Bombs Away!: The World War II Bombing Campaigns over Europe

The World War II Bombing Campaigns over Europe John R. Bruning

BOMBS The World War II Bombing Campaigns over Europe John R. Brüning

6

Z E N I T H

P R E S S

First published in 2011 by Zenith Press, an imprint of MBI Publishing Company, 400 First Avenue North, Suite 300, Minneapolis, M N 55401 USA Copyright © 2 0 1 1 by John R. Brüning All rights reserved. With the exception of quoting brief passages for the purposes of review, no part of this publication may be reproduced without prior written permission from the Publisher. The information in this book is true and complete to the best of our knowledge. Zenith Press titles are also available at discounts in bulk quantity for industrial or sales-promotional use. For details write to Special Sales Manager at MBI Publishing Company, 4 0 0 First Avenue North, Suite 300, Minneapolis, M N 55401 USA. To find out more about our books, join us online at www.zenithpress.com. Digital edition: 9 7 8 - I - 6 I 0 6 0 - 2 5 9 - 4 Softcover edition: 978-0-76033-990-9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Brüning, John R . Bombs away!: the World War II bombing campaigns over Europe / John R. Brüning, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7603-3990-9 (hb w/ jkt) I. World War, 1939-1945—Aerial operations. 2. World War, 1939-1945—Campaigns—Western Front. I. Title. D785.B78 2011 940.54'42094—dc22 2010042590 Maps by: Philip Schwartzberg, Meridian Mapping All photographs are from official U.S. archives and authors collection unless noted otherwise. On the cover: A Fifteenth Air Force B-24 drops its payload. Printed in China

For AlliLee: No matter what happens, no matter who we become or where our lives take us, your heart and inspiration gave me the strength and passion to stay true to this journey.

unbridled

CONTENTS Introduction

T h e Empty Sky

I

C H A P T E R ONE

A Panacea for Generational Destruction

7

CHAPTER TWG

Theory into Practice

23

CH A P I ER I H R EE

The Summer of the Few

43

CHAPTER FOUR

Response in Kind

69

C H A P T E R FIVE

T h e Americans Arrive

85

C H A P T E R SIX

Pointblank Begins

105

CHAPTER SEVEN

T h e Get Rich Quick Scheme

123

CHAPTER EIGHT

The W h e e l s Come Off

143

C H A PT E R N I N E

T h e M o r t a l Ones

C H A P T E R TEN

T h e Hybrid Stallion

183

C H A P T E R ELEVEN

Relentless Pursuit: Big Week

195

CHAPTER TWELVE

Tipping Point

213

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Destruction and Distraction

233

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Clutching Straws

257

EPILOGUE

Judgments

279

1 6 5

Acknowledgments

284

Bibliographical Notes

286

Index

287

W h i l e the British b o m b e d at night, t h e U S A A F r e m a i n e d c o m m i t t e d to d a y l i g h t a t t a c k s over Germany. B o m b e r C o m m a n d s w i t c h e d t o n i g h t raids a f t e r s u f f e r i n g heavy losses d u r i n g t h e o p e n i n g m o n t h s of t h e war. The U S A A F t o o k huge losses at t i m e s , but s o l v e d t h a t p r o b l e m w i t h the i n t r o d u c t i o n of l o n g - r a n g e e s c o r t f i g h t e r s a n d drop tanks. Better p r o t e c t e d f r o m G e r m a n i n t e r c e p t o r s , t h e U S A A F e n d e d the w a r w i t h a l o w e r loss rate t h a n B o m b e r C o m m a n d , d e s p i t e o p e r a t i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r in d a y l i g h t . Here, a g r o u p of curious RAF a i r m e n receive a lecture f r o m a USAAF officer on t h e Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress during ail inter-service e x c h a n g e late in t h e war.

Introduction

S E V E N D E C A D E S AGO, battles raged across Europe's flak-torn skies. T h a t epic clash consumed tens of thousands of aircraft born f r o m the factories of a dozen nations. R i d i n g them down to their final, fiery resting places were men of passion, vision, and dedication. T h e y died horribly, trapped in the machines that bore them aloft as flames engulfed them. Few deaths can ever reach that level o f pain and misery. Visit the battlefield at Verdun and the shell-torn land still harbors wounds even a century has not healed. N o t so with the titanic struggle to control Europe's skies during the six years it took to defeat N a z i Germany. T h o s e skies are empty now; there are no telltale scars to be found among the clouds. T i m e and the nature o f the fighting have swept away every vestige of what will probably remain the largest air war in h u m a n history. A few signposts of this clash remain here and there, off the beaten path ready for those w h o seek them out. An old Eighth Air Force bomber station, its runways now cracked and weed-riddled; local museums chocked with aircraft or memorabilia of an age that now exists only in fading memories o f the final few who lived it—these fragments are all that is left. T h e y cannot tell the total story of what occurred in the skies during those six years of W o r l d W a r II. It is just too massive, the forces engaged so large as to prevent most minds from grasping the enormity of the national c o m m i t m e n t s to such a new f o r m of warfare. Instead, those museums and memorials, those airfields that once thundered with the sounds of hundreds of engines but have long since fallen into disuse, at best can provide mere hints of the magnitude of the struggle. S o m e of those who fought in it survived to write their memoirs. T h o s e are only tiny representative threads of a vast tapestry that ultimately claimed hundreds o f thousands of lives, civilian and military. It all started with a dream, a vision of how the next war could be fought without the stalemate of the Great War. T h e theorists posited, and the air crews put those ideas to practice with

The Allied strategic bombing campaign virtually destroyed Germany's

mixed results and a staggering casualty rate. Strategic bombing,

urban centers. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died in the rubble

the solution to static, attritional warfare, ultimately itself became

and the firestorms created by the RAF's incendiary attacks. The morality and

a war of attrition and national resources. In trying to avoid more

the effectiveness of such raids have sparked one of the most enduring

Sommes, more Verduns, the theories espoused before the war

controversies to emerge from World War II.

1

H o m e for t h e night. A i l e x h a u s t e d Eighth Air Force c r e w brings a B-17 d o w n on final a p p r o a c h over an a i r f i e l d in East A n g l i a

created new versions of them in the sky. In the process, cities burned and civilians died right alongside the servicemen sent either to protect or destroy them. If Verdun consumed a generation o f French, American, and German warrior sons, the inter-war solution o f strategic bombing resulted in the mass destruction of Europe's most beautiful and culturally rich urban centers. T h i s book tells the story of that unique a n d exceptionally violent campaign through the photographs taken by noncombatants who rode into battle with the sole purpose of trying to capture these events for succeeding generations. H u n d r e d s of these photographers died in the line of duty, killed when their bombers were shot out of the sky by flak or fighters. At war's end, tens of thousands of those photos were simply d u m p e d on office floors in Eighth Air Force units all over East Anglia. Some of the men saw the value in those photos and scooped u p some of these precious and historic images. T h e y took them home as coveted treasures of the most difficult, and meaningful, time in their lives. M o s t of those images never survived, and that is a significant tragedy given the level of sacrifice the photographers took to record them. T h e comparative few that do exist today The incredible stress and psychological

survived an Air Force archive that bounced around among stateside offices, the Air and Space

pressure repeated missions over Germany

M u s e u m , a n d finally the National Archives. In the process, they were stored improperly,

produced are more than evident on Tech.

and many have degraded to the point that they are no longer useful. America has never been

Sgt. Vernon Lindemayer's face in this

past-centric; we have short memories, and the future is what matters to us as a people and a

photograph. Just back from another mission

culture. In some respects, this is good. S o m e cultures cling so caustically to their histories that

as a B-17's top turret, this image was snapped

centuries-old wounds continue to affect their social dynamics. T h a t is not the American way.

before he even had a chance to shave. Those

W e experience, then move on.

who returned home after their tour in Europe

But here, within these pages, I w o u l d like to return you, gentle reader, to a time when

did so as different men, branded forever by

thousands of aircraft darkened Europe's skies. It is a time when a generation of idealistic

what their experiences in the air war.

young men, steeped in the lore of flight through pulp magazines and movies like Dawn Patrol

10 I n t r o d u c t i o n

and Hell's Angels convinced diem that glorv awaited among the clouds. W h a t they discovered instead was a thousand wavs to die, a thousand terrors whose effects on the survivors of the campaign would last a lifetime, nestled in their nightmares and shared only with loving spouses—or at least the ones who stuck it out with them upon their return. T h e r e was 110 help for them and P T S D (post-traumatic stress disorder) as there is now for America's warriors. I hey were simply expected to return home, pick u p their old lives, and

D a m a g e d b o m b e r s l i m p i n g back to England o f t e n c r a s h - l a n d e d a n d burst into flames. The USAAF developed the most sophisticated and w e l l - e q u i p p e d f i r e - f i g h t i n g c r e w s in t h e w o r l d t o h e l p save lives in such s i t u a t i o n s . Here, a t e a m of fire f i g h t e r s in a s b e s t o s suits hold c h e m i c a l sprayers and a w a i t t h e call t o a c t i o n .

0261124 The b o m b e r c r e w s d e v e l o p e d t h e i r o w n rituals a n d t r a d i t i o n s , such as t h i s one. W h e n a c r e w m e m b e r f l e w his final m i s s i o n , he received a d u n k i n g upon return. It is a t r a d i t i o n t h a t carries t h r o u g h in s o m e U.S. a v i a t i o n units to t h i s day. Here M a j . J i m M c P a r t l i n gets t h e t r e a t m e n t in f r o n t of an Eighth Air Force EM 7.

The Empty Ski

3

A 401 st Bomb Group B-17G sits on an airfield

press on. But trauma and the h u m a n m i n d have an unpredictable relationship. T h e damage was

in East Anglia after limping home with an

done, and the effect of the air war on those who fought will linger until the final aviator f r o m

engine afire after a mission in March 1944. As

that long-lost age breathes his last. T h e war d i d not end in 1 9 4 5 ; it simply changed form.

the fire crews sought to contain the flames,

T h i s book is an homage to these young men, those who died and those who returned

they burned through the top of the cowling.

hollow and spent by their combat experiences. T h e photos tell the story better than any words

The engine's weight caused the cowl to snap

I will ever be able to put to paper, so they will take center stage on every page. R i d i n g a B - 2 4

and sag to the ground.

to Berlin a r m e d with nothing but a camera was no small feat of courage in 1 9 4 4 , but there were men w h o stepped forward a n d proved willing to do it. T h e i r surviving work paints a vivid picture of the h u m a n experience that defined a generation o f aviators. In the m y r i a d books written on the strategic b o m b i n g campaign, that human element seems all too often suborned to the technical aspects of the machines and weapons used to fight it. Book after book can be f o u n d with aircraft specifications: the number of .50-caliber machine guns in a B - I 7 F or how to tell the difference between a B-24D, J, or M . T h e r e will be some of that in the pages that follow, but the focus will be on the men who flew the machines and the civilians on the ground who endured the fall of their bombs. Ultimately, history is not defined by how m u c h horsepower a W r i g h t Cyclone engine could produce; it is composed of h u m a n experience. A few gallant writers—journalists and novelists whose patriotism drove them to England or I t a l y — r o d e into battle aboard these bombers in hopes o f capturing that human experience. M a c K i n l a y Kantor, a Civil W a r novelist, was one of those dedicated few w h o was rejected for military service due to his age. H e f o u n d a way to serve his country and share his words

4

Introduction

with a nation eager to understand what its sons were doing in Europe. H e flew the

flak-filled

missions, taking notes that f o r m e d the basis of his stories. A n d when he came home, he saw the struggle these vets experienced as they tried to readjust to civilian life. H e wrote about that quiet and desperate battle back here in the States in his brilliant novel Glory For Me, which became the basis for the movie The Best Years of Our Lives. In it, Fred Derry, a bombardier with the 3 0 5 t h Bomb Group, serves as one o f the three main characters. H i s words h u m a n i z e d the experience of a generation of aviators, and they will be quoted in the pages that follow. As a kid, I would sneak into my father's den, which was filled with the beautiful and accurate models o f the aircraft used in the strategic bombing campaign. He'd arrayed in one cabinet P - 5 I s , P - 3 8 s , Focke-Wulfs, and Messerschmitts. I'd stare at them, fingers pressed to the glass, and let my imagination roam. Next to those cabinets, stored with military-like

The 549th Bomb Squadron returns from a

precision in stout bookshelves were hundreds of books and folios related to W o r l d W a r II

mission to find coffee and donuts waiting for

aviation. N o t allowed to touch them, they became m y forbidden fruit. As soon as I was old

them, care of the Red Cross. Such gestures

enough to read, I w o u l d tiptoe inside Dad's den and pilfer a book or two, read it as quickly as I

helped sustain the morale of those doing the

could and return it. Somehow, he always knew, and more than once I got busted. Nevertheless,

flying and fighting. Through 1944, the Eighth

from those stolen m o m e n t s grew an abiding love of aviation history and the air war in Europe.

Air Force's commander, Jimmy Doolittle, tried

Someday, I wanted to have the o p p o r t u n i t y to write such volumes so that they may sit on

his best to give his airmen passes into the

Dad's shelf as well.

local English towns and cities so they could

M y childish and naive view o f the air war vanished in the 1 9 9 0 s when I interviewed

relax and unwind. Such consideration for his

hundreds of veterans of the Eighth a n d Fifteenth Air Forces. T h r o u g h my time with them

men landed Doolittle in hot water with his

in their last few years, I saw their lingering pain; I heard their stories o f friends trapped in

superiors, who were determined to ruthlessly

j a m m e d turrets that they were forced to leave behind as their bombers plunged broken and

prosecute the air war no matter how worn out

burning for the earth five miles below. In their words, in their tears for long-fallen comrades,

the crews became.

and in their eyes I saw the true meaning of what took place during those seminal years seven decades ago. As a result, this book has been both a privilege and a passion to w r i t e — o n e of those projects that defines my own accomplishments in life. I hope every page honors their experience by staying honest to what they endured and why. T h a t is my gift to those men who took the time to trust me with me those jagged memories and open their wounded hearts to a young historian who knew nothing o f the true nature of combat. T h o s e moments, shared in their homes, shaped who I became and gave m e purpose to my own life. T h i s is their story, the view f r o m their cockpits and turrets, told with all the raw honesty I gleaned from their words. A n d the fighters rolled into the tracer like rabbits, T h e blood froze over m y splints like a s c a b — D i d I snore, all still a n d grey in the turret, T i l l the p a l m s rose out of the sea with my death? A n d the world ends here, in the sand o f a grave, All my wars over? H o w easy it was to die! —Randall Jarrell,

Gunner

Home safe. Come dawn, they'd have to fly again.

The Empty Sky

5

The c r a t e r s c a p e of t h e W e s t e r n Front l e f t ail i n d e l i b l e i m p r e s s i o n on t h e y o u n g officers w h o s u r v i v e d it. N e v e r a g a i n , t h e y v o w e d , w o u l d t h e y send so m a n y m e n to t h e i r d e a t h s so pointlessly. T w o s c h o o l s of t h o u g h t e m e r g e d f r o m t h i s ordeal. S o m e b e l i e v e d a i r p o w e r a l o n e could e n d t h e n e x t w a r quickly. Others b e l i e v e d t a n k s a n d a r m o r e d v e h i c l e s c o u l d restore m o b i l i t y to t h e b a t t l e f i e l d a n d deliver the w a r - w i n n i n g blows w i t h speed and movement.

A PANACEA FOR GENERATIONAL DESTRUCTION *

There my adventurous

*

*

•

A

ardor experienced a sobering shock. A fair-haired

Scottish private was lying at the side of

the trench in a pool of his own blood. His face was grey and serene, and his eyes stared emptily at the sky. A few yards further

on the body of a German officer lay crumpled up and still. . . machine guns tapped, spiteful and

spasmodic. High up in the fresh blue sky an aeroplane droned and glinted. I thought what a (\ueer state of things it all was. . . . —Memoirs

of an Infantry

Officer, Siegfried Sassoon

T H E G R E A T W A R C A M E U P O N E U R O P E in the summer of 1 9 1 4 , sparked by an assassins bullet and fueled by diplomatic miscalculations. S p u r r e d by patriotic fever and images of glory and heroism in battle, legions o f young men kissed their loved ones good-bye, stepped aboard troop trains across the Continent, and found themselves thrown into a new f o r m of warfare n o b o d y — f r o m general to p r i v a t e — h a d ever envisioned. T h e y marched into battle in N a p o l e o n i c ranks. Instead of muskets, they faced M a x i m machine guns and m o d e r n artillery. Garish uniforms, fit for striking

impressions

during the Bastille Day parades colored the French rank

During the Great War, airpower served an important supporting function on the

and file. T h e Zouaves wore blue a n d bright red pantaloons.

Western Front. Reconnaissance, observation, and spotting for artillery units were

Against the s u m m e r s earth, they made exceptional targets

the aircraft's most important duties. Here, an American 1 st Aero Squadron Salmson

for German gunners, and they died in heaps.

recon aircraft soars above the front on a mission in 1918.

7

The concept of strategic bombing emerged from the traumatic experience of World War Is trench fighting. The machine gun, combined with long-range artillery, produced such appalling casualties that offensive operations could be conducted only at the expense of thousands of young lives for every mile of ground taken. When the Armistice was signed in 1918, the surviving professional officers took stock of what they'd just been through and sought ways to ensure such positional warfare would never happen again.

In the first three weeks of fighting on the Western Front, five hundred thousand men became casualties. Before the year was out, the French A r m y alone had suffered almost a million losses. T h e war devolved into positional fighting where a few hundred yards of g r o u n d would be bought with the blood of thousands of young men. T h r o u g h 1 9 1 5 , the loss rates only grew worse. T h e n came Verdun in February 1 9 1 6 , and the French A r m y all but succumbed to the flames of that crucible. Before the year was out, Verdun h a d claimed almost a million more men. In June, the reconstituted British A r m y launched its offensive along the S o m m e River. After a week long artillery bombardment, the British infantry was expected to simply walk over whatever German resistance was left. Instead, as the m e n clambered out o f their trenches and marched in orderly ranks through no man's land, they faced a hurricane o f shrapnel and machine gun fire. By dusk, nineteen thousand British soldiers lay dead, some still lying in their parade Charles DeGaulle (left) was one of the armor advocates in the

g r o u n d ranks on the shell-savaged battlefield. Another forty thousand w o u n d e d

French Army.

overburdened the already inadequate medical evacuation pipeline, and their continued on page 12

8

Chapter 1

A f t e r the first British e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h t a n k s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , t h e French d e v e l o p e d t h e i r o w n a r m o r e d vehicles. Such first steps w o u l d give rise t o the w h o l e c o n c e p t of c o m b i n e d a r m s — t h e i n t e g r a t i o n of armor, infantry, a n d a r t i l l e r y into one p o w e r f u l t e a m oil t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . Colonel W i l l i a m M i t c h e l l w a s t h e f i r s t — a n d , in the i n t e r - w a r era, t h e o n l y — a i r p o w e r a d v o c a t e w h o took t h e p r i n c i p l e of c o m b i n e d a r m s o p e r a t i o n s and a p p l i e d it to a v i a t i o n . His t a c t i c a l m a n u a l , w r i t t e n in t h e 1920s, w a s years a h e a d of its t i m e as a result.

A P a n a c e a for G e n e r a t i o n a l D e s t r u c t i o n

9

THE FLYING F O R T R E S S

TN 1 9 3 4 , T H E A I R C O R P S issued a challenge to A m e r i c a s aircraft companies: build a revolutionary new bomber capable of flying for ten hours at 2 5 0 miles per hour while carrying thousands of pounds of ordnance. T h r e e corporations, Boeing, M a r t i n , a n d Douglas, rose to that challenge. T h e Air C o r p s scheduled a fly-off between whatever three planes the companies developed, and the winner w o u l d receive a contract for the construction of two hundred planes. S u c h a contract would ensure the survival of any one of these companies in the lean Depression-era years, and their best designers a n d engineers threw themselves into the task. Douglas and M a r t i n settled on twin-engine designs known as the D B - I and the M o d e l 146, respectively. Boeing, which had recently built the X B - I 5 and had experience with larger craft, decided to construct a prototype powered by four 750-horsepower motors, despite the fact that this would increase the individual cost The Model 299's cockpit layout was not only one of the most complicated

of each aircraft significantly. Boeings management believed that

and technically challenging of the 1930s, but it was also well thought out and

die extra engines gave their plane the performance edge they would

designed with the pilots in mind.

need to secure the Air Corps contract. In July 1 9 3 5 , Boeing's M o d e l 2 9 9 took flight for the first time, a r m e d with five .30-caliber machine guns. T h e test flight exceeded all hopes, and a m o n t h later it flew to W r i g h t Field, Ohio, in under ten hours to take part in the performance competition against the D B - I and M o d e l 146. In Ohio, the 2 9 9 crushed the opposition. It was faster, possessed

Left: A close-up of the M o d e l 299's original Above:lhe

10

radioman's c o m p a r t m e n t in the

nose turret. This w a s discarded in subsequent

M o d e l 299. A s the 299 evolved into the B-17, the

models. Initially replaced by hand-held .30-

aircraft eventually contained miles of electrical

caliber and ,50-caliber guns, the ultimate

w i r i n g and its generators could produce enough

B-17, the G model, incorporated a chin turret

p o w e r to light a midsized t o w n .

w i t h t w i n ,50-caliber machine guns.

Chapter 1

The arrival of the first YB-17 at Langley made the other aircraft on the field look positively primitive in comparison.

a longer range, a n d carried 4 , 8 0 0 pounds of bombs, while its

M o d e l 2 9 9 , including more powerful W r i g h t - C y c l o n e engines

defensive firepower was unmatched. A t last, the Air C o r p s would

a n d even heavier defensive armament.

have a true instrument of strategic b o m b i n g in its arsenal. Yet, the contract ultimately went to Douglas. T h e D B - I

T h e Air C o r p s loved the new bomber and saw it as the ultimate workhorse for the strategic bombing doctrine that

became the B - I 8 Bolo, and the Air C o r p s ordered 1 3 3 of them.

dominated the service. T h r o u g h 1 9 3 8 and 1 9 3 9 , more were

Sixty-five Boeings were ordered as well, but then even that small

ordered in penny-packet amounts. Finally, as the war in Europe

amount got canceled when the M o d e l 2 9 9 crashed in October

reached its first crisis in the s u m m e r of 1 9 4 0 when France

during an evaluation flight. T h e crew had neglected to unlock the

surrendered, Washington shook loose enough m o n e y to order

control surfaces before take-off, and the 2 9 9 nosed up, stalled,

just over five h u n d r e d B-17s. T h a t first major contract set the

and augered in.

stage for the aerial a r m a d a that w o u l d blacken the skies over

Tt looked like the end for the Boeing project. Nevertheless,

Germany in a few short years. Yet, by the time the Japanese

enough Air C o r p s officers saw the potential that they steered

attacked Pearl Harbor, fewer than two hundred Flying Forts h a d

some money toward Boeing the following year to build thirteen

reached operational status in the Air Corps.

test aircraft, now designated as the Y B - 1 7 . T h e y cost almost a

By 1 9 4 5 , 1 2 , 7 3 1 B - I 7 s h a d been produced by Boeing and

hundred thousand dollars a p i e c e — a tremendous s u m to the

Vega, a subsidiary of Lockheed. During the course of the war,

Air C o r p s at a time when military appropriations h a d been cut

Flying Forts dropped 6 4 0 , 0 0 0 tons of bombs on enemy targets,

to the b o n e — b u t the Y B - 1 7 s reached the 2 n d Bomb Group in

more than any other American aircraft. F r o m its humble origins

the spring of 1 9 3 7 . T h e y came to the eager Air C o r p s crews

a n d near extinction in 1 9 3 5 , the B - I 7 rose to be the ultimate

complete with a number of improvements over the original

expression of strategic bombing during W o r l d W a r II.

A Panacea for G e n e r a t i o n a l

Destruction

11

continued from page 8

misery as they lay untended for hours or even days seems unimaginable now in a time when removing a casualty from the field takes a mere matter of minutes. T h e pointless killing over ruined ground continued. T h e French A r m y nearly

collapsed

in mutiny. U n i t s refused to charge headlong into German machine guns. Some bleated like sheep in their trenches when their officers ordered them to attack. Russia collapsed in revolution later in the year, and the Allied cause looked almost hopeless. T h e Americans arrived in the nick of time. T h e French and British armies, scarred by four years of trench warfare, h a d not the heart to carry the day any longer. T h e Americans, unknowing and naive, s t o r m e d into battle with the same elan seen in 1 9 1 4 . In a matter of weeks, 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 U.S. soldiers and marines fell during the summer and fall of 1 9 1 8 . In the end, the Americans gave the Allies the spirit and numbers to at last defeat the German army on the Western Front. Above: Most postwar officers, especially from the older Victorian generation, did not see

W h e n the war finally ended in the famous railroad car at Compiegne, Europe's era of global dominance ended with it. T h i r t y million lives h a d been destroyed—eight million

much potential in airpower. They saw fragile,

d e a d — i n what became the bloodiest conflict in human history. T h e French m o b i l i z e d 8 . 4

fabric-covered aircraft like these German

million men during the war; 5 . 7 million became casualties. N i n e t y percent of France's eighteen-

Fokker Dr. I fighters and focused on their

to twenty-four-year-olds died or were m a i m e d defending the trenches of the Western Front.

limited range, armament, and combat payload.

A generation h a d been all but w i p e d out. Aside from the U n i t e d States, the warring

These early aircraft did not have the capability

nations lay in economic and social ruin. Entire villages in Britain, France, and Germany

to win wars, but the reality of the day blinded

h a d been picked clean of its healthy sons. N o w in the aftermath, only the elderly, infirm, or

many to the potential that lay in the future.

adolescent remained to move forward. In the wake o f the war, those junior officers who survived recognized the complete failure of the upper echelons of their chains of command, most of w h o m seemed unable to adapt to the convergence of new technology and dated tactics that took place on the Western Front. S o m e young turks, such as J. F. C. Fuller, D. H . L i d d e l l - H a r t , George Patton, and Charles DeGaulle, advocated the use of a r m o r to restore m o b i l i t y to the battlefield. T h e y clashed with the old-school infantry and artillery officers who seemed incapable of understanding how squandering the youth of their nation in pointless frontal assaults had crippled their societies.

Left: Then there were men of extraordinary vision who embraced the airpower cause with almost zealot-like devotion. The most influential was Italy's rebellious Guilio Douhet. He believed airpower, if used to destroy an enemy nation's civilian morale through terror bombing, could bring a quick end to future wars.

20 C h a p t e r 1

The 1920s saw the first steps toward creating a bomber force capable of realizing Douhet s bloody vision. Here, American MB-2 bombers pass over New York. From these dope-and-fabric-covered fragile craft would spring the deadly effective weapons of the following decade.

Other military rebels rose to prominence in the early 1 9 2 0 s . T h e s e renegades believed technology h a d made armies all but obsolete, and that the next war would be won not by rifle and bayonet, but by aircraft. Enter the airpower zealots. One of the first of these was the Italian Giulio Douhet. In 1 9 1 1 , during the Italo-Turkish War, he glimpsed the potential of the aircraft as an offensive weapon o f war. H e c o m m a n d e d an air battalion in N o r t h Africa and during his stint in the desert penned one of the very first air battle manuals ever written. During the Great War, D o u h e t relentlessly advocated for a massive bomber force that could devastate Italy's enemies. H e bombarded his superiors and senior governmental officials for such an expansion program. Simultaneously, he castigated the Italian army for its ineptitude and unpreparedness. All this agitation managed only to get him court-martialed and thrown in prison for a year. In 1 9 1 7 , after Italy suffered staggering losses during the Battle of Caporetto, the Italian military released him from his cell and made him central director of aviation at the General Air Commisariat. H e continued to be an agitator and drove his superiors nuts widi his persistent demands and complete lack of a political filter. H e said what he felt, didn't care who took offense, and flamed out yet again. T h i s time, he resigned from the Italian A r m y and turned his attention to writing. In 1 9 2 1 , he published what would become the single most influential book on military airpower for the next thirty years. Seen through the lens of twenty-first-century warfare and the pains Western militaries take to m i n i m i z e civilian losses, Douhet's book is nothing short of an apocalyptic vision o f societal destruction through aerial bombardment.

A Panacea for G e n e r a t i o n a l Destruction

1 3

Billy M i t c h e l l in the c o c k p i t of a T h o m a s M o r s e Scout. M i t c h e l l w a s not ail exclusive a d v o c a t e of s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g . He w a s an a d v o c a t e of a i r p o w e r in g e n e r a l a n d its b a l a n c e d e m p l o y m e n t on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d A b r a s i v e , visionary, d e v o t e d to t h e c a u s e of an i n d e p e n d e n t air service w i t h v i s c e r a l d e v o t i o n , he w a s t h e army's u l t i m a t e rebel d u r i n g t h e 1920s. It c o s t h i m his career, but his t e a c h i n g a n d influence d e f i n e d t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s A r m y Air Corps for g e n e r a t i o n s to c o m e .

M i t c h e l l m a d e n a t i o n a l h e a d l i n e s w h e n he u n l e a s h e d an a s s a u l t on t h e navy's s a c r e d c o w : t h e b a t t l e s h i p . In a series of tests, he p r o v e d c o n c l u s i v e l y t h a t a i r c r a f t c o u l d sink any a r m o r e d vessel, b o t h w i t h d i r e c t hits as w e l l as near m i s s e s t h a t s h a t t e r e d hulls w i t h t h e i r h a m m e r - l i k e c o n c u s s i o n w a v e s . W h a t s e e m s obvious n o w w a s not to h i d e - b o u n d , t r a d i t i o n - i m p a i r e d elderly flag o f f i c e r s w h o d o m i n a t e d the upper e c h e l o n s of t h e navy d u r i n g t h e 1920s. They s p e n t m u c h of t h e d e c a d e t r y i n g t o m a r g i n a l i z e t h e tests.

22 C h a p t e r 1

The Navy invested millions of dollars into its lighter-than-air program during the 1920s and 1930s. For the most part, it was wasted effort. Rigid airships like the USS Shenandoah, Akron, and Macon had no place on the modern battlefield. The infrastructure to support these massive aerial giants survived their demise to be used in a variety of roles in the decades to come. Here, the massive rigid airship hangar at Moffett Field, California, became home to squadrons of anti-submarine blimps used by the navy to patrol the west coast. The hangar was so huge it developed its own weather systems. It is still in existence today.

Douhet believed that the next war w o u l d see armies stalemated in murderous trench fighting

once again. As men flung themselves into raining artillery shells and sweeping

machine gun fire, Douhet envisioned the ultimate victory would be the nation that devoted its resources toward the construction o f an offensive air force. W i t h the deadlock claiming thousands below, fleets of bombers w o u l d soar over the front to first secure c o m m a n d of the air. W i t h the enemy's air units destroyed through bombing of their airfields and production infrastructure, the victor could turn its attention to carpet-bombing cities, communication centers, and vital targets. Kill women, children, the factory workers who built the planes, tanks, a n d rifles used on the front lines, and the war would be won. Douhet's cold calculations even called for drenching already stricken cities with poison gas to kill its first responders and security forces as they sought to save trapped citizens and restore order. It was the ultimate vision of total warfare. N o longer w o u l d the rifle-armed soldier be in the crosshairs. For Douhet, the answer to W o r l d W a r I s gruesome toll was to traumatize a society so completely that its terrorized citizens would rise u p in revolution, sweep away their

When the navy's airship USS Shenandoah

government, a n d sue for peace. T h e airplane and the aerial bomb w o u l d be the delivery system

went down in 1925, Mitchell used the

for slaying national morale and resolve to continue the

fighting.

T h r o u g h the 1 9 2 0 s , Douhet's book gained traction slowly throughout Europe. In

event to publically excoriate his superiors in Washington, D.C. Such an assault could not go

France, while some air-minded officers became followers of Douhet, the French military

unpunished, and Mitchell was court-martialed.

establishment gradually let the L'Armee de L'Air waste away to a skeleton of its former 1 9 1 8

The trial ended his military career.

glory and instead devoted its budget to building the M a g i n o t Line. To the French Army, concrete seemed to be the answer to positional warfare. In Britain, however, the independent Royal Air Force h a d been searching for a u n i q u e role. Douhet's concepts gave the R A F a raison d'etre and dovetailed with thinking already developing in that service. H u g h " B o o m " Trenchard, the commander of the R A F , saw strategic bombing as the saving grace for his

A Panacea for G e n e r a t i o n a l Destruction

1 5

George Kenney, w h o w o u l d latter gain f a m e as the c o m m a n d e r of General Douglas M a c A r t h u r ' s Far Eastern Air Forces, had spent much of his career in the 1920s focused on tactical aviation. He innovated and developed a number of tactics and w e a p o n s to support such operations. Ironically, he w a s the officer w h o translated Douhet's seminal w o r k on strategic bombing, Command

of the Air into English and brought

it to an American audience.

b e l o v e d i n d e p e n d e n t b r a n c h o f the British m i l i t a r y a n d u s e d that c o n c e p t as a w a y to m a i n t a i n w h a t s l e n d e r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s were available to n a t i o n a l d e f e n s e t h r o u g h t h e 1 9 2 0 s . In the U n i t e d S t a t e s . G e n . W i l l i a m " B i l l y " M i t c h e l l d o m i n a t e d the n a s c e n t air service. M i t c h e l l w a s o n e of t h o s e officers w h o g e n e r a t e d e n o r m o u s p a s s i o n a r o u n d h t m . H i s d y n a m i c l e a d e r s h i p a n d vision a t t r a c t e d m a n y acolytes, i n c l u d i n g m e n like H e n r y " H a p " A r n o l d and Carl Spaatz. At the same time. Mitchell possessed a knack for alienating his superiors and the p o l i t i c a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l w i t h his b l u n t t a l k and w i l l i n g n e s s to s p e a k his m i n d . In t h a t respect, h e a n d D o u h e t were k i n d r e d spirits, a n d M i t c h e l l never b a c k e d a w a y f r o m a fight if it f u r t h e r e d the c a u s e o f m i l i t a r y a i r p o w e r in the U n i t e d S t a t e s .

16

Chapter 1

In 1 9 2 1 , M i t c h e l l took on the U.S. N a v y establishment and slaughtered that services

The early 1930s saw the United States Army

sacred cow: the battleship. In a series of tests, he proved that aircraft could sink what had

Air Corps receive some of its first modern and

been up to that point the foremost expression of military power projection. M i t c h e l l went

homegrown aircraft designs. The American

on to write a treatise on airpower doctrine that he called Notes on the Multi-Motored

aeronautical industry had made tremendous

Bombardment

Group Day and Night. In most respects, it was more sophisticated and down-to-earth than

gains after its rocky performance during

Douhet's g r a n d vision of the future. Douhet didn't sweat the details; Mitchell, who had

World War I. Here, a squadron of Martin

c o m m a n d e d a force of almost a thousand planes at the end of W o r l d W a r I, kept his ideas

B-10 bombers sit on a parking ramp at March

rooted in operational realities. As a result, his doctrine believed that firm cooperation between

Field in 1934. Fast and well-armed, the B-10

bomber a n d fighter groups w o u l d be the only way to defeat an enemy's air force. As a former

represented a huge technological leap for the

infantryman, he became the first of the airpower visionaries to integrate combined operations

United States and helped pave the way for the

between the two types of combat aircraft.

superb aircraft that would help win the war.

Unfortunately, before he could m o l d the U.S. Air Service in his image, his m o u t h earned him an E-ticket ride into retirement. In September 1 9 2 5 , the U.S. Navy's airship, continued on page 20

A Panacea for G e n e r a t i o n a l Destruction

1 7

IHE

NORDEN B O M B S I G H T

D E V E L O P E D BY T H E C A R L N O R D E N , a Dutch engineer

accuracy so much that it became one of the most sensitive items

and entrepreneur who cut his teeth in the aviation business at the

in its inventory, a closely guarded secret device that bombardiers

S p e r r y Corporation, the N o r d e n bombsight gained tremendous

were sworn to destroy should their planes go down in enemy

fame before and during W o r l d W a r II as one of the most accurate

territory. Ironically, a German spy who worked at S p e r r y stole

devices of its kind. Press reports claimed it could place a b o m b

the design data for the N o r d e n bombsight and passed it back

in a pickle barrel f r o m 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet. T h e Air C o r p s valued its

to the T h i r d Reich as early as 1 9 3 8 .

The nose of the Model 299. For this strategic bomber to reach its full potential, the aircraft had to be married with an ordnance delivery system that could effectively put bombs on target. This was easier said than done and required a technological revolution in bombsight design to achieve.

26 C h a p t e r 1

The Norden bombsight was that technological revolution. Essentially, it functioned as a primitive analog computer. The USAAC was so paranoid that it might fall into foreign hands that bombardiers had to swear they would destroy it if they were about to be shot down. Ironically, the Germans stole the design in the 1930s, so the whole secrecy operation had been compromised long before the Norden went into battle for the first time.

T h e secret behind the N o r d e n bombsight's accuracy was its ability to compute w i n d drift and g r o u n d speed. W o r k i n g in conjunction with an autopilot system, the bombardier actually controlled his aircraft's movements during the final approach to

A B-17 bombardier sits in his office. The USAAF's belief in the accuracy of

target through inputs to the autopilot via the Norden sight.

the Norden bombsight made the entire concept of daylight pinpoint bombing

T h e Air C o r p s believed that this gave its bombardment

possible. While in the field under combat conditions, the Norden sight did not

groups the final tool necessary to carry out long-range pinpoint

perform nearly as well as advertised, it was still one of the most accurate

bombing. W i t h such an accurate sight, no factory would be safe

devices of its day.

f r o m the bombs carried aloft by the new B - 1 7 Flying Fortresses. Civilian casualties could be minimized, and the accuracy w o u l d allow the Air C o r p s a measure o f economy of force Douhet's

In the few seconds it w o u l d take for the other bombardiers to

carpet bombing theories never would have allowed.

toggle their loads, the B - I 7 s would have traveled hundreds, if not

In practice, the N o r d e n sight did prove more accurate than most of its contemporaries, but a variety of factors still made

thousands of feet beyond the initial drop point, causing a w i d e pattern on the ground.

hitting a target from 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet extraordinarily difficult. A B - 1 7

Other factors limited accuracy as well. T h e bombs

on its b o m b run traveled at least 3 5 0 feet per second. In combat,

themselves were aerodynamically unpredictable. T h e weight of

the Eighth a n d Fifteenth Air Force groups learned early on that

the paint on the b o m b affected its fall. W h e n different paints

it was tactically impossible for every plane in the formation to

were used, the trajectories were affected as well. In the end,

aim and b o m b independently. T h a t h a d been tried during the

pinpoint bombing w o u l d have to wait until the advent of laser-

N o r t h African campaign, but it broke up formations and made

g u i d e d weaponry in the 1 9 7 0 s . T h e best the N o r d e n bombsight

the bombers vulnerable to Luftwaffe fighters. As a result, each

could d o during W o r l d W a r II was get half the bombs d r o p p e d

g r o u p dropped its bombs when the lead bombardier released.

within a quarter mile of the target area.

A Panacea for G e n e r a t i o n a l

Destruction

19

The Douglas B-18 Bolo served as the first

U S S Shenandoah, went down in a M i d w e s t storm, killing fourteen members of its crew. M i t c h e l l

conceived and purpose-built strategic

used the disaster to excoriate the defense establishments leadership, calling his superiors

bomber for the USAAC. It possessed many

"criminally negligent."

drawbacks, including a light payload and short radius of action.

M i t c h e l l s bomb-throwing in the press landed him in front of court-martial board, which ultimately found h i m guilty of "conduct prejudicial to g o o d order and discipline" despite the fact that many of his acolytes, A r n o l d and S p a a t z included, testified on his behalf. Sentenced to five years suspension f r o m active duty, M i t c h e l l instead resigned his commission, his career over. D u r i n g the final years of his life, he grew increasingly shrill with his attacks on the army and his agitation for an independent air force along the British lines. M i t c h e l l m a y have flamed out just like Douhet, but his ideas h a d taken root. H i s devotees proved m u c h more patient and politically adept. In the years that followed, they worked within the system to see much of Mitchell's vision actually get implemented. In 1 9 3 3 , George Kenney, who h a d been one of the few American advocates of lowlevel tactical bombing, translated Douhet's Command

20

Chapter 1

of the Air into English. T h e book spread

A YB-17 Flying Fortress over the Cascade Mountains. Though the B-17 program initially lost out to the cheaper B-18, the USAAC saw so much potential in the design that funds were made available to continue developing it.

through the Air C o r p s like a wildfire. A t the Tactical School, which had been established in 1 9 3 1 at M a x w e l l Field, Alabama, Douhet's theories soon f o r m e d the core o f the syllabus taught to an entire generation of aviators. Lieutenant Colonel Don W i l s o n , the curriculum director at Maxwell, added his own twist that became the signature of American strategic bombing doctrine in the years to come. W i l s o n read Douhet and found his total disregard for civilian life to be appalling. W h y was it necessary to replace the slaughter in the trenches with mass slaughter in the streets of an enemy's cities? Instead, W i l s o n advocated focusing bombing attacks on vital targets. Instead of raining bombs down on urban centers, the Tactical School taught the focused application of bombing against key industrial targets. Along the way, Mitchell's belief that combined fighter and bomber operations lost favor. T h e strategic bomber became the be-all and end-all to die U.S. A r m y Air Corps's mission for the next war. From that was born the concept of pinpoint bombing, carried out by multi-engined, long-range aircraft that possessed enough defensive firepower to defeat any enemy interceptors

A B-10 during a flight to Alaska in 1934.

launched at them. T h r o u g h the 1 9 3 0 s , the A r m y Air C o r p s strived to develop the tools needed for such a mission. T h e two critical c o m p o n e n t s — a n aircraft with the capability to undertake the mission and a b o m b sight that could deliver ordnance on target a c c u r a t e l y — came together in the late 1 9 3 0 s with the arrival of the Boeing B - 1 7 Flying Fortress and the N o r d e n Bombsight. T h e s e two remarkable innovations placed the U n i t e d States on the leading edge of long-range bombing technology just as the war in Europe broke out in 1 9 3 9 . Finally, the airpower advocates had the tools to see their vision realized.

A Panacea for Generational

Destruction

21

In Poland, t h e J u - 8 7 Stuka d i v e - b o m b e r earned a f e a r s o m e r e p u t a t i o n w i t h i n t h e Polish rank a n d file. Deadly a c c u r a t e in its dive, the Stuka c r e w s a f f i x e d sirens to t h e i r a i r c r a f t a n d t h e y w o u l d shriek d o w n o u t of the sky t o d e l i v e r t h e i r b o m b s oil Polish t r o o p a n d v e h i c l e convoys. Such a t t a c k s h e l p e d break t h e spirit of Poland's d e f e n d e r s

1 THEORY INTO PRACTICE ^ ^

I was theßrst correspondent

*

to reach Guernica, and was immediately pressed into service by some Basque

soldiers

collecting charred bodies that the fiames had passed over. Some of the soldiers were sobbing like children. There were ßames

and smoke and grit, and the smell of burning human ßesh was nauseating. Houses were collapsing

into

the inferno. —Noel Monks, London Daily Express, 193 7

THE

BOMBERS

THUNDERED

OVERHEAD

sometime after lunch on an April day in 1 9 3 7 . C u r i o u s Basque citizens turned their faces skyward to see orderly formations of shepherded

twin-engine aircraft paraded

along

by

an

equal

number

of

overhead, fighters.

Curiosity turned to terror when the bombs began to fall. Panic stricken, the men, women, a n d children of Guernica fled the streets for the sanctuary of cellars a n d stoutwalled buildings. Messerschmitt B f - 1 0 9 s and Fiat C R - 3 2 s swept down on the town to strafe those w h o attempted to fly the town and gain refuge in the countryside beyond. It was cold-

One of the first fast twin-engine bombers produced by a resurgent Germany in the 1930s

blooded murder, and it lasted for almost four hours. W h e n

was the Junkers Ju-86. Such aircraft helped destroy Guernica during the Luftwaffe's

the German and Italian planes finally turned for home,

terror bombing experiment in the Spanish Civil War.

Guernica burned virtually to the last building. In the ashes lay the corpses of 1 , 6 5 0 civilians.

23

W o l f r a m v o n R i c h t h o f e n , seen here on t h e Eastern Front d u r i n g W o r l d W a r II, c o n c e i v e d and e x e c u t e d t h e terror raid on Guernica a n d w a s q u i t e p l e a s e d w i t h t h e s u b s e q u e n t results.

Following the experiment at Guernica, the beautiful city of Barcelona became the next terror bombing test case. Hundreds more civilians died as Italian aircraft pummeled the city with bombs. These two attacks helped convinced the Luftwaffe's leadership that Douhet's theories had merit. They set the stage for Warsaw, Rotterdam, and the London Blitz. N o e l M o n k s , a daring war correspondent w h o w o u l d later spend time in France with the R A F during the P h o n y W a r and beyond, later wrote in his memoir, Eyewitness,

"A sight

that haunted me for weeks was the charred bodies of several women and children huddled together in what h a d been the cellar of a house." T h e Germans a n d their Nationalist Spanish allies denied any involvement in the attack. It was not until 1 9 9 9 that the German government formerly acknowledged the L u f t w a f f e s role and apologized for what took place there that day in 1 9 3 7 . In the midst of the Spanish Civil War, the Luftwaffe s leadership had decided to test Guilio Douhet's nihilistic vision of terror bombing. T h e people of Guernica d i d not know it, but they had been selected as the guinea pigs for this doctrinal experiment. Families died, children burned alive as flames consumed their homes, a n d in a secret report, C o n d o r Legion commander W o l f r a m von Richthofen declared the attack to be a tremendous success.The will of the survivors in Guernica had been broken.

24

Chapter 1

A d o l f Hitler o f f e r s a w a r m g r e e t i n g to R e i c h s m a r s c h a l H e r m a n n Goering, c o m m a n d e r of t h e n e w L u f t w a f f e . The G e r m a n air force's p e r f o r m a n c e in Poland a n d t h e Battle of France s e n t Goering's p o l i t i c a l influence soaring. Only a f t e r t h e B a t t l e of Britain did his s t a n d i n g e r o d e in his Fuehrer's eyes.

G e r m a n t r o o p s fight their w a y into a Polish v i l l a g e d u r i n g t h e i n i t i a l invasion in S e p t e m b e r 1939. The Poles f o u g h t v a l i a n t l y , b u t t h e y w e r e overmatched against the more modern Nazi w a r m a c h i n e . The L u f t w a f f e ' s t a c t i c a l air s u p p o r t , c o m b i n e d w i t h its terror b o m b i n g of W a r s a w , p l a y e d a key role in t h e Polish d e f e a t .

Tlieori Into Practice

2 5

G e r m a n officers in a field h e a d q u a r t e r s c o o r d i n a t e a n d s e t t h e t e m p o of t h e b a t t l e f l o w in Poland. C o o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f o r w a r d units and t h e L u f t w a f f e p r o v e d t o be very d i f f i c u l t , but also of t r e m e n d o u s v a l u e in c r u s h i n g o p p o s i t i o n w i t h m i n i m a l losses in return.

Polish t r o o p s f o u g h t fiercely a n d inflicted heavy losses at t i m e s on t h e G e r m a n W e h r m a c h t . But w h e n t h e Soviets i n v a d e d Eastern Poland, t h e soldiers lost all h o p e Crushed on both flanks, the Poles s u r r e n d e r e d W a r s a w , a n d t h e w a r e n d e d a f e w days later.

34 C h a p t e r 1

The Junkers Ju-88, the fastest twin-engine bomber then in service, saw extensive combat over Poland, France, and the Low Countries. Used both as a level bomber and a diveThe Stuka's fixed gear, slow speed, and lack of armament became manifestly obvious as soon as its crews

bomber, the Ju-88 later found another niche as

faced a determined and modern air force. Against the Poles, French, Belgians, Dutch, Danes, and Norwegians,

a night fighter. It became the mainstay of the Luftwaffe's nocturnal interceptor force along

however, the Ju-87 served up stark terror to its targets.

with the Messerschmitt Bf-110. Two years later, A d o l f Hitler's W e h r m a c h t invaded Poland, a move that triggered France and Britain to declare war on Germany. For the second time in twenty years, Europe descended into the nightmare of another general war. T h o u g h the Luftwaffe h a d developed mainly into a close support force, W o l f r a m von R i e t h o f e n s Douhetesque experiment at Guernica was taken to heart. From the outset of the fighting, the Luftwaffe conducted terror raids against the Polish capital. Civilians were strafed by passing fighters. H e i n k e l H e - I I I s and Dornier D o - 1 7 s p u m m e l e d W a r s a w daily with bombs. O n September 10, 1 9 3 9 , they flew seventeen raids against the city and caused so m u c h havoc the residents referred to that day as "Bloody S u n d a y " afterwards. T h e Germans ignored m a n y choice military targets, such as Polish A r m y barracks and army facilities around the capital, choosing instead to stick with Douhet s playbook. Defended by a hundred diousand desperate and courageous Polish soldiers, Warsaw held out for over a week in the face of overwhelming German forces. As the siege progressed, the Poles even managed to counterattack and push the Wehrmacht back in places. Hitler turned to the Luftwaffe to break the siege. Von Richthofen wanted to burn the capital to the ground, making it fit only as a "customs station" in the future. Terror would bring die Poles to their knees. continued on page 35

Right: A close-up of a Messerschmitt Bf-109's nose. The 109 possessed an excellent rate of climb and a slight speed advantage over its most capable adversaries, including the French D.520 and British Spitfire. Its extremely short endurance made it an impractical escort fighter.

Tlieori

Into Practice

2 7

J u - 8 7 S t u k a c r e w s study m a p s in t h e final m i n u t e s b e f o r e a m i s s i o n a g a i n s t t a r g e t s in N o r w a y . A i r p o w e r p l a y e d a vital role in Nazi Germany's s u c c e s s f u l c a m p a i g n in S c a n d i n a v i a .

28

Chapter 1

The w r e c k e d r e m a i n s of Polish b o m b e r s , seen in the a f t e r m a t h of t h e first c a m p a i g n of W o r l d W a r II,

The G e r m a n A r m y , t h o u g h largely c o m p o s e d of i n f a n t r y d e p e n d e n t on h o r s e - d r a w n t r a n s p o r t , did possess a t h o r o u g h l y m o d e r n a r m o r e d force. Used en m a s s e at w e a k points a l o n g e n e m y d e f e n s i v e lines, t h e panzers a c h i e v e d n u m e r o u s critical b r e a k t h r o u g h s d u r i n g t h e c a m p a i g n s of 1939 a n d 1940. W i t h o u t the panzer m e n a c e , it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h e terror b o m b i n g u n l e a s h e d on Poland a n d H o l l a n d w o u l d n o t have had the e f f e c t t h a t it did.

T l i e o r i Into Practice

2 9

A p a i n t i n g of a G e r m a n b o m b e r pilot. T h a n k s to t h e i r c o m b a t t o u r s in Spain d u r i n g the Civil W a r , L u f t w a f f e air c r e w s w e r e a m o n g t h e m o s t e x p e r i e n c e d a n d w e l l - t r a i n e d in the w o r l d in 1940.

G e r m a n t r o o p s react to i n c o m i n g a r t i l l e r y fire. In t h e 1939 a n d 1940 c a m p a i g n s , t h e W e h r m a c h t d e f e a t e d its o p p o n e n t s t h r o u g h superior o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d b e t t e r i n t e g r a t i o n of a i r p o w e r into t h e land war. W i t h o u t t h e L u f t w a f f e , t h e s e early v i c t o r i e s w o u l d not have b e e n possible

Chapter 1

A f o r m a t i o n of Bristol B l e n h e i m RAF b o m b e r s . The B l e n h e i m w a s one of t h e m o s t n u m e r o u s t w i n - e n g i n e strike c r a f t in t h e British arsena at t h e start of the war. Early a t t a c k s on G e r m a n naval bases in broad d a y l i g h t r e s u l t e d in heavy B l e n h e i m losses a n d h e l p e d c o n v i n c e t h e BAF high c o m m a n d to s w i t c h t o n i g h t b o m b i n g .

To c o n q u e r H o l l a n d , t h e G e r m a n s used d a r i n g tactical operations that gained strategic results. This i n c l u d e d t h e a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t on Fort Eben-Emael, a key d e f e n s i v e c o m p l e x t h a t could have held up the m a i n G e r m a n invasion f o r c e for m a n y days. Instead, f e w e r t h a n a hundred German paratroopers—including the ones seen h e r e — l a n d e d a t o p the f o r t and c a p t u r e d it in a surprise c o u p de m a i n . Such an o p e r a t i o n w o u l d never have been p o s s i b l e had not t h e L u f t w a f f e o w n e d the skies over H o l l a n d f r o m the o u t s e t of the 1940 c a m p a i g n

T l i e o r i Into Practice

31

THE F R E N C H AIR FGRCE IN W O R L D W A R l l i T G D LITTLE, TOG LATE

France attempted to nationalize its aircraft industry in the m i d - 1 9 3 0 s . T h e results were absolutely disastrous and played a major role in the nations humiliating defeat in 1 9 4 0 . After the industry was nationalized, production plummeted, work on new designs languished, and innovation, once a hallmark of French aviation, atrophied. In 1 9 3 9 , the situation was so desperate that the country that a r m e d the U n i t e d States' fledgling air service in 1917—1918 h a d to look across the Atlantic for help. T h e L'Armee de L'Air purchased hundreds of American-built aircraft, including Curtiss H a w k 7 5 A

fighters.

