Chrysippus' on Affections: Reconstruction and Interpretations (Philosophia Antiqua)

C H R Y S I P P U S ' ON AFFECTIONS

PHILO S Ο PHI A ANTIQUA A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY F O U N D E D BY J. H. W A S Z I N K | AND W.J. VERDENIUSf EDI TED BY

J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

VOLUME XCIV T E U N TIELEMAN

CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS

' '6 8 V

CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS RECONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

BY

T E U N TIELEMAN

' 6 S ^

BRILL LEIDEN · B O S T O N 2003

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tieleman, Teun. C h r y s i p p u s ' O n affections : reconstruction a n d interpretation / by T e u n T i e l e m a n . p. cm. — (Philosophia a n t i q u a , I S S N 0 0 7 9 - 1 6 8 7 ; v. 94) Includes bibliographical references a n d indexes. I S B N 90-04-12998-7 1. Chrysippus, ca. 280-207 or 6 B.C. O n affections. 2. Stoics. 3. E m o t i o n s (Philosophy) I. Title. II. Series. B 5 4 1 . 0 5 3 8 2003 128'.37-dc21 2003040330

ISSN ISBN

0079-1687 90 0 4 12998 7

© Copyright 2003 by Kortinklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Cover illustration: Alje Olthof Cover design: Cédilles/Studio Cursief, Amsterdam All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy itemsfor internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriatefees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. p r i n t e d in t h e

netherlands

TABLE O F C O N T E N T S

Preface Abbreviations — Notice to the Reader

ix xi

General I n t r o d u c t i o n 1. Chrysippus' On Affections a n d How Von Arnim Dealt with It 2. Aims a n d Methods. O t h e r Studies 3. Chrysippus' On the Soul: Looking Back o n an Earlier Study 4. Pathos: A Terminological N o t e

12 15

C h a p t e r O n e PHP books 4 a n d 5: Aims a n d M e t h o d s 1.1. P r e a m b l e 1.2. T h e m e 1.3. O p t i o n s 1.4. Authority Tradition T r u t h 1.5. Galen the C o m m e n t a t o r 1.6. Galen's Working Method: T h e Selection of Texts 1.7. Conclusion

17 17 19 34 39 46 51 58

C h a p t e r Two Doxography 2.1. Galen a n d the Planta 2.2. Ps. Plutarch a n d T h e o d o r e t 2.3. Tertullian 2.4. Ps. Galen 2.5. Nemesius 2.6. Plutarch 2.7. Porphyry 2.8. Conclusion: Galen Again

61 61 65 66 70 72 76 78 80

C h a p t e r T h r e e Chrysippus' On Affections: T h e Theoretical Books (I-II) 3.1. N u m b e r of Books, L e n g t h a n d C o n t e n t s 3.2. Z e n o ' s Definitions of Affection 3.3. T h e Causes of Affection

1 1 4

89 89 94 102

3.4. 3.5. 3.6.

T h e Four Generic Affections Book 2: P r o b l e m s C o n c e r n i n g Affections T h e Origins of Evil

114 122 132

C h a p t e r Four T h e Therapeutics (Book IV) 4.1. Title, Subject-matter, A u d i e n c e 4.2. T h e Medical Analogy 4.3. T h e Roots of Affection 4.4. Regimen 4.5. Emotional O p p o n e n t s 4.6. T u r n i n g O n e ' s Back o n Reason 4.7. Madness a n d Mental Blindness 4.8. T h e Medical Backdrop: Hippocratic a n d O t h e r Writings 4.9. Conclusion

140 140 142 157 162 166 170 178

C h a p t e r Five Posidonian Puzzles 5.1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 5.2. Did Posidonius Speak of Psychic Powers? 5.3. T h e ' A n c i e n t A c c o u n t ' 5.4. C h i l d r e n a n d O t h e r Animals 5.5. Posidonius o n the Causes of Affection 5.6. Intermezzo: Diogenes of Babylon a n d Panaetius 5.7. Posidonius a n d Chrysippus' apcmai 5.8. Cleanthes' Dialogue between Reason a n d A n g e r 5.9. Two F u r t h e r Witnesses: Seneca a n d ps. Plutarch 5.10. Conclusion

198 198 202 206 220 231 242 250 264 277 284

C h a p t e r Six Cicero o n Affections 6.1. Preamble 6.2. Tusculan Disputations Books 3 a n d 4: Overview 6.3. Cicero's logika (4.11-33) 6.4. W h a t d o e s Cicero add? 6.5. Chrysippean Reflections in O t h e r Sections of Book 4 6.6. T h e T h i r d Tusculan 6.7. Conclusion

288 288 290 296 304

General Conclusion

321

190 196

305 309 317

Appendix: Overview of the Evidence

325

Bibliography

327

Index Locorum Potiorum Index N o m i n u m et Rerum

340 345

PREFACE

T h e writing of this b o o k has taken m e l o n g e r t h a n I a n d , I fear, o t h e r s h a d a n t i c i p a t e d . In t h e process I have i n c u r r e d d e b t s of g r a t i t u d e to several institutions a n d persons. T h e f o u n d a t i o n s were laid while I held a research fellowship of the Royal Dutch Academy of Arts a n d Sciences (1993-6) at U t r e c h t University. D u r i n g L e n t T e r m of t h e course 1993-4, I h a d the h o n o u r of working at the Faculty of Classics in C a m b r i d g e University. In C a m b r i d g e I e n j o y e d t h e hospitality of Professor Malcolm Schofield at St J o h n ' s College. A p e r i o d of t e a c h i n g Classics at Lauwers College, B u i t e n p o s t (Friesland) followed, d u r i n g which the work c a m e to an almost c o m p l e t e halt. It was given new i m p e t u s by a sabbatical leave s p e n t at t h e N e t h e r l a n d s Institute f o r A d v a n c e d Study in the H u m a n i t i e s a n d Social Sciences (NIAS) at Wassenaar, t h e N e t h e r l a n d s (2000-1). I want to r e c o r d my g r a t i t u d e to NIAS, t h e Dutch O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Scientific Research (NWO) as well as the Board of Lauwers College f o r facilitating this invaluable p e r i o d of reflection a n d writing. In the years I worked o n this book I also p r o f i t e d f r o m the e x p e r t assistance of Luc d e Vries a n d A m a r e n s H i b m a in the best classical library of the N e t h e r l a n d s , the Buma Bibliotheek in L e e u w a r d e n . An e m b r y o n i c version of C h a p t e r 4 was delivered at t h e IX^™ Colloque Hippoaratique International (Pisa, S e p t e m b e r 1996) a n d subsequently p u b l i s h e d in its p r o c e e d i n g s (= T i e l e m a n 1999, see Bibliog r a p h y ) . S o m e of my ideas on Z e n o of Citium a n d psychological m o n i s m received a preliminary airing at the International Z e n o Conf e r e n c e , L a r n a c a Cyprus 9-11 S e p t e m b e r 1998 (see T i e l e m a n , forthcoming 1 ). An ancestor of C h a p t e r 1 will a p p e a r in the p r o c e e d i n g s of t h e VII Jornadas Internacionales, Estudios actuates sobre textos grìegos: Galeno, composiciôn literarìa y estilo (Madrid, O c t o b r e 1999; see Tielem a n , forthcoming 2). In r e c e n t years I discussed o t h e r aspects of this book b e f o r e a u d i e n c e s in Wassenaar, Leiden a n d Utrecht. T h e past years have n o t always b e e n the easiest, both privately a n d professionally. For the successful o u t c o m e of this project it was essential to have f r i e n d s a n d colleagues a r o u n d who kept their faith in it a n d actively h e l p e d create the circumstances which r e n d e r e d completion possible. A m o n g t h e m , J a a p Mansfeld played a crucial role b o t h

in instigating the project a n d in providing stimuli d u r i n g its gestation. His work and personality provide a model of scholarship which I feel very privileged to have h a d b e f o r e my eyes. I also owe warm thanks to my friend a n d colleague Keimpe Algra for his encouragem e n t and help over the years. It is a real pleasure to be able to work together again at the Utrecht D e p a r t m e n t of Philosophy, to which I am p r o u d to be affiliated. It is difficult to d o justice in a few words to everything my wife Linda H a z e n k a m p has d o n e for me d u r i n g these years while having a d e m a n d i n g j o b of her own a n d sharing with me the care of o u r two sons, Laurens a n d Sebastiaan. T o t h e m this book is dedicated with love. Leeuwarden, 13 May 2002

ABBREVIATIONS

ANRW

W. Haase, H. T e m p o r i n i (eds.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Berlin 1972-

CHHPh

K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge 1999) H. Diels, Doxographi Graeci, Berlin 1976 (=1879) H. Diels, W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols., Berlin I960 1 0

DG DK FHSàfG

W.W. F o r t e n b a u g h - P.M. H u b y - R.W. Sharpies - D. Gutas, T h e o p h r a s t u s of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings a n d Influence, 2 vols., Leiden etc. 1992

LS

A.A. L o n g & D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols., C a m b r i d g e 1987.

LS)

H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart J o n e s , A Greek-English Lexicon, O x f o r d 1968 (=1940 9 ) Galenus, Deplacitis Hippocratis et Piatonis Pauly's Real-Encyclopädie d e r Altertums-Wissenschaft, herausg. von G. Wissowa, Stuttgart 1894 etc. J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 3 vols., Leipzig 1903-5; vol. 4, indexes by M. Adler, Leipzig 1924

PHP RE

SVF

N O T I C E T O T H E READER

W h e n q u o t i n g G r e e k texts, I have u s e d , u n l e s s it is o t h e r w i s e indicated, t h e m o d e r n s t a n d a r d editions: the O x f o r d Classical Texts (OCT) f o r Plato a n d Aristotle, t h e L o e b e d i t i o n s f o r Plutarch a n d Sextus Empiricus a n d the Berlin edition of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca for the G r e e k c o m m e n t a t o r s o n Aristotle. For Diogenes Laertius I have used the T e u b n e r e d i t i o n by Marcovich. For o t h e r a u t h o r s see the editions r e f e r r e d to in the I n d e x l o c o r u m . For Galen I have used t h e editions available in t h e Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (CMG). References to the Deplacitis Hippocratis et Piatonis (PHP) give

xii

ABBREVIATIONS — NOTICE TO T H E READER

book-, c h a p t e r - a n d p a r a g r a p h - n u m b e r s in t h e De Lacy's edition in t h e CMC series (Berlin 1978-84). F u r t h e r I have used t h e T e u b n e r e d i t i o n s of the Scripta Minora by M a r q u a r d t , von Müller a n d Helmreich a n d that of t h e De usu partium by H e l m r e i c h . In all o t h e r cases t h e still i n d i s p e n s a b l e Opera Omnia e d i t i o n by K.G. K ü h n (Κ.) (20 vols. Leipzig 1821-33, repr. Hildesheim 1964-5) has b e e n used. In g e n e r a l t h e n a m e s of a n c i e n t a u t h o r s a n d t h e titles of their works are abbreviated a c c o r d i n g to LSJ a n d the O x f o r d Latin Dictionary. For Galen I use the abbreviations p r o p o s e d by R.J. H a n k i n s o n (1991), A p p e n d i x 2 ( Ά g u i d e to the editions a n d abbreviations of the Galenic c o r p u s ' ) . Most of these are self-explanatory; b u t if n e e d e d s o m e assistance is given by the Index locorum at the e n d of this volume.

GENERAL I N T R O D U C T I O N

1. Chrysippus'On

Affections and Hoiu Von Arnim Dealt ivith It

Chrysippus of Soli (c. '280-204 BCE), the third h e a d of the Stoa, may c o u n t as o n e of the greatest p h i l o s o p h e r s of Graeco-Roman antiquity. His role in t h e history of his school was c o n s i d e r e d pivotal. ' W i t h o u t Chrysippus t h e r e would be n o Stoa', it was said (D.L. 7.183). M o d e r n studies have c o n f i r m e d the a n c i e n t verdict. But his stature stands in m a r k e d contrast to t h e fate s u f f e r e d by his v o l u m i n o u s writings. As the Stoic schools closed down in t h e course of t h e third century CE his works, like those of the o t h e r f o u n d i n g fathers of Stoicism, were n o l o n g e r preserved. 1 Today we study their t h o u g h t o n the basis of q u o t a t i o n s a n d r e p o r t s f r o m a diverse a s s o r t m e n t of later a u t h o r s — very m e a g r e r e m a i n s i n d e e d , involving a c o m p l i c a t e d Rezeptionsgeschichte. A m o n g o u r losses is Chrysippus' On Affections (Περί παθών). For m o r e than t h r e e centuries Stoics a n d o t h e r s t u r n e d to this treatise as the classic s t a t e m e n t of the Stoic d o c t r i n e of t h e affections or e m o tions of t h e soul. 2 Its vogue may have c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e relatively favourable state of o u r evidence. S o m e seventy verbatim q u o t a t i o n s a r e e m b e d d e d in t h e polemical discussion c o n d u c t e d by the philosopher-cum-physician Galen of P e r g a m o n (129-c.213 CE) in books 4 a n d 5 of his great work On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (which I shall r e f e r to as PHP f r o m the initial letters of its Latin title). This material can b e s u p p l e m e n t e d f r o m t h e discussion of the affections o f f e r e d by C i c e r o (106-43 BCE) in b o o k s 3 a n d 4 of his Tusculan Disputations. In addition two intriguing verbatim f r a g m e n t s have b e e n preserved by t h e Christian theologian O r i g e n (c. 185-254 CE) in his Against Celsus (VIII, 51). Witnesses of a less direct n a t u r e , t h o u g h by n o m e a n s i n d i s p e n s a b l e , a r e D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s (c. 200 CE) a n d Stobaeus (early 5th c e n t CE), w h o p r e s e n t or reflect scholastic systématisations of what Chrysippus originally wrote. F u r t h e r , we should n o t e t h e On Moral Virtue by Plutarch (c.45-125 CE), who m o u n t s a 1

This provides j u s t o n e e x a m p l e of t h e loss of large parts of Hellenistic philosophical literature, see the Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (1999) 3 ff. 2 O n the terminology see infra section 4.

well-informed p o l e m i c against Stoic psychology that can be usefully c o m p a r e d with G a l e n ' s PHP. This list may b e a u g m e n t e d , e.g. with Calcidius' Latin c o m m e n t a r y on the Platonic Timaeus (c. 350 CE) as well as o t h e r treatises by Galen. 3 T o t h e u n i n i t i a t e d this may s e e m impressive; b u t in fact o u r evidence is miserably defective. T h e original text of t h e On Affections e n c o m p a s s e d f o u r books, each of which, Galen tells us, was twice the size of a b o o k of his PHP.4 W h a t Galen has p r e s e r v e d may (on a r o u g h estimation) a m o u n t to n o m o r e t h a n 20 p e r c e n t of t h e original text. Substantial sections a r e completely lost. Of o t h e r s we get m e r e glimpses. Even so, the On Affections has fared m u c h b e t t e r than most o t h e r C h r y s i p p e a n works (which n u m b e r e d m o r e t h a n 200, several of t h e m quite long). 5 So when H a n s von Arnim c o m p i l e d his still s t a n d a r d collection of f r a g m e n t s of t h e Early Stoa, h e m a d e an e x c e p t i o n to his t h e m a t i c p r i n c i p l e of a r r a n g e m e n t 6 a n d b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r the material relating to On Affections in o n e separate section {SVF 3.456-490). T h e only o t h e r treatise to receive such privileged t r e a t m e n t was the On the Soul (Περι ψυχής, SVF 2.879-910). From this work G a l e n in PHP bks. 2 a n d 3 f u r n i s h e s so m a n y v e r b a t i m q u o t a t i o n s t h a t V o n A r n i m felt a b l e to r e c o n s t r u c t t h e a l m o s t c o n t i n u o u s text of t h e p a r t thus preserved, viz. m o s t of t h e s e c o n d half of the first b o o k ( o u t of two), w h e r e Chrysippus d e m o n s t r a t e d that the intellect resides in the h e a r t (SVF2.911). 7 C o n t i n u o u s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of o n e or m o r e extensive sections of the On Affections is impossible because of the way the original text has 3

For an overview see I n d e x . I n s o f a r as this b o o k involves t h e p r o c e d u r e of sifting a n d inventorizing the evidence for the On Affections I would like to refer t h e r e a d e r to t h e new edition of Stoic f r a g m e n t s that is in statu nascendi in U t r e c h t . It will include a fresh p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e evidence f o r this treatise in t h e light of the results o b t a i n e d by the research of which this b o o k is t h e written record. 4 PHP 5.6.45, p.336 De Lacy. 5 For the evidence a n d f u r t h e r details see my article on Chrysippus in D J . Zeyl (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Classical Philosophy (Westport C T 1997). 6 This is loosely based on original Stoic divisions of philosophical topics. In view of Chrysippus' s u p p o s e d i n f l u e n c e Von Arnim p r i n t e d explicitly attested Chrysipp e a n material t o g e t h e r with texts taken to r e p o r t ' g e n e r a l Stoic d o c t r i n e ' . In compensation h e provided an Appendix listing sets of verbatim f r a g m e n t s f r o m n a m e d treatises by Chrysippus (SVF3, p p . 194-205). A glance at this a p p e n d i x reveals how widely m a n y of these f r a g m e n t s have c o m e a p a r t in the p r e s e n t collection. In fact, their diversity as to philosophical c o n t e n t was o n e of t h e reasons why Von Arnim o p t e d f o r a t h e m a t i c a r r a n g e m e n t ; see his observations in his ÄE-article 'Chrysippos' (nr. 14), vol. Ill (1899) col. 2505. 7 T h e s e f r a g m e n t s a n d G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t a r e t h e subject of an earlier study, T i e l e m a n (1996a), on which see f u r t h e r infra, section 3.

b e e n e x c e r p t e d a n d p r e s e n t e d by Galen a n d o u r o t h e r sources. Still, t h e s h e e r a m o u n t of textual evidence justifies Von A r n i m ' s decision to devote a separate section of his fragment-collection to this particular treatise. However, t h e c o u r s e taken by Stoic studies since t h e a p p e a r a n c e of his Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (1903-5) seems to have proved him wrong. No separate study has sofar b e e n dedicated to the treatise. Historians of Stoicism have b e e n quick to c o n c l u d e that its r e m a i n s (like t h o s e of o t h e r C h r y s i p p e a n treatises) p r o v i d e t o o m e a g r e a basis for the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of his doctrines, let a l o n e for t h e study of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l , literary or o t h e r aspects of his argum e n t . Von A r n i m may n o t have b e e n over-optimistic in conceiving t h e idea of a separate section f o r t h e On Affections. But t h e way h e actually h a n d l e d t h e m a t e r i a l also c o n t r i b u t e d to the s u b s e q u e n t neglect of the treatise. H e i n c l u d e d several relevant testimonies f r o m Cicero in t h e m a t i c sections elsewhere in SVF, thus m a k i n g the body of evidence look smaller than it is. Following Von A r n i m ' s lead, s t u d e n t s of Stoicism have o n t h e whole a d o p t e d a t h e m a t i c a p p r o a c h with only a few e x c e p t i o n s of little i m p o r t . 8 T h e direct q u o t a t i o n s to be f o u n d in Galen, Plutarch a n d o t h e r a u t h o r s are treated not as a privileged source of i n f o r m a tion b u t as j u s t o n e a m o n g several—a practice reflecting the j u m b l e of sources characteristic of Von A r n i m ' s m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n . 9 In this respect his collection is certainly o p e n to criticism. Most of his c h a p t e r s o p e n with derivative reports, with precious ipsissima verba of C h r y s i p p u s t u c k e d away a m i d later i n f e r i o r m a t e r i a l — a m o d e of presentation calculated to p r o m o t e a distorted picture of the relative value of t h e sources involved. In partial apology it must be said that the S. V.F. necessarily mirrors the state of knowledge of Stoicism at the t i m e of its p u b l i c a t i o n (1903-5). Since t h e n t h e r e have b e e n c o n s i d e r a b l e advances in research which (it is only fair to say) were certainly facilitated a n d stimulated by Von A r n i m ' s collection. And it

8 Bréhier (1951) ch. II p r e s e n t s brief surveys of t h e c o n t e n t s of a n u m b e r of Chrysippean treatises, including On Affections, a n d so does Steinmetz (1994) 586 ff. O n Fillion-Lahille (1984), see infra, pp. 6 f. Much earlier Alfred G e r c k e (1885) assembled a n d discussed f r a g m e n t s f r o m On Providence a n d On Fate. In his preface, t h o u g h , h e criticized Von A r n i m ' s predecessor, F. Baguet, De Chrysippi vita, doctrina et reliquis commentatio (Louvain 1822) f o r having assigned f r a g m e n t s to individual treatises on t h e basis of d o c t r i n a l c o n t e n t a l o n e : G e r c k e (1885) 691. O n t h e h a n d f u l of studies devoted to individual treatises cf. also the bibliography in Flashar (1994) 619 f. 9 See supra, n. 6

is only in t h e past t h r e e o r f o u r d e c a d e s t h a t t h e study of early Stoicism g a i n e d real m o m e n t u m in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e g e n e r a l u p s u r g e of interest in Hellenistic philosophy. T h e v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t s have s u f f e r e d a c o m p a r a t i v e n e g l e c t . T h e r e a r e g o o d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s to r e d r e s s t h e b a l a n c e in favour of this category of textual evidence wherever this seems feasible. I have studied the rich evidence for the On the Soul in an earlier m o n o g r a p h (1996), m o r e o n which see below (section 3). T h e present study aims to d o the same for the On Affections.

2. Aims and Methods. Other Studies In this b o o k the comparatively rich material f r o m a n d relating to the On Affections will be subjected to a closer scrutiny t h a n has sofar b e e n u n d e r t a k e n . This should lead to answers o n the following questions: J u s t how far can t h e treatise b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d ? W h a t d o e s such an inquiry a d d to o u r knowledge of t h e theory of e m o t i o n p r o p o s e d by Chrysippus? W h a t d o e s it tell us a b o u t his relation to his predecessors? And a b o u t his influence o n later developments? In addition, the textual e v i d e n c e may even p e r m i t us to study his p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d . H o w d i d h e d e v e l o p his p o s i t i o n with a n eye o n t h e philosophical c o m p e t i t i o n of his day? In studying these aspects, we may achieve a fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e Stoic p h i l o s o p h y of e m o t i o n a n d its t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t . It is well k n o w n that Chrysippus took t h e b o l d step of identifying e m o tions with j u d g e m e n t s , i.e. m i s t a k e n j u d g e m e n t s o n t h e value of things. Accordingly h e saw e m o t i o n s as t h e d i s t u r b a n c e s of a wholly rational intellect. Scholars o f t e n characterize this c o n c e p t i o n of t h e intellect as ' m o n i s t i c ' (a m o d e r n c o i n a g e ) as o p p o s e d to Platoniccum-Aristotelian dualism with its distinction b e t w e e n rational a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s . T h i s o p p o s i t i o n s e e m s clear e n o u g h ; yet it leaves o p e n i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the precise n a t u r e o f — a n d r a t i o n a l e b e h i n d — t h e Stoic i n n o v a t i o n . It is o f t e n insufficiently realized that the m o n i s m / d u a l i s m polarity is taken f r o m two of o u r m a i n s o u r c e s — G a l e n a n d P l u t a r c h — w h o are n o t historians (or at least n o t in o u r sense) b u t e n g a g e d in a t r e n c h a n t anti-Stoic polemic g o v e r n e d by rules a n d conventions radically d i f f e r e n t f r o m ours. S t u d e n t s of a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y a r e b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y — t h o u g h slowly— sensitive to t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues involved in

c o l l e c t i n g a n d s t u d y i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l f r a g m e n t s . 1 0 O u r existing collections, however c o n v e n i e n t a n d i n d e e d indispensable, p r e s e n t material f r o m sources which d i f f e r widely in date, literary g e n r e , philosophical or religious affiliation, intelligence, reliability a n d so o n . T h e r e is an obvious t e n s i o n l u r k i n g h e r e . W h e r e a s so-called f r a g m e n t s are b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r u n d e r the h e a d i n g of o n e particular d o c t r i n e , they o f t e n serve q u i t e d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s in t h e original expositions f r o m which they have b e e n culled. N o n e of t h e a n c i e n t sources was in the business of historiography in its present-day sense. In c o n s e q u e n c e , we have to take their specific aims a n d p u r p o s e s into a c c o u n t in o r d e r to assess the n a t u r e a n d reliability of their r e p o r t s a n d even quotations. In sum, the c o n t e x t of the so-called f r a g m e n t s c o m e s into play. By ' c o n t e x t ' I d o n o t merely m e a n the i m m e d i a t e context, i.e. the kind of f o r m u l a s sandwiching q u o t a t i o n s in sources like Galen a n d P l u t a r c h which even scissors-happy Von A r n i m includes. C o n t e x t should also be taken in a wider sense, i.e. t h e c o m p l e t e treatise that is used as a source or p e r h a p s even t h e c o m p l e t e oeuvre of the a u t h o r c o n c e r n e d . T h u s we may a c q u a i n t ourselves with the habits of m i n d of these sources a n d the peculiarities of the literary a n d philosophical traditions whose s t a m p they b e a r . " Clearly fragment-collections can be of little use here. But t h e n they n e e d n o t be. T h e i r f u n c t i o n is to provide a sort of data-base, i.e. an overview of the relevant texts a n d sources. We s h o u l d j u s t use t h e m in full awareness of t h e issues involved in working with a n c i e n t sources. Collections such as Von A r n i m ' s SVF o r Edelstein-Kidd's P o s i d o n i u s (to take an arbitrary sample) are the materializations of a host of decisions a n d p r e f e r e n c e s — s o m e of which m i g h t b e idiosyncratic or e p h e m e r a l — w i t h r e g a r d to t h e n a t u r e a n d reliability of t h e sources involved. T h e s e c o l l e c t i o n s o f t e n b e c o m e a u t h o r i t a t i v e — w h i c h may b e g o o d — o r i n d e e d achieve canonical status—which is decidedly d u b i o u s . T h e SVF provides a fine e x a m p l e , as d o e s Diels' Vorsokratiker. Both collections a r e o f t e n used as if they c o n s t i t u t e t h e definitive b o d y of evidence. T h i s t e n d e n c y towards c a n o n i z a t i o n s h o u l d be resisted, however. F r a g m e n t - c o l l e c t i o n s s h o u l d signal a n d g u i d e us toward 10

Cf. e.g. t h e studies assembled by Most (1997), Burkert et al. (1998). I h e r e subscribe to a principle u n d e r l y i n g m u c h of the work of J. Mansfeld a n d D.T. Runia; cf. Schofield, Phronesis 36.2 (1991) 235-9. Kidd (1998) t o o makes valuable observations—supported by e x a m p l e s — on how to study the Stoic material o f f e r e d by Plutarch, a r g u i n g that o n e s h o u l d a c q u a i n t oneself with his habits of m i n d by r e a d i n g his vast oeuvre as a whole (esp. 288 f.). 11

t h e s o u r c e s i n s t e a d of p r o v i d i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r leaving t h e m unopened. But if o u r p u r p o s e is to r e c o n s t r u c t the On Affections by tracing a n d analyzing relevant sources, an obvious q u e r y arises. Does n o t this project involve a r e t u r n to s o m e t h i n g awful called Quellenforschung, or source-criticism? T h e 19th a n d early 20th c e n t u r y variety of this m e t h o d e a r n e d itself a r e p u t a t i o n f o r b a r r e n speculation a n d circular r e a s o n i n g (things c a n n o t have b e e n all that bad: it is precisely to this p h a s e of classical s c h o l a r s h i p that we owe s o m e of t h e f r a g m e n t collections still in u n q u e s t i o n e d use). 1 2 But, I would like to c o u n t e r , it r e m a i n s legitimate a n d feasible to o p e r a t e with t h e c o n c e p t of source or t h e m o r e flexible o n e of tradition provided we steer clear of the pitfalls of Quellenforschung in the a n t i q u a t e d m o d e . 1 3 S o m e of its p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s have now b e e n r e m o v e d o r m o d i f i e d . We n o l o n g e r treat a u t h o r s such as P l u t a r c h a n d C i c e r o as m e r e m o u t h pieces f o r o n e or m o r e lost m o d e l s that are standardly taken as m o r e i m p o r t a n t f r o m a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view. We m a k e full allowa n c e f o r their i n d e p e n d e n c e in the light of their theories a n d practices as philosophical authors. Obviously this r e n d e r s the question of t h e i n f l u e n c e s inspiring t h e m m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d . S o m e consolation may be derived f r o m the r e c o g n i t i o n that t h e results p r o d u c e d by a m o r e sophisticated a n d up-to-date a p p r o a c h rest o n a f i r m e r basis than those p r o d u c e d by the c r u d e r type of source-hunting. T h e question will c o m e to the f o r e especially in c o n n e c t i o n with Cicero who a p p a r e n t l y did n o t draw directly o n Chrysippus' treatise b u t seems to have used an i n t e r m e d i a r y source. Galen could a n d did use the On Affections directly. In his case p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n s arise as to t h e t r a d i t i o n , o r t r a d i t i o n s , o n w h i c h h e d e p e n d s in h a n d l i n g his Chrysippean material. Surprisingly little work has b e e n d o n e o n o u r sources f o r Chrysippus' treatise—despite t h e increasing appraisal of c o n t e x t u a l factors we have j u s t n o t e d . T a k e o u r m a i n source—Galen in PHP4-5. Fillion-

12 For a r e c e n t a c c o u n t of Quellenforschung i n c l u d i n g its s t r e n g t h s a n d limitations, see Mansfeld (1998). 13 Sallmann (1971) 1 ff., 31 ff., 165 ff. makes several excellent observations o n Quellenforschung a n d how an e n l i g h t e n e d f o r m of it should b e practised today. T h e responsible source critic d o e s n o t o p e r a t e on t h e basis of preconceived ideas a b o u t t h e lost s o u r c e so as to avoid circular r e a s o n i n g . Instead h e starts f r o m (1) t h e literary p u r p o s e of t h e a u t h o r of t h e extant work; (2) his working m e t h o d ; (3) his relation to bis source; (4) his c o n c e p t i o n of his subject-matter. All these aspects are adverted to in t h e course of this book.

Lahille (1984) has m a d e some way towards a reconstruction of Chrysippus' treatise t h r o u g h a c o m p a r i s o n between Galen a n d Cicero. She includes s o m e C i c e r o n i a n material unjustifiably o m i t t e d by Von A r n i m . However, she is c o n c e r n e d with the On Affections (as well as Chrysippus' On the Soul a n d P o s i d o n i u s ' On Affections) primarily as source f o r Seneca's On Anger, which constitutes h e r main subject. In c o n s e q u e n c e , the material is p r e s e n t e d b u t n o t studied in a systematic m a n n e r involving G a l e n ' s aims a n d m e t h o d s . 1 4 N o n e t h e less, Fillion-Lahille makes s o m e useful observations on Galen as a source a u t h o r a n d she is rightly suspicious of his story of a dramatic controversy between Chrysippus a n d Posidonius. Yet I have to disagree with some of h e r solutions as to the reconstruction of the On Affections a n d shall indicate the points at issue as the occasion arises. O t h e r scholars too have grown suspicious of Galen's claims. T h u s Gill (1998) argues that Galen takes a r a t h e r one-sided view of Platonic psychology, involving clearly d e m a r c a t e d psychic functions, which may or may n o t co-operate. In the latter case an o u t b u r s t of e m o t i o n e n s u e s . However, Galen s e e m s less sensitive to o t h e r f e a t u r e s of Plato's theory on the emotions. Plato increasingly stressed their cognitive n a t u r e as well as t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between the soul-parts r a t h e r than their separation. In fact, Gill suggests, Plato's t e n d e n c y to conceive of t h e psychic f u n c t i o n s in terms of (often c o m p e t i n g ) sets of beliefs is far m o r e similar to, a n d presumably influenced, Chrysippus' view of e m o t i o n (viz. as a kind of psychological division). 1 5 Galen suppresses this similarity because of t h e obvious fact that h e is conc e r n e d to play off Plato against Chrysippus. Clearly this r e a d i n g would also p u t a d i f f e r e n t c o m p l e x i o n o n Posidonius' role. Insofar as h e is drawing on Plato, h e is merely following Chrysippus' lead. Gill provides stimulating a n d o f t e n plausible suggestions, but, as h e himself acknowledges, o n e would like to have f i r m e r g r o u n d f o r t h e m , especially w h e r e Chrysippus' s u p p o s e d r e a d i n g s of Plato are c o n c e r n e d . 1 6 We n e e d n o t d o u b t that Chrysippus knew a n d used the relevant Platonic works b u t the precise ways in which h e did are m o r e difficult to establish. 1 7 Gill u n d e r t a k e s to study the relations between 14 T h e same holds for Graver (2002) 203 ff., who also notes t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t a n d t h e C h r y s i p p e a n f r a g m e n t s p r e s e n t e d by Galen ( t h o u g h without r e f e r e n c e to Fillion-Lahille). 15 See esp. Gill (1998) 114 f. 16 See esp. Gill (1998) 135. 17 Gill (1998) esp. 135 ff. suggests that Chrysippus did n o t explicitly criticize P1ato(a fact a b o u t which Galen c o m p l a i n s ) because of his d e p e n d e n c e on Plato.

t h e t h e o r i e s of Galen, Chrysippus, Posidonius a n d Plato within the compass of a single article. So, naturally e n o u g h , h e covers only part of t h e relevant evidence. W h a t we n e e d is a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e scrutiny of t h e relevant texts. In particular, we should study Chrysippus' position b o t h in its complete Galenic context a n d in relation to its own c o n t e m p o r a r y b a c k d r o p . In so d o i n g I h o p e to show that we should c o m p a r e Chrysippus n o t only with Plato b u t also with Aristotle a n d medical literature. In the relevant c h a p t e r s of his g r a n d m o n o g r a p h o n the emotions, Sorabji (2000) takes a c c o u n t of G a l e n ' s m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h o u g h n o t u n d e r t a k i n g a systematic t r e a t m e n t of this aspect either. 1 8 Overall, h e leans heavily o n S e n e c a ' s On Anger, a r g u i n g t h a t this a u t h o r reconciles the differences that existed between Zeno, Chrysippus a n d Posidonius—according to Galen. For reasons to be a r g u e d in t h e m a i n b o d y of this b o o k I shall d i s a g r e e with Sorabji o n t h e positions of each of these Stoics. Unlike him, I d o n o t accept Galen's claim that t h e r e was an i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between Chrysippus o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d Z e n o a n d Posidonius o n t h e o t h e r . Accordingly I take a d i f f e r e n t view of Seneca's role as well. T h e Stoic p h i l o s o p h e r Posidonius (c. 135-c.51 BCE) is also a source f o r Chrysippus' treatise, albeit o n e in a special sense. In his own On Affections Posidonius r e s p o n d e d to Chrysippus a n d in d o i n g so quoted f r o m the latter's work. Galen in his turn used Posidonius against Chrysippus, claiming that Posidonius h a d criticized a n d a b a n d o n e d Chrysippus' u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n of the soul in favour of t h e o l d e r Platonic tripartition. Galen backs u p this claim with p a r a p h r a s e s a n d direct q u o t a t i o n s f r o m Posidonius. S o m e of these q u o t a t i o n s contain Chrysippean material as used by Posidonius. So what we have h e r e is Chrysippus in Posidonius in Galen. Clearly we n e e d s o m e certainty as to Posidonius' real motivation in citing Chrysippus. Is Galen right in p r e s e n t i n g Posidonius as a full-blooded dissident? It is a m o o t question w h e t h e r a n d how far this was t h e case a n d (which is a n o t h e r question) what Posidonius himself t h o u g h t h e was doing. T h e most

But this (not c o m p l e t e ) lack of explicitness can be explained by r e f e r e n c e to Chrysippus' c o n c e p t a n d use of dialectic, see T i e l e m a n (1996a) 265. Apart f r o m that, Chrysippus did a r g u e against t h e Platonic tripartition, as is witnessed by his On the Soul, o n which see f u r t h e r infra, p p . 12 ff. O n Gill's view Chrysippus even d r e w inspiration f r o m Plato's a c c o u n t of t h e tripartition-cum-trilocation of t h e soul as e x p o u n d e d in t h e Timaeus, see also Gill (1997) 18 Ch. 6 d o e s f o c u s o n G a l e n ' s r e p o r t , albeit in c o n n e c t i o n with P o s i d o n i u s ' position only.

authoritative collection of P o s i d o n i a n f r a g m e n t s — t h a t of Edelstein a n d Kidd (1972)—goes a l o n g with Galen in this respect, i n c l u d i n g g e n e r o u s c h u n k s of t r e n c h a n t p o l e m i c as based o n P o s i d o n i u s ' critique of Chrysippean psychology—so m u c h so that c o n s i d e r a b l e parts of PHP4-5 would have to be read as paraphrases of this critique. In c o n s e q u e n c e , we c a n n o t d o d g e the question of Posidonius' role. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations b o o k s 3 a n d 4 d o e s n o t p r o v i d e verbatim q u o t a t i o n s b u t a c o m p a r i s o n with Galen shows that several passages in these books reflect, in o n e way or a n o t h e r , Chrysippus' original text. O n e e x t e n d e d section, Tusc. 4.11-33, seems particularly close to the Chrysippean original ( t h o u g h , as we have seen, t h e r e is r o o m f o r d o u b t w h e t h e r Cicero ever saw t h e original text himself). Cicero's testimony is all the m o r e useful for o u r p u r p o s e s since h e is f r e e of t h e polemical c o n c e r n s that i n f o r m G a l e n ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n of the evidence. T h o u g h n o t a Stoic himself Cicero expresses a predilection f o r the Chrysippean theory of e m o t i o n (4.10-11). T o be sure, h e d o e s n o t s u r r e n d e r himself to Chrysippus. But his selections a n d e m p h a s e s may be e x p e c t e d to differ f r o m Galen's in ways that e n a b l e us to s u p p l e m e n t a n d check the latter's assertions. Since Von Arnim a n d his g e n e r a t i o n t h e r e have b e e n m a r k e d advances in o u r knowledge of Cicero's o u t l o o k a n d p r o c e d u r e s . It was an article by Boya n c é (1936) which m a r k e d the e n d of old-fashioned (Quellenforschung as a p p l i e d to Cicero. 1 9 However, s u b s e q u e n t study of Cicero as a p h i l o s o p h e r in his own right has c o n c e n t r a t e d on o t h e r works a n d o t h e r books of t h e Tusculans. For the third a n d f o u r t h books of this treatise we still have to turn to studies as old as Pohlenz (1906) a n d Philippson (1932), whose main o c c u p a t i o n was to c o m b a t even m o r e enthusiastic source-hunters. T h e lack of r e c e n t work stands in awkward contrast to Cicero's i m p o r t a n c e b o t h as a source a n d a philosop h e r in his own right. 2 0 W h a t we n e e d are m o r e studies c o n c e n t r a t ing o n the interaction between this a u t h o r a n d his Stoic material, j u s t as in Galen's case. Although I set out to c o n c e n t r a t e on Galen a n d in 19 Boyancé was by n o m e a n s t h e First to criticize t h e excesses of traditional Quellenforschung. T h e criticism levelled at so-called Pan-Posidonianism by such scholars a s J . F . Dobson, R.M. J o n e s a n d L. Edelstein a r o u n d t h e same time also h e r a l d e d a new era. 20 Graver (2002) provides a new translation of t h e two b o o k s with a comm e n t a r y a n d a p p e n d i x e s d e a l i n g with t h e sources f o r Cicero's a c c o u n t i n c l u d i n g Chrysippus a n d Posidonius. T h e main c o n c e n t r a t i o n of this book, however, is on t h e translation. T h e concise discussion of possible sources necessarily r e m a i n s at the surface of t h e questions to be solved. Obviously, Graver is m o r e c o n c e r n e d with Cicero's aims a n d m e t h o d s than with reconstructing Chrysippus' On Affections.

t h e p r e s e n t b o o k still d o , I c o u l d n o t b u t e n g a g e m o r e fully with C i c e r o t h a n I h a d initially a n t i c i p a t e d . I h o p e to have d o n e j u s t e n o u g h to be able to p r e s e n t a few r e s p o n s i b l e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t how to assess the evidence provided by Cicero in relation to Galen. T h e r e is n o shortage of historical studies c o n c e r n e d with e m o t i o n — a situation which reflects t h e lasting fascination e x e r t e d by this subject o n p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d psychologists alike. N o r has t h e Stoic theory g o n e u n n o t i c e d . My justification f o r a d d i n g a m o n o g r a p h will have e m e r g e d f r o m the p r e c e d i n g pages. It is largely methodological: n o t only d o e s this b o o k deal with astonishingly u n d e r u s e d material b u t it also takes an a p p r o a c h that differs f r o m that taken by o t h e r studies b u t that is n e e d e d f o r a fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics originally m e a n t to a r g u e . Because this is a p r o j e c t of historical r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , I have k e p t r e f e r e n c e s to e m o tion t h e o r i e s by c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h e r s to t h e b a r e s t minim u m — w h a t e v e r g e n e r a l i n s p i r a t i o n I may have drawn f r o m t h e m while working o n the intricacies of a n c i e n t texts. 21 O n e should n o t try to d o too many d i f f e r e n t things within t h e compass of a single book. My p u r p o s e is t h e m o r e down-to-earth o n e of p r o v i d i n g a f i r m e r f o u n d a t i o n f o r c o n c l u s i o n s o n t h e Stoic t h e o r y a n d its historical d e v e l o p m e n t . In this r e s p e c t it can be seen as p r e l i m i n a r y to any comparison between this theory a n d c u r r e n t ideas a n d debates. T h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e p r e s e n t study reflects my p u r p o s e of u n d e r taking a systematic a n d contextual a p p r o a c h to the material f r o m t h e On Affections, ' c o n t e x t u a l ' b e i n g taken in b o t h t h e wider a n d n a r r o wer sense I have e x p l a i n e d above. I shall take my p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e aims a n d m e t h o d d e t e r m i n i n g G a l e n ' s overall a r g u m e n t in PHP b o o k s 4-5 ( c h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2). In t h e light of this discussion I shall take a closer look at t h e material deriving f r o m the On Affections in its m o r e i m m e d i a t e Galenic context. H e r e b o t h lesser sources f o r On Affections (such as O r i g e n ) a n d Stoic texts will be called u p o n to elucidate Chrysippus' m e a n i n g ( c h a p t e r s 3 a n d 4). N e x t I shall address Posidonius' p r e s e n c e in PHP 4-5 ( c h a p t e r 5). T h e final c h a p t e r is c o n c e r n e d with Cicero, f o r the reasons a n d with the disclaimers I have j u s t expressed ( c h a p t e r 6). I shall c o n c l u d e with an Epilogue in which I a s s e m b l e t h e c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m t h e individual c h a p t e r s ,

21

T h e c o n c e r n with c o n t e m p o r a r y topics is m o r e p r o m i n e n t in Sorabji (2000). N u s s b a u m (1994) too is strongly motivated by t h e relevance of Hellenistic philosophical therapy f o r us h e r e a n d now.

drawing an overall picture of the position of Chrysippus a n d the other Stoics concerned. This book takes the form of an extensive a r g u m e n t in support of a few related theses. For the convenience of the reader I had better lay my cards on the table b e f o r e e m b a r k i n g on it. I shall argue that Galen misrepresents the relations between the philosophers whom h e discusses in i m p o r t a n t respects. Moreover, his main points of criticism against Chrysippus involve gross distortions of the latter's position. Exactly how and to what extent this is the case can only be established by taking full account of the aims and m e t h o d s of Galen as a philosophical a u t h o r a n d polemicist of the second century CE. T h e picture that emerges f r o m this inquiry is o n e of basic harmony f r o m Zeno u p to and including Posidonius. This continuity contrasts sharply with Galen's t h e m e of disagreement. In fact, it also corrects o u r own expectation that shifts and divergences will have occurred in the course of t i m e — d e v e l o p m e n t s i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h to justify periodisations such as the distinction between Early a n d Middle Stoicism. In reality the Stoics r e m a i n e d within the basic framework left by their f o u n d e r , Zeno, each of t h e m c o n t r i b u t i n g to the mainstream Stoic position. Of special i m p o r t a n c e was Chrysippus, who grafted his conception of affection firmly on to his causal theory. T h e r e is an important physical basis underlying his theory, which has been largely suppressed by Galen (at least in PHP 4-5) as well as by Cicero. Yet it remains possible to clarify this aspect by means of the evidence supplied by these sources malgré eux and by taking account of the medical backdrop to the Chrysippean theory. Posidonius was not the dissident portrayed by Galen. Posidonius' r e f e r e n c e to Plato in his discussion of the ' a n c i e n t a c c o u n t ' (ό π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος) should not be taken to imply that h e r e p u d i a t e d Chrysippean monism in favour of the Platonic tripartition. Rather he a p p r o p r i a t e d Plato a n d o t h e r s as f o r e r u n n e r s of the mainstream Stoic position. But his role was not very significant from a philosophical point of view. H e merely contributed a few doctrinal refinements and technical terms. From a historiographical perspective, however, the extensive use m a d e by Galen of Posidonius' treatise is quite valuable. T h e evidence thus transmitted sheds welcome light on some of the distinctive features and motives of the Stoic 'monistic' position. Thus, Cleanthes' versified dialogue between Reason a n d Anger as q u o t e d by Posidonius attests to the way the Stoics r e s p o n d e d to the faculty approach to the soul of their adversaries.

3. Chrysippus' O n the Soul: Looking Back on an Earlier Study This v o l u m e is designed as a sequel to my Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the De Placitis Books //-/// (1996). In what follows I will s u m m a r i z e t h e m a i n c o n c l u s i o n s of this earlier m o n o g r a p h because they h e l p explain s o m e of t h e q u e s t i o n s raised h e r e as well as my m e t h o d of d e a l i n g with t h e m . But t h e results p r e s e n t e d in 1996 a r e n o t used in such a way as to m a k e t h e argum e n t of this volume vitally d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e m . In t h e first t h r e e books of PHP (of which t h e first is largely lost) Galen d e f e n d s his scientifically u p d a t e d version of the Platonic (and, h e claims, H i p p o c r a t i c ) trilocation of the soul: reason in the brain, a n g e r in t h e h e a r t a n d desire in the liver. His o p p o n e n t s are the Peripatetics a n d most Stoics, w h o assign all these f u n c t i o n s to the heart. As in the later books, a distinctive f e a t u r e of Galen's t r e a t m e n t is his insertion in his a r g u m e n t of substantial q u o t a t i o n s f r o m the principal a u t h o r i t i e s of these schools—Aristotle a n d Chrysippus. T h u s , as we have noticed in section 1, h e pillages the relevant part of the latter's On the Soul. T h e s e q u o t a t i o n s serve as p r o o f - t e x t s s u b s t a n t i a t i n g G a l e n ' s criticisms of t h e Stoic ( a n d Aristotelian) position a n d t h e a r g u m e n t s s u p p o r t i n g it. His t r e a t m e n t is n o t exclusively o r even primarily polemical, however. Galen presses Chrysippus' words into t h e service of a dialectical p r o c e d u r e a i m e d at arriving at positive results. T h u s h e also d r u m s u p scientific p r o c e d u r e s such as dissection a n d vivisection e x p e r i m e n t s . 2 2 By these m e a n s h e succeeds in showing t h e s t r u c t u r e a n d workings of the nervous system including t h e central role played by t h e brain. O t h e r a r g u m e n t s which a p p e a l to t h e a u t o m a t i s m of t h e h e a r t - b e a t or physical effects r e l a t e d to e m o t i o n s s u c h as f e a r a n d e r o t i c d e s i r e (which h a d also b e e n a d d u c e d by Chrysippus) are taken to p o i n t to t h e location of t h e Platonic spirited part in t h e heart. I also m a d e a foray into PHP b o o k 6, which b e l o n g s with this a r g u m e n t . H e r e Galen advances a n a t o m i cal insights to d e m o n s t r a t e that the liver is the seat of the principle of growth a n d n o u r i s h m e n t a n d h e n c e of the Platonic third part of the soul, i.e. appetite. This c o m p l e t e s his vindication of the tripartitioncum-trilocation of t h e soul.

22

In T i e l e m a n (1996a) I showed how t h e e x p e r i m e n t s fit i n t o t h e whole of Galens d e m o n s t r a t i o n . For a discussion that focuses on these e p o c h a l e x p e r i m e n t s themselves see T i e l e m a n (2002).

Galen's project involves a massive e f f o r t of r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the original positions of Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s . Plato did n o t assign appetite to the liver. More problematically still, ' H i p p o c r a t e s ' did n o t a n t i c i p a t e t h e Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation of t h e soul. Yet this is what Galen sets o u t to show, c o r r o b o r a t i n g his claims by m e a n s of q u o t a t i o n s , j u s t as h e d i d in r e g a r d to o p p o n e n t s s u c h as Chrysippus. But this time we a r e in a position to c h e c k G a l e n ' s q u o t a t i o n s a n d claims against t h e e x t a n t works of the a u t h o r i t i e s c o n c e r n e d . Galen's m e t h o d in PHP 1-2, it has t u r n e d out, involves a large d e g r e e of distortion of what his predecessors h a d said. T h e i r words a r e mercilessly e x p l o i t e d in s u p p o r t of p r e c o n c e i v e d theses a n d options. Obviously Galen in PHP 1-3 a n d 6 e x p o u n d s a c o h e r e n t a n d powerful d e m o n s t r a t i o n based o n philosophy a n d empirical science. But w h e r e does this leave Chrysippus? Why did h e c h o o s e to i g n o r e t h e discovery of the nervous system by the great Alexandrian scientists H e r o p h i l u s a n d Erasistratus (first half of the third cent, B C E ) ? A n d what a b o u t his naive (or so it seems) a p p e a l to c o m m o n parlance, p o p u l a r n o t i o n s a n d the poets? J u d g i n g f r o m Galen's a c c o u n t this type of a r g u m e n t m u s t have taken u p t h e m a j o r p a r t of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . O u r j u b i l a t i o n o n t h e large quantity of preserved text is immediately d a m p e n e d by o u r d i s a p p o i n t m e n t at the a p p a r e n t i n e p t i t u d e of Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e . An assessment based u p o n uncritical a c c e p t a n c e of Galen's argum e n t is h a r d to s q u a r e with Chrysippus' r e p u t e d a c u m e n . I n d e e d , the above picture is superficial a n d anachronistic. In o r d e r to explain how a n d why this is so, I took a contextual a p p r o a c h akin to the o n e p u r s u e d in the p r e s e n t study. I f o u n d that Galen follows a traditional p r o c e d u r e of d e f i n i t i o n - c u m - d i a e r e s i s as it h a d t a k e n s h a p e in c o n t e m p o r a r y Platonism (so-called 'Middle P l a t o n i s m ' ) . His version of this p r o c e d u r e is f u r t h e r e n r i c h e d by t e c h n i q u e s b e l o n g i n g to the exegetical tradition c o n c e r n e d with t h e Aristotelian Topics. T h e s e historical affiliations could be established t h r o u g h a c o m p a r i s o n of his theoretical passages a n d actual p r o c e d u r e with a wide r a n g e of sources i n c l u d i n g Cicero, Alcinous, C l e m e n t a n d Boethius. O n e of the most salient features of Galen's m e t h o d is a s h a r p differentiation between real attributes of t h e thing u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n (such as t h e h e a r t or the brain) a n d the beliefs of experts (philosophers, scientists a n d even poets) as well as p e o p l e in general, i.e. the whole r a n g e of w h a t Aristotle h a d r e f e r r e d to as endoxa ( έ ν δ ο ξ α ) , i.e. received or

r e p u t a b l e o p i n i o n s that are suited as the starting points f o r dialectical disputation. Galen, however, declares this type of e x p e r i e n c e to b e r h e t o r i c a l a n d f o r e i g n to scientific a n d dialectical p r o c e d u r e . This position motivates his dismissal of large parts of Chrysippus' argum e n t as b e l o n g i n g to this category. T h i s is to i g n o r e t h e fact t h a t C h r y s i p p u s took r e f e r e n c e s to c o m m o n n o t i o n s a n d p o p u l a r parlance as his point of departure a n d to attack t h e m as if they r e p r e s e n t e d the definitive conclusions of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . But in fact, they c o n s t i t u t e d t h e raw c o n c e p t u a l m a t e r i a l f r o m which t h e g r e a t s c h o l a r c h d e v e l o p e d p r o o f s of a m o r e t e c h n i c a l k i n d , i n c l u d i n g scientific insights. If o n e takes d u e a c c o u n t of t h e level a n d spread of anatomical knowledge at the time, Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e a p p e a r s in a completely d i f f e r e n t light. I p r o p o s e d a reconstruction of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t which differs in certain respects f r o m that o f f e r e d by Von Arnim. It shows Chrysippus d e v e l o p i n g a few a r g u m e n t s in a s e q u e n c e of fields of r e f e r e n c e m a r k e d by an increasing level of c o n c e p t u a l articulation: c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e , poetical statements, science a n d philosophy. T h e integrative c o n c e p t of t h e whole p r o c e d u r e is that of t h e plausible or persuasive (τό πιθανόν). Its role in Hellenistic dialectic e m e r g e s f r o m a comparison between Chrysippus and Carneades. Here, then, the recovery of t h e original c o n t e x t d o e s m u c h to explain Chrysippus' p r o c e d u r e , f o r instance his sophisticated a n d powerful attack o n the Platonic separation of psychic parts. B e h i n d Galen's m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s lies n o t so m u c h a blatant lack of professional morality b u t a set of entirely d i f f e r e n t conventions of d e a l i n g with o t h e r p e o p l e ' s words in written philosophical disputation. A central role is played by t h e s c h e m a of options. Authorities a n d their p r o n o u n c e m e n t s (i.e. the quotes) are so to speak plugged into t h e pre-existing schema. We f o r o u r p a r t would use a n d e x p e c t of o t h e r s t h e reverse p r o c e d u r e : first study t h e literature a n d n e x t c o n d e n s e your findings into a s c h e m a . T h u s G a l e n ' s p r o c e d u r e cuts across o u r own habits a n d expectations. If we are n o t sensitive to this fact we r u n a serious risk of b e i n g f o o l e d i n t o believing w h a t h e tells us a b o u t t h e s e v e r b a t i m f r a g m e n t s which h e has so kindly preserved.

