Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism (Philosophy, Social Theory, and the Rule of Law)

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism

Rainer Forst Translated by John M. M. Farrell Copyrighted material

PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL THEORY, A N D T H E RULE OF LAW

General Editors A n d r e w Arato, Seyla B e n h a b i b , F e r e n c F e h e r , William Forbath, A g n e s Heller, A r t h u r J a c o b s o n , a n d Michel Rosenfeld 1.

William Rehg, Insight a n d Solidarity: A Study in the Discourse Ethics of J u r g e n H a b e r m a s

2.

Alan Brudner, T h e Unity of the C o m m o n Law: Studies in Hegelian J u r i s p r u d e n c e

3.

Peter Goodrich, Oedipus L e x : Psychoanalysis, History, L a w

4.

Michel Rosenfeld, J u s t Interpretations: L a w between Ethics a n d Politics

5.

Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, T h e Vestal and the Fasces: H e g e l , L a c a n , Property, a n d the Feminine

6.

Michel Rosenfeld and Andrew Arato, editors, H a b e r m a s on L a w a n d Democracy: Critical E x c h a n g e s

7.

Desmond Manderson, S o n g s without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of L a w and Justice

8.

Arthur J. Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink, editors, Weimar: A J u r i s p r u d e n c e of Crisis

9.

Rainer Forst, Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy b e y o n d Liberalism a n d Communitarianism. Translated by J o h n M . M . Farrell.

The publisher gratefully acknowledges the contribution to the series Philosophy, Social Theory, and the Rule of Law provided by the Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Contexts of Justice

Contexts of Justice Political Philosophy beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism

Rainer Forst T R A N S L A T E D

B Y

John M. M. Farrell

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley

Los Angeles

London

Originally published as Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit. Politische Philosophie jenseits von Liberalismus und Kommunitarismus. © Suhrkamp 1994 University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 2002 by the Regents of the University of California

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Forst, Rainer, 1964[Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit. English] Contexts of justice : political philosophy beyond liberalism and communitarianism / Rainer Forst; translated by John M.M. Farrell. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-520-21408-0 (cloth alk. paper)—ISBN 0-520-23225-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Justice (Philosophy) I. Tide. B105.J87 F6713 2002 172' .2—dc2i 2001002084

Manufactured in the United States of America 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The paper used in this publication is both acid-free and totally chlorine-free (TCF). It meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992 (R1997) (Permanence of Paper).

To

Mechthild

CONTENTS

PREFACE

/

Introduction: Liberalism, Communitarianism, a n d the Question of Justice

/

3

1 . T h e Constitution of the Self / 6 1 . 1 . The Critique of the "Unencumbered Self/ 1.2. Ethical Person and Legal Person / 16

8

2. T h e 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4.

Ethical Neutrality of L a w / 30 Liberalism and Neutrality / 31 Individual Bights and Autonomy as a Good / General Law and Particular Identities / 68 Basic Individual Rights / 80

3. The 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4.

Ethos of D e m o c r a c y / 88 Modus Vivendi and Overlapping Consensus / 90 Substantivist and Republican Communitarianism / Civil Society and Deliberative Democracy / Citizenship and Social Justice / 137

48

4. Universalism and Contextualism / 154 4.1. A Contextualist Universalism / 7 5 7 4.2. Constructivism and Practical Reason / 173 4.3. Which Person ? Whose Reason ? / 200 4.4. Ethical Universalism and Modern Identity / 215 5 . Contexts of Justice / 230 5 . j . Justice and the Good / 231 5 . 2 . Contexts of Justification / 241 5 . 3 . Contexts of Recognition / 275 NOTES

/

2

93

BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

/

/

309

335

ix

PREFACE

T h e c o n c e p t of "justice" is frequently symbolized in a particular way—as Justitia, blindfolded, with a scales in o n e h a n d a n d a sword in the other.

1

T h e blindfold symbolizes impartiality, which is her principal feature; the scales represent the idea of balanced j u d g m e n t a n d of equal considerations guaranteeing "to each h i s / h e r own"; the sword underscores the conclu­ siveness a n d authority of h e r j u d g m e n t . Justice is the highest political-moral virtue by which legal, political, a n d social conditions as a w h o l e — t h e basic structure of society—can b e measured. O n closer inspection, however, d o u b t about this presentation of the idea of justice makes itself felt. O n what is its normative authority f o u n d e d if divine a n d natural law have lost their validity? Doesn't "justice" m e a n some­ thing different d e p e n d i n g o n the period a n d the culture in which one refers to it? Imagine Justitia in a completely different religious a n d political society—does it still appeal to c o m m o n , universalist conceptions of moral­ ity? T h e blindfold also gives rise to questions. W h a t notion of impartiality assumes that, "without distinction of person," it does 'justice" to individual persons? Isn't a conception o f j u d g m e n t a n d reason that isolates itself from concrete h u m a n experiences itself in d a n g e r of b e c o m i n g blind to the various needs of h u m a n beings? H o w can justice, we ask, turning to the symbol of the scales, find a single standard for the complexity of conflicting claims? A n d doesn't the e m p l o y m e n t of the sword presuppose a humanly unattainable, definitive, a n d infallible j u d g m e n t on the basis of n o r m s en­ j o y i n g absolute validity? T h e s e are some of the questions that reverberate in what follows. I ex­ plore the possibility of a conception of morally justified political a n d social justice that avoids both the criticism of context blindness a n d a contexxi

xii

PREFACE

tualism that fails to recognize the universalist core of the call for 'justice." In differentiating "contexts of justice," I try to clarify the normative con­ ditions on which the basic structure of society can b e called just. H e r e I would like to thank the persons a n d institutions that have h e l p e d m e in n u m e r o u s ways in preparing this study. It is the revised version of my dissertation at the D e p a r t m e n t of Philosophy of the J o h a n n W o l f g a n g G o e t h e University in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. I a m especially grateful to J u r g e n H a b e r m a s for his always e n c o u r a g i n g a n d willing furtherance of my work a n d — n o t least—for all I have learned from him. In the interdis­ ciplinary research g r o u p "Legal T h e o r y , " which he supervised a n d which was financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft ( G e r m a n research council), I h a d the possibility of getting to know the various dimensions of the connection between law, democracy, a n d morality. I owe a great deal to the discussions with the m e m b e r s a n d guests of the research g r o u p , in particular K e n n e t h Baynes, J a m e s B o h m a n , Klaus G u n t h e r , I n g e b o r g Maus, B e r n h a r d Peters, a n d Lutz Wingert. I thank the Studienwerk Villigst for a grant to complete my dissertation and in particular for enabling a research stay at the D e p a r t m e n t of Philos­ o p h y of Harvard University ( 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 ) . With regard to this period in the U n i t e d States, which was very important to m e , I would especially like to thank J o h n Rawls for being so a c c o m m o d a t i n g and for valuable and in­ structive discussions. F o r n u m e r o u s helpful suggestions a n d clarifications I am indebted to discussions of papers on different parts of m y work. In the course of the text I have tried to mark some of the places at which I have especially profited from criticisms raised by particular individuals. I w o u l d like how­ ever to single out A x e l H o n n e t h , with w h o m I have discussed many of the questions I deal with in what follows. Finally, a very special thanks to Mechthild for all of h e r e n c o u r a g e m e n t and support. T h e b o o k is dedicated to her, my first reader. T h e welcome publication of my b o o k in English gives m e additional reason to b e grateful: to the editors of the series "Philosophy, Social T h e o r y , a n d the Rule of Law" for including my study; a n d especially to J o h n Farrell for his excellent translation. A p a r t from occasional a n d m i n o r clarifications, the text has r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d .

2

Introduction: Liberalism, Communitarianism, and the Question of Justice

T h e question of justice has b e e n at the core of political philosophy ever since Plato's Republic. It is an old but still current question that has to b e answered each time a n e w — a n d indeed not only in respect of normative content but also with regard to the methodological justification of a phil­ osophical theory of political a n d social justice. W h a t norms legitimate the legal, political, and social relations within a political community, a n d how can these norms be justified? M y study is guided by the conviction that a critical analysis of the con­ troversy between liberalism a n d communitarianism offers the possibility of making a systematic contribution to the clarification of the basic concepts of a theory of justice. T h e title Contexts of Justice refers (a) to the central problem of such a theory; (b) to the chosen mode of access to this problem; a n d (c) to the proposed conceptual solution. (a) A t the center of the discussion between liberalism a n d communitar­ ianism lies the classic p r o b l e m of a morally justified theory of political a n d social justice: the norms that are to be designated as j u s t must be both context-immanent a n d context-transcending; they have to claim validity for a particular community a n d for its specific self-understandings a n d insti­ tutions but at the same time hold u p a moral-critical mirror to the latter. H o w abstract may such a theory b e a n d yet remain adequately concrete? H o w can it b e simultaneously related to a specific society a n d yet not b e relativistic? T h i s is not j u s t a methodological question, for different answers have different normative, substantive consequences for the theory of a just society. "Communitarianism" a n d "liberalism" are vague generic concepts for positions in a controversy that, during the 1 9 8 0 s , unfolded a r o u n d this p r o b l e m and developed—even beyond its original A n g l o - A m e r i c a n context 1

2

INTRODUCTION

of e m e r g e n c e — a s a productive debate on the fundamental normative ques­ tions of political communities. T h i s controversy was sparked primarily by J o h n Rawls's study A Theory of Justice (first published in 1 9 7 1 ) , a work that put an e n d to the eulogies on the bygone, great tradition of normative political philosophy; a work whose contemporary reformulation of Kantian arguments within the framework of a liberal contract theory proved to be not only an effective counterproject to utilitarian theories but also an im­ petus for the development of alternative liberal approaches to combining individual f r e e d o m a n d social equality (if one thinks of the work of R o n a l d 1

Dworkin and B r u c e A c k e r m a n , for instance). W h a t especially drew criti­ cism was the character of the justification of Rawls's theory, o n e that ab­ stracted from concrete social contexts, as well as the theory's emphasis on the priority of equal individual liberties over substantive conceptions of the good. T h i s criticism—inspired in varying ways by Aristotle, classical repub­ licanism, Rousseau, Hegel, or Tocqueville—emphasized the embeddedness

of justice

in

communally

constituted

self-understandings

and

traditions. Yet the objections raised in this connection by such theorists as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair Maclntyre, or Michael Walzer (just to mention the most important ones) exhibit fundamental method­ ological and normative differences. H e n c e , I avoid speaking of the com­ munitarian or the liberal theory in what follows; rather, what is important is to d o justice to the complexity of the debate by considering individual 2

positions—and their development—in a differentiated m a n n e r . N o t only is it w r o n g to assume homogeneity on the part of the two sides in the controversy, it is also inaccurate to assert the incompatibility, in principle, of individual liberal a n d communitarian arguments. F o r unlike Gemeinschaft in the G e r m a n language, "community" in the United States has a primarily 3

democratic, participatory meaning; a n d the "liberalism" that is being de­ bated here is a kind of "social liberalism," which is to be distinguished from "libertarian" positions (Robert Nozick's, for instance). Formulated at a sufficiently general level, however, one communitarian thesis that justifies the use of this label can be r e g a r d e d as central. It states that the "context of justice" has to be a community that, in its historically evolved values, practices, a n d institutions—in its identity, in short—forms the normative horizons that are constitutive of the identity of its m e m b e r s and thus of the norms of justice. O n l y within these horizons of value is it possible to pose questions of justice and answer them with reference to what is g o o d a n d valid for the community against the b a c k g r o u n d of its evaluations a n d its self-understanding. Principles of justice grow out of such a community context, are valid only there, and can b e realized solely within this context; all attempts at a liberal-deontological justification of norms stressing the priority of individual rights or formal procedures remain ex­ ternal a n d foreign to this context; they presuppose contextless "nonper-

INTRODUCTION

/

sons" w h o are supposed to decide matters of justice in an "impersonal" ,\\u\ "impartial" manner, independently of their communally constituted i d r n tities. S u c h theories of the priority of the 'just" or the "right" over t h e "good" are forgetful of context. Opposing this diametrically is the liberal re­ sponse, which criticizes communitarian theory for being obsessed with context. (b) T h e first four chapters of my study serve the purpose of reconstruct­ ing a n d disentangling this general c o m p l e x of critique and countercritiquc, which contains both descriptive and normative assertions. In the process, they distinguish four conceptual levels, four theoretical "problem con­ texts." First, the critique of the atomistic conception of the person that liberal theories put forward; second, the critique of the claim to neutrality of liberal principles of justice and law a n d the critique of the priority of individual rights over the c o m m u n a l good; third, the critique of the insuf­ ficiently integrative sittlich (ethical) force of liberal accounts of the political community; fourth, and finally, the critique of universalist theories of mo­ rality.

4

T h o u g h these problems are linked with one another in a c o m p l e x way, they nonetheless require their own conceptual responses. Questions con­ cerning the theory of the person, legal theory, political theory, a n d moral theory should not be c o n f o u n d e d or connected in the w r o n g way, as has occasionally h a p p e n e d in the controversy; to draw conclusions for a con­ ception of law, democracy, or morality from an intersubjectivist conception of the person, it is necessary to have arguments located at each of these theoretical levels. T h e c o n c e p t of the "good," for instance, has in each case a different m e a n i n g a n d a different relation to the problem of justice w h e n it refers to (i) the g o o d life of a person, (ii) shared conceptions of the g o o d within a political community, or (iii) a higher good, in a culture-specific or objectivist sense; in the last case, a value such as individual autonomy (and distance from c o m m u n a l conceptions of the g o o d ) can, for e x a m p l e , be considered a "good." T h e levels distinguished by this m o d e of access to the debate enable not only a clearer analysis of its philosophical dimensions and distinct issues but, taken together, constitute—and that is what is special about this con­ troversy—the domain within which a theory of justice has to prove itself. (c) T h e fourfold differentiation of theoretical problems and levels serves as the key to a systematic proposal for conceptual clarification. If the com­ munitarian thesis, a c c o r d i n g to which persons are always communityb o u n d a n d principles of justice always context-bound, is queried as to what conceptions of person a n d community are at the center of discussion at each of these particular levels, then it becomes evident that four different con­ ceptions of person a n d community can be distinguished, which in turn correspond to four different normative contexts. T h u s the discussion of the constitution of the self revolves a r o u n d the conception of the ethical person

4

INTRODUCTION

(as a m e m b e r of an identity-constituting ethical community), which is to be distinguished from the conception of the legal person (as a bearer of indi­ vidual rights a n d a m e m b e r of a legal community)—a

conception of central

importance to the issue of legal neutrality. Problems of political legitima­ tion and integration refer, however, to the correct understanding of citizen­ ship (as membership in a political community of politically responsible citi­ zens),

whereas

in

the

controversy

about

moral

universalism

and

contextualism the conception of the moral person (and the moral community of all morally autonomous actors) plays an essential part. In distinguishing these conceptual-normative levels, o n e secures the pos­ sibility of appropriately discussing liberal and communitarian a r g u m e n t s — also with the help of other, in particular, feminist or discourse-theoretic approaches—in o r d e r to be able to contribute {horizontally

t

on one specific

level) to a clarification of the particular problems. T h e r e b y one can ascer­ tain which normative context is addressed in a particular question, a n d which conception of person a n d community is understood in a specific way by the opposing positions (e.g., the various understandings of citizenship), or how moral autonomy is explained in each case. In this way, it is possible to determine m o r e precisely, first, what the real points of difference are (and thereby avoid misinterpretations that arise from c o n f o u n d i n g differ­ ent questions); second, what criteria o u g h t to be applied in the individual contexts; and, third, how these contexts, whose conceptual differentiation is not to be understood in the sense of a disjunction, are to be linked to o n e another. W h a t thus unfolds in four stages {vertically,

in working

through the individual issues) is the outline of a theory of justice that takes these four contexts of justice adequately into account without reducing them to one another—this being the central thesis of the book. T h e basic struc­ ture of society can be considered just(-ified) to the extent that it does 'jus­ tice" to persons in all these dimensions. T h e proposal to differentiate various normative community contexts of an ethical, legal, political, a n d moral kind, a n d attempt to analyze the man­ n e r in which they cohere, makes it possible to scrutinize the compatibility of individual rights and the c o m m o n g o o d , of political generality and eth­ ical difference, of moral universalism a n d contextualism, a n d to avoid false opposites. T h e resulting critical-constructive position "beyond liberalism 5

and communitarianism" is developed in the discussions of the first four chapters, the central results of which are b r o u g h t together in chapter 5 (in the section 'Justice a n d the Good") a n d then in a further step consolidated from a moral-theoretic perspective. T h e latter is based on a principle of practical reason according to which justification for the validity of values or norms is sought in the particular inter subjective

"contexts of justification"

within which validity is claimed. L o c a t e d in the Kantian tradition, this nonmetaphysical conception of practical reason does not turn out to be an

INTRODUCTION

5

authoritarian source of context-insensitive norms; rather, in the absence of "ultimate" substantive reasons, it is f o u n d e d o n the necessity of "good" reasons a n d reflects the different meanings a n d criteria of normativcly g o o d reasons in these contexts. Correspondingly, the c o n c e p t of "auton­ omy" must also be differentiated (in a fourfold m a n n e r ) according to these contexts. T h e reconstruction of the logic of normative justification is aug­ m e n t e d in a final step by a theory of "contexts of recognition," w h e r e it will be seen that the p r o p o s e d conception presents a meaningful a c c o u n t of interpersonal relationships that is not exposed to the critique of abstractness.

6

T h e analysis of the debate between supposedly "context-forgetful" liberal-deontological theories a n d "context-obsessed" communitarian theo­ ries thus leads to a differentiation of four normative contexts in which persons are "situated" as m e m b e r s of various communities; that is to say, they are intersubjectively recognized a n d are authors a n d addressees of validity claims in various communities: communities of ethical, constitutive b o n d s a n d obligations; a legal community that protects this "ethical iden­ tity" of a person as a free a n d equal legal person; a political community in which persons are the authors of law a n d mutually responsible citizens; finally, the moral community of all h u m a n beings as moral persons with the right to moral respect. A theory of justice is at the same time contextb o u n d a n d context-transcending insofar as it takes these normative dimen­ sions into consideration, without absolutizing any particular one. A c c o r d ­ ing to this theory, the society that unites these contexts in the appropriate m a n n e r can b e called just.

ONE

The Constitution of the Self

T h e critique of the "image of the h u m a n being" on which liberal political theory is based is as old as this political theory itself. E v e r since T h o m a s H o b b e s conceived of h u m a n beings "as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, c o m e to full maturity, without all kind of e n g a g e m e n t to each other" (Hobbes 1 9 6 2 , 1 0 9 ) ; ever since he w r e n c h e d the h u m a n being from the ethical universe of Aristotelianism and scholasticism and thereby p r e p a r e d the way for liberalism, the latter has been confronted with the objection of atomism. T h i s critique is di­ rected especially at the liberal contract theory of the state. T o imagine social a n d political institutions as the o u t c o m e of a contract a m o n g free, equal, a n d independent persons would be to misunderstand the historical char­ acter of these institutions and persons as if "only an agglomeration of at­ omistic individuals" (Hegel 1 9 6 7 , 1 7 8 [§ 2 7 3 ] ) had c o m e together to enact a constitution. O f course, what this historical character misread by liber­ alism is actually c o m p o s e d of is determined differently by Aristotelian, re­ publican, Hegelian, and Marxist critics. W h e t h e r the h u m a n being has to be conceived of as a zoon politikon within an ethically comprehensive "polis" or as a virtuous political citoyen; w h e t h e r as part of the "objective Spirit" of the ethical life of a people or as a m e m b e r of a social class in a particular historical situation, depends on the various directions taken by the critique of liberalism. B u t what all these critiques have in c o m m o n is their under­ standing of the "liberal self" as an abstract artificial p r o d u c t of a theory that is c o n c e r n e d with the defense of individual rights and, to this end, makes the i n d e p e n d e n t individual the normative focus of attention. "At­ omism represents a view about h u m a n nature and the h u m a n condition which ( a m o n g other things) makes a doctrine of the primacy of rights plausible" (Taylor 1 9 7 9 , 1 8 9 ) . 6

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

7

It is not surprising that J o h n Rawls's attempt to use the theory of social contract in a modified form for a theory of justice was soon confronted by a range of objections that linked u p with the critique of atomistic individ­ 1

ualism. It was in particular Rawls's central notion of an "original position" that was predestined to generate reservations. T h i s is the conception of a position in which persons c o m e together b e h i n d a "veil of ignorance"— that is, without knowledge of their particular capabilities, weaknesses, or of the social status they would assume in a future society—in order to de­ cide u p o n a distribution of social primary goods that is in their view j u s t .

2

Yet weren't the persons too individualistically oriented in their struggle for primary goods (basic rights a n d liberties, social opportunities, income and wealth, the social basis of self-respect), a n d h a d they not also b e e n ab­ stracted from contexts without which we c a n n o t speak meaningfully about justice? W e r e n ' t the resulting principles of justice therefore both too in­ dividualistic and too abstract? W h a t some people considered the greatest achievement of Rawls's theory seemed to others to be this theory's greatest shortcoming—namely, to have reformulated the Kantian moral standpoint of impartiality and universalization in such a way that fair principles of formal and material equality follow from a fair starting point. Wasn't Rawls's model the clearest p r o o f of Hegel's thesis of the internal connec­ tion between abstract individualism a n d universalism? F o r critics of deontological theories like B e r n a r d Williams ( 1 9 8 1 a ) , it is therefore obvious that the universalist a n d impartial moral point of view can be r e a c h e d only by means of a contextless understanding of "detached" individuals. F o r this kind of critique, liberal individualism and Kantian universalism constitute two sides of the same contextless understanding of morality (cf. Maclntyre 1984a). In particular Michael Sandel's book Liberalism and the Limits of Justice ( 1 9 8 2 ) saw to it that the p r o b l e m of the understanding of the self b e c a m e the main topic of controversy. However, his critique must be seen against the b a c k g r o u n d of Charles Taylor's work. In his book on H e g e l , Taylor interpreted the latter's critique of the m o d e r n c o n c e p t of liberty as a cri­ tique of an empty, "situationless" concept of the subject (Taylor 1 9 7 9 , 1 5 7 ) H e opposed this naturalistically curtailed view of subjectivity with an alter­ native version of linguistically, historically, culturally, and communally "sit­ uated" identity—an identity that is part of a community's "comprehensive life" that absorbs individuals ( 1 9 7 9 , 8 7 , 1 5 3 - 6 6 ) . Taylor's thesis that liberal deontological theories are based on a "situationless," "punctual," a n d "at­ omistic" theory of the person is taken u p by Sandel and effectuated (in a 3

particular m a n n e r ) in a critique of Rawls's theory of justice. A n analysis of this critique and its countercritique will constitute the first step toward a differentiation of conceptions of community a n d person a n d will explain why the question of the constitution of the self is, as Michael Walzer ( 1 9 9 0 a ,

8

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

2 1 ) remarks, a "battlefield" on which there is litde to b e won as far as political theory is c o n c e r n e d . Even Taylor warns against construing a onedimensional connection between atomism a n d liberalism ( 1 9 8 9 b , 1 7 6 ) — "ontological" issues of the constitution of the self have to be distinguished from "questions of advocacy" for particular political-theoretical positions.

1.1.

T H E CRITIQUE OF T H E "UNENCUMBERED SELF"

Sandel's critique of Rawls can b e divided into five principal steps. ( 1 ) H e attempts to show that Rawls's theory is based on a "philosophical anthropology" (Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 5 0 ) that can be read from the description of the parties of the original position. Rawls's assertion that the description of persons in the original position as rational individuals looking out for their own interests a n d not interested in o n e another does not at all match the description of h u m a n beings "in everyday life" (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 1 4 8 ) is rejected by S a n d e l with the a r g u m e n t that, in order to justify the original position in the "reflective equilibrium," Rawls has to m a k e certain individ­ ualistic anthropological assumptions that legitimate the description of the rational parties. Since Rawls assumes that the description of the original position is justified to the d e g r e e to which the principles decided u p o n in this position match our "considered j u d g m e n t s " (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 2 0 ) , the nec­ essarily general a n d weak assumptions u p o n which h e would like to rely must, says Sandel, correspond to "our" understanding of the essence of moral subjects. T h u s he concludes: "We must be p r e p a r e d to live with the vision contained in the original position, mutual disinterest a n d all, pre­ p a r e d to live with it in the sense of accepting its description as an accurate reflection of h u m a n moral circumstance, consistent with our understand­ ing of ourselves" (Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 4 8 ) . (2) In addition, Sandel attempts to show that Rawls's moral subject is an "unencumbered self" that does not d o justice to the ethical experience of being a self. In this context, "self" designates the basic condition of the possibility of personal identity: the possibility of self-understanding and selfconsciousness. B e i n g a "self" implies the ability to speak in the first person, to identify oneself, to see oneself recognized by others as having an identity. Sandel does n o t in fact determine the c o n c e p t of the self explicitly but rather also employs the concepts of "identity," "person," a n d "moral sub­ ject" ( 5 0 ) . Nevertheless, in his critique of Rawls with respect to the self, h e is essentially c o n c e r n e d with what it means to have a qualitative identity that offers the possibility of self-identification and, in particular, with the kind of relation that persists between the self a n d its ends a n d conceptions of the g o o d .

4

Rawls's conception of the self is, according to Sandel, profoundly voluntaristic: all qualitative determinations of the self's identity are freely cho-

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SKI !• sen a n d thereby in a certain sense external to the self like other thinx* ami objects we choose. Rawls's self is a "subject of possession" that "has" end*, values, a n d conceptions of the g o o d a n d "is" not identical with these

( ) ,

it is an antecedendy individuated self whose identity is not connected in a constitutive way with its surrounding world, in particular with other

M I I I

jects. T h e g o o d is simply a p u r e preference of an independently defined subject. In o r d e r to prove this S a n d e l quotes statements by Rawls such as the following: It is not our aims that primarily reveal our nature but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be formed and the manner in which they are to be pursued. For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it; even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities. (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 560) T h i s remark is to be f o u n d at a point w h e r e Rawls criticizes h e d o n i s m — that is, the theory that pleasure represents the only and highest standard for h u m a n e n d s — o n the grounds, first, that the heterogeneity of h u m a n ends precludes finding, even within the framework of pleasure, an une­ quivocal standard that w o u l d rank ends; and, second, that all ends cannot be subsumed u n d e r the yardstick of pleasure in the first place. Rawls therefore insists on the heterogeneity of ends with r e g a r d to a person's ends and, all the m o r e so, with regard to the ends of various persons; he argues that only a deontological concept of the right that is not justified on the basis of a "common denominator" in various ends can provide a standard for the life plans a n d ends that are permissible in a moral sense. T h e s e moral "background conditions" express the "nature" of practically reasonable beings w h o would like to act in a c c o r d a n c e with principles of justice. T h a t the self is there "prior to" its ends must therefore be under­ stood normatively a n d not ontologically (as S a n d e l believes): there is n o ethical value that has, objectively a n d in a universally binding sense, primacy over deontological norms; these norms therefore constitute the moral frame­ work for conceptions of the g o o d . T h e primacy of these n o r m s — f o r ex­ 5

ample, those expressed in individual liberty rights —corresponds to a moral "higher o r d e r desire" ( 5 6 1 ) to formulate within the principles of right one's own plan of life, to revise it if necessary, and to follow it ration­ ally. F u n d a m e n t a l interests and primary ends, Rawls says, are not so fun­ damental that they are in principle b e y o n d the possibility of c h a n g e . T h a t is why it is in the interest of persons to have the freedom to make these changes w h e n necessary. If that were not the case, Rawls says ( 1 9 7 5 a , 9 6 ) , it would not make sense to say that persons are responsible for their plans of life.

io

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF Sandel's conception of the self emphasizes the constitution of personal

identity—and the possibility of self-definition—through membership in communities to a far greater d e g r e e than Rawls's theory. T h e latter does indeed insist on the fact that there must not be any barriers to the pursuit of "communitarian" life plans in a society ordered according to principles of fairness ( 1 9 7 5 c , 5 4 0 - 4 2 ) , but such values, argues Sandel, would be merely preferences the subject chooses. His conception of the "constituted self" that owes its identity to a "constitutive community" denies the possi­ bility of an identity that is perceptible as being separate from the shared vocabulary of a community a n d a b a c k g r o u n d of c o m m o n practices a n d beliefs: "And in so far as our constitutive self-understandings c o m p r e h e n d a wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or tribe or city or class or nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense" ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 7 2 ) . T h e normative c o m p o n e n t s a n d beliefs necessary for an identity are not chosen, as in the voluntarist model, but are found by the self in a life shared with others, within a "larger life," to use Taylor's ( 1 9 7 9 , 1 2 5 ) term. H e r e , Sandel follows Taylor's critique of a "simple weigher" w h o weighs his or her preferences according to interests but, in so doing, does not delve into the "depths" of his or her identity as a "strong evaluator" does (Taylor 1 9 8 5 b , 2 3 - 2 7 ) . H e r e , the question is not what o n e wants to have but w h o o n e is; questions of personal identity com­ pel us to reflect on the "strong evaluations" that are discernible only within a life as part of a larger c o m m u n i t y — a n d can perhaps b e better recognized here by others, for example, by a friend.

6

Since both Rawls a n d Sandel disassociate themselves from an extreme understanding of the self, there is a spectrum of four conceptions of the self a n d its relation to community. In section 7 9 of A Theory of Justice Rawls demarcates his ideal of a "well-ordered society" as a "social union of social unions" from a m e r e "private society." In a private society, on the o n e h a n d — h e refers here to Hegel's c o n c e p t of civil society—citizens d o not have any c o m m o n ends a n d assess social arrangements solely from the viewpoint of personal advantage. In a V e i l - o r d e r e d society," on the other hand, the "social nature of man" can b e seen in the existence of c o m m o n ends. W h a t this means, Rawls says, is not "the truism that social life is a condition for o u r developing the ability to speak a n d think, a n d to take part in the c o m m o n activities of society a n d culture" ( 1 9 7 1 , 5 2 2 ) ; rather, it means the i d e a — b o r r o w e d from H u m b o l d t — o f n u m e r o u s communities within a society that have the c o m m o n e n d of social cooperation within the framework of a publicly shared conception of justice. ' T h u s the public realization of justice is a value of community" ( 5 2 9 ) . Social cooperation is understood here not instrumentally but as a system of mutual supplemen­ tation a n d realization, like an orchestra in which the abilities of individuals lead to a general accomplishment. Since this comes about within the frame-

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

//

work of justice, it is a constitutive c o m p o n e n t of this c o m m u n a l achieve­ ment. T h o u g h Sandel recognizes this distinction in Rawls, both

conceptions

of community remain b o u n d to the image of the antecedently individuated self, according to his interpretation. H e describes "private society" as an "instrumental" conception of community; the idea of a "social union of social unions" is for him a "sentimental" conception. Indeed, community here is neither external to the subject nor constitutive of it, j u s t c o n n e c t e d to it through feelings of a n d inclinations toward community (Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 1 4 9 ) . E v e n if the subject here can have "communitarian" motives, these have nonetheless been chosen by a self a n d are not from the outset indis­ pensable components of its identity. T h e sense of community, S a n d e l ar­ gues, is not however a feeling or a preference; rather, it is constitutive of a self. T h i s a r g u m e n t does of course compel him to determine the particular kind of "constitution" m o r e specifically, a n d he therefore distinguishes be­ tween a "situated" a n d a "radically situated subject," which in direct contrast to a "radically disembodied" self does not have any possibility of distin­ guishing between itself a n d its "situation" (its c o m m u n a l identity), or of being able to distance itself reflectively if needs be. T h u s Sandel emphasizes the fact that the subject "participates" in the constitution of its identity ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 5 3 ) . "As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it" ( 1 7 9 ) . Sandel does not however give any indication as to how the self, which is only "pardy" (ibid.) defined by "attachments a n d commitments" to the community, establishes this dis­ tance or as to how a "revision" ( 1 8 0 ) of identity is possible if after all the self-understanding

of

the

community

is

constitutive

of

the

self-

understanding of the subject. If the self has b e c o m e a self as part of a "wider subject," how can it then distinguish itself from this? H e r e is a point that many critics have taken u p (and to which I r e t u r n ) . ( 3 ) S a n d e r s third step, after having attempted to show that Rawls's con­ ception of the self is implausible, consists in the thesis that every deonto­ logical theory of morality presupposes such a conception of the self. T h e deontological priority of individual rights over the c o m m u n a l g o o d serves primarily the purpose of securing the f r e e d o m of the "unencumbered" self to be able to choose its conception of the g o o d according to its own criteria ( 1 5 7 ) . "As the right is prior to the good, so the subject is prior to its ends" ( 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g to Sandel, the p u r e capacity of choice is the foundation a n d e n d of deontological morality. In order to prove this thesis not just in relation to Rawls's theory, Sandel discusses the Kantian c o n c e p t of the moral subject. Following this inter­ pretation, I m m a n u e l Kant's "intelligible ego" (Sandel speaks misleadingly of the "transcendental subject") as the foundation of deontological moral­ ity (i.e., of the priority of rights) displays the same structure as Rawls's

12

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

"unencumbered self." Free of empirical a n d constitutive determinations, it chooses principles of justice that enable the free as well as indefinite choice of ends a n d goods. "On the deontological view, what matters above all is not the ends we choose but o u r capacity to choose

them"

( 1 9 8 2 , 6 ) . Rawls's empirical a n d proceduralist reformulation of Kant's theory merely avoids the "Germanic obscurities" of transcendental ide­ alism; at heart both of them present the same: an u n e n c u m b e r e d , rad­ ically liberated self (Sandel 1 9 8 4 a , 2 4 ) . Accordingly, autonomy means for Kant that I am "free to pursue my own ends consistent with a similar freedom for all" (Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 6 ) . A "worldless" subject and a morality that asserts the priority of individual rights over the g o o d entail each other. Rights secure the freedom of the subject to choose its ends free of all c o m m u n a l determinations. H e r e , the following assumptions are m a d e in respect of Kant's theory of morality: moral autonomy is basi­ cally freedom of choice and action (Willkurfreiheit);

the moral law is the

same as the Kantian principle of law that regulates the exercise of that freedom of choice; and, furthermore, the "intelligible

ego" is a con­

struction that not only explains moral freedom but refers to the con­ duct of every free subject c o n c e r n i n g its ends a n d values of the good. T h e s e three assumptions, which contradict fundamental Kantian con­ cepts, are not however argumentatively proven by Sandel. Kant explicidy distinguishes moral autonomy—acting according to general, self-given, universalizable laws—from the f r e e d o m of choice a n d action of legal sub­ 7

jects whose external relations are regulated by law. Sandel, however, mis­ understands f r e e d o m from empirical determinations in the characteriza­ tion of moral a u t o n o m y — w h i c h serves to ensure that particular a n d self-interested considerations d o not suppress moral ones—as the descrip­ tion of the h u m a n freedom to choose the personal g o o d . T h e issue is thus a completely different one: Kant is c o n c e r n e d with the morally right, San­ del with the personally good. H e n c e , Sandel does not at all mention the categorical imperative in his discussion of Kant; instead, h e tacitly assumes that the priority of the freedom of being able to choose in the form of personal liberties follows automatically for Kant from the description of the (ethical) subject of the freedom of choice. S u c h an a r g u m e n t cannot how­ ever be f o u n d in Kant's moral philosophy. Sandel thus connects an ethical thesis about choosing the personally g o o d — a thesis he ascribes to K a n t — with the assumption of a resulting normative consequence for the regula­ tion of freedom of choice (i.e., the freedom to choose the g o o d ) — w h i c h is basically an assumption c o n c e r n i n g relations in law; a n d this he does in order to criticize Kant's theory of morality. Moral autonomy is therefore misunderstood at times as ethical choice a n d at other times as the freedom of legal subjects. Sandel's decisive thesis, which he attempts to justify in his interpretation

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

/ 7

both of Kant a n d of Rawls, thus assumes that there is a correspondence between the "epistemological priority" of the empirically un-conditioned self a n d the "moral priority" ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 5 6 ) of individual rights with deon­ tological validity—and that the connecting link between the two is the con­ ception of the ethical f r e e d o m to choose the g o o d on the part of the unen­ c u m b e r e d a n d atomistic self, which leads to a moral notion of

the

individual right of the f r e e d o m of choice. J u s t as the self is determined independently of the constitutive good, so too is morality. (4) F r o m the three p r e c e d i n g arguments—that Rawls's theory is based on a conception of the "unencumbered" self; that this conception is im­ plausible; a n d finally that every deontological notion of morality has a struc­ turally equivalent notion of the self as its f o u n d a t i o n — S a n d e l draws the conclusion that every deontological conception of morality has to fail: 'Jus­ tice c a n n o t be primary in the deontological sense, because we c a n n o t coh e r e n d y regard ourselves as the kind of beings the deontological ethic— w h e t h e r Kantian or Rawlsian—requires us to be" ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 4 ) . Since persons cannot be meaningfully conceived of without constitutive a n d c o m m u n a l conceptions of the g o o d , principles of living together cannot b e conceived of either without notions of the good. Deontological justice meets its limit in the self-understandings, attachments, a n d values of communities, which are integrated not through deontological n o r m s but through shared be­ liefs. Every constitutive c o m m u n i t y — b e it a family, tribe, city, class, nation, or p e o p l e ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 7 2 ) — e n c o m p a s s e s in its collective identity the identity of its members; the deontological view does not d o justice theoretically to these c o m m u n a l bonds, a n d if it b e c o m e s social practice it even destroys these "personal and political attachments." In these c o m m u n i t i e s — a n d Sandel does not distinguish here between familial, associative, o r political communities—there are attachments, loyalties, a n d commitments that de­ m a n d m o r e than what justice in the deontological view calls for. T h e self, Sandel says, takes u p these commitments not according to viewpoints of justice; rather, identity is impossible without them; subjects c a n n o t conceive of themselves i n d e p e n d e n d y of them ( 1 7 9 ) . Justice, he argues, separates persons from one another, the g o o d unites them. T h e "deontological re­ public" is a community of strangers without character, without attachments, without identity; the form of political community suggested in contrast by Sandel is o n e in which the public a n d the private g o o d mutually constitute each other ( 1 8 3 ) . T h i s conclusion—to develop a fundamental critique of deontological conceptions of morality from the a r g u m e n t against an at­ omistic view of the self—is central not only to Sandel's critique of Rawls but also mutatis mutandis to Taylor's or Alasdair Maclntyre's communitar­ ianism. (5)

Finally, Sandel attempts to show that the atomistic premises of

Rawls's (and Dworkin's) deontological theories necessarily lead to internal

14

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

contradictions wherever, as in the case of Rawls's difference principle (or 8

of affirmative a c t i o n ) , questions of social justice are c o n c e r n e d . In order to justify the difference principle—the principle that social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities have to b e such that they grant the least advantaged the greatest possible benefit (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 3 0 2 ) — R a w l s attempted, with the help of the veil of ignorance within the framework of his Kantian theory of equality, to make the choice of principles of justice i n d e p e n d e n t of nat­ ural and social contingencies. H e r e he includes in particular persons' nat­ ural talents a n d the position acquired through birth in a particular social class. T h i s information is therefore not available to the parties of the orig­ inal position. T h u s they are compelled to put themselves in the role of those disadvantaged by natural o r historical circumstances a n d w h o have not h a d the same social opportunities at the outset. T h e difference prin­ ciple compensates to a certain extent inequalities of this kind—within a framework that is compatible with e c o n o m i c efficiency. In this context, Rawls argues that "inequalities of birth a n d natural e n d o w m e n t are unde­ served" ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 0 0 ) a n d even that we are "to regard the distribution of natural talents as a c o m m o n asset a n d to share in the benefits of this dis­ tribution whatever it turns out to be" ( 1 0 1 ) . Benefits that persons have as a result of special talents have to b e justified socially a n d are subject to distributive justice. Sandel's critique of this a r g u m e n t makes use of an objection raised by Robert Nozick. W h e r e a s Rawls regards the fact that the

difference

principle improves opportunities in the life of everyone socially less fa­ vored as an expression of the Kantian respect for persons and of the principle of treating persons not as means but as ends, Nozick criticizes the a r g u m e n t of regarding natural talents as c o m m o n

assets as un-

Kantian a n d in essence utilitarian. F o r , in a c c o r d a n c e with this princi­ ple, persons with certain special talents are treated as a means to the e n d of social equality. A c c o r d i n g to Nozick's theory of individuals' legit­ imate claims to their legally acquired property, this treatment violates these persons' rights (Nozick 1 9 7 4 , 2 2 8 ) . Moreover, Nozick argues, this treatment introduces a fissure between the person him- or herself a n d his or her attributes a n d talents, a fissure that contradicts the historicity a n d particularity of individuals, just as Rawls's abstract distribution principle runs counter to the historicity of entidements: the rights to property that an individual has acquired in the course of his or her life history (and that of his or h e r forebears). "Why we, thick with particular traits, should be c h e e r e d that (only) the thus pu­ rified m e n within us are not r e g a r d e d as means is also unclear" (ibid.). In this way, Sandel argues, Nozick identifies the presupposition of the "unen­ c u m b e r e d self" to which Rawls's separation of the person a n d his or h e r talents and attributes refers. If, therefore, the choice w e r e between Rawls's

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

/5

atomistic person w h o is essentially without attributes and Nozick's concept of the person as being characterized constitutively by attributes that, like property acquired by virtue of these attributes, cannot be separated from the person, then Nozick would be right. Rawls, Sandel argues, does have another line of defense against Nozick, but it contradicts Rawls's own assumptions about the antecedendy individ­ uated self. A c c o r d i n g to this view, considering natural talents as c o m m o n assets would not be an illegitimate treatment of persons as means only if the distinction between the attributes and normative claims of a person and those of a community were abandoned. Since the self is constitutively connected with a community, the community's claims to the fruits of per­ sons' attributes are legitimate. It is not the individual person but the com­ munity that is the subject that may lay claim to possessions. If the difference principle is to avoid using some as means to others' ends, it can only be possible under circumstances where the subject of possession is a 'we' rather than an T,' which circumstances imply in turn the existence of a community in the constitutive sense. (Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 80) Only if the community does indeed have an antecedent rights claim to the self's attributes is Rawls's talk of c o m m o n assets and thus the difference principle justified. Sandel therefore concludes that to defend his redistributive justice Rawls has to rely u p o n a strong, "organic" ( 1 0 1 ) conception of community that contradicts his other individualistic premises. Nozick's and Sandel's critique proceeds, however, from too strong an interpretation of Rawls's reference to "the distribution of natural talents as a c o m m o n asset." By this phrase Rawls does not want to say that natural attributes are "contingent" ( 1 9 7 5 a , 9 6 ) in the sense that they are not part of the identity of persons; rather that they are contingent from a normative perspective in the sense that we cannot d e d u c e from the (legitimate) fact of natural inequality the legitimacy of a social inequality for the benefit of those favored by nature. H e n c e , it is not persons' natural endowments that are the object of social (re-) distribution but the fruits and advantages ob­ tained as a result of these endowments. F o r the question is—and it is one that arises in connection with Nozick too—what regulations apply in a so­ ciety in o r d e r to j u d g e the legitimacy of claims to social goods (cf. P o g g e 1 9 8 9 , ch. 2 ) . A n d here it is Nozick w h o can b e criticized for atomism be­ cause h e assumes that persons have, by nature, rights claims to everything that they can appropriate within the framework of minimal law—as if there were essentially no distinction between social circumstances a n d natural (Robinson-like) circumstances of the acquisition of property; as if the in­ dividual were entitied by nature to what is acquired in a society. T h i s as­ sumption, Rawls ( 1 9 7 8 , 5 2 - 5 5 ) argues, fails to appreciate both the social character of the formation a n d development of individual abilities and

16

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

talents as well as the social character of the production a n d acquisition of property—the latter c o n c e r n i n g the social cooperation a n d general social conditions necessary for production as well as the p r o b l e m of existing in­ equalities in these social relations, ones that make it impossible to speak of "free" or "fair" transactions. It is not until the "background conditions" of a society are r e n d e r e d just by means of a fair distribution of basic social goods, Rawls argues, that one can r e g a r d the individual appropriation a n d transfer of property as fair. "We have a right to our natural abilities a n d a right to whatever w e b e c o m e entided to by taking part in a fair social pro­ cess" (Rawls 1 9 7 5 a , 9 8 ) . Since Sandel adopts Nozick's interpretation of the expression "common assets," h e misses the Rawlsian differentiation between, o n the one h a n d , what determines, pardy by nature a n d partly by society, the constitution of a person as an individual with special talents and abilities and, on the other, what it means in a society to acquire rights to goods p r o d u c e d a n d distrib­ uted within this society. Since for S a n d e l the only alternative to atomism is social monism, h e proposes, as a counterconception to an atomistic self without attributes, a c o m m u n a l self as a macrosubject in which all individ­ ual attributes are essentially c o m m u n a l attributes. T h u s , as in Nozick, "com­ m o n asset" is to be understood quite literally, only this time in an affirmative sense: individuals are simply the "guardians" of the community's ownership of goods and the abilities leading to the production of these goods (see Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 9 7 , 1 0 2 ) . O n this understanding of the relation between self and community S a n d e l cannot however explain why such an organically integrated community would at all consist of individuals w h o raise inde­ p e n d e n t (and potentially conflicting) claims to primary social goods, since the relation of constitution between self a n d community (and here this must mean the political community) is determined not reciprocally b u t unilaterally. T h e discussion

can therefore be summarized as follows.

W h e r e a s Rawls attempts to appraise the normative claims individuals raise vis-a-vis society according to principles of justice to which all could agree from a fair perspective, Nozick absolutizes the ("natural") claims of indi­ viduals against the viewpoint of social equality, a n d S a n d e l absolutizes, as a mirror reflection to this, the antecedent claim of a c o m m u n i t y vis-a-vis its members.

1.2.

ETHICAL PERSON A N D L E G A L PERSON

In this reconstruction of Sandel's theses, a n u m b e r of important counter­ arguments have already been advanced, especially c o n c e r n i n g the last point, the p r o b l e m of internal contradictions in Rawls's theory. T h i s fifth point is based on the theses of the p r e c e d i n g four, b u t it is not constitutive of these (as the similarity to Nozick's critique of Rawls shows). T h e argu-

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF merits leveled at Sandel's conclusion

(i.e., at the fourth point)

/7 must

therefore set in at one of the first three points. W h a t I want to show is that this conclusion is a communitarian fallacy, that is, that the attempt to develop an a r g u m e n t against the possibility of a deontological morality from the argument for an intersubjectivist conception of the self fails. T h e critique of the third point—the thesis that every theory, even the Kantian deontological theory, presupposes a c o n c e p t of the "unencum­ bered self"—has already b e e n conducted above insofar as Sandel's attempt to prove Kant guilty of atomism was criticized as a misinterpretation of Kant's c o n c e p t of moral autonomy as ethical freedom of choice (the choice of the g o o d ) , on the one h a n d , a n d the legal freedom of action (the free­ d o m to choose the g o o d ) , on the other. F u r t h e r m o r e , his claim to have refuted all forms and justifications of deontological concepts of morality with his critique of Kant a n d his critique of Rawls—even if they were suc­ cessful—has not been demonstrated.

9

T h e responses to the second and first points are however m o r e funda­ mental: they criticize Sandel's own proposal of a "constituted self" (second point) a n d — t h a t is Rawls's own response—they already contest the validity of the first step, the thesis that A Theory ofJustice is in fact f o u n d e d on an atomistic conception of the self. On Sandel's second point: at the center of critique here are Sandel's con­ ceptions of community a n d self, and the relation between them. F o u r main points can be analytically isolated here ( a - d ) but nevertheless remain very closely related. (a) W h a t first occasions some questions is Sandel's theory c o n c e r n i n g the possibility for the self to "codetermine" its own identity a n d to relate to itself reflexively. H o w is the process of "constitution" in Sandel to be understood precisely? H e often speaks of a "constitutive community" as a "wider subject" or macrosubject whose identity cannot be separated from the identity of this community's members and indeed determines it to a high degree. Individuals d o not "choose" their identity, they "find" it; sim­ ilarly, their normative obligations to the community are not chosen by them and g o beyond what the abstract norms of justice d e m a n d (see Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 1 7 9 ) . It therefore seems that the process is to be understood not bilaterally but unilaterally: the community constitutes the identity of its members, gives them their self-understanding. Individuals thus a p p e a r as accidents of a c o m m u n a l substance. Nonetheless, Sandel does attempt to preclude such an interpretation in terms of unilateral constitution by ex­ plicitly objecting to the c o n c e p t of a "radically situated subject" ( 2 1 ) . T h u s he explains that there is a difference between the self a n d its "situation" or embeddedness in a community ( 2 0 ) ; that the subject's identity is deter­ m i n e d by the community only "to some extent" ( 1 5 0 ) ; that the self "par­ ticipate [s]" in the constitution of its identity; a n d that there is therefore

18

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

the possibility for distancing reflection ( 1 7 9 ) a n d revision ( 1 8 0 ) of a given identity. Sandel does not however provide any precise criteria according to which this distancing reflection would b e possible. Moreover, his presentation seems contradictory insofar as, on the o n e hand, he says that this reflection is possible only within the intersubjectively constituted identity in which one finds oneself—hence the distancing is "precarious" ( 1 7 9 ) ; on the other hand, however, he considers subjective introspection possible ("the capac­ ity for reflection enables the self to turn its lights inward u p o n itself, to inquire into its constituent nature, to survey its various attachments a n d acknowledge their respective claims" [ 1 5 3 ] ) — a n introspection that makes of the self an observer of itself, allowing its identity to b e c o m e a distanced object in a m a n n e r that an intersubjectivist theory precludes (cf. S h e r 1 9 8 9 , 1 5 1 - 5 7 ) . T o be able to conceptually grasp the possibility of distancing re­ flection,

Sandel w o u l d have to envision a distinction like the one m a d e by

G e o r g e H e r b e r t M e a d between the "me" of the "generalized other" a n d the reflective "I" that keeps the communally constituted self in critical di­ alogue with itself a n d its social e n v i r o n m e n t .

10

T h i s self-reflection is expli­

cated in M e a d neither as self-objectification n o r as the reproduction of social role expectations, but as communicative self-determination within c o m m u n a l contexts. In Sandel, on the other hand, it remains o p e n as to whether a n d how a revision of certain personal conceptions of the g o o d or personal ends is possible—for instance, in the light of "second-order desires" (Frankfurt 1 9 8 8 ) . T h a t a self is intersubjectively constituted does not imply that persons d o not relate to themselves critically or cannot ques­ tion their values a n d attachments. Ethical questions of orientation require an answer not only to the question w h o I am but also to the question w h o I want to be against the b a c k g r o u n d of my "strong evaluations" that, though tied to personal identity via "constitutive communities," have to be con­ sciously accepted a n d upheld by me. A theory of ethical autonomy must b e able to state h o w talk of "my" identity a n d of personal responsibility for the life decisions m a d e by "situated persons" can be meaningful (see chapter 5 . 3 ) . In this respect, Sandel's theory is insufficient. (b) T h i s unclarity concerning the nature of the self-reflective process is mirrored in the p r o b l e m Sandel has in providing for the possibility of crit­ icizing a community by a self whose identity is constituted by this very com­ munity. If the obligations that a self has to a community are so m u c h a part of its identity that they d e m a n d m o r e than just fulfilling reciprocal norms of justice a n d n o n c o m p l i a n c e with them means a loss of self (see 1 9 8 2 , 1 7 9 ) , how then is it possible that not simply the limits of justice are set by the forms of community that determine identity (see 1 8 2 ) but, inversely, that a community can b e criticized according to standards of justice? T h i s case is not envisioned by the theory of the priority of the g o o d that Sandel

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

/ <j

defends. A r e , for instance, family traditions, g e n d e r relations, religious sell

1

understandings—not to mention national traditions—beyond normative critique?

11

F r o m the fact of the constitution of identity in community San­

del incorrectly infers the normative obligation to maintain this identity as a part of the community. Aspects of genesis c a n n o t however prejudice nor­ mative questions of validity in this way—that w o u l d not be compatible with ethical autonomy (reflection on one's own life), as mentioned above, or with moral autonomy (practical self-responsibility toward others). H e r e too, Mead's distinction between the "I" and the "me" would be relevant since the "I" possesses the moral capability of referring to a "larger" community and therefore of criticizing particular communities ( M e a d 1 9 6 2 , 1 9 9 , 2 7 2 ) . (c) Moreover, Sandel does not indicate—even in a descriptive sense— how his conception of self relates to the fact that in m o d e r n societies per­ sons have to assume a n d fulfill different roles in different social settings, roles that can c o m e into conflict with one another (Feinberg 1 9 8 8 , 1 0 5 1 3 ) . Sandel leaves u n d e c i d e d the question of how persons' identity is formed "between" different communities, of how a person w h o feels h e or she belongs to a familial, a religious, and a political community can remain one a n d the same person w h e n these affiliations raise contrary demands. In this case, does a person's identity disintegrate into contradictory frag­ ments?

12

(d) T h u s far I have spoken of "community" or "communities" whenever there has been mention of Sandel's "constitutive community." U n d e r this term h e subsumes various communities such as "family or tribe o r city or class or nation or people" ( 1 7 2 ) . A n d it is in this nondifferentiation that one finds o n e of the roots of the cited problems of reflection, critique, and integration. By subsuming these "communities" in a one-dimensional man­ ner u n d e r the concept of identity-determining, "wider" subjects, Sandel loses sight of the various normative structures of such dissimilar community forms as the family or the nation. His nondifferentiation leads to an organic account of all these communities as h o m o g e n e o u s , value-determined macrosubjects in which a synthesis of collective a n d individual identity pre­ dominates. Susan Moller O k i n ( 1 9 8 9 , 2 9 ) remarks that not only is the family in the traditional sense idealized in this m a n n e r , but also all other forms of social life a p p e a r as communities in which an idea of the g o o d preforms everything a n d the absence of normative conflicts renders a con­ cept of justice unnecessary indeed. T h i s a c c o u n t misses not only the par­ ticular character of such social forms and the conflicts therein but also the differences between them. T h a t a nation exhibits a completely different normative infrastructure than a family or a class is obvious. H e r e there are different notions of the c o m m o n e n d and of the roles individuals play for this purpose, different affiliations, different intensities of affiliation, differ­ ent kinds of obligation (as a m e m b e r of a family or as a citizen, for in-

20

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

stance). Sandel makes it too easy for himself in his critique of liberalism w h e n he interprets the political community as a "constitutive community." For what has to be determined is how this community itself is constituted and legitimated, what it may a n d may not expect of its members. A t this point, the question of justice first arises. W h a t is therefore missing is a differentiated account of the various forms of community to which persons belong, of the different values and norms by means of which these communities are integrated, a n d of the question of the degree to which the identity of subjects is thereby affected. S u c h a differentiated depiction would have to provide an understanding of the reciprocal relation between individuation and socialization that is m o r e dialectical than the one f o u n d in Sandel, a model of the relation of self and community that is located b e y o n d the alternative between atomism and social monism. C o m p a r i n g Sandel's thematization of the relation of self and community with the few points at which Rawls thematizes this relation in A Theory of Justice (particularly in part 3 ) is elucidating (cf. Flanagan 1 9 9 1 , ch. 5 ) . Rawls attempts to strike a balance between the social constitution of individuals and the possibility for individuals to form (and revise) their plans of life independently in o r d e r to make the priority of justice clear in both respects. A c c o r d i n g to his understanding it is indisputable that the speaking, think­ ing, and acting of individuals is socially constituted a n d that h u m a n beings realize themselves in intersubjective relationships; however, it does not fol­ low from this that there is no possibility to revise a n d c h a n g e particular ends, interests, a n d conceptions of the g o o d . T h e right to personal free­ d o m , he concludes, thus corresponds to individuals' "higher order desire" ( 1 9 7 1 , 5 6 1 ) to retain this possibility. T h e principles of justice, Rawls argues, are compatible with the "social nature of mankind" ( 5 2 2 ) in another respect. T h e y make the existence of a "social union of social unions" possible inasmuch as they form a frame­ work for societal cooperation within which individuals realize themselves in various forms of life and communities while, in a c c o r d a n c e with univer­ sally recognized rules, all these communities collaborate to the general advantage of society as a whole. In this vision of a well-ordered society, he says, the conceptions of the g o o d possible—individualistic, communitarian, or religious—are left o p e n in an ethical respect, as long as they remain within the frame of justice ( 1 9 7 5 c ) . Justice is still however connected to individuals in a closer sense, namely, through one's sense of justice a n d the interest in living in a just society as a just h u m a n being. Rawls even speaks of the "congruence" ( 1 9 7 1 , 5 7 7 ) of the g o o d a n d the just, that is, of the g o o d and the j u s t life. A c t i n g justly is based on the desire "to express our nature as free moral persons" ( 5 7 2 ) . Living in a j u s t society enables individual self-realization, life in c o m m u -

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

2/

nities, acting according to j u s t principles, a n d finally, all in all, a Hie that makes self-respect through the recognition of others possible ( 4 4 0 - 4 1 ) . For two reasons, however, it would be inadequate to present Rawls's answer o n this level. First, even if Rawls's conceptions of person a n d com­ munity in part 3 of A Theory of Justice could explain ethical a n d moral au­ tonomy in a nonatomistic way, it could turn out that this view is in contra­ diction to the justification p r o g r a m of the original position (an a r g u m e n t that Sandel tries with regard to the difference principle); second, the later Rawls drew back from the strong thesis of the "congruence" of the right and the g o o d . In his opinion, a n d contrary to what Sandel argues for, the principles of justice have to b e distinguished even m o r e clearly from ethical conceptions of the g o o d life. In this distinction one finds the key to his response to Sandel, which has to begin with the latter's first thesis, the reconstruction of Rawls's theory. On Sandel's first point: Rawls's (for the most part, implicit) response to Sandel's first thesis consists of two parts. First, though he does not call into question that a particular conception of the "moral person" is at the center of his theory, he does however dispute that this can be read off the descrip­ tion of the parties of the original position. Rather, it is to be f o u n d in the description of this initial situation as a whole. A n d , second, this conception of the moral person is not synonymous with a theory of personal identity; instead, it is a "political" conception inasmuch as it refers solely to the m o r e abstract level of political justice a n d not that of the constitution of the self. It is therefore not itself an intersubjectivist ethical c o n c e p t of the self; n o r is it by n o means incompatible with such a concept, for that matter. Rawls underscores this especially in his later writings; the core of this fundamental distinction of conceptions of the person can however b e f o u n d already in A Theory of Justice. H e r e , Rawls makes it quite clear "that e m b e d d e d in the principles of justice there is an ideal of the person that provides an A r c h i m e d e a n point f o r j u d g i n g the basic structure of society" (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 5 8 4 ) . T h i s ideal is not however to be f o u n d in the description of the rational a n d selfinterested parties of the original position, as Sandel assumes, but in the whole construction that, by means of the veil of ignorance, places the ra­ tional parties u n d e r moral conditions. Rawls's ideal of the person is at the center of his attempt to provide a procedural interpretation of Kant's con­ ception of autonomy. T h e specification of the original position has, Rawls says, the task of conceptualizing the moral point of view of autonomous, that is, free and equal reasonable persons: "Kant supposes that this moral legislation [acceptable to all] is to be agreed to u n d e r conditions that char­ acterize m e n as free a n d equal rational beings. T h e description of the orig­ inal position is an attempt to interpret this conception" ( 2 5 2 ) . T h e original position compels the parties to put themselves in the perspective of every

22

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

possible m e m b e r of society a n d to recognize as moral the principles that all could agree to as free and equal persons. T h e original position thus formulates the viewpoint of intelligible beings in the Kantian sense: the persons here, especially because of the veil of ignorance, are free from selfinterested empirical considerations in their j u d g m e n t inasmuch as empir­ ical interests in securing the best possible distribution of primary goods are not influenced by knowledge of special natural or social advantages o r disadvantages that concern their person. T h e principles that thereby ap­ pear rational are, by way of the initial situation of fairness, in the interest of all. T h e original position as a whole therefore expresses the "nature" ( 5 8 0 ) of a h u m a n being as a free a n d equal reasonable being w h o acts autonomously. T h i s moral autonomy of persons as represented in the orig­ inal position does not m e a n that they have a contingent and external re­ lation to ethical conceptions of the good; it does however require of per­ sons that these different conceptions not serve them as the foundation of principles of justice that are to be universally valid. Accordingly, Rawls's Kantian conception of equality is based on a mor­ ally substantive conception of the person, which is however detached from the "metaphysical surroundings" of Kant's theory ( 2 6 4 ) . T h e original po­ sition stands for persons' rational interests in acquiring the best possible share of social primary goods as well as for the moral point of view that this distribution be conducted according to principles that can be accepted by all free and equal reasonable beings. F o r that reason, the person to w h o m the original position corresponds is characterized by two fundamental ca­ pacities: that of having a conception of the g o o d a n d that of having a sense of justice ( 5 0 5 , 5 6 1 ) . T h e first, Rawls says, is realized in a rational plan of life—its conception, possible revision, a n d best conceivable fulfillment— and the second in the desire to act according to j u s t principles. T h e g o o d is therefore u n d e r the constraint of the right but is not predetermined in content by the latter. In his writings after A Theory of Justice, especially in the Dewey lectures on Kantian constructivism ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Rawls places this conception of the moral person m o r e clearly at the center of his theory, avoiding h o w e v e r — even m o r e so in later articles (see Rawls 1 9 8 5 ) — t h e thesis of a concor­ dance of the g o o d and the right in determining the "well-being" a n d "na­ ture" of the h u m a n being. T h e moral person is now r e g a r d e d m o r e strongly as a "second-order" concept a n d n o longer extends substantively into the determination of what constitutes the g o o d for the h u m a n being. T h e "higher-order interest" ( 1 9 8 0 , 5 2 5 ) of being capable of pursuing one's own conception of the g o o d is distinguished from "highest-order interests" in being able to exercise the two moral capacities. T h e moral person is com­ p r e h e n d e d on the one h a n d m o r e formally a n d less ethically, and on the other m o r e "politically" in the sense of the logic of his justification, because

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

23

K.iwls characterizes this conception of the person as the leading conception within a democratic political culture ( 1 9 8 0 , 5 1 8 - 1 9 ) — e v e n though h i s t h e o r y continues to claim to rest on a "Kantian" conception of person and l e a s o n . Attempts to provide a "metaphysical" justification for this concep­ tion of the person or to interpret this conception as a substantive deter­ mination of the g o o d life are, according to Rawls, in d a n g e r of making the t h e o r y of justice into a "comprehensive moral doctrine" and of deviating h o r n the real task of a "political" theory of justice, namely, that of formu­ lating a theory referring solely to the basic structure of society, a n d doing so on the basis of universal moral, "nonmetaphysical" concepts. In this s e n s e , Rawls stands in contrast to Kant's moral theory, which is "compre­ hensive" insofar as it is metaphysically justified a n d refers to the moral virtuousness of persons as such (see chapter 4 . 2 ) . T h e two capacities of a moral person, to have a rational plan of life a n d to have a sense of justice, are connected by Rawls with the concepts of "rational" a n d "reasonable" in order to explain to what degree they are distinguished from each other a n d how they enter the description of the original position. T h e c o n c e p t of the "rational" corresponds to the first "moral power" of the person, namely, the capacity to form, revise, a n d pursue a conception of the g o o d , whereas the c o n c e p t of the "reasonable" corresponds to the second moral power, the capacity to have an effective sense of justice ( 1 9 8 0 , 5 2 5 ) . T h e interest in having sufficient "primary goods" for pursuing one's own conception of the g o o d is, Rawls says, ra­ tional; on the other hand, a person's interest that the conditions of social cooperation be fair a n d universally acceptable is reasonable in the moral sense.

13

T h e two sides of the "rational" a n d the "reasonable" are represented in the original position, on the o n e h a n d — i n the case of the rational—by characterizing the parties as rationally calculating beings not interested in one another, a n d on the other—in the case of the reasonable—by the constraints imposed u p o n the parties by the veil of ignorance ( 1 9 8 0 , 5 2 0 2 1 ; 1 9 8 2 a , 8 6 ) . T h e person's two fundamental moral features are reflected not only, as Sandel assumes, in the description of the parties but in the whole construction of the initial situation. T h e "rational" autonomy of the parties of the original position must not be confused with the "full auton­ omy" ( 1 9 8 0 , 5 2 1 , 5 3 3 - 3 4 ) of free a n d equal citizens. T h e moral point of view of the reasonable must n o t only not be overlooked in comparison to the rationality of the parties, it even has priority over this rationality: ' T h e Reasonable subordinates the Rational because its principles limit, a n d in a Kantian doctrine limit absolutely, the final ends that can be pursued" (530).

The

"priority of

the

deontologically

right" (or

the just)

is

therefore—contrary to S a n d e l — s y n o n y m o u s not with the priority of a ra­ tional subject of free choice, b u t with the priority of the standpoint of fair

24

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

social cooperation over subjective freedom of choice. T h e original position expresses a conception of the person that consists of the two moral powers of the g o o d a n d the right. Rawls therefore retracts his assertion that the theory of justice was "a p a r t . . . of the theory of rational choice" ( 1 9 7 1 , 16): What I should have said is that the conception of justice as fairness uses an account of rational choice subject to reasonable conditions to characterize the deliberations of the parties as representatives of free and equal persons; and all of this within a political conception of justice, which is, of course, a moral conception. ( 1 9 8 5 , 2 3 7 n . 20) T h e original position is simply a "device of representation" ( 2 3 6 - 3 7 ) of the moral person and of the latter's two moral powers—which, as has b e e n seen, are represented in the description of the parties a n d the constraints they are subject to. ' W h e n , in this way, we simulate being in this position, our reasoning n o m o r e commits us to a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our playing a g a m e like M o n o p o l y commits us to thinking that w e are landlords e n g a g e d in a desperate rivalry, winner take 14

all." T h u s , by differentiating conceptions of the person according to con­ texts of normative questions, Rawls answers Williams's ( 1 9 8 1 a ) objection that the Kantian view of persons "in abstraction from character" is a false presentation of what it means to b e a person a n d to be confronted by practical problems: "Within different contexts we can assume diverse points of view toward our person without contradiction so long as these points of view cohere together when circumstances require" (Rawls 1 9 8 0 , 5 4 5 ) . T h e two components of Rawls's response to Sandel's first thesis thus b e c o m e apparent. First, it is not the purposive rationality of the parties in the original position that distinguishes the conception of the person o n which Rawls's theory is based but the whole construction of this initial situation: the rational parties and (in the moral sense) the reasonable fair­ ness of the constraints imposed u p o n the parties. In this sense, the moral person with his or her two highest-order interests corresponds not to a notion of subjective freedom of choice but to o n e of moral autonomy. Second, this conception of the moral person is not a conception of the ethical self; rather it is located at a m o r e abstract, political-moral level (see Rawls 1 9 8 5 , 2 3 2 n . 1 5 ) . T h u s (a) the leading conception of the person with the two moral powers leaves o p e n how the ethical identity of a person is constituted. Moral autonomy does not m e a n that a person cannot b e de­ termined in his or her identity by "constitutive" values a n d attachments; it does however m e a n that a person has, first, the capacity to examine these critically (if necessary) and, second, a sense of justice in compliance with which he or she is willing to act toward others according to principles that can be endorsed publicly ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 9 , 4 9 ) . In this sense, the person is mor-

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF •illy "reasonable."

15

25

Rawls argues furthermore (b) that this is a "political

i onception of the person" ( 1 9 8 5 , 2 4 0 ) , a n d this in the sense that it expli­ cit r s moral powers that can (and must) be expected of citizens as respon­ sible members of a fair system of social c o o p e r a t i o n .

16

A n d finally (c) this

< onception of the person, mediated via the original position, serves the justification of principles of justice that relate to the "political," "public," "institutional" identity of persons—to their identity "as a matter of basic law" ( 1 9 8 5 , 2 4 1 - 4 2 ; 1 9 9 3 a , 3 0 ) . T h i s dimension of the person is different hut not separate from, as Rawls says, the "nonpublic" or, better (because 1 his identity is also a public o n e ) , "noninstitutional" identity of persons with their "enduring attachments a n d loyalties," their lived conceptions of the g o o d in "constitutive" communities. T h e identity of the legal person presents, as it were, the external abstract cover for the ethical person; it protects the particular identity of a person a n d at the same time constrains it according to universal moral principles of justice. It is not of significance to his polit­ ical-legal identity, which is constituted by these principles (and their trans­ lation into positive law), that Saul of Tarsus b e c o m e s Paul the A p o s d e on the road to Damascus. T o take a normative standpoint that promotes the equality of basic individual rights for all persons does not therefore m e a n assuming that all persons in their ethical existence are individuals whose good life consists in having rights that grant them a free choice of values. There is a central conceptual difference between the normative, rightsjustifying perspective a n d the ontological perspective. Rawls's conception of the person is thus "political not metaphysical" ( 1 9 8 5 ) in the following sense: in terms of the logic of justification, it does not obligate him to decide for or against a particular theory of personal identity,

17

a n d it is sufficient to make those assumptions about the moral

person that are indispensable for the justification of principles that refer to the foundations of persons' legal-political identity. This conception char­ acterizes the person a n d his or her freedom in a threefold m a n n e r , that is, as a person with particular conceptions of the g o o d and with equal rights to pursuing his or her own ends and to their possible revision; furthermore, as a person w h o raises certain (legal) claims in his or her own interest; a n d as a person w h o assumes practical responsibility for his or h e r ends (see 1 9 8 5 , 2 4 0 - 4 4 ) . It can therefore also be characterized as "legal identity" because here the person is r e g a r d e d as a subject of law, as a person with legal status. 18

J u s t as the abstract conception of the person as a legal p e r s o n — t h e person as a bearer of individual rights a n d a subject of law—is to b e distin­ guished from the conception of ethical person, a conception of political community has also to be distinguished from that of an ethical community. This distinction can already b e found in A Theory of Justice, w h e r e Rawls underscores "that the primary c o n c e r n is that there are many types of social

26

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

union and from the perspective of political justice w e are not to try to rank them in value. M o r e o v e r these unions have no definite size; they range from families a n d friendships to m u c h larger associations" ( 1 9 7 1 , 5 2 7 ) . H e thus distinguishes between the political a n d various social (or ethical) com­ munities: in the former the person is a subject of law, in the latter a m e m b e r of particular communities with which the identity of the self is connected in manifold w a y s .

19

W h e r e a s the political community is normatively inte­

grated via a political a n d public understanding of justice, particular com­ munities are integrated via different kinds of conceptions of the g o o d , especially to the extent that they are determined by "comprehensive moral doctrines." T h e state, Rawls concludes, is therefore not an ethical com­ munity of the good: Justice as fairness assumes, as other liberal political views do also, that the values of community are not only essential but realizable, first in the various associations that carry on their life within the framework of the basic structure, and second in those associations that extend across the boundaries of nationstates, such as churches and scientific societies. Liberalism rejects the state as a community because, among other things, it leads to the systematic denial of basic liberties and to the oppressive use of the state's monopoly of (legal) force. (Rawls 1 9 8 7 , ion. 1 7 ) T h e distinction between state a n d community (or communities) protects the individual liberty of persons as subjects of law a n d also enables them to share as citizens the common e n d of political justice. T h i s c o m m o n e n d must not however e n d a n g e r the basic liberties of legal persons, n o r does it apply as a conception of the g o o d that determines the identity of the ethical person. Ethical identity and legal-political identity have to be kept apart just as ethical communities a n d political communities have to be distin­ guished (which are not however to b e understood as merely instrumental legal communities; see chapter 3 . 1 ) . Sandel does not distinguish sufficiently between these conceptions of community a n d person. By regarding "family," "tribe," a n d "nation" o r "people" in a single series as "constitutive communities," he loses sight of the fact that the conception of the person as "rights-bearer," as Taylor ( 1 9 8 5 1 , 2 7 4 ) says, is located at a m o r e abstract level than the conception of self he discusses. T h e highest-order interests of the moral person lead to a theory of justice that determines the rights a n d duties of citizens as persons of law but does not specify particular conceptions of the g o o d for individuals (or g r o u p s ) . Rather, these rights a n d duties form a protective coverfor ethical conceptions of the g o o d . Individual rights grant the ethical self constituted in the community the latitude to develop and the formal possibility to e x a m i n e critically a n d revise this identity. T h i s possibility does not have any direct ethical implications in the sense of particular individ­ ualistic ideals of the g o o d life.

20

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

27

This analysis thus shows that in the debate between liberals a n d com­ munitarians it is necessary to differentiate between different conceptions l the person, to which different conceptions of community correspond. T o the relations between person a n d community discussed here there corspond various kinds of relations of recognition—of an ethical or a legalpolitical nature. T h e s e dimensions must not b e r e d u c e d to o n e another: legal relations cannot replace ethical ones o r substitute for them, or vice versa. "Legal person" is an abstract conception that must not be understood (>n tologically; in legal relations it is fundamental rights and duties that form the basis of the legally regulated basic structure of society; in ethical ones it is "comprehensive" ethical doctrines that determine the g o o d life of in­ dividuals a n d the "strong evaluations" (Taylor) of their identity. T o rec< >gnize a person as an equal bearer of rights is o n e thing; it is quite another to recognize this person as the person w h o he or she is in all his or h e r attributes. In this distinction, a starting point has b e e n f o u n d for the critical analysis of the discussion of the "atomistic" conception of the h u m a n being: inasmuch as the reproach of atomism implies that the idea of equal legal persons entails a "liberal self" to which a particular conception of the g o o d life a n d of freedom from communities corresponds, it rests on a conceptual confusion. It is important to see that legal-"negative" (personal f r e e d o m to act) a n d ethical-"positive" f r e e d o m (in the sense of self-realization) are connected to each other in a c o m p l e x relation (yet to b e analyzed), but that they are not located at the same conceptual levels. A r g u i n g for indi­ vidual rights does not m e a n arguing for the individualistic plans of life of "unencumbered" persons. T h u s , as a systematic o u t c o m e of the Rawls-Sandel debate there emerges a first differentiation between the ethical person a n d the legal person (the person as a bearer of rights a n d a subject of law)—without this o u t c o m e implying that the Rawlsian m o d e l of the original position is the only or best possibility to justify principles of a society's basic structure o n the basis of a conception of practical reason, that is, principles that do justice to this differentiation. This possibility will b e the object of further analyses that will reveal the necessity to g o b e y o n d Rawls's theory (without thereby af­ fecting the outcome of the controversy with Sandel, however). B u t what matters first of all in the current context is the question of how the dis­ tinction between ethical person a n d legal person is to be understood pre­ cisely. If the legal person forms a normative framework for the ethical per­ son, o n e that both formally enables ethical identities a n d limits them in content, is this conception of the legal person ethically neutral? Aren't

the

highest-order interests of the moral person themselves part of a particular, albeit "thin," liberal theory of the g o o d , a n d isn't the distinction between ethics a n d law therefore willfully misleading? T h e answer to this question is of central significance not only to the

28

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

possibility of liberal political theory, but also to a deontological c o m p r e ­ hension of morality as a whole. T h e latter's thesis is that universally valid norms a n d principles, in contrast to ethical values a n d conceptions of the g o o d , have to be universally justifiable, without recourse to particular con­ ceptions of the good. In contrast to ethical values, legal norms and, to a different degree, moral norms raise a claim to justified general validity "for all," whatever ethical conceptions persons may have. Legal norms de­ m a n d observance by all legal persons as m e m b e r s of a particular legal community a n d are the outcome of a legislative process within a political community; whereas moral norms claim universal validity, that is, are bind­ ing for all h u m a n beings as m e m b e r s of the h u m a n community (without applying in positive law). Ethical values, on the other hand, have a differ­ ent validity claim: they are valid only for individuals w h o can identify with these values, that is, w h o can affirm them as part of their identities in view of their life histories (as histories within communities and particular contexts). Ethical values a n d conceptions of the g o o d answer the ques­ tion c o n c e r n i n g one's own identity a n d the g o o d life "for me"; general norms answer the question of how persons' action toward other persons can be generally legitimated, that is, in consideration of the justified in­ terests a n d needs of all those affected. H e r e , it is not principally a ques­ tion of w h o I a m or w h o I want to be, but how I o u g h t to act toward oth­ ers. L e g a l n o r m s concern not primarily the question of morally justified action but that of action according to laws that apply within a legal com­ munity. T h e y regulate "external" c o n d u c t and specify how a person has to act toward others according to the prescripts of law (hence the ques­ tion of the legal person as the subject of law), as well as how relations be­ tween citizens are to b e regulated in the general interest (hence

the

question of the citizen as the author of law). Ethical values and univer­ sally binding norms represent different answers to different practical questions 2

that correspond to different validity criteria. * It is important to recognize that this provisionally introduced distinc­ tion of contexts in which persons are confronted by different practical questions is a criteriological distinction that does not isolate particular value realms as belonging, in an a priori m a n n e r , to one or the other context.

T h u s ethical values frequently raise general,

unconditional

claims to validity (and are accepted as such by persons), a n d ethical ques­ tions are posed to persons as m e m b e r s of particular communities (and are therefore not in the narrow sense of the term "private" questions). W h a t is essential in this distinction is the fact that different reasons c o u n t as answers in o n e or the other context—that, for instance, moral ques­ tions have to be answered by "sharable" reasons. However, this analytical differentiation will not b e c o m e productive until the c o m p l e x connection between these contexts has b e e n e x a m i n e d — a n d hence, in addition to

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SELF

29

1 lie conceptions of ethical person and legal person, which have been mentioned so far (but not yet clarified), the conceptions of citizenship .ind moral person will b e discussed. T h e problem of the distinction between ethical values a n d general norms is, as will be seen, at the center of the communitarian critique of 1 he separation of ethics and law—thereby

raising the question of the ethical

neutrality of law (chapter 2 ) — t h e separation of ethics and

politics—with

reference to questions of the integration of the political community a n d 1 hose of political legitimation (chapter 3 ) — a s well as the separation of ethics and morality—with special reference to the question of the justification of universal norms (chapter 4 ) . C a n the concepts of law, democratic com­ munity, or the morally right b e determined without constitutive notions of (he g o o d ?

TWO

The Ethical Neutrality of Law

T h e dispute about the priority of the "right" or the "just" over the "good" has a special significance in the context of the question of the ethical neu­ trality of the liberal conception of the legal person—the conception at the center of the answer to the communitarian critique of the liberal self. A n d it is to be understood as a dispute about the priority of individual rights over ( c o m m u n a l ) conceptions of the g o o d . Isn't there in this conception of the person a n d of his or her fundamental rights—so the communitarian suspicion r u n s — a hidden conception of the g o o d that is concealed by the claim of being based on general n o r m s and not ethical values and of being "neutral" toward these values? A r e n ' t the "highest-order interests," to which the liberal legal person corresponds, part of a particular ideal of the person, one that does not indeed match an atomistic theory of the self—so m u c h must be c o n c e d e d after the debate about the self—but o n e that does how­ ever exclude in a practical sense certain competing conceptions of the g o o d and thereby forfeits its neutrality at the level of justification as well as at the level of political and legal practice? Within current liberal theory, the debate about these questions has led to a remarkable differentiation c o n c e r n i n g the status of "liberal values." In what follows I first put forward the liberal arguments for the ethical neutrality of general n o r m s (and basic rights) ( 2 . 1 ) , then the communitarian counterarguments, a n d finally the various reactions to these on the part of liberal theorists ( 2 . 2 ) . W h a t is important here is to distill the various ways in which the c o n c e p t of "neutrality" is used. In a further r o u n d of critique, it will be seen h o w the conception of legal person must be interpreted so that particular ethical identities can be recognized ( 2 . 3 ) . O n this foundation, finally, it will b e possible to formulate a conception of basic individual rights ( 2 . 4 ) . T h e central idea of this chap­ ter is that an intersubjectivist theory upholds the liberal principle of neu30

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

3i

nality in a particular m a n n e r a n d can integrate communitarian resei-valions without being ethical in the w r o n g way.

2.1.

LIBERALISM AND NEUTRALITY

I iberalism is primarily a political (and not a uniform moral) theory that evolved u n d e r particular historical circumstances and has continued to de­ velop u p to the present. T h e ends of this political theory were the following: 1 lie struggle against absolutism a n d for civil a n d economic liberties and basic rights guaranteed by a constitution, as well as the struggle for the separation of church a n d state, that is, for religious tolerance. In his Two Treatises of Government ( 1 6 9 0 ) and A Letter Concerning Toleration ( 1 6 8 9 ) J o h n Locke gave these ends a paradigmatic philosophical justification. Early lib­ eralism with its doctrine of natural law as the expression of h u m a n dignity and liberty (Bloch 1 9 8 6 ) thus reacted to the major social and cultural transformations of its time: to the rise of the bourgeoisie in a radically changing social and e c o n o m i c structure a n d to the political d e m a n d s of this bourgeoisie; to the reformation and the schism of the church; and, finally, to the decline of the traditional, metaphysically legitimated worldview, which was challenged by a new c o n c e p t of science. T h e o r d e r of the natural a n d social world was n o longer r e g a r d e d as hierarchically struct ured, with every living being having "its" place a n d keeping it. In this sense Hobbes was the most radical social philosopher of his time. Liberalism is therefore the political child of m o d e r n times and the Enlightenment, one that finally found its epochal expression in the A m e r i c a n a n d F r e n c h rev­ olutions.

1

T h e fact that liberalism is a political theory that has been developing now for m o r e than three centuries explains the problems that arise in providing a clear definition. T h r e e central values must in any event be mentioned, irrespective of how they may assume concrete form: personal liberty, social pluralism,

a n d political constitutionalism. A r g u m e n t s for social

equality or popular sovereignty must be constructed on the basis of these values; they are not themselves part of these central foundations.

2

With

regard to the moral justification of liberal principles (equal rights and a fair political system, i.e., o n e that safeguards basic rights constitutionally) there are various arguments a n d starting points—corresponding to these three elementary values: (a)

Liberal principles can b e justified primarily in their function as safe­ guards and guarantees of personal f r e e d o m as "negative liberty," that is, freedom from political tutelage with regard to how o n e o u g h t to live.

(b)

3

Liberal principles c a n — i n view of incompatible differences between

32

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW citizens concerning conceptions of the g o o d life—be understood as an a g r e e m e n t to let mutual tolerance prevail in ethical questions of the g o o d life.

(c) Liberal principles can be understood as norms that are justified by a general consensus a m o n g those w h o live according to these norms. T h e y express a general interest. By no means d o these alternatives exhaust all possible models of justi­ fication nor are they mutually exclusive. T h e y d o nonetheless express dif­ ferent focal points of justification, which can be designated

individualist,

pluralist, and proceduralist. C o m m o n to all is of course the distinction be­ tween ethical—"personal"—values and moral—"general"—norms, that is, values that exist within law and n o r m s that can serve as the foundation for law. T o determine m o r e precisely this characteristic, which leads to the claim of ethical neutrality, I discuss in what follows current liberal theories that weigh individualist, pluralist, a n d proceduralist aspects differently. H e r e the goal is to clarify the understanding of "neutrality." This is a con­ dition for discussing on the one h a n d communitarian objections a n d on the other the position of "ethical liberalism," which unlike the three justi­ fication

strategies mentioned (or better: in a particular version of the in­

dividualist a p p r o a c h ) justifies liberal principles via conceptions of the good. Ronald Dworkin's theory is an example of an individualist approach. In his essay "Liberalism" he defends the fundamental liberal principle of the right to "equal concern and respect," that is, nondiscriminating treatment of each citizen as a person with the same liberties a n d with the right to an allocation of social resources that guarantees equal opportunity ( 1 9 8 5 b , 190-91).

4

Ultimately, Dworkin argues, this elementary right to equal con­

cern and respect is a supra-positive natural right that h u m a n beings have as h u m a n beings, even if it always has to take on a specific form in positive law and be interpreted concretely (cf. 1 9 7 8 a , 1 8 2 ) . T h e principles of for­ mal and material equality justified on this basis (and compatible with o n e another), Dworkin further argues, are moral (and not ethical) principles and are therefore "neutral on what might be called the question of the g o o d life" ( 1 9 8 5 b , 1 9 1 ) . If that were not the case, with respect to the first principle of fair treatment, a g o v e r n m e n t might instruct or force citizens to pursue o n e particular way of life or give preferential treatment to a 5

specific one; whereas for the second principle of equal opportunity, par­ ticular ethical conceptions of 'Virtue" or "merit" might determine the cri­ teria according to which social resources were distributed. T h i s treatment would violate the right of all persons to be treated as equals, which accord­ ing to Dworkin is the "nerve of liberalism" ( 1 9 8 5 b , 1 8 3 ) ; individuals have a "right to moral independence" ( 1 9 8 5 ^ 3 5 3 ) , which "trumps" ( 3 5 3 ) util-

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

33

itarian or communitarian ends a n d considerations. Liberal principles guar­ antee the legally secured possibility of living one's own, self-determined life, this being the central m e a n i n g of the d e m a n d for ethical neutrality, r.tliical neutrality guarantees the equality of persons in their basic rights. Accordingly, Dworkin's formulation of an individualist liberalism derives the right to personal autonomy a n d the principle of neutrality from a basic i ight to treatment as an e q u a l — a n important difference from individualist models such as Nozick's ( 1 9 7 4 ) , for w h o m the ownership right to one's own body a n d to the fruits of one's labor is fundamental. Unlike Nozick's approach, Dworkin's fundamental natural right already relates to social a n d political conditions a n d has therefore always b e e n a "political right" in the sense that its addressee is a political community (see Dworkin i 9 7 8 d , 2 7 3 ) . This addressee is constitutive of the realization of this right, it is n o t how­ ever the source of its validity. Bruce A c k e r m a n ' s attempt at philosophically justifying a liberal theory of justice shares with Dworkin a strong c o n c e p t of equality but is not a "right-based" theory (Dworkin 1 9 7 8 a , 1 7 1 - 7 2 ) . In his approach, the liberal principle of neutrality toward the g o o d is itself constitutive—unlike Dwor­ kin's model, as the latter ( 1 9 8 5 c , 2 0 5 ) emphasizes—and is not conceptu­ alized in a theory of rights to equal concern a n d respect. In comparison to Dworkin's theory of rights, the dialogic model of justifying political a n d social distributions of power, which A c k e r m a n proposes, has the advantage that it seeks to determine m o r e concretely the criterion of "neutral" n o r m s and to operationalize it in political contexts. T h u s a first important step toward the possibility of a m o r e contextual interpretation of the conception of legal person—as a bearer of individual rights a n d a person of law—has been taken insofar as the moral content of the m e a n i n g of being "a bearer of individual rights" is explained not in terms of natural law but through t he (yet to be specified) principle of the legitimacy of norms that are to be justified generally; and, accordingly, the legal content of the m e a n i n g of being "a subject of positive law" is left to its determination within a d e m o ­ cratic political community's institutionalized procedures of justification— taking us outside the dispute between natural-law and positivist theories.

6

This interpretation, which points to an internal connection between "legal person" as the addressee a n d "citizen" as the author of law, pushes—as will be seen—liberal theory b e y o n d itself inasmuch as in this respect liberalism and d e m o c r a c y form an indissoluble connection. T h o u g h A c k e r m a n ' s theory is proceduralist in the sense that it g r o u n d s principles of justice in a general a g r e e m e n t of all citizens, the most impor­ tant of the three principles h e assumes to b e elementary is the "principle of neutrality," which reflects the pluralism of society. W h e r e a s the "prin­ ciple of rationality" requires that social a n d political power relations be legitimated by g o o d reasons a n d not by the exercise of power, a n d the

34

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

second principle, the "principle of consistency," imposes u p o n the partic­ ipants of these justification dialogues the condition that the reasons they advance in various contexts d o not contradict o n e another, the "principle ,,

of neutrality specifies m o r e precisely what reasons are g o o d reasons: "No reason is a g o o d reason if it requires the power holder to assert: (a) that his conception of the g o o d is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens, or (b) that, regardless of his conception of the g o o d , h e is intrin­ sically superior to one or m o r e of his fellow citizens" ( A c k e r m a n 1 9 8 0 , 1 1 ) . A c c o r d i n g to A c k e r m a n , for this m o d e l of dialogic justification it is n o t necessary to assume that the participants are not really convinced of their personal conceptions of the good; it is sufficient in a dialogue on the le­ gitimate distribution of scarce resources that o n e accepts that alter e g o cannot be forced to accept the higher value of ego's conception of the good. T h e ends that the distribution of resources is to serve cannot therefore b e controversial ethical ends; rather, they must b e backed by generally shared reasons; a n d the latter justify, as A c k e r m a n attempts to show, a state of formal equality before the law a n d an initially equal distri­ bution of resources. H e calls this state "undominated equality" ( 1 9 8 0 , 2 8 ) . A c k e r m a n ' s theory is problematic in two respects. First, the criterion for the distinction between legitimate a n d illegitimate ethical reasons remains unclear; and, second, this distinction is reified in that ethical arguments are r e g a r d e d as nonpublic a n d as not o p e n (in the political sense) to dia­ logue (see chapter 3 . 1 ) . In the present context, the criteriological question left open by A c k e r m a n is important: what does it m e a n to speak of an ethical disagreement that justifies excluding certain arguments on the basis of "conversational restraint" ( 1 9 8 9 , 1 6 ) ? In a m a n n e r similar to A c k e r m a n , Charles L a r m o r e stresses in his at­ tempt to justify the ethical neutrality of "political principles" that the "po­ litical ideal" of the priority of general principles must b e distinguished from the multitude of "personal ideals" that determine the g o o d life in the pri­ vate sphere. Neutral principles of equal rights can b e justified only "neu­ trally," namely as a procedural m o d u s vivendi between incompatible con­ ceptions of the g o o d . T h i s procedural justification is based on a "universal n o r m of rational dialogue" that stipulates the following: In discussing how to solve some problem (for example, what principles of political association they should adopt), people should respond to points of disagreement by retreating to neutral ground, to the beliefs they still share, in order to either (a) resolve the disagreement and vindicate one of the dis­ puted positions by means of arguments which proceed from this common ground or (b) bypass the disagreement and seek a solution of the problem on the basis simply of this common ground. (1990, 3 4 7 ; cf. 1 9 8 7 , 5 3 ) T h i s principle of neutrality does not rule out ethical arguments from the outset; that is to say, not until they prove to be irresolvable in "reasonable

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

75

disagreement" between persons w h o strive to c o m e to a consensus. In this < asc, which according to L a r m o r e is an irreversible consequence of the pluralism of ethical values in modernity, citizens have recourse only to "minimal" ( 1 9 9 0 , 3 4 0 - 4 1 ) c o m m o n g r o u n d that all can share. Following h i s "contextual" ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 9 ) conception of justification, these commonali­ ties (this "neutral ground") are not the result but the presupposition

of a

ational agreement. However, these presuppositions are only pardy contin­ g e n t , since the m o d u s vivendi of c o m m o n principles is not a purposive1 ational compromise of ethical communities but is morally justified. W h a t is required of citizens is not primarily that they strive for social p e a c e but t h a t they morally recognize the basic norms of rational dialogue a n d of mutual respect for persons as ends—to put it in Kantian terms—a respect t h a t calls for dialogue in the first place and is thus m o r e fundamental. T h e principle of neutrality is therefore not just a less than perfect solution in view of irreconcilable ethical differences but a moral principle of justifi­ cation: "If our aim is to devise principles of political association a n d if we are resolved to respect each other as persons in this effort, then the prin­ ciples to be established must be ones which are justifiable to everyone whom they are to bind" ( 1 9 9 0 , 3 5 1 ) . T h e c o n c e p t of "reasonable disagreement" does however remain insufliciendy specified, if the a p p e a r a n c e of a dissension is already e n o u g h to require recourse to the c o m m o n , neutral g r o u n d (ultimately: basic moral norms) a n d the bracketing of conflicts. H e r e it can be seen that the sepa­ ration of "political principles" a n d "private," ethical conceptions,

whose

coexistence constitutes the core of the idea of m o d u s vivendi, makes dia­ logic justification a p p e a r m o r e as conflict minimization by resorting to a prior minimal consensus (and thereby reducing complexity) than as a pro­ cess of argumentative universalization. "Neutral dialogue" is introduced by Ackerman and L a r m o r e primarily as a conflict-avoidance strategy to guar­ 7

antee the primacy of liberal principles, especially individual rights. Ulti­ mately, they present the—insufficient—criterion

that distinguishes "rea­

sonable" from "unreasonable" disagreements a n d reflects the

different

"codes" of ethical-private a n d political spheres (cf. H o l m e s a n d L a r m o r e 1982). A l t h o u g h in this respect the pluralist element leads to a certain reduc­ tion of the proceduralist one, it makes a crucial course setting within liberal theory, one that allows an explanation of the idea of the priority of the "right" in terms of a proceduralist theory; on this basis, the c o n c e p t of "reason" implied in the term "reasonable disagreement" is to explicated according to certain criteria.

8

T h e principle of liberal neutrality—namely, that disputed ethical values may not serve as the foundation for general norms—therefore requires a special m o d e of procedural justification for such norms, one according to

36

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

which "no one could reasonably reject" these n o r m s — t o borrow a formu­ lation from T h o m a s Scanlon ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 1 0 ) . It would thus be "unreasonable" in a moral sense to reject these norms, whatever ethical convictions one may have. T h o m a s N a g e l has attempted to explicate this "higher-order im­ partiality" ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 1 6 ) of general n o r m s within the framework of a theory of "public justification." T h i s impartiality is on a level above ethical ques­ tions—according to Nagel, it is on the level of what is generally binding and can therefore b e c o m e the foundation of valid law. T h e question is: when is legal force legitimate and how are the limits of tolerance within a liberal state to be determined? T o be m o r e precise: h o w can the m e m b e r s of a religion, for e x a m p l e — b e i n g convinced that their religion is the path to happiness or salvation—be restrained by g o o d reasons from enforcing it upon other "nonbelievers"? N a g e l proposes two arguments; one a Kan­ tian, which could be termed the a r g u m e n t of reciprocity; and one an epistemological, an a r g u m e n t of generality. Both arguments aim at a separation of ethical (personal) values and politically acceptable (public) principles. T h e a r g u m e n t of reciprocity insists on it being morally wrong to force someone to share an e n d of which he or she is not convinced, even if the person exercising the force feels certain that it is to the advantage of the other. In this case, a person is being used—to put it in Kantian terms—as a means to an e n d to which he or she did not agree (Nagel 1 9 8 7 , 2 3 3 ; 1 9 9 1 , 1 5 9 - 6 0 ) . However, whether an action transgresses against the re­ quirement of reciprocity depends on a description of the act's context, N a g e l argues. If the force to convert exercised by person (or g r o u p ) A on person B is described as deliverance from eternal damnation, person A could acknowledge that he or she would not c o n d e m n the reverse c a s e — that he or she was being f o r c e d — a s being incompatible with his or h e r true interests. If however the action is described as interference in a per­ son's religious freedom, person A cannot simply claim that he or she is not violating the principle of reciprocity ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 3 6 ; 1 9 9 1 , 1 6 2 ) . T h i s descrip­ tion of the situation does however presuppose that the first answer is not acceptable. T o demonstrate this, N a g e l resorts to the second, epistemological a r g u m e n t of generality. This a r g u m e n t has to show that it is illegitimate to refer simply to the truth of an ethical conception in o r d e r to justify legal force. B u t N a g e l wants to avoid a skeptical position—that ethical truth does not exist—and is look­ ing for a "higher standard of objectivity" ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 2 9 ) . T h i s standard re­ quires of persons that they assume a "universal," "impersonal" standpoint vis-a-vis their own ethical convictions, one that draws a distinction between "belief" a n d "truth." H e n c e "there is a big difference, looking at it from the outside, between my believing something and its being true" (ibid.). Persons should not however stop considering certain conceptions to be true; they j u s t o u g h t to be in a position to assume a standpoint "outside

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

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themselves" that allows them, u n d e r certain conditions, to recognize dial their truth is their truth a n d thus a belief, a conviction not shared by others. T h e justification of morality must therefore correspond to a higher stand­ point of general agreement, whereas the justification of ethics is a matter of "individual rationality" ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 3 0 ) . T h i s is synonymous, N a g e l says, with an "epistemological division between the private and the public domains" (ibid.). T h e justification of n o r m s that are to be valid for all must therefore be public, which means that one has to be in a position to make one's reasons accessible to public discourse and to convince others of one's own concep­ tions in such a m a n n e r that "they have what you have, and can arrive at a judgment on the same basis" ( 2 3 2 ) . If this is not possible, there is then reason to assume that part of the conception, which is not convincing, is to be attributed to personal belief or religious reasons. N o r is it presumably possible in such a case—this being the second condition of public justifi­ cation—that there is an explanation for disagreement that would lead to the identification of an error ("errors in their evidence, or identifiable errors in drawing conclusions from it") on the part of one of the conflicting parties. T h i s is not the case in a confrontation between incompatible per­ sonal convictions such as those of different religions. In questions that ul­ timately lead to such confrontations, N a g e l considers tolerance necessary in such a way that they are not the object of majority decisions. T h e second a r g u m e n t is nonetheless exposed to objections that led N a ­ gel to withdraw it in favor of a reformulated version of the first argument, that of reciprocity (see N a g e l 1 9 9 1 , 1 6 3 ) . H e now sees the criterion for displaying tolerance in ethical questions located in the fact that it is im­ moral to exercise political control in the "most central ends of selfrealization" ( 1 6 4 ) , a condition of which is the freedom to chose one's own g o o d life. T h e Kantian a r g u m e n t of reciprocity is strengthened to the point that only reasons the other can accept g r a n t the right to treat him o r her in accordance with these reasons—insofar as a particular, central realm of moral questions is affected (from which there follows in turn the prob­ lem—yet to be discussed—of specifying this r e a l m ) . In withdrawing his epistemological argument, N a g e l is reacting to objections such as those raised by J o s e p h Raz ( 1 9 9 0 , 3 6 - 4 6 ) , w h o questions the possibility of per­ sons holding their convictions to be simultaneously true and in a certain sense—namely, after assuming the "impartial" standpoint—not true, or just to be a belief or a conviction. T h e "epistemological separation between private and public" p r o p o s e d by N a g e l does not d o justice to the character of what it means to consider something true. W h a t one considers right "privately" one defends "publicly" too. Nevertheless, this critique can be answered in a w a y that supports Nagel's second a r g u m e n t in a modified f o r m — b y means of an intersubjectivistic

38

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

interpretation of the criterion of generality. T h e problems with Nagel's proposal, about which Raz has misgivings, c o m e from the m a n n e r in which N a g e l describes the moral point of view as "impersonal" or even as a stand­ point from which persons objectivate themselves, step out of themselves, as it were, and call themselves into question ("look at certain of their con­ victions from outside" [ 1 9 8 7 , 2 3 0 ] ) . A c c o r d i n g to this interpretation, it does indeed seem as if an ethical conviction is valid "from inside" but not "from outside," j u s t as Raz ( 1 9 9 0 , 4 3 ) criticizes. N a g e l believes he can ex­ plain the difference in validity modes between ethical values a n d general norms according to the criteria of the subjective and objective validity of these values a n d norms. T h u s the "higher" objectivity of general norms or values is ultimately presented through its affirmation by an impartial stand­ point of rational insight into objective truth (see N a g e l 1 9 8 6 , ch. 8 ) . T h e criterion of impartiality is located in this objectivity, not in intersubjectivegeneral acceptability: objectivity is the presupposition of generality and pub­ licity. T h e difference

between

subjective and objective values is only

"shown" in public justification a n d not constituted by it. If however the distinction between ethical and moral validity is separated from an objectivist conception of validity, then it becomes evident that moral reasons must be intersubjective-general, discursively redeemable, shared reasons (cf . Korsgaard 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e difference between ethical values and generally binding norms is therefore not to be understood as an

epistemological

difference between a subjective conviction and an objective truth that, in­ sofar as it is recognized, questions the validity of the former. Rather, it is 9

essential to keep the contexts of ethical and moral questions apart. Ethical values frequendy (though not always) raise the claim of being ethical truths, of representing absolute (metaphysically or religiously justified) standards for the g o o d life. A s such, they answer the question of the g o o d life "for me" or "for us" as m e m b e r s of an ethical community. However, in contexts in which it is a question of moral n o r m s that are to be valid "for all" persons as members of different ethical communities, the reasons for their validity must be general in the sense that they cannot be reasonably rejected by any person. A truth valid "for me" can claim moral validity only if it can be defended with moral reasons; ethical "truth" is not automatically moral "rightness" since for this to be the case, a personal truth would have to be justifiable "interpersonally." T h i s does not m e a n that a person views his or her ethical convictions from an "impersonal" perspective; he or she is forced to provide "public" reasons for them only in the specific case in which he or she claims that these convictions have moral validity "for others" generally. H e r e it is important to see that the reasons sufficient for answering a person's ethical questions d o not b e c o m e ethically false p e r se for this person if they d o not turn out to be an acceptable basis for general norms. It j u s t means that

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

V)

there are different ethical conceptions and that morality is not the medium to demonstrate their ethical truth or falsehood. A form of life does not b e c o m e false because its general realization c a n n o t be morally d e m a n d e d , fust as ethical reasons are not necessarily general reasons in a moral sense, moral reasons are not sufficient to determine the g o o d life. With regard to the justification of generally valid norms, this presup­ poses a revised connection between Nagel's two arguments of reciprocity and generality. Reasons are g o o d moral reasons only if they can b e justified reciprocally: if person A d e m a n d s of person B n o m o r e than what he or she is willing to grant, a n d if person B c a n n o t reciprocally reject this de­ m a n d by pointing out a one-sided situation description or a projection of interests, needs, values onto him or her by person A (reciprocity), a n d if, in reference to the interests of all those affected, the reasons can be justified and accepted by all with g o o d reasons (generality). Only then are they the reasons for general norms. Reasons must be addressed to the other recip­ rocally a n d to all others generally in o r d e r to justify validity "for everyone." A n ethical conviction that does not pass this "test" is not necessarily deval­ ued in the ethical sense, but it cannot raise a validity claim in the moral sense. T h a t one affirms o r rejects a particular way of life for oneself is a question different from the question as to whether one wants to make a form of life binding for others or prohibit it. In this case one must be able to show that one is not disputing others' right to something that o n e claims for oneself (e.g., the right to one's own way of life); and the person must be able to provide moral reasons (and not merely personal aversions to forms of life) that prohibit certain ways of life—reasons that c a n n o t be reasonably rejected. T h e two criteria of reciprocity and generality have to be met. T h i s is how the difference is to be explained "between the values a person can appeal to in conducting his own life a n d those he can appeal to in justifying the exercise of political power," to use Nagel's formulation ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 2 1 ) . By means of a boundary (in the sense of an argumentative threshold) set by the criteria of reciprocity a n d generality, one could say, per­ sons are protected from being forced to adopt ways of life or values that c a n n o t be d e m a n d e d reciprocally a n d generally; norms, however, that can­ not be rejected with such reasons have to be accepted—this being the deontological c o m p o n e n t of the idea of public justification. In this way, we can also give m e a n i n g to Nagel's idea of a protected core area of personal autonomy. T h i s conception of intersubjective justification does not imply that persons as "good citizens" have to surrender their personal, ethical identity; it does however indicate that the general binding validity of ethical values and of the norms ensuing from them is subject to a further criterion, namely, to the a g r e e m e n t of all those affected. T r u e , ethical values can in principle b e c o m e the basis of general norms, but only if they are subjected to a different mode of justification and validity. T h e m o d e of legitimating liberal

o

4

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

principles is therefore general justification, just as J e r e m y W a l d r o n inter­ prets the theoretical foundations of liberalism: "Liberals d e m a n d that the social order should in principle be capable of explaining itself at the tri­ bunal of each person's understanding" (Waldron 1 9 9 3 a , 6 1 ) . Even though Rawls does not put the c o n c e p t of neutrality at the center of his theory (because of this concept's semantical diversity), the problem it designates is nonetheless constitutive of his theory: how are principles of justice—as the foundation for the basic structure of society—and corre­ sponding institutions to be justified without curtailing in an "unreasonable" m a n n e r the pluralism of ethical conceptions of the g o o d , which, according to Rawls, is a "fact" of m o d e r n societies? W h a t can and must citizens agree on without a b a n d o n i n g their ethical identity? T r u e , Rawls also assumed in A Theory of Justice that persons have the rational and legitimate e n d of realizing their conceptions of the g o o d life a n d that "there is no urgency to reach a publicly accepted j u d g m e n t as to what is the g o o d of particular individuals. T h e reasons that make such an agreement necessary in questions of justice d o not obtain for j u d g m e n t s of value" ( 1 9 7 1 , 4 4 8 ) . However, in part 3 where the stability of society is m a d e d e p e n d e n t u p o n a (limited) c o n g r u e n c e of the g o o d a n d the just in the eyes of citizens, Rawls presented his m o d e l — h e believes, in retrospect—at least as a "partially comprehensive" moral doctrine ( 1 9 9 3 a , xvi)—not, to be sure, metaphysically justified but nonetheless as an independent and central part of citizens' ethical identity. T h i s serious disadvantage of the original theory now forces him to reinterpret it as a "political" and not a "comprehensive moral" conception. H e r e , on the one h a n d , his language usage is equivocal: the "political" conception of justice is also of course a "moral" conception ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 1 ) — t h o u g h one that rests on foundations that are not drawn from "comprehensive doctrines" but are "freestanding" ( 1 2 ) . T h e m e a n i n g of "moral" from which Rawls withdraws is the ethical sense of a conception that is justified in ultimate values a n d refers to the g o o d life.

10

O n the other hand, emphasizing stability as a central problem

is misleading, as Rawls has meanwhile acknowledged ( 1 9 9 6 , x x x v i i i - x x x i x ) . It is not primarily a matter of how a democratic society can be stable but of how it can relate a c o m m o n normative basis to ethical conceptions; basically, it is about the problem of the justification of general norms: "Given the fact of the reasonable pluralism of democratic culture, the aim of political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable public basis of justification on fundamental political questions" ( 1 9 9 3 a , xix). Obviously, a conception of "reason" plays a central part in Rawls's polit­ ical liberalism. It serves the justification of the theory with the help of a "constructivist" m e t h o d that builds on "principles" and "ideas of practical reason" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 0 7 ) .

1 1

In this connection, it explains to what extent Rawls

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

4 1

raises the claim that the theory of justice is "reasonable" but not "true." Furthermore, the conception of reason serves to distinguish between "rea­ sonable" and "unreasonable" ethical conceptions and to justify the thesis that the principles of justice are at the center of an "overlapping consensus" of reasonable doctrines. Citizens w h o hold such doctrines d o not have to surrender their ethical identity; rather, they interpret and accept justice from within their ethical perspective. A n d the conception of reason serves in turn to explain the reasonableness of persons w h o as legal persons attune their ethical convictions to the primacy of justice in questions that affect the basic structure. T h u s the "reasonable" theory is not "political" in the sense that it represents a contingent consensus of ethical doctrines; it is "political" in that it attempts to keep the moral limits that reason draws as ethically neutral as possible. "[W]hile justice draws the limit, and the g o o d shows the point, justice c a n n o t draw the limit too narrowly" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 7 4 ) . But what does it mean that "reasonable" persons now j u d g e their ethical identity as being ethically g o o d a n d valuable n o longer primarily according to the parameter of the j u s t but by incorporating justice into their ethical convictions? H o w d e m a n d i n g is this posttraditional conception of reason which, in the event of ethical convictions militating against the just, qualifies them as "unreasonable"? T o answer this question it is necessary to recall the conception of the "reasonable" to which Rawls referred in the debate with Sandel a n d ac­ cording to which the conception of the person on which the original po­ sition is based includes the "moral power" of having a sense of justice and of being capable of social cooperation. Reasonable persons, Rawls says, have the capacity of practical, "shared and public political reason" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 9 ) ; they are willing to propose and observe fair principles of cooperation; what is more, they are morally motivated because of a

"conception-

d e p e n d e n t desire" ( 8 3 - 8 4 ) to act as free a n d equal citizens according to principles "that cannot be reasonably rejected by persons w h o are moti­ vated to find a free a n d informed basis of willing a g r e e m e n t in political life" ( 1 2 4 ) . Rawls thereby adopts Scanlon's formula (see above) for morally justified action: the foundation of "reasonable" action is principles that are to be "publicly" justified in the sense that they cannot be reasonably rejected. T h e c o m m o n basis that is generally nonrejectable in this m a n n e r is, ac­ cording to Rawls, the political conception of justice, which was justified with the help of the original position; it satisfies Scanlon's criterion, Rawls says, since primarily (though not only, as will be seen) ideas a n d principles of practical reason have g o n e into its justification—it "represents" free and equal persons in a "reasonable" initial situation that leads to "reasonable" principles. Scanlon's criterion is aufgehoben (sublimated), as it were, in the original position, whose principles represent a starting point for the "public reason" of citizens.

2

4

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW T h e recognition of "reasonable" principles presupposes, Rawls argues,

a second aspect of the reasonable, apart from the willingness to e n g a g e in fair cooperation; it is an aspect that elucidates the c o n c e p t of "reasonable disagreement" employed by L a r m o r e a n d Nagel. Reasonable persons rec­ ognize the "burdens of judgment" (or the "burdens of reason" [ 1 9 9 3 a , 5 4 ] ) . T h e s e bin d e n s explain the reasons for the disagreements a m o n g "rea­ sonable," that is, neither irrational n o r egoistic persons, but ones oriented toward reaching understanding ( 1 9 8 9 a , 2 3 5 - 3 9 ) . A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, it is often not clear what counts as evidence in a political-moral question a n d what considerations are to be w e i g h e d in what way; in difficult cases, moral concepts can encounter their limits a n d be indeterminate; different ex­ periential backgrounds and especially ethical values influence practical judgments; g o o d reasons might be advanced for two mutually exclusive alternatives; finally, limited social space unavoidably leads to giving priority to certain values over others without the latter being of lesser value in all respects.

12

All these grounds lead to normative conflicts that cannot be

definitely resolved on the basis of theoretical or practical reason; we must therefore reckon with irresolvable, though not unreasonable disagree­ ments within the bounds of justice. O n e can express it like this: it might not be unreasonable not to want to accept a particular form of life (and its values) for oneself; this does not make this form of life unreasonable, how­ ever. T o acknowledge the "fact" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 5 8 ) of the "burdens of j u d g m e n t " is a d e m a n d of reason: acknowledging its own limits a n d the inevitable plurality of ethical perspectives. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, reasonable persons see that there can be ethical differences that must be accepted because the individual positions are neither obviously irrational n o r immoral—even if one does not share them oneself. H e n c e , Rawls's view (xviii) of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that recognize this as being "incompatible" has to be relativized to the effect that they are incompatible not in a moral but in an ethical respect—there remains an "overlapping" consensus. His point is that comprehensive doctrines in a "reasonable" pluralism exhibit both aspects of being reasonable. T h e y accept the priority of justice principles (which they incorporate as part of their comprehensive doctrine) and know that ethical differences between reasonable persons are not a reason to force opponents to adopt one's own view. "To conclude: reasonable per­ sons see that the burdens of j u d g m e n t set limits on what can be reasonably justified to others, a n d so they endorse some form of liberty of conscience and freedom of thought" ( 6 1 ) . This view of what is d e m a n d e d of persons as citizens of a well-ordered society is "not an epistemological idea" ( 6 2 ) , as Rawls emphasizes, since it does not d e m a n d of persons that they bracket their ethical convictions as m e r e "opinions" in contrast to the "objective" moral truth of justice. In the presupposition of the acknowledgment of the limits of reason, however, it

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

./ 7

does have "epistemological elements" (ibid.). T h i s acknowledgment refers to the limits of one's own reason and that of others. T h e former does not necessarily lead to the circumstance that one's own conviction is no longer considered right but does lead to critical examination rather than dogmatic defense of one's conviction; and this, the m o r e the latter leads to under­ standing others' convictions against the b a c k g r o u n d of their genesis, either (the strong version) to seeing in them a certain normative justification or (the weak version) to recognizing them only in their meaning for the other person, even though o n e considers them not even partially right for one­ self. Neither precludes the possibility of wanting to convince this person of the merit of one's own values; it only requires attention to the reciprocal conditionality of ethical perspectives (cf. Hinsch 1 9 9 2 , 2 5 - 2 6 ) . W h a t is m o r e important than this cognitive dimension of ethical selfrelativization is its moral dimension, according to which tolerance is re­ quired not because of the dilemma posed by normative indeterminacy but by virtue of insight into the legitimacy criteria of general norms. F o r this Rawls falls back on the criteria that were identified in connection with Nagel as that of reciprocity and that of generality: Of course, those who do insist on their beliefs also insist that their beliefs alone are true: they impose their beliefs because, they say, their beliefs are true and not because they are their beliefs. But this is a claim that all equally could make; it is also a claim that cannot be made good by anyone to citizens generally. So, when we make such claims, others, who are themselves reason­ able, must count us unreasonable. (1993a, 6 1 ; italics added) H e r e it is evident that both aspects of "being reasonable"—willingness for public justification a n d recognition of the b u r d e n s of reason—are indebted to the principle of practical reason, namely, only those norms may claim general validity that are reciprocally and generally justified; a n d those per­ sons are in a practical sense "reasonable" w h o are cognitively capable of conducting and morally willing to carry out this justification. T h e y are able to provide and accept g o o d reasons and they can distinguish g o o d ethical from g o o d moral reasons. T h i s does not m e a n , as mentioned above, that ethically g o o d reasons "for me" or "for us" c a n n o t be cogent reasons for orienting one's own life toward them as being "true"; it only m e a n s that w h e n ethical values claim general validity "for all," they require reasons that can be reciprocally a n d generally justified. In this way, moral consensus and ethical difference b e c o m e compatible, a n d the criterion of "cannot be reasonably rejected" b e c o m e s m o r e clearly determinable. After all, the principles of justice themselves (and the n o r m s compatible with them) are justified as ones that form a "reasonable" basis for society by not being reciprocally and generally contestable, unlike ethical values. It is in this respect correct to say that the principle of reciprocal and general justifi-

44

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

cation is the basis of the "original position," such that Rawls's device of justification is j u s t o n e way of applying this principle. T h e following can thus be concluded: practical reason is differentiated according to ethical and moral aspects on the basis of the principle of justification, so that reasonable persons recognize the threshold of reciprocity and generality; they can advance g o o d reasons in each of the particular practical contexts. T h i s proposal of a distinction between contexts of ethical and moral validity has the advantage of grasping the criterion of the "reasonable" a n d its relation to ethical "truth" m o r e precisely. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls's concep­ tion, "reasonable" persons regard the principles of justice as "part" of their own ethical doctrine and therefore as "true" (and not j u s t r e a s o n a b l e ) — nevertheless, justice (and reason) trumps ethical values (and therefore "truth") if they c o m e into conflict with it. T o explain this conception of the priority of reason as well as the compatibility of truth and reason now within the perspective of a comprehensive doctrine, Rawls follows J o s h u a C o h e n ' s ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 8 3 ) suggestion that in questions of justice reasonable per­ sons (a) refer indeed to "their" truth, which is contained in the overlapping consensus, but (b) activate only the "part" of their convictions that lies within this consensus, and (c) recognize that reference to the "whole truth" is not possible since this would be equivalent to an a r g u m e n t on the basis of mere beliefs (Rawls 1 9 9 3 a , 1 2 7 - 2 8 ) . However, this distinction between reasonable "truth" and m e r e "belief" within the ethical perspective of one person remains rooted in Nagel's epistemological conception, which trans­ forms the criterion of morally g o o d reasons shareable in justification dis­ courses into a particular attitude toward one's beliefs (even if this is not understood objectivistically in Nagel's sense). A s "reasonable" truth, truth within the overlapping consensus w o u l d be "truer," as it were, than truth outside of it; in contrast to that, it is m o r e plausible to assume that it is not m o r e or less true but satisfies other validity criteria in a different practical context.

13

T h e overlapping consensus is to be understood not as a static

stock of "true" a n d "reasonable" values that enjoy a special normative and epistemic position within comprehensive doctrines but as a dynamic con­ sensus on norms that, in questions of justice, prove to be "publicly" justified and "reasonably" acceptable on the basis of g o o d reasons. Reasonable per­ sons recognize general norms because the latter are reciprocally and gen­ erally justifiable a n d thus acceptable to every person. In this sense, they can be reasonably (i.e., without g o o d counterreasons) integrated into his or her comprehensive normative identity. Reconstructed in this manner, insight into the necessity of reciprocal and general justification does not presuppose a g a p between the two "parts" (Rawls 1 9 9 3 a , 3 8 ) of the normative perspective of justice a n d the good. Ethical self-relativization in questions of general legitimation does

not

m e a n casting off one's own ethical identity, but it does m e a n being willing,

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

45

in contexts relevant to justice (and only h e r e ) , to limit one's own iden lilydetermining values in view of others' ethical identity, and to do so to such a degree as to respect the value of the other person's identity for him or her. Hence, the basis for mutual tolerance is not doubting the ethical validity of one's own values (or of values generally) but recognizing what it means to have an ethical identity. Awareness of the constitutive connection be­ tween ethical values a n d the identity of persons, together with knowledge of the context connectedness of "strong evaluations" (Taylor), as well as acceptance of the threshold of reciprocity a n d generality, lead to the ex­ ercise of reciprocal tolerance. T h e image of the "atomistic" person has receded into a dim distance; the right to an ethical identity is not an at­ omistic right but one that reflects the significance of values to p e r s o n s .

14

T h u s , to summarize, "reasonable" persons recognize the possibility of a plurality of ethical answers to questions of the g o o d life—answers that are reasonable insofar as they are neither irrational n o r immoral. Furthermore, they recognize the significance of such answers to persons and respect them even if they regard them as ethically unsatisfactory answers. T h e y therefore r e c o g n i z e — a n d it is here that the moral dimension of insight into the limits of reason begins—that ethical answers have to be answers that relate affir­ matively to "my" (jemeinig) life. This insight does not rule out the attempt to convince others of the quality of certain values that would enrich their lives; but it does rule out restricting their ethical form of life with reasons other than those reciprocally and generally justified. Respect for ethical identity is therefore morally required. Recognition of the threshold of reciprocity a n d generality is a normative d e m a n d that is indispensable for the m e m b e r s of a legal community. T h e principle of neutrality, which implies this threshold (and the b o u n d a r y between contexts of justification), serves therefore in liberal theory to jus­ tify individual rights to freedom of ethical self-determination within the bounds of morality. T h e s e individual rights are reciprocally justified, "neg­ ative" rights to the possibility of determining "positive" projections of ways of life—John Stuart Mill ( 1 9 8 9 , 5 7 ) speaks of "different experiments of living." A n "enforcement of ethics" is ruled out inasmuch as it seeks to universalize a particular way of life and thereby violates the two criteria of justification. In this m o d e l of normative justification there is also the inter­ nal

connection

between

liberal

neutrality

and

democratic

self-

determination a m o n g citizens—a connection neglected by liberal theory and one that reveals itself w h e n the question is raised as to what it means to justify legal norms. I shall return to this. Against the b a c k g r o u n d of this discussion, o n e can determine m o r e pre­ cisely what "neutrality" means. ( 1 ) T h e central m e a n i n g o f neutrality follows from the principle that only those norms that can be justified reciprocally a n d generally can claim gen-

46

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

eral validity. T h e principle of neutrality therefore distinguishes a criterion for the justification of the validity of norms. T h e "neutrality ofjustification,

,,

or "neutrality of reasons," or "procedural neutrality" are terms that hint at this principle (without determining it precisely in this f o r m ) .

1 5

Neutrality

in this sense refers to the moral impartiality of the justification. A n important distinction has to be observed here, o n e frequently ne­ glected by liberal theories. Insofar as it is a matter of justifying basic prin­ ciples of law, in particular basic rights, moral arguments for or against their validity are required. T h e s e principles claim—in accordance with their ab­ stract core, which has to be determined and institutionalized concretely in legal terms—deontological validity as n o r m s that are not mutually contest­ able and therefore make moral d e m a n d s on law. T h a t moral norms (have to) enter into positive law in this way does not mean that they constitute a "superordinate law"; it simply means that basic principles of law are to be justified according to the criterion of strict reciprocity and generality a n d can be restricted only by reasons that satisfy this criterion. T h i s requirement does not a p p r o a c h law from the outside, in the sense of natural law: the persons themselves with vulnerable identities are the ones w h o d e m a n d reasons for any restrictions imposed on their form of life, reasons that have to be justified in the strict sense a n d to which then all those affected have to be able to agree. T h e coercive character of law can be legitimated only if it does not violate the justified rights of persons to respect for their person and can be followed "on the basis of insight" (Habermas 1 9 9 6 a ,

121).