T h i s stopgap effort proved to be too little, too late. W h e n the Germans invaded in 1 9 4 0 , the French Air Force was still a shadow of its former world-leading self. It lacked a

first-rate,

modern fighter that could stand against the B f - I 0 9 . M o s t of its bomber force flew ancient or outdated aircraft. T h e A m i o t 1 4 3 , designed for both bombing a n d reconnaissance, was slow, ugly, and vulnerable. T h e m e d i u m bombers were easy meat for hunting B f - I 0 9 s and Bf-IIOs. T h e most modern bomber available to the French in 1 9 4 0 was the L e O 4 5 1 . Fast with clean lines and heavy defensive armament for its time, the L e O 4 5 1 could have been a major offensive addition to the Allied arsenal if it had been deployed in greater numbers. Instead, the French went to war with a largely antiquated fleet of bombers. T h e Dewoitine D.520, a newly designed fighter, saw service in very small numbers during the Battle of France. T h o u g h a great leap forward over the M o r a n e 4 0 6 and Bloch M B - 1 5 2 fighters then in front line service, the D . 5 2 0 actually

American Curtiss Hawk 75A fighters purchased by the French Air Force in a

ended u p serving the Axis powers m u c h longer than it d i d the

last-minute effort to modernize their outdated and underpopulated arsenal.

Allies. T h e Germans used it as a trainer; the Vichy French ended u p fielding several squadrons of them, and others f o u n d their way into the hands of some of the lesser Axis nations as point defense interceptors. T h e French airpower disaster remains one of the most complete defeats in aviation history. T h o u g h its brave fighter pilots d i d take a steady toll on the Luftwaffe, the L'Armee de L'Air suffered a complete strategic defeat at the hands o f a tactically focused air force.

32

Chapter 1

The Liore et Olivier LeO 451 w a s a r e l a t i v e l y m o d e r n b o m b e r design, b u t p r o d u c t i o n delays m i n i m i z e d its i m p a c t on t h e w a r .

The D e w o i t i n e D.520, a l t h o u g h s l o w e r t h a n t h e G e r m a n Bf-109, w a s more m a n e u v e r a b l e , if s o m e w h a t erratic t o c o n t r o l . A s w i t h t h e LeO 451, p r o d u c t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s l i m i t e d its n u m b e r s .

W i t h d e s i g n roots s t r e t c h i n g back to t h e late 1920s, t h e u n g a i n l y A m i o t 143 w a s far o u t c l a s s e d by t h e G e r m a n a i r c r a f t it h a d to go up a g a i n s t .

Tlieori Into

Practice

33

By c o n c e n t r a t i n g its panzer d i v i s i o n s in the lightly g u a r d e d A r d e n n e s sector of t h e W e s t e r n Front, t h e G e r m a n s w e r e a b l e t o r u p t u r e t h e A l l i e d lines a n d cut m u c h of t h e A n g l o - F r e n c h A r m y off in Belgium. This f o r c e d t h e A l l i e s to w i t h d r a w over t h r e e h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d men f r o m t h e c o n t i n e n t at Dunkirk. T h a t d i s a s t e r p r e s a g e d t h e c o m p l e t e c o l l a p s e of France a n d its surrender a f t e r f o r t y days of f i g h t i n g .

A t r u e m u l t i n a t i o n a l e f f o r t . A m e r i c a n - b u i l t , F r e n c h - f l o w n H a w k 75 f i g h t e r s e s c o r t a f o r m a t i o n of BAF Fairey B a t t l e light a t t a c k b o m b e r s . The Fairey B a t t l e s q u a d r o n s in France w e r e v i r t u a l l y w i p e d o u t in t h e f i g h t i n g f o l l o w i n g t h e G e r m a n invasion of t h e W e s t in M a y 1940.

34

Chapter 1

O n September 2 5 , 1 9 3 9 , the Luftwaffe launched over a thousand bomber sorties against

German citizens look over the wreckage of

Warsaw. Five hundred tons of explosives and incendiaries leveled entire blocks. Hospitals,

two Allied bombers shot down during the 1940

schools, waterworks, and once-quiet neighborhood streets grew choked with rubble and dying

campaign. In the background are the skeletal

civilians.The situation became intolerable. T h e next day, the Poles explored surrender options

remains of a Vickers Wellington, the mainstay

rather than let the slaughter of its people in W a r s a w continue.

of Bomber Command's long-range squadrons in

T h e following spring, when the Germans invaded Norway, the Low Countries, and

1940. In the foreground are the twisted pieces

France, the Luftwaffe employed terror bombing once again, this time to break the will of

of a French Amiot 143, one of the ugliest and

the Dutch to carry on fighting by flattening the last major industrial city not under German

most vulnerable bombers deployed in any

control. T h e D u t c h troops defending the city were given an u l t i m a t u m to surrender or face

number during World War II. These same

aerial destruction. Just as the g r o u n d force c o m m a n d e r accepted the ultimatum, the German

curious citizens would experience the full

bombers arrived. S o m e received a hastily sent abort order, but most did not, and downtown

horrors of terror bombing in the years to come.

Rotterdam crumbled to burnt ruins under a rain of bombs. continued on page 41

Tlieori

Into Practice

3 5

G e r m a n t r o o p s at Narvik hunker d o w n in t h e s n o w d u r i n g a British air a t t a c k . The N o r w a y c a m p a i g n w a s a n y t h i n g but an easy one for t h e Third Reich. S t r e t c h e d t o t h e l i m i t of its l o g i s t i c a l c a p a c i t y t o pull the invasion off, t h e g r o u n d f o r c e s u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d e d on t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s c o n t r o l of t h e air for close s u p p o r t a n d resupply m i s s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r t h e G e r m a n N a v y w a s so badly m a u l e d in t h e initial invasion

The first m a j o r s t r a t e g i c a i r l i f t of t h e w a r c a m e in s u p p o r t of t h e N o r w a y o p e r a t i o n The L u f t w a f f e , using d u n k e r s 52 t r a n s p o r t s ike the ones seen here, seized airfields w i t h oads of troops, t h e n b r o u g h t in s u p p l i e s to keep t h e m e n w e l l p r o v i s i o n e d w i t h f o o d a n d a m m u n i t i o n . It w a s an e x a m p l e of t h e s t r a t e g i c flexibility airpower offered whoever controlled t h e skies.

36

Chapter 1

A J u - 5 2 t o w s a glider, m u c h like t h e ones used to seize Fort Eben-Emael in B e l g i u m d u r i n g t h e a s s a u l t on t h e L o w Countries.

The G e r m a n panzer divisions p o u r e d o u t of the A r d e n n e s a n d c a p t u r e d t h e s t r a t e g i c a l l y v i t a l t o w n of S e d a n on t h e i r w a y to t h e C h a n n e l Coast. It w a s a s i g n i f i c a n t m o m e n t , as t h e French had b e e n d e f e a t e d here in 1871 d u r i n g t h e Franco-Prussian W a r , and t h e m e m o r y of t h a t d i s a s t e r l i n g e r e d in t h e French c o n s c i o u s n e s s . Seeing S e d a n fall a g a i n c a m e as a b l o w to n a t i o n a l m o r a l e .

H a u p t m a n n Hozzel, a w e l l - d e c o r a t e d Stuka leader, poses for t h e c a m e r a in N o r w a y . W i t h the s t r a t e g i c seizure of airfields, t h e L u f t w a f f e w a s a b l e to f o r w a r d d e p l o y close s u p p o r t units t h a t h e l p e d d e f e a t t h e A l l i e d f o r c e s in t h e Narvik area.

Tlieori Into Practice

37

The a f t e r m a t h of t h e f i g h t i n g a r o u n d Dunkirk. A British a n t i - t a n k unit has been w i p e d o u t by roving panzers.

The Potez 63.11 m u l t i - r o l e a i r c r a f t c a m e in r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , light a t t a c k , n i g h t fighter, a n d heavy f i g h t e r variants. H a m p e r e d by i n e f f e c t u a l e n g i n e s t h a t lacked p o w e r , t h e Potez series w a s a n o t h e r f a i l e d French design. M o s t w e r e d e s t r o y e d in 1940, but e n o u g h survived to e g u i p several Vichy s g u a d r o n s in N o r t h A f r i c a , w h e r e t h e y w e r e e n c o u n t e r e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s d u r i n g t h e Torch c a m p a i g n In 1942.

38

Chapter 1

The G e r m a n s m a r c h under the Arc de T r i o m p h e in d u n e 1940. W i t h Paris in t h e Third Reich's hands, the French c a u s e u n r a v e l e d , a n d its g o v e r n m e n t sued for peace. It w a s the l o w e s t p o i n t in France's long a n d storied m i l i t a r y history.

G e r m a n pilots c o n f e r over a m a p prior to a n o t h e r m i s s i o n in t h e W e s t . A f t e r t h e f a l l of France, Britain fell s q u a r e l y in t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s crosshairs, s e t t i n g t h e s t a g e for t h e first pure air c a m p a i g n in history.

Tlieori Into Practice

3 9

Dutch Fokker DXXI f i x e d - g e a r e d f i g h t e r s in f o r m a t i o n . Light a n d agile, t h e s e w e l l - b u i l t f i g h t e r s lacked t h e s p e e d of t h e Bf-109 a n d c o u l d n o t hold its o w n a g a i n s t t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s m o r e m o d e r n d e s i g n e d . H o w e v e r , s o m e of t h e m d i d see service w i t h t h e Finnish Air Force in t h e 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 0 W i n t e r W a r a n d t o o k a heavy t o l l of Soviet Red Air Force aircraft. Over H o l l a n d the f o l l o w i n g spring, h o w e v e r , t h e Fokker s q u a d r o n s c o u l d n o t hope to r e t a i n c o m m a n d of the air a g a i n s t t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s s u p e r i o r n u m b e r s a n d m o r e a d v a n c e d fighters.

48

Chapter 1

A few days later, the Germans threatened to the b o m b Utrecht if the Dutch government did not surrender. W i t h o u t an air force left to defend its skies f r o m such an onslaught, the Netherlands accepted defeat and fell beneath the N a z i jackboot. Terror bombing succeeded once again. Against France, the Luftwaffe unleashed a concerted attack against the L'Armee de L ' A i r s infrastructure. Waves of Dorniers, Heinkels, and Junkers bombers unleashed their full f u r y u p o n the French airfields and air depots. T h e French, whose aviation production system h a d all but collapsed at the end of the 1 9 3 0 s when the Socialists nationalized the aircraft companies, fought valiantly with obsolete equipment that the Germans simply shot out of the sky. T h e French managed to take a heavy toll of the attacking Luftwaffe planes, but simply did not have the numbers or the quality to stand and fight for long. W i t h i n days, the Germans h a d secured Douhet s H o l y Grail: c o m m a n d of the air. T h e British A r m y evacuated the Continent at D u n k i r k , a n d the French d i d not stand a chance. After forty days of

fighting,

they surrendered to H i t l e r in the same railroad car that ended W o r l d W a r I. Britain now stood alone.

The French airpower disaster remains one of the most complete defeats in aviation history. Though its brave fighter pilots did take a steady toll on the Luftwaffe, the L'Armee de L'Air suffered a complete strategic defeat at the hands of a tactically focused air force.

Tlieori Into Practice

41

A H u r r i c a n e HC w i t h 2 0 m m c a n n o n . The Hurricane's robust s t r e n g t h a n d r e l a t i v e ease of c o n s t r u c t i o n m a d e it i n d i s p e n s a b l e d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e of Britain.

3 THE SUMMER DF THE FEW ^ ^

*

Once coming back from the gates with some fresh water to drink and to steep the handkerchiefs which we had tied across our faces against the colossal heat, I saw our hoses disappearing

into the smoke and fiame where we were

working. I suddenly felt cut o f f and alone. I thought, "How bloody hopeless—all —Firefighter

London's alight."

Louis Abbot Wilson

Up on the topßoor

of the gynecological

ward, we had f f teen women

couldn't move. They stayed in their beds through it all without

we

complaint,

although a bomb smashed the staff quarters next door, covering them with glass from

their windows

and plaster from

we had to leave another dozen fracture

the ceiling. In another

wing,

cases. All night long, they lay on

their backs, unable to move, hung up on their frames

and watched the

Jerry planes cruising about the fire lit sky through a huge hole that had been blown out of the wall. The e f f e c t was —Dr. Harry Winter,

JULY

stupefying.

Coventry

10, 1 9 4 0 . T h e Luftwaffe bombers f o r m e d u p

over Pas de Calais, twenty-six strong f r o m the crack Kampfgeschwader KG-2. T h e

crews manning

KG-2's

D o r n i e r D o - I 7 Z "Flying Pencils" first cut their teeth

Dornier Do-17 "Flying Pencils" equipped much of the Luftwaffe's bomber force in the summer of 1940. During the Spanish Civil War, the Dornier was faster than most of the

in combat over Poland the previous fall. S o m e had even

Republican interceptors trying to shoot it down. That experience seemed to vindicate

flown

the Dornier's design philosophy, which sacrificed armament and armor for speed. Over

missions

with

the

Condor

Legion.

Seasoned,

capable veterans, they arrayed themselves into tight V s and

England, the Do-17 crews faced first-line fighters like the Hurricane and Spitfire for the

sped across the Channel, bound for a convoy an earlier

first time. Unable to run away from interception, their lack of heavy defensive weaponry

reconnaissance mission discovered churning through the

became a significant weakness that led to a lot of casualties.

43

The Luftwaffe deployed three twin-engined tactical bombers during the Battle of Britain, including the Do-17, the Heinkel He-111, and the Junkers Ju-88. The Dornier Do-17 was the workhorse, but its design weaknesses led it to be phased out of front-line service over the next two years. Different variants did function as night interceptors, including the Do-217, but the Battle of Britain was the Dorniers operational peak in its originally intended role.

waters o f the T h a m e s Estuary. En route, they linked u p with no fewer than five squadrons of escorting B f - 1 1 0 a n d B f - I 0 9 f i g h t e r s . T h e y w o u l d be the shield, guarding the Dorniers from any R A F interceptors that rose to challenge them. British radar stations detected the inbound raid. Already, six H u r r i c a n e fighters patrolled over the convoy, but clearly they would not be enough to handle the size of the attacking force. T h e radar sites reported this development u p the chain of c o m m a n d . Eleven Group scrambled seven Hurricanes f r o m B Flight, 5 6 Squadron. T h i s was the legendary element led by ace J i m m y M c C u d d e n , who fought an epic battle with forty-eight-kill W e r n e r Voss in 1 9 1 7 . Now, a new generation of British pilots would swarm into battle with the legacy of their squadrons elite heritage riding their shoulders. A t nearby M a n s t o n , a flight of Spitfires from 7 4 " T i g e r " Squadron stood on the runway, cocked and locked, waiting for the order to scramble. In minutes, they too took to the skies and sped for the T h a m e s Estuary.

44

Chapter 1

In 1940, Fighter C o m m a n d i n c l u d e d a n u m b e r of i n t e r n a t i o n a l s q u a d r o n s . Pilots w h o s e n a t i o n s had been o v e r r u n by t h e G e r m a n s m a d e t h e i r w a y t o England t o c o n t i n u e t h e fight. In c o m b a t , t h e y d i s p l a y e d t e n a c i o u s resolve as t h e y s o u g h t v e n g e a n c e a g a i n s t t h o s e w h o c o n q u e r e d t h e i r h o m e l a n d s . Here, Belgian pilots in t h e RAF cluster a r o u n d a Hurricane's cockpit.

The M e s s e r s c h m i t t B f - 1 1 0 Z e s t r o y e r j o i n e d t h e L u f t w a f f e as its first heavy fighter. D e s i g n e d to be a f a s t , p o w e r f u l l y a r m e d s t a b l e m a t e of t h e Bf-109, t h e 110 lacked t h e m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y to e f f e c t i v e l y d e f e a t f r o n t line f i g h t e r s like the Spitfire or Hurricane. D u r i n g t h e 1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 0 c a m p a i g n , t h e lack of q u a l i t y o p p o s i t i o n m a s k e d its w e a k n e s s e s in air c o m b a t . Over England, Fighter C o m m a n d f e a s t e d on the 110 g e s c h w a d e r s a n d inflicted sharp losses on t h e m . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e Bf-110 w a s t h e only L u f t w a f f e f i g h t e r c a p a b l e of long-range escort m i s s i o n s , a n d it r e m a i n e d in t h e f o r e f r o n t of t h e fight t h r o u g h o u t t h e B a t t l e of Britain.

T h e S u m m e r o f t l i e F e w 53

The H a w k e r Hurricane f o r m e d t h e b a c k b o n e of RAF Fighter C o m m a n d . The first British f i g h t e r c a p a b l e of reaching s p e e d s over 300 m i l e s per hour, t h e H u r r i c a n e e n t e r e d service in t h e late 1930s as t h e RAF's first m o n o p l a n e fighter. A r m e d w i t h e i g h t ,303-caliber m a c h i n e g u n s , f o u r in each w i n g , the British o r i g i n a l l y b e l i e v e d it w a s q u i t e heavily armed. Combat against German bombers c o n v i n c e d Fighter C o m m a n d t h a t t h e ,303s lacked the punch n e e d e d to bring such a i r c r a f t d o w n . Later v e r s i o n s of t h e Hurricane c a m e e q u i p p e d w i t h four 2 0 m m c a n n o n s as a result.

C o n c e n t r a t e d f i r e p o w e r w a s the Bf-110's g r e a t e s t asset. Four 7 . 9 m m m a c h i n e guns a n d t w o 2 0 m m c a n n o n s filled t h e aircraft's nose, m a k i n g it one of t h e m o s t heavily a r m e d f i g h t e r s in a c t i o n in 1940, Despite t h i s a d v a n t a g e , its lack of m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y o f t e n m a d e t h e 110 a liability in t h e skies over England. Eventually, it w o u l d find its niche as a night fighter a n d w o u l d e q u i p m o s t of the nachtjaeger geschwarders tasked w i t h d e f e n d i n g t h e Reich f r o m RAF b o m b e r s .

A t C r o y d o n , o n l y a f e w m i l e s f r o m D o v e r , all available H u r r i c a n e s f r o m I T I

Squadron

launched w i t h i n m i n u t e s o f receiving news o f the i n c o m i n g strike. I heir nine fighters

took

station in a long, shallow V T h e y w o u l d e m p l o y a particularly terrifying tactic o n this day to b r i n g d o w n the LuftwafFe's bombers. O v e r the convov. I I I S q u a d r o n s p o t t e d the o n r u s h i n g F l y i n g Pencils. T h e

Hurricane

p i l o t s r o l l e d i n t o t h e a t t a c k : n i n e a g a i n s t t w e n t y - s i x in a f u r i o u s h e a d - o n p a s s w i t h a c l o s u r e r a t e of over five h u n d r e d m i l e s an h o u r . T h e C r o v d o n b o y s w e r e o n l y o n e of t w o o u t f i t s to p r a c t i c e t h i s s o r t o f d a r i n g m a n e u v e r i n 1 1 G r o u p . It r e q u i r e d s t e e l n e r v e s a n d reflexes to pull off successfully.

Chapter 3

cat-quick

A Luftwaffe bomber c r e w jokes around d u r i n g a final p r e - f l i g h t m o m e n t d u r i n g t h e Battle of Britain.

A t t h e o u t s e t of t h e B a t t l e of Britain, m u c h of t h e air c o m b a t took place over t h e English Channel. The L u f t w a f f e f i g h t e r a n d b o m b e r c r e w s w e r e a m p l y s u p p l i e d w i t h surviva gear, and air-sea rescue float p l a n e s a n d flying b o a t s w e r e d e p l o y e d t o the French a n d Belgian coasts to pick up c r e w s w h o f o r c e - l a n d e d in t h e Channel. Ironically, the Germans w e r e better prepared than the British on t h a t f r o n t , a n d it w o u l d t a k e several w e e k s a n d s u p r e m e e f f o r t for t h e British t o organize an e f f e c t i v e w a y t o recover pi lots w h o e n d e d up in t h e w a t e r .

The S u m m e r o f tlie Few

4 7

The Defiant represented serious error in tactical design judgment within the RAF during the mid-1930s. Conceived as a two-seat fighter that allowed the pilot to focus on flying and the gunner to focus on shooting, the Defiant carried only four .303 Browning machine guns in the turret. Without any forwardfiring armament, and the weight of the turret

The Defiant later saw service as one of the first RAF night fighters, using their turret guns to fire upward into

inhibiting speed and maneuverability, the

Luftwaffe bombers from below. Lacking a radar system, it was at best a stopgap, and the aircraft was later

Defiant squadrons quickly discovered they

relegated to target towing duties after other, more effective night fighters like the Bristol Beaufighter arrived

stood virtually no chance against the Bf-109.

in strength.

T h e two formations merged, the Hurricanes' seventy-two .303-caliber machine guns spewing tracers into KG-2's Dorniers. T h e steady veteran pilots behind the controls of the German bombers reeled at the attack. T h e i r orderly V s disintegrated as they d o d g e d and weaved the incoming fire. T h e British timed their attack perfectly; the Germans had been on the final stages of the bomb run. As they scattered to avoid the Hurricanes, their payloads fell all over the estuary. O f the 1 5 0 bombs dropped, only one scored a hit on the convoy. T h e daring head-on pass of 1 1 1 Squadron had just saved scores o f sailors' lives. In seconds, their H u r r i c a n e s flashed past, going flat-out below or above the bomber formation. O n e R A F pilot, Flight Officer T. P. K. Higgs, misjudged his r u n — a n easy thing to d o with such a pass. H i s H u r r i c a n e careened into the lead D o - 1 7 . Both planes exploded, their remains streaming for the estuary below. Miraculously, the Luftwaffe's Staffel leader, H a u p t m a n n Walter Krieger and one other crewman survived the fall into the water. T h e y were fished out by the British and taken prisoner. H i g g s died in the collision. T h e remaining eight H u r r i c a n e s swung around to make another pass. A t the same time, the German fighter escort sped to the rescue, caught one of the I I I S q u a d r o n pilots, Flight Officer H e n r y Ferris, as he shot down a B f - 1 0 9 . T h r e e more Messerschmitts latched onto his tail, their machine guns chewing through his aileron control. H e dove for home a n d raced the 1 0 9 s back to Croydon in what became a twenty-mile chase. Undeterred, Ferris managed

48

Chapter 1

The B l o h m & Voss Bv-142 w a s one of t h e f e w f o u r - e n g i n e b o m b e r d e s i g n s t h e G e r m a n s t i n k e r e d w i t h d u r i n g t h e p r e w a r a n d w a r t i m e era. G o e r i n g w a s an o p p o n e n t of f o u r - e n g i n e a i r c r a f t , and the idea of a s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r never really t o o k hold inside t h e L u f t w a f f e . The lack of such a w e a p o n has o f t e n b e e n used as a reason

A d u - 8 8 in flight. RAF pilots f o u n d t h e J u - 8 8 t o

for the G e r m a n f a i l u r e d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e of Britain, b u t the t r u t h is more n u a n c e d t h a n that.

be a very d i f f i c u l t o p p o n e n t . Fast and d e c e n t l y a r m e d , the d u n k e r s rugged c o n s t r u c t i o n m a d e it t o u g h to bring d o w n w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d .303-caliber m a c h i n e g u n s t h a t a r m e d t h e Spitfires a n d Hurricanes d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e .

A Heinkel He-111 in flight. Capable of carrying over four t h o u s a n d p o u n d s of o r d n a n c e , the He-111 r e p r e s e n t e d a m a r k e d i m p r o v e m e n t over t h e Dornier D o - 1 7 a n d w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y replace it as t h e b a c k b o n e of t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s level b o m b e r force.

to force-land, taxi to the dispersal area, and run to another Hurricane, where he fired up its Merlin engine and took off m hot pursuit of the Luftwaffe raid once again. Meanwhile, I I I Squadron's second pass knocked down another Dornier 17. Onlv one German survived its comet-like plunge into the estuary. The others burned alive as their bombers became their fiery tombs. Seventy-Four Squadron rolled into the action and tangled with part of the Bf-110 and Bf-109 escort. McCudden's old flight from 56 Squadron went after the Dormers, but the German fighters held them at bay. One section from B Flight caught a 1 1 0 by surprise and knocked it out of the air.

The Summer of tlie Few

49

A Heinkel 111 c r e w sits next to t h e i r b o m b e r on an airfield in France, w a i t i n g the w o r d t o launch for t h e day's m i s s i o n .

The H e - 1 1 1 H w a s t h e m o s t c o m m o n H e i n k e l e m p l o y e d d u r i n g t h e B a t t l e of Britain. S o m e units a d d e d under w i n g b o m b racks t h a t a l l o w e d t h e m t o carry over six t h o u s a n d p o u n d s of b o m b s w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g a radius of a c t i o n of over five h u n d r e d miles. In 1940, the He-111 w a s t h e c l o s e s t t h e L u f t w a f f e had t o a s t r a t e g i c bomber.

50

Chapter 1

The Heinkel was originally designed as a civilian airliner that could quickly be converted to a bomber in order to get around the Versailles Treaty limitations that prohibited Germany from building an air force. In combat, the He-111 units flew in tight, mutually supportive formations that allowed them to mass what minimal air defense machine guns they possessed. Apic/Getty Images

Another D o - 1 7 fell out of formation after Hurricanes raked its fuselage, killing one crew member and leaving two of remaining three badly wounded and bleeding at their stations. T h e desperate pilot fought to save his bomber and struggled to keep it aloft long enough to crash-land back in France.

The last seconds of a Ju-8

In minutes, the raging fight ended and the gray, storm-filled skies over the estuary grew empty and silent. T h e R A F interceptors turned for home and set down at M a n s t o n and Croydon, two forward bases close to the Channel coast. A t Croydon, I I I Squadron lost another H u r r i c a n e when Sgt. R . Carnall crashed on landing. S o began the first "official" day of the Battle of Britain. T h a t night, the exhausted crews f r o m KG-2 gathered for dinner and did their best not to notice the eleven e m p t y seats around them. But the sight could not help but be a sobering one. T h e fighting would only escalate f r o m there, and the German bomber unit h a d already lost 1 0 percent of its strength. T h e British fared little better. Fighter C o m m a n d started the Battle of Britain on a shoestring, w i t h o u t enough replacement pilots in the pipeline to keep pace w i t h the losses the front-line units suffered. In 1 1 1 S q u a d r o n alone, the ensuing days of combat cost the u n i t most of its experienced pilots. H e n r y Ferris's fate s y m b o l i z e d the fate of so many of his flying comrades. O n July 10, he set his battle d a m a g e d H u r r i down back at Croydon, then charged back into the fight in a new mount. T h a t aggressiveness defined m o s t of the R A F fighter pilots that s u m m e r — t h e y knew they were fighting for the fate of their n a t i o n —

The S u m m e r of tlie Few

51

S o m e of the f e w . In t h e s u m m e r of 1940, t h e f a t e of Great B r i t a i n — a n d the f r e e w o r l d — rested on a c o u p l e h u n d r e d Hurricane a n d Spitfire pilots. They s u f f e r e d a p p a l l i n g losses, but d e f e a t e d t h e L u f t w a f f e in one of the m o s t i m p o r t a n t c a m p a i g n s of t h e t w e n t i e t h century.

T w o RAF pilots check o u t t h e ruins of a Heinkel He-111

52

Chapter 1

German Messerschmitt Bf-109 pilots lounge around at their flight line, waiting for news to scramble for the next mission.

yet it came at a very steep cost. Ferris died when he collided with a German bomber in another gut-check head-on pass a few weeks later. T h e Battle of Britain became a titanic test of national will—just as Douhet envisioned.The winner would be the side that devoted the most resources to the fight and could survive the attrition rate among the clouds. T h e outcome of the battle ultimately determined the fate of Europe and much of the world, though the young fighter pilots defending England probably did not realize at the time how much the free world depended on dieir shoulders. Fifty-Six Squadrons commanding officer, G. A. L. " M i n n i e " Manton, later wrote: I don't think any of us really appreciated the seriousness of the situation. W h e n we were scared to death five or six times a day, and yet find ourselves drinking in the local pub before closing time on a summer evening, it all seemed so u n r e a l . . . . While Fighter Command bore the load of the Battle of Britain, RAF light and If the British H u r r i c a n e and Spitfire pilots didn't see the big

medium bombers struck at the seagoing invasion force the Germans assembled

picture, the German high c o m m a n d completely stumbled on this

in French and Belgian coastal ports. Here, a Dutch RAF bomber crew makes

front as well. For the first time, the Luftwaffe faced prosecuting

some last-minute decisions prior to a mission's departure.

The S u m m e r of tlie Few

5 3

an air war without any other combined operations. T h e r e would be no panzers rolling for the enemy's capital, no W e h r m a c h t infantry infiltrating around frontier fortifications. For England to fall, the Luftwaffe w o u l d have to set the table alone. A n d they blew it. In m o d e r n parlance, the Germans needed to execute a concentrated S E A D campaign. S E A D — s u p p r e s s i o n of enemy air defenses—in this case meant crushing or driving Fighter C o m m a n d s squadrons away from the Channel coast. T h e Germans only needed to control the air f r o m the French ports where the invasion barges were assembling to the beaches the W e h r m a c h t troops would s t o r m in Southern England. T h a t was the key to the entire battle, a n d the G e r m a n s — a l o n g with quite a few historians—missed it. In fact, the Luftwaffe didn't even need to destroy all of Fighter C o m m a n d . Divided into four p a r t s — 1 0 Group, I I Group, 12 Group and 13 G r o u p — o n l y the first two were in the way of an invasion of Southern England. Twelve and 13 Groups covered n o r t h of London, the M i d l a n d s , a n d Scotland. W h i l e those squadrons could have been transferred down to 1 0 Group

in Southern

England

or

11 Group in front of London, they would have done so only after the Luftwaffe had inflicted catastrophic casualties on the existing units in each

command.

Essentially,

they

w o u l d have rotated into the action just in time to be defeated in det a i l — i f the Luftwaffe had focused its efforts on that one goal. T h e Luftwaffes short-ranged tactical aircraft could have achieved such a focused goal. M a n y postwar American and British historians have castigated the Germans for not having a four-engined long-range strategic bomber in their aerial arsenal. Blinded by their own nation's subsequent strategic campaign, they've missed the essential point: the air battle before the invasion was not

Drug-addicted Hermann Goering visits his

Werner Mölders rose to fame in 1940 as the commander of

aviators. As the Battle of Britain wore on,

JG-51. During the Battle of France, he had been shot down,

in itself a strategic campaign, but a

he grew increasingly frustrated with his

and while on his first flight during the Battle of Britain,

grand tactical one that required con-

fighter pilots. They bore his wrath on many

he was wounded in a dogfight, possibly by RAF ace A. G.

stant pressure on Fighter Command's

occasions and were forced to alter their

"Sailor" Malan.

airfields, command and control net-

tactics so drastically that eventually Goering

work, and the radar system that pro-

all but chained them to the bombers during

vided the British with such excellent

escort missions.

ground control intercept capabilities.

Chapter 3

Fighter Command had been organized around a series of fixed-sector station airfields that each included a couple of smaller satellite fields nearby. T h e satellite fields lacked the logistical and communication facilities of the sector stations. Destroying the sector stations—key installations like Biggin Hill, Kenley, Middle Wallop, and Hornchurch—would have played havoc not just with the many squadrons based there, but with Fighter Commands ability to react swiftly to any incoming raids. H a d this happened, the German air campaign would have set the strategic table for the next phase, the invasion of Southern England. It never came to that. Instead, the Germans squandered their massive numerical superiority by diffusing their effort on a variety of targets. T h e German objective for the air campaign was not the destruction of Fighter Command, it was the destruction of the entire Royal Air Force. As a result, Coastal Command and Bomber Command airfields were targeted throughout the summer, which in no way helped secure local air superiority over the Channel. Additionally, the Luftwaffe planners chose to broaden the target spectrum to include aircraft and engine factories that supported the RAF. Other targets, such as docks,

A d o l f Galland, left, c o m m a n d e d JG-2S d u r i n g

convoys, and naval bases were hit as well.

t h e 1940 c a m p a i g n a n d rose to f a m e as one

In fact, the Germans began the Battle of Britain almost half-heartedly. Hitler and much

of Hitler's f a v o r i t e f i g h t e r pilots. He w o u l d

of his high command assumed that England would settle for peace after France fell. W h e n

later b e c o m e General of t h e Fighters a n d help

that did not happen, the surprised Fuehrer gave the nod to the air campaign and the planned

organize t h e d e f e n s e of t h e Reich a g a i n s t t h e

execution of the invasion.

U S A A F Eighth a n d F i f t e e n t h Air Force.

Confident a n d h a n d s o m e , a w e l l - h e e l e d G e r m a n

G a l l a n d w a t c h e s over a chess g a m e b e t w e e n t w o of his aviators.

b o m b e r p i l o t n a m e d Captain Helbig. He poses w i t h his Knight's Cross, one of t h e h i g h e s t a w a r d s for valor in t h e air t h a t the L u f t w a f f e could b e s t o w .

The Summer of tlie Few 63

THE F I G H T E R S

D U R I N G T H E BATTLE OF BRITAIN, the Germans

Werner Mölders and Adolf Galland and their men, the

learned the hard way that their bombers could not operate

British could now pick and choose their time to engage.

in hostile skies without strong fighter escort. Before the

Using speed and altitude, they could blow through the

war, the Luftwaffe believed that high-speed medium

fighter escort, hit the bomber formation, and run to fight

bombers would be all but impervious to interception.

another day.

T h e air campaigns against Poland and the West in 1 9 4 0

T h e key aircraft in this deadly subtext of the Battle

seemed to support this conclusion. T h e n the Luftwaffe

of Britain were the Messerschmitt I09E, the Spitfire,

clashed head-on with the RAF, whose aircraft and pilots

and the Hurricane. All three became legendary aircraft

were their equals. Suddenly, the situation changed, and the

of World War II. T h e Spitfire and the 109 saw combat

outcome of the Battle of Britain depended on the ability

from the first day of the war to the last, undergoing

of German fighter units to protect the bombers. An entire

multiple upgrades and model developments during six

dynamic took shape, a battle within a battle, where the

years they served in front line units. T h e Hurricane, older

R A F tried different tactics to penetrate the escort shield,

and slower at the start of the war, gradually transitioned

and the Germans developed countermeasures. Ultimately,

into a ground attack role. Equipped with 2 0 m m cannon

Goering stepped in and ordered his fighter pilots to

and sometimes even 4 0 m m tank-busting Bofors, the

provide such close escort to the Heinkels and Junkers that

Hurricane not only served as the backbone of Fighter

they lost their freedom of movement and aggressiveness.

Command in the summer of 1940, it gave the R A F its

Losses in the B f - I 0 9 and Bf-IIO units spiked as the

first truly effective ground attack aircraft. It saw service in

British took advantage of this tactical shift. Instead of

all theaters until it was ultimately replaced by the Hawker

being relentlessly pursued all over the skies by the likes of

Typhoon and Hawker Tempest in 1944.

T h e start of the battle in July reflected that reluctance. T h e Luftwaffe made tentative strikes against the coastal convoys, holding back its main strength in the process, instead of unleashing the full fury of the bomber and fighter geschwaders now arrayed against England in France and the Low Countries. N o t only did this not serve any lasting purpose, it gave Fighter Command the chance to hone its interception techniques. A month later, the Germans quit shadow boxing and threw the weight of their air force against England. August became the crucial month during the Battle of Britain as the Luftwaffe put such intense pressure on "the Few" that Fighter Command lost 2 6 percent of its fighter pilots. T h e Germans sporadically raided the sector airfields, doing telling damage at times. But again, they squandered the opportunity to simply focus on the air defense system and work its targets until it collapsed. Despite their mistakes, the Germans had battered Fighter C o m m a n d to the ropes. In the last ten days of August, the R A F lost 1 2 6 Hurricanes and Spitfires. So many experienced

56

Chapter 5

Hitler d e c o r a t e s one of his L u f t w a f f e b o m b e r c o m m a n d e r s in 1940. A s t h e B a t t l e of Britain u n f o l d e d , t h e Fuehrer g r e w i n c r e a s i n g l y f r u s t r a t e d w i t h t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s lack of a p p a r e n t progress in d e s t r o y i n g t h e RAF, a n d such m e d a l c e r e m o n i e s s o m e t i m e s c o n t a i n e d an u n d e r l y i n g s e n s e of t e n s i o n since Hitler's d i s p l e a s u r e w i t h Goering a n d his a v i a t o r s w a s w e l l k n o w n . A f t e r Berlin w a s hit by t h e RAF in a night b o m b i n g raid in A u g u s t , Hitler lost p a t i e n c e w i t h t h e t a c t i c a l c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t t h e British a n d o r d e r e d t h e full scale terror b o m b i n g of London. T h a t d e c i s i o n cost t h e G e r m a n s t h e B a t t l e of Britain, a n d q u i t e possibly, t h e war.

The d u - 8 8 A had not arrived in large n u m b e r s by t h e t i m e t h e B a t t l e of Britain began. Had t h e r e b e e n m o r e a v a i l a b l e to t h e L u f t w a f f e , t h e c a m p a i g n over S o u t h e r n England m i g h t have gone d i f f e r e n t l y . A b l e to hit t a r g e t s in a t r a d i t i o n a l level b o m b i n g f a s h i o n , its a b i l i t y t o d i v e - b o m b m a d e it a s u p e r b l y a c c u r a t e w e a p o n p l a t f o r m . It w a s used d u r i n g the Battle of Britain not only as a h a r b i n g e r of terror t o the English p e o p l e , b u t a l s o to hit s h i p p i n g in t h e Channel a n d b o m b Fighter C o m m a n d ' s airfields.

pilots had burned to death within those aircraft that Fighter Command was forced to pull raw replacements straight from operational training units and throw them into the battle. Other pilots were taken from Bomber and Coastal Commands and even the Fleet Air Arm, given minimal training, and sent into the air. Thev died at an appalling rate. The mounting losses forced the British to change the way they intercepted incoming German raids. No longer could 11 Group risk pilots over the Channel, where if shot down

T h e S u m m e r o f t l i e F e w 63

A Ju-88 crew, within the confined space of

they had slender hopes of survival. Instead, they were ordered to break off pursuit of any

their plane's cockpit, flies toward England

German aircraft at the coastline. N o r would they attack German fighter formations any longer.

during a mission in 1940.

T h r o u g h o u t August, whenever possible the British tried to hit the Messerschmitt escorts with their superior Spitfires, who would clear a path to the bombers for the slower but more rugged Hurricanes. Now, in growing desperation, 11 Group abandoned such balanced tactics and went all in for the bombers. T h e L u f t w a f f e s units h a d suffered heavy losses as well, but their material superiority still gave them the edge. Plus, their fighter units h a d not been nearly as strained as the R A F s. Nevertheless, the British resistance began to have an effect on how the N a z i leadership perceived the battle. Impatient a n d frustrated, H i t l e r and his oddball minions could not understand why the Luftwaffe was taking so long to get the job done. After all, it took only forty days to conquer all of France. Poland fell in a few weeks. Field M a r s h a l l H e r m a n n Goering, the Luftwaffe commander, d i d not recognize the progress his air units had made against the R A F . Part of that was a result of bad intelligence,

58

Chapter 5

but part of it was G o e r i n g s personality. T h e resolve of Fighter C o m m a n d s increasingly

A quiet, tranquil scene in a London park. Such

inexperienced, young replacement pilots enraged "Fat H e r m a n n . " H e demanded more and

afternoons became distant memories as the

more of his units, excoriated his fighter pilots for perceived failures, and forced a change in

Luftwaffe poured its recourses into destroying

escort tactics that tied the B f - I 0 9 s to the bomber formations so closely as to negate their

the English capital.

freedom of movement. To Hitler, Goering, and Field M a r s h a l l Albert Kesselring, it looked as if the attempt to destroy the Royal Air Force h a d failed. R i g h t at the climactic moment, with Fighter C o m m a n d almost driven to its knees, the Germans abandoned their attempt to achieve air superiority and totally lost sight of the purpose of the battle. Air superiority as a precursor to invasion was abandoned. From September 7 forward, the Luftwaffe would have one objective: terrorize the British populace into surrender. O n September 4, H i t l e r gave a speech in Berlin warning of the coming terror raids and declared " W e will eradicate their cities!" T h r e e days later, the full might o f the Luftwaffe was thrown directly at L o n d o n s East End docks. T h e raid took on a vastly different character than previous Luftwaffe incursions. Instead of a number of small formations forming u p over Calais and then heading to their different targets, some three hundred Heinkel H e - 1 1 Is, Dornier D o - 1 7 s , and Junkers J u - 8 8 s climbed above 1 5 , 0 0 0 feet a n d swept toward L o n d o n in a great phalanx. Almost six hundred B f - I 0 9 s and B f - 1 1 0 s covered the aerial a r m a d a s f l a n k s . T h e raiders m a d e no feint or pretense: they headed straight for London.

The S u m m e r o f tlie F e w

63

The Battle of Britain

Eleven Group thought at tirst this was business as usual for the Luftwaffe. The British squadrons in front of London were scrambled to cover the sector stations and other high-value SEAD-related targets. As a result, the Germans had clear sky all the way to London. Only after most of the bombers dropped their payloads did the R A F manage to intercept the raid.The Polish volunteer pilots of 3 0 3 Squadron made a name for themselves that day when they ambushed a geschwader of about forty Do-1 7s, claiming about a quarter of the bombers for the loss of

The Blitz. In the s e c o n d half of S e p t e m b e r , t h e G e r m a n s s w i t c h e d to night terror b o m b i n g t o m i n i m i z e t h e i r a i r c r a f t losses. The RAF had to s c r a m b l e to m e e t t h a t t h r e a t w i t h n e w night i n t e r c e p t o r s . Fire b o a t s a t t e m p t to c o n t a i n t h e d a m a g e to London's riverside w a r e h o u s e s a n d docks a f t e r t h e first m a j o r terror raid on t h e city in S e p t e m b e r 1940.

62

Chapter 5

four of their Hurricanes. Altogether, the Germans suffered sixtytwo aircraft damaged or destroyed. Forty-four Hurricanes or Spits were shot down or damaged as the fighting raged between London and the Channel. L o n d o n p a i d a heavy price as the air battle raged overhead. Bombs fell on the docks, warehouses, and factories along the East End, sparking massive conflagrations. A t the West India Docks, a building loaded with r u m took a b o m b hit. Burning alcohol gushed f r o m the warehouse, ignited everything in its path. In other places, the fires not only sent people fleeing for cover, but rats as well. In one notable instance, thousands of them swarmed out of a soap factory set ablaze during the bombing. T h e human toll was extraordinary. N e i g h b o r h o o d s lay in ruins; houses burned and women, children, and men buried under piles of rubble struggled to survive. Rescue crews began digging them out even as thousands o f firefighters converged on the area to fight the flames. T h e first raid ended at six that evening, but 2 5 0 more bombers arrived at supper time to deliver another h a m m e r blow to the East Side. Silverton, an industrial section of the city surrounded by neighborhoods of small houses built in the m i d -

While the Spitfire equipped only a limited number of Fighter Command's

nineteenth century, erupted in flames. T h e bombs cut swaths right

squadrons at the start of the Battle of Britain, it was the RAF's most formidable

through the old houses, blowing civilians to bits a n d leaving the

point defense fighter and interceptor. Its remarkable performance made it more

survivors gasping in horror at the h u m a n carnage.

than a match for a Messerschmitt 109. One RAF tactic was to use a Spitfire

Ever after, Londoners called September 7 "Black Saturday."

squadron to distract a Luftwaffe raid's fighter escort. While engaged with the

Day after day, the Luftwaffe returned to sow more destruction

Spitfires, Hurricanes would use the chance to attack the Luftwaffe's bombers.

on the English capital.Thousands of civilians died in the attacks, but British morale did not b r e a k . T h e Germans had failed to learn a vital lesson f r o m Poland and H o l l a n d : terror b o m b i n g as an instrument of political power only worked if the enemy government saw no remaining hope or options left to continue the fighting. In the Polish example, W a r s a w had been surrounded and its water supply compromised. T h e y could not have held out m u c h longer, and the terror raids merely hastened the Polish surrender, not caused it. S a m e thing happened in H o l l a n d . T h e Dutch government knew it could not defend the civilian populace any longer a n d did the humanitarian thing in an attempt to save lives. Britain September

did not face the same

desperate

situation

in

1 9 4 0 . T h e Germans still h a d to get across the

The human effect of terror bombing. Hundreds of Londoners take refuge in the subway system. In the years that followed this scene, the people of Germany would experience this tenfold.

The Summer of tlie Few

63

A t i g h t f o r m a t i o n o f He-111 s en route to their t a r g e t . The Battle of Britain b e c a m e the first pure air c a m p a i g n in history, a n d it w e n t a long w a y to d i s c r e d i t i n g the p r e w a r t h e o r i s t s ike D o u h e t , w h o b e l i e v e d t h a t a i r p o w e r a l o n e w o u l d break an e n e m y p o p u l a t i o n to its knees.

A f t e r the e x p e r i e n c e of the Battle of Britain, t h e RAF realized t h e s h o r t c o m i n g s of the ,303-callber m a c h i n e gun t h a t e q u i p p e d t h e H u r r i c a n e s a n d Spitfires. Later v e r s i o n s of t h e Hurricane, like t h e s e , carried f o u r 2 0 m m c a n n o n s t h a t w e r e far m o r e d e a d l y a g a i n s t G e r m a n b o m b e r s t h a n t h e older s m a l l - c a l i b e r m a c h i n e guns.

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Channel. Every day, the citizens of L o n d o n could look skyward and see the interleaved contrails that told them Fighter C o m m a n d was still fighting ferociously for them. Falling bombers landed in f a r m e r s fields, where the crews were captured by the local civilians. Other German aircraft crashed in L o n d o n itself, or the surrounding towns. T h e British population knew they were not helpless to the onslaught, and that played a major role in maintaining civilian morale. Worse, for the Germans, the switch to terror bombing gave Fighter C o m m a n d the respite it needed to survive and continue to intercept raids effectively. T h e n u m b e r of attacks on the sector stations and satellite fields dropped off, giving base personnel time to repair damage both to their facilities and to the H u r r i c a n e s and Spitfires so badly needed in the air. For the rest of the month, losses staggered both sides. Fighter C o m m a n d lost 2 8 percent of its fighter pilots in those crucial thirty days. T h e Messerschmitt units suffered a staggering 2 3 percent loss rate. T h e number of empty chairs in the mess halls grew as the month wore on.

While the Messerschmitt Bf-110 failed as a

O n September 15, now known as "Battle of Britain D a y " in the U n i t e d Kingdom, the fighting

daylight fighter, it gained a new lease on life

reached its zenith. Exhausted Luftwaffe survivors of the s u m m e r s fighting climbed into their

as a bomb-carrying, fast fighter-bomber. Hard

cockpits, manned their machine gun positions aboard their bombers and sped back into the

to catch due to its swiftness, the Luftwaffe

fight. Bone weary British fighter pilots who had flown to the edge of their physical and mental

used the 110 to strike at a variety of targets,

endurance for weeks now, lay in the grass near their aircraft, waiting with dread for the phone

including shipping and RAF airfields. Here,

call and summons, "Full squadron scramble!" that would send them into the fray once again.

a BF-110 releases its bombs on a British

For the remaining Few, the operational tempo in September had become a marathon test of

merchant vessel.

human endurance. Four, five, and sometimes six intercept missions a day became the norm. A n d on every return to their home field, fewer men were left to lounge in the s u m m e r s grass in die shadow of their bullet-scarred fighters. By the end of September 15, the BBC announced the destruction of 1 8 5 German planes. T h e true figure unearthed after the war was 7 9 destroyed or damaged, but that in no way diminished the magnitude o f the d a y s victory for the R A F . After the fifteenth, the raids gradually slacked off and the Germans switched to bombing under the cover of darkness. T h e Blitz grew into a nightly ordeal for the citizens of London. T h o u s a n d s more perished in the flames and rubble. October and November saw massive raids shatter entire districts. O n November 14, in Operation M o o n l i g h t Sonata, five hundred Heinkels, Dorniers, and Junkers carpet b o m b e d the city of Coventry. T h e flames and high-explosive ordnance destroyed over four thousand houses a n d burned out 7 5 percent of the city's factories. A t least six hundred

A JG-26 Bf-109E. The Luftwaffe fighter pilots

civilians died, including a large number of firefighters killed when their headquarters took a

wanted to have the freedom of movement

b o m b hit. M o r a l e never wavered. Britain d i d not submit to terror. Guilio D o u h e t s nihilistic vision

needed to roam the flanks of the bomber formations in search of RAF fighters to attack.

of future warfare, once put to the ultimate test, proved bankrupt. T h e Germans gave u p on

Such loose escort tactics enraged Goering,

the invasion of England, and when the terror bombing failed to break the British people,

who ordered his 109 pilots to fly virtually wing-

H i t l e r essentially lost interest in the campaign. H e turned his attention to Russia and all the

to-wing with the bombers they were assigned

twisted plans N a z i ideology had laid for the Slavic people in Eastern Europe. If he could not

as escort. Thus hobbled, the 109s could not

destroy Britain, he'd at least neutralized them as a threat, or so H i t l e r thought. T h i s would give

seize the initiative and drive the RAF out of the

Germany the time needed to knock out Soviet Russia and create a N a z i agrarian paradise in

air. In fact, the 109s became easy targets by

its place, all the while plundering the conquered lands for all their natural resources.

marauding British fighters.

T h e S u m m e r o f t l i e F e w 63

The Bf-109E's c o c k p i t layout.

A . G. " S a i l o r " M a l a n b e c a m e one of t h e great RAF f i g h t e r leaders of t h e B a t t l e of Britain. Reported to have shot d o w n G e r m a n ace W e r n e r M ö l d e r s , M a l a n c o m m a n d e d the l e g e n d a r y 74 S q u a d r o n d u r i n g t h e s u m m e r of 1940. A S o u t h A f r i c a n by birth, M a l a n eventually w a s credited w i t h twenty-seven aerial kills. It w a s m e n like Sailor M a l a n w h o e n s u r e d Britain's survival a n d d e l i v e r e d a r e s o u n d i n g d e f e a t to t h e v a u n t e d L u f t w a f f e .

Britain did indeed have very little offensive capability with which to strike back at Germanv in late 1940. T h e army was still re-equipping after its defeat in France and would not be ready to return to the Continent for vears. The Roval Navy, as Churchill put it, could lose the war but could not win it. Embroiled in the war against the U-boats and the fighting in the Mediterranean, the Royal Navy had been stretched to the limit, much like Fighter Command had been in August. Churchill cast about for any weapon with which to wield offensively against Germany. He concluded there was only one: Bomber Command.

T h e S u m m e r o f tlie F e w 63

The Bristol B e a u f i g h t e r arrived in t h e nick of t i m e for the RAF. W i t h a r e a s o n a b l e t o p speed, heavy a r m a m e n t , a n d g o o d range, t h e Beau s e r v e d as a m u l t i r o l e f i g h t e r - b o m b e r a n d n i g h t fighter. In t h e latter role, the B e a u f i g h t e r f u n c t i o n e d as b o t h an i n t e r c e p t o r of G e r m a n n o c t u r n a l raiders as w e l l as an e s c o r t for B o m b e r C o m m a n d ' s m i s s i o n s over W e s t e r n Europe.

4

RESPONSE IN KIND ^ ^

*

They told me when they cut the ready wheat, The hares are suddenly homeless and afraid, And aimlessly sicle the stubble with scared feet, Finding no place in sunlight or shade. It's morning and the Hampdens have

returned.

The crews are home, have stretched and laughed and gone, Whence the planes came and the Chance-light

burned

The sun has ridden the sky and made the dawn. He walks distraught, circling the landing

ground,

Waiting the last one home that won't come back, And like those hares, he wanders round and round, Lost and desolate on the close cropped track. —"Missing," by Herbert

Corby

E V E N A S F I G H T E R C O M M A N D F O U G H T to protect the skies over Southern England, Bomber C o m m a n d took the first baby steps forward to bring the war h o m e to the German people. T h e counteroffensive—in the best D o u h e t f a s h i o n — s t a r t e d with a w h i m p e r instead of a bang, mainly as a result of a complete lack realistic prewar preparation for the mechanics o f b o m b i n g cities hundreds of miles f r o m England. In m i d - 1 9 4 0 , Bomber C o m m a n d was a flat-out mess. Its squadrons lacked everything f r o m decent aircraft to effective

At the start of the war, the RAF lacked a truly effective long-range strategic bomber. The Bristol Blenheim was among the mediocre twin-engine designs that formed the backbone of Britain's offensive aviation.