4. Pathos: A Terminological Noté13 At least since t h e days of Plato a n d Aristotle t h e t e r m πάθος could i n d i c a t e e m o t i o n as a g e n e r i c c o n c e p t covering c o m m o n m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a such as a n g e r , fear, distress, j o y a n d t h e like. 2 4 It is clearly what Chrysippus is talking a b o u t . ' E m o t i o n ' is t h e r e f o r e used by Sorabji. 2 5 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e r e n d e r i n g ' p a s s i o n ' is m o r e firmly e n t r e n c h e d in the Western philosophical tradition. It is used by e x p e r t s o n Stoicism s u c h as I n w o o d (1985) a n d Long-Sedley (1987). In present-day English, however, this t e r m usually bears the specific sense of very strong e m o t i o n , in particular (sexual) desire. As a very s t r o n g f e e l i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g , it m i g h t seem particularly a p p r o p r i a t e to t h e Stoic ideal of t h e extirpation of all π α θ ή on t h e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e Stoics c a n n o t have m e a n t to e r a d i c a t e all feelings. As an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d o c t r i n e c o n c e r n e d , this is contentious. T h e p r o t r a c t e d controversy between the Stoics a n d their P e r i p a t e t i c o p p o n e n t s (who a d v o c a t e d m o d e r a t i o n of e m o t i o n ) would boil down to a q u e s t i o n of terminology. 2 6 So if 'passion' is a d o p t e d as a translation, n o such c o n n o t a t i o n s h o u l d be taken f o r granted. 'Passion' is derived f r o m Latin passio, which, like the Greek πάθος, c o n n o t e s passivity. 27 Yet the m o d e r n t e r m retains this c o n n o t a t i o n only f o r those w h o a r e sensitive to its etymology. N u s s b a u m uses ' s u f f e r i n g ' ( t h o u g h with special r e f e r e n c e to Epicurus) 2 8 . But this is to overemphasize the e l e m e n t of passivity to the exclusion of others. T o limit ourselves to the Stoics, it would o b f u s c a t e the active aspect involved in the technical Stoic definition of πάθος, viz. as a particular kind of conation, or impulse (ορμή). Moreover, the Stoics class πάθη as morally wrong. It s h o u l d however be said that with r e f e r e n c e to

23

O n t h e translation of πάθος see also Inwood (1985) 127 ff., Vegetti (1995), Nussbaum (1994) 13, 102, 319 n.4 . 24 See PI. Phaedr. 265b, Tim. 86b; Arist. EN B.5. 1105b21-23, De an. A . l . 403a2-18, Rh. 1418a12, Pol 1287b; cf. also Demoer. Β 31 DK. 25 See esp. Sorabji (2000) 7, 17; likewise, t h o u g h with some hesitation, A n n a s (1992) 103 f., 114n.77. 26 O n this question see Frede (1986) 84; Dillon (1983); Sorabji (2000) 206 ff. 27 For this reason by A q u i n a s p r e f e r r e d ' p a s s i o n ' (i.e. Latin passio), see ST IaIIae.22.2. It s h o u l d be n o t e d that A q u i n a s ' view of passion (or e m o t i o n ) as a passive potency is m o d e l l e d on Aristotle's a c c o u n t of t h o u g h t r a t h e r than that of e m o t i o n . In fact Aristotle, like the Stoics, recognized both active a n d passive aspects of e m o t i o n , see De an. A 1: 403a5-8. 28 Nussbaum (1994) 13, 102.

Stoicism Nussbaum uses, more or less interchangeably, 'emotion' and 'passion'. 2 9 T h e r e n d e r i n g 'affection'—preferred by Frede (1986) and others —may not be so fashionable as ' e m o t i o n ' but this can be turned into an advantage. It preserves the aspect of passivity. But it also does justice to that other c o m m o n m e a n i n g of the Greek word πάθος, viz. disease or illness. 30 As will transpire in the course of my a r g u m e n t , it is this sense that conditions Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t in important ways, as when h e exploits it in drawing his detailed analogy between philosophy and medicine (ch. 4). So with some hesitation a n d with the other possible renderings in mind, I shall mostly use 'affection' as p e r h a p s best suited to preserve the d i f f e r e n t shades of m e a n i n g of πάθος in its Stoic usage.

29

Cf. N u s s b a u m (1994) p.319 n.4. O n this sense cf. Pl. Ti. 86b a n d t h e translator's n o t e issued by Cic. Tusc. 4.5, who himself p r e f e r s ' d i s t u r b a n c e ' (perturbatio) to 'disease' (morbus); cf. also ibid. 3.7, Fin. 3.35. See f u r t h e r , with special r e f e r e n c e to t h e Corpus Hippocraticum, Vegetti (1995). 30

CHAPTER O N E

GALEN, PHP 4-5: AIMS AND M E T H O D S

1. Preamble Galen's insistence o n empirical verifiability m a d e h i m disinclined to p r o n o u n c e o n a n u m b e r of issues which divided t h e p h i l o s o p h i cal schools of antiquity. 1 Until n o t quite so l o n g ago, this a t t i t u d e legitimated his exclusion f r o m the p a n t h e o n of philosophy. Historians of a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h y r e a d h i m mainly as a s o u r c e f o r t h e d o c t r i n e s of o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s h e h a p p e n s to speak a b o u t . Meanwhile n o t i o n s of w h a t p h i l o s o p h y is, o r s h o u l d be, have s h i f t e d , trailing along o u r perspective o n o u r philosophical pedigree. Today, ironically, it is precisely G a l e n ' s scientific c o n c e r n s which boost his a p p e a l for historians of philosophy. It has b e c o m e possible to welc o m e him as a e x c e p t i o n to the metaphysicists crowding t h e philosophical scene of his day. This re-appraisal is to be a p p l a u d e d , n o t least because h e was taken seriously as a p h i l o s o p h e r in his own day a n d beyond. In fact, o u r earliest e x t a n t testimonies—a m e r e h a n d f u l — c o n c e r n his i n f l u e n c e in r e g a r d to p h i l o s o p h i c a l n o t m e d i c a l matters. 2 A fuller u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Galen's position, his purposes, habits of m i n d , priorities a n d b l i n d spots h e l p s to explain his r e s p o n s e to Chrysippus a n d the o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o m h e quotes or refers to. O n this a s s u m p t i o n I shall u n d e r t a k e to p r e s e n t in t h e following pages an a c c o u n t of his a r g u m e n t in PHP books 4 a n d 5. Obviously e n o u g h , t h e r e are several ways of discussing the ideas a n d a r g u m e n t s of Galen (or any o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r ) . O n e could, for instance, analyse the logical structure of his a r g u m e n t s m o r e or less in isolation. This is n o t the line taken h e r e . I shall a t t e m p t to study Galen as m u c h as possible against t h e b a c k d r o p of his p h i l o s o p h i c a l , m e d i c a l a n d

1 O n this peculiarity of G a l e n ' s b r a n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l eclecticism, see t h e p i o n e e r i n g study by Frede (1981). T h e s e speculative questions include that of t h e substance of t h e soul a n d the n a t u r e of God. 2 See t h e testimonies a d d u c e d a n d discussed by N u t t o n (1984) 316 ff. Cf. also T e m k i n (1973) 51 ff., Frede (1981) 66.

literary environment. T h e motivation b e h i n d this strategy is simple but, I believe, appropriate and rewarding. When we identify the various literary a n d philosophical influences present in Galen's argument, we put ourselves in a better position also to isolate what is peculiar to him. So to which traditions was he indebted? What does this mean for his representation of the positions of Stoics such as Chrysippus and Posidonius? O r those ascribed by him to Plato and Aristotle? I h o p e to show that we would grossly oversimplify the actual situation if we were to picture Galen as conversing directly with a few past masters—however hard he himself may try to have it seem that way. T o be sure, he had read several of their original works. But o n e should never u n d e r e s t i m a t e the role of traditional ways of reading classical authors which had developed in the schools in the course of c e n t u r i e s a n d which may h e l p explain certain peculiarities of exegesis. O n e first came to such an a u t h o r u n d e r the guidance of a t e a c h e r a n d with prior knowledge of their t h o u g h t derived f r o m traditional h a n d b o o k s a n d compilations—a fact of life (in Dillon's apt words) which is often overlooked. 3 T h e universality of Galen's interests and c o m p e t e n c e is well known. In practical terms, it means that we have to take account of a variety of literary a n d intellectual traditions as possible influences on his work. In the following section I shall explore several of them in the h o p e of d o i n g justice to those viewpoints that seem relevant to his treatment of the Stoics. I shall first set Galen's subject-matter in its historical context, starting from the way he himself has defined and o r d e r e d the questions he tackles (§ 2). In addition, it is worth studying the way in which Galen presents the options at issue in the debate (§ 3). As an extension of this aspect, I shall continue to discuss relevant ideas on authority, tradition a n d truth (§ 4). Next, I will move on to some aspects of a m o r e technical and practical nature: the procedures c u r r e n t in the c o m m e n t a r y tradition a n d Galen's own relation to this tradition (§ 5) as well as the working m e t h o d of ancient authors like Galen, notably the technique of excerpting (§ 6). Finally I shall present a few general observations about the relevance to PHP 4-5 of the genres and techniques surveyed in the main body of this chapter (§ 7).

3

Dillon (1977) xv.

2. Theme PHP books 1-6 were the fruit of Galen's t u m u l t u o u s first stay in R o m e (162-166 CE).4 His c o n c e r n with philosophical issues in these books suited the c a m p a i g n of self-advertisement h e h a d m o u n t e d . C o m p e t e n c e as a p h i l o s o p h e r would e n h a n c e his s t a n d i n g as a doctor. O n a n o t h e r , less m u n d a n e level, h e was keen to d e m o n s t r a t e the relevance of medical t h e o r e m s to questions that h a d traditionally divided t h e p h i l o s o p h e r s . T h u s t h e a n a t o m i c a l e x p e r i m e n t s r e p o r t e d in books 1-3 are designed as a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the long-standing d e b a t e c o n d u c t e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s over t h e seat of t h e intellect a n d everything implicated by it. 5 But t h e r e is m o r e to Galen's b l e n d of philosophy a n d m e d i c i n e than the o p p o r t u n i t y for occasional cross-fertilisation, however topical or i m p o r t a n t the issues c o n c e r n e d . T h e r e is a distinctly p r o g r a m m a t i c side to PHP i n s o f a r as it p r o m u l g a t e s a unitary p r o j e c t of s o u n d medicine-cum-philosophy, with Plato a n d Hippocrates as its fountain-heads. 6 Medicine is so r e d e f i n e d by Galen as to a b s o r b those traditional parts of philosophy which h e takes as useful f o r scientific a n d m o r a l progress." This includes ethics a n d what we m i g h t call moral psychology. T o this last field b e l o n g PHP 4 a n d 5, dealing with the affections of t h e soul. 8 Of the n i n e books of t h e work these a r e p e r h a p s t h e least m e d i c a l in its c o n v e n t i o n a l sense. 9

4

Books 7-9 were c o m p l e t e d after 176 CE. See Ilberg (1889) esp. 217 f. 228 f., De Lacy (1978) 46-8. 5 O n t h e significance of these e x p e r i m e n t s cf. Lloyd (1979) 167; Mansfeld (1991) 128, 131; T i e l e m a n (2002). O n G a l e n ' s public p e r f o r m a n c e s of these a n d o t h e r e x p e r i m e n t s see D e b r u (1995); cf. also Von Staden (1995a). 6 Of course philosophy a n d m e d i c i n e had always to some extent overlapped, as is witnessed, a m o n g others, by Plato in his TimaeuY, see f u r t h e r infra, p. 39 n. 77. 7 See in particular his m a n i f e s t o That the Best Doctor Is Also a Philosopher, I 53-63 K. (= SM II, pp. 1-8 Müller), in which h e argues that the ideal d o c t o r has a t h o r o u g h c o m m a n d of t h e t h r e e traditional parts of p h i l o s o p h y (logic, physics, ethics). O n G a l e n ' s view of t h e n a t u r e a n d mission of m e d i c i n e see f u r t h e r Isnardi P a r e n t e (1961); Vegetti (1981), (1986). 8 Many treatises on moral philosophy listed at Libr. prop, c.12, XIX pp. 45 f. K. (SM II pp.121-122 Müller). Most relevant to t h e subject-matter of PHP A a n d 5 a r e the twin essays A f f . Dign. a n d Pecc. Dign. (V 1-57; 58-103 K., CMC V 4,1,1 De Boer) as well as t h e On Moral Dispositions (Περί ηθών, f o u r b o o k s ) , e x t a n t in an Arabic e p i t o m e only (transi, by Mattock 1972); cf. Walzer (1962). 9 But cf. 5.2.10, w h e r e Galen draws o n his medical expertise in o r d e r to correct Chrysippus a n d even Posidonius on their use of the m e t a p h o r of disease to explain psychic affections.

W h i c h q u e s t i o n s can t h e r e a d e r e x p e c t G a l e n to tackle? T h e c e n t r a l issue can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: Do a f f e c t i o n s causally involve o n e or m o r e non-rational functions? O r are affections purely cognitive, b e i n g perverted states of the wholly rational intellect? T h e field was d o m i n a t e d by t h e o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e Platonic-cumAristotelian tradition, which p o s t u l a t e d non-rational faculties alongside reason, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d Stoicism, which d e n i e d t h e presence of such faculties in the h u m a n intellect, o n the o t h e r . This was t h e t r a d i t i o n a l issue t h e n u m b e r of t h e faculties of t h e soul. It features in d o x o g r a p h i c compilations such as the Aëtian Plaâta, IV 4 (§ 5 is c o n c e r n e d with t h e r e l a t e d issue of t h e seat of t h e m i n d discussed in PHP 1-3 a n d 6 ) 1 0 as well as t h e De anima literature. 1 1 Separate tracts were devoted to the question, e.g. Plutarch's On Moral Virtue, which, like PHP 4-5, is d e s i g n e d as an attack o n t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of the unitary intellect. A later t h o u g h i m p o r t a n t witness to this traditional d e b a t e is Porphyry's essay On the Powers of the Soul, of which a h a n d f u l of f r a g m e n t s have b e e n preserved. 1 2 In fact, Galen too wrote a m o n o g r a p h in t h r e e b o o k s (now lost) e n t i t l e d On the Parts and Powers of the Soul, which in his c o n s p e c t u s On My Own Books is listed u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g 'Treatises p e r t a i n i n g to Plato's philosophy'. 1 3 At PHP 9.9.42 h e refers to t h e same tract, using t h e variant title On the Forms [or: Parts] of the Soul (Περί των της ψυχής ειδών). 1 4 H e r e , G a l e n tells us, h e p r o c e e d e d 'in a c c o r d a n c e with P l a t o ' s inquiry'—which must primarily r e f e r to Republic 4, f r o m which Galen quotes substantial passages in PHP 5.7. PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5 can b e r e a d as a m o r e or less self-contained c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e traditional issue of t h e n u m b e r of psychic faculties. But they are n o t completely u n r e l a t e d to t h e rest of the work. It

10

I shall deal with the relevant passages from the doxographic traditions separately below Ch. 2. 11 The issue can be traced back to Aristotle, see esp. De an. A 1.402bl-3: σκεπτέον δε καί εί μεριστή ή άμερής , καί πότερον ομοειδής ίίπασα ψυχή ή οΰ · ει δε μή ομοειδής, πότερον ε'ίδει ή γένει. cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3087 and further infra, p. 22. 12 See Frs. 251-255 Smith; on this treatise cf. also Beutler (1953) 289; Dörrie (1959) 158 n . l . On the position taken by Porphyry (232/3-c.305 CE) in the debate as compared with Galen's, see further infra, pp. 78 ff. 13 Lib. Prop. 13, SM II p. 122.14 f. Müller; cf. Ilberg (1897) 595 ff. 14 That is, if one accepts the plausible addition of (ibid. p.608.8) proposed by Einarson and De Lacy; see De Lacy ad loc. At Foet. Form. IV pp. 701-2 K. Galen refers twice to this tract in a context similar to our section, viz. PHP9.9.6 ff.. On its contents see esp. 9.45-46.

may t h e r e f o r e b e worth c o n s i d e r i n g briefly t h e i r place within t h e overall f r a m e w o r k of PHP. Due to t h e loss of a large p a r t of b o o k 1, we d o n o t possess Galen's initial s t a t e m e n t of his p u r p o s e in writing PHP.15 But in the e x t a n t books h e declares a few times that h e a i m e d to e x a m i n e the principal d o c t r i n e s of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato with a view to proving their truth a n d basic a g r e e m e n t . " ' Which doctrines of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato h e has singled o u t for t r e a t m e n t first is stated in t h e following passage, which a p p e a r s to b e r e p e a t e d f r o m t h e preface to the whole work in the lost b e g i n n i n g of Bk. 1 (2.1.1 = Test. Bk. 1, f o u r t h text) : H a v i n g p r o p o s e d to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e d o c t i n e s o f H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato, I b e g a n with t h e d o c t r i n e that is first in i m p o r t a n c e , f r o m w h i c h I s h o w e d that very nearly all particular details follow; 1 7 this is their d o c t r i n e a b o u t t h e p o w e r s ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ω ν ) that g o v e r n us, their n u m b e r , the nature of e a c h , a n d the place that e a c h o c c u p i e s in the animal (τα περί των διοικουσών η μ ά ς δ υ ν ά μ ε ω ν ό π ό σ α ι τέ είσι τόν άριθμον ο π ο ί α τέ τις ε κ ά σ τ η καί τ ό π ο ν ο ν τ ι ν ' έν τω ζωω κατείληφεν).18

It is easy to recognize h e r e an e c h o of t h e Aristotelian categories of quantity, quality a n d place. But it is m o r e a c c u r a t e to say that t h e types of q u e s t i o n listed by Galen b e l o n g with t h e rhetorical-cumdialectical c o n c e p t of the 'theoretical q u e s t i o n ' or thesis (θέσις, Latin quaestio), which a r o s e u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of Aristotle's work in p a r t i c u l a r . 1 9 Aristotle h a d d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e s e question-types in theoretical contexts 2 0 a n d applied t h e m in a r g u m e n t . This is how h e i n t r o d u c e s his own m o n o g r a p h on the soul: W e s e e k to study a n d u n d e r s t a n d its [seil, t h e s o u l ' s ) n a t u r e a n d b e i n g a n d t h e n its a c c i d e n t s (On the Soul A 1.402a7 f.).

15

Of Book 1 we possess only the closing sections, which on De Lacy's estimation a m o u n t to about o n e third of the original whole, which must have been rather long; see De Lacy (1978-84) vol. 1, 12-13. 16 O n the harmonization of Plato and Hippocrates as Galen's t h e m e see 6.8.76, 9.1.1 = Book 1, Test. I a, b (p.64.6-14 De Lacy); the t h e m e of the accuracy of their doctrines is made explicit at 5.6.40-41, which should be a d d e d to the two testimonies for book 1 printed by De Lacy; cf. also De Lacy (1978 etc.) vol. 1, 48. 17 I.e. ethical subjects such as the e m o t i o n s and the virtues addressed in PHP 4 and 5; cf. supra, n. 19. 18 Similarly 3.1.1 (= Test. II, second text). 19 Its role in dialectic as well as its relation to the Placita literature has b e e n studied by Mansfeld (1990b), esp. 3193 ff. For their use as items on the check-lists of Cicero, Lucretius and Sextus see Mansfeld (1990b) 3125 ff, 3149 ff, 3161 f. 20 See esp. APost. Β 1.89b24-35; Rhet. Γ 16.1416b20-l; cf. Alex. Aphr. In Top. p. 63.13-9.

T h e soul's existence is taken for g r a n t e d ; its definition (i.e. its being) a n d accidents are discussed f r o m A 2 onwards. W h a t we have h e r e is Aristotle's celebrated distinction between categories, i.e. b e i n g ('subs t a n c e ' ) a n d t h e so-called accidental categories. C o m p a r e also t h e following passage: Perhaps it is first necessary to determine in which of the genera it [seil, the soul] belongs, and what it is. I mean whether it is a particular thing (τόδε τι), i.e. a substance (ουσία), or a quality (ποιόν) or quantity (ποσόν) or belongs to any other of the distinguished categories (διαιρεθεισών κατηγοριών), and furthermore, whether it has potential or actual existence. 21 For this makes no small difference. And also we must inquire whether it has parts or not and whether each soul is of the same kind or not; and if not of the same kind, whether the difference is one of species or genus... (On the Soul A 1.402a23-b3; cf. ibid. 402b10-403a3). Galen d o e s n o t ask in which particular category the soul belongs. O n the o t h e r h a n d Aristotle d o e s anticipate the question w h e t h e r or n o t t h e soul has p a r t s (cf. On the Soul Γ 9 ) . Since this q u e s t i o n h a d b e c o m e traditional well b e f o r e Galen, we n e e d n o t assume that h e a r r a n g e d his material in t h e light of Aristotelian passages such as these ( a l t h o u g h h e will have k n o w n t h e m ) . R a t h e r these passages were used in a systematized f o r m in t h e schools as a check-list of q u e s t i o n s a n d o p t i o n s of t h e k i n d k n o w n f r o m various sources. C o m p a r e also the way in which his y o u n g e r c o n t e m p o r a r y A l e x a n d e r of Aphrodisias (flor. ca. 200 CE) o p e n s his On the Soul: Our theme is to discuss the soul belonging to the body in growth and decay: what is its being (substance) and which are its powers and how many, and what is their difference from each other (p. 1.2-3 Bruns). 22 H e r e we have b e i n g / quality / quantity again. A l e x a n d e r omits t h e question of place but h e discusses this question after the questions h e d o e s list h e r e (94.7-100.17 Br.). In g e n e r a l , these later a u t h o r s stuck to this list of question-types far m o r e systematically t h a n Aristotle himself h a d ever d o n e . T h e i r a g e n d a broadly c o n f o r m s to the division a n d o r d e r i n g of issues in t h e so-called Placita tradition, which 21

This particular problem is not addressed by Galen. ή μεν πρόθεσις ήμίν περί ψυχής ειπείν τής (του) έν γενέσει τε καί φθορά σώματος, τίς τέ έσχιν αυτής ή ουσία και τίνες αί δυνάμεις καί πόσαι, καί τις αυτών ή προς άλλήλας διαφορά. In addition see Cic. Tusc. 1.60 (quoted infra, n. 25); ps. Alex. Mantissa, p. 101, 1 f. as well as the section headed "Οτι πλείους ai τής ψυχής δυνάμεις καί ού μία (ibid. pp. 118.5-119.20 Br.); Porphyry ap. Stob. Ecl.phys. I p.353.2, 353.13, 14 W. (= Fr. 253 Sm.). For their use as items on the check-lists of Cicero, Lucretius and Sextus see Mansfeld (1990b) 3125 ff., 3149 ff., 3161 f. 22

since Diels has b e e n associated with the n a m e of Aëtius in particular. T h u s the division into c h a p t e r s of the relevant section of t h e f o u r t h b o o k of the reconstructed Aëtian Planta runs: IV, 2-3 (substance of the soul); IV, 4 (its parts); IV, 5 (location of regent part); IV, 6 + 8-13 (various functions: sense-perception, imagination, thought, speech). 23 T h e Placita tradition provides f u r t h e r p o i n t s of c o n t a c t with PHP A a n d 5, especially w h e r e t h e a u t h o r i t i e s are c o n c e r n e d (see c h a p t e r 2). But for the m o m e n t it may suffice to n o t e the questions at issue. Of these t h e ' h o w many?' a n d 'of what kind?' are clearly o n t h e a g e n d a in PHP books 4 a n d 5, which are c o n c e r n e d with the n u m b e r a n d n a t u r e of the soul's parts, while the 'where?' is discussed in books 1-3 a n d 6. T h e question of being, by contrast, does seem to provide a p o i n t of d i f f e r e n c e between Galen a n d b o t h the Placita a n d De anima traditions. It is conspicuously absent f r o m his a g e n d a as cited above. But in practice Galen d o e s n o t , i n d e e d c a n n o t , avoid the aspect of ' b e i n g ' in every sense of the term. First, t h e r e is the preliminary issue of b e i n g in the sense of existence, i.e. w h e t h e r t h e r e is such a thing as a soul. For Galen, in line with the large majority of a n c i e n t a u t h o r s , takes t h e soul's existence as evident f r o m t h e body's m o t i o n s a n d processes. Since in o t h e r s works h e is explicit o n this point, h e may have m a d e it in the lost o p e n i n g of PHP 1 as well. 24 Of g r e a t e r i m p o r t a n c e is t h e q u e s t i o n of b e i n g in the sense of substance: if t h e soul exists, is it e i t h e r i n c o r p o r e a l or c o r p o r e a l ? If

23

What a p p e a r s to be roughly t h e same s e q u e n c e h a d already b e e n followed by Chrysippus in his On the Soul: (1) its substance; (2) t h e n u m b e r of its parts; (3) its r e g e n t part a n d its f u n c t i o n s , see ibid. Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP3AA6 (SVF 2.885) with Mansfeld (1990b) 3168 ff., T i e l e m a n (1996) 134 ff., 154 ff. D i o d e s Magnes ap. D.L. 7.50 (SVF II 55). In the long passage cited at PHPÌ. 10-15 (SVF II 885) Chrysippus in fact draws on t h e Placita tradition, see Mansfeld (1990b) 3168 ff. T h e fixed o r d e r of subject relating to t h e soul may have b e e n part of t h e traditional o r d e r i n g of physical subjects in general; for some a t t e m p t s at reconstruction see f u r t h e r Festugière (1945), Mansfeld (1971) 130 f., Giusta (1986) 149-70, but t h e issue n e e d s f u r t h e r study. 24 Cf. Propr. Plac. 14.1 N u t t o n , w h e r e Galen a p p e a r s to b e looking back to t h e PHP in particular. Similarly Atticus, a Platonist a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y of Galen, ap. Eus. ΡΕ XV 9.10-11 (= Fr. 7 Des Places, 11.51-64); ps. Alex. Mantissa p . 1 0 1 . 3 4 Br. Sextus, M. VIII 155 is n o d o u b t using a stock e x a m p l e w h e n h e calls bodily m o t i o n an 'indicative sign' (τό ένδεικτικόν σημεΐον) of soul, i.e. a sign which signifies s o m e t h i n g directly a n d out of its own n a t u r e .

corporeal, of what substance? T h e omission of this equally traditional question has a d i f f e r e n t , m o r e peculiarly Galenic b a c k g r o u n d . It is o n e of those e t e r n a l q u e s t i o n s which Galen c o n s i d e r e d insoluble in default of empirical evidence a n d so chose n o t to p r o n o u n c e u p o n . 2 5 Yet it is i m p o r t a n t to realize that the positions h e takes o n related issues b r i n g h i m close to o n e particular o p t i o n in this debate, viz. the Aristotelian c o n c e p t i o n of t h e soul as the f o r m of t h e body (On the Soul B . l ) . 2 6 This is because h e t e n d s to link the c o n c e p t of t h e soul's parts o r f o r m s with their b e i n g situated in separate bodily organs. 2 7 I n d e e d , h e a p p r o a c h e s t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e location of t h e psychic f u n c t i o n s by i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e f u n c t i o n of the organs p r o p o s e d , i d e n t i f y i n g f u n c t i o n with b e i n g or essence a n d invoking Aristotle (e.g. PHP 1.8.7 ff.). From h e r e it seems b u t a small step to identify the parts (or ' f o r m s ' , ε'ιδη) of t h e soul with the f o r m s of the organs. 2 8 In PHP h e n e v e r m a k e s this last step, however. In spite of c e r t a i n passages w h e r e h e s e e m s to c o m e close, h e has n o t yet a c c e p t e d reductionism in the h y l o m o r p h i c m o d e (see 9.9.7-9). 29 In fact, he still considers c o r p o r e a l i s m an o p t i o n in view of t h e s u p p o s e d existence of psychic πνεύμα. At 3.8.32, f o r e x a m p l e , h e associates intelligence

25

See PHP 9.9.7-9; Hipp. Epid. p. 271.5 ff. Wenkebach-Pfaff; Foet. Form. IV pp. 699-702 K, Prop. plac. 13.7, 15.2, pp. 108.11-110.3, 116.20-118.10 N u t t o n . Likewise Cicero, Tusc 1.60 opts f o r suspension of j u d g e m e n t as to t h e soul's s u b s t a n c e — t h o u g h h e p r e f e r s t b e view that it is divine a n d u n c o r p o r e a l in view of its power of m e m o r y : si quid sit, non vides, at qu a I e sit vides; si ne id quidem, at quantum sit profecto vides. H e r e we have t h e same s e q u e n c e substance—quality —quantity as in the parallel passages. For o u r p u r p o s e s it d o e s n o t m a t t e r that Cicero h e r e uses t h e 'how many?' question with r e f e r e n c e to the soul's powers of memory. 26 This of c o u r s e left o p e n m a n y questions, notably what this m e a n t f o r t h e h e a r t as an individual o r g a n which Aristotle h a d elsewhere described as central to t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of t h e w h o l e o r g a n i s m , e.g. PA Γ 4 a n d luv. 3-4. T h e later d o x o g r a p h i c tradition seems to have entailed an increasing c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n o n e o r m o r e organs as o p p o s e d to t h e body as a whole. 27 T h e linking as such can be paralleled f r o m Alcin. Did. 24, p. 176 H. so was n o longer an exclusively Peripatetic move. 2 ® See PHP5.7.50, 6.2.5; cf. In Tim. pp.11.25-30, 12.15-18 S c h r ö d e r . 29 For this we have to t u r n to t h e treatise of his old age, The Powers of the Mind Follow the Temperaments of the Body, w h e r e h e assigns great weight to t h e d e p e n d e n c e of m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a on bodily factors such as d r u g s a n d alcohol. In this light h e actually submits that t h e parts of t h e soul a r e t h e f o r m s (είδη) of the organs, i.e. t h e m i x t u r e (κράσις) of t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities o r c o r p o r e a l elements, QAM c.3, IV p p . 774 ff., 782 ff. K. = S M II p p . ' 3 7 - 8 , 44-8 Müller. Cf. D o n i n i (1974) 134 ff., M o r a u x (1984) 774ff. This is m e a n t to qualify t h e view—held by Peripatetics like A n d r o n i c u s of R h o d e s a n d A l e x a n d e r of A p b r o d i s i a s — t h a t t h e soul is t h e power (δύναμις) supervening on t h e bodily m i x t u r e . See Alex. De an. pp.2.25-11.13, ibid. 24.15-26.30. Cf. M o r a u x (1984) 784 f.

with the psychic πνεύμα in the middle ventricle of the brain. 3 0 His promise (ibid. 29) to provide a fuller physiological account is fulfilled only partially in book 7 (3.19-36). H e r e h e reports certain experimental observations: an animal only looses consciousness when o n e lets its psychic πνεύμα escape by incising the ventricles of its brain. Moreover, the same animal regains sensation a n d motion when the ventricles have been closed up. In the light of these observations he prefers to call the psychic πνεύμα not the soul's substance n o r its dwelling but, with an Aristotelian touch, its 'first instrument'. 3 1 In sum, in PHP the question of the soul's substance, though surfacing here and there, remains undecided (esp. ibid. 21). But if we think we can understand why Galen skips the issue of the soul's substance, it is less easy to see why he includes the discussion of the n u m b e r of faculties after having discussed their location in books 1-3 (though not the Platonic appetitive part, which he discusses in book 6)—a discussion which also involves their differentiation. This c a n n o t merely have been a matter of working o n e ' s way t h r o u g h a traditional check-list. Galen subscribes to Posidonius' view that a p r o p e r understanding of the cause of the affections may also teach us how to conceive of the virtues, or moral excellences; and knowledge of the cause of the affections in turn d e p e n d s on that of the powers of the soul (e.g. 5.5.36-6.4). 32 T h u s on m o r e than o n e occasion we find him wavering between p r o l o n g i n g the discussion of the trilocation and addressing the t h e m e of virtue (e.g. 3.1.6). T h e subject of virtue is a n n o u n c e d for book 6 (5.7.73; 6.1, 7.11) but taken u p only in book 7 (1.9-2.17). 3 3 H e r e , in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y polemical section, he summarily explains the virtues in terms of the Platonic 30 This point comes up in the context of an allegorical interpretation of a myth, viz. Hesiod's account of the birth of the goddess Athena f r o m Zeus' head. Galen's interpretation is m e a n t to c o u n t e r the reading proposed by Chrysippus in support of the cardiocentric position (quoted 8.3-19 = SVF2.908). 31 See esp. MA c. 10 (on role of the σύμφυτον πνεΰμα); cf. De an. Γ 433b18 ff., Cael. Δ 301b20 ff. 32 But the point is made elsewhere as well, see e.g. Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel. I 369.12-13 W., Plut. Virt. Mor. 441C-D. For Posidonius cf. Kidd (1971) 202 f. 33 Galen tells us that lack of space keeps him f r o m refuting, in the wake of Posidonius, what Chrysippus said in his On the Difference of the Virtues (7.1.10). At 7.3.1 he a n n o u n c e s his intention to d o so in a separate work (cf. 4.4.1); a n d at 8.1.47-48 he i n f o r m s us that h e has c o m p l e t e d this work, which, he says, also includes an exposure of f u r t h e r self-contradictions in Chrysippus' On Affections not dealt with in PHP either (Books 7-9 were written some time after 1-6, in the period between 169 and 176 cf.; cf. De Lacy (1978) 46-8). This latter, projected treatise c a n n o t be identified. Galen may have been inspired by the g e n r e exemplified by such works as Plutarch's On the Self-Contradictions of the Stoics, cf. infra, p. 44.

tripartition (7.1.22-3; cf. Plato, Rep. 442b-d; 443c-444a)—hardly a proper treatment. A n o t h e r aspect, too, calls f o r s o m e c o m m e n t . In b o o k s 4 a n d 5 G a l e n focuses o n t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n u m b e r of psychic faculties (5.7.2), regardless of their ontological status as e i t h e r parts (μόρια, μ ε ρ ή ) or powers ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς ) — a n o t h e r scholastic question. 3 4 Galen takes t h e status of t h e faculties as parts in t h e above sense to b e implied by their spatial separation, viz. t h e Platonic trilocation established in PHP 1-3 a n d 6. 3r ' T h e exclusive c o n c e n t r a t i o n in b o o k s 4 a n d 5 o n t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of faculties brings h i m t h e dialectical advantage of b e i n g able to align Aristotle a n d Posidonius with Plato in a c o n c e n t r a t e d assault o n t h e Stoic u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n . For Aristotle a n d , Galen argues, Posidonius h a d accepted the celebrated Platonic division into reason, a n g e r a n d a p p e t i t i o n , t h o u g h conceiving of t h e m as powers r a t h e r t h a n separately located parts. In fact, Galen o f t e n takes the perspective of powers in speaking o n behalf of himself, or of Plato. T h e c o n c e p t of power is of course central to his physiology, b u t in the c o n t e x t of ethics, as Galen repeatedly makes clear, o n e may as well, o r even preferably, speak of powers. T h u s Plato, w h o in Republic 4 was c o n c e r n e d with t h e m o r a l issue of t h e virtues, was c o n t e n t to prove that ' t h e powers (δυνάμεις) which govern us a r e t h r e e ' , 3 6 o r t h a t we have ' t h r e e powers d i f f e r e n t in k i n d ' (δυνάμεις ετερογενείς) (5.7.7, 7.9). 3 7 Likewise, h e has n o q u a l m s 34 Porphyry ap. Stob. Eel. I, 350.9-12 (Fr. 253 Smith): 'Tfie ancients a r e divided (διαπεφώνηται) [...] also a b o u t t h e parts (μερών) of t h e soul, a n d in general what a part (μέρος) is a n d what a power ( δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ) a n d w h e r e i n their d i f f e r e n c e lies.' Cf. Iambi. Dean. ap. Stob. I 49.33, p.367.10ff. (Περί δυνάμεων ψ υ χ ή ς ) , 34, p.369.5ff. (Περί πλήθους δυνάμεων); translation a n d n o t e s by Festugière (1953) 190-93. Cf. also t h e ps. P l u t a r c h e a n tract Ει μέρος τό παθητικόν τής άνθρωπου ψυχής ή δύναμις, o n e of t h e two 'Tyrwhitt's F r a g m e n t s ' ( T h o m a s Tyrwhitt [ e d . ] , Fragmenta duo Plutarchi, 1773); best m o d e r n edition S a n d b a c h (1969) 60-71. For t h e same issue in t h e d o x o g r a p h i c tradition cf. infra, pp. 72 ff. 35 Cf. supra, n. 24. 36 Cf. the f o r m u l a at 2.1 (Test. Book I, f o u r t h text), cited supra, p. 21. 37 For powers in c o n n e c t i o n with Plato 5.4.3, 7.2, 70.50 (= Posid. Frs. 142-145 E.K.) ; cf. In Hipp. lipid, pp.272.22-273.2 Wenkebach-Pfaff, esp. 272.25 ff: ' Α ρ ι σ τ ο τ έ λ η ς μεν ούν καί Π λ ά τ ω ν υπό μίαν προσηγορίαν [seil, ψυχήν] άμφοτέρας άγουσι τάς δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς , ού μόνον ή λογιζόμεθα καί μεμνήμεθα ψυχήν καλούντες, ά λ λ α καί τήν έν τοις φυτοίς, ή τρέφεται [...]. Cf. Deuse (1983) 101 n. 28, who rightly points o u t that what matters in this c o n t e x t is the opposition to the c o r p o r e a l a n d unitary c o n c e p t i o n of t h e Stoa. This is of course also t h e situation in PHP 4 a n d 5. D e u s e d o e s n o t however n o t e t h e close r e s e m b l a n c e s in w o r d i n g a n d c o n t e n t between this Galenic passage a n d t h e m o r e extensive abstract f r o m Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel I, pp.367.10-368.11 W. Cf. Gal., ibid. p. 273.15-19, In Tim. p.12.15-21 S c h r o e d e r : Πλάτων δε ονομάζει τάς ά ρ χ ά ς τ α ύ τ α ς είδη ψυχών, ού μιάς ο ύ σ ί α ς

a b o u t assimilating t h e c o n c e p t of p o w e r a n d t h e originally Stoic c o n c e p t of ορμή ( ' c o n a t i o n ' ) , as when h e says that each of the Platonic parts is m a r k e d by its own ορμή (5.7.1). 3 8 T h e n o t i o n of power a n d even m o r e that of c o n a t i o n a d m i t s of translation in t e r m s of desire a n d its subspecies a n d is t h e r e f o r e especially suited to ethical c o n t e x t s (see below § 3). T h e assimilation of c o n a t i o n a n d power h e r e is of crucial i m p o r t a n c e f o r G a l e n ' s p r o j e c t of playing off P o s i d o n i u s against Chrysippus. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t in d u e course (see below, p. 37f.). But the dialectical a d v a n t a g e of a l i g n i n g Plato a n d Aristotle is b o u g h t at the price of an incongruity of structure. As we saw, Galen has n o l o n g e r any n e e d of a separate a r g u m e n t f o r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , having established the tripartition-cum-trilocation in books 1-3. T h e logical s e q u e n c e would have b e e n first to discuss t h e n u m b e r of faculties (regardless of their status as e i t h e r powers or parts) a n d next to d e t e r m i n e t h e i r status. But n o t h i n g p r e p a r e s us f o r G a l e n ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t that h e will establish the d o c t r i n e of tripartition a n d trilocation in the next b o o k (viz. 6), as if h e h a d n o t d o n e so already (5.7.7). 3 9 T h e p r o b l e m is also r e f l e c t e d in t h e p r e f a c e to b o o k 6, where h e indicates a c h a n g e of plan: 4 0 It was my purpose at the beginning to inquire about the powers that govern us, whether they all have the heart as their base (όρμώνται), as Aristotle and Theophrastus believed, or whether it is better to posit three sources (άρχάς) for them, as Hippocrates and Plato held. But since Chrysippus disputed with the ancients (τους παλαιούς) not only about the sources but also about the powers (δυνάμεων) themselves, admitting neither the spirited nor the desiderative I decided that I must first [i.e. in books 4-5] examine his opinion and then return to my original plan, which was to show that the brain, the heart and the δυνάμεις μόνον, οντος ουν του καί τάς ο ύ σ ί α ς αυτών διαφερούσας είναι και την έν τοις είρημένοις σπλάγχνοις οϊκησιν, έ ξ έ σ τ ω τ ω β ο υ λ ο μ έ ν ω δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς . . . . όνομάζειν ο ύ ψ υ χ ά ς · ούδέ γ α ρ ο ΰ τ ' εις ί α τ ρ ι κ ή ν ο ΰ τ ' εις φ ι λ ο σ ο φ ί α ν βλαβησόμεθα, διοικεΐσθαι τί ζώον υπό τριών άρχών είπόντες ... For Plato on psychic faculties as powers cf. Re/). 5.477c. 38 Galen m e n t i o n s ορμή alongside p e r c e p t i o n as a d e f i n i n g characteristic of t h e regent part at 2.3.4. O n t h e m o t i o n s of t h e psychic faculties see Manuli (1988), esp. 207 ff. who stresses early Stoic influence. Cf. Mansfeld (1991) 135 ff., who stresses Posidonian i n f l u e n c e ( t h o u g h also with r e f e r e n c e to such passages as Rep. 9.580d ff.). 39 It might be supposed that this passage was written b e f o r e books 1-3, o r at any rate b e f o r e these books were d e s t i n e d to b e c o m e t h e first t h r e e of t h e whole treatise. But I know of n o o t h e r indication to this effect, a n d t h e r e are many passages in PHP which tell against it, e.g. 3.7.53, even if allowance is m a d e f o r later a d d i t i o n s etc. 40 Which is b u t o n e of many such cases, cf. De Lacy (1978-80) 48-50.

liver are the sources of the powers that govern us (6.1.1-2 = Test. lib. 2, first text, transi. De Lacy, modified).

prìmi,

Galen claims that Plato m a d e the very same proviso with regard to the parts/powers distinction in Republic 4, where he proved 'cogently and irrefutably' that the soul has three sections. According to Galen, this proof does not include their n a t u r e as parts differing in essence (ούσίαις, 5.7.2, 8). 4 1 In s u p p o r t of this r e a d i n g h e a d d u c e s Rep. 435c9-d3 (5.7.6). But Plato's proviso here concerns the cogency of his a r g u m e n t for tripartition. 4 2 This has n o t h i n g to d o with the part vs. power issue which arose u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of critique of t h e Platonic tripartition as f o r m u l a t e d by Aristotle in his On the Soul A 5 a n d Γ 9. 4 3 Galen a n n o u n c e s that h e will explain exactly what kind of demonstration is m e a n t by Plato's 'longer a n d fuller way' in the next book (5.7.7). But in book 6 this promise is f o r g o t t e n , or at least n o t really kept. 4 4 Instead we are given an overview of passages illustrating Plato's use of the terms f o r m ' a n d ' p a r t ' with r e f e r e n c e to the soul (6.2). 4 5 Of course Galen could find in Plato n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n of tripartition which would have satisfied his own professed standards. Republic 4 discusses the threefold division into purely functional categories with

41

In his treatise On Moral Disposition (extant in an Arabic abstract only) Galen makes t h e same qualification; p. xxvi Walzer: 'It makes n o d i f f e r e n c e how I r e f e r to these things in this b o o k [viz., in t h e On Moral Dispositions], w h e t h e r as separate souls, as parts of t h e o n e h u m a n soul, o r as t h r e e d i f f e r e n t powers of t h e same essence.' For t h e division of o p t i o n s , cf. 6.2.5 (see infra, p. 34). In this treatise, Galen d o e s n o t appeal to physiological insights, such as that into the nervous system, n o t even w h e n discussing t h e psychology of action, see pp. xxvi, xlv. O n these passage see f u r t h e r Mansfeld (1991) 140-2, w h o observes t h a t Galen in On Moral Dispositions 'silently d r o p s o n e of t h e main points proudly established in t h e PHP. Yet this should n o t be taken to imply a c h a n g e of o p i n i o n but r a t h e r a d i f f e r e n c e in dialectical c o n t e x t f r o m PHP. Cf. G a l e n ' s a t t i t u d e , In Tim p. 12.15-21 S c h r ö d e r q u o t e d supra, n. 37. In t h e On Moral Dispositions, too, Galen considers t h e tripartite s c h e m e as a moral t h e o r e m u n r e l a t e d to t h e parts-powers issue; h e thus makes his exposition a c c e p t a b l e f o r o t h e r s (notably Peripatetics). But it r e m a i n s t r u e , as Mansfeld p o i n t s o u t , t h a t Galen faces t h e p r o b l e m in r e c o n c i l i n g t h e Platonic tripartition q u a moral d o c t r i n e with t h e physiology of the nervous system. 42 καί εύ γ' ϊσθι, ώ Γ λ α υ κ ώ ν , ώς ή έμή δ ό ξ α α κ ρ ι β ώ ς μεν τούτο έκ τοιούτων μεθόδων ο ϊ α ι ς δή ν υ ν έν τοίς λόγοις χρώμεθα, ού μή ποτε λ ά β ω μ ε ν ά λ λ η γαρ μακροτέρα και πλείων οδός ... For similar disclaimers see 504b, 534a, 612a. 43 This question — first raised at 4 0 2 b l - 3 (see supra, n. 11) — is also c o n s i d e r e d at 402b9-16, 413a4-10, 413b11-414a3, 429al-2, 43219-b7, 433bl-4. Aristotle's view is that in c o n t r a s t with νους t h e o t h e r sections of t h e soul a r e n o t s e p a r a b l e b u t theoretically (λόγφ) different, Β 2.413b27-30. 44 As is observed by De Lacy ad he. (338.3-6); cf. also De Lacy (1972) 32 n.28. 45 Cf. In Tim. p. 11.21 ff. S c h r o e d e r .

a repeatedly stated proviso 4 6 that is most unwelcome to Galen. For trilocadon based on anatomy o n e has to turn to the Timaeus. But its mythical m o d e of p r e s e n t a t i o n could n o t pass for the r e q u i r e d demonstrative proof either. 4 7 T h e only thing Galen is able to do is to show that Plato, in Republic 4 and Timaeus, spoke of parts and forms. Proof is what he has to provide himself (viz. in bks 1-3 and 6), though h e of course claims it to be based on Platonic methodology, notably the m e t h o d of diaeresis as explained in PHP book 9. By Galen's day soul-partition had become increasingly problematic for those who wished to u p h o l d the soul's unity and immortality. Some Platonists were persuaded to a b a n d o n the notion of parts in favour of that of powers. W h e n Galen presents his r a t h e r forced reading of Republic 4.435c9-d3, which, as we saw, contradicts rather than supports his case, this may represent his attempt to counter-act those who had used the same passage to show that Plato had not been dogmatic about tripartition. Omission of this awkward passage, o n e supposes, would have been a m o r e attractive option had it been open to him. Galen, then, vindicates a radical variety of soul-partition with an eye not only on his Stoic a n d Peripatetic adversaries but also on a g r o u p of Platonists who had taken over the Peripatetic conception of powers (δυνάμεις). Exactly whom he has in mind remains uncertain, but a version of the view u n d e r attack was advanced by the Platonist Severus, who was a c o n t e m p o r a r y of Galen's. 4 8 Versions of it are moreover attested for Nicolaus Damascenus (c. 5 BCE- 64 CE)49 as well as Porphyry's teacher Longinus (early 3rd c. C E ) . 5 0

46

See supra, n. 42. ' Galen elsewhere stresses that Plato qualifies his account as merely 'probable' (είκώς, 29c4-d3, 72d4-8). But this c o n c e r n s issues Galen himself m a d e a point of refraining from: the substance and immortality of the soul, God, etc. See PHP9.9.3, 6, 7 (p.298.9, 20, 26). That this emphasis on Plato's proviso is not e x t e n d e d to the issue of location runs parallel to Galen's treatment of Rep. 435c9-d3 as discussed in the text. Both passages are at o d d s with Galen's belief that the tripartition can be d e m o n s t r a t e d . So o n e passage is misrepresented, a n d the o t h e r is n o t applied to the issue concerned. 48 See Eus. .PĒXIII 17.1-6; II, p.239.9 ff. Mras; with Deuse (1983) 102-108, esp. 104 ff. Cf. Dillon (1977) 262-64. 49 See Porph. ibid, (see n. 34) p. 353.12-354.6 W. (= F 7 R o e p e r / T 9 Lulofs) with Moraux (1973) 481-7. 50 Porph. ibid. p. 351.11-19 W. (Fr. 253, p. 272.32 ff. Sm.), cited infra, p. 35; cf. also ibid. p. 353.1-11 W. (Fr. 253, ρ.274.77 ff. Sm.). Highly relevant in this connection is also Tert. De an. c. 14, insisting that the idea of powers (as opposed to parts) is f u n d a m e n t a l to that of the soul's unity and immortality. 4

The Structure o / P H P 4 and 5: Synopsis It may b e c o n v e n i e n t to take stock of t h e overall c o n t e n t s of these books. It s h o u l d be n o t e d that t h e c h a p t e r s m a r k e d off by G a l e n ' s Renaissance editors d o n o t always coincide with the real a r r a n g e m e n t of subject-matter, w h e t h e r o r n o t as i n d i c a t e d by Galen himself. At the same time, it is clear that n o alternative a r r a n g e m e n t will reveal t h e s e b o o k s as a m o d e l of t r a n s p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n , as will n o t surprise those familiar with G a l e n ' s work. Yet, for all his repetitions a n d vagaries, an overall a p p r o a c h is discernible: most space in these two b o o k s is d e v o t e d to a critique of C h r y s i p p e a n m o n i s m , which revolves a r o u n d two m a i n objections: first, Chrysippus' self-contradictions; second, his failure to explain the cause of the affections of t h e soul (parts A a n d Β of Book 4 a n d part A of 5, see below). T h e m e t h o d followed in these parts is n o t wholly destructive, however. T h e Stoic's self-contradictions, as we have seen, are o f t e n caused by what Galen p r e s e n t s as isolated a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s of n o n - r a t i o n a l factors in the soul which have b e e n f o r c e d u p o n Chrysippus' m i n d by t h e plain facts of n a t u r e . 5 1 T h u s h e p r e p a r e s t h e g r o u n d f o r t h e vindication of t h e Platonic tripartition in t h e s e c o n d half of Book 5 (part B, below). In t h e following synopsis, Chrysippus is i n d i c a t e d by C. T h e pres e n c e of Posidonius [P.] is i n d i c a t e d by m e n t i o n of t h e f r a g m e n t s a c c o r d i n g to Edelstein-Kidd's edition. N o t e that these ' f r a g m e n t s ' d o n o t only o f f e r clearly r e c o g n i z a b l e v e r b a t i m passages f r o m P. b u t o f f e r m u c h larger stretches of Galenic exposition. I have also indicated by m e a n s of dots (·) the verbatim proof-texts of various authorities p r e s e n t e d in these books, w h e t h e r directly by Galen [G.] o r f r o m an i n t e r m e d i a t e source (e.g. P.).

BOOK FOUR (A) CHRYSIPPUS' SELF-CONTRADICTIONS (chs. 1-4) 1. C.'s inconsistencies i n t r o d u c e d (ch. 1.1-6) a n d illustrated by: — proof-text f r o m C.'s On the Soul (SVF 2.905): C. effectively accepts the Platonic parts in his exegesis of H o m e r i c passages (1.7-13). 51

See infra, p. 43.

— b e g i n n i n g of the On Affections: exegesis of Z e n o ' s definitions (1.14-2.44): C. admits irrational e l e m e n t . · Proof -text: 2.9-12; 14-18 ( r u n n e r s simile, SVF3.462). — sequel in C. Affections: s u p e r v e n i n g o n j u d g m e n t s (view ascribed to Zeno) o r j u d g m e n t s tout court? P. i n t r o d u c e d . P. follows ancients (T 102 E.-K.); asks C. what the cause of affections is (see f u r t h e r B) (3.1-5) — C.'s u n c o m m o n a n d a m b i g u o u s use of l a n g u a g e (3.6-4.34) • e.g. sense o f ' i r r a t i o n a l ' (αλογον) (4.9-34): proof-texts: 16-17, 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (SVF3.476).

(B) T H E CAUSE O F AFFECTION (ch. 5.1-46) 2. Objections against C.'s monist theory : — Affections c a n n o t be u n c a u s e d , contrary to what C. says. • Proof-text: 5.6, f r o m On Affections 1 (SVF3.476) — Reason c a n n o t be the cause. • P r o o f - t e x t : 13-14, f r o m Therapeutics (SVF 3.479): a f f e c t i o n contrary to reason. — S o m e non-rational power must be t h e cause. • Proof-text: 21-2, f r o m Ther. (SVF 3.480): view of psychic weakness (άρρωστήμα) as m a d n e s s implies non-rational power (23). — magnitude of a p p a r e n t g o o d o r evil as a d e t e r m i n a n t of weakness (C.). • Rejoinder with quotes f r o m P. (F 164, part) (24-35). — Psychic p h e n o m e n a that are inexplicable on C.'s account. • More texts f r o m Posidonius (F 164, part) (36-44). — Conclusion with quotation f r o m P. (T 60 E.-K.) (45-46). 3. Elaboration on some of the points raised (chs. 6-7): — T h e p r e s e n c e of a non-rational e l e m e n t in the soul. F u r t h e r admissions with r e g a r d to psychic s t r e n g t h / w e a k n e s s a n d tension (6.1.48) • Proof-texts f r o m Therapeutics 5-9, 11, 19 (SVF3.473). (Further ' P o s i d o n i a n ' criticisms, ch. 7.1-45 = P. F 165 E.-K.) — problematic notion of affection as ' f r e s h ' o p i n i o n (2-11) • 10-11: quotation f r o m Euripides (fr. 964 Nauck, Ale. 1085) — cessation in time

• prooftexts f r o m C. On Aff. bk. 2: 12-17 (SVF 3.476); 26-27, 30-31 (SVF 3.467). (7.45-46: E p i l o g u e to bk. 4: p r e s e n t line of criticism to b e c o n t i n u e d in bk. 5).

