Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions: Locating, Identifying the contaminants, and Planning for Environmental Cleanup of Land and Sea Military Ranges and Dumpsites

CLEANUP OF CHEMICAL AND EXPLOSIVE MUNITIONS Locating, Identifying Contaminants, and Planning for Environmental Remediation of Land and Sea Military Ranges and Ordnance Dumpsites

Richard D. Albright

N o r w i c h , N Y, U S A

Copyright © 2008 by William Andrew Inc. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. ISBN: 978-0-8155-1540-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Albright, Richard D. Cleanup of chemical and explosive munitions : locating, identifying contaminants, and planning for environmental remediation of land and sea military ranges and ordnance dumpsites / Richard D. Albright. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-8155-1540-1 ISBN-10: 0-8155-1540-5 1. Chemical weapons disposal. 2. Explosive ordnance disposal. 3. Hazardous waste site remediation. 4. Bombing and gunnery ranges--Environmental aspects. 5. Military bases--Environmental aspects. I. Title. TD899.A76A475 2008 623.4’45--dc22 2007029904 Printed in the United States of America This book is printed on acid-free paper. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Published by: William Andrew Inc. 13 Eaton Avenue Norwich, NY 13815 1-800-932-7045 www.williamandrew.com Cover: Design by Russell Richardson. Top photo: Representation of a playground built over a weapons-contaminated area. Earth cross-section of remediation area: Even if a military range were in the mountains, contaminants will flow down stream and leach into residential wells; groundwater contaminants will also eventually enter lakes and escalate up the food chain. Bottom photos of ordnance typically found in old munitions ranges: Left top to bottom: 3.5-inch rocket; 2.5-inch bazooka. Right top to bottom: 81-mm illumination mortar; 3-inch Stokes chemical mortar; 60-mm high explosive mortar.

To my dear wife Sheila and my fine sons Richard and Arie, who graciously allowed me the time for my obsession And to my father, the late Granville Albright, Deputy Chief, Detroit Fire Department, who taught me the value of public service

NOTICE This book is intended to provide general, first-step information about the identificationand cleanup of chemical and explosive munitions sites for organizations and communities that are faced with cleaning up an old munitions burial site. It is not intended as a thorough instruction manual on munitions site remediation, nor is it intended as a primary source of research information since it does not include all information or discuss all situations that might occur. It cannot be assumed that all necessary warnings and precautionary measures are contained in this work, and that other, or additional, information or assessments may not be required. For the cleanup of munitions sites it will be necessary to obtain additional detailed information from other sources as well as expertise from those with extensive training. To the best knowledge of the publisher and the editors, the information presented is accurate and no warranty, express or implied, is made. Neither the publisher nor the author assume any liability or responsibility for completeness or accuracy of the information presented or any damages of any kind alleged to result in connection with, or arising from, the use of this book.

Contents Foreword

xvii

Preface

xxi

Acknowledgments

xxiii

Abbreviations

xxix

Introduction

xxxiii

Part 1 The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions 1

2

Cleaning Up Old Munitions Sites 1.1 A Primer on the Science and Concepts of Cleaning Up a Range Site 1.2 A Historical Background of Old Munitions Sites 1.3 New Requirements for Old Munitions 1.3.1 Final Military Munitions Rule 1.3.2 Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges 1.3.3 The Nonexistent Range Rule 1.3.4 Chemical Weapons Convention 1.3.5 Base Realignment and Closure Act 1.3.6 Defense Environmental Restoration Program 1.3.7 Primary Purpose of the New UXO Rules Limitations and Expertise in Remediating Munitions Sites 2.1 State and Local Regulators Need to Develop Their Own Expertise in Remediating Munitions Sites 2.1.1 Examples of the Military’s Lack of Experience in Environmental Cleanup 2.1.2 The EPA Also Lacks Experience in Some Regions with Military Issues 2.1.3 Barriers Unique to Military Site Remediation

3 The Extent of the Munitions Problem 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Extent of the Munitions Problem Generally 3.3 Land Mines

3 3 4 5 6

6 7 7 8 8 9 11 11 12 14 15 19 19 19 22

vii

viii

Contents 3.4

Munitions Burials by the Civilian Conservation Corps 3.5 Extent of the Explosive Munitions Problem 3.5.1 Storage Depots 3.5.2 Manufacturing Facilities for Explosives 3.5.2.1 Toluol 3.5.2.2 Nitrates 3.5.2.3 Nitrogen Fixation 3.5.2.4 Other Explosive Precursors 3.5.2.5 Powder Manufacture 3.5.2.6 TNT Production 3.5.2.7 Ammonium Nitrate Production 3.5.2.8 Picric Acid Production 3.5.2.9 Tetryl Production 3.5.2.10 Tetranitroaniline Production 3.5.2.11 Fulminate of Mercury Production 3.5.2.12 Nitrostarch Production 3.5.3 Experimental Explosives 3.5.3.1 Anilite 3.5.3.2 Perchlorates 3.5.3.3 Hydrazine Nitrate 3.5.3.4 NDMA 4

Explosive Ordnance 4.1 Danger From Explosive Ordnance 4.1.1 Hypersensitivity of Old Deteriorated Explosives 4.1.2 How Explosives Work 4.1.3 Blow in Place 4.1.4 Toxicity of Explosives 4.1.5 UXO Masquerading as Inert Practice Rounds 4.1.6 UXO Claimed to be Inert 4.1.7 Expect the Unexpected with Ordnance 4.2 Explosive Contamination 4.2.1 Methods of Treating Explosive Contamination in Groundwater 4.2.2 Methods of Treating Explosive Contamination in Soil 4.2.3 Sampling for Explosives and Breakdown Products

23 25 26 27 27 28 28 28 29 29 29 29 30 30 30 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 33 33 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 40 41

Contents

ix

4.3

43 43 43 44 45

5

Methods of Destroying Military Explosives 4.3.1 Open Air Burning 4.3.2 Underwater Detonation 4.3.3 Surface Detonation 4.3.4 Detonation Chambers

Chemical Warfare Material 5.1 Introduction to Chemical Warfare Material Issues 5.2 History of Chemical Warfare 5.3 Extent of the Chemical Warfare Material Problem 5.3.1 University Research in World War I 5.3.2 Chemical Companies and Other World War I Facilities 5.3.3 Overlooked Sites 5.3.4 Toxic Smoke Candles 5.3.5 Quantities of Chemical Agents on Hand at the End of World War I 5.3.6 Research up to and during World War II 5.4 Unique Problems in CWM Site Remediation 5.4.1 Mycotoxins 5.4.2 Chemical Agent Identification Sets 5.4.3 CWM Contamination 5.4.4 Arsenic Contamination 5.4.5 Chronic Effects of CWM 5.5 Potential Chemical Agents That May Be Encountered 5.5.1 Known Chemical Agents 5.5.2 Nerve Agents 5.5.3 Binary Components 5.5.4 CWM, Smoke and Incendiary Abbreviations Found on Ordnance or in Reports (Old and New) 5.5.5 Identification of Munitions with Paint Intact 5.5.6 CWM Breakdown Products 5.5.6.1 Ions 5.5.6.2 Anions 5.5.6.3 Acids 5.5.6.4 Mustard

47 47 47 48 48 49 49 50 51 51 52 54 54 54 55 55 55 56 56 62 63 64 65 65 65 65 65

x

Contents 5.5.6.5 5.5.6.6 5.5.6.7 5.5.6.8 5.5.6.9 5.5.6.10 5.5.6.11

5.6 6

7

VX GA GB GD Lewisite Other Agent Breakdown Products Perchlorate Rocket Propellants and Explosives Known at AUES (1918) 5.5.7 Natural Poisons 5.5.7.1 Relative Toxicity of Natural Poisons 5.5.8 Experimental Toxic Substances 5.5.9 Less Toxic Chemical Fillers 5.5.10 Smoke and Incendiary Munitions 5.5.11 Sampling for Chemical Agents and Explosives Radioactive Facilities

65 66 66 66 66 66

67 67 68 70 72 73 73 74

Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices 6.1 Introduction 6.1.1 Determining Whether Buried Munitions and Explosives Are Likely 6.2 Burial of Chemical Weapons 6.3 Dumping Explosive and Chemical Ordnance Underwater 6.3.1 Charleston, South Carolina 6.3.2 Colts Neck Naval Pier, Earle, New Jersey 6.3.3 Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, and other Atlantic Coast Areas 6.3.4 Other Sea Dumping Events 6.3.5 Lake Erie

77 77

Ordnance Detection and Analysis 7.1 Introduction 7.1.1 The Importance of Researching the Latest Ordnance Detection Technology 7.1.2 Difficulties in Differentiating Between Ordnance Items and Other Debris

89 89

77 78 80 83 83 83 88 88

89 90

Contents

xi

7.2

90 91 91 91 92 92 92

7.3

7.4 7.5

7.6

7.7

7.8

8

9

General Types of Metal Detectors 7.2.1 Very Low Frequency Types 7.2.2 Pulse Induction Types 7.2.3 Radio Frequency Types 7.2.4 Cesium Vapor Magnetometers UXO Location Technologies 7.3.1 Brands Commonly Used for Ordnance 7.3.2 Some Detectors Can Detonate Fuses, Detonators, or Electric Blasting Caps Choosing a Metal Detector or Magnetometer 7.4.1 Conducting a Geophysical Prove-Out UXO Analysis 7.5.1 Pulsed Neutron Identification 7.5.2 X-Ray of Shells Other Geophysically Intrusive Techniques 7.6.1 Ground Penetrating Radar 7.6.2 Infrared Imaging 7.6.3 Sonar 7.6.4 Bioassay 7.6.5 Sampling Data May Help Locate Buried Ordnance 7.6.6 Arsenical CWM Biolocation Using a Fern How to Conduct a Correct Search for Buried or Range Impact Ordnance 7.7.1 Geophysical Search Plans Historical and Archival Data Sources 7.8.1 Archival Searches 7.8.2 Library Materials 7.8.3 Aerial Photography for Munitions Sites

Excavation and Removal of Ordnance 8.1 Excavating the Ordnance Item after Proper Identification 8.1.1 Personal Protective Equipment and Clothing 8.1.2 Robotics Recommendations 9.1 Basic Site Requirements 9.2 Time is Running Out

93 93 93 95 95 96 97 97 98 98 98 99 99 99 100 101 101 103 103 105 105 105 107 109 109 109

xii

Contents

Photo and Map Section Part 2

Case Study: The American University Experiment Station (AUES): A Formerly Used Defense Site

Introduction to Part II 10 A History of the American University Experiment Station (AUES) Site 10.1 Introduction 10.1.1 The Author’s Involvement with the AUES 10.2 The History of the AUES Site 10.3 The District of Columbia’s First Report on the World War I Poison Gas Production at the AUES 10.3.1 Why the First Two Cleanups Failed 10.3.2 Documentation of Original Research Work On-Site 10.3.3 Specific Structures 10.3.4 Dispersion Tests 10.3.5 Remaining Unexploded Chemical Ordnance 10.3.6 Burial Operation 10.3.7 Conclusion 11

Concerns over the Adequacy of Previous Remediation Efforts 11.1 Introduction 11.1.1 Inadequate Sampling 11.1.2 Health Impact 11.1.3 Environmental Impact 11.1.4 Over-Reliance on Expertise of Personnel 11.2. Concerns about Remaining Unexploded Ordnance and Chemical Containers 11.2.1 Over-Reliance on Expertise 11.2.2 Little Available Knowledge on World War I Experimental Ordnance 11.2.3 Experience Limited Due to Uniqueness of Site 11.2.4 Anomaly Review Board Protocols Excluded Laboratory Equipment Signatures 11.2.5 Equipment Limitations 11.2.6 Areas Not Searched 11.3 Community Right to Know

113 115 115 116 118 119 120 122 124 128 129 131 134

137 137 137 139 140 140 141 141 141 142 142 143 143 144

Contents 12 The District of Columbia’s Initial Success as a State Regulator on AUES 12.1 Success Results from Hard Work and Providence 12.1.1 The House Next Door 12.1.2 The Partnering Effort 12.2 Myths and Falsehoods Regarding the AUES 12.2.1 1995 No Further Action Report Problems 12.2.2 Small Laboratory Quantities of Toxic Material 12.3 The Glass Stopper 12.4 The Child Development Center at American University 13 The Continuing Search for Burial Sites 13.1 Many Clues Must Be Used to Find Burial Sites 13.1.1 Subsequent Report on a 1921 Article in a Campus Newspaper 13.1.2 Report of the Burial of Shells by the Civilian Conservation Corps 13.1.3 Findings 13.1.4 Recommendations 13.1.5 Burial Pit Found by Civil War Relic Hunter 13.1.6 AOI 17: The Hopeless Hollows Burial Areas 13.1.7 Historical Photographs 13.1.8 Historical Maps 13.1.9 Historical Documents 13.1.10 Previous Sampling Results 13.1.11 Previous Geophysical Results 13.1.12 Review and Evaluation 13.1.13 Lot 18 on the American University Campus 13.1.14 Aerial Photographs 14

Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site 14.1 Finding the Range Impact Areas 14.1.1 Westmoreland Circle Impact Area 14.1.2 Livens Projector Battery Impact Area 14.1.3 Dalecarlia Impact Area 14.2 Expanding the Boundary 14.2.1 New Boundaries

xiii

145 145 146 146 147 147 149 149 150 153 153 153 158 159 167 168 169 170 170 170 170 170 171 171 171 173 173 173 175 175 176 177

xiv

Contents 14.3

New Points of Interest 14.3.1 Background 14.3.2 Ground Scar at the Junction of Trails 14.3.3 Additional Concrete Bunkers, Magazines, and Explosive Chambers 14.3.4 Livens Gun Pit 14.3.5 Rows of Spots 14.3.6 Burial Sites for Leaking Shells 14.3.7 Old Mustard Field and Linear Testing Troughs 14.3.8 Linear Testing Troughs Erroneously Labeled as an Airstrip 14.3.9 Circular Testing Fields 14.3.10 Toxic Smoke Candles 14.3.11 Munitions Plants 14.3.12 Persistency Test Area 100 ft × 100 ft 14.3.13 Courier Explosives Burial Site 14.3.14 Debris Field at a Third Glenbrook Road Property 14.3.15 Anomaly Areas within the Dalecarlia Reservoir 14.3.16 The Rockwood Six 14.3.17 Sedgwick Vicinity Ground Scars 14.3.18 Pit and Trenches at 52nd Court 14.4 Aerial Photographic Interpretation

178 178 179 179 180 180 181 182 182 184 185 185 185 185 188 188 188 190 190 193

15 The Dangers of Lewisite and Arsenic 15.1 The History of Lewisite and a Speech by W. Lee Lewis 15.1.1 History of Lewisite 15.1.2 A Speech by W. Lee Lewis 15.2 Arsenic Contamination Cleanup 15.2.1 The Problem with Arsenic

195

16

203

Sampling Conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers 16.1 Secret Sampling for the AUES List Conducted by the Corps 16.1.1 Sequence of Events 16.1.2 Generic Comments 16.1.3 Specific Constituents 16.1.4 Comments on Risk

195 195 196 199 201

203 203 204 205 208

xv

Contents 16.1.5

16.2 16.3 16.4 17

Comments on Implications for the Spring Valley Project Effort to Deny the Existence of Additional Burial Sites Requests Directed to the Corps Requests Directed to the EPA

Conceptual Site Model for the AUES 17.1 Introduction 17.1.1 Writing a Conceptual Site Model 17.1.2 Adjusting the EPA’s Triad System Conceptual Site Model 17.2 Historical Records, Drawings and Maps 17.2.1 Boundary 17.2.2 Explosive Burials 17.2.3 Impact Areas 17.2.4 Persistency Test Area 17.2.5 Major Tolman’s Field 17.2.6 Tenleytown Station 17.2.7 Railroad Sidings 17.3 Aerial Photographs and Reports 17.4 Still Photographs 17.5 Toxicity and Exposure Data 17.6 Site Contaminant Data 17.6.1 Constituents Actually Found 17.6.2 Perchlorate 17.7 Geophysical Data 17.8 Geologic Data 17.8.1 Hydrogeologic Information 17.9 Residents 17.10 Other Environmental Receptors 17.11 Site Development Infrastructure Information 17.12 Anecdotal Information 17.12.1 Range Issues 17.13 Professional Conjecture 17.13.1 Toxic Metals Can Be Transformed into More Toxic Substances 17.13.2 Other Burial Sites 17.13.3 Burial of Shells by the Civilian Conservation Corps

208 209 210 212 213 213 213 215 216 216 216 217 218 218 218 218 219 220 220 221 221 223 224 225 226 226 226 227 227 227 228 228 229 229

xvi

Contents 17.13.4 17.13.5 17.13.6 17.13.7 17.13.8 17.13.9 17.13.10 17.13.11 17.13.12

18

Slonecker Pit Dirt from Glenbrook Road Benzo(a)pyrene Hot Spots Manganese Compounds Selenium Compounds Mercury Compounds Antimony Compounds Sulfur Compounds Chemical and Experimental Ordnance

Summary 18.1 Future Necessary Work at the AUES Site 18.2 Role of the States in Environmental Remediation of Military Sites 18.3 Conclusion

230 230 230 231 231 231 232 232 233 235 235 236 236

Appendix I

Major State Reports on the AUES

239

Appendix II

National Archives Record Groups With Military Information

241

Appendix III World War I Range and Ordnance Sites Likely to be Unknown to the Military Appendix IV Appendix V

243

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites

257

List of U.S. Military Ranges Worldwide

275

Bibliography

301

Index

317

Foreword In 1991 I wrote, in the introduction to a report called The U.S. Military’s Toxics Legacy: Imagine, for a moment, that a foreign nation has dispatched a band of terrorists to the United States. The intruders silently move across the landscape depositing toxic chemicals at a thousand sites around the country. Some of the toxic compounds quickly enter the rivers and underground reservoirs that supply America with drinking water. Other chemicals contaminate our neighborhoods and backyards where our children play. Still others sit like time bombs, destined to contaminate our water supplies after months, years, or even decades. The toxic chemicals carried by these enemies are the products of the most sophisticated laboratories on Earth. They cause birth defects, liver disease, and cancer. Their effects may be felt for generations. Unquestionably, if this imagined threat were real, we would turn to the Pentagon to combat this threat to our national security. After all, the Pentagon’s job is to defend the nation against outside enemies. But what do we do when the threat comes, not from abroad, but from the Department of Defense (DOD) itself? What if our own worst enemy is the same institution that is charged with defending us? We turn to environmental regulators like Rich Albright. I first met Rich in February 2001. I was in DC for a meeting, and a friend invited me to an Army Corps of Engineers-sponsored community meeting at Sibley Hospital, in the Spring Valley neighborhood in northwest Washington. This area, as Rich documents, contains a witches’ brew of old chemical warfare materiel, other hazardous substances, and unexploded ordnance left over from its days, during World War I, as the American University Experimental Station. The Army Corps had conducted an emergency response for this “Formerly Used Defense Site” in the early 1990s, declared victory, and moved on. But Rich Albright, representing the DC Department of Health, forced the Corps to begin a much larger investigation. This effort marched along slowly, under the radar screen of Washington’s hyperactive mass media, until January 2001, when it made the front page of Washington Post. High concentrations of arsenic—the active ingredient in many early chemical xvii

xviii

Foreword

weapons—had been found in soil around the American University Child Development Center. Between 250 and 300 people crowded the Sibley auditorium for the Army’s regular community meeting. Attendees included the wife of a U.S. Senator—who lives in Spring Valley—and scores of lawyers for the District’s high-powered law firms—all residents of the neighborhood. They were upset, but polite. A few were outspoken. They had many questions. In my work, I’ve visited dozens of communities in the U.S. that host active or former military installations and ranges. Spring Valley is near the top of the list, in terms of public exposure to really nasty stuff, as well as the political influence of its residents. So it’s one of the most active programs. But people at other former military facilities from the Aleutians to Puerto Rico are similarly concerned, with just as many unanswered questions. Overall, I think I’ve had a better experience than Rich with the Army Corps, the entity with primary cleanup responsibility at Formerly Used Defense Sites. I’ve found many Army Corps personnel and their contractors to be diligent and competent, though the constraints of funding and bureaucracy often get in the way. Still, one only needs to look at former U.S. facilities overseas, in places like Panama and the Philippines, to recognize the essential role played by environmental regulatory agencies such as the DC Health Department. I think few people are surprised when live munitions are found on old battlefields, such as the forests of Verdun, the jungles and rice paddies of Indochina, or the Kuwaiti desert. However, not many people recognize that the most bombs, shells, and grenades are fired in training or testing, while many more have been discarded en mass when they have become unserviceable or obsolete. Excluding active military ranges and ocean ranges, the U.S. has as many as 10 million acres of former military land ranges, containing tens or even hundreds of millions of live ordnance items. Some, such as “inert” practice rounds, could barely dent a bulldozer. Others, from 2,000-pound aerial bombs to artillery rounds containing aging mustard agent, are potentially deadly. It’s remarkable, in fact, that the number of civilian fatalities from such weapons since World War II—at least as reported by government agencies—is counted in the dozens. Despite all the sensitivity today to “weapons of mass destruction,” very few people recognize that all of the major powers stockpiled huge quantities of chemical weapons during World War II. After all, chemical munitions—similar to those tested at the American University Experimental Station—were used in the trenches of the Western Front during World War I. Miraculously, the advanced lethal chemical munitions of World War II

Foreword

xix

never made it into battle, but they have not disappeared. Most were buried on land or dumped at sea. Tens of thousands of small chemical agent identification sets, designed to train troops to recognize the smell of chemical weapons, were presumably disposed of at military bases throughout the U.S., using the technology of the time: land burial, without lasting documentation. The challenge of protecting the American people from our own weapons is formidable, but possible. Three things are necessary to address the little known but persistent risks of public encounters with old munitions and chemical warfare materiel: knowledge, will, and resources. Knowledge. The records of U.S. military activities during the two world wars were incomplete and many have disappeared. That’s understandable: Fighting a great war, it was hard to conceive of unknown environmental impacts decades in the future. Furthermore, none of people who participated in the World War I mobilization are still alive, to tell their stories. Still, it is possible for environmental sleuths like Rich Albright to guide current investigations using old records, aerial photos, and knowledge of how research, testing, and training were conducted. The Will. While many people in the Defense Department, environmental agencies, and Congress recognize the hazards posed by old munitions, others view the risks as relatively insignificant. It took a scary news story— the explosive death of two boys on a San Diego cul-de-sac in 1983—to start the Army Corps’ programs to investigate formerly used ranges. It took the report of arsenic at the American University children’s center to attract a crowd to Sibley hospital. We all know what it takes to get a stop sign installed at a busy intersection. Unfortunately, the crisis mentality only gets specific hazards addressed. Unless overall funding is increased, resources are diverted from other important projects. Resources. The Defense Department’s Formerly Used Defense Sites program has always been the poor stepchild among the U.S. military’s environmental programs, even though it is responsible for sites, like Spring Valley, where Americans are living, working, playing, and going to school. In its most recent annual environmental report, the Pentagon reported that munitions response is required, or may be required, at nearly 1200 former military facilities. Chances are that there are many sites that have not yet made it into the database. That same report estimates that the cost to complete munitions response (the cleanup up of live explosives, chemical warfare materiel, and related wastes) at those sites will total nearly $13 billion. What’s the annual budget for munitions response at Formerly Used Defense Sites? Usually about $90 million per year. At that rate, it will take 145 years to make land acceptably, but not completely safe.

xx

Foreword

Until the Defense Department and Congress budget adequate funds for timely response, the country must rely upon a handful of activists and environmental regulators to demands that the hazards be addressed. More pressure is necessary if the level of effort—higher at Spring Valley than most other sites—is to be expanded to match the risks. Otherwise, as more Americans come into contact with the legacy of preparations for past wars, people will be asking why we didn’t take action when we first recognized the danger. Lenny Siegel Executive Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight January 2008

Preface When the District of Columbia started cleaning up the first of 27 ordnance ranges, the project seemed simple. We had a small National Guard training facility with mortar and small arms ranges. Because the impact area was in a public park, we had to clean up the unexploded ordnance (UXO) immediately. It seemed like metal detectors and shovels would solve the problem in short order. Suddenly, we had liquid filled (chemical) shells being detonated on-site near a hospital. We had to find a truckload of buried ammunition. We had arsenic in the groundwater and lead in the soil. We had buried leftover poison gas used on the bonus marchers (Adamsite actually killed the pregnant wife of one of the veterans) and we had the potential of buried poison gas grenades stockpiled for the civil rights marchers. We had a buried Sherman tank. We had a “whites only” swimming pool buried so that black guardsman could not swim in it after integration (no pool, no integration). The pool was reportedly filled with barrels of waste oil, solvent, and paint. We had a 20-foot long auger, blown out of a monitoring well hole when it struck an explosive or ordnance item. We had a contractor and the Corps of Engineers Project Manager almost coming to blows in a public meeting over whether they had found four or five Livens drums (a large World War I chemical mortar shell). The previous Army Corps of Engineers Project Manager resigned and entered a seminary hopefully finding a life without lying about the gas shells. Did I mention polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)? The only thing we did not have was a secret society guarding firstcentury documents. But at least we had buried treasure—a railroad car full of bronze cannons and swords given to us by the French government after World War I, supposedly buried when the site was closed. With all these surprises at a benign National Guard Training Facility, what could be in store for local citizens or a state government trying to clean up a large military installation? I was soon to find out when I tackled my next site, what was once the American University Experiment Station (AUES), and which is today the neighborhood of Spring Valley, which by most accounts is now the worst Department of Defense weapons dumpsite in the country. There are approximately 25.1 million land acres and about 161 million water acres of ranges in this country. Estimates of the extent of military

xxi

xxii

Preface

ranges varies greatly. As Lee Davidson reported in 2004 (“Military Lacks Data about Test Ranges,” Desert Morning News, July 2, 2004.), The General Accounting Office (GAO) said different arms of the military used different criteria, assumptions and methods in their inventories, which ‘raise questions about the reliability’ of comparisons and cost estimates made using them. It said the Pentagon reported 10,444 operational ranges covering 24.6 million acres nationally in a 2003 inventory. But a 2004 inventory listed 353 range complexes and 172 individual ranges on 26 million acres worldwide. Sometimes the same arm of the military reported different numbers in separate inventories for the same ranges, it said. For example, one inventory said the Marine’s Camp Lejeune, NC, has 95,872 acres of rangeland, while a more recent inventory says it has 152,000 acres, even though the entire installation covers 153,000 acres. Another example is that the Marine’s Camp Pendleton, CA, was listed having 39,084 acres of range in one inventory, and 114,000 acres in a more recent one—a threefold increase. I wrote this book as a guide for those who are trying to clean up these ranges, whether they are experienced environmental scientists, Explosive and Ordnance Demolition (EOD) personnel, or the farmers next door. Because of the surprises I encountered at the National Guard facility, I also included many experimental compounds more likely to exist only at a few experimental sites like university research laboratories, Fort Dietrich, MD, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD, Porton Downs, UK, or Lakehurst, NJ. Although at the start of World War I and World War II we were so seriously behind in the arms race, any of the poison gases or explosives listed herein could have been tested at any range. It is my intention that this book will also provide a valuable reference tool for those charged with protecting us against dangerous chemicals and explosives in the fight against terrorism. One of the reasons that the Chemical Weapons Ban Treaty only included an odd half-dozen compounds is because many substances listed in this book as effective chemical weapons are also used in industrial and agricultural operations. Many are available for sale to terrorists over the Internet. Terrorists in Iraq are now using chlorine, a common drinking water disinfectant, as a poison gas with tragic results. That same gas sits unguarded on railroad sidings near many American cities.

Preface

xxiii

The book will be useful to first responders and elected officials because many of these lesser-known chemical weapons are manufactured, used, and shipped in large quantities through their respective populated areas. Scarcely a month goes by in which a train or truck wreck does not release some dangerous chemical. If a spilled chemical is listed in this book as a poison gas, it may guide the official accident response in a more protective fashion. Transportation placards only tell part of the story. Even industry officials may also be ignorant of the origin and danger of some materials. Proper planning and legislative actions require knowledge of the nature of the problem. Did you know that nicotine was tested as a poison gas by the military? Indeed, the lead compound added to gasoline for many years—now an environmental disaster—started out as an experimental chemical weapon. That same lead compound has impacted the lives of tens of thousands of inner-city kids and environmentally damaged millions of urban and rural acres along highways. Perhaps elected officials would have asked for more study if they knew that a chemical weapon was being added to gasoline. Did you know that a substance originally used in pet flea collars and the fly killer once dangling in the nursery is a “sarin-like” nerve gas? Indeed, the flea collar that your kids rubbed when they petted the family dog was once blamed by the military as the cause of the Persian Gulf Syndrome because the soldiers also wore flea collars. Therefore, this book may be useful to government regulators when deciding whether or not to approve a new pesticide, food additive, fertilizer, or other substance. For all these reasons, I wrote this book. Richard D. Albright Grasonville, MD January 2008

Acknowledgments WITH THE HELP OF OTHERS Many people contributed to my success with the American University Experiment Station (AUES), or Spring Valley, and thereby indirectly to this book. This list is in a time sequence of some of the main players. Don Campbell was the first. Don is an industrial hygienist, with a master’s degree, very experienced in health and safety and author of several works on the subject. He was always there for me to vet the ideas in the first report on Spring Valley. Don and I shared an office with the sign dumb and dumber over the door. Colleagues would ask who was who? To which we answered that we were too dumb to figure it out. The question was finally answered when Don got a good paying federal job. Nicholas Kauffman also provided valuable insight over the years. After finishing my first report, I met informally with the Corps of Engineers. I suggested that the Spring Valley site would have had a dump for an operation with 1900 people. I reasoned that every time a high school chemistry class met, someone broke a piece of glassware, i.e. a test tube, thistle tube, etc. 1200 chemists must have broken a lot of stuff. At this meeting, Mark Baker, the Corps’ historian said that they had a picture of a dumpsite. The Army eventually sent me a copy of the photo. If it hadn’t been for Mark Baker’s admission, the Corps probably wouldn’t have reopened the investigation. A photo, it turns out is worth 12,000,000 dollars a year, the current American University Experiment Station (AUES) cleanup budget. The photo it turns out was part of a collection supplied by Eric Olsen from the Natural Resource Defense Council. After reading about Spring Valley, he remembered that his aunt had photos in the attic taken by his ancestor, Sgt. Maurer, who worked at the AUES. He gave copies of the photos to the Army, but they did nothing to try and locate the pit or anything else shown in the photos, including cases of Stokes mortar shells. Eric Olsen turns out to be the real hero in the Spring Valley saga. His contribution was the lodestar that led to the reopening of the site. Dr. Harvey Sloan was head of the District of Columbia Department of Health at this time. He quickly appreciated the hazards to human health evident in my first report. He arranged for a full-blown meeting with EPA and the Corps together with the acting city administrator, Michael Rodgers, and various deputy mayors. I presented my findings and the EPA and the

xxv

PART I THE CLEANUP OF CHEMICAL AND EXPLOSIVE MUNITIONS

1

Cleaning Up Old Munitions Sites

1.1 A Primer on the Science and Concepts of Cleaning Up a Range Site There are two types of warfare ordnance that we search for on a range site—chemical and high-explosive—and sometimes these are combined. Most chemical warfare material (CWM) exists in the form of a liquid that vaporizes at normal temperature. In the manufacture of poison gas and loading shells, the gas is refrigerated to a liquid, much like how alcohol vapor is cooled down to a liquid when making moonshine in a still. The liquid is then poured into drums, bottles, jugs, barrels, or shells. (One exception to the liquid CWM is chlorine or arsine, which, when filled into shells, exists as a compressed gas.) When a chemical shell is fired and strikes the ground, a sensitive fuse— usually in the nose of the shell—detonates. The shock wave causes an explosive inside the shell to detonate. For a chemical weapon, this is a small “burster” charge in a pipe or tube in the middle of the shell, designed to just open the shell up or clamshell it. Open to the air and splashed about, the liquid agent then vaporizes, aided by the heat of the explosion. For a high-explosive shell, the explosive charge is the entire cavity of the shell or bomb, except for shrapnel balls that may line some shells. When a fuse fails to detonate—as often happens with ordnance—the shell or bomb is called unexploded ordnance (UXO). The shell remains full of CWM until it rusts through, releasing the agent. If the UXO were a high-explosive round, the explosive becomes increasingly unstable with time and presents an explosive hazard that could be triggered by the vibrations of a lawn mower or being hit with a shovel. Even properly stored munitions can sometimes spontaneously detonate. Many magazines over the years have simply blown up one day. Such an incident happened in the early 1990s when a Navy magazine exploded in White Oak, MD, scattering shells about the neighborhood; which are still being found to this day. Whether as single UXO or buried en mass in a pit, UXO is usually located by means of a metal detector or magnetometer, the latter only finding magnetic metals like iron and steel. The process is called a geophysical search and, when a signal is given off by the instrument, its cause is called an anomaly. However, metal detectors are problematic. Often they cannot tell a large deep object, like ordnance, from a small shallow object, like a 3

4

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

flashlight battery. In a residential area, there are many pieces of construction debris, like piles of nails or pieces of pipe. On a range, there are plenty of fragments (frag) from shells that have detonated. Both debris and frag further confuse the geophysical search. Other technology includes ground penetrating radar, microgravity, and shear wave. These can locate glass bottles and voids, which cannot be found with metal detectors. Ground penetrating radar is not suitable for heavy clay soils, like those found in Spring Valley in Washington, DC. Shear wave and microgravity are quite new. Finally, sampling for breakdown products from CWM or explosives can also help find burial sites. Volatile compounds like acetone would be expected to evaporate after many years. When they are found, it provides some evidence of a continuing release, such as a bottle burial site. Aerial photographs (covered in Chapter 7) can show test areas, disturbed ground caused by a burial, or impact craters showing an area that was shelled. Because most chemical agents kill vegetation, bare spots called ground scars, shown on aerial photographs taken over a period of years, may show CWM burial sites. Because nitrate explosives contain compounds also used in fertilizers, conversely lush areas (dark-toned on aerial photographs) may show sites with explosives present. Historical documents can provide clues to where burials or contamination are likely. Most of the experiments at the American University Experiment Station (AUES) were recorded and often included a diagram. For example, if there were only two or three sets of circular trenches and if the experiment shows a circular trench, this narrows down the location where it occurred. If the experiment indicates that two shells did not fire, one can conclude that there may be a burial site for UXO near the trenches. Historical documents may suggest what contamination to include in a search.

1.2 A Historical Background of Old Munitions Sites This section explains briefly why residents, stakeholders, and regulators must understand the historical background of a site. Examples of how and where to find and use historical information is covered in more detail in Chapter 13, and the Appendices. In years past, land would sometimes be leased by the military for training and other purposes. This often happened during wartime or when the mood in Congress did not favor a large expenditure of money for the military to buy land. When these leases expired, the land reverted to the owner.

1: Cleaning Up Old Munitions Sites

5

Complicating the matter, the military sometimes used land that was not leased or accidentally extended their training operations to adjacent unleased land. After all, who knows exactly where you are in the woods at night. Now, the once-routine burial of munitions and UXO casually left on ranges and training courses is coming back to haunt the Department of Defense (DOD). Not long ago, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states also saw ordnance as a military responsibility. Whereas the military has significant ordnance experience, that experience does not translate into environmental remediation experience. The military’s ordnance experience does not include knowing the health effects of the contaminants that might remain in the soil or groundwater, what clearance efforts must be undertaken to be legally defensible, how to use aerial photographs to find burial sites, and other scientific techniques. Likewise, private remediation firms are not used to dealing with substances that are designed to kill. States, local governments, and the EPA can no longer abdicate their responsibility for the cleanup of military sites. Because of this recognition, the federal government has sought to prevent such casual range transfers with a flurry of legislation and regulations. Indeed, for the past 15 years Congress has passed legislation aimed at giving state and local governments a say in military and federal environmental remediation. In addition to historical information about the particular facility, it is important to study the history of the particular timeframe that the base was active. Sites that came and went with a particular war are the most difficult to deal with because their records may be lost or were poorly kept due to the pressure of getting troops trained quickly for overseas duty (“90 day wonders”). The site may never have made a map of where the range was located.

1.3 New Requirements for Old Munitions This section reviews some of the legal drivers for munitions cleanup. The actual statutes and regulations are not included but should be read in detail by officials charged with the responsibility for the cleanup. As with most environmental cleanups, science and technology control the process. However, there may also be legal requirements, so the best scientists and engineers may fail if they do not pursue knowledge in other disciplines. Two new guidance documents, the Final Military Munitions Rule promulgated by the EPA (62 FR 6622, February 12, 1997), and the EPA and DOD’s “Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at Closed, Transferred, and Transferring (CTT) Ranges,” help create a systematic approach to the UXO problem. In addition to these, the DOD has

6

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

instituted much thought and discussion to the problem of UXO and ranges. The DOD is supporting the Interstate Technology and Regulatory Council (ITRC). The ITRC operates as a state-led committee of the Environmental Research Institute of the States, which also funds the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS). The ITRC has teams that produce guidelines dealing with small arms ranges, UXO, and perchlorate. (The author serves on these teams.) The ITRC also deals with non-military contaminants of concern, such as methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE).

1.3.1

Final Military Munitions Rule

The EPA’s Final Military Munitions Rule (62 FR 6622; February 12, 1997) essentially classifies UXO as solid waste once it is disposed of or is no longer intended for its original purpose. Conceivably, everything from war souvenirs to duds previously disposed of are now classified as solid waste and therefore regulated. The importance is not so much in what form the munitions must be in to qualify as solid or hazardous waste, but rather that states as well as the EPA now have more authority over munitions under their Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, also known as “Superfund”) of 1980 statutes. Many states have adopted variations of the Munitions Rule. Whereas the Munitions Rule inexplicably excludes duds (UXO) on ranges, some states are savvy enough to vary from the EPA’s version as it applies to ranges. The Munitions Rule also exempts past ordnance disposal sites such as burials and underwater dumps. Again, smart states are adding these areas (where appropriate) to their own versions of the Munitions Rule.

1.3.2 Management Principles for Implementing Response Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges On March 7, 2000, the EPA and the DOD signed an agreement pending promulgation of the Range Rule. This agreement begins with “State and Tribal Participation.” Obviously, this recognizes the growing tendency for state and local governments to become involved in what was formerly a “military problem.” The agreement states, “In many cases, a State or Indian Tribe will be the lead regulator at a CTT range.” Clearly, the EPA and the DOD anticipate the propriety of an increasing role for state and local governments.

1: Cleaning Up Old Munitions Sites

7

1.3.3 The Nonexistent Range Rule Though now hopelessly withdrawn, the Range Rule still had some good ideas that could be copied for range cleanups. The Range Rule stressed the need to examine the entire range after a range assessment/accelerated response (RA/AR) is completed. The Range Rule stated, Range Evaluations (REs) are detailed investigations of the military munitions employed on the military range, the other Constituents believed or known to be present, and the environmental setting . . . This information collection often is a complex, long-term effort (e.g., groundwater monitoring) that demands careful planning before its execution. This phase includes evaluation of site safety, and potential human health and ecological impacts. RE examples include, but are not limited to: (1) Military ranges where chemical munitions were employed and where the RA/AR process shows a potential exposure from a chemical agent release. (2) Military ranges where land use or the degree of public access is incompatible with the condition of the range following the RA/AR process. (3) Military ranges with a reasonable potential for contamination of surface water or groundwater that is in excess of applicable standards and which is a potential source of drinking water. The Range Rule has since been withdrawn, and there are indications that it will not be reintroduced. Even if the Range Rule is never promulgated, the environmental restoration of ranges and other sites likely to contain UXO is mandated under CERCLA, RCRA, and other traditional state and federal statutes and regulations.

1.3.4

Chemical Weapons Convention

In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention (1993) mandates requirements for chemical demilitarization. Congress began that effort in earnest with the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act (PL 102-484), directing the Army to identify the locations, types, and quantities of all non-stockpile chemical materiel, explain disposal methods, estimate costs, establish a schedule for their destruction, and discuss transportation alternatives. Nonstockpile CWM includes buried CWM, binary chemical weapons, recovered chemical weapons, former production facilities, and miscellaneous CWM. As of 1997, the non-stockpile program director stated that all the recoveries would fit in the trunk of his economy car. I told him he should get a

8

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

bigger car. This slow pace was due to a moratorium on excavating chemical munitions, which was not lifted until 1994, and the lack of record-keeping or mapping of disposal sites. In short, there is little interest in finding and unearthing old chemical munitions under the treaty. Such munitions were never intended to be used and the treaty probably covered them as a catchall condition. Nevertheless, shrewd states are using the treaty as an impetus to cleaning up old CWM sites. One caution is that only a handful of chemical agents are included in the treaty. Tests for CWM conducted by military components will usually only include this handful, whereas many more agents have been found in World War I stockpiles or at experiment stations. For example, phosgene and arsine are used for industrial purposes and were omitted from the treaty, yet they should be sampled for at chemical weapon sites because both are present in our current arsenal.

1.3.5

Base Realignment and Closure Act

The Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) of 1990 requires a large number of military bases to close for good. BRAC further stresses that efforts should be made to reduce the impact on local economies. One of the easiest ways to do this is to offer the bases for development or parkland. Portions of the bases may have roads as well as water and sewer systems already in place and can be turned into residential subdivisions. Some bases or parts of bases may be suitable for industrial parks, which can replace the jobs lost by the base closure. Many bases contain vast pristine acreage, which can be used for public recreational purposes. Such usage can spawn a tourist industry that also helps to replace jobs and business lost by the base closure. However, these pristine areas usually contain ordnance and explosive waste (OEW) in burial or disposal areas, or UXO on former ranges and training areas. Funds are available under BRAC to assist state and local regulators in the cleanup of these military sites. The UXO is often located on top of the ground or very near the surface. This presents an extreme hazard to camping, hiking, hunting, fishing, and other human uses. Therefore, states should make UXO clearance a priority.

1.3.6

Defense Environmental Restoration Program

The Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) also provides funding for Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS), which allows the state and local regulators to hire additional personnel to oversee cleanup.

1: Cleaning Up Old Munitions Sites

9

Many of the sites listed in the following sections on chemical and explosive munitions would qualify as FUDS sites.

1.3.7

Primary Purpose of the New UXO Rules

As more military installations and ranges are closed and transferred to the private sector pursuant to BRAC, the likelihood of tragedies from UXO increases. While reading this text and in the actual site remediation, the reader is urged to keep in mind the inherent dangers of UXO. The new munitions requirements are a logical attempt to address these potential dangers and place the onus on the party that created the hazard in the first place. One important aspect of this regulatory scheme is to empower the EPA, states, and local governments with oversight responsibilities, thus stripping the cloak of secrecy (and denial) from the DOD. The Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 2002 required the DOD to establish a program and protocol for the prioritization of sites containing munitions and explosives of concern (MEC), releases of hazardous substances, and CWM. Each of these aspects has a distinct scoring module within the Munitions Response Site Prioritization Protocol (MRSPP). These are titled the Explosives Hazard Evaluation (EHE), the Human Health Evaluation (HHE), and the Chemical Hazard Evaluation (CHE), respectively. The MRSPP was finalized through federal rulemaking on October 5, 2005, under 32 CFR Part 179. Additional information on the prioritization protocol can be found online at http://www.denix.osd.mil.

2

Limitations and Expertise in Remediating Munitions Sites

2.1 State and Local Regulators Need to Develop Their Own Expertise in Remediating Munitions Sites This chapter identifies the limitations the various official parties to a cleanup action have. It is not intended as an indictment of incompetence but rather as a reminder of the strengths and weaknesses of the players. Of course, this book is designed to teach, refresh, remind, or supplement the knowledge gaps of each of the major players in addition to serving as a crash course for those who do not know a 105 shell from an abalone shell. State and local governments must realize at the outset that the military lacks experience in many aspects of environmental remediation and even in munitions clearance. For example, until 1994 there was a moratorium on the excavation of chemical weapons. UXO technicians may also be unfamiliar with residual contamination from chemical and explosive weapons. Even with explosive ordnance, mistakes can occur. Recently a scrap metal worker was killed when an ordnance item that was hidden among other ordnance scrap metal exploded while being cut up for scrap with a torch. Another area where the military lacks ordnance experience is in World War I and older ordnance and in experimental ordnance. The database of the U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center in Huntsville, Alabama, is often incomplete in these areas. Military environmental cleanup is heavily controlled by the accountants. This is partly due to the fact that the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) sounded like a permissive budgetary authorization instead of the extension of CERCLA, which it is. State and local governments were only authorized to receive payment for a specific set of functions. This list is too restrictive to promote adequate oversight. As an example, many large military establishments have still not begun a preliminary assessment or a site investigation of their entire facility. A few competent state programs did address leaking underground storage tanks or other specific problems on military facilities. Some facilities have adopted strict handling practices (i.e., the pharmacy concept) for hazardous materials. However, military facilities largely have not yet begun to clean up past pollution, and therefore lack expertise in this area. 11

12

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

Part of the delay in starting serious environmental cleanup at military facilities was due to a series of environmental assessments done in the late 1980s and early 1990s that uniformly decided that no further action was necessary. These preliminary assessments were self-serving documents that were completed according to military “guidelines” that were designed to minimize the need for environmental restoration. In spite of this, these preliminary assessments often contain valuable information on the history of a site and the probable location and type of contaminants. For the Navy, these studies were done pursuant to the Navy Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants (NACIP) Program. For the Army, some of these reports were done in accordance with Army Regulation 200-2 and National Environmental Policy Act Guidelines. These reports are generally honest in reporting past disposal practices based on interviews with current and former employees. They also contain detailed information about past facility operations. However, the people making these reports seldom—if ever—took soil, groundwater, sediment, or surface water samples and accordingly did not address the cleanup of past contamination, simply overlooking it. Also, many military facilities made the mistake of putting the environmental responsibilities in the facility engineering office. For example, Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) responsibility is placed with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. These are the same folks who drained the Everglades, suggested channeling the Mississippi River into a large sewer, and built the New Orleans levees. Staff in these engineering offices typically lack academic training in environmental science, health science, and law, training that is necessary to know what to do in the area of environmental remediation. At the base level, dumps, disposal drain lines, and other environmental nightmares were often designed or sanctioned by the facility engineers, and there is a built-in reluctance to identify environmental problems created by the same office now charged with cleaning up the mess. Finally, environmental cleanup is not in the mission statement of any of the military branches. The head environmental officer for some branches of the service is not even a general officer. This is magnified at the DOD level because there is no “Undersecretary of Defense for the Environment.”

2.1.1 Examples of the Military’s Lack of Experience in Environmental Cleanup This statement is not intended to belittle the military but to suggest to states, local governments, EPA contractors, or residents involved in ordnance cleanup to watch their backs. A recent example is Spring Valley, located in

2: Limitations in Remediating Munitions Sites

13

Washington, DC. This upscale neighborhood, with homes currently ranging from one half to four million dollars, was built over World War I’s second largest chemical weapons facility. Workers have broken bottles of CWM, ordnance burials have been unearthed during excavations, and dangerous levels of contamination—such as arsenic—have been found on university athletic fields, a daycare playground, and many residential yards. Residents have reported many rare illnesses. One resident found a live white phosphorus shell and had it sitting on his fireplace hearth as a souvenir. Due to a lack of expertise, the Army and the EPA spent $20 million studying the site and issued a “no further action” decision in 1995. The author wrote an extensive report, excerpts of which are contained in Ch. 10. This report was critical of the Army’s expertise and required more work to be done on the Spring Valley site. The Army orally and in its written response denied that it lacked such experience. Now that it was forced to reopen the site and excavate several more burial sites containing chemical weapons and material, it has posted a website acknowledging that this was the first such site it had ever cleaned up. It seems that the Army did not even know that it did not have experience in this area. Another $80 million has since been spent, and 650 more shells and 350 bottles of CWM and other reagents have been found to date in the second effort. Arsenic contamination on 10% of the properties needed to be cleaned up; and now the parties agree that cleanup is just beginning. Clearly, a lack of environmental experience was responsible for the premature closure of the site. Spring Valley is also listed as the worst site in the country by the DOD. How many more Spring Valleys are out there? The author has accidentally located numerous potential munitions burial sites and FUDS in other states during historical research on his own FUDS projects. The Army’s lack of experience in UXO is especially noteworthy at sites that may have been involved in experimental work, especially during World War I when record-keeping was at a minimum. For example, during ordnance clearing operations at another site (Camp Simms in Washington, DC), the Army took the position that if an x-ray of the projectile did not show a liquid line, it was not chemical. It took extensive documentation to convince them that there were many solid chemical agents such as Adamsite, powdered magnesium arsenide, and pumice mixed with phosgene that may have been tested on the site. (Solids were developed to penetrate the World War I German gas masks.) Again, that same mistake—the absence of a liquid line—was made at Spring Valley and three compressed arsine gas shells were sent offsite as a solid arsenical. In another instance at this same range, the Army identified a Livens projectile as an incendiary weapon because it had a drawing of one in

14

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

the archives at Huntsville, Alabama, that was labeled “Pyrotechnic Division.” Contrary to the name, this division did all the toxic chemical testing at the nearby American University Experiment Station (AUES, or Spring Valley). The type in the drawing became the only toxic shell loaded after it was developed. The fact that it may have started out as an incendiary projectile appears to have been only happenstance, and the superior design was promptly adopted for liquid toxic agents. The author is of the opinion that the military should adopt a formal system of notifying its ordnance personnel, schools, centers, and contractors of such discoveries, much like the auto industry sends out recall notices or warnings to owners and mechanics. In another example of the lack of experience, the Navy was forced to call a retired officer back to active duty to oversee the cleanup of a site put on the National Priorities List (NPL) because this person was the only Navy officer with an environmentally related degree. It turned out to be a wise move because this retired submarine skipper was able to get an NPL site off to a good start.

2.1.2 The EPA Also Lacks Experience in Some Regions with Military Issues The EPA often picks its project managers for military facilities from its federal facilities branch. Because the federal government is normally not involved in manufacturing, most civilian federal facilities are office buildings or, at worst, a print shop. Even where their project managers are from the hazardous waste side, factories normally do not make products designed to kill people. It is not surprising then that the EPA lacks the expertise to oversee the sampling of chemical weapons or the magnetometer clearance of a range site. Only very recently has the EPA begun conducting training courses for project managers in military problems. To compensate for its lack of knowledge regarding military site contamination, the EPA regions often hire a retired military officer to act as liaison with the military facilities undergoing environmental restoration. This is an example of the fox guarding the hen house. States must recognize that as good as the EPA may be on industrial sites, military sites require specialized knowledge, which the EPA is unlikely to possess at the local region. Also, in recent years there has been a concerted effort in Washington to dramatically cut the EPA’s budget. Fortunately, the agency survives. However, states should not rely on the EPA for having a taste for creating controversy by ordering a military base to spend $100 million for environmental restoration. Of course, there are some EPA regions (e.g. EPA

2: Limitations in Remediating Munitions Sites

15

Region 10) and many individuals who are well versed in military issues. Also, the EPA’s Solid Waste unit in its headquarters has a senior engineer with extensive range remediation experience.

2.1.3

Barriers Unique to Military Site Remediation

“Loose lips sink ships” and similar slogans have long been dear to the military. Therefore, regulators should not expect the military to come clean with information suggesting past practices that may have produced contaminated sites. Recently, the Department of Justice refused to prosecute individuals who withheld information on the contaminated wells at Camp Lejeune near Jacksonville, North Carolina, from the users of the wells. Whereas the decision has some legal support due to the vague nature of the laws, it will serve to continue the shroud of secrecy regarding military contamination that will lead to many future deaths and illnesses among U.S. citizens and military families. Once outside the presence of his supervisor, a factory worker will often spill the beans. Many regulators intentionally send two inspectors to an industrial site so that one can keep the management busy while the other strikes up friendly conversations with the employees. How fortuitous it seems when the regulator comes back to sample and coincidently finds the dumpsite. The same technique may not work with the military because of the training in keeping military secrets. One recent example involved the cleanup of Camp Simms. Here, the military kept secret the fact that they found a chemical shell. Indeed, the contractor and the Corps of Engineers argued publicly in front of the community’s Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) as to whether four or five shells were found. (RABs are encouraged by the military to allow the citizens’ input into the restoration work at their site.) Later, another chemical shell was excavated. The workers were not wearing respirators and chemical suits. The World War I shell breached while being moved, sending a stream of CWM into the air. Fortunately, the shell had leaked most of its contents and probably only contained a bromine agent of lower toxicity, saving the workers. The Case Study included in Part II contains excerpts of actual reports written by the author in the course of an exhaustive archival study and is presented as an example of what could be done by the state at the beginning of an environmental restoration project. Nevertheless, the author is continually shocked by information that still dribbles out of the military regarding the site. After the report was submitted, the military admitted during the next two years that it had a photograph of a CWM burial, a newspaper story indicating a large-scale munitions burial after the site was

16

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

closed, and an extensive aerial photo report done by the EPA seven years before the first munitions were discovered. They did not admit for years that their own intelligence summary suggests another munitions burial site at the location identified by the author and confirmed by the EPA from other aerial photographs. In another example, the State of Maryland has a public park that was formerly a Civil War fort. At a meeting with the U.S. Park Service, which owns the site, the Corps of Engineers representative stated that the military found a map (sketch) showing munitions burial pits in a line. A geophysical survey confirmed the presence of ferrous metal anomalies compatible with the map. The State of Maryland has been trying to get a copy of that map for over a year at last report. Apparently, the sketch has been so closely held by Huntsville that it was never made part of the FUDS file at the Corps of Engineers. Moreover, the existence of some information regarding munitions burials must exist or Huntsville would not have flown a UXO technician with a metal detector to the site in the first place. The District of Columbia also tried recently to get a copy or even a description of the suspected burial to see if it matched an anecdotal reference to the burial of munitions from one of their sites, which may have occurred in an adjacent facility. This information might have closed an ongoing investigation. That same military representative now states that, “I don’t know about any map.” The National Park Service had consented to the geophysical survey and has been apprised of its results. We are not talking about a UFO here— this is information that both states have a legitimate interest in knowing. Again, it is important for states, cities, local governments, and native tribes to assign an expert to assess all work being done by the DOD on a chemical or other weapons site. Money is available in grant form pursuant to the DERP 10 USC Section 2701 et seq. (1991 amendments to CERCLA). Grant funding may also be available under the Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988 (102 Stat. 2623) and the Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 (104 Stat. 1808). Ideally, such expertise should include the ability to research historical documents; knowledge of military ordnance and operations; a background in environmental health science or epidemiology; knowledge of chemistry; and knowledge of the biology of the area (i.e., marine, desert, and so on). Rarely will one person have all these skills, so team building is an important aspect. It is important to keep in mind that chemical weapons and explosives are designed to kill people. Even in the worst-case scenario in industrial site remediation—such as Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York— the contaminants are by-products and often do not rise to the same level

2: Limitations in Remediating Munitions Sites

17

of toxicity. Even where the contaminants of an industrial site are the same as those of a CWM site (i.e., phosgene or arsine), the concentrations or quantities may be lower or less pure. Thus, even the extensive experience of a contractor in hazardous material (HAZMAT) remediation may not be sufficient for these chemical agents. Many respected certified laboratories cannot analyze for CWM. At the Spring Valley site, a contractor dug up some bottles and sent them to a respected environmental laboratory in the area for analysis. The lab director mentioned that one bottle smelled like chromic acid. He was surprised to learn that we suspected both bottles contained CWM. A little knowledge may be dangerous if it produces overconfidence.

3 The Extent of the Munitions Problem 3.1 Introduction This chapter summarizes some of the data on the extent of the munitions problem. It is impossible to keep it up to date, as the time to publish a book is lengthy. It would be safe to assume that the actual sites are much more numerous than the numbers presented here. The final report resulting from the 2002 Defense Appropriations Study should be more accurate, but it is not likely to be available until after this book goes to print. On information and belief, even that study will miss substantial World War I training sites listed in the Appendix.