69

navigational aids and useful payload capacities. T h e crews were green as grass, and every time they'd been thrown into the fray, bad things happened. T h e first days o f the war proved that when the R A F sent its first raids against German naval targets, it lost most o f the aircraft dispatched. D u r i n g the Battle of France, the light bomber squadrons sent to try and blunt the panzer penetrations in H o l l a n d and Belgium ran into a firestorm of flak and B f - I 0 9 s . Flying fossilized aircraft like the virtually defenseless Fairey Battle, these brave crews died in droves to no strategic purpose. As the Battle of Britain unfolded, Bomber C o m m a n d ' s best aircraft was the Vickers Wellington. Twin-engined, fabric-covering its rugged geodetic frame, the "Wimpy," as the crews affectionately called it, could carry 4 , 5 0 0 pounds of bombs to targets almost a thousand miles away. A r m e d with only six . 3 0 3 - c a l i b e r light machine guns, the W e l l i n g t o n could hardly defend itself against determined daylight interceptors, a fact the Luftwaffe drove home repeatedly in 1 9 3 9 . In December of that year, three W e l l i n g t o n squadrons attempted to b o m b Schillig Roads and Wilhelmshaven, only to lose ten W i m p y s , with another three badly damaged. After that, Bomber C o m m a n d abandoned long-range unescorted daylight raids against Germany. Such missions just proved too costly with the aircraft available, and the R A F could not maintain the loss rate of crews and bombers.

Initially, the RAF's ability to strike back at Germany was limited not only by the aircraft in its inventory, but by the technology required to get its bombers to their target areas at night. The RAF had trained throughout the 1930s as a daylight bombing force. When the first Blenheim and Wellington raids resulted in unsustainable losses, night bombing looked to be the only way for Britain to strike back at Germany. Much would have to be learned and developed on the job. In the meantime, the aircrews paid for that process with their lives.

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The Vickers W e l l i n g t o n w a s t h e c l o s e s t t h i n g t o a heavy s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r t h e RAF could field at t h e o u t s e t of the w a r . It w o u l d d o m i n a t e B o m b e r C o m m a n d ' s s q u a d r o n s for a l m o s t t h e first t h r e e years of t h e war.

W i t h its rugged c o n s t r u c t i o n , reliable e n g i n e s and a b i l i t y to carry a good p a y l o a d , the Wellington w a s the indispensable w e a p o n of t h e n o c t u r n a l air war. Yet, w h e n used in d a y l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s , t h e i r light d e f e n s i v e a r m a m e n t m a d e t h e m easy prey for A x i s interceptors.

Response in Kind

7 1

A 1,000-pound bomb about to be loaded aboard a Wellington. The British developed a whole range of specialized ordnance designed to maximize the destruction wrought on German cities. From incendiaries to start fires to "blockbuster" bombs intended to destroy water, sewer, and gas mains, the RAF became the leading agent of urban devastation.

Besides the Wellington, Bomber C o m m a n d fielded a motley collection of mediocre early 1 9 3 0 s designs, such as the A r m s t r o n g - W h i t w o r t h W h i t l e y a n d the H a n d l e y Page H a m p d e n . In 1 9 3 6 , the R A F asked the British aircraft industry to build a true long-range strategic bomber. T h e S h o r t Stirling and the Avro Manchester resulted f r o m that process, but four years later neither had yet reached operational status. Bad luck and poor design decisions hampered the development of both bombers. T h e Stirling prototype crashed during its maiden flight in 1 9 3 9 , underscoring multiple issues that took many months to sort out. T h e Manchester didn't have much more success. Equipped with four engines powering two propellers, the aircraft had a distressing habit of spontaneously combusting while in flight. T h e missions flown against Germany in 1 9 4 0 highlighted the problems o f nocturnal long-range bombing. First, navigation played a vital factor in the success of any raid. T h r o u g h o u t the fall, a large proportion of crews could not locate their targets in the dark. Given how few aircraft were available for offensive operations in 1 9 4 0 , every bomber that failed to find its way in the dark whittled down Bomber C o m m a n d ' s ability to do serious h a r m to the Germans. N o t that m u c h h a r m was being done by those aircraft that f o u n d their targets. Post-strike reconnaissance photos showed that few b o m b s fell within a mile of where they were intended. Such accuracy did not lend itself to surgical, precision strikes.

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A n o t h e r case study in m e d i o c r i t y : the Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley equipped many B o m b e r C o m m a n d s q u a d r o n s at the s t a r t of t h e w a r . Totally i n a d e q u a t e for t h e s t r a t e g i c c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t Germany, the s h o r t a g e of m o d e r n b o m b e r s f o r c e d it to r e m a i n in service w e l l p a s t its p r i m e .

The M e s s e r s c h m i t t Bf-110 c a m e into its o w n as a n i g h t interceptor. Equipped w i t h t w o 2 0 m m c a n n o n s m o u n t e d in the f u s e l a g e b e h i n d the p i l o t a n d s e t to fire u p w a r d at a f o r t y - f i v e d e g r e e angle, t h e 110 c r e w s w o u l d a t t a c k British b o m b e r s f r o m their v u l n e r a b l e bellies. The Bf-110 also carried an a i r b o r n e radar s y s t e m t h a t could help t h e p i l o t hone in on a t a r g e t a f t e r being g u i d e d to t h e s t r e a m by g r o u n d controllers. The L u f t w a f f e ' s n i g h t fighter force remained a deadly effective threat until late 1944.

Response in Kind

73

W h a t to d o about these issues? T h a t question plagued Bomber C o m m a n d through 1 9 4 2 as it struggled to re-equip a n d train for the task at hand. But in 1 9 4 0 , the British bomber crews lived in the shadow of their own technological and material shortcomings. N o t much could be accomplished in that environment, except to lay the foundation for future operations through hard-won experience a n d the blood of the young crews. T h e r e would be hope and successes in the future, but in 1 9 4 0 the pipeline looked pretty empty. Bomber C o m m a n d settled into its role with the aircraft it went to war with in 1 9 3 9 , which meant the young men sent aloft night after night p a i d the price for the prewar neglect. Nevertheless, Churchill was right: Bomber C o m m a n d served as the only way Britain could wield offensive action against Germany in 1 9 4 0 . Its army could never face the W e h r m a c h t alone; the navy could win the Battle of the Atlantic and secure the Mediterranean, but its ships could not defeat Germany. As a result, Churchill and most of his senior military advisors agreed that Bomber C o m m a n d gave the country the best chance of ultimate victory. In October 1 9 4 0 , C h i e f

One of Bomber Command's more numerous medium bombers at the start of the war, the Handley Page Hampden was such an ergonomic nightmare that its crews called it the "Flying Suitcase." Shoehorned into tight confines within its narrow fuselage, the RAF airmen could drag aloft four thousands pounds of bombs over a radius of action of about five hundred miles. Armed with only four (later six) popgun ,303-caliber machine guns, it was meat on the table for Luftwaffe interceptors when used in daylight. Out of necessity, the Hampden soldiered on until late 1942. By the time they were withdrawn from front-line service, half had been lost in operational accidents or in combat over the Third Reich.

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Chapter 5

A B o m b e r C o m m a n d c r e w m o u n t s up at sunset. T h o u g h D o u h e t a n d other t h e o r i s t s b e l i e v e d a s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n could bring a b o u t a c h e a p victory, t h e reality t u r n e d o u t t o be v a s t l y d i f f e r e n t . This y o u n g RAF c r e w had a b o u t a 75 p e r c e n t c h a n c e of dying, being w o u n d e d , or f a l l i n g into G e r m a n hands.

The Avro M a n c h e s t e r o f f e r e d a g l i m m e r of h o p e t h a t B o m b e r C o m m a n d m i g h t receive n e w first-rate l o n g - r a n g e a i r c r a f t w i t h w h i c h t o p u m m e l Germany. P o w e r e d by f o u r e n g i n e s linked t o a pair of p r o p e l l e r s , t h e M a n c h e s t e r never m e t e x p e c t a t i o n s . Fussy, c o m p l e x , a n d p r o n e to f a t a l e n g i n e fires, t h e M a n c h e s t e r e q u i p p e d only a t i n y n u m b e r of B o m b e r C o m m a n d squadrons. Its g r e a t e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e w a r e f f o r t w a s to serve as t h e first design stepping stone to the much more s u c c e s s f u l Lancaster.

The Blackburn Botha r e p r e s e n t e d one of t h e w o r s t d e s i g n f a i l u r e s t h a t p l a g u e d the British a i r c r a f t industry in t h e late 1930s. I n t e n d e d t o be a f o u r - s e a t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e a i r c r a f t and t o r p e d o bomber, t h e Botha w a s d a n g e r o u s l y u n d e r p o w e r e d a n d d i f f i c u l t t o fly. It proved to be u n s u i t a b l e for f r o n t - l i n e o p e r a t i o n s a n d w a s r e l e g a t e d to a n t i - s u b m a r i n e p a t r o l w o r k u n t i l replaced by other, m o r e s u c c e s s f u l a i r c r a f t .

Response in Kind

75

When the Blenheim, Hampden, and Wellingtons sent over Germany in 1939 ended up getting shot down in droves by the Luftwaffe's air defenses, the British Air Ministry went searching for a new medium bomber that could survive such daylight operations. The Bristol Buckingham was the product of that search. It took two years to get the Buckingham in the air, and despite its top speed of over three hundred miles per hour, the RAF no longer really needed a daylight medium bomber. It represented another diversion of effort and resources at a time when Bomber Command was struggling desperately to expand in the face of production issues and incredibly high losses.

of the Air Staff Sir Charles Portal sent Bomber C o m m a n d a directive that essentially served as a blueprint for its operations for the remainder of the war. T h e r e w o u l d be two top priority targets: German morale and Germany's oil industry. British air planners studied N a z i Germany's wartime economy a n d concluded the weak link was its oil infrastructure. S h o u l d the synthetic fuel refineries be destroyed, the panzers could not roll. T h e Heinkels could not fly. T h e British would fight fire with fire. T h e London Blitz and all the devastation the Germans had wrought on the Kingdom's capital had removed whatever moral qualms the British leadership had at pursuing the destruction of Germany's cities and killing its civilian populace. T h e gloves came off that October, and in the years to come, the German people would feel the wrath for Warsaw, Rotterdam, and London a hundredfold. Douhet's cold vision of future air warfare would become Germany's reality for five long years. Nevertheless, there were problems with assaulting morale by killing civilians. First, the British looked back in time and saw how the German home front collapsed in 1 9 1 8 and concluded that Germany's people w o u l d not be able to put u p with the hardship of area attacks on their cities. T h e British made the same mistake Goering and H i t l e r made in September 1 9 4 0 a n d completely underestimated the resolve of those upon which the b o m b s fell. N a t i o n a l morale, never an easy thing to gauge in the first place, served as an elusive objective, a will-of-the-wisp sort of target that could be chased but never really seized. In 1 9 4 0 , however, this was unclear, and the men making the decisions believed pounding German cities to rubble would cause systemic collapse and the end to W o r l d W a r II. T h e oil industry, on the other hand, f o r m e d the weak link in Germany's war machine, and no doubt its facilities were legitimate military targets with no moral ambiguity surrounding their destruction. U n f o r t u n a t e l y for the British, these targets tended to be isolated, away from cities and small enough to defy even the best b o m b i n g accuracy the R A F crews could offer

Chapter 4

early in the war. Additionally, most of the major oil facilities, such as Ploesti, lay in Eastern Europe and were either out of range to Bomber C o m m a n d s early war aircraft or left the crews dangerously exposed to interception for lengthy periods of time. As a result, the targets in 1 9 4 0 and 1 9 4 1 tended to be "industrial centers"—cities with lots of factories where falling bombs were likely to do some damage no matter how far off the intended mark they landed. Through

November

and

December

1940,

Bomber

C o m m a n d embarked on its new, well-defined campaign. Five raids were launched against Berlin, three more against H a m b u r g . All eight combined managed to put fewer than six hundred individual sorties over Germany, resulting in little damage and quite a few R A F losses. After one particularly rough night in which Bomber C o m m a n d lost eleven planes, Churchill personally despaired over such casualties and made it clear to the R A F s leadership that they could not be sustained. In 1 9 4 1 , the first of the four-engined bombers finally reached operational status. T h e S h o r t Stirling finally flew its first combat mission in February 1 9 4 1 . Ironically, Bomber C o m m a n d sent these new aircraft against Rotterdam. T h r o u g h o u t the year, Stirlings arrived in dribs and drabs, but there were never enough to equip more than a couple of squadrons. S a m e with the Manchesters, whose operational record did not merit the effort and treasure devoted to the project. Fortunately, in M a r c h 1 9 4 1 , the first H a n d l e y Page H a l i f a x squadron flew a mission against German naval targets at Le Havre, France. Over seven years in development, the H a l i f a x represented the first effective four-engined bomber to achieve operational status in Europe. Capable of carrying an astonishing

13,500-pound

b o m b load over seven hundred miles to its target and back, the H a l i f a x gave the R A F its first aerial sledgehammer with which to batter Germany's cities. T h e problem was that there weren't enough of them to make a difference. T h r o u g h o u t the year, Bomber Command

averaged

only

twenty-three

operational

Halifaxes

between two squadrons. Teething troubles and technical bugs kept the serviceability rates down. In desperation, the British turned to the U n i t e d States for help and purchased a squadron's worth of Boeing B - I 7 C s . D u b b e d the Fortress I, these rugged, long-legged bombers gave the R A F high hopes. Once operational with 9 0 Squadron, a whole array

The Short Stirling was the first long-ranged four engine aircraft to join Bomber

of problems cropped u p with them. First, the manually operated

Command. Entering service in 1941, its pilots discovered that at altitude, the

defensive guns turned out to be almost useless in battle. T h e

Stirling could actually outmaneuver Ju-88 and Bf-110 interceptors, something

fuselage blisters h a d to be opened in order to use those guns, which

the later Halifax and Lancaster could not do.

Response i n Kind

77

A f o r m a t i o n of H a m p d e n b o m b e r s over England. The c r e w s of this poorly d e f e n d e d m e d i u m b o m b e r f a c e d long odds of survival over Germany.

The d e m a n d for o f f e n s i v e a i r c r a f t w a s so great t h a t t h e RAF o r d e r e d h u n d r e d s of Lockheed Hudsons to fill t h e gap the British a v i a t i o n industry could not close. Used in r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , light bomber, a n d a n t i - s u b m a r i n e w a r f a r e roles, t h e Hudson gave g o o d service t h r o u g h t h e early years of the war.

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Chapter 5

The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress arrived in t h e RAF i n v e n t o r y in 1941 w i t h great e x p e c t a t i o n s for its c o m b a t p e r f o r m a n c e Both t h e A m e r i c a n s s u p p o r t i n g t h e RAF Fort p r o g r a m a n d t h e British t h e m s e l v e s w e r e t e r r i b l y d i s a p p o i n t e d w i t h t h e early B-17's p e r f o r m a n c e . The w a i s t blisters, w h e n o p e n e d at 20,000 f e e t , m a d e t h e f u s e l a g e as cold as t h e A r c t i c in t h e d e a d of w i n t e r . E q u i p m e n t failures w e r e common, and the Norden b o m b s i g h t f a i l e d to p e r f o r m as a d v e r t i s e d . T h e y s a w very l i m i t e d service w i t h one s q u a d r o n b e f o r e being w i t h d r a w n .

exposed the crew to freezing cold temperatures at high altitude. The Fortress I also lacked armor protection. Disappointed, 9 0 Squadron flew only hftv-one sorties before handing their Forts over to Coastal Command in September 1941. On one mission to Bremen, not a single Boeing even hit the citv during their high-altitude bomb runs. On the maht of November 7—8, 1941, Bomber Command launched four hundred aircraft against targets all over Europe. T h e crews flew missions to mine Oslo harbor in Norway and bomb Berlin and other cities in Germany. Thirty-seven bombers and 1 2 0 airmen went down that night, victims of anti-aircraft fire and the Luftwaffe's growing night fighter capabilities. In Berlin, the attack wrecked 3 9 0 homes and killed nine civilians.

R e s p o n s e i n K i n d 87

W e l l i n g t o n s n o t only served in B o m b e r C o m m a n d , b u t a l s o f u n c t i o n e d as a n t i s u b m a r i n e patrol a i r c r a f t as w e l l as search and rescue birds.

In t h e early years of the w a r , the RAF's n e a r - s i n g l e - m i n d e d f o c u s on t h e s t r a t e g i c air w a r a g a i n s t G e r m a n y a n d t h e industria b u i l d - u p required to s u p p o r t it c a m e at t h e e x p e n s e of t h e d a y l i g h t , t a c t i c a l l e v e l - b o m b i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s . The British p u r c h a s e d the N o r t h A m e r i c a n B-25 M i t c h e l l to help fill t h i s need.

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The i n i t i a l e x p a n s i o n of B o m b e r C o m m a n d w a s h a m p e r e d by d e l a y e d d e s i g n d e v e l o p m e n t , p r o d u c t i o n p r o b l e m s , a n d t h e f a i l u r e of s o m e key projects, i n c l u d i n g t h e Avro M a n c h e s t e r . In t h e 1930s, t h e British a v i a t i o n i n d u s t r y s t r u g g l e d to bring to p r o d u c t i o n an e n t i r e crop of n e w b o m b e r s , such as t h e Short S t i r l i n g , w h i c h t o o k five years to go f r o m c o n c e p t to c o m b a t o p e r a t i o n a l . A s t h e s e g r o w i n g pains h a m p e r e d t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e force, t h e older d e s i g n s , such as t h e s e B l e n h e i m s , w e r e f o r c e d to r e m a i n in f r o n t - l i n e service long a f t e r t h e y had b e c o m e o b s o l e t e .

For a year, a p a t c h w o r k force of o b s o l e s c e n t m e d i u m b o m b e r s carried the fight t o Germany's c i t i e s w i t h very little results for t h e e f f o r t . A s t h e c a m p a i g n c o n t i n u e d , it b e c a m e clear t h a t b e t t e r a i r c r a f t a n d better e q u i p m e n t w o u l d be n e e d e d to inflict s u b s t a n t i a l d a m a g e on t a r g e t s in t h e Third Reich. The first g l i m m e r of h o p e arrived on t h e w i n g s of t h e o u t s t a n d i n g H a n d l e y Page Halifax, a p o w e r f u l a n d e f f e c t i v e four-engine bomber that reached operational s t a t u s in M a r c h 1941. A v a i l a b l e in very l i m i t e d n u m b e r s t h r o u g h t h a t year, t h e H a l i f a x eventually became the second-most numerous a i r c r a f t in B o m b e r C o m m a n d ' s a r s e n a l b e h i n d t h e A v r o Lancaster.

Response in Kind

81

The C o n s o l i d a t e d Liberator e n d e d up being one of t h e m o s t s u c c e s s f u l of t h e Lend-Lease b o m b e r s e m p l o y e d by t h e RAF. Used b o t h as a b o m b e r as w e l l as an a n t i - s u b m a r i n e patrol a i r c r a f t w i t h Coastal C o m m a n d , t h e Liberator's heavy o r d n a n c e load a n d long range p l a y e d a v a l u a b l e role in o p e r a t i o n s in Europe and t h e Mediterranean.

The early export v a r i a n t of t h e B - 2 4 w a s c a l l e d t h e C o n s o l i d a t e d LB-30. Lacking p o w e r t u r r e t s a n d m a n y of t h e f e a t u r e s f o u n d on the later B - 2 4 D m o d e l , the LB-30 s a w l i m i t e d service. M a n y w e r e later c o n v e r t e d into t r a n s p o r t s .

T h e night spelled utter disaster for the British. The nation had pinned its hopes on Douhet's theories and had undertaken a massive effort to expand bomber command so that rt would ultimately held a force of some four thousand aircraft. Yet, the expansion had gone slowly, and what raids reached their targets had yet to inspire much hope that serious damage could be inflicted. A change was needed. A few months later, in February 1942. Sir Arthur Harris was appointed the new chief of Bomber Command. Single-minded, directed, and

Chapter 4

Striking back. In 1940, the British had no other way to launch a counteroffensive against Germany besides Bomber Command's aircraft and crews. Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, sent a directive to the RAF that October that laid the foundations for the British strategic bombing campaign for the next five years. German

Bombing up a Wellington the afternoon before

morale would be the primary target, and destroying the Third Reich's cities would be the means to strike at it.

a night mission. Until the arrival of the Halifax

Killing civilians had become official British policy.

and the Lancaster, the Wellington remained the most versatile and effective bomber in the RAF's inventory.

energetic, H a r r i s believed wholeheartedly in the concept of area bombing. In the months to come, he w o u l d reshape Bomber C o m m a n d from the struggling, fledgling force it was into a formidable weapon that could lay waste to entire cities. H e d i d it with such ruthlessness of purpose that his own men, upon whose shoulders the campaign depended, sometimes called him "Butcher Harris," especially on those m o r n i n g s when dozens of bombers failed to return home from the dark skies over N a z i Germany. Nevertheless, the stage was set. Bomber C o m m a n d had a new leader. N e w weapons, including the deadly 4 , 0 0 0 - p o u n d "blockbuster" bomb, had been perfected. N e w tactics, new countermeasures, and new aircraft w o u l d soon reach operational status. As they did, Germany's population would be in the crosshairs in what became the largest air war in h u m a n history.

Response in Kind

8 3

The U S A A F b a n k e d oil t h e B-17 Flying Fortress a n d its c r e w s to deliver t h e k n o c k o u t b l o w s a g a i n s t t h e Third Reich. The U n i t e d S t a t e s i n v e s t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e resources, money, a n d m a n p o w e r on t h e c r e a t i o n of a s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g f o r c e s h a p e d by the B-17's e x c e p t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d d e f e n s i v e a r m a m e n t .

5 THE AMERICANS ARRIVE * * * * *

T H E Y C A M E T O T H E W A R A S F L E D G L I N G S , high of spirit, confident in their aircraft, and wed to the concept of daylight precision bombing. In February 1 9 4 2 , just as Sir Arthur H a r r i s took over Bomber C o m m a n d , the advance wave of what would become a flood of hundreds of thousands of officers a n d airmen arrived in England f r o m the U n i t e d States. T h e Americans had arrived. T h a t advanced echelon included the commander of the recently activated Eighth Air Force, M a j . Gen. Carl Spaatz. A Mitchellite to the core, Spaatz appeared at Bomber C o m m a n d s headquarters at H i g h W y c o m b e on February 2 3 , 1 9 4 2 . H e and Harris hit it off at once. T h e y were kindred souls with unshakable faith in the ability of airpower to win the war, though they differed in the details. T h a n k s to the R A F s earlier hard knocks, Bomber C o m m a n d would stick to night attacks for die majority of the war. Spaatz believed that the latest-generation B - I 7 had all the defensive armament needed to conduct long-range missions in the teeth of Luftwaffe fighter interception. If flown in close, mutually protective formations, a B - I 7 group could field all-round defense with literally hundreds of deadly .50-caliber machine guns. Through the spring, aircraft and men trickled in from the U n i t e d States. It was not an impressive force at first, and on the streets of London there was much gossip about the big-talking Americans who had yet to actually measure u p to their own words. T h e measuring u p would take time. First, the U S A A F had to learn hard lessons of its own.

The Americans joined the fight in the 1942, full of confidence in the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. The RAF's lessons with the early variants of the B-17 led to significant refinements that Boeing incorporated into the E model. This was

O n Independence Day 1 9 4 2 , six American crews from the

not the same Fort that failed so grievously with 90 Squadron, RAF the previous

15th Bomb Group ( L i g h t ) climbed into aircraft borrowed from

year, and the E model laid the groundwork for the USAAF's bombing campaign

their R A F mentors in 2 2 6 Squadron. Ironically, 2 2 6 flew Douglas

in Europe.

The A m e r i c a n s e n t e r e d t h e European Air W a r on

DB-7 "Boston" bombers, the Lend-Lease version of the venerable A - 2 0 Havoc. For one

t h e Fourth of d u l y 1942. Using b o r r o w e d Lend-

mission, those aircraft were loaned back to the native sons of the country that provided the

Lease D o u g l a s Boston b o m b e r s , a small U S A A F

R A F with these excellent aerial weapons.

c o n t i n g e n t t o o k part in a l o w - a l t i t u d e raid on

T h e Americans formed half the strike formation that dav. Four V s of three Bostons

G e r m a n t a r g e t s in Holland. From t h i s tiny s t e p

each sped low over the North Sea to target German airfields m Holland. Bv staying low, thev

w o u l d spring f o r t h t h o u s a n d - p l a n e raids t h a t

sought to avoid radar detection, but Axis vessels steaming through the area spoiled their

t o r e t h e i n d u s t r i a l heart o u t of t h e Third Reich

element of surprise bv reporting the incoming raid.

only t w o y e a r s later.

Once the Bostons reached the Dutch coast, the formation split up and raced for their airfield targets. Fhe Allied force (lew straight into ferocious and accurate anti-aircraft fire. Fhe

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Carl Spaatz awards the Distinguished Service Cross to Maj. Charles Kegelman for his personal courage and flying skills during the USAAF's first raid on German targets in Northwest Europe.

Germans spared nothing when it came to airfield defense, and attacking such targets remained one of the most difficult and costly missions of the air war for low-flying tactical aircraft and fighter-bombers. T h e Allies p a i d a heavy price that Fourth of July. Two of the six American crews went down in flames. A third U S A A F - m a n n e d Boston took a flak hit in the engine and scraped the g r o u n d while streaking across De Kooy Airdrome. Flames feathering back f r o m the stricken fan, the Boston pilot somehow m a n a g e d to pull u p and get his crew home safely, a feat that earned him a Distinguished Service Cross, the second-highest award for valor next to the Congressional M e d a l of H o n o r . T h e British also lost a Boston on the mission, m a k i n g this first American foray against the Germans a costly one indeed. A fourth of the bomber force succumbed to flak. It was a taste of things to come. T h a t summer, the first of the heavy b o m b groups arrived in Great Britain. T h e 9 7 t h earned that honor, setting u p operations at R A F Polebrook. Flying the new B - I 7 E , the 9 7 t h lacked training, experience a n d tactical knowledge. S o m e of the navigators didn't know how to navigate. S o m e o f the radio operators couldn't even read or send M o r s e code. Few of the men h a d ever conducted flights over 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet. In fact, most h a d never even strapped on their oxygen masks. A n d yet, the 9 7 t h w o u l d serve as the seed unit for what w o u l d become the m o s t massive air effort ever put forth by the U n i t e d States. Everything has a start point, no matter how

lite A m e r i c a n s A r r i v e

8 7

Another photo of RAF Bostons during a raid on a French port.

successful or not. For the M i g h t y Eighth, it began on August 1 7 , 1 9 4 2 , when the 9 7 t h carried out a twelve-plane raid against a railroad marshalling yard at Rouen, France. Over a hundred Royal Air Force Spitfires provided heavy escort force for the bombers. Experience h a d shown the Luftwaffe s fighter units in France, which included the elite Jagdgeschwader 2 6 , could be deadly effective adversaries in their new F o c k e - W u l f 1 9 0 "Butcher Birds." Flying in a B - 1 7 n a m e d Yankee Doodle on that first mission was Gen. Ira Eaker, head of VIII Bomber C o m m a n d . He'd come along to see for himself how the 9 7 t h would fare. T h e co-pilot of Butcher Bird, the lead aircraft that day was M a j . Paul Tibbets. In 1 9 4 5 , Tibbets w o u l d pilot the Enola Gay over Hiroshima and his crew w o u l d drop the first atomic b o m b used in battle. T h e raid succeeded beyond all expectations. T h e dozen Forts dropped almost 4 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s of British-built bombs on the target area. Post-strike reconnaissance showed an impressive, tight pattern to the destruction wrought on the ground. T h e N o r d e n bombsight

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Chapter 5

appeared to be a wonder device after all. N o t h i n g the British could do at night matched this

Later in August, the Eighth Air Force flew its

level of accuracy.

first combat mission. Flying B-17Es, the 97th

W h a t ' s more, not a single B - I 7 went down. All the crews returned safely to England,

Bomb Group struck rail targets at Rouen,

and there was m u c h revelry that evening at Polebrook. T h e r e wouldn't be many g o o d days

France, without loss. It was an auspicious

ahead like this one. In fact, two missions later, a Messerschmitt made a pass a t T i b b e t t s ' B - I 7 .

beginning to what would become one of the

A 2 0 m m cannon shell exploded in the cockpit, which w o u n d e d him with shrapnel and nearly

longest attritional campaigns in U.S. history.

took his co-pilot's left hand off.

Here, a squadron of B-17s forms up over

Still, the Rouen raid served as a g o o d beginning for the nascent Eighth Air Force. It also

England in preparation for a mission in 1942.

m a d e excellent propaganda and quieted the British down for awhile. To counter that English attitude, S p a a t z took to carrying recon photos o f strike damage in his pocket. He'd pull t h e m out and show the results o f precision bombing to anyone who wanted to take a look. Elated at the results, S p a a t z and Eaker set about laying the foundations for the massive force they hoped to field against Germany. T h r o u g h the s u m m e r and fall, new b o m b groups

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The Eighth Air Force had to develop tactics, formations, and procedures almost from scratch when its crews began flying missions in 1942. Combat experience honed and refined those tactics and techniques and led to innovations from the squadron level on up.

reached England, including the 3 0 3 r d and 93rd. T h e 1st Fighter Group and its P - 3 8 s flew across the Atlantic to join VITT Fighter C o m m a n d . In time, the 31st, 5 2 n d , and 4 t h Fighter Groups w o u l d f o r m the initial core of the available escort force. T h r o u g h the rest of the fall, the Eighth Air Force devoted most of its energy against U - b o a t targets in support of the campaign in the N o r t h Atlantic. T h e s e deeply u n p o p u l a r missions contributed little to the Allied cause. By this time, the U - b o a t pens in the French ports like St. Nazaire had been reinforced with a twenty foot concrete roof. T h e bombs the B - 1 7 s did get on these targets exploded harmlessly on the surface of these massive structures. Worse, the missions exposed the B - 1 7 crews to heavy fighter and anti-aircraft attack. For the men who laid their lives on the line daily to carry out these sorties, such a ridiculous target selection frustrated and demoralized them. M e a n w h i l e , the build u p gained steam until Operation Torch derailed everything. T h i s was the invasion of N o r t h w e s t Africa by a combined Anglo-American force. To carry out this operation, the Allies needed every available plane to support it. T h e Eighth was stripped of m o s t of its fighter units, including the 1st, 31st, and 5 2 n d groups, a n d lost some of its B - I 7 outfits as well. S p a a t z and Eaker protested to no avail. Eventually, the Eighth lost 1 , 2 5 0 aircraft and 3 0 , 0 0 0 men. T h e bombing campaign came to a crashing halt. In December, the Eighth lost its talented commander, General S p a a t z to the M e d i t e r r a n e a n theater as well. Ira Eaker took his place It would not be until the following January that the fledglings in England General Ira Eaker commanded VIII Bomber Command, then later the Eighth Air Force

90

would commence large-scale bombing operations against N a z i - h e l d Europe. As the Americans arrived in England, then h a d their build-up derailed by Torch, Bomber

during its formative stages through the end of

C o m m a n d ' s night raids began to cause substantial damage. Soon after taking over, H a r r i s wanted

the brutal 1943 campaign.

to make a statement, both to the British people a n d to Germany, by launching the R A F s first

Chapter 5

T h r o u g h t h e 1930s, t h e s t a n d a r d U S A A F b o m b e r f o r m a t i o n r e m a i n e d the

B-17Es on a t r a i n i n g b o m b run back in t h e States. A s t h e air w a r over

e l o n g a t e d V. In Europe, the Fort c r e w s realized t h a t such an a r r a n g e m e n t did

Europe d e v e l o p e d into a t i t a n i c s t r u g g l e of a t t r i t i o n , rapid a n d e f f e c t i v e c r e w

n o t m a x i m i z e t h e f i r e p o w e r t h e i r a i r c r a f t carried. The b o m b groups began t o

t r a i n i n g b e c a m e one of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t logistical e l e m e n t s in d e f e a t i n g

e x p e r i m e n t w i t h n e w f o r m a t i o n s d e s i g n e d t o give the Fort g u n n e r s o v e r l a p p i n g

t h e L u f t w a f f e . Eventually, t h e G e r m a n f i g h t e r units w o u l d nearly run out of

fields of fire. The c o m b a t box e m e r g e d f r o m this f o r m a t i v e p e r i o d a n d w a s

e f f e c t i v e l y p r e p a r e d r e p l a c e m e n t pilots, but t h a n k s to the s y s t e m e s t a b l i s h e d

w i d e l y a d o p t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e Eighth in short order.

s t a t e s i d e , t h e f l o w of w e l l - t r a i n e d a i r m e n never s l o w e d t o t h e Eighth Air Force.

The B-17E i n c o r p o r a t e d n u m e r o u s c h a n g e s f r o m t h e earlier v a r i a n t s t h a t s a w

The b o m b a r d i e r ' s c o m p a r t m e n t in t h e nose of a B-17. T h a n k s to t h e N o r d e n

service in t h e Pacific a n d w i t h t h e British. A m o n g t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c h a n g e s

b o m b s i g h t ' s linkage to the flight c o n t r o l s , t h e b o m b a r d i e r a c t u a l l y f l e w

w a s the a d d i t i o n of p o w e r t u r r e t s , each e q u i p p e d w i t h t w i n ,50-caliber

t h e a i r c r a f t f r o m t h e initial p o i n t all the w a y t o t h e release p o i n t w i t h t h e

m a c h i n e guns.

a s s i s t a n c e of an a u t o p i l o t s y s t e m .

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91

THE A V R G L A N C A S T E R

B O R N F R O M F A I L U R E , forged from experience, bought and

thousand were built at a cost of about fifty thousand pounds

paid for with the blood o f British airmen, the Avro Lancaster

each. For Great Britain, the Lancaster p r o g r a m marked a

emerged as one o f the best heavy bombers of W o r l d W a r II.

prodigious expenditure of treasure a n d effort. Once in service,

W h e n the Avro Manchester turned out to be such a

the aircraft exceeded all expectations. Over the course of the final

disappointment, the company's engineers and designers went

three years of the war, Lancasters flew over 1 5 8 , 0 0 0 sorties over

back to work, searching for a way to make the aircraft more

Europe and dropped 6 0 8 , 6 1 2 tons of bombs.

effective and reliable. T h e Lancaster resulted f r o m that return to the drawing board. W i t h four engines turning four instead of two props, a longer wingspan, and other modifications, the Lancaster carried a crew of seven and a payload that could exceed twenty-two thousand pounds in certain instances. T h e R A F at last possessed a companion aircraft to the H a l i f a x that could carry out the massive area bombing missions Sir Charles Portal and Bomber H a r r i s envisioned. T h e "Lane," as the R A F ' s crews called it, came into service gradually through 1 9 4 2 . By the following year, it f o r m e d the Bomber C o m m a n d ' s backbone. Eventually, over seven

Loading a four-ton "blockbuster" bomb aboard a Lancaster. The Lane gave the RAF a long-range aircraft capable of carrying fourteen thousand pounds of ordnance. Modified versions could carry the 22,000-pound "Grand Slam" bomb.

Chapter 5

The quad .303 machine guns in the Lancaster's tail turret.

A f o r m a t i o n of B - 1 7 s t a k e s s h a p e over England w e l l a b o v e a near t o t a l layer of clouds. Often, w e a t h e r w a s the s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n ' s w o r s t enemy.

The Eighth Air Force's b o m b e r c r e w s in 1942 a n d early 1943 d i s l i k e d b o m b i n g t h e G e r m a n U - b o a t pens b u i l t in t h e French c o a s t a l port cities. They f a c e d i n t e n s e o p p o s i t i o n d u r i n g such a t t a c k s , a n d the pens w e r e p r o t e c t e d w i t h r e i n f o r c e d c o n c r e t e t w e n t y - s o m e t h i n g - f e e t t h i c k or more. The U S A A F had no b o m b t h a t could p e n e t r a t e such a h a r d e n e d t a r g e t .

Paul Tibbets led t h e 9 7 t h B o m b Group's f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g t h e f a m e d A u g u s t 17,

"thousand plane r a i d . ' W h c n he first floated the idea. Bomber C o m m a n d possessed only about

1942, m i s s i o n t o the Rouen railroad

four hundred operational aircraft, the majority of which were still Wellingtons distributed

f a c i l i t i e s . Later, as t h e c o m m a n d e r of the

among sixteen squadrons. H a r r i s had six squadrons of Halifaxes, six more of the new and

5 0 9 t h C o m p o s i t e Group, he f l e w t h e

very capable Lancaster, plus two each flying Manchesters and H a m p d e n s . To come up with

Enola

Gay to H i r o s h i m a a n d d r o p p e d the w o r l d ' s

the remaining aircraft for the raid, H a r r i s had to draw on the RAF's operational training units.

first a t o m i c bomb.

Instructors and student pilots would tlv side-by-slde on the m a h t of this mission. Shortly before the raid began, H a r r i s sent a message to all his group commanders and outlined what he hoped the night's bombing would achieve. At best the result may bring the war to a more or less abrupt conclusion owing to the enemy's unwillingness to accept the worst that must befall h i m increasingly as our bomber force and that of the U n i t e d States of America build up. .At worst it must have the most dire moral and material effect on the enemy's war effort as a whole and force him to withdraw vast forces from his exterior a g r e s s i o n s for his own protection. On the night of M a y 30—31, H a r r i s gave the go-order. From

fifty-three

bases all

over Hngland, 1 , 0 4 6 bombers lifted into the darkness, bound for the R u h r Valley industrial

General Ira Eaker at his desk. A f t e r Spaatz w e n t to N o r t h A f r i c a , Eaker t o o k over c o m m a n d of t h e Eighth A i r Force. He lasted a b o u t a year b e f o r e he w a s t r a n s f e r r e d to t h e M e d .

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Chapter 5

O p e r a t i o n Torch, t h e A l l i e d invasion of N o r t h A f r i c a , d r e w a w a y f r o m England a n d W e s t e r n Europe a l m o s t all t h e air, naval, a n d g r o u n d units a v a i l a b l e t o the A l l i e s in t h e f a l l of 1942, It v i r t u a l l y c r i p p l e d t h e n a s c e n t A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n by absorbing almost a thousand aircraft from t h e Eighth Air Force a n d e n s u r e d t h e invasion of France w o u l d be d e l a y e d a year.

W h e n t h e t h o u s a n d - p l a n e raid w a s l a u n c h e d a g a i n s t Cologne in M a y 1942, B o m b e r C o m m a n d f i e l d e d t h i r t y - s e v e n squadrons. The W e l l i n g t o n e g u i p p e d s i x t e e n of t h e m and still f o r m e d t h e b a c k b o n e of t h e RAF's offensive capabilities.

lite A m e r i c a n s A r r i v e

9 5

city of Cologne. For hours, b o m b s rained down on the civilian populace. Tens of thousands took refuge in basements and cellars, b o m b shelters, and other underground locations. T h e initial wave of attackers dropped incendiary bombs on the oldest part of the city. T h e flames served as a beacon for the rest of the bombers that night, a n d they rumbled over the city to release their loads as smoke boiled 1 5 , 0 0 0 feet into the air. T h e scene was soon lit with a hellish crimson glow, swathed in the acrid smoke o f a city suffering immolation. T h e last wave of bombers could see the flames raging from over a hundred miles away. Cologne burned and smoldered for days, m a k i n g reconnaissance efforts almost useless. Finally, a week after the bombing, the first clear images of the city returned to England aboard fast-moving photo recon aircraft. T h e results staggered even H a r r i s . Over six hundred acres of Cologne s downtown districts had been burnt and flattened. T h i s represented almost thirteen thousand buildings reduced to After the failure of the Avro Manchester, the Lancaster emerged as the future for Bomber Command. By the time of the Cologne thousand-plane raid, Bomber

heaps of twisted rubble. Forty-five thousand residents of the city now found themselves homeless. Another five thousand suffered death or serious injury. Harris's optimistic view that such an attack w o u l d force an early end to the war was not

Command possessed six Lancaster squadrons. After

realized. It didn't matter. T h e future h a d been glimpsed by both sides, and now the British

years of mediocre twin-engine and four-engine designs

devoted ever-increasing resources toward Bomber C o m m a n d while the Germans raced to

that proved terribly vulnerable over Germany, the RAF

bolster their night fighter force.

crews finally received an outstanding bomber with tremendous potential.

In August, the British established their first pathfinder squadrons. T h e s e units consisted of dedicated and well-trained crews w h o would lead the way each night and illuminate the target area with incendiaries. U s i n g new electronic systems, including radar, navigation became a considerably easier prospect at night. A mission to Duesseldorf in m i d - S e p t e m b e r carried out by about five hundred bombers inflicted substantial damage on the city. T h e R A F had hit it earlier in the summer as well, yet industrial output grew 1.8 percent over the first half o f the year despite all the damage and dislocation done to the city's infrastructure and factories. In the fall, the Lancaster began to arrive in greater numbers until by October Bomber C o m m a n d possessed nine squadrons totaling about a 1 7 5 planes. T h i s was the aircraft o f the future for the British strategic bombing effort. In the m o n t h s to come, it w o u l d play the most vital role in nocturnal air war over Europe. T h e growing attacks excited the R A F ' s high c o m m a n d and energized Churchill. T h a t fall, the Prime Minister told President Roosevelt, " W e know our night bomber offensive is having a devastating effect." T h e contagious o p t i m i s m led Portal to conclude that the air offensive could end the war by 1 9 4 4 without having to land a massive army in northwest Europe. H e envisioned a campaign in 1 9 4 3 and 1 9 4 4 that could drop 1 . 2 5 million tons of b o m b s on German cities. T h e estimated result of such high-explosive and incendiary carnage? Portal and the Air Staff estimated it w o u l d kill nine hundred thousand German civilians, leave

Cologne. The citizens of the city suffered terribly

twenty-five million homeless and severely wound another million. T h e physical destruction

under the aerial punishment delivered upon their

was estimated at six million houses and near total disruption of public power a n d water

homes and factories.

systems, industrial capacity, and transportation routes.

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The Lancaster first j o i n e d B o m b e r C o m m a n d w i t h 4 4 S q u a d r o n (pictured here) in late 1941. The unit f l e w its first o p e r a t i o n a l s o r t i e s in t h e spring of 1942, j u s t before t h e t h o u s a n d - p l a n e raid. Over t h e next t h r e e years, G e r m a n d e f e n s e s c l a i m e d a l m o s t 150 of 4 4 Squadron's Lancasters. T w e n t y - t w o m o r e c r a s h e d in a c c i d e n t s . This gave t h e unit ail a t t r i t i o n rate of a l m o s t 700 p e r c e n t d u r i n g the c l i m a c t i c b a t t l e s of the s t r a t e g i c air war.

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97

The North African campaign drained off

Portal wanted to kill, wound, or dislocate 7 5 percent o f all German citizens living

most of the Eighth Air Force's strength in

in cities with populations larger than fifty thousand people. It was an extraordinary and

the fall of 1942. Almost thirty thousand

apocalyptic vision of total war on a civilian populace. And, it was the incarnation of Douhet s

air and ground crews were transferred

central theme from Command of the Air.

to the primitive and hostile desert to join Doolittle's Twelfth Air Force.

T h e 1 9 4 3 campaign would soon begin, and with it would come die first major contributions by the U S A A F and its new fleet of heavy bombers. Exactly how that effort would be carried out in cooperation with the R A F dominated top-level discussions for the remainder of 1 9 4 2 , and during the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting at Casablanca in January 1 9 4 3 . T h e R A F wanted the Americans to join the night bombing effort. Convert the Eighth Air Force to nocturnal operations and the Allies could have a force of thousands hitting Germany by moonlight before the end o f 1 9 4 3 . T h e U S A A F recoiled at the idea. T h e entire structure of its strategic force had been predicated on daylight precision bombing. All the Stateside training was geared toward this effort. Switching to night operations w o u l d require a wholesale reconstruction o f the strategic bomber force. H a p Arnold, c o m m a n d e r of the

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Above: Churchill and his senior military leaders had nearly convinced FDR to s w i t c h the Eighth Air Force to night terror bombing. General Arnold tasked Ira Eaker w i t h saving the daylight campaign Eaker produced one of the most stunning one-page summaries of the w a r for Churchill, w h o w a s spellbound by its final, memorable words.

Left: FDR and his senior military leadership at Casablanca. The meeting b e t w e e n the Americans and British there shaped the future of the strategic air w a r for the next t w o years.

lite A m e r i c a n s Arrive

9 9

VIII F I G H T E R C O M M A N D

"The primary role of VIII Fighter Command

is to bring the bombers

back alive "

Fighter sweeps—which f o r m e d two-thirds o f the missions flown by VITT Fighter C o m m a n d during 1 9 4 2 a n d part of 1 9 4 3 — turned out to be archaic and useless. T h e Germans simply

G E N E R A L F R A N K H U N T E R H U N G T H A T S I G N in his

w o u l d not come up a n d play, preferring instead to hoard their

office when he took over VIII Fighter C o m m a n d in 1 9 4 2 . A

interceptor force for use against bombers.

W o r l d W a r I fighter pilot, H u n t e r believed close escort and lots of fighter sweeps w o u l d achieve the goal he set for his pilots.

D u r i n g escort missions, H u n t e r repeated the errors the Germans made during the latter stages of the Battle of Britain. C h a i n e d to the bomber streams, the American fighter pilots could not even pursue Luftwaffe aircraft below 1 8 , 0 0 0 feet. W i t h their aggressiveness negated by their tactics, the Yanks did not rack u p an impressive kill ratio. T h e 5 6 t h Fighter Group, for example, arrived in January 1 9 4 3 but d i d not score its first confirmed kill until June, losing a number of pilots along the way to marauding 1 0 9 s and 190s. Beyond tactical restrictions, VIII Fighter C o m m a n d suffered f r o m numerous other shortcomings. Lack of external fuel tanks crippled the fighters and restricted their radius of action to only a few hundred miles. T h i s prevented any escort missions into Germany itself, where the majority of German interceptors waited for the bombers. As the campaign took shape, the Luftwaffe pilots simply waited until the American P - 4 7 s a n d P - 3 8 s turned for home before wading into the bomber stream. Yet external

An engine change for an Eighth Air Force Spitfire.

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tanks did not gain favor until

P-38s of t h e 3 3 8 t h Fighter S q u a d r o n , 55th Fighter Group, on t h e i r airfield in East A n g l i a . The 55th Fighter Group f l e w L i g h t n i n g until c o n v e r t i n g to P-51 M u s t a n g s in late 1944.

A 3 1 s t Fighter Group Spitfire in England. The 3 1 s t f l e w m i s s i o n s over D i e p p e in A u g u s t 1942 b e f o r e g e t t i n g s e n t t o N o r t h A f r i c a t o a i d in the e f f o r t t o knock t h e Axis o u t of Tunisia. They w e r e part of t h e m a s s i v e drain of a i r c r a f t t h a t eft t h e M i g h t y Eighth little more t h a n a s k e l e t a l f o r c e in late 1942.

m i d - 1 9 4 3 . To the USAAF's materials command, hanging gas tanks under a fighter was an anathema that would ruin the aircraft's maneuverability in combat. It would take time to sort out the fuel tank issue and the tactics. In the meantime, the B-I 7 and B-24 crews paid the price. I he 1943 campaign would prove once and for all that if the bombers were to survive deep penetration raids into Germany,

The Republic P-47 T h u n d e r b o l t r o u n d e d o u t the t y p e s of f i g h t e r s a v a i l a b l e

the Mightv Eighth had to have fighters that could go the distance

t o the Eighth A i r Force in 1942 and early 1943. Rugged a n d huge, its pilots

with them. Wartime experience proved Billv Mitchell right: fighter

d u b b e d it " t h e d u g " for its r e s e m b l e d t o a milk j u g on w h e e l s w h e n s i t t i n g

and bomber had to work together just like combined operations

on t h e g r o u n d . Early v a r i a n t s sucked gas like a H u m m e r a n d could not e s c o r t

in ground warfare. The cost to learn that lesson envisioned two

t h e Eighth's b o m b e r s m u c h b e y o n d t w o h u n d r e d miles. T h a t w o u l d c h a n g e

decades before by America's most famous airpower theorist would

in t h e y e a r s t o c o m e , b u t in 1942 its lack of radius s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d its

be dreadfully high.

u s e f u l n e s s in t h e s t r a t e g i c air w a r .

lite A m e r i c a n s Arrive

1D1

Eaker's s y n o p s i s c o n c l u d e d , "If t h e RAF

USAAF, could not let that happen. Yet. Churchill had already nearly sold Roosevelt on the

c o n t i n u e s b o m b i n g at n i g h t a n d w e b o m b

idea of doing this.

by day, w e shall b o m b t h e m round t h e clock

102

During the Casablanca conference in January, he cabled Eaker and told hnn it was up to

a n d the devil shall do t h e rest." ChurchilI

him to save the daylight bombing campaign. Eaker had majored in journalism in college. He

c o n f e r r e d w i t h FDR, a n d t h e t w e n t y - f o u r - h o u r

sat down and drafted a tight, one-page summary for Churchill that outlined all the reasons

b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n b e c a m e t h e s t r a t e g y to

why converting the Eighth Air Force to night operations would be folly. The final sentence

emerge from Casablanca

captured the Prime Minister's imagination.

Chapter 5

Eaker (left) shakes hands with General Kenney, the officer who translated Douhet's classic Command of the Air for an American audience. Eaker's genius with words (he had been a journalism major in college) ensured the survival of the daylight bombing campaign. In a twist of irony, he himself would not survive the year as the commander of the Eighth Air Force.

"If the R A F continues bombing at night and we b o m b by day, we shall b o m b them round the clock and the devil shall do the rest." Both leaders loved the idea of "round the clock bombing." T h e British w o u l d batter the Germans at night while from dawn to sunset the Americans w o u l d rule the skies. Twenty-four seven, Germany would receive no respite f r o m the aerial bombardment. After Casablanca, Eaker a n d one of his subordinates, General Hansell, sat down with two R A F counterparts and drafted a detailed plan for the 1 9 4 3 air campaign. Called the C o m b i n e d Bomber Offensive, the document set seventeen key target types to be attacked and destroyed during the year. T h e top three included: I ) the German aircraft industry, 2 ) ball bearings factories, and 3 ) Germany's oil refining infrastructure. H a r r i s and Bomber C o m m a n d would still make destruction of German morale its key objective for the year. For both sides, 1 9 4 3 would be a pivotal period in the strategic air war. O f course, as with most wartime ventures, nothing went as planned.

General Hap Arnold shakes hands with an aviator in the MTO while General Spaatz looks on. Arnold kept a very close eye on the strategic air war in Europe, considering it the USAAF's main effort in World War II.

lite A m e r i c a n s A r r i v e

1 0 3

B o m b i n g up an Eighth Air Force Fort prior to a m i s s i o n in 1943.

POIWTBLANK BEGINS ^ ^

*

I saw a Fort knocked out of the group On fire and in despair With Nazi fighters surrounding As itßew

The Messerschmitts Throwin'a

her

alone back there. came barreling

through

hail of lead

At the crippled Fort that wouldn't quit Though two of its engines were dead. But a couple of props kept straining

away

And her guns were blazing too As she stayed in the air In that hell back there And fought as Fortresses do. —Anonymous

Eighth Air Force crewman, penned while in captivity

in Stalag Luft # /. Quoted in Staying Alive by Maj. Carl Fyler

B R E M E N W A S O N E O F T H O S E T A R G E T S that made the American bomber crews groan. T h e factories in Bremen gave birth to many of the F o c k e - W u l f 1 9 0 s that intercepted their formations to kill and w o u n d their friends. T h e Germans

An Eighth Air Force raid en route to Bremen. Bremen was one of the nail-biter

ringed Bremen with heavy anti-aircraft guns and a concentration

missions for the crews. Thoroughly defended by flak and fighters, the city was

of fighters that made every raid on the city a harrowing ordeal for

home to aircraft factories and U-boat construction facilities. Losses on such

the M i g h t y Eighth.

raids were heavy throughout 1943.

O n April 17, 1 9 4 3 , Eaker sent his men against Bremen. Four b o m b groups, led by the 9Ist's twenty-eight B - I 7 s , f o r m e d u p

105

over East Anglia and headed for their target. T h e force totaled 1 0 7 bombers. Back at the 9 1 s t G r o u p s base at Bassingbourn, the c o m m a n d i n g officer h a d arranged to host a huge party that evening that included 1 5 0 civilian guests and 2 0 0 men f r o m the group. N e a r the target area, the Germans coordinated a masterful interception. T h e Messerschmitts and FockeW u l f s concentrated on the 9 1 s t and made determined head-on attacks against its squadrons. Six of its Forts went down in flames—five f r o m one squadron. M o s t of the 9Ist's remaining planes suffered damage. Altogether, fifteen Forts fell to the German fighters. Another thirtynine returned home scarred by flak shrapnel, cannon shells, and machine gun hits. Over half the attacking force went down or took damage. It was a desperate and sobering m o m e n t for the Eighth Air Force. At Bassingbourn, the partiers awaited the 9 1 s t Group's return. T h e y straggled in, dead aboard their battered Forts. In horror, many of the guests realized The U-boat yard at Bremen was a priority

that the men who had invited them had died that afternoon over Germany. As the survivors

Eighth Air Force target, one that was

climbed out of their aircraft, most wanted nothing to d o with the festivities.

repeatedly bombed through 1943 and 1944.