B O O K FIVE (A) T H E C R I T I Q U E O F MONISM, C O N T I N U E D 1. Introduction: t h e m e of bks. 4 a n d 5 justified ( c h . l ) — relation of subject-matter to question of seat of r e g e n t part as treated in bks. 1-3 (§ 1-3). — diaeresis of tenets c o n c e r n e d with the affections (C., Zeno, P.- cum-Plato, § 4-7) — Stoics c o n t r a d i c t obvious p h e n o m e n a as well as themselves (§8-11) 2. The Stoic body/soul analogy (chs. 2 a n d 3) — P.'s criticism of C.'s analogy in terms of health a n d illness (17) • q u o t a t i o n f r o m P. at 2.7 (3-12 - Posid. F 163) — G.'s criticism of b o t h C. a n d P. (8-12) — Criticism of C.'s c o m p a r i s o n with fever (13-19) • Proof-text f r o m Ther. at 2.14 (SVF3.465). — F u r t h e r evidence f o r C.'s use of analogy (2.20-34): • Proof-texts f r o m Ther. at 2.22-24, 26, 27, 31, 32, 33 (SVF3.471) — Criticisms against C.: (a) inconsistency vis-à-vis On Aff. bk. 1 ; (b) his failure to i m p l e m e n t the analogy (2.34-52). — physical a n d psychic beauty as right p r o p o r t i o n (2.46-3.11). • Proof-texts f r o m Ther. at 2.47 a n d 49 (SVF3.471, first text). 3. Various points repeated (ch. 4.1-17) (diaeresis of views, beauty a n d ugliness of the soul, e m o t i o n as o p p o s e d to purely cognitive e r r o r )

4. Evidence provided by children; implications for education (ch. 5.1-40; 1-29 = Posid. F 169 E.-K.). — children (and animals) display anger and desire (1-8) — origin of vice in children u n a c c o u n t a b l e on monist view (9-21) — Posidonian physiognomies (22-29) — P. and Plato on pre- and post-natal child-raising (30-35) (P. F 31 E.-K).

(B) TRIPARTITION VINDICATED 5. Posidonius on the cause of affection (ch.5.36-6.46; 6.3-36 = P. F 187 E.-K.) (cf. Book four, section B) — Implications of P.'s acceptance of the Platonic tripartition: = for virtue and the end (5.36-6.12) = for therapy of the soul (6.13-22) — some difficulties raised earlier (book Four, section B) now soluble (6.23-32) — P. could claim support of Zeno and Cleanthes (6.33-36) • Proof-text at 35 (SVF 1 Cleanthes 570); n o text of Zeno (cf. 40). — implications for scala naturae (37-39) (P. F 33 E.-K.) — concluding remarks (40-46): the views of Hp., Pl., Pyth. as compared with those of Zeno and C. 6. Plato's Proof in Rep. 4 (ch. 7): — Plato's a r g u m e n t introduced (question of its status) (1-11) — c o m m e n t s on Platonic passages on reason vs. desire (12-43) • proof-texts: Rep. 436b, 437b (12, 13); 439a-d (36-40). — comments on Platonic passages featuring anger. • proof-texts: Rep. 439e-440a (45-47), 440a-b (53-54), 440c-d (6263), 440e-441a (72), 441a-c (75-76), i n c l u d i n g H o m e r , Od. 20.17, leading to — comments on p r o p e r use of poetic witnesses.

3. Options This is how Galen distinguishes t h e options, a l o n g with their m a i n representatives: 5 2 Plato, holding that they [i.e. the forms, εϊδη, of the soul] are separated by their location in the body and differ greatly in essence (ταΐς ούσίαις πάμπολυ διαλ(λ)άττειν), has good reason to call them both forms and parts (εϊδη τε και μέρη). 53 But Aristotle and Posidonius do not speak of forms or parts of the soul but say that there are powers of a single essence which has its base at the heart (δυνάμεις ... μιας ουσίας έκ τής καρδίας ορμώμενης). 54 Chrysippus not only subsumes anger (θύμος) and desire (επιθυμία) under one essence (ουσία) but also one power (δύναμις) (PHP6.2.5 = Posid. F. 146 E.-K.). T h e t h r e e doctrines c o n c e r n e d are given in o r d e r of correctness. T h e position ascribed to Aristotle a n d Posidonius is neatly i n t e r m e d i a t e in b o t h merit a n d c o n t e n t : t h r e e essences t h r e e parts o n e essence t h r e e powers

brain, heart, liver heart

o n e essence

heart

o n e power

Plato Aristotle-cumPosidonius Chrysippus

As we have n o t i c e d , Galen links t h e n o t i o n s of essence, p a r t a n d bodily o r g a n . T h e n o t i o n of a plurality of powers d o e s n o t involve a division a c c o r d i n g to essence a n d location. This conceptual s c h e m a is Platonist a n d Peripatetic. 5 5 Galen's division of options, then, provides c o m m o n g r o u n d b e t w e e n at least t h e Platonists a n d Peripatetics. How far the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e Stoic position, or r a t h e r positions, is accurate, seems m o r e problematic. As to t h e a p p o r t i o n m e n t of o p t i o n s a n d authorities a c c o r d i n g to this s c h e m a we may c o m p a r e a few e x c e r p t s f r o m Porphyry's aforem e n t i o n e d On the Powers of the Soul preserved by Stobaeus. T h e first of these reads: 52 That the diaeresis set out here underlies the discussion in books 4 and 5 is further borne out by its more concise version at 5.4.3; cf. also the partial parallel at 6.1.1-2, cited. 53 Ct. PI. Tim. 73b-d, Rep. 504a, 580d-581e, 590c, Phaeár. 253c.265a ff. 54 For this phrasing see also 6.1.1; cf. Porph. ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 349.3-4 (= Fr. 251 Smith, p. 269.31 f.): μίαν μεν τήν ούσίαν λογικήν ού ... έκ μιας ή τε νόησις ούσίας δ ρ μα τα ι καί ή αϊσθησις ... 55 Cf. Alex. Aphr. De an. p.94.1-3 Bruns: πάσαι γαρ αύται μία ούσαι κατά τό ύποκείμενον, ταίς διαφοραΐς των δυνάμεων αύταΐς διήρηνται. Themist. De an. p.l 17.1-3 Heinze.

It should be said what is the difference between power and part: parts differ from one another in character and kind, whereas powers pertain to the same kind. This is why Aristotle declined to speak of parts with respect to the soul, but not of powers. For partition entails at once a change of substrate, while difference in power also occurs in a single substrate. 56 Longinus holds that not even animals have a plurality of parts but rather are without parts while having a plurality of powers, saying that, as Plato says,57 the soul receives a plurality of parts when embodied but lacks parts when it is on its own; but the mere fact that it has no parts does not make it single-powered; for it is possible for one entity without parts to have more than one power (Eel. I p. 351.8-19 W. = Porph. Fr. 253, p.272.32-42 Smith, Longinus Fr. 22 Patillon - Brisson). 58 It is easy to see that Porphyry avails himself of the same conceptual schema as Galen does at PHP 6.2.5. At the same time his account differs f r o m it in such a way that he c a n n o t d e p e n d on Galen. Both a u t h o r s draw on the same traditional division of options between Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (or Chrysippus) in terms of the p a r t s / power distinction. 5 9 It interesting to n o t e how each of the two authors adapts this schema to his own purposes. In Porphyry's account his teacher Longinus occupies a compromise position between Plato and Aristotle. This is the main point. T h e Chrysippean option of o n e power only is merely m e n t i o n e d as n o t necessarily entailed by L o n g i n u s ' position. Porphyry does n o t t r o u b l e to identify it as Chrysippean, but it is easy to recognize as such in the light of the Galenic parallel. Nevertheless h e handles the schema the way that

56

I omit to translate the phrase τό δέ έτεροδύναμον καί περί εν υποκείμενου παραλλαγην είσάγειν inserted by Smith at p. 273.35 f. but probably d u e to a printer's error. It is entirely absent f r o m the edition of Wachsmuth and c a n n o t be a c c o u n t e d for by what is to be f o u n d in the critical apparatus of either Smith or Wachsmuth. 57 This is based on an exegesis of Tim. 35a: τής αμέριστου καί άεί κατά ταύτα έχούσης ουσίας καί τής αύ περί τα σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστής τρίτον έξ άμφοίν έν μέσω συνεκεράσατο ούσίας είδος, τής τε ταύτοΰ φύσεως [αύ περί] και τής του ετέρου, καί κατά ταύτα συνέστησεν έν μέσω του τε άμερούς αύτών καί του κατά τα σώματα μεριστού. 58 'Ρητέον δε ως δύναμις μέρους διήνεγκεν, οτι τό μεν μέρος έκβέβηκε κατά γένος τόν χαρακτήρα του άλλου μέρους, αί δέ δυνάμεις περί τό αύτό στρέφονται γένος. Διό τα μεν μέρη παρητεΐτο 'Αριστοτέλης έπί τής ψυχής, τάς δέ δυνάμεις ούκέτι- τό γαρ έτερομερες εύθύς υποκειμένου παραλλαγην είσάγειν, τό δέ έτεροδύναμον καί περί εν ύποκείμενον ένίστασθαι. Λογγινος δέ ούδέ τό ζώον πολυμερές είναι ά λ λ ' άμερές, πολυδύναμον δέ, τό του Πλάτωνος έν τοις σώμασι πολυμερή φάσκων τήν ψυχήν γίγνεσθαι, καθ' έαυτήν ούσαν άμερή. οτι δέ ού πολυμερής, ού δια τούτο καί μονοδύναμος· ένδέχεσθαι γαρ εν άμερές δυνάμεις πλείους έ'χειν. 59 See also Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel. I, p.368.12-369.4 W. Cf. ibid. p.367.11-20; Alex. De an. p.94.1-3 Br. Cf. the interpretation by Dörrie - Baltes (1990), Β. 46.7.

Galen does, viz. as providing t h e t h r e e m a i n possible o p t i o n s (save for c o m p r o m i s e ) . N o innovative genius, L o n g i n u s e s p o u s e d w h a t was p r e s u m a b l y o n e of the o p t i o n s o p e n to Platonists w h o wished to r e s p o n d to the Peripatetic c r i t i q u e of soul-partition a l o n g Platonic lines. 6 0 O n the o n e h a n d , h e accepted a plurality of powers in t h e Aristotelian sense as basic; b u t the soul also has parts w h e n it resides in t h e body (and h e n c e n o parts b e f o r e or a f t e r e m b o d i m e n t ) . As we have n o t i c e d , Galen too linked the psychic parts to bodily parts. But the motivation seems entirely d i f f e r e n t . Platonists like L o n g i n u s s o u g h t to m a i n t a i n t h e unity ( a n d h e n c e immortality) of t h e soul in t h e f a c e of t h e Aristotelian critique. H e makes his qualified a c c e p t a n c e of a plurality of powers palatable to his fellow-Platonists by seeking s u p p o r t f r o m the ipsissima verba of Plato. 6 1 Galen took over the Platonist association of the c o n c e p t s of psychic a n d bodily parts b u t lost sight of the unity of the soul—so m u c h so that it b e c o m e s problematical. His position, with its b l i n d spot f o r t h e c o h e r e n c e a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s between t h e parts of t h e soul, resulted f r o m a c o m b i n a t i o n of his physiological notion of the power of individual o r g a n s a n d the Platonic tripartition a n d trilocation. J u s t as P o r p h y r y h a d an i n t e r e s t in a t t a c h i n g t h e n a m e of his m e n t o r to the traditional division of the options, so Galen a p p e n d e d Posidonius' n a m e to t h e s t a n d a r d Aristotelian position. This move is entirely motivated by t h e role assigned by Galen to Posidonius in b o o k s 4 a n d 5. As I have already indicated, t h e c o n c e p t u a l s c h e m a applied h e r e is i n c o m m e n s u r a t e with Stoic distinctions. First of all, it entails an equivocation with respect to the sense of being, i.e. ούσία. For P o s i d o n i u s , like t h e o t h e r Stoics, it d e n o t e s n o t Aristotelian essence b u t c o r p o r e a l substance, viz. the psychic pneuma.62 In his On 60

See supra, p. 29. Note that the same position is ascribed by Porphyry to a plurality of Platonists, ibid. p. 353.1 ff. 61 Cf. supra, pp. 29, 34 for Galen's similar appeal to Plato. 62 D.L. 7.157 = Pos. F 139 E.-K. Cf. Kidd ad 6.2.5 (Fr. 146), Comm. vol. Il.i, p.543 f., who speaks of a confusion on Galen's part as to the sense of ούσία, but it may be m o r e accurate to speak of distortion. Galen s h o u l d be taken to use the t e r m consistently in the sense of 'essence'. Kidd argues that this sense is impossible in view of the difference between έπιθυμείν, θυμοΰσθαι and λογίζεσθαι. But in speaking of three δυνάμεις of a single ούσία Galen's point is precisely that as far as ethics is c o n c e r n e d t h e r e is n o essential difference between tbe Platonic a n d Aristotelian conceptions. Accordingly, Aristotle also conceives of mental conflict in a Platonic way. This view has good credentials f r o m passages in the Aristotelian corpus, notably De an. 3.10.433b5-13, presenting the same t h r e e desires as conflicting as are at issue at PHP 6.2.5; cf. ENA 13.1102bl4-18. Admittedly Aristotle is less unambiguous

the Soul h e said that psychic pneuma is diffused in the b o n e s a n d in his On the Gods that t h e soul p e r v a d e s t h e b o n e s a n d sinews. 6 3 Galen however effectively saddles h i m with Aristotelian b e i n g or essence. T h e r e is n o g o o d reason to d o u b t that Posidonius c o n c u r r e d with Chrysippus a n d m o s t o t h e r Stoics in situating intelligence in t h e heart. O n this p o i n t at least the c o n j u n c t i o n with Aristotle involves n o distortion. 6 4 Does Chrysippus fare any b e t t e r in this Platonist-Peripatetic f r a m e work? Hardly, of course. Galen ascribes to Chrysippus o n e p o w e r ( δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ) only, j u s t as Plutarch h a d d o n e b e f o r e him a n d Porphyry was to do. 6 5 This p o i n t clearly refers to t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e wholly a n d h o m o g e n e o u s l y rational ήγεμονικόν or διάνοια, which was c o m m o n l y assimilated to the Platonic λογιστικόν. 6 6 I n d e e d , the Stoics

on o t h e r occasions, cf. Price (1994) 104 f. Likewise Dörrie (1959) 170, in characterizing Galen's position, says that parts can oppose o n e a n o t h e r whereas δυνάμεις cannot. But this does not follow f r o m the passage f r o m Porphyry ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 352.7 ff. (= Fr. 253 Sm.) to which h e refers. This does not of course alter the fact that the use in this context of the essence/powers scheme, which is absent from the relevant Aristotelian passages, seems to have arisen in the parts vs. powers debate in the post-Aristotelian era. 63 Posid. Fr. 28a, b, p.21.5 f. E.-K. In the latter testimony the word νεύρων in the phrase κεχώρηκεν δια των όστών καί των νεύρων must m e a n 'sinews': see Mansfeld (1991) 137, who inter alia compares Sext. M. VII 19 (Posid. F 88 E.-K). We may take his point that if Posidonius had assigned any function to the nervous system, Galen would surely have played off Posidonius against Chrysippus on this score as well. But in fact, Posidonius and Chrysippus were in essential a g r e e m e n t on voluntary motion a n d perception. For Chrysippus see e.g. Calc. In Tim. 220 (SVF 2.879); Gal. PHP3.1 Λ0 (SVF2.885); and Sen. Ep. 113..23 (SVF 1.525 = 3.836, second text). 64 See the text referred to supra, n. 62. Mansfeld's observation (1991) 122 that 'Galen is ... r a t h e r coy a b o u t the fact that Posidonius did not assign d i f f e r e n t locations in the body to different functions' is not entirely justifiable. True, he says so only at 6.2.5 a n d 5.4.3 a n d it is obvious that he has an interest in aligning Posidonius as m u c h as possible with Plato. But on the other h a n d the books where Posidonius is present (4 and 5) are c o n c e r n e d solely with the n u m b e r of the soul's functions (cf. 5.7.1 ff.). And as to the points on which he criticizes the Stoics, he emphatically singles out Chrysippus as representative of the Stoic school as a whole: PHP 4.1.3; 5.6.41. 65 Cf. also PHP 4.5.4, 5.1.3; a n d , for Plutarch, Virt. Mor. 441C with Babut (1969a) 4 f. 66 See esp. 2.5.81, w h e r e Galen aligns these two terms a n d several others, including the Aristotelian νοοΰν. O n their provenience see De Lacy ad, loc. (144.36); cf. also De Lacy (1988) 51. Galen typically insists that the terms we use are not what matters as long as their r e f e r e n c e remains constant. T h a t the ήγεμονικόν was regularly identified with the λογιστικόν is stated explicitly in Alcinous' Platonist h a n d b o o k , Did. 182.24-26 H. (cf. 173.1-2). Alexander too uses both λογιστικόν and ήγεμονικόν to r e f e r to the intellect, see De an. pp. 39.21-2, 98.24 f. 99.14-5; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3109 n.222. Cf. also V a n d e r Waerdt (1985b) 377 n.16 with f u r t h e r passages; cf. (1985a) 293 n.27.

d o n o t recognize desire a n d a n g e r as separate powers b u t as excessive manifestations o f ' c o n a t i o n ' (ορμή). 6 7 Importantly, conation is n o t an Aristotelian power alongside reason. Chrysippus d e f i n e d c o n a t i o n as 'reason (λόγος) c o m m a n d i n g m a n to act'. 6 8 In o t h e r words, conation is reason in a particular role, viz. as the initiator of action. Did the Stoics use the c o n c e p t of ' p o w e r ' (δύναμις) in this context a n d , if so, how? A few sources ascribe to the Stoic r e g e n t part several d i f f e r e n t powers, viz. φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, όρμή, λόγος (Iambi, ap. Stob. Eel. I p.368.19-20 W„ SVF 2.826, s e c o n d text). 6 9 But arguably this list may also have arisen f r o m t h e wish to c o m p a r e t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n with those of o t h e r schools in t h e c o n t e x t of scholastic d e b a t e . T h e inclusion of λόγος o n a par with the o t h e r s is suspect. In fact, this usage of the t e r m ' p o w e r ' ( δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ) is n o t reliably attested as early Stoic. But Aët. Plac. IV 21.1 (SVF 2.836) seems to provide a m o r e a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t . H e r e ' t h e Stoics' are said to d e s c r i b e t h e r e g e n t p a r t as that which produces τάς φ α ν τ α σ ί α ς καί συγκαταθέσεις καί αισθήσεις και ορμάς· καί τούτο λογισμόν καλούσιν. T h e r e is n o m e n t i o n of 'powers' h e r e . 7 0 Moreover, this notice fits in b e t t e r with Chrysippus' own definition of conation (όρμή) I have j u s t r e f e r r e d to. T h u s w h e n Inwood argues in favour of viewing these δυνάμεις as e n d u r i n g dispositions of t h e t h e r e g e n t part, 7 1 h e r u n s t h e risk of i m p o r t i n g into his a c c o u n t a viewpoint which is f o r e i g n to t h e Stoic c o n c e p t i o n . In fact, it stems f r o m t h e traditional Platonist m o d e of schematization. T h e crucial p o i n t h e r e is n o t w h e t h e r o r n o t conation a n d t h e like r e p r e s e n t e n d u r i n g capabilities of the m i n d ; t h e p o i n t is w h e t h e r these capabilities r e p r e s e n t a plural aspect which served to a c c o u n t for such m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a as weakness of the will (άκρασία). In fact, the original Stoic usage of the t e r m δ ύ ν α μ ι ς is n o t that of p o w e r in t h e sense of faculty o r capacity, as e.g. in Aristotle. It is power in t h e sense of strength, which d e p e n d s o n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d e g r e e of physical tension (τόνος) of the psychic p n e u m a . 7 2 As such, 67 O n the affinities with certain Aristotelian concepts, notably όρεξις, επιθυμία and θύμος, see infra, pp. 272 f., 275 f. 68 Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1037F (SVF3.175); see f u r t h e r infra, p. 125, 276. 69 In addition, separate powers are assigned to the seven other parts of the Stoic soul: the five senses and the reproductive and phonetic functions; cf. ibid., p. 368.6 ff. (SVF2.826, second text). 70 See f u r t h e r Chr. ap. Gal. PHP 3.5.31 (SVF 2.896); D.L. 7.159. Cf. also the definition of φαντασία as an alteration of the soul, SVF2.55, 56. 71 Inwood (1985) 33ff. Cf. Voelke (1973) 29. 72 Plut. Virt. mar. 441C (SVF 1.202; 3.459); Stob. Eel. II p. 74.1-3 (SVF3.112) ; cf.

it d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r a soul is characterized by weakness of will or self-control. 7 3 This idea of psychic strength—which is n o t c o n f i n e d to t h e Stoics—is a b o u t equivalent to o u r c o n c e p t of 'will'. 74 Its import a n c e f o r t h e Stoics is, a m o n g o t h e r things, clear f r o m C l e a n t h e s ' m o v e to r e p l a c e practical w i s d o m ( φ ρ ό ν η σ ι ς ) with self-control (εγκράτεια) as o n e of the primary virtues. 7 5 Clearly this is s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m δύναμις as used at PHP6.2.5.

4. Authority, Tradition, and Truth In PHP 4-5, Galen identifies a basic insight into the n a t u r e of e m o tion c o m m o n to Plato, Hippocrates, Pythagoras, Aristotle, C l e a n t h e s a n d Posidonius. Z e n o is an a m b i g u o u s case, 7 6 b u t C h r y s i p p u s is u n d e n i a b l y deviant. T h i s g r o u p i n g of a u t h o r i t i e s is n o t a purely dialectical move. It f o r m s p a r t of his vision of a tradition of s o u n d philosophy-cum-medicine deriving f r o m H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato a n d f u r t h e r e n r i c h e d by o u t s t a n d i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of later g e n e r a tions. 7 7 This betrays a reconciliationist t e n d e n c y n o t u n c o m m o n in Galen's day. Its hallmark is an i m p a t i e n c e with terminological differe n c e s between schools a n d t h i n k e r s when a case can be m a d e f o r their substantial a g r e e m e n t . Galen m o r e o v e r glorifies past masters at t h e e x p e n s e of their self-styled followers. Accordingly, h e carefully avoids personal association with any of the sects or schools of his day a n d expresses his i n t e n t i o n only to select what is best f r o m t h e m . 7 8 W h e r e v e r possible, t h e Stoics t o o are i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e g r a n d tradition, with or without complaints a b o u t their p e n c h a n t for empty

Alex. Aphr. De an. Mantissa p. 118.6 ff. Br. (SVF2.823). 73 Cf. Plut. Wirt. mar. 446F-447A (SVF3.459, second text). 74 O n the tension a n d strength in ancient representations of psychic p h e n o m e n a see Vegetti (1993); on strength and the will see Mansfeld (1991), esp. 114 ff. 75 Plut. De Stoic. Rep. 1034D (SVF 1.563). 76 See f u r t h e r infra, pp. 85 f. 77 O n this and related aspects of PHP see Vegetti (1986); on Galen's ideas on scientific progress as an aspect of tradition see also De Lacy (1972), esp. 33 ff., Hankinson (1994b). T h e association of philosophy and medicine is by no means novel; cf. Plato's Timaeus 81-89 and the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of Hippocrates' m e t h o d , Phaedr. 269e ff. Cf. Lloyd (1991), esp. 403. Arist. at De resp. 480b23-30 a n d De sensu 436a17b l p o i n t s o u t that t h e m o r e a c c o m p l i s h e d p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n c l u d e with t h e principles of health a n d disease, whereas the m o r e sophisticated d o c t o r s say something about n a t u r e a n d derive their principles t h e r e f r o m . For Galen a n d the doxographic tradition, see infra pp. 61 ff. 78 Cf. Lib. Prop. p. 94.26 ff. Müller with Mansfeld (1994) 171 f.

terminological innovation (καινοτομία). 7 9 T h o s e who, like Chrysippus, are too obviously deviant to be thus enlisted are castigated for their sectarian contentiousness (φιλονεικία). T u r n i n g their back on the tradition, they have set u p philosophical sects of their own—an attitude which Galen puts down to m e g a l o m a n i a c lust for glory. Galen's own Platonism a n d Hippocratism shielded him f r o m the charge of contentiousness, since it marked him out as a true a d h e r e n t of the ancients while leaving ample room for innovations. 8 0 This orientation towards philosophical a n d cultural origins is not peculiar to Galen. Platonists such as Porphyry likewise appeal to what they call the 'old account', the παλαιός λόγος, i.e. the body of insights e n t e r t a i n e d by the m e n of old. 8 1 Galen too uses the expression π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος (or similar formulas) with r e f e r e n c e to his unitary tradition, or at least in its earlier stages. 82 What marks him out is his firm exclusion of pre-philosophical t h o u g h t a n d poetic myth. 8 3 Accordingly, h e d o e s n o t associate the π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος with any thinkers before Hippocrates a n d Plato. 84 Furthermore, he insists that 79 Similarly e.g. Plotinus, Enn. II 9.6.1, who associates καινοτομείν, ιδία φιλοσοφία a n d εξω τής αληθείας. 80 See Lloyd (1991), esp. 411 f. 81 See H a d o t (1987), esp. 23 ff., Dörrie (1967) esp. 406 f. O n the παλαιός λόγος a n d its epistemic value in Plato (e.g. Phae. 70c, Tim. 20c-d, 21a) see A n d r e s e n (1955) 111-14. T h e fact that the π α λ α ι ό ς λόγος of Tim. 20 c-d is also an α λ η θ ή ς λόγος appears to have stimulated the equation of the two notions by Platonists such as Celsus, who wrote an anti-Christian work entitled 'Αληθής λόγος, cf. Andresen (1955) 117. 82 PHP 2.8.20, 3.1.30, 4.3.3, 7.1.9; παλαιόν δόγμα or π α λ α ι ά δόξα, e.g. 4.6.31; 5.1.5, 8; 4.7; 4.6.30, 42; h e also speaks of οί παλαιοί, referring to Hippocrates and Plato but also Pythagoras, Aristotle a n d Theophrastus, see 4.2.44-3.1, 7.38 f., 5.2.2, 6.1.1-2, 2.3.12. In these passages Galen is bent on playing Chrysippus off against the ' t h e ancients'; the derogatory label typically used in c o n n e c t i o n with Chrysippus' divergence is φιλονεικία, see f u r t h e r De Lacy's Index n o m i n u m s.v. παλαιοί. 83 See esp. his reaction to Chrysippus' allegorical interpretation of the myth of A t h e n a ' s birth f r o m the crown of the h e a d of Zeus, q u o t e d 3.8.3-19 (SVF2.908). Having submitted an alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c o n f o r m i n g with anatomical fact (ibid. 29-32), h e points o u t that allegoresis is n o substitute for scientific premises based on sense-perception and experience, and adduces Plato's rejection of allegoresis, Phaedr. 229d3-e4 (ibid. 33-37). O n the classification of poetic testimonies as rhetorical a n d unscientific see also PHP2.4.4, 3.2.18, 7.47. 84 See the passages referred to supra, n. 82; Pythagoras is an exception but it was Posidonius who m e n t i o n e d him as anticipating Plato's psychology; a n d Galen, t h o u g h citing this view of Posidonius with n o sign of disapproval, gives Pythagoras n o role to play in the rest of his a r g u m e n t ; see f u r t h e r pp. 77 f. T h e idealized vision of early man enjoying a larger share of insight—accepted by many Stoics (but cf. also PI. Phil. 16c-e, Pit. 272b-c), is absent f r o m Galen. In Galen the nearest we have to this idea would a p p e a r to b e his idyllic vignette of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d his entourage, AA III 2: II 346.15-347.2 Κ; IV 2: II 421.18-422.6, IV 4: II 439.18-440.3 K.;

tenets s h o u l d n o t be a c c e p t e d o n a u t h o r i t y b u t tested in i n d e p e n d e n t - m i n d e d r e s e a r c h . I n p r i n c i p l e , t h e d o c t r i n e s of Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s stand in n e e d of justification as well. 85 This position is also reflected in the classification of f o u r types of a r g u m e n t in b o o k s 2 a n d 3. H e r e ( u n t e s t e d ) r e f e r e n c e s to philos o p h e r s a n d o t h e r authorities are classed as rhetorical. Unlike b o t h d e m o n s t r a t i v e (apodeictic) a n d dialectical premises, they d o n o t p e r t a i n to actual f e a t u r e s of t h e subject u n d e r investigation a n d so are i n a p p r o p r i a t e to scientific discourse (2.3.8-11; 4.3-4). T h e use of e x p e r t authorities is aligned with t h e testimony of n o n - e x p e r t s like poets a n d with c o m m o n o p i n i o n . Galen cites with approval a view expressed by Plutarch in his Homeric Studies that the poets can be m a d e to speak in favour of all d o c t r i n e s (3.2.18, fr. 125 S a n d b a c h ) . 8 0 In books 2 a n d 3 h e r e p r i m a n d s Chrysippus f o r attaching i n d e p e n d e n t value to what classical p o e t s a n d o t h e r n o n - e x p e r t s say. Yet t h e r e is also a n o t h e r side to Galen's attitude which is particularly relevant to his a r g u m e n t in books 4 a n d 5. Galen also claims that the poets, if called u p o n , actually testify in favour Plato r a t h e r than the Stoics. 87 At 2.2.5 h e even envisages a contest to decide who—Plato or Chrysippus — h a s a majority of poetical a n d o t h e r n o n - e x p e r t testimonies o n his side. A n d when h e summarizes his a r g u m e n t in PHP at On the Affected Parts III 5, h e d o e s n o t fail to i n c l u d e a few lines of verse which l e n d s u p p o r t to Plato. O n e of t h e passages c o n c e r n e d — H o m e r ' s

IX 2: II 716.8-13 Κ O n Galen's Hippocratism see Lloyd (1991), Harig and Kollesch (1975). O n his Platonism see the preliminary survey by De Lacy (1972). 85 E.g. P H P 3 A . 3 1 (the intelligent person does not believe the mere statements of even the wisest m e n , but 'waits for the p r o o f ) ; Nat. Fac. Ill 10, SM III, p.231 Helm.; Hipp. Epid. II 27, p. 91 Wenkeback-Pfaff; QAM9, SM II, ch. 9 p.64.9 ff., with Walzer (1949b) 51; Lloyd (1988) 15. In this last tract, however, the appeal to authority in practice provides the main backing for his own positions; cf. also Lloyd (1988) 38. O n PHP see esp. Vegetti (1986) 236 ff., esp. 239 f. A similar attitude is sometimes a d o p t e d by authors such as Cicero, cf. ND 1.10, Luc. 8-9; 7'use. 5.83; cf. 4.7 (stating an eclectic attitude in terms closely similar to Galen, Lib. Prop. 1 p.94.26 ff.). Cicero was n o d o u b t inspired by such earlier Academics as Arcesilaus a n d Carneades, who could point to the spirit of o p e n - e n d e d debate to be f o u n d in Plato's Socratic dialogues; cf. Sedley (1989) 102. 86 Conversely, the a u t h o r of the ps.Plutarchean De Homero takes the fact that H o m e r has provided the 'seeds and starting points' for all philosophical schools as evidence of the poet's wisdom (B 92). In its present f o r m , this tract c a n n o t be by Plutarch himself but it may at least in part be based on a collection of material m a d e by Plutarch for his Homeric Studies and o t h e r works; see Kindstrand (1990) p. VIII; cf. Babut (1969) 162, who less plausibly suggests that Galen refers to the De Homero but is mistaken as to the title. 87 E.g. PHP 2.2.5, 3.3.1-2, 3.7.47, 3.8.37.

description of Tityos' p u n i s h m e n t in Hades (Od. 11.576-81)—serves as the finale of his proof c o n c e r n e d with the liver (PHP 6.8.77-83). Some theoretical p r o n o u n c e m e n t s at the e n d of book 5 f u r t h e r explain his attitude to the use of poetry in scientific, or philosophical, contexts (7.83-88). Having j u s t cited Rep. 441a, containing a quotation of Od. XX. 17, Galen is led to p r o n o u n c e on the p r o p e r use of witnesses like H o m e r which, he says, is exemplified by Plato. H e distinguishes (1) timing: o n e should n o t begin by calling u p o n witnesses but only do so after full proof has been delivered (cf. 3 8.35); (2) subject-matter: witnesses should n o t be called u p o n 'to testify a b o u t matters that are utterly o b s c u r e b u t e i t h e r a b o u t evident p h e n o m e n a or about things the indication (ενδειξις) 8 8 of which lies close to sense-perception' (84). T h e e m o t i o n s are a case in point. H e r e no e x t e n d e d or detailed proofs (αποδείξεων) are called for; a simple r e m i n d e r of what we e x p e r i e n c e (πάσχομεν) is adequate. 8 9 I n d e e d , the d i f f e r e n c e between the soul's powers as such (i.e. the Platonic tripartition) is obvious for all m e n (cf. p.358, 13, 29: ένάργειαν). 9 0 T h u s Plato q u o t e d H o m e r merely to illustrate the opposition between anger and reason; h e consistently r e f r a i n e d f r o m the quotation of verse with regard to their location, which is not obvious and so does not m e e t condition (2). 91 88

I.e. an inference which is not merely empirical, but proceeds from the 'actual n a t u r e of the thing', see MM II 7, X pp. 126-7 K„ Nat. Fac. II 9, II p. 124 K. Subfig. Emp. 1-2 Walzer. Cf. the c o n c e p t of indicative sign, which Sextus regards as the invention a n d hall-mark of dogmatic p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d rationalist physicians, M. VIII 154-6. Galen, Inst. Log. 11.1, p. 24 Kalbfleisch sharply differentiates between ενδειξις and άπόδειξις on the g r o u n d that the f o r m e r does n o t p r o c e e d by the rules of the syllogism. Pace De Lacy ad loc., the fact that c o n c e p t of ενδειξις at PHP 5.7.84 has its technical m e a n i n g is s u p p o r t e d by Galen's e x a m p l e of the bodily effects of the affections of the soul, e.g. the h e a r t ' s palpitation, which Galen considers an indication as to the location of some of the f u n c t i o n s of the soul: 2.7.17 ( n o t e p.154.32 ένδείξεται a n d the r e f e r e n c e to the h e a r t ' s natural—κατά φύσιν—state, ibid. 1.29); cf. PHP2.8.24; 3.1.26-33; 8.1.23. 89 T h e whole passage (7.83-84) is printed as Posidonius F 156 E.-K (cf. Τ 87). Yet the precise extent of the Posidonian reference must remain uncertain—except p e r h a p s for the point a b o u t o u r experiencing the passions immediately; Kidd ad F 156 (Vol. II (ii) 566-8) is strongly in favour of taking the whole passage as Posidonian. 90 7.86, p. 358.13 f. δια ... την ένάργειαν του πράγματος ουδείς εστίν δς ούχ οΰτω γιγνώσκει. 87, ρ. 358.20: τοΰτο ... άπαντες άνθρωποι γιγνώσκουσι... 91 Cf. 5.7.75-6. Galen does not say h e r e that Plato also q u o t e d H o m e r at the e n d of his a r g u m e n t : condition (1). But he probably takes him to satisfy this condition as well; cf. § 82. Note, however, that at 6.8.80 (on which see supra in text) Galen, c o n c l u d i n g his proof a b o u t the f u n c t i o n of the liver with a H o m e r i c quotation, clearly means to comply with condition (1) (cf. 77), but flouts condition (2), if the seat of the mind is considered unclear, as it is according to 5.7.87 (and many others

A well-established tradition of anti-Stoic polemic s o u g h t to prove the Stoics at variance with t h e c o m m o n notions, which they used as their 'natural criteria of t r u t h ' 9 2 in virtue of their clarity (ένάργεια) 9 3 An e x t a n t treatise d e d i c a t e d to this line of criticism is Plutarch's On the Common Notions Against the Stoics.94 C o m p a r i s o n is surely e n c o u r aged by Galen's discussion of the criterion of truth at 9.7.2-4, where h e aligns t h e Stoic c o m m o n n o t i o n s (κοιναί εννοιαι) with his own c o n c e p t of p h e n o m e n a evident to all m a n k i n d , which is also at issue at 5.7.84. 9 5 T h u s Chrysippus' s t a t e m e n t (4.5.6 = SVF I5.476, fifth text) that t h e a f f e c t i o n s move at r a n d o m (είκη), i.e. without a cause, is d e n o u n c e d as conflicting with the c o n c e p t i o n s (εννοιαι) of all men. 9 6 Galen c o n s i d e r s t h e fact in q u e s t i o n ( ' n o t h i n g h a p p e n s w i t h o u t a cause') logically obvious (ibid. 7). In PHP 4-5, t h e evident facts a b o u t m e n t a l life are for t h e most part a d d u c e d by Chrysippus. Evident, universal truth o b t r u d e s itself even on the m i n d s of those who try to deny it. T h u s Chrysippus (who gives Plato's arguments less t h a n their d u e 9 7 ) o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t s his professed d o c t r i n e by m a k i n g s t a t e m e n t s c o n s o n a n t with the teachings of Plato a n d Hippocrates. 9 8 Conversely, he c a n n o t p r o p o u n d his own d o c t r i n e without c o n t r a d i c t i n g his t r u e statements as well as the obvious facts. 9 9 T h e way clear a n d c o m m o n p e r c e p t i o n a n d selfpassages). H e n c e either only o n e of the conditions of 5.7.84 suffices or Galen is simply inconsistent; cf. also Loc. Aff. Ill 5, referred to supra in text. 92 So Alex. Aphr. Mixt. p. 218.10-21 (not in SVF). 93 O n clarity (ενάργεια) as characteristic of the c o m m o n conceptions cf. Alex. Mixt. pp. 217.32-218.1 Bruns (SVF2.473, p. 155.24-30) and ibid. p. 227.12-17 (SVF 2.475, p. 156.19-23); cf. ibid. 227.20-22; cf. Plut. Comm. Not. 1074B, 1079A, F. 94 On this treatise see Babut (1969a) 34 ff., Cherniss (1976) 397 ff., 622 ff 95 T h e Stoic c o n c e p t of ' c o m m o n notions' in the technical sense, which the Stoics saw as the 'seeds' of their system, is not co-extensive with c o m m o n opinion; cf. T o d d (1973), who takes a rather ( p e r h a p s too) restrictive view; cf. also Schian (1973) 134-74. But if t h e r e is a d i f f e r e n c e , it is b l u r r e d by the polemicists; cf. Cherniss (1976) 625 ff. 96 These conceptions are aligned with Aristotle a n d Plato, who are said to represent the 'ancient a c c o u n t ' (see supra, p. 40) a n d to reflect ' t h e n a t u r e of things' (4.5.7). 97 O n Chrysippus' reticence about Plato's doctrine see e.g. 4.1.15, 2.1, 3.6; his omission of an exposition of views and a r g u m e n t of o p p o n e n t s can be related to the principles of his dialectic as r e c o r d e d elsewhere, see e.g. SVF 3.271 with Tieleman (1996a) 140 f., 264 f. Galen's view that Chrysippus completely failed to engage with Plato is false, see e.g. 4.1.7-13, f e a t u r i n g Platonic terminology in an antiPlatonic a r g u m e n t . In such cases Galen seizes on the Platonic terms to argue that Chrysippus is supporting Plato instead of refuting him. 98 See PHP4.1.5, 1.14 (where note the term έπαμφοτερίζω); 2.28; 3.6, 4.1, 4.3, 4.38; 5.1.9, 4.8, 4.14. 99 E.g. 5.4.7-8, w h e r e n o t e also the relation with the παλαιόν δόγμα, which

c o n t r a d i c t i o n are linked h e r e is familiar f r o m Plutarch's On Common Notions too. 1 0 0 Plutarch also devoted a separate treatise to the e x p o s u r e of Chrys i p p e a n inconsistencies, t h e On Stoic Self-Contradictions.101 Indeed, Galen too c o n t e m p l a t e s m a k i n g Chrysippus the b u t t of a similar treatise (4.4.1). 1 0 2 Interestingly e n o u g h , h e presents an h o r s d'oeuvre: h e plays off Chrysippus' definition of desire (ορεξις) in the first b o o k On Affections against a n o t h e r o n e which was to be f o u n d b o t h in the sixth b o o k of his Generic Definitions103 a n d his On Conation (or: On Desire, Περί ορμής, ibid. 2). 1 0 4 We h e a r n o t h i n g a b o u t the orginal c o n t e x t of the latter definition, a n d the two works f r o m which they are taken are m e n t i o n e d n o w h e r e else in t h e Galenic corpus. It is t h e r e f o r e likely t h a t G a l e n draws h e r e u p o n a lost s p e c i m e n of t h e t r a d i t i o n of c o m p i l a t i o n s of Stoic self-contradictions. An a n a l o g o u s case is pres e n t e d by t h e solitary d e f i n i t i o n of r e a s o n f r o m C h r y s i p p u s ' On Reason (Περί λόγου, 5.3.1). 1 0 5 A related p o i n t of criticism raised by b o t h Plutarch 1 0 6 a n d Galen c o n c e r n s Greek usage. Chrysippus can only escape the c h a r g e of selfChrysippus, Galen says, s o u g h t to discredit, thereby misusing his own intelligence. F u r t h e r 5.1.8, 2.1; cf. 6.5.21; 4.2.44; 4.8; cf. 3.3.23 on the relation of poetic testimony to evident p h e n o m e n a , o n which see also supra in text. Cf. 5.1.10, w h e r e Chrysippus is said to r e f u t e himself a n d at t h e same time contradicts τα έναργώς φαινόμενα, taken u p at 11, p. 294.21 as τα π ά σ ι ν ά ν θ ρ ώ π ο ι ς έναργώς φαινομένα. 100 See esp. 4.4.38, 5.1.9, 4.8 a n d cf. Plut. De comm. not. 1068D, 1070E; 1062A-B; 1084D, with Cherniss (1976) 626, 629 f. 101 O n t h e n a t u r e of P l u t a r c h ' s treatise see esp. B a b u t (1969a) 24 ff. a n d Cherniss (1976) 369-406, w h o a r g u e s that a failure to a p p r e c i a t e t h e s e q u e n c e of t h o u g h t of t h e treatise has o f t e n led to an overestimation of Plutarch's d e p e n d e n c e on sources, w h e r e a s in fact his direct knowledge of Chrysippus' writings was intim a t e a n d extensive (p.396); cf. Babut (1969a) 235-38. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if Galen used a compilation, such a s o u r c e m u s t have b e e n available f o r Plutarch too. Still, c o m p a r i s o n with Galen is j u s t i f i a b l e a n d r e w a r d i n g in view of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t in the works of both authors. 102 H e seems eventually to have written such a tract, see 8.1.47-48 a n d supra, n. 33. 103 έν έ'κτφ τών κατά γένος ορων, which must refer to a separate work r a t h e r than p e r t a i n i n g to what at 4.2.1 are called t h e όρισμοις τών γενικών παθών, ους πρώτους έξέθετο—i.e. t h e definitions p r e s e n t e d by Chrysippus in t h e first book On Affections. Cf. De Lacy ad 250.8, who, t b o u g h inclining to t h e alternative view, suggests as t h e s e p a r a t e work r e f e r r e d to t h e "Ορων τών προς Μητρόδωρον τών κατά γένος (six books), listed in D.L.'s Catalogue, see SVFII p.8.36; cf. SVF3, A p p e n d i x II, nr. XLI, where two o t h e r possible r e f e r e n c e s are m e n t i o n e d . 104 This work is, it seems, attested only o n e o t h e r time in a n c i e n t sources: see SVT"" III, App. II, nr. XL, w h e r e Von Arnim gives Epict. Diss. I 4.14, b u t omits o u r passage. 105 O n this work cf. SVF III, App. II, Nr. XXXIV. 106 See e.g. De comm. not. 1073. Cf. Cherniss (1976) 641.

contradiction if we take his words in a sense different from c o m m o n usage. Apparently, so Galen intimates, this is what Chrysippus expects us to do. This leads Galen to criticize his bad linguistic m a n n e r s in general (4.3.6-4.34; cf. 5.7.26-33). This traditional motif fits in with some of Galen's f u n d a m e n t a l intuitions about p r o p e r usage in scientific (and other) contexts: o n e should use ordinary Greek words (the συνήθεια τών Ελλήνων) in a consistent and unambiguous manner. 1 0 7 T h e r e is a characteristic grumble at 4.4.8 with respect to the sense of άλογον in Chrysippus: He could have avoided all these ambiguities, fabricated so inappropriately and contrary to Greek usage (6 τών 'Ελλήνων έ'θος), and made his argument exact and articulate in plain Greek words. Likewise, at 4.3.4: Right from the start one should avoid the kind of discourse that makes it necessary for one's audience to understand each word not in its usual meaning but according to certain other meanings. T h e polemical edge h e r e lies in the Stoics' claim that their concepts were firmly rooted in c o m m o n usage (cf. 4.4.15; 2.12 = SVF 3.462). With regard to introducing novel meanings, Galen warns us, the utmost restraint is due. In fact, it is justifiable only in those cases where c o m m o n parlance lacks a p r o p e r term. But even so, new terms should always be modelled on it. 108 Galen's remark that Chrysippus apparently expects us to take his words in a m e a n i n g diverging f r o m standard usage is striking. 1 0 9 It recalls the Stoic acceptance of 'misuse' (κατάχρησις) in its strong sense, i.e. not j u s t e x t e n d e d usage but ' t h e transference of a wordusage f r o m an object which is properly (κυρίως) signified to a n o t h e r object which has no p r o p e r n a m e (κύριον δνομα)'. 1 1 0 Galen n o d o u b t 107

O n Galen's views on language see Von Müller (1892) 84 ff., Manuli (1986), H a n k i n s o n (1994a), von Staden (1995b). 108 Cf. Morb. Temp. VII p.417 Κ. νόμος έστι κοινός άπασι τοις "Ελλησιν ών μεν αν εχωμεν ονόματα πραγμάτων παρά τοις πρεσβυτέρους είρημένα, χρήσθαι τούτοις, ών δ ' ούκ εχωμεν, ήτοι μεταφέρειν άπό τίνος ών εχομεν ή ποιεΐν αύτούς κατ' ά ν α λ ο γ ί α ν τινά τήν πρός τά κατωνομασμένα τών πραγμάτων ή καί κ α τ α χ ρ ή σ θ α ι τοις έφ' ετέρων κειμένοις. εξεστι μεν τω μηδέ φυλάττειν τά συνήθη τοις "Ελλησιν ... καί πολύ τοΰτ' εστι π α ρ ά τοις νεωτέροις ίατροΐς ώς άν μή παιδευθείσι τήν έν παισί παιδείαν... Cf. MM Χ ρ.55 Κ., PHP5.7.26 ff. I0fl It is r e p e a t e d at 4.3.5 with r e g a r d to Chrysipus' d e f i n i t i o n s of a p p e t i t i o n (ορεξις) a n d desire ( έπιθυμία) ; cf. infra, pp. 120 f. 110 Definition given by ps.Plut. De Homero Β 18; see Barwick (1957) 88-97, esp. 90 f., A t h e r t o n (1993) 162-7. Chrysippus wrote on ' Z e n o ' s correct usage of words' (Περί τού κυρίως κεχρήσθαι Ζήνων τοις όνόμασι, D.L. 7.122 = SVF3.617). This title

knows a b o u t a n d r e s p o n d s to this Stoic position. But it should also b e n o t e d that the principle f o u n d its way into the c o m m e n t a r y tradition at large. H e r e the appeal to i n c o r r e c t usage serves to resolve a p p a r e n t self-contradictions instead of h a m m e r i n g t h e m out. 1 1 1 I n d e e d , t h e p o l e m i c a l p r o c e d u r e of t r a c i n g ( a p p a r e n t ) inconsistencies in o n e a n d the same a u t h o r can also b e viewed as an application of the timeh o n o u r e d Homerum e Homero-rule in a polemical context. 1 1 2

5. Galen the Commentator This brings us to G a l e n ' s affiliations with the g e n r e of c o m m e n t a r y . Galen n o t only wrote c o m m e n t a r i e s himself 1 1 3 b u t also reflected o n exegetical principles a n d m e t h o d s involved in their c o m p o s i t i o n . It may b e worth o u r while to c o m p a r e his views in this a r e a with his p r o c e d u r e s in PHP4-b. T h o u g h n o t constituting a c o m m e n t a r y in the f o r m a l sense, these books, with their extensive q u o t a t i o n s , certainly b e a r comparison with the c o m m e n t a r y g e n r e .

suggests that Galen's c h a r g e was levelled at Z e n o in Chrysippus' time already. 111 Cf. e.g. Philo, De mut. nom. 11-14, P o r p h . In Cat. p.55.10-14 Busse with Whittaker (1992) 67 f., 73 f. Similarly P o r p h . ap. Simpl. In Cat. p.30.13-15 Kalbfleisch (= Fr. 220 Smith); cf. also H a d o t (1987) 19 ff. See Barwick (1957) 88-97; Runia (1988) 82-89, w h o traces t h e creative use of i n t e n t i o n a l κ α τ ά χ ρ η σ ι ς in t h e theological a r g u m e n t s of Philo; b u t cf. Whittaker (1992), esp. 70-1, w h o raises strong d o u b t s as to w h e t h e r t h e c o n c e p t ever f u n c t i o n e d in this sense outside Stoic circles. In t h e c o m m e n t a r y tradition t h e appeal to κατάχρησις was m a d e to h a r m o n i z e apparently conflicting passages in a u t h o r s such as Plato; cf. Whittaker (1987) 109 f. with furt h e r references. Likewise the s u p p o s e d unanimity of Plato a n d Aristotle was illustrated, cf. e.g. Alcin. Did. 25 with Whittaker (1989) 90 f.; cf. also Moraux (1986) 138 ff. 112 For G a l e n ' s k n o w l e d g e of this exegetical p r i n c i p l e see Dign. Puls. VIII p.958.6 ff. K , Hipp. Vict. pp. 183.15-184.2 H e l m r e i c h ; cf. Mansfeld (1994) 148 f. U3 p//f> a n t e d a t e s t h e m a j o r c o m m e n t a r i e s o n t h e Hippocratic treatises, t h o u g h h e may have b e g u n t h e c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e Aphorisms a n d h a d c o m p l e t e d at least two works o n H i p p o c r a t e s : On the Elements according to Hippocrates a n d On Hippocrates' Anatomy (lost), see De Lacy (1978) 55 f., 48, w h o shows that in PHP Galen q u o t e s f r o m t h e Hippocratic c o r p u s with less discrimination than in his later works. While a y o u n g m a n , Galen h a d written υ π ο μ ν ή μ α τ α o n logical works of Aristotle, T h e o p h r a s t u s a n d Chrysippus, see Lib. Prop. chs. 14-15, SM II p. 122.19 ff. Müller; cf. Ilberg (1897) 591 ft. O n υ π ο μ ν ή μ α τ α as collections of n o t e s n o t i n t e n d e d for publication see e.g. Hipp. Fract. Ill 32, XVIIIA, p. 529 Κ with Skydsgaard (1968) 107 ff. N o t e however that at 8.2.14, p.294.33 it refers at least to t h e p u b l i s h e d treatise Hipp. Elem. O n G a l e n ' s practices as a Hippocratic c o m m e n t a t o r see f u r t h e r Manuli (1984), Manetti-Roselli (1994), Mansfeld (1994) 131 ff. Cf. Sluiter (1995), Vallance (1999). At 6.8.76, Galen points to t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the selective p r o c e d u r e of PHP a n d t h e style of a r u n n i n g c o m m e n t a r y ; cf. 8.2.13, f o r which see infra, p. 49. For his selective p r o c e d u r e in regard to Chrysippus, cf. 3.1.3.