1 6

L a w — w h e n it is a matter of the sensitive, morally relevant areas of basic rights—has to be justifiable with "shareable" reasons. It must correspond to the threshold of reciprocity and generality. H e r e i n lies the rightsguaranteeing character of the neutrality principle. T h e criterion of restricted generality, in contrast, applies to normative reg­ ulations that relate not primarily to moral questions a n d rights but to po­ litical questions, which d o indeed also have to be regulated in the general interest but in which legitimate compromises and majority decisions are nevertheless possible. T h e reasons advanced here do not have to be morally "shared" reasons but, in the broadest sense of the term, "political" reasons, into which ethical o r pragmatic viewpoints e n t e r .

17

If however moral ques­

tions are affected, they cannot be "trumped" (Dworkin) by other view­ points. T h e y then require a raising of the threshold of reciprocity a n d gen­ erality. Prohibiting or limiting certain forms of life on the basis of ethical or even pragmatic considerations violates the criterion of strict generality; promoting certain values on the basis of an imperfecdy general j u d g m e n t , for instance, p r o m o t i n g art, does not p r i m a facie concern the moral prob­ lem of discriminating against certain forms of life. T h u s ethical neutrality does not m e a n that law is entirely free from eth­ ical values or that political communities cannot have strong evaluations. It

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

41

does however place certain conditions on an "ethicization" of law. It does not imply a dichotomous relation between ethics a n d law; the division of regulations that are to be justified generally in the strict or restricted sense cannot be determined in terms of content a fortiori—what matters is the reasons for and especially against a regulation. F o r the possibly disadvan­ taged are the ones w h o question the given reasons and raise moral prob­ lems a n d thereby bring about a "switching" of justification criteria. T h e critical potential of this c o n c e p t of law—which I still have to discuss—rests here. N o r m s that are not

the

object of "reasonable disagreement" are

therefore general in the strict sense; they constitute the framework for treating questions that are controversial in the reasonable sense. Ethically controversial values cannot then be the foundation of generally binding norms, but the question is whether compromises—on the basis not of shared reasons, but not of entirely opposing reasons either—are not per­ haps possible, compromises that conform to a general n e e d for regulation without being morally p r o b l e m a t i c .

18

(2) T h e question of the normative justification of the neutrality princi­ ple has to be separated from the principle itself and its meaning. Is there a "neutral" justification of the principle of neutral justification? Does the principle itself rest on a theory of the good, on a conception of moral rights, on moral-skeptical assumptions, or on a conception of practical reason? T h e s e questions will be dealt with in the following section. ( 3 ) Since the neutrality principle relates primarily to the validity crite­ rion of general norms, it does not imply neutrality in the process of justi­ fication

in the sense that ethical arguments would be e x c l u d e d from it.

Political discourses are not "neutralized"; what is important is that ethical arguments, when they propose values as the foundation for general regu­ lations, be "translatable" into universal arguments. T h e y must b e compat­ ible with the principle of public justification; however, they d o

not

therefore completely detach themselves from the ethical b a c k g r o u n d from which they originate. T h e criteria of strict a n d restricted generality d o not disengage arguments o r justified norms from their social contexts.

19

(4) N o liberal theory defends the thesis of a "neutrality of effect" or a "neutrality of consequences" in the sense that the realization a n d institu­ tional implementation of n o r m s within a legal system has the same effects on all life forms in the legal community a n d all conceptions of the g o o d present t h e r e .

20

Neutrality prohibits ethically motivated

discrimination

against forms of life; it does not guarantee that all are affected in the same way by the decisions a n d development of the political community a n d by social change. A n ethical justification of legal regulations cannot as such be inferred from the different effects these regulations have on ethical communities in practice. T h o u g h this is possible in the critical sense, there

48

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

d o not follow from this any affirmative consequences in the sense that law is and should b e unavoidably justified ethically. ( 5 ) However, the liberal state must observe a "neutrality of aims" in the sense that "the basic institutions a n d public policy are not to b e designed to favor any particular comprehensive doctrine" (Rawls 1 9 8 8 , 2 6 3 ) — f o r instance, by establishing a state religion. T h i s neutrality conforms to the above-mentioned "weak" or "restricted" generality of political regulations insofar as a legal community can translate collective ends into valid law, but this must be d o n e in a legitimate procedural way a n d the criterion of strict generality may not be violated (cf. H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 8 a ) . (6) With regard to the relation between law a n d legal person, ethical neutrality is understood—by Dworkin, for instance—as "equal concern a n d respect," that is, as the principle of treatment as an equal, be it formal or material, before the law. L i n k e d to this is the problem of whether ethically neutral law is "blind" to ethical differences that justify special attention. H e r e it must b e seen that "neutral" equal treatment links equality a n d difference appropriately a n d sensitively.

21

( 7 ) A s Sunstein ( 1 9 9 3 ) in particular emphasizes, the principle of neu­ trality a n d impartiality does not m e a n that existent conditions appear as justified in the sense of a "status-quo neutrality" and, inasmuch as the state does not c h a n g e them, it remains "neutral." "Neutral" reasons have b e generally justifiable, whether they are for or against existing

institutions

(cf. A c k e r m a n 1 9 9 0 ) . T h i s differentiation of (heterogeneous) meanings of the c o n c e p t of neu­ trality may be incomplete but o u g h t to help clarify the c o n c e p t to such a degree that the various critiques of liberal neutrality can b e better under­ stood against this b a c k g r o u n d . T h u s , in what follows the arguments on the justification of the neutrality principle will first b e discussed a n d then the principle's implications for an understanding of equal treatment will b e examined.

2.2.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND AUTONOMY A S A GOOD

T h e communitarian critique of the neutrality claim of norms of liberal justice disputes, on principle, the possibility of a division between ethics, law, a n d morality. A c c o r d i n g to this critique, the principle of general jus­ tification merely conceals a particular, individualistic theory of the good; neither in its justification n o r in practice is liberal neutrality neutral toward ethical conceptions. Various arguments can b e distinguished in this cri­ tique. A fundamental a r g u m e n t against liberal-deontological theory has been advanced by Maclntyre: the charge of skepticism. A c c o r d i n g to it, the claim to neutrality in justification is not a position that can b e defended morally

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

49

but is rather the outcome of a "moral catastrophe," namely, that of the Enlightenment's attempt to justify a conception of morality free from his­ torical traditions, ethical practices, a n d a teleological view of h u m a n nature. Without these three elements—the central elements of a c o n c e p t of virtue, Maclntyre says—there c a n n o t be a conception of justice. A c c o r d i n g to his Aristotelian theory, morality a n d ethics cannot b e distinguished (Maclntyre 1 9 8 4 a , 1 5 2 ) ; that is, norms cannot be justified generally a n d independently of particular values. Politics in a pluralistic state without a c o m m o n con­ ception of the g o o d is "civil war carried on by other means" ( 2 5 3 ) . T h e a r g u m e n t with which Maclntyre supports this thesis rests o n a par­ ticular theory of the person, which has already been discussed in connec­ tion with Sandel's critique of Rawls. Maclntyre uses almost the same words as Sandel when he remarks that the identity of persons is formed in partic­ ular c o m m u n a l contexts, in "roles" that incorporate certain obligations that individuals cannot discard e x c e p t at the cost of losing their identity. "Hence what is g o o d for m e has to b e g o o d for o n e w h o inhabits these roles. A s such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations a n d obligations. T h e s e constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point" (Maclntyre 1 9 8 4 a , 2 2 0 ) . T h e s e identity-determining values, Maclntyre argues, make it impos­ sible to have a neutral ("impersonal") a n d impartial deontological stand­ point of morality, o n e conceived for "nonpersons" (see 1 9 8 4 b ) In its similarity to Sandel's conception of the person, Maclntyre's theory inherits the same problems. T h u s it does not sufficiendy explain how the many dissimilar roles, which he lists and which belong to various contexts, can b e unified within o n e identity, how conflicting values can be j u d g e d , and what it means to be recognized as an autonomous p e r s o n .

22

Further­

m o r e , it leaves unclear h o w the self, whose moral identity is context-bound in this m a n n e r , can transcend the moral limits of certain particular com­ munities in "search for the g o o d , the universal," which Maclntyre explicidy envisions ( 1 9 8 4 a , 2 2 1 ) . In connection with "evil" practices a n d traditions that d o not provide any internal possibilities for critique, he even speaks of the necessity of resorting to a "moral law" ( 2 0 0 ) . H e cannot however justify such a universally valid law within his theory because, in his view, a self that distances itself in a radical m a n n e r from its community loses "all g e n u i n e standards of j u d g m e n t " ( 1 9 8 4 b , 1 1 ; see chapter 4 . 3 below). A deontological theory, by contrast, is not forced to endorse an ethical or a moral skepticism. It does not have to d o u b t in principle the possibility of objective values, n o r does it have to understand the norms that it distin­ guishes as universally binding as compromises in a war of all against all. Recognizing the possibility of "reasonable disagreement" neither includes n o r excludes a radically skeptical position r e g a r d i n g the g o o d (Rawls 1 9 8 7 , 1 2 - 1 3 ; L a r m o r e 1 9 9 0 , 3 4 1 ) . T h o u g h liberalism is an offspring of the skep-

5 0

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

tical E n l i g h t e n m e n t (Barry 1 9 9 0 ) , it can nonetheless also maintain the view that there is a plurality of incompatible objective values between which persons and communities have to—tragically—decide, so that a liberal so­ ciety is the place where most—though not all—of these values can b e re­ alized.

23

M o r e important, however, is the following. If Maclntyre differentiated between the various communities he lists, the difference between relations of reciprocal recognition that distinguish ethical from political a n d moral communities would b e c o m e evident. T h e n it would b e seen that there is the "civil war" he diagnoses only if m e m b e r s of ethical communities rec­ ognize solely their own kind a n d have n o respect for "other" persons as legal cohorts, fellow citizens, or moral persons—persons w h o do not share their own conception of the good. T h i s respect is, however, not an ethical but a moral requirement—the moral requirement to recognize others as equals despite their difference. B u t since Maclntyre rejects m o r e abstract, legal as well as moral relations of recognition a n d transforms all norms into ethical values, he does not do justice—descriptively—to the conditions of m o d e r n pluralist legal communities or—normatively—to the requirements of mutual recognition. With regard to the problem of the neutrality of legal principles, this means that, by u n d e r m i n i n g the distinction between gen­ eral law and particular ethical values, Maclntyre also reads "legal person" in a concretistic sense as a description of the self. Since n o r m s are for him always of an ethical nature, abstract legal norms c o r r e s p o n d to an abstract "emotivist" self that has n o d e e p b o n d s anymore. It c a n n o t however b e c o n c l u d e d from the thesis of persons' being m e m b e r s of constitutive eth­ ical communities that legal communities either have to b e ethical com­ munities or consist of atomistically singularized persons. T h e crucial point is that the legal person is just the abstract cover for concrete identities in the form of general a n d equal recognition—an abstract cover that presup­ poses conceptually neither that ethical values are not taken seriously n o r that moral principles of equal recognition are m e r e compromises. T h u s Dworkin underscores that "Liberalism c a n n o t be based on skepticism. Its constitutive morality provides that h u m a n beings must b e treated as equals by their government, not because there is n o right a n d w r o n g in political morality, but because that is what is right" (Dworkin 1 9 8 5 b , 2 0 3 ; 1 9 8 5 c , 205). Maclntyre does however have another, m o r e important argument. Even if it is granted that liberalism is not based on a skeptical position, a n d even if it is recognized that the abstract conception of legal person does not contain a description of the person, the claim to morally justified ethical neutrality a n d tolerance conceals the fact that liberalism is based on "a particular conception of the g o o d life" (Maclntyre 1 9 8 8 , 3 4 5 ) . Corre­ spondingly, liberalism is n o longer to b e r e g a r d e d as the breakdown of all

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

5/

traditions but rather as o n e tradition a m o n g others that may not raise a claim to priority of a moral kind. It enjoys currency only within a particular, Western culture, a n d there only a m o n g those w h o share the individualistic theory of the g o o d on which it rests. T h e theory of the legal person is not per se already a theory of the self, but it reckons with social conditions in which individuals seek to realize themselves, in an impoverished m a n n e r , as "ghostly" (Maclntyre), "unencumbered" ( S a n d e l ) , or "neutral" (Taylor) selves without "deep" c o m m u n a l bonds. Liberalism rests, as it were, on a "bad theory of the good": ' T h e starting points of liberal theorizing are never neutral as between conceptions of the h u m a n good; they are always liberal starting points" (Maclntyre 1 9 8 8 , 3 4 5 ) . T h e foundation of Rawls's "thin" theory of the g o o d , for example, is a "thick," individualistic theory. T h e failure to find a neutral justification is reflected, as Sandel claims, at the political level: the ethical conceptions that d o not conform to the liberal theory of the g o o d are marginalized and excluded. Liberalism is nonneutral not only in respect of its effects but also in its ends, and its justification; furthermore, the ethics on which it is based is without substance. T h e s e are two claims—that liberalism rests on a theory of the g o o d a n d that this is a problematic theory—that have led to different liberal answers. T h e central communitarian critique thus doubts the possibility of a separation of values and norms: what liberalism d e m a n d s in terms of ethical self-relativization can be philosophically justified a n d subjectively pursued only on the basis of a liberal theory of autonomous life. W e shall have to pay attention to these two aspects of the critique in w h a t follows. Basically, the first question u n d e r discussion is the philosophical justification of the neutrality principle; the discussion of the possibility of acting according to it, a n d of the sacrifice that this requires of ethical identities, then follows. Before that, however, it is important to take a second look at the com­ munitarian arguments. Below the level of their c o m m o n thesis that the claim of liberal neutrality is false and that it is based on an individualistic theory of the good, there are important differences. In Maclntyre's di­ chotomy between Nietzschean nihilism (read: skeptical liberalism) a n d A r ­ istotelian traditionalism there does not seem to b e any r o o m for a concep­ tion of equal rights a n d recognition. Persons are ethical subjects "through and through"—there are n o norms that span roles a n d communities a n d that are not themselves in turn part of a tradition of self-understanding. T h u s the universal "moral law," which he calls for in After Virtue, seems in later writings to be possible only within a Christian, Augustinian, or T h o mistic tradition ( 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 8 ) . Sandel's critique of liberalism is also based on an ethical-contextual the­ ory of the self a n d of norms. Accordingly, the "procedural republic" must be c h a n g e d in such a way that ethical bonds are granted recognition a n d — in a political respect—that self-government in small units is m a d e possible.

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW His theory does however permit two interpretations; o n the one hand, the radical questioning of all abstract, legal conditions of recognition (by draw­ ing parallels between "family" a n d "nation" a n d "people" as constitutive communities, a n d by emphasizing the primacy of an ethical c o m m o n g o o d ) ; on the other hand, the m o r e moderate thesis of promoting selfgovernment, ethical pluralism, a n d social solidarity. T h e r e f o r e , in a later text he retracts the equation of family a n d political community (Sandel 1 9 8 8 , 2 2 ) a n d cannot m a n a g e without a conception of equal civil rights w h e n he, for instance, criticizes the exclusion of African A m e r i c a n s from the political community ( 1 9 8 4 b , 1 7 ) . Equal, formal civil rights, and not the "shared understandings" of the A m e r i c a n political community tradi­ tionally reserved for whites, protect the "good" of persons h e r e — a n d this with formal arguments of equality a n d not with substantively ethical ones. Sandel's criticisms, to which I shall return, do however highlight an im­ portant question: how can a "colorblind" legal system, treating all persons as formally equal legal persons, grant special rights at that point where, because of certain circumstances, this "difference-blindness" (in the broad­ est sense of the term) leads to the unequal treatment of certain groups in the population? Charles Taylor has endorsed this critique of procedural liberalism in respect of the question of the recognition of cultural communities

(see

section 3 below). His view of the p r o b l e m of ethics a n d law differs however from Maclntyre's a n d Sandel's. T r u e , Taylor proceeds from a theory of the person and from the thesis that a meaningful life is possible only in har­ m o n y with identity-determining strong evaluations, which the individual has already adopted as one socialized in particular communities a n d traditions; and, on this basis, he also criticizes atomistic theories of morality that focus on rights; but he explicidy identifies in the "transcending goods" that determine the identity of m o d e r n subjects "substantive" goods, such as liberty a n d respect for the dignity of all (Taylor 1 9 8 9 a , 5 3 1 - 3 2 ^ 6 0 ) , which lead to the principles of a liberal democracy. T h u s the "primacy of the good" means not that the c o n c e p t of individual rights is questioned, but that rights are justified via certain "transcending goods" such as indi­ vidual self-determination, and that from this there follow certain social obligations to acknowledge that strong evaluations are b o u n d to context and community in this m a n n e r ( 1 9 8 5 ^ 1 9 7 ; see chapter 3 . 2 below). T h e thesis that rights are ethically justified is therefore located at a "higher" level in Taylor's view than in that of Maclntyre or Sandel. T h e legal person is not r e d u c e d to the ethical person; rather, there is a leading c o n c e p t of value-constituted identity that permits a differentiation between particular ways of life a n d general rights. T h i s leading concept of ethical identity and a moral idea of the g o o d will therefore be analyzed in the discussion of universalism a n d justification in chapter 4 . 4 .

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

53

Despite the differences between the individual theorists, it can be said in summary that the communitarian critique of the liberal c o n c e p t of neu­ trality is of a twofold kind. First, it is claimed that liberal theory rests on a particular, individualistic view of the g o o d life that excludes a priori other alternatives; a n d second, it is criticized that this view of the g o o d is prob­ lematic because of its atomistic character. T h e liberal responses to this critique differ according to whether they reject both the first and the second thesis or accept the first a n d oppose just the second. L a r m o r e , A c k e r m a n , and, with qualification, Rawls belong to the first g r o u p , Dworkin in recent publications, Raz, M a c e d o , Galston, and Kymlicka to the second; they add an ethical liberalism to the individualist (rights-based), pluralist, and proceduralist versions of liberalism discussed so far. L a r m o r e ' s theory of political liberalism defends the possibility of justi­ fying neutral principles of justice without referring to controversial con­ ceptions of the g o o d life or the m o r e abstractly conceived ideals of auton­ omy a n d individuality ( L a r m o r e 1 9 9 0 , 3 4 2 - 4 3 ) . T h e s e principles rest solely on the moral norms of rational dialogue—that is, the necessity of public justification on the basis of a "neutrar g r o u n d c o m m o n to all those in­ volved—and of equal respect, that is, the recognition of all persons as ends, not as means. T h e s e norms have, insofar as public and not private life is concerned, priority over ethical ideals of the good. T h i s conception ex­ tends into the ethical realm of the g o o d life, L a r m o r e argues, only insofar as it presupposes the capability of persons to distinguish between their role as citizens and their roles in ethical communities—to that extent, speaking of a "liberal conception of the person" ( 3 5 1 ) has a certain justification. This is nonetheless a moral a n d not an ethical condition that determines the g o o d life in a substantive manner. Moreover, what matters in this con­ nection is that this conception of the person is not the

philosophical

g r o u n d on which liberal theory is based; it is simply implied in the dialogicgeneral form of the justification of political norms. ' W e do better to rec­ ognize that liberalism is not a philosophy of man, but a philosophy of politics" ( 1 9 8 7 , 1 2 9 ) . T h e justification of the neutrality principle by these two norms is itself, L a r m o r e argues, an ethically, not a morally "neutral" justification ( 5 3 ) . C o n c e r n i n g the n o r m of rational dialogue, he refers to J i i r g e n Habermas's ( 1 9 7 9 ; 1 9 8 4 a , 1 : 2 2 - 4 2 ) discourse-theoretic reconstruction of the validity conditions of universal norms. H e raises the objection, however, that contextualist recourse to c o m m o n l y shared, local standards and beliefs is suf­ ficient for n o r m justification a n d that the notion of "ideal" conditions of justification presuppose a standard that c a n n o t be met ( L a r m o r e 1 9 8 7 , 5 5 5 9 ; 1 9 9 6 , 2 0 8 ) . T h i s view corresponds to his m o d e l of justification by re­ ferring to a "neutral ground"; however, it misinterprets the specification of

54

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

justification u n d e r "ideal" conditions as an anticipation of substantive con­ ditions of reaching understanding b e y o n d particular contexts. Yet, what it means is formal conditions of reciprocity and generality, u n d e r which con­ sensual agreements can be called "reasonable" in the first place (Habermas 1 9 9 6 a , 3 1 1 - 1 2 ) . L a r m o r e ' s critique that a communicative conception of practical reason is also the object of "reasonable disagreement" ( L a r m o r e 1 9 9 6 , 2 1 4 - 1 5 ) is thus faced with the problem of how this "reasonableness" can be explicated as a critical standard i n d e p e n d e n d y of conceptions of the good. H e r e , a general conception of "reasonable" justification (and thus of practical reason) is needed. W h e r e a s L a r m o r e proceeds from the morally justified norms of dialogic justification a n d equal respect, the philosophical foundations of Acker­ man's dialogic m o d e l are unclear. In Social Justice and the Liberal State he discusses four possible ways of justifying the priority of morality over ethics in universal questions: "realism about the corrosiveness of power; recog­ nition of doubt as a necessary step to moral knowledge; respect for the autonomy of persons; and skepticism concerning the reality of transcen­ dent meaning" ( 1 9 8 0 , 3 6 9 . ) . E a c h of these paths leads individually to the goal. In later articles, A c k e r m a n does however criticize Rawls's strategy of making a conception of the morally autonomous person the foundation of the theory ( 1 9 8 3 , 3 7 8 ) ; yet h e also wants to avoid adopting a proceduralist theory of morality ( 1 9 8 9 , 7 - 8 ) . "Political" justification, A c k e r m a n argues, can be imagined not according to a moral model but as a "supreme prag­ matic imperative" ( 1 0 ) , and it must attain peaceful coexistence in a political power struggle by keeping controversial ethical questions out of the polit­ ical discussion. T h e principle of general justification is thus diluted to a pragmatic principle of avoiding irresolvable political conflicts—the parties in a justification dialogue therefore act primarily according to their own interests, and A c k e r m a n assumes that the interest in social peace will pre­ dominate. However, the question of the raora/justification of the dialogue principle is thereby left open. Like L a r m o r e a n d A c k e r m a n , Rawls disputes the assertion that liberalism is g r o u n d e d in a particular conception of the good, but unlike A c k e r m a n he provides moral reasons for this, a n d unlike L a r m o r e he is willing to recognize certain substantive values that belong to the moral content of the theory of justice as fairness. Rawls sees five ideas of the g o o d contained in his theory (see Rawls 1 9 8 8 ) . T h e first is the idea of goodness as rationality: the assumption that every person has the capability of forming a rational plan of life that h e or she seeks to realize in his or her life. Rawls does not describe how such a plan of life comes about, how it changes, succeeds, or fails; he merely assumes that persons in general have essential ends in life that they want to realize. T h e first idea of the g o o d is therefore formally defined. T o realize their own plans of life, persons n e e d certain means;

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

55

and at this point the second idea of the g o o d comes into play: that of primary goods (i.e., rights, liberties, opportunities, material resources, and the social bases of self-respect). A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, this list of primary goods is so formally defined that it does not favor particular plans of life, for e x a m p l e , possessive-individualistic ones ( 1 9 7 5 c , 5 4 0 ) ; rather, it is com­ patible with a multitude of very different concrete ethical ways of life (cf. Hinsch 1 9 9 2 , 3 6 - 4 4 ) . B u t not all "comprehensive doctrines" are compatible with the concep­ tion of justice as fairness. T h e third idea of the g o o d advanced by Rawls is therefore that of "permissible" or "reasonable" conceptions of the g o o d . H e r e Rawls underscores that his theory of justice is not in a strict sense "procedurally neutral" since the conceptions of the moral person a n d of social cooperation that enter into the original position are just as "substan­ tive" ( 1 9 8 8 , 2 6 1 ) as the principles of justice justified in this way. It is how­ ever procedurally neutral insofar as it is guided by the principle of the "public basis of justification" (ibid.), which is based on a notion of practical reason i n d e p e n d e n t of ethical conceptions of the good. Yet ethical views that are not "unreasonable" can also prove on a polit­ ical-cultural level to be too weak to survive a n d gain e n o u g h supporters. In that case, however, they c a n n o t appeal to political principles of justice to guarantee their survival; they must not be suppressed but they d o not have to be especially p r o m o t e d either—unless special circumstances of justice require this. T h e conception of justice rules out only those views that violate basic moral principles, a n d it supports no ethical views in any special w a y — unless they can provide moral arguments to sustain them. Conversely, the liberal state does not d e m a n d of ethical communities that they p r o m o t e as ideals within their forms of life the "values of autonomy and individuality" in the sense of Kant or Mill; the state tolerates illiberal forms of life to the extent that these d o not violate the basic rights of their communities' mem­ bers. E v e n w h e n justice as fairness is formally defined, Rawls claims that it can highlight certain virtues—these are however political virtues like willing­ ness to cooperate, tolerance, a n d the practice of justice. T h e s e virtues d o not constitute determinations o f the g o o d life, as "civic humanism" ( 1 9 8 8 , 2 7 2 - 7 3 ) assumes; rather, they describe an ideal of the "good citizen" that, insofar as it is generally shared, contributes to the stability a n d development of a j u s t society. N o r is the fifth idea of the g o o d , that of a well-ordered society, an ethical idea but rather a political-moral one. T h i s g o o d is not only instrumentally justified—as safeguarding individual rights; rather, it is a "social good"—a g o o d that can be realized only jointly and not individ­ ually. Rawls employs here (as in A Theory of Justice, § 7 9 ) the image of an orchestra that unites individual achievements into a single work, of which each particular individual as well as all j o i n d y are p r o u d . Individual a n d

56

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general well-being are n o longer opposites in a well-ordered society because society may not have priority over individuals and individuals can find their well-being only in an ordered society. T h e s e ideas of the g o o d are "political ideas," with reference to which Rawls assumes " ( 1 ) that they are, or can be, shared by citizens regarded as free and equal; a n d ( 2 ) that they d o not presuppose any particular fully (or partially) comprehensive doctrine" ( 1 9 8 8 , 2 5 3 ) . T h e y are therefore justified generally—as implications of the principle of the public basis of justification a m o n g free and equal citizens—and not ethically—as values that are identity-determining c o m p o n e n t s of the g o o d life for persons or groups. T h e conception of autonomy that is formally determined in Rawls (the first idea of the g o o d ) merely designates the condition that autono­ mous life is one's own life. L e g a l autonomy guarantees the freedom to act in a way that does not harm others, whereas ethical autonomy consists in seeking, choosing, adopting, and c h a n g i n g one's own g o o d . T h e point of "political" liberalism consists in justifying principles of legal autonomy not through a conception of the g o o d — e v e n a formal o n e — b u t through the principle that the subject matter of an overlapping consensus can only be norms that c a n n o t be reasonably rejected, that is, n o r m s that do not con­ tradict fundamental conceptions of person and society, which are "concep­ tions of practical reason" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 0 7 ) . T h i s notion of practical reason enters into the original position; a n d what is problematic about it is not a particular conception of the ethically g o o d that is connected to it, but the "political" assumptions that are present in, for instance, the theory of pri­ mary goods. It will have to seen to what extent these assumptions lead to tension in Rawls's m o d e l and particularly in that which is to be "reasonably" justified (chapters 3 . 4 a n d 4 . 2 ) . W h a t the answers of Rawls, L a r m o r e , a n d A c k e r m a n have in c o m m o n is that they insist on the principle of the ethical neutrality of the justification of liberal principles. T h e y therefore reject the communitarian thesis that liberalism has an individualistic theory of the g o o d as its foundation (and thus implicitly the second thesis too, viz., that this conception of the g o o d is problematic). A n ethical liberalism, on the other h a n d , affirms the first thesis but rejects the second. Versions of this theory have b e e n suggested by Dworkin, Raz, M a c e d o , Galston, and Kymlicka, a m o n g others. T h e y attempt to defend a substantive conception of liberal ethics that justifies liberal principles but is nonetheless formal e n o u g h to leave r o o m for a plurality of concrete ethical projects. T h i s seems to a m o u n t to squaring the circle: justifying the primacy of principles that can be tolerant toward different conceptions of the g o o d with the help of one conception of the g o o d — w h e r e b y the latter obligates us to be ethically tolerant in the moral sense. W h a t character can this "second-order ethics" have?

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57

As lias already been noted, Dworkin defends the conception of a funm e n t a l moral right of all citizens to equal c o n c e r n a n d respect and (on 1 he basis of this) a principle of "equality of resources." H e introduces the In si principle as a natural right that must be institutionalized in a political 1 ommunity; the second principle, that of distributive justice, is introduced is ihe d e m a n d for equal opportunity a m o n g citizens to b e able to realize 1 h< • mselves, without disadvantage from differences that spring from a worse Marling point at birth, from c h a n c e , or from certain handicaps pertaining 10 personal capacities ( 1 9 8 5 c , 2 0 7 ; 1 9 8 1 b ) — t h a t is, from those contingen1 ies that Rawls excludes from the specification of the fair initial situation wilh the help of the veil of ignorance. In his article "Liberalism," Dworkin d e f e n d s his liberal conception of political and social equality as a deonto­ logical conception that is g r o u n d e d in the fundamental principle of the equality of all persons as persons ( 1 9 8 5 b ) and, as such, is neutral toward ethical conceptions

of the good: its principles are moral principles

1 hat "trump" ethical values a n d are universally binding; they

neither

1 est on ethical conceptions of the g o o d nor favor particular ethical forms of life. In contrast to this model, however, in his T a n n e r lectures on the foun­ dations of this liberal conception of equality Dworkin attempts to find the "ethical foundations for liberalism" ( 1 9 9 0 , 3 ) ; h e tries to show that liberal principles can be connected to an "appealing" theory of the g o o d life. It is important to see that Dworkin does not c h a n g e the content of the princi­ ples h e defends; instead, he merely attempts to develop an ethical concep­ tion that is compatible with these principles a n d can explain what reasons persons can have to advocate these principles. T r u e , he does not want to have this understood as a question that is a i m e d at "motivation," at the empirical motives that can move persons to accept normative principles of equal respect ( 5 n . 1 ) ; however, the m e a n i n g of the c o n c e p t of foundations is unclear in this context: is the conception of the g o o d life that he proposes the only possible a n d fundamental normative (teleological) justification of liberal principles, or does it j u s t supplement another, deontological justi­ fication? W h a t does the validity of these principles rest on? In opposition to Rawls's or Scanlon's contractualist theory of "disconti­ nuity" between justice principles and conceptions of the g o o d , Dworkin proposes a "strategy of continuity"—a liberal ethics. Yet this ethics, Dworkin argues, must be "abstract," that is, m o r e "structural a n d philosophical" than "substantive" ( 2 0 ) : it must be formal e n o u g h to include "diverse substantive ethical convictions" ( 2 1 ) . Liberal, formal ethics is therefore a second-order ethics because it d e m a n d s neutrality ( 4 2 ) in substantive questions of the g o o d life. It raises a superordinate claim to general validity a n d attempts to provide ethical reasons for the ethical neutrality of political principles. T o achieve this, Dworkin introduces a n u m b e r of distinctions. T h u s h e

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differentiates between a "volitional" a n d a "critical" conception of wellbeing. T h e former is satisfied w h e n a person has or achieves what he or she wants, whereas the latter requires that a person have o r achieve what he or she should want—that is, achievements that distinguish a life b e y o n d subjective preferences but also below objective value standards. T h e stan­ dards according to which persons j u d g e what belongs to a g o o d life have a cultural index b u t are nonetheless measured by further normative crite­ ria. Now, it is Dworkin's goal to show that the normativity of critical wellbeing ("the interests one ought to have" [ 4 9 ] ) has to be not only a purely ethical but also a moral normativity. W h a t is more, he attempts to dem­ onstrate that ethical and moral normativity harmonize in a m a n n e r that provides g o o d reasons for persons to accept liberal principles "naturally" (46)

in their own critical interest. Dworkin takes a first step toward this

goal in a further distinction between an "additive" and a "constitutive" con­ ception of the g o o d life. A n additive appraisal of a life merely considers what successes, experiences, a n d other things considered valuable are or were to be f o u n d in the life of a person without asking whether these values were actually this person's own ends. B u t a "constitutive" appraisal does ask this question; here, a life is to be j u d g e d as successful only if the person identifies with what has b e e n achieved. Dworkin argues that the constitutive view is to be favored since we cannot speak meaningfully of a person's g o o d life if he or she does not identify with this life and with what makes it g o o d . A n d from this a r g u m e n t Dworkin infers the liberal principle that realizing certain values in a life on account of external constraint c a n n o t lead to a g o o d life: n o o n e can be forced to live a g o o d life. T h e next distinction m a d e by Dworkin is the o n e between two models of the g o o d life: the model of "impact" a n d that of "challenge." A c c o r d i n g to the first, a life is j u d g e d in terms of the impact it has on the world as a whole; according to the second, the value of a life lies in the inherent value of "a skillful p e r f o r m a n c e of living" ( 5 4 ) , whereby "skillful" here means responding appropriately to challenges,

"mastering" t h e m .

24

A liberal

ethics, Dworkin says, favors the second model since the requirements it places on "critical" well-being are less d e m a n d i n g than those of the first model. T h e g o o d life does not m e a n living a great a n d famous life accord­ ing to objective standards. B u t what are the parameters for a model of challenge e q u i p p e d with a cultural index? W h a t do "critical" interests con­ sist in, according to this model? Most parameters, Dworkin says, arise out of the circumstances from which the challenges of life spring: circum­ stances of life's place and time, personal talents, preferences, chance oc­ currences, a n d m u c h more. T h e "right" way to respond to particular cir­ cumstances d e p e n d s u p o n the objective and subjective elements of the situation as well as u p o n certain standards a n c h o r e d in cultural selfunderstandings.

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But Dworkin also counts the parameter of justice a m o n g the parameters that determine what one o u g h t to do. H e counts it not only in the sense that s o m e o n e w h o has less than what he or she would b e entided to ac­ cording to the justice conception of "equality of resources" has fewer op­ portunities to lead a successful life a n d to master challenges, but also in the sense that someone w h o has m o r e than what he or she is j u s d y entitled to also lives a less g o o d life from a "critical" perspective. Plato's question as to whether an unjust life can b e a g o o d life is answered in the negative by Dworkin. If the "challenge" of a life consists in responding to particular circumstances in the best possible way, then it is clear "how difficult it is to lead anything like the right life w h e n circumstances are far from just" ( 7 4 ) . A t this point Dworkin introduces the moral criteria of fairness a n d reci­ procity. H e proceeds on the assumption that the conception of the g o o d life as "mastering" challenges is meaningful only if persons enjoy equal conditions at the outset. J u s t as Hegel's master does not achieve conscious­ ness of his own self as a recognized self because he stands opposite the slave, the person w h o attains a g o o d life on account of a better starting position cannot assume that h e or she really is successful. "Hegel said that masters a n d slaves are prisoners together; equality unlocks the prison for both" ( 1 0 4 ) . Dworkin's restatement presupposes that it is in persons' "crit­ ical" interest that the value of their lives be generally recognized, not only by a limited community of equals but by all the m e m b e r s of a political community. This presupposition is, however, questionable in an ethical respect. T h a t there is not equality of opportunity in a society is morally criticizable, but the inequality—seen empirically—does not necessarily lessen recognition for the achievements of s o m e o n e w h o , notwithstanding a favorable position (e.g., by virtue of particular ancestry or talents), has accomplished extraordinary things. A n d to assume that such a person leads a less g o o d life presupposes that this person's moral consciousness cannot be seen as a general ethical principle. T h a t the ethical-critical interests of a person m e r g e with the sense of justice can b e m a d e plausible by Dworkin only if a person accepts the premises of general recognition a n d success solely on the basis of equal starting opportunities. T h e n , however, the "cat­ egorical force" ( 2 5 ) of justice would d e p e n d u p o n p e r s o n s ' j u d g i n g their g o o d life in such a strong m a n n e r — t h e categorical force of obligation would remain hypothetically d e p e n d e n t u p o n this self-understanding, which, indeed according to Dworkin's comprehension of the "constitutive" conception of the g o o d , cannot be d e m a n d e d or enforced. Liberal justice would apply only to persons w h o can a n d w a n t to understand themselves as "liberals" in this specific sense. T h i s understanding is not however com­ patible with Dworkin's view that his conception of equality contains prin­ ciples that have to be justified in a deontological sense a n d can attain the status of legal principles, principles that are to b e recognized not in the

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ethical sense for the sake of one's own well-being, but on account of others' justified claims. T h u s the division between ethics a n d morality has to reappear within Dworkin's ethics. T o show that ethicallyjustified liberal equality is "neutral" in its justification a n d its ends, he draws a distinction between "first-person ethical beliefs" (conceptions of one's own g o o d ) a n d "third-person ethical convictions" (conceptions of the g o o d for others or the general g o o d ) and writes: "Liberal equality is neutral about

first-person,

not third-person,

ethics, and only insofar as first-person ethics does not e m b o d y antiliberal political principles" ( 1 1 8 ) .

T h e liberal antipaternalism that Dworkin

thereby defends means, first, that various, even religious, conceptions of the g o o d are compatible with liberal equality and, second, that only reasons of justice, not of ethics, may restrict individual freedom ( 1 1 3 - 1 4 ) .

He

thereby sets a moral limit to ethical ideals: "Liberal equality cannot be neutral toward ethical ideals that direcdy challenge its theory of justice" ( 1 1 7 ) . Only general principles legitimate law's coercive character; ethical convictions c a n n o t d o this (cf. 1 9 8 7 a ) . Second-order ethics permits not only a plurality of ethical conceptions of the first person; ultimately, it traces the model of challenge back to the moral principles of equality and toler­ ance. T h e s e principles are valid for a n d apply to every person, irrespective of whether the person has a particular conception of the g o o d according to this model. Moral obligation is not normatively tied to conceptions of the good. Justice may well be part of the g o o d of a "liberal person" accord­ ing to the model of challenge, but it is not called for because it is g o o d for a person. T h u s liberal justice is not, as Dworkin claims, g r o u n d e d in a conception of the good; but rather, one possible conception of the g o o d is g r o u n d e d in justice. Justice is deontologically,

a n d not

teleologically,

grounded: n o ethical values are normatively prior to it. Mutual tolerance and material equality of opportunity are g r o u n d e d in persons' remain "trumps" over ethical conceptions ( 1 9 9 0 , 9 ) .

rights—they

2 5

Because of the primacy of deontological principles, Dworkin's theory is not "perfectionist" in the Rawlsian sense. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, the principle of perfection is characteristic of a teleological political a n d moral theory in which social institutions aim at realizing certain h u m a n ideals (Rawls 1971, 325).

2 6

In an elitist, Nietzschean form, this theory sacrifices certain

principles of equal respect in favor of promoting some persons w h o have special capacities; in a m o r e egalitarian form, this theory attempts to pro­ mote the g o o d of all persons in a form regarded as valuable. Dworkin's formal theory of the g o o d life rejects both forms: the principles of equal respect and equal resources have priority over substantive ethical values. It therefore rules out perfectionism—and, correspondingly, political pater­ nalism. J o s e p h Raz, however, proposed in his book The Morality of Freedom ( 1 9 8 6 ) an ethical justification of liberal principles that leads to a perfec-

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lionist political theory at whose center there is a qualitative conception of autonomy. Raz's main a r g u m e n t unfolds in three steps. First, he attempts to show that a particular conception of personal autonomy (or political freedom corresponding to it) forms the core of liberalism's "political morality." Sec­ ond, he argues that this conception of freedom (in conjunction with an ideal of autonomy) must not b e understood in purely formal terms: free­ dom is a qualitative notion, it can be realized only u n d e r certain social a n d cultural conditions. F r e e d o m is a value only if it means the possibility of realizing values. T h u s , third, Raz concludes that it is the duty of the liberal state to create a context in which valuable options are available for the autonomous "self-creation" of individuals. T h e liberal state must be perfec­ tionist in this sense. "Autonomous life is valuable only if it is spent in the pursuit of acceptable and valuable projects a n d relationships. T h e auton­ omy principle permits a n d even requires governments to create morally valuable opportunities, a n d to eliminate r e p u g n a n t ones" ( 1 9 8 6 , 4 1 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g to Raz, a "neutral" liberal state does not master its task of guaranteeing personal—ethical—autonomy in a substantive sense. A n antiperfectionist policy would u n d e r m i n e the survival of "many cherished as­ pects of o u r culture" ( 1 6 2 ) since it prohibits promoting ethical values that belong to a particular form of life. However, this critique rests on too strong an interpretation of neutrality as a strict neutrality of effects, according to which state measures have to ensure equally the chances that all existing conceptions of the g o o d have of being realized in society ( 1 1 4 - 1 5 ) . Yet this interpretation is, as has already been mentioned, not implied; the neu­ trality principle refers essentially to the criterion of the justification of gen­ erally valid norms a n d is not a principle of the equal preservation of ethical forms of life. B u t Raz also criticizes this understanding of neutrality. A c ­ cording to him, it is incorrect to assume that ethical values are necessarily disputed a n d should thus not enter into law; for Raz, it is not only n o r m s that can be generally justified. F o r example, institutions such as m o n o g a ­ mous marriage can, on the basis of "unanimous support" ( 1 6 1 ) in a com­ munity, b e c o m e part of law, a n d certain measures such as the awarding of art prizes a n d the taxing of activities (e.g., hunting) can be "perfectionistically" justified without thereby enforcing a particular style of life. T o the extent that Raz has such values a n d practices in mind, he does not contra­ dict the neutrality principle explicated so far. F o r these measures either are covered by the criterion of the restricted generality of ethical-political questions, which d o not violate the morally relevant criterion of strict gen­ erality (art a n d h u n t i n g ) , or, as in Raz's description of the example of mar­ riage, they are not at all disputed a n d are therefore not at the center of a neutrality p r o b l e m — f o r this arises only in the case of conflicting ethical values. T o the extent, however, that there is not "unanimous support" for

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the legal institutionalization of a particular form of life, the problems of Raz's perfectionism appear: according to what criteria are ethical possibil­ ities that ought to be prohibited j u d g e d "repugnant"? A n d w h o is to j u d g e them? T h e "government," the totality of all those affected in their majority, or the individuals themselves? Raz attempts to solve this p r o b l e m — w h i c h is at the center of a nonmetaphysical, Aristotelian-perfectionist political theory,

27

a n d which is all

the m o r e difficult because a liberal theory is at stake—by falling back u p o n the "social forms" existing in a society. T h e y are, as it were, culturally ob­ jective practices a n d behavioral patterns within w h i c h — a n d here Raz em­ braces a communitarian idea—the g o o d of persons can be formulated as part of this practice and realized. "I m e a n social forms to consist of shared beliefs, folklore, high culture, collectively shared metaphors and imagina­ tion, and so on" ( 3 1 1 ) . T h e s e social forms represent the ethical context from which the standards for "valuable forms of life" stem—with the two qualifications by means of which Raz seeks to avoid a problematic conser­ vatism: by regarding these social forms as being internally capable of c h a n g e and, moreover, by pointing to (unspecified) moral standards that social forms must meet whatever the case ( 3 1 9 ) . However, both problems c o m e together in the case in which law prescribes certain social forms a n d thereby ceases to be the addressee of claims to equal treatment raised by minorities: law becomes deaf to the claims of "different" communities to equal treatment if the form of life (usually, of a majority) that is criticized by these communities and that marginalizes them is itself an integral part of the law. Raz tries, however, to avoid a too restrictive understanding of social forms: within a society there exist partially incommensurable and incom­ patible values a n d forms of life; there is in a society a plurality of options that are valuable without a clear j u d g m e n t on their order of priority being possible and without their being j o i n d y realizable within a life. Unlike Maclntyre, Raz regards the compulsion in modernity to be a u t o n o m o u s — that is, to decide between valuable options—not as a loss of ethical whole­ ness but as a value itself. A u t o n o m y is therefore a fact a n d a value in m o d e r n societies—not an absolute value ( 3 9 1 , 3 ) . Consequently, there are n o moral rights i n d e p e n d e n d y of the "interests" of persons that are recognized within societies as the basis of justified claims to legal protection against the b a c k g r o u n d of what is part of the normative integration of a political community—its "values." "The importance of liberal rights is in their ser­ vice to the public good" ( 2 5 6 ) . Correspondingly, rights d o protect ethical identities, but they protect only those specific identities that fit the ethical criteria of a particular political culture. H e r e is the central difference to a conception of rights as the reciprocally and generally justified "protective cover" for ethical-autonomous identities, without having antecedently given

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a substantive (and thus potentially exclusive) determination of the g o o d and the valuable a n d thus of w h a t is to be protected. A c c o r d i n g to Raz, autonomy is valuable only as the c h o i c e of

valuable

ethical options; and, to contribute to a g o o d life, ethical options have to be self-chosen ( 3 7 0 - 7 1 ) . T h e r e is a tension between these two specifications. O n the o n e hand, autonomy is determined as the choice of the g o o d of a society (i.e., of what is considered g o o d within a society); on the other h a n d , autonomy consists in choosing the g o o d for a person. A substantive a n d a formal specification of autonomy compete with each o t h e r — a competition that ultimately crystallizes in the question of the d e g r e e to which the frame of ethically autonomous life may be limited. T h e authority responsible for this limiting is the government. H o w e v e r , this authority seems to b e incompatible with a liberal position a n d to give rise to the d a n g e r of paternalism—a p r o b l e m that Raz examines in his discussion of J o h n Stuart Mill. T h e latter's "harm principle"—"that the only purpose for which power can b e rightfully exercised over any m e m b e r of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent h a r m to others" (Mill 1 9 8 9 , 1 3 ) — c a n be r e g a r d e d as one of the basic principles of political lib­ eralism: it precludes an "enforcement of morality," that is, the political implementation of ethical conceptions of the g o o d , even if less strict inter­ pretations of Mill's principle apply in protecting persons from certain dan­ gers (safety belts are an e x a m p l e ) (cf. Hart 1 9 6 3 ) . A perfectionist theory does however differ from this liberal-individualist view. It regards it to be the state's duty to promote persons' g o o d life in a substantive sense. A political community has the duty to secure the necessary "contexts" of au­ tonomy, to promote persons' "opportunities" a n d their "ability to use them," which the autonomous choice of the g o o d requires (Raz 1 9 8 6 , 4 1 3 ) . T h e h a r m principle, Raz says, is violated not only w h e n a state ille­ gitimately forces its citizens to d o something they d o not accept, but also when a state fails to secure them the possibility of a g o o d , a u t o n o m o u s life. "It is a mistake to think that the h a r m principle recognizes only the duty of governments to prevent loss of autonomy. Sometimes failing to improve the situation of another is h a r m i n g him" ( 4 1 5 - 1 6 ) . However, don't these two principles—the negative a n d the positive h a r m principle—contradict each other? C a n a person b e forced to be autonomous? T o this question Raz responds that though a state has the task of making valuable options available a n d of giving its citizens the possibility of choosing these options, he denies that this choice may b e enforced ( 4 1 7 ) . Since every form of force restricts autonomy, a political theory based on a principle of autonomy cannot enforce a good. "Given that people should lead autonomous lives the state c a n n o t force them to be moral. All it can do is to provide the conditions of autonomy" ( 4 2 0 ) . A t this point he gives priority to a formal, negative conception of autonomy over a qualitative-positive, perfectionist

64

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one. O n the o n e h a n d , Raz points out that the basically legitimate, forced prohibition of "repugnant" options impairs the capability of persons to b e autonomous in the first place—that is, he gives priority to this capability in a formal, nonqualified sense; on the other hand, he distrusts political in­ stitutions a n d fears that they could mistake the valuable for the b a d a n d misuse their power. H e can thus avoid the paternalism of perfectionist values or of a too powerful state only by having recourse to a nonperfectionist conception of personal autonomy (cf. Sadurski 1 9 9 0 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 ) . Despite these reservations, Raz's theory exhibits certain paternalist fea­ tures. A special p r o b l e m arises within a liberal state in the treatment of a minority culture (he does not distinguish here between an e n d o g e n o u s culture, an immigrant culture, or a religious sect) whose m e m b e r s live nonautonomous lives according to liberal standards. In Raz's view, in cases in which the m e m b e r s of a liberal culture are convinced that the minority culture is "inferior" to them, they are justified in assimilating this culture, even at the cost of this culture's survival o r its absorption ( 4 2 4 ) . T h i s assim­ ilation takes place however on the assumption that in this way the m e m b e r s of this minority culture get the possibility of having a better, m o r e auton­ o m o u s life. W h e r e it is evident that the c h a n g e would lead to complete disorientation a n d disintegration, Raz argues for tolerance and gradual change. Nevertheless, by regarding the liberal-autonomous life as the better life in principle, even for cultural minorities, he violates his culturalist view that autonomy is a value only for those individuals "who grew u p in the e m b r a c e of the liberal tradition or w h o at least have felt its attraction" ( 1 ) . H e r e again, the absence of a distinction between ethical a n d moral stan­ dards becomes apparent: criticizing a culture as ethically a n d culturally "inferior" from a particular standpoint does not justify impairing it legally; to do this, moral arguments are necessary (e.g., in the case in which a community denies its own m e m b e r s basic moral rights). Raz's model, it can thus be concluded, exhibits the following weaknesses. First, his critique of neutrality falls short of the mark because it presumes too strong a neutrality thesis. S e c o n d , his theory does not provide a satis­ factory answer to the question of the exclusion criterion for "repugnant" forms of life; insofar as Raz defines the criterion ethically, h e violates the neutrality principle a n d denies persons the possibility of appealing to law as the "protective cover" against ethical discrimination. T h o u g h "social forms" can c h a n g e , a n d ethical-legal standards reflecting the exclusion of certain forms (e.g., m o n o g a m o u s , homosexual marriage) may gradually alter, law is nonetheless ruled out as the authority for checking existing regulations in terms of aspects of equality because it itself speaks the ethical language of the majority. In this sense, ethically justified law does not d o justice to ethical identities. T h i r d , Raz's conception of autonomy remains ambivalendy located between a formal a n d a substantive meaning, whereby

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65

the former serves to support liberal arguments against the d a n g e r of pa­ ternalism. Fourth, his conception of the state a n d of law does not assign a central role to the notion of democratic justification. Yet it is in political justification discourses that the claims to recognition of particular forms of life have to be reciprocally defended a m o n g citizens having equal rights. Only in this way can these claims enter law, a n d it is only in this m a n n e r that all can then assume j o i n t responsibility for the law. (I discuss political justification discourses in the n e x t chapter.) Fifth, and finally, an ethical foundation of law cannot explain its general a n d obligating character a n d the primacy of individual rights: if persons have n o "right to personal au­ tonomy" ( 2 4 7 ) but just rights within the framework of certain values, then law can claim validity only within this framework a n d appears to others as representing a specific form of life. T h i s does not d o justice to the d e m a n d for basic rights to personal a u t o n o m y — a c c o r d i n g to the strict generality criterion. W h a t is not disputed here is the fact that values are "constitutive" of persons or that values which are not criticizable morally can attain gen­ eral, legal validity; yet, insofar as there is a plurality of various "constitutive" values in a political community, the consequence following from the aware­ ness of these values' significance for persons' identity consists in the ex­ pectation that law will meet the requirement of reciprocal justification. T h i s expectation is not adequately reflected in Raz's approach. A n u m b e r of other ethical-liberal objections to the neutrality principle connect u p here. A c c o r d i n g to William Galston, the requirement of re­ specting ethical autonomy does not speak in favor of a strong perfectionist promotion of certain forms of life, but liberalism cannot be justified "neu­ trally" or "pragmatically": liberal principles serve particular purposes of hu­ man well-being a n d r e q u i r e — a t the political level—certain virtues. A lib­ eralism without

"liberal purposes" remains empty. T h i s view of

an

alternative between a second-order ethical justification and a primarily stra­ tegic, pragmatic, or conventional justification leads Galston to the conclu­ sion that it must be a "thin" theory of the g o o d on which liberalism is based ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 7 7 ) . T h e list he proposes comprises g o o d s such as life, the devel­ o p m e n t of h u m a n capacities, the attainment of subjective ends, freedom, rationality, social bonds, subjective satisfaction. Galston c o m p r e h e n d s these goods as generalizations of h u m a n experiences, without raising a strong essentialist claim ( 1 6 9 ) .

2 8

A l o n g with Amartya S e n ( 1 9 8 5 , 1 9 9 3 ) , h e un­

derstands this extended theory of essential basic goods as functions of a g o o d life; the liberal state has the task of p r o m o t i n g citizens' capacities to realize these functions. This theory of the g o o d does not however contain a criterion c o n c e r n i n g the question of what claims to these goods are justified in social contexts; they merely form a foundation for very general viewpoints of the g o o d for persons, which assumes different forms in various contexts. W h e t h e r a n d

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in what m a n n e r persons claim these goods is left to them, a n d the degree to which they can d e m a n d them from others and must grant them to others has to be reciprocally a n d generally justified. T h u s the formal theory of the g o o d simply explicates central topics of justification discourses; it does not however impose any ethically justified restrictions on these discourses. T h e priority of the criterion of the reciprocal and general justification of norms thereby avoids the too narrow alternative between an ethical and a prag­ matic justification of liberal principles.

29

Stephen M a c e d o ' s attempt ( 1 9 9 0 a , 5 ) to defend liberalism against com­ munitarianism as an ethical way of life that implies certain personal and political virtues does not argue that liberal principles are based on a theory of the g o o d in the way Galston does. Instead, M a c e d o tries to show that liberal states are "regimes" in the sense that they highlight standards of the virtuous and g o o d life that are neither u n d e m a n d i n g n o r atomistic. H e r e , he quite correcdy emphasizes "public virtues" such as tolerance and the willingness to provide "public justification"; however, he reifies these into the virtues e m b o d i e d in a liberal form of life: self-critique, openness, a n d willingness to experiment. "Liberalism holds out the promise, or the threat, of making all the world like California" ( 1 9 9 0 a , 2 7 8 ) . In this way, M a c e d o ethically overextends and absolutizes the moral concept of reasonableness, even though he does c o n c e d e elsewhere that "Equality of respect for per­ sons is, perhaps, the m o r e basic liberal concern, but the g o o d of autonomy has, in a liberal political regime, a status that is i n d e p e n d e n t and worth preserving: the first a m o n g equally respectable ideals of life" ( 2 5 3 ) . T h e normative validity of legal principles is thus not r e d u c e d to an ethical va­ lidity solely for those w h o understand themselves as "liberals" in a sense that "encompasses" their ethical life—for instance, in Richard Rorty's sense of "liberal ironists" ( 1 9 8 9 , 6 1 ) ; even if M a c e d o seems to assume that liberal tolerance is in the long run compatible only with liberal forms of life.

30

This a r g u m e n t of reasonableness, however, gives rise to a further, central problem for a "neutral liberalism." Is the idea of "reasonableness," which was specified above as persons' capacity and willingness to provide g o o d reasons in various contexts, an impossibility? Does it presuppose a "schiz­ ophrenic" separation of the ethical a n d "political" identity of persons? "When it comes to thinking about politics and about what justice demands, we are to suspend o r bracket our beliefs—beliefs that perhaps give our life its meaning and make u p our very identities as individuals—in favour of a particular understanding of citizenship a n d society" (Mulhall a n d Swift 1992, 178).

3 1

A c c o r d i n g to this objection, persons have to be liberals (in

at least a partially comprehensive sense) w h o regard the principle of "public justification" to be a part of what is as such important to them ("private" or "public"), and this to such a degree that they accept the priority of justice in political questions. T h e priority principle must itself be part of their

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67

"comprehensive doctrine." H e n c e , liberalism is compatible only with cer­ tain forms of life and rules out others for ethical reasons. This conclusion is not justified, however. T h e fact that generally justified principles are not compatible with all forms of life does not mean that they discriminate against these forms for ethical reasons; only moral reasons justify a restriction of forms of life. O n e cannot conclude nonneutrality of justification directly from nonneutrality of effect; though this conclusion is possible in the critical sense (as the unearthing of a problematic ethical justification of law), it is then precisely not so in the affirmative sense. F o r what one criticizes is that the law is justified in the w r o n g way. S e c o n d , it must be emphasized that the ethical self-relativization d e m a n d e d of "rea­ sonable" persons refers only to conflicts about n o r m s that are to be valid a m o n g persons with different ethical convictions. T h i s qualification excludes ethical values neither from public discourses n o r from law, as long as cer­ tain criteria of justification are observed. T h e acceptance of these criteria is morally required and leads to a constraint on one's own way of life only if the latter places claims on others that cannot be justified. T h e "threshold of reciprocity and generality" is equally respected by the majority a n d by minorities—and this respect has to be justifiably compatiblewith their ethical convictions, without their having to give u p these convictions as answers to ethical questions. T h e "internal" interweaving of ethical values a n d general principles to which Mulhall a n d Swift refer means that the "reasonableness" required in moral and political contexts can be b r o u g h t into a g r e e m e n t with ethical convictions to such a degree that persons are, from their per­ spective but nevertheless unrestrictedly, willing to generate this r e s p e c t — a n d this, on the basis of insight into the justified validity of general n o r m s .

32

This

willingness is not d e m a n d e d for the sake of an ethical good, and there is no particular conception of the g o o d connected to it. In ethical contexts, a plurality of values and forms of life remains valid, ones that are not nec­ essarily "liberal" forms of life in the ethical sense. T h e idea of a "liberal self," which is criticized by some as "unencumbered" a n d is reified by others as an ethical ideal, is not the normative foundation of law; "liberal" prin­ ciples of law constitute not a particular form of life but a system of justified norms that, to be sure, is not without ethical demands (and not entirely with­ 33

out ethical content) but is not justified on ethical grounds.

Only reciprocally

and generally justified law can be ethically pluralistic, open, inclusive, a n d legitimately binding; only in this way can legal persons be responsible to the law and, as citizens, be responsible for it. ( A n examination of how this conception of law is to be "situated" in the context of a political community follows in 2 . 3 . ) T h u s it is evident that the seven different uses of the neutrality c o n c e p t can be c o h e r e n d y connected if the question raised in ( 2 . 2 ) c o n c e r n i n g the justification of the neutrality principle is answered through reference to

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the conception of practical reason a d d u c e d in the notions of "reasonable" persons and "reasonable" justification. Persons are reasonable in the prac­ tical sense if they can provide a n d accept g o o d reasons in various practical contexts. In moral contexts—which can also be political contexts insofar as their subject matter is moral questions—sharable reasons are required for the validity of norms that satisfy the strict criterion; in political questions that do not primarily affect moral issues, there is a n e e d for reasons that are acceptable generally to a certain degree, ones that can lead to fair agreements o r compromises; in ethical contexts, finally, there is a need for reasons that answer the specific ethical questions of what is "my" or "our" g o o d life. T h e dissimilarity of these contexts does not lead to a fragmen­ tation of the self; it just requires of persons that they pay attention to the dissimilarity for the sake of others a n d of themselves.

2.3.

G E N E R A L LAW AND PARTICULAR IDENTITIES

Law's normative idea of recognizing and respecting persons as free a n d equal legal persons whatever concrete identity they may have as ethical persons implies that the conception of legal p e r s o n — w e can therefore say—represents outwardly the cover for the abstract-formal recognition of the person, and inwardly the cover for the individual's concrete identity. H e n c e , to recognize individual rights as normatively binding does not m e a n conceiving of the organization of social life according to the model of contractual relations: that persons have rights does not imply that, in a society that recognizes rights, all social relations—be they marriage, friend­ ship, or the political c o m m u n i t y — a r e transposed into legal relations in which self-interested subjects attempt to have "their" rights enforced in the best way possible.

34

H a n n a h A r e n d t ' s ( 1 9 7 3 b , 1 0 8 ) conception of the "pro­

tecting mask of a legal personality" reflects the m e a n i n g of persona as a "mask" that, as a protective cover, enables personal-ethical autonomy a n d demands o/legally autonomous persons that they not dispute this possibility in others. Against the b a c k g r o u n d of this ideal conception of the ethically neutral legal person, a p r o b l e m crops u p w h e n its role as an ethical protective cover turns into o n e of ethical straightjacket. W h e n does law's "blindness" to differences in race, gender, and religion b e c o m e blindness to the special requirements of recognizing these identities?

35

A new dimension in the

controversy is o p e n e d u p by this, o n e that now asks at the level of law how ethical identities can be recognized a n d protected by a formally and gen­ erally formulated law. A t the center of legal theory's critique of the claim to neutrality are especially problems of exclusion or of the nonrecognition of persons w h o , despite equal "liberal-neutral" rights, d o not have the pos­ sibility of b e c o m i n g personally a n d politically autonomous members of the

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY (>!• I AW

hij

political community. It concerns, for instance, problems thai aii.se I n tut religious affiliation, sexual orientation, g e n d e r , or ethnic origin. On

the basis of a n u m b e r of cases adjudicated by the U . S . S u p r e m e

Court, S a n d e l attempts to d o c u m e n t his thesis that the liberal conception of the legal person does not d o justice to the identity of persons as members of "constitutive communities." T h u s when liberal law attempts to be "ncii tral" a n d impartial, it is biased toward those g r o u p s that d o not correspond to the image of individualistic persons. T o avoid this bias, law must include m o r e substantive considerations of an ethical kind. T h i s conclusion does not however seem necessary: it is one thing to claim that law violates the ethical identity of persons in a form that o u g h t to be criticized morally, but it is quite another to c o n c l u d e that law itself must therefore b e ethically g r o u n d e d . T w o of Sandel's examples display this. T h e first concerns the question of religious identity. Sandel considers it a mistake—one that stems from a voluntarist conception of the p e r s o n — to g r o u n d religious liberty not on respect for the ethical value of religion but on persons' free choice to lead a religious life. T h e value of free choice trumps the value of religion, which is thereby d e g r a d e d to a merely sub­ jective preference. T h u s the S u p r e m e C o u r t ruled in a case that an ortho­ d o x J e w may not wear his traditional skullcap (the yarmulke) while he is on duty in a clinic of the U . S . A i r Force. In the justification provided it is stated that military service makes it necessary to subordinate "personal pref­ erences a n d identities" to the requirements of the service (Sandel 1 9 8 9 b , 6 1 4 ) . Accordingly, the court did not distinguish between a m e r e preference and

a religious duty that is constitutive of a person's identity.

36

Sandel

righdy criticizes the fact that this ruling does not d o justice to the ethical significance of religious belief a n d that law must b e able to distinguish the significance of an ethical duty from a mere subjective preference. H e can­ not however show that recognition of this distinction is itself an ethical d e m a n d . F o r the religious person cannot argue for recognition of his or her belief, a n d the consequences that follow from this recognition, by re­ ferring to the superiority or the absolute value of his or her religion, but must refer to the particular implications, peculiar to a specific case, of claim­ ing the general right to the free practice of religion. T h e reason for this general right is not respect for a particular religion or its ethical value but respect for the convictions that are constitutive of an autonomous, ethical identity. T h i s right is morally a n d not ethically g r o u n d e d since it safeguards the possibility of identity by recognizing the significance that belief has for a person a n d his or her personal-ethical autonomy: it is the religious identity of the person that is at the center of the argument, not the religion itself. A person's religious conviction is worthy of protection because it is identitydetermining, a n d not because it is religious. T h u s it is neither the volun­ tarist f r e e d o m of choice n o r the intrinsic value of religion that is protected;

JO

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

rather it is the possibility of persons to form and maintain (as well as, of course,

change)

ethical

identities.

To

recognize

ethical,

identity-

determining values does not mean in law that ethical values replace uni­ versal-moral norms. A second e x a m p l e from Sandel demonstrates the p r o b l e m of g r o u n d i n g rights on certain values.

37

H e attempts to justify tolerance toward homo­ 38

sexual partnerships a n d sexual p r a c t i c e s by referring to the values of mar­ riage, which homosexual relationships share (Sandel 1 9 8 9 a , 5 3 4 ) . Toler­ ance toward homosexuality must therefore be defended with ethical, substantive reasons and not on the basis of a voluntarist conception of the free choice of forms of life, of whatever kind they may be. A c c o r d i n g to Sandel, the "privacy"—recognized in S u p r e m e C o u r t decisions—that, in matters of the conjugal community, is considered worthy of protection on the basis of the "intrinsic value or social importance of the practice it pro­ tects" ( 5 2 4 ) can also apply to homosexual relationships, which also e m b o d y "virtues" such as intimacy, harmony, a n d loyalty between persons. In this way, Sandel argues, rejecting the liberal-voluntarist conception of neutrality toward ethical values does not necessarily lead to intolerance. B u t here it is Sandel w h o does not reach his goal of taking persons' ethical identity seriously. By presupposing that homosexual couples identify with and live according to the "values" and "virtues" of marriage as are current in society, he does not d o justice to the self-understanding of those w h o do not see their form of life according to this model. A n d even homosexuals w h o advocate the legal recognition of a partnership as a marriage do not nec­ essarily have to accept for themselves the traditional implications of this form of community. Yet Sandel, b o u n d to the dichotomy of subjective choice and (socially guaranteed) objective values, overlooks the possibility of arguing with moral reasons for a form of recognizing particular forms of life that c o m p r e h e n d s ethical identities not as mere preference nor as the e m b o d i m e n t of values. T h e "right to privacy" is thus justified not on the basis of certain traditional understandings of valuable practices (San­ del's "old privacy"), n o r by the value of freedom of choice as such ("new privacy"), but on the recognition of persons' right to develop and to de­ termine by themselves their own identity within ethical communities. T h e right to freedom from identities that, from the perspective of those affected, deserve to be c h a n g e d , and the right to freedom to an ethical identity that one can affirm, are what determine the content of talk about a "right to privacy." It is not the "good morals" of a community that establish the domain of tolerance, but rather moral norms according to which the equal rights of all to a personal identity are to be recognized. With regard to the "privacy" of persons, law thus has the threefold function of (a) guarantee­ ing a formal framework for the possibility of forming one's own identity, (b) recognizing a n d protecting particular identities with certain legal con-

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

7'

sequences, a n d (c) maintaining the moral limits of this recognition. Such a conception of privacy as the protection of ethical-autonomous identity avoids grasping privacy as a social no-man's-land of individual autonomy and understanding it as "nonpublic" or n o n c o m m u n a l . Ethical identity and legal autonomy are not opposites; they presuppose and c o m p l e m e n t each other. T h e legal person is not ethically determined but is for that very reason ethically "sensitive." Communitarian critiques of the liberal conception of the person are not alone in casting doubt on this sensitivity. Feminist critiques protest that the conception of the legal person has a predetermination—one d o m i n a t e d by a masculine-individualistic orientation—of what identities law will rec­ ognize a n d what legal consequences will follow from this recognition. L a w disregards the requirements of women's identity, critiques insist, precisely at that point w h e r e these requirements warrant special legal recognition. T h e identity that feminist critiques want to see recognized is not however one that corresponds to the traditional self-understanding of society, it is a c h a n g e d one: what is d e m a n d e d is a right to the special recognition of a self-determined identity. Recognition of the concrete person through law must not b e understood, as Sandel or Maclntyre asserts, as recognition of the traditional-concrete person in his or her conventionally determined 39

identity. Values are not to be given priority over identities. F r o m a feminist perspective, the liberal conception of "privacy" is not therefore too individ­ ualistic but too intent on legitimating domination in a sphere such as that of the family, which enjoys the wrong protection of the "private sphere." " [ T ] h e legal c o n c e p t of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery, marital rape, a n d women's exploited domestic labor. It has preserved the central institutions whereby w o m e n are deprived of identity, autonomy, control, a n d self-definition" ( M a c K i n n o n 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 4 ) . Feminist critique has an ambivalent relation not only to communitarianism but also to liberalism: the critique of an individualism that recognizes only the claims raised a n d justified by "masculine" persons stands alongside the individualistic de­ m a n d for the possibility of a self-determined identity. T h e distinction be­ tween an ethical person a n d a legal person constituted by general n o r m s makes it possible in this context to understand the critique of the legal person without a b a n d o n i n g this conception a n d to see how the recognition of "difference" a n d the recognition of equality can coexist—equal rights require, as rights to equality, the particular consideration of particular iden­ tities. In exploring this problem, however, o n e must bear in mind an essential difference between the conception of the "legal person" and that of the "moral person." T h e "legal person" assumes a form in a particular, legally constituted community only by means of positivization a n d institutionali­ zation. T h e r e f o r e , this form is always concretely defined a n d bears the mark

72

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

of a particular, historical-political legal community. It is not until basic rights b e c o m e positive law that they b e c o m e binding for legal persons and require a concrete institutionalization and, above all, interpretation. T h i s interpretation is the subject matter primarily of legal—law-interpreting— but also political, law-changing discourses. H e n c e , in the c o m p l e x of prob­ lems addressed here one has to discern whether critics of liberal "neutral­ ity" are referring to general conceptual problems of this notion or primarily to questions of the political and legal practice of a particular political com­ munity. Even if it is implied in the notion of the "neutrality of justification" that the general legitimation of principles is general in a discursive sense a n d the "legal person" constitutes a protection for vulnerable identities, femi­ nist critique nevertheless expresses d o u b t as to whether law's claim to gen­ erality does not necessarily disregard particular "different" identities. T h e claim to equal treatment of all legal persons thus mutates into injustice toward those w h o are disadvantaged by this equal treatment, ones w h o are not in a position to avail themselves in the same way of the rights a n d liberties granted. Rights and liberties c a n n o t be m a d e use of equally by all persons—social inequalities prevent this. In an unjust society, "neutrality" and equal treatment turn into a nonneutral affirmation of precisely this inequality (Minow 1 9 9 0 ; Sunstein 1 9 9 0 , 5 ) . L a w , Catharine M a c K i n n o n asserts, is "masculine" through and through: "the law sees a n d treats w o m e n the way men see a n d treat women" ( 1 9 8 9 , 1 6 1 - 6 2 ) . Moreover, law's claim to be "neutral" a n d to be "passive" toward the private spheres of social life is not correct: legal regulations intervene in these spheres and maintain social power relations. T o the "sentimentality of liberalism" ( M a c K i n n o n 1 9 8 9 , 2 3 1 ) in its claim that a general law guarantees general equality there is the response of two approaches, neither of which wishes to d o without the c o n c e p t of individual rights. O n e m o d e l rejects a special treatment of w o m e n with the a r g u m e n t that this treatment just underpins existing differences: it both affirms them symbolically and can in reality (for instance, in labor law) turn out to the disadvantage of w o m e n . H e n c e , so the d e m a n d , the goal of legal equal treatment should be favored as m u c h as possible over explicit special treat­ m e n t (cf. K a m i n e r 1 9 9 1 ) . T h e second position, however, objects to this goal since it sees here a misappreciation of the special problems of w o m e n and of their identity (Young 1 9 9 0 , 1 7 5 ) . Accordingly, equal treatment of unequals can be achieved only through unequal treatment. T h e status of the legal person is sensitive to the identity of w o m e n only if the "genderblindness" of law is dissolved in favor of special rights a n d regulations. A c c o r d i n g to M a c K i n n o n , however, both a p p r o a c h e s — t h e o n e emphasiz­ ing legal equality a n d the other difference—suffer from the same weakness, that of measuring the identity of w o m e n against that of men: "Gender

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

77

neutrality is the male standard. T h e special protection rule is the female standard. Masculinity or maleness is the referent for both" (MacKinnon 1 9 8 9 , 2 2 1 ) . Put differendy, both approaches are in a "dilemma of differ­ ence," as Martha Minow ( 1 9 9 0 , 4 2 ) describes it: "Governmental neutrality may freeze in place the past consequences of differences, yet any departure from neutrality in governmental standards uses governmental power to make those differences matter a n d thus symbolically reinforces them." T h e dilemma consists in the question of how law can d o justice to particular identities without binding them to traditional role patterns, on the one hand, or branding them "different," on the other. H o w can "difference" be preserved a n d at the same time not have disadvantageous effects: how can it be recognized? H o w can impartiality d o justice to particular a n d une­ qual parties? M i n o w proposes a "social relations approach." It puts "difference" into a concrete social context: w h a t identities are defined as "different," a n d in what way? A n d w h o does the defining? W h a t identities are self-chosen a n d what ones are not? (Minow 1 9 9 0 , 1 1 9 ) . T h e sensitivity of law thus d e p e n d s u p o n those individuals a n d groups affected examining the validity of ex­ isting understandings of difference and equality in respect of their genesis and

the possibility of their justification a n d acceptance ( 2 1 3 ; cf. J a g g a r

1 9 9 0 ) . H e r e , rights are indispensable: formerly e x c l u d e d groups articulate their interests and needs in the language of rights (Minow 1 9 9 0 , 3 0 7 ; cf. S c h n e i d e r 1 9 9 1 ) . By recognizing these rights claims, law recognizes per­ sons as "special" and, at the same time, "equal"—as persons with a right to material equal treatment, a right that, d e p e n d i n g on the particular context, makes it necessary to have special regulations for guaranteeing equal rights to a self-determined identity.

40

In contrast to a communitarian-substantive

or an ethical-liberal conception of the legal person, a procedural c o m p r e ­ hension of law provides in this context the possibility of e m b r a c i n g this conception as the "protective cover" of ethical identities, instead of—in the n a m e of social values—placing criteria on it that specify what identities are worthy of legal recognition, a n d in what way. F o r instance, rights to a "pri­ vate sphere," insofar as it is understood in the m a n n e r elaborated above, are a c o m p o n e n t in this protection of the "personality" of the person a n d are not constituted by a previous determination of "the private." T h e formal cover can maintain its claim to protecting concrete persons only if it re­ mains o p e n to their (self-determined) particularity.

41

T h e reciprocal and general justification of norms, however, requires that particular claims to legal recognition be justified generally, that is, that it be possible to draw u p o n a reinterpretation of the norms of equal treatment. A n existing "false" generality must be criticized a n d c h a n g e d with the help of general and reciprocally justified arguments, which refer to instances of unequal treatment in concrete contexts.

14

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW T h e scars of a legal community, the history of the exclusion of certain

groups from political and social life, determine whether the special consid­ eration required by the equality principle can g o so far as to grant, at the price of violating formal equality, to m e m b e r s of these g r o u p s — i n contra­ distinction to other

persons

(as representatives of

nondiscriminated

groups)—preferential rights, for e x a m p l e , in the form of quotas. C a n quota regulations be justified "neutrally"? T h e discussion between Dworkin and Sandel on affirmative action shows h o w liberal and communitarian argu­ ments differ in this connection. T h e a r g u m e n t that preferential treatment on the basis of quotas is unfair because here too it discriminates against a person (a white student w h o is not admitted to the university because a certain n u m b e r of places is reserved for African A m e r i c a n and other mi­ nority students)

42

because of race is not valid, according to Dworkin

( 1 9 8 5 c ) . S u c h a person is disadvantaged not on account of social prejudice against his or h e r race but in the n a m e of the social e n d of bringing about justice. H e r e "justice" means to create conditions in which members of a heretofore (and still) discriminated minority receive the opportunities that they were denied owing to the history of repression, and would still be denied without the introduction of special measures. T h i s justification makes of deontological principles a societal e n d state; that is, it seems to transform deontological arguments into teleological ones. Dworkin de­ fends this a p p r o a c h , however, by denying that in this way deontological principles are sacrificed to the advantage of utilitarian ones. T h e policy of preferential treatment would be utilitarian if it were justified by an increase in the average utility that this policy would have for society as a whole a n d if it sacrificed the rights of individuals to this e n d — f o r instance, the dis­ crimination of a certain part of the population could be justified with the a r g u m e n t of an increase in the wealth of society ( 1 9 7 8 c , 2 3 7 - 3 8 ) . Yet the goal of bringing about a m o r e j u s t society, which is at the center of the policy of preferential treatment, is of a different kind: this policy is based not on utilitarian but on "ideal" reflections about a m o r e just society. B y distinguishing between a right to equal treatment and a right to be treated as an equal ( 2 2 7 ) , Dworkin disputes that affirmative action violates the rights of individuals. T h e right to equal treatment concerns fundamental basic rights such as the right to vote or the right to an appropriate basic education, but not the right to admission to a university, for instance. With­ out violating the right to treatment as an equal, the university can introduce certain admission criteria that d o not discriminate against a person as a m e m b e r of a particular social g r o u p but pursue an e n d that helps realize j u s t i c e — m o r e social equality. T h i s policy does not presuppose, as Sandel states (drawing on his objection to Rawls's justification of the difference principle), a priority of society over individual subjects in the sense that society as the "wider subject of possession" (Sandel 1 9 8 2 , 1 4 1 ) has an an-

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

75

tecedent claim to the assets of individuals. Sandel derives this claim from the constitution of the self by the community, through which individuals see themselves as part of a c o m m u n a l undertaking, to which they d o not sacrifice anything in the case of affirmative action, but the ends of which they recognize as their ends. However, if this were the justification for the preferential treatment of minorities, it would not only presuppose under­ standing the nation as a wider subject, to which individuals belong just as parts whose substance c a n n o t be cognized without the substance of the macrosubject, it would also be unclear according to what criteria individ­ uals' contribution to the c o m m o n g o o d could be legitimately determined and appraised. Sandel's "ethic of sharing" ( 1 4 4 ) leaves this question open. Moreover, when he discusses the civil rights movement, which advocates the rights of the African A m e r i c a n population, he must call u p o n argu­ ments

of general

rights with which

the

socially discriminating

"self-

understanding" of a society can be criticized, thus determining the foun­ dation for the d e m a n d for justice in the first place (cf. Sandel 1 9 8 4 b , 1 7 ) . Liberal "neutrality" does not mean that "reasons that can be publicly defended" (Nagel 1 9 8 4 , 1 4 ) cannot speak for correcting a history of injus­ tice by means of measures that especially p r o m o t e the individuals of a dis­ criminated g r o u p . W h e t h e r correction is justified in the specific case of a particular legal community, a n d how it is to be made, has to be j u d g e d ultimately in consideration of the particular circumstances. Constitutive here is the continued existence of past injustice; and it does not have to be demonstrated that individual persons are obligated to r e n d e r direct compensation since they acquired an immediate "net benefit" from the discrimination—thus R o b e r t Fullinwider's ( 1 9 8 6 , "backward-looking" justification

1 7 6 ) objection to a

of affirmative action. Rather, what is

n e e d e d is the justified assumption that (a) existing inequalities between social groups stem from the discrimination of o n e by the others (cf. T h o m ­ son 1 9 7 3 , 3 8 3 ; Sunstein 1 9 9 3 , 1 5 0 ) , and that (b) n o other measures are suitable to overcome these effects. Only in reference to this genesis and persistence of the present social distribution of power can the "prospective" e n d of effectively bringing about equal opportunity be justified a n d reasons advanced as to what g r o u p has a right to special treatment. O n this basis, we ask of social institutions in a differentiated m a n n e r what measures—on a scale of weak to strong regulations for preferential treatment—are justi­ fied and promising. T o enable a discourse on making its basic structure m o r e just, a political community must at any rate fulfill a substantive presupposition about how it o u g h t to respond to the rights claims of discriminated minorities: these minorities themselves must have a voice. A n d this presupposition encom­ passes the possibility of participating in the political process as well as the means (education and social communication) necessary for it, which en-

j6

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

able the m e m b e r s of the minority to raise their voice. W i t h o u t a certain d e g r e e of social equality there cannot be equal political participation or formal legal equality (for instance, equal opportunities to take legal ac­ tion). Equal "value of political liberty" (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 2 2 6 ) requires that minorities be first of all able to articulate their interests before a political community decides what measures are justified. A t this point, the limits b e c o m e evident that are encountered by a dis­ cussion of the "legal person" that focuses on the normative significance of the conception as "bearer of individual rights" and overlooks the fact that this is a legally positivized status that requires a political-legal configuration through democratic procedures of justification. "Legal person" is to be un­ derstood as a dynamic conception that is realized and developed within a political community; its content must be determined in discourses on the claims to legal recognition raised by citizens. T h e liberal principle of neu­ trality thus pushes beyond the self-understanding of liberal theories toward the supposition of an internal connection between the protection of rights and democratic self-determination. T h e principle of reciprocal and general justification requires a location, a forum where what is to be justified is concretely determined. Ethical persons, w h o as legal persons are to be protected u n d e r general norms in their integrity and identity, must be citizens too: they are not only addressees but also authors of the law. T h e political discourse of equally entitled citizens fills the v a c u u m created when the legal person is not identified with the moral person; instead, its con­ crete form is r e g a r d e d as being institutionalized within a particular legal community. T h i s concrete form does have to satisfy moral norms, but it is determined by the political discourse of autonomous citizens w h o have the authority to legitimately posit and c h a n g e law. It is here w h e r e possible redefinitions of the "nonneutral" content of legal regulations have to be justified. L a w is the concrete m e d i u m of mutual recognition as persons with a personal identity worthy of protection and with equal rights and liberties; political discourse is the place where these claims must be sup­ ported by general reasons. (I return to this in the following section.) A n additional p r o b l e m must first be considered in a discussion of the protection of identities through individual rights. Is it possible—thus the question—in this framework to justify the collective rights of cultural mi­ norities w h o claim protection for their culture? W h a t is the basis of such claims? W h a t rights can a cultural minority d e m a n d from the political com­ munity? A n d what rights have priority within such a cultural c o m m u n i t y — the rights of its m e m b e r s or the group's rights to the preservation of its structure? A r e g r o u p rights asserted only against the political community or also against individual persons within groups? Especially the suspicion that g r o u p rights grant collectives too m u c h power over individuals sustains liberal skepticism about this type of rights (Waldron 1 9 9 3 d , 3 6 5 - 6 6 ) . Will

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

77

Kymlicka ( 1 9 8 9 a ) , however, argues that the "colorblindness" of a liberal political community must not lead to ignoring minority cultures' legitimate claims to the preservation of their culture. H e attempts to justify this ar­ g u m e n t with liberal means by defending "cultural membership" as a pri­ mary g o o d in the Rawlsian sense. H e refers to a cultural context as a "con­ text of choice" ( 1 9 8 9 a , 1 6 9 ) , as being necessary for the development of an ethically autonomous identity within the cultural community to which a person belongs. N o w if a cultural community is called into question by the decisions of another, m o r e comprehensive community, as in the case of Native A m e r i c a n s , the decisions interfere with the possibility of these cul­ tures' m e m b e r s to live in a m a n n e r in which they can link their own life history to the history a n d practices of their origins. Indigenous peoples do have a special moral reason to d e m a n d the preservation of their own culture by virtue of the fact that this culture already existed in the territory before the culture that is now the majority culture developed there—as in the case of the U n i t e d States a n d C a n a d a . T h e i r rights claim to cultural preservation and autonomy is sustained by this fact and by the moral obligation of the majority culture not to perpetuate past injustices of extermination, depor­ tation, and discrimination. T h e i r rights claim is therefore not of an ethical kind—the a r g u m e n t is not j u s t that of the i m m a n e n t 'Value" of a form of life. T h e fact that Kymlicka grants moral principles priority over ethical values is also evident in the e x a m p l e he discusses, that of a Native A m e r i c a n culture that denies its m e m b e r s certain rights to personal autonomy (Kym­ licka 1 9 8 9 a , 1 9 7 ) . T h e liberal-individualist stress on conceptualizing the right to cultural m e m b e r s h i p as an individual right to the possibility of choosing a lifestyle leads to Kymlicka's granting individual m e m b e r s of cultures general rights to personal autonomy, even against the

self-

understanding of the minority culture. Cultural membership is an option for such persons, not a duty. M e m b e r s h i p in a comprehensive political community grants the possibility of exit to m e m b e r s of communities w h o can n o longer accept these communities' practices, insofar as the cultures d o not prove to be capable of reform. In short, members of such minorities have as m e m b e r s certain rights vis-a-vis the comprehensive political com­ munity, the majority itself does not as a g r o u p have any particular rights vis-a-vis its members. H e r e , o n e could speak of an "individual g r o u p right." Accordingly, Kymlicka's defense of the rights of a minority culture's m e m b e r s presupposes not only that this culture can advance moral reasons for special legal respect, but also that there is a d a n g e r that, against the will of its members, this culture will be marginalized by the d o m i n a n t culture and may cease to exist. If however a culture changes of its own accord, through the options of its members, then there is n o duty to shelter it from this d e v e l o p m e n t .

43

In Taylor's view, this a r g u m e n t falls short of the mark since it does in-

j8

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

d e e d consider the "context of choice" of existing members of cultures but not "survival through indefinite future generations" ( 1 9 9 2 a , 4 0 - 4 i n . 1 6 ) . W e cannot, Taylor argues, in this way overcome the p r o b l e m of a "differ­ ence-blind" ( 4 3 ) , neutral-proceduralist liberalism according to which a col­ lective e n d like that of preserving a form of life cannot be realized on account of the primacy of a wide interpretation of "neutral" basic rights. H e elaborates this point with reference to the C a n a d i a n province of Que­ bec. Unlike a "politics of equal respect," a "politics of difference" calls for a "nonneutral" recognition of difference insofar as the preservation of Que­ bec's collective identity requires that, contrary to a strict application of the Canadian Charter of Rights, certain measures be taken to secure the sur­ vival of the culture (e.g., restricting the choice of school for the children of francophones a n d immigrants; language regulations for large businesses a n d advertising). "Policies aimed at survival actively seek to create members of the community, for instance, in their assuring that future generations continue to identify as French-speakers" ( 1 9 9 2 a , 5 8 - 5 9 ) . T h o u g h the fun­ damental basic rights of persons are respected, exceptions are however m a d e for the benefit of a politics of the g o o d that serves a greater end: the survival of a culture. Taylor's critique of the procedural liberalism of equal rights as homog­ enizing and difference-blind is nonetheless problematic for the following reasons. First, as H a b e r m a s points out ( 1 9 9 8 a , 2 0 7 - 1 0 ) , it is based on a one-sided interpretation of neutral liberalism that screens out the fact that the content of equal protection rights is determined reciprocally in political discourses, discourses in which those affected examine existing conditions with regard to instances of unequal treatment. Within a federal state, Que­ b e c has political-cultural semi-autonomy—on the basis of a c o m m o n con­ stitution—as a province that for historical reasons has a special position in C a n a d a . Yet this special position cannot, H a b e r m a s argues, lead to "a kind of preservation of the species by administrative means" ( 2 2 2 ) since the preservation of a cultural context remains an option for persons, not a duty. Second, this position relates to the problem of the proposal to make Q u e b e c , as a "distinct society," an exception to the purview of the Canadian Charter of Rights. T h e politics of the g o o d that Taylor has in m i n d could lead to a strong cultural-political d o m i n a n c e of a majority within Q u e b e c . T h i s outcome would in turn mean (a) that the recognition of difference within Q u e b e c would be guaranteed solely by the remaining basic rights and (b) that it would be required of the political community of C a n a d a as a whole to accept a procedural liberalism insofar as a particular politics of the g o o d must not be imposed on a cultural minority (French quebecois). Contrary to Taylor's critique, therefore, the neutrality principle proves not to be difference-blind in these two respects; a n d yet the politics of the good,

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

79

which emerges from the "politics of difference," does not rule out the dan­ ger of "homogenizing" tendencies. T h e problem remains as to what degree a form of life such as Q u e b e c ' s may restrict the "context of choice" of some persons for the purpose of securing its future. T o resolve it, one would have to show that n o other measures, compatible with political federalism on the basis of a j o i n t basic rights adjudication, are suitable to secure the possibility of persons freely deciding whether or not they want to continue belonging to the franco­ p h o n e form of life. Pointing to the fact that such measures are not sufficient to secure the existing character of this form of life "for all time" overshoots the mark because it ascribes to this character an independent ethical value that exceeds the value of this form of life for persons in the p r e s e n t . The

44

issue of multiculturalism, however, relates not only to "multina­

tional" societies in which, as a result of conquest, colonization, or confed­ eration, different cultural-historical communities form a c o m m o n political community, but also to "polyethnic" societies in which different immigrant cultures live together (cf. Kymlicka 1 9 9 1 b ) . With regard to the latter, spe­ cial regulations cannot b e justified in historical-moral terms; however, there d o arise two questions, that of the relation between the ethical "permea­ tion" (Habermas 1 9 9 8 a , 2 1 5 - 2 0 ) of law by majority culture a n d minorities' rights claims to representation a n d nondiscrimination,

45

on the o n e hand,

and that of a possible withdrawal from the c o m m o n political culture, on the other. In both cases, the c o n c e p t of "citizenship" is at the focus of attention. W h a t substantive implications does this concept have? H o w "for­ mally" can it b e determined? T h e s e debates focus particularly on questions of education. With regard to the legitimacy of a religiously motivated re­ treat from the m o d e r n world, Rawls's "political liberalism" d e m a n d s that as citizens m e m b e r s of such ethical communities b e instructed in the course of their education not only in what constitutional rights they have, but also in a cultural knowledge that enables them to be active a n d cooperative citizens a n d members of the whole society (Rawls 1 9 8 8 , 2 6 8 ) .

4 6

Member­

ship in traditional forms of life must remain voluntary; it is however re­ spected. M e m b e r s h i p in the political community is thus not "neutral" in the sense that it is compatible in all aspects with all cultural (ethnic, reli­ gious) forms of life—through the "modesty" of the demands placed on the m e m b e r s of such communities to b e citizens too, it is nonetheless compat­ ible with different ways of life. T h i s is a principle that leads to conflicts even in a "multicultural" society such as the U n i t e d States (cf. Walzer 1 9 9 2 b ) , but m o r e so in societies in which the political community has strong tra­ ditional-cultural, ethical characteristics a n d sees itself confronted by the participatory rights claims of minorities (see chapter 3 ) . T h e division be­ tween ethical communities, on the one h a n d , a n d the legally constituted

80

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

political community, on the other, is always precarious a n d remains the object of political debate.

2.4.

BASIC INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS

C o n s e q u e n c e s for a theory of individual rights follow from the preceding discussion of the question of law's ethical neutrality. T h e liberal conception of the "legal person"—as the subject of positive law and bearer of individual rights—was determined as being ethically neutral in the sense that it is not based on any ethical conception of the g o o d . Its justification rests on gen­ eral norms and not on ethical values. T h e liberal conception of the legal person is not however ethically neutral in imposing restrictions on ethical conceptions of the g o o d or on particular communities; moreover, it is an enabling condition

for the development and realization of the

good

through individuals a n d communities. T h u s liberal theory draws from the "fact of reasonable pluralism" (Rawls)—that is, the decline of ethically in­ tegrated political communities—the necessary conclusion of a procedur­ alist theory of the justification of norms. T h e normative-legal status of the legal person not only secures the equal recognition of all persons before general laws and thereby forms an exter­ nal protective cover for particular identities, but as such it is also sensitive to the rights claims of those identities that, by standard n o r m s of equal treatment, are treated in effect unequally on account of their difference. T h e claim of being generally and reciprocally justified obligates law to take into account the particular perspective of those w h o have so far been ex­ cluded from the community as a whole. L e g a l autonomy is the general framework for particular ethical autonomy; legally guaranteed "negative" liberty makes ethically "positive" liberty possible. Individual rights are not located outside contexts of intersubjectivity and are not ascribed to atom­ istic, contexdess, individualistic subjects; rather, they secure general rec­ ognition as legal cohorts and the particular possibility of developing per­ sonal

identities

in

different

intersubjective-ethical

contexts

and

communities. Basic individual rights are therefore guaranteed by n o r m s that "cannot be reasonably rejected," norms that c o n f o r m to the strict criteria of reci­ procity and generality. T h u s n o person can reciprocally dispute with g o o d reasons another person's rights and justified claims that he or she asserts for him- or herself (e.g., the right to one's own way of life), a n d any argu­ m e n t that generalizes ethical values must be formulated in a way that can be accepted generally. Reasons that must b e justified in strict reciprocity and generality legitimate norms that, by observing the "threshold" established by these two criteria, d o not violate persons' elementary rights claims to autonomy and grant these claims—through the positivization of such

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW n o r m s — a concretized, protective legal status. If a person attempts to cross argumentatively the divide between what is valid for him or her and what is to be valid for all, arguments have to be given in accordance with the dif­ ferent validity modes of ethical and general norms. A s N a g e l ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 5 9 ) apdy expresses it, "if you force someone to serve an e n d that he c a n n o t be given adequate reason to share, you are treating him as a m e r e m e a n s — even if the e n d is his own g o o d , as you see it but he doesn't." Put another way, this means that no o n e may be forced to advance general reasons for the values that are valid for him or her as long as he or she does not violate any moral principles or raise any moral claims.

47

Basic individual rights are

rights to personal autonomy within the limits of generally justified princi­ ples—they can be defended or restricted only by strict, moral-universal argu­ ments. In this sense, they are justified (and always justifiable), not simply "given" basic rights. Nongeneralizable reasons cannot serve as the founda­ tion for legal principles. In this sense, law secures individual liberty: "Free­ dom (independence from being constrained by another's c h o i c e ) , insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every m a n by virtue of his humanity" (Kant 1 9 9 1 , 6 3 ) . T h e rights of individual liberty—the right to respect for the integrity of the person a n d for the personal f r e e d o m to a c t — a r e rights to liberty that cannot be restricted by reciprocally a n d gen­ erally justified norms; in fact, those norms protect them. Liberty rights are thus not "innate" or primarily justified on the basis of "highest-order inter­ ests" (Rawls); they are moral rights of "reason" in the sense that they c a n n o t be reasonably disputed inasmuch as persons recognize one another as au­ thors a n d addresses of the n o r m s to be justified. W h a t is first of all deter­ mined in this way is j u s t a m o d e of justification, not any concrete contents. T h e r e f o r e , what is foundational is an individual basic right to justification, the right of moral persons to veto, as it were, certain norms (or actions) .

4 8

T h i s right corresponds to the principle of practical reason that only recipro­ cally a n d generally justified n o r m s can claim general (or, in moral matters, universal) validity: no generality or universality can therefore disregard in­ dividuals' justified rights claims. T h e right to justification is not to be un­ derstood as an "original" liberty right in Kant's sense; rather, it is inherent in the principle of justification, which has to be "recursively" reconstructed, and which I characterize as a principle of practical reason (see chapter 4 . 2 ) . H e r e , "practical reason" is to be grasped not as an authoritative source of moral norms but as the capability of "reasonable" persons to give in the appropriate contexts "good" reasons for (action-legitimating) norms. Prac­ tical reason is understood in a nonmetaphysical sense as a reason in (and not outside) intersubjective contexts. T h i s conception of reason, morality, and law makes it possible to provide a justification of the principle of equal individual rights, which corresponds to Rawls's first principle of justice,

82

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

without calling on the thought e x p e r i m e n t of the original position. In its revised form, Rawls's principle states: "Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all" (Rawls 1 9 8 2 a , 5 ; see chapter 3 . 4 ) . T h e conception of the "legal person" is however determined not only in the normative sense to be a person with individual

rights, but also as the

subject of positive law. Frequendy, these two dimensions are not sufficiendy distinguished in the liberal, natural-law tradition (which calls positivism into action); they d o nonetheless draw attention to the fact that legal per­ sonality embodies only in essence moral norms, the realization of which requires institutionalization, concretization, and interpretation, however. L a w is always the law of a particular legal a n d political community. W e infer from the above-mentioned principle of the general justification of norms that legal personality embodies in its core moral norms of reciprocal rec­ ognition, yet its determination and realization require, in a c c o r d a n c e with this principle, institutionalization within a political community and legitimation by this community. T h i s requirement in turn means that procedures of "public justification" in political discourses a m o n g citizens are necessary to determine law in the legitimate sense.

49

T h e moral content of the principle

of general justification must be politically "translated," a translation in which law does not duplicate a transcendental moral o r d e r a n d political discourses do not operate in a moral-free space: the criteria of strict reci­ procity and generality d o not ascribe content to these discourses but set conditions for the treatment of moral problems that a p p e a r in political contexts. T h e r e thus emerges a c o m p l e x picture of various "contexts of justice" (which still cannot be fully explicated h e r e ) : norms that can be justified in strict reciprocity a n d generality are for every h u m a n being as a moral person obligating norms of action in light of which a person must be able to justify him- or herself in moral contexts to every other concrete person. In legalpolitical contexts these norms are to be translated into h u m a n and basic rights. T h e s e rights form the abstract core of the conception of legal person (as a general protection of the ethical person). Unlike morality, law is valid only within a legal community; it obligates persons to act not in a morally motivated m a n n e r but in agreement with the law; it is therefore—with its coercive character—addressed to persons' freedom of choice a n d stabilizes mutual expectations regarding external c o n d u c t (cf. H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 6 a , 1 1 2 ) . A s legal persons, people are the subjects of a certain, institutionalized law, which is the law of a political community. L e g a l persons are subjects and addressees of this law, and as citizens they are at the same time its authors. It is the consensus of the citizens that first creates (and later changes) law and that is the m e d i u m within which claims to recognition are discussed and recognized. T h i s is not supposed to m e a n that the status of the "citizen"

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

Hj

is not a legal status too; in a normative respect, however, this status adds the dimensions of political rights to participation (Teilnahmerechte) and so­ cial rights to share society's resources (Teilhaberechte)—as enabling personal and

political autonomy—to the individual rights to personal liberty. It

thereby gives effect to the conception of political autonomy alongside that of personal autonomy a n d thus to a different dimension of the duties, responsibilities, and reciprocal recognition of "citizens."

50

A n e x a m p l e of the connection between various conceptions of the per­ son proposed here can be f o u n d in Kant. H e distinguishes the following "a priori principles" of a legal state: " 1 . T h e freedom of every m e m b e r of society as a human being. 2 . T h e equality of each m e m b e r with every other as a subject. 3 . T h e independence of every m e m b e r of the commonwealth as a citizen" (Kant 1 9 8 3 , 7 2 ) . H e determines the first as the right of every h u m a n being to "seek happiness in the way that seems best to him [or her]"—that is, ethical-personal autonomy; the second as the right to be subject to general and identical laws irrespective of status or ancestry—that is, legal autonomy; the third as the right, as "co-legislator" ( 7 5 ) , as citoyen, to pass laws that express the "public will"—that is, political autonomy. Re­ iterating Rousseau's idea, Kant regards this last one as an essential require­ m e n t for the legitimacy of law, since this is the only way to guarantee that law is general: what affects all must be decided by all, "for only to oneself can one never deny what is r i g h t " ( 7 6 ) ,

51

as Kant says (cf. Maus 1 9 9 2 , 1 4 8 -

7 5 ) . L a w requires legitimation through all those affected, as citizens. Lib­ eralism—as a descendant of the natural-law tradition—cannot content it­ self with justifying universal moral principles without establishing the nec­ essary connection to the democratic constitutional state. Moral rights are not institutionalized and determined by themselves, and law's legitimacy cannot be explained by its being "covered" in its validity by natural-law norms. T h i s is overlooked by a liberal position that disputes a necessary con­ nection between law a n d deliberative democracy; even a "liberal-minded despot," as Isaiah Berlin ( 1 9 6 9 b , 1 2 9 ) says, could guarantee individual rights: "The answer to the question 'Who governs me?' is logically distinct from the question 'How far docs g o v e r n m e n t interfere with m e ? ' " ( 1 3 0 ) . For law is legitimate only because the subjects of law (Kant's Untertanen, the subjects of the ruler) conceive of themselves as the authors of the law and recognize their interests in it; that is to say, they acknowledge it as their self-given law. T h e r e is n o other way to answer the follow-up question to Berlin's, namely, what rights d o persons concretely have as well as what interference can be justified, and how. G e n e r a l legitimacy a n d individual freedom to act are conceptually connected in this way in the framework of law. Personal and political autonomy refer to each other. In his legal theory, H a b e r m a s terms this internal connection the "co-

84

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

originality" of the two conceptions of the autonomy of persons as the ad­ dressees and as the authors of law ( 1 9 9 6 a , 1 0 3 - 4 ) . Below the level of a discourse principle (D) for the justification of action norms—"D: J u s t those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses" ( 1 0 7 ) — h e draws a distinction be­ tween a principle of morality and o n e of democracy. T h e former refers to universally valid moral norms, the latter to the justification of legal norms. T h e discourse principle a n d the c o n c e p t of "legal form"—according to which, as presented above, coercive law relates to the "external relation" of legal persons with freedom of choice—"interpenetrate" in the principle of democracy in such a way that there follows a "logical genesis of rights" ( 1 2 1 , italics omitted) that persons as addresses and authors of law must grant reciprocally "if they want to legitimately regulate their interaction and life contexts by means of positive law" ( 1 2 2 ) . T h e s e are basic rights to the greatest possible measure of individual liberties, to equal membership, to legal actionability, to political participation, and, in a derivative sense, to securing the material conditions for having equal opportunities to avail oneself of these rights to private and political autonomy. T h e internal con­ nection between h u m a n rights and p o p u l a r sovereignty m e a n s that there is n o democracy without the exercise a n d institutionalization of political power in the form of law (and therefore not without the status of the pri­ vately autonomous legal person), and there is no legitimate law without dem­ ocratic legitimation (by politically autonomous citizens). B u t nothing has yet b e e n said about the content of these rights—it is "unsaturated" inas­ m u c h as it is not politically "interpreted and given concrete shape" ( 1 2 5 , italics omitted). T h i s a r g u m e n t rightly avoids the thesis of the priority of moral rights, which have to be determined in "transcendental purity" ( 1 2 9 ) and are given in advance as natural rights, "prior to the state," so to speak; but it cannot avoid recognizing the moral core of individual liberties, which jus­ tifies speaking in the first place of "human rights" ( 1 0 4 ) and j u d g i n g the legal order morally ( 1 0 6 ) . T h e alternative between natural law, on the one hand, and individual rights as the positivized possibility of liberty without its own moral weight, on the other, is too narrow: the discourse principle itself, understood as the principle of reciprocal and general justification, requires that individual liberty rights be understood as moral rights that cannot be mutually disputed; moreover, these rights constitute the abstract core of the legal person a n d must be politically determined a n d interpreted in their concrete content. T h u s n o additional external moral requirement is imposed on law other than the one it has to meet in any event according to the criterion of general legitimacy. In its "translation" into political-legal contexts, the moral content of reciprocal justification does not m e a n that

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW all legal norms, which must be justified at the level of restricted generality with reasons that are in the broadest sense political (ethical or pragmatic ones, for instance), require moral reasons to be legitimate;

52

this content does

however m e a n that the criterion of strict reciprocity and generality requires that, in the case of moral questions that c o n c e r n basic rights, moral reasons satisfying this criterion be given. Basic rights d o indeed have a concrete legal content, but they require moral justification: they form the core of the protection of the person, and, for moral reasons, this core cannot be limited in favor of ethical or practical considerations. This morally justified primacy of basic rights within law is underscored by Habermas's deontological understanding of law (see H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 6 a , 2 5 6 ; 1 9 9 8 a , 2 1 6 ) . T h i s moral claim m a d e on law does not c o m e from without but is raised against it from within by the claims of those w h o , to defend their "person," d e m a n d stricdy reciprocal reasons in the event of an infringement of their rights. Within contexts of political discourses, the members of legal communities require that law a n d morality "substantively intersect" ( 1 9 9 6 a , 2 0 7 ) . T h i s conception of a "threshold of reciprocity a n d generality," as I call it, which gives effect in a procedural-criteriological m a n n e r to moral points of view within law, justifies in the first place the d e m a n d for the "greatest possible" a n d "equal" individual freedom. T h e different validity m o d e s of law a n d morality are thereby maintained; but moral d e m a n d s are m a d e on law, ones it must meet as legitimate l a w .

53

T h u s the following constellation of personal-legal, ethical, political, and moral autonomy b e c o m e s evident. If morally autonomous persons are si­ multaneously (co-) authors a n d addressees of moral norms (see chapter 4 ) , then persons are as citizens (co-) authors a n d as legal persons addressees of legal norms, which make ethical autonomy possible. Until now, the eth­ ical a n d the legal dimensions have been at the center of the discussion; at the following points, however, reference was already m a d e to the concep­ tual connection with the concepts of citizenship and political community. First, without these dimensions the theory of the neutrality of law a n d of the public justification of legal norms, and their concrete political deter­ mination, is incomplete. L a w is always the law of a particular political com­ munity a n d the subject matter of citizens' political discourses. T h i s com­ prehension of law therefore raises the question of the nature of both this community and these discourses. W h a t does the principle of justification mean in political contexts? Especially the discussion of the feminist critique of liberalism a n d com­ munitarianism makes it clear that law cannot be primarily the f o r u m in which claims to recognition are raised.

54

In its discourses and institutions,

the political community itself must be the forum in which the relation between generality (legal person) and difference (ethical person) is dis-

86

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

cussed and regulated, a n d in which groups raise their voices to protest against exclusions a n d to question p o w e r relations (operative in how "pri­ vate" is defined, for instance). Second, in the discussion of the question of affirmative action it b e c a m e apparent that it is necessary to give formerly excluded groups certain pos­ sibilities to raise their claims politically. F o r that, not only political but also social rights are required. T h e status of the "citizen" not only requires for­ mally equal opportunities to participate but also includes material condi­ tions, which make personal and political autonomy possible. T o secure and to determine these is the task of a political community. Third, in the discussion of the rights of cultural minorities the question a p p e a r e d as to what substantive conditions belong to the conception of the full citizen as a m e m b e r of the political community. H o w formal or sub­ stantive can "membership" in a political community be determined if it is not to exclude cultural differences? T h e s e systematic questions lead back to the debate between liberalism and communitarianism—the questions of political legitimation, of the fo­ rum for public discourses, of social justice a n d solidarity, a n d of citizenship and political-normative integration. A n d to analyze the debate on this level of the controversy, the discussion so far has provided conceptual possibil­ ities—for law a n d ethics form paradigms within which liberalism and com­ munitarianism deal with these questions. With regard to the first question, that of political legitimation, this means that

liberal

positions

predominandy

understand

democratic

self-

g o v e r n m e n t functionally as the means to secure individual rights, whereas communitarian positions in the republican tradition are inclined to regard the democratic community and its practice of self-government as an ethicalcollective value, since private "bourgeois" b e c o m e political citoyens in this practice. A c c o r d i n g to the view of communitarian critics such as Taylor, the liberal conception of society corresponds to a "rights model" ( 1 9 8 5 k , 2 1 0 ) in which, in contrast to a "participatory model," citizens conceive of themselves as individuals w h o have rights claims to equal liberties and de­ fend these claims primarily through court action. In Sandel's ( 1 9 8 4 a ) and Walzer's ( 1 9 8 1 ) view too, the central role played by the S u p r e m e C o u r t in deciding essential political questions in the United States points to the democratic deficiency of a "procedural" republic in which citizens conceive of themselves primarily as legal persons. T h e second question concerns the possibility of social solidarity and dis­ tributive justice. H o w , the communitarian asks, can there be in a liberalindividualist society arguments for solidarity that are g r o u n d e d on the j o i n t responsibility of citizens for their fellow citizens? Doesn't the dimension of social citizenship b e l o n g to a conception of full citizenship, and how is this conception to be justified?

THE ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF LAW

8j

T h e third question refers to the fundamental problem of the normative integration of the members of a political community. W h a t does it mean to be a "citizen" of a state—to be a m e m b e r of a legal community integrated simply through equal rights a n d general principles, or to be a m e m b e r of an ethically a n d culturally integrated "community of fate"? H o w can a po­ litical community survive that merely consists of a "heap" of atomistic and privatized legal persons, as Taylor ( 1 9 7 9 ,

1 3 3 ) , following H e g e l

(1967,

1 7 6 - 7 8 [§ 2 7 3 ] ) , asks. W h a t is the nature of democracy's Sittlichkeit (ethical life), its "ethos"?

THREE

The Ethos of Democracy The principle of modem states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of selfsubsistent personal particularity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself H E G E L

1967,

161

(§

260)

T h e problem H e g e l takes u p , that of reconciling the moments of subjec­ tivity and generality, must be r e g a r d e d as a central issue of political phi­ losophy. Since H e g e l , however, the p r o b l e m has b e c o m e m o r e acute. Mod­ ern states exhibit a pluralism of ethical convictions that calls into question the possibility of citizens identifying strongly with the political community, and yet these m o d e r n societies, w h e r e traditional bonds of solidarity and community have dissolved, require even m o r e societal solidarity and dem­ ocratic self-government (cf. Walzer 1 9 9 0 a ) . T h i s dilemma is a c c o m p a n i e d ,

by a second one, for the burden of m o d e r n societies decisions increases with growing complexity, but at the same time the differentiation and the particular logics of the spheres of administrative and e c o n o m i c power re­ strict the decisions' latitude (cf. H a b e r m a s 1 9 7 6 ; Walzer 1 9 8 4 ) . H o w can m o d e r n societies meet these challenges in a m a n n e r that connects toler­ a n c e and solidarity, democracy and social complexity? W h a t cultural pre­ suppositions and institutional arrangements will they require? A t the center of the dimension of the communitarian critique of liberal theories to be dealt with here is the question of the sociocultural presup­ positions of an intact democratic community, whereas the question of the necessary institutions plays a subordinate role. W h a t is at issue here is the "ethos" of democracy: the m a n n e r in which citizens conceive of themselves as m e m b e r s of a political community, what they have in c o m m o n and what responsibilities they bear. Especially the conditions of the possibility of a "public justification" of legitimate norms in democratic discourses as well as the m a n n e r of such a justification are the points in question. T h e critique of atomism and of the priority of individual rights resur­ faces here, not in reference to the constitution of the self or of legal neu­ trality but as the issue of the priority of individual rights over the c o m m o n 88

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

H

9

g o o d of a political community. T h e concepts of "ethical person" and "legal person" elaborated in the preceding chapters can serve as parameters for this discussion, as has already b e e n remarked. If—to put it in ideal-typical terms—communitarianism conceives of citizenship as being ethically con­ stituted a n d characterized by certain virtues oriented toward the c o m m o n g o o d , then liberalism understands citizenship as the primarily legal status of equal individual liberties. Correspondingly, a communitarian position takes social and political integration to be creation of societal unity through shared ethical-cultural values that link the identity of subjects a n d the col­ lective, whereas a liberal position makes only minimal assumptions about the commonalities that integrate a political community, namely, the recip­ 1

rocal assurance of basic rights a n d procedural principles. T h u s , in a com­ munitarian reading, political legitimacy is a collective's

"ethical

self-

clarification" (Habermas 1 9 9 8 b , 2 4 5 ) , whereas in the liberal view it is a fair settlement between c o m p e t i n g individual interests. In short, the

political

community appears in o n e reading as a prepolitical, culturally integrated ethical community, and in the other as a community of social cooperation that is c o m p o s e d of a plurality of subjects with individual rights a n d recip­ rocal claims—thus, essentially, as a legal community. In

this context,

the

central communitarian

critique of

liberalism

amounts to the thesis that liberalism cannot adequately explain the polit­ ical-cultural presuppositions necessary for a democratic community; in­ deed, that it destroys these in its very practice. Yet the critique employs concepts from sociology a n d political science—the Durkheimian c o n c e p t of anomie (Lasch 1 9 8 8 , 1 7 5 - 7 6 ; Barber 1 9 8 8 , 1 7 7 ; Taylor 1 9 9 2 b , 4 4 ) , for example—primarily in a normative and very general manner. A s a result, there arise certain unclarities such as the disparity, remarked by Walzer ( 1 9 9 0 a , 7 ) and Yack ( 1 9 8 8 ) , between, on the one hand, the critique that liberal theory is not appropriate to social reality and misrepresents it atomistically and, on the other, the critique that liberal theory represents social reality appropriately, but because of this reality's atomistic tenden­ cies, it has to be criticized normatively. W h a t is c o m m o n to all these cri­ tiques however is the thesis that liberalism is a self-undermining political theory:

in

a

"dialectic

of

liberalism," the

"unencumbered"

subject

disengaged from social relations, whose defense liberalism o n c e took u p , b e c o m e s the "disempowered," privatized citizen (Sandel 1 9 8 4 a , 9 4 ) w h o leaves c o n c e r n for the c o m m o n g o o d to a benevolent, bureaucratic des­ potism. In his analysis of d e m o c r a c y in A m e r i c a , Alexis de Tocqueville pointed out this danger explicidy and is for that reason considered a trail2

breaker by many communitarian critics. O n c e citizens begin to conceive of themselves only as legal persons and believe they can neglect their po­ litical rights (and especially duties) as distinct from their individual liberty rights, they are in d a n g e r of even losing these too. T h e r e cannot b e any

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY individual liberty without political liberty, a n d there cannot be any political liberty without an orientation to the c o m m o n g o o d on the part of demo­ cratic, virtuous citizens. T h e legal person, the communitarian thesis goes, must be sublimated in an ethically determined conception of the citizen. In what follows, this debate on the ethos of democracy, presented here in a simplified m a n n e r , is to be discussed on the basis of an analysis of four different models of political integration a n d legitimacy, to which different conceptions of citizenship correspond in each particular case. T h e two lib­ eral models are that of "modus vivendi" a n d that of "overlapping consen­ sus" ( 3 . 1 ) ; the two communitarian ones are a "substantivist" a n d a "repub­ lican-participatory" theory of political community ( 3 . 2 ) .

3

T h e s e theories

answer the question as to how extensive the commonalities between mem­ bers of a political commonwealth must be so that this polity can possess stability and solidarity in various ways; finally, different conceptions of "pub­ lic space" as well as of the conditions a n d function of political discourses also correspond to these theories. T h i s discussion makes it possible to work out the central problems of the particular positions a n d leads in the e n d to a tertium datur of the controversy between liberalism a n d communitari­ anism: the model of "deliberative democracy" ( 3 . 3 ) . E v e n this conception (as well as the theory of civil society that partially corresponds to it) still has some of those difficulties generally characterized by the problem of creating substantive "democratic ethical life" and social solidarity in a plu­ ralist society without the substance of ethical-cultural homogeneity. T h e y are particularly evident in the question of social, distributive justice ( 3 . 4 ) . H e r e , the procedural theory of public justification must prove itself capable of delimiting a substantive concept of political recognition: the d e m a n d for a procedural conception of legitimacy does not banish ethical questions to the "private" sphere n o r does it imply a purely "procedural" conception of normative integration. T h e levels of legitimacy and integration have to b e distinguished.

3.1.

MODUS VIVENDI AND OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

T h e principle of the "public justification" of liberal, neutral principles has been discussed so far in reference to the justification of the basic norms that protect personal liberty; but it b e c o m e s evident that this principle's central role in liberal theories at a legal-moral level necessitates its trans­ lation into political terms. T h i s necessity points, however, to a serious prob­ lem in liberal theory. F o r though the latter was able to avail itself of the distinction between ethics and morality, between questions of the g o o d life and questions of general principles, in o r d e r to defend the category of the person with equal individual rights, this distinction is problematic when it— conceived of as the difference between "private" and "public" q u e s t i o n s —

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

9'

leads to the restriction of political discourses to such questions that are r e g a r d e d as "public" a n d general in a raora^principled sense that is too narrow for political problems. T h u s the critique is that the liberal theories of A c k e r m a n , L a r m o r e , and Rawls (to different degrees) generally place too strict a criterion on discourses of political justification—a critique that, in emphasizing the political context of reciprocal justification, must not on the other h a n d neglect the strict criterion of justification in moral ques­ tions. T h e false alternative between the distorted picture of a liberal model of contextless hypothetical dialogue and a model of public discourses that is "unrestricted" in a moral respect must be avoided; rather, it is a question of weighing legitimacy criteria appropriately. (a) The Theory of Modus

Vivendi

L a r m o r e ' s theory does not refer primarily to questions of democratic le­ gitimacy a n d political integration. His model of modus vivendi focuses on the justification of basic principles and does not deal with the question of democracy explicitly. D e m o c r a c y seems to him merely to be "the best means for protecting the principles of a liberal political order" ( L a r m o r e 1 9 9 0 , 3 4 6 n . 1 5 ) . Nonetheless, in his discussion of the "rational dialogue" between citizens there are important implications for questions of legiti­ macy a n d citizenship, that is, for the realization of liberal principles; "po­ litical neutrality consists in a constraint on what factors can be invoked to justify a political decision" ( 1 9 8 7 , 4 4 ) . A n d at this level, the problems of his minimal liberalism b e c o m e evident. T h e theory, whose central objective is to secure the freedom a n d equality of legal persons, locates the social pluralism it wants to preserve primarily in "private," nonpublic space. L a r m o r e ' s modus vivendi, understood as a model of political integra­ tion, draws a clear dividing line between citoyen and homme, between the private (the "nonpolitical") a n d the public (the "political"), between the g o o d a n d the neutrally justified ( 7 5 - 7 6 ) . Political neutrality means that the incompatible ideals of the g o o d life play n o role in the political realm ( 7 3 ) , that they remain in the "private" sphere. T h o u g h he disputes that according to this model the role of public discourses is minimized since the possibility is still left o p e n to argue for ethical convictions ( 4 7 ) , his epistemological theory of the incompatibility of ethical ideals nonetheless permits at best "reasonable disagreement" in these debates ( 7 3 ) . Moraluniversal a n d ethical-particular arguments follow so to speak their own particular "codes," which are not translatable. Citizens do not have ethical commonalities; rather, the "common g r o u n d " that serves them as the basis for liberal-neutral dialogue is recognition of the procedural rules of ra­ tional dialogue and the n o r m of equal respect, which have priority over ethical values. In this way, citizens preserve their society's moral a n d social complexity and d o not b u r d e n it with any irresolvable moral conflicts.

4

92

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY In emphasizing moral mutual recognition L a r m o r e disassociates himself

from an interpretation of his theory as a Hobbesian m o d u s vivendi in which participants observe certain general rules of compromise solely for strategic reasons. It is not only the "desire for civil peace" (60) that binds citizens but also the awareness of shared norms. Contrary to the assumption of being a m e r e "private" (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 5 2 1 ) or "instrumental" (Taylor 1 9 8 9 b , 1 7 2 ) so­ ciety, the political community presented here is m o r e strongly integrated; L a r m o r e speaks of a "common project" of the citizens: "They must already have a c o m m o n life before they can think of organizing their political life ac­ c o r d i n g to liberal principles" ( 1 9 9 0 , 3 5 2 ) . W h a t belongs to this c o m m o n life, L a r m o r e says, is a c o m m o n territory, a c o m m o n language, and a com­ m o n historical experience. T h e commonality, however, is a commonality of present and past conflicts: without a pluralism and the conflict of incom­ patible ethical ideals, there is no n e e d for recourse to "neutral" principles. T h e fact that the "common g r o u n d " of citizens has to be a "neutral ground" means, according to L a r m o r e as well as A c k e r m a n , that ethical controversies must be kept largely e x c l u d e d from the political a g e n d a of the liberal state. "Public justification" is understood here in a minimal sense, as a public dialogue in which the participants attempt to avoid ethical conflicts. A c k e r m a n ' s principle of "conversational restraint" thus states: When you and I learn that we disagree about one or another dimension of the moral truth, we should not search for some common value that will trump this disagreement; nor should we try to translate it into some putatively neu­ tral framework; nor should we seek to transcend it by talking about how some unearthly creature might resolve it. We should simply say nothing at all about this disagreement and put the moral ideals that divide us off the conversa­ tional agenda of the liberal state. (1989, 1 6 ) A c k e r m a n wants this rule of excluding ethical questions to be understood solely with reference to possible answers, that is, with reference to the jus­ tification of the exercise of power in a democratic struggle for political power ( 1 9 9 0 ) , not with reference to the possible questions that can be asked. His doubts about the "translatability" of ethical values into a "neu­ tral" framework are misleading here; like L a r m o r e , he assumes the possi­ bility of recourse to "primary moral commitments" ( A c k e r m a n 1 9 8 9 , 1 8 ) on the basis of which "reasonable" answers can be found. H e r e , however, there is a problem for both conceptions. Since these primary commitments consist essentially of principles of mutual respect a n d discursive proce­ dures, they contain no substantive criterion (going b e y o n d these basic norms) that would suffice to exclude ethical arguments from political dis­ courses. T h e exclusion of certain arguments cannot therefore be justified a fortiori on the basis of this "common ground"; moreover, the exclusion of arguments harbors the danger of excluding certain ethically and politi-

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

93

cally relevant questions. A decision to remove a controversial issue from political discourse a n d to impose "gag rules" (Holmes 1 9 8 8 ) on oneself is itself in truth a political decision a n d is legitimate (and revisable) only as the o u t c o m e of a practical discourse. A s S t e p h e n H o l m e s ( 1 9 8 8 , 5 2 ) re­ marks, g a g rules can e x c l u d e problems in a m a n n e r that is to the disadvan­ tage of minorities (e.g., not dealing with the question of slavery in the U n i t e d States during the first half of the nineteenth century). After all, the limits of g o o d reasons can be determined only within unrestricted discourses. Critics point out in this connection that inherent in the model of m o d u s vivendi is a strict separation of "private" a n d "public" questions, which ne­ glects the problem that m a n y areas of the traditionally private realm actu­ ally hide inequalities that deserve to be the object of political debate (Benhabib 1 9 9 2 b , 8 1 - 8 5 ; M o o n 1 9 9 1 , 2 1 4 ) . T h e definition of privacy has itself b e c o m e a political question. E v e n examples from what the liberal view re­ gards as the "private" sphere of religion demonstrate—for instance, in questions of what may b e taught in schools (the doctrine of creation or a particular religious or secular worldview)—that this sphere is a publicly regulated one. Finally, the notion of citizenship that this conception incorporates is problematic. O n the o n e h a n d , it presupposes j u s t a small measure of sub­ stantive commonalities; on the other, it requires a "common ground" that is able to evade the controversies between incompatible ethical convictions. T h e cognitive requirements thus placed on the participants of discourses are contradictory: on the o n e h a n d , they o u g h t to b e able to have the in­ sight to remove from the political a g e n d a their ethically controversial posi­ tions as not being generally agreeable; on the other hand, they are not able to discuss their positions in an argumentative dialogue a n d to reach pro­ ductive a n d fair compromises or consensual agreements. O n the o n e h a n d , they have the capability to relativize their views but, on the other, they don't. T h e s e difficulties draw attention to the central p r o b l e m of liberal theory: it is o n e thing to defend the primacy of the impartially justified basic prin­ ciples of political justice, it is however quite another to thematize their re­ alization in a political community. L a r m o r e a n d A c k e r m a n extend the moral-theoretic distinction between ethics and morality to the social- a n d po­ litical-theoretic distinction between the private a n d the public; in so doing they first of all neglect the distinction between questions requiring a stricdy general justification and those requiring a restrictedly general o n e

(see

chapter 2 . 1 ) in favor of the strict criterion; second, they reify the procedural criteria of g o o d reasons in justification discourses into substantive criteria of permissible arguments. T h e y apply the idea of a moral justification of basic principles (and of the distinction between morality a n d ethics) to the justi­ fication

of legal norms a n d political decisions in general in such a way

94

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

that ethical questions appear as "private questions." Political discourses then have primarily the task of securing social coexistence by guaranteeing individual rights—the interpretation of these rights a n d the legitimacy of political decisions in argumentative discourse playing a subordinate role here. Defending the "neutrality" of the legal person leads to a certain "neu­ tralization" of political discourses a m o n g autonomous citizens; ethical plu­ ralism leads to a political-legal minimalism with regard to questions of po­ litical legitimacy a n d integration.

