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BetweenEmpire andAlliance

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BetweenEmpire andAlliance AmericaandEurope duringtheColdWar Editedby

MarcTrachtenberg

R O W M A N & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS,I N C .

banham Boulder

New York

Oxford

ROWMAN & LI’ITLEFIELI)PUBLISHERS.INC.

Published in theUnitedStatesof America Inc. by Rowman& LittlefieldPublishers, A Memberof theRowman& LittlefieldPublishing Group 4501ForbesBlvd.,Suite200, Lanham,Maryland20706 www.rowmanlittlefield.com PO Box 317 Oxford OX2 9RU, UK

Copyright0 2003 by Rowman& LittlefieldPublishers, Inc.

Theintroduction as well aschapters 1,2, 5, 6, and7 werepreviously published in LiaisonCommittee of Historians (eds.),Journalof EuropeanIntegrationHistoy, volume6, number2 (2000).Verlagsgesellschaft NOMOS, Baden-Baden, 2000. All rightsreserued. No partof ths i publication maybe reproduced, storedin a retrieval system, or transmitted in anyformor by anymeans,electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, withoutthepriorpermission of thepublisher. photocopying, recording, in Publication InformationAvailable BritishLibraryCataloguing

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Betweenempireandalliance: AmericaandEuropeduringthe coldwar / editedby MarcTrachtenberg. p. cm. Includesbibliographical references andindex. ISBN 0-7425-2176-1(cloth: alk. paper)--ISBN 0-7425-2177-X(pbk.: alk. paper) 1. ColdWar. 2. UnitedStatesForeign relations-Soviet Union.3. SovietUnion-Foreign relations-United States.4. World politics-1945- 5. North AtlanticTreatyOrganization-History.6. Europe-Politics andgovernment-1945- I. Trachtenberg, Marc,1946D843 .B48652003 9098 2 ’ 5 - 4 ~12 2002013054 Printedin the UnitedStatesof America

W The Mpaperusedin thispublicationmeetstheminimumrequirementsof

AmericanNationalStandard for InformationSciencesPermanence of Paper for PrintedLibraryMaterials,ANSI/NISO 239.48-1932.

Contents

vii

Introduction Marc Trachtenberg America,Europe,andGermanRearmament, August-September 1950:A Critiqueof a Myth Marc Trachtenberg and Christopher Gehrz

1

“A GeneralNamedEisenhower”: AtlanticCrisisandthe Origins of theEuropeanEconomicCommunity PaulM . Pilman

33

Trigger-happy Protestant Materialists? The EuropeanChristian Democrats andthe UnitedStates WolframKaiser

63

The UnitedStatesandtheOpeningto the Left, 1953-1963 Leopoldo Nuti Hegemonyor Vulnerability? Giscard,Ball, andthe 1962 Gold Standstill Proposal Fruncis J . GavinandErin Mahan WesternEuropeandtheAmericanChallenge: Conflictand Cooperation in Technology andMonetaryPolicy,196-1973 HubertZimmermann GeorgesPompidouandU.%-EuropeanRelations Georges-Henri Soutou

83

99

127

157

Index

201

Aboutthe Contributors

209 V


Introduction Marc Trachtenberg

Thisis a bookaboutUS.-European relations duringthemostintensephase of the ColdWar,thequarter-century fromabout1950to 1974.For theEuropeansat thattime,theirrelationship with Americawasof fundamental importance. The “Americafactor”playeda far-reaching role in shapingtheir policies,andindeedin shaping theirrelations with eachother.The United Stateswastheprotectorof WesternEurope;the freedomof Europe,it was generallybelieved,depended on Americanmilitarypower.But a relationshipof dependence wasalwaysa sourceof unease. How couldEuropedependsoheavilyon a non-European power,no matterhowwell intentioned, for thedefense of its mostvital interests? Wouldn’tit makesensefor theEuropeancountries to cometogether asa politicalunit-for Europeto organize itselfandbecomestronger, sothatEuropewouldnot be sodependent onAmerica? Thisproblemwasof absolutely centralimportance. The “America factor”wasthusboundto play a majorrole in European historyin that period,andin particular in thehistoryof European integration. Buttheactualroleit playeddepended onthespecific policiestheUS. government pursued. Thosepolicies,it turnsout,hada profound effectonwhat wasgoingon withinEurope.The articlesin thisbookwereall writtenindependently of eachother.Therewasnooverallagenda thatlaidoutthethemes thevariousauthors wereto develop.It is therefore strikingthatmostof the contributors herestress thewaydissatisfaction withAmericaaffected-one is temptedto say,lay at the hearto f 4 e Europeanintegration process. Paul Pitman,for example,stresses the way dissatisfaction with the UnitedStates hadbeenbuildingup in manyareas-political, economic andstrategic-in themid-1950s; he arguesthatthosefeelingsplayeda key rolein theprocess thatledto theTreatiesof Rome.WolframKaisernotestheambivalence of the vii

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Introduction

EuropeanChristianDemocrats towardAmerica-their sensethat although theirinterests overlapped, EuropeandAmericawereculturallydistinct,and thatEuropethereforehadto pursuea policyof her own in worldaffairs,a policythatwas rootedin her own distinctive values.HubertZimmermann and Georges-Henri Soutoubothemphasize the impactof America’srather cavaliermonetary policyduringthe Nixonperiodon the European integrationprocess at thattime.And the articleChristopher GehrzandI wrotediscussed thewayin whicha bare-knuckled Americanpolicyin late1950ledthe FrenchandtheGermans to seethattheyhadmajorinterests in common, interestssomewhat dstinctfromthoseof the UnitedStates; whatthisepisode suggested wasthatby comingtogether, theEuropeans mightbe ableto providesomething of a counterweight toAmerican powerwithintheWesternalliance. All of thisis important because thebasicargument hereis at variance with a commonview of the US.-Europeanrelationship duringthe ColdWar period,andin particular with a commoninterpretation of the originsof Europeanintegration. Thisis the ideathatthe Americansecurity guarantee and theColdWar politicalsystem in generallargelydepoliticized relations among themajorWestEuropean states: theyno longerhadto worryaboutproviding for theirown securityandthusno longerhad to worryaboutrelative powerin theirdealings with eachother,andthatmeantthattheycouldnow cooperate with eachothermuchmoreeasilyin theeconomic sphereandin otherareas.Theycould,in otherwords,get on with the business of Europeanintegration because thepoliticalstakeswereno longerveryhigh.’But the thrustof the argument in manyof the articleshereis thatfor the Europeansthe politicalstakeswereveryhigh.The goalof buildingEuropewas notrootedin an acceptance of the fact that the Europeanstatescouldno longerplay a majorpoliticalrole and that they shouldthereforefocuson economic cooperation. It wasrootedinsteadin the sensethatbuildingEuropewasa wayfor theEuropeans to reclaimtheirpoliticalautonomy. But as fundamental as thatgoalwas,the alliancewith Americawasalso veryimportant, sothroughout thisperiod,theEuropeans neededto balance betweenthosetwo aims:reaching for greaterautonomy andmaintaining the tie with the UnitedStates.How that balancewas struckdepended on circumstance, soascircumstances shlfted,theUS.-Europeanrelationship had to adjustto thosechanges. The relationship itself,thatis,changed overtime, andthestoryof howit developed is morecomplexandrichlytexturedthan onemightsuppose. Thebasicstructure of US.-Europeanrelations, in otherwords,wasby no meansset in concretein the late 1940s. The importantdevelopments that ‘See especiallyKenneth Waltz. 7beofyof InternationalPolitics(New York McCraw-Hill, 19791,pp. 70-71. andJosefJoffe,“Europe’sAmericanPacifier,”ForeignP o k y ,no. 54 (1984), pp. 67-68.

Introduction

xi

took placein the 1950s,the 1960sand early 1970shad a certainlogicto them,a logic,as LeopoldoNuti stresses in his articlehere,thatcanonly be understood by lookingat boththe domesticandtheforeignpolicysidesof the storyandanalyzingtheirconnections with eachother.And therewas a real storyhere;thingscouldhavegonein all kindsof differentdirections. Whatemerges fromthisseries of articlesis a sensethatevenwhatwe assume to be fundamental policieswere not sacrosanct-thatattitudescouldSM dramatically, that far-reaching shiftsin policycouldrarelybe ruledout.As FrancisGavinandErin Mahanshow,for example,the Kennedyadministration wasby no meanscommittedto the Bretton Woods monetaryregimeas a fundamental elementof a U.S.-dominated system,butwasinsteadinclined to view BrettonWoodsas a kind of albatross; it was far moreopento fundamentalchangein this key areathan peoplehavegenerallyrecognized. They alsoshowhow,duringthe Kennedyperiod,the Frenchgovernment (or at leastthe Frenchministerof finance)wasnot outto destroythisdollarbasedmonetarysystem,the supposed symbolof Americanhegemony,but wasinsteadquiteinterested in shoringup thesystemandpursuinga policy of monetarycooperation with the UnitedStates.And Soutou,in an article drawingo nsomenewandquiteextraordinary FrenchandAmericanarchival sources, showshow differentboth the Pompidouandthe Nixon-Kissinger policieswerefromthepoliciesthathadpreceded them.Perhaps themostremarkablefindingherewashowfar thingshadmovedduringthePompidouNixon periodin theareaof nuclearweaponscooperation-averyimportant development that reflectedfundamental shiftsin basicpoliticalthinkingin bothcountries. One mightthink,giventhe manybooksandarticlesthat havebeenpublishedon US.-EuropeanrelationsduringtheColdWar period,thatnotmuch remainsto be saidon the subject.But takenasa whole,whatthesearticles showis how misleading that sortof assumption canbe. Archivalresearch, evenon theearlyColdWar, canstillyield importantnew insights; andwork on the laterperiod,especiallythe early 1970s,canprofoundlyreshapeour understanding of whatwasgoingon. And with the openingin recentyears of importantnew archivalsourceson both sidesof the Atlantic,one can safelypredictthatwe will be learninga gooddealmoreaboutthesubjectin thenearfuture. Mostof thecontributions herewereoriginallypublished in theJournalof European IntegratioiiHistoy ,vol. 6, number2 (2000);someof themarerepublished herein slightlyrevisedform.I wouldlike to thanktheyournal and itseditorsandpublisherfor allowingus to republishthosearticleshere,and I am particularly indebtedto Professor CharlesBarthelfor all the helphe has givenuswith thisproject.


1 America,Europe,andGerman Rearmament, August-September 1950:A Critiqueof a Myth Marc Trachtenberg andChrktopher Gehrz

In September 1950,U.S. Secretary of StateDeanAchesonmet in New York with theBritishforeignsecretary, ErnestBevin,andtheFrenchforeignminister,RobertSchuman. Achesonhad an importantannouncement to make. waspreparedto “takea stepneverbefore The UnitedStates,he declared, takenin history.” TheAmericangovernment waswillingto send“substantial forces” to Europe.TheAmericancombatforcewouldbe partof a collective forcewith a unifiedcommand structure, a forcethatultimatelywouldbe capableof defending WesternEuropeon theground.But theAmericans were willingto takethatsteponlyif the European allies,for theirpart,werepreto “makethisdefense of Europea success.” paredto dowhatwasnecessary And hisgovernment, he said,hadcometo theconclusion thatthewholeeffort couldnot succeedwithouta Germanmilitarycontribution. So if the NATO allieswantedtheAmerican troops,theywouldhaveto accepttheidea of Germanrearmament-andthey wouldhaveto acceptit rightaway.The U.S. government, he insisted, neededto “havean answernowon thepossible useof Germanforces” in thedefense of WesternEurope.’ The positionAchesontookat the New York conference wasof quiteextraordinaryhistoricalimportance. The Americangovernment was finally committing itselfto buildingan effectivedefenseof WesternEuropeandto playinga centralrole in themilitarysystemthatwasto be setup. But the Americans werealsotryingto lay downthelaw to theirEuropean allies:the US. government wantedto forcethemto go alongwith a policythatmade themveryuneasy. It wasnot,of course, thattheEuropeans dislikedthewholepackage Achesonwasnow proposing. Theyknewthataneffectivedefense of WesternEuropewouldhaveto be basedon Americanpower,andtherefore welcomed

2

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muchof theAmericanplan.The offerof a majorAmericantrooppresence in Europe,the proposalto setup a strongNATO militarysystem,the suggestionthatanAmericangeneralwouldbe sentoverasNATO commander-all of thiswas,in itself,musicto theirears.The problemlay with thefinal part of Acheson’s proposal,the part relatingto Germanrearmament, and even herethe issuehadmoreto do with timingthanwith ultimateobjectives. The alliedgovernments were not againstthe very idea of Germanrearmament.Of all the NATO allies,the Frenchwere the mostreluctantat this point to accedeto Acheson’sdemands.But Schumanwas not dead set againstGermanrearmament asa matterof principle.*He in factnowadmitted that it was “illogicalfor us to defendWesternEurope,includingGermany,withoutcontributions from germ an^."^ The Frenchgovernment, he toldAcheson,was“notirrevocably opposed to Germanparticipation” in the NATO army. Indeed,he thoughtit was likely that “someday” Germany wouldjoin theWesterndefenseforce.* The problemfrom Schuman’s pointof view was thatAchesonwantedto movetooquickly.The Americans wereinsisting on immediateandopenacceptanceof the principleof Germanrearmament.But Schumancouldgo alongwith the US. plan,he said,only if thiswerekeptsecret.It waspoliticallyimpossible for him to accepttheplanpubliclyat thatpoint.5Onlya minorityin France,he pointedout,appreciated “theimportance of Germanyin Westerndefense.”6 The Frenchpubliccouldprobablybe broughtalongand butonly wouldultimatelyaccepttheideaof a Germandefensecontribution, if the West movedaheadmore cautiously-nly if a strongEuropeandefensesystemhadbeenbuiltu p first. Domesticpoliticswas not the only reasonwhy Schumantook this line. The East-West militarybalancewasperhapsan evenmorefundamental factor.In late1950theWesternpowerswerejustbeginningto rearm.In military terms,theyfelt theycouldscarcely holdtheirownin a warwith Russia.GeneralOmarBradley,chairmanof the U.S. JointChiefsof Staff(JCS),for example,thoughtin November1950thatif war brokeout,theUnitedStatesmight well lose.The Soviets,on the otherhand,seemedto be gettingreadyfor a war:thesensewasthat theywerepoisedon thebrinkandmightbe tempted to strikebeforethe Westbuilt up its power.In suchcircumstances, people like Schumanaskedif it was wise to moveaheadwith the rearmamentof Germany,something the Russians were boundto find highlyprovocative. Ratherthan risk war now, at a time of Westernweakness,didn’tit make senseto put off the decisionuntil after the West had rearmeditself and wouldthusbe betterableto withstandthe shock?’ Thesewere perfectlyreasonable arguments, and were in fact supported by the US. government’s own assessments of the risk of war with Russiaat thetime.TheUS. highcommissioner in Germany, JohnMcCloy,thought,for example,inJune1950that“therearmament of Germanywouldundoubtedly

America,Europe,and GermanRearmament, August-September 1950

3

speedu p anySovietschedule for anypossiblefutureactionin Germanyand would,no doubt,be regardedby [theSoviets]as sufficientlyprovocative to warrantextremecountermeasures.”* In December,the CIA concludedthat theUSSRwould“seriously consider goingto war wheneverit becomesconvincedthatprogress towardcompleteWesternGermanrearmament,” along with the rearmament of NATO as a whole,had reachedthe pointwhereit by othermethods.”’ It was,of course,possible thatthe couldnotbe “arrested Sovietsmight chooseto live with a rearmedGermany,especiallyif there continued to bemajorlimitsonGermanpower,butcertaingroupswithinthe U S . government-armyintelligence, for example-believedthatif theWest movedaheadin thisarea,it wasmorelikely “thatthe Sovietswoulddecide on resortto militaryactionratherthanmaketherequiredadjustment.”1° So if evenAmericanofficialswereworriedaboutwhata decisionto rearm Germanymightleadto, it is nothardto understand why theEuropeans, and especially theFrench,weresodisturbed by theUS. proposal. The NATO allies would have to acceptthe whole package,Achesontold them.They wouldhaveto agree,publiclyandimmediately, to the rearmament of Germany.They would haveto go alongwith what they honestlyviewedas a very provocative policyvis-2-visRussiaandrisk war at a time whenno effectivedefensewas in place-ither that, Achesonsaid,or the Americans wouldsimplynot defendthem. The factthatthe U.S. government hadchosento dealsoroughlywith its allieshadoneveryimportanteffect:it helpedbringFranceandGermanytogether.It helpedbringabouta certainchangein perspective-a changein the way the Europeans viewedAmericaand thusin the way they viewed eachother.Up to thispoint,theFrench,for example,hadtendedto thinkof thepolicyof “buildingEurope”in essentially manipulative andinstrumental terms.It was,to useRaymondPoidevin’s phrase,a way “toseduceandto control”Germany.”But now the ideawas beginningto takehold that the Europeans-thatis, the continentalWest Europeans-wereall in the same boatin strategic terms.The Europeans hadinterests of theirown-interests thatoverlapped with,butwhichwerein importantwaysdistinctfrom,those of the United States.The fact that the Americanscould adopt a highly provocative policytowardRussia,with scantregardfor Europeaninterests, meantthat the Europeanscould not afford to be too dependenton the UnitedStates. Yes,therehadto bea strongcounterweight to Sovietpowerin Europe,andyes,thatcounterweight hadto restlargelyon Americanpower. The Americanpresence in Europewasobviouslyessential andan American combatforcewouldhaveto be the heartof an effectiveNATO defensesystem.But thereneededto be somecounterweight to Americanpowerwithin theAtlanticalliance.And giventhefactthatBritainhelditselfalooffromEurope,that counterweight had to be built on a real understanding between FranceandGermany.

4

Chapter1

We do notwantto overstate the argumenthere.Thissortof thinkingwas justbeginningto takeshapein 1950andthingsobviouslyhada longway to go.12Buttheimportance of whatwasgoingon at thetimeshouldnotbe underestimated either.The lineAchesontookat theNew York conference was quiteextraordinary, and what was at stakewas of enormousimportance. Theeventsof late 1950,therefore, wereboundto makea profoundimpression.Theywereboundto leadmanyEuropeans to beginthinkingmoreseriouslyabouttheimportance of comingtogetherasa unitin orderto giveEuropemoreof a voicein settingthe policyof theWestasa whole. Consider,for example,the reactionof the Germanchancellor,Konrad Adenauer, to theAmericanplan.ShortlyaftertheNew York conference, Adenauerhad his top advisor,HerbertBlankenhorn, tell ArmandBerard,the Frenchdeputyhigh commissioner in Germany,that he did not want Germanyto simplyprovideforcesfor an Americanarmy-that is, an army in whichthe Americanswouldhaveall of the power.The two men soonmet again and Blankenhornreturnedto the charge.“With great emphasis,” Berardwrote,Blankenhorn “repeated whathe hadalreadytoldme a couple of weeksago,namely,howdesirableit wasthatan initiativecomefromthe Frenchside.Germanydid notwantto takeherplacein an Americanarmy.” “If France,”Blankenhorn continued,“proposed the creationof a European army underallied command,an army whosesupremecommander might evenbe a Frenchman,” hisgovernment “wouldsupportthats ~ l u t i o n . ” ’ ~ Berardscommenton thisis worthquotingat length: The chancellor is beinghonestwhenhe sayshe is worriedthatwhatthe German [military]contribution will boil downto is simplyGermanforcesin an Americanarmy.He is afraidthathiscountrywill endup providingthe footsoldiersand shocktroopsfor an anti-Communist offensiveforcethat the United Statesmightbuildin Europe.Peoplein ourowncountryareworriedaboutthe same sort of thing.Adenaueris askingfor a Frenchinitiativethatwouldheadoff thisAmericansolution, whichhe fears.I thinkhe is sincerein all this,justassincereashe was,andstill is, in his supportfor the Schuman Plan[for a coaland steelcommunity in WesternEurope].He believesthatthe problemsof Western Europehavebe to resolvedon a Franco-German basis,the militaryproblemas well asthe economicproblem^.'^

The importantpointherewas thatFranceandGermanyhadmajorinterests in common,not just vis-2-visRussia,but visd-visAmericaas well. There was,Bkrardnoted,“acertainparallelism betweenthepositionof Franceand thatof WestGermanywith regardto the defenseof theWest.Bothof them areconcerned aboveall with makingsurethattheyarenotinvadedandthat theirterritorydoesnot serveasa battleground; theybothfeel very strongly thattheWestshouldholdbackfromprovokingtheSoviets,beforea western force,worthyof the name,hasbeensetup.”liTo go fromthatpointto the


5

conclusion thatthe Europeans hadto act moreas a strategic unit-thatEuropeanintegrationhad to be real, and not just a deviceto keepGermany from becominga p r o b l e m 4 i dnot requireany greatleapof the imagination. Readingtheseand relateddocuments, one thushasthe senseof a new way of thinkingbeginningto take shape-ofFrenchleadersrubbingtheir eyesandwakingup to thefactthattheyandtheGermanshadmorein common than they had perhapsrealized,of an importantthresholdbeing crossed,of Franceand Germanyjust startingto think of themselves as a strategic unit.And if thiskind of thinkingwasbeginningto emerge,it was, in largepart,a reactionto the heavy-handed way in whichU.S. government 1950. hadchosento dealwith its Europeanalliesin September But had the Americangovernment, in any real sense,actuallychosen to dealwith the alliesin thatway?It is commonlyarguedthatthepolicyAcheas a choicefreely sonpursuedin September1950is not to be understood madeat the top politicallevel,but ratheris to be seenas the outcomeof a bureaucratic disputein whichAchesonultimatelyhad to give way to pressurefromthePentagon.16 TheStateDepartment, according to thisargument, understood the needfor an effectivedefenseof WesternEurope;now,followingthe outbreakof the KoreanWar in June,theneedfor actionwasobvious.It thereforewantedto beginbuildingan effectivedefenseby sending an Americancombatforceoverto Europe.But thisgavethemilitaryauthoritiesthe leveragethey neededto achievetheir “long-standing objectiveof Germanrearmament.”” Theywerewilling,theynowsaid,to go alongwith the planto sendovertheUS. combatdivisions, but onlyaspartof a “package”:theJCS “wantedcategorical assurances thattheycouldcounton German assistance in the shapethey desiredand that they would be able to makean immediatestarton raisingandequippingthe Germanunits”;they insistedthatthe offerto deploythe US. force“bemadestrictlyconditional uponiron-cladcommitments by the Europeans to theirown contributions, and in particular,uponunequivocalacceptance of an immediatestarton Germanrearmamentin a form technicallyacceptable to Americanstrategists.”ls The StateDepartment, the argumentruns,resistedthe Pentagon’s efforts to bringthe Germanrearmamentquestionto a head in sucha blunt and high-handed way. The two sidesdebatedthe issuefor abouttwo weeksin lateAugust,but the “Pentagon stoodunitedandunmovable.” Acheson,accordingto his own widely-accepted account,“agreedwith their strategic purpose,” but “thought theirtacticsm u r d e r o ~ sAt . ”the ’ ~ endof August,however,Achesonhadreluctantly decidedthathe hadto giveway. He hadfelt earlierthatinsisting on the inclusionof Germanyat the outset“woulddelay and complicatethe whole enterprise,” and that a more flexibleapproach mademoresense,but, by his own account,he was almosttotallyisolated

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withinthegovernment andthereforehadno choicebutto backoff fromthat position.“I was right,”he said,“butI wasnearlyalone.”20 Most of the State Department, andeventhepresidenthimself,seemed to beon theotherside. So somewhat againsthis betterjudgment,he accepted whathe laterrecognized as a mistakenpolicy.21He acceptednot only the “package” approach-that is, as onescholarput it, a formulathat “tiedGermanrearmament to the StateDepartmentpackagemuch more rigidly than the State Departmenthad intendedz2-but a plan that would allow Germanyto rearmon a nationalbasis,whichwasalsoverymuchat variancewith what the StateDepartmenthadoriginally~ a n t e dBut . ~ 3thiswasthe onlyway he couldgetthe Pentagonto accepttherestof the plan. If all of this is true-if the Americangovernment just stumbledinto the policyit pursuedin September 1950,if thepolicy,thatis, is to be understood essentiallyas the outcomeof a bureaucraticprocess-then the episode mightnot tell us muchabouthowtheAmericangovernment, at thetop politicallevel,dealtwith itsEuropeanallies.But if thatstandard interpretation is notaccurate, thenthestorymighttell ussomething fundamental aboutthe nature of America’sEuropeanpolicy, and indeed about the nature of US.-Europeanrelationsin general. The goal here,therefore,is to examinethis interpretation of what happenedin AugustandSeptember 1950in thelightof theevidence.Butis there any point,one mightwonder,to conducting an analysisof this sort?If so many scholarswho lookedinto the issueall reachedessentially the same conclusion, thatconclusion, onemightreasonably assume, is probablycorrect.Thereis, however,a basicproblemwith thisassumption: the standard interpretation restson a verynarrowevidentiary base.It rests,to a quiteextraordinary extent,onAcheson’s ownaccountandonscholarly accounts that dependheavily on Acheson’sstory.24A self-servingaccount,however, shouldneverbe takenat facevalue;giventhe importance of the issue,the And a standard interpretation reallyneedsto be testedagainsttheevidence. gooddealof archivalevidencehasbecomeavailablesinceAcheson’s memoirsandthefirstscholarly accounts werepublished. Butwhatlightdoesthis new materialthrowon the issue?

