, will greatly enhance the ability to refine the new field. Thirdly, there already exists a body of knowledge that can be readily built upon to further develop the canon—most notably the extensive theories and associate studies related to counterinsurgency; this especially since now terrorism is often viewed to be an aspect of global counterinsurgency. There is recognition of both continuity and change in regards to understanding the mutation of both insurgencies and terrorism. Fourthly, in developing the canon there will be a particular need for theoretical “yardsticks” that can be refined to measure and evaluate the operational effectiveness of counterterrorism operations, strategies and policy. Finally, a canon on terrorism faces the ultimate task of addressing where terrorism fits within the most fundamental areas of inquiry: the role of violence in political life, the transformation of warfare, and the concomitant transformation of terrorism. None of these are going to be easy tasks in an international arena where the classic state system is now undergoing fundamental assaults of change created by nonstate actors, the impact of the global web, and the acceleration of technological change.20 Faced with these challenges, a new generation of counterterrorism specialists may have a very daunting challenge, but it can also place them at the forefront of researching and, consequently, understanding the fundamental change that characterizes and challenges our human existence. CONCLUSION There is, unfortunately, every reason to believe that a new generation of terrorists—even as they may pursue highly different causes—will increasingly forge their own form of academic alliances through their use of the Internet. They may not belong to particular institutions of higher education or be drawn from a particular discipline; but whether they have shared outlooks or engage in marriages of convenience, in too many instances, they are professionals without the need for core courses, master’s theses or dissertations. They are engaged in developing their own areas of specialization and interdisciplinary capabilities, and the completion of their studies may end in the death of their victims as well as their own.21 Like it or not, they have forged both a virtual and real community of the committed—committed to a protracted conflict that can and will increasingly test the resolve of their global targets. Confronted with these realities, it is absolutely essential that the United States and other governments, organizations, and regions educate, in the fullest sense, a new

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generation of counterterrorism professionals, a generation that has the knowledge and commitment to not only help lead and guide those who are in the forefront of combating terrorism, but also help to educate both traditional, modernizing, and developed societies who are confronted by adversaries who are rapidly developing their own body of murderous knowledge. We can not afford the luxury of long curriculum committee meetings, drawn out bureaucratic competition, or the lack of operational unity in the face of “the men and women of violence” who, in too many instances, are rapidly completing their undergraduate and graduate education where the degree requirements lead to fear, injury, and death of so many whose only “crime” in many cases was that they were adjudged “guilty by location,” guilty of being at the wrong place at the wrong time. The semester for the counterterrorism professionals must begin, since today’s terrorists are now completing their advanced studies. NOTES 1. Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Lanham and London: Scarecrow Press, 2002). 2. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965). 3. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1966). 4. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a list of many of the excellent books on insurgency—both classics and new. Unlike books on terrorism where few have weathered the passing of time to validate them given the recent origins of the emerging field, one can readily argue over who are the best strategists, theorists, and writers on insurgency. One of the author’s favorites that in many ways is just as relevant today as when it was written is: Bernard Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis, 2nd ed., revised (New York: Praeger, 1967). The authors’ analysis of insurgent organizations in a territorially based conflict remains valid today and certainly can be applied to what is now called Global Insurgency. For an excellent discussion of how traditional theories and concepts of insurgency apply to modern insurgency see: David Killcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies (August 24, 2005): 597–617. For fine a collections of articles that address the changing face of insurgency see: Robert J. Bunker (ed.), Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (Oxford: Routledge, 2005). The contributors include representatives of a new generation of scholars who are, and will continue to, make their names in the field. 5. Brian Jenkins’ studies at the Rand Corporation and Paul Wilkinson’s contribution to the field were and still are very significant. They established the foundation and encouraged other pioneers who were finding their ways in a yet to be recognized field. 6. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict (Los Angeles, CA: Crescent Publications, 1974). 7. Stephen Sloan, The Anatomy of Nonterritorial Terrorism: An Analytical Essay (Gaithersburg, MD: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1979).

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8. J. K. Zawodny, “Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations,” Conflict Quarterly 1 (Spring 1981), 61–70. The author drew from his experience in the Polish underground to provide one of the earliest and best accounts of, not only the way clandestine organizations operate, but also how the organizational structure influences the behavior of both leaders and followers in a combat cell. 9. William Regis Farral, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). If one reads this book they will be struck by how many of the problems that confronted Washington in 1982 remain today. Moreover Washington is still “In Search of an Effective Strategy.” 10. The impact of the “failure of imagination” lack of vision, bureaucratic turf battles that helped to lead to the events of 9/11 will be subject to continuous historical investigation in the years to come. The following report provides a very readable work that seeks to address what took place before and during the attacks. Certainly there are areas in the respective accounts that are subject to debate and new questions are continually raised, but the report should be required reading for potential, present and future counterterrorism professionals. Steve Strasser (ed.) with an Introduction by Craig R. Whitney, The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Report of the 9/11 Commission (New York: Public Affairs Reports, 2004). 11. The author served on the steering committee that was charged with establishing the goals, organization, program, and funding The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Given the understandable concern and pride in how the first responders and the community reacted to the bombing along with the extraordinary assistance on the state, local and national level there was a desire to apply what was called “The Oklahoma Standard” to assist others who would face acts of terrorism. 12. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. No update listed, http://www. dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial 0498.xml (accessed May 22, 2006). 13. Robert K. Mullen, “Mass Destruction and Terrorism,” Journal of International Affairs 32 (1978): 63–89. Dr. Mullen wrote this very prescient study. The threat was readably recognized by those who had the imagination and talent to recognize the threat. It is ironic that after all these years weapons of mass destruction are part of the conventional wisdom on terrorism. 14. E-mail to author from Brian Houghton, Director of Research, The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. 15. Brian Houghton. 16. See the Combating Terrorism Center’s excellent Web page for an overview of its activities and research, http://ctc.usma.edu/research.asp. 17. The Counterterrorism Fellowship Program comes from a long tradition in the United States Air Force to develop and teach courses for military personnel and their civilian equivalents in the counterterrorism field. In the early seventies, for example, the USAF pioneered the outstanding Dynamics of International Terrorism Course that is still given today at Hurlburt Airfield which is now home to the Special Operations University. An extensive discussion of the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program and the future course of terrorism studies was conducted from September 28 to October 1, 2004, in Orlando, Florida (despite the threat of a natural WMD) weather of mass destruction—a hurricane.

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18. E-mail to author from Sebestyen Gorka (May 23, 2006). 19. There are now and will increasingly be a variety of references, encyclopedia and other works that will seek to provide definitive scope and detail on the current nature of terrorism research. There are two early studies however that not only provide “the state of the art” of the time but should be used as models for future detailed surveys in the field. They are: Alex P. Schmid with a bibliography by the author and A.J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences Social Science Research Center (SWIDOC) and New York: Transaction Books, 1981). A second edition of this book authored by Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jogman et al. was published in 1988. More recently, see the two post-9/11 terrorism research bibliographies published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, http://ctc.usma.edu. 20. For an outstanding study of the profound impact of the Internet on contemporary and future terrorism see: John Arquilla and David Ronfelt, Networks and Netwar: The Future of Terrorism, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001). 21. For more on this topic, please see Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

PART I CASE STUDIES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS AND COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 3 “BEGINNING OF A WAR”: THE UNITED STATES AND THE HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 8471 Richard M. Wrona, Jr.

June 14, 1985, began the most prolonged and media-intensive aircraft hijacking in the history of terrorism. Over a 16-day period, the American population was inundated with unprecedented access to the drama and coverage of unfolding events.2 This public drama, when combined with precarious regional relationships and continuing hostage situations, led to a demonstration of American impotence in the face of a direct attack. The TWA 847 hijacking highlighted an atypical aspect of terrorism—instead of sowing fear among their target audience, the terrorists generally succeeded in convincing spectators to sympathize with the hijackers’ cause. BACKGROUND TO THE HIJACKING Lebanon’s Civil War By 1985, Lebanon’s civil war had been raging for close to 10 years. After the division of the Lebanese population along ethno-religious and familial lines, the country faced ongoing violence between sectarian militias. At the macro level, these militias could be identified by their religious allegiance—Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, Shi’a Muslim, and Druze. However, even within these sectarian groupings there were competitions for power. Most notably, the Shi’a Muslims were divided between organizations taking a more secular stand (like Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah, or AMAL) and those taking a more religious position (Hizbollah,3 Islamic AMAL, or “Lebanese Resistance

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Brigades” and other smaller groups).4 Additionally, the Shi’a organizations had competing state sponsors. While Syria backed AMAL (in support of Syrian efforts to subsume Lebanon into a “Greater Syria”), the Iranian Islamic regime supported Hizbollah and the other radical religious groups. International intervention added fury and uncertainty to the boiling Lebanese cauldron. In 1976, an Arab League multinational peacekeeping force, overwhelmingly dominated by the Syrian military, entered Lebanon in an attempt to quell the civil war’s sectarian violence. The Syrians used the excuse of the open-ended mandate to occupy Lebanon. Then, in June 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon, in order to combat escalating cross-border attacks by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Two months later, Lebanon incurred a third introduction of foreign forces when American, French, and Italian forces (later joined by the British) of the Multinational Force (MNF) landed to evacuate Israeli-encircled Syrian and Palestinian forces. September 1982 found the peacekeepers assuming the role of peacemakers, when the MNF attempted to divide the warring Lebanese factions. By 1985, war still raged in Lebanon. Israel had withdrawn to a security zone in the south. The Syrians roamed freely in the east. Beirut was a free-fire zone, with competing militias (Lebanese and Palestinian) raging against each other for control of sections of the city. The multinational forces had withdrawn in 1984 after suffering spectacular terrorist attacks against diplomatic and military targets. Their departure, however, did not occur before the development of a lingering antipathy resulting from their role in the conflict—particularly, a hate harbored by the Shi’a religious factions.

The Prisoners In addition to the direct combat with their militia rivals, kidnappings of Western citizens became a weapon in the Lebanese militias’ arsenals. Beginning in 1982 with the kidnapping of David Dodge, the president of the American University of Beirut, numerous individuals with a variety of national and occupational backgrounds were kidnapped. By 1985, militias held seven American hostages, but the United States had little information as to where the hostages were or what groups detained them. The Lebanese also faced a hostage dilemma. After its 1982 invasion, Israel soon faced an unstable situation in southern Lebanon, as the domestic population revolted against Israel’s continuing occupation. Israel’s answer to the increasing guerrilla activity was to implement an “Iron Fist” policy, which included the raiding of Lebanese villages in the south,

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and, more importantly, the detention of large numbers of Lebanese Shi’a thought to be involved in the guerrilla actions. These detentions assumed a new dimension when, in April 1983, the Israelis moved 1,200 of the detainees to Israel.5 Lebanese leaders protested the movement as a violation of the Geneva Convention—a position that the United States supported.6 However, Lebanese opinion commonly held that the United States had not done enough to pressure the Israelis to abide by the convention and release the Shi’a. The Lebanese Shi’a also faced other hostage/prisoner predicaments. The radical Lebanese Shi’a had ties to other radical Shi’a groups in the Middle East, which led to joint operations against some of the region’s secular/autocratic Arab regimes. Lebanese Shi’a were involved in two particular cases of interest. On December 12, 1983, terrorists of radical Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’a factions attacked multiple targets in Kuwait. Soon after, Kuwait captured and tried 17 individuals, and delivered sentences ranging from 5 years’ imprisonment to death.7 Radical Shi’a groups made the release of these individuals, the “Dawa 17,” their central demand during the hijackings and kidnappings of 1984–1985.8 In addition to the Dawa 17, radical Lebanese Shi’a were concerned about two Lebanese Shiites incarcerated in Spain for the attempted assassinations of Saudi Arabians in 1984.9 TWA Flight 847’s hijacking must be considered not only in the context of these prisoners, but also in the environment of prisoner exchanges that preceded the attack. While nearly every country had a public policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists, two states that stood center-stage in the Flight 847 drama had established dangerous precedents. Israel, in the 18 months preceding the TWA flight, made prisoner exchanges an established norm when dealing with the Lebanese and Palestinian factions (see Figure 3.1.) Likewise, Greece was perceived to be sympathetic to radical Arab regimes and movements. On two different occasions, it released individuals known or implicated in terrorist operations.10 Date November 1983 June 1984

May 1985 Total

Hostages Released by Israel 4,500 (Lebanese and Palestinian) 291 (Syrian), 21 (civilians— nationality not designated), 70 (Syrian bodies) 1150 (Palestinian and others) 5962 (alive)/70 (dead)

Israeli Hostages Returned 6 (Israeli) 6 (Israeli), 5 (Israeli bodies)

3 Israelis 15 (alive)/5 (dead)

Figure 3.1 A Summary of Israeli Hostage Exchanges (November 1983–May 1985) Source: “The Beirut Hostages: Background to the Crisis” (Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, June 21, 1985).

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The Hijackings—A Target-Rich Environment Aircraft hijackings became a regular part of the Middle East’s d´ecor during the 1970s and 1980s. A method refined by the PLO during the 1970s, by the 1980s many Arab nonstate actors accepted aircraft hijackings as an effective way to broadcast their appeals internationally. While attainment of their demands was only moderately successful, hijackers adopted the international air carrier as a podium for proclaiming their organizations’ manifestos. After the operations, hijackers usually evaded prolonged imprisonment, either by escaping or as the result of ultimatums delivered to their captors. Two important hijackings in the Middle East immediately preceded the TWA 847 incident. On June 11, a Shi’a Muslim hijacked a Royal Jordanian Airlines 727 departing Beirut Airport in an attempt to hasten the exit of Palestinian guerrillas from Beirut. Then, on June 12, a Sunni Palestinian responded to the June 11 operation by hijacking a Middle East Airlines 707.11 THE HIJACKING12 TWA 847, a passenger aircraft carrying 145 passengers and 8 crewmembers, was bound for Rome when two young male Arabs hijacked the plane at 10:10 a.m. (local time) on June 14, 1985.13 Armed with pistols and hand grenades that they had smuggled through the X-ray machines at Athens airport, the hijackers violently subdued the crew and passengers. Firstclass passengers were forced to vacate the first-class section and join the rest of the passengers in coach. The hijackers then ensured that all male passengers were seated next to windows, in order to prevent attempts by the men to retake the plane.14 The pilot, Captain John Testrake, acceded to the hijackers’ demand of diverting the flight to Beirut International Airport. Throughout the flight, passengers were forced to remain incommunicado with their heads on their knees. Landing at Beirut International Airport proved to be no easy feat. Because of its value as a transit node and a symbolic point of the city, Lebanon’s sectarian groups continually fought to gain control of the airport. When TWA 847 approached Beirut, the airport’s control tower initially denied the pilot permission to land. Moreover, he found the runway barricaded by the Druze militias that were fighting the Shi’a AMAL.15 Testrake landed after AMAL defeated the Druze and removed the barricades. The short stay at Beirut on June 14 began the cycle of violence that led to the death of the U.S. Navy’s Robert Stethem. After releasing 17 women and 2 children, the hijackers beat Stethem because of the airport’s hesitation in refueling the aircraft.16 At Beirut, the hijackers read a prepared letter to the control tower and released their first of a series of demands—Israel had to release the 766 Arab prisoners held in Atlit

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prison.17 TWA 847 then departed Beirut enroute to Algeria. Upon landing at Algiers, the terrorists increased their list of demands. In addition to Israel’s release of the 766 Shi’a Muslims held at Atlit, the hijackers also demanded Spain’s release of 2 Lebanese Shiites held for the attempted assassinations of two Saudi nationals, Kuwait’s release of the Dawa 17, and an end to Arab oil and arms transactions with the United States.18 Algeria was a contentious place for the plane to land. Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid initially planned to refuse landing permission to the aircraft, but reconsidered after American appeals. American officials believed that Algeria was a far better alternative to other possible airports that the hijackers might request. In addition, Algeria had proved an effective negotiator in the past, particularly in 1979 when the Algerian government acted as the primary intermediary in the negotiations with Iran concerning American captives in Tehran.19 Relying on Algeria proved to be beneficial. Algerian forces secured TWA 847 without incident. More importantly, the Algerians successfully gained the release of 21 additional passengers. During this initial stay in Algiers, the hijackers severely beat an American, Kurt Carlson, when the airport delayed the plane’s refueling.20 After approximately 5 hours, the hijackers demanded a departure. TWA 847 landed a second time at Beirut in the early morning of June 15. Either because the Beirut control tower was delinquent in lighting the runway markings or because the hijackers’ demand of a meeting with AMAL representatives was not satisfied promptly, the hijackers shot Petty Officer Robert Stethem and dumped his body from the plane.21 Soon after, AMAL representatives approached the plane, and 10–12 gunmen reinforced the original hijackers. One of the reinforcements was believed to be Imad Mugniyeh, an individual implicated in the 1983 Marine barracks bombing and the kidnapping of Americans in Beirut.22 During this second stop in Beirut, the hijackers made the strategic decision to separate the hostages. AMAL and Hizbollah captors segregated approximately 12 hostages with American government identification or “Jewish-sounding” surnames and spirited them away to different locations in the city. After only a few hours on the ground, TWA 847 was once again airborne for a second trip to Algiers. TWA 847’s second visit to Algeria was a mixed blessing. After communicating demands for the release of additional prisoners in Cyprus and Greece,23 the hijackers (now the 2 original hijackers plus the 10–12 reinforcements from Beirut) entered into negotiations with the Algerian government and the International Red Cross. As a result of the negotiations, the Algerians secured the release of approximately 65 passengers, which included the flight’s remaining women and children. The release, however, required a quid pro quo. In exchange for the release of Greek citizens (at least two fo whom were in Beirut), Greece agreed to release Ali Atwa, a

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third hijacker who had been unable to board the flight in Athens.24 After he failed to secure a seat on the flight and raised a commotion, Greek authorities detained Atwa. When the hijacking was announced, Atwa readily admitted to his planned participation, and was subsequently arrested by the Greek government. After Atwa rejoined his companions in Algiers, TWA 847 began the final leg of its air travel at 8:00 a.m. on June 16, the third day of the ordeal. Once again, upon approaching Beirut International Airport, Captain Testrake found the runway blocked. After he communicated the necessity of landing, even at the expense of a crash landing, airport personnel moved the obstacles, and TWA 847 landed for its final time at Beirut.25 The hijackers demanded to speak to AMAL personnel, who were soon at the airport. After meeting with the representatives of AMAL, the hijackers reemphasized their demands for the release of Shi’a prisoners in Spain and Israel. This meeting also had the effect of positioning Nabih Berri, the leader of AMAL, as the middleman in the TWA crisis. Approached by both the hijackers and the United States,26 Berri became the public negotiator and spokesman for the hijackers’ demands. He publicly assumed responsibility for the hostages’ safety. June 16 showed the weakness of Lebanon’s recognized government and the powerlessness of the United States government to respond to the hijacking. After the United States conducted a demonstration of force with attack aircraft in the skies over Beirut, AMAL and its allies reinforced the airport with scores of fighters, and the Lebanese Army withdrew its 180 soldiers.27 Hostile militias completely controlled the airport and its surrounding area, negating the slim hopes for a rescue attempt. Also on June 16, the hijackers, in coordination with Berri, removed the passengers (but not the three-person flight crew) from the aircraft, divided them into groups, and transferred them to different locations in Beirut. While the AMAL militia gained control over the majority of the passengers, Hizbollah retained control of at least four hostages. Finally, June 16 brought Nabih Berri’s first press conference, the beginning of his parley with Western negotiators, and the start of his dance with the international media. Berri had been educated in France and maintained a residence in the United States. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, who met Berri in 1983, believed that the AMAL leader “had in his hands the ability to end the hijacking.”28 During the press conference, Berri masterfully presented a number of points. First, by assuming responsibility for the hostages, he placed himself at the center of the situation for the remainder of the crisis. Berri became the de facto spokesman for an operation and an organization (Hizbollah) over which he had little control. Second, in his reiteration of the terrorists’ demands, he presented himself as the fair moderator between parties.29 Knowing the reticence of the Kuwaiti regime, he convinced the hijackers to concentrate on the prisoners detained in Israel

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and Spain. In doing so, Berri fed perceptions that he could influence and moderate the hijackers’ demands. Third, Berri tied the hostages’ plight to the plight of the Lebanese prisoners in Israel’s Atlit prison—a parallel that gained increasing public legitimacy throughout the crisis.30 He consistently compared the remaining TWA hostages, now predominantly American men, with the Lebanese Shi’a held in Israel, I do not know why the policy of the U.S. differentiates between a kidnapper of a country and its people [Israel], and a hijacker of an airplane. Why should someone who defends his country be termed a terrorist, while the terrorism against our people is disregarded?31

After June 16, the hijacking of TWA 847 degenerated into a stand-off between competing entities with Berri acting as a churlish third party. By June 17, AMAL and Hizbollah controlled the Beirut airport, 36 hostages were held in various locations around Lebanon, 3 crew members remained on the aircraft, and the United States had few options. A military operation seemed to be impossible, as the United States had little information concerning the passengers’ locations and few friends in Lebanon to aid in a rescue attempt.32 Diplomatically, the United States also faced an impasse. Not only did it not have confirmation of the group affiliation of the hijackers (although most analysts assumed that they belonged to an organization tied to Hizbollah), but the United States did not control the foci of the hijackers’ demands. On June 16, Spain had publicly announced that it would not release the two Shi’a prisoners held in its prison. On the same day, Israel had started to demonstrate its intransigence concerning the Atlit prisoners. As a result, circumstances forced the United States into a position of relying on mediators, particularly Berri, to protect the hostages and attempt to gain their freedom. From June 17 through June 22, none of the major variables in the hijacking changed significantly. AMAL and Hizbollah moved the prisoners between locations in an effort to prevent rescue attempts. Berri shifted between stances of utmost concern for the hostages and a willingness to “wash his hands” of the hijacking.33 The United Nations, the International Red Cross, and various European states offered to act as negotiators between the hijackers, the United States, and Israel. The Reagan Administration, facing the specter of the 1979–1980 Iranian hostage crisis, came under increasing domestic pressure to solve the situation in Lebanon. As a result of this cumulative inertia, the United States increased its diplomatic traffic to Israel, Iran, and Syria. American messages centered on the question of the Shi’a prisoners in Atlit and the possibility of their release. Because of its public policy of “no negotiations” with terrorists, however, the United States refused to formally or publicly ask the Israelis for the prisoners’ release. In communications to Iran and Syria, the United States sought assistance from those believed to be the state sponsors of

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AMAL and Hizbollah. Advocates within the administration felt that the correct mix of incentives and deterrents toward these two states might gain the hostages’ freedom. Unfortunately, the United States made little headway, and concern mounted that the TWA passengers faced a fate similar to the seven American hostages already in Beirut, some of whom had been held for longer than a year. Days continued to slip by with little hope of a resolution. Even after the Israelis’ release of 31 prisoners from Atlit on June 23, the hijackers refused to make a comparable release of TWA passengers. Berri approached France and Switzerland to enlist their embassies as way-stations for the hostages until the release of the remaining Shi’a prisoners, but France and other European states only agreed to shelter “released” persons. Berri unilaterally expanded the list of demands to include the withdrawal of American warships from Lebanese waters and an American guarantee against retaliation upon the conclusion of the crisis.34 Israel and the United States publicly refused any attempts to tie TWA 847 and Atlit together as part of a hostage exchange bargain, but both states tacitly agreed to the step should the TWA hostages be released. Soon, however, pressures outside Lebanon began to move the event toward a conclusion. Hafez al-Assad’s influence and Syria’s strength in Lebanon came to bear on AMAL, in an effort to (according to a CIA report) “extract Shia AMAL leader Nabih Barri . . . from a no-win situation” and to prevent Shi’a Islamists from gaining too strong a hold in Lebanon.35 Syria’s increasing pressure on Berri forced him to seek new ways to bring the situation to a hasty conclusion. Also, Israel’s position shifted to one that viewed the release of the Atlit prisoners as a process interrupted by the TWA hijacking—a process that could be reinstated once the passengers were released.36 The hostages were released on June 30, 1985, but not without a number of missteps that delayed the process. Three days prior to the release, the United States hindered the negotiations, when it publicly demanded that the seven non-TWA American hostages held in Beirut be included in the release. Berri and Hizbollah, separately, refused to entertain such a notion. However, after Berri became satisfied that the demands concerning the Shi’a prisoners and American retaliation would be met, and after Syria agreed to accept responsibility for the hostages, the TWA passengers were consolidated in Beirut and shuttled to Damascus.37 From Damascus, a U.S. Air Force transport plane carried them to American military facilities in Germany and to freedom. After 16 days of brinkmanship, the conclusion seemed anticlimatic, at least to everyone except the hostages. TWA 847 IN CONTEXT Two noticeable differences separated the TWA 847 crisis from earlier hijackings, and particularly from the contemporary hijackings by Arab

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factions in the Middle East. First, TWA 847 received more media attention and direct media involvement than any previous hijacking. Second, the hostages’ role in the media coverage of the hijacking was something not previously seen in similar events. Beginning with Berri’s press conference on July 16, through the final press conference by the hostages in Damascus on June 30, the international media gained unprecedented access to the event and its actors. In addition to interviews with released hostages,38 the media publicized an interview and a press conference with hostages still held captive. The first event, on June 19, immortalized TWA 847 in media history, when journalists approached the aircraft on the Beirut tarmac to interview the captive crew. Then, on June 20, AMAL brought four hostages to the Beirut airport for a press conference. In addition to covering the hostages, the press gave unprecedented coverage to the captors. Nabih Berri became an overnight media sensation with almost-daily press conferences, interviews, and statements. AMAL gained international recognition as a result of its part in the stand-off, particularly after Berri negotiated the release of the hostages. Even the original hijackers, albeit with hooded masks, gained international recognition in a press conference conducted on June 30. This nonstop coverage colored the Reagan administration’s approach to the situation, causing it to seek the quickest resolution possible in an effort to maintain popular support of the president. While such media inundation may have proved inconsequential to the Middle East’s autocracies or to Lebanon’s failed state, it was all-important to an American population increasingly influenced by television coverage. As David C. Wills highlights in his excellent account of the hijacking, President Reagan’s chief of staff, Donald Regan, raised the important point during the June 24 meeting of the National Security Planning Group, How long is the process [going to take]? We don’t have the luxury of waiting. Public opinion will desert the President [and we’ll face the] Carter Syndrome.39

WHY TWA 847? Why did Ali Atwa, Mohammed Ali Hammadi, and Hasan Izz-Al-Din choose TWA 847? While we can never be sure of the true intentions of the hijackers or the organization that they represented, tactical and strategic considerations made the flight an ideal target. The flight offered a number of advantages. Athens, the flight’s departure airport, was known to have lax security—a deficiency that led to many successful and recent hijackings. In 1973, the PLO’s Black September attacked passengers inside the airport, and, in 1976, members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Germany’s BaaderMeinhof Gang hijacked an Air France flight.40 In June 1983, a Romanian

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aircraft scheduled to fly the Athens-to-Rome route was hijacked to Libya. Then, in March 1985, an “Arab” fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a Royal Jordanian airliner after he breached the airport’s perimeter fence.41 In addition to this demonstrated lack of preventive measures, Greek reactive measures were weak. The Greek police were inefficient and poorly trained,42 and according to Middle East analyst Spiros Kaminaris, Papandreou’s government showed “[a] sympathy for radical Arab regimes and causes [that] was encouraged and, to some extent, exploited by Papandreou’s ambition to promote Greek leadership of Third World states . . . ”43 Finally, the Greek government demonstrated on at least two occasions that it was willing to free hijackers and suspected terrorists, particularly in response to other hijackings of Greek citizens, aircraft, or ships.44 Strategically, the TWA 847’s majority-American passenger list offered the hijackers the bargaining chips necessary to gain the freedom of their compatriots. While contemporary scholars viewed the hijacking merely as one-upmanship between the Lebanese Shi’a factions,45 this analysis seems only accurate concerning the intervention of Nabih Berri and AMAL. Other evidence indicates that Hizbollah was primarily concerned with the Shi’a prisoners’ release. First, Hizbollah and its affiliates (most notably, Islamic Jihad) made the release of Lebanese Shi’a prisoners their core demand after the Dawa 17’s detention in 1983. Prior to the TWA hijacking, Islamic Jihad hijacked a Kuwaiti Airways aircraft and made demands similar to those presented by Hammadi and Izz-Al-Din.46 Likewise, in May 1985, Islamic Jihad contacted Western news agencies with pictures of the seven American hostages held in Beirut in an effort to achieve the Dawa 17’s release. On the heels of these events, TWA 847 seemed to be a more robust effort to gain the same objectives. As the United States was a patron of Israel, a patron of Kuwait, an ally of Spain, and a world superpower, the logic of forcing American pressure on these states through a hijacking of Americans appeared eminently sensible. Also, Hizbollah’s decisions during the crisis indicated that Lebanese power politics was hardly the group’s foremost consideration. For example, the original hijackers’ demands of June 15 and 16 of only AMAL mediators, followed by a reinforcement contingent of AMAL and Hizbollah gunmen, showed little hesitancy by Hizbollah to share the spotlight with its sectarian rival. THE LESSONS OF 847 Military Difficulties From the second day of the incident until its conclusion, the lack of a military solution to the TWA hijacking frustrated the United States. In hindsight, an attempted rescue mission would have undoubtedly caused hostage fatalities and significant diplomatic problems for the United

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States. Any rescue attempt first faced the problems of time and space. While much was made in the contemporary media about the deployment of Delta Force to the region,47 the unit’s deployment faced significant problems. One problem stemmed from the unit’s position in the United States. Although it had the ability to react immediately to any deployment order, Delta still found itself 8–10 hours away from the Middle East. Bureaucratic inertia compounded this problem by delaying the deployment of the force until the second day of the crisis.48 Related to this variable of proximity was the temporal window within which the United States could feasibly react. Even at the time of the hijacking, high-ranking American officials recognized that a rescue mission became impossible once the aircraft landed in Beirut for the second time (the early morning of June 15).49 The Shi’a factions’ ability to reinforce the airport and disperse the hostages to a variety of unknown locations made a successful rescue extremely unlikely. Another problem facing military action and, particularly, a rescue attempt was the lack of agreement to such an operation by key regional actors. Even had the United States been ready to mount a rescue operation in the early hours of the crisis, Beirut was not a feasible location. The government, while friendly to the United States, did not have effective control over the airport or its surrounding area, as was demonstrated by the Lebanese Army’s withdrawal from the airport on June 16. Likewise, the Algiers airport could not be the rescue location due to the Algerian government’s adamant objection to any such operation.50 While attempts had been made to force TWA 847 to land at a more hospitable location (Cyprus being the first choice as it was the staging location for Delta), the hijackers invariably controlled the aircraft’s destinations. Other problems concerning a rescue included the lack of coordination between entities that wanted to make such an attempt, and the lack of expertise of some of those actors. In addition to the United States, reports indicated that the Lebanese, the Jordanians, the Israelis, and a shadowy private entity expressed interest in staging a rescue operation.51 Who would control such a rescue, particularly should two countries attempt simultaneous operations, became highly problematic. Even after the hostages’ release on June 30, the United States faced problems concerning the use of military force to retaliate for the hostagetaking. First, the United States faced the important question of who to retaliate against. AMAL and Hizbollah were obvious choices, but there were difficulties in distinguishing one group from another, particularly given Hizbollah’s amorphous nature and the predilection of the terrorists to espouse membership in many different groups. Also, there was the question of what to retaliate against. In 1985, groups like AMAL and Hizbollah had little infrastructure for the United States to strike. Air attacks could

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have been conducted against Hizbollah’s training camps in the Bekaa Valley, but doing so might have caused casualties among the camp’s Iranian cadre or the seven Americans still held hostage in Lebanon. More importantly, conducting attacks after the United States government’s June 30 reiteration of its foreign policy calling for the “preservation of Lebanon, its government, [and] its stability and security,” would have caused multiple difficulties.52 Berri and the Syrians took the statement as a guarantee against retaliation, and military action after the statement could have caused other states and movements to question American reliability in future negotiations. Friends, Neutrals, and Adversaries Given the difficulties of a military response, diplomacy became the instrument of necessity during the TWA 847 hijacking. In this arena, the United States experienced unexpected benefits and difficulties. Algerian intervention was one of the great advantages of the crisis. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reportedly once said, “[I]f you want to find out what the Arab ‘radicals’ are thinking, go to Algiers.”53 In June 1985, the government of President Benjedid proved instrumental, particularly in gaining the freedom of so many hostages. While the Algerians were resistant to the idea of allowing American forces to attempt a rescue attempt at the Algiers airport, the Algerian performance mirrored the central role that they had played in the release of the Tehran hostages nearly 5 years earlier. Algeria was no democracy, but it certainly proved to be a valuable American friend during the crisis. On the other hand, Israel proved to be more of an obstacle than an ally during the event. The hijackers’ central demand focused not on a redress of American actions, but on the Israeli detention of Lebanese Shi’a. The Israelis had established a precedent of exchanging hostages. However, in the case of TWA 847, the Israelis demonstrated an intransigence that hindered American diplomatic efforts. At one point, according to David Wills’ analysis of these events, Israeli Defense Minister Rabin told the media that “the Americans will have to crawl on all fours before we even discuss . . . releasing the detainees.”54 Israeli obstinacy, particularly during the first week of the hijacking, acted as a distraction to Reagan Administration officials who had expected and assumed far better support from the country thought to be the United States’ best regional ally. Lessons Learned Again, and Again . . . and Again During and after the TWA 847 crisis, the United States undertook a number of actions in response to the incident. On June 16, the administration established the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting

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Terrorism.55 Directed to provide recommendations to President Reagan concerning responses to future terrorist threats, the task force presented its report in December 1985. On June 18, in his first public statement concerning the hijacking, President Reagan issued a travel advisory against travel to Athens International Airport and issued a directive for expansion of the Department of Transportation’s sky marshal program.56 Finally, the Department of Transportation implemented a ban on American airline traffic to Beirut International Airport and restricted the Lebanese national carrier, Middle East Airlines, from landing at American airports. In retrospect, several recommendations stemming from the Task Force’s review of TWA 847’s hijacking failed to be implemented, and would haunt the United States in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. For example, their final report observed that: – Pre-flight screening of passengers and carry-on baggage is a cornerstone of our domestic security program . . . [t]he recent terrorist acts against international aviation and maritime interests indicate a need for continual monitoring and updated security procedures. – Currently, while several federal departments and agencies process intelligence within their own facilities, there is no consolidated center that collects and analyzes all-source information from those agencies participating in antiterrorist activities. – An increase in human intelligence gathering is essential to penetrate terrorist groups and their support systems.57

In short, the recommendations put forth by the 1985 task force are remarkably similar to the recommendations provided 16 years later in response to other, far more deadly aircraft hijackings. Another failure displayed before, during, and after the TWA hijacking was the United States’ inability to recognize terrorism as a form of warfare, rather than a criminal act. Statements made by President Reagan, Secretary of State George Schultz, and other administration officials showed a desire to arrest, prosecute, and “bring to justice” the perpetrators and supporters of the hijacking.58 Likewise, the Task Force’s report to the president reflected a similar mindset. Unfortunately, this approach has not always produced a lasting justice for the atrocities committed by terrorists. For example, after his arrest in Germany in 1987 on other charges, Mohammed Ali Hammadi was tried for the hijacking of TWA 847 and the murder of Robert Stethem, and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. However, his “life” sentence only lasted until December 2005, when German authorities released Hammadi. He is now thought to reside somewhere in Lebanon.

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CONCLUSION This study of TWA 847’s hijacking offers specific lessons concerning antiterrorist and counterterrorist strategies. Military action, while seemingly the default response of the United States, is not the best (or a feasible) response in many circumstances. In this case, the terrorists offered little opportunity for a rescue attempt to be executed. Beirut offered too many impediments, the Algerian government would not allow any such operation in Algiers, and the hostage-takers would not allow the plane to land elsewhere. Another lesson centered on the diplomatic efforts employed during the incident. While diplomatic solutions became difficult, particularly because of strained or nonexistent relations between some parties (as in the case of American-Iranian exchanges), diplomacy was productive when the United States enlisted the aid of a third party (Algeria) that had credibility with the hijackers. Yet another lesson stemming from the incident concerned the importance of the media in the modern battle against terrorism. When countering terrorist actions, states must gain and maintain the initiative when dealing with the media. During the TWA crisis, Nabih Berri’s preeminence in the media spotlight gained popular legitimacy for an incident that was an act of war, and showed the dangers of allowing terrorists to shape the media environment. Finally, TWA 847 demonstrated that states must be able to adjust their tactics and strategies in an effort to recognize terrorism for what it is—war. Whether terrorist organizations act to further their own interests or on behalf of state sponsors, their actions are a means of combat, not of crime. As such, continuing efforts to treat terrorists as criminals (even after September 11) accord the terrorists a freedom of action that hinders antiterrorist and counterterrorist efforts. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not purport to reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense. NOTES 1. The phrase “beginning of a war” in relation to the TWA hijacking was attributed to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in David C. Wills, The First War on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism Policy during the Reagan Administration (Lanham, MO: Roman and Littlefield, 2003) 137. 2. Barry Rubin, “The United States and the Middle East, 1984–1985,” in Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, Contemporary Survey, Vol. 9, 1984–1985 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), http://meria.idc.ac.il/us-policy/data1984.html (accessed May 2006).

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3. The “correct” English spelling of the group’s Arabic name is Hizb’Allah or Hizbu’llah, however it is more usually spelled “Hizbollah,” “Hizbullah,” or “Hezbollah.” In order to standardize across all three volumes, the editor has chosen “Hizbollah” because that is the spelling employed in the URL designating the group’s official homepage. 4. AMAL is an acronym of Afwaj al-Muqawamah al-Lubnaniyyah, or “Lebanese Resistance Brigades.” Amal is also the Arabic word for “hope.” 5. Robert B. Bowie, “Hostages: American and Shiite,” Christian Science Monitor (June 28, 1985): 16. 6. Bowie: p. 16. 7. “ITAC Intelligence Note (IIN 88-58): The Dawa 17 and Islamic Jihad Terrorism: Attempts to Win the Release of Dawa Party Prisoners in Kuwait,” (declassified cable) Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center, US Army Intelligence Agency, June 22, 1988, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (document number TE00958) (accessed June 2006). 8. “Dawa” (Arabic for “call”) was a movement started in Najaf, Iraq, under the tutelage of senior Shi’a clerics Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr. Its belief structure centered on the need for the establishment of Islamic regimes in the Middle East, even if such establishments required radical action. Dawa became the font from which many of the radical Shi’a regional movements (to include the Iranian Islamic regime and Lebanon’s Hizbollah) developed. See “ITAC Intelligence Note . . . ” (pp. 4, 7) for a description of the numerous hijacking and kidnapping operations that involved demands for the release of the Dawa 17. 9. Charles Waterman, “Islamic Jihad—hostage-takers with an Iranian connection,” Christian Science Monitor (June 17, 1985): 11; Wills: p. 96. 10. Spiros Ch. Kaminaris, “Greece and the Middle East,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (June 1999): 37–38. 11. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology of Events” (Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, July 15, 1985) 12. 12. For an excellent day-by-day account of the hijacking that focuses particularly on the American decision-making process, see David C. Wills, The First War on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism Policy during the Reagan Administration. 13. “The Beirut Hostages: Background to the Crisis” (Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, June 21, 1985) 9. 14. Kurt Carlson, One American Must Die, A Hostage’s Personal Account of the Hijacking of Flight 847 (New York: Congdon and Weed, 1986) 27–28. 15. Carlson: p. 32. 16. “He’s Pulled a Grenade Pin,” The New York Times, June 15, 1985: 1; Carlson: pp. 33–34. 17. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 11; Wills: p. 92. 18. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 11. 19. Wills: p. 92. 20. Carlson: pp. 46–50. 21. Different accounts exist concerning the cause and time of Stethem’s murder. See Wills: p. 93 and Carlson: pp. 61–62.