(b) Rawls's Overlapping

Consensus

T h e problem of social stability a n d unity is a special p r o b l e m for every liberal contract theory, and so too for Rawls, even though he, in contrast to classic contract theory, proceeds from a conception of the person with a sense of justice that—as can be assumed in accordance with a "reasonable moral psychology" ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 2 ) — u n d e r the conditions of a just society will motivate persons to behave cooperatively. In A Theory of Justice, moreover, Rawls assumed that there is a "congruence" between the subjectively g o o d and the morally just inasmuch as, given the social nature of the h u m a n being, "participating in the life of a well-ordered society is a great good" ( 1 9 7 1 , 5 7 1 ; cf. § 7 9 ) . A well-ordered society is stabilized by this congruence. Rawls now considers this view of social stability to be "unrealistic" ( 1 9 9 3 a , xvii) since it does not seem to be compatible with the "fact of reasonable pluralism" of ethical values within a democratic society. T h e problem that political liberalism faces is therefore the following one: "How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable a n d just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, a n d moral doctrines?" (xviii). T h e two concepts with which Rawls has explained political unity a n d legitimacy since 1 9 8 5 are "overlapping consensus" and "free public rea­ son." T h e y belong to the "second stage" of his theory: contrary to the in­ terpretation that overlapping consensus is a model for the justification of justice principles, Rawls distinguishes between the justification stage of the theory as a "free-standing" political-moral conception a n d the stage of ex­ 5

plaining social stability. T h e overlapping consensus is to explain how a society can be pluralistic but nonetheless stable, not as m u c h as an ethically integrated society but m o r e than a strategic modus vivendi. T h e solution he proposes follows the "method of avoidance" ( 1 9 8 5 , 2 3 1 ) : a political conception of justice must be compatible with a multitude of ethical values and forms of life and must therefore itself avoid ethical validity claims—it must be acceptable and reasonable for ethical conceptions without con­ testing their truth. "The question is: what is the least that must be asserted; and if it must be asserted, what is its least controversial form?" ( 1 9 8 7 , 8 ) .

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

95

In an overlapping consensus (as already mentioned in chapter 2 ) , "rea­ sonable" comprehensive ethical doctrines accept the basic structure of their society on the basis of a shared conception of political and social justice. T h e y are in agreement c o n c e r n i n g the fundamental "reasonable" idea of social cooperation between free and equal citizens—an idea that they see as part of their own ethical convictions. T h e consensus is thus essentially a political-moral one between comprehensive doctrines—it being ethical only from the perspective of the particular doctrines. We now assume citizens hold two distinct views; or perhaps better, we assume their overall view has two parts. One part can be seen to be, or to coincide with, a political conception of justice; the other part is a (fully or partially) comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception is in some manner related. The political conception may be simply a part of, or an adjunct to, a partially comprehensive view; or it may be endorsed because it can be derived within a fully articulated comprehensive doctrine. (1989a, 249) Different ethical doctrines incorporate the justice conception and regard it as their own, so to speak, as part of their view of the g o o d (cf. 1 9 8 7 , 9 ) . Rawls elucidates his conception of stability by taking u p various objec­ tions. Against the criticism that the overlapping consensus is a m e r e m o d u s 6

vivendi, h e says that the principles of justice as fairness are "moral." T h e i r acceptance is not purely strategic but normative; and the test for this status is the continued support for justice even in conditions in which the p o w e r position of a group, for instance, changes for the worse. In such a situation, the g r o u p would contradict its own conception of the g o o d if it violated the principles of justice for the sake of its own advantage ( 1 9 8 7 , 1 1 ) . Against the second objection that the overlapping consensus represents a skeptical theory of morality, Rawls remarks that 'justice as fairness" does not question the "truth" of ethical doctrines but applies "the principle of tolerance to philosophy itself" ( 1 3 ) . T h e "method of avoidance" leads to the circumstance that the claim of the theory of justice to be reasonable does not compete with the claim of ethical doctrines to be true. T h e con­ ception of justice can of course b e considered "true," as part of the ethical convictions, but it itself only raises the claim to be "reasonable." Nonetheless, this terminology conceals the fact that the claim to be "rea­ sonable" has unequivocal normative priority over the ethical truth claim in questions of justice. F o r ethical doctrines are p u t to the moral test so that they may be regarded as "reasonable": they have to recognize the principles of justice, whereas they can fit these principles into their "comprehensive doctrines" in their own way. T h e strength a n d stability of the conception of justice d e p e n d s in the empirical-practical sense u p o n ethical doctrines supporting it; its "free-standing" moral priority is not however thereby af­ fected. T h e conception of justice is therefore not a "comprehensive doc-

g6

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

trine" (the third objection against Rawls's conception of stability [ 1 5 - 1 7 ] ) but is itself a d e m a n d i n g moral conception that incorporates particular virtues of tolerance a n d cooperation. T h a t the theory is not Utopian (the fourth objection) a n d can be accepted a n d implemented in a pluralist so­ ciety does not make its normative validity on the basis of fundamental moral "ideas" d e p e n d e n t u p o n this acceptance. Rawls's talk of the "moral" accep­ tance ( 1 1 ) of the principles of justice on the part of comprehensive doc­ trines does not distinguish sufficiently here in conceptual terms between the "free-standing" moral validity of principles and their ethical acceptance. T h e political community is a community of "reasonable" citizens w h o ac­ cept the basic political-moral consensus for shared reasons, though they integrate them into their comprehensive ethical conceptions. In this sense it is a "reasonable" consensus that can be seen as justified. It does not presuppose that o n e has to relinquish one's own ethical perspective, but it does however assume that one e x p a n d s the perspective in questions of justice. Various consequences follow from the normative priority of justice for Rawls's conception of political legitimacy a n d political discourse. T h e realm of the political is governed by the principles that form the content of the overlapping consensus. T h e y represent the limits that "public reason" must take into account. Rawls's "liberal principle of legitimacy" states: "our ex­ ercise of political p o w e r is fully p r o p e r only w h e n it is exercised in accor­ d a n c e with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free a n d equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles a n d ideals acceptable to their c o m m o n h u m a n reason" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 3 7 ) . T h e idea of "public justification" corresponds to the concept of "public reason"— "the reason of equal citizens w h o , as a collective body, exercise final polit­ ical and coercive power over one another in enacting laws a n d in a m e n d i n g their constitution" ( 2 1 4 ) . "Public reason" is reason a m o n g citizens as au­ thors of law—their justifying reason in reference to generally valid norms. Citizens are reasonable in a political sense when they defend "public rea­ sons" to one another. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, this reason (Vernunft)

must—on the basis of the

shared conception of justice—observe certain limits inasmuch as it refers to "constitutional essentials" or to "questions of basic justice." Constitu­ tional essentials c o n c e r n the structure of political institutions a n d questions of basic rights; questions of basic justice essentially c o n c e r n problems of distributive justice ( 2 2 7 - 2 8 ) . N o t all political questions fall u n d e r these categories; the distinction is however a problem that Rawls leaves unre­ solved ( 2 1 4 ) . M a n y political controversies could well reach a point where these categories are applicable. T h e limits of public reason consist in the fact that g o o d reasons must b e able to refer to "political values": to "the values of political justice" and to

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"the values of public reason," that is, the substantive principles of justice and the guidelines for public inquiry that w o u l d b e decided in the original position ( 2 2 4 - 2 7 ) . T h e s e principles a n d guidelines constitute the criterion for what cannot be reasonably rejected by citizens; that is, they constitute both the criterion for public reasons a n d the c o m m o n g r o u n d on which reasonable comprehensive doctrines in the sense of j o i n t citizenship stand and present their arguments. In other social contexts, Rawls says, citizens can use "nonpublic" reasons, which are to b e understood not as "private" but as "social" reasons (e.g., in communities a n d associations within the "background culture" of political discourses). In their capacity as citizens, persons are however b o u n d to the limits of public reason—they 'View them­ selves as ideal legislators" ( 1 9 9 7 , 7 6 9 ) . It is only in this way, Rawls believes, that political discourses remain within the overlapping consensus between ethical doctrines and d o not lead to irresolvable ethical conflicts, which would result in social instability. Rawls can therefore grasp the practice of the S u p r e m e C o u r t as being exemplary for this model of liberal legitimacy ( 1 9 9 3 a , 2 3 1 - 4 0 ) . It is con­ c e r n e d solely with fundamental questions of justice, and the reason of the S u p r e m e Court's decisions is "public" inasmuch as it relies only u p o n "po­ litical values" a n d argues in a m a n n e r that can b e appreciated by the public. This e x a m p l e demonstrates the liberal element in Rawls's model of re­ stricted discourses: their primary function is to maintain the consensus on basic

principles

of justice;

the

function

of

enabling

political

self-

g o v e r n m e n t remains secondary to this. T h e principles of justice are sub­ stantivized into political values that are imposed u p o n the p r o c e d u r e of democratic discourses m o r e than j u s t as procedural restrictions. It is only in this way that the public reason of the C o u r t exercised for the citizens serves as a model for the public discourse actually conducted by the citizens. Liberal legal principles have priority over democratic self-government— even if, as A c k e r m a n proposes in his theory of "dualist democracy" ( 1 9 9 1 ) , these principles follow "higher lawmaking" w h e n , at historical turning points, democratic citizens' movements bring about a new orientation in the political system and constitutional interpretation, which is then main­ tained a n d given shape within the framework of "normal policy" by the system's institutions, especially the S u p r e m e C o u r t (see Rawls 1 9 9 3 a , 2 3 1 4 0 ) . It is evident that the an tecedendy justified principles of justice consti­ tute a substantive basis for what cannot be reasonably rejected; in the con­ text of political autonomy, the "burdens of reason," whose recognition in ethical questions leads to mutual tolerance, seem to b e c o m e b u r d e n s that call for a restriction of democratic discourses in terms of their content. Rawls, however, wants to avoid a strict, "exclusive" theory of political discourses that banishes ethical arguments completely from the political agenda. His "inclusive" perspective mentions two instances for permitting

g8

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

ethical justifications ( 2 4 8 - 4 9 ) . In the first case, with regard to a conflict in which it is doubted that an ethical community still shares the central polit­ ical values, this community is justified (or forced) to present its ethical convictions and refute this criticism. In the second case, it might be justified in an unjust society to appeal to "comprehensive" values—as those w h o opposed slavery in U n i t e d States did or, later, as Martin L u t h e r King d i d — in order to call for justice as manifesdy a n d as appealingly as possible a n d to bring about a j u s t society. In both cases, therefore, ethical arguments serve the strengthening of public reason. But the inclusive perspective is also too narrow. A c c o r d i n g to it, religious motives on the part of citizens are not indeed illegitimate in political con­ texts, n o r are problems that affect religious questions, but arguments or rea­ sons g r o u n d e d on religious convictions are. T h i s perspective however pre­ supposes too strong a division between ethical motives and

political

reasons; in political discourses, persons d o of course remain ethical persons with particular values and attitudes—and their language a n d arguments reflect this b a c k g r o u n d .

7

In a recent article on this problem Rawls carries out a revision. A c c o r d ­ ing to it, citizens cannot and n e e d not completely bracket ethical "ground­ ing reasons" ( 1 9 9 7 , 7 9 7 ) in political discourses. T h e s e convictions play an unavoidable role in persons' practical reflections. Nonetheless, a political office—that of a j u d g e or a g o v e r n m e n t official—requires that decisions be justified solely in a strictly "political" m a n n e r (on the basis of law a n d basic principles); in this sense, ethical values are bracketed. Yet, in a "wide" view of public reason, the office of citizen—the "duty of civility"—does not necessarily require a bracketing of this kind but allows us in political dis­ courses to rely u p o n reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which are how­ ever to be c o n n e c t e d "in due course" ( 7 8 4 ) to political values (cf. Greenawait 1 9 8 8 , 2 1 5 - 3 0 ) . In other words, persons must be in a position to gradually translate their arguments into reasons that are acceptable on the basis of the values a n d principles of public reason. It is only then that their reasons can be g o o d political reasons, a n d it is only then that the justifi­ cation discourse commences. T h i s revision does not c h a n g e anything at the core of his theory of the limits of public reason. Rawls objects to an "open" view: if ethical arguments were permitted without restrictions, the "crite­ rion of reciprocity" (as Rawls [ 1 9 9 7 , 7 9 7 ] calls it now) would not be guar­ anteed—the condition according to which political reasons must be rea­ sons that can be justified reciprocally. T h i s last objection does not however necessarily apply. F o r if the "cri­ terion of reciprocity" is not substantivized into concrete "political values" but, in a c c o r d a n c e with the requirements of strict and restricted generality (depending on the issues in question), is procedurally interpreted, there is n o n e e d for restrictions on the content of arguments but there is a n e e d

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for certain procedures of justification as the condition of reciprocally ac­ ceptable reasons. In any case, restrictions of content through certain values or "guidelines" of reason may b e decided only in discourses: n o basis of the reasonable can therefore be substantively prescribed to discourses. Rawls's conception thus amounts to a "private use of reason with polit­ ical-public intent," as it were, not to a truly public discursive use of reason. It is both too d e m a n d i n g a n d too u n d e m a n d i n g for citizens in a cognitive respect—just like A c k e r m a n ' s theory. It is too d e m a n d i n g for them because they are supposed to be in a position to abstract from their ethical—"non­ public"—identity and refrain from ethical-political argumentation in polit­ ical discourse; yet it is too u n d e m a n d i n g because it assumes that ethical convictions are not o p e n to discursive clarification and mutual argument. O n the o n e h a n d citizens are able to abstract from their convictions a n d on the other they are not. In neither respect is the possibility of a discursive translation—or Aujhebung (sublimation)—of ethical into general-political reasons considered. In contrast to this, it seems m o r e plausible to locate in procedures of argumentation themselves the cognitive possibility of clari­ fying, defending,

or c h a n g i n g ethical convictions

(cf.

G u t m a n n and

T h o m p s o n 1 9 9 0 , 1 4 3 - 4 4 ) . Public justification must be conducted not prior to but within discourses. T h u s even the "wide" view of public reason also remains b o u n d to the notion that political discourses interpret principles a n d d o not generate them. T h e principles justified in the original position are conceived of as norms whose content is determined a n d on the basis of which discourses operate as "forums of principle" (here Rawls adopts a term from Dworkin's legal theory). Ultimately, this restricted conception of democratic legitimacy, which Rawls shares to a certain extent with L a r m o r e a n d A c k e r m a n , reflects a c o m m o n problem of these liberal theories: too narrow a parallel is drawn between the justification of basic principles of justice a n d the justification of political decisions. T h e distinction between ethics and morality (or be­ tween "comprehensive doctrines" a n d "political" justice) is translated into one between the nonpolitical a n d the political; the strict criterion of the primacy of morality (in moral questions) is generalized a n d substantivized, with regard to political discourses, in the c o n c e p t of particular, given "po­ litical values" and leads to a content restriction of these discourses that does not do justice to their plurality. T h e application of the neutrality prin­ ciple to political contexts thus remains incomplete: procedural criteria of political justification b e c o m e substantive criteria of the primacy of liberal justice principles. T h u s n o central role is left to political discourses a n d the political autonomy of citizens within the basic structure of society. While Rawls shares certain problems c o n c e r n i n g the question of political legitimacy with the model of m o d u s vivendi, he nonetheless advocates a stronger theory of political integration. T h o u g h he clearly distinguishes

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between different forms of (ethical, cultural) communities a n d the political community a n d emphasizes that the political community is not integrated through a comprehensive conception of the g o o d , he nevertheless defends the thesis that the citizens of a well-ordered society regard the promotion of just institutions as a c o m m o n e n d that they can realize only in a coop­ erative way. Citizens have not only personal b u t also collective ends: social cooperation in a j o i n t project appears as a desirable g o o d to them. T h e g o o d of the well-ordered society, Rawls says, is one of the central concep­ tions of the g o o d in a theory of justice. A further idea of the g o o d is that of political virtues. T h o u g h the citizens of a well-ordered society d o not regard political life primarily as the location and realization of the g o o d life (as in the "civic humanism" of a Rousseau), they nonetheless consider political virtues a n d participation in public life to be necessary for securing their basic rights and liberties. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, the model for this conception is "classical republicanism" ( 1 9 8 8 , 2 7 2 ) . Political virtues—willingness to cooperate, tolerance, reasonableness, fairness ( 2 6 3 ) — c o n s t i t u t e an "ideal of the g o o d citizen." A c c o r d i n g to this ideal, citizenship is specified not as m e m b e r s h i p in an ethically integrated community, n o r however solely through the conception of the person as bearer of individual rights. Nevertheless, it is clear here too that citizens' political autonomy is conceived of not primarily as a necessary condition of the legitimacy a n d interpretation of the basic structure of society or as the self-government of a pluralist society but as the—joint—securing of individual rights (cf. J o s h u a C o h e n 1 9 8 9 , 2 0 ; Baynes 1 9 9 2 a , 1 6 7 - 7 2 ) . A c ­ cording to Rawls, citizens are persons with two moral powers—that of having a conception of the g o o d a n d that of having a sense of j u s t i c e — w h o live together in a system of mutual recognition a n d reciprocal coop­ eration; the basic structure of society is geared to this cooperation. T h i s conception of the citizen is "thin" inasmuch as it highlights social pluralism and relates the overlapping consensus solely to "political" principles; it is however "strong" inasmuch as it visualizes political virtues that must ulti­ mately extend far e n o u g h to help realize the difference principle of social justice. In the view of communitarian critics, there is a fundamental con­ tradiction here.

3.2.

SUBSTANTIVIST AND REPUBLICAN

COMMUNITARIANISM

Central to a communitarian understanding of political legitimacy, integra­ tion, a n d citizenship is the thesis that a political community must be, in a strong sense, a culturally integrated, ethical community in order to make social unity, democratic self-government, a n d solidarity possible. T h e com­ munitarian response to the outcome of the debate on the neutrality of legal principles runs thus: if the legal person can be r e g a r d e d as a protection of

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ethical identities a n d thus as a condition of the possibility of their devel­ o p m e n t , then it is essential to ask what the condition of realizing a political community guaranteeing these rights consists i n — a n d this condition can only b e "strong" communality. Even if it is granted that a political com­ munity must recognize a n d secure the rights of individual persons, a society that just consists of a "heap" (Taylor 1 9 7 9 , 1 3 3 ) of privatized legal persons is in d a n g e r of being c o n s u m e d by "administrative despotism" (Bellah et al. 1 9 8 6 , 2 1 1 ) ,

of e n d i n g in "bureaucratic individualism" (Maclntyre

1 9 8 4 a , 7 1 ) . H o w can such a society develop a public life that is strong e n o u g h to withstand these dangers? Liberal "public purposelessness" (Bar­ ber 1 9 8 6 b ) does not permit a form of democracy that gathers the citizens a r o u n d a c o m m o n g o o d in which they participate jointly a n d with which they identify. T h e liberal m o d e l lacks an "ethos" of political communality a m o n g citizens oriented to the c o m m o n good. Moreover, such a legalindividualist society not only c a n n o t survive in the long run, it c a n n o t be just either. F o r even if it is in a position to recognize the equality of all citizens as a principle, it can realize this principle only by appealing to the c o m m o n - g o o d orientation a n d the solidarity of all citizens, to their sense of b e l o n g i n g together (Sullivan 1 9 9 0 , 1 5 4 ) . Aristotelian, Hegelian, a n d Rousseauian motifs flow together in this cri­ tique, a n d their differences are j u s t as significant as their commonalities. F o r this reason, in what follows I distinguish between a substantivist a n d a republican-participatory communitarian

theory, which

determine

the

"ethos" of a democratic community in each case differently. F o r instance, is the "common good" conceived of as a community's prepolitically existing "substance" or "essence" that must be affirmed, or as the o u t c o m e of a discursive process? T h a t is to say, as a presupposition or as a result? Is citizenship conceived of as m e m b e r s h i p in an ethical collective that is con­ stitutive of individuals' identity (similar to a family) or as participation in a c o m m o n political practice, a participation that presupposes certain vir­ tues? Is political discourse understood as ethical self-understanding a n d affirmation of the antecedent b o n d of civic friendship or as a c o m m o n practice of public action? S o m e theorists cannot of course be unequivocally categorized in o n e of these positions; Taylor, in particular, combines ar­ guments from both directions. S e e n as ideal types, however, there are fundamental differences between the approaches. A n Aristotelian position, for instance, conceives of a polit­ 8

ical community as a "regime" whose practices a n d institutions e m b o d y the character of a particular way of life and particular ideals, which form a unity (though a tense o n e ) with the character a n d virtue of the citizens. Public virtues, r e g a r d e d as the highest virtues, m a k e it possible to assume public positions. A less "classical" but not less substantivist view can b e traced back to Hegel. It assumes that there must b e a strong unity between

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the identity of individuals and the identity of the public as a whole, a unity that "sublimates" (aufheben) the difference between subjectivity and com­ munity. Sittlichkeit, ethical life, means this in Hegel: the "objective Spirit" of the political community's institutions grants the citizens individual lib­ erties; the liberties d o not however place them in opposition to the state, which is in the first place their "reality"—the realization of their rights and liberties. O f course, the state is their reality in a "substantive," not an in­ strumental sense: in the ethical—particular as well as general—values that the state embodies, a collective discovers itself first of all as a self-conscious one, beyond the individuality of its members. T h e state's ethical life is not merely the sum of its parts but the e m b o d i m e n t of "strong evaluations" (Taylor), which bring about an identity between subjective a n d objective Spirit. Furthermore, H e g e l ascribes to objective Spirit an objective will that goes beyond subjective wills, a will in whose substance intersubjectivity is in d a n g e r of being suppressed (cf. Theunissen 1 9 8 2 ) . In contrast to this construct, a republican-participatory position inspired by Rousseau assumes not a substantive-ethical unity of citizens but a unity through participation. T h e c o m m o n g o o d is discovered, not merely af­ firmed, in a discourse between free a n d equal citizens. A c c o r d i n g to Rous­ seau, nonetheless, citizens are not private bourgeois but politically virtuous citoyens oriented to the c o m m o n good, a n d their particular interests are subordinate to the "general will" of the "sovereign people," w h o speak with a single voice. H e r e too, the concept of citizen is understood ethically—at least in p a r t — a n d the intersubjectivity of the citizens corresponds to an objectivity of the people's will. The

two leading concepts by which the differences between the two

communitarian positions—the substantivist and the participatory ones— can be understood are that of identification a n d participation.

O n e position

emphasizes the necessity of a "strong" identification of individuals with the commonwealth, the other the necessity of general participation. Both how­ ever agree that the models of m o d u s vivendi and overlapping consensus are too weak to grasp the ethos of the political community: ' T o have a viable society requires not just that I a n d others think it is a g o o d thing, but that we c o m e to a c o m m o n recognized understanding that we have launched a particular c o m m o n enterprise of this sort, and this creates a particular b o n d a r o u n d this society, this tradition, this history" (Taylor 1989c, 863-64). Maclntyre's conception of the essence of a political community repre­ sents a paradigmatic e x a m p l e of an Aristotelian theory that attempts to justify a particular conception of morality a n d political community by means of a theory of the identity of the person. A c c o r d i n g to him, there cannot be a coherent conception of morality without a conception of the h u m a n g o o d as telos, h e n c e there cannot be an authentic political com-

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munity that does not e m b o d y a n d aspire to these ideals of h u m a n life. J u s t as the m o d e r n conception of a "universalist" morality removed from par­ ticular-communal

contexts is a chimera that is tantamount to being a

"moral catastrophe," so it is disastrous to attempt to establish a political community in which citizens are represented as individuals with their own particular incompatible conceptions of the g o o d . T h e ideals e m b o d i e d by the m o d e r n "regime" are the impoverished "characters" of the "rich aes­ thete," the "manager," a n d the "therapist"—all of w h o m are consequences of the decline of an objective value order that gives a life meaning, an end, and direction. In contrast to that, a "true" political community must rep­ resent a form of c o m m u n a l practice e m b e d d e d in a moral tradition that individuals recognize as their own; the narrative of subjective life must be part of a superordinate narrative (cf. Maclntyre 1 9 8 4 a , 1 8 6 - 8 7 ) . T h e eth­ ically desirable telos of life follows from this trinity of practice, tradition, and subjective biography: the goods internal to social practices are what is worth striving for. Maclntyre c o m p r e h e n d s membership in a political community accord­ ing to the model of family membership: obligation to one's own community has absolute normative priority over "neutral" moral points of view. T h e virtue of patriotism is therefore the highest political virtue a n d as such "systematically incompatible" ( 1 9 8 4 b , 5 ) with the standpoint of impartial morality. T h e view that there can b e an A m e r i c a n patriotism is a c c o r d i n g to Maclntyre the result of a "conceptual confusion" that presumes the pos­ sibility of combining particular "ethical life" with abstract "morality." H e is however aware of the fact that the kind of community he is defending cannot b e reestablished in view of the pluralism of m o d e r n societies. Only communities integrated on the basis of ethical-cultural a n d religious com­ monalities are in a position to create such a form of identity a n d virtuous life a n d to survive the new dark age "after virtue." In Sandel too, one finds the notion that membership in a political com­ munity, like family m e m b e r s h i p , is a relationship "constitutive" of the per­ son's identity, o n e from which immediate duties follow. T o him too, the relationship between citizens appears as the b o n d of friendship, a n d the "pathos of politics" consists in recognizing a c o m m o n g o o d that reveals a n d strengthens a c o m m o n identity ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 8 2 - 8 3 ) . B u t unlike Maclntyre, for S a n d e l — a s for Bellah et al. a n d T a y l o r — t h e "conceptual confusion" of m o d e r n societies is not that they fail to recognize the irreconcilable con­ tradiction between patriotism on the one h a n d a n d morality a n d individual rights on the other, but that they fail to recognize that n o democratic mod­ ern society can do without solidarity and patriotism—hence, liberal society lives on its citizens' patriotism but in practice conceptually negates a n d constandy endangers it. T h u s , Bellah et al. ( 1 9 8 6 ) attempt to prove that the language of individualist liberalism c a n n o t adequately grasp citizens'

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orientation to the c o m m o n g o o d w h e r e it exists a n d c a n n o t create it where it is needed. T h e result is both an impoverishment of the conceptual re­ sources subjects use to describe themselves in their social life and an im­ poverishment of public space and the search for the c o m m o n g o o d itself. T h i s result leads to a psychologically a n d politically disquieting selfcentered privatism that endangers the "social ecology" of a political com­ munity (Bellah et al. 1 9 8 6 , 2 8 4 ) . E v e n in a pluralist society, Robert Bellah says, there must b e the possibility of a "deep pluralism" w h e r e citizens with­ draw neither into themselves nor into their immediate ethnic or cultural communities, but w h e r e they understand the c o m m o n g o o d as part of their own g o o d (Bellah 1 9 9 1 , 6 1 ; cf. Sullivan 1 9 8 2 ) . Taylor also considers it an illusion to believe that liberal societies can do without the virtue of patriotism, citizens' identification with the c o m m o n ­ 9

wealth. However, this identification is based not on the "regime's" high­ lighting certain virtues that represent life ideals for the citizens, but on the fact that the political community embodies in its self-understanding and institutions values with which individuals can identify in their "strong eval­ uations." H e n c e , though patriotism is a sign of a strong b o n d to a collective a n d is in this respect similar to m e m b e r s h i p in a family ( 1 9 8 9 b , 1 6 6 ) , this collective is—contrary to Maclntyre's view—the e m b o d i m e n t of particularist and universalist strong evaluations. In his theory that the political system's legitimacy crises are ultimately identity crises, citizens no longer view the system as e m b o d y i n g the values they consider essential, Taylor does however leave it u n d e c i d e d as to how o n e can weigh the universalist values of equal liberties against the particularist values that first weld a specific political community together. For, as he emphasizes, a political community's "ethos" is always a particular Sittlichkeit that has its origins in a prepolitical communality of a history, a tra­ dition, and, ultimately, a "common sense of what the g o o d life is" ( 1 9 8 9 c , 8 6 4 ) . Citizens have to be able to identify in their particularity with the political institutions, to regard them as "an expression of themselves" ( 1 9 8 9 b , 1 6 5 ) . "Constitutional patriotism" (Habermas 1 9 8 9 a , 2 6 1 ) or an overlapping consensus cannot achieve this identification: But we have to remember that patriotism involves more than converging moral principles; it is a common allegiance to a particular historical com­ munity. Cherishing and sustaining this has to be a common goal, and this is more than just consensus on the rule of right. Put differendy, patriotism in­ volves beyond convergent values a love of the particular. (Taylor 1989b, 1 7 6 ) In Taylor's theory of political legitimacy, both concepts are present: identification as well as participation. His "republican thesis," which is cen­ tral in this connection, states that a strong patriotic identification with the political institutions o n the part of the citizens represents an indispensable

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY J 0 5 condition for the stability of a free regime. T h e r e cannot be any legal free­ d o m , any democracy, without this kind of solidarity, according to which citizens regard the promotion of the c o m m o n g o o d as one of the highest goods of a virtuous life. T h e political community is an " 'immediately' com­ m o n good" of the citizens, w h i c h is regarded by them as a g o o d for its own sake. E v e n though this identification is realized primarily in the exercise of political freedom, it nonetheless has its origin in a prepolitical unity: "Participation of all in a decision is only possible if there is a g r o u n d of agreement, or of underlying c o m m o n purpose. Radical participation can­ not create this; it presupposes it" ( 1 9 7 9 , 1 1 5 ; italics omitted). Accordingly, the "participatory" model of citizenship, which he contrasts with the "rights model" a n d in which citizens' capabilities a n d dignity consist not in assert­ ing their rights and interests b u t in being part of the self-governing citi­ zenry, is f o u n d e d on such a strong sense of commonality. The condition for a successful participatory model is a strong identification with the fate of the community. . . . This identification can perhaps be de­ scribed in this way: it exists where the common form of life is seen as a su­ premely important good, so that its continuance and flourishing matters to the citizens for its own sake and not just instrumentally to their several indi­ vidual goods or as the sum total of these individual goods. The common life has a status of this kind when it is a crucial element in the members' identity, in the modern Eriksonian sense of the term; hence my use of "identification." (1985k, 2 1 3 ) W h a t is controversial about this model is not only how the patriotic attitude can distinguish between universalist a n d particularist strong eval­ uations, which a particular political community embodies, in order to de­ cide w h e t h e r it continues to deserve support, b u t also how strong the com­ monalities between citizens have to be in o r d e r to make democratic self-government possible. F o r if a g r e e m e n t on basic principles of justice as well as participation in political discourses are not e n o u g h to guarantee the loyalty of members, Taylor's theory then seems to make very high de­ mands o n the homogeneity of a political population, demands that are very difficult to square with the "fact" of ethically, ethnically, and culturally plu­ ralist societies. T h i s difficulty b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t in his e x a m p l e of a "participatory" po­ litical community: C a n a d a . H e lists two conditions for the "strong identi­ fication" necessary for democratic self-rule, namely "an identification with participatory forms of politics as central to the community's definition a n d a strong sense of a particular community as b o u n d together in these forms" ( 1 9 8 5 k , 2 2 0 ) . H e can find only the first condition fulfilled in C a n a d a , not however the second one. T h o u g h there is i n d e e d a politically active p o p ­ ulation, there is not an ethically unified "national identity"; to p r e s u m e this

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would be "utopian," according to Taylor. F o r this reason, he argues for the decentralization of political structures in o r d e r to make m o r e unified and smaller-scale units of democratic self-rule possible but wants to preserve the Canadian state as a political unit ( 2 2 1 - 2 2 ; cf. 1 9 9 1 b ) . H e thereby qualifies a central premise of his theory of democratic Sittlichkeit: the political com­ munity is not identical with an ethically, ethnically, a n d culturally inte­ grated community, it can contain m o r e than one of these communities. Political a n d ethical (ethnic, cultural) forms of community must b e sepa­ rated: o n e presents itself in the singular, the other (in pluralist

societies)

in the plural. In the text on the "politics of recognition" already discussed (chapter 2 . 3 ) , Taylor argues explicidy for a "politics of difference" within C a n a d a as a whole, which would grant Q u e b e c as a "distinct society" a special "politics of the good." In this "politics of recognition," on the one hand, the political community of C a n a d a as a whole recognizes a weak form of procedural liberalism a n d defines c o m m o n citizenship not ethically, but so formally that even exceptions c o n c e r n i n g individual liberties (in Que­ bec) are possible—these liberties being the core content of liberal citizen­ ship. O n the other, within Q u e b e c "different" minorities must step back in consideration of the f r a n c o p h o n e form of life. Precisely the issues of school choice and language regulation, which Taylor ( 1 9 9 2 a , 5 2 - 5 3 ) addresses, are however particularly important for the symbolic recognition of ethical identities and for creating an inclusive political community (as discussions in U n i t e d States demonstrate; see Citrin et al. 1 9 9 0 ) . Definitions of citizen­ ship that generalize the ethical values of o n e form of life as the n o r m are in this case "difference-blind." If the thesis of a cultural-ethical, sittlich integration of political c o m m u ­ nity has to be a b a n d o n e d , can political life then continue to b e regarded to such a great d e g r e e as a central c o m p o n e n t of the g o o d life? Does this paradigm still d o justice to citizens' strong evaluations a n d to their concep­ tions of the virtuous life? T h e "virtues" of citizenship, in particular that of patriotism, not only have to be qualified by universalist norms, which ac­ cording to Taylor a political community also has to embody; they must also be grasped as political a n d not as ethical virtues. H e r e too, a third element is needed: pointing out the necessity of political virtues required in public discourses (tolerance a n d willingness to argue, for instance) does not have to m e a n hypostatizing these virtues into indispensable, strong evaluations of the g o o d life. Nonetheless, righdy emphasizing that the citizens of a democratic society must assume responsibility not only for themselves but also for the collective a n d thus for their fellow citizens—especially vis-a-vis other persons a n d collectives—does not m e a n that the citizens must iden­ tify with the political community in a way comparable to the loyalty to a family, to friends, or to an ethical community. H e n c e , in o r d e r to escape the "thin" paradigm of liberal rights relations, Taylor ethically overburdens

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

ion

not only the conceptions of citizen and political community but also the p r o c e d u r e of political legitimacy. F o r in political discourses it is not. pri­ marily the case that a prior identity is affirmed; rather, it is c h a n g e d and put into question, especially by groups hitherto e x c l u d e d from the defini­ tion of this identity. A political community c a n n o t affirm its history without questioning it—a history that is also the history of exclusion because of racial, class-defined, gender-specific, or also sittlich (in the sense of moresdefined) criteria. T h e idea of a c o m m o n ethical identity does not give e n o u g h r o o m to this necessity for calling into question the understanding of what does and does not belong to c o m m o n identity (cf. Wallach 1 9 8 7 ) . B u t even if Taylor's "republican thesis" does not do adequate justice to this kind of mediation between self-determination within social groups a n d the self-determination of all citizens, his question remains valid: how can a political community conceive of itself as one community, a n d what kind of virtues must citizens have? His answer is of course firmly guided by the Hegelian premise that the "alienation" of m o d e r n society a m o n g citizens and between citizens a n d state (Taylor 1 9 7 9 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 , 1 2 5 ) can b e coun­ tered by "strong identification" on the basis of c o m m o n ethical strong eval­ uations a n d on the basis of a c o m m o n sense of what the g o o d life is. T h i s kind of holistic reconciliation has been lost not in view of the "victory" of liberal individualism but in view of the plurality of forms of life a n d the accompanying conflicts about the definition of a c o m m o n political com­ munity. Walzer has e x a m i n e d the p r o b l e m of the e pluribus unum of a m o d e r n pluralist society, using the e x a m p l e of the U n i t e d States, and comes to a conclusion different from Taylor's. It is particularly the fact of ethnic plu­ rality that leads Walzer to return to H o r a c e Kallen's ( 1 9 2 4 ) theory of "cul­ tural pluralism" and to distinguish between ethnic communities a n d the political community as well as between ethical a n d political identity.

10

The

unity of the political community is guaranteed not through a c o m m o n cultural identity but through a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g political principles of liberal citizenship. "If the manyness of A m e r i c a is cultural, its oneness is political" (Walzer 1 9 9 2 b , 2 9 ) . "Citizenship" is a political, not a cultural concept. "In these circumstances, republicanism is a mirage, a n d A m e r i c a n nationalism or communitarianism is not a plausible option; it doesn't reach to o u r complexity" ( 4 7 ) . Nevertheless, Walzer qualifies Kallen's division between /w£&c-political a n d pnvate-c\\\t\xx2l identity in that he remarks that an ethnic culture cannot survive in a pure form in A m e r i c a n society a n d that ethnic identities play an important role at the political level t o o — a n d indeed especially insofar as ethnic communities d e m a n d political repre­ sentation in the political community's self-understanding a n d symbols. A l o n g with Kallen, however, Walzer is convinced that only a politically and not an ethically defined conception of political community and citizenship

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is in a position to integrate a pluralist society politically; a n d so Rawls's conception of society as a "social union of social unions" appears adequate (Walzer 1 9 9 0 a , 2 1 ) . Neither the liberal m o d e l of a division between privateethnic and political identity n o r the communitarian m o d e l of an ethically uniform identity can grasp a "multicultural" society: it has to find a m o d e of integration that mediates between necessary oneness a n d possible manyness, that does not exclude particular identities, and yet does not abandon a "comprehensive" identity. A multicultural society must find a collective identity that can resolve the dilemma of substanceless substance: on the one hand, not to understand political identity too substantively a n d marginalize minorities; but, on the other, not too weakly, so as to make political inte­ gration and social solidarity possible. T h e response to this problem must be a differentiated c o n c e p t of citizenship that connects ethical difference, legal equality, as well as political a n d social inclusion. T h e theory of a participatory-republican communitarianism, which is represented paradigmatically by B e n j a m i n Barber, provides a radically democratic response to the problem of a pluralist society's substanceless substance. In contrast to substantivist communitarianism, B a r b e r rejects the Hegelian thesis that a political community must have a cultural-ethical foundation and attempts to formulate, between a liberal-formal "thin" con­ ception of d e m o c r a c y and a "unitary" one, the third position of a "strong" democracy. A t its center stands the democratic self-rule of citizens as polit­ ically autonomous individuals w h o ascertain the c o m m o n g o o d discursively a n d argumentatively. Citizens are not "legal persons" o r "brothers" here, but "neighbors," c o n n e c t e d not through contractual relations or c o m m o n values but through c o m m o n practices. T h e consensus between them is not "generic" or "substantive," it is a dialogic "creative" one (Barber 1 9 8 4 , 2 1 9 ) . T h e alienation a n d privatization of citizens, which Barber also recognizes as a problem in liberal societies, can be redressed not by reference to a d e e p e r identity but through the c o m m o n political practice of citizens. Fol­ lowing Rousseau, B a r b e r writes: "We have lawyers, bankers, arbitragers, bro­ kers, doctors, teachers and workers e n o u g h . W e leave politics to the poli­ ticians. W h a t n e e d have we for citizens?" ( 1 9 8 7 , A 2 1 ) . Barber defines "strong democracy" as politics in the participatory mode where conflict is resolved in the absence of an independent ground through a participatory process of ongoing, proxi­ mate self-legislation and the creation of a political community capable of transforming dependent, private individuals into free citizens and partial and private interests into public goods. ( 1 9 8 4 , 1 3 2 ; italics omitted) Both the advantages a n d the problems of Barber's proposal are captured in this formulation. T h e advantages lie in his separation of citizenship and ethical membership, such that citizenship is a concept that corresponds to

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a c o m m o n discursive practice. With regard to the realization of these dis­ courses, B a r b e r presents a list of measures that ranges from local demo­ cratic self-administration to democratic access to m o d e r n means of com­ munication, from a v o u c h e r system for distributing social goods and opportunities (education, accommodation) to referenda a n d experiments with electronic balloting ( 1 9 8 4 , 2 6 7 - 3 1 1 ) . The

proposal's problems lie in its realization, which depends u p o n a

transformation of citizens from privately interested bourgeois into political citoyens, a transformation that comes about in political discourses. Citizens conceive of themselves as "comrades" ( 1 9 8 4 , 1 3 3 ) of a community that first gives them the possibility of self-development as individuals. 'Without par­ ticipating in the c o m m o n life that defines them a n d in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat, w o m e n a n d m e n cannot b e c o m e individ­ uals" (xv). Participation "is a way of defining the self, just as citizenship is a way of living" ( 1 5 3 ) . In political discourses, citizens are transformed into beings oriented to the c o m m o n good; discourses are a m e d i u m of c o m m o n living a n d experiencing, a m e d i u m with "the potential for empathetic a n d affective expression" ( 1 9 8 8 , 1 5 1 ) , a m e d i u m of personal-communal selfdevelopment. By means of political participation, the identity of citizens is transformed in the same way as the identity of a bachelor is c h a n g e d by marriage ( 1 9 8 9 , 6 3 - 4 ) . Citizenship consists in this metamorphosis b e y o n d the "hollow shell of legal personhood" ( 6 1 ) . T h u s there are two central premises that Barber shares with Rousseau: (a) democratic self-government is based on the citizens' virtue to subor­ dinate their individual interests to the c o m m o n g o o d a n d to regard this ability itself as a gain in freedom a n d self-development; (b) democratic selfg o v e r n m e n t is the autonomy of a body, of a sovereign people w h o speak with a single voice, namely, the voice of the c o m m o n g o o d a n d c o m m o n will that sublimates all individual interests, the voice of the volonte generate, which, as H a b e r m a s ( 1 9 8 9 c , 9 8 ) remarks, is "more a consensus of hearts than of arguments." T h e citizens' virtue sees to it that this will is not en­ d a n g e r e d by the plurality of individual interests. T h i s compromise of Rous­ seau's between the classical-republican principle of rule by the virtuous a n d the m o d e r n principle of rule by all, a compromise e m b o d i e d in the theory of rule by all as the virtuous, b u r d e n s Barber's m o d e l with an ethical over­ taxing of the conception of citizenship. Walzer criticizes this notion of citizenship, too. H e advances a n u m b e r of arguments (Walzer 1 9 8 0 a , 7 0 - 2 ; 1 9 9 1 ) . First, the Rousseauian c o n c e p ­ tion presupposes that the political community is a uniform totality that expresses o n e will, a n d consequendy the field of political decisions is grasped as a linearly structured field—a notion that does not take the com­ plexity of m o d e r n societies adequately into consideration.

11

S e c o n d , Walzer

points out that the political activity of citizens has its location not primarily

no

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

at the national political level but in the various associations a n d c o m m u ­ nities of civic life. F o r that reason h e argues that citizenship at the national level is m o r e a passive role. T h i r d , a c c o r d i n g to Walzer, the plurality of projections of the g o o d life in m o d e r n society does not let citizens regard political life as the realization of the g o o d life. N o conception of the g o o d — thus runs his central a r g u m e n t for a pluralist civil society—be it a repub­ lican, socialist, capitalist, or nationalist one, can claim priority in a society that is both c o m p l e x a n d fragmented in its political, social, a n d e c o n o m i c structures. Walzer's idea of "critical associationalism" in civil society is an attempt to c o n n e c t these conceptions of the g o o d social life: active citizenship is possible in associations of social life that are integrated through c o m m u n a l concerns a n d that as a g r o u p introduce these concerns into the political process; associations also use the (limited) possibilities of a market society to c h a n g e it by means of various initiatives ( 1 9 9 1 , 3 0 0 ) ; finally, Walzer sees in this form of society the possibility of a "domesticated nationalism" in which different ethnic, cultural, a n d religious communities a n d living ex­ periments coexist a n d continue to exist as distinct communities that can tolerate one another on account of their enjoying certain liberties in their cultural reproduction. B u t Walzer sees the p a r a d o x of this civil society in the fact that the citizens in all these associations and communities are still in a particular way m e m b e r s of the comprehensive political community. A n d not only by virtue of the fact that they are d e p e n d e n t u p o n the state to assert their interests, but also because they shape the comprehensive community's "common life" and are therefore responsible for this com­ munity as a whole. Citizens are m e m b e r s of individual communities and also m e m b e r s of the comprehensive community; over a n d above the g o o d of their community, they must attend to a n d promote the c o m m o n good. "Hence citizenship has a certain practical pre-eminence a m o n g all o u r ac­ tual and possible memberships" ( 3 0 2 ) . Walzer thereby addresses a central p r o b l e m of a theory that distinguishes between ethical communities and the political community. U n g e r ( 1 9 7 5 , 2 8 4 - 8 9 ) analyzes this as the "dilemma of communitarian politics," Bellah ( 1 9 9 1 ) as a conflict between "communalist pluralism" a n d "deep plural­ ism." H o w is a "social union of social unions" possible if citizens are divided in their loyalty between different communities? Tocqueville's optimistic assumption that participation in associations and m e m b e r s h i p in small communities will lead citizens to participate in the welfare of the general community can b e countered with the thesis that participation in smaller g r o u p s leads to a fragmentation of the political community. T h e prob­ lem consists not in mediating between the individual a n d the c o m m u n ­ ity, but in mediating between different communities, not in mediating be­ tween the "unencumbered," "atomistic" self a n d the citizen obligated to

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

i n

the community, but in mediating between the communities to which a citizen feels obligated, a citizen w h o stands between "family," "tribe," and "nation." Walzer circumscribes this dilemma, which communitarian theo­ ries disregard in favor of the conception of an ethically integrated political community, with the c o n c e p t of "pluralist citizenship" (Walzer 1 9 7 0 , 2 1 9 2 0 ) . "Pluralism builds loyalty not only toward the state but also against it." This dilemma of divided loyalty, Walzer argues, is not completely resolva­ ble; it can however b e c o m e politically productive in that the m e m b e r s of particular communities recognize that they have a relation of mutual de­ p e n d e n c y with other communities and try to find a fair balance of political representation, which is b r o u g h t about through procedures of argumen­ tation a n d interest offsetting. T h e r e is a further thought. J u s t as it cannot be assumed that all the citizens of a political community feel obligated to this community alone, so it c a n n o t b e supposed that they feel obligated only or primarily to o n e single ethical community or particular association. Loyalties are not then tragically divided but are in m a n y cases multiplied ( 1 9 9 2 d , 1 7 1 ) . T h e iden­ tity of a person is connected with different roles in different communities, and identity as a citizen is j u s t o n e of these; it is however a general one, or rather the only one that all have in c o m m o n . T h e connecting principle of c o m m o n citizenship must be in a position to create an orientation to the c o m m o n g o o d without assuming m o r e commonality than formally defined (though not "formally" perceived) membership in a political community (see Walzer 1 9 9 2 c , 2 9 5 ) . A democratic state has the task of p r o m o t i n g associations and communities, but it cannot replace them. A n d , paradox­ ically e n o u g h , it is precisely the plurality of ties that citizens have in such a community that creates commonality: as m e m b e r s of certain communities, citizens in a democratic-pluralist society also make their d e m a n d s on them­ selves as m e m b e r s of other communities. T h e y are trade unionists, c h u r c h members, m e m b e r s of political parties, and taxpayers all at the same time; that means that societal dividing lines are not drawn such as to create strict dichotomies. B u t where lines are drawn, as is the case in certain social conflicts, citizens are called u p o n as citizens of a state to present their arguments in a way that can b e generally accepted: for such claims there is only o n e addressee, the community of all citizens. H e n c e , even in the absence of an ethical identity encompassing all citizens, they speak not a purely individualist or particularist language but o n e addressed to the com­ munity of all; a n d where they c a n n o t appeal to c o m m o n values or concep­ tions of the good, they appeal to agreement on the basis of a consensus on c o m m o n basic principles of mutual recognition a n d responsibility. T h i s responsibility cannot then be a responsibility j u s t for oneself o r a respon­ sibility for a community substantively embodying one's own identity; rather, it is the individuals' responsibility for and to their fellow citizens with w h o m

112

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

they a r e c o n n e c t e d in a political collective o f responsibility; responsibility m e a n s h e r e r e s p o n d i n g to o n e ' s fellow citizens a n d b e i n g able to justify oneself to them.

3.3.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND DELIBERATIVE

DEMOCRACY

F r o m t h e discussion s o f a r it follows that w h a t questions o f (a) political integration,

( b ) c i t i z e n s h i p , a n d ( c ) p o l i t i c a l l e g i t i m a c y r e q u i r e is a t h e o r y

b e y o n d liberalism a n d communitarianism,

o n e that assimilates

elements

f r o m b o t h sides. (a) A t t h e level o f political i n t e g r a t i o n it h a s b e e n s e e n that, i n r e s p o n s e to t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e "substanceless s u b s t a n c e " o f a n ethically pluralist, but also responsible, solidary political community, a n answer must b e f o u n d that accepts the separation between "ethnos" a n d "demos" (Lepsius 1990) as t h e starting p o i n t ; t h e political c o m m u n i t y is n o t a n ethical, "constitutive" c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h t h e identity o f subjects is f o r m e d i n a w a y that consti­ tutes their personality a n d self-image. T h e m a n n e r in w h i c h H e g e l raised the topic o f the political c o m m u n i t y permits o f course only the following alternative: M i n d h a s a c t u a l i t y , a n d i n d i v i d u a l s a r e a c c i d e n t s o f this a c t u a l i t y . T h u s i n d e a l i n g w i t h e t h i c a l life, o n l y t w o v i e w s a r e p o s s i b l e : e i t h e r w e s t a r t f r o m t h e substantiality o f t h e ethical o r d e r , o r else w e p r o c e e d atomistically a n d b u i l d o n the basis o f single individuals. T h i s s e c o n d p o i n t o f view e x c l u d e s m i n d [geistlos] b e c a u s e it l e a d s o n l y t o a j u x t a p o s i t i o n . M i n d , h o w e v e r , i s n o t s o m e ­ t h i n g s i n g l e , b u t is t h e u n i t y o f t h e s i n g l e a n d t h e u n i v e r s a l . ( 1 9 6 7 , 2 6 1 [ a d ­ dition to § 1 5 6 ] ) A third e l e m e n t m u s t b e a d d e d to this d i c h o t o m y . T h epolitical c o m m u n i t y is n e i t h e r a " c o n v e r g e n t " g o o d i n w h i c h s u b j e c t i v e p r e f e r e n c e s c o n v e r g e , a n d w h i c h is dissolvable i n these, n o r a n " i m m e d i a t e l y " c o m m o n g o o d that, s i m i l a r t o f r i e n d s h i p a s a v a l u e , is a j o i n t l y s h a r e d g o o d a p p r e c i a t e d f o r its o w n s a k e ( T a y l o r 1 9 8 9 b , 1 6 8 - 6 9 ) . N e i t h e r a p u r e l y subjective, n o r a n objec­ tive, b u t a n intersubjective g o o d , t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y i s a c o m m u n i t y o f politically a u t o n o m o u s citizens w h o p e r c e i v e it a s a " g o o d " t o t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h it p r o v i d e s t h e (institutional a n d material) p r e c o n d i t i o n s f o r all to be able to understand

t h e m s e l v e s as full

members.

J u s t as t h e central H e g e l i a n assumption o f a political c o m m u n i t y as a n ethically integrated

macrosubject

seauian assumption

o f a principle o f popular sovereignty as a sovereign

must

b e qualified, so must

the Rous-

b o d y constituted b y t h e citizens a n d r e p l a c i n g t h e b e h e a d e d k i n g . I t is t h e plurality o f ethical a n d associative c o m m u n i t i e s existing within the frame­ w o r k o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y t h a t fills t h i s f r a m e w o r k a n d f o r m s i t i n t o a totality that is i n a c o n t i n u o u s p r o c e s s o f r e d e f i n i t i o n . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e

THE E T H O S OF DEMOCRACY

debate about the concrete determination

1 / 3

of a political community's char­

acter a n d identity also p r e s u p p o s e s the existence o f such a political identity as the r e f e r e n c e p o i n t a n d subject m a t t e r o f the controversy. (b) W i t h r e g a r d to the c o n c e p t i o n o f citizenship, this h a s the f o l l o w i n g implications. E v e n if citizenship m u s t b e d e f i n e d "formally" insofar as the a c q u i s i t i o n o f the rights to b e a full citizen c a n n o t b e c o n n e c t e d to cultural, e t h n i c , o r e t h i c a l c r i t e r i a , a n d p o l i t i c a l life is n o t c o n s i d e r e d a s p e c i a l f o r m o f t h e g o o d life, t h e c o n c e p t o f " p o l i t i c a l v i r t u e s " is still n e e d e d . T h e s e a r e n o t e t h i c a l v i r t u e s b u t " l i b e r a l " v i r t u e s s u c h a s t o l e r a n c e a n d f a i r n e s s ; "di­ a l o g i c " virtues like willingness to c o o p e r a t e a n d a r g u e as well as the to r e a c h a consensus;

finally,

also " c o m m u n a l " virtues s u c h as

effort

assuming

responsibility f o r the c o m m u n i t y ( o f all fellow citizens). M u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n as citizens thus e n c o m p a s s e s n o t o n l y r e c o g n i t i o n o f ethical d i f f e r e n c e a n d legal equality b u t also of j o i n t political responsibility. Finally, the status o f full m e m b e r s h i p h a s in a c e r t a i n s e n s e inevitably "substantive" p r e s u p p o ­ sitions: in r e s p e c t o f the social, material c o n d i t i o n s o f participating

with

e q u a l r i g h t s in political a n d s o c i a l life. (c) A c c o r d i n g to the liberal theory o f d e m o c r a t i c legitimacy, the c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e a s s u b s t a n t i v e c r i t e r i a f o r w h a t is a r g u a b l e in enjoy

priority

over the

procedural

principle

of democratic

prin­

discourses legitimacy,

w h e r e a s a c c o r d i n g to the substantivist, c o m m u n i t a r i a n version, l e g i t i m a c y can only m e a n c o n g r u e n c e with a n a n t e c e d e n t collective identity. T h e par­ ticipatory lective

position i m b e d s the p r o c e d u r e o f discursive legitimacy in a col­ of virtuous

restrictedly—in

the

citoyens r a t h e r

than

liberal m a n n e r — o r

understand

political

discourses

substantivistically—in the

com­

m u n i t a r i a n m a n n e r . It c a n b e e x p e c t e d o f discourses rather t h a n o f indi­ v i d u a l subjects (in their "private use o f r e a s o n " ) that they b r i n g "particular" arguments into a "public" f o r m — a form that m a k e s argumentation refutation

o r acceptance possible. A n ethically pluralist c o m m u n i t y

and does

not collapse into a multitude o f ethical worlds a n d languages. Conversely, neither

identity n o r participation

c a n b e c o n c e i v e d o f a c c o r d i n g to

the

H e g e l i a n m o d e l o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e substantive totality o r the R o u s s e a u i a n m o d e l o f a collective as the u n i f i e d s o v e r e i g n with a n a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g will. M o r e r e c e n t a p p r o a c h e s in d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y a t t e m p t to d r a w these "deHegelianizing" and

"de-Rousseauianizing" consequences:

the

theory

of

"civil s o c i e t y " a n d t h e m o d e l o f " d e l i b e r a t i v e d e m o c r a c y . " T h e i r o b j e c t i v e is t o r e p l a c e t h e n o t i o n with the

o f an ethically integrated political macrosubject

theory of a plurality of democratic forms a n d associations that

treat questions of legitimacy argumentatively in institutionalized a n d

non-

institutionalized political-public discourses, q u e s t i o n s that n e e d to b e tack­ led in a pluralist a n d c o m p l e x society. T h e c o n c e p t o f "civil s o c i e t y " c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d

in various ways. A c ­

c o r d i n g to o n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it d e s i g n a t e s a n i n n e r - s o c i e t a l s u b s e c t i o n o f

114

T

H

E

ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

associations a n dpublic spheres in w h i c h citizens discuss c o m m o n p r o b l e m s a n d interests a n d , if n e e d b e , interject their justice claims into politically institutionalized p r o c e s s e s (see H a b e r m a s 1996a, 3 6 6 - 7 9 ; C o h e n a n d A r ­ a t o 1 9 9 2 , c h s . 9 a n d 1 0 ) . H e r e , h o w e v e r , a strict c o n t r a s t i n g o f civil s o c i e t y a n d t h e p o l i t i c a l s y s t e m is t o b e a v o i d e d , f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y is t h e total context o f t h e f o r u m s o f c i v i l s o c i e t y , t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h p e r s o n s a s c i t i z e n s a r e both a u t h o r s o f n o r m a t i v e c l a i m s ( d i r e c t e d a t t h e s t a t e ) and t h e addressees o f these claims. A m o r e b r o a d l y g r a s p e d c o n c e p t o f "political civil s o c i e t y " t h e r e f o r e d e s i g n a t e s m o r e t h a n a s o c i a l s u b s e c t i o n : it is a " c o m ­ m u n i t y o fsocial c o m m u n i t i e s " in w h i c h political action isc o n v e y e d t h r o u g h a plurality o f associations a n d communities, a plurality in w h i c h are connected

as citizens, h o w e v e r . H e n c e , W a l z e r ( 1 9 9 1 , 3 0 1 - 3 ;

persons 1992c,

2 8 8 - 8 9 ) says, t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e r o l e o f c i t i z e n s h i p : t h e state is n e i t h e r a p a s s i v e f r a m e w o r k f o r civil s o c i e t y n o r a r e a l m stricdy s e p a r a t e d f r o m it n o r its a c t i v e , a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g c e n t e r ; r a t h e r , i t is t h e l o c a t i o n a n d i n s t r u m e n t f o r j o i n d y c o o r d i n a t i n g generally j u s t i f i e d s o c i a l l i f e . S u c h a c i v i l s o c i e t y r e ­ quires t h e deliberative legitimation o f law i n p r o c e d u r e s o f "public justifi­ cation" as well as a f o r m o f political integration that d o e s justice both to societal plurality a n d to the necessity o f certain conditions f o r t h e realiza­ tion o f deliberative democracy. T h e d e g r e e to which recent theories o f d e m o c r a c y represent alternatives to liberalism a n d communitarianism in respect o f these p r o b l e m s is investigated i n w h a t follows.

(a) The Theory of Civil Society It w a s n o t b y c h a n c e t h a t t h e r e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f civil s o c i e t y w e n t h a n d in h a n d with the m o v e m e n t against totalitarianism (in the coun­ tries o f state socialism) o r that, i n m a n y o f t h e guises i n w h i c h t h e theory a p p e a r e d , it h a d its o r i g i n s t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t i n T o c q u e v i l l e ( t h o u g h h e himself did n o t so employ the concept). F o r Tocqueville, asAlbrecht Wellm e r (1998a) r e m a r k s , is t h e o n e w h o p o s e s t h e H e g e l i a n q u e s t i o n o f t h e possibility o finstitutionalizing f r e e d o m b u t u n l i k e H e g e l a n s w e r s it n o t with t h e o b j e c t i v e e t h i c a l life o f the state b u t w i t h t h e e x e r c i s e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e p a r t i c i p a t o r y f r e e d o m i n a s s o c i a t i o n s o f civil a n d p o l i t i c a l life. "Civil society" thus denotes n o t H e g e l ' s "bourgeois society," the "system o f n e e d s " as t h e s p h e r e o f e c o n o m i c - l e g a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p e r s o n s , b u t t h e s p h e r e o f cit­ izens' political f r e e d o m to practice democratic participation i n m a n a g e a b l e units. I n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e aristocrat A l e x i s d e T o c q u e v i l l e , this c o m m u ­ nicative f r e e d o m h a s a d o u b l e antitotalitarian

direction o f thrust. First, it

c r e a t e s those i n t e r m e d i a t e p o w e r s that o n c e m e d i a t e d i n t h e f o r m o f aris­ tocratic persons between t h e p e o p l e a n d t h e ruler a n d b r o u g h t about a n infrastructure that f a c e d u p to a b s o l u t e rule. I n this way, s e c o n d , n o t o n l y is a b u l w a r k a g a i n s t t y r a n n i c a l r u l e e r e c t e d , b e it t h e r u l e o f a m o n a r c h o r

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

/ / M 7 - 4 ) M o d e r n "liberal republicans" like S u n s t e i n ignore the conflict-ridden

1 9

or Frank Michelman d o not

character o f modern

societies b u t believe that

the ideal o f deliberative politics cannot d o without a strong c o n c e p t i o n o f " c i v i c s e n s e . " ' T h e persuasive c h a r a c t e r o f t h e p r o c e s s d e p e n d s o n t h e n o r ­ m a t i v e efficacy o f s o m e c o n t e x t that is e v e r y o n e ' s — o f t h e p a s t t h a t is c o n ­ stitutively p r e s e n t i n a n d f o r every self a s l a n g u a g e , culture, w o r l d v i e w , a n d p o l i t i c a l m e m o r y " ( M i c h e l m a n 1 9 8 8 , 1 5 1 3 ; cf. P e r r y 1 9 8 8 , 1 5 2 - 6 0 ) . ocratic-communicative

a c t i o n is t h e r e f o r e

the affirmation

of a

Dem­

"common

life" o r e v e n "a p r o c e s s o f p e r s o n a l self-revision u n d e r social-dialogic stim­ ulation"

(Michelman

1988, 1528). T h e possibility o f r e a c h i n g

presupposes an antecedent

consensus

c o m m u n a l i t y o f citizens as c o m m u n a l

beings.

T h e sensus communis o f j u d g i n g j o i n t l y , a s A r e n d t ( 1 9 7 7 a , 2 2 3 ) t o o u n d e r ­ s t o o d this, is t h e a f f i r m a t i o n

of a common

world a n d at the same

time

p e r s o n s ' "disclosure" o f themselves in t h e "sphere o f public life." T h e sub­ j e c t m a t t e r o f d e l i b e r a t i o n , says R o n a l d B e i n e r ( 1 9 8 3 , 1 3 8 , 1 5 2 ) , is t h e t w o questions W h o a r e we, a n d W h o a m I? Yet this c o n c e p t i o n an ethical community

assimilates the political c o m m u n i t y t o o strongly to (as the place o f self-realization). T h e g e n e r a l

lan­

g u a g e o f c o n s e n s u s , c o m p r o m i s e s , o r m a j o r i t y d e c i s i o n s is n o t a n e t h i c a l l a n g u a g e of j o i n t self-discovery b u t o n e resting o n reasons a n d o n e in w h i c h the

particularity

o f "individual languages" continues

to b e recognizable.

T h i s c o n c e p t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s citizens w h o w a n t t o r e g u l a t e t h e i r s o c i a l life together

according to n o r m s that a r e in t h e best possible interest o fall.

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

The

sensus communis i m p l i e d h e r e c o n s i s t s i n t h e m u t u a l

735

recognition of

citizens as fellow citizens to w h o m o n e m u s t rationally justify o n e ' s o w n claims a n d w h o have the right to p u t forward a n d defend their o w n claims. C i t i z e n s m u s t b e c a p a b l e o f e x e r c i s i n g political autonomy—of

rationally a n d

responsibly b i n d i n g their actions to self-given laws. T h e political responsi­ b i l i t y o f c i t i z e n s a s " c o - a u t h o r s " o f l a w h a s b o t h a dialogic d i m e n s i o n — h a v ­ i n g t o " r e s p o n d " t o f e l l o w c i t i z e n s i n a r e s p o n s i b l e m a n n e r — a n d a collective one—citizens are j o i n d y responsible f o r the actions o f the collective. M a c l n t y r e h a s laid e m p h a s i s o n t h e latter d i m e n s i o n . I n his o p i n i o n , individualist o r proceduralist concepts d o n o t adequately explain actions of the collective: without b e l o n g i n g ethically to o n e ' s o w n nation,

citizens

cannot assume such a responsibility: I m a y legally b e a citizen o f a certain country; b u t I c a n n o t b e h e l d responsible for what m y country does o r has d o n e unless I choose implicidy o r explicidy t o a s s u m e s u c h r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . S u c h i n d i v i d u a l i s m is e x p r e s s e d b y t h o s e A m e r ­ icans w h o d e n y a n y responsibility f o r t h e effects o f slavery u p o n b l a c k A m e r ­ icans, saying "I n e v e r o w n e d a n y slaves."

[T]he young German who be­

lieves that b e i n g b o r n after 1 9 4 5 m e a n s that w h a t Nazis d i d to J e w s h a s n o m o r a l r e l e v a n c e to his relationship to his J e w i s h c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , e x h i b i t [ s ] t h e s a m e a t t i t u d e , t h a t a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e s e l f is d e t a c h a b l e f r o m its s o c i a l a n d historical roles a n d statuses. (1984a, 2 2 0 - 2 1 ) H e r e M a c l n t y r e identifies a p r o b l e m that relates to a c o m p l e x c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n o f historical-political a n d m o r a l points o f view. F o r , o n the o n e h a n d , h e r i g h d y refers to t h e fact that p e r s o n s as "situated" citizens h a v e concrete obligations that follow from

their m e m b e r s h i p

in a

spatiotem-

porally located a n d acting collective, a n d to the fact that these obligations a r e o f a historical-political n a t u r e : o n e h a s t h e m a s a m e m b e r o f t h i s p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y . I n a n o r m a t i v e r e s p e c t , o n t h e o t h e r , t h e s e special r e s p o n s i b i l ­ ities—for instance, f o r the "crimes" (Maclntyre 1984b, 16) o f the political c o m m u n i t y — g r o w o u t o f t h e universal moral d u t i e s o n e h a s t o h u m a n b e ­ i n g s a s human beings. W i t h h i s e t h i c a l m o n i s m , M a c l n t y r e c a n n o t h o w e v e r adequately spell o u t what the universal standard

is f o r t h e c r i m e s t h a t a

collective perpetrates o n "other" persons o r collectives since h e recognizes o n l y s t a n d a r d s t h a t a r e l o c a t e d within t r a d i t i o n s a n d c o l l e c t i v e s . C i t i z e n s b o r n l a t e r d o h a v e a c e r t a i n i n d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s u c h d e e d s as m e m ­ b e r s o f a political collective a n d its history ("as" G e r m a n s , "as" A m e r i c a n s ) ; t h e y h a v e i t h o w e v e r by reason of a. m o r a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the victims ( a m o r a l responsibility j u d g e d a c c o r d i n g to universalist s t a n d a r d s ) . I n that s e n s e it is n o t e t h i c a l l y g r o u n d e d . H e r e it b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t n o t o n l y t o w h a t e x t e n t citizens as m e m b e r s o f a political c o m m u n i t y h a v e substantive obligations of a mutual k i n d a n d ones to third parties, b u t also that political collectives m u s t live u p to certain m o r a l principles. T h e c o n t e n t o f s u c h — d i r e c t o r

136

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

i n d i r e c t — o b l i g a t i o n s t o third parties is ultimately a question o f c o n c r e t e cases in consideration o f their temporal a n d moral dimensions.

2 0

Responsibility asm e m b e r s o fthe political c o m m u n i t y does h o w e v e r have a further collective dimension: as citizens' responsibility f o r o n e a n o t h e r i n t h e s e n s e o f t h e realization o f a c c e p t e d c l a i m s t o r e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e f o r m o f rights a n d benefits. H e r e lies t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f civic solidarity: a political c o m m u n i t y is a c o m m u n i t y o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n

and r e a l i z a t i o n o f e q u a l

rights a n d duties, w h i c h constitute t h e status o f a "full" m e m b e r

of the

community. T h i s dimension leads to the question o f a theory o f social jus­ tice, w h i c h will b e d e a l t with i n t h e n e x t section. T o s u m u p , it c a n b e said that t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s interpreta­ tions a n d aspects o f a theory o f deliberative d e m o c r a c y h a s demonstrated the possibility o f reformulating liberal, feminist, a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n

con­

cerns within the framework o f a process o f finding, problematizing, a n d redefining a general language. T h e general language o f political discourse m u s t b e general e n o u g h t o g u a r a n t e e r a t i o n a l i t y a n d f a i r n e s s , open e n o u g h t o p e r m i t c r i t i q u e a n d c l a i m s t o r e c o g n i t i o n , a n d strong e n o u g h t o r e a l i z e recognition in a responsible a n d solidary manner. T h e legitimacy o f p o l i t i c a l n o r m s a n d d e c i s i o n s p r e s u p p o s e s , i n t h e s e n s e of the requirement o f general justification a n d "public reason," processes of deliberative preference a n dj u d g m e n t formation within a n d between associations a n d communities, processes that enter into

institutionalized

p r o c e d u r e s o f will f o r m a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g . T h e n o r m a t i v e integration o f a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y i s c o n s t i t u t e d plurality therefore

of communities, be

understood

associations, as a n

forms

ethical

o f life;

community

it itself in

the

by a

cannot identity-

c o n s t i t u t i n g s e n s e . T h o u g h its m e m b e r s d o n o t s h a r e a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d life, they d o h a v e a c o m m o n past, p r e s e n t , a n d future. T h e c o m m o n ­ alities o f all citizens a r e to b e f o u n d i n a s h a r e d political practice a n d i n values a n d self-understandings

that m u s t b e justifiable over against the

claims o f those w h o w e r e e x c l u d e d f r o m this c o m m o n identity. T h e collec­ tive i d e n t i t y o f a n e t h i c a l l y , e t h n i c a l l y , a n d r e l i g i o u s l y p l u r a l i s t s o c i e t y c o n ­ s i s t s o f m o r e t h a n t h e m e r e principles o f i n c l u s i o n ( e q u a l r i g h t s a n d c o m ­ mon

political institutions),

it consists

o f t h e history o f e x c l u s i o n a n d

inclusion, the history o f c o m m o n experiences. T h i s qualification applies n o t only to a "multicultural" society like t h e U n i t e d States; it is n o t only in the sense o f "polyethnicity" o r "multinationality" that m a n y countries today are "multiethical," b u t also in the sense o f a plurality o freligions a n d forms o f life. I n a n o r m a t i v e s e n s e , h o w e v e r , a political c o m m u n i t y is n o t a l r e a d y "multicultural" w h e n it consists o fdifferent cultures, b u t w h e n t h e c o m m o n political identity represents these particular identities appropriately. A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d ,

2 1

citizenship i s a c o m p l e x c o n c e p t , f o r i t m u s t

simultaneously e n c o m p a s s ethical-cultural difference, legal equality, a n d

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

13J

p o l i t i c a l c o m m o n a l i t y . C i t i z e n s m u s t r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r a s ethical per­ sons, a s legal persons, a n d a s fellow citizens i n t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e a n d t h e i r s a m e ­ ness. Civil rights thus c o m p r i s e individual rights to personal political rights

to participation,

a n d social rights

to share

autonomy, society's re­

s o u r c e s , w h i c h constitute t h e status o f full m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e political c o m ­ munity. "Citizenship" c a n therefore b e understood o n the o n e h a n d as a status d e f i n e d b y c e r t a i n r i g h t s , b u t o n t h e o t h e r a s a process o f a c q u i r i n g a n d e x t e n d i n g r i g h t s (cf. M a r s h a l l 1 9 9 2 ) . T h i s t h e o r y o f t h e d i f f e r e n t d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e c o n c e p t o f c i t i z e n s h i p is a r e s p o n s e t o t h e dilemma of the substanceless substance o f a p l u r a l i s t d e m o c ­ racy: h o w is this d e m o c r a c y t o c r e a t e a p o l i t i c a l entity t h a t is n e i t h e r s o s t r o n g t h a t it m a r g i n a l i z e s identities n o r s o w e a k that it r u l e s o u t s o c i a l stability a n d solidarity? I n v i e w o f t h e plurality o f ethical c o n c e p t i o n s , a politically inclusive c o m m u n i t y c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d in a n ethically sub­ stantive m a n n e r — i n

this s e n s e , political m e m b e r s h i p is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d

formally. A n d yet, to avoid material exclusion through

social inequality,

m e m b e r s h i p in the political c o m m u n i t y must b e understood

substantively

i n a n o t h e r s e n s e : i n r e f e r e n c e t o s o c i a l r i g h t s . T h i s legal and social i n c l u s i o n m a k e s it ultimately possible f o r t h e citizens to participate i n a

politically

substantive sense in justification discourses a n d to conceive o f themselves as part o f a political c o m m u n i t y o f responsibility. I n t h e t w olatter respects, m e m b e r s h i p i n a political c o m m u n i t y is n o t "substanceless." T h e m a t e r i a l social s i g n i f i c a n c e o f this c o n c e p t o f citizenship, w h i c h l e a d s to t h e q u e s t i o n o f social j u s t i c e , is t o b e e x a m i n e d m o r e c l o s e l y i n w h a t follows. T h i s q u e s t i o n is a n i n s e p a r a b l e p a r t o f t h e "ethos" o f a d e m ­ ocratic political community.

3.4.

CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

T h e question o f social justice revolves a r o u n d the significance a n d impli­ c a t i o n s o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f f u l l m e m b e r s h i p , a p r i n c i p l e t h a t is i n d i s p e n s a b l e in a d e m o c r a t i c community. T h u s T . H . Marshall (1992, 18) writes: C i t i z e n s h i p is a status b e s t o w e d o n t h o s e w h o a r e full m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u ­ nity. . . . [ S ] o c i e t i e s i n w h i c h c i t i z e n s h i p is a d e v e l o p i n g i n s t i t u t i o n c r e a t e a n i m a g e o f a n ideal citizenship against which achievement c a n b e m e a s u r e d a n d towards which aspiration c a n b e directed. T h e urge forward along the p a t h t h u s p l o t t e d is a n u r g e t o w a r d s a f u l l e r m e a s u r e o f e q u a l i t y , a n e n r i c h ­ m e n t o f t h e stuff o f w h i c h t h e s t a t u s is m a d e a n d a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e n u m b e r o f t h o s e o n w h o m t h e status is b e s t o w e d . Marshall emphasizes, furthermore, that the twentieth century h a s h a d the task o f realizing t h e p r i n c i p l e o f citizens' "equal social w o r t h " (24) a s a n "absolute r i g h t to a certain s t a n d a r d o f civilisation" (26) i n r e s p e c t o f t h e

138

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

d i m e n s i o n o f social rights ( c f . B a r b a l e t 1 9 8 8 ; D . M i l l e r 1 9 8 9 ) . T o b e r e c ­ o g n i z e d as a citizen with equal rights m e a n s having social rights to partic­ i p a t e i n social a n d c u l t u r a l life, it m e a n s h a v i n g t h e m e a n s t o l e a d a "social" life, t h a t is t o say, o n e w o r t h y o f r e c o g n i t i o n a c c o r d i n g to t h e s t a n d a r d s o f the particular society—having the m e a n s to realize "liberal" a n d "demo­ cratic" rights. T h e principle o f equal citizenship forms the core o f both Rawls's a n d Walzer's theories o f social justice, the two most far-reaching

conceptions

in this respect. T h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s a r e l o c a t e d i n t h e interpretation

o f this

principle. W h a t g o o d s a r e to b e distributed according to what criteria in o r d e r t o fill o u t a p p r o p r i a t e l y t h e s o c i a l d i m e n s i o n o f e q u a l c i v i l r i g h t s ? W a l z e r ' s c r i t i q u e o f R a w l s i n Spheres of Justice ( 1 9 8 3 ) r e p r e s e n t s a c o m m u ­ n i t a r i a n c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l b u t is d e s i g n a t e d "social d e m o c r a t i c " b y W a l z e r h i m s e l f ( 1 9 9 0 a , 6 - 7 ; 1 9 9 2 c , 2 8 7 ) a n d c l a i m s t o r e s t o n liberal p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f s p h e r e s ( 1 9 8 4 ) . H e r e it is r e m a r k a b l e t h a t W a l z e r d o e s not highlight the ethically a n d culturally pluralist nature o f political com­ munities in his theory o f distributive justice b u t determines t h e m as "com­ m u n i t i e s o f c h a r a c t e r " (1983, 6 2 ) , as c o m m u n i t i e s with particular, histor­ ically d e v e l o p e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d , with a "substantive life" ( 3 1 3 ) . T h e p l u r a l i s m at t h e c e n t e r o f t h e t h e o r y o f " s p h e r e s o f j u s t i c e " is a p l u ­ ralism o f spheres o f distribution o n the basis o f "shared

understandings."

T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f p l u r a l i s m is distinct f r o m a n ethical-cultural p l u r a l i s m , as W a l z e r ( 1 9 9 2 c , 290) r e m a r k s self-critically, a n d t h e r e is a c e r t a i n t e n s i o n b e t w e e n the two, o n e that d o e s n o t lead to a contradiction only if t h e s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y a n d its " c h a r a c t e r " a r e n o t d e ­ t e r m i n e d ethically. T h i s latter point suggests a n interpretation o f his theory o n the basis o f the principle o f political-autonomous a n d social m e m b e r ­ ship, a n interpretation

Walzer himself (1993b) puts forward. H e n c e , de­

spite important differences, a c o m m o n intention o n the part o f t h e theories o f R a w l s a n d W a l z e r c a n b e identified: it puts w h a t M a r s h a l l refers to as "ideal citizenship," the ideal o f a self-respecting recognized m e m b e r o f a pluralist political community, at the center o f a conception o f social justice. Rawls's theory attempts to justify principles o f equal liberties a n d prin­ ciples o f social equality f r o m the s a m e root: f r o m the thought

experiment

o f c h o o s i n g principles i n a fair initial situation, t h e original position. With the h e l p o f t h e " m o r a l g e o m e t r y " ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 2 1 ) o f this initial situation, h e a t t e m p t s t o c o n c e p t u a l i z e a n " i d e a l t h e o r y " (9) o f j u s t i c e b u t a d m i t s h o w ­ e v e r "that f o r e a c h traditional c o n c e p t i o n o f justice there exists a n inter­ p r e t a t i o n o f t h e initial situation i n w h i c h its p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h e p r e f e r r e d solution" ( 1 2 1 ) . H e n c e , Rawls's "ideal theory" is b a s e d o n a particular j u s ­ tification

o f t h e fair o r i g i n a l position, a n d this justification is l o c a t e d i n a n

"ideal o f the person" (1975a, 94)—characterized

by the two moral pow­

ers—to which there corresponds a n ideal o f social cooperation a m o n g per-

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY 1

sons w h o have incompatible conceptions o f the g o o d a n d a c o m m o n

3

9

sense

of justice. R a w l s restricts h i s initial a s s u m p t i o n s i n a twofold m a n n e r : principles to b e a g r e e d refer j u s t to the institutional

society ("the w a y in w h i c h the major social institutions rights a n d duties a n d determine

the justice

basic structure o f a distribute

the division o f advantages from

basic social

c o o p e r a t i o n " [ 1 9 7 1 , 7 ] ) ; a n d o n l y p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l primary goods a r e t o b e distributed,

n a m e l y , "rights a n d liberties, p o w e r s a n d opportunities, in­

c o m e a n d w e a l t h " (62) a n d , a s "the m o s t i m p o r t a n t p r i m a r y g o o d " (440), t h e s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f s e l f - r e s p e c t . T h i s list o f p r i m a r y g o o d s fulfills

a

central function: it presents t h e g o o d s that a r e sufficiently d e f i n e d i n f o r m a l terms to serve as "all-purpose m e a n s " (1982b,

167), as necessary means for

realizing o n e ' s o w n individual notions o f the g o o d ; a n d a r e sufficiently defined in substantive terms to provide a criterion f o r equal

opportunity

in society. T h e list o f p r i m a r y g o o d s f o r m s t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e d e c i s i o n of the parties in the original position to find principles that distribute

these

g o o d s as justly as possible without sacrificing individual liberty to equality, or vice versa. T h e parties in the original position are e q u i p p e d with the capacity to reflect rationally, a n d to d o s o o n t h e basis o f certain information the "circumstances of justice" ( 1 2 7 - 2 8 )

about

a n d about basic questions o f eco­

n o m i c a n d societal organization ( 1 3 7 - 3 8 ) : scarce resources, conditions o f e c o n o m i c efficiency, subjective interests, p l a n s o f life, a n d t h e c a p a c i t y f o r social c o o p e r a t i o n a r e p r e s u p p o s e d . B y m e a n s o f t h e veil o f i g n o r a n c e t h e parties a r e forced to p u t themselves in the place o f every h u m a n

being

e x i s t i n g i n this society, w h e t h e r h e o r s h e is a t a l e n t e d , w e a l t h y , successful, o r u n s u c c e s s f u l h u m a n b e i n g , w h e t h e r h e o r s h e is i n this o r t h a t g e n e r a ­ tion. T h i s construction o f t h e original position results in allp e r s o n s finding themselves i n the s a m e situation a n d in choosing principles o f equality that ensure (a) that every h u m a n b e i n g c a n realize his o r h e r talents a n d plans o f life a n d ( b ) t h a t this r e a l i z a t i o n takes p l a c e i n c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e that prevent inequalities f r o m d e v e l o p i n g to d e n y part o f the population these opportunities. T h u s the parties o f the original position choose the following principles: F I R S T

P R I N C I P L E

E a c h p e r s o n is to have a n equal right to the m o s t extensive total system o f equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system o f liberty for all. S E C O N D

P R I N C I P L E

Social a n d e c o n o m i c inequalities a r e to b e a r r a n g e d so that they a r e both: (a) to t h e greatest benefit o f t h e least advantaged, consistent with the j u s t savings principle, a n d (b) a t t a c h e d to offices a n d positions o p e n to all u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f fair equality o f opportunity. ( 1 9 7 1 , 3 0 2 )

140

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

T h e s e p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e d o n o t g u a r a n t e e a n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f all p r i m a r y g o o d s ; h o w e v e r , t h e y c a l l f o r absolute e q u a l i t y i n b a s i c r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s , t h e greatest possible e q u a l i t y o f o p p o r t u n i t y , a n d a relative e q u a l i t y of resources, according to which inequalities n e e d to b ejustified a n d c a n i n d e e d b e j u s t i f i e d u n d e r c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s (cf. 1 9 8 2 b , 1 6 2 - 6 3 ) . T h e first

p r i n c i p l e t h u s e n j o y s p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e s e c o n d ( t h e first p a r t o f w h i c h

h e calls t h e "difference p r i n c i p l e " ) . T h e r e is h o w e v e r a n internal n o r m a t i v e connection between the two: the second principle, that o f equality o f op­ p o r t u n i t y a n d s o c i a l j u s t i c e , i s r e q u i r e d f o r t h e realization o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o f t h e first p r i n c i p l e . R a w l s d i s c u s s e s t h i s c o n n e c t i o n a s a p r o b l e m o f t h e "worth o f liberty": "liberty is r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h e c o m p l e t e system o f the liberties o f equal citizenship, while t h e worth o f liberty to persons a n d g r o u p s is p r o p o r t i o n a l t o t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o a d v a n c e t h e i r e n d s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k the system defines" ( 1 9 7 1 , 204). T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e society not having sufficient resources to b e able to realize their e n d s adequately within the f r a m e w o r k o f their liberties d o n o t enjoy equal liberties to a n e q u a l extent; their liberty is w o r t h less. T h i s p o i n t a p p l i e s t o i n d i v i d u a l liberty rights a s well a s t o political rights t o participation: it is essential t o e n s u r e "fair v a l u e o f political liberty" (226). E c o n o m i c a n d social i n e q u a l ­ ities m u s t n o t l e a d to political d i s a d v a n t a g e s . I n a n i m p o r t a n t revision o f this a p p r o a c h , R a w l s h i m s e l f interprets t h e g u a r a n t e e o f t h e fair v a l u e o f politicalrights

a n d l i b e r t i e s a s a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e first p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e

( 1 9 8 2 a , 4 1 - 4 6 ) . I n t h i s w a y , t h e first p r i n c i p l e i s a l r e a d y a m a t e r i a l

prin­

ciple of justice. Furthermore, the primary g o o d s guaranteed b y the s e c o n d justice prin­ ciple secure in t h e f o r m o f opportunities a n d material r e s o u r c e s t h e pri­ m a r y g o o d s o f equal rights a n d liberties in a c o m p l e t e sense; together they a l l t h u s s e r v e t h e " m o s t i m p o r t a n t " ( 1 9 7 1 , 4 4 0 ) p r i m a r y g o o d o f self-respect. T h e c o n c e p t o f self-respect is e m p l o y e d b y R a w l s i n v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s . A t o n e point, self-respect is s e c u r e d t h r o u g h

t h e "status" g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e

" p u b l i c affirmation . . . o f e q u a l citizenship f o r all" (545), a n d is c o n n e c t e d to t h e "sense o f political c o m p e t e n c e " (234) o f citizens as p e r s o n s exercis­ i n g political rights. A t a n o t h e r point, h o w e v e r , h e d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o n c e p t m o r e c l o s e l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f i n d i v i d u a l p l a n s o f l i f e ( § 6 7 ) . H e r e , selfr e s p e c t h a s t w o s i d e s : first, a " s e n s e o f o n e ' s o w n w o r t h " ( s e l f - e s t e e m ) f r o m h a v i n g a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d that is r e c o g n i z e d a s v a l u a b l e b y o t h e r p e r s o n s ( o f a particular g r o u p ) a n d b y t h e p e r s o n h i m -o r herself; a n d , s e c o n d , t h e self-confidence i n o n e ' s o w n ability to b e also able to realize this n o t i o n o f t h e g o o d . T h e political d i m e n s i o n o f self-respect thus consists in b e i n g r e c o g n i z e d a s a full fellow citizen, t h e ethical d i m e n s i o n i n b e i n g v a l u e d a s a p e r s o n w i t h a p l a n o f life t h a t is w o r t h y o f r e c o g n i t i o n (cf. 1 9 8 2 a , 34) ,

2 2

T h e principles of justice therefore c o r r e s p o n d to citizens' efforts to

create social conditions i n w h i c h t h e possibility exists f o r persons to lead a

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

141

l i f e t h a t i s c o n d u c i v e t o s e l f - r e s p e c t (cf. 1 9 8 2 b , 1 6 6 ) . T h e p r i m a r y g o o d o f self-respect c a n thus b e t e r m e d a "second-order primary g o o d " : securing the p r i m a r y g o o d s of e q u a l rights a n d liberties, social opportunities,

in­

c o m e , a n d w e a l t h contributes to a c h i e v i n g this g o o d . I n r e c e n t writings, Rawls presents his theory o f p r i m a r y g o o d s

more

strongly within the framework of his conception of the "moral p e r s o n " a n d this p e r s o n ' s " h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s " i n l i v i n g a life that, i n r e a l i z i n g m o r a l p o w e r s , is w o r t h y o f g e n e r a l r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n r a i s e d b y H . L . A . Hart

(1989, 240-44)

concerning

the

criterion

that justifies talk o f

the

" m o s t e x t e n s i v e total s y s t e m o f e q u a l b a s i c l i b e r t i e s " i n t h e first j u s t i c e p r i n ­ ciple a n d

that permits in particular a concretization

o f this p r i n c i p l e is

a n s w e r e d by Rawls with r e f e r e n c e to the f o r m a l a n d reciprocal

character

o f this s p e c i f i c a t i o n , a n d h e r e p l a c e s it w i t h " a n e q u a l r i g h t t o a fully a d e ­ quate s c h e m e of equal basic liberties" (1982a, 5). T h e principles of justice m a k e possible an "adequate" d e v e l o p m e n t a n d exercise of the two m o r a l p o w e r s — " a d e q u a t e " in social c o n t e x t s — a n d for this p u r p o s e in a f o r m a l sense certain liberties as b e i n g central

their centrality has certain c o n s e q u e n c e s at the level o f the of these liberties in a constitution

distinguish

( a c c o r d i n g to

Rawls,

concretization

[46-49]).

W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h a t R a w l s ' s i n c r e a s e d e m p h a s i s o n t h e " p o l i t i c a l " c h a r a c t e r o f h i s t h e o r y n o l o n g e r m a k e s it n e c e s s a r y t o r e g a r d

primary

g o o d s in g e n e r a l as serving "the satisfaction o f rational d e s i r e " ( 1 9 7 1 , 93) b u t f a c i l i t a t e s s p e c i f y i n g t h e s e g o o d s i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e n e e d s o f citizens. T h u s t h e list o f p r i m a r y g o o d s is a i m e d s o l e l y at p r o v i d i n g citizens w i t h t h e m e a n s n e c e s s a r y f o r full m e m b e r s h i p in a political c o m m u n i t y . " [ A ] t t h e b a s i s o f t h e p a r t i e s ' r e l i a n c e o n p r i m a r y g o o d s is t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n

that

these g o o d s a r e essential all-purpose m e a n s to realize the h i g h e r - o r d e r in­ terests c o n n e c t e d with citizens' m o r a l p o w e r s a n d their d e t e r m i n a t e

con­

c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d " ( 1 9 9 3 a , 7 6 ; cf. H i n s c h 1 9 9 2 , 3 6 - 4 4 ) . W i t h t h i s p o ­ litical c o n c e p t i o n f o c u s e d o n e q u a l citizenship, R a w l s (1993a, 188) n o t to h a v e to take a " c o m p r e h e n s i v e " t h e o r y o f the g o o d as a

tries

foundation

b u t n o n e t h e l e s s b e still a b l e t o p r o v i d e c r i t e r i a a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h

the

distribution o f social resources c a n b e m e a s u r e d . In Rawls's view, the t h e o i y of primary g o o d s has the advantage of m a k i n g m e a s u r e m e n t s of the social equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y easier insofar as, following the difference p r i n c i p l e , it is n e c e s s a r y t o i n v e s t i g a t e o n l y w h a t s h a r e o f p r i m a r y g o o d s t h e s o c i a l l y l e a s t a d v a n t a g e d h a v e . "It is f a i r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d t o a s c e r t a i n w h a t

things

w i l l a d v a n c e t h e i n t e r e s t s o f t h e l e a s t f a v o r e d " ( 1 9 7 1 , 3 2 0 ; cf. 9 1 - 9 5 ) . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is o f c o u r s e l e s s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d i n r e s p e c t o f t h e q u e s t i o n h o w to identify the g r o u p o f the

least a d v a n t a g e d a n d w h e t h e r

of

Rawls's

primary g o o d s are sufficient for their n e e d s (Sen 1985). D o n ' t g r o u p s like t h e h a n d i c a p p e d fall o u t o f t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d worst-off g r o u p (Dworkin 1981b, 339)? H o w big are the i n c o m e differences permitted be-

142

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

t w e e n t h e t w oe x t r e m e s ? W h a t is t h e m i n i m u m o f self-respect that m u s t b e g u a r a n t e e d ( M i c h e l m a n 1989)? Rawls assumes that these questions relate to the implementation a n d application o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e p r o p o s e d b y h i m , n o t t o i t s c o r e . In his view, t h e theory o f primary g o o d s c a nb e nothing m o r e than a formal theory o fnecessary goods, whereas questions concerning which goods must b e distributed in what way in certain societies in order to d ojustice to the d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e a r e q u e s t i o n s o f c o n c r e t e a p p l i c a t i o n i n political dis­ courses (1982b, 163). A c c o r d i n g to Rawls's theory o f the "four stages"— f r o m the justification o f t h e two principles, t h r o u g h the constitutional con­ vention, to legislation a n d t h e c o n c r e t e interpretation o f laws in courts a n d administration

( 1 9 7 1 , § 3 1 ) — t h e e q u a l r i g h t s a n d l i b e r t i e s o f t h e first j u s ­

tice p r i n c i p l e a r e i m p l e m e n t e d

already at t h e level o f t h e constitutional

c o n v e n t i o n , b u t t h e s e c o n d p r i n c i p l e o f social j u s t i c e is n o t a p p l i e d until the level o f legislation a n d judicial interpretation

h a s b e e n r e a c h e d (cf.

1982a, 5 2 - 5 5 ) . F o r e x a m p l e , questions such as that o f the o w n e r s h i p o f the m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n c a n n o t b e d e c i d e d o n t h e basis o f t h e principles of justice b u t in consideration o f "the traditions a n d social institutions o f a c o u n t r y a n d its p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m s a n d h i s t o r i c a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s " ( 5 3 ) . U l t i m a t e l y , t h e r e f o r e , it is t h e responsibility o f political d i s c o u r s e s i n par­ ticular

contexts to decide (a) which primary goods a r e to b e distributed

(b) in what way, a n d (c) to w h i c h social groups. T h e difference principle requires interpretation

a n d concretization in the discourses o f a political

c o m m u n i t y . A p r i n c i p l e o f social j u s t i c e c a n b e d i s c u s s e d , d e t e r m i n e d , a n d c o n c r e t i z e d a l w a y s o n l y i n a particular society's p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s , i n w h i c h it i s a q u e s t i o n o f w h a t s o c i a l r i g h t s a r e c i t i z e n s o f this s o c i e t y e n t i t l e d t o . A n d i n s u c h d i s c o u r s e s , a t h e o r y o f p r i m a r y g o o d s is a n i m p o r t a n t

view­

point—as their subject matter, however, n o t as their a priori. H e n c e , the a p p l i c a t i o n p r o b l e m s h e a d d r e s s e d p o i n t t o p r o b l e m s i n t h e justification o f Rawls's theory. Rawls's response to A m a r t y a S e nreflects those problems. A c c o r d i n g to the latter, t h e orientation t o w a r d p r i m a r y g o o d s m u s t b e g i v e n u p i n favor of a n orientation toward a person's capabilities f o rrealizing certain

human

functionings (see S e n 1985; 1993; 1995, 8 1 - 8 4 ) . A n equal distribution o r measurement o f resources according to primary goods does n o t d o justice to u n e q u a l p e r s o n s w h o c a n utilize these g o o d s differendy o n a c c o u n t o f u n e q u a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . T h i s d i s c r e p a n c y d o e s n o t p e r t a i n t o t h e e t h i c a l dif­ ferences between persons o r to the p r o b l e m o f "cosdy" conceptions o f the g o o d f o r w h i c h t h e r e is n o e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y o f d e v e l o p m e n t , b u t t o p r o b ­ lems o f handicapped persons f o r instance: " [ A ] disadvantaged person m a y g e t l e s s f r o m p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a n o t h e r s no matter what comprehensive doctrine h e o r s h e h a s " ( S e n 1995, 83). Rawls (1993a, 183), however, points o u t that t h e a i m o f t h e t h e o r y o f p r i m a r y g o o d s is to g u a r a n t e e t h e basic ca-

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

H3

p a b i l i t i e s o f p e r s o n s t o b e c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r s o f s o c i e t y . I n c a s e s o f ill­ ness o r disability, special m e a s u r e s a r e necessary to restore these capabilities o r — a s in the case o f p e r m a n e n t disabilities—to secure as m u c h as possible a f o r m o f social c o o p e r a t i o n . I n these cases, a "sufficiently flexible

index"

(185) o f p r i m a r y g o o d s c a n b e established at t h e "legislative stage." H e r e it is e v i d e n t that t h e a s s u m p t i o n s m a d e i n t h e o r i g i n a l

position

a b o u t "citizens' n e e d s " ( 1 8 7 ) h a v e only a provisional character: n o t only c a n t h e list o f p r i m a r y g o o d s b e e x p a n d e d — f o r e x a m p l e , t o i n c l u d e g o o d s like leisure

time

(181-82)

o r h e a l t h — t h e list's c o n t e n t a n d i m p o r t a n c e

c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e w o r s t - o f f o n l y within c o n t e x t s . N o w , this a r g u m e n t follows t h e d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e insofar as o n l y those a r r a n g e ­ m e n t s m a yb e called j u s t that c a n b e justified to this g r o u p , in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e principle o f e q u a l m e m b e r s h i p . I n this sense, p r i m a r y g o o d s a r e "the best available s t a n d a r d o f justification o f c o m p e t i n g c l a i m s that ism u ­ tually a c c e p t a b l e to citizens g e n e r a l l y " (188). Y e t i n this w a y t h e d i f f e r e n c e principle

itself i s c o n t e x t u a l i z e d : a s a p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n

a m o n g c i t i z e n s w i t h t h e c l a i m t o e q u a l m e m b e r s h i p . B y m e a n s o f t h i s proceduralized i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e

princi­

p l e — t h a t distributions o f social g o o d s must b e justified to the worst-off— i s p r e s e r v e d without h a v i n g t o f a l l b a c k u p o n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n f o r its j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I t t h u s b e c o m e s a " p o l i t i c a l " p r i n c i p l e o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e t h a t is g r o u n d e d

in a conception

o f practical justification

citizens. C i t i z e n s ' n e e d s a r e n o t first a b s t r a c t e d , t o b e t h e n

among

contextualized

in a s e c o n d step b u t are justified "politically" in contexts o f reciprocal j u s ­ tification—following

a political-discursive principle o f normative justifica­

tion w i t h t h e a i m o f r e a l i z i n g e q u a l citizenship, w h i c h is c o n s i d e r e d t h e m a i n qualitative standard

( a n dw h i c h includes t h e possibility o f a list—yet

to

social

be

concretized—of

primary

goods

or

basic

capabilities).

T h e r e f o r e , l i k e t h e first p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i c e ( s e e c h a p t e r 2 . 4 ) , R a w l s ' s sec­ o n d o n e c a n also b e captured i n a theory o f reciprocal justification without l o s i n g its c o r e c o n t e n t . T h e p r o b l e m s w i t h c o n s t r u c t i n g tion,

a n original posi­

as identified b y S e n a n d others, c a n thus b e a v o i d e d .

2 3

T h e s e p r o b l e m s e x p o s e t h e difficulties in a t t e m p t i n g tojustify universal principles o f equal rights co-originally with a principle o f social justice that has substantive presuppositions a n d implications (see chapter 4.2). A l r e a d y the heterogeneity a n d the different context d e p e n d e n c y o f primary g o o d s p o i n t to t h e difficulty in justifying m o r a l claims to m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n at the s a m e level as claims that c a n b e justified only within concrete

social

c i r c u m s t a n c e s . P r i m a r y g o o d s a r e "social" to different d e g r e e s : basic lib­ erties a r e n o t j o i n d y p r o d u c e d concrete g o o d s b u t a r e the core o f individual rights that must b e morally recognized; material g o o d s a r e socially pro­ d u c e d concrete goods that a r e to b e distributed in consideration o f con­ c r e t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e first p r i n c i p l e o v e r t h e s e c o n d ( a n d

T

144

H

E

ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

the distinction between "constitutional essentials" a n d "questions o f basic j u s t i c e " ) reflects this d i v e r s e status o f m o r a l a n d social p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e . T h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s o c i a l g o o d s is j u s t i f i e d o n t h e b a s i s o f b a s i c c l a i m s t o e q u a l rights a n d their V o r t h " — a n d this justification isa m a t t e r f o r political d i s c o u r s e s , a m a t t e r o f c l a i m s r a i s e d b y c i t i z e n s as c i t i z e n s a n d directed at citizens o f a political

community.

A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d , n o n e t h e l e s s , t h r e e essential p o i n t s f o r a c o n ­ ception o f social justice a r e to b e drawn f r o m Rawls's theory: 1. T h e difference principle c a n b e interpreted o n t h e basis o f a p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e o f g e n e r a l justification: s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t i e s h a v e t o b e j u s t i f i e d to t h e social g r o u p s that benefit least f r o m a society's wealth. T h i s principle follows Rawls's view (seechapter

1) that a just society c a n

a c c e p t natural a n d social "contingencies" o n l y " w h e n d o i n g s o is f o r t h e c o m m o n benefit" ( 1 9 7 1 , 102), a n d that treating h u m a n beings as ends n o t as m e a n s h a s t h e m e a n i n g o f "forgo [ing] those gains w h i c h d o n o t con­ tribute to everyone's expectations" tified

2 4

—that

is, t h e g a i n s t h a t c a n n o t b e j u s ­

to e v e r y o n e . I n questions o f social justice, t h e principle o f g e n e r a l

j u s t i f i c a t i o n m e a n s t a k i n g t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h o s e w h o a r e w o r s t off. T h e y h a v e , a s R a w l s says, a "veto": "those w h o h a v e g a i n e d m o r e m u s t d o s o o n terms that are justifiable to those w h o have g a i n e d the least." cumstances

a r e , as socially generated

the

S o c i a l cir­

a n d changeable circumstances, in

n e e d o fjustification; t h e principle o f equal m e m b e r s h i p h e r e a strictly e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n

2 5

does not imply

o f i n c o m e a n d w e a l t h b u t it d o e s

necessity o f justifying unequal

distributions

(cf. W a l d r o n

entail

a n d King

2. A p r o c e d u r a l i s t t h e o r y c a n p r o v i d e n o t o n l y a r g u m e n t s f o r t h i s p r o c e ­ d u r e o f general justification b u t also substantive viewpoints a n d argu­ ments f o r social rights; f o r they a r e necessary f o r the equal "worth" o f individual liberty rights o r political rights

to participation.

They are

r i g h t s f o r t h e realization o f r i g h t s a n d a r e n o t t o b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m

them.

T h e y prevent e c o n o m i c p o w e r from b e c o m i n g political power, a n d avert s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y f r o m l e a d i n g t o s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l e x c l u s i o n (cf. B a y n e s

1992a, 159-60). 3. I n j u s t i c e discourses,

finally,

it is a m a t t e r o f t h e self-referential

m i n a t i o n o f citizens, w h a t it m e a n s t o b e a "citizen," to b e a full

deter­

member

of t h e political community. R a w l s rightly p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e g o o d i n w h o s e light all o t h e r p r i m a r y g o o d s h a v e t o b e s e e n i s t h a t o f self-respect. P o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s m u s t

guarantee

t h e possibility f o r citizens t o r e c o g n i z e t h e m s e l v e s a sfull m e m b e r s o f society a n d t o b e r e c o g n i z e d a s s u c h . I t is a q u e s t i o n , a s S e n ( 1 9 8 7 ,

1 7 ) says w i t h

A d a m Smith, o f "notbeing ashamed to appear in public"—of having the

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

145

m e a n s t o l e a d a life that, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d s o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r s o ­ ciety, d o e s n o t stigmatize a p e r s o n . I n e v e r y society, S e n a r g u e s ,

certain

c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e n e c e s s a r y f o r a n a v e r a g e " g o o d " life ( 2 5 , 3 2 ) . T o l e a d a life worthy o f recognition in society A c a n require material resources different f r o m o n e i n society B . T h e "quality o f life" is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e possibility o f l e a d i n g a life w i t h o u t e x c l u s i o n , w i t h o u t s h a m e — a n e g a t i v e

determi­

n a t i o n t h a t l e a v e s t h e p o s i t i v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e g o o d life o p e n a n d , b y emphasizing general a n d basic recognition, rules o u t personal idiosyncra­ sies a s s t a n d a r d s .

2 6

T o i n t e r p r e t this d e t e r m i n a t i o n

concretely in a society,

h o w e v e r , t h e first t w o p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t o f g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t h a t o f the w o r t h o f e q u a l rights, a r e r e q u i r e d ; i n t h e c o n c e p t o f self-respect itself— o r i n S e n ' s c o n c e p t o f c a p a b i l i t y — t h e r e is n o i n d e p e n d e n t

standard.

H e n c e , a theory o f social justice h a s the idea o f equal m e m b e r s h i p in a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y a s its c o r e ; this status i m p l i e s c e r t a i n r i g h t s a n d lib­ erties a s well as t h e g o o d s n e c e s s a r y to e x e r c i s e t h e m . T h e y m a k e it pos­ sible

to develop capabilities that turn

persons

into

social

participants.

W h i c h claims to which g o o d s a r e legitimate f o r realizing which capabil­ ities m u s t h o w e v e r b e j u s t i f i e d r e c i p r o c a l l y (cf. S c a n l o n 1 9 9 3 , 1 9 8 ) . L i s t s of g o o d s — b e they "thin" in t h e Rawlsian sense, o r "thick" in N u s s b a u m ' s sense

(1990a;

1992)—represent

neither

"political" n o r "essentialist"

a

priori viewpoints o f t h e g o o d that w o u l d p e r se suffice to evaluate recip­ rocal claims in the sense o f social justice. Questions o f social distributive j u s t i c e r e m a i n d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h it is a m a t ­ ter o f d e t e r m i n i n g full m e m b e r s h i p . I n e m p h a s i z i n g this relativity t h e r e is n o r e l a t i v i s m , i n a t w o f o l d s e n s e . F i r s t , c e r t a i n c l a i m s t o m o r a l

recog­

nition highlighted by N u s s b a u m (1992, 226-27) a r e justified in every so­ c i e t y ; t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r i g h t s o f moral persons ( s e e chapter

4) a n d a r e p r e s e r v e d i n basic rights. B e y o n d these

basic forms o f respect claimed b y h u m a n tions

beings as h u m a n

universalist, beings, ques­

of social justice a r e c o n c e r n e d with certain claims to social g o o d s

r a i s e d b y p e r s o n s a s citizens. T h e y a r e a n s w e r e d r e l a t i v e t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r society a n d in reference to t h e standard o f e q u a l m e m b e r s h i p — t h e y a r e thus n o t a n s w e r e d relativistically.

2 7

T h e three viewpoints—that o f the general n e e d for justifying social in­ equalities, that o f the necessity o f realizing rights, a n d that o f guaranteeing the possibility o f recognition a n d self-respect—form the core o f a simul­ t a n e o u s l y g e n e r a l a n d c o n t e x t u a l t h e o r y o f social j u s t i c e . I t is f o u n d e d o n general principles o fjustification a n d o n rights that have substantive im­ plications i n political contexts. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l citizenship is b o t h formal a n d material here: formal with regard to participation in political discourses o n the legitimate distribution o f goods; material with regard to the c o n d i t i o n s f o r realizing this participation life a s s u c h .

a n d participation in social

146

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

Walzer's substantive and "communitarian" theory of social justice, as is to be shown in the following, is also based on such an ideal of "inclusive citizenship" ( 1 9 8 3 , 7 7 ) . It is the ideal of a citizen in a society where goods are distributed according to generally shared understandings and principles, where the "worth" of citizens' liberties and rights is secured, and where a life in self-respect is possible. Walzer's theory also combines general prin­ ciples and context sensibility. Just where Rawls's basic assumptions relate to concrete contexts and "rational" needs, namely, in the conception of primary goods, he expects of his theory at a fundamental level justifications that can be provided only in political discourses; Walzer, however, who emphasizes especially this political dimension of distributive justice, is mis­ taken about the presence of general principles of individual and collective self-determination in his theory (which forces him to make certain revi­ sions) . The most important methodological difference between Rawls and Wal­ zer lies in Walzer's critique of the attempt to conceive an "ideal" theory of the distribution of a priori fixed goods. Rawls ( 1 9 7 1 , 2 2 7 ) thus writes: 'We are in the way of describing an ideal arrangement, comparison with which defines a standard forjudging actual institutions, and indicates what must be maintained to justify departures from it." Walzer, by contrast, considers it wrong to justify an "ideal" theory of distributive justice in an "ideal" initial situation on the basis of a "thin" theory of the goods to be distributed ( 1 9 8 3 , 5 ) . On the contrary, a theory of distributive justice must begin within the "shared understandings" of a political community, in Plato's cave; and it must do justice to the particularism of this historically developed com­ munity and its "spheres ofjustice," within which particular goods correspond to conceptions of the good and must be distributed according to their own criteria. "Every substantive account of distributive justice is a local account" ( 3 1 4 ) . To a theory of "simple equality" that knows only a single principle, Walzer opposes his theory of "complex equality" that knows the "shared meanings" of distributive spheres and goes by them. The theory takes its principles from these spheres: "one might almost say that goods distribute themselves among people" ( 7 ) . Walzer's theory attempts to combine pluralism and particularism; it rec­ ognizes the pluralist character of spheres of justice on the basis of their internal, collectively shared values and principles. He thereby takes up an Aristotelian notion: justice means distributing equal things equally, it means having a sense of what is appropriate in a given context. "The just is something proportional" (Aristode 1 9 8 4 , 1 1 3 ^ 2 9 ) . In this sense Wil­ liams ( 1 9 6 2 , 1 2 0 - 3 1 ) also argues for a theory of distributive justice in con­ sideration of what is to be distributed and its social meaning. And Taylor ( 1 9 8 5 b , 2 4 5 ) underscores: "It ought to be clear... that no singleconsideration procedure, be it that of utilitarianism, or a theory of justice

T H E E T H O S OF DEMOCRACY

147

b a s e d o n a n i d e a l contract, c a n d o j u s t i c e to the diversity o f g o o d s we have t o w e i g h t o g e t h e r i n n o r m a t i v e p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g " (cf. 1 9 8 5 J ) . T h i s t h e o r y is t h e r e f o r e

affirmative i n s o f a r a s i t f o l l o w s t h e s h a r e d , tra­

d i t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f a s o c i e t y ; i t i s h o w e v e r critical i n s o f a r a s i t ( a ) maintains

boundaries

between

these

spheres

and

(b)

illuminates

shared understandings within these spheres in the light of an

the

interpretation

o f t h e i r m e a n i n g . " G o o d f e n c e s m a k e j u s t s o c i e t i e s " ( 1 9 8 3 , 3 1 9 ) is W a l z e r ' s critical p r i n c i p l e , a p r i n c i p l e that serves to p r o t e c t o n e s p h e r e f r o m " c o l o n i z e d " (282)

being

b y a n o t h e r . B u t t h a t is n o t all: it is W a l z e r ' s a i m t o r e ­

construct the "shared understandings" of the A m e r i c a n political c o m m u ­ nity in s u c h a w a y that a "decentralized d e m o c r a t i c socialism" c a n

appear

a s t h e " a p p r o p r i a t e a r r a n g e m e n t s " i n its s p h e r e s o f j u s t i c e ( 3 1 8 ) . T h e i d e a o f a n e g a l i t a r i a n s o c i e t y is still " h i d d e n " i n " o u r c o n c e p t s a n d c a t e g o r i e s " ( x i v ) , b u t t h e a t t e n t i v e t h e o r i s t w i l l f i n d it. T h e r e is a s u b t e x t i n W a l z e r ' s b o o k t h a t b e c o m e s e v i d e n t w h e n o n e l o o k s at the difficulty l o c a t e d b e t w e e n this affirmative i n t e n t i o n a n d the critical o n e of his theory. J o s h u a C o h e n (1986, 463-64) called Walzer's p r o b l e m the "simple c o m m u n i t a r i a n

dilemma":

If the values of a c o m m u n i t y a r e identified t h r o u g h its c u r r e n t distributive practices, then the distributive n o r m s subsequendy "derived" f r o m those val­ ues will n o t serve as criticisms o f existing practices. . . . O n the other h a n d , if w e identify values apart f r o m practices, with a view to assessing the conformity o f practices to those values, w h a t evidence will there b e that w e have the values right? E i t h e r the self-understandings o f the spheres a r e to b e a c c e p t e d p r i m a facie o r e l s e a m e a n i n g is e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e m t h a t w a s b o t h p r e s e n t a n d h i d d e n . H o w e v e r , this e x t r a p o l a t i o n is itself a p a r t i c u l a r n o r m a t i v e

interpretation

w h o s e c l a i m t o v a l i d i t y is o n l y p a r t i a l l y c o v e r e d b y t h e s o c i e t y ' s p r a c t i c e s u p to n o w i n this " s p h e r e " ; it c a n n o t c o m p l e t e l y c o n c e a l a n " e x t e r n a l " n o r ­ mativity. D w o r k i n ' s ( i g 8 5 d , 2 1 8 - 1 9 ) c r i t i q u e is that, i n t h e a b s e n c e o f truly "shared"

understandings,

Walzer—who

insists

on

arguing

immanendy

(Walzer a n d Dworkin 1983)—drafts a theory of "Platonic spheres" that h e projects o n t o a society a n d thereby deludes himself in respect o f his o w n methodology. It c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t W a l z e r is a b l e t o a v o i d t h e dilemma

(between critiqueless i m m a n e n c e a n d Platonic

communitarian transcendence)

o n l y if h e falls b a c k u p o n t h e t h r e e c e n t r a l v i e w p o i n t s that w e r e e l a b o r a t e d in c o n n e c t i o n with the a b o v e discussion of Rawls's theory—implicidy in Spheres of Justice, e x p l i c i t l y i n a m o r e r e c e n t e s s a y ( 1 9 9 3 b ) . A c c o r d i n g l y , shared understandings are legitimate reference points for normative theory o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e r e a l l y general a n d s h a r e d b y i n d i v i d u a l c i t ­ izens out o f free conviction a n d are consensually legitimated. M o r e o v e r ,

148

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

they a r e reconstructed a n dinterpreted o n t h e basis o f a n overarching prin­ ciple: that o f e q u a l a n d full

membership i n t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y . A l l

s p h e r e s a r e e x a m i n e d w i t h r e g a r d t o w h e t h e r t h e y a r e c o n d u c i v e t o a life i n self-respect. " M e m b e r s h i p " i s r e g a r d e d b y W a l z e r a s t h e p r i m a r y

good

( 1 9 8 3 , 3 1 ) , that is, "equality o f m e m b e r s h i p " (84) i n a l l s p h e r e s r e l e v a n t to this: ' T h eself-respecting citizen is a n a u t o n o m o u s p e r s o n . . . . H e is a u ­ t o n o m o u s in his community, a free a n d responsible agent, a participating m e m b e r . I t h i n k o f h i m a s the ideal subject of the theory of justice" ( 2 7 9 ; i t a l i c s a d d e d ) . W a l z e r ' s t h e o r y is c a r r i e d i n a n d t h r o u g h all s p h e r e s b y this i d e a l o f "inclusive citizenship"; it is t h e ideal that allows h i m to f o r m u l a t e h i s o w n ideal o f a j u s t society a n d to criticize t h e existing s h a r e d

understand­

i n g s o f h i s s o c i e t y . I n c l u s i v e c i t i z e n s h i p i s a p r i n c i p l e above t h e i n d i v i d u a l s p h e r e s ; a s s u c h , it r e d u c e s t h e ( a f o r e m e n t i o n e d ) t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n ­ cept o f sphere pluralism founded o n shared conceptions o f the g o o d a n d the thesis o f t h e ethical pluralism o f political c o m m u n i t i e s without g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d ; a n d it d o e s s o i n a s m u c h a s t h e s p h e r e s o f j u s t i c e are n o t to b e understood

e t h i c a l l y b u t a r e b a s e d o n politically

"sharable"

values. T h e following eleven spheres (a-k) are the ones distinguished by Walzer with reference to the g o o d s that a r e to b e distributed in t h e m

according

to specific criteria; a n d they a r e t h e s p h e r e s in w h i c h a particular

interpre­

tation o f the m e a n i n g o f " m e m b e r s h i p " in a democratic political c o m m u ­ nity is d e c i s i v e f o r h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f g o o d s — t h i s , h o w ­ ever, only i n those s p h e r e s that are, a c c o r d i n g to Rawls, part o f t h e "basic structure o f society," thus n o t in the spheres o f "kinship a n d love" o r "divine grace," for instance. (a) W i t h r e g a r d to t h e q u e s t i o n o f m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e political c o m ­ m u n i t y — t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t g o o d o f all s p h e r e s — i t is p a r t i c u l a r l y e v i d e n t that the above m e n t i o n e d reduction in tension between the two concepts o f p l u r a l i s m d o e s n o t r e m o v e this tension entirely. W a l z e r ' s Aristotelian e m p h a s i s o n political c o m m u n i t i e s as " c o m m u n i t i e s o f c h a r a c t e r " that, like c l u b s o r families ( 4 2 ) , freely d e c i d e o t h e r s ' a c c e s s t o their c o m m u n i t y , is i n d e e d constrained b y various m o r a l assumptions. Accordingly, political c o m m u n i t i e s h a v e t h e r i g h t t o d e f e n d t h e i r w a y o f life a g a i n s t t h o s e w h o desire admission only if they are willing to share

the "superfluous" re­

s o u r c e s o f l a n d o r w e a l t h necessary f o r a " d e c e n t life" (47) with those w h o need

these resources. A political c o m m u n i t y

would enough

probably have

to b e satisfied with

c a n still s e c l u d e i t s e l f b u t

a smaller territory

or

export

m a t e r i a l g o o d s ( t h e c r i t e r i o n f o r " s u p e r f l u o u s " r e s o u r c e s is left

o p e n here, however). States are, however, obligated to accept persons

flee­

i n g f r o m r e p r e s s i o n , f o r "every victim o f a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m a n d b i g o t r y is t h e m o r a l c o m r a d e o f a liberal citizen" (49). It r e m a i n s imperative that all p e r s o n s w h o h a v e g a i n e d a d m i s s i o n h a v e e q u a l civil rights; " g u e s t w o r k e r s , "

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

'49

f o r i n s t a n c e , m u s t n o t b e d e n i e d p o l i t i c a l rights. A c c o r d i n g to W a l z e r , this c o r r e s p o n d s to the basic "principle o f political justice": the a d d r e s s e e s o f law, l e g a l p e r s o n s , w h o live a n d w o r k i n a c o u n t r y m u s t b e a b l e to b e c o m e c i t i z e n s , t h e a u t h o r s o f l a w (cf.

60).

D e s p i t e t h e s e constraints o n the rights o f a political c o m m u n i t y to reg­ u l a t e i m m i g r a t i o n , n a t u r a l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e g r a n t i n g o f civil r i g h t s u n d e r

the

t e r m s o f m a i n t a i n i n g its f o r m o f l i f e , W a l z e r ' s A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m is q u e s t i o n ­ able particularly in the c o n t e x t o f the U n i t e d States. In his article

'What

D o e s It M e a n to B e a n ' A m e r i c a n ' ? " (1992b) h e criticizes the "nativist" v i e w a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the U n i t e d States h a s a particular ethical-cultural char­ a c t e r — a n a r g u m e n t a d v a n c e d in the past against the i m m i g r a t i o n o f reli­ gious o r ethnic g r o u p s w h o supposedly could not b e assimilated socially (cf.

Higham

1985; Fuchs

1990).

Instead,

he

underscores

the

ethical-

cultural o p e n n e s s o f this political c o m m u n i t y a n d the f o r m a l u n d e r s t a n d ­ i n g o f citizenship. N o w this d o e s n o t m e a n that a "multicultural" political c o m m u n i t y d o e s n o t h a v e " c h a r a c t e r " ; r a t h e r , it m e a n s t h a t t h e c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n a political w a y o f life a n d i n d i v i d u a l life p l a n s ( W a l z e r 1 9 8 3 , 47) is n o t p e r m i s s i b l e — w h e r e b y , h o w e v e r , t h e c o m p l e x q u e s t i o n o f t h e

(non-

ethical) legitimacy criteria of admission restrictions, w h i c h c a n n o t b e dealt w i t h h e r e , i s l e f t o p e n (cf. W a l z e r 1 9 9 2 a ; H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 8 a ,

226-32).