GERMAN REARMAMENT:O N WHAT BASIS? The StateandDefensedepartments did not seeeye-to-eyeon the German rearmament questionin mid-1950.On thatpoint,the standard interpretation is indeedcorrect.Butthedifferences betweenthetwo departments werenot nearlyasgreatastheysometimes seemed,andtheareaof disagreement had virtuallydisappeared by thetimetheNew York conference metin earlySeptember.


7

The militaryauthorities hadfavoredGermanrearmament since1947.On May 2, 1950,they officiallycalledfor the “earlyrearmingof WesternGermany,”andformallyreiteratedthiscall onJune8. But the StateDepartment took a very differentline andonJuly3 flatly rejectedthe ideathatthe time hadcometo pressfor Germanrearmamer~t.’~ It was not that top StateDepartmentofficialsfelt that Germanycouldneverbe rearmed.Achesonhimselfhadnoted,evenin 1949,thatonecouldnot “haveanysortof securityin westernEuropewithoutusingGermanpower.”26 But until mid-1950,it was thatit wouldbe unwiseto pressthe issue. thoughtfor a varietyof reasons In July1950,however,a majorshifttookplacein StateDepartment thinking. Achesontold President Trumanat the endof thatmonththatthe issue was not whetherGermanyshouldbe “broughtinto the generaldefensive plan,”but ratherhow this couldbe donewithoutundermining America’s otherbasicpolicy goals in Europe.He pointedoutthattheStateDepartment was thinkingin termsof a “European armyor a NorthAtlanticarmy”;that forcewould includeGermantroops,but the Germanunits“wouldnot be subjectto theordersof Bonn.”z7 A wholeseriesof key StateDepartment officials,bothin Washington andin the majorembassies abroad,had,in fact, cometo the conclusion at aboutthistime that somekind of international armythatincludedGermantroopswouldhaveto be created,andAcheson’s ownthinkingwasfully in line with thisemergingconsensus.’8 Thisshiftin StateDepartment thinkingis notto beviewedin bureaucratic politicstermsas an attemptby theStateDepartmentto reachsomekind of compromise with theJCSon theGermanrearmament issue.It wasinsteada of the outbreakof the KoreanWar in quite straightforward consequence June.As Achesonlaternoted,afterthe NorthKoreanattack: we andeverybody elsein Europeandthe UnitedStatestooka new lookat the Germanproblem.It seemedto us that it was now clearthat Germanyhad to takea partin thedefenseof Europe;it seemedclearthatthe ideathatwe had hadbeforethatthis wouldwork out througha process of evolutionwasn’tadequate-there wasn’ttime,the evolutionhad to be helpedalongby action.It wasquiteclearby thistime,asa resultof thestafftalksin NATO, thattheWestern Unionideaof defenseon the Rhinewasquiteimpractical andfoolish,and thatif youweregoingto haveanydefenseat all, it hadto be in therealmof forward strategy, whichwas asfar eastin Germanyas possible. Thismadeit absolutelyclearthat Germanyhad to be connectedwith defense,not merely throughmilitaryformations, but emotionally andpolitically,becauseif the battle wasgoingto be foughtin Germanyit meantthatthe Germanpeoplehadto be on ourside,andenthusiastically so.

The U.S. government“immediately went to w o r k on “thisGermanmatter”-at leastas soonas it could,giventhe needto deal,in Julyespecially, with evenmoreurgentproblemsrelatingto theKoreanWarez9

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Sotherewasnowa certainsenseof urgency: aneffectivedefenseof West-

ern Europehadto be put in placeand,indeed,put in placeratherquickly. It was obviousfrom the startthat thiswould“requirereal contributions of Germanresources and men.”But the Germancontribution couldnot take the form of a Germannationalarmy;the Germanscouldnot be allowedto builda militaryforceableto operateindependently. The onlyway the Germanscouldmaketheirdefensecontribution wasthusto createsomekind of international armythatincludedGermanforces-but forcesnotableto conductmilitaryoperations on their A key StateDepartment official,HenryByroade,workedouta planbased on thisfundamental conceptat thebeginningof August.Byroade,thedirector of the StateDepartment’s Bureauof GermanAffairs,discussed his ideas with the armystaffofficersmostdirectlyconcerned with theseissuesonAugust3. (The army,for obviousreasons, tooktheleadin settingpolicyon this issuefor themilitaryestablishment asa whole.)Thoseofficerswerepleased by the factthattheStateDepartmentnow appeared“tobe lookingwith favor towardthe controlledrearmament of WesternGermany”; they “feltthat greatprogress hadbeenachievedon thequestionof Germanrearmament, sinceboththeStateDepartmentandthe Department of Defensearenowattemptingto work outa suitableplanwhichwouldmakepossiblea German contribution to the defenseof WesternEurope.”Thesearmyofficershad in factjustcomeup with theirown planfor a “controlled rearmament of Germany.”3l Therewere, however,majordifferences betweenthe two plans,or so it seemedto bothsidesat thetime.The Byroadeplancalledfor theestablishArmy,”whichwouldincludepractimentof a highlyintegrated“European cally all Westernmilitaryforces-American and Germanas well as West European-stationedin Europe;it wouldhavea “GeneralStaff of truly internationalcharacter,” anda singlecommander, an Americangeneral,with “complete jurisdiction” overthewholearmy.Theforcewouldhaveasmuch of an international character aspossible. The goal,Byroadesaid,wasto apply theSchuman Planconceptto themilitaryfield;theaimwasto enablethe Germansto contributeto the defenseof theWest,withoutat the sametime becomingtooindependent-thatis, withoutgettinga nationalarmyof their 0wn.3~ Thearmy,on theotherhand,wasnot in favorof settingup a highlyintegrated“European Army.”It did not explicitlycall for a “Germannational army,”but key officersdid seemto feel that any plan the U.S. government cameup with wouldneedto “appealto the nationalistic tendencies of the Germanpeople.”The army plan,moreover,calledfor “controlled rearmament,”but the officerswho draftedit werereluctantto stateformallywhat the “natureof the controls” wouldbe. In short,the StateDepartmentcalled for a truly internationalforce, while the military authorities,it seemed,


9

wanteda lesshighlyintegrated forcecomposed of nationalarmies.The two plans,in Byroade’s view,were“milesapart.”Or, asthearmystaffput it, the StateDepartment proposalwouldreducethe “militarysovereignty status” of theEuropean countries down“tothelevelof Germanyin orderto secureher contribution,” while the army proposed“toraiseGermany’sstatus”to the levelof the NATO allies.33 So therewas clearlya majordifferenceof opinionon thisissue-at least at thelevelof rhetoric.But in practicalterms,werethetwo sidesreallysofar apart?The greatgoal of the StateDepartmentwas to makesurethat there was no new Germannationalarmy-that is, an army capableof independent action,and thusable to supportan independent foreignpolicy.The militaryauthorities understood thepoint,andit wasfor thisreasonthatthey, of Germany.And when from the start,favoredthe “controlled rearmament oneexaminesthe sortsof controlstheyhad in mind andnotesthatcertain key militarycontrolsin theirplanwouldapplyto Germanyalone,it becomes obvious-the rhetoricnotwithstanding-thatmilitaryleadershad no intention of givingthe FederalRepublicthe same“militarysovereignty status”as the NATO allies.In the Byroadeplan,not justalliedheadquarters, but also field army and corpsheadquarters were to be “international”; in the plan workedoutby the officersin the Pentagon, “ArmyandCorpsshouldbe national,”exceptthat the Germanswouldbe “allowednone.”In both plans, the Germanswouldcontributeonly groundforces,not air or navalforces; therewouldbe Germandivisions,but no larger,purelyGermanunits;the Germanforceswouldbe underalliedcontrol;theGermanswouldnotbe allowed to manufacture certainkindsof weapons(“heavyordnance,etc.”); and,finally,bothplansimpliedGermanparticipation in NATO.34 Thus,the real differencebetweenthe plansdid not haveto do with Germany,but with how the NATO forceswereto be treated.Byroadewas not tooexplicitaboutthispartof theproposal, but hisplancalledfor virtuallyall of the alliedforcesin Europeto be integrated into the proposedEuropean defenseforce.Therewouldbe no distinctBritish,French,or evenAmerican armyon theContinent,onlyan international armywith a singlecommander did servedby an integratedinternational staff.The U S . militaryauthorities not like this proposalat all, eventhoughthe whole forcewould have an Americangeneralasits commander. Byroade,it seemedto them,wantedto gotoofar in pushingthealliesdownto theGermanlevel;theChiefsalsofelt thatsomething thatradicalwasnot essential, andthatinsteadof creatingan entirelynew institution, the “European DefenseForce,”it mademoresense to buildon theonebasicinstitution thathadalreadybeencreated: theNorth AtlanticTreatyOrganization. Both NATO andtheWesternUnionmilitaryorganizationsetup by the Brussels Treatyof 1948were alreadyin existence; to createa new international forcewould “tendto complicatean already confusing ~ t r u c t u r eAnd . ” ~ there ~ was no pointin doingso,becauseNATO

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itselfcouldprovidethe necessary degreeof integration; a Germanforceintegratedintothe NATO system-especially a strengthened NATO systemwouldbe incapable of independent action. Thislogicwasquitecompelling. It did notmatterif theinternational force wascalledEDF or NATO. Thenamewasnotimportant. Whatreallymattered waswhetheryou had an international structure withinwhichthe Germans couldmaketheircontribution, but whichat the sametime wouldprevent themfrombecoming too independent. And if an institution thathadalready beencreated-that is, NATO-couldachievethatresult,thensomuchthe better.36 EvenByroadehimself,whoby hisownaccount wasquiteconservative on theseissuesin comparison with otherStateDepartment officials,wasquick to seethepoint.His originalplan,in anyevent,hadnotreallybeenputforwardasa practicalproposal; his aim hadbeento sketchout a “theoretical solution fromwhichonecouldworkbackwards” withaneyetoworkingout a “compromise betweenthetheoretical andwhatis alreadyin existence.” So whena toparmyofficerexplained to him onAugust10howNATO coulddo the trick,he at leasttemporarily droppedhis objections and basicallyacceptedtheirapproach: he agreedthat“German divisions, organized assuch, mightwell be integrated intothe NATO forcesas now planned,provided onlyan Americancommander for theseforcesweresetup in the nearfuture.”Thedifferences betweenthetwodepartments wereclearlynarrowing. Indeed,it turnedout thatByroade’s earlierobjectionto the armyplanhad “stemmed entirelyfroma misunderstanding of terms.” Byroadehadthought thatwhenarmyofficersreferredto “controlled rearmament,” theyhadonly a “limitation on numbers andtypesof divisions” in mind.Whenhe wastold thatthe army“alsocontemplated aspartof the controla very definitelimit as to the typesand quantities of materielandequipment whichGermany shouldmanufacture, Byroadesaidhe wasin completeaccord.”3’ By the end of the month,it seemedthat a full consensus had been reached. ForAcheson, far morethanfor Byroade, onlythecoreissuewasreally important. For him,it wasnot a problemthattheGermans wouldhave a nationalarmyin an administrative sense-that is, thattheywouldrecruit theirown troops,pay them,providethemwith uniforms,and soon. The only important thingwasto makesurethatthingsdid not go toofar-that the “oldGermanpower,”as Achesonput it, was not r e s u r r e ~ t eIfd an .~~ arrangement couldguarantee that,he waspreparedto be quiteflexibleon the secondary issues. Achesonwascertainlynot goingto go to the wall to defendthosepartsof theByroadeconcept thatwouldtendto striptheNATO forces,includingtheAmericanforcein Europe,of theirnationalcharacter. Achesonhadan important meetingwithJCSChairmanBradleyonAugust 30 to workthingsout,andhe discussed thatmeetingwith hisprincipaladvisorslaterthatmorning.He did notcomplain thatthemilitarywantedto go


11

toofar towardcreatinga Germannationalarmy;hisrealcomplaintwasthat theJCS was“confused andhadsomehowgottentheideathatthe StateDepartmentpositionwasmoreextremethanit reallywas.The Pentagon’s own position,Achesonthought,was just not clearenough:“he did not know whatwasmeantby ‘nationalbasis’and‘controlled status.”’39 But the militaryauthorities werenowwillingto be moreaccommodating on thispointandwerepreparedto statemoreexplicitlywhattheymeantby thoseterms.This represented a certainshiftfromthe line theyhadtakenat the beginningof the month.In earlyAugust,theyhadpreferrednot to outline formallythe sortsof controlstheyhadin mind.*OBut by the endof the month,the armyleadership hadconcluded thatit neededto be moreforthcoming. This was becausePresidentTrumanhad intervenedin thesediscussions on August26. On thatday,he askedthe two departments to comeup with a commonpolicyon the wholecomplexof issuesrelatingto EuropeandefenseandWestGermanrearmament. Giventhe president’s action,a simple rejectionof theByroadeplanwasno longera viableoption.Leadingmilitary officersnow felt that they neededto comeup with a more “positiveapproach”to theproblem.A “Planfor theDevelopment of WestGermanSecurity Forces” wasquicklyworkedoutandapproved by thearmyleadership at the beginningof September. This plan spelledout the controlsthe military hadlongfavored:theNATO organization wouldbe strengthened; Germany wouldnotbe allowedto havean air forceor a navy;thelargestGermanunit wouldbe thedivision;therewouldbe no Germangeneralstaff;Germanindustrywould be permittedto provideonly light weaponsand equipment. The militaryauthorities werethusnot pressing for thecreationof a German nationalforcethat would have the samestatusas the Britisharmy or the Frencharmyor theAmericanarmy.Indeed,by thebeginningof September, there was no fundamental differencebetweentheir positionand that of Achesonon thisissue.41

THE ORIGINS OFTHE PACKAGE PLAN SotheStateDepartment andthePentagon hadclashedin August1950on the questionof Germanrearmament. Thatconflicthadfocusedon the question of theextentto whichtheGermanforcewouldbe organizedon a “national” basis-r, to look at the issuefromthe otherside,the degreeof militaryintegrationneededto keepGermanyfromhavinga capabilityfor independent action.By the endof the month,however,thatconflicthadessentially been resolved.Therewouldbe a Germanmilitarycontribution, bothdepartments agreed,but no Germannationalarmy.The Germanforcewouldbe fully integratedintotheNATO force;thatis,theGermanforcewouldnot be ableto

12

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operateindependently. This was all Achesonrequired,and the JCS had neverreallyaskedfor anythingmoreby way of a Germannationalforce. But evenif the conflicthadbeensharper,evenif the Pentagonhadbeen intransigent on thisissue,andevenif the StateDepartmenthadcapitulated to theJCSon thisquestion, all of thiswouldin itselftell us verylittleabout the mostimportantissuewe are concerned with here:the questionof the a separateissue.The originsof the “packageplan.”This was essentially Americangovernment, at the New York conference in mid-September, demandedthat the NATO alliesagree,immediately and publicly,to the rearmamentof WestGermany;if theyrefusedto acceptthatdemand,theAmericanswouldnot sendoverthe combatdivisionsor an Americangeneralas NATO commander. Everythingwastiedtogetherinto a singlepackage,and it waspresented to the allieson a “takeit or leaveit” basis.It wasthispolicy, thistactic,whichcreatedthewholeproblemin September 1950. How exactlydidtheissueof Germanrearmament gettiedto thequestion of sendingoverAmericancombatdivisionsandto appointing an American generalas NATO commander? The standardview is that the JCS was responsible for the packageplan.The militaryauthorities, it is commonlyargued,simplyrefusedto acceptthe deploymentof the Americancombat forceunlesstheEuropeans, for theirpart,agreedto therearmament of West Germany.Achesonsupposedly thoughtthesetactics“murderous” andtried hardto get the Pentagonto changeits mind.But theJCSwas intransigent, thisargumentruns,andto getthetroopssent,Achesongaveway in theend andreluctantlyacceptedthe tacticthe militaryleadership had insisted Butdoesthisbasicinterpretation holdup in thelightof thearchivalevidence now available? Augustfor the packageapFirst of all, did the militarypushthroughout proach? Themilitaryleaderscertainlyfeltthata Germanmilitarycontribution wasessential. TheWestEuropeanNATO allies,in theirview,couldnotgenerateenoughmilitaryforceby themselves to providefor an effectivedefense;Germantroopswere obviouslynecessary for that purpose.German rearmament wasthereforeseenas a “vitalelement”of an effectivedefense The militaryauthorities alsosupported the ideaof beefingup the U.S. militarypresencein Europeandsendingoveran Americangeneralas NATO commander.44 Butthekey pointto notehereis thattheseweretreated asessentially separate issues. Military leadersdid not say(at leastnot in any of the documents thatwe haveseen)thatU.S. troopsshouldbe sentonlyif the alliesacceptedGermanrearmament. They did not saythat the way to pressfor Germanrearmament was to tell the alliesthat unlessthey went alongwith the Americanplan,the US. combatdivisionswouldbe kept at home. Indeed,in theformalpolicydocuments on thedefenseof Europe,theJCS did not makethe Germanrearmament issueits top priority.The Chiefsin-

America,Europe,and GermanRearmament,August-September 1950

13

steadtendedto play it down.The basicJCSview in thosedocuments was that NATO Europe-the “Europeansignatories” of the North Atlantic Treaty-neededto “provide thebalanceof theforcesrequiredfor theinitial defense” overandabovewhatthe UnitedStateswaspreparedto supply.45 WestGermany,whichat thistime,of course, wasnot a memberof NATO, wasnot evenmentioned in thiscontext.What thissuggests is thatthe military leadership wasnot poundingits fist on the tableon the Germanrearmamentquestion.The Germanissuewas important,of course,but the suggests thattheChiefswereprepared to deal choiceof thiskindof phrasing with it in a relativelyreasonable, gradual,andbusinesslike way. Whataboutthe StateDepartment? How did it feel aboutthepackageapproach? Did it agreeto theinclusion of Germanrearmament in thepackage because thiswastheonlyway to getthePentagon to go alongwith its plan to sendadditional troopsto Europe? Somescholars suggest thatthiswasthe case,buttherealpictureis ratherdifferent.46 Theoutbreak of theKoreanWar wasthekeydevelopment here,andState Department officialsunderstood fromthe startthatif Europewasto be defended,a Germanforceof somesortwouldbe required.As McCloywrote Achesonon August3: “todefendWesternEuropeeffectivelywill obviously requirerealcontributions of Germanresources andmen.”47 Thissimplywas theconventional wisdomat thetime:neitherMcCloynoranyoneelsein the StateDepartment neededtheJCSto remindthemthat an effectivedefense meanta Germanmilitarycontribution. But theywerealsodeadsetagainst the ideaof allowingthe Germans to buildup an armyof theirown-a nationalarmy,ableto operateindependently andthuscapableof supporting an independent foreignpolicy.It followedthatsomekind of international theGermans couldmaketheircontribution, forcewouldhaveto be created: aneffectiveforcecouldbe builtup,buttherewouldbe no riskof a German nationalarmy.Thewholeconcept of a multinational force-ofmilitaryintegration,of a unifiedcommandstructure, of a singlesupremecommander supported by an international staff-was thusrootedin an attemptto deal with thequestion of Germanrearmament. It wasnotasthoughthethinking aboutthe defenseof WesternEuropeand theshapeof the NATO military system haddeveloped on its own,andthatit wasonlylaterthattheGerman rearmament issuehadbeenlinkedto it by theJCSfor bargaining purposes. Thefundamental ideathatthedifferentelements in theequation-the U.S. divisions, theunifiedcommand structure, theforcesprovidedby NATO Europe, and the Germancontribution-wereall closelyinterrelatedand neededto be dealtwith aspartsof a unlfiedpolicythusdeveloped naturally andorganically asthebasicthinkingaboutthedefense of Europetookshape in mid-1950.This idea-in a sense,the basicidea behindthe package concept--took holdquiteearlyin August1950,andit wastheStateDepartmentthattookthe leadin pressing for thiskind of approach. The Byroade

14

ChapterI

plan,for example,explicitlytied all of thesedifferentelementstogether:in thisplan,whichin mid-Augustbecamea kind of officialStateDepartment plan,Germanunitscouldbe createdif andonlyif theywereintegrated into an alliedforcewith an Americancommander.48 The StateDepartmentwas thusthe drivingforcebehindthiskind of approach.Fortheentiremonthof August,itsofficialspressed for a unifiedpolicy.But themilitaryauthorities, because of theirdislikefor theByroadeplan, tendedto dragtheirfeet in thisarea.49 The StateDepartment, in frustration, andawarethata policyneededto beworkedoutbeforetheNATO ministers metin mid-September, thengotthepresidentto intervene.On August26 (as notedabove),Trumanaskedthe two departments, Stateand Defense,to comeup with a commonpolicy.He laid out a seriesof eightquestions that the two departments were to answerby September1, a deadlinethat was laterextendedto September 6.5O The “EightQuestions” document wasactually draftedin the StateDepartmentby two of Acheson’s closest advisors. TheStateDepartment goal,in gettingTrumanto signit, wasto prodthePentagoninto acceptinga commonplan.jl The tacticworked.Military leadersunderstood that the Eight Questions documentwasbasedon the StateDepartmentplan.52 Giventhe president’s intervention (again,asnotedabove),theynowfelttheycouldno longersimply “disregard” thatplan,but insteadneededto takea moreaccommodating and“positive” line.53 The militaryauthoritiesnow drafteda documentthat, they felt, might serveasa basisfor a jointreplyto the president. Thatdraftwasgivento the StateDepartmenton September1;Achesonhadbeenshowna preliminary versiona coupleof daysearlier.54 Eventsnow movedquickly.In a few days of intensivetalks,a joint replyacceptable to bothdepartments wasworked to top out.Thefinaldocument wasapproved by thepresident andcirculated officialsas “NSC82” on September11,a day beforethe New York conferencewasdueto begin.jj This periodfromAugust26 throughSeptember Qfrom the EightQuestionsletterto thejointreply-is thusthemostimportantphaseof thiswhole episode,andtheevidencerelatingto thisperiodneedsto be examinedwith particularcare.Does it supportthe view that the militaryinsistedon the packageapproach andthatthe StateDepartmentopposedit, but gavein reluctantlyat the end? By far themostimportantdocument bearingon theseissuesis therecord of a meetingAchesonhad on August30 with histhreetop advisorsin this area,thethreeofficialswho,in fact,wereconducting thenegotiations with theDefenseDepartment: Byroade,Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Perkins,and Paul Nitze, headof the StateDepartment’s PolicyPlanning Staff.Acheson(as notedin the previoussection)had just met with JCS ChairmanBradleyearlierthat morning.He had alsojust seenthe draftre-


15

ply theJCShad preparedto the president’s Eight Questions letter.At the meetingwith his advisors, Achesondiscussed theJCSdraftsectionby section andfoundmostof it acceptable. The few smallproblemshe hadwith it didnot involveanyissueof principle.At no pointdidAchesoncomplain about,or evencommenton, any insistence on the part of the militarythat all of theelementsin theprogramwereto be tiedtogetherin a singlepackto be drawnfrom this is absolutelyfundamental for age.The conclusion thepurposes of theanalysishere:if theJCShadbeeninsisting on thepackageconcept,andif Achesonandthe StateDepartmenthad beenopposed to that concept,it is scarcelyconceivable that the issuewould not have comeup at thismeeting. Nor is it very likely thata conflictoverthe packageissuedevelopedsuddenlyoverthe nextfew days.Nitze’srecollection (in 1953)wasthat,following the Acheson-Bradley meeting,thingsmovedvery quickly.jG He says nothingabouta disputeover the packagequestionsuddenlyemergingat that point,andit is in fact highlyunlikelythatthingscouldhavemovedso quicklyif a seriousdisputehaddeveloped. Indeed,PerkinsandNitze spoke in those1953discussions of the commonpolicydocument-the document reflectedtheirviews,and thatlaterbecameNSC 82-as thoughit essentially which,throughgreateffortson theirpart,theyhadfinallymanaged togetthe militaryauthorities to accept.“Wehadgreatdifficulty,”Perkinsrecalled,“in finally gettingthe Pentagon”to sign on to the commonpolicy.57Nitze agreed:he rememberedgoing over to the Pentagonafter Achesonhad worked“thisthing”outwith GeneralBradleyon August30, and“wetrotted outthespecificpieceof paperwhichspelledoutthepackageproposalwith the Pentagonpeopleand got their agreementto this document.”j8 It was scarcelyasthoughthe StateDepartmentwasgoingalongwith the package planreluctantly or againstitsbetterjudgment. An analysis of the draftinghistorypointsto the samegeneralconclusion. The passage in NSC 82 thatservedas the basisfor the packagepolicy-indeed,the only passagein the documentthatcalledfor sucha policy-was part of the answerto the sixthquestion:“Werecommend thatan American nationalbe appointednow as Chief of Staff and eventuallyas a Supreme Commander for theEuropean defenseforcebutonlyupontherequestof the Europeannationsandupontheirassurance thattheywill providesufficient forces,includingadequateGermanunits,to constitute a commandreasonably capableof fulfilling its resp~nsibilities.”~~ That final documentwas basedon the drafttheJCShadturnedoveron September 1;the key phrase “including adequate Germanunits”did not appearin theoriginalJCSdraft.60 It scarcely standsto reasonthatthemilitaryauthorities, havingdecidedto be cooperative, would hardentheir positionin the courseof their talkswith StateDepartment representatives, aboveall if StateDepartmentofficialshad arguedstronglyagainstan intransigent policy.