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22. Wills: p. 93. 23. Wills: p. 96. 24. Paul Anastasi, “Athens Discloses a Hijacker Deal,” The New York Times, June 16, 1985: 12. 25. Wills: pp. 97–98. 26. Wills: pp. 99–101. 27. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 10. 28. Larry Rother, “Passengers Taken From Hijacked Jet, Lebanese Reports,” The New York Times, June 18, 1985: 1. 29. Berri reiterated the hijacker’s demands concerning prisoners in Israel, Spain, and Kuwait, and then went on to say that, “I persuaded the hijackers not to include this demand [the prisoners in Kuwait] in the case of the American aircraft.” See “Nabih Berri’s June 16 Press Statement,” declassified cable from Ambassador Reginald Bartholomew to the Department of State, June 18, 1985, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (document number TE00765) (accessed June 2006). 30. For example, 58 percent of Americans favored negotiating with the terrorists. See Wills: p. 109. 31. “Nabih Berri’s June 16 Press Statement.” 32. At one point, CIA Director William Casey even briefed President Reagan that some of the hostages may have been moved to Tehran. See Wills: p. 101. 33. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 8. 34. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 5; Wills: p. 126. 35. “Syria-Lebanon: Next Steps after the Hijacking,” Center Intelligence Agency Analysis (declassified), July 9, 1985, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (document number TE00773) (accessed June 2006). 36. Wills: p. 128. 37. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 1. 38. Joseph Berger, “Hijackers Release over 60 from Jet in Algiers Airport,” The New York Times, June 16, 1985: 1. 39. Wills: p. 122, brackets in original. 40. The airport attack resulted in 3 killed and 55 wounded. The Air France flight was hijacked to Entebbe, Uganda, from which Israeli commandoes rescued the hostages. Kaminaris: pp. 36–37. 41. Patrick Quinn, “Lax security at Athens airport weakens anti-hijack efforts,” Christian Science Monitor, June 17, 1985: 9. 42. Quinn: p. 9. 43. Kaminaris: p. 37. 44. Kaminaris: p. 37; Quinn: p. 9. 45. Bruce Hoffman, “Shi’a Terrorism, the Conflict in Lebanon, and the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847,” Rand Policy Paper July 1985: 3, http://www.rand.org/ pubs/papers/P7116 (accessed June 2006); Rubin: p. 1. 46. “ITAC Intelligence Note . . . ”: p. 4. 47. Delta Force, better referred to as Special Forces Operations Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D), is the U.S. Army’s premier counterterrorist force. See Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Said to Send Commando Squad,” The New York Times, June 16, 1985: 1. 48. Wills: p. 94.

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49. Peter Grier, “US finds it hard to use military might against terrorists,” Christian Science Monitor, June 19, 1985: 1; Wills: p. 102. 50. “The Beirut Hostages . . . ”: p. 11; Wills: p. 94. 51. Berger: p. 1 (Lebanese); Wills: p. 99 ( Jordanians); “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 11 (Israelis); Carlson: pp. 147–148 (private). 52. “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 1. 53. John K. Cooley, “Hijacking emphasizes US need for friends in the third world,” Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1985: 11. 54. As quoted in Wills: p. 98. 55. Donald P. Gregg and Douglas E. Menarchik, “Vice President’s Meeting with Admiral Holloway” (declassified briefing memorandum), July 16, 1985, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (document number TE00779) (accessed June 2006). 56. Ronald W. Reagan, “Presidential Remarks: News Conference Opening Statement Tuesday, June 18, 1985,” June 18, 1985, http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com (document number TE00764) (accessed June 2006). 57. Public Report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism, February 1986: 24–26, http://www.population security.org/bush and terror.pdf (accessed July 2006). 58. Ronald W. Reagan, “Presidential Statement on Release of the Hostages” (internal White House memo), June 30, 1985, http://nsarchive.chadwyck. com (document number TE00772) (accessed June 2006); “TWA Hijacking: A Chronology . . . ”: p. 2.

CHAPTER 4 THE ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKING Sean K. Anderson and Peter N. Spagnolo

In October 1985, tension between the State of Israel and the Palestinians was nothing new. Four major wars had been fought, the Israelis had invaded and occupied southern Lebanon in 1981, and countless attacks, counterattacks, preemptive strikes, and raids had been carried out by both sides over the larger questions of Israeli existence and Palestinian rights. One of the results of the 1981 invasion was the displacement of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon and the relocation of its headquarters to Tunis in 1982. On September 25, 1985, three Israeli citizens were killed on their yacht as it was anchored off the coast of Larnaca, Cyprus. Credit for this attack was claimed by Force 17, an elite unit of the PLO whose main function was the personal protection of the PLO leadership but, who also conducted terrorist strikes as well as attacks on rival Palestinian factions. On October 1, 1985, Israel launched a long-range air strike against the PLO headquarters in Tunis, killing over 73 people and wounding about 100 others. Israel announced this attack on Tunis in a press conference held by Israeli Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff Moshe Levy, and Air Force Chief Amos Lapidol. During the press conference, the three Israeli leaders announced a new policy whereby terrorist targets would be attacked wherever they were located and that no terrorist would be safe. According to Israel’s official account of these events: Mounting wave of terror against Israelis and Jews, in Israel, in the areas and abroad, culminating with the murder of three Israelis in Larnaca’s harbour, led the government of Israel to seek new ways to combat terror. Since it was evident that the attacks were masterminded by the PLO and the various

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organizations under its umbrella, Israel decided to attack the PLO headquarters in Tunis. In a daring, long distance aerial raid, Israeli planes bombed a PLO base in Tunis, some 4800 kilometers round-trip from Israel. 60 terrorists were killed, including some senior members of “Force 17.” Arafat was not in Tunis at the time, but his headquarters was hit.1

Some claim that the three Israelis killed in Cyprus were Mossad agents, while the official Israeli position is that they were civilians. While many considered the aerial attack on Tunis as specifically a retribution for the Larnaca incident, the Israeli government insisted it was simply a part of their wider ongoing war on terrorism.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE HIJACKING When the Achille Lauro attack occurred, at first many believed that it had been conducted in retaliation for Israel’s attack on Tunis. However, the hijacking operation had been planned in advance for over 10 months, involving two previous journeys on the Achille Lauro by Masar Kadia,2 who posed as a Greek shipping magnate under the name “Petros Floros,” and was accompanied on at least one of these trips by the man who would lead the hijacking, Magied al Molqi. These scouting trips were intended— among other things—to assess security measures, meal times, the normal activities of passengers and crew, the relative competence and aggressiveness of specific crew members, the likely response of the ship’s captain and crew, and the layout of the ship. On September 28, 1985, accomplices smuggled four Soviet-made Kalashnikov automatic rifles, eight hand grenades, and nine detonators aboard the Tunis-to-Genoa ferry, the Habib, which were then carried aboard the Achille Lauro by the four hijackers in their uninspected baggage on October 3, 1985.3 Masar Kadia, the previous scout who was also the handler of the four hijackers, booked a cabin separate from the others, and did not associate with them apart from one private meeting with their tactical commander, Magied al Molqi, after which he debarked in Alexandria. Later, it was learned that only Kadia and al Molqi knew of the full hijacking plan. Prior to arriving in Alexandria, after consulting with Kadia, al Molqi gave orders to the other three to unpack their weapons and prepare to seize the vessel.4 Although the other three attackers had been kept in the dark until that moment, the original plan had apparently been to hijack the ship on the high seas.5 Technically, such an operation would violate the PLO’s declared policy since 1974, which ruled out terrorist attacks “outside the territory of Occupied Palestine.”6

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While adhering to the 1974 policy had made the PLO and its factions more respectable as “freedom fighters” in the view of the international community (apart from the United States and Israel, who still regarded them as terrorists), it also reduced the strategic effectiveness of their military struggle. The group that would seize the Achille Lauro had conducted seven major actions in the period 1978–1983, all of which involved attempts to take hostages, and all but one involved attempts to infiltrate Israel. Only three of the six infiltration attempts succeeded, while in only one case did the terrorists succeed in seizing hostages, but in no case did they win the release of any Arab prisoners. In April 1979, four Palestinian fighters landed on a beach near Nahariyah, Israel, on a mission to seize hostages. Three Israeli civilians were killed by the terrorists, two of whom were killed and the other two captured. The political and military payoffs of such actions were minimal: Israel was able to defend its territory and citizens effectively while the rest of the world, whose citizens were no longer in the cross-fire of the Arab-Israeli conflict, could regard it now with relative indifference.7 The Achille Lauro, a vessel owned by the Italian government, was a 23,629-ton cruise ship that was 643-feet long, capable of serving 900 passengers, having two swimming pools, a movie theater, and a discotheque. The Italians had leased the ship to the Chandris-Italy Company, which offered low-cost cruises throughout the Mediterranean. Some 748 passengers had boarded the ship at Genoa on October 3 for a 12-day Mediterranean cruise, with calls at Naples, Syracuse, Alexandria, Port Said, Ashdod (Israel), Limassol (Cyprus), and Rhodes (Greece). Cruise manager Max Fico later reported that a party of several young men kept to themselves and displayed none of the friendly behavior usual on cruises. Some passengers tried to strike up conversations with the men during a meal, but they seemed reluctant to interact with their fellow passengers and merely said they were from Argentina. When a female passenger who was fluent in Spanish tried to speak with them, none seemed to understand anything she said to them. The terrorists boarded with passports issued from Norway, Argentina, and Portugal.8 According to a document seized later, the four had planned to attack the Port of Ashdod upon arrival, but when a crew member saw them cleaning their weapons, they were forced to change their plans. Excerpts of this document read as follows: The Ashdod Port Operation: When the Zionist enemy carried out an air strike against the Palestinian HQ in Hamam al-Shatt in Tunis in October 1985, the Front reacted to this aggression by attempting a sea landing in Ashdod port . . . This operation was unsuccessful, forcing the Front’s fighters to change the original plan . . . Once they were uncovered on the ship taking them. They

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took over the ship known as “Achille Lauro” . . . The organization found itself fighting on several fronts, [including] directly against the American enemy. This, especially after American aircraft hijacked a civilian Egyptian aircraft that carried the comrade Abu al-Abbas, General Secretary of the Front and Member of the PLO Executive Committee, and other comrades, and forced them to land in the Sicily airport in Italy.9

Although there had been numerous aircraft hijackings during the early 1980s, the taking of a civilian passenger ship was unprecedented. Consequently, the security measures on the ship were lax: only a passport was required to buy a ticket, there were no checks of luggage, and very little observation of persons embarking other than to ensure they were paid passengers. Therefore the Achille Lauro’s distress call would receive immediate international attention. Fortunately, before the actual hijacking occurred, most of the passengers had debarked at Alexandria for a tour of the Pyramids, planning to travel overland to Port Said (the next port of call) to continue their voyage. This was on Day 5 of the planned 12-day cruise, and the next stop after Port Said was to be Ashdod, Israel, the terrorists’ supposed target. The people remaining on board included the 350 members of the crew (Italian and Portuguese citizens) and 97 passengers of various nationalities.10 Another reason this hijacking would captivate the worldwide attention that the terrorists were seeking was the nature of their immediate victims—namely, tourists from about 20 nations, including, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, France, Holland, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the United States, and West Germany. No Israelis were on the passenger list, however. A group of elderly Jewish Americans would eventually be singled out for “special treatment” by the hijackers, and thus receive the anxious attention from the on-looking global audience. This group included Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer, along with eight of their closest friends—three retired couples and two older women who shared the Klinghoffer’s summer homes in the same group of condominiums in Long Branch, New Jersey. The Klinghoffers were celebrating their 38th wedding anniversary, but their voyage also had some urgency behind it: Marilyn, age 58, had been diagnosed as having an incurable colon cancer and had less than a year to live. Leon Klinghoffer, a 69 year-old retired small appliance manufacturer, had suffered two strokes and was partly paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair. He had limited ability to use his hands, which were tremulous, while his speech was often slurred. Fellow hostages recalled afterwards that the hijackers seemed irritated and uneasy with his slurred speech and erratic motions. Neither spouse expected to long survive the demise of the other, but both had decided to make the most of this twilight honeymoon voyage in

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the company of their closest friends. However, the hijackers would also radio threats to kill all of the over 400 people aboard if their demands were not met or if escape were attempted, so anxiety was shared among the several nations, families, and friends who had other passengers and crew members aboard the cruise ship. EVENTS DURING THE HIJACKING The passengers first realized something was amiss when the hijackers burst into the dining room toward the end of the noon meal of October 7, firing over their heads and shouting barely intelligible commands. Some passengers fled into the kitchen, pursued by one of the hijackers who beat two of the kitchen staff to the floor and then forced everyone back to the dining room. Two crew members were reportedly shot, but received only minor wounds, while another Italian sailor was slightly wounded by shrapnel from a bullet.11 As the hijackers consolidated their control over the vessel, they took command of the ship’s bridge and radio room. After securing the passengers in the dining room, the hijackers ordered the crew to summon Captain Gerardo de Rosa, who later testified that “As soon as I got there, I faced the machine guns. First they fired some shots at the deck, shouting in Arabic. Then they told me to head for Tartus.”12 The ship then turned for the Syrian port, which was about 300 miles to the northeast. The hijackers then allowed the crew to return to running the ship, telling the captain that any attempts by him or the crew to thwart them would result in harm to the passengers held hostage. After the initial shooting spree, the terrorists herded all passengers— except for Anna Hoerantner, a 53-year old Austrian—into the dining room, and instructed Captain de Rosa to order the crew to carry on with their normal duties but avoid all contact with the hostages. Hoerantner had been knocked down a stairwell when the hijackers had rushed into the dining room. In the confusion, she escaped and hid in a bathroom in an unoccupied cabin for the duration of the hijacking and was found hiding there 15 hours after the hijacking had ended. The terrorists told the crew that there were 20 hijackers on board; this was probably a ruse to discourage any attempts to retake the ship. The treatment of the hostages was erratic, going from considerate one minute to brutal the next: when one passenger asked for a cup of water, the hijackers handed one to her, but when an exhausted Marilyn Klinghoffer attempted to lay down on the floor, one of them struck her with the butt of his weapon, ordering her to get up. The terrorists also tried some form of political statement by occasionally proclaiming “Reagan no good! Arafat good!”13 and then later forced the passengers into a common area, the Arazzi Lounge. After the terrorists directed the ship into the Mediterranean and turned off the ship’s transponders, the ship blended into the

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busy sea lanes, and in spite of extensive tracking efforts by the United States, Egypt, Italy, Great Britain, and Israel, it disappeared for much of the next 36 hours. To further exacerbate the confused situation, it was unclear exactly who the hijackers were and with what (if any) group they were affiliated. Early on, the terrorists claimed to be part of the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), and this seemed to be confirmed by the fact that the only prisoner named in the release demand was a member of the PLF. However, the PLF was no longer a single entity but had splintered into no fewer than three factions. The original PLF had been founded in 1961 by Ahmed Jabril, who coordinated the group’s efforts with Fatah in 1965. In 1967, a group from the PLF, which included Jabril, founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under Dr. George Habash. Soon after the founding of the PFLP, Jabril became disillusioned with the group’s emphasis on ideology, and broke away to form yet another splinter group—namely, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLPGC)—while still sharing the parent group’s goal of the eradication of Israel in favor of a Palestinian state. In 1977, yet another split took place when the current PLF broke away from PFLP-GC over Jabril’s support of Syria’s policy in Lebanon. In late 1983, the PLF split when founder Abu Abbas decided the group was growing too subservient to Syria. He and his followers left for Tunis in order to align themselves closer with Arafat’s al Fatah. The PLF faction remaining in Damascus was headed by Talat Yaqub, but was itself split when Abdal Fatah Ghanim tried unsuccessfully to seize power over the PLF in January 1984. The Yaqub faction remained in Damascus, while Ghanim and his followers established their rival PLF office in Libya. While the PLF had been recognized by Yassir Arafat in April 1977 as a member of the PLO, this recognition continued to be extended only to the faction led by Abu Abbas,14 who was eventually made a member of the PLO Executive Committee.15 With all of these factions and shifting loyalties and alliances, the authorities did not initially know which PLF faction they were dealing with in the hijacking of the Achille Lauro. On the following day, the hijackers sought to separate Jewish and American passengers from the others. When the hijackers asked if there were any Jews present, two elderly Austrians identified themselves, whom the hijackers immediately beat and manhandled. Having seen this, the small group of Jewish Americans held their tongues. The hijackers separated the 2 Jewish Austrians—as well as the 12 Americans and 5 British women belonging to a dance troupe—from the rest of the hostages, and forced them to climb up to an upper open deck, where they were forced to sit or lie under the burning sunlight and where they were surrounded by tins of gasoline or diesel fuel. The hijackers told these hostages that they would be shot, blown apart by grenades, and burned alive if anyone attempted

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to rescue them. When there was difficulty in moving Leon Klinghoffer’s wheelchair up the stairs to the upper deck, the hijackers separated him from the rest, over the protests of Marilyn Klinghoffer, who was forced to leave him at the point of a gun. The hijackers took Mr. Klinghoffer’s watch and cigarettes from him at that time. This was the last time that Marilyn Klinghoffer would see her husband alive. The hijackers took the passports of these 19 selected passengers and shuffled them, telling them that they would be killed one by one in the order of the shuffled deck of passports. Meanwhile, the hijackers ordered Captain de Rosa to sail toward Syria and radioed their demands in the name of the PLF for the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israel, naming only Samir al-Qantari, a PLF member arrested for the murders of an Israeli man and his five year-old daughter during a 1979 raid on the Israeli town of Nahariya on the Mediterranean coast. Once they had come into radio contact with the Syrian port authorities in Tartus, they repeated demands to talk to International Red Cross officials, and to the Ambassadors of Italy, West Germany, and Britain, whom they wanted to pressure the Israelis to comply. While they claimed to have seven Israeli captives aboard, this claim was denied by Israel. The Voice of Lebanon, a Christian radio station in Beirut, intercepted radio communications between the hijackers and the Syrian authorities, providing the first indication that a hostage had been killed. At 2:42 p.m. [local time], the voice of a hijacker demanded: “[Where are the] negotiators? We will start killing at 1500 hours.” At 3:23 p.m., the hijacker’s voice then said: “What are the developments, Tartus? We will kill the second. We are losing patience.” However this report was followed by another radio message from the captain in English stating that everyone aboard was “in very good health. Please, please, please don’t try anything!”16 However, according to the later testimony of Captain de Rosa, around 3:05 p.m. he heard gunshots and when the hijackers appeared in the bridge with blood spattered over their pants and shoes, they told him that they had killed Leon Klinghoffer. The ship’s bartender later testified that he witnessed the oldest hijacker shoot Klinghoffer in the forehead and in his chest. The ship’s barber and one of the waiters were forced to pick up Mr. Klinghoffer in his wheelchair and to throw them both over the side of the ship. According to one of the women held hostage in the Arazzi room, the youngest hijacker had started to weep. When she asked him what was wrong, he replied that the other hijackers had killed the man in the wheelchair. Refused landing rights in Syria, the hijackers ordered the captain to return to Port Said. Meanwhile, Yassir Arafat—who declared that he “totally dissociated himself” from this operation—sent PLO Executive Council members Abu Abbas and Hani al-Hassan to Cairo in order to help mediate the crisis. With the ship anchored 16 miles off Port Said, at

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7:15 a.m. [local times] on October 9, 1985, Egyptian authorities contacted the ship and began negotiations. A boat containing some Egyptian officials, along with Abu Abbas and another unidentified man aboard, reached the Achille Lauro. The Egyptian and Italian authorities had agreed to grant the hijackers’ demands of safe passage out of Egypt with no prosecution in exchange for their freeing all the hostages and their surrendering the ship, but only on the condition that no one had been harmed. Captain de Rosa was interviewed by Egyptian officials between 1:30 p.m. and 4:30 p.m., during which time he stated that “I am the captain. I am speaking from my office. And my officers and everyone is in good health.” Based on this false assurance, the Egyptians agreed to the hijackers’ demands, who in turn agreed to surrender at 4:20 p.m. They finally left the ship at 5:00 p.m., after they packed their guns and remaining weapons to take with them off the ship. The hijackers then disappeared from public view. In spite of the shipping company’s and captain’s wish to sail the Achille Lauro to its next intended destination of Ashdod, Egyptian officials insisted on it remaining in Port Said for their own investigation. The Achille Lauro was then steered into Port Said, arriving there at 4:00 a.m. the morning of October 10, 1985.

AFTER THE HIJACKING: FLIGHT AND PURSUIT Immediately after the hijackers had left the ship, Marilyn Klinghoffer ran to the infirmary where the hijackers had told her they had left Leon Klinghoffer. Not finding him there, she was told by the infirmary staff to go see the captain. When she reached the bridge, the captain informed her that her husband had been murdered by the hijackers. In fact, the cruise came to an end at Port Said, with the 15 Americans returning to the United States by a military plane on October 12, after a brief stopover in Sicily to allow witnesses to identify the hijacking suspects who by then were in custody there. The other passengers were booked return passage by either the cruise line or their respective governments. The repeated denials by the hijackers, by Abu Abbas, and by Yassir Arafat that anyone had been killed and that Leon Klinghoffer had merely died of a heart attack before they threw his body overboard were refuted on October 15 by the discovery of Klinghoffer’s body on the Syrian coast. Subsequent forensic tests confirmed not only his identity but also his violent death by gunshots to his forehead and chest. Syria’s actions in recovering and delivering the body (which eventually was returned to his widow on October 20, 1985, and buried later in New Jersey) may have been intended to undermine the international credibility of Yassir Arafat, with whom Syria had serious differences over his peace policies toward Israel.17

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Throughout the hijacking, the United States had urged all governments to deny landing rights to the hijackers, as well as any safe passage or asylum to them and, if possible, either to extradite them to the United States or at least to arrest them pending other legal actions. After the hijackers had left the Achille Lauro and U.S. officials demanded that local officials arrest them, President Mubarak claimed that they had already left Egypt for an undisclosed destination. In fact, U.S. intelligence knew that they were being moved around the region by Egyptian authorities until they could be flown out on an EgyptAir 737 bound for Tunis. President Reagan was briefed about this at around 5:00 p.m. (all following times are GMT) on October 10, and he ordered the U.S. Defense Department and CIA to attempt an interception of the airplane. At 7:15 p.m., four F-14 fighter planes left the U.S.S. Saratoga stationed off the coast of Albania. Earlier, two E-2C electronic surveillance planes (smaller versions of the AWACS aircraft) had already left the Saratoga in order to track the EgyptAir flight. When the EgyptAir flight carrying the four hijackers, along with Abu Abbas and his bodyguard, took off from Cairo at 9:15 p.m., U.S. intelligence quickly informed President Reagan, who was aboard Air Force One en route from Chicago to Washington, DC, at that time. At 9:37 p.m. Reagan gave final approval to intercept the plane. At 10:30 p.m. the F-14s intercepted the EgyptAir flight that had been refused permission to land at either Tunis or Athens, and ordered it to land in Sicily. At 11:45 p.m. the plane had landed at the NATO Air Base at Sigonella, just outside Catania.18 Respecting diplomatic protocol, President Reagan telephoned Italy’s Prime Minister Bettino Craxi just minutes before the plane was due to land at Sigonella to inform him of the operation. Craxi immediately ordered the Italian police and military at Sigonella to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians. The Italian prime minister had worked during his 26-monthlong tenure in office to secure good relations with the PLO and the Arab states, but would claim later that he had intervened because the unauthorized landing of the EgyptAir flight at Sigonella violated the United States-Italian accord on the use of the NATO base. Once the EgyptAir 737 landed at Sigonella and had come to a stop, several dozen U.S. Army Delta Force soldiers exited a nearby C-141 transport plane and surrounded the civilian plane. While their orders had been to take the four hijackers, along with Abu Abbas and his bodyguard off the civilian plane, rush them into the C-141 and to take off immediately for the United States, members of the Italian carabinieri arrived and surrounded the American soldiers. A tense situation took hold on the ground, with the Italian police being joined by Italian soldiers already on the base, facing off U.S. troops for three hours. As U.S. troops parked trucks in front of, and behind, the Egyptian plane to prevent it from moving, the Italians countered by doing the same to the C-141 to prevent it from being able to move. While the Italian and American troops each held their own ground

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for the next three hours, Reagan Administration officials tried in vain to persuade the Craxi government to relent and allow them to take into custody the four hijackers along with Abu Abbas and his bodyguard, Ozzuddin Badrakkan, who also was suspected of direct involvement in the hijacking conspiracy. At about 3:00 A.M. GMT President Reagan ordered the U.S. troops to “stand down” and allow the Italians to take custody of the six men.19 The four hijackers were arrested and held in Sicily for several days, while Abu Abbas and his bodyguard again boarded the EgyptAir plane that flew them to Rome. The Craxi government refused several U.S. requests to arrest them, even stating that Abu Abbas, as a PLO official, enjoyed diplomatic immunity, and claiming a lack of evidence linking him to the hijacking. While the United States consistently demanded that Italy arrest the two men or at least prevent their departure, both were permitted to leave for Yugoslavia on October 12, in spite of U.S. claims of having evidence “based on sensitive intelligence” that Abu Abbas had actually directed the hijacking.20 The Yugoslavians also refused to extradite or to try Abu Abbas, who later was reported to have left for South Yemen and who eventually found refuge in Iraq. THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL FALLOUT OF THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR Prime Minister Craxi’s decisions that stymied U.S. attempts to seize the hijackers and Abu Abbas led to strained relations between Italy and the United States. They also triggered the resignation of Craxi’s government on October 18, 1985, after the Defense Minister Giovanni Spandolini withdrew his Republican Party from the governing five-party coalition government two days earlier in protest against Craxi’s actions. Craxi then led an interim government and eventually won parliamentary approval on November 8, 1985, to form a new government. However, ironically, the Craxi government—which had tried so much to appease the PLO and Arab governments in its handling of the Achille Lauro affair— faced another Palestinian terrorist attack upon Italian soil on December 27, 1985, when gunmen of the Abu Nidal faction murdered 18 travelers and wounded 60 others in coordinated attacks in both Rome and Vienna. While Washington was angry at President Mubarak for his deception and refusal to hand over the hijackers, the U.S. action in intercepting the EgyptAir flight itself triggered anti-United States resentment and demonstrations in Egypt and other Arab nations. The governments of Egypt and Jordan were also irritated and embarrassed by the duplicity of Yassir Arafat for his apparent involvement in the Achille Lauro hijacking at the same time that his PLO was involving their governments in purported joint peace initiatives with Israel. The Tunisian government, still in shock

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from the Israeli air raids earlier that month, now found itself embarrassed over the Achille Lauro operation that had been set in motion from its own territory, and also found itself accused by Egypt and other Arab states of caving in to U.S. pressures for having denied landing rights to the EgyptAir flight carrying the hijackers. Following the Achille Lauro fiasco, for which Abu Abbas and his followers were responsible, the Tunisian government ordered Abu Abbas and the PLF to leave; they then moved to Baghdad, Iraq. On October 11, 1985, Marilyn Klinghoffer, with three other former hostages, identified the four hijackers in a police lineup in Sicily. On October 16, Israel’s military intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Ehud Barak, revealed the transcripts of intercepted radio communications between Abu Abbas and the hijackers, which indicated that he was not merely a mediatory as he and Yassir Arafat maintained, but rather was the mastermind of the operation and was giving orders to the four hijackers of the Achille Lauro.21 Israeli authorities also claimed to have intelligence indicating that Arafat himself played a knowing and controlling role in these events.22 By October 17, following much cross-examination of the four suspects along with ample testimony by Captain de Rosa and crew members, the Italian investigators in Sicily concluded that the hijackers’ claim that they had originally intended to attack Ashdod—a position that seemed to crumble under interrogation—was a ruse, and that a stand-alone hijacking had been the original plan. According to this original plan, the ship would be sailed near the Syrian port of Tartus where PLF comrades ashore would take the American hostages off the ship and hold them in safe-houses until the 50 Palestinian prisoners were released.23 It should be noted that most American and Israeli experts continue to endorse the explanation that the PLF hijacking was a spontaneous improvised response to their having been discovered by an errant cabin steward. However, the Italian investigators concurred that the testimonies of both the accused hijackers and eye-witnesses did not confirm the account of their having been supposedly surprised and exposed, while there were serious discrepancies in the testimony claiming that the port of Ashdod was the intended target. Ironically, the first suspect to break down and collaborate with Italian investigators was Magied al Molqi, the hijackers’ leader, who had also killed Leon Klinghoffer: he confessed that the hijackers had been acting on the written orders of Abu Abbas.24 As other hijackers broke down and began talking, naming accomplices and contacts, the judicial authorities began issuing more arrest warrants. Whereas Prime Minister Craxi had insisted that the United States lacked any proof of Abu Abbas’ involvement, by October 23, 1985, the magistrates in Sicily had issued an arrest warrant for Abu Abbas. Genoa’s magistrates lost little time asserting their right to try the case under Italian maritime law, since Genoa was the home

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port of the Achille Lauro, and they shortly assumed full jurisdiction over the case. On November 11, 1985, Luigi Carli, one of the Genoa prosecutors assigned to the case, announced that 16 arrest warrants had been issued. The four captured hijackers, including the leader Magied Youssef al Molqi (23 years old), Ahmad Marrouf al-Assadi (23 years old), Ibrahim Fatayer Abdelatif (20 years old), and Bassam al-Ashkar (17 years old) were charged with hijacking, kidnapping, murder, and various charges involving the illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also charged and already in custody were Mohammad Khalaf and Mohammad Issa Abbas, the latter a close relative of Abu Abbas, for their roles in bringing the arms and explosives from Tunis to the hijackers in Genoa. Those charged but still at large included Abu Abbas and his bodyguard, Ozzuddin Badrakkan, both of whom had left Italy on October 12; Ibrahim Hassir, a PLO official; Abu Kitah and Mohammad al-Khadra, who had procured the arms later sent to Genoa; Ziad al-Omar, who was believed to have directed the operation both in Tunis and Genoa; and Masar Kadia (49 years old), who had scouted out the Achille Lauro and who later handled and accompanied the four on the cruise ship as far as Alexandria, where he disembarked. Those in custody were convicted on November 18, 1985, on the arms and explosives charges and sentenced to jail terms ranging from four to nine years. The most severe sentence of nine years was imposed on Muhammad Issa Abbas, who had delivered Abu Abbas’ instructions to the four hijackers. Although he had been arrested in late September on charges of possessing falsified passports, while remaining in custody he had revealed nothing of the planned operation to the authorities. By securing the conviction of the hijackers on these lesser charges, prosecutors could hold them in prison while they could more thoroughly prepare to try them on the more serious charges of murder and piracy.25 Later, on November 27, 1985, the Klinghoffer family filed two lawsuits, one in the State Supreme Court in Manhattan suing the PLO for $1.5 billion, and another in Federal District Court in Manhattan suing Chandris-Italy Inc, the Port of Genoa, and Club ABC Tours Inc., for compensatory and punitive damages.26 In 1986, Abu Abbas was tried in absentia in Italy and convicted on charges of conspiracy in connection with the Achille Lauro hijacking and murder of Leon Klinghoffer; however, he would never be extradited to Italy from his safe haven in Iraq. Similarly, Italy sought to extradite Masar Kadia from Greece in 1991. On May 30, 1990, members of the Abu Abbas faction of the PLF, with Libyan support, made a seaborne attack on Tel Aviv beaches that was quashed by the Israeli Defense Forces. Four of the PLF terrorists were killed and 12 captured. This raid occurred in the eighteenth month of talks between the United States and the PLO. While Yassir Arafat disavowed any PLO connection with the raid, he also did not

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publicly condemn the raid nor expel Abu Abbas from the PLO Executive Committee. This in turn prompted the United States to suspend its dialogue with the PLO. Later, in 1991, Abu Abbas resigned his membership in the PLO Executive Committee, but retained his seat on the Palestine National Council. In 1995, an immunity accord was completed between Israel and the PLO constituting a general amnesty and granting immunity from prosecution for all PLO members for violent acts committed before September 1993. Subsequently Abu Abbas could travel freely from Iraq back and forth to the territories under control of the Palestinian Authority to take part in PLO business. On April 22, 1996, Abu Abbas—who was still wanted by the United States for his role in the Achille Lauro hijacking—attended the Palestine National Council meeting held in Gaza. During his presence at this meeting, Abu Abbas repeatedly stated to reporters that the Achille Lauro affair “was a mistake and it led to other mistakes.” He claimed that his men did not know Leon Klinghoffer was Jewish or American, but that they had killed him “because he started to incite the passengers against them.” By early August 1997, the PLO had agreed to settle the civil lawsuit brought against it by the Klinghoffer family. Rejecting the PLO claim that as a sovereign state it could not be sued, Federal District Judge Louis L. Stanton ordered Yassir Arafat to give a deposition.27 Instead, the PLO moved to settle the dispute out of court and to pay the surviving Klinghoffer daughters an undisclosed sum.28 Following the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, Abu Abbas was captured by U.S. troops on April 14, 2003. He was held as a prisoner in Iraq under U.S. custody until March 8, 2004, when he died apparently of natural causes. CONCLUSION: PRE-PLANNED HIJACKING OR IMPROMPTU IMPROVISATION? In retrospect it may appear to some that the entire operation had the foreknowledge and blessing of Yassir Arafat, and was just another example of a repeated pattern of covert attacks ordered by him and carried out by proxies, whose roles could then be covered up by plausible denials, followed by an offer from Arafat and the PLO to use their good offices as mediators to solve the crisis. Whereas many Western leaders and policy experts seemed to accept at face value Arafat’s denial of PLO involvement in the hijacking, and to welcome his role as a mediator, by contrast both Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan’s King Hussein regarded Arafat as being directly responsible for the hijacking and guilty of duplicity and even of personal treachery in the matter. Egypt’s role in trying to resolve the Achille Lauro crisis cost Mubarak political goodwill with the United States. Likewise it cost King Hussein his credibility with Britain

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for Jordan’s recent efforts to mediate with Britain vouching for the PLO as a party earnestly seeking a peace settlement. For a while, King Hussein contemplated dissociating himself completely from the PLO and negotiating directly with Israel over the issue of the occupied territories in the West Bank29 The question remains: Was the takeover of the Achille Lauro merely a tactical blunder occasioned by the haphazard intrusion of a cabin steward upon the PLF gunmen while they were cleaning their weapons? Or was it instead a premeditated hijacking aimed at forcing the PLO’s agenda back into the forefront of the world’s consciousness by threatening to kill hundreds of citizens of nations other than Israel—in short, a quintessentially normal terrorist operation? While the consensus of U.S. and Israeli experts and commentators favors the view that an attack on Israeli soil was the original motive, there are problems with this hypothesis. First, previous attempts by the PLF to attack Israel using inflatable landing craft, hanggliders, and the like, had not proven very effective. Although smuggling the arms and explosives aboard the Achille Lauro seemed relatively easy, the next stage of smuggling them into Israel through Ashdod customs and Israeli port security would not be so easy. If the plan had been to attack the port of Ashdod from the decks of the Achille Lauro, in effect using the civilian cruise liner and its passengers as human shields, then there was still a terrorist threat directed indiscriminately at all the nationalities on board and not directed simply at Israel in particular. In effect, this would have been no less heinous than simply seizing the cruise ship on the high seas and using its crew and passengers as hostages. The other problem was that noted by the Italian investigators: the testimonies of the suspects on the supposed Ashdod plan were inconsistent and contradictory. At one point, suspects said a crew member had spotted them cleaning their guns, but at another point, the suspects also claimed that they had been recognized by Egyptian port authorities and had decided to seize the ship then. Some of the suspects—in particular Bassam al Ashkar—stated that they had never been surprised by any crew member, that the Ashdod attack account was in fact a fabrication, and that he had been instructed by al Molqi that they were going to seize the ship. While preparations for the Achille Lauro venture had been in the works for over 10 months prior to the hijacking, the inspiration for the final form of this operation more likely may have come from a recent and very dramatic hostage situation that proved itself very successful from the viewpoint of the terrorists who perpetrated it—namely, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 on June 14, 1985.30 Shiite gunmen in this hijacking seized 145 passengers and 8 crew members. One American serviceman among the hostages was killed and 39 American men were held hostage in Lebanon until the leader of Lebanon’s Shiite AMAL militia, Nabih Berri, negotiated their release in exchange for 119 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners

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held in Israel’s Atlit Prison. Berri, whose own gunmen played a principal role in the hijacking and hostage-taking incident, was portrayed in Western media as a negotiator and mediator. Thus, the Achille Lauro attackers may have felt that the seizure of a large number of Western hostages on a cruise liner could similarly lead to a negotiated settlement in which the PLO might wind up being hailed as a mediator and peacemaker, “saving” the hostages and conceivably gaining freedom for PLO prisoners in Israel. There was also a Palestinian precedent for attempting such an operation—namely the “Black September” attack on the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics, which also had been a hostagebarricade siege in which the hostage-takers demanded the release of 234 prisoners in Israel, including the surviving Japanese Red Army member who took part in the Lod Airport massacre of May 1972.31 While the PLO denied responsibility for those attacks, it later became well-established that Black September was a PLO creation led by PLO Executive Committee member Salah Khalaf, also known as “Abu Iyad,” who later even wrote about his role in the operation in his memoirs.32 Therefore, the problem for Arafat and the PLO was not any lack of willingness to engage in covert terrorist actions, under the cover of plausible denial, from which to reap political benefits. Nor was there any lack of motivation, since the outcome of the TWA 847 hijacking demonstrated that such an action could be successful and benefit the PLO. The problem, rather, was one of execution: to seize and hold a multideck cruise ship, full of myriad passageways, hidden service conduits and crawl spaces, with over 700 passengers and close to 350 crew members, would be a formidable task for a mere four hijackers. The success of Anna Hoerantner in evading capture illustrates this problem. This would explain why the hijackers would wait to seize the vessel until after the ship had unloaded over 600 passengers for their temporary sightseeing tour of the Pyramids. However, unlike the TWA 847 hijacking, or even the 1979 occupation of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the actual venue of the hijacking on the high seas remained isolated from any possibility of minuteby-minute instantaneous global press coverage. Therefore, the hijacking unfolded without creating the sort of constant coverage feeding high public emotion and outrage that had helped pressure the U.S. and Israeli government decision-makers into making concessions in the TWA 847 case, concessions that undermined their ability to maintain a steadfast and consistent position in the face of terrorist manipulation. Interestingly, there have been no noteworthy attempts by any other terrorist groups to try to replicate the Achille Lauro incident by hijacking another cruise liner. Unfortunately, the only persons who could have verified whether the hijacking was intended as a PLO-sponsored stand-alone action—namely

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Yassir Arafat and Abu Abbas—died without ever confirming this in spoken word or writing. The idea that Ashdod was the original intended target of the hijackers may be attractive to Western observers outside of Israel for a psychological reason: the need to believe that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can in fact be mediated and solved through some combination of goodwill, rationality, self-interest, and skillful diplomacy. The images of Arafat’s character and of PLO politics that are most consistent with the “stand-alone” hypothesis are those of a deceptive and intransigent party that in fact would be incapable of making a lasting peace. And that hypothesis clashes with the perennial optimism and faith in human progress and rationality that must underlie any hope for peace in the Middle East. Even with the 2006 Hamas political victory in the Palestinian Authority, United States and other Western diplomats—as well as well-meaning people elsewhere—continue to speak of the possibility of Hamas somehow accepting the existence of the State of Israel despite the Hamas Charter calling for the extermination of Israel, the repeated calls of Hamas leaders for destroying Israel, and the over 60 suicide-bombings sponsored by Hamas over the five-year period preceding their election. Even with so much evidence to the contrary, the United States and other Western observers wish to believe, hoping against hope, that there is still some possibility for reconciliation, compromise, and peace. Likewise, at the time of the Achille Lauro crisis, both the world public and Western leaders wanted to believe that Yassir Arafat and the PLO were earnestly seeking to mediate that crisis, and not simply exploiting it for political gain. It is more perplexing to understand why Israeli analysts, who have had a much more pessimistic assessment of Arafat and the PLO leadership, endorsed the view that the hijackers originally intended to attack Ashdod and not simply hijack the ship. If the objective of an attack on Ashdod were ruled out, then the Achille Lauro incident would become almost completely detached from Israeli concerns, apart from the murder and mistreatment of Jewish individuals at the hands of the hijackers. After all, none of the passengers were Israeli citizens, the cruise ship was not an Israeli vessel, and the incident did not take place in Israeli territorial waters. Israel felt no need to make any concessions to the hijackers. However, for Israel, stressing the Ashdod connection helps to make it clear to nations such as Italy, France, and others, that as long as Israel remains the target of Palestinian terrorism, the nationals, ships, and territories of these other nations will not be protected from the scourge of that same terrorism no matter what separate political accommodations they make between their own nations and the PLO, and no matter how much they attempt to distance themselves from being associated with Israel. The reader is left with two conflicting interpretations of the real purposes and motives behind the Achille Lauro hijacking. Nor is this a merely “theoretical” concern: at the time these actual events were unfolding, these

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same disagreements over how to interpret and assess the crisis also caused great rifts and conflicts between allies both in the NATO alliance as well as in the Arab world. Neither can anyone rule out that events similar to the Achille Lauro hijacking will not be repeated in the twenty-first century. NOTES 1. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20since%201947/1984-1988/92%20 Press%20Conference%20Following%20Israel%20air%20Force%20Att (retrieved April 7, 2006). 2. Masar Kadia also went by names of “Petros Floros” and “Abdel Rahim Khaled.” In the earliest Italian legal documents he is referred to as “Abdel Rahim Khaled” but in later extradition documents as “Masar Kadia.” The name “Masar Kadia” is used throughout this chapter to avoid confusion. 3. John Tagliabue, “Italians Identify 16 in Hijacking of Ship,” New York Times, November 20, 1985: A3. 4. This was learned from the youngest hijacker, Bassam al-Ashkar (only 17 years old at the time), who later denied a separate report that the weapons had been discovered by a cabin steward and they had seized the ship on the spur of the moment. 5. Tagliabue, “Italians Identify 16 in Hijacking of Ship,” A3. 6. Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, “Palestine Liberation Organization,” in Terrorism: Assassins to Zealots (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003) 308. 7. Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, “Palestine Liberation Front,” in Terrorism: Assassins to Zealots (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003) 304–305. 8. Robert D. McFadden, “15 Passengers, on Return to U.S., Tell of Terror on the Cruise Liner,” New York Times, October 13, 1985: A1, A24. 9. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Web site http://www.mfa.gov.il/ MFA/MFAArchive/2000 2002/9/The%20Palestinian%20Liberation%20Front%20Headed%20by%20Abu%20al (retrieved April 7, 2006). 10. Vlad Jenkins, The Achille Lauro Hijacking, John F. Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 1988. This case was written by Vlad Jenkins at the John F. Kennedy School of Government for Professor Philip Heymann and the Project for the Study and Analysis of Terrorism, Harvard Law School. Funding was provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. (0894) 11. Joseph Berger, “Even With a Name, It’s Hard to Know Who the Hijackers Are,” New York Times, October 9, 1985: A9. 12. Michael K. Bohn, The Achille Lauro Hijacking; Lessons in the Politics and Prejudice of Terrorism (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2004). 13. Anderson and Sloan, “Palestine Liberation Organization,” 308. 14. NOTE: “Abu Abbas” or “Abu al-Abbas” was the nom de guerre of Muhammad Abbas. Throughout this chapter for sake of brevity he will be referred to always as “Abu Abbas” however in the official U.S. and Italian documents mentioned in this chapter he is generally referred to as “Muhammad Abbas” rather than “Abu Abbas.” 15. Anderson and Sloan, “Palestine Liberation Front,” 304.