3.2 Extent of the Munitions Problem Generally Various estimates have placed the requirements for the ordnance clearance and CWM destruction contemplated under the previously mentioned mandates at between $60 billion and $100 billion. This expenditure is already producing significant contracting opportunities. It is the purpose of this work to enhance the safety, technical ability, and cost-effectiveness of contractors, federal, state and local regulators, military personnel, and other stakeholders in remediating these dangerous sites. Obviously, the cost contemplated above is dictated by the extreme threat to the health and safety of humans potentially coming into contact with munitions and CWM. For example, according to Donovan Webster’s excellent article, “The soldiers moved on. The war moved on. The bombs stayed,” since 1946 over 630 French experts have been killed trying to clear the battlefields of munitions. In 1991 alone, 36 French farmers were killed. There are 4000 FUDS ranges according to the DOD, and there are 16,000 ranges worldwide. Table 3.1 lists the number of military bases and sites in each state or territory that potentially contain UXO and CWM sites as of March 1997, according to the DOD. The author believes the numbers are much higher than these because countless universities and smaller private companies produced munitions and CWM and are not included in the tally. For example, Michigan has no CWM sites listed, but according to The Story of the Development Division (Chemical Warfare Service, 1920), “Under this arrangement the work at 19

20

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

Table 3.1 Military Sites with Potential UXO or CWM

FUDS States Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Delaware Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania

5 12 42 6 102 6 5 6 53 7 30 6 8 2 3 30 2 8 18 9 39 11 0 14 7 4 19 6 2 15 119 17 14 0 5 9 13 9

Active

BRAC

CWM Burial

7 9 7 4 54 9 4 1 19 14 18 2 7 4 1 4 3 6 4 11 7 6 2 9 4 5 3 4 3 7 4 17 6 6 4 7 2 9

1 1 1 1 7 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0

5 9 3 11 3 1 0 0 8 4 5 1 4 3 0 1 2 4 0 9 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 4 0 5 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 1

21

3: The Extent of the Munitions Problem Table 3.1 Military Sites with Potential UXO or CWM (cont’d)

FUDS

Active

BRAC

CWM Burial

Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming

7 11 13 3 70 5 0 6 6 3 0 8

1 8 0 7 22 4 2 26 3 3 4 2

0 0 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0

0 3 4 2 4 45 0 1 1 0 0 0

Territories Guam Oceana Puerto Rico Virgin Islands Washington, DC

8 6 4 1 57

3 0 4 0 7

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 9 2

FUDS: Formerly used defense sites BRAC: Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990 CWM: Chemical warfare material

Midland [Michigan] proceeded, and by August 20th an entire plant for the production of mustard had been developed and operated successfully on a five-ton-unit [per day] plant scale.” On that same page, seven soldiers were reported burned with mustard gas in May at this plant. The plant was suddenly abandoned in August due to a more efficient way of making mustard gas. In the author’s experience, when a site is rapidly abandoned, CWM is buried. Because this plant was under the control of a Colonel Dorsey, it is a Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and should be on the list. Many of the university sites produced both explosives and CWM. Further, all World War I private companies making munitions or chemical agents were under control of the War Department and consequently qualify as FUDS. These are generally unknown to the military. Finally, a report to Congress in 1919 listed all the leases in World War I. It appears that leases were taken out of the military property records section to compile this report and some leases were never returned. (In the author’s experience,

22

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

the military property records section is usually quite accurate except for World War I sites.) A current DOD list contains 600 priority sites. In addition, the DOD recently released the names of nearly 400 sites where atomic weapons research was conducted. The latter is in addition to the previously cited worldwide list from DOD which contains 16,000 sites, and the FUDS list for the US, which contains 4000.

3.3

Land Mines

The installations listed in Table 3.2 have reported land mine sites. It is generally unknown whether these sites are disposal sites, training sites, Table 3.2 Sites with Reported Land Mine Activity

Fort Meade, MD

Tipton Airfield Patuxent Research Refuge North Tract Inactive Landfill #2

Fort Houston, TX

V.A. Cemetery Stonewall Jackson Field Old Pershing Range Camp Bullis Cantonment Area

Fort Riley, KS

Forsyth/Custer Hill Main Post/Marshall Field Whilside Funston

Jefferson Proving Ground, IN

South of Firing Line North of Firing Line

Polk, LA

EOD Range SELF Airfield

Pueblo Chemical Depot, CO

Area South of B Block

Red River Army Depot, TX

Northwest Surveillance Function

Savanna Depot, IL

Savanna Army Depot Activity

Seneca Army Depot, NY

Ordnance Destruction/LTA 7 Grenade Range/FTA 2

Sierra Army Depot, CA

Honey Lake Demolition Range

Umatilla Chemical Depot, OR

Quality Assurance Function Range

3: The Extent of the Munitions Problem

23

security perimeters, or test sites. In some cases, the names will suggest which type of site exists on the facility. This list does not include cluster bomb range sites. Some cluster bombs essentially act like mines in that they are small and scattered about. (The bomb separates during flight and separate bomblets with wings like dandelion seeds drift down over a wide area.) The coffee-mug sized bomblets may be fused to detonate later or upon movement, thus acting like anti personnel mines. A photo of a cluster bomblet is shown in the center photo section (Photo 11).

3.4 Munitions Burials by the Civilian Conservation Corps Often anecdotal evidence is received by a state’s environmental office. Nevertheless, the military will not normally accept the statements of a retired employee or resident that an event requiring remediation occurred years ago. This is a good place to use archival research. For example, in February 1993 a phone call was made by a Mr. Ian MacFee to the District of Columbia alleging that the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) buried French 75-mm mustard gas shells in 14 pits in the District of Columbia. The caller stated that he worked for a Lt. Wray Noel. Using the National Archives, the author was able to confirm that a Lt. Wray Noel was attached to the Third Corps CCC operation and, more importantly, that his first tour as a Second Lieutenant ended on July 4, 1937. He finished Reserve Officer training at Fort Meade in Maryland on or about May 3, 1935. Therefore, if the information provided by the phone call is correct, the alleged burials had to occur between May 3, 1935, and June 19, 1937, based on the dates Lt. Noel was on active duty. Mr. Ian MacFee indicated that he worked out of an office in Luray, Virginia. The author was also able to confirm that there were five CCC camps in Luray, including Camp Roosevelt and Camps NP-1, NP-2, NP-10, and NP-12. The caller also indicated that munitions burials occurred at Aberdeen, Maryland, and at the Old Navy Radio Station in northern Virginia. The author was able to confirm that CCC range work occurred at Aberdeen Proving Ground and that range work was requested at Langley Field, Virginia. The Navy was involved in the research at Spring Valley and shells were tested at Langley Field. The Radio Station was adjacent to Ft. Meyer and there was a 75-mm Howitzer Battery located there. It is plausible that shells were left over from that Battery and were buried at the Radio Station.

24

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

The author’s research also found a request by the CCC for an Ordnance Captain from Aberdeen to assist with a special project. Further, it is well documented that the Ordnance Department used men and funds from the emergency relief programs instituted in the 1930s. In a multi-volume series on military history by the military history section, the volume entitled, Planning Munitions for War—The Ordnance Department: 1919– 40 (1959), the authors state: Then as Congress realized the severity of the depression, it again cut ordnance funds . . . Fortunately, the financial picture after 1932 was less somber than the official figures of Ordnance appropriations suggest. The extensive emergency relief program that the Roosevelt administration launched in 1933 benefited the Department greatly . . . The Roosevelt administration stressed projects that employed large numbers of men rather than expensive equipment, and much of the repair work at Ordnance installations fitted admirably into that category. From the Civil Works Administration, Ordnance received about $1,390,000, mostly for the pay of laborers . . . Though this labor force taken from the rolls of the unemployed was usually unaccustomed to Ordnance assignments and suffered many physical handicaps, it accomplished valuable work that must otherwise have been or left undone. In the March 25, 1934, budget of the Chemical Warfare Service, there is a description of Project 22, the Edgewood Chemical Warfare Depot (Bush River Project): The condition under which large quantities of toxic gases, spontaneously inflammable materials and high explosives have been stored at Edgewood Arsenal (in the Edgewood Chemical Warfare Depot) have contributed to a serious hazard to life and property for a number of years past, and efforts have been made by this office to correct this situation by segregating all these dangerous stores in an isolated part of the reservation where they can be housed in fireproof buildings suitable for the purpose, and stored in accordance with the approved practice prescribed by the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board. This matter has been carefully studied by a War Department Board appointed under the provisions of Special Order 214, War Dept. Sept. 12, 1931, and subsequent orders and the whole project has been approved by the War Department under date October 20, 1933 by 15 Endorsement AG 600.12 EA 3-29-32 Misc. D.

3: The Extent of the Munitions Problem

25

and has also been included as an item under the War Department Technical Construction Program submitted to the Public Works Administration [PWA] . . . However, should funds not be provided by the PWA for this project it is urged that it be included as a new project of the CWS for FY 1936. (National Archives RG 175 E-4 Box 2) The Bush River project in Maryland buried chemical shells (probably policed up from the ranges) and bottles of mercury in the low cliffs at the water’s edge. These are now eroding out. It is clear that the CCC and the related PWA were tapped for chemical ordnance disposal projects at Aberdeen, as indicated by Mr. MacFee and the supporting documentation. It is also clear that the leftover World War I chemical munitions were in a dangerous state by 1931. The previous example also indicates the need to sometimes look beyond the time frame that a facility operated, as a burial of contaminated material or munitions could have been made at a later date, and to also look at records of other organizations that may have had a connection with the site.

3.5 Extent of the Explosive Munitions Problem This section identifies some of the other military munitions sites likely to be excluded from official lists but which are problematic nevertheless. As explained previously, the modern relationships in the military–industrial complex prevent World War II and later manufacturing sites from being included as military FUDS. For the reasons listed, this was not true in World War I, and these sites will be missed in the military survey. As with chemical munitions, in addition to Table 3.1 many other facilities produced or handled explosives for the military during World War I. During World War I, all facilities manufacturing ordnance, CWM, or explosives were under the control of an officer. (Some sites in World War II were similarly under the control of an officer.) These sites therefore qualify as FUDS. For example, in FMC Corp. v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843 (3d Cir. 1994), a federal appellate court held that the federal government had substantial control over a facility producing war-related products during World War II because, among other things, the government determined what product the facility would manufacture and controlled the supply and price of the facility’s raw materials and, thus, could be considered the operator of the facility under CERCLA. Also see FMC Corp. v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 786 F.Supp. 471, 486

26

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

(E.D. Pa. 1992), where the federal government ownership of installations, equipment, and pipelines associated with a high-tenacity rayon plant made the government liable as an owner for cleanup costs; and E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. United States, 365 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004), where the federal government was liable for CERCLA costs under an open-ended contract indemnification clause in the contract with the owner and operator of the ordnance plant.

3.5.1

Storage Depots

At the end of World War I, there were 22 military storage depots. This number was rapidly reduced to 16 over the next several years: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, NJ Delaware General Ordnance Depot, Wilmington, DE San Antonio Arsenal, TX Augusta Arsenal, GA Benicia Arsenal, CA Ogden, UT Savannah, IL Curtis Bay, near Edgewood, MD Nansemond, near Norfolk, VA Charleston, SC Rock Island, IL Wingate, NM Erie Proving Ground, OH Columbus General Supply Depot, OH New Cumberland General Depot, PA Schenectady General Depot, NY

Many of these were ordnance depots during the war. Only the five Atlantic Coast depots, along with Ogden and Savannah, continued as ammunition depots after the war. Any World War I depot should be suspected of having CWM if only by accident, as there were extensive stockpiles of munitions returned from the battlefields. As ordnance deteriorates, it must be disposed of properly. Also, many World War I guns and mortars were replaced over the next two decades, rendering many munitions obsolete, such as the Stokes and Livens mortars. Much World War I small arms ammunition was corrosively primed, rendering it undesirable. Fuses were improved and standardized around 1930, rendering still more ammunition unserviceable. Much of this obsolete ordnance was buried during this time frame and is even more

27

3: The Extent of the Munitions Problem

dangerous today because of toxicity and the hypersensitivity of its explosive filler.

3.5.2

Manufacturing Facilities for Explosives

3.5.2.1 Toluol Trinitrotoluene (TNT) was one of the primary World War I explosives used by the United States. During the war, the United States bought all the Chilean sodium nitrate and still needed more nitrate. The United States turned to toluol as the main raw material for producing the quantity of TNT needed, as it was cheaper and more readily available. Some toluol was produced in by-product ovens by the distillation of coal by the companies listed in Table 3.3. In addition to these companies, toluol was also extracted from gas, which only marginally reduced the efficiency of gas for home use. The following city gas companies extracted toluol: • • • • • • • • • •

New York, NY Brooklyn, NY Boston, MA New Haven, CT Albany, NY Utica, NY Elizabeth, NJ Washington, DC Detroit, MI St. Louis, MO

Table 3.3 Coal Distillation Companies and Their Production of Toluol

Coal Distillation Company Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., Pittsburgh, PA Sloss-Sheffield Co., Birmingham, AL United States Steel Corp., Clairton, PA International Harvester Co., Chicago, IL Rainey-Wood Co., Swedeland, PA Seaboard By-Product Co., Jersey City, NJ Pittsburgh Crucible Steel Co., Midland, PA

Toluol Production (lbs/yr) 5,770,160 2,019,556 2,308,064 1,586,794 2,163,810 1,081,905 2,019,556

28

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions • New Orleans, LA • Denver, CO • Seattle, WA

Extensive contamination has been found at the toluol extraction gas site in Washington, DC, including dinitrotoluene. Some of the groundwater samples vary extensively, indicating that containerized explosives, precursors, or munitions may have been buried on the gas light site. Ironically, this site is next to the Washington Navy Yard, and dinitrotoluene is a component of bag powder. Was the toluol being converted to bag powder? Toluol was also extracted from petroleum. The General Petroleum Company of Los Angeles, California, built two plants, one in Los Angeles and one in San Francisco. Each produced about 3,000,000 pounds of toluol per month. Lastly, toluol was produced at Neville Island, Pennsylvania, and at the Standard Oil Company in Bayonne, New Jersey. It is unknown whether any explosives were manufactured at the toluol refining sites. 3.5.2.2 Nitrates Nitrates are necessary for most explosives. As noted, the sodium nitrate exported by Chile during World War I was insufficient to meet the wartime nitrate need. Therefore, nitrogen fixation efforts occurred, as well as experimentation with perchlorates, in addition to the extraction of toluol. 3.5.2.3 Nitrogen Fixation The government established nitrate plants at Sheffield and Muscle Shoals, Alabama, at Toledo and Cincinnati, Ohio, and at the AUES in Washington, DC. Nitrogen fixation required the use of a catalyst, usually powdered iron, and was added to a furnace. The iron reacted with the oxygen in the hot air (i.e. rusted), leaving nitrogen. Many metallic catalysts could have been used at any of the nitrogen fixation facilities. Most troubling is a 1927 inorganic chemical book reference to uranium as one of the catalysts used. About 7% of natural uranium is radioactive with a 12,000 year half-life. Therefore, World War I nitrogen fixation sites should conduct a radio assay because a sizable percentage of uranium ore is radioactive. 3.5.2.4 Other Explosive Precursors Phenol was needed to produce picric acid, an explosive relied upon primarily by our French allies. Sulfuric acid was needed to produce powder. Both hazardous materials were produced in large quantities.

3: The Extent of the Munitions Problem

29

3.5.2.5 Powder Manufacture Smokeless powder from mills was sent to bag-loading plants. Woodbury, New Jersey, Tulleytown, Pennsylvania, and Seven Pines, Virginia, had plants designed to fill 20,000 bags of powder a day. (Larger field and naval guns, bigger than 4.7 inches in caliber, had the powder stored in bags separate from the projectile.) In World War I, the Delaware Valley had so many powder manufacturing plants that there was fear a German destroyer would come into Delaware Bay and shell the plants. Therefore, a defensive shore battery (with up to 12-inch guns) was established at Lewis, Delaware. These plants likely left extensive explosive contamination. 3.5.2.6 TNT Production The government’s biggest TNT plants were at Giant, California, and Racine, Wisconsin. As the town name implies, the plant at Giant was set up to produce 2,000,000 pounds of TNT per month. Two other TNT plants blew up during World War I—Aetna Explosives Company at Oakdale, Pennsylvania, with several hundred killed and Semet-Solvay Company at Split Rock, New York, with 60 killed. 3.5.2.7 Ammonium Nitrate Production The Ordnance Department built a plant at Perryville, Maryland, operated by the Atlas Powder Company, which produced 452,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate per day. Also, the two nitrogen fixation plants at Muscle Shoals and Sheffield, Alabama, were set up to fix nitrogen in the form of ammonium nitrate. 3.5.2.8 Picric Acid Production Picric acid was made for the French government. It was also used to produce Explosive D (ammonium picrate) and chlorpicrin, a chemical warfare agent. Picric acid crystallizes into yellowish grains that are extremely shock sensitive. A small bottle was found at a military laboratory in DC. Chemists decided that it was too sensitive to move and brought in a robot to drill a hole through the bottle so that it could be neutralized. Another bottle was found at the University of the District of Columbia and was taken out to an athletic field for detonation. The U.S. government built three picric acid plants: the first at Picron, Arkansas, operated by the Davis Chemical Corporation; the second at

30

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

Savannah, Georgia, operated by the Butterworth-Judson Corporation; and the last at Grand Rapids, Michigan, operated by the Semet-Solvay Company. 3.5.2.9 Tetryl Production Tetryl was the main explosive used in boosters and detonators (fuses) for shells, as well as blasting caps. Expanded tetryl production was carried out by the DuPont Powder Company and the Bethlehem Loading Company. The government also built a tetryl plant at Senter, Michigan, operated by the Atlas Powder Company. 3.5.2.10 Tetranitroaniline Production Tetranitroaniline (TNA) was used by the Russian government as a booster and fuse explosive. Aetna Powder Company produced TNA for Russian export at its plant in Noblestown, Pennsylvania. The plant exploded, ending our only source for this explosive. A new plant was built at Bound Brook, New Jersey, operated by the Calco Chemical Company. 3.5.2.11

Fulminate of Mercury Production

Three plants produced 50,000 pounds per month of fulminate of mercury, a major explosive used by the United States in caps, primers, and detonators: the DuPont plant at Pompton Lakes, New Jersey, the Atlas plant at Tamaqua, Pennsylvania, and the Aetna plant at Kingston, New York. Obviously, the mercury content makes these three FUDS primary candidates for remediation. 3.5.2.12

Nitrostarch Production

Nitrostarch was used as an explosive because it did not use the same precursor chemicals as TNT or amatol. The Trojan Powder Company at Allentown, Pennsylvania, produced up to 1,720,000 pounds per month. It was used in the 3-inch Stokes mortar and in hand grenades. DuPont also made a form of nitrostarch called grenite. Nitrostarch is a flour-based explosive often mischaracterized by EOD personnel as a flour-filled inert round instead of a high-explosive round.

3.5.3

Experimental Explosives

Many different explosives were tested. Attempts were made to produce explosives in World War I that would also produce toxic gases or fumes. Other explosives that used cheap and plentiful raw materials were also in demand. Finally, many of the fuses or detonators in shells malfunctioned, and

3: The Extent of the Munitions Problem

31

explosives were sought for use that would more surely detonate on impact but not detonate upon handling or firing. Lyconite, various chlorates and perchlorates, azides of lead, strontium and thallium, and hydrazine nitrate were tested. Much of this work occurred at the AUES, but many of these private companies also had laboratories where this experimentation took place. 3.5.3.1 Anilite Anilite, a French explosive used in World War I, became the most important of the toxic explosives. Anilite was a new explosive composed of a mixture of a nitrobenzol and liquid nitrogen peroxide. It is far more powerful than TNT and is considerably less expensive to manufacture. Its sensitivity to shock may be varied at will by varying the properties of the constituents. The addition of carbon tetrachloride made it possible to obtain a phosgene content of 91% in the gases released on detonation (40% was the amount determined in actual tests with the explosive effect equal to or greater than TNT). Anilite production ceased after 1924 because it was felt that the greater explosive power dispersed the toxic phosgene too much to create a sufficient concentration to be lethal. Also, it was too shock sensitive to be a safe military explosive. Reducing the shock sensitivity correspondingly reduced the power to more nearly equal TNT, thus eliminating any advantage. Most of the anilite was reportedly buried at the AUES as it was thought to be more practicable to have separate shells for explosives and toxic gas. However, the Navy did continue with the notion that explosives and toxics could be mixed in the same shell because even a high-explosive shell with gas exploding after penetrating a ship’s hull would not disburse the gas below an effective concentration because of the confines of the ship. It is unknown whether the Navy used anilite but it would have met their desire for explosive and toxic combinations. Thus, some experimental shell might still be buried at Aberdeen or other experimental stations. The Navy ordered that ten percent of their shells should be filled with anilite, prior to 1924. 3.5.3.2 Perchlorates The first military use of perchlorates as an explosive was as a filler for a German shell in World War I, when conventional explosives ran short, as a filler for gas grenades because it had a predictable rate of burn, and as pyrotechnics for communication before the age of field radios and rockets. (A paragraph in the Treaty of Versailles banned Germany from possessing rockets.) Since World War I, the military has used thousands of tons of perchlorate compounds.

32

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

By World War II, perchlorates were used mostly for solid rocket motors, which account for most of the emerging perchlorate problem in this country. Besides rocket fuel, perchlorates are used in 3-inch and 4.2-inch mortar shell illumination rounds, perimeter illumination booby traps, artillery simulators used in training, signal flares, smoke pots, artillery tracers, and railway torpedoes. The following perchlorate compounds have been used by the military: • • • • • • • • •

Ammonium perchlorate Perchlor chloracetophenone Perchloromethyl mercaptan Perchloromethyl carbonate Perchloroethylene Perchloromethyl sulphide (sulfide) Perchloromethylchloroformate potassium perchlorate Silver perchlorate Sodium perchlorate

3.5.3.3

Hydrazine Nitrate

Hydrazine nitrate is about the third most powerful explosive known. With a shock wave between 28,000 and 29,000 feet per second it warrants careful consideration. Although never used as a military explosive, it is used as a binary rocket fuel and thus may exist in considerable quantities at some military sites. 3.5.3.4

NDMA

Nitroisodimethylamine (NDMA) is a rocket fuel. It is toxic in drinking water in parts per trillion! When the space shuttle Columbia burned up on reentry in 2003, NASA warned people not to touch pieces of debris because of this fuel. The widespread contamination from this chemical is just now being realized.

4

Explosive Ordnance

4.1 Danger From Explosive Ordnance This chapter should be read by all, even by the Explosive and Ordnance Demolition (EOD) experts. Military training often deals with current ordnance and does not account for changes in explosives over time. Also, experts often become numb to the dangers with which they work. It cannot be stressed enough that there is a big difference between 20-year-old ordnance and 100-year-old ordnance, the latter being much more sensitive. Target shooters and hunters using muzzleloaders think nothing of carrying a pound of black powder in the trunk of their car. That same pound of black powder from the Civil War era could well detonate on the first bump.

4.1.1

Hypersensitivity of Old Deteriorated Explosives

Lead azide was a common ingredient in primers and fuses from the time of the Civil War and most certainly can be encountered in older burial sites. When lead azide is encased in a copper container (primer cap, percussion cap, or blasting cap) and water gets into the container, copper azide, a hypersensitive compound, can form. Some Civil War rounds (i.e., the Schenkel) contained a musket cap inside the round with an inertia-driven slide hammer to detonate the round on impact. All musket caps used in the Civil War were made of copper and some had lead azide. The Bluejackets’ Manual (US Navy, 1940) states, “Powder stored for a considerable period in a leaky container is likely to deteriorate rapidly, with the attendant danger of spontaneous combustion.” Because Navy bag powder contained smokeless powder with a charge of black powder at the end placed next to the primer, it is not known whether this comment referred to either or both types of powder. However, the Manual continues: “Smokeless powder which has been wet from any cause whatever must be regarded as dangerous for dry storage.” War Department Technical Manual TM 9-1904, Ammunition Inspection Guide (March 2, 1944) states, The dangerous nature of explosives makes safety the major consideration in their destruction. They are made immeasurably more dangerous by deterioration because the sensitivity of such 33

34

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions explosives is usually increased. Safety must not be sacrificed for cost reduction and speed. There are cases on record of explosions, which destroyed property worth much more from the standpoint of dollars and cents and the time necessary for replacement than could be saved through several years of relaxation of certain fundamental safety rules. This is to say nothing of the lives that were lost and could not be replaced . . . There is a tendency among personnel to become less respectful of explosives upon observing that rough handling does not always result in an explosion. It should be remembered that explosives are fickle and when treated in certain disrespectful ways will respond violently.

Thus, both an Army and a Navy manual suggest that at least two types of explosives likely to be encountered become hypersensitive or may even combust spontaneously. The Manual continues: “Ammunition inspectors may sometimes be called on to destroy duds . . . Amateurs should leave duds strictly alone because components that have failed to function are extremely dangerous to handle. They should not be moved but should be destroyed wherever found, if practicable.” Moreover, fused or not, aging explosives can create their own increased hazard. In fact, many common military explosives of the World War I and later eras will certainly develop hypersensitive crystals when they age and become very shock sensitive. Essentially, the crystals grow larger over time and become more sensitive in this process. The greater danger for a single UXO munition is not that these crystals spontaneously detonate but rather that they will get so sensitive that a lawn mower, leaf blower, or other common tool could detonate the munitions. Any explosive that will weep liquid exudate can grow crystals. For example, trinitrotoluene (TNT) is a common filler in explosive shells. The Bluejackets’ Manual states, “TNT exudate is explosive and highly flammable. Therefore the outsides of cast TNT containers shall be kept free from exudate, and it shall not be allowed to accumulate on decks nor come into contact with wood, linoleum, or other materials into which it will soak. TNT exudate shall be removed before it hardens.” War Department Field Manual FM 9-40, Ordnance: Unexploded Bombs Organization and Operation for Disposal (1943) states for lead azide, “Sensitivity . . . varies with crystal size . . . Large crystals detonate spontaneously.” Sensitivity concerns over crystal size is compatible with the manufacturing process for lead azide in which dextrin or polyvinyl alcohol is added to inhibit crystal growth during the precipitation stage.

4: Explosive Ordnance

35

(See Explosives by Rudolph Meyer.) FM 9-40 also states for TNT, “Impurities may cause exudation. This is undesirable because of probability of low order detonation and increased sensitivity to shock of the explosive.” The Range Rule also confirms this problem with deterioration of explosive fillers. It states, “As they deteriorate over time, some explosives may form sensitive crystals that could detonate if subjected to heat, shock or friction. Chemical munitions contain toxics that present additional safety risks. High explosive fillers, deteriorated explosives, and chemical munitions are a few examples of Military Munitions where the filler itself requires special safety considerations, even if the fusing mechanism is no longer capable of firing.” Recently, someone had the not-so-great idea of using old military explosives for mining, thinking that reuse or recycling was better than disposal. A serious accident occurred when these explosives prematurely detonated! While building the Panama Canal, many workers were killed when a carload of dynamite got “soft” in the hot sun and detonated. Dynamite at that time contained sawdust soaked in nitroglycerine, which would weep out unless the cases were constantly rotated. Similarly, a carload of stannic chloride grenades detonated in the summer heat while sitting on a railroad siding at the Edgewood arsenal after World War I. Many old explosives factories, now abandoned, have crystals growing on the steel doorjambs. A dark hallway illuminated with a flashlight will provide a spectacular display of the crystal problem. The doorjambs condense moisture like a bathroom mirror. The moisture absorbs nitrates from the air, which grow into crystals. Old perchlorate, often used as a fuel in rockets, has the specific risk of spontaneously combusting (burning). Rockets containing nerve agent in the nose now run the additional risk of simply taking off if the perchlorate catches fire. Monitoring has documented a steady increase in temperature in old rocket motors. The problem is magnified by the fact that the nose cone containing the nerve agent cannot be detached from the rocket motor.

4.1.2

How Explosives Work

Explosives simply burn. They contain a fuel, which combines with oxygen, and they simply burn faster than the wood in a campfire. They do their damage primarily because of the large expansion of gas as well as the heat that results from the burning process. A simple explosive like black powder is a mixture. The oxygen source is potassium nitrate, and the fuel is charcoal with sulfur added to aid the burning. Flour and air is even a simpler explosive but powerful enough to blow a grain elevator apart. Even the most modern explosives still use a

36

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

partial mixture, such as adding a reactive powdered metal like magnesium or aluminum to the explosive. Nitroglycerine and later TNT were early explosives in which all the necessary elements were in one molecule. Because the fuel and oxygen source are in one molecule, it can burn faster than a mixture. In essence, TNT has a faster detonation rate of 22,600 feet per second than, say, black powder at 1500 feet per second. Thus, explosives like TNT are casually referred to as more powerful, although that is an imprecise term. In truth, explosives cannot be measured by a single factor. Detonation velocity is the speed of the reaction. Brisance is the ability to fragment (i.e., the shell casing); it is a combination of density, heat, detonation rate, and gas volume released.

4.1.3

Blow in Place

Because of a recognition that old explosives become more sensitive, and of course that munitions that did not detonate on the range usually have fuse damage, the current military mandate is to blow the shell in place or, as the author says, “as is where is.” Of course, this again requires the caution for chemical rounds. In 2004, a 75-mm round was dredged up from Delaware Bay and found its way into a driveway along with the clamshells. An EOD team from Dover AFB (very experienced and cautious people, from my experience with them) blew the round in place. Just picking up the frag resulted in a month-long hospital stay for one of the team due to very bad mustard burns. See Photo 12 in the photo section. The American Rifleman notes an interesting variation of blow in place. Apparently, the Norwegian Army has been using the fine Barrett 50-caliber rifle to detonate mines and UXO up to 155 mm. Apparently, the armorpiercing rounds penetrate the ordnance item and reliably detonate the explosive fill. This could allow for the rapid and low-cost disposal of ordnance on the surface of a range. This author would add a word of caution about ricochets because a 50-caliber round can take out a vehicle at 2000 meters. As for mines, the danger lies in locating and digging them. Using bioluminescent bacteria to detect the mines might allow for the shooting of the mines at night from an elevated position, without ever having to walk in the minefield.

4.1.4 Toxicity of Explosives In addition to the detonation danger, many ordinary explosives and breakdown products are toxic. Dinitrotoluene (DNT), for example, is carcinogenic. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has a

4: Explosive Ordnance

37

number of toxicological profiles on explosives. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) has a field guide that lists the toxicity values and illnesses caused by over 400 compounds including common explosives. These documents provide specific levels of the different substances that will impact human health. This factor is important for areas where explosive munitions are shipped for detonation when they cannot be detonated on site. Also, it behooves range clearance personnel to put the toxic effects of UXO detonation in their safety plans. In truth, the toxic residue from military munitions in drinking water, soil, surface water, and air present a far greater hazard to more people than an accidental detonation on an old range. Toxic substances can also escalate up the food chain rendering that big bass harmful to eat. Many common foods are contaminated with perchlorate because plants were watered from contaminated rivers or wells.

4.1.5

UXO Masquerading as Inert Practice Rounds

Much newer ordnance, such as rockets, are sometimes painted blue and used for training. They may be inert but do not forget the propellant, as one contractor found out when cutting a long practice rocket in half with a torch for transport to the junkyard in 2001. The two halves flew around the base for some time. It is a little like gathering wild mushrooms. You may know what a safe puffball looks like. The range may be full of blue painted 3.5-inch rockets. But the little young stunted destroying angel may have grown in the clump of puffballs. That rusted 3.5-inch may become your destroying devil.

4.1.6

UXO Claimed to be Inert

In the past, some EOD personnel often told civilians that the ordnance recovered was inert. These innocent “white lies” comforted the civilians and made the military look better. However, because the emergency EOD units usually deal with the ordnance item that was unearthed and do not initiate a full-scale cleanup, this practice of deception throws other governmental agencies, like the EPA or state, off the track and can result in very bad stuff still buried. Also, EOD training is often incomplete. For example, it is usually given by one branch of service for their ordnance and only for current inventory items. Thus, EOD teams responding to a call for assistance from police may encounter ordnance unfamiliar to them (i.e., the Dover AFB EOD encountering a World War I field artillery 75-mm mustard shell).

38

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

There are also practice bombs. In the author’s experience, they were seldom used. Indeed, many of the current confrontations over closing active ranges result from the resounding military chorus that they must practice with live ordnance. There is a logical synapse between ordnance called inert when found by civilians and the need to practice with live ordnance. Two types of explosive filler can be confused with inert fillers. Recently, eleven 500-pound bombs were found buried in a Baltimore shipyard. They were examined and determined by EOD personnel to be filled with cement. (Perhaps this was a logical conclusion, as only an idiot would bury 500-pound bombs in a shipyard. Then again, digging holes is a good job for someone of lower intelligence.) At any rate, amatol looks exactly like concrete. The only field way to tell the difference is to gently break off a piece, take it a little away, and light it. (Hint! Concrete does not burn.) Nevertheless, there was no report that such a test was performed on these bombs. Videotape the burn-test for your trial, in case you decide to call them concrete, and ship them away to the local dump. Nitrostarch was also used in wartime as a bomb explosive. It looks like flour; in fact, it is flour with the additional spice of nitrogen. And some spice it is! Funny how words like “cement and flour,” often used to describe inert ordnance, bring to mind other words like “liars and fools.”

4.1.7

Expect the Unexpected with Ordnance

I repeat certain points in case someone skims this book or only reads certain chapters. Many ranges may have been used for other experimental ordnance development during wartime, or simply to expend some old but serviceable ordnance for a training exercise. A mortar range is just as good a place to test out an old bazooka as anywhere else. A very experienced ordnance contractor—a former artillery colonel with a Ph.D. in Chemistry, Tom Jenkins—was cleaning up a remote howitzer range. The several mile morning dirt road trip in the jeep was made more fun by that one bump in the road, over which they could clear all four wheels. After finishing the range, an air geophysical survey of nearby areas for stray rounds found one anomaly. The bump in the dirt road turned out to be a 200-pound live fused bomb.

4.2 Explosive Contamination This section deals with the unique properties of explosive contamination. Most explosives are toxic, particularly in drinking water. The older the site, the more explosive residue will enter the groundwater. Even explosives

4: Explosive Ordnance

39

considered insoluble will eventually be found in groundwater. Also, explosives may break down into equally toxic compounds. Military laboratories, arsenals, and manufacturing facilities working with explosives often leave residual contamination from a variety of processes. Currently, these sources of contamination are disposed of by return to the manufacturing process, open burning on the ground or in trays, open detonation on the ground, and underwater detonation. Prior to modern environmental regulation, these wastes were often buried or disposed of in the water or soil. In addition, many explosively configured shells detonated on a range have left chunks of undetonated explosive on the ground surface. Many of the explosives compounds from decades ago are still present in the soil and groundwater. As of 1997, the Army noted over 80 sites with groundwater contaminated with explosive wastes. Dinitrotoluene (DNT), trinitrotoluene (TNT), high melting explosive (HMX), and royal Dutch (or demolition) explosive (RDX) are typical examples. Breakdown products and isomers from the list in Section 4.2.3 are also found. For example, contamination was recently noted in the aquifer at Cape Cod, Massachusetts, requiring the Air Force to supply the residents with bottled water. The contamination at Cape Cod was discovered by an environmentalist who noticed chunks of undetonated explosive while touring the range. That forced the Air Force to drill some groundwater monitoring wells and, to everyone’s surprise, the aquifer was contaminated with RDX. The Bickford case in Utah illustrates the dangers of explosive contamination. Four out of seven individuals exposed to RDX and RDX intermediates (nitrosamines) for about six to seven years from contaminated private wells have contracted non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma; one has already died. The levels of RDX were about 60 parts per billion (ppb) in their wells when it was discovered, and the RDX plume is about three miles long. In addition, they watered their food crops with RDX-contaminated water. RDX tends to show moderate bioaccumulation in plant tissues, particularly in the leaves. Surface water has also been contaminated by explosive residue. Pink lagoons are now infamous around explosive plants. Many of the explosives also produce toxic vapors when detonated. This is a frequent problem for miners and other explosives users working in confined spaces. The toxic vapors and fumes must be cleared before reentering the mine after using many common explosives. The extent of vapor contamination near old ranges or explosive burial sites is largely unknown. In addition to the explosives, lead, mercury, cadmium, and other toxic metals from the shell casings or fuze compounds may also be present. According to the Military Toxics Project, “The toxic explosive compound RDX was found in drinking water supplies in civilian areas in the late 1970s. In 2000, excessive levels of mercury were found in the hair

40

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

and fingernails of 45% of Vieques residents tested. Vegetables and plants growing in civilian areas are highly contaminated with lead, cadmium, and other heavy metals. From 1985–1989, Vieques children aged 0–9 were 117% more likely to contract cancer than children of the same age on the main island of Puerto Rico. Children aged 10–19 were 256% more likely to contract cancer. A 2001 study found that Vieques residents are 73% more likely to suffer from heart disease than residents of the main island, 64% more likely to develop hypertension, 58% more likely to have diabetes, and 18% more likely to be diagnosed with asthma.” (http://www .miltoxtroj.org/munitions_and_ranges.htm)

4.2.1 Methods of Treating Explosive Contamination in Groundwater Currently, several methods are in use for treating explosive contaminated groundwater. The first injects Fenton’s reagent into the ground. This rapidly destroys a great variety of chemical compounds, including explosive compounds. However, extreme care must be taken to insure that no munitions or bulk explosives are buried in the vicinity of the reagent injection. Fenton’s reagent could initiate an explosion in those circumstances. Another advantage of this injection system is that it also remediates the soil. However, it won’t deal with heavy-metal contamination. The second remediation technique pumps the groundwater along with hydrogen peroxide, ozone, or peroxone into vertical metal cylinders or tanks. At one demonstration project, the process took groundwater contaminated at 50 ppb and successfully cleaned it to 2 ppb. This may be more suitable for smaller sites. The third method simply uses an active carbon filtration system on the groundwater. Here again, filtering an explosive waste must be monitored carefully to avoid reaching a dangerous concentration in the filters.

4.2.2 Methods of Treating Explosive Contamination in Soil Soil contaminated with TNT, RDX, HMX, or picric acid (ammonium picrate) can be bioremediated. One method involves composting the soil by mixing it with manure, sawdust, and so on. The same microorganisms and fungi that cause organic material to rot will “eat” the explosive contamination. The soil–manure mixture must be stirred and watered every few days to bring in oxygen. Some methods lay down perforated pipes and pile the mixture on top.

4: Explosive Ordnance

41

4.2.3 Sampling for Explosives and Breakdown Products As noted, many explosives are wholly or partly water soluble. Groundwater and surface water, such as ponds or lakes, should be sampled. Detection limits should be very low because the concern is not only whether or not the water exceeds EPA or state limits but also, as water (ground or surface) flows downhill, potential burial or UXO areas may be found by tracking trace levels of explosive contaminants back uphill. Finding and removing the source may be more important initially than arguing over whether the levels in the groundwater or pond exceed regulatory limits. Trace amounts of contaminants provide one set of clues in the search for munitions. Sampling should also include any nearby storm sewers as explosives always find their way into storm sewers, according to Tom Jenkins. Recently, sampling inside the ventilation system at an AUES building found perchlorate levels so high there was fear that the ducts would explode during the removal process. Sampling for explosives should include the following explosives and breakdown products: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Nitrobenzene 2-Nitrotoluene 3-Nitrotoluene 4-Nitrotoluene 1,3-Dinitrobenzene 2,3-Dinitrotoluene 2,4-Dinitrotoluene (usually from bag powder, 10% from TNT) 2,5-Dinitrotoluene 3,4-Dinitrotoluene 3,5-Dinitrotoluene 2,6-Dinitrotoluene 1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene Tetranitroanaline (TNA) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT) 2-Amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene 4-Amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene 3,5-Dinitroaniline 5-Nitrotetrazole Nitroglycerine Tetryl Ammonium nitrate Amatol Anilite (nitrobenzol + liquid nitrogen peroxide) Composition A-3 (RDX + wax)

42

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions • Composition B (hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine + 2-methyl-1,3,5-trinitrobenzene) • Composition C • Composition C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4 (The numbers refer to the ratio of RDX and plasticizer and the type of plasticizer, e.g., explosive or not.) • Composition C-4 (RDX + polyisobutylene + motor oil + di-(2-ethylhexyl) sebacate) • Gunpowder (nitrocellulose + nitroglycerine) with stabilizers such as diphenylamine and diethyldiphenylurea, burning rate modifiers and coolants such as potassium nitrate, potassium sulfate, barium nitrate, or dinitrotoluene. • HMX (cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine) • Nitrocellulose (gun cotton was loaded into some highexplosive rounds) • NG nitroglycerine (early military dynamite was NG and sawdust) • Picric acid (picryl sulfonic acid) • RDX (cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine), royal demolition explosive, hexogen, or cyclonite (also called royal Dutch explosive)

Other possible explosive breakdown products include: • • • • • •

2-Amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene 2,4-Dinitrophenol 4,6-Dinitro-2-methylphenol 3-Nitroaniline 2-Nitroaniline n-Nitrosodi-n-propylamine

Failure to find any of these products in groundwater or soil gas may not necessarily mean that there are no explosives buried at the site but only that the casings have not yet breached. Fuses, initiators, detonators, and blasting caps are often buried separately and may contain different and sometimes hypersensitive compounds such as: • • • • • • • •

Aluminum powder Antimony sulfide Barium nitrate Dinitrobenzofuroxane (benzanates) Diazinates Diazodinitrophenol Lead azide Lead styphnate

4: Explosive Ordnance

43

• Fulminate of mercury (often mixed 85% with 15% potassium chlorate for blasting caps) • Mercury azide • Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN; detonates less sensitive explosives such as TNT or ammonium nitrate) • Selenium azide • SINOXID • Tetrazene • Tetryl (used in blasting caps) • Trinitroresorcinol (trizinate, lead trizinate)

4.3 Methods of Destroying Military Explosives This section is simply a primer on some of the terminology and techniques used to destroy military explosives. As noted earlier, this book is not intended as a thorough instruction manual on munitions destruction techniques. Other books already on the market address this aspect. Repeated throughout this work is the “as is where is” theme. From a safety standpoint, old explosives should be moved as little as possible for destruction. Two types of destruction, burning and underwater detonation, may allow the destruction of explosives in closer proximity to populated areas.

4.3.1

Open Air Burning

Outdated or dynamite scrap, nitroglycerine, contaminated containers (not sealed ones, which could allow a pressure buildup), detonating cord, black and smokeless powders, and wet explosive sludge from explosive burials may be burned in the open. Besides having little noise, burning has the advantage of not scattering undetonated material around. However, toxic contaminants are often released into the air and may violate air pollution laws. At one time before the hazards of perchlorate were appreciated, rocket fuel was being reprocessed into a tube-like device that was strapped to a UXO item and ignited remotely. The flame was so hot it cut through the metal jacket and burned the cast TNT or other explosive.

4.3.2

Underwater Detonation

Detonating the munitions underwater significantly reduces the noise. It also leads to a more complete destruction of the explosive because the water pressure confines the initiating blast. It is noted below that the French

44

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

would pile the mustard (gas) shells on a tidal flat with the explosives on top, wait for the tide to come in and then detonate it. The water and the extra confinement provided increased the temperature, which helped to hydrolyze the mustard agent. The problem with underwater detonations of multiple munitions is that it may be difficult to know if all of the munitions have been destroyed because of water turbidity or a soft bottom into which unexploded munitions may have been driven. Also, there will be considerable water pollution if large-scale detonations take place. Finally, the shock waves will kill fish and other marine life. Mustard will polymerize in cold water if a shell is forced away from the heat of the blast before it opens. North Sea fishermen are often burned when polymerized mustard sticks to their fishnets. It is unnoticed or mistaken for “bilge” until the blisters appear eight hours later. The source is from the German U-boats that were filled with CWM and sunk after the war.

4.3.3

Surface Detonation

Where a sufficiently isolated place is available, as often exists for ranges, the UXO can be placed in two rows abutting each other on the ground. The back of the shell or the fins of the mortar rounds are placed back to back with the fuses toward the perimeter. C-4 blocks can be placed on top of the shells perpendicular to the shell casing across the widest part or center of the explosive charge. Another row of C-4 can be placed adjacent to the fuses or noses of the shell around the perimeter. (This is slightly contrary to the blow in place mandate but that may be difficult where there is a great deal of unexploded ordnance in a small area, such as near a target. Exploding one could kick another into an area previously cleared with geophysics or render nearby rounds much more dangerous for the EOD crew coming back to blow another. One size may not fit all situations.) Although this will lead to substantial destruction of the UXO, the area should be double-checked for shells that survive. (One of the known problems when magazines spontaneously detonate is finding the shells that survive.) The author believes in sandbagging the detonation site to help confine projectiles and to make a search for errant surviving shells easier. Finally, loose explosive “balls” may also survive, contaminating the soil and eventually the groundwater. Of course, the contamination will also occur if the munitions are left onsite. It is a lose–lose situation from the pollution perspective.

4: Explosive Ordnance

4.3.4

45

Detonation Chambers

Several chambers are now available that will allow the enclosed detonation of both high-explosive and chemical rounds. Although shell size is currently limited to 220 mm, the chambers are useful for areas where “as is where is” detonation is impossible. Some are designed with filter banks specifically for chemical munitions. Those intended for explosive shells can still be equipped with charcoal filter banks to handle the explosive toxic residue, as well as the misclassified CWM shell. A “cricket cage” can be installed at the end to insure that no toxics make it through the filters. Even where open detonation is feasible, the chambers virtually eliminate the pollution and the risks of an errant shell being blown away from the detonation site and left unexploded. However, the chambers only detonate one or two shells an hour and will prolong the effort.

5

Chemical Warfare Material

5.1 Introduction to Chemical Warfare Material Issues This chapter describes some of the considerations peculiar to chemical weapons. It is a must-read for even experienced EOD personnel because familiarity with chemical weapons ended with World War I. Certainly, few EOD units have any significant experience with these weapons. Even the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) does not have adequate personal protective equipment for these weapons charged with explosive material. Only the European crews have this experience level, unless one works at Aberdeen, Dugway, or some other CWM storage facility. There are some issues that are unique to chemical weapons. Certainly, most contain an explosive charge and possibly an initiating explosive or fuse. However, some CWM may be stored in glass containers, making location difficult. Also, CWM residuals may exist in the soil and pose a hazard to excavation crews. UXO technicians clearing possible CWM sites should always wear respirators, if not Level A protective suits.

5.2 History of Chemical Warfare Chemical weapons were probably first used by the Spartans against the Athenians. They used sulfur and arsenic smoke in 431 B.C. Greek-fire (burning liquid sulfur) was used in the seventh century to set enemy ships on fire. Sulfur with turpentine oil was used against fortresses in the sixteenth century. Asphyxiating or deleterious gases were banned by the First Hague Conference in 1899. In spite of this prohibition, the Germans planned to use chemical weapons prior to the start of World War I. In that war, the Germans first used Bromlost (dibromoethyl sulfide) on the Russian front. The effort was a failure because the cold weather kept the agent from vaporizing. The Americans and Canadians experimented early with jute fiber soaked in fuel oil and other “wicks” designed to catch fire from the bursting charge and help the liquid agent to vaporize in cold weather. Many of these shells are misdiagnosed as incendiary shells instead of chemical shells. 47

48

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

The Germans’ early failure with gas was probably why they were not prepared to follow up on their initial success, in warmer weather, with their mustard attack at Ypres, the attack at Nieuport, which produced 14,000 casualties, or the attack against the French, which produced 20,000 casualties.

5.3 Extent of the Chemical Warfare Material Problem Table 3.1 details some suspected CWM burial sites. This does not include all sites where work was conducted on chemical weapons and residual contamination or burial of CWM probably occurred. For example, leaking chemical containers or ordnance items were required to be buried immediately, thus a convoy shipping chemical weapons, merely passing through a facility and stopping for the night, might lead to a burial. For another example, ranges may have tested an occasional chemical shell or bomb. Lewisite contamination has been found at the World War II Pontiac Bombing Range in South Carolina (now a residential subdivision). Chemical weapons developed at AUES were tested at Langley Field in Virginia, Camp Simms in Washington, DC, and Fort Foote in Maryland.

5.3.1

University Research in World War I

During 1917 and 1918, laboratories at various colleges conducted research into chemical weapons: American University, Bryn Mawr, Catholic University, Cornell, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Northwestern, Ohio State, Princeton, and Yale. Because there was no commercial use for the agents produced at these colleges, the sudden armistice probably had the same result as it did at their supervising institution, the Organic Unit No. 1 Experiment Station— that is, the chemical agents were probably buried at a convenient dump site with the exception of Northwestern, where research continued after the war. The new FUDS manual, Corps of Engineers Regulation ER 200-3-1, requires the states to provide their documentation when asking that a FUDS site be listed or reopened. This proactive authorization differs from the Corps’ previous position, which was that states could only comment on the Corps’ reports. The author’s research report on American University, copied substantially in Chapter 10, is an example of a report sufficient to

5: Chemical Warfare Material

49

cause the Corps to reopen a FUDS site. The author concluded that there are likely to be some residual burial sites on or near the campus. Four substantial burial sites have now been found and two more have yet to be found.

5.3.2 Chemical Companies and Other World War I Facilities World War I chemical weapons laboratories included the Bureau of Standards, the Geophysical Laboratory, and the Naval Research Laboratory located in Washington, DC. The Naval Research Laboratory also had a large chemical weapons site on the Chesapeake Bay. Experiments with CWM also occurred at the Dow Chemical Company of Midland, Michigan, Zinsser & Company of Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, and a Trench Warfare Section at Cleveland, Ohio. The manufacture of various toxic substances occurred at Oldbury Electrochemical Company of Niagara Falls, New York, Charleston Chemical Company of Charleston, West Virginia, Frank Hemingway Inc. of Bound Brook, New Jersey, National Aniline & Chemical Company of Buffalo, New York, Commercial Research Company of Flushing, New York, and Federal Dye & Chemical Company of Kingsport, Tennessee. The government also built subsidiary plants at Stamford, Connecticut, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York, Kingsport, Tennessee, and Croyland, Pennsylvania, which were separate from any private companies at these locations. As with any manufacturing facility using hazardous materials, the disposal practice at the time was wanton dumping, burial, or pouring down the drain. Keep in mind that the capacity for production at some of the listed facilities was very large and there was no use for many of these World War I toxic gases after the war, so any disposal would likely be very large. For example, the first small plant at Niagara Falls produced 83,070 pounds of phosgene and only 24,800 pounds made it overseas. Likewise, the Bound Brook plant and Oldbury’s main plant each made five tons of phosgene daily. Oldbury’s plant loaded 18,768 Livens drums.

5.3.3

Overlooked Sites

From factories and plants, gas munitions and containers had to be transported to the battlefield. For example, from the Edgewood arsenal (Aberdeen Proving Ground) the gas was transported by railroad to docks on the Bush River. Such depots and loading facilities could be expected

50

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

to have considerable contamination and may be a long way from the site of concern. Berlin, Maryland, is another overlooked site. For example, a 1923 contingency plan provided for an estimated strength of 3053 personnel, 3355 gas masks, 500 horse masks, 150 protective suits, 1400 pounds of chloride of lime, 1100 extra canisters, 70 alarm devices, and 80 two-ounce cans of glycerine to be placed at the Berlin Station. This was never implemented but, obviously, this was a significant facility in the eyes of the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS). This same contingency plan provided for CWS personnel and material to be placed at Carlisle Barracks, Fort Hoyle, Camp Holabird, Fort Howard, Camp Mead, Camp Mead Tanks, Front Royal, Fort Humphreys, Fort Hunt, Chemical Detachment (CD) of Chesapeake Bay, CD of Baltimore, CD of Potomac, Fort Eustis, Langley Field (in Virginia at Langley AFB), Middletown, Philadelphia, Reading, Lancaster, Mt. Gretna, Lebanon, Gettysburg, York, Harrisburg, Butler, Pittsburg, Greensburg, Baltimore, Richmond, Petersburg, Camp Lee, Norfolk, and Virginia Beach, as well as the several widely known CWS sites. Each of these places had a connection to the CWS during World War I and hence was chosen as a location for varying amounts of personnel and supplies in the event of a mobilization.

5.3.4 Toxic Smoke Candles At the end of World War I, four million smoke candles (pots) existed in the inventory. The smoke candle usually consisted of a 5-lb tin canister (much like the old kitchen flour canister) with a screw lid. An igniting device like that found on a highway flare was immediately under the lid. The contents were diphenylaminochlorarsine (DM Adamsite) or diphenylchlorarsine (DA). Larger smoke pots, looking like a very small wood stove, also existed. Toxic smoke, usually an arsenical compound, could penetrate gas masks—which were quite effective by 1918 because smoke is not a gas and the smoke particles would not be absorbed by the charcoal or lime in the mask canisters. Moreover, America had developed a thick felt that would filter out the smoke particles even with Brownian motion operating. This felt was simply wrapped around existing mask canisters. Also, the small size of bombs and projectiles made candles and smoke generators particularly attractive. With the prevailing wind blowing toward the German Army trenches, Britain and America planned to burn millions of smoke candles in the spring

5: Chemical Warfare Material

51

of 1919; hence, the tremendous production of smoke candles and filler (Britain was also producing candles but with our toxic fillers). For example, it is known that large numbers of Adamsite candles were tested at Berlin, Maryland, in 1918. Of the millions of candles produced some may be buried at Berlin and the Naval Test Basin (Conduit Road) in Maryland. The rest are likely buried at depots. The author has confirmed that a CCC camp was established at Berlin, Maryland. It is likely that any buried candles may still be preserved, and certainly the arsenic would still survive and be toxic. This is a new consideration not yet fully realized.

5.3.5 Quantities of Chemical Agents on Hand at the End of World War I At the end of World War I, it was estimated that gas for filling five million rounds had been sent to France and England, and gas for filling another four million shells was on hand. This not only confirms the enormous production potential of the facilities, it suggests the potential buried supplies. A memorandum dated December 5, 1922, requesting regulations on the handling and storage of chemical munitions states, “Although it is true that the Ordnance Department has a relatively small quantity of chemical ammunition on hand at the present time, it is thought to be very important that this material should receive proper care.” A 1923 list sets the war reserve CWM at, “White Phosphorus 500 tons, Titanium tetrachloride 100 tons, Phosgene 192 tons, Mustard Gas 60 tons, Chlorine 200 tons, Chlorpicrin 40 tons . . . Shell 4” Stokes Mortar, complete 188,000, Livens Projectors 25,000, Shell, L.P. complete 40,000, Cylinders, chemical, portable 25,000, Candles, smoke 75,000, Candles, toxic 15,000, Candles, lachrymatory 25,000, Arsenious oxide 100 tons . . . Sulphur monochloride 2,000 tons . . . Hexochlorethane 100 tons.” While this is substantial and frightening, it is considerably less than the material known to have been on hand at the end of the war, particularly the shells and smoke candles. The author believes that the balance was buried or dumped at sea during the years following World War I.

5.3.6

Research up to and during World War II

Chemical weapons research continued from shortly after the CWS became a permanent branch of the Army in 1920 through World War II. For example, from December 1921 until December 1939, the total number of officers in the CWS ranged from 79 to 92. In 1940, the number rose

52

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

to 381, and by 1944 it was up to 8117. As with World War I, the number of personnel rapidly diminished after the war. By December 1946, there were only 972 officers. Total staff numbers also reflected rapid growth and drop. In December 1939, there were 917 total CWS personnel. That number rose to 66,610 by December 1943 and dropped to 3126 by July 1947. Appropriations remained at about $1.2 million from 1927 to 1935 and then rose gradually to $2 million in 1940, reaching a zenith of $1,067,461,059 in 1942. By 1945, it had dropped to merely $100, probably due to carryover. These figures are presented so that the regulators and contractors involved can appreciate the quantity of potentially buried CWM and contaminated sites. Specific leftover munitions and the magnitude of chemical research are even more revealing. In four years after World War I, the University of Chicago Toxicity Laboratory investigated over 1500 new compounds. Ultimately, 15 were selected for further study. This included the nitrogen mustards, first noted in 1925, and several solid toxics potentially several hundred times more toxic than anything in the arsenal, including Lewisite. During this time frame, W. Lee Lewis and H. W. Stiegler, known for their development of Lewisite, continued their work at Northwestern University. Large-scale production of chemical warfare agents continued at Edgewood Arsenal (Aberdeen Proving Ground) through the 1920s and 1930s. Huge chemical warfare depots were established as defensive measures near the Panama Canal, in Hawaii and in the Philippines. During World War II, the nerve agents were first synthesized, including diisopropyl fluorophosphate, very similar to sarin. Toxic tests during World War II continued at Dugway Proving Ground and at Camp Sibert, Alabama. By August 31, 1945, the United States arsenal had 1,343,728 chemical bombs. It should be noted that the 1000-lb bomb was considered the most effective and may have constituted the bulk of that number, though bombs ranged from 10 to 2000 lbs. There were also 6389 chemical 4.2-in. mortars and 13,550,613 chemical mortar rounds (all types). In addition, there were chemical candles, smoke generators, pots, grenades, and shells.

5.4 Unique Problems in CWM Site Remediation At the outset, it is important to reemphasize that the Army lacks experience in chemical ordnance removal operations. A well-known example will illustrate this important point. The Army detonated a massive arms bunker

5: Chemical Warfare Material

53

during the Persian Gulf War knowing that the enemy possessed sarin nerve gas and other chemical weapons. It is now well documented that the bunker contained substantial quantities of sarin. Many U.S. troops were exposed to sarin and possibly other nerve agents when this bunker was destroyed. Sarin rockets were found up to one-half mile away. Indeed, many (if not all) of the symptoms now known as the Persian Gulf Syndrome are classic symptoms of low-level nerve agent exposure. In the author’s opinion, blowing up a munitions dump containing chemical weapons when your troops are downwind is indicative of the fact that the military has become complacent about the dangers of chemical weapons in the nuclear age. It also illustrates a lack of expertise in the military about the nature of chemical weapons and how to destroy them. Indeed, most of the existing practical knowledge of chemical weapons rests with the few remaining World War I veterans, though chemical weapons were reportedly used by the Italians in the late 1930s and in the early 1940s by Japan in China. After World War II, the Egyptians (with British planes) used mustard and other agents in Yemen as reported in the Sunday Telegraph. Nevertheless, even these sporadic chemical attacks—usually denied by the belligerents—have not contributed significantly to U.S. expertise in chemical weapons. This necessitates that the contractors and regulators gain an independent expertise for their own safety. At the end of World War I, there were four million shells in the United States inventory. World War I ordnance such as the Livens projectile and Stokes mortar were outmoded by World War II, resulting in burials and dumping. Leaking ordnance was a continual problem. Add to that the 1,343,728 World War II chemical bombs, and the 13,550,613 World War II chemical mortar rounds not used in World War II, and the probability of substantial buried chemical weapons becomes a certainty, in addition to the tremendous numbers of currently stockpiled ordnance. Also, even current inventory ordnance would have an occasional leaking or damaged munition. In addition, experimental ordnance, grenades, rockets, candles, spray tanks, smoke pots, and cylinders are also burial candidates. “Where?” is the question state and local regulators need to repeatedly ask. By 1994, 190 sites in 75 locations across 32 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were suspected to contain buried CWM. Twenty-nine of these were FUDS sites, meaning that they were no longer owned or controlled by the military. Chemical material buried included mustard, Lewisite, nerve agents, blood agents, and choking agents. Buried containers range from 1-ton cylinders, 55-gallon drums,

54

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

aerial bombs, rockets, and projectiles such as Stokes and Livens mortars. The author was told that a 500-lb mustard bomb was unearthed less than 400 yards from a school in Maryland, near Aberdeen.