(b) T h e s p h e r e o f "security a n d welfare" relates to the question o f social welfare

and

health

care—Walzer considers the

distributive criterion

of

" n e e d " t o b e a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e ( 1 9 8 3 , 7 5 ) . All c i t i z e n s h a v e e q u a l c l a i m s t o social security a n d welfare a c c o r d i n g to n e e d . T o

find

arguments for

A m e r i c a n w e l f a r e state, h o w e v e r , W a l z e r p r o p o s e s u n d e r s t a n d i n g lations b e t w e e n citizens as the

"moral b o n d " of a social contract

" d e e p e s t " m e a n i n g it is t o d e f e n d "the r i g h t s o f t h e p o o r " (83)

the

an re­

whose

in accor­

d a n c e with the following principle: " F r o m e a c h a c c o r d i n g to his ability (or his r e s o u r c e s ) ; to e a c h a c c o r d i n g to his socially r e c o g n i z e d n e e d s " (91). O f c o u r s e , it is n o t p r i m a r i l y t h e h i t h e r t o s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f A m e r i c a n society that a r e decisive f o r this interpretation, b u t the ideal o f citizens with equal rights w h o enjoy recognition a n d w h o respect themselves. (c) H e t h e r e f o r e a r g u e s in the s p h e r e o f " m o n e y a n d c o m m o d i t i e s " f o r a system o f " b l o c k e d e x c h a n g e s " (100)

that serves to p r e v e n t "market im­

p e r i a l i s m " f r o m u n d e r m i n i n g civil rights as w e l l as t h e political a n d s o c i a l s p h e r e s a n d switching t h e m o v e r to the " m e d i u m o f m o n e y , " to s p e a k with Habermas

(1984-87, 2:264-67). M o n e y and economic power must

not

b e c o m e totalitarian forces that devalue the principle o f equal citizenship; drawing the boundaries correcdy between e c o n o m i c a n d political p o w e r also includes, a c c o r d i n g to Walzer, e x a m i n i n g o n this p r e m i s e the

owner­

s h i p o f t h e m e a n s o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d s u b j e c t i n g it t o p u b l i c c o n t r o l

(122).

T h e " w o r t h " (Rawls) o f civil liberties m u s t n o t b e r e d u c e d b y s o c i a l i n e ­ qualities a n d e c o n o m i c p o w e r (see esp. Walzer 1984, 3 2 1 - 2 2 ) .

J J O

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

(d) In the sphere of public office Walzer argues for the distributive cri­ terion of best qualification; he nonetheless connects this to a demand for a redistribution of social resources in favor of groups that have no possi­ bility of acquiring the relevant qualifications, (e) Hard work must be dis­ tributed as equally as possible among citizens, also in the form of a general "national service program" ( 1 7 5 ) . (f) The distribution of free time also has to follow principles of equality, (g) In the sphere of education the "ideal of membership" ( 2 0 3 ) is best satisfied if all future citizens are to receive a school education of equal value; neighborhood schools must not lead to an increase in social inequality ( 2 2 5 ) . Here too, an ideal of democratic citizenship, and not the shared understandings of the white American mid­ dle class, serves Walzer as the normative standard, (h) In the sphere of "kinship and love," distributive criteria apply that follow the feelings and self-understandings of individuals. (Here it nonetheless remains open as to how a legal community can relate to the practices of a cultural minority that educates its children according to different shared understandings and—more or less—exerts pressure on them.) On the one hand, Walzer says, the family must be protected from the imperatives of the market; on the other, however, it must not itself cement unequal power relations be­ tween the sexes inside or outside this sphere ( 2 4 0 - 4 1 ; cf. Okin 1 9 8 9 , 1 1 1 1 7 ) . (i) "Divine grace" is distributed according to the convictions of be­ lievers and their religion. (j) In the discussion of the sphere of recognition Walzer distinguishes explicitly (unlike Rawls) between self-esteem and self-respect (cf. Sachs 1 9 8 1 ) . Self-esteem is the result of others' recognition of oneself as a human being with especially esteemed characteristics and capabilities. Self-respect, on the other hand, is measured not primarily in terms of others' acknowl­ edgement of oneself as a particular human being but in terms of a "stan­ dard" of generally recognized dignity. This standard is not however a primarily moral one—the dignity of humanity in general—but the stan­ dard of full membership in a political community (Walzer 1 9 8 3 , 2 7 6 - 7 7 ) . To be able to respect oneself means to be recognized as an equally entitled member of a political community. Accordingly, a political community can­ not distribute self-esteem, but it can distribute rights and the forms of rec­ ognition that make self-respect as a citizen possible. The membership that enables self-respect is endangered by exclusion: by legal, political, and so­ cial exclusion. 'The welfare state is an effort... to guarantee effective membership. But even when it does this in the best possible way, meeting needs without degrading persons, it doesn't guarantee self-respect; it only helps make it possible. This is, perhaps, the deepest purpose of distributive jus­ tice" ( 2 7 8 ; italics added). (k) Finally, political power, the "most dangerous . . . good" ( 1 5 ) , must be institutionally distributed in such a way as to permit discursive self-rule—

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

1

5

1

"the rule of reasons" ( 3 0 4 ) : "What counts is argument among the citizens" (ibid.). Citizens must have the possibility of being co-authors of the law, and this as participants in political discourses among free and equal persons (ibid.). From a reconstruction of the self-understandings of the spheres of jus­ tice Walzer claims to have gleaned principles for the separation of the spheres and for the internal distribution of goods that lead to a "decen­ tralized democratic socialism" in which citizens with equal rights control political and economic power. For this he believes to be able to do without "external or universal principles" and formulates the following principle: "A given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way—that is, in a way faithful to the shared understandings of the members" ( 3 1 3 ) . This, says Walzer ( 3 1 4 ) , is a consequence that follows from human beings' attribute of being "culture-producing creatures": justice requires universally that the concrete ideas of justice held by the inhabitants of different social worlds be respected. The discussion of the spheres ofjustice presented by Walzer shows how­ ever that he must recognize various universal principles in a formal sense in order to give them a substantive content. These are the basic principle of the general and public justification of norms that apply equally to all members of a political community; and the accompanying principle of the general and equal rights of membership in a democratic community of selfrespecting citizens. These two principles are at once formal-general and substantive-contextual: they represent a framework for the validity of norms that has to be filled out concretely. It is not predetermined how a political community understands itself or what political decisions it will make; it is however determined that the community will make decisions joindy and democratically. It is not predetermined what it means to realize the "worth" of equal political membership rights; it is however determined that such a rights claim exists on the basis of political membership. It is not predetermined what conditions exacdy help make self-respect possible in a particular society; it is however determined that the task of a political community is to guarantee those conditions by safeguarding rights. Walzer underscores this interpretation when taking stock of his theory on one occasion. There he emphasizes, first, the joint—and thereby cri­ tique-permitting—determination of distribution criteria in the individual spheres: 28

29

A l l the p e o p l e , every m a n a n d w o m a n , are o r are s u p p o s e d to be equal par­ ticipants in all the spheres o f j u s t i c e , sharing, as m e m b e r s , in the distribution o f welfare, security, wealth, e d u c a t i o n , office, political p o w e r , a n d so o n — a n d also j o i n i n g in the debates a b o u t w h a t that sharing involves a n d h o w it o u g h t to b e m a n a g e d . ( 1 9 9 3 b , 5 5 )

J J 2

T H E ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

All spheres n o w have a n eminently political m e a n i n g . T h u s Walzer e m p h a ­ sizes, s e c o n d , t h e c e n t r a l a i m o f c r e a t i n g a n "inclusive society" i n all s p h e r e s a n d s t r e s s e s t h a t d i s a d v a n t a g i n g c i t i z e n s i n one s p h e r e b e c o m e s a g e n e r a l political p r o b l e m s i n c e t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u a l m e m b e r s h i p is t h e r e b y vio­ lated. T h i s e m p h a s i s o n political m e m b e r s h i p a s t h e m a i n p r i n c i p l e o f all s p h e r e s h a s l e d to t h e structural insight that t h e state h a s a special r o l e to play in maintaining justice within a n d between the spheres, a role under­ e s t i m a t e d b y W a l z e r i n Spheres of Justice. T h e p o l i t i c a l s p h e r e i s a s u p e r o r d i n a t e o n e : "Politics is i m p l i c a t e d i n all distributive disputes; t h e state can­ n o t d i s r e g a r d w h a t is g o i n g o n i n t h e d i f f e r e n t s p h e r e s o f j u s t i c e " (63). Q u e s t i o n s within s p h e r e s m u s t b e j o i n d y r e g u l a t e d b y citizens, b e it i n al­ locating office, questions o f e c o n o m i c policy o r education. " A n d all these d e c i s i o n s a r e , i n s o m e t h i n g c l o s e t o a foundational (partly) d e t e r m i n e d b y a n understanding

sense, warranted a n d

o f citizenship. Inclusion begins

with citizenship, which then serves asa value reiterated through democratic p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n all t h e s p h e r e s o f j u s t i c e " ( 6 4 ; i t a l i c s a d d e d ) . H e n c e , e q u a l m e m b e r s h i p is (as it w e r e ) t h e f o r m a l a n d m a t e r i a l " m a s t e r principle" o f the spheres o f social justice, a principle according to which the plurality o f distributive criteria f o r certain g o o d s c o n t i n u e s to exist; h o w e v e r , t h e s e c r i t e r i a r e q u i r e political j u s t i f i c a t i o n — i n s o f a r a s t h e y

con­

cern political q u e s t i o n s — a n d d o n o t themselves speak a l a n g u a g e o f the g o o d that t h e theorist c o u l d j u s t listen i n o n . T h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e s p h e r e s is t h e ( d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ) l a n g u a g e o f t h e c i t i z e n s . W i t h t h i s ( p a r t i a l ) r e v i s i o n W a l z e r h a s p u t h i s t h e o r y u n e q u i v o c a l l y o n a p o l i t i c a l f o o t i n g . T h e context of social justice i s , t h e r e f o r e , t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y o f e q u a l c i t i z e n s . T o s u m u p , the o u d i n e o f a theory o f social justice d e v e l o p e d in con­ nection with Rawls a n d Walzer thus combines liberal a n d communitarian a r g u m e n t s . T h e i d e a o f a d i a l o g i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s (cf. A c k ­ e r m a n 1980) is p r e s e r v e d a n d c o n t e x t u a l i z e d i n political discourses, w h i c h d o justice to the particularity o f a society a n d t h e plurality o f social goods. General p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n u n c o v e r t h e substantive i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e c o n c e p t o f "social citizenship." T o r e t u r n t o t h e d i l e m m a o f "substanceless s u b s t a n c e , " it r e q u i r e s that citizens u n d e r s t a n d themselves in political discourses n o t only as recipro­ cally "responding" participants w h o a s s u m e j o i n t responsibility f o r political regulation a n d actions b u t also as those w h o a r e mutually responsible for guaranteeing equal membership. T h e y a r e the addressee o f the critique o f exclusion.

3 0

T h e r e f o r e , reciprocal recognition as citizens c a n n o t b e g r a s p e d

ethically i n t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n sense, n o r c a n it b e e x p l i c a t e d , as i n a par­ ticular interpretation b y liberal theories, primarily according to the ideal of the mutual recognition o f legal persons. It implies (a)—as a reflection on the pluralism o f ethical communities—tolerance

a n d r e s p e c t f o r "dif­

f e r e n t " f o r m s o f life t h a t ( b ) a r e p r o t e c t e d b y r e c i p r o c a l l y s a f e g u a r d i n g

THE ETHOS OF DEMOCRACY

153

i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s ; f u r t h e r m o r e , it i n c l u d e s (c) r e c o g n i t i o n as a n e q u a l p a r ­ ticipant

in political discourses with w h o m o n e must j o i n d y assume respon­

sibility f o r p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s a n d t h e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s vis-a-vis f e l l o w c i t i z e n s as well as o t h e r p e r s o n s affected. Finally, this i m p l i e s (d) that n o citizen m a y b e e x c l u d e d f r o m full m e m b e r s h i p in a political

fellow

community

for ethical, social, o r political reasons, a n d that certain social g o o d s

are

necessary f o r the p u r p o s e o f their inclusion. Citizens' claims to the r e c o g ­ nition a n d realization o f their individual liberty rights, of their political a n d social rights a r e n o t d i r e c t e d at a n ethical v a l u e system s h a r e d by all citizens b u t a r e d e t e r m i n e d b y w h a t it m e a n s to b e a " c i t i z e n " i n a p a r t i c u l a r society. T h e ethos of democracy c o n s i s t s i n r e a l i z i n g t h i s d i m e n s i o n o f c i t i z e n s h i p . C o m b i n i n g the general principle of reciprocal justification with specific c o n t e x t s o f ethical o r political self-determination, w h i c h this suggests, l e a d s to a further level in the d e b a t e b e t w e e n liberalism a n d

communitarianism,

o n e at w h i c h various systematic questions m u s t b e clarified: at the

center

is t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n e m p l o y e d s o f a r a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f "moral person" and "moral community." A n d here again, counterarguments

communitarian

interject: c a n there b e a universalist morality a n d

cor­

r e s p o n d i n g conceptions of reason, person, a n d c o m m u n i t y "beyond" eth­ ical a n d legal-political contexts? T h e s e issues l e a d n o t o n l y to the tization o f a further, fourth

thema-

context of justification a n d recognition:

the

context o f morality. In a methodological respect, they necessitate an anal­ ysis o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n o n w h i c h t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n all n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s is b a s e d .

of

FOUR

Universalism and Contextualism

T h e debate between liberalism and communitarianism returns again and a g a i n to a central point: the q u e s t i o n o f the priority o f the g o o d o r the just. S o far this p r o b l e m h a s a p p e a r e d o n t h r e e levels. First, with r e g a r d to

the

c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e self, m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , o n t h e b a s i s o f S a n d e l ' s q u e s t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r R a w l s ' s p r i m a c y o f d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e is n o t p e r h a p s f o u n d e d o n a notion of the person that ignores the

constitutive

r o l e o f t h e g o o d a s r e g a r d s t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e s e l f a n d its n o r m a t i v e r e l a ­ tions

to others. T h e r e s p o n s e to this w a s the distinction b e t w e e n the

"eth­

i c a l " p e r s o n , w h o is c o n s t i t u t e d c o m m u n a l l y a n d t h r o u g h p a r t i c u l a r c o n ­ ceptions of the g o o d , a n d the abstract "legal p e r s o n " — a distinction

that

c o m p r e h e n d s the two c o n c e p t i o n s as b e i n g in a relation of c o m p l e m e n ­ tarity a n d n o t o f c o m p e t i t i o n . A t the s e c o n d level, this distinction w a s e x a m i n e d critically, m o r e spe­ cifically, in r e f e r e n c e to the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e r e c a n b e the possibility of a general justification of legal n o r m s without favoring or marginalizing c e r t a i n c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d o r c e r t a i n w a y s o f life. T h e possibility o f a t h e o r y o f the legal p e r s o n as the "protective c o v e r " for ethical

identities

a n d of a corresponding notion of individual rights was demonstrated within the framework of a proceduralist theory of the justification o f legal norms. O n l y if these n o r m s are n o t constitutively b a s e d o n particular c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d d o they r e m a i n o p e n to the rights claims o f ethical persons. O n l y i f l a w s p e a k s a l a n g u a g e t h a t is g e n e r a l , a n d o n e t h a t is t o b e c o n t i n ­ u a l l y g e n e r a l i z e d , c a n it b e sensitive to t h e p a r t i c u l a r v o i c e s o f t h e g o o d . T h i s result h a d to p r o v e itself at a f u r t h e r level o f the discussion: the p r i n c i p l e o f g e n e r a l justification led to a theory o f political legitimacy that r e d e e m s law's c l a i m to generality b u t at the s a m e time c o u n t e r s

liberal

doubts a b o u t the possibility o f consensus f o r m a t i o n in society, c o m m u n i i54

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

tarian d o u b t s a b o u t t h e viability o f this "substanceless" political c o m m u n i t y , a n d , finally, feminist d o u b t s a b o u t t h e possibility o f a truly g e n e r a l

lan­

g u a g e . T h eresponse to these doubts a n d to the question o f the justification of a theory o f social justice w a s a theory o f g e n e r a l legitimacy that avoids both the liberal minimal a n d the communitarian

maximal conception of

political c o m m u n i t y a n d p r o p o s e s a differentiated c o n c e p t i o n o f citizen­ ship. Here, however, a point in the debate has b e e n reached at which com­ munitarians again raise the question o f the g o o d as the foundation o f the t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e . T h e o b j e c t i o n r u n s : e v e n if it c o u l d b e s h o w n t h a t a dis­ tinction c a n b e drawn between the ethical person, the legal person, a n d the citizen as dimensions o f recognition o r o f the normative justification o f v a l u e s a n d n o r m s — i f a d i s t i n c t i o n c a n b e d r a w n b e t w e e n ethical c o n c e p ­ tions

of the g o o d (that a r e constitutive o f t h e identity o f a p e r s o n o r a

community) a n d generally justified n o r m s — t h e principle o f general justi­ fication

m a y n o n e t h e l e s s b e f o u n d e d o n a moral good, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t o f

u n i m p e d e d individual f r e e d o m a n d self-determination. H o w else c o u l d the p r o c e d u r e o f general justification m a k e sense if n o t as the explication o f this basic v a l u e o f i n d i v i d u a l f r e e d o m ? A n d h o w else c o u l d t h e validity o f n o r m s b e a p p r a i s e d if n o t o n t h e basis o f this v a l u e ? A l l p r o c e d u r a l i s m a n d all u n i v e r s a l i s m d r a w o n this s o u r c e — o n e o f t h e s o u r c e s f r o m w h i c h " m o d ­ e r n identity" ( T a y l o r ) d r a w s its "strong" i d e n t i t y - d e t e r m i n i n g

a n d consti­

tutive evaluations. A l l legal a n d m o r a l n o r m s , h o w e v e r g e n e r a l they m a y be, a r e l o c a t e d in a cultural-ethical c o n t e x t o f "our" identity. T h i s objection leads t h e debate to the level o f a moral-theoretic reflec­ tion

of fundamental character. C a n the procedural conception o f practical

reason, according to which only n o r m s that c a n b e reciprocally a n d gen­ erally justified a r e generally valid, m a k e d o without constitutive conceptions of t h e g o o d ? T o w h a t e x t e n t d o e s this c o n c e p t i o n o f r e a s o n r e m a i n

tied

to

concrete contexts? This

final

r o u n d o f t h e d e b a t e will b e a n a l y z e d i n f o u r steps. First, Wal­

zer's hermeneutic doubts about a proceduralist theory o f morality a n d jus­ tice w i l l b e t a k e n u p a n d h i s c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l d i s c u s s e d . I t w i l l b e s e e n t h a t his p r i n c i p l e o f "reiterative u n i v e r s a l i s m " is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e a b o v e m e n t i o n e d p r i n c i p l e o f p r a c t i c a l justification, t h a t it is itself a n e x p l i c a t i o n of this p r i n c i p l e — a n a p p l i c a t i o n that c o n n e c t s i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective self-determination with each other From

the discussion

(4.1).

o f the principle

o f general justification

there

e m e r g e s , at t h e m o r a l level, a further c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e person, that o f t h e moral person. I t d e s i g n a t e s n o t t h e p e r s o n i n h i s o r h e r e t h i c a l i d e n t i t y , a s the subject o f law, o r as a citizen, b u t t h e h u m a n b e i n g as h u m a n b e i n g , a s a "mere" m e m b e r of the h u m a n c e p t i o n is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r

c o m m u n i t y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , this c o n ­

to explain the concept o f "human

rights"

756

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

(Walzer's "minimal m o r a l c o d e " ) . Political communities must respect s o m e f o r m o f basic recognition of moral persons in their self-determination their legal constitution

in o r d e r to b e a b l e to raise the c l a i m to

and

moral

legitimacy. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l p e r s o n p o i n t s b e y o n d this specific p r o b l e m c o m p l e x o f the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n law, politics, a n d m o ­ r a l i t y t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f m o r a l a c t i o n , w h i c h is i n d e e d action in concrete contexts b u t w h o s e justification requires "shared" rea­ s o n s that a r e also valid b e y o n d ethical o r legal-political c o n t e x t s (for in­ stance, b e t w e e n "strangers"). M o r a l n o r m s refer to action t o w a r d

persons

"in g e n e r a l " in a c o n t e x t o f c o m m o n h u m a n i t y — t o w a r d o n e a n d , at same

time,

the

all i n d i v i d u a l m o r a l p e r s o n s .

I n a s e c o n d step, R a w l s ' s p r o p o s a l o f a "constructivist" t h e o r y will

be

e x a m i n e d (4.2). T h e discussion o f his justification p r o g r a m b e y o n d r e a l i s m a n d relativism has the task o f investigating m o r e precisely the

conception

o f m o r a l p e r s o n a s a n " i d e a o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n " a n d o f q u e s t i o n i n g it i n r e s p e c t o f t h e " p o l i t i c a l " a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t e n t e r i n t o it. R a w l s ' s

approach

will b e contrasted with a n alternative c o n c e p t i o n o f practical r e a s o n

that

not only understands the conception of m o r a l person differendy (and ex­ plains the already m e n t i o n e d differences to Rawls's theory) b u t also serves as the g e n e r a l basis for the differentiation o f v a r i o u s "contexts of justice." F o r this I h a v e r e c o u r s e to further constructivist ( O ' N e i l l ' s ) a n d discoursetheoretic (especially Habermas's) The

approaches.

conception of communicative-practical reason and the moral

s o n e x p l i c a t e d in this c o n n e c t i o n

finds

per­

itself e x p o s e d to M a c l n t y r e ' s fun­

d a m e n t a l objections. A c c o r d i n g to h i m , s u c h a c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d i n g ception of reason a n d such a "placeless" conception of the person be meaningfully defended. T h e r e are only context-immanent of

reason, with the

possibility o f rational

comparisons not

con­

cannot

standards

being

ruled

out. M a c l n t y r e ' s t h e o r y itself d o e s h o w e v e r m a k e b o r r o w i n g s o f a

moral

k i n d that question his thesis of the nontranscendability o f ethical worlds

(4-3)T a y l o r d o e s n o t contest the validity o f universalist m o r a l principles, but in his opinion they are themselves g r o u n d e d in the value horizons of the " m o d e r n identity." T h e y are b a s e d o n m o r a l g o o d s , ethical g o o d s o f h i g h e s t o r d e r , a s it w e r e , t h a t r e p r e s e n t o r i e n t a t i o n p o i n t s f o r t h e

the

modern

question o f morality. E v e n w h e r e "our" m o r a l principles g o b e y o n d partic­ u l a r c o n t e x t s , t h e y still m o v e w i t h i n " o u r " v a l u e c o n t e x t . I n t h i s c a s e , h o w ­ e v e r , d i f f e r e n t v a l i d i t y c r i t e r i a f o r w h a t is v a l i d " f o r u s " a n d w h a t is v a l i d "for a l l " m u s t b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . It is i n t h e s e t e r m s t h a t T a y l o r ' s c o n ­ c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is t o b e c r i t i c a l l y e x a m i n e d (4.4).

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM 1

4.1.

A CONTEXTUALIST

5

7

UNIVERSALISM

Nor will you think it strange that anyone who descends from contemplation of the divine to human life and its ills should blunder and make a fool of himself, if, while still blinded and unaccustomed to the surrounding darkness, he's forcibly put on trial in the law-courts or elsewhere about the shadows of justice or thefiguresof which they are shadows, and made to dispute about the notions of them held by men who have never seen justice itself. P L A T O

1974,

321

( S T E P H A N U S

517)

J u s t i c e , s a y s P l a t o ' s S o c r a t e s i n t h e Republic, i s a n i d e a t h a t i s t r u m p e d

only

b y t h e h i g h e s t i d e a o f t h e g o o d , w h i c h is " s u p e r i o r t o it [i.e., t o b e i n g ] i n dignity a n d p o w e r " (302,309 [504, 509]). Participating in the divine i d e a o f t h e g o o d , j u s t i c e is a n e t e r n a l a n d u n c h a n g e a b l e i d e a a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h all " s u r r o u n d i n g

figures"

c a n b e measured; ultimately they a r e images,

s h a d o w s o f t h e i d e a , w i t h o u t e v e r r e a c h i n g its purity. A n d it is t h e p h i l o s ­ o p h e r w h o , i n a l o n g c l i m b o u t o f t h e c a v e o f s h a d o w s , sets o u t t o v i e w t h e s h i n i n g truth a n d w h o , h a v i n g r e t u r n e d t o t h e cave, is i n d a n g e r o f b e i n g c o n d e m n e d b y the ignorant as being tainted. T h e r e f o r e , within the con­ fines

o f doxa, w h i c h p r e v a i l s i n t h e c a v e , episteme, p h i l o s o p h i c a l k n o w l e d g e

o f t h e t r u t h , m u s t r e m a i n p l a c e l e s s , u-topos. T h i s Platonic theory o f t h e relation between philosophy a n d truth, as well a s b e t w e e n politics a n d p u b l i c o p i n i o n , is c o n f r o n t e d b y A r i s t o t e l i a n skepticism about the notion o f a n idea o f the g o o d as "form without

con­

tent," w h i c h n e g a t e s t h e plurality o f g o o d s . " [ E ] v e n if t h e r e is s o m e o n e g o o d w h i c h is universally p r e d i c a b l e o f g o o d s o r is c a p a b l e o f s e p a r a t e a n d i n d e p e n d e n t existence, clearly it c o u l d n o tb e a c h i e v e d o r attained b y m a n " ( A r i s t o d e 1 9 8 4 , 1 0 9 6 0 3 0 - 3 5 ) . T h u s it is m e a n i n g l e s s t o w a n t t o m e a s u r e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t a c c o r d i n g t o a " g o o d i n itself," f o r t h e y a l w a y s r e f e r t o a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h t h e g o o d l i f e o f dif­ f e r e n t m e m b e r s is r e a l i z e d i n d i f f e r e n t ways. J u s t i c e is t h e m e d i a t i n g , c o m ­ p e n s a t i n g e l e m e n t i n t h e m i d s t o f h u m a n relations; it is a practical v i r t u e o f t h e r i g h t a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e . " [ T ] h e r e f o r e j u s t i c e is essentially s o m e ­ thing h u m a n "

(Nicomachean Ethics H 3 7 a 3 o ) ; i n W a l z e r ' s w o r d s : " J u s t i c e i s

relative to social m e a n i n g s " (1983, 3 1 2 ) . If o n e u n d e r s t a n d s the c o r e o f t h e Aristotelian theory of justice as t h e t h e s i s o f t h e i r r e d u c i b l e plurality a n d sociality o f g o o d s a n d r e c o g n i z e s t h a t o n l y a n i m m a n e n t t h e o r y , o n l y a t h e o r y t h a t i s in a n d n o t above t h e p r a c t i c e s of a political c o m m u n i t y , c a n d ojustice to this social plurality o f t h e g o o d , then the essential c o n c e r n hermeneutic

o f Walzer's theory o f justice a n d that o f his

m e t h o d b e c o m e a p p a r e n t . T h e details o f t h e theory o f dis­

tributive j u s t i c e h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n discussed; i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t it is a matter o f e x a m i n i n g h i s objections to universalist a n d "abstract" of morality. H i santi-Platonic theory o f the contrast between

theories

"philosophy"

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a n d " d e m o c r a c y " a n d h i s thesis o f t h e priority o f t h e "cave" o v e r "ideal" theory constructions

a r e central here. Walzer thereby links u p with the

classical p r o b l e m o f political p h i l o s o p h y c o n c e r n i n g t h e relation p h i l o s o p h i c a l truth a n d social reality, a p r o b l e m that h a s b e e n

between

transformed

but at the same time h a s persisted since Plato a n d Aristode, through St. A u g u s t i n e ' s t w o states, u p t o H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e o f K a n t , a n d t h e n t h e critique of H e g e l himself a n d o f universalist-Tundamentalist" theories. I f in Aris­ t o t l e ' s c a s e c r i t i q u e is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t P l a t o ' s i d e a l state, i n m o d e r n i t y it is against abstract theories o f social contract, a n d in postmodernity

against

all t h e o r i e s that raise t h e universalist n o r m a t i v e c l a i m o f w a n t i n g to c o n ­ ceive standards o f the g o o d o r the just i n d e p e n d e n d y

o f c o n t e x t (cf. L y -

o t a r d 1987; R o r t y 1 9 9 1 ) . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t a c c o r d i n g t o W a l z e r is to

find

a f o r m o f political t h o u g h t that b o t h evades the fundamentalism o f moralrealist theories a n d avoids a b a n d o n i n g a theory critical o f c o n c r e t e munities.

com­

1

Walzer refers to the topos o f the contrast between truth a n d politicsjust a s A r e n d t ( 1 9 7 7 b , 2 6 3 ) e x p l i c a t e s it: p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h , i m p a r t i a l i n t h e H o m e r i c s e n s e , is l o n e l y a n d r e m o v e d f r o m s o c i a l reality, w h e r e a s t h e c o m ­ m u n i c a t i v e p l a y o f o p i n i o n s a n d interests i n t h e political r e a l m is discursive b u t r e m a i n s i n t h e s p h e r e o f " o p i n i o n . " ' T r u t h is o n e , b u t t h e p e o p l e h a v e m a n y o p i n i o n s ; truth is eternal, b u t t h e p e o p l e continually c h a n g e

their

m i n d s . H e r e i n its s i m p l e s t f o r m is t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n p b i l p s o p h y a n d d e m o c r a c y " ( W a l z e r 1 9 8 1 , 3 8 3 ; cf. B a r b e r 1 9 8 8 , 9 - 1 4 ) . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r believes h e o r s h e is i n possession o f a n e t e r n a l truth that o n l y h e o r s h e r e c o g n i z e s fully b u t is b i n d i n g f o r all h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r d o e s n o t w a n t to h a n d o v e r responsibility f o r this truth to d e m o c r a t i c a n d , i n principle, o p e n discourse; h e o r s h e prefers to discuss his o r h e r n o r m s in an "ideal speech situation" ( H a b e r m a s ) , a n original position (Rawls), o r a spaceship

( A c k e r m a n ) — o f course, in a constrained

a n d idealized

dis­

2

c o u r s e . B u t t h e n o r m s j u s t i f i e d i n this m a n n e r a r e t o o f a r f r o m t h e c o n t e x t s of concrete communities

to b e able to claim validity f o r t h e m ; they a r e

abstract a n d general hypotheses that d o n o t d o justice to the plurality a n d sociality o f existing c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d . T h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l status o f W a l z e r ' s critique o f t h e priority o f philos­ o p h y o v e r d e m o c r a c y , w h i c h B a r b e r (1988) a n d (with i m p o r t a n t

differ­

e n c e s ) R o r t y ( 1 9 9 1 ) also f o r m u l a t e i n a s i m i l a r way, is, h o w e v e r , u n c l e a r . W a l z e r presents this critique o n t h e o n e h a n d as a differentiation o f m o d e s o f social criticism, o n t h e o t h e r a s a d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f p a t h s i n moral philoso­ phy. " G o o d " s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m i s " c o n n e c t e d "

criticism in contrast

to "de­

t a c h e d " criticism a n d , i n t h e s a m e way, h e says, m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y c a n o n l y b e a n i m m a n e n t reconstruction o f the shared understandings o f a political c o m m u n i t y , n o t a "view f r o m n o w h e r e " ( N a g e l ) , n o r a theory s u b specie aeternitatis (Rawls). A further level also a d d r e s s e d b y Walzer i n his critique

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

I59

of universalist moral theory is, finally, that of a normative theory of democracy. According to this, abstract, formal, and universalist conceptions of morality are undemocratic since they are removed from political discourse. He at­ tempts to illustrate the latter with the example of the philosophical rule exercised by the Supreme Court of the United States (cf. 1 9 8 1 , 3 8 7 - 9 3 ) . All three viewpoints are based on a common hermeneutic-normative in­ tuition, namely, respect for the plurality and integrity of communities. On the one hand, however, it is questionable whether Walzer's position is ap­ propriate within each of the dimensions of social criticism, moral theory, and the theory of democracy; and, on the other, even if it is plausible, a particular form of moral philosophy cannot be derived from the thesis that a social critic must speak the language of his or her community and be "connected" with it. The social critic is concerned with convincing a par­ ticular community of the correctness of certain norms or actions; moral philosophy is concerned with the general question of the good and the right. It will however be seen that a theory of "good" social criticism cannot manage without availing itself of universal principles. Furthermore, neither a particular form of social criticism nor a form of moral philosophy can be concluded from the democracy-theoretic principle that only the citizens of a particular political community decide, on the basis of their historically developed values, what is to be valid in their political community. A dis­ tinction has to be made between the following: the question of the philo­ sophical justification of moral principles, the question of the best path for social criticism, and the question of the self-determination of a political community. Their interconnection—which (in contrast to what Walzer as­ serts) consists in the fact that they represent different application contexts of the principle of reciprocal and general justification—can be recognized only in this way. (a) On the Relation between Philosophy and Democracy

In Walzer's view, Rawls's theory is an example of an undemocratic theory of democracy: it conceives a theory of justice for a political community in an abstract situation of rational choice based on certain capabilities of ab­ stract persons and on certain abstract primary goods, which are to be dis­ tributed jusdy. The citizens of a concrete community do not however ask themselves, Walzer says, what individuals would choose under ideal con­ ditions but rather: 'What should we choose against the background of our conceptions of the good and our identity?" Not only does Walzer criticize Rawls for leveling "complex equality," which (considering the different na­ ture of goods) prevails in a political community, in favor of "simple equality," he alsofindsfault with the Platonic feature of the theory, namely, that Rawls anticipates the discourses of those involved on how goods (and

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

w h i c h ones) a r e to b e distributed. B ycontrast, "political" as distinct

from

" p h i l o s o p h i c a l " k n o w l e d g e inquires: "What is t h e m e a n i n g a n d p u r p o s e o f this a s s o c i a t i o n ? W h a t i s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e

structure

o f our c o m m u n i t y a n d

g o v e r n m e n t ? " (Walzer 1 9 8 1 , 393). Political theory speaks n o t only f o rb u t a l s o w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y a n d b e c o m e s i n v o l v e d i n its p a r t i c u l a r ­ ity, i t s s h a r e d

understandings.

Walzer himself does however build a n important premise into his theory of shared understandings:

that "shared" implies a process o f developing

practices a n d institutions conditions o f reciprocity

intersubjectively, a process into w h i c h

certain

enter.

A r g u i n g with o n e a n o t h e r , w e interpret, revise, elaborate, a n d also call into question the p a r a d i g m s that shape o u r thinking. S o w e arrive at s o m e con­ ception o f a j u s t society (say) t h r o u g h a conversation that is constrained, i n d e e d , b y the ordinary constrains o f everyday life.

T h e r e is n o design.

R e a l talk is unstable a n d resdess, h e n c e it is ultimately m o r e radical than ideal speech, ( l g g o d , 1 9 5 ) T h e " w e " W a l z e r s p e a k s o f is a n " i n t e r p r e t i v e c o m m u n i t y " ( 1 9 8 7 , 3on. 2 1 ) o f all citizens, a n d w h a t c o u n t s i n political d i s c o u r s e s is "the r u l e o f r e a s o n s . Citizens c o m e into the f o r u m with nothing

b u t their arguments"

(1983,

304). Implicit in Walzer's usage o f the terms "shared understandings" a n d "real talk" is t h e n o r m a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e g e n e r a l justification o f general values a n d norms. T h i s principle alone gives h i m a way o u t o f the "communitarian d i l e m m a " — a s h a sb e e n seen with reference to social j u s t i c e ( i n c h a p t e r 3 . 4 ) . T h o s e distributive criteria a r e "just" that a r e s h a r e d , a n d s h a r e a b l e i n that they g u a r a n t e e t h e status o f e q u a l bership. Despite important

mem­

methodological differences, both Walzer a n d

Rawls hold these normative premises; the contextualization

o f t h e differ­

ence principle, which brings Rawls's theory closer—in the sense o f these premises—to Walzer, means

that the principle does n o t dissolve in the

i m m a n e n c e o f social c o n t e x t s b u t m a i n t a i n s its c o n t e n t a n d certain g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h distributions c a n b e c a l l e d j u s t at all. T h e s e "phil­ osophical" premises o f reciprocity, o f democratic a n d social equality a r e n o t e x t e r n a l t o b u t immanent i n t h e i d e a o f " d e m o c r a c y . " If Walzer w e r e to r e c o g n i z e t h e difference b e t w e e n a (proceduralistically interpreted)

Kantian

a n d a Platonic u n i v e r s a l i s t t h e o r y — t h e

first o n e for­

mulates universal principles o f individual a n d collective self-determination t h a t h a v e t o b e filled o u t , t h e s e c o n d i d e n t i f i e s b i n d i n g s u b s t a n t i v e v a l u e s — the

opposition

between

"philosophy" a n d "democracy" would

without the cited formal principles o f self-determination

collapse:

a n d equality, a

m e a n i n g f u l c o n c e p t o f d e m o c r a c y is n o t possible. Particularly h i s critique of Habermas's theory o f the normative, "ideal" presuppositions o f concrete discourses is m i s t a k e n i n a s s u m i n g that s u c h p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s m e a n

some-

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

161

thing other than that it is required of "real talk" to make a "rule of reasons" possible. Democratic discourses do not take place in "ideal" space; rather, they cannot be called "radical" in Walzer's sense until the principle of gen­ eral justification can be laid claim to by all those who are members of the democratic community (and are always in a position to question resolu­ tions) . This "philosophical" demand is the normative and critical sense of "democracy." (b) On the Problem of Social Criticism

Another problem, but one connected to the appropriate relation of phil­ osophical principles to democratic practice, is that of the relation between the critic of a society and the society itself. Social criticism has to rely upon certain principles that it holds up to a society. Here it is concerned neither with a theory of morality nor a theory of society; but it can nonetheless— in the sense of a "critical theory"—be based on such a theory. It is the interest of the social critic to get a society in a particular situation to rec­ ognize certain norms or, to be more specific, to carry out or desist from certain actions; the social critic's interest is a practical one. But where are the critic's principles supposed to come from? Walzer's central thesis that societies form entities and that each entity speaks its own language with certain social meanings leads him to the view that the "natural language of criticism" must be the language of the folk ( 1 9 8 8 , 9 ) . The standards of criticism must come from a specific commu­ nity's universe of discourse and the critic must be very closely connected with this community. 'We criticize our society just as we criticize our friends, on the assumption that the terms of the critique, the moral references, are common" ( 2 3 0 ) . Critics speak to a community in its own language, they hold its own standards and its reality up to it, without believing that they themselves are in possession of the absolute truth; the criticism is an im­ manent criticism. Here, there is both a conceptual and a functional argument (which Walzer does not clearly distinguish): criticism can be critical only by comparing social ideals and social reality and by making use of the particular community's language, for it cannot fall back upon another, superordinate language or upon transcendental values; in addition, criti­ cism can be effective only if it speaks the language of the folk: if it is au­ thentic and appears credible. Critics must be loyal and patriotic to the society as a whole, holding it close to their hearts, as it were. This theory contains important presuppositions: a society must have cer­ tain general beliefs to which a critic can appeal in a generally intelligible sense; these beliefs must satisfy certain moral standards, which give moral weight to the critic; and,finally,there must be the prospect offindingin society a receptive ear for the critic's appeal. In short, a society must provide

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a morally acceptable possibility for the concerns of the critic. But what can his or her legitimate moral concerns consist in? Solely in improving his or her society? What triggers criticism? The intention of the social critic that Walzer has in mind is an intuition that he obliquely calls "moral sense" ( 2 9 9 ) : the protest against oppression, exploitation, violence, and cruelty. Hence, the critic is concerned with improving society not solely for its own sake but for the sake of its (possible) victims. To the extent that Walzer introduces this premise—that there is "universal value in opposing op­ pression" (227)—his theory plausibly holds that a critic, intent on defend­ ing possible victims of a community, has only the option of appealing to the community's values, believing that they accommodate the critic's moral concerns. Thus it is not the critic's "connectedness" to his or her commu­ nity that is a criterion of the moral quality of the criticism, but the question of on whose behalf the critic speaks, namely, on behalf of the victims of a community. The critic is not primarily a connected, but a "connecting" critic; critics connect their moral protest with the political-ethical contexts in which they raise this protest; they appeal to those social values that can be morally justified. For that reason, Walzer's objections to universalist criticism can be di­ rected not at the universalist core of the critic's concern—this is actually presupposed—but at the manner in which this core is realized in concrete criticism. This distinction becomes clear in his comparison of the prophets Amos and Jonah. The two do not differ in the moral content of the divine message they proclaim, but Jonah speaks to the inhabitants of Nineveh as a stranger, as God's messenger who demands that the path of "violence" be abandoned. Amos, in contrast, speaks to the people of Israel as a mem­ ber of this community, and his talk of divine justice appeals to the values and practices that constitute this community in its core. He speaks to them in a different way than to other peoples: to other peoples he can only appear, like Jonah, as the representative of the moral "minimal code. "Jo­ nah is a "minimalist critic" (90), whereas Amos is a member of the com­ munity he criticizes. Jonah speaks in the name of universalist values against "violence," Amos in the name of particularist values against "oppression." T h e rules against violence arise f r o m the e x p e r i e n c e o f international as well as internal relations; the rules against oppression arise f r o m internal relations alone. T h e first rules regulate o u r contacts with all humanity, strangers as well as citizens; the s e c o n d regulate only o u r c o m m o n life. ( 1 9 8 7 , 9 3 )

Nonetheless, Walzer cannot avoid moderating this distinction between an external and an internal normative perspective, for even if immanent pro­ test against oppression is directed at a particular community's practices and values and tends therefore "toward particularity" (ibid.), the prescript against oppressing the poor, of which Amos reminds us, is without doubt

/ Oy

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a "universal r u l e . " T h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e " e x t e r n a l " a n d "inter­ nal" criticism o f o p p r e s s i o n is that A m o s c a n s p e a k differently to Israel than t o S y r i a , " n o t w i t h t h e s a m e w o r d s , i m a g e s , r e f e r e n c e s " ( 9 1 ) — b u t still o n the basis o f the s a m e m o r a l prescript. A distinction must b e m a d e between t h e moral validity o f n o r m s a n d t h e social possibility o f bringing t h e s e to bear i n

such

a

w a y that

the

critic

also

appeals

to

norms

existing

self-

understandings. I n W a l z e r ' s view, it f o l l o w s f r o m t h e n e c e s s i t y t h a t " g o o d " s o c i a l c r i t i c i s m (a)

a l w a y s s p e a k t h e language o f a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y , t h a t i t a l s o ( b )

a p p e a l t o i t s values. O n e o f h i s p a r a d i g m a t i c e x a m p l e s o f " c o n n e c t e d " c r i t i c s s h o w s h o w e v e r t h a t this is n o t a n e c e s s a r y c o n c l u s i o n a n d is n o t s u f f i c i e n t to e x p l a i n legitimate criticism: t h e e x a m p l e o f t h e S o u t h A f r i c a n writer Breyten Breytenbach, w h o a p p e a l e d to his fellow countrymen a n d w o m e n in their l a n g u a g e to a b a n d o n a p a r t h e i d a n d d i d this w i t h o u t d e n y i n g h i s o w n i d e n t i t y a s a S o u t h A f r i c a n . T h i s a t t i t u d e t h u s f u l f i l l s t h e first r e q u i r e ­ m e n t , ( a ) . B u t w h a t a b o u t ( b ) ? I t is e v i d e n t h e r e that B r e y t e n b a c h d i d n o t rely primarily u p o n t h e "shared values" o f white S o u t h African society. T h e standard o f his criticism m u s t b e characterized solely as o p p o s i t i o n to "in­ justices" (1988, 2 1 6 ) :in advocating the self-determination

of the black

p o p u l a t i o n , e q u a l l e g a l a n d political t r e a t m e n t , a n d a m o r e j u s t life to­ gether o f blacks a n d whites. T h o u g h h e believed that h e could

identify

"efforts" a m o n g s o m e o f h i s p e o p l e t o satisfy t h e s e d e m a n d s , h e w a s n o n e ­ theless aware o f his fundamental

opposition to the self-understanding o f

his p e o p l e . H i s avowal o f b e i n g a n Afrikaner w a s a m o r a l avowal o f t h e historical g u i l t o f this, h i s society; this a l l o w e d h i m t o say a t t h e s a m e

time:

"I a m n o t a n A f r i k a n e r " ( 2 1 9 ) . I n t h e l i g h t o f m o r a l s t a n d a r d s , t h e critic presents a n interpretation

o f social reality, n o t p r i m a r i l y a n

interpretation

o f social values. I t i s n o t c o n n e c t e d n e s s w i t h t h e c o m m u n i t y c r i t i c i z e d t h a t i s t h e p r i m a r y c r i t e r i o n o f g o o d c r i t i c i s m b u t c o n n e c t e d n e s s w i t h t h e suf­ fering. "[I]n

matters o f morality, a r g u m e n t s i m p l y is t h e a p p e a l to

meanings" (Walzer 1983, 29)—this central normative statement

common o f Wal­

zer's must b e modified accordingly. S h a r e d "meanings" o f a linguistic kind a r e n o t y e t j u s t i f i e d , shareable v a l u e s — c r i t i c i s m m a y s p e a k a p a r t i c u l a r l a n ­ g u a g e , b u t it s p e a k s to a p a r t i c u l a r society f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f t h o s e " o p ­ p r e s s e d " b y this society, f r o m w h i c h it follows t h a t it c a n rely u p o n

only

t h o s e " c o m m o n m e a n i n g s " t h a t satisfy t h e m i n i m a l m o r a l d e m a n d s o f b a s i c f o r m s o f r e c o g n i t i o n ; a n d it also follows that " c o m m o n " m e a n i n g s c a n b e a basis f o r n o r m a t i v e criticism only if they a r e truly " c o m m o n " a n d n o t e x c l u d i n g . S o c i a l v a l u e s a n d p r a c t i c e s a r e j u d g e d o n t h e b a s i s o f a n external a n d a n internal c r i t e r i o n . T h e e x t e r n a l c r i t e r i o n — i n t h e f o r m o f a m o r a l " m i n i m a l c o d e " (1987, 24, 4 5 , 9 3 ) — c a l l s f o r n o r m s that m u s t b e o b s e r v e d in all societies; t h e internal criterion calls f o r social relations that c a n b e

164

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

j u s t i f i e d t o a l l t h e m e m b e r s o f a society. ' V i o l e n c e " is t h e d i s r e g a r d o f m o r a l persons'

claims to rights,

"oppression" the disregard of a

community's

m e m b e r s ' j u s t i f i a b l e c l a i m s to full m e m b e r s h i p i n a substantive s e n s e . T h u s criticism c o n t i n u e s to b e r e l a t e d to s h a r e d v a l u e s a n d n o r m s , b u t t h e cri­ terion o f t h e "shareable" b e c o m e s t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r criticism. Criti­ cism requires a "more g e n e r a l " nonexclusive l a n g u a g e that continues to b e the "thick" l a n g u a g e o f a particular society b u t m u s t n o t h o w e v e r contradict a "thin" m o r a l l a n g u a g e . I n t h i s w a y , s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , p r a c t i c e s , a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s , as well as v a l u e s a n d self-understandings b e c o m e criticizable. Criticism d e m a n d s reasons for e x i s t i n g s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ; a n d it e x a m i n e s t h e s e r e a s o n s ,

first,

in respect of

w h e t h e r they are in a basic sense morally acceptable a n d in a general sense socially shareable; a n d , second, in respect o f w h e t h e r existing social prac­ tices c a n i n d e e d b e legitimated o n t h e basis o f them. T h e c o m m u n i t y o f all m e m b e r s r e m a i n s t h e "effective a u t h o r i t y " (30) f o r t h e criticism o f val­ ues as well as practices; shared understandings are themselves the object o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n d i s c o u r s e s , n o t t h e fixed a n d u n e q u i v o c a l starting point o f criticism. T h e victims o f oppression ( a n d criteria o f m o r a l c r i t i c i s m ) r e l y u p o n o n l y those i d e a s o f t h e r u l i n g c l a s s e s ( 4 0 - 4 2 ) w i t h w h i c h the o v e r t h r o w o f this r u l e c a n b e j u s t i f i e d — a n d they rely u p o n these i d e a s because they are the right ones, n o t because they are the ruling ones (or t h o s e o f t h e r u l e r s ) . I m m a n e n t criticism r e m a i n s "situated" i n c o n t e x t s ; it c a l l s n o t f o r a " p u r e " l a n g u a g e b u t f o r o n e t h a t all m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u n i t y c a n s p e a k a n d o n e t h a t c o n t a i n s m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d s o f a moral n a t u r e . W i t h ­ o u t t h e s e e l e m e n t s o f g e n e r a l i t y a n d universality, i m m a n e n t criticism is n o t critical: social relations m u s t b e reciprocally a n d g e n e r a l l y justifiable. F o r all t h e substantivist-"thick" c h a r g i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t o f " c o m m o n meanings," the principle of justification in a n internal a n d external sense c o n t i n u e s t o b e t h e l e a d i n g p r i n c i p l e , w i t h o u t this e x t e r n a l s e n s e i m p o s i n g "foreign" concepts u p o n particular contexts. This circumstance thus points to the possibility o f a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n universalism a n d contextualism, o n e that Walzer himself elaborates in later articles—without however rec­ ognizing the above-mentioned elements o f practical reason as such.

3

(c) Four Paths in Moral Philosophy Walzer distinguishes three paths in m o r a l philosophy: those o f "discovery," "invention," a n d "interpretation." T h e path o f discovery presupposes a di­ vinely c r e a t e d reality r e v e a l e d to h u m a n b e i n g s o r a m o r a l reality that dis­ c l o s e s itself t o a p h i l o s o p h i c a l 'View f r o m n o w h e r e " ( N a g e l ) t h a t is f r e e o f all particularity. G o d - g i v e n , objective, o r natural values a n d rights a r e n o t created by human

beings, they a r e discovered b y them;

the moral

facts

discovered h e r e i n — W a l z e r also includes t h e utilitarian c o n c e p t i o n o f m o -

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

1 6 5

rality—are b y definition universally valid. N o less universalist, b u t b a s e d o n t h e o p i n i o n t h a t m o r a l n o r m s a r e c o n s t r u c t e d b y h u m a n b e i n g s , is t h e p a t h of "invention." A "design," an abstract thought experiment, helps construct n o r m s that c a n raise a c l a i m to universal validity. Rawls's theory (but also Habermas's discourse ethics a n d A c k e r m a n ' s approach)

is p a r a d i g m a t i c

for this. T h e participants in t h e t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t a r e t h e m s e l v e s ideal­ ized a n d located in a n ideal w o r l d in w h i c h they draft a n ideal theory o f the

i d e a l society. T h e y tell t h e

p e o p l e w h o live in their o w n

particular

h o m e s to m o v e into a H i l t o n H o t e l in w h i c h all the r o o m s a r e identical. W a l z e r disputes that this k i n d o f morality c a n b e r e l e v a n t to " o u r

own

h o m e s , " w h i c h a r e t h e s t a r t i n g a n d e n d p o i n t o f a l l m o r a l q u e s t i o n s ; h e is nonetheless aware that for "strangers," w h o d o not have their o w n h o m e s , t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g p r o b l e m i s t o find s h e l t e r i n s u c h a h o t e l . H e i s t h e r e f o r e f o r c e d at this p o i n t to distinguish b e t w e e n a universalist m o r a l i t y f o r strang­ ers a n d a particularist morality for natives. W a l z e r ' s a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e p a t h s o f d i s c o v e r y a n d i n v e n t i o n is a h e r m e n e u t i c one: morality c a n n o t b e f o u n d e d in an objective o r ideal world; it m u s t b e p r e s e n t if a m o r a l q u e s t i o n is t o a r i s e a t a l l . N o r c a n t h e conceptions break out of the hermeneutic circle: ' T h e claim of

first

two

interpre­

t a t i o n is s i m p l y this: t h a t n e i t h e r d i s c o v e r y n o r i n v e n t i o n is n e c e s s a r y b e ­ cause w e already possess w h a t they pretend to p r o v i d e " (1987, 19). Discov­ erers m a y well u n d e r s t a n d themselves as the e x e c u t i v e o f morality a n d

the

inventors as the legislative, but interpretation r e m a i n s the judiciary, leaving the

final

w o r d o n w h a t is t o b e c o n s i d e r e d m o r a l t o t h o s e w h o h a v e a l w a y s

lived in the

m o r a l h o m e . I n reality, discovery a n d

"disguised interpretations"

(21)

that cannot

invention

are

simply

cast off the particularity

t h e i r p r e m i s e s . T o a r g u e m o r a l l y is t o i n t e r p r e t

a specific

of

community's

principles a n d practices (and the contradictions a m o n g t h e m ) . F o r

this

interpretation

par­

of existing morality, conceived o f as a r g u m e n t a m o n g

t i c i p a n t s , t h e r e is n o a u t h o r i t a t i v e e n d p o i n t : e a c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p u b l i c l y j u s t i f i e d to t h o s e f o r w h o m this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n valid. T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t

must

be

is s u p p o s e d t o

be

implies that the m o r e comprehensively an

inter­

p r e t a t i o n reflects the interests o f this c o m m u n i t y ' s participants, the

better

it is. A n d i n p o i n t o f f a c t : " I n s o f a r a s w e c a n r e c o g n i z e m o r a l p r o g r e s s , it has less to d o with the discovery o r invention o f n e w principles than with the inclusion u n d e r women"

the o l d principles of previously e x c l u d e d m e n

(27). T h i s a r g u m e n t h o w e v e r p r e s u p p o s e s that these

and

principles

permit inclusion a n d are as such justified—which m a y require a radical moral reinterpretation

(in intersubjective c o n t e x t s ) . T h e internal principle

o f g e n e r a l , consensual j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o n s e q u e n t l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e

communal

" c a v e " o r i e n t s i t s e l f b y t h e l i g h t o f l e g i t i m a t e p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s is t h e philosophically central o u t c o m e of a consistent interpretation considerations.

first

of Walzer's

166

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

T h e s e c o n d consists i n a reflection o n t h e difference b e t w e e n the indig­ e n o u s morality o f particularity a n d the universalist morality o f strangers, the "minimal a n d universal moral c o d e " (24). T h e morality o f strangers, the morality of humanity, d o e s n o t s t a n d , u n c o n n e c t e d , a l o n g s i d e a c o n c r e t e morality of community b u t c o n s t i t u t e s i t s f o r m a l f r a m e w o r k ( 2 5 ) . A c c o r d i n g to Walzer, these m i n i m a l m o r a l n o r m s o f r e c o g n i z i n g all h u m a n b e i n g s as moral persons d o n o t r e p r e s e n t a n e t h i c a l - p o l i t i c a l f o r m o f l i f e : t h e y d o n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e specifications o f ethical p e r s o n , legal person, o r citizen; they assume concretely different forms b u t nonetheless constitute a n indispens­ able f r a m e w o r k f o r individual self-determination within t h e concrete, col­ lective self-determination o f a c o m m u n i t y . T h e r e f o r e , the value o f respecting t h e integrity o f collective forms o f life, w h i c h W a l z e r c o n t i n u a l l y e m p h a s i z e s , h a s t o b e s u p p l e m e n t e d b y prin­ ciples, n a m e l y , t h a t t h e s e f o r m s o f life m u s t — f r o m tive—be

an internal

perspec­

generally justified a n d must—from a n external perspective—rec­

ognize certain m o r a l rights. Collective self-determination m u s t n o t b e at the e x p e n s e o f individual self-determination. A c c o r d i n g to Walzer's con­ ception, the m o r a l w o r l d thus consists n o t only o f incompatible

internal

moralities b u t also o f n o r m s that all c o m m u n i t i e s have to recognize. This u n d e r s t a n d i n g is g r o u n d e d o n t h e i n s i g h t t h a t p e r s o n s a r e n o t o n l y e t h i c a l persons in local communities, legal persons in particular legal ties,

communi­

citizens i n p a r t i c u l a r political c o m m u n i t i e s b u t also, a n d first o f all,

strangers w h o are nothing m o r e than "human beings." T h e moral minimal c o d e c a n b e f o u n d also, a n d in particular, b y a "single person, i m a g i n i n g h i m s e l f a s t r a n g e r , d e t a c h e d , h o m e l e s s , lost i n t h e w o r l d " ( 2 4 ) , i n d e e d , it i s t h e l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h a m o r a l p e r s o n a s a human being a p p e a l s t o o t h e r h u m a n beings. A r e n d t forcefully pointed o u t the m o r a l necessity o f such a H i l t o n H o t e l f o rstateless persons, w h o h a v e lost t h e security o f m e m b e r s h i p in a political c o m m u n i t y . I n h e r call f o r " o n e h u m a n right," n a m e l y , t h e right to have rights that a r e politically g u a r a n t e e d ( A r e n d t 1949), s h e takes into account the insight that h u m a n beings as moral persons a r e in n e e d of protection precisely w h e n they have lost t h e shelter p r o v i d e d b y their state, w h e n they a r e n o l o n g e r legal p e r s o n s . H o w e v e r , states h a v e n o t o n l y to g r a n t s t r a n g e r s this p r o t e c t i o n ; they also h a v e t h e duty t o g u a r a n t e e their citizens at least the standards o f such a hotel. H u m a n beings have m o r a l rights, b u t these rights b e c o m e concrete a n d actionable rights only in legal communities.

Individual rights m a y well derive, as I a m inclined to think, f r o m o u r ideas a b o u t personality a n d m o r a l agency, without r e f e r e n c e to political processes a n d social circumstances. B u t the e n f o r c e m e n t o f rights is a n o t h e r matter. . . . Rights are only enforceable within political c o m m u n i t i e s w h e r e they have b e e n collectively r e c o g n i z e d , a n d the process by w h i c h they c o m e to b e rec-

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

i6j

o g n i z e d is a political process w h i c h requires a political arena. (Walzer 1980b,

226) This conception o f moral rights b e c o m e s manifest in Walzer's

treatment

of international justice. H i s theory of just a n d unjust wars defends o n the o n e h a n d the right o f political communities to the self-determination o f their " c o m m o n life" b u t roots this right in a n o t i o n o f individual rights that is a l s o t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r h i s t h e o r y o f j u s t w a r s ( 1 9 8 0 b , 2 0 9 ) . T h e b a s i c rights o f states i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l

l a w , says W a l z e r , t h e rights o f territorial

integrity a n d political sovereignty, "derive ultimately from the rights o f in­ d i v i d u a l s , a n d f r o m t h e m t h e y t a k e their f o r c e " (1992a, 5 4 ) . I n e s s e n c e , it is t h e r i g h t t o s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f e a c h m e m b e r o f a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y t h a t is a t t a c k e d w h e n t h e c o m m u n i t y is a t t a c k e d , n o t t h e r i g h t o f t h e a b ­ stract unity o f t h e state. ' T h e rights o f states rest o n t h e c o n s e n t o f their m e m b e r s " (ibid.). T h i s p r i n c i p l e h a sfar-reaching c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a state's l e g i t i m a c y a n d its c l a i m t o s o v e r e i g n t y a n d f o r t h e possibility o f i n t e r v e n t i o n from without, f o r instance, in the case o f grievous h u m a n rights violations.

4

Individual rights (to life a n d liberty) underlie the most i m p o r t a n t j u d g m e n t s that w e m a k e a b o u t w a r . . . . [ T ] h e y a r e s o m e h o w entailed by o u r sense o f w h a t it m e a n s to b e a h u m a n being. If they a r e n o t natural, then w e have i n v e n t e d them, b u t natural o r invented, they a r e a palpable feature o f o u r m o r a l world, (ibid.) This determination

of universal h u m a n

rights shows that Walzer's argu­

m e n t f o r a particularist theory of justice c a n n o t b e "radically particularist" ( 1 9 8 3 , x i v ) i n r e s p e c t o f m o r a l q u e s t i o n s . E v e n i n Spheres of Justice ( x v ) h e r e m a r k s that h e understands the conception o f h u m a n rights o n w h i c h his treatment of j u s t w a r w a s b a s e d as b e i n g c o m p l e m e n t a r y to t h e p r o b l e m o f e x t r a p o l a t i n g " s p h e r e s o f j u s t i c e " — " d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e is n o t all o f m o r a l i t y , it d o e s n o t e v e n c o v e r t h e w h o l e o f j u s t i c e " ( 1 9 9 2 c , Walzer's moral hermeneutics tions

for

291).

5

c a n n o t a v o i d p r o v i d i n g universal

condi­

w h y a n d for what forms o f community are to b e respected o r

c r i t i c i z e d a n d i n w h a t t h e i r m o r a l c l a i m s vis-a-vis t h e i r o w n m e m b e r s a n d strangers a r e to consist. T h i s consideration leads to his theory o f "reiterative universalism." It connects formal universalism a n d substantive

contextual­

ism b y m e a n s o f the i d e a that universal principles establish a f o r m a l frame­ w o r k t h a t is c o n s t a n d y r e i t e r a t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t m a n n e r i n c o n t e x t s o f p o ­ litical c o m m u n i t i e s , i n their s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , practices, a n d institutions. B y r e a s o n o f this idea, W a l z e r a b a n d o n s

the flawed opposition

between

u n i v e r s a l i s m a n d c o n t e x t u a l i s m a n d c o m e s t o a contextualist universalism

that

sees in t h e very formality a n d universality o f m o r a l n o r m s the possibility o f incorporation

i n t o v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s a n d s p a c e f o r t h e s e c o n t e x t s o f self-

determination.

" C o n t e x t u a l i s t " is t h e r e f o r e t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e s e n s e

of "contextualized" o r "context-sensitive"; this f o r m o f universalism respects

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

the limits o f social contexts b u t d o e s n o t r e g a r d t h e m as t h e limits o f m o ­ 6

r a l i t y a s a w h o l e . T h e r e i s e v e r y i n d i c a t i o n h e r e o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a fourth path i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y t h a t c o n n e c t s t h e f i r s t t h r e e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d b y Walzer. H e distinguishes twokinds o f universalism. A covering-law universalism believes that it c a n e x p l a i n principles of j u s t i c e a s well as standards o f t h e g o o d i n d i v i d u a l a n d p o l i t i c a l life b y o n e u n i v e r s a l l y v a l i d r o o t . O n e s o u r c e o f m o r a l k n o w l e d g e c o v e r s , a s it w e r e , a l lp o s s i b l e m o r a l p h e n o m e n a i n t h e world. These p h e n o m e n a

d o n o t have their o w n right b u t a r e simply re­

flections o r preforms o f true justice. T h e s e c o n d kind, reiterative univer­ salism, however, assumes a plurality o f m o r a l sources a n d p h e n o m e n a

that

are to b e h e e d e d according to the universal prescripts o f tolerance a n d r e s p e c t . M o r a l w o r l d s a r e u n i v e r s e s o f d i s c o u r s e t h a t c a n n o t b e reduced t o o n e l a n g u a g e ; y e t i n e s s e n c e t h e y contain c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s t h a t e n j o y u n i ­ versal validity b u t a r e b r o u g h t

to b e a r only particularistically.

"Indepen­

dence, inner direction, individualism, self-determination, self-government, freedom, autonomy: allthese c a n b e r e g a r d e d as universal values, b u t they all h a v e p a r t i c u l a r i s t i m p l i c a t i o n s " ( 1 9 9 0 b , 5 1 8 ) . H u m a n creativity reiter­ ates, r e n e w s f o r m s o f h u m a n life w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f t h e s e u n i v e r s a l values. T h e value o f self-determination assumes a special position here: the a t t e m p t t o d i s p u t e this v a l u e is a s m o r a l l y c o n d e m n a b l e a s t h e a t t e m p t to give a n a priori specification o f what the self-determination o f a people o r a h u m a n being must mean. "People have to choose f o r themselves, each p e o p l e f o r itself" ( 5 1 9 ) . T h e m o r e a b s t r a c d y t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l u e is u n d e r ­ s t o o d , t h e g r e a t e r t h e latitude it p r o v i d e s f o r its substantive

reiteration.

7

" [ P ] e o p l e should b e treated in a c c o r d a n c e with their o w n ideas about h o w they should b e treated" The

(530).

highest principle o f reiterative universalism consists in t h e recip­

rocal recognition o f others as "moral makers" (532), as self-determining b e i n g s i n a n d w i t h a c o m m u n i t y . A l r e a d y i n Spheres of Justice ( a s r e m a r k e d a b o v e i n c h a p t e r 3 . 4 ) , this p r i n c i p l e p o i n t e d t o t w o different

conceptions

of justice in Walzer: a universal o n e o f t h e moral necessity o f respect f o r j o i n d y p r o d u c e d cultural contexts, a n d a concrete o n e o f respect for the contents o f various social understandings understandings

is (always) to a c t u n j u s d y "

o f the just. ' T o override

those

(1983, 3 1 4 ) . Respect for the

autonomy o f "culture-producing creatures" does however refer to respect n o t p r i m a r i l y f o r c o m m u n i t i e s b u t f o r i n d i v i d u a l s i n c o m m u n i t i e s ; persons h a v e "rights to reiteration," as W a l z e r e m p h a s i z e s ( n o wm o r e strongly than

i n Spheres of Justice): W e a c t immorally w h e n e v e r w e d e n y to o t h e r p e o p l e the w a r r a n t f o r w h a t I will n o w call the rights of reiteration, that is, the right to a c t a u t o n o m o u s l y a n d the right to f o r m attachments in a c c o r d a n c e with a particular u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the g o o d life. O r , immorality is c o m m o n l y expressed in a refusal to rec-

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

169

ognize in others the moral agency and the creative powers that we claim for ourselves. (1990c, 5 3 5 ; italics added)

According to Walzer, this moral respect for persons is based on a reiterative core of common human experiences, on the moral minimum of all com­ munal contexts. Stuart Hampshire's ( 1 9 8 3 , ch. 6) proposal to proceed from a "deep structure" of the justice norms of rational argumentation—a structure on which all particular languages of ethical forms of life are based—is re­ garded by Walzer as correct in its intention, on account of its "minimal" moral claim; but he raises the anthropologically grounded objection that this minimal concept can be obtained not from a linguistic, universal deep structure, but from an interpretation of what moral claims are recognized in various cultural contexts and can therefore be regarded as universally valid. Walzer considers it possible to lay hold of a concept of "minimal natural law," as proposed by Hart ( 1 9 6 1 , 1 8 9 - 9 5 ; 9 ^ 4 ) » * skeptical, first, about a "transcendental" justification of this "code" and, second, about a definitive determination of its content. Walzer's universalism thus re­ mains a hermeneutic universalism: he proceeds from an analysis of the moral claims that are raised by human beingsfindingthemselves in distress, need, and suffering and that are recognized in various human cultures. The acknowledgement of "family resemblances" between human experi­ ences and norms—and the "extraction" of universal values—is "additive and inductive . . . and so it does not require an external standpoint or a universal perspective" ( 1 9 9 0 b , 5 2 7 ) . Knowledge of universal values is founded on moral experience; as if passed through a sieve, certain "mini­ mal" values arefilteredand abstracted from a multitude of "maximalist" cultural practices: these values can raise a claim to universality (see 1 9 9 4 a , 1 5 ) . 'Though we have different histories, we have common experiences and, sometimes, common responses, and out of these we fashion, as needed, the moral minimum" ( 1 9 9 4 a , 1 7 - 1 8 ) . We can, Walzer says, intu­ itively recognize the demonstrators' signs on which "truth" and "justice" are written; we are marching with them, however unfamiliar to us they and their country may be; but there isn't for us any real non-maximal notion of these minimal norms. We are marching with the demonstrators but we are really marching in our own understanding of these words. There is no moral Esperanto, just a multitude of languages that are based on common human experiences. This understanding explains Walzer's elucidation of the minimal moral code, which, though it can in his view be philosophically constructed, follows nonetheless from a consideration of norms that "have been accepted in virtually every human society" ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 4 ) . The "odd an­ thropological example" might call this outcome into question, but our moral experience points to these minimal values. It is the human experiD u t n

1

8

e

s

ijo

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

e n c e s i n a l l c u l t u r e s t h a t c a l l f o r t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a human morality, w h i c h is n o n e t h e l e s s n e v e r e n c o u n t e r e d i n a p u r e f o r m . W e f e e l w i t h ( a n d h o w ) o t h e r s w h o suffer o p p r e s s i o n a n d p a i n , a n d f r o m this e m p a t h y w e u n d e r ­ score the same m o r a l rights claims that follow from these negative expe­ riences. T h u s H a m p s h i r e (1989, 107-8) writes: H u m a n i t y is u n i t e d in the recognition o f the g r e a t evils w h i c h r e n d e r life scarcely bearable, a n d w h i c h u n d e r d e t e r m i n e any specific way o f life a n d any specific c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d a n d o f the essential virtues. T h e glory o f h u m a n i t y is in the diversity a n d originality o f its positive aspirations a n d dif­ ferent ways o f life, a n d the only universal a n d positive m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t is the application o f p r o c e d u r a l justice a n d fairness to the h a n d l i n g o f m o r a l conflicts between t h e m . U n l i k e H a m p s h i r e , however, Walzer d o e s n o t want to restrict the m o r a l m i n i m u m to p r o c e d u r a l n o r m s ; n o t only these n o r m s , w h i c h m a k e

differ­

e n c e possible, c a n b e morally distinguished, b u t also n o r m s a n d values that prove to b e c o m m o n ones: f o r e x a m p l e , values o f political responsibility, n o r m s o f conduct in war, honesty in bilateral trade. T h e r e a r e n o proce­ d u r a l l i m i t s t o a h e r m e n e u t i c - i n d u c t i v e u n i v e r s a l i s m (cf. W a l z e r 1 9 9 4 a , 1 4 -

15)T h u s the fourth path in moral philosophy, that o f contextualist univer­ salism, s e e m s to l e a d b a c k into the third o n e , that o f interpretation—only this

time

the shared understandings n o t o f o n e b u t o f many, a n d , in prin­

ciple, o f all cultures, are interpreted w h i c h all h u m a n b e i n g s as h u m a n

core

about

beings can agree. T h e minimal

in terms of a c o m m o n

moral

c o d e grants m o r a l p e r s o n s t h e possibility to object in cases in w h i c h

their

basic m o r a l rights to inviolability o f p e r s o n a r e e n d a n g e r e d . The

criterion o f justified universal m o r a l c l a i m s is n o t h o w e v e r

ciently clarified i n this way. T h e cited c o m m o n

suffi­

negative experiences of

o p p r e s s i o n a n d injustice a s well a s — t o p u t it p o s i t i v e l y — t h e c o m m o n d e ­ sire f o r a life f r e e o f t h e s e e x p e r i e n c e s d o c o n s t i t u t e

t h e foundation

for

m o r a l c l a i m s ( a n d f o r a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e o f b e i n g h u m a n ) , b u t t h e va­ lidity criterion o f t h e s e c l a i m s i s l o c a t e d i n t h e i r g e n e r a l a n d r e c i p r o c a l n o n rejectability. Universal m o r a l claims a p p e a l to t h e o t h e r pacity as a h u m a n persons—that

(in his o r h e r ca­

b e i n g ) t o r e c o g n i z e p e r s o n s a s human beings, a s m o r a l

is, i n a w a y that

no human

being

can reasonably a n d

reciprocally d e n y a n o t h e r w i t h o u t d e n y i n g h i m o r h e r t h e b a s i c " r i g h t t o justification" (or to reiteration), w h i c h h u m a n beings have b yvirtue o f their membership person—as

i n t h e human

community. T o r e c o g n i z e a p e r s o n a s a moral

a n e n d a n d n o t a s a m e a n s , t o p u t it i n K a n t i a n

terms—means

therefore recognizing h i m o r h e r as a representative o f the moral authority of h u m a n i t y , a n d it m e a n s acting t o w a r d h i m o r h e r i n a c c o r d a n c e with n o r m s t h a t a r e b a s e d o n shared r e a s o n s a n d a r e j u s t i f i e d i n t h e s t r i c t s e n s e

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

I J I

o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ( a n dr e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) . It is o n l y i n this w a y that one

c a n m a k e sense o f Walzer's concept o f a universalist morality as a

"human

morality" b e y o n d a (weak) quasi-empirical o r a (strong)

meta­

p h y s i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d c a n fill i t w i t h a c o n t e n t t h a t d o e s j u s t i c e t o t h e demands a n d experiences o f concrete persons. O n t h e basis o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f r e a s o n , t h e n o t i o n o f m o r a l

person

c a n n o t b e e x p l i c a t e d w i t h o u t t h e right a n d t h e criteria o f m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The

c o r r e c t p a t h i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y is n o t that o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f

e x i s t i n g n o t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y ( 1 9 8 7 , 2 2 ) a c c o r d i n g t o t h e q u e s t i o n " w h a t is t h e r i g h t t h i n g for us t o d o ? " ( 2 3 ) , b u t t h e p a t h o f r e c i p r o c a l a n d g e n e r a l justification between concrete persons as h u m a n beings, as m e m b e r s o fthe common

context of being human. T h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y o f a l l h u m a n

beings

is t h e ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y " o f m o r a l n o r m s m u s t n o t h o w e v e r b e u n ­ derstood in a n abstract m a n n e r . It does n o t m e a n that these claims d o n o t originate in moral experiences a n d are n o t raised in concrete contexts, o r that m o r a l "minimal" n o r m s a r en o ta n c h o r e d in a "maximal" f o r m in social c o n t e x t s . It m e a n s that c o m m u n i t i e s m u s t n o t fall b e l o w " m i n i m a l " stan­ dards o f m o r a l recognition a n d that persons as h u m a n beings have a basic right to justification. M o r a l n o r m s a r e n o t "context-transcending"

norms

in t h e sense that they a r e valid only for "ideal," bodyless beings; rather, they a r e v a l i d f o r a l l , a n d t h a t m e a n s f o r e v e r y m o r a l p e r s o n vis-a-vis e v e r y o t h e r . Accordingly, a contextualist universalism imposes two essential restrictions o n social contexts.

9

O n e is t h e r e s t r i c t i o n — c a l l e d

moral

"internal"

a b o v e — t h a t a c o m m u n i t y h a s a c l a i m t o l e g i t i m a c y a n d to r e s p e c t f o r its i n t e g r i t y o n l y i f its " c o m m o n life" is g e n e r a l l y r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e m e m b e r s t h e m s e l v e s as justified. T h i s restriction d o e s n o t m e a n — i n a c c o r d a n c e with Walzer's reiterative universalism—that

the normative

requirement

con­

tains substantive i m p l i c a t i o n s as t o h o w t h e c o m m u n i t y o u g h t to live a n d u n d e r s t a n d itself; i t s i m p l y r e q u i r e s t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s b e a b l e t o i d e n t i f y w i t h t h e c o m m o n life. W a l z e r h a s m a d e this r e a d i n g c l e a r i n a critical r e ­ flection o n his c o n c e p t o f "social m e a n i n g s " as social constructions within a community. With regard to the recognition o f persons in social contexts, these constructions a r e n o t "free"; individuals c a n "nullify" constructions of themselves if they c a n n o t share

them:

W e m i g h t say, looking at the idea itself as s o m e t h i n g we have m a d e , that the construction o f social-construction-with-human-agents h a s certain m o r a l en­ tailments. A m o n g these is the right o f subjective nullification, the r i g h t o f the agents to refuse any given object status—as c o m m o d i t i e s , "hands," slaves, o r whatever. ( 1 9 9 3 a , 1 7 3 ) The

s e c o n d restriction a m o u n t s to the observation that n o t only must a

political ( o r ethical) c o m m u n i t y h a v e t h e s u p p o r t o f its m e m b e r s , it m u s t also e m b o d y certain m i n i m a l m o r a l n o r m s that a r e indebted to therec-

in2

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

o g n i t i o n o f the h u m a n i t y o f h u m a n b e i n g s as m o r a l p e r s o n s p e r se. T h i s "external" viewpoint follows f r o m the "internal" o n e insofar as the

latter

a l r e a d y r e q u i r e s o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e " r i g h t o f s u b j e c t i v e n u l l i f i c a t i o n " ; it is therefore n o t in a n abstract sense "externally" justified. It m a k e s possible criticism from "without," w h i c h m e a n s f r o m the perspective o f

nonmem-

b e r s ; a n d it i m p l i e s c e r t a i n s t a n d a r d s f o r t r e a t i n g " s t r a n g e r s " — a d i m e n s i o n t h a t a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e m u s t n o t i g n o r e . M o r a l c r i t i c i s m o f a c o m m u n i t y is justified, says W a l z e r (in his t h e o r y o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e ) , w h e n

these

minimal criteria of morality are not guaranteed. T h e apartments in com­ m u n i t i e s a r e always d e c o r a t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r style, b u t n o n e m a y i n a d m i s sibly fall b e l o w t h e s t a n d a r d o f t h e H i l t o n H o t e l . A theory of contextualist universalism thus provides a formal framework in which collective a n d individual self-determination can b e b r o u g h t

into

a g r e e m e n t . B e c a u s e this theory d o e s n o t m a k e a n y substantive a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e g o o d t h a t is t o b e r e a l i z e d , it c a n p r o v i d e s p a c e f o r t h e

concrete

conceptions of the g o o d joindy inherited or created by m e m b e r s of a com­ munity. Universality a n d formality d o not destroy c o m m u n a l contexts, they m a k e them possible u n d e r "minimal" moral conditions. T h e principle of g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s a p r i n c i p l e in a n d above c o m m u n a l p r a c t i c e — i t d o e s n o t r e q u i r e that c o m m u n a l contexts b e r e a r r a n g e d a c c o r d i n g to

abstract

p r i n c i p l e s " i n v e n t e d " i n a n i d e a l s i t u a t i o n ; it s i m p l y r e q u i r e s t h a t contexts be jointly accepted and be open

these

to the rights c l a i m s o f

persons o n the basis of negative experiences. C o m m u n a l i t y a n d

moral

humanity,

the morality of natives a n d the morality of strangers, must b e compatible, w i t h o u t the natives b e c o m i n g strangers to o n e a n o t h e r a n d w i t h o u t m a k i n g s o m e natives into strangers. Practical reason does not i m p o s e an Esperanto u p o n p e r s o n s , a s W a l z e r f e a r s , n o r d o e s it i m p o s e a c o n t e x d e s s i d e n t i t y o r a n i d e a l i z e d c o n v e r s a t i o n ; it d o e s n o t i m p l y a n y " e x t e r n a l " a n d

undemo­

cratic substantive justifications of n o r m s . If the contexts of justification are sufficiendy

distinguished,

ethical

particularity,

political autonomy,

and

m o r a l recognition b e c o m e not only compatible, they actually refer recip­ rocally to o n e other. T h e dualism b e t w e e n h u m a n universality a n d social p a r t i c u l a r i t y , w h i c h is u n a v o i d a b l e a c c o r d i n g t o W a l z e r

( 1 9 9 4 a , 8)

leads to various c o n c e p t i o n s o f c o n c r e t e justice a n d to a c o m m o n

and

under­

s t a n d i n g o f c e r t a i n b a s i c n o r m s o f j u s t i c e a n d o f t h e v e r y c o n c e p t o f "jus­ tice,"

is t o b e e x p l a i n e d i n n o o t h e r w a y t h a n b y t h e d i f f e r e n c e

between

various contexts of justice o n the basis o f a c o n c e p t i o n o f practical justifi­ cation. I n this discussion, a further

"context" of person and community

has

b e c o m e evident: the m o r a l p e r s o n as a m e m b e r o f the c o m m u n i t y o f all h u m a n beings "beyond" particular contexts. In the moral context, the prin­ ciple o f practical r e a s o n calls for a justification o f actions o n the basis o f r e a s o n s that a r e " s h a r e a b l e " in the strict s e n s e . T h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f per-

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

1 7 3

son, r e a s o n , a n d morality will b e e l a b o r a t e d in a discussion o f Rawls's con­ structivism in w h a t follows, for Rawls's t h e o r y also rests o n a certain

con­

c e p t i o n o f the m o r a l p e r s o n that, as a n "idea o f practical r e a s o n , " serves as the foundation for the justification of principles of justice. H o w does Rawls "do j u s t i c e " to the m o r a l c o n t e x t a n d to the differentiation

of

different

contexts of justice?

4.2.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND PRACTICAL

REASON

A g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f W a l z e r ' s t h e o r y , it m a y s e e m that the "contextualist" Walzer a n d the "universalist" Rawls have e x c h a n g e d r o l e s : n o w it is W a l z e r w h o a r g u e s u n i v e r s a l i s t i c a l l y , w h e r e a s R a w l s — i f w e follow R o r t y ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n — h a s restricted his theory as b e i n g

"political

n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l " to "trying to systematize the p r i n c i p l e s a n d

intuitions

t y p i c a l o f A m e r i c a n l i b e r a l s " ( R o r t y 1 9 9 1 , 1 8 9 ) . W h a t e l s e c a n it m e a n w h e n R a w l s r e m a r k s t h a t " s i n c e j u s t i c e a s f a i r n e s s is i n t e n d e d as a p o l i t i c a l c o n ­ c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e f o r a d e m o c r a t i c society, it tries to d r a w s o l e l y u p o n b a s i c intuitive ideas that are e m b e d d e d

in the political institutions

o f a consti­

tutional democratic r e g i m e a n d the public traditions of their tion" (1985,

interpreta­

225)? C a n such a culturally a n d historically a n c h o r e d

argu­

m e n t r a i s e a c l a i m t o u n i v e r s a l i t y o n l y if it is b a s e d o n a H e g e l i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f history in the f o r m o f the thesis that A m e r i c a n (or 'Western") culture

represents

the

normative

endpoint

of political

political

developments?

1 0

W h a t d o e s Rawls's a t t e m p t to p r e s e n t a "reasonable" theory o f justice m e a n ? " R e a s o n a b l e " i n a n A r i s t o t e l i a n , a n H e g e l i a n , o r , i n s p i t e o f all, still a K a n ­ tian sense? A c c o r d i n g to a conventionalist interpretation o f Rawls's "political" con­ ception, the p o i n t critical o f c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m — d i s c u s s e d in c h a p t e r

1 —

namely, that of distinguishing the conception of "moral person" from

that

o f "ethical p e r s o n , " l e d to a c o n c e s s i o n to munitarian price

criticisms: r e b u k i n g

of relinquishing

the

the

(differently positioned)

atomism

com­

objection would carry

theory's universalist, m o r a l

claim. Rawls

the de­

f e n d e d the original position, as w e h a v e seen, by pointing to the fact that it is b a s e d o n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e " m o r a l p e r s o n " t h a t c a n n o t

be

criticized for having a p r o b l e m a t i c view o f p e r s o n s ' ethical identity. R a t h e r , it is a s e c o n d - o r d e r c o n c e p t t h a t a b s t r a c t s f r o m e t h i c a l i d e n t i t i e s a n d s e r v e s as the f o u n d a t i o n

f o r a n i m p a r t i a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e ; it

presupposes the two m o r a l powers, namely, the capacity for a of the g o o d and

conception

the capacity for a sense of justice, which are

"neutral"

toward particular conceptions of the g o o d . This conception of the

moral

p e r s o n , R a w l s says, is " l a t e n t i n c o m m o n s e n s e " ( 1 9 8 0 , 5 2 0 ) ; it is i m p l i e d in the

notion

of the free a n d

equal

citizens o f a d e m o c r a t i c

society

(cf.

1 9 9 3 a , 1 3 ) a n d is t o t h a t e x t e n t a " p o l i t i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n . A s s u c h it s e r v e s

in4

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

as the f o u n d a t i o n for a "political" interpretation o f the principles of justice in respect of neutrality toward "reasonable" c o m p r e h e n s i v e doctrines

(see

c h a p t e r 2) a n d i n r e s p e c t o f t h e e s s e n t i a l v i e w p o i n t s o f s o c i a l j u s t i c e ( s e e chapter 3). With

this

"politicization" o f the

conception

of the

person,

however,

R a w l s s e e m s t o b e r e l a t i v i z i n g its K a n t i a n - m o r a l c o n t e n t a n d t o b e r e l y i n g solely o n an understanding tion

o f "citizenship" that o r i g i n a t e s in " o u r " tradi­

o f l i b e r a l - d e m o c r a t i c states. It is t h e n j u s t o n e p o s s i b l e

interpretation

o f t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m o n g o t h e r s . H a s n ' t it t h e r e b y l o s t its c l a i m t o d e ­ f e n d i n g t h e priority o f j u s t i c e o v e r c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s o f w h a t i s g o o d "for us"? T h i s q u e s t i o n calls for a m o r e d e t a i l e d l o o k at Rawls's w h i c h will s h o w to w h a t e x t e n t this c o n t e x t u a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

theory,

is i n a p p r o ­

priate. Conventionalist interpretations o f Rawls's political liberalism can assume v a r i o u s f o r m s . A c c o r d i n g t o a p o l i t i c a l - " p r a g m a t i c " u n d e r s t a n d i n g , R a w l s is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y w i t h the p r o b l e m o f stability; the o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n ­ s u s d o e s n o t t h e r e f o r e h a v e a n y i n d e p e n d e n t m o r a l b a s i s ; r a t h e r , it is t o b e understood

as the

minimal consensus for maintaining

social peace. A c ­

c o r d i n g to this view, R a w l s e x c h a n g e s the r o l e o f the p h i l o s o p h e r f o r that of the

"politician" striving for political consensus

unequivocally rejects

this

interpretation;

he

(Raz 1990,

distinguishes

10).

Rawls

between

two

stages o f the theory (1989a): the stage o f the "freestanding" m o r a l justifi­ cation o f the theory, a n d the subordinate stage o f e x p l a i n i n g the possibility o f s o c i a l s t a b i l i t y (cf. 1 9 9 3 a , ventionalist interpretation,

1 3 3 - 3 4 ) . N o n e t h e l e s s , says the s e c o n d

con­

the "freestanding" justification c o u l d place the

c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l p e r s o n a t t h e c e n t e r o f t h e t h e o r y b e c a u s e it r e f l e c t s "our" self-understanding as m e m b e r s o f a particular political culture (Rorty 1991). This understanding

is h o w e v e r i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h R a w l s ' s c l a i m t o

justify a "reasonable" conception that—unlike conceptions of the g o o d that question

the priority of justice

(or also unlike alternative, for e x a m p l e ,

utilitarian, c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e ) — p u t s forward stronger reasons than the r e f e r e n c e to "our" practices allows. T h e criterion o f the " r e a s o n a b l e " contrast to " u n r e a s o n a b l e " c o m p r e h e n s i v e doctrines) r e q u i r e s a v e n t i o n a l i s t j u s t i f i c a t i o n : t h e r e i s o n l y one c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e

(in

noncon-

normatively

prioritized reasonable. But, so runs the third interpretation,

this justification c o u l d ultimately

lie in the " f u n d a m e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t to the liberal political i d e a l " ( M u l h a l l a n d S w i f t 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 1 ; cf. G i u s t i 1 9 9 4 ) o f a p o l i t i c a l o r d e r " p u b l i c l y " j u s t i f i e d a m o n g free a n d equal citizens—an ideal of liberal citizenship that plays a d o u b l e r o l e : "it i s b o t h w h a t l e a d s R a w l s t o s e e k a c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e t h a t is p u b l i c l y j u s t i f i a b l e a n d w h a t h e f i n d s w h e n h e g o e s t o t h e p u b l i c p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e in o r d e r to d o j u s t that" ( M u l h a l l a n d Swift 1992, 190). W h a t f o r m s the

n o r m a t i v e s t a r t i n g p o i n t is n o t t h e r e f o r e

the m e r e

presence of

the

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

J 75

l i b e r a l i d e a l i n a p a r t i c u l a r political c u l t u r e b u t t h e n o r m a t i v e i d e a l itself— an ideal, nevertheless, that c a n in turn b e justified only as a

"comprehen-

sive" liberal doctrine o f t h e g o o d (222-26). Rawls h o w e v e r contradicts interpretation

by emphasizing that his fundamental

this

idea o f social cooper­

ation a n d t h e a t t e n d a n t i d e a s o f free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s a n d o f t h e wello r d e r e d s o c i e t y ( R a w l s 1 9 9 3 a , 1 4 ) a r e " i d e a s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n " (90, 1 1 0 ) t h a t " c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y r e j e c t e d " i n a moral s e n s e . O n l y w i t h t h i s a r g u ­ m e n t c a n the priority of justice principles over "comprehensive doctrines" b e d e f e n d e d a n d a "reasonable" limit b e set to these doctrines—a limit that c a n n o t itself originate i n s u c h a doctrine. T h e t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e c a n t h u s assert t h e validity o f its p r i n c i p l e s o n l y i n the sense o f a "freestanding" a n d "moral" ( n o t "ethical") c o n c e p t i o n ( 1 1 ) . I t r e t a i n s i t s deontological c h a r a c t e r , w h i c h R a w l s ( 1 9 7 1 , 3 0 ) d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r o u g h t h e priority o f t h e right, o n l y if it rests o n p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ; a n d a "political" c o n c e p t i o n , o f all c o n c e p t i o n s , c a n n o t d o w i t h o u t this. F o r that reason, the conception o f 'justice as fairness" begins n o t with

contingent

" s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g s " b e c a u s e t h e y are c o n t a i n e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l c u l t u r e , b u t w i t h c o n c e p t i o n s o f p e r s o n a n d s o c i a l c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t must c o n t a i n e d i n s u c h a c u l t u r e — a n d i n d e e d necessarily s o i f t h e c u l t u r e r a i s e s t h e c l a i m t o b e i n g a democratic o n e t h a t r e s t s o n a s h a r e a b l e ,

reasonable

foundation. Without these c o n c e p t i o n s o f practical reason there is n o d e m ­ ocratic, legitimate society. T h e y a r e i n h e r e n t in t h e f u n d a m e n t a l

principle

of public justification: a just a n d publicly justified basic structure

o f soci­

e t y — a structure that expresses citizens' "shared a n d public political reason" (1993a, 9 ) — m u s t rest o n these conceptions since they themselves a r e part of the i d e a o f public reason. " L e tus say, then, that the c o n c e p t i o n s o f society a n d person, a n d t h e public role o f principles of justice, a r e ideas o f practical reason" (110). T h a t t h e t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e a s fairness "starts" ( 1 4 ) with c e r t a i n

funda­

m e n t a l i d e a s o f a d e m o c r a t i c political c u l t u r e is t h e r e f o r e j u s t i f i e d i n t h e "philosophical b a c k g r o u n d o f political liberalism in practical reason" (xiv), n o t i n a m o r e o r less c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t a l i g n m e n t o f t h e theory. T h a t w e c a n r e c o n s t r u c t t h e r i g h t f r o m f a m i l i a r c o n c e p t i o n s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t it is r i g h t b e c a u s e it c o r r e s p o n d s t o " o u r " f a m i l i a r c o n c e p t i o n s . R a w l s m a k e s it clear that the ideas a n d principles encountered

in a democratic

political

culture a r e contradictory a n d must therefore b e o r d e r e d o n the basis o f fundamental

"abstract" m o r a l c o n c e p t s (9); h e r e h e u n d e r s c o r e s t h e r o l e

of political philosophy: ' W e turn to political philosophy w h e n o u r shared political understandings,

as Walzer m i g h t say, break d o w n , a n d equally

w h e n w e a r e torn within ourselves" (44). This Kantian interpretation

o f the n e wshape o f Rawls's theory refers to

the o u t c o m e o f a p r o c e s s w h o s e e x a m i n a t i o n is w o r t h w h i l e since w e c a n l o c a t e t h e r e t h e p o i n t s at w h i c h this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n u n c o v e r s a d i s h a r m o n y

in6

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

in Rawls's theory with other c o m p o n e n t s o f his conception—with, f o r e x ­ a m p l e , the political-"substantive" loading o f the conception o f m o r a l per­ son in regard to the theory o f primary goods, o r with a certain

(at least

terminological) political-"nonmetaphysical" relativization o f t h e theory in respect o f the "truth" o f c o m p r e h e n s i v e doctrines. B e t w e e n these twoun­ derstandings o f the "political" a n d a third o n e , the political-"moral" sense of the priority o f justice, Rawls's m o d e l exhibits a heterogeneity that a n " a u t o n o m o u s " (98) t h e o r y m u s t a v o i d . U l t i m a t e l y , o n l y a (similarly " n o n metaphysical")

Kantian interpretation

o f the theory

that clearly distin­

guishes between moral norms a n d ethical "doctrines"

(but nonetheless

takes into account the difference to Kant's "moral constructivism" e m p h a ­ sized b y Rawls) c a n m a i n t a i n this c l a i m t o a u t o n o m y ; a n d s u c h a n inter­ pretation goes b e y o n d Rawls at decisive points. T o demonstrate

this m o v e i n w h a t follows, t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f a

d e o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e will first b e e x t r a p o l a t e d ( a ) ; s e c o n d , R a w l s ' s j u s t i f i c a t i o n m o d e l s i n A Theory of fustice a n d t h e i r a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e D e w e y lectures will b e d i s c u s s e d ( b ) ; i n o r d e r , third, to e x a m i n e h i s n o w refor­ m u l a t e d theory o f constructivism (c). O n t h e basis o f a n i m m a n e n t

critique

o f R a w l s i a n theory, finally, a p r o p o s a l will b e m a d e to i n t e r p r e t t h e t h e o r y of "political" constructivism in the direction o f the universalist-contextualist t h e o r y that w a s f o r m u l a t e d i n c o n n e c t i o n with W a l z e r a n d that will b e e x ­ plicated with the help o f discourse-theoretic assumptions ( d ) .

(a) Deontological Theories of Justice At the center o f the m o d e l o f a nonmetaphysical, deontological theory o f j u s t i c e is t h e a t t e m p t to r e f o r m u l a t e t h e K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e o f m o r a l auton­ o m y as acting according to universally justified principles with a view to drafting principles o f justice f o r a basic structure o f society. It is, to u s e a specific formulation o f Rawls's, a matter o f "a p r o c e d u r a l interpretation o f Kant's conception o f a u t o n o m y a n d the categorical imperative [within the framework o f a n empirical theory]" (Rawls 1 9 7 1 , 256). ception

of autonomy

is d e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i z e d

1 1

T h eKantian con­

a n d proceduralized:

what

free a n d equal persons c a n agree u p o n in their mutual a n d general interest is w h a t is t o b e r e g a r d e d a s g e n e r a l l y j u s t i f i e d . tical

1 2

T h u s the principle o f prac­

r e a s o n , n a m e l y , t h a t g e n e r a l n o r m s m u s t b e g e n e r a l l y j u s t i f i e d , is t o

be interpreted

recursively ( O ' N e i l l 1 9 8 9 , 2 1 ) a n d discursively

(Habermas

1990a, 5 7 - 6 8 ) : i n t h e a b s e n c e o f m e t a p h y s i c a l l y v a l i d a t e d n o r m a t i v e prin­ ciples, moral-universal justification c a n b e located only in a process o f re­ ciprocal rational argumentation

that is i n p r i n c i p l e u n f i n i s h e d . I f t h e al­

ternatives o f m o r a l realism a n d relativism a r e to b e equally avoided, then n o r m s o f j u s t i c e m u s t , a s it w e r e , " e a r n " t h e i r u n i v e r s a l c l a i m t o validity. I n this c o n t e x t , practical r e a s o n r e q u i r e s that w e b e able to p r o v i d e r e c i p r o c a l

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a n d universal reasons f o r t h e validity o f a m o r a l n o r m .

777

I n this way, t h e

c o n d i t i o n o f " i m p a r t i a l i t y " is t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t is c e n ­ tral to t h e validity o f n o r m s o f j u s t i c e . A distinction m u s t h o w e v e r b e m a d e between basic justice n o r m s o f a m o r a l k i n d a n d concrete legal-political n o r m s ( a n d decisions) a n d determinations basic

structure,

the former

constitute

o f social justice. A s part o f the

the framework

f o r the political-

a u t o n o m o u s justification o f concrete n o r m s a n d decisions a m o n g

citizens

having e q u a l rights. N o t all questions o f justice a r e m o r a l questions

that

r e q u i r e universalist a n s w e r s ( i n t h e strict s e n s e ) . On

t h e basis o f H a b e r m a s ' s

analysis (1990b,

characteristics o f a Kantian-procedural

196-97),

four

essential

theory o f morality c a n b e expli­

c a t e d . F i r s t , i t s deontological c h a r a c t e r : i t i s a i m e d a t t h e c a t e g o r i c a l

nor­

m a t i v e v a l i d i t y (Sollgeltung) o f n o r m s t h a t c a n b e u n i v e r s a l l y j u s t i f i e d w i t h s h a r e d r e a s o n s ; this n o r m a t i v e validity is u n c o n d i t i o n a l

in the sense

that

n o o n e has, i n a n o r m a t i v e s e n s e , g o o d r e a s o n s n o t to a c c e p t this v a l i d i t y — w h i c h m u s t p r o v e itself i n c o n t e x t s of justification. T h e s e n o r m s a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e "right" life o f p e r s o n s t o g e t h e r a s m o r a l p e r s o n s , n o t t h e question

o f t h e g o o d life o f o n e p e r s o n

(though

the former

does

have

significant c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e latter). A K a n t i a n t h e o r y is o p p o s e d t o answering the question o f t h e universal validity o f n o r m s b y pointing to a n individual o r a collective conception

of good—to

the extent

that

these

conceptions o f the g o o d c a nc o m e into conflict with n o r m s of justice, which m u s t b e j u s t i f i e d t o all p e r s o n s a n d t h u s t o each individual

person, as Rawls

emphasizes against utilitarianism. T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s , s e c o n d , t h e cognitivist a s s u m p t i o n

that m o r a l

ques­

tions a d m i t o f rationally a n d generally justified answers, in principle. T h e Tightness claim o f m o r a l n o r m s must b e u n d e r s t o o d redemption

i n t h e s e n s e t h a t its

does n o t consist in demonstrating a correspondence to objec­

tively v a l i d m o r a l "facts," r a t h e r t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l validity o f m o r a l i t y rests o n a r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y justified c o n s e n s u s o f free a n d e q u a l "ra­ tional

b e i n g s " — " r a t i o n a l b e i n g s , " h o w e v e r , w h o a r e n o t s t r i p p e d o f all par­

ticularity i n favor o f t h e intelligible, b u t w h o a r e i n a position to take t h e perspective o f others. S h a r e d reasons must b e generally recognizable as g o o d reasons. A deontological theory therefore

h a s a p r o c e d u r a l principle o f justifi­

c a t i o n a t i t s c o r e ; i n t h i s s e n s e i t i s a proceduralist t h e o r y ( H a b e r m a s c a l l s i t "formalist"). T h i s third characteristic does n o t m e a n that all m o r a l

norms

h a v e a p r o c e d u r a l o r f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r ; it m e a n s that they m u s t b e g e n e r a l l y a n d reciprocally justified. Intersubjective reciprocity enters into t h e struc­ ture o f t h e justification o f n o r m s : to t h e e x t e n t that they s p e a k f o r all, all must speak out of them. Fourth, a n d

finally,

H a b e r m a s u n d e r s c o r e s t h e universalist c h a r a c t e r o f

such a theory: t h e universality o n w h i c h t h e validity o f a m o r a l n o r m

(in

in 8

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

contrast to a legal-political n o r m )

is b a s e d c a n n o t b e restricted to a spe­

c i f i c — s p a t i o t e m p o r a l l y l o c a l i z e d — g e n e r a l i t y ; t h e c l a i m t o b e v a l i d f o r all m o r a l p e r s o n s m u s t b e j u s t i f i a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e t o each p e r s o n . T h e m o r a l community

of human

b e i n g s is t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n

community

for moral

norms. This implies n o t that there c a n b e moral n o r m s only in a supraempirical K i n g d o m o f E n d s b u t that only moral reasons legitimate moral action ( a n d moral norms)

"here a n d n o w " — a n d that these reasons

must

b e s h a r e a b l e r e a s o n s f o r e a c h c o n c r e t e p e r s o n w h o is their a d d r e s s e e , s o t h a t h e o r s h e c a n u n d e r s t a n d h i m - o r h e r s e l f a t t h e s a m e time a s t h e a u t h o r of these reasons. M o r a l r e a s o n s — a n d the duty to provide justification—do not stop at the borders o f ethical worlds. A t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e m u s t c o n t a i n this universalist c o r e c o n t e n t o f morality. It d o e s n o t h o w e v e r u n i f o r m l y m o l d n o r m s a n d v a l u e s that a r e to b e valid solely f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y ( i n its s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ) . T h i s is t h e m a i n p o i n t o f W a l z e r ' s r e i t e r a t i v e u n i v e r s a l i s m , w h i c h r a i s e s t h e r e c ­ o g n i t i o n o f particular collective identities itself to a universal d e m a n d . R e ­ spect for the moral person does n o t replace the dimension o f membership in ethical a n d political c o m m u n i t i e s ; rather, it gives effect to basic m o r a l norms. T h e construction o f the original position represents Rawls's attempt to bring, with the help o f "reasonable" assumptions, the d e m a n d f o r general justification into a f o r m that permits the derivation o fsubstantive principles o f j u s t i c e . T h e p r i n c i p l e s d e r i v e d i n this state o f equality a r e g e n e r a l a n d a u t o n o m o u s i n t h e s e n s e that, with t h e e x c l u s i o n o f h e t e r o n o m o u s m o t i v e s a n d interests, they w o u l d b e c h o s e n b y all m o r a l p e r s o n s as free a n d e q u a l rational b e i n g s — t h e veil o f i g n o r a n c e m a k e s sure that t h e interests o fo n e p e r s o n a r e i n a g r e e m e n t with t h e interests o f all p e r s o n s a n d that "unanim­ ity" ( R a w l s 1 9 7 1 , 2 6 3 ) is p o s s i b l e . I n W i l f r i e d H i n s c h ' s ( 1 9 9 2 ,

16) words:

"If w e a r e to s u m m a r i z e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s a n d c o n d i t i o n s e m b e d d e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , w e c a n s a ythat i n it u n a n i m o u s l y a c c e p t e d p r i n c i p l e s o f justice are generally a n d publicly justifiable principles f o r which w e c a n r a t i o n a l l y a r g u e with all p e r s o n s , to all p e r s o n s , a n d w i t h reasons that are the same for all p e r s o n s . " T h e g u i d i n g q u e s t i o n i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n i s t o w h a t e x t e n t Rawls's t h e o r y c o r r e s p o n d s to this characterization o f a theory that i s n o t o n l y " r e a s o n a b l e " b u t a l s o reason-based, a n d h o w t h e c h a n g e s t o h i s m o d e l a p p e a r i n this light.

(b) Reflective Equilibrium and Practical Reason A c c o r d i n g t o R a w l s , t h e s t r o n g p o i n t o f a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e lies i n its m o d e s t y : o n l y if it rests o n t h e m o s t g e n e r a l l y s h a r e d , n o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l

premises

p o s s i b l e is t h e r e t h e p r o s p e c t that it will b e a c c e p t a b l e r e a s o n a b l y . "Ideally, to justify a c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e t o s o m e o n e is to give h i m a p r o o f o f its

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

179

principles f r o m p r e m i s e s that w e b o t h accept, these principles h a v i n g in turn consequences that m a t c h o u r considered j u d g m e n t s " (1971,

580-81).

S u c h a justification c a n n o t rely, as a "Cartesian" (578) theory does,

upon

self-evident principles f r o m w h i c h a system o f n o r m s w o u l d b e derivable; t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e t h e o r y is a h e r m e n e u t i c

undertaking

i n s o f a r a s it

must correspond to the "considered" a n d "reasonable" moral j u d g m e n t s t h a t c a n s t a n d t h e test o f a reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . T h i s m e t h o d o f reflective e q u i l i b r i u m i s a h e r m e n e u t i c - " S o c r a t i c " ( 5 7 8 ) o n e : t o find o u t w h a t

prin­

ciples of justice c a n raise a justified claim to validity, they m u s t b e accept­ able asjust principles to free a n d equal p e r s o n s — a n d the conditions for this f r e e a n d e q u a l a c c e p t a n c e m u s t b e m u t u a l l y clarified a n d laid d o w n i n the equilibrium b e t w e e n t h e specific resulting principles a n d " o u r " m o r a l judgments. By g o i n g b a c k a n d forth, s o m e t i m e s altering the conditions o f the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing o u r j u d g m e n t s a n d c o n f o r m i n g t h e m to principle, I assume that eventually w e shall find a description o f the initial situation that b o t h expresses

reasonable

c o n d i t i o n s a n d yields

principles

w h i c h m a t c h o u r c o n s i d e r e d j u d g m e n t s duly pruned and adjusted. ( 1 9 7 1 , 20; italics a d d e d ) The

reflective equilibrium therefore expects o f the candidates for princi­

ples of justice n o t only that they b e in accord with moral intuitions

(Rawls

1 9 7 1 , 4 0 - 4 1 ; cf. H a r e 1 9 8 9 ; F e i n b e r g 1 9 8 9 ) , f e e l i n g s , a n d j u d g m e n t s , b u t that they also order these coherently (Lyons 1989;Hoerster 1977). H e r e , t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t a k e s u p a m e d i a t i n g p o s i t i o n : it is t h e " r a t i o n a l i z i n g " m e d i u m o n the basis o f w h i c h generally acceptable j u d g m e n t s o n fairness a n d equality c a n b e formulated in such a way that substantive principles o f j u s t i c e s p r i n g f r o m it. F r o m t h i s m e t h o d o f b r i n g i n g i n t u i t i o n s , p r i n c i p l e s , a n d abstract procedural conditions c o h e r e n d y together, Rawls expects the possibility o f e n l i g h t e n i n g t h e s e n s e o f j u s t i c e a b o u t itself i n a r e c o n s t r u c ­ tive m a n n e r — i n d e e d , d o i n g s o v i a t h e c o n n e c t i o n to s i m p l e c o n c e p t s that m a k e p o s s i b l e a "fairly s o p h i s t i c a t e d m a t h e m a t i c s "

(1971, 47) o r "moral

geometry" ( 1 2 1 ) , which actualize the implications o f these concepts. T h e s e c o n c e p t s a r e n o t manifest; rather, they m u s t b e critically reconstructed, as R a w l s ( 1 9 9 3 a , 9) e m p h a s i z e s : T h e public political culture m a y b e o f two m i n d s at a very d e e p level. . . . T h i s suggests that if w e a r e to s u c c e e d in finding a basis f o r public a g r e e m e n t , w e m u s t find a way o f o r g a n i z i n g familiar ideas a n d principles into a c o n c e p t i o n o f political justice that expresses those ideas a n d principles in a s o m e w h a t different way than before. The

central presupposition o f a theory of justice from which Rawls pro­

c e e d s is t h e i d e a t h a t o n l y t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s t h a t c a n s t a n d u p t o a r a t i o n a l

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

discussion a m o n g the citizens affected b y t h e m c a n raise a c l a i m to valid­ i t y — w h i c h is s u p p o r t e d b y h i s l i n k i n g o f a u t o n o m y a n d objectivity: ' T h u s a c t i n g a u t o n o m o u s l y is a c t i n g f r o m p r i n c i p l e s t h a t w e w o u l d c o n s e n t t o a s free a n d e q u a l r a t i o n a l b e i n g s , a n d that w e a r e to u n d e r s t a n d in this way. Also, these principles are objective

, ,

( 1 9 7 1 , 5 1 6 ) . I n this way, the i d e a o f

j u s t i f i c a t i o n b e c o m e s self-reflexive: a c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e is r e a s o n a b l y j u s t i f i e d if it is b u i l t o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a u t o n o m o u s p r a c t i c a l - r a t i o n a l a c ­ tion

a n d , with r e g a r d to questions o f the j u s t i c e o f the basic

structure,

o p e r a t i o n a l i z e s this p r i n c i p l e as best as possible. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f a u t o n ­ o m y a n d r e a s o n is t h e r e f o r e t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e ; a n d the m o d e l of n o r m justification b a s e d o n reflective equilibrium

has

t h e task o f r e p r e s e n t i n g this f o u n d a t i o n in a n a p p r o p r i a t e m a n n e r . I n re­ s p e c t o f t h i s m o d e l , R a w l s ' s a p p r o a c h i s l o c a t e d between a n e m p i r i c a l , c o n ­ tract-theoretic tradition, o n the o n e h a n d , a n d a Kantian tradition, o n

the

other, insofar as the p r o c e d u r a l m o d e l — w h i c h h e believes c a n b e affirmed in a "narrow" reflective equilibrium tionally

( w h i c h o r d e r s a p e r s o n ' s beliefs ra­

a n d coherently) a n d in a "wide" o n e (which takes alternative con­

ceptions o f morality as well as n o r m a t i v e substantive considerations

into

a c c o u n t ) — i s c o n c e i v e d of in the specific f o r m o f the original position.

1 3

T h i s ideal initial situation c o n n e c t s rationality a s s u m p t i o n s a n d e m p i r i c a l considerations concerning necessary primary goods with a Kantian concep­ tion

of practical reason a n d of the impartiality a n d a u t o n o m y of principles

that, w i t h o u t the i n f l u e n c e o f individual o r social c o n t i n g e n c i e s , a p p l y to all " r a t i o n a l a n d r e a s o n a b l e " p e r s o n s . " [ 0 ] n e c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e is m o r e r e a s o n a b l e t h a n a n o t h e r , o r j u s t i f i a b l e w i t h r e s p e c t t o it, i f r a t i o n a l p e r s o n s i n t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n w o u l d c h o o s e its p r i n c i p l e s o v e r t h o s e o f t h e

other

for the role of justice" ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 7 ) . Rawls c a n therefore call the principles o f j u s t i c e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s ( 2 5 3 ) , w h i c h a p p l y "to a p e r s o n i n v i r t u e of his nature as a free a n d equal rational being." T h e p r o c e d u r a l principle o f g e n e r a l a n d a u t o n o m o u s j u s t i f i c a t i o n is c o n n e c t e d , i n a

hypothetical

t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t , to certain a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t a "rational" c h o i c e o f subjectively desirable primary g o o d s — t h i s thus clarifying Rawls's

remark

t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is " a p r o c e d u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f K a n t ' s c o n c e p ­ tion of a u t o n o m y a n d the categorical imperative [within the f r a m e w o r k o f an empirical theory]" (256).

1 4

T h e resulting d o u b l e character of Rawls's theory, m o v i n g between Kan­ t i a n m o r a l c o n c e p t s a n d m o r e e m p i r i c a l l y f o u n d e d a s s u m p t i o n s , is e v i d e n t in his theory o f the m o r a l person. A n elementary presupposition,

which

s e e m s " r e a s o n a b l e a n d g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e " to h i m , is t o a s s u m e " e q u a l i t y b e t w e e n h u m a n b e i n g s as m o r a l p e r s o n s , as creatures h a v i n g a c o n c e p t i o n of their g o o d a n d capable of a sense of justice" (1971, 19). T h e principles o f j u s t i c e that b e s t reflect these attributes o f p e r s o n s a r e "fair," as a r e

the

p r i n c i p l e s that a r e a g r e e d in a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n that best e x p r e s s e s this

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

181

equality a n d f r e e d o m o f p e r s o n s . T h e K a n t i a n side o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t it rests o n a n i d e a l o f a u t o n o m y a c c o r d ­ ing to w h i c h principles o f justice must b e justified without attention to c o n t i n g e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o r differences b e t w e e n h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e "ra­ tional"

side o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n lies i n t h e a s s u m p t i o n

that

p e r s o n s h a v e p l a n s o f life t h a t they w a n t t o r e a l i z e a s b e s t a s p o s s i b l e . T h e p r o c e d u r a l rule that those principles a r e justified that c a n b e rationally accepted b y these kinds o f free a n d equal persons prompts Rawls to expli­ c a t e t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n i n a K a n t i a n , reasonable a n d a n e m p i r i ­ c a l l y rational r e s p e c t a n d t o m a k e i t t h e s u b s t a n t i v e f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e t h e o r y a n d o f t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s to b e distributed—in t h e sense o f t h e satisfaction o f " r a t i o n a l d e s i r e " ( 9 3 ) . I n h i s w r i t i n g s a f t e r t h e p u b l i c a t i o n o f A Theory of Justice, R a w l s s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e s t h e r o l e o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n , w h i c h allows h i m to m a k e this c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n various e l e m e n t s o f t h e theory. I n the article " A K a n t i a n C o n c e p t i o n o f Equality," f o r instance, h e writes: " W h e n fully a r t i c u l a t e d , a n y c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e e x p r e s s e s a c o n ­ ception o f the person, o f the relations between persons, a n d o f the general structure a n d ends o f social cooperation" (1975a, 94). In the Dewey lectures o n "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," the m o r a l p e r s o n c l e a r l y c o m e s t o t h e f o r e , w h i l e its s t r o n g j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n " o u r nature a s f r e e a n d e q u a l r a t i o n a l b e i n g [ s ] "

( a s R a w l s w r i t e s i n A Theory

[ 1 9 7 1 , 2 5 6 ; italics a d d e d ] ) r e c e d e s . R a w l s spells o u t t h e c o r e o f h i s c o n ­ structivist c o n c e p t i o n a s follows: ' T h e l e a d i n g i d e a is t o establish a suitable c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n a n d first p r i n ­ ciples o fjustice, b y m e a n s o f a procedure o f construction"

(1980, 5 1 6 ) .

F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e " w i d e r e f l e c t i v e e q u i l i b r i u m " ( 5 3 4 ) , h e says, it is i m p o r t a n t t o c o m b i n e t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s o f t h e c i t i z e n s o f a w e l l - o r d e r e d society a n d the perspective o f the parties in the original position i n such a way that the description o f the parties a n d the constraints i m p o s e d

upon

t h e m l e a d to principles that are, in "our" view, reasonably acceptable to the citizens o f a well-ordered society. T h e self-interested "rational

autonomy"

o f t h e p a r t i e s m u s t d o j u s t i c e t o t h e "full a u t o n o m y " o f c i t i z e n s " i n t h e i r social life," that is t o say, t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n m u s t e m b o d y t h e t w o " m o r a l powers" of the person—having

a rational c o n c e p t i o n

of the g o o d a n d

h a v i n g a reasonable s e n s e o f j u s t i c e . A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, a "constructivist" position d o e s n o t claim to b e "true" in the sense o f "rational intuitionism" o r o t h e r versions o f m o r a l realism; it is j u s t " r e a s o n a b l e " ( 5 6 9 ) i n s o f a r a s it r e s t s o n a " r e a s o n a b l e " c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n — a c o n c e p t i o n , h o w e v e r , that b e a r s "critical reflection" a n d c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c e n t e r o f a n " o b j e c t i v e , " p u b l i c c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e . I t is in this sense that w e a r e to u n d e r s t a n d Rawls's r e m a r k that a c o n c e p t i o n of justice m u s t b e "the m o s t r e a s o n a b l e doctrine f o r us": "Kantian construc­ tivism

h o l d s that m o r a l objectivity is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f a suitably

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

constructed social point o f view that all c a n accept. A p a r t f r o m the proce­ dure o f constructing

the principles o f justice, there are n o moral

facts"

( 5 1 9 ) . H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s h e r e — i n c o n t r a s t t o A Theory of Justice—between

a

t h e o r y o f h u m a n n a t u r e a n d a (less d e m a n d i n g ) c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m o r a l p e r s o n ; i n h i s view, h o w e v e r , this distinction s t r e n g t h e n s t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m o r a l p e r s o n s i n c e it b e c o m e s i n d e p e n d e n t of h u m a n

nature:

of controversial

theories

T t is h a r d to i m a g i n e realistically a n y n e w k n o w l e d g e

that should convince us that these ideals [ o f the person

a n d t h e well-

o r d e r e d society] a r e n o t feasible, given w h a t w e k n o w about the general n a t u r e o f t h e w o r l d , as o p p o s e d to o u r p a r t i c u l a r social a n d historical cir­ cumstances"

(566). T h e basic ideals o f t h e m o r a l p e r s o n

a n d t h e well-

o r d e r e d society a r e "available to the c o m m o n sense o f any thoughtful a n d reflective p e r s o n " (ibid.). H e r e , t h o u g h h i s theoretical self-restriction seeks to

avoid controversial

clearly understands

philosophical

a n d scientific

truth

claims,

Rawls

his conception o f the person in a strong sense. T h a t

the "fundamental ideals" to which h e refers a r e i m m a n e n t in a democratic political culture d o e s n o t m e a n that their c l a i m to validity is restricted

a

p r i o r i to this c u l t u r e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e "political" c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m o r a l person

(in the m a n n e r

R a w l s h a s d e s c r i b e d it s i n c e 1 9 8 5 ) h a s a m o r a l -

"Kantian" a n d substantive-"political" d o u b l e The

character.

latter plays a role especially in t h e c o n t e x t o f Rawls's explication o f

the principles of justice with r e g a r d to their function o f socially enabling in a substantive sense the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the twom o r a l p o w e r s o f persons (see t h e discussion i n c h a p t e r 3.4). T h e p r i m a r y g o o d s a r e thus justified as "all-purpose m e a n s " f o r satisfying p e r s o n s ' "highest-order interests." Vari­ ous elements therefore enter the conception o f the "political" as well as the "reasonable": a "moral" element with reference to the priority of justice a n d t h e p r a c t i c a l - r e a s o n a b l e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e m o r a l p e r s o n ; a (first) " p o ­ litical" e l e m e n t p e r t a i n i n g to t h e restriction to "political" c o n c e p t i o n s o f "citizen" a n d "social cooperation"; a n d ,

finally,

a (second) "political" ele­

m e n t in respect o f the assumptions about certain

"citizens' n e e d s . " It is

a g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d that h i s t h e o r y o f "political c o n s t r u c t i v i s m " is to b e e x a m i n e d , w h i c h is n o l o n g e r u n d e r s t o o d moral t h e o r y

(1985,

a s Kantian

constructivism in

2 2 4 n . 2; 1 9 9 3 a , g o n . 1 ) , a s w a s still t h e c a s e i n t h e

D e w e y lectures. T h i s n e w understanding

h o w e v e r entails a distancing n o t

f r o m t h e theory's m o r a l validity claims as a w h o l e , b u t f r o m certain moraltheoretic

assumptions

(Kant's, in particular)

a n d especially from

ethical

doctrines.

(c) Political

Constructivism

In Rawls's writings since "Justice as Fairness: Political n o t Metaphysical" (1985), further important changes in his theory c a n b e ascertained,

ones

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

183

t h a t l e d t o a r e f o r m u l a t i o n i n h i s b o o k Political Liberalism, w h o s e v e r y t i t l e is a s t a t e m e n t

o f his p r o g r a m : h e emphasizes m o r e strongly the theory's

n o n m e t a p h y s i c a l c l a i m t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d its "political" c h a r a c t e r

in a n

epistemological s e n s e . T h e t h e o r y s t a n d s i n g r e a t e r c o n t r a s t t o e t h i c a l ceptions of the good a n d concentrates

o n t h e normative-practical

con­

task o f

being able to b e affirmed in a ("reasonably" justified) overlapping consen­ sus o f a n ethically pluralistic state. "Political" is to b e u n d e r s t o o d

i n this

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l - p r a c t i c a l d o u b l e sense: a t h e o r y is political i f it a v o i d s c o n ­ troversial c l a i m s t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d if it r e f e r s solely t o t h e b a s i c

structure

of a pluralist society. T h e essential motive f o r Rawls's emphasizing the "political" character o f t h e t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e s t e m s f r o m h i sv i e w t h a t it c a n r e a c h its " p r a c t i c a l " a i m of b e i n g "a basis o f a reasoned, informed, a n d willing political a g r e e m e n t " b e t w e e n citizens ( 1 9 9 3 a , 9) i n a society f r a g m e n t e d b y t h e "fact o f r e a s o n ­ a b l e p l u r a l i s m " o n l y i f it a v o i d s t h e c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n e t h i c a l d o c t r i n e s . I n t h i s s e n s e , n e i t h e r A Theory of Justice—in

its e x p l a n a t i o n o f social stability

by a " c o n g r u e n c e " o f t h e g o o d a n d t h e j u s t — n o r

the Dewey lectures—

w h i c h w e r e still u n d e r s t o o d a s " m o r a l t h e o r y " — w e r e s u f f i c i e n d y " p o l i t i c a l . " T h e theory o f the basic structure o f society refers solely to "political" ques­ tions

and

a i m s at a political o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s ; f o r t h a t r e a s o n , it

"starts" w i t h " f u n d a m e n t a l

ideas" that a r e generally shared a n d a r e able to

provide the basis f o r a g e n e r a l

agreement.