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16. John Tagliabue, “Hijackers of Ship Vow Again to Kill 400 Held Hostage,” New York Times, October 9, 1985: A1, A9. On page A9 is an insert of the radio dialogue reported by Reuters on October 8, 1985. 17. Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Believes Body Found By Syrians Is Slain Hostage’s,” New York Times, October 16, 1985: A1, A13. 18. Francis X Clines, “U.S. Heads Off the Hijackers: How the Operation Unfolded,” New York Times, October 12, 1985: A1, A9. 19. Bill Keller, “Aides Say Reagan Put End to Troop Standoff,” New York Times, October 19, 1985: A4. 20. Philip Shenon, “U.S. Reported to Have Evidence Linking P.L.O. Aide to Hijacking,” New York Times, October 14, 1985: A1, A11. 21. Thomas L. Friedman, “Israelis Say Tape Ties Top P.L.O. Aide to Ship Hijackers,” New York Times, October 17, 1985: A1, A12. 22. Joseph Berger with E. J. Dionne, Jr., “Italy Said to Free 2 P.L.O. Aides; U.S. Issues a Warrant for One; Hostages Tell of a ‘Death List:’ Account of Ordeal,” New York Times, October 13, 1985: A1, A22, col. 6, paragraphs 2 and 3. 23. John Tagliabue, “Italians Doubt View That Hijacking Was Improvised,” New York Times, October 18, 1985: A10. 24. John Tagliabue, “Hijacker Is Reported to Implicate Abbas,” New York Times, October 24, 1985: A3. 25. John Tagliabue, “Italy Convicts Palestinians in Arms Case,” New York Times, November 19, 1985: A3. 26. Anonymous, “The Klinghoffers Sue P.L.O. for $1.5 Billion,” New York Times, November 28, 1985: B7. 27. Anonymous, “Judge Rules P.L.O. Liable in Raid on the Achille Lauro,” New York Times, June 9, 1990. Stanton’s ruling: “Although [the PLO] claims the attributes of a state, it controls no defined territory or populace and is not recognized by the United States . . . [therefore there is no justification in] treating it as a foreign sovereign or state in this litigation. Rather, as its name indicates, the P.L.O. is an organization.” 28. Anderson and Sloan, “Palestine Liberation Front,”: 305–306. 29. John Kifner, “Warning by Arafat: Peace Will Not Exist Without the P.L.O.,” New York Times, October 30, 1985: A1, A6; also, Ihsan A, Hijazi, “Arafat’s Palestinian Foes Split on How to Challenge His Leadership,” New York Times, October 30, 1985: A6: also John Kifner, “Hussein Reported to Weigh Leaving P.L.O. Out of Plan,” New York Times, October 27, 1985: A1, A14. 30. Please see the chapter by Rick Wrona in this volume. 31. Sean K. Anderson and Stephen Sloan, “Munich Massacre,” in Terrorism: Assassins to Zealots (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003) 270–271. 32. Joseph Berger, “Even With a Name, It’s Hard to Know Who the Hijackers Are,” New York Times, October 9, 1985: A9.

CHAPTER 5 THE FEBRUARY 1993 ATTACK ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER Daniel Baracskay

Recent decades have proven that large urban centers are particularly prone to terrorist attacks. They have reputations of national and international standing, are centers of trade in a capitalist society, and have dense populations of people who live and work within their borders. Over time, New York City has matured into a globally recognized bastion of commerce, entertainment, and industry. Composed of several soaring buildings, the World Trade Center has been a familiar landmark in the city for decades. The north and south towers, each with 110 stories of office space, were the tallest and most populated of the cluster. Scores of businesses are located in close proximity to these two towers, making it a congested but profitable location. New York City’s population in 1990 was approximately 7.3 million people, making it the most populated American city.1 The World Trade Center (WTC) bombing in 1993 warrants analysis for several reasons.2 First, it signaled that the threat of a terrorist attack is not solely confined to foreign soil. Second, the WTC bombing indicated that foreign terrorist organizations can successfully penetrate American borders with a significant attack that embodies a political and religious plot for restitution against American presence overseas, particularly in the Middle East. Third, the attack signified the expanding nature of ad hoc terror groups that come together exclusively for violent purposes and exist as organizations that are linked together by the like-minded ideologies of their extremist members. Finally, the event in 1993 was a precursor to the September 11 attack on the two World Trade Center towers in New York City 8 years later, indicating that further efforts are essential to prevent the

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ongoing prospect of similar incidents. This chapter will examine the WTC bombing of 1993 and present several lessons and implications of the event. EXAMINING THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK OF 1993 On February 26, 1993, a terrorist group drove a truck containing more than 1,000 pounds of explosives into the underground parking garage of the 110-story north tower of the WTC in New York City. The truck exploded at 12:17 p.m., killing six Americans and injuring hundreds more. The explosion reduced daily activities to a standstill, and created a cloud that blanketed the area with smoke and debris. The physical structure of the building was significantly damaged but did not collapse. The immediate psychological ramifications of the incident were profound. It was believed that more than 50 thousand people were in the twin towers of the WTC at the time. Evacuees from the building walked down flights of stairs in complete darkness. Smoke inhalation was rampant among the survivors.3 The bombing was testimony that American borders were penetrable, making us vulnerable to attack by outside terrorist groups. Besides the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and a small number of isolated incidents, the United States had not witnessed an aggressive display of violence of such magnitude on American soil. In fact, with the absence of a continual wave of bombings like those that had historically affected London, Paris, Rome, and numerous other cities each year, the United States lived under a “myth of invulnerability.” As Jeffrey Simon observes, “since international terrorists could find an abundance of U.S. targets overseas to strike with relative ease and avoid capture, it appeared as though they would be unwilling to risk traveling to the United States to carry out their violence . . . Yet it was only a matter of time before America joined the rest of the world in encountering terrorist assaults on its soil.”4 Victims at the scene directly experienced what millions of other American citizens viewed through the lens of journalistic reporting—a political act of aggression by a radical Islamic terrorist organization that was seeking retribution for what it perceived to be American oppression and interference in the affairs of Muslims in the Middle East. While the WTC bombing occurred inside the spatial borders of American territory, it was considered an act of international terrorism by a group that was not statesponsored but still operated abroad. State-sponsored terrorism involves the actions of “rogue states” (e.g., Iran, Libya, and Iraq) that threaten adjacent or regional actors that pose a threat to that country’s policies by using government-sponsored terrorist behaviors.5 This pattern of behavior does not preclude an attack against democratic states, however. Terror groups have a different inclination. With the exception of Hizbollah and a few

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others, terrorist groups typically do not associate themselves directly with rogue states, but present a more pervasive display of power that transverses the international arena. CIA veteran Paul Pillar refers to these entities as “ad hoc terrorists,” which are basically “small cabals of extremists who do not belong to any larger, established, previously known group. Although the individuals involved may gravitate toward particular political or spiritual leaders, they do not become a group until they become one for the purpose of conducting a particular terrorist operation. After the operation, they may dissolve and disperse.”6 These groups elude capture and are discernibly more challenging to trace, since they often roam across the penetrable borders of rogue states or other nations that are considered safe havens for terrorist activities. The terrorists of the WTC attack in 1993 subscribed to a religious fundamentalism that is quite alien to many Americans. The conventional practice of separating church from state to prevent the fusion of religion and politics in democratic regimes is manifestly absent in the proscribed doctrines of several major world religions. With over 1.2 billion adherents, Islam is the world’s second largest religion after Christianity and promotes unique views on the nature of politics and religion. Students of religion and philosophy have long observed that “from its very beginnings, Islam has viewed religion and politics (church and state) as necessarily and rightfully inseparable. To Muslims, the notion of religion as separable from the totality of the human context is unimaginable, even detestable.”7 For some adherents, these religious convictions are a key motivating factor behind various forms of political violence, including terrorism. Indeed, many kinds of religious extremists, including radical Islamic fundamentalists, employ the use of terrorist activities to bridge their beliefs with reality.8 An extremist interpretation of Islam served as the mutually reinforcing principle that guided the WTC conspiracy. Ramzi Yousef was acknowledged as the operational mastermind of the Trade Center bombing, although the FBI has ultimately determined that the activities were part of a broader plot by al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.9 Removed from Palestine and raised in Kuwait, Yousef developed a militant posture and advanced his skills at a training camp in Afghanistan. For several decades, Afghanistan has been a haven for militant rebels, including those who fought the occupation of Soviet troops from 1978 to 1988. Presidents Carter and Reagan covertly provided aid from the United States to Afghan rebels during that decade to destabilize the left-leaning and Marxist Afghani government. Simultaneously, bin Laden pledged his own money, weapons, and resources to the Afghan cause. During the late 1980s, bin Laden helped form al Qaeda and funneled his extensive family fortune into supporting a global “jihad,” or holy war against the West. When the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1988, as terrorism analyst Peter

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Bergen observes, al Qaeda viewed it as a “victory against the communists in Afghanistan . . . a superpower had been defeated. It was an important lesson for the Afghan Arabs and for bin Laden himself, who applied it to his next holy war—a war against the United States.”10 Al Qaeda used its relationship with the amenable Taliban regime in Afghanistan to build a coalition of supporters for its cause. Bin Laden has specifically blamed his use of terror tactics on American support for Israel and its presence in Islamic holy lands like Saudi Arabia.11 After his experience with al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, Yousef traveled to the United States in 1992 using a falsified passport. Also traveling with Yousef was his colleague, Ahmed Ajaj. Ajaj was detained by American authorities for having a phony passport and documents in his luggage on how to construct a bomb. The name Abu Barra was printed on the documents. It was the alias used by another colleague, Mohhamed Jamal Khalifa.12 Ajaj was arrested for the incriminating evidence and Yousef informed the authorities that he had lost his passport and wanted to claim political asylum. Ajaj remained in custody, serving as a decoy to draw attention away from Yousef, who was issued a temporary passport by the Pakistani Consulate in New York, allowing him to travel freely. Late in 1992, Yousef initiated communication with Umar Abd alRahman, an Egyptian cleric known as the “Blind Sheikh” who preached to his followers at the al-Farouq mosque in Brooklyn.13 Abd al-Rahman was an unlikely culprit for the World Trade Center plot. He was 55 years of age, blind, diabetic, and moderately immobile. Those who ultimately pledged support for Abd Al-Rahman’s views did not originally migrate to the United States as an independent sectarian group. Rather, they forged a link from their analogous extremist views and contacts at New York mosques.14 Abd al-Rahman was the self-professed leader of a holy war that he waged against the United States for being an enemy of Islam. Yousef, along with other Abd al-Rahman followers and coconspirators Mohammed Salameh, Mahmud Abouhalima, and El Sayyid Nosair, constructed the explosive device that was detonated on February 26. The result of the bombing fell short of Abd al-Rahman’s optimism that the force of the explosion would collapse the north tower onto the southern one, destroying both in the process.15 Following the incident, Yousef fled to Pakistan. Based upon information conveyed by an informant,16 several of the conspirators were captured by authorities in the months after the attack. They were brought to trial in September 1993 and subsequently convicted in March 1994. Yousef was later arrested in Islamabad in 1995.17 His arrest came after an informant divulged Yousef’s location in exchange for a $2 million reward that had been offered for information leading to his capture. During his deportation back to America, Yousef elaborated more of his plan to the FBI agents

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Table 5.1 Defendants and Outcomes of the U.S.A. v. Eyad Ismoil et al. Trial Defendant

Number of Counts Convicted

Ramzi Ahmed Yousef

18

Mahmud Abdouhalima Mohammad Salameh Nidal Ayyad Bilal Alkaisi∗

9 10 9 1

Ahmad Mohammad Ajaj Abdul Hakim Murad

9 7

Eyad Ismoil

10

Prison Sentence and Fines Assessed 8 life sentences, plus 240 years; Fined $4.5 million dollars 240 years; fined $250,000 117 years; fined $250,000 117 years, fined $250,000 20 months and 2 years supervised release 115 years; fined $250,000 Life in prison, plus 60 years; fined $250,000 240 years; fined $250,000

∗ Turned states evidence to receive a lesser sentence Source: Table derived from data from The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base (Washington, DC), September 2006.

who accompanied him. As the plane holding Yousef and the agents passed by the WTC, Yousef allegedly stated that he would have succeeded in toppling one tower onto the other if he had been able to secure more money and explosives.18 Mohammed Salameh was one of the first to be arrested. Salameh had rented the truck used in the explosion, later reporting that it was stolen. He was captured at the truck company rental office when he attempted to get back his $400 deposit. The FBI also arrested Nidal Ayyad, an engineer who acquired the chemicals for the bomb, and Mahmoud Abouhalima who mixed the chemicals.19 In the case U.S.A. v. Eyad Ismoil et al (93-CR180-KTD), a total of ten radical Islamic extremists were convicted for the incident and sentenced to prison. The table above lists the defendants, number of convictions, and sentences for those involved in the WTC bombing case. The WTC attack of 1993 was not Yousef’s only plot. He was also allegedly involved in another bombing conspiracy. Yousef and his associates plotted to slip several bombs composed of liquid explosives onto 11 U.S. commercial aircraft.20 The liquid explosives were designed to pass easily through airport metal detectors. The modes of transportation and expected destructive capacities for executing the plot were similar to what actually transpired on 9/11. However, Yousef’s plan was foiled and he was forced to flee his apartment after a chemical reaction started a fire. The computer he left behind was salvageable and tipped the FBI and other criminal investigators off to his plans. It contained information that was used to help capture Yousef later that year.21

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The Islamic cleric Abd al-Rahman was also arrested and convicted of five counts, including seditious conspiracy, solicitation and conspiracy to murder Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, solicitation to attack a military installation, and bombing conspiracy. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus 65 years without the possibility of parole in the case, U.S.A. v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel-Rahmen et al. (93-CR-181-KTD). Also on trial in the case were nine coconspirators, who were sentenced to various prison terms ranging from 25 to 35 years.22 This case addressed the information supplied by an informant to the FBI detailing plots to bomb additional landmarks in New York City—namely the United Nations building, the FBI building in New York, and the Holland and Lincoln Tunnels. Despite the favorable outcomes that these two trials had in bringing the assailants to justice, “an unfortunate consequence of this superb investigative and prosecutorial effort was that it created an impression that the law enforcement system was well-equipped to cope with terrorism.”23 This was not the case—the trial executed justice but did not bring bin Laden or his network to the attention of either the public or policymakers.24 Overall, 1993 was a slightly more active year for terrorist activities globally.25 In addition to these plots by Abd al-Rahman and his associates, the FBI also foiled an Iraqi-motivated plot to assassinate former Republican President George Bush while he visited Kuwait in April of that year. These attempts were more obscured in coverage by the media, indicating that efforts by FBI and CIA agents to successfully thwart an attack emit much less public attention than when an attack does occur.26 THE RESPONSE TO THE ATTACK The World Trade Center had been attacked by foreign perpetrators and government inquiries were launched into two primary issues. The first issue probed whether the incident had state sponsorship. In such circumstances, the U.S. Department of State investigates whether the act was committed by a state or rogue terrorist group. If evidence suggests the latter, then the next step examines where the terrorists were residing prior to the incident, and whether the state that housed them covertly supported or had knowledge of their activities. Much of this analysis was predicated on foreign intelligence information gathered and supplied by the CIA. President Bill Clinton immediately charged the National Security Council (NSC) with coordinating the initial response, and the New York office of the FBI assumed control of the local investigation.27 The NSC and its interagency Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) both used their authority to respond to the attack with domestic and foreign counterterrorism measures.28 In 1986, Congress had granted the FBI authority to investigate terrorist acts against Americans overseas, and in 1989 this authority was expanded to allow the FBI the authority to arrest

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perpetrators abroad without the consent of the host country. House and Senate intelligence committees likewise conducted their own series of investigations. The U.S. Department of Justice’s investigation sought to identify and apprehend those responsible for the incident. It attempted to isolate where the breaches in public security occurred and develop a strategy for preventing similar attacks in the future. These investigations uncovered an integrated network of terrorists who spanned the globe. The reaction times for initiating these investigations were rapid, but the process itself was long and tedious, and spanned state borders—as the capture and deportation of Yousef from Pakistan demonstrated. The governor of the state of New York at the time of the attack, Mario Cuomo, worked closely with David N. Dinkins, the mayor of the City of New York throughout the response and recovery. As mayor, Dinkins had the primary role of reassuring the city’s residential and professional inhabitants of the government’s resolve, and of coordinating the efforts of local law enforcement officers with federal agents, primarily from the FBI. Dinkins was perceived throughout his short mayoral tenure (1989– 1993) as being weak and unresponsive to some of the city’s more plaguing problems, despite his handling of the WTC attack in 1993. The 3-day Crown Heights Riot in August of 1991 and the perceptions citizens had of the growing crime problem were contributing factors to Dinkin’s defeat in the fall 1993 election, when Rudy Giuliani assumed the city’s leadership for two terms, and—like his predecessor—was also forced to respond to an attack on the WTC. The destruction of the two towers 8 years later on 9/11 indicated the persistence of bin Laden and those affiliated with (or inspired by) his al Qaeda network, which produced the level of destruction envisioned for the first WTC incident. IMPLICATIONS AND LESSONS OF THE WTC ATTACK IN 1993 Perceptions and Culture in World Politics Counterterrorism measures in the United States inherently take into account the unconventional ideologies and cultures embraced by terrorist groups. This has been a growing challenge over time. Political scientist John Rourke has explored the importance that perceptions have in international politics, and argues that perceptions create a “lens” through which reality is perceived. These lenses often create distortions in the images of both ourselves and other states in the world arena. How strongly the perceptual distortion is depends upon the strength of the beholder’s beliefs. Misperceptions cause a misjudgment of others’ actions and plausibly increase the likelihood of a conflict.29 Given the low levels of knowledge that most Americans have of domestic and international politics,30 citizens consequently have a difficult time identifying either a motive

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for the World Trade Center attack or an understanding of the assailants. American political culture was built upon fundamentals of democracy, which include values like freedom and independence. This has allowed the nation’s borders to be porous and vulnerable to attack. Like-minded Americans find the acts of a terrorist organization morally reprehensible and inconceivable. Yet, the values embraced by terrorist groups encourage a merging of politics and religion. The two cultures find each other incomprehensible, if not disagreeable at times. This implies an innate difficulty that cannot be easily resolved. Terrorism has become a favored tactic of several extremist religious sects, as well as groups from both the left and right of the ideological spectrum. Yet, religious doctrine itself is not to be blamed for acts of terror, but rather it is the interpretation of such doctrine. As terrorism scholar Cindy Combs has observed, “Islam is not, in any sense, a violent religion. Nor are Christianity, Judaism, or any of the other religions in whose name violence has been carried out. However, the mixture of religion and politics has quite often resulted in violence, frequently against innocent victims, which makes it . . . terrorism.”31 Combs likens the actions of extremist, self-sacrificing Islamic fundamentalists engaged in a jihad to the Brotherhood of Assassins from the Middle Ages. Though from different eras in world history, both groups promised their followers that they would be rewarded for their actions with paradise. However, Combs also observes that governments have been ineffective in preventing the proliferation of these fundamentalist groups or their use of terror to achieve their objectives. The problem has remained inherently insoluble over the years, partly because the difference in cultures and approaches has made the actions of terrorist groups difficult to predict and respond to with counterterrorism policies. Overall, the understated nature of these cross-cultural disparities, along with the inability for both sides to negotiate and bargain over perceived grievances, makes peace improbable. Counterterrorism Measures That Target Terrorist’s Growing Financial Resources One poignant lesson of strategic importance involves tracing the financial resources of terrorist networks.32 These resources have expanded over time and pose a significant threat in preventing acts of terrorism. Correspondingly, this trend has also commanded the attention of counterterrorism policymakers. The terrorists who conducted the WTC bombing in 1993 drew financial support from a well-funded network of like-minded Islamic fundamentalists. Rohan Gunaratna’s research finds that this expansive network—particularly with the support of bin Laden—provided the necessary funding for Yousef’s terrorist activities and numerous other

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Islamic fundamentalists. Yousef also received financial backing from his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Mohmmad, who lived in Qatar at the time.33 AlRahman’s base of support came from Egyptian groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as from Algerian, Afghani, and Pakistani elements in al Qaeda.34 The acknowledged father of al Qaeda is Abdul Azzam, a mentor of bin Laden. Together, they founded the Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK, or Afghan Service Bureau) to increase membership, raise money, and spread their jihad globally. The MAK has expanded al Qaeda influence exponentially over time and has allowed numerous terrorist groups to extract both money and capital to support their cause. From an operational and counterterrorist policy standpoint, the United States has found that preventing the spread of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations requires considerable thought and effort to track the financial resources of such networks. These funds have allowed al Qaeda and other groups to successfully recruit a seemingly endless number of members, and to secure weapons and supplies for its activities. For instance, U.S. intelligence tracked a money trail used to fund an assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to the National Commercial Bank (NCB) of Saudi Arabia. Millions of dollars had been transferred to al Qaeda operatives via banks in New York and London, without the banks’ knowledge. U.S intelligence has additionally traced over $100 million that went to support al Qaeda’s efforts to recruit loyal Islamic groups, including the Taliban.35 The unregulated nature of banking systems in the Middle East allows members to easily transfer funds without much governmental scrutiny. This poses a significant threat to democratic nations and has burdened U.S. counterterrorism measures with having to respond to an everexpanding terrorist network. The Al Taqwa and Al Barakaat banking networks have both been identified by the U.S. Justice Department as financial havens for terrorists, but hundreds more like these exist. The Dubai Islamic Bank, which is controlled by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), funneled millions of dollars in laundered money from Saudi businessmen to al Qaeda operatives.36 The 1993 WTC attack demonstrates that the multinational character of al Qaeda has often made it difficult for the CIA to trace its funding sources. These sources are extensive and span several decades. For instance, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International channeled funds to support the Afghan rebels during the Soviet Occupation. This fueled the Afghani cause and jihad that spread to the United States. But as Gunaratna notes, “intelligence and security services worldwide, including the CIA and MI6, have never before encountered a global terrorist financial network as sophisticated as Al Qaida’s . . . [it] has built the most complex, robust and resilient money-generating and money-moving network yet seen.”37

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Globally interconnected relationships enable large terrorist groups like al Qaeda to generate funding from many sources. Much of al Qaeda’s financial base is used for technical and logistical operations, and comes from Islamic philanthropists and foundations, notably the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.38 Many Islamic charities and NGOs pose as fronts for raising money. Other money has filtered into terrorist activities from the sale of drugs through organized crime connections.39 The al Qaeda financial network has been analogized to a holding company, with associated Islamic terrorist groups functioning as its subsidiaries. According to numerous sources, the financial system of al Qaeda is overseen by a committee of Muslim bankers and accountants, and has supported an estimated 3,000 core Afghani and overseas members, along with 120,000 ancillary members who spread terrorism across the globe, and has an annual budget of under $50 million. Bin Laden’s own family inheritance was in the range of $25–30 million, which he has used to substantially buttress the network.40 Prior to 9/11, efforts by the CIA to weaken the financial networks of terrorist groups were only nominally supported by other countries, particularly Canada and those in Western Europe. The attention devoted to funding sources has taken a new strategic importance in modern times as governments across the globe more readily link the growing monetary bases of terrorist groups to specific activities. The counterterrorism strategies of many of these countries have been revamped accordingly. Approximately 2,500 companies and individuals have been identified by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control as entities that must have their assets blocked.41 The Sprawling Nature of Interconnected Terror Networks Counterterrorism policies have required significant adaptation in the post-Cold War era. After World War II, conflict between the United States and former Soviet Union dominated American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. The official collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991 ended what was considered a contentious bipolar era.42 This era seems to pale in light of a perceptibly different global system. The number of rogue and nuclear-capable states has grown, as have the terrorist organizations that use such failed or rogue states for shelter. This makes the post-Cold War era much more perilous for democracies.43 These various groups are bonded together by a shared extremist ideology, and many of them seek to infiltrate American society with terror cells. The declaration of war against terrorist activities was enunciated by President George W. Bush on the evening of September 11. The declaration represented the cumulative effects of prior terrorist acts like the first WTC bombing in 1993, and the culmination of an incremental shift

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toward a more guarded state of existence for the United States. In strategic terms, the creation of the cabinet-level Office of Homeland Security—and corresponding realignment of FBI, CIA, and Department of Defense communications and functions—demonstrates that the internal threat to our nation is not expected to recede in the foreseeable future. However, terrorist groups present a different operational challenge than was perceived during the Cold War or other points in American history. They represent a “borderless” war by groups of interconnected radical ideologues with different beliefs of political and religious idealism. Bergen argues that the end of the Cold War produced an environment conducive for the expansion of terrorist groups. His research on bin Laden and al Qaeda led him to conclude that “it was precisely the end of the Cold War, which brought more open borders, that allowed his organization to flourish . . . made possible by the changing rules of the New World Order.”44 Yet, despite the nature of this interconnected terrorist network, the end of the Cold War brought funding cuts in the U.S. budget for national security expenditures from 1990 to 1996, and led to flat budgets from 1996 to 2000.45 This challenged the vibrancy of counterterrorism measures before 9/11. Meanwhile, al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan attracted an expansive coalition of followers. The WTC bombing in 1993 illustrates how terrorist groups are interconnected in nature. Yousef, the operational leader of the bombing, had trained at an al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan where he met an array of Islamic extremists. As Pillar notes, these acquaintances have allowed for “cooperation among groups—such as in procuring false documents, facilitating travel, and performing other support functions— even if they do not conduct joint terrorist operations.”46 In order to successfully combat the sprawling and integrated nature of terrorist organizations, democratically based states must be willing to band together their own counterterrorist organizations more effectively to share information and effectively track down the vestiges of terror networks. This is not to say that such cooperation does not exist at present. The international police organization, INTERPOL, exists for just this reason—to gather information on terrorist and criminal activities, and disseminate it to countries for use in their counterterrorism measures. But such coordination and communication are increasingly complex endeavors that require significant levels of dexterity when spanning national boundaries. One obstacle to counterterrorism measures has been the difficulty many states have had in distinguishing terrorists from viable nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are legitimately performing social service work. For instance, NGOs such as the Pakistani Maktab al-Khidamat exist for a valid reason, but are unwittingly used as pawns by terrorist groups that take advantage of them. Terrorists have been known to join the organization and use it as a vehicle to transport both money and materials

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across their organization. The NGOs provide jobs and make activities appear legitimate when members consequently travel to other regions.47 Another related lesson that has been learned has been the tendency toward cross-pollination of terror networks.48 Members communicate, recruit across organizational boundaries, transfer tactical knowledge and ideas, and share financial resources. The effect of capturing and punishing one group’s members only creates a small ripple in a larger sea of the network. This has required a broader application of counterterrorism policies. Similar to the building of vast interest group coalitions and advocacy networks in the United States,49 terrorist groups recognize the advantages of linking human and material resources together in a nonhierarchical network. The ultimate effect generates a stronger force and mechanism for inducing chaos. For example, a partnership between the Japanese Red Army and a group of anti-Israeli Palestinian Arabs led to the May 1972 terrorist attack at Lod International Airport in Tel Aviv. Additional illustrations pointedly suggest the proliferation of terror network coalitions. Renowned terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman calls this the “internationalization of terrorism,” which he traces back to the hijacking of an Israeli El Al commercial flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. The incident took place in 1968 and was instigated by the Palestinian terror group Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). What differentiated the hijacking of that flight from the 11 prior incidents was that it expressed a political statement, and successfully used the media as an outlet to propagate the group’s actions and goals.50 Following this, the Red Army Faction (RAF) of West Germany and the Action Direct (AD) of France formed a cooperative coalition in the 1980s to destabilize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through a series of attacks that spanned across Europe.51 A meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1986 provided a forum for several hundred terrorists from around the world to share agendas and ideas to spread a revolution across the globe.52 This cross-pollinating tendency appears to be intensifying as time progresses and via the expansion of the Internet, thus future counterterrorism policies must evolve to respond to this trend. Terrorists Are Well Trained and More Sophisticated Counterterrorism measures in the United States and worldwide must address the changing nature of technology and its inherent use by terrorist organizations. The 9/11 Commission Report found that the old Cold War intelligence community has been ill-equipped to handle the challenges of the new era. Congress failed to reorient itself to effectively respond to new threats. Advances in technology have forced counterterrorism measures to evolve incrementally, with an emphasis on new digital technologies and satellite systems rather than relying upon human intelligence or physical

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troops.53 This new age of technology has necessitated a time-consuming but essential shift in the operational and strategic cultures of governmental bureaucracies. With the progression of time, terrorists have also employed the use of technology to advance their cause. Modern terrorists are well trained. For instance, Yousef was educated in Wales and became an engineer with excellent communication skills and fluency in the English language. Yousef’s training in terrorist activities began early. He attempted to assassinate Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s first woman prime minister, elected in 1988.54 His training continued in the Afghani al Qaeda camps operated under the auspices of bin Laden. Yousef’s communication skills and militant training later facilitated successful contact with Abd al-Rahman and other likeminded Islamists in New York City. The execution of the 1993 bombing was not an isolated aim. Yousef’s terrorist plots for the United States included smuggling liquid explosives onto several passenger jets, a plan to assassinate Pope John Paul II, and a scheme to crash a plane into the CIA headquarters in Virginia.55 In effect, according to Bergen’s analysis, “the 1993 World Trade Center bombing looks increasingly like a dress rehearsal for al-Qaida’s devastating attack on the Twin Towers eight years later. Several of the 1993 plotters had ties to the Alkhifa Center . . . [Yousef] appears not to have frequented the Alkhifa Center, but he had close ties to al-Qaida members.”56 Further, technological advances in the 1990s, particularly the Internet, have made communication easier for terrorist groups. Terror groups have used the Internet and DVD technology to recruit members to their cause. Many even used Internet chatrooms to open communications with their compatriots. Intelligence research has revealed that “the men who lead these movements are generally well-educated and utilize the latest in technology in their various jihads.”57 With data and information being exchanged at faster rates, terrorists have become more sophisticated in their plots. A charismatic leader like bin Laden need not set foot on American soil to successfully motivate a following to execute an attack. Terror Cells Integrate Themselves Deep in Society Terrorists have a propensity for patience. They devoutly spend years devising and preparing to execute the perfect plot. Despite the fact that the 1993 WTC attack did not produce the outcome envisioned by the perpetrators (the collapse of both the north and south towers), the event still called for increased vigilance. Al Qaeda plotters of the September 11 attack began arriving in the United States as early as 1994. They were as resolute as ever, just cognizant that more planning was necessary to execute the plot.58

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The infiltration of terrorists is well documented. A clear example is the case of Ali A. Mohamed. Mohamed enlisted in the U.S Army in November of 1986. He was first assigned to a supply company at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, one of the most secretive military installations in the country. The base houses the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, which offers courses on warfare and enemy psychology to American soldiers. Mohamed became a sergeant within one year of enlisting, and began teaching seminar courses on Middle Eastern politics, history, and culture at the base. As Bergen notes, “Fort Bragg is pretty much the last place in the world you’d expect to find a bin Laden operative. Yet Ali Mohamed, it turns out, was an indispensable player in al-Qaida . . . [he was] a chilling illustration of how easily a ‘sleeper’ bin Laden agent was able to penetrate one of the U.S. military’s most secretive establishments and plot terrorist acts on American soil.”59 Mohamed advanced impressively in his military career. But after an unauthorized interlude to fight in the Soviet-Afghanistan War, Mohamed received an honorable discharge from the U.S. Army in 1989. His al Qaeda roots were highly entrenched, as was his commitment to the Islamic religion. After his dismissal from the military, Mohamed continued to fight for the Afghani and al Qaeda causes. At the Alkhifa Refugee Center in Brooklyn, New York—a center where Afghan refugees displaced by the war would go for help—Mohamed developed a camaraderie with El Sayyid Nosair, one of the convicted conspirators of the 1993 WTC attack. Mohamed was providing weapons and military training in New York City to followers he had met at the Alkhifa Center. Meanwhile, Nosair was later convicted for the assassination of the Jewish leader Rabbi Meir Kahane at a Manhattan hotel in 1990.60 Investigation of the Kahane assassination by federal agents tied Mohamed and Nosair together, after authorities found U.S. Army documents in Nosair’s New Jersey apartment given to him by Mohamed. During this period, Mohamed was also traveling back and forth to Afghanistan to help train commanders of al Qaeda. The Alkhifa Center became a base of operations for bin Laden to recruit new members and coordinate activities for a New York City terror attack.61 This account of Mohamed’s activities reveals that terror cells can easily infiltrate into democratic societies, thus complicating counterterrorism policies. Another example was Ihab Ali, an American citizen who was also an associate of bin Laden. Ali was employed at various jobs in Orlando, Florida—including Disney’s Magic Kingdom, the Sheraton Hotel, a Wells Fargo Bank, and as a taxicab driver. The other portion of his double life included travel to Peshawar in 1989 to support the jihad against the Soviets, and assistance in purchasing a U.S. airplane in 1993 that was to be flown to aid al Qaeda in Sudan. He learned to fly at a flight school in Norman, Oklahoma, and later worked as a pilot for al Qaeda.62 In sum, Ali lived as an American citizen but worked to advance al Qaeda’s cause.

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CONCLUSION The attack on the WTC in 1993 signaled a turning point in American history; where beforehand, terrorist attacks were waged primarily on foreign soil, the events of February 26, 1993, revealed that Americans no longer enjoyed immunity from this form of violence. In all, the incident clearly demonstrates Combs’ observation that “terrorism is a phenomenon that is becoming a pervasive, often dominant influence in our lives. It affects the manner in which governments conduct their foreign policy . . . it influences the way we travel and the places we travel to see.”63 The physical damage from the WTC attack of 1993 was repaired quickly, and the north tower reopened in less than a month. The psychological ramifications, particularly those of the surviving victims and their families, penetrated much deeper. The attack was committed by a group of terrorists who adhere to a religious fundamentalism that is alien to the values and beliefs of many Americans. The incident signaled the inherent disparities that prevent diplomacy and communication to exist between terror groups like al Qaeda and nations like the United States. These disparities made the 1993 and 2001 attacks imminent, and became a catalyst for the posing of critical (but not altogether answerable) questions. As this chapter has indicated, the implications and lessons from the incident are vast, but suggest that time and cooperation, both domestically and internationally, will create a more unified front to combat terrorist behavior.

NOTES 1. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2000, 120th edition (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000) table no. 39. 2. In addition to this analysis, please also see the chapter by Gary Ackerman and Sundara Vadlamudi in this volume. 3. Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: American’s Experience with Terrorism (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994). 4. Ibid.: p. 14. 5 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 51. 6. Ibid.: p. 49. 7. S. A. Nigosian, World Religions: A Historical Approach (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press, 2000) 310. 8. Pillar: p. 49. 9. Thomas R. Dye, Politics in America (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005). 10. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 75. 11. Dye, Politics in America.