5.4.1

Mycotoxins

There are over 150 forms of trichothecene mycotoxins. Most are insoluble in water and are heat resistant. For the cleanup of a unique laboratory site such as Fort Dietrich or Aberdeen, both in Maryland, a bottle of such a mycotoxin buried in some landfill could be extremely dangerous. In Laos, there were more than 6000 deaths reported, 3000 in Afghanistan, and a good number in Kampuchea from the so called “yellow rain.”

5.4.2

Chemical Agent Identification Sets

One unique problem involves the Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS). These sets contain chemical agent samples in glass ampoules, which are very stable until broken. Of the 110,000 CAIS produced, only 21,458 have been recovered with many of the rest presumed buried. Although these sets are small, many sets have been found buried in single locations. Therefore, a backhoe, for example, could release lethal quantities of mixed agents during an excavation. These sets were likely to have been stocked at any military installation or depot during and after World War II for training or in anticipation of an actual attack. They could be buried anywhere. Because glass obviously cannot be located with metal detectors, finding these sets is difficult. Microgravity or ground penetrating radar may be able to determine a large burial site. Often, a few of the ampoules have broken and chemical agent breakdown products might be evident in soil or groundwater samples.

5.4.3

CWM Contamination

By definition, chemical warfare agents are volatile in liquid form. Some obvious exceptions are the solid toxics like Adamsite or ricin. Generally, the danger is that the CWM is in a container (glass bottle, cylinder, drum, or shell) and if that is breached, a hazardous concentration is achievable. Some CWM, like mustard, can polymerize in the soil. This can present dangerous conditions for long-term exposure to low levels. The body detoxifies mustard so slowly that even minute levels can produce illness over a long period of time.

5: Chemical Warfare Material

5.4.4

55

Arsenic Contamination

When an arsenical, such as Lewisite, Adamsite, or arsine, breaks down, it will leave arsenic in the soil, much the same way lead would settle out of gasoline near major highways, but much worse. A gallon of gasoline contains only a gram of lead. On the contrary, Lewisite is one-third arsenic. World War I gas warfare research included working with over 70 arsenical compounds. Research testing and disposal at one facility has resulted in elevated arsenic being found on 160 residential properties. Soil removals began in 2002. Diseases include aplastic anemia, brain and bone cancers, pernicious anemia (often misdiagnosed arsenic toxicity), cancers of the larynx, and learning disabilities. Where the range or CWM complex is transferred, small disease clusters may serve to identify potential burial sites.

5.4.5

Chronic Effects of CWM

Neurological changes, eye lesions, cancer, premature aging, loss of libido, pulmonary disease, decline in liver function, and bone marrow changes all can occur over time with low levels of CWM contamination. CWM low-level contamination can occur from soil vapor entering homes (particularly in the winter in areas where the ground freezes), CWM in drinking water, or CWM in the air. Low-level CWM and explosives contamination probably injure and kill more people in this country than traumatic injury from UXO.

5.5 Potential Chemical Agents That May Be Encountered This section is primarily for the technical regulators. It endeavors to be all-inclusive, but it will quickly become obvious that not all of the compounds would be sampled for on a typical range. However, experimental areas, like Porton Downs (UK), Lakehurst (New Jersey), or Edgewood, might necessitate sampling for many of the items. The lists also are useful for ascertaining if compounds actually detected can be military in origin. One of the great mistakes currently being made is to test for only the six CWM agents covered in the Chemical Weapons Ban treaty. Many other were in common use by the military and at least those should be tested. For example, there are 27 World War I-era chemical warfare symbols for agents in this country, not including the World War II-era nerve agents and toxins. Because records are lacking or incomplete at most sites and markings on munitions or containers may be obliterated, all chemical agents, precursor

56

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

and intermediate chemicals, experimental chemical agents, and natural toxins are listed as a caution to the remediation experts and as an aid to complete laboratory analysis of unknown suspected chemical agents. A recent experience during removal operations at a FUDS range near a chemical weapons experiment station illustrates the need for personnel to be familiar with experimental chemicals. A Livens projectile being removed from under the roots of a tree to a detonation area began to smoke. It was covered with plastic sheeting and a bulb test was negative for common chemical agents. Checking the list of experimental chemicals against those eliminated by the testing left only a handful of substances that would fume in moist air.

5.5.1

Known Chemical Agents

Table 5.1 lists the commonly named chemical agents (and breakdown products) by the end of World War II, their Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) symbols, if any (new followed by old), nicknames, foreign names, chemical names (if different), notes, and formula.

5.5.2

Nerve Agents

World War II and later sites may also contain nerve agents. These are generally organophosphate ester derivatives of phosphoric acid. The G agents are volatile like most of the earlier chemical warfare agents. The V agents tend to stay in liquid form and must be dispersed as droplets. Table 5.2 lists many of the common nerve agents. More experimental nerve agents may still be found at some facilities. They include: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Gd-7 Armin 3152 CT Phospholine DCMQ HC-3 Seleno-VE Ethylthioethyl-metasystox 33SN Dioxin Homocholine tammelin-ester GD-42 TL 1236 Ro3-0422

Chloromethyl chloroformate

BBC, CA BA

Brombenzylcyanide Bromoacetone Cadmium oxide Carborundum Chloracetone Chloracetophenone Solution Training solution Chlorine

CN CNS CNB S-10

SC

SA BR

DM

Acetate Acrolein Adamsite

Arsine Arsenic trichloride Benzyl bromide

CWS

Common Name

Table 5.1 Known Chemical Agents

CH3COCH2Cl C6H5COCH2Cl Mixture of CN, PS, and CHCl3 Cl2

Red Star Berthollite Cipalite Palite

C6H5CHBrCN

CH2CHCHO NH(C6H4)2AsCl

Chemical Formula

Tonite Tear Gas

Diphenylaminechlorarsine 10-chloro-5, 10-dihydrophenarazine Yellow Star Marsite Cyclite Lachrymogene Camite

Other Names

Notes

(continued)

5: Chemical Warfare Material 57

MG CB CC, CK

Chromyl chloride Cyanogen bromide Cyanogen chloride Dibromoethyl sulfide Dichloroethyl arsine Dichloromethyl ether Diphenylchlorarsine

Ethyl bromacetate Ethyl chlorosulfonate Ethyldichlorarsine Ethyl iodoacetate Hexachlorethane HC mixture

Diphenylcyanarsine Methylphosphonic difluoride Diphosgene

PS, S-1

Chlorpicrin

ED, CY SK, KSK HC

US

DP, SF

DC, CDA DF

DA

CWS

Common Name

C2Cl6 + Zn + NH4ClO4 + NH4Cl + CaCO3

Dick

Hexachlorethane + zinc + ammonium perchlorate +

Cl3CCOOCl

(C6H5)2AsCN

CNBr CNCl (BrCH2CH2)2S As(C2H5)Cl2 (ClCH2)2O (C6H5)2AsCl

Cl3CNO2

Chemical Formula

CH2BrCO2C2H5 ClSO2OC2H5 C2H5AsCl2

Trichloromethyl chloroformate Super Palite

Blue Cross Clark I Clark II

Mauguinite Bromlost

Trichloronitromethane Aquinite Vomiting gas

Other Names

Table 5.1 Known Chemical Agents (cont’d)

Notes

58 The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

L, M-1

Lewisite

MD H, HS, MO HS

IM NP

Incendiary mixture Incendiary napalm Kieselgur

Methylchlorsulfonate Methyldichlorarsine Mustard (sulfur)

AC

Hydrocyanic acid

Bis (beta-chlorethyl) sulfide Hun’s Stuff/Hun’s Schwefel Yellow Cross Yperite Lost (after Lommel and Steinkoff)

Beta-chlorovinyldichlorarsine

ammonium chloride + calcium carbonate Prussic acid Forestite

(ClCH2CH2)2S

ClSO2OCH3

ClCH:CHAsCl2

HCN

(continued)

Guhr (silicon dioxide) holds gas down Beta 1 is most toxic, beta 2 is less toxic, and beta 3 is barely toxic. Technically, Lewisite is the first distillation containing the three beta variants and caused early confusion as to lethality.

World War I nerve agent

5: Chemical Warfare Material 59

Sulfur trioxide Thermate Thermite Thiophosgene Titanium tetrachloride White phosphorus Xylylbromide

CX

Phosgene oxime Potassium chlorate and aluminum Stannic chloride

TP FM WP

FS TH

KJ

PD, PDA, MA CG, L-3

Phenyldichlorarsine Phosgene

Fumigerite Fumite

Opacite Tin tetrachloride

Ophorite

Green Cross Coliongite Carbonyl chloride

Distilled Mustard

HD HT

HL, MS HN

Other Names

CWS

Mustard-Lewisite Mustard (nitrogen)

Common Name

Table 5.1 Known Chemical Agents (cont’d)

C6H4CH3CH2Br

TiCl4

Fe3O4 + Al + S

55% SO3 + 45% HClSO3

C6H5AsCl2 COCl2

Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine

ClCH2CH2-S-CH2CH2Cl Mixture of 60% HD and 40% T T = (ClCH2CH2SCH2CH2)2O to lower freezing

Chemical Formula

Solution

Hydrolysis products are toxic

Notes

60 The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

CMPF GB GD GA

GF Sarin Soman Tabun VX

Vx

CWS

Common Name

C7H14FO2P (CH3)2CHO(CH3)FPO (CH3)3CCH(CH3)OPF(O)CH3 C5H11N2O2P (CH(CH3)2)2N(CH2)2SP(O)(OC2H5)CH3

o-Cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate Isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate 1,2,2-Trimethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate Also called V gas

It is much more volatile than VX with a molecular weight of 211.2 instead of 267.38.

Chemical Formula (Where Not Classified)

Other Names

Table 5.2 Common Nerve Agents

5: Chemical Warfare Material 61

62

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

5.5.3

Binary Components

Binary munitions are those in which the chemical substances are held in separate containers and react when mixed or combined. This may happen during firing, launching, or by other initiation methods. The product is a chemical agent or material agent. Binary components must be tested for individually because in a burial situation they may not be combined. Care must be taken not to mix chemical agents found at post-World War II sites (i.e., compositing soil samples). Binary munitions developed from a logical idea where the final step in the synthesis of a chemical agent was the simple combination of two ingredients. Where these final two compounds served to facilitate storage and handling (i.e., liquid, noncorrosive), it was not difficult to conceptualize a weapon where the constituent chemicals are separated. Common binary agents and components include: • Binary GB—methylphosphonic dichloride (DC) plus isopropyl alcohol (forms crude GB) • Binary GB2—methylphosphonic difluoride CH3F2PO (DF) plus isopropyl alcohol with an amine added (OPA) • Binary VX2—O,O′-ethyl (2-diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonite CH3PCH3CH2OCH2CH2N[CH(CH3)2]2 • EDMP or QL plus dimethylpolysulfide (NM) or sulfur plus silica aerogel (NE) In the case of VX2, the two binary constituents (QL and S) have low toxicity individually, but when combined they form one of the deadliest nerve agents. The Russians are said to have a binary nerve agent made from combining two relatively safe agricultural chemicals. Even nature produced such a weapon in the bombardier beetle, which combines two chemicals that actually combust, creating a poison gas when the beetle is attacked. One recent possible example of a naturally occurring binary compound could be the dinoflagellate, Pfiesteria piscicida, of the Neuse River in North Carolina. This microorganism has been around for a long time but apparently only reaches its most toxic state in water that has hog or chicken manure contamination, though the precise chemical formula has not yet been discovered. Most probably, the pollution from manure or possibly from other farm chemicals adds an organophosphate structure to the less toxic compound.

5: Chemical Warfare Material

63

5.5.4 CWM, Smoke, and Incendiary Abbreviations Found on Ordnance or in Reports (Old and New) AC BA BBC, CA BR BZ CB CC, CK CG, L-3 CN CNB CNS CS CX DA DC, CDA DM DP, SF ED, CY FM FS GA GB GB type I GB type II GB2 GD GF H, HS, M0 HC HD HL, MS HN-1 HN-2 HN-3 HT IM KJ

Hydrocyanic acid (Prussic acid), hydrogen cyanide Bromoacetone Brombenzyl cyanide Arsenic trichloride (Marsite) 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate Cyanogen bromide Cyanogen chloride Phosgene (carbonyl chloride) Chloracetophenone Chloracetophenone—training solution (Mixture of CN, PS, and CHCl3) Chloracetophenone—solution o-Chlorobenzylidene malononitrile Phosgene oxime Diphenylchlorarsine Diphenylcyanarsine Adamsite (diphenylaminechlorarsine) Diphosgene (trichloromethyl chloroforomate) Ethyldichlorarsine Titanium tetrachloride Sulfur trioxide Tabun (ethyl dimethylamidocyanophosphate) Sarin (isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate) Sarin plus tributylamine (stabilizer) Sarin plus diisopropylcarbodiimide (stabilizer) Binary DF plus OPA Soman (pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate) o-Cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate Mustard Levinstein Crude (30% sulfur and 70% HD) Hexachlorethane Mustard distilled [bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide] Mustard–Lewisite mixture Nitrogen mustard [bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine] Nitrogen mustard [bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine] Nitrogen mustard [tris(2-chloroethyl)amine] Mustard {60% HD and 40% bis[2-(2-chloroethylthio) ether]} Incendiary mixture Stannic chloride

64

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

L, M-1 Lewisite [dichloro(2-chlorovinyl)arsine] MD Methyldichlorarsine MG Chromyl chloride NP Incendiary napalm PD, PDA, MA Phenyldichlorarsine PG Chlorpicrin–phosgene mixture PS, S-1 Chlorpicrin (trichloronitromethane) S-10 Chlorine SA Arsine SC Carborundum (moissanite) SK, KSK Ethyl iodoacetate TH Thermate TP Thiophosgene US Ethyl bromacetate V gas (more volatile than VX) Vx VX O-Ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate VX2 Binary EDMP or QL plus DB or NM or NE WP White phosphorus

5.5.5

Identification of Munitions with Paint Intact

World War I to 1925 Chemical Shells (Color indicates the nature of the shell; number of bands indicates strength) Nonpersistent White Two white Three white Semipersistent White, red White, red, white White, red, yellow Persistent Red Two red Three red Smoke Shells Yellow Two yellow Purple bands denote incendiary

Diphenylchlorarsine Phosgene PD Chloropicrin 75% Chloropicrin, 25% phosgene 80% Chloropicrin, 20% stannic chloride Bromacetone Bromobenzylcyanide Mustard gas WP FM

5: Chemical Warfare Material World War II Chemical Naval Shells Red band denoted gas Yellow band denoted Explosive D 1925 and Later (Alphanumeric stenciling, gray body, plus) One green Nonpersistent Two green Persistent or VX Three green Other nerve agents One red Riot control agents One yellow Smoke Purple (light red) Incendiaries

5.5.6

CWM Breakdown Products

5.5.6.1 Ions • Chloride • Nitrate • Sulfate 5.5.6.2 Anions • Arsenite • Arsenate 5.5.6.3 Acids • Sulfuric acid • Hydrochloric acid • Nitric acid 5.5.6.4 Mustard • • • • •

1,4-Oxathiane 1,4-Dithiane Thiodiglycol Thiodiglycol sulfoxide Thiodiglycol sulfone

5.5.6.5 VX • bis(2-Diisopropylaminoethyl) sulfide • bis(2-Diisopropylaminoethyl) disulfide

65

66

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions • • • • • • •

Diisopropylaminoethanol Diisopropyl ethyl mercaptoamine Ethanol Ethyl methylphosphonic acid Ethyl methylphosphonothioic acid Methylphosphonic acid S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl) methylphosphonothioate

5.5.6.6 GA • • • • • • •

Dimethylamine Dimethylphosphoramidate Dimethylphosphoramide cyanidate Ethyl N,N-dimethylamido phosphoric acid Ethylphosphoral cyanidate Hydrogen cyanide Phosphorocyanidate

5.5.6.7 GB • • • •

Hydrogen fluoride Isopropyl alcohol Isopropyl methylphosphonic acid Methylphosphonic acid

5.5.6.8 GD • Methylphosphonic acid • Pinacolyl alcohol • Pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid 5.5.6.9 Lewisite • Chlorovinylarsonic acid • Chlorovinylarsonous acid 5.5.6.10 • • • • •

Other Agent Breakdown Products

Benzothiozole p-Chlorophenylmethylsulfide p-Chlorophenylmethylsulfoxide p-Chlorophenylmethylsulfone Dimethyldisulfide

5: Chemical Warfare Material

67

• DIMP (Diisopropyl methylphosphonate) • DMMP (Dimethyl methylphosphonate) It is possible that many of these could be found at a World War I chemical weapons sites even if only a few were actually used on the European battlefields. The war ended just as our chemical weapons development reached its zenith. 5.5.6.11 Perchlorate Rocket Propellants and Explosives Known at AUES (1918) • • • • • • • • • • •

5.5.7

Ammonium perchlorate Perchlor chloracetophenone Perchloromethyl mercaptan Perchloromethyl carbonate Perchloroethylene Perchloromethyl sulphide (sulfide) Perchloroethyl mercaptan Perchloromethylchloroformate Potassium perchlorate Silver perchlorate Sodium perchlorate

Natural Poisons

Toxins are poisons produced by living organisms which are then extracted or copied to produce militarily useful quantities. Naturally occurring toxins are technically biological weapons but are included here because they are in reality chemical weapons and are applied as chemicals rather than as living organisms such as germs, spiders, or vipers. Military and university research laboratories being investigated as chemical agent sites should be considered as possible sites for these natural poisons. Some natural poisons such as ricin could be found in large quantities. In research facilities or landfills, toxins may also exist in deceptively small vials or ampoules, thus such discoveries should be handled with extreme care. The PINS technology has not been refined to accommodate natural toxins. Toxins were employed in ground or air bursting munitions, aircraft spray tanks or ground-level aerosol generators. It was widely reported a few years ago that an air gun was developed for the CIA that shot a steel dart one-fifth the thickness of a human hair. The dart was dipped in shellfish toxin (saxitoxin, Gonyaulax tamarensis or perhaps catanella) and was

68

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

quickly lethal. In the recent attack by Israeli agents on a Hamas leader, a toxin was sprayed or injected into his ear. Apparently such toxins are still a part of some countries’ arsenals. (U.S. policy now forbids the use of biological agents offensively under any circumstances. However, the policy allows the use of such research for defensive measures. Recent use of such toxins and confirmed stockpiling by some countries such as Iraq may prompt continued defensive research.) Some natural toxins are refined to a white powder or colorless crystals. As with chemical warfare agents, some of these poisons are extremely stable and can retain their toxicity for decades. Plants and fungi yield the most stable toxins. There is no evidence that the Neuse River toxin has yet been experimented with by the military, probably due to the toxin and bacteriological ban treaty. However, four dinoflagellate toxins were a part of the U.S. inventory in the not-so-far-distant past. Natural poisons were experimented with as far back as World War I. Crystalline ricin is confirmed at two World War I university sites and concerns us because of its purported stability and the ability to refine large quantities. By some accounts, it may be two orders of magnitude deadlier than sarin or as deadly as VX or soman. Ricin was the agent in the British M bomb developed for World War II. Dangerous quantities of natural toxins were refined using common cell defractionation (centrifuge) techniques or, in the case of ricin, by dissolving the natural toxin from the bean in a solvent and then distilling it. In nature, the butter clam (a filter feeder) can concentrate high levels of shellfish toxin from algae. 5.5.7.1 Relative Toxicity of Natural Poisons Natural toxins include the most poisonous substances still known to man, and a few are several magnitudes more lethal than the best artificial nerve agents. The author considers the Pfiesteria piscicida microorganism to contain one of the most deadly toxins yet known, but much research needs to be done to confirm this. The author believes that this toxin is dangerous to health at less than one part per trillion. For example, one of these microbes can damage a quarter-sized spot of flesh on man or fish. Moreover, one such “bite” can disrupt the nervous system of a 10-lb rockfish. Several bites on a man can cause neurological impairment, including short-term memory loss. In the author’s opinion, the natural poisons in order of lethality are given in Table 5.3. In addition to the numerous toxic substances listed in this table, breakdown products may need to be considered.

69

5: Chemical Warfare Material Table 5.3 Natural Poisons

Poison

Source

Dinoflagellate toxin Botulinal toxin type A, α-fraction Botulinal toxin type A, crystalline Tetanal toxin, crystalline Botulinal toxin type A, amorphous Botulinal toxin type B, C, D, E Staphylococcus enterotoxin (SEB) Palytoxin

Pfiesteria piscicida Botulinal toxin type A Clostridium botulinum Clostridium tetani Clostridium botulinum Clostridium botulinum Staphylococcus aureus bacteria Palythoa zoanthid, coelenterates (soft corals) Snake paralytic neurotoxin Ricinis communis seeds (castor bean) Phyllobates aurotaenia and terribilis (Columbian frog) Three Central American frogs are lethal to the touch! Chondrodendron tomentosum, calabash (curare arrow poison) Gonyaulax catanella, dinoflagellate marine algae (proposed for lethal steel darts one-fifth the thickness of a human hair shot by an air pistol) Takifugu puffer fish (arothron) and some salamanders Spider neurotoxin Atelopus zeteki (Panama frog) Abrus precatorius seeds (jequirity beans) Paralytic snake neurotoxin Bungarus multicinctus Banded krait, paralytic (neurotoxin) Ricinis communis seeds Indian or Formosan cobra venom Black Widow venom Vipera russelli Leiurus quinquestriatus Amanita phalloides (Death cap mushroom, lethal in 10 days) Naja naja (Note: A king cobra has enough venom to kill an elephant.)

Taipoxin Ricine, crystalline Batrachotoxin Kokoi arrow poison C-alkaloid E Saxitoxin

Tetrodotoxin Alpha-latrotoxin Atelopidtoxin Abrin, crystalline Notexin Alpha-bungarotoxin Beta-bungarotoxin Ricin, amorphous Cobra neurotoxin Black Widow spider toxin Russell’s Viper venom Israeli scorpion venom α-Aminitin Indian cobra venom

70

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

5.5.8

Experimental Toxic Substances

It should be noted that virtually all chemical warfare agents have a vapor density greater than 1 and therefore are considerably heavier than air. These agents were most effective in trench warfare and in level terrain. Logically, other agents may have been experimented with for applications where the enemy exposure point may be above the height of typical ground troops. For example, in hilly terrain enemy troops may desire to occupy the high ground. It would be folly to shell the top of a hill with Lewisite, which would promptly roll down the hill onto one’s own troops trying to take the hill. Likewise, the deck of a ship and its air intakes may be 75 feet above the water. For these situations, agents approximating air density or lighter than air may have been the subjects of experiments. To the author’s knowledge, no lighter-than-air chemical weapons are currently or ever were a part of the U.S. inventory, although some cylinders of such gases have been found at one known chemical warfare research laboratory. It is unknown as to what experimental uses these lighter-than-air gases were subjected. It should also be mentioned that one World War I experimental site actually tested over 400 potential chemical agents and had hundreds more compounds on-site. Thus, experimental sites should be tested for more than just the common CWM listed previously. Also, because gas masks have been well developed since World War I, lesser-known toxic chemicals may have been experimented with to see if they penetrated a particular mask better. Such was the nature of the experimentation with solid toxics. Thus, numerous other dangerous toxic and hazardous substances have been experimented with by the military, and their presence is possible at laboratory and similar facility remediation sites. The following is a list of those substances known to have been actually used in experimentation, including chemical warfare agents, pyrotechnics, and chemicals with other industrial applications: • • • • • • • •

Acrolein Acetyl chloride Acetylene–arsenic trichloride Acetyl fluoride Aluminum chloride Aluminum arsenide Ammonium cyanide Anilite (toxic); CCl4 added to nitrobenzol and nitrogen peroxide produces up to 40% phosgene on detonation • Anthracene

5: Chemical Warfare Material • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Arsenic trifluoride Benzyl chloride Benzyl cyanide Boron trifluoride Bromine trifluoride Butyl lithium Butyl mercaptan Calcium arsenide Carbon bisulfide Carbon monoxide Carbonyl fluoride Carbonyl sulfide Chlorine monofluoride Chlorine trifluoride Chloroacetic anhydride Chloroacetyl chloride Chloroform Chrysarobin Coal tar Cyanogen Cyanogen bromide (bromocyanide) Dichlorosilane Dimethylamine Disulfurdecafluoride Disulfurpentafluoride Diethyl sulfide Diphenyl sulfide Ethane Ethylaluminum chloride Ethyldibromoacetate Ethylene oxide Fluorine Hexafluorobutadiene Hydrogen bromide Hydrogen chloride Hydrogen sulfide Hydrocyanic acid Iodine pentafluoride Isovaleric acid Kendalite Magnesium arsenide Martonite Methyl bromide Methyl fluoride

71

72

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

5.5.9

Methyl mercaptan Methyl sulfate Molybdenum fluoride Nickel carbonyl Nitrogen peroxide Nitrogen trifluoride Nitrosomethylurethane Oleum (fuming sulfuric acid) Oxygen difluoride para-Nitro benzyl chloride Perchloromethylmercaptan Phenylbromoacetonitrile Phenylcarbylamine chloride Phenylimidophosgene Phosphine Phosphorus pentafluoride Polarine oil Selenium mustard Silicon tetrafluoride Strontium chlorate Strontium permanganate Sulfur chloropentafluoride Sulfur dichloride Sulfur hexafluoride Sulfur monochloride Titanium tetrachloride Thiocarbonyl dichloride Thionyl fluoride Thiophosgene Triethyl aluminum Trifluoromethyl iodide Triisobutylaluminum Trimethylaluminum Vanadium tetrachloride Vincennite Vinyl bromide Vinylmagnesium bromide Xenon difluoride Zinc arsenide

Less Toxic Chemical Fillers

Many ordnance items—particularly at training sites—may be filled with smoke or incendiary chemicals. Because some early smoke agents were

5: Chemical Warfare Material

73

subsequently determined to have deleterious health effects, such as titanium tetrachloride, they are also included in the previous list.

5.5.10

Smoke and Incendiary Munitions

Some smoke and incendiary fillings may be extremely dangerous because they often combust when exposed to air. Thus, an old range or burial site smoke round may be nearly rusted through and can breach during excavation. The accompanying heat from a combusting smoke round may be enough to detonate the fuse or booster charge. In the case of a combined incendiary shell like white phosphorus, this booster could spew burning material over a considerable distance. Typical Level A or B suits would provide little protection to workers. A 4.2-in. white phosphorous mortar shell will ignite easily combustible materials and cause casualties within a 40-yard diameter. In addition, a booster detonation from a smoke round or heat from a phosphorus shell could detonate nearby UXO. At range sites, the recovered UXO often has a detonated fuse and is then deemed safe to move to a detonation area on- or off-site. This practice is unwise at indirect fire ranges (mortar or long-range artillery) because phosphorus was sometimes used for training as the smoke was excellent for long-range impact identification. The Chemical Corps also used white phosphorous smoke rounds for simulation training in the application of gas during windy conditions. The thought of a truckload of defused UXO being transported to Fort Letterkenny, Pennsylvania, for detonation and having a rusty phosphorous round with the Explosive D filled projectiles is not comforting. White phosphorus UXO should be transported in a sealed container of water. Since World War I, the known smoke and incendiary fillers are listed in Table 5.4.

5.5.11

Sampling for Chemical Agents and Explosives

As noted previously, the state regulator or local oversight team must have an expert in sampling methodology. It may not be enough to take a surface or subsurface soil sample; the particular toxic or explosive substance must be considered. For example, arsenic may migrate little over 70 years but other volatile substances may have disappeared altogether. Thus, samples taken every two feet could miss an inordinate concentration if the arsenic was deposited in a narrow band by open air testing or surface/subsurface dumping of arsenical agents. For arsenical air-deposited

74

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

Table 5.4 Smoke and Incendiary Fillers

WP PWP TH HC FS FM BM BM

KJ Anthracene Coal tar Polarine oil Selenium mustard Bromine compounds

White phosphorus Plasticized white phosphorus Thermite (iron oxide and aluminum) Hexachlorethane and zinc oxide Sulfur trioxide (in chlorosulfonic acid) Titanium tetrachloride (Bureau of Mines) Zinc, CCl4, and sawdust (Berger Mixture) 35.4% zinc, 41.6% carbon tetrachloride, 9.3% sodium chlorate, 5.4% ammonium chloride, 8.3% magnesium carbonate Stannic chloride (a toxic World War I grenade filler, not recommended to fit-test masks) Experimental in World War I

plumes, a boring core might have to be checked in one-inch segments with x-ray fluorescence to find a plume of arsenic. Then the band or horizon can be analyzed by more exacting means for concentrations.

5.6

Radioactive Facilities

This section is included because residents, stakeholders, and regulators may overlook radioactive material. Many military sites used, stored, or disposed of radioactive substances, including the newer depleted uranium anti-tank shells, in addition to atomic bombs and demolition devices. Equipment is now available, that can make quick, accurate, and cheap surveys just to verify the absence of this hazard. Recently, DOD listed 400 atomic weapon test sites. The author does not know if this list includes all atomic weapon storage facilities or ocean dumpsites. Although the cleanup of nuclear facilities is a function of the Department of Energy (states and local government entities only have authority over medical radioactivity), locating and defining radioactive contamination is still a proper role for these entities.

5: Chemical Warfare Material

75

Whereas just about any Geiger counter from the Civil Defense era can tell if the radioactivity is above background levels, more sensitive instruments are needed. Some can detect excessive radioactivity at 100 feet. The author recommends the Exploranium GR-135 detector because it will tell the isotope in addition to the radioactivity level. The author also recommends consulting a nuclear physicist before sounding the alarm if the Geiger counter clicks a few too many times. It might just be an old alarm clock face a few inches below the ground level where it fell when thrown out the bedroom window. And do not forget about radon gas, which is naturally occurring, before accusing the military of concealing a buried warhead when your Geiger counter sounds off. High on a list of radioactive site concerns would be spent fuel rod dumps offshore in the ocean. These are not FUDS but may nevertheless warrant investigation. As noted in the section on underwater dumping, spent nuclear fuel amounted to hundreds of thousands of tons. Because of the weight, these barge loads were dumped fairly close to shore in areas of commercial shell fishing. It is unknown whether ocean clams bioaccumulate radioactive metals but shellfish such as oysters certainly do accumulate other heavy metals, particularly during lower dissolved oxygen periods in late summer. A second area of potential concern would be ranges in which spent uranium anti-tank shells were used. These may not be a concern when unfired and intact. However, evidence now suggests that when pulverized into dust after hitting an armored target, the radioactive dust can be inhaled and ingested. Even non-penetrating radiation such as alpha particles may be dangerous once it enters the body. Third, atomic bomb tests in the west may have contaminated areas later used as ranges for conventional ordnance. Radioactive elements in the early atom bombs have a half-life of 12,000 years. Thus, these areas are just about as radioactive now as they were 60 years ago. Ranges in suspected atomic bomb test plumes should be surveyed prior to ordnance recovery work. Radio assay of groundwater or drinking water also requires substantial expertise.

6 Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices 6.1 Introduction This chapter is very important for state and federal regulators, residents, and stakeholders. One cannot rid an area of munitions unless they can be found. They will not be found unless the high probability areas are searched. Herein are the essential practices that formerly existed. Many standard operating procedures are described in military manuals. Too often, ordnance clearance operations concentrate on the target or impact areas of ranges. They forget or ignore the firing line, magazine areas, facility dump, likely disposal areas for obsolete ordnance such as swampy areas or places near surface water, and troop maneuver training areas. This chapter discusses many of these high probability areas. As noted, Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS) containing small glass vials or larger bottles of chemical agents for calibrating equipment were routinely buried without breaking the glass. In earlier times, the disposal practices at some sites were absolutely terrible. One cache in the middle of the District of Columbia contained chemical shells, fuming sulfuric acid, gun cotton, and high-explosive shells buried together. Even considering that burial was an accepted practice in 1918, this incompatible combination could not have been deemed responsible even then, and it certainly does not support the conclusion of prudent past disposal practices.

6.1.1 Determining Whether Buried Munitions and Explosives Are Likely Any military installation is likely to contain a burial site of explosives or munitions. As noted previously, prior to 1944 burial of explosives was standard operating procedure. Habits die slowly, and it may have been decades more before that policy ended. The alternative of open detonation may not have been practicable in congested areas. Some common explosives such as dynamite may become dangerous when old, prompting disposal by burial. Munitions may become obsolete or too old to be 100% reliable in wartime and may similarly be disposed of by burial. 77

78

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

Manuals containing pictures of common military explosives, fuses, and munitions suspected at a site should be studied carefully by the excavation crews. Also, some explosives, toxic smoke candles, and CAIS vials were canned and may look like any other garbage in a landfill. The age of the military facility may provide a clue to the presence of burial or other disposal sites of munitions. If the facility existed during a major advancement in ordnance, disposal is more likely. For example, when breach-loading cannons supplanted the muzzleloaders, or “front stuffers,” projectiles also changed from round to conical. Cannon shell—exploding cast iron cannonballs—would have been promptly discarded. Even a caliber change such as the 90-mm antiaircraft gun making the 40-mm obsolete would lead to expected ordnance disposal of large quantities. The facility’s existence and use during and after wartime would again give important clues to the type and amount of ordnance disposal. A particular facility that was an arsenal during wartime and a war college during peacetime would have had to dispose of large quantities of ordnance.

6.2

Burial of Chemical Weapons

The Instructions for the Care, Storage and Handling of Gas Warfare Material issued by the Gas Service A.E.F., June 15, 1918, stated, “If a leak is suspected it should be reported immediately and all men required to work near the dump should keep the respirator in the alert position. The suspected shell should be located immediately and removed and buried. The removal and disposal of leaky shells should be conducted only by men wearing respirators and gloves. Holes 4 feet deep will always be kept prepared . . .” On March 2, 1944, the War Department published TM 9-1904, Ammunition Inspection Guide. To the author’s knowledge, this was the first manual to detail how to dispose of explosive ordnance. This was also the first time that the traditional method of burial of ordnance was restricted. The manual states: “Three general methods are authorized for the destruction of ammunition and explosives: detonation, also referred to as demolition or static firing; burning; and dumping at sea. Burying or dumping into waste places, pits, wells, marshes, shallow streams or inland water ways is prohibited except as may be authorized under the provisions of paragraphs 66a and 259d of the Ordnance Safety Manual for the disposition of black powder and chemical ammunition” (emphasis added). Thus, even when burying was generally outlawed for all ammunition, it was still authorized in some instances for chemical munitions.

6: Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices

79

This manual continues with more detailed instructions: When chemical ammunition containing mustard cannot be dumped at sea and a sufficiently isolated area is not available for static firing, it must be destroyed by one of the following methods. The precautions discussed in the chapter on storage of chemical ammunition will apply to the transporting and handling of the ammunition. Personnel will wear complete protective clothing and equipment. The appropriate first aid supplies must be on hand. Burying. A small hole (about 1/4 in.) is drilled into the void space of the component. A handful of waste or cloth wadding saturated with 5 percent bleaching powder solution should be held around the point where the hole is being drilled to absorb any H vapor emitted when the drill pierces the component. The hole is then reamed or drilled to a diameter large enough to allow the mustard to be poured out. The H is then poured over a pile of loose earth and bleaching powder mixture in the bottom of a hole about 5 feet deep, dug at least 200 yards from well sites, streams, or bodies of water. Personnel must have the wind blowing away from them during this operation. Fortunately, no similar instruction is given for other more toxic chemical agents, except high test hypochlorite (HTH). (The author knows of no NCO in the Chemical Corps that would have exposed his troops to a chemical agent by following this idiotic recommendation.) Therefore, a squad charged with burying a quantity of chemical shells filled with agents would probably and properly dispense with the drilling. Moreover, the precaution for the wind direction recognizes that the protective clothing of the day was inadequate. A publication entitled Non-Stockpile Chemical Material ProgramInterim Survey and Analysis Report by the U.S. Army Chemical Material Destruction Agency, April 1993, states, One of the most difficult problems associated with buried CWM is the lack of available information. Even at well-documented burial sites, the condition of the material in the subsurface is usually unknown. Even when many sophisticated geophysical procedures are employed in attempting to determine the identity and condition of the buried material, until excavation and positive identification can be made, the actual hazards associated with the material remain relatively unknown. Archeological type excavation by hand is frequently employed in uncovering CWM,

80

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions since mechanical means may cause a release or detonation. Robotics are being considered for use in excavating CWM . . . Small Explosives Sites. This site category represents the most difficult scenario in terms of destruction . . . The small explosive sites represent two classes of hazard in a relatively unknown condition, the explosive hazard and the chemical agent hazard . . . Exploratory excavations will be more hazardous if explosives are present. Mitigation of the risk of CW agent release becomes a difficult technical task when coupled with the unknown condition of the material.

The document also states, “In most cases, these sites served more than one purpose. Ranges were often used to dispose of leaking or defective munitions. Many historical references, primarily during and immediately after World War II, cite instances where chemical weapons were buried because of leaks discovered during transportation or in storage. In some cases, munitions and other containers were drained into holes, covered with lime or open-pit burned and finally covered with earth.” Thus, it is perfectly clear that the burial of chemical ordnance was the preferred method of disposal through the end of World War II, and that such burials are the most difficult problems in site remediation.

6.3 Dumping Explosive and Chemical Ordnance Underwater Some of the most overlooked areas of ordnance disposal requiring remediation are the underwater dumps. The CHASE program, “Cut Holes and Sink ’Em,” dumped large quantities of nuclear and chemical ordnance at sea. Prior to CHASE, large quantities of explosive and chemical ordnance have been disposed of in a similar manner. Whereas some of these dumps are located far out to sea, others may be in rivers, bays, lakes, and other bodies of water. When these sites will be in deep water, identification and removal will be difficult but the pollution to marine life will not be reduced. Photos 13 through 18, and Maps 1 through 6 in the photo section relate to some of the ocean dumping of chemical munitions referred to in this chapter. TM 9-1904 (cited previously) states, “The safest and easiest way to destroy unusable ammunition is to dump at sea. The items disposed of in this manner must be of sufficient weight to sink to the ocean floor. Only at establishments located near a deep sea waterway is this method practicable. Port authorities must be consulted prior to taking explosive materials out to sea . . . Personnel supervising the loading of boats and barges should be familiar with army regulation no. 55-470.”

6: Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices

81

In cold water, including groundwater, vesicants hydrolyze very slowly. They also only hydrolyze at the surface of the agent. In groundwater or water with low turbulence, the hydrolysis is slower. Also, the CWM is in a container and when a breach occurs—that is, it corrodes through—the opening is usually a small area, again restricting hydrolysis. Even nonpersistent Lewisite, which will hydrolyze rapidly in damp air, can polymerize when disposed of underwater. The absence of sunlight apparently can retard hydrolysis. Also, Lewisite can degrade into Lewisite oxide, a solid that is still very toxic, and mustard can polymerize into a tarry substance, also toxic. For chemical ordnance disposed of underwater, the liquid density becomes the most important factor. Liquid density is the weight in grams per cubic centimeter (i.e., the weight of the agent compared to water). Thus, most of the agents have a liquid density greater than 1 and will accordingly sink if released into water (as would happen if their container corroded through). However, a few such as hydrogen cyanide will float. Once at the surface of the water, such an agent could readily vaporize depending on the temperature. Note that liquid density could be affected severely by salinity, mud, and other water conditions. Many ordnance disposal areas are not indicated at all on the charts. The hapless captain who dropped anchor, causing a 500-lb bomb to explode, may find his frail craft in trouble. Even causing a chemical ordnance item to rupture could be a problem as the “bilge” stuck to his rope when he hauls up his anchor could turn out to be polymerized mustard. Most ordnance disposal sites, if listed at all, are listed only as disposal areas on the navigation charts. Experienced boaters know not to anchor in those areas. However, the charts’ euphemism of “disposal site” for “munitions dumping area” may leave novice boaters unaware. For example, Fort Armistead is a very old fort located near Baltimore, Maryland. It was used as an ammunition dump during World War II by the Navy. Charts of the northern Chesapeake Bay list a strange disposal site just south of this fort with the notation, “Do not anchor.” Were leftover munitions disposed of here? A recent dredging project near the Navy Yard in Philadelphia led to the dredge spoils being placed on federal property located nearby. Unfortunately, the adjoining property was used as a community garden. Gardeners would frequently cull the dredge spoils for tools and other “goodies.” Once ordnance was discovered and a search of the dredge spoils uncovered more, the gardeners were contacted. Many had found live shells, polished the brass casings and carted them home as souvenirs! Likewise, even if the chemical agent would be confined to a layer at the bottom of the water, it could still devastate aquatic life, such as can be seen

82

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

in Photo 16 in the photo section. (The specific gravity of most chemical agents is greater than 1 and they will sink in water.) Confinement to a layer in the water would also maintain a high concentration. Operation CHASE and earlier ocean dumping left munitions in water that was only 100–200 feet deep. Now, clam dredging and scuba diving can reach those depths previously considered safe. Even where dumped in deeper water, they were often dumped in trenches, which would still confine the chemicals in high concentrations. Turbulence due to river currents or a storm could move such a layer— and even entire shells—to shallower depths at which human contact could occur. All that layering would mean is that the chemical agent would be at the bottom. If the river current moved the layer downstream where sedimentation resulted in shallow water, human contact is conceivable. If the river flowed into the ocean where salinity causes the chemical agent’s liquid density to be less than that of salt water, it could even rise to the surface. Last, if the chemical agent enters a potable aquifer or a water intake downstream, ingestion is possible. CWM contamination is a problem in the Arabian Sea, where desalination provides most of the drinking water. The previous considerations are illustrative of the need to remediate underwater chemical ordnance disposal sites. Explosive ordnance also presents a problem. Whereas most types of ordnance will loose their explosive capability once water enters the shell casing through corrosion, the pollution is still a factor. Fuses often contain fulminate of mercury. Nitrogen compounds are present in all of the various explosive fillers, and nitrogen is a major water pollutant for inland lakes. As is the case with chemical agents, many explosive chemicals could be disastrous if allowed to enter drinking water aquifers, seafood, or water system intakes. After World War II, German chemical ordnance (stockpiled but not used) was loaded into submarines and sunk in the coastal waters. Now, the submarine hulls are rusting through, as well as the shells inside. Mustard gas is polymerizing and floating free in the water. The tarry globs stick to fishing nets and ropes. Fishermen are continually getting mustard burns when pulling up their nets. Also, the arsenic from the Lewisite mixtures is getting into seafood. Clams and oysters can uptake arsenic and other toxic metals in low-oxygen-content water. Nevertheless, the new FUDS manual limits FUDS sites to those within 100 yards of shore. This provision may be challenged, particularly where there is a likelihood of human contact with the disposal area, such as shells being coughed up on the beach during storm events or bombs floating to the surface.

6: Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices

6.3.1

83

Charleston, South Carolina

The Small Boat Wet Storage Basin in Charleston, South Carolina, has been the launching point for a horrendous dumping at sea of chemical weapons. Approximately 24 barges of Lewisite were dumped at sea between August and October 1946, and one in 1948. No wonder seafood sometimes contains arsenic. Some mustard gas, phosgene, and sarin were also included in these dumps. The use of barges suggests that the dumps were fairly close to shore, as it is dangerous for a tug crew to tow a barge out into open sea. A sudden storm could sink the barge, taking the tug down with it, if the towrope is not cut in time. This should be an NPL site.

6.3.2

Colts Neck Naval Pier, Earle, New Jersey

This facility also served as a shipping point for sea dumping: in June 1967, a shipload of rockets and bulk sarin and mustard; in June 1968, a shipload of rockets and bulk sarin, VX, and arsenicals; in August 1968, a shipload of bulk mustard; and in November 1957, a shipload of bulk Lewisite.

6.3.3 Chesapeake Bay, Delaware Bay, and other Atlantic Coast Areas For years, watermen and farmers have been blamed for the decline in fish, oysters, and crabs in Chesapeake Bay. Watermen have been accused of overharvesting and farmers have been faulted for fertilizer and chemical run-off. Now, another culprit has been added to the list: chemical weapons and other weapons material. There are two problematic areas—a single dump site in Chesapeake Bay and a three-site dump area in the ocean near or in Delaware Bay off the coast of New Jersey. The site in Chesapeake Bay is believed to be within 100 yards of shore and therefore eligible for FUDS consideration. The location of the Delaware Bay or ocean area may be beyond the reach of the FUDS program. However, both sites should be non-stockpile sites with treaty implications as they are in relatively shallow water. In the first event, 150 tons of Lewisite was likely dumped into Chesapeake Bay. Lewisite was the deadliest gas invented—but never used—in World War I. Lewisite was extremely feared, and many rumors surrounded it. It was called the “Dew of Death,” as a single drop on a man’s skin was said to be fatal. The joke of the day was that if you put three drops

84

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

on the tongue of a dog, it would kill the owner. It could penetrate rubber boots. The Japanese reportedly used Lewisite and mustard to kill a quarter million Chinese in the Iching Peninsula just before World War II. The Lewisite saga began with a top-secret program to manufacture Lewisite during World War I. The gas was invented by Capt. W. Lee Lewis at Catholic University in 1918. A secret plant was established to manufacture it at Willoughby, Ohio. The first batch of 150 tons was en route to the Edgewood arsenal when the war ended on November 11, 1918. It traveled on a train like no other. Only the engineer aboard the train was from the railroad; the rest of the crew where soldiers. The train went no faster than 10 miles per hour. It took four days for it to get to Edgewood, and by then the war was over. In the book Gas Warfare (1944) by Brigadier General Alden H. Waitt, Chemical Warfare Service, Waitt states, “A plant for its manufacture was constructed at Willoughby, Ohio, and a quantity was manufactured. This plant was called The Mousetrap because the product was so secret that the men who were engaged in making the first lots could not leave the premises . . . The Armistice took place before shipment of the first supply could leave port, and it was sunk at sea soon after the Armistice in order to destroy the gas.” In their book, A Higher Form of Killing (2002), Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman state, “The first batch of 150 tons of Lewisite was at sea, on its way to Europe when the Armistice was signed.” In the book, Chemical Warfare (1986), Edward M. Spiers states, “The first 150 tons of Lewisite was at sea, en route to Europe, when the armistice was signed.” However, this does not end the problem. “Sea” is a little word that covers a big area. The San Francisco Journal of February 19, 1923, stated, “At last the makers decided to sink the cylinder containing it in the waters of Chesapeake Bay, on the theory that it would disintegrate so gradually that no harm would be done.” Lewisite was still cloaked in secrecy when this paper was published and the quantity produced (150 tons) may not have been known. In a speech by Capt. Lewis on November 21, 1921, he states that after the explosion of the Lewisite plant at American University, the War Department used the explosion as an excuse to say that Lewisite would not be produced. He could not even tell his team, who were depressed by the false story, that a large plant was built to produce Lewisite in Ohio. In a translation of an editorial in a French publication, Arbetaren, dated January 12, 1926, the following is stated: “As early as the next year [1918] the United States had such a large supply of Lewisite that the united armies of Europe might have been annihilated with it . . . After the war, the

6: Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices

85

greater portion of the poisonous gas was destroyed . . .” The editorial continues: “In trying to bore a hole in a safe in a bank in Chicago, three burglars were killed by a gas streaming out of a metal bottle in the safe. This gas was Lewisite and two milligrams, that is only two thousandths of a gram, were sufficient to kill three men.” This paper also refers to a later dump in 1926 of six chests in the Atlantic Ocean. This material was believed to have been the production run after the train left Willoughby and before the war ended. On February 1, 1943, Time Magazine honored Capt. Lewis when he died. It stated, “Because no one knew what to do with it, the U.S. supply of lewisite was dumped in the sea off Baltimore after the Armistice” (emphasis added). Other sources suggest that the Lewisite was dumped 50 miles from Baltimore, namely Gassed! (2000) by R. Evans and Lewisite: Production, Use, Dumping and Destruction (2004) by Joel A. Vilensky and Pandy R. Sinish. Because the Chesapeake and Delaware canal was too shallow at the time to take 150 tons of anything through it, the shipment had to go south. Yankee Ingenuity in the War (1920) by F. P. Stockbridge suggests that it was dumped three miles out in the ocean. It could be that there was a significant amount produced in the few days between the time the first train left Willoughby and the Armistice. This too might have been shipped at some later date to the Edgewood Pier, and that is the Lewisite dump referred to by Stockbridge. Indeed, this may be referring to the Elinor dumping. There were also six chests containing Lewisite dumped in the ocean off a passenger liner, noted previously. Records are unclear. George Loper states, “Press Reports suggest that Conant’s team manufactured more than 150 tons of Lewisite. It is believed that 516 steel drums were taken by heavily guarded train to Baltimore, where they were put on barges, carried 50 miles offshore, and dumped. Other accounts suggest that the material was en route to Europe when the war ended; the ship, it is said, was scuttled at sea to avoid bringing the lewisite back.” However, the most reliable sources state that it was at the pier when the war ended. Fifty miles from Baltimore ends right in the middle of the largest “dead zone” in Chesapeake Bay. Not so strangely, charter boat captains do not take their clientele there to catch rockfish. The 50-mile line also ends at one of the deepest portions of the Bay channel, about 95 feet. That line also coincides with a military warning zone; these zones usually indicate ordnance. It is unclear whether this zone was drawn for the Naval Research Laboratory or the Lewisite dump or both. Chesapeake Bay has other contamination and dangers from past military dumping. A one-ton cylinder of mustard gas was dumped in the northern part of the Bay and radioactive pellets were strewn on the bottom

86

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

of the Bush River. Shells from the ranges at Aberdeen Proving Ground (Edgewood) were buried near the shore and are now eroding out of the little cliffs, or dumped in a nearby creek. Also, bottles of mercury recently eroded out of the little cliffs along Aberdeen. Lewisite was also dumped in Kings Creek. The Atlantic Ocean had three large dumps of toxic munitions in 1960, 1962, and 1964. The first dumping was reported to contain two one-ton cylinders of Lewisite, a smaller cylinder of Lewisite, and 318 tons of radiological waste. The second dumping included 378 105-mm mustard shells, 341 155-mm mustard projectiles, a one-ton cylinder of Lewisite, 20 drums of cyanide 421, 757 pounds of radiological waste, and 5232 white phosphorous munitions. The third dumping included 456 one-ton containers of riot control agent, 1700 75-mm mustard projectiles, 74 one-ton containers of mustard agent, 10 500-lb cyanogen chloride bombs, and 800 55-gallon drums of radiological waste. These sites were near each other. It is believed that these sites are near the Delaware Bay because these are different from the sites listed in Map 1. One of the mustard cylinders was dumped in the upper Bay during the trip because it started leaking. Being dumped in the upper Bay indicates that the barge went through the Chesapeake and Delaware canal. Barges are not very seaworthy, especially with 500 tons aboard, and it makes sense that they would not have been towed too far out to sea given the unpredictable weather in the North Atlantic. In Delaware, hundreds of live ordnance items (French rifle grenades, hand grenades, and shells) have also been dredged up with clams. The resulting empty clamshells together with the real shells have been used as a driveway paving material. One 75-mm mustard shell has been found in a Delaware driveway and it burned three ordnance crewmen from Dover AFB when they detonated it. (They thought it was an explosive round and simply detonated it with a small explosive charge and then picked up the pieces.) (See Photo 12 in the photo section.) This shell is believed to be part of the 1700 mustard shells referred to above. A second mustard shell (believed to be one of the 1700) has been found off the coast of New Jersey. The boat stopped and the location is now known. An effort should be made to locate the other 1698, not to mention the radioactive waste. Finally, there is also a military warning zone off Cape Henlopen with a strange triangular marking, in fairly deep water. Triangular markings are generally used to designate chemical, biological, radiological, (CBR) or nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC) hazard sites. Oysters in South Carolina and the Chesapeake Bay have been found to contain arsenic, as reported in “Differences in the bioaccumulation of arsenic by oysters from Southeast coastal US and Chesapeake Bay” (Chemosphere,

6: Prior Ordnance Disposal Practices

87

2002) by G. F. Riedel and N. Valette-Silver. The authors concluded that the source was environmental but left open the primary source. (Note: They did not sample oysters in the vicinity of 50 miles from Baltimore.) Naturally occurring arsenic is very low on the East Coast, usually 1–3 parts per million (ppm) in the soil. Because Lewisite was also dumped off the coast of South Carolina—1507 tons in March 1958—this could be one source. Lewisite is one-third arsenic by weight, thus even if it has broken down by now, that would still amount to 50 tons of arsenic in Chesapeake Bay. Lewisite remains in our chemical weapons arsenal today, even after the discovery of the nerve agents such as sarin and VX. It causes severe damage at 1 ppm in the air over time. It is instantly lethal at 250 ppm. There is evidence that it has similar lethality for fish because their gill structure is similar to our lungs, as reported in “Chemical warfare agents: Estimating oral reference dose” (Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology, 1998) by D. M. Opresko, et al. In fact, bluegills are used to test for trace amounts of chemical warfare agents in water because they are so sensitive, much like the canary in the mine. No one can estimate how many fish, crabs, oysters, and clams have succumbed to the poisons dumped in the Chesapeake Bay. As these containers breach, sea life in the vicinity will be certainly killed. Efforts should be made to locate these munitions and remove them or encapsulate them in concrete. Another unique problem area in Chesapeake Bay is the Edgewood arsenal (Aberdeen Proving Ground). This was the largest chemical weapons production facility in the world. For years, this facility dumped chemical weapons in the Chesapeake tributaries and, in one case, nuclear material near Delaware Bay. Edgewood made three sea dumps: a barge of mustard, cyanogen chloride, and NBC bulk and projectiles, August 2–7, 1968; a barge of mustard, Lewisite bulk and projectiles, July 11–18, 1962; and a barge of 2-ton containers of Lewisite, June 6–17, 1960. Records do not exist prior to 1946. Incidents occurred in one of these, resulting in a leaking one-ton cylinder being thrown overboard in the bay. Presumably, the mustard could polymerize and float around in globs. Although not a dumping, VX was sprayed on Carroll Island in Chesapeake Bay. Also, chemical UXO was policed up from ranges at Edgewood by the Civilian Conservation Corps and buried near the beaches. It is now eroding out. Islands in the Bay served as bombing targets in World War II, which has left unexploded bombs in several areas. Large ordnance disposal areas are also noted on several charts.

88

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

6.3.4

Other Sea Dumping Events

Commencing on February 3, 1919, the Steamer Elinor was loaded with drums of mustard and phosgene and gas shells at Edgewood. The drum dumping took place offshore from the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. The boat then made its way up the Atlantic coast to New York, dumping shells along the way. The whole event took several weeks. The log book contains the latitude and longitude of the exact course the ship took. Other sea dumping events include: • The Naval Mine Depot, Norfolk, Virginia, March 1946, a shipload of mustard projectiles • New Orleans Port of Entry, Louisiana, May 1946, three phosgene bombs • Theodore Naval Magazine, Mobile, Alabama, July 1946, a barge of German mustard bombs, and in February 1954, a landing ship tank of CNS (tear gas) projectiles • Naval Weapons Station, Concord, California, April 1958, a shipload of mustard and Lewisite bombs and bulk, and in May 1958, a barge of bulk Lewisite and nitrogen mustard • Sunny Point Naval Pier, Sunny Point, California, March 1958, four barges of bulk Lewisite and nitrogen mustard, and in August 1970, a shipload of sarin rockets

6.3.5

Lake Erie

The historical documentation suggests that on or about November 6, 1918, a train loaded with 150 tons of Lewisite left the Lewisite factory at Willoughby, Ohio. Details suggest that the train went no faster than 10 mph and took four days to reach the Bush River Pier at Edgewood, Maryland. While at the dock, the war ended. The daily Lewisite production is not known for November 6. However, figures between 10 and 40 tons a day are mentioned. Taking the lower figure, at least 40 tons more Lewisite was produced prior to the end of the war. There is no evidence that this Lewisite was shipped and only one later disposal of six “iron chests” dumped overboard from a passenger liner a few years later. Thus, there are three options for the large quantity that was left: It was either buried, dumped into Lake Erie, or shipped to the Bush River Depot. Supporting the Lake Erie theory is the discovery of a railroad tank car sunk on a barge in the Lake, near Willoughby. The divers first discovering this thought it was a submarine. There is also a dead zone not unlike that in Chesapeake Bay centered on Willoughby.