T h e party went on. T h e men showed up, nerves shot from the ordeal they'd just experienced. T h e m o o d only grew worse as the alcohol flowed and the evening wore on. T h e survivors drank away their pain and some got so out of control that the group s historian recorded the event for posterity, noting that "several of the combat crew members indulged too freely." Bremen set the tone for a year of catastrophes and casualties. O n June 13, the heavies struck at Kiel and Bremen simultaneously with 1 8 2 aircraft. T h e Germans shot 2 2 of them out of the sky and damaged another 2 3 . Such losses simply could not be sustained. T h e crews began to suffer the effects of prolonged exposure to the stress o f combat. T h e y h a d trouble sleeping. T h e y self-medicated with alcohol. S o m e broke down completely and had to be grounded. A few c o m m i t t e d suicide rather than face the crucible of flak and fighters again. T h r e e days before that dreadful mission, the U.S. chiefs o f staff issued the Eighth its marching orders in what became known as Directive Pointblank. Taken straight from the C o m b i n e d Bomber Operations document Eaker, Hansell, and the British produced, Pointblank called for the destruction of the German aircraft industry and the simultaneous seizure of air superiority over Western Europe. It was a tall order. T h a t summer, the Germans h a d put their aircraft factories in high gear. T h a t spring, the workers in those plants constructed over a thousand fighters a month. T h e total Luftwaffe fighter force rose f r o m about 1 , 6 0 0 planes in February to over 2 , 0 0 0 by the start of the summer. O f those, about 8 0 0 defended the Reich and its Western approaches f r o m the Eighth Air Force. Bad weather hampered the execution of Pointblank for over a m o n t h . Finally, toward the end of July, the clouds vanished a n d blue skies greeted the bomber crews each dawn. Eaker

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A 95th Bomb Group B-17 struggles through a sky full of 88mm flak bursts over Bremen.

seized the moment. In what became known as "Blitz W e e k " the Eighth flew m a x i m u m effort missions for six consecutive days starting on July 2 5 . H a m b u r g served as the first target of the new offensive. T h e target had been chosen jointly with Bomber C o m m a n d in what became one of the first incidents of round-the-clock bombing on a German city. T h e night before, Bomber C o m m a n d hit the city with incendiaries and 4 , 0 0 0 - p o u n d blockbuster bombs. T h e next morning, T h e Eighth attacked Hamburg's shipyards. Frantic Luftwaffe interceptors pressed their attacks to point-blank range over the burning city and blew fifteen American bombers out of the air. Sixty-seven more suffered serious damage out of the hundred that made it to the Initial Point (IP), the start of the b o m b run. T h e following night, the British b o m b e d H a m b u r g again, but thunderstorms disrupted the mission. T h e y tried again on the night of the twenty-seventh, sending 7 3 9 bombers through the darkened skies to H a m b u r g . W i t h the air dry and warm, the incendiary attack created a tornado of fire that stretched a thousand feet into the air. T h e flames, whipped and propelled by winds of over 1 5 0 miles an hour, consumed eight square miles of downtown Hamburg. T h e

firestorm

melted asphalt, asphyxiated hundreds of civilians trapped in

underground shelters, and burned everything in its path. Witnesses reported seeing the hurricane-like winds sweep people right off the streets and throw them into the roiling flames. Bomber C o m m a n d hit the city two more times before August 3. W h e n the operation ended,

Unlike t h e RAF's n i g h t c a m p a i g n , t h e r e w a s no hiding in the d a y l i g h t skies over W e s t e r n Europe. Early on, the Eighth A i r Force c r e w s discovered their aircraft left contrails that could be seen for dozens of miles. L u f t w a f f e fighters had little t r o u b l e l o c a t i n g t h e m once t h e i r g r o u n d c o n t r o l l e r s v e c t o r e d t h e m into t h e b o m b e r stream's g e n e r a l vicinity.

A 9 1 s t B o m b Group Fort s w i n g s l o w over an airfield in East A n g l i a after a m i s s i o n over Europe in S e p t e m b e r 1943

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Chapter 5

Eighth Air Force Bases and Air Divisions

As a stopgap, the Eighth Air Force

over fifty thousand German civilians lay dead in the smoldering ruins of their city. A million

experimented with YB-40 escort bombers to

more emerged from their shelters to find their homes destroyed.

protect its Flying Fort formations. The YB-40

W h i l e Bomber C o m m a n d devastated H a m b u r g , the Eighth s "Blitz W e e k " continued.

was an up-armored B-17 loaded with extra

O n the twenty-sixth, the Forts and Liberators hit Hanover a n d H a m b u r g again; 2 2 7 American

ammunition and .50-caliber machine guns.

airmen died, went missing, or suffered wounds during those twin raids.

In combat, they proved to be nearly useless and were so laden that they could not stay in

In the first two days of Blitz W e e k , the Eighth lost 3 1 7 men. Eaker did not ease u p on the operational tempo. O n the twenty-eighth, the bombers struck the Fieseler aircraft factory

formation with the more lightly loaded B-17s

in Kassel a n d another aviation plant at Oschersleben. Over three hundred bombers left East

after they had emptied their bomb bays. These

Anglia. Twenty-two went down over Europe a n d over a hundred more returned to England

YB-40s belonged to the 91st Bomb Group.

with battle damage. Another 2 3 1 airmen became casualties. D u r i n g the d a y s missions, the Germans unleashed a new surprise on the American bomber crews. T h i s time, deep over the T h i r d Reich, the B - 1 7 formations encountered a formation of Messerschmitt B f - 1 1 0 fighters equipped with rocket projectors under their

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Chapter 5

The 3 5 1 s t B o m b Group en route to a t a r g e t inside G e r m a n y d u r i n g the 1943 c a m p a i g n .

A t a r g e t p h o t o s h o w i n g t h e 303rd B o m b Group's t i g h t p a t t e r n of 5 0 0 - p o u n d b o m b s w a l k i n g across t h e hangar a n d barracks f a c i l i t i e s at a L u f t w a f f e airfield o u t s i d e of Orleans, France

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Chapter 5

Above:

S u m m e r at M o l e s w o r t h A i r f i e l d in

East A n g l i a , h o m e of t h e 303rd B o m b Group. M a n y of t h e Eighth Air Force s t a t i o n s w e r e c a r v e d s t r a i g h t o u t of the f a r m l a n d in the area The local f a r m e r s w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o w o r k t h e land s u r r o u n d i n g t h e f a c i l i t i e s , l e a d i n g t o f a l l h a r v e s t s as t h e A m e r i c a n s c o n t i n u e d t h e air w a r a g a i n s t Germany.

Left: Ground c r e w s f r e q u e n t l y d e c o r a t e d b o m b s b o u n d for t h e Third Reich w i t h typica irreverent A m e r i c a n humor.

Pointblank Bejins

1 1 3

A formation of Eighth Air Force Forts in

wings. Called die G r . 2 I , the new weapon was an adaptation of a W e h r m a c h t infantry mortar.

1943. The nose armament ended up being

T h e IIOs lurked behind the 3 8 5 t h Bomb Group, their pilots careful to stay out of machine

the weak point of the B-17E and F models.

gun range as they launched their rockets. T h e projectiles shot out of their tubes, soared over

When the Luftwaffe discovered this, the best

the 3 8 5 t h s aircraft, then fell right into the m i d d l e of their formation a n d exploded. T h e

Jagdgeschwaders executed head-on passes

attack scored a direct hit on a B-17, which spun into two others and sent them plummeting

through the bomber boxes.

earthward in flames. Tn a heartbeat, the 3 8 5 t h lost thirty men. July 2 9 , 1 9 4 3 , saw Eaker send his units against Kiel and the Heinkel factory at Warnemünde. T h e effort that day claimed anodier hundred American airmen. And still Eaker would not ease u p on the pace. Over a hundred more men went down the next day over Kassel. S o much bloodshed, so many aircraft l o s t — t o what gain? Post strike reconnaissance showed spotty accuracy at best. In order to get their bombs to their intended destination, the Forts a n d Liberator crews h a d to fly straight and level from the IP until they reached the target. T h i s usually required flying without any evasive maneuvers at all for at least fifteen miles at a time when the crews usually faced the heaviest concentrations of anti-aircraft fire. continued on pape 121

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Chapter 5

The d r e a d e d " B u t c h e r B i r d " — t h e F o c k e - W u l f Fw-190A, the Luftwaffe's most deadly daylight i n t e r c e p t o r in 1943. S t a n d a r d a r m a m e n t included f o u r 2 0 m m c a n n o n s a n d a pair of m a c h i n e guns firing over t h e nose. Later, t h e Germans manufactured underwing 20mm p a c k a g e s t h a t could d o u b l e t h e Focke-Wulf's c a n n o n f i r e p o w e r . In such a c o n f i g u r a t i o n , the Focke-Wulf became a deadly bomber destroyer. But t h o s e extra c a n n o n s c a m e at t h e e x p e n s e of m a n e u v e r a b i l i t y , h o w e v e r , and if c a u g h t by A m e r i c a n e s c o r t f i g h t e r s t h e y w e r e easy prey.

A B-17 n a v i g a t o r at w o r k in his c r a m p e d c o m p a r t m e n t .

Hit by flak over T r o n d h e i m , N o r w a y , an Eighth A i r Force B-17 f a l l s out of f o r m a t i o n over t h e N o r t h Sea. The c o m b a t box provided s a f e t y and mutual defense. W h e n a damaged B-17 Based m a i n l y inside the Third Reich itself, out of range of VIII Fighter C o m m a n d ' s a i r c r a f t , t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s heavy

could n o t keep up w i t h its s q u a d r o n m a t e s ,

fighters, like t h i s M e s s e r s c h m i t t M e - 4 1 0 , used rockets to d i s r u p t B-17 f o r m a t i o n s b e f o r e closing in a n d picking

chances w e r e good marauding Luftwaffe

off s t r a g g l e r s w i t h c a n n o n fire. They w e r e t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e c a s u a l t y - p r o d u c i n g i n t e r c e p t o r in the skies d u r i n g

f i g h t e r s w o u l d p o u n c e oil t h e m a n d finish the

1943 a n d h e l p e d tip the scales in f a v o r of t h e L u f t w a f f e later t h a t fall.

c r i p p l e d a i r c r a f t off.

Pointblank Bejins

1 1 5

A 3 8 5 t h B o m b Group c r e w d r a g s a d a m a g e d Fort h o m e as " m e a t w a g o n s " — a m b u l a n c e s — a w a i t its landing.

"This is It," a 3 8 1 s t B o m b Group Flying Fort on a b o m b run over M a i n z , Germany. The final a p p r o a c h to a t a r g e t area w a s a l w a y s t h e m o s t v u l n e r a b l e m o m e n t s for the Eighth Air Force c r e w s . To ensure m a x i m u m accuracy, t h e Forts a n d Liberators had to fly s t r a i g h t a n d eve for at least f i f t e e n m i l e s w h i l e t h e lead b o m b a r d i e r s located a n d t r a c k e d t h e t a r g e t . The G e r m a n s recognized t h i s as t h e killing m o m e n t s a n d ringed v i t a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s w i t h heavy flak b a t t e r i e s . If t h e flak d i d n ' t a c t u a l l y knock a i r c r a f t d o w n , it f r e q u e n t l y d i s r u p t e d f o r m a t i o n s e n o u g h to d e g r a d e accuracy.

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A B-17 c o m b a t box over France in 1943. The G e r m a n f i g h t e r pilots learned to j u d g e w h i c h groups w e r e better t h a n o t h e r s by h o w t i g h t t h e pilots s t a y e d in t h e s e f o r m a t i o n s . Less e x p e r i e n c e d c r e w s t e n d e d to fly in looser boxes, w h i c h t h e L u f t w a f f e w o u l d e x p l o i t w i t h s u d d e n , s l a s h i n g a t t a c k s at t h e i r w e a k e s t points.

A c a p t u r e d F w - 1 9 0 A under f l i g h t t e s t i n g back in t h e U n i t e d States. The U S A A F t h o r o u g h l y e v a l u a t e d the F o c k e - W u l f to learn its w e a k n e s s e s a n d s t r e n g t h s so t h a t t a c t i c s c o u l d be d e v e l o p e d to d e f e a t t h i s very e f f e c t i v e G e r m a n fighter.

S h o t up a n d on fire w i t h t h r e e e n g i n e s out, t h i s B-17's c r e w m a n a g e d t o limp back t o East A n g l i a a n d crashland in rolling f a r m l a n d , w h e r e Eighth Air Force g r o u n d p e r s o n n e l c a u g h t up to it a n d b e g a n e f f e c t i n g repairs. Such i n c i d e n t s w e r e all t o o c o m m o n t h r o u g h t h e 1943 c a m p a i g n .

Pointblank Bejins

117

The t a i l gunner's p o s i t i n g in a 9 1 s t B o m b Group B-17 at B a s s i n g b o u r n in 1943. The t w i n .50-caliber m a c h i n e guns proved so e f f e c t i v e w h e n g r o u p s m a s s e d into t h e i r p r o t e c t i v e c o m b a t boxes t h a t t h e L u f t w a f f e i n t e r c e p t o r s v i r t u a l l y gave up stern a t t a c k s .

The Fort's w e a k nose a r m a m e n t — a s i n g l e h a n d - h e l d .50 used by the b o m b a r d i e r — w a s s o o n d i s c o v e r e d and e x p l o i t e d by t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s f i g h t e r pilots. To c o u n t e r t h e i r h e a d - o n a t t a c k t a c t i c s , t h e Eighth Air Force g r o u p s b e g a n f i e l d - m o d i f y i n g t h e i r a i r c r a f t . In this case, t h e ground c r e w s of t h e 91 st B o m b Group i n s t a l l e d a t w i n .50 m o u n t in t h e nose of a B-17 at B a s s i n g b o u r n in February 1943.

118

[Itapter 1

Above: Eaker and Gen. Jacob Devers pose beneath the nose of the most f a m o u s Eighth Air Force B - 1 7 — t h e Memphis of the Memphis

Belle. The c r e w

Belle became the first to

complete their t w e n t y - f i v e - m i s s i o n tour in England.

Left: In M a y 1943, L u f t w a f f e reconnaissance aircraft and occasional bombing raids on England remained a threat. Here, the 92nd Bomb Group has covered one of its Forts w i t h camouflage netting. Pup tents for the ground c r e w s surround the aircraft.

Pointblank Bejins

119

M o r n i n g at R i d g e w e l l , h o m e of t h e 3 8 1 s t B o m b Group, in A u g u s t 1943.

120

[Itapter 1

M o s t groups simply abandoned that S O P (standard operating procedure). Even after the IP h a d been reached, they w o u l d change altitude every few seconds to throw off the radar-operated guns below them. T h e N o r d e n sights could not handle such maneuvers and still make its calculations with any accuracy. Fewer Forts went down, but the targets remained intact, which required return visits to them and more exposure to Luftwaffe interceptors. It was a zero-sum game with the crews caught in a hellish cycle. In 1 9 4 2 , the average Eighth Air Force bomber crew could expect to survive about fourteen or fifteen missions. Twenty-five completed a tour. N o t many did. T h e y faced long odds that year. In the summer of 1 9 4 3 , the o d d s grew even worse. T h e average crew survived fewer than ten missions. As Blitz Week came to its bloody end, there was no doubt who was winning the air war over Germany: the Luftwaffe still controlled the daylight skies. Caught from behind by an Eighth Air Force fighter, a Focke-Wulf Fw-190 pilot breaks right in a desperate effort to get out of his pursuer's line of fire. He was a split second too late, and the American's bullets can be seen scoring hits along the right wing root.

A pair of 305th Bomb Group B-17s prepare for takeoff at Chelveston in June 1943. The Eighth Air Force had grown strong enough that summer to challenge the Luftwaffe over the Third Reich for the first time. Without a long-range escort fighter to protect them, the Eighth's bombers took a serious beating.

Pointblank Bejins

121

M e m b e r s of t h e 3 7 6 t h B o m b Group pose b e f o r e one of t h e i r B-24Ds. K n o w n as t h e Liberandos, t h e 3 7 6 t h w a s one of only t w o heavy b o m b a r d m e n t g r o u p s in Brereton's N i n t h Air Force.

THE GET RICH QUICK SCHEME * * * * *

T H E U S A A F ' S S T R A T E G I C B O M B I N G D E V O T E E S understood that to destroy the T h i r d Reich's military industrial complex would require a long campaign whose success would not be quantifiable until long after the war ended. A t least, intellectually they understood this. Viscerally, the targeting experts and planners continually sought to deliver a single body blow to the Reich's war making capabilities that could materially affect the strategic situation in the moment, not six m o n t h s down the road. It w o u l d take three painful lessons a n d well over a thousand fine young men to finally drive this fantasy f r o m the ranks of the U S A A F ' s senior brass. By the late fall of 1 9 4 3 , it was obvious to everyone that there was no super-target that could drive Hitler's air force and armies to their knees. At first glance, it is easy to see why such a visceral desire lingered. Colonel Richard Hughes, the Eighth Air Force targeting expert, had studied the Reich's economy with his staff to develop a prioritized list of industrial facilities to be bombed. Several stuck out, including the massive ball-bearings complex at Schweinfurt, the aircraft factories at Regensburg and Wiener-Neustadt, and the oil refineries of Ploesti. In each case, these plants formed a significant percentage of the production in their respective fields. If they could be knocked out, the effect could be immediate. Ploesti looked to be among the most promising. T h e various refining facilities there provided the T h i r d Reich with 3 5 percent

The Eighth Air Force units were accustomed to the weather and conditions

of its refined oil. Such a huge concentration of production capacity

in England. The Libyan desert's primitive conditions and minimal logistical

had to become a key target for any serious strategic b o m b i n g

support seriously complicated preparations for Tidal Wave. Here, members of

campaign, but by the summer of 1 9 4 3 , the Allies h a d attacked

the 93rd Bomb Group prepare a bomb prior to a mission in the cold morning

Ploesti only three times. T h e Russians had launched two nuisance

air in England before deploying to Libya. Just the aircraft made the trip to the

raids, and the Americans h a d attacked it with an inconsequential

North African desert, forcing the Eighth Air Force groups to rely on the Ninth

number of B - 2 4 Liberators based in N o r t h Africa.

Air Force ground crews to service, arm, and fuel their B-24s.

123

The 343rd Bomb Squadron of Col. J o h n Kane's 98th Group painted their aircraft in a Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs

theme. The 98th w a s f o r t u n a t e to have a t a l e n t e d artist named A m o s Nicholson serving w i t h

the ground crew. His inspired nose art has captured the eye of generations of collectors and historians. This particular B-24, Dopey, miraculously survived the war, only to be c o n d e m n e d and scrapped in the late fall of

124

[Itapter 1

Prince Charming, another 343rd Bomb Squadron B-24D, was flown by Lt. Thomas Bennett during Operation Tidal Wave. It was one of the eight aircraft that aborted due to mechanical failure prior to reaching the Balkan coast.

T h e r e were a number of problems with attacking Ploesti. A t the top of that list was its location deep in R o m a n i a . O u t of range f r o m England, using the Eighth Air Force was not an option. T h a t left Gen. Louis Breretons N i n t h Air Force, stationed in Libya. Even so, such an attack would stretch Breretons already over tasked B - 2 4 Liberator units. Getting there and back w o u l d require a 2 , 7 0 0 mile flight, m u c h of it through an air defense network bristling with anti-aircraft artillery, supported by an outstanding radar a n d observation network and backed u p by over three hundred Axis interceptors. Due to the ranges involved, any attacking

file Gel B i c h Q u i c k S c h e m e

1 2 5

Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs

was

Tn any scenario, rolling in over Ploesti at 20,000

f o l l o w i n g Colonel Kane into Ploesti and

suicidal aerial parade across the Balkans.

dropping their bombs on target, Gunn's

126

Allied force would have to go in without escort fighters riding shotgun during the bomb runs.

piloted by Lt. J a m e s A. Gunn III. A f t e r

feet at 1 8 0 miles an hour would be a near-

Brereton had precisely two bomb groups: the 3 7 6 t h "Liberandos" and the 98th

c r e w ran into a flight of Bf-109 interceptors

"Pyramiders." Without massive reinforcements, bombing Ploesti would have to remain a

from JG-27. The 109s knocked Gunn's

distant pipe dream.

aircraft d o w n w e s t of Kefalonia Island,

After the Casablanca Conference in early J 943, one of Gen. Hap Arnold's trusted inner

Greece, killing eight of the nine men on

circle, Col. Jacob Smart, happened to attend a training exercise that involved a formation of

board. One member of the c r e w survived to

A - 2 0 Havocs attacking vehicles. The Havoc pilots came in low on the deck and nailed their

be captured by the Germans.

targets with such deadly accuracy that it got Smart's wheels turning. If the light attack boys

[Itapter 1

The primitive, harsh conditions of the Libyan desert defied the traditional image of the aviator's cushy life in W o r l d W a r II. Tents, desert sand, and terrible f o o d and w a t e r w e r e the order of the day for the men. A lack of University of Oregon alumnus Brian Flavelle piloted the doomed Wongo

Wongo on A u g u s t 1 , 1 9 4 3 . The former

Fighting Duck w a s assigned to the 376th Bomb Group's second element, but as they approached the Balkan coast, Wongo

Wongo suffered some sort of catastrophic control failure, w h i c h sent it p l u m m e t i n g into the

hangars, spare parts, and logistical support facilities, like proper bomb storage magazines, played havoc w i t h the ground c r e w s , w h o had

M e d i t e r r a n e a n Sea. All aboard w e r e killed. The disaster disrupted the Liberando f o r m a t i o n and started a chain

to w o r k in the open under the blazing North

of events t h a t caused the group's t i m i n g and navigation to break d o w n .

African sun day after day j u s t to keep the bombers flying.

could wreak such destruction, even if it was in a simulated environment, what could a lowflying strategic bomber do? This was not a novel idea. In Kenneys Fifth Air Force, the B-24 and B - I 7 groups had been running low altitude attacks on Japanese shipping for months with good results. Could it be done against strategic targets? The question intrigued Smart. All of thirty-three years old. Smart had replaced Launs Norstad on Arnold's AdvisoryCouncil in mid-1942 after Norstad was sent overseas to serve as Jimmy Doolitdes chief of stall in the Twelfth Air Force. The Advisory Council functioned as Arnold s brain trust, conceiving long-range plans while functioning as the communications conduit between the meeting-averse Arnold and the Air Staff. The young, capable officers on the Advisory Council had Arnold s ear, and had the potential to greatly influence how the USAAF was employed across the globe. Nowhere is that more evident than in the aenesis of Operation Tidal Wave. After Smart's epiphany on the training range marveling at the deftly handled A-20s as they roared low overhead, he proposed that Brereton's bombers hit Ploesti in the same way. There were reasons to like the plan. First, by staving low the Liberators could stay undetected bv German radar. I hat could give the strike force an edge of surprise that would minimize casualties. Going in on the deck would also maximize bombing accuracy and the damage the B-24s

lite Get dielt Quick Scheme

127

Ploesti was the most heavily defended target in Southern Europe in the summer of 1943. Some 300 anti-artillery guns and 320 interceptors guarded the oil refineries. The Germans used flak trains to quickly shift their anti-aircraft assets from one threatened target to another around the Ploesti complex. Here, a flak train mounts heavy 128mm guns. During Tidal Wave, the B-24 gunners fought a desperate, point blank gunfight with these trains as they sped along at low altitude.

could inflict on the target area. In that sort of scenario, a smaller force could do more damage down low than a massive one f r o m 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet. S m a r t took his idea to Arnold, who loved it. Soon, the concept had the approval of the Air Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was so w i l d and innovative that F D R was smitten by it as well. H e loved the unorthodox, and Smart's idea flaunted all doctrine and broke every prewar rule. Clearly, two groups of B - 2 4 s that h a d been operating out of the Western Desert for m o n t h s w o u l d not be enough. T h e y weren't at full strength, and fifty bombers would not be sufficient to get the job done anyway. For this one raid, the Eighth Air Force would have to lend Brereton three b o m b groups. N o t surprisingly, Ira Eaker howled in protest at the dispersion of his scant resources. He'd already lost several Another example of a German 128mm anti-aircraft

B - 1 7 groups to Doolittle's Twelfth Air Force. N o w he was asked to siphon away even

gun, this one emplaced in a fixed position. Capable of

more men and planes, even if it were temporary.

reaching any altitude Allied bombers could attain, the

128

T h e r e were other opponents in theater as well. Colonel H u g h e s didn't like

128 provided the perfect heavy flak support to the more

the plan. Neither d i d Gen. Gordon Saville, Spaatz's chief of staff at M e d i t e r r a n e a n

numerous and famous 88s.

Air C o m m a n d .

[Itapter 1

A 44th Bomb Group B-24D. The 44th had trained in Washington at McChord Field before moving to Oklahoma for its final pre-deployment training. Assigned to the Eighth Air Force, the 44th became one of the early B-24 groups to operate in England. To bolster General Breretons B-24 strength for the Ploesti Raid, the 44th, 389th, and 93rd Bomb Groups were redeployed to the Libyan desert in the early summer of 1943. After Operation Tidal Wave, the 44th returned to England and operated for the duration of the war with the Mighty Eighth. This particular B-24 was shot down in May 1943 while serving with the 68th Bomb Squadron.

Louis Brereton loved the idea and completely embraced it. H i s N i n t h Air Force would be in the limelight, a n d the potential of delivering a catastrophic blow to the T h i r d Reich captivated his imagination. H i s enthusiasm drove the ultimate execution of what became known as Operation Tidal Wave. Starting on July 19, 1 9 4 3 , the B - 2 4 groups began rehearsals for the attack. Navigating at low altitude took a lot of skill a n d practice, so the squadrons kicked off a crash course in it. O u t in the Libyan desert, Breretons c o m m a n d constructed a mock u p of the Ploesti area complete with white-washed outlines of buildings and landmarks and gasoline d r u m s serving as stand-ins for the oil storage tanks at each of the seven refineries on the target list. Every day, the groups practiced formation flying on the deck while finding the target area out in the desert. As they did, more resistance to the plan developed. General U z a l Ent, head of 9 t h Bomber C o m m a n d , tried to get T i d a l Wave altered so his men could go in at high altitude as they h a d trained all their U S A A F careers to do. A few days of rehearsals w o u l d not prepare his men for the trial ahead. H e was ignored. W o r r i e d , he elected to join his men on the mission, a n d when the 3 7 6 t h Bomb Group lifted off their dusty Libyan airfield, Ent was riding with the group's c o m m a n d i n g officer, Colonel Keith C o m p t o n . M o r e concern came f r o m Ike and Tedder, both of w h o m urged Brereton to cancel the mission. If only they had made that an order. August I, 1 9 4 3 : five groups of B - 2 4 D Liberators arose in the early hours of dawn to face curtains of flak and diving interceptors. T h e 3 7 6 t h took station as the lead group. Colonel Compton's ride, TeggieAnn, f o r m e d the point of a spear 1 7 6 Liberators strong. Behind

the Liberandos came the Pyramiders of Col. John "Killer" Kane's 9 8 t h Bomb Group, and the 4 4 t h , 3 8 9 t h , a n d 9 3 r d groups as well. Over the M e d , the first Liberators began to abort. Mechanical issues claimed eleven of the bombers, and they limped back to die desert to find their airfields. At 1 1 3 0 that morning, the first disaster struck. Flying in the Liberandos' second element was Wongo Wongo, a B - 2 4 D flown by University of Oregon graduate Brian Flavelle. For reasons never determined, his Liberator suddenly jerked out of formation and staggered erratically through the air. T h e entire element broke apart as the other pilots sought to avoid a mid-air collision widi Wongo Wongo. Flavelle and his copilot must have fought the controls, but it was no use. T h e i r B - 2 4 plunged straight into the Mediterranean off the coast of Corfu, killing all ten aboard. Flavelle's wingman dove down and circled the area in hopes of spotting survivors, but the effort was in vain. M a n y accounts of T i d a l Wave point to this m o m e n t as the one that unraveled the entire operation. Flavelle's plane supposedly carried the lead navigator for the mission, and with his Anxious ground crew await the return of the

death the 3 7 6 t h ended up off course. Recent scholarship has shown this probably was not

Tidal Wave strike force. When the battle-

the case. T h e lead navigator was with Colonel C o m p t o n and General Ent in Teggie Ann at the

damaged B-24s limped back to Libya, the full

head of the strike formation. T h e r e is no doubt losing Flavelle to some sort of malfunction

cost of the raid slowly dawned on those left

affected the Liberandos, but what happened next can't be blamed on his loss.

behind. There would be dreadfully large gaps

T h e Liberators reached the Balkan coast like an onrushing earthquake. T h e i r passage

around the tables in the chow tent that night.

shook the g r o u n d for miles as 6 5 6 Pratt & W h i t n e y R - 1 8 3 0 s blasted the pastoral scenes below with 7 8 7 , 2 0 0 combined horsepower. It must have been an unforgettable sight to those on the g r o u n d w h o witnessed it. Over mountains the bombers skimmed, racing against not just the Axis air defense network, but against the complex timing o f the attack as well. T i d a l Wave called for nearsimultaneous attacks on all seven refineries around Ploesti. Since there were only five b o m b groups, several o f the targets would be hit with less than optimal numbers. T h e plan called for simultaneous runs on all seven facilities. Already, the chaos over the M e d caused by

The Liberandos return home to Libya. Eight of the group's B-24s were lost that day.

130

[Itapter 1

Preparing a 5 0 0 - p o u n d b o m b in t h e desert w a s a very e l e m e n t a l affair. W i t h o u t proper equipment, the ground crews improvised and m a d e it w o r k .

A B-24 roars low over the target area, engulfed by the chaos of flames, smoke, and flak.

Flavelle's loss h a d compromised the timing for the 3 7 6 t h . Now, as the Liberandos reached w h a t Colonel C o m p t o n thought was their IP, another critical mistake was made. C o m p t o n turned too early. T h e plan called for the bombers to fly northwest of Ploesti, then swing right a n d descend on the target area f r o m an unexpected direction. Instead of that happening, Colonel Compton's premature turn set the Liberandos on a direct course to Bucharest, over thirty miles south of Ploesti.

file Gel B i c h Q u i c k S c h e m e

131

A c r e w f r o m t h e 3 7 6 t h B o m b Group reaches

Many of the group's navigators soon detected the error. Radio silence was broken as they

t h e i r a i r c r a f t in the p r e d a w n hours b e f o r e

called out. "Mistake! Mistake!" over the command net. Compton pushed on, directly into the

t h e g o - o r d e r w a s given a n d t h e Ploesti s t r i k e

heaviest concentration of anti-aircraft guns in Europe. The German defenders had calculated

launched. D u r i n g t h e i r p r e - m i s s i o n briefings,

an attack on Ploesti would have to come from the south, aiven the fuel considerations the

t h e air c r e w w e r e s h o w n a s p e c i a l l y m a d e

Americans had to take into account. The southern corridor into Ploesti was lined with AAA.

film a b o u t Ploesti. It s t a r t e d w i t h t h e n a r r a t o r

Meanwhile, one B-24, Brewery Wagon, broke out of the Liberando formation and turned

saying, " P l o e s t i is a virgin t a r g e t . . . " w h i l e

for Ploesti. Alone, it waded into the target area leapina over fences, telephone poles, and

depicting a supple half-naked young w o m a n .

buildings like a hurdler at a track meet. Flak filled the skies around the B-24 until an 88111111 shell struck its nose and killed the plane's navigator and bombardier. Crippled, the pilot

132

[Itapter 1

A Liberando B-24 returns home. The Ploesti raid cost the USAAF over five hundred men.

d u m p e d his bombs to stay aloft. M o m e n t s later, a Messerschmitt B f - 1 0 9 spotted them and dove for the kill. T h e interceptors finished what the flak gunners started. Brewery

Wagon

slammed into the ground. German and Romanian soldiers surrounded and captured them within minutes. Just as the rest of the 3 7 6 t h Bomb Group reached the outskirts of Bucharest, Colonel C o m p t o n realized his mistake and ordered a sharp left turn to the north. Instead of coming in to Ploesti running northwest to southeast like the rest of the strike force, the Liberandos flew straight into the teeth of the most heavily defended sectors around Ploesti racing south to north. T h e y crossed paths with the other B - 2 4 s in a flaming chaos over the target area. O n l y the 9 8 t h Bomb Group maintained its schedule and appropriate course. C o m i n g into the target area, Kane h a d already lost eight of his aircraft to mechanical aborts. N o w down to a skeleton crew, he could see smoke boiling u p f r o m the refineries. Other units h a d already attacked. At that moment, a flight of 3 7 6 t h Bomb Group B - 2 4 s suddenly appeared below Kane's aircraft, Hail Columbia, streaking off target before turning for home. T h e sky filled with anti-aircraft fire. Ahead, a haystack on the edge of the refineries suddenly melted away to reveal a flak gun. Kane dove below the tree line a n d used the two fixed-forward

firing

. 5 0 calibers to "shoot my way in." Before even reaching the target, he'd

Sandman, a 98th Bomb Group Liberator flown by Lt. Robert Sternfels, skims across the smoke and flames of the Astra Romana Refinery at

fired all 2 , 4 0 0 rounds of ready a m m u n i t i o n for the guns, leaving his navigator knee deep in

the height of the Tidal Wave attack. Sternfels

sizzling, spent shell casings.

and his crew could not make it back across the

To the right of Kane's flight a flak train appeared. A r m e d with 8 8 m m and 1 2 8 m m heavy guns, the train rolled parallel to the 9 8 t h Bomb Group's course a n d hammered the

Med after exiting the target area. Instead, they diverted to the RAF field on Cyprus.

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1 3 3

formation with point blank fire. T h e fusillade was so accurate that two o f Kane's B-24s, including his wingman, took hits that killed two men and wounded another. A third Liberator had an engine shot out. T h e German and American gunners traded fire in one of history's most unusual drive by shootings, and for interminable seconds the planes and train dueled to the death. Overhead, a squadron of German Messerschmitt B f - 1 0 9 s spotted Kane's group rushing forward on their final approach to their target area in five waves. Diving down into their own flak, the interceptors played havoc with the Liberators. Kane's flight leader in the fifth wave went down, victim to both flak and fighters.

THE B 2 4

At this point, Kane could have aborted the mission.The furious reception, the devastating losses already suffered by the unit through aborts and battle damage had thinned the 98th's already stretched

W H E N C O N S O L I D A T E D conceived and constructed the B-24, they chose a path of function over form. Ugly, box-like, and looking like a duck with its shoulders around its ears, the Liberator inspired none o f the aesthetic pleasure that defined the B - 1 7 Flying Fortress.

ranks. All Kane had to do was radio the code word "crabapple" and the Pyramiders would break contact and speed for home. H e did not give that code word. Instead, throttles

firewalled,

his B - 2 4 plunged into the tempest of flames, flak and smoke over the target. Colonel Kane led the way across the Phoenix Orion

Yet, it could carry a heavier bomb load than the Fort over a longer distance. In time, it outstripped the B - 1 7 as the mainstay of Americas strategic bombing force. Over sixteen thousand—double the number of B - I 7 s — r o l l e d off stateside production lines by w a r s end. T h e Liberator was not without its issues. First, its narrow, long wings did not lend themselves to close formation flying at high altitudes. W h i l e the Forts remained rock solid and easy to keep tucked into a group defensive box above 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet, fully loaded Liberators tended to wallow around. T h i s had profound consequences over Germany, as the Luftwaffe preyed on groups displaying looser formations. T h e more spread out the bombers were, the less able they became at mutually supporting defensive fire. Liberator groups took heavy losses at times because o f this design deficiency. T h e Liberator also lacked the Fort's rugged construction, a fact that did nothing to endear the B - 2 4 to its crews. It was the ultimate utilitarian bomber of W o r l d W a r II, a workhorse, never beloved or revered, but one that carried the war to the heart of the T h i r d Reich by 1 9 4 4 .

W h a t passed for a m e n i t i e s in t h e Libyan desert. The m e n of t h e heavy b o m b a r d m e n t g r o u p s s u f f e r e d f r o m ail array of diseases, i n c l u d i n g dysentery, due to the S t o n e A g e q u a l i t y of their living c o n d i t i o n s .

134

[Itapter 1

The 9 8 t h and 4 7 6 t h B o m b Groups had been h e a v i l y e n g a g e d t h r o u g h o u t 1943 in t h e lead up to Tidal W a v e . During duly, t h e t w o groups s u p p o r t e d O p e r a t i o n Husky, t h e invasion of Sicily, b e f o r e s w i t c h i n g into t r a i n i n g m o d e for the Ploesti attack. D e s p i t e t h e a l m o s t c a t a s t r o p h i c c a s u a l t y rate over t h e Balkans, the B - 2 4 g r o u p s r e t u r n e d to N a z i - d o m i n a t e d skies in t h e i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h of the raid. The pressure on the c r e w s could n o t have been m o r e intense.

file Gel Bich Quick Scheme

1 3 5

refinery, one of Ploesti s seven facilities, when one of the huge storage tanks took a bomb hit and exploded. A shaft of flames erupted from the tank, blowing the saucer-shaped lid hundreds of feet into the air. Moments later, Kane's left wing was engulfed m the fire, but miraculously neither engine began to burn. T h e final seconds before Kane's men reached their release points proved a holocaust of flames and steel. The German flak crews wiped out an entire three-plane flight. One by one, the B-24s fell out of the sky and exploded within the refineries. The last plunged right into a building and blew hunks of masonry and rubble high into the air. Shrapnel tore through the

TeggieAnn,

Col. Keith Compton's ride into Ploesti, taxis to the parking area

back in Libya f o l l o w i n g Operation Tidal W a v e . Compton's 376th Bomb Group ed the entire strike force, but a navigational error sent the Liberandos on a bombing run t o w a r d Bucharest, not Ploesti. Compton corrected the mistake, but w a s forced to make an improvised bomb run on the correct targets from a d i f f e r e n t direction, w h i c h crossed paths w i t h the other groups right w h e n the A m e r i c a n s w e r e most heavily engaged by the German air defense network.

Dedicated ground c r e w s put the final touches on their aircraft in the dark prior to the take-off.

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[Itapter 1

The Liberandos return. For most of the raid's survivors, August 1,1943, became the seminal moment of their lives. The price of the raid did not just include the physical losses manifested by the empty seats around the chow tent tables that evening. What happened over Southeastern Europe that day would linger in their memories and nightmares for decades to come.

fuselage of another 9 8 t h Liberator, wounding three o f its crewmen as they fought back with their .50-caliber machine guns. T h e survivors completed their runs, d r o p p e d their bombs, and sped after Colonel Kane as he led the remains of his c o m m a n d south for home. Even then they were not safe. Fighters made swift, deadly passes on them. Exhausted, the crews fought back, draining the last of their a m m u n i t i o n as they struggled to fend off the Messerschmitts and Romanian I A R - 8 0 s . Several more Pyramiders went down. Ultimately, of the thirty-eight B - 2 4 s Colonel Kane led into the target area, only

B-24s over the Mediterranean. The Ploesti raid required the crews to navigate at low altitude

twelve made it back to Libya. Five diverted to fields in Sicily or Cyprus, too battled damaged

for 2,700 miles. Some of the Liberators were

to make it across the M e d . T h e flak and fighters the group faced destroyed eighteen B - 2 4 s

airborne for over fifteen hours, a grueling

with almost 1 8 0 men aboard. T h e 4 4 t h , 93rd, and 3 8 9 t h waded into the fray, B - 2 4 s criss-crossing paths in the m a d

psychological and physical challenge for the young aircrews.

scramble to get to their assigned targets. Wave after wave of Liberators dodged smoke stacks, ducked low behind terrain features to avoid anti-aircraft fire, a n d braved the ocean of flames

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1 3 7

A w a v e of L i b e r a t o r s e n t e r s t h e Ploesti inferno. Facing flak, fighters, geysers of f l a m e , d e b r i s , and exploding delayed-action bombs dropped by p r e c e d i n g w a v e s , t h e losses over t h e t a r g e t area w e r e a p p a l l i n g .

Colonel J o h n " K i l l e r " Kane, c o m m a n d e r of t h e 9 8 t h B o m b Group. During t h e h e i g h t of

now boiling from the refineries. The 93rd lost two of its B-24s to a midair collision as they

t h e a t t a c k , he led his Pyramiders into t h e fray

came off the bomb run. Another nine more Libs from the Traveling Circus went down.

even as flak t r a i n s s h o t up his f o r m a t i o n s .

T h e 3 8 9 t h lost six of its twenty-nine B-24s, and the 44th returned home less eleven of its

Of t h e t h i r t y - s i x Liberators he t o o k into t h e

thirty-eight aircraft. Out of sheer desperation, some of the crews dragged their battered

f l a m e s of Ploesti, only t w e l v e reached Libya

B-24s to Türke)-, where they crash-landed. T h e Turkish authorities interned the surviving

a f t e r t h e m i s s i o n . For his valor a n d s t u b b o r n

crew members.

d e t e r m i n a t i o n , Colonel Kane received t h e M e d a l of Honor.

Chapter 1

Altogether, the five groups lost 5 4 out of the 164 Liberators that made it to the target area, a loss rate of 32 percent. Most of the remaining bombers that did get back to friendly

bases had suffered major damage during the running battle over the Balkans. O f the 1 , 7 5 1 air crew on the mission, 3 0 6 were killed, 1 3 9 captured, 6 9 interned in Turkey, and 4 escaped and evaded, returning to Allied territory in the months that followed. M a n y more crewmen returned to Libya, their bodies torn by shrapnel and bullets. T h e one mission h a d virtually destroyed the N i n t h Air Forces strategic bombing capabilities. T h e Germans lost about a hundred anti-aircraft gunners. Two Luftwaffe pilots and three R o m a n i a n pilots were killed intercepting the B-24s. For the American survivors, there was no time to rest. Brereton sent them u p against targets in Italy the very next day. W h a t a l u m i n u m could withstand, flesh w o u l d be tested to the utmost. T h e campaign would continue with ruthless execution. A n d what of Ploesti? Post-strike reconnaissance missions returned with photos that showed the crews h a d p e r f o r m e d extraordinarily in the face of so m u c h opposition. M u c h

An onrushing, if ragged and battle-thinned, wave of B-24s on the bomb run over Ploesti.

The oil refineries were equipped with smoke generators designed to obscure them from high-level bombers. Here, the white smoke from them mingles with billowing black clouds boiling up from burning oil tanks.

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O p e r a t i o n Tidal W a v e w a s t h e first a n d only t i m e s t r a t e g i c b o m b e r s w e r e used oil the deck in the European Theater. Hoping to maximize accuracy and minimize detection, t h e n a p - o f - t h e - e a r t h flying a l s o m a d e the Liberators easy t a r g e t s for t h e t h r e e h u n d r e d a n t i - a r t i l l e r y guns d e f e n d i n g Ploesti. Here, a f o r m a t i o n of B-24s hugs t h e earth as it s p e e d s t o t h e release point.

A r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p h o t o of t h e S t a n d a r d Oil Refinery at Ploesti. It w a s not s e r i o u s l y damaged during the attack, something the Nazi p r o p a g a n d a m a c h i n e w a s guick to point out a n d note t h a t both the French a n d Britishs p o n s o r e d refineries had b e e n h a m m e r e d .

Chapter 1

of refinery facilities had been devastated, though the strike missed the one American-built plant owned by Standard Oil, a fact that was played up by Axis propaganda. Brereton later claimed that Operation T i d a l Wave destroyed 6 0 percent of Ploesti s output. W h i l e that number was high, the damage was extensive. A n d yet, Jacob S m a r t s get rich quick scheme failed to deliver the knock out blow to the Reich's military machine. T h e reason why was rooted in the nuances of aerial economic warfare. First, when the Liberators reached Ploesti that August, the seven refineries h a d been operating far below their m a x i m u m capacity. Altogether, the seven plants could produce 9 . 5 million tons of oil. But that summer, the production rate was only 4 . 7 5 million tons. In the days following the attack, the R o m a n i a n workers busily rerouted production to the u n h a r m e d facilities a n d brought online the unused capacity. W i t h i n weeks, the black gold o f Ploesti flowed from its refineries once again, to be whisked away in rail road tanker cars to feed the T h i r d Reich's voracious appetite for fuel. Ploesti left both an enduring legacy a n d a scar on the U S A A F . Such heavy losses, when combined with what was to follow over northwest Europe in the weeks to come, finally convinced the senior strategic bombing leadership that the campaign as envisioned in the inter-war period was simply not going to work. U n e s c o r t e d bombers, no matter how many defensive guns they possessed, could not defend themselves against determined interceptors. It would take several more grievous lessons to h a m m e r that point home, but Ploesti was a turning point in that shift of mindsets. It was the resolution and courage of the American air crews that left the most enduring legacy. W h e r e other air forces would have turned back in the face of such incredible opposition, men like Col. John Kane pressed the attack and refused to be dissuaded. T h e courage this required cannot be underestimated. Flying below the treetops, hedgehopping across the Romanian countryside, the pilots clearly saw what they were in for as they approached the swirling inferno over Ploesti. T h e y could not doubt their fate. T h a t their hands remained steady on the controls, their hearts resolved because they believed in the missions importance, left an example of heroism unsurpassed in American aviation history. Five men, including Colonel Kane, received the M e d a l of H o n o r for their valor that day. T h e i r Balaclavalike charge at Ploesti sent a clear message to the Germans: T h e Americans would not be dissuaded.

The target area during the climax of the attack.

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141

D ü r i n g t h e initial d e e p p e n e t r a t i o n raids over Germany, t h e b o m b e r gunners d i s c o v e r e d t h e y had to w a t c h t h e i r a m m u n i t i o n supply carefully. So m a n y f i g h t e r s w o u l d a t t a c k t h e i r f o r m a t i o n s t h a t o f t e n t h e y ' d run o u t of .50c a l i b e r a m m u n i t i o n . A f t e r m i s s i o n s like R e g e n s b u r g a n d S c h w e i n f u r t , t h e w a i s t g u n n e r s s t o o d in a n k l e - d e e p piles of s p e n t brass, a t e s t a m e n t to the f e r o c i t y of the fighting.

THE WHEELS CDME DFF ^ ^

*

This was to be my 25 th mission. I was so battle weary I could hardly function, was right. Maybe, subconsciously,

but I acted. I did what I thought

I knew it would be over one way or another . . . there were only two of us left

from the top squadron. —Carl Fyler, Staying Alive AUGUST

1943 W A S T H E M O N T H

FOR E-TICKET TARGETS. While

Ploesti

attracted the N i n t h Air Force, the Eighth cast around for something really substantial to bomb. Colonel R i c h a r d D ' O r l y Hughes, VITT Bomber C o m m a n d s chief targeting officer, studied his m a p s a n d reviewed his lists o f aircraft factories a n d their estimated production levels in search o f some German Achilles' heel the Americans could exploit. H e thought he found that weakness in three locations: Schweinfurt, Regensburg and W i e n e r N e u s t a d t . T h e aircraft factories at Regensburg and W i e n e r N e u s t a d t accounted for almost half the Luftwaffe's fighter production, while Schweinfurt produced half of the T h i r d Reich s ball bearings. C o u l d a triple strike hammer all of these choice targets at once? Such an operation would require coordinating with the N i n t h Air Force in Libya; W i e n e r N e u s t a d t was located near Vienna, Austria, and was out of the Eighth Air Force's range. W e a t h e r issues conspired against such cooperation. W h e n the skies cleared over Western Europe, they clouded over to the south. T h e N i n t h ended up b o m b i n g W i e n e r Neustadt on its own on August 13, 1 9 4 3 . U s i n g the sixty-five remaining Liberators that survived the inferno of Ploesti, the N i n t h surprised the Germans with this deep penetration raid. H a r d l y any interceptors were based in the area and for a change the B - 2 4 crews didn't take it on

Forts over England. By the summer of 1943, the Eighth Air Force had grown

the chin. O n l y a few bombers were lost. T h e raid failed anyway; the

strong enough to attempt deep penetration raids into the Third Reich. The

bombardiers missed their targets.

theory of daylight precision bombing would finally be put to the test.

143

The Messerschmitt Bf-109G was the most common Eighth Air Force adversary over Germany's skies in 1943. Over thirty-five thousand 109s were built during the war. While an excellent air superiority fighter, the 109 was not a particularly good bomber interceptor. It lacked the firepower of the Bf-110 or the Fw-190, a severe disadvantage when attacking the ultra-rugged Flying Fortress.

T h a t left the Eighth Air Force to tackle Regensburg and Schweinfurt. VIII Bomber C o m m a n d concocted a complicated and timing-based plan that required a lot of moving pieces to function without normal operational friction. General Curtis L e M a y s 4th Bomb W i n g would lead the mission with the elite 9 6 t h Bomb Group at the tip of a spear 1 3 9 bombers strong. Regensburg would be their target for the day. Located deep inside Germany, L e M a y s B - I 7 s would face the ultimate test: could they survive for hours unescorted in the face of determined Luftwaffe interception? To maximize their chances, L e M a y came up with a new type of mutually supporting formation that required three bomb groups. H e had twelve total under his command, so he organized them into four tightly-drawn "combat wings," each with a middle group, a high group, and a low group flying in close proximity to one another. T h i s way, the groups could cover each others flanks with their B - I 7 s massed defensive gun power. T h e 1st Bomb W i n g was supposed to follow directly behind the 4 t h with a

fifteen-

m i n u t e interval between the two formations. Once over Central Germany, the 1st would veer off to b o m b Schweinfurt, hopefully surprising the Luftwaffe's radar operators with the sudden course change. To further confuse the Luftwaffe, L e M a y s men w o u l d not turn back for England. Instead, his Forts would continue southward to land in N o r t h Africa. T h i s represented the first of several "shuttle" bombing missions p e r f o r m e d by the Eighth. The Eighth Air Force targeting specialists searched for weak spots in the German war

O n August 17, 1 9 4 3 — t h e one-year anniversary of the M i g h t y Eighth's first m i s s i o n — weather reconnaissance aircraft detected clear skies over the target areas. In England, however, the

machine and its industrial base, hoping to

crews sat next to their B - I 7 s enduring mist, fog, and light rain. L e M a y didn't let that stop him.

locate some key facility that when destroyed

He'd trained his groups in instrument take-offs, and after a ninety-minute delay, his men gained

could materially affect the war right away.

the sky, formed up into a column some fifteen miles long, and headed for Regensburg.

Chapter 1

T h e Germans attacked them over Belgium. S w a r m s of interceptors swept out down into deadly head-on passes. T h e Luftwaffe pilots concentrated on the trailing combat w i n g — t h e

Curtis LeMay (far right) led the 4th Bomb Wing during the famous double strike mission to

unlucky 9 1 s t again along with the 3 8 1 s t . T h e escorting American P - 4 7 s could not handle

Regensburg and Schweinfurt. LeMay's combat

the German onslaught, and the interceptors broke through their cordon to flame six of

experience in the Eighth Air Force shaped his

L e M a y s B - I 7 s . A t the German frontier, the T h u n d e r b o l t s ran low on fuel and turned for

vision of strategic bombing for years to come.

home, leaving the Forts to the depredations of hundreds of German fighters. Before even

Later, he commanded the B-29 forces in the

reaching Regensburg, another eight Forts went spinning down to their destruction. Bombing from below 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet, the 4 t h W i n g inflicted considerable damage to the aircraft factories. Later estimates put the production loss at almost a thousand fighters. W i t h

Pacific and burned Japan's major cities to the ground. After the war, he forged Strategic Air Command into an elite and highly effective force.

their bays now empty, the Forts continued southward for N o r t h Africa, a move that d i d catch the L u f t w a f f e s g r o u n d controllers by surprise. A few B f - 1 1 0 s gave chase, shooting down three more American planes.

The W h e e l s Come Off

1 4 5

M e a n w h i l e , the I st Bomb W i n g d i d not leave its airfields until L e M a y s had been in the air for five hours. T h e delay, caused by the weather in East Anglia, set the table for a Early in 1943, the Boeing B-17E began

catastrophe. Once aloft, the 2 2 2 bombers in this second wave m a n a g e d to place a perfect

to be replaced by the B-17F. This early

interval between themselves and L e M a y s m e n — a t least f r o m the German perspective. T h e

Fort arrived in England with an unusual

timing allowed the Luftwaffe's fighters to land, rearm, and refuel. S o m e of the 1 0 9 and F w -

camouflage pattern that resembled the

1 9 0 pilots even had time to grab a bite to eat before taking to the air again.

standard RAF disruptive scheme.

T h e Luftwaffe's g r o u n d controllers had spent m u c h of the afternoon marshalling resources to really p o u n d the 4 t h W i n g when it headed back to England. Instead of facing off against the 4 t h W i n g , these interceptors turned out to be perfectly placed to devastate the second American wave. S o m e three hundred fighters tore into the I st Wing's formation. T h i s time, they concentrated on the lead combat box. Seventeen Flying Forts fell out of the sky as the fighters made relentless attacks from all quarters. Over Schweinfurt, the wing had to select a new IP on the fly

146

[Itapter 1

in order to keep the setting sun out of the eyes of its bombardiers. T h e last-minute switch threw a monkey wrench into the attack. T h e crews scattered their bomb loads all over the city. Fritz Boost, a young Luftwaffe transport pilot, happened to be in Schweinfurt after the

A 96th Bomb Group B-17 over Belgium. The

raid and saw the damage it inflicted. T h e bombs had cut neat swatches right through the city,

96th was one of the Eighth Air Force's elite

destroying block after block o f buildings without causing catastrophic damage to the ball

outfits, which is why it was selected to lead

bearings plants located there.

the Regensburg mission in August 1942.