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12. Mohammed Jamal Khalifa allegedly trained with 9/11 mastermind Osama bin Laden in Afghani camps during the former Soviet Union’s incursion in Afghanistan which began in 1979. Kalifa created the Benevolence International Corporation in the Philippines in 1988 to recruit followers in the war against the Soviets. He was arrested in December of 1994 in relation to the bombing and was deported to Jordan by the INS in May of 1995. A Jordanian court acquitted him of the charges, at which time he moved to Saudi Arabia. See Bergen, Holy War, Inc., for more information. 13. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004) 72. 14. Pillar: p. 49. 15. Ibid. 16. The informant was Emad A. Salem, an ex-Egyptian army officer. Salem alleged that he told the FBI about the WTC plot and volunteered to derail it by supplying fake explosives to the perpetrators. While Salem claims to have several conclusive taped telephone messages to confirm his allegations, the New York branch of the FBI denies any foreknowledge that the attacks were imminent. For additional information, see: Bergen, Holy War, Inc. 17. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. 18. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999) 107–109. 19. The 9/11 Commission Report: p. 72. 20. For more on this, please see Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Lose and Learn Doctrine: The Trajectory from Oplan Bojinka to 9/11,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 21. Laurie Mylroie, “The World Trade Center bomb: Who is Ramzi Yousef? And Why It Matters,” The National Interest (Winter 1995/96). Available at http://www. fas.org/irp/world/iraq/956-tni.htm. 22. The defendants in this trial were Ibrahim Elgabrowny (convicted of ten counts and sentenced to 57 years), Clement Hampton-El (convicted of three counts and sentenced to 35 years), Fares Khallafalla (convicted of three counts and sentenced to 30 years), Tarig Elhassan (convicted of three counts and sentenced to 35 years), Fadil Abdelgani (convicted of three counts and sentenced to 30 years), Mohamed Saleh (convicted of three counts and sentenced to 35 years), Victor Alverez (convicted of five counts and sentenced to 35 years), Matarawy Mohamed Said Saleh (plead guilty to one count and sentenced to 3 years probation), Earl Grant (plead guilty to one count and sentenced to 3 years probation), El Sayyid Nosair (convicted of nine counts, and sentenced to life plus 15 years). See: The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Base, (Washington, DC, 2006); and The United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1995 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication 10321, April 1996). 23. The 9/11 Commission Report: p. 72. 24. Ibid.: p. 72. 25. United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1993 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication 10136, April 1994). 26. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy.

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27. The 9/11 Commission Report: p. 71. 28. Ibid.: pp. 75, 108. 29. John T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 5th ed. (Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group, 1995) ch. 5. 30. Dye, Politics in America. 31. Cindy C. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2000). Ibid.: p. 19. 32. For an analysis of terrorism and financial networks, please see the chapter by Paul Smith in Volume 2 of this book. 33. Mohammed received a tip that the United States had obtained an indictment against him in January 1996, which allowed him to evade capture. He later played a central role in the 9/11 attacks. See: The 9/11 Commission Report: p. 73. 34. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002) 36, 101. 35. Ibid.: p. 61. 36. Paul L. Williams, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Alpha: A Pearson Education Company, 2002) 167. 37. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaida: p. 61. 38. Ibid.: pp. 60–62. 39. Williams, Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror: p. 167. For more on this, please see the chapters by Gregory Lee, JP Larsson, and Jon Byrom and James Walker in Volume 2 of this book. 40. The CIA estimates that besides the core and ancillary members, there are about 6–7 million radical Muslims worldwide who provide a base for recruitment. See: Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaida: pp. 61, 95. 41. After the 9/11 attack, the United States was able to freeze approximately $100 million in assets for 27 terrorist groups associated with al Qaeda. Some of these groups included: Abu Sayyaf Group (Philippines), Armed Islamic Group (Algeria), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Osama bin Laden, Harkat ul-Mujahidin (Kashmir), Wafa Humanitarian Organisation, Al Rashid Trust, and Mamoun Darkanzanli Import Export Company. See Ibid.: pp. 63, 66–67. 42. Rourke, International Politics. 43. Keith Philip Lepor, ed., After the Cold War: Essays on the Emerging World Order (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997). 44. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: p. 20. 45. The 9/11 Commission Report, 93. 46. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy: p. 52. 47. Ibid. 48. For more on this, please see Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). 49. Marie Hojnacki, “Organized Interests’ Advocacy Behavior in Alliances,” Political Research Quarterly 51, no. 2 (June 1998): 437–459. 50. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 51. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. 52. Walter Laquer, The Age of Terrorism (Boston, MA: Little Brown Publishing Company, 1987).

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53. The 9/11 Commission Report: pp. 103–104. 54. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. 55. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999). 56. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: p. 136. 57. Ibid.: p. 39. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid.: pp. 127–128. 60. See U.S.A. v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, 93 Cr. 181 (SDNY). 61. Bergen documents that despite Mohamed’s al-Qaeda activities throughout the 1990s, he still sought to infiltrate the federal government to view classified documents. For instance he applied to become a translator for the FBI in 1993, and sought security clearance to work as a guard at a company that was conducting classified work for the U.S. Department of Defense in 1995. Mohamed was arrested in September of 1998 on suspicion of conspiring with the al-Qaeda; Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: pp. 132–133. 62. Ibid. 63. Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: pp. 5–6.

CHAPTER 6 INSURGENT SEIZURE OF AN URBAN AREA: GROZNY, 1996 James S. Robbins

The highest form of the art for an insurgent group is to seize and hold a major urban area. Cities are natural power centers, and holding them confers control over people, infrastructure, and trade. The physical control of a city also brings with it a measure of legitimacy and allows a movement to begin to exercise power. There are a number of noteworthy historical examples of insurgent groups making a bid to seize and hold urban areas, such as the Tet uprising in Vietnam during the spring of 1968, or the takeover of Fallujah, Iraq, in the summer of 2004. In both cases, insurgent forces were able (for a time, at least) to raise their flags and begin organizing society according to their revolutionary blueprint. While insurgencies must at some point seize and hold cities if they are to prevail in their radical programs, it is more easily attempted than accomplished. In most cases, the seizing is much easier than the holding. In the abovementioned examples, insurgent forces either were unsuccessful in the initial part of their enterprise, or soon found themselves subject to devastating counterattacks that ended their erstwhile period of rule. One of the few cases of an insurgency prevailing in an urban takeover is the August 1996 seizure of Grozny in Chechnya. Rebel forces took the city in a matter of days and were able to hold it for a period of years. However, the reason for the Chechens’ success had less to do with their battlefield prowess than the unwillingness of the Russian government to pay the costs necessary to take the city back. Thus, the 1996 Battle of Grozny is a cautionary tale for countries involved in counterinsurgency operations under conditions of diffident leadership and weak public support at home.

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BACKGROUND The Chechen relationship with Russia is one of enduring enmity, dating back to Russia’s annexation of the north Caucasus in the nineteenth century. The cycle of uprising, reprisal, suppression, and bitterness was well established before the Chechen uprising in the 1990s. The most noteworthy event during this period was Soviet leader Joseph Stalin’s deportation of the entire Chechen nation to internal exile during World War II. It was the most comprehensive attempt in history to eradicate the Chechen people. The Chechens were permitted to return to their homeland in the 1950s during the Khrushchev period. Among the returnees was future Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudaev, who had been born in exile. Dudaev was the first and only Soviet General of Chechen ethnicity, and would play a central role in the attempt to secure the Chechens an independent state. The Chechens, like other nationalities in the Soviet Union, sought to make use of the opportunity afforded by the gradual collapse of Soviet authority at the end of the Cold War. Lithuania was the first Union Republic to declare (or reaffirm) its independence, on March 11, 1990. The Lithuanians were gradually followed by other former Soviet states.1 On November 23, 1990, Dudaev presided over a Chechen National Congress that called for free elections and the formation of a Chechen parliament. Two days after the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, a small Chechen parliament convened and selected Dudaev as the putative country’s interim leader. The following month, Dudaev stormed the local parliament and killed the Soviet Communist Party chief for Grozny, Vitali Kutsenko. His men also seized the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or Committee for State Security) headquarters as well as radio and television stations in the capital. Dudaev easily won a referendum held October 27, 1991, which Moscow denounced, and immediately declared the independent Republic of Ichkeria. Russian President Boris Yeltsin flew troops to Grozny in November and Chechen forces immobilized them at the airport. Lacking political support for war, Yeltsin withdrew the troops, and the Chechens won their first bid for independence. The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria existed as a de facto political entity for three years, unrecognized by Russia or the international community. The situation was barely tolerable to Moscow. The Russian Federation had many such minority enclaves within its borders, and there was concern that other nationalities might try to copy the Chechen experiment. There was also some fear of Chechnya serving as a base for the spread of Muslim fundamentalism, though this tendency was less prevalent in the early years of the Chechen conflict, which was largely a nationalist movement before 1995. Chechnya was also strategically located close to the Caspian oil fields and along some planned pipeline routes. Within

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Chechnya, government controls were weak and black markets and other forms of transnational criminal activity began to proliferate, spreading to Moscow and other major Russian cities. Dudaev’s rule was not without problems; he faced factional infighting (sometimes violent) and generally decreasing popularity after the flush of enthusiasm for independence waned. The Yeltsin administration attempted various overt and covert means to suppress and subvert the Dudaev government, finally opting for direct military action in December 1994. Moscow was very optimistic; Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said Grozny could be taken with a single airborne regiment in 2 hours, and Russian Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov predicted “a small victorious war.” However, Operation WAVE—the campaign against Chechnya—was ill-planned and poorly executed, and became a case study in how not to conduct military operations against a separatist uprising, particularly in urban settings. Poorly trained and illsupplied Russian troops made slow going against determined Chechen forces, and were frustrated by civilian protestors, poor weather, and the unwillingness of some of their commanders to press the offensive. By contrast, the Chechens were highly motivated, fought on their home ground, and enjoyed strong public support. In January 1995, Russian forces attacked the Chechen capital of Grozny and suffered a humiliating setback as the Chechen guerillas used the advantages of defense in complex urban terrain to good effect.2 The most notable example was the experience of the 131st Independent Motorised Infantry Brigade (the Maikop Brigade), which lost 20 of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 APCs, and suffered over 1,000 combat fatalities, including commanding officer Colonel Ivan Savin. Despite these initial setbacks, the Russians were eventually able to secure Grozny by exploiting Russia’s advantage in firepower and inflicting tremendous damage on the city and its halfmillion inhabitants. On February 26, 1995, Russia declared the city secure, and by this time was already pushing its campaign into the region’s southern highlands. Other Chechen urban centers—such as Argun, Shali, and Urus Martan—fell shortly afterwards, and Chechen guerilla bands sought sanctuary in the high mountains to the south, or over the border in the Republic of Georgia. Throughout the next year, Russia engaged in a difficult and controversial counterinsurgency with the Chechens. The Chechen guerillas fought back creatively—for example, when rebel leader Shamil Basayev seized control of a hospital in Budyonnovsk in June, 1995, taking 1,000 hostages. Salman Raduyev undertook similar attacks in Gudermes and Kizlyar. But the Russian response was the traditional one: reprisals against Chechen villages thought to be sheltering guerillas, and war of no quarter on the frontier.

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MARCH 1996: TESTING CAPABILITIES After the reduction of major hostilities in early 1995, Grozny had been handed over to the special troops of the Interior Ministry (MVD), which was standard Russian procedure for Phase IV operations dating back to World War II.3 The city was occupied by between six and twelve thousand troops of various types—special armed units of the MVD, MVD contractors (kontrakniki), local pro-Russian Chechen militia (OMON), police, and other security forces. All varied in levels of training, equipment, motivation, and loyalty to the regime. Russia installed Doku Zavgayev, a proRussian Chechen, as the leader of the region, and began an aid program to bolster the loyalist regime; however, such programs were plagued by corruption, and much of the money was embezzled or diverted, doing little to ameliorate conditions inside Chechnya. On March 6, 1996, 1,500 to 2,000 Chechen guerillas attacked Grozny from five directions. Most were from bands that had filtered back to the city from the mountains. Some were members of Zavgayev’s own militia, and many others wore the militia uniform, arriving on the morning trains without raising the suspicions of Russian security forces. The attack came one day after Defense Minister Pavel Grachev paid the city a visit to discuss peace talks. “I wanted to save him the trouble of finding me,” Dudaev later joked.4 It was also the day before the Russian Security Council was to meet to talk about Chechnya. General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of Russian troops in Chechnya, said the rebels wanted to “show off their strength on the eve of the meeting.”5 Dudaev soon appeared on rebel television with field commander Shamil Basayev and stated, “The city of Grozny will be taken. There will be no mercy for Chechen traitors.”6 (The Chechens used mobile TV transmitters that could overpower state-run TV signals, and Dudaev would regularly appear on regular television channels, interrupting scheduled programming with his special announcements.) The guerillas burned two police stations, attacked the power station and main administrative building, and attempted to seize the Interior Ministry. The railway station and main bridges were occupied to impede possible Russian movements. Fifteen Russian checkpoints were destroyed, and at the height of the raid, the insurgent forces had free movement in 80 percent of the city. As well, on March 8, Chechen rebels hijacked a Turkish Cypriot airliner and flew it to Munich as a means of publicizing their cause.7 The assault lasted for 2 days. Russian forces initially paused to see what the OMON (interior ministry special forces) and local police would do, but they offered no effective resistance.8 As the Russians began their counterattack on the third day, the insurgents withdrew quietly from the city, ending the attack. Some snipers and saboteurs remained behind to harass

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the Russians, and security forces were still trying to root out some of these as late as March 26.9 Nevertheless, the main attack was over. There were characteristically conflicting claims of damage. Russian television reported 70 government soldiers had been killed and 200 wounded. The Russian government claimed 170 rebels were killed and more than 100 were wounded, with about 100 civilians dead.10 Dudaev claimed to have killed 91 Russian troops while losing just 8 of his own men. But regardless of the scale of damage, the Chechens had made their political point. “Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudaev, Aslan Maskhadov and many other Chechen commanders studied in Soviet military academies, where they learned in detail about the Soviet-backed Cold War guerrilla campaigns in Algeria and Vietnam,” one analyst wrote. “Many a pundit who remembers the Vietnam War will immediately notice the striking similarities between the latest Chechen attack on Grozny and the 1968 Vietcong Tet offensive.”11 The attack also served as a dress rehearsal for future operations, according to Dudaev.12 He called it “a little harassing operation . . . a training exercise for ‘a new dimension of war’ that will include bolder attacks inside Russia proper.”13 Dudaev believed that the raid demonstrated that “it is no big problem for us to capture any city” including “militaryindustrial and political-administrative centers” in Russia and other former Soviet republics.14 “We are prepared to fight indefinitely to add to our history of 437 years fighting against the Russian Empire,” Dudaev stated. “Only independence and withdrawal of the federal troops can bring peace.”15 Meeting while the fighting raged, the Russian Security Council adopted a plan for “peace through stabilization” in Chechnya, and sought to end fighting by March 28. Initially, this entailed increasing attacks on rebel concentrations in towns and villages, using the same encirclement techniques that had been used since the nineteenth century.16 But a ceasefire agreement was signed on March 31. Politics were very much in play. President Yeltsin was running for reelection in a hard-fought campaign, and was not doing well in the polls. The war was a major issue, one on which he was vulnerable. The March ceasefire was portrayed as a political victory after the embarrassing attack, and Yeltsin promised an expeditious Russian troop withdrawal. On April 21, 1996, at a joint press conference with U.S. President Bill Clinton following the Moscow summit, Yeltsin declared that “there are no military operations in Chechnya.” Of course this was not true, and 3 days later the Russians scored a noteworthy success when they assassinated Dudaev by targeting a transmission from his satellite phone with an air-to-ground missile. Dudaev was in the village of Gekhi-Chu, talking to Russian negotiator Konstantin Borovoy at the time of the strike.17 Dudaev had argued for some time that

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killing him was the main objective of the Russian plan. “We have made preparations so that in case of my death, the Russians’ ordeal would increase tenfold,” he once said.18 Dudaev was quickly succeeded by Zalemkhan Yanderbayev, to whom Yeltsin immediately reached out with peace feelers. The two men met in the Kremlin on May 27. Three weeks later, in the first round of elections, Yeltsin gained 35 percent of the vote, followed by Communist challenger Gennady Zyuganov with 32 percent. Yeltsin was reelected in the second round on July 3, 1996 with 53 percent of the vote, and most credited the peace offensive with helping secure his reelection. Yeltsin was set to be inaugurated on August 9. AUGUST 1996: THE ATTACK In early August, there were no signs of an imminent attack in Grozny. The political climate likewise seemed pacific; Chechen leaders agreed to negotiate with Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) representatives on various aspects of the current peace plan. For its part, Moscow announced that by September 1 all Federal soldiers would be withdrawn from Chechnya except for a few garrison troops. The moment seemed promising for some type of long-term settlement. However, at a July 25 meeting Chechen commanders initiated Operation ZERO OPTION, the planned takeover of Grozny, with smaller scale attacks on Argun and Gudermes. The operation sought to change the correlation of forces in the struggle with the Russians by taking the fight unexpectedly to the symbolic center of Russian power in Chechnya. At base, the attack sought to serve as a reminder; Aslan Maskhadov, Yanderbayev’s chief of staff, stated, “the actions in Grozny have a single aim— showing that the war in Chechnya is not over yet.”19 The attack was something of a gamble, as are all insurgent attacks of this nature, since they forego some insurgent strengths, such as mobility, and place the insurgency at risk of being surrounded, pinned down, and destroyed. But the Chechens may have been emboldened by their relative success in March, and perhaps felt that should events turn against them they could again withdraw to regroup and fight another day. As well, they may have felt that the risks were worth taking. A fierce, highly visible, and symbolic attack against an unmotivated enemy in an unpopular war led by a weak leader could turn the tide, or so they reasoned. The attack was set for dawn on Tuesday, August 6, 1996. Shamil Basayev was given overall command of the ground forces, which were organized in the usual semiautonomous groupings based on family and tribal affiliations. Rebels began infiltrating the city and hiding in prepared apartments to await the attack. About 4,000 Chechen fighters faced approximately 6–7,000 Russian troops, primarily MVD with militia and police. (There were 30–40,000 Russian troops in theater.) Though they outnumbered the

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Chechens, the Russians were hampered by lack of unity of command between the various types of Russian units, and no systematic information sharing or systems for coordinated action. As with the March raid, many members of the ostensibly pro-Russian Chechen government were actually in league with the rebels. One estimate had 75 percent of the Chechen police and security units being rebel sympathizers. Major Sultan Tuleyev of the Chechen Interior Ministry helped direct some of the rebel attacks, particularly those aimed at pro-Russian Chechen targets.20 The August attack plan did not differ significantly from the March plan. Rebel units first seized the communications apparatus and strategic choke points in the city such as bridges and rail stations. They then attacked government buildings, Russian defensive positions, and the Severny airport. They worked in small teams of 20 or less, as they had in 1995, armed with rocket launchers, small arms, and the occasional mortar. Snipers worked from predetermined positions with wide fields of fire. Supplies had been prepositioned in the city, dispersed at key points to support the attacking forces. The Chechens achieved surprise at every level. Strategically, it was an embarrassing incident, made more so because it was successful. The attack generated a great deal of press coverage, and emphasized the growing sense of drift under Yeltsin. Tactically, surprise was complete, though it need not have been. Journalist Maria Eismont, who was in Chechnya covering the war for Sevodnya, stated that “only a blind man or the deaf and dumb did not know about the impending attack a week before it came. Talk about the coming offensive could be heard in offices and in markets, at home and in the barracks.”21 Chechen rebels had circulated leaflets a week before the attack asking civilians to evacuate, but these had been ignored by the Russians. A wounded Russian private told of the chaos in the early moments of the fight: “They attacked us at night. Nobody expected it. We just had no idea. They trapped us all at our posts or between buildings in groups of three or four. They would shoot from buildings and pick us off when we had no way to fight back. They had better weapons than we did and they were organized.”22 The Chechens also won the intelligence war. Chechen rebels had effective human intelligence (HUMINT) in the city from their established networks, and creatively used off-the-shelf and stolen equipment to intercept Russian signals. They combated Russian attempts to collect signals intelligence by using a system of couriers. The smaller, flatter Chechen command hierarchy allowed intelligence to be exploited more quickly and for greater effect. Likewise, their decentralized organization allowed for better counterintelligence—it was difficult to penetrate the closely knit tribal organizations. The rebels also benefited from a long-term intelligence collection effort they had undertaken inside the city, amassing detailed information on the Russian defensive positions. They were aided by their

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preexisting knowledge of the city and the sympathies of many of the nonRussian inhabitants. The Russian defensive plan for Grozny recognized that they lacked sufficient troop strength to guard the entire city. Instead, the Russians had established checkpoints along the major roads coming into Grozny, and strong points at various locations within the city. These bunkers were intended to form knots of resistance to any rebel attacks and were designed to be strong enough to withstand attacks until reinforcements arrived. Essentially, the main effort would come through counterattacks. However, this gave the insurgents several advantages. According to guerilla band leader Vakha Ramzanov, “at most checkpoints the soldiers ignore us; they don’t want a fight. Or sometimes we pay a bribe.”23 The strong points were not always mutually supporting and could be isolated and sometimes destroyed. In addition, because they were by their nature defensive positions, the Chechens were able quickly to consolidate the areas the Russians had chosen not to defend. By the end of 4 days of fighting, the Chechens had control of most of the city. A Russian military spokesman stated that Federal units were “totally surrounded in Grozny, and they are not even trying to attack the rebels, only trying to defend themselves.”24 By seizing most of the city and establishing their own defenses, the Chechens exposed another serious contradiction in the Russian defensive plan. Chechen leaders acknowledged that the Russians would probably be able to take back the city with a concerted effort, but they doubted that the Russians would be willing to absorb the estimated 15,000 casualties in the process. The Chechens planned for the Russian counterattack by establishing harassment positions at high points around the city, and mining the main highways. Some armored reinforcements were allowed to enter the city following the same playbook as 1995, in order to be surrounded and destroyed. The Russians had not learned the lessons of the first battle of Grozny, and the Chechens were again able to cut off and kill or capture a number of Russian units. Basayev told rebel gunners to attempt to disable rather than destroy Russian vehicles when possible, in order to use them later.25 After a few days, the Chechens were able to field four tanks and six APCs captured from Russian forces. Russian doctrine stressed the use of firepower, either artillery, standoff air assets such as helicopters, or bombardment by fixed wing aircraft. However, in most cases the Russians lacked accurate, timely targeting information and these attacks were rarely effective (though helicopter-fired rockets could be useful against known sniper positions). Thus, though the Russians could mass firepower, the quick-moving Chechens were not often at the receiving end. This increased the level of damage to the city and the number of civilian casualties. Furthermore, the armed formations of the MVD generally lacked the fire support capabilities enjoyed by MOD units and were unable effectively to respond to Chechen attacks.

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Human factors were another asymmetric element of the battle. The Russians were in poor morale, inadequately trained and supplied, generally unmotivated, and combat ineffective. A Russian official described the troops as “hungry, lice-infested and in rags,” commanded by “indifferent, tired-out people.”26 By contrast, the Chechens were well trained, well supplied, and highly motivated. “We are much more interested in continuing the war than Russia is,” Dudaev had declared after the March raid. “What is left for us? Our economy has been destroyed. Our people have no homes, no bread, no jobs, nothing. We have 500,000 men aged 15 to 50 who know only one thing: how to fight.”27 Akhmed Zakayev, a Chechen ground commander, said, “It’s easier for us. After a year and a half of fighting, each of us is a strategist, a commander, a general. Each person knows what he’s fighting for—which I can’t say for the Russians.”28 A journalist covering the attack observed that “it is not difficult to demonstrate one’s fighting ability with people going quite calmly to meet their deaths. Russian soldiers have nothing to die for—neither in Grozny nor in any other settlement in Ichkeria.”29 Initially, official statements from Russian military sources during the attack were mostly upbeat, stressing the imminent collapse of the rebel force. Journalists inside the city could be counted on to give a reality check to these claims, when they could reach the outside. But after the first few days of fighting, Russia admitted to losing 8 helicopters, 15 armored vehicles, 50 dead, and 200 wounded. In the first week, Russia admitted to 221 dead and 766 wounded troops, having only previously admitted to 1,000 casualties since December 1994.30 MOSCOW REACTS Boris Yeltsin was reinaugurated president of the Russian Federation on August 9 in Moscow, 3 days into the Chechen attack. Planned inauguration pageants had been cancelled the day after the attack began; the organizers cited financial concerns. During the inauguration ceremony, Yeltsin appeared wooden and slurred his words. He spoke for 45 seconds only, simply reciting the oath of office and then departing for a long vacation. Yeltsin lacked the fortitude to be a decisive wartime leader; one of his first official acts in response to the crisis in Grozny was to ask Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin to convene a commission to fix blame for the fiasco.31 A statement released the day after Yeltsin’s inauguration vowed, “All acts of terrorism will be crushed with determination.” Nevertheless, Yeltsin’s office was largely silent on the developing crisis. On the second day of the battle, Doku Zavgayev, the pro-Russian Chechen leader installed by Moscow, said, “the situation in Grozny is perfectly under our full control now.”32 However, sporadic reports from reporters trapped in

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Grozny told a different story. Six days into the fighting, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin threatened to declare a state of emergency “if that is what we need to do.” But whether declared or not, a state of emergency had been imposed on the Russian leadership. Yeltsin decided to hand the crisis to his national security advisor Aleksandr Lebed. Lebed was a charismatic former lieutenant general in the Soviet and Russian armies, an Afghan veteran, known for his outspoken views and sarcastic wit. He had run against Yeltsin as a peace candidate, opposing the war in Chechnya, and come in third with 15 percent of the vote. Two days later, Yeltsin named him his national security advisor, seeking to coopt the peace platform, and sacked Lebed’s old rival, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, who was made the scapegoat for the war. Grachev was replaced by Lebed’s supporter General Igor N. Rodionov. Lebed believed that the conflict in Chechnya could not be won by military means alone. “Regardless of the blood spilled in Grozny due to the Chechen opposition,” he said, in the opening days of the battle, “the security council does not intend to resolve the sharpened crisis purely by means of force, even though this is how the leaders of the illegal military formations are acting.”33 Lebed was sent to Chechnya to lead negotiations, replacing hard line national security council member Oleg Lobov. Chechen spokesman Movladi Udugov saw the move as positive, and pledged that if Lebed dealt fairly with them they would help Russia preserve its interests in the Caucasus and “get out of this war while saving face.”34 For his part, Lebed felt certain that he had been sent to Chechnya by people playing “apparatchik games” who wished to see him “break his neck” in the process, but he did not shy away from the assignment. Lebed met with Aslan Maskhadov in the village of Stariye Agagi on August 11. ‘‘We discussed the question of the possible [political] status of Chechnya and arrived at the conclusion that in order to implement any good intentions, it is first necessary to stop killing people,” said Lebed. He said the two sides could reach agreement on 90 percent of the outstanding issues.35 The solution began to take the form of an agreement along the lines of the treaty Russia had with the then-Republic of Tatarstan. Lebed also denounced nominal Chechen leader Zavgayev as a megalomaniac who had difficulties with reality. The next day, Mashkhadov negotiated an agreement with Russian ground commander Lieutenant General Konstantin Pulikovsky to separate the warring parties in Grozny. The ceasefire went into effect at noon on August 13, though it was soon being violated by both sides. One problem the Russians faced was that provisions had not been made in the agreement for the safe conduct or resupply of troops inside the city. The Chechens were more than willing to let the Russians starve in their bunkers, and some violations of the ceasefire occurred when attempts were made to bring rations to the isolated troops.

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Lebed was adamant that the conflict had to end. “A country with a collapsing economy and armed forces cannot allow itself the luxury of waging a war, a democratic country cannot decide questions of nationality with rockets and shells,” Lebed said on August 15. “This war should be ended and it will be.” He called the war “a colossal loss for Russian prestige.”36 Lebed praised the fighting ability of the Chechens and said that the situation would be resolved not by fighting but by “humane considerations and common sense.” Maskhadov, a former Soviet Colonel, said that Lebed’s “guarantee is the word of honor of a Russian officer.” But not all the Chechen leaders were impressed with Lebed. Shamil Basayev said, “I am glad that Lebed thinks highly of our skills . . . But I don’t believe in the words of any Russian. I believe it was Winston Churchill who said an agreement with Russia isn’t worth the paper it was written on. So agreements mean little to me.”37 As exchanges of gunfire became more common over the next few days and tensions began to mount, General Pulikovsky—the acting ground forces commander during the absence of the equally hawkish General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov—issued an ultimatum to the citizens of Grozny, giving them 48 hours to vacate the city before he used extreme measures. “Grozny will be cleared of the rebels,” he said, “The only way out of the current situation in Grozny is the use of force.” This sparked an exodus of tens of thousands of people to refugee camps. The breakdown in policy caused many to look to Moscow for guidance, but none was forthcoming. President Yeltsin was unavailable, looking for a new dacha; Parliament was on vacation; Prime Minister Chernomyrdin had no comment.38 Lebed was left standing, having to make difficult decisions on his own, which suggested that he had been right—that he was being set up by his adversaries. However, he was true to his belief that the war had to end. Lebed went to Grozny around August 21 and again met with Maskhadov. A new and final ceasefire went into effect at noon August 23. Lebed expected a hero’s welcome in Moscow, but Yeltsin at first snubbed Lebed on his return to the capital. Yeltsin later congratulated him over the phone for achieving this “first step” toward peace.39 By late October, Lebed would be forced out of office by his opponents. The day the peace agreement with the Chechens was announced, the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets ran a front-page headline, “They Won.” ANALYSIS The Chechen victory in August 1996 was not primarily a military victory, but rather a political victory catalyzed by military means. The attack on Grozny forced Russia to face political contradictions that made continued fighting untenable. The defeat came from the top; Yeltsin was a weak

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leader of a war-weary country. The Chechens correctly diagnosed that one more dramatic, large-scale attack would set the conditions for a peace on their terms. The Russians could well have taken the city back by applying the ruthless force they had in the past, but in the summer of 1996, Russian society could not make the sacrifices necessary to win it in the same old way. A negotiated settlement and withdrawal was seen as the better option by the political leaders and most of the voters. The Chechen rebels established facts on the ground at precisely the right time to achieve their political ends. Russian Army forces began pulling out of Chechnya that same week, and completed their withdrawal by the end of the month, as scheduled. A peace agreement was signed at Khasavyurt, Dagestan, which postponed consideration of Chechnya’s political status until 2001, a de facto recognition of Chechen independence. It gave tacit recognition to the rebel Chechen government and ended Moscow’s support for the opposition government. The two sides agreed to mount joint security patrols in the city, and television audiences saw Chechen guerillas and MVD troops trading cigarettes and making a show of cooperation. The Chechens began imposing sharia-based law, and taking vengeance on former collaborators with the Russian puppet government. Chechen rebel leader Zelimkhan Yanderbayaev arrived in Grozny on September 6, the fifth anniversary of the original Chechen declaration of independence, and began organizing his government. Grozny was a shambles, the presidential palace was in ruin. There was little running water, natural gas, or electricity. But among the populace there was a feeling of expectation that perhaps this time peace would prevail. Most would agree with rebel troop commander Akhmed Zakayev, “We aren’t taking over the city, we’re liberating it.” During the conflict with Chechnya from 1994–1996, about 6,000 Russian soldiers, 2–3,000 Chechen fighters, and 80,000 civilians were killed. Another 240,000 persons were wounded, though estimates of total casualties ranged much higher. Chechnya’s infrastructure was almost completely destroyed, its urban areas reduced to rubble, and its people impoverished spiritually as well as materially. But the Chechen rebels had again secured their independence. In an interview in September 1996, Russian Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov stated, “Personally, I have one concern: how to prevent the current tactical gain from becoming a future strategic loss.”40 The tactical gain he was referring to was the end of open warfare. The strategic loss he feared was the gradual establishment of sovereighty by Chechnya41 Over time and through acquiescence—by Russia, by neighboring states, and eventually the international community—a fully independent country would be created. “The danger,” he continued, “using the example of Afghanistan, is the Chechenization of the war. That is, a war for power, among Chechen groups, all hostile to Russia, against each other just like

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what happened in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. It is possible that the irreconcilable Chechen opposition will be consolidated around some leader. Then indefinite prolongation of the war is not out of the question at all.” This was a sound prediction, and over the next 4 years, the Chechens squandered their opportunity to establish an internationally recognized state through infighting, criminal activity, and extending their Muslim uprising to neighboring states. In so doing, they lost sight of the fact that they had won their independence by exploiting a very particular set of political circumstances. They began to overreach, failing to understand the changing dynamics within Russia. By 1999, political conditions in the Federation had changed, and Yeltsin’s successor Vladimir Putin demonstrated that he was unwilling to let Chechen provocations stand. Putin was not interested in letting the separatists have their own homeland, and would make the sacrifices necessary to resubjugate Chechnya. Russian forces returned to Grozny in February 2000 and leveled the city.42 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the National War College, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. NOTES 1. The Soviet Union officially recognized the secession of the Baltic States on September 6, 1991. Note that the Union Republics that comprised the Soviet Union had been guaranteed the right to secede by the Soviet constitution. Chechnya, as an independent oblast within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, had no such right. 2. C. F. Stephen, J. Blank, and Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Russia’s Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph, January 13, 1995, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/ people.cfm?authorID=21; Mr. Lester W. Grau, “Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Leavenworth, KS, July 1995, available at http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/ grozny.htm; Timothy L. Thomas, “The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat,” Parameters (Summer 1999): 87–102; Anatol Lieven, “Russia’s Military Nadir: The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle,” The National Interest (Summer 1996), 24–33. 3. Note that the term of art “Phase IV Operations” is appropriate, since the handover to the MVD was slated as Phase IV of the original Russian campaign plan. 4. Richard Boudreaux, “Chechen Leader Vows to Step Up Attacks on Russia,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1996: A1. 5. Moscow Times, March 7, 1996: 1.

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6. Ibid. 7. On November 9, 1991, Shamil Basayev had hijacked a Russian aircraft, diverting it to Ankara, also to gain publicity. No one was harmed. 8. Dmitry Balburov, “Russia Disgraced by Attack on Grozny,” Moscow News, March 14, 1996. “The policemen sitting there in the office confided that they had more problems with federal troops than with Chechen fighters, and stressed the need for Russian troops to pull out of Chechnya as soon as possible. ‘We’ll take care of Dudaev’s men on our own—it’s our own problem,’ they said. I came to believe them as I saw policemen and unarmed separatist fighters standing side by side on the porch chatting amiably.” 9. Boris Kipkeyev, “ ‘Special Operation’ Against Rebels in Grozny Begins,” ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1331 GMT, March 26, 1996. 10. “Russia Takes Grozny,” Toronto Sun, March 11, 1996: 3. 11. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Chechnya’s Tet Offensive,” The Moscow Times, March 14, 1996. 12. Carlotta Gall, “ ‘The Plan Is to Kill Me,’ Dudaev Says,” The Moscow Times, March 19, 1996. 13. Bourdreaux, “Chechen Leader Vows to Step Up Attacks on Russia,” Los Angeles Times, March 18, 1996: A1. 14. Ibid. 15. Sergei Strokan, “Bad News from the Front Weakens Yeltsin,” IPS-Inter Press Service, March 21, 1996. 16. “Federal forces in Chechnya are currently employing the tactic of gradually squeezing Dudaev’s gunmen from the population centers where their headquarters and bases are situated. This tactic is well known from the history of fighting rebellious mountain detachments in the nineteenth century. It involves successively surrounding villages, offering a ‘safe corridor’ through the encirclement to women and children and to men prepared to surrender and lay down their arms. Anyone not accepting this ultimatum is considered an enemy. They are treated according to the laws of wartime.” “Everything Calm in Bamut, Russian Military State in Response to Duma Deputies’ Initiative Aimed at ‘Averting a Military Operation’ in Yet Another Chechen Village” IZVESTIYA, March 13, 1996. 17. Sharip Asayev, “Dudaev Said Killed in Rocket Attack on Chechen Village,” ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1537 GMT, April 23, 1996. According to a transcript of the conversation released afterwards, his last words were “Russia must regret what it is doing . . .” Yuliya Kalinina, “Dudaev’s Last Words: ‘Russia Must Regret . . .’ After That the Conversation Broke Off,” MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, April 26, 1996. 18. Bourdreaux, “Chechen Leader . . .” Note that the tribally based decentralized nature of Chechen organization made this type of attack less useful than it might have been, as events showed. 19. “Chechen Rebels Storm Russian Units in Grozny,” New York Times, August 7, 1996: A6. 20. Alexander Tolmachev, “They Betrayed Us in Grozny,” Moscow News, August 15, 1996. The Chechen experience should inform efforts in Iraq to build indigenous defense forces. 21. Michael Specter, “Chechnya Rebels Entrap and Shell Moscow’s Troops,” New York Times, August 10, 1996: 1.

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22. Michael Specter, “Russians Failing to Wrest Grozny from Insurgents,” New York Times, August 12, 1996: A1. 23. Kirill Belyaninov, “To Live and Die in Grozny,” US News and World Report, September 2, 1996: 44. 24. Specter, “Chechnya Rebels . . .” 25. Ilya Maksakov, “Inability To Resolve Chechen Problem Leads To New Casualties,” NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, August 7, 1996: 1 26. “In Chechnya, Anything is Possible,” The Economist, August 17, 1996: 40. 27. Bourdreaux, “Chechen Leader . . .” 28. Lee Hockstader, “Chechen Guerrillas’ Deadly Swagger; Despite Theatrics, Highly Disciplined Rebels Overwhelm Russian Troops,” The Washington Post, August 18, 1996: A01. 29. Sergey Agaponov, “Itogi’: Wage Real War in Chechnya or Withdraw Troops,” Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT, March 10, 1996. 30. Carlotta Gall, “Cease-Fire May Halt Grozny Battle,” The Moscow Times, August 14, 1996. 31. Chernoyrdin had been the target of a small Chechen bomb in Moscow, coinciding with the opening of the battle in Grozny. 32. Michael Specter, “Rebels Overrun Russian Troops in Chechen City,” New York Times, August 8, 1996: A1. 33. James Meek, “Russians are Hit Hard as Rebels Take Grozny,” The Guardian, August 8, 1996: 10. 34. Specter, “Russians Failing . . .” 35. “Opposing Chechnya Commanders Talk Truce,” United Press International, August 12, 1996. 36. Ron Laurenzo, “Lebed Attacks Russian Interior Minister,” United Press International, August 16, 1996. 37. Michael Specter, “Chechen Rebel Leader Savors Triumph in a Shattered City,” New York Times, August 16, 1996: A3. 38. Jo Durden-Smith, “On Holiday from Blame,” The Moscow Times, August 27, 1996. 39. A good analysis of the political problems Lebed faced came to be found in Jonas Bernstein, “Kremlin Duplicity Makes Minefield for Lebed,” The Moscow Times, August 23, 1996. 40. “Chechnya: Black Hole of Russia,” Moscow News, September 12, 1996. 41. See James S. Robbins, “Sovereignty-Building: The Case of Chechnya,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer/Fall 1997): 17–36. 42. C. F Timothy L. Thomas, “Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned,” Military Review (July–August 2000): 50–58.

CHAPTER 7 THE U.S. EMBASSY BOMBINGS IN KENYA AND TANZANIA Sundara Vadlamudi

The bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was the first major al Qaeda attack against U.S. targets that resulted in a large number of casualties. The meticulous planning, sophistication of the attack (involving near simultaneous bombings), and the number of casualties served as an extreme wake-up call to the U.S. intelligence and lawenforcement community. The attack brought into sharper focus the danger posed by transnational jihadists and forced the U.S. government to readjust its counterterrorism policies. This study examines the plot to bomb the U.S. embassies, the responses by the U.S. government, and the lessons learned from those responses. The study is divided into six sections. The first section details the bombing plot and lists the key individuals involved in the plot. The second section lists the immediate U.S. response to the bombing and the third section provides an overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts against Osama bin Laden from the early 1990s until the embassy bombings in August 1998. The fourth section describes the cruise missile attacks on al Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, launched by the United States as a response to the embassy bombings. The fifth section examines U.S. counterterrorism policies and efforts after the cruise missile attacks. And finally, the conclusion highlights some of the lessons learned from the U.S. response to the embassy bombings. THE BOMBING PLOT On August 7, 1998, two bomb-laden trucks were driven almost simultaneously into the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, at approximately 10:35 a.m. and 10:39 a.m., respectively.