A c o m m e n t a r y , Galen a r g u e d in his (lost) On Exegesis (Περί έξηγήσεως), is n o t the place to test each t e n e t as to truth a n d to d e f e n d it against sophistic criticisms. Its p r o p e r goal ( σ κ ο π ό ς ) is r a t h e r to clarify what is unclear. 1 1 4 Clearly, the question of truth was raised by many o t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s (including, in practice, Galen himself)· 1 1 5 Similarly, in his c o m m e n t a r y o n the third b o o k of the H i p p o c r a t i c Epidemics116 he criticizes those who c o n f u s e c o m m e n t a r y a n d instruction ( δ ι δ α σ κ α λ ί α ) . T h e latter is c o n c e r n e d with explaining the facts in a detailed a n d precise m a n n e r , whereas c o m m e n t a r i e s d o n o t provide p r o o f (άπόδειξις). But they d o p r e s u p p o s e it: the c o m m e n t a t o r brings to the Hippocratic texts a f r a m e w o r k of theories (θεωρήματα, p.22.20 W e n k e b a c h ) a n d c o n c l u s i o n s (συμπεράσματα, p.22.6 W.). T h e medical texts c o n t a i n i n g these are logically a n d chronologically p r i o r to the c o m m e n t a r i e s . T h e latter provide t h e c o n t e x t f o r t h e discovery (εϋρεσις) n o t of t r u t h , but of o p i n i o n (δόξα, p.22.13 f.). If Galen in his H i p p o c r a t i c c o m m e n t a r i e s d o e s advert to the question of t h e t r u t h of t h e d o c t r i n e s u n d e r discussion, this is b e c a u s e H i p p o c r a t e s e m b o d i e s his m e d i c a l ideal in all respects. Yet o n occasion he m e n t i o n s truth (but n o t proofs) as o n e of the two main goals of the exegete (i.e. alongside a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c o n s o n a n t with the i n t e n t i o n s of the a u t h o r ) . 1 1 7 His r e m a r k s recall the t h r e e successive stages of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (viz. of the Platonic dialogues) listed at D.L. 3.65: (1) the m e a n i n g of what is said; (2) the a u t h o r ' s intention in saying it (e.g. constructive, or in r e f u t a t i o n a n d ad hominem)·, (3) the correctness of what has b e e n said. 1 1 8 T h e first two stages were to b e c o m e s t a n d a r d in N e o p l a t o n i s t c o m m e n t a r i e s b u t can be traced back to at least the first century CE.119 In Neoplatonist exegesis, obviously, the second stage b l e n d s into the third o n e , Plato's philosophy

114 See esp. t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c s t a t e m e n t s in Hipp. Fract. XVIII.2 pp.318.1-22.2 K. s u m m a r i z i n g what h e h a d said in Iiis On Exegesis. Cf. Roselli (1990) 121, Barnes (1992) 271, Mansfeld (1994) 136 f., 149 ff. For the p r o c e d u r e of clarification see f u r t h e r Diff. resp. VII p.825.6-7; Hipp. Vict. pp. 183.15-184.2 Helmreich. 115 Cf. Hipp. Aph. XVII.2 pp. 561.4 ff. K. with Mansfeld (1994) 135 f. 116 Hipp. Epid. Ill, CMC V 10,2,1 p. 22 ff. Cf. D e i c h g r ä b e r (1930) 24, Manuli (1983) 476 f. 117 Hipp. Epid. Ill, p. 17.16-18 W e n k e b a c h ; cf. ibid. p.6.11, w h e r e the instruction into useful t h i n g s a p p e a r s instead of t r u t h w i t h o u t any real d i f f e r e n c e b e i n g implied; cf. Deichgräber (1930) 24. 118 Cf. Dörrie - Baltes (1993) 3, 169 f., 353 ff. 119 Cf. D ö r r i e - Baltes (1993) 3, 170, w h o trace t h e s c h e m e (which b e c a m e s t a n d a r d in N e o p l a t o n i s m ) back to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De comp. verb. 3, II 4.6 f f , Ad Pomp. Gem. 2,13 II 230.13 ff. U.-R.; cf. Dionysius T h r a x ap. Sext. M I 59 (cf. ibid. 301), Gal. In Tim. p. 10.31 ff. Sehr.

r e p r e s e n t i n g truth. Clearly Galen is in a similar position in regard to Plato a n d H i p p o c r a t e s . In t h e case of Chrysippus a n d o t h e r o p p o n ents, m o r e o v e r , t h e test as to t r u t h o f t e n leads to negative results t h o u g h n o t invariably so. As to Chrysippus, Galen states a twofold p u r p o s e : first, to explicate his m e a n i n g ; secondly, to show how far h e is mistaken. 1 2 0 T h e a d d i t i o n , now a n d t h e n , of the question of t r u t h shows t h a t t h e r e is n o u n b r i d g e a b l e g a p s e p a r a t i n g c o m m e n t a r i e s a n d dialectical discussions involving t h e ipsissima verba of philosophers. So it should occasion little surprise to find Galen applying exegetical principles in philosophical contexts. T h e exegetical c o n c e r n with clarity o f t e n takes t h e guise of a c h a r g e of unclarity (ασάφεια). 1 2 1 This usually c o n c e r n s obscurity in malam partem—i.e. the intentional variety. But at times an o p a q u e passage of Chrysippus encapsulates a valuable e l e m e n t waiting to b e u n c o v e r e d by an insightful p e r s o n such as G a l e n . 1 2 2 In a d d i t i o n , we s h o u l d n o t e a few cases w h e r e Chrysippus is credited with clarity of expression (3.1.18, 5.38). A n o t h e r exegetical p r i n c i p l e relevant to o u r p u r p o s e s is that of selection. In PHP 4 a n d 5 Galen is quite explicit a b o u t his intention to limit himself to Chrysippus a m o n g t h e Stoics 1 2 3 a n d , within t h e c o m p a s s of t h e latter's work, to w h a t h e c o n s i d e r s his m a i n arguments. 1 2 4 This c o n f o r m s to his characterization of his p r o c e d u r e in his On the Elements According to Hippocrates, which is an exegesis of the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man: 120

See esp. 4.1.5, w h e r e G a l e n specifies as his aim as twofold: τήν γνώμην έρμηνεΰσαι τάνδρός [seil. Chrysippus; cf. (1) a n d (2)] ... οπ-η σφάλλεται δεικνύναι (cf. 3). 121 ρΗρ 2.5.54, 3.3.5,4.7, 4.8, 4.10, 4.4.8. Cf. also 2.3.1, where Galen refers to his 'clear a n d full' explanation in t h e On Demonstration of the ' r a t h e r unclear a n d b r i e f s t a t e m e n t s of t h e a n c i e n t s , i.e. in p a r t i c u l a r Aristotle in his Analytics. O n t h e clarification of what is unclear as o n e of Galen's exegetical principles see esp. Hipp. Fract. XVTIIB 318-19, 327-8 K., Diff. Resp. VII 825 ff. K. with Barnes (1992) 269 ff., Mansfeld (1994) 148 if. 122 2.5.71, 5.94 f. o n ibid. 69-70 (= SVF 2.898). Of course this kind of assistance to an a u t h o r w h o is thus shown to b e on the right track is even m o r e c o m m o n in the case of Plato a n d Hippocrates. O n Galen's m e t h o d of creative exegesis see also Mansfeld (1994) 155 ff. 123 P H P 4.1.3; 5.6.40-42. 124

Cf. 3.1.8: a l t h o u g h Galen, in c o n n e c t i o n with b o o k 2, speaks of a selection of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t s o n t h e basis of their relative strength, it is clear that h e h a d i n t e n d e d to limit himself to this selection in b o o k 2 (3.1.6 ff.) a n d devote book 3 to an entirely d i f f e r e n t subject (apparently not involving Chrysippus). As it was, h e was c h a l l e n g e d by a Stoic to r e f u t e all C h r y s i p p u s ' a r g u m e n t s a n d this is what h e e m b a r k s u p o n in b o o k 3, this time following t h e o r d e r of t h e a r g u m e n t s as h e f o u n d t h e m in Chrysippus' text.

It d o e s n o t e x p l a i n e v e r y w o r d as w r i t e r s of e x e g e s e s c o m m o n l y d o ; r a t h e r it c o m m e n t s o n l y t h o s e s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h c o n t a i n t h e d o c t r i n e , a l o n g with t h e p r o o f s b e l o n g i n g with it ( P H P 8 . 2 . 1 3 ) .

This is c o n f i r m e d by a few passages f r o m PHP. At the b e g i n n i n g of book 3 Galen a n n o u n c e s that h e will treat those a r g u m e n t s of Chrysippus which h e h a d o m i t t e d f r o m b o o k 2 a n d would never have c o n s i d e r e d in b o o k 3 were it n o t for the fact that h e was challenged by an ' e m i n e n t sophist' to r e f u t e t h e m as well. In line with the same p r o c e d u r e as h e h a d followed with r e g a r d to the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man, Galen had initially c o n c e n t r a t e d o n what was strongest in the p r o o f p r e s e n t e d by Chrysippus in his On the Soul, that is to say o n t h e most i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s (PHP 3.1.5-8). Similarly h e says that h e will c o n c e n t r a t e o n the m a i n points of Plato's a r g u m e n t in the f o u r t h book of the Republic, that is to say h e intends to q u o t e only those passages which h e believes c o n t a i n these highlights. Interestingly h e adds that everyone can easily read the full text for himself if h e so wishes (5.7.34). S o m e of the Stoic treatises exploited by Galen may have b e e n less accessible than Republic 4 a p p e a r s to have b e e n f r o m the passage j u s t r e f e r r e d to. But it seems d o u b t f u l that even the possibility of checking certain claims m a d e by Galen against the statem e n t s of Chrysippus or o t h e r Stoic scholarchs in their original contexts would have served as some g u a r a n t e e that Galen's presentation r e m a i n e d reasonably balanced. Galen's orientation towards the philosophical past (on which see § 3) tends to e n h a n c e the philological streak of PHP 4 a n d 5, with their extensive q u o t a t i o n s f r o m p h i l o s o p h e r s a n d poets. 1 2 5 In a sense, Galen is e n g a g e d in d e t e r m i n i n g , on the basis of his quotations, who b e l o n g s to t h e g r e a t tradition a n d who d o e s not. Real or a p p a r e n t discrepancies of d o c t r i n e a n d terminology are e x p l a i n e d or h a r m o nised; obscurities clarified; alleged misinterpretations set straight. 1 2 6 His t r e a t m e n t of Chrysippus, however devastating as to its conclusions, is p r e s e n t e d as a c o m p a r i s o n of his exact words with those of Plato a n d Hippocrates, i.e. an e x a m i n a t i o n of what the Stoic actually

125

O n this aspect of t h e work see esp. Vegetti (1986) 230 ff. Vegetti rightly points to G a l e n ' s selective p r o c e d u r e in citing texts, but his suggestion that Galen offers a kind of anthology for an a u d i e n c e — c o n s i s t i n g largely of practitioners of the τ έ χ ν α ι — w h o did not possess t h e original works themselves is at least in Plato's case incompatible with 5.7.34 (see in text). 126 O n e of t h e many g r u d g e s Galen bears against t h e m e m b e r s of t h e philosophical a n d medical sects of his day is that they m i s r e p r e s e n t what their f o u n d e r s actually said in their written works; cf. De Lacy (1972) 27.

wrote (4.1.3, 6; 5.6.40-2) a n d an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or exegesis of his m e a n n g (τήν γνώμην έρμηνεΰσαι τάνδρός, ibid. 1.5, τήν ρήσιν έξηγησάμενος αύτοΰ, ibid. 1.15, 4.10). This exegetical style of philosophizing had developed u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e of such c o m m e n t a t o r s as A n d r o n i c u s of R h o d e s a n d Boethus of Sidon (first century BCE).127 Systematic philosophy was taught mainly on the basis of the major works of the great classical philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus. 1 2 8 Accordingly, authors wishing to make a philosophical point o f t e n did so t h r o u g h citation. 1 2 9 T h a t philosophical discussion could b e c o m e predominantly exegetical a p p e a r s f r o m those passages where Galen speaks of his dispute with o p p o n e n t s on obscure textual details. 130 Naturally e n o u g h , t h e n , philosophical polemic o f t e n took the form of criticism of the writings of the f o u n d e r (or most authoritative p h i l o s o p h e r ) of the school of o n e ' s o p p o n e n t s , who were thus involved in the attack without being separately or explicitly refuted. In the 2nd century CE Chrysippus was the recognized authority for Stoic doctrine; his treatises were still studied a n d used for teaching purposes in the Stoic schools. 131 In consequence, as we have seen, h e is singled out by Galen for criticism, just as he had been Plutarch's favourite butt (4.1.3; 5.6.40-42). 132 127 Seneca complained: 'quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est' (Ep. 108.23). For the philosophical a n d exegetical traditions of Later Antiquity in the light of educational practice (esp. the preliminary stage in the study of an a u t h o r ) see Mansfeld (1994); cf. also Gottschalk (1985) 65, H a d o t (1987) 14 ff. 128 Of course the c o m m i t m e n t of a school to the scriptures of o n e or m o r e f o u n d e r s was essential to its cohesion and survival; cf. Sedley (1989) 100. 129 C o m p a r e Seneca's homily against excessive reliance on quotations f r o m philosophical authorities (Ep. 33). According to Seneca, o n e can only acquaint oneself with great minds by studying their texts as a whole, not just a limited n u m b e r of highlights (4-6). Cf. also Iren. Adv. haeres. I 9.3-5, on which see also infra, p. 88 n. 97. Moreover, the use of their statements tends to come in the place of i n d e p e n d e n t t h o u g h t (7-9). But Seneca could be quite irreverent when he f o u n d the arguments of Z e n o a n d o t h e r scholarchs useless for moral progress; cf. Ep. 82.9; 83.9; Otio 3.1. 130 T h u s he quarelled with a Stoic on the correct m e a n i n g of the verb χωρεί in Zeno's syllogism c o n c e r n e d with spoken language (PHP2.5.22). So Galen decides to q u o t e and examine not only Zeno's original a r g u m e n t (ibid. 8) but also its m o r e elaborate versions by Diogenes of Babylon a n d Chrysippus (ibid. 9-13, 15-20), which prove his r e a d i n g of Z e n o ' s a r g u m e n t correct. Cf. also 3.4.12-13, w h e r e Galen reports on a difference of opinion between him and certain Stoics on the o n e h a n d a n d o t h e r Stoic i n t e r p r e t e r s on the o t h e r with respect to an obscure passage in Chrysippus' On the Soul. 131 O n the evidence (mostly f r o m Epictetus) that Chrysippus was the prime authority in Stoic circles of the time see Babut (1969a) 17-18; cf. Gould (1970) 12-14. 132 Cf. Babut (1969a) 19 f. Cherniss (1976) 397 f.

6. Galen's Working Method: The Selection of Texts Given t h e p a r t played in o u r study by s o u r c e analysis, it is worth c o n s i d e r i n g Galen's p r o c e d u r e f r o m a m o r e practical angle as well. How did h e actually go a b o u t c o m p o s i n g PHP books 4 a n d 5? This question r e q u i r e s an answer which takes a c c o u n t of what is known a b o u t t h e working m e t h o d s of a n c i e n t scholars. Explicit testimonies are however small in n u m b e r a n d in s o m e cases o p e n to d i f f e r e n t interpretations. Galen himself is o n e of o u r main sources in this area. In a d d i t i o n , s o m e e x t a n t papyri are silent witnesses to t h e stages followed in t h e process of c o m p o s i t i o n a n d h e n c e have a d d e d considerably to o u r knowledge. M o d e r n research has s u c c e e d e d in r e c o n s t r u c t i n g f r o m this d i s p a r a t e a n d sparse material a plausible picture of what authorial practice may have looked like. 133 Ancient a u t h o r s used a working m e t h o d which differs in i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m that of m o d e r n scholars. This d i f f e r e n c e is largely d u e to practical circumstances a n d constraints. Ancient scrolls were difficult to h a n d l e a n d less accessible than present-day books. Books were p r o d u c e d in small n u m b e r s . If o n e wished to r e f e r to a particular passage in the work of a n o t h e r a u t h o r , o n e served o n e ' s r e a d e r s b e t t e r by q u o t i n g it in full t h a n to give j u s t t h e r e f e r e n c e . It was i n c o n v e n i e n t to have to look u p each passage in the original work. A scholar did not write with a n u m b e r of scrolls spread out b e f o r e t h e m or having t h e m within reach. As a rule, he would first read a n d m a k e e x c e r p t s f r o m a fairly up-to-date s t a n d a r d work. Having worked it t h r o u g h , h e would move on to o t h e r relevant ones, both m o r e r e c e n t a n d o l d e r than t h e first o n e . H e would c o n t i n u e to m a k e excerpts b u t gradually h e would e x c e r p t less, only m a k i n g notes of what was d i f f e r e n t or new. 1 3 4 Accordingly Galen in PHP refers repeatedly to t h e p r o c e d u r e of e x c e r p t i n g ( ε κ λ έ γ ε ι ν ) t h e Stoic treatises by Chrysippus a n d Posidonius he has singled out f o r use. 1 3 5 A scholar did n o t always d o the e x c e r p t i n g himself. More o f t e n h e would dictate t h e selected passages to a slave, w h o collected t h e

13S p o r t | l e f 0 i i 0 W i n g ι d r a w on the researches by Dorandi (1991), with special reference to the important papyrological evidence, and id. (1993); see now also his m o r e comprehensive discussion in Dorandi (2000). In addition I f o u n d m u c h of use in Skydsgaard (1968) 101-16, who is c o n c e r n e d with Varro and other historians, Mejer (1978) 16 ff., who applies the results of Skydsgaard and others to Diogenes Laertius, as well as Van den Hoek (1996) (Clement of Alexandria). 134 See Skydsgaard (1968) 105. 135 PHP3.3.1, 2.18, 2.40; 4.6.47, 7.1.

e x c e r p t s o n a s e p a r a t e scroll. Alternatively, h e c o u l d m a r k t h e passages in the original text a n d h a n d it over to t h e scribe to d o t h e e x c e r p t i n g . T h e r e s u l t i n g c o l l e c t i o n s of e x c e r p t s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e material f o r a d r a f t o u t of which a publishable work could grow. An e x t a n t text of this kind is P h i l o d e m u s ' Academicorum philosophorum index Herculanensis ( ΡH 1012). W h a t we have h e r e is a disorderly collection of notes, m a n y of t h e m j o t t e d down in the m a r g i n s a n d even o n t h e back of t h e sheet. 1 3 6 T h e s e n o t e s are n o t only excerpts f r o m existing works b u t i n c l u d e i n t r o d u c t i o n s a n d t r a n s i t i o n a l c o m m e n t s — p o s s i b l y also d i c t a t e d — b y t h e a u t h o r of t h e work in progress. 1 3 7 Dictation seems to have b e e n c o m m o n , in particular d u r i n g t h e e a r l i e r stages of c o m p o s i t i o n . 1 3 8 G a l e n even r e p o r t s o n e n t i r e treatises h e dictated to a s t e n o g r a p h e r without going himself t h r o u g h the text o n a later occasion. 1 3 9 But in these cases the circumstances were u n u s u a l a n d led to a d e p a r t u r e f r o m regular p r o c e d u r e — w h i c h m a d e it worthy of m e n t i o n in t h e first place. Usually, his w o r k i n g m e t h o d passes w i t h o u t c o m m e n t . N o n e t h e l e s s , it surfaces in a few passages in his On My Own Books, f o r instance w h e r e h e says that h e h a d g e n e r o u s l y l e n t to f r i e n d s a n d p u p i l s n o t e s , o r n o t e b o o k s (υπομνήματα). 1 4 0 T h e s e were n o t i n t e n d e d for publication a n d so did n o t b e a r his n a m e . G a l e n c o m p l a i n s t h a t they w e r e stolen a n d p u b l i s h e d u n d e r o t h e r n a m e s a n d / o r u s e d by o t h e r s f o r t h e i r lectures. Nonetheless a n u m b e r of t h e m were r e t u r n e d to him so that h e could u n d e r t a k e their c o r r e c t i o n (διορθώσις) a n d provide t h e m with a title a n d his n a m e , t h u s a u t h o r i s i n g t h e views p r o f e s s e d in them. 1 4 1 Correction t h e n constituted the final stage of composition. 136

See D o r a n d i (1991) 15 ff. Cf. Plin. Ep. Ill 5.10-17 with D o r a n d i (1991) 14; cf. also 16 f. 138 Cf. Dorandi (1991), esp. 25., id. (2000) 51 ff. 139 See Wen. Sect. Er. XI pp. 19 f., 16 ff. K., Praev. 5.20-1. pp. 98 ff. with N u t t o n ad loc. Cf. also D o r a n d i (1991) 22. 140 O n the r a n g e of m e a n i n g of t h e term ύπομνήμα see esp. Skydsgaard (1968), esp. 110 f., D o r a n d i (1991), esp. 26 f. Galen, Hipp. Art. Ill 32, XVIIIA p.529 f. K. calls t h e s e c o n d b o o k of t h e H i p p o c r a t i c Epidemics a υ π ό μ ν η μ α as o p p o s e d to t h e first a n d third books ( ' σ υ γ γ ρ ά μ μ α τ α ' ) , whose m o r e polished state marks t h e m as finished p r o d u c t s i n t e n d e d for p u b l i c a d o n . Note, however, that f r o m t h e e n d of t h e Hellenistic p e r i o d onwards the term is also used f o r published treatises m a r k e d by a loose s t r u c t u r e . I n d e e d , s o m e a u t h o r s t h o u g h t t h e less p o l i s h e d style well suited to t h e i r subject-matter, e.g. p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e m p l a t i o n , as C l e m e n t of Alexandria did, see Van d e n H o e k (1996) 225. 141 Lib. Prop. 1, p. 92.13 ff. Cf. ibid. 1, p.94.16 f., p.95.21 ff., 11. p . l 17.24 ff., p.118.13 f. Müller. See t h e discussion of these a n d o t h e r related testimonies in D o r a n d i (2000) 78 ff. 137

H o w f a r G a l e n ' s c o r r e c t i o n s w e n t will have d i f f e r e d in e a c h individual case. This seems clear f r o m a c o m p a r i s o n between e.g. his h i g h l y p o l i s h e d a u t o b i o g r a p h i c a l s h o w - p i e c e On Prognosis a n d m e d i c a l tracts of a m o r e technical k i n d which were less a m b i t i o u s f r o m a stylistic p o i n t of view. O n the whole Galen is n o t o r i o u s f o r his repetitiveness a n d incongruities of s t r u c t u r e — a n d large parts of PHP d o little to improve this reputation. 1 4 ' 2 T h e s e compositional flaws are at least to s o m e e x t e n t explicable o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n that Galen h a d d i c t a t e d his e x p o s i t i o n s — i n line with t h e w i d e s p r e a d p r a c t i c e we have j u s t n o t e d . In particular, his repetitiveness seems to be a m a r k of orality, especially w h e n t h e stage of d i c t a t i o n was n o t followed by r i g o r o u s editing. Presumably Galen did n o t always devote m u c h time to polishing his writings himself. H o w else, o n e may well ask, c o u l d h e have c o m p o s e d his p r o d i g i o u s o e u v r e while at t h e s a m e t i m e fulfilling his professional a n d social duties ? Let us take a closer look at t h e p r i n c i p l e , o r principles, which g o v e r n e d t h e selection of e x c e r p t s in t h e first stage of c o m p o s i t i o n . S o m e h e l p is provided by o n e of the key passages o n a n c i e n t m e t h o d s of c o m p o s i t i o n . T h i s t i m e it is n o t to b e f o u n d in G a l e n b u t in A m m o n i u s , On Aristotle's Categories 4.3-13 Busse: Of the general treatises [seil, by Aristotle] 1 4 3 some are syntagmatic (συνταγματικά), while others are hypomnêmatic (ύπομνηματικά). Hypomnêmatic are called those in which only main points are noted down; for one should know that in the past if one chose to compose a [publishable] treatise (συγγράψασθαι), 144 they recorded along main lines their individual findings which contributed to the demonstration of their thesis and they took many ideas from older books in order to strengthen those which were correct and to refute those which were not; in a later stage, however, bringing also a certain arrangement to their material and adorning it with beautiful expressions and stylistic elaboration they composed their treatises (συγγράμματα). And herein lies the difference between hypomnêmatic and syntagmatic treatises, viz. in order and beauty of expression. T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , t h o u g h associated with t h e n a m e of Aristotle in particular, fits i n t o t h e g e n e r a l p i c t u r e we have s k e t c h e d , i n c l u d i n g t h e relevant s t a t e m e n t s of Galen. 1 4 5 A m m o n i u s c o n f i r m s that it was 142

O n t h e work's compositional flaws see De Lacy (1978-80) 51 ff. In t h e c o n t e x t A m m o n i u s p r e s e n t s a m a i n division of t h e Aristotelian treatises i n t o t h r e e classes, viz. g e n e r a l ( κ α θ ό λ ο υ ) , special ( μ ε ρ ι κ ά ) a n d interm e d i a t e (μεταξύ) 144 Cf. G a l e n ' s usage as q u o t e d supra, n. 140. 145 O n this a n d r e l a t e d t e s t i m o n i e s see now D o r a n d i (2000) 84 ff. Cf. also 143

n o t necessary f o r a n a n c i e n t a u t h o r to g o t h r o u g h b o t h stages of c o m p o s i t i o n ; t h e first c o u l d s u f f i c e — a s we have s e e n in G a l e n ' s case. 1 4 6 F u r t h e r m o r e , A m m o n i u s provides u s e f u l i n f o r m a t i o n conc e r n i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i o n of e x c e r p t s . C o n c e n t r a t i o n is f o c u s e d o n t h e m a i n thesis a l o n g with t h e p r o o f s b a c k i n g it u p . This b e a r s c o m p a r i s o n with w h a t G a l e n in PHP says a b o u t his p r e f e r r e d style of exegesis as p r a c t i s e d in his On the Elements according to Hippocrates (see above, p. 48 f.). By o u r s t a n d a r d s , a n c i e n t c o n v e n t i o n s of q u o t a t i o n p a i d little r e g a r d to c o n t e x t — w h e t h e r in p o l e m i c o r praise. As it was, m a n y b o o k s were r a r e a n d difficult to consult; h e n c e t h e n e e d to m a k e e x c e r p t s in t h e first place. Posidonius' On Affections, which plays such a p r o m i n e n t role in the attack l a u n c h e d by Galen against Chrysippus, was a case in p o i n t . T h i s treatise is r e f e r r e d to by G a l e n only. 1 4 7 Explicitly a t t e s t e d views of P o s i d o n i u s o n t h e a f f e c t i o n s o r o t h e r ethical subjects c o m e a l m o s t exclusively f r o m G a l e n . A few o t h e r s o u r c e s c o n t e m p o r a r y with o r later t h a n G a l e n , if they c h o o s e to m e n t i o n P o s i d o n i u s in c o n n e c t i o n with m o r a l topics at all, d o so in clusters of tenets, taken f r o m c o m p i l a t i o n s a n d n o t directly f r o m t h e original e x p o s i t i o n s of P o s i d o n i u s a n d t h e o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s conc e r n e d . 1 4 8 Later a u t h o r s such as Strabo, C l e o m e d e s a n d A l e x a n d e r of A p h r o d i s i a s treat P o s i d o n i u s as a t h i n k e r w h o was primarily k n o w n f o r his detailed investigations in such areas as m e t e o r o l o g y a n d geography. 1 4 9 His philosophical i n f l u e n c e in later antiquity has certainly b e e n overestimated, n o t least b e c a u s e of his p r o m i n e n c e in the PHP. T h e Stoics themselves at any r a t e d o n o t s e e m to have b e e n t o o impressed by Posidonius' alleged critique of Chrysippean psychology. G a l e n c o m p l a i n s t h a t P o s i d o n i u s ' a t t e m p t to assimilate Z e n o ' s

Lucian, On How History Should Be Written 47-8, with Skydsgaard (1968) 107 f. 146 As observed by D o r a n d i (1991) 29. 147 See Frs. 30-35 E.-K. 148 T h e r e l e v a n t m a t e r i a l f r o m G a l e n (mostly) a n d t h e s e o t h e r s o u r c e s is collected as Frs. 150-187 E.-K, i.e. in t h e section ' f r a g m e n t s n o t assigned to books'. P o s i d o n i u s a p p e a r s relatively o f t e n in t h e clusters of Stoic a u t h o r i t i e s a n d t h e i r treatises m e n t i o n e d in c o n n e c t i o n with a particular t e n e t by Diogenes Laërtius, see Edelstein-Kidd's i n d e x , vol. 1, p. 259. But obviously these r e f e r e n c e s d o n o t pres u p p o s e direct i n s p e c t i o n of t h e original treatises. D i o g e n e s Laërtius, m o r e o v e r , t h o u g h usually d a t e d to t h e 2 n d o r 3rd cent. CE., reflects t h e Hellenistic stage of a n c i e n t h i s t o r i o g r a p h y a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y reveals little to n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e standing e n j o y e d by P o s i d o n i u s in t h e I m p e r i a l era. See M e j e r (1978); cf. Mansfeld (1986) 300 ff. 149 Cf. t h e assessment by K. Algra, s.v. ' P o s i d o n i u s ' in t h e Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

position to that of t h e Platonists did n o t p r e v e n t 'nearly all o t h e r Stoics' f r o m clinging to Chrysippus' errors (4.4.38, Posid. Τ 59 E.-K.) a n d h e is even m o r e explicit a b o u t P o s i d o n i u s ' lack of i n f l u e n c e a m o n g later Stoics in his The Powers of the. Soul Follow the Temperaments of the Body (pp. 77.17-78.2 Müller ~ Posid. Τ 58 E.-K.). But if G a l e n s e e m s e x c e p t i o n a l in d r a w i n g o n o n e P o s i d o n i a n treatise in the original, this should not lead us to think of his project as historiographical a c c o r d i n g to present-day standards. H e does n o t seem to have consulted any o t h e r works of Posidonius. Conspicuously a b s e n t is a n o t h e r treatise of direct relevance to the issues raised in PHP—Posidonius' On the Soul, in at least t h r e e books. 1 5 0 It is difficult to decide w h e t h e r Galen was simply u n a b l e to take hold of a copy or had some less i n n o c e n t reason to omit any m e n t i o n of this treatise. 1 5 1 Likewise Galen, while r e f e r r i n g to books 1, 2 a n d 4 of Chrysippus' On Affections, is silent o n its t h i r d book. 1 5 2 His r e m a r k c o n c e r n i n g the length of each of the f o u r books On Affections (5.6.44) suggests that he h a d seen t h e m all. Why h e used t h e o t h e r t h r e e is n o t so difficult to see. T h e first b o o k c o n t a i n e d an exposition a n d exegesis of Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s a n d was f u n d a m e n t a l . T h e s e c o n d was m o r e a p o r e t i c , dealing as it did with ill-explicable p h e n o m e n a , a n d so was useful as a quarry for self-contradictions a n d admissions of the truth on Chrysippus' part. T h e f o u r t h , separately entitled the Therapeutiken, seems to have b e e n a rather p o p u l a r guide in m o r a l self-improvement. 1 5 3 Chrysippus' standing a m o n g the Stoics of the first two centuries CE e n s u r e d his role as the favourite target of critics such as Plutarch a n d A l e x a n d e r of Aphrodisias. By this time, it seems, his treatises h a d almost completely eclipsed those of Z e n o a n d Cleanthes. Galen too c o n c e n t r a t e s o n Chrysippus, as h e explicitly a n n o u n c e s (4.1.3). But, as we have seen (chs. 1.5, 2), this d o e s n o t prevent him f r o m m a k i n g c o n f i d e n t a n d far-reaching claims a b o u t Z e n o a n d Cleanthes, telling us t h a t C h r y s i p p u s ' i m m e d i a t e p r e d e c e s s o r s h a d a c c e p t e d n o n 150

See Posid. Frs. 28a-b E.K. Cf. Mansfeld (1991) 122 f., 136 f., who notes t h e striking contrast with Galen's extensive dealings with Chrysippus' On the Soul. 151 T h e f r a g m e n t s of this treatise (see previous n.) as well as F 21 (D.L. 7.138) strongly indicate that Posidonius followed Chrysippus a n d his o t h e r predecessors in taking t h e soul's substance to be pneuma a n d assigning n o role to t h e nerves. See f u r t h e r , supra p. 36 f. 152 C o m p a r e G a l e n ' s c o m p l e t e silence on t h e first of t h e two books of Chrysippus' On the Soul, even t h o u g h h e inserts a g r e a t n u m b e r of q u o t a t i o n s (some of t h e m extensive) f r o m t h e second half of its second b o o k in PHP books 2 a n d 3; cf. supra, pp. 12 ff. 153 See infra, p. 141.

r a t i o n a l f a c t o r s in t h e soul a n d i n d e e d t h e full-fledged Platonic tripartition. 1 5 4 T h e only textual s u p p o r t — t a k e n by Galen f r o m Posidonius—consists of a versified d i a l o g u e between a n g e r a n d reason c o m p o s e d by C l e a n t h e s (5.6.35 ~ SVF 1.570). But it is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r this proves that C l e a n t h e s h a d subscribed to s o m e f o r m of psychological d u a l i s m at o d d s with C h r y s i p p u s ' position. 1 5 5 As to Z e n o , G a l e n excuses himself o n g r o u n d s of lack of space f o r n o t p r o d u c i n g a separate proof-text in his case; that is to say, h e admits to n o t having l o o k e d u p Z e n o ' s position in an original treatise of his (ibid. 40-2). 156 We should now try to derive some conclusions f r o m this picture of G a l e n ' s w o r k i n g m e t h o d . First, we are to a g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n we m i g h t like at the mercy of Galen as to what h e considers i m p o r t a n t in an a u t h o r a n d h e n c e suitable f o r inclusion in his discussion. A n e a t illustration of this fact is the a r r a n g e m e n t of subject-matter over PHP books 2 a n d 3. W h e r e a s Galen, as we have seen (see supra in text), says that h e has selected a n d discussed the most i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s of Chrysippus in b o o k 2 (e.g. t h e c e l e b r a t e d a r g u m e n t f r o m spoken language, 2.5), it is the q u o t a t i o n s p r e s e n t e d in the first two c h a p t e r s of b o o k 3 which reveal a few crucial facts a b o u t the line of a p p r o a c h followed by Chrysippus, especially as c o n c e r n s the status a c c o r d e d to n o n - e x p e r t witnesses—one of the main targets of Galen's criticism. 1 5 7 Marginal points, m i n o r concessions, r e m a r k s o n the difficulty of t h e p r o b l e m u n d e r discussion—all such cases could be easily exploited by skillful polemicists such as Galen (cf. Plutarch in his On Stoic SelfContradictions). N o n e t h e l e s s t h e r e may have b e e n certain factors which may, at least to s o m e extent, c u r b e d t h e t e n d e n c y to irresponsible m a n i p u l a tion. Galen took part in oral d e b a t e s with his Stoic c o n t e m p o r a r i e s on the questions at issue in PHP. Substantial sections may be taken to reflect these discussions. In c o n s e q u e n c e , Galen may be e x p e c t e d to r e s p o n d to those a r g u m e n t s of Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics which their followers still f o u n d p o w e r f u l e n o u g h to use. T h u s t h e argum e n t f r o m s p e e c h was used by m a n y Stoics as o n e of their t r u m p -

154 5.6.33, 36 (Zeno and Cleanthes accepted the Platonic postulate of a παθητικόν in the soul, a point which Galen says had already been made by Posidonius); cf. ibid. 6.42, 8.1.15 (the Platonic tripartition). 155 On this passage, see further infra, p. 264 ff. 156 On this startling passage, see supra, p. infra, pp. 85 f. 157 See further Tieleman (1996a).

c a r d s in t h e d e b a t e o n t h e seat of t h e soul. In c o n s e q u e n c e , it p r o m p t s an extensive r e f u t a t i o n o n Galen's part. 1 5 8 T h e preliminary stage of r e a d i n g a n d e x c e r p t i n g described above s h o u l d warn us n o t to b e t o o quick in positing o n e m a i n source. M o r e o f t e n t h a n not, t h e situation is c o m p l e x . T h e s a m e original could reach an a u t h o r by m o r e than o n e way. An a u t h o r could first c o m e across a n d e x c e r p t a q u o t a t i o n f r o m X in a work by Y h e h a d c h o s e n to r e a d first of all. L a t e r h e c o u l d d e c i d e to e x p a n d a n d d e e p e n his r e a d i n g by t u r n i n g to the original exposition of X a n d cull f r o m it m o r e excerpts which s u p p l e m e n t e d that drawn earlier f r o m Y. T h e r e is thus n o t h i n g u n u s u a l a b o u t an a u t h o r using the same sources b o t h directly a n d indirectly. 1 5 9 This is c o n f i r m e d by a few passages in PHP books 4 a n d 5. O n o n e occasion Galen fabricates a c o n t r a d i c t i o n between definitions in Chrysippus' On Affections a n d two o t h e r works. T h e definitions f r o m these two o t h e r works (which a r e m e n t i o n e d n o w h e r e else in t h e Galenic c o r p u s ) are n o d o u b t derived f r o m an a d d i t i o n a l s o u r c e . A n d , I would suggest, G a l e n f o u n d t h e m played off against the definition f r o m the On Affections in the same source as well. 160 Likewise, his i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t Chrysippus' On Affections may in s o m e passages be derived f r o m Posidonius' work of t h e same title even if Galen h a d also read the f o r m e r work directly himself a n d is drawing u p o n it on o t h e r occasions in PHP. This f e a t u r e will be of relevance o n c e we take a closer look at Galen's use of Posidonius in discussing the Chrysippean doctrine a n d text. T h e a n c i e n t practice of e x c e r p t i n g m a k e s it all too likely t h a t passages were q u o t e d o u t of context. T h e n u m b e r of collected excerpts is limited in principle a n d o n e could n o t easily, or at any rate o f t e n did not, check t h e original context. Moreover, collections of excerpts were o f t e n used some time after they h a d b e e n compiled. By that time the original reason why passages h a d b e e n e x c e r p t e d might have b e e n f o r g o t t e n . In c o n s e q u e n c e , s o m e were used for d i f f e r e n t p u r p o s e s which h a d little to d o with their original context. At PHP 6.2.7 we have an instance of an e x c e r p t b e i n g used in such a way. H e r e Galen p r o d u c e s Timaeus 77b3 f. as evidence that Plato spoke of ' f o r m s ' (ε'ιδη) r a t h e r than 'powers' (δυνάμεις) with r e f e r e n c e to the soul. However, this q u o t a t i o n d o e s n o t d o this duty particularly well,

158 159 159 160

See esp. PHP2.5.7, 22, 3.1.8. Cf. Gal. Hipp. Epid. I, p. 43.21 ff. W„ Hipp. O f f . Med. Ill 22, XVIIIB p.863 K. Cf. Skydsgaard (1968) 105; Mejer (1978) 18 f. See supra, p. 44.

while constituting a clear illustration of the central thesis d e f e n d e d by Galen in PHP 6, viz. that the liver is the seat of desire. We need not d o u b t that it was first excerpted for this purpose when book 6 was projected. In sum, the a n c i e n t m e t h o d of c o m p o s i n g treatises like PHP involves a fair a m o u n t of selectivity and makes it highly likely that the original context of quoted passages is lost sight off. In addition Galen is seen to be selective when it comes to choosing Stoic treatises or individual b o o k s — t h e r e are striking a n d u n e x p l a i n e d omissions, which may be related to the limited availability of certain works or books. Add these facts to Galen's polemical style and motives and it becomes clear that we should expect grave distortions of Chrysippus' original a r g u m e n t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , Galen could not, i n d e e d would not, leave undiscussed those doctrines a n d a r g u m e n t s that were believed to be distinctive of the Stoic position a n d were still cited by the Stoics. Thus in regard to Chrysippus' On Affections, Galen singles o u t for criticism the central thesis that the affections are j u d g e m e n t s and some of the main arguments supporting it (PHP4.2 ff.). H e r e not his selection of material but interpretation of it may entail distortion f r o m a present-day historiographical point of view. But when Galen proceeds to argue that Zeno and Cleanthes had said something significantly different f r o m Chrysippus, it is the textual evidence again which seems very slim indeed. No original expositions by Zeno and Cleanthes have been used.

7. Conclusion This c h a p t e r sets the stage for o u r detailed t r e a t m e n t of Galen's quotations f r o m Chrysippus' On Affections (chs. 3-5). T o this e n d I have sketched his overall aims and m e t h o d s in the light of the traditions to which he is indebted. I have considered the general contents of PHP books 4-5 and their place in the structure of the treatise as a whole ( § 1 ) ; the philosophical and scholastic backdrop (§ 2-3); the polemical and exegetical literary traditions (§ 4-5) as well as Galen's technique of excerpting (§ 6). It is difficult, and probably pointless, to assign PHP 4-5 to a single g e n r e m a r k e d by a specific set of rules. Galen was a many-sided author, who practised various genres. So it is n o t surprising to see that elements f r o m various genres a n d traditions are traceable in

these pages. T h e different genres themselves were not self-contained entities but may overlap and interact. Thus, as we have noticed, the ways in which he responded to the text of Chrysippus and others also owes something to his work as a c o m m e n t a t o r , in particular his m e t h o d of creative exegesis (§ 5). In criticizing Chrysippus Galen provides himself with the context for developing positive doctrines (cf. also § 4). Particularly important in this respect are those Chrysippean passages which according to Galen point to an irrational e l e m e n t in the mind alongside a rational one. T h u s he not only chides Chrysippus for denying this obvious truth but isolates useful insights, e.g. by clarifying what the Stoic said obscurely. In studying the Stoic fragments we should therefore be prepared to face a large degree of distortion from a present-day historiographical point of view. This is not so much a matter of low professional morals as of different conventions when it comes to dealing with texts. We shall encounter similar instances of creative exegesis in Galen's attribution of Platonic and Aristotelian ideas to Zeno, Cleanthes and Posidonius (chs. 2.8, 5.6, 5 passim).^ Of particular interest for our purposes is the fact that Galen follows procedures distinctive of later ancient philosophical literature. He is unmistakably indebted to the same tradition of Platonist scholasticism as is reflected by such authors as Clement, Porphyry, Alcinous, particularly where the essence/attributes and e s s e n c e / powers distinctions are c o n c e r n e d . His d o d g i n g of the parts vs. powers issue, moreover, could be related to current debates between Peripatetics and Platonists as well as among the Platonists themselves

(§2). Further, Galen used, and expected others to use, the m e t h o d of division (διαίρεσις) of available options in any given debate. This practice is related to his use of schémas, some of which can be paralleled from the relevant sections in extant doxographic texts. It is a fair assumption that such schémas determined the expectations an a u t h o r like Galen b r o u g h t to the original expositions (§ 3). In addition the actual mode of composition of treatises encouraged a disregard for the original context of passages borrowed from other sources (§ 7). O u r survey points to an intricate interplay between memory, intermediate sources, direct consultation of texts, and note181

Cf. also his ascription of t h e Platonic tripartition-cum-trilocation to H i p p o crates a n d t h e interpretative effort r e q u i r e d by this move in PHP books 1-3 a n d 6; see also supra, p. 39.

taking. Galen's use of a limited n u m b e r of options a n d authorities can be related to his projection into the past of a tradition of good philosophy and science (§ 4). T h e traditional ways in which the views themselves were phrased a n d assigned to authorities should also be studied against the b a c k d r o p of d o x o g r a p h i c literature. Given the i m p o r t a n c e a n d complexity of the relevant evidence, the next c h a p t e r is entirely devoted to the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition c o n c e r n e d with the parts of the soul.

CHAPTER T W O

DOXOGRAPHY

1. Galen and the Placita T h e t e r m ' d o x o g r a p h e r ' is a m o d e r n coinage. 1 Its Latin c o u n t e r p a r t ' d o x o g r a p h u s ' was first used by H e r m a n n Diels in his m o n u m e n t a l Doxographi Graeci ( p u b l i s h e d in 1879) with r e f e r e n c e to ps.Plutarch's Placita, p s . G a l e n ' s Historia philosopha a n d c o g n a t e abstracts to b e f o u n d in S t o b a e u s ' Eclogae physicae as well as T h e o d o r e t ' s Graecarum affectionum curatio. T h e s e , t h e n , a r e e x t a n t s p e c i m e n s of t h e ' d o x o g r a p h i c ' tradition r e c o n s t r u c t e d , at least in its m a i n outlines, by Diels a n d traced back to T h e o p h r a s t u s ' Physical Opinions,2 It was typical of Diels' style of working to p i n p o i n t milestones o n t h e way along which t h e doxai were t r a n s m i t t e d . T h u s Diels p l a c e d m u c h e m p h a s i s o n specific sources such as T h e o p h r a s t u s , Aëtius a n d , s o m e w h e r e halfway b e t w e e n t h e m (first c e n t , BCE), a work h e called t h e Vetusta Placita, reflected by passages in Cicero a n d Varro {ap. C e n s o r i n u s ) . In w h a t follows I shall speak of t h e Placita t r a d i t i o n to d e s i g n a t e t h e family of texts f e a t u r i n g in Diels' work. At face value, t h e a p p e l l a t i o n ' d o x o g r a p h y ' seems quite a p p o s i t e f o r t h e s e j e j u n e c o m p i l a t i o n s of physical t e n e t s labelled with t h e n a m e s of authorities a n d a r r a n g e d a c c o r d i n g to traditional questiontypes. 3 In antiquity such c o m p i l a t i o n s were used by a great variety of a u t h o r s with d i f f e r e n t axes to grind. S o m e drew f r o m t h e m preliminary overviews of available o p t i o n s in the c o n t e x t of a systematic treatm e n t of a particular issue. O t h e r s used t h e m to create, in a Sceptical 1

O n the origin, use a n d abuse of the term see Mansfeld & Runia (1997) 101 f. Cf. also Mejer (1978) 81 ff. 2 T h e details of this reconstruction n e e d not concern us here. Diels' reconstruction of the Placita tradition as set o u t in the labyrinthine Prolegomena of the D. G. is conveniently summarized by Runia (1989) 245 ff. O n the origins of Diels' theory see Mansfeld a n d Runia (1997) ch. 1 . 3 But note that the text of Diels' reconstructed Aëtius has preserved objections a n d traces of objections to a small n u m b e r of the tenets. T h e s e t h e n must have b e e n a f e a t u r e of the collection at an earlier stage of its transmission; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3206 ff. (= XIII 2: 'Dialectic in Aëtius'). Galen attests to the dialectical use to which doxographic texts put, see infra in text.

vein, a s t a l e m a t e b e t w e e n c o m p e t i n g d o c t r i n e s . This last possibility was facilitated by the a r r a n g e m e n t of t h e tenets to be f o u n d in m a n y sections. O f t e n a m a i n o p p o s i t i o n is p r e s e n t e d b e t w e e n two schools of t h o u g h t , followed by f u r t h e r divisions a n d r e f i n e m e n t s within each of t h e two camps. O f t e n this diaeretic p a t t e r n is c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by i n t e r m e d i a t e o r c o m p r o m i s e positions. 4 This schematization, with its stress o n tenets r a t h e r t h a n n a m e s , 5 inevitably entailed distortions of t h e original d o c t r i n e s . P h i l o s o p h e r s (or physicians) a r e m o r e o v e r m a d e to p r o n o u n c e o n issues which arose w h e n they were long d e a d ; f o r e x a m p l e , ' H i p p o c r a t e s ' a n d several Presocratics are c r e d i t e d with views o n t h e seat of t h e ' r e g e n t p a r t of t h e s o u l ' in its o r i g i n a l Hellenistic sense (e.g. Aët. Plac. IV 5). 6 G a l e n was o n e a m o n g m a n y a u t h o r s w h o knew a n d u s e d t h e Placita tradition. A key text in this c o n n e c t i o n is On the Affected Parts III 5 (VIII, p. 157.3 ff. K.). 7 H e r e G a l e n c h a r g e s t h e P n e u m a t i s t physician A r c h i g e n e s of A p a m e a (flor. c. 100-120 CE) with contradicting himself in r e g a r d to m e n t a l afflictions a n d diseases: h e believed t h e h e a r t to b e t h e a f f e c t e d p a r t b u t at t h e s a m e time p r e s c r i b e d treating t h e h e a d . 8 Archigenes, Galen claims, t h u s neglects the many s t a t e m e n t s (or a r g u m e n t s , λόγοι) a b o u t the r e g e n t part which are t h e s u b j e c t of dialectical d e b a t e ( δ ι α λ ε κ τ ι κ ώ ς ερωτηθέντες, 157.17-18) a n d which indicate (ένδεικνύμενοι, 158.1) that m e n t a l disease should b e c u r e d by t e n d i n g to t h e h e a r t . T h u s , A r c h i g e n e s unjustifiably i g n o r e s t h e c a r d i o c e n t r i c view as o n e of t h e o p t i o n s which a r e at stake in this dialectical d e b a t e . 9 T h a t t h e o p t i o n s at issue b e l o n g to what we today r e f e r to as t h e Placita tradition b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t f r o m G a l e n ' s s u b s e q u e n t discussion. Dogmatists like A r c h i g e n e s , h e c o m p l a i n s , cling to u n t e n a b l e positions b e c a u s e of t h e i r a s s u m p t i o n that t h e whole body of tenets

4

Cf. supra, pp. 34 f. Cf. the c o m m e n t s o n tenets and 'labels' by Mansfeld (1990b) 3058. 6 This is merely c o n f i r m e d by the Aristotelian anticipations (esp. PA Γ 4) pointed o u t by Mansfeld (1990b) 3212 ff. T h e opposition between Aristotle a n d Plato may have originally stimulated the inclusion of a separate section on this issue. For a relatively early Hellenistic witness, see Chrys. ap. Gal. P / / P 3.1.10-15 ( SVF 2.885) with Mansfeld (1990b) 3167 ff., who speaks in this c o n n e c t i o n of the 'Vetustissima Placita', thus capping Diels' 'Vetusta Placita'. 7 For what follows cf. the survey by Mansfeld (1990b) 3141-43. 8 For the same point m a d e against Pneumatist doctors a n d others, cf. MM XIII, X 928.2-932.17 K. with Mansfeld (1990b) n. 225 with text thereto. 9 For a similar criticism as levelled at Chrysippus, see PHP 3.1.20 ff., 4.1.15 f. a n d cf. supra, p. 43 n. 97. 5

(δόγματα) of t h e i r school o r sect will b e wrecked by t h e a b a n d o n m e n t of a single o n e of t h e m . This a s s u m p t i o n is foolish, since many of the tenets involved are n o t mutually consistent, so these dogmatists may give t h e m u p without betraying their sect as a whole. T h e seat of the soul's leading part is a case in point. W h e t h e r o n e locates it in the b r a i n o r t h e h e a r t , 1 0 o n e is f r e e to o p t f o r various tenets o n o t h e r physical q u e s t i o n s w i t h o u t r u n n i n g i n t o inconsistencies. Such questions i n c l u d e g e n e r a t i o n a n d decay, t h e soul's substance, t h e gods, t h e creation of the world a n d still o t h e r s (ibid. 158.14-159.9). T h e s e questions, like that of t h e seat of t h e r e g e n t part, all c o r r e s p o n d to c h a p t e r s in t h e Aëtian Planta,11 as d o e s t h e m o d e of f o r m u l a t i o n in terms of polarities (e.g. 'Is t h e world c r e a t e d or n o t ? ' ) . T h e fact that Galen separates topics which have b e e n c o m b i n e d in Aëtius suggests that his i n f o r m a t i o n derives f r o m a fuller version of the Planta, which devoted separate c h a p t e r s to these topics. 1 2 I shall revert to this p o i n t in d u e course. G a l e n ' s r e f e r e n c e to dialectical d e b a t e s a f f o r d s a r a r e glimpse of what may be called the Sitz im, Leben of d o x o g r a p h i c compilations. It is a fair assumption that this type of d e b a t e , with its traditional s c h e m e s of o p p o s i n g tenets, is r e f l e c t e d by t h e relevant b o o k s of PHP, to which h e r e f e r s in t h e following c o n t e x t (159.15-16). 1 3 It is noteworthy that h e links these s c h e m e s to what h e calls the 'rational (or dogmatist) m e t h o d ' (της λογικής οδού, 158.7), thus u n d e r l i n i n g their i m p o r t a n c e f o r his m e t h o d o l o g y , notably t h e p r o c e d u r e of m a k i n g an a c c u r a t e division of relevant d o c t r i n e s w h e n o n e starts an inquiry. A r c h i g e n e s flouts this p r o c e d u r e , j u s t as Chrysippus fails to draw u p a c o m p l e t e diaeresis at t h e o u t s e t of his On Affections or to apply his own i m p e c c a b l e diaeresis in the On the Soul,14 10

I.e. t h e m a i n diaeresis of Aët. Plac. IV 5 a n d t h e relevant passages in related sources; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3092 ff. Cf. UP I p.15.2 f. H e l m r e i c h , reflecting t h e same d o x o g r a p h i c schema; cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3094 n.143. 11 Cf. Aët. Plac. IV 5 (seat of t h e r e g e n t p a r t ) ; I 24 ( g e n e r a t i o n a n d decay), IV 23 (the soul's s u b s t a n c e ) , I 7 (gods), II 4 (creation of t h e world), a n d f o r a full a n d detailed c o m p a r i s o n Mansfeld (1990b) 3142. Against Mansfeld, N u t t o n (1999) 142 f. a r g u e s that ' t h e r e is n o reason to think that Galen was h e r e relying directly on a h a n d b o o k to o r g a n i s e his t h o u g h t s ' . But w h a t M a n s f e l d m e a n s is r a t h e r t h a t a u t h o r s such as Galen were so familiar with the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition that they did n o t n e e d to look u p things every time. 12 As observed by Mansfeld (1990) 3142. 13 Cf. also PHP 2.8.47 f., w h e r e h e uses a l e m m a a b o u t t h e soul's s u b s t a n c e derived f r o m t h e P/««7a-tradition: cf. Aët. Plac. IV 3.3, 14 with Mansfeld (1990b) 3073 n. 48. 14 See 4.1.14 ff„ 3.1.20 ff. Cf. also 5.3.18 f., w h e r e Galen raises t h e question of

Elsewhere I have shown that t h e p a t t e r n of o p t i o n s in PHP 1-3 a n d 6 c o n f o r m s to t h e s c h e m a k n o w n f r o m t h e Placita tradition, viz. its section o n t h e location of t h e r e g e n t p a r t of t h e soul (e.g. Aët. Plac. IV 5). 1 5 This explains such f e a t u r e s as his a l i g n m e n t of H i p p o c r a t e s a n d Plato, o r his b l i n d spots in r e g a r d to c e r t a i n a u t h o r i t i e s a n d doctrines, o r to alternative i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of e x p e r i m e n t a l results. 1 6 So it seems worth c o n s i d e r i n g b o o k s 4 a n d 5 against t h e b a c k d r o p of t h e Placita tradition as well, particularly since it i n c l u d e s a s e p a r a t e section devoted to the issue of t h e ( n u m b e r of) parts of t h e soul (Aët. Plac. IV 4). T h e m a i n q u e s t i o n s are: H o w c o u l d Galen align Plato, Aristotle a n d Posidonius (with Pythagoras a n d H i p p o c r a t e s a d d e d ) ? W h a t d o e s this tell us a b o u t t h e r e c e p t i o n of these p h i l o s o p h e r s in a n c i e n t d o x o g r a p h y ? An answer to these q u e s t i o n s may throw m o r e light o n G a l e n ' s h a b i t s a n d p r o c e d u r e s a n d h e n c e o n w h a t these a u t h o r i t i e s h a d m e a n t in t h e i r original expositions. T h i s is particularly i m p o r t a n t in t h e case of t h e r e l e v a n t d o c t r i n e s of t h e Stoics, n o t a b l y C h r y s i p p u s a n d P o s i d o n i u s , f o r w h o m G a l e n is o u r m a i n source. As I have n o t e d , t h e study of d o x o g r a p h i c r e p o r t s s h o u l d n o t limit itself to individual tenets, b u t also c o n s i d e r t h e way these have b e e n a r r a n g e d in e a c h s e p a r a t e section. T h e ' p r o s o p o g r a p h i c ' a p p r o a c h , with its a t t e n d a n t d i s r e g a r d f o r aspects of schematization, is familiar e n o u g h f r o m o u r present-day collections of f r a g m e n t s . But its drawbacks s h o u l d b e a p p a r e n t . In this light, I shall b e studying t h e way relevant d o x o g r a p h i c s o u r c e s treat t h e cast of c h a r a c t e r s staged by Galen (Plato a n d Pythagoras, Aristotle, t h e early Stoics, Posidonius). T h a t is to say, I shall p r o c e e d by d e a l i n g with these sources separately instead of o r g a n i z i n g my discussion a r o u n d t h e individual philosop h e r s involved. 1 7 I shall a p p e n d a brief discussion of two relevant passages in Plutarch a n d Porphyry, w h o c o m b i n e t h e use of similar d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s with t h e i r own r e a d i n g of t h e o r i g i n a l expositions. In this r e s p e c t they w e r e like G a l e n a n d so o f f e r us an

t h e s u b s t a n c e of living b o d i e s as r e l e v a n t to t h e c o n c e p t i o n of b e a u t y as a p r o p o r t i o n of their elements. 15 T i e l e m a n (1996a) xxxiv ff. 16 See T i e l e m a n (2002); cf. also Mansfeld (1991) 139. Of course Galen also felt j u s t i f i e d to cling to t h e Platonic trilocation by certain physiological observations a n d considerations, notably t h e a u t o m a t i s m of t h e heart-beat. 17 T h i s a c c o u n t develops f u r t h e r t h e observations m a d e by Mansfeld (1990b) 3085-89 o n t h e section in t b e Placita c o n c e r n e d with t h e parts of t h e soul.

o p p o r t u n i t y to c o m p a r e their r e c e p t i o n of the d o c t r i n e s involved with the latter's m o d e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . O u r textual evidence is slim a n d derivative. It is even m o r e fragm e n t e d t h a n in t h e case of the seat of t h e soul. H e r e , as elsewhere, the n a t u r e of the various sources involved requires special attention. Yet I believe that a small d e t o u r will prove rewarding. In fact, t h e r e is still r o o m for m o r e work o n the influence of d o x o g r a p h y on accounts of the soul in antiquity a n d in Middle Platonism in particular. 1 8

2. Ps. Plutarch and Theodoret A section e n t i t l e d ' O n t h e parts of t h e soul' is to be f o u n d at ps. P l u t a r c h , Plac. IV 4. T h e parallel section in S t o b a e u s is lost 1 9 b u t T h e o d o r e t in his Cure for the Greek Affections (Graec. ä f f . cur.), V 19-21, clearly d e p e n d s o n t h e s a m e s o u r c e as ps. P l u t a r c h , viz. Diels' r e c o n s t r u c t e d 'Aëtius' (to be d a t e d to the first or second cent, C E ) . 2 0 Ps.Plutarch r e p o r t s that Pythagoras a n d Plato posited two parts, o n e rational (λογικόν), the o t h e r irrational ( α λ ο γ ο ν ) . This is called t h e 'highest e x p l a n a t i o n ' . A c c o r d i n g to the ' e n s u i n g a n d precise' explanation, the soul is tripartite (τριμερή): ' f o r they divide the irrational part into t h e spirited (θυμικόν) a n d appetitive (έπιθυμητικόν) parts' (IV 4.1). 2 1 T h e tripartite a n d bipartite schemes are thus explained in terms of o n e a n o t h e r . 2 2 18

But cf. Mansfeld (n. 7); Vander Waerdt (1985a), (1985b). For a trace of it, see however infra, n. 35. 20 Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 319 ff. For doubts abouts the value of T h e o d o r e t as a witness to 'Aëtius' see however Frede (1999), esp. 138 ff., 147 f. 21 T h e terms θυμικόν and, it seems, λογικόν as referring t o soul-parts are not Platonic but Aristotelian in origin; cf. Arist. De an. 432a25, 433b4, Top. 12912-19. O n the early Peripatetic interpretation of the Platonic tripartition cf. ps. Arist. MM 1182a24 f. Πλάτων διείλετο τήν ψυχήν εϊς τε τό λόγον εχον καί εις τό άλογον όρθώς, και άπέδωκεν έκάστψ [τάς] άρετάς τάς προσήκουσας. T h e reference to the virtues is remarkable since Plato in Rep. 4 specifically grafts the four primary virtues o n t o the tripartite structure of the soul. 22 Similarly Posid. ap. Gal. PHP4.7.39 (= Posid. Test. 95 E.-K.), Cic. Tusc. 4.10, on which parallel passages see infra, p. 77 f., 293. Alcin. Did. ch. 17, p.173.5 ff.; cf. 24, 176.12; 5, p.156.35-6 H e r m a n n ; cf. also Anon. Lond. col. XV.26-30; XVI.33-44 Diels. A n o t h e r tripartition is given to Pythagoras at D.L. 8.30: νους, θυμός and φρένες. (Since the first two are shared by man with animals and the third possessed by m a n alone, the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the Platonic s c h e m e extends somewhat beyond the m e r e fact of there being three faculties). M. Giusta (1964-7) vol. 1, 57 f. compares the Aëtian lemma and Cicero with Tusc. 4.10 (on Plato and Pythagoras) and D.L. 7.110 (on the eight parts of the soul according to the Stoics), explaining the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e by reference to a lost d o x o g r a p h i c manual which dealt first 19

T h e familiar Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e e i g h t parts of t h e soul 2 3 is ascribed to t h e Stoics in g e n e r a l by b o t h ps. P l u t a r c h (IV 4) a n d T h e o d o r e t (V 20), w h o b r i n g s it m o r e i n t o line with t h e o t h e r d o c t r i n e s by r e f e r r i n g to t h e f u n c t i o n s of the r e g e n t p a r t as well. 24 Aristotle receives n o l e m m a in ps.Plutarch, 2 5 b u t T h e o d o r e t r e p o r t s that ' t h e son of N i k o m a c h o s ' posited five ένεργείαι, viz. τήν όρεκτικήν τήν θρεπτικήν τήν αίσθητικήν τήν μεταβατικην τήν διανοητικήν, which coincides with Aristotle's list at On the Soul Β 3.414a31 f.