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Noneof thismeans,of course, thattheJCSwasopposed to including a call for Germanrearmament in the package.In theirview,thiswasa goalthat obviously hadto pursue.But thisdoesnot meanthat the U.S. government tacticsto theStateDeparttheChiefsweregoingto try to dictatenegotiating ment-that theyweregoingto insiston a diplomaticstrategythatAcheson andhistopadvisors rejected. StateDepartment officials,in fact,did not reallyblametheJCSfor what hadhappened at theNew York conference. Nitze, for example, although he saidin 1953thattheChiefswouldnotagreeto sending additional forcesuntil theygotassurances fromtheBritishandtheFrenchabouta Germanmilitary contribution, did not actuallyholdthemprimarilyresponsible for the confrontation withtheEuropeans in mid-September.61 He pointedoutat that timethattheGermanrearmament issuecouldhavebeendealtwithverydifferently.The issue,he said,couldhavebeenpresented “tothe Britishand Frenchin a waywhichemphasized thesupreme commander andtheAmericancommitment”; the “question of Germanparticipation” couldhavebeen “putin a lowercategory andkind of weavedin gradually.”62 Nitze did not blametheJCSfor vetoingthatapproach. In hisview,therealresponsibility lay elsewhere. “Wewerefouledup onthis,”he said,by pressleaksprimady comingfromMcCloy,“whoagreedentirelywith the tacticalimportance of doingit theotherway”-thatis, of dealingwith theGermanrearmament issuehead011.~3 But Achesonwasnotfundamentally opposed to thebluntapproach, and (contraryto his laterdisclaimers) he himself,on balance,thoughtthatthe US. government hadchosen therightcourseof actionat thetime.Wouldit havebeenbetter,he askedin thatsamediscussion, to haveoptedfor quiet talkswiththeBritishandtheFrench,whena planhadjustbeenworkedout, whena NATO foreignministers’ meetingwasabouttobeheld,andwhenthe issuewasbeing“talkedabouteverywhere”? “It seemed to me then,”he said, “andit seemsto me now,thatwe did therightthing.”& And indeed,in his reportsto Trumanfrom the New York conference, Acheson gaveno signthathe waspursuing thepackage planstrategy reluctantlyor againsthisbetterjudgment. He gavenosignthathewaslookingfor a way to softenthegeneralline anddealwith the alliesin a moreconciliatory manner.He explainedto the president on September 15 how he had laid out the Americandemands, how he had discussed the issue“withthe to theAmerglovesoff,”howhe had“blown” someof theallies’objections of “whose icanplan“outof thewater,”andhowit mightwell be a question nervelastslonger.” He wasclearlypleasedwith hisown performance and wasnotat all unhappyaboutthelinehe hadtaken.65 As oneof its top officialspointedout at the time,the StateDepartment was conducting a “hard-hitting kind of operation” in this area-and was proudof it.66


17

DEAN ACHES0N:THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN Thereis a final setof considerations thatneedsto be takeninto accountin of U.S. policyin September 1950,andthishasto dowith what an assessment we know aboutAchesonin general-about the sortof personhe was and the kind of policyhe favoredthroughouthis career.Was he the type of leaderwho believedin compromise, especially with America’smostimportantallies,andwas inclinedto takea relativelymoderateandcautiousline? Or washe,asGeneralBradleylatercalledhim,an “uncompromising hawk,” aggressive in termsof bothhisgoalsandhistactics?67 The greatbulk of the evidencepointsin the latterdirection.6s In 1950in particular,he tendedto takea veryhardline.He was in favorof a rollback policyat thattime.Thiswasthe real meaningof NSC 68, an importantpolicy document with whichAchesonwascloselya ~ s o c i a t eAmerican d . ~ ~ scholdefensiveandstatus arsgenerallytend to portrayU.S. policyas essentially quo-oriented, andNSC 68 is commonlyinterpretedas simplya “strategy of ~ o n t a i n m e nBut t . ” ~the ~ aggressive thrustof thisdocumentis clearfrom its owntext:NSC 68 calledexplicitlyfor a “policyof calculated andgradualcoercion”; theaimof thatpolicywasto “checkandroll backtheKremlin’sdrive for worlddomination.” Thewholegoalat thattime,asNitzerecalledin 1954, was to “laythe basis,”throughmassiverearmament, for a policyof “taking solution” of increased risksof generalwar”in orderto achieve“asatisfactory America’sproblemswith Russiawhilethe Sovietnuclearstockpile“wasstill small.”71 This extraordinary aggressiveness was not out of characterfor Acheson, anditswellspringwasnotsimplyanti-Communism or extremedistrust of the SovietUnion.His generalhawkishness canin factbe tracedbackto thesummerof 1941,when,asa mid-levelStateDepartment official,he playeda major role in shapingthe policythatput theUnitedStateson a collisioncourse withJapan.Achesonwasoneof a handfulof officialswho helpedengineer theoil embargoin mid-1941-a development thatled directlyto a sharpcrisisin U.S.-Japanese relationsandultimatelyto theattackon PearlHarborin December.72 His aggressiveness wasalsoapparentin theearly1960s.DuringtheBerlin and Cubanmissilecrisesespecially,he pushedfor very toughpolicies.In 1963,he evencalled(in a talk to the Institutefor Strategic Studies)for what amounted to a policyof armedintervention in EastGermany.73 Whenhewas attackedfor takingthis line, he lashedout at his critics:“Callme anything you like, but don’tcall me a fool;everybodyknowsI’m not a fool.”“I will not saythatMr. Achesonis a fool,”oneof hiscriticsreplied.“I will onlysay thathe is completelyandutterlyreckless.”74 Achesonoften sneeredat thosehe viewedas softand indecisive. After Eisenhower tookofficein 1953,Achesoncomplained repeatedly to Truman

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Chapter1

aboutthe “weakness” of the new admini~tration.~~ After the Democratsreturnedto powerin 1961,President KennedyallowedAchesonto playa major role in the makingof Americanpolicy,but Achesonviewedthe young presidentwith barelyconcealed contempt.The Kennedyadministration, in his view, wasweak,indecisive, andobsessed with appearance^.^^ He even criticizedthe administration in public,goingsofar at onepointthathe was virtuallyforcedto apologize.77 At anotherpoint,he practicallytold the presidentto his facethat he was indecisive.Kennedyhad askedAchesonto look into the balanceof paymentsproblem,andin early1963he presented hisreportto thepresident. It was a “very strong,vivid, Achesonianpresentation.And the President thankedhim and said,‘Well, we have to think aboutthat.’Achesonsaid, ‘There’snothingto thinkabout,Mr. President. All you haveto do is decide. Hereit is, andwhy don’tyou decide?”’ Kennedyturnedred,andthenbroke up themeeting.He wasfurious.“It’sa longtimebeforeDeanAcheson’s going to be hereagain,”he remarkedto an aide.78 As for Acheson,he continued to criticizeKennedyas weak and indecisive,even after Kennedy’s death.79 AchesontreatedPresident Johnson thesameway he hadtreatedPresident Kennedy.Whenhemet withJohnson in 1965,hewassoirritatedby thepresident’swhiningand indecisiveness that he “blew[his]top”andtold him to his facethat all the troubleAmericawashavingin Europe“cameaboutbecauseunderhim andKennedytherehadbeennoAmericanleadership at all. The ideathatthe Europeans couldcometo theirownconclusion hadledto an unchallenged de Gaulle.”so Thesestoriesreveala lot aboutAcheson. A manwhocoulddealwith presidentsthatway was not thetypeof personwho wouldallowhimselfto be pushedaroundby meremilitary officers on an issueof centralpoliticalimportance-aboveall at a timewhenhe wasat the heightof his powerand had the full confidenceof PresidentTruman.Nor was he the type who wouldbe understanding if he thoughtalliedleaderswerereluctantto face problemsandmakethe reallytoughdecisions. u p to fundamental Acheson,in fact,did not believein takinga softline with the alliesor in treatingthemasfull partners.In 1961,he playedthekey role in shapingthe new Kennedyadministration’s policyon NATO issues; the goalof thatpolicy wasto gettheEuropeans “outof thenuclearbusiness” (aspeoplesaidat the t i m e t t h a tis, to concentrate power,and especiallynuclearpower,in Americanhands.81 Acheson,moreover,was not the sortof statesman who viewedconsultation andcompromise asendsin themselves. At onepointduringthe Berlin crisisin 1961,he complained thattheU.S. hadbeentryingtoohardto reach agreement with the Europeans. The U.S. government did not needto coordinatepolicywith the allies,he said,“weneedto tell them.”82 “Wemustnot


19

be too delicate,” he saidat anotherpoint,“aboutbeingvigorousin ourleadership.’’It wasAmerica’s job,practically America’s duty,to lay downthelaw to the allies.TheUnitedStates-and he actuallyusedthisphrase-was “the greatestimperialpowertheworldhaseverseen.”83 “Inthefinalanalysis,” he told McGeorgeBundy,“theUnitedStates[is]the locomotiveat the headof mankind,andthe restof theworld is the caboose.”s4 Americaninterests werefundamental; Europeanconcerns wereof purely secondary importance. PaulNitze,whowasverycloseto Achesonthroughout thisperiod,madethe pointquiteexplicitlyin 1954. The “primarygoal,” of theUnitedStatesandthecontinuation of a he said,wasthe “preservation ‘salutary’ world environment”; the “avoidance of war”wasof secondary importance.“Evenif war were to destroythe world aswe know it today,still the U.S. mustwin thatwar decisively.” He thenagainstressed thepointthat “thepreservation of theUS.”was“theoverridinggoal,notthefateof ourallies.”85 Peoplelike NitzeandAchesonwerethusnotinclinedtotakeEuropeanintereststooseriously or to dealwith the Europeans on a basisof mutualrespect.And Achesonhimselfwas clearlynot the kind of personwho would havefoundit difficultto dealroughlywith the alliesin September 1950.

THEMEANING OFTHE STORY The goalherewasto testa particularinterpretation of whathappenedin the latesummerof 1950.According to thatinterpretation, themilitaryauthorities hadessentially forcedthepackageplanonAcheson, whohadaccepted it reluctantly,and only aftera struggle.The basicconclusion is that that interpretationsimplydoesnotstandup in thelightof theevidencefromlate1950 andin thelightof whatwe knowaboutAchesonin general.Thepolicythe US. government pursuedat the New York conference is not to be understoodas a more or lessaccidentalby-productof a bureaucratic dispute in Washington. The way Achesondealt with the allies at the New York conference-thebare-knuckled tacticshe pursued,the way he triedto lay downthelaw to theEuropeans, theway he dismissed theirmostfundamental concerns outof hand-has to beseenasdeliberate: he knewwhathewas doing,andhe hadnot beenforcedby the Pentagonto proceedin thatway. Thereis certainlyno evidencethat he thoughtthosetacticswere “murderous’’:he did not giveway on thispoint aftera longbattle;he nevercomplainedat the time aboutthe military’s(alleged)insistence on thisstrategy; he neverraisedthe issuewith Trumanor expressed misgivings aboutthe policyashe wascarryingit out. Doesthismeanthat the Achesoninterpretation was a completefabrication?The truthis probablynot quitethatsimple.For Acheson,as for many

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peoplein publiclife, honestywasnot the top priority,andhe wasfully capableof deliberatelymisleadingthe publicon theseissues.86 But thatin itselfdoesnot meanthattheAchesonstoryaboutthepackageplanwasmanufacturedout of wholecloth. Indeed-in a certainsenseat least-there wasprobablysomebasisto the story.After all, the militaryauthorities werewillingto sendovertheAmericantroopsonly if the Europeanalliesagreedto providethe balanceof the andtheJCSdidbelieve forcesneededto makeaneffectivedefensepossible, thatGermanforceswouldbe neededfor thatpurpose.Soin thatsense,from was certainlya vital partof the rmlitarypointof view, Germanrearmament the package.But thiswas at the levelof fundamental objectives, not at the level of tactics,andthe basicJCS view was consistent with a relativelysoft negotiating strategy: if theStateDepartment (to paraphrase Nitze) hadcalled for emphasizing theUS. troopcommitment andonlythengradually“weavit is hardto believe ing in” the questionof a Germandefensecontribution, thattheJCSwouldhaveobjected.But an agreementon the part of theJCS thatall of the elementsof the problemwere interconnected couldbe interpretedasa callfor presenting theallieswith a singlepackage:thebasicpolicy couldbe interpreted as translating directlyinto a particularnegotiating strategy.The basicmilitarypoint of view, in otherwords,could serveas cover-that is, asa kind of licensefor pursuingthesortof negotiating policy StateDepartmentofficialsconsidered essentialat thispoint.87 The fact that the militaryview could be interpreted(or misinterpreted) in this waywhetherdeliberately or not is nottheissuehere-made it easierfor Acheson andhis advisors to dowhattheyprobablyreallywantedto do in any case. Thisis all quitespeculative, of course,andthereis not enoughevidenceto shouldnotbe getto thebottomof thisparticularissue.But theseuncertainties allowedto obscure thefactsthatthedocuments areableto establish. Andone thtng,at least,is veryclear:theStateDepartment didnotfightthermlitaryover thepackageplan.If AchesonactuallythoughtthetacticstheU S . government adoptedwere“murderous,” he certainlyhada veryoddway of showingit. Why is this storyimportant? Partlybecauseit showshow easyit is for to gettakenin by self-serving memoiraccounts, andthushow cruscholars cialit is to testclaimsagainstarchivalevidence; partlybecause of whatit tells us aboutcivil-militaryrelationsin the UnitedStates,aboutthe willingness and abilityof the militaryleadershipto imposeits viewson issuesof great politicalimportance, andaboutthe validityof the bureaucratic politicstheory of policy-making in general;but mainlybecause of thelightit throwson the politicalmeaningof what happenedin September1950.The American government did not juststumblealongandadopta policyagainstits better judgmentbecauseof pressurefrom the military;the packagepolicywas adoptedquitedeliberately, andthishasa certainbearingon howAmerican policytowardEuropeduringthe earlyColdWar periodis to be interpreted.

America,Europe,andGermanRearmament, August-September 1950

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There has been a certaintendencyin recentyearsto idealizeUS.Europeanrelationsduringthe ColdWar period.The argumentis thatthe NATO systemworkedbecause, no matterhow lopsidedpowerrelations were, the Americansdid not simplyinsiston runningthe show.Instinctively,thedemocratic countries dealt withthe problemsthatarosein their relationswith eachotherthe sameway they dealtwith domesticissues: not throughcoercion,but throughpersuasion and compromise, “bycutting dealsinsteadof imposingwills.”ss The democratic habitof compromise,of giveandtake,wasthe bedrockuponwhichtheAtlanticAlliance was built.The Americanstreatedtheir allieswith respect,and this, it is said,was one majorreasonwhy the Europeans were ableto live with a system that restedsoheavilyon Americanpower.89 Thestoryof howtheU S . government managed theGermanrearmament issuein late 1950suggests thatthingswerenotquitesosimple.TheAmericanswerecapableof dealingratherroughlywith theirEuropean allies,even on issues of absolutely centralpoliticalimportance. If thepackage planstory tellsusnothingelse,it certainlytellsusthat.And thefactthattheAmericans werecapableof treatingtheiralliesthatway hada certainbearingon how manypeople,especially in Europe,thoughtaboutcorepoliticalissues. In 1880,aftera remarkable electoralcampaign, William Gladstonewas sweptbackintoofficeasprimeministerof GreatBritain.Gladstone, in that campaign, hadlaidouta seriesof principles onwhichBritishforeignpolicy wasto be based;onefundamental aim was“tocultivateto the utmostthe concertof Europe.” Five yearslater,Gladstone’s policylay in ruins.He had managed to alienateeveryothermajorpowerin Europe-ven Franceand Germanyhad cometogetherin 1884in a short-lived anti-British ententeandin 1885hisgovernment fell frompower.TheGladstone government had achieved its“longdesired‘Concertof Europe”’ all right,LordSalisbury noted bitterlyat the time.It hadsucceeded in “unitingthe continent of EuropeagainstEngland.”9o The parallelwith Americanpolicyduringthe earlyCold War periodis verymuchwantedtheEuropean countries to striking.The U.S. government cometogetherasa politicalunit,andsupportfor European unification was oneof thebasictenetsof Americanforeignpolicyin thisperi0d.9~ But it was to cooperatewith each not Americanpreachingthat led the Europeans otherandbeginto formthemselves intoa bloc.TheUnitedStatesplayedan important rolein theEuropean integration process, butAmericahadan impactmainlybecauseof the kind of policyit pursued-a policywhich,on occasion, didnotpaydueregardto themostbasicinterests of theEuropean allies. Acheson’s policyin late 1950is perhaps the mostimportant casein point. Acheson waspressing for a courseof actionthatwouldhavegreatlyincreased therisk of war at a time whenWesternEuropewasparticularly vulnerable.

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The US. government couldtreatits allieslike that-it couldpursuea policy forEurope-only because theUnited thatmightwell haveledto totaldisaster Stateswassomuchstronger thananysingleEuropeancountry.It followed thattherehadto be a counterweight to AmericanpowerwithintheWestern alliance,a counterweight basedon the sensethatthe Europeans had major strategic interests in common andthatthoseinterests weredistinctfromthose of theUnitedStates. Theeventsof late1950helpedpushtheEuropeans+speciallytheFrenchandthe Germans-to thatconclusion; it helpedgetthem to seewhytheyhadto puttheirdifferences asideandcometogether asa kind of strategic unit.Thisepisode thusplaysanimportant rolein thehistoryof Europeanintegration, and indeedin the historyof the Westernallianceas a whole.