T h o u g h production did drop as a result of the attack, the Germans simply made u p the shortfall by purchasing ball bearings from the Swedes. H a p A r n o l d attempted to stop the sale by offering the Swedish government P - 5 1 M u s t a n g s a n d C - 4 7 Skytrain cargo aircraft, but the Swedes refused the offer and cut a deal with N a z i Germany instead. Altogether, sixty B - I 7 s failed to return f r o m the Regensburg-Schweinfurt double strike mission. Worse, when L e M a y s men reached N o r t h Africa, the landing grounds were so primitive that they lacked even basic maintenance facilities. A n d the 4th W i n g s Forts

The W h e e l s Come Off

1 4 7

needed a lot of maintenance. M o s t of the ones that reached N o r t h Africa had suffered Boeing could not produce B-17s fast enough

battle damage. L e M a y ended up having to abandon sixty non-flyable B - I 7 s in N o r t h Africa.

to support the global effort against the

Bombing Regensburg cost the 4 t h W i n g 4 0 percent of its effective strength.

Axis powers. As a result, construction was contracted to a number of other companies,

T h a t night, Bomber C o m m a n d flattened Peenemünde, N a z i Germany's secret rocket research facility. Tn the process, Luftwaffe night fighters shot down forty R A F bombers. In

including Douglas and Vega. This Eighth Air

one day, the Allied strategic forces h a d lost a hundred aircraft and close to a thousand men.

Force B-17 was produced at the Douglas plant

T h e staggering losses only grew worse.

in Long Beach, California.

After the double strike raid, Eaker began to waver. D i d the British have it right after all? H e decided to explore the idea of converting the Eighth Air Force to night operations. H e sent a squadron f r o m the 3 0 5 t h Bomb Group to the R A F to gain experience in nocturnal raiding. After a short respite, the Eighth increased its operational t e m p o through September, reaching an almost fever pitch the following m o n t h . T h e intense losses a n d the constant

148

[Itapter 1

missions through the spring and summer h a d already strained the air crews to the limit of their endurance. S o m e simply could give no more. Pilot Bob " S p o o k " Bender came to England in the spring of 1 9 4 3 as part of the original cadre of the 9 5 t h Bomb Group. During a raid on Lorient, Benders Fort took a flak hit that knocked out two engines. H e dragged the crippled bomber back to England and crashed at the R A F fighter station at Exeter. T h e B - I 7 skidded off the runway and took out a highway bridge. Bender lost two more Forts over the next few missions. Both were so badly shot u p by flak and fighters that after he crash-landed back in England they were dragged off for salvage. O n his eighth mission, a raid on the U - b o a t pens at St. Nazaire, Benders f o u r t h B - I 7 took a serious hit that knocked out an engine. T h i s time, they didn't make it home. H e and his crew ditched off the French coast a n d spent m o s t of two days and a night riding the swells in a couple of rubber rafts until a British torpedo boat fished them out of the water. Eight missions, four crash landings. Psychologically, Bob Bender had given all he h a d to the strategic bombing cause. W h i l e off duty, he went to see a movie with some o f his squadron mates. T h e newsreel that evening featured a piece on the U S A A F ' s bombing campaign and depicted attacks on B - I 7 formations f r o m Luftwaffe gun camera footage. T h e sight o f the

Two Southerners behind the controls of a B-17. At left is pilot Lt. Bob Boundrecor who hailed from small-town Louisiana. At right is Lt. Ned Hawkins, a native of Jacksonville, Florida.

The W h e e l s Come Off

1 4 9

Forts going down caused Bender to start screaming at his gunners to "Shoot/ Shoot!" H e ducked behind a balcony railing until his friends eased him out of the building. A few days later, Bender and his crew went to pick u p their fifth B - I 7 . As they took off, he froze at the controls and h a d to be overpowered. Group sent h i m to a hospital, where he suffered a complete breakdown. H e returned to the States, a psychological casualty who never recovered from his ordeal. A t age twenty-five, Bender suffered a fatal heart attack. T h e crews just had to put their heads down a n d endure. T h e y counted their missions and prayed that every briefing would reveal the d a y s target would be a m i l k run. T h e r e weren't any m i l k runs in the fall of 1 9 4 3 . In October, the 1 9 4 3 air campaign over W e s t e r n Europe reached its climax as the Eighth Air Force flew a series of m a x i m u m effort strikes deep into Germany. O n the eighth, 4 0 0 Forts a n d Liberators returned to Bremen a n d Vegesack. T h e y returned less 3 0 bombers and three hundred more airmen. Another 1 1 0 l i m p e d back to England with battle damage. T h e next day, the groups sortied for Germany again, striking Danzig, Marienburg, The crowded confines of a B-17's bomb bay.

A n k l a m and Gdynia with about 3 5 0 bombers. Twenty-eight went down while another 1 5 0

Sometimes, loading the ordnance could be

suffered damage.

exceptionally dangerous, and there were cases

T h e next day, the Eighth flew its third m a x i m u m effort mission in three days. M o s t of

of bombs exploding. This usually resulted in a lot of casualties.

A Luftwaffe Bf-109 pilot with his dog in the cockpit with him. As the 1943 campaign wore on, the average quality of German replacement pilots plummeted.

150

[Itapter 1

Fritz Boost w a s a r e p l a c e m e n t pilot. Trained t o fly M e s s e r s c h m i t t M e - 3 2 3 t r a n s p o r t s , he w a s p u l l e d into t h e D e f e n s e of t h e Reich and t a u g h t (briefly) h o w to fly t h e F o c k e - W u l f Fw-190. Fritz h a d a l r e a d y b e e n s h o t d o w n on t h e Eastern Front in a M e - 3 2 3 , ending up in the Black Sea until rescued. Later, as a F o c k e - W u l f p i l o t , o u t n u m b e r e d a n d a l o n e , he w a s s h o t d o w n in again in the w i n t e r of 1 9 4 4 - 1 9 4 5 . A f t e r t h e w a r , he e m i g r a t e d t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d b e c a m e a high school teacher.

The a f t e r m a t h of a d a y l i g h t p r e c i s i o n b o m b i n g raid. The d e a d lay w i t h i n t h e t a n g l e d i n d u s t r i a l ruins.

The Wheels tome Olf

151

The e n d of a M e s s e r s c h m i t t Bf-109, w h o s e s u r p r i s e d p i l o t did n o t even have t o drop his belly t a n k .

A f t e r the R e g e n s b u r g raid, L e M a y ' s B-17s r e a c h e d N o r t h A f r i c a in bad shape. A l m o s t 4 0 p e r c e n t of his a i r c r a f t had either b e e n s h o t d o w n d u r i n g t h e m i s s i o n or r e a c h e d N o r t h Africa w i t h major damage that grounded t h e m . He had to a b a n d o n sixty n o n - f l y a b l e Flying Forts on his return f l i g h t t o England a f e w days later.

152

[Itapter 1

Tom Paine w a s a survivor. This B-17 served throughout the w a r w i t h the 388th Bomb Group and f l e w countless missions against Nazi Europe only to be scrapped at war's end in dune 1945.

The W h e e l s Come Off

153

General Eaker bore the brunt of the failing long-range penetration effort into Germany. By year's end, he had been bumped to the MTO, never to receive another promotion. He's seen here at war's end as a Soviet official decorates him with a Red Army medal. Had the Fort not been as durable as it was, the Eighth Air Force's crew losses would have been unsustainable.

the bomber crews h a d already flown at least one of those, a n d some h a d flown on all three. T h i s time, the target was Münster. T h e Americans ran into a Luftwaffe b u z z saw, and within minutes of getting intercepted, the 1 3 th C o m b a t W i n g s three groups lost twenty-five planes. T h e air battle raged all the way to the target and throughout the desperate return to England. Lieutenant John W i n a n t , the son o f the American ambassador to Great Britain, was shot down that day while piloting a 3 9 0 t h Group B - I 7 . H e managed to bail out and spent the rest of the war in a German P O W camp. T h i s third consecutive deep penetration raid cost the Eighth another thirty bombers and 3 0 6 airmen. Four days later, the Eighth Air Force struck Schweinfurt for the second time. T h e ball bearings factories proved to be an irresistible lure. T h i s time, the high c o m m a n d held no illusions at how difficult this mission would be on the crews. W o r d came down from Eighth

154

[Itapter 1

The aftermath of an air battle. Spent ,50-caliber machine gun rounds rattle around in the bottom of a Flying Fort's fuselage.

Air Force H Q that this target could shorten the war if destroyed. T h e group commanders received explicit instructions to tell the crews this in hopes that it would motivate them. T h r e e hundred twenty B - I 7 s and B - 2 4 s took off f r o m East Anglia that day. T h e y f o r m e d u p into their tight combat boxes a n d drove into the teeth of the Luftwaffe juggernaut. For hours the b o m b groups came under fighter attack. Wave after wave of expertly led jagdgeschwaders of F w - I 9 0 s a n d B f - I 0 9 s drove their gunnery runs to point-blank range, drilling the American bombers with cannon and machine gun fire. T h e raid devolved into a parade of slaughter as Fort after Fort went down. S o m e of the American gunners ran out of

The W h e e l s Come Off

1 5 5

A search and rescue aircraft locates a B-17 that splashed down in the North Sea. A larger boat has been dropped to the crew, who are crammed into a rubber dinghy.

a m m u n i t i o n before reaching the target area, so fierce was the fighting. T h e B - 1 7 carried about seven thousand rounds for its thirteen machine guns, which gave each crewman only a few minutes of firing time for their weapons. T h e 1 0 0 t h Bomb Group suffered the worst that day. After the preceding raids in October, the outfit could only field eight B - I 7 s for the Schweinfurt mission. T h e Germans cut all eight out of the sky. After that, the unit was known throughout the U S A A F as the "Bloody Hundredth." Once again, Col. Archie Olds a n d his 9 6 t h Bomb Group led the entire force to target aboard a B - 1 7 n a m e d Fertile Myrtle ILL T h e 9 6 t h endured repeated fighter attack for an hour and h a l f on the way to Schweinfurt, but Olds' aircraft evaded damage. D u r i n g the b o m b run, their luck evaporated. A flak shell burst next to the bomber's nose, sending shrapnel into the bombardier's head a n d legs. Despite his wounds, he crawled back to his N o r d e n sight and laid his bombs on target. O n the way home, the 9 6 t h passed over Reims, where a surprise volley of anti-aircraft fire hit Fertile Myrtle III a second time. T h e group's navigator died instantly as shrapnel tore through his back. T h e bombardier suffered a thigh wound. O l d s was blown out of his seat at the same time more shrapnel scythed through the cockpit, wounding two more crewmen. W i t h two engines out, the B - 1 7 entered a dive f r o m 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet. Somehow, they stayed aloft long enough to get back home a n d execute an emergency landing. As Olds watched the g r o u n d crew remove the bloody remains of the navigator, he said, "Save me a pew in church on Sunday." T h e second Schweinfurt raid cost the Eighth Air Force sixty-seven bombers and almost 6 5 0 airmen. T h e 3 0 5 t h Bomb Group incurred 1 3 0 of those casualties, a figure that represented 8 7 percent of the group's strength that day. T h e 3 0 6 t h lost another 100.

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[Itapter 1

The t h r e a t of a f o r c e d landing in the N o r t h Sea or t h e English Channel w a s ever p r e s e n t for t h e Eighth A i r Force c r e w s . In East A n g l i a , the a i r m e n used c a s t - o f f or c a n n i b a l i z e d w r e c k s to t r a i n for such a possibility.

The W h e e l s Come Off

1 5 7

Shrapnel w o u n d s from bursting anti-aircraft shells inflicted t h o u s a n d s of c a s u a l t i e s on A m e r i c a n b o m b e r c r e w s . To p r o t e c t themselves, the men often w o r e armor plating, s o m e of w h i c h w a s s t a n d a r d issue. S o m e

Often, the b o m b s w o u l d find t h e i r mark a n d d e s t r o y m u c h of a f a c t o r y c o m p l e x ' s structures. Inside, o f t e n the

a i r m e n had t h e g r o u n d c r e w s f a b r i c a t e c u s t o m

v i t a l m a c h i n e t o o l s , e g u i p m e n t , a n d g e n e r a t o r s w o u l d survive the o n s l a u g h t , w h i c h a l l o w e d the w o r k e r s t o

a r m o r e d slabs a n d even c o d p i e c e s as w e l l .

clear debris a n d g e t the plant up a n d r u n n i n g g u i t e guickly.

A w a i s t g u n n e r in a c t i o n . This w a s t h e c o l d e s t p o s i t i o n in a B-17 W i t h t h e side w i n d o w s open to t h e o u t s i d e , t h e t e m p e r a t u r e s could be as l o w as sixty b e l o w d u r i n g w i n t e r flying at 20,000 f e e t . Taking gloves o f f , even for a f e w seconds, o f t e n r e s u l t e d in f r o s t b i t e .

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[Itapter1

In the nose of a B-17F, modified with a pair of ,50-caliber machine guns. The bombardier position was not well suited for larger men.

In return, the ball bearing plants took severe damage. Yet, the raid failed to affect the German war machine as hoped. T h e T h i r d Reich actually possessed a large surplus of ball bearings in the fall of 1 9 4 3 , a n d whatever more they needed the Swedes readily provided. Besides, the workers quickly went to work restoring their factories to functioning levels again and within a short time the production rate climbed to pre-attack levels. T h i s represented a major oversight on the part of the prewar strategic bombing advocates. Everyone from D o u h e t to Trenchard, S p a a t z and M i t c h e l l failed to consider that once bombed, a factory could be rebuilt. T h e Eighth Air Force f o u n d itself faced with a multi-dimensional adversary.

T h e W h e e l s C o m e O f f 167

Above:

Ten Knights

in a Bar Room, a 94th Bomb Group B-17G, rail afoul

of a L u f t w a f f e M e s s e r s c h m i t t Bf-110 f l o w n by Lt. Jacob Schaus of N a c h t j a g d g e s c h w a d e r - 4 during a mission to Emden on October 4 , 1 9 4 3 . Schaus shot the bomber d o w n , but all t e n men m a n a g e d to get out of their d o o m e d Fort safely. Three became POWs, and the other seven s o m e h o w miraculously evaded capture and returned safely to Allied hands.

Left:The

100th Bomb Group earned a reputation as a jinxed unit. During the

October S c h w e i n f u r t raid, the entire group w a s shot d o w n . Throughout much of 1943, the L u f t w a f f e singled out the group and inflicted severe casualties, p r o m p t i n g many rumors and speculation as to w h y the 100th seemed to receive such t r e a t m e n t so freguently.

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[Itapter 1

A f o r m a t i o n of " B l o o d y H u n d r e d t h " B-17s d u r i n g a m i s s i o n in t h e s u m m e r of 1943. One r u m o r t h a t c i r c u l a t e d t h r o u g h t h e Eighth Air Force e x p l a i n e d w h y t h e L u f t w a f f e s e e m e d b e n t on t h a t group's d e s t r u c t i o n . During a raid in early 1943, the r u m o r said, the 100th h a d m a c h i n e g u n n e d a G e r m a n p i l o t in his p a r a c h u t e a f t e r h e ' d b a i l e d o u t of his b u r n i n g interceptor. W o r d s p r e a d t h r o u g h t h e D e f e n s e of the Reich units a n d the 100th b e c a m e a m a r k e d b o m b group. P o s t w a r research f a i l e d to c o n f i r m any of this. M o r e likely, t h e 100th f l e w a ooser f o r m a t i o n t h a n t h e other units in its c o m b a t w i n g . The G e r m a n s p i c k e d up on t h i s a n d e x p l o i t e d t h a t m i s t a k e w i t h r e l e n t l e s s n e s s t h a t led to the d e a t h s of h u n d r e d s of A m e r i c a n c r e w s .

The W h e e l s Come Off

161

Me and My Gal, a 384th Bomb Group B-17, became another v i c t i m of the Luftwaffe's heavy fighters t h a t fall, A J u - 8 8 f l o w n by Uffz. Benno Grämlich caught Me and My Gal over S i m m e r s h o f e n , Germany, during the October 1 4 , 1 9 4 3 , mission and brought it d o w n . Until the Eighth could protect its bombers f r o m the L u f t w a f f e ' s t w i n engine fighters, deep penetration raids w e r e simply too costly to continue.

Fifty-fifth Fighter Group P-38 Lightnings on the flight line in England. Though a w a r - w i n n e r in the S o u t h w e s t Pacific, the P-38 never achieved the same level of success in N o r t h w e s t Europe against the L u f t w a f f e , leading to its general replacement w i t h P-51 M u s t a n g s throughout the Eighth Air Force.

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Alabama Exterminator II, a 384th Bomb Group B-17, is examined by curious RAF personnel.

N o t only d i d the bombers have to fight their way through flak and fighters to reach the target areas, but they h a d to contend with the workers on the g r o u n d who patched u p the damage their bombs inflicted. T h i s meant there w o u l d be n o knock-out blow, no get rich quick target that could shorten the war or bring the T h i r d Reich to its knees. Instead, the U S A A F faced the prospect of a grueling, prolonged campaign to not only knock out their targets, but keep them nonoperational with repeated attacks. Schweinfurt underscored the problem with that reality: the Eighth Air Force simply could not absorb the losses such sustained bombing would require. Unescorted strikes deep inside

Mission debriefing. Landing back in England

Germany had failed dramatically and at a terrible cost. It was either time to throw in the towel

did not end the day for the Eighth Air Force

and join the R A F s night campaign or come up with something else that could keep the bomber

crews. After securing their bomber, they would

losses manageable. It was the something else that saved daylight bombing.

gather to go over the details of the mission with their group's intelligence section.

The W h e e l s Come Off

1 6 3

A w a i t i n g the start of a briefing for a m i s s i o n to Leipzig at t h e 3 8 5 t h B o m b Group's base at Great A s h f i e l d

THE MORTAL ONES ^ ^

*

Fred Derry shook his head and walked a path From bathroom to dresser . . . Stopped a while and leaned his elbows . . . Looked against the glass And saw the snapshots curling there: The faces of the 305th. And some were

ringed—

He'd put an inky ring around the ones He'd seen exploded, f r y i n g , going —MacKinlay

down.

Kantor, Glory For M e

L O N G B E F O R E S U N R I S E , the duty officer awoke the crews for the day's mission, moving f r o m barracks to barracks with a flashlight

a n d a list of names. Groggy, weary men, barely removed

f r o m frat parties and family farms, arose in the d a m p velvet darkness of England at war. A shower and shave in cold water followed an indifferent breakfast: powdered eggs, spam, and coffee thick as syrup. T h e banter w o u l d be forced; uncertainty dominated the mess hall. W h e r e were they going today? W o u l d it be a m i l k run to the French coast? O r w o u l d it be a meat grinder like Schweinfurt or Leipzig, Berlin or Bremen? To the men who would soon m o u n t u p

The men of the 305th. Fred Derry was the main character in MacKinlay Kantors

in the a l u m i n u m depths of their Liberators and Forts, the fickleness

poetic novel, Glory For Me, which was written just after the end of the war.

of their lot seemed both cruel and capricious. T h e decisions made

Instead of creating a fictional unit for Derry to have flown with while in the

above them at wing or c o m m a n d H Q held little reason, only dread

Eighth Air Force, Kantor went for added realism and used an actual unit. Glory

thinly concealed with crude jokes and camaraderie.

For Me became the basis of the enduring classic film The Best Years of Our

Breakfast finished, the officers departed for their briefing. It was here that the suspense w o u l d be lifted. T h e y sat in wooden

Lives, which probed the effects of combat on three veterans after they returned home from the war.

165

Inside the 385th's briefing room. At the back of the room, behind

Once the group commander announced the target for the day, the intelligence officer

the table and chairs, is a screen for projecting slides and film. It

would usually walk through the planned mission in detail, using a huge wall map of

was here that the crews assigned to the day's mission would learn

Europe to illustrate the critical elements of the raid.

the target they were to bomb.

chairs clad in their A - 2 flight jackets, boots a n d k h a k i pants, waiting for the g r o u p commander to stride into the room and stand before his men. Elmer Bendiner wrote of this daily ritual in The Fall of the Fortresses: " W e sat as if in school assembly. T h e death's-head-and-crossed-bombs insignia on our leather jackets a n d the pistols dangling from our belts lent a boyish wickedness to the scene." W h e n the commander arrived, the room went silent and the tension immediately spiked. Behind their old-man facades, these boy-warriors prayed for an easy mission. T h e daily toll of deep strikes had left them weary. T h e strategic air war had become a test of human endurance, and all had known men whose character could not withstand this test. T h e y failed in odd and sometimes dramatic ways. T h o s e who kept slogging aged well beyond dieir tender years as friends died or came home in shattered blood-stained bombers, their bodies burned, torn or disfigured by shrapnel and bullets. They'd long since learned that the glory they saw back home on small town silver screens simply d i d not exist in the skies over Germany. Physically and psychologically, the strategic bombing campaign was a Course to the target was usually denoted by a red ribbon or string. The longer it stretched into Nazi-held Europe, the more groans and sounds of angst would arise from the audience.

death march that only the luckiest and strongest would survive. T h e group commander w o u l d make a few introductory comments. Perhaps he'd crack a joke to ease the tension. But then, it was down to business. " T h e target for today is . . . "

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[Itapter 1

For America, the strategic bombing campaign may have been planned in the prewar era by professional USAAF officers, but it was carried out by average young men from all walks of life, most of whom had never set foot in an airplane prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.

Behind him, a m a p w o u l d be concealed until this moment. Operational security was taken very seriously, so the m i s s i o n s destination w o u l d remain a closely guarded secret for as long as possible. T h e m a p w o u l d reveal relief or angst. T h e officers seated in those wooden chairs cheered or groaned as they greeted the news. M i l k run or flak trap. Fighter escort, or go it alone. Colored lines denoted the ingress and egress routes. T h e time hacks each squadron would be required to meet were carefully reviewed and noted. At times, the mission requirements left some of the men in attendance with greatly troubled hearts. T h e s e were young Americans, steeped in the traditions of their family's

T h e M o r t a l O n e s 175

For s o m e of the air c r e w s , the c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t G e r m a n y e l i c i t e d moral concerns. M a s s i v e b o m b i n g of cities, c l o a k e d in t e r m s ike " p r e c i s i o n b o m b a r d m e n t " could not h e l p but p r o d u c e m a s s i v e c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s . To s o m e of t h e s e y o u n g m e n , t h i s w a s an e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t m i s s i o n to carry out.

The M ü n s t e r raid broke f r o m t h e d o c t r i n e of p r e c i s i o n b o m b i n g on i n d u s t r i a l t a r g e t s . For t h e first t i m e , t h e Eighth Air Force d e l i b e r a t e l y p l a c e d a c i v i l i a n w o r k f o r c e in t h e N o r d e n s crosshairs. Here, the 9 4 t h B o m b Group plods its w a y to t h e t a r g e t area, w h e r e 30 out of t h e 236 b o m b e r s t h a t r e a c h e d the t a r g e t w o u l d be lost. Four days later, t h e Eighth Air Force l a u n c h e d t h e f a m o u s d o u b l e strike raid on S c h w e i n f u r t a n d R e g e n s b u r g , c u l m i n a t i n g w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as Black W e e k . Today, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f f i c i a l l y c e l e b r a t e s t h i s g r i m period in a e r i a l history w i t h N a t i o n a l Eighth Air Force w e e k , October 8 - 1 4 .

religion. Had not Pearl Harbor been savaged in a surprise attack, most would have passed their years in ordinary anonymity devoid of violence or unnatural death. Instead, circumstance led them to tins place where they were expected to kill their enemies without question or remorse. For some, the philosophical or spiritual beliefs they cherished conflicted with their duty at hand. Tn one early case, the Eighth Air Force laid on a strike against Münster, a key choke point m the industrial Ruhr Valley's railroad network. I he target stripped away any pretense of precision, pinpoint bombing designed to minimize civilian casualties. Rather, the Münster raid's purpose was the verv opposite. Time over target was picked to be the moment church got out on a Sunday morning in October 1943. The medieval cathedral in the heart of the city was designated as the aiming point. Eighth Bomber command wanted to kill as many employees of the nearby railroad marshalling yard as possible, thus hindering attempts to repair the tracks, a fact that was briefed to the B-17 crews of the 95th Bomb Group the morning of the raid.

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[Itapter 1

In the p r e d a w n hours before a mission, final preparations are made on a 91st Bomb Group B-17G.

A f t e r the officers completed the morning briefing, they rejoined the rest of their c r e w and pushed d o w n all the relevant information to them. Not long after this photo w a s taken, the 381st Bomb Group B-17G Button

Nose

took a flak hit over Caen on A u g u s t 8 , 1 9 4 4 , and w e n t d o w n in flames.

The Mortal Ones

169

Shrouded in fog, a B-17 awaits its crew at Bassingbourn. Ground fog played havoc with

Sitting in the audience that day was the 9 5 t h s lead navigator, Capt. Ellis Scripture. In Ian H a w k i n s ' excellent work, The Münster Raid, Scripture remarked:

the bomber groups during take-off. Forming up in this sort of thick soup was also quite

I'd been raised in a strict Protestant home. I was shocked to learn that we were to b o m b

dangerous and led to many aerial collisions.

civilians as our p r i m a r y t a r g e t . . . a n d that our aiming point was to be the front steps of the M ü n s t e r Cathedral at noon on Sunday, just as M a s s was completed. I was very reluctant to fly this mission. Scripture's qualms were in the distinct minority. M o s t o f the aircrews settled into their g r i m and violent jobs and did as they were told. In this war, the gloves h a d come off a long time ago, and every mission they f o u n d themselves in a bare knuckled brawl with the best interceptor pilots the world had ever seen. After experiencing that, charity and mercy became early casualties. After the group commander a n d his intelligence officer briefed the final mission details, the men dispersed to go brief the rest of their crews. T h e enlisted men and N C O s w h o f o r m e d the majority of each bomber's human complement w o u l d be found killing time

170

[Itapter 1

The crew of a 95th Bomb Group B-17G rolls to their aircraft prior to a mission in 1944.

playing poker or reading, or writing a final letter home. Anxiously, they crowded around their pilot, w h o served as the plane captain and was responsible for all of them. In these minutes, the pilot pushed down the information his crew would need to execute the mission. Once that was done, the men w o u l d settle in to wait for the go-order. T h a t wait could grow interminable, thanks to the European weather. Reconnaissance planes over the target area transmitted last-minute details back to England, including updated weather reports. M a n y times the target might be clear, but the airfields in East Anglia or the Foggia Plain would be blanketed with fog. Other times, the fields were clear but the targets were obscured. Prewar strategists had never seriously considered something as m u n d a n e as

T h e M o r t a l O n e s 179

172

[Itapter 1

The crew of a Fifteenth Air Force B-24 arrives for the preflight check and routine.

Waiting for the go-order was always tension filled and difficult.

weather into their conceptualized bombing campaigns. H e r e on the front lines, it served as one of the great limiting factors on what the bombers could actually achieve. M i s s i o n s were scrubbed almost every week thanks to storms over the home airfields or cloud cover over the target area. C o m e fall and winter, clear skies grew increasingly rare. S n o w b o u n d bombers sat in their revetments, the air war on hold thanks to the power of M o t h e r Nature. O n most days, the crews assembled and drove out to the flight line to their assigned bombers. T h e A r m y Air Forces took a lenient attitude toward individualizing aircraft, and the crews took advantage of that. T h e talented artists in each group painted artwork on the nose, while the crew or pilot selected a name for their aircraft. Away f r o m home, restraint and taste frequently d i d not factor into the name or the artwork. N a k e d women abounded, buttressed

Opposite: Nose art ranged from the sublime

by d i r t y names and ribald humor. In some cases, the aircraft's name mirrored the type of

to the raunchy and serves as a window into

humor, music, or entertainment the crew enjoyed. In fact, nose art and plane names served as

the sociological climate of the USAAF during

a wellspring of sociological information about the m e n who flew the bombers.

World War II. Lesser known than nose art is

T h e customization did not stop with the name or the nose art. T h e gunners, navigators,

the personal additions other crew members,

and other crewmen frequently added their own touches on the fuselage around their position. A

both ground and air, made to their bombers.

The M o r t a l Ones

1 7 3

Inside the bombers, the group's armorers

motto, a name that meant something to the m a n behind the weapon, or swastikas representing

had already cleaned, oiled, and installed

interceptors downed a n d aerial firefights won gave these men a greater sense of ownership in

the defensive weapons and filled the ready

their aircraft.

ammunition boxes with as much lead and brass as they could hold.

T h e pre-mission checklists were long. As the briefed take-off time approached, the crews w o u l d work through their lists. T h e g r o u n d crews h a d already done m u c h of the work. T h e machine guns were cleaned, oiled, a n d installed. Ready a m m u n i t i o n for each position had been placed inside their aircraft. T h e bombs to be dropped that day already sat snug in the b o m b bays. Once the work was done, the checklists reviewed, the men settled down to wait once again. If weather delayed the mission, this could be the worst time of all, especially if the

174

[Itapter 1

target was a tough one. Idle time meant time for the brain to engage and think about what was

When the bomb groups received the go-

soon to come. A n d yet, uncertainty often persisted. W o u l d weather delay the mission or scrub

order and the mission began, Wright Cyclone

it altogether? T h e y hung on tidbits of information passed along f r o m crew to crew as they

engines and Pratt & Whitneys roared to life.

sat with their gear in the d a m p grass beside their planes. N o t a few threw u p as the tension

Hundreds of them merged together to create a

manifested physically in them. T h e lack of control over o n e s own fate was among the most difficult psychological

unique sound that resonated for miles across the countryside.

aspects of the strategic air war. A crew could perform their functions flawlessly a n d still be blown out of the sky by flak or fighters. A r a n d o m anti-aircraft shell, fired f r o m five miles below by an illiterate conscript could kill a dozen Americans in an eye blink. A mechanical

The M o r t a l Ones

1 7 5

The sheer randomness of who lived and who

failure could cripple the unlucky bomber and force it out of formation, leaving it terribly

died created a unique dynamic within the

vulnerable to the predacious interceptors that thrived on such easy pickings.

ranks of the strategic bomber crews. That

T h a t sense of helplessness created a whole subculture of superstition. If one routine

sense of helplessness and inability to control

worked and the crew returned home, it w o u l d be duplicated for every mission thereafter.

their fate caused many of the men to become

T h e men clung to lucky charms and placed their faith in a higher power. In a 1 9 8 4 N B C

superstitious. Comfort was found in rituals and

documentary called All the Fine Young Men, Elmer Bendiner recalled:

routines considered "lucky," and many of the men carried small talisman with them into the

W e resorted to magic . . . you pick u p talisman. If you do one thing and you come home

air. Such behavior served as a psychological

that night, well that's the thing to do. W h e t h e r it's the way you tie your scarf around

safety valve.

your neck or the socks you put on your feet. It's a k i n d of do-it-yourself s u p e r s t i t i o n — you make it up as you go. T h e veterans h a d long since ritualized their routines. T h e new crews, the replacements who'd never encountered such tension or psychological pressure, learned from the old hands. If they survived. T h e go-order roused the men to their feet. T h e savvy ones emptied their bladders right there around the aircraft, for the missions could last upwards of ten hours as their groups p l o d d e d across Europe at 1 7 0 miles an hour. O n e by one, they swung themselves through the forward hatch or climbed into the b o m b bays to take u p their assigned stations.

176

[Itapter 1

Engines turned over. T h e g r o u n d shook as the big radials roared to life. O n e b o m b group typically included over a hundred engines, and they could be heard starting up for miles across the English and Italian countryside. T h e locals living nearby always knew a mission was on when the g r o u n d began to shake and windows rattled in their frames. Frequently, on S u n d a y mornings, the civilians w o u l d fill the pews in the local churches, and the sudden cacophony of the Pratt & W h i t n e y s w o u l d drown out the pastors service. Back at the fields, the danger began. From the m o m e n t the chocks were pulled away from the m a i n wheels, the risk of death or grievous wound came f r o m a myriad of sources. Just taxiing to the runway could be dangerous, especially in f o g g y conditions. Ground collisions between B - 2 4 s and B - I 7 s were not u n c o m m o n . Such calamities often led to mass casualty events right there at the home station as fuel burned and bombs cooked off in the wake o f such accidents. Taking off was the next gut-check m o m e n t . T h e crews were taught to launch thirty seconds apart. Often, this was achieved either in fog or in pre-dawn darkness. If a fully loaded bomber

With the engines started, the bombers would then taxi to the runways. From this moment on, the potential dangers and chance of sudden death were many and varied.

The 381 st Bomb Group lines up for take-off. In such a crowded environment, catastrophic accidents were depressingly common.

The M o r t a l Ones

177

Collisions oil t h e g r o u n d w h i l e t a x i i n g c l a i m e d m a n y a i r c r a f t a n d lives. Here, a pair of 401 st B o m b Group B-17s ran into each other in t h e t y p i c a l l y f o g g y m o r n i n g c o n d i t i o n s in England.

178

[Itapter 1

Two fatal accidents. W h e n loaded w i t h fuel, bombs, and ammunition, the bombers w e r e explosive tinder boxes, t e r r i b l y v u l n e r a b l e to d e s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d s o m e t h i n g go w r o n g on the r u n w a y s d u r i n g t a k e - o f f .

To m a k e it easier for t h e pilots to find t h e i r groups a m i d t h e aerial c h a o s over S o u t h e r n Italy or East A n g l i a , t h e U S A A F d e v e l o p e d g a r i s h l y p a i n t e d a n d e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e "circus s h i p s " t h a t w e r e used as a e r i a l rally p o i n t s for the g r o u p s to use as t h e y linked up a f t e r t a k e - o f f . They r e p r e s e n t s o m e of t h e m o s t o u t l a n d i s h p a i n t s c h e m e s ever e m p l o y e d by American aircraft.

crashed as it sped down the field, sometimes the aircraft behind it would not know it. T h e y d begin their take-off rolls only t o drive right into the flaming ruins of the preceding bomber. O n c e airborne, the risk o f collision actually increased. Forming u p by squadrons and

The finished product: Formed up and ready to go, the 381st Bomb Group heads east toward the hostile skies of Nazi-held Europe,

groups into the tight combat boxes took time, skill a n d precision. Again, the weather often played havoc with such a delicate operation. To make things easier for the pilots, each group used a "circus ship" to help assemble their formations. Usually, these were outdated or warweary B - 2 4 s or B - 1 7 s that h a d been painted in garish, easily recognizable ways. T h a t way in the crowded skies over England and Italy, the men could tack on to their circus ship as it orbited. Once assembled, the squadron and groups would then merge with their neighbors until finally the entire wing h a d formed up. T h e gunners would test fire their weapons over the Channel or N o r t h Sea, the pilots w o u l d concentrate on staying tucked in tight as their flights bounced and bucked in turbulence and prop wash. T h e N o r t h Sea and the Channel served almost as the strategic war's no-mans-land. T h e y represented the last stretch of real estate not d o m i n a t e d by the T h i r d Reich. O n c e the coast appeared, the battle would be joined. It was time to meet the enemy.

The M o r t a l Ones

181

A M u s t a n g I running l o w over t h e European c o u n t r y s i d e . The RAF t a c t i c a l r e c o n n a i s s a n c e s g u a d r o n s relied on h e d g e - h o p p i n g a n d s p e e d t o a v o i d d e t e c t i o n , i n t e r c e p t i o n , a n d a n t i - a i r c r a f t fire. The p h o t o s t h e y b r o u g h t back h e l p e d s h a p e the D - D a y invasion plan.

THE HYBRID STALLION ^ ^

*

"When I saw Mustangs over Berlin} I knew the war was lost." —Hermann Goering D R O P T A N K S , F U E L M A N A G E M E N T , and a new

fighter

saved the daylight strategic bombing campaign. Ironically, all three solutions found their way to Europe despite entrenched resistance f r o m the U S A A F s stateside bureaucracy. D r o p tanks—external fuel cells that could be released after the gas inside them had been c o n s u m e d — h a d been around for several years. T h e Germans h a d them available for their B f - I 0 9 s during the Battle of Britain but failed to employ them as well. Basically, what it came down to was this: hanging stuff under a fleet-of-foot

fighter

made them far less fleet-of-foot, and that was

anathema to the fighter purists within the U S A A F . Fortunately, there are always rebels in uniform willing to buck the establishment and do what is right, not what is acceptable or career-friendly. Colonel Cass H o u g h was one of those brilliant rogues. Before the war, he'd been the C E O of the Daisy Air R i f l e Company and had made millions selling BB guns to an entire generation of American kids. H e possessed a sharp intellect, courage, and a solid understanding of engineering. As a pilot himself, he also grasped many of the issues facing the combat crews in England. During the war, as the c o m m a n d e r of the Eighth Air Force's Technical Service Section, he watched the bombers come home

Designed and built in less than four months, the North American Mustang

shot full of holes day after day a n d began to ponder how he could

was the product of a British need for more fighters. Originally, the RAF simply

extend the range of the existing fighters serving in England. T h e

wanted North American to build Curtiss P-40s for it. The management at North

Spitfire was never going to be more than a short-range air superiority

American believed they could do better—and they did.

183

The USAAF took an interest in the new

weapon. T h e P - 4 7 was a different story. In 1 9 4 3 , on internal fuel, the T h u n d e r b o l t pilots

North American design and ordered fighter,

could hang with the bombers for about 2 3 0 miles before they had to turn back,

reconnaissance, and dive-bomber versions of it.

H o u g h experimented with existing American ferry tanks at first. H e f o u n d them lacking in every respect. A t altitude, some w o u l d not feed properly. Others banged against the underside of the fuselage or wing, even at n o r m a l cruising speeds. T h e lightweight paper tanks tended to leak after only a few hours. H o u g h realized he needed a new design. H e looked at British auxiliary tanks, then settled on fabricating his own. Since the fighters operated above 2 0 , 0 0 0 feet most of the time, the tanks h a d to be pressurized in order to feed properly at such heights. T h a t proved to be a tricky engineering problem. Nevertheless, by M a y 1 9 4 3 , he a n d his men developed a steelfabricated hundred-gallon tank for the P - 4 7 . Once approved, the design was contracted to local British firms, but a shortage o f sheet metal hampered production through the summer. H o u g h looked for another alternative. H e began playing around with a British 1 0 8 gallon ferry tank made out o f paper. W i t h some finesse, his engineers came up with a way to

184

Chapter 10

The d i v e - b o m b e r v a r i a n t of t h e M u s t a n g w a s d e s i g n a t e d t h e A - 3 6 . It s e r v e d in t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d ChinaBurma-India theaters.

The M u s t a n g I p r o b a b l y w o u l d have been r e l e g a t e d to an a v i a t i o n history f o o t n o t e had it n o t b e e n for Ronald Harker, Rolls-Royce's c h i e f t e s t pilot. He f l e w one a n d realized t h a t if t h e A l l i s o n e n g i n e could be replaced w i t h a Rolls-Royce M e r l i n , the M u s t a n g ' s p e r f o r m a n c e a n d range w o u l d be s i g n i f i c a n t l y e n h a n c e d . He a d v o c a t e d such an e x p e r i m e n t d e s p i t e red t a p e a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c o p p o s i t i o n . The result w a s a hybrid A n g l o - A m e r i c a n e f f o r t t h a t w o u l d play a s i g n i f i c a n t part in w i n n i n g t h e w a r .

strengthen the tanks so that they could withstand pressurization. The new version went into production in July 1943. A shortage of drop tanks marred the summer and fall. In desperation, some four thousand seventy-five-gallon cells designed for the P - 3 9 arrived in England. The lighter groups put them to good use until the larger tanks became available in sufficient numbers. Through the fall, larger tanks went into production, and the P - 4 7 was modified to be able to carry them under the wmgs as well as the fuselage centerlme.

The Hybrid Stallion

1 8 5

A P-51A at a depot in England. It would not be until the marriage between American airframe and British engine that the Mustang became a world-class fighter. Even then, its significance to the strategic bombing campaign was totally missed by the Eighth Air Force's leadership until Jimmy Doolittle arrived to replace Eaker in early 1944.

By early 1 9 4 4 , the T h u n d e r b o l t units could carry aloft an extra three hundred gallons of fuel under their wings. T h i s gave the Jug pilots the legs to stretch deep into the T h i r d Reich. Given that the P - 4 7 composed the majority of the VIII Fighter C o m m a n d ' s available strength, extending their radius of action played the single most important role in winning the air war in 1 9 4 4 . A t the same time the tanks came into widespread use, the U S A A F underwent a minirevolution in fuel management, thanks in part to Charles Lindbergh. T h e famed aviator traveled all over the world, showing American pilots diat if they leaned out their fuel mixtures, raised their manifold pressure in dieir engines, and slowed the revolutions per minute their propellers made, they could significantly extend their radius of action. T h e P - 3 8 pilots went from being able to spend four or five hours in the air to eight to ten—longer by war's end with the addition of larger external tanks. Inevitably, the Jug pilots of die 5 6 t h Fighter Group made it all the way to Berlin and back on more than one occasion before the war ended in M a y 1 9 4 5 . D r o p tanks and fuel management never received the press they deserved for saving the daylight strategic bombing campaign. Instead, the M u s t a n g absorbed most of that credit. An early Mustang undergoing cold-weather

Born f r o m a British design requirement, turned into the U S A A F ' s only dedicated single-seat

testing in Alaska.

dive bomber used during the war, the M u s t a n g eventually m o r p h e d into history's ultimate long-range air superiority weapon.

186

Chapter 1 0

In 1 9 4 0 , the British came to the U n i t e d States on an aviation shopping spree. Desperate for aircraft to use against the Germans a n d knowing that their own production capacity was very limited, the British Purchasing C o m m i s s i o n traveled around America offering contracts for such planes as the Curtiss P - 4 0 and the Lockheed H u d s o n . W h e n the Brits reached N o r t h American Aviation, they asked the company to build P - 4 0 s under license for the R A F . T h a t did not appeal to N o r t h American's management, and instead the company offered to build a totally new fighter design that incorporated all the hard-won lessons learned in Europe so far. W h a t ' s more, they promised to build the prototype in 1 2 0 days. T h e British agreed and the race was on. N o r t h American p u t the project in full gear and made everyone work sixteen hour days, seven days a week. T h e effort paid off: after 1 1 7 days, the prototype rolled out o f the factory. D u b b e d the X N A - 7 3 , the new fighter used a 1,100-horsepower Allison engine as its power plant. Test flights encouraged the British so m u c h that they ordered it into production. T h e first M u s t a n g I, as the R A F called it, took flight in April 1 9 4 1 . At low altitudes, it could beat anything in the air, including the Spitfire. Below 1 0 , 0 0 0 feet, it could best a Spitfire's top speed by thirty-five miles an hour. Further flight evaluations in 1 9 4 1 and early 1 9 4 2 , however, demonstrated a serious lack of power above 1 5 , 0 0 0 feet. T h e Allison engine without a supercharger just could not perform at altitude. Fighter C o m m a n d rejected the new aircraft, and it was sent to the purgatory of army cooperation and reconnaissance squadrons, where they went into operational service starting in the spring of 1 9 4 2 . T h e U S A A F took notice o f the new design as well. W h e n N o r t h American adapted the M u s t a n g to the dive b o m b i n g role, the A r m y ordered five hundred o f them. Called the A - 3 6

An A-36 over Mount Vesuvius. The A-36 filled the dive-bombing role quite well, though by the time it arrived such tactics had fallen out of favor within the USAAF.

T h e H y b r i d S t a l l i o n 195

P-51A M u s t a n g s s e r v e d in c o m b a t in t h e C h i n a - B u r m a - I n d i a Theater, w h e r e t h e y g a i n e d a r e p u t a t i o n as e x c e l l e n t f i g h t e r - b o m b e r s .

Invader, they would see combat in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n with both ground attack units and reconnaissance squadrons.

4

Later, the U S A A F ordered a fighter variant as well, which originally was called the P - 5 1 A Apache. T h e y saw service in the China-Burma-India T h e a t e r and the Mediterranean. In April 1 9 4 2 , Ronald Harker, the chief test pilot for Britain's Rolls-Royces aircraft engine department, flew to Duxford and climbed into a M u s t a n g I s cockpit for the first time. A man of vision and great energy, he quickly saw the Mustang's potential. H e noted that the new plane could carry three times the fuel the Spitfire could, and dien he wondered what might happen if the airframe was mated to a Rolls-Royce M e r l i n engine. T h e Merlins tended to sip less fuel than die gas-hungry Allison, and the idea of such a union

The 31st Fighter Group left England in 1942 to take part in the North African

intrigued him enough that he went to his superiors to advocate for

campaign. The outfit never returned to the Eighth Air Force. Instead, it

such an experiment.

joined the XIV Fighter Command when it was activated at the end of 1943.

188

H e came u p against a lot of opposition and R A F disinterest

Re-equipped with Mustangs, the 31 st provided long-range escort for the

in the American design, but he stuck with his idea until he finally

Liberators and Forts of the XIV for the rest of the war.

got approval. T h e test showed it to be a match m a d e in heaven,

Chapter 1 0

The P-51B quickly showed its mastery over the Bf-109 and Fw-190A. Initially armed with four ,50-caliber machine guns, the new fighter did suffer from frequent weapon jams. It only took a few months to fix that problem, and after that the Mustang came into its own just in time to help deliver the knock-out blow to the Luftwaffe.

perhaps the best example of trans-Atlantic technical cross-pollination during the entire war. T h e new Merlin-powered aircraft excited everyone. Back in the States, N o r t h American saw it as a chance to save the design, and the high-altitude, long-range performance the new engine offered gave it considerable potential. H a p A r n o l d quickly grasped that and ordered over two thousand in late 1 9 4 2 . To keep pace with the airframe's production, Packard was given a contract to build the M e r l i n u n d e r license in the U n i t e d States. By November 1 9 4 2 the first P a c k a r d / M e r l i n P - 5 1 rolled off the assembly line at N o r t h Americans Tnglewood plant in Southern California. Known as the P - 5 I B M u s t a n g , the aircraft replaced the 3 5 4 t h Fighter G r o u p s aging P - 3 9 Airacobras during the final phases of that outfits pre-deployment work u p in the U n i t e d States. In December 1 9 4 3 , the "Pioneer M u s t a n g s " reached England and joined, ironically, the N i n t h Air Force, which was a dedicated tactical aviation organization. It didn't matter. T h e 3 5 4 t h Fighter Group began flying long-range escort missions with the Eighth Air Force almost immediately. W h e n m a r r i e d to long-range drop tanks, the new

Max Lamb, one of the 354th Fighter Group's aces, sits in the cockpit of his P-51. The Pioneer

M u s t a n g s could range the length and breadth of the T h i r d Reich. N o longer w o u l d the Forts

Mustangs produced no fewer than forty-five

and Libs be left alone to face hordes of Luftwaffe interceptors. T h e only thing the Americans

aces during its amazing combat career.

The Hybrid Stallion

1 8 9

L i e u t e n a n t W i l l i a m Groceclose c l i m b s o u t of his 4 t h Fighter Group P-51. The 4 t h e a r n e d f a m e as the t o p - s c o r i n g Eighth Air Force unit d u r i n g t h e w a r , a c c o u n t i n g for over a t h o u s a n d L u f t w a f f e a i r c r a f t on t h e g r o u n d a n d in t h e air.

A r m o r e r s prepare to load ,50-caliber a m m u n i t i o n into t h e w i n g s of a 4 t h Fighter Group P-51. The D m o d e l c a r r i e d six guns i n s t e a d of t h e earlier v a r i a n t s ' four.

190

Chapter 10

The " B o t t i s h a m F o u r " — a l e g e n d a r y q u a r t e t of 3 6 1 s t Fighter Group P-51 M u s t a n g s led by T h o m a s Christian's Lou IV. Christian, a W e s t Point g r a d u a t e , w a s only t w e n t y - e i g h t years old w h e n he w a s killed in A u g u s t 1944. This p h o t o w a s part of a series shot f r o m a 91 st B o m b Group B-17 on d u l y 2 6 , 1 9 4 4 .

Big Friend, Little Friend. The M u s t a n g saved c o u n t l e s s b o m b e r c r e w s a n d e n s u r e d the success of the 1944 s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n .

The Hybrid Stallion

191

L i e u t e n a n t Colonel T h o m a s Christian flies over England in A u g u s t 1944. Christian lived only a f e w more days a f t e r t h i s p h o t o w a s taken. He w a s killed in c o m b a t on A u g u s t 1 2 , 1 9 4 4 .

Don Blakeslee, l e g e n d a r y f i g h t e r leader, t a c t i c i a n , a n d ace, c o m m a n d e d t h e 4 t h Fighter Group. He had f l o w n w i t h one of t h e RAF's Eagle S q u a d r o n s prior to t h e U.S. entry in t h e war, a n d in t h e y e a r s t h a t f o l l o w e d he f l e w m o r e m i s s i o n s a n d a c c u m u l a t e d more c o m b a t hours t h a n j u s t a b o u t any o t h e r f i g h t e r pilot in t h e European Theater.

200 C h a p t e r 1 0

A formation of 361 st Fighter Group P-51D Mustangs in flight over England late in the war. The D model arrived in theater later in 1944 sporting a new canopy that provided much better all-round visibility than did the B and C razorback versions.

needed now was more M u s t a n g groups. T h r o u g h the first months o f 1 9 4 4 , new ones arrived nearly every week. T h e famed 4 t h Fighter Group t u r n e d in their P - 4 7 s and took delivery of factory-fresh M u s t a n g s . M o s t of its pilots h a d served with the Eagle Squadrons in the R A F and had loved their graceful Spitfires and never liked their heavier, less maneuverable Jugs. But when they climbed into their new M u s t a n g s , they knew they'd been given a true t h o r o u g h b r e d — o n e that w o u l d take them to Berlin and back. T h e end of 1 9 4 3 saw the confluence of these developments reach England just in the nick of time to save die daylight bombing campaign. It was true serendipity and set the stage for the massive air battles that determined the fate of the T h i r d Reich in the ensuing six months. W i t h o u t the fuel tanks, widiout the Mustang, the Eighth Air Forces campaign would have remained dead in the water. Now, as 1 9 4 4 began, the Eighth would return to the skies over Germany with renewed energy, a new mission, and fighter escort needed to get the job done. 361 st Fighter Squadron P-51 ace Vernon Richards. He flew a Mustang named Tika IV. The 361st, 352nd, and 4th Fighter Groups were among the leading P-51 outfits in the Eighth Air Force.

The Hybrid Stallion

1 9 3

7 8 t h Fighter Group P-47 T h u n d e r b o l t s prepare for an e s c o r t m i s s i o n over Germany. A s l o n g - r a n g e drop t a n k s b e c a m e a v a i l a b l e , t h e Eighth Air Force's T h u n d e r b o l t s w e r e able to e x t e n d t h e i r reach d e e p into G e r m a n y — so d e e p t h a t b e f o r e t h e e n d of the w a r P-47s f l e w e s c o r t m i s s i o n s all t h e w a y to Berlin a n d back.

RELENTLESS PURSUIT: BIG WEEK ^ ^

"Our little band grows for

smaller

*

and smaller. Every man can work it out

himself on the fingers of one hand when his own turn is due to come."

—Heinz Knocke, Luftwaffe fighter pilot T H E FALL'S D E B A C L E S F I N I S H E D O F F I R A EAKER. At the end of 1 9 4 3 , Arnold recast the command structure in Europe. Eaker went to the Mediterranean and never received his third star. In his place, J i m m y Doolittle took over the Eighth Air Force. Spaatz became the overall commander of U.S. Strategic Forces Europe, which included both the Eighth and the freshly established Fifteenth Air Force in Italy. T h e Eighth would be the left hook; the Fifteenth would be the uppercut. Together, Spaatz could use both to batter the T h i r d Reich into submission. In England, changes were afoot. Doolittle inspected his new c o m m a n d and raced around East Anglia meeting the bomber and fighter crews. Toward the end of January 1 9 4 4 , during a familiarization trip over to VIII Fighter C o m m a n d Headquarters, he walked into Gen. W i l l i a m Kepner's office and saw the sign hanging on the wall. Doolittle read it over, " T h e first duty o f the Eighth Air Force fighters is to bring the bombers back alive." Doolittle didn't like it. H e asked Kepner the source of the sign. Kepner told h i m that it h a d been something Gen. Frank H u n t e r h a d put u p in the office in 1 9 4 2 . "Take it down," Doolittle ordered. H e told Kepner to post

When the Fifteenth Air Force was activated at the end of 1943,

another one in its place that read, " T h e first duty of the Eighth Air

Spaatz took overall command of the strategic air war in Europe. He

Force fighters is to destroy German

drove Doolittle relentlessly to prosecute the campaign at all costs.

fighters."

195

SMOKING

When Doolittle became the Eighth Air

Kepner loved this. It signaled a new approach to the use o f his pilots. In the ensuing

Force's commanding officer, he embarked

weeks, Doolittle made it clear he wanted Kepners fighter jocks to channel their inner

on a whirlwind tour to meet his men and his

aggressiveness. In the air, their restrictions were removed. N o longer would the fighters be

units. Here, he gets a short brief on the M2

chained to the bomber stream, unable to pursue fleeing German aircraft below 1 8 , 0 0 0 feet.

,50-caliber machine gun during one of his

Indeed, Doolittle made it clear that if the L u f t w a f f e s fighters were not pursued relentlessly,

stops in East Anglia.