7

Ordnance Detection and Analysis

7.1 Introduction This chapter deals with the problems of finding the ordnance items once the high probability areas are determined. Metal detectors, magnetometers, ground penetrating radar, and other techniques are extremely limited, though they are improving. It is important for the residents, stakeholders, and regulators to realize that even if the guidance laid out in this book is followed conscientiously, not all ordnance will be found on range impact areas or burial sites. Signs, deed notification, and other means of communication should be employed to warn land users of the possibility of finding further ordnance and what to do.

7.1.1 The Importance of Researching the Latest Ordnance Detection Technology In addition to a lack of experience in environmental remediation of munitions by regulators and the military, tried and accepted technology is also very inferior. For example, the Range Rule refers to a magnetometer and metal detector technology demonstration at the Jefferson Proving Ground in Madison, Indiana, stating “that all of the demonstrators performed below expected detection and identification capabilities. Ordnance detection ratios fell below 65 percent . . . For example, if 100 ordnance items were located on a range scheduled for remediation, the best technology demonstrated at JPG would correctly identify 65 of the 100 UXO locations.” This Jefferson Proving Ground demonstration tested 49 different metal detector systems. The equipment included hand-carried, vehicle-towed, and airborne systems using ground penetrating radar, magnetic fields, electrical impulses, and other technologies. The test site was 40 acres with inert ordnance, scrap metal, and other objects buried at specific locations. An 80-acre site was used for airborne systems. The best systems were then to be tried with live ordnance and at different bases having different soil types. The author’s experience at Camp Simms and American University has been that all items must be excavated. Recently at American University, two large anomalies were found presumably including a laboratory dump and a munitions burial. Eleven nearby small anomalies were excluded. After the landowner insisted that all anomalies be excavated, the third small 89

90

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

anomaly turned out to be a complete 75-mm shell, three inches deep. Even with all the criticism and attention focused on this site and the most reliable operators and equipment used, this anomaly was initially rejected. Accordingly, because live CWM munitions as well as high-explosive shells may be found buried at some sites, it is important to explore the latest in technology to find as many ordnance items as possible.

7.1.2 Difficulties in Differentiating Between Ordnance Items and Other Debris Even when using the best available technology in metal detectors, a number of factors can prevent this technology from reliably differentiating between ordnance items and other debris. First, the mineral content of the ground can influence the detector. Magnetic black sand (Fe3O4) produces a negative response. The iron in the earth is essentially the same as that in a nail. Grinding a nail down in shavings will produce the same reading as black sand. Similarly, a hot rock often contains the same iron oxide. Alternatively, pyrite (FeS2) is positive. Wet salt sand will also create a positive influence. Most high-grade metal detectors can be adjusted or tuned for prevailing soil conditions. Second, many ranges have been used over such long periods that weapons systems have changed. For example, in clearing Camp Simms, a national guard camp and range in the District of Columbia, live and detonated ordnance and shrapnel included World War I Livens and Stokes mortars, 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, 2.3-in. rockets, grenades, Garand clips, 30-caliber and 45-caliber bullets from the backstops, a Vietnam-era rocket nose, and a Civil War Minié ball, all in the same general area. Not to mention that this range was a park for many years with beer cans, pipes, mufflers, batteries, and other assorted metallic debris including several handguns. The depths ranged from surface to nearly four feet. Differentiating between ordnance and debris in such a situation is nearly impossible. Third, signal strength is inversely proportional to depth in all metal detectors and magnetometers. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between a small metal object near the surface and a larger object that is deeper. Some detectors are better at reading depth than others.

7.2

General Types of Metal Detectors

Generally, there are three types of instruments used to detect ordnance: cesium vapor magnetometers, radio telemetry (common metal detectors),

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

91

and pulse induction units. For many years, none could reliably distinguish between metal debris and ordnance items. Even size is difficult to tell because the signal is faint on a smaller, closer object and faint on a larger, deeper object.

7.2.1 Very Low Frequency Types The most common detector today by coin hunters is the very low frequency (VLF), 3000–30,000 Hz, combined with the transmitter–receiver (TR) circuit. This combination can be used to differentiate between metal and mineralized ground. The VLF detector will respond similarly to an out-of-place hot rock and a metal object. The detector is then switched to the TR mode and the signal will die down if the object is mineralized rock or soil. Also, where the ground is uniformly mineralized the VLF detector can be tuned (desensitized to eliminate the noise from the ground). However, mineralized ground will reduce the depth penetration of most types of detectors. Both VLF/TR detectors are available in underwater configurations. This detector is not used for UXO, although the author believes that it is valuable to tell the depth of an anomaly found with another detector. The VLF detector is limited to a factor of depth. Thus if it does not respond to an anomaly, the anomaly is deeper and likely large enough to be a UXO.

7.2.2

Pulse Induction Types

The pulse induction (PI) type of detector pulses a radio frequency signal into the ground and is not affected by iron minerals (negative) and salt water (positive). It is good to use where the terrain varies from wet to dry or where uneven patches of mineral sand are found, as it does not have to be retuned. The PI detector will respond to hot rocks and is unaffected by salt water. The PI detector is often used in underwater configurations. Some larger and newer PI instruments are capable of determining the depth of an object fairly accurately.

7.2.3

Radio Frequency Types

The radio frequency detector is generally designed with two halves, each mounted on the ends of a pole. Commonly called the two-box detector, this was the standard for many years for deep penetration. It also has the advantage of ignoring small “trash” items. This type will also respond

92

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

to hot rocks or underground wet spots, but can be tuned to ignore them. Depth penetration is also significantly reduced in mineralized ground or wet salty sand. This detector should not be used where proximity fuses or electric detonators are likely to be buried.

7.2.4

Cesium Vapor Magnetometers

These magnetometers have a long tube (usually about 2 feet long) that contains two cesium vapor sensors that respond to changes in magnetic fields. They only detect ferrous metal, but have the advantage of deep detection. If two tubes are used, they may be placed at the ends of beams or poles, either hand-carried or affixed amid ships to a boat. Thus, they can cover a significant search swath. An underwater version has several single tubes mounted on a submersible trailer that is towed across the bottom.

7.3

UXO Location Technologies

Of course, all of the described types of detectors can locate ordnance. Many UXO technicians still “mag and flag” using a hand-held cesium vapor magnetometer. If all anomalies are to be intrusively investigated, these work fairly well. But they will not find brass or aluminum fuses and detonators, lead projectiles, or aluminum-cased bombs. On range impact areas, any loose fuses are likely to have detonated anyway. However, on impact areas the amount of shell fragments (frag) render the cesium vapor magnetometer less than desirable because it does not discriminate effectively between small frag on the surface and deeper UXO.

7.3.1

Brands Commonly Used for Ordnance

Professional UXO remediation services often rely on instruments that can digitally record the signals as well as map the anomalies using the Global Positioning System (GPS), such as the Ferex 4.021®, the Forester CAST® (digital recording option attached to the 4.021), Varian V92/Mk22®, the TM-4®, the GEM® 3, the EM31®, and the EM61®. The first four are analog magnetometers, which only detect ferrous metals or magnetic objects. The 4.021 uses a fluxgate-type sensor and the V92 uses an optically pumped cesium-type (atomic resonance) sensor probe. The TM-4 is a cesium or helium sensor type. The EM61 is a PI type detector, which can detect all metals. The Multi-sensor Towed Array Detection System (MTADS) is an improved PI system developed by the Naval Research Laboratory. The

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

93

Geometrics G-858® is another useful instrument. Likewise, the GEM 3 is also useful. Newer systems are being developed constantly and any omission is due to lack of familiarity by the author and not an indication of disapproval. New computer programs are available that can show metal mass and depth. Thus, selection of an instrument may be less important than what program is used. The Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC, has developed a superb metal detection system. They can do work on federal property but have a civilian contractor, Black Hawk, for work on nonfederal sites, the FUDS, or transferred ranges.

7.3.2 Some Detectors Can Detonate Fuses, Detonators, or Electric Blasting Caps Keep in mind that radio (proximity) or variable time (VT) fuses and electrical blasting caps could be detonated with some devices, especially a radio frequency device. The best discussion of this problem is in a report entitled Electronic Fuse Evaluation; Sensitivity of pre-1960 Fuses to Instrument Electromagnetic Fields (1997) by ECG, Inc., Huntsville, Alabama. This report carefully evaluated several common instruments used in the UXO field. Several products, including the GEM 3 frequency domain sensor and the EKKO IV/100 and EKKO 1000 radar units, were mentioned as not being assured for safe operation where VT fuses are suspected. Other instruments had varying degrees of safety factors. The report did not assess the twin box receiver–transmitter style detectors preferred by some (including the author) for the deepest work. Presumably, these would also violate the safety margins.

7.4 Choosing a Metal Detector or Magnetometer 7.4.1

Conducting a Geophysical Prove-Out

A geophysical prove-out must be conducted. The ITRC has an excellent guideline document on prove-outs. Basically, a prove-out is a test of various instruments on a surveyed test plot of buried ordnance of the type likely to be found on the site along with junk and frag. The ordnance is buried at depths likely to be encountered. (Keep in mind that every range also has an ordnance storage area, firing line where hang fires are likely to be buried, and a disposal area if the site spanned enough years to render ordnance obsolete.) Thus, the 1- to 4-ft depth at a mortar impact area may increase to 10 feet at the disposal site.

94

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

At the Spring Valley site in Washington, DC, a twin pole (with 10-ft beams) magnetometer EM31 was selected for the geophysical survey. Unfortunately, terrain was not considered. Many areas at this site were covered with shrubs, brush, or trees. It is also a region with steep hills. Indeed, most of the burial areas were in low-lying ravines where the earth was soft and could easily be dug. These same areas now contain the most brush and shrubs. At least 15 large burial sites were missed because an otherwise good device could not be physically used in likely areas. In choosing the correct detectors, other particular facts should also be considered. Whereas most ordnance is ferrous, fuses may be nonferrous and are usually buried separately from the projectile bodies and may be in large and dangerous quantities. Some explosives such as dynamite or C-3 and C-4 may not be in metallic containers, thus the nonferrous detonators may be the only clue to their location. Also, some chemical agent containers are nonferrous. Chemical weapon test sites may have the unique problem of arsenic, magnesium, and other metals in the soil. Ranges may have copper and beryllium in the soil. The effects of such contamination or natural soil conditions on the detection equipment should be carefully considered. At any CWM or UXO site that cannot be secured from entry, all anomalies should ordinarily be intrusively investigated (dug). Only in the rare case where the exact type of ordnance is known (e.g. a range used only for 155-mm shells) and other refining techniques are used can metallic objects be eliminated on the basis of signal data, which is digitally recorded. The amount and type of potential chemical and explosive ordnance, which may have been fired at a range or buried in a dump, is ordinarily too numerous to reject based on signal data alone. For example, a large piece of frag lying horizontal cannot be differentiated from a UXO nose-down (vertical) at the same depth. In an attempt to eliminate some anomalies, the borehole technique is often used as a way of determining the depth of the object. A hole is drilled alongside (but not too close) to an anomaly. A special magnetometer or metal detector—usually just the coil or induction tube—is lowered into the hole. Maximum signal strength will determine the precise depth of the anomaly and therefore give a clue as to the size of the object based on the original and borehole signal strengths. The borehole is good for eliminating a weak signal close to the surface as a possible mortar shell; however, it has little use in eliminating a larger signal deeper. But it can make excavation safer. Newer computer programs can determine “metal mass” or the depth of an object, minimizing the necessity for some intrusive investigations.

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

95

In most cases, burial sites as well as individual UXO should be considered. Those sites will often be in different locations and different instruments can be selected. Some experimental wartime sites are troublesome because the testing or impact areas may have also doubled as ordnance burial sites when the operation was closed.

7.5 7.5.1

UXO Analysis Pulsed Neutron Identification

A pulsed neutron beam can penetrate the casing of munitions and identify the filler contents, be it explosive, chemical agent, incendiary, or smoke. This is a one-sided device, unlike an x-ray, and requires a minimum of disturbance to the item. In fact, the item does not need to be dug to the point of being visible. It is absolutely necessary for any ordnance remediation work, and it should be part of any health and safety plan. A portable isotopic neutron spectroscopy (PINS) detector can be used to help eliminate an anomaly or munitions as being dangerous. The PINS detector is only effective for six inches, thus the object does not have to be completely excavated. A larger truck-mounted version called pulsed fast neutron analysis (PFNA) can penetrate to five feet, but it is extremely dangerous to drive a heavy vehicle over a munitions site. Still larger permanently mounted versions are available for customs work, which can look through an 8-ft wide steel shipping container or semitrailer. In some cases, these devices are able to positively identify the chemical constituents inside a steel shell. They can locate plastic land mines by the same technique, for that matter. They save valuable time in eliminating the careful handling of expended ordnance. Neutron beams can identify chemical, explosive, smoke, and incendiary munitions, each of which may require special handling. However, the PINS system normally only looks for seven key elements. Experimental sites which contain unique ordnance will find the “no key element” decision of the Munitions Assessment Review Board (MARB) useless. Also, the PINS system may not be good for nitrogen, the key constituent in explosives, probably due to the nitrogen in the air. The original trial of the PINS system resulted in a charge by a whistleblower that the data was falsified as to its ability to detect nitrogen. That whistleblower has won his court case, adding validity to the claim. The author does not know if the claims are true but a healthy skepticism of the PINS product is warranted. Shells having “no key elements” should still be detonated in

96

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

a chamber and the resulting air filtered through banks of charcoal, just to be on the safe side. One example suffices: An MARB was established to review shell finds from the Spring Valley site. The board, composed of very experienced EOD people, PINS nuclear physicists, and historians, misinterpreted data. The PINS system revealed silicon in a number of shells. The MARB incorrectly concluded that they were sand-filled training rounds. Actually, they contained Kieselgur, a silicon substance used to keep the poison gas down at ground level after detonation. Now, a PINS unit small enough to be lowered into a borehole located alongside of the anomaly is available. This is the only device remotely capable of determining whether or not an anomaly is a viable explosive or chemical ordnance item, what the chemical or explosive is, and possibly whether or not it is fused. But, as we have seen, it has uncertainty. Also, boreholes are too labor intensive on a range impact area with hundreds of anomalies. Again, a caution is necessary around experimental ordnance sites because only seven key elements are routinely analyzed with the PINS system. Experimental chemical agents, such as bromine compounds, may not be detected. Thus, at the present time a PINS unit may still fail to identify common potential hazards. However, they are the best thing around short of the explosive destruction system (EDS). The EDS is a sealed heavy steel explosive chamber which can open the shell and analyze its content, and then neutralize it.

7.5.2

X-Ray of Shells

Suspected chemical weapons are usually x-rayed to determine whether a liquid line is present. Because several solid chemical agents (i.e., ricin and Adamsite) remain in the current and past inventories, and others were experimented with in great numbers during chemical weapon development, the x-ray technique is over-relied upon for determining chemical rounds. It also will not find a compressed gas like arsine. If a liquid line is present, it may only be water and mask the explosive hazard of a high-explosive round. The PINS system, even with its shortcomings, has made the x-ray technology obsolete for chemical ordnance. The x-ray can still detect fuse channels, burster tubes, and other fuse components, making it useful for determining whether a round is a dummy, but its value must be weighed against the danger of the extra handling of corroded or unstable munitions. Finally, detonation chambers are now used instead of open detonation and can be protected against a chemical release, making tentative chemical weapon identification unnecessary.

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

97

7.6 Other Geophysically Intrusive Techniques Other geophysical equipment such as ground penetrating radar and microgravity analysis are capable of locating buried ordnance at great depths. Microgravity—developed substantially by Dwain K. Butler, U.S. Army Engineer at the Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Mississippi—can be used for locating bunkers, pits, trenches, and large items often associated with mass burials as opposed to UXO on a range. It can cover a very large area, at great depths, in a short time. It is unaffected by vegetation, rocks, terrain features, buildings, and metallic debris that can make metal detectors unreliable or utterly useless. Computer interpretation and mapping is available, lessening operator error in interpretation. Microgravity also has the advantage of being able to find bulk explosives not buried in metal containers, such as Navy bag powder, dynamite, or C-4. Instrumentation is a rapidly developing art and recent innovations could make microgravity even more sensitive in the near future. Presently, it should be considered for locating burial sites. A new technology called shear wave uses sound waves and their reflections to detect burial sites. This technology has the advantage of being able to “see” under a house and to detect glass CWM containers.

7.6.1

Ground Penetrating Radar

Ground penetrating radar (GPR) can locate major soil disturbances, which would occur in a large burial, as well as individual ordnance items. It is dependent upon a skilled operator experienced with the local geology. Of course, an oblong rock could be misinterpreted as an ordnance item but a false positive is better than a false negative in this business. GPR has the advantages of deep penetration (up to 30 feet or more) in soil or water, and a visual picture as compared to a metal detector or magnetometer. The GPR can also “see” glass chemical carboys, bottles, and potentially a quantity of CAIS, which are usually small glass vials in cardboard boxes. GPR is a useful technique to employ for looking at an anomaly prior to drilling a borehole. For example, a deep four-foot piece of rebar could be eliminated without the necessity to drill a borehole even though its detector signal may be similar to a deep mortar shell. Similarly, multiple close fragments of a detonated ordnance item could be seen as distinct from intact munitions. To detection equipment, the signals would be identical. Because GPR operates with the ease of a vacuum cleaner, it would take only a few seconds to scan an anomaly. Even if the visualization could not make a positive finding, it could make borehole operations safer and faster by determining depth and location and confirming single or multiple items.

98

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

GPR can also be used for underwater dumps by floating the antenna on top of the water. Only after a suspected ordnance item is located and identified can an informed decision be made as to how to remove the threat.

7.6.2

Infrared Imaging

Shallow ordnance items such as mines can have a temperature gradient different from that of the surrounding soil. Infrared analysis can show the location of these items.

7.6.3

Sonar

For underwater dumps, sonar may be a reliable, inexpensive method. Modern units priced under $1000 can show bottom configurations, penetrate mud, record on a graph, show a three-dimensional picture, and record position via attachment to a GPS unit. Metal detectors having these capabilities may exceed $30,000.

7.6.4

Bioassay

Many types of chemical weapons are lethal to micro and macro invertebrates. Bioassay can be used as a good indicator of polluted surface water. The types of species that more easily succumb to pollution have been well outlined by several sources. Bioassay has now been successfully used to locate and assess CWM burial sites in Canada, and it should be a routine part of CWM site remediation in this country. Unlike sampling, it can be used in real-time, as a glance under the microscope will promptly reveal sterile soil. One of the most important aspects of bioassay is that it clearly tells if there is an impact on the environment. Another aspect is that reduced speciation can indicate precise burial sites. It is known that many types of chemical weapons kill vegetation when buried (i.e., arsenicals and mustard, which breaks down into sulfuric acid, are two examples). Stressed vegetation can be easily seen during a walkthrough of the site and will be a beginning point for a metal detector sweep. Conversely, explosives (which are nitrogen based) may promote plant growth. Small areas where the vegetation is noticeably lush may indicate buried explosive ordnance. A patch of hardwood trees in dune ecology having only pine trees may indicate an explosive burial site. A genetically altered germ has been developed that thrives on TNT and glows in the dark (photoluminescence). This can locate plastic mines and other ordnance burials at night.

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

99

7.6.5 Sampling Data May Help Locate Buried Ordnance Soil gas surveys can be done rapidly and easily and can cover a wide area. One new type uses a Gortex “shoelace” with absorbent pellets inside (called the Goresorber). The shoelace is inserted into the ground with a two-foot push tube. (Clearance with a metal detector is recommended.) The lace is withdrawn in a day or so and the pellets analyzed for CWM or explosive breakdown products. A geographic information systems (GIS) computer printout is made extrapolating areas of increased concentrations. This method can be used to locate all manner of landfills or contaminated soils. Similarly, soil samples can hint at burial sites. Where most soil samples are clean but some reveal CWM or explosive breakdown products, this may present evidence of a nearby burial site. Groundwater samples may show explosive breakdown products such as toluene. If it is uniform throughout the site, it can be dealt with as a simple contaminant. Very high concentrations of explosive breakdown products in only a few spots across a site may indicate buried containerized explosives (munitions). Of course, some compounds like toluene could also indicate a leaking underground storage tank. Although you may look a little silly digging up an old tank with your flak suit and Kevlar helmet, you can at least take credit for finding another source of pollution. Groundwater may also hold trace amounts of CWM. In fact, CWM contamination is a concern where burials are near wells or sea dumps are near water intakes.

7.6.6

Arsenical CWM Biolocation Using a Fern

An arsenic hyper-accumulating fern has been developed by Lena Q. Ma, Kenneth M. Komar, Cong Tu, Weihua Zhang, Yong Cai, and Elizabeth D. Kennelley (Business Week, February 12, 2001). This fern not only cleans up soil contaminated with arsenic but can locate arsenic hot spots, such as those where arsenical shells are buried. It will grow faster in high levels of arsenic.

7.7 How to Conduct a Correct Search for Buried or Range Impact Ordnance Once the metal detectors are selected for a particular site, usually after a prove-out in the same soil type for the particular types of ordnance suspected, the method of searching must be developed. Various issues should

100

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

be addressed such as whether the entire site can be searched and whether the focus is individual shells or burial pits or both, CWM or high explosives, standard or experimental ordnance, future land use, terrain, vegetation, projected depth of ordnance, and so on. Other portions of this book will deal with historical searches, photogrammetry, bioassay, groundwater plumes, and other methods of narrowing the areas to be searched. With regard to a typical military installation, it may be difficult to completely reach excluded areas, even using all of the science just mentioned. Certainly, the range will be an important area— however, a burial pit could be found almost anywhere. Military sites often span several wars or decades. The constant improvement in the weapons of war may suddenly render a particular ordnance item obsolete. A timeline should be constructed for major changes in ordnance and then the site should be considered against that backdrop. The advent of the Dahlgren gun, breach loading cannon, chemical weapons, modern mortars, airplane-deployed bombs and the demise of smaller guns such as the 3-in. Stokes, 75-mm or larger 30-caliber ammunition in rifles in favor of 22-caliber bullets should be considered as these events would be motivation to dispose of substantial quantities of obsolete ordnance. Once the decision to dispose of ordnance is made, it seems that recordkeeping ends. Still, clues can be found. For example, Fort Meyer in Virginia had two 75-mm batteries in World War I. The Civilian Conservation Corps supposedly buried two pits of ordnance at an adjoining facility, which had no record of having ordnance, in 1935. That is just when the 75-mm was being phased out.

7.7.1

Geophysical Search Plans

The best that historical records and aerial photos can usually do is show high probability areas for ordnance searches. These areas must be divided into polygons, staked and the boundaries marked with string. Every square inch must then be searched. Usually, the detector operator trails a string and begins walking a line parallel to the boundary of the polygon. Each succeeding line is walked parallel to the first and no farther away than the detector’s horizontal range. GPS may not be as accurate as the old-fashioned string in ensuring coverage. Brush must often be cleared in advance of the search. The base of trees must be searched completely because the roots of trees often are wrapped around UXO. When a shell fails to detonate, it nevertheless often leaves a hole. Tree seeds (acorns, maple feathers, and so on) tend to fall into these holes and start growing, and eventually the roots engulf the UXO item.

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

101

Range maps may show the impact area or target area on the range when the map was made. However, ranges often change over time; hence, every area within the potential range fan must be searched. Also, standard operating procedure for a hang fire is to carefully remove the item from the gun and dispose it of by burying it nearby. Thus, not only the impact area but also the firing area must be searched. If ordnance is found on a polygon at the edge of an area to be searched, then another polygon must be established to ensure that there are no fliers that went off the main impact area. Searches of only a statistical sampling of the range are not acceptable. First, the accuracy of modern arms may place the shells in a tight impact area, and a statistical sample may miss a large quantity of UXO. Second, the target and hence the impact area may be moved periodically and finding one will not belie the presence of others. Third, fliers can still be found, especially from ranging or fire control errors. Fourth, leaving only a few rounds is unacceptable from a legal and moral standpoint.

7.8 Historical and Archival Data Sources This section tells why, how, and where to find historical information on your site. It includes the types of documents that are usually helpful and what information to seek. Many military sites are old, and the munitions may have been buried or fired into target areas not recorded. Nevertheless, clues as to what types of training took place, what munitions were likely present, and even high-priority locations can be found in the historical documents. Year-end accomplishments may mention obsolete ordnance disposal, for example. An old topographic map may locate a low-lying area suitable for burial, and so on. Historical information on a facility or site can often provide important information on the types of activities that occurred in the past and what types of contamination or ordnance can be expected. Although burial maps are infrequent, reports, correspondence, budget itemizations, maps, photographs (aerial and still), and other material can provide important information.

7.8.1

Archival Searches

Archives may contain very valuable information as to what may be buried at a site and where it might be located. One interesting source is the local newspaper. Many papers keep a running index. For example, during a recent search of the Washington, DC, Evening Star index under the heading

102

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

of “munitions” for information on a local site, the following interesting descriptions of stories were observed: • “Navy dumping obsolete ammunition into sea,” January 30, 1946, B-10 • “Deadly dust from A Bomb plant to be dumped at sea,” June 29, 1946, A-2 • “Live 174-mm [sic] shell found in field,” November 11, 1936, A-4 • “Major Gen. Gilchrist cites hazard at Edgewood Arsenal,” November 17, 1932, B-15 • “Exploding dud at junkyard,” October 19, 1937, B-9 The good indexing of many periodicals makes such archival work easy. Although headquartered in Washington, DC, the National Archives also has regional branches for most material. The Archives has certain record classifications, which are particularly useful for seeking information on buried ordnance. Record Group (RG) 175 is the Chemical Warfare Service records. RG 77 deals with military CCC camps. RG 156 covers ordnance records. RG 175 contains cartographic records. In addition, there are still photo collections of sites that date back to the Civil War. Often, a photograph of a fort will contain valuable clues to the direction that its guns could have fired. There is also an aerial photographic section. The staff at the National Archives is uniformly helpful. They specialize in narrow areas and are quite familiar with the types of records in their sections and also the indexing tools that are available. The Corps of Engineers has historians who generally do a credible job of research. Historians often lack a scientific background and, accordingly, may not fully appreciate some of their findings. For example, at the AUES the historians properly concluded that the site had 1200 chemists and engineers plus 700 support personnel. However, this did not get translated into “there must be a dump somewhere.” Because there was no mention of a dump in the records, the conclusion was reached that there was no dump. It took the state to order the Corps to find the dump. Actually, it turns out that there are many, and some have already been found. The military branches generally will not authorize an environmental cleanup unless there is direct proof of the problem. Often, accountants are in charge of the environmental process and are somewhat oblivious to scientific observations. Therefore, the military historical studies will sometimes make unwarranted “no further action” (NOFA) statements because they did not find a burial map or see shells sticking out

7: Ordnance Detection and Analysis

103

of the ground during a site visit. States now have a right to challenge these determinations. Challenging these NOFA decisions requires extensive archival research. Also, the military avoids remedial actions on the “whole site” and routinely tries to limit their efforts to the “hot spots.” It is sometimes very difficult to get them to sample even the four corners of the site. It is therefore imperative for the states to do enough archival research to support a request for facility-wide investigations.

7.8.2

Library Materials

All the military branches have libraries as well as archives. The U.S. Army Historical Center at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, has an excellent library that includes most of the technical manuals ever issued by the Army. The Navy’s Archive is located at Port Hueneme, California. The facility itself, if it is an active base, may have an archive and a library or historical office. Old maps of the base may show ranges, munitions bunkers, magazines, and other buildings and structures that suggest the need for further environmental assessment and cleanup. The local town or city may have a historical society or library with historical photos and maps of the facility.

7.8.3

Aerial Photography for Munitions Sites

Aerial photographs exist for many military, university, and rural sites. The Spring Valley site had an aerial mosaic from 1918, a 1927 parked car survey, and 1937 Agricultural Department photos. Aerial photographs are particularly good for detecting chemical weapon burial sites because several of the common chemical agents will retard revegetation long after the burial occurred. Mustard will produce sulfuric acid, which will kill vegetation. Arsenicals contain large amounts of arsenic, which is an herbicide. Very often, the aerial photographs that may be available may be 10 years apart. Areas of light colored soil appearing on two photographs many years apart may denote a chemical munitions burial. For explosive ordnance, nitrates may have the opposite effect and will promote rapid revegetation of a disturbed site. This may not occur for deep burials, intact recent munitions, or where the topography overcomes revegetation (slopes, high ground, and so on). Aerial photos may delineate range or testing areas by paths, roads, firing points, or other features.

8

Excavation and Removal of Ordnance

8.1 Excavating the Ordnance Item after Proper Identification This section covers some common considerations and methods for removing or exposing ordnance items for on-site demolition. Each site is different. Some of the considerations include safety, thoroughness, time, and cost. Recovery of items will become the one of the fastest developing areas of technology in future years because of the tremendous number of sites that must be cleaned up. The fact that the EOD team did it this or that way last year may not be the best way this year. Regulators, stakeholders, and residents must keep abreast of the latest technology. Traditionally, hand excavating the item has been used. Non-sparking tools such as beryllium–copper alloy shovels and trowels should be used. Plastic or nylon shovels and trowels are better in soft earth because they do not jar the item if they touch it. Excavation techniques can vary widely. Many considerations must go into selecting the proper techniques. For example, robotic techniques may be the safest for the personnel but may not have the control necessary to unearth a badly corroded chemical shell.

8.1.1

Personal Protective Equipment and Clothing

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) normally specifies protective requirements. However, they have not become involved with ordnance work; therefore, some interpolation is necessary. For chemical shells that also contain an explosive filler, there is no suitable personal protective equipment (PPE). For UXO, proper protective clothing is necessary. For explosive items, TM 10-8470-203-10, Operator’s Manual for Body Armor Set, Individual Countermine (BASIC) sets out a substantial list of equipment. The BASIC is made up of the following ballistic components: • • • •

Helmet cover (ballistic) Face shield Mine protective overboots Anti-fragmentation trousers (ballistic) 105

106

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions • • • • • •

Vest cover (ballistic) Armor chest plate (ballistic) Upper arm protector (ballistic) Lower arm protector (ballistic) Collar (ballistic) Armor groin plate with carrier (ballistic)

Some body armor is available from civilian markets (i.e., Kevlar chain saw leggings). Kevlar helmets, flak vests (not the old ballistic nylon ones, but Kevlar), and groin aprons are available at Army surplus stores in states where they are not illegal. Kevlar gloves, not included in the above list because they were not available at the time this list was developed, are now available from safety supply houses and should be used. They can be lined with Nomex gloves for further protection from fire. Summer Nomex flying gloves are also available at surplus stores and provide the flexibility necessary for fine dexterity. For chemical shells, the explosive filler is not the main worry; therefore, OSHA Level A protective suit is required. Where the weight limits restrict the use of a self-contained breathing apparatus and brushy terrain restricts the use of air-supplied respirators, Level B protective suit may be used. For example, surveying a range with a metal detector may preclude Level A. Shrapnel could cut an air hose and the tank would interfere with the detection equipment. With Level B, the choice of cartridge for the mask becomes important. Normally, the organic vapor cartridge would be appropriate. However, ricin and Adamsite can exist as a dust, so a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter is best. Arsine, stibine, and other hydrogenated metals are also best covered by a metal fume cartridge. Some shells may have fuming sulfuric acid and a corrosive cartridge is necessary. However, because many old shells—whether unexploded on a range or buried—have rusted, they may be difficult to assess as paint and markings are gone. Some ranges and many burial sites may have both chemical and high explosive ordnance. Wearing a chemical suit under Kevlar may be the best practice. Where only explosive ordnance is likely to be encountered, but chemical rounds are still possible, a charcoal-lined suit is a good choice under the Kevlar. Old chemical shells can corrode through and break or leak if handled. They should be encased in foam or a bag of charcoal powder or delicately slid into a sealable container such as a multiple round container (MRC) before movement is attempted. After PINS confirmation, explosive shells are best detonated on-site as even unfused old ordnance can have hypersensitive crystals growing in

8: Excavation and Removal of Ordnance

107

the exudate that forms in the bottom of the shell as the explosives age. For single UXO on a range, the author believes in the “as is where is” philosophy for detonating explosive ordnance. Simply build a containment structure and sandbag it over the shell and detonate it where it is. However, chemical shells with Lewisite or other arsenicals will leave behind arsenic, which must be cleaned up after detonation. If not detonated where found for fear of touching off adjacent munitions, or because of the proximity of buildings or people, the UXO should be robotically moved as short a distance as possible for detonation. Smoke and some incendiary and toxic shells can react with air if they have corroded through. Such an exothermic reaction can generate enough heat to detonate the burster (booster) charge injuring nearby personnel. These shells could also be encased in foam, immersed in water, or containerized, depending upon the filler, before movement is attempted.

8.1.2

Robotics

Many new robotic designs are being created. Vehicles looking like the lunar excursion module are common in bomb disposal units. Robotic backhoes and other devices are now in use. However, the concept of robotics can be as simple as placing an explosive ordnance item on a 3-in. foam rubber cushion atop a child’s plastic basin-shaped sled and pulling it via a 200-ft nylon rope to a sandbagged detonation area. Another idea being tested is taping a powerful magnet (50- or 100-lb. pull) to a child’s remote-control four-wheel drive truck. A 3/16th-in. nylon rope or parachute line is tied to the magnet and is played out as the truck is driven to the shell. Once the truck maneuvers the magnet into the shell and it sticks, the shell can be pulled out of its burial spot to a detonation area. (Such a technique would be used where a number of shells are buried together and intentionally detonating the shell in situ would trigger too large an explosion.) Neither the occasional loss of a $50 toy truck nor the time involved should discourage using this technique. Because the magnet can be used once even a small corner of the shell is exposed, there is no additional delay because to hand-excavate the remainder of the shell would be as time consuming as maneuvering the magnet into place. Similarly, a 10- or 20-ft length of rigid plastic pipe can be used to excavate an ordnance item with a stream of water operated from behind sand bags. Another larger hose can pump out the mud and water from the hole. This is particularly useful for white phosphorus incendiary shells. Buried and presumably set anti-personnel land mines can also be excavated

108

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

this way. This is a much safer way than with a bayonet, as was once the preferred technique. In arid areas, air pressure can be substituted for water. The pressure of air or water can be lowered as the excavation gets closer to the item. Jefferson Proving Ground is equipping ordinary backhoes and other construction equipment with closed-circuit cameras and remote controls. Smaller robots are being built at Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona that are specifically designed to remove munitions. These smaller units also have closed-circuit cameras and special arms to retrieve shells, mines, and other ordnance. RedZone Robotics, Inc., has developed robots for near-shore and beach minefields. The robots contain an explosive charge and are released in the minefield. They find the mines and stay nearby. After all the robots have found a mine, their charges are detonated, which explode the mines.

9

Recommendations

9.1 Basic Site Requirements This chapter is brief but is nonetheless important for stakeholders, residents, and regulators. Numerous examples of the types of actual recommendation documents are included in Part II. These examples are more useful than just listing the types of considerations because the formats can be examined for applicability to the reader’s site. It is important for the stakeholders to make detailed recommendations for the remediation of a chemical or explosive weapons site. Obviously, these must be tailored by the archival research and facts known about the particular site. However, a few routine recommendations follow. The threat posed by a chemical weapons site requires that every part of it be surveyed with magnetometers and ground penetrating radar as deep as possible, with all anomalies intrusively investigated and cleared. Upon finding any intact ordnance, it is important to analyze the contents. This will give clues as to what contaminants may exist in the soil or water from other ordnance no longer intact. In addition, the entire site should have the soil at various depths sampled for the toxic substances listed in Chapters 4 and 5. This should be a random grid sampling comparing the results to off-site background levels. The groundwater should likewise be sampled by strategically placed monitoring wells. Surface water and sediments should also be sampled. Sediments in bogs or intermittent streams may provide useful data. Finally, a health survey of nearby residents should be conducted to determine if there is any elevated incidence of any disease processes related to the hazardous substances found in the sampling.

9.2 Time is Running Out This section stresses the need for timely action due to the increasing contamination and sensitivity of munitions. Residents, stakeholders, and regulators must be reminded of the deleterious aspects of delay. It was noted previously that all explosives become more dangerous with age. In addition, low-level contamination may be more problematic than realized by the scientific community. Buried chemical munitions unearthed in the District of Columbia from World War I were already rusted through or nearly so. The fact remains 109

110

The Cleanup of Chemical and Explosive Munitions

that most chemical agents will vaporize at normal soil temperatures except in the winter. As they vaporize, people and animals in the area are put at extreme risk. Although some agents like mustard gas may hydrolyze if buried below the groundwater table, this cannot be assured. Given the amount and size of chemical weapons buried around the country, a repeat of Bhopal, India, is certainly possible. The Bhopal tragedy of 1984 was caused by the release of methyl isocyanate, not as deadly as some common chemical warfare agents. By most estimates, this release killed 3000 people initially and 15,000 have died since then from related illnesses. It is the purpose of this work, in some small way, to minimize that eventuality. Even gradual releases are a serious problem. The body does not detoxify mustard, a Class A human carcinogen, and even low levels can cause serious health effects if breathed over a long period of time. Stomach cancers have been reported in a community near a large mustard gas manufacturing facility in Maryland. Two former District of Columbia residents with a mustard gas burial site in their yard both died of cancer. Such anecdotal evidence does not prove anything but it points to the need for a thorough health screening of residents living near a CWM burial site. The field of toxicology itself has recently been transformed to account for chronic low-level exposures. The old axiom that dose makes the poison is no longer true. Low-level exposures can damage the body because they do not trigger an immune response, whereas higher doses would. One toxin long thought to be safe at particular levels, like arsenic, has been shown to damage the gene responsible for repairing or destroying all cancer cells. Experience with the leftover gas shells found on the World War I European battlefields conclusively demonstrates that the gas in these shells remains viable and that the shells will corrode through releasing the gas. A very definitive article on the hazards of remaining World War I gas munitions is “The Soldiers Moved On. The War Moved On. The Bombs Stayed.” by Donovan Webster, from the Smithsonian Magazine (1994). The article consists of interviews with the French demineurs, who find and destroy the live munitions on the European battlefields. Many demineurs have been hurt or killed by gas shells.

PART II CASE STUDY: THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY EXPERIMENT STATION (AUES): A FORMERLY USED DEFENSE SITE

Introduction to Part II To assist the reader in undertaking the daunting task of cleaning up a chemical or explosive ordnance site, we are presenting, as Part II, a case study: The American University Experiment Station (AUES), a Formerly Used Defense Site. This site was formerly a chemical weapons research and development facility active during World War I, and is now a college campus and residential neighborhood. Part II is comprised of actual reports by a state regulator, in this case, the District of Columbia, to initially force the cleanup of this chemical weapons site, and then to guide the effort. The reports from this case study illustrate how to integrate the evidentiary information and present it to show the need for environmental remediation of the site. These case study reports also illustrate how sampling and geophysical data should be paired with the other data to find data gaps and/or more precise location information. Omitted from these reports due to space considerations are all the documents upon which these reports were based. For example, the report presented as Chapter 10 was 17 pages long, while the documents referenced in the report added 160 pages as an appendix. The original reports are maintained in an administrative record at the AUES site, which by law is open to the public for any who desire further detail. Many of the references in these reports are to single documents that were never published, and only the date and/or author’s name are available; thus, additional references could not be provided. In addition, the case reports have been renumbered to fit the paragraph scheme of the book and some material found in earlier reports was omitted as repetitious in later reports. (i.e. the history of the site). Some of the reports included in Part II were initiated by the state regulator (the District of Columbia) to dispel a “No Further Action” finding. Some were written to memorialize documents or physical discoveries, which in the state regulator’s opinion required further field investigation. Some were written in response to reports from the regulated community (the military) that were deemed inaccurate or false. Numerous other shorter documents were written that are not included here. As stated previously, the research was the key at this site and will be the key to the adequate remediation of most ordnance sites. The research consumed about seven years of full-time work. The site was very dangerous and the subsequent finding and removal of over 800 chemical and 113

114

Introduction to Part II

explosive shells and 1000 bottles of chemicals and chemical warfare material to date, from a residential neighborhood, justified the expenditure of resources. The reader’s site may be simpler, with less catastrophic potential, and may not justify all these reports. Nevertheless, the author is aware of a number of residential communities that continue to be built atop ordnance ranges without removing the ordnance first. Finally, some state regulators have sampling capabilities which could shortcut the need for some archival work. Adequate sampling has yet to occur at the AUES site. Of course, some archival work is necessary to know what to sample for, and where to sample in the first place.

A Note About Several Reference Photographs and Maps Included: While most of the original source materials mentioned in Part II have been omitted from this book due to space considerations, several photos and maps that may be especially illustrative to the reader are included in the center photo section: • Photo 19, a 1918 photo of one Sgt. Maurer burying carboys of mustard gas (or possibly Lewisite), referenced throughout Part II, was an important piece of evidence in the AUES site search. • Photo 20 shows a stokes mortar found at the AUES site, one of the typical sort of weapons found at such sites. • Photo 21 shows a cement trough the Livens Mortar Battery used for the placement of mortar tubes. Finding this precise firing point structure after 80 years enabled us to establish an exact range fan. • Photo 22 is a 1918 aerial photograph of the AUES site, an important piece of evidence in the AUES site search. • Photo 23 is a recent satellite photo of the AUES site using Linear Spectral Mixing to show arsenic-affected grass. • Map 7 is a point-of-interest (POI) map of the AUES site displaying all the points of interest (POIs) referred to in Part II, with accompanying descriptions of the POIs. • Map 8 is a sampling overview map of the 640 acre AUES site.

10 A History of the American University Experiment Station (AUES) Site Case Study: A State’s Effort to Get the Corps of Engineers to Clean Up a Chemical Weapons Development Manufacturing and Test Site

10.1 Introduction This chapter should be read by every resident and stakeholder, even though they are interested in their own particular site. This chapter should also be read by state and federal regulators that are relatively new to military site cleanup. Residents and stakeholders can see what types of documents could be presented by the regulators. If there is any major discrepancy between these types of documents and what their regulators are submitting, residents might want to know why. Is their regulator lazy? Are they afraid of incurring the wrath of the military by asking for specific things? Or is the regulator inexperienced and does not know what to do? Who is guarding the henhouse? Is your drinking water safe? Will your kids be playing in a park full of live ordnance? Case studies are frequently used in environmental books and training courses. Obviously, if everyone knew how to clean up a site, books and training courses would be unnecessary. The value of this case study is to show the reader examples of the various documents that have been written by a state regulator in the course of cleaning up a chemical weapons site. The case study takes the theory set forth in the first part of this book and applies it to a specific site. For example, Part I of this book stresses the need for a historical study of a site. The case study shows, by example, how such historical information can be used to buttress specific requests for sampling or cleanup action. The theory is that when writing something for the first time, it is valuable to see a sample of how someone else did it. Of course, most of these documents are site-specific, but many of the generic types of documents included should be drafted for most sites. These documents also suggest formats that might be helpful in presenting requests or information to a responsible party, citizens or other regulators. Environmental cleanups of the type contemplated by this book (i.e., ranges) 115

116

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

require an administrative record. Much of this record consists of the documents written by regulators and cleanup contractors. Obviously, for the record to be complete requests by regulators should be in writing even when agreed to by the responsible party. These documents also suggest general lines of inquiry. One of these documents (Chapter 11) was written at the early stages of the cleanup effort when little was known. Nevertheless, it illustrates how broad concerns can be framed to create a study framework by the regulator. This and other documents can provide checklists for regulators, residents, and stakeholders to ensure that all necessary considerations are taken into account and all necessary work is performed. Documents like the Conceptual Site Model in Chapter 17 are actually encouraged by the EPA. Finally, some of these documents are rebuttals to documents prepared by unscrupulous government workers who are just trying to save the government money by creating “spin.” In Chapter 13, an Army historian sought to discredit a 1920 campus newspaper story about a large burial of munitions on the campus. The Army historian even tried to discredit the story on the grounds that, as a religious college, there were scriptural references in their newspaper. The state regulator wrote a scathing report debunking the cheap spin tactic by the Army. Ironically, this was necessary to get the Army to look for the burial pit. By the way, three large munitions burial pits have been found on the campus to date, justifying the state’s vitriolic rebuttal. This case study is also a success story on how a local government can demand an environmental cleanup of a chemical weapons site, even after a “no further action” (NOFA) decision had been made by the Army and the EPA. It also confirms the wisdom of Congress in creating the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP), so that a state or local government (the District of Columbia, in this case) could hire people to oversee the military’s work.

10.1.1 The Author’s Involvement with the AUES In June 1995, the author began work with the District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) Environmental Regulation Administration. Almost immediately, the author was assigned to a new unit with the responsibility to oversee the environmental cleanup of military facilities. In September of 1995, a report by the US Army Corps of Engineers on the Spaulding and Rankin Areas of Spring Valley, Washington, DC, was delivered to the office. The author, with his partner Don Campbell, were shocked to learn that a large chemical weapons facility called the American University Experiment Station (AUES) once existed within the boundaries of the District of Columbia and that a NOFA decision

10: A History of the AUES Site

117

had been issued for most of the facility. Research on the AUES began at the National Archives. By July 1996, the author had completed a 170 page report (including appendices) on the AUES. In asking that the site be reopened, the author made three recommendations: 1. “The threat posed at the American University site requires that every part of the 600 acre site be surveyed with magnetometers and ground penetrating radar to a depth of 10 feet, with all anomalies intrusively investigated and cleared.” 2. “In addition, the entire site should have the soil at various depths sampled, as well as the groundwater sampled for the toxic substances listed below. This should be a random grid sampling comparing the results to off-site background levels.” 3. “Finally, a health survey of the residents should be conducted to determine if there is any elevated incidence of any disease processes, related to the hazardous substances found.” After several months of delay, this report was presented to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in January 1997. Out of that meeting came recognition by the Corps that there was a dumpsite, which had not been found, and that they had a picture of it (the Sgt. Maurer photograph, Photo 19 in the center photo section). The author said that they had to locate this dumpsite. However, the Corps gave no indication that it was willing to reopen the NOFA decision. In April 1997, with the support of three high-level Washington, DC, government managers—Harvey Sloan, Health Commissioner; his assistant, the late Theodore Gordon; and acting head of DCRA, David Watts, (a former Army captain in Vietnam in charge of explosive demolition)—a high-level meeting was scheduled with the Corps and the EPA. City Administrator, Michael Rogers, and David Watts co-chaired the meeting. The author presented the report, reproduced without appendices in this chapter, and the EPA and the Corps agreed to respond to the report. Whereas the EPA never responded, the Corps eventually acknowledged only one mistake in their 1995 NOFA decision, the incorrect location of one of their points-of-interest, POI 24. That mistake led to the rediscovery of two pits. Excavation found 275 shells and 175 chemical bottles on a residential property. Clearly, not excavating these anomalies during the 1993–1994 cleanup constituted a gross failure of command. However, this effort did not locate the carboys being prepared for disposal in the Sgt. Maurer photograph. Therefore, the author analyzed the 1918 aerial photograph (Photo 22 in the photo section), for the

118

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

first time, to try and locate the pit (POI 24). Not satisfied with his analysis, the District of Columbia asked the EPA’s Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center (EPIC) to redouble their efforts and see if the Army had twice mislocated POI 24.

10.2 The History of the AUES Site This section sets forth an account of how a site is discovered and how a cleanup starts. All too often, sites are discovered by accident, sometimes with horrific results. It is more interesting than particularly apropos to the reader’s site of interest. However, the reader should know just how their site came to the attention of the concerned parties. The accidental discovery of World War I unexploded poison gas shells at the AUES Spring Valley site on January 5, 1993, properly evoked an immediate emergency response. Altogether, 141 UXO items were found, including at least 43 chemical (poison gas) shells. This discovery prompted an initial remediation and an intensive investigation of the historical records to determine the scope and magnitude of the Experiment Station. The Spring Valley site is now considered to comprise more than 600 acres with more than 13,000 current residents. It is now considered to be the worst defense site in the country. On a list of 600 sites, Spring Valley is number 1. Even when work on the site was suspended and a NOFA decision on the site was issued, it still ranked 36th on a list of the worst 600 sites! The fact that so many people currently live directly on the site is a significant factor in the risk assessment process. Only 20 percent of the Superfund sites have residential areas nearby. At AUES, there were 1200 chemists and engineers supported by more than 700 non-technical staff for a total of 1937 people performing warrelated gas research and production in 1917 and 1918. It was the second largest chemical weapons facility in the world at that time. It was larger than the famed British facility Porton Downs at Salisbury Plain or Avonmouth and larger than any of the German sites. According to the archival records, among the 400 substances tested, at least 54 toxic or dangerous substances were used substantially on the site, and many hundreds of other substances were used in the research. A total of 102 substances have been found in the soil gas at four residences. In addition to the large variety of substances, large quantities also existed. Many of these experiments involved releasing great quantities of these toxic substances into the air and on the soil to see the effects on animals placed at specific distances from the release point for various time frames.

10: A History of the AUES Site

119

Several of these contaminants, such as mustard gas and arsenic, are carcinogens. Most of the substances are extremely toxic. Some can remain viable for long periods even in the soil exposed to water. Many remain dangerous in munitions for more than 90 years. In addition, there was a companion facility called Camp Leach. This facility abutted the AUES and trained 100,000 engineers during World War I in offensive and defensive gas and flame warfare and other engineering applications. Photos show the troops constructing makeshift mortars, emplacing howitzers, and firing rifles.

10.3 The District of Columbia’s First Report on the World War I Poison Gas Production at the AUES Although written early in the state’s effort to get the site cleaned up, this section presents a good example of the details needed to get the military to start a cleanup activity. As it turns out, most of the predictions made in the report were true. Likewise, the requests that the state made were necessary and productive. This 1996 case report on the AUES is presented here in Sections 10.3.1 through 10.3.7 as an example of how state and local regulators can examine a military site and oversee or correct remediation efforts.1 Reflecting a certain naiveté, the first report incorrectly was styled “Final,” assuming that it would be the District’s only report. Circumstances have required many, many more reports. Of course, the right expertise is needed. The report also illustrates what can go wrong relying on the military’s experts during site remediation and how to avoid these mistakes. The information is also particularly useful for World War I sites that were by definition experimental because all of the known agents and ordnance designs are included in these materials. Finally, it shows the type of archival documents that may be available for your site. (The appendix exhibits are not included in the first report but comprised 150 pages.)

1

The report presented in herein has been slightly edited to make the section enumeration more compatible with the format of this book; in addition, 150 pages of historical documents and other supporting documentation included with the original report are not included in this book.

120

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

It should be noted that the first report was completed after a record of NOFA decision was issued and signed by the DOD and the EPA. Obviously, this type of research project should be undertaken prior to remediation as was done in the second report, presented in Chapter 11. Nevertheless, the independent research and report writing was successful in getting the site reopened with startling results.

10.3.1 Why the First Two Cleanups Failed Although the Spring Valley site was identified by the U.S. Army in 1985, stakeholders were not informed until the buried munitions story emerged in the press in 1993. This cover-up served to make the stakeholders or regulators extremely distrustful of future decisions. Indeed, it was not until 1994 that the DOD recognized the need to refine its community involvement policy. Such failure to involve stakeholders from the inception is often cited for the failure of adequate remediation. The 1994 Annual Report to Congress on the Environmental Restoration Program said, “In 1994, DOD recognized a need to refine its basic community involvement policy . . . [and] to quickly communicate the new policy and procedures to the very people charged with its implementation at the installation level.” One of the failures of the remedial action at the Spring Valley site was a breakdown between the historical study and the scientific and military assessment. For example, it was known that 100,000 gas and flame troops were trained there. Yet, the conclusion was made that they did not test fire mortars as part of the training (mortars were a major vehicle for dispersing gas on enemy troops, and numerous photographs were discovered depicting troops firing mortars). Because mortar firing is an integral part of infantry basic training, a military expert might conclude that special units, whose job it would be to fire mortars, might fire them in training. The lack of such expertise led to no magnetometer search being conducted for UXO in the training portion of the site—about half of the 600 acres. Subsequently, on April 2, 1996, another live incendiary white phosphorous shell was reported. The District of Columbia was told that this shell was found in the backyard and kept as a souvenir by the owner inside the house on the fireplace hearth. Although this munition would not have killed as many people as a poison gas shell, it could have quickly burned down the house and occupants because white phosphorus burns when exposed to air. In addition, the contractor was never told that arsenicals were tested in open air bursts, which was readily apparent from the records. Hence, there was no effort to establish a wind drift plume of arsenic. Thus, even

10: A History of the AUES Site

121

when the facts are known from the archival search it is important to have the correct expertise to identify those of importance and communicate the information to the responsible elements. Only a few of these chemicals were tested at the site, and then only at 53 separate locations. No random grid sampling of soil and groundwater was done. No survey has been conducted to determine if there are any adverse health effects to the residents of the area. Also, only some of these 53 points of interest were scanned with metal detectors in an effort to locate other buried munitions. During this limited scanning, 2000 anomalies were found (an anomaly is a reading indicating the presence of a metallic object underground). Of these anomalies, approximately 87 were excavated. (There is some conflict in the reports over the precise number; see the 1995 Final Report on Spring Valley.) This failure to fully investigate all buried metal is magnified by the inadequacy of current detection equipment noted in the Jefferson Proving Ground study and the inability to access much of the Spring Valley site with a dual 10-ft beam apparatus. Further, the search was not done using polygons (rough rectangles staked out with string) to ensure that no spot was missed. The District of Columbia undertook this study because of three important observations. First, the contaminants potentially present were not industrial chemicals but were expressly designed to kill people. Second, the containers unearthed to date are shell casings—which are thicker than the drums and cans usually associated with toxic waste dumps—or bottles, increasing the likelihood of lethal concentrations. Third, there was open air testing, which likely left behind metal contamination such as arsenic. There is mounting evidence that the Spring Valley site encompassed a massive production facility for poison gas in addition to its development and experimentation functions. The District of Columbia’s research further found that, The Army attempted to contract out the production of war gases to a number of civilian chemical companies, but these firms objected immediately to the contracts because of the inherent dangers in the production of large quantities of war gases and because the demand for the product would not extend beyond the conflict . . . The Army thus found itself with no alternative but to construct its own production facilities. In December 1917, construction of plants to produce chemical agents began at Gunpowder Neck, Maryland. By the summer of 1918, the Edgewood Arsenal there had plants in operation . . . [Leavenworth Papers (1984) by Maj. Charles E. Heller, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas]

122

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Additionally, on June 10, 1996, the District of Columbia was informed that a full glass chemical bottle with a glass stopper had been unearthed along with the remains of several more at Spring Valley. While awaiting a laboratory analysis, it was found that soil samples contained arsenic levels as high as 1200 parts per million, as well as other pollutants. To date, 40 cubic yards of contaminated soil have been removed. The District of Columbia was also informed that in 1992, several workers were overcome during excavation procedures at an adjoining property and hospitalized for respiratory problems. They feel strongly that these workers may have been exposed to poison gas from these broken bottles or leaking munitions disturbed during the excavation process. It is the District’s opinion that the remediation efforts did not address all of the areas of concern reflected in the Historical Report and Range Rule and our own study, both with respect to the potential for contamination and the likelihood of more unexploded munitions on the site. This report details the basis for this conclusion.

10.3.2 Documentation of Original Research Work On-Site Numerous reports speak to the quantity of gas being produced at the Spring Valley site. Excerpts from “Report of the Work Done at Bureau of Mines Experiment Station Spring Valley DC on War Gas Investigations During May, 1918” specify the quantities produced, as follows: • G-34. On May 5th, “DC made a successful run, producing 250# of Crude G-34.” (G-34 refers to gas #34, Lewisite.) • G-43 (hydrocyanic acid). “Small scale plant for making about 150 lbs per day put into operation early in May.” • G-67 (cyanogen bromide). “172.5 lbs produced in first week of May, completing the requirement.” • G-178 (cyanogen chloride). “50 lbs of G-178 produced in the first week of May. Plant turned over to Mr. Dorsey.” • G-337 (bromobenzyl cyanide). “Production requirement was completed. Report and specifications were completed May 18th and work discontinued.” • Nitrogen peroxide. “80 pounds were produced. During May the method of production was changed, due to the very great increase in the demand. An apparatus has been set up in stoneware and a larger steel apparatus ordered.” • Strontium chlorate. “About two pounds made for experimental work and considerable work done on the development of a new method, which is now in successful operation. This will produce a better product at a lower cost.”