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The attacks killed 213 people in Nairobi, including 12 Americans and 11 people in Dar es Salaam.1 More than 5,000 people were injured in the attacks. The bombings, carried out by al Qaeda and Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad Organization, also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad) operatives, represented the first attack that was “planned, directed, and executed by al Qaida, under the direct supervision of bin Laden and his chief aides.”2 The attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, code-named by al Qaeda as “Operation Holy Ka’ba” and “Operation al-Aqsa,”3 respectively, were timed to occur between 10:30 and 11:00 a.m. when observant Muslims would be in the Mosque for their prayers.4 The attacks took place 8 years to the day after U.S. troops landed in Saudi Arabia as part of an international effort in response to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In December 1998, bin Laden denied his involvement in the bombing, but added “I don’t regret what happened there.” Bin Laden said that “our job is to instigate [people against the Jews and the Americans], and by the grace of God, we did that, and certain people responded to this instigation.”5 Al Qaeda established its presence in East Africa during the early 1990s in response to the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia, who went there to implement a U.N. program to supply food to Somali citizens. Al Qaeda viewed the U.S. troops’ deployment as a step toward increasing U.S. hegemony in the region as well as targeting al Qaeda’s infrastructure in neighboring Sudan.6 At times, bin Laden and others have suggested that al Qaeda established its presence in Somalia even before the arrival of U.S. troops in order to unify the Somali militias and oppose the U.S. presence in the country.7 It is difficult to ascertain the precise timeline of al Qaeda’s entry into Somalia, but it is apparent that bin Laden has always been opposed to the U.S. presence in the Horn of Africa. After all, he explicitly stated that America must be stopped and called for cutting “the head of the snake and stop them [Americans].”8 In 1992, Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri, al Qaeda’s military commander at that time, established cells in East Africa, specifically in Nairobi, Kenya,9 that acted as a transit point for al Qaeda operatives entering Somalia. Several al Qaeda members who went to Somalia and were involved in running the Nairobi cell participated in the embassy bombings. These operatives include Muhammad Atef (who became al Qaeda’s military commander after the death of Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri), Abdullah Muhammad Abdullah (also known as Ali Salih or simply Salih), Muhammad Siddiq Odeh, and Fazul Abdullah Muhammad (also known as Harun Fazil).10 By late 1993, al Qaeda, then based in Sudan, initiated reconnaissance efforts to identify targets in Kenya. Ali A. Muhammad11 cased the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, the USAID building, the French embassy, the French Cultural Center, and other British and Israeli targets. In 1994, Ali

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Muhammad went to Djibouti to conduct surveillance on several facilities, including the American and French embassies and French military installations. For some unknown reason, additional trips to Senegal to gather intelligence on French targets12 were cancelled. It is believed that bin Laden examined the surveillance photographs of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi and pointed to the exact spot where an explosive-laden truck should enter the building.13 The exact reason why al Qaeda did not immediately carry out attacks on U.S. targets is not known. One possible reason is that some al Qaeda members feared that such attacks would invite retaliation from the Kenyan government, which would affect the flow of al Qaeda operatives into Somalia.14 Another possible explanation is that a combination of factors, such as al Qaeda’s relocation to Afghanistan, the resulting loss of financial resources in Sudan, the death of al-Banshiri in a ferry accident in May 1996, and the time taken to rebuild the organization in Afghanistan, contributed to the delay in carrying out the attack. In any event, the U.S. withdrew its troops in March 1994, and al Qaeda’s cell in Nairobi remained active as a logistics base but did not plan any attacks.15 In May 1996, bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan and seek refuge in Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter, in August 1996, bin Laden declared war on the United States. Later, in February 1997, Wadi al-Hajj was summoned to Afghanistan, at which point bin Laden asked al-Hajj to “militarize” the cell in Nairobi.16 Later, in August 1997, U.S. officials investigating bin Laden’s role in financing terrorist attacks on the United States, raided al-Hajj’s house and confiscated his computer and several documents. Al-Hajj was then ordered to appear before a Federal jury in New York. After al-Hajj left Nairobi, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad took over the management of the Nairobi cell. Then, in February 1998, bin Laden issued the fatwa ordering Muslims worldwide to kill Americans and their allies wherever possible. The timeline of the plot and the subsequent attacks indicate that the final decision on the selection of targets and the date of attacks was probably taken around the same time that the fatwa was issued. Beginning in March, the preparations for the bombings moved forward at great speed. The attack planners rented safe houses for building the bombs, prepared false documents, and acquired delivery vehicles and explosives.17 By the first week of August, most of the attack planners had left Kenya and Tanzania, and the remaining members included only the actual perpetrators of the attack and a couple of al Qaeda operatives who were responsible for clearing up any traces of the group’s involvement in it.18 Al Qaeda had several reasons for attacking the U.S. embassy in Kenya. According to Muhammad al ‘Awhali, Abdullah Muhammad Abdullah provided the following reasons for choosing the U.S. embassy in Nairobi,19

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a. a large American presence at the embassy; b. the U.S. Ambassador was a female, whose killing might generate large publicity for the attack; c. U.S. embassy personnel were also managing some duties in Sudan;20 d. a number of Christian missionaries were at the embassy in Nairobi; and e. it was an easy target.

Abdullah explained that if multiple attacks were launched against U.S. targets outside the United States, it might make it easier to launch attacks inside the United States.21 Al Qaeda’s basic operational strategy in carrying out terrorist attacks was outlined by Abu Jandal, bin Laden’s bodyguard, following his capture and interrogation. According to Abu Jandal, al Qaeda pursues a method or principle that calls for “centralization of decision and decentralization of execution.” In action, this principle means that the decision to attack is made centrally but the method of attack and execution is decided by the field commanders. For example, in the USS Cole operation, the target was set by al Qaeda operatives on the ground. Then it was referred to a higher military central committee in al Qaeda called the Military Affairs Committee that approved the operation and provided the support and the funds for the operations.22 Muhammad al ‘Owhali said that the training at the al Qaeda camps for operating a cell divided cell into four sections: the intelligence section, the administration section, the planning and preparation section, and the execution section.23 L’Houssaine Kherchtou, an al Qaeda operative who turned an informant and testified in the embassy bombings trial, stated that there were four parts in an operation, namely, surveillance, targeting, facilitators, and the executors.24 Table 7.1 provides a brief list of the committees and members involved in planning and executing the 1998 attack on the U.S. embassies. Before examining the U.S. response to the embassy bombings, it is useful to look at whether or not the United States possessed any intelligence information that could have helped to prevent the attacks. The Accountability Review Board’s report on the embassy bombings, prepared by Admiral William J. Crowe, stated that there was no “credible intelligence that provided immediate or tactical warning of the August 7 bombings.” The report, however, acknowledged that there were rumors of threats to diplomatic missions, including the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, but added that the information was “discounted because of doubts about the sources.” The Board’s analysis termed other threat reporting as “imprecise, changing and non-specific as to dates.”25 The first clue about a possible attack came, ironically, as a result of the U.S. investigation into bin Laden’s role as a terrorist financier. Officials from the CIA and the Department of State were pursuing associates of bin

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Table 7.1 Key Members of the 1998 Embassy Bombings Plot Military Committee: Osama bin Laden, Muhammad Atef (killed in Afghanistan), Abu Ubayda al-Banshiri (killed in ferry accident) Surveillance: Ali A. Muhammad, Anas al-Liby (Anas Al-Sabai, Nazih Al-Raghie, Nazih Abdul Hamed Al-Raghie) Mastermind: Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (Abu Mohamed Al-Masri, Saleh, Ali Saleh, Abu Mariam) Bomb Builder: Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah (Abdul Rahman, Abdul Rahman Al-Muhajir, Abdel Rahman, Mohammed K.A. Al-Namer) Nairobi Attack Facilitators: Wadi al-Hajj, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad (Haroon Fazul, Fadil Abdallah Muhamad, Abdallah Mohammed Fazul), Muhammad Siddiq Odeh, Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam (Fahid Mohammed Ali Musalaam, Fahid Muhamad Ali Salem) Nairobi Attack Executors: Muhammad Rashid Daoud al ‘Awhali, Jihad Muhammad Ali (Azzam) Dar es Salaam Attack Facilitators: Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam (Fahid Mohammed Ali Musalaam, Fahid Muhamad Ali Salem), Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, Khalfan Khamis Muhammad, Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan (Sheikh Ahmad Salem Suweidan) Dar es Salaam Attack Executor: Hamden Khalif Allah Awad Sources: “Most Wanted Terrorists,” Federal Bureau of Investigation. Accessible at http:// www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/fugitives.htm. (Accessed on July 16, 2006); and FBI Executive Summary of FBI’s investigation into the embassy bombings. The document can be found at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/ summary.html (Accessed on July 4, 2006).

Laden, and their investigations led to Wadi al-Hajj, who was managing an NGO called Help Africa People in Nairobi. Kenyan police officials and U.S. investigators raided al-Hajj’s house and confiscated his computer as well as several documents.26 The presence of an al Qaeda associate in Nairobi should have alerted investigating officials about the possibility that other al Qaeda operatives were in the country. Additionally, investigators found a letter by al-Hajj’s deputy Fazul Abdul Muhammad, who expressed alarm about the deteriorating security situation of the Nairobi cell members. Muhammad warned that “there are many [r]easons that lead me to believe that the cell members in East Africa are in great danger” and added that “we are convinced one hundred percent that the Kenyan intelligence are aware about us and that indeed our security situation is extremely bad.” Muhammad goes on to state that he was extremely concerned about a report in the Daily Telegraph, which stated that “a leading associate [of bin Laden] . . . [known as] Abu Fadhl, the terrorist alias for Sidi Tayyib” was being held by Saudi authorities, and that the information provided by the captive was being passed to U.S. and British intelligence officials.27 Muhammad wished to confirm whether the al Qaeda operative mentioned in the news article was in fact Abu al-Fadhl

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al-Makki, since precautionary measures would have to be taken if such an important operative was in the custody of security officials.28 Muhammad asked his superiors, in lieu of the dangerous security situation, “are we ready for that big clandestine battle?”29 The discovery of the letter should have alerted U.S. officials about the presence of a larger al Qaeda cell in Nairobi. Later, in November 1997, an Egyptian named Mustafa Mahmud Sa’id Ahmad informed U.S. intelligence officials at the Nairobi embassy about a plot to target the U.S. embassy. Mr. Ahmad revealed that the plot involved the use of several vehicles and stun grenades and the detonation of a truck bomb inside the underground parking garage. The CIA, acting on Mr. Ahmad’s revelations, sent two reports to the Department of State. In response, the level of security was raised for several weeks but was lowered after no attack materialized. The CIA also cautioned that the effort might be an attempt by al Qaeda to observe the defensive measures adopted by the embassy. Mr. Ahmad was later arrested in Tanzania for his role in bombing the U.S. embassy in that country.30 Based on the general threat information, the Department of State and the CIA issued general threat advisories on two occasions. On June 12, 1998, the Department of State issued a statement indicating that it was stepping up the security at embassies and government sites in the Middle East and South Asia following “serious” reports of a terrorist attack.31 The announcement, which did not contain information on Africa, followed bin Laden’s interview with the ABC television network in May 1998, in which he repeated his intentions to attack U.S. targets, including civilians. Curiously, a large map of East Africa was prominently displayed on the wall behind bin Laden during this interview. On July 29, the Counter Terrorism Center (CTC) at the CIA issued a general alert about a CBRN attack by bin Laden. Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam were classified as medium threat posts, but the embassy security officers were as worried about muggings and carjacking as they were about terrorism.32 The U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Prudence Bushnell, twice requested that the embassy to be relocated to a different place, since its current location posed great risks. Ambassador Bushnell’s requests, however, were rejected by the Department of State.33 INITIAL RESPONSES Immediately after the embassy bombings, Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, convened the Counterterrorism and Security Group to respond to the bombing. Plans were made to evacuate the injured to Europe, deploy the Navy’s Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team (FAST)—a specialized team trained to provide force protection at sensitive locations—to provide security for the damaged embassies, and send the Department of State’s Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)

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to provide highly trained staff to assist the U.S. ambassadors in both the countries.34 The FBI launched a massive investigation, collecting evidence from the bomb sites, interviewing suspects, and arresting people. The Kenyan and Tanzanian investigations, supervised by the New York field office, were codenamed “KENBOM” and “TANBOM” respectively.35 In the first few days, some 400 FBI agents went to Africa from several field offices in the United States. The Washington, DC, office sent bomb experts and lab technicians; computer specialists were called from Pocatello, Idaho; and counterterrorism experts arrived from the New York office. The FBI conducted more than 1,500 interviews and collected about 8 tons of material that was shipped back to the United States for evidence analysis.36 During the investigation in Kenya, the FBI paired agents with the local Criminal Investigative Division (CID) in order to elicit better cooperation during the investigation.37 On the day of the bombings, the first break into the investigation occurred in Karachi, Pakistan, when Pakistani immigration officials detained Muhammad Siddiq Odeh based on the suspicious nature of his passport. The Pakistani officials did not reveal details of the arrest for another 3 days.38 Later, Odeh was taken into U.S. custody. Within a week, Kenyan police arrested Muhammad Rashid Da’ud al-Awhali, the alleged passenger in the truck that was used in the bombing. The original attack plan, if carried out successfully, would have resulted in the death of al-Awhali. However, he escaped the attack with some injuries.39 The arrests of Odeh and al-Awhali provided the investigators with crucial details about the plot and the identities of the al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives involved in the attack. Within a week, the CIA was able to attribute the attacks to bin Laden, and on August 14, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), delivered his formal judgment that bin Laden and his senior Egyptian aides were responsible for the attacks.40 Shortly after the bombings, U.S. intelligence agencies became aware of a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Tirana, Albania. The CIA, in collaboration with Albanian officials, disrupted an al Qaeda forgery cell as well as the plot to attack the embassy.41 Similarly, in the months after the embassy bombings, the CIA and the FBI, working with foreign intelligence agencies, managed to disrupt al Qaeda cells in several countries. In Uganda, the CIA and the FBI foiled a plot to attack the U.S. embassy in Kampala.42 The disruption efforts were aided by the National Security Agency’s (NSA) efforts in reviewing the communications made from al Qaeda safe-houses in Nairobi.43 U.S. intelligence agencies also received assistance from some Muslim countries. The arrested members were involved in logistics, fundraising, and communications. U.S. intelligence agencies realized the difficulties involved in apprehending the bombing teams, which are usually mobile, and hence came to the conclusion that

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these bombing teams might find it difficult to operate if the infrastructure and the support networks were disrupted. The number of apprehended members revealed the extent and depth of the organization.44 The United States made an important breakthrough when German officials arrested Mamduh Mahmud Salim, also known as Abu Hajir, a senior aide to bin Laden.45 After the bombings, the Counterterrorism Security Group examined the security levels of U.S. diplomatic missions around the world and identified 40 missions that needed urgent evaluation. Seven Embassy Security Assessment Teams (ESAT) comprising officials from several agencies, including the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the CIA, traveled to these posts to make their assessments. The U.S. Congress, in the meantime, acted on a $1.8 billion request from the White House for improving the security of U.S. diplomatic posts, and appropriated $1.5 billion for improving the security of U.S. diplomatic missions worldwide. The money was used to buy “radios, surveillance cameras, and armored cars” and to increase the number of diplomatic security personnel and improve the physical security of the buildings.46 U.S. RESPONSE TO AL QAEDA: PRE-EMBASSY BOMBING Prior to examining the set of U.S. responses to the embassy bombings, it is useful to look at U.S. counterterrorism efforts against bin Laden prior to 1998, since it will help us both to evaluate the extent to which the U.S. government was focused on bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, and to better understand the response measures taken after the embassy bombings, since some policies involved building upon (or improvising) existing counterterrorism measures. Following the first bombing of the World Trade Center in February 1993, and the subsequent discovery of a plot to target important landmarks in New York City, U.S. intelligence officials became aware of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden, although his role was identified primarily as a terrorism financier.47 Over the years, however, U.S. intelligence officials noticed increased reporting on bin Laden, and his stay in Sudan became a contentious issue between Sudan and the United States.48 After the United States withdrew its diplomatic staff from Sudan, citing threats and hostile surveillance of that staff, Sudanese officials attempted to mend ties with the United States. In those meetings, the sojourn of bin Laden and his supporters in Sudan figured prominently in the discussions.49 After the assassination attempt on Mubarak in June 1995, the Counterterrorism Security Group also considered taking direct action against bin Laden, who was suspected of being involved in the attack. The retaliation plans included targeting “Veterans’ Housing for Afghan War Fighters,” a bank believed to contain bin Laden’s money, as well as a few other options.50

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Eventually, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States forced Sudan to evict bin Laden, who then sought refuge in Afghanistan. In January 1996, David Cohen, chief of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, created a “virtual station”—like a CIA field station, but located in CIA’s headquarters in Langley, Virginia—that was supposed to focus on terrorism financing. The focus was then shifted to Osama bin Laden based on the recommendation of Michael Scheuer, the first chief of the station, which was named “Alec station”51 and had an initial staff of 10–15 officials.52 The intelligence gathered by this station enabled the United States to respond immediately and aggressively after the embassy bombings. During the summer of 1997, the CIA-funded Afghan tribal unit that was used to capture Mir Amal Kasi53 was transferred to the bin Laden unit to help capture bin Laden. The unit was renamed as FD/TRODPINT (a CIA codename). The proposed strategy was to capture bin Laden and simultaneously work toward obtaining an indictment that would enable the United States to prosecute him or, in the absence of an indictment, send him to another country such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia to stand trial.54 By early 1998, the Principals Committee55 gave its “blessing” to the plan. Meanwhile, the FBI’s New York field office, working with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, was preparing to indict bin Laden on charges of conspiring to attack U.S. defense installations.56 The court issued a sealed indictment in June 1998, which was revealed in November 1998, and the earlier indictment was superseded by another indictment issued after the embassy bombing.57 During the spring of 1998, a CIA plan to capture and remove bin Laden from Afghanistan was cancelled due to a lack of precise intelligence and an increased risk of failure.58 After the CIA plan to capture bin Laden was cancelled, Richard Clarke asked the Pentagon to prepare a military option to target bin Laden. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton, asked CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni to develop a plan. The Pentagon plan was presented in the first week of July. The Pentagon’s plan involved cruise missile strikes against eight terrorist camps as well bin Laden’s compound in Tarnak Farms near Kandahar, Afghanistan.59 Between 1996 and 1998, the Department of State’s South Asian bureau focused attention on bin Laden, especially after his relocation to Afghanistan, but the bureau’s agenda was dominated by the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, ending the civil war in Afghanistan, and improving human rights conditions under the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan.60 While looking for options to evict bin Laden from Afghanistan, the CIA approached Saudi Arabia and requested that the Saudi rulers utilize their influence on the Taliban to force bin Laden out of Afghanistan. Saudi Prince Turki bin Faysal, then head of Saudi Arabia’s General

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Intelligence Directorate (GID), met with Mullah Omar in June 1998; subsequently, Omar agreed to hand over bin Laden and promised to work with the Saudis in implementing the hand over.61 Of course, that never happened. As things stood on August 7, 1998, certain elements within the U.S. government became increasingly concerned about bin Laden’s pronouncements and activities. However, the government’s options were limited due to the lack of a legal indictment against bin Laden (at least until June 1998), the absence of U.S. influence over the Taliban regime, and poor intelligence on bin Laden’s movements. OPERATION INFINITE REACH On August 8, a day after the bombing, the CIA received intelligence that senior leaders of Islamist groups linked to bin Laden planned to meet on August 20 at the Zawhar Killi camp near Khowst in eastern Afghanistan in order to discuss the embassy bombings and plan additional attacks. George Tenet informed the Principals Committee at the White House about the planned meeting. The Principals Committee decided to target the meeting using cruise missiles. Air strikes seemed to be a likely option due to their past use in both the 1986 bombing of Libya, in response to a terrorist attack in Berlin, and the 1993 retaliatory strikes against the Iraqi intelligence headquarters after the discovery of an Iraqi plot to assassinate President Bush, Sr., during his visit to Kuwait. The Principals hoped that the missiles would hit bin Laden, but the National Security Council (NSC) recommended that the attacks be launched regardless of the meeting.62 The Zawhar Killi camp, besides being the location of the upcoming meeting, also had historical linkages to bin Laden that made it an attractive target. Bin Laden fought his most famous battle at that location and later issued his February 1998 fatwa against “Jews and Crusaders” from there, while announcing the creation of the World Islamic Front. The camp also served as a training ground with a base headquarters and five satellite training areas.63 An interagency group of officials prepared a list of 20 targets in Afghanistan, Sudan, and an unnamed third country.64 The decision to attack al Qaeda’s infrastructure outside Afghanistan was based on the desire of President Clinton and his foreign policy aides to launch a global response to al Qaeda’s attack on U.S. targets in two different countries.65 At a high-level meeting on August 19, it was decided to launch the attacks on the Zawhar Killi complex in Afghanistan and two Sudanese targets, the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant and a tannery. The al-Shifa plant was included on the grounds that bin Laden was using that facility to produce nerve agents that could be used in a future attack on the United States.66 The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Hugh Shelton, intervened to remove the tannery from the list of targets.

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On August 20, as part of Operation Infinite Reach, 75 Tomahawk missiles—each costing more than $750,000—hit the training camp complex in Afghanistan. At the same time, 13 Tomahawk missiles hit the alShifa facility in Khartoum, Sudan.67 The missile attack killed between 20–30 people68 in Afghanistan and 1 person in Sudan. But bin Laden remained unscathed, since he was not present when the cruise missiles struck the camps.69 The cruise missiles targeted the training camp complex, which included the Zawhar Killi al-Badr base camp, support complex, and four primary training camps.70 President Clinton issued a statement explaining that he ordered the cruise missile attack for the following four reasons: a) the groups’ involvement in the embassy bombings, b) the groups’ involvement in the past attacks on Americans, c) to prevent additional attacks planned by the groups, and d) because the groups were seeking to acquire chemical weapons and other dangerous weapons.71 Since international law prohibited acts of revenge, the Clinton administration portrayed the cruise missile attacks as self-defense measures aimed at disrupting the planning and execution of future attacks.72 Clinton administration officials cautioned that the missile attacks would not prevent further attacks, but would have certainly disrupted attacks being planned for the not-too-distant future. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, reiterating President Clinton’s remarks, stated that “while our actions are not perfect insurance, inaction would be an invitation to further horror.”73 POST-OPERATION INFINITE REACH ACTIONS The U.S. response to the embassy bombings did not end with the cruise missiles attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan. The United States saw the bombings as a wake-up call that brought into clearer focus the danger posed by religious terrorists in general and by Osama bin Ladin in particular. After the cruise missile attacks, officials involved in designing and implementing counterterrorism policies discussed several options to capture bin Laden, disable elements of his network (that are spread across several countries), and cripple his financial infrastructure. The discussion below considers some elements of the U.S. strategy aimed at addressing the threat posed by the al Qaeda network, and deals primarily with the efforts undertaken by the CIA, the Department of Defense, and diplomatic efforts, chiefly led by the Department of State, since a major portion of the Clinton administration’s counterterrorism efforts relied on these agencies. Other agencies, such as the FBI and the Department of Treasury, played crucial roles as well, and where appropriate they will also be discussed. However, because of space limitations, this section will not examine the responses to several threat reports that arrived immediately after the embassy bombings and throughout 1999.74

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Operation Infinite Resolve After the cruise missile attacks, some officials wished to carry out a sustained campaign of missile strikes against targets in Afghanistan. JCS Chairman General Shelton issued a planning order for additional missile strikes, and President Clinton expressed his desire to carry out such attacks sooner rather than later. The Pentagon named the planned strikes Operation Infinite Resolve. But some officials advised against further attacks. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Walter Slocombe advised Secretary Cohen that the list of targets did not seem promising and suggested defining an “articulate rationale for military action.” Some officials also feared that the missile strikes might cause large civilian casualties and stressed the need to collect better intelligence on bin Laden. Department of State officials cautioned that, after the bombing campaign in Kosovo and Operation Desert Fox in Iraq, the United States might be perceived as a mad bomber if it carried out additional cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan. President Clinton also feared that the additional missile attacks might increase the list of volunteers wishing to join al Qaeda’s training camps.75 During the fall of 1998, Richard Clarke developed a plan called “Political-Military Plan Delenda”76 to deal with the al Qaeda network. It was a multifaceted plan that involved bringing together several agencies of the U.S. government to attack the al Qaeda network. However, this plan was never formally adopted by the Principals Committee at the White House. In the plan’s military component, Clarke suggested a sustained campaign against bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan or elsewhere whenever the situation provided a set of targets. Clarke advised against solely relying on targeting terrorist leaders, thereby implying that a sustained campaign might persuade the Taliban’s leaders to hand over bin Laden. Defense Secretary William Cohen and JCS Chairman Shelton did not support Clarke’s idea of “rolling attacks,” since the primitive terrorist training camps offered poor targets for the expensive cruise missiles. President Clinton and Sandy Berger were also concerned about the “blowback” effects that might result from such a sustained campaign.77

The CIA’s Role The CIA, working with the FD/TRODPINT unit, developed plans to kidnap bin Laden as well as assist the Pentagon in launching cruise missile strikes on bin Laden whenever sufficient intelligence was available to carry out such an action. Sandy Berger ordered the Pentagon to deploy U.S. Navy ships and two cruise-missile-carrying submarines to the Arabian Sea. The submarine crew rehearsed the launching of the missiles and reduced the time gap between a presidential order and the missile

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impact in Afghanistan to about 4 hours.78 On three occasions between August 1998 and December 1999, the U.S. government seriously considered launching cruise missiles to kill bin Laden.79 The first chance occurred in December 1998 when intelligence information suggested that bin Laden might stay in the Haji Habash house that was part of the residence of the Governor of Kandahar. The strike was called off due to fears of causing large civilian casualties as well as concerns regarding the reliability of the intelligence source.80 Again, in February 1999, the tribal unit in Afghanistan provided information that bin Laden was at a desert hunting camp that belonged to visitors from a Gulf state believed to be UAE, a U.S. counterterrorism ally in the region. Once again, the option of using cruise missiles was discussed, but it was dropped after NSC officials considered the intelligence to be unreliable. Certain officials have hinted that the strike was called off to avoid injuring or killing members from the UAE royal family or senior officials from the UAE who were believed to be in that camp.81 The last attempt—and possibly the one with the best opportunity to kill bin Laden—was made in May 1999, when intelligence indicated that bin Laden will be staying in or near Kandahar for a period of 5 days. CIA field officers thought that this was the best piece of intelligence on bin Laden’s location. The strike was once again called off at the last minute, citing unreliable intelligence as a pretext.82 On all three occasions, the field officers at the CIA, officers in the bin Laden unit, and working-level military officials were unhappy with the decisions not to follow through with the missile strikes. In addition to collecting intelligence to facilitate cruise missile strikes on bin Laden, the CIA was also working with the FD/TRODPINT unit to kidnap bin Laden and bring him to trial. The effort was put on hold during the spring of 1998 but was reactivated after the embassy bombings. Following those attacks, President Clinton signed a Memorandum of Notification (MON) authorizing the CIA to let the FD/TRODPINT unit use force to capture bin Laden and his associates and also to attack bin Laden in other ways. However, this MON only allowed the tribal unit to use force in self-defense.83 As the tribal unit expressed its desire to conduct a raid to kidnap bin Laden rather than wait and lay an ambush, the initial MON was modified to include the use of firepower. The final draft of the MON included language that seemed to indicate that it was permissible to kill bin Laden only if it was not feasible to capture him during a raid.84 In February 1999, the CIA received White House sanction to employ troops from the Northern Alliance to hunt and capture bin Laden. However, the MON authorizing the action only allowed the use of force as a measure of self-defense during the capture operation.85 Divisions arose between White House officials and CIA field officers and officials working at the bin Laden’s unit over the ambiguity regarding the use of lethal force in attempts to capture bin Laden. CIA’s field officers

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felt that the White House was engaging in legal doubletalk concerning the use of lethal force, while unnecessarily criticizing the CIA for failing to capture bin Laden. The White House, on the other hand, felt that the CIA field officers were risk averse and purposefully misinterpreting the MONs to justify their inaction against bin Laden.86 In the fall of 1999, the CIA developed a new strategy called “The Plan.” Its elements included disrupting bin Laden’s operations, channeling and capturing bin Laden, conducting psychological operations to help capture bin Laden, targeting bin Laden’s associates, and increasing the technical capability to conduct surveillance and gather more information.87 The plan included a program for hiring and training better officers with counterterrorism skills, recruiting more assets, and trying to penetrate al Qaeda’s ranks.88 Meanwhile, in July 1999, Clinton authorized the CIA to develop plans, in collaboration with foreign governments, to capture bin Laden. This authorization allowed the CIA to make plans to work with the governments of Uzbekistan and Pakistan.89 Uzbekistan provided basing rights for small aircraft, trained a commando unit to hunt bin Laden, allowed the NSC and the CIA to install monitoring equipment to intercept Taliban and al Qaeda communications, and later allowed Predator reconnaissance planes to be based on Uzbek soil.90 The Pentagon’s Role After the embassy bombings, while discussing retaliation options against the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan, the Clinton administration did not consider a full-scale military invasion of Afghanistan as an option, since it was not considered feasible at that time. Key members of the Clinton administration, such as Sandy Berger and Madeleine Albright, as well as Clinton himself, did not believe that the United States could obtain domestic approval and external support for such an invasion. An option to employ Special Forces was considered and then rejected, since the operational plans presented by General Shelton involved extensive logistical planning and a long deployment time.91 Similarly, after the effort to attack bin Laden in December 1998 using cruise missiles was dropped due to fear of extensive collateral damage, the Pentagon proposed to use the AC-130 gunship instead of cruise missiles in order to reduce the extent of collateral damage. This proposal, however, was not implemented because its implementation would have involved extensive preparations and basing rights in neighboring countries, which the United States did not possess at that time.92 Unfortunately, during this period, the Pentagon missed an opportunity to reorient its counterterrorism strategies. In the fall of 1998, lower level officials in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict suggested a broad change in the national strategy

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and the Pentagon’s approach to counterterrorism, hinting at large-scale operations across a whole spectrum of U.S. military capabilities. The authors suggested an eight-part strategy that was more “pro-active and aggressive.” The authors warned that when faced with horrific attacks in the future, the Pentagon might not have a choice or a plan to respond to the attack. For unknown reasons, the concept paper did not advance much higher in the decision-making hierarchy.93 Diplomacy Diplomacy was also a major element of U.S. counterterrorism policy, as the United States tried to build alliances in its fight against the al Qaeda network and persuade countries that were providing safe haven to al Qaeda operatives to desist from continuing such support. During bin Laden’s stay in Sudan the United States—in collaboration with Egypt and Saudi Arabia—forced the Sudanese government to evict bin Laden. After bin Laden fled to Afghanistan, the United States was faced with a difficult situation, since Afghanistan was roiled by a civil war between the Taliban movement and the several factions that constituted the Northern Alliance. The United States did not have any diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. After the Taliban movement captured Kabul and assumed power, the issue became even more complicated, since the United States did not recognize the Taliban government. Only three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, recognized the newly formed Taliban government. Therefore, the United States at times relied on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to negotiate with the Taliban government, especially its reclusive leader Mullah Omar, regarding the handover of bin Laden to the United States or to any other Arab country. As described earlier, Prince Turki bin Faysal visited Mullah Omar in June 1998 to discuss the possibility of handing over bin Laden to Saudi Arabia, and Omar initially seemed favorably disposed toward the idea. However, when the Prince visited Mullah Omar again in September 1998, after the cruise missile attacks, Omar reneged on his pledge and instead railed against the Saudi Kingdom. Immediately after this event, Saudi Arabia withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan. Similarly, the United States requested that Pakistan engage the Taliban leadership in diplomatic efforts to evict bin Laden as well as cooperate with the CIA in its efforts to capture bin Laden. Pakistan stalled, however, and at times refused to provide such assistance. Sections within the Pakistani government, especially the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), were helping the Taliban government and did not wish to cooperate with the United States in apprehending bin Laden, who in turn was helping the Taliban government with money and supplying troops for fighting the Northern Alliance. Even within the U.S. government, there was a significant debate on defining

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a policy to deal with the situation in Afghanistan. Some officials felt that the United States should help negotiate an end to the civil war and aid in the formation of a unity government. Other officials felt that the United States should label the Taliban movement as a terrorist group and funnel assistance to the Northern Alliance to help defeat the Taliban government. In addition, the Department of State’s South Asia bureau was chiefly concerned with preventing hostilities between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, so the issue of bin Laden ranked lower in its list of priorities.94 Finally, in July 1999, Clinton declared the Taliban regime to be a state sponsor of terrorism and in October 1999, the United Nations imposed economic and travel sanctions on Afghanistan. Unfortunately, these actions did not change Mullah Omar’s behavior toward bin Laden. Later in 2000, the United Nations passed Resolution 1333, imposing an embargo on arms shipment to Afghanistan. Pakistan, however, continued to ship arms to Afghanistan.95 Terrorist Financing On August 20, on the same day that the United States launched cruise missile attacks on targets inside Sudan and Afghanistan, President Clinton—using powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act—signed Executive Order 13099, which prohibited transactions with terrorists “who threaten the Middle East peace process,” and included the names of Osama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (a.k.a. Osama bin Laden), Islamic Army (a.k.a. Al Qaeda, Islamic Salvation Foundation, The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places, The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, and The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites), Abu Hafs al-Masri, and Rifa’i Ahmad Taha Musa.96 Senior Clinton administration officials described the objectives of the executive order as “identifying the network, asserting jurisdiction, denying material support, technological, financial, provision of services and fundraising, and then working with allies to take similar steps, [through which] we will seek to identify a financial trail.”97 The Clinton administration also hoped that this measure would force other countries to adopt similar anti-terrorism financing regulations.98 Until President Clinton signed Executive Order 13099, there was no systematic effort within the U.S. government to examine bin Laden’s financing apparatus. This was a strange situation, since bin Laden was initially identified in U.S. investigations as a terrorist financier. Conventional wisdom within the CIA stated that terrorists carry out attacks cheaply, and hence that bin Laden did not need large amounts of money to operate his network. Also, the prevailing wisdom held that bin Laden inherited a vast fortune that was being used to finance his organization. Investigations by Clarke’s team and the Department of Treasury’s Office

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of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) revealed that bin Laden needed vast sums of money to operate his worldwide network, and that al Qaeda generated and moved large sums of funds through a vast financial network. The investigation revealed that bin Laden raised significant amounts of funds through generous donations from wealthy patrons in the Gulf States, circulated the money through regional banking centers, and then used Islamic NGOs operating as front organizations to deliver the funds to al Qaeda operatives.99 Discussions with Saudi officials and bin Laden’s family members revealed that his financial inheritance was not being used to finance the al Qaeda network.100 The U.S. government received limited assistance from Saudi Arabia in regulating its banking system and sharing the information requested. The U.S. government considered using covert operations against key financial nodes that were involved in money laundering operations. U.S. officials, however, feared that such actions (if discovered) might damage confidence in the international financial system, leading to massive losses. Therefore, U.S. officials adopted a policy of “naming and shaming” organizations involved in money laundering operations.101 CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED You can’t fight this enemy simply in defense. You also have to be prepared to go on the offense. —Sandy Berger, National Security Advisor to President Clinton102

President Clinton, in his address to the nation on August 20, 1998 following the launch of cruise missiles, stated that there are certain occasions when “law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough” and that the United States “must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens.” Implying that the struggle against terrorism did not end with the cruise missile strikes, President Clinton indicated that the fight will be a “a long, ongoing struggle between freedom and fanaticism, between the rule of law and terrorism” and warned that the United States “is and will remain a target of terrorists precisely because we are leaders; because we act to advance peace, democracy and basic human values; because we’re the most open society on earth.”103 The cruise missile attacks and the counterterrorism policies outlined by Clinton administration officials revealed a shift in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. According to Congressional Research Service analyst Raphael Perl, the cruise missile attacks represented the first time that the United States assigned such “primary and public prominence to the preemptive, as opposed to the retaliatory, nature and motive of a military strike against a terrorist organization or network.” Perl’s evaluation of the

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Clinton administration’s response to the embassy bombings is very informative and worth repeating in its entirety. Perl argued that the new counterterrorism policy was:104 1. more global, less defensive, and more proactive; 2. more national security oriented and less traditional law enforcement oriented; 3. more likely to use military force and other proactive measures; 4. less likely to be constrained by national boundaries when sanctuary is offered to terrorists or their infrastructure in instances where vital national security interests are at stake; and 5. generally, more unilateral when other measures fail, particularly if other nations do not make an effort to subscribe to like minded policies up front.

U.S. counterterrorism policies since the September 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington, DC, have built upon the Clinton administration’s aggressive response to the embassy bombings. After 9/11, which served as a far more traumatic wake-up call, all the relevant agencies of the U.S. government that are involved in formulating and implementing counterterrorism policies have made significant progress in increasing their capabilities to address the threat from the transnational jihadists and self-starter cells inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology. Despite such improvements, significant gaps remain in our understanding of the nature of the evolving threat and the means to address it. The limited scope of this chapter precludes a detailed examination of either the improvements made in U.S. counterterrorism capabilities since 9/11 or the shortcomings that still need to be addressed. However, some of the lessons learned from the U.S. responses to the embassy bombings can be identified: – Terrorism financing: The imposition of economic sanctions on al Qaeda and its top leaders led to a better understanding of al Qaeda’s financial network. The investigations into al Qaeda’s financial network enabled the U.S. government to map the major nodes in the financial network that were used for collecting and routing money. – Liaisons with local governments: The FBI made every effort to work closely with Kenyan and Tanzanian officials and actively involve them in the investigative process. This outreach effort helped the investigators gain the cooperation of local investigative agencies. – Sharing intelligence with foreign governments: The CIA provided intelligence and worked closely with the governments of Albania and Uganda to disrupt plots to attack U.S. embassies in those countries. Similarly, the CIA worked with several foreign intelligence agencies to disrupt several al Qaeda cells. – Importance of good actionable intelligence: The success of an aggressive strategy of targeting terrorists and their infrastructure is dependent on the ability to

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collect accurate intelligence on the targets and striking the targets with limited collateral damage.