VIII Fighter C o m m a n d was not doing its job. A t the same time, A r n o l d and S p a a t z took a hard look at the failure of Pointblank with an eye on the u p c o m i n g invasion of France, scheduled for the late spring of 1 9 4 4 . In a sense, it was the Battle of Britain in reverse. W i t h o u t air superiority over the battlefield, D - D a y

196

C h a p t e r 10

w o u l d be a disaster. A sense of urgency pushed both men forward. T h e Luftwaffe had to be

General Jimmy Doolittle took command of the

destroyed, and they h a d five m o n t h s to d o it. A r n o l d t o l d S p a a t z to get it done in the air, on

Eighth Air Force after running Twelfth Air Force

the ground, or by knocking out the factories that produced the L u f t w a f f e s interceptors.

in the Mediterranean Theater.

W i t h the arrival of the M u s t a n g and the new long-range drop tanks, the escort fighters held the keys to victory. American intelligence consistently underestimated Germany's aircraft production, sometimes by as much as a factor of four. Even so, it became obvious to S p a a t z and his staff that no matter how many bombers landed on Luftwaffe factories, its front line units w o u l d not be hurting for replacement interceptors anytime soon. Doolittle noted this as well, stressing that fuel and aviators were the Luftwaffe's major limiting factors. A n d in early 1 9 4 4 , the American strategic forces went to war against Germany's fighter pilots. A d o l f Galland, the Luftwaffe's General of the Fighters, had patched together a formidable interceptor force in the fall of 1 9 4 3 by stripping other c o m m a n d s to keep his fighters in the air. H e grabbed pilots out of army co-operation squadrons, weather recon

R e l e n t l e s s Pursuit: Big W e e k

1 9 7

W i l l i a m Kepner replaced General Hunter as head of VIII Fighter C o m m a n d . W h e n D o o l i t t l e t o o k over the M i g h t y Eighth, he w e n t to Kepner a n d ordered h i m to go a f t e r t h e L u f t w a f f e w i t h his fighters. It r e p r e s e n t e d a m a j o r s h i f t in strategy, one t h a t p l a y e d a key role in d e f e a t i n g the G e r m a n Air Force in t h e m o n t h s b e f o r e D-Day.

units, and Liombcr geschwaders and straight from training schools to keep warm bodies in his cockpits. It had been a near run thing that fall, but thanks to the awesome bomber-killing power of the Messerschmitt Bf-110, Ju-88G and Me—110 Hornet, the Luftwaffe retained control of the skies over the Reich. The equation changed in earlv 1944. First, Galland's heavy twin-engine fighters proved virtually helpless against aggressive P-47, P-38, and P-51 pilots.They served a useful purpose onlv as long as they did not have to contend with American escorts. Now, the heavies had no safe place to operate. The Fifteenth's and Eighth's fighters could roam to the far corners of the Reich, negating one of the biggest LiomLier-killing weapons the Luftwaffe would have in the air war.

206 C h a p t e r 10

5 6 t h Fighter Group a r m o r e r s load 5 0 - c a l i b e r a m m u n i t i o n into Francis " G a b b y " Gabreski's P-47 T h u n d e r b o l t . The J u g carried e i g h t m a c h i n e guns, a d e v a s t a t i n g a m o u n t of f i r e p o w e r t h a t could s a v a g e G e r m a n f i g h t e r s and g r o u n d t a r g e t s alike.

G o e r i n g c o n v e r s i n g w i t h A d o l f G a l l a n d (right) and ace W a l t e r N o w o t n y on t h e s t a t u s of

Second. Galland's pilots had been given a virtual free pass in 1943. W i t h VIII Fighter

t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s f i g h t e r force. By 1944, t h e

Command chained to the bombers, the German fighters could dictate the (low of air combat

L u f t w a f f e ' s J a g d g e s c h w a d e r s had b e e n

over the Reich. I hey'd launch their attacks and run for home, confident that the Americans

s t r e t c h e d to t h e i r b r e a k i n g p o i n t by c o m b a t

would not pursue them. T h a t changed on January 24, 1944, during an Eighth Air Force

c a s u a l t i e s a n d a i r c r a f t losses. C o n t i n u i n g the

mission to Frankfurt. The escort fighters roamed the flanks of the bomber stream, searching

b r u t a l w a r of a t t r i t i o n over t h e Beich required

for targets. In a running battle that spread all over Germany, the Americans knocked down

c u t t i n g many corners in t r a i n i n g to g e t n e w

twenty-three interceptors and lost nine fighters and onlv two bombers.

pilots into t h e cockpits. It also required

The Eighth needed more davs like this. To secure air superiority over Western Europe

s t r i p p i n g o t h e r b r a n c h e s of t h e L u f t w a f f e of

before D-Day, the Luftwaffe had to be drawn out and destroyed in battle. Spaatz and his stall

s o m e of t h e i r pilots, d i m i n i s h i n g t h e G e r m a n

studied the target lists with a new eye: what would make Galland's men come up and fight?

A i r Force's c a p a b i l i t i e s as a result.

R e l e n t l e s s P u r s u i t : Big W e e k 207

D e f e a t i n g the heavy f i g h t e r m e n a c e d u r i n g d e e p p e n e t r a t i o n raids p l a y e d a key role in c u t t i n g d o w n b o m b e r losses. W i t h M u s t a n g s a n d T h u n d e r b o l t s a b l e t o r o a m d e e p into t h e Third Reich, the Bf-110s, M e - 4 1 0 s , a n d J u - 8 8 s could n o t survive in the sky w i t h o u t t h e L u f t w a f f e p r o v i d i n g an escort f o r c e of Fw190s. It w a s a u n i q u e s i t u a t i o n having to d i v e r t i n t e r c e p t o r s to p r o t e c t o t h e r i n t e r c e p t o r s , and it d e g r a d e d t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s a b i l i t y to knock planes down. From its rocky start as a m a r g i n a l l y e f f e c t i v e , s h o r t - r a n g e d fighter, t h e Republic P-47 d e v e l o p e d into t h e VIII Fighter C o m m a n d ' s w o r k h o r s e . The T h u n d e r b o l t s c o r e d more kills a n d served longer in c o m b a t t h a n t h e M u s t a n g in t h e ETO, a n d t h a n k s to l o n g - r a n g e t a n k s a n d better p i l o t t r a i n i n g in f u e l m a n a g e m e n t , it could o p e r a t e over m o s t of G e r m a n y by w a r ' s end.

W h a t emerged was Operation Argument, a massive, sustained bombing campaign focused on German fighter airframe construction and ball bearings. In a sense, it was simply a modified version of Pointblank. This time, any damage done to the ground targets was simply a bonus. The real target was the Luftwaffes interceptors sent up in response to the incoming waves of aircraft. The bomber crews would be the bait. The Mustanas and Thunderbolts would be the The A m e r i c a n f i g h t e r s b e c a m e so a g g r e s s i v e t h a t t h e y f o l l o w e d their prey d o w n to the deck

trap. I he stage had been set for history's largest attrition-based air campaign. Argument kicked off with a massive R A F raid on the night of February 19—20, 1944.

a n d s o m e t i m e s t o t h e ground. Here, an VIII

W h i l e the 7 3 0 bombers burned out vast stretches of Leipzig, the attackers paid a terrible

Fighter C o m m a n d p i l o t s t r a f e s a Bf-110 he's

price. German night fighters and flak teamed up to destroy 78 British aircraft, and 5 6 9 R A F

brought down, sending a German crewman

airmen were lost in the epic nocturnal duel.

d i v i n g for cover. Such a g g r e s s i v e n e s s e n s u r e d t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s d e f e a t over its o w n country.

T h e next morning, the winter weather cleared enough to get the Eighth Air Force into the air. The Liberators and Forts struck at aircraft factories at Leipzig, Gotha, and Brunswick, very selectively targeting the Bf-I09, Bf-110, F w - I 9 0 , and ]u-88 airframe production facilities there. The Germans could have no doubt; the Eighth was coming after the Defenders of the Reich. I he day cost Galland's units fifty-eight fighters. Tn return, the Americans lost twentyone bombers and four fighters. Big Week kicked off with a tremendous success.

200

C h a p t e r 10

J I M M Y DOOLITTLE

IF M A J . GEN. J i m m y Doolittle h a d never

Doolittle R a i d e r s continued on to C h i n a where

c o m m a n d e d the Eighth Air Force, he still would

all crash-landed.

have been one of the most illustrious and famous

T h e attack electrified the United States and

military aviators of his generation. Born in 1 8 9 6 ,

made Doolittle a national hero. Later, he took

Doolittle grew u p in N o m e , Alaska, joining

c o m m a n d of the Twelfth Air Force in N o r t h

the army in 1 9 1 7 . H e learned to fly, but never

Africa before taking command of the M i g h t y

deployed to Europe before W o r l d W a r I ended.

Eighth in January 1 9 4 4 after Eaker was sent to the

Instead, he served as a flight instructor a n d helped

Mediterranean. T h e move put Doolittle at center

train America s first generation of

stage of the U S A A F s air effort in Europe, but it

aerial warriors.

also put h i m at odds with his two superiors, Fred Anderson and Carl Spaatz. Doolittle loved airmen

In the 1 9 2 0 s and 1 9 3 0 s , Doolittle earned a reputation as a remarkable racing pilot. H e

and aviators. H e loved visiting the bomb groups,

won the Schneider C u p in 1 9 2 6 , then piloted a

sharing time with his men. H i s concern for their

Gee Bee R - I to victory in the 1 9 3 2 T h o m p s o n

morale, fitness, and level of exhaustion conflicted with Spaatz and Andersons more cold-hearted

Trophy. H e also won the cross-country Bendix race. In 1 9 4 2 , he led the legendary "Doolittle

Jimmy Doolittle, one of America's

approach to keep the pressure on the Luftwaffe

most illustrious flying generals.

no matter the effect it had on die U S A A F airmen carrying out the missions.

R a i d " — t h e first bombing attack on Japan. U s i n g B - 2 5 M i t c h e l l bombers, Doolittle and his men daringly took off from the deck of the U S S Hornet hundreds of miles off the Japanese coast. Following attacks on Tokyo, the

Doolittle remained one of the most beloved general officers the air force ever produced. After the war, he played a significant role in the development of A m e r i c a s ballistic missile program. H e died in Pebble Beach, California, in 1 9 9 3 .

Jimmy Doolittle in the years between World War I and II. He set many racing

A Doolittle Raider B-25 bomber struggles aloft from the USS Hornet on

records and earned national fame by winning the Cleveland Air Races' coveted

April 18,1942.

Thompson Trophy in 1932.

R e l e n t l e s s P u r s u i t : B i g W e e k 209

A lone B-17 picks up a f r i e n d l y P-38 as an escort for a h o m e b o u n d journey.

The F i f t e e n t h Air Force p l a y e d a s u p p o r t i n g role in Big W e e k . Still a n a s c e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e s e Italy-based a v i a t o r s a n d b o m b e r s lacked t h e n u m b e r s a n d the escort s t r e n g t h e n j o y e d by t h e M i g h t y Eighth. A s a result, t h r o u g h February, t h e Fifteenth's l o n g - r a n g e m i s s i o n s t o heavily d e f e n d e d t a r g e t s in A u s t r i a , S o u t h e r n Germany, a n d Eastern Europe p r o v e d q u i t e costly. Here, a F i f t e e n t h Air Force B-17 goes d o w n in f l a m e s a f t e r g e t t i n g hit by flak.

I he following afternoon. Doolittle's men returned to the heart of Germany and destroyed numerous targets around Brunswick. I hirty-two German fighters were written off bv nightfall. That night, Goering called a conference with all his Reich defense commanders. T h e previous two days alarmed the Reichmarshal. The Americans had inflicted severe damage to the production lines that kept his forward units fighting. He wanted to know what his commanders could do to stop it. The conference resulted in some organizational changes that streamlined the operational chain of command. It was also agreed that when launching attacks against the bombers, the Luftwaffe would need to mass its strength in order to break through the ever-thickening layers of American escort fighters. Once massed, at least one

210 C h a p t e r 10

Some of the most heavily defended targets in Germany lay within the Fifteenth Air Force's area of responsibility.

jagdgeschwader needed to be assigned to attacking the escorts. Theoretically, this would give the other units a hole through which to attack the bombers. Previous orders h a d stressed the need to avoid American fighters and focus all efforts on the heavies. O n February 2 2 , the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces flew their first joint mission. Almost 1 , 4 0 0 B - I 7 s and B-24s thundered over the Reich, escorted by nearly a thousand white-starred fighters. T h e Luftwaffe threw itself at the oncoming formations. Running battles raged all across the Reich. Bad weadier hampered both sides, resulting in wholesale aborts, operational accidents, and sudden encounters with the enemy in the cloud-dominated skies. General LeMay, who now commanded the Eighth Air Force s 3rd Bomb Division, noted the number of catastrophic collisions among his B - I 7 s as they struggled to f o r m u p in the thick soup and ordered a full abort. T h e B - 2 4 s in the 2 n d Bomb Division also received the abort signal, but not before some of them had already reached the Continent. T h e Liberator crews looked for targets of opportunity to bomb, which led to an unfortunate incident where one very lost B - 2 4 crew dropped its payload on England. Anodier B - 2 4 formation targeted Nijmegen, Holland, with deadly accuracy, mistaking the Dutch city for a German one. T h e misplaced cascade of falling

Torn in half by a direct flak hit, a B-17 spins

high explosives and incendiaries killed 8 5 0 civilians.

earthward. During the titanic air battles in

T h e 1st Bomb Division performed the best that day. Part of the B - I 7 s f r o m the 3 8 4 t h

February 1944, such sights—and the loss

and 3 0 3 r d groups reached Aschersleben and virtually destroyed the J u - 8 8 factory there. T h e

of the ten men inside those aircraft—were

extensive damage cut production in half for the next sixty days.

depressingly common.

Over Bernberg, the 3 0 6 t h Group b o m b e d another J u - 8 8 plant, scoring numerous hits. But as they sped for home, they ran into a swarm of Luftwaffe fighters. T h e interceptors raked the group's combat box and chased them two hundred miles back to the Dutch coast. By the time the last one made its run at the 3 0 6 t h , the beleaguered Americans h a d lost seven Flying Forts. T h e remaining twenty-three had all been shot up.

R e l e n t l e s s Pursuit: Big W e e k

2 0 3

Allied Industrial Targets in Europe

Frantic ground crewmen fight to snuff the flames out on a stricken 401 st Bomb Group Flying Fort.

T h e Luftwaffe wrote off another

fifty-two

fighters

by sunset. Forty-one Forts and

Liberators went d o w n — 1 6 percent of the Eighth Air Forces b o m b e r s — a l o n g with eleven VTII Fighter C o m m a n d aircraft. T h e Fifteenth Air Force suffered 1 0 percent losses. It had been a brutal day for the U S A A F . Doolittle wanted to give his bomber crews a break. H e reported to S p a a t z a n d his operations chief, M a j . Gen. Fred Anderson, that his overtaxed airmen were subsisting on a diet of "Benzedrine and sleeping pills" to keep functioning and flying. S p a a t z and Anderson vetoed the break. Anderson in particular believed the Doolittle consistently lost sight of the mission as a result of his attachment to his men. T h e strain between the two generals w o u l d grow in the days and weeks ahead. W e a t h e r ended u p scrubbing the scheduled missions for the twenty-third, so the M i g h t y E i g h t h s airmen d i d get a break. But then again, so d i d the L u f t w a f f e s exhausted

fighter

pilots, some of w h o m had been flying three or four missions a day in skies crowded with American aircraft. O n February 2 4 , the Americans returned, flying missions to Schweinfurt again and the aircraft factories in the cities of Gotha, Kreising, and Posen. T h e winter weather hampered operations once again. L e M a y s 3rd Bomb Division was supposed to hit targets along the A 15th Air Force B-24 gunner after a mission.

Baltic coast in a very daring, unescorted strike. W h e n the Forts got to their assigned areas, layers of clouds obscured the p r i m a r y targets. Instead, the bombers turned for the city of Rostock and p u m m e l e d it before heading back over the N o r t h Sea for home. T h e B - I 7 s of the 1st Bomb Division found blue skies over Schweinfurt that miraculously were devoid of marauding Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. T h e bombardiers took advantage of the o p p o r t u n i t y and blasted the ball bearings factories there until little more than rubble remained.

206

C h a p t e r 10

F e w t a r g e t s w e r e better d e f e n d e d a n d m o r e d a n g e r o u s for t h e F i f t e e n t h Air Force t h a n V i e n n a . Here, a F i f t e e n t h Air Force Liberator s t r u g g l e s t h r o u g h a sky f u l l of flak a f t e r g e t t i n g hit in t h e right i n b o a r d engine.

F i f t e e n t h Air Force B - 2 4 over Italy d u r i n g a m i s s i o n in 1944.

R e l e n t l e s s P u r s u i t : Big W e e k

215

If the Forts found the day's missions easier than expected, the Liberators of the 2nd Bomb Division paid the price for their easy entry over Germany. The Luftwaffe's ground controllers vectored the bulk of the available fighters at the B-24 stream heading for Gotha. Eighty minutes from their Initial Point, the Luftwaffe pilots swarmed over the leading Liberator groups. I he 3 8 9 t h Bomb Group formed the tip of the divisional spear. In a freakish twist of fate, as the Liberator crews battled their way to Gothas Bf-110 factories, the group's

A b a t t l e - d a m a g e d T h u n d e r b o l t a f t e r crashlanding back in England. W h e n t h e VIII Fighter C o m m a n d b e g a n h i t t i n g airfields, trains, a n d o t h e r g r o u n d t a r g e t s , such e f f o r t s d r e w c o n s i d e r a b l e l i g h t a n d m e d i u m a n t i - a i r c r a f t fire t h a t t o o k a steady t o l l on the a t t a c k i n g a i r c r a f t .

S m o k e and f l a m e s rise over a t a r g e t area as a B - l 7 c o m b a t w i n g reaches its release point.

216 C h a p t e r 10

lead aircraft suffered an oxygen system failure. As the B - 2 4 veered out of formation, the

A formation of Fifteenth Air Force B-17 Flying

bombardier passed out and accidentally toggled off his bombs. T h e rest of the group followed

Fortresses over Eastern Europe in 1944. This

suit a n d missed the factories completely. M o m e n t s later, the interceptors waded into the

photo achieved a measure of fame when it

g r o u p and flamed six of the silver-winged Libs.

appeared in the movie The Best Years of Our

Behind the 3 8 9 t h came the 4 4 5 t h Bomb Group. T h e y stayed as tight as a Liberator

Lives. In one scene, Dana Andrews's character,

outfit could, the gunners tracking incoming fighters a n d snapping out short bursts at them.

Fred Derry, shows his war bride this photo,

T h e Germans proved relentless, using everything from cannon and rocket fire to aerial cables

and she was so clueless to what he

and air-burst bombs to try to bring the Liberators down. One by one, the g r o u p s B - 2 4 s

experienced she asked what the little black

caught fire and fell out of formation. Others l i m p e d along, streaming thick tongues of black

clouds were.

smoke behind savaged engines. By the time the survivors limped h o m e to England, thirteen of the 4 4 5 t h s twenty-five Liberators were little more than smoking craters on the Continent. O f the remaining twelve, nine had been heavily damaged. T h e 3 9 2 n d , another B - 2 4 group, somehow managed the best b o m b run of the day despite repeated fighter a t t a c k s . T h e group s bombardier put 9 8 percent of the u n i t s ordnance within two thousand feet of the B f - 1 1 0 factories at Gotha. It was one of the best operational examples o f precision bombing of the war, but the 3 9 2 n d d i d not get away unscathed. Seven of its B - 2 4 s went down in flames. To the south, the Fifteenth Air Force struck an aircraft plant at Steyr, Austria. T h e longrange mission f r o m Italy cost the Fifteenth 2 0 percent of the bombers dispatched. Altogether, S p a a t z s two air forces lost over seventy bombers. T h e Luftwaffe wrote off about sixty of its interceptors. Doolittle looked around East Anglia and saw nothing but burnt-out airmen, bullet scarred bombers, and g r o u n d crewmen working round the clock to patch planes together for the next mission. O n c e again, he begged Anderson and S p a a t z to give his men a break.

R e l e n t l e s s Pursuit: Big W e e k

2 0 9

Anderson told h i m to shut u p and d o his job. T h e targets for February 2 5 included Regensburg, the huge Messerschmitt 1 0 9 plant at Augsburg, plus the ball bearings factory in Stuttgart. It w o u l d be another m a x i m u m effort, a two-air-force strike. T h e Fifteen Air Force drew the Regensburg mission. A b o u t 1 4 0 of its bombers reached the target, only to be assailed by flak a n d fighters. T h i r t y - n i n e of its Forts a n d Libs went d o w n — a brutal 2 0 percent of the attacking force. T h e Eighth followed u p the Fifteenth with a hundred-Fort raid on Regensburg later that day. T h i s move caught the Reich's defenders by surprise and the Americans found the skies far less hostile than they were earlier in the day. T h e heavies utterly destroyed the B f - I 0 9 factory there in another remarkable display o f accuracy. Altogether, the day cost the U S A A F another seventy four-engined bombers. T h e Luftwaffe suffered just as hard, and had started to run out of fresh bodies to fill the cockpits of the available interceptors. In fact, the commander of the I Fighter C o r p s subsequently wrote, "In the long run, our forces are fighting a hopeless battle." W h e n February finally drew to a close, the Luftwaffe's fighter force h a d lost a total of 4 3 4 pilots, almost 1 8 percent of its total strength. T h e daylight battle over the Reich was bleeding the jagdgeschwaders white. Big W e e k ended after the missions on the twenty-fifth. T h e Fifteen and Eighth Air Forces h a d flown a combined 3 , 8 2 3 bomber sorties while the R A F put 2 , 3 5 1 over Germany at night. Together, the Allies dropped 1 8 , 2 9 1 tons of bombs on eighteen aircraft factories and two ball bearings plants. T h e week cost the Luftwaffe at least a hundred pilots and almost

The air war mingled physical discomfort and boredom with searing moments of sudden violence. Here, an 88mm flak hit has ripped a Fifteenth Air Force B-24 in half.

210

C h a p t e r 10

three hundred interceptors. T h e U S A A F lost 2 2 7 bombers; the R A F lost another 1 5 7 . S o m e five thousand R A F and U S A A F airmen died, returned to England or Italy wounded, or simply went missing over the flak-filled German skies. Big W e e k inflicted significant damage on the targeted German factories. T h e Regensburg B f - 1 0 9 plant was totally destroyed, which effectively denied the Luftwaffe about 7 5 0

fighters.

At Augsburg, 1 6 0 freshly completed aircraft were either destroyed or damaged in the bombing, and further production did not resume for over two weeks. T h e factories weren't the real targets though; the Luftwaffe was. A n d in meeting the American m a x i m u m effort with one of their own, the defenders of the Reich had been stretched beyond their endurance. T h e Americans finally h a d the Luftwaffe on the ropes. Now, they needed to deliver the knock-out blow.

A 9 1 s t B o m b Group Flying Fort over the M e s s e r s c h m i t t plant at A u g s b u r g , Germany, d u r i n g Big W e e k on February 2 5 , 1 9 4 4 ,

They didn't make it quite home. The end of a battle-damaged B-24 and its crew of ten dedicated young Americans.

Relentless Pursuit: Big Week

211

Robert S. J o h n s o n , one of t h e l e a d i n g 5 6 t h Fighter Group aces, is c r e d i t e d t o d a y w i t h t w e n t y seven a e r i a l v i c t o r i e s . He shot d o w n eight G e r m a n f i g h t e r s in one m o n t h d u r i n g t h e i n t e n s e air b a t t l e s over G e r m a n y in t h e spring of 1944. For a t i m e , he w a s t h e Eighth Air Force's l e a d i n g f i g h t e r ace.

12 TIPPING POINT ^ ^

"The strained manpower demands urgently

situation

the further

in units operating in defense of the Reich

bringing up of experienced fiying personnel

other arms of the service . . .for the maintenance

from

of the fighter arm."

Adolf Galland, General of the Fighters, March SINCE NOVEMBER

*

1944

1 9 4 3 , the R A F h a d waged a singular

campaign against the German capital. In what became known as the " T h e Battle of Berlin," the British launched sixteen m a x i m u m effort raids on the city through the winter of 1943—1944. Bomber H a r r i s declared, "It m a y cost us a thousand bombers, but it will cost Germany the war." By this point in the war, Bomber C o m m a n d had come up the night attack learning curve. U s i n g early electronic countermeasures techniques, such as " w i n d o w " or chaff to spoof German radars, the British h a d on occasion been able to throw the Luftwaffe off its game a n d hit targets without significant interception. N e w navigation aids helped considerably, and the number of aircraft that actually bombed the primary target steadily increased through 1 9 4 3 and 1 9 4 4 . R a d a r became a staple for both the heavy bombers and the night fighters sent out to protect them. A n d by m i d - 1 9 4 3 , a radio transponder system known as " O b o e " provided decent poor weather guidance to a target area. Oboe used two stations back in England that h o m e d in on a radio beacon carried by a

The versatile DeHaviland Mosquito played a significant role in Bomber

pathfinder D e H a v i l a n d M o s q u i t o . T h e stations would pinpoint

Command's operations in 1943 and 1944. Some flew nocturnal hunting

the p a t h f i n d e r s location and guide it to the target area. Once in

missions as night fighters, prowling the flanks of the bomber stream to pick off

the right place, the Mossies w o u l d release parachute flares to mark

German Bf-110s and Me-41 Os. Other Mossies flew ahead of the Lancasters

the area. Further pathfinders would then drop incendiary bombs

and Halifaxes to mark the target area in the pathfinder role.

213

The Battle of Berlin began in November 1943 at a time when Bomber Command had finally made the jump from a twin-engine dominated force to one far more capable, thanks to the massive influx of Halifaxes and Lancasters. Nevertheless, Berlin was the most heavily defended target in the world at that time, and Bomber Command lost five hundred aircraft trying to break the German people's morale with the destruction sown on their city.

on the flares, creating a conflagration in the target area that served as the aim point for the rest of the bomber stream. W i t h Oboe, the heavies could sometimes strike their targets with nearly the same level of accuracy that the N o r d e n bombsight possessed. It was used extensively in the R u h r Valley, but it could not operate all the way to Berlin due to the curvature of the earth. For such missions, Bomber C o m m a n d relied on the H 2 S radar system carried by its Lancasters and Halifaxes. By late 1 9 4 3 , the W e l l i n g t o n was being phased out of front line service as more Halifaxes and Lancasters rolled off the production line. T h e enormous amount of material, treasure,

214

C h a p t e r 10

and h u m a n i t y Great Britain poured into Bomber C o m m a n d finally began to pay dividends. By the time the Battle of Berlin began, the vast majority of the squadrons committed to it flew Lancasters. Eventually, Lane crews carried out just over seven thousand sorties over the N a z i capital out of about nine thousand total during the campaign. T h e first night's attacks resulted in only nine bombers lost. Encouraged, Bomber C o m m a n d struck again a few nights later. Between missions to Berlin, the R A F continued hitting cities in the R u h r and elsewhere throughout Germany. T h e low loss rate d i d not hold. As the campaign wore on, Luftwaffe night

fighters—including

now the deadly effective

Heinkel 2 1 9 " O w l " — f o u n d their way into bomber stream and took a devastating toll. F r o m November 1 8 until the end of M a r c h , the campaign cost the R A F over a thousand aircraft (five hundred alone on the Berlin raids). T h e grinding loss rate appalled the crews, w h o felt as if they were being thrown away for little purpose. M o r a l e plummeted. One squadron alone suffered over 1 0 0 percent losses in three months. O n some missions, the R A F senior leadership questioned the resolve of the crews in pressing home their attacks on Berlin. After the campaign, one group commander, Air V i c e M a r s h a l Bennett, s u m m e d u p the situation: " T h e r e can be no doubt that a very large number of crews failed to carry out their attacks during the Battle of Berlin in their customary determined manner." W h i l e losing over 1 , 0 0 0 bombers a n d another 1 , 6 0 0 damaged ( p l u s 3 , 7 0 0 aircrew), Bomber C o m m a n d inflicted extensive damage on Berlin. By the end of the campaign in M a r c h

The Battle of Berlin profoundly affected the surviving Bomber Command aircrews. Morale plummeted, especially after it appeared all the sacrifices the men had made seemed all for nothing. Much of Berlin lay in ruins, but the German people seemed ever more resolved to fighting on. From the end of the Battle of Berlin to May 1945, the RAF crews tasked with carrying the offensive to the German people grew increasingly fatalistic. Having a 24 percent chance of surviving the campaign unscathed, safe at home in England were not odds anyone could endure with perpetual good cheer.

A formation of 44 Squadron Lanes high over England. The Germans learned to exploit the Lancaster's lack of a belly turret by using their "Jazz Music"-equipped Bf-110s to creep under the Avros and fire up into them while safely inside the RAF aircraft's blind spot.

l i p p i n g P o i n t 223

Fires burn in the city s t r e e t s b e l o w , s i l h o u e t t i n g a Lancaster in its hellish g l o w . D u r i n g s o m e raids, the f i r e s t o r m s c r e a t e d t u r b u l e n c e a n d s m o k e c l o u d s over t e n t h o u s a n d f e e t a b o v e t h e urban a r e a s being c o n s u m e d . RAF c r e w s c o u l d n a v i g a t e to t h e t a r g e t by t h e f l a m e s , w h i c h c o u l d s o m e t i m e s be seen f r o m s i x t y m i l e s a w a y .

The Battle of Berlin a n d all its a s s o c i a t e d

B o m b e r C o m m a n d g r o u n d c r e w s p u t t h e final t o u c h e s on a Lancaster b e f o r e t h e night's m i s s i o n . The

raids cost B o m b e r C o m m a n d a t h o u s a n d

d e d i c a t i o n a n d w o r k ethic t h e g r o u n d c r e w s gave to t h e i r s q u a d r o n s m a d e t h e s u s t a i n e d air w a r a g a i n s t

a i r c r a f t f r o m N o v e m b e r 1943 t o M a r c h

G e r m a n y possible. W i t h o u t t h e i r d e v o t i o n , t h e o u t - o f - c o m m i s s i o n rates w o u l d have c r i p p l e d t h e b o m b i n g

1944. Here, a Halifax g o e s d o w n a f t e r

e f f o r t . Yet, t h e i r t h a n k l e s s j o b s received little r e c o g n i t i o n d u r i n g t h e w a r or after.

losing its right v e r t i c a l stabilizer.

216

C h a p t e r 10

The end of a very long day for an Eighth Air Force B-17 crew. The furious pace Spaatz and Anderson set for the crews in the spring of 1944 alarmed Doolittle, who fought whenever he could to give his men some time off.

1 9 4 4 , almost half a million Germans h a d been left homeless by the British raids. Another fourteen thousand had been killed or injured. Yet, German morale d i d not crumble. Instead the people H a r r i s sought to kill or coerce into surrender only grew more resolute to continue the fight. Despite the damage to Berlins factories, war production quickly increased in 1 9 4 4 . Despite the hardships inflicted by the nocturnal bombers, the Germans w o u l d not quit. Four years after the L o n d o n Blitz failed, the Battle of Berlin proved Douhet wrong again. Bomber C o m m a n d suffered a clear defeat over Berlin that winter. T h e crews started to wonder what the point of all this sacrifice was when nothing tangible ever seemed to be gained by it. S o m e historians have compared the crisis within Bomber C o m m a n d in the spring of 1 9 4 4 to the one the British A r m y experienced in France in 1 9 1 7 . M o r a l e never collapsed, but it never fully recovered. A fatalistic resolve permeated Bomber C o m m a n d until the end of the war. Meanwhile, Doolittle s Eighth Air Force crews finished out February with a 2 0 percent overall loss rate among the bombers. Five percent was considered sustainable in both the R A F and the U S A A F . Doolittle continued to want to give his airmen time to recover, but his bosses, Fred Anderson and Spaatz, demanded that he maintain the pressure on the Luftwaffe. To do so, the U S A A F h a d to find another target that would force the Germans to come out and fight. Just as the British lost the Battle of Berlin, S p a a t z stepped in and ordered the M i g h t y Eighth to hit the German capital in broad daylight. For the first time, the Americans would not target a specific factory complex. Instead, Berlin was to be carpet bombed under the winter sun. In retrospect, that shift away from precision targeting to area targeting marked a major step forward in the evolution of American aerial strategy, one that lead ultimately to the firebombing of T o k y o and the atomic attacks on Nagasaki and H i r o s h i m a .

l i p p i n g P o i n t 225

The RAF's Mosquito ranked as the best all-purpose aircraft of World War II. It served as a night fighter, a strike aircraft, a fighter-bomber, as well as a pathfinder and reconnaissance platform. Here, a Mosquito lays waste to German ships caught at anchor in a Norwegian fjord in the summer of 1944.

Berlin lay 1 , 1 0 0 miles from the bomber bases in Hast A n g l i a . T h e distance involved had already cost the British dearly. D u r i n g the night raids, the Luftwaffe took to intercepting the R A F over the N o r t h Sea, continuing the interceptions all the way to Berlin, then pursuing them almost to the British coast on their way out. W i t h such a long exposure period, the R A F lost scores of bombers on these missions. In the first week of M a r c h , the Eighth went to Berlin. W e a t h e r was an obstacle f r o m the outset. T h e final days of winter left the Continent blanketed in thick cloud cover. It didn't matter. S p a a t z ordered the bombers into the air anyway. For the survivors of the Big Week, the sight of red ribbon stretching all the way to Berlin on the briefing room's wall m a p h a d a profound affect two weeks later. Groans, whistles, dead silence greeted the news of the target. It didn't help that the weather was awful. T h e first raid, set for M a r c h 3, misfired due to heavy clouds and storms the bombers encountered. O n l y the B - 2 4 s of the 3rd Bomb Division reached Berlin. T h e American campaign against the capital started more with a w h i m p e r than a bang. T h e next day, snow fell in East Anglia. Doolittle wanted to scrub the mission. Anderson

218

Pilots of the Eighth Air Force's legendary 4th

and S p a a t z ordered h i m to get the bombers in the air. Five hundred Forts and Liberators

Fighter Group pose for a snapshot prior to a

headed for the target, only to run into even more appalling weather. O n l y sixty-nine tons of

mission in 1944.

ordnance landed on Berlin.

C h a p t e r 10

In t h e f u r i o u s air b a t t l e s of Big W e e k a n d Berlin, t h e 4th Fighter Group's t a n d e m aces, Don G e n t i l e a n d d o h n n y Godfrey, rose to f a m e as t h e Eighth Air Force's m o s t f a m o u s f i g h t i n g pair. G e n t i l e scored 19,83 aerial kills a n d 6 m o r e on the ground d u r i n g his c o m b a t career. G o d f r e y received c r e d i t for 28.99 air and g r o u n d kills before he h i m s e l f w a s s h o t d o w n and t a k e n prisoner in the late s u m m e r of 1944.

A b a t t l e - d a m a g e d Fort burns on a f a r m e r ' s field

I hat night, Doolittle wanted to give his airmen off-base passes. He saw their fatigue, saw their stress, and continued to worry that Spaatz and Anderson were pushing them beyond

back in East A n g l i a , having f a i l e d to reach its airfield a f t e r a m i s s i o n over Germany.

human endurance. They needed a break. Spaatz said no. The passes were cancelled. The weather intervened and gave the crews the break they needed. Severe storms and fog grounded the Eighth Air Force on March 5. T h e next day, though, Spaatz wanted every bird in the air. Despite heavy cloud cover, Doolittle gave the "Go" order and 7 3 0 bombers found their wav through the soup to wing their way east. The Luftwaffe rose to challenge them with a vengeance. Vectored into elements of the I st Bomb Division, an epic air battle erupted over the German frontier as waves of interceptors

lipping Point

2 1 9

waded into the 91st, 9 2 n d , and 3 8 1 s t Bomb Groups. Frantic gunners laid on their triggers as the 1 0 9 s a n d I 9 0 s flashed past through their formations. T h e 9 1 s t took a beating, losing six Forts and sixty men. T h e other two groups in the wing lost seven more. M o m e n t s later, a squadron of Messerschmitt B f - I 0 9 s slipped through the escort screen to make a head-on attack on the 4 5 7 t h Bomb Group. One German pilot misjudged his run and collided into 2 n d Lt. R o y Graves' B - I 7 . Locked together, the wreckage from both planes spun into Graves' wingman, 2 n d Lt. Eugene W h a l e n ' s Fort. T h e formations soldiered forward. Fresh interceptors struck the unluckiest group in the Eighth Air Force. T h i s was the Bloody Hundredth, and again they earned their reputation. Caught unprotected by Mustangs or Thunderbolts, the Hundredth encountered upwards of a hundred German fighters or more. In seconds, they dove down into the American combat box in another furious head on pass. T h e entire 3 5 0 t h Bomb S q u a d r o n — t h e high element in the box that d a y — w e n t down in flames. Ten bombers in a blink of an eye. Still the buzz saw continued. Before their return to England, the 100th Bomb Group lost fifteen of its twenty planes. 56th Fighter Group ace Francis Gabreski

T h e Eighth made no effort to hide their destination. T h e Luftwaffe controllers

received national press for his exploits over

scrambled everything that could fly and fight. Even units that were serving on the Eastern

Germany while scoring twenty-eight air and

Front received orders taking them over Berlin. T h e fighting raged across the length of the

ground kills. But even as the veteran pilots of

Reich until late afternoon when the final battle-damaged burning bombers crash-landed back

VIII Fighter Command took a heavy toll of the

in East Anglia.

Luftwaffe's aces defending the Third Reich, the merciless war of attrition claimed plenty

S p a a t z was right: T h e Germans w o u l d fight for Berlin. Sixty-nine bombers had gone down during the day. T h e Germans lost sixty-six

fighters.

of American ones as well. Gabreski crashlanded during a strafing run against a German airfield in July 1944 and was taken prisoner. By the end of the summer, the Luftstalags held many of the VIII s top aces, including fellow Wolfpack ace and former commanding officer Hubert "Hub" Zemke.

Francis Gabreski and members of the 56th Fighter Group stage a celebratory shot in the group's officer's club at Halesworth.

228 C h a p t e r 10

Forts of the 384th Bomb Group over Berlin during the March 6,1944, raid. The lead bomber, Shack Rabbit, survived the air war only another month. During an April 24,1944, raid to Oberpfaffenhofen, Shack Rabbitwas shot down over France. The Fort's pilot, Lt. Walter L. Harvey, and four other members of the crew were able to escape back to England, thanks to the French underground. The 384th Bomb Group lost eight bombers that day, over a quarter of its strength.

T h e next day the weather closed in, but on M a r c h 8, S p a a t z ordered the Eighth to hit Berlin again. Thirty-seven bombers went down. T h e Luftwaffe lost fifty-five interceptors. W o r n out, pushed to the edge of h u m a n endurance, the German pilots h a d reached a breaking point. Since the Americans commenced attacks on Berlin, some of the L u f t w a f f e s best fighter leaders h a d been killed in the Reich's cloud-strewn skies. Egon Mayer, Anton Hackl, H u g o Frey, Gerhard Loos, a n d R u d o l f Ehrenberger—all bomber-killing experts and aces with a combined 4 7 1 aerial v i c t o r i e s — h a d died in battle between M a r c h 2—8. T h e Luftwaffe simply couldn't sustain the loss of such veteran pilots. By this point in the war, their experience and leadership were the only things holding together the fighter geschwaders. O n the other side of the fence, the American crews had been pushed to the ragged edge of exhaustion as well. Doolittle fretted and worried about them, but S p a a t z and Anderson were unrelenting. T h e y l a i d on another strike against Berlin for M a r c h 9. T h e r e would be no respite for the crews, m a n y of w h o m h a d already flown on every other mission to the capital.

lipping Point

2 2 1

One of t h e 2 n d B o m b Division's B - 2 4 g r o u p s m a k e s its w a y t o w a r d Berlin d u r i n g the M a r c h 6 , 1 9 4 4 , raid. A s an e n g i n e m e c h a n i c goes a b o u t his business, an a r m o r e r p a u s e s as a loca farmer's w i f e f e e d s her ducks right t h e r e in t h e parking area of the Eighth Air Force s t a t i o n Civilians lived c l u s t e r e d a r o u n d t h e edges of the American bases and frequently came and w e n t as t h e y s a w fit.

The 3 0 6 t h B o m b Group, 1st Division, closing in oil Berlin d u r i n g t h e M i g h t y Eighth's epic c a m p a i g n a g a i n s t t h e G e r m a n c a p i t a l . The A m e r i c a n s s u c c e e d e d in d e l i v e r i n g a body b l o w to t h e L u f t w a f f e by m a k i n g its f i g h t e r f o r c e c o m e o u t and fight to d e f e n d Berlin.

Chapter 12

A 56th Fighter Group Wolfpack P-47D Razorback Thunderbolt escorting a B-17 formation during one of the March Berlin raids. This particular P-47 survived the brutal attrition over Europe until August 3,1944, when it was shot down over Europe.

T h a t morning, the crews gathered in the briefing room and learned they w o u l d b o m b Berlin again. Given the desperate battles and loss o f so many friends over the past week, it w o u l d be difficult to underestimate the fear a n d despair that the news of the day's target evoked in these young Americans. S o m e of those men were short-timers; this w o u l d be their twenty-fifth mission. Instead of an easy m i l k run and a flight back home, they faced another grueling ordeal over the heart of the Reich. O n e such veteran described how he became a "nervous wreck" as he a n d his comrades struggled to finish their last four missions in the midst of this blitz on Berlin.

lipping Point

2 2 3

The 94th Bomb Group over Berlin in early March. The pace of combat operations and the level of attrition during the spring of 1944 made chances of survival guite dicey for the crews of these B-17s. The Fort in the picture's foreground w a s severely d a m a g e d a f e w w e e k s later during a raid on Brunswick on M a r c h 2 3 , 1 9 4 4 . The c r e w m a n a g e d to coax the crippled bird to the English Channel, but they finally had to set it d o w n in the water. All aboard w e r e killed.

224

Throughout the Berlin campaign, the w e a t h e r

Chow Hound, a 91st Bomb Group B-17 over Berlin during the M a r c h 8 , 1 9 4 4 , mission. Thirty-seven bombers

played havoc w i t h the Eighth's operations.

w e n t d o w n during this raid on the Reich's capital, but the previous week's fighting had h a m m e r e d the

Several days' raids had to be canceled,

L u f t w a f f e ' s interceptor force. The next day, the Germans could not defend Berlin against one more attack, and

especially after an unseasonal s n o w s t o r m

the Eighth suffered only light losses. Chow Hound and her c r e w survived the offensive against Berlin, only to

dusted the East Anglia bomber stations.

be lost over France in August. Nine men w e n t d o w n w i t h their B-17 and died

C h a p t e r 10

A 93rd B o m b Group B - 2 4 en route to Friedrichshafen. A f t e r t h e Berlin c a m p a i g n , t h e Eighth Air Force did not relent. N e a r daily deep p e n e t r a t i o n raids s u s t a i n e d t h e pressure through March and April, forcing the L u f t w a f f e ' s e x h a u s t e d i n t e r c e p t o r pilots to rise and do b a t t l e a g a i n s t ever-longer odds. This p a r t i c u l a r B - 2 4 e n d u r e d t h e spring o f f e n s i v e b e f o r e D-Day, only t o go d o w n over B e l g i u m on September 21,1944.

A 3 4 t h B o m b Group B - 2 4 on its b o m b run. The Eighth Air Force e x p a n d e d to i n c l u d e by the Berlin raids t w o b o m b d i v i s i o n s of B-17s a n d one o f B - 2 4 s .

Heavy cloud cover obscured most of Germany that day. I he bombers hit Berlin and other cities using radar to guide them into the target areas. But instead of swarms of German fighters to greet them, the grey winter skies were devoid of interceptors. Weather, catastrophic losses, and fatigue conspired to keep the Luftwaffe on the ground. Flak shot down nine bombers. Berlin had been raided, and the Germans could no longer defend it. A turning point had been reached. By the end of the month, the Luftwaffe lost 56 percent of its available fighters and 2 2 percent of its interceptor pilots. Twenty-five more veteran aces would die attacking the bomber streams between March and Mav. The commander of the fiahter defenses in the north (Jagdgruppe I), later remarked, "The American forces captured air supremacy over almost the entire Reich . . . and this meant the complete collapse of Germav's position as an air power."

lipping Point

2 2 5

M a j o r J i m H o w a r d , a f o r m e r Flying Tiger ace

d i m H o w a r d , George Bickell, a n d O w e n S e a m a n , the 3 5 4 t h Fighter Group's s g u a d r o n c o m m a n d e r s in early

w i t h six kills, j o i n e d the 3 5 4 t h Fighter Group

1944, pose on t h e f l i g h t line b e f o r e a m i s s i o n . Bickell a n d S e a m a n had b o t h b e e n at Pearl Harbor oil

as a s g u a d r o n c o m m a n d e r in t i m e to reach

D e c e m b e r 7 , 1 9 4 1 , a n d had e n d u r e d t h e J a p a n e s e surprise a t t a c k . W i t h o u t the 3 5 4 t h and t h e arrival of

England w i t h t h e unit in D e c e m b e r 1943. On

m o r e P-51 M u s t a n g s in theater, t h e Berlin s t r i k e s in M a r c h w o u l d never have been possible.

J a n u a r y 1 1 , 1 9 4 4 , he e n c o u n t e r e d a b o u t t h i r t y L u f t w a f f e f i g h t e r s a t t a c k i n g t h e B - 1 7 s of t h e 4 9 1 s t B o m b Group. A l o n e , H o w a r d w a d e d into

It would not Lie easy. Plenty of light remained in the Jagdgeschwaders, and at times they

t h e G e r m a n i n t e r c e p t o r s and shot d o w n six of

could inflict serious damage. On March 18, they punished the 2nd Bomb Division's B-24s

t h e m . He saved t h e 4 9 1 s t f r o m s u f f e r i n g t h e

for a terrible mistake made over Friedrichshafen when the 44th Group executed a 360-degree

f a t e of so m a n y o t h e r b o m b e r groups t h a t had

circle over the target area. T h e trailing groups, confused by the unscheduled move, abandoned

been s i n g l e d o u t by t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s fighters.

their bomb runs and switched to a secondary target. In the process, the Liberators became

For his a c t i o n s t h a t day, H o w a r d received the

strung out. At that moment, the Luftwaffe hit them with seventy-five fighters. Attacking in

M e d a l of Honor, t h e only f i g h t e r p i l o t in the

waves of six, they sent fifteen 3 9 2 n d Group B-24s down in flames.

Eighth Air Force to be so d e c o r a t e d .

Old Cloty was one of them. Damaged bv flak that had already wounded or killed two members of the crew, the Liberator struggled to maintain formation with one engine feathered and two fires raging. As the pilots fought to save the aircraft, German fighters CDHtinmd on page 2 11

226

C h a p t e r 10

The 4 5 2 n d B o m b Group over Berlin d u r i n g the M a r c h 9 , 1 9 4 4 , raid. The s u r p r i s e d A m e r i c a n s , j a d e d a n d c a u t i o u s f r o m t h e b l o o d b a t h s over Berlin since M a r c h 2, e x p e c t e d heavy losses. Instead, t h e y f o u n d t h e cloudy skies v i r t u a l l y f r e e of L u f t w a f f e i n t e r c e p t o r s .

S t a r t i n g a 3 8 1 s t B o m b Group B-17's e n g i n e s required c o o r d i n a t i o n b e t w e e n pilots a n d g r o u n d c r e w s . Here, a ground c r e w m a n checks out t h e right inboard e n g i n e as it s p u t t e r s t o life, k e e p i n g a fire e x t i n g u i s h e r h a n d y in

Hub Z e m k e ranks as one of t h e g r e a t e s t f i g h t e r

case s o m e t h i n g w e n t w r o n g

leaders of W o r l d W a r II. He shaped t h e 5 6 t h Fighter Group into one of t h e m o s t e f f e c t i v e in t h e history of t h e USAAF. He s c o r e d 17.75 c o n f i r m e d kills d u r i n g his t e n u r e in t h e VIII Fighter C o m m a n d b e f o r e being lost over G e r m a n y in October 1944. He s p e n t t h e rest of t h e w a r in a P O W c a m p .

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227

Düring the spring and s u m m e r of 1944, the skies over Germany filled w i t h contrails a l m o s t every day.

Little Miss Mischief

after a mission over Nazi-held Europe, Thanks to the tireless efforts of the ground c r e w s ,

such crash-landings rarely kept a B-17 out of action long. They performed miracles w i t h mechanical ingenuity.

228

C h a p t e r 10

A crippled Fort f r o m the 381st B o m b Group belly-lands back in England. The w e i g h t of the aircraft usually crushed the ball turret during such desperate landings. If the t u r r e t had j a m m e d or had been put out of action by battle d a m a g e , the gunner inside faced a grim reality: his life for the rest of the crew's.

A G e r m a n - e y e v i e w of a 4 5 2 n d B o m b Group B-17G a b o u t t o drop its b o m b s on Berlin d u r i n g a raid in t h e spring of 1944.

lipping Point

229

The gut-check m o m e n t : on t h e b o m b run, s t r a i g h t a n d level, s i t t i n g t a r g e t s . . . the c r e w s could only pray t h e y w o u l d c o m e t h r o u g h u n s c a t h e d . It all c a m e d o w n t o c h a n c e — a n d p e r h a p s f a i t h

H a u p t m a n n A n t o n Hackl, one of t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s leading b o m b e r -

kill ace G u n t h e r Rail. He w a s w o u n d e d in a c t i o n flying

d u r i n g t h e f u r i o u s f i g h t i n g in t h e s p r i n g of 1944. The a t t r i t i o n

a g a i n s t the A m e r i c a n s a n d w a s k n o c k e d o u t of a c t i o n for

rate on G e r m a n pilots g r e w so s e v e r e t h a t t h e i r life e x p e c t a n c y

several w e e k s .

in c o m b a t a v e r a g e d e i g h t to t h i r t y days.

230

C h a p t e r 10

A n o t h e r L u f t w a f f e c a s u a l t y d u r i n g t h e spring w a s 275-

killers, w a s a m o n g t h e t w e n t y - e i g h t G e r m a n aces to be killed

A n o t h e r shot of t h e 4 5 2 n d B o m b Group at its release p o i n t over Berlin, M a r c h 6 , 1 9 4 4 .

pounced. Bullets flayed the fuselage. T h e nose gunner cried out for help. T h e next attack knocked out the oxygen system; the L i b started to buck and heave, growing increasingly out of control. T h e tail gunner h a d moved forward and was in the waist when an oxygen bottle overhead took a direct hit and exploded. T h e blast threw the tail gunner, Chester Strickler, straight through the waist window. As he parachuted to the ground, the Liberator was reduced to falling debris. H e was its lone survivor. T h o u g h the tipping point had been reached, plenty of desperate, hard fighting remained.

The remains of a battle-damaged B-24 after crashing back in England. Six wounded, four miraculously escaped harm.

lipping Point

231

A graphic display of t h e P-51 's r u g g e d n e s s at the 3 6 4 t h Fighter Group's h o m e s t a t i o n in East A n g l i a

13 DESTRUCTION AND DISTRACTION ^ ^

*

"l would rather have a mass of aircraft standing around unable to fiy owing to a lack of petrol than not have any at all" —Herman

Goering

LIKE W I N G E D P A R T I S A N S , T H E VIII F I G H T E R C O M M A N D S T R U C K . M u s t a n g s a n d T h u n d e r b o l t s , cut loose from bomber apron strings, roamed low across N a z i - h e l d Europe in search of anything worth blowing up. Trucks, staff cars, a m m u n i t i o n dumps, airfields, flak batteries, and trains became choice targets. Trains served as bullet magnet. If they moved in daylight anywhere in Western Europe that spring of 1 9 4 4 , chances were g o o d an Allied fighter would drop down out of the clouds and rake it with gunfire. T h e pilots especially loved to blow u p the locomotives. Fiftycaliber rounds could d o a lot of damage very quickly, a n d a stricken locomotive would erupt in clouds of white steam when hit. Ace M a x Lamb, an original member of the 3 5 4 t h "Pioneer Mustangs," f o u n d a train running along an open stretch of flat farmland. H e led a flight of four P - 5 I s down to flay the locomotive with machine gun fire. W h e n it exploded, hundreds of W e h r m a c h t soldiers poured out o f the now-stationary passenger cars. Line abreast, almost wing-to-wing, the four M u s t a n g s m a d e pass after pass at the soldiers, their sixteen M 2 fifties slaughtering dozens in with every run. C a u g h t without any cover, the soldiers panicked and either ran for it or lay flat and prayed. By the time the last spent casing fell f r o m Lamb's wing, the better part o f a battalion had been mauled by four American pilots. W e l c o m e to the new air war, where

fighter-bombers

ruled

the w i l d blue a n d nothing below was safe. W i t h two m o n t h s left

Max Lamb's North American ride. Gentle and soft-spoken, Lamb was a capable

to go before D-Day, Doolittle unleashed Kepners fighters and told

and dedicated pilot who finished the war with 7.5 confirmed kills.

233

Once the VIII Fighter C o m m a n d w a s unleashed f r o m rigid b o m b e r escort tactics, the L u f t w a f f e had no safe place.

234

C h a p t e r 10

Strafing t r a i n s b e c a m e serious sport for t h e pilots of VIII Fighter C o m m a n d . D e s t r o y i n g l o c o m o t i v e s a n d rolling stock h e l p e d c r i p p l e the W e h r m a c h t ' s s t r a t e g i c m o b i l i t y a n d m a d e it very d i f f i c u l t for the G e r m a n s to push r e i n f o r c e m e n t s into N o r m a n d y .