A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, the line between justice a n d the g o o d must b e re­ drawn: the theory of justice must b e tolerant toward a multitude o f ethical v i e w s a n d t h e i r t r u t h c l a i m s ; i n d e e d , it m u s t b e a c c e p t a b l e " f r o m these conceptions, from their perspective, a n d maintain

within"

its s t r e n g t h a n d

stability. H e r e lies its p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o d e s t y , w h i c h d o e s h a v e a n o t h e r side, however. T h e theory must n o t only b e compatible with ethical of the g o o d a n d avoid as m u c h

conceptions

as possible colliding with their claim to

v a l i d i t y — t h i s i s a practical r e q u i r e m e n t . E v e n m o r e i m p o r t a n t i s t h a t e t h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s b e c o m p a t i b l e with t h e t h e o r y o f justice, that is to say, they m u s t restrict their claim to truth precisely w h e n they c o m e into

conflict

w i t h t h e t h e o r y ' s c l a i m t o r e a s o n — t h i s i s a moral r e q u i r e m e n t . A n d w h i l e Rawls emphasizes in his recent writings the practical requirement ticular, there c a n b e n o d o u b t that the m o r a l r e q u i r e m e n t ' T h e c o n c e p t o f j u s t i c e is i n d e p e n d e n t

in par­

predominates.

from a n d prior to the concept o f

g o o d n e s s i n t h e s e n s e that its p r i n c i p l e s limit t h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d which are permissible" (1985,

249). T h e theory must b e able to provide

independent reasons a s t o h o w " r e a s o n a b l e " a c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e i s a n d as t o w h a t constitutes t h e t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e ' s a u t h o r i t y t o d r a w t h e s e limits. Contrary to t h e view that t h e theory c a n d o without a strong claim to m o r a l validity, it will b e c o m e e v i d e n t that t h e t h e o r y c a n b e n e i t h e r e t h i c a l n o r political "in t h e w r o n g w a y , " a s R a w l s c l a i m s , o n l y if it c a n fall b a c k u p o n a

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

conception o f the m o r a l person that c a n b e justified solely as a n "idea o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . " T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e c a n d e f e n d its m o r a l

priority

o v e r ethical c o n c e p t i o n s o n l y if it is m o r e t h a n a rational c o m p r o m i s e a n d less t h a n a n ethical d o c t r i n e , that is t o say, if it is a m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d c o n ­ ception. T h e line R a w l s d r a w s b e t w e e n c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s a n d t h e "polit­ ical" theory of justice was discussed in t h e context o f his debate with S a n d e l already in chapter 1 .T h e "political" conception o f free a n d equal persons, which corresponds to the conception

o f free a n d e q u a l citizens in their

"public identity," i s — i n view o f t h e "fact o f t h e r e a s o n a b l e p l u r a l i s m " o f ethical beliefs—the conception o n which ethical doctrines c a n agree in a n overlapping consensus, those doctrines that wish to exist in their o w n par­ ticular

b u t n o n e t h e l e s s g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t a b l e w a y in a d e m o c r a t i c society.

T h i s a r g u m e n t d o e s h o w e v e r h a r b o r t h e d a n g e r o f b e i n g "political in the w r o n g way" (1989a, 2 3 4 ) . Rawls's " m e t h o d

o f avoidance" o f ethical

claims to truth seems to w e a k e n the moral claim to reason to such a degree that the theory b e c o m e s contingent (in terms o f the logic of justification), and the overlapping consensus c a n hardly b e distinguished from a modus vivendi, from a n (unstable)

c o m p r o m i s e between ethical conceptions. I n

his r e s p o n s e to this criticism, Rawls (as w a s n o t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f this section)

finds

himself c o m p e l l e d to distinguish between two stages o f the

t h e o r y : t h e s t a g e o f the justification o f t h e t h e o r y a s a " f r e e - s t a n d i n g " ( 1 9 8 9 a , 234), i n d e p e n d e n t conception o n the basis o f fundamental

moral ideas o f

p e r s o n a n d s o c i e t y ; a n d t h e s t a g e o f stability, i n w h i c h t h e c o n c e p t o f o v e r ­ lapping consensus serves to explain h o w the theory c a n b e supported b y e t h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d i n a m a n n e r that is itself " m o r a l . " A c c o r d ­ i n g t o R a w l s , t h e first s t a g e r e s t s o n t h e " f u n d a m e n t a l

idea" o f society as a

fair system o f social c o o p e r a t i o n a n d o n t h e "two c o m p a n i o n

fundamental

ideas" o f citizens as free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s a n d o f t h e well-ordered society. T h e g e n e r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l n e u t r a l i t y o f t h e s e i d e a s make it possible f o r t h e m to b e a c c e p t e d i n different ethical c o n c e p t i o n s ; a c c e p t a n c e f r o m t h e per­ s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c a l d o c t r i n e s d o e s n o t h o w e v e r ground

their

universal validity, f o r validity lies i n t h e basic c o n c e p t i o n o f practical reason, w h i c h is " i n d e p e n d e n t "

of comprehensive

doctrines

a n d represents

the

formal necessary condition o f a "publicly," reciprocally, a n d generally jus­ t i f i e d c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e . T h a t i s w h y i t i s o n l y a "reasonable p l u r a l i s m " t h a t i s c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e t h e o r y a n d l e a d s t o a morally j u s t i f i e d

over­

l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . B e t w e e n t h e i r v a l u e s a n d w h a t is t o a p p l y i n a p o l i t i c a l community

as generally binding,

"reasonable" comprehensive

doctrines

recognize the antecedent criterion o f reciprocal a n d general, "reasonable" justification (seechapter 2.1). With the distinction between "reasonable" a n d "unreasonable"

compre­

h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s (1993a, 58-66) it b e c o m e s clear that t h o u g h these d o c -

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

185

t r i n e s can a c c e p t t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e f o r ethical r e a s o n s , t h e y must h o w e v e r a c c e p t i t f o r moral r e a s o n s . A t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e m i g h t w e l l b e a "part" o r a "module" ( 1 2 ) o f ethical doctrines a n d ,from the perspective o f a p a r t i c u l a r d o c t r i n e , e v e n " d e r i v e d " f r o m it (1989a, 249);h o w e v e r , this ethical validity f o r this d o c t r i n e d o e s n o t constitute t h e b i n d i n g validity o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e f o r all c i t i z e n s . T h e p r i n c i p l e s a r e v a l i d n o t p r i ­ marily because they a r e ethically incorporable; rather, they c a n a n d must be ethically incorporated because they a r e generally a n d reciprocally jus­ tifiable

a n d c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y rejected, w i t h o u t — a n d this is i m p o r t a n t

to R a w l s — b e i n g "externally" o r metaphysically justified. T h e y a r e to b e justifiable with shared a n d generally (reasonably) acceptable reasons. I n this respect, Rawls's u s e o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f "truth" a n d political does not underscore

clearly e n o u g h

"reason"

that t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is a

m o r a l c o n s e n s u s to w h i c h n o ethical claim to validity as such is c o n n e c t e d a n d w h o s e " r e a s o n a b l e " validity is therefore

not dependent upon

being

transformable into a n ethical "truth." T h i s c a n b e m a d e clear b y t h e fact that t h e priority of justice o v e r ethical doctrines guments

cannot be defended that stem from

with ethical arguments—neither

the conception

with ar­

of the good of the person de­

m a n d i n g j u s t i c e ("act j u s d y b e c a u s e this a g r e e s w i t h m y c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d " ) , n o r with arguments that appeal to the conception o f the g o o d o f the a d d r e s s e e o f this d e m a n d

("act j u s d y b e c a u s e this is g o o d f o r y o u i n

the sense o f your ethical conception"). T h o u g h o n e m a y b e able to argue effectively i n this w a y i n s o m e situations, it d o e s n o t h o w e v e r e x p l a i n t h e m o r a l l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e d e m a n d for j u s t i c e ; j u s t a c t i o n is d e m a n d e d n o t f o r the sake o f the g o o d o f a particular ethical doctrine b u t for the sake o f e q u a l r e s p e c t f o r t h e l e g i t i m a t e a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " c l a i m s o f all. J u s t i c e m i g h t b e a d i a m o n d that reflects different colors in t h e light o f different

com­

p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s ; its m o r a l w o r t h is n o t h o w e v e r l o c a t e d i n this e t h i c a l reflection. If o n e distinguishes b e t w e e n

m o r a l a n d ethical validity, t h e theory o f

justice c a n avoid b e i n g ethical o r political i n the w r o n g way. M o r a l

norms

are ethically incorporable, f o r they d o n o t themselves form a n i n d e p e n d e n t ethical doctrine; the reasons that underlie t h e m a r e however reciprocally a n d g e n e r a l l y s h a r e a b l e . T h e m o r a l c l a i m to r e a s o n is thus c l e a r e r t h a n t h e o n e defined in Rawls, w h o uses the concept "moral" n o w in the sense o f "ethical," a n d n o w in the sense o f "moral-reasonable"

( a n d "freestand­

i n g " ) — f o r instance, i n stressing that t h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is a " m o r a l " conception

a n d is a c c e p t e d b y c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s

"for moral

rea­

s o n s , " o n t h e basis o f their ethical c o n c e p t i o n s a n d y e t also " f o r its o w n s a k e " (1987, 1 1 ) . T o a v o i d these ambiguities, it is n e c e s s a r y to u n d e r s c o r e that a c o n c e p t i o n of justice is morally justified, ethically i n c o r p o r a b l e , a n d refers to t h e basic political structure o f society.

186

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

T h e chapter o n "Political Constructivism" in Rawls's r e f o r m u l a t e d

theory

can b e read as a step in the direction o f a stronger m o r a l justification o f the theory, even t h o u g h the "reasonable" foundations o f the theory

retain

their political-moral d o u b l e character h e r e too. W h a t Rawls's political con­ s t r u c t i v i s m h a s i n c o m m o n w i t h h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n e n d e a v o r s i n A Theory of Justice a n d i n t h e D e w e y l e c t u r e s i s t h e a t t e m p t t o s t e e r a c o u r s e

between

m o r a l realism a n d relativism without surrendering a m o r a l claim to objec­ tivity.

T h e a i m o f political c o n s t r u c t i v i s m , h e says, consists i n b e i n g a b l e t o

present the principles of justice as the o u t c o m e o f a p r o c e d u r e o f construc­ tion

t h a t rests o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a m o r a l l y g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t is t o

say, t h a t u n d e r

reasonable conditions rational parties c h o o s e these

prin­

ciples. ' T h i s p r o c e d u r e , w e conjecture, e m b o d i e s all the relevant require­ ments o f practical reason a n d shows h o w the principles o f justice

follow

f r o m the principles o f practical reason in u n i o n with conceptions o f society a n d person, themselves ideas o f practical r e a s o n " (1993a, 90). A theory o f j u s t i c e is " a u t o n o m o u s " (98) if its p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p r i n ­ ciples a n d ideas o f practical reason. Although Rawls's m o d e l shares with Kant's "moral constructivism" the central idea o f justifying principles o f justice by means o f a

construction

p r o c e d u r e that reflects the a u t o n o m y o f m o r a l persons as "reasonable a n d rational" (1989b, 9 7 ) , h e differs f r o m K a n t i n essential points. First, u n l i k e Kant's "comprehensive m o r a l view," the political conception of justice re­ fers n o t to the a u t o n o m o u s

life o f p e r s o n s a s s u c h , b u t t o p r i n c i p l e s o f a

basic structure o f society. S e c o n d , the "doctrinal a u t o n o m y " o f the political conception does n o t imply, as Kant's transcendental idealism does, a "con­ stitutive a u t o n o m y " (1993a, 99), t h e constitution o f all m o r a l v a l u e s o n t h e basis o f practical reason. I n contrast

to Kant's view o r that o f

"rational

i n t u i t i o n i s m , " R a w l s says, t h e political c o n c e p t i o n r e m a i n s n e u t r a l — i t

does

however accept Kant's view that the ideas a n d principles o f practical reason c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d f r o m o t h e r v a l u e s ; t h e y a r e " s e l f - o r i g i n a t i n g a n d selfauthenticating"

( 1 0 0 ) . It is t h u s c l o s e r t o K a n t t h a n t o o t h e r

conceptions

of morality. Third, the fundamental concepts o f the theory d o n o t originate from metaphysical assumptions about a K i n g d o m of Ends. Fourth, the po­ litical t h e o r y is n o t a i m e d a t a d e f e n s e o f t h e u n i t y o f ( t h e o r e t i c a l

and

p r a c t i c a l ) r e a s o n . I t s a i m i s t o find a s h a r e a b l e b a s i s f o r j u s t p r i n c i p l e s . What both construction

procedures—the

procedure o f the categorical

imperative a n d that o f the original position—have in c o m m o n ,

nonethe­

less, is t h a t t h e y a r e p r o c e d u r e s f o r t h e r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f p r i n c i p l e s o n the basis o f principles a n d ideas o f practical reason.

1 5

T h e principles

a n d i d e a s that constitute this p r o c e d u r e a r e t h e r e f o r e t h e m s e l v e s n o t c o n ­ structed b u t reconstructed o r "assembled." "[W]e c a n reflect o n h o w these i d e a s a p p e a r i n o u r practical t h o u g h t a n d try to set o u t a n o r d e r i n w h i c h they c a n b e related, f r o m the g e n e r a l a n d simpler to the m o r e specific a n d

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

i8j

c o m p l e x " ( 1 0 8 ) . T h e principles o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a r e t h e r e f o r e t o b e f o u n d t h r o u g h r e f l e c t i o n o n w h a t i t m e a n s t o t h i n k a n d j u d g e rationally a n d rea­ sonably, a n d t h e ideas o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , n a m e l y , t h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f person a n d society, a r e t o b e f o u n d t h r o u g h r e f l e c t i o n o n t h e s u b j e c t a n d p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t o f this t h i n k i n g a n d j u d g i n g . Political constructivism t h u s consists o f t h r e e s t e p s : t h e r e f l e c t i v e reconstruction o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d i d e a s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ; t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t i n laying out a p r o c e d u r e — t h a t

o f the

original position—which e m b o d i e s these principles (of the rational a n d t h e r e a s o n a b l e ) a n d i d e a s ( o f p e r s o n a n d s o c i e t y ) ; a n d t h e construction o f p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e with t h e h e l p o f this p r o c e d u r e . T h e t h i r d stage a l o n e is t h e a c t u a l " c o n s t r u c t i v i s t " s t a g e ; " [ t ] h e p r o c e d u r e i t s e l f is s i m p l y l a i d o u t using as starting points t h e basic conceptions o f society a n d person, the principles o f practical reason, a n d the public role o f a political conception of justice" (104). T h e s e principles o fjustice m a yn o w claim morally " a u t o n o m o u s " justi­ fication; they c a n claim f o r themselves a n objectivity that c o r r e s p o n d s n o t to N a g e l ' s " i m p e r s o n a l p o i n t o f view" b u t to a perspective "from

some­

w h e r e " (116): the perspective o f public, reciprocal, a n d general justifica­ tion b e t w e e n reasonable, free a n d equal persons. T h e principles of justice c a n b e j u s t i f i e d by a n d to e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n . ' T o s a y t h a t a p o l i t i c a l conviction is objective is to say that t h e r e a r e reasons, specified b y a rea­ sonable a n d mutually recognizable conception . all r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n s t h a t it is r e a s o n a b l e "

, sufficient to convince

(119).

T h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f r e a s o n a b l e a n d rational p e r s o n s as well as o f fair social c o o p e r a t i o n , o n w h i c h R a w l s relies i n this self-description o f r e a s o n (96-97), a r e "conceptions o f practical reason" in a universal sense; though they a r e restricted to t h e "political" questions o f the m o r a l justification o f a basic structure between free a n d equal persons, they nonetheless refer in t h i s r e s p e c t t o w h a t i t m e a n s i n t h e first p l a c e t o b e m o r a l l y r e a s o n a b l e : "they characterize t h e agents w h o r e a s o n a n d they specify t h e c o n t e x t f o r the p r o b l e m s a n d questions to which principles o f practical reason apply" (107). I n so doing, the principles of justice "cannot b e reasonably rejected" by "reasonable" persons

(124).

I n c o m p a r i s o n to this justification o n t h e basis o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f recip­ rocal a n d g e n e r a l justification, Rawls m a k e s further assumptions i n his the­ o r y t h a t a r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y stronger a n d weaker t h a n a p r o c e d u r a l i s t i c a l l y arguing theory. T h o s e assumptions a r e stronger that c o m p r e h e n d the con­ c e p t i o n o f t h e m o r a l p e r s o n substantively: to realize t h e p e r s o n ' s

moral

powers, certain primary goods a r e necessary that g o into the content o fthe o r i g i n a l position, w h i c h is itself t h e crystallized f o r m o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f the rational a n d the reasonable. O n the basis o f these substantive

compo­

n e n t s o f his theory, R a w l s e x p e c t s that it will b e a b l e t o say m o r e o n c o n c r e t e social questions than a proceduralist theory, w h i c h w o u l d have to leave the

188

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

determination

o f t h e c o n t e n t o f p r i m a r y g o o d s itself t o t h e discourse o f

g e n e r a l justification, o n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that t h e c o n t e n t is t h e subject matter a n d n o t a premise o f the discourse. Rawls thus expects that the t h e o r y c a n l i n k u p m o r e a d e q u a t e l y w i t h s o c i a l c o n t e x t s a n d that it is less abstract. S e n ' s criticism, a m o n g others', shows, h o w e v e r , that Rawls d o e s n o t q u i t e s u c c e e d i n this, f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e r e q u i r e s a n d p e r m i t s a stronger, discursive contextualization (see chapter 3.4). Yet precisely these substantive assumptions m a k e Rawls's theory w e a k e r i n r e s p e c t o f n o r m a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , f o r its c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t

assumptions

c a n n o t raise the claim to b e i n g as "reasonably" justified as the basic con­ c e p t i o n s o f practical r e a s o n . H e is f a c e d with a d i l e m m a : e i t h e r h i s as­ s u m p t i o n s a r e r e a s o n - b a s e d i n a strict s e n s e o r they c o n t a i n

substantive

c o n c e p t i o n s o f social m e m b e r s h i p ; i n b o t h cases t h e t h e o r y is "political," h o w e v e r , i n a m o r e o r less c o n t e x t - b o u n d s e n s e . T h u s " m o r a l p e r s o n " is o n the o n e h a n d explicated o n the basis o f m o r a l concepts a n d , o n the other, interpreted with reference to the implications o f "citizenship" in a m o r e concrete m e a n i n g — f o r instance, with r e f e r e n c e to "citizens' needs." B o t h enter the formulation

o f t h e o r i g i n a l position. I n t h e e n d , this

double

m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a "political" t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e is u n a v o i d a b l e f o r R a w l s ' s t h e o r y , s i n c e t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a t t e m p t s t o j u s t i f y on equal terms—in

o n e s t e p — p r i n c i p l e s o f g e n e r a l m o r a l j u s t i c e and o f m o r e

con­

crete socialjustice. T h e f o r m e r require a m o r a l justification in the Kantian sense, w h e r e a s t h e latter c a n n o t b ejustified without additional ("political") assumptions. This tension between Kantian a n d strongly empirical com­ p o n e n t s is, a s h a s b e e n n o t e d , c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r h i s t h e o r y i n its v a r i o u s stages; it u l t i m a t e l y l e a d s t o t h e d o u b l e s e n s e o f h i s "political" c o n c e p t i o n a n d its c e n t r a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d e v i c e o f t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , w h i c h s e e k s t o c o n n e c t different p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s . T h i s m a k e s t h e c o n c e p t i o n i n a m o r a l r e s p e c t too political;with

respect to d e m o c r a t i c self-determination a n d social

j u s t i c e i t i s not political enough. O n t h e basis o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i c e s o f a r , it is p o s s i b l e to formulate a n alternative theory that preserves Rawls's central tivist" tical

"construc­

idea of justifying principles of justice by a procedure based o n prac­ r e a s o n w i t h o u t u s i n g t h e m o d e l o f a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , that is to say,

without, o n the o n e h a n d , abstracting t h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t of justifica­ tion i n a n initial situation, i n o r d e r , o n t h e o t h e r , to c o m p e n s a t e this a b ­ straction b y i n t r o d u c i n g c o n c r e t e a s s u m p t i o n s . I n this alternative, t h e prin­ ciple o f general a n d reciprocal justification links different contexts f o r intersubjectively j u s t i f y i n g b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f e q u a l r i g h t s ( s e e c h a p t e r 2) a n d social j u s t i c e ( s e e c h a p t e r 3) w i t h i n a b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f society that is m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d a n d f o r m s a f r a m e w o r k f o r p r o c e s s e s o f c o l l e c t i v e selfdetermination. T h i s leads to a differentiated theory that locates deontolog­ ical principles a n d m o r e concrete, substantive points o f view at the various

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

levels o f justification, without c o n n e c t i n g

heterogeneous

189

elements in an

initial situation. M o r a l p r i n c i p l e s f o r m t h e c o r e o f a basic structure o f e q u a l rights a n d liberties that defines a politically a u t o n o m o u s , democratic

com­

m u n i t y o f e q u a l l y a n d fully entitled citizens h a v i n g different ethical

iden­

tities. T h e conception o f the person at the center o f the theory must

therefore

b e differentiated. "Moral p e r s o n " a n d "citizen" m u s t b e distinguished

more

clearly than in Rawls: m o r a l persons a r e authors a n d addressees o f m o r a l norms;

citizens a r e a u t h o r s a n d (as legal persons)

addressees

o f legal

norms. A s such they layclaim to certain social primary goods, w h o s e spec­ ification a n d distribution m u s t b e reciprocally justified in political contexts. S u c h a theory does justice to Rawls's principles a n d attempts to avoid his theory's difficulties ( w h i c h w e r e discussed at t h e v a r i o u s levels). I t is n o t primarily "ideal-based," as Rawls

(1985,

2$6n.

19) characterizes his ap­

p r o a c h , b u t "reason-based" i n t h e sense i n w h i c h h i s constructivism is also to b e essentially u n d e r s t o o d .

T h i s thesis is n o w to b e d e t e r m i n e d

more

precisely for the context o f morality.

(d) Moral Justification

and Communicative-Practical

Reason

A m o n g Kantian models that p u t the principle o f practical reason—accord­ ing to which moral n o r m s must b e reciprocally a n d generally justified—at the center o f their reflections o n m o r a l theory ( a n din addition to T h o m a s Scanlon's contractualism, w h o s e formula o f n o r m s that "no o n e could rea­ sonably reject" I interpret in the sense o f the criteria o f reciprocity a n d generality [see chapter 2.1]), O n o r a O'Neill's constructivism aswell as KarlOtto Apel's and J u r g e n Habermas's discourse theory o f morality are to b e given special emphasis.

1 6

W h a t they h a v e in c o m m o n is that they m a k e t h e

validity claim o f m o r a l n o r m s d e p e n d e n t u p o n fication

their intersubjective justi­

in a p r o c e d u r e o f mutual a r g u m e n t a t i o n — w i t h o u t

using the model

of a n original position o r relying u p o n a "comprehensive" ethical o r meta­ physical

doctrine.

O'Neill explicates the Kantian idea o f moral autonomy in a communicative-intersubjective m a n n e r a n d s e e s it g r o u n d e d i n a n o n r e a l i s t a n d n o n r e l a t i v i s t c o n c e p t i o n o f recursive and discursive r e a s o n ( 1 9 8 9 , 2 1 ) : a r e a s o n that is w i t h o u t definitive substantive a n s w e r s t o m o r a l q u e s t i o n s , b u t w i t h definitive d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f w h a t it m e a n s t o s e a r c h f o r a n o r m a t i v e a n s w e r to a m o r a l q u e s t i o n , n a m e l y , i n a d i s c o u r s e o f f r e e a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s . T h e c e n t r a l i d e a , w h i c h O ' N e i l l s h a r e s w i t h d i s c o u r s e ethics, is l o c a t e d i n t h e K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e t h a t reason m u s t g e n e r a t e i t s s t a n d a r d s a n d p r i n ­ c i p l e s f r o m w i t h i n i t s e l f a n d t h a t t h e c l a i m o f t h e principles of reason t o b e universally valid c a n b e r e d e e m e d

only in the public exchange o f argu­

ments. Kant remarks o n the internal connection between reason a n d the

igo

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

f r e e d o m o f critique ( o f t h e critique o f r e a s o n itself): " R e a s o n d e p e n d s o n this f r e e d o m f o r its v e r y e x i s t e n c e . F o r r e a s o n h a s n o d i c t a t o r i a l

authority;

its v e r d i c t is a l w a y s s i m p l y t h e a g r e e m e n t o f f r e e c i t i z e n s , o f w h o m

each

o n e must b e permitted to express, without let o r hindrance, his objections o r e v e n h i s veto" ( K a n t 1 9 7 3 , 5 9 3 [ A 7 3 8 - B 7 6 6 ] ) . c r i t i c a l , vindicating

1 7

P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is a

r e a s o n that regards principles as g r o u n d e d only if they

are generally justified—in the "public u s e o f reason" (O'Neill 1989, 37) o r in the forceless, undistorted a r g u m e n t a t i o n

(Habermas) between free a n d

e q u a l p e r s o n s . H e r e t h e r e is a K a n t i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e f r e e a n d e q u a l moral person: i t r e g a r d s p e r s o n s a s e n d s b y g r a n t i n g t h e m t h e r i g h t t o d e ­ m a n d reasons f o r actions b yw h i c h they a r e a f f e c t e d — a n d t h e duty to justify themselves with universal reasons (O'Neill 1989, 1 1 3 - 1 4 , 127). Moral jus­ t i f i c a t i o n m e a n s t o p r o v i d e r e a s o n s t h a t w o u l d h o l d t h e i r o w n b e f o r e each m o r a l p e r s o n a n d t h a t m e a n s all. T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f m o r a l n o r m s

takes

place therefore in a n unrestricted "universal debate" (37-38). T h u s a pro­ c e d u r a l r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e universalist c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e is p o s s i b l e . T h e s e "ideal" determinations

o f free a n d equal participation in discourse

m e a n f o r " r e a l " d i s c o u r s e s t h a t i n m o r a l q u e s t i o n s no one m a y b e e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e c o m m u n i t y o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t h a t t h e s e d i s c o u r s e s m u s t b e open to a r g u m e n t s — i n t h e f u t u r e t o o . " [ T ] h e r e c a n n o t b e g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t h o s e w h o s e s t a n d i n g is d e n i e d b y a n a c c o u n t o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n i n g t o a c c e p t that reasoning" ( O ' N e i l l 1988, 7 0 5 ^ 1 ) . M o r a l n o r m s m u s t always b e jus­ t i f i e d in i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e x t s , b u t t h e y m u s t r e s t o n r e a s o n s t h a t d o n o t e n d in particular contexts: unlike ethical values, moral n o r m s a r e valid n o t j u s t "for u s . " T h i s d o e s n o t i m p l y a c o n t e x t l e s s , fully t r a n s p a r e n t c o m m u n i t y o f r e a s o n c o n s i s t i n g o f i r r e a l i d e a l p e r s o n s : i t o n l y r e q u i r e s t h a t each p e r s o n b e r e c o g n i z e d as a m o r a l p e r s o n with a right to justification a n d that this right b e discursively respected. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , O ' N e i l l says, d o e s n o t h a v e a n y d e m a n d i n g metaphysical presuppositions; sence

of a

metaphysical

it p r o c e e d s o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n

authority

o f reason,

whose

of the ab­

principles

must

therefore prove themselves solely in a p r o c e d u r a l sense, namely, as prin­ ciples that a r e shareable f o r a plurality o f persons (O'Neill 1989, 2 1 ) . T h e authority o f reason must b e a justified authority that c a n always b e ques­ tioned—the

" r e c u r s i v e " s e l f - q u e s t i o n i n g o f " d i s c u r s i v e " r e a s o n is its a u t o n ­

omous nature

(cf. O ' N e i l l 1 9 9 2 ) . P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n m a n i f e s t s itself i n t h e

procedure o f j u s t i f y i n g p r i n c i p l e s a n d r e f l e c t s t h e absence o f " f i n a l " r e a s o n s a n d values. If reasoning has only a discursive and recursive grounding and lacks tran­ scendental vindication, then even the "supreme principle of practical reason," the Categorical Imperative, has no greater authority than that it is a principle capable of guiding the interactions, including the communicating, of beings whose coordination is not naturally guaranteed. The Categorical Imperative

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

191

states essential requirements for a possible community (not an actual com­ munity) of separate, free and rational beings. ( 1 9 8 9 , 4 3 - 4 4 )

T h e s u p r e m e principle of reason i s t h a t o f g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t o r i g i n a t e s in r e f l e c t i o n o n w h a t it m e a n s t o justify a n o r m t h a t c a n c l a i m

grounded

authority. O'Neill proposes a "Kantian constructivism" according to w h i c h moral principles of justice arejustified n o tb y the hypothetical

consensus

o f r a t i o n a l p a r t i e s b u t b y t h e "possible consent of actual agents" ( 2 1 7 ) .

Hence

in r e a l l e g i t i m a c y d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h m u s t satisfy c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r a l

condi­

tions, it is precisely t h e d i s a d v a n t a g e d o f a society w h o h a v e a right t o d e ­ mand

the Kantian condition

o f t h e true generality o fjustification. It is

essential to maintain t h e correct balance between abstract principles a n d their concrete justification: "Idealized accounts o f justice tend to ignore actual vulnerabilities, a n d relativized accounts

tend to legitimate

them"

(ibid.). O'Neill does n o t however distinguish

clearly between

the normative

contexts in which the principle o f general justification m e a n s

something

different i n e a c h c a s e , w h e r e v a l u e s o r n o r m s h a v e t o s a t i s f y d i f f e r e n t v a ­ lidity c o n d i t i o n s . and

H e r proposed

action, which concentrates

ception

universalistic

"disciplining" o f thought

o n the moral dimension

( a n dthe con­

o f the moral person), does n o t d o adequate justice to t h e par­

ticular

normative

cation

o f individual

logic o f t h e ethical justification rights

(within

o f values, t h e justifi­

l a w ) , t h e justification

o f politically

legitimate norms, o r the justification o f moral norms: practical reason re­ quires a differentiation general justification means and

something

o f validity spheres, n o t a n identically c o n c e i v e d

o f these

different

answers required

different

in these

values a n d norms.

contexts;

a r e o f a diverse nature.

"Generality"

the normative

questions

Ethical o r political

dis­

courses have to b e m o r e clearly distinguished from moral discourses—al­ though

O'Neill

(1993)

rightly points

o u t that

ethical

o r political

dis­

courses must bear moral criticism t o o . T h e failure to distinguish different contexts o f practical justification— a n d different justification c o m m u n i t i e s — i s l i n k e d to t h e fact that O ' N e i l l ' s m o r a l t h e o r y rests n o t o n a n a r g u m e n t a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c

reconstruction o fthe

conditions o fr e d e e m i n g different practical validity claims, b u to n t h e K a n ­ tian

assumption that t h eauthoritative claim o freason to "reasonably" con­

nect unity a n d diversity requires, i n a practical respect, a "public justifica­ tion"

of principles a m o n g a plurality o f persons. T h o u g h practical

reason

i s , a s v i n d i c a t i n g r e a s o n , mte7subjective, i t i s " c o m m u n i c a t i v e " o n l y t o t h e extent that it m a k e s c o m m u n i c a t i o n as c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l p e r s o n s possible: practical reason isunity-generating r e a s o n that "disciplines" c o m ­ munication i n t h e m o r a l sense (O'Neill 1989,4 7 ) . I f h o w e v e r t h e analysis begins n o t with reason's claim to authority in general but,i n particular,

192

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

with practical validity claims b e t w e e n persons that already refer to justifying r e a s o n s , t h e n it b e c o m e s c l e a r i n a f u n d a m e n t a l

internally

sense to what

e x t e n t practical r e a s o n is to b e u n d e r s t o o d a s c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e a s o n . C e r ­ tain conditions o f "the public u s e o f r e a s o n " — i n a n d g e n e r a l justification—are

the form of reciprocal

implicit in normative validity a n d c a n b e "re­

c u r s i v e l y " r e c o n s t r u c t e d b y m e a n s o f t h e v a l i d i t y reasons o n w h i c h p r a c t i c a l n o r m s a r e based. "Principles o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n " (43) a r e p r e s u p p o s e d b y practical justifications o f "principles o f cooperation" already in the form o f the criteria o f reciprocity a n d generality—not in the f o r m

o f particular

m o r a l n o r m s . T h e r e a s o n p r i n c i p l e of justification reveals itself as t h e c o m ­ municative condition o f t h e possibility o f practical n o r m s g r o u n d e d in their validity as s u c h — a n d thus m a k e s possible a differentiation o f different con­ texts of justification, a c c o r d i n g to t h e validity reasons

required.

Unlike O'Neill, the theory o f discourse ethics p r o p o s e d Habermas

grounds

the principle

by Apel a n d

of n o r m justification—namely,

m o r a l n o r m c a n b e justified only in a n argumentative w a yu n d e r conditions o f free a n d equal participation

that

a

certain

in discourses—by means of a

formal-pragmatic a n a l y s i s o f t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f r e d e e m i n g m o r a l v a l i d i t y claims. I n this w a y t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p r a c t i c a l - c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e a s o n a n d g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n b e c o m e s e v i d e n t : it is l o c a t e d i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f the validity o f m o r a l n o r m s themselves. I n w h a t follows I d e a l with

this

widely b r a n c h i n g m o d e l solely with t h e intention o f e x p l a i n i n g the prin­ ciple of justification. I n the process I refer primarily to H a b e r m a s ' s version o f d i s c o u r s e ethics; it will b e p o s s i b l e t o l i n k u p with its d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f v a r i o u s practical d i s c o u r s e s ( H a b e r m a s 1993a; 1996a, 1 5 8 - 6 2 ) i n t h e s e n s e of a distinction munities),

between

doing

contexts o f justification

so in a manner

( a n djustification

that modifies the

com­

discourse-theoretic

model. T h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y o f m o r a l i t y a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t K a n t ' s "fact o f reason" in terms o f a theory of argumentation

in order to reformulate the

moral conception o f autonomy intersubjectively a n d procedurally, a n d to m a k e possible a "construction"

of norms—to

use Rawls's

concept—that

avoids the p r o b l e m s o f a hypothetical contractual situation a n d that does n o t relinquish t h e universalist claim to validity o f these n o r m s . A c c o r d i n g t o H a b e r m a s , t h e s t a g e s o f t h i s t h e o r y c o n s i s t i n a reconstruction o f t h e a r ­ g u m e n t a t i v e presuppositions of justifying n o r m s , o n e that leads to t h e for­ m u l a t i o n o f a discourse principle t h a t s e r v e s a s a principle of morality o r democ­ racy ( H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 6 a , 1 0 4 - 1 1 ) f o r j u s t i f y i n g ( i n e a c h c a s e d i f f e r e n t ) norms u n d e r conditions o f mutual a n d forceless argumentation. T h e n o r m justi­ fication

procedure

rests a c c o r d i n g l y n o t o n a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e p r o p ­

erties o f m o r a l persons b u t o n a reflection about the conditions of justifying action-guiding, generally valid norms. H a b e r m a s h a ssuggested the concept of a n "ideal s p e e c h situation" (1984, 1 7 7 ) to characterize the formal prop-

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

erties that discourses must exhibit so that rational consensual

1

9

5

agreements

can occur within them. T h e s e are conditions o f equal opportunities o n the p a r t o f d i s c o u r s e participants to i n t r o d u c e topics a n d v i e w p o i n t s into dis­ courses, to raise o r p r o b l e m a t i z e validity c l a i m s ( s e e 1990a, 8 8 - 8 9 ) . N e i t h e r the c o n c e p t o f "ideal c o m m u n i c a t i o n

, ,

community —the

auditorium, ac­

c o r d i n g to Apel, necessarily p r e s u p p o s e d in validity c l a i m s — n o r that o f the ideal s p e e c h situation s h o u l d h o w e v e r b e hypostatized into concrete j e c t i o n s o f s o c i a l life; t h e y a r e n o t h i n g m o r e a n d n o t h i n g less t h a n

pro­ coun-

terfactual assumptions ( H a b e r m a s 1982, 261-62) that k e e p real discourses a n d factual consensual agreements open, in principle, to possible reasons and

counterreasons

as well

as to unrestricted

participation.

A

formal-

pragmatic reconstruction o f the conditions o f the justified redemption o f (different) validity claims thus attempts to u n c o v e r t h e presuppositions o f theoretical a n d practical discourses u n d e r which arguments c a n b e under­ stood a n d accepted as g r o u n d e d . H e r e I cannot g o a n y further into the truth- o r m e a n i n g - t h e o r e t i c i m p l i c a t i o n s o f this c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y o f communication and argumentation.

1 8

In w h a t follows I confine m y s e l f — a n d t h e discourse-theoretic thesis f r o m which I p r o c e e d — t o the p r o b l e m central to a theory o f morality, namely, t h a t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t e x i s t f o r t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f prac­ tical n o r m s . I t i s s o l e l y a m a t t e r

of reconstructing

the logic o f justifying

n o r m a t i v e l y b i n d i n g validity c l a i m s — c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h n o r m s o r val­ ues c a n b e a c k n o w l e d g e d asjustified in contexts o fjustification. T h i s in­ terpretation

o f t h e d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c m o d e l h a s a s its g o a l a " r e c u r s i v e , "

formal-pragmatic analysis o f the conditions of justifying values o r n o r m s in the respective justification communities in w h i c h these reasons a r e said to b e valid. It m o v e s inquiringly f r o m normative validity claims b a c k to validity r e a s o n s a n d validity justifications. Practical, g r o u n d e d validity m u s t b e s e e n as "situated" i n c o n t e x t s o f justification. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m a k e s p o s s i b l e a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n a l y s i s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y i n different contexts, according to w h i c h n o t allvalues o r n o r m s — i n a c c o r d a n c e with their validity c l a i m — m u s t b e justifiable within o n e "ideal c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y " o r universal justification c o m m u n i t y . T h e validity o f ethical values is t o b e ethically a n d a u t o n o m o u s l y j u s t i f i e d b y p e r s o n s t o a n d f o r themselves as m e m b e r s o f "constitutive" communities; legal n o r m s require a j u s t i f i c a t i o n that is a u t o n o m o u s , r e c i p r o c a l , a n d g e n e r a l w i t h i n a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y (in order to enable legal a u t o n o m y ) ; moral norms,

finally,

must

rest o n reasons that a r e to b e a u t o n o m o u s l y justified in a sense o f tran­ scending particular contexts. Persons are authors a n d addressees o f norms in all t h e s e practical c o n t e x t s ; a n d this n o r m a t i v e c o m p l e x i t y r e q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n a l y s i s o f v a l i d i t y . T h i s t h e s i s i s t o b e s h o w n first f o r m o r a l norms; from here, the principle of justification c a n b e applied to the other levels.

ig4

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

Moral norms are expressed in the form o f categorical ought or commandments:

sentences

" O n e o u g h t n o t t o kill a n y b o d y . " T h i s s e n t e n c e c a n

also b e f o r m u l a t e d i n o t h e r ways: " N o b o d y m a y kill a n o t h e r p e r s o n " o r "All h u m a n b e i n g s a r e m o r a l l y o b l i g a t e d n o t t o kill o t h e r p e r s o n s . " T h e cate­ gorical claim to validity implies a n unconditional claim to justification, in­ s o f a r a s t h e s e o u g h t s e n t e n c e s a s s e r t t h a t t h e r e a r e no l e g i t i m a t e

reasons

a g a i n s t their validity: it is c o n s i d e r e d that n o p e r s o n s c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y r e ­ j e c t t h e m . T h e y m u s t h o w e v e r b e a b l e t o d e f e n d this c l a i m . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y c l a i m t o b e v a l i d f o r all, o u g h t s e n t e n c e s m u s t b e j u s t i f i a b l e t o a l l with the same reasons, so that m o r a l persons c a n understand

themselves

both as the addresses a n d the authors o f these norms. M o r a l n o r m s

must

b e reciprocally justified so that their observance c a n b e reciprocally d e ­ m a n d e d ; accordingly, their validity c a n b e p u t into question only b y reasons that d i s p u t e this reciprocity. D i s p u t i n g a n o r m raises, a s it w e r e , a n e g a t i v e c l a i m t o u n i v e r s a l i t y ( c o n c e r n i n g w h a t i s not t o a p p l y universally; i . e . , w h a t c a n n o t b e universally a c c e p t e d ) that m u s t b e raised a n d d e f e n d e d i n dis­ c o u r s e s justifying a n o r m , w h e r e b y positive claims c o n c e r n i n g w h a t is to apply universally cannot b e avoided. T o justify n o r m s , H a b e r m a s (1990a, 65) a r g u e s , a universal discourse is necessary u n d e r conditions that allow only the "force o f the better

argu­

m e n t " : ' V a l i d n o r m s m u s t deserve r e c o g n i t i o n b y all c o n c e r n e d . " V a l i d n o r m s m u s t t h e r e f o r e satisfy t h e p r i n c i p l e o f u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n ( U ) , w h i c h is i n t r o ­ d u c e d a s t h e r u l e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n f o r m o r a l d i s c o u r s e s : " ( U ) All a f f e c t e d c a n a c c e p t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d t h e s i d e e f f e c t s i t s general o b s e r v a n c e c a n b e a n t i c i p a t e d t o h a v e f o r t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f everyone's i n t e r e s t s ( a n d t h e s e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e p r e f e r r e d to those o f k n o w n alternative possibilities f o r regulation)" (ibid.). Against Ernst T u g e n d h a t ' s proposal to trace back the validity o f a m o r a l n o r m as "equally g o o d f o r all" to w h e t h e r a p e r s o n h a s his o r h e r o w n reasons to "subject" him- o r herself to a n o r m

(Tugendhat

1984, 8 5 ) , H a b e r m a s objects that this falls s h o r t o f b o t h t h e c o g n i t i v e a n d discursive c h a r a c t e r o f m o r a l justification ( H a b e r m a s 1990a, 6 8 - 7 6 ) . T h e "reasons" that, a c c o r d i n g to T u g e n d h a t , characterize t h e reciprocity o f t h e normative obligation aren o t shared reasons, a n dthe communicative aspect o f t h e justification is " n o t a c o g n i t i v e b u t a voluntaristic o n e " ( T u g e n d h a t 1984,

1 2 3 ) . A s o p p o s e d t o this, m o r a l validity d e p e n d s u p o n r e a s o n s t h a t

c a n b e j u s t i f i e d r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y b y p e r s o n s t o others a n d t h a t , a s such, are generally acceptable r e a s o n s — a n d therefore also individually ac­ ceptable for each person—which b e c o m e the foundation for morally m o ­ tivated,

justified action. Deontological reasons are universally shared, in­

tersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d

reasons—"reasons

we can share"

(Korsgaard

1993). Moral reasons are simultaneously general a n d individual, for rea­ s o n s d o n o t j u s t i f y t h e m s e l v e s b u t a r e j u s t i f i e d between p e r s o n s ; a s s h a r e a b l e reasons, they a r e action-justifying a n d action-guiding, a n d they motivate a

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

p e r s o n t o a c t m o r a l l y o u t o f insight ( i n t o t h e i r c o r r e c t n e s s ) .

I < )

795

Moral action

c a n b e j u s t i f i e d o n l y w i t h r e a s o n s o f this k i n d . T h e principle o f moral universalization must b e understood

as a prin­

ciple o f discourse: r a t h e r than ascribing as valid to all others any m a x i m that I c a n will to b e a universal law, I must submit m y m a x i m to all others f o r the p u r p o s e s o f dis­ cursively testing its claim to universality. T h e e m p h a s i s shifts f r o m w h a t e a c h c a n will without contradiction to b e a g e n e r a l law, to w h a t all c a n will in a g r e e m e n t to b e a universal n o r m . ( M c C a r t h y 1 9 7 8 , 3 2 6 ) T h e p r i n c i p l e o f universalization is t h e r e f o r e u n d e r s t o o d n e i t h e r f r o m t h e perspective o f the

first-person

s i n g u l a r (cf. S i n g e r 1 9 7 1 ; H a r e 1 9 6 3 , 1 9 8 1 ) ,

n o r f r o m t h e " i m p e r s o n a l " p e r s p e c t i v e o f a t h i r d - p e r s o n s i n g u l a r (cf. N a g e l 1986 a n d , f o r a consequentialist standpoint, Wiggins 1987), b u t from the perspective of the with reference

first-person

p l u r a l , w h i c h is i n p r i n c i p l e u n r e s t r i c t e d

to the second-person

and,

singular, must b e discursively con­

structed. M o r a l n o r m s raise a universal c l a i m to validity—this is to b e a n ­ alyzed semantically—that can b e r e d e e m e d only u n d e r certain conditions— this is t o b e d e t e r m i n e d

w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p r a g m a t i c a n a l y s i s (cf. R e h g

1 9 9 1 ) . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f d i s c o u r s e ethics ( D ) t h u s states: " O n l y t h o s e can claim to b e valid that m e e t

norms

( o r could meet) with the approval o f all

affected in their capacity asparticipants in a practical discourse" ( H a b e r m a s 1990a, 93; s e e also 1996a, 1 0 7 ) . J o h n M a c k i e ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f s t a g e s o f u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n i l l u s t r a t e s t h e dif­ ficulties

of a subjective a n d non-intersubjective generalization o f m a x i m s .

T h e g o l d e n rule " D o unto others as y o u w o u l d have them

d o unto you"

does n o t rule o u t the generalization o f those n o r m s that s e e m to, f o r i n s t a n c e , R . M . H a r e ' s c o n s i s t e n t f a n a t i c

(Hare

acceptable

1 9 6 5 , c h . 9) b u t

n e v e r t h e l e s s c a n n o t b e reciprocally a n d generally j u s t i f i e d , s i n c e t h e i n t e r e s t s of possible victims a r e evaluated solely f r o m o n e ' s o w n idiosyncratic spective.

2 0

A n dyet, M a c k i e says, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t

o f a perspective

per­

change

that generalizes n o t only o n e ' s o w n perspective b u t adopts that o f o t h e r s — a n d i n d e e d completely, without o n e ' s o w n slant—gives rise to d o u b t as to w h e t h e r a n y p r i n c i p l e s a t all c a n fulfill this r e q u i r e m e n t . T h a t is w h y M a c k i e (1977, 93) proposes a m o r e m o d e s t principle: ' W e must lower o u r sights a litde, a n d look n o t f o r principles w h i c h c a n b e wholeheartedly

endorsed

f r o m every point o f view, b u t f o r o n e s w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a n acceptable c o m ­ promise between the different actual points o f view." T h e question o f h o w " a c c e p t a b l e " is t o b e e x p l i c a t e d d o e s h o w e v e r l e a d b a c k t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l c r i t e r i o n o f g e n e r a l justification: o n e c a n establish w h e n it is actually j u s ­ tified

to s p e a k o f a generally justified n o r m o n l y o n t h e basis o f a g e n e r a l

a g r e e m e n t , a n d this a g r e e m e n t is " a c c e p t a b l e " o n l y if all t h o s e

potentially

affected c o u l d a g r e e o n this n o r m ; a n d , c o n t r a r y t o M a c k i e ' s view, it is n o t

196

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

possible to i m a g i n e this a g r e e m e n t as a c o m p r o m i s e . T h e n o r m a t i v e validity o f m o r a l n o r m s d o e s n o t a l l o w d i f f e r e n t r e a s o n s f o r its v a l i d i t y b e c a u s e i f it d i d , p e r s o n s m i g h t h a v e t h e i r o w n r e a s o n s f o r o b s e r v i n g t h e

norm—or

f o r n o t o b s e r v i n g it i n c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n s , t h a t i s , f o r n o t c o n s e n t i n g t o it. T h i s o u t c o m e is n o t h o w e v e r c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l validity o f m o r a l

norms,

against which

there are n o

good

normative

reasons—or

w h i c h , insofar as s u c h reasons exist, are p u t into question in respect of their validity. T h a t is w h y m o r a l a c t i o n c a n b e l e g i t i m a t e l y d e m a n d e d , a n d w h y n o a n t e c e d e n t c o m p r o m i s e i s n e e d e d . If, m o r e o v e r , a d i s t i n c t i o n i s m a d e b e t w e e n the validity o f m o r a l n o r m s a n d the validity o f legal n o r m s

(which

d o not rest o n stricdy shared reasons a n d d e m a n d only action that con­ f o r m s t o t h e l a w ) a n d e t h i c a l v a l u e s ( " f o r m e " ) , it b e c o m e s c l e a r t h a t m o ­ rality d o e s n o t i m p l y casting off all the c o n t e x t c o n n e c t e d n e s s of v a l u e s a n d n o r m s , a n d t h a t it r e p r e s e n t s o n l y o n e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e p r a c t i c a l w o r l d . " C o m m u n i c a t i v e r e a s o n " ( H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 6 a , 3 - 4 ) is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d a s " v i n d i c a t i n g r e a s o n " t h a t is o r i e n t e d t o w a r d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; a n d , i n v i e w o f the

distinction

between

practical

contexts,

"practical

reason"

can

g r a s p e d as the capacity to give the "right" r e a s o n s in the a p p r o p r i a t e

be con­

texts. I n the p r o c e s s , different m o d e s o f justification a r e to b e h e e d e d , as is still t o b e s h o w n ( c h a p t e r 5 . 2 ) . P r a c t i c a l n o r m s a n d v a l u e s r a i s e v a l i d i t y claims within particular contexts a n d must be justified in their own respec­ tive

ways—whereby general norms, b e they legal or m o r a l norms,

must

always b e g e n e r a l l y a n d reciprocally justified ( m o r e o r less stricdy) within t h e r e s p e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . One p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s t h u s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n r e s p e c t o f different p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s ; h e n c e , i t i s n o " a b ­ stract" o r "external," "context-remote" p r i n c i p l e o f r e a s o n that absolutizes o n e o r the o t h e r context. F o r a discourse-theoretic m o d e l that k e e p s this differentiation in m i n d , therefore, there follows the c o n s e q u e n c e that the concepts of "communication differentiated

on

the

community" and

basis of the

difference

" g o o d r e a s o n s " a r e to between

be

practical validity

claims in respect o f different justification communities. Validity claims, w h i c h serve as the starting p o i n t o f f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c analyses, are after all in

different

ways

"context-bound"

and

"context-transcending."

raise mutual validity claims as m e m b e r s o f different c o m m u n i t y n o t j u s t as m e m b e r s o f the all-encompassing m o r a l

Persons contexts,

community.

A s f a r a s m o r a l q u e s t i o n s a r e c o n c e r n e d , it is i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s t a n d the principle o f justification as a "recursively" a n d "formal-pragmatically" r e c o n s t r u c t e d p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h m o r a l validity claims m u s t

be

justified r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y in a n u n l i m i t e d c o m m u n i t y o f all m o r a l persons. This idea of an "unlimited justification community" does not imply that there a r e n o m o r a l n o r m s as l o n g as a n u n l i m i t e d c o n s e n s u s o f all p o s s i b l e p e r s o n s h a s n o t b e e n f o u n d ; it m e a n s t h a t m o r a l n o r m s m u s t

be

justifiable to, in principle, e a c h p e r s o n , w h o h a s a m o r a l right to v e t o —

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

197

a n d this, o n t h e basis o f t h e criteria o f r e c i p r o c i t y a n d generality. H e r e lies the m e a n i n g o f "respect" f o r moral persons as a u t o n o m o u s beings. N oo n e may

b e excluded from the community of the authors a n d addressees of

morality—a m e m b e r s h i p that protects a n d obligates all equally. A l t h o u g h it is a difficult o n e , t h e c o n c e p t o f " r e a s o n " is a n u n a v o i d a b l e concept

i n this respect:

the appropriate

moral justification

of

(action-

legitimating) n o r m s must b e a "reasonable" justification; a n d morally au­ tonomous

a c t i o n is i n t h e p r a c t i c a l s e n s e " r e a s o n a b l e " w h e n it rests o n

justified r e a s o n s . T h e f o l l o w i n g p r o p e r t i e s o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f r e a s o n a r e to b e e m p h a s i z e d . (1)

Reason

(Vernunft)

is i m m a n e n d y

connected

t o reasons

(Grunde)

y

w h i c h a r e n o t substantively p r e g i v e n b u t m u s t p r o v e to b e r e a s o n a b l e . I t is precisely t h e a b s e n c e o f "ultimate" a n d "absolute" reasons that calls f o r a n d enables "constructions without foundations"

(O'Neill 1992,291)—a

rea­

s o n " w i t h o u t a b a n n i s t e r , " t o u s e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f A r e n d t ' s . R e a s o n is crit­ ical i n t h e K a n t i a n s e n s e i n t h a t it t u r n s r e c u r s i v e l y t o itself a n d q u e s t i o n s its o w n s t a n d a r d s ; i t i s d e p e n d e n t u p o n a f o r m o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n w h i c h its a d d r e s s e e s a r e its a u t h o r s t o o . W h a t is c o n s i d e r e d u n i v e r s a l a n d r e a s o n a b l e m u s t b e u n i v e r s a l l y j u s t i f i a b l e . T h e b u s i n e s s o f r e a s o n is always a

(self-)

critical business. (2) A c c o r d i n g t o t h e c l a s s i c a l n o t i o n ,

reason creates a justified

unity

a m o n g a diversity o f p h e n o m e n a i n t h e w o r l d . B r i n g i n g a b o u t this unity i n the practical sense m e a n s creating a "rational identity" ( A d o r n o ) a m o n g a plurality o f "nonidentical" persons: a justified a n d nonrepressive generality. Here, particular persons a n d communities are n o t subordinated

to" b a d "

g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s ; r a t h e r , it is g u a r a n t e e d that e x i s t i n g ( m o r e o r less c o m ­ p r e h e n s i v e ) generalities a r e n o t i m m u n e to critique. T h e "unity o f r e a s o n " is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e " d i v e r s i t y o f its v o i c e s " ( H a b e r m a s 1 9 9 2 b ) . R e a s o n d o e s n o t itself s p e a k a w o r l d l e s s a n d c o n t e x d e s s l a n g u a g e b u t calls f o r t h e justifiability e v e n o f "thick" l a n g u a g e s in at least a "minimal" m o r a l sense. This justifiability—we must emphasize with W a l z e r — d o e s n o t constitute a "thick" l a n g u a g e ; it f o r m s a c o m m o n basis f o r r e c i p r o c a l m o r a l

understand­

ing, w h i c h represents t h e b o n d b e t w e e n m o r a l l y respecting p e r s o n s

pre­

cisely at that p o i n t w h e r e "thicker" l a n g u a g e s d o n o t p e r m i t a n y u n d e r ­ standing. T h e criteria o f reciprocity a n d generality u n d e r s c o r e t h e i d e a o f a "rea­ sonable" moral justification that does n o t subsume the "concrete

other"

( B e n h a b i b 1 9 8 7 ) u n d e r a false universality. I f n o r m s must b e justifiable, reciprocally, to each single person and, generally, forevery possible person, t h e n t h e one form o f m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d m o r a l r e s p e c t i m p l i e s t h e p a r ­ ticular-universal d o u b l e m o m e n t that leads Lutz Wingert (1993) to speak of two "basic forms o f m o r a l respect" (179-90): "solidary" respect individuals as persons w h o cannot b e represented by others

toward

(unvertretbar,

ip8

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

i.e., w h o m u s t r e p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s ) , a n d "just" r e s p e c t f o r e q u a l l y e n t i t l e d m e m b e r s o f a c o m m o n "communicative f o r m o f life."

2 1

M o r a l justification

therefore requires o f persons a "twofold e x c h a n g e o f perspective": with the "concrete other" a n d with "third parties" as representatives o f the m o r a l community

( 2 5 2 - 5 8 ) . I n this s e n s e , W i n g e r t says, m o r a l r e a s o n s c a n b e

morally shared reasons. It must b e objected, however, that ifshared reasons are understood

a s r e c i p r o c a l l y and g e n e r a l l y j u s t i f i e d r e a s o n s , t h e i d e a o f

(moral) justice c a n n o t b e attributed to o n e side only—that o f generality— s o t h a t it r e q u i r e s r e c i p r o c a l "solidarity" i n o r d e r t o c o r r e c t a false, s t e r e o ­ typical generality ( 1 9 0 - 9 1 ) . Insofar as 'justice" d e m a n d s e q u a l respect f o r all, it a l r e a d y i m p l i e s t h e possibility o f a r e c i p r o c a l " v e t o " a n d w o u l d n o t deserve the n a m e

"justice" i f its g e n e r a l i t y w e r e n o t o n e t h a t is m u t u a l l y

j u s t i f i a b l e a n d n e e d e d "solidarity" a s its "reverse s i d e . "

2 2

It will h a v e to b e

s h o w n t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e i n s e p a r a b i l i t y o f t h e r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s a s indi­ viduals a n d a s members o f c o m m u n i t y b y m e a n s o f a n a n a l y s i s o f d i f f e r e n t "communities o f recognition" leads to four forms o f recognition

(chapter

5-3)A t t h e level o f morality, " g e n e r a l i t y " is always "reflective" a n d n o t "subsumptive" (see K a n t 1987, 1 8 - 1 9 ) ;

t n e

possibility o f r e c i p r o c a l o b j e c t i o n is

constitutive h e r e . B u t this possibility is n o t o n l y to b e u n d e r s t o o d

horizon­

tally; a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y s e e n , t h e d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t s c o r r e c t o n e a n o t h e r : ethical persons challenge general legal concepts, moral persons ethical values. P e r s o n s a r e always m e m b e r s

question

o f different contexts,

which

provide n u m e r o u s possibilities f o r conflict a n d critique (chapter 5.2). (3) F i n a l l y , a t h i r d e l e m e n t o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is a l s o to b e h i g h l i g h t e d : its c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d i n g a n d y e t c o n t e x t - i m m a n e n t

char­

acter. M o r a l validity claims g o b e y o n d the "local" contexts in w h i c h

they

e m e r g e . T h o u g h m o r a l p r o b l e m s arise in a contingent m a n n e r , not permit

contingent

responses. U n l i k e ethical values o r legal

they d o norms,

moral n o r m s a r e n o t "reasonable" if they a r e valid only "for u s " a n d w e cannot therefore

demand

t h e m o f "others" with g o o d reasons o r justify

t h e m t o " o t h e r s . " E v e n t h o u g h r e a s o n is "internally" l o c a t e d , it c o n t a i n s a u n i v e r s a l c l a i m , a s P u t n a m e m p h a s i z e s : " R e a s o n is, i n this sense, b o t h i m ­ m a n e n t ( n o t t o b e f o u n d o u t s i d e o f c o n c r e t e l a n g u a g e g a m e s a n d institu­ tions)

and transcendent

( a regulative i d e a that w e u s e to criticize t h e con­

d u c t o f all activities a n d institutions)"

(Putnam

1 9 8 7 , 2 2 8 ; cf. H a b e r m a s

1 9 9 2 b ) . I n this r e s p e c t t o o , " r e a s o n " c o n t i n u e s t o b e a critical c o n c e p t ; it speaks n o t a "Platonic" language b u t rather the language o f critique—the language o f those w h o d e m a n d a justification. In s u m m a r y , three levels a r e to b e distinguished within the f r a m e w o r k o f t h e d i s c o u r s e - t h e o r e t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l i t y p r o p o s e d h e r e . First, t h e r e c u r s i v e a n d f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c reconstruction o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; second, t h e r e c i p r o c a l a n d g e n e r a l justification o f

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

/ 99

p a r t i c u l a r p r a c t i c a l n o r m s i n d i f f e r e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s ; third, a n d finally,

t h e j u s t i f i e d action o f p e r s o n s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h j u s t i f i e d n o r m s o n

the basis o f reasonable insight into the well-grounded character o f these norms, which must b e proved in the particular contexts o f action.

(From

this, it f o l l o w s t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i f y i n g r e a s o n s d o e s n o t s p e a k in favor o f a strict division b e t w e e n t h e justification o f n o r m s a n d j u s t i f i e d a c t i o n ; s e e c h a p t e r 5.2.) I n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e s e t h r e e levels, o n e m u s t b e a r in m i n d that t h e question o f m o r a l justification is n o t u n d e r s t o o d question W h y b e moral?, which already presupposes a particular

as the concep­

tion o f morality; rather, t h e q u e s t i o n is W h a t d o e s it m e a n t o b e m o r a l ? , a n d it r e q u i r e s a differentiated a n s w e r with r e s p e c t t o a justification

prin­

ciple that m a k e s possible t h e substantive justification o f n o r m s that g r o u n d moral action. T o saythat moral reasons as shared reasons a r e also " m y " r e a s o n s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t m o r a l r e a s o n s a r e t o b e e x p l i c a t e d only a s " m y " reasons—as reasons that a r e moral reasons only if they c a n motivate m e (reasons that a r e g o o d f o r m e ) .

2 3

Moral reasons must b e intersubjective

action-justifying reasons. The

recursive-reflective a n d formal-pragmatic

reconstruction

of the

p r i n c i p l e o f j u s t i f y i n g r e a s o n p r o p o s e d a t t h e first l e v e l r e s t s , a s h a s b e e n s e e n , o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e "authority" o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n c a n n o t fall back upon

ultimate

reasons o r substantive

"external" values from

m o r a l n o r m s c a n b e derived, a n d that n o r m s must therefore

which

b e able to

justify their claims to a reciprocal a n d g e n e r a l normative validity

under

these very validity c o n d i t i o n s o f reciprocity a n d generality. O f c o u r s e , this r e c o n s t r u c t i o n itself c a n b e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a self-reconstruction o f rea­ son a n d as such cannot claim absolute o r (in Apel's sense [1988, 1 1 0 ] ) "ultimately g r o u n d e d " authority, b u t it d o e s c l a i m "recursive," best justified authority

with r e s p e c t t o its s u b j e c t m a t t e r : t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " validity o f

n o r m s . T h e principle implicit i n t h evalidity a n d justification claim o f m o r a l ought sentences—the principle that general n o r m s must b e generally a n d reciprocally justified—is a "nontranscendable"

necessary condition o f the

c o n c e p t o f m o r a l validity a n d is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f m o r a l l y responsible, justified action: the action that practical-reasonable,

autono­

m o u s p e r s o n s c a n e x p e c t of, a n d d e m a n d f r o m , o n e a n o t h e r . T o r e t u r n t o t h e starting p o i n t o f this discussion, a g l a n c e a t t h e differ­ ences between Rawls's theory a n d a theory based o n the principle of jus­ tification shows w h a t a d v a n t a g e s t h e latter h a s a n d w h a t parallels exist b e ­ tween t h e two:

(a)

A theory resting o n t h e principle o f justification steers a course b e ­ tween realism a n d relativism, without a b a n d o n i n g t h e claim to valid­ ity o f u n i v e r s a l i s t m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s — a c l a i m t h a t j u s t i f i e s t h e p r i o r i t y o f j u s t i c e a n d d o e s n o t fall b a c k u p o n a " c o m p r e h e n s i v e

doctrine."

200

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

(b)

It relies u p o n a p r o c e d u r a l n o t i o n o f r e a s o n , w i t h o u t i n t r o d u c i n g as fundamental

a substantive conception o f the p e r s o n that cannot

be

j u s t i f i e d s o l e l y o n a s s u m p t i o n s o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ; it t h e r e b y satisfies the

c l a i m to

"neutrality o f justification" a n d

the

priority of

equal

rights a n d liberties (chapter 2 a b o v e ) . (c)

B y m e a n s o f this m o v e i n a b s t r a c t i o n , it is i n a p o s i t i o n to f o r m u l a t e principles o f p e r s o n a l a n d political a u t o n o m y that l e a d to a nonrestricted t h e o r y o f political l e g i t i m a c y a n d to a substantive

conception

of social justice (chapter 3 a b o v e ) . Such

an

"abstractly" j u s t i f i e d t h e o r y is n o t

w r o n g way; the

therefore

b a s i c s t r u c t u r e it a r g u e s f o r r e p r e s e n t s

abstract

in

the

a framework

in

w h i c h p e r s o n s are r e c o g n i z e d intersubjectively in different ways: as eth­ ical p e r s o n s in their ethical self-determination

o f t h e g o o d life; as l e g a l

p e r s o n s in their rights c l a i m to " e q u a l c o n c e r n a n d r e s p e c t " ( D w o r k i n ) ; as politically a u t o n o m o u s a n d equally entitled citizens o f a political c o m ­ munity; theory

and,

finally,

proposed

as m o r a l persons, as h u m a n

here

connects

a procedural

beings

conception

"per se." T h e of

normative

justification with a wide spectrum of recognition relations a n d of various communities.

2 4

This theory does however

find

itself c o n f r o n t e d

by two

fundamental

c o m m u n i t a r i a n objections to d e o n t o l o g i c a l theories o f justice. T h e

first

is

M a c l n t y r e ' s c r i t i q u e o f t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t it is p o s s i b l e to d e f e n d a u n i v ­ ersalist and, in his view, "contexdess" c o n c e p t i o n o f the m o r a l p e r s o n

and

o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n ; t h e s e c o n d is T a y l o r ' s thesis t h a t e v e n a u n i v e r s a l i s t theory must be justified in a "transcending" g o o d . O n c e again the o f t h e g o o d " is p r o m o t e d

"priority

over the priority of deontological justice:

the

p r i o r i t y o f t h e g o o d t h a t is a l w a y s o n l y c o m m u n a l l y l i m i t e d ( M a c l n t y r e ) o r of the g o o d g r o u n d e d in the m o d e r n identity

4.3.

(Taylor).

WHICH PERSON? WHOSE REASON?

A t all f o u r discussion levels o f the d e b a t e b e t w e e n liberalism a n d

commu­

nitarianism, Maclntyre's critique o f deontological theories o f justice takes the most consistent liberalism-critical position of c o n n e c t i n g a

particular

conception of personal identity (chapter 1) with the critique of the ethical neutrality of legal principles (chapter 2), with the defense o f the tive

ethical life" o f political c o m m u n i t i e s

(chapter 3), and,

"substan­

finally,

with a

t h e o r y o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a n d the rationality o f traditions. A t all t h e s e lev­ els, M a c l n t y r e ' s theory d r a w s o n a single source: the view that p e r s o n s de­ velop their self-understanding, their conceptions o f the g o o d a n d the just, a n d t h e i r c a p a c i t y f o r n o r m a t i v e j u d g m e n t s o l e l y in c o n t e x t s o f a p a r t i c u l a r community, a particular tradition. T h e conceptions o f person,

morality,

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

201

a n d reason cannot b e separated from the substantive horizons o f a form o f life, a n e t h o s ; j u s t a s t h e r e c a n n o t b e a n y c o n t e x t l e s s , " i m p e r s o n a l " per­ sons,

there

cannot

transcending

be a

neutral

or impartial

morality

or a

context-

reason.

L i k e T a y l o r , M a c l n t y r e is c o n v i n c e d t h a t m o d e r n i t y d r a w s o n a "variety of m o r a l s o u r c e s " ( M a c l n t y r e 1984a, 10) that, i n their diversity, l e a d to a fragmentation o f m o d e r n consciousness, to "an u n h a r m o n i o u s m e l a n g e of ill-assorted f r a g m e n t s " (ibid.). U n l i k e Taylor, M a c l n t y r e d o e s n o t believe t h a t t h i s f r a g m e n t a t i o n c a n b e aufgehoben ( s u b l i m a t e d ) i n a s y n t h e s i s t r a c i n g o u t t h e s e m o r a l s o u r c e s ; M a c l n t y r e ' s t h e o r y is n e g a t i v e H e g e l i a n i s m inas­ much

as the bifurcation,

personally

good,

the fragmentation

communal

o f the unitary ethos o f the

self-understanding,

and

a

metaphysical-

t h e o l o g i c a l w o r l d v i e w c a n n o t b e r e v e r s e d . M o d e r n i t y is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y the competition between incompatible traditions o f "moral enquiry" w h o s e central form, that o f the "encyclopedic" a n d "liberal" belief in a unitary h u m a n r e a s o n a n d u n i v e r s a l m o r a l i t y , c o n c e a l s i n its a b s o l u t e c l a i m , first, its o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d — i t s i n d i v i d u a l i s m — ( 1 9 8 8 ,

3 - 4 ) a n d is,

second, the worst conceivable, most degenerated form of moral

inquiry:

"What for the kind o f ancient a n d medieval moral enquiry a n d practice which T h o m i s m embodied wasthe exceptional condition of the deprived a n d isolated individual b e c a m e for modernity the condition o f the h u m a n b e i n g as such" (1990, 1 9 3 ) . I n w h a t follows I try to trace M a c l n t y r e ' s critique o f t h e m o d e r n

con­

c e p t i o n o f morality itself i n a n a r r a t i v e — i n a c c o r d a n c e with h i s i d e a l o f m o r a l i n q u i r y ( 1 9 9 0 , 1 2 9 ) — i n o r d e r t o s h o w t h a t h i s ethical monism w i t h respect to the connection between person, morality, a n d reason

harbors

p r o b l e m s that arise w h e n , as M a c l n t y r e requires o f a rational critique, m e a ­ s u r e d a g a i n s t its o w n s t a n d a r d s . T h e n a r r a t i v e b e g i n s w i t h h i s c r i t i q u e o f t h e a t t e m p t a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y t h a t b e l i e v e s it c a n d o w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t o f h u m a n t e l o s {After Virtue); i t c o n t i n u e s w i t h M a c l n t y r e ' s a t t e m p t t o f o r m u l a t e a t h e o r y that, first, s h o w s t h a t it is still p o s s i b l e t o b e a b l e t o j u d g e rationally between traditions even without a

tradition-transcending

s t a n d a r d o f r a t i o n a l i t y a n d , s e c o n d , m a k e s it p o s s i b l e t o c o n c e i v e o f a si­ multaneously context-immanent a n d context-transcending concept o f hu­ m a n t e l o s a n d o f n a t u r a l m o r a l l a w (Whose Justice? Which Rationality?).

This

attempt leads Maclntyre from his originally Aristotelian to a Thomistic p o ­ sition: T h o m i s m s e e m s to h i m to b e t h e o n l y tradition that m e e t s t h e re­ q u i r e m e n t o f t h e possibility o f a dialectical-rational c o m p a r i s o n with o t h e r traditions a n d the r e q u i r e m e n t

o f the unity o f person, community, a n d

tradition, as well as maintaining a connection between

practice-immanent

a n d p r a c t i c e - t r a n s c e n d e n t t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t s . T h o m i s m is t h e t r a d i t i o n that steers between the illusion o f the "encyclopedia" o f a context-neutral reason a n d the perspectivist-contextualist conception o f "genealogy," a n d

202

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

the only o n e that really deserves t h e n a m e "tradition"

of Moral

(Three Rival Versions

Enquiry).

I n t h e c o u r s e o f this narrative, h o w e v e r , it will b e s e e n t h a t M a c l n t y r e m a k e s g e n e r a l r a t i o n a l i t y d e m a n d s o n t r a d i t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t b e aufgehoben within o n e particular tradition. H e h a s to recognize t h e principle of justi­ fication in a practical a n d a h e r m e n e u t i c

respect; traditions m u s t rest "in­

wardly" as well as "outwardly" o n reasons that r e s p o n d

appropriately

practical questions, without themselves being able to determine

to

compre­

hensively what "appropriately" m e a n s both in ethical questions o f orienta­ tion a n d in moral questions. T h e counterthesis

to Maclntyre's view that

p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is t o b e c o n c e i v e d o f a s a c o n t e x t - i m m a n e n t

ethical

self-

r e f l e c t i o n i n a t r a d i t i o n , h o w e v e r , is n o t t h a t m o r a l n o r m s a r e t o b e j u s t i f i e d rationally in the sense that "rational" persons, without a n y social particu­ larity a n d h a v i n g o n l y k n o w l e d g e o f their egoistic interests, c o u l d assent to them

(as M a c l n t y r e s u g g e s t s [ 1 9 8 3 , 4 5 0 ; 1984b, 7 ] ) . T h e c o u n t e r t h e s i s is

that, o n t h e basis o f t h e principle that p e r s o n s a r e always situated in c o n ­ texts, different contexts m u s t b e distinguished in w h i c h questions o f t h e g o o d life, q u e s t i o n s o f e q u a l rights, o f political o b l i g a t i o n s , a n d o f m o r a l n o r m s a r i s e . I n t h e s e c o n t e x t s i t i s i n e a c h c a s e different a n s w e r s t h a t m u s t b e g i v e n to t h e r e s p e c t i v e n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s . P e r s o n s live i n ethical uni­ v e r s e s b u t a l s o i n l e g a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o n e s , a n d i n one m o r a l

universe—and

the Thomistic view that all these universes a r e in metaphysical with o n e another

harmony

c a n n o longer b e upheld, so that the T h o m i s t h i m - o r

herself must recognize the plurality o f traditions a n d i m p o s e certain ra­ tionality

obligations o n traditions, obligations that h o n o r b o t h the ethical

self-determination o f persons a n d their basic claim to moral

respect.

Maclntyre's "narrative" recounts in three stages the history o f occidental c u l t u r e f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r ethical p e r s p e c t i v e . T h i s history is o n e o f m o r a l d e c l i n e . A t t h e first h i s t o r i c a l a n d m o r a l - r e f l e c t i v e s t a g e t h e r e e x i s t e d r e a l objective moral standards

that were e m b e d d e d

in a unity o f theory a n d

practice, in a n ethos. This unity b r o k e d o w n in the attempt, at a second stage, to justify these m o r a l standards in a different way, a n attempt that l e d t o a " m o r a l c a t a s t r o p h e " i n a s m u c h a s t h e c e n t r a l p r e m i s e s o f t h e first stage w e r e a b a n d o n e d . T h e third stage, finally, consists i n t h e r e p e r c u s s i o n s o f this c a t a s t r o p h e , i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e that t h e r e m n a n t s o f t h e o r i g i n a l notion o f morality exist side by side in incompatible conceptions, a n d belief in a n objective justification o f morality h a s given way to relativism. A c c o r d ­ i n g t o M a c l n t y r e , A r i s t o t e l i a n e t h i c s , a s it d e v e l o p e d vis-a-vis H o m e r i c a n d Platonic ethics a n d as connected b y T h o m a s A q u i n a s to St. Augustine in medieval philosophy, represents

t h e first s t a g e o f m o r a l d e v e l o p m e n t i n

w h i c h t h e n a r r a t i v e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l life w a s still c o n n e c t e d — o n dation

o f a n ethical tradition—to

the foun­

the narrative o f a community

a n d its

practices, a n d in w h i c h the inherent g o o d s o f these practices a n d traditions

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

203

p r o v i d e d t h e s t a n d a r d s o n t h e b a s i s o f w h i c h t h e v i r t u o u s life h a d m e a n i n g a n d d i s c e r n i b l e d i m e n s i o n s . T h e s e c o n d stage is r e p r e s e n t e d

by the En­

lightenment (the roots d o however reach as far back as nominalism), which d i s e n g a g e s h u m a n b e i n g s f r o m this c o m m u n a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l - r e l i g i o u s context a n d thereby robs t h e m o f their practice-immanent the Aristotelian perspective) a n d practice-transcending

(as seen

from

(as seen f r o m the

A u g u s t i n i a n - T h o m i s t i c p e r s p e c t i v e ) telos as it a t t e m p t s to justify m o r a l i t y o n the basis o f a contextless r e a s o n o f persons r o b b e d o f all particularity. B e i n g w i t h o u t e t h i c a l s u b s t a n c e , this a t t e m p t fails a n d results i n a m e l a n g e consisting o f the ruins o f past conceptions

o f morality, from which

the

existing "emotivist" culture draws the conclusion that there a r e n o m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s at all f o r s u c h d e t a c h e d p e r s o n s . T h e self sees itself f a c e d with t h e e x i s t e n t i a l c h o i c e o f c r e a t i n g itself; f o r M a c l n t y r e , F r i e d r i c h N i e t z s c h e is t h e p h i l o s o p h e r w h o h a s d i a g n o s e d t h i s s t a t e

appropriately.

M a c l n t y r e is c o n c e r n e d w i t h s h o w i n g that, i n v i e w o f t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e project o f Enlightenment to provide an a u t o n o m o u s justification f o r m o ­ rality, t h e q u e s t i o n sions o r

finds

rior—as

a

can only b e whether

o n e accepts Nietzsche's

conclu­

a way to present Aristotelian ethics as being rationally supe­

conception

that

overcomes

the internal

weaknesses o f the

Enlightenment's morality as well as those o f the emotivist conception in a w a y t h a t c a n e x p l a i n a n d s o l v e t h e i r p r o b l e m s . After Virtue b e g i n s t h i s a t ­ t e m p t a s it p r e s e n t s t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s f a i l u r e a n d t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n c o u n t e r p o s i t i o n . I t i s Whose Justice?

Which Rationality? t h a t p r o v i d e s t h e

under­

lying conception o f m o r a l superiority a n d supplements Aristotelian ethics w i t h u n i v e r s a l i s t T h o m i s t i c n a t u r a l l a w . Three Rival finally,

Versions of Moral

Enquiry,

s h o w s h o w t h e T h o m i s t i c t r a d i t i o n is s u p e r i o r t o t h e e n c y c l o p e d i c

and genealogical modes of moral

reflection.

All these attempts are based o n a particular theory o f personal

identity,

w h i c h a s s u m e s t h a t t h e s e l f c a n find i t s w a y t o i t s e l f o n l y i f i t i s n o t " r a t i o n ­ ally" (as i n K a n t o r Rawls) o r "emotivistically" (as in N i e t z s c h e o r Sartre) detached from ethical traditions a n d communities a n d their

conceptions

o f t h e g o o d . A life is m e a n i n g f u l o n l y a s a n i n d i v i d u a l n a r r a t i v e w i t h i n a c o l l e c t i v e n a r r a t i v e t h a t is itself p a r t o f a m e t a p h y s i c a l tradition. T h e t h r e e c e n t r a l c o m p o n e n t s o f a g o o d , b e c a u s e v i r t u o u s , life a r e t h e n a r r a t i v e o r d e r o f a life ( a s t h e " s e a r c h f o r t h e g o o d " ) , its e m b e d d e d n e s s i n s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s of a community

(in which there are "internal" g o o d s conducive to the

c o m m o n g o o d ) , a n d m e m b e r s h i p in a moral tradition that provides abso­ lute values, a "final telos" ( s e e M a c l n t y r e 1984a, 1 8 6 - 8 7 ,

2 1 9 ) .T h e g o o d

l i f e c o n s i s t s i n t h e s e a r c h f o r t h e g o o d for me, f o r m y community, a n d f o r t h e h u m a n b e i n g as such. O f c o u r s e , e v e n t h e t h i r d s e a r c h i s c o n c e i v a b l e o n l y within a tradition, within a n ethical

context.

T h e s e t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s o f t h e g o o d , v i r t u o u s life d o h o w e v e r

require

c l o s e r s c r u t i n y ; a f t e r a l l , i n ( a ) t h e i r formal d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e g o o d l i f e , ( b )

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

t h e i r general-nonexclusive d e f i n i t i o n o f c o m m u n i t y a s a " c o m m o n

project,"

a n d ( c ) t h e i r universalist f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e h i g h e s t t e l o s o r o f t h e " m o r a l law," they i n t r o d u c e t h r e e viewpoints that reflect t h e m o d e r n

conception

of morality, w h i c h Maclntyre opposes. (a) A c c o r d i n g t o M a c l n t y r e t h e life o f a h u m a n b e i n g is t o b e c o n c e i v e d o f a s a n a r r a t i v e , a s t o r y w h o s e " c o - a u t h o r " o n e is i n s o f a r a s t h e c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h o n e lives also tells t h e s t o r y — a restriction t h a t d o e s n o t distract f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e story o f o n e ' s o w n life is m e a n i n g l e s s i f o n e d o e s n o t understand

oneself as the author

o f oneself, w h i c h m e a n s assuming re­

sponsibility f o r past, present, a n d future actions. F o r M a c l n t y r e , b e i n g ac­ c o u n t a b l e f o r o n e s e l f i n this w a y constitutes t h e " c h a r a c t e r " o f a p e r s o n (1984a, 2 1 6 - 1 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g to his classical c o n c e p t i o n , a story

remains

m e a n i n g l e s s if it c a n n o t b e told w i t h continuity, if it is n o t c l e a r t h a t o n e ' s own

l i f e h a s a direction, a t e l o s . T h i s t e l o s o f l i f e d r a w s o n t w o s o u r c e s : t h e

g o o d s internal to a c o m m u n a l practice a n d the search f o r a highest g o o d t h a t t r a n s c e n d s t h e s e g o o d s . T h e n a r r a t i v e u n i t y o f life is a q u e s t f o r t h e g o o d within a community a n d within the role intended for the individual as well as f o r t h e g o o d f o r t h e h u m a n b e i n g as s u c h . H o w e v e r , M a c l n t y r e leaves both determinations

o f the telos o p e n a n d formal. With

reference

to t h e s e a r c h f o r t h e c o m m u n a l g o o d h e r e m a r k s : " A v i r t u e is a n a c q u i r e d h u m a n quality the possession a n d exercise o f which tends to enable u s to achieve those g o o d s which are internal to practices a n d the lack o f which effectively prevents u s f r o m a c h i e v i n g a n y s u c h g o o d s " (1984a, 1 9 1 ) . A n d t h o u g h h e r e g a r d s the three central virtues of justice, c o u r a g e , a n d truth­ fulness a s constitutive o f every social p r a c t i c e , h e m a k e s it quite c l e a r that this c o n c e p t i o n o f v i r t u e is i n a c c o r d w i t h a plurality o f c o m m u n i t i e s a n d c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d . B u t t h e r e is m o r e : against A r i s t o d e ' s "metaphys­ ical biology" a n d t h e "ahistorical character o f his u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h u m a n n a t u r e " (1984a, 1 5 9 ) , M a c l n t y r e stresses that n o t j u s t certain p e r s o n s a r e c a p a b l e o f l e a d i n g a v i r t u o u s life b u t a l l h u m a n b e i n g s w h o a r e p a r t o f a c o m m u n i t y . T h e t e l o s o f life is n o t r e s e r v e d f o r c e r t a i n p e r s o n s (cf. 1 9 6 97). This view h a s repercussions for his concept o f community. (b)

Persons o w e their identities to the c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h they g r o w

u p a n d l e a r n w h a t it m e a n s t o d o g o o d , t o h a v e duties, a n d t o b e a r r e ­ sponsibility. A s m e m b e r s o f this c o m m u n i t y , f r o m w h i c h w e r e c e i v e t h e "roles" w e have

to "play" within

this

community

(without

having any

c h o i c e ) , w e a r e w h o w e a r e . I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f v i r t u e i n After Virtue ( a n d in his essay o n patriotism [1984b]), M a c l n t y r e interprets t h e polis, under­ stood in the Aristotelian sense as t h e " b o n d o f friendship" (1984a, 1 5 5 ) , as a n essential c o n t e x t f o r t h e n o r m a t i v e constitution

o f identity.

Unlike

A r i s t o d e , h o w e v e r , M a c l n t y r e d o e s n o t limit this b o n d to f r e e ( G r e e k ) m a l e citizens; r a t h e r it is o p e n t o "all": t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y is c o n s t i t u t i v e o f p r a c t i c e - i m m a n e n t c o n c e p t s o f virtue o n l y if it p r o v i d e s all m e m b e r s with

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a n i d e n t i t y t h a t i s a c c e p t a b l e to them ( 1 5 9 ) ; i t m u s t b e a t r u l y

205

"common

p r o j e c t " s h a r e d b y all w h o s e p u r p o s e is t o "bring a b o u t s o m e g o o d

recog­

n i z e d a s t h e i r s h a r e d g o o d b y a l l t h o s e e n g a g i n g i n t h e p r o j e c t " ( 1 5 1 ; cf. B e r n s t e i n 1986a); h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e political is t h e r e f o r e

closer to a

m o d e r n r e p u b l i c a n i s m (cf. P o c o c k 1 9 7 5 ) t h a n t o a c l a s s i c a l t h e o r y o f the polis. (c)

F i n a l l y , M a c l n t y r e c a n n o t a v o i d a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y that

t h e p r a c t i c e s o f a c o m m u n i t y c a n s i m p l y b e " e v i l " ( 1 9 8 4 a , 2 0 0 ) . T h u s lie r e m a r k s "that a m o r a l i t y o f v i r t u e s r e q u i r e s a s its c o u n t e r p a r t a c o n c e p t i o n of m o r a l law" (ibid.). Practice-immanent c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d by them­ selves a r e n o t able to j u d g e these practices themselves. H e d o e s n o t o f c o u r s e see a n y possibility o f justifying this universal m o r a l law i n a K a n t i a n m a n n e r ; rather, h e c o n n e c t s it to a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d as t h e "final telos" that goes b e y o n d communities. It does n o t follow from

the com­

m u n a l constitution o f t h e self that the self has to a c c e p t the m o r a l limitations o f the particularity o f those f o r m s o f community. W i t h o u t those moral particularities to b e g i n f r o m there w o u l d never b e a n y w h e r e to begin; b u t it is in m o v i n g forward f r o m such particularity that the search f o r the g o o d , f o r the universal, consists. ( 1 9 8 4 a ,

221) Accordingly, M a c l n t y r e sees two possibilities f o r criticizing o n e ' s o w n c o m ­ m u n i t y : first, i n t h e f o r m o f i m m a n e n t c r i t i q u e a n d , s e c o n d , i n t h e f o r m o f an appeal to a universal moral law (1984b, relates

to a p r o b l e m

15).This second

in his discussion o f patriotism

possibility

(see chapter 3.3).

T h o u g h h e righdy points o u t that only the m e m b e r s o f a nation w h o iden­ tify

with

its p a s t

(in a particular

manner)

c a n feel

responsible

"crimes" (1984b, 1 6 ) , h e c a n n o t h o w e v e r explain o n purely

f o r its

contextualist

p r e m i s e s w h a t a " c r i m e " actually consists in, o n e that, f o r instance, w a s committed o n n o n m e m b e r s o f a community in the n a m e o f certain values a n d traditions o f this

community.

T w o properties o f Maclntyre's theory prevent h i m from being l e dby the idea o f a m o r a l law to t h e conclusion o f a universalist,

context-transcending

c o n c e p t i o n o f morality. O n t h e o n e h a n d , it is h i s b e l i e f that e v e n

norms

that claim universal validity c a n b e meaningfully conceived only within a "tradition" that, t h o u g h e m b o d i e d i n c o m m u n i t i e s , g o e s b e y o n d these in r e s p e c t o f its c o n t e n t . O n t h e o t h e r , it is h i s v i e w t h a t t h e r e c a n n o t b e a n y moral norms

that d o n o t s e r v e a s t h e telos o f t h e g o o d life. H i s ethical

m o n i s m thus leads to the c o n s e q u e n c e o f connecting the final telos o f the i n d i v i d u a l g o o d life w i t h a " m o r a l l a w " that, i n its u n i v e r s a l c o n t e n t , is itself p a r t o f a tradition a n d is r e g a r d e d a s t h e h i g h e s t e n d o f h u m a n This connection

endeavors.

l e a d s h i m i n t h e w r i t i n g s f o l l o w i n g After Virtue t o m o v e

f r o m A r i s t o d e to T h o m a s A q u i n a s . It is o n l y i n t h e T h o m i s t i c tradition

that

2o6

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

M a c l n t y r e s e e s t h e t h r e e c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e g o o d life s a f e g u a r d e d — e t h i c s , politics, a n d t h e o l o g y , t h a t is t o say, t h e i n d i v i d u a l q u e s t f o r t h e g o o d i n the c o m m u n a l a n d universal senses. Ethics, in both Greek practice and Aristotelian thought, was part of politics; the understanding of the moral and intellectual virtues, in both medieval practice and Thomistic thought, was part of theology. T o abstract the ethics from its place in either is already to distort. ( 1 9 9 0 , 1 9 1 ) A c c o r d i n g to M a c l n t y r e , t h e r e is n o r o o m f o r a n i n d e p e n d e n t

morality,

as K a n t o r S i d g w i c k a t t e m p t e d t o j u s t i f y it, b e s i d e t h e u n i t y o f e t h i c s , p o l i ­ tics,

a n d theology. It h a s b e e n seen h o w e v e r that h e attempts to support

t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h i s t h e s i s b y r e p l a c i n g m o r a l i t y w i t h a formal e t h i c s , a nonexclusive p o l i t i c s , a n d a morally s u b s t a n t i v e t h e o l o g y . T h i s

conclusion

must b e a u g m e n t e d b ypointing o u t n o t only that h e builds these additional assumptions into h i s theory, b u t also that his o w n thesis o f the

rational

superiority o f t h e Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition is b a s e d o n a c o n c e p t o f rationality that is p r o c e d u r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d a n d c o n f i r m s o n a h e r m e n e u t i c level that h e h a s to relativize his ethical constriction o f t h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f p e r s o n , morality, a n d r e a s o n . T o this e n d , it is n e c e s s a r y t o take a c l o s e r l o o k at his c o n c e p t i o n o f rationality. After Virtue a r g u e s t h e t h e s i s t h a t t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n t r a d i t i o n

can be de­

f e n d e d i n a m e a n i n g f u l w a y against o t h e r traditions. Its d e f e n s e r e q u i r e s a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l c o m p a r i s o n , o n e t h a t is n o t p r o v i d e d until Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

O n t h e basis o f this n o t i o n o f rationality,

After Virtue a p p e a r s a s t h e d i a g n o s i s o f t h e " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c r i s i s " o f m o d ­ e r n c o n c e p t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y , a s a d i a g n o s i s o f t h e i r f a i l u r e . W h a t is t h e diagnosis that explains the failure o f the E n l i g h t e n m e n t ? Maclntyre pro­ vides essentially two arguments: a historical a n d a c o n c e p t u a l o n e . T h e historical a r g u m e n t states that t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s c l a i m to h a v i n g c o n ­ ceived a morality that w o u l d b e equally plausible a n d valid f o r all rational beings must b e r e g a r d e d as untenable

s i n c e this a t t e m p t h a s l e d to t h e

opposite situation: to a f r a g m e n t e d culture o f m a n y moralities a n d ration­ alities a n d to t h e emotivist p e r s p e c t i v i s m that in t h e e n d d i s p e n s e s entirely with rationality standards. For the best evidence that there are no such principles constituting morality is that no one version of them has been able to compel assent from all, or anything like all, the members of that distinguished subclass of rational per­ sons, modern moral philosophers, let alone from all rational persons. ( 1 9 8 3 , 4 5 r; cf. r988, 3 3 4 ; rggo, 1 8 9 ) M a c l n t y r e is s o s u r e o f t h e failure o f t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t t h a t o n l y i n p a s s i n g d o e s h e p u t f o r w a r d a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t K a n t ( o n this, s e e O ' N e i l l 1989, c h . 8) a n d G e w i r t h i n o r d e r t o d o c u m e n t t h i s f a i l u r e e x e m p l a r i l y . T h e d e b a t e

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

207

w i t h d e o n t o l o g i c a l ( o r a l s o u t i l i t a r i a n ) t h e o r i e s i s t h e r e f o r e m u c h less i m ­ p o r t a n t t o h i m t h a n t h e d e b a t e w i t h t h e o r i e s i n t h e w a k e o f N i e t z s c h e , for they at least witnessed t h e failure o f t h e E n l i g h t e n m e n t ( t h o u g h they did n o t d i a g n o s e it c o r r e c d y ) . H i s historical a r g u m e n t c a n n o t h o w e v e r suffice (cf. F r a n k e n a 1 9 8 3 ) ; f o r i f t h e m e r e f a c t u a l d i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g K a n ­ tian

o r utilitarian p r i n c i p l e s i n o u r c u l t u r e is e v i d e n c e f o r t h e failure of

t h e s e m o d e l s , t h e n t h e c o l l a p s e o f t h e T h o m i s t i c t r a d i t i o n a n d i t s loss o f c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i c a n c e i s a l s o a s u f f i c i e n t a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t it. I n this c a s e , relativism a n d emotivism, w h i c h M a c l n t y r e r e g a r d s as d o m i n a n t i n o u r cul­ ture, w o u l d necessarily h a v e t h e last w o r d . C o u l d h i s a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t nat­ ural rights f o r individuals serve also against T h o m i s t i c natural law? T h e best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are n o such rights is i n d e e d o f precisely the same type as the best reason w h i c h w e possess for asserting that there a r e n o witches a n d the best reason w h i c h w e possess for asserting that there a r e n o unicorns: every attempt to give g o o d reasons f o r believing that there are such rights has failed. ( 1 9 8 4 a , 69) M a c l n t y r e m u s t t h u s fall b a c k u p o n a c o n c e p t u a l a r g u m e n t t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e i d e a o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t had to f a i l a n d t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e r e l a t i v i s t a l t e r n a t i v e is i n a d e q u a t e . A c c o r d i n g t o this a r g u m e n t , h u m a n life is m e a n ­ ingless without a telos that points the h u m a n b e i n g to a n e n d f o rw h i c h h e o r s h e strives i n a m a n n e r that p r o v e s h i m o r h e r to b e w o r t h y o f this e n d . T h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t i s h u m a n nature, t h e p a t h i s ethics, t h e e n d i s t h e h i g h e s t

telos. W e have thus a threefold s c h e m e in w h i c h human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be ( h u m a n nature in its u n t u t o r e d state) is initially discrepant a n d discordant with the precepts o f ethics a n d n e e d s to b e transformed by the instruction o f practical

reason

a n d experience

into

human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-

realized-its-te/os. ( 1 9 8 4 a , 5 3 ) T h e s e three c o m p o n e n t s refer to o n e another a n d must n o t b e separated. B u t this is p r e c i s e l y w h a t m o d e r n m o r a l i t y d i d : it c u t o f f t h e level o f t h e telos a n d retained u n f o r m e d h u m a n

nature as well as the principles o f

ethics, s o that its a t t e m p t t o r e l a t e t h e t w o t o e a c h o t h e r w i t h o u t t h e ele­ m e n t o f telos w a s b o u n d t o fail. E t h i c a l p r i n c i p l e s w e r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r communal-metaphysical context, a n d henceforth tween nature

ethics w a s placed b e ­

a n empirical reliance o n basically n o n m o r a l

(or fallen)

human

a n d a desubstantivized ethics o f principles. A l l nonteleological

e t h i c s m u s t r e m a i n f r a g m e n t a r y a n d u l t i m a t e l y l e a d t o relativism; it c a n n o t g i v e h u m a n a n d s o c i a l l i f e t h e direction i t n e e d s . ' T h e i n d i v i d u a l h u m a n b e i n g is a unity i n w h o m t h e d i r e c t e d n e s s o f t h e d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s o f h i s spiritual a n d social existence have to b e o r d e r e d hierarchically into a uni­ f i e d m o d e o f life" ( 1 9 9 0 , 1 4 2 - 4 3 ) . I t is o n t h e b a s i s o f this s t r o n g thesis o f

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

the integrity o f t h e self that M a c l n t y r e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f rational

compari­

s o n — a n d t h e o u t c o m e o f this c o m p a r i s o n — i s to b e u n d e r s t o o d ; a n d o n this basis it m u s t b e m e a s u r e d . H o w c a n t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f a tradition b e justified, a n d what does the superiority o f the Thomistic tradition

consist

in? Whose Justice? transcending

Which Rationality?

rationality standards

disputes

the possibility o f

that determine

context-

what the standards o f

the g o o d a n d the just are: there a r e only r a t i o n a l i t y a n d justices. N o n e ­ theless, M a c l n t y r e says, t h e relativist c o n c l u s i o n that t h e r e is n o possibility o f a r a t i o n a l c o m p a r i s o n is p r e m a t u r e

(1988, 9 - 1 0 ; 1990, 5 ) . I n his con­

c e p t i o n h e a t t e m p t s t o find a p a t h b e t w e e n t h e f a l s e a s s u m p t i o n o f a c o n ­ text-transcending, neutral r e a s o n as well as l a n g u a g e a n d t h e thesis o f eth­ ical universes radically separated f r o m o n e another. Every tradition-constitutive

a n d tradition-constituted

f o r m o f moral in­

quiry, M a c l n t y r e argues, develops in three stages: a first in which the relevant beliefs, texts, and authorities have not yet been put in question; a second in which inadequacies of various types have been identified, but not yet remedied; and a third in which response to those in­ adequacies has resulted in a set of reformulations, reevaluations, and new formulations and evaluations, designed to remedy inadequacies and over­ come limitations. ( 1 9 8 8 , 3 5 5 ) It is n o t until t h e t h i r d stage t h a t a tradition b e c o m e s

firmly

established

a n d d e v e l o p s i n t o a n e t h i c a l u n i v e r s e — a u n i v e r s e w i t h its o w n , o n e a n d o n l y " l a n g u a g e - i n - u s e , " its o w n s t a n d a r d s o f rationality a n d j u s t i c e . S u c h a tradition's c l a i m to truth is a b s o l u t e b u t m u s t v i n d i c a t e itself a g a i n a n d a g a i n to t h e m e m b e r s o f this tradition

i n a "process o f dialectical justifi­

c a t i o n " (360). A t r a d i t i o n t h u s h a r b o r s its o w n rationality s t a n d a r d s o n t h e b a s i s o f w h i c h a r g u m e n t s a r e a d v a n c e d ; it m u s t h o w e v e r satisfy a s e c o n d o r d e r transcending s t a n d a r d o f r a t i o n a l i t y , w h i c h M a c l n t y r e d o e s n o t d i s t i n ­ g u i s h a s s u c h : it m u s t b e g e n e r a l l y j u s t i f i e d t o its m e m b e r s . " O n l y

those

w h o s e t r a d i t i o n a l l o w s f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f its h e g e m o n y b e i n g p u t i n q u e s ­ tion

c a n have rational warrant f o r asserting such a h e g e m o n y " (388). S u c h a tradition m i g h t r e a c h t h e p o i n t a t w h i c h it p r o v i d e s insufficient

r e s p o n s e s to p r o b l e m s — i n s u f f i c i e n t a c c o r d i n g to its o w n s t a n d a r d s .

Mac­

l n t y r e calls this a n " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l crisis": a p r o b l e m is r e c o g n i z e d b u t n o t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s o l v i n g it. S u c h a crisis c a n b e o v e r c o m e o n l y

through

a c o n c e p t u a l i n n o v a t i o n t h a t m u s t satisfy t h r e e criteria. First, it m u s t s o l v e t h e p r o b l e m ; s e c o n d , it m u s t b e a b l e t o e x p l a i n w h y it w a s n o t p o s s i b l e t o solve t h e p r o b l e m with t h e o l d c o n c e p t u a l m e a n s ; third, it m u s t b e i n a position

to establish continuity between

the old a n d the n e w concepts

( 3 6 2 ) . Y e t it m a y still b e t h e c a s e t h a t a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l crisis p r o v e s t o b e irresolvable f o r a tradition, that all the conceptual m e a n s that c a n b e

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

20Q

m o b i l i z e d a r e i n s u f f i c i e n t . I n this c a s e , t h e " e n c o u n t e r " w i t h a n a l i e n tra­ d i t i o n c a n l e a d to t h e r e c o g n i t i o n that t h e s t a n d a r d s o f this s e c o n d tion-bound

tradi­

l a n g u a g e - i n - u s e , w h i c h m u s t b e l e a r n e d a s a " s e c o n d first l a n ­

guage," provide the means—the

m e a n s , t h a t is t o say, i n t h e light o f t h e

s t a n d a r d s o f t h e first l a n g u a g e — t o s o l v e a n d e x p l a i n t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l crisis. T h e n e w e x p l a n a t i o n c a n n o t h o w e v e r fulfill t h e t h i r d c r i t e r i o n , that o f c o n t i n u i t y ; t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e first t r a d i t i o n

a r e therefore f o r c e d to

recognize the superior rationality o f the s e c o n d o n e (364-65). To

m a k e this result p l a u s i b l e , M a c l n t y r e m u s t qualify t h e thesis o f t h e

u n t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y o f t w o t r a d i t i o n s : it m e a n s n o t t h a t e t h i c a l u n i v e r s e s c o n ­ stitute c o m p l e t e l y e n c l o s e d units, b u t that l a n g u a g e s a r e e m b e d d e d

in

f o r m s o f life a n d c a n t h e r e f o r e b e l e a r n e d o n l y b y e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e s e c o n ­ texts, a s it were—-just a s a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s d o s o w h e n t h e y b e c o m e of

a n alien

community

(374).

Experiencing the contexts

first

members enables

k n o w l e d g e o f translatability; k n o w i n g t w o different traditions m a k e s it pos­ s i b l e i n t h e first p l a c e t o s e e w h a t k n o w l e d g e o f o n e t r a d i t i o n i s n o t a c c e s ­ sible to t h e other. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that this d i f f e r e n c e c a n b e translated into a neutral, internationalized workaday l a n g u a g e — w h i c h does n o t nec­ essarily stand in contradiction

to Maclntyre's o w n approach, f o r h e does

not claim to present all the strong points o f a tradition

(his T h o m i s m , for

instance) in a generally understandable language—even though h e regards h i m s e l f a s a n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t , as it w e r e , w h o h a s l e a r n e d f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e s a n d systems o f thought

(1990, 4 3 ) . T h e central difference between

this

a p p r o a c h a n d a h e r m e n e u t i c s as p r o p o s e d b y G a d a m e r consists in t h e fact t h a t t h e d i a l o g i c test l e a d s n o t t o a f u s i o n a n d a n e x p a n s i o n o f h o r i z o n s , to l e a r n i n g f r o m t h e o t h e r tradition

(cf. M c C a r t h y 1 9 8 9 ) , b u t t o t h e f a c t

t h a t , i n v i e w o f u n b r i d g e a b l e d i f f e r e n c e s , t h e i n d i v i d u a l m u s t decide b e t w e e n the t w o traditions h e o r s h e h a s g o t t e n to k n o w . E i t h e r this d e c i s i o n relies on

a rediscovery o f the values o f a particular tradition

o n e h a s "always

a l r e a d y " r e c o g n i z e d , w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g this t r a d i t i o n i n its e n t i r e t y o r l i v i n g in it ( M a c l n t y r e 1 9 8 8 , 3 9 4 ) ; o r it a m o u n t s

to a "conversion" in which a

p e r s o n m o v e s f r o m a state o f ethical a l i e n a t i o n t o a tradition n e w t o h i m or h e r a n d to a n e w self-understanding

(396). W h a t is typical o f m o d e r n

society, M a c l n t y r e says, is n o n e t h e l e s s t h e f r a g m e n t e d self t h a t lives w i t h m a n y half-convictions without ordering t h e m one

coherendy in the sense o f

tradition.

M a c l n t y r e gives h o w e v e r a n insufficient explanation f o r h o w t h e m e m ­ bers o f a tradition c a n "encounter" another tradition. F o r if traditions w e r e really s o drastically different (having different m o d e s o f thinking

[381]),

it w o u l d t h e n b e u n c l e a r a s t o h o w t h e m e m b e r s o f t r a d i t i o n A , w h i c h w a s intact b e f o r e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l crisis, c o u l d k n o w that tradition B h a s t h e appropriate

r e s o u r c e s f o r resolving t h e crisis. F o r to r e c o g n i z e these r e ­

s o u r c e s p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t o n e h a s already l e a r n e d t r a d i t i o n B a s a " s e c o n d

2io

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

first

l a n g u a g e " ; h o w e v e r , t h e r e w a s n o r e a s o n f o r d o i n g so p r i o r to the crisis

in tradition A . Ethical persons are not anthropologists: they know, accord­ i n g to M a c l n t y r e , if they are m e m b e r s o f o n e

tradition,

tradition, a n d to b e a b l e to r e c o g n i z e that a n o t h e r

only their

tradition

own

is s u p e r i o r ,

t h e y w o u l d h a v e t o k n o w it a l r e a d y . B u t t o b e m o t i v a t e d t o l e a r n it a n d

to

g e t to k n o w it f r o m t h e i n s i d e , t h e y m u s t a l r e a d y k n o w t h a t it is s u p e r i o r . I f t h e a d o p t i o n o f t h e n e w t r a d i t i o n is n o t t o b e a l e a p i n t o t h e it m u s t a l r e a d y b e f a m i l i a r , l i k e a s e c o n d time

first

unknown,

l a n g u a g e o n e l e a r n e d at a

w h e n t h e o r i g i n a l t r a d i t i o n w a s still i n t a c t . T h e " c o n v e r s i o n " t h e r e f o r e

p r e s u p p o s e s i t s e l f i n o r d e r t o m o t i v a t e itself. I t is u n c l e a r w h a t M a c l n t y r e m e a n s w h e n h e says that the m e m b e r s o f a tradition

finding

itself in crisis

" n o w c o m e o r h a d a l r e a d y c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e b e l i e f s a n d w a y o f life o f this o t h e r a l i e n tradition"

(1988, 364). A t another point, however, h e

argues: First the onset o f an epistemological crisis, a systematic b r e a k d o w n o f enquiry in the face of a certain set of intractable p r o b l e m s within a particular s c h e m e of belief, may, if r e c o g n i z e d , provide g o o d reasons for seeking o u t s o m e ra­ tionally different alternative; a n d s e c o n d the possibility of l e a r n i n g to u n d e r ­ stand the o t h e r i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e

p o i n t of view f r o m within

imaginatively,

before it can b e o c c u p i e d intellectually, c a n never b e ruled out. It is by such uses o f the imagination

that o n e can c o m e as if to inhabit a n o t h e r alien

culture a n d in so d o i n g recognize h o w significant features o f one's own cul­ ture to w h i c h o n e has hitherto b e e n , a n d c o u l d not b u t have b e e n , blind can b e discovered a n d characterized f r o m that o t h e r culture's p o i n t o f view.

(1990, 1 2 0 ) I n this p a s s a g e M a c l n t y r e retracts the s t r o n g thesis that u n d e r s t a n d i n g

an­

o t h e r tradition is p o s s i b l e o n l y t h r o u g h d i r e c t e x p e r i e n c e , t h r o u g h living i n it; h e n o w c o n s i d e r s i t p o s s i b l e t o i m a g i n e a d o p t i n g i t . T h e l e a p i n t o

the

n e w is n o t a l e a p i n t o t h e u n k n o w n o n l y i f t h e n e w is n o t s o n e w , i f it w a s a l r e a d y p o s s i b l e t o l e a r n it. T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s the possibility o f simultaneously u n d e r s t a n d i n g

two

traditions and, o n the basis of the s a m e p r o b l e m s a n d the s a m e personal identity, o f c o m p a r i n g t h e m as answers to o n e a n d the s a m e question

(cf.

H a b e r m a s 1993b, 1 0 3 - 4 ) . M a c l n t y r e c a n n o t d i s p u t e this h e r m e n e u t i c pos­ sibility, after all t h e n e w t r a d i t i o n is r e g a r d e d a s a n a n s w e r to t h e p r o b l e m s o f t h e o l d t r a d i t i o n . I f it w e r e e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e l a t t e r , it c o u l d n o t r e s p o n d t o t h e s e p r o b l e m s , a n d it c o u l d n o t g u a r a n t e e t h a t a f t e r r e c o g n i z ­ i n g t h e n e w a n s w e r p e r s o n s w e r e still a b l e t o tell t h e i r life h i s t o r i e s a s a consistent narrative. G e t t i n g to k n o w a n o t h e r tradition m a y o f c o u r s e e x ­ pose blind spots in o n e ' s o w n tradition o r conceptual differences that are difficult to r e c o n c i l e . T h e s e a r e h o w e v e r insights that surface within

one

i d e n t i t y a n d a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f q u e s t i o n i n g ; t o a n s w e r s u c h q u e s t i o n s it is necessary to establish a continuity b e t w e e n the o l d a n d the n e w , o n e

that

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

has the character o f adding something

211

n e w to existing k n o w l e d g e — o f

l e a r n i n g ( a n d e v e n a r a d i c a l r e o r i e n t a t i o n , a s a j u s t i f i e d r e o r i e n t a t i o n , is a form o f continuity). A person must b e able to integrate coherently new answers to his o r h e r p r o b l e m s : h e o r s h e must b e able to identify with the n e w a n s w e r a s t h e p e r s o n h e o r s h e is a n d w a s . Maclntyre's one-sided ethical conception o f the rationality o f traditions thus contradicts hisown ethical conception o f the person. H e cannot avoid accepting a h e r m e n e u t i c rationality o f reciprocal understanding in o r d e r n o t to d e f e n d a thesis o f t h e seclusion o f ethical universes that w o u l d p u t the continuity o f t h e self into q u e s t i o n — a continuity that is m a i n t a i n e d between t r a d i t i o n s ; h e t h u s a l s o r e l a t i v i z e s t h e e t h i c a l m o n i s m o f t h e c o n ­ c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n . T h i s h e r m e n e u t i c r a t i o n a l i t y i s a second-order ration­ ality: i t d o e s n o t s t a t e w h a t s t a n d a r d s o f t h e

first-order

g o o d a r e justified; it

d o e s h o w e v e r state that traditions c a n b e j u s t i f i e d o n l y b y b e i n g

"tested

dialectically" ( 1 9 8 8 , 3 5 8 ) , t h a t is t o say, b y j u s t i f y i n g t h e m s e l v e s r a t i o n a l l y w i t h g o o d r e a s o n s t o t h e i r o w n m e m b e r s i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d vis-a-vis

other

traditions. E v e n if different traditions h a v e different standards o f t h e g o o d , a

second-order

hermeneutic

rationality

nonetheless

states

that

these

traditions must justify their claims with g o o d reasons. T h e y must d o so because ethical traditions a r e d e p e n d e n t u p o n individuals' b e i n g able to identify with them. T h e i r validity criterion lies i n t h e question o f w h e t h e r the individual "finds h i m o r herself m o s t a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n e d a n d ac­ c o u n t e d for" (398). M a c l n t y r e ' s second-order c o n c e p t o f rationality—con­ c e r n i n g the rationality o f the rational-dialectical c o m p a r i s o n o f traditions— i s i t s e l f n o r m a t i v e ( c f . K e l l y 1 9 9 0 , 8 7 ) a n d context-transcending: i t d e t e r m i n e s the criteria that traditions m u s t m e e t if they raise a claim to rational justi­ fication.

This c o n c e p t i o n o f rationality d o e s n o t determine

what r e a s o n s

s u b j e c t s r e c o g n i z e e t h i c a l l y ; it d e t e r m i n e s s o l e l y t h a t it is r e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t , reasons that convince rather than persuade

(Maclntyre 1990, 169)—"by

reasoning rather than b y the use o f power" (1983, 4 5 1 ) . This

outcome

c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f After Virtue i n w h i c h i t b e c a m e e v i d e n t t h a t Maclntyre

avails h i m s e l f o f certain

second-order,

context-transcending

principles, such as a formal definition o f the g o o d , the conception o f com­ munity as a nonexclusive project, a n d universal "moral law." T h e s e

prin­

c i p l e s a r e p r a c t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y c o n d i t i o n s a c o m m u n i t y h a s t o fulfill, a c ­ c o r d i n g to M a c l n t y r e , i n o r d e r to b e a c c e p t a b l e . T h e r e f o r e h e h i m s e l f is forced to introduce a separation between second-order formal principles a n d ethical-substantive contents o f the g o o d — b o t h in a h e r m e n e u t i c a n d in a practical sense. Three Rival

Versions of Moral Enquiry c a n b e r e a d a s M a c l n t y r e ' s r e s p o n s e

to this o u t c o m e : as t h e a t t e m p t to identify i n T h o m i s m a tradition absorbs

these

hermeneutic

a n d practical second-order

principles

that once

a g a i n into o n e tradition a n d o n e c o n c e p t o f ethical rationality. H e is c o n -

212

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

c e r n e d with showing that a Thomistic position

( n o w alone regarded as

" t r a d i t i o n " ) , h a v i n g a b s o r b e d A r i s t o t e l i a n a n d A u g u s t i n i a n e l e m e n t s , is s u ­ perior to the two other models present in o u r culture—universalist "en­ c y c l o p e d i a " a n d relativist " g e n e a l o g y . " T h o m i s m is t h e o n l y tradition

that

substantively i n c o r p o r a t e s t h e integrity a n d continuity o f t h e self a n d t h e dialectical test o f rationality. It p r e s e r v e s t h e p r o c e d u r a l rationality o f t h e d i a l e c t i c a l test a n d t h e m o r a l n o r m s o f t h e " m o r a l l a w , " j u s t a s it b r i n g s i n d i v i d u a l life a n d c o m m u n a l life t o a s u b s t a n t i v e u n i t y i n a t r a d i t i o n

with

context-immanent

con­

(Aristotle) a n d context-transcendent

(Augustine)

ceptions of the good. Moral inquiry in the Thomistic sense

presupposes

this unity o f p e r s o n , morality, a n d r e a s o n within o n e ethos. T h e narrative o f t h e individual life, that o f t h e c o m m u n i t y a n d o f tradition a r e indissolubly connected

(1990, 129). Only the Thomistic tradition gives moral in­

quiry a meaningful—practical and, at the same

time,

supertemporal—di­

rection: W i t h o u t s o m e rationally w a r r a n t e d belief in, s o m e g e n u i n e k n o w l e d g e o f that perfect g o o d n e s s in relationship to w h i c h alone the soul

finds

ultimate

g o o d — t h a t divine g o o d n e s s b y r e f e r e n c e to w h i c h alone, in A u g u s t i n e ' s Pla­ tonic terms, the unity underlying a n d o r d e r i n g the r a n g e o f uses a n d appli­ cations o f the c o n c e p t o f the g o o d c a n b e d i s c o v e r e d — t h e soul w o u l d find itself directed b e y o n d all finite g o o d s , unsatisfiable by those g o o d s , a n d yet able to find n o t h i n g b e y o n d them to satisfy it. (r 3 7 - 3 8 ) The

o u t c o m e w o u l d b e a soul without a n e n d o r without order, a "Hob-

besian soul" (138). E n c y c l o p e d i a f o u n d e r s o n its c o n c e p t i o n o f a m o r a l i t y w i t h o u t a telos, g e n e a l o g y o n its c o n c e p t i o n o f a d i s c o n t i n u o u s self w i t h o u t a telos. G e n e ­ a l o g y sets o u t to d i s a v o w t h e e n c y c l o p e d i c c l a i m to truth a s a n e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e will t o p o w e r , b u t it c a n n o t a v o i d r e c o g n i z i n g t h e " m e t a p h y s i c s o f r e a d i n g " (46); it c a n n o t itself a v o i d raising t e m p o r a l l y c o n t i n u o u s

truth

claims f o r w h i c h t h e a u t h o r m u s t b e " a c c o u n t a b l e " (208). T h e g e n e a l o g i s t has to take off his o r h e r mask. " T h e function o f g e n e a l o g y as emancipatory from deception a n d self-deception thus requires the identity a n d continuity o f t h e self that w a s d e c e i v e d a n d t h e self that is a n d is t o b e " ( 2 1 4 ) . Nietz­ s c h e ' s r e m a r k i n Twilight of the Idols: " I f e a r w e a r e n o t g e t t i n g r i d o f G o d b e c a u s e w e still b e l i e v e i n g r a m m a r " ( 1 9 6 8 , 3 8 ; q u o t e d i n M a c l n t y r e 1 9 9 0 , 67)

is t a k e n u p b y M a c l n t y r e : t o b e t h e a u t h o r o f a t e x t — l i k e b e i n g t h e

author o f o n e ' s o w nl i f e — m e a n s b e i n g accountable f o r oneself, preserving o n e ' s o w n p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y o v e r t i m e , a n d b e i n g responsible f o r o n e ' s p o ­ sition

(even w h e n it h a s c h a n g e d ) ; it m e a n s p r o v i d i n g r e a s o n s f o r o n e ' s

position. T h e rationality standards o f responsible c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e nec­ essarily p r e s u p p o s e d — t h e

"reason-giving, reason-accepting,

a n d reason-

rejecting, in the light o f which alone the genealogist a n d his o r h e r reader can p u t each other to the question" (45).

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM Maclntyre's Thomistic counterposition

213

to encyclopedia a n d genealogy

is h o w e v e r p r o b l e m a t i c i n t w o r e s p e c t s ( a n d t h i s j u s t i n r e f e r e n c e moral-theoretic

c o n t e n t ) . First, h e c a n n o t s h o w t h e c o n n e c t i o n

t o its

between

t h e " d i r e c t i o n " o f a n i n d i v i d u a l life a n d a r e l i g i o u s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e h i g h ­ est telos: b e t w e e n ethical self-realization a n d t h e truth o f a highest g o o d t h e r e is n o n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n . S e c o n d , h e d o e s n o t d o j u s t i c e to t h e "responsibility" that a n actor must assume toward others in the m o r a l sense; here

it is n o t e n o u g h

to justify oneself b y referring

to t h e convictions

"within m y c o m m u n i t y . " On

t h e first p o i n t : M a c l n t y r e ' s t h e s i s t h a t t h e n a r r a t i v e e x i s t e n c e o f a

p e r s o n is "directed" a n d in a position to m e a n i n g f u l l y integrate

practice-

i m m a n e n t a n d finite g o o d s o n l y i f h i s o r h e r m e n t a l e x i s t e n c e i s g u i d e d b y a h i g h e s t e n d , a summum bonum, d o e s n o t d o j u s t i c e t o h i s o w n t h e s i s o f t h e intersubjectivity o f p e r s o n a l identity. T h o u g h t h e unity o f a life his­ t o r y — a history c o a u t h o r e d b y the subject a n d b y others as w e l l — r e q u i r e s a n integration o f t h e subject's self that d o e s n o t rule o u t radical revisions a n d c o n n e c t s t h e past, t h e present, a n d t h e future with o n e a n o t h e r , a n ethical-religious transcendence

o f c o n t e x t s o f social e x i s t e n c e is n o t n e c ­

essary t o a c h i e v e this integration. T h e i m a g e o f itself a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h a subject u n d e r s t a n d s a n d projects itself d e v e l o p s i n t h e light o f necessities a n d possibilities w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h a self lives a n d is r e c o g n i z e d as s u c h . A n t i c i p a t i o n o f a f o r m o f r e c o g n i z e d i d e n t i t y t h a t o n e d o e s " n o t yet" h a v e a n d that t r a n s c e n d s e x i s t i n g social c o n t e x t s is o f c o u r s e

always

p o s s i b l e ; this f o r m , h o w e v e r , d r a w s o n t h e " m a t e r i a l " social life h a s t o offer, o n t h e o n e h a n d ; o n t h e o t h e r , it is ultimately, a s M e a d r e m a r k s , a g a i n j u s t an anticipation o fanother, "larger" community before which o n e interprets o n e ' s life history ( s e e M e a d 1 9 6 2 , 2 7 1 - 7 2 ; H a b e r m a s

1992c,

192). This

can b e a religiously motivated transcendence o f context ( M e a d 1962, 275), b u t it d o e s n o t h a v e t o b e : t h e life i d e a l s a n d v a l u e s c h o s e n ( o r a d o p t e d ) by a subject as the highest o n e s d o n o t necessarily refer to a s u p e r t e m p o r a l t r u t h ; t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e ethical t r u t h o f a l i f e a n d t h e religious t r u t h o f t h e summum bonum d o e s n o t e x i s t . M a c l n t y r e r e c o g n i z e s this h i m s e l f at those p o i n t s w h e r e h e d e f i n e s t h e g o o d f o r m a l l y a n d leaves it t o t h e s e l f - k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s u b j e c t s — w h e r e h e d o e s n o t s p e a k a s a "partisan." On

the second point: Maclntyre defines his conception

o f moral re­

sponsibility as follows: " S o part o f b e i n g o n e a n d the s a m e p e r s o n

through­

o u t this b o d i l y life is b e i n g c o n t i n u o u s l y l i a b l e t o a c c o u n t f o r m y a c t i o n s , attitudes, a n d beliefs to others within m y c o m m u n i t i e s " (197). Y e t h e c a n apply this c o n c e p t i o n o f responsibility to m o r a l responsibility o n l y b e c a u s e he conceives o f "my community" in the Thomistic sense as a community in w h i c h divine natural l a w a n d the laws o f t h e c o m m u n i t y coincide ( 1 9 2 93). T h e ethical truth o f this c o m m u n i t y is also m o r a l l y v a l i d — t h a t

means

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

for all p e r s o n s — o n l y b e c a u s e it is a t i m e l e s s u n i v e r s a l r e l i g i o u s truth ( 2 0 0 201).

This understanding

does not however explain h o w the

statements

that a r e valid according to these c o m m u n a l standards o f the g o o d a n d o f the j u s t o u g h t to b e also valid f o r p e r s o n s w h o a r e n o t m e m b e r s o f this c o m m u n i t y — v a l i d in the sense that they c a n b e justified to these and

that these

persons ought

to observe them.