10: A History of the AUES Site

123

• Arsenic trichloride. “Started production May 18th. 192 pounds produced. Larger apparatus set up and operating to make about 35 pounds per day.” • “Captain Lewis at the District of Columbia University is making no report, as he has instructions to place nothing regarding his work in writing at this time. Captain Conant is also doing certain work with which you are undoubtedly familiar, and concerning which nothing is said.” • “On May 21st, Mr. Rowland’s division turned in the formal report of the manufacture of G-337 from Benzyl Chloride. Since that time apparatus has been ordered for construction of a new plant to produce three thousand pounds for G-337 per 24 hour day. The design of the plant layout has proceeded as fast as the blue prints were obtained. Excellent progress has been made here.” • “On May 20th, the G-43 plant was turned over to this division. The apparatus for the production of 150 pounds of G-43 per 24 hours has been realized. 200 pounds were made for Mr. Rowland.” • “The G-178 plant was also taken over on May 20th and is now producing 15 to 20 lbs of product per 24 hours. As soon as the 4-ton refrigeration plant is in operation, a large production of G-178 is anticipated.” • “The design and purchase of the G-178 apparatus necessary to duplicate the 400 lb per day French process is proceeding satisfactorily. This entails the procurement of much special equipment, such as a 20-ton refrigeration plant, enamel, lead and silver lined apparatus, etc.” Of all the toxic substances listed above, Lewisite is the most deadly. It is thought to be seven times more lethal than mustard gas. It has been called the “Dew of Death,” as a single drop on the skin could be fatal. Actual animal test results graphically demonstrate our concern over Lewisite. A concentration as low as 0.34 mg/l would kill dogs in 7.5 minutes. The scientists extrapolated that 1 part per million would cause serious effects in a man if breathed for several hours. It is widely reported that a single drop on the skin can be fatal. Lewisite was found on glassware apparatus recovered during the removal operations at Spring Valley, and in about a dozen bottles, which also testifies to its long-term viability. The process for making large quantities of Lewisite was perfected at nearby American University, and 150 tons of Lewisite was manufactured in Willoughby, Ohio, in the summer of 1918. Another research reference states, “In the spring of 1918 a team based at the Catholic University, Washington, DC, discovered Lewisite . . . The first

124

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

batch of 150 tons of Lewisite was at sea, on its way to Europe when the Armistice was signed.” (A Higher Form of Killing (2002) by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman)

10.3.3

Specific Structures

The District of Columbia determined that the following structures existed at the site: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

History Building Dispersoid Laboratory No. 2 Ohio Hall Building Pharmacological Laboratory Annex Physiological Laboratory Old Man Test Building Machine Shop Storage Shed Paint Shop Man Test House (including stack) Smoke Laboratory No. 1 Smoke Laboratory No. 2 Incendiary Laboratory Special Pyrotechnic Laboratory Shell Storage Pit Livens Gun Pit Shell Loading Plant Chemical Research Laboratory Transformer Shed Original Bomb Pit (outside fence) Chemical Engine Shed Reclamation Building Explosives Laboratory Fireworks Storage General Shop Toxic Storage Shed Toxic Storage Shed (second) Canister Laboratory General Storehouse Safety Building Bacteriological Laboratory Mechanical Building Cylinder C. Acid Storage Dispersoid Shed Laboratory No. 2

10: A History of the AUES Site • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Dispersoid Laboratory No. 1 Pharmacological Laboratory Explosives Magazine Fire Cage Wire House Shack No. 1 Shack No. 2 Shack No. 3 Shack No. 4 Volatile Inflammable Building Munitions Plant Chemical Engine Shed No. 2 Chemical Engine Shed No. 3 Chemical Engine Shed No. 4 Machinery Shed, Shack No. 5 Dispersoid Storage Laboratory No. 4 Warehouse and Office Explosive Service Building Organic Research Shack No. 1 Organic Research Shack No. 2 Dangerous Explosive Laboratory No. 2 Dangerous Explosive Laboratory No. 1 Chemical Ice House Oil Storage Oil Storage (2) 10-m3 Explosive Chamber 10-m3 Explosive Chamber (second) Storage Shed 10-ton Refrigeration Plant Latrine Acetylene Plant Furnace Shed Shack No. 10 Shack No. __ (no identifying number) Furnace Shed Shed Tank Shack No. 6 Lead Burners Shop Photo Chemical Laboratory Shack No. 7 Shack No. 8 Shack No. 9 Smoke House

125

126

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Explosive Warehouse Concrete Gun Pit Fragmentation Box Armor Plate Bomb Proof Lead Furnace House Mustard Laundry Maj. Tolman Bomb Pit (outside fence) Capt. Burrell Bomb Pit (outside fence) Shed (outside fence) Explosive Tank Shelter (outside fence) Powder Magazine No. 1 Powder Magazine No. 2 Detonator Storage House Bomb Pit Bridge Fire and Flame Laboratory Oil Storage Shed Colored Men Latrine White Men Latrine Blacksmith Shop Concrete Storage Pit Electrolytic Laboratory Forge Shop Shed Gas Generator Supply Laboratory and Office Mustard Shed Drum Platform Toxic Storage Shed Mustard Storage Shed Storage Shed Storage Shed (no further description) Nitrating Shed Boiler House Dog Test House Dug Out Blanket House Lt. Waddell’s Laboratory Open Shed Incendiary Laboratory Shed Detonator Shed Bomb Filling Shed Concrete Pit Explosive Enclosure Oil Storage Shed Latrines and Washrooms Q.M.C. Storehouse for Research Division

10: A History of the AUES Site

127

In addition to the structures identified on the document from which the District took our above listed points of interest (POIs), the Corps has listed other POIs drawn from aerial photographs, on-site observations, and other sources. It is also possible that some of the pits listed below correspond to some of those identified in our list above: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Circular Trenches Possible Pit Small Crater Scars Possible Pit (each possible pit corresponds to a particular ground scar on the aerial photographs) Possible Pit Possible Target or Test Site Possible Test Area Possible Target or Test Site (each possible target or test site corresponds to a particular ground scar on the aerial photographs) Possible Firing or Observation Stalls Possible Target or Test Site Scattered Ground Scars Possible Graded Area Circular Trenches Pit Ground Scar Possible Munitions Storage Pad Area Possible Pit Small Crater Scars Old Mustard Field Ground Scar Shell Pit Shell Pit (2) Shell Pit (3) Probable Pit Possible Trenches Small Crater Scars Probable Trench or Ditch Probable Trench or Ditch (each probable trench or ditch corresponds to a particular ground scar on the aerial photographs) Ground Scar Training Trenches Training Trenches (2) Training Trenches (3) Training Trenches (4) Training Trenches (5) Training Trenches (6)

128

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • • • • •

Training Trenches (7) Mill Creek Maj. Tolman’s Field Static Test Fire Area Baker (Arsenic) Laboratory

Altogether, there were about 164 structures and earthworks identified by the District of Columbia and the Corps of Engineers. However, only 53 POIs have been listed. Except for arsenic, only about a third have been sampled; about two-thirds have had any geophysical exploration. Although some of these points encompassed more than one structure, many clearly have been omitted. Only recently has the district received a map locating most of these structures. Indeed, many of these structures have not been located on any map, supporting the author’s initial recommendation that the entire 600 acres must be examined. An undated attachment to a letter dated October 27, 1918, detailing the relationship between the War Department and Spring Valley states, “There are about 135 such buildings and small structures and the cost of their construction has been about $400,000.00 . . . About $775,000.00 has been spent on equipment at American University . . . .” The Historical Report says that there were 153 structures by the end of the war. Spills, dumping, or burial of small quantities of toxic substances could have occurred at any of these structures, necessitating extensive soil and groundwater testing. One document indicates the expenses for various projects at the Spring Valley. Of particular interest, it details the second largest expenditure for a cylinder storage building, indicating a very large structure. This could have been an extensive burial site.

10.3.4

Dispersion Tests

Numerous documents detail tests of chemical shells at the Spring Valley site. Some shells were attached to the top of poles or placed in the ground and fired electrically. Others were fired from mortars designed to detonate on impact. In either case, glass bottles were placed on the ground or in circular trenches to establish the concentrations of the heavier-than-air gas at known distances from the shell explosions so that the effects on dogs could be assessed accurately. The District found trench maps and test reports from Spring Valley indicating that many Livens projectiles as well as smaller 75-mm artillery shells were tested with poison gas. In particular, they noted tests with arsine and magnesium arsenide. Arsenic is very heavy and settles rapidly to

10: A History of the AUES Site

129

the ground. In one test, 60 lbs of arsenic were released; similar quantities of other arsenic compounds were released. Arsenic is not only a known carcinogen but it also damages the gene that allows cells to repair themselves and that kills the cell if it turns cancerous. Therefore, arsenic enables many other carcinogenic compounds to cause cancer at lower concentrations than normally would occur. Being a metal, arsenic remains intact in the soil even after 85 years. Originally, the arsenic soil test data the District of Columbia had available was for areas away from many of the probable test sites. Arsenic soil test data from the Naval Security Station, leeward from Spring Valley, revealed an elevated arsenic level approximately 1 ft underground, which could be compatible with a 75-year-old deposition. Soil above and below this narrow band showed very little arsenic. Now, the District knows that this sample came from the high arsenic found in the Tindall Street area and came, not from testing, but from post-1918 storage/ disposal. The District of Columbia found diagrams of the early delivery system using cylinders and the location of the cylinder storage building. Tremendous amounts of gas could be stored in even small cylinders. Some of the shells experimented with at Spring Valley were also very large. For example, a 12-in. Naval chemical shell was developed. The 8-in. Livens projectile was another large shell, developed primarily to carry poison gas. Again, the District’s early guess that they also compressed toxic gases, in addition to chilling gases into liquids, has been borne out by the discovery of three 75-mm compressed arsine gas shells. Finally, one discovery for the cylinder release of compressed toxic gases was a remote detonated explosive cylinder valve. The District hopes they did not bury even one cylinder of chlorine with such a device. Again, the point is that many POIs were not properly assessed against current knowledge. For another example, one POI—identified previously was the Old Mustard Field—was a 500-ft diameter circle covered repeatedly with mustard gas, a known carcinogen. This area has not been surveyed for buried containers of mustard or for polymerized mustard.

10.3.5

Remaining Unexploded Chemical Ordnance

As noted, some of the munitions previously found contain liquefied poison gas, which is designed to vaporize when the shell ruptures on impact and likewise will vaporize if it rusts through. Because the similar World War I Livens projectiles the District of Columbia examined at Camp Simms were badly pitted and corroded—reducing their original thickness

130

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

by 75%—the District theorized that any shells still buried at the site are nearing the point where they will corrode through, causing a release of poison gas into the environment with untoward consequences. A memorandum dated February 2, 1993, by General George E. Friel, on the emergency response states, “Inspection of the munitions revealed heavy corrosion with the potential for leaking.” Now we know that about 80% of the 650 shells recovered along the south edge of the campus may have already leaked, raising the specter of groundwater or air contamination, depending on their depth. The burial of explosive munitions and chemical weapons together increases the risk of the old explosives becoming hypersensitive and detonating spontaneously or from a mild shock, triggering a release of the chemical fillers. This raises the level of potential devastation where old explosive shells are buried together with large quantities of chemical shells, as was the case at Spring Valley, because a hypersensitive explosive filler could detonate, rupturing many adjacent corroded chemical munitions and greatly increasing the amount of agent released. In a 1918 accidental gassing of a residential area at Spring Valley, 8–10 lbs of Lewisite was sufficient to blister the residents some 1200–1500 ft from the release. The sparse population of the area at that time doubtless reduced the number of casualties. Because a single Livens projectile has 30 lbs of gas, the damage from several of these rupturing with an adjacent explosive detonation is easily appreciated. It should be noted that there were 1.3 million casualties (most nonfatal) from gas in World War I, principally from mustard gas. There are two potential sources for gas exposure at Spring Valley: individual UXO resulting from the dispersion testing, and gas shells, bottles, and cylinders— intentionally buried—when the operation ended. A significant but unknown percentage of misfired UXO (duds) is expected. Again, the Draft Range Rule is instructive: “It is not until after a Military Munition has been employed and failed, in total or part, to function properly that it becomes UXO. Due to the complex design of many Military Munitions employed, some percentage of them are almost certain to become UXO.” There were many shells fired during the dispersion testing that must have left many isolated dud or UXO rounds. For example, on fired Stokes mortars at Camp Simms several unexploded (dud) shells were found resulting from failure to detonate on impact. A similar number of exploded Stokes mortars were also found. Although the final numbers are not in yet, an approximate 50% dud ratio is emerging. Similarly, one of three Livens projectiles was a dud. This is extremely high, most likely due to the early developmental stage of the mortar at this time.

10: A History of the AUES Site

131

Additionally, the extensive experimental work at Spring Valley on the development of better fuse mechanisms confirms our suspicion that duds were commonplace. This experimental work on developing improved fusing mechanisms is detailed in many reports. One example citing the difficulties in finding a way to seal the small powder charge separated from the liquefied gas by a steel diaphragm is detailed in a paper by Richter, Burrell, Clayton, and Meigs covering April 3 to May 18, 1918. The report states, “It is most important that the powder (black powder at the base of the shell designed to expel the gas on detonation) be kept dry. Several kinds of mixtures were tried, such as paraffin, paraffin mixed with wax, a glue composed of resin, gelatin and glycerin, and glue as manufactured by the LePage Co.” There is no way of knowing how many unsatisfactory shells were produced and tested before arriving at the best solutions, or just how effective the chosen method was in most cases. However, it appears that it took four people a month and a half to solve just one problem with one type of shell designed for static testing, indicating a substantial number of dud shells. Similar research details an extensive effort to develop an “all ways” fuse for the Stokes and Livens mortars, suggesting more malfunctions. In all probability, there are numerous isolated dud rounds that must be located and cleared.

10.3.6

Burial Operation

A very significant risk at the Spring Valley site is the now-demonstrated reality that many chemical munitions, glass carboys, and cylinders were buried when the project was abandoned at the end of the war. The District of Columbia’s research sought to identify possible burial sites as well as determine the potential amount of chemicals that may have been buried. Because the remediation efforts at Spring Valley did not address all of the areas of concern reflected in the Historical Report, serious questions remain over the adequacy of the search for unexploded ordnance as well as the survey for residual contamination from the toxic substances used in the research. There are five areas of research findings that bear on the issue of whether or not a potential for more buried chemical weapons munitions exists: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Burials occurred at other sites. Gases and shells were produced in extremely large quantities. The entire site was shut down quickly at the end of the war. There was a printed newspaper story of a large-scale burial operation.

132

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site 5. There is a lack of evidence that the leftover munitions were turned over to other departments or moved elsewhere— and now three large burials a mile apart, have already been found.

First, past experience at other sites indicates a tendency to bury excess munitions. And, as noted, buried chemical weapons munitions have already been found at the Spring Valley site. Second, as the District of Columbia has seen above, the production of chemical warfare agents was very large. The operation had 1200 chemists and engineers and 700 support personnel. If each chemist used only one small bottle of dangerous chemicals a week, that is a lot of material. Information bearing on the number of rounds sent to Spring Valley is one objective of our research. A memorandum from Edgewood Arsenal dated June 4, 1918, describes the loading of 75-mm gas shells. Of the 56,800 shells loaded by the Hall Lamp Company, only 25% did not show leakage. The memorandum indicates that 200 shells were sent to Spring Valley for testing. Another memorandum dated June 18, 1918, states, “Shell with a lining of electrolytically deposited lead have been tested at Spring Valley and pronounced satisfactory. 1000 of these shell are being purchased for more extensive test . . .”. The file date on this document suggests that the shells may have been shipped sometime later. Thus, 1200 shells may have been sent to Spring Valley shortly before its closing, in addition to those loaded in the shell loading factories on-site. From test reports and the shells recovered, the District of Columbia is only able to account for 107 of these, leaving 1093 unaccounted for gas shells in just the 75-mm size. The District was unable to locate any information on the number of Livens, Stokes, or other gas shells sent to Spring Valley. A letter dated November 8, 1918, in response to concerns raised by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, stated, “DC have to inform you that the District of Columbia University is being confined more and more every day to research problems. The large experiments with gases developed at the University are being made at Lakehurst, N.J., and other proving grounds.” However, Lakehurst was not operational until August 1918; prior to that, most tests were performed at Spring Valley. This letter also supports the concept that shells sent to the AUES earlier may not have been completely used up, because testing was being curtailed due to complaints. As previously noted, a map shows a shell filling plant at Spring Valley. Also, there were numerous reports on the methods employed to load 75-mm shells and Livens projectiles, clearly indicating that many shells were loaded on-site.

10: A History of the AUES Site

133

Third, the abandonment of the Spring Valley site happened very fast, as the following excerpts from the documents show. Some even spoke in terms of one month. The Experiment Station “was abandoned in January, 1919, and ordered salvaged.” (Encyclopedia of Historic Forts (1988) by Robert B. Roberts) In a memorandum dated November 30, 1918, the Chief of Engineers ordered the Commanding Officer at Training Camp (part of Spring Valley), “To the end that certain land in use by the Government at Training Camp may eventually be restored to the condition existing before government occupancy, you will proceed with such filling in of trenches, pits, dugouts, and works of a similar nature as can well be done at this time; as such work will be more difficult after the ground becomes frozen.” The District of Columbia listed 124 structures as POI and an additional 39 trench works were listed by the Corps of Engineers. Obviously, these trenches would have been an easy place to bury chemical munitions and contaminated glassware. A memorandum dated December 4, 1918, states, On account of the cessation of hostilities and the instructions received to demobilize the Chemical Warfare Service as soon as possible, all research work of the Chemical Warfare Service at the Spring Valley Experiment station will be terminated before December 31, 1918, and the only further work pertaining to this service now contemplated at the Station will be the preparation of reports necessary to complete proper records of the various investigations conducted there. A memorandum dated December 2, 1918, states, The Secretary of War directs: DC. That the Commanding Officer, Training Camp, DC be directed as follows: 1. It has been decided to discontinue the use of Training Camp with the least practicable delay, and to dispose of all supplies, equipment and transportation . . . Direct them to dispose of all supplies, equipment and transportation now at Training Camp in such a way as will be in the best interests of the Government, and to salvage such property as it is considered necessary to salvage for the best interests of the Government. The use of the word “dispose” for supplies means burial to us, whereas “salvage” for property means to sell or keep. Because there did not appear to be much interest in surplus poison gas after the war—a reason cited by chemical companies for declining the offer of production contracts—it

134

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

does not seem that existing stockpiles could be sold, leaving only the alternative of disposal. By July 1919, only 18 people were left at the site from approximately 1900 original employees. Fourth, there were rumors of large-scale burial of munitions at the site. In the Historical Report it states, The USATHAMA (U.S. Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency) study incorporated materials from American University and concluded that there was no evidence to confirm rumored large-scale burials of munitions. But it did highlight two sites that would be likely candidate locations if burial had occurred. Although instances of small-scale burial at American University were not documented per se, a prudent assumption would have been that such disposal did indeed occur . . . Fifth, the munitions apparently could not and were not turned over to the Ordnance Department. In a memorandum dated September 16, 1918, from the Director, Chemical Warfare Service, to the Executive Officer, Research Division, Spring Valley, states, Concerning removal of explosives from various points where they are stored, wish to state that it is DC’s opinion that these explosives were purchased by, and are the property of the Research Division, and therefore cannot properly be turned back to the General Stores of the Ordnance Department. Confirmation of this can be obtained from the Pyrotechnical Division. The question of the removal of these explosives from the depots from where they are stored is a matter strictly for the Research Division to settle. Not only is there no evidence that the “enormous quantities” of toxic substances and munitions known to have been there were moved, but these two memoranda seem to indicate that the chemical and explosive munitions were not moved to the Ordnance Department facilities at Aberdeen.

10.3.7

Conclusion

From the historical documents, the military experience at other ranges, and the fact that UXO have already been discovered on-site, unexploded and buried chemical and high-explosive ordnance is certain to remain at Spring Valley. Although quick and commendable efforts were done to check 53 key areas and to remove ordnance accidentally discovered, the

10: A History of the AUES Site

135

District of Columbia believed that the bulk of the work still needed to be completed, as stated in their original recommendations. The District’s view on the need for a complete site investigation with a study of environmental contamination, health impacts, and a search of the entire area for individual UXO and buried stockpiles is also confirmed by the proposed Range Rule. It is also confirmed by the tremendous amount of ordnance and chemical bottles found subsequent to the District’s original conceptual site model. Lastly, the District underscores that this site represents the first site in which the Corps of Engineers conducted a removal action where residents live on top of an old chemical munitions range. This lack of experience with populated sites, or any CWM sites, may account for the divergence of views. In conclusion, the presence of 13,000 people on the site demands the complete and thorough analysis recommended here. Such a historical study should then be coupled with a list of specific concerns. In the present example, some remediation and study had already been done. Thus, some of the District of Columbia’s concerns focused on the extent and quality of the prior work. By phrasing the historical discoveries as concerns, the option is somewhat left open to the military as to how to alleviate the District’s concerns. If the District were instead to require some specific action at the outset, it may make it difficult for the them to accept less, even if subsequent study and expert opinion deem less to be satisfactory. Finally, Congress charged the Corps of Engineers with the responsibility for remediating the sites, whereas the states were left with only being “lead regulators.” For example, if the District of Columbia was concerned that buried nonchemical ordnance of a specific type may exist at the site, the military may be able to alleviate that concern by: a magnetometer sweep, a ground penetrating radar analysis of any anomalies, an anomaly review board interpretation of each anomaly, a groundwater sample showing no explosive residue, and a deed restriction on future excavation. This may prevent the cost of digging all anomalies while providing a reasonable margin of safety. Of course, such shortcuts may be inadequate at a laboratory facility with known burials of unknown types of chemical apparatus and experimental chemical weapons, as in this example.

11

Concerns over the Adequacy of Previous Remediation Efforts

11.1 Introduction This section is very important to residents, stakeholders, and regulators for two reasons. First, it presents an orderly example of how to raise issues where little research or information is available. Second, it suggests areas of inquiry that will be common to many sites. In 1997, after more study the author wrote a second document itemizing concerns about the site.1 To put the following concerns in proper perspective, these facts should be reemphasized. The site was the second largest poison gas production facility in the world during 1917 and 1918, employing 1200 chemists and engineers along with 700 technicians. There were 153 structures, including a shell loading factory. There was extensive testing of 400 different toxic substances, some of which were produced in extremely large quantities. Many were tested in the open air, depositing a layer of pollutants including arsenic, thallium, antimony, and manganese over portions of the site. The facility was shut down very rapidly at the end with haphazard burial of munitions and chemical containers. Some 13,000 residents now live on the site. Camp Leech, the adjacent facility, trained an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 gas and flame engineers in the application of poison gas, smoke and flame, basic small arms training, engineering techniques, and defensive measures. This training included the firing of mortars and howitzers with gas shells. These projectiles sometimes fail to detonate on impact, resulting in UXO or duds, which are extremely dangerous.

11.1.1

Inadequate Sampling

The District of Columbia was concerned that the open-air arsenical war gas testing during 1917 and 1918 deposited an arsenic layer over the site. There is new information that a layer of 75 ppm arsenic exists at an adjacent site but about a mile from the testing locations. This layer exists in a narrow horizon, 1 ft below the surface, suggesting that it was deposited 1

Like the first report, the paragraph numbering of this "Concerns" document was edited to fit the format of this book.

137

138

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

by the wind during the testing. Samples above and below this layer show low arsenic levels. Subsequently, high levels of arsenic were found across the Nebraska Avenue. It is believed that arsenical chemicals were stored in this area after the site was closed in an effort to sell them as surplus. Thus, the arsenic sample was probably not from a wind driven plume but from leakage during storage. Because of this new information, the District was concerned that the Army employed no technology, such as x-ray fluorescence, to ascertain that its soil samples were taken at this precise horizon. Although most samples were taken between 6 in. and 3 ft in an attempt to test the 1918 surface, they could not be certain if the high readings for metals were in the horizon and the low readings were from samples inadvertently taken just above or below the horizon and therefore misleading. The District of Columbia was concerned over new information from the Final Report Conducted on President’s Residence by Environmental, Inc., dated August 6, 1996, that an arsenic level of 1200 ppm was found as well as other high arsenic readings. In the excavation where five construction workers were overcome on May 27, 1992—which is next door to the 1200 ppm sample—a white granular layer was observed that may be inorganic arsenic. Thallium is found in significant amounts. One unit at the Experiment Station developed explosives and fuses. Thallium azide, thallium nitride, and thallium fulminate are shock sensitive explosives and emit poisonous fumes. It would have been an ideal subject of experimentation. Thallium as high as 58.52 ppm was found. The oral LD50 for rats is 16 mg/kg, and the LD50 for children is 8 mg/kg. LD50 is the lethal dose at which 50 percent of the population dies. Adding to the District’s concern was the fact that there was a wide deviation between the content of arsenic and other metals such as beryllium, even within the same POI. For arsenic, the overall range is from 241 ppm to an undetectable level. With a wind-driven plume, such a variance would be proportional to the distance from the source, but that is not the case here. The high and low readings carry no logical significance except that sampling may have missed the thin arsenic layer. All of the high arsenic readings were biased low, thus the District of Columbia did not know what the highest arsenic levels actually were. Because the Apex Report (Apex is an environmental sampling company) found 1200 ppm arsenic, the District was concerned that the readings for the “hot spots” be accurate. The “background samples” taken on the site were too close to the site to ensure that they reflected actual arsenic levels before the open air testing of arsenical warfare agents. Actual arsenic background for this area is

11: Adequacy of Previous Remediation Efforts

139

1–2.6 ppm (see “Selenium, fluorine, and arsenic in surficial materials of the conterminous United States,” Geological Survey Circular 692, 1974). The mean arsenic level for the entire country is only about 5 ppm. No sediment samples were taken in the streambed and storm sewers that run from the area known as “arsenic valley” or in any of the other streams in the area. Sediment samples from the creek at the Naval Security Station showed elevated levels of arsenic. When samples were taken in the streambed running from arsenic valley, high levels were found for over 100 ft downstream. No sediment samples were taken from the Potomac River at the confluence of the storm sewers and creeks that run off the AUES site. Only 13 of the 53 POIs were sampled. The District of Columbia was concerned that sampling was not done over a random grid of the entire site. The EPA’s Soil Screening Guidance: Technical Background Document (May 1996) calls for exposure areas of half acre with six sample locations per half acre. Ultimately, arsenic sampling reflecting a similar protocol was completed and surface levels up to 1000 ppm were found. The District was also concerned that insufficient off-site sampling has been done to define the outer limits of the arsenic and other metal contamination, given its discovery at the Naval Security Station. Laboratory analysis should be performed to ascertain whether the arsenic is in the inorganic form or in the form of methylated arsine compounds, which are much more harmful than some other forms.

11.1.2

Health Impact

A “background” sample showing 16 ppm arsenic was found about 200 ft from the drinking reservoir. The District of Columbia was concerned that there is a discrepancy between the arsenic (±0.004 mg/l) and beryllium (0.001 mg/l) in the drinking reservoir and the levels of those same metals in the raw water of the upper Potomac in the vicinity of the intake for the drinking reservoir. Discrepancies also exist for barium, cadmium, and thallium. All five of these metals exist in significant concentrations at the Spring Valley site. Although none of these metals exceed the EPA drinking water standards, the District of Columbia wanted to ensure that none of these metals are leaching into the reservoir from the Spring Valley site. The health risk assessment should also address the double exposure of Spring Valley residents to soil concentrations and drinking water concentrations. The District of Columbia was concerned that no health risk assessment was performed on arsenic even though many samples revealed extraordinarily high levels. The District was at a loss to explain how the major chemical

140

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

of concern could have been so overlooked in the 1995 record of NOFA decision. They were also concerned that the potential routes of exposure cannot be accurately determined until it is known how close residents are to the arsenic horizon. Thus, the depth of the horizon for arsenic and other metals must be precisely determined before an adequate risk assessment can be performed.

11.1.3

Environmental Impact

Stressed vegetation is evident at numerous places throughout the site. Arsenic is a known herbicide, and these areas need further assessment to determine if arsenic is causing the problem. Fish tissue studies from the Potomac River indicate arsenic contamination. Further sampling must be done to assure the District of Columbia that the site is not the source for this arsenic.

11.1.4

Over-Reliance on Expertise of Personnel

The District of Columbia was concerned that the Corps placed too much reliance on the experience of personnel that it hired. Because there was a moratorium on remediating chemical weapons sites, there was by definition no experience available, at least in this country. This was compounded because this was an experimental site. For example, although extensive testing (over 400 samples) was done in the 1993–1994 timeframe, the laboratories ran only a standard suite of tests, as though this was a commercial industrial site. Even the few times they tested for chemical agents, they only tested for the six chemical warfare agents included in the Chemical Weapons Treaty. They did not test for the 20 or so common warfare agents, let alone the 400 experimental agents developed at AUES. The District of Columbia was also concerned that the Remedial Investigation is dated June 1, 1995, whereas the Record of Decision recommending no further action was first presented to the public on March 23, 1995. This creates the appearance of a rush to judgment. The risk assessments did not include the EPA soil sample data. Moreover, there was no mention of the EPA’s extremely high arsenic readings. Because the EPA and the Army analyzed different samples, not including the EPA data in the risk assessment for all chemicals was fundamentally flawed. A representative of the contractor on the Spring Valley site acknowledged to the District of Columbia on January 23, 1997, that he was never told that they tested arsenicals at the site. The District was therefore concerned

11: Adequacy of Previous Remediation Efforts

141

whether the contractor had complete information on the site prior to doing the risk assessment. The testing of arsenicals was clearly reported in the document, “A Brief History of the Spring Valley Experiment Station” (May 1994). As previously mentioned, the background samples were taken too close to the test areas given that part of the concern is the deposition of chemical agent breakdown products (e.g., arsenic) settling out as the result of open air tests. Again, the District of Columbia was concerned that the contractor may have lacked complete information on the site prior to performing critical judgments.

11.2 Concerns about Remaining Unexploded Ordnance and Chemical Containers 11.2.1

Over-Reliance on Expertise

The District of Columbia felt that the Army placed too high a reliance on the expertise of its personnel in assessing whether or not more work needed to be done because of the limitations of the technology employed, the uniqueness of the site, use of only ordnance protocols, the subsequent discovery of ordnance and chemicals in areas not searched, and prior documented gaps in the knowledge of World War I experimental ordnance. In the 1993 Annual Report to Congress on the Defense Environmental Cleanup Program, the DOD stated, “The Spring Valley project set a precedent because it marked the first time the Army has conducted an ordnance and explosive waste and chemical warfare material removal project in a residential community.”

11.2.2 Little Available Knowledge on World War I Experimental Ordnance The ordnance document base at Huntsville, Alabama, contained insufficient and erroneous information on World War I-era experimental chemical projectiles. Incomplete data led to the assumption that all chemical ordnance was liquid filled. Initially, experts used a melting box to heat a frozen shell (the first shells were found in January) to determine if it was chemical. Much information exists that numerous solid toxics were tested on the site rendering a test for fluids (in our opinion) futile, as well as dangerous due to the pressure increases.

142

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Similarly, the Huntsville database mischaracterized a Livens projectile as non-chemical if it lacked a plug on the bottom because the Huntsville data contained a drawing of a Livens with only a top plug labeled “Pyrotechnique Division Incendiary.” Huntsville was unaware that the Pyrotechnique Unit— contrary to its name—did all the toxic testing at the Spring Valley Experiment Station and the one-plug design was used in all later toxic tests. Reliance on this incomplete information resulted in the vaporization (smoking) of a chemical projectile at Camp Simms when the skin breached while it was being moved to a detonation site. The personnel mistakenly thought it was an incendiary projectile. This lack of expertise continues to plague the site. For example, AUES developed a smaller Livens projectile to double the range. Some of these projectiles were recovered in the 52nd Court trench. Nevertheless, the Corps stuck to the 1600-yard range for the Livens when constructing its range fan, ignoring the experimental rounds and the fact that Livens were found at greater distances.

11.2.3

Experience Limited Due to Uniqueness of Site

As noted, the Army in 1994 and 1995 had no remediation experience with a chemical weapons range and manufacturing facility of this magnitude, having 13,000 residents living on top of the site. This lack of experience is exemplified by the fact that the Army Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency conducted an extensive study of the site in 1986 but did not tell the District of Columbia’s officials of the problem until the 1993 accidental discovery of buried munitions. The Army’s delay in beginning remediation led to seven more years of corrosion, further weakening the already fragile skins of the chemical munitions and posing an increased risk to the ordnance removal personnel and the residents. Note that 10 U.S. Code Section 2705(a)(1) gives clear guidance on notification issues.

11.2.4 Anomaly Review Board Protocols Excluded Laboratory Equipment Signatures New information from the Apex Report indicated that full chemical bottles were buried as well as ordnance. The geophysical investigation with a magnetometer and the anomaly review board protocols looked only for ordnance, not for lead- and silver-lined laboratory equipment or metal hardware that could be a clue to the burial of glass laboratory carboys or smaller containers. In fact, one suspect chemical shipping container was unearthed in the 73 anomalies intrusively investigated.

11: Adequacy of Previous Remediation Efforts

143

Clearly, larger gas cylinders or drums buried or miscellaneous chemical equipment hardware such as stands or clamps could have electronic signatures different from ordnance items. The District of Columbia was concerned that an anomaly review board composed of ordnance experts may miss finding laboratory equipment because it may not have an ordnance signature. The District was of the opinion that the anomaly review board constituted a “technical review committee” under 10 U.S. Code Section 2705(c) with the right of appropriate state and local citizen representation.

11.2.5

Equipment Limitations

The best expertise is limited by available equipment. Ground penetrating radar or microgravity analysis would better locate buried glassware containers than metal detectors or magnetometers. Irrespective of the expertise of the ordnance personnel involved in the remediation efforts, the Jefferson Proving Ground subsequently published its study that the best available technology, including the equipment used during the remediation effort, was only capable of identifying 65 out of 100 ordnance items using a similar anomaly review. Thus, even with the best expertise a confidence level of 65 percent is scientifically inadequate upon which to rest the safety of these state residents. Subsequently, the Corps conducted two geophysical prove-outs, which confirmed the difficulty of finding certain ordnance items and ceramic jugs.

11.2.6

Areas Not Searched

Although 2000 anomalies were discovered, the District of Columbia has been told that there was no electronic investigation of the Training Camp portion of the site for UXO either as individual (dud) rounds or leftover burial. In a meeting with the Corps on January 23, 1997, the District of Columbia presented evidence of the lengthy training of the individual units and a photograph of soldiers firing 3-in. Stokes mortars. Moreover, new information indicates that a resident of the Training Camp area found a 3-in. Stokes white phosphorus mortar intact. Another such munition was presumably deposited by a resident at a POI during the geophysical investigation. These chance finds of single rounds of the type logically used for training further heightens the District’s concern. The District of Columbia was concerned that the geophysical investigation covered less than 25 percent of the Spring Valley site. The Corps acknowledged that much of the site was not scanned. Thus, the accuracy

144

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

of the anomaly review board is irrelevant as to whether the remaining site contains buried ordnance. During the January 23, 1997, meeting, the District of Columbia was told that a worker at the original Spring Valley Experiment Station had produced a photograph showing a dump site, which the Corps conceded was never located. The District was concerned with the closure of the site prior to the dump being located. This fact highlights the need for a complete geophysical investigation and the excavation of all anomalies. The Corps produced a copy of the photograph after several requests. Much later, the District discovered that the Corps had geophysically located an anomaly consistent with a “pit or trench” in the vicinity of where they believed this burial site to be. This subsequently became one of the two pits excavated on Glenbrook Road. In addition, in January the District of Columbia also presented evidence that the Army retained a three-acre site after closing the Experiment Station. The District was concerned that this site was omitted from the 53 POIs and believes that it should be geophysically investigated. They were concerned that POIs 1, 10, 11, 16, 19, 20, 24, and Baker Valley had various semi-volatile compounds in some samples. The general absence of these compounds elsewhere due to the age of the site may suggest the need for further evaluation at these POIs for buried leaking containers or ordnance. Subsequently, outrageous contamination has been found.

11.3

Community Right to Know

The District of Columbia was concerned that the failure to fully inform the community regarding the arsenic contamination and the possibility of buried chemical containers and ordnance increases the risk of contact through certain ordinary homeowner activities such as vegetable gardens and excavations. Arsenic is on the Community Right to Know List. The District was concerned with apparent violations of 10 U.S. Code Section 2705(a)(1) by experts who should have been familiar with the Defense Environmental Restoration Program requirements.

12 The District of Columbia’s Initial Success as a State Regulator on AUES 12.1 Success Results from Hard Work and Providence This section underscores the success that can be obtained through hard work even though a state may have little first-hand experience with a complex military site. It should provide encouragement to residents, stakeholders, and regulators. The list of concerns was presented to the Corps during their review of the “no further action” decision as a result of the District of Columbia’s first report. Eventually, the Corps concluded that an original POI was mislocated during the original aerial photo interpretation. Using correct protocols and equipment (metal detectors and ground penetrating radar), two large anomalies were found in the backyard of a private residence. One of these two sites was believed to be the site where many jugs of mustard were lined up for disposal in the Sgt. Maurer photo (Photo 19 in the center photo section). However, as it turned out neither of the sites was the Sgt. Maurer pit because carboys were not found, nor were sufficient remnants of the carboys. They were dumpsites or ordnance and chemical burial sites. Cylindrical objects were visualized on the ground penetrating radar at one pit. It should be noted that both of the former residents of this property died of cancer and all the children had severe skin problems, which cleared up mysteriously when they went away to college. One of the kids had to be tied down at night so he would not scratch his skin irritation. Because of these reports, the District of Columbia requested arsenic samples on the surface of the property and levels as high as 1000 ppm were found. That result forced the Corps to sample all of the properties in Operational Unit 3 (OU-3), about 60 houses in total. Findings of several other properties with elevated arsenic ultimately led to the Corps’ acceptance of one of the recommendations made in the District of Columbia’s first report, which was to test everywhere for arsenic. The author would not have recommended sampling all 1400 lots for arsenic if there wasn’t historic evidence to support it. The author attached 155 pages of historical documents to that first report culled from about 3000 pages that were read. 145

146

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

In all, about 250 shells and about 175 bottles1 were removed from the two pits. Many of the shells had presumably already leaked and some were no doubt empty when they were thrown into the hole. It appeared that the burials were somewhat segregated as many of the bottles in one pit contained bromine compounds. Both the Munitions Assessment Review Board (MARB) and the author misidentified one type of shell found in the pits. Because the PINS instrument correctly read silicon dioxide as part of the contents, we believed that those shells were practice rounds filled with sand. It now appears that they were chemical shells filled with Kieselgur, a substance intended to keep the gas closer to the ground and make it more persistent. Whatever gas they were already filled with had either leaked or was one of the many odd ones not recognized by the PINS, which only identified six common chemical agents. This lapse underscores the need to spend a year or more studying the history of a site, and the general military developments which occurred during the site’s operation. Of the shells found in the pits that still had contents, some were smoke, some were high explosive, some were white phosphorus (incendiary), and some contained common chemical warfare agents like mustard. The pits generally stopped at about 12 ft in depth but they had to be excavated to 17 ft to remove the residual arsenic. The Corps apparently tested the soil in the pits for other substances but did not tell us the results.

12.1.1 The House Next Door Because the Sgt. Maurer pit was not located, the District of Columbia asked the Corps to look further. They also asked Terry Slonecker of the EPA’s EPIC to try and refine the location for the pit shown in the 1918 aerial photograph. Both he and the District thought that the pit was located next door.

12.1.2 The Partnering Effort The validation of the major premise in the District of Columbia’s report—that more hazardous material was buried in Spring Valley— forced the Corps and the EPA to begin a halting partnership effort with the

1

The Corps has been a bit Delphic about putting together a report itemizing all of the finds but did publish a newsletter near the end of the excavations with some totals as of that date.

12: The District of Columbia’s Initial Success

147

District’s Environmental Health Administration to design an appropriate cleanup plan for Spring Valley. The District of Columbia was the remedial project manager for Spring Valley from 1998 until their removal from the partnering team in March 2003.

12.2 Myths and Falsehoods Regarding the AUES Sites often take a long time to finish. Sometimes the spin stories told by the primary responsible party take on a life of their own. Due to the rotation of government workers, it is important for residents and regulators to set forth an accurate picture of reality at some point in the site cleanup history, pointing out the lies and falsehoods. This section presents such an example. This is also the story of the problems at Spring Valley, starting with the 1986 investigation in which the Army wrote a scandalous report attempting to discredit the story of a burial in the 1922 American University Campus newspaper. Because this university was a religious institution and the story had a scriptural reference, USATHAMA’s comments denigrating the story because of the references amounted to religious discrimination. Further, the discovery of the Sgt. Maurer photograph (Photo 19) and the University trustees’ meeting minutes validated the story. The problem was exacerbated when the Corps and the University agreed to keep the findings secret. This failure to act and to warn property owners allowed a contractor to excavate at the 52nd Court trench in 1993 and dig into a pit of chemical and high-explosive shells. This agreement to maintain silence may have more directly resulted in several workers being injured during construction and landscaping along the south edge of the American University. One worker lost the skin from his knee to his ankle.

12.2.1

1995 No Further Action Report Problems

What the District of Columbia did not know at the time was that the Army knew all along that there was a burial site at the Glenbrook Road home. They had discovered their mistake in the location of POI 24 in 1994. They had conducted a geophysical survey of the property and had found an anomaly (a reading on a metal detector indicating the presence of metal underground), which they believed was a burial pit. Nevertheless, they wrote in the June 1995 No Further Action Record of Decision that there

148

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

were no pits or trenches in Zone VII (the area including the Glenbrook Road house). For years, the Corp of Engineers has maintained that there has been no detection of chemical warfare agents in Spring Valley. Indeed, the Corps of Engineers made the following statement in its Remedial Investigation Report for Operation Safe Removal, dated June 1, 1995: “Mustard agent, chloropicrin, phosgene, and explosives were not detected in any samples analyzed for those parameters. BNAs [Base Neutral Acid Extractable Organic Compounds] were detected in two soil samples.” Again, “Sixty-four soil samples, four water samples, one sediment sample, and one groundwater sample were collected by the Army from or within the vicinity of POI 14 between January 12 and 27, 1993. All samples were analyzed for BNAs, metals, and explosives. Certain soil samples were also analyzed for chemical agents and breakdown products. No chemical warfare agents or their breakdown products were detected in any sample” (emphasis added). In 1996, the District of Columbia vigorously attacked the Army Corps of Engineer’s conclusion of “no further action” in that same Final Report on the World War I Poison Gas Production at the AUES. Since then, the District’s main contentions—that there were significant quantities of munitions, chemical glassware, and arsenic contamination remaining— have been proven to be 100 percent correct. Now, the District of Columbia asserts that the emphasized statement quoted above is a mistake. The District maintains that trinitrotoluene (TNT) and tetryl are explosives; and further, that Adamsite, chloroacetophenone, and phenyldichloroarsine were found in the original samples. These are all listed as chemical warfare agents in FM 3-9, “Potential Military Chemical/ Biological Agents and Compounds” (1990). Finally, numerous Lewisite and mustard breakdown products are identified in the sampling report. Were this a singular mistake, long past, it could be forgotten. However, the Corps has made similar statements in newsletters and public presentations over the years. Republishing this false statement makes it more difficult for the District of Columbia to obtain the sampling that it requests. For example, the Corps has even refused to engage the District in a discussion over the most recent sampling request made by the District (i.e., to sample properties adjacent to the four properties where the total of 102 substances were found and to grid sample the properties to locate any hot spots). Repeating this falsehood may also lead to greater risks being taken by the residents. Finally, the Corps rotates its Spring Valley project managers every two or three years. New project managers will read summaries in the reports and begin their work with incorrect information, giving an erroneous impression of the site that belies its serious nature. This lack

12: The District of Columbia’s Initial Success

149

of understanding could prompt cost-saving decisions, which fail again to address known contamination and for the third time lead to a premature closure.

12.2.2

Small Laboratory Quantities of Toxic Material

Throughout many reports and speeches, the Corps has maintained that there were only small quantities of munitions and chemicals on hand. However, numerous documents belie that position. First, a memorandum states that 50 tons a day of supplies came in by rail to AUES. Second, Capt. Lewis said that a still was set up to make Lewisite in semi-large scale quantities. Third, a ton of butyl mercaptan (the odor in skunks) exploded, leading to the name “Skunk Hill.” Fourth, documents state the weekly production of some compounds. Fifth, a narrow-gauge railroad was constructed and used to move heavy stills.

12.3 The Glass Stopper Early partnering efforts were halting at best. The author, Jim Sweeney, and Don Campbell would travel up to the Baltimore District Army Corps of Engineers and be surrounded by 20–30 EPA and Corps staff trying to refute the District’s reports. Campbell joked on the drive back after one meeting that he carried two sharpened wooden pencils with him so that he could back into a corner and fend off the attacks. Finally, the Corps excavated the first two burial sites on the Glenbrook Road property and we felt that things would change in our relationship with the Corps. At this point in time, the District of Columbia’s attention shifted to trying to get some arsenic sampling around the Glenbrook Road property. To their surprise, the Corps agreed and not only did that lot but also the two adjoining ones. To their surprise, the arsenic was as high as 1000 ppm on the surface of the Glenbrook Road backyard and 600 ppm next door (the EPA had only found 241 ppm). Of course, this created quite a stir and at this point, the EPA was forced to take some of its own arsenic samples. During this effort, the author discovered some laboratory glassware protruding from the ground on the American University campus behind the Glenbrook Road property. Two of the items were glass stoppers. The Corps came and took the items—without receipt—from the author’s office. The author was not at work that day, but his co-workers were under the impression that the Corps was going to test the glass tubing and other pieces of

150

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

glassware for CWM breakdown products. If any such testing was done, the District of Columbia was never given the results. Imagine their surprise at the next partnering meeting when one of the Corps’ staff gave a 30-minute report of his contacts with a glassware manufacturing company in a month-long effort to establish that glass stoppers did not exist in 1918. In fact, he alleged that they first appeared in a 1925 catalogue; therefore, he reasoned that the glassware was not of AUES origin. We sat and listened politely to his report. Because the first glass stopper the author found was broken, and he only had the top of it, he was not sure what it was. It was hollow, looking very much like a Christmas tree bulb or a miniature chandelier light bulb, with swirls to simulate a candle’s flame; in fact, that is what he first thought it was. The other glassware consisted of 4-mm tubing, test tubes, a crucible, and other hand-blown and odd-looking distillation columns that were clearly laboratory glassware. Eventually, the District of Columbia found a complete glass stopper with the ground glass, Morris tapered end and the light-bulb shaped top. Ironically, one of the few photos the District found at the National Archives showed a small lab at AUES. In the photograph was a picture of the Christmas tree bulb-like glass stopper, as well as the type used when the author studied chemistry, which had a simple glass disc on top of the tapered stopper piece. They brought the picture to show the bulb-type stopper, which the District thought uniquely tied the glassware burial site to the AUES. Because the Corps agreed to excavate the burial site, the District of Columbia never showed the photograph to the Corps. It proved far more valuable in later years to understand the lengths that the Corps would go to in trying to discredit the District of Columbia’s work or to deny their own culpability.

12.4 The Child Development Center at American University It is very important for regulators, residents, and stakeholders to get whatever help they can get. The press is often invaluable at uncovering information. Most reporters are inquisitive and observant. This section presents an example of how listening to a simple observation by a reporter (actually, a magazine writer) led to the discovery of a major problem area and undoubtedly kept a lot of kids from falling prey to Lewisite contamination. As a regulator, there is a tendency to act like one knows it all. One day in the fall of 2000, Harry Jaffe, a writer for the Washingtonian Magazine,

12: The District of Columbia’s Initial Success

151

asked if we knew that there was a nursery school just uphill from the excavations on the Glenbrook Road property. We certainly did not know that! We can only assume that whenever we were in that area of campus, the kids must have been inside. We immediately asked the Corps to sample for arsenic on the playground of the Child Development Center (CDC). The first sampling that was done was a six-part composite sample. This was consistent with the plan that we agreed to with the Corps for other properties at that time. Essentially, they would take six scoops of surface soil, mix them up in a bowl and then send one sample to the laboratory for analysis. If the results were above the background level of 12.6 ppm of arsenic, then the Corps would divide up the property into grids of 10 ft by 10 ft, or 20 ft by 20 ft in most areas, and take a separate sample in each grid. The composite sample had over 30 ppm arsenic. Accordingly, the Corps promptly took grid samples and sent them off for analysis. Although 30 ppm was above the current cleanup level of 20 ppm, it was not shockingly high. The fear with the composite samples was that five of the locations might be clean and the sixth scoop might be extremely high. As it turned out, the arsenic in one grid was 400 ppm. Also, that grid was where the little tykes had their vegetable garden and, after harvesting and eating their carrots and other vegetables, they would play with their toy trucks in the dirt. In other words, they were getting significant exposure to soil that was clearly poisonous. To make matters worse, as the Corps excavated the contaminated soil the arsenic levels increased every foot until they reached 3500 ppm at a depth of 5 ft. Of course, thanks to the combined backing we received from the parents and a very astute day-care supervisor, Ms. Green, the kids were immediately removed from the facility. We believe that Ms. Green was prepared to engage the Major in hand-to-hand combat if necessary to protect her little charges. Had that occurred the author would have bet on Ms. Green. Of course, now we know that there were several illnesses among the previous residents of the building when it was a fraternity house. There was one case of testicular cancer and one double club-footed infant, who was allegedly conceived at the house, and at least one child at the day-care facility came down with a fairly rare illness. We also know that the Lewisite still (Shack #8) sat on top of the very spot where the high arsenic level was found. That still exploded, gassing retired Senator Nathan Scott. He and his wife survived, having donned the gas masks that were issued to them. Finally, we know that there were many organic compounds found in the soil during sampling for specialized compounds peculiar to AUES research, as covered elsewhere.

13 The Continuing Search for Burial Sites 13.1 Many Clues Must Be Used to Find Burial Sites It is important for residents, stakeholders and regulators to recognize the precepts of this chapter. Success is never fully obtained in cleaning up an old military site because there is always the possibility of more burial or munitions sites. There is a tendency to declare victory too early. This chapter teaches the importance of patience and perseverance. With the discovery of 141 shells in January 1993 (44 of them deemed poison gas), it became apparent that some leftovers were simply buried. Therefore, the District of Columbia decided that their first priority would be to search for other burial sites. They made this the District’s fundamental goal because burial sites of high-explosive and chemical shells presented the greatest hazard to a residential neighborhood. Also, this is an affluent neighborhood, constantly making additions to older, smaller houses and putting in swimming pools or landscaping features requiring major excavations. The District of Columbia also reasoned that a site with 1200 chemists and 700 support personnel would have a lot of leftovers to dispose of at the end. In this case, the Armistice came rather suddenly. In fact, they had some tests so far along in the planning process that they continued some limited testing after the Treaty was signed because it caught them by surprise. By July 1919, the number of personnel at the site had been reduced to just 37 people.

13.1.1 Subsequent Report on a 1921 Article in a Campus Newspaper The historical search also found two articles from the American University Courier campus newspaper. In the April 1921 issue, there is an extensive article on the Chemical Warfare Service’s use of the campus. In the pertinent part, the paper states, When the armistice was signed two thousand chemists, with their assistants, were employed in the largest laboratory this side of the sun or other burning stars. There were munitions 153

154

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site on hand, including multiplex gas and an invented explosive many times dynamite, valued at $800,000 . . . disarmament began at the University. It was begun by the destruction of the munitions? The numerous collections on hand, just ready to go overseas, was valued at nothing now but the expense of putting them away. As “this was to be the last war,” permission was given to go far back on the University acres, to dig a pit deeper than the one into which Joseph was cast, bury the munitions there and cover them up to wait until the elements shall melt with fervent heat, when the earth and the works therein shall be burned up. (American University Courier, April 1921, by William Osborn)

Osborn was also the secretary for the Board of Trustees and was present during the meeting when the permission was sought and granted. The Army historian that led the search effort concluded that the article was historically suspect because of when it was written, the contexts in which the comments appear, the nature of the source, and inferences from comparisons with other sources. The District of Columbia’s research led me to reach a far different conclusion. In doing so, it should be noted that the historian completed his search and opinion in only 23 days; the District had been studying this site for over two years. They also had the benefit of substantial recent knowledge regarding the site. The District’s reasons for crediting the accuracy of the story follow. First, documents discovered later suggest the disposal of supplies that could not be salvaged. It appears from Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19) that very few chemicals were salvaged. This was also consistent with other works cited in the District’s Report, which suggest that the reason the government established its own laboratories and plants was that the chemical companies of the day did not see any commercial use for these compounds. Second, one large-scale haphazard burial has already been found after the historian made his conclusions, which adds considerable credence to the burial story. However, the location, size, and depth of this burial do not seem to mirror the one described in the campus newspaper. Third, that edition of the campus newspaper generally contains a glowing description of the quality of the work done by the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) at the university and the fact that the War Department was going to leave the Fixed Nitrogen Research Laboratory. It further provided a very detailed description of the laboratory and the major people responsible for its success. It appears that some of these people remained and could well have supplied the newspaper with other details of the AUES, including

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

155

the burial. Much of that edition of the paper revealed detailed investigation of names and facts—rendering it “accurate,” not “suspect.” Fourth, the newspaper mentions that permission was given to bury the material far back on university property. This conveys the idea that someone in authority at the university was told of the planned burial when permission was sought. The District of Columbia originally felt that the inclusion of the permission statement and the location impute some knowledge on the part of the author. In reality, the author was the secretary for the Board of Trustees and had direct knowledge of the permission grant. Fifth, as a campus paper it would have been concerned with campus events. The timing of the story seems to coincide with the last destruction of laboratory buildings too contaminated for use and the decision to continue the nitrogen laboratory. The passage of two years would not dull the memory as to a major burial at the university. Sixth, the historian attempted to show that the total allotment to the CWS for ordnance stores and ammunition for 1918–19 was $1,196,646; thus, the $800,000 figure could not be accurate. The chart that he bases this on states, “In the United States Treasury June 30, 1920.” The chart also states, “In the United States Treasury July 1, 1919, $1,223,485.36.” It appears that the figure cited by the historian was what was appropriated after the war ended and was not spent. In the Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War (1917–19), it states that the total amount for just contracts for the production of gas was $10,444,035.02. Presumably, these were to universities and private chemical companies. The demobilization of the CWS reduced the Service to 7 percent of its total, or 124 officers and 1348 enlisted men. This sudden demobilization would account for the million-dollar leftover and also give credence to the need to bury large stores. The reference to the value of the munitions buried, $800,000, is not clearly an exaggeration. It is just as likely that this was the total “cost” of the output of the munitions derived from the cost of the total operation at the station. Valuing something by how much it cost to produce it is not necessarily a patent exaggeration. While it does not give us any meaningful estimation of the scope of the burial, attempting to disprove its accuracy is reaching. Several documents on the site support this figure. A new budget in 1917 called for $662,000 at a time when the first laboratory was just about finished. Documents pertaining to the university research itself indicate that $500,000 was spent on gas investigations work for two months at the end of the 1917–1918 fiscal year, and that $775,000 was spent just on laboratory equipment during the war. Valuing the remaining stores at $800,000 does not seem unsubstantiated if the value was based

156

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

on the cost of manufacture. This document also mentions that each new gas can cost from $5000 to $50,000 to develop (note that there were 250 gases developed). Even $10,000—well below the average or median figure— multiplied by the 50 major gases experimented with equals $500,000, a figure not grossly inconsistent with that quoted in the paper. Seventh, the campus paper says that the burial included a new explosive many times more powerful than dynamite. That new explosive was described in one of the periodic reports on the site’s activities. Apparently, one of the plants at the site was being devoted exclusively to the manufacture of a precursor gas for this explosive. The equipment at the nitrogen laboratory was valued at $399,000 and according to the Washington Star, it cost $300,000 annually to operate this laboratory. Again, the $800,000 figure is highly believable and, correct or not, could well have been a figure advanced by a person knowledgeable in the operations of the site. As a result of these reports and listed concerns by the District of Columbia, the Corps of Engineers undertook an extensive reevaluation of its original remedial work at the AUES site. The Corps did locate several disposal sites (far back on university acres) but has not yet located the explosive burial site referred to in the campus newspaper account. Excavation of the sites in 1999, and continuing to date, has failed to find anything this large. However, the amount of toxic and explosive material excavated to date is considerable. This refusal to accept the federal government’s explanation shows the value of the state and local regulators expending the time and resources necessary to oversee, critique, and perform independent research on military sites. The significance of this article and the above recitation of the District of Columbia’s reasons for finding the story credible is that the Corps was using the buried mustard containers as the maximum credible event in the Site Safety Submission Work Plan for the AUES Operable Unit 3 excavation. The maximum credible event should have included the detonation of a large quantity of explosives. Although the District of Columbia believed at the time that a substantial quantity of munitions was buried on university property, it was not—and is still not—clear where these munitions are all buried. Now, perchlorate (one of the powerful new explosives developed at AUES) has been found in the groundwater. It is likely that this comes from a burial site. The more obvious significance is that we still need to find that massive burial of explosives. A 1927 aerial photograph depicts three large ground scars, any of which could be the burial referred to in the Courier. One of these three ground scars appears to be near POI 24R. A 1918 aerial photograph (not expected to show the burial referred to in the Courier) shows a pit and

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

157

two trenches. At the time, the District of Columbia believed that the pit was POI 24R. The trenches may have been early testing trenches; these other two trenches should be examined as potential burial areas as well, at a later date. Of course, now the pit shown on the 1918 aerial photograph is believed to be on the property adjacent to POI 24R. Finally, the Sgt. Maurer still photograph shows a mustard (Lewisite) disposal pit. This could be the same pit as that shown on the 1918 aerial photograph or a different one. That too is believed to be on the property adjacent to POI 24R. Once the Geophysical Investigation Report, Republic of South Korea, Glenbrook Road Residence, showed significant variations between Anomaly 1 and Anomaly 2 in both depth and ferrous-metal content, suggesting different burials, we all thought that both the 1918 pit and the campus newspaper pit were found. However, none of the carboys shown in the Sgt. Maurer photo were found. No bulk explosive, except for some black powder, was found. Moreover, the total amount removed from the two pits on the Glenbrook Road residence, plus that removed next door, does not approach $800,000. Therefore, the possibility of another burial area should be kept open. Also, there are three pits, not just one as stated in the campus newspaper. The District of Columbia believed it is possible that when permission was sought for the burial, the total extent of material needing disposal was not known. By mid-1919, there was a moratorium on shipping any more munitions to the depots. Perhaps the CWS expected to sell more of the chemicals to private industry. Thus, one burial approval may have been considered a blanket authorization. Perhaps what has been found to date was simply the ongoing burials shown on the 1918 aerial photograph and not the $800,000 hoard. To that note, the EPA Criminal Investigation Division (CID) Investigative Activity Report States that, “It would have been efficient to load a large volume ($800,000 worth of almost anything in 1918–1920 dollars would be a large volume) onto rail cars. There was a railway on the AU campus at that time which traversed elevation changes, particularly to the northwest. The material could have been taken to the elevation drop and a tunnel dug into the side of hill. The material placed into this ‘cave’ would then be further concealed by subsequent fill material placed in the low area.” The witness, a former employee of the American University, further testified that he could not recall where he had seen the references but clearly recalls reading mid- to late-1918 discussions of the CWS developing a “new weapon” for use in Europe in the spring of 1919. This weapon was “unlike anything developed before.” The witness believes the “Spring Offensive” weapon was Lewisite. However, the report “concludes that the

158

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

$800,000 burial was not the strategic ‘Spring Offensive’ weapon but other material.” The report further states, “the material is buried sideways into a former cliff face.” One similar burial area (side of a hill near a railroad track) has been located and is area of interest (AOI) 2, the relic hunter’s pit. A narrow-gauge railroad was completed on the campus of AUES one month before the site was closed. The rail line was supposed to be extended out into the testing area where manufacturing units were to be located. Originally, the District of Columbia thought that the shells in the relic hunter’s pit were found during construction of the Van Ness Reservoir and transported to the Dalecarlia property because there was also a narrow-gauge railway used during construction of the Van Ness Reservoir, but now it seems likely that these shells were moved to Dalecarlia directly from AUES. The 1918 map shows several paths that go to the Dalecarlia property— one goes “northwest” from the American University and is a straight line that enters the federal property near the railroad bed described and found in our AOI 2 report. Spikes have been found where this path enters the federal property in addition to the spikes found near the Rick Woods pit location where a rail bed is still evident. The 1994 geophysical survey found a line of shells along what is believed to be the route of the narrow-gauge railway based on the railroad spike recoveries. Perhaps these shells simply fell off the railcar and were not fired into the area. Now, an AUES publication called “The Retort” has surfaced that directly describes the narrow-gauge railroad on the campus. It is thus plausible that the railroad track, which originated at the AUES, was extended all the way to the Dalecarlia property to dispose of the vast quantities of material on hand at the AUES. It was probably already near there at the close of the site (going to the Sedgwick Trenches, for example). This shows the need for a willingness to reevaluate one’s own positions as more data or information becomes available.