NOTES Copiesof themoreimportant unpublished documents citedhere areavailableonthe thosedocInternet(~~~.p0li~~i.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/acheson/l~50.html); umentsaremarkedin the noteswith an asterisk. 1. Minutesof foreignministers’meetings,September12-13, 1950, U.S. Departmentof State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates(FRUS), 1950,vol. 3 (Washington:GPO,1977),pp. 1192,1208.Henceforth references to thissourcewill be citedin thefollowingform:FRUS 1950,51192, 1208. 2. Thisclaimis somewhat at variance with theconventional wisdomon thispoint. See,for example,Laurence Martin, “TheAmericanDecisionto RearmGermany,” in AmericanCivil-Militay Decisions: A Bookof CaseStudies,ed. HaroldStein(Birmingham:Universityof AlabamaPress,1963),658:“Totheendof theNew York meetings,however,theFrenchrepresentative refusedto accepteventheprincipleof Germanrearmament.” But the realstoryis not nearlythatsimple. 3. Foreignministers’ privatemeeting,September 12, 1950,FRUS 1950,51200. 4. Achesonto TrumanandActingSecretary, September 16, 1950,ibid.,312-313. 12, 1950,andmeetingof British,French 5. Acheson-Schuman meeting,September andAmericanforeignministers andhighcommissioners, September 14, 1950,ibid., 287, 293-300. 6. Acheson-Schuman meeting,September 12, 1950,ibid.,287-88. andBevinin a meetingof British,French,andAmericanforeignminis7. Schuman tersandhighcommissioners, September 14, 1950,ibid.,296-97. Thisfearof provoking a Sovietattackhadbeenan importantelementin Frenchpolicysinceearly1948.The concernat thattimewasthatthe Russians wouldinterpretmovement towardthe establishment of a West Germanstateas a major steptowardGermanrearmament, which,it wasfelt,mightprovokepreventive militaryaction.See,for example,Chauvel vol. 1,andMassiglito Foreign to Bonnet,March18andMay 19, 1948,BonnetPapers, Ministry,May 3, 1948,MassigliPapers, vol. 67, bothFrenchForeignMinistryArchives (FFMA), Paris.In 1950,thisfactorcontinued to playa fundamental rolein Frenchpolicy on theissue,evenbeforetheGermanrearmament question waspushedto thetop of the agendaby the eventsin Koreain June.See,for example,a QuaidOrsaymem-


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orandumfromApril 1950,published in Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland undFrankreich:Dokumente 1949-1963,ed. HorstMoller andKlausHildebrand(Munich:K.G. to bringup thequestion of an evenSaur,1997),1:376:“WecanexpecttheAmericans to therearmament of theWesternpowers.A programof that tualGermancontribution sortis acceptable to usonlyto theextentthatit wouldnotconstitute a provocation visin general,andfor theBradleyquotation in particular, 2-vistheUSSR.”On theseissues A Constructed Peace:7beMakingof theEuseethe discussion in MarcTrachtenberg, PrincetonUniversityPress,19991,96-100, ropeanSettlement, 19451963(Princeton: HistoryandStrategy(Princeton: Princeton Univer111-12, andin MarcTrachtenberg, sityPress,1991),118-127, 13C-31. 8. McCloyto Acheson, June13, 1950,President’s Secretary’s Files(PSF),box 178, Missouri. Germany,folder2, Harry S. TrumanLibrary(HSTL), Independence, to a Remilitarization of WesternGermany,” ME 17, 9. “Probable SovietReactions December27, 1950,PSF/253/HSTL. 10. “SovietCourses of Actionwith Respectto Germany,” ME 4, January29, 1951, PSF/253/HSTL. 11. RaymondPoidevin,RobertSchuman, hommed’ktat:18861963(Paris:ImprimerieNationale,19861,220. 12. For the beststudyof thesubject, seeGeorges-Henri Soutou,L’Allianceincertaine:Lesrapports politico-stratkgiques franco-allemanak, 19541996(Paris:Fayard, 1996). Soutoubeginshis storyin 1954,which,as he pointsout (for example,on p. 22), is whena real bilateralFranco-German strategic relationship began.This is trueenough;the pointhereis simplythatthe thinkinghad begunto take shapea numberof yearsearlier. 13. ‘Bttrardto ForeignMinistry,mid-October1950,series“Europe1949-55,”subseries“Allemagne,” volume187(formerlyvol. 701, folio7, FFMA. 14. Bttrard’snextsentence is alsoworthnoting,becauseit showshow Frenchofficialswere alreadythinkingin termsof balancingbetweenGermanyandAmerica withintheWesternalliance:“Thisis notto saythatonehasto thinkin termsof a Western army from which the Americanswould be excluded,and within which the FrenchandtheGermans wouldprovidethemainforces.Sucha solutionmightsome dayforceus to fight,if not ‘forthe kingof Prussia’@ourle roi dePrusse-a French expression implyingthat one is not gettinganythingfor oneselfin return],thenat of Prussia.” *Bi.rardto ForeignMinistry,October17, 1950,Euleastfor thereconquest rope1949-55, Allemagne,vol. 187(formerlyvol. 701, ff. 16-17, FFMA. Thesedocuof European integration (andontheorimentsshedlightnot onlyonthebeginnings gins of the EuropeanDefenseCommunityprojectin particular),but also on the relations. Adenauer,for example,is oftenportrayedas evolutionof Franco-German view is thathis attipursuinga very pro-American policyat thispoint;the standard tudetowardFranceat thistimewasrelativelycool.Notethetone,for example,of the discussion in Hans-PeterSchwarz,Adenauer:Der Aufstieg,18761952,3rd ed. 1986),836. But it is clearfrom theseFrench (Stuttgart:DeutscheVerlags-Anstalt, sources thatthe rootsof hislaterpolicywerealreadyin placein 1950. 15. ‘Berardto ForeignMinistry,October17, 1950(asin n. 14). 16. See,for example,Martin, “AmericanDecisionto RearmGermany,”656657; Question: American Diplomacy andEuRobertMcGeehan,7beGermanRearmament ropeanD e f m eaper WorldWarZZ (Urbana:Universityof IllinoisPress,1971),41, 47;

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DavidMcLellan,DeanAcheson: i’%eStateDepartment Yean(NewYork:Dodd,Mead, 1976),328-329; JamesChace,Acheson: iSbeSecreta y of StateWhoCreatedtheAmer19981,324;DavidClayLarge,Germans to icanWorld(New York:SimonandSchuster, in theAdenauer Era (ChapelHill: Universityof theFront:WestGermanRearmament North CarolinaPress,19961,8485;Saki Dockrill,Britain’sPolicyfor WestGerman Rearmament, 195G1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1991), 32-33. 17. McLellan,Acheson, 328. 18. Martin,“American Decisionto RearmGermany,” 656. 19. Dean Acheson,Presentat the Creation:My Yearnin the StateDepartment (New York: Norton,1 9 6 9 , 438; McLellan,Acheson, 329; McGeehan,GermanRear41. mamentQuestion, 20. Acheson, Presentat theCreation,438. 21. Ibid.,440;DeanAcheson, Sketches from LifeofMenIHaveKnown(New York: Harper,1961), 26, 41; McGeehan,GermanRearmament Question, 41. 22. Martin,“American Decisionto RearmGermany,” 657. 23. McGeehan,GermanRearmament Question, 41. Thisaspectof theargument is America’s Germany: JohnJ. McCloyand theFedemphasized in ThomasSchwartz, HarvardUniversityPress,1991), 134. eralRepublicof Germany(Cambridge: 24. The two published accounts Acheson gave-Present at theCreation,437-440, andSketches from Life, 25-27, 41-43-are citedfrequentlyin the historicalliterature alsorelied on information Achesonprorelatingto this issue.Scholarssometimes vided in personalinterviews.SeeMartin,“AmericanDecisionto RearmGermany,” 665, andMcLellan,Acheson, viii. Othersourcesare sometimes cited,but uponexamination thisadditional evidenceturnsoutto be quiteweak.McLellan,for example, of a conversation betweenAchesonandJCSChairmanBradley citesa memorandum on August30 fromtheAcheson Papersat theTrumanLibraryassupporting his contentionthatAchesonhad at thispoint“givenin to the militarypointof view”(329). But according to thearchivists at theTrumanLibrary,no suchdocument existsin that collection. The pressaccounts citedin n. 41 in theMartinarticlealsodonotprovethe pointtheyaremeantto support.Theyarecitedto backup theclaimthattheJCSwas insisting on includingGermanrearmament in the package,but the picturetheygive is thatthe Germanrearmament issuewasa relativelyminorissue(‘‘onlyan incidental partof a muchlargerAmericanprogram”), andthatthe U.S. government hadnot embracedthe packageconcept(“Achesonhas not definitelymade it a condition withoutwhichthe UnitedStateswouldrefuseto sendtroopsto Europe”).“Western Post,August31, 1950,p. 8, and“Schuman Got Little Europe”(editorial),Washington Post,September 17, 1950,p. 10. Warningon U.S. Plans,”Washington 25. “Extracts of Viewsof theJointChiefsof Staffwith Respect to WesternPolicytoof Stateon the wardGermany,” NSC 71,June8, 1950,and“Viewsof theDepartment of WesternGermany,” NSC 71/1,July3, 1950,in FRUS 1950,4:686-687, Rearmament 691-695. 26. PolicyPlanningStaff meeting,October18, 1949, Recordsof the PolicyPlanning Staff, 1947-53, box 32, RG 59, U S . NationalArchives(USNA), CollegePark, Maryland. 27. Acheson memoof meetingwith Truman,July31, 1950,FRUS 1950,4:702-703. President Trumanhadearlieropposed theJCScall for Germanrearmament. SeeTrumanto Acheson, June16, 1950,ibid.,688-689.


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28. Bruceto Acheson, July28, 1950; Acheson-Truman meeting, July31, 1950; McAugust8, 1950; Kirk to AcheCloyto Acheson, August3, 1950; Douglasto Acheson, son,August9, 1950; in FRUS 1950, 3157, 167-168, 181-182, 190-193. 29. Princeton Seminar,pp. 910-911,921, AchesonPapers,HSTL. Soonafterhe left gottogetherat Princeton to disoffice,Acheson andsomeof hisformercollaborators cusswhat had happenedduringthe Trumanadministration; tapeswere made of wasprepared. Microfilmcopiesof thetranscript of thosediscussions anda transcript this“Princeton Seminar,” as it was called,are availableat a numberof universitylibrariesin the UnitedStates.But the microfilmis oftenillegibleandthe bestsourceis from thissource the originaltranscript at the TrumanLibrary.All of the references of October11, 1953 discussion. citedherecomefromthe transcript 30. Seethesources citedin n. 28 above,esp.pp. 157, 181(for thequotation), 190, 193. 31. The ByroadePlan,“AnApproachto theFormationof a ‘European Army,”’was draftedon August3; the text is includedin ‘Byroadeto McCloy,August3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, Department of StateCentralFiles(DSCF),RG 59, USNA. For the record of Byroade’s talkswith theArmyofficersonAugust3, see*Memorandum for General Schuyler, August5, 1950, ArmyOperations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51, box21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. For the Army plan, see ‘“Staff Study:Rearmament of WesternGermany,”August2, 1950, and ‘Bolt6 of Germany,August10, 1950 Memorandum for GeneralGruentheron Rearmament (containing a systematic comparison of the StateandArmy plans),bothin samefile in RG 319. 32. ByroademeetingwithArmystaffofficers,August3, 1950, in *Memorandum for of Western GeneralSchuyler, August5 , 1950, and ‘Army “StaffStudy:Rearmament Germany,” August2, 1950, both in Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. *“An Approachto the Formationof a ‘European Army,”’in Byroadeto McCloy,August3, 1950, 740.51’8-350, DSCF, RG 59, USNA. 33. ‘Army “StaffStudy:Rearmament of WesternGermany,” August2, 1950; ‘Byroademeetingwith Army staffofficers,August3, 1950 (documentdatedAugust5); *Bolt6 to Gruenther, August10, 1950 (with attached“Comparison of Plans”);all in Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. 34. *Bolt6 to Gruenther, August10, 1950 (with attached“Comparison of Plans”), Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. SeealsoByroademeetingwith Army staff for GeneralSchuyler, August5, samefile in officers,‘August3, 1950, Memorandum RG 319, and, for the Byroadeplan, see ‘Byroade to McCloy, August3, 1950, 740.5/8-350, DSCF,RG 59, USNA. 35. ByroademeetingwithArmystaffofficers,August3, 1950, in ‘Memorandum for of Western GeneralSchuyler, August5, 1950, and ‘Army “StaffStudy:Rearmament Germany,” August2, 1950, bothin Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51, box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. 36. The idea thatNATO coulddo it-that onedid not needto createa new into solvethiswholecomplexof stitutionbut couldrely on a strongNATO structure problems-reemergedin 1954 as the EuropeanDefenseCommunityprojectwas

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collapsing andpeoplewerelookingfor alternatives. The militaryauthorities, especially the NATO commander, GeneralAlfred Gruenther,playeda key role at that pointin pushingfor the NATO solution;seeTrachtenberg, Constructed Peace,127. But theyweredrawingon basicthinkingthathadtakenshapein 1950.At thattime, bothGruenther-thenDeputyArmy Chiefof Stafffor Plans-and GeneralSchuyler, anothertopArmy officerwho wouldendup as Gruenther’s Chief of Staff in 1954, werealreadypressingfor the NATO solution. 37. Byroadeto McCloy,August4, 1950,FRUS 1950,3:183-184; ‘Bolt6 to Gruenmeetingwith Schuylerthe previousday), ther,July 25, 1950(accountof Byroade’s of Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt meeting, August10,1950,in Army and‘memorandum Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51,box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, BooksI and11, RG 319,USNA. 38. ‘Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins meeting,August30, 1950,OflicialConversationsandMeetingsof DeanAcheson(1949-1953) (UniversityPublications of America microfilm),reel3. 39. ‘Ibid. The references are probablyto variousJCS documents from thisperiod that containedtheseterms.See,for example,JCS 212418 of September 1, 1950, p. 162,in CCS092 Germany(5449),JCSGeographic File for 1948-50, RG 218, USNA. 40. Seethe‘Army “StaffStudy:Rearmament of WesternGermany,” August2, 1950, 8, Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51,box 21, file G-3 091 paragraph GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. 41. ‘Gruentherto Davis,Duncan,andEdwards,September 1, 1950,enclosing the “Planfor the Developmentof West GermanSecurityForces.” The plan had been workedout “pursuant to verbalinstructions” GruentherhadgivenGeneralSchuyler onAugust31;thefeelingin militarycircleswasthatafterthepresident’s letter,theJCS neededto take a moreaccommodating line in their discussions with the StateDepartmentthan they had takenthusfar. Gruenther,Bolte,and Army Chief of Staff Collinswerebriefedon the planon September 1,Collinsapproved it, andit wasofficiallypresented to theJCSthatsameday.‘Miller memorandum for record,Septemof WesternGermany,August31, 1950, ber 1, 1950,*Bolt6to Collinson Rearmament 1, 1950.All in Army Operations GeneralDecand‘Ware toJCSSecretary, September imal File 1950-51,box21, file G-3 091GermanyTS, Sec.k,Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA. The old conventional argument-laid out, for example,in McGeehan,GermanRearmamentQuestion,41-was thattheU.S. government, by earlySeptember, haddecidedto pressfor a Germannationalarmy “with no particular controlarrangement otherthan that which would haveresultedsimplyby virtue of the German troopsbeingunderNATO command andwithouttheirowngeneralstaff.”But this,it turnsout,was incorrect: the controlsthe Army wasnow callingfor were quitefarreaching. 42. See especiallyMcLellan,Acheson,328-330; Martin, “AmericanDecisionto Presentat the Creation,437-438,440. RearmGermany,” 656657;andAcheson, of 43. See,for example,JointStrategic SurveyCommittee reporton Rearmament WesternGermany,July27, 1950,JCS2124/11,JCSGeographic File for 1948-50,092 Germany(5-449), RG 218, USNA. 44. ‘Bolte to Collins,August28, 1950, Army OperationsGeneralDecimalFile 1950-51,box 20, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.1,RG 319,USNA. Note alsothe initial draftthatthemilitaryhadpreparedof a jointreplyto thepresident’s “EightQues-


27

6, 1950.The originaldraft,according tions”letter,givenin JCS2116/28of September

to anotherdocument, wasgivento the StateDepartment on September 1. SeeBolt6 to Collins,September 2, 1950.Bothdocuments arein Army Operations GeneralDecimal File 195C-51,box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, BooksI1 and

6 document)111,RG 319, USNA. (for the September 45. Thiskey phrasefoundits way intoa wholeseriesof majordocuments in early for the Secretaryof Defense,“United September.See appendixto memorandum JCS2073/61,SeptemStatesViewson Measures for theDefenseof WesternEurope,” ber 3, 1950,JCSGeographic File for 1948-50, Box 25, RG 218, USNA. The samedocument,afterbeingapproved by theSecretary of Defense,wasforwardedto theState Departmenton September 12 and appearsin FRUS 19503:291-293. A very similar phrasewasincludedin NSC 82; seeFRUS 19503274. 46. See,for example,McLellan,Acheson, 328. 47. McCloyto Acheson, August3, 1950,FRUS 1950,3:lSl. meeting,August10, 1950,Army Operations Gen48. ‘Byroade-Schuyler-Gerhardt eralDecimalFile 195C-51,box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book 11,RG 319,USNA. For thefinalByroadeplan,andfor itsadoptionastheofficialState FRUS Department position,seeMatthewsto Burns,August16, 1950,with enclosure, 1950,3:211-219. 49. See,for example,PaulNitze,with Ann Smithand StevenRearden,FromHiroshimato Glasnost: At theCenterof Decision(New York: GroveWeidenfeld,19891, 123;andPrinceton Seminar,p. 914. Notealsothetoneof Secretary of DefenseJohnon the August16 son’sinitialreplyto StateDepartmentletteraskingfor comments Byroadeplan:Johnson to Acheson, August17, 1950,FRUS 1950,3:226-227. 50. Trumanto AchesonandJohnson, August26, 1950,FRUS 1950,3:250-251. 51. Draftmemoby Nitze andByroade, August25, 1950,Records of thePolicyPlanningStaff,CountryandArea File, Box 28, RG 59, USNA. Somescholars-Martin,for example,in “TheAmericanDecisionto RearmGermany,” 65Sportraythe JCS as to take“prompt diplomatic action.” And Acheson, in “prodding” the StateDepartment Presentat theCreation(4281,alsoportrayshimselfas havingbeenpushedforward, especially by pressure fromthe president, andactuallycitesthe EightQuestions documentin thiscontext.But in reality-and not just at thispoint,but throughout this episode-it wastheStateDepartment thatwaspushingthingsforward,andit wasTrufor example,hadbeenagainstGermanwhofollowedAcheson’s lead.Thepresident, manrearmament whentheJCShadpressed for it inJune.ButwhenAcheson toldhim onJuly31 thatit no longerwasa questionof whetherGermanyshouldbe rearmed, was thattherealissuenowwashowit wasto be done,andthattheStateDepartment thinkingin termsof creating“aEuropean armyor a NorthAtlanticarmy,”Trumanimmediately“expressed his strongapproval”of thiswholeline of thought.Trumanto Acheson, June16, 1950 (two documents), and Acheson-Truman meeting,July 31, 1950,FRUS 1950,4:688,702. 52. ‘Bolt6 to Collins,August28, 1950:“Thequestions listedin the President’s letter areapparently basedupontheStateDepartment’s proposalfor the establishment of a Europeandefenseforce.”Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 195C-51,box 20, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.1,RG 319,USNA. The pointwasclearfromthetext of the letter.The two departments were not simplyasked,for example,to consider question; theywere what,if anything,shouldbe doneon the Germanrearmament

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askedinsteadto consider whethertheU.S. government waspreparedto support“the conceptof a Europeandefenseforce,includingGermanparticipation on otherthan a nationalbasis”-which wasnot exactlya neutralway of puttingthe issue.Truman to AchesonandJohnson, August26, 1950,FRUS 1950,3250. 53. Bold to Collins,August31, 1950,and*Gruenther to Davis,Duncanand Ed1, 1950,enclosing the “Planfor the Development of WestGerman wards,September SecurityForces,” bothin Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51,box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12,Book11, RG 319, USNA. 2, 1950,Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 54. Bolt6 to Collins,September 1950-51,box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book11, RG 319, USNA; ‘Acheson-Nitze-Byroade-Perkins meeting,August30, 1950,citedin n. 38 above. 8, 1950,FRUS 1950,5273-278. 55. AchesonandJohnson to Truman,September 56. Princeton Seminar,pp. 92C-921. 57. PrincetonSeminar, p. 914. 58. PrincetonSeminar,p. 914. 59. NSC 82, FRUS 1950,3:276. 6, 1950,whichgivesthe final draft and shows 60. SeeJCS 2116/28, September changes fromthe earlierdraft;Army Operations GeneralDecimalFile 1950-51,box 21, file G-3 091 GermanyTS, Sec.lc, Case12, Book111, RG 319, USNA. For another copy,seeJCStoJohnson, September 5,1950,Records of theAdministrative Secretary, Correspondence ControlSectionDecimalFile:Julyto Dec 1950,CD 091.7(Europe), box 175,RG 330, USNA. 61. PrincetonSeminar,p. 915. 62. PrincetonSeminar, p. 916. 63. PrincetonSeminar,p. 916;seealsop. 912.The archivalevidenceconfirms the pointthat McCloy favoreda very toughline at thistime. Seeespecially the handwrittenletterfromMcCloyto Acheson,September 20, 1950,in theAchesonPapers, September1950,HSTL.. A high Frenchofficial,McMemorandaof Conversations, Cloy reported,had just “referredagainto the delicacyof Frenchopinion”on the Germanrearmament issue.‘‘I thinkthetimehascome,”he wrote,“totell thesepeople thatthereis otheropinionto dealwith andthatU.S. opinionis gettingdamndelicateitself.If thereshouldbe an incursionin Januaryand U.S. troopsshouldget of a Frenchreluctance pushedaroundwithoutGermantroopsto helpthembecause to face facts,I shudderto think how indelicateU.S. opinionwould suddenlybecome.” 64. PrincetonSeminar,p. 913. 65. Achesonto Truman,September 15, 1950,FRUS 1950,51229-31. For moreinon, see formationrelatingto the part of the storyfrom the New York conference Christopher Gehrz,“DeanAcheson, theJCSandthe ‘SinglePackage’: AmericanPol1950,”Diplomacyand Statecraft12 (March 2001): icy on GermanRearmament, 135-60. 66. Undersecretary Webb,in telephone conversation withAcheson, September 27, 1950,AchesonPapers(Lot File 53D 444, box 13, RG 59, USNA. Webbwascomparing the StateDepartment“operation” with the way the DefenseDepartment under Marshallwashandlingthe issue. Life (New York:SimonandSchuster, 67. OmarBradleyandClayBlair,A General’s

19831,519.


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68. The idea thatAchesonwas an exceptionally aggressive statesman is scarcely the consensus view. Americanwriterstendto treatAchesonrathergently,but this, we think,is to be understood in essentially politicalterms.Acheson’s reputation profitedenormously fromthe factthatduringhis periodin officehe hadbeenthetarget of a greatdealof ill-informedcriticismfromright-wingRepublicans; RichardNixon’s famousreferenceat the timeto the “Acheson Collegeof CowardlyCommunist Containment” is a goodcasein point.And with enemieslike that,it wasnothardto find friends-among liberalacademics, at anyrate. 69. Trachtenberg, HistoryandStrategy, 109-110. 70. See,for example,ErnestMay, ed.,AmericanCold WarStrategy:Interpreting NSC 68 (New York: St. Martin’s,1993), andJohnLewis Gaddis,Strategies of Containment:A CriticalAppraisalof PostwarAmericanNationalSecurityPolicy(OxfordandNew York: OxfordUniversityPress,1982),chapter4. 71. NSC 68, April 7, 1950,FRUS 1950,1:253,255, 284; Nitze quotedin Trachtenberg,Historyand Strategy,11211. Nitze, the principalauthorof NSC 68, was quite thisperiod.See,for example,DavidCallahan, Dangercloseto Achesonthroughout ousCapabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York: HarperCollins, 19901, 95-96, 155,andStrobeTalbott,7heMasterof theGame:PaulNitzeandtheNuclear Peace(New York: Knopf,1988),51. 72. SeeJonathanUtley, “Upstairs, Downstairs at FoggyBottom:Oil Exportsand Japan,194M1,”Prologue 8 (Spring19761,17-28;Jonathan Utley, Goingto Warwith Japan(Knoxville:Universityof Tennessee Press,19851,153456,180;IrvineAnderonOil toJapan:A Bureaucratic Reflex,”PacificHisson,“The1941defact0Embargo toricalReview44 (19751,201-231; andIrvineAnderson,7heStandardVacuumOil Princeton UniCompany andUnitedStatesEastAsianPolicy,193.3-1941 (Princeton: versityPress,1975). 73. Achesonspeechat annualmeetingof the Instituteof StrategicStudies,September1963,in AdelphiPaperNo. 5, 7heEvolution of NATO.SeealsoDouglasBrink7heCold War Yean,1953-71 (New Haven:Yale University ley, Dean Acheson: Press),153. Note alsoAcheson’s commentin 1961aboutthe needfor the sortof forcesthatwouldenabletheWesternpowersto intervenein theevent,for example, of a new uprisingin Hungary:Acheson-de Gaullemeeting,April 20, 1961,Documentsdiplomatiques franGais1961,1:494. 74. BernardBrodie,WarandPolitics(New York:Macmillan,19731,402.The critic Harold in questionwas the formerdefenceministerin the Macmillangovernment, Watkinson. 75. See,for example,Achesonto Truman,May 28, 1953,box 30, folder391, and Achesonmemorandum of conversation, June23, 1953,box 68, folder172,in AchesonPapers,SterlingLibrary,Yale University,New Haven,Connecticut. Note also had Nitze’scomplaint at theveryendof theTrumanperiodthattheU.S. government a purelydefensive policy.America,he wasafraid,wasin dangerof becoming“asort of hedge-hog, unattractive to attack,but basicallynot veryworrisomeovera period of time beyondour immediateposition.” Nitze to Acheson, January12, 1953,FRUS 1952-54, 2:59. 76. Seeespecially Acheson to Truman,June24,July14,August4, andSeptember 21, 1961,AchesonPapers,Box 166,Acheson-Truman Correspondence, 1961,SterlingLibrary,Yale University;someextracts arequotedin Trachtenberg, HistoryandStrategy,

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230. See also Michael Beschloss,7be Crisis Years:Kennedyand Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (New York: Edward Burlingame,1991), 410; and Honor6 Catudal, Kennedy andtheBerlinWallCrisis:A Studyin U.S.Decision-Making (Berlin:BerlinVerlag,19801,18211. 77. WalterIsaacson andEvanThomas,7beWiseMen: Six Friendsand theWorld 1986),612-613;seealsoBrinkley,Ache7beyMade(New York:SimonandSchuster,

son,138.