I n this case,

persons

Thomistic

" m o r a l l a w " m u s t a l s o b e i n a p o s i t i o n t o b e valid for ( a n d acceptable to) t h o s e who

d o n o t b e l o n g to this tradition. T h e T h o m i s t m u s t b e a b l e t o justify

his o r h e r actions to non-Thomists affected b y these a c t i o n s — h e o r s h e must b e accountable. T o their questions c o n c e r n i n g thejustification o fhis or h e r actions affecting them, the T h o m i s t cannot r e s p o n d b y referring to his o r h e r c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d b u t must give reasons that a r e as ac­ ceptable to others as they are to h i m o r her: moral-reciprocal reasons. T h e difference between the justification o f actions within o n e ethical "world" a n d the justification o f actions between persons w h o b e l o n g to different e t h i c a l w o r l d s c a n n o t b e s u b l i m a t e d i n t h e e t h i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f one t r a ­ dition. M o r a l reasons must b e "found" between persons w h o c o m e

from

different ethical contexts. T h e s e contexts represent t h e starting point b u t not the endpoint o f "reason-giving" a n d "reason-accepting" in a c o m m o n moral context. Maclntyre's o w n "metaphysics" o f argumentation

reflects

t h e n e c e s s i t y o f a s s u m i n g a formal s e c o n d - o r d e r r a t i o n a l i t y ( o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ) v i s - a - v i s a substantive r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s t o c k o f r e a s o n s t h a t i s a t first a v a i l a b l e to persons b u t c a n then b e e x p a n d e d in a process o f r e a c h i n g H e r e it is i m p o r t a n t

agreement.

to note that m o r a l justification presupposes n o t a

"pure" language o f morality, b u t the process o f

finding

a common language

(a m i n i m a l v o c a b u l a r y ) that—it m u s t also b e e m p h a s i z e d — d o e s n o t h a v e task o f g e t t i n g different ethical w o r l d s to c o i n c i d e perfectly;

rather,

o n l y i n m o r a l q u e s t i o n s o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o n d u c t d o e s it r e q u i r e

the

shared

norms. Neither in a hermeneutic

n o r in a practical respect c a n Maclntyre's

ethical conceptions o f person, morality, a n d reason dispute the rationality criterion o f "dialogic" justification. F o r their m e m b e r s , ethical

traditions

rest o n g o o d reasons with w h i c h they must b e able to identify individually. H e n c e t h e e t h i c a l t r a d i t i o n a t t e m p t s t o r e d e e m its c l a i m t o t r u t h i n a " c o ­ o p e r a t i v e " w a y a n d sees this p r o c e s s as dialectical a n d o p e n — t o

other

traditions too. A n "outward" m o r a l o p e n n e s s — a n o p e n n e s s to r e a s o n s — corresponds to the "inward" ethical openness. T h e r e f o r e , if o n e asks, a l o n g with M a c l n t y r e , a b o u t a n a p p r o p r i a t e prac­ t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n o f person, morality, a n d reason, o n e m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e necessity to u n d e r s t a n d persons as m e m b e r s o f a n ethical c o m m u n i t y a n d tradition does n o t allow o n e to describe the relation o f ethical persons to their c o m m u n i t y a n d tradition, to o t h e r c o m m u n i t i e s a n d traditions, a n d t o p e r s o n s b e l o n g i n g t o o t h e r c o m m u n i t i e s s o l e l y i n t e r m s o f one e t h i c a l

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

2/5

t r a d i t i o n . T o v i e w p e r s o n s , m o r a l i t y , a n d r e a s o n within c o n t e x t s m e a n s p a y ­ i n g a t t e n t i o n t o t h e different c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h p e r s o n s r e l a t e t o t h e m s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s . I f m o r a l i t y is c o n c e i v e d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t it p a y s a t t e n t i o n to the different contexts o f normative questions, t h e criticism that by replac­ i n g c o n c r e t e v a l u e s a n d b o n d s w i t h " i m p e r s o n a l " n o r m s it b e c o m e s a "dan­ gerous phenomenon"

( M a c l n t y r e 1984b, 1 6 ) is i n c o r r e c t : m o r a l i t y a p p l i e s

only w h e r e ethical values a n d b o n d s a r e n o t sufficient to recognize the l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m s o f m o r a l p e r s o n s . M a c l n t y r e d o e s n o t d o j u s t i c e to this dimension o f morality. T h i s r e s u l t i s n o w t o b e e x p o s e d t o a final c o u n t e r o b j e c t i o n : d o e s n ' t t h e t h e o r y o f c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i c e itself rest o n a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l

theory of

t h e g o o d t h a t h a s d e v e l o p e d i n m o d e r n i t y a n d is " n o n t r a n s c e n d a b l e "

in

the sense that w e c a n dispute these values only at the cost o f losing o u r identity? T h i s is C h a r l e s T a y l o r ' s position.

4.4.

ETHICAL UNIVERSALISM AND MODERN

IDENTITY

Taylor's w o r k represents the large-scale attempt to resolve the competition b e t w e e n the g o o d a n d the j u s t at a h i g h e r level, to the benefit o f the priority of the g o o d . Rather than argue that the principles o f equal individual rights a n d universal respect

find

their "limit" in tradition-bound

conceptions of

the g o o d (as M a c l n t y r e a n d S a n d e l d o ) , h e asserts that certain

"transcend­

ing" goods (Taylor 1986, 128) are part o f the value horizons o f m o d e r n subjects a n d thus d e m a n d the respect o f t h e dignity o f the person. A c c o r d ­ i n g l y , T a y l o r d o e s n o t a t t e m p t t o p l a y o f f a n ethical good—an

ideal o f the

g o o d l i f e — a g a i n s t liberal p r i n c i p l e s ; a t a h i g h e r justificatory level h e is c o n c e r n e d w i t h d e f e n d i n g moral goods t h a t d e m a n d r e s p e c t f o r a p l u r a l i t y o f ethical c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d . A t this level, a c c o r d i n g t o T a y l o r , p r o ­ ceduralist c o n c e p t i o n s o f morality h a v e two serious deficits. First, they over­ l o o k t h e fact that they themselves a r e g r o u n d e d

in certain

foundational

conceptions o f the g o o d a n d a r e therefore contradictory in their reflection o n justification. "They a r e caught in a strange pragmatic

contradiction,

whereby the very goods which m o v e them push them to deny o r denature all s u c h g o o d s " ( T a y l o r 1989a, 88). S e c o n d , they n e g l e c t t h e fact that they are b a s e d o n only a part o f the ethical-moral values that d e t e r m i n e

the

identity o f m o d e r n subjects. T h e y thus absolutize t h e d o m a i n o f rights a n d reciprocal obligations as constituting the w h o l e o f moral e x p e r i e n c e a n d s u p p r e s s o t h e r d o m a i n s o f t h e g o o d t h a t r e l a t e t o q u e s t i o n s o f t h e selfunderstanding

o f concrete persons a n d their e m b e d d e d n e s s

in horizons

o f "qualitative distinctions." A n d y e t o n l y a p e r s p e c t i v e that d i s c l o s e s this d i m e n s i o n o f "strong evaluations" hermeneutically c a n b e in a position to e x p l a i n t h e obligating f o r c e o f values. "Articulating o u r qualitative distinc­ tions is setting o u t t h e p o i n t o f o u r m o r a l actions. It e x p l a i n s i n a fuller

216

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a n d r i c h e r w a y t h e m e a n i n g o f this a c t i o n f o r us, j u s t w h a t its g o o d n e s s o r b a d n e s s , b e i n g o b l i g a t o r y o r f o r b i d d e n , consists i n " (80). T h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n o f morality is t h e r e f o r e itself part o f the "malaise o f modernity": i t i s t h e context forgetfulness o f a p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t s e e k s t o j u s t i f y m o r a l principles in isolation from subjective, intersubjective, a n d "transcendent" conceptions o f the good. Taylor's theory thus leads the debate back to the starting point: b a c k to the c o m m u n i t a r i a n

thesis o f t h e c o n t e x t

connect­

edness o f person, morality, a n d reason. T h e counterthesis—that a concep­ t i o n o f j u s t i c e c a n b e d e v e l o p e d t h a t , b y v i r t u e o f its r e s t i n g o n a p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , is c o m p a t i b l e with c o n t e x t s o f i n d i v i d u a l a n d collective i d e n t i t y — m u s t p r o v e its w o r t h o n c e m o r e i n d i a l o g u e w i t h Taylor's position. T h e similarities a n d differences b e t w e e n Taylor's a n d Maclntyre's c o m ­ m o n diagnosis "that t h e project o f E n l i g h t e n m e n t to justify a secular, in­ dependent morality has failed" (Taylor 1986, 130) are important for the question o f contexts in which o n e locates person, morality, a n d reason, in contradistinction to the morality o f the Enlightenment. L i k e M a c l n t y r e , T a y l o r d e f e n d s t h e thesis that t h e starting point o f r e ­ flections in ethical-moral theory should b e n o t the atomistic "disengaged identity"

(Taylor 1985a, 7) b u t t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e "situated

subject"

( 1 9 7 9 , 1 6 7 - 6 8 ) w h o s e n a r r a t i v e u n i t y o f life is t o b e s e e n w i t h i n t h e h o r i ­ z o n s o f t h e narrative o f a c o m m u n i t y a n d certain identity-determining val­ u e s ( s e e c h a p t e r 1 ) . T h i s h e r m e n e u t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e e t h i c a l p e r s o n is the central premise o f Taylor's methodological critique o f naturalist objec­ tivism i n t h e h u m a n sciences, o f his critique o f d e o n t o l o g i c a l ( a n d utilitar­ i a n ) c o n c e p t i o n s o f m o r a l i t y , a n d , f i n a l l y , o f h i s c r i t i q u e o f m o d e r n i t y itself. Unlike Maclntyre, however, Taylor does n o t believe that the narrative unity o f i n d i v i d u a l life history p r e s u p p o s e s a " h i g h e s t telos" t h a t m o d e r n i t y c a n n o longer furnish. T h e values constituting the horizons o f modernity are, a c c o r d i n g t o T a y l o r , sufficient f o r a m e a n i n g f u l life, h o w e v e r , they m u s t b e "disclosed" a n d articulated in their

content.

With regard to the critique o f individual rights a n d o f formal morality, Maclntyre a n d Taylor agree that these rights take their orientation from a negative c o n c e p t o f liberty that i g n o r e s that persons b e l o n g to a political c o m m u n i t y in a n ethical, value-related m a n n e r (Taylor 1985^ 205-8) a n d disregards t h e fact that particular m o d e s o f c o m m u n a l existence allow u s to define liberty i n a qualitative sense (i985g). I n contrast to Maclntyre, T a y l o r d o e s n o t b e l i e v e that m o d e r n i t y is n o l o n g e r c a p a b l e o f a f o r m o f Sittlichkeit t h a t c a n e s t a b l i s h t h e b o n d o f a n o n a l i e n a t e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n b e ­ t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d t h e collective. L i k e H e g e l , T a y l o r is a t t h e s a m e time aware that a "post-industrial

Sittlichkeit" ( 1 9 7 9 ,

125-34) cannot

do

without the principle o f individual liberty (in a nonatomistic sense). A g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f this c o n c e p t i o n o f p e r s o n a n d c o m m u n i t y ,

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

217

Taylor, like M a c l n t y r e , criticizes a p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n o f practical rea­ son. T h o u g h being "reasonable" in a practical-moral sense m e a n s able to give reasons for the validity o f values a n d n o r m s , these

being

reasons

originate nonetheless in a particular constellation of values a n d must pro­ vide the "best a c c o u n t " o f these values, with w h i c h a n individual c a n identify in the light o f a n interpretation o f h i m - o r herself. A c c o r d i n g to M a c l n t y r e ( 1 9 8 8 , 3 9 8 ) , t h e r a t i o n a l v a l i d i t y o f m o r a l t r a d i t i o n s is d e t e r m i n e d i n t e r m s of "which o f these rival m o d e s o f m o r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g

[the

individual]

finds h i m or herself most adequately e x p l a i n e d a n d accounted for"; a n d T a y l o r p r o p o s e s the p r i n c i p l e o f "best a c c o u n t " (1989a, 58) as a p r i n c i p l e of practical reason: the a r g u m e n t s for the validity o f certain g o o d s

must

c o n n e c t u p with the narrative self-understanding of subjects in such a way that the subjects understand themselves better n o w than before as a result of adopting these values (see Taylor 1993). A person must be

internally

" m o v e d " b y v a l u e s to b e a b l e to a c c e p t t h e m (1989a, 7 2 - 7 3 ) . T h e r e a r e n o conclusive "basic r e a s o n s " f o r values o r n o r m s , all r e a s o n s m u s t b e

com­

p a t i b l e w i t h t h e "qualitative d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s " (77) o f a m e a n i n g i n life t h a t d e v e l o p s i n a c o n t e x t o f g e n e r a l v a l u e s . It is o n l y w i t h i n this c o n t e x t t h a t a r g u m e n t s a r e at all intelligible: they h a v e m e a n i n g f o r m e b y c o n t r i b u t i n g to the

m e a n i n g o f m y life. U n l i k e M a c l n t y r e , T a y l o r d o e s n o t

however

p r o c e e d o n the assumption of an unbridgeable fragmentation of the

mod­

ern constellation o f values, w h i c h m a k e s "directed" identity possible only beyond m o d e r n convictions; though he does see a fragmentation

of mo­

dernity's " m o r a l s o u r c e s " ( M a c l n t y r e 1984a, 10; T a y l o r 1989a) as a result of the failure of the E n l i g h t e n m e n t , h e nonetheless believes in the possi­ bility o f a " r e c o n c i l i a t i o n " ( T a y l o r 1989a, 106). H i s h e r m e n e u t i c

holism

d o e s n o t allow h i m to r e g a r d as i n s u p e r a b l e the bifurcation o f m o d e r n i t y into the c a m p o f "naturalist" instrumentalism romantic

and atomism and

"expressivism"; already in his b o o k o n H e g e l (1975)

he

that of found

that H e g e l ' s failed attempt at a synthesis o f these two strands o f m o d e r n i t y n o n e t h e l e s s p o i n t e d the way to finding the necessary reconciliation o f these e l e m e n t s splitting m o d e r n society in the c o n c e p t i o n o f a "situated subjec­ tivity." T a y l o r ' s s t r o n g e s t t h r u s t is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e t h e o r e t ­ i c a l l y a n d p r a c t i c a l l y r e a s o n a b l e s u b j e c t t h a t v i e w s itself, o t h e r s u b j e c t s , a n d the w o r l d as totally s e p a r a t e d , objectifiable entities a n d sees itself in

de­

marcation from contexts already structured in terms of language, intersub­ jectivity, a n d values. S u c h a c o n c e p t i o n o f subjectivity d o e s n o t

understand

w h a t identity m e a n s . T o h a v e ( o r b e t t e r : t o b e ) a n i d e n t i t y m e a n s

moving

within h o r i z o n s in w h i c h relations to others a n d the relation to the w o r l d have always b e e n c o n v e y e d in a world-disclosing l a n g u a g e in w h i c h subjec­ tive, collective, a n d e t h i c a l - " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " identities f o r m a w h o l e — a l b e i t a c h a r g e d o n e . M o d e r n identity—and that m e a n s the identity o f e a c h m o d -

218

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

e r n s u b j e c t a n d t h e i d e n t i t y o f m o d e r n i t y itself, o f t h e " s p i r i t " o f m o d e r n ­ ity—is f r a g m e n t e d a s l o n g a s subjects a r e n o t c o n s c i o u s o f t h e totality o f their ethical relations to the world, as long as they banish their

romantic

longing to the "private" realm, as l o n g as they u n d e r s t a n d nature as a n object a n d themselves as a distanced subject. Taylor e n d e a v o r s to articulate this f r a g m e n t a t i o n a n d thereby b r i n g it closer to a reconciliation. H i s w o r k is

an

"attempt

to uncover

buried

goods

through

rearticulation—and

thereby to m a k e these sources again e m p o w e r , to bring the air back again into t h e half-collapsed lungs o f t h e spirit" (1989a, 5 2 0 ) . To

understand Taylor's ethics o f the g o o d o n the basis o f a transcen­

dental hermeneutics o f the m o d e r n identity a n d his conception o f m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y , it is n e c e s s a r y to a s c e r t a i n t h e basic f e a t u r e s o f his c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e r s o n . T h estarting p o i n t for this c o n c e p t i o n is H e i d e g g e r ' s analysis o f D a s e i n i n Being and Time a s a b e i n g t h a t , " i n i t s v e r y B e i n g , t h a t B e i n g i s a n issue for i t " ( H e i d e g g e r 1 9 6 2 , 3 2 ) , a b e i n g t h a t h a s a l w a y s a l r e a d y h a d a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f its b e i n g a n d its w o r l d , a b e i n g t h a t c a n i n q u i r e this u n d e r s t a n d i n g

about

b u t c a n n e v e r fully s e t it " b e f o r e itself": t h e w o r l d is

always a h e a d o f D a s e i n a n d d e t e r m i n e s t h e h o r i z o n s w i t h i n w h i c h it c a n i n q u i r e i n t h e first p l a c e . H e r m e n e u t i c r e f l e c t i o n is n o t a self-positing o r a s e l f - o b s e r v i n g a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t s c h e m e b u t a n interpreting of oneself.

The human

being,

says T a y l o r , is a "self-interpreting

animal"

(1985c), a n d all t h e resoluteness o f t h e self a n d all t h e disclosure o f t h e world remain provisional a n d b o u n d within a historical given. "Situated subjectivity" d e s i g n a t e s precisely this w o r l d c h a r a c t e r o f t h e subject, w h i c h only h a s a n interpretative

access t o i t s e l f — a n d that m e a n s to itself a s a

temporal, bodily, historical, a n d ethically particular subject within the h o ­ r i z o n s o f c e r t a i n b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s a n d o f a w o r l d linguistically "dis­ closed" b u t n e v e r a p p e a r i n g in crystal-clear light. F o u r d i m e n s i o n s in par­ ticular

a r e central i n this c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n : t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e

h u m a n b e i n g as (a) a n ethical-evaluating, (b) a c o m m u n a l , (c) a linguistic, and (d) a temporal-historical being.

2 5

(a) T a y l o r f o l l o w s F r a n k f u r t ' s ( 1 9 7 1 ) d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n first- a n d s e c ­ ond-order desires: h u m a n beings d o n o t simply have certain desires a n d needs,

they a r e also able to e x a m i n e

them

reflectively in the light o f

"higher" desires a n d to a s s u m e responsibility f o r t h e m . T h i s reflective eval­ u a t i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d , T a y l o r says, i n a w e a k e r a n d a s t r o n g e r s e n s e . A person c a n e x a m i n e a n d evaluate his o r h e r desires a n d needs

according

to criteria o f c o n v e n i e n c e a n d c o m f o r t b u t c a n also view t h e m in t h e light of qualitatively m o r e substantive ethical values that a d m i t o f g r a d a t i o n s — values that distinguish the noble f r o m the base, the g o o d from the b a d . T a y l o r calls t h e f o r m e r "weak" a n d t h e latter "strong evaluations" ( T a y l o r 1985b; see also t h e discussion i n chapter 1 a b o v e ) . S t r o n g evaluations a r e — contrary to what utilitarianism believes—the real action-guiding consider-

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

2/9

ations, f o r they a r e indissolubly c o n n e c t e d to the self-interpretation o f per­ sons: t h e y establish t h e f r a m e w o r k w i t h i n w h i c h o n e sees oneself as a par­ ticular k i n d of person. S i n c e it is a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f o n e s e l f , s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n is n o t a " r a d i c a l c h o i c e " a s e x i s t e n t i a l i s m e n v i s i o n s it. V a l u e s c o n s t i t u t e t h e h o r i z o n s w i t h i n w h i c h the p e r s o n has always u n d e r s t o o d him- o r herself—horizons that can b e fully t r a n s c e n d e d o n l y a t t h e c o s t o f l o s i n g o n e ' s i d e n t i t y . It is n o t

that

t h e p e r s o n h a s always b e e n a w a r e o f t h e s e v a l u e s ; i n s t e a d , it m i g h t b e that h e o r she b e c o m e s conscious o f their validity o r their doubtfulness

only

w h e n they are articulated. T h e "deeper" a person delves questioningly into his o r h e r strong evaluations, the greater the possibility that a reevaluation of c o n v i c t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d r i g h t until n o w will follow since they d o n o t cor­ r e s p o n d t o " w h a t is e s s e n t i a l " i n e t h i c a l i d e n t i t y . " T h u s t h e q u e s t i o n

can

always b e p o s e d : o u g h t I to re-evaluate m y m o s t basic evaluations? H a v e I r e a l l y u n d e r s t o o d w h a t is e s s e n t i a l to m y i d e n t i t y ? H a v e I t r u l y

determined

w h a t I s e n s e to b e the h i g h e s t m o d e o f life?" ( T a y l o r 1985b, 40). T h e

"deep

r e f l e c t i o n " (42) t h a t a s k s " w h a t w e r e a l l y a r e a b o u t " ( 1 9 8 5 ^ 68) m u s t h o w ­ e v e r m a k e d o w i t h o u t a "fixed yardstick" (1985b, 42): ultimately, t h e cri­ terion as to w h e t h e r certain s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s b e l o n g to the " e s s e n c e " o f a n identity m u s t b e left to the p e r s o n a n d his o r h e r possibility to i n t e g r a t e t h e s e e v a l u a t i o n s m e a n i n g f u l l y i n t o a life a n d to a s s u m e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r it. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t o h a v e a " s t r o n g " i d e n t i t y m e a n s n o t o n l y h a v i n g a " p e r ­ sonal style" but also a g r e e i n g "deeply" with o n e s e l f a n d o n e ' s actions

and

b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e f o r o n e s e l f , t h a t is, b e i n g a b l e to r e s p o n d c o g e n t l y to questions c o n c e r n i n g oneself. T h e r e f o r e , T a y l o r argues, liberty c a n n o t

be

g r a s p e d negatively as the a b s e n c e o f e x t e r n a l obstacles to action; rather,

a

p e r s o n c a n b e free o n l y if h e o r she "really" a g r e e s consciously with his o r h e r actions; in a c c o r d a n c e with an "exercise-concept" (i985g, 216) o f pos­ itive liberty, liberty consists i n r e a l i z i n g " a u t h e n t i c " d e s i r e s o n t h e basis o f "qualitative distinctions." It m i g h t b e , T a y l o r says, that w e o u r s e l v e s d o

not

always k n o w best w h a t w e "really" w a n t a n d n e e d the h e l p o f o t h e r s to b e f r e e . H e is n o t h o w e v e r w i l l i n g t o d r a w f r o m this p o l i t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the type that s o m e authority outside the p e r s o n w o u l d b e g i v e n this pre­ rogative—in that sense his "positive" c o n c e p t o f liberty d o e s n o t anything

in

the

"negative" concept

change

o f legal-political liberty that B e r l i n

( 1 9 6 9 b ) d e f e n d s p r e c i s e l y f o r this r e a s o n . I t is e v i d e n t , a s I h a v e a l r e a d y argued

(chapters

1 and

2), that these concepts o f liberty are located

different levels (for n e i t h e r

d o e s Berlin dispute that a p e r s o n can

at

learn

from others s o m e t h i n g a b o u t his o r h e r "real" interests [1969b, 1 3 3 - 3 4 ] ) . Ethical a n d legal liberty a r e c o n c e p t i o n s that b e l o n g to different

dimen­

sions of "being a person" that d o not necessarily collide with e a c h

other.

(b) T h a t p e r s o n s ' s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s a r e n o t their "projections" b u t self-interpretations oriented by the values o f the

"noble" a n d the

are

"good"

220

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

r e f l e c t s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e s e v a l u e s a p p l y is a

shared

world: persons, to s p e a k with H e g e l , h a v e already b e e n r e c o g n i z e d as par­ t i c u l a r p e r s o n s w i t h i n a c o n t e x t . ' T h e c o m m u n i t y is a l s o c o n s t i t u t i v e o f the individual, in the sense that the self-interpretations w h i c h define are drawn from the interchange which the community carries on" lor

1985a, 8). V a l u e s a r e always " o u r " values, a n d

him (Tay­

" m y " i d e n t i t y is c o n ­

stituted t h r o u g h dialogic f o r m s o f ethical recognition that e n a b l e the for­ mation

of

an

understand

identity

within

oneself and

a

others

community within

"moral space" in w h i c h persons

find

and

common

make ethical

it

possible

horizons.

to

The

a n d d i s c o v e r t h e m s e l v e s is a l w a y s a

"public s p a c e " (1989a, 35); without the ethical r e c o g n i t i o n by others that is

based

on

common

values,

r e s p e c t i n g i d e n t i t y is n o t nected

through

strong

the

development

possible. Individual a n d

of

and

self-

community are

con­

evaluations—individual and

a

stable

collective

identity

f o r m a u n i t y t h a t is itself b r o u g h t a b o u t linguistically: s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s express a c o m m o n "disclosed" by those

world, c o m m o n involved in

horizons of meaning

the

articulation

that are

first

o f this m e a n i n g .

The

m o r a l - p u b l i c s p a c e is t h e s p a c e o f a l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i t y ; p e r s o n s e x i s t in "webs o f interlocution" (1989a,

36).

(c) C e n t r a l to T a y l o r ' s v i e w o f this c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h i c a l identity, c o m m u n i t y , a n d l a n g u a g e is h i s t h e o r y o f t h e " e x p r e s s i v e " p o w e r o f l a n ­ g u a g e , a theory that g o e s b a c k to H e r d e r , H u m b o l d t , a n d H a m a n n .

Lan­

g u a g e is n o t a p u r e l y d e s i g n a t i v e m e d i u m , it a l s o d i s c l o s e s a c o m m o n w o r l d . T h r o u g h the linguistic articulation o f the g o o d a n d the right, subjects be­ c o m e conscious o f the force o f these values; only in a n evaluative l a n g u a g e d o they d i s c o v e r w h a t they " d e e p l y " c o n s i d e r to b e right, h o w they interpret

their feelings a n d

thoughts.

L a n g u a g e is t h e

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , it is " c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h o u g h t "

can

m a t e r i a l o f self-

(Taylor ig85d, 229). A pre­

e x i s t i n g " e s s e n c e " is n o t h o w e v e r e x p r e s s e d i n t h e d i a l o g u e w i t h i n a l a n ­ g u a g e c o m m u n i t y ( t h a t is w h y t h e r o m a n t i c c o n c e p t o f " e x p r e s s i v i s m " is m i s l e a d i n g ) : " W h a t is m a d e m a n i f e s t is n o t e x c l u s i v e l y , n o t e v e n m a i n l y , t h e self, b u t a w o r l d . . . . I n t h i s k i n d o f e x p r e s s i o n , w e a r e r e s p o n d i n g the way things are, rather than just exteriorizing o u r feelings"

to

(238-39).

L a n g u a g e discloses (in the H e i d e g g e r i a n sense [Taylor 1985c, 269-70]) a s u b j e c t i v e a n d c o m m u n a l w o r l d ; it is t h e m e d i u m i n w h i c h this w o r l d b e ­ c o m e s c o n s c i o u s to i n d i v i d u a l s a n d is a t t h e s a m e E m p h a s i s is t h e r e f o r e p l a c e d n o t o n

time

formed by

them.

the expressive e l e m e n t but o n

the

world-disclosing aspect. T h u s there are three things that g e t d o n e in language: m a k i n g articulations, a n d h e n c e b r i n g i n g a b o u t explicit awareness; putting things in public space, thereby constituting public space; a n d m a k i n g the discriminations w h i c h a r e foundational to h u m a n c o n c e r n s , a n d h e n c e o p e n i n g us to these c o n c e r n s .

(263)

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

2 2 /

(d) T h e c o m m o n , linguistically u n v e i l e d w o r l d is a historical w o r l d , a n d the p e r s o n s w h o d i s c o v e r t h e m s e l v e s i n it a r e t e m p o r a l b e i n g s : they h a v e a past that they m u s t connect, i n t h e present, with a projection o f their

future

on the basis o f the l a n g u a g e at their disposal (inasmuch as o n e c a n speak o f a l a n g u a g e "at o n e ' s d i s p o s a l " ) . P e r s o n s m u s t s e e t h e m s e l v e s i n a "life story," a "narrative," a s T a y l o r says with M a c l n t y r e ( a n d R i c c e u r ) : " I n o r d e r to h a v e a s e n s e o f w h o w e a r e , w e h a v e t o h a v e a n o t i o n o f h o w w e h a v e b e c o m e , a n d o f w h e r e w e a r e g o i n g " (1989a, 4 7 ) . I n contrast to t h e con­ c e p t i o n o f a L o c k i a n " p u n c t u a l s e l f " (cf. P a r f i t 1 9 8 4 ) , T a y l o r p r o c e e d s a s d o e s M a c l n t y r e o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g life a s a "quest," a s a s e a r c h f o r t h e g o o d that gives life m e a n i n g a n d d i r e c t i o n . T h e i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion o f t h e self c a n n o t m a n a g e w i t h o u t this narrative d i m e n s i o n : t h e future m u s t " r e d e e m " t h e p a s t ( 1 9 8 9 a , 5 1 - 5 2 ) , m u s t g i v e it, i n r e m e m b r a n c e o f things past, a m e a n i n g within a w h o l e . T h e temporality o f existence points accordingly to the narrative dimension o f the quest for the good, which in t u r n h a s its p l a c e w i t h i n a h i s t o r i c a l c o m m u n i t y . T h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s d o e s n o t p r e s c r i b e a h i g h e s t telos t o life, b u t it d o e s p r o v i d e the r e s o u r c e s — o r s o u r c e s — o f m e a n i n g f r o m w h i c h all o f life d r a w s . F r o m this c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n a n d its f o u r d i m e n s i o n s o f ethical, c o m m u n a l , linguistic, a n dt e m p o r a l existence there follow far-reaching the­ oretical c o n s e q u e n c e s i n T a y l o r ' s w o r k — a t v a r i o u s levels. " N a t u r a l i s m " fails to r e c o g n i z e t h e s e d i m e n s i o n s i n d i v i d u a l l y a n d i n t h e i r i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n . I t results i n (a) a n atomistic c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n a s "a subject w h o only e v a l u a t e s w e a k l y " ( 1 9 8 5 b , 2 3 ) , w h o fails t o r e c o g n i z e qualitative d i s t i n c t i o n s a n d u n d e r s t a n d s itself as a subject with m e r e "preferences"; ( b ) a n instru­ mental a n d external conception o f community, a negative notion o f free­ d o m , a n d a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e "state b a s e d o n n e e d , t h e state a s t h e U n ­ derstanding (1967,

e n v i s a g e s i t [Not- und Verstandesstaat]," t o u s e H e g e l ' s w o r d s

1 2 3 [§ 1 8 3 ] ) ; ( c ) a d e s i g n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e t h a t c o n ­

ceives o f l a n g u a g e as a n external

instrument

a n d o v e r l o o k s its w o r l d -

disclosing character; ( d ) finally, a forgetting o f t h e historicity o f t h e ques­ tion

o f t h e g o o d a n d t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f life. N a t u r a l i s m c a n n o t

therefore

p o s e t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e g o o d c o r r e c d y , a n d this i n a d e q u a c y is r e f l e c t e d in utilitarianism's a n d p r o c e d u r a l i s m ' s d e f i c i e n t c o n c e p t i o n

o f morality,

w h o s e c e n t r a l m i s t a k e is that it d o e s n o t e n t e r p e r s o n s ' s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s "from t h e i n s i d e " a n d i n s t e a d limits itself to their e x t e r n a l relations a n d a d o p t s a o n e - s i d e d n o t i o n o f r e a s o n t h a t is f o r m a l i n c h a r a c t e r . T a y l o r ' s critique o f a t o m i s m operates at these different theoretical levels a n d a t a n e x p l a n a t o r y metalevel a s w e l l . H e n o t o n l y c r i t i c i z e s n a t u r a l i s m a n d o p p o s e s it with a n alternative theory, h e also shows h o w naturalism itself d e v e l o p e d f r o m a o n e - s i d e d c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s o f m o d e r n i t y . O f c o u r s e , n a t u r a l i s m c a n n o t g r a s p its o w n g e n e s i s s i n c e t h e capacity to penetrate

hermeneutically into the "sources" o f the develop-

222

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

merit of the m o d e r n

i d e n t i t y is d e n i e d t o it. T a y l o r ' s m e t a c r i t i q u e

" r e d e e m s " n a t u r a l i s m f r o m its b l i n d n e s s b y s h o w i n g f r o m w h i c h

thus

strong

e v a l u a t i o n s it h a s d e v e l o p e d a n d w h i c h o t h e r o n e s it h a s s u p p r e s s e d . H e therefore relates his c o n c e p t i o n o f the p e r s o n at a h i g h e r level to the gen­ esis o f all p o s s i b l e t h e o r i e s o f t h e p e r s o n : h o w t h e self w a s c o n c e i v e d is a n o u t c o m e o f t h e m a n n e r in w h i c h t h e self d e v e l o p e d a n d u n d e r s t o o d itself in modernity. H i s theory n o l o n g e r o p e r a t e s at t h e s a m e e y elevel as c o m ­ p e t i n g theories o f t h e p e r s o n a n d morality: it also w a n t s to give a historicalconceptual explanation o f these

theories themselves. H i s metanarrative

shows h o w one-sided developments o c c u r r e d that l e d to problematic re­ p e r c u s s i o n s i n t h e theory o f t h e p e r s o n , liberty, a n d l a n g u a g e , as well as in the practices o f m o d e r n societies. Taylor's reconstruction o f the m o d e r n identity c o m b i n e s H e g e l a n d M a x W e b e r : the rationalization o f modernity is d e s c r i b e d a s a p r o c e s s o f b i f u r c a t i o n , a n d t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h i s p r o c e s s appeals to m o d e r n subjects to return to their sources. Sources of the Self n o t o n l y p r e s e n t s a t h e o r y o f t h e s e l f a n d o f s t r o n g e v a l u a t i o n s , it also tries t o g e n e r a t e a n "articulation" t h a t discloses, t h a t raises to c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e c o m m o n w o r l d o f m o d e r n i t y a n d its b i f u r c a ­ tion. T h r o u g h this articulation, t h e h o r i z o n s o f ethical v a l u e s that T a y l o r regards as determinative o f identity a r e to b e linked n o t to a particular c o m m u n i t y o r a particular p e r i o d b u t to the d e v e l o p m e n t o f m o d e r n West­ e r n c u l t u r e a s a w h o l e . T h e "self" w h o s e " s o u r c e s " a r e b r o u g h t t o l i g h t is therefore n o t a particular, b i o g r a p h i c a l self b u t t h e " m o d e r n

self"; h e r -

m e n e u t i c s is shifted i n this w a yf r o m a h e r m e n e u t i c s o f t h e p e r s o n t o a h e r m e n e u t i c s o f t h e m o d e r n spirit, a super-self w h o s e s t r o n g evaluations must

find

their w a yto a unity—this, however, n o longer in the form o f

a b s o l u t e S p i r i t b e c o m i n g c o n s c i o u s o f itself, b u t o f m o d e r n i t y ' s i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t s b e c o m i n g c o n s c i o u s o f t h e m s e l v e s , e a c h f o r itself. H e g e l ' s o n t o logical a n d historico-philosophical premises a r e hermeneutically refracted in T a y l o r — t h e r e b y raising t h e central

question

o f the epistemological

s t a t u s o f T a y l o r ' s t h e o r y o f t h e g o o d (cf. N u s s b a u m 1 9 9 0 b , 3 3 - 3 4 ; H a b e r ­ mas

1993b, 7 4 ) . T o w h o m d o e s this m e t a n a r r a t i v e a p p l y , a n d w h a t a r e t h e

c o n d i t i o n s o f its validity i f t h e "spirit" o f m o d e r n i t y h a s d i s s o l v e d i n t h e spirits o f m o d e r n society? T a y l o r r e s p o n d s t o t h i s q u e s t i o n w i t h a transcendental-hermeneutic i n t e r ­ pretation o f his theory o f the person: the reconstruction o f the goods o f m o d e r n i t y b r i n g s to light t h e "inescapable" (Taylor 1989a, 3 1 ) "transcen­ dental conditions" (32, 38-39) which modern

of modern

identity—the values without

subjects cannot understand

t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e totality o f

their c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d . I n this sense, t h e " h y p e r g o o d s " o f m o d e r n i t y a r e a " f r a m e w o r k , " a m o r a l s p a c e t h a t is a s r e a l f o r u s a s a n e t h i c a l f a c t c a n be, a fact that c a n n o t b e r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e m e a n s p r o v i d e d b y the natural sciences: "what y o u c a n ' t h e l p h a v i n g r e c o u r s e t o i n life is real, o r a s n e a r

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

223

to r e a l i t y a s y o u c a n g e t a g r a s p o f a t p r e s e n t " ( 1 9 8 9 a , 5 9 ) . M a c k i e ' s ( 1 9 7 7 ) antirealist s t a t e m e n t t h a t m o r a l c o n c e p t s a r e " p r o j e c t i o n s " is d i s p u t e d by Taylor n o t only in the sense that these concepts have d e v e l o p e d historically a n d a r e therefore "inherited," b u t also in the sense that they simply c a n n o t be m e a n i n g f u l l y d i s p u t e d s i n c e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e v e r y u n i v e r s e o f p o s s i b l e m e a n i n g . "What better m e a s u r e o f reality d o w e h a v e i n h u m a n affairs than those terms w h i c h o n critical reflection a n d after correction o f t h e errors we c a n d e t e c t m a k e t h e b e s t s e n s e o f o u r l i v e s ? " ( T a y l o r 1 9 8 9 a , 5 7 , cf. 2 5 7 ;

1991a, 242). T h i s t h e o r y o f " h e r m e n e u t i c r e a l i s m , " a s it w e r e , u n d e r p i n s t h e s t r o n g validity c l a i m o f t h e objectivity o f e t h i c a l v a l u e s o n l y i n t h e s e n s e t h a t it provides t h e "best a c c o u n t " (58), t h e m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e articulation o f m o ­ dernity's h y p e r g o o d s — a n articulation that e x p o s e s contradictions,

unrav­

els c o n f u s i o n s , a n d f o r m u l a t e s v a l u e s o f s u c h i m p o r t a n c e i n "our" c o n c e p ­ tions o f values that w e a r e individually " m o v e d " to a "transition"

(1989a,

7 2 ; 1 9 9 3 , 2 2 4 - 2 5 ) . A hermeneutic p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n f o r m u l a t e s v a l u e s w i t h w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s can i d e n t i f y , w h e r e a s a transcendental p r a c t i c a l

reason

w o u l d h a v e t o b e a b l e t o f o r m u l a t e p r i n c i p l e s w i t h w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s must identify (as "transcendental c o n d i t i o n s " o f their identities). T a y l o r ' s theory oscillates b e t w e e n these t w o p o l e s : it e x c a v a t e s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

goods

constituting m o d e r n i t y , b u t it c a n n o t raise a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l validity c l a i m for

this

excavation. It rejects

a n "external" model

o f practical

reason

(1989a, 7 5 ) that p r o v i d e s objective "basic r e a s o n s " f o r n o r m s , b u t h i s h e r m e n e u t i c - i n t e r n a l m o d e l t h a t a d d r e s s e s its r e a s o n s t o " m y " e x i s t e n c e is u n ­ d e c i d e d c o n c e r n i n g t h e reconciliatory p o w e r t h e theory thinks itself ca­ p a b l e of. F o r o n t h e o n e h a n d

it is d e p e n d e n t

upon

t h e a s s e n t o f its

a d d r e s s e e s , o n t h e o t h e r it k n o w s t h a t m o d e r n c u l t u r e is u n d e r t h e r u l e o f a partially b l i n d n a t u r a l i s m , a n d t h e r e f o r e t h e r e q u i r e d s e l f - k n o w l e d g e is h i n d e r e d ; it t h u s a l r e a d y h a s a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r its critics. T h e r e c o n c i l i a ­ t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y w i t h itself, T a y l o r says, is a d i f f i c u l t task. W e have to search f o r a way in w h i c h o u r strongest aspirations towards hy­ p e r g o o d s d o n o t e x a c t a price o f self-mutilation. I believe that such a recon­ ciliation is possible; b u t its essential condition is that w e enable ourselves to r e c o g n i z e the g o o d s to w h i c h w e c a n n o t b u t h o l d allegiance in their full range. (106-7) A c c o r d i n g to T a y l o r there a r e three levels to b e distinguished at w h i c h w e c a n s p e a k o f t h e g o o d . T h e first, t h e l e v e l o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l g o o d life, consists o f t h e biographical narrative within w h i c h a p e r s o n seeks to s h a p e his o r h e r life m e a n i n g f u l l y . T h e s e c o n d level c o n s i s t s o f c e r t a i n "life g o o d s " (1989a, 9 3 ) i n w h o s e light p e r s o n s evaluate their lives a n d actions a s g o o d . S u c h " h y p e r g o o d s " as liberty, altruism, universal justice ( 1 0 1 ) d o n o t how­ ever shine i n a clear, u n i f o r m light: they c a n c o m e into conflict with o n e

224

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

a n o t h e r . T h i s possibility points to the third level, the f u n d a m e n t a l

one of

"constitutive g o o d s " (93), f r o m w h i c h e v e n t h e life g o o d s t h e m s e l v e s d r a w their p o w e r a n d their ultimate m e a n i n g . T h e y are the "moral sources" con­ stituting the f r a m e w o r k for possible c o n c r e t e g o o d s . T h e y p r e s e n t the ul­ timate g r o u n d for persons' self-identification, the ultimate sense o f o n e ' s own

b e i n g i n t h e w o r l d . M o d e r n i t y is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a n a b u n d a n c e

a n d a conflict a b o u t h y p e r g o o d s that o w e their origin to three

of

essential

"moral sources": belief in divine creation a n d the unity o f the world,

the

a u t o n o m o u s subject's powers o f reason, a n d the richness a n d g o o d n e s s of n a t u r e . " M o d e r n c u l t u r e is o n e o f m u l t i p l e s o u r c e s ; it c a n b e

schematized

as a s p a c e in w h i c h o n e c a n m o v e i n t h r e e d i r e c t i o n s . T h e r e a r e the independent

frontiers a n d the o r i g i n a l theistic f o u n d a t i o n .

two

T h e fact that

the directions are multiple contributes to o u r sense o f uncertainty" cf. 4 9 5 ) . M o d e r n c u l t u r e d r a w s o n t h e s e t h r e e s o u r c e s ; h o w e v e r ,

(317,

modern

subjects see themselves mainly only in a partial light, the light b e a m e d

from

o n e o f these sources. A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d T a y l o r n o w elaborates in a complex and rich presentation

the genesis of the m o d e r n

identity a n d

a

diagnosis o f the p r o b l e m s a n d conflicts within this identity (1989a, ch. 25), which I c a n n o t e x a m i n e in detail h e r e ;

2 6

and I cannot therefore

consider

w h e t h e r t h e s u b j e c t i v i z i n g w a y o f s p e a k i n g o f one c o m p r e h e n s i v e

modern

i d e n t i t y i s j u s t i f i e d (cf. S t e i n f a t h 1 9 9 1 ) . I n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t , t h e theoretic implications of Taylor's approach are of primary

moral-

importance.

H i s Sources of the Self c l a i m s t o g i v e t h e b e s t a c c o u n t o f t h e s t r o n g e v a l u ­ ations that are inescapable for the identity of m o d e r n i t y — a n d thus of e a c h individual m o d e r n subject. T h e validity c l a i m o f this narrative, o f this story o f t h e g e n e s i s o f m o d e r n h y p e r g o o d s , is h o w e v e r , a s I h a v e a l r e a d y p o i n t e d out, e x p l i c a t e d by T a y l o r n o w strongly (with r e f e r e n c e to

"transcendental

conditions"), and now weakly (hermeneutically): "A hypergood can

only

b e d e f e n d e d t h r o u g h a c e r t a i n r e a d i n g o f its g e n e s i s " ( 7 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o this h e r m e n e u t i c

perspective—as opposed

to a " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l "

recon­

struction o f "real" g o o d s — t h e story's p o w e r to c o n v i n c e d e p e n d s ultimately u p o n the a d d r e s s e e : "I c a n o n l y c o n v i n c e y o u b y m y d e s c r i p t i o n o f the g o o d if I s p e a k f o r y o u , e i t h e r b y a r t i c u l a t i n g w h a t u n d e r l i e s y o u r e x i s t i n g m o r a l intuitions o r p e r h a p s by m y description m o v i n g y o u to the point of m a k i n g it y o u r o w n " ( 7 7 ) . O n l y s u c h a f o r m o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t c a n

provide

reasons to " m o v e " a p e r s o n to revise his o r h e r self-understanding

is c o n ­

sidered by T a y l o r to b e m e a n i n g f u l a n d possible. H e r e h e p r o c e e d s

from

the paradigmatic case that practical r e a s o n as a r g u m e n t a t i o n always has the f o r m of convincing a person of his or her already accepted strong evalua­ tions—in a c c o r d a n c e with the criterion that h e o r she c a n "identify" with these

values. H o w e v e r , by pitting this f o r m

against a form

of ethical

of "external" reason, Taylor neglects the

nontranscendental

practical

reason

possibility o f

a

c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t is a l s o t o b e

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

225

l o c a t e d " i n t e r n a l l y " i n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e x t s b u t i s a i m e d a t a moral j u s ­ tification o f n o r m s , n o t a n ^ z c a / j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f values. T a y l o r c o n c e n t r a t e s on t h e question o f a p e r s o n ' s ethical g o o d i n view o f his o r h e r identity a n d t h e r e f o r e o n a n e t h i c a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n f o r t h e s a k e o f this p e r s o n to w h o m certain v a l u e s — a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g a c t i o n s — a r e suggested a n d rec­ o m m e n d e d . Y e tthe hermeneutic-reconstructive

disclosure o f certain hy­

p e r g o o d s , w h i c h is T a y l o r ' s m o d e l f o r d i s c o v e r i n g t h e s o u r c e s o f m o d e r n i t y , fails t o s e e t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h o s e " g o o d s " a p e r s o n o u g h t t o r e c ­ ognize because in so doing h e o r she reaches a better

self-understanding

and those that ought to b e recognized because they are required for the sake o f o t h e r persons, a n d this o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s that c a n n o t b e g e n ­ erally a n d reciprocally rejected. W h e r e a s i n a n ethical respect

practical

r e a s o n s u g g e s t s v a l u e s a p e r s o n can a c c e p t a s t h e p e r s o n h e o r s h e i s , i n a m o r a l r e s p e c t it r e q u i r e s a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f j u s t i f i e d n o r m s a p e r s o n must r e c o g n i z e . I t d o e s n o t s p e a k i n t h e n a m e o f " e x t e r n a l " p r i n c i p l e s , i t gives r e c i p r o c a l effect to t h e c l a i m s o f o t h e r p e r s o n s ; it r e m a i n s a d d r e s s e d to p e r s o n s " a d h o m i n e m " ( T a y l o r 1 9 9 3 ) b u t h a s a d i f f e r e n t e n d t h a n a n ­ swering the question o f the g o o d life.

2 7

Taylor distinguishes three axes o f moral thinking: the question o f re­ spect toward persons a n d obligations to them; the question o f one's

self-

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e g o o d life (in g e n e r a l a n d f o r o n e s e l f i n p a r t i c u l a r ) ; a n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f o n e ' s o w n dignity, w h a t it m e a n s t o b e e s t e e m e d ( a n d estimable) in a particular society (1989a, 1 5 ) . I n T a y l o r ' s view, these three c o m p l e x e s cannot b e separated according to criteria o f ethics a n d morality; all t h r e e

find

their answers in the strong evaluations o f a historically d e ­

v e l o p e d c o m m u n i t y . T h e first c o m p l e x d o e s h o w e v e r a s s u m e a s p e c i a l p o ­ s i t i o n , f o r i t i s o n e o f m o d e r n i t y ' s n o n r e j e c t a b l e h y p e r g o o d s t o r e s p e c t all h u m a n beings, whatever origin o r skin color they m a y have; a n d that also m e a n s : w h a t e v e r c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d t h e y m a y h a v e . I n this c a s e , it w o u l d b e "utterly w r o n g a n d u n f o u n d e d

to draw the boundaries a n y nar­

r o w e r t h a n a r o u n d t h e w h o l e h u m a n r a c e " (6-7). H e n c e this h y p e r g o o d of m o r a l r e s p e c t k n o w s n o limits: " w e " b e l i e v e t h a t it is valid " f o r all," a n d i n d e e d not just within the culture o fmodernity b u t also in societies in w h i c h widows a r e b u r n e d o r other h u m a n beings a r e sacrificed (67). T h i s g o o d of u n i v e r s a l r e s p e c t a s s u m e s a s p e c i a l i m p o r t a n c e : w e c o n s i d e r it n o t o n l y a g o o d that o u g h t to guide o u r action toward every h u m a n being b u t also a g o o d that ought to guide the action o f every h u m a n being as such. T a y l o r b r i n g s this g e n e r a l n o r m to b e a r a g a i n s t t h e "racist" (7) o r t h e " N a z i " ( 1 9 9 3 ) : i n s u c h a n a r g u m e n t it is i m p o r t a n t ,

first,

to link u p with

p r e m i s e s r e c o g n i z e d b y that p e r s o n t o o (in this case a v e r s i o n o f t h e p r o ­ hibition against killing) a n d , s e c o n d , to s h o w that t h e limiting o f this prin­ c i p l e d o n e b y t h e p e r s o n i n q u e s t i o n is a r g u m e n t a t i v e l y u n t e n a b l e . P r a c t i c a l reason therefore

means exposing contradictions o r confusions in a per-

226

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

son's view o r pointing o u t aspects s o far neglected b y h i m o r h e r (1993, 2 2 5 ) . A n a p p e a l to absolute criteria is n o t possible h e r e : w e b e g i n w h e r e a p e r s o n stands. B u t even w h e r e there is n o explicidy c o m m o n starting point, it is p o s s i b l e t o m o v e a p e r s o n

to a position that, i n c o m p a r i s o n to t h e

initial position, is a " m o r e rational" o n e i n t h e sense that it c a n b e j u d g e d retrospectively as better in accordance with such i m m a n e n t

criteria a n d

formal aspects as coherence a n d f r e e d o m from contradictions.

Progress

consists in a n "error-reducing step." H e r e T a y l o r links u p with M a c l n t y r e ' s conception

o f rational

traditions (see chapter

comparisons

a n d justified

"transitions"

between

4.3).

It b e c o m e s c l e a r h e r e , h o w e v e r , t h a t it is n e c e s s a r y t o distinguish b e ­ tween a n ethical-practical reason o f t h e best account a n d a moral-practical a r g u m e n t that d e m a n d s reciprocity a n d generality. I n both instances there a r e o n l y " i n t e r n a l " c r i t e r i a f o r a " m o r e r a t i o n a l " p o s i t i o n , b u t t h e y a r e dif­ f e r e n t : o n t h e o n e h a n d , it is a m a t t e r o f a b e t t e r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n t h e p a r t o f p e r s o n A ; o n t h e o t h e r , a m a t t e r o f this p e r s o n A c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m o r a l r i g h t s c l a i m s o f o t h e r p e r s o n s B , G, D , a n d s o o n . I n e t h i c a l c o n t e x t s , reason therefore appeals to the self-understanding o f a person because h e o r s h e s e e m s t o b e l e a d i n g h i s o r h e r life falsely; i n m o r a l c o n t e x t s , b y contrast, b e c a u s e h e o r s h e is acting falsely t o w a r d others. W h a t a p e r s o n cannot reject reasonably, "what h e cannot lucidly repudiate" (1993, 209), are,

o n the o n e hand, values that the person ought to recognize f o r the

sake o f his o r h e r o w n identity a n d , o n t h e other, n o r m s that t h e p e r s o n c a n n o t reject reciprocally o r generally, whatever ethical identity h e o r s h e may have. It cannot b e explained in a n yother way why "we" d e m a n d

this

one g o o d — m o r a l r e s p e c t f o r every p e r s o n a s a n " e n d " ( 1 9 8 9 a , 6; 1 9 9 3 , 2 2 7 ) — o f every p e r s o n , w h e t h e r o r n o t i t i s a p a r t o f h i s o r h e r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . I n this sense it is a "categorical" g o o d that is n o t a n ethical g o o d a m o n g others serving as t h e basis f o r strong evaluations b u t the only " m o r a l " g o o d that o b l i g a t e s i n a universalist sense: it t h e r e f o r e

designates

n o t a n e t h i c a l v a l u e b u t a m o r a l duty c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o a b a s i c m o r a l right. In ethical contexts persons provide others with reasons f o r recognizing v a l u e s that s e r v e t h e e n d o f h a v i n g t h e a d d r e s s e e s f i n d t h e i r w a y t o a life b e t t e r for them; i n a b r o a d e r s e n s e , t h i s i s t h e m o d e l f o r T a y l o r ' s

entire

theory, w h i c h r e c o m m e n d s to t h e m e m b e r s o f modernity's ethical identity certain h y p e r g o o d s o n whose basis they learn to understand

themselves

better. T h e motivation f o r a "transition" from o n e self-understanding

to

a n o t h e r is t h e r e f o r e e t h i c a l - r a t i o n a l i n c h a r a c t e r . I n m o r a l c o n t e x t s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i f i e d a c t i o n toward others a r e t o b e a n s w e r e d with moral reasons that must b e m ^ u b j e c t i v e l y shareable. H e r e the jus­ tification f o r a "transition" f r o m o n e f o r m o f a c t i o n t o a n o t h e r is m o r a l rational in character. T h o u g h moral questions refer to individual persons, they c a n n o t h o w e v e r b e a n s w e r e d solely with reasons that a r e valid "for

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

227

them." Structurally, they are intersubjective in a w a y different from ethical questions; in c o m m u n a l contexts, both types of questions are

answered

"together" in different ways; the "final authority" f o r a n s w e r i n g ethical ques­ t i o n s is t h e p e r s o n w h o h a s t o live h i s o r h e r life, f o r m o r a l q u e s t i o n s

this

a u t h o r i t y is l o c a t e d " b e t w e e n " p e r s o n s — w i t h o u t t h e c o m m u n i t y b e i n g l i m ­ ited, i n p r i n c i p l e . T o e x p r e s s it n e g a t i v e l y : if a p e r s o n i g n o r e s e t h i c a l l y g o o d reasons, h e or she pays the price of a deficient self-understanding; p e r s o n i g n o r e s m o r a l r e a s o n s , t h e p r i c e is t h e d i s r e s p e c t o f o t h e r s .

2 8

if a This

d o e s n o t m e a n that in m o r a l a r g u m e n t a t i o n w e d o n o t a p p e a l to p e r s o n s ' self-understanding o r a t t e m p t to c o n v i n c e t h e m against this b a c k g r o u n d — the r e a s o n s w h y a c h a n g e i n t h e i r a t t i t u d e is c a l l e d f o r a n d w h y a c e r t a i n m o d e o f a c t i o n is r e q u i r e d a r e h o w e v e r d i f f e r e n t . A differentiated conception of the relation between ethics a n d morality cannot

therefore

be understood—as

Taylor

(1991a,

244)

insists in

re­

s p o n s e to o b j e c t i o n s in this c o n n e c t i o n r a i s e d b y K y m l i c k a ( 1 9 9 1 a , 1 7 3 7 6 ) — a s a d e f e n s e o f universal principles that are "blind" to questions o f the g o o d life, f o r m o r a l i t y is n o t b r o u g h t to b e a r u n t i l p e r s o n s o r s o c i a l practices b e c o m e "blind" to the m o r a l rights c l a i m s o f individuals. O f all m o r a l i t i e s , a " p r o c e d u r a l " m o r a l i t y — p r o v i d e d its p r o c e d u r a l c h a r a c t e r is not e r r o n e o u s l y r e i f i e d — i s sensitive to the voices o f e a c h p e r s o n , voices that m u s t n o t b e sacrificed to a "thick" l a n g u a g e . B e t w e e n Taylor's "internal" ethical conception of practical reason

and

the "external" c o n c e p t i o n (which h e criticizes)—which assumes that there are substantive basic reasons for n o r m s that are valid above the heads of t h o s e c o n c e r n e d , as it w e r e — w e m u s t p l a c e a c o n c e p t o f c o n t e x t - i m m a n e n t and, at the s a m e time, context-transcendent

p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t is n o t

o p e n to T a y l o r ' s critique o f naturalism; o n e that operates intersubjectively without however reducing the m o r a l viewpoint of generality a n d

imparti­

a l i t y t o t h e e t h i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e first p e r s o n . T h i s t h e o r y o f m o r a l i t y d o e s n o t organize "everything a r o u n d a single b a s e " (Taylor 1989a,

76)

that prescribes abstract laws a n d suppresses ethical values, as T a y l o r , like Williams (1985,

1 7 4 - 9 6 ) , f e a r s : m o r a l r e a s o n s a r e j u s t i f i e d internally i n a

r e c i p r o c a l a n d g e n e r a l m a n n e r . T h u s W i l l i a m s ' s t h e s i s is t o b e

simultane­

o u s l y a c c e p t e d a n d m o d i f i e d : " P r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n is i n e v e r y c a s e personal, a n d the

first

first-

p e r s o n is n o t d e r i v a t i v e o r n a t u r a l l y r e p l a c e d b y

anyone" ( 1 9 8 5 , 6 8 ) . T h i s s t a t e m e n t i s t r u e b o t h o f e t h i c a l a n d o f m o r a l questions; however, the r e a s o n s that are g o o d reasons in these contexts are to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d : m o r a l q u e s t i o n s m u s t n o t b e a n s w e r e d like e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s i n t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e . " M y " r e a s o n s m u s t first b e p r o v e d to b e g o o d r e a s o n s i n a m o r a l r e s p e c t ; a n d this p r o o f p r e s u p p o s e s a p e r ­ spective c h a n g e in discourse. Morality does not devalue or replace persons' q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n s , it n o n e t h e l e s s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e y m o d i f y t h e s e dis­ tinctions

r e l a t i v e t o t h e m o r a l c l a i m s o f o t h e r s , i n s o f a r a s it is a m a t t e r o f

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UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

moral-intersubjective problems

( a n d n o t ethical questions

that

persons

must answer against the b a c k g r o u n d o f their identity-determining values). P e r s o n s d o i n d e e d exist "in a s p a c e o f q u e s t i o n s " ( T a y l o r 1989a, 29), b u t these questions pose themselves (or a r e posed) to persons in different re­ spects a n d require different answers. A theory o f different practical con­ texts d o e s j u s t i c e t o this c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e n o r m a t i v e w o r l d . It avoids t h e false alternative b e t w e e n a one-sided u n d e r s t a n d i n g

o f "Kantian" "pure"

morality a n d the equally one-sided absolutization o f the ethical perspective. (I r e t u r n t o this i n c h a p t e r 5.2.) A further possible objection must b e considered. Doesn't morality ac­ c o r d i n g to this u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e m a i n f o r m w i t h o u t c o n t e n t i f it is n o t w i t h w h a t i s m o r a l i t y ' s c o n c e r n i n t h e first p l a c e : t h e good o f e a c h equally? W a s n ' t procedural, "sensitive" morality d e t e r m i n e d

i n this way?

H e n c e , i t c a n b e n e i t h e r explicated n o r justified w i t h o u t a formal, tatively d e t e r m i n e d

filled

person

nonquali-

a n d m i n i m a l c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d — a s t h e "possi­

bility" o f a f r e e p e r s o n a l life f o r w h i c h "latitude" is n e e d e d . A c c o r d i n g t o M a r t i n S e e l this f o r m a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e g o o d constitutes t h e m a t e r i a l core o f morality: ' T h e priority o f the formally understood g o o d refers to a conceptual p r i o r i t y , t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e c r i t e r i o l o g i c a l l y u n d e r s t o o d r i g h t d e s ­ i g n a t e s a normative p r i m a c y " ( S e e l 1 9 9 3 , 2 3 2 ) .

2 9

M o r a l a c t i o n is t h e r e f o r e

not "preferential" action f o r the sake o f one's o w n g o o d , a n d moral justi­ fication

l o o k s f o r s h a r e a b l e r e a s o n s ; b u t t h e i d e a o f m o r a l justification is

itself b a s e d o n a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d that n o t o n l y e x p l i c a t e s it ( h e n c e the conceptual priority) b u t also includes the notion that the binding char­ acter o f morality—that shared reasons are required—rests

o n accepting

t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f this " n o n r e l a t i v e " g o o d a n d o n i n s i g h t i n t o its n e c e s s i t y for e a c h p e r s o n (234). A n df r o m this t h e r e also follows i n a certain s e n s e the

normative

p r i m a c y o f this c o n c e p t i o n

o f t h e g o o d , w h i c h b y itself

pushes to o v e r c o m e the particular limits o f the m o r a l

community.

3 0

A c c o r d i n g to this view, m o r a l i t y is c o n c e r n e d n o t w i t h o n e ' s o w n g o o d l i f e b u t w i t h t h e g o o d l i f e o f all equally. M o r a l i t y i s c o n n e c t e d n o t t o a (substantively) d e t e r m i n e d c o n c e p t i o n o f the g o o d b u t to the g e n e r a l pos­ sibility o f a n a u t o n o m o u s life w i t h i n m o r a l limits: t h e m o r a l l y r e l e v a n t g o o d i s a g e n e r a l a n d f o r m a l g o o d . B u t this—pace S e e l — d o e s n o t e n t a i l a c o n ­ c e p t u a l priority o f t h e g o o d s i n c e this c o n c e p t o f the g o o d is a l r e a d y m o r a l l y d e f i n e d i n its f o r m a l i t y a n d g e n e r a l i t y : t h e g o o d o f f r e e p e r s o n a l e x i s t e n c e is d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c r i t e r i a o f r e c i p r o c i t y a n d g e n e r a l i t y a s a " m o r a l g o o d " w h o s e respect a n d recognition cannot b e d e n i e d b y o r to any person with g o o d reasons. T h e formal, general, a n d "nonrelative"

determination

o f this g o o d p r e s u p p o s e s c o n c e p t u a l l y t h e criteria o f t h e "right," n o t t h e other way round. T h e conceptual a n d normative priority o f morality a r e i n s e p a r a b l e : t h e g o o d — b e it "thick" o r " t h i n " — c o m e s i n t o p l a y o n l y a s t h a t w h i c h is g e n e r a l l y a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y justified serving a s t h e basis f o r m o r a l

UNIVERSALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM

229

c l a i m s . H e n c e t h e right t o t h i s g o o d c a n n o t b e l i m i t e d t o a c e r t a i n munity

a n d has normative

priority over c o m p e t i n g

conceptions

com­

of t h e

good. H o w e v e r m o r a l i t y i s e x p l i c a t e d — f o r i n s t a n c e , v i a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t s of t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r s o c i a l g o o d — i t i m p o s e s c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l i z i n g a n d for­ malizing criteria u p o n this explication: t h e criteria o f reciprocity a n d gen­ erality, w h i c h a r e p r e s c r i b e d f o r all m o r a l validity o f n o r m s a n d f o r their "reasonable" justification "between" persons. I n the absence o f "ultimate" r e a s o n s , t h e v e r y p o i n t o f m o r a l i t y "without a b a n n i s t e r " is f o u n d in this self-critical, r e c u r s i v e " u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y " o f r e a s o n . B y r e a s o n o f its p r o c e d u r a l c h a r a c t e r , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a ­ tion d o e s justice to t h e substantive c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e g o o d o f p e r s o n s in communities, without resting o n a theory o f the good: regarding questions of ethical self-determination, e q u a l rights, political a u t o n o m y , a n d m o r a l integrity, it r e f e r s t o c o n t e x t s t h a t a r e filled i n c o n c r e t e l y b y e t h i c a l p e r s o n s o n the basis o f their identities, b y legal persons in mutual respect f o r per­ sonal autonomy, b y citizens in political self-determination, a n d b y m o r a l persons in reciprocal recognition. T h e practical reason o f "morality" does n o t s u p p r e s s "ethical" c o n t e n t ; r a t h e r , it f o r m u l a t e s p r i n c i p l e s t h a t j o i n d y e n a b l e individual a n d collective self-determination. I n this c o m p l e x view of different contexts o f practical questions a n d reciprocal recognition there lies t h e possibility o f a c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n u n i v e r s a l i s m a n d c o n t e x t u a l i s m .

FIVE

Contexts of Justice

F r o m the reconstruction o f the communitarian critique o f liberal a n d de­ ontological theories in four p r o b l e m areas—the constitution

o f t h e self,

the neutrality o f law, the ethos o f democracy, a n d the conception

of a

universalist theory o f morality—it h a s b e e n seen in a horizontal respect, as it w e r e , t h a t c r i t i q u e a n d c o u n t e r c r i t i q u e i n e a c h a r e a o f t h e d e b a t e

permit

possibilities f o r m e d i a t i o n that l e a d to redefinitions o f the c o n c e p t i o n s o f legal person, citizenship, o r morality in w h i c h arguments f r o m both sides a r e aufgehoben. A t t h e s a m e

time,

it h a s b e e n s e e n that t h e s e possibilities

m a k e it n e c e s s a r y t o clarify t h e v a r i o u s c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e p e r s o n ,

com­

m u n i t y , a n d v a l u e s o r n o r m s i n v o l v e d — c o n c e p t i o n s o f t e n i n s u f f i c i e n d y dif­ ferentiated in the debate. T h e s e conceptions, then, have to b e c o m b i n e d in a vertical respect. T h i s task constitutes t h e m a i n thesis o f t h e t h e o r y o f "contexts of justice" developed in the passage through the respective prob­ l e m s , this is, t h e t h e s i s t h a t t o t h e f o u r l e v e l s o f t h e d e b a t e t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d four different conceptions o f person a n d community, which are indeed c o n n e c t e d b u t a r e n o t h o w e v e r reducible to o n e another. T h e y form four "contexts" o f reciprocal recognition—as an ethical person, as a legal per­ s o n , as a fully e n t i t l e d citizen, a n d as a m o r a l p e r s o n — w h i c h

correspond

to different m o d e s o f the n o r m a t i v e justification o f values a n d n o r m s in different 'justification communities." T h e analysis o f t h e debate

between

"context-forgetful" liberal-deontological a n d "context-obsessed" nitarian theories has therefore l e d to a differentiation

of four

commu­

normative

contexts in w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e "situated." T h e vertical p e r s p e c t i v e h e l p s clarify certain m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f t h e d e b a t e , b u t n e i t h e r this n o r t h e h o r i z o n t a l p e r s p e c t i v e c a n c l a i m to g a t h e r all t h e a r g u m e n t s i n t o a c o m p r e h e n s i v e synthesis. It p e r m i t s t h e possibility o f b r i n g i n g t h e t w o s i d e s together—Sittlichkeit a n d m o r a l i t y , t h e g o o d a n d

230

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

231

the j u s t — i n a m a n n e r that c o n n e c t s t h e recognition o f ethical identity a n d collective f o r m s o f life a s w e l l a s substantive d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f social j u s t i c e with t h e validity o f individual rights, discursive p r o c e d u r e s , universal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s ; a n d i t d o e s s o o n t h e b a s i s o f one c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n a n d i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f different n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s . T h e s e elements have to b e integrated in a comprehensive, complex, a n d yet "au­ tonomous" theory o fjustice. Therefore, just principles a r e ones that a r e generally a n d i m p a r t i a l l y j u s t i f i e d i n t h a t t h e y c o r r e s p o n d i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e w a y t o t h e concrete i n t e r e s t s , n e e d s , a n d v a l u e s o f t h o s e a f f e c t e d b y t h e m . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , t h e ethical i d e n t i t y o f p e r s o n s i s r e c o g n i z e d a n d legally p r o t e c t e d i n a s o c i e t y , a n d t h i s t h r o u g h politically a n d a u t o n o ­ m o u s l y p o s i t e d l a w w i t h i n a political c o m m u n i t y o f fully e n t i d e d

mem­

b e r s — l a w p o s s e s s i n g a moral c o r e t h a t r e s p e c t s t h e i n t e g r i t y o f m o r a l

per­

sons. T h e thesis o f t h e c o n t e x t c o n n e c t e d n e s s o f all j u s t i c e p r i n c i p l e s t h u s has to b e related to the diversity o f c o n t e x t s — f r o m a n ethical-substantive to a m o r a l - u n i v e r s a l i s t k i n d — i n w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e m e m b e r s ( i n a n o r m a ­ tively s u b s t a n t i v e w a y ) o f c o m m u n i t i e s , b u t v e r y d i f f e r e n t o n e s ; a n d f r o m this m u l t i p l e c o n s t i t u t i o n

o f the normative world there follow

different

m o d e s o freciprocal recognition a n dnormative justification. R e d r a w i n g the m a p o f a theory o f justice in the w a yp r o p o s e d here requires that

these

d i m e n s i o n s b e c o n n e c t e d i n a justified b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f s o c i e t y . H e r e l i e s the ideal o f a j u s t society. In w h a t follows, a s u m m a r y o f t h e essential a r g u m e n t s o n b o t h t h e hor­ izontal a n d t h e vertical levels will serve to clarify o n w h a t I b a s e t h e c l a i m to f o r m u l a t e , with this theory, a m e d i a t i n g p o s i t i o n b e y o n d

communitari­

a n i s m a n d l i b e r a l i s m ( 5 . 1 ) . T h e "contexts o f j u s t i c e " will t h e n b e a n a l y z e d in t e r m s o f m o r a l theory a s "contexts of justification" (5.2), a n d e x p l i c a t e d in terms o f a recognition theory as "contexts o f recognition"

5.1.

(5.3).

JUSTICE AND T H E GOOD

F r o m t h e discussion o f S a n d e l ' s critique o f Rawls there follow, as h a s b e e n seen, n o t only the distinction between ethical person a n d legal person b u t also t h e m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l

distinction b e t w e e n different m o d e s of justify­

ing ethical values a n d the n o r m s that claim to b e generally v a l i d — b e they legal o r m o r a l n o r m s . It is p r e c i s e l y t h e m o d e o f r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y justifying general n o r m s — t h e

thesis states—that m a k e s it possible to d o

justice to the communitarian concern for recognizing particular, nal,

as well as "different" ethical identities

(to t h e latter, f e m i n i s t

commu­ theory

a t t a c h e s g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e ) . I t i s t h e r e f o r e a communitarian fallacy t o i n f e r the impossibility o f a n y deontological legal o r m o r a l principles f r o m t h e t h e s i s o f t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e self. T h i s f a l l a c y fails t o s e e the difference b e t w e e n various conceptions o f t h e p e r s o n a n d relations o f

232

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

r e c o g n i t i o n ; it fails to s e e t h a t t h e d i c h o t o m o u s o p p o s i n g o f ' j u s t i c e " a n d t h e " g o o d " is n o t sufficient. W i t h i n d i f f e r e n t n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s , o n e

has

to distinguish v a r i o u s c o n c e p t i o n s o f the individual, collective, o r m o r a l " f o r m a l " g o o d t h a t e n j o y " p r i o r i t y " w h e r e v e r it is a m a t t e r o f e t h i c a l q u e s ­ tions;

in contexts, however, in w h i c h n o shared ethical convictions provide

c o n v i n c i n g a n s w e r s t h e r e is a n e e d f o r n o r m s t h a t c a n b e j u s t i f i e d i n

a

d i f f e r e n t ( b u t a l s o ) i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e w a y . I t is h e r e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f j u s t i c e begins. S a n d e l ' s critique o f the liberal " u n e n c u m b e r e d " self p r o c e e d s f r o m thesis that Rawls's construction o f the original position relies o n an istic c o n c e p t i o n

of the person

the

atom­

that forms the basis o f his theory of

the

priority of justice over the g o o d . H e n c e , S a n d e l argues, liberal principles o f l a w ( a n d a t t h e s a m e time d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s ) a s w e l l a s t h e conception of the legal person rest o n such an ontological theory of

the

self. T h i s t h e s i s , h o w e v e r , m i s u n d e r s t a n d s R a w l s ' s t h e o r y i n p a r t i c u l a r

and

the justification

of universal principles in general. T h e

level to

which

R a w l s ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e m o r a l p e r s o n r e f e r s is t h a t o f t h e b a s i c s t r u c t u r e o f a n e t h i c a l l y p l u r a l i s t i c s o c i e t y , a s t r u c t u r e t h a t is e q u a l l y f a i r to all. I t is limited to the "public identity" o f p e r s o n s as p e r s o n s o f law. H e r e a r e r e g a r d e d as e q u a l s a m o n g equals; they h a v e certain rights a n d

persons duties,

w h i c h they h a v e b o t h as S a u l o f T a r s u s a n d as P a u l the A p o s d e — R a w l s also speaks of the

"institutional

identity"

of a person.

T h i s identity

differs

therefore f r o m the ethical identity o f p e r s o n s as b i o g r a p h i c a l l y individu­ the c o m p l e x

connection

between ethical persons a n d legal persons, one must m a k e a

ated, "unique" beings. In o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d

conceptual

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m : i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s to p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y m a k e it possible for ethical p e r s o n s to d e v e l o p their c o n c e p t i o n s o f the g o o d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f self-determination a n d fairness. A s the f r e e d o m to act, legala u t o n o m o u s s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n is t h e r e f o r e f o r m a l a n d is n o t t o b e

under­

stood in a n ontological sense: individual liberty rights d o not imply indi­ vidualistic life p l a n s . T h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f l e g a l n o r m s

is n o t b a s e d o n

certain c o n c e p t i o n o f personal a u t o n o m y as an ethical "ideal" o f the

a

self-

d e t e r m i n e d l i f e — a s c o m m u n i t a r i a n a n d "ethical-liberal" t h e o r i e s b o t h as­ sume equally, but with varying evaluations. Rather, the difference between the

t w o s p h e r e s is g r o u n d e d

in the

different validity m o d e s o f

general

n o r m s a n d ethical values: these values are valid for subjects against

the

b a c k g r o u n d o f their identities; they m u s t b e a c c e p t e d by t h e m as their o w n values. L e g a l n o r m s , b y contrast, raise a n o b l i g a t i n g c l a i m to generality a n d must therefore rest o n generally justifiable reasons a n d n o t o n

particular

values. O n l y in this w a y c a n law d o j u s t i c e to different ethical identities a n d b e c o n s i d e r e d generally j u s t i f i e d . L a w d o e s n o t e x p r e s s a p a r t i c u l a r w o r l d o f " l i b e r a l s e l v e s " t h a t is to b e c r e a t e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d — b u t political-autonomous c o m m u n i t y o f citizens.

it d o e s e x p r e s s a

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

2

33

T h e distinction b e t w e e n e t h i c a l p e r s o n a n d l e g a l p e r s o n g o e s h a n d in h a n d with the distinction between ethical c o m m u n i t i e s a n d the legal com­ munity. Within a legal c o m m u n i t y there prevails a form o f general a n d equal recognition as a legal person that does n o t consider the person's c o n c r e t e i d e n t i t y . I n t h e l i b e r a l v i e w , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e l e g a l c o m m u n i t y is n o t a n e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t y w i t h w h i c h a p e r s o n ' s identity is v e r y

closely

c o n n e c t e d is n o t a loss b u t a g a i n ; it m a k e s p o s s i b l e a p l u r a l i t y o f e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s within a state. I n that sense t h e legal-"negative" f r e e d o m

to

act a n d t h e ethical-"positive" f r e e d o m o f self-realization d o n o t e x c l u d e b u t i m p l y e a c h o t h e r : l a w i s t h e protective cover f o r e t h i c a l i d e n t i t y . T o b e r e c ­ ognized as a legal person m e a n s to b e protected in one's ethical

identity

under a law o f general a n d equal freedom. T o b e regarded as a protective c o v e r i n this w a y , l a w m u s t b e e t h i c a l l y " n e u t r a r i n its m o d e o f validity, s o that it itself d o e s n o t lay d o w n certain "values" as h i g h e s t g o o d s that c a n n o t b e r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y justified. N o n e t h e l e s s , this m o d e

presupposes

on the part o f "reasonable" ethical persons the capability a n d willingness to r e c o g n i z e t h e t h r e s h o l d o f g e n e r a l i t y a n d r e c i p r o c i t y a n d t o m o d i f y their conceptions o f the g o o d relative to the legitimate claims o f other

persons.

T h e y d o n o t h a v e to d o w n g r a d e their ethical "truth" to a m e r e "belief," b u t they h a v e to reciprocally respect others' e q u a l rights to a n ethical identity. T h e l i n e s e p a r a t i n g t h e e t h i c a l a n d t h e l e g a l s p h e r e s is n o t t o b e u n d e r ­ stood in the sense o f a n a priori o r a dichotomy: lawcan—especially with r e g a r d t o ( n o n m o r a l ) q u e s t i o n s t h a t d o n o t c o m e u n d e r t h e "strict" crite­ rion o f neutrality—take

u p ethical contents

to the extent that they a r e

justified. O f course, in questions that affect persons' ethical identity in a morally relevant manner,

a n e t h i c a l s e l f - r e l a t i v i z a t i o n i s r e q u i r e d recipro­

cally: r e s t r i c t i n g a f o r m o f l i f e c a n b e j u s t i f i e d n o t w i t h e t h i c a l , o n l y w i t h m o r a l r e a s o n s . P e r s o n s h a v e a r e c i p r o c a l r i g h t to this

protection.

Individual rights a r e therefore reciprocally nonrejectable

rights to re­

s p e c t f o r p e r s o n a l integrity. I n this nonrejectability lies their m o r a l c o r e , w h i c h is j u s t i f i e d n e i t h e r e t h i c a l l y n o r i n t e r m s o f n a t u r a l l a w b u t i n t e r s u b ­ jectively; the core must b e legally d e t e r m i n e d

a n d institutionalized.

T o

avoid false c o n c l u s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e relation b e t w e e n ethics a n dlaw, o n e m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g . First, i n a c c o r d a n c e with this ( p r o c e d u r a l ) conception of law neither

the conception o f the ethical n o r that o f the

l e g a l p e r s o n is u n d e r s t o o d "atomistically"; t h e f o r m e r is "situated" i n "con­ stitutive" c o m m u n i t i e s ,

t h e latter in the reciprocal recognition o f e q u a l

m e m b e r s in a c o m m u n i t y o f rights a n d duties. S e c o n d , as a protective cover, law is a reflection o f t h e fragility o f ethical identities a n d d o e s n o t i m p o s e a p r e f o r m e d identity u p o n

the latter—a

stipulation

that places high de­

m a n d s o n law. O n l y l a w that d o e s n o t itself s p e a k a particular ethical lan­ guage

(to which minorities w o u l d have to subordinate

themselves) can

satisfy t h e s e d e m a n d s : e t h i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d l a w will n o t d o j u s t i c e t o e t h i c a l

234

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

identities. L a w is "neutral" n o t i n t h e sense that r e s p e c t i n g t h e t h r e s h o l d of reciprocity a n d generality d o e s n o t set limits to certain c o n c e p t i o n s o f the " g o o d " that, f o r instance, b r i n g t h e ethical a u t o n o m y o f minorities to b e a r a g a i n s t t h e e t h i c a l a u t o n o m y o f majorities; l a w is t h e r e f o r e n o t ethi­ cally u n d e m a n d i n g .

L a w is " n e u t r a l " i n s o f a r a s this t h r e s h o l d

a n d these

limits a r e n o t themselves b a s e d o n ethical values. H e n c e , third, "neutrality" is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d

in the sense o f the principle o f general justification

( a n d o f certain criteria) a n d n o t as t h e "neutrality o f c o n s e q u e n c e s " o r the "neutralization" o f political discourses. T h i s t h e o r y o f t h e e t h i c a l n e u t r a l i t y o f l a w is a critical s t a n d a r d f o r a l l t h o s e l e g a l r e l a t i o n s that, i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t is t o b e l e g a l l y r e c o g n i z e d , use particular conceptions that e x c l u d e "other" identities b u t claim to b e neutral a n d "color-" o r "gender-blind." T h u s , like the c o m m u n i t a r i a n s , fem­ inist theory criticizes t h e false c l a i m o f t h e l e g a l p e r s o n to b e g e n e r a l w h e r e in t r u t h this p e r s o n is i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c a n d " m a s c u l i n e " ; b u t f e m i n i s t departs from the communitarian

theory

critique w h e r e the latter wants to abso­

lutize c e r t a i n c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y ' s g o o d life. H e r e o n e c a n i n ­ fer—critically, b u t o f course n o t affirmatively—an ethical justification o f law f r o m a " n o n n e u t r a l " effect o f law. W h a t matters is that l e g a l n o r m s that are exclusionary in character d o n o t obstruct ethical self-determination (of cultural minorities too, for instance); a n d only law that claims to b e gen­ erally a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y justified c a n o p e n itself to h i t h e r t o e x c l u d e d c l a i m s to r e c o g n i t i o n — p a r t i c u l a r

p e r s o n s ' c l a i m s t o equal r e c o g n i t i o n

law, that is. T h e status o f t h e l e g a l p e r s o n

through

r e m a i n s a status o f equality.

N e u t r a l i t y i m p l i e s n o t e q u a l t r e a t m e n t that is b l i n d t o d i f f e r e n c e b u t r e c ­ o g n i t i o n o f e q u a l e n t i d e m e n t i n a s u b s t a n t i v e s e n s e . B e c a u s e life is partic­ ular, law m u s t b e g e n e r a l , e q u a l f o r all, a n d equally sensitive. I n short, o n l y as g e n e r a l l y a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y g r o u n d e d l a w is law, o n t h e o n e h a n d , ethically inclusive a n d mindful o f difference a n d , o n the other, justified in a w a y t h a t l e g i t i m a t e s its o b l i g a t i n g a n d s u m m o n i n g

character.

T h i s c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n ethical a n d legal contexts calls f o r the e x p a n ­ sion o f perspective to include the context o f c o m m o n citizenship a n d o f the

democratic

legitimation o f law within a political community.

claim to generality h a s to b e r e d e e m e d

Law's

a n d l e g i t i m a t e d in political dis­

c o u r s e s — i n a consensus o f citizens w h o a r e authors a n d n o t just addressees of law. I n contrast to a natural-law c o n c e p t i o n o f the legal p e r s o n ' s

moral

c o r e , w h i c h is r e f l e c t e d , a s it w e r e , i n positive l a w ,this c o r e m u s t itself b e reciprocally a n d generally justified a n d concretely determined

in a legal

a n d political community. M o r e o v e r , legal n o r m s must b e n o t only justified a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y a f f i r m e d b u t a l s o realized i n a p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y ' s p o ­ litical a n d s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s i n w h i c h citizens u n d e r s t a n d t h e m s e l v e s a s m e m ­ bers of a community a n d grant o n e another the necessary presuppositions of personal a n d political autonomy. L e g a l persons a r e as individuals re-

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

235

s p o n s i b l e before t h e l a w , c i t i z e n s a r e j o i n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e l a w . Citizens c r e a t e a n d r e a l i z e t h e l a w i n w h i c h ( p a r t i c u l a r ) ethical persons a r e r e c o g n i z e d a s ( e q u a l ) legal persons. E t h i c a l , l e g a l , a n d p o l i t i c a l a u t o n o m y f o r m a n i n ­ ternal

connection.

T h e question o f t h e m e a n i n g o f "citizenship" a n d "political c o m m u n i t y " o p e n s a n o t h e r r o u n d i n t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n c r i t i q u e o f l i b e r a l i s m : e v e n ii it i s g r a n t e d t h a t , i n a j u s t i f i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a n d a p r a c t i c a l r e s p e c t , " e t h i c a l p e r s o n " a n d "legal p e r s o n " b e l o n g to two different n o r m a t i v e levels, a n d even if law's claim to generality does n o t e x c l u d e ethical identities but protects

t h e m , t h e r e still r e m a i n s t h e q u e s t i o n

o f t h e Sittlichkeit t h a t a

" h e a p " o f l e g a l p e r s o n s c a n c r e a t e , a h e a p that is ethically pluralistic a n d whose constituents enjoy equal rights in law. D o e s n ' t the political com­ m u n i t y h a v e t o b e a n e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t y ? C a n l i b e r a l i s m r e a l i z e its p r o m i s e of

a

"social

union

o f social

unions"

only

if it

counts

on

a

civic-

c o m m u n i t a r i a n solidarity that respects a n d realizes general n o r m s ? F o r t h e conceptualization o f t h e terms "citizen," "political c o m m u n i t y , " a n d "legitimacy" o n the communitarian side, ethical m e m b e r s h i p in com­ m u n i t i e s serves a s t h e m o d e l ; o n t h e liberal side, t h e m o d e l is l e g a l p e r s o n and legal community—both

v i e w p o i n t s , h o w e v e r , fall s h o r t o f t h e m a r k

here. Against the b a c k g r o u n d o f the discussion o fliberal m o d e l s o f political legitimacy a n d community

(viz., m o d u s v i v e n d i a n d o v e r l a p p i n g

consen­

sus) , o f their critique b y substantivist a n d participatory c o m m u n i t a r i a n a p ­ p r o a c h e s , a n d o f t h e d e b a t e w i t h t h e o r i e s o f civil society a n d d e l i b e r a t i v e democracy, o n e c a n formulate a n alternative conception in w h i c h political i n t e g r a t i o n is n o t u n d e r s t o o d i n a n ethical m a n n e r , b u t i n w h i c h citizens conceive o f themselves as part o f a political w h o l e f o rwhich they are jointly r e s p o n s i b l e . T h epolitical c o m m u n i t y is less t h a n a n ethical c o m m u n i t y b u t m o r e than a purposive c o m m u n i t y f o r securing individual rights. Solidarity b e t w e e n citizens d o e s n o t rest o n c o m m o n

ethical values b u t consists in

r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n a s fellow citizens w i t h t h e (realized) r i g h t t o fully e n t i t l e d m e m b e r s h i p , t h a t is, t o p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t l e g a l , p o l i t i c a l , o r s o c i a l exclusion. A theory o f political recognition as (a) a n ethically "different"

person,

(b) a legal p e r s o n h a v i n g e q u a l rights, (c) t h e "co-author" o f law, a n d (d) a fellow citizen with t h e right to the equal "worth" o f personal a n d political a u t o n o m y — s u c h a t h e o r y is a r e s p o n s e to t h e d i l e m m a o f "substanceless substance," namely, to t h e d i l e m m a o f n o t tying citizenship to ethicalcultural (ethnic, religious, etc.) specifications a n d c o m m o n a l i t i e s b u t at the same

time

b e i n g able to e x p l a i n "substantive" political integration a n d so­

cial solidarity. I n the political sense, responsibility h a s a discursive m e a n i n g a n d o n e referring to solidarity: citizens r e s p o n d to a n d a r e responsible f o r o n e a n o t h e r a n d f o r their collective as a w h o l e . I n this sense o n e c a n s p e a k o f "political virtues." A political, c o l l e c t i v e identity p r e s u p p o s e s that t h e

23 6

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

c i t i z e n s c a n i d e n t i f y w i t h t h e i r p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y t o t h e d e g r e e t h a t it recognizes t h e m in the above-mentioned respects. T h u s they can see them­ selves adequately r e p r e s e n t e d in the self-understanding a n d institutions of t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y a n d c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s " p a r t " o f it. T h i s i d e n t i t y has g r o w n historically out of c o m m o n

e x p e r i e n c e s a n d conflicts, a n d

it

c o n t i n u e s t o b e t h e o b j e c t o f p o l i t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; it is n e i t h e r a f i x e d s u b s t a n c e n o r c o m p l e t e l y substanceless. I n contrast to the thesis that a p o ­ litical c o m m u n i t y n e e d s a n ethical-cultural basis o f i n t e g r a t i o n a n d r e c i p ­ rocal recognition, an ethical-pluralistic political c o m m u n i t y can b e integrative

o n l y i f it d o e s

not

politically absolutize

a particular

fully

ethical-

c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . F o r it is o n l y t h e n t h a t a l l p e r s o n s c a n b e r e g a r d e d

as

m e m b e r s having equal rights a n d the political c o m m u n i t y can b e consid­ ered a common

"good."

W i t h r e f e r e n c e to the q u e s t i o n o f political legitimacy, political d i s c o u r s e s are n o t g r a s p e d as the ethical self-clarification o f a c o m p r e h e n s i v e m a c r o subject o r as the fusion o f p a r t i c u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e s into a c o m m o n will o f all v i r t u o u s citoyens, n o r a r e t h e s e d i s c o u r s e s l i m i t e d t o " p u b l i c " q u e s t i o n s i n a restricted, political-moral sense. C o n t r a r y to the view o f s o m e liberal ap­ p r o a c h e s , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h i c a l v a l u e s a n d g e n e r a l n o r m s is n o t translated

"private"

and

"public": all q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g u n e q u a l social c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d

one-dimensionally into

the

separation

between

the

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f ethical identities a r e q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i c e . B u t this b r o a d ­ e n i n g of the scope of justice does not m a k e political discourses into ethical discourses o f self-discovery. In political discourses, a public-general

lan­

g u a g e o f c i t i z e n s m u s t b e f o u n d t h a t g i v e s e f f e c t t o r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s , is o p e n to c r i t i q u e , a n d is at t h e s a m e

time

a common, binding

language.

A c c o r d i n g to the t h e o r y o f "deliberative" d e m o c r a c y , d e m o c r a c y ' s c l a i m to legitimacy rests o n a justified generality o f c o n s e n s u a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d c o m ­ p r o m i s e s t h a t is ( a n d a l w a y s h a s t o b e ) d i s c u r s i v e l y b r o u g h t a b o u t b y p r o ­ cedures of reciprocal argumentation.

These procedures exclude

neither

topics n o r participants; they enable "public" reason, the concrete

content

o f w h i c h is a s c e r t a i n e d p o l i t i c a l l y a n d j o i n d y . T h u s , o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e first t w o " r o u n d s " o f t h e d e b a t e , the discussion of the communitarian

c r i t i q u e o f t h e l i b e r a l t h e o r y o f citi­

zenship, political c o m m u n i t y , a n d legitimacy has l e d to a conception

of citizenship that assimilates the

differentiated

two previously

mentioned

conceptions o f the person a n d adds essential elements. T h e dimensions o f ethical

person,

legal person,

and

citizen

are

conceptually

t h r o u g h law's c l a i m to legitimacy; the f o r m a t i o n o f a

connected

personal-autonomous

ethical identity presupposes the protection of the law a n d therefore political a n d social participation

certain

possibilities, w h i c h in turn require

m e m b e r s h i p in a political community. Ethical, legal, a n d political o m y m u s t n o t b e set in false opposition: ethical self-determination,

full

auton­ legal

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

237

f r e e d o m to act,as well as political participation a n d responsibility are com­ patible b e y o n d individualistic atomism a n d social m o n i s m (which does not m e a n that they c a n n o t c o m e into conflict). A t this level t o o , t h e p r i n c i p l e of general justification

a n d the requirements

of recognizing

particular

identities—be they individual o r collective identities—supplement o n e an­ other: a " p r o c e d u r a l r e p u b l i c " ( S a n d e l ) is n o t b a s e d o n t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f an "unencumbered

self."

A t t h e final s t a g e o f t h e d e b a t e , t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e g o o d i s a s s e r t e d o n c e m o r e o n a h i g h e r level. Principles o f e q u a l rights as well as p r o c e d u r e s o f g e n e r a l justification, it is said, rest u l t i m a t e l y o n a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d that is c o n t e x t - b o u n d ( b e it i n a political c o m m u n i t y o r i n a c u l t u r e ) . T h e r e c a n n o t b e a conception o f practical r e a s o n — o r a universalist morality— that stands "above" particular, "thick" contexts. A refutation tization

o f these objections leads, o n the o n e hand, to the thema-

of another,

fourth

context o f the justification o f norms: to the

m o r a l c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f y i n g s t r i c d y u n i v e r s a l moral norms b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a s m o r a l p e r s o n s a n d m e m b e r s o f t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y o f all h u m a n b e i n g s . On

t h e o t h e r h a n d , it l e a d s t o a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , m o r a l - t h e o r e t i c

recon­

struction a n d justification o f the principle o f practical reason according to which practical values o r n o r m s must b ejustified in the respective contexts to w h i c h their validity c l a i m s refer; that is t o say, it l e a d s t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n that is context-sensitive b u t n o t contextualist. T h e dimension o f m o r a l norms, moral justification, a n d m o r a l

recog­

n i t i o n is o v e r l o o k e d b y a c o m m u n i t a r i a n t h e o r y that u n d e r s t a n d s t h e c o n ­ c e p t o f "context" t o o n a r r o w l y a n d d o e s n o t a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r t h e "uni­ versal context" o f humanity.

Persons a r e n o t only ethical persons, legal

persons, o r citizens h a v i n g c o r r e s p o n d i n g rights a n d duties, they a r e also, as h u m a n

beings, moral persons w h o have certain rights a n d duties o f

recognition toward "every" person in principle—rights that the concrete c o n c e p t i o n o f l e g a l p e r s o n m u s t c o n t a i n a t its c o r e . It is o n l y h e r e t h a t t h e r e a l m e a n i n g o f a c a t e g o r i c a l l y b i n d i n g m o r a l i t y a n d t h a t o f moral autonomy (as a f o u r t h c o n c e p t o f a u t o n o m y ) reveal t h e m s e l v e s . It is i m p o r t a n t t o s e e t h a t n e i t h e r t h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n — w h i c h is r e f l e c t e d i n v a r i o u s j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o n t e x t s o f a n o r m a t i v e k i n d — n o r t h e c o m m a n d o f m o r a l r e s p e c t a n d g e n e r a l justification is mis­ takenly abstract. M o r a l n o r m s

protect concrete persons where only the

context o f c o m m o n h u m a n i t y exists as the normative foundation, a n d the duty to have moral respect corresponds to the basic duty to generally a n d reciprocally justify m o r a l action a c c o r d i n g to n o r m s with a g e n e r a l validity c l a i m — a duty that follows from the intersubjective-communicative edness" of being human

together.

Moral autonomy

presupposes

"situatnot a

"pure" realm o f moral obligation b u t action according to shareable, recip­ rocally justified, a n d intersubjective reasons. Furthermore, moral n o r m s d o

238

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

not replace ethical values o r political norms; rather, they enter into

com­

petition with t h e m only w h e r e these ethical values o r political n o r m s b e ­ c o m e m o r a l l y q u e s t i o n a b l e , that is t o say, w h e r e they d e n y p e r s o n s basic r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f g e n e r a l justification is c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d i n g n o t i n t h e s e n s e t h a t i t v i o l a t e s c o n t e x t s o f i n d i v i d u a l a n d c o l l e c t i v e selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n b u t i n s o f a r a s it d e s i g n a t e s m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d s w i t h i n w h i c h self-determination is "reiterated" (Walzer) in a particular w a y i n e a c h case. Moral principles o f respecting h u m a n dignity a n d o f recognizing the duty to stricdy justify g e n e r a l l y valid n o r m s g r a n t m o r a l p e r s o n s as h u m a n b e i n g s the

minimal comfort o f a Hilton

Hotel, without reducing

Sittlichkeiten o f p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s t o t h i s

the concrete

standard.

A s a K a n t i a n theory, Rawls's theory rests o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f g e n e r a l justification: h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f practical r e a s o n is e x p l i c a t e d o n a f u n d a ­ m e n t a l level o n t h e basis o f t h e " i d e a s " o f r e a s o n , t h a t is, t h e m o r a l p e r s o n a n d social cooperation. T h e s e serve thejustification b o t h o f moral princi­ ples o f equal rights a n d o f substantive principles o f socialjustice (for w h i c h certain additional a s s u m p t i o n s a r e n e c e s s a r y ) ; a n d i n their twofold task lies the

reason

for the political-moral double

character

o f Rawls's

model.

H e n c e , with r e g a r d to " r e a s o n a b l e " principles' d e o n t o l o g i c a l claim to pri­ ority, h i s t h e o r y is o n t h e o n e h a n d t o o political i n that it c o n n e c t s

certain

substantive p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s with its c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n ; y e t o n t h e o t h e r it is n o t political e n o u g h , i n s o f a r a s i n q u e s t i o n s o f political l e g i t i m a c y a n d social j u s t i c e it d o e s n o t a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r t h e c o n t e x t o f political a u t o n o m y a n d that o f the c o n c r e t e discursive d e t e r m i n a t i o n o ffull political membership. A

discourse-theoretic

constructivism,

formulated

in connection

with

O'Neill a n d discourse ethics as a n alternative to Rawls, argues instead f o r a recursive a n d discursive conception o f practical reason: in the absence o f objective, transcendental

moral truths w e cannot, a n d d o n ' t have to, d o

w i t h o u t a m o r a l validity c l a i m i n s o f a r a s this is u n d e r s t o o d a s a " r e a s o n a b l e " claim that cannot b e rejected with general a n dreciprocal reasons. Practical reason

is c o m m u n i c a t i v e - v i n d i c a t i n g , self-questioning r e a s o n — i t

(recur­

sively) d e m a n d s r e a s o n s o n w h i c h t h e validity o f p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e s o r n o r m s rests i n t h e contexts ( a n d c o m m u n i t i e s ) Thus

in w h i c h they claim to b e valid.

one p r i n c i p l e o f p r a c t i c a l - r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n r e f e r s t o different

m o d e s a n d contexts of justification. T h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f m o r a l p e r s o n a n d c o m m u n i t y i m p l i e d b y this n o t i o n o f r e a s o n (with r e f e r e n c e to t h e c o n t e x t o f morality) a r e n o t , as M a c l n t y r e criticizes, a n illusion i n their context-transcending

property a n d are not

themselves a n c h o r e d in a "liberal" conception o f the g o o d . A c c o r d i n g to Maclntyre, persons c a n b e c o n c e i v e d o f only as ethical p e r s o n s within eth­ ical universes, e a c h universe i n c o m p a t i b l e with any other. H e himself how­ e v e r is f o r c e d t o relativize h i s ethical-monistic c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e p e r s o n i n

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE o r d e r t o d o justice t o p e r s o n s ' ability to b e c o m p e t e n t

239

members of two

traditions; m o r e o v e r , h e must i m p o s e u p o n ethical contexts certain

moral

d e m a n d s that (internally) prevent exclusion a n d (externally) generate universal "moral law";

finally,

a

h e employs a dialogic-formal conception of

r e a s o n insofar as justification is a d d r e s s e d to i n d i v i d u a l s — a " s e c o n d - o r d e r " rationality (of justified validity) that is i m p o s e d u p o n a "first-order" ethical rationality ( w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n i n g its r e a s o n s i n t e r m s o f c o n t e n t ) . Taylor's defense o f the priority o f the g o o d over thejust acknowledges the differentiation o f normative spheres a n d the idea o fa universal morality b u t s e e s this m o r a l i t y j u s t i f i e d i n t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

goods" of modern

identity, in t h e strong evaluations that arise within m o d e r n i t y ' s ethical h o ­ rizons a n d raise their claim to g e n e r a l validity only against t h e b a c k d r o p o f t h e s e h o r i z o n s . I t is a s i g n o f m o d e r n i t y ' s f o r g e t f u l n e s s o f t h e self a n d o f c o n t e x t that it p r o c e e d s f r o m a g e n e r a l a n d abstract c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l reason that does n o t correspond to a n y conception o f the g o o d a n d does not operate by appealing to those conceptions o f the g o o d that c a n b e a c c e p t e d a s i d e n t i t y - d e t e r m i n i n g b y p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n s . O r ought t o b e a c ­ c e p t e d ? I n this q u e s t i o n t h e r e is a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l

problem

of a theory that traces t h e m o r a l validity o f n o r m s b a c k to ethical values a n d overlooks the decisive difference between a n ethical a n d a m o r a l form of practical reason. I n contrast to the ethical f o r m o f practical reason, the moral form has the goal n o t primarily o f helping the addressee,

through

i n s i g h t , t o a b e t t e r life b u t o f g i v i n g effect t o r e a s o n s t h a t t h e a d d r e s s e e must recognize a n d r e s p o n d to in o r d e r to b e able to justify his o r h e r a c t i o n s t o t h o s e p e r s o n s a f f e c t e d b y t h e m . T h i s f o r m o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is n o l e s s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e t h a n t h e e t h i c a l f o r m , a n d it t h u s a v o i d s T a y l o r ' s c r i t i q u e o f a c o n c e p t i o n o f r e a s o n that b e l i e v e s it c a n p r o v i d e "basic rea­ sons" that ignore intersubjective contexts. Yet ethical a n d moral

contexts

call f o r different types o f r e a s o n s a n d justifications o f these reasons: ethical values

a r e valid

understanding,

for an

individual

on

t h e basis

o f his o r

her

self-

insofar as h e o r she accepts them as being "important"

to

him or her; m o r a l n o r m s a r e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y v a l i d a s t h o s e n o r m s t h a t c a n ­ n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y r e j e c t e d before other persons. T h e passage through

t h e f o u r levels o f t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n

critique o f

liberal-deontological theories h a s s h o w n that f r o m t h e thesis that p e r s o n s are always "situated" as m e m b e r s o f concrete c o m m u n a l contexts o n e can­ n o t c o n c l u d e that questions o f law, d e m o c r a t i c self-rule, a n d morality c a n b e r e d u c e d t o ethical c o n t e x t s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it h a s b e e n s e e n

that

the c o n c e p t i o n s o f legal p e r s o n , citizen, a n d m o r a l p e r s o n , w h i c h a r elo­ cated alongside the ethical person, must b e formulated in such a way that the abstraction that necessarily a c c o m p a n i e s these conceptions always re­ lates to t h e possibility o f protecting a n d r e c o g n i z i n g concrete identities a n d reflects t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f realizing t h e j u s t i n c o m m u n i t i e s . I n this sense,

240

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

communitarian

critique represents a n important corrective m o m e n t for

liberal theory. The

analytical distinction

between

normative

spheres, which

follows

f r o m the discussion o f the levels at w h i c h liberal a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n p o ­ sitions c o n f r o n t o n e a n o t h e r , t h e r e f o r e calls f o r a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l theory o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f p e r s o n s i n c o m m u n i t i e s that is b a s e d o n a n i n t e r s u b jectivist c o n c e p t i o n o f practical r e a s o n . Its p r i n c i p l e — n a m e l y , that v a l u e s a n d n o r m s a r e to b e justified in the respective contexts in w h i c h they claim validity—does

not contradict

the contextuality

of ethical

values,

legal

norms, political discourses, a n d moral justification precisely because o f the f a c t t h a t a t a l l t h e s e l e v e l s it is c o n c r e t e p e r s o n s w h o p u t f o r w a r d v a l i d i t y claims a n d justify t h e m in different "justification c o m m u n i t i e s "

(see the

following section). T h e "priority o f practical r e a s o n " i m p l i e s a differenti­ ated understanding o f the contexts in which practical questions are to b e answered in c o m p l i a n c e with the priority o f the ethically g o o d , the priority of equal individual rights, the priority o f w h a t c a n b e politically legitimated g e n e r a l l y , o r t h e p r i o r i t y o f t h e m o r a l l y r i g h t ; a n d it i m p l i e s a n u n d e r s t a n d ­ i n g o f h o w t h e s e v i e w p o i n t s a r e c o n n e c t e d , t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f w h i c h is n o t to b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e s e n s e o f a d i s j u n c t i o n . It is t h e s e

distinctions

t h a t first a l l o w o n e t o s e e t o w h a t e x t e n t l a w , d e m o c r a c y , a n d m o r a l i t y c a n d o ' j u s t i c e " t o t h e " g o o d " ( i n its v a r i o u s m e a n i n g s ) . A t h e o r y o f justice m u s t n o t a b s o l u t i z e o n e o f t h e s e d i m e n s i o n s a n d s h a p e t h e o t h e r s a c c o r d i n g t o it; j u s t i c e m a i n t a i n s t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n spheres by giving effect—in accordance with generally justified

these

norms—to

ethical identity, e q u a l rights, political m e m b e r s h i p , a n d m o r a l respect. J u s ­ tice

recognizes ethical persons as persons in n e e d o f protection a n d grants

t h e m general rights a n d the liberties o f personal a n d political a u t o n o m y u n d e r t h e m i n i m a l s t a n d a r d o f m o r a l r e s p e c t . I n this s e n s e o n e c a n s p e a k o f a n " a u t o n o m o u s l y " justified basic structure o f society. W h a t r e c o g n i t i o n of persons in their ethical identities, as legal persons o r citizens, as partic­ u l a r s a n d as e q u a l s , m e a n s c o n c r e t e l y is left to t h e c o n t e x t s o f ethical a n d p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s ; that t h e y m u s t b e r e c o g n i z e d a s s u c h i s a r e q u i r e ­ m e n t o f j u s t i c e . T h e p e r s o n a t t h e c e n t e r o f a t h e o r y o f j u s t i c e is n o t j u s t a n e t h i c a l p e r s o n , a l e g a l p e r s o n , c i t i z e n , o r m o r a l p e r s o n , h e o r s h e i s all o f these s i m u l t a n e o u s l y i n a d i f f e r e n t way: h e o r s h e is ethically, legally, politically, m o r a l l y a u t o n o m o u s .

I n this c o n c e p t i o n , therefore,

n o t i o n s o f p e r s o n a l a n d p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t y a r e aufgehoben—notions stressed differently b y liberal a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n

different that are

theories.

T h e o u t c o m e o f this d e b a t e m u s t n o w b e e x a m i n e d closely. T h e follow­ ing moral-theoretic analysis o f these f o u r normative contexts a n d c o n c e p ­ tions

o f a u t o n o m y , w h i c h h a v e b e e n o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h a d i s c u s s i o n o f dif­

f e r e n t p r o b l e m levels in a theory o f justice, h a s t h e task o f clarifying h o w t h e y c a n b e s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a n d c o n n e c t e d t o g e t h e r . T h i s sys-

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE tematic analysis will t h e n b e s u p p l e m e n t e d

241

by a perspective provided by

the theory o f recognition.

5.2.

CONTEXTS OF JUSTIFICATION

In a normative respect, p e r s o n s a r e "situated" i n different contexts: are m e m b e r s o f different (ethical, legal, political, a n d moral)

they

communities

in w h i c h they a r e f a c e d with practical questions that they m u s t a n s w e r with g o o d reasons within these communities. A theory o f morality (in the larger sense) must therefore b e g i n in intersubjective-practical contexts in order to reconstruct t h e different m o d e s o fvalidity a n d justification a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h " a u t o n o m o u s " p e r s o n s a c t "rightiy." A closer e x a m i n a t i o n o f these n o r m a t i v e s p h e r e s will s h o w i n w h a t s e n s e o n e c a n s p e a k h e r e o f "justifi­ cation." T h i s analysis is t h e starting p o i n t b o t h f o r t h e discussion o f possible n o r m a t i v e c o n f l i c t s within a n d between c o n t e x t s a n d f o r a d e t a i l e d lation o f the conception

of autonomy.

formu­

First, h o w e v e r , I d e a l with

three

fundamental moral-theoretic objections a n d problems against whose back­ g r o u n d the character o f t h e p r o p o s e d conception appears m o r e clearly.

(a) Three Problems in Moral Theory O n e c o u l d object, f o r instance, that the idea o f different spheres o f prac­ tical

questions a n d answers leads to a fragmentation

o f t h e self a n d t h e

normative w o r l d that n o l o n g e r allows the idea o f a n integration o f these spheres, o r that the separation o f different questions, particularly ethical a n d m o r a l o n e s , a b s o l u t i z e s t h e r e a l m o f m o r a l i t y vis-a-vis t h e e t h i c a l i d e n ­ tity o f p e r s o n s . T h i s p o i n t p e r m i t s t w o a l t e r n a t i v e s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e

first,

m o r a l questions themselves c a n b e answered solely o n a n ethical basis "for m e " a n d n o t g e n e r a l l y i n t h e strict sense; t h e s e c o n d says that, ethical a n d moral questions c a n b e distinguished, morality must less itself b e a n c h o r e d

though nonethe­

i n t h e e t h i c a l " b e i n g a self." H e r e t h e i d e a o f a

c o m p r e h e n s i v e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a n d o f g e n e r a l n o r m s is n o t d o u b t e d i n principle, b u t moral obligations a r e grasped ultimately as ethical obliga­ tions. T h e discussion takes u p t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e fragmentation

o f the

normative world in debate with T h o m a s N a g e l ( a n dhis suggestion f o r in­ tegration), e x a m i n e s t h e ethical critique o fmorality o n t h e basis o f B e r n a r d Williams's objections to deontological theories, a n d then e x p l o r e s t h e eth­ ical a n c h o r i n g o f morality with r e f e r e n c e t o E r n s t T u g e n d h a t . T h e s e p r o b ­ lems c o n c e r n all three stages o f moral justification discussed in

chapter

4 . 2 — m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h m o r a l action m u s t b e j u s t i f i a b l e i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h norms t h a t a r e i n t u r n " r e a s o n a b l y " j u s t i f i e d i n a c c o r ­ d a n c e w i t h t h e principle o f r e c i p r o c a l a n d g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . W h a t

notion

o f r e a s o n s o r n o r m s is p r e s u p p o s e d b y this c o n c e p t i o n , a n d w h a t d o e s it m e a n to act "reasonably"?

242

CONTEXTS OF J U S T I C E

( 1 ) U n d e r t h e title ' T h e F r a g m e n t a t i o n o f V a l u e " N a g e l ( 1 9 7 9 ) a n a l y s e s five

different values that c a n c o m e into conflict with o n e another w h e n a

p e r s o n asks h i m - o r herself w h a t h e o r s h e s h o u l d d o . H e distinguishes b e t w e e n "specific obligations" (as a m e m b e r o f a family, f o r instance), t h e r i g h t s o f o t h e r s , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f g e n e r a l utility, p e r f e c t i o n i s t v a l u e s t h a t are to b e p r o m o t e d

f o r their o w n sake (art, f o r e x a m p l e ) , a n d ,

finally,

p e r s o n a l e n d s a n d c o m m i t m e n t s . N a g e l d o u b t s t h a t t h e r e is a v a l u e s c a l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h all values c o u l d b e p l a c e d in a n o r d e r o f priority; nei­ ther the personal a n d subjective-relative e n d s n o r t h e objective a n d "im­ p e r s o n a l " values ( o f a utilitarian o r perfectionist kind) h a v e absolute pri­ ority in all practical questions. Human beings are subject to moral and other motivational claims of very different kinds. This is because they are complex creatures who can view the world from many perspectives—individual, relational, impersonal, ideal, etc.— and each perspective presents a different set of claims. (r 3 4 ) It is a q u e s t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l j u d g m e n t a s t o w h a t p e r s p e c t i v e i n w h a t c o n t e x t is a p p r o p r i a t e .

1

N a g e l thereby relativizes his c o n c e p t i o n f r o m (1970)

according

to which

only

The Possibility of Altruism

"objective reasons" a r e g o o d ,

action-

justifying r e a s o n s : " W h e n e v e r o n e acts f o r a r e a s o n , I m a i n t a i n , it m u s t b e possible t o r e g a r d o n e s e l f a s a c t i n g f o r a n o b j e c t i v e r e a s o n , a n d p r o m o t i n g an objectively valuable e n d " (96-97). Persons must b e able to adopt a n "impersonal" o r suprapersonal standpoint toward their o w nactions so that their reasons c a n at all b e reasons f o r persons, p r o m o t i n g objective values. D e s p i t e t h e partial qualification relative to subjective r e a s o n s , this c o n c e p ­ tion remains at the heart o f N a g e l ' s theory: m o r a l justification

requires

recourse to objective values that a r e to b e realized as best as possible—here t h e c o n s e q u e n t i a l i s t c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s c o n c e p t i o n s h o w s itself. M o r a l r e a ­ s o n s p r e s u p p o s e t h e objectivity a n d reality o f t h e s e v a l u e s ( 1 9 7 0 , 9 5 ; 1 9 8 6 , 138-63). T h e p r o b l e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r o f this c o n c e p t i o n , w h i c h s c r e e n s o u t t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e d i m e n s i o n o f j u s t i f y i n g r e a s o n s , is e v i d e n t i n N a g e l ' s a t t e m p t in

The View from Nowhere ( 1 9 8 6 ) t o c o n n e c t t h e o b j e c t i v e a n d s u b j e c t i v e

m o r a l standpoints. H e r e h e d e f e n d s t h e possibility o f a n "objective" stand­ point o f the p e r s o n w h o observes h i m - o r herself a n d situations o f m o r a l decision "from outside." ' T h e basic question o f practical reason from which ethics b e g i n s is n o t ' W h a t shall I d o ? ' b u t ' W h a t s h o u l d this p e r s o n d o ? ' " (141). T h e objective j u d g m e n t o f s o m e o n e w h o reflects f r o m the perspec­ tive o f t h e o b s e r v e r p r e s u p p o s e s a n objectivity o f v a l u e s t h a t a n s w e r s t h e question o f the right a n d the g o o d b e y o n d all particularity.

"Agent-neutral

reasons" a r e reasons that are valid f o r every person without

consideration

of his o r h e r concrete identity a n d designate unconditional values that a r e

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

243

t o b e p r o m o t e d ; " a g e n t - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s , " o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are v a l i d for a p e r s o n a s t h e p e r s o n h e o r s h e i s . T h r e e k i n d s o f r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s put die h e g e m o n y o f neutral reasons into question: "reasons o f autonomy"

(per­

sonal e n d s ) , "deontological reasons" (what o n e m a y d o to others),

and

s p e c i a l " r e a s o n s o f o b l i g a t i o n " t o a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y ( 1 6 5 ) . E v e n con­ t r a r y t o " o b j e c t i v e " r e a s o n s f o r c e r t a i n a c t i o n s , t h e s e r e a s o n s c a n be g o o d reasons to a c t differently: reasons that follow f r o m the individual's

partic­

ular situation a n d special relationships to others. H e r e t o o N a g e l eschews the attempt to construct a hierarchy between these reasons that w o u l d rank all p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n s ; t h e m o r a l task lies i n i n t e g r a t i n g t h e p e r s o n a l a n d i m p e r s o n a l standpoints a s best a s possible. T h e n o r m a t i v e w o r l d is s o c o m ­ p l e x t h a t c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n w h a t is g o o d f o r m e a n d w h a t is u n i v e r s a l l y r i g h t can arise a n d , contrary to Williams's (1985) objection to Kantian (with w h i c h N a g e l a g r e e s in respect o f utilitarianism

theories

[1986, 205]), the

moral-objective standpoint does n o t d e m a n d too m u c h o f persons in terms o f self-relativization: t h e ability to observe o n e s e l f "from outside" 198) is a basic h u m a n

(1986,

ability without w h i c h p e r s o n s c o u l d n o t s e e t h e m ­

selves as m o r a l persons. It continues to b e their central m o r a l attribute. Nagel's assumption that the adoption o f the third-person perspective o n o n e s e l f is t h e o n l y possibility f o r n o t n a r r o w i n g practical r e a s o n

to the

e t h i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e first p e r s o n , a n d h i s i n f e r e n c e f r o m t h e n e c e s s i t y of "objective" reasons the existence o f objective values fundamental to m o ­ rality, s h o w that h e c o n s i d e r s " d e o n t o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s , " like ethical v a l u e s , to b e agent-relative, w h i c h d o e s n o t h o w e v e r e x p l a i n d e o n t o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s ' c l a i m t o universality a n d o b l i g a t i o n . T o e x p l a i n it N a g e l w o u l d h a v e t o abandon

the dichotomy o f subjective a n d objective reasons ( a n d values)

a n d a c c e p t intersubjective r e a s o n s a s t h e b a s i s f o r j u s t i f i e d a c t i o n s between p e r s o n s . I n o r d e r to p u t f o r w a r d a claim to g e n e r a l validity, r e a s o n s that are valid b e t w e e n persons n e e d n o t rest o n "objective-realistic" values b u t must

be

intersubjectively

"constructed"—shared—reasons

(Korsgaard

1 9 9 3 , 28; D a r w a l l 1 9 8 3 ,1 4 0 - 4 5 ) . T h e i r objectivity lies n o t i n their

"exter­

n a l " reality; r a t h e r , it lies i n t h e i r b e i n g j u s t i f i e d r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y in a strict sense. T h u s these r e a s o n s retain a validity " i n d e p e n d e n d y " o f subjective m o t i v e s , a n d a r e r e a s o n s " f o r e v e r y o n e " — w h i c h is p a r t i c u l a r l y important to N a g e l (1970, 85; 1986, 144)—without to a t r a n s c e n d e n t

their

corresponding

reality that must b e "discovered." Christine K o r s g a a r d

(1993) therefore argues, o n the o n e h a n d with Nagel, for the distinction between normatively universal a n d subjective reasons ( o r motives), o n the other against Nagel's objectivism: Ask yourself, what is a reason? It is not just a consideration on which you in fact act, but one on which you are supposed to act; it is not just a motive, but rather a normative claim, exerting authority over other people and yourself at other times. T o say that you have a reason is to say something relational,

244

CONTEXTS OF J U S T I C E something which implies the existence of another, at least another self. It announces that you have a claim on that other, or acknowledges her claim on you. For normative claims are not the claims of a metaphysical world of

values upon us: they are claims we make on ourselves and each other. (Kors­ gaard 1 9 9 3 , 5 1 ) This conception o f the practical-intersubjective construction

of common

values through reciprocal argumentation contradicts the conception o f ob­ jective m o r a l values a n d thus the possibility o f consequentialist conceptions o f morality, a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h acts a r e justified insofar as they

promote

as best as possible the i n d e p e n d e n d y definable g o o d . G o o d reasons

must

b e located in intersubjective contexts i n w h i c h acts h a v e to b e justified to a n d f o r others (as subjects a n d objects of justification, respectively). N a g e l ' s thesis o f t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n

o f values must b e reinterpreted

in

this light. T h i s f r a g m e n t a t i o n d o e s n o t reflect t h e h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f subjec­ tive a n d o b j e c t i v e v a l u e s , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a g e n t - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s a r e i n ­ d e e d n o t "inferior" reasons b u t a r e n o n e t h e l e s s always i n c o m p e t i t i o n with objective values. Rather,

the complexity of the normative

world

corre­

s p o n d s to t h e different questions that p o s e themselves to p e r s o n s i n differ­ ent c o m m u n i t y contexts. T h u s questions o f "specific obligations," personal ends, as well as perfectionist, cultural values a r e ones that pose themselves to p e r s o n s as m e m b e r s o f ethical c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o f a particular T h e y a r e to b e r e s p o n d e d to against the b a c k g r o u n d o f shared

culture.

understand­

ings a n d o n e ' s o w n identity as part o f a collective identity; ultimately, e a c h e t h i c a l p e r s o n h i m - o r h e r s e l f is r e s p o n s i b l e i n t h e e t h i c a l l y

autonomous

sense f o r the ethical duties a n d e n d s that a r e "forh i m o r h e r " determinate o f life. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k , "ultimate v a l u e s " a r e a l s o e t h i c a l v a l u e s t h a t are jointly appreciated in a strong sense a n d a r e as such "valuable" (values o f art, f o r i n s t a n c e ) . Q u e s t i o n s o f g e n e r a l utility, b y c o n t r a s t , a r i s e m a i n l y i n political contexts, hardly ever in ethical considerations c o n c e r n i n g what de­ cision c o n t r i b u t e s to o n e ' s o w n g o o d life. T h e y d o h o w e v e r h a v e to b e a n ­ s w e r e d a n d g e n e r a l l y j u s t i f i e d — a n d this is a m o r a l a r g u m e n t — i n

consid­

eration o f the rights o f persons, b e they positive-legal o r m o r a l rights. M o r a l questions, o n e s in w h i c h persons m a k e m o r a l d e m a n d s o n others, a r e to b e answered only with stricdy shared reasons; they a r e "objective" insofar as they cannot b e reasonably (reciprocally o r generally) rejected. T h e criteria of reciprocity a n d generality a r e essential for morality's " c o m m o n

stand­

p o i n t " ; t h e y first e x p l a i n w h a t i t m e a n s t o s p e a k o f " s h a r e d " r e a s o n s . T h e normative w o r l d does n o t disintegrate into a h e t e r o g e n e o u s diver­ sity o f i n c o m p a t i b l e v a l u e s p h e r e s , n o r is it h o w e v e r a s i n g u l a r l i n e a r o r d e r . B o t h within a n d between p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s t h e r e i s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n f l i c t s (cf. N a g e l 1 9 7 9 , 1 3 4 ) . A n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of practical questions manded

c o n c e r n i n g w h a t is g o o d

o f all the spheres

" f o r m e , " w h a t is c o m ­

b y l a w , w h a t is politically j u s t i f i e d " f o r u s , " a n d w h a t is m o r a l l y

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

245

r i g h t " f o r all" d o e s n o t a s s u m e that t h e a n s w e r s that c a n b e g i v e n al these levels, a n d particularly b e t w e e n levels, will b e necessarily in a g r e e m e n t with o n e a n o t h e r . S u c h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d o e s n o n e t h e l e s s a s s u m e that they c a n a n d o u g h t to b e in a g r e e m e n t . " A u t o n o m o u s l y " integrating the different practical contexts a n d t h e obligations that persons as m e m b e r s o f different communities

h a v e is a p r a c t i c a l task w h o s e possibility is n e i t h e r

t h r o u g h a n objectivity o f c o m p a t i b l e values n o r p u t into question

given

through

2

an incompatibility o f different objectively valid values. Within the norma­ tive w o r l d t h e r e is n o p r e e s t a b l i s h e d h a r m o n y a n d n o r e a s o n s i n p r i n c i p l e f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e a t t e m p t o n t h e p a r t o f a p e r s o n w i t h i n t h e different c o n t e x t s o f one i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d w o r l d t o f i n d c o m p a t i b l e

answers

to d i f f e r e n t questions. W i t h o u t d o u b t , n o n e t h e l e s s , conflicts w i t h i n contexts as well as conflicts between

these

t h e m a r e serious, possibly "tragic"

conflicts in which g o o d reasons m a yspeak f o r different mutually exclusive actions; though

the different character o f contexts allows a n analysis o f

these conflicts a n d o f the formal criteria that " g o o d " answers to practical q u e s t i o n s m u s t satisfy, t h e c o n c e p t o f a u t o n o m y w o u l d h o w e v e r l o s e its m e a n i n g if m o r e than analysis w e r e possible a n d substantive criteria c o u l d be identified for the "only correct" solution

to practical problems as a

whole. O n t h e basis o f the c o n c e p t i o n o f different justification contexts a n d o f the criterion o f "shareable" reasons regarding moral questions, o n e c a n point out—with N a g e l a n d against a n ethical narrowing o f practical reason t o t h e first p e r s o n — t h a t

m o r a l reasons a r e action-justifying reasons

that

" g o b e y o n d " t h e first p e r s o n b u t d o s o i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i s t i c a l l y a n d n o t o b j e c tivistically;

h e n c e moral justification requires that o n e n o t objectivate one's

o w n perspective "from outside" b u t e x p a n d it discursively t o w a r d

others.