3.

Tertullian

Galen's y o u n g e r c o n t e m p o r a r y Tertullian (c. 160-240 CE), On the soul 14.2 provides a glimpse of the Placita tradition at a stage o l d e r t h a n that r e p r e s e n t e d by ps. Plutarch a n d T h e o d o r e t 2 6 . In t h e p r e c e d i n g c o n t e x t (ch. 14.1) Tertullian draws on t h e same d o x o g r a p h i c source w h e n h e a p p e a l s to t h e Sceptic A e n e s i d e m u s as well as Strato a n d Heraclitus for his view that t h e soul is indivisible. As we shall see, this

with t h e division of t h e soul a n d next with its affections, i.e. t h e o r d e r followed by Cicero, ibid. 10-32. However, his reconstruction of what h e calls a 'Vetusta Placita di Etica' (an allusion to o n e of t h e lost sources posited by Diels in D.G.), as part of his e n t e r p r i s e of u n c o v e r i n g a tradition of m o r a l d o x o g r a p h y , is now generally rejected; cf. e.g. Mansfeld (1998) 26. A m o n g o t h e r things, Giusta c o n f u s e s d o x o g r a p h y in t h e strict sense (e.g. Aëtius) with t h e On sects literature instantiated by Diogenes Laertius a n d Arius Didymus. O n Cicero (who is in many ways sui generis) a n d Tusc. 4.10-32, see f u r t h e r infra, p p 296 ff. T h e soul, i n c l u d i n g its location a n d division, traditionally belongs with physics r a t h e r than ethics. 23 See Chrys. ap. Gal. PHP 3.1.10-15; D.L. 7.157 (generally Stoic). Cf. also P o r p h . De an. ap. Stob. Eel. I p.350.13-18 (SVF 2.830); cf. Iamblichus, De anima ap. Stob. Eel. I, p.368.12-16 W. (SVF2.826, second text). 24 T h a t t h e Stoic a n d Platonic p a r t i t i o n s a r e n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e is n o t e d by Porphyry ap. Proclus In remp. I 234.9-17 Kroll (cf. ibid 1-9 = P o r p h y r y Fr. 263 Smith), with Dörrie (1959) 107 f. 25 I fail to see o n what evidence Diels, D.G. p.46 bases his r e m a r k that ps. Plutarch has conflated the l e m m a t a on Plato a n d Aristotle in his sources as o p p o s e d to T h e o d o r e t , Graec. a f f . cur. V 29. 26 Diels, D. G. 203 ff. derived t h e s c h e m e p r e s e n t e d by Tertullian f r o m t h e socalled Vetusta Placita via Soranus, t h e Sceptic A e n e s i d e m u s b e i n g involved as well. O n the c o m p l e x relations between this a n d o t h e r d o x o g r a p h i c schemes c o n c e r n e d see f u r t h e r Mansfeld (1990b) 3085 ff. T h e text of De An. 14.2 p r e s e n t s various difficulties, notably t h e fact that Posidonius is said to have a d d e d two parts to a n u m b e r of twelve as r e c o g n i z e d by ' c e r t a i n Stoics' b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y is given seventeen. Kidd (1988) (i) 547 may be right to suggest that this reflects a confusion between two systems of division in Tertullian himself a n d / o r his i m m e d i a t e source, which t h e r e f o r e may b e u n d e r s t o o d b u t n o t e m e n d e d (e.g. so as to read ' f i f t e e n ' instead o f ' t w e l v e ' ) .

preliminary issue—which goes back to Aristotle 2 7 —is left o u t by almost all parallel passages as the result, n o doubt, of a process of epitomization. Starting with Plato, whose n a m e is associated with bipartition, 2 8 the reader is led through a numerically m o u n t i n g series climaxing in seventeen parts distinguished by Posidonius (F 147 E.K.). T h e parts themselves are not specified; several m o d e r n attempts —all m o r e or less speculative, some downright frivolous—have been m a d e to supply them. T h e quintet of faculties given to Aristotle, 2 9 however, must be identical to those listed in o t h e r d o x o g r a p h i c reports in accordance with Aristotle's list at On the Soul Β 3.424a31. This differs f r o m Galen's attribution of three powers, but, as we shall see, it is a moot point how far we are entitled to speak of a g e n u i n e discrepancy. 3 0 Views ascribed to Stoics p r e d o m i n a t e . Interestingly, Zeno, who is second on the list, is given three parts (SVF 1.144). Again, the parts are not specified and o n e would have liked to know what could have occasioned this number. 3 1 But it is noteworthy that Galen, taking his cue f r o m Posidonius, is quite p r e p a r e d to suggest that Zeno a n d Cleanthes had accepted bipartition along Platonic lines, i.e. a bipartition admitting of f u r t h e r subdivision so as to yield three parts. 32 This, then, constitutes an important parallel between Galen and the Placita tradition as reflected by Tertullian. Indeed, when the latter ascribes three parts to Zeno, it is highly likely that reason, anger and desire are meant, i.e. those three faculties which are elsewhere ascribed to Plato as well as Aristotle. Galen, as we have seen, excepts only Chrysippus from the general consensus in favour of the Platonic tripartition. Tertullian (or rather the tradition to which he is i n d e b t e d ) , by contrast, is c o n c e r n e d to convey the impression of disagreement a m o n g pagan philosophers, most notably the Stoics or (anonymous) groups of Stoics. 33 This may

27

De an. A 1.402b1f., Γ 9.432a20 ff. Cf. supra, p. 22. See supra, n. 21; infra, pp. 77 f. 29 Pamelius' insertion of after quinque has f o u n d general acceptance; cf. Diels, Ü.G. p.205 and Waszink ad loc. 30 See infra, pp. 74 f., 78 f. 31 Zeno is on record as having posited the familiar conception involving eight parts; cf. supra, 38 n. 69. However, some caution is due, since sources may use his n a m e merely to label the doctrine at issue as Stoic and so do not warrant firm conclusions about his position: see e.g. Stob. Eel. I 49.34, p. 369.6 ff. W., Nem. Nat. horn. c.15, 72.7-9 (SVF 1.143). 32 PHP5.6.34 (Posid. T 9 3 / F r . 166 E.-K.); cf. 8.1.14-15 (Fr. 38 E.-K.). 33 Kidd ad loc. (p.545) observes that the particular form of this report—a series 28

explain why the division into eight parts—elsewhere given as generally Stoic—appears h e r e as exclusively Chrysippean. 3 4 A few contributions f r o m m i n o r Stoics are added. 3 5 T h e details of Posidonius' original scheme too will have to remain uncertain. 3 6 But that does n o t mean that we can discount the report altogether. Of particular importance is the fact that he is said to have p r o c e e d e d f r o m two headings, the ήγεμονικόν a n d λογιστικόν. Do these headings c o r r e s p o n d to the g o v e r n i n g / s u b o r d i n a t e a n d ration a l / i r r a t i o n a l distinctions familiar f r o m the Posidonian material in Galen? 37 I d o u b t that this distinction is particularly relevant here. At any rate, the h e a d i n g of λογιστικόν suggests the familiar Platonic division into λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and έπιθυμητικόν, whereas a wider range of powers related to bodily functions (nutrition, motion) may have been subsumed u n d e r the ήγεμονικόν. 38 This pair of series yields a parallel to the two series of psychic faculties attributed to Aristotle in o t h e r sources (see f u r t h e r below). We are strongly r e m i n d e d of

of conflicting d o g m a t i c t e n e t s — h a s a Sceptical ring. Note t h e m e n t i o n of Aenesid e m u s at De an. 14.1 (see above in text). 34 Cf. supra, n. 31. 35 T e r t u l l i a n says t h a t A p o l l o p h a n e s , a m i n o r f i g u r e w h o h a d s t u d i e d with Ariston of C h i u s ( S V F 1.408), divided t h e soul into n i n e parts (SVF 1.405). His a d d i t i o n of o n e part to t h e canonical e i g h t — h a r d l y a m o m e n t o u s e v e n t — h a s n o parallel in o u r sources. But it is interesting to n o t e that his n a m e occurs in o n e ms. of Photius' list of p h i l o s o p h e r s treated by Stobaeus in his lost section o n t h e parts of t h e soul. T h e r e f e r e n c e in Photius bears out t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f T e r t . De an. 14.2 on t h e Placita tradition; cf. Stob. Eel. phys. 49.7a (where W a c h s m u t h has inserted a l e m m a with A p o l l o p h a n e s ' view) a n d Mansfeld (1990b) 3085. A p o l l o p h a n e s ' n e a t little move was i m m o r t a l i z e d , p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e it c o u l d be blown u p into an instance of dissent f r o m o t h e r Stoic opinions. F u r t h e r , certain Stoics ( a n o n y m o u s ) are said to have o p t e d f o r twelve parts. T h i s n u m b e r may result f r o m a d d i n g t h e traditional q u a r t e t of f u n c t i o n s of t h e ήγεμονικόν (φαντασία, συγκατάθεσις, όρμή, λόγος o r αϊσθησις) to t h e eight parts of the d o m i n a n t school doctrine; cf. Iambi. De an. ap. Stob. Eel. II p.368.19-20 W. (SVF2.826); ibid, p.369.6-9 W. (SUF2.831); Aët. IV 21.1 (SVF2.836), w h e r e n o t t h e sequel listing t h e eight parts (ibid. 21.2). This a n d t h e anonymity of t h e r e f e r e n c e d o n o t inspire c o n f i d e n c e as to its historicity; see also supra, p. 38. 36

Cf. t h e critical survey of proposals by Waszink (1974) 209 ff. a n d see now also Kidd (1988) (i) esp. 547 f. T h e i l e r ' s suggestions ( C o m m e n t a r y ad 396, pp. 329-334) are vitiated by a characteristic use of n o t explicitly attested material as Posidonian. 37 As is suggested by Kidd (1988) (ii) 547 f. 38 Kidd (1988) (ii) 548 refers to Sen. Ep. 92.1: partes ministras, per quas movemur alimurque, propter ipsum principale nobis datas. Cf. P o r p h . De an. apud Stob. Eel. I, p. 350.13 ff. W a c h s m u t h ( SVF 2.830) : oi μεν από τής Στοάς όκταμερή τήν ψυχήν θέντες καί πέντε μεν μέρη τά α ι σ θ η τ ι κ ά λαβόντες, έκτον δέ τό φωνητικόν καί εβδομον τό σπερματικόν, τό λοιπόν τό ήγεμονικόν ά ς άν άρχοντος χώραν εγειν ϋπετίθεντο, τά δέ ά λ λ α μέρη έν ύπηρέτου τάξει ά π ε δ ί δ ο σ α ν , ωστε τό αυτό έξ άρχοντος καί αρχομένων συνεστάναι.

the fact that Galen too ascribes t h e tripartition to Posidonius ( t h o u g h without r e f e r e n c e to any o t h e r division). T h e i m p r e s s i o n o n e gets f r o m PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5 is t h a t t h e g o v e r n i n g / s u b o r d i n a t e d i s t i n c t i o n is identical with t h e r a t i o n a l / irrational o n e a n d has a m o r a l p o i n t . H e r e , m o r e o v e r , P o s i d o n i u s seems n o t to have kept t h e two series s e p a r a t e a c c o r d i n g to t h e contextual e t h i c a l / p h y s i c a l distinction. T h u s h e is c r e d i t e d with a rudim e n t a r y scala naturae in t e r m s of t h e P l a t o n i c t r i p a r t i t i o n : n o n rational animals posses only t h e spirited a n d appetitive p a r t s — e x c e p t f o r a n i m a l s t h a t a r e h a r d to move ( δ υ σ κ ί ν η τ α ) a n d a r e like plants a t t a c h e d to rocks: these are g o v e r n e d by desire alone. Man stands o u t as the sole possessor of reason (5.6.37-9). T h e same s c h e m e u n d e r l i e s his distinction of t h r e e f o r m s of οίκείωσις, e x p l a i n e d by r e f e r e n c e to t h e b e h a v i o u r of a n i m a l s a n d c h i l d r e n b e f o r e t h e age of r e a s o n (5.5.1-8 = F 169 E.-K.). H e r e , too, P o s i d o n i u s is said to e x p l a i n m o v e m e n t a n d n u t r i t i o n in t e r m s of t h e Platonic tripartition, assigning these f u n c t i o n s to the two non-rational parts. Posidonius' hierarchy of t h e animal k i n g d o m seems to b e inspired by such P l a t o n i c passages as Tim. 76e-77d a n d Rep. 441a7-b3. But certain features, notably t h e r e f e r e n c e to l o c o m o t i o n , indicate that A r i s t o t e l i a n passages may b e involved as well. At On the Soul Β 3.414a29 ff 3 9 Aristotle charts his well-known scale of living beings in t e r m s of a n i n c r e a s i n g n u m b e r of p o w e r s ( δ υ ν ά μ ε ι ς ) , viz. t h e θρεπτικόν, όρεκτικόν, αίσθητικόν, κινητικόν κατά τόπον, διανοητικόν. Plants have only t h e θ ρ ε π τ ι κ ό ν ; a n i m a l s posses t h e αίσθητικόν in a d d i t i o n . 4 0 A n d , if t h e latter, t h e n t h e όρεκτικόν as well. T o facilitate this last i n f e r e n c e , Aristotle divides ορεξις ( ' d e s i r e ' ) i n t o επιθυμία, θυμός a n d β ο ύ λ η σ ι ς , a r g u i n g that these f u n c t i o n s a r e m o r e readily seen to p r e s u p p o s e t h e α ί σ θ η τ ι κ ό ν t h a n t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t of όρεξις. In o t h e r passages Aristotle attributes, of the t h r e e f o r m s of ορεξις, επιθυμία or b o t h επιθυμία a n d θύμος to animals. 4 1 T h e s c h e m e ascribed by G a l e n to P o s i d o n i u s t h u s r e p r e s e n t s a conflation of Platonic a n d Aristotelian elements. W h e t h e r it is d u e to 39

As observed by De Lacy ad loc. (= ad p.334.4-8); cf. f a e g e r (1914) 63-4, 104

n.2. 40

Cf. Dean. Β 2.413 b 2-11: s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n is characteristic of a n i m a l s n o t local m o t i o n , f o r even animals that do not move have sensation; plants have only t h e nutritive faculty (θρεπτικόν). 41 De an. 413b20-4, 414b3-6, 11-12, 414a29-bl9; EN 1111a24-6, b6-13, 1116b231117a5, 1118al6-26; HA 448b21; De sensu 4 3 6 a 8 - l l . Of c o u r s e Aristotle was influe n c e d by Plato as well; see f u r t h e r Solmsen (1955).

Posidonius himself is m o o t p o i n t . In s o m e sources a p p a r e n t l y related to the Placita tradition, t h e ethical a n d psychological ('physical') lists of faculties are, o n behalf of Aristotle, linked by the subdivison of t h e όρεκτικόν into a n g e r a n d desire. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t presently.

4. Ps. Galen T h e section o n t h e s o u l ' s p a r t s in o u r n e x t s o u r c e , t h e p s e u d o Galenic tract Philosophos histona (ch. 24, p.615.1-10 Diels), is clearly related to that by ps.Plutarch, t h o u g h it exhibits certain peculiarities which m u s t b e d u e to t h e use of o t h e r sources. 4 2 Like Tertullian, On the Soul 14.1, its a u t h o r begins by raising t h e preliminary question as to w h e t h e r o r n o t o n e s h o u l d a s s u m e parts of t h e soul at all. T h e Stoics in g e n e r a l a r e said to have d i s t i n g u i s h e d four parts, viz. t h e λογικόν 4 3 αίσθητικόν φωνητικόν σπερματικόν. Since t h e α ί σ θ η τ ι κ ό ν e n c o m p a s s e s t h e five sensory parts, this notice seems to constitute an abbreviation of t h e division i n t o e i g h t parts ascribed by Aëtius a n d T e r t u l l i a n to t h e Stoics in g e n e r a l a n d C h r y s i p p u s respectively. Ps.Galen n e x t ascribes to Plato t h e t h r e e p a r t s λ ο γ ι κ ό ν θ υ μ ι κ ό ν έ π ι θ υ μ η τ ι κ ό ν , in a c c o r d a n c e with p s . P l u t a r c h , t h o u g h w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to t h e ' h i g h e r ' twofold division. T h e r e is a s e p a r a t e notice o n Aristotle, w h o is said to have a d d e d t h e φυσικόν a n d the ζωτικόν to Plato's t h r e e parts. 4 4 In a sense, t h e n , we have h e r e a n o t h e r instance of t h e ascription of t h e Platonic tripartition to Aristotle. But it seems h a r d to parallel this a n d o t h e r f e a t u r e s of ps. G a l e n ' s survey f r o m the o t h e r r e p o r t s . T h e λογικόν a n d φυσικόν c o r r e s p o n d to T h e o d o r e t ' s δ ι α ν ο η τ ι κ ή a n d θρεπτική ενέργεια respectively. Arguably, a similar c o r r e s p o n d e n c e h o l d s b e t w e e n t h e ορεκτική ενέργεια a n d t h e θυμικόν + έπιθυμητικόν. 4 5 But if so, we are still left with two f u n c t i o n s

42

On this particular section see Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 f. On the nature of ps.Galen's tract and its relation to the Pladta tradition see now Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 141 ff. Cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3069, 3164. 43 On the assimilation of the rational parts and the ηγεμονικών, see supra, p. 37. 44 For the ζωτικόν μέρος of the soul cf. Nemesius, Nat. horn. c. 22, p. 82.21-2, from a closely related context (see infra in text): καλείται δέ φυσικόν μεν τό θρεπτικόν .... ζωτικόν δέ τό σφυγμικόν, further explained pp. 84.25 ff. Cf. ibid. 2, p.27.11 ff. (in connection with Aristotle particular); cf. Aët. IV 5.10 (ζ. placed by Pythagoras in the heart); Epiph. Adv. haeres. Ill 21 (DG p. 591.16). 45 As suggested by Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 n. 116. This assumption can be shored up by reference to Calcidius, In Tim. c.223, p.238.10-11 Waszink (... appetitum qui in perfectioribus invenitur animalibus, in quibus est cupiditas et iracundia ... ) and

specified by T h e o d o r e t (viz. the αισθητική a n d the μεταβατική έν έργεια) and o n e by ps.Galen (viz. the ζωτικόν). 4 6 Α closer parallel is provided by a few passages f r o m Plutarch, w h e r e the αϊσθητικόν a n d θρεπτικόν (or φ υ τ ι κ ό ν ) are a d d e d to Plato's three canonical parts. 4 7 T h e harmonization of psychological terms of different provenance is typical of d o x o g r a p h i c literature. Assimilation a n d modernization of terminology were b o u n d to occur o n c e tenets of various provenance were accomodated within a single diaeretic scheme. Moreover, s o m e of o u r e x t a n t witnesses, such as ps.Plutarch a n d ps.Galen, betray the h a n d of the epitomator. Hence, in this section of ps.Galen, we find a c o n d e n s a t i o n of the canonical Stoic list of functions. In regard to the l e m m a on Aristotle, it should be n o t e d that the two f u n c t i o n s a d d e d to the tripartition are at h o m e in the context of physics r a t h e r than ethics. It would t h e r e f o r e seem that the division presented by ps.Galen a n d Plutarch results f r o m a conflation of two original series of faculties, o n e ethical (the Platonic-cum-Aristotelian tripartition), the o t h e r physical a n d including functions such as the natural or nutritive (φυσικόν/θρεπτικόν), the perceptive (αϊσθητικόν) a n d / o r vital (ζωτικόν). This conflation is m a d e possible by the fact that both series feature a function covering cognition a n d appetition (ορεξις) in the physical series is analysable into the spirited a n d desiderative faculties of the ethical tripartition. Such an e t h i c a l / physical distinction may, as we have noticed, be presupposed by the two headings associated with the n a m e of Posidonius in the abstract preserved by Tertullian (see above, p. 68). Not only this distinction but also two full lists are to be f o u n d in o u r next witness, Nemesius.

Nem. Nat. horn. p. 73.8-12 Morani dividing the όρεκτικόν into the θυμικόν and έπιθυμητικόν. The latter two passages are from contexts are related both to one another and to the Placita tradition; see further infra in text. 46 Mansfeld (1990b) 3086 n. 116 argues that a correspondence obtains between θρεπτική + μεταβατική έν έργεια on the one hand and the φυσικόν and the ζωτικόν on the other. He argues that ps. Galen offers what seems a simplification of the account from which both his and that of Aëtius' source are derived and that in a later stage the Platonic tripartition was ascribed to Aristotle in order to fill out the quintet traditionally attributed to him. But even so, the μεταβατική έν. remains without a proper counterpart in ps. Galen (on the ζωτικόν see next, n.) and the αισθητική remains. 47 De Ε apud Delphos 390F, De def. orac. 429E.

5. Nemesius T h e essay in Christian Platonism On the Nature of Man by Nemesius of Emesa (c. 400 CE) is r e m a r k a b l e f o r its wide r e a d i n g in philosophical a n d m e d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . In chs. 15 a n d 16 (72.3 ff. M o r a n i ) t h e l e a r n e d b i s h o p p r e s e n t s a d o x o g r a p h i c a c c o u n t of t h e parts of t h e soul which unmistakably b e l o n g s with t h e Placita tradition. 4 8 Interestingly, we find h e r e c o m b i n e d a n u m b e r of e l e m e n t s f r o m the various s o u r c e s we have b e e n reviewing. N e m e s i u s d o e s n o t disclose his s o u r c e , b u t we m u s t n o t e t h a t 72.7-73.7 r u n parallel to t h e e x c e r p t f r o m Porphyry's On the Powers of the Soul (ap. Stob. Eel. I p. 350.9-351.1 W. = Fr. 253 Smith; see f u r t h e r below). But at t h e s a m e time this e x c e r p t is in s o m e respects less d e t a i l e d t h a n N e m e s i u s ' a c c o u n t . 4 9 Presumably, t h e n , N e m e s i u s draws o n a f u l l e r a c c o u n t by P o r p h y r y than t h e o n e preserved by Stobaeus. 5 0 N e m e s i u s first a d d r e s s e s a p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n (which is n o t identical to that f o u n d in T e r t u l l i a n a n d p s . G a l e n ) , viz. w h e t h e r t h e non-rational e l e m e n t (ή άλογία) s h o u l d b e seen as a p a r t of the soul or as a soul in its own right. T o those 5 1 w h o p o i n t to n o n - r a t i o n a l See D. G. 49-50, taking Nemesius to have known the doxographic work by Aëtius (mentioned by the only other witness, Theodoret, CAG 2.95, 4.31, 5.16). See further Mansfeld and Runia (1997) 291 ff. 49 But Porphyry, unlike Nemesius, links Plato's name to the tripartition and reports that Numenius assumed two souls (viz. a rational and an irrational one) rather than parts, cf. infra, n. 51. 50 Porphyry often repeated himself; see Waszink (1962) p. ι,χχιι (on Porph. as the source of Calcidius, In Tim. cf. 214-235). Which treatise this was must remain uncertain—the Mixed Questions or the On the Soul to Boethus come to mind; for the former see De nat. horn. 3, pp.38.12-42.9, 42.22-43.8 Morani (Περί ενώσεως ψυχής καί σώματος) = 259-261 F Smith; cf. also ibid. 2, p.34.18-35.11 M. = Porphyry 447 F Smith (on the immortality of the soul). The explicitly attested fragment from the same work found at Proclus, In remp. I 233.29-234.8 (263 F) deals with the issue of the division of the soul, opposing the Stoic and Platonic conceptions. On Nemesius and the Σύμμικτα ζητήματα see further Dörrie (1959) 99 ff, 111 ff. Cf. Cale. In Tim. 223, p. 238.5-13, whose account of Aristotelian soul-division is closely similar to Nem. De nat. horn. p. 72.12 ff. and likely to derive from Porphyry, see Waszink (1962) l x x v - l x x v i i . For Porphyry's On the Soul see De nat. horn. 3, pp.38.12-42.9, 42.22-43.8 Morani (259-261 F Smith); cf. also ibid. 2, p.34.18-35.11 M. (Fr. 447 Smith). Another apparent possibility would seem to be Porphyry's (lost) Φιλόσοφος ιστορία ('Philosophical History'), which Theodoret aligns with Aëtius' τήν Περί άρεσκόντων ξυναγωγήν and (pseudo-) Plutarch's Περί τών τοις φιλοσόφοις δοξάντων έπιτομήν, saying that Porphyry not only presented an account of the life of the Greek philosophers but added their tenets as well, Graec. a f f . cur. II 95, p.62.4-7 (Porph. Τ 195 Smith); cf. ibid. IV 31, V 16. But the extant Life of Pythagoras, which was part of this work of Porphyry, shows that it cannot have been a member of the Placita family, see Porph. Frr. 193-224 Smith with Segond (1982). 51 These people remain anonymous (τίνες), but cf. Porph. ap. Stob. Eel. I,

animals in s u p p o r t of the latter option, Nemesius opposes Aristotle as having c o n s i d e r e d t h e non-rational e l e m e n t to be b o t h a part a n d a power (p.73.3-7 M o r a n i ) . This may seem suprising in view of Aristotle's seminal critique of soul-partition—especially its Platonic variety —delivered at On the Soul Γ 9 a n d reflected by such later a u t h o r s as Galen who distinguish the respective positions of Plato a n d Aristotle in terms of the p a r t s / p o w e r s distinction (e.g. PHP 6.2.5). In practice, however, Aristotle's terminology fluctuates. T o be sure, the fact that h e o n occasion speaks of 'parts' d o e s n o t imply c o m m i t m e n t to t h e Platonic doctrine; h e uses t h e term merely to r e f e r to the divisions of the soul regardless of their ontological status. 5 2 Nemesius attests to the exploitation of the terminological variation to c o n s t r u e a comp r o m i s e position typical of d o x o g r a p h i c schématisations. 5 3 As such, t h e notice originally b e l o n g e d to the traditional section ' w h e t h e r the soul has parts or not?' preliminary to the o n e a b o u t the n u m b e r a n d identity of t h e parts themselves. Being preliminary, it was o m i t t e d by e p i t o m a t o r s such as ps.Plutarch a n d others responsible for o u r extant witnesses to the Placita tradition. But, as we have noticed, Tertullian, w h o reflects an earlier stage of t h e same tradition, has preserved a d o x o g r a p h i c notice c o n c e r n e d with the parts vs. powers issue. 54 As to t h e faculties of t h e soul, Aristotle a p p e a r s m o r e regularly in an i n t e r m e d i a t e position, n o t a b l y b e t w e e n Plato a n d t h e Stoics. In G a l e n ' s s c h e m e of options, as we have n o t i c e d , Aristotle sides with Plato as to t h e n u m b e r of faculties ( w h e t h e r parts or powers) b u t with the Stoics as to their seat. 55

p.350.25 f. W. (= Fr. 253 [p.272.19-21] Smith = N u m e n i u s Fr. 44 Des Places): "Αλλοι δέ, ών καί Ν ο υ μ ή ν ι ο ς , ού τρία μέρη ψυχής μιας ή δύο γε, τό λογικόν και αλογον, ά λ λ α δύο ψυχάς εχειν ημάς οϊονται, την μεν λογικήν, την δέ άλογο v. Those p r o p o n e n t s which remain u n m e n t i o n e d may include Galen, who too diffentiated sharply between the parts or f o r m s of the soul a n d on occasion, in a way not warranted by the Platonic text, referred to them as souls. 52 O n this later issue see supra, p. 34 ff. 53 For an example f r o m PHP5 see 6.42, where Zeno appears in a position intermediate (μέσος) between the worst (Chrysippus) a n d the best view (Hippocrates and Plato) on the affections, or emotions. 54 A f u r t h e r point of contact is noteworthy as well. Both Nemesius a n d Tertullian record that Panaetius modified the Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of eigth parts (which however Nemesius gives to ' Z e n o ' a n d Tertullian to Chrysippus) by d e m o t i n g the reproductive part to ' n a t u r e ' (φύσις) instead of soul a n d s u b s u m i n g the vocal function u n d e r the will (ή κατ' όρμήν κινήσεως) and h e n c e the ήγεμονικόν), which resulted in a total n u m b e r of six parts (p.72.7-11 = fr. 86 Van Straaten; cf. p. 73.17 ff. = fr. 86a v. Str.). See Tieleman (1996a) 99 with f u r t h e r references. Tertullian, as we have seen, presents still m o r e deviant Stoic views. 55 See supra, p. 34.

W h e r e a s in related sources t h e opposition between Plato a n d the Stoics is most p r o m i n e n t , it is Aristotle who receives t h e lion's share of a t t e n t i o n f r o m Nemesius. T h u s h e is also c r e d i t e d with a n o t h e r reconciliatory view. In his physical works, Nemesius affirms, h e posited five d i f f e r e n t parts [sic\, that is to say t h e o n e s listed at On the Soul Β 414a31f. a n d also m e n t i o n e d by T h e o d o r e t (Aëtius). In his ethical works, Aristotle d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n λογικόν a n d α λ ο γ ο ν as t h e primary a n d most g e n e r i c (πρώτα καί γενικώτατα) parts, subdividing the αλογον into o n e part o b e d i e n t a n d a n o t h e r d i s o b e d i e n t to reason (cf. Nicomachean Ethics A. 13.1102b27-35). In t h e n e x t section (§ 16) Nemesius identifies the o b e d i e n t part of the αλογον as the όρεκτικόν, which h e f u r t h e r s u b d i v i d e s i n t o t h e έ π ι θ υ μ η τ ι κ ό ν a n d θυμικόν (p.73.11 f. Cf. 75.8 f. M o r a n i ) . This division is a t t r i b u t e d to Aristotle a n d to h i m only (p.73.7). But of c o u r s e t h e ' e t h i c a l ' division is identical to t h e familiar Platonic o n e . In particular, we s h o u l d n o t e that ps.Plutarch presents o n behalf of Plato this division in the same way, viz. in b o t h b i p a r t i t e a n d t r i p a r t i t e t e r m s . 5 6 Again we recall Posidonius' two series of f u n c t i o n s in T e r t u l l i a n , o n e of which may have b e e n identical to t h e trifold ethical division in N e m e s i u s (see above, pp. 68 f.). T h e r e p o r t o n Aristotle may b e p r e s e n t e d in d o u b l e columns: Science:

Ethics:

τό διανοητικόν

τό λογικόν

, , , το όρεκτικόν κ

τό θυμικόν ν > n > το επιουμητικον

τό κινητικόν κατά τόπον τό φυτικόν τό αίσθητικόν While, as n o t e d , t h e left 'scientific' c o l u m n reflects Aristotle, On the Soul 414a31 f., the s c h e m e as a whole s h o u l d b e c o m p a r e d with t h e final c h a p t e r (13) of t h e first b o o k of t h e Nicomachean Ethics. H e r e Aristotle argues that in ethical analysis (i.e. as o p p o s e d to t h e scientific psychology of On the Soul) o n e should isolate the specifically hum a n f u n c t i o n s , f o r m o r a l virtue is peculiar to m a n . In c o n s e q u e n c e , 56

See supra, p. 65.

the principle of n o u r i s h m e n t a n d growth, being c o m m o n to all living things, can be dispensed with (ibid. 13.1102a32 ff., esp. b 11-12). T h e division of the όρεκτικόν—the non-rational part relevant to ethics— into the θυμικόν a n d the έπιθυμητικόν is implied, or may easily have b e e n taken to be implied, at 1102b27 ff. 57 Since the όρεκτικόν is also said to be o b e d i e n t to reason (λόγος), we have the same bipartite a n d tripartite s c h é m a s in the same relation to o n e a n o t h e r as we have e n c o u n t e r e d in o t h e r witnesses to the Placita tradition. T h e n o t i o n that tripartition along Platonic lines was accepted by Aristotle f o u n d s u p p o r t in m a n y passages w h e r e h e a d o p t s a distinction b e t w e e n t h r e e f o r m s of a p p e t i t i o n (ορεξις) which were generally taken to c o r r e s p o n d to t h e t h r e e Platonic parts, viz. βούλησις, θύμος, επιθυμία. 5 8 T h e c o n t e x t u a l distinction is in fact i n d i c a t e d by Aristotle himself, w h o hints at t h e possibility to e x p a n d t h e 'ethical' list to include the f u n c t i o n s of growth a n d nutrition, which are non-rational in an absolute sense. Of course, o n e uses t h e e x p a n d e d list w h e n e m b a r k i n g o n a scientific a c c o u n t such as r e p r e s e n t e d by Aristotle's own On the Soul.59 H e r e all f u n c t i o n s constituting the scala naturae are relevant. I now p r o c e e d to two Platonists f r o m t h e Imperial p e r i o d , w h o show familiarity with the Placita tradition as well. Since they also knew t h e original expositions directly, their situation is n o t dissimilar to Galen's. As will be shown, they felt obliged to a c c o u n t f o r certain a p p a r e n t a n d real discrepancies between the classical texts a n d the 57

Just a f t e r a r e f e r e n c e to the state of m i n d of t h e m o d e r a t e (σώφρονος) a n d t h e brave ( α ν δ ρ ε ί ο υ ) m a n , Aristotle speaks of t h e 'desiderative a n d in g e n e r a l appetitive faculty' (το δ ' έπιθυμητικόν καί δλως όρεκτικόν μετέχει πως) of the soul. T h e virtues of m o d e r a t i o n a n d c o u r a g e b e l o n g to t h e appetitive a n d spirited parts respectively; cf. Resp. 441c2, 604d9; Lg. 863; cf. also Def. 415e7; T h e o p h r . Fr. 577B FHS&G. O n t h e Platonic b a c k d r o p of E N A 13 see f u r t h e r Dirlmeier (1956) 293; cf. also V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985a) 299 f. A little earlier Aristotle says h e bases himself in r e g a r d to t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e soul on his f u l l e r a c c o u n t in t h e e x o t e r i c works (1102a25 ff.). This is o f t e n taken to r e f e r to t h e Protrepticus in view of fr. 6 Ross, w h e r e t h e bipartition is m e n t i o n e d . However this may be, h e may have given a m o r e precise analysis of the όρεκτικόν elsewhere. We may t h e r e f o r e have to reckon with tbe influence of this a n d o t h e r lost works on such later schematizations as have b e e n preserved. 58

For these t h r e e f o r m s of a p p e t i t i o n see De an. Β 3.414b2, Γ 9.432b5-8; 10.433a23-8; Rh. A 10.1369a1-4; MA 6.700b22; Pol. 1334b6-28, esp. 22-3; cf. also De an. A 5 . 4 1 1 a 2 7 f f , E N H 7.1149bl-3 (where n o t e t h e inspiration of Pl. Resp. 441a-c); cf. also T h e o p h r . fr. 441 FHG&S. 59 Cf. Arist. De an. A 1.402bl-5: 'We m u s t [...] i n q u i r e w h e t h e r it has parts o r n o t , a n d w h e t h e r every soul is of the same kind o r not; a n d if not, w h e t h e r t h e d i f f e r e n c e is o n e of species o r of genus. For today those who p r o n o u n c e o n a n d investigate the soul a p p e a r to c o n f i n e their attention to t h e h u m a n soul ...'

t r a d i t i o n a l view as solidified a n d t r a n s m i t t e d in t h e d o x o g r a p h i c schémas. I am r e f e r r i n g to Plutarch (c. 45-125 CE) a n d Porphyry (234c. 305 C E ) .

6. Plutarch I have already t o u c h e d u p o n P l u t a r c h ' s use of t h e Planta tradition c o n c e r n e d with the faculties of the soul in t h e section devoted to ps. Galen (see above, p. 71). In a d d i t i o n , it is worth c o n s i d e r i n g how P l u t a r c h p r e s e n t s t h e views of t h e Stoa, Plato-eim-Pythagoras a n d Aristotle in his On Moral Virtue, 440E - 442B. P l u t a r c h b e g i n s by positing a m a i n o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n t h e Stoic u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n a n d those theories which involve an irreducibly non-rational e l e m e n t (αλογον) of t h e soul (440E-441D). H a v i n g a t t r i b u t e d t h e latter position to Pythagoras a n d Plato, h e t u r n s to Aristotle (442B): A r i s t o t l e m a d e m u c h [ o r : l o n g , έπί π λ έ ο ν ] 6 0 u s e o f t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s , 6 1 as is c l e a r f r o m w h a t h e w r o t e . L a t e r h e a s s i g n e d t h e s p i r i t e d p a r t t o t h e a p p e t i t i v e o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t a n g e r is a f o r m o f d e s i r e a n d a n a p p e t i t i o n towards v e n g e a n c e . 6 2 But until t h e e n d h e u s e d t h e affective a n d n o n - r a t i o n a l e l e m e n t as d i f f e r i n g f r o m t h e r a t i o n a l ...

Plutarch tells us that t h e affective e l e m e n t ( π α θ η τ ι κ ό ν : bipartition again), t h o u g h devoid of a rationality of its own, is capable of obeying reason, as o p p o s e d to the sensory or the nutritive-cum-vegetative part which, b e l o n g i n g to t h e body, are deaf to t h e c o m m a n d s of reason (442B-C; cf. Arist. ENA 13.1102b28 f. a n d above). This of course conf o r m s to the distinction drawn at Nicomachean Ethics A 13, t h o u g h we h e a r n o t h i n g f r o m Plutarch a b o u t the contextual d i f f e r e n c e between morally a n d psychologically relevant faculties. 6 3 H e refers to ' w h a t 60 T h e sense of έπί πλέον is d i s p u t e d . W h e n it is taken in t h e sense a d o p t e d in t h e text, this r e p o r t provides an i n t e r e s t i n g case of an a n c i e n t a u t h o r positing a Platonic p h a s e in Aristotle's d e v e l o p m e n t . As such, it has even f o u n d its way into m o d e r n developmental accounts of Aristotle; see esp. Verbeke (1960) 238 f. Düring (1957) 354 f. translates έπί πλέον as ' f u r t h e r ' ('We may f u r t h e r observe that ...'); similarly Babut (1969) 137-41; D o n i n i (1974) 68-9; S a n d b a c h (1982) 215-17. 61 I.e. t h e t h r e e Platonic parts. 62 Cf. t h e well-known d e f i n i t i o n of όργή as ορεξις άντιλυπήσεως, Arist. De an. A 403a30-l; cf. Top. 156a31-b4. By now it was c o m m o n currency, cf. ps. Plut. De Lib. et aegrit. c h . l , Sen. De ira 1.3 with S a n d b a c h (1982) 219; see f u r t h e r infra, pp. 277 ff. 63 Cf. Plut. De Ε 390F a n d Def. vrac. 429E, o n which supra, n. 71. Cf. also Arius Did. ap. Stob. Eel. II 7.20, p. 137.15-7 W., in a section e n t i t l e d Περί της ήθικτης αρετής, ότι μεσάτης (which parallels t h e title a n d o n e of t h e m a i n theses of P l u t a r c h ' s tract): ταύτην [seil, τήν ήθικήν άρετήν] ύ π ο λ α μ β ά ν ο υ σ ι περί τό αλογον

Aristotle wrote', b u t w h e t h e r h e is directly drawing o n o n e or m o r e A r i s t o t e l i a n texts is d o u b t f u l . 1 ' 4 P l u t a r c h ' s exclusive a n d d i r e c t d e p e n d e n c e o n the Aristotelian c o r p u s has t o o o f t e n b e e n taken f o r g r a n t e d . But p e r h a p s t h e choice is n o t o n e between an i n t e r m e d i a r y s o u r c e o r t h e original Aristotelian e x p o s i t i o n . C o m p a r i s o n with t h e d o x o g r a p h i c texts I have sofar b e e n reviewing suggests a t h i r d possibility, viz. that P l u t a r c h is r e c o n c i l i n g a d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e with w h a t h e h a d f o u n d in t h e original expositions. 6 5 T h i s a s s u m p t i o n receives s o m e s u p p o r t f r o m a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of his t r e a t m e n t of Plato a n d Pythagoras. In the Placita tradition, Pythagoras a n d Plato are conj o i n e d as c h a m p i o n i n g bipartition ( a n d at least Plato as also positing tripartition, see above p. 65). Plutarch takes over this scheme, 6 6 a n d assigns to Plato t h e b i p a r t i t e a n d tripartite divisions: Plato disting u i s h e d between a rational a n d a non-rational part (τό παθητικόν m i άλογον) a n d t h e n subdivided t h e latter into the spirited a n d desiderative parts (441E-442C). Plutarch draws textual s u p p o r t f r o m Plato's a c c o u n t of the g e n e r a t i o n of t h e World-Soul at Tim. 35a ff. (cf. De gen. an. in Tim. 1012B ff.). 6 7 But w h e n it c o m e s to finding an a p p r o p r i a t e p r o o f - t e x t f o r Pythagoras, t h e r e is n o t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e . P l u t a r c h t h e r e f o r e resorts to a r e m i n d e r of Pythagoras' r e p u t e d interest in music, which, h e claims, p r e s u p p o s e s his a c c e p t a n c e of a non-rational e l e m e n t of t h e soul (441E). 6 8 In fact, P o s i d o n i u s f a c e d t h e s a m e difficulty as Plutarch w h e n h e wished to a c c o u n t f o r the attribution of bipartition to Pythagoras. His solution is d i f f e r e n t : Posidonius infers

μέρος γίνεσθαι τής ψυχής, επειδή δ ι μ ε ρ ή π ρ ό ς τ ή ν π α ρ ο ΰ σ α ν θεωρίαν ύπέθεντο τήν ψυχήν, ιό μεν λόγον έ'χουσαν, τό δ' άλογον. 64 T h a t Plutarch uses a traditional account r a t h e r than any original Aristotelian text is a r g u e d by D ü r i n g (1957) 353 ff. a n d S a n d b a c h (1982) 218 f. For a n o t h e r ( a p p a r e n t ) r e f e r e n c e to Aristotle's writings in a very similar context cf. Porphyry F 251 Smith, discussed infra, pp. 78 ff. 65 I have to disagree with V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985b) 379n.23 who considers this o p t i o n a case of 'having it b o t h ways' a n d as such suspect. T h e most economical explanation f r o m a logical p o i n t of view is not necessarily the most plausible o n e f r o m a historical point of view. 66 Pace V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985b) 380 n.25, who dismisses the possibility of Plutarch using the Planta with respect to Plato: 'It goes without saying that o n e would not expect Plutarch to resort to a d o x o g r a p h y for information a b o u t Plato.' Note the deliciously pejorative intonations with respect to doxography. 67 Babut (1969b) 136 n.28 suggests that Plutarch also bases himself on o t h e r passages in the Tim. viz. 41c ff., 69c ff., as well as Pit. 309c. 68 For music as used by the Pythagoreans to influence the non-rational part of the soul, see also De Is. et Os. 384A. T h e link between musical therapy a n d psychological dualism is also m a d e by Galen a n d still exerts a bad influence on presentday studies, see infra, pp. 242 ff.

t h e view of Pythagoras f r o m t h e e x t a n t writings of his pupils (who r e m a i n a n o n y m o u s ) . Presumably h e used p s e u d e p i g r a p h i c tracts prod u c e d in t h e late Hellenistic e r a when t h e r e was a g e n e r a l r e s u r g e n c e of i n t e r e s t in all t h i n g s P y t h a g o r e a n . 6 9 H o w e v e r this may be, t h e p r o c e d u r e s of Plutarch a n d Posidonius reveal the i m p o r t a n c e b o t h of d o x o g r a p h i c p a t t e r n s a n d of t h e wish of t h e s e a u t h o r s to a d d u c e proof-texts illustrating t h e tenets involved. T h e s e traditional p a t t e r n s could n o t simply be d r o p p e d or revised, it seems. Still it is noteworthy that P l u t a r c h h a d q u a l m s a b o u t t h e d o x o g r a p h i c ascription of t h e Platonic t r i p a r t i t i o n to Aristotle. If my r e a d i n g is c o r r e c t , h e h a d r e c o u r s e to a d e v e l o p m e n t a l s o l u t i o n . A n o t h e r l e a r n e d a u t h o r , t h o u g h , d i d r e f e r to t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n ethics a n d scientific psychology as a m e a n s of m a k i n g s e n s e of this a s c r i p t i o n . I a m speaking of Porphyry.

7. Porphyry P o r p h y r y — t h e a u t h o r i t y we have sighted b e h i n d N e m e s i u s ' On the Nature of Man chs. 15 a n d 16—is an extremely valuable source f o r t h e p r e c e d i n g scholastic (notably Platonist) t r a d i t i o n . We a r e in a position to m a k e direct use of s o m e of his observations o n t h e parts a n d powers of t h e soul. An e x c e r p t f r o m his (lost) On the Powers of the SouP0 addresses the same subject-matter: In Plato and Aristotle in the ethical works [or: in ethics], the soul is said to be tripartite (τριμερής), and this (seil., opinion) has prevailed among the majority, who are unaware that the division of the structure (seil, of the soul) has been made because of the virtues; for [it has] not [been made] to capture all the parts. For obviously the imaginative (φανταστικόν) and perceptive (αίσθητικόν) and cognitive (νοερόν) and vegetative (φυτικόν) [seil, parts] have not been included in this division (Stob. Eel. I 49.25 a , p.350.19-25 = Fr. 253 Smith, in part). P o r p h y r y attests to t h e p r e v a l e n c e of t h e view t h a t Aristotle h a d e s p o u s e d t h e Platonic tripartition tout court—i.e. t h e view as it also a p p e a r s Galen in PHP b o o k s 4 a n d 5. Like P l u t a r c h , P o r p h y r y corrects this qualification with an a p p e a l to Aristotle's original writings. 7 1

69 70 71

Posid. ap. Gal. PHP5.6.43 = Test. 91/Fr. 151 E.-K. See supra, p. 40 n. 84. On this treatise see supra, p. 20. On Porphyry's study of Aristotle's writings see Beutler (1953) 282 fT.

H e e c h o e s t h e critique of t h e Platonic partition at On the Soul Γ 9.432a22 ff, in p a r t i c u l a r Aristotle's p o i n t t h a t t h e imaginative, perceptive a n d nutritive (θρεπτικόν, ο καί τοις φυτοίς υπάρχει καί πάσι τοις ζωοις) 7 2 faculties would have j u s t as strong a claim to the status of p a r t as the t h r e e parts singled o u t by Plato. 7 3 T h e psychic faculties m e n t i o n e d are j u s t examples: the faculties, Aristotle says, 'in a way seem infinite' (ibid. 432a24). In d u e course I shall r e t u r n to Aristotle's critique of soul-division which I take to be have b e e n highly influential in s h a p i n g the positions of s u b s e q u e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s of various d e n o m i n a t i o n s (see infra, pp. 274 ff.). W h e r e a s Plutarch a p p e a l e d to a d e v e l o p m e n t a l e x p l a n a t i o n , Porphyry relates Aristotle's criticism to a contextual d i f f e r e n c e between two sets of psychic f u n c t i o n s : (1) a tripartite or bipartite division b e l o n g i n g to t h e m o r a l a n d exclusively h u m a n sphere; (2) a n o t h e r division involving a larger ( p e r h a p s even infinitely large) n u m b e r , which b e l o n g s in the c o n t e x t of scientific psychology. As we have n o t e d in c o n n e c t i o n with Nemesius (above, p. 74), this p o i n t is anticipated by a passage in Nicomachean Ethics A. 13 where Aristotle makes t h e p o i n t — e c h o e d by P o r p h y r y — t h a t t h e virtues d e t e r m i n e t h e scope of psychological analysis in an ethical context (1102b11-12; b u t cf. also De an. A 1.402bl-5, q u o t e d n. 59). Moreover, Porphyry's surprising m e n t i o n of the νοερόν ('cognitive' 7 4 ) a m o n g the f u n c t i o n s n o t covered by the Platonic tripartition c a n n o t be paralleled f r o m the On the Soul passage b u t m a k e s excellent sense in the light of Aristotle's removal of purely intellectual t h o u g h t f r o m moral discourse in t h e s a m e c h a p t e r f r o m Nicomachean Ethics A (ibid. 1103a2). O n e m i g h t say that Porphyry read the passage f r o m the On the Soul in the light of Nicomachean Ethics A 13. 75 For o u r p u r p o s e s it is i m p o r t a n t to note, first, that Porphyry attests to the widespread idea that Aristotle, like Plato, h a d accepted the tripartition. Moreover, we must n o t e that Porphyry's r e m a r k s a r e motivated by the failure of his c o n t e m p o raries (or at any rate the later i n t e r p r e t e r s of Plato a n d Aristotle) to take a c c o u n t of the contextual distinction. W h o are they? O n e of the most influential d e f e n d e r s of the scientific (as well as moral) accuracy 72

In fact Plato does assign the nutritive function to the έπιθυμητικόν, Tim.