78. Carl Kaysenoral historyinterview,July 11, 1966,p. 85,JohnF. KennedyLibrary,Boston.We aregratefulto FrankGavinfor providingthis reference. 79. See,for example,Brinkley,Acheson, 174,202. 80. Achesonto Truman, July10, 1965,in DeanAcheson, AmongFriends:Personal ed.DavidMcLellanandDavidAcheson(New York: Dodd, Lettersof DeanAcheson, Mead,19801,273. 81. SeeTrachtenberg, Constructed Peace,304-31 1. Acheson,however,deliberatelygavethe Europeans a verydifferentimpression. Note especially his discussion hisreference of theissuein an April 20, 1961,meetingwith de Gaulle,andespecially to a systemthat“wouldpermitEuropeto takeits own decisionon the nuclearmatdiplomatiques franGais1961,1:495. ter.”Documents 82. White Housemeeting,October20, 1961,FRUS 1961-63,14:518-519.Emphasisin original. 83. Quotedin FrankCostigliola, “LBJ,Germanyandthe ‘Endof the ColdWar,”’in LyndonJohnsonConfrontsthe World:AmericanForeignPolicy,1963-1968,eds. WarrenCohenandNancyTucker(New York:Cambridge UniversityPress,19941,195. Achesonwascomplaining aboutwhathe viewedasJohnson’s weakresponse to de Gaulle’sdecisionin 1966to takeFranceout of the NATO militaryorganization. 84. Brinkley,Acheson, 133. 85. ‘Notesof Councilon ForeignRelations StudyGroupon NuclearWeaponsand U.S. ForeignPolicy,November8, 1954,meeting,p. 12,HansonBaldwinPapers,box 125,folder23, Yale UniversityLibrary. 86. An accountAcheson gavein 1952,implyingthattheissueemergedonlyin the misleading. For the quotationand courseof the New York meeting,wasparticularly a discussion pointingout how inaccurate thataccountwas,seeMcGeehan,German 48-49. Rearmament Question, of the discussion of thisissuein the 87. This pointis suggested by the structure PrincetonSeminar:afterestablishing the basicpointthatthe Pentagonhad insisted on the packageplanandwasthusresponsible for whathappened in September (pp. 911,915), AchesonandNitze thenfelt free to easeup and talk abouthow the real reasonwhy the Germanrearmament issuecouldnot havebeenplayeddownand did not haveto do with theJCS,but ratherwith what “kindof weavedin gradually” McCloywasdoing(p. 916). Theythenwenton to saythatMcCloy,in fact,probably performeda servicein forcingpeopleto facethe issuethenandthere(pp.922-9251, 88. JohnLewis Caddis,WeNow Know:RethinkingCold War History(Oxford: Clarendon,19971,201. 89. Caddis,WeNowKnow,199-203, 288-289. The idea hereof internalpolitical normsprojected outwardwasalsoa themein the “democratic peace”literature ofthe Grasping theDemocratic Peace:Principles for 1990s.Seefor exampleBruceRussett, a Post-ColdWar World(Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,19931,119.


31

90. R. W. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe,17891914(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,19381,547; Lady GwendolenCecil,Life of RobertMarquisof Salis1931),136. bury,vol. 3 (London:HodderandStoughton, 91. Seeespecially GeirLundestad, ‘‘Empire”byIntegration: 7’beUnitedStatesand EuropeanIntegration,1945-1997 (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,1998) and facea l’unification deI’Europe,1945-1954(Paris:A. PierreMelandri,LesEtats-Unis Pedone,1980).Note alsoan importantseriesof interpretative articleson the subject by KlausSchwabe: “DieVereinigten Staaten unddie Europaischen Integration: AlterIntegrationvom nativender amerikanischen AuTsenpolitik,” in Die Europaischen Schuman-Plan biszu den Vertragen von Rom,ed. GilbertTrausch(Baden-Baden: Europeand Nomos,1993);“TheUnitedStatesandEuropean Integration,” in Western Germany:7’beBeginnings of European Integration, 1945-1969,ed.ClemensWurm (Oxford:Berg,1995);and“AtlanticPartnership andEuropeanIntegration: AmericanEuropeanPoliciesandthe GermanProblem,1947-1969,”in No EndtoAlliance:n e UnitedStatesand Western Europe:Past,Present,and Future,ed. Geir Lundestad (New York: St.Martin’s,1998).


2 “A GeneralNamedEisenhower”: AtlanticCrisisandtheOriginsof the EuropeanEconomicCommunity PaulM. Pitman

In January1957,the Frenchgovernment stageda parliamentary debateto buildsupportfor its conduct of thenegotiations on thecommonmarket(or European Economic Community [EEC]). Referringto the SuezCrisis,which hadunfoldedovertheprevious months, onespeaker whofavoredthecommonmarketsardonically thankedEgyptianColonelGamalAbdulNasserand SovietMarshalNikolaiBulganinfor helpingtheWestEuropeans understand theneedfor unity.In response, a leftistdeputyshouted, “Istherenot alsoa generalnamedEisenhower?”’ This brief exchangeat the PalaisBourbon epitomizes the continental reactionto the international crisesthatclimaxed in November1956.Indeed,by the winterof 1956,manyin Francefelt that tensions withthecountry’s allieshadcontributed morethanconflicts with its enemies to thedrivetowardeconomic integration. Alreadyin thefall of 1956it wasclearthatdissatisfaction with theUnited States hadhelpedrevivetheEuropean movement. In October, JanetFlamer, Pariscorrespondent for theNew Yorker,hadwrittenin herdiarythattheEuropeansappeared to be movingtogethernotonlybecause of thechallenge fromEgyptbut alsobecause of frustration withAmerica: Secretary Dulles’. . . semi-idealistic pressremarksthatgoodmightevencome of the Suezdifficultiesif they stimulated Europeanfederationbroughta grim smilefromFrenchpoliticians. It istruethatlatelytherehasbeenrevivedtalk on the continentabouta unitedEurope,but the feelingof unionunfortunately s e e mto be foundedlargelyon a commondislikeof Mr. Dulles.2

Thenin earlyNovember, thespectacular climaxof theSuezCrisis,alongwith the bloodysuppression of the Hungarian revolution by SovietandWarsaw Pactforces,highlighted Europe’s weakness in a worlddominated by thetwo 33

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superpowers. SeenfromWesternEurope,the crisisdemonstrated yet again BritishperfidyandAmericanunreliability. Publicists andpoliticians alikearguedthat oneof the main lessonsof Suezwas that the Europeangovernmentsshouldunitetheirforcesin the EEC. But didthe SuezCrisisreallytip thebalancetowardtheformationof a sixcountrycustomsunionand away from alternatedesignsfor the European economicorder?Did a fleetinggeopolitical conjuncture determinethe Continent’sinstitutional path,therebyreshaping the socialandeconomic developmentof theAtlanticzone?For decades, the ideathatoneof the resultsof theSuezCrisiswastheestablishment of thecommonmarkethasoftenbeen takenfor granted.Firstexpounded in authoritative contemporary analyses, the link betweenthe crisisand breakthrough in the negotiations on Europeanintegration hassincebecomea standard elementin generalhistories of postwarinternationalrelation^.^Thusin the first archive-based accountof the negotiation of the commonmarkettreaty,which primarilydrawsupon thepapersof the Germandelegation to the EEC talks,HannsJurgenKusters claimsthat the SuezCrisispromptedthe Frenchgovernment’s realization that geopoliticalimperativesrequiredthat it drop its long-standing objectionsto the commonmarket,therebyopeningtheway for theconclusion of theEEC Treaty.4In a morerecentcontribution, Kustersbaldlystatesthat“the successful outcomeof the EEC negotiations wasan historicalaccident,initiatedby Nasser’s Suezcrisisin November1956.”5 In themostfruitfulchallenge to suchviews,AlanMilward,Frances Lynch, andassociated scholars havearguedthat Suezhardlymatteredfor the EEC negotiations. Not that geopolitics was alwaysirrelevantto the evolutionof the Europeaneconomicorder:in fact,Frencheffortsto containWest Germany’sindustrialpotentialand militaryrevival inspiredearlierintegration schemes suchas the EuropeanCoal and SteelCommunity(ECSC) and the EuropeanDefenseCommunity(EDC).6But Europe’ssecurityproblemshad mostlybeensettledin October1954,when the ParisAccordssanctioned Germanrearmament withinan Atlanticframework.Fromthispointon, the onlyremaining“security” concernrelevantto European integration washow to guideWestGermany’s industrial exportsintochannels thatwouldbenefit socialandeconomicadvancethroughout WesternEurope.According to Milwardandhis associates, afterthewinterof 1954,it wasnot geopolitical factorsbut the politicalandeconomicimperatives of the postwarsocialsettlementsthat accountedfor decisionsto pursueeconomicintegration.They havetracedtheprocess by whichthecustoms uniontreatyemergedlogically (butnotinevitably)fromdebates onthefutureof theEuropeaneconomic order thatbeganin the earlypostwaryearsand cameto focuson a customs unionin the early1950s.Throughout, decisions abouteconomic integration did notresultfrommerehistorical accidents. Rather,nationalnegotiating positionsreflectedlong-termeconomicpolicieshammeredout by top elected

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officialsandhigh-levelbureaucrats, who soughtexport-ledgrowth,technical modernization, full employment, andsocialwelfarethroughcontrolled tradeliberalization. Morefundamentally, across WesternEuropeforeigneconomicpolicy-makingreflectedthe new postwardetermination to pursue economicandsocialgoalsthatwouldstrengthen politicalcoalitions thatincludedthe organized workingclass,farmers,andthelowermiddleclass.’ As for thesupposed influenceof theSuezCrisison Frenchpolicy,Frances Lynch’strenchant accountshowsthatParis’scrucialdecisionto endorsethe commonmarketcamein earlySeptember 1956-at a timewhentheFrench, apparently in theexpectation thattheUnitedStateswouldtacitlysupport(or at leastacquiesce in) an invasionof Egypt,werestillformulating theplanto seizethe SuezCanalwith theirBritishandIsraelipartners,two monthsbefore the humiliations that supposedly swungFrance’sgoverningclassbehind the Europeancause.Insteadof Suez,Lynchpointsto the proposalfor a FreeTradeAreathatwouldincludeall members of theOrganisation for EuropeanEconomicCooperation(OEEC), put forwardby the Britishin July 1956,whichstrengthened theview in Francethatthecountrycouldnot dependon existingarrangements to protectFrenchinterests.* Recentwork in politicalsciencehaslikewisetendedto de-emphasize geopolitics. Andrew Moravcsik,for example,arguesthat commercialinterest,as articulatedby major producergroups,was the main factor that drove the integration process in the 1950s;in hisanalysis, “geopolitical ideology” and“security externalities” wereonly influentialat the margin.’ The establishment of thecommonmarketis oneof themosthighlycelebratedandbestdocumented episodes in postwarEurope’s history.Our interpretationof this eventhassignificantimplications, not only for our underof theoriginsof theEuropean communities, butalsofor ourviewsof standing the intrinsiccharacter of Europeanintegration anditsmeaningfor global politics.This chapterexaminesthe long-termpolicydevelopments that shaped the FrenchandGermandecisions to construct a new economicandpolitical orderontheContinent. Insteadof arguingthateithereconomic goalsor stratepolicyin themidgicambitions weretheprimarydriversof foreigneconomic 1950s,it attempts to showthatthetwosetsof concerns actedtogether to shape decisions in bothFranceandGermany.The firstsectionsetsthestage:it analyzesthe politicsof Europeantradingandmonetaryarrangements, surveying the forcesbehindalternative regionaldesigns. Themainpointhereis thatas lateasthesummerof 1956,thefutureof thecommonmarketplan,andmore generally theformthat European integration waslikelyto take,remainedanythe role of geopolitical conthingbut certain.The secondsectionconsiders siderations in drivingthe integration processwell beforeSuez.The focusin thatsectionis on continental responses to Atlanticstrategic developments in the mid-1950s,especially on the implications of the nuclearization of NATO warplans.Thebasicpointhereis thatthesecurity issuehadby nomeansbeen

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resolvedwhenthe ParisAccordswere signedin October1954;on the contrary,at aboutthattime policy-makers in FranceandGermanybeganto explorethe possibility of a Europeannuclearforceindependent of the United Thethirdsectionretraces theFrenchandGermandecisions to establish States. thecommonmarketin thefall andwinterof 1956.It arguesthatthe SuezCrisis,whichbothsymbolized anddeepened tensions betweenthe continental powersandthe “Anglo-Saxons,” triggeredthe establishment of the Common Market,butthatthekey decisions werenottakenin a vacuum:long-term policy goalsdeterminedwhat happenedduringthis crucialphaseof the Europeanintegration process.

THE POLITICSOF EUROPEANTRADE UntilJanuary1959,whenthecommonmarketfirstcameintoeffect,Europe’s tradewas regulatedthroughintergovernmental cooperative arrangements, the mostimportantof whichweresponsored by the OEEC.The OEECtrading systemrestedon two mainpillars, gradual trade“liberalization,” that is, theremovalof quantitative restrictions (but nottariffs)on importsfromother OEECcountries, andthe moresignificant EuropeanPayments Union(EPU), whicharrangedmultilateral settlement of bilateralpaymentsimbalances betweenthesamecountries. By makingtradewith therestof theworld,especiallythe UnitedStates,less attractive, theOEECcountries hadconstructed a discriminatory tradingsystemthat embracedmore than half of the free world’strade,includingthatof theWestEuropean countries, themembers of the SterlingArea,andthe variouselementsof the FrancZone.Thisframework had nurturedWesternEurope’spostwareconomicmiracle,the tradedrivengrowththat had loweredunemployment while accommodating increasesin both wages and workplacedemocracy.The solidaritiesand disputesthat emergedin this structurewould shapethe debateover Europe’seconomicfuture.1° Startingin the early 1950s,as the Europeaneconomyemergedfrom the rearmamentboom sparkedby the KoreanWar, discontentwith the perceivedshortcomings of theOEECsystemstimulated discussions of thefuture of the region’seconomicorder.While existingstructures continuedto provideindispensable propsfor theEuropeanpoliticaleconomy,manyon both sidesof the Atlanticsaw them as temporaryexpedients whosecontinued functioning threatened the realizationof theirlong-termgoals.On the Continent,the Dutch government put forwardplansfor a customsunionthat wouldgivethe smallercountriesaccessto the marketsin France,Germany, and the UnitedKingdom,which were still shieldedby high tariffs.At the sametime, the Britishgovernment beganto campaignvigorouslyfor the restoration of currencyconvertibility as a way not only to reviveSterling’s

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prewarroleasa reservecurrency,in particularfor theCommonwealth counof a customs unionon the Continent. tries,but alsoto blockthe emergence In contrast,the Frenchcabinetsof thisperiodopposedbothregionaltariff reductionsand convertibility, favoringinsteada customsunion with the Franczonebuttressed by bilateralcommercial agreements with France’s major tradingpartners, especially WestGermany. TheWestEuropeangovernments facedchoicesbetweenthreecontending visionsof the futureof the region’seconomicorder:the furtherconsolidation of the Europeanmarketcenteredon the ECSCcountries, knownasthe “Six,”*a liberalizedfree-worldmarketin whichcurrencies wouldbe freely convertible, anda revivalof theFrenchandBritishcolonialeconomic blocs. As a resultof the teleological biasin boththe popularandacademicliteratures,accountsof thesedebateshave focusedalmostexclusivelyon the emergence of the commonmarketandvirtuallyignoredsupportfor Atlantic or imperialschemes. Althoughtherehavebeenattemptsto arguethat the Britishproposalfor an OEEC-wideFreeTradeArea stoodsomechanceof adoption,no studyhasattemptedto weighthe politicalsupportacrossEuropefor thethreeserious contenders. Forthepurposes of thischapter,it sufficesto notethatall threealternatives weretakenseriously enoughto frame debateson foreigneconomicpolicyin bothFranceandGermany. In the 1950sEuropeanpolicy-makers stillpaidspecialattentionto signals fromWashington. Like its Democratic predecessor, theEisenhower administration,whichtookofficein January1953,stoutlybackedtheformationof a WestEuropeanpoliticalandeconomicbloccapableof anchoring Germany to theWestandcountering Sovietinfluenceon theContinent.I2 But thenew administration soughtto cut militaryspendingand foreignaid in orderto protectAmerica’s long-termeconomic healthandcivicvitality,whichit identified with decentralized government and a competitivemarketorder.The administration alsosoughtto shiftUS. aid fromEuropeto theThirdWorld, to threaten Western whereSovieteconomicinitiativesincreasingly appeared influence.Theseconsiderations, which inspiredthe famous“NewLook”in militarystrategy,alsodroveeffortsto rethinkforeigneconomicrelations. l3 Nonetheless, justasthe Eisenhower administration wouldendup maintainingitsgroundforcesin Europe,it wouldalsocontinue to giveEuropean economicunificationpriorityover a worldwideliberalmarketorder.But the mixedmessages thatemergedfromtheWashington policyprocesscastseriousdoubton America’swillingness to toleratecontinued Europeandiscriminationagainstimportsfromthedollarzone.In Europetheimpactof rumors aboutpoliticalbattlesin the administration and Congressmay well have beenmoresignificant thantheUnitedStatesgovernment’s steadfast policies. In the summerof 1953Eisenhower sponsored the first seriousreviewof foreigneconomicpolicysincethedebateon theMarshallPlan.Published in *Thatis, Belgium,France,Germany,Italy,Luxembourg, andthe Netherlands.

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early 1954,the reportof the bipartisan Commission on ForeignEconomic Policy(CFEP) declared thatit wastimeto endtheMarshallPlansettlementwhichhad alwaysbeenseenas a temporary expedient-underwhichthe Europeans hadcometo trademoreintensively with eachotherbutsystematicallydiscriminated againstimportsfromtheUnitedStates,despitereceivingsubstantial economic aid.The CFEPcalledfor a returnto something like theBrettonWoodsprogramof multilateral tradeandcurrency convertibility. Logicallyenough,thecommission alsoarguedthatin orderto overcome the worldwidedollarshortage, whichblockedprogress towardliberalizinginternational tradeandpayments, theAmericanmarketshouldbe openedto importsfromtherestof thefreeworldeconomies. Likewise,thegovernment shouldencourage increased privatedirectinvestment insteadof continuing to provideforeignaid.’* The Eisenhower administration endorsed the CFEP’scall for “Trade,not Aid.”But theAmericangovernment failedto followthrougheitherat home or abroad.Thepresident madeconsiderable effortsto convince Congress to reducequotaandtariff barriersthat excludedEuropeanproducts fromthe Americanmarket,but the victorious commander on the European Frontin WorldWar I1 wasno matchfor homegrown protectionism. And despite public endorsements of convertibility, Washington repeatedly put off themagic daywhencurrencies wouldbe exchanged freely.I5 Likewise,although much aidwasredirected towarddeveloping countries, theEisenhower administrationcontinued to providemassive amounts of militaryandeconomic assistanceto theEuropeans because it seemed necessary, interalia, to pushthe Germans to rearmquicklyandto encourage theFrenchto meettheirNATO obligations despitethedrainimposed by thewar in Algeria. Althoughitspolicycameunderfire fromtheTreasury,Congress, andthe public,the Eisenhower administration wasclearlywillingto live with Europeantradepreferences in the interestof achievingthe greaterstrategic goalof buildinga secondgreatpowermasswithintheWestcapableof resistingthe Sovietthreat.In 1955and 1956Americandiplomacy focused on supporting theproposal for a six-power European AtomicEnergyCommunity(EURATOM), whichappeared to offera wayto channelcontinental nuclearambitions into a supranational framework.It paid relativelylittle attentionto the commonmarketnegotiations, presumably becausemost observers expectedprotectionist forcesin Franceto blockeconomic integration.Still, Washington backedthe formationof a six-member customs union,hopingit wouldadopta liberalexternalpolicy.Americananalysts did notethe dangerthat the commonmarketmightform a protectionist tradebloc,especially if Frenchpreferences determined its externalstance, but many hopedthat increasedintra-European trade would allow the weakereconomies to modernizeand eventuallydroptheir opposition to freertradewith NorthAmerica.16 Certainlythe commonmarketoffereda


39

betterway to tie Germanindustryto the West thanan OEEC-wideFree TradeArea suchasthatproposed by theBritish.The Britishscheme would for Americanexporters withoutdeepening haveled to evengreaterlosses Europe’spoliticalintegration. Thus,althoughAmericanleadersoftendeclaredtheirinterestin a more liberalworldeconomic system, thishadno tangibleeffecton Washington’s actualpolicytowardfurthereconomic integration on the Continent. It was thusironicthatAmerica’s continued diplomatic supportfor European unificationdid not carryas muchweighton the Continentasthe mixedsignals thatemergedfromWashington policydebates. Thereis roomherefor just oneexample,drawnfromtherealmof monetary politics.TheAmericans repeatedlydeclinedto ponyup thecashneededto backBritishplansto make the poundconvertible. Suchan actionwouldhavesetoff a chainreaction leadingto thedissolution of theEPU andthusa cutin creditsto Francethat wouldforcetheFourthRepublicto choose betweenimprovements in social welfare,investments in industry,and payingfor the war in Algeria.”AlthoughFrenchpolicy-makers wereno doubtrelievedeachtimea convertibilityplanwasvetoed,theycontinued to heardarkrumorsof secretnegotiationsbetweenBritishand AmericanTreasuryofficials.lsGiven that the Americans had frozenaid payments to the Frenchas a punishment for the rejectionof the EuropeanDefenseCommunity, who couldsaywhat they mightdo in somelaterfight?19 The Eisenhower administration’s grandstrategycalledfor the establishmentof a six-powercommonmarket,whichwouldprovidethe economic underpinnings for a “unitedEuropeasa thirdgreatforcein theworld.”Zo In contrast, successive Britishgovernments stubbornly opposed theconsolidationof “LittleEurope,” because it wouldthreaten theUnitedKingdom’s economicandpoliticalstanding in the worldby undermining the City of London’srole as a financialcenter,weakeningthe Commonwealths already attenuated tradingtieswith the BritishIsles,andincreasing the dangerthat Franceand GermanywouldbecomeAmerica’sprimarypoliticalpartners, therebyreducingthe chancesthat Washingtonwould continueto aid Britain’s“independent” atomicforces.21 However,as eventswouldshow, neithertheBritishnortheiralliesandclientson theContinent werein a positionto stopintegration projectsbackedby ParisandBonn.And American support andBritishweakness meantthattheonlyrealquestion waswhether thesharpdifferences betweenthe Frenchand Germanvisionsof the New Europecouldbe overcome. TheFrenchgovernment’s policyon economic integration reflected therequirements of its modernization plans,its commitment to thewelfarestate, andits ambitions for thereconstitution of theempire.Thustheproposal for the ECSC was designed to guarantee the success of the MonnetPlan;the EDC mettheneedsof theFrenchaircraftandelectronics industries; andthe