Hopefully, further lessons can be learned that will enable U.S. government agencies to interdict or forestall future terrorist attacks. NOTES 1. In Kenya, the number of casualties would have been significantly higher if it were not for the guards who refused to allow the truck inside the compound. In Tanzania, due to good fortune, a water tanker stood between the bomb-carrying truck and the embassy building and absorbed a lot of the bomb’s impact. 2. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004) 67–70. 3. Prosecution’s closing argument presented by Kenneth Karas, United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al., [henceforth USA v Usama bin Laden et al.] United States District Court, Southern District of New York, s(7) 98 cr. 1023, May 1, 2001, p. 5376. In February 1998, while issuing the fatwa against the Americans and announcing the formation of the World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders, bin Laden stated: “[I]t is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it to kill Americans and their allies—civilian and military—in any country where it is possible to do so, in order to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Holy Mosque [the Al-Haram Mosque in Mecca, home of the Kaba] from their grip . . . ” See Randall B. Hamud, ed., Osama Bin Laden: America’s Enemy in His Own Words (San Diego, CA: Nadeem, 2005) 60. 4. Peter Bergen, Holy War Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden (New York: The Free Press, 2001) 108. 5. “Bin Laden hints he instigated embassy attacks,” The Ottawa Citizen, January 3, 1999. 6. According to Abu Jandal, whose real name is Nasir Ahmad Abdallah al-Bahri, who served as bin Laden’s bodyguard, “The impact of international developments on Somalia and the entry of the U.S. forces into it were [Osama bin Laden’s] justification for the entry of al Qaida into [the country]. Al Qaida viewed the entry of the Americans into Somalia not as a move that is meant to save the Somalis from [famine], but to control Somalia and then spread U.S. hegemony over the region. This will achieve several goals. First, it will strike the growing Islamic movement in Sudan. Second, it will setup a rear U.S. base in the Gulf, since Somalia was the closest point to the Arabian Gulf.” See Abu Jandal’s interview, Khalid al-Hammadi, “Part 2—Al Qa’ida from Within, as narrated by Abu Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri), bin Laden’s bodyguard,” Al Quds al-Arabi, March 19, 2005: 19. 7. Abdel bari Atwan, who interviewed bin Laden in 1997, said “Bin Laden told me that he was expecting the [Americans] to come to Somalia and he sent people a month before their arrival to be prepared. And when they came actually he attacked them. But unfortunately, according to him, they ran away. And he wanted them to stay in order to fight them. He told me that the American

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soldiers were cowards in comparison with the Soviet soldiers.” Also Abu Jandal, bin Laden’s bodyguard said “the Al-Qa’ida Organization mujahidin were already there when the United States entered because they had a program and camps and a vision to unify the country. They aspired to make of Somalia a stronghold for them close to the Arabian peninsula because the brothers in the Al Qa’ida had an aim to liberate the Arabian peninsula later on.” For Atwan’s comments see Peter Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: An Oral History of al Qaeda’s Leader (New York: Free Press, 2005), pp. 137–138. 8. Testimony of Jamal al-Fadl during the trial of USA v Osama bin Laden. Quoted in Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: 137. 9. 9/11 Commission Report: 65. 10. USA v Osama bin Laden, Summation of Prosecutor: pp. 5253–5261; For names of the operatives see the declassified FBI Executive Summary of FBI’s investigation into the embassy bombings, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/binladen/bombings/summary.html (accessed July 4, 2006). 11. Ali Muhammad was a former major in the Egyptian Army and later became a supply sergeant in the U.S. Army’s Special Forces base in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 2000, Muhammad pled guilty to five counts of conspiracy to kill nationals of the United States and officers or employees of the U.S. government on account of their official duties, to murder and kidnap, and to destroy U.S. property. 12. Bin Laden wanted to attack French targets as a result of France’s role in Algeria. 13. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002), pp. 129–130. 14. Khalid al-Hammadi, “Part 9 - Al Qa’ida from Within, as narrated by Abu Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri), bin Laden’s bodyguard,” Al Quds al-Arabi, March 28, 2005: 21. 15. Benjamin and Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: 130. In fact bin Laden expected the U.S. troops to stay and planned for a long fight in Somalia. See Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: 137–138. 16. USA v Osama Bin Laden, Summation by Prosecutor Karas: 5225. 17. 9/11 Commission Report: 69. 18. Ibid.; Zahid Hussain, “Suspect Reportedly Says Hired Hands Left Behind to Carry Out Bombings,” Associated Press, August 20, 1998. 19. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: 222–223. Interestingly bin Laden is also believed to have provided some rationale for attacking the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. According to Abu Jandal, bin Laden’s bodyguard, bin Laden told Abu Jandal and others that the two American embassies were big detention centers for Muslims. They were also described as the “plotting minds” of the events in Rwanda where more than “80,000 Muslims were killed.” The fight between the Hutus and the Tutsis was characterized as a fight between Muslims and Christians. The American embassy was portrayed to be behind that struggle. See Khalid al-Hammadi, “Part 3—Al Qa’ida from Within, as narrated by Abu Jandal (Nasir al-Bahri), bin Laden’s bodyguard,” Al Quds al-Arabi, March 25, 2005: 19. 20. In February 1996, after evaluating the threat to U.S. diplomatic personnel in Sudan, the U.S. embassy staff was withdrawn and 2,100 Americans living in

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Sudan were urged to leave. Then Ambassador Timothy Carney moved to Nairobi and monitored Sudan. See Benjamin and Simon: Age of Sacred Terror pp. 244–245. In 1993, Sudan was designated a State Sponsor of Terrorism. 21. Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know: 223. 22. Ibid.: 253. 23. Ibid.: 220–221. 24. Prosecution’s closing argument presented by Kenneth Karas, United States of America v. Usama Bin Laden et al., May 1, 2001, p. 5248. 25. Report of the Accountability Review Boards: Bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/ board introduction.html (accessed June 30, 2006). 26. Oriana Zill, “A Portrait of Wadih El Hage, Accused Terrorist,” PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/ elhage.html(accessed on July 4, 2006). 27. Hugh Davies, “Saudis detain member of anti-American terror group,” The Daily Telegraph, August 2, 1997. The news article stated that Sidi Tayyib was providing information about the financial methods of bin Laden. The article also mentioned that another al Qa’ida operative named Jallud is also in the custody of the Saudis. Sidi Tayyib is also known as Madani al-Tayyib. Even though the article correctly stated that Tayyib was in U.S. custody, it incorrectly assumed that Saudi Arabia was passing on the information provided by Tayyib. In fact, Saudi Arabia blocked U.S. attempts to interview Tayyib. After the embassy bombings, U.S. officials made several requests to interview Tayyib during their investigations of al Qaeda’s financial network. See 9/11 Commission Report: 122. 28. “The Letter From El Hage’s Computer,” PBS Frontline, http://www.pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/computer.html (accessed July 4, 2006). 29. Ibid. 30. Raymond Bonner and James Risen, “Nairobi Embassy Received Warning of Coming Attack,” The New York Times, October 23, 1998, Section A: 1. 31. “US increases security following ‘serious’ threats of terrorist attack,” Agence France Presse, June 13, 1998. 32. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004) 404. 33. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: 109. 34. Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror (New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 181–183. 35. “The War on Terrorism: Remembering the losses of KENBOM/ TANBOM,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/aug03/ kenbom080603.htm (accessed July 5, 2006). 36. Angie Cannon, “Searching Hell,” The Advertiser, October 10, 1998; David E. Kaplan, “On Terrorism’s Trail,” U.S. News & World Report, November 23, 1998: 30. 37. Kaplan, “On Terrorism’s Trail.” 38. Ibid. At least one report suggested that U.S. intelligence officials, after intercepting conversations between bin Laden’s associates, alerted Pakistani

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officials to watch for suspicious individuals, thus resulting in the capture of Odeh. See Gregory L. Vistica and Daniel Klaidman, “Tracking Terror,” Newsweek, October 19, 1998: 46. 39. Karl Vick, “Assault on a U.S. Embassy: A Plot Both Wide and Deep,” The Washington Post: A1. 40. Coll, Ghost Wars: 406–407. 41. 9/11 Commission Report: 127. The U.S. Embassy in Albania was closed on August 14. See Philip Shenon, “Security Experts Assessing U.S. Embassies,” The New York Times, September 8, 1998: 6. 42. In September 1998, Ugandan officials, acting on information provided by the CIA and assisted by the FBI, arrested 18 members, including 7 Somalis, who were planning an attack on the U.S. embassy. See Neely Tucker, “U.S. Deals Serious Blow to Bin Laden’s Network,” Times-Picayune, September 20, 1998. Another news report suggested that 20 people were arrested during the raids. See “CIA reportedly thwarted plot against embassy in Uganda,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 25, 1998. 43. John Miller, Michael Stone, and Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (New York: Hyperion, 2002), p. 213. 44. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: 267–268. The countries in which the cells were disrupted include Italy, Britain, and Azerbaijan. 9/11 Commission Report: 127. See also James Risen, “U.S. Directs International Drive on Bin Laden Networks,” The New York Times, September 25, 1998: 3. 45. Benjamin Weiser, “U.S. Says Bin Laden Aide Tried to Get Nuclear Material,” The New York Times, September 26, 1998. 46. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: 266; Eric Schmitt, “Administration to Ask $1.8 Billion for Embassy Security,” The New York Times, September 22, 1998; Shenon, “Security Experts Assessing U.S. Embassies.” 47. Eleanor Hill, “Joint Inquiry Staff Statement—Part I,” Joint Inquiry Staff, September 18, 2002: 13. 48. Barton Gellman, “U.S. Was Foiled Multiple Times in Efforts To Capture Bin Laden or Have Him Killed; Sudan’s Offer to Arrest Militant Fell Through After Saudis Said No,” The Washington Post, October 3, 2001: A1. 49. “1996 CIA Memo to Sudanese Official,” The Washington Post, October 3, 2001. 50. Clarke, Against All Enemies: 141. 51. It was named Alec station after Michael Scheuer’s son. Mark Mazzetti, “C.I.A. Closes Unit Focused on Capture of bin Laden,” The New York Times, July 4, 2006. 52. Hill, “Joint Inquiry Staff Statement—Part I”: 13. 53. Mir Amal Kasi was a Pakistani who, in 1993, shot five and killed two CIA employees outside the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. Kansi was eventually captured in June 1997 and convicted in a U.S. court and was awarded the death sentence. Kansi was killed by lethal injection in November 2002. 54. Coll, Ghost Wars: 375–376. 55. The Principals Committee of the National Security Council (NSC) is a cabinet level policy formulation and implementation group of the U.S. government.

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56. Al Qa’ida was involved in bombing two hotels in Eden in December 1992 where U.S. troops were staying on their route to Somalia. Two people, but no Americans, were killed in the attack. U.S. troops left before the bomb went off. Al Qa’ida was also involved in the attack on U.S. military personnel in October 1993 when 18 U.S. troops were killed in a firefight in Mogadishu, commonly known as the “Black Hawk Down” incident. 57. 9/11 Commission Report: 110. 58. Ibid.: 111–114. 59. Ibid.: 116. It is certain that the Zinni’s plan to use cruise missiles was influenced by previous U.S. responses to terror attacks or plots. In 1986, responding to the bombing of a disco in Berlin, the United States launched air strikes against Libya. Similarly, in 1993, after uncovering a failed Iraqi plot to assassinate President Bush, Sr., Clinton ordered cruise missiles attacks on the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. 60. Ibid.: 110; Coll, Ghost Wars: 382. 61. Ibid.: 115; Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, “Strained Alliance: Al Qaeda’s Sour Days in Afghanistan—Fighters Mocked the Place; Taliban, in Turn, Nearly Booted Out bin Laden—A Fateful U.S. Missile Strike,” Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2002: A1. 62. 9/11 Commission Report: 116; Coll, Ghost Wars: 409. The level of accuracy of the information regarding bin Laden’s presence at the facility varied. The source of the intelligence on the meeting is not known. Peter Bergen a journalist, has suggested that the information was provided by a Pakistani source. Bergen, Holy War Inc.: 121. 63. Coll, Ghost Wars: 409–410. 64. James Risen, “To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not; A Year Later, Debates Rankle,” The New York Times, October 27, 1999. 65. Ibid. 66. The decision to attack the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant was closely contested within the U.S. administration. The Clinton administration was severely criticized across the world for targeting that facility. An evaluation of the information available in the public domain indicates that the intelligence on chemical weapons production at the Al-Shifa plant was not entirely accurate. For more information on the debates within the Clinton administration and the controversy surrounding the decision, see Michael Barletta, “Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence,” The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 1 (Fall 1998):115–136; James Risen, “To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not; A Year Later, Debates Rankle,” New York Times, Oct. 27, 1999: A1; Tim Weiner and James Risen, “Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise Inferred From Evidence,” The New York Times, September 21, 1998: 1. 67. Coll, Ghost Wars: 411. 68. 9/11 Commission Report: 119; Barletta, “Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence”: 116. 69. Several reasons have been offered to explain bin Laden’s absence at the camps. One explanation offered was that bin Laden expected the missile attacks and went into hiding. Another explanation offered was that Pakistani officials noticed the presence of U.S. Naval vessels and probably alerted bin Laden

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through the Taliban. Another explanation was that the evacuation of U.S. diplomatic staff from Pakistan alerted bin Laden to the cruise missile attacks. Another explanation, offered by bin Laden’s bodyguard, attributed bin Laden’s escape to pure luck. 70. “U.S. DOD DoD news briefing,” M2 Presswire, August 21, 1998. The training camps are used for training terrorist tactics, indoctrination, weapons, and the use of improvised explosive devices. See Ibid. 71. Statement by President Clinton, August 20, 1998, http://www.state.gov/ www/regions/africa/strike clinton980820.html (accessed on July 5, 2006). 72. “Press Briefing by Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger,” M2 Presswire, August 21, 1998; Coll, Ghost Wars: 409. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, while replying to a question whether the attacks represented assassination, denied that the missile attacks were an act of assassination and stated that the camps were a “military target” and “it is appropriate . . . for protecting the self-defense of the United States . . . for us to disrupt and destroy those kinds of military terrorist targets.” 73. “Press Briefing by Madeleine Albright and Sandy Berger,” M2 Presswire, August 21, 1998; See also “White House: Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and Mile McCurry,” M2 Presswire, August 24, 1998. Berger stated that “We can’t guarantee that something like this will prevent further attacks on the United States. But I am absolutely certain that had we not done this we would have been the victim of other terrorist attacks in the not too distant future.” 74. For a discussion of the threats faced during 1998 and 1999, see 9/11 Commission Report: 128–130, 141. 75. Coll, Ghost Wars: 413; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: 283–284; 9/11 Commission Report: 120–121, 134. 76. Delenda in Latin meant “[something] must be destroyed.” See 9/11 Commission Report: 120. 77. Clarke, Against All Enemies: 196–198; 9/11 Commission Report: p. 120. 78. Coll, Ghost Wars: 421. 79. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: 280–281. 80. 9/11 Commission Report: 130–131; Coll, Ghost Wars: p. 422. 81. 9/11 Commission Report: 137–138. For a detailed description of the events see Coll, Ghost Wars: 445–450. 82. 9/11 Commission Report: 140–141. 83. Ibid.: 126, 131. 84. Ibid.: 131–132. 85. Ibid.: 139. 86. For a good description of the debates on both sides, see Coll, Ghost Wars: 424–430. 87. “Testimony of J. Cofer Black—Director of CIA Counterterrorist Center (1999–2002)” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, April 13, 2004: 2. 88. 9/11 Commission Report: 142; “Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, March 24, 2004: 14–15. The decision to sue the Predator reconnaissance aircraft grew out of a policy decision to gather more real-time intelligence on

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bin Laden’s movements. See Coll, Ghost Wars: 526–530; Clarke, Against All Enemies: 220–222. 89. 9/11 Commission Report: 142. 90. Coll, Ghost Wars: 459–460, 531–532. 91. Ibid, 407–408; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: 294–295. Peter Schoomaker, Commander of the Special Operations Command, however, stated that it was possible to deploy Special Forces to attack bin Laden. During 1998, the Special Operations Command was not a “supported” command, rather it was a “supporting command” that meant it only acted to support other force commands and could not develop plans on its own. In this case, the elaborate plan for deploying Special Forces was prepared by CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni. 9/11 Commission Report: 136. 92. Ibid.: 135. 93. Ibid.: 121. 94. Coll, Ghost Wars: 441–443; 9/11 Commission Report: 121–124; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, & Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 183–196. 95. 9/11 Commission Report: 125–126. 96. Clarke, Against All Enemies: 190; “The White House: Executive Order,” M2 Presswire, August 25, 1998. Abu Hafs al-Masri is commonly known as Muhammad Atif, al Qaeda’s military commander. Rifa’i Ahmad Musa Taha is the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Group who signed the statement announcing the creation of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders. 97. “The White House: Background briefing by Senior Administration Officials,” M2 Presswire, August 24, 1998. 98. Ibid. 99. Clarke, Against All Enemies”: 190–193; Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: pp. 268–270. 100. 9/11 Commission Report: 122. 101. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror: 270. 102. Raphael Perl, “Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction?” CRS Report for Congress, September 1, 1998: 2. 103. “Address to the Nation by the President: The Oval Office,” M2 Presswire, August 20, 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/strike clinton980820a.html (accessed July 5, 2006). 104. Perl, “Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania”: 2–3.

CHAPTER 8 THE CASE OF RAMZI YOUSEF Gary A. Ackerman and Sundara Vadlamudi

Despite being replete with all sorts of colorful and dastardly characters, the annals of terrorism contain few more brazen and ambitious rogues than Ramzi Ahmad Yousef (also sometimes spelled Yusuf). During his relatively brief career as an international terrorist, crisscrossing the globe from 1993 to 1995, Yousef succeeded in attacking one of the world’s most prominent structures, plotting the assassination of several heads of state, winning over dozens of Muslim radicals, and planning what would have been one of the deadliest and most complex terrorist attacks of all time, all the while being pursued by several nations’ law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Yousef has been variously described as a “mastermind”1 and—at least while he was active—as “the most dangerous man in the world,”2 monikers that he himself no doubt appreciated; yet much about this chameleon-like and egoistical villain remains a mystery. This chapter will describe what is known about Yousef’s origins and his development as a terrorist as well as trace his global exploits of mayhem. At the same time it will examine the nature and efficacy of the ultimately successful counterterrorist effort directed toward capturing a man who quickly rose to the rank of the world’s most wanted terrorist. Lastly, the chapter will attempt to draw lessons from the campaign against Yousef, lessons that can be applied to both current and future counterterrorism operations. ORIGINS During his operational period, Yousef utilized a slew of aliases (more than 40 in all) and was known to periodically alter his external appearance—for instance, by changing the length and color of his hair. This penchant for disguising his identity to confuse his adversaries was sufficiently successful that to this day there exist those who doubt his true

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origins,3 although most commentators believe that he was born Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul Karim4 on April 27, 1968, in a working-class suburb of Kuwait City.5 His father was a Pakistani from Baluchistan who worked as an engineer for Kuwaiti Airlines and his mother was a Kuwaiti of Palestinian lineage. Although Yousef’s father apparently became radicalized by Wahhabi doctrine while Yousef was still a teenager (and allegedly later joined the anti-Shi’i terrorist group Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan6 ), Yousef is believed to have had a relatively standard Islamic education. Yousef showed great promise as a student, especially in mathematics and the sciences, and was conversant in Arabic, Urdu, and English. Contemporaries recalled him even then as being charismatic and seeking to lead, and several of his childhood friends later on ended up joining him in his terrorist pursuits.7 At the age of 18, Yousef traveled to Britain, and shortly thereafter, in August 1987, he began studying at the West Glamorgan Institute of Higher Education in Swansea, Wales. After receiving his diploma in 1989, Yousef returned to Kuwait, where he was likely swept up in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. By this stage his militant attitudes were almost certainly already crystallized, and by mid-1991, he was associating and training with fellow militants in Pakistan, to which his family had moved in 1986. It was at this time that Yousef and one of his brothers married the sisters of a Pakistani militant, and Yousef bought a house in Quetta. Shortly afterwards, in late 1991, Yousef reportedly accompanied the future founder of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, whom he had befriended, to the Philippines to help him train militants.8 By the middle of 1992, Yousef was back in Pakistan, serving as an instructor at the University of Dawa and Jihad, a terrorist training camp, ready to embark on his campaign of violence. Physically, Yousef was a rather unimposing individual, being described as “tall with a long and skinny neck and face, . . . a large, bulbous nose and flared ears.”9 Intellectually and psychologically, however, he certainly had the tools to become one of America’s more lethal adversaries. CHRONOLOGY OF ATTACKS The first major terrorist attack that Yousef was involved in was the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City.10 In the early 1990s, a group of followers of an imprisoned extremist named alSayyid Nusayr began formulating plans to carry out acts of jihad against the United States.11 Mahmud Abu Halima, a burly, red-bearded Egyptian who had fought in Afghanistan against the Soviets realized that the group needed an explosives expert, and sent for Yousef, whom he had presumably met a few years earlier in one of the training camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Yousef, using a false passport, entered the United States on

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September 1, 1992, and within a short space of time took de facto control over the group’s planning and activities.12 Soon Yousef, using the alias Rashid, had developed a plan to conduct a large-scale bombing and settled on the WTC as the target. The core group of conspirators now consisted of Yousef, Abu Halima, a simpleton named Muhammad Salama, Salama’s close friend Nidal Ayyad (who was a chemical engineer and helped acquire difficult-to-obtain chemicals through the company for which he worked), and an Iraqi named Abdul Rahman Yasin. Beginning in November, Yousef and Salama had begun ordering chemicals from chemical suppliers, storing them in a public storage facility and building the bomb in a rented apartment in Jersey City. Yousef directed the production of a 1,500 pound urea-nitrate bomb, the most difficult part of which was the production of the notoriously unstable nitroglycerine that was needed as a primary explosive. Salama, a somewhat incompetent driver, involved himself and Yousef in a car accident in late January 1993, resulting in Yousef’s hospitalization and nearly derailing the entire plot. After returning from the hospital, Yousef continued work on the bomb, the force of which he enhanced with various chemicals and bottled hydrogen, and the conspirators began surveilling their target. Then, on February 26, 1993, having loaded the bomb into a rented Ford Econoline van, the conspirators drove the van into the parking garage of One World Trade Center, lit four fuses, and left. At 12:17 p.m. the bomb exploded, creating a huge crater in the parking garage and collapsing several floors. However, the blast did not succeed in bringing down either of the twin towers, as Yousef had intended.13 Yousef later claimed that he would have made a more powerful bomb if he had not run out of money.14 Ultimately, 6 people lost their lives and over 1,000 were injured in the blast.15 A few hours later, Yousef departed the United States for Pakistan. After the WTC attack, Yousef’s star was on the rise amongst extremists and in July 1993 he was approached in Karachi, Pakistan, and offered $68,000 to assassinate then prime ministerial candidate Benazir Bhutto.16 After spending a week scouting and preparing, Yousef was ready to place the bomb but was wounded when the explosive detonated unexpectedly. Despite requiring several weeks of recuperation, Yousef doggedly persisted, and plotted to kill Bhutto with a sniper rifle. Unfortunately, when the rifle was not delivered on time, Yousef was forced to abandon the plot. Undaunted, Yousef traveled to Bangkok in early 1994 to begin assembling a new terrorist cell to attack U.S. or Israeli targets there. Yousef assembled a 1-ton bomb, but the plot was aborted when the driver of the truck with the bomb had an accident on the way to the Israeli Embassy, and Yousef was forced to flee back to Pakistan. In May 1994, he began to display rising animosity toward Shi’i Muslims and, when recruited by the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (MEK) organization, he agreed to lead an attack in Iran. On June 20, 1994, Yousef’s efforts resulted in the detonation of

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a small bomb comprising high-explosive in a shrine in Mashhad, Iran, which killed 26 people and injured at least 200.17 Yousef did not rest on his laurels; during the summer of 1994, he was involved in a series of incipient plots, prolific networking activities, and training other extremists in bomb-making in the Philippines. It is alleged that Osama bin Laden requested that Yousef assassinate President Bill Clinton during his upcoming November 1994 visit to the Philippines.18 While Yousef was enthusiastic, for once he demurred and decided that the security surrounding Clinton would be too great to conduct a successful attack. Thereafter, he refocused his attention toward assassinating Pope John Paul II, who was scheduled to visit the Philippines on January 15, 1995. One tactic he considered was to use a suicide bomber dressed as a Filipino priest, who would detonate an explosive when the Pope approached the “priest” to kiss him,19 while an alternative plan consisted of the detonation of a remote-controlled device on the Pope’s scheduled route.20 The envisaged attack on the Pope would also serve to divert attention from Yousef’s single most ambitious plan, potentially even more destructive than the WTC attack, which carried the rather lyrically-sounding codename of “Bojinka.”21 From mid-1994, Yousef—together with his uncle, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad22 —developed a plot to use 5 operatives to place timed explosives on 12 different flights that would explode on subsequent legs (mostly en route to the United States) after the attackers had disembarked during stopovers.23 This was to be accomplished using a novel bomb devised by Yousef that could pass through airport security. While in Pakistan, Yousef recruited Abdul Hakim Murad, Wali Khan Amin Shah, and others and trained them to build his bombs. Yousef also did extensive background work on airport security and even obtained Boeing 747 blueprints to determine where to place his bombs so as to maximize their damage. Yousef traveled to Manila in September 1994 to implement “Oplan Bojinka,” and was later joined first by Murad and then by Amin Shah. Yousef wanted to test his explosive creation before the final attack, so he set off a similar device in a generator room in a shopping center in Cebu City in November, and on December 1 arranged for another device to be placed under a seat in a Manila movie theater, the detonation of which injured several patrons. On December 11, 1994, as a final test, Yousef succeeded in smuggling his device on Philippines Airlines Flight 434 from Manila to Japan, planted it under a seat, and left the plane at a stopover. During the next leg of the trip, the device exploded, killing one passenger and causing an emergency landing. At the same time, in mid-December 1994, he even came up with the idea of having his friend Murad fly a plane laden with chemical weapons or explosives and either crashing it into CIA headquarters, or spraying chemicals over the area.24

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The Bojinka plot was nearing completion when, on January 5, 1995, roughly 2 weeks before it was to be activated,25 a fire started while Yousef was mixing chemicals in an apartment in Manila. Yousef was forced to flee and both Yousef’s friend Murad and a laptop detailing the plan were captured. The plot was aborted and Yousef returned to Pakistan, where, after considering several further terrorist plots (mainly aimed at the Philippines, with the ostensible aim of securing Murad’s release), Yousef was captured before he could engage in any further violence. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATIONAL LINKS Yousef did not take his terrorist career lightly; he applied his intellect and energy toward developing the skills he would later use so adroitly in his attacks. While completing his diploma in computer-aided electrical engineering, Yousef took a course in microelectronics, which probably facilitated his later bomb-making. Although he did not actually fight in the Afghan conflict, it is believed that as early as 1988, Yousef spent time there and in Pakistan learning how to make explosives.26 He also claimed to have studied numerous chemical encyclopedias in order to become a more proficient bomb-maker.27 This allowed Yousef to create some genuine innovations in bomb-making, including the ingenious device consisting of nitroglycerine in a contact lens case, a Casio databank wristwatch as a timer, and an ignition circuit made from a light bulb filament and a standard 9-volt battery. It was this bomb that he intended to use in the Bojinka attacks and tested successfully in the Philippines in 1994. However, it was Yousef’s networking skills that arguably contributed the most to his success as a terrorist. Neil Herman, one of the investigators tasked with tracking down Yousef proclaimed, “The real eye-opener for me, the thing that brought it all together, was the ease with which Yousef was traveling around the world. . . . That’s when I realized he had to have a sizeable organization behind him.”28 While there are still questions about the extent to which Yousef acted on his own initiative or was following the guidance of others, there is no doubt that Yousef maintained strong links with several Islamist leaders in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Philippines,29 most prominent among these being Osama bin Laden. Yousef’s links to bin Laden are circumstantial but varied. First, the camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan in which Yousef trained and taught were linked to bin Laden and al Qaeda. Second, several of Yousef’s friends and contacts, including Wali Khan Amin-Shah and Ibrahim Munir30 had strong ties to bin Laden. Third, Yousef was the nephew of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, with whom he maintained close contact and who would later become bin Laden’s chief operational strategist and the architect of

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the 9/11 attacks. Fourth, during the preparations for the 1993 WTC bombing there was a trail of money leading to bin Laden,31 and Yousef was in constant contact with several overseas parties during the course of the plot, including his uncle and perhaps even bin Laden himself. Fifth, according to police interviews with a senior member of Abu Sayyaf, Yousef introduced himself as an emissary of bin Laden in 1991.32 Despite some assertions to the contrary, there is no concrete evidence of Iraqi involvement in most of Yousef’s activities. However, there are two, albeit tenuous, indications of possible linkages between Yousef and the Iraqis. First, it is reported that Yousef maintained close links to the MEK, on behalf of whom he may have participated in the bombing in Mashhad.33 The MEK was supported by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein at the time. Second, Abdul Rahman Yasin, one of Yousef’s accomplices in the WTC bombing, was an Iraqi who fled to Baghdad after the bombing and was allowed to remain there in safety; however, this may have been more of a function of Iraq’s post-1991 relations with the United States than a result of any direct links between the regime of Saddam Hussein and Yousef.

PERSONALITY TRAITS AND MOTIVATIONS Yes I am a terrorist and I’m proud of it. —Ramzi Yousef during sentencing at his 1997 trial34

A preliminary step in countering the terrorists of today and tomorrow is to understand the terrorists of yesterday and why they chose to act as they did. In short, we need to answer the questions “what kind of man is Ramzi Yousef?” and “what can we learn from his behavior that will help us catch the next Yousef?” To begin with, Yousef himself was something of an enigma in that, unlike many of his associates and coconspirators, he was not a religious zealot and did not practice Islam devoutly. For instance, he engaged in frequent womanizing while married, frequented bars and strip clubs, and did not always (or perhaps ever) fast during the month of Ramadan. Nevertheless, he harbored an intense hatred for the United States, Israel,35 and Shi’ite Muslims. For example, he was quite ready to kill thousands of American civilians in the WTC bombing in order to punish America for supporting Israel,36 and justified this by appealing to notions of collective punishment and the visiting upon his enemies of the same suffering he believed had been inflicted upon those he identified with, namely the Palestinians and Pakistani Sunnis. He therefore reasoned that only by sustaining a level of casualties on the scale of that inflicted by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would the American public realize it was at war.37

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It is unclear exactly when this intense hatred developed, but it is known that Yousef flirted with the Muslim Brotherhood while in Britain, but rejected their orientation as too moderate. Perhaps like many other impressionable and dissatisfied young Arabs, he felt simultaneously hopeless about the plight of the Palestinians and emboldened by the success of the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Despite the familial connections through his mother, Yousef’s ostensibly strong identification with the Palestinian people might be viewed as somewhat curious, considering that he has never visited Palestinian areas, and most of his knowledge about their situation is second-hand. This leads one to entertain the notion that a search for the source of much of Yousef’s hostility might prove more productive by examining the make-up of his personality. While clearly intelligent and inventive, Yousef is hardly the humble type. Indeed, he displays all the signs of being a narcissist. A selfproclaimed genius, he has consistently displayed a great arrogance and sense of self-belief—for example, electing to defend himself during his first trial (wherein he was charged with capital offenses) despite lacking any legal training. His ambition has led him to contemplate attacks of enormous scale and impact, even though his resources were sometimes limited and he was being hunted by counterterrorism forces. At the same time, his supreme confidence has enabled him to maintain a calm demeanor in stressful or adverse situations. Examples of such behavior include his unhurried departure from the United States in the wake of the WTC bombing and his rapid resumption of terrorist activities after the interruption of the Bojinka plot when his computer was seized. He proved to be single-minded—such as when he continued with the plot to bomb the World Trade Center even though he had been hospitalized in a car accident in January 1993—and at times even a little foolhardy, for instance, when he continued his terrorist plots in the United States despite being aware that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was monitoring members of his cabal in New York and New Jersey in 1992–1993. At other times, however, he displayed evidence of pragmatic thinking, replying to a question about why he had sought to attack the United States rather than Israel by stating that Israeli targets were too well defended. Another aspect of Yousef’s character that greatly facilitated his terrorist activities was his ability to quickly surround himself with willing accomplices. A master manipulator, who could in turn be domineering and charming, Yousef displayed the capacity for at once attracting others to his cause and steering them toward doing his bidding.38 Yet his apparent lack of concern for the well-being of his colleagues, as expressed by his willingness to risk or sacrifice their freedom and safety before his own,39 ultimately proved to be his undoing, leading to his betrayal by one of his erstwhile prot´eg´es.

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U.S. EFFORTS TO CAPTURE RAMZI YOUSEF Immediately after the bombing of the World Trade Center, the FBI was able to arrest key members involved in the attack, including Muhammad Salama, Nidal Ayyad, and Ibrahim El-Gabrowny. The breakthrough in the investigation came as a result of a combination of good luck and good investigative efforts. The first break came when explosive forensics experts at the bombing site found the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) of the truck used in the bombing. Using the VIN, the FBI was able to trace the make of the vehicle and subsequently its registration information. Further investigation revealed that the truck, a Ford Econoline, was rented by Salama, who had reported the truck stolen prior to the day of the bombing. Luckily, investigators found that Salama had visited the rental agency to recover the $400 deposit money. The rental agency, acting per the FBI’s request, asked Salama to come back the next day to collect his money. After luring Salama into the trap, FBI agents arrested him as he came out of the rental agency after collecting $200 of his $400 deposit money.40 Other members of the plot, including Yousef, Muhammad Abu Halima, Abdul Rahman Yasin, and Iyad Ismoil fled the country. Soon Abu Halima was arrested in Egypt, and in July 1995, Ismoil was arrested in Jordan. The local police in Egypt and Jordan cooperated with U.S. officials and easily identified and arrested the two suspects.41 Yousef, on the other hand, would prove far more difficult to track and apprehend. Following the capture and interrogation of several suspects involved in the attack, the FBI was able to determine the identity of Yousef, and by mid-March of 1993 was able to single him out as a major player in the plot.42 The U.S. government—specifically, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) led by the FBI—launched an international manhunt to capture Ramzi Yousef. Six agents were specifically assigned “to build up the evidence against Yousef, find him, capture him, arrange an extradition, get him back to the U.S. and secure a conviction in the U.S. court.”43 The six-member team was assisted by several investigators from the Department of State, New York City Police Department, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Port Authority.44 The JTTF got one of its early breaks in the hunt for Yousef when it was able to get a copy of his passport and his picture. Investigators searching through Salama’s house discovered legal documents related to Ahmad Ajaj and were able to determine that Yousef arrived on the same plane with Ajaj. Since Yousef used an Iraqi passport belonging to Ramzi Ahmad Yousef, investigators were able to recover a copy of his passport submitted on arrival.45 Based on Yousef’s passport, the FBI discovered that Yousef had visited the United Kingdom several times between 1986 and 1989. The FBI therefore requested that Scotland Yard and the South Wales Police Special Branch help provide a history of Yousef’s stay in that country. The FBI also contacted

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officials in several countries, and requested their assistance in tracing the addresses of the telephone numbers called by Yousef during his stay in the United States.46 As the investigation began to reveal Yousef’s international linkages, the FBI notified Interpol that issued an international “Red Notice,” alerting all countries about Yousef. Also, on April 2, 1993, the FBI added Yousef as an eleventh member to its list of “Ten Most Wanted” fugitives.47 In addition, the U.S. Department of State offered $2 million for any information leading to Yousef’s capture, as part of its Rewards for Justice program. The reward announcement was printed on the covers of matchboxes, and they were distributed across parts of South and Central Asia.48 The JTTF received and followed a multitude of leads, most of which led to dead-ends. JTTF representatives visited the Baluchistan province in Pakistan several times, but were unable to achieve significant progress in the investigation there. On the Pakistani side, Rehman Malik, the DirectorGeneral of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), assumed supervision of the investigation. Malik, based on his investigation of Pakistani Islamists, identified Yousef’s location in Quetta, Baluchistan, and sent a team of Pakistani agents and two agents from the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) to raid the house. Yousef, however, evaded capture and fled to Peshawar in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan.49 Following other leads, FIA agents, in another attempt to capture Yousef, raided the Peshawar house of Zahid al Sheikh, another of Yousef’s uncles and a senior official in Mercy International, a Saudi charity for the Afghan mujahideen and Arab-Afghans. But Yousef and his uncle fled before the FIA officials raided the house.50 While the JTTF was exploring overt options to capture Yousef and legally extradite him to the United States (or bring him back to the United States using the Rendition program),51 the CIA also explored the possibility of covertly kidnapping Yousef and bringing him back to the United States.52 Both efforts, however, were hampered by the lack of precise and actionable intelligence regarding Yousef’s location. So, despite such sweeping measures deployed against him, Yousef proved a difficult quarry, primarily due to the extensive nature of his network of contacts. Unlike Abu Halima or Ismoil, whose arrests were accomplished relatively easily, Yousef had numerous contacts around the world who helped him evade capture by providing him with shelter and other resources. Yousef knew veteran Arab-Afghans53 in several countries, wealthy bankers from the Gulf countries, several sectarian militants within Pakistan, Afghan mujahideen leaders, and several recruits in Southeast Asia.54 In fact, Yousef seemed unfazed by the efforts to capture him, and (as described earlier) even planned and carried out several attacks while on the run. As part of the investigation of the WTC bombing, the FBI found several numbers called by Yousef during his stay in the

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United States, and created a database of telephone numbers that was used as late as 1998 to help track terrorists worldwide.55 Factors that impeded the FBI’s efforts to capture Yousef included a lack of human intelligence agents within the rapidly proliferating Islamist cells worldwide, a lack of strategic focus on the threat of religiously inspired terrorism, and a period of uneasy United States–Pakistan relationship as a result of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, as well as Pakistan’s displeasure with the sudden U.S. withdrawal of support to Afghanistan following the departure of Soviet troops. Ultimately, Yousef’s arrest came as the result of a lucky break, but one that was precipitated by Yousef’s own arrogance and domineering demeanor. Yousef had recruited Ishtiaque Parker, a South African Muslim, to assist him in his operations. In one such attempt, Yousef involved Parker in a plot to kidnap the Philippine Ambassador to Thailand to secure Abdul Hakim Murad’s release. In another plot, Yousef asked Parker to deliver suitcases packed with explosives on airplanes departing from Bangkok, Thailand, so that they would explode over U.S. cities. Parker failed to execute this mission due to heightened security measures that were implemented after the discovery of the Bojinka plot. After these plots failed, Yousef called Parker back to Pakistan and involved him in another attempt to kidnap the Philippine Ambassador to Pakistan, following which he planned to exchange the Ambassador for Murad. Yousef also ordered Parker to assist him in another plot to bomb a Shiite shrine in Islamabad, Pakistan.56 Parker panicked, and on February 3, 1995, informed the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan that he wished to provide U.S. authorities with information on Yousef. Parker’s decision to turn in Yousef was also partly based on his revulsion at Yousef’s attempts to kill innocent people in his plots.57 Initially, DSS Agents Jeff Riner and Bill Miller interrogated Parker and became convinced that he was telling the truth. The agents informed Regional Security Officer Art Maurel, who then informed the Department of State about the new informant. The Department of State in turn passed the information to John Lipka, the Special Agent responsible for coordinating overseas liaisons in Yousef’s case at FBI’s Counterterrorism Section. John Lipka informed Neil Herman about the informant and a decision was made to utilize Parker to locate Yousef. On February 6, 1995, Parker informed his handlers that Yousef was in Islamabad and was planning to leave soon for Peshawar. An impromptu snatch team was hastily formed at the U.S. Embassy, and Art Maurel sought assistance from Pakistan’s security agencies to capture Yousef. On February 7, officials from the U.S. Embassy and seven heavily armed Pakistani security officials, tipped off by Parker, apprehended Yousef at the Su-Case guesthouse in Islamabad’s F7/2 sector. Yousef was identified by Agent Riner and was taken to the airport, where a JTTF team from the United States was waiting to take him