13.1.2 Report of the Burial of Shells by the Civilian Conservation Corps The District of Columbia Department of Health, Environmental Health Administration received information from a resident of Spring Valley consisting of, among other things, a February 25, 1993, memorandum of a phone call from one Ian MacFee to the Mayor’s Office of Constituent Services alleging that the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) buried munitions in 14 pits at the AUES.

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

159

The caller stated that he worked with the CCC in the 1930s under the command of a Lt. Wray Noel. The Corps of Engineers responded to the resident’s inquiry regarding the phone call memorandum by saying that they had previously investigated the statements in this phone call but were unable to confirm anything except that Noel had died in 1988. However, the Corps did consider the representations in planning for the nonintrusive investigations. The Corps made a similar disposition of the reported burial of munitions in the American University campus newspaper, which has now been shown to be accurate. Therefore, the District of Columbia reviewed the Corps’ de facto decision to take no further action in finding the reported CCC burials. The District of Columbia staff was initially troubled by the allegation of a burial in the 1930s because it ran contrary to the assumption based on some evidence that any burials that did occur happened prior to 1922. Therefore, the District raised the issues presented in the phone call memorandum at the regular May 1998 work group meeting in Baltimore. The Corps provided a copy of its thorough investigation summary and added that they spoke with Noel’s widow, who stated that Noel was never in the CCC. Subsequently, the Corps supplied the entire investigative package, which confirmed that Lt. Noel’s military history does include a CCC assignment, as the District of Columbia had found. In addition to the confirmation that Lt. Noel existed, there were other intricate details in the telephone call that confirmed facts previously known to the District of Columbia staff (i.e., “French 75s and mustard gas”) but which are known to only a small circle of experts. These facts recited by the caller suggested a very knowledgeable witness. Also, the statement was made spontaneously in response to a newspaper story, reducing the possibility of fabrication. Accordingly, the District of Columbia staff was obligated to consider the witness credible. The District of Columbia had a legal duty to investigate credible eyewitness evidence of a munitions burial in the District. Also, under the District/ Defense Memorandum of Agreement (DDMOA), the District has the right to review and comment on documents submitted by the Corps of Engineers in response to a request by the District. The District of Columbia also has oversight responsibility to review “no further action” decisions by the Corps.

13.1.3

Findings

First, to have a large-scale munitions burial in the 1930s, there had to be munitions remaining after the site was closed. The District of Columbia

160

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

and the Corps discovered facts during the investigation that provide evidence of potential munitions storage areas: “the shell pits, powder magazines, detonator house, and explosives service building on the Spaulding property were boarded up and enclosed with fences or barbed wire to prevent access.” (A Brief History of the American University Experiment Station and the U.S. Navy Bomb Disposal School, American University, by Gordon, Sude, Overbeck, and Hendricks, Office of History Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, May 1994; hereinafter referred to as Brief History). Further, a 1927 aerial photograph reveals the continued presence of three shell pits—POIs 21, 22, and 23—and nearby magazines. Surprisingly, the grounds adjacent to these structures appear to be kept clean of debris that would have been expected to accumulate over nine years in a forested area. The paths leading to these pits are still clearly visible. By contrast, the wide swath cut through the woods for a double water main (now Dalecarlia Parkway) was completely overgrown between the 1927 and 1937 photos. The appearance that the magazine area and shell pits were maintained after the site was otherwise abandoned adds to the suggestion of some continued use. Finally, there is anecdotal evidence that these shell pits were smoking in the 1930s. A 1931 map indicates that 4.67 acres of the Spaulding property (part of the original 640 leased acres for the site) was sold to John Small III (Washingtonian Collection, D.C. Library). This was squares 1507 and 1509. Plan 30, dated 1937, indicates that this property (now listed as 4.69 acres) was sold to Olive M. Dwight. This property contained the three shell pits. A 1936 map of the construction development in the AUES area confirms that construction, which otherwise developed street by street, strangely bypassed these shell pits. Except for a steep terrain feature known as East Creek, all of the roads in this subdivision are designed to allow the lots to back up to each other. Only the area of POIs 20–23 has a parcel that is landlocked. The District of Columbia discovered that the War Department maintained a presence at the AUES after the site was abandoned. The Annual Mobilization Plans through 1924 list the AUES as a CWS station. Small quantities of difficult to obtain chemicals and reagents were sent to the Department of Agriculture research lab at the AUES by the Edgewood Arsenal. The U. S. government also maintained ownership of 1.92 acres of land on the former Camp Leach between 44th and 45th Streets and bounded on the south by Van Ness Street. The Corps of Engineers also leased 2.93 acres as a “searchlight testing station” known as Tennleytown Station. The District of Columbia now knows where this was: It was a parcel on Nebraska Avenue, just north of Massachusetts Avenue.

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

161

This area has now been found to have some of the highest arsenic levels found on private lots. In 1918, this area was where the Camp Leach soldiers’ tents were located, making it difficult to believe that a deadly poison would have been stored or used there. However, the presence of 90 troops—including guards—staying on at a searchlight testing station would have made this a good spot to store some shells or chemicals. The AUES site was rapidly decommissioned after World War I ended. By July 1919, there were only 37 men remaining, and by November 1, 1919, only 18 men were on staff. Similar cuts occurred at the Edgewood Arsenal. This shortage of manpower would have been a factor limiting the transport of a substantial number of leftover munitions. Second, the District of Columbia was able to confirm that a Lt. Wray Noel was attached to the 1376th Company, District No. 1, in the Third Corps CCC operation, which covered Luray, Virginia, and more importantly that his first tour as a Second Lieutenant ended on July 4, 1937. He finished Reserve Officer training at Fort Meade on or about May 3, 1935. Thus, if the information provided by the phone call is correct, the alleged burials had to occur between May 3, 1935, and June 19, 1937, based on the dates Lt. Noel was on active duty. MacFee indicated that he worked out of an office in Luray and buried Civil War munitions as well. The District of Columbia was also able to confirm that there were five CCC camps in Luray, including Camp Roosevelt and Camps NP-1, NP-2, NP-10, and NP-12. These camps were near a large storage depot and in an area rich with Civil War remnants, which may have provided MacFee and his unit with experience in burying munitions. The caller also indicated that munitions burials occurred at Aberdeen, Maryland, and that the Old Navy Radio Station in Arlington, Virginia, had two munitions dumps on it. The District of Columbia was able to confirm that CCC range work occurred at Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Range work was requested at other sites in Virginia, including Langley Field, a site that performed testing for the AUES. CCC work was requested at Fort Myer, Virginia, which is next to the Old Navy Radio Station. The 30th Engineers were the first Gas and Flame Regiment located at the American University. Companies E and F were located at Fort Myer because the AUES had developed into a huge, overcrowded chemical warfare research center. Fort Myer also had a 75-mm gun battery. The District of Columbia’s research also found a request by the CCC for an Ordnance Captain from Aberdeen to assist with CCC technical activities. It is well documented that the Ordnance Department used men and funds from the emergency relief programs instituted in the 1930s. In a

162

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

multivolume series on military history by the Military History Section, the volume entitled, Planning Munitions for War—The Ordnance Department: 1919–40 (1959) states, Then as Congress realized the severity of the depression, it again cut ordnance funds . . . Fortunately, the financial picture after 1932 was less somber than the official figures of Ordnance appropriations suggest. The extensive emergency relief program that the Roosevelt administration launched in 1933 benefited the Department greatly . . . The Roosevelt administration stressed projects that employed large numbers of men rather than expensive equipment, and much of the repair work at Ordnance installations fitted admirably into that category. From the Civil Works Administration, Ordnance received about $1,390,000, mostly for the pay of laborers . . . Though this labor force taken from the rolls of the unemployed was usually unaccustomed to Ordnance assignments and suffered many physical handicaps, it accomplished valuable work that must otherwise have been or left undone. In the March 25, 1934, budget of the CWS, there is a description of Project 22, Edgewood Chemical Warfare Depot (Bush River Project). The condition under which large quantities of toxic gases, spontaneously inflammable materials and high explosives have been stored at Edgewood Arsenal (in the Edgewood Chemical Warfare Depot) have contributed to a serious hazard to life and property for a number of years past, and efforts have been made by this office to correct this situation by segregating all these dangerous stores in an isolated part of the reservation where they can be housed in fireproof buildings suitable for the purpose, and stored in accordance with the approved practice prescribed by the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board. This matter has been carefully studied by a War Department Board appointed under the provisions of Special Order 214, War Dept. Sept. 12, 1931, and subsequent orders and the whole project has been approved by the War Department under date October 20, 1933, by 15 Endorsement AG 600.12 EA 3-29-32 Misc. D. and has also been included as an item under the War Department Technical Construction Program submitted to the Public Works Administration . . . However should funds not be provided by the PWA for this project it is urged that it be included as a new project of the CWS for FY 1936. (National Archives RG 175 E-4 Box 2)

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

163

It is thus clear that the CCC, and the related Public Works Administration (PWA), were tapped for chemical ordnance disposal projects at Aberdeen, as indicated by MacFee and the supporting documentation. It is also clear that the leftover World War I District of Columbia chemical munitions were in a dangerous state by 1931. If CWM were stored at the AUES, they likewise should have been in a similar dangerous condition by 1935 and 1936 when MacFee would have most likely completed the burials as determined from the service dates of his supervisor. In the November 17, 1932, issue of the Washington Evening Star newspaper, Section B-15, Maj. Gen. Gilchrist cites the hazards at Edgewood Arsenal. In 1933, munitions exploded at Edgewood, killing two people. Although the Corps conducted an extensive search for MacFee, the District of Columbia was not convinced that the Corps was given accurate information by the Aberdeen Police. The District was able to confirm that there was a MacFee living in Aberdeen with an unlisted telephone number. The inability to find MacFee in Scotland does not bear on the truthfulness of the caller because an elderly gentleman moving back to his native country may well be residing with relatives and not have a telephone in his name. Likewise, not much importance can be placed on the failure to find an Ian MacFee flying out of area airports on the date in question. The Memorandum did not specify at which airport the caller was located. A passenger going overseas might take a shuttle to New York and not be on a passenger manifest, or might take a flight to another international airport for a connection to Scotland. The District of Columbia was also able to confirm that older phones in Scotland had five-digit numbers, many of which are seen in the 1994 telephone directory for Aberdeen, Scotland. In light of the findings by the District of the street named by the caller, and an unlisted phone number for a MacFee in Aberdeen, the Corps should make another attempt to locate MacFee. However, it is speculative that he could offer anything more in determining the exact location of the alleged burials because of the undeveloped nature of the area in 1936 and the changes wrought to the topography would make it difficult to find a reference place. While the caller gave extensive details, he did not provide any specific location—which would have been more important than who he worked for—suggesting that he did not remember anything else. Therefore, although finding MacFee might provide that one additional clue to narrow the possible burial areas, the District of Columbia decided it could still pursue the investigation through further archival searches and aerial photograph analysis. Subsequently, a newspaper reporter located an Ian McFee who worked for Porton Downs, the British equivalent of AUES, and also that this

164

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

individual buried chemical weapons there after World War II. Could this person have been the son of our Ian Macfee? His birth date rules him out as being the same person. The District of Columbia checked that spelling of McFee and found 109 in the British telephone directory. A memorandum states, “G.O. (General Order) 54, W.D., 1920, charges the Ordnance Department with the responsibility for storage, issue, supply, and design of artillery shell, bombs, and grenades containing chemical filling” (RG175 Entry 4, Box 12, National Archives). Because the final disposition of salvageable items at the AUES did not occur until 1921, it is possible that any leftover munitions stored at the facility fell between the cracks of two different departments. Because the Ordnance Department was extremely shorthanded at this time, any munitions may have been left there in storage. There was a standing order placing a moratorium on depots receiving any more munitions referenced in a memorandum, dated June 4, 1919, that stated, “due to the congested conditions and the embargo of our depots” (RG 156, Box 39, 400.35–411.6). This embargo was due to the staggering numbers of ordnance being returned from overseas. For example, on April 30, 1919, there were 196,658 75-mm gas shells in storage depots with 3,785,878 shrapnel shells just returned from overseas and another 7,023,690 already in the depots (RG 156, Box 1, 400.7). During March 1919, many shipping orders were canceled (RG 156, Box 39, 400.35 901– 950, 951–1000). Also, Field Service Bulletin No. 2, dated Feb. 5, 1919, revised March 19, 1919, sub paragraph 3-E, established a salvage board in the Ammunition Division “to handle all unserviceable ammunition and explosives and determine disposition of obsolete stores or equipment” (RG 156, 190 085 35, 400.93, salvaging 1–50). It is highly likely that the request for shipping orders of the leftover munitions from the AUES was superseded by these orders. When the CWS was created, its demise was also established at six months after the cessation of hostilities, or May 11, 1919. Congress did not extend the CWS until July 1919, and then only after a long and bitter debate. All of these factors could account for shells being left at the AUES. Although the request for shipping orders for the leftover munitions from the AUES was signed March 1919, several months ahead of the demise of the CWS, the railroad required special trains for chemical munitions. With the tremendous stores of ordnance coming back from overseas and being shipped from manufacturing facilities, such trains were in demand, necessitating a long wait. Thus, the CWS may have ceased to exist before shipment could be made. Because the Corps has not found a record of Edgewood receiving the shipment, the District of Columbia

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

165

could not assume that shipment occurred in light of the embargo and these other facts. MacFee also said that the Old Navy Radio Station in Northern Virginia had two munitions dump sites on it. Terrence Slonecker from the EPA’s Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center (EPIC) has viewed another photo from the same flight series as the 1937 AUES aerial photographs and noted two ground scars on the Old Navy Radio Station property in Arlington, Virginia. A Navy historian, James Dolph, found an archival reference indicating that a new sewer line was dug at the Old Navy Radio Station by the Works Progress Administration (often confused with the CCC) and that the two old septic tanks were to be filled with ashes, and so on. He has found a map of the old septic tanks. Fort Myer had two gas and flame companies located there during 1918, and it is likely that they fired 75-mm chemical ordnance. Also, the Navy was involved in the research at the AUES and shells were tested in Virginia (see page 29 of Brief History). Because the CCC was working at Fort Myer, which is adjacent to the Old Navy Radio Station, at the same time that the dumps became available at the Radio Station, it is plausible that some ordnance may have been disposed of there. MacFee did not state that pits were dug but rather that there were dumps at the Radio Station. This subtle difference in descriptive language could be compatible with munitions simply placed in septic tanks being converted to dumps. MacFee also did not state that he was involved in the disposal at the Radio Station. A CCC Camp, NP-6-Va, was established in Fairfax County (Alexandria), Virginia, and was commanded by Nathan C. Sutton, Ensign, U.S.N. Ironically, this was the only Navy commander of a CCC camp in this area. Thus, CCC workers under the command of the Navy were available to work on the Radio Station. The District of Columbia believed that the creation of two waste dumps at the Old Navy Radio Station within the same time frame as Noel’s service adds significantly to confirmation of MacFee’s statements. Because the District of Columbia was able to confirm so many of the representations contained in the memorandum of the phone conversation, they raised the issue at the partnering meeting in October 1999. EPIC indicated that it could probably find burials of the nature described by MacFee on old aerial photographs. Therefore, the District’s staff turned their efforts toward obtaining aerial photographs from that time period that may show excavations using a steam shovel. The National Archives in College Park, Maryland, apparently prepared a list of aerial photographs and maps of the AUES area for the Corps of Engineers dated January 13, 1992 [sic] 93.

166

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

The District of Columbia had previously found that the list of aerial pictures contained a mistake in the 1937–38 series. It included four alphanumeric frame sequences beginning with “NV.” Those alphanumeric designations are for photographs of the middle of Montgomery County, Maryland, and are totally erroneous. The correct alphanumeric frame sequences for the AUES area are FG-118-120 and FG-118-134. Apparently, because of the mistake by the National Archives the Corps had only FG-118-134. Unfortunately, this photo had extensive negative damage. The District of Columbia was able to obtain FG-118-120. This photograph is dated April 30, 1937, and covers 22 months of Lt. Noel’s 24-month service period. Therefore, this series should contain evidence of the massive burial reported. Indeed, as EPIC predicted the photo contains an obvious linear feature approximately a half mile long parallel to the C&O Canal suggesting mechanically worked earth. EPIC briefly examined the photo and confirmed the District of Columbia’s observation. This area had railroad access and it would have been possible to bring a steam shovel into the area as MacFee indicated. It was also federal property and close to the AUES. Further, the area upon physical examination still shows clear evidence of earth that has been excavated by mechanical means, compatible with the aerial photograph representation. The District of Columbia obtained a permit from the National Park Service and the District’s staff surveyed this area with a Fisher Gemini-3 Radio Frequency Transmitter-Receiver Metal Detector. They repeated the survey using a Schonstedt GA-72 Cd Magnetic Locator. Thus far, the District has located 13 anomalies that are compatible with munitions burials. Additionally, the EPA’s expert in UXO recovery has confirmed the compatibility of several of the District’s anomalies with deep munitions burials and has located a 14th anomaly. The anomalies are marked with tape and are plotted on the attached map (deleted for purposes of this book). In addition, the District of Columbia looked at the utility maps to eliminate the possibility that a utility line may account for the anomalies. One such map bears the strange comment, “NOTE: FOR NONINTERFERENCE BETWEEN NEW CHAIN BRIDGE AND U.R.DC., SEE E.D. 236905-1.” EPIC has performed a spectrum analysis of the stressed vegetation over several of the anomalies located by the District and has concluded that there are distinct differences in the vegetation chemistry over the anomalies as compared to nearby background locations. It should be noted that the District of Columbia has also looked at other aerial photographs to see

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

167

if there are other potential burial sites on federal land near the AUES. No other site has been found. Accordingly, the District reassessed the original conclusion. They obtained a still photograph of the steam shovel being unloaded from a railroad car. However, it was unloaded on the opposite side of the canal from where they thought the burials occurred. The District also obtained another photograph showing the shovel in the canal, which had been drained. Could it be that the burials occurred in the canal while they were shoveling out the flood debris and silt?

13.1.4

Recommendations

Because the District of Columbia was able to confirm so many of the representations contained in the memorandum of the phone conversation, the Corps must make a substantial effort to find the burials. Because EPIC has now analyzed the aerial photographs and found no pits near the canal, it is likely that the burials were made in the canal proper while the crane was there for the purpose of rebuilding the towpath. The aerial photograph was taken after water was again allowed to enter the canal and therefore the pits are not visible. In either case, the District of Columbia requested that the Corps of Engineers or the EPA fund further geophysical examination, soil gas, groundwater, or other sampling of the C&O Canal for potential sites. If munitions are confirmed, the Corps of Engineers must excavate the sites. The EPA has contacted the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), which has developed an ordnance detection system valued at $750,000. The NRL represents that their system is capable of determining depth and shape of any burials. The District of Columbia is under the impression that this instrument is able to distinguish between munitions burials and hot rocks and believe that this is the best available technology for this site. The NRL has viewed the site and also confirms the appearance of multiple potential burials from the surface topography. They then precisely surveyed the anomalies the District of Columbia had found. With their better equipment, they ruled out all but five of the District’s anomalies as potential burial sites. In spite of their good effort, this shows the value of having the best equipment available. It also suggests that the few remaining metallic anomalies were simply river wash debris buried during the towpath reconstruction. Unfortunately, the NRL did not survey the canal because we did not have the photograph of the crane in the canal—and

168

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

therefore the possibility of the burials there—at the time the NRL performed their work.

13.1.5

Burial Pit Found by Civil War Relic Hunter

This burial event was brought to the District of Columbia’s attention by a television reporter, Melanie Almwood, who was contacted by the individual who found the site. The relic hunter stated to the EPA and the author that he found the site while looking for a reported Civil War cannonball location. He stated that he found the track bed for a narrow-gauge railroad line and followed it as it ran along a hillside. After finding more railroad spikes than he wanted, he began searching downhill from the track bed and he found the anomaly. He dug out about 30 shells that he believed to be of the Spanish-American War era. Some contained Roman numerals on them. He shared the information with a colleague and they returned to dig up 20 more shells. After being told that the shells were experimental and very dangerous, he contacted the Fairfax Police bomb disposal unit. The police cleared five shells, which they let him keep, and took the rest to Fort Belvoir, where the Army detonated the shells. The police reported to him that the shells were live. The whereabouts of the other 20 rounds, dug up by his friend, are not known. The burial site lies on the Dalecarlia Reservoir property. There are photographs of the five shells kept by the relic hunter. The District of Columbia was able to relocate the narrow-gauge railroad bed in the exact position described by the relic hunter. Previously, the District had found small spikes that looked like railroad spikes in a nearby location but did not know that they were from a narrow-gauge railroad. Also, the description of the Roman numerals on the shells led to the inescapable conclusion that the story is totally credible because some of the original test reports and pictures of shells from the AUES use Roman numerals. Moreover, the District of Columbia was able to locate the narrow-gauge railroad bed, exactly as he described it, and found one large anomaly. Several historical documents list the land owned by the Girls Reform School as 185 acres, and that includes the area where the burial pit is located. The relic hunter stated to the EPA and the author that he found an anomaly approximately 10 ft by 10 ft. He further stated that the anomaly was comprised of individual shells but that they were so dense as to make it impossible to separate out the individual shells even with a VHF detector with an average search coil. The District of Columbia has conducted a geophysical search of nearly all of the area between the Dalecarlia Parkway and the road around

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

169

the Reservoir. They had previously located narrow-gauge railroad spikes near the fence and the District identified the five remaining shells as 75-mm shells consistent with those of the AUES era. Finally, the burial pit and rail bed is just south of a large impact area in which the District has found numerous pieces of frag.

13.1.6

AOI 17: The Hopeless Hollows Burial Areas

As noted previously, there was an American University campus newspaper story in 1921 that discussed the burial of $800,000 worth of explosives as well as multiplex gas. The District of Columbia always presumed that this was on the edge of the campus, as the article stated. Indeed, there have been three large burials found in this vicinity to date. However, nothing approaching the description in the campus newspaper has been found. A periodic newsletter called “The Retort” was published by “the Enemies of Germany” at the AUES Research Division. Edition No. 1, dated October 6, 1918, states, “Narrow-Gauge Railway Constructed.” Besides an interesting event when a car broke loose and almost smashed into Shack #10, which could have been catastrophic, the story contains several interesting details about the railroad. First, as with the Sgt. Maurer, “Hole Called Hades,” the railroad had a nickname: It was called the “Death’s Valley Limited” or “Hillside Express.” Second, it would eventually carry workers from the campus to convert “bleak hillsides and hopeless hollows” into manufacturing districts. This suggests that both the railroad and its destinations were important enough roles to warrant the nicknames and be the featured story in the first edition. It also indicates that the railroad was completed on the campus six weeks before the war ended, and that an expansion westward was planned. Presumably, it took one week for “The Retort” to be typeset and printed from the time the story of the completion was written. One burial area (side of a hill near a railroad track) has been located: AOI 2, The Rick Woods’ Pit or the Relic Hunter’s Pit. The spot where the District of Columbia first found the spikes is between the Rick Woods’ rail bed and the AUES. Clearly, in the month that followed October 6, 1918, the railway was extended from the AUES campus. What is now very clear is that it eventually reached the grounds of the Dalecarlia Reservoir. What is equally clear is that this extension of the narrow-gauge railway all the way to Dalecarlia could only have been done for burial purposes because “The Retort” only contemplated that it would extend to the west for manufacturing purposes. Most likely, the Dalecarlia extension was completed after the war ended.

170

13.1.7

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Historical Photographs

A narrow-gauge railroad was in the vicinity in 1924 and used for construction of the Van Ness Reservoir. It is unknown whether this is the same railroad track. However, because the one at the AUES was owned by the government, it may well have been kept after the Hopeless Hollows burials and then used for the Van Ness Reservoir construction. It is highly possible that later photographs of the AUES may show this railway. Unfortunately, most of it was probably constructed after the 1918 aerial photograph was taken.

13.1.8

Historical Maps

The 1918 map shows several paths that go to Dalecarlia property. One goes “northwest” from American University and is a straight line that enters the federal property near the railroad bed described and found in our AOI 2 report. Spikes have been found where this path enters the federal property, in addition to the spikes found near the Rick Woods’ pit location where a rail bed is still evident.

13.1.9

Historical Documents

The story in “The Retort,” October 6, 1918, and the $800,000 burial is noted in a 1922 American University Courier article and in the trustee minutes.

13.1.10

Previous Sampling Results

Perchlorate has been found in the groundwater on the opposite side of the reservoir that is not coming from the reservoir. Perchlorate was developed at the AUES in several forms, including its use as a hand grenade filler. Eighty years of travel in the groundwater could result in the detection at the sample location from a burial on the other side of the reservoir. A high level of thallium was found on the Reservoir property and on the American University campus. Elevated arsenic levels have also been detected on the Reservoir property. Also, metal samples from the sediments in the reservoir show the highest levels in the middle of the reservoir, adjacent to the rail bed.

13.1.11

Previous Geophysical Results

Background data from the Multiple Towed Array Detection System (MTADS) showed numerous anomalies in one of the fill areas. Except for one part done by the District of Columbia, the area adjacent to the railroad

13: The Continuing Search for Burial Sites

171

line has not been geophysically surveyed. Three deep anomalies in one grouping were detected in the fraction surveyed by the District of Columbia. However, spikes and other railroad relics were found during the search for the Rick Woods’ Pit. The 1994 geophysical search along Dalecarlia Parkway showed that four shells were found in a straight line, heading toward the Rick Woods’ Pit. This is the same area where the District found the railroad spikes along the fence. The District now believes that these shells fell off the train car as opposed to having been fired during ranging of a gun.

13.1.12

Review and Evaluation

The Cut and Fill map shows several areas of deep fill in the federal property compatible with the witness’ description. The undeniable fact that a narrow-gauge railroad line existed on the federal property and the discovery of one burial pit on a hillside adjacent to that railroad give credence to the witness’ statement. Three items being developed at the AUES— Lewisite, ricin, and the toxic smoke candles—could have been termed strategic weapons as the term was used in the EPA CID report.

13.1.13

Lot 18 on the American University Campus

In a letter to Henry J. Sokolowski, Chief Federal Facilities Branch, EPA Region III, dated June 24, 1999, the District of Columbia stated, “As you probably know, we found another laboratory glassware and metallic debris burial site in the area referred to as ‘death valley’ on Sgt. Charles W. Maurer’s photograph. A magnetometer sweep of the area suggests a burial site of about 10 feet by 10 feet. There are other scattered readings in the area. Our 1927 aerial photograph shows numerous footpaths in the vicinity of this burial area, which may suggest other such burials.” To the credit of the Corps and the EPA, Lot 18 is now scheduled for a major excavation. Over 600 anomalies, two suggestive of major pits, have been found. Previous excavations (not including the small disposal area the District of Columbia found) uncovered six drums of chemical glassware and 36 bottles, one of which was sampled and discovered to contain a small amount of Lewisite.

13.1.14

Aerial Photographs

Since obtaining the 1927 aerial photograph from the archives, the District of Columbia have been concerned that it showed multiple small burial sites at the terminals of footpaths. There were so many burial sites, the District commented to EPIC that one area looked like the scales on a dinosaur’s back.

14 Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site 14.1 Finding the Range Impact Areas Locating the range impact areas is the most crucial activity for most munitions sites. If one does not find all the sites, one cannot find and safely remove all the munitions. This section illustrates how historical documents, aerial photography, geophysical investigations, anecdotal information, old maps, knowledge of artillery fire (trajectory, accuracy, projectile range, terrain, and dud ratios), and explosive and CWM sampling can be brought to bear on the search. Hopefully, this section will give residents, stakeholders, and regulators a concrete example of how to meld the various bits and pieces of knowledge to give the highest probability of finding impact areas. While this book frequently notes the importance of finding the often overlooked munitions burial and disposal areas, UXO on range impact areas remains the most troublesome. The UXO rounds are fused, damaged by impact (rendering them more likely to detonate with human contact or leak CWM or explosive contamination), and close to or atop the surface where human contact is also most likely.

14.1.1 Westmoreland Circle Impact Area A live fire test report in Bancroft’s History of the Chemical Warfare Service in the United States (1921) mentions firing 2000 gas shells, fired in groups of 100, of chloropicrin into an impact area 2400 yards downrange. Because the gun emplacement is vague, the exact impact location cannot be precisely determined. However, the District of Columbia obtained a picture of a gun in a trench, believed to be one of the trenches in POIs 30–36. A 2400-yard range from there would place the impact area west of the current boundary. At a partnering meeting, the Corps’ contractor placed the guns at several locations along the east edge of the AUES boundary and produced a Venn diagram. The intersecting circles met near the Westmoreland Circle, both inside and outside the existing boundary. Chlorpicrin, or chloropicrin, is normally classified as a very powerful lachrymator and nauseating agent. It is lethal in higher concentrations. The median lethal dosage is 2000 mg-min/m3 (compared to phosgene at 3200 mg-min/m3, or mustard at 1500 mg-min/m3). As with most 173

174

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

World War I gases, it is a liquid in the shells. Kieselgur (silicic acid, SiO2), mentioned in the document, was intended to suppress the volatility and hold the gas at a lower altitude. The nomenclature “P.G.” used in the document appears to be a mistake or it is from a nomenclature system unknown to the author. Both the new and old symbol for chloropicrin is “PS.” For unknown reasons, very few of the symbols seem to be abbreviations for the name of the agent, so it is understandable that they got confused too. The interest to us is the number of shells designated for testing and the location of the impact zone. Also, note that chloropicrin was one of the agents manufactured at the AUES in sizeable quantity. Finally, the report notes that the area had been fired into previously, which loosened the dirt. Presumably, this resulted in more duds (UXO). One photograph shows a gun in a trench and mortars at Camp Leach. Photographs also show the firing of the Livens battery and the distant explosion of a chemical shell, proving that chemical shells were ballistically fired at the AUES. However, the Livens battery is not believed to be the location of the howitzers firing the chloropicrin shells because it is not located on the east edge of the AUES, and no still photograph shows any guns there but Livens and Stokes mortars. The 1922 aerial photograph shows numerous clusters of small ground scars in this area compatible with impact areas. Several of these ground scars within or near the FUDS boundary are shown superimposed over a current aerial photograph and street map. Several other clusters of small ground scars are not highlighted because they are further away from the FUDS boundary. The 1918 map shows this area as belonging to Henrietta Huff. Part of the area is listed as the Am[erican] University Heights Subdivision. The Corps mentions that early residents of AU Park found their property pockmarked with shells. (This apparently came from a newspaper story.) There is some confusion over the discrepancy in names but it appears that Am[erican] University Heights is now called AU Park. However, it appears that this might be the correct area as the 1918 map of the American University Range and Reservation shows this area as the Am[erican] University Heights Subdivision. Some elevated arsenic was found to the east near Massachusetts Avenue and west of Dalecarlia Parkway on reservoir property. Single point anomalies were found near the 52nd Court Trenches after the initial find of shells but were not investigated. This area is close to some of the ground scars believed to be impact craters. A resident of the site stated that the children used to hunt for shells along Murdock Mill Road, which cuts right through

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

175

this area. The Washington Times published a letter, believed to be from the same individual, indicating that the children knew where to find shells in Spring Valley. For many years, the Corps denied that gas shells were tested ballistically. This evidence and other documents and photographs belie that contention. The Corps also argues that they would not have shelled near a residence. However, there is no house shown on the Henrietta Huff parcel except for a “ruin.” The 1994 geophysical survey for the Dalecarlia Reservoir shows two clusters of anomalies, about the same size as the clusters shown on the 1922 aerial photograph. Having worked this area with both a magnetometer and a metal detector, the District of Columbia can confirm that these anomalies are frag and lead shrapnel balls. These two impact areas are not visible on the 1922 aerial photograph because they are in the woods; however, they are just south of four impact areas shown on the aerial photograph. The District believes these to be 100-shot barrages as mentioned in the Bancroft book.

14.1.2

Livens Projector Battery Impact Area

The District of Columbia requested that the Corps locate the Livens battery. During a field trip, a representative from the Corps, Greg Nielson, and Terry Slonecker located a cement structure. The District immediately identified it as the Livens battery. (See Photo 21 in the center photo section) The 1918 map lists a target area. Crater scars are seen in the 1918 aerial photograph (Photo 22 in the center photo section) in the vicinity of this target. Recently discovered photographs found at Fort Leonard Wood show a firing test from the Livens battery and a cloud of poison gas in the distance. One undetonated Livens shell was found along Dalecarlia Parkway and contained a liquid agent.

14.1.3

Dalecarlia Impact Area

Ted Carlson, a UXO technician who worked on the Spring Valley site in 1993–1994, reported to the EPA that he had found an impact area and flagged approximately 400 anomalies. The next day, he was ordered to pull up the flags because the impact area was outside the FUDS boundary. This area is also shown on the 1994 geophysical survey map but appears to be larger than the impact areas that the District of Columbia believes to be the 100 round groups. Again, a map of lessors shows the area as being used by the AUES. Several documents show 185 acres as being leased from the Girls Reform School. This would include this impact area.

176

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Greg Hope, the author’s partner, had previously located an impact area in the Dalecarlia property and recovered shrapnel balls and numerous pieces of frag from Stokes mortars. The District of Columbia also found frag from 75-mm shells, suggesting that there was another firing point. They flagged approximately 60 larger anomalies compatible with shells. Shrapnel balls were tested for ricin, which tested negative. The author, Maj. Brian Plaisted (ACOE), Ken Shuster (EPA), and Ricky Stauber (master UXO technician) met with Carlson. The District of Columbia located a general impact area and found some more frag. Ricky Stauber found a piece of a Livens drum. We then called Huntsville from the Corps trailers and spoke with the individual who reportedly ordered the flags removed. He confirmed that the flags were pulled up because it was outside the FUDS boundary. Later, the District of Columbia learned that the FUDS boundary was drawn where it was at the request of the Washington Aqueduct because they did not want the District’s major water reservoir associated with the AUES because it raised questions about the quality of the drinking water. However, the District had previously examined that issue and found that the creeks draining the area had been diverted around the reservoir in 1905, long before the AUES. This was probably done to keep the water potable because creek valleys were convenient places to throw garbage, including butcher shop waste. Four shells were found inside the FUDS boundary and excavated during the 1993–94 time frame. They were described as being conventionally fused, not rigged for static detonation. They were found in a linear progression, suggesting that they were ballistically fired. Also, the District of Columbia found part of a nose fuse, which would not have been used for statically fired shells. A resident also told the District that he found a live fuse in Dalecarlia as a child and that his father called the police, who confirmed that it was live and took it away. The Area of Interest Task Force (AOITF) believes that the combination of terrain features, frag recovered by the author, anecdotal statements, and geophysical instrument readings indicate a significant possibility that an impact area is located in the vicinity identified on the map.

14.2

Expanding the Boundary

This section is an example of how to write a report when new information suggests the need to enlarge the site. As mentioned previously,

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

177

military training often strayed over the ownership or leasehold of a base. In rural areas, there may be no roads or fences marking the perimeter. Of course, groundwater plumes can also extend offsite. High-altitude bombing ranges frequently dropped bombs far from the target. Bombing ranges that existed only during major wars were often used by novice pilots and crews trained rapidly for the war. At least through World War II, bomb sights and navigation aids were primitive at best. This section is important for residents, stakeholders, and regulators.

14.2.1

New Boundaries

New documents and data have recently surfaced requiring a further reconfiguration of the boundary for the AUES FUDS. First, in response to requests by the District of Columbia and residents, the Corps has sampled most of the properties in Spring Valley for arsenic. Surprisingly, an area of elevated arsenic in the Camp Leach tent area at the northeastern corner has been found as well as an area along Massachusetts Avenue along the northern FUDS boundary. These elevated arsenic areas require extending the northern boundary to allow sampling of the adjacent area, which is currently outside the AUES FUDS border. A memorandum from Maj. Gen. W. M. Black, dated October 25, 1918, states, “Since a large investment in buildings has already been made on land neither owned nor leased by the United States, it may be good policy to purchase the land.” During a partnering meeting in 2001, the EPA’s EPIC found some new trench areas near Westmoreland Circle. The Corps maintained that this land was not leased and, hence, could not have been used by the AUES. Because the AUES used land that was neither leased nor owned, according to Maj. Gen. Black, the original premise used to determine the site boundary is faulty. Because much of Maj. Gen. Black’s memo concerns the hazards of testing poisons in an urban area and the fear that the desirable land will be unusable, the quotation is even more significant. A memorandum from H. C. Hutchins, dated July 12, 1918, states, “Mr. Martin, Chief Engineer, wishes to consider the possibility of building a railroad siding from the Baltimore and Ohio belt line . . . Captain Harris was very enthusiastic for the construction of a railroad siding in order to facilitate the shipment of camp supplies and coal . . .” A memorandum dated August 8, 1918, from Mr. Vanderlip discusses surveys for extending the railroad “siding” and additional land south and west.

178

14.3

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

New Points of Interest

This section illustrates why a site must constantly be reevaluated based on new information and the rethinking of old information. Residents, stakeholders, and regulators will see specific examples of how to add points of interest (POIs) as new information is developed. For example, if a range impact area is known to have existed on the site, the suspected area should be sampled and geophysically surveyed. If neither frag nor munitions constituents are found, then by deductive reasoning the impact area must be somewhere else. It cannot simply be ignored. In environmental studies, the absence of something is almost as important as finding something. All too often, the primary responsible party is in a hurry to leave once nothing is found. While we do not want to chase the Golden Fleece, the failure to find a known hazard on the first attempt does not end the search.

14.3.1

Background

Since the District of Columbia’s first report on the AUES in 1996, questions have been raised as to the completeness of the POIs originally selected by the Corps of Engineers. The Corps acknowledged making an error in locating POI 24, the pit shown in the 1918 aerial photograph, although it remains to be seen if that pit has now been located on the property adjacent to the property where the first two pits not shown in the 1918 aerial photograph were found. Indeed, all these pits contained large amounts of hazardous materials and ordnance. Because of the error in locating POI 24, the question was next raised as to the certainty of other POI locations. EPIC found that several POIs had been mislocated, including POIs 4, 5, 6, and 7. In addition, POI 16 was increased significantly in size. The Corps originally selected 153 POIs. Only a small number of these (18) were sampled for contamination. A slightly larger number of POIs were surveyed with a magnetometer designed to find only large burial pits. This particular instrument had two 10-ft long “beams” that stuck out on either side, looking much like a tightrope walker’s pole. It was not possible to get into wooded, brushy areas or areas landscaped with shrubs, so even those POIs that were searched were not covered very well. In addition, many new POIs have been found as the result of aerial photographic interpretation, anecdotal information, and historical documents.

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

14.3.2

179

Ground Scar at the Junction of Trails

During the 2001 partnering meeting discussions on the Corps’ proposed geophysical plan, the EPIC and the District of Columbia agreed to try and locate additional POIs. The first such feature, located at the rear property corners of three properties on Tilden and 52nd Street, has been included on the first 50 properties to be geophysically searched. EPIC agreed to locate other new features, a work still in progress.

14.3.3 Additional Concrete Bunkers, Magazines, and Explosive Chambers On or about January 22, 2002, the EPA, the District of Columbia, the ACOE, and Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) members met with Sandra Sharpe, a current resident of the area, and toured the American University and seminary property. Sharpe described three concrete bunkers that she remembered from her childhood. She thought that two were in the vicinity of the American University athletic fields, bordering the driveway. These two concrete bunkers she remembered as being in the woods at American University. Understandably, locating them precisely was impossible because the woods no longer existed. Also, there was a question as to whether the bunkers were the same ones as were located on another property. Sharpe felt strongly that her bunkers were in a different location. She was able to locate the third bunker more precisely because it was within sight of her house. That one was on the grounds of the seminary. During the field tour, a large metallic anomaly was located directly over the area she pointed to as the concrete bunker on the seminary property. This confirmed the accuracy of Sharpe’s information. Because of the burials of hazardous material and ordnance already found, Sharpe’s information is highly relevant. Accordingly, the District of Columbia reviewed still photographs of the AUES and was able to locate one potential concrete bunker in the area described by Sharpe. On April 5, 2002, two RAB members, Gaza Teleki and Kent Slowinski, reported finding an original map of the AUES at the National Archives. The District of Columbia and the EPA joined them on April 8th and spent many hours reviewing this map and hand-copying faint building numbers onto a photocopy. From this combined effort, the two concrete bunkers described by Sharpe can clearly be seen and, more importantly, can be precisely located. They are Building Number 18 (Shell Storage Pit) and Building Number 119 (Concrete Storage Pit). In addition, Building Number 19 (Levens [sic] Gun Pit) is also located. This is believed to be the bunker

180

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

shown in the background of the photograph of the Stokes and Livens mortar battery. The Corps already has a Gun Pit shown as POI 43. This would approximate the location of Building 119, the Concrete Storage Pit, but not the Levens [sic] Gun Pit. It is unclear how the Corps arrived at its name but possibly it misread 119 for 19. In any event, the Shell Storage Pit needs to become a POI. Although the Corps has included POI 43, now calling it the Concrete Shell Pit (still incorrect) on its first 50 highest priority lots for geophysical survey, all three pits identified by Sharpe, Building Numbers 18 and 119, as well as the bunker on the seminary property, should be excavated as soon as possible. Excavation of these pits should be elevated in priority because Sharpe described drums in one of the bunkers. Because drums are currently being excavated on Glenbrook Road, there is an increased likelihood that these are of AUES origin. In addition, the American University and the District have requested a time-critical arsenic removal. The District of Columbia feels that all excavations known to be necessary on a property be conducted simultaneously so as not to disturb landowners repeatedly. In addition to the two concrete chambers on the AUES mentioned by Sharpe, building construction reports list several more storage pits, magazines, and so on. Previously, the District of Columbia only knew of three magazines, two near POI 20 and one at the southeastern corner of the American University. These magazines were never designated POIs but all three should be made POIs as well as any other magazines.

14.3.4

Livens Gun Pit

The concrete pit excavations should be expanded to include Building Number 19 on the original map of the AUES, the Levens [sic] Gun Pit. This munitions bunker can also be seen on a still photograph. It is located on the American University property.

14.3.5

Rows of Spots

The District of Columbia has long been concerned about rows of spots in numerous locations on the 1918 aerial photograph. Recently, a RAB member discovered test reports that indicated that dogs were chained to stakes in groups of 20, four rows of five. The District of Columbia believes for a variety of reasons that these tests took place at POI 7, because of the

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

181

diagrams in the reports and because it is a fenced area. Dogs struggled so desperately that they often slipped their collars and the fence could contain those that got away. Also, there is a small rectangle where the shells were placed adjacent to each group of 20 spots. Originally, the District of Columbia thought that the spots might represent holes where poles were placed. Several test reports indicate that shells were statically fired while attached to the ends of 10-ft poles, probably to simulate shells striking trees in a forest. This may still be a plausible explanation for some spots in other locations. A newly discovered document in the archives offers another explanation, especially for the spots that are near known shell storage areas: these could be pre-dug holes to bury leaking chemical shells.

14.3.6

Burial Sites for Leaking Shells

During a search of Record Group 70, Bureau of Mines, the District of Columbia found a document entitled, “Instructions for the Care, Storage and Handling of Gas Warfare Material.” This manual was issued by the Gas Service A.E.F. on June 15, 1918. The manual states, “If a leak is suspected it should be reported immediately and all men required to work near the dump should keep the respirator in the alert position. The suspected shell should be immediately located and removed and buried . . . Holes 4 feet deep will always be kept prepared . . . Piles of earth and a spade should be kept near the chemical projectile stacks, to cover up the liquid that has escaped. “It is much easier to bury leaky shells, as explained in preceding [sic] paragraphs . . . (than to blow them up).” Burying shells becomes more significant when the number of leaking shells is recognized. A document dated June 4, 1918, states, “Subject: Filling 75m/m gas shells at Edgewood . . . On May 18th the Hall Lamp Company showed the following conditions: 56,800 completed, 56,800 accepted, 51,600 shipped, 50,000 estimated next two weeks production. It was stated that about 25% of the Hall Lamp Co. shells did not show leakage.” Looking at the aerial photograph, there are numerous disturbed areas behind the two largest magazines. This area is known as POI 20 and was never adequately explained, but it is highly likely that it represents a burial site for leaking shells. Also, there are several small areas of disturbed ground in the vicinity of the Sedgwick trenches, both to the north and south. Because burials of leaking shells would have occurred during the operation of the AUES, these burials should be seen on the 1918 aerial

182

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

photograph (unlike the large burials at the end when the station was closed down), and indeed they are. In addition to burying leaking gas shells, there is the consideration for UXO or duds occurring frequently in the tests. The District of Columbia has long maintained that UXO would have been buried near the testing areas. In past partnering meetings, the Corps asserted that any UXO resulting from the tests would have been over-detonated. The “Instructions for the Care, Storage and Handling of Gas Warfare Material” dispels the Corps suggestion. Therefore, any small, disturbed areas or spots near the testing areas should be made separate POIs for purposes of geophysical analysis.

14.3.7

Old Mustard Field and Linear Testing Troughs

POI 19, the “Old Mustard Field,” was presumably taken from the map dated July 1918 entitled, “Reservation American University Experiment Station Research Division of the Chemical Warfare Service (AUES).” On the map, this field is shown as being approximately 510 ft by 360 ft. On the POI map, it is shown as slightly smaller, about 470 ft by 330 ft, give or take a few feet. Because July 1, 1918 was the date of the formation of the Chemical Warfare Service, this map may have been hastily commissioned by the newly created service. On the 1918 aerial photograph, this area has a double row of troughs transecting the field at its western portion. A cross set of double trenches crosses the field at its northern portion. South of and along this double set of trenches are three rows of spots. These are believed to be either postholes where posts were set in the ground for tests of shells fastened to their tops or stakes to which dogs were fastened. These trenches appear much shallower than the circular trenches. An old house is shown on the 1918 map and in the 1918 aerial photograph northwest of the Old Mustard Field, aiding in the location of the field. The District interprets the word “Old” before “Mustard Field” to mean that the area was used for some time. A 1918 report of Persistency Test Experiments refers to mustard being repeatedly sprayed on a large plot of ground.

14.3.8 Linear Testing Troughs Erroneously Labeled as an Airstrip A deeper set of double trenches is indicated on the aerial photograph to the east of the Old Mustard Field trenches. Whereas these again do not

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

183

appear to be as deep as the circular trenches, they are deeper than the ones at the Old Mustard Field. This feature is not listed as a POI. This omission probably occurred because EPIC had incorrectly assumed this to be an airstrip and, as such, it would not have required investigation. Indeed, the two sets of trenches actually interconnect. The northern set of trenches at the Old Mustard Field actually continues on due east and eventually crosses the north–south trenches in the other pair at their northern terminus. This feature, discussed in detail at several partnering meetings, is not an airstrip. The spacing between the lines is far greater than the axle length of World War I planes, and parallel runways were not in use then. Also, the interspersed trees and depth of portions of the “runways,” as shown by the shadows, would make this “airstrip” impossible for planes to land. Indeed, the District of Columbia’s understanding of the consensus at the partnering meetings was that this was not an airstrip. The District believes that this feature should also be a POI. Further, they believe that these are shell proving and testing trenches, based upon numerous pieces of information. First, the book Chemical Warfare by Gen. Amos A. Fries and Maj. Clarence J. West (1921) states, The American University Experiment Station, established by the Bureau of Mines in April, 1917, became July 1, 1918 the Research Division of the Chemical Warfare Service . . . The relation of the various sections may best be shown by outlining the general procedure used when a new toxic substance was developed . . . The compound was also sent to the Pyrotechnic Section which studied its behavior when fired from shells, or, if suitable, when used in a cylinder. If it proved stable, large field tests were then made by the Proving Division, in connection with the Pyrotechnic and Toxicological Sections of the Research Division, to learn the effect when shells loaded with the compound were fired from guns on a range, with animals placed suitably in or near trenches . . . For field concentration work, two complete and separate lines of trenches were used and also several impact grounds. Some of the language in the book by Fries and West was copied from the Bancroft book. In this manuscript, Col. Bancroft details the Lakehurst Experimental Grounds. While some proving of shells may have taken place earlier, the first animal tests were not started until August 1, 1918. Construction had begun at Lakehurst on March 21, 1918, with one captain, five lieutenants, and 25 enlisted men. Also, in August 1918 the Lakehurst

184

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Experimental Grounds were transferred from the Ordnance Department to the new Chemical Warfare Service and the name changed to the Proving Division of the Chemical Warfare Service. From the Bancroft book, it is clear that the description of “two complete and separate lines of trenches” is a description of the Lakehurst trenches. It is equally clear from the dates in Bancroft’s book and those on the actual test reports that the tests conducted in lines of trenches occurred at the AUES. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the Lakehurst Experimental Station copied the lines of trenches at AUES. Second, in the index to the test reports the shell tests are usually located in the section for the particular agent. A few examples were included but are omitted here. However, there are at least 35 such references to shell testing or firing tests. Third, several test documents indicate large numbers of shells were tested at one time, including a sketch of a long linear test with dimensions of 7.5 yards and 20 yards for each group of shells. In one test, the bottles were placed in a parallel line 20 yards from the shells. (The lines in the Old Mustard Field are about 20 yards apart.) In another test at the Mustard Gas Field dated October 30, 1918, two separate fields were used. The test was designed to compare mustard with methyldichlorarsine. The shells were one-third buried in the ground (this would be easy to do in a plowed furrow, which might be the lines on the Old Mustard Field). There were elevated readings for arsenic in the vicinity of the Old Mustard Field. Fourth, the prevailing south wind during the summer months would have allowed the use of these trenches with the wind blowing the gas into uninhabited land north of Massachusetts Avenue. Fifth, a survey of a portion (50 ft) of the north–south trench with a Schonstedt GA 72 Cd HeliFlux Magnetic Locator located three single point anomalies exactly in the trench. The location of the area, away from utility lines, and the signal strength, size, and shape of the anomalies suggest possible ordnance. This area was reported by the homeowner to have produced numerous “strange pieces of metal” during gardening activities. Because numerous duds occurred during shell tests, it is likely that these were buried near the test sites.

14.3.9

Circular Testing Fields

Several reports indicate that shells were placed in circles for tests. Clearly, these reports do not refer to the circular trenches. Several circular areas are seen in the vicinity of the Old Mustard Field.

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

185

14.3.10 Toxic Smoke Candles Many sources indicate that 3–4 million toxic smoke candles had been manufactured before the signing of the Armistice. New documentation indicates that a major manufacturing plant for these smoke candles was built at the AUES. In Record Group 175, Chemical Warfare Service technical document files from 1917 to 1920, labeled “Plant-Ranging of Artillery Shells Box 12,” the original engineering drawings for the irritant candle-filling plant are presented. This plant was 10,527 ft2. The plant was located on AUES grounds. The concern is that smoke candles may have been buried when the AUES was closed down. Because these contain arsenic, locating the filing plant and nearby burial sites is necessary.

14.3.11

Munitions Plants

Because of the success of the various chemical agent manufacturing plants, “the supply of toxic materials exceeded the supply of shells.” Probably for that reason, a significant effort was made to load shells at the AUES. These shell loading factories and any nearby ground scars should be made into separate POIs.

14.3.12

Persistency Test Area 100 ft × 100 ft

In addition to the 20 ft × 20 ft persistency test area (POI 16), the test report describes a large test field. The District of Columbia believes this to be the large square ground scar known as POI 15, now POI 15R (relocated). No soil sampling was done at this POI in 1994.

14.3.13

Courier Explosives Burial Site

There were two stories from the AU campus newspaper Courier in 1921 (one in April) that stated, “There were munitions on hand, including multiplex gas and an invented explosive many times dynamite, valued at $800,000 . . . Permission was given to go far back on University acres, to dig a pit deeper than the one into which Joseph was cast, bury the munitions there and cover them up.” This has always been presumed to be on the southern edge of the campus, as the article stated. Indeed, there have been three large burials found in this vicinity to date. However, nothing approaching the description in the campus newspaper has yet been found. The athletic field was a valley that was subsequently filled with dirt.