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GreenPoolgrewout of the decisionto aim for permanentagricultural surpluses.More broadly,the policy-making communityin Parisrejectedthe in those classical liberalview thattradeshouldleadto furtherspecialization productsin whicheachcountryenjoyeda comparative advantage. Instead, the Frenchsoughtto negotiatepoliticalagreements to fix a favorablestructurefor key industries beforetradecontrolswerelifted.GiventhatFrance’s advancedsociallegislation put the countryat a disadvantage in exportmarkets,Frenchleadersalsomadethe harmonization of regulations on collective bargaining, paidvacations, women’swages,andsocialwelfarea condition for theiracceptance of a new tradingsystem.Moreover,to compensate for thelossof directpoliticalcontroloveritsempire,theFrenchsoughtto reformulatethe tradeandmonetarylinksbetweenthe membersof the Union francaise,whichwould thenjoin the Europeancommunityas a unit. This arrangement promisedto increaseFrance’s weightin Europeand,sothe argumentwent,Europe’srole in world politics.22 WestGermanattitudestowardthe Europeaneconomic orderwerepulled betweenliberalideologicalpreferences andthe practicalneedto guarantee economicties with Germany’smain trading partners,France and the Beneluxcountries.Earlieraccounts of the FederalRepublic’s policyon the CommonMarket emphasized that the country’stradinginterestsextended well beyondthe Six, andthatindustry,represented by Professor LudwigErsupported an OEEC-wideFreeTradeArea hard,the Ministerof Economics, asa steptowardtherestoration of currency convertibility. However,morerecent researchhas shownthat many businessleadersremainedskeptical aboutthewisdomof depending on theworldmarket,preferringthesecurity of established tradetieswith Germany’sclosestneighb01-s.~~ A strikingexampleof thisattitudeemergesin the ForeignMinistry’srefutationof an attackon the commonmarketissuedby theEconomics Ministry: The ForeignMinistrydoesnot completely sharethe Economics Ministry’splan for economic conquest of theworld,because sucha rash. . . thrustintoempty spacemusteventually reachits limits,whetherin an economic downturnor anothertypeof shock.At thatpoint,the onlythingthatwill be left will be whateverhasbeenpoliticallyorganized, namelythecommunity of theSix (or Seven if GreatBritainjoins);otherwise Germany’s economic expansion will fall in on itself.24

In line with suchthinking,the competent Germanauthorities, includingthe centralbank,vigorouslyprotected thetradingarrangements thathadgrown up since1949, and in particularthe specialeconomicrelationshipwith France,Germany’stop economicpartner.25 Of course,bothindustryrepresentatives andgovernment officialsagreedon opposingtheFrenchproposalsto harmonize wagesandbenefits,whichwouldeliminatewhatmanysaw askey sources of Germany’s exportcompetitiveness. Evenwhilesupporting

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the commonmarketscheme,Bonn’snegotiators foughtParis’sspecificdemandsregardingsocialpolicy,agricultural imports,atomicenergy,andsubsidiesto France’simperialdependencies. At the sametime, the divisions withintheGermanpolicy-making community meantthat,whenit cametime to decidewhetherto go aheadwith thecommonmarket,Chancellor Konrad Adenauerwouldbe able to imposehis own preferences, whichby all accountswere shapedmoreby geopolitical thinkingthanby economicarguments.26 The firstyearanda half of thecommonmarketnegotiations demonstrated the conflictbetweenFrenchandGermanvisionsfor Europe’seconomicfuture.In the fall andwinterof 1954,the Dutchhad renewedthe pushfor a customs union,in partoutof fearof theconsequences of the secretFrancoGermantradeandinvestment dealsthataccompanied theParisAccords.’’In May 1955,oncethe FederalRepublichadformallyjoinedNATO, the Dutch commonmarketproposal,combinedwith a Frenchproposalfor an atomic energypool,kickedoff a new setof negotiations on six-powerintegration, the so-calledrelanceeuropkenne. But overthe summer,the commonmarket initiativegot off to sucha rockystartthat the Dutch submittedfurther tradeliberalization proposals to boththe OEEC andthe GeneralAgreement on TariffsandTrade.28 The mainstickingpointin the commonmarkettalks wasGermanopposition to Frenchdemands. The Frenchdelegation focused almostexclusivelyon EURATOM-it did not even receiveinstructions regardingthe customsunionuntil earlyOctober,shortlybeforethe negotiationshadto be suspended becausethe EdgarFauregovernment decidedto call new elections.29 The Molletgovernment, whichtookpowerfollowingparliamentary electionsin January1956,supported Europeanintegrationmuchmorestrongly thanany cabinetsinceearly 1952(whenthe first“Europeanist coalition”in theNationalAssemblyhadcollapsed). Its leadingmembershadimpeccable Europeanist credentials, andmanyscholars haveaccepted theirlaterclaims to havesecretlyplannedto pushthroughthe commonmarkettreatyfrom the momentthey enteredoffice.30 But in the springof 1956,Socialistinfluencein interministerial debates resultedin a negotiating positionthatthreatenedto blockthe commonmarketnegotiations onceandfor all. France’s newpositiondid notjuststrengthen earliercallsfor theharmonization of labor regulations andsocialpolicy,whichwasonlyto be expectedgiventhe Mollet government’s center-leftorientation.The Frenchalso pushedfor commonmacroeconomic policiesandlong-termindustrialplans.In effect, the Frenchnow soughtto usethe commonmarketto lock in expansionist Keynesianpoliciesandsectoralplanningthroughout continental Europe.31 For the governmentin Bonn, Paris’snew position,which directlychallengedtheprinciplesof Germany’s sozialeMarktwirtschaft, wassimplyunacceptable. As soonasthe Frenchdelegation presented its newpositionin

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Brussels, the commonmarketnegotiations cameto a standstill. The Mollet government’s newdirigistdesignmadeit lesslikelythaneverthata customs unionwouldcomeinto being. Whatwouldhavehappenedif the conflictbetweenthe FrenchandGermanplansfor the Europeaneconomyhadnot beenovercome? It is hardto imaginethattheBritishgovernment wouldhavepursueditsFreeTradeArea proposalseriously, because London’smaingoalwasto avoidbeingshutout from Europeanmarkets.32 Instead,the West Europeaneconomyprobably would have continuedto developwithin existingframeworks.Tradecertainlycouldhave expandedsignificantly underthe OEEC’s“liberalization” program,with whateverneoimperialextensions the Frenchandthe British wereableto cultivate.Thereprobablywouldhavebeenfurtherprogress toward convertibility throughgradual“hardening” of settlementtermsin the EPU. And it seemslikely that the Germanauthorities would have backed emergency creditsto Francewhenevera realpinchcame,bothto safeguard its maintradinginterests andfor moregeneralpoliticalreasons.33 But without new politicalunderstandings betweenthe FrenchandGermangovernments,it wasunlikelythat“LittleEurope”wouldhaveemergedasa defined economicbloc.

THE DEBATE OVER EUROPEAN DEFENSE

As notedabove,recenthistoricalaccountsof the originsof the Common

Marketstartwith theproposition thatthekey securityissues thathaddivided theWesternnationsduringthe firstpostwardecadeweresettledwhenWest GermanyjoinedNATO. In fact,intra-alliance arguments remainedas lively aseverafterMay 1955.The Westernpowerswerestilldividedoverdefense for onesimplereasonwith manycomplicated consequences: thenuclearization of NATO strategy.The otherproblemsthat had troubledAtlanticrelationssincethe late 1940s,suchas burden-sharing, controlsoverarmament levels,or competitionover the productionof technologically advancedarmaments,neversimplywent away.They persisted, but the practicalimplifor themchanged,oftendramaticationsof the varioussolutionsproposed cally,asa resultof nuclearization. And all of theseproblemscameto a head of a sharp simultaneously in thesummerandfall of 1956,primarilybecause controversy sparkedby Anglo-American plansto substitute atomicweapons for troopsstationed in Germany. DisputesoverEuropeandefensehaveoftenbeenseenas a longstruggle to reacha compromise aroundsensibleAtlanticistpoliciesthat effectively meshedNATO’s conventional “shield”and its atomic“sword.”But in the mid-l950s,Westerncapitalshadjustbegunto struggle with thebasicpolitical choicesimposedby thespreadof atomicweapons,andtheconclusions


43

to thesedebateswereanythingbut foregone.34 On the Continent,it seemed thatthreedistinctstrategicoptionswerestill open.The firstoption,known as“forwarddefense,” calledfor stopping anySovietattackasfar eastaspossible,preferablyalongthe WestGermanborder.While forwarddefenseremainedofficialNATO doctrine,skepticalEuropeans perceivedsignsthatthe UnitedStatesandthe UnitedKingdomwishedto revertto a secondoption, the “peripheral strategy,” according to whichthe Westernpowerswouldallow Sovietforcesto overrunmostof the Continentbeforetryingto reconquerwhateverwasleft aftera monthof armoredoperations accompanied by nuclearstrikes.35 The Europeanalliestendedto feel thateconomicconcerns (for the British,the defenseof Sterlingand Commonwealth economicties; for theAmericans, the needto roll backthe garrisonstate)drovethe efforts at strategic revisionandconventional retrenchment. In response to thethreat thatthe “maritimepowers”wouldwithdrawtheirgroundforcesor decouple theirdeterrentforcesfrom the Central Front, somecontinental strategists favoreda thirdoption:theestablishment of a “Eurafrican” bloc,armedwith an autonomous nucleardeterrentand able to draw on the depthofferedby France’sAfricant e r r i t ~ r i eThe s . ~ ~importantpoint to note here is that the broaddirections Europeanstrategycouldpursuein the mid-1950s-forward defense,peripheralstrategy, or Eurafricancoalition-roughlycorresponded to the threealternateschemes for the region’stradeandmonetaryrelations thatwereunderconsideration in policycirclesat the sametime. Washington’s commitment to “forwarddefense” wasfar fromcertainin the mid-1950s.As part of its grandstrategy,the Eisenhower administration tried to fosterthe consolidation of a Europeanpowerbasethatwouldallow a reductionin America’seffortsto defendthe Old World. But the main policy pursuedby the Americans, the deployment of largenumbersof tacticalnuclearweaponsin WesternEuropealongwith schemes for “sharing” control of theseweapons,ironicallymadeit evenmoredifficultto withdrawU.S. troops.37 In the end,despitethe attractiveness of Britishstrategicproposals andthe pull of isolationism, the Eisenhower administration did maintainestablishedforcelevelsin Europe.At the sametime,as in economicaffairs,it may have beennot so muchofficialAmericanpolicyas continental fears basedon unsubstantiated but plausiblerumorsaboutPentagonpriorities thatgavethebiggestpushto Franco-German understanding. TheFrenchresponse to thenuclearization of Atlanticstrategy wasstraightforward.To defendthe metropole,to maintaininfluencein the empire,to havea sayin Westernstrategy,Franceneededto field an independent nuclearforce.But to build a deterrentforce,the Frenchneededtechnical,industrialandfinancialassistance. Giventhatthe BritishandtheAmericans refusedto help,the Frenchturnedto WestGermany.Thusthe nuclearization of NATO strategyled the Frenchto spearhead effortsto build a European bomb.38

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AlthoughFrance’s strategists hadbeengrappling with the implications of nuclearweapons for overa decade,it wasin AugustandSeptember 1954justbeforeandaftertheFrenchparliament’s voteto rejecttheEuropean DefenseCommunity-thatthe country’s militaryauthorities andpoliticalleaders first drew conclusionsabout the need for continentalnuclear cooperation. The basicstrategic viewsthat emergedin thesemonthsare worthreviewingin somedetailbecause theyprovidedmuchof the hidden impetusbehindParis’sEuropean policiesdownto theendof theFourthRepublic,if not beyond.The development of France’s policytowardcooperation in atomicenergyshowsthat,ratherthanopposingEuropeanintegration,militaryleadersoftenpointedtheway. The debateopenedin response to a draftentitledthe “Possibilities Plan,” putforwardby GeneralAlfredGruenther, NATO’sSupreme Allied Commander,Europe(SACEUR).The Possibilities Planprovidedthe basisfor the alliance’snew strategicdoctrine,whichthe NATO Councilwouldformally adoptas MC-48 in December1954.39 In a hard-hitting response to Gruenther’splan,France’s representative in NATO’sStanding Group,General Jean Valluy, offeredideasthatappearto haveorientedthecountry’s politicalresponse to the nuclearization of NATO ~trategy.~’ Valluyfrstpointedoutthat SACEUR assumed thatanywar foughtin Europewouldbe decidedquickly by a brief but intenseatomicexchange. If the CentralFrontcouldbe held duringthe crucialearlydaysof a conflict,the West’soverallsuperiority in strategicweaponswould prevail.Thus NATO’s chancesfor victorydependedasneverbeforeon blockingSovieteffortsto launchrapidair strikes againsttacticalnuclearforcesin WesternEurope.To meetthis challenge, Gruenther’s new strategycalled for “unconditional and instantaneous” atomicstrikesthat woulddestroySovietnuclearweaponson the ground. Providedtheycouldbe shielded fromair strikes,NATO’s “covering forces” deployedon the CentralFront,which includedunitsarmedwith tactical atomicweapons, stooda goodchanceof repellinga Sovietgroundassault. According to Valluy, the new NATO strategy wouldcausea majortransformationin France’sstrategicsituation. Forwarddefenseof WesternEurope,previously “affirmedsomewhat academically,” hadnotonlybecomea technical necessity, it wouldsoonbe a practicalpossibility. Butasa keystaging groundfor NATO’s atomicattacks, WesternEuropewouldalso become a primarytargetfor Sovietnuclearstrikes.France’sgroundforceswould haveto preparefor operations in an atomicenvironment, whileFrance’s future nuclearforceswouldneedto coordinate operations with the United StatesStrategic Air Command. Whateverthe militaryandbudgetary implications, the new strategy’s key difficultywaspolitical.In orderto preemptSovietatomicstrikes,it wouldbe necessary to authorize NATO to launchattacksat the earliestpossiblemoof authorityto initiateatomicstrikes,presumment.But the predelegation

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ably to SACEUR,threatened to leaveEurope’sdefensein the handsof an Americangeneral.ForValluy,the consequences wereclear: The defenseof the West,now concentrated aroundatomicweapons,will depend entirelyon America’swill. The only correctivefor this subordination wouldbe the constitution by the Europeannationsof an atomicarsenalthat wouldallow themto intervenewith theirown forcesin sucha new war and consequently resumea key rolein the leadership of the c ~ a l i t i o n . ~ ~

NATO’sadoptionof a nuclearstrategy did notsimplymeanthatFrancehad to adaptits conventional forcesandacquireatomicweapons. It alsomeant thatFrance,in association with itscontinental allies,neededto buildanddeploya European deterrent force. Duringthefall of 1954,theFrenchhighcommand amplifiedValluy’smessage.An exampleis the response to a ForeignMinistryproposal for an armaments poolto replacetheindustrial sideof theEDC prepared by General Jacques Faure,the topmilitaryaideto DefenseMinisterEmmanuelTemple (and one of the leadersof the coterieof militaryofficerswho had openly campaigned againstthe European Army plan).Faurearguedthatimposing restrictions on the Germana r m industrywould only benefitBritishand Americanproducers. Instead,withinan Atlanticframeworkandpreferably with Britishparticipation, Franceshould produce atomicweapons with Germanyin “secure” zonessuch as FrenchNorthAfrica.42 Whatdid France’s militaryleaders actuallyhavein mind?Thepoliticalimplications of theirproposals areclear:a European deterrent force,developed underFrenchcontrolon the basisof Germanindustrialpotential,couldat onceimproveEurope’s standing withintheAtlanticAllianceandanchorthe Americannuclearguarantee. But despitetheirgenerous Europeanist rhetoric, it is unclearhowfar the Frenchintendedto go in sharingcontrolof the forcewith the Germans. One wondersif Frenchleadershad reachedfirm in thisfundamental area. conclusions Duringthefall andwinterof 1954,theFrenchgovernment beganto move forward,albeittentatively andcautiously, withtheproposals for a European deterrentput forwardby the military.In September, the Cornit6de d6fense nationale,France’shighestauthorityin militarymatters,debatedthe expenseof a nationaldeterrent forceandthepossibility thatsix-power atomic cooperation mighthelp Francepay for atomicweapons.43 In the springof 1955,thegovernment soughtGermanassistance in constructing an isotopic separation plantto producethe enricheduraniumneededfor the French bombprogram.But the Germans, stillwaitingto join NATO, chosenot to respondto Frenchovertures at thistime.In thecomingmonths,theFrench wouldcontinueto reachoutto theirneighbors; for example,in July1955a representative of theAtomicEnergyCommission met with Italianmilitary a jointresearch anddevelopment program.44 TheFrench officesto propose

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government’s main effortson behalfof a “European deterrent” took place within the frameworkof the EURATOM negotiations, the real focusof whichwas,andwouldremain,an isotopicseparation ~lant.~5 Onceagain,Paris’smainproblemwasto overcomeopposition withinthe Bonngovernment. Althoughthe GermanForeignMinistrystoodbehindthe EURATOM initiative,the ministerresponsible for atomicenergy,FranzJosef StrauB,did not. Backedby industrialinterests, StrauBstronglyopposed key elementsof the plan suchas supranational controlsand monopolyownershipof fissilematerials, favoringinsteaddirecttieswith BritishandAmerican industry.46 In July 1956the EURATOM talksbecameevenmoredifficultasa Facingheavyoppositionto resultof the debatesin the FrenchParliament. EURATOM, the Mollet government hadto promisethatthe planwouldnot effortsto produce interferewith France’sstill officially unacknowledged atomicweapons.In Bonn,thisraisedonceagainthe fear that Paris’sEuropeanpolicysoughtto limit Germany’s strategic options. Althoughthe Germanshad worried aboutthe nuclearization of NATO didnotdirectlyaddress itspostrategy for sometime,theBonngovernment liticalconsequences until the summerandfall of 1956.*’ In June1956,German worrieswere stimulatedwhen the British,determinedto reducethe largestdrainon the balanceof paymentsby withdrawingtroopsfrom Germany,proposedthat NATO developa new PoliticalDirectiveto endorse evengreaterrelianceon nuclearweaponsthan that authorizedunderMC48.48Thenin JulytheNew YorkTimesreportedplanssupposedly underconsiderationby AdmiralArthurW. Radford,chairmanof the JointChiefsof Staff,to reduceconventional forcesandwithdrawtroopsfrom Germany.49 Newsof the “Radford Plan”hadtremendous repercussions in Bonn.Leading Germanpoliticians, not leastChancellor Adenauer,expressed fearsthatthe maritimepowersmightabandontheir allieson the continent.The controversycameat a particularly awkwardtime, just daysafterthe government haddefendedtheneedfor eighteenmonths’compulsory militaryservicebefore a skepticalBundestag. The Anglo-American strategicinitiativesthreatenedto turn Germany’s twelvenew divisions-for yearsthe causeof fights overthe futuremilitarybalancewithinWesternEurope-into mere“atomic cannonfodder.” The so-calledRadfordCrisisgenerated hugetensionsin the relationsbetweenBonnandWashington. It alsoprovideda politicalexcusefor a thoroughgoingreconsideration of the FederalRepublic’srearmamentplans. West Germany’s politicalleadersactedas if they had suddenlygraspedthe practicalimplications of the strategic situationtheyhadaccepted by joining NATO. In the cabinetdiscussion on 20 July 1956ministersagreedthat the FederalRepublicshouldseekto increaseits influencein NATO in orderto pressure itsalliesto maintainconventional forcelevels.Chancellor Adenauer statedthatif Westernstrategycontinued to switchoverto nuclearweapons,

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47

the FederalRepublicwouldhaveto reconsider its 1954renunciation of the production of atomic,bacterial,andchemicalweapons. And Straulstold the cabinet,“Todaya nationthatdoesnot produceatomicweaponsitself is dkc l a ~ s i .Of . ” ~course, ~ the WestGermangovernment hasneveropenlyadmitted the extentof its interestin atomicweapons.But the nuclearization of NATO strategyexplainsthe formtakenby Germanrearmament. Duringthe fall andwinterof 1956,the dynamicStrauls,who took overthe postof defenseminister, wouldoverseea fundamental shiftfromlargeconscript forces towarda smaller,moreprofessional militarycapableof deployingtactical nuclearweapons.51 The tensionsbetweenWashingtonand Bonn providedan openingfor thosewithinthe Frenchgovernment who soughtbackingfor a “European” deterrent.The Frencharrangedfor a high-ranking Germanrepresentative, GeneralAdolf Heusinger, to presenthis government’s criticisms of the Radford Planat a specialmeetingof NATO’sStandingGroup.Duringthe meeting,Heusingerfirstnotedthatpresscoverageof theRadfordPlanhadweakeffortsto enedpublicsupportfor NATO and threatened his government’s raisetroops.He then discussed the importanceof strong“shield”forces, stressing the dangerthatNATO mightlosea “small”conventional war if the Britishand Americanswithdrewsignificantgroundforcesfrom Germany. Supporting the Frenchwar effortin Algeria,Heusingeralsoreferredto the importanceof holdingNorthAfrica as NATO’s southernflank.The French member of the StandingGroup, GeneralJean Valluy, stronglybacked Heusinger’s criticismsof Anglo-American proposalsto dependon atomic forcesto defendEurope.He alsoattackedthe UnitedStates’policyof withholdingnucleartechnology from its continental Allies.52 In a subsequent privatetalk betweenValluy and Heusinger,at which a numberof otherFrenchandGermanofficerswerepresent,thefundamental compatibility betweenFrenchandGermanstrategic perspectives cameout. Valluystressed thattheWestEuropeancontinental powersshouldunitetheir forcesin orderto escapecompletedependence ontheAnglo-Saxons. In particular,asthe twostrongest Europeanpowers,FranceandGermanyneeded to cooperate to breakthe Anglo-American nuclearmonopoly.Valluy also emphasized the significance of NorthAfrica for Europe’sdefense-a point thatHeusingerhadunderlinedin hispresentation to the StandingGroup.In the two generalsalsodiscovered thatthey the courseof theirconversation, andcommand problems sharedsimilarviewson a widerangeof operational in NATO.53 France’ssupportfor Germanyin NATO debates,alongwith Valluy’sapproachregardingatomiccooperation, apparently encouraged policy-makers in Bonnto reconsider theMollet government’s repeatedeffortsto revivebilateralarmaments c ~ o p e r a t i oThus, n . ~ ~in the summerof 1956-just at the timewhenthe commonmarkettalkshadreachedan impasseoverGerman

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opposition to Frenchproposals regardingindustrialplanning,welfarepolicy, and laborrelations-Frenchand Germanstrategists were discovering thatthey sharednot only reasonable fearsregardingAnglo-American tendencies to revertto a peripheral strategy, butalsoan interestin establishing a Eurafricandefensebloc with atomiccapabilities. During the following months,duringoneof thepostwarera’smostserious crisesin Atlanticrelations,thesecontradictory trendsfoundresolution in aneconomic andstrategicsettlement thatwouldshapetheEuropean orderfor decades to come.