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back to the United States. Parker received $2 million for the information that led to the capture of Ramzi Yousef.58 SUCCESS AND FAILURE Clearly, the capture of Ramzi Yousef was a significant victory for the JTTF. The long and intense manhunt provided a wealth of information on Yousef and several other terror operatives who were linked to him. At the beginning of the investigation, after realizing the extent of Yousef’s connections, the JTTF forged overseas alliances to assist in the international manhunt. Similarly, FBI’s Legal Attach´e (Legat) in Bangkok, Thailand, proved to be quite useful for gaining the assistance of Asian security services in tracking Yousef. Another counterterrorism tool that played a role in successfully capturing Yousef was the Rewards for Justice Program. Even though Parker was not solely motivated by the reward, the $2 million prize certainly influenced his decision to turn Yousef in. The manhunt, however, revealed at least two glaring absences in U.S. counterterrorism efforts. First, and foremost, the United States did not possess agents within the support milieus that helped Yousef evade capture and plan subsequent terror attacks. The CIA was unable to provide actionable intelligence on Yousef to facilitate his capture. The FBI’s Legal Attach´e scheme, though commendable, was severely understaffed. For example, the Legal Attach´e for Pakistan was based in Bangkok, where he was responsible for several other countries.59 Second, despite the international search operation, Yousef still managed to travel to several countries in Asia using false passports. The relative ease with which Yousef traveled across Asia, especially Southeast Asia, reveals the lack of coordination in circulating terrorism watch lists among countries. LESSONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM Yousef’s activities and the corresponding manhunt offer several important lessons that can be applied to current and future counterterrorism efforts. To a certain extent, the planning and execution of the WTC bombing by Ramzi Yousef and his associates can be likened to the threat posed by self-radicalized cells that are inspired by al Qaeda’s ideology, which conceivably makes any lessons particularly relevant in present day circumstances. First, the search for Yousef revealed the difficulty of tracking and apprehending terrorists ensconced in widespread clandestine networks that cross several national borders. Although Yousef was a relatively independent terrorist “entrepreneur,” he received support from a sizable logistical network that was largely unknown to investigators. Reliance on such a

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large logistical network is a double-edged sword, since it also provides opportunities for investigators to track an individual. Second, the United States—in order to elicit better international cooperation—must make other countries aware of the transnational nature of the terrorist threat and the risks associated with inaction in disrupting terrorist cells and operatives operating within their borders. Understandably, countries that have been directly targeted by terrorists have generally shown much greater interest in capturing or killing terrorists. However, other countries that have not been attacked by terrorists must be equally involved in counterterrorism efforts, since terrorists might be using those countries for raising funds, propaganda, and recruiting members; moreover, the absence or near absence of terrorist attacks in a country’s past is not an assurance that it will never occur in the future. Third, the security agencies, working closely with the media, researchers, and the public should develop mechanisms to ensure the functioning of an open society, while making sure that certain types of information that can be misused by terrorists are properly protected. For instance, Yousef told his captors that he learned from a CNN special report about airport screening techniques, information that he used for the Bojinka plot, including details that enabled him to devise methods to transport explosives and batteries undetected through the screening machines.60 Fourth, in instances of search operations, the rewards for providing information should be widely publicized in the relevant communities. In addition to financial rewards, security incentives should also be announced and widely publicized. Fifth, Yousef was an extremely determined and innovative adversary— neither the presence of his wife and children in Pakistan, nor the fact that there was a massive counterterrorist effort arrayed against him had much effect on his willingness to plan and launch further attacks. In this case, at least, law enforcement efforts may have complicated the terrorist’s operations, but did not do much to prevent further attacks by such a dedicated opponent. Sixth, the case of Yousef indicates that even where the primary suspect is intelligent and a consummate professional, there can still be interdiction opportunities provided by less competent accomplices. While Yousef was generally extremely careful in his operations, the incompetence of cohorts like Salama or the driver of the truck in the Bangkok plot can provide law enforcement and intelligence with tangible early warning indicators, if these sometimes weak signals are detected against the pervasive background noise. Furthermore, even the very professionalism that makes a particular terrorist like Yousef so difficult to apprehend can provide distinct signals. For example, Yousef was meticulous about testing his devices

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and conducting dry runs, which might have provided indicators of his activities, were counterterrorism officials paying sufficiently close attention. Last, but not least, the case of Ramzi Yousef highlights the inevitable role played by luck in counterterrorism operations, and confirms the dictum that in the long run, fortune falls equally on all sides. On the one hand, Yousef repeatedly benefited from good luck, such as when he succeeded in passing through U.S. customs while his companion Ajaj did not, or when he escaped several accidents relatively unscathed. At the same time, counterterrorism officials benefited from the coincident good fortune of identifying the van used in the WTC bombing and Salama’s return to the rental company, as well as the Manila apartment fire that scuttled the Bojinka plot, and Ishtiaque Parker’s decision to turn in Yousef. CONCLUSION In many respects, Ramzi Yousef was unique, an outlier, a terrorist with the independence of action, the ambition and the charisma of Carlos the Jackal, combined with an all-consuming hatred and desire to cause mass fatalities. In this light, one must draw any lessons from his exploits and capture with some degree of caution. However, in other ways, Yousef served as the harbinger of certain novel aspects of terrorism that counterterrorism officials would increasingly have to deal with at the beginning of the twenty-first century. His lust for revenge on a large scale would become the norm amongst the strain of jihadist terrorism most prominently represented by al Qaeda, while the diffuse, transnational nature of his support network and multinational contacts would continue to hamper counterterrorist efforts when these were used on a larger scale by groups like al Qaeda. Thus, while differing somewhat from the typical religious fanatic, Yousef displayed many of the operational characteristics that would come to be successfully employed by a generation of violent jihadists, especially self-starting terrorist entrepreneurs. This makes a careful study of his strengths and weaknesses—as well as the successes and failures of the counterterrorist effort against him—particularly instructive, as counterterrorism forces struggle to find answers to the multitude of current terrorist threats. NOTES 1. See Dwyer et al. describing the moniker applied to Yousef by the Federal Bureau of Investigation—Jim Dwyer, David Kocieniewski, Deidre Murphy, and Peg Tyre, Two Seconds Under the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994) 76. 2. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (Boston, MA: Northeastern University, 1999) 254. 3. The obscurity surrounding Yousef’s identity has led to a host of alternative, if tenuous, theories about his origins, including that he was an Iraqi intelligence

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agent acting at the behest of Saddam Husayn, who had taken over Abdul Basit’s identity. See, e.g., Laurie Mylroie, Study of Revenge: The First World Trade Center Attack and Saddam Hussein’s War against America (Lanham, MD: AEI, 2001). 4. This is the name Yousef gave when captured and asked to give his true name, see “Examination of Special Agent Brian Parr, U.S. Secret Service,” United States of America v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, S1239cr.180 (KTD), October 22, 1997, 4706. 5. Reeve, The New Jackals: 112. 6. Ibid.: 135. 7. Ibid.: 114. These include Abdul Hakim Murad and Eyad Ismoil, who participated in the Bojinka plot, among others. 8. Reeve, The New Jackals: 136. 9. John Miller and Michael Stone with Chris Mitchell, The Cell: Inside the 9/11 Plot and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It (New York, Hyperion, 2002) 76. 10. Please see the chapter by Daniel Baracskay in this volume. 11. One of the members of this group, Imad Salim, actually turned out to be an FBI informant, although amidst disagreements with his FBI handlers his warnings about an incipient plot went largely unheeded by the authorities, and Salim ceased congregating with the conspirators before the WTC attack plans were finalized. See Dwyer et al., Two Seconds: 170–171. 12. Yousef’s traveling partner, one Ahmad Ajaj, was arrested upon their entrance to the United States at John F. Kennedy Airport with a fake passport and several bomb-making and other military-type manuals. See Miller et al., The Cell: 76–77. 13. “Prosecution’s Closing argument by David Kelley,” United States of America v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, November 3, 1997, 5235. 14. Miller et al., The Cell: 135. 15. Soon after the bombing, the attackers sent a letter to the New York Times claiming responsibility on behalf of the Liberation Army: “We are, the fifth battalion in the LIBERATION ARMY, declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political, economical and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region. OUR DEMANDS ARE: 1. Stop all military, economical and political aids to Israel. 2. All diplomatic relations with Israel must stop. 3. Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries interior affairs. If our demands are not met, all of our functional groups in the army will continue to execute our missions against military and civilians targets in and out the United States. This also will include some potential Nuclear targets. For your own information, our army has more than 150 suicidal soldiers ready to go ahead. The terrorism that Israel practices (Which is supported by America) must be faced with a similar one. The dictatorship and terrorism (also supported by America) that some countries are practicing against their own people must also be faced with terrorism. The American people must know that their civilians who got killed are not better than those who are getting killed by the American weapons in support.

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Lessons from the Fight against Terrorism The American people are responsible for the actions of their government and they must question all the crimes that their government is committing against other people. Or they—Americans—will be the targets of our operations that could diminish them. We invite all the people from all countries and all the revolutionaries in the world to participate in this action with us to accomplish our just goals. “If then anyone transgresses the prohibition against you transgress ye likewise against him . . .” Liberation Army Fifth Battalion Al-Fareek Al-Rokn, Abu Bakr Al-Makee.” See United States of America v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, S1293cr.180 (KTD), September 17, 1997, 5261.

16. Reeve, The New Jackals: 51. 17. Ibid.: 66. 18. Ibid.: 76. 19. Doug Struck, Howard Schneider, and Karl Vick. “Borderless Network of Terror; Bin Laden Followers Reach Across Globe,” The Washington Post, September 23, 2001. 20. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Berkley Books, 2002) 241. 21. The Bojinka plot’s name may have been drawn from the Serbo-Croatian word for explosion or loud bang. For a detailed account of this plot, please see Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Lose and Learn Doctrine: The Trajectory from Oplan Bojinka to 9/11,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 171–188. 22. After helping to set the plot in motion, Muhammad left the implementation to the others and went to Qatar. 23. For further details of the mechanics of the plot, see “Prosecution’s Statement,” United States of America v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, Eyad Ismoil, Abdul Hakim Murad, Wali Khan Amin Shah, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, S1239cr.180 (KTD), May 29, 1996, 5123. 24. See Reeve, The New Jackals: 87; Matthew Brzezinski, “Bust And Boom” The Washington Post, December 30, 2001. 25. Yousef admitted as much when he was captured—USA v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef et al.: 4098. 26. USA v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef et al.: 4090 27. Ibid. 28. Miller et al., The Cell: 137. 29. Yousef even reportedly met with Omar Abdul Rahman, the blind sheik, who was later convicted of participating in a plot to blow up several targets in New York City. 30. Miller et al., The Cell: 138. 31. Investigators believe that at least some of the $20,000 Bin Laden gave to Ibrahim al-Jabrawni, ostensibly for Nusayr’s legal defense, was used in making the WTC bomb. See Reeve, The New Jackals: 79. 32. Reeve, The New Jackals: 158. 33. Ibid.: 247. 34. Ibid: 242.

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35. It does not appear that Yousef was anti-Semitic per se; he seemed to have no misgivings about using a Jewish lawyer in his second trial. 36. “Testimony of Brian Parr,” United States of America v Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and Eyad Ismoil, S1293cr.180 (KTD), October 22, 1997. 37. Ibid. 38. Two pertinent examples of Yousef’s powers of persuasion are 1) his success in steering the target of his U.S. attack toward the World Trade Center and away from the initial plan, prior to his joining the group of radicals, to attack several Jewish targets in New York and 2) his ability to convince his accomplices to undertake incredible risks, such as when he sent Murad back to the apartment in Manila to recover Yousef’s laptop computer. 39. It is true that Yousef made certain threats with the ostensible intention of freeing both his friend Murad, who had been captured by Philippine authorities and his father, who was being held in Iran. However, these efforts were never followed up in any real sense, and it is therefore possible, based on Yousef’s personality, that Yousef merely used his cohorts’ incarceration to justify actions that he already wanted to undertake. 40. Miller and Stone: 102–105. 41. For information on Abu Halima’s arrest see Miller and Stone, 109; For information on Ismoil’s arrest see the Testimony of Brigadier General Fayez Mohamed Qablan of Jordanian Police in USA v Ramzi Yousef et al.: 4114–4165. 42. Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: 41. 43. Ibid.: 45–46. The JTTF team tasked with capturing Yousef included FBI Special Agent Frank Pelligrino, Secret Service Agent Brian Parr, and FBI Special Agent Charles Stern. The team was led by FBI Senior Supervisory Agent Neil Herman. Realizing the international nature of the manhunt Senior FBI Agent John Lipka was assigned the task of forging overseas alliances. Additionally Ralph Paul Horton, FBI’s Legal Attach´e in Bangkok, Thailand, was also coordinating with the Asian intelligence agencies for assistance in capturing Yousef. Ibid.: 67. 44. Ibid. 45. Miller et al., The Cell: 108. 46. Reeve, The New Jackals: 42 47. Ibid.: 42–43. 48. Miller et al., The Cell: p. 119. The reward announcement was also advertised in newspapers in several countries, including Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Philippines. More than 37,000 matchbox labels with the reward announcement were printed and dropped by plane over Baluchistan and several areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. See Reeve, The New Jackals: 56–57. 49. Ibid.: p. 47; See also Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003) 99. After fleeing Quetta, Yousef is believed to have stayed in one of Osama bin Laden’s guest houses in Peshawar. The exact date of the Quetta raid is not known. It can be speculated that the raid took place between March and June 1993. 50. Reeve, The New Jackals: 48. 51. The Rendition program is a policy tool used by the United States to return indicted terrorists to the United States to stand trial. The logistics of the rendition process are stated in Executive Order 12333, signed by President

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Reagan in December 1981, and state that the CIA and its employees can “Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or agency” and could “Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authorities not precluded by applicable law.” This executive order has been renewed by successive presidents. In June 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39, which states that “If we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the host government, consistent with the procedures outlined in NSD-77, which shall remain in effect.” For information on Executive Order 12333 see Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2001) 116–117; for information on PDD-39, see the unclassified version of the document,http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm. 52. Reeve, The New Jackals: 57. 53. The Arab volunteers who went to Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were called Arab-Afghans. 54. Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror: 94. Yousef’s network of friends, associates, recruits, and sponsors helped him to evade the international manhunt as well as plan and carry out terrorist attacks. In Quetta, Yousef was helped by Haji Akhtar Muhammad Bareeh, a timber merchant. Also, Abu Safian, an Arab-Afghan who headed the UAE funded Red Crescent Society, helped Yousef in Quetta. As a result of the WTC bombing, Yousef became a legend in Islamist circles and it certainly helped his efforts to escape the international dragnet. See Reeve, The New Jackals: 46. 55. Reeve, The New Jackals: 39. 56. For a discussion of Yousef’s attempts to secure Murad’s release, see Reeve, The New Jackals: pp. 96–101. For a discussion of the security measures implemented at several airports in Southeast Asia after the discovery of the Bojinka plot, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (New York: Random House, 2002) 24–25. 57. Reeve, The New Jackals: 105–106. 58. Ibid.: 101–107. 59. Miller and Stone, The Cell: 121. 60. USA v Ramzi Yousef et al.: p. 4094. For more on the role of the media in facilitating terrorist learning, please see Cindy C. Combs, “The Media as a Showcase for Terrorism,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Praeger, 2006) 133–154.

CHAPTER 9 THE ATTACK ON THE USS COLE Ruth Margolies Beitler

The gaping 40-foot hole on the port side of the USS Cole, a U.S. Navy destroyer refueling in Aden’s harbor off the coast of Yemen on October 12, 2000, underscored the fact that terrorism against American targets is not bounded by land, air, or sea. With 17 sailors dead and more than 38 wounded, the attack shocked the United States and its allies, and continued the era of dramatic strikes against American targets, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, and the simultaneous attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. With the bombing of the USS Cole, Americans recognized that terrorism had become a routine component of American life whether on U.S. soil or on targets abroad. Although the United States had established an integrated, interagency counterterrorist process in the 1980s, the synchronized bombings of the embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998 served as a wake-up call that the U.S. government must pay more attention to al Qaeda’s ability to adapt and threaten U.S. interests. This chapter explores the events leading up to the bombing of the USS Cole, the challenges of executing an investigation on foreign soil and the ramifications of the Cole attack for U.S. counterterrorist policy. By assessing how the Cole investigation was handled, this chapter provides lessons for future investigations and counterterrorism cooperation. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE COLE BOMBING Relations between the United States and the newly unified Yemen were tepid in the early 1990s due to Yemen’s refusal to support the UN Security Council’s mandate for Desert Strom following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. By the mid-1990s, relations had begun to thaw between the two countries, and the United States provided renewed

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aid program to the poverty-stricken gulf state.1 Prior to 1998, the U.S. Navy refueled many of its vessels in the small African country of Djibouti, located directly across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen. General Anthony Zinni, commander of U.S. Central Command from 1997–2000 moved refueling operations to Aden in January 1999 due to his interest in engagement with Yemen. According to Zinni, Yemen provided a strategic location on the narrow straights connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, and was the “best of bad choices” in a region besieged by conflict.2 U.S Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, contends that General Zinni moved the refueling for logistical rather than political reasons since the port in Djibuti was congested, inefficient, and posed potential security threats. Ambassador Bodine shared General Zinni’s assessment that relative to other ports in the region, Yemen was manageable. Although she ended traditional port calls (where sailors disembarked and took leave in Aden), she supported refueling operations and believed that Yemen provided an adequate option for two key reasons. First, before the Cole attack, there were no operational threats active in Yemen. Although there had been numerous kidnappings of foreign tourists by tribes eager to pressure the Yemeni government to meet their local economic demands, for the most part, they were nonviolent, did not harm the hostages, and were confined to the desert regions in the northeast of the country. An exception occurred in 1998, when the Islamic Army of Aden kidnapped a British tour group and several hostages were killed in a rescue attempt.3 Second, according to Ambassador Bodine, the Navy arranged to do the refueling in a matter of a few hours during daylight hours and most importantly at a “dolphin” in mid-harbor. As such, any security threat to U.S. ships seemed manageable.4 Some analysts have debated the U.S. decision to use Yemen as a refueling port and have suggested that the United States was searching for another base in the Middle East in which to store military hardware in case of regional conflagrations, and therefore discounted any negative threat assessments.5 The suicide bombing of the USS Cole was not the first time the United States experienced a maritime threat in Yemen’s waters. In January 2000, 9 months before the Cole assault, local operatives (possibly with al Qaeda connections) planned a suicide attack against the USS The Sullivans as it refueled in the port of Aden. The assault on the U.S. naval vessel fizzled due to the terrorists’ poor planning. The perpetrators utilized a remote control boat laden with explosives that was meant to collide with the USS The Sullivans. However, due to overloading, the skiff sank immediately when pushed into the water. According to Ambassador Bodine, no one in the U.S. or Yemeni government knew about the plot until after the Cole bombing.6 Some analysts have concluded that both the plan to bomb the USS The Sullivans and the suicide attack on the Cole were al Qaeda schemes. Ambassador Bodine believes that due to amateurish technology

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and inadequate preparation used in the attempt on the USS The Sullivans, the group was most likely an affiliate that ventured out on its own without strong support from al Qaeda. For years, al Qaeda has recognized the potential of Yemen in both recruiting operatives and for staging operations. According to one estimate, Yemenis are the third largest national group represented in al Qaeda.7 However, Ambassador Bodine notes that although Yemenis are numerous in al Qaeda, they rarely assume leading roles in the operations. Yemen’s connection to al Qaeda stems, in part, from its relationship to the jihad in Afghanistan. During the 1980s, jihadists from Yemen joined the mujahideen’s struggle in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation.8 Numerous Yemenis volunteered to fight, and analysts contend that it was in Afghanistan that Yemenis and others formed the embryonic al Qaeda movement. Osama bin Laden’s father was born in Yemen, and this historical tie may have inspired bin Laden to contact Yemenis who fought in Afghanistan, in order to plan and execute attacks against Western targets. In 1992, bin Laden provided Tariq al Fadhi with financial support to bomb the Gold Mahur Hotel in Aden, with the intention of killing U.S. military personnel serving in Somalia.9 According to some reports, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, returning jihadists—both Yemeni and Arab Afghans— were incorporated into Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s security apparatus.10 The rationale behind this action was to employ them, give them a stake in the status quo, and retain the ability to surveil them.11 Yemeni jihadis were enlisted to fight against the rebel south during the 1994 civil war. Some jihadis joined the conservative Salafi movement that espoused a literal interpretation and application of Islamic law. The Salafis in Yemen have particularly strong ties with Saudi Arabia due to their similar beliefs. A very small element of these Yemeni jihadis formed the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), also known as the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA), and was responsible for several bombings in Yemen as well as the 1998 kidnapping of 16 tourists.12 The group also utilized training camps in Yemen.13 In 1997, Yemeni sheikhs met with al Qaeda operatives, and supposedly bin Laden considered transferring his base of operations to his ancestral homeland.14 After Yemen’s government captured and executed the group’s leader, Zein al-Abidine al-Midhar in October 1999, the organization’s appeal diminished; however, the IAA, along with two previously unknown offshoot groups—Muhammad’s Army and the Islamic Deterrence Forces—later claimed responsibility for the Cole bombing. One other reason that Yemen appeals to al Qaeda as a base of operations is related to its interconnection with Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s influence on Yemen’s education system. During the oil boom of the 1970s, many Yemenis found work in Saudi Arabia’s oil and construction industries, and when they returned home they brought with them Salafi

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teachings. Islamic schools in Yemen began to teach this more radical version of Islam.15 A result of Yemen’s decentralized government structure that clearly appealed to al Qaeda was the almost unimpeded stream of weapons into the state. Investigators have traced weapons used in attacks against Western interests in Saudi Arabia to Yemen.16 Due to the years of internal warfare and ensuing chaos in Yemen between 1967 and 1994, significant numbers of weapons entered the country. According to some estimates, there are three weapons for every one person in Yemen.17 Part of Yemen’s appeal for terrorists is its forbidding geography and the tribal networks that have frequently shielded al Qaeda operatives. When al Qaeda militants fled Afghanistan after the U.S. attack on the Taliban in October 2001, many sought refuge in Yemen.18 Although bin Laden’s historical ties to Yemen partially explain why Yemenis play a large role in al Qaeda, another account holds that bin Laden is able to provide financial incentives to tribal leaders in order to secure their support of al Qaeda operatives in the country. Some tribes that shield al Qaeda members resist the authority of the government in Sanaa. They prefer to remain independent from a central authority and keep Sanaa’s control out of the tribal regions. According to Mark Katz, many tribal leaders are motivated more by mercenary concerns than ideological ones when it comes to supporting al Qaeda.19 Katz contends that some tribes support al Qaeda in order to pressure Sanaa to counter al Qaeda’s influence by providing resources to their tribes as well.20 Al Qaeda has frequently used Yemen as a base of operations or as a point of transit in its war against the West. Investigators have linked the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings with both the Cole bombings and the attacks of September 11, 2001. During a meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Yemeni President Saleh in April 2000, terrorism was high on the list of topics, with President Saleh requesting enhanced support from the United States to counter foreign jihadis.21 Several members of the group that conducted the East Africa embassy bombings made lengthy visits to Yemen—including Muhammad Reshed Daoud al-Ahwali, who was a passenger in the truck delivering the bomb to the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, on August 7, 1998.22 Some members of the embassy bombing cell also held false Yemeni passports and had spent time in Yemen.23 THE COLE BOMBING U.S. naval commanders are required to file force protection plans detailing the security measures being undertaken to secure the vessel while refueling or making port calls. The Cole’s plan was approved at high levels in the government and the ship was placed at threat condition Bravo (the

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second lowest level of four).24 However, some reports indicate that the United States had received a warning of a terrorist threat 12 hours prior to the Cole bombing. According to Walter Slocombe, then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, the warning was not specific enough for the military to take appropriate action.25 A day after the Cole bombing, a defense intelligence agency analyst resigned, citing that his warnings of terrorist plots against U.S. targets in the Middle East went unheeded.26 Despite the failure by terrorists in Yemen to bomb the USS The Sullivans, the idea of conducting a maritime attack clearly appealed to al Qaeda operatives. Reportedly, a suspect later arrested for participation in the Cole bombing set the idea in motion to use boat bombs as early as 1996. Abd al Rahim al Nashiri allegedly received approval from bin Laden in 1998 to prepare for a maritime assault in Yemen.27 On the morning of October 12, 2000, as the Cole was refueling, a small boat approached the ship. According to witnesses, two men on the small boat stood up, waved or saluted, and then detonated their explosives, leaving 17 sailors dead and inflicting $250 million worth of damage on the destroyer. THE INVESTIGATION From previous al Qaeda operations, it is clear that the terror network was meticulous in its planning process, and thus expectedly sent advance teams to gather intelligence for the Cole operation. In Yemen, expatriates with ties to al Qaeda returned to their country of origin in order to recruit operatives for the Cole operation. According to a Rand study, the terrorist cell that conducted the Cole operation was comprised of 16 members, 11 of whom were Yemeni.28 Yet as the RAND study concludes, the impetus for the attack did not appear to come from local militants, though several were used for logistics inside Yemen.29 The Cole plot was part of a global network of terror operations that had been implemented over the past several years against Western targets. Investigators have determined that local Yemeni groups did not have the level of technological sophistication that was evident in the Cole attack. Therefore, early into the investigation, terrorism experts concluded that al Qaeda directed the operation. Furthermore, the technology and long-term planning bore the fingerprints of bin Laden. The bombers used a shaped explosive charge, a clear indication of increasing sophistication.30 Some reports claimed that Osama bin Laden used expert bombers from the Shia Lebanese group Hizbollah to build the huge bomb that incapacitated the Cole.31 A day after the Cole bombing, seven U.S. planes landed in Aden’s airport carrying representatives from numerous U.S. government agencies charged with a variety of missions. Under the direction of the Ambassador and the Embassy, based on instructions from the Secretary of State,

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the missions were: recover the ship and her crew, provide force protection, establish a joint investigation with the Yemenis, and maintain a strong bilateral relationship with the Yemeni government.32 Included among the groups was the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)—a rapid response, interagency group that is deployed when U.S. interests abroad have been attacked.33 From its base in Aden, the team, led by a senior Department of State officer with Yemen experience, supported the Ambassador and members of her staff now working from Aden with communications equipment, interagency liaison staff, and crisis management expertise.34 Two agents from the FBI’s Washington Field Office had established a working relationship with Yemeni investigators in the aftermath of the 1998 Mudiyah kidnappings. These agents immediately deployed to Aden along with legal attach´es assigned to a number of U.S. embassies in the region. The Navy Criminal Investigative Services (NCIS), which also had a preexisting relationship with the Yemenis, deployed a small, languagecompetent team to Aden. FBI Head Advisory Agent John O’Neill arrived in Aden several days after the bombing and stated that he intended to deploy 150 agents to Aden. The Ambassador countered that there was only room for 50 agents at that time and suggested that the remaining agents could be staged out of Cairo until there was a clearer delineation of investigative requirements. Despite this decision, O’Neill brought the entire 150 agents into the country and sent away all regionally based legal attach´es and Washington Field Office agents who had already established working relationships with the Yemeni government.35 According to several American investigators, some Yemeni authorities in Aden—in contravention of their government’s stated policy—were uncooperative and refused to allow FBI investigators to directly interview alleged suspects in the Cole bombing.36 Initially, Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Ibraheem, the commander of the naval base at Aden, claimed that the explosion came from inside the ship and did not appear deliberate.37 The day after the explosion, however, at the request of the U.S. Ambassador, President Saleh sent his own ranking military advisor and a team of experts to the ship, who determined that the attack on the ship was clearly terrorism.38 A week after the explosion, President Saleh publicly referred to the bombing as an act of terrorism.39 One crucial problem in the investigation was that the FBI decided to rotate their senior advisory agent every 30 days, hindering the development of effective continuity in the relationships among U.S. agencies and between the FBI and the Yemenis. The FBI did not develop an efficient handover from one agent to the next, leaving some agents with only a minimal grasp of the situation. Many of the agents lacked a background in counterterrorism, further impeding progress in the investigation. Although several agents were qualified for the position, many came with

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the attitude that they would get through their 30-day deployment and return to their “real job.”40 This attitude filtered down to other agents, and was also recognized by the Yemenis. In November, because of difficulties between senior members of the FBI and local Yemeni investigators, Ambassador Bodine—along with the new senior supervisory agent, Patrick Paterson, and a senior Yemeni judge— negotiated and concluded a memorandum of agreement setting the terms and parameters for both Yemeni and American investigators. Although this was a significant step in fostering a better working relationship between the FBI and Yemeni investigators, some agents remained dissatisfied with their inability to question suspects directly, a situation that was ameliorated when the FBI sent agents who were native Arabic speakers to work with the Yemenis.41 Some agents from the New York Field Office alleged that the Aden investigators impeded the investigation in order to sanitize records and conceal senior Yemeni officials’ involvement in the plot.42 The allegation that government personnel were somehow implicated in the attack stemmed from the previously mentioned fact that during the 1980s numerous volunteers from Yemen joined jihadists in Afghanistan to battle the Soviet occupation.43 Clearly, there is an undisputable connection between the government and jihadist fighters, but not necessarily between the government and those involved in the Cole attack. During the USS Cole investigation, FBI Director Louis Freeh insisted upon a broad investigation that he asserted had the potential to lead to powerful officials in the President Saleh’s government.44 The investigation into the Cole bombing was initially hampered by several key factors that Ambassador Bodine describes as “some inevitable, some avoidable and some unacceptable.”45 The inevitable factors included the resentment that any law enforcement perceives toward an outside entity arriving to investigate an event that took place within their jurisdiction. The resentment was amplified by Yemen’s extremely unsophisticated investigative services, lacking even fingerprint powder to process crime scenes colliding with a state-of-the-art service such as the FBI. As Ambassador Bodine succinctly put it, “coming from two different planets couldn’t have been more of a shock to both sides.”46 In terms of avoidable issues, the Ambassador had requested in a meeting with Director Freeh a legal attach´e at the embassy months earlier, in order to increase ties with the Yemenis. Additionally, the Ambassador believed that the U.S. Navy could have stationed a representative full-time in Aden to manage the refueling program. The creation of networks and interrelationships could have facilitated the investigation during its early phases. Furthermore, Ambassador Bodine had advocated the reopening of the consulate in Aden, which would have increased networks with Adeni officials.

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Information on the Cole bombing was difficult to obtain due, in part, to the reluctance of Yemeni officials to share intelligence with American investigators and the unwillingness of the FBI to share the results of their forensic work with the Yemenis. For Ambassador Bodine, the manner in which some senior agents handled the investigation was unacceptable, and led to some of the Yemeni reluctance to share information. She recounts that the Yemenis up to and including the President “had long advocated a more robust and formal cooperative relationship on counterterrorism and were rebuffed by the United States on a number of occasions.”47 From her perspective, the Yemenis were interested in cooperating with the U.S. investigation, but the FBI’s heavy-handed and culturally insensitive approach threatened to derail the investigation—in fact, she notes, President Saleh and members of his cabinet, military, and investigative services made it very clear to his government that they would work with the Americans.48 Yemeni officials agreed that the FBI’s arrogant and culturally insensitive style hampered cooperation from the outset.49 In fact, Ambassador Bodine denied a request for John O’Neill’s return in January 2001. There are, however, several other explanations as to why the Yemenis appeared or were reluctant to cooperate with U.S. investigators. Some members of the Yemeni security services did not like the Americans and were “probably sympathetic to the jihadi worldview, even if not supportive of their tactics.”50 Other Yemeni officials, although ambivalent about their feelings toward the United States, supported a solid relationship with the United States. When the FBI arrived with their culturally insensitive attitude, those ambivalent Yemenis were put in an awkward and embarrassing position. Additionally, cultural misunderstandings led the FBI to perceive the Yemenis as uncooperative. For example, occasionally, when the FBI Americans asked the Yemenis for particular evidence, the Yemenis had no idea why they needed it. For example, since DNA testing is a foreign concept in a poverty-stricken developing country such as Yemen, a request for collecting fiber or hair samples was inexplicable to the Yemenis. Ambassador Bodine reiterated to her investigators that if they could explain to her why they needed particular evidence and she understood its purpose, she would then relay the significance of the request to the appropriate Yemeni official.51 Moreover, the issue of “pure pride” emerged as a factor in Yemen’s occasional reluctance to work with the Americans. For example, Yemenis were embarrassed when the FBI requested their passport or immigration records. They had no computer records; it was all piles of handwritten paper. Thus, in some cases, Yemeni officials—in an effort to defer humiliation—dragged their feet. Ambassador Bodine worked directly with the FBI to clarify, on a case-by-case basis, whether the Yemenis were

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unaccommodating because they did not have the evidence requested, because they did not understand the request due to “bureaucratic incompetence,” or because they were actually being obstructionist. The distinction among these is significant, as it reflects the intent of the Yemenis.52 One other impediment to the investigation concerned the relationship among American agencies. Organizational cultural clashes between the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are legendary, and these battles were played out in the Cole case as well. The CIA and FBI not only “put up firewalls, but they suffered from low-intensity warfare.”53 As the agencies retained different mandates, they guarded their intelligence. The FBI’s key concern is to acquire evidence that they can use to prosecute the perpetrators of the attack. For the CIA, the crucial nature of the intelligence is to prevent another attack. In one instance, Ambassador Bodine and an FBI agent paid a visit to a Yemeni official to request a particular piece of information. When they made the inquiry, the Yemeni official revealed that he had already given the information to the Americans. When the Ambassador requested clarification as to whom the information had been given, it was revealed that her CIA station chief had received the data but did not share it with the FBI.54 In June 2001, the FBI announced that it had identified credible threats against its agents, and decided to remove its remaining agents from Yemen. Much to the dismay of the Department of State and the other agencies resident at the American Embassy in Sanaa, the FBI refused to share its threat intelligence with anyone “despite its legal and moral obligation to do so.”55 Ambassador Bodine asserted that since an attack would not differentiate between various players, all Americans were potentially in danger. The CIA, on the other hand, did not find evidence of any particular threat against the FBI and was rebuffed when the agency requested to see on what evidence the FBI based its position. Therefore, there was no draw down of embassy personnel or their dependents. Senior officials involved in the interagency process were also not convinced that the FBI had to leave in June. At the very least, members of the interagency believed that the FBI should have left a core group of language-qualified agents behind to continue the investigation. But despite ongoing interagency discussions, “the FBI unilaterally and without notice” removed its agents in the middle of June, taking a reluctant NCIS with them.56 Ambassador Bodine believed that 3 months of work were lost, although she continued to pursue the investigation with the CIA station chief and others in the embassy.57 Following the attacks, the Yemeni government quickly rounded up several low-level suspects including Fahd al Quso and Jamal al Badawi. Badawi is alleged to have rented safe houses in Aden and to have brought the boat from Saudi Arabia that was used in the attack. Al Quso was supposed to film the attack, presumably to be used for recruitment and

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motivation, though the tape was never recovered.58 Some Yemenis were interested in closing the case quickly by trying the six Yemenis that they had in custody.59 Ambassador Bodine disputes this and explained that the Yemenis were interested in a full investigation to prove that the attack was a Saudi, not Yemeni-based attack. The Ambassador, working with President Saleh, assured that the suspects’ trials would be delayed as long as possible to allow the investigation to continue. U.S. officials wanted to complete additional investigations and connect the suspects to al Qaeda. FBI officials were concerned that the Yemeni legal system would quickly try the suspects and execute them before all the evidence was collected. Ambassador Bodine explained to the investigators that the Yemeni legal system did not work that way and that “the possibility of summary justice in the Saudi style was remote, if not impossible.”60 In November 2000, al Quso told investigators about his dealings with a man named Khallid. He said that he traveled to Bangkok in January 2000 with one of the Cole suicide bombers, Ibrahim al Thawwar, and met Khallid, bringing him $36,000 in cash.61 Both the CIA and FBI were familiar with Khallid, also known as Tawfiq Attash Khallad, since they had tracked him prior to the Cole bombing. According to U.S. officials, Khallad met with two of the eventual September 11 hijackers, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000.62 This meeting was crucial in that it linked the Cole bombing with the September 11 plot, but this interconnection was not unearthed until after the attacks on the United States in 2001. After the Cole bombing, the FBI connected Khallid to that plot, asserting that he delivered a letter to the suicide bombers approving the assault on the ship. It was only after the Cole bombing that the CIA and FBI reassessed the dangerous threat posed by al Midhar and al Hazmi. By the time they were put on a terrorism watch list in August 2001, both men were already residing in the United States.63 Eventually, the United States also gathered information about the Cole bombing from al Qaeda prisoners captured in Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion in October 2001.64 In September 2002, Pakistani officials arrested nine Yemenis including Ramzi bin al Shibh, who was a high-level planner in the September 11 attacks and was implicated in planning the Cole bombing. In November 2002, the United States—with the reticent acquiescence of the Yemeni government—assassinated Qaed Salim Sunian al-Harethi, one of the Cole attack’s planners, using an unmanned U.S. predator drone.65 At the end of April 2003, Pakistani officials arrested Khallad in the port city of Karachi, along with a cache of weapons and explosives.66 Information collected in Afghanistan also led to the capture of Muhammad Hamdi al Ahdal, who was a known member of al Qaeda and was responsible for finances and operational planning for the Cole bombing as well as a subsequent attack in Yemen’s Gulf of Hadhamut on a French ship, the Limburg.67 In November 2003, Yemeni forces arrested al Ahdal outside

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of the capital city of Sanaa. According to Yemeni sources, al Ahdal was one of Osama bin Laden’s key al Qaeda leaders in Yemen.68 Undoubtedly, progress on capturing some key players in the Cole operation was advancing. COUNTERTERRORISM AND LESSONS LEARNED Aside from developing strong bilateral relationships with host nations in order to fulfill a variety of political, economic, and security purposes, resilient bilateral relationships are a crucial element in fostering effective counterterrorism links. In the late 1990s, under the direction of Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Yemen and America renewed their relationship in earnest and increased their ties in several important realms. In 1998, the United States began a modest, yet active police-training program carried out by the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service, which included activities such as rudimentary crime scene collection and processing.69 To further strengthen ties with Yemen, also in 1998, the United States implemented a program to remove landmines that littered Yemen as a result of conflicts spanning 30 years. Instead of bringing in a private company to remove landmines, the United States opted to assist the Yemenis in creating an indigenous capacity to do this work. Eventually, the Yemenis were able to train their own demining force.70 As part of the demining program, the U.S. Embassy signed a mass casualty agreement with a hospital in Aden. When the Cole was hit, the Yemeni deminers used the fleet of vehicles supplied by the United States to evacuate the wounded to the regional hospital. The preexisting mass casualty agreement—although anticipating an operation different than the one resulting from the Cole bombing—provided an important service for the United States and strengthened the goodwill and friendship between the two countries.71 Following the attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, Yemeni President Saleh’s resolve to cooperate with the United States increased. Some analysts suspect that Yemen feared it would become a target in the global war on terror. Clearly President George W. Bush’s statement that “you are either with us or against us” resonated sharply in Sanaa.72 The Yemeni government, however, had been improving its counterterrorism capabilities prior to the attacks on the United States—for example, Yemen’s police academy graduated its first class of antiterrorist police in September 2001.73 During President Saleh’s November 2001 visit to the United States, President Bush discussed aid packages for Yemen along with Special Forces training. Additionally, the leaders discussed U.S. assistance in helping Yemen receive International Monetary Fund loans.74 When President Saleh declared his intention to cooperate more fully with the United States

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in the war on terror, teams from the 5th Special Forces Group were sent to train Yemenis in counterterrorism.75 President Saleh supported increased collaboration with the West in order to deter terrorists from using Yemen as a base for their operations. The suicide attack against the Limburg in October 2002 was costly for the Yemenis, both in terms of the environmental effects of the oil spill caused by the attack and in the loss of potential trade and investment. As such, when pressure from the United States to join the West in the global war on terror intensified, President Saleh implemented several steps to counter terrorism in Yemen. He increased cooperation with the British and American Special Forces, monitored mosques, and broadened a program dating to 1997 to deport suspected terrorists.76 Additionally, Yemen—with assistance from the United States and others—improved its surveillance of those entering Yemen from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which provided increased intelligence on potential terrorists. Many visitors from those countries were interrogated more intensely than they had been in the past. When people requested visas in Pakistan, consular officials allowed them to complete the paperwork, then denied their visas and shared the information with American intelligence agencies.77 Another effort by President Saleh’s government to fight terrorism and violence has been the implementation of a plan to buy back weapons from the population; however, cultural constraints have hampered the effort.78 Yemeni men wear the traditional curved Yemeni dagger, but this tradition fosters Western misperceptions of Yemeni extremism. Additionally, in October 2003, President Saleh implemented a controversial counterterrorism program granting amnesty to low-level militants despite their suspected links to al Qaeda.79 President Saleh was under pressure from human rights organizations for Yemen’s treatment of detainees, and Amnesty International accused the Yemeni government of torturing prisoners. In November 2003, 96 prisoners who had “repented” to an Islamic cleric were released, although they continued to be closely monitored by the government.80 This program has caused some American officials concern, although the State Department does not believe that any suspects with direct links to terrorist attacks in Yemen have been released.81 Although Yemeni officials have been more aggressive in their hunt for al Qaeda operatives within Yemen, questions continue to arise as to the Yemeni government’s dedication to this pursuit. In April 2003, ten suspects in the Cole bombing escaped from prison in Yemen, including Badawi, who was subsequently recaptured. Further, in February 2006, 23 al Qaeda operatives—13 of whom had been convicted in the USS Cole bombing—tunneled their way out of their cells in Sanaa. Some analysts contend that without assistance from high-ranking Yemeni officials, escapes of these magnitudes would have been virtually impossible.82 As mentioned previously, some fighters who returned from

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Afghanistan were employed by the security services, thereby enhancing the plausibility of the explanation that the escapees received inside assistance. In fact, in May 2006, 12 military officers were tried in Yemen for negligence that led to the escape of prisoners in February.83 Despite some key obstacles and some skepticism as to the reliability of the Yemenis, the United States worked with Yemen to establish an elite Counterterrorism Unit in 2002 and continues to provide support in that operation. Additionally, in another security cooperation program that predated the attack on the Cole, the United States assisted Yemen in the creation of a Coast Guard to patrol its long and treacherous coastline. Situated across the Gulf of Aden from the unstable states of Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, the waters here are some of the most dangerous in the world.84 Yet the growing problem of corruption in Yemen has led donors to cut aid programs, an essential component in funding counterterrorism operations.85 The investigation into the Cole bombing led Ambassador Bodine to several conclusions that impacted the ability of the United States to carry out effective investigations in the future. First, she is adamant that U.S. agencies need to “work with, not in spite of, the host government.”86 The United States cannot enter a country and expect to transform or ignore the host government, especially one with a 4,000-year history. American investigators need to work within a particular cultural milieu and act in a respectful manner. Second, investigators must recognize not only that the ambassador is the senior U.S. government representative in the country and technically in charge of any investigation, but also that embassy personnel have “well-honed tools” for both collaboration and cooperation. The embassy role is to facilitate the investigators’ ability to do their job, utilizing its cultural knowledge and established networks. Implementing tactics that are effective in the United States might not yield positive results overseas. According to Ambassador Bodine, the FBI “never asked, but always demanded” during their investigation into the attack on the Cole.87 Third, constant rotation of the FBI senior advisory agent seriously hampered the continuity and effectiveness of the investigation. This problem has since been corrected with the establishment of a permanent legal attach´e office in Sanaa. Some other key lessons learned relate to maritime force protection and a reassessment of security measures. In a U.S. Department of the Navy report released on January 19, 2001, it was found that many procedures in the ship’s security plan were not followed.88 Although one cannot say with certainty whether or not different measures might have prevented the Cole attack, the Navy has implemented new guidelines for protecting its vessels. The Navy has recognized that bolstered security measures are required in a region as volatile as the Middle East, and has revamped its antiterrorist and force protection plans accordingly. The Navy is also

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updating its technology and access to intelligence, along with enhancing its use of the NCIS agents in ports to give the commanding officers intelligence assessments.89 CONCLUSION The investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole indicated clear shortcomings on a variety of levels. First, agencies within the United States must work together to increase the effectiveness of the investigations. Issues regarding intelligence sharing between agencies such as the CIA and FBI have been addressed in earnest since September 11, and progress has been made. Second, the United States must recognize the indigenous capability of a host nation, such as Yemen, and capitalize on those areas where the host nation retains a clear advantage over American investigators. Despite the fact that Yemeni officials initially would not allow U.S. agents to interview suspects, the host nation has the distinct advantage in human intelligence.90 Clearly, had a mutually beneficial joint investigation occurred initially, with each group exploiting its comparative advantage—U.S. technology and Yemeni human intelligence—more expedient progress could have been made. Third, the U.S. government must grasp the flexible and ever-changing tactics utilized by al Qaeda. Finally, although it is nearly impossible to anticipate new modes of attacks, the government must remain forward thinking and vigilant. NOTES 1. Christopher Cooper and Neil King, Jr., “Why Was the U.S. in Yemen Anyway: Some think Washington Planned Staging Area for Regional Crises,” Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2000: A.15. 2. “Terrorism against the USS Cole and the Context in Yemen,” Policy Watch #499, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, http://www. washingtoninstitute.org (accessed June 15, 2006). 3. Ibid. 4. Ambassador Barbara Bodine, phone interview with author, June 26, 2006. 5. Cooper and King: p. A.15. 6. Bodine, phone interview. 7. Jonathan Schanzer, “Yemen’s War on Terror,” Orbis (Summer 2004): 522. 8. Michael Knights, “Internal Politics Complicate Counterterrorism in Yemen,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (February 1, 2006), http://www4.janes.com (accessed June 7, 2006). 9. Schanzer: p. 522; see also, Knights. 10. Knights, Arab Afghans refer to those non-Yemeni Arabs who trained with Islamic militant groups in Afghanistan. Yemeni Jihadis refer to those Yemenis who fought in Afghanistan.