70d-e. 73

The same criticism applies to the division into τό λόγον εχον and τό άλογον, propounded by an anonymous group of Academics, cf. ibid. 24 ff. 74 On the sense of this term see PA 648a3; Pr. 954a35 /5 If we may believe Arabic catalogues, Porphyry wrote a commentary—now completely lost—in twelve books on the EN, see e.g. Bender (1953) 284 (nr. [16]).

of the Platonic tripartition was of course Galen. In t h e PHP h e even explicitly aligned the t e r m s s e p a r a t e d by Porphyry. 7 6 In view of t h e i n f l u e n c e e x e r t e d by this treatise in the 3rd c e n t u r y d e b a t e o n the location a n d s t r u c t u r e of the soul, it is extremely likely that h e is in the f o r e f r o n t of Porphyry's mind. 7 7

8. Conclusion: Galen Again T h e r e are g o o d s reasons f o r c o m p a r i n g t h e p a t t e r n of o p t i o n s a n d authorities in PHP 4-5 with relevant passages deriving f r o m the doxog r a p h i c tradition ( § 1 ) . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the evidence f o r d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s c o n c e r n e d with t h e ( n u m b e r of the) soul's f u n c t i o n s is f r a g m e n t a r y , s c a t t e r e d a n d derivative. It is n o l o n g e r possible to r e c o n s t r u c t a c o m p l e t e p i c t u r e of t h e relevant sections in the Planta tradition at a particular stage. Nonetheless, o u r survey has revealed a few facts of i m m e d i a t e relevance to G a l e n ' s h a n d l i n g of tenets a n d thinkers in PHP 4-5. O n the whole, the d i f f e r e n c e s a n d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s between the various related sources we have b e e n reviewing suggests that a fairly c o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d d e t a i l e d version m u s t have b e e n available by G a l e n ' s time. 7 8 An impression of its elaborate quality is still conveyed by Tertullian in the case of t h e Stoics (§ 3) a n d by N e m e s i u s in the case of Aristotle (§ 5). T h e Placita at a certain stage p r e s e n t e d two c o l u m n s of faculties o n behalf of Aristotle (as well as Posidonius; see T e r t u l l i a n , § 3), o n e f o r ethics, a n o t h e r f o r scientific psychology. 7 9

76 Thus Galen identifies the Platonic appetitive part with Aristotelian nutritivecum-generative function (as well as Stoic 'nature'), holding the desirative part in the liver is the cause both of the digestive process and of conscious desires in a more morally relevant sense, see PHP6.3.7; cf. also 8.57, 77. 77 Cf. Tieleman (1996b), id. (1998). 78 Cf. Mansfeld (1990b) 3086. 79 It might be objected that Porphyry Fr. 253 indicates that it was he who introduced the contextual difference out of dissatisfaction with the attribution of tripartition tout court to Aristotle, which, unlike many authors who adopted it, he knew was not warranted (or at least was only the partial truth) from his own reading of the Aristotelian works; hence the presence of two lists of functions in Nemesius (chs. 15-6). Againt this proposal, one could point to (1) the traces of conflation of the two lists in authors like ps. Galen (supra, pp. 70 f.); (2) the indication for an analogous pair of series ascribed to Posidonius by Tertullian's source (supra, pp. 66 ff.); (3) the fact that the contextual difference is intimated by Aristotle himself and other authors who lived well before Porphyry, e.g. Arius Didymus (supra, pp. 74, 76 f. n. 63).

A desire for simplification p r o m p t e d the conflation of the two lists, or simply the selection of o n e of t h e m . E x a m p l e s are e p i t o m a t o r s as p s . P l u t a r c h (§ 2) a n d ps.Galen (§ 3) o r t h e i r sources, notably 'Aëtius'. 8 0 In this c o n n e c t i o n it should be recalled that the reflections of t h e Placita in G a l e n ' s own On Affected Parts III 5 indicate that h e was familiar with a c o m p i l a t i o n that was f u l l e r than Diels' r e c o n structed Aëtius a n d may have r e s e m b l e d the passage f r o m Tertullian m o r e closely than those f r o m T h e o d o r e t , ps.Plutarch a n d ps.Galen. 8 1 T e r t u l l i a n , On the Soul 14.2 illustrates o n e of the uses to which d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s were put, viz. the tack of playing off against e a c h o t h e r t h e views of a g r o u p of p h i l o s o p h e r s (the Stoics in this particular case), i.e. the Sceptical t e c h n i q u e of διαφωνία. Christian apologists such as Tertullian o f t e n recycled this t e c h n i q u e as a m e a n s of b r i n g i n g o u t t h e prevailing d i s a g r e e m e n t a m o n g t h e i r p a g a n o p p o n e n t s . Galen a n d o t h e r s conveyed the impression of disagreem e n t a m o n g a m o r e specific g r o u p of o p p o n e n t s while at the same time using d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s as overviews of t h e o p t i o n s that stood in principle o p e n to anyone who took part in the debate. It has already transpired that d i f f e r e n c e s such as those c o n s t r u e d between the Stoics in Tertullian's s c h e m e go back to shifts of e m p h a sis or r e f i n e m e n t s r a t h e r than f u n d a m e n t a l d e p a r t u r e s in the (often lost) original expositions. T h e s c h e m a t i z a t i o n involved (viz. t h e a s c e n d i n g n u m b e r of p o s t u l a t e d faculties) s h o u l d warn us against taking r e p o r t s of this kind f o r g r a n t e d . In this case, o t h e r sources p o i n t to u n a n i m i t y a m o n g the Stoics with respect of the c o n c e p t i o n of the p n e u m a t i c soul. Posidonius, it has to be stressed, is n o exception. 8 2 I n d e e d , the differences we have n o t e d between the ascriptions in a n u m b e r of particular cases attest to the fluidity of d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s h a n d e d down in o n e a n d t h e s a m e tradition. No d o u b t s c h é m a s were f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t e d t h r o u g h t h e a d d i t i o n of intermediate or c o m p r o m i s e views. T h u s the view ascribed by Tertullian to Posidonius seems to be i n t e r m e d i a t e between the Stoic a n d Platonic positions. A n d if o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e c o r r e c t , a very similar position is ascribed by N e m e s i u s to Aristotle. Such c h a n g e s of the n a m e s a t t a c h e d to certain tenets show o n c e m o r e that the pattern of o p t i o n s r a t h e r than the authorities involved d e t e r m i n e the resulting

80 81 82

See supra, p. 65 f., 70 f. See supra, p. 62 ff. See supra, p. 36 f.

s c h e m e . In s u m , it is necessary to c h e c k individual l e m m a s very carefully against o t h e r sources. Now exactly which c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s can be n o t e d between Galen a n d t h e s p e c i m e n s of t h e Placita tradition we have b e e n reviewing? First, b o t h Galen a n d t h e d o x o g r a p h i c r e p o r t s distinguish between t h e p a r t s vs. p o w e r issue o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e issue of t h e n u m b e r of faculties on the o t h e r . O n e could say that PHP 4-5 is to be s u b s u m e d u n d e r the latter h e a d i n g . Secondly, G a l e n ' s attribution of the Platonic tripartition to Z e n o a n d Aristotle can b e paralleled f r o m the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition. A n d t h e s a m e p r o b a b l y h o l d s f o r his association of P o s i d o n i u s with Aristotle. We should note, t h o u g h , that we h e a r n o t h i n g f r o m Galen a b o u t any contextual d i f f e r e n c e such as u r g e d by Porhyry in line with the d o x o g r a p h i c schemes preserved by Nemesius a n d Tertullian (§ 7; cf. Plutarch, § 6). In ch. 5 I shall e x a m i n e the Galenic text with a view to answering t h e question w h e t h e r Galen is correct in ascribing his own scientific r e a d i n g of the tripartition to Posidonius. 8 3 A f u r t h e r p o i n t of c o n t a c t between Galen a n d the sources I have b e e n discussing lies in the assimilation of the Aristotelian bipartition a n d the Platonic tripartition which a p p e a r s to have o c c u r r e d n o t long a f t e r Aristotle's d e a t h . 8 4 In fact, this process of h a r m o n i z a t i o n may have b e e n stimulated, o r at least a p p e a r e d to be w a r r a n t e d , by the original texts themselves a n d Platonic passages implying bipartition. 8 5 83

See infra, pp. 198 ff. An early instance is ps. Arist., MM 1182a24 f. attributing the Aristotelian division into τό αλογον αλογον a n d τό εχον λόγον to Plato; cf. Vander Waerdt (1985a). This division as such was well-established d u r i n g Plato's lifetime, see e.g. Arist. Protr. frr. Β 23 f., Β 59-70, with discussion a n d f u r t h e r r e f e r e n c e s in V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985a) 283 f. 85 E.g. those passages in the Tim. where distinction between an immortal a n d mortal part is drawn, e.g. 35a-b, 41c-d, 69c, 69e, 72d, 90a-c. Galen, PHP9.9.8 refers to the view of certain Platonists who explained the use of ' m o r t a l ' for two of the soul's parts as p e r t a i n i n g to their inferiority vis-à-vis the rational part—which a m o u n t s to the rational/non-rational distinction ( u n d e r which n o special position is taken by the spirited part). Contrast V a n d e r W a e r d t (1985a) 299 ff., who dismisses as irrelevant the above passages f r o m the most influential Platonic dialogue; instead he emphasizes Resp. 441a ff. where θύμος is introduced as an ally of reason (after an initial bipartition into the rational a n d desiderative part). According to V a n d e r Waerdt, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the Platonic tripartition in terms of the Aristotelian bipartition (viz. τό λόγον εχον and τό αλογον, cf. EN A 13) by the Middle Platonists and many others entailed a substantive deviation f r o m Plato's original position, there being n o special, intermediate role left for the spirited part. Nonetheless his admission ([1985b] 375η.8) that Galen was an exception because h e u p h e l d the original (anatomically based) version of the Platonic tripartition is odd, since Galen does speak in the same bipartite terms as his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s do: see 84

And, as we have seen, t h e r e are Aristotelian texts c o r r e s p o n d i n g to t h e Platonic tripartition insofar as t h e f o r m s of a p p e t i t i o n a r e conc e r n e d . 8 6 T h e b i p a r t i t i o n of Nicomachean Ethics A 1 3 - a n influential key p a s s a g e — c o u l d l e n d itself easily to a subdivision of t h e n o n r a t i o n a l part, r e s u l t i n g in tripartition in m u c h t h e s a m e way as at Aëtius, Placita IV 4.1. 8 7 I n d e e d , s o m e Aristotelian passages f e a t u r e tripartition w i t h o u t any sign of d o u b t o r disapproval. 8 8 T h a t Galen a c c e p t s t h e e q u i v a l e n c e of t h e b i p a r t i t e a n d tripartite s c h e m e s is b o r n e o u t by PHP 9.6.61. R e c o m m e n d i n g diaeresis as an indispensable m e t h o d f o r settling p r o t r a c t e d controversies, h e gives t h e n a t u r e of t h e virtues as an e x a m p l e . P h i l o s o p h e r s w h o q u a r r e l a b o u t this topic w o u l d have d o n e b e t t e r 'if they h a d divided ( δ ι ή ρ η ν τ ο ) t h e f o r m s [or: parts, ε ϊ δ η ] of t h e soul a n d clearly r e c o g n i z e d that t h e rational (λογιστικόν) is o n e a n d t h e n o n - r a t i o n a l (άλογον) a n o t h e r , a n d that the latter can be split u p in two sections as well.' O n c e again, b i p a r t i t i o n l e a d s t h e way, with t r i p a r t i t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e s u b s e q u e n t subdivision of the αλογον. 8 9 Likewise Galen, s u m m a r i z i n g bks. 4 a n d 5, draws a distinction between o n e divine f o r m (είδος) a n d two affective ( π α θ η τ ι κ ά ) o n e s (9.9.7). 9 0 T h e division m a d e a n d

below in text. In fact Galen, as well as many others, employ a bipartite interpretation which is fully compatible with the intermediate role of the spirited element, and they were encouraged to do so by a number of Platonic passages.. There is no real difficulty here. The bipartite interpretation of Plato's psychology highlights the rational/non-rational aspect—the role of the spirited part is another matter. In this light, we need not take recourse to developmental solutions to explain both bipartite and tripartite formnulations in Plato, cf. e.g. Rees (1961). The fact that several other sources give the tripartition without the preliminary dichotomy should not be taken to point to the existence of a serious opposition between two schools of interpretation; cf. Vander Waerdt (1985b) 389 n.56. 86 See supra, p. 69. 87 See supra, p. 74. 88 Top. Ε 133 a 30-32 where 'having a tripartite (τριμερή) soul' serves as an instance of a property (seil, of man); cf. 113 a35, 126 a 6, 129 a 12 if., 136 b 10. Of course, passages such as these have stimulated developmental solutions; cf. von Arnim (1927). Today we prefer to regard these passage as giving merely dialectical examples which warrant no conclusions about any doctrinal commitment on Aristotle's part. 89 Similarly Alcin. Did. 5, 156.34-7 Η.: διαίρεσις μεν τοίνυν εστίν ή μεν γένους εις εϊδη τομή, ή δέ ολου εις μέρη · ώς ήνίκα τέμνομεν τήν ψυχήν εις τε τό λογικόν καί εις τό παθητικόν, και αύ πάλιν τό παθητικόν ε'ίς τε τό θυμικόν καί τό έπιθυμητικόν. 90 These Galenic passages refute the view taken by Vander Waerdt (1985b) 375 n.8 that Galen was exceptional in upholding the original Platonic version of tripartition with the spirited part in a truly intermediate position , see esp. RepublicA 441a ff. O n e of Vander Waerdt's main claims is that the ancient interpretation of the Platonic tripartite scheme in bipartite terms seriously distorts Plato's original intention but came to prevail among Platonists and others under Peripatetic influence.

justified in this context is entirely functional, i.e. non-anatomical. But that its influence could e x t e n d to anatomical contexts is clear f r o m o n e passage in book II, where Galen e n t e r t a i n s the possibility that both the spirited a n d desiderative parts reside in heart (2.7.17). This isolated passage illustrates a f u n d a m e n t a l weakness of Galen's project, viz. his failure to a c c o u n t satisfactorily for the interactions between the parts of the soul (most notably, that between the two nonrational ones) at the anatomical a n d physiological level. At any rate it seems clear that in passages like the o n e f r o m book 9 we have j u s t cited it is the traditional d o x o g r a p h i c division r a t h e r than Galen's own anatomical researches which d e t e r m i n e his m o d e of presentation, a n d that his overall treatment reveals that h e r e lies a problem of reconciliation between the two spheres which h e never adequately solved, or indeed faced. A u t h o r s such as Galen, Plutarch a n d Posidonius c o m e to the original expositions of classical authors with an expectation of which opinions are to find there. They had b e e n i n t r o d u c e d to these texts by their teachers a n d with the assistance of manuals a n d doxographic compilations. Obviously, they did n o t shed off this e d u c a t i o n when they became teachers of philosophy a n d authors in their own right. If only for reasons of convenience or simply out of habit, they may have c o n t i n u e d to follow their h a n d b o o k s alongside their reading of the classics. So when it comes to assessing their response to past philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle or Zeno, we should take a c c o u n t of the d o x o g r a p h i c tradition as well as t h e original texts (insofar as available). In addition, it should be said that n o t only tenets, but also a r g u m e n t s were lifted f r o m the original text a n d , o f t e n in a somewhat simplified f o r m , h a n d e d down b o t h in oral t e a c h i n g a n d in h a n d b o o k s and compilation. 9 1

But he gives too little weight to passages from other dialogues (Phaedr., Tim., Lg.) which tell in favour of a basic bipartition; when viewed in this light, Peripatetic influence appears to have been less crucial. The interfacing between the conception of the two schools also led to the ascription of tripartition to Aristotle—which could also be justified by reference to certain Aristotelian passages; see previous p. Cf. Arius Didymus' account of Peripatetic ethics: after describing the λογικόν as κριτικόν and the αλογον as όρμητικόν (a typically Stoic term), he divides the αλογον: καί του άλογου τό μεν όρεκτικόν των έφ ήμίν έπιθυμητικόν· τό δέ πρός τους πλησίον οίον άμυντικόν θ υ μ ι κ ό ν (EcL II ρ.117.12-18 W.). 91 Cf. Alcin. Did. c. XIV pp. 176-7 H.; ps.Plut. Utrum pars an facultas animi affectilms subiecta sit c. 2; Plut. Virt. Mor. 442B. A further parallel between Alcinous (ibid. 177 H.) and Galen (PHP 4.6.19 ff.) is their treatment of Euripides, Medea 1078-9.

T h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e s c h e m e s p r o v i d e d by this tradition s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r e s t i m a t e d . I n d e e d , original passages are q u o t e d to fill o u t a n d justify these schemes. T h e passages f r o m Plutarch (§ 6) a n d Porphyry (§ 7) we have discussed are highly interesting in this regard. T h e s e a u t h o r s try to c o r r e c t t h e a p p a r e n t discrepancy b e t w e e n t h e d o x o g r a p h i c ascription of tripartition tout court to Aristotle a n d what they r e a d in t h e original writings: Plutarch assumes a real discrepancy between t h e tripartition a n d bipartition which can only be solved by ascribing t h e f o r m e r to an early stage in Aristotle's career. Porphyry, as we have noticed, is motivated by passages f r o m t h e Aristotelian On the Soul a n d Nicomachean Ethics to insist o n a c o n t e x t u a l distinction. Both, it s h o u l d be e m p h a s i z e d , d o n o t dismiss t h e ascription of t h e tripartition to Aristotle altogether. So t h e fact that Galen q u o t e s so extensively f r o m the original expositions d o e s n o t p r e c l u d e his use of d o x o g r a p h i c s c h e m e s . O n t h e contrary, these s c h e m e s largely d e t e r m i n e t h e p a t t e r n of allegiances a n d silences to be f o u n d in PHP 4 a n d 5 a n d it is this p a t t e r n which is filled o u t by passages f r o m t h e original expositions of t h e authorities c o n c e r n e d . G a l e n ' s f o r c e d exegesis of Republic 4.436-440 in PHP5.7 is a case in p o i n t insofar as it shows Galen i m p o s i n g o n the Platonic text t h e d o x o g r a p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two issues: (1) p a r t s o r powers? a n d (2) how many faculties? (see also above, p. 28 f.). T h a t pre-existing s c h e m e s r a t h e r t h a n i n d e p e n d e n t - m i n d e d study of primary sources largely d e t e r m i n e s G a l e n ' s t r e a t m e n t may also be i n f e r r e d f r o m 5.6.40-42. In t h e p r e c e d i n g c o n t e x t Galen has a r g u e d that C l e a n t h e s a c c e p t e d t h e Platonic tripartition, q u o t i n g a versified dialogue between reason a n d a n g e r c o m p o s e d by the latter (ibid. 35 ~ SVF 1.570). 9 2 H e i n t r o d u c e s this d i a l o g u e as evidence f o r the original view of b o t h C l e a n t h e s a n d his predecessor Zeno. This agrees with his attribution of t h e tripartition to these philosophers. 9 3 H e r e , however, his s o u r c e — P o s i d o n i u s — d o e s n o t provide a separate proof-text f r o m Z e n o a n d Galen is n o t able to p r o d u c e o n e either. A l t h o u g h at first h e takes t h e passage f r o m C l e a n t h e s as a d e q u a t e e v i d e n c e f o r t h e view of Z e n o t o o , h e e x c u s e s h i m s e l f a little f u r t h e r o n f o r n o t p r o v i d i n g a passage f r o m Z e n o (ibid. 40). 9 4 H e r e h e a p p e a l s to his 92

For a full discussion f r o m the Stoic perspective see infra, pp. 264 ff. See PHP 5.6.33, 34, 42; cf. 4.2.6, 4.38. Galen o n c e says that Chrysippus too admitted that the soul has three powers, 3.7.53; cf. 4.1.14. 94 T h a t is to say, he excuses himself for n o t looking u p a relevant passage in an original work by Zeno. T h a t Z e n o ' s treatises were still read in the second century c e is also attested by Epictetus, see Diss. 1.20.15, 4.9.6. 93

d e c i s i o n — d i c t a t e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t i m e — t o c o n c e n t r a t e o n Chrysippus. This is strange b e c a u s e h e has j u s t i n t r o d u c e d a passage f r o m C l e a n t h e s , in s u p p o r t of his claims a b o u t t h e latter as well as Z e n o . But it is n o less r e m a r k a b l e t h a t Galen h e r e says that t h e view of Z e n o stands in n e e d of e x a m i n a t i o n o n t h e basis of his own words. But Z e n o , h e goes o n to a r g u e , will have taken o n e of t h e following t h r e e views {ibid. 42): (1) Z e n o h e l d that a f f e c t i o n s a r e j u d g e m e n t s — t h e view of Chrysippus. If so, Z e n o is liable to t h e same r e f u t a t i o n as Chrysippus a n d n e e d s n o separate r e f u t a t i o n . (2) Z e n o a c c e p t e d Platonic p r i n c i p l e s — t h e view of C l e a n t h e s a n d Posidonius. If so, h e subscribes to t h e position d e f e n d e d by G a l e n a n d n e e d s n o r e f u t a t i o n either. (3) Z e n o t o o k a position i n t e r m e d i a t e b e t w e e n t h e best (2) a n d t h e worst (1) view, viz. t h a t a f f e c t i o n s supervene on j u d g e m e n t s . Alt h o u g h h e d o e s n o t explicitly say so, G a l e n a p p a r e n t l y takes this o p t i o n to have b e e n r e f u t e d a l o n g with (1). I n any case G a l e n says h e r e t h a t h e believes this was Z e n o ' s original view. O f c o u r s e this conflicts with t h e o t h e r passages w h e r e Z e n o is c r e d i t e d with t h e Platonic tripartiton, i.e. o p t i o n (2). In this passage G a l e n e n t a n g l e s himself in various self-contradictions. But what it shows above all is t h e d o m i n a n t role of s c h e m e s such as t h e p r e s e n t o n e . PHP 5.6.40-42 is striking precisely b e c a u s e Galen diverges f r o m his g e n e r a l p r o c e d u r e : instead of a p p o r t i o n i n g t h e o p t i o n s a m o n g t h e a u t h o r i t i e s a c c o r d i n g to a pre-existing diaeretic s c h e m a , h e now declares himself in favour of taking his p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e f r o m the original exposition. H e claims that Z e n o ' s original position s h o u l d be e x a m i n e d o n t h e basis of his own words, even t h o u g h h e has a t t r i b u t e d views to h i m in t h e p r e c e d i n g discussion w i t h o u t revealing any d o u b t s whatsoever. T h e views earlier ascribed to Z e n o are identical to two of t h e o p t i o n s in t h e above s c h e m a . T h e s a m e s c h e m a , t h e n , u n d e r l i e s t h e discussion as a whole. T h e only d i f f e r e n c e with t h e earlier passages is that h e r e Galen shows himself u n d e c i d e d as to which of t h e t h r e e o p t i o n s is t h e correct o n e (but, as e x p l a i n e d above, in all t h r e e cases h e can dispense with an i n d e p e n d e n t inquiry c o n c e r n i n g Z e n o ) . But as a rule, it clearly is the s c h e m e of o p t i o n s which c o m e s first a n d its c o r r o b o r a t i o n by m e a n s of prooftexts next. As a third e x a m p l e , it is instructive to c o m p a r e PHP 7.3, w h e r e we have s o m e t h i n g similar to P l u t a r c h ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e a t t r i b u t i o n of

t h r e e p a r t s to Aristotle. H e r e G a l e n a r g u e s t h a t Erasistratus first located the source of the nerves in the so-called thick m e m b r a n e (i.e. t h e d u r a m a t e r ) b u t that, w h e n later in his life h e p e r f o r m e d his dissections with greater care, h e discovered that the nerves grow f r o m t h e b r a i n itself, viz. f r o m t h e c e r e b e l l u m . T h i s later view is d o c u m e n t e d by the q u o t a t i o n of a relevant r e p o r t of a dissection (7.3.811). T h e earlier view ( ' n e r v e s grow f r o m t h e m e n i n x that encloses t h e b r a i n ' ) is said to be f o u n d in ' m o s t of his writings' b u t is n o t illus t r a t e d t h r o u g h citation. Did Erasistratus really c h a n g e his m i n d a b o u t t h e seat of t h e intellect? In t h e text q u o t e d by Galen this is n e i t h e r said n o r implied. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n given by Galen that Erasistratus at first h a d n o leisure to p e r f o r m his dissections with a d e q u a t e care (ibid. 7.3.7) looks g r a t u i t o u s . But it is worth n o t i n g that this alleged initial view can be paralleled f r o m t h e section in t h e Aëtian Placita c o n c e r n e d with t h e seat of the r e g e n t p a r t (ps.Plut. Plac. IV 5.3; cf. T h e o d . GACV 22): Ε ρ α σ ί σ τ ρ α τ ο ς περί τήν μήνιγγα του έγκβράλου, ήν έ π ι κ ρ α ν ί δ α λέγει. T h e t e r m μήνιγγα h e r e m e a n s t h e o u t e r m e m b r a n e or d u r a m a t e r , while έπίκρανις ('against the skull') d e n o t e s t h e p o s t e r i o r ventricle of t h e b r a i n which lies under t h e c e r e b e l l u m . 9 5 W h a t is m o r e , this l e m m a f r o m t h e Placita is e c h o e d by Galen himself in t h e first b o o k of his On the Use of Parts (p. 15.2 f. H e l m r e i c h : 6 μεν γ α ρ τήν κ α ρ δ ί α ν , ό δε τ ά ς μήνιγγας, ό δέ τον έγκέφαλον έν έαυτω φησιν έ'χειν τό τής ψ υ χ ή ς ήγεμονοΰν). T h e r e can be n o d o u b t that Erasistratus lurks b e h i n d t h e s e c o n d tenet. Galen merely selects f r o m a fuller s o u r c e ( f e a t u r i n g the n a m e s of a u t h o r i ties) what h e d e e m s sufficient in a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t . 9 6 It is a fair a s s u m p t i o n that PHP 7.3 r e p r e s e n t s G a l e n ' s a t t e m p t to s q u a r e t h e t e n e t of Erasistratus h e knew f r o m t h e Placita with a passage f r o m Erasistratus himself which l e n d s s u p p o r t to G a l e n ' s own a n a t o m i c a l findings. In o r d e r to r e c o n c i l e t h e d o x o g r a p h i c ascription with his own r e a d i n g , G a l e n has r e c o u r s e to t h e s a m e ploy as we f o u n d Plutarch using (see above, p. 76), viz. the d e v e l o p m e n t a l solution. T o c o n c l u d e . O n the basis of the p r e c e d i n g overview the following e x p e c t a t i o n may be f o r m u l a t e d with r e g a r d to PHP 4 a n d 5. Galen derives d i a e r e t i c s c h é m a s f r o m t h e Placita t r a d i t i o n o r a p p l i e s a n a l o g o u s s c h é m a s of his own m a k i n g . W h e n it c o m e s to o p p o n e n t s such as t h e Stoics, h e employs these s c h é m a s in o r d e r to fabricate 95

Cf. Pollux, Onom. II 226; cf. II 46, p. 95.20-23, N e m e s . Nat. Morani with Mansfeld (1990b) 3093 n.143. 96 See supra, p. 63.

hom. 69.19-20

discrepancies between invididual Stoics or between the statements of one of them such as Chrysippus, who is his main target. In general the quotes from their original expositions, if available, are adduced to flesh out and illustrate the pre-existing schema. 97 Yet all kinds of interactions and some amount of wavering between the schémas and the original passages might occur because of certain differences between them. To be sure, these are assumptions that stand in need of further corroboration and explanation in each separate case. This further step crucially involves the study of the Stoic material itself. It will be taken in the next three chapters dealing with Chrysippus (chs. 3, 4) and Posidonius (ch. 5).

97

Cf. the 'plot' or 'argument' (ϋπόθεσις) which serves as the basis of a cento (Gr. κέντρων, 'patchwork', 'rag'). Here statements from an existing text are assembled in such a way that an entirely different story is created. Such a patchwork may serve a plurality of purposes. A prose cento may explicitly mention the source, or sources, used, or at least some of them. Comments of various sorts may be interspersed etc. It is often difficult to distinguish between a cento in the strict sense and a concatenation of quotes that have been assembled to serve a particular purpose. On the genre of cento, which in Galen's day had become quite popular, see Mansfeld (1992) 152 ff., id. (1999) 28, with further references. Mansfeld also notes the similarities between the cento and certain forms of philosophical and religious polemic as practised in Galen's day. On the possibility of relating the cento to doxography see Diels, D. G. 171 f. Cf. also Schoedel (1959) 23 f., who points to the issues listed at Irenaeus, Adv. haeres. II 28.2, which correspond to some of the material to be found in ps. Plutarch/Aëtius, Plac. III.

CHAPTER THREE

CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS·. T H E T H E O R E T I C A L B O O K S (I-II)

1. Number of Books, Length and Contents T h e a n c i e n t s saw t h e idea of a f f e c t i o n s as j u d g e m e n t s as t h e m a i n thesis of Chrysippus' On Affections. N o t only d o e s it provide t h e focal p o i n t f o r G a l e n ' s critique, it also t h e thesis f o r which t h e treatise is cited by D i o g e n e s Laertius (7.111 ~ SVF 2.456). O n its overall contents we are f u r t h e r i n f o r m e d by Galen a n d Cicero, a l t h o u g h their i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t as clear a n d precise as we would like it to be. C h r y s i p p u s ' work, Galen tells us, consisted of f o u r books, e a c h of which was twice t h e l e n g t h of a b o o k of his own PHP (5.6.45 ~ SVF 3 . 4 5 8 ) . 1 T h i s p o i n t is m a d e in s u p p o r t of t h e c h a r g e of verbosity Galen o f t e n levels against his o p p o n e n t s , contrasting this f e a t u r e with t h e ideal of scientific ( ' g e o m e t r i c a l ' ) brevity (cf. e.g. 8.1.17-48). But even allowing f o r s o m e d e g r e e of e x a g g e r a t i o n , we n e e d n o t d o u b t t h a t t h e treatise as a w h o l e was substantial. F u r t h e r , f r o m a n o n p o l e m i c a l passage in G a l e n ' s On Affected Parts we learn s o m e t h i n g a b o u t Chrysippus' aims a n d m e t h o d s : ... t h e o r e t i c a l are all t h o s e [ s t u d i e s ] w h i c h g o i n g b e y o n d practical utility c o n s i d e r t h e n a t u r e o f things, o f w h a t e v e r kind they are with r e s p e c t to their o w n e s s e n c e : thus, for instance, Chrysippus the philos o p h e r , t o o , wrote o n the a f f e c t i o n s o f the soul o n e b o o k Therapeutics, w h i c h w e u s e a b o v e all with a view to their c u r e , a n d t h r e e o t h e r s c o n t a i n i n g theoretical (λογικάς) i n q u i r i e s .(Loc. A f f . Ill, 1: VIII p. 138 Κ. ~ S V F 3 . 4 5 7 ) . 2

1

.. ώς τοΰτο γε [seil, how to speak more briefly without omitting anything essential] καί έξ αύτών ών εγραψε Χρύσιππος Περί παθών ενεστι καταμαθεΐν. τεττάρων γαρ βιβλίων οϋτω μεγάλων αύτφ γεγραμμένων ώσθ' εκαστον είναι διπλάσιον των ημετέρων, ομως ημείς ούδ' έν ολοις δύο την περί των παθών αύτοΰ γνώμην έξητάκαμεν. 2 τα μέν ούν τοιαύτα λογικώτερά πως εφην είναι · λογικά γαρ όντως εστίν οσα της χρείας έπέκεινα προερχόμενα την φύσιν άθρεί τών πραγμάτων, οποία τις υπάρχει κατά την οίκείαν ούσίαν · οϋτως γοΰν καί Χρύσιππος ό φιλόσοφος έγραψεν περί τών της ψυχής παθών εν μέν τό θεραπευτικόν βιβλίον, ού μάλιστα χρήζομεν εις την ϊασιν αύτών, έτερα δέ τρία λογικάς έχοντα ζητήσεις.

Galen uses t h e division of subject-matter e x e m p l i f i e d by Chrysippus' treatise to illustrate a p o i n t of his own. I n d e e d , h e a p p e a r s to r e c o m m e n d t h e Stoic's n e a t a r r a n g e m e n t a n d speaks in t h e first plural almost as if h e a n d m a n y o t h e r s use t h e Therapeutics as an authoritative g u i d e in m o r a l affairs. I shall r e t u r n to its s u p p o s e d popularity in t h e separate c h a p t e r devoted to the Therapeutics.3 But a few q u e s t i o n s r e m a i n : Is t h e d e s i g n a t i o n of t h e first t h r e e as λογικά C h r y s i p p e a n o r at least early Stoic in origin? 4 A n d if so, is G a l e n ' s gloss ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' correct? W h e n we t u r n to t h e PHP, we f i n d that Galen employs the same g e n e r a l characterization of the books of Chrysippus' treatise: '.... h i s e n t i r e treatise On Affections, t h e t h r e e b o o k s in w h i c h h e investigates theoretical (λογικά) q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e m a n d m o r e o v e r 5 t h e Therapeutics, w h i c h is a l s o e n t i t l e d Ethics by s o m e ...' ( 4 . 1 . 1 4 , p . 2 3 8 . 4 - 6 - SVF3.461).6

In r e g a r d to t h e f o u r t h a n d last b o o k Galen implies that Therapeutics was t h e title given by Chrysippus, a n d Ethics that e m p l o y e d by certain o t h e r s (see also 5.7.52, q u o t e d b e l o w ) . But it r e m a i n s u n c e r t a i n w h e t h e r Chrysippus himself r e f e r r e d to t h e first t h r e e b o o k s as t h e λογικά, t h o u g h this would seem plausible given his use of a s e p a r a t e title f o r t h e last o n e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e fact that o t h e r s t h a n Chrysippus are responsible f o r an alternative title f o r t h e Therapeutics urges us to exercise c a u t i o n . A l t h o u g h in t h e f r a g m e n t s themselves t h e t e r m d o e s n o t f e a t u r e , G a l e n r e f e r s f o u r m o r e times to t h e first t h r e e b o o k s as λ ο γ ι κ ά in a casual way s u g g e s t i n g t h a t it was t h e i r s t a n d a r d designation (4.5.10, 4.7.21, 5.7.52, 8.1.47). This b r o a d characterization of t h e books, at any event, seems to be b o r n e o u t by t h e f r a g m e n t s . Galen directly q u o t e s several passages f r o m b o o k s 1 a n d 4 a n d a few f r o m b o o k 2 as h e f o u n d t h e m in P o s i d o n i u s ' On Affections. H e d o e s n o t q u o t e f r o m o r r e f e r to b o o k 3—a silence c o m p a r a b l e to that s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s e c o n d b o o k On the Soul a n d s h a r e d by o u r o t h e r m a i n source, Cicero. 7 Book 1 o f f e r e d a 3

See infra, pp. 140 f. Fillion-Lahille (1984) 82 ff. takes it thus, using the appellation 'Logikon' as if it were a separate title for the first books on a par with Therapeutics. 5 De Lacy prints the word concerned with a capital Θ yet translates 'the book on their cure'. 6 τά Περί παθών άπαντα, τά τε τρία δι' ών έπισκέπτεται τά λογικά περί αυτών ζητήματα καί προσέτι τό Θεραπευτικόν, δ δή καί 'Ηθικόν έπιγράφουσι τίνες ... 7 On this silence see supra, p. 55 (ch. 1); on Cicero see further, infra, pp. 302 ff. (ch. 6). 4

discussion of Zeno's definitions of affection a n d its main species and so was c o n c e r n e d with their nature, including their cause. Book 2 discussed at least a series of difficulties (άπορίαι) posed by certain everyday p h e n o m e n a a n d featuring prominently the question of the cause, i.e. w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n a c o n c e r n e d can be causally explained within the f r a m e w o r k of the Stoic unitary theory. This overall a r r a n g e m e n t can be paralleled f r o m medical literature, where we e n c o u n t e r the same sequence of nature-cum-cause and therapy. 8 Closer inspection of the evidence indicates that the Therapeutics o f f e r e d far m o r e theory than Galen's distinction might suggest. It offered a summary of the o p e n i n g section of book l. 9 T h e r e are some indications that this f e a t u r e is d u e to the fact the Therapeutics was designed to stand on its own feet, that is to say for use by those, Stoics a n d others, who were m o r e interested in the practical side of Stoic moral thought. In this light it would have m a d e sense for Chrysippus to r e p e a t t h e gist of the theoretical discussion a n d show what practical consequences might follow f r o m it. A different reason—not necessarily e x c l u d i n g the f o r m e r — m a y lie in the role played by 'theoretical' e l e m e n t s such as definition in the Stoic conception of therapy. C o m p a r e what o u r o t h e r main source, Cicero, has to say with reference to Chrysippus' treatise: ... w h e n C h r y s i p p u s a n d t h e S t o i c s 1 0 d i s c u s s t h e s o u l ' s a f f e c t i o n s , t h e y a r e in l a r g e p a r t e n g a g e d in d i v i d i n g a n d d e f i n i n g t h e m ; q u i t e b r i e f is that exposition of theirs o n h o w they c u r e t h e souls a n d d o n o t 8 Thus Diocles of Carystus {/lor: c. 350 bce) wrote a treatise entitled Πάθος αιτία θεραπεία (Gal. Loc. ä f f . VIII p.186 K.) and Praxagoras of Cos (Jlor. c. 300 b c e ) an Α'ίτια πάθη θεραπείαι (from Cael. Aurel. Ac. morb. Ill 17.163[Fr. 109 St.]: 'libris de causis atque passionibus et curationibus', cf. Steckerl (1961) 5: Πάθη Αίτίαι Θεραπείαι). Caelius also ascribes to Praxagoras a 'quarto libro Curationum' (Ac. morb. Ill 4.32 = fr. I l l St.) and knows about a 'tertio libro de morbis' (Chron. morb. V 2.50 = fr. 81 St.). Pace Steckerl (1961) 5 and Bardong, ßEXXII.2 (1954) 1736, these three references may be to one and the same original work. On Praxagoras and Stoicism see infra, p. 192 n. 174 and text thereto. Of course the sequence in which an affection was described first and then its cure prescribed is fairly general and encountered also in such treatises as Philodemus' On Anger and Plutarch's On Garrulity and On Bad Shame. De Lacy ad 238.4-6, who notes the correspondence, suggests that Chrysippus set the pattern for many subsequent moral essays. 9 Thus the two substantial fragments from book 1 presented at PHP 4.2.10-12, 14-18 (SVF 3.462) can be paralleled from 4.4.16-17 and 24, 30, 31, 32 (SVF 476, omitting 30), all from book 4. Two further fragments from book 4 also e c h o Chrysippus' explanation at the beginning of book 1: 4.5.13-14 (SVF479) and 4.6.35 (SVF478). Galen explicitly remarks on two such correspondences, 4.4.23, 4.5.10. On these passages see further infra, nn. 51, 63 and text thereto. 10 This formulation amounts to 'Chrysippus as followed by other Stoics', see Dougan and Henry ad loc. On the context in Cicero, see further infra, pp. 292 ff.

permit them [i.e. the souls] to be disturbed (Cicero, Tusc. 4.9 ~ SVF 3.483)." Cicero is h e r e r e f e r r i n g to a particular f e a t u r e of t h e Stoic a p p r o a c h , viz. t h e fact that definition h a d a role to play in therapy a n d t h e r e f o r e even l o o m e d large in t h e separately e n t i t l e d t h e r a p e u t i c a l b o o k . At 4.53 h e himself indicates very clearly that t h e study of (Stoic) m o r a l d e f i n i t i o n s is c o n d u c i v e to m a s t e r i n g affections. I shall r e t u r n to this p o i n t presently. But C i c e r o will h a r d l y have s p o k e n of t h e Stoic therapeutical discourse as 'quite b r i e f w h e n it o c c u p i e d a whole ( a n d a c c o r d i n g to G a l e n long) b o o k . W h a t may also have struck h i m was t h e e m p h a s i s p l a c e d by t h e Stoic o n t h e preventive side of t h e r a p y ( h e r e p e r h a p s i n d i c a t e d by t h e p h r a s e nec ... patiantur, ' a n d d o n o t p e r m i t t h e m ...'). 1 2 T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e role played by t h e o r y in C h r y s i p p e a n t h e r a peutics gains a d d i t i o n a l weight in t h e light of t h e m o d e r n view that Hellenistic m o r a l t h e o r y ( i n c l u d i n g Stoic ethics) t o o k its starting p o i n t f r o m t h e individual with his or h e r needs, feelings a n d o p i n i o n s without o b t r u d i n g a d o g m a t i c world-view. 13 T h a t t h e Therapeutics may also have b e e n i n t e n d e d f o r separate use may b e s u g g e s t e d — i n a d d i t i o n to its s e p a r a t e title 1 4 a n d t h e above passage f r o m G a l e n — b y t h e following testimony: Not only in this book [seil, the first book On the soul] was he [seil. Chrysippus] completely silent about Plato's arguments, 1 5 but also in his writings On Affections, both the three theoretical ones and that which was written by him separately and apart from these, that which is entitled Therapeutics and Ethics (PHP 5.7.52 ~ SVF 3.461; cf. 4.1.14). 16 T h i s t e s t i m o n y c o n f i r m s t h e division b e t w e e n t h e first t h r e e a n d t h e final b o o k s of t h e t r e a t i s e a n d p e r h a p s even s u p p o r t s t h e 11

Chrysippus et Stoici cum de animi perturbationibus disputant, magnam partem in his partiendis et definiendis occupati sunt; ilia eorum perexigua oratio est qua medeantur animis nec eos turbulentos esse patiantur. 12 See further infra, pp. 141, 167 ff. 13 See further infra, pp. 141 ff., 167. 14 Origenes, Contra Celsum I 64, VIII 51 (vol. 1, p. 117.16 ff., vol. 2, p. 266.18 ff. Kö. ~ SVF 3.474) too uses the separate tide Therapeutics but refers to it as part of the A f f . Cf. also Philod. De ira Col. I . 11-19 Indelli. 15 The silence about Plato may not have been as complete as Galen claims but the objection appears to reflect an authentic feature of Chrysippean dialectic, see Tieleman (1996a) 141,256. 16 ού μόνον δέ κατά τούτο έσιώπησε τούς τού Πλάτωνος λόγους άλλα και κατά τά περί παθών συγγράμματα, τά τε τρία τά λογικά καί χωρίς αύτών ιδία γεγραμμένον ύπ' αύτοΰ, τό Θεραπευτικόν τε και 'Ηθικόν έπιγραφόμενον.

assumption that the Therapeutics was d e s i g n e d to be m o r e or less selfcontained. It is t e m p t i n g to s u p p o s e that C h r y s i p p u s himself h a d u s e d t h e t e r m λογικά to c h a r a c t e r i z e certain parts of his treatise. But did h e m e a n t h e s a m e by it as G a l e n did in t h e passage f r o m On Affected Parts? A n o t h e r s n i p p e t of e v i d e n c e is especially valuable since it c o m e s f r o m a n o t h e r source, viz. Cicero. C o n c l u d i n g his a c c o u n t of t h e c o n t e n t s of the On Affections, h e says: H e r e y o u h a v e w h a t t h e S t o i c s d i s c u s s in p l a i n t e r m s a b o u t t h e a f f e c t i o n s . T h e y call t h e s e t h i n g s λ ο γ ι κ ά , b e c a u s e t h e y a r e e x p o u n d e d in a r a t h e r u n a d o r n e d f a s h i o n . A n d s i n c e o u r e x p o s i t i o n h a s s a i l e d away f r o m t h e s e t h i n g s as f r o m r o u g h cliffs, let u s h o l d o u r c o u r s e f o r t h e r e s t of o u r d i s q u i s i t i o n , p r o v i d e d t h a t w e h a v e s p o k e n a b o u t t h o s e t h i n g s with s u f f i c i e n t l u c i d i t y g i v e n t h e o b s c u r i t y of o u r s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ( Tusc. 4 . 3 3 ) .

Cicero m a k e s it clear that the Stoics themselves spoke of λογικά a n d this m u s t i n c l u d e Chrysippus whose treatise h e has j u s t s u m m a r i z e d a n d whose n a m e h e used at the outset of his s u m m a r y (4.9). However C i c e r o takes t h e t e r m λογικά in t h e sense of ' p l a i n ' , ' u n a d o r n e d ' , w h i c h is r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m G a l e n ' s ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' . C i c e r o has c h o s e n to r e p r o d u c e the Stoic a c c o u n t b e c a u s e of its terseness a n d precision, t h i n k i n g primarily of the d e f i n i t i o n s in b o o k I b u t also, it seems, of t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e Therapeutics. T h e above observation is m e a n t to c o n c l u d e t h e s u m m a r y of C h r y s i p p u s ' whole treatise, i.e. i n c l u d i n g t h e section covering t h e Therapeutics (4.23-32). 1 7 T h i s last b o o k , as we n o t i c e d , r e p e a t e d m u c h of t h e t h e o r y i n c l u d i n g t h e definitions e x p o u n d e d in t h e first book. But t h e n f o r Cicero the term λογικά s e e m s to have a stylistic a p p l i c a t i o n . H e uses this t e r m to o p p o s e t h e C h r y s i p p e a n t r e a t m e n t to t h e m o r e expansive style o n which h e e m b a r k s in what follows. Accordingly h e d o e s n o t apply it to b o o k s o r sections, b u t r a t h e r to their c o n t e n t s (using, r a t h e r vaguely, p r o n o u n s in t h e n e u t r e p l u r a l ) . It is h a r d to believe that h e simply l u m p s t o g e t h e r t h e o r y a n d (Stoic) dialectic (as c o n c e r n e d with d e f i n i t i o n ) . It is however also possible that Cicero used an abstract, or r e p o r t , in which t h e division of s u b j e c t - m a t t e r a m o n g the original books was b l u r r e d (see f u r t h e r below, p p . 302 ff.). But d o e s Cicero's mistake, or p r o b a b l e mistake, a b o u t the sense of λογικά, m e a n t h a t Galen is right? W h a t is k n o w n a b o u t its original Stoic m e a n i n g ? T h e Stoics used t h e t e r m λ ο γ ι κ ό ς in t h e sense of 1

' Pace H e i n e ad loc.

logical, p e r t a i n i n g to logic, o r in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l (as in t h e expression 'rational a n i m a l ' ) . T h e first sense could b e related to what is k n o w n a b o u t b o o k I if we take it to p e r t a i n to t h e p a r t of logic ( a n d , m o r e specifically, d i a l e c t i c ) d e a l i n g with d e f i n i t i o n s a n d partitions. T h e use of these m e t h o d s is particularly evident in ethical texts. 1 8 In On Affections b o o k 1 we c o m e across Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n as t h e result of t h e p r o c e d u r e of articulation of c o m m o n c o n c e p t i o n s , t h e latter r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e stage c h a r a c t e r i z e d as t h e ' a c c o u n t in o u t l i n e ' (see below). Moreover, we find h e r e t h e division of affection a c c o r d i n g to g e n e r a a n d species. However, t h e aporiai of b o o k 2 clearly b e l o n g to a d i f f e r e n t b r a n c h of logic t h a n t h e c o n c e p t u a l articulation of b o o k 1, a n d it is difficult to t h i n k of a sense of λογικά a p p l i c a b l e to b o t h books. In s u m , G a l e n ' s e x p l a n a t i o n may b e t h e correct one.