ATLANTIC CRISIS ANDEUROPEAN MARKET The SuezCrisisintensified tensions betweenthe UnitedStatesandits main European allies.Recenthistorical studies haveprovideda detailedpictureof the crisisitself,whichbeganin July 1956whenthe Egyptiangovernment nationalized the SuezCanalandendedthe followingNovemberwhenan Anglo-French attemptfailedto retakethecanalby force.But itsbroaderconsequences for international and transnational relationsremainto be exof thischapter,it suffices to notethatit wasnot p10red.~~ For thepurposes Moscow’s threatsof atomicreprisals butWashington’s movesagainstSterling that convinced the Britishgovernment to abandonits French(and Israeli) partnersin the middleof an otherwise brilliantlysuccessful militaryoperation.FrenchandGermanleadersreactedto Sovietthreats,Americansabotage,andBritishwithdrawalwith bitterangerat GreatBritain’sfecklessness and dark speculations regardingthe possibility that the two superpowers mightfind condominium mutuallybenefi~ial.~~ As Chancellor Adenauerreportedlysaidduringhis visit to FrenchPremierGuy Mollet at the turning pointin thecrisison 6 November, theonlywaytheEuropean powerscould play a decisiverole in world affairswouldbe to buildEurope.No doubt seeking to playonFrenchresentment towardtheEnglishandtheAmericans, thechancellor added,“Europe will be yourre~enge.”~’ TheGermanstatesman’s remarks apparently hit themark.Butwhatdidhis geopolitical posturing haveto do with mundanenegotiations on European trade? Conclusive documentary evidence showsthattheFrenchandGerman governments hadalreadytakenthebasicdecisions on the commonmarket andEURATOM in September andearlyOctober1956,well beforethe high pointof the SuezCrisisin November.Onecouldargue,alongwith scholars suchasMilward,thatgeopolitical factorsin general,andSuezin particular, whichwerereallydrivenby the did not countfor muchin thesedecisions, of nationaleconomic andsocialprograms.58 I submitthata rerequirements view of FrenchandGermanforeignpolicy-making showsthatthe overlappingdisputes with the Americans overbotheconomic andsecurityissues, whichcameto a headjust asParisandBonnreformulated theirEuropean


49

strategies, providea fullerexplanation for thenewdiplomatic alignment that resulted in thecommonmarkettreaty. ThusSueztriggered sharppoliticalreactions, butthesereactions werenot the fundamental causeof the politicalshiftin Europethatoccurredin the fall of 1956.Policy-makers in Parisand Bonninterpreted the disloyalbehaviorof themaritimepowersin lightof yearsof bruisingfightsoverinternationaleconomicrelations, Atlanticstrategy, andpolicytowardthe Third World.Americanactions duringthecrisiscertainlydidnotreverseEuropean attitudestowardAtlanticties. Instead,by dramatizinglong-standing concerns,Suezunderscored theneedto lessenEurope’s strategic andeconomic dependence on theUnitedStates,a goalthatmanycontinental leadershad alreadycometo seeas essential. The recurringrumorsaboutconvertibility, thepossibility of Americansupport for theFreeTradeArea,thecontroversy overthe nuclearization of NATO strategy, andthe repercussions of thewar in AlgeriaclearlyweighedmoreheavilythantheSuezCrisisin France’s acceptance of a liberalcustoms union andGermany’s supportfor the “Euroof thedopean”bombprogram.59 Thischapteris tooshortfor a full account mesticand international bargainsthat resultedin the formationof the EuropeanCommunities. But evena brief overviewof the shiftsin French andGermanpolicytowardEuropein thelatesummerandearlyfall of 1956 canillustratehowthecrisisin Atlanticrelations facilitated theconsolidation of Little Europe. TheMollet Government wasrun by “goodEuropeans,” but theyfailedto pursuetheirdesigns for the regionaleconomic orderuntilearlySeptember 1956,whentopministers accepted theprincipleof integration throughtrade liberalization anddroppedtheirspringtime proposals for panEuropean industrialplanninganddemandmanagement. In subsequent interministerial negotiations, theprincipalplayerson theFrenchside,includingrepresentativesof producerinterests, elaborated furtherdemands regarding subsidies for imperialdevelopment, agriculture, and safeguard clausesdesignedto make the treatyacceptable to Parliament.6o France’snegotiating partners sometimes interpreted thesenewdemands asfreshevidence thattheFourth Republicmightneverbereadyto acceptthecommonmarket.But in Paris,a pagehadbeenturned. Whataccounts for thedecision by theFrenchgovernment to change course onEuropeat h sparticular time?Althoughmanyfactorsmaybe adduced, the decisivecausewastherealignment in domestic politicsthatresultedfromthe developments in Algeria.61 The Socialist-led government’s vigorousprosecutionof thewardestroyed thecenter-left alignment thathademerged fromthe January1956elections andled to thegradualreconstitution of a new “Europeanist coalition” in Parliament, whichincluded themaincenterandrightparties.62 One consequence, whichfurtherweakened supporton theleft,wasa scalingback of the government’s ambitious socialand economic programs

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andtheimposition of measures associated with a war economy.France’s intransigent standin Algeriaalsosharpened ongoingconflicts in NATO overpolicy towardtheThirdWorldandbroughtnewtensions withWashington63 Ironically, what critics bitterly termed “National-mol1etisme”-the Socialist government’s playfor nationalist support-pened theway for economic liberalssuchas ForeignMinisterChristianPineauand his advisor,economist RobertMarjolin,actingin accordwith organizedbusiness and the farming lobby,to seizethe initiativeon the commonmarket.The decisionby Mollet andhiscloseadvisors to put theempireandEuropeaheadof socialism coincidedwith a renewedpushfor militarycooperation with West Germany, which won additionalsupportfrom conservative politicalforces,including Gaullistssuchas DefenseMinisterMauriceBourg&Maunourywho had earlier sponsored theEURATOM proposaLM As always,for the Europeanist government in Paristhe key questionwas howto lineup supportin Bonn.Afterputtingforwardhisgovernment’s new line in Brussels, EuropeanAffairsMinisterMauriceFauretraveledto Berlin andBonnto presenthis caseto Germanleaders.In talkswith GermanForeignMinisterHeinrichvon Brentano,Faurelinkedprogress in Europeanintegrationto Franco-German armaments collaboration. He apparentlysurprisedvon Brentanoby suggesting that EURATOM mightalsobe extended to militaryusesof atomicenergy.FaurealsonotedthattheFrenchwouldnot opposeGermanacquisition of tacticalnuclearweapons.65 Like GeneralValluy, Fauresuggested that cooperation with Francewouldhelp,ratherthan hinder,Germaneffortsto acquireatomicweapons. In the meantime,Mollet attemptedto reinforceties with Londonbefore settlingon partnership with Bonn.Duringa meetingwith BritishPrimeMinisterAnthonyEdenin earlySeptember, theFrenchPremierproposed revivingJeanMonnet’sJune1940proposalto mergethe BritishCommonwealth andtheFrenchUnion.In the run-upto theSuezoperation, Molletremained attentiveto the sensibilities of his Britishpartners.66 But duringa visit to Bonnat theendof themonth,he agreedwith Adenauerthatthedangerthat theAnglo-Saxons wouldreturntothe“peripheral strategy” meantit wasnecessaryto build “LittleEurope.”Mollet arguedthat Franco-German cooperation was neededboth to completethe negotiations on the EEC and EURATOM, the success of whichwouldencourage Britishparticipation in Europeanaffairs,andto revivecontinental armaments cooperation. In response, Adenauerstatedthat his government would weigh France’sproposals regardingmilitarycooperation whensettingits positionson EURATOM and the commonmarket.67 The Mollet government, longawareof Britain’slack of supportfor Frenchpoliciesin Europe,andno doubtespecially frustrated by London’sditheringpreparations for the Suezinvasion,had apparently decidedto bet on the Franco-German axis.And theFederalRepublic’s leadersclearlywelcomedFrance’s choices.


51

Paris’scampaign for Germansupportsoonpaidoff. Chancellor Adenauer of the Bonngovernment’s positionon the EEC dominated the formulation andEURATOM,strongly favoringententewith Franceagainst theAtlanticists in hisgovernment, suchasEconomics MinisterLudwigErhard,whoargued that Germanyshouldpursuea new economicWelpoZitik.68 In public,the chancellor continued to stress the needfor full Britishparticipation in Europeanaffairs,69 but in government deliberations he staunchly supported “Little Europe.”Evenscholars who arguethatthe commonmarketwasestablishedprimarilyas an extensionof domesticeconomicpolicy or in the pursuitof commercial advantage acknowledge that the FederalRepublic’s stanceon Europewasdecidedby Chancellor Adenauer, andthatAdenauer’s policywasdrivenaboveall by geopoliticalconsideration^.^^ But theyhave not notedthatthe Germangovernment’s discussions of the EEC andEURATOM reallyturnedon twospecificissues: Europe’s placein theAtlanticAllianceandquestions of nuclearstrategy. First,theEuropeans neededto unite in orderto maintainsupportfromtheAmericans. ThusAdenauer arguedin earlyOctoberthatif the Europeans didnot conclude theEEC andEURATOM treatiesquickly,Americanisolationism mightgaintheupperhand.Whenan economic downturncame,Washington mightdecideit couldno longerbear the burdenof keepingits marketsopen,let alonethe costof leadingEurope’sdefense.71 Second, Europe,ratherthanNATO, mightbe thebestway for Germanyto regainthe rightto produceatomicweapons. As the chancellorput it duringa cabinetmeetingon 19 December1956:“Europewill to pushaheadwith the havea longerlife thanNATO. It is now necessary unificationof Europeand to produceatomicweaponsin the FederalReThe basicmessage wasclear:the unreliability of transatlantic ties requiredtighterEuropean economic andmilitarycooperation. The strategic issuesandthe economic issueswerethusvery tightlyboundup with each other. The showdown overBonn’sEuropeanpolicycameon 5 October1956, severalweeksbeforethe launchof the Suezoperation. Adenauer imposed acceptance of a negotiating positionthattookaccountof the mainFrench demands,overridingoppositionfrom EconomicsMinister Erhard and AtomicEnergyMinisterStraulJ. In oneof hismanyeffortsto blockthecommonmarket,Erhardsuggested thatthesix-power talksshouldbe postponed pendingfurtherconsultations with theBritishregarding theFreeTradeArea. TheChancellor, seconded by therepresentative of theForeignMinistry,opposedanydelayonthegrounds thattheBritishwereonlypursuing theFree TradeArea because of the dangerthatBritainwouldbe excludedfromthe commonmarket.Led by the chancellor, thecabinetrejectedErhard’s objectionsoneafterthe other.Whenthe discussion turnedto EURATOM,Strauls arguedthatthe atomicenergycommunity wouldrepresent moreof a sacrificethananadvantage fortheGermans. Adenauer’s response, asrecorded in

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the officialcabinetminutes,was unequivocal: “[TheChancellor] wantedto use EURATOM as the quickestway to gain the optionto producenuclear weapons.” ThiswasjustwhattheFrenchhadbeenhintingat sincethesummer. Adenauerfurtherarguedthat EURATOM would be worthwhileeven thoughGermanywould not be able to catchup with France’slead in researchfor sometime.73 Despitedecisions by the FrenchandGermansto favorsix-powerintegration,thenegotiations ontheEEC andEURATOM continued to facemajorobstacles.Indeed,the OctoberForeignMinistersconference reachedan impassebecause the FrenchandGermanrepresentatives wereunableto reach a workablecompromise on two crucialproblems:harmonization of social policiesand ownershipof fissilematerials.Mollet andAdenauerovercame this deadlockduringa meetingheld in Parison 6 November,at the high pointof the SuezCrisis.The Frenchdroppedtheirdemandthatregulations on overtimepay be harmonized, in exchangefor the right to invokesafeguardclauses on behalfof industries harmedby competition fromcountries withlongerworkweeks.And theGermansfinallyaccepted theideathatEURATOM wouldenjoya monopolyoverfissilematerials unlessthecommunity was unableto providesufficientsupplies,in which casememberstates would be authorizedto make purchases from third parties.’*At the same time,theGermansalsoagreedto Frenchproposals regardingclosercooperationin weaponsdevelopment, underWEU auspices if possible, or on a bilateralbasisif necessary.’j Negotiating overtheheadsof theirEuropean partners,the two governments had formulateda compromise settlement of the main outstanding issues,a settlementthat would find its way almostunchangedintothe EEC andEURATOM treaties.

CONCLUSION FrenchandGermandissatisfaction with theAtlanticsystemdrovethe political decisionsthat led to the establishment of the EuropeanCommunities. The SuezCrisismattered,but only as a trigger,not as a fundamental cause. Thespecialcircumstances of theSuezCrisisspurredthedecisionby theleadersof FranceandGermanyto cooperate in establishing Europeanstructures thatwouldforman autonomous zoneof economic policyandstrengthen the Continent’s influencein NATO. Suezalsopushedpublicandparliamentary opinionin bothParisandBonntowardEuropeanintegration as an alternative to Atlanticcooperation, makingit possibleto strikea deal with little worryaboutthedomestic repudiation thathadkilledtheEDC. Butthepackagedealagreedon by theFrenchandGermansin November1956-a liberal customsunionflankedby sectoralagreements for agriculture, imperialdevelopmentand,lastbut not least,strategic industries-represented a practi-

cal compromisebetweenthe key policy requirementsof long-standing FrenchandGermaneconomicandstrategic programs. The reorganization of theEuropeaneconomicorderwasthustheresult,notof anysingleincident, howeverdramatic,but of persistent tensions withinthe Atlanticsystemacting upondomesticeconomic policyprocesses. Continentalperspectives on Europeanintegrationreflectedthe experienceof yearsof disputes with the “Anglo-Saxon” powers.Fundamental questions regardingthe durabilityof Atlanticeconomic tiesandthe reliability of extendeddeterrence pushedthe Frenchand Germangovernmentstoward a new strategicand economicpartnershipyears before ColonelNassernationalizedthe SuezCanal.As part of its grandstrategy, the United Statesconsistently supported Europeanunity, but in practice its supportseemedto dolittle to bringtheEuropeans together.Rather,the United Statesplayeda crucialrole in the integrationprocessby making attempts-often unsuccessful-tolimit its European engagements in order to protectAmerica’sdomesticeconomichealth and socialvitality. As muchas anyspecificpolicypursuedby the UnitedStates,it wastheseattemptsto lightenits Atlanticburdensthat generated the feelingthat, as ChancellorAdenauerput it in November1956, Europeneededto “unite againstAmeri~a.”’~

NOTES Thisessaybeganasa paperpresented at theJune1996meeting of theSocietyforHistoriansof AmericanForeignRelationsin Boulder,Colorado.I thankMonikaDickhaus,JamesEllison,DouglasForsyth,WolframKaiser,LawrenceKaplan,Vojtech Mastny,TimothyNaftali,LeopoldoNuti, LorenzaSebesta, Mark Sheetz,HubertZimmermann, andtwo anonymous reviewersfor theJournalof EuropeanIntegration Historyfor helpfulsuggestions andadvice.I remainresponsible for all remaining errorsof factor interpretation. 1.Journalo f f i e lde la Rgpublique frantaise,Assemblge nationale,Dkbats,17 January 1957,p. 107. 2. JanetFlanner, ParisJournal,19441965(NewYork:Atheneum, 1965),324. 3. Seefor example AlfredGrosser, “Suez, Hungary,andEuropean Integration,” ZnternationalOrganization 11(1957):470-480; DavidReynolds, OneWorldDivisible: A GlobalHistorySince1945(New York:Norton,2000),128-129. 4. SeeHannsJiirgenKiisters,Fondements de la communautg kconomique eur(Brussels: Officedespublications officielles desCommunautks europkennes opkenne andEditionsLabor,19901,esp.211-216, 356;thisis an updatededitionof Kusters’ originalstudy,Die Griindungder Europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (BadenBaden:Nomos,1982).In a parallelstudyon EURATOM, PeterWeilemannalsounderlinedthe importance of the SuezCrisisfor Frenchpolicy.SeePeterWeilemann, Die Anfangeder Europaischen Atomgemeinschaft: Zur Griindungsgeschichte von Nomos,19831,131. ELRATOM,195557 (Baden-Baden:

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5. HannsJurgenKusters,“WestGermany’s ForeignPolicyin WesternEurope, in Western Europeand Germany:7beBegin1949-1957: The Art of the Possible,” ningsof European Integration, ed. ClemensWurm (Providence: Berg,1995),69. 6. Alan S. Milward, 7beReconstruction of WesternEurope,1945-51 (Berkeley andLosAngeles:Universityof CaliforniaPress,19841,ch. 12;FrancesLynch,“ResolvingtheParadoxof theMonnetPlan:NationalandInternational Planningin FrenchReconstruction,” Economic HistoryReview,2ndser.,37, no.2 (May 1984):223-243. 7. Alan S. Milward,“Entscheidungsphasen derWestintegration,” in WestdeutschKontrolle,Integration, ed. LudolfHerbst(Munich: land,1945-1955:Unterwerfung, Oldenbourg, 19861,231-245; idem,TheEuropean Rescue of theNation-State, 2d. ed. (LondonandNew York: Routledge, 2000);esp.ch. 4; idem,“TheSpringsof Integration,”and“TheSocialBasesof MonetaryUnion?” in 7beQuestion of Europe,eds.Peter GowanandPerryAnderson (LondonandNew York:Verso,19971,5-20, 149-161; Alan S. Milward, et al., 7%eFrontierof NationalSovereignty: Historyand neory, 1945-1992(LondonandNew York: Routledge, 1993). 8. FrancesLynch,“Restoring France:The Roadto Integration,” in Milward,et al., 7beFrontierof NationalSovereignty, esp.59-60, 86-87; cf. Milward,EuropeanRescueof theNation-State, 214-215. For anotherargument thatSuezhadlittleeffecton the negotiation of the RomeTreaties,seeWilfried Loth,“Vertragsverhandlungen bei abklingender Europabegeisterung: einezeitgeschichtliche Einordnung,” Integration 3 (1987), esp.110-111,113. 9. AndrewMoravcsik,7beChoice for Europe:SocialPutposeand StatePower fromMessinatoMaastricht(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1998),ch. 2; cf. Hubert Zimmermann’s reviewof 7beChoice for Europein theJournalof European IntegrationHistory5, no. 2 (1999): 142-145. 10. For the OEECbackground to theprocess of Europeanintegration, seeRichard T. Griffiths,“TheEuropeanIntegration Experience, 1945-58,”in KeithMiddlemas,et al., Orchestrating Europe:TheInformalPoliticsof EuropeanUnion,1973-95(London:Fontana,19951,ch. 1;idem,ed.,Explorations in OEECHistory(Paris:Organisationfor Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, 1997). 11. PaulMarshPitman111, “France’s EuropeanChoices: The PoliticalEconomyof EuropeanIntegrationin the 1950s,”Ph.D. diss.(New York: ColumbiaUniversity, 19971, ch. 1; Wendy AsbeekBrusse,Tar$%,Trade,and EuropeanIntegration, 1947-1957 From StudyGroupto CommonMarket(New York: St. Martin’sPress, 1997). 12. GeirLundestad, ‘Empire”byIntegration: TheUnitedStatesandEuropean Integration,19451997(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,19981,ch. 4-5. 13. On theEisenhower administration’s grandstrategy anditsdomestic rationales, seeMarc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace:TheMakingof theEuropeanSettlePrinceton UniversityPress,1999),147-156;JohnLewis ment,1945-1963(Princeton: Gaddis,Strategies of Containment: A CriticalAppraisalof PostwarAmericanNationalSecurity Policy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,19821,ch. 5; RobertGriffith, “DwightD. Eisenhower andtheCorporate Commonwealth,” American Historical ReIn theShadowof the GarrisonState: view87 (1982): 87-122; AaronL. Friedberg, America’sAnti-Statism and Its Cold War Strategy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,2000), ch. 2-3.


55

14. FedericoRomero,“Interdependence and Integration in AmericanEyes:From the MarshallPlanto CurrencyConvertibility,” in Milward,et al., TheFrontierof Na155-181;Councilon ForeignEconomic Policy,ReporttothePrestionalSovereignty, identand Congress (Washington: UnitedStatesGovernment PrintingOffice, 1954), esp.1-10, 14-15, 43-52, 72-75. ForeignEconomic Policy, 15. BurtonI. Kaufman,Tradeand Aid: Eisenhower’s 1953-3961(Baltimore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,19821,ch. 2-3; Romero,“Interdependence andIntegration in AmericanEyes,”160-1651, 16. See,for example,Memorandum of Conversation, Couillardwith StateDepartof theUnitedStates,195557 mentOfficials,21 December1955,ForeignRelations (FRUS, 1955-57) (Washington, D.C.: United StatesGovernmentPrintingOffice, Talks,14 May 1956,ibid.,4: 438441;Re19861,4: 374-76; Recordof Dulles-StraulS portof the Subcommittee on RegionalEconomicIntegration to the Councilon ForeignEconomic Policy,15 November1956,ibid.,482-86. 17. Milward,European Rescueof theNation-State, 383-420;PaulM. Pitman,“The FrenchCrisisandthe Dissolution of theEuropeanPayments Union,1956-58,”in Explorationsin OEECHistoy ,ed. Griffiths,213-227. 18. Seefor exampleOIlivierl W[ormserl,“Notea s . convertibilitk de la livre,”19 January1953,Ministeredesaffairesetrangsres (MAE), Paris,Directionkonomique, Servicede coop&ationkonomique(DECE) 197; idem,“NotepourI’Ambassadeur, SecrktairegCn6ra1,a s . nouvellesperspectives dansle domainede la coop6ration Cconomique et financisreinternationale,” 4 May 1954,DECE 197. 19. On Americanfinancialpressurein September andOctober1954,seeIrwin M. Wall, 7beUnitedStatesand theMakingof PostwarFrance,19451954(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress,1991),286-295. A Constructed Peace,150. 20. Eisenhower quotedin Trachtenberg, 21. For the bestaccountof whatmotivated Britishpolicy,seeJamesR. V. Ellison, Threatening Europe:BritainandtheCreationof theEuropean Community (London andNew York:MacmillanandSt. Martin’sPress,2000). 22. This accountof FrenchpolicyfollowsFrancesLynch’spathbreaking analysis of theFourthRepublic’s foreigneconomic policy,aswell astheresultsof my ownreand imperialprojects.SeeFrancesLynch,Franceand searchon military-industrial theInternationalEconomy: From Vichyto the Treatyof Rome(Londonand New York: Routledge,1997) and Pitman,“France’s EuropeanChoices.” SeealsoGerard Bossuat’s detailedaccount,LEuropedesfranGais,1943-1959:La N e Rgpublique (Paris:Publications de la Sorbonne, 1996). auxsources delEuropecommunautaire 23. ThomasRhenisch, Europaische Integrationund industrielles Interesse:Die deutsche Industrieund die Griindungder Europaischen Wirtschaftgemeinschaft, Beihefte der Vierteljahrschrift f i r Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, no. 152 (Stuttgart: FranzSteinerVerlag,1999). 24. “Gemeinsamer Markt,”4 October1956, 210-225-30-01/1208/56,Politisches ArchivdesAuswartigen Amts (PAAA), Berlin,BuroStaatssekret3r 155,vol. 2. For furtherexplicationof thisdocument, seeWernerAbelshauser, “‘IntCgration P la carte’: The Primacyof Politicsand the EconomicIntegrationof WesternEuropein the in TheConstruction of Europe:Bsaysin Honour of EmileNoel,ed. Stephen 1950s,” Martin (Dordrecht:KluwerAcademic Publications, 1994),17-18.

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25. Seethe superbstudyby Monika Dickhaus,Die Bundesbank im westeuropaischenWiederauflau:Die internationaleWahrungspolitik der Bundesrepublik derVierteljahreshefte f i r Zeitgeschichte, Deutschland, 1948bis1958,Schriftenreihe vol. 72 (Munich:Oldenbourg, 1996). 26. On BOM’S Europeanpolicy,seeHamsJurgenKusters,“DerStreitum Kompetenzenund KonzeptionendeutscherEuropapolitik,1949-1958,” in VomMar-

in diewestshallplanzurEWG:DieEingliederung derBundesrqublik Deutschland liche Welt, ed. Werner Buhrer, Ludolf Herbst, and Hanno Sowade (Munich: Oldenbourg,19901,335-370; for Adenauer’s dominantrole in West Germanforeign policy, see GottfriedNiedhart,“Aul-jenpolitikin der &a Adenauer,” in Moim WiederauJbau, ed.Axel SchildtandArnoldSywottek(Bonn:Dietz, dernisierung

19931,805-818.