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11. Bodine, e-mail correspondence with author, July 6, 2006. 12. Jillian Schwedler, “Yemen’s Aborted Opening,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 4 (October 2002): 53. 13. According to Ambassador Bodine, the instigator of the AAIA was a British cleric, Abu Hamza al-Misri, who financed the group and established the first team made up of his Egyptian and Pakistani relatives and not Yemenis. Additionally, training camps existed in Yemen since the time of the Marxist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. 14. Schanzer: p. 522. 15. Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle against Terror (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005) 44, http://www.rand.org. Ambassador Bodine vehemently disagrees with the idea that the Yemenis returned home and fostered Salafi teachings. She argues that the Yemenis dislike most aspects of the Saudis. For Ambassador Bodine, Yemen’s appeal to terrorist groups remains in its large and young population along with its rugged and uncontrolled territory. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 16. Knights. 17. James Brandon, “Yemen Attempts to Rein in Outlaw Tribes,” Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 2006: 6. Ambassador Bodine remains skeptical about this estimate of the number of weapons in Yemen and believes it is “urban legend.” Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 18. Dana Priest and Susan Schmidt, “Hunt Grows in Yemen for Al Qaida: Persian Gulf Nation’s Links to Terror Fuel U.S. Resolve,” Washington Post, September 15, 2002: A1. 19. Mark N. Katz, “Breaking the Yemen-Al Qaida Connection,” Current History (January 2003): 41. 20. Ibid. 21. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 22. Richard Shultz, Jr., and Ruth Margolies Beitler, “Tactical Deception and Strategic Surprise in Al Qai’ida’s Operations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 8, no. 2 (June 2004): 63. 23. Scott Peterson, “Is Yemen a Conduit for Global Terrorism?” Christian Science Monitor, March 31, 2000: 1. 24. Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke, “Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress # RS20721, p. 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html. 25. John Diamond, “U.S. had Warning 12 Hours before Cole Blast, Pentagon Official Says,” Chicago Tribune, October 25, 2000. Ambassador Bodine recalls that the report of a threat against U.S. naval vessels was too vague to be actionable. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 26. Rowan Scarborough, “Pentagon Analyst Resigns over Ignored Warnings,” Washington Times, October 26, 2000: A1. 27. “The Enemy’s Patient Plotting,” Newsweek, August 16, 2004: 26. 28. Cragin and Gerwehr: p. 42. 29. Ibid. 30. “Terrorism against the USS Cole.” 31. Richard Sale, “USS Cole Update: Hezbollah Built Bomb,” United Press International, May 20, 2001, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed June 6, 2006).

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32. Ambassador Barbara Bodine, e-mail correspondence with author, June 25, 2006. 33. For more on the responsibilities of the FEST, see http://www.state.gov/ s/ct/rls/fs/2002/13045.htm#5. 34. Bodine, phone interview. 35. Ibid. 36. Charles Schmitz, “Investigating the Cole Bombing,” Middle East Report Online, September 6, 2001, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero090601.html (accessed June 12, 2006). 37. Walter Pincus, “Yemen Hears Benefits of Joining U.S. Fight,” Washington Post, November 28, 2001: A8. 38. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Bodine, phone interview. 42. Knights. 43. However, Ambassador Bodine argues that it was “a leap” to connect antiSoviet mujahideen from Afghanistan to the Cole attack. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 44. “FBI, U.S. Ambassador Clash over Cole Probe,” United Press International, November 12, 2000, http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed June 14, 2006). 45. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 46. Ibid. 47. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 48. Bodine, phone interview. 49. Danna Harman, “Yemen Slowly Warms to U.S.” p. 6. 50. Bodine, phone interview. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 57. Ibid. 58. Michelle Mittelstadt, “U.S. Government Indicts Two Fugitives in 2000 Attack on USS Cole,” Knight Ridder, May 16, 2003: 1. Ambassador Bodine explained that al Quso claimed to have slept through the attack. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 59. John F. Burns, “FBI’s Inquiry in Cole Attack is Nearing Halt,” New York Times, August 21, 2001: A1. 60. Bodine, phone interview and e-mail correspondence. 61. David Johnston and James Risen, “Inquiry into Attack on the Cole in 2000 Missed Clues to 9/11,” New York Times, April 11, 2006: 1. 62. Zahid Hussain, “Pakistan Arrests Yemeni with Ties to Cole, Sept.11,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2003: A16. 63. Johnston and Risen: p. 1. 64. Harman, “Yemen Slowly Warms to U.S.” : p. 6.

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65. David Cloud and Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Kills al Qaida Suspect in Yemen,” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2002: A8. 66. Zahid Hussain, “Pakistan Arrests Yemeni with Ties to Cole, September 11,”: p. A16. 67. Ibid. See also, “Suspect in USS Cole Bombing is Arrested,” Houston Chronicle, November 26, 2003: 20. 68. Ibid. 69. Bodine, phone interview. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Scott Peterson, “Yemen Quakes in Cole’s Shadow,” Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 2001: 6. 73. Nabil Sultan, “Yemen: Fatal U.S. Chopper Crash May be Tied to Al Qaida Escape,” Global Information Network, February 20, 2006: 1. 74. Pincus: p. A8. 75. Priest and Schmidt: p. A1. 76. Schanzer: p. 527. 77. Karl Vick, “Yemen Walks Tightrope in Terrorism Stance,” Washington Post, September 29, 2001: A 20. 78. Schanzer: p. 521. 79. Bodine, e-mail correspondence. 80. “Yemen Pardons Al Qaida Suspects,” United Press International, November 16, 2003, http://lexis-nexi.com (accessed June 28, 2006). 81. Jonathan Schanzer, “Yemen’s Al Qaida Amnesty: Revolving Door or Evolving Strategy?” Policy Watch #808 Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 26, 2003, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org. 82. Sultan: p. 1. 83. “Yemen puts officers on military trial over al Qaida Jailbreak,” Duetche Press Agenur, May 25, 2006, http://lexis-nexis.com (accessed June 28, 2006). 84. Kevin Whitelaw, “On a Dagger’s Edge: Yemen has Become America’s Surprise Ally in Fighting Terrorism,” U.S. News and World Report, March 13, 2006, http://proquest.umi.com (accessed June 12, 2006). 85. Whitelaw. 86. Bodine, phone interview. 87. Ibid. 88. Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke, “Terrorist Attack on the USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress # RS20721, p. 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/index.html. 89. Richard Scott, “USN Ups Tempo for Anti-Terrorist Force Protection,” Janes Defence Weekly, January 4, 2002, http://www4.janes.com (accessed June 7, 2006). 90. Bodine, phone interview.

CHAPTER 10 CAPTURING KHALID SHEIKH MOHAMMAD Robert N. Wesley

The fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates has produced a mixture of successes and frustrated efforts since its post-9/11 reinvigoration. One of the highest priorities of the United States’ counterterrorism strategy is the capture or killing of the movement’s traditional leadership. Although, as of this writing, al Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to elude concerted efforts by allied intelligence and security forces, the organization’s other top ranks have been in perpetual need of replenishing. Some of these achievements have been in the form of assassination strikes on difficult targets. More significantly, though, are successes where U.S. officers—working with local security services—have been able to actually capture high-ranking al Qaeda operatives alive. One such success involved a March 3, 2003, raid in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. Acting on intelligence generated from a string of raids stretching over a year, scores of Pakistani paramilitaries raided an apartment building in an upscale section of Rawalpindi, awakening the mastermind of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (widely referred to by his initials KSM), the most important catch thus far in the fight against al Qaeda-inspired terrorism, was taken without a fight, carrying with him the details of the inner workings, history, and future operations of the network. The most significant capture of an al Qaeda operational leader deserves to be detailed, not only for the strategic importance of the individual involved, but for delineating the complex process that led to his detainment and the lessons underlined by this process. His capture serves to emphasize how the United States will be operating in the future to ensure

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continued progress in disrupting both the traditional leadership and those who replace them. Mohammad’s case study allows for reflection on several counterterrorism issues likely to have an impact on the future of this conflict. These include, inter alia, the importance of: developing strong international partnering relationships; harnessing the core competencies of joint operations involving United States and host-country organizations; creating and exploiting actionable intelligence; identifying and provoking security mistakes by al Qaeda operatives; and targeting “partner organizations” of al Qaeda. THE MASTERMIND Although this case study will focus on the lessons learned from the counterterrorism perspective, the content of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s background is significant enough to merit further elaboration. Mohammad was not an ordinary operative; nor was he a mediocre leader. He had a hand in so many of the most significant attacks preceding his arrest, including both World Trade Center attacks, that some counterterrorism officials gibingly referred to him as the “Forrest Gump” of al Qaeda. His insatiable appetite for the spectacular, and being the most experienced executor of attacks, elevated his detainment to the highest priority. Hence his capture on March 3, 2003, put al Qaeda’s most accomplished operational leader out of business. As al Qaeda and its broader movement the Global Jihad have become more laterally structured and loosely coordinated, such capable independent-minded leaders are of the utmost importance in terms of executing complex terrorist attacks. Mohammad is thought to have been born in 1964 or 1965 in Kuwait to parents likely from Baluchistan, an area covering parts of Pakistan and Iran.1 Mohammad’s experiences and natural attributes made him an exceptionally well-endowed operative. His mixed heritage, along with his Western education and traveling, account for his being fluent in at least Arabic, English, Urdu, and Baluchi. These languages allowed him to operate in disparate environments, freely moving about under multiple covers. One of the common denominators of al Qaeda’s core leadership is that most grew up in what can be considered religious families.2 Mohammad is no exception, and it is believed that he joined a sect of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait around age 16.3 From this foundation, he was inculcated in violent jihad from an early age, even participating in desert training encampments. After finishing his secondary schooling, Mohammad decided to venture to the United States for a Western university education and enrolled in a small Baptist college in North Carolina in 1983.4 After pursuing

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mechanical engineering, he transferred to North Carolina Agriculture and Technology University and finished his degree in 1986.5 His religious fervor never seems to have weakened over the years, as he was constantly engaged in jihadi activities, even while simultaneously pursuing nonrelated objectives. His radicalization was further galvanized after traveling to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets in 1987.6 In Afghanistan, Mohammad confided in Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a leading Afghan resistance figure and head of the Islamic Union Party (HizbulIttihad al-Islami). From 1988 to 1992, Mohammad was engaged in, among other hobbies, helping to run a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Peshawar, Pakistan. The NGO was sponsored by his mentor Sayyaf and was involved in facilitating travel and other support to mujahideen wishing to join the Afghan jihad. During this period, Mohammad’s network of associates grew significantly. After leaving the NGO, Mohammad— like many career mujahideen—spent some time fighting and supporting the Bosnia jihad. Mohammad’s nephew, Ramzi Yousef, was at this time planning the first World Trade Center (WTC) bombing. The two relatives were in communication, and indeed Mohammad wired Yousef $660 for the operation.7 By the time of the first WTC bombing in 1993, Mohammad had moved to Qatar and taken a position as an engineer at the Qatari Ministry of Electricity and Water, following the advice of Sheikh Abdallah bin Khalid bin Hamad al-Thani, the former Qatari minister of Islamic affairs.8 This was not a “settling-down” period for Mohammad; rather, it was a time for realigning his path of jihad. Apparently inspired by the near success of the WTC attack, Mohammad moved with its mastermind, his nephew Yousef, to the Philippines to plan further grandiose attacks.9 While in Manila, a plan was hatched that would be the inspiration for the 9/11 attacks. The widely known but failed Yousef-Mohammad plot to blow up 11– 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean [a plot they referred to as “Oplan Bojinka”] was in the final planning stages when it was disrupted.10 An explosives accident in Manila, along with investigations of other attack plans, led to the disruption of the cell and the subsequent return of Mohammad to Qatar, where he regained his government position while clandestinely globetrotting to meet with associates in Sudan, Malaysia, Brazil, and Yemen.11 Simultaneously, a U.S. court indicted Mohammad in January 1996 for his involvement in the first WTC bombing. U.S. authorities were also tracking Mohammad during this period and were hoping to arrest him and transport him to face trial. After learning of his residence in Qatar, U.S. officials debated where or not to snatch Mohammad by force, eventually deciding to request permission from the Qatari government. Unfortunately, however, the response from Qatar came too late, as Mohammad had already fled to Pakistan to seek refuge with brothers in the region.12

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Later in 1996, Mohammad, needing financing and operatives, was able to meet with Osama bin Laden, where he proposed to train pilots for a plan that involved crashing airplanes into buildings on the east and west coasts of the United States. Bin Laden reportedly was not particularly interested in pursuing the plan at the time as he had recently moved from the Sudan to Afghanistan and was assumedly more concerned with reorganizing and consolidating his position in the chaotic region.13 The roaming Mohammad was also trying to find his jihadi nitch, and thus became enamored with jihadi training camps and supporting groups operating in the region and beyond. Mohammad moved his family to Karachi, Pakistan, in 1997. Later the same year, he tried to join Ibn alKhattab, the famous Saudi militant leader in Chechnya, but failed to transit through Azerbaijan. During this period, Mohammad maintained his ties to al Qaeda’s operatives, including Mohammad Atef and Sayf alAdl, assisting them in various projects. These relationships flourished until bin Laden in late 1998 or early 1999 gave Mohammad the goahead for the “planes operation,” and the September 11 plot began in earnest.14 As the September 11, 2001, attacks have been detailed in other publications, this study will only emphasize that Mohammad was the operational leader, the strategic guide, and the overall commander of the operation. It is also important to note that Mohammad had not sworn an official oath of allegiance, bayat, to bin Ladin, and thus preserved his autonomy for the coming years. Mohammad, conforming to his modus operandi, was also engaged in simultaneous planning for further operations, as the “planes operation” was viewed as the beginning of a protracted campaign. Following the surprising success of the operation, the hunt for Mohammad, which had been initiated in the mid-1990s, accelerated. CAPTURING THE FORREST GUMP OF AL QAEDA Mohammad, like many al Qaeda operatives with previous knowledge of the attacks, expressed surprise at the magnitude of destruction of September 11. Correspondingly, the strength and determination of the U.S. response to the attacks seems to also have caught leaders such as Mohammad off guard. However, Mohammad’s role in the attacks did not become clear until 2002, when interrogations—especially of al Qaeda senior leader Abu Zubaydah—revealed Mohammad to have been the primary organizer.15 Even though al Qaeda’s operational environment was being constantly restricted after the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and the strengthening of cooperation with the government of Pakistan, the network continued to plan future attacks and reevaluate existing plans. For example, the September 11 attacks were to be followed by a “second wave” of

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attacks in the United States by operatives such as Zacarias Moussaoui.16 The “second wave” plans seemed to have been postponed or cancelled following intense counterterrorism operations and the arrest of Moussaoui. Nonetheless, Mohammad pushed on with multiple operations. On September 10, 2001, the same day that the Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Massoud was assassinated by al Qaeda operates in Northern Afghanistan, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad dispatched his trusted operative Mohammad Mansor Jabarah to South East Asia to lay the groundwork for multiple suicide truck bombings in the region targeting U.S., British, and Israeli interests.17 This operation was reportedly frustrated in December 2001 after the cell in Singapore was dismantled.18 A week after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Mohammad is reported to have traveled from his base in Pakistan to Afghanistan to seek out bin Laden, who congratulated Mohammad and instructed him to continue operations with increasing autonomy.19 Mohammad responded by delegating operational authorities to subordinates and sanctioning further attacks. One such move involved giving $20,000 and a fake passport to Jemaah Islamiya senior operative Riduan Isamuddin, commonly known as Hambali, with instructions to case targets in the region for further attacks.20 Mohammad is also believed to have had a hand in the April 2002 attack on a synagogue in Jerba, Tunisia, which claimed the lives of 19 people.21 In the early stages of the U.S. and allied campaign against the al Qaeda organization and its networks, both sides were caught trying to come to grips with what had happened and what the future direction of the conflict would be. Al Qaeda’s cadres began to seek out refuges for regrouping and continuing operations. Mohammad seems to have decided that utilizing the numerous contacts and affiliates he had collected over the years in Pakistan’s cities was the wisest method of evading capture while planning future attacks. Pakistan’s cities are teaming with numerous militant groups of all varieties, and Mohammad had connections with operatives and facilitators throughout many of them. One of the most familiar cities to him was Karachi. A huge port city with a population of over 14 million, Karachi offered Mohammad easy access to people, materials, and numerous safe houses from which to evade counterterrorism initiatives. Militant groups have long had a heavy presence in the city, and support networks sympathetic to al Qaeda and Mohammad were well entrenched. The negative side of taking refuge in Karachi, however, was that it was swarming with intelligence officers and agents. Unlike the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, any neighborhood in Karachi could be easily accessed within a moment’s notice. Mohammad undoubtedly weighed these advantages and disadvantages, and in the end decided that Karachi was a beneficial place from which to operate.

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The city of Karachi was a primary suspect for the location of Mohammad due to his previous residencies there coupled with the known presence of al Qaeda operatives in the city. However, in late 2001 and early 2002, Mohammad’s location was still unclear, and indeed the priority of his capture had not yet fully matured. Later in 2002, it became known that Mohammad, Khalid bin Atish, and probably Ramzi bin al-Shibh as well had been hiding in Karachi since at least January 2002. This information was partially based on subsequent raids where it was discovered that Atish had been giving lectures in January and February 2002 to local militants, primarily from the violent sectarian group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.22 Much information is not publicly known concerning Mohammad’s movements or counterterrorism activities targeting him in the early months of 2002; however, it can be assumed that since both groups were in a perpetual state of operations, there was much occurring in this respect. Indeed, the Jerba synagogue bombing occurred in April of 2002, thus emphasizing Mohammad’s continued relevance. Meanwhile, the U.S. and allied intelligence agencies were in need of more specific information on Mohammad’s whereabouts in order to focus their resources. The break that investigators had been searching for occurred after alJazeera investigative reporter Yosri Fouda received an invitation from al Qaeda to conduct an interview in June 2002. Fouda arrived in Karachi and was escorted on a series of well-orchestrated countersurveillance procedures before reaching a residence where he met two of the primary planners of the September 11, 2001 attacks: Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Ramzi bin al-Shibh.23 Eager to take credit for the attacks and to voice their justifications, opinions, and goals, the two senior operatives proceeded over the next 2 days to outline the attacks and impress their ideology upon Fouda. This was the turning point in the hunt for Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. The importance of the interview rested not in the rhetoric of the two planners, but rather in how the circumstances of the interview were exploited. The first mistake made by Mohammad was allowing the interview to take place in the same city, regardless of its size, as where he was in “long-term” hiding. Fouda was able to identify the sequence of events of his escort to the safe house and determine that he was conducting the interview in Karachi. This enabled joint Pakistani-U.S. tracking teams to focus their immediate energies on the city where they knew he had been hiding. After finishing the interview, Fouda was not able to return with any of the audio or video tapes that had been recording the 2-day event. Mohammad and Bin al-Shibh had claimed that they needed to black out their faces by their own technical means. Fouda was promised the videotapes but never received them. After some time, Mohammad made his second mistake by allowing an audio recoding of the interview to be sent to Fouda

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as documentation. This recording now allowed U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) technicians to develop a “voiceprint” of both al Qaeda operatives. These prints enabled U.S. agencies to monitor telecommunications transmissions for matching voice patterns with the hope of further isolating Mohammad or Bin al-Shibh’s location. From this point, the manhunt began to pick up momentum. One of the most successful ways of tracking down the location of leadership figures such as Mohammad is by producing “actionable” intelligence based on information gleaned from interrogations and clues collected in raids of individuals who could be in close proximity to the leader in question.24 This intelligence must be exploited quickly, as al Qaeda’s leaders—although making mistakes at times—tend to practice effective personal security procedures. The trail usually dries up quickly, and thus U.S. and Pakistani joint teams must work in fluid cooperation in order to harness their core competencies and maintain production of this actionable intelligence. The period between the Fouda interview and September 2002 saw multiple low-level raids and intelligence collection activities focused on uncovering new leads in Karachi. One such raid netted Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, a Kenyan national wanted for his participation in the 1998 embassy bombings. His arrest is reported to have come as the result of information retrieved from the interrogation of members of a sectarian group in Karachi, most likely from Laskar-e-Jhangvi.25 A series of raids conducted in September 2002 were the most considerable to date. The most significant of these began on September 9, when two foreigners and a Pakistani were arrested in a Karachi apartment. The suspects reportedly told investigators of two apartments in the Defense Housing district of Karachi that were purported to contain additional militants.26 Investigators were also chasing down the location of a satellite phone call that was thought to have matched Mohammad’s voiceprint.27 U.S. and Pakistani teams were generating actionable intelligence that was encouragingly pointing to the location of Mohammad. The following day on September 10, Pakistani officers raided two apartments in the Bahadurabad neighborhood. The terrorists contested the raid with automatic weapons and grenades, which led to the death of two of their comrades and the capture of five. Inside the apartments, investigators found satellite and mobile phones, laptop computers, CDs, $5,000, and other valuable materials that required immediate attention. Mohammad was apparently a frequent visitor of the raided safe houses.28 Interrogations of suspects and individuals in and around the apartment directed the joint teams to another apartment in a run-down business district of Karachi. Pakistani Interservice Intelligence (ISI) paramilitaries raided this apartment on September 11, 2002. On the one-year anniversary of the attacks on the United States, one of the leading perpetrators was captured.29

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Ramzi bin al-Shibh had essentially become Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s proverbial right-hand man. The former roommate of Mohammad Atta, the tactical Emir of the 9/11 attacks, bin al-Shibh, was initially meant to take part in the attacks, but could not gain the proper visa to enter the United States.30 He thus became a primary facilitator and organizer for the 9/11 attack group. Excelling in this role, he became even closer to KSM and began taking leading positions in further operations. He even participated in refining the ideological justifications of al Qaeda’s campaign.31 Although ISI officials and U.S. intelligence officers might have been surprised to have discovered bin al-Shibh instead of KSM during the September 11, 2002 raid, they no doubt knew they had caught a substantial figure with serious implications for future operations. Indeed, KSM referred to bin al-Shibh as the “Coordinator of the Holy Tuesday Operation” in their joint interview with Fouda. The September 11, 2002 raid not only captured bin al-Shibh, but also provided new intelligence on the activities of KSM and his associates. Authorities expected to find KSM and Khalid bin Atish at the apartment, and indeed they probably had been staying there previously, as Atish’s artificial leg was found in one of the rooms.32 Other materials indicated to investigators that some of those who were operating out of the safe house were involved in facilitating the foreign travel of al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan wishing to exit the country.33 Also present were the usual assortment of phones, computers, documents, CDs, and money.34 Investigators exploited the intelligence gleaned from the previous raids to conduct yet a third raid the next day on September 12 in the Gulshan-eIqbal district of Karachi.35 The raid captured seven suspects, including an Egyptian woman who reportedly told investigators that KSM had stayed in the building several times during the preceding weeks. Mohammad was clearly moving often from one safe house to another, and would receive news of the compromised refuges in very short order. However, Mohammad was still believed at this time to be in Karachi. Subsequent raids in mid-November 2002 led to the capture of eight al Qaeda suspects, although Mohammad was not among them.36 Joint U.S. and Pakistani teams were tracking leads generated since September all over Pakistan. In Lahore, a joint ISI and U.S. team conducted a midnight raid on the Manawan compound owned by the prominent Dr. Ahmed Javed Khawaja. The doctor was found to be harbouring al Qaeda operatives identified as Abu Yasir al-Jaziri, Assadullah Aziz, Sheikh Said al-Misri, and Abu Faraj. Khawaja was the third known Pakistani doctor to have been arrested since September 2002. Abu Faraj was reportedly also known to have been a deputy of Mohammad.37 The first month of 2003 brought another wave of important raids targeting Mohammad and his associates. ISI agents raided the compound of a highly visible female leader of the Jama’at-e-Islami (JeI) political party in

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the Gulshan-e-Maymar neighborhood of Karachi on January 9.38 She was the wife of the famous Pakistani field hockey player Shahid Ali Khan. In addition, the raid led to the arrest of two Arab members of al Qaeda and information that could be exploited for future operations.39 After a gun battle the next day in Gulshan-e-Maima district, another raid netted suspected al Qaeda operatives Abu Omar and Abu Hamza.40 Investigators also uncovered weapons, mobile phones, computers, and $25,000 in cash.41 On January 17, 2003, investigators identified four safe houses and captured four suspected al Qaeda operatives with links to Mohammad and the banned group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.42 An Australian citizen was also arrested during January and questioned regarding his links to Mohammad.43 Investigators had started slowly identifying the network of supporters that was facilitating Mohammad’s movements or who was otherwise linked to him. They were getting the kind of actionable intelligence that was necessary for breaking up a network and capturing its members. The arduous process of pursuing leads and finding dead ends, frustrated near misses, big catches, and sleepless hours came to a climax starting in February 2003, when a combination of investigative techniques and intelligence collection methods—and possibly the reward money offered by the United States—resulted in the arrest of Mohammad Abd alRahman, son of the infamous Omar Abd al-Rahman imprisoned in the United States.44 Al-Rahman was arrested on February 14 in the Pakistani city of Quetta. It is reported that al-Rahman divulged valuable details of KSM, with whom he had purportedly been hiding.45 U.S. technicians were also able to exploit the materials that were left behind in the Quetta compound to trace previous communications to individuals with whom KSM might have sought refuge. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad’s trail was picked up again in Rawalpindi, and the ISI—with the support of the United States—employed surveillance and stalking techniques to arrest at least seven individuals associated with Mohammad. Mohammad had apparently been staying for 10 days with Ahmed Abdul Qadus, the son of an eminent microbiologist in the city with links to the Jama’at-e-Islami political group.46 Mohammad was caught sleeping when officers raided the house in the early morning of March 3, 2003. Arrested along with Mohammad and Qadus was Mustafa Ahmed alHawsawi, a trusted associate of Mohammad who had, among other activities, facilitated finances for the 9/11 operation.47 Mohammad was quickly interrogated for more actionable intelligence and then handed over to U.S. officials to be flown out of the country for more extensive, long-term interrogations. After an arduous process, less than a year after the Fouda

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interview, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks was captured along with dozens of other highly experienced associates. LESSONS LEARNED Such a robust and protracted counterterrorism project can provide insights as to how counterterrorism has been practiced in the past, and how it could be effectively practiced in the future. This chapter focuses on five of these lessons. These lessons are in many respects interdependent of one another, since the failure to accomplish one can lead to the marginal benefits of another. A successful counterterrorism campaign, as demonstrated by the KSM case study, will display a positive incorporation of these lessons. International Partnering Relationships Probably the most glaring lesson that this case study of KSM illuminates is the necessity of building strong, trusting relationships between the country hosting the operations—in this case Pakistan—and the other involved parties, such as the United States. This cooperation must be comprehensive, affecting all levels of government from the policymakers to the working-level operators collecting intelligence and conducting raids. Al Qaeda and those following a similar philosophy and terrorist strategy are a danger to all states. Most major counterterrorism operations that have involved targeting leadership have been the result of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Mohammad would have continued to elude capture if the vested countries had pursued the hunt unilaterally. The necessity of close cooperation cannot be understated. Synergy and Core Competencies Closely connected to the development of international partnering relationships is defining and exploiting the core competencies of workinglevel officers and agencies. Developing a synergy of strengths is crucial to breaking highly adaptive and loosely connected networks such as al Qaeda. Capturing the leadership, which is even more evasive, requires the optimizing of joint operations to develop the necessary actionable intelligence. Pakistan exhibited strengths, or core competencies, in the area of human intelligence (HUMINT); local knowledge; human capital; national and local police capabilities; and the authority to raid, detain, and interrogate suspects. The United States brought to the team refined investigative

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techniques such as surveillance and stalking; advanced analytical tools; additional HUMINT resources; and unique SIGINT capabilities, all of which complemented the core competencies of its Pakistani partner. Creating and Exploiting Actionable Intelligence Mohammad did not suffer the same fate as his nephew Ramzi Yousef, who was captured as a result of one of his associates walking into the U.S. Embassy and leading U.S. and Pakistani officers to his location. Rather, Mohammad was captured as a direct result of months of the tireless joint efforts of Pakistani and U.S. intelligence and police officers who created their own “lucky breaks” by exploiting one piece of intelligence information to cause another to appear. Although joint operations are usually far from displaying perfect synergy, the competencies harnessed by the teams involved in the hunt for Khalid Sheikh Mohammad allowed for a continual production of actionable intelligence. Terrorist groups under the strain of counterterrorism operations continuously adjust their security procedures. They also learn to compartmentalize information in order to insulate themselves when colleagues are detained and safe houses raided. Although this tradecraft is becoming highly advanced, it is permeable, and thus synergetic exploitation teams are necessary to maintain production of actionable intelligence. Need to Identify and Provoke Mistakes Most terrorist leaders are well practiced in covert tradecraft, and have proven to be adept at insulating themselves from detection and capture. Intelligence collection and counterterrorism operations can place significant pressures on leaders, which in turn constricts their operational capabilities, but may not necessarily lead to capture. However, terrorists cannot solely concentrate on evading detection as they must remain relevant by interacting with their audiences and continuing operations. Terrorists can make mistakes when they engage in these necessary activities, and these mistakes can be exploited. In this case study, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad was an operational commander who tragically decided to dabble in public relations. Mohammad exposed his location and later his voice to an exogenous source. Al Qaeda leaders have since learned of the danger of inviting journalists for interviews and thus now produce their propaganda indigenously in order to maintain full control of the information released. After unnecessarily exposing himself, U.S. and Pakistani intelligence was able to pick up his trail. Since KSM was the chief operational commander, he had to maintain active communications and access to personnel, which further

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exposed him to SIGNIT activities and Karachi-focused counterterrorism operations. Such mistakes will eventually occur when pressure is applied, but they can also happen by chance, as this case depicts. An intimate understanding of the necessary activities and objectives of terrorist leadership can allow pressure to be applied more effectively to induce more mistakes. Targeting Partner Organizations The idea of targeting organizations that support or are otherwise connected to terrorist groups is not a novel concept. This case study serves to underline the fact that rolling up complex and amorphous networks such as al Qaeda requires targeting the groups that can provide an actionable intelligence “cascade” or a piece of information that leads to another, thus developing a trail that can be followed toward more significant targets. An example of this is the tangential relationships between al Qaeda members and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). The two groups shared resources and facilitated movement for each other in Karachi, and indeed vital information gathered in the KSM case came from LeJ. Jama’at-e-Islami, another group in this case study with links to al Qaeda, is a bit more difficult to target due to the size of the political party and the backlash major investigations might have. However, directly targeting groups with less potential political backlash such as the LeJ, with the goal of obtaining information on al Qaeda in Karachi, can produce real results. NOTES 1. “Profile: Al-Qaeda ‘Kingpin’,” BBC News Online, March 5, 2003. 2. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 77. 3. The 9/11 Commission Report, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, Chapter 5. Available at http://www.911commission .gov. 4. “Profile: Al-Qaeda ‘Kingpin’”. 5. Ibid. 6. The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Defendant’s Exhibit 941, U.S. v. Moussaoui, 2006. 10. For a detailed analysis of this plot, see Rohan Gunaratna, “Al Qaeda’s Lose and Learn Doctrine,” in Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical Learning in the Terrorist World, ed. James J. F. Forest (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) 171–188.

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11. “Profile: Al-Qaeda ‘Kingpin’,”; The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5. 12. Niles Lathem, “Neighbors Sold out 9/11 Fiend: Reward-Seekers Gave Cops Tip that Ended 8-Year Hunt,” New York Post, March 3, 2003. 13. The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5. 14. “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Defendant’s Exhibit 941, U.S. v. Moussaoui, 2006; The 9/11 Commission Report, Chapter 5. 15. Yosri Fouda, “War on Terror: The Masterminds,” The Sunday Times, September 8, 2002. 16. “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Defendant’s Exhibit 941, U.S. v. Moussaoui, 2006. 17. “Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: Life of Terror,” CNN.com, March 5, 2003. 18. Yoram Schweitzer, “The Capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad,” Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, March 5, 2003; Robert MacPherson, “Al-Qaeda Initially Planned to Hit Nuclear Plants,” Agence France-Presse, September 8, 2002. 19. Paul Martin, “Chicago, L.A. Towers Were Next Targets,” The Washington Times, March 30, 2004; Christina Lamb, “Focus: The Confessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” The Sunday Times, March 28, 2004. 20. Lamb, “Focus: The Confessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.” 21. Schweitzer, “The Capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.” 22. Mazhar Abbas, “Al-Qaeda Terror Mastermind Gives Pakistani Security the Slip,” Agence France-Presse, November 14, 2002; Rana Jawad, “Arrest of Top alQaeda Suspect a Lucky Break,” Agence France-Presse, September 18, 2002. 23. Fouda, “War on Terror: The Masterminds.” 24. For more analysis on intelligence gathering and best practices in manhunting, please see several chapters in Volume One of this book. 25. “Two al-Qaeda Leaders Allegedly Arrested in Karachi,” Xinhua News Agency, September 9, 2002. 26. Jawad, “Arrest of Top al-Qaeda Suspect a Lucky Break.” 27. Rory McCarthy, “Al-Qaeda Linchpin Eludes His Pursuers, Most Wanted is Elusive Quarry,” The Guardian, September 23, 2002. 28. Abbas, “Al-Qaeda Terror Mastermind Gives Pakistani Security the Slip.” 29. Rana Jawad, “Alleged 9/11 Mastermind in U.S. Custody,” Agence FrancePresse, March 2, 2003. 30. “Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,” Defendant’s Exhibit 941, U.S. v. Moussaoui, 2006. 31. Fouda, “War on Terror: The Masterminds.” 32. Jawad, “Arrest of Top al-Qaeda Suspect a Lucky Break.” 33. Nick Fielding, “Phone Call Gave Away al-Qaeda Hideout,” The Sunday Times, September 15, 2002. 34. Abbas, “Al-Qaeda Terror Mastermind Gives Pakistani Security the Slip.” 35. McCarthy, “Al-Qaida Linchpin Eludes His Pursuers, Most Wanted is Elusive Quarry.” 36. Abbas, “Al-Qaeda Terror Mastermind Gives Pakistani Security the Slip.” 37. “Informant to be Paid Mi