186

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

A still photograph in the possession of Eric Olsen, Natural Resources Defense Counsel (the “Sgt. Maurer photo”), shows a burial pit. It is not believed that this is the burial referred to in the campus newspaper because Sgt. Maurer states that the jugs are full of mustard as opposed to explosives. Also, there is a pit in the 1918 aerial photograph that appears to be in the same vicinity as the Sgt. Maurer photograph. This coupled with the nickname, “the Hole called Hades” (this nickname was found written on the back of an historic photograph), suggests that it was an ongoing location, and not something for which special permission would be sought. The Sgt. Maurer burial of mustard gas jugs has not yet been found. Since the Courier article was written in 1921, the best evidence of such a burial would be found in the 1922 aerial photograph. The existence of this aerial photograph was first reported by the National Park Service to the author, who in turn asked Slonecker to find it. Slonecker’s effort was successful. EPIC noted a large ground scar that has been identified as a “possible pit.” Numerous ground scars are shown in the 1922 aerial photograph in the vicinity of the edge of American University. Those on Lot 18 were certainly burials, as well as one on Glenbrook Road. However, one ground scar in the 1922 aerial photograph is larger than any of the others. This pit is between Watkins Hall and the athletic field. It would have been the side of arsenic valley; it would also be compatible with a burial described by a CID witness (Criminal Investigation Division, Environmental Protection Agency). Still photographs of tests on new explosives—anilite and monomethyl hydrazine nitrate—are in the National Archives, including field explosions and Truzel block tests. A Truzel block is a block of lead into which a hole is drilled partway down from the top. A small quantity of explosive is detonated in the hole. The enlarged channel can be viewed when the block is sawn in half. Thus one explosive can be compared to another. The July 1918 Range and Reservation American University Experiment Station map (a Chemical Warfare Service Map) shows the sloping terrain where this ground scar is located. There is a December 7, 1918 map of the buildings on the AUES. The $800,000 burial is noted in two 1921 American University Courier articles and in the American University trustee minutes. Bancroft states that, “The Small Scale Manufacturing Section (located at Spring Valley) made the following amounts . . . nitrogen tetroxide, 3000 lbs.” The highest perchlorate concentration detected was 124 ppb from the Glenbrook Road wells. These wells also had low levels of RDX and phenol hydrazine. Perchlorates were developed at the AUES in several forms, including their use as a hand grenade filler. Only low levels of perchlorates

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

187

have been detected in the two wells on Lot 18, and no perchlorate has been detected in the background wells. A boring for arsenic near this large pit was made during the athletic field sampling event. It had a high level of arsenic 9 ft down. The athletic field was surveyed but interference from the television tower presented difficulties. The amount of fill over this pit (10–12 ft from the cut and fill maps), together with the description of the pit as deep in the 1921 Courier story, suggest that the current instruments would not be able to locate it. Finally, the explosives may have been buried in bulk, not shells. Wooden barrels have little signature for a metal detector. Three items being developed at the AUES—Lewisite, ricin, and the toxic smoke candles—could have been termed strategic weapons but the CID report does not believe that the burial was the strategic weapon. A quantity of 800 lbs of wet picric acid was also known to be present. Crystallized picric acid is a very shock-sensitive explosive but was not invented at the AUES. Two new explosives were invented there, monomethyl hydrazine nitrate and anilite (not to be confused with aniline). The test photographs show monomethyl hydrazine nitrate to be far more powerful than TNT. Anilite was only slightly more powerful than TNT. Its attraction was not the power but the fact that it gave off phosgene when it exploded. Although perchlorates are an explosive, they are not particularly powerful and were not invented at the AUES. RDX also was not invented at the AUES but is a very powerful explosive. It is unclear whether the $800,000 refers to the total value of munitions, explosive, and multiplex gas or just the value of the new explosive. The nitrogen fixation furnaces at AUES ran 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, for a year and undoubtedly produced a tremendous quantity of explosives. Regardless of the value even in 1918 dollars, a burial that describes bulk explosive creates a new hazard, far greater than anything found to date. Excavating and then moving 85-year-old bulk explosives, whatever their composition, through a residential neighborhood will require the partners to use all their expertise, skill, and genius. However, first such a welldocumented burial must be found. The 3000 lb figure for nitrogen tetroxide is interesting. The only reference for this compound by Rudolf Meyer in his book Explosives is under “Liquid Propellant Rockets” for its ability to combine with hydrazine. Meyer also lists hydrazine nitrate. The detonation velocity of hydrazine nitrate is 28,500 ft/s. It is only significantly exceeded by HMX at 29,800 ft/s and RDX at 28,700 ft/s. By comparison, TNT is 22,600 ft/s and pentaerythritol tetranitrate (penthrite, or PETN), used in detonation cord, is 27,600 ft/s. If this 3000 lbs of N2O4 was combined with hydrazine H4N2 to make hydrazine nitrate, we are looking at possibly two tons of the

188

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

second most powerful explosive in the world buried on a college campus. This is a maximum credible event, which cannot be ignored. The lack of any large quantity of explosives discovered to date, the specific description as to size, depth, and location on the American University property together with the time frame and down gradient groundwater sampling make this Watkins pit a likely candidate for the Courier burial.

14.3.14 Debris Field at a Third Glenbrook Road Property After workers were sickened digging up several chemical bottles while planting a tree on a Glenbrook Road property, Apex Environmental performed an environmental survey of the property. Arsenic at 1200 ppm was found in the hole, confirming that at least one of the bottles contained chemical warfare agent. The District of Columbia viewed one of the bottles and it appeared to date to around 1918. Acid readings were detected at two places on the property, and a debris field was noted in the rear of the property. The recent geophysical study has also noted metal anomalies in the rear of the property and under the driveway. Any anomalies and the debris field on this property should be excavated.

14.3.15 Anomaly Areas within the Dalecarlia Reservoir As noted previously, anomalies were located outside of the Spring Valley boundary during the 1993–1994 geophysical survey. Roughly 400 flags marking these anomalies were ordered pulled up because they were outside the boundary. The District of Columbia relocated this anomaly field and it should now be made a POI. In addition, an individual indicated that he dug up 50 shells, 45 of them live, adjacent to this field 18 years ago. He indicated that many more remained in one small area. Each of these areas should be a new POI.

14.3.16 The Rockwood Six The Rockwood area comprises six residences. It is adjacent to the original AUES and portions of the lots may have been within the fenced perimeter of the site. However, once the fence was removed after the AUES was closed, burials could have occurred there. Portions of some of the backyards have been filled in, and several disposal areas have been found

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

189

in close proximity. In a December 2000 Washingtonian Magazine article, Harry Jaffe coined the phrase the “Rockwood Six.” There exists a photograph of Sgt. Maurer disposing of jugs of “mustard”. The location of this photograph is in the vicinity of the south edge of the AUES. There is a 1927 aerial photograph that shows numerous trails and disturbed spots of ground in the vicinity of the Rockwood Six. The 1918 aerial photograph shows numerous buildings and trails in this area. There is a map showing the AUES buildings that also marks the buildings that were burned. Several of these are in the vicinity of the Rockwood Six. The map also identifies several structures, including a magazine in the vicinity. In fact, a burn pit has recently been excavated adjacent to one of these properties. One 1922 campus newspaper article (American University Courier) talks about giving permission to make burials far back on university acres. One document dated November 26, 1918, by Col. G. A. Burrell and Capt. D. L. Williams states, “The following tracts have also been used by the American University Experiment Station. Agnes V. Scott 10.5 acres.” The Rockwood Six are on this tract. Because this tract was not leased and it was outside the fence, it is doubtful that this parcel was used during the AUES operation (at least there is no clear evidence of use on the 1918 aerial photograph). Therefore, it might have been used for burials after the site was closed. One resident testified before the City Council in July 2003 that she found large quantities of glassware, including carboy shards, on her property. She brought representative samples to the hearing. Scores of volatile compounds have been detected on two of these properties. Arsenic at a level of 2400 ppm has been found adjacent to one of these properties. A small disposal area of chemical glassware was excavated about 100 ft from one of these properties with surface arsenic levels at 3350 ppm. As noted previously, the District of Columbia surveyed the adjacent American University area and found several anomalies. The Corps surveyed portions of American University and found 600 anomalies. Excavation on a portion of Lot 18 on the American University campus has confirmed 30 shells to date with a burn pit of debris including six 50-gal drums of chemical glassware. Thirty bottles—one containing Lewisite— have also been found. Some residents have reported health problems to the EPA, including the resident that testified before the City Council. The AOITF believes that the combination of terrain features, 1918 and 1927 aerial photographs, anecdotal statements, geophysical instrument readings, arsenic levels, and the AUES list sampling results and excavations indicate a significant possibility that small burial sites are located in the

190

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

vicinity of the Rockwood Six. The AOITF holds that further investigation of this area is justified.

14.3.17

Sedgwick Vicinity Ground Scars

In 1986, the EPA’s EPIC identified a number of small ground scars or disturbed ground in the vicinity of the Sedgwick Trenches.1 Some of these became POIs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8. None of these were sampled. Also, POIs 4, 5, and 6 were completely mislocated, and POI 3 was partially mislocated by the Corps. The 1918 aerial photograph clearly shows a number of ground scars, and some have trails leading to them. The 1918 map lists a “target” believed to be POI 8. It also lists “ruins” that are near POI 4. The area was included in the arsenic sampling, and six lots covering several of the POIs or AOIs had arsenic levels above background. Most of the lots in this area were partially surveyed (often the front yards) with the EM31 during the initial investigation. Six lots were not originally surveyed. The EM31 is not suitable for finding shallow ordnance and explosives items (single point anomalies) such as individual UXO, as might be found near a target or buried individually near a testing area if the shell did not detonate. Finally, only POI 4 had any intrusive investigation. Another resident called and reported that three shells were found during construction of a wall on an adjoining lot, now merged with another lot on Tilden Street. Relocated POI 5 is adjacent to this property; POI 8 (the target) is also nearby. This lot is within the range fan that was drawn after the Livens emplacement was found. The AOITF believes that the proximity of these smaller ground scars to the Sedgwick Trench and POI 7 test areas necessitates further investigation. The Task Force notes that six of these ground scars were originally selected as POIs in the first investigation. Many of these ground scars are quite pronounced and some have trails to them on the 1918 aerial photograph, indicating considerable activity.

14.3.18

Pit and Trenches at 52nd Court

POIs 13 and 14 were the northern circular trenches and a side pit. On January 5, 1993, laboratory glassware and munitions were found buried

1

Historical Photographic Analysis, American University, Washington, D.C., Environmental Photographic Interpretation Center, July 1986, Vol. 2, by Frank R. Wolle.

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

191

in the pit. The discovery was made by a contractor digging a trench to install utility lines to a newly constructed house. One chemical shell was breached by the backhoe. An emergency removal action was conducted that eventually resulted in 141 shells being excavated, of which 44 were deemed chemical. Some were high explosives, filled with gun cotton. Lewisite (L-2 and L-3) was found on glassware. The 1918 and 1927 aerial photographs show the trenches and the pit. Several documents in December 1918 give directions for disposal operations and the filling in of the trenches before the ground freezes. It appears that the burial in the pit occurred as a result of these directives. The Chemical and Biological Defense Agency (CBDA) Analytical Results dated July 1993 state, “The following compounds were found to be present in one or more of the soil/debris samples collected at POI 14: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Acetophenone Adamsite (DM) Arsenic Arsenic III oxide Benzaldehyde Benzoic acid Chloroacetophenone (CN) Bis-(2-Chlorovinyl) chloroarsine (L-2) Tris-(2-Chlorovinyl) arsine (L-3) Chlorovinylarsonous acid (CVAA) 2- Chlorovinylarsonic acid (CVAOA) 1,4-Dioxa-7-thionane Diphenylamine 1,4-Diphenyl-1,4-butanedione Diphenyl sulfide Diphenyl sulfone Diphenyl sulfoxide 1,4-Dithiane Ethyl 2-hydroxethyl sulfide (2-Oxo-2-phenyl) ethyl benzoate Phenyldichloroarsine Red phosphorus cis(1,4-Polyisoprene) (rubber) Polymeric ethers/sulfides of thiodiglycol Polystyrene Sulfur (elemental, S8) Tetryl Thiodiglycol Thiodiglycol sulfone

192

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • • • •

Thiodiglycol sulfoxide 1,4-Thioxane Trinitrotoluene (TNT) Triphenyl arsine”

Other CWM agents and related compounds were found inside shells and bottles. For example, the CBDA report states for item #65, a Livens drum, “In addition to the high levels of barium.” Barium was found in the groundwater and surface water. Barium was used for green flares and in the experimental explosive barium nitrate. The results for Pig #1 state, “The presence of CVAOA was confirmed by HPLC/IC which found 20 ppm CVAOA and 40 ppm CVAA in the sample.” The results for Pig #2 state, “The presence of DM was also confirmed by the large amount of arsenic found in the sample (>5000 ppm).” Current arsenic removal guidelines require the removal of arsenic contaminated soil above 20 ppm, irrespective of depth. Recent sampling of groundwater at the Dalecarlia Reservoir has found perchlorate, nitroglycerin, and carbon tetrachloride. These compounds were widely used at the AUES, giving further evidence that buried contaminants can enter the groundwater and break out into the surface water. Previously, the District of Columbia noted that single point anomalies within the POI 13 and 14 boundaries were not excavated in spite of a logical request made by an experienced EOD technician at the site. The entire area should be geophysically surveyed and excavated as appropriate. The District was also told by several individuals that numerous truckloads of dirt from the American University campus were deposited as fill at one site along Massachusetts Avenue. Years later, office buildings were constructed at this site and dirt, possibly the AU fill dirt, was removed and dumped in the 52nd Court trench area. It is unknown whether any of this soil is contaminated. The 1980 and 1981 aerial photographs show this filling operation. Because the pit was excavated under emergency removal guidelines, lower levels of contamination could not be addressed. Some contamination from the pit had leached into groundwater and possibly into surface water; this suggests the need for confirmatory sampling to ensure that all contaminated soil has been removed from the pit. Contamination in the pits excavated on Glenbrook Road ran down to 17 ft. There is no reason to believe that similar contamination does not exist at POI 14, especially because some of the contaminants found at the 52nd Court pit (Lewisite and phenyldichloroarsine) were worse than many found in the first two Glenbrook Road pits excavated.

14: Expanding and Enlarging a Remediation Site

193

The CBDA Analytical Results note the recovery of much glassware and a pressure reactor (Pig #8). The establishment of a semi-large scale production of Lewisite (in iron) on the American University campus, but the presence of substantial glassware with Lewisite on it in the 52nd Court pit, suggests that this was a disposal pit for the earlier Lewisite experimentation in glassware. With all the burials of glassware on the south edge of AU’s campus, it defies logic that glassware was moved all the way to 52nd Court just for burial. It could have been the fear of Lewisite or it could have been that the ground froze during the winter and this was the only available open pit. One memo suggests the need to hurry before the ground freezes. The trench (POI 13) shows recent excavation on a 1951 aerial photograph. This suggests that any shells found there were removed. Indeed, one shell was found in 1993, wrapped in plastic and duct tape, suggesting that it was a stray from the 1951 excavation. Perhaps it was found in 1980 during the fill operation. Further, the shells in 1993 were found during the installation of utility lines. It is likely that future workers may be exposed to this residual contamination during future repair to existing utilities or installation of new utility lines such as fiber optics. Further archival study must be performed, including a study of the 3500 still photographs of the AUES, to determine additional POIs.

14.4 Aerial Photographic Interpretation This section presents the story of how inexperienced state regulators can turn one aerial photograph into a bonanza of information. Aerial photographic interpretation, as explained previously, is probably the single most important piece of information except for a burial map. Other historical information may offer clues as to what munitions have been at the site and even how much ordnance has been discarded, but it normally does not tell the archivist where. The aerial photographs provide important clues to where range or disposal activity took place. This section tells the resident, regulator, and stakeholder how aerial photographs can be developed into important information. When the District of Columbia found the first aerial photograph in the archives, the 1936 aerial photograph, they requested an analysis of it looking for burial sites that might be the ones referenced by Ian MacFee. The District’s expert was the former head of the U.S. State Department’s Aerial Photographic Center. Particularly, he looked at the area near to where the

194

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

original shells were found in 1993. He found numerous areas of stressed vegetation or ground scars. The District does not now think that these represent actual burials, having since obtained the 1918, 1922, and 1927 aerial photographs. However, they do think that the District of Columbia’s expert found a number of the impact areas seen on the 1922 aerial photograph. These are also in one part of Murdock Mill Road, which is compatible with the statement that children used to hunt for shells along Murdock Mill Road. The EPA’s EPIC has completed aerial studies of July 1986 and May 2001. In addition, they also performed the C&O Canal Study, dated April 2002. These studies provide many important pieces of evidence as to where to look for contamination, shells, and burial sites. For example, the C&O study shows a possible third circular trench west of the Reservoir. Finally, the District of Columbia has obtained the 1951, 1970, 1979, and 1981 aerial photographs, which when read together show a dramatic excavation of both the 52nd Court trench and what the District believes to be Maj. Tolman’s field. It is quite possible that these areas were cleaned of contamination and burials before houses were built on them. Although some confirmatory sampling and geophysical surveys may need to be done, this may be good news for residents living in those areas. Finally, the notion that some prime areas of contamination were cleaned up prior to home construction is compatible with the findings at the Sedgwick Trench. Here, EPIC found that the southern portion of the trench was excavated between 1918 and 1927. Everyone presumed it was to bury more shells. After looking at the comparable trench on the 1951 aerial photograph, and having found magnetic soil but no shells or contamination in the southern edge of the Sedgwick Trench, it now appears that the widening of the Sedgwick Trench was done to remove shells, not to bury them. Of course, this does not address where the shells from either trench were taken. However, the Rick Woods’ Pit, the narrow-gauge railway, the perchlorate samples, and the 1951 aerial photograph showing contemporaneous work in the Dalecarlia Reservoir all point the District of Columbia in that direction.

15 The Dangers of Lewisite and Arsenic 15.1 The History of Lewisite and a Speech by W. Lee Lewis This chapter shows how the search for historical information must involve writings, books, and even speeches by important figures (such as commanding officers) at a site long after they have left. At the AUES, it was important to learn all that could be found out about Lewisite and the where, how, what, why, and when it was made and used. Lewisite contains arsenic and thus a residual poison will exist after 85 years. The person credited with its discovery, Capt. W. Lee Lewis, wrote and gave speeches about Lewisite long after the war was over. These articles and speeches provided important information that helped the regulators learn where to search for arsenic.

15.1.1

History of Lewisite

In 1904, J. A. Nieuwland under the direction of John J. Griffen, in a dissertation entitled, “Some Reactions of Acetylene,” stated, “Pure arsenic chloride free from oxide did not show any reaction with perfectly dry acetylene. When aluminum chloride was added the absorption of the gas was effected with the evolution of considerable heat. The contents of the flask turned black. When decomposed by pouring the substance into cold water, a black gummy mass separated out, and on standing for some time crystals appeared in the aqueous solution. The tarry substance possessed a most nauseating and penetrating odor and was extremely poisonous. Inhalation of the fumes, even in small quantity, caused nervous depression.” In the author’s view Nieuwland discovered the precursor reaction in the development of Lewisite and Capt. Lewis discovered Lewisite. Father Nieuwland is generally credited with the later discovery of neoprene, a discovery seemingly more valuable to mankind than Lewisite. According to A Higher Form of Killing (2002) by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, “a team based at Catholic University, Washington, DC, discovered Lewisite: faster acting than mustard gas it caused ‘immediate excruciating pain upon striking the eye, a stinging pain in the skin, and sneezing, coughing, pain and tightness in the chest on inhalation, often 195

196

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

accompanied by nausea and vomiting.’ The first batch of 150 tons of Lewisite was at sea, on its way to Europe when the Armistice was signed.” Large-scale production of this gas was at some point commenced in Willoughby, Ohio. That facility was so secret that the men working there were not allowed to leave; hence, it was named “the Mousetrap.” The 150 tons noted previously were produced there. Lewisite adds immensely to our concern because of its extreme toxicity, even when compared to the other gases used at the time. It is thought to be seven times more lethal than mustard gas. It has been called the “Dew of Death,” as a single drop on the skin could be fatal. Like the Manhattan Project of World War II fame, Lewisite was the closely guarded secret in World War I that could have won the war for us if the Armistice had not come when it did. A test result document states, “A concentration of 0.02 mg. per liter (or 2.8 parts per million) killed dogs, rats, mice, guinea pigs and monkeys, but not rabbits on four hours exposure, while for the same length of exposure, 0.01 mg. per liter (or 1.4 parts per million) killed dogs, rats and mice, but not rabbits or guinea pigs. The susceptibility of man to this gas is not known, but from this experiment it is possible that a concentration of 1 part in a million may cause serious effect if breathed for several hours.” The Merck Index, an annual encyclopedia of chemicals and drugs, states for Lewisite: “Caution: Extremely toxic! Produces severe vesication, even through rubber. If left on skin, as little as 0.5 ml may give rise to sufficient absorption to produce severe systemic effects; 2 ml may cause death.” (Similar warnings do not accompany the other war gases.)

15.1.2

A Speech by W. Lee Lewis

Winfred Lee Lewis is credited with the discovery and refinement of Lewisite, one of the most toxic gases developed during this period and one that remained in our arsenal until the treaty banning chemical weapons. The relevant parts of this speech are reproduced here to get a good understanding of the history of the effort and how the work was actually accomplished. The speech was found by Joel Vilensky, an accomplished scientist with whom the District of Columbia has collaborated on another chemical weapon site. He has written an excellent book on the history of Lewisite called The Dew of Death (2005). Capt. Lewis states: So I went over to the trench warfare division of the Ordnance Dept., told them that I wanted to work in gases, was commissioned

15: The Dangers of Lewisite and Arsenic

197

and assigned to the American University Experiment Station, then under the Bureau of Mines. I was directed to study the corrosive action of gases on shell. Instead of putting pieces of shell in the liquid, as had been done, I decided to put the liquid in the actual shell, heat them up, let them stand etc. and then open them up and study the results. The second day I succeeded in gassing one of the two men I had into the hospital, and gassing most of the enthusiasm for this particular form of experimentation out of myself. So the next day when more men were sent to me I refused to take them until I was given a decent, safe place in which to work. In consequence Col. Norris told me to go get a truck and a . . . driver, take DC’s men and a load of chemicals and move over to the Catholic University and go to work. Selecting chemicals to make a gas that you never heard of, wasn’t easy, but I loaded the truck with a little of everything in stock, including bottles of acid and ammonia and a cage of rats. Going over I struck a rut and broke several bottles of hydrochloric acid and conc[entrated] ammonia. The [driver], who was suspicious of the whole undertaking any way, took one look, turned the color of a [sheet], and departed without ceremony for some unannounced point. After running him down and reassuring him I proceeded without further incident and began our year at the Catholic University in Organic Research Unit No. 3. I analyzed mustard gas and made sulphur chloride and chlor-hydride for the rest of them, worked on a color detector for mustard gas, and on a large scale preparation of ricin and its military application etc. One day Dr. Griffen, Head of the Department of Chemistry at the Catholic University handed me a dissertation by J. A. Nieuwlands, printed but not published, entitled, Some Reactions of Acetylene . . . That report mentioned the reaction of arsenic chloride and acetylene and a tarry very poisonous substance that was produced. We now know this to be Lewisite oxide, or M1 oxide, one of the concerns at the AUES owing to its toxicity and stable nature. Capt. Lewis continues: Organic unit No. 3 reduced the reaction to controllable conditions, isolated three new compounds in the reaction mixture, proved their nature, worked out methods of laboratory control and submitted plans for large scale production. In the later stages of the work Major Conant and his laboratory [at AUES] also took up the chemical study of these substances . . .

198

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site After our preliminary report was made and it was established that this was a better weapon than mustard gas, the production of this material in iron on a semi-large scale was undertaken on the hill back of American University. However, the plant blew up one morning accidentally or intentionally, and it was reported that the gas wafted over toward Ex-Senator Scott’s residence and killed his chickens, canary birds and prostrated the Senator and his wife . . . However, the explosion was opportune as the War Department took strategic advantage of the occurrence to report that Lewisite would not be further investigated as it was dangerous and uncontrollable. Meanwhile a $5,000,000 plant was built at Nile Park, Cleveland, and about a thousand men incarcerated for the period of the war. Here the compound was being manufactured at the rate of ten tons a month but so far as I am aware none was ever shipped to the other side . . . After the armistice, the plant which had been built in an old automobile factory I am told, from materials largely brought in as [luggage?] was scrapped, the accumulated stock is reported to have been dumped in the ocean . . .

As is reported, the first 150 tons of Lewisite was shipped by railroad to Edgewood Arsenal—probably to the Bush River Depot—to be shipped overseas. The train was described as a train like no other. Apparently, it only had an engineer on it and the rest of the crew were soldiers. It went no faster than 10 miles an hour and took four days to get to Edgewood. The Armistice came while the train was en route. Various news stories report that the load was taken out to sea and dumped, 50 miles from Baltimore. It is unclear whether that means Chesapeake Bay or just off the coast of Delaware. However, the San Francisco Journal on February 19, 1923, reported that Lewisite was dumped in Chesapeake Bay. Photos 13, 14, 15, 17, and 18 in the center photo section show some of the ocean dumping of Lewisite and other chemical munitions. Wherever it is, fish are probably dying. As just one example, see the dolphin casualty shown in Photo 16 in the center photo section. The author suggests that the decline of commercial fish species off the U.S. East Coast is as much the result of all the chemical weapons sunk there as it is from overfishing. In the North Sea, commercial fishers are occasionally burned by clumps of mustard and Lewisite oxide sticking to their nets from the German stockpiles sunk there after World War II.

15: The Dangers of Lewisite and Arsenic

199

15.2 Arsenic Contamination Cleanup This section illustrates the value of knowing what munitions constituents to consider. We list a great many CWM formulas and compounds in chapter 5. The purpose of this is to allow the regulators to know what agents and breakdown products to test for once the historical research is complete. The fate and transport of constituents is important but knowing what constituents were likely to have been on a site is the beginning point. Our knowledge of chemical weapons, historical knowledge of the site, and knowledge of chemistry allowed us to make an educated guess that arsenic would have remained. It is important for the reader to understand that our site already had a “no further action” decision before we became involved. Whereas it would still be nice to sample for all the constituents known to have been on the site—or at least the major ones—we had to get our nose in the tent first. We chose the one contaminant we knew would be at the most places and present an undeniable health threat. From this gambit, the investigation was expanded once, as the author predicted, arsenic was found. Obviously, because the site tested shells the presence of arsenic mandated a geophysical survey of the property before a backhoe could be used to remove the arsenic contamination. This led to the discovery of still more burial areas and individual shells. The District of Columbia was successful in getting the entire Spring Valley area sampled for arsenic. The entire neighborhood, some 1400 residential lots plus the campus, were divided into grids. A grid was an area either 10 ft × 10 ft or 20 ft × 20 ft. A single scoop of dirt in the middle of the grid was sampled for arsenic. Whatever the value, it was considered the same for the whole grid. If the level of arsenic was above 20 ppm, then the entire grid was excavated down to 2 ft deep and the contaminated soil removed. Because approximately 150 lots had elevated arsenic levels, the Corps developed an arsenic cleanup prioritization that was based upon the average of the arsenic grid sample results. Thus, if a property had one very high grid of arsenic but the rest of the property was low, that property would be cleaned up several years later. It was the District’s belief that we needed to consider where the excessively high arsenic grids were on a given lot and, if the high arsenic grids were in an area frequented by the residents, they should be cleaned up more quickly. They developed the chart shown in Table 15.1.

200

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Table 15.1 Properties of Concern Noted in Arsenic Grid Sampling Data, Received May 2002

Address

High Arsenic Level (ppm)

Number of Grids above 80 ppm

Group I 52nd Street 45th Street Rockwood Parkway Tindall Street Rockwood Parkway Public Space 5-L-15 Corey Place Massachusetts Avenue Tindall Street Springdale Street Fordham Road 45th Street Tindall Street 49th Street 50th Street

613 529 489 410 406 346 335 290 286 254 225 201 195 174 170

1 30 4 14 7 9 2 3 8 12 1 2 2 6 8

Group II Massachusetts Avenue 42nd Street Quebec Street Springdale Street Tindall Street Van Ness Street 52nd Street Rodman Street 49th Street Fordham Road Rockwood Parkway Sedgwick Street Sedgwick Street Quebec Street Warren Street Upton Street

153 142 142 135 123 118 117 108 108 107 105 104 99 97 96 93

3 3 6 5 4 3 3 7 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 1

Group I should be time critical. Group II should be removed next FY 2003.

15: The Dangers of Lewisite and Arsenic

201

15.2.1 The Problem with Arsenic The industrial hygiene literature is replete with references to the problem of arsine gas formation with arsenic in the soil. The 1994 NIOSH “Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards” by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states, “There is a high potential for the generation of arsine gas when inorganic arsenic is exposed to nascent hydrogen.” Likewise, The Fundamentals of Industrial Hygiene (J. B. Olishifski and F. E. McElroy, National Safety Council, 1977) states, “The possibility of arsine formation should always be considered when there is freshly formed hydrogen around ores of the heavy metals, since arsenic is widely distributed in small amounts and only a trace of it is required to produce enough arsine to be troublesome.” This is basically due to a chemical reaction involving an acid, a metal such as zinc, and inorganic arsenic. Certainly, the AUES has the requisite arsenic and reactive metals available. For example, zinc, a highly reactive metal, was widely used in smoke mixtures and has been found in substantial levels at numerous places throughout the AUES. Because it is not very toxic, it has largely been ignored. The District of Columbia does not know what pH is necessary to cause nascent hydrogen to be formed from a reaction with zinc but with the acid in the air at one property on Glenbrook Road, acid rain and other sources of acidic conditions such as buried bottles of acid, this problem must be investigated. The more troublesome problem is the biotransformation of arsenic into arsine gas. Four common soil fungi, two anaerobic bacteria and algae in surface water can generate a methylated version of arsine. Generally, see “Arsenic Speciation in the Environment” by W. R. Cullen and K. J. Reimer, Chemistry Review (1989); “Arsenic in the Soil Environment” by E. Smith, R. Naidu, and A. M. Alston, Advances in Agronomy (1998); and “Arsenic Chemistry in Soils: An Overview of Thermodynamic Predictions and Field Observations” by Muhammed Sadiq, Water Air and Soil Pollution (1997). The problem, if any, would be expected to magnify due to the landscaping activities in the area. Mulch has long been known to foster the growth of fungus. Some gardeners suggest that it should not be placed near shrubs or trees, lest the fungus kill the ornamental plant. Also, the AUES is in an area that gets substantial rainfall most years. Thus, fungi can readily develop in this area. Municipal landfills producing nominal amounts of methane soil gas in the summer months can cause serious illness and death in the winter because the frozen soil has a chimney effect on the soil gas, causing it to migrate laterally and collect in nearby buildings. Thus, there is no dilution

202

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

effect and the concentrations are increased. Homes near landfills have even exploded from concentrations of methane gas. Furnaces in houses also consume air and create a vacuum, which can suck soil gas into the basement. This may explain how high levels of arsenic were found in one Spring Valley home and high levels of volatile compounds were found in another. In years past, several Spring Valley residents and pets have come down with rare blood diseases; at the time, the cause was unknown. One of these illnesses is aplastic anemia. The Merck manual lists two causes of aplastic anemia: benzene and arsenic. Another illness is pernicious anemia. Medical literature suggests that arsenic toxicity can masquerade as pernicious anemia. A recent experiment by Dartmouth Medical School (“Decreased DNA repair gene expression among individuals exposed to arsenic in the United States drinking water,” Angeline Andrew et al., J. Cancer, Apr. 10: 104(3): 263–8, 2003) indicates that arsenic in drinking water (as low as 25 ppb, or half the legal limit at that time) can mutate the gene that guards against cancer (by repairing the cell or killing it). In other words, it is not that arsenic causes cancer so much as it is that arsenic destroys the body’s natural defense against cancerous cells caused by other carcinogens. See also “Ding Dong Dell, Arsenic in the Well,” by Roger P. Smith, Ph.D., Dartmouth Medicine, Dartmouth Medical School, Hanover, NH Fall, 2006.

16 Sampling Conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers 16.1 Secret Sampling for the AUES List Conducted by the Corps This section reveals another trick used by the military. They conduct the sampling the regulator asks for, but in secret—and then do not share the results if the data is incriminating. The regulators, residents, and stakeholders must inquire periodically whether there has been any other sampling conducted on the site. Since the military detected trichloroethylene in 1980 as a water problem at Camp Lejeune and did not disclose it until 1985, secret sampling may be more widespread than just at Spring Valley. Therefore, this section must be read by all.

16.1.1

Sequence of Events

First, the Corps of Engineers’ Final Report of Analytical Results (“Report”) was dated May 8, 2002. Relevant data from this report was transmitted to only one of the property owners, 48th Street, on or about January 14, 2003. The property owner transmitted his portion of the data to the District of Columbia Department of Health on January 23, 2003. At the partnering meeting on January 29, 2003, the District expressed concern over the delay and means of obtaining even a portion of the Report. Also, concern was expressed over the more important delay in notifying the four property owners. At the partnering meeting, the District noticed that the EPA’s Remedial Project Manager had a completed Report dated May 8, 2002, which he also was given on January 14, 2003. The District of Columbia requested a copy of this Report, which the Corps transmitted on January 31, 2003. The Report indicates that sampling was performed on February 8 and 13, 2001. The Report also states on page 2 under Summary: “Except as indicated in this report, all samples were prepared and analyzed within the specified holding times using the EPA-approved analytical procedures.” The District commented on this Report and requested copies of all field notes, chain-of-custody forms, laboratory quality control results, and all other information included in the data packages including the original laboratory reports, hereby requested pursuant to the Department of 203

204

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Defense and District Memorandum of Agreement (DDMOA) dated May 9, 1994. This request was necessary due to the unusual nature of the timeline. A delay of a year and three months from sample collection to validated results is unusual, even for the AUES. Another delay of eight more months until the regulators and at least one property owner were notified is another inexplicable circumstance. Finally, the Report states in the first sentence, “In accordance with the revised Final Work Management Plan for Follow-on Sampling for OU-4 Residential Lots, Amendment 2 (Parsons, April 2001), Parsons (a leading environmental remediation firm) collected soil samples from four OU-4 residences to assess for the presence of the American University Experiment Station (AUES) list of chemicals.” The District must know how samples collected in February 2001 could be in accordance with a plan amended in April 2001. Because many of the constituents of concern were volatile substances, this lengthy timeline and the missing date as to when the samples were actually analyzed are even more important. Also, several trip blank samples were apparently contaminated with volatile compounds, raising a further question on how well the sample blanks were sealed and whether any loss of volatile constituents occurred before analysis.

16.1.2

Generic Comments

During January and February of 2002, the District of Columbia had several discussions with the Corps of Engineers’ “new” members of the partnering team over the need to include the District in the deliberative process. Whereas the District was and is pleased with the high level of expertise these “new” members possess, they were under the impression that these “new” members were not used to working with state or local governments that assumed such a prominent role on a military weapons site. The District was under the impression that long before May 2002, these “new” members understood the need to include the District in the deliberations and to supply the District with all information regarding items or contamination found at the site. Therefore, after this new member orientation the District is at a loss to explain why it was not told of the sampling results, at least at a point in time when the results were validated. The District requested that the Corps of Engineers search its files to ensure that no other relevant data or information was being withheld. The District reminded the Corps that the vast majority of the AUES site is private property and military customs regarding “need to know” are

16: Sampling Conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers

205

simply inapplicable. The District has been informed that rights of entry for this expanded sampling were not obtained from two of the residents. The District was not in a position to assess the accuracy of this anecdotal information. The District was also concerned about the timeline because the Corps repeatedly stressed that its expertise is in the ordnance and engineering aspects, and has deferred the health-related issues to the regulators. In the Work Management Plan for OU-5, August 10, 2001, the Corps states, “CENAB responsibilities include . . . obtaining rights-of-entry to properties in the investigation areas . . . and coordinating with regulatory agencies on issues pertaining to protection of human health and the environment.” In the Work Management Plan for OU-4 dated August 14, 2000, the Corps states, “Communication with the residents . . . is considered paramount to the successful completion of this project. The flow chart . . . indicates the general sequence of events necessary to accomplish the sampling of the residential properties . . . Submit Right of Entry Letter to Homeowner . . . Receive signed Right of Entry . . . Submit Sample Results Letter to Homeowner.” The District suggests that the Corps ensure that its new personnel familiarize themselves with these generic work plans. Because the Corps defers health issues to the regulators, not advising the regulators of the presence of these compounds left the residents without any competent opinion on the impact of the compounds for a period broaching two years. The fact that the residents were not even informed about the existence of the compounds further exacerbates the problem. This “ostrichesque” approach to environmental remediation was not appropriate.

16.1.3

Specific Constituents

The following constituents are listed in the Report as being detected: • • • • • • • • •

Acenaphthalene Acetone Acrolein Acetaldehyde Alpha-lindane Anthracene Benzaldehyde Benzo[A]anthracene Benzo[B]fluoranthene

206

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Benzo[G,H,DC]perylene Benzo[K]fluoranthene Benzoic acid Benzyl alcohol Benzyl bromide Benzene Benzeneetanol-4-hydroxy Benzene-(1-methylethenyl) Benzene, 1-methyl-3-(1-methyl) Bicyclo-2,2,1-heptane,7,7-d Bicyclo-3,1,1-hept-2-ene, 2,6,5-trimethyl Bicyclo-3,1,1-hept-2-ene, 2,6,6-trimethyl bis(2-Ethylhexyl)phthalate Butanal Butane 2-Butanone 2-Butanone, 3-methyl 2-Butene, (z) Butylbenzylphthalate Carbon disulfide Carbonyl sulfide Carboxylic acid ester Chloride Chloroform Chloromethane Chrysene Cyanide Cyclohexene, 1-methyl-4-(1-methylethenyl) Cyclopropane, 1,2-dimethyl-, trans Cyclotetrasiloxane, octamethyl Dibenz[A,H]anthracene Dibenzofuran Dichlorofluoromethane Diethylphthalate Di-n-butylphthalate Docosane Dodecanal 1-Eicosanol Ethanethiol Ethanol, 2-(2-ethoxyethoxy) Ethanone, 1-(3-ethyloxiranyl) Fluoranthene Fluorene Fluoride

16: Sampling Conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Gama-sitosterol Heptadecane Heptadecane, 9-octyl Heptane, 3-methylene Hexadecanoic acid 9-Hexadecanoic acid 2,4-Hexanedione 2-Hexanone Hexanal Hexanal, 2-ethyl Hexanal, 5-methyl Hexane 1-Hexene, 4-methyl 2-Hexene, (z) Indeno[1,2,3-CD]pyrene Methyl acetate Methylene chloride 2-Methylnaphthalene Naphthalene Nitrate-n Nonacosane Nonadecane Nonanal Octacosane 13-Octadecenal 14-Octadecenal 9,12-Octadecadenoic acid Octanal Octane 1-Octanol, 2,7-dimethyl 2-Octene 2-Octene, (e) Oleic acid Pentadecane, 8-hexyl Pentanal isomer 1 Pentanal isomer 2 Pentanal isomer 114-octadecenal Phenanthrene Phenanthrene, 9-methyl Phosphate-P Propanal, 2-methyl Propane, 1,1-oxybis 1-Propene, 1,2,3-trichloro Pyrene

207

208

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • • • • •

Sulfate Thiodiglycol Toluene Trichlorofluoromethane Tricosane

16.1.4

Comments on Risk

Because many of these are volatile compounds, and many of these were found in surface soils, a presumptive pathway to human exposure exists. However, because many of these compounds are unknown in modern industry and do not have risk-based concentrations established, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to complete an accurate risk assessment. The District agrees with the Corps that most of these compounds are found in very low levels (i.e., a few parts per billion). However, the District notes that a few of these compounds are experimental chemical warfare agents or precursor compounds listed in the archival documents. Some are listed in standard hazardous materials references. In addition, there are 102 compounds detected on one or more properties. The lowest number on any single property is 24, and the two properties with the largest number of compounds lie in close proximity to each other. Because of the number of compounds on any given property, the synergistic and combinative effects would make it difficult, if not impossible, to complete a risk assessment. Finally, because the EPA has already completed a risk assessment on the AUES site, it would be repetitive to perform another. Although the EPA’s Risk Assessment was done in 1999, it was primarily based on the limited sampling data from 1993 and 1994. Newer data from the site-wide arsenic sampling and limited sampling for other constituents should be added. If the EPA feels that a risk assessment could be completed on this new data, it should also be included.

16.1.5 Comments on Implications for the Spring Valley Project Because two of these properties are known to have burial sites adjacent to them and are suspected of having burial sites on them based on geophysical surveys, the remaining two properties should also be examined geophysically for potential burial sites. Indeed, one of those properties is already on the list for the first 50 properties to be geophysically surveyed for other reasons.

16: Sampling Conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers

209

The District noted in a letter sent to the Corps in 1998 that the general absence of volatile and semi-volatile compounds found in the 1993 and 1994 sampling suggested that where such compounds were found, a containerized burial site might exist. The reasoning seems especially apropos in light of the Report. Other adjacent properties, as well as those in the points of interest, should have a similar battery of tests performed. The District suggests that the partners discuss, as a priority, the need for more extensive sampling (some of these properties had only three samples) and whether a mapping of the soil gas would be useful in pointing to potential burial sites. The Corps should discuss interim measures with the property owners.

16.2 Effort to Deny the Existence of Additional Burial Sites This section is especially important for the residents and stakeholders. It illustrates to what lengths the military will go to come up with a plausible story as to why there is no problem at your site. While the stories will be different for each site, there will be contrived explanations for not taking action. Your regulators may be inexperienced in military sites and there may be a tendency to defer to military expertise. This section may provide clues to the method of operation that might be employed. Since our first meeting with the Corps of Engineers and the EPA, there has been a continual denial of suggestions for further work. With respect to the District of Columbia’s initial report, the Corps summarily denied 58 of the 59 points covered. Many of the District’s theories, including the likelihood of ordnance burial sites and arsenic contamination, have now been clearly demonstrated. In fact, the DOD now characterizes AUES as the worst defense site in the country. Nevertheless, the tendency to deny the existence of contamination or burial sites continues. A recent example came in comments dated April 24, 2003 to a Task Force decision to create a new AOI 5. Comments suggested indicating that certain chemicals listed in the AOI 5 report (antimony, methylene chloride, toluene, barium, chromium, and lead) are not of AUES origin. These comments were made by an experienced engineer who obviously did not bother to check the historical documents or even the Corps of Engineers’ own historical report. Many forms of these chemicals or other indications of their use are included in various AUES documents. Other federal agencies, charged with the protection of health, have also participated in this summary denial process. For example, after Harry Jaffe,

210

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

a writer for the Washingtonian Magazine, told the author about a child day-care center in the midst of the AUES, the District of Columbia asked the Army to sample the soil for arsenic. They complied and found a composite arsenic level of 36 ppm. Before these results were in, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) rushed to publish a report saying there was no risk. Fortunately, the District did not believe them and continued to press for discrete grid samples pursuant to a previously established work plan. This sampling found 408 ppm directly at the spot where the children had their garden (from which they ate the vegetables they grew and played with their toy trucks in the bare dirt). Later, it was discovered that the arsenic at a depth of 5 ft was 3550 ppm. In another instance, the District of Columbia discovered a burial site of broken and intact chemical glassware on the American University campus. They were able to get Alan Davies, an expert in arsenic soil sampling of the University of Maryland Environmental Engineering Program, to have a graduate student, Michael Peterson, run five arsenic samples. They found 3350 ppm in a two-part composite taken on the surface of the burial site. The EPA sent the sampling report to their laboratory at Fort Meade without the District’s consent. Instead of immediately driving down to the District of Columbia and taking some more samples to better identify the extent and severity of the problem, in a four-page critique the EPA questioned the validity of the sampling. Subsequently, the Army found 2400 ppm in another burial site nearby and, of course, the 3500 ppm sample at the child development center, also not far away.

16.3

Requests Directed to the Corps

This section is a roadmap for residents, stakeholders, and regulators. The contaminants and activities can be changed to fit the particular facts of one’s own site, but the requests are typical of what must be done. It also illustrates how to buttress the request with salient facts. It shows how to build on data or information already collected. In the case of the AUES, the District of Columbia did not have its own sampling capability. If your state has such capability, the scenario would be changed slightly. Find the list of probable contaminants from the historical records or extrapolated from the first part of this book, take a few samples at likely locations, and then frame the requests if the results are positive. The District asked the Corps to sample for arsenic in the surface soil of the address where the first burial pits intentionally discovered were located. Highly elevated samples were detected, up to 1000 ppm. They then

16: Sampling Conducted by the Army Corps of Engineers

211

asked the Corps to sample for arsenic in the surface soil next door. Highly elevated samples were detected, up to 620 ppm. The District asked the Corps to sample for arsenic in the surface soil of the Child Development Center. Highly elevated samples were detected, up to 400 ppm and up to 3500 ppm at a depth of 5 ft. The District asked the Corps to sample all of the properties in Spring Valley for arsenic. The Corps complied and found levels up to 605 ppm. Because the first burial pits at Glenbrook did not reveal the carboys shown in a photograph being buried, the District asked the Corps to look on the adjacent property. A total of 380 shells, several 50-gal drums, and 40 bottles, most containing mustard or Lewisite, have been found to date. During the arsenic sampling, the District of Columbia found a pit of chemical glassware. They asked the Corps to remove the items, which they did. Arsenic on the surface soil was 3350 ppm. The District then asked the Corps to conduct a geophysical survey of several areas on the American University campus. Several disposal pits and empty shells have been found. The District discovered a list of 192 chemicals prepared for toxicological testing at the AUES. They asked the Corps to try and sample for these chemicals. However, without advance knowledge or an opportunity to review the work plan, the Corps secretly sampled four properties in February 2001 and found a total of 102 chemicals. Several of the property owners allege that the Corps failed to inform them in advance and obtain rights of entry to sample for anything other than arsenic. More importantly, the Corps intentionally failed to tell the homeowners, the EPA, and the District of Columbia of the results of the sampling, even though they had issued a final report dated May 2002. The findings were accidentally leaked to one homeowner during a meeting in January 2003 by a new Corps staff member, who did not know that the results had been kept secret. The District asked the Corps to develop a plan for conducting geophysical (metal detector) surveys on selected lots. They complied and developed a good prioritization plan. However, the District developed another plan and the Corps agreed to let the District select 20 percent of each group of 50 lots to be surveyed from our version. The District of Columbia has asked the Corps to geophysically survey or sample certain properties or areas based on the results of previous investigations, anecdotal information, archival information, or their own field investigations. This includes lots where bottles, ordnance and ordnance scrap have been found, previous anomalies have been found, or features have been identified on maps or aerial photographs. Until recently, the Corps was complying with these requests. For example, the Corps arranged for a team of Greg Nielson, Terry Slonecker, and the author to look for the

212

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

location of the Livens mortar battery. We located the gun pit, and the Corps has now geophysically surveyed the area. The District has asked the Corps to geophysically survey and excavate the burial pit of shells and the impact area near the Reservoir. They have asked the Corps to sample the groundwater near burial sites. They have asked the Corps to expand the points of interest and the boundaries of Spring Valley. They have organized a task force, which has added 12 areas of interest to date. The Corps is currently considering expanding the boundaries.

16.4

Requests Directed to the EPA

This short section is presented for state regulators, residents, and stakeholders to illustrate that the EPA is not beyond the reach of such requests. Very early in the partnering, the District of Columbia asked the EPA to perform some arsenic sampling on the American University campus and several other properties. They complied and found several elevated readings. It was during this sampling event that the District found the glassware disposal site on the campus. They asked Ken Shuster of the EPA to compile a list of the best metal detection equipment. He recommended several firms to the Corps.

17 Conceptual Site Model for the AUES 17.1 Introduction This chapter presents a superb example of the new mandate from the EPA for a “Conceptual Site Model.” Many experienced state regulators may never have written one, and it is hoped that this will provide an example of the completeness that is advisable. The format recommended by the EPA must be altered slightly, due to the uniqueness of the site. In most sites, there will be data gaps or considerations that do not need to be addressed (i.e., Civil War forts may lack aerial photographs but are likely to have artists’ sketches).

17.1.1 Writing a Conceptual Site Model The District of Columbia has been involved in the cleanup of the AUES since its first report in 1996. That report called for an abandonment of the “no further action” Record of Decision approved by the United States Army and the EPA. The District of Columbia has written the following major reports on the AUES: • “Final Report on the World War I Poison Gas Production at the American University Experiment Station,” District of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs by Richard D. Albright (1996) • District of Columbia’s “Specific Concerns Memorandum” (1997) • District of Columbia’s Draft “Comments on the Corps of Engineers’ letter dated March 20, 1995, detailing its Investigation into the Reported Munitions Burial by the Civilian Conservation Corps at Spring Valley” • District of Columbia’s Draft “Report on the Proposed Geophysical Search for Ordnance and CWM at Spring Valley” (January 2002) • District of Columbia’s Draft “Comments on the Corps of Engineers Selection of Points of Interest and Boundary 213

214

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site Delineation for the Spring Valley DERP/FUD Site” (May 2002 with subsequent attachments) • Major Area of Interest Reports 2003–2006: Rick Woods Pit; Dalecarlia Impact Area; Sedgwick Ground Scars; Sharpe Bunker on Wesley Seminary; Westmoreland Circle Impact Area; The Courier Burial Site; Major Tolman’s Field; Tenleytown Station; Possible Perchlorate Burial Sites; Weaver Farm; Mercury Detection Areas; Railroad Sidings; Antimony Detection Areas; Potential Third Pit on Korean Ambassador’s Residence; Glenbrook Road Ground Scar; Camp Leach Trenches; Fort Totten Fill Dirt from Spring Valley; American University Thiodiglycol Areas; AU Contaminated Building Burn Sites; Benzo(a)pyrene Hot Spots; PAH Hot Spots on American University; and POI 24 at American University

As a result of this research effort, the District of Columbia has gained a deep insight into the potential environmental issues at the AUES. Nevertheless, the lack of precise information on burial sites, contaminants, areas of likely contamination, impact areas, and the fate and transport of contaminants has created a pale of uncertainty for the community and those charged with cleaning up this site. This uncertainty has resulted in a “patchwork” of remedial projects. Although each project has been beneficial in finding and removing hazards or at least increasing the knowledge base about, waste and inefficiency have been major by-products due to the lack of a comprehensive plan. For example, most properties were sampled for arsenic. Now a repeat mobilization will have to be conducted to sample for a small handful of other toxic metals and constituents, which could have been sampled for in the first event. It is in an effort to minimize such future duplication of effort and data gaps that the District of Columbia has tackled the enormity of a comprehensive planning document with this Conceptual Site Model. The need for planning on this project has been pointed out by other groups and individuals. For example, the Mayor’s Scientific Advisory Panel has stated, “The panel concludes that further steps (e.g., data collection and analysis) are necessary to provide sufficient information for a more complete understanding of environmental and health conditions in the Spring Valley community.” Indeed, one of their specific recommendations is that, “the District of Columbia Department of Health should develop a comprehensive plan.” Of course, the panel was focused primarily on the health concerns, not on the rudiments of finding live ordnance. Nevertheless, their wisdom can be extrapolated to other AUES needs.

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

215

The disarray in the AUES remediation effort, evident to many, is caused by the failure to follow routine CERCLA/RCRA, Military Munitions Rule, and ER 200 3-1 procedures. Most importantly, as the Unexploded Ordnance Management Principles require, “Adequate site characterization at each Closed, Transferring or Transferred (CTT) military range is necessary to understand the conditions, make informed risk management decisions, and conduct effective response actions.” Thus, a conceptual site model must be written for the AUES, including the two ranges that have now been documented. Current DOD policy for a CTT range requires that all potential munitions and explosives constituents (MEC) areas be examined. This includes impact areas, firing line areas where hang fires are buried, disposal areas, and storage areas. This is not an option under current DOD/EPA range policy.

17.1.2 Adjusting the EPA’s Triad System Conceptual Site Model Recently, the EPA has set forth an approach for environmental remediation called, the “Triad System.” A key step in this is the development of a Conceptual Site Model. According to the Triad System, the Conceptual Site Model includes the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Historical records Aerial photographs Toxicity and exposure data Site contaminant data Geologic data Hydrogeologic information Residents Other environmental receptors Site development infrastructure information Professional conjecture

This generic approach should be modified due to the unique nature of each site. In the case of the AUES site, first, there are UXO and MEC issues including buried chemical warfare material. Most industrial sites (for which the Triad System was designed) did not develop weapons of mass destruction and do not have constituents on the site that were designed to kill people. Second, a large number of residents live on the site, moving in before the site was remediated. Third, a large university occupies a significant portion of the site. Fourth, the site is unique even as a military site because it was a research and development site utilizing a great number of

216

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

chemicals in experiments. Fifth, the site abuts and is up-gradient from an unlined drinking water reservoir. The EPA has also experimented with conceptual site models for UXO.

17.2

Historical Records, Drawings, and Maps

It has been estimated that there are about 8500 lbs of records that were meticulously kept on the experiments at the AUES. Several indexes of these reports exist. The length of these indexes suggests that the poundage figure may be accurate. To date, the District of Columbia staff has been denied access to these records, both at Fort Leonard Wood and at Aberdeen. However, some duplicate records exist in the National Archives or were copied by historians at an earlier date. Many of these have been attached to some of the District’s reports cited previously. In addition, two contemporaneous books, i.e., the History of the Research Division (Bancroft, 1921) and the History of the Development Division, published by the Divisions just after W.W.I. for their own staff, contain much useful information about the work done at the AUES. Various heads of the Chemical Warfare Service and other experts have also written books about the World War I activities by the Chemical Warfare Service, including the AUES. In addition to the two indexes of AUES records, several lists of constituents exist that were chemicals and elements ordered and used.

17.2.1

Boundary

There are four major historic maps that cover the buildings at the AUES, the 1918 Range and Reservation Map and several maps of Camp Leach. Two Camp Leach maps indicate that portions of Camp Leach (two parcels) were included as part of Camp Leach (given letter designations) but not leased. A separate memorandum indicates that Camp Leach did not know who owned one of the parcels. Another historical Camp Leach document (by Gen. Black) indicates that they used land that was not leased. These references are significant in terms of the FUDS boundary.

17.2.2

Explosive Burials

In addition to the April 1921 article in the American University Courier previously quoted, other records also indicate that two new explosives were developed at the AUES: anilite (a French explosive) and monomethyl

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

217

hydrazine nitrate. Hydrazine nitrate is the most interesting because it is still the third most powerful explosive known. Phenol hydrazine has been detected in two groundwater samples a mile apart, raising the specter that hydrazine was an explosive that may have been buried in large quantities. Photographs of tests on “mono” and anilite exist. Other sources confirm that a large amount of explosives were made at the AUES. First, “The Small Scale Manufacturing Section (located at AUES) made the following amounts . . . nitrogen tetroxide, 3000 lbs.” Second, the Washington Star stated, “Here in Washington is located the greatest nitrogen research laboratory on the western hemisphere,” referring to the nitrate division at the AUES. As noted, RDX (cyclonite) also called royal Dutch explosive or royal demolition explosive, was developed in 1898 by Henning, a German chemist. His method was to nitrate hexamthylene tetramine using concentrated nitric acid. Hexamthylene tetramine appears on the list of chemicals purchased in bulk by the Chemical Warfare Service. A “nitrating” shed appears on the 1918 building plat map. This structure is far removed from the AUES campus, probably due to the danger inherent in making explosives. Report Nos. DR 03-065 and DR 03-046 indicate the AUES experiments with RDX precursors. The 1922 aerial photograph reveals two ground scars that are significantly larger than those ground scars that have already been excavated as burial pits. One of these ground scars is under a campus building. A nearby soil boring found elevated arsenic and laboratory debris in the front yard of this building. The explosive capability of hydrazine nitrate underneath a university building is unsettling.

17.2.3

Impact Areas

Several documents show 185 acres as being leased from the Girls Reform School; this would include the Dalecarlia woods. Monograph No. 2, entitled “Chloropicrin” by Clarence J. West and dated May 3, 1918, states that 2000 shells—75-mm and 4.5-mm—will be fired. He reports on the first 100 and indicates that these were fired into an area that had already been shelled. Bancroft indicates that the guns were placed against the east edge of the Reservation and fired at a range of 2400 yards. That could place the impact area in the Dalecarlia woods, another wooded area, or the adjacent open areas. The 1918 Range and Reservation Map includes a target area. The 1918 plat of the buildings shows a Livens gun pit (now located).

218

17.2.4

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Persistency Test Area

A “Report of Casualties caused on Weaver Farm by G-34,” dated September 19, 1918, and the Bancroft description of persistency testing of gas indicate a substantial ongoing operation. The Weaver Farm was used, apparently by 18 men, as a staging area for spraying chemical agents on the patches of ground to test for persistency. G-34 was used as a code for Lewisite even though it is listed as mustard. The 1918 Range and Reservation Map shows the location of the Weaver Farm. (See the 1918 aerial photograph for persistency test patches.) These areas could have significant residual contamination like polymerized mustard or arsenic.

17.2.5

Major Tolman’s Field

A number of smoke tests were conducted by Maj. Tolman and many different types of toxic smoke were tested. One test report contains a sketch of the test field. The sketch indicates a test of nine G-76 diphenylchloroarsine shells. A document dated November 26, 1918, lists the use—without leasing— of 6.75 acres by the AUES that were owned by John R. Scott. A Map of Lessors, discovered by Mark Baker and the author, shows this area as owned by John R. Scott. Although this land was used, no specific mention of its use exists. According to the April 1921 American University Courier, “He [Richard C. Tolman] is the man who developed the famous toxic smoke candle, planned to be used by the allied armies in the spring drive, but which was unnecessary on account of the signing of the armistice.”

17.2.6 Tenleytown Station One of the side projects of the AUES involved the development of searchlights. Numerous documents indicate that after the AUES was shut down, this project continued under the name Tenleytown Station. The lease reference is provided. The land, Lots 1680 and 1681, were leased by Mary E. Helen, Josephine Patton, and Edith Patton Corbin. Because searchlights are listed on the Camp Leach map, it is believed that this is the area of the station. This was a large project with nearly 100 men.

17.2.7

Railroad Sidings

Several documents refer to the use of the railroad and the spur to ship supplies to Camp Leach and the AUES. One historic document lists the

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

219

daily tons of supplies (50 for AUES), which clearly calls for significant loading and storage capability. A 1906 and a 1940 map of railroad spur lines on this leased parcel exist; one map calls it a chemical siding.