M o r a l r e a s o n s t h e r e f o r e h a v e a c h a r a c t e r that is " i n d e p e n d e n t " o f subjec­ t i v e m o t i v e s b y t h e i r b e i n g r e a s o n s between p e r s o n s ; a s s u c h , h o w e v e r , t h e y r e m a i n "subjective" reasons insofar as they a r e justified "by m e " to other persons. T h e i r intersubjectivity lies b e y o n d t h e alternative b e t w e e n objec­ tivism

a n d s u b j e c t i v i s m . P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h e r e f o r e c o n t i n u e s t o b e "first-

personal" (Williams 1985, 68), a n d concrete actors remain

irreplaceable

a n d a r e n o t dissolved into "anyone"; d e p e n d i n g o n the different contexts, though a n y reasons I give in response to practical questions must b e"my" reasons in order, f o r instance, to motivate m e to act morally, these reasons a r e h o w e v e r i n m o r a l contexts—unlike r e a s o n s i n ethical

contexts—not

already morally g o o d reasons b y being "my" reflectively affirmed reasons. Moral questions concern m e in a way different from ethical ones:

rather

t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g m y o w n g o o d life, t h e y a r e p e r s o n s ' d e m a n d s o n m e to which I must respond. T h e intersubjective character o f m o r a l r e a s o n s is f u n d a m e n t a l

a n d cannot b e r e d u c e d to the ethical

spective o f w h a t is g o o d " f o r m e . "

per­

246

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE (2) T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n c a n t h e r e f o r e

respond to the

following objections to deontological theories raised b y B e r n a r d Williams a n d M a r t h a N u s s b a u m . I t d o e s n o t a c c e p t ( a ) a moral transcendentalism a c ­ c o r d i n g to w h i c h morality consists o f "pure," "externally" justified

norms

that c o r r e s p o n d to a w o r l d o f values w i t h o u t conflict, a w o r l d b e y o n d life's contingencies o r "luck" (Williams 1981b; 1985,195-96; N u s s b a u m 1986, 4, c h . 1 0 ) . N o " n o u m e n a l " o r " c h a r a c t e r l e s s " ( W i l l i a m s 1 9 8 1 b ; 1 9 9 3 , 1 5 8 62)

self can, outside Plato's cave a n d inside K a n t ' s K i n g d o m o f E n d s , b e

the legislator o f m o r a l n o r m s b e y o n d all particular contexts (I leave o p e n w h e t h e r K a n t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n this w a y ) . M o r a l justification, j u s t like ethical reflection (which Williams a n d N u s s b a u m take as the m o d e l o f prac­ tical

r e a s o n ) , r e m a i n s " c o n t e x t - b o u n d , " b u t it d o e s r e q u i r e strictly r e c i p ­

rocal a n d general reasons that a r e "reasonable" in a n intersubjective sense, not a "transcendental" one. Even without the metaphysical presupposition o f a p u r e v a l u e s p h e r e , t h e validity o f m o r a l n o r m s rests o n this c l a i m t o universality a n d reason. Precisely because m o r a l n o r m s must b e able to s h o w concretely their validity a n d r e m a i n d e p e n d e n t they a r e n o t abstract, context-remote

constructions

upon

justification,

that spring from the

dream of a disengaged community o f reason (argues Williams 1985, 197). F u r t h e r m o r e , this c o n c e p t i o n o f practical r e a s o n d o e s n o t s p e a k f o r ( b ) a moral imperialism a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h m o r a l n o r m s o v e r r u n t h e a u t o n o m y of persons in the other spheres, a n d questions o f the g o o d are to b e an­ swered only in accordance with criteria o f what c a n b e generally agreed. A n "impersonal" morality does n o t take the place o f personal relationships, as Williams (1981a) a n d M a c l n t y r e (1982) fear. E t h i c a l questions

remain

ethical questions, b e they questions that a r e to b e a n s w e r e d collectively o r individually. N o morality relieves persons o f their responsibility f o r their g o o d a n d f o r their relationships to others within their "constitutive" c o m ­ munities. Ethical questions r e m a i n questions within a plurality o f ethical values; i n this s e n s e W i l l i a m s a n d N u s s b a u m r i g h d y p o i n t t o t h e limits o f ethical j u d g m e n t concerning the g o o d : ' W e k n o w that the world was n o t m a d e f o r u s , o r w e f o r t h e w o r l d , that o u r history tells n o p u r p o s i v e story, a n d that t h e r e is n o p o s i t i o n o u t s i d e t h e w o r l d o r o u t s i d e history

from

w h i c h w e m i g h t h o p e to authenticate o u r activities" (Williams 1993, 1 6 6 ) . All practical questions r e m a i n questions in contexts without definitive an­ swers; however, s o m e — m o r a l o r political q u e s t i o n s — m u s t

be answered

jointly b e c a u s e they arise jointly. T h e ethical self-relativization r e q u i r e d i n m o r a l q u e s t i o n s is n o t a n a b a n d o n i n g o f ethical identity b y " c o n t e x t l e s s " i n d i v i d u a l s ( n o r is it a self-objectivization); it is a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e u n a ­ v o i d a b l e relativizing relation o f t h e self to others, w h o themselves h a v e their own

identities.

As already mentioned,

t h e thesis o f t h e possibility o f conflict b e t w e e n

competing ethical values, a n d conflict between ethical values a n d moral

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE norms, does not mean,

first,

that r e a s o n a b l e resolutions to these

247

conflicts

a r e r u l e d o u t , n o r , s e c o n d , that t h e ethical conflicts of a p e r s o n a n d m o r a l conflicts between persons a r e to b e r e s p o n d e d to in the same,

ultimately

contingent way. F o r instance, a n (unforeseeable a n d fortuitous)

special

e t h i c a l s u c c e s s — f o r e x a m p l e , a p e r s o n ' s s u c c e s s i n h i s o r h e r life in c r e a t i n g a r t i s t i c v a l u e s — d o e s n o t r e p r e s e n t a m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e v i o l a t i o n of others' legitimate claims a n d cannot compensate such a violation. Indeed, as W i l l i a m s points o u t , ethical decisions a r e often to b e j u d g e d tively

retrospec­

o n t h e basis o f t h e i r s u c c e s s ; f r o m this, h o w e v e r , t h e r e d o e s n o t follow 3

a n y m o r a l l e g i t i m a t i o n f o r t h e action l e a d i n g t o this s u c c e s s . E t h i c a l d e ­ c i s i o n s — f o r f a m i l y life o r f o r life a s a n artist, f o r i n s t a n c e — a r e m a d e b y persons "forthemselves" (though they a r e m a d e together with others); yet the d e c i s i o n against f a m i l y life m u s t n o n e t h e l e s s b e m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e i n view o f the c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r others. T h e r e a r e n o "highest" values that t r u m p this responsibility. E t h i c a l p e r s o n s a r e always also m o r a l p e r s o n s w h o m u s t n o t fail t o satisfy c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a o f r e c i p r o c a l a n d g e n e r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n vis-a-vis t h o s e a f f e c t e d b y t h e i r a c t i o n s w h e n t h e y a c t a s p r a c t i c a l - r e a s o n a b l e persons. Satisfying these criteria d o e s n o t p r e s u p p o s e leaving o n e ' s o w n ethical p e r s p e c t i v e b u t i m p l i e s m o r a l l y e x p a n d i n g this p e r s p e c t i v e b y rea­ s o n s that o t h e r s b r i n g to b e a r — n o t with r e g a r d to h o w I o u g h t to live b u t with r e f e r e n c e to w h a t c o n d u c t I c a n justify t o t h e m . T o c o n s i d e r i n this j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h e t h e r a life f o r a r t a s a " v a l u e " e x c e e d s o t h e r m o r a l

points

o f v i e w p r e s u p p o s e s that v e r y " e c c e n t r i c " a n d c o n t e x d e s s s t a n d p o i n t t h a t is i m p u t e d t o d e o n t o l o g i c a l m o r a l i t y . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f this k i n d is a l s o " o n e thought too many," as Williams points o u t in another place (1981a, 18). H e r e h e righdy argues that t h e m o r a l standpoint w o u l d b e p r o b l e m a t i c if it d e m a n d e d i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h o n l y o n e p e r s o n c a n b e r e s c u e d f r o m a d a n g e r t h a t w e " i m p a r t i a l l y " c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r it is j u s t i f i e d , o f a l l t h e p o s s i b l e p e r s o n s i n d a n g e r , t o save o n e ' s o w n wife. T h i s is n o t h o w e v e r o n e o f those "situations

[that]

lie b e y o n d justifications" since here a n ethical

point o f view adds something contradict

to the moral point o f view a n d does n o t

i t . I f i t d i d , t h a t i s t o s a y , if, f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f o n e ' s

creation o r to please a p e r s o n close to oneself, o n e d i d n o t h e l p

artistic

someone

in i m m e d i a t e danger, o n e w o u l d clearly also e x p e n d o n e t h o u g h t t o o m a n y or, rather, o n e t o o few. Finally, the theory p r o p o s e d h e r e does n o t d e f e n d

( c ) a moral purism:

morally autonomous action in accordance with reciprocally a n d generally justified reasons does n o t presuppose "pure" motives such that the actionmotivating reasons a r e n o t m y o w n reasons affirmed o n the basis o f moral insight. T h i s p r o b l e m o f t h e relation b e t w e e n action-justifying,

normative

r e a s o n s a n d a c t i o n - m o t i v a t i n g , subjective r e a s o n s is a t t h e c e n t e r o f t h e debate b e t w e e n "externalist" a n d "internalist" theories. T h e s e c o n c e p t s a r e f r e q u e n d y e m p l o y e d i n different ways, w h i c h I c a n n o t discuss here.^ I n a

248

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

g e n e r a l sense, internalist theories state that practical r e a s o n s f o r a p e r s o n to a c t i n a particular w a y m u s t b e r e a s o n s that motivate this p e r s o n to a c t in this way. G o o d r e a s o n s m u s t m o t i v a t e t h e p e r s o n w i t h i n s i g h t into t h e m to act. E x t e r n a l i s t t h e o r i e s , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a s s u m e t h a t it is p o s s i b l e t o recognize reasons as justified b u t n o t b e motivated b y them. A further

rea­

s o n m u s t b e a d d e d , as it w e r e , i n o r d e r t o a c t i n t h e p a r t i c u l a r way. I t is h o w e v e r difficult t o i m a g i n e s u c h a r e a s o n , f o r if it is t o m o t i v a t e

someone

to a c t morally ( a n d not just in conformity with morality), t h e action

must

be based o n insight into the justification o f the act. Evidentiy, everything d e p e n d s here o n the concept o f "insight/' T h u s internalism points o u t that m o r a l reasons must b e able to motivate persons to act morally if they have i n s i g h t i n t o t h e s e r e a s o n s ( N a g e l 1 9 7 0 , 64; K o r s g a a r d 1 9 8 6 , 1 1 ) , w h e r e a s externalism points o u t that a n "amoralist" (Brink 1989, 46) c a n very well h a v e insight into w h a t it m e a n s t o b e m o r a l b u t is b y n o m e a n s

motivated

t o b e m o r a l . O b v i o u s l y , " i n s i g h t " i n t h e first s e n s e i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m " i n s i g h t " i n t h e s e c o n d : i n t h e first i t i s m o r a l i n s i g h t ; i n t h e s e c o n d i t i s i n s i g h t i n t o morality, w h i c h is n o t m o r a l insight. T h e c o n c e p t o f " m o r a l i n s i g h t " m e a n s that a p e r s o n acts m o r a l l y b y acting i n a c c o r d a n c e with reasons that c a nb e reciprocally a n d g e n e r a l l y justified; this p e r s o n sees these r e a s o n s a s h a v i n g the b e s t justification a n d iswilling a n d a b l e t o a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e with t h e m , since there a r e n o g o o d reasons to act contrary to them. therefore

"Reasons" are

intersubjective: t h e y a r e r e a s o n s b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d a r e t h u s

normatively valid i n a n " i n d e p e n d e n t " w a y as r e a s o n s with t h e best justifi­ cation; a n d they a r e "subjective" reasons f o r the individual persons, w h o are after all at o n c e authors a n d addressees o f m o r a l validity c l a i m s — t h e r e a s o n s b e t w e e n m o r a l p e r s o n s a r e r e a s o n s of, for, a n d between m o r a l

per­

sons. Internalism emphasizes the "subjective" side o f these reasons,

externalism

their

independent,

action-motivating

action-justifying

validity.

It

t h e r e f o r e m a k e s s e n s e t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n r e a s o n s t h a t explain a n a c ­ tion

a n d o n e s t h a t justify a n a c t i o n ; b e t w e e n r e a s o n s a p e r s o n h a d f o r d o ­

i n g s o m e t h i n g a n d r e a s o n s t o j u s t i f y it (cf. N a g e l 1 9 7 0 , 1 5 ; D a r w a l l 1 9 8 3 , 28-29,

80-81).

N o w ,in moral

actions—and

this is w h a t

characterizes

t h e m — t h e t w o levels m u s t coincide: a m o r a l action m u s t b e morally m o ­ tivated; o t h e r w i s e , t h o u g h it c o n f o r m s w i t h morality, it is n o t m o r a l . It is moral when

the reason w h ya person

acts a c c o r d i n g to certain

reasons

consists i n t h e fact that these r e a s o n s a r e m o r a l l y justified. T h i s is t h e core o f a morally reasonable, a u t o n o m o u s action, which c a n therefore b e explained without

a metaphysical concept

of freedom.

A n action

well

g r o u n d e d i n t h e m o r a l s e n s e is a n a c t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o r e a s o n s that c a n ­ not b e reciprocally a n d generally rejected—that normative

reasons that are nonetheless

is t o say,

"independent"

subjectively motivating

through

insight a n d d o n o t c o r r e s p o n d to "externally" established truths o r rest

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE on

"external" sanctions b u t a r e justified in intersubjective

persons w h o accept

240

contexts by

them.

Internalist theories a r e h o w e v e r f r e q u e n d y d e f e n d e d in a specific ver­ sion. If—following a particular interpretation

o f David H u m e ' s — w e

take

as a f o u n d a t i o n a c o n c e p t i o n o frationality a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h "reasonable" a c t i o n is action that, o n t h e basis o f a p e r s o n ' s e n d s ( g r o u n d e d o n desires or beliefs), best realizes these ends, then g o o d reasons c a n b e understood o n l y relative to t h e e n d s ( a n d d e s i r e s a n d b e l i e f s ) t h a t a p e r s o n h a s . R e a s o n s for action a r e thus necessarily part o fa person's "motivational (Gosepath

constitution"

1 9 9 2 , 229) o r "subjective motivational set" (Williams

198id,

102; italics o m i t t e d ) . T h e y c a n therefore b e o n l y "internal," action-causing, motivating reasons that simultaneously justify a n d explain a n a c t i o n — a n d t h i s w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e e n d s a p e r s o n h a s . R e a s o n (Vernunft)

does not

" s p a w n " r e a s o n s (Griinde) i f i t i s n o t c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e d e s i r e s a n d e n d s t h a t a p e r s o n h a s a s t h e p e r s o n h e o r s h e is. T h o u g h r e a s o n is n o t t h e "slave of the passions" in a narrow understanding

o f "passions," this

conception

nonetheless assumes with H u m e (1978, 4 5 7 ) the following: "Since morals, t h e r e f o r e , h a v e a n i n f l u e n c e o n t h e a c t i o n s a n d affections, it follows, that they cannot b e driv'd from reason; a n d that because reason alone, asw e have already p r o v ' d , c a n n e v e r have a n y such influence." T o b e effective, reason remains dependent u p o n the motives a n d values o f persons; prac­ tical

reasons c a n b e reasons only f o r persons w h o c a n affirm

them.

B u t this a p p r o a c h n a r r o w s practical q u e s t i o n s t o ethical questions: prac­ 5

tical justification is always a justification " f o r m e a n d o n l y f o r m e . " T h e r e a s o n f o r this lies i n a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t i o n o f practical rationality a n d the motivating f o r c e o f rational reasons. F r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n that, to g u i d e actions, reasons must b e subjective reasons o n e might infer that only rea­ s o n s t h a t " f i t " a p e r s o n ' s m o t i v a t i o n a l s e t c a n b e good r e a s o n s . T h e r e a r e therefore only subjective, hypothetical reasons f o raction, a n d h e n c e action n o r m s a r e "justified" o n l y i n this s e n s e . T h i s i n f e r e n c e is n o t h o w e v e r c o r ­ rect; f o r t h e fact that g o o d , justified r e a s o n s c a n motivate w h e n

persons

h a v e insight i n t o t h e m d o e s n o t m e a n

reasons

that subjectively "fitting"

a l o n e c a n b e a p p r e c i a t e d o r a r e a l r e a d y morally g o o d . M o r a l r e a s o n s c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d t o p e r s o n s ' d e s i r e s : m o r a l a c t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d o n l y if, g o i n g b e ­ y o n d o n e ' s o w n e n d s , p r a c t i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i n q u i r e s a f t e r r e a s o n s t h a t others c o u l d reasonably b r i n g f o r w a r d a g a i n s t a p o s s i b l e a c t i o n ( a n d w h i c h I c a n n o t reject r e c i p r o c a l l y ) . A n d this r e f l e c t i o n is a faculty o f practical r e a s o n that, unlike a purposive-rational reflection, inquires n o t after m e a n s f o r reach­ ing o n e ' s o w n ends o r — i n a wider sense—after ends that a r e praiseworthy but after action that c a nb e intersubjectively justified. T h ereasons that are, in a m o r a l respect, g o o d r e a s o n s m u s t b e a b l e to a n s w e r t h e q u e s t i o n W h y d i d y o u d o that? i n a w a y that n o t o n l y e x p l a i n s t h e action b u t also legiti­ m a t e s it.

250

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

T h e willingness t o a n s w e r m o r a l q u e s t i o n s w i t h r e a s o n s t h a t c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y r e j e c t e d , a n d t h e capability t o h a v e a c t i o n - m o t i v a t i n g i n s i g h t i n t o these reasons, c a n b e regarded in a wider sense as part o f a person's m o ­ tivational

set—however, only if the c o n c e p t o f "desire," w h i c h according to

empiricist theories is a l o n e action-motivating, i n c l u d e s t h e " r e a s o n a b l e d e ­ sire" ( n o t u n d e r s t o o d in a purposive-rational sense) to "find a n d agree o n p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h n o o n ew h o h a d this desire c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y reject" (ScanIon 1982, 1 1 1 ) . Rawls (1993a, 82-86) therefore distinguishes between "ob­ ject-dependent

desires" to pursue certain ends, "principle-dependent d e ­

sires" to act a c c o r d i n g to certain formal-rational o r (in t h e m o r a l sense) reasonable principles,

0

and,

finally,

"conception-dependent

desires," ac­

c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a p e r s o n is m o t i v a t e d t o a c t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a c e r t a i n political ideal o f free a n d equal citizens. I n a m o r a l respect, t h e principled e p e n d e n t d e s i r e is decisive i n a c t i n g a c c o r d i n g t o g e n e r a l l y a n d r e c i p r o ­ cally a g r e e a b l e r e a s o n s ; a n d it is n o t a d e s i r e , u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e e m p i r i c i s t o r ethical sense, to realize "my" e n d s b u t a faculty o f reason a c c o r d i n g to which "reasonable" reasons motivate "reasonable" persons to "reasonable" action, without these reasons having to b e "translated" into empirical, pur­ posive-rational d e s i r e s ( K o r s g a a r d 1 9 8 6 , 2 1 - 2 5 ) . P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is t h e c a ­ pability a n d w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c t w i t h j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is v i n d i ­ c a t i n g r e a s o n in i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e x t s . O n l y i n t h i s w a y i s i t p o s s i b l e t o distinguish moral action from action conforming with morality a n d only in t h i s w a y i s i t p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t o w h a t e x t e n t w e c a n demand o f p e r s o n s that they act in accordance with justified reasons (or c a n reproach

them

for n o t having acted thus). G o o d r e a s o n s a r e in t h e m o r a l — n o t the ethi­ cal—sense reasons "form e " ( a n d a r e thus "internally" motivating) a n d at t h e s a m e time r e a s o n s " b e t w e e n u s " ( a n d a r e t h u s t o b e " e x t e r n a l l y " j u d g e d a n d a r e normatively valid). T h e s e reasons a r e n o t "automatically" actionguiding; they c o m p e t e with other interests a n d possible special obligations. T h e y a r e h o w e v e r a c t i o n - g u i d i n g i n s o f a r a s a p e r s o n is w i l l i n g a n d a b l e t o act o n the basis o f m o r a l insight. Skepticism a b o u t moral-practical r e a s o n is t h e r e f o r e f u e l e d b y a partic­ ular c o n c e p t i o n o f ethical-practical r e a s o n a n d motivating "desires" that, b e c a u s e o f t h e t o o restrictive alternative b e t w e e n subject-relative a n d o b jectivistic justifications

o f morality,

neglects

morality's

intersubjectivity.

F r o m t h e c l a i m that " o u g h t " i m p l i e s "can" it c a n n o t b e c o n c l u d e d

that

" o u g h t " is t o b e r e d u c e d t o " ( c a n ) will." F o r i n s o f a r a s t h e assertion " ' o u g h t ' i m p l i e s ' c a n ' " is m e a n i n g f u l

( w h i c h I c a n n o t e x a m i n e h e r e ) , it refers to

the relation b e t w e e n w h a t o u g h t to b e d o n e a n d t h e possibility o f d o i n g it u n d e r t h e g i v e n c o n t i n g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n t h e w o r l d ; it d o e s n o t refer t o " o u g h t " b e i n g b i n d i n g o n l y i f a " w i l l i n g " c o r r e s p o n d s t o i t (cf. L a r m o r e 1 9 8 7 , 8 5 - 9 0 ) . Moral-categorical d u t i e s t h e r e f o r e a s s u m e n o t t h a t a p e r s o n casts o f f h i s o r h e r ethical interests, e n d s , a n d m o t i v e s b u t that i n m o r a l

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

251

questions ( a n d only in these) h e o r s h e acts a c c o r d i n g to n o r m s that c a n b e j u s t i f i e d r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y i n t h e strict sense. T h e s e r e a s o n s a r c t h e n b o t h his o r h e r r e a s o n s a n d g e n e r a l reasons; as such they have cate­ gorical validity—which m e a n s that they cannot b e meaningfully by a n y o n e — a n d

rejected

their m o r a l m e a n i n g consists in including e a c h

moral

p e r s o n i n t h e "justification c o m m u n i t y " o f m o r a l n o r m s . This intersubjective understanding tion

o f m o r a l validity a n d m o r a l motiva­

p r e s u p p o s e s action o n t h e basis o f motives a n d reasons that a r e not

"empirically unconditional" in the sense that moral actors must

abstract

f r o m allempirical conditions a n d interests o r feelings o n their o w n part o r even that o f other persons. H o w e v e r the Kantian determination will" is c o m p r e h e n d e d ,

7

o f "pure

the unconditionality o fmorally autonomous action

is, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n p r o p o s e d h e r e , t o b e u n d e r s t o o d

intersub­

j e c t i v e l y a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l l y . I t m e a n s t h a t w h a t is d e c i s i v e i n a p p r a i s i n g m o r a l q u e s t i o n s is n o t ethical, self-referential m o t i v e s , o r e v e n egoistic in­ t e r e s t s , b u t r e a s o n s t h a t c a n b e r e c i p r o c a l l y a n d g e n e r a l l y j u s t i f i e d to others. " F r e e d o m " f r o m e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s lies i n this reciprocity a n d g e n e r a l i t y of justification between moral persons, w h o recognize a n d respect o n e an­ other as both reciprocally responsible a n d vulnerable beings in n e e d of p r o t e c t i o n . M o r a l i t y l i e s i n t h e criteria o f a c t i o n - j u s t i f y i n g r e a s o n s , n o t i n i t s " p u r e " source—in

the metaphysical sense.

(3) T h e r e d o e s h o w e v e r r e m a i n a p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n . T h o u g h it is c o r ­ rect to distinguish morality f r o m ethical questions a n d to understand m o ­ rality's c o n t e n t i n t e r m s o f K a n t ' s c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e , its j u s t i f i c a t i o n itself (i.e., t h e justification o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f justification) is n o t h o w e v e r located in a n "emphatic" conception o f practical reason b u t in the ethical c o n d i t i o n s o f b e i n g a s e l f — t h a t is, i n t h e g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n s o f b e i n g a self as a m e m b e r o f a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . T h i s is T u g e n d h a t ' s ( 1 9 9 3 a , 80, 4 5 ) objection.

8

H e tries to justify a K a n t i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f morality without r e c o u r s e to a n o t i o n o f practical r e a s o n b y asserting that this c o n c e p t i o n is s u p e r i o r t o c o m p e t i n g t h e o r i e s a n d s h o w i n g t h a t it is t h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for the m o r a l identity o f persons. I n the c o n c e p t o f a " g o o d h u m a n

being,"

w h o h a s internalized the moral ought in light o f the internal sanction o f m o r a l s h a m e (56-64), m o r a l i t y a n d ethics a r e c o n n e c t e d . I n this w a y T u g ­ e n d h a t attempts to avoid both a contractualist position, according to which n o r m s a r e observed solely o n account o f external sanctions, a n d t h e strong thesis that b e i n g m o r a l is a n e c e s s a r y a n d u n a v o i d a b l e c o n d i t i o n o f b e i n g a self. N o n e t h e l e s s , a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y c a n s u c c e e d , h e a r g u e s , o n l y i f t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l justification a n d s o c i a l recognition is a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d . T u g e n d h a t ' s c o n c e p t o f t h e 'justification" o f a conception o f morality has two basic meanings. O n the o n e hand, h e begins with a particular idea

252

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

of morality a c c o r d i n g to which m o r a l n o r m s must m e e t the criteria that they c a n b e d e m a n d e d g e n e r a l l y i n t h e strict sense a n d a r e g e n e r a l l y a c ­ ceptable o n the basis o f insight—this thus rules o u t n o t only traditionalist o r religious justifications o f morality b u t also o n e s that locate the basis o f m o r a l i t y i n e m p a t h y , c o n t r a c t , o r g e n e r a l utility. T h e " g r a m m a t i c a l l y a b ­ solute" value expressions o fthe morally "good" a n dthe "unconditional use" o f t h e m o r a l "must" o r " o u g h t " (37, 40) i m p o s e u p o n t h e c a n d i d a t e s f o r the possible explanation o f these expressions conditions that

ultimately

o n l y a K a n t i a n m o r a l i t y c a n f u l f i l l . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h o w e v e r , t h e s e rea­ sons f o r t h i s m o r a l i t y f a c e a f u r t h e r d i m e n s i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n : i t m u s t b e a b l e t o s t a t e t h e motives ( 2 9 , 8 5 ) o n t h e b a s i s o f w h i c h p e r s o n s a r e a t a l l willing to o b s e r v e this m o r a l i t y a n d u n d e r s t a n d

themselves as morally

" g o o d " p e r s o n s . T h e " g r a m m a t i c a l l y a b s o l u t e " u s e o f " g o o d " is, a c c o r d i n g to T u g e n d h a t , a n attributive u s e i n r e f e r e n c e to t h e " b e i n g g o o d " o f p e r ­ sons. H e r e lies t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m o r a l o u g h t a n d subjective will: in a p e r s o n ' s w a n t i n g to b e g o o d . A n d h e r e there is also a crucial p o i n t e r for the rest o f t h e analysis, since m o r a l a r g u m e n t s a n d d e m a n d s o n a p e r s o n c a n n o t then rest o n a n i n d e p e n d e n t sense o f the morally right b u t c a n only appeal to the self-understanding o f t h e particular p e r s o n to c o m p r e h e n d him- o r herself morally. T h e moral

"must" is t h u s d o u b l y relativized: it

presupposes a n internal sanction o n nonobservance, which in turn presup­ p o s e s a n "act o f will," n a m e l y , t h e will to b e m o r a l (60). T h e alternative, c o n c e i v e d o f o n e m p i r i c i s t p r e m i s e s , b e t w e e n a "must" that is " a b s o l u t e " i n quasi-religious t e r m s , a n d a " m u s t " that is a n " o u g h t " o n l y a s subjective will, causes T u g e n d h a t to overlook the independent, b u t n o t absolute sense o f the

moral ought

as that which c a n n o t

t h e r e f o r e b e mutually

b e reasonably rejected a n d c a n

demanded.

9

This hypothetical justification o f being moral h a s problematic conse­ quences for his attempt to prove the Kantian theory, in terms o f content, to b e a plausible c o n c e p t i o n o f m o r a l i t y a n d to e x p l a i n t h e m o r a l

"ought"

b e t t e r t h a n a l t e r n a t i v e c o n c e p t i o n s . I n s o f a r a s t h e normative v a l i d i t y o f m o ­ rality is d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e will t o u n d e r s t a n d o n e s e l f i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, arguments formorality in general a n d forbeing moral in particular remain oriented to the "well-being" a n d the "prudential" reflection o f a n acting person

(89). B u t these a r g u m e n t s ultimately m e a n

that m o r a l a c t i o n is

c o m m a n d e d f o r t h e sake o f o n e ' s oam well-being a n d c a n n o t t h e r e f o r e b e r e c i p r o c a l l y demanded of a p e r s o n . H e r e i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t m o r a l i t y ' s ( s u b j e c ­ tive)

validity " f o r " a p e r s o n is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m its ( n o r m a t i v e ) v a ­

lidity "vis-a-vis" a p e r s o n : m o r a l i t y is v a l i d n o t o n l y w h e n a p e r s o n h a s a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d t h e s a n c t i o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h its v i o l a t i o n ( s u c h that, if p e r s o n s d i d n o t a c c e p t this, w e w o u l d h a v e to advise t h e m f o r their o w n s a k e t o understand themselves in such a way that they a r e a s h a m e d o f themselves f o r c e r t a i n a c t i o n s ) ; r a t h e r , it is v a l i d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e a p e r s o n acts n o t

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

253

only "for him- or herself" but must consider in his or her actions die claims of others—those possibly affected. Neither can this "must" be traced back to an ultimate, transcendental sanction that forces us to be moral, nor is it dependent upon an internalized sanction of hurting my sellunderstanding: the concept of sanction does not play a role until the ques­ tion of the observance or nonobservance of moral norms arises, and not already in the question of why someone ought to recognize others morally or what action is commanded or forbidden and ought to be penalized with sanctions. Sanctions—indignation and, correspondingly, shame—follow the violation of the morally right, and therefore the validity of the latter cannot be dependent upon the existence (and antecedent acceptance) of certain sanctions (cf. Habermas 1 9 9 3 b , 4 7 ) . This internal connection be­ tween validity and sanction (Tugendhat 1 9 9 3 a , 9 5 ) is a legacy of contractualism, which makes moral obligation dependent upon an antecedent act of will and cannot give any reasons as to why this act is commanded, namely, for the sake of others and not for one's own sake. A particular action ought to bring sanctions in its train because it is immoral; it is morally com­ manded not just when it brings (internal or external) sanctions in its train. This does not mean, it should be remarked, that moral action (unlike ac­ tion in conformity with the law) does not rest on inner moral motives or is not connected internally with accusations of guilt by others and oneself (in the "inner dialogue" that represents conscience). One must respect one­ self as a moral person, be able to "look oneself in the face"—however, respect for others is commanded not for the sake of one's own face. That would mean an "instrumentalization" of the other (Wingert 1 9 9 3 , 2 4 8 ) , which is not compatible with a morality of equal respect. Sanctions are more or less legitimate and "reasonable"—and for this evaluation we need "independent" moral standards of the right and the commanded, and in­ deed not primarily with reference to persons but with reference to actionjustifying norms. On the one hand, Tugendhat understands moral validity relative to what is "good for me" ( 1 9 9 3 a , 9 0 ) ; on the other, his basic critique of alternative theories of morality is that they envision such a condition. Thus he criticizes the restriction of moral obligation that accompanies an ethics of empathy in that it has recourse to a "feeling," which according to Tugendhat is not universalizable in the moral sense. Such an ethics knows no "common con­ ception of being good" ( 1 8 3 ) . Contractualism, on the other hand, knows no "moral sense" whatsoever; it does not really justify obligations morally; it is more a "quasi-morality" that is at best advantageous for persons but is not binding: "What is justified is a kind of being good relative to each individual" ( 7 7 ) . This does not lead to a shared idea of being good, ac­ cording to which the action of every "good" person corresponds to the categorical imperative. 'When I say that my reasons for raising certain 10

254

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

m o r a l c l a i m s ( t h a t this o r t h a t is g o o d / b a d ) c o n s i s t i n it b e i n g i n m y in­ terest to raise s u c h claims ( g o o d f o r m e ) , t h e n in so d o i n g I h a v e retracted these claims" (1993b, statement,

4 5 ) . M o r a l r e a s o n s , s o it s e e m s a c c o r d i n g to

c a n n o t b e "my" r e a s o n s a l o n e . Y e t this u n d e r s t a n d i n g

this

contra­

dicts the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f his o w n c o n c e p t i o n . T r u e , the reasons that are g o o d reasons

(for actions)

within K a n t i a n

m o r a l i t y a r e n o t l o c a t e d at the s a m e level as the r e a s o n s that s p e a k f o r m o r a l i t y as such, s i n c e t h e l a t t e r p r e c e d e t h e f o r m e r , a c c o r d i n g t o T u g e n ­ d h a t . T h e s e e d o f m o r a l i t y m u s t fall o n fertile subjective g r o u n d . H o w e v e r , the will t h e r e b y r e m a i n s a constant c o m p a n i o n o f the m o r a l o u g h t (1993a, 6 2 ) , s o t h a t b o t h levels d o v e t a i l . F o r , T u g e n d h a t says, a u t o n o m y m e a n s i n the sense of the f r e e d o m m o r a l i t y (97,

to act that p e r s o n s c a n d e c i d e for o r

against

160). M o r a l p e r s o n s n e v e r internalize morality to such a de­

g r e e t h a t it d e p r i v e s t h e m o f a u t o n o m y ; t h e y d o n o t " h a v e t o "

understand

themselves morally. T h u s the basic practical reflection continues

to

be

w h e t h e r it is " g o o d f o r m e " t o b e " g o o d " — a d e c i s i o n t h a t is o n e f o r

or

against s a n c t i o n e d c o n d u c t , for o r against a " c o n s c i e n c e . " Y e t this v o l u n tarist c o n c e p t i o n o f " w a n t i n g to h a v e a c o n s c i e n c e " (as o n e c o u l d say p a r ­ aphrasing H e i d e g g e r ) , o f "adopting a conscience," d o e s not d o justice to the i n v o l u n t a r i n e s s o f c o n s c i e n c e , w h i c h " m a k e s itself felt" w h e t h e r d e s i r e d o r n o t . T h i s q u e s t i o n is n o t h o w e v e r c e n t r a l ; e v e n t h o u g h o n e c a n n o t d e ­ c i d e o n " d e v e l o p i n g " (60)

a c o n s c i e n c e — i t j u s t m a k e s i t s e l f f e l t — i t is still

left u p to t h e p e r s o n t o f o l l o w this " c a l l . " R a t h e r , w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that, w h a t e v e r s o c i a l i d e n t i t y a p e r s o n h a s a n d w a n t s to h a v e , h e o r s h e is a s a m o r a l p e r s o n unavoidably an addressee o f validity claims raised by others, a n d t h e a u t h o r o f c l a i m s a d d r e s s e d t o o t h e r s . T h o u g h it d o e s n o t f o l l o w from

this that t h e p e r s o n n e c e s s a r i l y "feels f o r c e d " to r e s p o n d to

these

c l a i m s a n d to r e s p o n d in a certain w a y ( o r to justify his o r h e r o w n c l a i m s ) , it d o e s n o n e t h e l e s s f o l l o w t h a t t h e a b s e n c e o f this f e e l i n g — o r o f t h e w i l l to u n d e r s t a n d

o n e s e l f m o r a l l y — d o e s n o t invalidate the criteria o f a "rea­

sonable," morally justified, and reciprocally d e m a n d e d (and

demandable)

r e s p o n s e to t h e s e c l a i m s . Connecting ethics a n d morality in the

concept of the

"good

human

b e i n g " i s q u e s t i o n a b l e i n a n o t h e r s e n s e : w h a t i s t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n "selfe s t e e m " a n d the m o r a l "respect" o f o t h e r s a n d by others? T h e thesis o f the i m m a n e n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l i t y a n d " e g o identity" states that to b e e s t e e m e d "as a h u m a n b e i n g " as s u c h , a n d n o t as a p a r t i c u l a r

human

b e i n g w i t h c e r t a i n a t t r i b u t e s a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s , is e s s e n t i a l f o r s e l f - e s t e e m a n d for b e i n g able to affirm o n e s e l f (1993a, 59, 3 1 1 ) . s e n s e (cf. T u g e n d h a t

1 1

It n o n e t h e l e s s

makes

1984, 1 3 7 ; W o l f 1984, 1 0 0 - 1 1 1 ) to distinguish be­

tween b e i n g ethically e s t e e m e d as a "valuable" h u m a n

being and

having

m o r a l r e s p e c t a s a m o r a l p e r s o n , a n d h e n c e t o r e g a r d self-esteem a s b e i n g d e p e n d e n t u p o n w h e t h e r a p e r s o n is e v a l u a t e d a n d e s t e e m e d as a n i n d i -

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

255

vidual m e m b e r o f a n ethical c o m m u n i t y o n t h e basis o f shared values.M o ­ ral r e s p e c t o f a n d b y others, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , c o r r e s p o n d s to p e r s o n s ' self-respect i n b e i n g m o r a l l y a u t o n o m o u s ;

it is b o t h n a r r o w e r

c o m p r e h e n s i v e than the f o r m o f recognition that constitutes

a n d more self-esteem:

it r e f e r s t o r e s p e c t f o r h u m a n b e i n g s a s h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e i d e a o f " w a n t i n g to b e a f f i r m e d " i n t h e f o r m o f w a n t i n g to b e a p p r o v e d b y a n impartial m o r a l observer ( T u g e n d h a t 1993a, 3 1 1 ) oscillates b e t w e e n a n ethical a n d a m o r a l evaluation o f the h u m a n being considered "good." For, o n the o n e hand, to b e a b l e to e x p l a i n self-esteem substantively, this f o r m o f r e c o g n i t i o n ("wanting to b e affirmed") must involve recognition within a particular c o m m u n i t y a n d relate to t h e latter's social n o r m s — t o a

particularmeaning

o f " g o o d " (58) as a m e m b e r o f this c o m m u n i t y . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t o b e m o r a l i n t h e s e n s e o f a "morality o f universal r e s p e c t " (345), this f o r m o f recognition must relate to t h e unlimited m o r a l c o m m u n i t y o f all h u m a n beings (83-84). B u t then "wanting to b e l o n g " to a particular society c a n n o l o n g e r b e the motive f o r m o r a l action, which c a n o f course

require

g o i n g b e y o n d a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y a n d c r i t i c i z i n g it. S o c i a l e s t e e m a n d m o r a l self-respect w o u l d m o v e apart a n d the p e r s o n w o u l d s e e h i m - o r herself recognized in the eyes o f a "larger" community, as G e o r g e Herbert

Mead

says ( t o w h i c h I r e t u r n i n c h a p t e r 5 . 3 ) . N o t p r i m a r i l y w a n t i n g t o b e s o c i a l l y recognized, then, b u t having m o r a l self-respect motivates action a c c o r d i n g to n o r m s that leave all social particularity b e h i n d , a s T u g e n d h a t says ( 3 1 5 ) ; it w o u l d n o t b e t h e " w o r t h " b u t t h e m o r a l " d i g n i t y " ( i n t h e K a n t i a n s e n s e [cf. V l a s t o s 1 9 8 4 ] ) o f a h u m a n b e i n g t h a t w o u l d m a k e h i m o r h e r i n t o a n author a n d addressee o f morality. T h e n , however, a social c o m m u n i t y o f recognition h a s b e c o m e a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y of justification. H e n c e , it is o n l y c o n c e p t u a l l y w i t h i n K a n t i a n a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t T u g e n d ­ hat c a n argue for a n expansion o f the moral community to include all h u m a n b e i n g s ; h e c a n n o t a r g u e f o r it o n t h e basis o f h i s t h e o r y o f r e c o g ­ n i t i o n . T h a t t h e r e s t r i c t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i t y , a n d n o t its u n i v e r s a l i z a t i o n , needs to b ejustified (1992a, 330) corresponds to the principle o f g e n e r a l a n d reciprocal justification, according to w h i c h a moral n o r m must

con­

s i d e r "all e q u a l l y " ( 1 9 9 3 a , 3 1 7 ) a n d s o , i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h its c l a i m t o validity, d o e s n o t allow a n y restriction. M o r a l n o r m s a r e t h e r e f o r e

to b e

distinguished from other norms n o t primarily by means o f a concept o f s a n c t i o n b u t t h r o u g h t h e criteria o f strict g e n e r a l i t y a n d reciprocity. T h e s e norms

correspond to a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m o f s e l f - r e s p e c t , b u t t h e y c a n n o t b e

justified i n a t h e o r y o f s o c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n . W h e n i t i s a q u e s t i o n o f m o r a l i t y , justification a n d recognition m u s t b e linked in t h e correct way: t h e fact that certain (subjective a n d social) b o n d s a r e necessary so that persons c a n u n ­ derstand themselves morally a n d c a n act morally does n o t lead to the sub­ jective o r social conditionality o f m o r a l validity. T o a s s u m e this w o u l d m e a n falling v i c t i m t o a " g e n e t i c fallacy," a s T u g e n d h a t criticizes it a t a n o t h e r

256 point

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE (202). A s will b e s e e n , a t h e o r y o f c o n t e x t s o f justification is i n a

position to b e linked to a differentiated analysis o f relations o f recognition; yet t h e justification itself o f m o r a l i t y d o e s n o t rest o n certain

identity-

t h e o r e t i c o r a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l a s s u m p t i o n s . T h e basic m o r a l q u e s t i o n is n o t W h o d o I w a n t to b e ?b u t W h a t c a n I justify morally? T h a t persons must b e able to bring their actions into a g r e e m e n t with their

(ethical) i m a g e o f

themselves d o e s n o t m e a n that they c a n justify actions only o n t h e basis o f this i m a g e a n d its c e n t r a l v a l u e s a n d i d e a l s . T h e principle o f practical reason, w h i c h follows "recursively" from the a b s e n c e o f "ultimate" foundations a n d t h e inevitability o f m o r a l claims b e ­ t w e e n p e r s o n s , is n o t " r a m m e d i n t o u s a s a n a b s o l u t e m u s t " ( 9 7 ) . P r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is a f a c u l t y f o r p r o v i d i n g r e a s o n s , h a v i n g i n s i g h t i n t o t h e m , a n d a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e m ; it is t h e faculty w e a s c r i b e t o m o r a l l y r e ­ sponsible persons a n d to which w e a p p e a l — a n d have to a p p e a l — w h e n w e address questions o f action that affects others. R e s p e c t i n g m o r a l

persons

m e a n s recognizing t h e m as authors a n d addressees o f validity claims—it m e a n s considering t h e m morally responsible a n d b e h a v i n g responsibly to­ w a r d t h e m . T o b e m o r a l i n s u c h a w a y i s a task o f a u t o n o m o u s p e r s o n s , a n d n o a n o n y m o u s objective r e a s o n that s p e a k s a n d acts t h r o u g h

them can

r e l i e v e t h e m o f this task. It is n o w n e c e s s a r y to l o o k m o r e closely a t h o w t h e intersubjectivist t h e o r y p r o p o s e d h e r e d i s t i n g u i s h e s v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g dif­ ferent values a n d n o r m s with various validity m o d e s , w h i c h refer to different 'justification communities." T h i s theory leads in turn to a c o m p l e x theory o f p r a c t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s a n d a t h e o r y o f f o u r f o r m s o f autonomous, j u s t i f i e d , a n d self-responsible action as a n ethical person, a legal p e r s o n , a citizen, a n d a m o r a l p e r s o n . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t , s o m e o f t h e issues

mentioned

above—for instance, the question o f normative conflicts—can b e discussed m o r e precisely.

(b) Practical Justification

and Autonomy

T o "situate" t h e c o n c e p t o f a u t o n o m y in intersubjective contexts a n d to s u b j e c t it t o a f o u r f o l d d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s h a v i n g a n i n t e g r a l p r e ­ l i m i n a r y c o n c e p t . A c c o r d i n g t o it, p e r s o n s a s a c t o r s a r e i n a p r a c t i c a l s e n s e "autonomous" self-determining beings w h e n they act consciously a n d with justification. A s s u c h t h e y a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s : t h e y c a n b e q u e s ­ tioned

with r e g a r d to t h e reasons o n t h e basis o f w h i c h they acted. A s

responsible p e r s o n s t h e y a r e responding p e r s o n s , a n d w e e x p e c t o f t h e m t h a t they h a v e c o n s i d e r e d their r e a s o n s f o r action a n d c a n justify t h e m . I n this sense, a u t o n o m o u s

persons are reasonable in terms o f practical

reason:

they have reasons f o r their actions that they c a n justify to themselves a n d can c o m m u n i c a t e a n djustify to others, so that these r e a s o n s — u n d e r t a i n (still t o b e d e t e r m i n e d )

circumstances—can b e shared.

cer­

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

257

U n d e r what circumstances d o "my" reasons have to b e "general" reasons? D o e s n ' t it contradict t h e m e a n i n g o f self-determination to u n d e r s t a n d a u ­ t o n o m o u s action i n this s e n s e as justified action? A differentiation o f "con­ texts o f a u t o n o m y " m u s t r e s p o n d t o this o b j e c t i o n a n d s h o w in what tical q u e s t i o n s a u t o n o m o u s

prac­

answers have to rest o n reasons l o r which a

p e r s o n m u s t b e able to b e r e s p o n s i b l e — b y him- o r herself alone, with oth­ ers, o r b e f o r e others ( a n d b e f o r e w h i c h o t h e r s ) . Different f o r m s o f "posi­ tive" a n d "negative" f r e e d o m c a n therefore b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d ,

1 2

ones

that

h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n d i s c u s s e d i n t h e p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r s : t h e ethical autonomy o f p e r s o n s i n r e s p e c t o f t h e i r ( g o o d ) life ( a n d t h e validity o f e t h i c a l v a l u e s ) , t h e legal-personal autonomy o f l e g a l p e r s o n s ( a s a d d r e s s e e s o f t h e l a w ) , t h e political autonomy o f c i t i z e n s ( a s a u t h o r s o f t h e l a w ) , a n d t h e moral autonomy o f p e r s o n s a s a u t h o r s a n d a d d r e s s e e s o f m o r a l n o r m s . A s w i l l b e s e e n , dif­ ferent

dimensions

o f practical responsibility correspond

realization, personal f r e e d o m

to ethical

self-

to act, political self-legislation, a n d m o r a l

self-determination. N o n e o f these concepts c a n raise the claim to b e the sole legitimate representative o f a u t o n o m y ; it is n e c e s s a r y to differentiate t h e m i n o r d e r to a v o i d false opposites a n d to s e e h o w they h a r m o n i z e a n d c o m e into conflict with o n e a n o t h e r . T h e constructive task o f integrating these f o r m s o f a u t o n o m y is r e q u i r e d i n a d o u b l e sense: e v e r y p e r s o n

must

a c h i e v e this " a u t o n o m o u s l y " f o r h i m - o r herself, a n d within t h e basic struc­ ture o f society these forms must connect in a m a n n e r that does n o t sacrifice one

dimension for another.

H e r e lies their i m p o r t a n c e

for a theory o f

justice. "Autonomous" persons ask themselves the questions What ought I to d o ? o r W h a t is g o o d o r r i g h t f o r m e / f o r u s / g e n e r a l l y ? i n d i f f e r e n t

con­

texts. A n d these questions d e m a n d answers that c a n b ejustified within t h e particular communities in w h i c h persons as individuals a r e m e m b e r s (in different ways). A discourse-theoretic

conception

of autonomy

a n d nor­

mative validity must differentiate these contexts i n o r d e r to s h o w w h a t prac­ tical q u e s t i o n s p r e s u p p o s e w h a t f o r m o f universalization f o r their a n s w e r , a n d n o t to refer practical questions as a w h o l e to a n "unlimited" justifica­ tion

community. I f o n e recursively follows t h e logic o f the justification o f

action-legitimating values o r n o r m s by reconstructing the contexts of jus­ tification

in which

validity claims a r e raised,

there

then

emerges

the

p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n intersubjectivist t h e o r y that is n e i t h e r particularistic n o r universalistic i n t h e w r o n g way. A theory that a p p r o a c h e s t h e m a t t e r i n this m a n n e r a n d distinguishes different m o r e o r less c o m p r e h e n s i v e justifica­ tion

c o m m u n i t i e s d o e s n o t a s s u m e a strict s e p a r a t i o n o f v a l u e s p h e r e s ( s e e

the discussion o f N a g e l a b o v e ) ; it i n q u i r e s o n l y after t h e criteria that v a l u e s or n o r m s must m e e t in o r d e r to b e valid in certain contexts.

Furthermore,

it m u s t c o n s i d e r t h e i r r e d u c i b l e " s u b j e c t i v e " e l e m e n t e s p e c i a l l y i n e t h i c a l p r o b l e m s o f " m y " ( g o o d ) life ( w h i c h W i l l i a m s u n d e r s c o r e s )

a n d in legal

258

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

p e r s o n s ' f r e e d o m to act. H e r e too, q u e s t i o n s o f validity a n d g e n e s i s a r e to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d , b u t this

time

not in favor of morally "unconditional" va­

lidity b u t (for e x a m p l e ) with r e g a r d to ethical responsibility f o r o n e ' s o w n life: e v e n t h o u g h

ethical questions arise for m e as a m e m b e r

of ethical

c o m m u n i t i e s a n d h a v e g r o w n o u t o f this c o n t e x t , I a l o n e , "as t h e

final

authority," a m responsible for ethical decisions. T h e following analysis of different m o d e s of justification

concentrates

o n the validity d i m e n s i o n o f v a l u e s a n d n o r m s . H e r e I restrict m y s e l f to t h e basic systematic points that g o b a c k to c o n c e p t i o n s a n d a r g u m e n t s devel­ o p e d in the p r e c e d i n g chapters o n ethics, law, d e m o c r a c y , a n d

morality.

A n d to s u p p l e m e n t a n d c o m p l e t e this analysis o f practical justification a n d a u t o n o m y , I e x a m i n e different f o r m s o f recognition in the s u b s e q u e n t sec­ tion. Despite their complementarity,

the perspectives of justification

r e c o g n i t i o n h a v e to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y . O n the o n e

and

hand,

the validity claims o f values a n d n o r m s are i n d e e d c o n n e c t e d in a c o m p l e x m a n n e r with p e r s o n s ' claims to n o r m a t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n . E t h i c a l persons, f o r instance, are recognized a n d e s t e e m e d against the b a c k g r o u n d of j o i n d y s h a r e d ethical values; a n d to r e s p e c t a p e r s o n as a m o r a l p e r s o n

means

recognizing h i m o r h e r as the a u t h o r a n d addressee o f m o r a l validity claims. O n the other h a n d , however, validity claims, w h i c h are raised b e t w e e n per­ s o n s , a r e n o t p e r s e c l a i m s t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f p e r s o n s ' i d e n t i t y (cf. H a ­ bermas

1992c,

189-90); they can have different contents

and ends

m a y affect structures o f r e c o g n i t i o n o n l y i n d i r e c d y — e v e n if in

and

normative

q u e s t i o n s o f a l e g a l - p o l i t i c a l k i n d , f o r e x a m p l e , it is f r e q u e n t l y a m a t t e r o f w h a t it m e a n s t o r e c o g n i z e p e r s o n s a s e q u a l l y e n t i d e d , full c i t i z e n s . T h e methodologically primary orientation

to the validity criteria o f values o r

n o r m s permits a differentiated analysis o f the various contexts o f justice, to which

certain, justice-relevant forms

of recognition

nonetheless

corre­

s p o n d . W h a t is d e c i s i v e is t h a t this o r i e n t a t i o n e n a b l e s a m o r e p r e c i s e clar­ ification o f the question o f w h i c h claims to r e c o g n i t i o n — a s claims directed toward others—need

to b e r e c i p r o c a l l y justified a n d c a n b e justified, a n d

justified in w h a t sense. Criteria in this c o n n e c t i o n — w h i c h are necessarily formal but not

"contextless"—cannot

b e drawn solely f r o m a theory

of

recognition.

(1) ETHICS E t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s a r e q u e s t i o n s o f t h e g o o d life o f a p e r s o n as a

member

o f p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s , w i t h w h o s e history t h e u n i q u e life his­ tory, the narrative o f the self—its past, p r e s e n t , a n d f u t u r e — i s

connected.

" C o n n e c t e d " d o e s n o t h o w e v e r m e a n "identical," e v e n if the identity o f a c o m m u n i t y is ( p a r t i a l l y ) c o n s t i t u t i v e o f a p e r s o n ' s identity. A c o m m u n a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d i d e n t i t y c a n c h a n g e , b u t it c a n n o t fall o u t o f c o n t e x t s ; t h e r e is n o r a d i c a l c h o i c e o f self, b u t t h e r e is a c h o i c e o f c o n d u c t t o w a r d o n e s e l f

CONTEXTS OI«'JUSTICE

259

a n d t o w a r d o t h e r s . H e r e i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o s p e a k o f ethic al c o i m i i i i i i i i i e s in the plural: to b e simultaneously part o f a love relationship, o f a family, a n d of

communities

like religious o r ethnic

communities

requires

ethic al-

integrative capabilities o n the part o f ethically a u t o n o m o u s persons.

There

i s n o t j u s t one " c o n s t i t u t i v e c o m m u n i t y " t h a t d e t e r m i n e s a p e r s o n ' s i d e n t i t y . Intersubjective constitution does n o t therefore e x c l u d e ethical

autonomy,

a n d e t h i c a l a u t o n o m y i s f o r i t s p a r t a n a u t o n o m y within c o m m u n i t i e s . E t h ­ ical p e r s o n s c o n s c i o u s l y d e f i n e t h e m s e l v e s t h r o u g h m e m b e r s h i p in c o m ­ munities that e m b o d y certain values a n d allow persons to have certain roles that they recognize f o r themselves as being part o f themselves. Ethical ques­ tions inquire after w h o a n d w h a t I a m ,w h oI h a v e b e c o m e a n d w a n t to b e , as t h e p e r s o n I " n o w "a m . T h e y a r e questions c o n c e r n i n g t h e orientation I h a v e i n " m y " w o r l d , w h i c h is n o t j u s t " m i n e " b u t a l s o t h e w o r l d o f o t h e r s . Ethical questions are questions o f orientation to which a person h i m -o r h e r s e l f together with others m u s t respond, b u t u l t i m a t e l y h e o r s h e alone i s responsible f o r t h e a n s w e r s . N o c o m m u n i t y c a n relieve ethically a u t o n o m o u s persons o f the respon­ sibility t h e y h a v e f o r t h e e n d s a n d v a l u e s t h a t d e f i n e t h e i r lives. I n s o f a r a s they a r e ethically a u t o n o m o u s , persons a r e in a position to give reasons f o r t h e i r p l a n s o f life a s w e l l a s "to f o r m , t o r e v i s e , a n d r a t i o n a l l y t o p u r s u e " these plans (Rawls 1980, 5 2 5 ) . T h i s does n o t imply that they p u r s u e linearly t h r o u g h t h e i r lives a d e t a i l e d , f o r e o r d a i n e d p l a n o f life o r a n u l t i m a t e ( o r , in t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l sense, "highest") telos. T h e i r b i o g r a p h i c a l "narrative" (Maclntyre), w h o s e co-author they are, develops a c c o r d i n g to a "plot" that a p e r s o n s e e k s to e n d o w w i t h t e m p o r a l " m e a n i n g " ; this n a r r a t i v e i n c l u d e s the co-authorship o fothers, t h e influence o fluck, a n druptures, w h i c h must be retrospectively a n d prospectively harmonized through

interpretation.

T o live o n e ' s o w n life w i t h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m e a n i n g is a c o n s t a n t

her­

m e n e u t i c task f o r t h e p e r s o n , w h o d o e s n o t "possess" h i s o r h e r identity i n the a t o m i s t i c s e n s e , b u t t o w h o m it n o n e t h e l e s s " b e l o n g s " m o r e t h a n t o a n y o n e else. W h a t is j u s t i f i e d i n a n e t h i c a l r e s p e c t ? T w o t h i n g s . O n t h e

subjectivelevel

I j u s t i f y " m y " life d e c i s i o n s t o m y s e l f a n d t o t h o s e w h o b e l o n g t o t h e c o r e o f m y identity; t h e y a r e i m p o r t a n t t o m e f o r t h e y tell m e h o w t h e y s e e m e — w h o I a m for them. I share with t h e m a particular ethical world that forms the f r a m e w o r k f o r strong evaluations without w h i c h I c a n n o t

understand

myself. U l t i m a t e l y , t h e s e o t h e r s d o n o t h o w e v e r m a k e m y life d e c i s i o n s for m e ; I myself must b e able to identify with everything b e l o n g i n g to m y i d e n t i t y . I m u s t still b e a b l e t o s a y " I " t o m e . A c c o r d i n g l y , e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n m e a n s : I m u s t b e able to face a n d e x p l a i n myself. I justify myself to myself a n d to others against the b a c k g r o u n d o f values important to us; b u t they a r e i m p o r t a n t only b e c a u s e e a c h i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n c o n s i d e r s t h e m i m p o r ­ tant: their validity d o e s n o t h a v e c a t e g o r i c a l f o r c e . T h e c e n t r a l d i f f e r e n c e

2 6o

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

between ethical a n d moral validity—and argumentation—is that in ethical a r g u m e n t a t i o n a p e r s o n c a n o n l y b e advised o r g i v e n t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n to r e g a r d certain v a l u e s as b e i n g i m p o r t a n t to h i mo r h e r (see c h a p t e r 4.4). H e r e n o moral o u g h t sentences a r e formulated that raise a claim to recip­ rocally a n d generally nonrejectable validity—even w h e n

these

"values,"

w h i c h , say, a f r i e n d r e c o m m e n d s t o m e , a r e " t r a n s c e n d e n t t r u t h s " c l a i m i n g g e n e r a l i t y . T h e y d o n o t b e c o m e a n e t h i c a l truth f o r m y life until I identify with them, until I understand myself through them. Ethical values are con­ s i d e r e d j u s t i f i e d a n s w e r s t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e g o o d life o n l y i f they a r e anchored in a person's self-understanding a n d have b e c o m e a constituent o f his o r h e r qualitative identity. I n a community-relevant r e s p e c t , e t h i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n m e a n s t h a t a c o m ­ munity with w h i c h individuals identify seeks to answer the question o f t h e g o o d "for u s "o n the basis o f a c o m m o n self-understanding. M e m b e r s o f a community constituted b y ethical values have to find c o m m o n answers to practical questions that spring f r o m n e w problems, without breaking the c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . J u s t i f i c a t i o n t h e n m e a n s t h a t we d e ­ t e r m i n e j o i n t l y h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d o u r s e l v e s , w h a t is c o m p a t i b l e with o u r identity. Ultimately, h o w e v e r , this t o o is a q u e s t i o n that is d i r e c t e d at t h e self-understanding o f individuals, namely, at h o w they understand

them­

selves a s m e m b e r s o f this ethical c o m m u n i t y . T h e thesis o f t h e intersubjec­ tive c o n s t i t u t i o n

o f t h e self m u s t n o t l e a d h e r e to t h e view that

ethical

communities a r e themselves subjects that reflect independently a n d decide for their m e m b e r s . C o m m u n a l ethical justification also remains

dependent

u p o n ethically a u t o n o m o u s persons. T h e collective identity o f a n ethical c o m m u n i t y a n d t h e individual identity o f m e m b e r s a r e therefore interwo­ ven in both respects: answers to ethical questions must b e compatible with both dimensions, b u t ultimately w e must b e able to assume responsibility f o r t h e m individually. W h a t m a t t e r s h e r e t o o is t o o v e r c o m e t h e alternative between atomism a n d social m o n i s m a n d to understand the p h e n o m e n o n of intersubjectivity correcdy: a u t o n o m o u s persons a r e intersubjectively con­ stituted p e r s o n s , a n d their a u t o n o m y is a n a u t o n o m y

"with" others, b u t

they remain a u t o n o m o u s persons. O n l y as such c a n they understand

them­

selves a n d b e e s t e e m e d a n d r e c o g n i z e d i n c o m m u n i t i e s as individuals. T h e validity m o d e o f ethical values is simultaneously subjective a n d c o m ­ m u n a l : a v a l u e is valid w h e n it is i d e n t i t y - d e t e r m i n i n g f o r m e a s p a r t o f a n e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t y . T h e r e a s o n s s u p p o r t i n g its validity a r e r e a s o n s that a p ­ peal direcdy to m y self-understanding as the person I a m — i n the com­ m u n a l relations that a r e constitutive o f m y identity. I c a n n o t observe these relations "from without," b u t I c a n criticize t h e m "from within." I c a n raise a n d answer ethical questions in n o other way than b y referring to what I c a n i d e n t i f y w i t h . T h e v a l i d i t y m o d e i s : this is good for me a s t h e p e r s o n I w a s , I n o w a m a n d w o u l d like to b e . A v a l u e isj u s t i f i e d b e c a u s e it e n d o w s m y

CONTEXTS OK JUSTICE

26/

l i f e w i t h meaning, c o n t r i b u t e s t o m y good life. T h i s m e a n i n g is disclosed to m e t h r o u g h o t h e r s , b u t i t i s o f g r e a t e r s i g n i f i c a n c e t o me than to others. T h e g o o d f o r a p e r s o n i s t h e g o o d f o r t h e p e r s o n w h o h e o r she alone is—ii provides h i m o r h e r with a place in the historical a n d c o m m u n a l

world.

J u s t a s t h e ethical c o m m u n i t y is n o t a u n i v e r s a l , c o m p r e h e n s i v e c o m m u n i t y , t h e l a n g u a g e o f t h e e t h i c a l i s n o t u n i v e r s a l e i t h e r . E t h i c a l s e n t e n c e s distin­ g u i s h v a l u e s a s " g o o d " a n d d e r i v e f r o m t h e s e v a l u e s c e r t a i n v i r t u e s , dispo­ s i t i o n s , a n d w a y s o f a c t i o n , w h i c h h a v e t h e i r p l a c e o n l y w i t h i n a s o c i a l prac­ tice, t h e narrative o f a c o m m u n i t y . Ethical values obligate ethical persons as m e m b e r s o f communities that these persons "feel" obligated; a n d , o n n o t d o i n g their ethical

in

duties

t o t h e f a m i l y , t o f r i e n d s , o r t o o t h e r s , t h e y w o u l d find t h e i r l i v e s d e f i c i e n t . S e l f - e s t e e m , w h i c h is c o n s t i t u t e d i n e t h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w o u l d b e h u r t if w e d i d n o t live u p to t h e ethical e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t o t h e r s h a v e c o n c e r n i n g us (see chapter 5.3). A s h a salready b e e n mentioned, these obligations have n o t b e e n a d o p t e d b y a r e s o l u t i o n that is f r e e i n t h e " d e t a c h e d " s e n s e ; w e " g r o w , " as it w e r e , i n t o t h e m , b u t o f c o u r s e w e a d o p t t h e m c o n s c i o u s l y . W e are obligated in the innermost

core o f ourselves: o n e would n o t b e the

p e r s o n o n e is, a n d w a n t s t o b e , if o n e d i d n o t a c t i n t h e ethically c o m ­ m a n d e d m a n n e r . T h e p r o b l e m s that arise w h e n different ethical expecta­ tions

placed on a person—for

instance,

as a family m e m b e r

a n d as a

f r i e n d — c o m e into conflict c a n then b e r e s p o n d e d to o n the basis o f o n e ' s own self-understanding, insofar as n o moral questions are involved. H e r e a p e r s o n asks h i m - o r h e r s e l f w h a t is "really" i m p o r t a n t t o h i m o r h e r , e v e n though

this s e a r c h f o r a " d e e p e r " s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g

evaluations must n o t b e understood

a n d for "stronger"

in the sense of a

self-transparency

w h e r e o n e d i s c o v e r s o n e ' s o w n " c o r e . " T h e " a u t h e n t i c , " t h e " t r u e " self is, a s T a y l o r ( 1 9 9 2 b , 6 6 ) s a y s , a l w a y s a l s o a n i n t e r p r e t i n g creation o f a s e l f a n d e n c o m p a s s e s o v e r c o m i n g social conventions o r hitherto f a v o r e d role inter­ p r e t a t i o n s . I n t h e p r o c e s s a p e r s o n c a n n o t cast o f f t h e " h o r i z o n s o f signif­ icance" o f a cultural-ethical l a n g u a g e o r existing b o n d s to others o r e m o ­ t i o n a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , h a b i t s , a n d c h a r a c t e r traits. T o d o ' j u s t i c e " t o t h e m is the task o f a n "authentic" self-understanding o f a p e r s o n w h o c a n "abide b y h i m - o r herself." I t is t o o s t r o n g a thesis t o c l a i m that this v a l u e c o n s t e l ­ lation g i v e n to ethical reflection is, as T a y l o r (1992b) believes, a constel­ lation o f ultimate values o f "a larger order"

(89) t h a t t r a n s c e n d s

human

s t r i v i n g ( 3 5 , 4 1 ) , s o t h a t i n t h e final a n a l y s i s i t i s n o t o u r p r e r o g a t i v e t o d e t e r m i n e w h a t is "really" i m p o r t a n t to us. T r u e , ethical a u t o n o m y consists, generally speaking, in c h o o s i n g the g o o d , a n d in every society o r culture t h e r e a r e certain v a l u e s t a n d a r d s f o r w h a t is c o n s i d e r e d " g o o d . " T h e s e can­ n o t h o w e v e r c l a i m t o h a v e a n " o b j e c t i v e " c h a r a c t e r i n t h e s e n s e t h a t a life is n e c e s s a r i l y a n e t h i c a l l y " b a d " o r a l i e n a t e d l i f e — b u t it c e r t a i n l y c o u l d b e — if it d o e s n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e s e v a l u e s fully o r partially ( w h i c h is i n t u r n

2 62

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

a question o f interpretation).

1 3

F o r , first o f a l l , v a l u e s t a n d a r d s o f t h e g o o d

a r e c h a n g e a b l e ; a n d ,s e c o n d , t h e v a l u e constellation o f m o d e r n societies is o f itself pluralistic a n d t h e s o u r c e o f i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e v a l u e s . T h e fact that ethically a u t o n o m o u s decisions evolve in shared contexts o f value a n dd e ­ p e n d u p o n a value-related affirmation b y others is c o m p a t i b l e with a plu­ rality o f ethical c o m m u n i t i e s a n dv a l u e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s — a plurality that c a n n o longer b e assimilated into a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d synthesizing language o f v a l u e s t h a t i s e t h i c a l l y binding f o r p e r s o n s ( b e i t i n a s o c i e t y o r w i t h i n a culture). In

ethical

questions,

therefore,

ethical communities

a r e justification

communities; a n d they a r e these, o n t h e o n e hand, in questions o f the c o m m o n self-understanding o f a collective i n t e g r a t e d t h r o u g h s h a r e d val­ ues: t h e r e s p o n s e to t h e p r o b l e m o f t h e g o o d "for u s " m u s t b e g i v e n jointly a n d b e able to stabilize t h e existing collective i d e n t i t y — o r t h e ethical c o m ­ munity ceases to b e such a community. O n the other hand, ethical com­ munities a r e also justification c o m m u n i t i e s in questions o f t h e g o o d "for m e " — w h i c h m u s t always also b e a n s w e r e d in questions o f t h e g o o d "for us." N o tonly in their genesis a r e t h e reasons o n the basis o fw h i c h I decide to l e a d m y life a s a m e a n i n g f u l a n d v a l u a b l e o n e d e p e n d e n t

upon

those

o t h e r p e r s o n s w i t h w h o m I s h a r e ( t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s ) m y life; t h e s e r e a s o n s are also d e p e n d e n t

u p o n o t h e r p e r s o n s in respect o f their validity, albeit

in a n indirect sense: other persons must b e able to r e g a r d these reasons as " c o m m e n d a b l e . " Who t h e s e o t h e r s a r e w h o h a v e t h e " a u t h o r i t y " t o j u d g e m y e t h i c a l r e a s o n s a s g o o d o r b a d is itself, h o w e v e r , a n e t h i c a l

question.

H e r e , u n l i k e i n t h e c a s e o f m o r a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e r e is n o s p e c i a l a u d i e n c e p r e s c r i b e d ; it m i g h t b e a p e r s o n o r a f r i e n d o r a n o t h e r p a r t i c u l a r community

( a n d is usually a c o m b i n a t i o n

ethical

o f these). Ethical persons are

d e p e n d e n t u p o n affirmation b y others, w h o o n the basis o f the identity o f the person c o n c e r n e d — a n d n o t o n the basis o f external v a l u e s — c a n j u d g e w h e t h e r h e o r s h e is acting m e a n i n g f u l l y ; they a r e a constituent

o f this

p e r s o n ' s life. T h i s j u d g m e n t o f c o u r s e p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e p e r s o n r e g a r d s these others as ethically "significant" a n d understands him- o r herself as a m e m b e r o f this ethical c o m m u n i t y . N o "ultimate" r e a s o n s c a n l e a d t h e w a y o u t o f this h e r m e n e u t i c r e c i p r o c i t y w h e n w e a r e d e a l i n g w i t h q u e s t i o n s o f the g o o d . A p e r s o n h i m - o r h e r s e l f must, like n o o n e else, b e a b l e to live with t h e r e a s o n s h e o r s h e r e g a r d s f o r h i m - o r herself, t o g e t h e r with others, as ethically justified. P e r s o n s a r e t h e r e f o r e t o b e c a l l e d ethically autonomous w h e n t h e y a r e i n a position to answer meaningfully a n d with justification the question o f their g o o d o n t h e basis o f a reflection o n their c o m m u n a l l y a n d valued e p e n d e n d y constituted identity. T h e y a c t a c c o r d i n g to "second-order d e ­ sires" (Frankfurt

1 9 7 1 ) , which they consider valuable—for instance, as a

part o f " c o m p r e h e n s i v e doctrines" (Rawls). T h e y consciously identify with

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE 2 6 5 such values b e c a u s e they c o n s i d e r t h e m valuable, n o t b e c a u s e they "cannot b u t d o s o . " E t h i c a l d e c i s i o n s a r e " r e a s o n a b l e " i f t h e y e n d o w life w i t h m e a n ­ i n g for a person, i f t h e y f o r m a p e r s o n ' s p a s t , p r e s e n t , a n d f u t u r e a s w e l l a s his o r h e r b o n d s a n d r o l e s — r e l a t i o n s to t h e w o r l d in g e n e r a l — i n t o a nar­ rative unity that d o e s n o t h a v e to b e oriented b y a future, linearly r e a c h a b l e telos; n o r d o e s it h a v e t o b e w i t h o u t r u p t u r e s , i n s o f a r a s they r e m a i n t i f i a b l e a s r a d i c a l c h a n g e s i n one l i f e ( c f . H o n n e t h

iden­

1995b, 269-70). T h i s

m e a n i n g m u s t b e i n t e l l i g i b l e for others i n a g e n e r a l r e s p e c t s o t h a t a p e r s o n h i m - o r h e r s e l f c a n r e g a r d it a s m e a n i n g f u l ; i n a p a r t i c u l a r r e s p e c t it m u s t b e acceptable a n d o f value to the c o m m u n i t i e s that "constitute" a person's identity a n d a r e r e c o g n i z e d b y h i m o r h e r as a n ethical "authority." A t least to this d e g r e e , a n ethically "thick" l a n g u a g e m u s t b e intelligible, a n d ethical r e a s o n s m u s t b e " s h a r e a b l e " r e a s o n s . I n this sense they a r e o p e n to cri­ 14

tique,

to w h i c h a n a u t o n o m o u s

person m u s t b e able to r e s p o n d

even

t h o u g h h e o r s h e r e m a i n s t h e "final a u t h o r i t y " o n t h e life f o r w h i c h h e o r s h e is r e s p o n s i b l e .

( 1 1 ) LAW As individuals, legal persons a r e also normatively responsible m e m b e r s o f a community, b u t in a way different from ethical persons: whether as Saul o f T a r s u s o r P a u l t h e A p o s t l e , a p e r s o n is a m e m b e r o f t h e l e g a l c o m m u n i t y a n d a p e r s o n o f law; e a c h p e r s o n m u s t o b e y t h e laws a n d h a s certain rights as s u c h a p e r s o n . E t h i c a l v a l u e s a r e valid i n r e s p e c t o f t h e particularity o f a person, legal n o r m s in respect o f his o r h e r attribute o f b e i n g a "person" as such: they enjoy g e n e r a l a n d b i n d i n g validity. T h e y a r e n o t constitutive o f identity; rather, they constitute t h e "outer" f r a m e w o r k o f "negative lib­ erty" that b o t h e n a b l e s a n d limits, in the f o r m o f a "protective cover," t h e positive liberty o f self-realization. Persons o f l a w d o n o t have to identify with these norms, b u t they must c o m e to terms with them: these a r e the n o r m s o f reciprocal respect that persons have to grant mutually a n d bindingly i n o r d e r to e n a b l e social c o o p e r a t i o n with legal certainty. L e g a l n o r m s a r e n o tjustified b y a n d through legal persons; l a w m a k i n g h a s this task a n d , if law w a n t s to r e d e e m its c l a i m to b e i n g g e n e r a l l y v a l i d (and that m e a n s valid f o r every person as a n addressee o f law), must con­ stitute a g e n e r a l justification b y t h e citizens a s t h e a u t h o r s o f law. T h e "basic norm"

(Kelsen) o r "secondary rule" (Hart)

o f law, w h i c h e n d o w s it w i t h

g e n e r a l l e g i t i m a c y , m u s t satisfy this r e q u i r e m e n t

(in whatever

concrete

f o r m it c o m p r e h e n d s i t ) . " I n t h e validity m o d e o f law, t h e facticity o f t h e s t a t e ' s enforcement o f l a w i s i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h t h e l e g i t i m a c y - g r o u n d i n g f o r c e o f a p r o c e d u r e o f lawmaking that c l a i m s t o b e r a t i o n a l b e c a u s e i t g u a r a n t e e s liberty" ( H a b e r m a s 1996a, 28).

1 5

I t is a d e m a n d o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n o n t h e

validity o f law that legal subjects as political citizens b e authors o f the law a n d that general justification b e guaranteed in procedures o f lawmaking.

2 64

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

"Legal p e r s o n " a n d "citizen" therefore refer to e a c h o t h e r b u t a r e n o n e ­ theless d i f f e r e n t i n a n o r m a t i v e r e s p e c t : t h e c o n c e p t o f p e r s o n o f l a w is c o n n e c t e d o n l y i n d e m o c r a c i e s w i t h t h a t o f "full c i t i z e n , " a n d h e r e a r e also p e r s o n s w h o a r e l e g a l subjects b u t a r e n o t fully e n t i d e d

there

citizens

(who as permanent m e m b e r s o f a legal community should n o t however b e d e n i e d p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n ) . C i t i z e n s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e l a w , l e g a l p e r s o n s a r e r e s p o n s i b l e before t h e l a w . A t t h e l e v e l o f l e g a l p e r s o n , ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n " t h u s m e a n s t h a t p e r s o n s m u s t j u s t i f y t h e i r actions, a n d t h i s with reference to the "lawfulness" o f these actions u n d e r the terms o fes­ t a b l i s h e d law. R e f e r e n c e t o o n e ' s o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d , t o w h a t is p o l i t i c a l l y c o r r e c t , o r t o w h a t is m o r a l l y c o m m a n d e d d o n o t c o u n t h e r e a s reasons, just reference

to the law. L e g a l obligation m e a n s assuming re­

sponsibility f o r o n e ' s o w n actions u n d e r t h e terms o f established law. L e g a l n o r m s r e f e r t o " o u t e r " a c t i o n a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y l e a v e t h e m o t i v e s f o r (law­ ful) a c t i o n t o p e o p l e ' s d i s c r e t i o n . L a w is a " c o e r c i v e " f r a m e w o r k : t h e c o ­ e r c i o n t o a c t lawfully is a c o e r c i o n s u p p o r t e d b y o u t e r n o t i n n e r s a n c t i o n s . This coercion does however presuppose "legal consciousness" in the sense of respect f o r others as equally entitled legal persons. Legal-personal autonomy t h e r e f o r e r e f e r s t o t h e l e g a l l y g r a n t e d l i b e r t y o f persons to b e self-responsible, accountable actors in different social spheres r e g u l a t e d a n d stabilized b y law. A s l o n g as a p e r s o n m o v e s i n this

sense

w i t h i n t h e l e g a l f r a m e w o r k , h e o r s h e d o e s n o t o w e a n y o n e any j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r h i s o r h e r actions, a n d h e r e lies t h e "liberating" e l e m e n t i n this c o n ­ ception o f autonomy. L a w nonetheless expects o f a legal person that h e o r she respect the legal personality o f all, a n d thus their equal right to a n identity "of their own." T h i s "negative" conception o f a u t o n o m y does n o t t h e r e b y describe w h a t i t m e a n s t o b e a u t o n o m o u s d e s i g n a t e s a right t o p o s i t i v e a u t o n o m y

i n a "positive" s e n s e , it

(cf. H i l l 1 9 9 1 b , 4 8 ) . T h e " r e a s o n ­

a b l e n e s s " r e q u i r e d o f legal p e r s o n s is h o w e v e r n o r m a t i v e l y d e m a n d i n g : l e ­ gal a u t o n o m y presupposes n o t only reciprocal respect a n d tolerance as well as mutual legal duties b u t also accountability a n d responsibility f o r o n e ' s own actions. T h e c o n c e p t o f legal p e r s o n h a s a "moral," a "political," a n d a n "ethical" d i m e n s i o n . T h e moral d i m e n s i o n a c c o u n t s f o r t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e n a t u r a l law protection o f h u m a n dignity, in that legal persons a r e g u a r a n t e e d basic rights that persons must grant o n e another; rights to personal

autonomy

are rights that c a n b e justified with reciprocal a n d general arguments. I n this sense, t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f basic r i g h t s — f o r m u l a t e d i n positive l a w — t o r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s ' integrity is a m o r a l d e m a n d political

dimension

(see chapter

a c c o u n t s f o r t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e positivistic

2.4). T h e counter-

theory that law must b e the positive law o f a c o m m u n i t y a n d c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a duplicate o f natural rights. T h i s d o e s n o t h o w e v e r release l a w f r o m t h e p r o c e d u r a l - n o r m a t i v e r e q u i r e m e n t t o b a s e its f a c t u a l c l a i m t o

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE 2 6 5 validity o n a m o d e o f g e n e r a l justification—in p r o c e d u r e s o f consultation a n d o f l a w m a k i n g . C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , l a w h a s a n ethical d i m e n s i o n

not be­

c a u s e it p r e s u p p o s e s a n d e m b o d i e s a p r i o r i c e r t a i n v a l u e s , but b e c a u s e citizens' ethical claims, needs, a n d interests e n t e r the p r o c e d u r e

o f law­

m a k i n g , insofar as they c a n b e justified with g e n e r a l r e a s o n s a n d c a n rely o n g e n e r a l n o r m s . B e c a u s e p r o c e d u r a l l a w is n o t v a l u e - b o u n d f r o m

the

outset, it is o p e n t o p a r t i c u l a r c l a i m s o f citizens t o b e t r e a t e d a s e q u a l s . Moreover, Klaus Gunther

(1993, e s p . part 4) h a s d e m o n s t r a t e d

d e g r e e law's claim to procedural

to what

impartiality extends into the context-

sensitive, impartial, a n d discursive application o f law. Legal norms are generally justified in a different way than moral norms, n a m e l y , a s p o s i t i v e - l e g a l n o r m s o f a p o l i t i c a l l y limited l e g a l c o m m u n i t y ( a n d n o t t h e universal c o m m u n i t y o f all m o r a l p e r s o n s ) , w h i c h c a n i n t u r n f o r m a plurality o f ethical c o m m u n i t i e s . T h i s possibility o p e n s u p a s p e c t r u m o f potential conflicts b e t w e e n l e g a l n o r m s , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d ethical val­ ues, political ends, a n d m o r a l n o r m s , o n t h e other. T h e validity o f a legal norm

("this is legally p e r m i t t e d o r f o r b i d d e n " ) c a n c o l l i d e w i t h a n e t h i c a l

c o n v i c t i o n ("this is n o t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h m y b e l i e f s " ) , w i t h a political e n d ("this o u g h t t o b e r e g u l a t e d d i f f e r e n t i y " ) , o r w i t h a m o r a l n o r m

("nobody

m a y d e m a n d this"). L e g a l persons have the obligation to o b e y t h e law a n d to a s s u m e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r t r a n s g r e s s i o n s . A n d i n this c a s e it is p o s ­ sible that a legal p e r s o n refers to ethical, political, o r m o r a l r e a s o n s ( a n d duties normatively superior in his o r h e r view) i n o r d e r tojustify disregard­ i n g h i s o r h e r l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . T h i s is a n u n a v o i d a b l e p r o b l e m f o r p e r s o n s w h o exist equally in allfour normative contexts, without the forms o f c o m ­ munity a n d obligation being identical. Legal persons d o n o t

surrender

their identity as ethical p e r s o n s , citizens, o r m o r a l p e r s o n s at t h e e n t r a n c e to a legal c o m m u n i t y ; they c o n t i n u e to b e e n v e l o p e d i n these duties a n d responsibilities. L e g a l systems envision different guidelines as to h o wo n e c a n p r o c e e d i n n o r m a t i v e c o n f l i c t s (cf. G r e e n a w a l t 1 9 8 7 , p a r t 4 ) . T h i s g i v e s rise t o q u e s t i o n s o f civil d i s o b e d i e n c e a n d c o n s c i e n t i o u s o b j e c t i o n , w h i c h must b e distinguished in respect o f their motives a n dends.

1 6

Ethical reasons

for refusing to o b e y the law refer to values that a r e constitutive o f a p e r s o n in his o r h e r ethical identity—values such as religious b e l i e f s — a n d a p p e a l to t h e l e g a l c o m m u n i t y t o r e c o g n i z e n o t i n d e e d t h e truth o f these r e a s o n s , but their existential significance to the person laying claim to them. This is a c l a i m t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f d i f f e r e n c e , w h i c h is h o w e v e r a c l a i m t o e q u a l r e c o g n i t i o n i n s o f a r a s a n a p p e a l is m a d e t o g e n e r a l i n s i g h t t h a t it is unreasonable to mutually expect the observance o f a particular law u n d e r given circumstances. T h e unreasonableness consists in the fact that aban­ d o n i n g the ethical conviction, w h i c h obeying the law w o u l d entail, w o u l d mean abandoning

o n e ' s o w n identity. I n such a case a legal

community

m u s t a s k itself w h e t h e r this ethical c l a i m c a n b e r e j e c t e d o r r e c o g n i z e d f o r

2 66

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

m o r a l reasons (and not merely out of political considerations). T h e rec­ o g n i t i o n o f r e l i g i o u s l y m o t i v a t e d e x e m p t i o n s f r o m m i l i t a r y c o n s c r i p t i o n is such a case. Gases o f this type m u s t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m politically justified resis­ t a n c e to l a w (civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ) . H e r e c i t i z e n s a p p e a l t o t h e i r f e l l o w citi­ z e n s as a u t h o r s o f the law to c h a n g e certain laws b e c a u s e they discriminate a g a i n s t s o m e c i t i z e n s — t h a t is t o say, t h e y c a n n o t b e d e f e n d e d w i t h g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t s . E v e n i f it is h e r e a m a t t e r o f a n e t h i c a l c o m m u n i t y ( f o r i n s t a n c e , a n ethnic minority o r a socially discriminated g r o u p o r f o r m o f life), that does not constitute

an ethical justification for resistance, for o n e

argues

h e r e not with ethical but with political reasons—principles, standards,

and

practices that are valid in a political c o m m u n i t y but are either one-sidedly f o r m u l a t e d o r one-sidedly a p p l i e d . E s t a b l i s h e d law's c l a i m to generality a n d l e g i t i m a c y is t h e r e b y p u t i n t o q u e s t i o n . I n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s u c h objections a r e a i m e d at deficiencies in the l a w m a k i n g

states

procedure's

r e q u i r e d g e n e r a l i t y — r e s i s t a n c e is t h u s t h e d e m a n d f o r r e a l i z i n g t h e

dem­

o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e o f g e n e r a l l e g i s l a t i o n (cf. M a u s 1 9 9 2 ) . F o r t h a t r e a s o n , t h i s k i n d o f o p p o s i t i o n is t o b e a r t i c u l a t e d i n p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s a n d

not

in discourses c o n c e r n i n g the application o f law in the n a r r o w sense. B u t a l s o i n t h e c a s e w h e r e a g e n e r a l l a w is a p p l i e d o n l y s e l e c t i v e l y ( b e it b y t h e executive or the judiciary)—for e x a m p l e , w h e n

racial discrimination

p r a c t i c e d b y i n s t i t u t i o n s o f t h e state e v e n t h o u g h it is l e g a l l y

is

prohibited—

r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f l a w is p o l i t i c a l l y j u s t i f i e d . Finally, t h e r e c a n b e m o r a l l y m o t i v a t e d resistance to law ( a n o t h e r

form

o f civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ) : p e r s o n s s p e a k h e r e n o t p r i m a r i l y a s e t h i c a l p e r s o n s o n the basis o f "their" values, but as m e m b e r s o f the c o m m u n i t y o f h u m a n b e i n g s . It is n o t e t h i c a l v a l u e s o r p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s o f e q u a l t r e a t m e n t t h a t are the basis of the a r g u m e n t , but m o r a l precepts that a legal c o m m u n i t y m u s t n o t v i o l a t e , n o t i n r e s p e c t o f its o w n c i t i z e n s o r " f o r e i g n e r s , " o r

in

respect of succeeding generations. Moral persons then speak on behalf of the s p e e c h l e s s o r the n a m e l e s s , the victims o f legal d e c i s i o n s that, for in­ stance, r u n c o u n t e r to the long-term legitimate interests o f h u m a n i t y .

In

s u c h cases, law m u s t deliberate o n h o w to evaluate the l a w b r e a k i n g in c o n ­ sideration of the motives; the political community, in contrast, must itself w h e t h e r these o b j e c t i o n s d o n o t p e r h a p s give effect to m o r a l

ask

norms

that cannot b e i g n o r e d by any political community. Issues of nuclear energy a n d weapons of mass destruction are such questions of long-term

respon­

sibility; m o r e i m m e d i a t e a r e q u e s t i o n s t h a t c o n c e r n , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e o b ­ servation of h u m a n rights within a legal system.

( i l l ) CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOCRACY A s fully e n t i d e d m e m b e r s o f a political c o m m u n i t y , citizens a r e

persons

with individual-negative, political, a n d social rights. A s citizens, persons are

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

267

not only addressees b u t also authors o f l a w — I n g e b o r g M a u s (1992, 2 1 6 ) s p e a k s o f t h e " p e r s o n a l u n i o n o f b o u r g e o i s a n d citoyen" i n t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f s o v e r e i g n c i t i z e n s h i p . T h i s d o e s n o t o f c o u r s e m e a n t h a t c i t i z e n s h i p is n o t a legally g u a r a n t e e d status o r that t h e r e is a legal obligation f o r citizens to e n g a g e i n political action. I t d o e s h o w e v e r m e a n that t h e r e is a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a p e r s o n ' s b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e l a w a s a citizen together with all other citizens and, o n t h e other, a p e r s o n ' s b e i n g r e s p o n s i b l e before t h e l a w a s a l e g a l p e r s o n . I n c o m p a r i s o n t o e t h i c a l o r moral autonomy, these two dimensions o f a u t o n o m y a r e therefore

com­

b i n e d in a particular way: h e r e the concepts o f addressee a n d author o f n o r m s a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d w i t h i n one c o m m u n i t y ( i n s o f a r a s t h e s a i d p e r s o n a l u n i o n exists). T h i s points to the internal connection between law a n dd e ­ mocracy a n d the concepts o f legal person a n d citizenship. While

persons

as l e g a l p e r s o n s a r e o b l i g e d t o a s s u m e responsibility within t h e f r a m e w o r k of law f o r their actions a n d tojustify themselves, as citizens they themselves m u s t j u s t i f y t o o n e a n o t h e r t h e l e g a l n o r m s u n d e r w h i c h t h e y live. A s citi­ zens they assume responsibility n o t only for their o w nactions b u t also f o r t h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y — t h i s i s w h a t political autonomy m e a n s . I n p o l i t i c a l discourses, politically a u t o n o m o u s

citizens o w e g o o d reasons to all those

w h o b e l o n g t o this political c o m m u n i t y . Political responsibility m e a n s b e ­ ing, as part o f t h e c o m m u n i t y , responsible to o n e ' s fellow citizens a n d "re­ sponding" in discourses, finding a c o m m o n language. Moreover, political responsibility h a s a further dimension: the responsibility f o r their

actions

that

parties

members

of the community

a s s u m e j o i n d y vis-a-vis

third

(whereby different levels o f indirect responsibility have to b e distinguished in a temporally differentiated Citizens understand

respect).

t h e m s e l v e s n o t o n l y a s l e g a l p e r s o n s w h o live i n a

legal c o m m u n i t y b u t also as m e m b e r s o f a political-historical project to w h i c h t h e y f e e l o b l i g a t e d t o t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h it l e n d s e x p r e s s i o n t o certain

principles they consider worth

supporting—vis-a-vis themselves,

their fellow citizens, a n d third parties. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that t h e "nation" is a n e t h i c a l

community;

b u t a political-collective identity

is t h e

self-

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y e v e n w h e n it is essentially b a s e d on moral principles o f reciprocal recognition a n d e m b e d s these in a con­ c r e t e c o n t e x t . T h e p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y is a c o m m u n a l g o o d w i t h w h i c h a l l citizens a r e c h a r g e d — a n d

the standard according to which the claim to

b e i n g a " c o m m u n i t y " m u s t b e m e a s u r e d is t h e i n c l u s i o n o f a l l citizens. A political c o m m u n i t y s t a n d s o r falls with this c l a i m . T h e validity claim o f a political n o r m

("this o u g h t t o b e valid f o r t h e

political c o m m u n i t y b e c a u s e it is i n t h e g e n e r a l interest") c a nb e r e d e e m e d o n l y discursively; t h e g e n e r a l i t y o f t h e n o r m m u s t b e v e r i f i e d b e f o r e it c a n b e c o m e a legal n o r m . O n l y this discursively established generality c a n sup­ p o r t l a w ' s c l a i m t o l e g i t i m a c y a n d o b l i g a t e c i t i z e n s politically. I t c a n t h e n b e

2 68

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

e x p e c t e d o f c i t i z e n s t h a t t h e y o b e y t h e l a w a s their\aw, n o t j u s t a s e s t a b l i s h e d l a w . P o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s a r e s e l f - i m p o s e d o b l i g a t i o n s (cf. P a t e m a n 1 9 8 5 , ch. 8). A t the level o f citizenship a n d d e m o c r a c y , 'justification" therefore refers primarily to the reciprocal justification o f n o r m s that a r e to b e gen­ erally valid f o r t h e political c o m m u n i t y ; it refers to t h e a u t o n o m o u s

self-

legislation o f citizens. A s c o m m u n i t i e s o f p e r s o n s w h o a r e always also m o r a l persons, political c o m m u n i t i e s have m o r a l duties to respect morally other p e r s o n s a n d c o m ­ m u n i t i e s n o t b e l o n g i n g to this political c o m m u n i t y . T h e s e duties r e f e r to n o r m s o f international justice, which place certain conditions o n the legal o r d e r o f a political c o m m u n i t y — t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e r i g h t o f a s y l u m is s u c h a n i n s t a n c e . I t is a r i g h t t h a t p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t i e s m u s t g r a n t m o r a l p e r ­ sons insofar as they h a v e lost t h e m i n i m u m o f legal protection that every p e r s o n n e e d s f o r m a i n t a i n i n g his o r h e r m o r a l integrity. H e r e t h e interests of the political c o m m o n w e a l t h m e e t t h e limits set b y t h e m o r a l

common­

w e a l t h o f all h u m a n b e i n g s . T h e d u t y t o " h e l p a n o t h e r w h e n h e is i n n e e d o r j e o p a r d y " is, a c c o r d i n g to Rawls ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 1 4 ) , a "natural duty" o f m o r a l persons.

(IV) MORALITY T h i s n o t i o n o f a c o m m o n w e a l t h o f all h u m a n b e i n g s b r i n g s t h e discussion to t h e characteristic features o f m o r a l questions. H e r e t h e question

What

o u g h t I to d o ? p o s e s itself n o t p r i m a r i l y a s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h o I w a n t to b e a n d w h a t is g o o d f o r m e , n o r a s t h e q u e s t i o n o fw h a t t h e l a w c o m m a n d s , n o r a s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t is in t h e g e n e r a l interest o f all citizens, b u t a s t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h a t i s morally j u s t i f i e d , o f h o w o n e o u g h t t o a c t a s a " h u m a n b e i n g . " W h a t is m o r a l l y valid m u s t b e valid f o r all m o r a l p e r s o n s a s h u m a n b e i n g s . E v e r y m o r a l p e r s o n h a s t h e d u t y t o all m o r a l p e r s o n s ( a n d t h a t m e a n s t o each one) t o d e f e n d t h e a c t i o n - g u i d i n g n o r m s h e o r s h e h o l d s t o b e justified with reasons that cannot b e rejected reciprocally (by "concrete" i n d i v i d u a l s ) o r g e n e r a l l y ( b y all t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y ) . A s such

they

a r e g e n e r a l l y " s h a r e a b l e " r e a s o n s . Moral

autonomy

therefore

m e a n s acting according to n o r m s that a r e valid generally in a morally un­ restricted sense. T h e y c a n n o t b e contested with g o o d reasons; their validity is u n c o n d i t i o n a l , c a t e g o r i c a l , a n d u n i v e r s a l . T h i s p r o c e d u r a l - d i s c u r s i v e f o r ­ mulation of the Kantian concept of autonomy does not however require o f m o r a l p e r s o n s that they refrain f r o m m o r a l action until t h e strict g e n ­ erality o f validity h a s b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d " o n c e a n d f o r all"; it s i m p l y r e q u i r e s that t h e n o r m s asserting, T h i s is valid f o r all h u m a n b e i n g s , b e a b l e to "re­ d e e m " this validity c l a i m b e f o r e a l l — a n d that m e a n s b e f o r e e v e r y c o n c r e t e p e r s o n i n view o f a m o r a l p r o b l e m . T h e m o r a l validity constituted b y t h e fact that s o m e t h i n g c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y r e j e c t e d is a u n i v e r s a l c l a i m that is not located over persons' heads b u t corresponds to the necessity o f the

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

269

basic m o r a l recognition o f p e r s o n s as such to w h o m o n e must justify oneself r e c i p r o c a l l y . T h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y o f all h u m a n b e i n g s is t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y i n m o r a l q u e s t i o n s is n o t o f "abstract" b u t o f c o n c r e t e

moral

significance i n t h e s e n s e that n o o n e m a y b e e x c l u d e d f r o m this c o m m u ­ nity, a n d g o o d m o r a l r e a s o n s m u s t b e a b l e t o p r o v e t h e m s e l v e s at all times to b e m o r a l reasons. M o r a l l y a u t o n o m o u s p e r s o n s r e s p e c t t h e m s e l v e s a n d others as authors a n d addressees o f m o r a l validity claims; m o r a l responsi­ bility m e a n s r e c o g n i z i n g e v e r y p e r s o n ' s basic r i g h t to r e c i p r o c a l justifica­ tion.

A s a m e m b e r o f the m o r a l c o m m u n i t y , h e o r s h e is a m o r a l

"authority."

T h e r e is t h e r e f o r e n o o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e g r o u n d i n g o f n o r m s a n d the justification o f actions, w h i c h w o u l d ascribe the f o r m e r to the context of t h e legitimation o f law a n d t h e latter to t h e c o n t e x t o f morally universalizable m a x i m s i n situations; n o r is t h e r e a n e e d t o a s s u m e a strict s e p a ­ ration between the justification a n d application o f n o r m s within morality.

1 7

T h e a u t o n o m o u s justification o f m o r a l actions in contexts relies o n t h e fact t h a t r e c i p r o c a l and g e n e r a l r e a s o n s s p e a k f o r t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f a n a c t i o n : t h e e l e m e n t o f r e c i p r o c i t y fulfills h e r e t h e f u n c t i o n o f o b s e r v i n g t h e v e t o right o f moral persons as "concrete" individuals, while the element o f gen­ erality guarantees t h e universality o f t h e actionjustifying reasons a n d con­ nects the reciprocal acceptability o f certain

modes of action w i t h

general

norms i n s u c h a w a y t h a t g o o d r e a s o n s m u s t i n p r i n c i p l e c o n s i d e r t h e n o r ­ m a t i v e v e t o r i g h t o f all p o s s i b l e m o r a l p e r s o n s . T h e c l a i m t o t h e m o r a l justification o f a n a c t i o n i m p l i e s t h e c l a i m that it c a n b e j u s t i f i e d i n t h e light o f morally justified n o r m s : o n the basis o f general a n d n o t just restrictedly valid reasons. T h e reasons that s p e a k f o r m o r a l actions

must

t h e r e f o r e b e at the same time r e a s o n s f o r g e n e r a l m o r a l n o r m s . W h a t i s m o r ­ ally c o m m a n d e d

(and justifiable) must correspond to a n ought

sentence

that c a n b e generally formulated a n d justified. E v e n if thejustification o f a moral action might a p p e a r to b e a matter between two o r m o r e p e r s o n s , t h e r e a s o n s t h a t j u s t i f y a n a c t i o n morally—and compromise or an arrangement—are

concrete

not just byway of a

n o t such a matter. Actions claiming

t o b e m o r a l l y j u s t i f i e d m u s t n o t o n l y not v i o l a t e m o r a l n o r m s , t h e y m u s t b e entirely justifiable o n t h e basis o f these n o r m s a n d b e able to stand u p to possible moral objections. J u s t as the justification o f actions cannot b e separated from t h e question of the justification o f norms, n o r m justification a n d n o r m application can­ not b e stricdy separated e i t h e r — i f o n e bears i n m i n d t h e t w o criteria o f reciprocity a n d generality. T h e same reasons considered to b e the foun­ dation f o rm o r a l n o r m s that cannot b e reasonably rejected must b e able to j u s t i f y m o r a l a c t i o n s concretely. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e i r v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a c ­ tion-guiding

a n d action-justifying n o r m s rest o n reasons that m u s t p r o v e to

enjoy n o t only general b u t also concrete reciprocal justification in action situations. T h u s t h e validity basis o f a n o r m a l r e a d y b e a r s i n itself t h e cri-

2 jo

CONTEXTS OF J U S T I C E

teria f o r a n o n r i g o r o u s application that seeks to avoid unjustifiable conse­ q u e n c e s — c o n s e q u e n c e s that w o u l d contradict the justified validity o f the norm

itself. I n t h e c o n t e x t o f m o r a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h e r e a s o n s j u s t i f y i n g

n o r m s a n d a c t i o n s equally a r e p u t t o t h e t e s t : t h e criteria t h a t j u s t i f y m o r a l actions normatively a n d norms

as action-legitimating

are

fundamental.

T h e y tie t o g e t h e r g r o u n d i n g a n d a p p l i c a t i o n i n t h e c o n c e p t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T o s e e this c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n actions, r e a s o n s , a n d n o r m s m e a n s t o u n ­ derstand m o r a l validity neither t o o concretely—solely oriented toward re­ stricted reciprocity—nor too abstractly—primarily oriented toward univer­ s a l g e n e r a l i t y {universale Allgemeinheit). T h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a n o r m i s n o t a "bad universality"; m o r a l justification d e m a n d s respect f o r e a c h individual a n d f o r all persons as authors a n d addressees o f validity claims. M o r a l uni­ versality is a "reflective" n o t a " s u b s u m p t i v e " universality. I n that s e n s e , moral autonomy—the

autonomy

o f reasonable a n d justifying

persons—

r e q u i r e s m o r a l j u d g m e n t , w h i c h s e e k s to justify c o n c r e t e l y t h e m o r a l l y r i g h t p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e o f its c l a i m to universality. T h a t moral j u d g m e n t h a s a context-sensitive a n d a context-transcending element has been underscored byA r e n d t in h e r interpretation

of the Kan­

t i a n c o n c e p t o f t h e " b r o a d e n e d w a y o f t h i n k i n g " a s p a r t o f t h e sensus com­ munis. A c c o r d i n g t o K a n t , t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a j u d g m e n t p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t o u r thinking b e n o t only "unprejudiced" a n d "consistent" b u t also "from a universal standpoint" (Kant 1987, § 40). I n the course o f h e r c o n c e r n with the

case o f E i c h m a n n , A r e n d t

came

across the problem

of judgment,

namely, to d e m a n d o f a person toj u d g e morally in a situation in which the " m o r e s " o r laws o f a political c o m m u n i t y r e q u i r e o f this p e r s o n that h e o r s h e carry o u t i m m o r a l duties a n d o b e y i m m o r a l laws. What we have demanded in these trials, where the defendants had committed "legal" crimes, is that human beings be capable of telling right from wrong even when all they have to guide them is their own judgment, which, more­ over, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard as the unanimous opinion of all those around them. (Arendt 1 9 8 3 , 2 9 4 - 9 5 ) Kant's specification o f reflective j u d g m e n t s e e m e d to b e helpful here: in consideration o f the concrete, to c o m e to a universal concept. B u t Arendt's a t t e m p t at e x p l a i n i n g j u d g m e n t as a j o i n t political activity a m o n g

citizens

was n o t adequate with regard to E i c h m a n n ' s problem; just as inadequate was the notion that only the observer o f historical events c o u l d pass e x post facto a universally valid j u d g m e n t .

1 8

N o r w a s it e n o u g h t o a t t e m p t to distin­

guish "thinking" normatively as a dialogue with oneself a n d as a response to t h e authority o f c o n s c i e n c e , a n d , accordingly, to highlight E i c h m a n n ' s inability to think critically ( A r e n d t 1 9 7 1 ) . F o r there was a n e e d f o r a "ban­ n i s t e r " i n a w o r l d without r e l i a b l e e t h i c a l s t a n d a r d s , a n e e d f o r m o r a l r e ­ flection

that gave effect to the voices o f t h e victims c o n d e m n e d to silence

CONTEXTS OK JUSTICE

27/

a n d p u b l i c i n v i s i b i l i t y . K a n t ' s e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e sensus communis, w h i c h a l l human fleeting

beings as h u m a n takes account

presenting

b e i n g s p o s s e s s , a s " a p o w e r t o j u d g e t h a i in i e

( a p r i o r i ) , i n o u r t h o u g h t , o f everyone else's w a y o l

[ s o m e t h i n g ] , i n o r d e r as it were t o c o m p a r e o u r o w n j u d g m e n t

w i t h human reason in general" ( K a n t 1 9 8 7 , 1 6 0 ; i t a l i c s a d d e d e x c e p t i n t h e p h r a s e "as it w e r e " ) — a n d t h u s a s a " b r o a d e n e d w a y o f t h i n k i n g " that a d o p t s the perspective o f all possible victims o f a c t i o n s — a p p e a r e d

to A r e n d t

to

r e f e r u l t i m a t e l y t o w h a t i s t r u l y " h u m a n " i n t h e c a p a c i t y t o j u d g e . " I t is b y virtue o f this i d e a o f m a n k i n d , p r e s e n t i n e v e r y single m a n , that m e n a r e h u m a n , a n d they c a n b e c a l l e d civilized o r h u m a n e to t h e e x t e n t that this idea b e c o m e s the principle n o t only o f their j u d g m e n t s b u t o f their actions" (Arendt

1 9 8 2 , 7 5 ; 1 9 7 8 , 2 7 1 ) . A "crime against h u m a n i t y " is a

"crime against h u m a n k i n d i t

(moral)

m e a n s failing to carry o u t the m o r a l duty to

recognize every h u m a n b e i n g in his o r h e r m o r a l integrity as a represen­ tative o f h u m a n i t y a s s u c h a n d to r e g a r d h i m o r h e r as a n authority

to

w h i c h o n e must justify oneself. T o j u d g e morally m e a n s regarding, as a h u m a n being, other h u m a n beings as m e m b e r s o f the comprehensive com­ m u n i t y o f all h u m a n b e i n g s a n d b e h a v i n g t o w a r d e a c h o n e h e r e a n d n o w in a w a y that c a n b e j u s t i f i e d w i t h g e n e r a l r e a s o n s . T h a t is t h e m e a n i n g o f "reflective" j u d g m e n t , w h i c h does n o t s u b s u m e the particular u n d e r the general b u t equips the particular with the authority to d e m a n d justified

reasons for m o d e s

o f action. T h e contrast

s e n s i t i v e phronesis a n d a u n i v e r s a l i s t i c j u d g m e n t

between

generally a

context-

is m i s l e a d i n g h e r e : it is

precisely in the e l e m e n t transcending concrete social standards that there lies t h e m o r a l e l e m e n t o f respect f o r o t h e r c o n c r e t e p e r s o n s with o n e k n o w s o n e is c o n n e c t e d w i t h i n a c o m m o n " c o n t e x t o f b e i n g

whom

human."

1 9

T h u s u n d e r s t o o d , m o r a l u n i v e r s a l i s m is a v i n d i c a t i n g n o t a d e c r e e i n g u n i ­ versalism. T h e p r o b l e m o f moral j u d g m e n t points to the m o r e fundamental tion—one

ques­

I w i l l d e a l w i t h p r e s e n d y w h e n I c o n s i d e r all f o u r c o n t e x t s o f

j u s t i f i c a t i o n — o f h o w a c o h e r e n t t h e o r y o f p r a c t i c a l j u d g m e n t is p o s s i b l e i n v i e w o f t h e plurality o f n o r m a t i v e s p h e r e s . F o r this it is essential t o distin­ g u i s h b e t w e e n j u d g m e n t in o n e o f t h e s a i d d i m e n s i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t be­ tween t h e m . P e r s o n s m u s t b e a b l e t o j u d g e a t w h a t l e v e l a p r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n p o s e s i t s e l f a n d w h a t i t m e a n s a t t h i s l e v e l t o find a n a n s w e r t h a t c a n c l a i m validity. H e r e , j u d g m e n t s i n contexts a n d j u d g m e n t s b e t w e e n c o n t e x t s a r e connected to o n e another in a c o m p l e x manner, for m a n y practical ques­ tions

are problematic b y reason o f the fact that they represent

conflicts

between these spheres. It is t h e r e f o r e i m p o r t a n t t o c o n s i d e r w h a t a justified a n s w e r to a practical q u e s t i o n consists in: w h o m u s t b e a b l e to a c c e p t it a n d w h a t c o u n t s as a sufficient reason. T o t h e question W h a t o u g h t I to d o ? there a r e ethical a n s w e r s ( d o this b e c a u s e y o u c a n b e s t identify w i t h it a n d c a n justify y o u r s e l f

2 72

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

to y o u r s e l f a s t h e p e r s o n y o u a r e o r w a n t to b e ) , a s well a s l e g a l ( d o this b e c a u s e it is lawful), political ( d o this b e c a u s e it is c o n d u c i v e t o t h e g e n e r a l interest), o r m o r a l a n s w e r s ( d o this b e c a u s e it is m o r a l l y c o m m a n d e d ) . It is o b v i o u s t h a t a l l t h e s e d i m e n s i o n s c o m e t o g e t h e r i n t h e i d e a l c a s e ; i n t h e n o n i d e a l case it is essential h o w e v e r t o d e c i d e w h a t a n s w e r a practical q u e s ­ tion

demands. A n d t h i s d e m a n d i s a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e d e m a n d : i t i s t h e o t h e r s

who demand

a n a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t i o n W h y a r e y o u d o i n g this? A c t o r s

m u s t ask themselves ( a n d a r e asked) h o w they can justify themselves. T o t h a t e x t e n t , t h e faculty o f j u d g m e n t is i n d e e d a subjective faculty, b u t j u d g ­ i n g itself is a f o r m o f intersubjective justification. Y e t o t h e r s c a n n o t r e l i e v e acting persons o f the question

o f h o w to decide between the claims o f

different justification c o m m u n i t i e s . H e r e lies t h e i r r e d u c i b l e e l e m e n t o f the

autonomy o f p e r s o n s . W i t h

regard

to problems

that affect

different

s p h e r e s , t h e y m u s t first a s k w h a t , f o r i n s t a n c e , e t h i c a l , l e g a l , a n d m o r a l d u t i e s i t i s e s s e n t i a l t o d o , i n o r d e r then t o a s k h o w t h e s e a r e t o b e w e i g h e d against o n e another.

First a p e r s o n m u s t k n o w what duties conflict a n d

t h e n a s k w h i c h d i m e n s i o n is t h e m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l . C r e o n says, " a n d if a n y h o l d s / A f r i e n d o f m o r e a c c o u n t t h a n h i s o w n city, / I s c o r n h i m " ( S o p h ­ ocles 1994, w . 1 8 1 - 8 3 ) , to w h i c h A n t i g o n e responds, " N o r c o u l d I think that a d e c r e e o f y o u r s — / A m a n — c o u l d override t h e laws o f H e a v e n Unwritten a n d unchanging"

/

( w . 4 5 3 - 5 5 ) . T h e "tragedy" accompanying

the disintegration o f G r e e k political a n d ethical unity (which H e g e l high­ 20

l i g h t s i n t h e Phenomenology of Spirit)

c a n n o t b e aufgehoben b y t h e p r o p o s e d

distinction. T h i s proposal does h o w e v e r allow a differentiated

perspective

o n practical conflicts within a n d b e t w e e n the individual contexts o f justi­ f i c a t i o n . I t s h o w s t h a t p e r s o n s a r e simultaneously m e m b e r s o f ( u s u a l l y v a r i ­ ous) ethical communities, o f a legal c o m m u n i t y a n d a political community (the latter two l a r g e l y c o i n c i d i n g ) , a n d , finally, o f the c o m p r e h e n s i v e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y o f all h u m a n b e i n g s ; f r o m this s i m u l t a n e o u s m e m b e r s h i p t h e r e follows the possibility o f criticizing o n e o f these c o m m u n i t i e s in the light o f t h e o t h e r s . T h i s a n a l y s i s s h o w s , f i n a l l y , w h a t criteria a r e t h e o n e s o n t h e basis o f which practical questions m u s t b e answered in different

contexts;

t h a t is, w h a t r e a s o n s — i n a f o r m a l s e n s e — a r e g o o d , r e s p o n s i b l e r e a s o n s i n these contexts. T h e analysis also m a k e s possible a differentiated view o f t h e p r o b l e m central to the controversy between liberalism a n d communitarianism, the p r o b l e m o f t h e priority o f t h e g o o d o r t h e r i g h t : i n m o r a l q u e s t i o n s , t h e priority o f the right "predominates," in ethical questions the priority o f the g o o d . A n ethical answer cannot b e given to a moral question, o r rather: every answer must b e justified in a certain way. I n the spheres o f law a n d democracy, therefore, the g o o d a n d the right have a particular place; here, however, the priority o f equal rights prevails, o n the o n e hand, a n d the priority o fw h a t is g e n e r a l l y justifiable, o n t h e o t h e r . T h u s , i n n o n e o f these

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

27?

c o n t e x t s is t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e " s i t u a t e d " s e l f o r its c o n n e c t e d n e s s to c o m m u n i t y n e g l e c t e d — n o t

e v e n w h e r e t h e p r i o r i t y o f m o r a l i t y is a s ­

serted. A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d o n e m u s t differentiate mative, tragic fragmentation

t h e thesis o f the n o r

o f t h e practical w o r l d — a c c o r d i n g to which

t h e r e is n o a l l - e m b r a c i n g " f o r m u l a " ( B e r l i n 1969b, 1 6 9 ) f o r t h e o r d e r ol v a l u e s o r n o e x t e r n a l s t a n d p o i n t t h a t c o u l d r e c o n c i l e (cf. W i l l i a m s 1 9 9 3 , 1 6 2 - 6 7 ) u s with t h e w o r l d — i n two respects. First, m a n y practical questions can b e determined

as ones that justifiably b e l o n g in o n e o f the contexts

a n d a r e n o t located between them. Even then, especially in ethical ques­ tions o f t h e g o o d , t h e w o r l d o f possible v a l u e s is pluralistic a n d " u n o r d e r e d " in t h e metaphysical sense, a n d a person equally g o o d reasons

m a y face a decision in which

(or equally b a d ones)

speak for both

alternatives.

Decisions a r e "tragic" n o t because h u m a n beings a r e d o o m e d to c h o o s i n g f r o m a totality o f "objective" ( a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e ) v a l u e s ( a thesis that o w e s its e x i s t e n c e t o a v a l u e - m e t a p h y s i c a l l e g a c y ) , b u t b e c a u s e i n a s i t u a t i o n m i g h t b e forced, in a sense, to a b a n d o n

they

a part o f the identity they have

h a d until n o w . T h i s possibility d o e s n o t o f course rule o u t a "relatively" g o o d solution to a n ethical conflict ( o n e that might retrospectively turn out to b e the "only correct" decision). S e c o n d , conflicts b e t w e e n normative spheres

(cf. A n t i g o n e ' s c o n f l i c t )

are n o t necessarily irresolvable conflicts in the sense that they admit o f n o "correct" answer (in a nonobjectivistic sense). T h u s ethical o r political con­ siderations that a r e themselves u n c o n n e c t e d with m o r a l duties cannot pro­ vide a n y "good reasons" n o t to act morally. I n a conflict between

ethical

commitments a n d moral duties (seethe discussion o f Williams's e x a m p l e above), a mixture o f ethical a n d moral points o f view (helping a person close

to oneself)

rather

than

another

moral

point

o f view

(helping

a

stranger) represents in certain circumstances (if only o n e p e r s o n c a n b e h e l p e d ) a g o o d reason to a c t according to ethical considerations; b u t eth­ ical v a l u e s (art, f o r instance) c a n n o t o u t w e i g h m o r a l responsibility t o w a r d o t h e r s . T h a t t h e d e c i s i o n f o r " m y " g o o d life restricts t h e life o f o t h e r s i n a manner

that c a n n o t b e j u s t i f i e d r e c i p r o c a l l y m a k e s this d e c i s i o n i n t o

m o r a l a n d n o t p r i m a r i l y e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n , a n d it t h e r e f o r e

a

requires the

c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m o r a l c r i t e r i a . I t is first a n d f o r e m o s t a p e r s o n h i m - o r herself w h o must "beable to live" with ethical decisions; in t h e case o f m o r a l decisions, h o w e v e r , those p e r s o n s affected m u s t also b e a b l e t o live with t h e m . T h e plurality o f e t h i c a l v a l u e s i s n o t a n a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e p o s s i ­ b i l i t y o f one m o r a l i t y b u t a n a r g u m e n t f o r i t , f o r t h e j u s t i f i e d f o u n d a t i o n o f t h e c o m m o n life o f e t h i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t p e r s o n s . B e t w e e n t h e d i f f e r e n t levels, t h e r e f o r e , t h e r e c a n b e practical d i s p a r i t i e s t h a t m a k e i t i m p o s s i b l e f o r a p e r s o n in a situation to r e c o g n i z e o r to d o t h e "right thing." T h e thesis o f a conceptual a n d t h u s n e c e s s a r y d i s p a r i t y b e t w e e n t h e s e l e v e l s i s h o w e v e r

2 J4

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

t o o strong (see the discussion o f N a g e l a b o v e ) . W h a t o n e "owes" to oneself, to p e r s o n s "close" to oneself, o r to o t h e r s as such, c a n n o t b e b y a g e n e r a l f o r m u l a , n o r is it i n p r i n c i p l e

determined

indeterminable.

A theory of the normative world can register only the dimensions

of

responsibility a n d the (formal) criteria of g o o d reasons that persons have t o c o n s i d e r ; it c a n n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e

how t h e y s h o u l d d o t h i s

specifically.

I n this o p e n n e s s lies the s c o p e for p e r s o n s to " d e t e r m i n e " t h e m s e l v e s in the normative world. This world does not however disintegrate

into

in­

c o m p a t i b l e v a l u e spheres: the theory's ideal continues to b e p e r s o n s w h o a r e a u t o n o m o u s i n all c o n t e x t s .

2 1

B e i n g m e m b e r s of different justification

c o m m u n i t i e s , p e r s o n s a c c e p t — o r m u t u a l l y p r e s e n t to o n e autonomous

connecting

of ethical, legal, political, a n d

bility vis-a-vis t h e m s e l v e s a n d

others

as the

central

another—the

moral

practical

responsi­ task.

One

w o u l d call s u c h individuals r e s p o n s i b l e , a u t o n o m o u s in a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e n s e , a n d r e a s o n a b l e in the practical s e n s e . T o this d e m a n d i n g

concept

of responsible persons there c o r r e s p o n d s the c o n c e p t of a responsible so­ ciety t h a t m a k e s t h e i r p r a c t i c a l e x i s t e n c e p o s s i b l e ( a n d is itself m a d e p o s ­ sible by it). T h e task o f i n t e g r a t i n g different s p h e r e s o f a u t o n o m y t h e r e f o r e

presents

itself in v a r i o u s ways b o t h to individuals in particular a n d to the basic struc­ t u r e o f a s o c i e t y as a w h o l e . W i t h r e g a r d to t h e f o r m e r , it m u s t b e

empha­

sized that the d e m a n d d i r e c t e d at p e r s o n s to integrate ethical, legal, polit­ i c a l , a n d m o r a l a u t o n o m y is itself a n o r m a t i v e d e m a n d . ethically

(or legally)

autonomous

without

understanding

Persons can

be

themselves

as

m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e " m o r a l p e r s o n s " o r as politically r e s p o n s i b l e "citizens"; e v e n i f u n d e r s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s o f r e c i p r o c i t y o n e is t o a s s u m e t h a t p e r s o n s s e e their g o o d life c o n n e c t e d in a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s e n s e w i t h b e i n g r e c o g ­ nized by others a n d with recognizing others, the unity of the g o o d a n d

the

j u s t is o n e t h a t m u s t b e e s t a b l i s h e d a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y d e m a n d e d e v e r a n e w a n d is n o t itself e t h i c a l l y c o m m a n d e d i n t h e n a m e o f a " d e e p e r " o r " h i g h e r " good. T h e l a t t e r — t h e integration o f different contexts within the basic struc­ t u r e o f s o c i e t y — l e a d s t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f justice: p r i n c i p l e s o f j u s t i c e p r o t e c t ethical a u t o n o m y by m e a n s o f rights to p e r s o n a l self-determination;

more­

over, they r e p r e s e n t p r o c e d u r a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d political rights to the polit­ ical self-determination o f citizens as well as principles o f social justice, w h i c h h e l p realize p e r s o n a l a n d political liberty. In addition,

they must

satisfy

m o r a l c r i t e r i a o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f p e r s o n s . A c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i c e is i t s e l f " a u t o n o m o u s " a n d j u s t i f i e d as a c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n if it c o m ­ b i n e s these c o n t e x t s o f justice. S u c h a t h e o r y lies b e y o n d the q u e s t i o n the priority of the ethically g o o d or the

m o r a l l y r i g h t ; it i n t e g r a t e s

of the

priority o f r e a s o n as well as a n intersubjective perspective o n the "contexts" o f p e r s o n a n d c o m m u n i t y in w h i c h o n e c a n s p e a k m e a n i n g f u l l y ( a n d crit-

CONTEXTS OK JUSTICE 2 7 5 ically) o f t h e priority o f t h e g o o d , individual rights, the generally justified, o r o f the morally right. O f course, such a theory o f justice also integrates these contexts as "con­ texts o f recognition." F r o m the moral-theoretic

e x p l i c a t i o n of t h e j u s t i f i ­

c a t i o n q u e s t i o n a s s e e n f r o m t h e performative p e r s p e c t i v e of p e r s o n s w h o m u s t r e d e e m v a l i d i t y c l a i m s b e f o r e a n d w i t h i n c o m m u n i t i e s , it f o l l o w s t h a t at these levels persons, as m e m b e r s o f (different)

c o m m u n i t i e s , a r e rtrog

nized a n d r e c o g n i z e t h e m s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s . T h e a n a l y s i s o f t h e justification communities—which practical reason—therefore

points

is b a s e d o n a c o n c e p t i o n to different

different

o f justifying,

relations o f recognition.