2. Zeno 's Definitions of Affection M o d e r n r e s e a r c h has s o m e w h a t n e g l e c t e d t h e Stoic c o n c e p t — a n d m e t h o d — o f definition. 1 9 Yet t h e r e can be n o d o u b t as to its centrality to Stoic p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d . D e f i n i t i o n starts f r o m t h e ' o u t l i n e ' (υπογραφή), which a c c o r d i n g to Diogenes is a ' s t a t e m e n t i n t r o d u c i n g us to things by m e a n s of a sketch, or which conveys t h e f o r c e of t h e definition m o r e simply t h a n a definition d o e s ' (7.60). In o t h e r words, it is t h e f o r m u l a used f o r t h e p r e l i m i n a r y step of m a r k i n g off a defin i e n d u m , p r i o r to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a t r u e d e f i n i t i o n . T h e a c c o u n t in o u t l i n e states a g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n ( έ ν ν ο ι α ) ; t h e d e f i n i t i o n c o n verts this into a philosophical c o n c e p t . T h u s a n o t h e r witness states: The Stoics [...] affirm that from the senses the intellect forms conceptions—which they call εννοιαι—viz. of those things which they articulate by definition. The entire method of learning and teaching, they say, stems and spreads from here (Augustine, Ci v. dei 8.7 ~ SVF 2.106). 20

18

See from the Tusc. itself 4.53 (LS 32 H); cf. also the list of ethical works with the heading 'Ethical theory concerning the articulation of moral conceptions', D.L. 7.199-200. 19 But Long-Sedley (1987) 190-5 assemble and excellently discuss a number of texts concerned with division and definition; cf. also Rieth (1933) 36-54. 20 Cf. D.L. 7.199, ps. Gal. Def. med. XIX p. 348.17-349.4 K., Plut. De comm. not. 1059C (SVF 2.33); cf. also Stob. Eel. II p. 67.11-12 Wachsmuth = SVF 3.294). Both the notion of 'account in outline' and the related procedure of articulation are

T h e reference to learning shows that definition as conceived by the Stoics is aimed at articulating what is true (cf. D.L. 7.42). After all, c o n c e p t i o n s are the very stuff of rationality a n d , when naturally e m b e d d e d in us, a primary criterion of truth. 2 1 This also holds good for the sphere of moral action. Accordingly, Cicero c o m m e n d s definitions of courage advanced by Chrysippus and other Stoics as follows: ' [ . . . ] I ' m a f r a i d t h e y m a y b e t h e o n l y r e a l p h i l o s o p h e r s . F o r w h i c h of t h o s e d e f i n i t i o n s d o e s n o t u n c o v e r t h e t a n g l e d c o n c e p t i o n of c o u r a g e w h i c h lies b u r i e d w i t h i n us all? A n d o n c e t h i s h a s b e e n u n c o v e r e d , who would require anything m o r e for the warrior, the general, or the o r a t o r , a n d n o t t h i n k t h e m c a p a b l e of p e r f o r m i n g any c o u r a g e o u s act w i t h o u t r a g e ? (Tusc. 4 . 5 3 ) . 2 2

T h u s the Stoics a d o p t e d the intellectualist position—here endorsed by Cicero— that to know a particular virtue r e n d e r s us capable of p e r f o r m i n g it. But this knowledge is in n e e d of articulation and, as Cicero indicates, should be b r o u g h t to full consciousness. O n e may assume that an analogous position was a d o p t e d with respect to the affections: to know them is a m e a n s of preventing them to strike h o m e . If o n e is able to recognize which condition is at the verge of taking hold of us, it may still be stopped through rational means, i.e. by letting o n e ' s better self persuade us to respond differently to the mental presentation in question. T h e long lists of affections, each carefully defined and subsumed u n d e r o n e of the four generic affections (pleasure, appetite, distress, fear), that have been preserved in sources such as Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus or ps.Andronicus, for all their a p p a r e n t aridity, reflect an a u t h e n t i c f e a t u r e of the original expositions which was geared to a therapeutic purpose. 2 3 T h u s the division between the theoretical a n d practical sides of the Stoic doctrine of the affections should not be exaggerated. In Chrysippus' treatise, too, the definitions of the first books did not only belong to a strictly theoretical sphere, but were also designed to influence moral Aristotelian in origin, see e.g. ENA 7.1098a20-9, Met Ζ 3.1029a7, ibid. 1028b31; De an. Β 1.413a9-10; cf. EE 1248b 10. On the affinities with Stoicism see also Rieth (1933) 176 f. 21 Aet. IV 11.3-4 (SVF2.83), D.L. 7.54 (SVF2.105) with Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 194. 22 Metuo ne soli philosophi sint. Quae enim islarum definitionum non aperil notionem nostram quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam ? Qua aperla quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aot oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existumet sine rabie quicquam fortiter faeere posse? 23 See the evidence collected, SVF3.391-430.

a c t i o n . A n d t h e s t i p u l a t i o n s of t h e Therapeutics r e m a i n e d firmly r o o t e d in the Stoic d o c t r i n e a b o u t the n a t u r e a n d cause of t h e affections. 2 4 But t h e n Stoic philosophy in g e n e r a l was never theoretical in this strict sense b u t m e a n t to b e relevant to living a well-reasoned life. 25 Let us now take a closer look at t h e evidence in PHP relating to Chrysippus' use of definitions. First o n e may ask w h e t h e r t h e r e are any i n d i c a t i o n s that Chrysippus e m p l o y e d t h e distinction b e t w e e n ' a c c o u n t in o u t l i n e ' a n d technical d e f i n i t i o n in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e p r o c e d u r e of articulation. Chrysippus employed such a m e t h o d when h e set o u t to establish t h e location of t h e intellect in the s e c o n d half of the first b o o k of his On the Soul—the t h e m e of the p r e d e c e s s o r of t h e p r e s e n t study ( T i e l e m a n 1996a, Pt. II). As to t h e a f f e c t i o n s , Chrysippus could avail himself of the technical definitions laid down by Z e n o in t h e l a t t e r ' s own On Affections26 o r p e r h a p s e x p r e s s e d orally. 27 I n d e e d , taking o n e ' s starting p o i n t f r o m Z e n o seems to have b e e n de rigoeur f o r any Stoic. In a d d i t i o n to c u r r e n t ideas o n philosophical allegiance, 2 8 it was also i m p o r t a n t to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e unity a n d continuity of o n e ' s school. T h u s a d d i t i o n s a n d i n d e e d adjustm e n t s — o f t e n occasioned by d e b a t e a n d criticism—were c o u c h e d in t h e f o r m of t h e exegesis of t h e f o u n d e r ' s ipsissima verba. Anti-Stoic a u t h o r s such as Galen a n d Plutarch provide m a n y e x a m p l e s showing that this did n o t prevent Stoics f r o m b e i n g played off against Zeno or o n e a n o t h e r . For the m o m e n t suffice it to observe that t h e t e c h n i q u e of s t a r t i n g f r o m Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s was s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e , p e r p e t u a t e d by later Stoics i n c l u d i n g P o s i d o n i u s w h o also t o o k Chrysippus' exegesis into account. 2 9 Chrysippus first t u r n e d to Z e n o ' s g e n e r a l definition of ' a f f e c t i o n ' , viz. as a n ' i r r a t i o n a l a n d u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n of t h e soul a n d an

24

I shall justify this statement more fully when dealing with the Therapeutics in ch. 6 below. 25 Aetius, Praef. 2 (SVF2.35): 'The Stoics said that [...] philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility.' Cf. Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 161. 26 D.L. 7.4. It is referred to ibid.. 110 (SVF 1.211) in connection with Zeno's fourfold classification of affections. 27 Galen presents what looks like a verbatim fragment from Posidonius saying that the definition of άτη ('baneful blindness') and 'many other affections' were pronounced by Zeno but recorded by Chrysippus (PHP4.6.2, p. 280 De Lacy, SVF 3.481, Posid. fr. 165 E.-K.); cf. De Lacy ad loc. On the 'blindness' at issue here see further infra, pp. 178 ff. 28 On which see Sedley (1989). 29 See infra, pp. 116 ff.

excessive c o n a t i o n ' (άλογον τε και π α ρ ά φύσιν κίνησιν ψυχής [...] καί π λ ε ο ν ά ζ ο υ σ α ν όρμήν, 4.2.8, ρ. 238 De Lacy). 3 0 It is a fair a s s u m p t i o n that this d e f i n i t i o n , like those of t h e f o u r g e n e r i c affections, 3 1 h a d b e e n a d v a n c e d by Z e n o in his On Affections. In o u r parallel passages t h e two parts of this d e f i n i t i o n a r e p r e s e n t e d as alternative descriptions by m e a n s of t h e disjunctive ' o r ' instead of ' a n d ' b u t it is n o t impossible that G a l e n ' s καί is to be r e a d as explicative, with 'excessive' e x p l a i n i n g 'irrational a n d u n n a t u r a l ' a n d ' c o n a t i o n ' specifying t h e k i n d of m o t i o n m e a n t . 3 2 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d Galen also distinguishes b e t w e e n ' i r r a t i o n a l a n d u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n ' a n d 'excessive c o n a t i o n ' , t h u s suggesting that we a r e d e a l i n g with two d e f i n i t i o n s (ibid. 13, p.240, 11.30-33). In his exegesis of these two definitions Chrysippus successively addressed t h e e l e m e n t s of 'irrational', ' u n n a t u r a l ' a n d 'excessive'. F r o m this c o n t e x t Galen q u o t e s t h e following substantial passage, 4.2.10-12: 33 ( 1 0 ) First it s h o u l d b e k e p t in m i n d t h a t t h e r a t i o n a l a n i m a l is by n a t u r e s o m e t h i n g t h a t f o l l o w s r e a s o n a n d a c t s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h r e a s o n as its g u i d e . (11) O f t e n , h o w e v e r , h e m o v e s d i f f e r e n t l y t o w a r d s c e r t a i n t h i n g s a n d away f r o m c e r t a i n t h i n g s in d i s o b e d i e n c e to r e a s o n w h e n h e is p u s h e d t o o m u c h . T o t h i s m o v e m e n t b o t h d e f i n i t i o n s r e f e r , b e c a u s e t h e u n n a t u r a l m o t i o n a r i s e s i r r a t i o n a l l y in t h i s way a n d s o d o e s t h e e x c e s s in o u r c o n a t i o n s . ( 1 2 ) F o r t h e w o r d ' i r r a t i o n a l ' s h o u l d b e t a k e n as d i s o b e d i e n t t o r e a s o n a n d h a v i n g t u r n e d away

30

This double definition is also given by D.L. 7.110; cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.11: est igitur Zenonis haec definitio ut perturbatio sit, quod πάθος ille dicit, aversa a recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. Quidam brevius, perturbationem esse appetitum vehementiorem. Ibid. 47: definitio perturbationis, qua recte Zenonem usum puto; ita enim définit ut perturbatio sit aversa a ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vet brevius, ut perturbatio sit appetitus vehementior, vehementior autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia. Note that the second passage corrects the information in the first that the second definition was used by others than Zeno. Cicero's translation of άλογος (aversa a recta ratione) reflect Chrysippus' exegesis, on which see infra in text. A similar e c h o is found in the version presented by Stob. Eel. II p. 88.8-11 Wachsmuth: πάθος δ' είναι φασιν όρμήν πλεονά+ζουσαν καί ά π ε ι θ ή τ ψ α ί ρ ο υ ν τι λ ό γ ω ή κίνησιν ψυχής (άλογον) παρά φύσιν. είναι δέ πάθη πάντα του ήγεμονικοΰ τής ψυχής, διό καί πάσαν πτοίαν πάθος είναι (καί) πάλιν (πάν) πάθος πτοίαν. Cf. ibid. p.39.5 ff. (mentioning Zeno), 44.4 ff. W. Plut. Virt. mor. 441D: τό ήγεμονικόν [...] πρός τι τών άτοπων παρά τόν αίρούντα λόγον έκφέρηται. The definition of affection as a πτοία of the soul is Zenonian as well. It was discussed by Chrysippus in the same context, see below. Plut. Virt. mor. ch. 3, 441C-D (SVF3.459) presents an accurate account which appears to be based on Chrysippus. 31 Cf. D.L. 7.111. 32 Conation (όρμή) is itself defined as a movement (φορά) of the soul towards something, Stob. Eel. II p. 86,1.19 (SVF3.169). 33 Compare the summary Chrysippus offered of this passage in book 4, i.e. the Therapeutics, as quoted /7/P4.4.16-17 (SVF3.476).

from reason, in accordance with which movement we say in ordinary usage that certain persons 'are pushed' and 'moved irrationally', 'without reason and judgement'. For when we use these expressions it is not as if a person is carried away by error and having overlooked something according to reason, but especially with reference to the motion which he [seil. Zeno] outlines, since it is not the nature of a rational animal to move thus in his soul but in accordance with reason (p.240,11.18-29, SVF3.462; transi. De Lacy's, modified). 34 Chrysippus' point of d e p a r t u r e is empirical. Affections are observed to deviate f r o m the natural pattern of action of h u m a n s as rational beings. 3 5 This typical behaviour results f r o m o u r i n n a t e ability to assess a p p e a r a n c e s as e i t h e r beneficial or d e t r i m e n t a l to o u r constitution. 3 6 T h e resulting pattern of responses was expressed by the Stoic in terms of conation, ορμή, which was d e f i n e d as a m o v e m e n t (φορά) of the intellect towards or away f r o m s o m e t h i n g . 3 7 This definition clearly underlies the description of action (with n o differentiation between the m e n t a l a n d its outward m a n i f e s t a t i o n ) 3 8 in terms of m o v e m e n t (viz. ώθεΐσθαι, 3 9 φέρεσθαι/φορά 4 0 a n d κινεΐσθαι/ 34

(10) δει δέ πρώτον έντεθυμήσθαι ότι τό λογικόν ζώον άκολουθητικόν φύσει έστί τω λόγω καί κατά τον λόγον ώς αν ηγεμόνα πρακτικόν. (11) πολλάκις μέντοι και άλλως φέρεται έπί τινα καί άπό τίνων άπειθώς τω λόγω ώθουμενον έπί πλεΐον, καθ' ην φοράν άμφότεροι έχουσιν οί οροι, της παρά φύσιν κινήσεως άλόγως οϋτως γινομένης καί του έν ταίς όρμαίς πλεονασμού. (12) τό γάρ άλογον τουτί ληπτέον άπειθές λόγφ καί άπεστραμμένον τόν λόγον, καθ' ήν φοράν καί έν τω έ'θει τινάς φαμεν ώθείσθαι καί άλόγως φέρεσθαι άνευ λόγου (καί) κρίσεως· (ού γάρ) ώς εί διημαρτημένως φέρεται καί παριδών τι κατά τόν λόγον, ταύτ' έπισημαινόμεθα, ά λ λ ά μάλιστα καθ' ήν υπογράφει φοράν, ού πεφυκότος του λογικού ζφου κινεΐσθαι οϋτως κατά την ψυχήν, άλλά κατά τόν λόγον. 35 Cf. 4.7.32 (SVF 3.476) (from the Therapeutics): διό καί αί οϋτως άλογοι κινήσεις πάθη τε λέγονται καί παρά φύσιν είναι ά τ ' ε κ β α ί ν ο υ σ α ι την λ ο γ ι κ ή ν σύστασιν. 36 As expounded in the theory of familiarization (οίκείωσις), e.g. D.L. 7.85-89 (SVF 3.178). 37 Cf. Stob. Eel. II p. 86, 1.19 (SVF 3.169); Clem. Al. Strom. II, 13.57.6, p. 145 Stählin (SVF3.377) 38 This was peculiar to Chrysippus, as appears from Seneca's account of the Stoic theory of action, Ep. 113.18 ff. esp. 23: inter Cleanthen et disdpulum eius Chrysippum non convenit quid sit ambulatio. Cleanthes ail spiritum esse a principali usque in pedes permissum, Chrysippus ipsumprincipale (SVF 1.525; § 18 is printed as 3.169, second text) 39 Cf. the term προωθοΰντα in the fragment preserved by Plut. Virt. mor. 450C, quoted infra, p. 180. 40 Chrysippus often uses φέρεσθαι/φορά for psychic phenomena and especially affection on account of its sense of 'being carried away' which connotes the loss of controll he considers typical of affection (as is also evident from his simile of the runners, PHP4.2.14-18, to be quoted and discussed shorüy); for more instances see 4.6.8-9 (SVF 473), 23 (SVF 3.475). Accordingly, the term indicates the impulse aspect of behaviour in particular. Our φοραί ('impulses', 'impeti') fluctuate or alternate, causing changes of attitude and especially affection, e.g. Schadenfreude

κίνησις) 4 1 t h r o u g h o u t this passage. T h e terms φέρεσθαι and ώθεΐσθαι ('being p u s h e d ' ) especially indicate the uncontrolled and undirected quality of emotional action. 4 2 These observations are p r e s e n t e d as c o m m o n a n d so reflected in c o m m o n parlance, witness the expressions m e n t i o n e d (12). In o t h e r words, Z e n o ' s definitions were r o o t e d in c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e a n d discourse: the c o m m o n expressions ' b e i n g moved irrationally' a n d 'without reason' or 'without j u d g e m e n t ' are represented by the 'irrational m o t i o n ' in the technical definition a n d ' b e i n g p u s h e d (too m u c h ) ' by the term 'excessive ( c o n a t i o n ) . ' Of course this does not imply that expressions such as 'without r e a s o n ' or 'without j u d g e m e n t ' c o u n t as a d e q u a t e technical descriptions. They belong to the s p h e r e of c o m m o n inarticulate reason. H e n c e Chrysippus stresses that we use t h e m 'in ordinary usage'. In addition, the verbal f o r m ' ( h e , seil. Zeno) outlines' reminds us that Chrysippus is speaking of a preliminary determination, i.e. the 'outline account', not the technical definition resulting f r o m the p r o c e d u r e of conceptual articulation (see above, p. 96). T h e main point of the c o m m o n expressions cited seems to be that people in general distinguish the kind of irrationality involved in behaviour or action f r o m purely cognitive mistakes (where the relation to action is absent or at least less direct). 4 3 turns into its opposite, pity, when persons change καθ' ετέρας φοράς: Chrys. ap. Plut. Stoic Rep. 25, 1046B (from the second book On the Good); we turn away from reason and fall prey to affection άλλη βιαιοτέρα φορά χρωμένους, Chrys. ap. Plut. Virt. mor. 450D (SVF 3.390), quoted' infra, p.180. Cf. PHP 4.6.29 (SVF 3.475), a passage from On Affections where φοραί refers to the impulsive, emotional behaviour expected of lovers. But Chrysippus also used φέρεσθαι/φορά in the more widely attested sense of a tendency of thought or opinion, as in the On the Soul for the c o m m o n view that the heart is the seat of the intellect, PHP3.1.22 (φορά), 23 (ένηνέχθαι), 25 (φέρεσθαι) (SVF 2.886); cf. 298a, p. 107.26 (indicating an instance of c o m m o n parlance in his Logical Inquiries); cf. Tieleman (1996a) 160 ff. Yet for Chrysippus this usage remained linked to that of a (spontaneous) tendency of behaviour, no doubt because thought is expressed through action, see esp. PHP 3.7.25 (SVF 2.903): κατά τοιαύτην δέ μοι δοκοΰσι μάλιστα φ ο ρ ά ν καί οί τιμωρητικώτερον πρός τινας φ ε ρ ό μ ε ν ο ι όρμάν έπί τό ταύτην [seil, καρδίαν] έκσπασαι, καθ' ήν φ ο ρ ά ν έπιτείνοντες καί πρός τά λοιπά τών σπλάγχνων όμοειδώς φ έ ρ ο ν τ α ι . In addition compare the use of φέρεσθαι in the account (no doubt Chrysippean) of affection, Plut. Virt. mor. 446F (where note that the motion occurs between two opposite affections, or between affection and reason). 41 Cf. Alex. Aphr. Fat. ch. 13, p.181.13 ff. Bruns (SVF 2.979, 11. 27-9): πάν γάρ ζώον ώς ζώον κινούμενον κινεισθαι (την) καθ' όρμήν κίνησιν, υπό τής ειμαρμένης διά ζφου γινομένην. 42 Cf. Chrysippus definitions as preserved by Stobaeus, Eel I, p. 165 Wachsmuth: κίνησιν μεταλλαγην κατά τόπον ή σχήμα· φοράν δέ μετέωρον κίνησιν όξεΐαν. 43 Cf. PHP4.2.23 ff. The same distinction was made by the Stoics on a technical level between two kinds of appearances, viz. conative and non-conative ones, see

Galen presents the expressions 'without reason' and 'without j u d g e m e n t ' as flatly c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e Stoic view ( i n c l u d i n g t h e Z e n o n i a n o n e ) of a f f e c t i o n s as j u d g e m e n t s . 4 4 T h u s h e c h o o s e s to i g n o r e n o t only t h e c o n t e x t in which they are located (a preliminary survey of c o m m o n n o t i o n s ) , 4 5 b u t also t h e n o r m a t i v e sense in which t h e t e r m reason (λόγος) is used t h r o u g h o u t this passage. This is why it is called a g u i d e which is r e j e c t e d o r d i s o b e y e d . But a f f e c t i o n s r e m a i n rational in t h e descriptive sense involved in t h e d e t e r m i n a tion of m a n as a rational (λογικόν) a n i m a l . Still, it m i g h t b e a r g u e d that Galen is e x p l o i t i n g a p o i n t which Chrysippus h a d left less t h a n crystal-clear. L a t e r scholastic e l a b o r a t i o n s of this section of Chrys i p p u s ' treatise d o p r o v i d e t h e d e s i r e d clarity by s p e a k i n g of preferential reason (ό αίρών λόγος) 4 6 o r correct reason (recta ratio, i.e. όρθός λόγος). 4 7 But it c a n n o t b e e x c l u d e d that Chrysippus used o n e or b o t h these expressions himself in the wider c o n t e x t of t h e passage q u o t e d . Chrysippus e c h o e s t h e above passage in his On Disharmony (or: On Inconsistency, Περί ά ν ο μ ο λ ο γ ί α ς ) . T h e following f r a g m e n t has b e e n preserved by Plutarch: ... Chrysippus [...] says: "Although the rational animal naturally avails himself of reason for each and every action and lets itself be guided by it, we often turn away from it, following another more forceful movement" (On Moral Virtue, ch. 10, p.450C, SVF3.390).48 T h i s s n i p p e t of text clearly r e f l e c t s t h e first two s e n t e n c e s of t h e passage f r o m t h e On Affections. W h a t c o m e s b e f o r e c o n t a i n s f u r t h e r e c h o e s , m o s t notably t h e p u s h i n g i m p a c t ascribed to t h e affections, b u t a d d s t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l a s p e c t r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s involved. In c o n j u n c t i o n t h e two passages show clearly how the a c c o u n t of e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r is carefully g r a f t e d o n t o t h e Stob. Eel. II p. 86.17-19 (SVF 3.169): τό δέ κινούν τήν όρμήν ουδέν ετερον είναι λέγουσιν άλλ' ή φαντασίαν όρμητικην του καθήκοντος αύτόθεν, τήν δέ όρμήν είναι φοράν ψυχής έπί τι κατά τό γένος. On this passage see also supra, nn. 32, 37 with text. 44 E.g. PHP 4.2.8, 4.5.4, 7. 45 The same contextual distinction is ignored and misrepresented by Galen in dealing with Chrysippus' On the Soul, see Tieleman (1996a) Pt. II, esp. 183 f., 258, 288. 46 Stob. EcL II p. 88.9 Wachsmuth (SVF3.378), quoted supra, n. 30. 47 Cic. Tusc. 4.11, 47, quoted supra, n. 30. 48 ό Χρύσιππος « του λογικού » φησι (( ζφου φύσιν έχοντος προσχρήσθαι εις έκαστα τφ λόγω καί ύπό τούτου κυβερνάσθαι πολλάκις άποστρέφεσθαι αύτόν ήμάς άλλη βιαιοτέρα φορά χρωμένους ». Plutarch goes on to make the same point as Galen, viz. that Chrysippus admits that reason and affection are different. See further, infra, pp. 180 ff.

Stoic theory of h u m a n action c e n t r e d o n t h e c o n c e p t s of c o n a t i o n a n d a p p e a r a n c e . An affection such as a n g e r mentally blinds us, so as to r e n d e r us u n a b l e to perceive obvious a p p e a r a n c e s as such. In c o n s e q u e n c e we n o l o n g e r m a k e t h e obvious choices, b u t o t h e r s we t h e n c o m e to regret. T h u s fits of a n g e r may lead us into d a n g e r , or m a k e us loose things or p e r s o n s d e a r to us. In g e n e r a l , t h e kind of irrationality involved in affection prevents us f r o m selecting what are technically called ' p r e f e r r e d i n d i f f é r e n t s ' a n d avoiding t h e i r o p p o sites. We n o l o n g e r act in t h e way to which N a t u r e has p r e d i s p o s e d us. 4 9 H e r e t h e e m p h a s i s lies o n m a k i n g t h e w r o n g choices in t h e s p h e r e of t h e i n d i f f é r e n t s , w h e r e a s t h e passage f r o m On Affections highlights t h e aspect of excess involved in affection. Galen presents a n o t h e r l o n g passage w h e r e Chrysippus says m o r e a b o u t Z e n o ' s s e c o n d d e f i n i t i o n . In Chrysippus' original exposition, Galen tells us (4.2.13, p.240.31-3), this passage directly followed t h e o n e h e q u o t e d first: (14) The excess of conation has also been meant 5 0 in this sense, on account of exceeding the measure of themselves and nature. (15) What is meant could become clearer by these things, for instance in the case of walking in accordance with conation the motion of the legs is not excessive but somehow commensurate with the conation, so that one may also stop when one wishes, and change one's pace. (16) But in the case of persons running in accordance with conation this sort of thing no longer happens but the movement of the legs exceeds the conation, and they do not obediently change their pace as soon as they have started. (17) Something similar to these [seil, movements of the legs] happens, I think, also in the case of the conations because of an excess of the measure of reason, so that when (a person) exercises conation he is not obedient to it [seil, reason], if in the case of running the excess meant goes beyond conation and in the case of conation beyond reason. (18) After all, natural conation is measured in terms of reason and goes only so far as reason itself thinks right. Thus when excess arises in this respect and in this manner, it is said to be an excessive and an unnatural and irrational movement of the soul {PHP4.2.14-18, W 3 . 4 6 2 ) . 5 1 49

See supra, n. 36 with text thereto. Seil, by Zeno. 51 (14) κατά τοΰτο δε καί ό πλεονασμός τής όρμής εϊρηται, δια τό τήν καθ' αύτους καί φυσικήν τών όρμών συμμετρίαν ύπερβαίνειν. (15) γένοιτο δ' αν τό λεγόμενον δια τούτων γνωριμώτερον, οίον έπί του πορεύεσθαι καθ' όρμήν ού πλεονάζει ή τών σκελών κίνησις ά λ λ ά συναπατίζει τι τή όρμή ώστε καί στήναι, οταν έθέλτ|, καί μεταβάλλειν. (16) έπί δέ τών τρεχόντων καθ' όρμήν ούκέτι τοιούτον γίνεται, ά λ λ ά πλεονάζει παρά τήν όρμήν ή τών σκελών κίνησις ώστε έκφέρεσθαι καί μή μεταβάλλειν εύπειθώς οϋτως εύθύς έναρξαμένων. (17) αίς οίμαι τι παραπλήσιον καί έπί τών όρμών γίνεσθαι δια τό τήν κατά λόγον ύπερβαίνειν συμμετρίαν, ώσθ' οταν 50

Chrysippus' G r e e k is at times difficult a n d o p a q u e . Yet t h e last sent e n c e m a k e s clear that t h e analogy of r u n n i n g is also relevant to the first ( p a r t of the) d e f i n i t i o n f o r m u l a t e d by Z e n o . F u r t h e r we have again t h e idea of d i s o b e d i e n c e to Reason. Rationality is o n c e again l i n k e d to n a t u r e , i.e. n o r m a l b e h a v i o u r , b u t n o w it is f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of m e a s u r e a n d c o n t r o l . Affection is an excessive i m p u l s e i n s o f a r as t h e soul transgresses t h e m e a s u r e set by r e a s o n a n d can n o l o n g e r be m a d e to c o n f o r m to this m e a s u r e . Chrysippus c o m p a r e s excessive c o n a t i o n to r u n n i n g legs which have a c q u i r e d an i m p e t u s of their own a n d so a r e n o l o n g e r s t o p p a b l e by a simple act of t h e will. In c h o s i n g this p a r t i c u l a r i m a g e C h r y s i p p u s r e t a i n s t h e idea of m o t i o n which was so p r o m i n e n t in t h e first q u o t a t i o n . Psychic acts like c o n a t i o n a r e m o t i o n s , o r processes, n o less t h a n acts like walking a n d r u n n i n g which involve t h e whole o r g a n i s m , i.e. body as well as soul. 5 2

3. The Causes of Affection Chrysippus explains Z e n o ' s first two d e f i n i t i o n s of affection t h r o u g h his striking analogy of t h e r u n n e r s . His a p p r o a c h in this stage of his a r g u m e n t seems predominantly descriptive and empirical. H e describes t h e p h e n o m e n o n of affection as involving an i n t e r r u p t i o n , or divergence, f r o m t h e n a t u r a l flow of m o v e m e n t typical of rational ορμά μή ευπειθώς έχειν πρός αυτόν, έπί μέν του δρόμου του πλεονασμού λεγομένου παρά την όρμήν, έπί δέ της ορμής παρά τόν λόγον. (18) συμμετρία γάρ έστι φυσικής όρμής ή κατά τόν λόγον καί έ'ως τοσούτου έ'ως αύτός άξιοι, διό δη καί τής υπερβάσεως κατά τούτο καί οϋτως γινομένης πλεονάζουσά τε όρμή λέγεται είναι καί άλογος κίνησις ψυχής. Cf. the excerpts from Chrysippus' own summary in the Therapeutics quoted at 4.4.24-25, 30, 31 (SVF 476). From these partly overlapping excerpts the following continuous text can be reconstructed: οίαι καί άκρατεΐς αί τοιαΰται καταστάσεις είσίν, ώς άν ού κρατούντων έαυτών, άλλ' έκφερομένων, καθάπερ οί τω τόνφ τρέχοντες προσεκφέρονται, ού κρατούντες τής τοιαύτης κινήσεως, οί δέ κατά τόν λόγον κινούμενοι ώς άν ηγεμόνα καί τούτω οίακίζοντες, καν όποιοσούν ή, κρατούσιν ήτοι άπαθείς είσι τής τοιαύτης κινήσεως καί τών κατ' αύτήν ορμών [24. κρατούσιν τών κινήσεων τών κατ' αύτάς ορμών, 31], ώστε πεισθήναι έάνπερ ένδεικνύηται αύτός, παραπλησίως [άνάλογον, 31] τοις περιπατούσιν, άλλ' ούχ ύπ' αύτών έκφέρονται βιαίως, ώσπερ οί κατά πρανούς θέοντες. As is indicated, Galen presents slightly different versions of the same text at 24 and 31. Such small differences (which in other cases might affect our interpretation) occur more often and may be due to Galen's own carelessness a n d / o r way of inserting his quotations. More serious is the fact that the quotation at 30—translated in the text below—is omitted by Von Arnim. 52 For affection as motion cf. also Arist. Phys. Γ 3.

beings. H e is n o t explicit a b o u t the cause. Unsurprisingly Galen makes m u c h of this omission, asking how reason could exceed its own measure and in general how something irrational could come from pure reason. On Chrysippus' behalf o n e might counter that this omission suits his approach at this stage. T h e question of the cause, as we shall see, receives ample attention in book 2. So it would be unfair to press for a causal explanation here. Yet the idea of motion central to the analogy may provide a clue. When the act of r u n n i n g (i.e. moving the whole body) becomes excessive and uncontrollable, the cause lies in the corporeality a n d weight of the body. This had also been pointed out by Posidonius (4.3.4-5 = Fr. 34 E.-K.). 53 But Galen t u r n s this into an instance of t h e criticism d i r e c t e d by Posidonius against Chrysippus: just as the weight of the body is (part of the) cause of the excess in the act of r u n n i n g , so Chrysippus s h o u l d — b u t fails to—specify the cause of the excess of psychic movement (ibid, and 4.5.12). Of course, Galen wants to h e a r only o n e answer to the question about the cause—a non-rational power. He constantly intimates that this is what Posidonius argued too. But he fails to produce any direct evidence that Posidonius criticized Chrysippus on this score. All movements or processes (κινήσεις), including those of the soul, are of a corporeal nature, since what moves or is moved are bodies. 5 4 This is presumably what Chrysippus meant. But then Galen systematically suppresses elements pertaining to the soul's corporeality from his presentation of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . 5 5 Posidonius n o t only c o n c u r r e d with Chrysippus on the soul's substance, 5 6 but, as we have seen, also i n c o r p o r a t e d it in his own ideas on character, the affections and their therapy. So he seems to be a more reliable witness on this passage from Chrysippus. T h e r e is a f u r t h e r indication that Chrysippus thought along these lines. Affections, t h o u g h excessive conations, vary in intensity, or excess, f r o m o n e p e r s o n to a n o t h e r , or f r o m o n e occasion to a n o t h e r . This was explained by the Stoics in physical terms, viz. as varying degrees of contraction and relaxation of the corporeal soul. 57 53

See infra, pp. 250 f. Aet. Plac. IV 20,1 (SVF 2.387). On the soul in particular see Iamblichus ap. Stob. Eel. I, p. 371.22 ff. (SVF2.801): οί σώμα τήν ψυχήν ύπολαμβάνοντες, οϊον ο'ι Στωικοί [...] Πάντες γαρ ούτοι σ ω μ α τ ο ε ι δ ε ΐ ς τάς κ ι ν ή σ ε ι ς αύτή άποδιδόασιν. 55 See further infra, pp. 114, 121 f. 56 See infra, p. 36. 57 See Plut. Vin. mor. ch. 10, 449D (SVF3.468). 54

Galen brings t h e same a t t i t u d e to b e a r o n a passage f r o m Chrysippus c o n c e r n e d with the third definition of affection f o r m u l a t e d by Z e n o ( P H P 4.5.3-8). Z e n o also d e f i n e d a f f e c t i o n as a ' f l u t t e r i n g ' (πτοία) of the soul. 5 8 T h r o u g h this t e r m t h e irrationality of affection is likened to the r a n d o m m o v e m e n t s of a flock of birds in panic. T h e use of this n o u n ( a n d its c o g n a t e verb) f o r states of e x c i t e m e n t a n d in particular fear a n d t e r r o r is attested f o r poets a n d o t h e r s well bef o r e Zeno. 5 9 Epicurus used it with r e f e r e n c e to sexual arousal (fr. 458 Us.). 6 0 Plato, moreover, used the t e r m in a relevant c o n t e x t (Republic 439D). In the case of Stoics such as Z e n o a n d Chrysippus we should b e a r in m i n d that t h e t e r m ' f l u t t e r i n g ' d e n o t e s t h e physical motions characteristic of t h e e m o t i o n a l soul. As such, it is ideally suited to convey the idea that affection interrupts, or diverges f r o m , the natural p a t t e r n of b e h a v i o u r as e x p l a i n e d by Chrysippus in c o n n e c t i o n with Z e n o ' s first two definitions. 6 1 H e r e is t h e relevant Chrysippean passage with its i m m e d i a t e Galenic c o n t e x t (4.5.5-7, p. 260 De Lacy ~ SVF 3.476): ... (5) On occasion he [seil. Chrysippus] also falls into the assertion that the movements related to the affections occur 'at random', which is by no means different from 'uncaused', if one weighs the word exactly. 62 (6) Thus directly after the passages I quoted a little earlier, 63 58

As explained by Stob. Eel II, p. 39.8-10 W. (SVF 1.206); cf. ibid p.88.11-12. See LSJs.v. 60 One might also hear here a—more distant and less certain—echo of Plato's comparison of the human intellect with an aviary, with elements of knowledge being represented by the birds, Theaetetus 196c-199c. Plato introduces this image shordy after that of the wax-tablet (ibid. 191a-195b), which was taken over by the Stoics; cf. Aet. IV 20.2, D.L. 7.50, Sext. M 7.228, 372. 61 Sorabji (2000) 57 takes the fluttering to indicate the mind's oscillation, too rapid to notice, between two alternative options on the basis of Plut. Virt. mor. 446F447A (SVF3.459). But Plutarch is not talking about affection in general but about mental conflict in the specific sense explained by the Platonists and Aristotelians in terms of a conflict between reason and an irrational power and by the Stoics in terms of the wavering of the rational intellect, i.e. the phenomenon of doing wrong while being simultaneously conscious of a better alternative (the Stoics, then, deny the simultaneity, arguing that there is in fact a succession of options too rapid to notice). 62 The phrase echoes PI. Theae. 184c. 63 This must refer to the passages quoted ibid. 24-25, 30, 31, 32 (pp. 256-8 De Lacy) which are all from the (opening?) section of book 4 (i.e. the Therapeutics, ibid. 23, p.256,11.2-3) where Chrysippus offered a summary of his treatment of Zeno's definitions in book 1; cf. supra, n. 9. The present passage must be from the same original context, as is also indicated by the και ('also') before πτοία and the reference to τφ τών παθών γένει ('the affections as a class'). Von Arnim was therefore right to print these quotations all under SVF 3.476. In this case, however, there is no corresponding passage from book 1. 59

h e says: ' " F l u t t e r i n g " t o o h a s b e e n a p p r o p r i a t e l y u s e d t o d e s c r i b e t h e a f f e c t i o n s as a class in r e s p e c t of t h i s " b e i n g a g i t a t e d " 6 4 a n d " m o v i n g a t r a n d o m " '. (7) B u t if by " r a n d o m " y o u m e a n " u n c a u s e d " , C h r y s i p p u s , y o u a r e in c o n f l i c t b o t h with y o u r s e l f a n d with A r i s t o t l e a n d P l a t o a n d t h e n o t i o n s of all m e n a n d l o n g b e f o r e t h a t y o u a r e in c o n f l i c t with t h e very n a t u r e of t h i n g s given t h e f a c t t h a t n o t h i n g c a n h a p p e n w i t h o u t a c a u s e ,.. 6 5

A p a r t f r o m failing to identify o n e or m o r e causes of affection, Chrysippus is said to fly in the face of Stoic determinism, i.e. the idea of the causal nexus, or Fate, to which h e surely subscribes. 6 6 By the 64

The composite verb ένσοβέω is rare; for the passive voice LSJ only gives this occurrence in the meaning 'agitation' (no doubt in view of the article το), but it is more likely that it indicates that it is used to refer to the expression as used in the context preceding the quotation, which is how De Lacy apparently takes it, putting τό ένσεσοβημένον τοΰτο and εική φερόμενον between inverted commas. This suggests that these terms too had been used by Zeno or, more likely, had been adduced by Chrysippus himself as items of common parlance supporting Zeno's definition of affection as a fluttering of the soul. De Lacy's translation of ένσεσοβημένον as 'being ruffled' seems less apposite, however. The meaning of ένσοβέω seems identical to that of the simple verb σοβέω, whose primary meaning is 'causing a violent movement', i.e. 'drive away' or 'scare away'. The focus on movement again. The passive voice also bears the metaphorical sense 'to be excited' or 'to be agitated' and is used in connection with various forceful affections. See LSJ s.v. σοβέω II. 65 (5) έμπίπτει δέ ποτε καί εις τό φάσκειν είκη γίνεσθαι τάς κατά τά πάθη κινήσεις, όπερ ουδέν άλλο έστίν ή άναιτίως, εϊ τις άκριβώς έξετάζοι τό ρήμα. (6) αίς γούν ολίγον έμπροσθεν γέγραφα ρήσεσιν έφεξής φ η σ ι ν · οίκείως δέ τω τών π α θών γ έ ν ε ι ά π ο δ ί δ ο τ α ι καί ή π τ ο ί α κ α τ ά τό έ ν σ ε σ ο β η μ έ ν ο ν τ ο ΰ τ ο καί φ ε ρ ό μ ε ν ο ν εική. (7) άλλ' εί μέν τό άναιτίως (τό) εική λέγεις, ώ Χρύσιππε, καί σεαυτώ μάχη καί Άριστοτέλει καί Πλάτωνι καί ταΐς απάντων άνθρώπων έννοίαις καί πολύ πρότερον αύτη τών πραγμάτων τή φύσει μηδενός άναιτίως γίνεσθαι δυναμένου. 66 O n e of the fullest expositions of the principle is Alex. Aphr. Fat. pp. 191.30192.28 Bruns (SVF2.945); cf. Gal. Plenit. VII, p. 526 K. (SVF2.440); Sext. M 9.75 (SVF 2.311). Indeed, Galen's phrase 'Nothing happens without a cause' (μηδέν άναιτίως γίγνεσθαι) reflects a distinctively Stoic dictum, see Chrys. ap. Plut. De Stoic. Rep. ch. 23, 1045C (SVF2.973); ps.Plut. Fat. 11, 574D (SVF2.912), Alex. Aphr. ibid. p. 191 Bruns; cf. Cic. Fat. 41. Chrysippus also defended it in the case of the choice between apparently indistinguishable things: just as weight always determines to which side the balance will tip, so there must always be a cause (whether internal or external) for our decision, even if we are not aware of the factors directing our conation o n e way or the other, Plut. De Stoic. Rep. ch. 23, 1045B-C (SVF 2.97). Accordingly the Stoics denied the existence of completely indistinguishable appearances, Sext. M 7.252 (SVF 2.65), Plut. De comm. not. 1077B, just as there cannot ever be two or more discrete objects that are exactly alike, Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.54, 85 (SVF2.113, 114). Similarly the choice for one of two similar drachmas, Sext. M XI 59 (SVF3.122), i.e. the same principle applies as in all other cases. On the Stoic causal theory in general see the classic article by Frede (1980; repr. 1987); see also Hankinson (1998b) 238 ff. On Chrysippus in particular see Bobzien (1999); for Galen see Hankinson (1998a). It is important to realize that the principle 'nothing happens without a cause' applies to antecedent causes, i.e. fated external events. The soul as the locus our moral responsibility is seen as a sustaining or complete cause, see Frede (1980) 234 ff. (repr. 1987: 138 ff.), Bobzien (1999) 208 ff.

s a m e t o k e n h e is played off against t h e c o n s e n s u s view of Plato, of Aristotle a n d of p e o p l e in g e n e r a l , t h e last category b e i n g i n c l u d e d b e c a u s e of t h e familiar Stoic a p p e a l to c o m m o n n o t i o n s . As Galen p o i n t s o u t , t h e thesis of an u n c a u s e d m o t i o n is typical of Epicurus, w h o h a d b e e n c e n s u r e d by t h e Stoics themselves o n this score (4.356, p.258 De Lacy). This yields the ironic vignette of Chrysippus contra mundum, t h o u g h with E p i c u r u s as his sole c o m p a n i o n . Of course this dialectical g r o u p i n g of authorities c a n n o t be justified f r o m a m o d e r n h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l p o i n t of view. C h r y s i p p u s associated πτοία with o t h e r c o m m o n expressions such as ' b e i n g agitated' (ένσεσοβημένον) a n d ' m o v i n g at r a n d o m ' (φερόμενον εική) in o r d e r to b r i n g o u t t h e fact that t h e e m o t i o n a l soul moves w i t h o u t plan or p u r p o s e , j u s t as birds in panic d o . Accordingly, t h e a d v e r b εική h e r e d o e s n o t m e a n , at least as far as C h r y s i p p u s is c o n c e r n e d , ' w i t h o u t c a u s e ' . In fact, C h r y s i p p u s h a d b r o a c h e d t h e s u b j e c t of causes himself, i n d i c a t i n g two factors. C o n s i d e r t h e following f r a g m e n t f r o m t h e Therapeutics (5.2.14, SVF 3.465): It must be supposed that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish state of the body in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregular and at random, from the condition [seil, of the ill person] and at the incidence of small causes. 67 T h i s passage, too, is c o n c e r n e d with t h e r a n d o m k i n d of m o t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a f f e c t i o n . H e r e C h r y s i p p u s c o m p a r e s it with a particular type of fever in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e analogy 6 8 b e t w e e n soul a n d b o d y d e v e l o p e d at l e n g t h in t h e Therapeutics b u t a l r e a d y u n d e r l y i n g t h e a r g u m e n t of b o o k l. 6 9 In this b o o k a similar passage almost certainly f e a t u r e d . 7 0 A l t h o u g h Chrysippus' m a i n c o n c e r n h e r e is n o t with t h e cause, o r causes, of affection, we get a glimpse of t h e twofold causal e x p l a n a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g his a c c o u n t . Chrysippus dist i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n two causes: (1) t h e (physical) c o n d i t i o n of t h e intellect a n d (2) e x t e r n a l i n f l u e n c e s . If t h e soul is diseased, small i n f l u e n c e s f r o m o u t s i d e p r o d u c e an o u t b r e a k of a f f e c t i o n c o m p a r able to fever, a n d of o n e type in particular, viz. that distinguished by

67

ύπονοητέον τοίνυν την μέν τής ψυχής νόσον όμοιοτάτην είναι τη του σώματος πυρετώδει καταστάσει καθ' ήν ού περιοδικώς άλλ' άτακτώς πυρετοί καί φρίκαι γίνονται καί άλλως άπό τής διαθέσεως καί μικρών έπιγινομένων αιτίων. 68 On the sense of'analogy' in this connection, see infra, pp. 142 ff. 69 ΡΉΡ5.3.12; cf. 5.2.43. 70 See PHP5.3.12, quoted infra, p. 107.

a n c i e n t physicians o n t h e basis of its i r r e g u l a r o c c u r r e n c e . 7 1 In t h e case of the soul, this u n d e r l i n e s the irrationality of its affections. C h r y s i p p u s also e m p h a s i z e s t h e fact t h a t small causes suffice to trigger bursts of fever. T h a t is to say, t h e a p p e a r a n c e ( φ α ν τ α σ ί α ) to the weak, or diseased, intellect of even relatively u n i m p o r t a n t events triggers an excessive, i.e. e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t . H e called this t h e intellect's proneness ( ε ύ ε μ π τ ω σ ί α ) 7 2 to a f f e c t i o n a n d u s e d it in t h e c o n t e x t of the above passage: Chrysippus in the first b o o k On Affections c o n f u s e d the n o t i o n o f disease by saying that disease in the soul is a n a l o g o u s to the state of the body, in which it is p r o n e to fevers or diarrhoea or s o m e t h i n g of the kind (PHP 5.3.12, not in SVF).

Galen takes the idea of p r o n e n e s s to imply health p r o n e to disease b u t Chrysippus consistently speaks of a c o n d i t i o n of soul a n d body that is diseased already. T h e distinction, t h e n , is that b e t w e e n t h e u n d e r lying diseased c o n d i t i o n a n d certain crises arising f r o m it u n d e r the i n f l u e n c e of i n c i d e n t s f r o m outside. Galen glosses over this distinction. 7 3 In Ch. 5 below I shall r e t u r n to this passage in c o n n e c t i o n with the pathology u n d e r l y i n g Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t . 7 4 T h e e x t e r n a l factors r e c u r elsewhere as o n e of t h e two causes of evil, i.e. affection. In this c o n t e x t Chrysippus refers to t h e m as ' t h e 71

As opposed to 'periodical' fevers, which e.g. occur each third or fourth day, see e.g. Galen, PHP 5.2.7, ibid. 13; cf. 8.6.23; and the full account in Galen's On Crises (IX, pp.550-760 K.) and On the Different Kinds ofFeuer (VII, pp.273-405 K.). For the Corpus Hippocraticum see Langholf (1990) 82-110, 120; Jouanna (1992) 215 f. On this Chrysippean passage and Galen's comments on it, see further infra, p. 155. 72 See the later scholastic systematizations of Chrysippus' account preserved at D.L. 7.115, Stob. Eel. II p.93 Wachsmuth and, with reference to Chrysippus, Cicero, Tusc. 4.23-31 (see esp. 23). According to Stobaeus (ibid. 11.1-4): 'Proneness is the propensity to slip easily (εύκαταφορίαν) into affection or one of the unnatural actions, such as tending to distress, irascibility, enviousness, quickness to anger and the like; but proneness also concerns acts that go against nature such as theft and adultery and insolence, from which thieves and adulterers and insolent men derive their name, (cf. ibid. 70.21 ff., where proneness is classed as a state, or εξις, which means that it permits of gradations). The Chrysippean analogy between soul and body is echoed by D.L. 7.115: 'And just as certain types of proneness are mentioned in the case of the body, e.g. catarrh and diarrhoea, so propensities (εύκαταφορίαι) exist in the case of the soul, e.g. enviousness, compassion, competitiveness and similar things.' Manifest affections like anger and pity and hate are thus distinguished from our propensity to each of them; hence the close link made by Stobaeus between affections and actions—a feature that we have found in Chrysippus also, see supra, p.98. On the concept of proneness see further Kidd (1983). 73 See further infra, pp. 155 ff. 74 See infra, pp. 155 ff.

very nature of the things' (5.5.14) or 'persuasive appearances' (φαντασίαι) 7 5 (5.6.19, p.320 De Lacy, SVF 3.229a). 7 6 It is a fair assumption, then, that Chrysippus took more account of the causes of affection and did so more systematically than Galen allows us to see. This would be in line with his interest in affections as motions or processes (κινήσεις)—an aspect which, as we have seen, he stresses constantly. In fact, the same two causes may be involved in the image of the people walking—a stock example standing for all kinds of action. First, there has been a 'preliminary' cause (προκαταρκτικών αίτιον) setting them in motion, viz. an (externally prompted) mental appearance inducing the conation to walk. 77 The 'sustaining' (συνεκτικόν) or 'complete' (αυτοτελές) 78 cause of this action lies within the soul, viz. the (persisting) decision to walk. 79 In general, any event lasts as long as the sustaining cause is present. Hence the soul is the locus of moral responsibility. 80 T h e related image of the runners might seem to introduce what the Stoics call an auxiliary cause, viz. the slope of the hill. Auxiliary

75

Strictly, of course, an appearance is a mental phenomenon but it presupposes, and is defined by reference to, external objects. 76 See on this passage also infra, pp. 160 f. " Stob. Eel II p.86.17-18 (SVF3.169): τό ... κ ι ν ο ύ ν την όρμήν ουδέν ετερον είναι λέγουσιν άλλ' φ α ν τ α σ ί α ν όρμητικήν του καθήκοντος αύτοθεν. On this passage see further supra, n. 43. The whole process is a matter of certain configurations being transmitted in the pneumadc continuum that exists between external objects and the intellect; see Frede (1980/7), esp. 145 f., Bobzien (1999) 204 ff. Accordingly, the mental presentation can also be viewed as an imprint (τύπωσις) or an affection (πάθος); but the presentation in turn stirs (κινεί) the conation; see esp. Aet. IV 12.1 (SVF 2.54); in addition D.L. 7.46, 50; Sext. M 7.242 (SVF 2.65): πιθαναί [seil, φαντασίαι].. είσιν αί λεΐον κίνημα περί ψυχήν έργαζόμεναι. Cf. Cic. Ac. Pr. 2.37 (SVF2.116) 78 Complete in the sense of sufficient for causing the action in question, see the explanation by Frede (1980) 236 ff. (repr. 1987: 140 fî. ); cf. Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 340 f. '!l Indeed, the capacity of movement from within is held to be characteristic of animals. According to the Stoic distinction between kinds of movement preserved by Origenes, Orat. 6., vol. II p.311.16ff. Kö. (SVF2.989): τρίτη δέ έστι κίνησις ή έν τοις ζωοις, ήτις ονομάζεται ή άφ' αύτοΰ κίνησις. οΐμαι δέ οτι ή τών λογικών κίνησις δι' αυτών έστι κίνησις. έάν δέ περιέλωμεν άπό του ζφου την άπ' αύτοΰ κίνησιν, ούδέ ζώον έτι öv ΰπονοηθήναι δύναται... Alex. Aphr. Defato ch. 13, p. 182.6-7 Bruns: πάν .. ζώον ώς ζώον κινούμενον κινεΐσθαι (την) καθ' όρμήν κίνησιν. Cf. also the passages from Origenes printed as SVF2.988, 989. 80 A full discussion of Stoic ideas on this problem goes beyond the scope of the present study, although its relevance should be kept in mind. On this problem in connection with some of the texts referred to here see e.g. Long-Sedley (1987), vol. 1, 386 ff.

causes typically intensify an e f f e c t which w o u l d o c c u r anyway (e.g. walking). 8 1 T h e p o i n t of c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t h e r u n n i n g a n d the soul's e m o t i o n a l r e s p o n s e lies precisely in t h e aspect of intensification o r excess a n d t h e c o n s e q u e n t loss of c o n t r o l . T h e walking m o v e m e n t is accelerated by the slope. But t h e sustaining cause of t h e r u n n i n g m o t i o n m u s t be t h e r u n n e r s t h e m s e l v e s . I n d e e d , t h e e x a m p l e of t h e r u n n e r s recalls a n o t h e r o n e , viz. t h e cylinder rolling f r o m a slope used by Chrysippus to illustrate t h e d i f f e r e n c e between ' p r e l i m i n a r y ' a n d 'sustaining' causes, r e p r e s e n t e d by the push downhill a n d t h e cylindrical s h a p e respectively. 8 2 In m u c h t h e same way, Chrysippus a r g u e d , t h e c o m p l e t e o r sustaining cause of o u r action is t h e c o n d i t i o n of o u r souls, i.e. o u r m o r a l qualities. T h e following testimony preserved by C l e m e n t takes fever as an illustration of these two kinds of cause in line with above passage f r o m Chrysippus: Causes are not of each other, but there are causes to each other. For the pre-existing condition of the spleen is the cause, not of fever, but of the fever's coming about; and the pre-existing fever is the cause, not of the spleen but of its condition's being intensified (Strom. VIII, 9.30.1 -SVF2.349) 8 3 Causes (or 'things responsible', Gr. αιτία) are bodies, 8 4 whereas their effects a r e classed as predicates, i.e. what t h e Stoics called 'sayables' ( λ ε κ τ ά ) , a n d h e n c e i n c o r p o r e a l . 8 5 In t h e above passage ' c o m i n g a b o u t ' a n d ' b e i n g intensified' are given as e x a m p l e s of effects in the sense of i n c o r p o r e a l predicates. For o u r p u r p o s e s it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e h e r e t h e role of t h e causes, viz. t h e spleen a n d t h e feverish spleen respectively. T h e s e two c o r p o r e a l substances f u n c t i o n as t h e pre-existing (in this case sustaining) causes of their effects. In t h e light of t h e analogy postulated by Chrysippus between affection a n d

81

See Clement, Strom. VIII, 9.33.1-9 (SVF2.351). See Cic. Fat. 43 (SVF2.974) with Frede (1980) 234 ff. (repr. 1987: 138 ff.), Bobzien (1999) 204 ff. Cf. also Rolke (1975) 330 f. Both Frede and Bobzien point out that the term 'sustaining' or 'cohesive' (συνεκτικόν, συνεχής) refers to the pneuma as holding together objects. On the sense o f antecedent' (προκαταρκτικός) see Frede (1980) 243 n. 6 (repr. 1987: 369 n.7). 83 αλλήλων ούκ έστι τα αϊτια, άλλήλοις δέ α'ίτια. ή γαρ σπληνική διάθεσις προυποκειμένη ού πυρετού αϊτιος, ά λ λ α τοΰ γίνεσθαι τόν πυρετόν· καί ό πυρετός προυποκειμένος ού σπληνός, άλλά τού αϋξεσθαι τήν διάθεσιν. 84 Aët. I, 11.5 (SVF2.340), Stob. Eel. I pp. 138.14-139.4 W„ Sext. M 9.211, Clem. Strom. VIII, 9.26.3-4, ibid. 30.1-3 (= SVF2.340, 1.89/2.336, 2.341, 2.349). 85 See Clement, Strom. VIII, 9.26.3-4; Sext. M 9.211 (SVF 2.341) with LongSedley (1987) vol. 1, 340. 82

fever, 8 6 we may i n f e r t h a t t h e soul plays an a n a l o g o u s causal role in r e g a r d to its own παθή, viz. t h e affections. Analogously, the same causal analysis is illustrated by g o o d actions, with t h e virtuous soul as its sustaining or ' c o m p l e t e ' cause. 8 7 T h e soul can only fulfil this causal role o n a c c o u n t of its c o r p o r e a l substance, since a c c o r d i n g to Stoic d o c t r i n e all causes a r e c o r p o r e a l . T h e Stoics were primarily interested in t h e implications of this analysis f o r m o r a l responsibility, so it s h o u l d n o t occasion s u r p r i s e if it was m a d e to apply n o t only virtue b u t also its opposite, affection. 8 8 P o s i d o n i u s took over t h e Early Stoic distinction b e t w e e n types of cause. 8 9 In addition, we have f o u n d that his position o n t h e affections a n d their cause c a n n o t have d i f f e r e d significantly f r o m that of Chrysippus. Like Chrysippus, h e stressed the role of motions, or processes, in t h e c o r p o r e a l soul. W h a t is m o r e , h e took over Chrysippus' analogy between soul a n d body w h e r e disease a n d illness a r e c o n c e r n e d — an analogy which is n o t merely a m e t a p h o r used for didactic or o t h e r p u r p o s e b u t the expression b u t an actual c o r r e s p o n d e n c e existing in physical reality. 90 In this light a passage f r o m G a l e n ' s theoretical tract On Sustaining Causes deserves special a t t e n t i o n , since it n o t only r u n s parallel to t h e above passages f r o m C h r y s i p p u s a n d C l e m e n t b u t f u r t h e r bears o u t the a s s u m p t i o n that this causal analysis was applied by t h e Stoics to their pathology: As for Athenaeus of Attaleia, he founded the medical school known as the Pneumatists. It suits his doctrine to speak of a sustaining cause in illness, since he bases himself upon the Stoics, and he was a pupil of Posidonius .... Athenaeus [holds that] there are three primary and most universal types of cause .... first that of the sustaining causes, then that of the antecedent causes, while the third type is comprised of the matter of preliminary causes. T h e last term is applied to externals whose function is to produce some change in the body, whatever this change may be. If what is thus produced in the body belongs to the class of what causes disease, then, while it has not yet actually given rise to the disease, it is known as an antecedent cause. 8,)

That this correspondence holds good in a literal and physical sense I argue further infra, pp. 142 ff. 87 Stob. Eel. I, p. 138.17-22 (SVF 1.89); cf. Sext. AÍ 9.211, Clem. Strom. VIII, 9.26.3-4. 88 Stob. Eel I p.138.14-139.4 Wachsmuth (SVF 1.89). 89 See esp. Stob. Eel. I, pp. 138.14-139.8 (= Arius Didymus fr. 18 Diels)—a testimony which is taken apart in our collections of fragments but presents the Stoic doctrine on the concept of cause with reference to Zeno, Chrysippus and Posidonius (fr. 95 E.-K.). The views given to these three partly overlap and are clearly identical. On this passage see now Mansfeld (2001). 90 See infra, pp. 142 ff.

A l t e r a t i o n s a r e p r o d u c e d in t h e n a t u r a l b r e a t h [i.e. t h e pneuma] by t h e s e c a u s e s a n d a l s o by t h o s e w h i c h a r e e x t e r n a l , l e a d i n g t o m o i s t u r e , d r y n e s s , h e a t o r c o l d , a n d t h e s e a r e w h a t h e calls t h e s u s t a i n i n g c a u s e s of d i s e a s e s ( C C 1.1-2.4; t r a n s i . L o n g - S e d l e y , slightly modified).