17.3 Aerial Photographs and Reports Aerial photographs dated 1918, 1922, 1927, 1928, 1936, 1940, 1951, and 1979 provide the most useful information. The EPA’s EPIC has produced reports on some of these photographs in 1986 and 2001. A CD has been produced that overlays aerial photographic information with a current map. Parsons has color-coded the ground scars and features from some of the various aerial photographs on a map. Ground scars seen on the 1927 aerial photograph but not seen on the 1918 aerial photographs are potential burial sites. Most of these have never been seriously tested for burials because the original hypothesis was that most of the materials were sent to the Edgewood Arsenal. That hypothesis is unsupported by the shipping logs at Edgewood, which show no arrivals from the AUES after the Armistice. That hypothesis is also unsupported by the large burials continually being found. The 1918 aerial photograph provides important information about the location of buildings and features such as trenches, which also could be burial sites. It also provides important information about test sites, such as the persistency test area. The 1922 aerial photograph also provides some of the most important information because the 1918 aerial photograph was taken several months before the site was closed (the Armistice). The 1922 aerial photograph likely shows impact crater fields, burial sites and other features. Unfortunately, it is of poor quality. The 1927 aerial photograph is finely detailed and some ground scars interpreted as burial sites by the District of Columbia staff have proven to be just that. For example, the multiple small burials on Lot 18 were first seen on the 1927 aerial photograph by the District’s staff. This aerial photograph is also important because burials of CWM tend to kill vegetation. Thus, a burial of innocuous material in 1918 would be re-vegetated in nine years but a burial of CWM would still be barren. The 1927 aerial photograph also depicts three large ground scars, compatible with the description of the burial in the Courier because it was taken before the war ended. One of these three ground scars appears to be near POI 24R. A 1918 aerial photograph (not expected to show the burial referred to in the Courier because it was taken before the war ended) does show a pit and two trenches on the American University campus. The trenches may have been early testing trenches or Civil War rifle trenches. These other two

220

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

trenches should be examined as potential burial areas as well. One of the trenches has high readings for mercury and antimony. Thus trenches existing before the war ended could be burial sites after the site was closed. The pit shown on the 1918 aerial photograph is now believed to be on the property adjacent to POI 24R. Finally, the Sgt. Maurer still photograph shows a mustard (Lewisite) disposal pit, affectionately nicknamed the “Hole called Hades.” This could be the same pit as that shown on the 1918 aerial photograph or a different one. That, too, is believed to be on the property adjacent to POI 24R. The 1951 aerial photograph shows an excavation of the 52nd Court trench. This earlier excavation was unmistakably demonstrated by the fact that three shells were found wrapped in plastic and duct tape during the excavation in 1993. This could only have resulted from an earlier discovery after their original burial because plastic and duct tape did not exist in 1918.

17.4

Still Photographs

There are still photographs of experimental ordnance, mines, other explosive devices, grenades, bombs, incendiary darts, sprayers, smoke devices, laboratories, and the tests. There exists a photograph of the burial of carboys of mustard (quite possibly Lewisite), known as the Sgt. Maurer Pit. This has been analyzed by a photogramatist. Photographs of two magazines exist; one photograph shows the explosives magazine to be very large, supporting the Courier story. Photographs show the Livens and Stokes mortar battery and test firings of gas shells exploding in the distance.

17.5 Toxicity and Exposure Data There were hundreds if not thousands of chemicals used on the AUES site. Many of these are exotic and unknown to modern chemistry or industry. For example, one list contained 192 compounds, selected as candidates for further testing, as potential chemical warfare agents. This list was shown by the contractor Parsons to five of the best laboratories around the country. Only about 140 compounds could be tested for presence. If the best laboratories in the country cannot even test for 25 percent of the compounds on one list, how could we possibly know the toxicity of the chemicals found in the soil at the AUES?

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

221

17.6 Site Contaminant Data It is variously reported that anywhere from 1600 to 3000 constituents were on hand at the AUES. Thus far, lists of only about 600 compounds have been reported. The District of Columbia staff located lists of about 400 constituents.

17.6.1

Constituents Actually Found

Thirteen points of interest out of 53 (25 percent) were sampled in the 1994 time frame. Several contaminants of interest were found including: antimony, mercury, thallium, sulfur, phthalate, polycyclic aromotic hydrocarbons (PAHs), selenium, beryllium, and manganese. Cyanide, mustard, and mustard breakdown products were found on a few lots in Spring Valley. A federal court has held that there is arsenic contamination on the Street Car Line property; this would have been adjacent to the spur lines. Later, most of the 1400 properties were tested for arsenic, and approximately 10 percent were elevated. As noted previously, four individual lots, the circular trenches, and the Child Development Center were tested for a unique list of 140 AUES chemicals. A total of 102 were found, as many as 80 on each of two properties: • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Acrolein Acetyl chloride Acetylene–arsenic trichloride Acetyl fluoride Aluminum chloride Aluminum arsenide Ammonium cyanide Anilite (toxic); CCl4 added to nitrobenzol and nitrogen peroxide produces up to 40 percent phosgene on detonation. Anthracene Arsenic trifluoride Benzyl chloride Benzyl cyanide Boron trifluoride Bromine trifluoride Butyl lithium Butyl mercaptan Calcium arsenide Carbon bisulfide Carbon monoxide

222

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Carbonyl fluoride Carbonyl sulfide Chlorine monofluoride Chlorine trifluoride Chloroacetic anhydride Chloroacetyl chloride Chloroform Chrysarobin Coal tar Cyanogen Cyanogen bromide (bromocyanide) Dichlorosilane Dimethylamine Disulfurdecafluoride Disulfurpentafluoride Diethyl sulfide Diphenyl sulfide Ethane Ethylaluminum chloride Ethyldibromoacetate Ethylene oxide Fluorine Hexafluorobutadiene Hydrogen bromide Hydrogen chloride Hydrogen sulfide Hydrocyanic acid Iodine pentafluoride Isovaleric acid Kendalite Magnesium arsenide Martonite Methyl bromide Methyl fluoride Methyl mercaptan Methyl sulfate Molybdenum fluoride Nickel carbonyl Nitrogen peroxide Nitrogen trifluoride Nitrosomethylurethane Oleum (fuming sulfuric acid) Oxygen difluoride Paranitro benzyl chloride

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

223

Perchloromethylmercaptan Phenylbromoacetonitrile Phenyl-carbylamine chloride Phenylimidophosgene Phosphine Phosphorus pentafluoride Polarine oil Selenium mustard Silicon tetrafluoride Strontium chlorate Strontium permanganate Sulfur chloropentafluoride Sulfur dichloride Sulfur hexafluoride Sulfur monochloride Titanium tetrachloride Thicarbonyl-dichloride Thionyl fluoride Thiophosgene Triethyl aluminum Trifluoromethyl iodide Triisobutylaluminum Trimethylaluminum Vanadium tetrachloride Vincennite Vinyl bromide Vinylmagnesium bromide Xenon difluoride Zinc arsenide

17.6.2

Perchlorate

Historical documents also suggest that the following perchlorate explosives and toxic compounds were also developed at the AUES: • • • • • • • •

Ammonium perchlorate Perchlor chloracetophenone Perchloromethyl mercaptan Perchloromethyl carbonate Perchloroethylene Perchloromethyl sulphide (sulfide) Perchloroethyl mercaptan Perchloromethylchloroformate

224

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • Potassium perchlorate • Silver perchlorate • Sodium perchlorate

Perchlorate has been found in the groundwater at worrisome levels. Although perchlorate is not considered the powerful explosive described as “many times dynamite,” it is an explosive. It is a useful explosive because of its even burning rate and it was found useful as the explosive in gas grenades. The fact that the highest levels of perchlorate were found just down-gradient from the 50-gal drums under 4825 Glenbrook Road may suggest a problematic burial. The levels of perchlorate are problematic in Wells 19, 20, and 22. Perchlorates have been found in the ventilation system of an American University building. Specifically, Well 19 had results of 9.8 parts per billion (ppb) and 10.6 ppb, Well 20 had results of 6.3 and 8.32 ppb, and Well 22 had results of 7.8 and 8.92 ppb. These wells are down-gradient from the Slonecker Pit. Up-gradient Well 26 had results of 1.6 and 2.28 ppb and up-gradient Well 27 had results of 2.6 and 3.23 ppb. The sump in the new elevator shaft near Sibley Hospital had over 50 ppb perchlorate. Groundwater wells on Glenbrook Road now have had levels of 60 and 70 ppb. This level significantly raises the likelihood of a perchlorate burial in the vicinity.

17.7

Geophysical Data

The District of Columbia used a Schonstedt GA 72 Cd fluxgate magnetometer and located about 12 anomalies in the area of the Rick Woods Pit. Most appeared to be single ordnance items but three or four resembled clusters of multiple shells. Previously, the District had flagged three such clusters using a Fisher M-Scope. Ironically, the spot that Woods indicated for his pit turned out to be directly uphill from the three previously identified anomalies. The District also reconfirmed these three anomalies using the Schonstedt device and interpreted them as probable multiple shell groups. The anomalies found here differ significantly from most of those previously found by the District north of this area; those were mostly frag from impact areas. Only a few likely represented whole shells, and then individual ones at that. Not one piece of frag or anomaly consistent with a piece of frag was found in the Rick Woods Pit area.

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

225

The District of Columbia surveyed the area of the Glenbrook Road Ground Scar with a Fisher M-Scope Gemini-3 instrument. A large anomaly, at a 45° angle to the road, exists exactly at the ground scar placement by EPIC and Parsons. The anomaly was outlined with blue paint. Other nearby areas were also surveyed by the Corps and three pits containing live ordnance have been discovered. Two pits are within 150 feet of this anomaly. The EPA and the District of Columbia smelled a strong “skunk-like” odor on the south side of Glenbrook Road in the vicinity of this ground scar. As noted elsewhere, butyl mercaptan (the odor of skunk) was produced in large quantities for use as a masking gas. A one-ton cylinder of this substance exploded, giving rise to the term “Skunk Hill.”

17.8 Geologic Data The geology of the Spring Valley neighborhood is very unusual for the East Coast. For example, during one trip to the AUES to conduct a geophysical search for munitions, a District of Columbia inspector noticed a white streak spilling down into a ravine. Thinking it was paint from new housing construction, the inspector climbed down into the ravine to get a better look. The white streak was a pegmatitic dike of quartz, a feature not often seen in this area. It should be remembered that one of the few gold mines on the East Coast existed a little north of the AUES. Four soil types are found at the AUES: Manor-Glenelg, Urban LandManor-Glenelg, Nashimy-Urban Land, and Urban Land-Sassafras-Chillum. Some of these are dense soils that make digging difficult. Also, a micaceous schist predominates at deeper levels. This dense medium prevents ground penetrating radar from being very useful. As a consequence, we do not have another instrument effective in locating bottles of contaminants. Alternatively, most 1919 burials are in the low areas where the digging with shovels was presumably easier. The unique geology may exacerbate the risk of the contaminants already on the site. For example, beryllium—a highly toxic metal—has been found in levels above expected background levels. Nevertheless, there is no known experimentation or use of beryllium at the AUES. Similarly, there are hints that radon may be a problem in the area. One illness in Spring Valley that concerns regulators is lung cancer among nonsmokers; radon is a known cause of this illness.

226

17.8.1

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Hydrogeologic Information

The site is called Spring Valley for good reason. There were and are many springs in the area. This presents a unique exposure pathway because some subsurface contaminants (from intentional burials or under fill dirt) can nevertheless be carried out into surface water. Children here, as everywhere, like to play in the streams. In years past, the children named one area, “the Devil’s Bathtub.” Only a few of us realize just how appropriate that name was. Many of these springs have been channeled into storm sewers. Also, the hilly nature of the site results in much soil erosion that also finds its way into the storm sewers. Once sediment testing is performed in these sewers, it will be relatively easy to trace the contaminants up-gradient. This is likely to narrow down areas of contamination and burial sites. For example, explosives always find their way into the storm sewers. The explosive burial site referenced in the historic document section will probably only be found via this storm sewer sediment testing.

17.9

Residents

The American University campus sits atop the center of the AUES. Some of the original buildings housing the AUES laboratories are still in existence. Of course, large buildings have air-conditioning ducts. Perchlorate had crystallized in one building’s ductwork to a quantity deemed explosive. The building was evacuated while the ducts were removed. It is unknown if this was part of the original and expensive ductwork installed in 1918 or if the perchlorate was from soil gas that had entered at a ground level intake. There are also about 1400 homes within the FUDS boundary and several business properties.

17.10 Other Environmental Receptors Storm sewers, springs, and surface creeks all drain into the Potomac River. As yet, significant sampling has not been performed to assess what if any contaminants are entering the river. The little sampling that has been done indicates a problem. Arsenic has been found in stream sediments and in the ephemeral pools along the river. Perchlorate was found in one storm sewer. Phenol hydrazine has been found in groundwater, which presumably enters the river. Thus, aquatic life is a potential receptor.

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

227

Soil is also contaminated at many places in Spring Valley. At least one dog has developed aplastic anemia. Pet deaths are so frequent that a pet cemetery was established.

17.11 Site Development Infrastructure Information There are 1400 homes, a large university, two drinking water reservoirs, and commercial properties on the original site.

17.12

Anecdotal Information

Many residents and workers have come forward with information about where ordnance was found, illnesses occurred, or other site-related information. In the District of Columbia and most places, witnesses are presumed to speak the truth. Therefore, anecdotal information provides an important set of information. Four 75-mm shells inside the FUDS boundary were found and excavated during the 1993–1994 time frame. They were described as being conventionally fused, as apart from being rigged for static detonation. They were found in a linear progression pointing toward the impact area. A resident of Spring Valley also told the District of Columbia that he found a live fuse in Dalecarlia as a child and that his father called the police, who confirmed that it was live and took it away. The Washington Times of July 29, 2003, also mentioned children finding shells. A resident said children used to hunt for shells along Murdock Mill Road. Another resident said three shells were found during the construction of a wall at 5001, 52nd Street. The finding of a 4.7-in. shell during geophysical clearance of the adjacent property in 2005 substantiates the anecdotal report.

17.12.1

Range Issues

The site contains several ranges. First, the partners—the District of Columbia, the EPA, and the Corps of Engineers—found the Livens battery. This also located the Stokes battery. A small gun pit is located on the plat of buildings.

228

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Next is the description of one ballistic gas test firing. Some 4.7-in. projectiles were fired in a test report written by one of the chemists Clarence West. The shells were filled with chlorpicrin or possibly a mixture of phosgene and chlorpicrin. The report suggests that the test contemplated firing 2000 shells, 1000 75-mm and 1000 4.7- or 4.5-in. projectiles. The shells were fired at 2400 yards from the east edge of the gas plantation. Third, ballistically fired 75-mm shells were found in the Dalecarlia Reservoir property. It is unclear whether or not these are part of the 1000 shells mentioned in the West report. The District of Columbia staff found the area covered with frag and larger single point anomalies suggestive of whole shells. Fourth, the 1922 aerial photograph reveals numerous ground scar clusters compatible with impact areas. Most of these are outside the current FUDS boundary and have not been surveyed. Fifth, the Range and Reservation map has a target identified. This was a point of interest. Last, the anecdotal evidence indicating that children found shells at various places is compatible with aerial photographic evidence and other range information.

17.13

Professional Conjecture

The same physical scenario that traps radon in houses and concentrates it may trap other soil gases such as CWM. A house is basically an upsidedown bucket. Gas enters through gaps in the basement walls and floor and cannot escape because most roofs do not leak. In addition, the small urban lot size results in more impervious surface area (i.e., roads and driveways). This causes a chimney effect, forcing soil gas to migrate sideways until it enters a house through a cinder block or cement block wall. Thus, a house not only gets what comes straight up through cracks in the basement floor but also some of the gas that comes up under nearby roads, driveways and sidewalks. The recent finding of perchlorate at high levels in groundwater and in the ducts in an American University building suggest that some AUES constituents of concern may volatilize. Thus, soil gas entering houses should be considered as an exposure route for some AUES constituents.

17.13.1 Toxic Metals Can Be Transformed into More Toxic Substances Heavy metals like arsenic and antimony may be hydrogenating into highly toxic volatile compounds such as arsine and stibine. Acids at

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

229

several parts per million have been found in the outside air at one AUES location. Acids react with metals like zinc (which exist in the soil in significant concentrations) and free nascent hydrogen. This then can combine with arsenic or antimony. (References omitted here due to their inclusion elsewhere.) The more troublesome problem is the biotransformation of arsenic into arsine gas. Four common soil fungi, two anaerobic bacteria, and algae in surface water can generate a methylated version of arsine. It is unknown whether these same biological processes can convert antimony to stibine.

17.13.2

Other Burial Sites

The conjecture of a former employee of American University witness testimony is bolstered by the finding of a narrow-gauge rail bed in the Dalecarlia area and the discovery by Woods of a pit of shells downhill from the rail bed. A high level of thallium was found on the Reservoir property and on the American University campus. Elevated arsenic has also been detected on the Reservoir property. (References omitted here due to their inclusion elsewhere.) Background data from the MTADS showed numerous anomalies in one of the fill areas. Except for one part performed by the author, the area downhill from the railroad line has not been geophysically surveyed. Three deep anomalies and a dozen single point “shell sized” anomalies were detected in the fraction surveyed by the author. The Cut and Fill map shows several areas of deep fill in the federal property, compatible with the witness’ description. The undeniable fact that a narrow-gauge railroad line existed on the federal property and on the AUES, and the discovery of one burial pit on a hillside adjacent to that railroad, give credence to the witness’ statement.

17.13.3 Burial of Shells by the Civilian Conservation Corps The Mayor’s Office of Constituent Services received a phone call in 1993 from an Ian MacFee indicating that he participated in the burial of 14 pits of mustard gas shells at the AUES while working for the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), presumably in the 1930s. MacFee made this call while he was waiting for an airplane to take him to Aberdeen, Scotland, where he was moving.

230

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

The Corps had found a list of 4300 munitions that were left when the AUES closed. Many of the munitions that have been excavated to date are different than those on the list. Nevertheless, the munitions found by Woods are compatible with those on the list. It is possible that these were moved via the narrow-gauge railway to the Dalecarlia property and stacked. Fifteen years later, CCC laborers became available and the munitions could be buried. The ones that Woods found may have been the bottom of one of those stacks, which settled into the dirt from the weight of those on top.

17.13.4

Slonecker Pit

Barrels (50-gal steel drums) of a white powder have been found end-to-end in a trench under Glenbrook Road. This substance was not sampled but is of sufficient quantity to be the source for the perchlorate. Potassium perchlorate and sodium perchlorate can exist as a white crystalline powder. Ammonium perchlorate is also a crystalline substance.

17.13.5

Dirt from Glenbrook Road

Approximately 70–100 truckloads of contaminated soil were excavated from the Glenbrook Road site, a place where 380 shells and over 20 bottles of Lewisite and mustard were found. The dirt was rejected at the Lorton landfill and then dumped where a metro parking lot was being constructed at Fort Totten. Because the Park Service owned the land, they were able to get the soil removed because of its odor after the bulldozer operator became ill. The Park Service stated that the dirt had old bottles in it. The property adjacent to the Fort Totten parking lot had high levels of arsenic.

17.13.6

Benzo(a)pyrene Hot Spots

The sample at Baker 3 revealed 2800 ppb of benzo(a)pyrene. This has probably been removed with the cleanup of a nearby disposal site. At Baker 5, the level was 170 ppm; it is unclear whether this has been removed. POI 24 had multiple compounds detected in nearly every sample. Its proximity to the Lot 18 excavations suggests the likelihood of buried material. The EPA-recommended remedial goal for benzo(a)pyrene was 0.1 mg/ kg at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida and at the Joliet Arsenal

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

231

in Illinois. A cleanup goal of 0.1 mg/kg was recommended for benzo(a) pyrene based on cancer risk.

17.13.7

Manganese Compounds

The Bureau of Mines monographs list many manganese compounds tested at the AUES (BM 29-104c, 20-031, 24-017, 24-017, 21-102, 10-065, 06-057, 31-018, 15-025, 21-032, 12-052, 16-023, and DR 17-327). Manganese has been detected in high levels during the 1994 sampling at several places. Because only 25 percent of the POIs were tested, more sampling should be performed to try and locate primary manganese testing areas. The monographs should also be examined for location clues such as diagrams. Manganese is a neurotoxin, especially in drinking water. Some of the levels in the soil are considerably above the District of Columbia’s background levels. Too little sampling has been completed to know if this contaminant is widespread as a result of AUES testing.

17.13.8

Selenium Compounds

The Bureau of Mines monographs list many selenium compounds tested at the AUES (BM-25-119u, 25-119v, 21-097f, 20-065g, 21-097b, 27-085j, 20-065f, 26-003, 26-0911, 25-119v, 24-039, 24-022, 21-092, 27-084, 35-046, and 19-083). The large number of compounds and monographs suggest that selenium may be a problematic constituent at Spring Valley. Selenium has been found at POIs 21, 22, 23, and Glenbrook Street. Because only 25 percent of the POIs were tested, more sampling should be completed to try and locate primary selenium testing areas. The monographs should also be examined for location clues such as diagrams.

17.13.9

Mercury Compounds

The Bureau of Mines monographs list mercury compounds tested at the AUES (BM-21-097i and 26-091q). Chemical Warfare Service Procurement Specifications include: mercuric acetate, mercuric bromide, mercuric oxide, and mercurous nitrate. Bancroft lists toxicological testing on: mercury methyl, mercury ethyl, and mercury trichloroethylene. Fulminate of mercury was also a component of fuses and detonators. Ceramic jugs labeled “mercury” were also found. POIs 21, 22, 23, 25, and 53 in the vicinity of the AUES had soil that tested high for mercury contamination. Most of Spring

232

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site

Valley had mercury concentrations less than 1 ppm or undetectable. Some of these POIs are near to detonator or explosive storage areas. POI 25 is a trench, and thereby is a possible burial area.

17.13.10

Antimony Compounds

The Bureau of Mines monographs list many antimony compounds tested at the AUES (BM-32-080, 19-080, and F 0121). Antimony was also a component of fuses. High levels of antimony, up to 44 times background levels, were found at POIs 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 7, 10, and 11. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) also flagged antimony while reviewing the AUES sampling data. Antimony was found to be a contaminant of concern in the Corps of Engineers 1995 Remedial Investigation Report for the Operation Safe Removal. The Army level for antimony, reported with the sampling data, was 0.76 ppm in 1995 as reported in Shacklett and Boerrigan (1984). Weston used 3.12 ppm as the non-carcinogenic antimony value for Spring Valley. Because the antimony has not been speciated, the author does not know exactly which value to use but they all fall within in the 3.1–3.9 ppm range. Estimates of the abundance of antimony in the Earth’s crust range from 0.2 to 0.5 ppm. Antimony and many of its compounds are toxic. Approximately 400 substances were considered for inclusion on the National Priority Index (NPI) reporting list. A ranking and total hazard score was given based on health and environmental hazards and human and environmental exposure to the substance. Antimony and its compounds were ranked as 84 out of 400. The total hazard score, taking into account both human health and environmental criteria, is 2.3. (A score of 3 is very high, and 1 is low.)

17.13.11

Sulfur Compounds

Sulfur compounds, especially mustard, were manufactured and tested in large quantities. Sulfur has not been sampled except for a few random areas, and at those sites, it has been found. It is highly likely that sulfur is a problematic constituent at the AUES. One resident has been noted by his physician to be immune to a sulfur-containing drug prescribed for him. The physician suggested that he must have been exposed to large quantities of sulfur over a period of time to develop such an immunity. (Our Conceptual Site Model next reiterated lists of likely compounds presented earlier in this book and are omitted here.)

17: Conceptual Site Model for the AUES

17.13.12

233

Chemical and Experimental Ordnance

Solid toxics can also be missed when shells are examined using only x-rays. Also, gases like arsine have been missed. Kieselgur is often mistaken for sand. Seemingly empty shells that were found intact should still be analyzed as their contents may have leaked out and left a residual toxin like Lewisite oxide, arsenic, mercury, or thiodiglycol. Many experimental ordnance items could be misdiagnosed by experienced UXO personnel, such as electric mines resembling pipe bombs, exploding tank valves, 1¼-in. pipe burster tubes for Livens drums, and other items. Even milk bottles, which were used in abundance at the AUES for toxic experiments, have been erroneously considered as household glass debris.

18

Summary

18.1 Future Necessary Work at the AUES Site The following list summarizes the necessary work that still remains to be done at the AUES site. • Sample select properties in high probability areas for the AUES chemical list. • Grid sample properties, which had AUES list detects, to locate hot spots or burial areas. This is necessary because the burial sites composed largely of bottles cannot be detected with the metal detectors currently being used for the geophysical survey. • Sample properties adjacent to properties that had AUES list chemical detections. • Conduct geophysical surveys on at least the first three priority tiers of properties and intrusively investigate all unexplained anomalies. This is necessary because there are still 4301 shells missing from the AUES inventory. • Conduct an extensive review of archives at Fort Leonard Wood for documents tabulating the amounts of toxins tested, location of test areas, number of duds, burial intimations, ballistic firing reports, amounts (costs) of chemicals shipped to and amounts manufactured at the AUES, and other information identifying potential sites needing examination. • Conduct a photogrammetric analysis of selected still photographs to determine locations. • Conduct groundwater sampling, particularly near known burial sites. • Geophysically survey the Dalecarlia Reservoir impact and burial areas and excavate all anomalies. • Conduct indoor air sampling at select properties in high probability areas. • Expand boundaries as appropriate and conduct arsenic sampling and geophysical surveys as appropriate on new properties. • Sample areas around chemical sidings at the Dalecarlia Reservoir. • Excavate the contamination at the 52nd Court pit. 235

236

The AUES Formerly Used Defense Site • Reevaluate the work performed on the original 53 points of interest (POIs) to see if it was adequate. Only a small number of these POIs have been sampled to date. • Reevaluate the knowledge of the site and add areas of interest (AOIs) as appropriate. • Excavate the burial pit under Watkins Hall. • Excavate the burial pit under the Public Safety Building.

18.2 Role of the States in Environmental Remediation of Military Sites This short section indicates the legal basis for the proper role states should assume. It is very important for residents and stakeholders, and it may also be helpful for inexperienced state regulators themselves. The Defense Environmental Restoration Program not only authorized the DOD to give money to state and local governments so they could hire people to oversee military site restoration but it also extended CERCLA to the military remediation process. Under CERCLA, states are the lead regulator unless the site is a National Priority List (NPL) site, in which case the EPA has the lead. The EPA states, “According to CERCLA § 120(a)(4) state laws concerning removal and remedial action including state laws regarding enforcement . . . apply at non-NPL Federal Facilities. It appears that sovereign immunity has been waived at such non-NPL sites.” The District of Columbia has included some military munitions (especially the types found in Spring Valley) as solid waste and hazardous waste under DCMR 45, Chapter 4512. The EPA entered into an agreement with the DOD entitled, “Management Principles for Implementing Actions at Closed, Transferring, and Transferred (CTT) Ranges.” In that agreement, the DOD and the EPA state, “In many cases, a state or Indian Tribe will be the lead regulator at a CTT range.” Spring Valley constitutes a transferred range. Finally, the Corps has promulgated Engineering Regulation 200-3-1. The FUDS Manual states that the states are the lead regulator at all nonNPL FUDS.

18.3

Conclusion

The AUES is a very complex site. The primary focus of the investigation under the District of Columbia’s direction was the finding of burial

18: Summary

237

sites containing CWM and explosive or chemical ordnance. As a direct and proximate result of the District’s work, 655 shells (many had already leaked) and 220 bottles containing Lewisite, mustard, bromine compounds, and other chemical warfare agents and precursors have been found. A secondary objective was to find areas of contamination. Approximately 10 percent of the properties have been found to contain elevated levels of arsenic, and about 15 required time-critical removal actions. Most of the 660 acres already identified are probably free of contamination or buried ordnance. Some portions, including new AOIs and many previous POIs, will require more investigation to ensure that there are no more burial or contamination sites present. To reiterate, 4000 shells and a burial containing $800,000 (in 1918 dollars) worth of a powerful new explosive have not been located. To be sure, more effort is needed and killing the messenger may not solve the problem.

Appendix I

Major State Reports on the AUES

1. Final Report on the World War I Poison Gas Production at the American University Experiment Station, DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 1996. 2. The District of Columbia’s Concerns over the Adequacy of the Remediation Efforts at the American University Experiment Station, DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 1997. 3. Selected Documentation on Poison Gas Production at the American University Experiment Station and Range Activities at Camp Leach, DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 1997. 4. The District of Columbia’s Review and Comments on the Final Remedial Investigation Evaluation Report, Operation Safe Removal Formerly Used Defense Site and on the USATHAMA Interim Status Report Camp American University Historical Search, DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, 1998. 5. Evidence Supporting the Potential for Finding Buried Munitions During Excavation at Operable Unit 3 of the American University Experiment Station, DC Environmental Health Administration, 1998. 6. Draft Report on the Proposed Geophysical Search for Ordnance and CWM at Spring Valley, DC Environmental Health Administration, January 2002. 7. Revised Comments on the Corps of Engineers’ Selection of Points of Interest and Boundary Delineation for the Spring Valley DERP/FUDS Site, DC Environmental Health Administration, December 2002. 8. Draft Comments on the Corps of Engineers’ Final Report of Analytical Results Dated May 8, 2002 3819 48th Street; 4710 Quebec Street; 4625 Rockwood Parkway and 4633 Rockwood Parkway, DC Environmental Health Administration, February 2003. 9. Draft Comments on the United States Army Chemical and Biological Defense Agency Analytical Results Operation Safe Removal Spring Valley, DC Environmental Health Administration, May 2003.

239

Appendix II National Archives Record Groups with Military Information • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Records of the Bureau of Ships (Record Group 19) Records of the Bureau of Yards and Docks (Record Group 71) Records of the Bureau of Aeronautics (Record Group 72) Records of the Bureau of Ordnance (Record Group 74) Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers (Record Group 77) Records of the Office of the Quartermaster General (Record Group 92) Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (Record Group 107) Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer (Record Group 111) Records of the Office of the Surgeon General (Army) (Record Group 112) Records of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (Navy) (Record Group 143) Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army) (Record Group 153) Records of the Office of the Chief of Ordnance (Record Group 156) Records of the Office of the Inspector General (Record Group 159) Records of the Chemical Warfare Service (Record Group 175) Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments (Record Group 181) Records of the Army Staff (Record Group 319) Records of the European Theater of War (Record Group 332) Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army (Record Group 335) Records of the Office of the Chief of Transportation (Record Group 336) Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1942–Present (Record Group 338) Records of Headquarters U.S. Air Force (Air Staff) (Record Group 341) Records of U.S. Air Force Commands, Activities, and Organizations (Record Group 342) Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, 1920–1942 (Record Group 394) Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1917–Present (Record Group 407) Records of U.S. Commands in the European, Mediterranean, and Africa-Middle Eastern Theater of Operations (Record Group 492) Records of Allied and U.S. Army Commands, China-Burma-India Theater of Operations (World War II) (Record Group 493) 241

242 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Appendix II

U.S. Army and Army Air Corps Facilities Records of U.S. Theaters of War, World War II Posts, Camps, and Stations Miscellaneous Sites Alaska Department U.S. Army, Alaska Caribbean Defense Command U.S. Army, Caribbean Eastern Defense Command Newfoundland Base Command Bermuda Base Command Iceland Base Command Numbered Service Commands Numbered Armies European Command (EUCOM) U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (AFPOA) U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC) Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC) U.S. Army, Services of Supply (USASOS) U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC) U.S. Army Force, Far East (Australia) (USAFFE 2) U.S. Army Forces, Far East Command (FEC) U.S. Army, Japan U.S. Air Force Facilities and Overseas Bombed Sites U.S. Navy Facilities

Appendix III World War I Range and Ordnance Sites Likely to be Unknown to the Military This 1919 Congressional Report by the War Department covers all property leased during World War I. Many of these leases are unknown today and may not be listed on the FUDS list for the states, or the land may not be within the current boundary for a military reservation listed herein. For example, none of the leases in the EPA Region III states were listed as FUDS. For the purposes of this book, only those properties with clear ties to ordnance, chemical weapons, or ranges are listed here. There are hundreds of other FUDS leases of lesser importance excluded here, such as depots, warehouses, camps, and training grounds. World War I artillery ranges may well have fired some chemical shells so EOD personnel should be cautious. Rifle ranges are included due to the lead hazard. I note that recent reports from Macon, GA indicate that residents in new subdivisions are finding ordnance in their yards. Could some of the leased land identified in this Appendix be involved?

243

Georgia Augusta

Florida Arcadia Miami-Dade Co.

California Los Angeles

Arizona Nogalas

Alabama Camp Sheridan (Montgomery) Montgomery Co.

Location

85.25

30.13

160 80 41.37 195 655 213

80

Tract of Land Tract of Land

4 9.75 3 160 1000

Acreage

Louisville & Nashville & Atlantic Coast RR Board of Commerce Augusta

Wallace Johnson Emma H. Bounnethou Jonathan Wainwright Walter Brown Avocado Land Co. Miami Corporation

John H. Barth

Blas P. Lapez Mrs. J. A. Saxton

Gen. Madison M. Mohr R. L. Blockwell Mamie C. Calloway City of Montgomery

Lessor

Artillery range

Ordnance depot

Target range Aerial gunnery school Aerial gunnery school Aerial gunnery school Aerial gunnery school Aerial gunnery school

L.A. Balloon School

Target range Target range

Gun pits Gun pits Gun pits Gun pits Training grounds

Use

244 Appendix III

70 33 35 25 103.15 116.73 15 84.27 40 9 24.74 15.26

19.3 Land

Kentucky Auxiliary Remount Depot Camp Zachary Taylor (Louisville)

Michigan Alma Battle Creek

Tract of Land

Iowa Des Moines

Macon

40 11,000 1250 506.25 551.2 2229

Frank & Fannie Gould Benjamin & Jerasha Ingrahm Frank & Emma Kent Carl & Gertrude Carlson Henry Bishop R. Henry Hopkins Joseph & Mary Kent Willie & Elnore Hemton John & Martha Miller Frank G. Evans Irving & Mary Farlan Lee & Amanda James

Sarah Heinz National Camp Land Co.

Greater Des Moines Comm.

Board of Commerce Augusta Board of Commerce Augusta Massie & Fulton Lumber M. L. Lelia, Nannie & J. L. Demson Frank S. Holmes Macon Chamber of Commerce

Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land

Artillery range Rifle range

Artillery range

Machine gun range Artillery range Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range Training ground

WWI Sites Likely Unknown to Military 245

T.23 Secs.1–17

Montgomery St. 700 feet

Chemists Building

New Jersey Elizabeth

New Mexico Camp Cody (Deming)

New York Albany Hastings on Hudson

New York City

583 14 86

43.5

Camp Custer (Battle Creek)

North Carolina Mecklenburg Co.

George & Kate Wakefield Thervn & Cora Palmiter Joel & Verioqua Miller Mary Lane & W. E. Hunt Sara C. Holmes Battle Creek Chamber of Commerce

125 52.83 114.5 91.81 61.12 1981

E. D. Latta Susie M. Spurier Kate Nixon

Chemical Engineering & Research Corp.

Security Trust Dock Zinser & Co.

Deming Chamber of Commerce

George & Edith Wetmore

Lessor

Acreage

Location

Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range

(CWS) Storage space (CWS) Mustard oil plant Chemical laboratory

Target range

Ordnance proving ground

Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Additional land Rifle range

Use

246 Appendix III

221 812 2 205 115 184 146 153.25 54 34 191,600 ft2 10

80

Cincinnati

Willoughby

Oklahoma Fort Sill (Lawton)

Ohio Camp Sherman (Chillicothe)

86 100 181

V. Stinchecum for O-Tip-Po-Ly

Chas. P. Moore

Rose Hammond Emma Walsh John T. Gill Georgie H. James Jas. C. Hammond Susan S. West Robt. D. Alexander Mary J. Johnson Wm. Mettler Ellen Krug & Frank Ritter Ellen Krug & Frank Ritter LeBlond Machine Tool Co.

I. A. & Mary Williams T. L. Sellers R. C. & Ada Belk

Target range and School of Fire

Artillery range Artillery range Artillery range Disposal plant Artillery range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Small arms factory (ordnance) Lewisite production facility (quite possibly the most polluted place in America)

Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range

WWI Sites Likely Unknown to Military 247

V. Stinchecum for Ralph ChahTin-Ne-Yach-Que V. Stinchecum for Chiwoony Guy C. Robertson A. M. Reinward H. R. & C. G. Woodman H. C. & Emmet Marxen John & Fannie Jones

10

200 80 40 200 160 T. H. Lewis E. S. Gooch J. M. Haines C. D. & A. Campbell Otto C. Jones

SW ¼ sec. 21 R3

N ½ SW ¼ sec. 7 Tp. 2 N12 W.R.N.

NW ¼ sec. 28 Tp. 3 R11 W.R.N.

N ½ SE ¼ sec.7 Tp. 2 N R12 W.I.N.

80

Lessor

Acreage

N ½ of SW ½ of sec. 8 Tp. 2

Location Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire

Use

248 Appendix III

30 100 53 32 204 174 10 50 225 60 289 11 100 80 25 21 239 85 12.37 106 Unknown

J. D. Koon Sylvania Landia A. O. Martin Edward Howell G. P. Roberts Jas. Wilson Ed. Martin Mary Murray W. E. Goff Lizzie M. Davis Peter Knight W. H. Mills W. W. Evans Jesse D. Cobb J. C. Williams E. R. Neiley W. H. Torrey, Jr. J. D. Louder & Sallie Eutrell C. Barron & W. Caughman C. M. Lide W. H. Terry

John F. Parr

SE ½ NE ¼ sec. 23 Tp.3 N R12 W.I.N.

South Carolina Camp Jackson (Columbia)

Martin B. Schofield

NE ¼ sec. 28 Tp. 3 N R11 W.I.N.

Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range

Target range and School of Fire Target range and School of Fire

WWI Sites Likely Unknown to Military 249

Richland Co.

Center Township Columbia

Location

Lessor John T. Duncan J. Sumpter Moore Mary Brazzell L. P. Brazzell J. C. Townsend Mrs. Ann Thomas H. M. Stork Isaac Solomon Geo. P. Roberts Charles & Martha Patricks A. C. Moore J. N. McCord Dr. F. D. Kendall Thomas S. Davis J. D. Davis Henry Dial S. R. Davis Daisy H. Cooper Austin Brazzell Toni Brauch J. D. Cobb B. T. Davis & D. T. Thomas J. H. Lee Thos. Williams

Acreage

Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 81 32 856 25 204 40 64 158 736 118 53 149 140 44 5 118 105 2 141 112

Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range

Use

250 Appendix III

90 80 100 15 53 51 372 175 25 130 62 107 3 549 105 111 950 37 104 51 50 56 186 6 141 39

Minnie J. Simmons Jamie M. Hammond W. M. Shannon Brice W. Ravonel Sal Solomon Martin R. Shealey Agnes Shannon A. W. Ploeger Charles Martin W. D. Turner M. S. Habinicht M. J. Martin C. R. Brown J. N. Burton I. W. Tucker W. E. Elmore Anna & Charles Freeman Thomas Branch S. S. Hammond W. J. Fee Jannie Aughtry Ellen R. Stokes W. G. Martin C. T. Harrell Eliza Boarwright Drawdey W. E. Conghman

Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range

WWI Sites Likely Unknown to Military 251

Location

Lessor W. E. & L. E. Davis Virginia L. Brazell Cole L. Blease Henry Jacob S. F. Futree Harriet Harly Toby Foote A. C. & E. O. Pass J. W. Blizzard Lydia A. Dempsey R. E. Carwile & J. Cooper Hiram Shannon Cornelia F. Boswell S. T. Wesberry C. L. & W. L. Kelly John Duncan J. B. Blizzard R. A. Davis A. Tally Calvo Clarence Richards J. Daniel Martin O’Dell King Lorick & Lawrence Inc. Wm. Jones

Acreage

343 115 20 94 12 410 241 39 150 50 25 110 101 88 198 25 79 140 421 460 201 50 77 59

Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range

Use

252 Appendix III

Texas Border Camp (Laredo) Eagle Pass

Spartanburg

562 Land East of RR, S of 30th Infantry Camp

135 75 10 15 325 15 60 30 16 172 59 155 150 67 11 10 87 125 226 14,776

Antonio M. Bruin Mrs. H. C. Gilbert

Lou Ella Kava J. E. Atherson H. P. Lee, Jr. H. P. Lee, Jr. Powell Fuel Co. T. A. McAllister Ernest A. Freeman E. B. Marks S. L. Sevan A. Patterson, Jr. George Goodwin John A. Davis, Jr. Eva Edmund Davis A. B. Roff H. D. Roof R. T. Dennis H. H. Dennin Virginia L. Brazzell Mary A. Eleazor Spartanburg Chamber of Commerce Target range Rifle range

Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range Rifle, artillery range

WWI Sites Likely Unknown to Military 253

Marfa, Wagon Co. Panchita

Leon Springs Military Reservation (San Antonio)

Camp Stanley (Boerne) Houston 325 933 946 139.5 670 565 300 106 1753 8200 1490 Section 159 Panchita Ranch

333

Courchesne Quarry 394 389.6 Tract of Land 3.8 81.4

El Paso Ellington Field (Houston)

Camp Fort Bliss (El Paso) Camp MacArthur (Waco)

Acreage

Location

Albert Moore Ed. Bacon Max Toopperwein Putchermick & Sinchau Joe Beckman Otto Scheel Fritz Brown Augusta Ricket Alea Briner Mary Stomers & H. Affleck Mary Neutz T. W. Turner Fred L. Johnston

Houston Chamber of Commerce

A. Courchesne Houston Chamber of Commerce Houston Chamber of Commerce C. Lebanon, H. Broaders & Z. White Mrs. M. A. Gregory Waco Chamber of Commerce

Lessor

Storage for explosives Bombing No. 6 Aerial gunnery school Target range Rifle range Target range Target range Aviation bombing school Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range Target range

Use

254 Appendix III

Washington Vancouver

Rosewood

Fort Myers, Edsall Station Newport News, Elizabeth Co.

Virginia Camp Lee (Petersberg)

Colchester

Vermont

Vancouver Barracks

Cummings Tract Roper Tract Marshal Tract Hiden Tract

50 Munt Farm 1 1 7 633 50 Wolf Tract Jubrey Tract Hamilton Tract Poole Tract

Lots 186 & 192 98

Hugh Mulligan

Jos. & Mary Prohaska Mattie & Andrew Johnson Albert Southall Sallie Cemrek & F. Waynock J. Westmore & Carrie Brown W. Smith & Bessie Barley Eddie Banks & M. Lovett Fannie Armsterm Jas. C. Jubrey Bank of Hampton N. Parker, M. Brown, & W. O. & A. Poole Wm. Barrett John Roper Lumber Co John Marshall P. W. Hiden Lillie I. Kent

Louis Dumas

Target range

Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range Military rifle range

Military rifle range Military rifle range Military rifle range Military rifle range Military rifle range Target range Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range Rifle range

Target range

WWI Sites Likely Unknown to Military 255

Appendix IV U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites The installations on this list may contain buried ordnance or other munitions-related contamination sites not included in the Range Master List (Appendix V). In other words, bases without ranges may still have ordnance. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Westfield—Broken Kettle Tng Site, IA Area I (North) Area II (Northwest) Area III (Central) Area IV (South) East Range Camp Carroll Training Center NG Juneau, AK NG Sitka, AK Stewart River Camp Denali, AK MTA Camp Carroll, AK Haines Pipeline Greely Richardson Gerstle River Test Site Wainwright (Yukon) Coosa River Storage Annex (Anniston) 81st Rsc Hq McClellan TS Walter J Hanna—Birmingham, AL TS Fort Rucker—Ozark MTA Eglin Afb—Ft Walton Beach, AL Cullman NG Spt Fac, AL Fort McClellan Rucker Alabama Aap Anniston Army Depot Phosphate Dev Works Redstone 257

258 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

90th Rsc Hq Robinson, AR Fort Chaffee Maneuver Training Ctr Chaffee Fort Chaffee Pine Bluff Arsenal Camp Navajo Buckeye Tng Site, AZ Casa Grande TS, AZ Douglas Tng Site, AZ Florence Papago Mil Res, AZ Safford Tng Site, AZ Fort Huachuca, Ita. Az Gila Bend, AZ Rittenhouse, Tng Site, AZ Safford TS Navajo Huachuca Yuma PG TS Oakdale Hunter—Liggett Van Nuys Maintenance Shop Parks 63rd Rsc Hq H.F. Radio Receiver, Santa Rosa Delveaga Park, CA Tng Site Fort Irwin, CA Hamilton Afb Tng Site, CA Los Alamitos Armed Forces Res. Ctr. Los Alimitos Tng Site, CA Camp Roberts Ng Oakdale San Diego, CA San Francisco—Ft Cronkite, CA Obispo, CA Tng Site Hunter Ligget Mil Res, CA Tng Site Beale Afb, CA Tng Site Edwards Afb, CA Tng Site Camp Pendelton, CA Tng Site Camp Elliott, CA

Appendix IV

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Tng Site Sloughouse, CA Roberts, CA Oakland Army Base Presidio of Monterey Presidio of Monterey (Fort Ord Ann) Riverbank Army Ammo Plant Sacramento Ad Sierra Army Depot East Fort Baker Fort Hunter Liggett Brac Irwin Presidio of San Francisco Lompoc Branch Disciplinary Barracks Sat Com Hamilton Army Air Field Rio Vista Res Trng Area U.S. Army Operations Fitzsimons Buckley Ang Base, CO Bennett Arng Trng Site Fort Carson Mta, CO Gypsum, CO Colorado Springs, CO Watkin Armory, CO Pueblo Chemical Depot Rocky Mountain Arsenal Carson Pinon Canyon Stones Mil Res, CT Camp Rowland, CT Camp Hartell, CT Bradley Field Arng Bradely, CT Stratford Army Engine Plant Housing Area Ansonia, CT 04 Housing Area Orange, CT 15 Housing Area Fairfield, CT 65 Housing Area East Windsor, CT 08 Housing Area Plainville, CT 67 Housing Area Middletown, CT 48 Family Housing Manchester, CT 25 Family Housing Shelton, CT 74

259

260 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Family Housing Westport, CT 73 Family Housing Portland, CT 36 Family Housing Milford, CT 17 Family Housing New Britain, CT 57 Fort McNair Walter Reed Army Medical Center BBTS Bethany Beach Tng Site, DE William Nelson Armor New Castle De Aviation Supply Facility, 49-A Eglin, FL Avon Park AF Base Blanding, FL Ocala Nga, FL TS H H Buckman (Barge Canal), FL Snake Creek Tng Site, FL Cape St. George Big Coppitt Key MTA NGTC Fort Stewart, GA MTA GA Mil Inst, GA Ft Gordon, GA Catoosa Benning Gordon Fort Gillem Ft McPherson Stewart Hunter Army Airfield Tng Site Ft Juan Muna, GQ Keaukaha Waiawa Gulch Wheeler Afb, HI Ft Ruger, HI Waiawa Gulch TS, HI Aliamanu Military Reservation Fort Derussy Fort kamehameha Fort Shafter Helemano Rad Rec Station Kahukus Kapalama Mil Reservation

Appendix IV

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Kawaihae Military Reservation Kawailoa Kilauea Military Reservation Kipapa Ammo Storage Sites Makua Pahakuloa Schofield Tripler Army Medical Center Waianae Kai Military Reservation Waikakalaua Ammo Storage Tunnels Wheeler Army Airfield Dillingham Kunia Military Reservation Dodge, IA Waverly Ng, IA Waverly Training Site Iowa Aap Fort Des Moines Orchard (Gowen Field) Orchard Mates Boise, ID Orchard Range Tng Site Boise, ID Gooding Tng Site, ID Pocatello TS, ID Kimama Tng Site Rupert, ID Hailey Tng Site, ID Edgemeade Ts Mtn Home, ID Kelly Canyon Tng Site Rigby, ID Weiser, TS, ID Homewood Arng Joliet (TS USA Tng Area), IL Marseilles, IL N. Riverside Maintenance Center Urbana Armory, IL Springfield (TS CP Lincoln) N Riverside (NG Maint Center), IL Charles Melvin Price Spt Ctr Joliet Aap—Kankakee Savanna Depot Act Rock Island Arsenal Housing Area Worth, IL Housing Area Addison, IL

261

262 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Fort Sheridan Camp Atterbury Atterbury, IN Fowler Rg, Tng Site, IN Fort Benjamin Harrison Indiana Aap Jefferson Proving Ground Newport Chem Depot 89th Rsc Hq Ft Riley/Funston Tng Site, KS Ft Leavenworth, KS Smokey Hills Ft Leavenworth Kansas Aap Sunflower Aap Riley Barbourville, KY Frankfort Boone, KY Louisville, KY Fort Knox Armory, KY Maysville, KY Olive Hill, KY Lta Artemus Cave Run Engineer Lta, KY Cave Run Aviation Lta, KY Mta Eastern KY Wets W.H. Ford Regional Tng Ctr Knox Blue Grass Facility-LBAD Lexington Facility-LBAD Blue Grass Army Depot Campbell Fort Polk Tng Site, LA Beauregard, LA Villere Minden (Ammo Plant), LA Minden (Ammo Plant) Mta Beauregard Trngs Military Ocean Terminal, New Orleans Louisiana Aap Polk

Appendix IV

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Peason Ridge Devens 94th Rsc Hq Edwards, MA USPFO/STARC AFRC, MA Westover Afb, MA National Guard Facility, Rehoboth Wayland Ang Armory New Braintree, MA Mta Camp Curtis Guil Soldier Systems Center ARL—Watertown Fort Devens Family Housing Hull, MA 36 Family Housing Nahant, MA 17 Hingham Annex Sudbury Training Annex Springfield, MA Housing Area Burlington, MA 84 Housing Area Wakefield, MA 03 Housing Area Beverly, MA 15 Housing Area Randolph, MA 55 Housing Area Bedford, MA 85 Housing Area Swansea, MA 29 Housing Area Topsfield, MA 05 Fort Holabird Fort George G. Meade Fort Ritchie Gaithersburg Res Facility Phoenix Mil. Res. Housing Area, Croom Fort Detrick Ft Ritchie Raven Rock Site R Lauterick Creek MD Lil Aaron Straus Olney Military Reservation Bg Louis Smith, MD Mta Gunpowder Military Reserva Bg (MD) Randolph Millholland, MD Mta Camp Fretterd Blossom Pt Field Test Facility

263

264 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Aberdeen Pg Adelphi Laboratory Center Auburn ME Camp Keyes Tng Site, ME Bangor Tng Site, ME Frye Mountain Tng Site, ME Bog Brook/Riley Deepwoods Loring Afb Range Complex, ME Saco Armory, ME TS NG Auburn Tng Site Brunswick Nas, ME TS Hollis Plains TS Caswell TS Gardiner TS Plymouth Pontiac Storage Activity Custer, MI Grayling Airfield, MI Newport, MI Alma, MI Fort Custer Training Center Grayling Camp Grayling Army Airfield Detroit Arsenal & Detroit Tank Plt Keweenaw Field Station Tank—Automotive Supt. Act—Selfridge USARC New Prague 88th Rsc Hq Detroit Lakes, MN Ripley, MN New Brighton Tng Site (TCAAP), MN Twin Cities AAP Gateway AAP St. Louis Ordnance Plant Crowder Tng Site Truman Reservoir (Clinton) Macon Camp Crowder Clark Bucksnort Club, MO

Appendix IV

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Raytown Tng Site, MO Jefferson Bks (St Louis), MO Wappapello Weldon Spring, MO Ts Ike Skelton (Jefferson City) Ft Leonard Wood, MO L.Wood Nike Kansas City 30 Lake City AAP St. Louis Army Ammunition Plant Housing Area St. Louis Spt Ctr, MO Shelby McCain Gulfport AVCRAD Hawkins Field, MS Meridian RCTA, MS Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant Harrison Billings, MT Fort William Henry Harrison Ft Missoula, MT Limestone Hills Fort Missoula Butner, NC Fort Bragg Tng Site, NC Ft Fisher Mta, NC Wilmington Oms #17 Ng New Hanover, NC NCMA West, NC Elkin, NC Fayetteville, NC Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point Tarheel Army Missile Plant Bragg Fort Bragg Recreation Ctr #2 Grafton, ND Grand Forks Complex, ND TS Valley Cty (Cp Davis) TS Williston Stanley R. Mickelsen Sc, MISR4, RSLS NG Camp Ashland MTA, NE

265

266 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Hastings, NE NG Mead MTA, NE NG Camp Ashland, NE NG Hastings MTA Lincoln, NE Ogallala, NE Cornhusker AAP Cold Regions Research & Eng Lab Hopkinton Dam Arng Camp Labonte, NH Keene, NH NH NG Training Site, NH Wendell Ford Dix Sea Grit, NJ Tng Site Fort Dix, NJ NJ NGTC Trenton Aviation Armory, NJ Tng Site Wg Night Avn, NJ Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne Fort Monmouth Picatinny Arsenal Fort Dix Brac Camp Pedricktown Camp Kilmer Housing Area Holmdel, NJ Housing Area Old Bridge, NJ Housing Area Livingston, NJ Housing Area Franklin Lakes, NJ Housing Area Clementon, NJ Deming Tng Site, NM Carlsbad Tng Site, NM Rio Rancho Training Site, NM Tng Site Taos, NM Tng Site Tucumcari, NM Tng Site Cannon Afb, NM Tng Site Dona Ana Range, NM Tng Site Camp Luna, NM De Bremond Training Site, NM Rosswell Wets Roswell

Appendix IV

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Camel Tracks Onate Complex Tng Site, NM Tng Site Fort Wingate, NM Fort Wingate Depot Activity White Sands MR Carson City/Ammo, NV TS Nas Fallon Rg B19, NV Clark County Complex, NV Mta Stead Fac, NV Hawthorne Army Depot Fort Tilden USA Bellmore Maint. Facility Fort Hamilton Fort Totten 77th Rsc Hq Farmingdale, NY Smith, NY Rochester CSMS & USPFO Warehouse Youngstown Wets NG Youngstown Wets Guilderland Wets Newark LTA, NY Seneca Army Depot Activity Watervliet Arsenal Drum Housing Area Dryhill, NY Housing Area Manhattan Beach, NY Housing Area Tappan, NY Housing Area Rocky Point, NY Housing Area Spring Valley, NY West Point Stewart Army Sub Post (USMAWP) CP Sherman OH TS-Hawk McConnelsville, OH Rickenbacker (MTA), OH Marion, OH Perry, OH TS-Newton Falls (RAAP) Tarlton Tng Site, OH Lima Army Tank Plant Ravenna AAP

267

268 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Gruber, OK Lexington, OK Kegleman Field Training Site, OK Davis Air Field, OK Whitaker Ed Trng Ctr, OK Sill McAlester AAP Cp Adair (Corvaliis) OR Or. Arng Regional Trng Institute Ashland Armory, OR Central Oregon Rilea, OR High Desert Tng Ctr Or Bend—Cotef, OR Ts Camp Withycombe (Clackamas) Umatilla Depot (Hermiston) Umatilla Chem Depot Hays AAP 99th Rsc Hq Indiantown GAP East Stroudsburg TS Kane TS, PA Lockhaven TS, PA Reading TS, PA West View, PA Fort Mifflin, PA Indiana Range TS Ridgeway TS Scranton TS Leach Range Carlisle Barracks Letterkenny Army Depot Def Distr Reg East Tobyhanna Army Depot Scranton Army Ammunition Plant Fort Indiantown GAP Family Housing Pittsburgh 43 C.E. Kelly Support Facility BRAC Tacony Warehouse Housing Area Irwin PA-36, PA Housing Area Rural Ridge, PA Housing Area Dorseyville PI-03, PA

Appendix IV

U.S. Military Installation List with Some Foreign Sites • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Housing Area Monroeville PI-25, PA Housing Area Herminie PI-37, PA Housing Area Elizabeth PI-42, PA Housing Area Finleyville, PA 52 Housing Area Coraopolis PI-71, PA Housing Area Coraopolis PI-72, PA Manor Launch Site Fort Allen, PR Santiago, PR Fort Buchanan Camp Varnum, RI North Smithfield ARNG CP Fogarty RI Housing Area Davisville, RI Housing Area Smithfield, RI Leesburg, SC Jackson Custer LTA—Bridge Site TS Rosenbaum Tng Site Mitchell TS Mobridge LTA—Bridge Site Parkston Armory Pierre TS RG Platte Mta Camp Rapid Redfield Sioux Falls Sioux Falls—Joe Foss Field Sioux Falls OMS Ft Meade Watertown TS RG Webster Winner Yankton Leesburg Sub Tng Site—Pickens, TN Leesburg Sub TS Fountain Inn, TN Leesburg Sub TS Hodges, TN John Sevier RGE, TN Smyrna Airport, TN Milan Clarks Hill TS, TN

269

270 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

MTA Fort Jackson, TN NAS Memphis, TN Grubbs/Kyle Training Center Tullahoma Winchester, TN Platte, TN Spencer Range, TN Holston AAP Milan Army Ammunition Plant Volunteer AAP Kwajalein Atoll Belvoir Fuels and Lubricant Res Lab USA Houston Armed Forces Center Camp Bullis Fort Sam Houston Canyon Lake Recreation Area Swift Bowie NG Bee Cave, TX Wolters Abilene, TX Bee Caves Armory Camp Swift Military Reservation Musgrave Tx Ft Worth Nr. 1, TX NG North Fort Hood, TX Fort Jacob F. Wolters Palestine, TX Maxey NG Saginaw, TX Tng Site Camp Bullis, TX Austin, Camp Mabry Groom Houston, Old Addicks La Reforma San Antonio Nr. 2, TX Bliss Longhorn AAP Red River Army Depot Lone Star AAP Hood

Appendix IV