T h e i r a n a l y s i s i s not, h o w e v e r , o f t h e o r y - v i n d i c a t i n g , b u t o f e x p l i c a t i v e i m ­ p o r t a n c e ; it s u p p l e m e n t s a n d e x p l a i n s t h e i d e a o f n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s a n d registers p h e n o m e n a

of recognition—and

especially p h e n o m e n a

o f the

lack o f r e c o g n i t i o n — t o w h i c h a theory of justice must b e conceptually sen­ sitive.

5.3.

CONTEXTS OF RECOGNITION

N o t least b e c a u s e o f t h e diversity o f t h e w a y s h e e m p l o y s it i n h i s w r i t i n g s f r o m t h e System of Ethical Life ( 1 8 0 2 ) t o t h e m a t u r e s y s t e m o f t h e Encyclo­ paedia

(1830), Hegel's concept of "recognition"

(Anerkennung)—and

es­

pecially the idea o f a struggle for recognition—has been the object o f nu­ m e r o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that h a v e a t t e m p t e d to m a k e this c o n c e p t , w h i c h is central to his practical p h i l o so p h y , fertile f o r reflections o n theories o f subjectivity, morality, a n d society, as well as o n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f history. P r o c e e d i n g f r o m F i c h t e ' s c o n c e p t o f " d e m a n d " (Aufforderung), nects the i d e a o f self-relation m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h

Hegel con­

others with the doctrine

o f t h e state o f n a t u r e a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f law f r o m o u t o f t h e struggle for the recognition o f individual normative c l a i m s — a struggle that c a n b e r e s o l v e d o n l y i n a state o f l a w i n w h i c h individuals a r e r e c i p r o c a l l y r e c o g ­ nized as equally entided subjects a n d o n the basis o f which other forms o f political a n d social recognition develop.

2 2

I n t h i s a p p r o a c h w e find t h e c o r e

of the idea o f recognition: the qualitative self-understanding develops through

recognition

( a n d affirmation)

o f a subject

by other subjects, w h i c h

in t u r n p r e s u p p o s e s r e c o g n i z i n g t h e s e s u b j e c t s a s e q u a l s . A l l subjectivity is " c o n s t i t u t i v e l y " r e l a t e d t o r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y — a n d is s o a t d i f f e r e n t levels o f t h e relation o f the self to others. A s A x e l H o n n e t h (1995a, part 1) shows, H e g e l ' s "original insight" (Ha­ bermas

1 9 7 4 , 1 4 6 ) — t h a t o f e x p l a i n i n g t h e f o r m a t i o n o f sittlich f o r m s o f

generality a n d o f self-consciousness through the mutual recognition o f a n d b y o t h e r s — l e a d s i n t h e e a r l y w r i t i n g s ( e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e System of Ethical

Life

a n d i n t h e First Philosophy of Spirit i n 1 8 0 3 - 4 [Realphilosophie, I ] ) t o t h e theory o f a dialectical mediation o f individuality a n d generality at different

2 J6

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

l e v e l s o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p s ( l o v e , l a w , Sittlichkeit); w h e r e a s i n t h e J e n a L e c t u r e s o n t h e P h i l o s o p h y o f S p i r i t i n 1 8 0 5 - 6 (Realphilosophie, I I ) t h e levels o f intersubjective recognition a r e already d e t e r m i n e d as " m o m e n t s " w i t h i n t h e c o m p r e h e n s i v e m o v e m e n t o f a b s o l u t e Spirit b a c k to itself (as f i n a l l y e x e c u t e d b y H e g e l i n t h e Phenomenology of Spirit i n 1 8 0 7 ) . T h i s d e ­ termination

in turn leads to a reinterpretation

ethical-general consciousness in the direction

o f the intersubjectivity o f of a

substantive-objective

g e n e r a l i t y o f S p i r i t , a s c a r r i e d o u t b y H e g e l i n t h e Philosophy of Right. Through

this step o f substantializing o b j e c t i v e Spirit a n d o f c o m p l e t e l y

m e d i a t i n g subjectivity a n d objectivity in absolute Spirit, H e g e l "suppresses" the idea o f a n o p e n a n d unfinished intersubjective constitution o f "univer­ sal c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " - * T h i s is a step f r a u g h t with c o n s e q u e n c e s , a s c a n b e s e e n i n t h e d e ­ bate between liberalism a n d communitarianism.

Hegel's formulation o f

t h e a l t e r n a t i v e i n t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f Sittlichkeit—"either

w e start f r o m t h e

substantiality o f t h e ethical order, o r else w e p r o c e e d atomistically a n d build

o n the basis o f single individuals," w h e r e b y t h e latter

geistlos ( w i t h o u t S p i r i t ) the

dichotomy

option

is

(Hegel 1967, 261 [addition to § 35])—leads

to

between

atomism

a n d substantialism,

which

does

not

s e e m to p e r m i t a third option: namely, a conception o f intersubjectivity that allows f o r a view o f different forms o f c o m m u n i t y in which

persons

are both independent,

commu­

nity m e m b e r s .

autonomous

T h e "constitutive

individuals a n d "situated"

relation"

lective identity is to b e u n d e r s t o o d

between

individual a n d col­

a s a reciprocal r e l a t i o n , n o t a u n i l a t ­

eral o r substantivist o n e . T h e critique o f a t o m i s m in m o r a l theory a n d in t h e t h e o r y o f political c o m m u n i t y is n o t d o o m e d t o a n intersubjective monism

( o f c o m m u n i t y ) ; it is p r e c i s e l y t h e c o n c e p t o f r e c o g n i t i o n

o r against H e g e l ) that generates t h e possibility o f c o n n e c t i n g and

generality with

the nonsubsumptive

recognition

o f individuality—

the possibility o f c o m b i n i n g identity a n d difference without one

side. T h e point

tion

and dynamic

as H a b e r m a s symbolic

of the concept

development

(1992c)

and

media­

socialization,"

says f o l l o w i n g M e a d , w h o s e e k s i n h i s t h e o r y o f

interactionism

dimensional) constitution ognition by other

absolutizing

lies in t h e n o n r e d u c t i v e

o f "individuation

(with

reciprocity

subjects

to

explain

the

intersubjective

(not one-

o f t h e self t h r o u g h linguistically m e d i a t e d rec­ (see Honneth

1995a, c h . 4).

In what follows I d o n o t discuss the m o d e l o f recognition with reference to its m u l t i f a r i o u s d i m e n s i o n s i n H e g e l ( o r b e y o n d h i m ) . I n s t e a d , I a r g u e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f r e c o g n i t i o n m a k e s it p o s s i b l e to i n t e r p r e t t h e "contexts o f justification" as "contexts o f r e c o g n i t i o n " ; this e n a b l e s a differentiated v i e w o f d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f t h e p r a c t i c a l relation-to-self ( r e c o g n i t i o n o f o n e ­ s e l f ) , w h i c h a t t h e v a r i o u s l e v e l s c o r r e s p o n d t o r e l a t i o n s o f being recognized b y o t h e r s a n d o f recognizing others. T h i s a n a l y s i s l e a d s t o a d i s t i n c t i o n b e -

CONTEXTS OK JUSTICE

277

t w e e n d i f f e r e n t f o r m s o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y a n d o f c o m m u n i t y connectedness in a subjective-intersubjective respect. In the debate between liberalism a n d communitarianism

it was seen at

v a r i o u s p l a c e s t h a t t h e c o n c e p t o f r e c o g n i t i o n o f f e r s c o n c e p t u a l possihilit ies t h a t m e a n i n g f u l l y m e d i a t e b o t h p o s i t i o n s . W i t h r e f e r e n c e t o S a n d e T s cri­ tique o f the " u n e n c u m b e r e d

s e l f , " f o r e x a m p l e , i t b e c a m e c l e a r that his

a l t e r n a t i v e o f t h e " c o n s t i t u t e d s e l f " c a n n o t a d e q u a t e l y e x p l a i n t h e possibil­ ity o f d i s t a n c i n g r e f l e c t i o n a n d i n d i v i d u a l i d e n t i t y , s i n c e it r e m a i n s bound u p with a one-sided understanding

o f constitution. Intersubjective

tution a n d ethical recognition d o n o t however rule o u t ethical

consti­

autonomy.

A t t h e s e c o n d level t o o , t h a t o f law, it w a s s e e n that t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f persons as ethical persons a n d m e m b e r s o f ethical communities must b e distinguished from the recognition o f persons as legal persons, with the f o r m e r n o n e t h e l e s s b e i n g legally p r o t e c t e d t h r o u g h t h e latter. T h i r d , t h e significance o f "citizenship" in a pluralistic society c o u l d b e e x p l a i n e d o n the basis o f the various dimensions o f the recognition o f ethical difference a n d legal, political, a n d social equality. H e r e , especially in c o n n e c t i o n with social justice, the "primary g o o d " (Rawls)

o f self-respect e n j o y e d b y the

political c o m m u n i t y ' s fully e n t i d e d m e m b e r s p l a y e d a central r o l e . Finally, it p r o v e d t o b e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n s i d e r a f o u r t h d i m e n s i o n o f r e c i p r o c a l r e c ­ ognition: recognition as a m o r a l person b e y o n d all m e m b e r s h i p in partic­ ular communities. "Recognition" therefore means reciprocal a s a n individual

to o n e a n o t h e r b u t m u s t n o t b e c o n f u s e d with o n e a n o t h e r . munitarian

recognition

a n d a communal being i n a l l t h e s e s p h e r e s , w h i c h a r e l i n k e d

thesis o f t h e intersubjective constitution—or

If the com­

m o r e generally,

of t h e situatedness—of t h e self a n d the thesis o f t h e c o m m u n i t y

connect­

e d n e s s o f law, d e m o c r a c y , a n d morality a r e taken seriously, all attempts to u n d e r s t a n d "intersubjectivity" o r " c o m m u n i t y " o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l l y will c o m e to

nothing. T h e perspective provided by the theory o frecognition demonstrates h o w

the concepts o f the theory of justice a r e a n c h o r e d in social a n d subjective life. T h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l e x p a n s i o n o f p e r s p e c t i v e a c c o m m o d a t e s J u d i t h S h k l a r ' s (1990) d e m a n d that every theory o f j u s t i c e — a n d especially a the­ ory o f "contexts" of j u s t i c e — b e able to appropriately consider and

phenomena

( s u b j e c t i v e o r c o l l e c t i v e ) e x p e r i e n c e s o f injustice. P u t p o s i t i v e l y , t h i s

m e a n s that the theory must m a k e clear what forms o f recognition a just society h a s to guarantee. Honneth's

interpretation

o f the struggle for recognition, which

con­

n e c t s u p w i t h t h e e a r l y H e g e l a n d M e a d , is t h e m o s t c o m p r e h e n s i v e at­ tempt to distinguish the various stages o f reciprocal recognition that de­ velop in a dialectic o f conflicts about the reciprocally granted of

claims to autonomy

spond—in

a n d individuality. T o these

a positive respect—different

relations

recognition

stages there

corre­

to t h e self a n d — i n

a

2 J8

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

negative

respect—different

drive each attained

experiences

of recognition

denied,

level i n the struggles f o r t h e recognition

which

of equal

r i g h t s a n d u n i q u e i n d i v i d u a l i t y b e y o n d itself. I n this p e r s p e c t i v e i t is p o s ­ s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e s t a g e s o f love, o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n a s p e r s o n s o f law,

a n d o f t h e solidarity-based r e c o g n i t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y ; a p e r s o n ' s self-

confidence, constituted

self-respect, a n d feeling o f self-worth at these stages ( H o n n e t h

these m o d e s o f positive recognition

( o r self-esteem) a r e

1 9 9 5 a , c h . 5; 1 9 9 2 a ,

195-96). T o

( a n d self-recognition) there

corre­

s p o n d m o d e s o f disrespecting identity claims: disrespecting the bodily o r legal integrity o f p e r s o n s o r t h e v a l u e o f their f o r m s o f life. A r e f o r m u ­ l a t e d c o n c e p t o f Sittlichkeit m u s t t h e r e f o r e i n c l u d e u n i v e r s a l r i g h t s a s w e l l as c o n s i d e r f o r m s o f the solidarity-based r e c o g n i t i o n o f particular

iden­

tities i n t h e l i g h t o f s h a r e d v a l u e s , s o t h a t "subjects c a n a s s u r e t h e m s e l v e s of the social significance o f their individual capacities" ( H o n n e t h

1995a,

8 7 ) . S o c i e t y a s a w h o l e is t h u s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o w h i c h c l a i m s t o t h e r e c ­ ognition

( e s t e e m ) o f a n i n d i v i d u a l life's v a l u e i n its p a r t i c u l a r i t y a r e d i ­

r e c t e d . A sittlich f o r m o f r e c o g n i t i o n h a s t h e t a s k o f c o n n e c t i n g t h e o p e n ­ ness o f the horizons o f possible personal autonomy with the existence o f particular

a n d limited horizons

of common

values within which

every

person c a n esteem him- o r herself as a valuable a n d particular person in his o r h e r chosen

life.

T h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n b e t w e e n (self-) r e s p e c t a n d (self-) e s t e e m t h a t is a t the center o f H o n n e t h ' s distinction b e t w e e n "law" a n d "solidarity" h a s al­ ready b e e n addressed (chapter 5.2). It designates a n important difference r e g a r d i n g w h a t it m e a n s t o r e c o g n i z e a p e r s o n i n a g e n e r a l s e n s e , a s e n s e d u e equally to all persons, a n d to recognize a person as a particular indi­ vidual with particular capabilities. W e respect all persons in a n equal way (and without gradations) because they a r epersons, b u tw e esteem a person in a particular way because h e o r s h e h a s a "personality" that e m b o d i e s c e r t a i n v a l u e s t h a t w e c o n s i d e r e s t i m a b l e (cf. S p e l m a n 1 9 7 8 ) . T o e s t e e m a p e r s o n a s t h e p e r s o n h e o r s h e is m e a n s o f c o u r s e n o t o n l y that w e e s t e e m this p e r s o n a s a s p e c i a l e m b o d i m e n t o f a v a l u e that s e e m s essential f o r a g o o d c h a r a c t e r , b u t also that this p e r s o n h i m - o r h e r s e l f a c c e p t s this v a l u e a n d u n d e r s t a n d s h i m - o r h e r s e l f a c c o r d i n g l y . T h e p e r s o n ' s f e e l i n g o f selfw o r t h — h i s o r h e r s e l f - e s t e e m — m u s t b e constituted b y this value. D a v i d Sachs's (1981) distinction b e t w e e n self-respect a n d self-esteem thus binds self-respect to attributes that o n e h a s i n c o m m o n with all h u m a n One

can therefore

never have too m u c h

beings.

self-respect, b u t t o o little

self-

r e s p e c t c a n l e a d t o a b a n d o n i n g oneself. O n e can, h o w e v e r , b e m o r e o r less convinced o f o n e ' s o w n worth; t o o m u c h self-esteem m e a n s overestimating oneself, w h e r e a s t o o litde m e a n s underestimating o n e ' s achievements a n d capabilities. I n Darwall's (1977) view, a f o r m o f "recognition respect" that is d u e t o p e r s o n s a s p e r s o n s a n d is t h e r e f o r e m o r a l l y r e q u i r e d c a n t h u s b e

CONTEXTS OF J U S T I C E

2 79

distinguished from a n "appraisal respect" that constitutes a positive appre­ c i a t i o n o f a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r traits. The distinction between appraisal respect and recognition respect for persons enables us to see that there is no puzzle at all in thinking both that all per­ sons are entitled to respect just by virtue of their being persons and that persons are deserving of more or less respect by virtue of their personal char­ acteristics. ( 1 9 7 7 , 46; cf. 1 9 8 3 , 1 5 0 ) H e r e it is e v i d e n t t h a t c o n c e p t i o n s s u c h a s t h o s e o f M a c l n t y r e ' s , that a person c a n conceive o f him- o r herself solely as a n ethical person a n d b e r e c o g n i z e d o n l y a s s u c h , fail t o s e e t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f o t h e r f o r m s o f rec­ ognition. With regard to the question o f the determination

of contexts of the

reciprocal esteem a n d respect o f persons, the methodological

difference

between Honneth's theory o f three forms o f recognition as necessary con­ ditions f o r successful self-realization—which taken together f o r m the con­ c e p t i o n o f a p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l t y p e o f Sittlichkeit—and

a theory o f contexts o f

j u s t i c e — w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d to different contexts o f the practical justifica­ tion

of values o r n o r m s — d o e s however lead to important

differences in

content. T h e methodological difference points again to a basic p r o b l e m in the controversy between deontological theories o f morality in the Kantian tradition a n d communitarian models closer to Hegel. C a n a theory based o n a n o t i o n o f practical r e a s o n that stresses (at t h e level o f t h e theory o f validity) a p r o c e d u r a l m o d e o f justifying n o r m s g e t a clear view o f anything o t h e r t h a n u n i v e r s a l n o r m s a l o n e , t h a t i s t o s a y , t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e selfrealization o f persons as a whole a n d n o t just their a u t o n o m y as moral persons? B y means o f the formal definition o f the good, H o n n e t h ' s

model

o f a c o n c e p t i o n o f Sittlichkeit b a s e d o n a t h e o r y o f t h e g o o d a n d " s u c c e s s f u l " life ( s e e 1995a, 1 7 2 - 7 5 ) a v o i d s g i v i n g n o r m a t i v e p r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s p e c i f i c v a l u e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r c o m m u n i t y a n d tradition; y e t it links u p w i t h t h e critique o f the one-sidedness a n d incompleteness o f deontological concep­ tions. A c c o r d i n g to H o n n e t h ,

t h e t h e o r y m u s t d e v e l o p its n o r m a t i v e

con­

c e p t s a n d s t a n d a r d s f r o m w i t h i n , a s it w e r e , f r o m t h e ( i n p a r t i c u l a r , n e g a ­ tive)

e x p e r i e n c e s o f c o n c r e t e individuals; o n l y i n this w a y — w i t h t h e h e l p

of empirical theories—can the theory develop a sensorium f o r "the social conditions under which h u m a n

subjects c a n d e v e l o p a positive attitude

towards themselves" (1995a, 169). T h e t h e o r y o f d i f f e r e n t " c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i c e " e s c a p e s , h o w e v e r , this cri­ tique

of deontological theories by showing to what extent a n appropriate

distinction o f conceptions o f person, community, a n d a u t o n o m y — c o n c e p ­ tions

n o t limited to m o r a l i t y — c o r r e s p o n d s to a n analysis o f the justification

m o d e s o f values a n d n o r m s . O n e thereby identifies conditions of justifica­ tion

t h a t a r e n o t b l i n d t o p e r s o n s ' c o n c r e t e c l a i m s a n d n e e d s : i n t h e dif-

280

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE

ferent

contexts, the justification o f general n o r m s

always relates to t h e

claims o f concrete persons—for instance, in the question o f the legitimacy of law a n d especially in questions o f social justice. T h e normative tions

between different conceptions o f person a n d community

distinc­

correspond

(as it w e r e ) t o d i f f e r e n t practical "relations o f justification," w h i c h a r e n o t to b e u n d e r s t o o d as b e i n g abstract i n t h e w r o n g way: they a r e contexts in which persons demand

reasons f o r e x i s t i n g n o n r e c i p r o c a l r e l a t i o n s . T h e y

a r e thus also, a n d a b o v e all, c o n t e x t s o f social conflicts a b o u t justice, w h i c h c a n b e described at least partially in t h e concepts o f struggles f o r recogni­ tion—for instance, recognition in the basic sense as a moral person o r in political contexts as equally entitled citizens. T o b e relevant t o social theory, h o w e v e r , this d e s c r i p t i o n is d e p e n d e n t u p o n e m p i r i c a l t h e o r i e s . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e c e n t r a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o i n t is that t h e s e analyses o f relations o f recognition have the character o f a m o r e extensive explication, description, a n d supplementation

of the proposed theory of justice's con­

ceptions o f person a n d community; they d o n o t have the function of jus­ tifying these c o n c e p t i o n s . T h e y a r e c o n c e p t i o n s t a i l o r e d t o ( t h e c o n t e x t s of) questions o f justice a n d a r e therefore n o t , i n t h e sense o f H o n n e t h ' s approach, a i m e d centrally at a universal a n d comprehensive theory o f rec­ ognition—developed in the genetic perspective—or at a "formal theory o f the g o o d . " F o r two basic reasons, such a theory o f invariant structures o f b e i n g a self c o u l d n o t b e a r t h e n o r m a t i v e b u r d e n

o f justification f o r a

t h e o r y o f justice: s i n c e i t r u l e s o u t s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e p t i o n s a s b e i n g a p r i o r i p r e s c r i b e d a n d b i n d i n g , it c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h e criteria a s t o

justice-

relevant claims o f persons directed at other persons o r communities (in v a r i o u s c o n t e x t s of, say, s o c i a l o r m o r a l j u s t i c e ) a r e j u s t i f i e d ; n o r c a n it explain

t h e generally ( a n d n o t e t h i c a l l y ) o b l i g a t i n g c h a r a c t e r

o f justice

n o r m s without t h e i d e a o f "reasonable," reciprocal a n d g e n e r a l justifica­ tion.

T h e c o n c e p t u a l sensorium f o r c l a i m s t o r e c o g n i t i o n c a n n o t b e c o n ­

n e c t e d w i t h criteria f o r t h e e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e s e c l a i m s w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n : i n s o f a r a s it r e p r e s e n t s t h e f o u n d a t i o n

o f justice

claims, t h e g o o d m u s t s h o w itself t o b e " r e a s o n a b l e " a n d justifiable ( s e e c h a p t e r s 4.4 a n d 5.2); t h e c o n c e p t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n m u s t h a v e

methodolog­

ical priority in a theory o f justice. A g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e , t w o i m p o r ­ tant content-related differences to H o n n e t h ' s theory concerning

questions

o f j u s t i c e s t a n d o u t . T h e first p e r t a i n s t o t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e " r e s p e c t , " t h e s e c o n d to the context o f the "esteem" o f persons. A l t h o u g h "posttraditional" societies, o n the assumption o f w h i c h

Hon­

n e t h p r o c e e d s , a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y legal s t r u c t u r e s t h a t e s s e n t i a l l y i n c o r ­ p o r a t e u n i v e r s a l i s t i c moral p r i n c i p l e s , i t i s n o n e t h e l e s s i m p o r t a n t t o d i s t i n ­ guish

between

(Achtung)

the respect

(Respekt)

o f legal persons

a n d the

respect

o f m o r a l p e r s o n s . T e r m i n o l o g y is n o t central h e r e , t h o u g h i n

CON I I'.X IS < >l 11 • I K I' G e r m a n t h e r e is a l e x i c o g r a p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the

2S1

lu\/nlzo willingly to their

death

s i n c e life h a s a l r e a d y b e e n

destroyed

( 1 9 7 3 a , 4 4 7 - 5 7 ; cf. S o f s k y 1 9 9 3 , 1 0 5 - 6 , 2 2 9 - 3 6 ) . T h i s t h i r d

in

them

dimension,

"individuality," control over o n e ' s o w n body, designates t h e most

funda­

m e n t a l d i m e n s i o n o f h u m a n personality as such: the basis o f any normative relation-to-self. I t is " t h e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l

f o r m o f practical relation-to-

self, n a m e l y , o n e ' s u n d e r l y i n g t r u s t i n o n e s e l f " ( H o n n e t h 1 9 9 5 a , 1 3 3 ) , a n d it is p r o t e c t e d b y m o r a l r e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s ' p h y s i c a l i n t e g r i t y . I n t h e r e c ­ ognition of the moral person, speaking o f respect for the h u m a n

being's

"dignity" acquires the sense o f respect f o r persons as bodily, vulnerable, a n d a s "their o w n " b e i n g s w h o h a v e t h e r i g h t t o live their lives t h e m s e l v e s in physical a n d psychical integrity—not b e c a u s e they "possess" themselves b u t b e c a u s e n o o n e p o s s e s s e s a p e r s o n m o r e t h a n this p e r s o n h i m - o r her­ self. A s s u c h , t h e y h a v e t h e m o r a l r i g h t t o a r e c i p r o c a l a n d g e n e r a l j u s t i f i ­ cation o f all actions that affect t h e m in their integrity. T h e basic f o r m o f m o r a l r e c o g n i t i o n lies i n c o n f e r r i n g this right.

I c a n thus c o n c l u d e by way o f the following. T h ec o m m u n i t a r i a n thesis that practical p r o b l e m s always confront "situated" persons as m e m b e r s o f com­ m u n i t i e s a n d m u s t b e r e s p o n d e d t o within i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c o n t e x t s i s n o t to b e r e j e c t e d , b u t it m u s t b e differentiated. P r a c t i c a l q u e s t i o n s p o s e t h e m ­ s e l v e s i n different c o n t e x t s a n d r e q u i r e a n s w e r s t h a t a r e j u s t i f i e d d i f f e r e n t l y ; a n d these community contexts c a n b e described as spheres o f reciprocal ethical, legal, political, a n d m o r a l recognition that b e l o n g to a c o m p l e t e conception of justice. T h e basis o f the distinction between these

spheres,

of their normative characterization, a n d o f the definition of justice, does n o t o f c o u r s e l i e i n a p a r t i c u l a r f o r m a l i d e a o f a g o o d life r e c o g n i z e d i n all these dimensions; rather, the discussion h a s shown h o w a differentiation of practical contexts follows from the conception o f practical reason

that

stipulates that values a n d n o r m s must b e intersubjectively justified. H e n c e universal m o r a l n o r m s with a claim to universal validity must b e justifiable to e a c h h u m a n b e i n g a n d thus to all h u m a n b e i n g s as h u m a n b e i n g s ; p o ­ litical d e c i s i o n s that l e a d t o legal n o r m s a r e t o b e j u s t i f i e d to all fellow citizens; accordingly, law raises a claim to g e n e r a l legitimacy that b o t h en­ a b l e s a n d constrains p e r s o n s ' liberty a n d c a n i n t u r n b e q u e s t i o n e d in p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e s ; a n d , finally, e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s a r e q u e s t i o n s o f i d e n t i t y c o n c e r n i n g t h e g o o d life, a n d t h e a n s w e r s t o w h i c h , t h o u g h they

cannot

b e given in solitude, d o n o t have to b e justified "publicly" in a moral o r

CONTEXTS OF JUSTICE political way. T h e p r i n c i p l e o f justification b a s e d o n practical r e a s o n calls tor a differentiation o f practical questions with r e f e r e n c e to these f o u r con­ texts o f intersubjective justification. T h e debate between liberalism a n d communitarianism thus teaches us that it is n o t e n o u g h t o s i m p l y j u x t a p o s e t h e g o o d a n d i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s / t h e m o r a l l y r i g h t , c o m m u n i t y a n d j u s t i c e , Sittlichkeit a n d m o r a l i t y , c o n c r e t e contexts a n d abstract reason; the analysis p r o p o s e d here h a s shown

that

the person at the center o f questions of justice must b e c o m p r e h e n d e d n o t solely as a n ethical p e r s o n , a legal p e r s o n , a citizen, o r a m o r a l p e r s o n , b u t as a p e r s o n i n all these d i m e n s i o n s o f c o m m u n i t y . T h e task o f a theory o f justice consists in appropriately d e t e r m i n i n g a n d b r i n g i n g together

these

c o n t e x t s o fj u s t i c e . A c c o r d i n g to this theory, t h e society that unites

these

c o n t e x t s m a y b e c a l l e d just.

NOTES

PREFACE 1. On the history of this symbolization in the European tradition, see the in­ formative study by Curtis and Resnik ( 1 9 8 7 ) . 2. For some of my more recent work in which the approach developed in the book is elaborated with respect to various issues, see "Politische Freiheit," Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophic 44 ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 2 1 1 - 2 7 ; "Foundations of a Theory of Multicul­ tural Justice," Constellations 4 ( 1 9 9 7 ) : 6 3 - 7 1 ; "Die Rechtfertigung der Gerechtigkeit: Rawls' Politischer Liberalismus und Habermas' Diskurstheorie in der Diskussion," in Das Recht der Republik, ed. Hauke Brunkhorst and Peter Niesen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1 9 9 9 ) , 1 0 5 - 6 8 ; 'The Basic Right to Justification: Toward a Con­ structivist Conception of Human Rights," Constellations 6 (1999): 3 5 - 6 0 ; "Praktische Vernunft und rechtfertigende Griinde: Zur Begrundung der Moral," in Motive, Griinde, Zwecke: Theorien praktischer Rationalitat, ed. Stefan Gosepath (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1 9 9 9 ) , 1 6 8 - 2 0 5 ; "Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Jus­ tice," Metaphilosophy 3 2 ( 2 0 0 1 ) : 1 6 0 - 7 9 ; 'The Rule of Reasons: Three Models of Deliberative Democracy," Ratiofuris 1 4 (forthcoming); 'Tolerance, Justice and Rea­ son," in Reasonable Tolerance: The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies, ed. Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forth­ coming) .

INTRODUCTION 1. The importance of Rawls's theory in this respect is emphasized by Gutmann (1989)2. Thus, for instance, Michael Walzer, who considers communitarianism to be a necessary but "inconstant feature of liberalism" (1990a, 6), criticizes the general characterization of his position as "communitarian" ( 1 9 9 2 c , 2 8 6 ) . Taylor ( 1 9 8 9 b ) , too, warns against one-dimensional readings of the controversy. 2

9 3

ju).f

NOTES TO PAGES 2 - 7

3. Joas ( 1 9 9 3 ) underscores this difference in meaning with reference to prag­ matism. Since I do not deal with this in what follows, it should be mentioned here that communitarian critique is connected with attempts within American histori­ ography and sociology to link up with the "moral resources" (Vorlander 1988; cf. Kallscheuer 1 9 9 2 ) of the religious or republican currents in the political tradition of the United States. On this, see in particular the "republican revisionism" in his­ toriography: Bailyn ( 1 9 6 7 ) , Wood ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Pocock ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; see also the discussions in Kramnick ( 1 9 8 2 ) and Rodgers ( 1 9 9 2 ) . This is also a strong motif in Sandel (1984a). Bellah et al. ( 1 9 8 6 , 1 9 9 1 ) and Lasch ( 1 9 8 8 ) represent this tendency in sociology; for critiques, see H.-P. Miiller ( 1 9 9 2 ) and Phillips ( 1 9 9 3 ) . The concept of communitarianism acquired a concretely political meaning through the Responsive Communitarian Platform, a nonpartisan initiative for the renewal of social and political institutions in the interest of the common good, one whose self-understanding has been formulated in large part by Etzioni ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 5 3 - 6 7 ) , Galston, and Glendon (see also the journal The Responsive Community). However, this translation of communitarian arguments into a political program that combines culturally conservative and democratic-participatory elements is just one possible communitarian position and cannot be regarded as the communitarian position par excellence. See also Barber (1986a) and Sandel ( 1 9 8 8 ) . 4. A survey of these four levels in the debate can be found in Forst ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 5. "Beyond" is to be understood here neither as a claim to synthesize both sides in the sense of a comprehensive Aujhebung (sublimation) nor as being "disengaged from" these sides, but in the sense of a position that has emerged critically from the debate and attempts to go further. 6. This explication of the concept of context shows its fundamental difference from Walzer's ( 1 9 8 3 ) theory of distributive "spheres of justice"; his theory, which is located on a methodological plane entirely different from that of my discussion, attempts to reconstruct a society's "shared meanings" that determine what goods are to be distributed and according to what criteria.

1. T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N O F T H E S E L F 1. See Teitelman ( 1 9 7 2 ) , Schwartz ( 1 9 7 3 ) , Nagel ( 1 9 8 9 ) , and Rawls's reply ( 1 9 7 5 c ) . In addition, see Lukes ( 1 9 7 3 , ch. 1 1 ) , Macpherson ( 1 9 7 3 ) , Fisk ( 1 9 8 9 ) , and, by way of a summary, DiQuattro ( 1 9 8 3 ) . 2. I discuss the principal features of Rawls's theory subsequently in connection with Sandel's critique rather than sketch them separately here. Nonetheless, the two principles of justice that follow from the original position may be presented at this point: "(1) Each person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. (2) Social and economic inequalities are permissible provided that they are (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls 1 9 7 8 , 5 7 ; on the changes to this formulation, see Rawls 1982a, 5 and chapter 3.4 below). 3. Taylor himself, however, is more reserved in his critique of Rawls, who in his view is "by no means a prisoner of the atomist perspective" ^ 9 8 5 ^ 274m 9).

NOTES TO PAGES 8-25 4. On the concept of "qualitative identity," see esp. Tugendhat (1986, 2 5 4 - 6 2 ) . 5. [Translator's note: although the functional equivalent of the distinction in German legal theory between subjektive Rechte or Freiheitsrechte on the one hand and objektives Recht on the other would be simply "rights" and "laws" in English, here as elsewhere in the book, the term subjektive has been translated as "individual," that is, rights pertaining to the individual. Freiheitsrechte has been variously translated as "liberty rights" and "liberties."] 6. I deal in detail with Taylor's own conclusions from this model in chapter 4.4. 7. See the introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1 9 9 1 ) . 8. On Sandel's arguments against Dworkin, see chapter 2 . 3 . 9. See the critique by Barry (1984) and Larmore ( 1 9 8 4 ) . With reference to discourse ethics, see Benhabib (1989a). 10. Mead ( 1 9 6 2 , 1 6 4 - 7 8 ) ; on this, sec chapter 5 . 3 . Selznick ( 1 9 8 7 ) and Post (1989) mention Mead's theory in the context of a critique of Sandel, but only just in passing. 1 1 . See the critiques presented by (iulmann ( 1 9 8 5 ) , Larmore ( 1 9 8 7 , 1 2 1 - 3 0 ) , Thigpen and Downing ( 1 9 8 7 ) , Waldron ( 1 9 9 3 c ) , Dworkin ( 1 9 8 9 ) , Kymlicka (1990, 2 1 3 - 1 5 ) , Phillips ( 1 9 9 3 , ch. 8); the critique by Holmes ( 1 9 8 9 ) , however, is exces­ sive. 1 2 . Bell ( 1 9 9 3 ) does not deal with this problem either; he does distinguish various forms of "constitutive communities" but assumes their unitary concordance. Informative discussions of the concept of community can be found in Plant ( 1 9 7 8 ) and Peters ( 1 9 9 3 , 9 6 - 1 3 3 ) . 1 3 . Rawls explains the difference in Kantian terms: "Finally, the way in which the Reasonable frames the Rational in the original position represents a feature of the unity of practical reason. In Kant's terms, empirical practical reason is repre­ sented by the rational deliberations of the parties; pure practical reason is repre­ sented by the constraints within which these deliberations take place" (1980, 5 3 2 ) . 14. Rawls ( 1 9 8 5 , 2 3 9 ) ; Rawls (1993a, 27) is also clear on this, where he regards Sandel's interpretation as an "illusion caused by not seeing the original position as a device of representation." 1 5 . On the morally "reasonable" person, see chapter 2 . 1 . 16. In this sense too we are to understand his remark that this conception of citizenship is implied in the political culture of a democratic society—for it must be implied so that this society can be legitimately designated "democratic." The fact that political philosophy normatively highlights concepts of a particular political culture is unavoidable and is not a problem as long as it is the right concepts, that is, those for which there are moral arguments. This fact is necessary because no political culture provides unequivocal "shared understandings" that are not in need of normative interpretation (cf. Rawls 1993a, 9, 4 4 ) . On this issue, see chapter 4.2. 1 7 . Elementary assumptions about the temporal continuity of persons identical with themselves are however made; see Rawls (1993a, 29m 3 1 , 3 i~32n. 3 4 ) on Parfit ( 1 9 8 4 ) , and already Rawls ( 1 9 7 5 b , 1 5 - 2 0 ) . 1 8 . The conception of "legal person" is determined here provisionally as "a bearer of individual rights and a subject of law." It will be developed fully in the course of the following discussion in contradistinction to (and in connection with) the conceptions of "ethical person," "citizen," and "moral person," some of which

M>

NOTES TO PAGES 26-35

have already been employed here. It will be seen that these are distinctions that go beyond Rawls's terminology. 19. This conceptual distinction means neither that these communities exist in a sphere that is not generally regulated by law nor that principles of justice do not apply in these communities—for instance, in families or ethnic communities. On this, see chapter 2. 20. On the compatibility of rights and communities, see Waldron ( 1 9 9 3 c ) , Buchanan ( 1 9 8 9 ) , Kymlicka (1989a, chs. 2, 3 ) , Honneth ( 1 9 9 1 a ) , Tomasi ( 1 9 9 1 ) , Caney ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 2 1 . I thereby link up with Habermas's (1990a, 108; 1993a) validity-theoretic distinction between questions of the good life and questions of "justice"—with the latter concept being differentiated with regard to law and morality (see Habermas 1996a, 1 0 4 - 1 8 ) . On ethics and morality, see also the discussions in Wingert ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 8 - 4 0 ) and Strawson ( 1 9 7 4 ) . According to the latter, the "region of the ethical" consists of incompatible life projects and worldviews, whereas "morality" designates reciprocally justified rules in the observation of which persons have an essential "interest." This notion of interest remains however criteriologically too undeter­ mined to be able to explain moral validity. 2. T H E E T H I C A L N E U T R A L I T Y OF LAW 1. On the origins of liberalism, see Rawls's introduction to Political Liberalism ( 1 9 9 3 a , xiii-xxxiv). 2. Berlin (1969b, 1 2 9 ) writes of negative, legally guaranteed liberty: "liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate with the absence of self-government. Liberty in this sense is principally concerned with the area of control, not with its source." 3. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1989, 1 6 ) : 'The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual." 4. See Dworkin's detailed discussion of the concept of equality in relation to distributive justice (Dworkin 1 9 8 1 a , 1 9 8 1 b ) , personal liberty ( 1 9 8 7 a ) , and political equality ( 1 9 8 7 b ) . 5. Cf. the classical discussion between Devlin ( 1 9 5 9 ) and Hart ( 1 9 6 3 ) on an "enforcement of morals" ("morals," that is, in the sense of mores or ethical values); on this, see Dworkin ( 1 9 8 9 ) and the discussion in O'Hagan (1984, ch. 5 ) . 6. Coing ( 1 9 5 9 ) represents an example for a natural-law conception of individ­ ual rights, whereas Kelsen (i960, 1 7 8 ) conceives of the legal person positivistically as the "union of a complex of legal duties and individual rights." 7. Accordingly, the neutrality discussion in Ackerman and Larmore does not relate primarily to a theory of democratic procedures; however, it does have im­ portant implications in this respect (see chapter 3 . 1 ) . Larmore makes it clear that he is concerned with the philosophical justification of the neutral validity of liberal principles: "Liberalism and democracy are separate values whose relation, it seems to me, consists largely in democratic self-government being the best means for pro­ tecting the principles of a liberal political order" (1990, 346m 1 5 ) .

NOTES TO PAGES 3 5 - 4 7 8. A further example of the tension between pluralist and proceduralist ele­ ments is Hampshire's liberal theory, which proposes a "bare minimum concept" of "procedural justice" (1989, 7 2 - 7 3 ) that, on the basis of universal human needs, represents a peaceful coexistence between ways of life. Going beyond the minimal content of moral prohibitions, "justice" in this sense of "procedural" means nothing more than that certain rules of fair compromise are to be observed. Accordingly, just conditions are a modus vivendi whose substantive fairness cannot however be adequately judged on the basis of Hampshire's theory. T o reach this judgment, a conception of "rational" justification would be needed—a conception Hampshire mistakenly criticizes in Rawls (Hampshire 1 9 9 3 , 4 5 - 4 6 ) . 9. In connection with this argument, the difference between moral and legal norms is still to be examined. 10. A moral conception "is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friend­ ship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole" (1993a, 1 3 ) . 1 1 . I return to this issue in chapter 4.2. 1 2 . Rawls refers here to Berlin's (1990) view that not all values can be realized together. 1 3 . Cohen ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 8 3 ) leaves the criterion of general validity too undetermined when he demands of reasons that they be "compelling" for reasonable persons, that is, for critically reflecting ones. 14. Cf. Waldron (1993a, 5 6 ) : 'The hunch is that, although people do not share one another's ideals, they can at least abstract from their experience a sense of what it is like to be committed to an ideal of the good life; they can recognize this in others and they can focus on it as something to which political justification ought to be ad­ dressed." 1 5 . See Larmore ( 1 9 8 7 , 4 4 ) , Rawls ( 1 9 8 8 , 2 6 1 - 6 2 ) , Kymlicka (1989b), Marneffe ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Ripstein ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 16. I return to Habermas's determination of the relation between morality and law at the end of this chapter. 1 7 . Cf. Habermas (1996a, 1 5 8 - 6 8 ) . It is thus misleading, as Habermas himself (1996b, 4 5 2 [esp. n. 3 ] ) critically remarks, to speak of different types of ethical, pragmatic, or moral discourses; in political discourses, all of these reasons come to­ gether, but they require appropriate treatment in each particular case, and that is what matters. 18. Such a distinction between various justification criteria makes it possible to determine more precisely a problem raised by Nagel ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 5 9 - 6 8 ) , namely, that of the domain where a person cannot be forced by good reasons to recognize the standpoint of a majority as the basis of legitimate, generally binding norms; the differentiation, proposed by Gutmann ( 1 9 9 3 , 200), between fundamental moralsubstantive principles and political conflicts that are regulated procedurally could thus also be conceptually explained in the sense of a "deliberative universalism," without falling back upon pregiven (anthropological) moral principles. 19. This issue will be discussed critically with reference to liberal models in chap­ ter 3 . On this, see especially Greenawalt ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Perry ( 1 9 8 8 ) , and Galston ( 1 9 9 1 , ch. 5 ) ; as well as Rawls (1993a, lecture 6; 1 9 9 7 ) .

2()<S

NOTES TO PAGES 47-67

20. See Larmore ( 1 9 8 7 , 4 3 ) , Rawls ( 1 9 8 8 , 2 6 2 ) , Nagel ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 6 6 ) . Raz's cri­ tique (1986, ch. 5) rests basically on the fact that he imputes the thesis of the neutrality of effects to liberal theories. On this, see Waldron ( 1 9 9 3 b ) . 2 1 . See section 2 . 3 . 2 2 . Cf. the objections raised by Frankfurt ( 1 9 8 2 ) . 2 3 . This is the view of Isaiah Berlin (1969a, li-liii; 1969b, 1 6 7 - 7 2 ; 1990). See also Williams ( 1 9 8 i d ; 1 9 8 1 c ; 1 9 9 3 , ch. 6). The concept of "values" is however used here in a very broad and criteriologically ambiguous sense. I return to this in chapter 5.2. 24. Cf. Rawls's ( 1 9 7 1 , 4 2 6 ) Aristotelian Principle: "other things being equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity." 25. Dworkin's central argument concerning the question of abortion also rests on the priority of rights over values. Insofar as a fetus (at least in the first part of pregnancy) cannot be regarded as a moral or "constitutional" person ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 3 ) (which would also rule out exceptions in special cases such as rape or incest), ar­ guments for or against abortion are based on various conceptions of the "intrinsic" or "sacred" value of life or of the "investments" of a natural or human kind in a life. According to Dworkin, these debates about the value of unborn life or of the quality of life are of a (quasi-) religious kind; they represent various interpretations of a superordinate ethical value that determines the value of one's own life. That is why the primacy of the right to religious freedom and to freedom of conscience applies here: a majority cannot impose an interpretation of the good life upon a minority ( 1 5 7 ) — i t must respect the right to an ethical identity of one's own. 26. For a critique of Rawls from the perspective of a "moral perfectionism" in the tradition of Emerson, see Cavell (1990, 1 0 1 - 2 6 ) . 27. Cf. Schnadelbach's ( 1 9 8 7 - 8 8 ) discussion of neo-Aristotelianism. 28. In this respect, Galston's list of basic human goods differs from the "thick vague theory of the good" that Nussbaum (1990a; 1 9 9 3 ) proposes. Galston is ori­ ented by Finnis's ( 1 9 8 0 , 8 1 - 9 9 ) list of seven "basic forms of human good": "life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, reli­ gion." 29. This narrow alternative is also the basis of the arguments for an ethical liberalism advanced by Mulhall and Swift ( 1 9 9 2 ) , Fitzmaurice ( 1 9 9 3 ) , and Hamp­ ton ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 30. Galston (1990, 3 3 0 ) criticizes this as "liberal totalitarianism." 3 1 . On this objection, see also Raz (1986, 2 1 4 ; 1990) and Kymlicka (1992a, 4 5 ) : "The problem is to explain why anyone would accept the ideal of autonomy in political contexts unless they also accepted it more generally." I owe thanks to Adam Swift for raising critical questions on this point. 3 2 . On the problem of moral motivation that the question of "insight" refers to, see chapter 5.2. 3 3 . Further ethical-liberal positions are represented by Neal ( 1 9 8 7 ) and Mason ( 1 9 9 0 ) ; in this connection, Rodewald ( 1 9 8 5 ) and Beiner ( 1 9 9 2 ) present their cri­ tique of (ethical) liberalism; Rosenblum ( 1 9 8 7 ) defends liberalism against com­ munitarianism in light of the romantic ideal of individuality, whereas Menke

NOTES TO PAGES 68-81 2 9 9 (1993a) favors the romantically inspired communitarian critique of the liberal con­ ception of freedom as self-disposition. Both models of personal freedom can be found in liberal theories, but neither one is the model of liberal freedom. 34. Glendon ( 1 9 9 1 ) protests the negative consequences in private and political life that follow from a fixation on individual legal rights. This critique does not affect the normative justification of rights, but it does concern the question of its use. Here, it is nonetheless important to inquire into the causes of certain social processes described too generally as a "loss of sensus communis" This is of normative significance to the institutional consequences following from an analysis such as the one proposed by Etzioni—especially concerning the problematic thesis that law embodies "values that the community holds dear" (Etzioni 1 9 9 3 , 8 1 ) . 3 5 . In his dissent on the famous ruling of the Supreme Count in Plessy v Ferguson, 1 6 3 U S 5 3 7 ( 1 8 9 6 ) , which laid down the principle of "separate but equal" races, Justice Harlan observed: "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Cited in Gunther ( 1 9 9 1 , 6 4 7 ) . 36. Sandel is referring to the case Goldman v Weinberger 4 7 5 U S 5 0 3 ( 1 9 8 6 ) ; on this, see also Michelman ( 1 9 8 6 , 5 - 1 7 , 3 3 - 3 6 ) . 3 7 . A position that seeks to mediate between liberal rights and community values can be found in Selznick ( 1 9 9 2 , ch. 1 4 ) . There remains however ambivalence con­ cerning the question of whether values are worthy of protection in their importance primarily for the integration of the political community or for the individual ethical person. 38. The case here is that of Bowers v. Hardwick, 4 7 8 U S 1 8 6 ( 1 9 8 6 ) , in which the Supreme Court upheld a law in the state of Georgia that forbids sodomy. 39. See Okin (1989, chs. 2 and 3 ) , Friedman ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Rossler ( 1 9 9 2 ) , andHonig (1993, 186-95). 40. See Rhode (1989, 1 1 7 - 2 5 ) , Maihofer ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Habermas (1996a, 4 1 9 - 2 7 ) . 4 1 . The definition of the legal person as a protective cover that is outwardly formal and "hard" and inwardly "soft" (Forst 1 9 9 2 , 2 9 8 - 9 9 ) presupposes the pos­ sibility of changing the outer form on the basis of concrete and justified claims. On the concept of privacy, see also Michelman ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Okin ( 1 9 9 1 ) , and Jean Cohen (1993)4 2 . See the cases DeFunis v Odegaard, 4 1 6 U S 3 1 2 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , and Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 4 3 8 U S 2 6 5 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 4 3 . With reference to Canada, see Kymlicka (1989a, 1 6 7 ) . 44. Steinfath ( 1 9 9 3 , 5 8 3 ) hints at this in his critique of Taylor. 4 5 . On this discussion in the United States, see the bibliographic review by Vorlander ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 46. Cf. the case of Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , in which the Supreme Court granted the Amish community limited exemption from compulsory educa­ tion. Cf. also the decision of Germany's Federal Administrative Court (25 August 1 9 9 3 , BverwG 6 C 8.91 = Neue Zeitschriftfur Verwaltungsrecht 1994, 5 7 8 ) on releasing a twelve year-old Islamic schoolgirl from the obligation to participate in coeduca­ tional school sports (cf. as well as the case mentioned in note 3 6 above). 4 7 . That the limits of individual freedom have to be justified reciprocally and that this freedom can be restricted only in this way does not therefore mean that the contents of ethical autonomy have to comply with general ideas about the good

too

NOTES TO PAGES 8 1 - 8 5

i that individual rights are justified primarily as political rights that are beneficial to discursive norm justification. Wellmer (1998a, 2 4 - 2 9 ) has this in mind when he argues for negative rights "not to be fully rational," thus getting into conflict with the principle of communicative rationality. However, one has to distinguish between practical contexts: insofar as "nonrationality" is understood ethically as nonconformism, it is protected by a reciprocally and generally justified right—and only by this one; it can nonetheless also be conceived of as the right not to have to participate in political discourses—there is no duty to participate; however, insofar as the right "to violate the demands of communal rationality" (29) is considered in a moral sense, as the refusal to recognize the moral claims of others or to justify such claims to others, such a right does not exist (which Wellmer does not in any case claim). 48. See Gunther's ( 1 9 9 2 ) discussion of a fundamental moral right to freely take a position, a right following the moral principle that universal norms have to be able to be based on universally acceptable reasons. According to Gunther, this moral right enters law primarily as the right to political participation; however, since per­ sons cannot be forced to take a position, this proposition implies a right to "negative liberty." Yet, if the right to taking a position is understood as the right to justification, as suggested above, negative liberty can also be determined in a moral sense (which undoubtedly befits it): not as freedom from communicative processes, but as a pos­ itively realizable personal freedom within the framework of norms that cannot be mutually rejected. 49. This connection between rights, law, and democracy is neglected in Hoffe's ( 1 9 9 5 ) attempt to explain the legitimation of coercive law with the help of the "distributive advantage" ( 3 7 - 4 3 ) that exists in the mutual waiving of unlimited rights to freedom of choice ( 2 5 7 - 5 8 ) . 50. In their complete juridical, rights-related significance, citizens as legal per­ sons are bearers of individual negative rights (Abwehrrechte), political rights to par­ ticipation, and social rights to share society's resources (cf. the four dimensions of Jellinek's status theory discussed in Alexy [ 1 9 8 6 , 2 2 9 - 4 8 ] ) . To understand the gen­ esis of and conceptual connection between these dimensions, it is however impor­ tant to distinguish between the conceptions of "legal person" and "citizen." Parsons ( 1 9 7 1 , 2 1 - 2 2 ) , Marshall ( 1 9 9 2 ) , Riedel ( 1 9 7 2 ) , and Koselleck ( 1 9 9 1 ) , for example, show the historical development of the concept of the citizen from "subject" as the object of law to citoyen as the author of law. With regard to the differences between "contexts of justice," what is essential is the distinction between persons as address­ ees and as authors of law, and, correspondingly, between legal-personal and political autonomy, various concepts of responsibility, and different forms of reciprocal rec­ ognition. On the basis of this, it is possible to understand normative focal points of liberal and republican theories, for example; against this background, moreover, distinctions within law between legally protected persons and fully entitled citizens (cf. Mark J . Miller [ 1 9 8 9 ] and, with reference to the Basic Law [constitution] of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hesse [ 1 9 9 1 , 2 2 1 ] ) can be thematized and crit­ ically questioned (e.g., in the matter of a too restrictive, ethical understanding of citizenship; on this, see chapter 3 . 4 ) . 5 1 . [Translator's note: translation altered slighdy.] 5 2 . The criteriological threshold of strict or restricted generality (see chapter 2 . 1 ) does not imply that a moral realm of independendy determined norms is

NOTES TO PAGES 8 5 - 1 1 8 5 0 1 separated off from political-pluralist discourses or that politically legitimate deci­ sions have to be based solely on stricdy moral, consensual reasons, as McCarthy (1996) criticizes in respect of Habermas. 5 3 . These demands are not metaphysical—to which Habermas objects in the postscript (1996b) to Between Facts and Norms—in the sense of a hierarchy of laws, nor are they anthropologically justified (Hoffe 1 9 9 3 ) ; the right not to be forced "to comply with a norm of action when it is not possible . . . to recognize through reason the validity of that norm" (Larmore 1 9 9 6 , 220)—a right Larmore emphasizes over against democratic procedures—is rather a right contained in procedures of justi­ fication themselves; and in this way, finally, O'Neill's ( 1 9 9 3 ) reservations about a violation of the criterion of strict reciprocity and generality in democratic discourses (if I may formulate these reservations thus) are taken into consideration. 54. The legal theories of Ely ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Michelman (1986; 1 9 8 8 ) , Habermas (1996a, 2 6 7 - 8 6 ) , and Sunstein ( 1 9 9 3 ) respond to this.

3. T H E E T H O S O F D E M O C R A C Y 1. The concept of the normative integration of a political community refers not to social integration in a comprehensive sense but to what the citizens of a political community have in common in terms of norms and values—commonalities on the basis of which they understand and recognize themselves and others as members of the community. On this, see Peters's ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 7 6 - 9 4 ) discussion of "legal-political systems." 2. See Tocqueville (1988, 6 9 1 - 9 2 ) , along with Maclntyre (1984a, 7 1 ) , Bellah et al. ( 1 9 8 6 , ch. 1 1 ) , Taylor ( 1 9 7 9 , 1 1 ; 1992b, 9 - 1 0 ) , Walzer (1990a). 3. Benhabib (1989a, 3 8 3 ) refers to the latter as the "integrationist" vs. "partici­ patory" models. 4. See Holmes and Larmore ( 1 9 8 2 , xviii), who contrast Luhmann's theory of social integration via binary codes with Durkheim's theory of normative integration. 5. The two principal parts of Political Liberalism represent this distinction between two stages (see Rawls 1993a, 1 3 3 ) . 6. Unlike Larmore's comprehension of the term, modus vivendi is to be under­ stood here in the sense of a strategic arrangement. 7. See the objections raised by Greenawalt ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Perry ( 1 9 8 9 ) , Macedo (1990b), Galston ( 1 9 9 1 , ch. 5 ) , McCarthy ( 1 9 9 4 ) . 8. This is a central concept from Leo Strauss's (influential) Aristotelian political philosophy; see Strauss ( 1 9 5 3 ) , Cropsey ( 1 9 8 6 ) , Diamond ( 1 9 8 6 ) . 9. Cf. Hegel ( 1 9 6 7 , §§ 268, 289) on patriotism. 10. See Gleason ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Fuchs (1990); for a critique of Kallen, see Higham ( 1 9 7 5 , 2 1 1 ) , Steinberg ( 1 9 8 1 , 2 6 1 ) . 1 1 . Taylor (1992c, 1 0 - 1 1 ) criticizes this Rousseauian conception too. 1 2 . Cf. the conception of the political in Mouffe (1988; 1990). 1 3 . Cf. Munkler ( 1 9 9 2 ) , along with Heater's (1990) discussion of political vir­ tues. [Translator's note: Shils's article is the German translation of a text that, to my knowledge, Shils did not publish in this form in English but apparendy later expanded into two separate essays: "Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil So-

NOTES TO PAGES 1 2 0 - 1 4 0

lt>2

ciely" and 'The Virtue of Civility," in The Virtue of Civility: Selected Essays on Liberalism, Tradition, and Civil Society, ed. Steven Grosby (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1 9 9 7 ) , 188-224 d 320-55.] 14. Here is the starting point of theories of "deliberative" institutions, which I cannot examine in detail in what follows. See Elster (1986; 1 9 9 1 ) , Dryzek (1990), Buchstein ( 1 9 9 2 ; 1 9 9 3 ) , Goodin ( 1 9 9 2 ) , Baynes ( 1 9 9 2 b , 5 9 - 6 2 ) , Sunstein ( 1 9 9 3 , ch. 6), J . P. Muller ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 4 8 - 2 0 4 ) . In various ways (and on the basis of different conceptions of political actors), these theories are directed at the implementation of procedures of public, reciprocal justification that make joint problem solutions possible; an important question here is the degree to which the "laundering" force of institutional mechanisms (forms of checks and balances) presupposes or can indeed compensate certain "deliberative," normatively substantive capabilities and attitudes on the part of citizens themselves. I return to this point in the next section. 1 5 . See Habermas ( i 9 9 2 d ) . Cf. (in addition to the works mentioned in the previous note) Peters's ( 1 9 9 3 , 3 2 7 - 4 4 ) theory of "sluice gates" between a periphery consisting of social opinion and will formation processes and a center consisting of political institutions. 16. See Miller's ( 1 9 9 2 ) discussion of social choice theories; in addition, Sunstein ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 3 5 ) : "A goal of politics is thus to reflect on and sometimes to change ex­ isting preferences, not simply to implement them. Preferences are not static; they are a subject of conversation and debate. People must justify social outcomes by reference to reasons." 1 7 . The critique of the parties of the original position as contexdess subjects who are unable to really take the perspective of the "concrete other" but can only adopt the stereotypical perspective of the "generalized other" (Benhabib 1 9 8 7 ) overlooks the fact that the original position is not a representation of real discourses as well as the fact that this thought experiment is limited just to the justification of the two basic principles ofjustice (and indeed on this level, a critique of the original position is possible; see chapter 4 . 2 ) . For that reason, the original position presup­ poses on "our" part moral reflection in this connection (see the three points of view, namely, that of the parties, of citizens, and of "ourselves" in Rawls [1980, 533])» it does not however presuppose a feeling of care on "our" part or even on that of the parties (as Okin [ 1990] argues). 18. See Young (1990, 1 1 9 - 2 0 ) , Benhabib ( 1 9 9 2 b , 9 2 - 9 3 ) , Okin ( 1 9 9 1 , 8 7 - 9 0 ) , Cohen and Arato ( 1 9 9 2 , 3 9 7 - 4 1 0 ) , Habermas (1996a, 3 1 3 ) . 19. In Sunstein ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 3 3 - 4 1 ) the four principles mentioned return in a mod­ ified form, one in which the procedural and institutional sides of deliberative de­ mocracy are more strongly emphasized. a n

20. See the discussion between Leist ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Low-Beer ( 1 9 9 0 ) , and Wingert 1

(199 ). 2 1 . The history of the United States and the debates on what it means to be an "American"—especially with reference to questions of immigration and the grant­ ing of citizenship—demonstrate that defining inclusion and the "substance" of a multiethnic society is a conflict-ridden, unfinished process. See Smith ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Fuchs (1990). 22. Here Rawls does not yet distinguish terminologically between self-respect and self-esteem; see Rawls ( 1 9 8 5 , 25 m. 3 3 ) .

NOTES TO PAGES 1 4 3 - 1 6 7

305

2 3 . See Scanlon ( 1 9 8 2 , 1 2 0 - 2 8 ) , who discusses further problems of the original position (especially with regard to the derivation of the justice principles). 24. [Translator's note: this quote appears on page 1 5 7 of A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1 9 9 9 ) . In Rawls ( 1 9 7 1 , 1 8 0 ) , it reads "to their [human beings'] expectations." The revised edition, which was the text for the German translation cited by the author, was published after the completion of the manuscript. The only other revisions appearing in quotes here are in the following quote and in chapter 4, notes 1 0 and 1 3 . ] 25. [Translator's note: this quote appears on page 1 3 1 of the revised edition of A Theory ofJustice; see preceding note.] 26. See also Williams ( 1 9 8 7 , 1 0 1 ) and Michelman (1989, 3 4 0 ) ; a sociological analysis of the loss of self-respect through "deficient status" can be found in Neckel (1991, 218-20). 27. Nussbaum does not distinguish sufficiently between moral and political con­ texts of recognition. Insofar as she is oriented toward the former, a list of essential human functional capabilities remains abstract and highlights certain basic forms of respect; if she goes beyond this, she is in danger of neglecting the social index of the "good." On this, see Sen's ( 1 9 9 3 , 4 7 ) reservations and Scherer ( 1 9 9 3 ) . 28. I return to these two concepts of justice in chapter 4 . 1 . 29. See Gill ( 1 9 8 7 ) , Downing and Thigpen ( 1 9 8 6 ) , Thigpen and Downing ( 1 9 8 7 ) , Warnke (1990b), Galston ( 1 9 9 1 , 5 1 ) , Buchstein and Schmalz-Bruns (1992). 30. See Karst (1989, 1 0 ) : "[R]eal membership in the community is more than a legal status, and real equality before the law can seem trivial only to those who are secure in their places as equal citizens."

4. U N I V E R S A L I S M A N D C O N T E X T U A L I S M 1. See Herzog ( 1 9 8 5 ) , Shapiro ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Warnke ( 1 9 9 2 ) . 2. See Walzer ( 1 9 8 1 , 389; 1 9 8 3 , 5, 30; 1 9 8 7 , 1 0 - 1 8 ; i99od). 3. According to Warnke ( 1 9 9 2 ) a hermeneutic understanding of political com­ munity requires a dialogic, common interpretation of "justice." The concept of practical justification thus presupposed—and of openness to voices as yet unheard (149)—can however be derived not from the idea of mutual learning as the goal of conversation ( 1 5 7 ) but from a principle of practical reason (which implies a "procedural" criterion of "good" interpretations [ 1 6 3 ] ) . The hermeneutic emphasis on "thick" contexts in contrast to "external" Kantian moral concepts ( 1 - 1 2 ) falls short of the mark; it does not distinguish between ethical, political, and moral con­ texts in which practical questions require special—"reasonable"—answers in each particular case. 4. I cannot go into the "just war" discussion here; see especially Walzer ( 1 9 9 2 c , 5 1 - 1 2 4 ; 1980b, 2 1 6 - 1 7 ) and the preface to the 2d ed. of Just and Unjust Wars (1992c, xi-xxxi). 5. See also the preface to the German edition of Spheres ofJustice, 'Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe," trans. Claus Offe, in Spharen der Gerechtigkeit, trans. Hanne Herkommer (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1 9 9 2 ) , 1 1 - 1 4 .

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NOTES TO PAGES 1 6 8 - 1 9 8

6. Thus this concept—in contradistinction to its employment by Ferrara (1990) with reference to Walzer and Maclntyre—is not to be understood in contrast to a "procedural universalism." 7. See Honneth ( 1 9 9 1 b ) ; the formal element of "reiterative universalism" is undervalued in Brunkhorst's ( 1 9 9 2 ) critique. 8. Such an anthropological example is Turnbull's ( 1 9 7 2 ) study of the Ik, an African tribe whose members, according to his description, have no sense of moral or ethical duty toward others, not even toward the members of their own families (I owe this reference to Michael Walzer). 9. In Walzer (1994b, 2 6 - 2 7 ) these two constrains are expressed very clearly. [Translator's note: the author has added this note for the English edition.] 10. See Neal ( 1 9 9 0 ) , Galston ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 3 6 ) , Schwarzenbach ( 1 9 9 1 , 5 4 7 ) , Kukathas and Pettit (1990, 1 4 2 - 5 1 ) . 1 1 . [Translator's note: the phrase in brackets appears in A Theory ofJustice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1 9 9 9 ) , 2 2 6 ] . 1 2 . See Baynes's (1992a) study of the theories of Kant, Rawls, and Habermas. 1 3 . On "narrow" and "wide" reflective equilibrium, see Rawls ( 1 9 7 5 b ) , Daniels (1979; 1980). 14. On Rawls and Kant, see Johnson ( 1 9 7 4 ; 1 9 7 7 ) , Darwall ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Hoffe ( 1 9 8 4 ) , Davidson ( 1 9 8 5 ) , Baynes (1992a, ch. 2 ) . [Translator's note: see note 1 0 above on the phrase in brackets in the Rawls quote.] 1 5 . On this, compare Rawls's elucidation of the particular construction proce­ dures in (1989b, 9 8 - 9 9 ) with (1993a, 1 0 3 ) . 1 6 . See, in addition, the illuminating discussion of constructivist theories by Barry (1989, part 2, esp. 3 7 1 - 7 2 ) . 1 7 . [Translator's note: italics omitted in the English translation of the Critique of Pure Reason.] 1 8 . See Habermas ( 1 9 7 9 ; 1984; 1 9 8 4 - 8 7 , 1 : 2 7 3 - 3 7 7 ; 1992a; 1 9 9 4 ) ; Apel ( 1 9 7 6 ; 1980; 1 9 8 7 ) . 19. In chapter 5.2 I return to this question of the relation between moral and ethical reasons. 20. This evaluation would violate the requirement of reciprocity; and the crite­ rion of generality rules out the possibility of the norm's addressee accepting nonreciprocity and of this acceptance being given as the moral justification. 2 1 . See also the concepts of solidarity and justice in Habermas (1990b, 200; 1990c, 2 4 4 ) . Here, "justice" refers to the equal respect of individuals who cannot be represented by others and "solidarity" to the recognition of others as members of a shared community, which is however extended in a universalist moral sense and thereby loses its particularist element. 2 2 . If different contexts ofjustice (not understood in the narrow sense of moral justice) are differentiated, "solidarity" can mean different things, but it does refer primarily to recognition between persons as "members" of communities: (a) in eth­ ical solidarity (that of a family, for instance); (b) in legal "equity" in view of special cases (as Habermas [1990c, 249] indicates at one point); (c) in social solidarity between citizens; and (d) in altruistic moral action; (the concept of solidarity is (specially appropriate in the first and third uses, where reference is made to par­ ticular communities; on the other levels one can speak more fittingly of "equity" or

NOTES TO PAGES 199-247 3 0 5 "altruism"). In some of these respects, "solidarity" is part ofjustice ([b] and [c]), in others it goes beyond it, for instance, in the sense of supererogatory acts (as in [d]) or can clash with it (as in [a]), for example, in the case of unjustified preferential treatment of one's own ethical community. 2 3 . Cf. the subject-relative conception of moral reasons in Gosepath ( 1 9 9 2 , 3 2 3 , 340) and Williams ( 1 9 8 i d ) . I discuss this more extensively in chapter 5 . 2 . 24. The conception of a moral context constituted by the comprehensive human community points to a further problem, that of international justice. I examined the problem of human rights briefly and in very general terms in chapter 4 . 1 ; the more extensive questions of a democratic "world society" (to which Apel [ 1 9 9 3 , 1 6 3 - 6 5 ] and Wellmer [1998b, 5 4 - 6 1 ] refer) and of distributive justice between states cannot be dealt with specifically here either (see O'Neill [ 1991 ] and Thomp­ son [ 1 9 9 2 ] ) . Especially interesting in this connection is Rawls's (1993b) attempt to extend the political conception ofjustice—with the help of the model of an original position between states—to questions of the law of peoples. On the one hand, this conception comprises "politically neutral" (69) human rights and therefore—ac­ cording to Rawls—human rights that are acceptable not just to liberal states (rights, nonetheless, whose moral justification remains open); on the other hand, however, it does not include (contrary to Beitz's [ 1 9 7 9 ] and Pogge's [ 1 9 8 9 ] interpretations) a "difference principle" for distributive justice between states. 25. Cf. Honneth's (1988) discussion of Taylor's anthropology. 26. See my discussion of his analysis of society in chapter 3.2 as well as, in par­ ticular, Taylor (1985*). 27. See Tugendhat's (1992c) critique of Taylor's ( 1 9 8 5 b ) conception of the person. 28. Taylor's response to Low-Beer's ( 1 9 9 1 ) objections shows that he underesti­ mates the difference between ethical and moral validity by grasping the principle of mutual moral justification as a "good" of dialogic identity formation that ought to be ethically recognized for the sake of one's own identity ( 1 9 9 1 a , 2 5 2 - 5 3 ) . 29. See also Seel ( 1 9 9 1 a , 3 5 8 - 6 5 ; 1 9 9 1 b ) . I am grateful to Martin Seel for his critical rejoinders on this point. For a restatement of Seel's position, see his Versuch uber die Form des Gliicks, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1 9 9 5 ) , esp. 1 9 1 - 2 5 5 . [Translator's note: the author has added this latter reference for the English edi­ tion.] 30. See Tugendhat ( 1 9 8 4 , 1 6 5 - 6 8 ) and Wellmer ( 1 9 9 1 , 2 0 7 - 1 1 ) .

5. C O N T E X T S O F J U S T I C E 1. See also Hampshire's ( 1 9 8 3 ) and Larmore's ( 1 9 8 7 , ch. 6) theories of the heterogeneity of moral points of view. 2. On the incompatibility of different objective values, see Berlin (1969a, li-liii), Williams ( 1 9 8 1 c ; 1 9 8 1 c ) . 3. See Williams's ( 1 9 8 1 b ) example of the painter Gauguin and his problem of having to decide between the needs of his own family and artistic creation. Williams ( 2 3 - 2 4 , 3 8 - 3 9 ) (cautiously) defends the thesis that the decision for art can be regarded as justified retrospectively, even in the moral sense (despite a serious

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NOTES TO PAGES 247-270

"moral cost" not further specified). Cf. Wolf ( 1 9 9 3 ) and Menke ( 1 9 9 3 b ) , who in varying ways refer to the relation between ethical and moral questions, but who do not explicidy highlight the criterion of moral, reciprocally and generally shared reasons. 4. Recent, illuminating discussions can be found in Nagel ( 1 9 7 0 , ch. 2 ) , Wil­ liams ( 1 9 8 i d ) , Darwall ( 1 9 8 3 , 5 1 - 6 1 ) , Korsgaard ( 1 9 8 6 ) , Brink (1989, 3 7 - 4 3 ) , Gosepath ( 1 9 9 2 , 2 2 8 - 3 6 ) . 5. Here I take no account of whether this form of rational deliberation narrows ethical questions too. 6. See Rawls's Kantian distinction between "rational" and "reasonable," which was discussed in chapters 1.2 and 4.2. 7. See Hill's (1992a, 1992b) Kant interpretation in contrast to Harman's ( 1 9 7 7 , ch. 6). 8. In what follows I refer primarily to Tugendhat's presentation of his model in Vorlesungen uberEthik ( 1 9 9 3 a ) . On his "Drei Vorlesungen uber Probleme der Ethik" ( 1 9 8 4 , 5 7 - 1 3 1 ) and the ensuing "Retraktationen" (1984, 1 3 2 - 7 6 ) , see especially Wolf ( 1 9 8 4 ) ; on these texts and further changes (Tugendhat 1990; 1992a; 1 9 9 2 b ) , see the critiques by Habermas ( 1 9 9 3 b , 4 3 - 4 8 ) and Wingert ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 4 2 - 5 2 ) . 9. See Tugendhat ( 1 9 9 3 a , 46, 60, 89) and the references to Foot ( 1 9 7 8 ) and Williams ( 1 9 8 5 ) . 10. Cf. Arendt ( 1 9 7 8 , 1 9 1 ) : "Conscience is the anticipation of the fellow who awaits you when you come home." 1 1 . See Wildt ( 1 9 8 2 ; 1 9 9 2 a ) , Tugendhat ( 1 9 8 6 , 2 4 5 - 5 0 ; 1 9 8 4 , 1 3 5 - 4 2 ) ; for a critique, see Wolf ( 1 9 8 4 , 2 1 3 - 1 7 ) . 1 2 . In Berlin (1969b), for instance, one can find alongside his defense of per­ sonal autonomy, which as legally secured autonomy offers negatively defined free­ dom, various "positive" determinations of autonomy pertaining to ethical selfrealization (Mill), political autonomy (Rousseau), and moral action (Kant), which have to be connected within the basic structure of a society, as I attempt to show. 1 3 . See Raz's (1986, chs. 1 4 and 1 5 ) discussion of ethical-personal autonomy, which is "valuable" as a conscious and independent choice of the good within a (pluralist) framework of sociocultural values (cf. chapter 2.2 above). 14. On the relation between ethical autonomy and critique, see Anderson (1994, 1 1 7 - 1 8 ) and Cooke ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; in her understanding of "accountability," Cooke does however place a requirement on autonomous persons that is primarily morally justified. 1 5 . [Translator's note: translation altered.] 16. On the question of civil disobedience, see Walzer ( 1 9 7 0 ) , Rawls ( 1 9 7 1 , §§ 5 5 - 5 9 ) ; Dworkin (1978b; 1 9 8 5 a ) , Habermas ( 1 9 8 5 ) , Rodel, Dubiel, Frankenberg (1989, 2 2 - 4 6 ) . 1 7 . In what follows I refer to arguments—without going into any details—de­ veloped by Wellmer ( 1 9 9 1 , 1 9 5 - 2 0 4 ) against the discourse-theoretic model of jus­ tifying moral norms, and to the responses given to Wellmer by Gunther ( 1 9 9 3 , 4 5 58) and Habermas ( 1 9 9 3 b , 3 5 - 3 9 ) , who argue for a distinction between justifica­ tion and application discourses. Compare also Wingert's ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 2 3 - 3 1 ) arguments for considering "personal" and "local intersubjective" aspects when justifying norms. 1 8 . On the first point, see Arendt ( 1 9 7 7 a ) and chapter 3.3 above; on the second,

NOTES TO PAGES 2 7 1 - 2 8 7

307

see Arendt ( 1 9 8 2 ) ; on the latter, see the different interpretations by Beiner ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Bernstein (1986b), Benhabib ( 1 9 8 8 ) , Wellmer ( 1 9 9 8 c ) , Passerin d'Entreves (1994, ch. 3 ) , who do not however discuss as a central problem the "solitary" moral judge as actor—the issue that presents itself in this context. 19. This faculty of judgment includes moral sensitivity (or empathy) as well as the cognitive element of not restricting the addressees of moral respect to certain others. 20. Hegel ( 1 9 7 7 , 2 6 6 - 9 4 ) ; see also Nussbaum ( 1 9 8 6 , ch. 3 ) , Menke ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 2 1 . See the differentiation of various conceptions of autonomy (with the exclu­ sion of political autonomy) that have to be integrated: Hill ( 1 9 9 1 a ; 1 9 9 1 b ) and Honneth ( 1 9 9 5 b ) . 22. See Siep ( 1 9 7 4 ; 1 9 9 2 ) , Wildt ( 1 9 8 2 ; 1 9 9 2 b ) . 23. See Theunissen ( 1 9 8 2 ) , as well as Habermas ( 1 9 7 4 ) , Hosle ( 1 9 8 7 , chs. 6 and 7 ) , Honneth (1995a, 5 7 - 6 3 ) . 24. See also Low-Beer (1994, 1 2 9 - 3 0 ) . A dimension central to self-esteem is that of labor, whose value and regard are a social (though rarely unequivocal) category (cf. Honneth 1995a, 8 9 - 9 1 ) . It is however doubtful whether a complex society based on a division of labor, where certain kinds of labor would not be discriminated against as being inferior, can be grasped as a community with a common ethical self-understanding and shared ends. Here too, being esteemed would probably be constituted by particular ethical communities (within the pluralistic horizons of divergent ideas of value). Moreover, the (self-esteem-constituting) value of labor to a person does not have to be unequivocally tied to the socially recognized value of this labor; other factors such as self-responsibility, communication, collegiality, or creativity, which relate more to the form and organization of labor, might be more important in this respect (cf. Lane [ 1 9 8 2 , 2 3 - 2 6 ] ) . 25. See the appraisal in Jaynes and Williams (1989, especially ch. 4 ) .

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125> on community as organized remembrance, 284; on conscience, 3o6nio; on deliberation, 1,54; on loss of recognition/self, 290^91; on politically guaranteed rights, 166; on the protec­ tive mask of a legal personality, 68; on truth vs. politics, 158:Aristotelian ethics, 202-3, 206 Aristotelian Principle, 2 9 8 ^ 4 Aristode: on friendship, 204; on human good as telos, 102-3; th idea ° f th good, 157; on justice, 146, 157; on phil­ osophical truth vs. social reality, 158; on political community, 101, 1 0 2 - 3 atomism: and democracy, 88-89; - ethical universalism, 221; and individualism, 67, 27; and individual rights, 6, 1 1 ; and o

n

e

e

liberalism, 8; of liberal neutrality, 53; of persons, 221; vs. substantialism, 276 Augustine, Saint, 158, 202-3 autonomy, 5; and critique, 306m4; ethical, 1 8 - 1 9 , 80, 83, 85, 236-37; legal, 56, 7 1 , 80, 83, 85, 236-37; moral, 19, 24, 85, 237-38; moral, Kant on, 12, 17, 2 1 , 175, 189, 268; negative, 63-64; perfec­ tionist, 60-62, 63-64; political and per­ sonal, 83-84, 85, 120, 135, 236-37. See also freedom; justification, practical, and autonomy; individual rights and auton­ omy as a good 12

1

Barber, Benjamin, 108-9, 9 - 3 ° > 5 8 Beauvoir, Simone de, 285 Beiner, Ronald, 134 Bell, Daniel, 295m 2 Bellah, Robert N., 103-4, Benhabib, Seyla, 1 3 1 - 3 2 , 301 n3 Berger, Peter, 284 Berlin, Isaiah: on autonomy, 306m 2; on in­ compatible values, 297m2; on legiti­ macy of law, 83; on negative liberty, 219,296n2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 70, 2 9 9 ^ 8 Breytenbach, Breyten, 163 Brunkhorst, Hauke, 304n7 1

1

0

v s

335

Canadian Charter of Rights, 78 categorical imperative, 186-87, 251

INDKX 3 ° 3 3 ° > ideal citizen­ ship, 138-39; inclusive citizenship, 1 4 5 46, 148; and primary goods, 139-43; and relativism, 145; and self-respect, 140-42, 144-45; and social rights, 1 3 7 38; and spheres of justice, 138, 146-52. See also difference principle civic humanism, 55 civic virtue, 134 civil disobedience, 266 civil rights, 52, 137. See also citizenship and social justice civil society, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 - 2 1 Cohen, Jean, 1 1 7 - 1 8 Cohen, Joshua, 44, 122, 147, 297m3 Coing, Helmut, 296n6 collective action, moral responsibility for, a n

l

2

n

1

35-36 collective identity, 1 1 6 - 1 8 commonality, 100-101, 105, 1 1 1 . See also solidarity/patriotism communal virtues, 1 1 3 communitarian fallacy, 1 6 - 1 7 , 3 3 communitarianism: debate about, general description of, 1 - 5 , 293n2, 2 9 4 ^ ; nor­ mative contexts of, 2-4; political mean­ ing of, 294n3 communities: constitutive, 18-20, 26, 69, 103; cultural, 79, 299n46; differing, 1 9 20; ethical, 233, 277, 283-87 {see also ethics/ethical communities); full/equal membership in, 147-49, 1 5 2 , 3 0 3 ^ 0 ; ideal, 286; instrumental/external con­ ception of, 221; as organized remem­ brance, 284; values of, 70, 2 9 9 ^ 7 . See also legal community; political commu­ nity "community," meaning of, 2 concentration camps, 290-91 2

1 _

2

congruence of right/good, 20-21, 22 conscience, 253, 254, 3o6nio constitutional essentials, 96, 143-44 constitutive communities, 18-20, 26, 69, 103 constructivism and practical reason, 164, 173-200; and deontological theories of justice, 154, 176-78; and moral justifica­ tion and communicative-practical rea­ son, 156, 189-200, 238, 305n24; politi­ cal constructivism, 182-89; and reflective equilibrium, 178-82 contexts of justice, 230-41, 291-92. See also justification, contexts of; recognition, contexts of contextualism. See universalism and contex­ tualism contextualist-universalist path of moral phi­ losophy, 170, 171 contractualism, 253-54 contractual relations, 68, 2 9 9 ^ 4 conversational restraint, 92-93 Cooke, Maeve, 306m 4 covering-law universalism, 168 crimes against humanity, 271 critical associationalism, 1 1 0 critique/conflict, in deliberative democracy, 122, 126-33 Darwall, Stephen L., 278-79 Dasein, 218 deliberative democracy, 90, 1 2 1 - 3 7 ; citizen­ ship in, 136-37; and communicatively generated power, 1 2 1 ; and critique/ conflict, 122, 126-33; and democratic legitimacy, 122; and ethical identities, 125-26; feminist critique of, 128-29; and liberal republicanism, 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 302m9; pluralism in, 136, 302n2i; and private autonomy, 1 3 1 ; as procedural, 1 2 1 - 2 2 , 123; and public discourses, 122, 236; and public vs. private realms, 127; and rationality/fairness, 122-26, 302m 6; and reconciliation/solidarity, 122, 1 3 3 - 3 7 ; ^ groups, 1 3 2 - 3 3 ; and truth, 124 deliberative universalism, 297m 8 democracy, 3, 88-153; ° d atomism, 88-89; as an ethical-collective value, 86; in Can­ ada, 105-6; and citizenship, 25, 89, 93, 1 0 6 - 1 1 , 1 1 3 , 266-68, 295ni6; and civil society, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 - 2 1 ; and collective s o c i a l

a

INDEX

357

identity, 1 1 6 - 1 8 ; and commonality, 100101, 105, 1 1 1 ; and communicative free­ dom, 1 1 4 - 1 5 ; and constitutional essen­ tials, 96, 143-44; deliberative (see delib­ erative democracy); and differing communities, divided loyalty to, 1 1 0 - 1 1 ; dualist, 97; and general justification, 1 5 1 , 152, 153, 234-35; and general law, 83-84; and identification vs. participa­ tion, 102; and individual rights, 86; and justification/autonomy, 266-68; and modus vivendi, 90, 91-94, 116, 3oin6; and morality, 84, 99; and the moral per­ son, 23, 153; and overlapping consen­ sus, 90, 94-100, 104, 174, 3om5; vs. philosophy, 1 5 7 - 6 1 ; and political/ethi­ cal vs. legal community, 89, 301m; and postconventional identity, 118, 119; and priority of individual rights over com­ mon good, 88-89; d public justifica­ tion/reason, 88, 96-99, 120, 1 5 1 ; and public space, 90; and public vs. private realm, 93-94, 107-8; and reasonable­ ness, 95, 96; and reciprocity, 98-99; and republican-participatory communi­ tarianism, 90, 100, 102, 104-9, ' 30in3; self-determination in, 45, 106-7; and self-interest, 1 1 5 ; and Sittlichkeit,

293n2; and primary goods, 139-40, 142; and principle of general justification, 144, 145; priority of first principle over, 143-44; Sandel on, 1 3 - 1 4 , 21 dignity, 225, 284, 291 discourse ethics, 189, 192-95 discourse theory, 129-32, 160-61 discovery path of moral philosophy, 164-65 distributive justice, 57, 86, 146-47 divine grace, 150 Dubiel, Helmut, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 Du Bois, W. E. B., 287 Durkheim, Emile, 30in4 Dworkin, Ronald: on abortion, 2 9 8 ^ 5 ; on affirmative action, 74; on coerciveness of law, 60; on distributive justice, 57; on equality of resources/opportunity, 57, 59, 60; ethical liberalism of, 56-60; on ethical neutrality, 48; on impact vs. chal­ lenge model of good life, 58-59; indi­ vidualist liberalism of, 3 2 - 3 3 ; on justice as deontologically grounded, 60; liberal antipaternalism of, 60; on liberalism and skepticism, 50; liberalism of, 53; on primacy of rights over ethical concep­ tions, 60, 298n25; on spheres of justice, 147; on volitional vs. critical well-being, 57-58

102, 104, 106; and solidarity/patriotism, 88, 90, 103-5, 1 1 6 - 1 7 ; strong, 108-9; and the substanceless-substance di­ lemma, 137, 1 5 2 - 5 3 , 303n3o; and sub­ stantivist communitarianism, 90, 1 0 1 - 2 , 1 1 3 ; and the Supreme Court, 97; symbolic apparatus of, 116. See also citi­ zenship and social justice deontological morality/norms: and ethical person vs. legal person, 28; and free­ dom, 1 1 - 1 2 ; intelligible ego as founda­ tion of, 1 1 - 1 2 ; primacy of, 9; Sandel on, 1 3 - 1 4 . See also deontological theo­ ries deontological theories: and constructivism, 154, 176-78; of Habermas, 85, 3 0 1 ^ 3 ; Maclntyre on, 200-201; Nussbaum on, 246; and practical reason, 246-51; Wil­ liams on, 7, 241, 246-51, 3 0 5 ^ . See also deontological morality/norms desires, 218, 250 difference principle: contextualization of, 160; original-position choice of, 139,

education of cultural communities/minori­ ties, 79, 299n46 empathy, 307m 9 Enlightenment, 203, 206-7, 216 equality: equal liberties, 141; Hegel on, 59; Kant on, 83; and neutrality, 48; vs. pref­ erential treatment, 72-78, 234; of re­ sources/opportunity, 57, 59, 60, 139-43; simple vs. complex, 146 ethical identities, 231; in deliberative de­ mocracy, 125-26; and general law, 6 8 73, 233; and individual rights, 52, 6 2 63; and liberal neutrality, 45. See also ethical person vs. legal person ethical liberalism, 32, 53, 56-60, 66-67, 2981133 ethical monism, 200-215, 238-39; and the Enlightenment, 203, 206-7; and the good life, 203-6; and the history of oc­ cidental culture, 202-3; and human te­ los, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207, 213; and moral responsibility, 2 1 3 - 1 4 ; and natu-

a n

1 1 2

JJH

INDEX

ethical monism (continued) ral moral law, 201, 203, 205, 2 1 1 ; and persons as attached to ethical traditions, 203, 204-5, 209, 2 1 4 - 1 5 ; and the ra­ tionality of traditions, 201-2, 206-11, 214, 217, 226; and Thomistic tradition, 201-2, 203, 205-6, 207, 208, 2 1 1 - 1 4 ethical persons/communities, 277, 283-87. See also ethical person vs. legal person; ethics/ethical communities ethical person vs. legal person, 3-4, 16-29, 85-86; and congruence of right/good, 20-21, 22; and constitutive communi­ ties, 18-20, 26; and deontological morality, 28; and ethical autonomy, 1 8 19, 80; and ethical values, 28; and ethi­ cal vs. legal communities, 233; legal per­ son, definition of, 295m 8; and legal vs. moral norms, 28; and moral autonomy, 19, 21, 24; and the moral person, 2 1 23, 24-25; and the original position, 7, 8, 21-24, 293n2, 295nn 1 3 - 1 4 ; and per­ sons as rights-bearers, 26-27; and politi­ cal vs. social communities, 25-26, 296m9; and rational choice, 23-24, 295m 3; and self-reflection, 18, 19; and situated identity, 1 1 , 1 7 - 1 9 ; and the well-ordered society, 20. See also democ­ racy; law, ethical neutrality of; law, gen­ eral, and particular identities; liberal neutrality; individual rights and autonomy as a good ethical universalism and modern identity, *55> *56, 215-29; vs. atomism, 221; and "best account" principle of practical reason, 217, 223, 226; and Dasein, 218; and dignity, 225; and the Enlighten­ ment, 216; and the expressive power of language, 220; and formal understand­ ing of the good, 228-29; and the good, levels of, 223-24; and the good life, 221, 225, 228; and individual rights, 216; and the intersubjectivity of moral reasons, 226-28, 305n28; modernity's bifurcation, 222; and modernity's hyper­ goods, 222-25, 226; and modernity's moral sources, 224; vs. naturalism, 2 2 1 22, 223; and person as ethicalevaluating, 2 1 8 - 2 1 ; and positive vs. neg­ ative liberty, 219; and qualitative distinc­ tions, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 227-28; and respect for others, 225-26; and Sittlichkeit, 216; and

situated subjectivity, 218; and strong evaluations, 218-20, 221, 224; and tran­ scendental goods, 215, 223, 224, 239 ethical values, 28 ethics/ethical communities, 189, 192-95, 202-3, 206, 258-63, 3o6ni3- See also ethical persons/communities; ethics vs. morality ethics vs. morality, 99, 1 3 1 ; ethical vs. moral practical reason, 239; and individ­ ual rights/autonomy, 48-49; priority of morality over ethics, 54; Strawson on, 2g6n2i; and validity, 38-39, 44, 185, 3°5 28 externalist vs. internalist theories, 247-49 n

feminism: on deliberative democracy, 1 2 8 29; on law, 7 1 - 7 6 , 234; on the legal person, 7 1 , 127; on private autonomy, Ferrara, Alessandro, 304n6 Fichte, Johann Gotdieb, 275 Finnis,John, 2 9 8 ^ 8 fragmentation of values, 241-45, 246-47 Frankenberg, Gunther, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 Frankfurt, Harry, 125, 218 Fraser, Nancy, 1 3 3 freedom: communicative, 1 1 4 - 1 6 ; and de­ ontological morality/norms, 1 1 - 1 2 ; and individual rights, 61, 2g8n33; Kant on, 81, 83; Mill on, 296n3; positive vs. nega­ tive, 257, 306m 2; Rawls on, 20; as selfdisposition, 2g8n33. See also individual rights French vs. American Revolution, 1 1 5 friendship, 204, 285 Fullinwider, Robert, 75 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 209 gag rules, 93 Galston, William A.: ethical liberalism of, 56; liberalism of, 53; on liberal totalitar­ ianism, 298n3o; on the thin theory of the good, 65-66, 2 9 8 ^ 8 Gauchet, Marcel, 1 1 5 - 1 6 generality, 36-38, 39-40, 43-46, 80-82 Glendon, Mary Ann, 299034 golden rule, 195 Goldman v. Weinberger, 69-70, 299n36 the good: Aristotle on, 157; basic forms of, 298n28; and contexts of justice, 2 3 1 - 4 1 ; distribution of goods (see spheres of jus-

INDEX tice); formal understanding of, 228-29; and generally justified norms, 155, 231; historicity of, 221; impact vs. challenge model of, 58-59; levels of, 223-24; meanings of, 3; permissible/reasonable conceptions of, 55; primary goods, 55, 56, 139-43, 8 2 ; priority of right/just over, 30, 272; as rationality, 54-55; as telos, 102-3; thick vague theory of, 145, 298n28; thin theory of, 5 1 , 65-66, 145, 146, 298n28; transcendental goods, 52, 2 1 5 , 223, 224, 239; of well-ordered soci­ ety, 20, 55-56, 100 good life, 203-6, 221, 225, 228 Gunther, Klaus, 265, 30on48, 306m 7 Gutmann, Amy, 123, 297m 8 x

Habermas, Jiirgen, 30on52, 306m 7; on communicative reason, 196; on deliber­ ative democracy, 122; on democratic discourses, 130, 160-61; deontological conception of law, 85, 3oin53; dis­ course ethics of, 189, 192-95; on equal rights, 78; on the good life vs. justice, 2g6n2i; on individuation/socialization, 276; on Kantian-procedural theory of morality, 177-78; on law, 263; on money, 149; political and personal au­ tonomy, 83-84; on political discourses, 297m 7; on popular sovereignty as pro­ cedural, 1 2 1 ; on system and life world, 1 1 7 ; on universal norms, 53; on the voice of the common good, 109; on will formation, 1 1 9 Hampshire, Stuart, 169, 170, 297n8 Harlan, Justice, 299n35 harm principle, 63 Hart, H. L. A., 1 4 1 , 169 hedonism, 9 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: on abstract individualism and universalism, 7; on al­ ienation, 107; on civil society, 10, 1 1 4 ; critique of Kant, 158; on legal persons, 287-88; on liberty, 7; on master/slave and equality, 59; on modernity, 217; on persons within a context, 220; on politi­ cal community, 108, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 ; on recog­ nition, 275-76, 288; on Sittlichkeit, 102, 216, 276; on Spirit, 276; on subjectivity vs. community, 1 0 1 - 2 ; on subjectivity vs. generality, 88; on will, 288 Heidegger, Martin, 2 1 8

339

Hinsch, Wilfried, 178 Hobbes, Thomas, 6, 3 1 , 92, 287. See also modus vivendi Hoffe, Otfried, 30on49 Holmes, Stephen, 93, 30in4 Homeric ethics, 202-3 homosexuality, tolerance of, 70, 2 9 9 ^ 8 Honneth, Axel, 275-76, 277-78, 279, 28081, 282 Hume, David, 249 identification vs. participation, in democ­ racy, 102 Ik people (Africa), 304ns impartiality, 7, 36-38, 39, 177 individualism/universalism, 7 individualist liberalism, 3 1 - 3 3 , 53, 103-4 individuality, 291 individual rights, 6, 1 1 ; vs. the common good, 88-89; * democracy, 86; and negative liberty, 216; as nonrejectable, 233. See also individual rights and auton­ omy as a good individualrightsand autonomy as a good, 4 8 68; autonomy as a modern value, 62; and civil rights, 52; and ethical identity, 52, 62-63; and ethics vs. morality, 48-49; and freedom, 61, 2g8n33; and the harm principle, 63; legal autonomy, 56, 80; and the legal person, 5 0 - 5 1 , 80; negative autonomy, 63-64; perfectionist auton­ omy, 60-62, 63-64; primacy of rights over ethical conceptions, 60, 2 9 8 ^ 5 ; and respect for others, 50; and skepti­ cism about the good, 48-50; and tran­ scendental goods, 52. See also the good institutional identity, 232 institutions, deliberative, 302m4 internalist vs. externalist theories, 247-49 international justice, 167, 3 0 5 ^ 4 interpretation path of moral philosophy, 165, 170 a n (

invention path of moral philosophy, 165 Jonah (biblical character), 162 justice: Aristotle on, 146, 157; contexts of, 230-41, 291-92; deep structure of norms of, 169; distributive, 57, 86, 1 4 6 47; international, 167, 305n24; Plato on, 157; priority of, 66-67; Rawls's moral conception of, 40, 54, 297nio; as relative, 157; spheres of, 138, 146-52

7./"

INDEX

justice (continued)

167, 294116; universal vs. concrete, 168. See also citizenship and social justice; de­ ontological theories justification: and communicative-practical reason, 156, 189-200, 238, 3 0 5 ^ 4 ; ex­ ternal vs. internal, 163-64, 172. See also justification, contexts of; justification, general; justification, practical, and au­ tonomy justification, contexts of, 4-5, 241-56; and fragmentation of values, 241-45, 24647; and Tugendhat's ethical anchoring of morality, 241, 2 5 1 - 5 6 ; and Williams's critique of deontological theories, 241, 246-51, 305n3. See also justification, practical, and autonomy justification, general: and ethical identities, 232; ethical neutrality of law, 234; and the good, 155, 231, 237; and particular identities, 237; in Rawlsian theory, 238; and respect, 237; and universalism/con­ textualism, 155, 172, 178, 1 9 1 - 9 2 , 1 9 6 98, 229, 238, 304n20 justification, practical, and autonomy, 2 5 6 75; and citizenship/democracy, 266-68; and ethics/ethical communities, 2 5 8 63, 306m 3; and law, 263-66; and mo­ rality, 268-75, 306m 7, 307m 9 Kallen, Horace, 107-8 Kant, Immanuel: on broadened thinking/ sensus communis, 125, 270-71; categori­ cal imperative of, 186-87, 251; on citi­ zenship, 83; comprehensiveness of moral theory of, 23; on equality, 83; on freedom, 8 1 , 83; Hegel's critique of, 158; on impartiality/universalization, 7, 177; on the intelligible ego, 1 1 - 1 2 ; on legitimacy of law, 83; on moral auton­ omy, 1 2 , 17, 21, 175, 189, 268; moral constructivism of, 186; on public use of reason, 123, 189-90; on pure will, 251; reciprocity argument of, 37; on reflec­ tive judgment, 125; transcendental ide­ alism of, 1 1 - 1 2 ; on treating persons not as means but as ends, 14 Kantian vs. Platonic universalism, 160 Karst, Kenneth L., 303n3o Kelsen, Hans, 296n6 Kersting, Wolfgang, 134 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 98

kinship/love sphere, 150 Korsgaard, Christine, 243-44 Koselleck, Reinhart, 30on50 Kymlicka, Will, 53, 56, 76-77, 2g8n3i language: expressive power of, 220; gen­ eral, 126-29, 1 3 1 , 133, 136 Larmore, Charles: modus vivendi model of, 90, 91-94, 116, 3om6; on neutrality, 3 4 - 3 5 , 56, 2g6n7; political liberalism of, 53-54; on public vs. private realm, 9 3 94; on rights and democratic procedu­ res, 30in53; on social/normative inte­ gration, 30in4 law, and legal persons, 263-66. See also ethi­ cal person vs. legal person law, ethical neutrality of, 3 0 - 3 1 ; and basic individual rights, 80-87, 29gn47, 3oonn48~5o; and general justification, 234; legal person as central to, 4, 82-83 (see also ethical person vs. legal person); legitimacy, 83, 86; and priority of right/ just over good, 30. See also autonomy; law, general, and particular identities; liberal neutrality; individual rights and autonomy as a good law, general, and particular identities, 6880; blindness to differences, 68, 234, 299n35; and citizenship, 76, 79, 86; and community values, 70, 299n37; and con­ tractual relations, 68, 29gn34; and de­ mocracy, 83-84; deontological concep­ tion of law, 85, 30in53; and equality vs. preferential treatment, 72-78; ethical identities, 68-73, 335 and * gal auton­ omy, 71; and the legal person, political context of, 76; and legal person as pro­ tective cover, 73, 299n4i; and legal vs. moral person, 7 1 - 7 2 ; and politics of dif­ ference, 78-79; and privacy rights, 7 0 71; and the protective mask of a legal personality, 68; and rights of cultural communities/minorities, 76-79, 86, 299n46; and social relations, 73; and tolerance, 70-71 2

e

legal community, 4, 5, 28, 82, 89, 233, 2 6 3 67, 287-88 legal persons: and individual rights, 5 0 - 5 1 , 80; and law, 263-66; and recognition, 277, 287-88. See also ethical person vs. legal person legitimacy: democratic, 122; of law, 83, 86;

INDEX moral vs. political criteria of, 125-26; political, 236; Rawls's liberal principle of, 96 liberalism: debate about, general descrip­ tion of, 1 - 5 , 294n5; individualist, 3 1 33> 53> !03~4; as self-undermining, 89. See also liberal neutrality liberal neutrality, 31-48; as atomistic, 53; and democratic self-determination, 45; and ethical identity, 45; ethical liberal­ ism, 32, 53, 56-60, 66-67, 2g8n33; and ethical vs. moral validity, 38-39, 44; and generality, 36-38, 39-40, 43-46, 80-82 (see also law, general, and particular identities); goals of liberalism, 3 1 ; and the good, 5 0 - 5 1 , 53; higher-order im­ partiality, 36-38; individualist liberalism, ^SS> 53; negative liberty, 3 1 , 80, 2 96ml 2-3; and neutral dialogue, 34-35; neutrality principle, 33-34, 45-48, 61, 67-68; and objectivity vs. acceptability, 38; and personal liberty, 3 1 ; pluralist liberalism, 3 1 - 3 2 , 35, 297n8; and politi­ cal constitutionalism, 3 1 ; political liber­ alism, 53, 56; and the priority of justice, 66-67; proceduralist liberalism, 3 1 - 3 2 , 33-36, 52, 296n7, 297n8; and rational dialogue, 53-54; and reasonable dis­ agreement, 35, 54; and reasonableness, 40-44, 45, 54, 66-68; and reciprocity, 3 > 37> 39> 43-46, 80-82, 84-85; and restricted generality, 46, 84-85, 3 0 0 ^ 2 ; and social pluralism, 3 1 ; and tolerance, 43, 45» 66; and truth, 44

341

50-51; on political community, 102-3; on skeptical liberalism, 48-49, 5 1 ; on universalist conception of moral person, 200; on universal moral law, 51 Mackie, John, 195-96, 223 MacKinnon, Catharine, 7 2 - 7 3 Madsen, Richard, 103-4 Mansbridge, Jane, 128 Marshall, T. H., 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 3 0 0 ^ 0 Maus, Ingeborg, 267 McCarthy, Thomas, 125-26, 195, 30on52 Mead, George Herbert: on esteem and selfrespect, 255; "I" concept of, 281, 283; on ideal communities, 286; on selfreflection, 18, 19; symbolic interactionism of, 276; on transcendence of con­ text, 2 1 3 Menke, Christoph, 2 9 8 ^ 3 Michelman, Frank, 134 Mill, John Stuart, 45, 63, 296n3 Miller, David, 124 minorities, 75-79, 86, 29gn46 Minow, Martha, 73 modernity, 222-25, 226. See also ethical uni­ versalism and modern identity modus vivendi, 90, 91-94, 116, 30in6 money/commodities sphere, 149 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de, 1 1 8 moral code, minimal, 166, 169-70, 304ns moral imperialism, 246 moral insight, 248 morality: and democracy, 84, 99; and justi­ fication/autonomy, 268-75, 306m7, 307m 9; Tugendhat on, 241, 2 5 1 - 5 6 ; liberal republicanism, 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 3 ° i 9 universalist, 1 0 2 - 3 liberal virtues, 1 1 3 liberty: Hegel on, 7; negative, 3 1 , 80, 216, moral persons: and ethical person vs. legal 296nn2~3, 30on48; personal, 3 1 ; posi­ person, 2 1 - 2 3 , 23, 24-25; and recogni­ tive vs. negative, 219; worth of, 140, 149 tion, 277, 289-91; rights of, 237; and universalism/contextualism, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , Locke, John, 3 1 , 1 1 8 170-74, 176, 180-82, 183-84, 189 love, 150, 285 Luhmann, Niklas, 30in4 moral philosophy, four paths of, 158-59, 164-73 Macedo, Stephen, 53, 56, 66-67 moral pluralism, 247-48 Maclntyre, Alasdair: on collective action, moral reasons, intersubjectivity of, 226-28, 135; on communicative-practical reason, 3°5 28 156; on deontological theories of jus­ moral recognition, 145, 3 0 3 ^ 7 . See also tice, 200-201; ethical monism of (see recognition, contexts of ethical monism); on identitymoral respect, 197-98, 3 0 4 ^ 1 . See also re­ determining values, 49, 50; on individ­ spect ual rights, 216; on legal persons, 50; on moral transcendentalism, 246 liberalism's conception of the good life, multiculturalism, 79 a

n

d

6

2 n

n

1./2

INDEX

Nii^d, Thomas, 297ni8; on fragmentation oi values, 242, 244; on higher-order im­ partiality of general norms, 36-38, 39; on objective vs. subjective reasons, 2 4 2 44; on treating people as means vs. ends, 81; on the view from nowhere, 164, 187 naturalism, 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 223 natural law, 169, 201, 203, 205, 211 needs, 1 3 1 - 3 3 , 149; of citizens, 1 4 1 - 4 3 , 182, 188 neutrality: of aims, 48; of effects/conse­ quences, 47-48, 298n2o; of equal treat­ ment, 48; of law (see law, ethical neutral­ ity of); liberal (seeliberal neutrality); principle of, 33-34, 45-48, 61, 67-68 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 203, 2 1 2 Nozick, Robert, 1 4 - 1 6 , 33 Nussbaum, Martha C , 145, 246, 2 9 8 ^ 8 , 3°3

n 2

7

objectivity vs. acceptability, 38 Offe, Glaus, 119-20 Okin, Susan Moller, 19 O'Neill, Onora, 189-92, 238, 30in53 oppression, 163-64 original position: and the categorical im­ perative, 186-87; contexdess subjects in, 130, 302m 7; and ethical person vs. le­ gal person, 7, 8, 21-24, 293n2, 295ml 1 3 - 1 4 ; and general justification, 178; and ideal of social cooperation, 138-39, 238; and Kantian autonomy, 180-81; and the moral person, 173-74; and needs, 143 (see also primary goods); and the neutrality of law, 43-44; princi­ ples chosen in, 139-40; as reformula­ tion of universalization test, 130. See also veil of ignorance "ought," 250, 252-53 overlapping consensus, 90, 94-100, 104, 174, 184, 3oin5 Parsons, Talcott, 3 0 0 ^ 0 participation: political, 102, 104-5, 108-12; political rights to, 83, 137, 140, 144, 264, 286, 30on48, 30on50 patriotism. See solidarity/patriotism person(s): atomistic conception of, 221; as attached to ethical traditions, 203, 2045, 209, 2 1 4 - 1 5 ; as rights-bearers, 26-27; as situated in contexts, 241; Taylor's

conception of, 2 1 8 - 2 1 . See also citizen­ ship; ethical person vs. legal person; le­ gal persons; moral persons; self Peters, Bernhard, 123, 302ni5 philosophy, 157-61 Plato: cave parable of, 146, 157; on justice, 157; on philosophical truth vs. social re­ ality, 158; on the unjust life as a good life, 59 Platonic ethics, 202-3 Platonic vs. Kantian universalism, 160 Plessy v. Ferguson, 299n35 pluralism: and the common good, 104; communalist vs. deep, 1 1 0 - 1 1 ; cultural, 107-8; in deliberative democracy, 136, 302n2i; moral, 247-48; reasonable, 80, 183-84; social, 31; and stability, 94 pluralist liberalism, 3 1 - 3 2 , 35, 297n8 political community, 234-35; Aristotle on, 101, 102-3; Hegel on, 108, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 ; integrationist vs. participatory, 30in3; vs. legal community, 89, 3 0 1 m ; Mac­ lntyre on, 102-3; membership in, 1 4 8 49; vs. social community, 25-26, 296m9; Taylor on, 102 political constitutionalism, 3 1 political identity, 235-36 political liberalism, 53, 56 political power, 150-51 political virtues, 55, 1 1 3 , 235 postconventional identity, 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 practical reason, 4-5, 8 1 - 8 2 , 153, 164, 303n3; "best account" principle of, 217, 223, 226; as context-sensitive, 237; ethical vs. moral, 239; intersubjectivist, 240; and objections to deontological theories, 246-51; priority of, 240; pro­ cedural conception of, 237; and rea­ sons, 256. See also constructivism and practical reason; justification, practical, and autonomy; practical reason; ration­ ality PreuB, Ulrich, 1 1 9 - 2 0 primary goods, 55, 56, 139-43, 2 privacy, definitions of, 93 proceduralism, 221 proceduralist liberalism, 3 1 - 3 2 , 33-36, 52, 2g6n7, 297n8 proceduralist universalism, 3 0 4 ^ property rights, 1 4 - 1 6 public justification/reason, 88, 96-99, 120, l g

151

INDEX public-office sphere, 150 public space, 90 public vs. private realm, 93-94, 107-8, 127 qualitative distinctions, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 227-28 quality of life, 144-45 Quebec, 78-79, 106 rationality: in deliberative democracy, 1 2 2 26, 302m6; and ethical person vs. legal person, 23-24, 295m3; the good as, 5 4 55; and intuitionism, 186; of traditions, 201-2, 2 0 6 - 1 1 , 214, 217, 226. See also practical reason; reasons Rawls, John: affirmative-action principle of, 1 3 - 1 4 ; Aristotelian Principle of, 2g8n24; on communitarian life plans, 10; on congruence of right/good, 20-21, 22, 40, 94; constructivism of (see constructiv­ ism and practical reason); on desires, 250; difference principle of (see differ­ ence principle); on discontinuity between justice and the good, 57; on distribution of natural talents as assets, 14-16; on duty to help others, 268; on education of members of ethical com­ munities, 79; on equal citizenship, 1 3 8 39; on the good citizen, 55; on good­ ness as rationality, 54-55; on hedonism, 9; on human rights, 3 0 5 ^ 4 ; on ideal theory of distributive justice, 146; on in­ dividuals as socially constituted, 20; on legal autonomy, 56; on the legal person, 25-26; liberalism of, 53, 56; liberal prin­ ciple of legitimacy of, 96; on moral au­ tonomy, 24, 54; moral conception of justice, 40, 54, 297nio; on the moral person, 2 1 - 2 3 , 24-25, 180-82, 183-84; on neutrality of aims, 48; on the origi­ nal position (see original position); on overlapping consensus, 90, 94-100, 174, 184, 3oin5; on perfection, 60-62; on permissible/reasonable conceptions of the good, 55; on pluralistic conceptions of the good, 40; political constructivism of, 182-89; on political philosophy, 175; on political virtues, 55; on political vs. social communities, 25-26, 296m9; on primary goods, 55, 56, 139-43; property rights, 1 5 - 1 6 ; on rational choice, 23-24, 295m 3; on reason/rea­ sonableness, 40-43; on reciprocity/gen­ o

n

343

erality, 43-44, 98-99; on reflective equi­ librium, 178-82; on the right to equal basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for all, 82; on the right to per­ sonal freedom, 20; on the right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all, 139-40, 142, 293n2; on self-respect, 140-42, 144-45; on stability, 174; A Theory of Justice, 2 (see also specific topics); on thin theory of the good, 5 1 , 145; on the unencumbered self, 8-16, 17, 232; on utilitarianism, 177; on the veil of ignorance, 7, 14, 2 1 22, 57, 178; Walzer's critique of, 1 5 9 60; on the well-ordered society, 20, 5 5 56, 94, 100, 175, 181; on well-ordered vs. private society, 1 0 - 1 1 ; on the worth of liberty, 140, 149 Raz, Joseph: critique of, 64-65; ethical lib­ eralism of, 56; on ethical-personal au­ tonomy, 306m 3; on freedom, 61; on the harm principle, 63; on impartiality, 37, 38; liberalism of, 53; on negative au­ tonomy, 63-64; on neutrality of effects, 298n2o; paternalism of, 64; on perfec­ tion, 60-61, 63-64; on social forms, 62 reasonable disagreement, 35, 54 reasonableness, 40-44, 45, 54, 66-68; of comprehensive doctrines, 184-85; and democracy, 95, 96 reasons: ethical-practical, 250-51; as inter­ subjective, 248; as motivating, 250-51; objective vs. subjective, 242-45, 249. See also entries starting with "justification"; practical reason; rationality reciprocity: and democracy, 98-99; Kant on, 37; and liberal neutrality, 36, 37, 39, 43-46, 80-82, 84-85; and proce­ dural justification, 177; Rawls on, 4 3 44, 98-99 recognition, contexts of, 198, 230, 275-92; and abstractness, 5; and citizenship, 277, 288-89; and esteem, 281-83, 307n24; and ethical persons/communi­ ties, 277, 283-87; and legal persons, 277, 287-88; and moral persons, 277, 289-91; and respect, 277-79, 280-81, 289-90; and self-esteem, 278, 285-87, 289-90, 307n24; and self-respect, 28991; and Sittlichkeit, 276, 277, 279; and

slavery, 290 recognition sphere, 150

777

INDEX

vvionciliation/solidarity, 122, 1 3 3 - 3 7 . See also solidarity/patriotism reflective equilibrium, 178-82 reflective judgment, 125 reiterative universalism, 155, 167-69, 1 7 1 , 178, 304nn6~7 relativism, 145 religious identity, 69-70, 2991136 republican-participatory communitarianism, 90, 100, 102, 104-9, » 3 3 respect: and general justification, 237; moral, 197-98, 304021; for others, 50, 225-26, 254-55, 278; and recognition, 277-79, 280-81, 289-90. See also selfrespect responsibility: ethical, 18, 204, 246-47, 2 5 8 63, 271-74; legal, 83, 234-35, 263-67; moral, 19, 135-36, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 246-47, 268-74; political, 83, 106-7, 1 1 1 - 1 2 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 9 - 2 1 , i35~3 > 5 « - 5 3 » 2 3 4 - 3 6 , 264, 266-68, 288-89 1 1 2

6

o i n

1

Responsive Communitarian Platform, n

294 3 Riedel, Manfred, 3001150 right(s): basic individual, 80-87, 299n47, 30onn48-5o; of cultural communities/ minorities, 76-79, 86, 299n46; to equal basic liberties compatible with similar liberties for all, 82; moral, in legal com­ munities, 166-67; ° f moral persons, 145; to the most extensive liberties compati­ ble with similar liberties for all, 139-40, 142, 293n2; of privacy, 70-71; social, 1 3 7 - 3 8 . See also individual rights; indi­ vidual rights and autonomy as a good Rodel, Ulrich, 1 1 5 , 1 1 6 Rorty, Richard, 66, 158 Rosenblum, Nancy, 2 9 8 ^ 3 Rousseau, Jeanjacques, 83, 102, 109, 1 1 2 , 113 Sachs, David, 278 sanctions, 253 Sandel, Michael: on affirmative action, 7 4 75; on civil rights, 52; on constitutive communities, 18-20, 26, 69, 103; cri­ tique of deontological morality by, 1 3 14, 154; critique of Rawls by, 7, 8-16, 17, 232; on the difference principle, 14, 21; on distribution of natural talents as assets, 1 4 - 1 5 ; on the intelligible ego, 1 1 -

12; on legal persons, 86; on liberal neu­ trality, 5 1 ; on private society, 1 1 ; on rec­ ognition of ethical bonds, 5 1 - 5 2 ; on re­ ligious identity, 69-70, 2 9 9 ^ 6 ; on the self, 7; on sharing, ethic of, 75; on situ­ ated identity, 1 1 , 1 7 - 1 9 ; on tolerance of homosexuality, 70, 299n38 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 285, 286-87 Scanlon, Thomas, 35-36, 4 1 , 57, 189 security/welfare sphere, 149 Seel, Martin, 228 self: and atomistic individualism, 6-7, 27; history of, 6; and individualism/universalism, 7; individual rights of, 6, 1 1 ; and the social contract, 6-7; as unencum­ bered, 8-16, 17, 232; as voluntaristic, 89, 10. See also ethical person vs. legal person; moral persons; person (s) self-esteem, 254-55, 261; and recognition, 278, 285-87, 289-90, 307n24; vs. selfrespect, 150, 278 self-reflection, 18, 19 self-respect, 255, 281; Rawls on, 140-42, 144-45; and recognition, 289-91; vs. self-esteem, 150, 278 Sen, Amartya, 65, 142, 144-45, 188 sensus communis, 1 3 4 - 3 5 , 270, 271 shame, 288-89 shared understandings, 160 sharing, ethic of, 75 Shklar, Judith, 277 singularity, 284 Sittlichkeit: and citizenship, 235; and democ­ racy, 102, 104, 106; and ethical univer­ salism, 216; Hegel on, 102, 216, 276; and recognition, 276, 277, 279 situated identity, 1 1 , 1 7 - 1 9 situated subjectivity, 218 slavery, 290 Smith, Adam, 144-45 social contract, 6-7 social criticism, 158-59, 161-64 socialism, decentralized democratic, 151 social rights, 137-38; to share society's re­ sources, 83, 137, 30on50 society: civil, 1 1 2 , 1 1 3 - 2 1 ; participatory vs. rights model of, 86. See also well-ordered society solidarity/patriotism, 86; in deliberative de­ mocracy, 122, 1 3 3 - 3 7 ; and democracy, 88, 90, 103-5, ° - 7 l and esteem, 2 8 1 1 1

1

INDEX 82; meanings of, 304nn2 1-22; as recog­ nition of others in shared community, 235, 3 0 ^ 2 1 Sophocles, 272 spheres of justice, 138, 146-52, 1O7, 294n6 Spirit, 276 stability, 94, 174. See also overlapping co sensus Strawson, P. F., 296ns! strong evaluations, 218-20, 221, 224 subaltern counterpublics, 1 3 3 substanceless-substance dilemma, 137, 1 5 2 n

53> 3 ° 3 3 ° substantivist communitarianism, 90, 1 0 1 - 2 , Sullivan, William M., 103-4 Sunstein, Cass R., 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 302m6, 302m9 Supreme Court, 97, 159 Swidler, Ann, 103-4 Taylor, Charles, 101, 293n2; on atomism and liberalism, 8; on atomism and rights, 6; on the authentic self, 261; on Canadian self-rule, 105-6; on civil soci­ ety, 1 1 8 ; on difference-blind liberalism, 77-78; on distributive justice, 146-47; on ethical universalism and modern identity (see ethical universalism and modern identity); ethical universalism of (see ethical universalism and modern identity); on Hegel's conception of lib­ erty, 7; on individualism, 284; on patri­ otism, 104-5; on persons as rights-bearers, 26-27; on political com­ munity, 102; on Rawls, 2 9 4 ^ ; republi­ can thesis of, 104-7; on rights vs. partic­ ipatory model of society, 86; on the simple weigher vs. the strong evaluator, 10; on situated identity, 7; on transcen­ dental goods, 52, 200, 239 telos, 102-3, ° 3 > °4> ° 5 > ° 7 ' 213 A Theory ofJustice (Rawls), 2. See also specific 2

0

2

2

2

2

topics

Thomism, 201-2, 203, 205-6, 207, 208, 211-14 Thompson, Dennis, 123 Tipton, Steven M., 103-4 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 89, 1 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 1 8 tolerance, 43, 45, 66, 7 0 - 7 1 , 299n38

345

totalitarianism, 1 1 4 transcendental idealism, 1 1 - 1 2 truth, 44, 124, 1 5 7 - 5 8 Tugendhat, Ernst, 194, 241, 2 5 1 - 5 6 Turnbull, Colin M., 3 0 4 n s Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, 1 1 0 United States, ethical-cultural character of, 149 universalism and contextualism, 3, 154-229; covering-law universalism, 168; and democratic discourses, 160-61; and ex­ ternal vs. internal justification, 163-64, 172; and general justification, 155, 172, 178, 1 9 1 - 9 2 , 196-98, 229, 238, 304n2o; Kantian vs. Platonic universalism, 160; and the moral person, 1 5 5 - 5 6 , 170-74, 176, 180-82, 183-84, 189; and moral philosophy's four paths, 158-59, 1 6 4 73; and philosophy vs. democracy, 1 5 7 61; proceduralist universalism, 304n6; reiterative universalism, 155, 167-69, 1 7 1 , 178, 304nn6~7; and social criti­ cism, 158-59, 161-64; universalism, def­ inition of, 134. See also constructivism and practical reason; ethical monism; ethical universalism and modern iden­ tity utilitarianism, 74, 221 veil of ignorance, 7, 14, 2 1 - 2 2 , 57, 178. See also original position violence, 164 Waldron, Jeremy, 39-40, 297ni4 Walzer, Michael: Aristotelianism of, 148-49; on citizenship, 109-10, 1 1 1 , 1 1 4 ; on communitarianism as a feature of liber­ alism, 293n2; on complex equality, 146; on covering-law universalism, 168; on critical associationalism, 110; on deep structure of justice norms, 169; on dis­ course theory, 129-30, 160-61; on equal citizenship, 138; on ideal theory of distributive justice, 146; on inclusive citizenship, 146, 148; on international justice, 167; on justice as relative, 157; on legal persons, 86; on liberalism as self-undermining, 89; on minimal moral code, 166, 169-70, 304n8; on minimal natural law, 169; on moral philosophy's

7./6

INDEX

Walzer, Michael (continued) paths, 164-65, 170; on normative the­ ory of democracy, 158-59; on philoso­ phy vs. democracy, 1 5 8 - 6 1 ; on plural­ ism, 107; reiterative universalism of, 155, 167-69, 1 7 1 , 178, 304n6; on the self, 7-8; on shared understandings, 160; on social criticism, 161-64; spheres of justice, 138, 146-52, 167, 294n6; on unconstrained talk, 130; on universal vs. concrete justice, 168 Warnke, Georgia, 3 0 3 ^ wars, just vs. unjust, 167 o

n

well-ordered society: vs. private society, 1 0 1 1 ; Rawls on, 20, 55-56, 94, 100, 175, 181; stability of, 94 will, 1 1 9 , 2 5 1 , 288 Williams, Bernard, 227; on deontological theories, 7, 241, 246-51, 3 0 5 ^ ; on dis­ tributive justice, 146; on the Kantian view of persons, 24 Wingert, Lutz, 197-98, 306m 7 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 29gn46 Yack, Bernard, 89 Young, Iris, 1 3 2 - 3 3

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