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n

2 3 5

The RAF's Spitfires from the 2nd Tactical Air Force joined in the strafing and ground attack campaign throughout northwest Europe. During the Normandy campaign, a Spitfire caught Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's staff car on a narrow French lane, strafed it, and wounded the legendary German panzer leader.

them to wreak havoc on anything worth a bullet. A t first, this applied only to VTIT Fighter C o m m a n d units that had completed their escort duties for the day. En route home from England, the pilots were told to fly low and go hunting. Starting in April this tactic evolved into specific missions. U s i n g U l t r a and other intelligence sources, the Eighth pinpointed the location of many Luftwaffe units based in France and Germany. On April 5, the VTTT Fighter C o m m a n d targeted some of those airfields. Bad weather hampered the operation, but two groups f o u n d their way to their targets and destroyed ninety-eight aircraft on the g r o u n d or in the air. N o n e of this would have been possible if the Luftwaffe still owned the airspace over the Continent. Big W e e k and Berlin set the conditions for this new offensive. A n d in concert with the

fighter-bomber

attacks, the R A F ' s heavies, the Allied tactical air forces and Spaatz's

c o m m a n d worked on the pre-invasion "Transportation Plan." H a r r i s thought it was a useless

236

C h a p t e r 10

A P o l i s h - f l o w n Spitfire a i r b o r n e over England. The Poles never lost t h e i r e x t r e m e a g g r e s s i v e n e s s a n d took to the strafing c a m p a i g n w i t h singular fury.

A 7 8 t h Fighter Group P-47D razorback T h u n d e r b o l t . T h o u g h d e s i g n e d as a h i g h - a l t i t u d e fighter, t h e dug's i n c r e d i b l e r u g g e d n e s s , o r d n a n c e capacity, a n d t r e m e n d o u s f i r e p o w e r t r a n s f o r m e d it into t h e best f i g h t e r - b o m b e r of W o r l d W a r II

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n

2 3 7

Don Gentile s famous Shangri-La, one of the best-known Mustangs of the European air war. He would run afoul of his commanding officer, Don Blakeslee, for flathatting (flying very low to the ground) in this aircraft for some reporters in spring 1944.

diversion and wanted to keep his men focused on turning German cities into rubble. But the battlefield preparation for D - D a y was truly massive in scope a n d required every aircraft to carry out. T h e Transportation Plan called for sealing off the N o r m a n d y area from the rest of Europe by destroying the rail and road network in Western Europe. By knocking out bridges, destroying railroad yards, carpet bombing road intersections, a n d strafing trains and vehicles, the Allies hoped to prevent the Germans f r o m quickly reinforcing their units in N o r m a n d y . Since the W e h r m a c h t h a d a larger force available than what the Allies could land and sustain on the Continent, the only way the invasion could succeed was if the Germans could not get more men and While stunting for his crowd of media types, Gentile crashed his Mustang and wrecked it. Blakeslee was so furious that he grounded Gentile and sent him home, ending his combat career.

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C h a p t e r 10

supplies to the new front. T h r o u g h April the Allied strategic forces split their effort between long-range strikes into Germany and supporting the transportation plan.

Part of t h e air plan in s u p p o r t of the N o r m a n d y o p e r a t i o n c a l l e d for the d e s t r u c t i o n of France's road a n d rail i n f r a s t r u c t u r e l e a d i n g to t h e f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d . Here, a bridge over the S e i n e River has been d r o p p e d by a w e l l e x e c u t e d strike.

W i t h drop tanks, all t h i n g s w e r e possible. W i t h e n o u g h gas to fly a l m o s t a n y w h e r e in t h e Third Reich, t h e L u f t w a f f e lost its a b i l i t y t o find s a n c t u a r y f r o m t h e M i g h t y Eighth's r o a m i n g fighters. Even t r a i n i n g units w e r e c a u g h t a n d t h r a s h e d by t h e M u s t a n g s , T h u n d e r b o l t s , a n d Lightnings.

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n 247

Preparing for another long-range mission

Meanwhile, the Eighth Air Forces Mustangs, Lightnings, and T h u n d e r b o l t s continued their

over Germany.

depredations all the way into southern Germany. By month's end, the Germans knocked down 4 0 9 Eighth Air Force bombers, more than any other m o n t h . In the fall of 1 9 4 3 , such losses w o u l d have crippled the American campaign. But two seasons later, the U S A A F ' s build-up and replacement rate was so robust that the Eighth continued to grow even as it lost four thousand men in a four week span. T h o u g h the Luftwaffe scored high in April, it was a Pyrrhic victory. T h e month's dogfights killed or wounded 4 8 9 pilots. T h e defenders of the Reich proper suffered a 3 8 percent attrition rate. W h a t ' s more, the Luftwaffe's training c o m m a n d only graduated 3 7 6

240

C h a p t e r 10

To avoid f r i e n d l y fire i n c i d e n t s , t h e A l l i e s p a i n t e d t h e i r a i r c r a f t w i t h w h i t e a n d black " i n v a s i o n " s t r i p e s in t h e days b e f o r e t h e N o r m a n d y landings. This w a s s u p p o s e d t o g i v e t h e w a r s h i p s in t h e Channel and t h e ground t r o o p s on t h e b e a c h h e a d a guick w a y to recognize A l l i e d a i r c r a f t .

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n

241

The Jug's l e g e n d a r y r u g g e d n e s s saved m a n y pilots f r o m d e a t h or captivity. Here, a 3 5 0 t h Fighter Group P-47 p i l o t b r o u g h t his bird h o m e a f t e r t a k i n g a hit in the oil system. Barely a b l e to see t h r o u g h the viscous fluid sprayed all over his canopy, he n e v e r t h e l e s s m a n a g e d t o g e t d o w n safely.

A s t h e s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n d e m o l i s h e d Germany's a v i a t i o n f a c t o r i e s , t h e Third Beich b e g a n d i s p e r s i n g t h e industry into v a s t u n d e r g r o u n d m i n e s a n d f a c i l i t i e s . Buried d e e p b e n e a t h t h e s u r f a c e , t h e s e p l a n t s c o u l d not be d e s t r o y e d by A l l i e d b o m b s .

242

C h a p t e r 10

cadets that m o n t h . M o s t of these aviators possessed only half the flight hours of their grass-

To build its newest-generation aircraft, the

green Allied enemies. As the intensity o f the air campaign escalated, such neophytes thrown

Nazis used slave laborers—Jews or Russians

in half-prepared were little more than airborne cannon fodder.

or Slavs rounded up to work under appalling

Meanwhile, with a shortfall of almost a hundred w a r m bodies for his cockpits, Galland

conditions until they died.

had to ask for more crews from the bomber a n d reconnaissance arms, thus weakening on the eve of D - D a y the offensive striking power the Germans possessed. In M a y , General Eisenhower released the strategic bombers from their p r e - N o r m a n d y prep work. S p a a t z took the opportunity to open a new offensive against Germany. T h i s time, instead of going after Berlin or the aircraft industry, he selected the Reich's oil producing

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n

2 4 3

A G e r m a n Gr. 21 rocket scores a near miss on a B-17. The Gr. 21 s w e r e m o s t e f f e c t i v e at d i s p e r s i n g a b o m b e r squadron's c o m b a t box.

A s m o k e pot marks t h e b o m b release p o i n t for a f o r m a t i o n of B - 2 4 L i b e r a t o r s d u r i n g a m i s s i o n over France in

A s t h e pilots banked a n d t u r n e d to evade t h e

d u n e 1944. The days of i n d i v i d u a l b o m b a r d i e r s t a k i n g a i m on a t a r g e t w e r e long g o n e a n d so w a s t h e illusion

incoming weapons, the Luftwaffe fighters

of p i n p o i n t b o m b i n g .

earned t o p o u n c e b e f o r e t h e A m e r i c a n s could g e t back in f o r m a t i o n

W r e s t l i n g c o m m a n d of t h e air f r o m t h e

H e r m a n n Goering c o n t i n u e d t o lose c r e d i b i l i t y w i t h Hitler as the L u f t w a f f e ' s a b i l i t y to p e r f o r m its roles

L u f t w a f f e did n o t c o m e cheap.

declined. In t u r n , he c a s t i g a t e d his f i g h t e r leaders a n d q u e s t i o n e d t h e i r bravery at a t i m e w h e n t h e f r o n t - l i n e units w e r e b e i n g p u s h e d to t h e b r e a k i n g p o i n t by t h e A l l i e d air o f f e n s i v e .

244

C h a p t e r 10

Watchful eyes peer out from above the oxygen mask. Captain Oscar O'Neil, pilot and plane commander of a B-17 named Invasion II, personifies the veteran's sense of vigilance in combat.

infrastructure.The new effort began on M a y 1 2 when the Eighth hit seven synthetic oil plants with almost a thousand bombers. T h e Germans reacted fiercely, shooting down forty-six bombers while losing fifty-six interceptor pilots killed and wounded. T h e bombing was not incredibly accurate, but one plant lost 1 7 percent of its production capacity. Albert Speer, Hitler's M i n i s t e r of Armaments, reacted to the Eighth Air Force's raids with extreme alarm. H e wrote Hitler, " T h e enemy has struck us at one of our weakest points. If they p e r s i s t . . . we will soon no longer have any fuel production worth mentioning." T h e gravity of the situation forced the Germans to redeploy their anti-aircraft defenses to better protect the oil industry. By the fall of 1 9 4 4 , over a thousand A A guns protected key

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n 253

For t w o years, the A m e r i c a n s and British had executed a m p h i b i o u s landings in both t h e Pacific a n d M e d i t e r r a n e a n theaters. The h a r d - w o n lessons learned f r o m those earlier operations w e r e absorbed and incorporated into Operation Overlord, the invasion of w e s t e r n France. The key in every instance: c o m m a n d of the air over the beaches.

A m e r i c a n t r o o p s load up for D - D a y in S o u t h a m p t o n Harbor.

246

C h a p t e r 10

W h i l e Harris and s o m e other s t r a t e g i c - m i n d e d air c o m m a n d e r s b e l i e v e d t h e d i v e r s i o n of t h e h e a v i e s in s u p p o r t of the p r e - i n v a s i o n aerial o p e r a t i o n s over France w a s a w a s t e f u l d i v e r s i o n f r o m t h e m a i n m i s s i o n of c r u s h i n g Germany's i n d u s t r i e s a n d m o r a l e , t h e f a c t w a s using t h e s t r a t e g i c forces saved the lives of c o u n t l e s s soldiers and sailors w h o o t h e r w i s e w o u l d have f a c e d m u c h m o r e i n t e n s e o p p o s i t i o n . Scenes like t h i s sinking LCI w o u l d have been far m o r e c o m m o n had t h e L u f t w a f f e b e e n a b l e to strike t h e b e a c h h e a d in n u m b e r s .

The final s o f t e n i n g up a e r i a l b o m b a r d m e n t b e f o r e t h e D - D a y l a n d i n g s i n c l u d i n g N i n t h Air Force B-26 M a r a u d e r s h a m m e r i n g Utah Beach and the Eighth A i r Force p o u n d i n g t a r g e t s b e h i n d O m a h a Beach.

Destruction and Distiactiuu

The crucial m o m e n t s : V u l n e r a b l e LCVPs ike t h i s one churn for the N o r m a n d y shore, June 6,1944.

A formation of Liberators on their bomb run.

installations. T h e s e were not facilities that could be moved underground. Since the beginning of the year, the Germans h a d been busy establishing critical factories in mines and gigantic underground complexes to make them impervious to bombing. M u c h of the aircraft industry h a d been reorganized this way, and slave laborers f r o m concentration camps were used on the production lines. In this way, Speer was able to drastically increase the outflow of armaments and aircraft despite all the damage the Allied air forces were doing to Germany's cities. Oil turned out to be the Reich's Achilles' heel. Cracking plants a n d refineries could not be moved underground or hardened. T h e only thing the Germans could do was ring them with anti-aircraft guns and trust that the Luftwaffe could hinder the attacking bombers. T h e Luftwaffe could not. A t the end of the month, S p a a t z hammered the oil targets again. T h i s time using four hundred bombers, thirty-two of which went down, the accuracy was stunning. T h e attacks inflicted massive damage. C o m b i n e d with several Fifteenth Air Force raids on Ploesti, Spaatz's bombers cut German oil production in half by the end of M a y . Despite losing eighty-four B - I 7 s and B-24s, plus almost 8 5 0 airmen, the Americans h a d scored the biggest victory yet in the strategic air war.

248

C h a p t e r 10

A l l day long on the 6th, the VIII Fighter C o m m a n d f l e w m i s s i o n s in s u p p o r t of t h e a m p h i b i o u s landings. Here, a 361 st Fighter Group P-51 gets t h e signal for t a k e - o f f in t h e m o r n i n g . S o m e of t h e VIII's pilots f l e w t h r e e m i s s i o n s or m o r e t h a t day.

In t h e m o n t h b e f o r e D-Day, w i t h t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n plan f u l l y e x e c u t e d , t h e Eighth a n d F i f t e e n t h A i r Forces struck a t oil t a r g e t s all over Central a n d Eastern Europe. The F i f t e e n t h c o n c e n t r a t e d on Ploesti. Long g o n e w e r e t h e days w h e r e t h e U S A A F d r e a m e d of a s i n g l e , k n o c k o u t b l o w on t h a t critical facility. Instead, a grim c a m p a i g n b e t w e e n t h e A m e r i c a n b o m b e r s a n d t h e A x i s repair c r e w s p l a y e d out t h r o u g h t h e s p r i n g a n d s u m m e r of 1944. The F i f t e e n t h struck Ploesti scores of t i m e s , inflicting m a s s i v e d a m a g e . Yet, in t h e e n d p r o d u c t i o n d i d n ' t c e a s e until the first Russian t a n k s rolled t h r o u g h the refineries later in 1944.

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n

2 4 9

H u n t e d on the g r o u n d , c h a s e d until f l a m e d in the air, t h e L u f t w a f f e ' s o n c e - v a u n t e d s t r e n g t h e b b e d a w a y t o a s k e l e t a l p r e s e n c e by the e n d of the s u m m e r of 1944.

250

C h a p t e r 10

Return of t h e 3 6 1 s t Fighter Group f o l l o w i n g a m i s s i o n over N o r m a n d y . The f i g h t e r s of the M i g h t y Eighth e n s u r e d t h e G e r m a n s paid in s p a d e s for m o v i n g t r o o p s , s u p p l i e s , or v e h i c l e s in d a y l i g h t t o w a r d the g r o w i n g b a t t l e in w e s t e r n France

A s the L u f t w a f f e ' s i n t e r c e p t o r s w e r e s w e p t f r o m t h e skies, the G e r m a n s i n c r e a s i n g l y relied on a n t i - a i r c r a f t b a t t e r i e s for t h e i r nation's d e f e n s e . It w a s a rare day over G e r m a n y w h e n a b o m b g r o u p c o u l d return w i t h o u t a n t i - a i r c r a f t artillery d a m a g e to its a i r c r a f t .

D e s t r u c l i o n and D i s l i a c t i o «

2 5 1

The destruction of Germany's above-ground military industries continued through the

T h e German war machine felt the new campaign's effects immediately. Calls went out to every c o m m a n d to conserve fuel and oil. Ruthless economy measures were put in place. T h e

summer, even after the shift to oil targets

training o f new pilots suffered as less aviation gas was made available. T h a t meant the cadets

took place. Here, a thoroughly bombed

received fewer hours in the air before being flung against the bomber streams. W o r s e things

Panther tank factory is examined after the

would soon follow as the campaign gained m o m e n t u m .

war by curious GIs.

M a y saw the first decline in American heavy bomber losses since the daylight strategic campaign began almost two years before. N o t only d i d the U S A A F have more Forts and Liberators available than any other time, the Luftwaffe h a d been g r o u n d down so severely by the attritional warfare over the Reich that its fighter units were staffed now by an increasingly small number o f old hands surrounded by half-trained replacements. Since March, the battles over Germany h a d cost the Reich defense units no fewer than twenty-eight aces killed in

252

C h a p t e r 10

A s the A l l i e d a r m i e s a d v a n c e d into France, t h e y c a m e across s o m e curious sights. Here in t h i s ruined h a n g a r t h e t r o o p s d i s c o v e r e d a c a p t u r e d 100th B o m b Group B-17 Flying Fortress.

A 3 0 5 t h B o m b Group B - 1 7 b u r n s a f t e r crashl a n d i n g in France. The A l l i e d a d v a n c e in W e s t e r n Europe a f f o r d e d t h e Eighth Air Force n e w e m e r g e n c y airfields t o use in case of b a t t l e d a m a g e . T h o u s a n d s of a i r m e n o w e d t h e i r lives t o t h e front's e a s t w a r d s h i f t t h a t s u m m e r and fall.

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n

2 5 3

A Fort c r e w p r e p a r e s for a c r a s h - l a n d i n g .

254

C h a p t e r 10

By the summer of 1944, the B-17 ruled supreme in Germany's daylight skies.

action. Others, like Gunther R a i l , suffered wounds that would keep them out of the fight for weeks a n d months to come. T h e Luftwaffe started the year with 2 , 3 9 5 single-engine fighter pilots. By June I, 1 9 4 4 , the Jagdgeschwaders had lost 2 , 2 6 2 of those pilots. In six months, the Luftwaffe suffered almost 1 0 0 percent losses. N o organization can survive such a body blow. T h a t the survivors continued to intercept raids and at times inflict heavy casualties stands as a testament to the courage a n d dedication in the face of an increasingly obvious lost cause. In June, the Allied heavy bombers worked in concert with the rest of the D - D a y invasion force to p u m m e l the Germans in their coastal emplacements. After two weeks of that, S p a a t z returned to the oil industry targets and began crossing them off a list that totaled slightly under a hundred facilities. In between raids, Bomber C o m m a n d and the Eighth were both used as battlefield sledgehammers in N o r m a n d y in hopes of breaking the deadlock there. T h e Eighth nearly destroyed the elite Panzer Lehr Division around St. L o in a carpet bombing attack that also inflicted almost five hundred friendly casualties on forward American units. Despite the commitments in N o r m a n d y , Spaatz's raids on the oil targets continued. By now, the Germans were experts in on-the-fly fix-it industrial repair. W o r k e r s swarmed over these critical facilities and soon restored m u c h of the lost production. T h i s time, S p a a t z gave them no respite. Gone were the days of the single knock-out blow. T h e Americans h a d come u p their learning curve and understood to win this campaign would require tenacity, patience, and consistency. By the end of July, the Eighth and Fifteenth smothered the aviation fuel facilities with hundreds of tons of bombs, reducing output by 9 8 percent. S p e e r s apocalyptic vision of what lay ahead for the Reich had come true.

D e s t r u c l i o n anil D i s t i n c t i o n 263

A V-1 p l u n g e s into a c r o w d e d London n e i g h b o r h o o d

CLUTCHING STRAWS ^ ^

"The superstition —Johannes

of the wonder weapon struck me as a transparent

*

trick."

Steinhoff, In Letzter Stunde

T H E Y W E R E S U P P O S E D T O S A V E T H E T H I R D R E I C H : new technologies that seemingly came straight off the pages of p u l p magazines and comic books. Rockets, guided missiles and jet fighters—the Germans raced the clock in a frantic effort to field these new "wonder weapons" that Hitler hoped would turn the tide of the war. Offensively, the new weapons included the V - I "Buzz B o m b " and the V - 2 rocket. Both were used against London, Antwerp, and targets in Southern England. T h e V - I became the w o r l d s

first

operational cruise missile on June 13, 1 9 4 4 , when the Germans fired an initial volley at Southern England f r o m facilities in France and H o l l a n d . W i t h a 1 , 8 7 0 - p o u n d warhead, the V - I could fly about 2 5 0 miles at 4 0 0 miles an hour. Using

a primitive

autopilot

system linked

to a

vane

anemometer, the V - I w o u l d fly in the general direction of its target. Once it traveled the distance between its launch r a m p back and its intended destination, it w o u l d automatically enter a steep dive and explode on impact with the ground. From June until the end of the war, the Germans launched about 9 , 5 0 0 "Doodle Bugs" at Allied targets. O n l y a quarter of those made it anywhere near their destination. Barrage balloons, anti-aircraft defenses, and fighters accounted for thousands of them. T h e others strayed off course or crashed. Still, the relatively

The last German terror campaign used weapons straight from the pulp comic

small number that did reach their targets did considerable damage.

books of the era. The V-1 pilotless "buzz bomb" was the first of these new

By war's end, the V-I menace had killed or w o u n d e d over twenty-

devices designed to kill civilians indiscriminately from remote locations

one thousand civilians.

hundreds of miles away.

257

T h e V-2 proved to be a much more menacing and dangerous weapon. T h e world s first ballistic missile, the V-2 actually entered sub-orbital flight on its trajectory to its target area. First launched against England on September 8, 1944, the V-2 alarmed Churchill and the rest of his cabinet. It flew too fast to be detected, prepared against, or shot down. In fact, most of the time it would impact and explode before anyone had heard it. T h e launch pads could not be bombed, either, as the V - I s could. T h e V-2 could be carted around by trucks and fired from almost anywhere. Trying to knock out their facilities would simply not work. There were no defenses for such a weapon—that would have to wait decades until the advent of anti-ballistic missile systems. T h e people of London and Antwerp would just have to endure. T h e mysterious explosions that rocked the British capital that fall were initially brushed off as gas leaks by the government, which sought to avoid a panic over the new weapon wielded against the civilian population.

A British T e m p e s t c h a s e s a V-1 a c r o s s t h e English c o u n t r y s i d e .

To p r o d u c e t h e Reich's " w o n d e r w e a p o n s " r e q u i r e d s e t t i n g up u n d e r g r o u n d f a c t o r i e s t h a t c o u l d n o t be d e s t r o y e d by A l l i e d b o m b s . Here, GIs check o u t a V-1 p r o d u c t i o n line in an u n d e r g r o u n d f a c i l i t y a f t e r t h e war.

258

C h a p t e r 10

The dreaded V-2, the world's first operational ballistic missile. The Allies possessed no defense to such a weapon and had to rely on counterintelligence tricks to fool the Germans as to the accuracy and lethality of their new weapon. This one was photographed in the United States after the war during a testing operation.

V - 2 strikes inflicted about three thousand casualties and scored some h o r r i f y i n g hits on crowded locations. In Antwerp, 5 3 7 people died when a V - 2 struck a movie theater. Another one landed on a Woolworth's in London, killing 1 0 8 . W i t h no effective defense, the British resorted to trickery.The Germans h a d developed a radio beam guidance system that gave the V - 2 effective accuracy. U s i n g its intelligence network, the British fed the Germans false information that the V-2s were falling ten to twenty miles beyond London. T h e Germans fell for this completely, recalibrated their guidance system and after that most of the V-2s fell harmlessly into the Kent countryside. T h e V - 1 and V - 2 programs absorbed enough German industrial resources and material to produce an estimated twenty-four thousand fighters. In the end, they achieved nothing more beyond senseless destruction and loss of civilian life. Yet, these two offensive vengeance weapons gave hope to the besieged German people, whose sufferings under Allied bombs

A buzz bomb over the English Channel. The V-1

sparked a desire for revenge. T h e V - I and V - 2 attacks satisfied that urge. In a real sense, the

threat forced the Allies to devote fighter units

N a z i regime invested vast treasure a n d resources into these weapons to m o l l i f y the population

to anti-buzz bomb defense. Shooting them

and inspire continued s u p p o r t for the government a n d the war effort. In the end, the average

down required speed and nerve. Sometimes,

V - 2 strike killed two people. T h e payoff did not match the outlay.

the pilots would actually fly alongside them

Coinciding with this mini-blitz on London was the arrival of the Messerschmitt 2 6 2 in operational service.The worlds first jet aircraft to reach front line units, the M e - 2 6 2 symbolized

and use a wing tip to flip the buzz bomb over, causing it to lose control and crash.

the Luftwaffes last, best hope to turn the tide in the skies over the Reich. After the war, so much misinformation and outright lies about the aircraft circulated in the memoirs of various Luftwaffe leaders that for decades the true nature of this revolutionary weapon has been clouded. Fortunately a new crop of historians, led by M a n f r e d Boehme, have stripped away much of the myth.

[ I i i l c l i i n g Straws

2 5 9

THE

PEOPLE'S

WONDER

WEAPON

W I T H T H E S H O R T A G E of fighter pilots reaching a crisis

hour, though it had a combat flying time of only thirty minutes.

point, Goering and Speer concocted a scheme to redress the

Worse, the B M W engine tended to flame out, and at least ten

situation. W h a t if a new jet fighter could be built from non-

H e - 1 6 2 s crashed in accidents. Altogether, about 1 2 0 reached

strategic materials and was easy enough to fly that H i t l e r Youth

combat squadrons. A few kills were scored in the final air battles

members could pilot it into battle with minimal training?

of the war. Two H e - 1 6 2 s were lost in return. W h e n the Allies

Galland thought this scheme ridiculous. H e advocated

finally overran the H e i n k e l factories, they discovered hundreds of

throwing all the production resources possible into the M e -

H e - 1 6 2 s awaiting delivery. Altogether, about six hundred rolled

2 6 2 program. Goering and Speer overruled him. T h e "People's

off production lines before the war ended.

Fighter" would go forward. T h e Heinkel H e - 1 6 2 was the result of this delusional and desperate vision. A t the end of September 1 9 4 4 , Goering gave the green light to the H e - 1 6 2 . Heinkel went to work constructing a prototype built of w o o d and glued together. R a p i d progress was made until the R A F b o m b e d the glue factory that produced what the H e - 1 6 2 needed. T h e substitute f o u n d failed repeatedly a n d caused a wing to come off during the aircraft's second flight in December. Nevertheless, the H e i n k e l was thrown into production, flaws a n d all. T h e first forty-six were sent to an operational test u n i t in January 1 9 4 5 . T h e "Salamander," as the H e - 1 6 2 was called, turned out to be a tricky plane to fly. T h i s made the idea of using Hitler Youth teenagers, versed only in glider flying, to pilot these new aircraft a preposterous proposition. In the early spring, elements of J G - I received the H e - 1 6 2

The Heinkel He-162 Salamander was born from desperation at the pilot

and began flying it operationally. Powered by the B M W - 0 0 3

attrition rate suffered by the Luftwaffe's interceptor force. Initially, it was

turbojet engine rejected for use in the M E - 2 6 2 program, the

supposed to be flown by half-trained teenagers recruited from Hitler Youth

Salamander could sustain speeds of over five hundred miles per

organizations. In practice, the He-162 required a highly trained pilot to fly.

T h e M e - 2 6 2 ' s genesis dates back to April 1 9 3 9 when Messerschmitt produced the first plans for a twin-engined jet fighter.The following year, on November I, 1 9 4 0 , Messerschmitt went to work on the new design, now dubbed "Project III." T h e initial airframe rolled out of the factory in January 1 9 4 1 . Later that spring, the project's engineers fitted a conventional piston engine to the aircraft's nose and test flew it for the first time. After numerous modifications, the first pure jet version of the new aircraft took flight a year later in July 1 9 4 2 . T h e M e - 2 6 2 represented a q u a n t u m technological leap over existing aeronautical technology. Like all major leaps forward, the project encountered numerous problems, not

268 C h a p t e r 10

By the s u m m e r of 1944, the L u f t w a f f e ' s f i g h t e r force w a s e q u i p p e d w i t h i n c r e a s i n g l y o b s o l e s c e n t a i r c r a f t like t h e Bf-109. Eclipsed by p l a n e s such as t h e M u s t a n g , the Spitfire XIV, t h e H a w k e r Tempest, a n d o t h e r A l l i e d a i r c r a f t , the a l r e a d y h o p e l e s s l y o u t n u m b e r e d G e r m a n f i g h t e r pilots no longer stood a c h a n c e in the skies over Europe in the a i r c r a f t a v a i l a b l e to t h e m . A d o l f G a l l a n d , Goering, a n d o t h e r s p i n n e d t h e i r slender hopes on the r e v o l u t i o n a r y n e w M e - 2 6 2 j e t fighterbomber. A h u n d r e d m i l e s an hour f a s t e r t h a n t h e P-51, G a l l a n d s a w it as t h e w e a p o n t h a t c o u l d w r e s t c o n t r o l of t h e air a w a y f r o m t h e A l l i e s a n d save Germany's c i t i e s f r o m f u r t h e r d e s t r u c t i o n .

[Iiilcliing Straws

2 6 1

An American patrol comes across a Me-262

the least of which were the unreliable B M W jet engines. By 1 9 4 2 , Germany faced a crushing

in Austria. German jet technology became one

shortage of strategic materials, which made producing the complex metal alloys that could

of the most sought-after prizes in the postwar.

withstand the super-heated environment within a jet engine feasible. Substitutes for such parts

Both the Russians and the Americans scoured

h a d to be found, and all had serious drawbacks. T h e B M W engines never fully m a t u r e d and

the remains of the Reich to locate those who

the M e - 2 6 2 program switched to the Junkers Jumo 0 0 4 . T h e change helped only slightly.

conceived and tried to perfect the 262 and

T h e Junkers contained the same Achilles' heel the B M W engines possessed and could only

other "wonder weapons."

function for about a dozen flight hours before they needed replacement. T h e technical problems surrounding the engines delayed the M e - 2 6 2 ' s development throughout its gestational phase. In 1 9 4 3 , A d o l f Galland flew one of the prototypes and saw the future f r o m its cockpit. H e saw this aircraft as the solution to the growing Allied strategic bombing campaign. W i t h a fighter a r m equipped with M e - 2 6 2 s , he believed the Luftwaffe could sweep the skies clear of Allied planes. H e pushed for its immediate introduction. T h a t couldn't happen any time soon. Teething troubles continued to plague the M e 2 6 2 a n d its engines. Messerschmitt announced in June 1 9 4 3 that January 1 9 4 4 w o u l d be the earliest it could deliver the first pre-production versions. Production would follow by the summer. Messerschmitt intended to construct 4 3 0 M e - 2 6 2 s a month by October 1 9 4 4 .

262

C h a p t e r 10

W h e n t h e 262 s h o w e d up in t h e skies over G e r m a n y in t h e f a l l of 1944, t h e n e w f i g h t e r s e n t shock

The 262's e n g i n e s c o u l d n o t be t h r o t t l e d up guickly,

w a v e s t h r o u g h t h e USAAF. Careful a n a l y s i s of t h e jet's p e r f o r m a n c e h e l p e d m i t i g a t e its speed

m a k i n g t h e m sluggish to a c c e l e r a t e . The M u s t a n g s and

a d v a n t a g e . M u s t a n g and T h u n d e r b o l t pilots learned t h a t the 262 c o u l d n o t hope t o m a n e u v e r w i t h

T h u n d e r b o l t s c a p i t a l i z e d on t h a t w e a k n e s s by c a m p i n g

t h e i r m o r e n i m b l e fighters. The 262 w a s an energy f i g h t e r — f a s t passes a n d guick d i s e n g a g e m e n t s

over a i r f i e l d s used by 262s a n d picking t h e m off at t h e i r

w e r e t h e t a c t i c s n e e d e d for it to be s u c c e s s f u l . If a M e s s e r s c h m i t t p i l o t a t t e m p t e d air c o m b a t

m o s t v u l n e r a b l e m o m e n t s , as t h e j e t s b e g a n to t a k e off

m a n e u v e r i n g , he w o u l d m o s t l y likely end up going d o w n in flames.

or c a m e in to land.

In t h e w a r ' s final w e e k s , a t w o - s e a t night f i g h t e r v e r s i o n of t h e M e - 2 6 2 b e g a n a r r i v i n g f r o m M e s s e r s c h m i t t ' s u n d e r g r o u n d p r o d u c t i o n lines. It c o u l d have been a very e f f e c t i v e a d d i t i o n to t h e n a c h t j a e g e r units, b u t it did n o t reach o p e r a t i o n a l service in n u m b e r s . Besides, t h e ground w a r w a s all b u t over.

[Iiilcliing Straws

2 6 3

W a l t e r N o w o t n y , one of Germany's leading aces, t o o k c o m m a n d of one of t h e first 262 f i g h t e r units. He led it into c o m b a t a n d w a s killed w h i l e f i g h t i n g t h e Eighth Air Force in one of t h e n e w jets.

A f t e r t h e w a r , b i t t e r L u f t w a f f e leaders like A d o l f G a l l a n d s o u g h t to p r e s e n t t h e 262 as a p o t e n t i a l t i d e - t u r n i n g w e a p o n t h a t c o u l d have r e s u l t e d in a G e r m a n victory. But p o l i t i c a l b u n g l i n g on Hitler's part d o o m e d t h e 262 a n d c a u s e d so m a n y delays t h a t it d i d n ' t reach o p e r a t i o n a l service u n t i l too late. Pure fiction. The 262 p r o g r a m w a s f r a u g h t w i t h t e c h n o l o g i c a l a n d m a t e r i a l issues t h a t t o o k t i m e t o o v e r c o m e . Even w h e n it did reach o p e r a t i o n a l s t a t u s , t h e 262 r e p r e s e n t e d i m m a t u r e t e c h n o l o g y t h a t p r e s e n t e d many very serious p r o b l e m s a n d l i m i t e d its e f f e c t i v e n e s s in c o m b a t .

264

C h a p t e r 10

After the war, A d o l f Galland, Albert Speer, and other senior leaders within the Luftwaffe and T h i r d Reich claimed that Hitler repeatedly intervened in the M e - 2 6 2 in such a chaotic manner that he delayed its introduction by months, if not years. T h e y f o u n d a perfect scapegoat for the L u f t w a f f e s defeat: a globally reviled dead m a d m a n w h o m n o b o d y would ever defend. As a result, the early postwar literature is colored with this blame-laying and legend-spinning.

When attacking bomber formations, the Me-

T h e legend goes like this: H i t l e r saw in the M e - 2 6 2 its offensive potential and in 1 9 4 3 ordered it to be produced as a bomber. T h a t decision cost the p r o g r a m months as

262 pilots generally attacked from astern and used rockets first before closing to cannon

modifications were necessary to carry out the Fuehrer s orders. Additionally, Galland claimed

range. The four 30mm guns in the nose could

that Hitler ordered Messerschmitt not to prepare for full series production of the M e - 2 6 2 .

tear apart a Fort or B-24 with just a handful of

First, the M e - 2 6 2 was designed to be a

fighter-bomber

virtually since its inception.

H a n g i n g a couple of bombs under the wings d i d not require the massive redesign the apologists

hits. Here, a B-24 goes down as two members of its crew free fall clear of it.

The Me-163 was a deadly aviation design Hail Mary—deadly for its pilots. A rocket fighter with only a few minutes' fuel supply, it was supposed to engage the bomber stream, glide back to its airfield, and land on a centerline skid. In tests, landings often resulted in the Me-163 blowing up or, even worse, the fuel tanks rupturing and pouring toxic chemicals into the cockpit that would essentially melt the pilot.

[ I i i l c l i i n g S t r a w s 273

have argued. A n d production was not hampered by H i t l e r s decision-making, it was delayed by technical troubles, lack of engines and material, and the chaotic state of the Reich as a result of the strategic bombing campaign. T h e fact that the first M e - 2 6 2 s reached experimental units in the summer of 1 9 4 4 was akin to a miracle, one that symbolized the remarkable capacity of the German aviation industry. Despite all manners of hardship, not the least of which most of M e s s e r s c h m i t t s prewar factories b u r n e d to the g r o u n d in the wake of Allied bombing raids, the M e - 2 6 2 reached operational status and made aviation history. In July, nine M e - 2 6 2 f r o m K o m m a n d o Schenk moved to France to begin high-altitude b o m b i n g missions against the Allies in N o r m a n d y . Two months later, elements of K G - 5 I began to re-equip with the jet aircraft, though the numbers available remained paltry. W h i l e a few M e - 2 6 2 were diverted to the L u f t w a f f e s bomber force, K o m m a n d o With a top speed of over six hundred miles per hour, the Me-163 was all but impossible to

1 9 4 3 . Once again, aircraft and engines served as the limiting factor. In the summer,Thierfelder

intercept for a P-51 or Thunderbolt. However,

died and Walter N o w o t n y took over the unit. It was renamed after h i m and sent into the fray

once it burned through its small fuel load, the

to defend the Reich from American daylight bombers.

pilot now found himself in a modern air war at

By fall, the situation for the L u f t w a f f e s fighter force h a d grown beyond desperate.

the controls of a glider. Within weeks of the

H a l f - t r a i n e d pilots, thrown into the air in now-obsolescent aircraft like the B f - I 0 9 died with

end of the war, the 163 program was cancelled

g r i m rapidity. T h e average Luftwaffe fighter pilot died in combat after eight to thirty days of

and the remaining pilots sent to Me-262 units.

operational service. T h e last few remaining veteran leaders and aces attempted to hold things

German rocket and missile technology was far ahead of any Allied program. This weapon was the X-4, a wire-guided surface-to-air missile designed to be directed to a bomber stream where its proximity fuse would detonate its warhead. It did not see operational service, but could have been a deadly effective weapon.

266

H a u p t m a n n W e r n e r T h i e r f e l d e r had been preparing to take it into battle since December

C h a p t e r 10

V-Äi

together as best they could, but the fresh-faced replacements they received possessed less than

W h i l e t h e w o n d e r w e a p o n s received m o s t of

a hundred hours of total flying time. There wasn't much they could do to save them. T h e

Goebbels's ink, other firms, like Dornier, w e n t t o

learning curve in the skies over the Reich proved far too steep. Of the 1 0 7 Luftwaffe aces

w o r k on making the m o s t out of existing technology.

to score a hundred or more kills, only 8 of them joined fighter units after the summer of

The Dornier-335 A r r o w w a s the product of this

J 942. The rest were the old hands who formed the backbone of an increasingly brittle and

design avenue. P o w e r e d by a pusher a n d tractor

green force.

engine both, it possessed surprising speed and

The Luftwaffe's leadership deluded itself believing that the M e - 2 6 2 could change

agility for such a large aircraft. Its t w o - s e a t version

this dynamic and restore air superiority over the Third Reich. They pinned their hopes to

w o u l d have been a very capable night fighter. Very

the wrong star. Rushed into service, the M e - 2 6 2 units suffered high casualty rates from

f e w w e r e constructed during the chaotic final

operational accidents. T h e pilots were not well-trained on the revolutionary new aircraft. T h e

w e e k s of the war, and the p r o g r a m had no impact

engines failed and sometimes caught fire in flight. I he operational attrition rate stayed high,

on the fighting.

[Iiilcliing S t r a w s

2 6 7

THE SS J O I N S THE A I R W A R

F O R M O S T OF W O R L D W A R II, T H E S S pervaded nearly

Germans had been working on surface-to-air missile technology,

every aspect of the Nazi war machine. T h e one place that had

but could not get the guidance system or the proximity fuses

been out of bounds was Goering s Luftwaffe. As the strategic

to work properly. A pilot seemed like the obvious solution to

bombing campaign forced Germany to look for increasingly

that problem. T h a t was the concept behind the Natter. Powered

desperate solutions to their air defense issues, Bachem came up

by a rocket engine plus four supplementary JATO-like rockets

with a hybrid aircraft/missile called the Ba-349 Natter. T h e

designed to be jettisoned after launch, the Natter would be

The Bachem Ba-349 Natter w a s conceived as a sort of m a n - d i r e c t e d surface-to-air missile and w a s supposed to have been a c h e a p w a y to hit Allied b o m b e r f o r m a t i o n s .

268

C h a p t e r 10

guided to a passing bomber stream by a ground controller. Once at the proper altitude, all the pilot had to do was pitch the nose forward, ditch the plastic nosecone to unmask a hive of two dozen or more air-to-air unguided rockets. The pilot would salvo them into the bomber stream then eject from the Natter's cockpit. Head of the SS Heinrich Himmler took an interest in the project and made available the funds to build the weapon. Thirty-six eventually were constructed. A manned flight test actually took place in March J 945. One of the booster rockets failed to release, which threw the Natter out of control. T h e test pilot attempted to bail out after releasing the canopy. He failed to escape from the craft and went down with the craft to his

•' ' " S J

death. I here is some speculation that as it plummeted to earth,

i

the Natter broke the speed of sound. After the war. the U S A A F captured four Natters and test fired one ( without a pilot) at Muroc Field in I 9 4 6 .

The N a t t e r a t t r a c t e d the interest of Heinrich Himmler, h e a d of t h e SS. He liked t h e c o n c e p t so m u c h t h a t he f u n d e d it w i t h SS money.

T h e r e w a s only one m a n n e d t e s t launch before In theory, t h e N a t t e r p i l o t w o u l d ride his rocket up t o t h e A l l i e d b o m b e r s t r e a m , level o u t long e n o u g h

t h e e n d of t h e w a r . It did not go w e l l , a n d t h e

to fire a nose f u l l of u n g u i d e d m i s s i l e s into t h e f o r m a t i o n s , t h e n eject f r o m t h e N a t t e r a n d f l o a t back to

p i l o t w a s killed w h e n the N a t t e r s w u n g out of

earth in a p a r a c h u t e .

control a n d crashed.

Clutchina

Slraws

and losses in combat with the U S A A F ran to 15 percent. Late in the war, in one air battle, the M e - 2 6 2 units suffered 5 6 percent casualties trying to defend the Reich. For all these difficulties, the M e - 2 6 2 certainly had potential. T h o u g h it could not accelerate quickly due to the nature of its engines, it possessed a top speed of almost 5 4 0 miles per h o u r — 1 0 0 miles an hour quicker than the Spitfire or M u s t a n g . A r m e d with four bomber-killing 3 0 m m cannon plus twenty-four air-to-air rockets, T h e M e - 2 6 2 solved the firepower problem that plagued the B f - I 0 9 and F w - I 9 0 geschwaders. Finally, the Luftwaffe could wield a bomber-destroyer that, unlike the B f - I I O or 4 1 0 , could defend itself against fighter attacks thanks to its superior speed. T h e Luftwaffe banked on it to save the d a y — a n d the night. T h e R A F continued its relentless destruction of Germany's major cities. Casualties remained heavy, though the advent of M o s q u i t o night fighters to escort the bombers helped keep the losses manageable. Aside f r o m the H e i n k e l - 2 1 9 , the Germans d i d not have a night fighter anywhere near as fast and maneuverable as the Mossie. Toward war's end, a two-seat variant equipped with the latest "Stag Antler" airborne radar system began to roll off the production lines. Nachtgeschwader I received a few of these aircraft along with some standard single-seat M e - 2 6 2 s . For three months, they flew against the R A F and demonstrated the new jet's dominance over the sleek and fast Mosquitoes.

The bomber kampfgeschwaders were to receive their own new jet attack aircraft in 1944-1945. This was the Arado-234. Faster than any Allied fighter, it could operate almost entirely free of threat of interception.

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C h a p t e r 10

The advent of the jet fighter over Germany caused a ripple of panic in the U S A A F that reached all the wav back to Washington, D.C. Arnold, Spaatz, and Doolittle feared the Germans might actually be able to stop the combined bomber offensive if they could field enough M e - 2 6 2 s . W h i l e the Allies kicked their own jet fighter programs into high gear, the front line P - 5 I and P - 4 7 units devised tactics to counter the M e - 2 6 2 ' s incredible speed advantage. T h e jet's Achilles' heel lay in its inability to accelerate quickly. The Americans picked up on this and concluded the best place to strike back at the jets—which the VIII Fighter Command pilots irreverently called "blowjobs"—was over their home airfields as they landed or took off.

The r e m a i n s of a p r o t o t y p e s p a c e - a g e w e a p o n k n o w n as t h e Gotha Go-229. This radica d e s i g n p r e s a g e d t h e A m e r i c a n flying w i n g a n d B-2 Spirit p r o g r a m s by years. The p r o j e c t d i d n o t go far, b u t in c o n c e p t t h e Go-229 w o u l d have been a t a i l - l e s s , b a t - s h a p e d fighteri n t e r c e p t o r c a p a b l e of s p e e d s in excess of six h u n d r e d m i l e s per hour.

A s the G e r m a n s t h r e w n e w t e c h n o l o g y into t h e fray, t h e A m e r i c a n s relied on t h e t r i e d a n d t r u e , first c r e a t e d ill t h e 1930s. Here, an Eighth Air Force b o m b a r d i e r sits in t h e nose of his B-17G. The N o r d e n sight w a s used to a i m o r d n a n c e on G e r m a n t a r g e t s right until t h e final days of the war.

[ I i i l c l i i n g Straws

2 7 1

Down low and slow, the 2 6 2 was fresh meat for enterprising American pilots. W h e n M e - 2 6 2 s hit an American formation, the escort fighters w o u l d immediately dispatch roving flights to all the nearby airdromes with concrete runways in hopes of catching the 2 6 2 s in their most vulnerable moments. O n October 7, 1 9 4 4 , Kommando N o w o t n y prepared to intercept 1 , 3 0 0 Eighth Air Force bombers en route to raid Germany's oil infrastructure. T h e i r home airfield at Achmer attracted the attention of a formation of 3 6 1 s t Fighter Group P - 5 I s . U r b a n D r e w spotted a couple of M e - 2 6 2 s on the runway. As they took off, he rolled into a dive f r o m fifteen thousand feet and caught the trailing jet just after it tucked in its landing gear. W i t h the 2 6 2 barely going two hundred miles per hour, Drew closed quickly and shot it out o f the sky. T h e lead jet tried to get away by executing a climbing left turn, but Drew had energy and speed to burn after his 1 4 , 0 0 0 foot dive. H e caught u p to the other jet and raked it with .50-caliber bullets until it flipped over and augered into the ground. Such attacks claimed the lives of several Kommando N o w o t n y pilots. On November 8, 1 9 4 4 , after his unit had been visited by several irate Luftwaffe generals who castigated the pilots for losing their fighting edge, N o w o t n y climbed into a 2 6 2 a n d set off to intercept an American B - 2 4 formation. N o w o t n y was one o f the last "great" Luftwaffe aces. H e held the Knight's Cross and h a d been credited with 2 5 6 kills. Along with several other 2 6 2 s f r o m his unit, he struck the Liberator boxes outside of Achmer, shot one down and claimed a P - 5 I . M o m e n t s later, he radioed back to base that he was on fire. H i s jet p l u m m e t e d through a layer o f clouds and cratered a few miles f r o m his unit's runway. T h e exact cause of his death cannot be established. A B-24's waist gunner. Though technology and

H e was either shot down by P - 5 I s or he suffered one o f the c o m m o n and catastrophic engine

new designs affected the ebb and flow of the

fires so common to the immature technology embedded in the 2 6 2 ' s design.

air campaign, at its roots the experience over Europe during World War II was a very human and tragic one.

Limping home with wounded aboard, an Eighth Air Force B-17 fires distress flares on final approach so the ambulance and fire crews can rush to their assistance.

280 C h a p t e r 10

Planning for the day's mission.

If the M e - 2 6 2 was barely operationally ready in the fall of 1 9 4 4 , the Luftwaffe killed a lot of its own pilots by sending the Messerschmitt M e - 1 6 3 "Komet" into battle. Designed as a short-ranged, rocket powered point defense fighter, the tiny Komet carried two 3 0 m m cannons and could reach sustained speeds of over six hundred miles an hour. It was the fastest thing in the sky that year, and when its blowtorch was burning, no Allied fighter could touch it. Yet, major drawbacks abounded. First, the rocket engine carried only enough fuel for about fifteen minutes of use. Canny M e - 1 6 3 pilots would milk their fuel load by shutting the rocket off and gliding once they'd climbed above the bomber formation they had intercepted. Coasting along, they'd pick their target, restart the rocket and swoop down for a rear attack. Once they'd burned through their 1 2 0 cannon shells, they'd dive away and out of the fight. T h e n they'd glide back to their runway to make a landing on the narrow centerline skid. Jagdgeschwader 4 0 0 flew the M e - 1 6 3 in combat, claiming around a dozen kills while losing about the same number o f aircraft operationally and in combat. T h o u g h the aircraft's speed was unmatched and it could climb to 3 9 , 0 0 0 feet in an astonishing three minutes, the Komet failed as a bomber destroyer. T h e closure rate between an M e - 1 6 3 and a B - I 7 was so great that the gunnery runs the Luftwaffe pilots could make lasted only a couple of seconds, even with a rear attack. T h e 3 0 m m cannon was slow firing and h a d a low muzzle velocity,

The bomber crews were frequently

m a k i n g it difficult for a 1 6 3 pilot to score a kill shot on a B - 1 7 or B - 2 4 .

overburdened with bulky flight suits and

T h e fuel used to power the rocket engine was extremely caustic. In some instances, pilots

armor designed to protect them from the

returning after a flight w o u l d l a n d hard on the skid a n d rupture one of the tanks, sending

freezing temperatures and flak shrapnel.

deadly chemicals into the Komet s cockpit with gruesome results. As a result, the M e - 1 6 3

Moving around while in the air came with

drivers wore unique flight suits made of asbestos to prevent them f r o m a horrible death.

only great effort.

[ I i i l c l i i n g Straws 2 7 3

A bomb-ravaged Dornier factory rusts in postwar Germany, the remains of a Dornier-335 still sitting in the old production area.

In the final weeks of the war, the Luftwaffe recognized the M e - 1 6 3 s failure and disbanded J G - 4 0 0 . Its surviving pilots joined M e - 2 6 2 units and served out the war in the more effective, if still troubled, twin-engined jet. T h e wonder weapons m a y have put a scare into the Allies in the final months of the war, but ultimately none of them h a d any effect on the T h i r d Reich's fate. In the air, the tiny number of M e - 2 6 2 s that rose to challenge the thousands of Allied bombers were simply brushed aside. As Spaatz's men continued to h a m m e r oil targets, the Reich all but ran out of fuel by the end o f 1 9 4 4 . C o m e winter, there were hardly any worthwhile urban targets left in Germany to bomb. T h e combined offensive h a d left the Reich in utter ruin, its people "dehoused," their industries and neighborhoods destroyed. By early 1 9 4 5 , the bombs dropped during further area attacks just rearranged the rubble. In the war's final months, Bomber C o m m a n d dropped 1 8 1 , 0 0 0 tons of ordnance on Germany. S o many bombs were expended that the factories back in England could not keep pace with the demand, and shortages plagued the R A F for the war's Despite the arrival of the Me-262, the Mustang remained the dominate presence over Europe throughout 1944-1945.

final weeks. Germany lay in ruins. Still its military and people fought on until the bitter end. A n d bitter it was. O n February 13—14, 1 9 4 5 , Bomber C o m m a n d sent aloft two waves of Mossies, Lanes, and Halifaxes, all bound for the picturesque city o f Dresden, some 7 7 0 miles from England. T h e first wave carried 4 , 0 0 0 - p o u n d blockbuster bombs, designed to destroy water a n d sewer mains with their fearsome blasts, along with some two hundred thousand incendiaries.

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C h a p t e r 10

Flying at 8 , 0 0 0 feet, the first wave of 2 5 0 Lancasters dropped all their ordnance on Dresden in under ten minutes. A firestorm took shape within the one-square-mile target area, sending flames so high that the second wave could see the city from sixty miles away. T h e second wave was specifically intended to kill or incapacitate the rescue and fire crews fighting to save the city. Three hours after the first raid, the second one arrived and sowed even more destruction. W i t h i n minutes, the R A F bombers ravaged the city with another 1 , 8 0 0 tons of bombs. T h e firestorm sent smoke up 1 5 , 0 0 0 feet. Temperatures reached 1 , 8 0 0 degrees. T h e civilians caught in the inferno were burned alive or died of smoke inhalation or asphyxiation when the firestorm sucked the oxygen out of their shelters. Others tried to flee the growing

3 5 5 t h Fighter Group P-51 s. By t h e e n d of

conflagration, but the flames sucked the air right out of the streets as well. Those who could

1944, a l m o s t all t h e Eighth A i r Force units

not get away fast enough would suddenly fall unconscious, victims of anoxia. Seconds later,

had converted to the Mustang. The notable

the flames would burn them to ashes.

e x c e p t i o n w a s t h e 5 6 t h Fighter Group, w h i c h

T h e next morning, four hundred Flying Forts from the Eighth Air Force's First Bomb

loved its J u g s .

Division struck Dresden as the dazed survivors dug themselves out of the rubble. T h e Eighth returned on February 15 to rearrange the rubble. Fires still blazed everywhere, and the dead lay untended in the firestorm's wake. Somewhere between twenty-one thousand and forty thousand people died during these attacks. Over six thousand were cremated in one of the city squares, a testament to the desperate nature of the post-attack circumstances. Rescue and clean-up crews stumbled across so many bodies partially burned in shelters that eventually they gave up trying to extricate them. Instead, they cremated them in place with flamethrowers. Seventy-eight thousand buildings lay destroyed, including most of Dresden's industrial plants. Since the war, Dresden's military value and the importance of its factories to the Third Reich's war machine have been questioned by succeeding generations of historians. Some have called the Dresden raids a war crime. Debate rages over it even today.

A c o m m o n s i g h t in early 1945 w e r e hundreds upon h u n d r e d s of B-17s, all in t i g h t c o m b a t box f o r m a t i o n s , s t r e a m i n g across G e r m a n y t o dea d e s t r u c t i o n t o n u m e r o u s t a r g e t s a day.