Ironically, Galen himself is o n e of o u r m a i n sources o n Stoic causal theory, a l t h o u g h h e i g n o r e s it c o m p l e t e l y in his PHP—a striking t h o u g h n o t u n c o m m o n c o n t e x t u a l d i f f e r e n c e . In the above passage t h e r e is n o sign of any d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n P o s i d o n i u s a n d o t h e r Stoics f o r that m a t t e r either. In fact, Posidonius features as the p r i m e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e Stoic d o c t r i n e of c a u s a t i o n — r e g a r d l e s s of t h e fact t h a t h e h a p p e n e d to b e t h e t e a c h e r of t h e f o u n d e r of t h e P n e u m a t i s t school of medicine, Athenaeus. 9 1 This constitutes a n o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e f r o m PHP, w h e r e G a l e n p r e s e n t P o s i d o n i u s as t h e only Stoic with a k e e n interest in t h e causes of things (in m o s t b l a t a n t contrast with Chrysippus, of course). Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the P o s i d o n i a n material in PHP (ch. 5) will reveal that Posidonius c o n f o r m e d to t h e d o c t r i n e of t h e a f f e c t i o n s of t h e m i n d h e h a d i n h e r i t e d f r o m his predecessors, most notably Z e n o a n d Chrysippus. T h e p a t h o l o g y o u t l i n e d in t h e above passage also c o n f o r m s to t h e ideas of these Stoics. In particular we may n o t e the p r o m i n e n c e given to d i s t u r b a n c e s of the p n e u m a a n d the theory of the f o u r e l e m e n t a r y qualities. This is f o u n d in t h e f r a g m e n t s relating to Chrysippus (most notably the Therapeutics) a n d Z e n o as well. 92 In the above passage c h a n g e s in t h e pneuma may upset the b a l a n c e b e t w e e n t h e e l e m e n t a r y qualities, causing o n e of t h e m to b e c o m e d o m i n a n t . T h e resulting physical c o n d i t i o n is t h e sustaining cause of disease in a way c o m p a r a b l e to t h e feverish c o n d i t i o n of t h e spleen a c c o r d i n g to C l e m e n t a n d of the soul a c c o r d i n g to Chrysippus. T h e r e p o r t o n A t h e n a e u s a n d his Stoic aetiology also c o n f i r m s t h a t e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s a r e d e s c r i b e d as p r e l i m i n a r y causes, a n d a d d s a f u r t h e r distinction between the external factors and the inner c h a n g e s e f f e c t e d by t h e m . T h e latter a r e t h e m o r e i m m e d i a t e cause of t h e diseased c o n d i t i o n a n d a r e separately classed as ' a n t e c e d e n t ' causes. 9 3 If we a r e e n t i t l e d to r e l a t e this d i s t i n c t i o n to m e n t a l 91

This is even clearer from the preceding context, where Galen refers repeatedly to the Stoics in general as defenders of the causal theory he has begun to expound there. 92 On this subject see further chs. 5.2-4 below. 93 On this term see Long-Sedley (1987) vol. 1, 342, who note that in Stoicism the term may indicate all causes (i.e. of various kinds) which pre-exist their effects

affections, we may see that it makes sense to distinguish between the external object and the mental appearance of it, the latter being an alteration in the mind and hence internal. I take it that Chrysippus has carefully designed his account of the nature and genesis of affection in the light of Stoic causal theory, viz. the distinction between sustaining and preliminary causes in particular. T h e first is represented by the physical condition of the soul, the second by the incoming impressions (i.e. mental appearances). Since the f o r m e r does not carry the cause of corruption in itself, the latter are vital to the Stoic account of the origin of evil. But once the soul has become weakened or diseased, it functions as the main or 'sustaining' cause of affections, i.e. excessive and unnatural and irrational responses to mental appearance. O u r response then d e p e n d s on the state of our intellect, on what Chrysippus and the o t h e r Stoics identify with the degree of its physical tension (τόνος). 94 This determines whether we are able to resist a particular impression and prevent our response f r o m being excessive or give in to it, i.e. be weakwilled. This idea, along with the twofold causal schema, also underlies Chrysippus' discussion in t h e Therapeutics of examples such as Menelaos abandoning his intention to kill Helen: One person desists when danger arises, another became slack and gave in when a reward of penalty was brought, another on encountering other such things, which are not few in number. For each of such things defeats and enslaves us, so that by yielding to it we betray friends and cities and give in to many shameful acts once the former impetus 95 has become slack. Euripides has presented Menelaus as this kind of person. He drew his sword and rushed at Helen to kill her but on seeing here and being struck by her beauty he let the sword drop, no longer able even to keep his hold on it. He was accordingly rebuked with these word: 'When you caught sight of her breast, you dropped your sword and accepted her kiss, fawning on the treacherous bitch.' 96 .... Therefore, since all inferior men act in this way, abandoning their course and yielding for many causes, it might be said that they act in every case weakly and badly [PHP4.6.7-9, 11 ~ SVF3.473).97

but that the narrower usage found here may be peculiar to Athenaeus; cf. Bobzien (1999) 233. 94 PHP4.5.5 (from the Therapeutics) ~ SVF3.473. 95 On the term 'impetus' (φορά) see supra, pp. 98 f. 96 Euripides, Andromache 629-630. 97 (7) 6 μέν δειμών έπιγινομένων άφίσταται, ό δέ κέρδους ή ζημίας φερομένης έξελύθη καί ένέδωκεν, 6 δέ καθ' έτερα τοιαύτα ούκ ολίγα. (8) έ'καστον γάρ τών

This example should be read in the light of Chrysippus' idea of physical tension (τόνος) which he had introduced in the preceding context, as we know from Galen who quotes a few observations from it before presenting the above passage (ibid. 5-6). A soul which lacks tension, or is slack, is weak. Such a person cannot keep to his or her intentions and so a b a n d o n s the most reasonable course of action. Apparently Chrysippus believes that Helen had deserved to die, and so did, initially, h e r deceived husband. But when Menelaus sees her beautiful body, he instantly drops his sword, being overcome by lust. T h e action that would have b e e n preferable from a rational and moral point of view is broken off. Here, then, we have the same twofold causal schema: mental condition (sustaining cause) and externally p r o m p t e d presentation (preliminary cause) explain in conjunction the mental response—in this case the affection of appetite ( ε π ι θ υ μ ί α ) — a n d the resulting action. T h e 'many causes' m e n t i o n e d at the e n d of this f r a g m e n t refer to the many a n d various preliminary causes (i.e. m e n t a l appearances) which may trigger an emotional response, as is clear from its beginning (where Chrysippus also seems to take account of the aspect of susceptibility or proneness which varies from person to person). 9 8 To c o n c l u d e . Galen's oft-repeated c o m p l a i n t that Chrysippus failed to give a causal explanation is entirely beside the point. Given the causal factors designated by Chrysippus, Galen's polemical τοιούτων τρέπεται τε καίδουλούται ήμάς, ώς ενδίδοντας αύτοΐς καί φίλους καί πόλεις προδιδόναι καί αύτούς εις πολλάς καί άσχήμονας πράξεις έπιδιδόναι τής πρόσθεν φοράς έκλυθείσης. (9) οίος είσήκται καί τω Ευριπίδη ό Μενέλαος - σπασάμενος γάρ τήν μάχαιραν φέρεται έπί τήν Έ λ έ ν η ν ώς άναιρήσων, ίδών δέ καί καταπλαγείς [εις] τό κάλλος έξέβαλε τήν μάχαιραν, ούδέ ταύτης έτι δυνάμενος κρατείν, καθά καί ή έπιπληξις αύτη εϊρηται αύτφ: « σύ δ' ώς έσεΐδες μαστόν [έκείνης] έκβαλών ξίφος / φίλημ' έδέξω προδότιν αίκάλ(λ)ων κύνα. )) .... (11) διό πάντων τών φαύλων οϋτω πραττόντων άποστατικώς καί ένδοτικώς κατά πολλάς αιτίας, άσθενώς καί κακώς έκαστα πράττειν άν λέγοιτο. 9S For once Galen seems accurate when h e too takes this expression in this way, ibid. 15. But h e r e too h e fails to give a p r o p e r account of the Stoic analysis in terms of the soul's weak condition on the o n e h a n d a n d the many incoming impressions on the o t h e r . Instead Galen plays off Chrysippus' r e f e r e n c e to many causes against the soul's weakness as c o m m o n to all the affections (ibid. 14). T h e cause c a n n o t be both o n e a n d many. As to the many causes, Chrysippus should have b r o u g h t t h e m u n d e r a few main heads, as Plato did in laying down his tripartition (ibid. 16-17). Of course, we may feel, Chrysippus did just that by positing his concept of preliminary cause. And the weakness of the soul's condition is not treated by him as o n e a n d the same in all individual cases but, as we have noticed, f u r t h e r differentiated in terms of varying propensities. Yet, for all his distortion, Galen h e r e effectively recognizes the twofold Stoic schema.

a p p r o a c h has o b s c u r e d an i m p o r t a n t i n g r e d i e n t of the theory, viz. the fact that the Stoic assigned an all-important role to the physical condition of the soul. It may seem surprising that the medical man Galen glosses over the physical a n d nosological aspects of Chrysippus a r g u m e n t . But his a p p r o a c h is exclusively c o n c e r n e d with t h e question of the n u m b e r of psychic powers—in a c c o r d i n g with a traditional o r d e r i n g of topics which can be paralleled f r o m extant doxographic texts (see above, pp. 23, 64 ff.).

4. The Four Generic Affections Having offered an exegesis of Zeno's three definitions of affection in general Chrysippus p r o c e e d e d to d o the same for his definitions of the f o u r ' g e n e r i c ' affections u n d e r which all o t h e r affections were subsumed: distress (λύπη), pleasure (ηδονή), fear (φόβος) a n d appetite (επιθυμία). These f o u r are arrived at by taking a pair of affections directed to the present a n d a pair directed to the future, o n e of each pair involving a p p a r e n t goods, the o t h e r a p p a r e n t evils: 99 Time:

Present

Future

Object:

Pleasure

Appetite

A p p a r e n t good

Distress

Fear

A p p a r e n t evil

T h u s distress consists in t h e ( e r r o n e o u s ) o p i n i o n that an evil is p r e s e n t . Given this s c h e m a a n d the g e n u s / s p e c i e s structure, t h e Stoics t e n d to explain irrational behaviour in terms of transitions b e t w e e n distinct a n d o p p o s i t e a f f e c t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n r a n d o m mixtures between them. 1 0 0 T h e relevant passages in PHP c o n c e r n e d with the generic affections have o f t e n b e e n taken to attest to a significant innovation on the part of Chrysippus. This however is based on Galen's r e p e a t e d claim that Zeno saw the affections as psychic motions supervening on j u d g e m e n t s , whereas Chrysippus straightforwardly equated the affections with j u d g e m e n t s (see above, ρ 86). But this claim, it has t u r n e d 99

Cf. Sorabji (2000) 29. In these respects their account is anticipated by that of Aristotle, Rhetoric Β 111, though the Stoics are more systematic. On the transitions between opposite affections, see also supra, p. 98 n. 40. 100

o u t , follows e n t i r e l y f r o m G a l e n ' s own d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e o p t i o n s t h a t a r e o p e n in t h e d e b a t e o n t h e n u m b e r of psychic faculties. G a l e n ' s a s s i g n m e n t of o n e of these o p t i o n s (which in fact c o n s t i t u t e s a c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n two of t h e m ) to Z e n o is n o t w a r r a n t e d by the d o c u m e n t e d evidence, as we would be led to e x p e c t in view of present-day c o n v e n t i o n s a n d practices. In o n e striking passage as we have n o t i c e d G a l e n actually a d m i t s to n o t having c h e c k e d his claim, simply because h e h a d n o t b e e n able to get h o l d of any treatise by Z e n o {PHP 5.6.40-42; see above, p. 86). I am n o t sure w h e t h e r h e h a d tried very h a r d . A f t e r all, h e also says that h e h a d d e c i d e d to focus exclusively o n Chrysippus {ibid. 41; cf. 4.1.3). Still, o n e m i g h t r e a d this admission as e v i d e n c e that Galen h a d at least s o m e sense of h i s t o r i o g r a p h i c a l responsibility. Yet this is an isolated case. In t h e r e m a i n d e r of b o o k s 4 a n d 5 h e shows absolutely n o c o m p u n c t i o n a b o u t ascribing t h e view of affections as e p i p h e n o m e n a of j u d g e m e n t s to Z e n o . In g e n e r a l G a l e n ' s s c h e m a of o p t i o n s prevails over historiographical accuracy in a m o d e r n sense. 1 0 1 T h e first relevant f r a g m e n t is n o t taken directly f r o m Chrysippus' treatise, b u t c o m e s f r o m P o s i d o n i u s ' discussion of s o m e p r o b l e m s (άπορίαι) c o n c e r n i n g a f f e c t i o n s t h a t h a d also b e e n discussed by Chrysippus in On Affections, Book 2. T h e fact that P o s i d o n i u s w e n t t h r o u g h these p r o b l e m s again could easily b e p r e s e n t e d as p r o o f that h e was dissatisfied by C h r y s i p p u s ' s o l u t i o n , o r t h e very lack of a solution. At any rate Galen claims that P o s i d o n i u s actually r e f u t e d Chrysippus o n f u n d a m e n t a l points, a n d h e works h a r d trying to m a k e it look that way. I shall deal with the c o n t e n t s a n d p r o c e d u r e of b o o k 2 in t h e n e x t section. Suffice it to n o t e h e r e t h a t P o s i d o n i u s , o n w h o m Galen bases himself, h e r e a p p e a r s to r e f e r back to Chrysippus' exegesis of Z e n o ' s definitions in b o o k 1. At PHP4.7.1-11 (1-7 ~ SVF3.481, Posid. F 165 E.-K.) we are dealing with C h r y s i p p u s ' e x p l a n a t i o n of Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n of distress as an o p i n i o n t h a t o n e is in t h e p r e s e n c e of evil. C h r y s i p p u s m a d e this m o r e precise by a d d i n g ' f r e s h ' to ' o p i n i o n ' to explain why after s o m e time distress f a d e s away. T h e passage follows o n G a l e n ' s own discussion of f r a g m e n t s f r o m C h r y s i p p u s ' Therapeutics which b r i n g h o m e t h e s h e e r irrationality a n d repulsiveness of e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r (see ch. 4.7). T h e passage which c o n c e r n s us h e r e reads as follows:

101

See supra, pp. 34, 80 ff.

(1) ... I proceed to some of Posidonius' answers to Chrysippus: (2) This definition of distress, 102 he [seil. Posidonius] says, and also many others [seil, definitions] that were pronounced by Zeno and recorded by Chrysippus clearly refute his [seil. Chrysippus'] view. (3) Indeed he says that distress is a fresh opinion that one is in the presence of evil. Sometimes they express it even more briefly: distress is a fresh opinion of the presence of evil. (4) He [seil. Posidonius] says that what is fresh is recent in time, and he asks that they tell him why it is that when the opinion of evil is fresh it contracts the soul and produces distress, but that after an interval it either does not contract it [seil, the soul] at all, or no longer to the same extent. (5) And yet, if Chrysippus' teachings were true, the words 'fresh' should not even have been included in the definition. It would have been more consistent with his view to call distress an opinion of the presence of a great or intolerable or unbearable evil—this is his [Chrysippus', apparently] 103 usual term, rather than a fresh evil.104 Galen t h e n r e n d e r s what Posidonius m u s t have said. But are we dealing with a verbatim quotation? And if so, how far exactly does it extend? 1 0 5 De Lacy's inverted c o m m a s indicate that h e regards both 102

The mss. give the rather improbable άτης ('baneful blindness') which is rejected by most editors in favour of λύπης but retained by De Lacy ad 280.21 on the grounds that the sentence in which it occurs may be transitional so that Posidonius may turn to distress only in the next sentence. But this seems less likely. De Lacy, following Pohlenz (1898) 616, points out that 4.5.42-44 dealing with persons who choose harmful things of their own accord may have led Posidonius to a discussion of άτη. But apart from the fact that nothing indicates that this passage preceded Posidonius' discussion reflected at 4.7.1 ff., the point (echoing Chrysippus, see ch. 4.6, infra pp. 170 ff.) at 4.5.42 ff. is precisely that the emotional people at issue are perfecdy aware that what they prefer is harmful to them and so are not blinded at all. Blindness (τυφλότης) is however at issue in the section directly preceding 4.7.1 ff. But here it features in Chrysippean fragments from the Therapeutics, see infra, p. 178 ff. This seems a more likely cause for the mistaken reading of άτης instead of λύπης. In that case the mistake may already have been made by Galen. If so, the reading άτης would have to be preserved. 103 However, as De Lacy notes, the terms άνυπομόνητος and άκαρτέρητος are not elsewhere attested for Chrysippus. 104 Although the phrasing is presumably Galen's (see below in text), the use of the adjective 'fresh' for the bad entity instead of the opinion entails no significant distortion of the Stoic position. In fact, it is also encountered in Stoic accounts, see Stob. Eel. II, p.90.14-16 Wachsmuth {SVF 3.394): λύπην δ είναι συστολήν ψυχή$ άπειθη λόγψ, αίτιον δ' αύτης το δοξάζειν π ρ ό σ φ α τ ο ν κ α κ ό ν παρείναι, έφ' φ καθηκει συστέλλεσθαι. Lists of Stoic definitions such as preserved by Stobaeus on the whole conform to the Chrysippean material transmitted by Galen. They give the appearance of being based on Chrysippus' version of Zeno's definitions as expounded in works like On Affections. Such compilations of Chrysippus' definitions were intended for scholastic use. 105 j n w hat follows I disagree with Kidd who regards the whole passage as Posidonian (albeit not wholly a verbatim quotation), see Commentary II (ii) 598 ff. Kidd's acceptance of Galen's presentation of the views of Posidonius and Chrysippus at issue is consistent with his overall conviction that Posidonius discerned and

§ 2 a n d § 3 as a direct q u o t a t i o n b u t this s e e m s arbitrary. T h e addition of an alternative version of the d e f i n i t i o n of distress which 'they' use looks m o r e like an i n t e r p o l a t i o n by G a l e n t h a n a r e f e r e n c e by Posidonius to his fellow Stoics. 106 My impression is that this q u o t a t i o n is n o t verbatim at all. At any rate we s h o u l d be extremely cautious in a c c e p t i n g t h e s t a t e m e n t in (2) that it was P o s i d o n i u s w h o explicitly c h a r g e d Chrysippus with self-contradiction. But when, as seems plausible, we take (3) as a r e p o r t o n Posidonius' view, t h e r e is clearly n o d i r e c t attack o n Chrysippus whatsoever. P o s i d o n i u s ' e x p l a n a t i o n of ' f r e s h ' as ' r e c e n t in t i m e ' n e e d n o t conflict with a n d i n d e e d s e e m s f a i t h f u l to what Chrysippus m e a n t . 1 0 7 M o r e o v e r , t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of freshness in terms of the physical contraction (συστέλλει) p r o d u c e d by t h e o p i n i o n in q u e s t i o n suits C h r y s i p p u s ' p o s i t i o n a n d can b e paralleled f r o m sources which are generally taken to state the g e n e r a l Stoic d o c t r i n e . 1 0 8 W h a t d o e s seem to preserve P o s i d o n i u s ' own distinctive c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e d e b a t e is that h e pressed t h e question of exactly why the freshness disappears, a n d h e n c e the distress vanishes. T h i s a p p r o a c h was typical of h i m a n d did n o t lead to significant m o d i f i c a t i o n s of t h e view taken by C h r y s i p p u s (who h a d m o r e o v e r raised m o s t of t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s a l r e a d y ) , b u t m o r e o f t e n to specifications u n d e r t h e i n f l u e n c e of r e c e n t philosophical a n d m e d i cal d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h i s is n o t to say t h a t C h r y s i p p u s p r o v i d e d n o e x p l a n a t i o n s at all—merely that Posidonius m a d e t h e m m o r e precise o r b r o u g h t t h e m up-to-date (see f u r t h e r c h . 5.5). A c c o r d i n g to C h r y s i p p u s , m e n t a l a p p a r e a n c e s loose t h e i r physical i m p a c t a f t e r s o m e time. How l o n g this takes will vary f r o m case to case, b u t will at any rate d e p e n d o n t h e d e g r e e of tension of t h e soul receiving t h e a p p e a r a n c e s , as well as o n t h e a p p a r e n t m a g n i t u d e 1 0 9 of t h e evil or g o o d in question.

hammered out real difficulties in Chrysippean psychological monism; cf. supra, pp. 8f„ infra, pp. 198 f. 106 Galen may have taken such definitions from a philosophical lexicon. For a very similar example see PHP 2.5.17. Similarly Reinhardt (1921) 291. 107 It cannot even be excluded that it is Chrysippus himself who is the 'he' who says so. On this pont see Kidd, Commentary II (ii), p. 599. 108 Cf. Stob. EcL II, p.89.2-3 (SVF 3.378): τό δέ πρόσφατον άντι του κινητικού συστολής άλογου (ή) έπάρσεως (the latter in the case of pleasure, ήδονή); on the physical reactions typical of the affections, see further supra, pp. 112 ff.; infra, pp. 145 ff. 109 On the importance attached by Chrysippus and the other Stoics to the magnitude of the good or evil, see PHP4.5.27, 29; Cic. Tusc. 3.25, 28 (for which see infra, p. 313).

W h e n we arrive at (5) it would be rash to a s s u m e that t h e r a t h e r l a m e criticism voiced h e r e stems f r o m P o s i d o n i u s . 1 1 0 In fact, w h a t follows f r o m 6 o n w a r d s strongly tells against this a s s u m p t i o n . Having inserted two d i f f e r e n t p r o b l e m s first raised by Posidonius c o n c e r n i n g affections in wise a n d p r o g r e s s i n g persons, Galen r e t u r n s to Chrysippus' a d d i t i o n of ' f r e s h n e s s ' to Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n (7). O n c e again we learn that P o s i d o n i u s raised t h e question why all that is u n p r e p a r e d a n d s t r a n g e may trigger an a f f e c t i o n w h e r e a s familiar or p r o l o n g e d m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s d o n o t cause an e m o t i o n a l m o v e m e n t (this t e r m at least is P o s i d o n i a n ) , o r d o n o t d o so to t h e same e x t e n t . W h a t we get is n o t an answer to this q u e s t i o n , b u t Posidonius' t h e r a p e u t i c , o r r a t h e r preventive, advice that we s h o u l d 'dwell in advance' (προενδημειν) o n images that m i g h t otherwise trigger an e m o t i o n a l response: by a c c u s t o m i n g ourselves to t h e m we may b e b e t t e r able to withstand t h e m w h e n we e x p e r i e n c e t h e m in real life. P o s i d o n i u s may have b e e n t h e first to use t h e term 'dwelling in a d v a n c e ' f o r this m e n t a l exercise. But f r o m a d o c t r i n a l p o i n t of view t h e r e is n o d e p a r t u r e f r o m t h e C h r y s i p p e a n position h e r e . 1 1 1 In fact, P o s i d o n i u s ' advice m e r e l y c o n f i r m s t h a t C h r y s i p p u s was r i g h t to qualify ' o p i n i o n ' t h e way h e did, i.e. by a d d i n g ' f r e s h ' to it. Pace G a l e n , P o s i d o n i u s a n d Chrysippus were basically in a g r e e m e n t as to t h e factors involved in the o c c u r r e n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of e m o t i o n a l responses. But what is left that can b e ascribed to Chrysippus? First, h e explicated the definition of distress a n d t h e t h r e e o t h e r g e n e r i c affections as laid down by Z e n o . This n e e d n o t suprise us since it was c o m m o n p r a c t i c e to start f r o m t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e s c h o o l ' s f o u n d e r , as C h r y s i p p u s h a d already d o n e with r e g a r d to Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s of a f f e c t i o n in g e n e r a l (see above, p. 96). Secondly, we know that h e specified that t h e o p i n i o n in q u e s t i o n h a d to b e fresh, i.e. r e c e n t in time. Of course o t h e r factors also explain t h e intensity a n d d u r a t i o n

110

Reinhardt (1921) 292 sees this as a Galenic addition too; Kidd, Commentary II (ii), 600 considers it to be part of the argument directed by Posidonius against Chrysippus. 111 Once again it is instructive to compare the parallel account offered by Cicero, Tusc 3.24 ff. At 28-29 he discusses the 'freshness' of the appearance which causes and maintains an affection and the need to familiarize ourselves beforehand with it in a way that runs closely parallel to PHP4.7.6 ff. Even Posidonius' examples (Anaxagoras and Euripides) can be paralleled from Cicero. In fact, the only significant difference between the account in Galen and Cicero is the fact that the former posits a disagreement between Posidonius and Chrysippus (they are not mentioned by Cicero).

of t h e affection in question: t h e soul's resilience a n d t h e d i m e n s i o n s of t h e e x p e r i e n c e , quite in line with t h e causal theory u n d e r l y i n g his g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of affection (see above, p. 102 ff.). T h a t G a l e n ' s a c c o u n t stresses t h e factor time ( ' f r e s h ' as ' r e c e n t in time') d o e s n o t m e a n that these o t h e r factors are e x c l u d e d . T h e r e f e r e n c e to physical contraction at any rate points to t h e c o n d i t i o n of the psychic pneuma, to its d e g r e e of physical tension. T h e scale (or t h e d e g r e e to which it is b e a r a b l e ) of t h e e x p e r i e n c e of evil is m e n t i o n e d as well, b u t is played off against the factor of freshness. This, typically, is how Galen b e h a v e s w h e n d e a l i n g with a s o p h i s t i c a t e d analysis by C h r y s i p p u s involving various factors. 1 1 2 This is c o n f i r m e d by Cicero's less partisan a c c o u n t in Tusculan Disputations b o o k 3, w h e r e we f i n d scale a n d freshness c o m b i n e d in the e x p l a n a t i o n of distress. 1 1 3 T h e s e c o n d m a i n passage c o n c e r n e d with Chrysippus' a c c o u n t of t h e so-called ' g e n e r i c a f f e c t i o n s ' (γενικά παθή) is f o u n d n e a r t h e b e g i n n i n g of b o o k 4, at 2.1-7 (SVF 3.463). In part, it r u n s parallel to 7.1-6, b u t a p p e a r s to b e b a s e d o n G a l e n ' s own r e a d i n g of t h e C h r y s i p p e a n text. This passage d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a verbatim q u o t a t i o n . W h a t C h r y s i p p u s said h a s to b e e x t r i c a t e d f r o m G a l e n ' s polemical discussion: (1) [...] in t h e first d e f i n i t i o n s t h a t h e gives of t h e g e n e r i c a f f e c t i o n s h e c o m p l e t e l y d i s t a n c e s h i m s e l f f r o m t h e i r [seil, t h e a n c i e n t s ' ] 1 1 4 view, d e f i n i n g d i s t r e s s as a f r e s h o p i n i o n t h a t evil is p r e s e n t . (2) F o r in t h e s e ( d e f i n i t i o n s ) h e o p e n l y m e n t i o n s o n l y t h e r a t i o n a l ( p a r t ) of t h e soul, o m i t t i n g t h e a p p e t i t i v e a n d s p i r i t e d ; f o r h e b e l i e v e s t h a t o p i n i o n a n d e x p e c t a t i o n arise o n l y in t h e r a t i o n a l p a r t . (3) N o n e t h e l e s s , in his d e f i n i t i o n of a p p e t i t e , w h i c h h e calls a n i r r a t i o n a l d e s i r e , 1 1 5 h e t o u c h e s in a way, v e r b a l l y at least, o n t h e i r r a t i o n a l p o w e r of t h e s o u l ; b u t h e r e t o o h e d i v e r g e s f r o m it in h i s e x p l a n a t i o n of it [i.e. o f a p p e t i t e ] , s i n c e e v e n t h e d e s i r e h e i n c l u d e s in t h e d e f i n i t i o n b e l o n g s

112

The definition of affection in general is another example, see supra, p. 97 ff. Tusc. 3.25: ... aegritudo est opinio m a g n i mali praesentis, et quidem r e c e n s opinio talis mali, ut is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere (note that the M the aspect of the appropriateness of an emotional response is once again associated with the n a m e of Chrysippus. H e r e we also have its therapeutical application: o n e should convince a m o u r n i n g person that he m o u r n s because he thinks it his duty to do so, that is to say, that he wants to m o u r n . T h u s we may speed u p a natural process, viz. the fact that almost everyone sees after a period of time that protracted expression of grief is irrational. It is very likely that these two passages go back to the Therapeutics. Interestingly, these passages sandwich a critical c o m m e n t on Cleanthes (§ 77 on which see supra, pp. 169 f.). 66

7. Conclusion In the p r e c e d i n g pages I have u n d e r t a k e n to provide a complete survey of the Ciceronian evidence which can be related to the On Affections a n d , consequently, be used in the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this treatise. T h e basis for attribution has b e e n twofold. First, I argued that the long section Tusc. 4.11-33 based on the so-called λογικά r u n s parallel, both as to c o n t e n t and (often) as to wording, to a comparatively large n u m b e r of verbatim quotations provided by Galen. In addition, the two sets of texts exhibit an unmistakable correspondence as to what must have been the original order of themes treated by Chrysippus (on which we are also informed by some explicit remarks by Galen). T h e testimony of Galen also reveals that certain passages offered by Cicero as part of the λογικά (i.e. the first three 'theoretical' books) were really f r o m the f o u r t h book, entitled Therapeutics (Θεραπευτικόν). This mistake—which led Cicero also to attach a different m e a n i n g to the term λογικά as well

64

See PHP4.5.27, 40 (Posid. F 164). Cf. (,SV/·'3.486). On this passage cf. Donini (1995) 305 ff. 66 On this passage see further Philippson (1932) 272 ff. and, more recently, White (1995). 65

(i.e. 'abstract' instead of ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' ) — m a y have arisen because of his use of an intermediary source, p e r h a p s an e p i t o m e f o r 4.11-33. T h e identification of Tusc. 4.11-33, at any rate, as a r e n d e r i n g , albeit in Latin, of the gist of Chrysippus' a r g u m e n t in the On Affections invites a scrutiny of o t h e r related related material f o u n d scattered in o t h e r sections of b o o k 4 as well as o t h e r books. It proved possible to track down s o m e f u r t h e r parallels between t h e C i c e r o n i a n material a n d explicitly attested f r a g m e n t s f r o m G a l e n . This p r o c e d u r e has e n a b l e d us to a d d several C i c e r o n i a n passages to o u r dossier o n Chrysippus' treatise. 6 7 So what does this a d d u p to when it c o m e s to r e c o n s t r u c t i n g Chrysippus' original position? A few times we have seen that Chrysippus in t h e C i c e r o n i a n a c c o u n t did p r o v i d e answers to q u e s t i o n s which a c c o r d i n g to Galen (with f r e q u e n t a p p e a l to Posidonius) h e could n o t resolve. A p r i m e e x a m p l e is the role a c c o r d e d by Chrysippus to j u d g e m e n t s o n how to r e s p o n d a p p r o p r i a t e l y to certain events—an i n g r e d i e n t which G a l e n s u p p r e s s e s as m u c h as h e c a n . C i c e r o c o n f i r m s that the affections involve two kinds of (wrong) j u d g e m e n t : (1) that a t h i n g is e i t h e r g o o d or bad; (2) that it is a p p r o p r i a t e to r e s p o n d to it in an e m o t i o n a l way. At the same time Cicero is n o t without his p r e f e r e n c e s a n d blind spots either. H e has little p a t i e n c e with the physical side of the Stoic theory. H e r e p e a t e d l y c o u c h e s t h e ' s h r i n k i n g s ' , ' e x p a n s i o n s ' a n d o t h e r physical effects involved in e m o t i o n in figurative l a n g u a g e . H e r e Galen r e m a i n s o u r m a i n s o u r c e of i n f o r m a t i o n , t h o u g h his a c c o u n t is p r o b l e m a t i c o n this p o i n t as well. Cicero is clearly m o r e i n t e r e s t e d in t h e social aspect of e m o t i o n , viz. ideas o n the a p p r o p riateness of certain types of b e h a v i o u r — i d e a s largely d e t e r m i n e d by o n e ' s c h a r a c t e r a n d social r e l a t i o n s or place in society, as in t h e e x a m p l e s drawn f r o m family life (3.64). H e n c e the g r e a t e r p r o m i n e n c e of j u d g e m e n t s of type 2 in C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t . But insofar as c h a r a c t e r is a m a t t e r of t h e soul's physical s t r e n g t h , we hardly f i n d anything in Cicero that we did n o t already know f r o m Galen. T h e r e is however a n o t h e r aspect of Cicero's a c c o u n t where h e is of greater h e l p than Galen could ever be. Galen, at least in PHP 4 a n d 5, is n o t i n t e r e s t e d in t h e r a p y in t h e sense of t h o s e t e c h n i q u e s a n d exercises d e s i g n e d to treat a n d p r e v e n t a f f e c t i o n s of t h e soul. H e focuses on the m o r e theoretical passages which illustrate what h e sees

67

See also the overview, infra, pp. 325 ff.

as the i n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t i o n of the soul advocated by Chrysippus— i n a d e q u a t e insofar as it fails to a c c o u n t for the cause of e m o t i o n . For therapy p r o p e r we have to t u r n to Cicero a n d a few testimonies f r o m o t h e r sources, notably Origen a n d Philodemus. Unlike Galen, Cicero is interested in therapy. Having a r g u e d that the Sage is e x e m p t f r o m distress a n d o t h e r emotions, h e disertis verbis t u r n s to the t h e r a p e u t i c t r e a t m e n t of those who are not yet Sages in both books (3 a n d 4). So what is t h e p i c t u r e of t h e t h e r a p e u t i c a l side of Chrysippus' treatise which e m e r g e s f r o m Cicero? O n a few occasions, as we have noticed, Cicero observes that Chrysippus a n d o t h e r Stoics, unlike the Peripatetics, in fact o f f e r little in t h e way of t h e r a p e u t i c measures. Cicero must think of those m e n t a l t e c h n i q u e s a n d exercises which h e l p persons who are in a state of e m o t i o n . T h i n k of such r e m e d i e s as c u r i n g erotic passion by realizing that the object of o n e ' s feelings really is n o t so beautiful after all.'' 8 T h a t Chrysippus h a d little therapy of this kind on o f f e r b e c o m e s m o r e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e in the light of a few o t h e r passages w h e r e Cicero r e p o r t s that Chrysippus believed e m o t i o n to be incurable—save f r o m a few e m e r g e n c y measures (cf. O r i g e n , Contra Celsum 3.51, Tusc. 4.69-70). This p o i n t bears directly o n the distinction drawn by Chrysippus between affection or e m o t i o n (πάθος, perturbatio animî) a n d disease (νόσημα, morbus), o n which we are i n f o r m e d by b o t h Galen a n d Cicero. Chrysippus saw the affection as a m o m e n t a r y o u t b r e a k , or a m o m e n t of activation arising f r o m an underlying condition, viz. the diseased state of the soul. C h r y s i p p e a n t h e r a p y would b e virtually n o n - e x i s t e n t if it was directed only at affection is this narrowly d e f i n e d sense—a hopeless task, as Chrysippus himself stressed, for obvious reasons: a persion at the climax of affection is particularly unreceptive to reason. In conseq u e n c e Stoic therapy is d i r e c t e d largely at t h e u n d e r l y i n g diseased c o n d i t i o n of the soul. T h e r e is thus an i m p o r t a n t preventive side to it. O n e n e e d s to s t r e n g t h e n the soul b e f o r e h a n d , so that it can withstand the impact of mental a p p e a r a n c e s that would otherwise d r a g it towards an e m o t i o n a l response. T h e n a m e f o r o n e of the m a i n techniques designed for this p u r p o s e is what Cicero calls praemeditatio, the ' c o n t e m p l a t i o n in a d v a n c e ' (προενδημεΐν in G r e e k ) . Mentally o n e invokes a p p e a r a n c e s of the above kind, thus training a n d improving t h e soul with a view to the possible o c c u r r e n c e of real objects which w o u l d cause t h e m . T h e r e l e v a n t passages of C i c e r o a n d G a l e n

68

For a general survey of such ancient techniques see Sorabji (2000) 211 if.

c o m b i n e d indicate that Chrysippus h a d r e c o m m e n d e d this technique. It was not a Posidonian invention. In addition Cicero provides a few indications that the definitions of the emotions were given therapeutic a n d preventive significance. Given the Stoic monistic c o n c e p t i o n of the soul, these definition teach us that the e m o t i o n s are misguided j u d g e m e n t s a n d h e n c e entirely voluntary. Since they are u p to us, they can be withstood in principle. Since they describe j u d g e m e n t s as a wrong evaluation, which mistakes an indifferent thing for something good or evil, it is the task of Stoic philosophy to teach us the correct value of things. Clearly this type of therapy concern j u d g e m e n t s of type 1 as distinguished above. Finally, the s h e e r ugliness a n d irrationality of e m o t i o n was depicted. T h u s it e m e r g e d as s o m e t h i n g to be avoided at all costs. This is also reflected in Philodemus' report that the Stoics did not d o m u c h m o r e than censure emotion. 6 9 This also should be c o m p a r e d with Cicero's testimony that the Stoics offer little to n o t h i n g in the way of therapy. T h e description of emotion as repulsive pertains to the second type of j u d g e m e n t , since it makes clear that u n d e r no circumstance such behaviour can be considered appropriate.

69

Philod. De ira col. 1.10-20 Indelli (cf. SVF 3.470 based on Gomperz' older transcription), who, referring to criticism levelled against Chrysippus by one Timaxagoras (on whose identity cf. Indelli, p. 142 f.) says: εί μέν ούν έπετίμα [seil. Timaxagoras] τοις ψέγουσιν μ[ό]νον, άλλο δέ μηδέ εν ποιούσιν ή βαι[ό]ν, ώς Βίων έν τώι Περί της όργης καί Χρύσιππος έν τ[ώ]ι Πε[π]ί παθών θεραπευ[τι]κώι, κάν μετρίως ϊστατο.

GENERAL C O N C L U S I O N

I have r e a c h e d the e n d of my discussion of the evidence relating to Chrysippus' On Affections. It is time to look back a n d p r e s e n t a general p i c t u r e of t h e position d e f e n d e d by Chrysippus, his p r o c e d u r e a n d arguments, as well as the relations between him a n d others philosophers, most notably t h e Stoics with w h o m h e is said by Galen to have disagreed. In line with the ' c o n t e x t u a l ' a p p r o a c h e x p l a i n e d in t h e G e n e r a l I n t r o d u c t i o n , I have paid considerable attention to the aims a n d m e t h o d s of o u r sources, most notably Galen a n d Cicero. My principal aim in d o i n g so was to establish the e x t e n t a n d n a t u r e of t h e evidence o n which any reconstruction of the On Affections should b e based. It has proved possible to m a k e several a d d i t i o n s (mostly f r o m Cicero) to t h e evidence assembled by Von Arnim f r o m Galen, Cicero a n d Calcidius. (A survey of the evidence is p r e s e n t e d in t h e A p p e n d i x , below, p. 325). Even so the assembled material is insufficient to u n d e r t a k e a c o n t i n u o u s reconstruction of c o m p l e t e sections. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , Galen a n d Cicero c o m b i n e d cover substantial sections of Books 1 a n d 4. In a d d i t i o n , G a l e n ' s evidence for Book 2 gains m u c h interest o n c e t h e real role played by Posidonius is u n d e r stood. Studying t h e relevant f r a g m e n t s a n d testimonies t o g e t h e r as deriving f r o m this particular treatise p e r m i t s us to see c o n n e c t i o n s that Chrysippus was c o n c e r n e d to make. Moreover, we may grasp the original c o n t e x t a n d sense of many snippets of preserved text which otherwise would be easily overlooked or n e g l e c t e d — a s in fact they o f t e n are. T h e main impression e m e r g i n g f r o m Galen, Cicero a n d o u r additional sources is of a Chrysippus w h o f u r t h e r develops Z e n o ' s doctrine. In so d o i n g h e takes full a c c o u n t of the soul's corporeal n a t u r e , witness his m e d i c a l analogy a n d o t h e r a r g u m e n t s . Overall, his a p p r o a c h is far m o r e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a n d empirical than would at first sight a p p e a r f r o m the a c c o u n t s of Galen a n d Cicero. F u r t h e r m o r e , we have noticed e c h o e s f r o m Plato's Timaeus (86-88) as well as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (ch. 4.7). Chrysippus can be shown to develop his position with an eye o n these predecessors, using t h e m as well as improving u p o n t h e m (cf. also ch. 5.7 o n Platonic a n d Aristotelian e c h o e s in Cleanthes' dialogue between Reason a n d A n g e r ) . In

addition, we have f o u n d several points of contact with the medical traditions such as represented by the Hippocratic corpus—a feature which suits the p r o m i n e n c e given by Chrysippus to the medical analogy (4.8). O n e of the main tasks we have set ourselves was to understand the workings of Galen's dialectic. Most of his cast of characters, it has t u r n e d out, played a rather different role in real life. Zeno did not identify the affections with the physical effects of the corporeal soul. In reality he used intentional as well as physical terms to refer to what were two aspects of o n e a n d the same p h e n o m e n o n . T h e r e is n o d i f f e r e n c e with Chrysippus (or for that matter Cleanthes) on this score. Chrysippus advanced beyond Zeno and Cleanthes in his analysis of the types of j u d g m e n t involved in emotion: (1) a false j u d g e m e n t on the value of a particular thing; (2) a false j u d g e m e n t that a particular emotional response is appropriate. We have devoted ample space to the motivation a n d application of this r e f i n e m e n t . From Galen's text we learned that Chrysippus introduced this distinction to tackle certain problems arising from the phenomenology of emotion, e.g. its a b a t e m e n t when the relevant value-judgements are still in place. Cicero's account shed light on its therapeutical relevance. T h e cure of an affection is primarily directed at j u d g e m e n t s of type (2), i.e. o n e may try to convince the patient of the inappropriateness of his response. However, affection is understood as a momentary crisis arising f r o m an underlying diseased condition marked by mistaken judgements of type 1. A complete and successful therapy is therefore aimed at this type of j u d g e m e n t s as well. But it can correct these judgements only in the intervals between emotional crises. In fact, since the patient is unreceptive to reason d u r i n g an emotional crisis, it is often difficult to convince him even of the inappropriateness of his behaviour. Many of Chrysippus' examples and poetic quotations, as we have noticed, capture the sheer irrationality and inconsistency of emotional behaviour. T h e ideal therapy t h e r e f o r e places m u c h emphasis on preventive measures, i.e. it seeks to s t r e n g t h e n the underlying mental condition from which the affections arise. It does so t h r o u g h philosophical instruction and t h r o u g h regimen aimed at physical factors. In addition, it consists of mental exercises and techniques (e.g. dwelling in advance on certain mental a p p e a r a n c e s ) . Chrysippus d e n o u n c e d affection as a f o r m of insanity, employing vivid depiction as a d e t e r r e n t . H e r e too the importance attached to prevention emerges.

A n o t h e r of o u r f i n d i n g s is t h e sustained physicalism u n d e r l y i n g Chrysippus' a p p r o a c h , a f e a t u r e which we have b e e n able to situate against the c o n t e m p o r a r y medical b a c k d r o p (ch. 4.8). His so-called medical analogy was n o t a m e r e m e t a p h o r b u t t h e expression of a m e a n i n g f u l physical c o r r e s p o n d e n c e between body a n d soul, most notably the physical tension in b o t h . Chrysippus explained this m o r e fully in t e r m s of t h e e l e m e n t a l qualities, following Z e n o in this respect as well. T h e c o r p o r e a l basis of his theory also surfaces in his c o n c e p t of 'first m o v e m e n t s ' , which may trigger a f u l l - f l e d g e d e m o t i o n . C o n s i d e r e d in this light, the soul's c o r p o r e a l n a t u r e helps explain t h e e l e m e n t of passivity in the e x p e r i e n c e of e m o t i o n , viz. insofar as it involves b e i n g a f f e c t e d by a m e n t a l i m p r i n t , i.e. t h e a p p e a r a n c e (φαντασία). But of course t h e r e is an i m p o r t a n t active aspect as well, in line with the Chrysippean c o n c e p t of the c o r p o r e a l cause. In e x p l a i n i n g t h e o c c u r r e n c e of e m o t i o n s Chrysippus employed his distinction b e t w e e n a n t e c e d e n t cause (~ t h e e x t e r n a l object a p p e a r i n g to us) a n d sustaining cause (~ the soul responsible f o r t h e a f f e c t i o n ) . G a l e n ' s c o m p l a i n t that Chrysippus provided n o p r o p e r causal a c c o u n t is u n j u s t i f i e d . Accordingly, his a p p e a l to Posidonius as the o n e Stoic who did press for such an explanation is equally misleading. T h e r e may have b e e n a d i f f e r e n c e between the two Stoics c o n c e r n i n g the limits of the causal explanation. This however shows Posidonius developing a Stoic line of explanation f u r t h e r than Chrysippus had d o n e . Contrary to what Galen alleges, Posidonius was n o dissident b u t merely c o n t r i b u t e d s o m e terminological p o i n t s a n d c o n c e p t u a l r e f i n e m e n t s . W h a t Galen tells us a b o u t his attitude to Chrysippus should n o t be taken at face value. It provides n o reliable g u i d e to possible weak spots in t h e Chrysippean theory b u t should be carefully a n d critically e x a m i n e d (see also the conclusion to ch. 5). O n e of the m a i n points resulting f r o m o u r inquiry is that o u r two principal s o u r c e s — G a l e n a n d C i c e r o — s h o w little interest in what m i g h t be called the physical-cum-theological basis of the Stoic theory of t h e emotions. Stoic corporealism was n o t c o n f i n e d to the h u m a n m i c r o c o s m . Each individual intellect is p a r t of t h e m a c r o c o s m i c whole e n s o u l e d by the divine intellect. T h u s o u r intellect is continuous n o t only with the lower levels of reality t h r o u g h its c o n n e c t i o n with the body. It is also r o o t e d in the higher, divine realm t h r o u g h its share in divine reason. This divine e l e m e n t of o u r being is referred to by b o t h Chrysippus a n d Posidonius (as it h a d n o d o u b t b e e n by Z e n o

b e f o r e t h e m ) as o u r g u a r d i a n spirit, t h e daimôn. T h i s Stoic m o d e l provides an alternative to t h e Platonist-cum-Peripatetic faculty app r o a c h , since it serves to explain p h e n o m e n a such as mental conflict a n d the status of so-called right reason. O u r own way of thinking is closer to the faculty a p p r o a c h since the Stoic parts-and-whole s c h e m a r e q u i r e s a drastic d e p a r t u r e f r o m o u r t e n d e n c y to conceive of t h e subjective a n d objective in t e r m s of a s h a r p i n t e r n a l / e x t e r n a l distinction. 1 T h e o p p o s i t i o n e r e c t e d by o u r m a i n s o u r c e s b e t w e e n t h e Stoic ' o n e - f a c u l t y ' a p p r o a c h a n d t h e Platonist-cum-Peripatetic multi-faculty a p p r o a c h has d o n e m u c h to o b s c u r e t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d of d i s t i n c t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h e Stoic a p p r o a c h — w h i c h , confusingly, takes a c c o u n t of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d especially Aristotelian heritage in o t h e r i m p o r t a n t respects. T h e view of e m o t i o n as cognitive was n o t a Stoic i n n o v a t i o n . It goes back to Plato a n d Aristotle. T h e Stoics f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d their insights a n d f o r m u l a t e d the most radically cognitive theory o n o f f e r in a n c i e n t philosophy. But t h e Stoic position resists rough-and-ready classification in m o d e r n terms. It is t h e r e f o r e potentially misleading to c h a r a c t e r i z e it as a cognitive theory tout court. T h e Stoic theory comprises various aspects, i n c l u d i n g physical ones, not least because of their view of t h e soul as pneuma. In c o n s e q u e n c e , they use intentional a n d physical t e r m s i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . P h e n o m e n a such as the intensity or d u r a t i o n of t h e e m o t i o n a l impulse or t h e quality of t h e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s a r e also e x p l a i n e d in c o r p o r e a l terms. Chrysippus also addressed elusive p h e n o m e n a of this sort. If h e did n o t press a few r e m a i n i n g questions, it was because t h e r e was as yet n o compelling answer. T h e Stoic Sage r e m a i n s silent in such cases, a l t h o u g h it is possible that Posidonius in revisiting s o m e of t h e same q u e s t i o n s pressed t h e m f u r t h e r . Chrysippus' willingness to leave the irrational a n i c h e of its own within t h e g e n e r a l Stoic f r a m e w o r k e a r n e d him the scorn of polemicists such as G a l e n . But G a l e n ' s u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d a p p e a l to irrational soul-parts is n o t in t h e slightest bit m o r e illuminating. Chrysippus f o r his part saw that e m o t i o n is n o t only cognitive (which holds g o o d for all h u m a n t h o u g h t ) b u t is also m a r k e d by a particular kind of impulse a n d c o n c o m i t a n t feelings. It seems theref o r e apposite to characterize his a p p r o a c h to e m o t i o n as conative n o less than cognitive.

1

On the difference between our own and other cultures in this respect see Taylor (1988).

APPENDIX

T H E TEXTUAL EVIDENCE RELATING T O CHRYSIPPUS' ON AFFECTIONS

In what follows I inventorize the textual evidence I have established as deriving f r o m Chrysippus' On Affections in chs. 3-6 of this book. T o locate t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o n t h e f r a g m e n t s a n d t e s t i m o n i e s conc e r n e d see the Index. Most of the texts are q u o t e d in the main body of the book. A full p r e s e n t a t i o n of the texts will be given in the new edition of Early Stoic f r a g m e n t s that is b e i n g p r e p a r e d at U t r e c h t University. For this reason r e f e r e n c e s to the SVF have b e e n omitted.

Overall contents, length: F o u r long books: the first t h r e e theoretical, the f o u r t h a n d last o n e therapeutical: Cicero, Tusc. 4.9, 4.33; PHP ΑΛΛΑ, 4.5.10, 4.7.21, 5.7.52, 8.1.47;Loc. Aff. Ill, 1, VIII p. 138 K. B O O K 1: Exegesis of - Z e n o ' s two d e f i n i t i o n s of a f f e c t i o n . PHP 4.2.10-12, 4.2.14-18 ( r u n n e r simile), 4.5.3-8; Tusc. 4.11-14, 4.22. - Z e n o ' s d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e f o u r ' g e n e r i c ' affections: PHP 4.2.1-7, 4.2.4-7; Tusc. 4.11-14 (cf. 3.24-7). - P h y s i c a l d e f i n i t i o n ( c o n t r a c t i o n , e x p a n s i o n ) . P H P 4.3.2, 4.15; Tusc. 4.15; cf. 3.61, 83. - S u b s p e c i e s of t h e g e n e r i c a f f e c t i o n s : Tusc. 4.16-22 ( n o t in Galen). Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.111 (affections are j u d g e m e n t s as main thesis of the treatise). BOOK 2: p r o b l e m s (aporiai): - the a b a t e m e n t of a f f e c t i o n / t w o types of j u d g e m e n t : PHP 4.7.1-17 (distress, a ' f r e s h ' j u d g e m e n t ) ; 4.7.26-7, 30-1 (id,.)·, cf. Tusc. 3.614; cf. 76, 79.

- t h e origin of evil: PHP 5.5.1-26; Calcidius, In Tim. 165-168; Tusc. 3.2; cf. D.L. 7.89.

BOOK 3: N o attested evidence. BOOK 4 ( T h e Therapeutics) • T h e 'medical analogy': - t h e analogy e x p o u n d e d : P H P 5.2.22-4, 26-7, 31-33, 47, 49; cf. Cic. Tusc. 3.6, 4.23, 30-31; cf. ib. 58. - health, strength a n d beauty: PHP 5.2.33, 47, 49, Tusc. 4.30-1. - e l e m e n t a l q u a l i t i e s : / 5 / ^ 5.3.7-8, 9-10, \2;QAM 4, pp.45.5-46.1 Müller; cf. Tusc. 4.32. - disease, fever (disposition vs. activation) P/iP5.2.13-14; cf. 5.3.12, 5.4.14; Tusc. 4.24-30. - p r o n e n e s s to disease, health: PHP5.2.3, 14;7msc. 4.27-8. - d i s e a s e , infirmity, badness: Tusc. 4.28-29, PHP 5.2.27; cf. 4.5.31 (Posid.) • definitions of affection ( r e p e a t e d f r o m Bk. 1): 5.2.14; cf. Tusc. 4.22. • weakness of the will, or t u r n i n g o n e ' s back o n (right) Reason: - a n g e r PHP 4.6.7-9, 11 ( M e n e l a o s a n d H e l e n ) , 19-20, 23, 24-25, 34-5 (Medea) - (erotic) desire: ib. 4.6.27-32 , 40-41. - grief: ib. 38, 40 - pleasure: ib. 43; cf. 30 • Affection as i n s a n i t y / m e n t a l blindness: PHP 4.5.21-2, 4.6.44-46; Tusc. 4.24-6, 79; cf. Philod.On Anger, col. 1.10-20, Tusc 4.76-7. • Therapy proper: - treating an e m o t i o n a l E p i c u r e a n o r Peripatetic: O r i g e n , Against Celsus VIII 51, vol. II, p. 266.18 ff. Kö. (cf. ib. I 64, vol. 1, p. 117.16 ff.). - Tusc. 4.59-63; cf. ib. 3.76, 79 (show that the e m o t i o n , t h o u g h considered a p p r o p r i a t e , is in fact i n a p p r o p r i a t e : o n e of the two types of j u d g e m e n t involved), 4.78-9 (no cure f o r o u t b u r s t of a n g e r ) ; - prevention: 'dwelling in advance': Tusc. 3.52 (cf. ib. 29); cf. PHP 4.7.6-11.

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