[Inlcliiiig Straws

The s u f f e r i n g of t h o s e on the g r o u n d w h o s e c i t i e s w e r e d e s t r o y e d by A l l i e d b o m b s c a n n o t lightly be d i s m i s s e d . The February raids on D r e s d e n have c o n t i n u e d to arouse moral r e p u l s i o n a n d have s p a r k e d ethical d e b a t e s on the e n t i r e c o n c e p t of s t r a t e g i c b o m b i n g ever since.

276

C h a p t e r 10

Singling out one raid seems at best an intellectual exercise when the b o m b i n g campaign killed u p to 6 5 0 , 0 0 0 German civilians during the war. T h e Royal Air Force s area bombing attacks claimed two-thirds of those lives. Other cities—Rostock and H a m b u r g among them—suffered Dresden's fate. As the Luftwaffe ran out of fuel, replacement aircraft, and pilots, it became impossible for its fighter units to contest every raid. Instead, during the final weeks of the war, the jagdgruppen would husband their resources until they had enough planes and gasoline to put a substantial force aloft. W h i l e they sometimes could score isolated successes, the inexperienced Luftwaffe pilots fell in droves to their better-trained veteran opponents in the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. As the Soviet army advanced on Berlin, the bombing campaign wound down. T h e last R A F raid on Berlin took place on April 21—22, 1 9 4 5 . A few days later, Bomber C o m m a n d flew its final major mission. T h i s final raid took out an oil refinery in Norway. T h e Eighth Air Force ran out of targets at the end of April as well. After repeated fighter sweeps and ground attack missions destroyed almost a thousand German aircraft in the air and on the ground, die heavy bombers hit the Skoda Armaments complex in Czechoslovakia on April 2 5 . After that, the Eighth stood down. Mission accomplished. T h e T h i r d Reich's cities had been destroyed. Germany's industrial base had been g r o u n d to dust. T h e Luftwaffe h a d first been shot out of the sky, then hunted to extinction on the ground. A r o u n d 9 0 percent of Germany's single engine fighter pilots became casualties during the war. T h o s e were S t a l i n g r a d odds. In return, Bomber C o m m a n d suffered a 7 6 percent casualty rate. A young British male h a d a better chance of survival in the trenches of the Western Front as an infantry officer than he d i d in the skies over Germany. T h e Eighth Air Force lost 4 9 , 0 0 0 airmen out of 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 deployed to East Anglia during the war. Altogether, the combined air offensive had cost the Allies over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 men. H a r d l y h a d the ink dried on Germany's surrender document when the second guessing began. Given all the destruction, all the deaths of airmen and civilians, was the strategic bombing worth the effort?

The shattered aftermath of the German war machine.

[ I i i l c l i i n g Straws

2 7 7

W h i l e h i s t o r i a n s have d e b a t e d the m o r a l i t y of t h e b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n as w e l l as its e f f e c t i v e n e s s , n o b o d y d i s p u t e s t h a t t h e early 1944 U S A A F c a m p a i g n d e a l t t h e c r i p p l i n g b l o w s t h a t u l t i m a t e l y d e f e a t e d t h e L u f t w a f f e over its o w n h o m e turf.

JUDGMENTS ^ ^

*

"We cut our way through a basement wall to discover a reeking hash of over 100 human beings. Flame must have swept through before the building's collapse sealed the exits, because the fiesh of those within resembled the texture of prunes. Our job, it was explained, was to wade into the shambles and bring forth the remains. Encouraged by c u f f i n g and guttural abuse, wade in we did. We did exactly that, for the fioor was covered with an unsavoury

broth

from burst water mains and viscera." —Kurt

Vonnegut on his experiences in Dresden. A r m a g e d d o n in Retrospect

T H E A I R P O W E R T H E O R I S T S W E R E W R O N G . Instead of avoiding the horrific attritional battles like the S o m m e and Verdun by striking quick, decisive blows from the air, strategic b o m b i n g ultimately became W o r l d W a r U s aerial version of the Western Front. It consumed men and machines at a rate no other service endured. By 1 9 4 3 , the "quick war" solution airpower seemingly offered in the eyes of M i t c h e l l or D o u h e t was clearly never going to materialize. T h e one-raid wonder missions designed to deliver a knock-out punch at a vital industry simply did not work. Ploesti proved that. So d i d Regensburg and Schweinfurt. T h e postwar U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded, " T h e German experience showed that, whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was permanently put out of commission by a single attack. Persistent re-attack was necessary." T h i s essential truth about waging war on industries that could be repaired or rebuilt set the table for the massive attritional campaigns of 1 9 4 4 - 4 5 . D o u h e t s belief that an enemy could be forced to surrender by crushing civilian morale f o r m e d the centerpiece o f Sir A r t h u r Harris's vision for Bomber C o m m a n d ' s nocturnal raids on Germany. Five years of bombing never produced a peoples' uprising, as Douhet believed

Bomber Harris, a devoted Douhetist and

would happen. Germany's will to keep fighting never wavered until R e d A r m y boots set foot in

single-minded believer in the strategic air war.

the Reichstag in the final days of the Battle of Berlin. Sir A r t h u r Harris, Portal, and the crews of Bomber C o m m a n d waged a five-year war on civilian morale, in part because the British had no other way to sustain an offensive against Germany. It never p a i d off with the decisive victory H a r r i s sought, but it clearly affected the N a z i hierarchy's decision m a k i n g process,

279

which led to wasted efforts and enormous diversions of resources. Hitler a n d his subordinates feared a repeat of the 1 9 1 8 revolution almost to the bitter end o f the war. T h e y h a d no way of knowing if the German people would make a sucker out of Douhet or not, and through the war they kept the country's emotional pulse by spying on its citizens. Again, the postwar Strategic Bombing R e p o r t concluded: T h e mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. U n d e r ruthless N a z i control they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. T h e i r morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means o f production remained. T h e power o f a police state over its people cannot be underestimated. In the early m o n t h s of the war, Bomber C o m m a n d ' s daylight losses proved so severe that the only way to strike at the Reich and sustain an offensive required a switch to nocturnal operations. T h e loss rate remained appalling, and for m u c h of the war it was higher than the U S A A F ' s . By war's end, 5 1 percent of Bomber C o m m a n d ' s airmen died as a result of combat with the German defenses. Another 9 percent died in accidents back in England, while an additional 3 percent suffered serious injury in those crashes. A full 1 2 percent o f the force ended u p in P O W camps. Only a tiny f r a c t i o n — I percent—bailed out of their flaming bombers and escaped capture. Just 2 4 percent survived the war u n h a r m e d . T h o s e were long o d d s — w o r s e than those faced by their fathers who served in the trenches at Paschendale or the S o m m e . In the years following the war, historians have passed j u d g m e n t on the British area-bombing campaign a n d the morality of massacring civilians from the air as deliberate national policy. At times, documentaries or b o o k s have stirred the controversy For five years, Europe's cities had been ravaged by aerial bombing. In the

and led to visceral reactions f r o m veterans' groups and those w h o

process, tens of thousands of men had perished in the flak- and fighter-

fought the campaign itself. In the decades to come, as time dilutes

filled skies. Below these raging air battles, more than six hundred thousand

the passion and emotions surrounding that era and the last of the

civilians died in firestorms and explosions or were crushed by falling debris.

wartime generation passes, no doubt new historical perspectives

Incendiaries melted them as they fled, and others died of anoxia when the

will be offered.

boiling flames sucked all the oxygen out of their bomb shelters. It was an allround horrific experience, the likes of which had no peer in human history.

280

Epilogue

British historian N o b l e Frankland, himself a veteran of Bomber C o m m a n d , perhaps best s u m m e d u p the strategic and

moral quandary the British faced during the war in a speech he gave in 1 9 6 1 : " T h e great immorality open to us in 1 9 4 0 and 1 9 4 1 was to lose the war against H i t l e r s Germany. To have abandoned the only means o f direct attack which we h a d at our disposal w o u l d have been a long step in that direction." Kurt Vonnegut, who h a d been an infantryman in the Battle of the Bulge and was captured when the Germans destroyed the 1 0 6 t h Infantry Division, presented an opposing view based on his experiences inside Dresden as a P O W . After the February raids, the Germans organized the Allied captives in the area into body-retrieval crews and sent them into the devastated city. O f that experience, Vonnegut told the London Times: It is with some regret that I here besmirch the nobility of our airmen, but, boys, you killed an appalling lot of women and children. T h e shelter I have described and innumerable others like it were filled with them. W e had to exhume their bodies and carry them to mass funeral pyres in the parks, so I know. T h e morality debate will continue for as long as historians have an interest in World W a r II. In light of t o d a y s N A T O and American policies to m i n i m i z e civilian casualties, sometimes with such restraint that it risks incurring losses among its own troops, the ruthlessness of the W o r l d W a r II city-busting campaigns seem cold blooded. T h e n again, the enemy f a c e d — N a z i G e r m a n y — w a s busily sending millions to their deaths in Eastern Europe's concentration camps. A n d that was just the start of the transformation H i t l e r and his minions sought to make in what h a d been vast stretches of the Soviet U n i o n . N o t taking any and all measures to stop a genocidal regime w o u l d have been a dereliction of moral responsibility. T h i s one m o m e n t in history required that humanity be set aside and the gloves be cast off so that the future could be saved. A n d what of pinpoint b o m b i n g and the American daylight effort? Clearly, had the Germans been left to reorganize their industries for total war and increase production without threat of attack f r o m the air, they could have turned out far more aircraft, tanks and The vast fleets of bombers created by American factories either were destroyed in place or were brought home to places like Walnut Ridge. Acre after acre of Liberator and Fort blanketed the Arkansas countryside as a testament to the power of a roused United States to meet the challenge of total war.

J u d g m e n t s 289

armaments than they did in the final years of the war. T h e Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces destroyed that growth potential and forced the Germans to invest considerable treasure and energy in dispersing their industrial base and sending it underground. T h i s made the Reich's war effort even more vulnerable to the destruction of its rail network, which further hampered production and movement of strategic materials. W h e n the oil campaign began in earnest in the spring of 1944, that is when Spaatz's command began to have a profound effect on Germany's ability to sustain the war. By the fall fuel shortages plagued every aspect of German military operations. W h e n the Wehrmacht launched the Ardennes offensive in December, the panzers rolled without enough fuel in rear area depots to get them to their objectives around Antwerp. Instead, the Germans counted on capturing large stocks of Allied fuel and oil as they overran the forward most American units. Talk about desperation. T h e panzer leaders could thank the B - I 7 and B-24 crews for their nightmarish dilemma. In 1945, the Reich simply ran out of fuel, and the entire nation came apart just as the Allied armies poured across its frontiers. By sticking with daylight bombing, the USAAF's strategic forces imposed an air campaign on the Luftwaffe that the Germans simply could not win. After their fleeting victory in the fall of 1943, the Germans did not have the resources, pilots or aircraft available to expand its fighter defenses in preparation for the grueling 1 9 4 4 campaign. W h e n Spaatz made drawing the Luftwaffe into the open a priority in early 1944 and selected targets he knew Goering's pilots would have to defend, the attrition rate soared and the jagdgeschwaders were bled white. In the span of four months, the entire balance in the air over the Third Reich shifted in the Allies favor. This became the single most important pre-condition to the D-Day invasion. Without air superiority over the beaches, die Allies never would have been able to pull off the Normandy landings. Without a doubt, this was the Eighth Air Force's greatest single contribution to the victory in Europe. T h e prewar theorists believed that airpower alone could defeat an enemy nation. Armies would become obsolete. Tanks would be so much useless scrap metal, and the infantrymen would be reduced to merely mopping up broken cities in their air force's wake. T h i s singular, almost obsessive vision of modern warfare missed the essential nature of it. Following the 1 9 1 8 armistice, warfare became the sum of integrated and mutually supporting elements working in concert to defeat an enemy. N o single element would be able to do the job alone now as a result of the technologies developed since the start of the century. T h e modern era of warfare would be defined by combined arms operations. Douhet, Trenchard, Harris, and to an extent Mitchell, all missed the mark. Eisenhower's Deputy Supreme Commander in 1944, Air Marshall Arthur Tedder probably understood this better than most Allied senior leaders. H e believed that the total integration of air, land, and sea operations into one overall strategic framework was the only way to defeat a nation as powerful and dangerous as Nazi Germany. H e got it. T h e strategic bomber was an important component of that combined arms vision, not the be-all and end-all war winner the airpower zealots believed it was. T h e skies are empty now, the airmen who fought these desperate and brutal battles above the Europe's burning cities are mostly in their graves. T h e y fought in their nation's defense, steeped in images of freedom and romance that the air seemingly offered. Such naive

282

Epilogue

visions proved to be a suckers bet, dispelled completely by the end of their first mission. As the shock of those shattered preconceptions wore off, the men came to realize their futures looked grim and short. T h e y saw men die, saw what flak shrapnel could do to the human body. Some suffered alone in single-set cockpits, their flesh flayed by bullets or shells that sent their mounts spiraling earthward. There were hundreds of ways to die in the air, and those comparative few survivors bore witness to most of them. T h e y returned home with deep scars. T h e air war cast a shadow across the rest of their lives. In the decades that followed the war, the vision of what the air war was as told by historians and Hollywood grew more remote from its reality. T h e vision of the glorious cause in the air crept back into popular culture. N e w generations found fascinating the aircraft and their technical specifications. W h o l e publishing industries grew up around this passion, which continues to this day. Others found glamour in the surviving aces and their tales of courage and daring. At conventions and conferences, they cut rakish and charismatic figures that endeared themselves to countless audiences. T h e y signed autographs. T h e y wrote books. Without realizing it, they contributed to the establishment of a legend that served as a barrier between what people back home wanted to hear and the actual human experience over Europe during the war. T h e reality must never be allowed to fade from memory. The aviators went into the war hoping to avoid the pain and trauma of the Western Front. Instead of repeating the attrition in the mud, their vision of a quick way to end war only changed the nature of the carnage. Ultimately, the bloodletting endured longer and claimed a higher percentage of the participants than was experienced in the trenches of World War I. Though the strategic bombing campaign materially contributed to the defeat of Nazi Germany and played a key role in that victory, airpower failed completely in the greatest hope of its prewar advocates: that it could minimize victory's cost. T h e airmen paid the price for that miscalculation, but all too often that is forgotten. At its heart, the strategic bombing campaign was a human experience, both to the aviators and to those who suffered under their bombs. Eighth Air Force veteran and poet Randall Jarrell, when seeking a way to convey this to those who never rode into battle aboard a four engine bomber, found powerful words to underscore the humanity sacrificed in the quest for ultimate victory. From my mother's sleep I fell into the State, And I hunched in its belly till my wet fur froze. Six miles from earth, loosed from its dream of life, I woke to black flak and the nightmare fighters. W h e n I died they washed me out of the turret with a hose. —Randall Jarrell\ "Death of a Ball Turret Gunner"

Judgments

2 8 3

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS * * * * * BOMBS AWAY! W O U L D N O T HAVE BEEN F I N I S H E D without the assistance and support of many people. First, a huge thanks to Scott Pearson for his diligence and patience. Hope I haven't caused you too many gray hairs this time around! As always, it has been a real pleasure working with you. Thanks to you and your staff for making me look good, even when I don't deserve it. T h e talent and dedication at Zenith is truly special, and it is always a pleasure to work with everyone there. To Richard Kane, I owe a debt of gratitude that cannot be repaid with mere words. Richard ensured I'd have the opportunity to write this book, which has served as an expression for a passion I've retained since my childhood back home in Saratoga, California. Having the opportunity to share some of these amazing photos and tell the story of the strategic air war in Europe represents one of the longest-held dreams I've had, both as a man and as a writer. T h a n k you, Richard, for helping me realize that goal. To my family, Ed, Renee, and Jenn. You three continue to suffer through my crazy schedules and long, long days with patience and love, and I would never be able to pursue this difficult career without your support. Renee, you've been a constant source of inspiration for me, and I have loved seeing you bloom as a writer in your own right this summer. Congratulations on your first two published articles, and I cannot wait to see how your skills develop and lead you forward in whatever you choose in the years ahead. Ed, my nine-year-old son, has been able to identify and talk about almost every major aircraft used in World War II since he was able to talk. One memorable summer day when he was barely three, Ed sat in my lap next to my dear friend Bill Runey, who flew P-40s with the 4 9 th Fighter Group during World War II, and successfully named every aircraft in a World War II aviation book. Bill was absolutely astonished. In later years, as Jenn and I ran a photo archival service, Ed would sometimes identify images and aircraft for my bride when I was out on a business trip. Jenn, you've been my partner and best friend for my entire adult life. Your support and faith in me is what carried me through the dues-paying years. W h e n everyone else gave up, you remained loyal and rock-steady in your support. T h a t means everything to me, and whatever success I will ever achieve will be yours too. Bob and Laura Archer, your friendship over these past fifteen years has been an integral part in my success as a writer. T h a n k you for all you've done for my family, and Laura, thanks

284

for your diligence with Vol. You've saved him from Simon's fate, at least for now, and I've treasured the time we get to share together. Denice, Andy, Brenda, Larissa, and Bob—thank you for making my mornings go smoothly and taking care of me even on days when I'm sullen and grumpy. Shawna Akin, your dedication and support these past twelve years have been vital for me. You keep me organized and sane. Thank you for all you've done for me. Taylor Marks—your inspiration has guided me diis past year. It will continue to do so as I negotiate the road ahead. Not a day goes by without you in my thoughts and prayers. And as time has passed, I've found myself missing you more and more instead of less and less. Part of this manuscript was finished in the barracks at North Fort Hood, Texas. Among the crickets, the 107-degree heat, and fireflies, I wrote many of the captions in the base's M W R , or on the lower bunk of my rack while embedded with I - 1 6 8 Aviation, Oregon and Washington National Guards. I was living with a group of pilots whose dedication to their mission is second to none, one that served as a reminder that the legacy and tradition established during World War II continues to flourish in the ranks of America's combat aviators today. Daryl Jones, whose bunk was next to mine, kept my nose to the grindstone as the clock ticked down to our departure for Afghanistan. Everyone else—Nate, W i l l , Eric West (thanks for those tips . . .), Brian, Alex, Captains H . and U., Heidi, Craig, Jim—your support and encouragement, as well as your acceptance of me joining you in this difficult journey, means the world to me. Since Emily Shumate pulled me from the flight at Fort H o o d August 5, I've focused on finding a way out to you. These new friends of mine fly C H - 4 7 Chinook heavy lift helicopters. Deployed to Eastern Afghanistan in August 2 0 1 0 , my friends have been split up and sent to FOB Salerno and FOB Shank. On August 28, 2 0 1 0 , Taliban fighters assaulted FOB Salerno while dressed in U.S. Army uniforms. Some wore suicide vests. T h e men I lived with at Fort Hood, including Daryl Jones, Will, Nate, and Brian, faced the same situation the pilots of the 7th Fighter Command faced on Iwo Jima in the spring of 1 9 4 5 when Japanese hold-outs launched a banzai charge through their encampment. One Taliban fighter breached the wire and came very close to the I - 1 6 8 before he was killed. T h a n k God none of these incredible Americans were lost in such a desperate and dangerous event. Lastly, to Allison Serventi Morgan, your work chronicling the U.S. military's relief operations in Pakistan following the catastrophic earthquake there in 2 0 0 5 is incredibly important and will show your audience a side of America's heart few ever get to see. I expect to see your book on the shelves someday soon. I have no doubt that your talent and drive will bring you rich success in this new path you've chosen. Your assistance on Heart for the Fight, Manhunt, and Bombs Away! has been instrumental and tremendously appreciated. T h a n k you for your selflessness, for the inspiration you've provided, and the unwavering support you've given me. You are significant. And I'm only saying all this because I want your car (even if it is slower than mine). Or was that last thing too flip?

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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES Since 1945, few aspects of World War II have attracted more

by Manfred Boehme has been one of the most important works to

attention than the struggle for Europe's skies. Thousands of books

emerge in the past two decades. Boehme debunks many of the myths

have been published on the subject. A few stand out as pillars of the

surrounding the M E - 2 6 2 and provides ample research to show how

subject's historiography.

those myths developed after the war. For any serious student of the air

N o study of the Eighth Air Force can be undertaken without

a counter-balance to Adolf Galland's The First and the Last. Interesting

and massive output on the Eighth has set the standard for future

personal memoirs of men who fought against the bomber streams

generations of historians. The Mighty Eighth, The Mighty Eighth War Diary,

include I Fought You From the Skies by Willi Heilmann.

The Mighty Eighth War Manual, The Mighty Eighth in Color, and Fighters of the Mighty Eighth were all indispensible research aids for this book.

T h e R A F side of the air war is well covered, starting with Francis K. Mason's Battle Over Britain, a staggeringly detailed book.

Jay A. Stout's The Men Who Killed the Luftwaffe (November 2 0 1 0 )

Derek Dempster and Derek Woods' classic, The Narrow Margin, still

offers a fresh and brilliant new look at the USAAF's victory over the

rates as one of the great works on the Battle of Britain and is a must

German Air Force.This is a book not to be missed. Eric H a m m e l s

read. John Terraine s A Timefor Courage provides an excellent account

The Road to Big Week is another excellent account of the 1942—1944

of the R A F in World War II. M a x Hastings Bomber Command remains

stretch of the strategic bombing campaign.

one of the single best books on the RAF's nocturnal offensive.

There are countless memoirs and biographies from veterans

Excellent personal accounts of the air war can be found in C.

of the Eighth Air Force. Zemke's Wolf Pack, by H u b Zemke with Roger

F. Rawnsly and Robert Wright's Night Fighter. Tale of a Guinea Pig by

Freeman, stands out in a crowded field. Staying Alive by Carl Fyler is

Geoffrey Page is a particularly poignant account of one member of

a gem of a book that provides insight into the experience of the

the Few who stopped the Luftwaffe, at a terrible personal cost.

bomber crews. Jimmy Doolittle's memoir, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again, is an entertaining and useful resource. To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority Over

286

war, Boehme's book cannot be missed, if for anydiing than to provide

Roger A. Freeman's body of work. Roger's devoted, detailed,

The books mentioned here represent a fraction of the sources I used for Bombs Away and which are available on the subject, but are

Germany,

the ones that I have found most useful or powerful over the years.

1942—1944 by Stephen L. MacFarland and Wesley Phillips ranks

Back in 1977, as a nine year old, I found Herbert Molloy

as one of the best of the new perspectives on the air war. For a

Mason Jr.'s Duel for the Sky and spent a good portion of that summer

more general look at the U S A A F and strategic bombing, The Rise

floating in my parents' pool reading and re-reading it. It spurred my

of American Air Power by Michael S. Sherry is the best single-volume

interest on the European Air War, and I've been collecting books on

account available.

the subject ever since. T h i s past week, as I moved my office into the

Since the early 1970s, some terrific accounts of the German

old U S A F air defense command center's plotting room at Camp

experience in the air war have been published. Williamson Murray's

Adair, Oregon, I came across my well-worn copy of Mason's book.

Luftwaffe ranks as the best general work on the German Air Force.

It now sits on my son's bookshelf in hopes that he will pick it up

Six Months to Oblivion by Werner Girbig provides a detailed look at die

soon and find a rekindled passion for a subject that has already

Luftwaffe's last stand as it was overwhelmed by the Allies in the final

captivated two generations of Brünings. If it can be found, Duel for

half year of the war. Alfred Price's The Last Year if the Luftwaffe is another

the Sky is the perfect introduction to World War II in the air for a

valuable resource on die subject. JG-7: The World's First Jet Fighter Unit

young reader.

INDEX

MILITARY U N I T S AND MATERIEL

401st Bomb Group, 4, 178, 206, 2 2 6 457th Bomb Group, 2 2 0

American Units

67th Fighter Wing,

106th Infantry Division, 281

352nd Fighter Group, 193

Advisory Council, 127

364th Fighter Group, 2 3 2

Joint Chiefs of Staff, 128

2nd Bomb Division, 203, 208, 222, 2 2 6

U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) (also USAAC), 3, 14, 17, 1 9 - 2 1 , 55,

2nd Bomb Wing,

8 4 - 8 7 , 9 1 , 9 4 , 9 8 , I 0 I - 3 , 1 1 7 , 1 2 3 , 1 2 7 , 129,133, 141, 149,156,

389th Bomb Group. 129, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 0 8 - 9

163, 167, 173, 180, 1 8 3 - 8 4 , 1 8 6 - 8 8 , 201, 206, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 217,

445th Bomb Group. 2 0 9

227, 240, 249, 252, 263, 2 6 9 - 7 1 , 278, 280, 2 8 2 f st Aero Squadron, 7

14th Bomb Wing, 44th Bomb Group, 129, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 226

2nd Bomb Group, 11

68th Bomb Squadron, 129

15th Bomb Group, 85

392nd Bomb Group, 209, 2 2 6

476th Bomb Group, 135

20th Bomb Wing,

509th Composite Group, 94 Eighth Air Force. 1 - 3 . 5. 19, 55, 85. 8 8 - 9 1 . 9 4 - 9 5 . 9 8 - 1 0 7 . 110, 113-119, 121. 123, 125, 128-29, 143-45, 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 1 5 0 , 154-57,

93rd Bomb Group, 90, 123, 129, 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 2 2 5 65th Fighter Wing, 4th Fighter Group, 90. 190. 1 9 2 - 9 3 . 2 1 8 - 1 9

159, 1 6 1 - 6 3 , 165, 168, 183, 186, 1 8 8 - 9 0 . 1 9 3 - 2 0 3 , 206, 210,

56th Fighter Group, 100, 186, 199. 212, 220, 223, 227, 275

212, 2 1 7 - 2 2 , 2 2 4 - 2 6 , 236, 2 3 9 - 4 0 , 245, 247, 249, 251, 253,

355th Fighter Group. 275

255, 264, 2 7 1 - 7 2 , 275, 277, 2 8 2 - 8 3

361st Fighter Group, 1 9 1 - 9 3 , 249, 251, 272

1st Bomb Division. 203. 206, 219, 222

3rd Bomb Division, 203, 206, 218

1st Bomb Wing, 144, 146

4th Bomb Wing, 1 4 4 - 4 6 , 148

91st Bomb Group, 105-6, 108, 110, 118, 145, 169, 191, 211, 220,

94th Bomb Group, 160, 168, 2 2 4 13th Bomb Wing, 154

224 381st Bomb Group, 116, 120, 145. 169. 177, 181, 220. 227. 229 40th Bomb Wing, 92nd Bomb Group, 119, 2 2 0 305th Bomb Group, 5, 121, 148, 156, 165, 253 306th Bomb Group, 156, 203, 222 41 st Bomb Wing, 303rd Bomb Group, 90, 112-13, 203 384th Bomb Group, 1 6 2 - 6 3 , 203, 221

95th Bomb Group, 107, 149, 168, 1 7 0 - 7 1 100th Bomb Group, 156, 1 6 0 - 6 1 , 220, 253 350th Bomb Squadron, 2 2 0 390th Bomb Group. 154 45th Bomb Wing, 96th Bomb Group, 144, 147, 156 388th Bomb Group, 153 452nd Bomb Group, 227, 229, 231

94th Bomb Wing,

93rd Bomb Wing,

351st Bomb Group, I II

34th Bomb Group, 225

385th Bomb Group, 114, 116, 164, 166

11 Group, 44. 46, 54. 57, 58. 62

549th Bomb Squadron, 5

56 Squadron, B Flight, 44. 49, 53

66 th Fighter Wing,

12 Group, 54

55th Fighter Group, 101, 162

13 Group, 54

55th Fighter Group, 338th Fighter Squadron, 101

74 "Tiger" Squadron, 44, 49, 6 7

78th Fighter Group, 194, 2 3 7

I I I Squadron. 46, 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 1

VIII Bomber Command, 88, 90, 1 4 3 - 4 4

Polish 3 0 3 Squadron, 62

VIII Fighter Command, 90, 100, 115, 186, 1 9 5 - 9 6 , 1 9 8 - 2 0 0 . 206,

Mediterranean Air Command, 128

208, 220, 2 2 7 . 2 3 3 - 3 6 . 2 4 9

Royal Navy, 6 7

Technical Service Section, 183 Far Eastern Air Forces, 16 Fifteenth Air Force, 5, 19, 55, 173, 195, 198, 2 0 2 - 3 , 2 0 6 - 7 , 2 0 9 - 1 0 , 2 4 8 - 4 9 , 255, 277, 282

GERMAN UNITS Condor Legion, 24, 4 3 Heer (German Army), 12, 2 9

Fifth Air Force, 127

Kriegsmarine (German Navy), 3 6

Ninth Air Force, 1 2 2 - 2 3 , 125. 129, 139, 143, 1 8 9 , 2 4 7

Wehrmacht, 2 6 - 2 7 , 30, 54, 74, 114, 233, 235, 238, 2 8 2

98th Bomb Group "Pyramiders," 343rd Bomb Squadron, 124, 126, 129, 133-35, 137-38

T Fighter Corps, 2 1 0 Jagdgeschwader 4 0 0 (JG-400), 2 7 3 - 7 4

354th Fighter Group, 189, 2 2 6 . 2 3 3

Jagdgruppe I (JG-I), 225, 2 6 0

376th Bomb Group "Liberandos," 122. 1 2 6 - 2 7 , 1 2 9 - 3 3 , 136

JG-26, 55. 65

Twelfth Air Force, 98, 1 2 7 - 2 8 , 197, 201

JG-5I, 54

1st Fighter Group, 90

Kampfgeschwader KG-2, 43, 48, 51

31 St Fighter Group, 9 0 , 1 0 1 . 1 8 8

KG-5I, 2 6 6

52nd Fighter Group, 90

Kommando Nowotny, 266, 2 7 2

97th Bomb Group (Heavy), 8 7 - 8 9 , 94

Kommando Schenk, 2 6 6

350(h Fighter Group, 2 4 2

Luftwaffe (German Air Force). 19, 2 3 - 2 7 , 3 0 - 3 2 , 3 5 - 3 7 , 3 9 - 4 1 , 4 3 -

Strategic Air Command, 145

50, 5 2 - 5 9 , 6 2 - 6 3 . 65, 67, 70, 7 3 - 7 4 . 76, 79, 85, 88. 91, 100,

XIV Fighter Command, 188

1 0 6 - 7 , 112, 114—15, 1 1 7 - 1 9 , 121, 134, 139, 1 4 3 - 4 7 , 1 4 9 - 5 0 ,

U.S. Navy. 17

1 5 4 - 5 5 . 160—62, 1 8 9 - 9 0 , 1 9 5 - 2 0 3 . 2 0 6 . 2 0 8 - 1 1 . 213, 215, 2 1 7 - 2 2 , 2 2 4 - 2 7 , 230, 234, 236, 2 3 9 - 4 0 , 244, 2 4 7 - 4 8 , 2 5 0 - 5 2 ,

BRITISH UNITS

255, 2 5 9 - 6 2 , 2 6 4 - 6 8 , 270, 2 7 2 - 7 4 , 2 7 7 - 7 8 , 2 8 2

British Air Ministry, 76

Nachtjagdgeschwader I, 2 7 0

British Army. 8, 4 1 , 2 1 7

Nachtjagdgeschwader 4, 160

Royal Air Force (RAF), I. 15, 24, 3 1 , 3 4 , 4 4 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 1 - 5 9 , 6 2 - 6 5 ,

Panzer Lehr Division, 2 5 5

6 7 - 7 2 , 7 4 - 8 0 , 8 2 - 8 3 , 8 5 - 8 8 , 90, 92, 9 4 - 9 6 , 98, 1 0 2 - 3 , 133,

SS, 2 6 7 - 6 9

146, 1 4 8 - 4 9 , 163, 1 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 8 7 - 8 8 , 1 9 2 - 9 3 . 200, 2 1 0 - 1 1 . 213, 2 1 5 - 1 8 , 236, 260. 270. 2 7 4 - 7 5 , 2 7 7

O T H E R NATIONAL U N I T S

2nd Tactical Air Force, 2 3 6

Finnish Air Force, 4 0

Bomber Command, 35, 55, 57, 6 7 - 7 7 , 7 9 - 8 3 , 85, 90, 92, 9 4 - 9 7 , 103,

French Army, 8, 12, 15, 34

107, 110, 148, 2 1 3 - 1 7 , 255, 274, 277, 2 7 9 - 8 0 4 4 Squadron, 97, 2 1 5

French L'Armee de I .'Air, 15, 32, 41 Italian Military, 13, 2 3 - 2 4

9 0 Squadron, 77. 79, 85

Polish Military, 22, 2 5 - 2 7 , 29, 62, 2 3 7

2 2 6 Squadron, 85

Soviel Air Force, 40

Coastal Command, 55, 57, 79, 82

Soviet Army, 26, 154, 2 7 7

Eagle Squadron, 192—93 Fighter Command. 45, 46. 51, 5 3 - 5 7 , 59, 63. 65, 67. 69, 187 10 Group, 54

Index

AIRCRAFT

DB-I, 1 0 - 1 1

A-20 Havoc. 86, J 2 6 - 2 7

DB-7 "Boston," 86—88

A-36, 185. 187

Defiant, 4 8

Alabama Exterminator TT, 163

DeHaviland Mosquito, 213, 218, 270, 2 7 4

Amiot 143, 3 2 - 3 3 , 35

Dewoitine D.520, 27. 3 2 - 3 3

Arado-234, 2 7 0

Do-17 "Flying Pencils." 27, 4 3 - 4 4 , 4 6 . 4 8 - 4 9 , 51. 59, 62

Armstrong-Whitworth Whitley, 72—73

Do-217, 4 4

Avro Lancaster, 75, 77, 81, 83, 92, 94, 9 6 - 9 7 . 2 1 3 - 1 6 , 2 7 4 - 7 5

D o - 3 3 5 Arrow, 267, 2 7 4

Avro Manchester, 72. 75, 77. 81, 92, 94. 9 6

Dopey, 124

B-2 Spirit, 2 7 1

Dormer, 27. 41, 4 3 - 4 4 , 4 8 - 4 9 . 59, 65. 267. 2 7 4

B-IO. 1 7 , 2 1

Douglas, I 0 - I I , 20, 8 5 - 8 7 , 148

B - I 7 "Flying Fortress," 2 - 3 , 1 0 - 1 1 , 19, 21, 77, 79, 8 4 - 8 5 , 8 8 - 9 1 , 93,

F.nola Gay, 88, 9 4

101, 1 0 4 - 8 , 110, 1 1 4 - 1 9 , 121, 1 2 7 - 2 8 , 134, 1 4 3 - 5 0 , 1 5 2 - 5 6 ,

Fairey Battle, 34

158, 1 6 0 - 6 3 , 1 6 5 - 6 6 , 168, 170, 1 7 7 - 7 8 , 181, 1 8 8 - 8 9 , 1 9 1 , 2 0 0 ,

Fertile Myrtle III, 156

2 0 2 - 3 , 206, 2 0 8 - 1 1 , 2 1 7 - 2 1 , 2 2 3 - 2 9 , 2 4 4 - 4 5 , 248, 2 5 2 - 5 5 ,

Fiat C R - 3 2 , 23

265, 2 7 2 - 7 3 , 275, 2 8 1 - 8 2 ; B-I7C, 77; B-I7E, 87, 89, 91, 114,

Focke-Wulf, 5, 88, 1 0 5 - 6 , 115, 117, 121, 151, 2 0 6

146; B-17F, 4, 114, 146, I 5 9 ; B - I 7 G , 4, 10, 160, 169, 1 7 1 , 2 2 9 ,

Fokker Dr. 1,12

2 7 1 : Model 2 9 9 . 1 0 - 1 1 . 18

Fokker DXXI, 4 0

B - I 8 Bolo. I I , 2 0 - 2 1 B-24 Liberator, 4, 82, 101, 110, 114, 1 16, 1 2 3 - 2 5 , 1 2 7 - 4 1 , 143, 150, 155, 165, 173, 177, 181, 188, 200, 203, 2 0 6 - 1 1 , 218, 222, 2 2 5 -

F w - I 9 0 , 88. 100, 105, 115, 117. 121, 144. 146, 151. 155. 189, 200, 220, 2 7 0 Gotha Go-229, 271

26, 231, 244, 248, 252, 265, 2 7 2 - 7 3 , 2 8 1 - 8 2 ; B-24D, 4, 82, 122,

Hail Columbia, 133

125, 129; B-24J, 4; B-24M. 4

Handley Page Halifax, 77, 81, 83, 92, 94, 2 1 3 - 1 4 , 2 1 6 . 2 7 4

B-26 Marauder, 2 4 7

Handle)' Page Hampden, 69, 72, 74, 76, 78, 94

B-29, 145

Hawker Hurricane IIC, 4 2 - 4 6 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 5 1 - 5 3 , 56, 58, 6 3 - 6 5

Bf-109, 23, 27, 3 2 - 3 3 , 40, 4 4 - 4 5 , 4 8 - 4 9 , 53, 56, 59, 63, 70, 126,

Hawker Tempest, 56, 258, 261

1 3 3 - 3 4 , 146. 150. 152, 155. 183, 189, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 220, 261, 266,

Hawker Typhoon, 56

270

He-111, 2 7 , 4 4 , 4 9 - 5 2 . 5 9 , 6 4

Bf-I09E, 6 5 - 6 6

H e T 6 2 Salamander, 2 6 0

Bf-I09G, 144

H e - 2 I 9 "Owl," 215, 2 7 0

Bf-110. 27. 32, 4 4 - 4 6 , 49, 56. 59. 65. 73, 77, 110, 1 4 4 - 4 5 , 160, 198,

Hetnkel. 27, 4 1 . 44. 4 9 - 5 2 . 56, 59, 65. 76, 114, 215. 2 6 0 . 2 7 0

200, 2 0 8 - 9 , 213, 2 1 5 . 2 7 0

IAR-80, 137

Blackburn Botha, 75

Invasion II, 2 4 5

Bloch M B - 1 5 2 , 32

Ju-52, 3 6

Blohm & Voss Bv-I42, 4 9

Ju-86, 23

Boeing. 1 0 - 1 1 , 21. 77, 79. 85, 148

Ju-87 Stuka, 22, 27, 28, 3 7

Brewery Wagon, 132—33

Ju-88, 27, 44, 49, 51, 5 7 - 5 9 , 77, 162, 198, 200, 2 0 3

Bristol Beaufighter, 48, 68

Liore el Olivier LeO 451, 3 2 - 3 3

Bristol Blenheim, 31, 6 9 - 7 0 , 76, 8 1

Little Miss Mischief, 2 2 8

Bristol Buckingham, 76

Lockheed, I I , 78. 187

Button Nose, 169

Hudson, 78, 187

C - 4 7 Skytrain, 147

Lou IV, 191

Chow Hound, 2 2 4

Martin, 10, 17

Consolidated LB-30, 82

Model 146. 10

Curtiss Hawk 75A, 32. 3 4

MB-2, 13

Curtiss P-40, 183, 187

M e - 1 6 3 Komet, 2 6 5 - 6 6 , 2 7 3 - 7 4

Index

2 8 9

Me-262, 2 5 9 - 6 7 , 2 7 0 - 7 4

H 2 S radar system, 2 J 4

M e - 3 2 3 , 151

Junkers Jumo 0 0 4 engine, 2 6 2

M c - 4 1 0 , 115, 198, 200, 2 1 3

U S S Macon, 1 5

M e and M y Gal, 162

Maxim, 7

Messerschmitt, 5, 48, 58, 65, 89, 1 0 5 - 6 , 137, 206, 211, 2 5 9 - 6 0 , 2 6 2 -

Norden bombsight, 1 8 - 1 9 . 21. 79. 88. 91, J 2 I . 156. 168, 214, 271

63, 2 6 5 - 6 6

Oboe system, 2 J 3—14

Moräne 406, 32

Panther tank, 252

North American B-25 Mitchell, 80, 201

Pratt & Whitney R - I 8 3 0 engine, 130, 175, 177

Old Glory, 2 2 6

Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, 49. 185, 1 8 8 - 8 9

P-38 Lightning. 5, 90, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 162, 186, 198, 202. 2 3 9 - 4 0

U S S Shenandoah. J 5. 2 0

P - 3 9 Airacobra. 185, 189

Stag Antler radar system. 2 7 0

P - 5 I Mustang, 5, 101, 147, 162, 1 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 8 5 - 9 1 , 193, 1 9 7 - 9 8 , 200,

U-boats, 67, 90, 94, 1 0 5 - 6 , 149

220, 226, 2 3 2 - 3 3 , 2 3 8 - 4 0 , 249, 261, 263, 266, 2 7 0 - 7 2 , 2 7 4 - 7 5 ;

Ultra. 2 3 6

P - 5 I A , 186, 188; P-5IB, 189; P-5ID, 192, 193

V-I "Buzz Bomb" or "Doodle Bug," 2 5 6 - 5 9

Potez 63.11, 3 8

V-2 rocket, 2 5 7 - 5 9

Prince Charming, 125

Wright Cyclone engine, 4, I I , I 75

Republic P - 4 7 Thunderbolt, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 145, 1 8 4 - 8 6 , 1 9 3 - 9 4 , 1 9 8 -

X-4. 2 6 6

200, 208, 2 2 0 . 223. 233, 237, 2 3 9 - 4 0 , 242, 263. 2 6 6 . 2 7 1 Salmson, 7 Shack Rabbit, 2 2 1

GENERAL I N D E X

Shangri-La, 2 3 8

Anderson, Fred, 201, 206, 2 0 9 - 1 0 , 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 221

Short Stirling, 72, 77, 81

Andrews, Dana, 2 0 9

Spitfire. 27, 4 3 - 4 5 . 4 9 . 5 2 - 5 3 . 56. 58, 6 3 - 6 5 . 8 8 . 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 . 1 8 3 . 1 8 7 -

Antwerp, Belgium, 2 5 7 - 5 9 , 282

88, 193, 2 3 6 - 3 7 , 261, 2 7 0 Teggie Ann, 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 136 Ten Knights in a Bar Room, 160

Armistice, 8, 2 8 2 Arnold, Henry "Hap," 16, 20, 9 8 - 9 9 , 103. 1 2 6 - 2 8 , 147, 189, 1 9 5 - 9 7 , 271.

Thomas-Morse Scout. 14

Augsburg, Germany, 210—11

T i k a l V 193

Bassingbourn. England, 106, 118, 170

lorn Paine, 153

Battle of Berlin, 2 1 3 - 1 7 , 2 7 9

Vega, I I , 148

Battle of Britain, 25, 42, 4 4 - 4 5 , 47, 4 9 - 5 1 , 5 3 - 5 7 , 6 3 - 6 5 , 67, 70,

Vickers Wellington "Wimpy," 35, 70—71

100, 183, 196

WongoWongo. 127, 129

Battle of France, 25. 32, 54. 70

Yankee Doodle. 8 8

Battle of Somme, I, 2 7 9 - 8 0

XB-15, 10

Battle of the Bulge, 2 8 1

YB-I7, 11,21

Battle of Verdun, 1 - 2 . 8, 279

YB-40. n o

Bender, Bob "Spook," 1 4 9 - 5 0 Bendiner, Elmer. 166, I 76

OTHER WEAPONS AND MATERIEL

Bennett, Marshal. 2 1 5

U S S Akron, 15

Bennett, Thomas, 125

Allison engine, 185, 1 8 7 - 8 8

Berlin, Germany. 4, 57. 59, 77. 79. 165. 183, 186, 1 9 3 - 9 4 , 2 1 3 - 2 7 ,

Ba-349 Natter. 2 6 8 - 6 9

229, 2 3 1 , 2 3 6 , 243, 277, 2 7 9

Bachem, 2 6 7

Bickell, George, 2 2 6

B M W - 0 0 3 engine, 260, 262

Big Week, 200, 202. 210—11, 2 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 3 6

Bofors, 5 6

Blakeslee, Don, 192, 2 3 8

Browning machine gun, 4 8

Boehme, Manfred, 2 5 9

Gr.2I, 114, 2 4 4

Boost, Fritz, 147, 151

Index

Boundrecor, Bob, 149

Gabreski, Francis "Gabby," 199. 2 2 0

Bremen, Germany, 79. 1 0 5 - 7 . 150, 165

Galland, Adolf, 5 5 - 5 6 , 1 9 7 - 2 0 0 , 213, 243, 2 6 0 - 6 2 , 2 6 4 - 6 5

Brereton, Louis, 122. 1 2 5 - 2 9 . 139, 141

Gentile. Don. 219, 238

Brunswick, Germany, 200. 202, 2 2 4

Godfrey, Johnny, 219

Bucharest, Romania, 131, 133, 136

Goebbels, Joseph, 267

Carnall, R„ 51

Goenng. Hermann, 25. 49. 54, 5 6 - 5 9 , 65, 76, 183, 199, 202. 2 3 3 , 2 4 4 ,

Casablanca, Morocco, 9 8 - 9 9 , 1 0 2 - 3 , 126

260-61,268,282

Christian, '! homas, 191—92

Gotha, Germany, 200, 206, 2 0 8 - 9 , 2 7 1

Churchill. Winston, 67. 74, 77. 96, 9 8 - 9 9 , 102. 2 5 8

Grämlich, Benno, 162

Cologne, Germany, 95—96

Graves, Roy, 2 2 0

Combined Bomber Offensive. 103, 106

Groceslose, William, 190

Compton, Keith, 1 2 9 - 3 3 , 136

Guernica, Spain, 23—24, 27

Congressional Medal of Honor, 87, 138, 141, 2 2 6

Hackl, Anton, 2 2 1 . 2 3 0

Corby, Herbert, 69

Hamburg, Germany, 77, 107, 110, 2 7 7

Coventry, England, 43, 65

Hansell, General, 103, 106

Croydon, England, 46, 48, 51

Harker, Ronald, 185, 188

D-Day, 182, 196, 198-99, 225, 233, 238, 243, 2 4 6 - 4 7 , 249, 255,

Harris. Arthur "Bomber," 8 2 - 8 3 . 85. 90, 92. 94. 96. 213, 217, 236,

282

247, 279, 282

DeGaulle, Charles, 8, 12

Harvey.Walter I„, 221

Derry, Fred, 5, 1 6 5 , 2 0 9

Hawkins, lan, 170

Devers, Jacob, 119

Hawkins. Ned, 149

Directive Pointblank. 106, 196, 2 0 0

Helbig, Captain, 55

Distinguished Service Cross, 8 7

Higgs, T. P. K„ 48

Doolittle, Jimmy, 5. 98, 127. 128, 186, 1 9 5 - 9 8 , 2 0 1 - 2 , 206, 209,

Himmler, Heinrich, 269

2 1 7 - 1 9 , 2 2 1 , 2 3 3 , 271 Douhet, Guilio, 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 5 - 1 7 , 19-21, 24, 27, 41, 53, 6 4 - 6 5 , 69, 7 5 76, 82. 98, 103. 159, 217. 2 7 9 - 8 0 , 282

Hiroshima, Japan, 88, 94, 2 1 7 Hitler, Adolf, 25. 27. 41. 55, 5 7 - 5 9 . 65. 76, 123. 2 4 4 - 4 5 . 257, 260, 264-66, 280-81

Dresden, Germany. 2 7 4 - 7 7 . 279, 281

Hitler Youth. 2 6 0

Drew. Urban, 2 7 2

Hough, Cass, 1 8 3 - 8 4

Dunkirk, Belgium, 34, 38, 41

Howard. Jim. 226

Eaker, Ira, 8 8 - 9 0 , 94, 9 9 , 1 0 2 - 3 , 1 0 5 - 6 , 110, 114, 119, 128, 148, 154, 186, 195, 201 East Anglia, England, 2 , 4 . 1 0 1 , 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 3 , 1 1 7 , 146, 155, 157, 171, 180, 195, 209, 2 1 8 - 2 0 , 224, 232, 2 7 7

Hoz/el. Hauptmann, 37 Hughes, Richard, 123, 128, 143 Hunter, Frank, 100, 195, 198 Jarrell, Randall, 5, 283

Ehrenberger, Rudolf, 221

Johnson, Robert S-, 212

English Channel. 37. 43, 47. 51, 5 4 - 5 5 . 57. 63, 65, 157. 181. 224,

Kane, John "Killer," 124, 126, 129, 1 3 3 - 3 4 , 1 3 6 - 3 8 , 141

241, 259

Kantor, MacKinlay, 4, 1 65

Ent, General. 130

Kegelman, Charles, 8 7

Ferris, Henry, 48, 51, 53

Kenney, George, 16. 20, 103, 127

Flavelle, Brian, 127, 1 2 9 - 3 1

Kepner. William, 1 9 5 - 9 6 , 1 9 8 , 2 3 3

Fort Eben-Emael, 31, 37

Kesselring, Albert, 59

Frankland. Noble, 2 8 0

Kiel. Germany, 106, 114

Frey, Hugo, 22 I

Knights Cross, 55, 272

Friedrichshafen, Germany, 225—26

Knocke, Hein/, 195

Fuller, J. F. C„ 12

Krieger, Walter, 48

Fyler, Carl, 105, 143

Lamb, Max, 1 8 9 , 2 3 3

Index

Leipzig, Germany, 164—65, 2 0 0

Richards, Vernon, J 93

LeMay, Curtis, J 4 4 - 4 8 . J 52. 2 0 3 . 2 0 6

Rommel, Erwin, 2 3 6

Liddell-Hart, D. H„ 12

Roosevelt, Franklin Delano "FDR," 96. 9 8 - 9 9 , 102, 128

Lindbergh, Charles, 186

Rostock, Germany, 206, 2 7 7

Lindemayer, Vernon, 2

Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 24, 35, 7 6 - 7 7

London Blitz, 24. 57, 62. 65, 76. 107, 110, 121, 2 1 7

Rouen, France. 8 8 - 8 9 . 94

London, England, 24, 43, 54, 57, 59, 6 2 - 6 3 , 65, 76, 85, 217, 2 5 6 - 5 9

Sassoon, Siegfried, 7

Loos, Gerhard, 221

Saville, Gordon, 128

MacArthur, Douglas, 16

Schaus, Jacob, 160

Malan. A. G. "Sailor," 54, 6 7

Schweinfurt, Germany, 123, 1 4 2 - 4 7 , 154, 156, 160, 163, 165, 168,

Manston, England, 44, 5 1

206, 2 7 9

Manton, G. A. L. "Minnie," 53

Scripture, F.llis, I 70

Mayer, Egon, 221

Seaman, Owen, 2 2 6

MeCudden, Jimmy, 44, 4 9

Smart, Jacob, 1 2 6 - 2 8 , 141

MePartlin, Jim, 3

Spaatz, Carl, 16, 20, 85, 87, 8 9 - 9 0 , 94, 103, 128, 159, 1 9 5 - 9 7 , 199,

Memphis Belle, 119

201, 206, 209, 2 1 7 - 2 1 , 236, 243, 248, 255, 271, 274, 2 8 2

Mitchell. William "Billy," 9, 1 4 - 1 7 , 2 0 - 2 1 , 101, 1 5 9 , 2 7 9 , 2 8 2

Speer, Albert. 245, 248, 255, 260. 2 6 5

Mölders, Werner, 54, 56, 6 7

Sperry Corporation, 18

Monks, Noel, 2 3 - 2 4

St. Nazaire, France, 90, 149

Münster, Germany, 1 54, 1 68, I 70

Steinhoff, Johannes, 2 5 7

Narvik, Norway, 36—37

Sternfels, Robert, 1 33

Nicholson, Amos, 124

Strickler, Chester, 2 3 1

Norden. Carl. 18

Tedder, Arthur. 129, 2 8 2

Normandy, France, 2 3 5 - 3 6 , 2 3 8 - 3 9 , 241, 2 4 3 . 2 4 8 . 251. 255, 266,

Thierfelder, Werner, 2 6 6

282 Norsrad, Lauris, 127

Tibbets, Paul, 87, 94 Transportation Plan, 236, 238, 249

North Sea. 86. 115, 1 5 6 - 5 7 , 181, 2 0 6 . 2 J 8

Trenchant Hugh "Boom," 15, 159, 282

Nowotny, Walter, 199, 2 6 4 . 266, 2 7 2

Vienna, Austria, 143, 2 0 7

O Neil, Oscar, 2 4 5

von Richthofen, Wolfram, 24, 2 7

Olds, Archie, 156

Vonnegut, Kurt, 279, 281

Omaha Beach, 2 4 7

Voss, Werner, 44

Operation Argument, 2 0 0

Warsaw, Poland, 2 4 - 2 7 , 35, 63, 76

Operation Husky, 135

Whalen, Eugene, 2 2 0

Operation Moonlight Sonata, 6 5

Wiener Neustadt, Austria, 123, 143

Operation Overlord, 2 4 6

Wilson, Don, 2 J

Operation Tidal Wave, 123, 125, 1 2 7 - 3 0 , 133. 1 3 5 - 3 6 , J 4 0 - 4 J

Wilson, Louis Abbot, 4 3

Operation Torch, 38, 90, 95

Wmant, John, 154

Packard, 189

Winter, Harry, 43

Paris, France, 39

Zemke, Hubert "Hub," 220, 2 2 7

Patton, George, 12 Pearl Harbor. I I , 1 6 7 - 6 8 . 2 2 6 Ploesti. Romania, 77, 123, 1 2 5 - 3 3 , 1 3 5 - 4 1 , 143, 2 4 8 - 4 9 , 2 7 9 Polebrook, England, 87, 89 Portal. Charles, 76. 83, 92, 96, 98, 2 7 9 Rail, Gunther, 230, 2 5 5 Regensburg, Germany, 123, 1 4 2 - 4 4 , 1 4 7 - 4 8 , 152, 168, 2 1 0 - 1 1 , 2 7 9

Index