27. AndreasWilkens,“DasProgrammvon La Celle-St.Cloud:Der Aufbauder deutsch-franzosischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, 1954-57,” Revuedxllemagne25 (1993): 565-580. 28. On DutchpolicyseeRichardT. Griffiths,“TheBeyenPlan,”and“TheCommon and theIntegrationof Europe,19451957,ed.Richard Market,”in TbeNetherlands NEHA, 19901,165-182 and183-208. T. Griffiths(Amsterdam: 29. SeePinayto Felix Gaillard,chiefof the FrenchDelegation to the Intergovernmental Committee,12 July 1955, enclosing“Instructions pour la Delegation,” (AN), Paris:Secretariat generaldu comiteinterministeriel pourles Archivesnationales questionsde cooperationeconomiqueeuropeenne(SGCI), 121.9; O[livierl W[ormser],“Notepourle President [Pinay],” 10 October1955,MAE: OfficeFilesof Olivier Wormser,Directeurdesaffaireseconomiques et financikres (DE) 11;“L‘Instauration d’unmarchecommunen Europe,” LeMonde,13October1955. 30. For example,seeMoravcsiksaccounts of the Mollet government’s European on evidencefrommemoirsandoralhistory policy,whichdependalmostexclusively interviews thatwereprepareddecades later:AndrewMoravcsik, “WhytheEuropean Community Strengthens the State:DomesticPoliticsandInternational Cooperation,” HarvardUniversityCenterfor EuropeanStudiesWorkingPaper,no. 52 (Cambridge: versionin idem,TbeChoice forEurope, CES,ca. 19941,3C-36, andthemorecautious 103-122, 137-50. 31. Althoughthe thrustof the Mollet government’s internaldebateson European havemissedthe signifipolicyappearedin the press,previoushistoricalaccounts position.Key archivalsources, whichhaveapparcanceof the resultingnegotiating entlybeenoverlooked or neglected by otherscholars, include:“Projetde memorandumdu gouvernement frangais surI’etablissement d u nmarchecommun(deuxikme redaction),” 22 May 1956,AlainSavaryPapers,Fondation nationale dessciences polidu Conseil,“Resume desdecisions du cornit6intertiques,Paris,SV 19; Presidence ministeriel du lundi,28 mai 1956,”28 May 1956,SGCI 121.9. Europe,ch.3. 32. SeeEllison,Tbreatening 33. SeePitman,“TheFrenchCrisisandthe Dissolution of the EuropeanPayments Union,1956-58.” affairsin the 1950sis Trachtenberg, A 34. The bestaccountof Atlanticstrategic Constructed Peace,ch.4-6. Nationalperspectives appearin JanMelissen,TbeStruggleforNuclearPartnership: Britain,the UnitedStates,and theMakingof an Ambiguous Alliance,1952-1959(Groningen:Styx Publications, 1993);Ian Clark,Nu-


57

clearDiplomacyand theSpecialRelationship (Oxford:Clarendon,1994);Georges franco-allemands, Soutou,L ’Allianceincertaine:les rapportspolitico-stratkgiques 19541996(Paris:Fayard,1996),ch. 2-3; BrunoThols,“DerBeitrittder Bundesre-

von Blockbildung und publikDeutschland zur WEU und NATO im Spannungsfeld Entspannung (1954-1956),in Die NATO-Option, vol. 3 of Anfangewestdeutscher 19451956,ed. Militargeschlichthiches Forschungsamt (Munich: Sicherheitspolitik, Oldenbourg, 19931,1-234. 35. For the terms“forwarddefense” and“peripheral strategy,” seeMarcTrachtenberg,HistoryandStrategy(Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress,19911,153-160. 36. On the development of the Eurafricanidea in postwarstrategic thought,see ClaudedAbzac-Epezy and PhilippeVial, “In Searchof a EuropeanConsciousness: Europe: FrenchMilitaryElitesandtheIdeaof Europe,1947-54,”in BuildingPostwar 3948-63,ed.AnneDeighton NationalDecision-Makers andEuropeanInstitutions, (London:St. Martin’sPressfor St. Antony’sCollege,19951,1-19. 37. SeeTrachtenberg, History andStrategy, 16C-168. 38. On the FourthRepublic’s atomicpolicy,seeMauriceVa’isse,“LeChoixatomSiBcle,no. 36 (December19921,21-30 and iquedela France(1945-19581,’’VingtiBme DominiqueMongin,La Bombeatomique fraqaise,1945-1958(Brussels andParis: 1997),esp.pt. 4. An acBruylantandLibrariegeneralede droitet de jurisprudence, countof Paris’squestfor aid appearsin Pitman,“France’s EuropeanChoices,” ch. 6. 39. On M C 4 8 seeMarcTrachtenberg, “La Formationdu systPme de defenseoccidentale:Les Etats-Unis,la France,et MC48,” in La Franceet I’OTAN, ed. Maurice Vai’sse,PierreMelandri,and Fri:di:ricBozo (Brussels:Editionscomplexe,19961, 115-127. 40. Valluyto Guillaume,No. 542/DFGP/TS,“Plande possibilites,” 13August1954, Papersof PierreMendPsFrance,InstitutPierreMendesFrance,Box CED 2. For furthermaterialon the Frenchresponse to the nuclearization of NATO war plans,see otherdocuments in the samebox, includingH[ervC]A[lphandl,“Notepourle President[MendPsl,” 14 August1954. 41. Thisquotationappears on pp. 5-6 in Valluy’sletter,citedabove. 42. [GeneralJacquesFaure],Cabinetdu ministre,MinistPrede la Defensenationale,“Fiche,” ca. 12 September 1954,DE 10. 43. This accountfollowsthe versionof the minutespublishedby RogerWybot, in the “affairedesfuites,”a scandal sparkedby pressreportsof oneof the principals leaksfrom the Comiti:de defensenationale.Facsimileof “ProcPs-verbal du Comite de defensenationale,”10 September1954,in PhilippeBernert,RogerWybotet la de la Cite,19751,annex. bataillepourla DST(Paris:Presses Revue 44. SeeLeopoldoNuti,“LeR6le de 1’Italiedanslesnegociations trilaterales,” 104 (1991), 142. d’histoire diplomatique du trait6 dEURATOM,”Relations 45. PierreGuillen,“La Franceet la negociation no. 44 (Winter1985):391-412. internationales, 46. PeterFischer,Atomenergie undstaatliches Interesse:dieAnfangederAtompolitikin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 19491955,Internationale Politik und Nomos,19941, Sicherheit, Bd. 30, NuclearHistoryProgram,no. 3 (Baden-Baden: 201-223, 274282. 47. For the development of West Germanpolicy on atomicenergyand nuclear weapons seePeterFischer,“DieReaktionderBundesregierung auf dieNuklearisierung

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der westlichenVerteidigung(1952-1958),” Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen52 (1993): 105-132; idem.,Atomenergie undstaatliches Znteresse; Hans-PeterSchwarz, Der Staatsmann, vol. 2 of Adenauer (StuttgartDeutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1991;reprint, PlanMunich:Deutsche Taschenbuch Verlag,1994);andAxel F. Gablink,Strategische ungenin derBundesrepublik Deutschland, 19551967,Politische KontrolleodwmilInternationale Politikund Sicherheit, Bd. 30, NuclearHistory itarische Notwendigkeit? Nomos,1996). Program,no. 5 (Baden-Baden: 48. See Dulles-Makins meetings,29 Juneand 13 July 1956,and Edento Eisenhower,18July1956,FRUS, 1955-57, 4: 84-92. NewYorkTimes,14July1956. 49. “Radford TermsNew ArmsVital to ServiceCuts,” 50. See“Gesprache uberRustungsbeschljdnkungen in denUSA und England,” 20 July 1956, in Die Kabinettsprotokolle der Bundesregierung, vol. 9, 1956 (Kabinettsprotokole 19561,comp.UrsulaHullbusch,ed. FriedrichP. Kahlenberg (Munich: Oldenbourg, 19981,pp. 484-489.The passage citedfrom Adenauerappearson p. 486, thatfromStraugon p. 487. Comparethe furtherdiscussion of thesamethemes, 1956,501-502. “Radford-Plan,” 26 July1956,Kabinettsprotokolle 51. StrauBwasnameddefenseministeron 16 October1956.A fine surveyof the Umriistungcrisisappearsin ChristianGreiner,“Die MilitarischeEingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die WEU und die NATO 1954 bis 1957,”in Die vol. 3 of Anfangewestdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik, 19451956,ed. NATO-Option, MiliMrgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Munich:Oldenbourg,19931,707-786. Com(Berlin:Siedler,1989), pareStrauB’saccountin FranzJosefStraul3,Die Erinnerungen 268-334 52. “Aufzeichnung uberdie Sitzungder StandingGroupam Freitag,den 27.7.56, 10.30Uhr,”Bundesarchiv Militararchiv(BAMA), Freiburg m i Breisgau,BW 17/37,ff. 84-87. 53. Heusinger,“Aufzeichnung uber ein Gesprachmit GeneralValluy von der Standing Groupund Mr. Allan Dullesvom CIA,” BAMA: BW 17/37,ff. 93-96. (Note that Heusingermet Valluy and Dullesseparately.) For an accountof thisexchange that drawson additional,still classifiedGermansources,seeGero von Gersdorff, “Westeuropaische Verteidigungskooperation und atlantischeBundnispraferenz: Wegewestdeutscher Zielsetzungen, 1949-1958,”in Ausder Ohnmachtzur Biindin derBundesrepublik Deutschland, 19451960,ed. nisrnacht: DasMachproblem FranzKnippingand Klaus-Jurgen Muller (Paderborn,Munich,Vienna,and Zurich: FerdinandSchoningh, 1995),227. 54. In April andSeptember the Mollet government put forwardmemoranda calling for intensiveFranco-German collaboration in the armaments sector.SeeDocumentsdiplomatiques franGais(DDF) 1956,2: 394, n. 2; “MCmorandum,” 25 September 1956,DDF 1956,3: 201-202. 55. Unfortunately, mostrecentstudiesconcentrate almostexclusivelyon AngloAmericanrelations. While thesearerelativelyeasyto research, theyarenot the only significant aspects of the affair.Representative worksincludeKeithKyle, Suez(London:WeidenfeldandNicholson, 1992);DianeKunz,B eEconomic Diplomacy of the SuezCrisis(ChapelHill: Universityof NorthCarolinaPress,1991);andThomasRisseAmongDemocracies: 7beEuropean Influenceon U S .Foreign Kappen,Cooperation PrincetonUniversityPress,19951,ch. 4. Broaderapproaches apPolicy(Princeton: pearin BrianMcCauley,“Hungary andSuez,1956:The Limitsof SovietandAmerican


59

Power,” Journalof Contemporary History16 (1981): 777-800;WinfriedHeinemann Krisenjahr, 1956.Polen,Ungarn, andNorbertWiggershaus, eds.,Dasinternationale 48 (Munich:Oldenbourg,1999);and Irwin M. Suez,Beitragezur Militargeschichte, Wall, France,the UnitedStates,and theAlgerianWar(Berkeley,Los Angeles,and London:Universityof CaliforniaPress,2001), ch. 2. 56. See“Proc&-verbal desentretiens franco-allemands [6 November19561,”DDF 1956,3: 234-237. 57. ChristianPineau,1956,Suez(Paris:RobertLaffont,1976),191. Comparethe 19761951(Frankfurt accountof thismeetingin WilhelmG. Grewe,Riickblenden, am Main, Berlin,andVienna:Propylaen,1979),283-290. 58. SeeMilwardsworkscitedin note8 above. 59. SeeWinfriedHeinemann,“1956als dasKrisenjahr der NATO,”in Das internationaleKrisenjahr1956,ed. HeinemannandWiggershaus, 615-637. 60. Thisprocessis well-documented in SGCI 122.21. 61. For more supportingevidence,see Pitman,“France’sEuropeanChoices,” 304-320; comparethe lateReneGirault’spenetrating analysis, “La Franceentre1’Europe et I’Afrique,”in I1 Rilanciodell’Europae i trattatidi Roma,ed. EnricoSerra (Baden-Baden: Nomos,19891,351-378. seeJacquesChapsal,La Viepolitiqueen 62. For thesepoliticaldevelopments, Francede19402 1958,2d ed.(Paris:Presses universitaires de France,1990),ch. 15; et l’impuissance, 1952-58,vol. 2 of La Francedela Jean-Pierre Rioux,L’Expansion Quatrigme Rkpublique, rev. ed. (Paris:Editionsdu Seuil,1983),117-127; Georgette des tourmentes,19541959,pt. 3 of Histoirede la IVe Elgey, La Rkpublique Rkpublique (Paris:Fayard,1992), 1: 407-456. 63. See Heinemann,“1956als Krisenjahrder NATO,” 616 and, more generally, Conflict MatthewConnelly,“TakingOff the Cold War Lens:Visionsof North-South AmericanHistoricalReuiew105(2000): duringtheAlgerianWar for Independence,” 739-769. 64. AlthoughBourgPs pursueda careerasa Radicalpartypolitician, he maintained closeties with the Gaullists.See Paul Marcus,MauriceBourggs-Maunoury; un rkpublicainindivisible(Biarritz:Atlantica,1997); Annkepolitique,1956 (Paris: Presses universitaires de France,1957),69, 71. 65. Earlieraccountsof thesetalkshavefollowedthe publishedFrenchrecords, on atomicweapons.See“Conwhichomitall referenceto Faure’scrucialcomments 1956,”DDF versationentreM. MauriceFaureet M. Erhard?i Berlin,le 16 septembre 1956,2: 384-387; Bonnto Paris,17 September 1956,DDF 1956,2: 387-388; “ConP versationentreMM. MauriceFaure,von Brentanoet Hallstein,lundi17 septembre, 16heures,” DDF 1956,2: 392-394; “Conversation entreMM. Faure,le chancelier Aden2 17 h. 15,” DDF 1956,2: 395-396; Bouverat, aueret Hallstein,lundi 17 septembre, [onFaure-vonBrentano-Hallstein talks,17 September 19561,”19 Sep“Aufzeichnung tember1956,PAAA: Abt. 2, bd. 922. havedivulgedlittle relatedto thisinitiative,whichmay 66. As yet,Frencharchives to keeptheBritishon boardat a delhavesimplybeena tacticalmaneuverdesigned icate moment.The best sourceremainsthe extensivedocumentation in Public RecordOffice,Kew: PREM 11/1352. diplomatiques de la France?i l’etranger,2 October 67. Paristo Representants “Kurzprotokoll uberdie Besprechungen 1956,DDF 1956,2: 493-496;[Karl]Carstens,

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zwischendem Herrn Bundeskanzler, dem Herrn Bundesminister desAuswartigen unddemH e m Staatssekretar desAuswartigen ArntesunddemH e m franzosischen 1956,”1 October1956, Aussenminister und Staatssekretar Fauream 29. September to thankthe archivists who PAAA: Abt. 2, bd. VS-3666.I wishto takethisoccasion helpedprocessmy requestto declassify thisdocument. 68. In additionto Daniel Koerfer’sclassicaccountof the Adenauer-Erhard feud, KampfurnsKanzleramt: ErhardundAdenauer (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988),seeHannsJurgenKusters,“Adenauers Europapolitik im Griindungsphase der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,” Vierteljahreshefte f u r Zeitgeschichte 42 europaischen (1994): 646673and Ulrich Enders,“Integration oderKooperation? LudwigErhard Zusammenarbeit, und Frantz Etzel irn Streit uber die Politik der europaischen f u r Zeitgeschichte 45 (1997): 143-171; BrunoTho& 1954-1956,” Vierteljahreshefte “Die Doppelkrisevon Suezund Budapestin ihren Auswirkungen auf Adenauers Krisenjahr,1956,ed. SicherheitsundEuropapolitik 1956/57,”in Das internationale HeinemannandWiggershaus, 573-588. 69. Cf. Adenauer’s25 September1956 speechto the Grandesconferences catholiques in Brussels in KonradAdenauer, Reden,1917-1967: EineAuswahl,ed. Hans-Peter Schwarz(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 19751,327-332. 197-198, 329-331; 70. See,e.g.,Milward,EuropeanRescueof theNation-State, for Europe,90-95, 136-137. Moravcsik,Choice 3 October1956,Kabinettsprotokolle 1956,610. 71. “Weiterentwicklung Europas,” Adenauer’s argument responded to thesamepressconference thatJanetFlannerhad commented on in her diary(seenote 3 above).SeealsoAdenauer’s 19 December onBritishandAmericandisengagement fromNATO, “Tagung desAt1956comments 1956,776. lantikrates in Paris,’’19 December1956,Kabinettesprotokolle 72. Adenauer’s argumentprefiguredcurrentEuropeanviewson Atlanticties,as shownby recentcomments madeby a Germanofficial:“Whilewe believethatNATO will remainimportantto Germanyin thenextfive to tenyears,the futureof ourforeignanddefensepolicylieswith theEuropeanUnion,not NATO.”Adenauercitedin ChristianGreiner,“DieBundesrepublik Deutschland als ‘Machtfaktor’ in der NATO, zur Bundnismacht, eds.KnippingandMuller, 210 1954-57,” in Ausder Ohnmacht (notethata morerecentlypublished versionof the 19 December1956cabinetminsee utesreplacesthe referenceto producingatomicweaponswith a euphemism; 1956, “TagungdesAtlantikrates in Paris,”19 December1956,Kabinettsprotokolle 775); unidentified Germanofficialcitedin SethG. Jones,“Letterto the Editor,”ForeignAffairs80, no. 5 (September-October 20011,180. 73. “Gemeinsamer Markt und EURATOM,” 5 October1956,Kabinettsprotokolle 1956,620-629.ThequotefromAdenauer appears onpage626. Furtherdetailsonthe cabinetdebate appearin “Ergebnisprotokoll uber die Ressortsbesprechung im Auswartigen Arnt am 6. Oktoberuberdie ProblemedesGemeinsamen Marktesund EURATOM,”Bundesarchiv (BA), Koblenz:B 138/722. 74. AdenauerandMolletapproved a packagedealontheEEC andEURATOM that Thesecondary literahadbeenhammered out by RobertMarjolinandKarl Carstens. of whatthedealsupposedly included;for the turecontains severaldifferentversions seeEnclosure to Letter,Adenauer to Balke,7 November actualtextof theagreement, 1956,BA: B 138/723.


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75. ArianeIllig, “Aufzeichnung,” 9 November1956,PAAA: BuroStaatssekretar, Bd. 278;UeanFrancois-Poncetl, “Note2 I’attention de M. Jurgensen,” 20 November1956, MAE: Europe,Gi.nCraliti.s,1945-60,185. 76. See“Proces-verbal desentretiens franco-allemands (6 November19561,”DDF 1956,3: 235.


3

TriggerhappyProtestant Materialists? The European ChristianDemocrats and the UnitedStates WolframKaiser

The studyof international relations,in the UnitedStatesespecially, is dominatedby two basictheoreticalapproaches: realismand liberalism.Realists focuson policy-makingat the statelevel; policy is analyzedin termsof powerandgeopolitical interestanddomesticpoliticalforcesarenot seenas playinga majorrole in the makingof foreignpolicy.Liberals,on the other hand,emphasize therole of interestgroupsin foreignpolicy-making in pluralistdemocracies: policymakerstend,in theirview,to respondto pressure from well-organized groups,especiallyfrom groupsthat are importantin electoralterms.Socioeconomic andcommercial interestis generallyseenas,for example,in theliberalintergovernmentalist analysis of postwarEuropeanintegration-as the principalsourceof suchpressure.' The realistand liberalapproaches differin manyways,but bothproceedfromthe assumption that politicalleadersmake rationalchoices-choices basedon recognizableinterests. of theColdWar andof US.-European Mostcontemporary historical studies relationsarebased,if onlyimplicitly,on thatsamesortof assumption-ven whenthosestudiesare not directlyinformedby eithersortof theory.Those worksgenerallytreatforeignpolicyastheoutcomeof rational,interest-based choicesby elites,and tend to ignorethe wider culturalcontextin which decision-making takesplace.Historians, moreover, tendasa ruleto focuson intergovernmental relations; nongovernmental transnational communities, on theotherhand,donotreceivemuchattention. In today'sworld,a worldcharacterizedby rapid globalisation and growinginterdependence, the role of transnational actors-nongovernmental organisations, for example+learly groups cannotbe ignored.Butevenin theearlypostwarperiod,transnational werealreadyplayinga majorrolein theAtlanticworld. 63

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It is important to dealwith theseissuesin a way thattakessuchrealities into account. Suchan approach is in factavailable: international politicscan be approached fromwhathascometo be calleda “constructivist” pointof view.Constructivists do notview powerandinfluencein essential materialist terms.Theyemphasize the importance of suchfactorsas identity,ideology,andhistorical consciousness; theystudytheirimpacton interestformation and preferences; they seek to show how foreign policy-making processes areculturally embedded, howpolicychoices arepath-dependent, andhowinternational conflictcanresultfromclashes of cultureandnotjust interests.* Thischapterwill dealin thatspiritwiththeWestEuropean Christian Democratsandwith theirattitudes towardtheUnitedStatesduringtheearlyCold War p e r i ~ dThis . ~ sortof approachis particularly appropriate in this case. In the West Europeanparliamentary democracies with their strongparty traditions, politicalpartieswereboundto play an importantrole in foreign policy-making. Ideasandattitudes developed in a partycontext-a context shapedby history,religion,ideology,and culturein general.Focusingon politicalpartiescanthushelpbringouttherolethatcultureplayedin shapingperceptions, andsometimes in shaping policy.And focusing on political partiesnotjustin a national,butratherin a transnational context,canbring outsomeimportantaspects of whatwasgoingon in relations betweenthe UnitedStatesandEuropeasa whole. The ChristianDemocratsformed an importantand quite cohesive transnational communityin postwarcontinentalWesternEurope.They wereinitiallythelargestpartyin everystatein theEuropean CoalandSteel Community(ECSC), foundedin 1951-1952, and the EuropeanEconomic Community(EEC), foundedin 1957-1958-in somecases,theywere the dominantparty-and had a decisiveinfluenceon nationalforeignpolicies and on the development of Europeaninstitutions. Thosenationalparties werelinked toeachotherin variousways.On theformallevel,theycooperated,from 1947on,withintheframework of theNouvellesEquipes Internationales ( N E I t a norganization thatdeveloped eventually intothe European People’sParty (EPP), now the largestfaction in the European Parliament.And leadingChristianDemocraticpoliticiansalso met informally(andsecretly)in Genevabetween1947and1955to discuss, aboveall, questions relatingto Europeanintegration andto East-Westrelations. They alsogottogetherin theAssembly of the Councilof Europe(from1949on) andin the parliaments of the ECSC andthe EEC, andof coursetherewere frequentmeetings at the governmental level.*In thesemeetings, basicpolitical,social,andeconomicissueswereregularlydiscussed; the Christian Democraticleaderswere especiallyinterested in the questionof Western Europe’sfuturerolein theworldandthusin thequestion of Europe’s relationshipwith the UnitedStates.

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At firstglance,theChristianDemocrats’ relationship with theUnitedStates in thepostwarperiodmightappearveryharmonious. Afterall, theChristian Democrats opted,in principle,for a marketratherthana centrallyplanned economy.They were very anti-Communist. They championed the idea of Europeanintegrationwith at leastsomesupranational elements;the U S . government, whichsoughtto strengthen WesternEuropeagainstthe Soviet Union in the Cold War, supported the samegeneralpolicy.The Christian Democraticpartiesalsostronglysupported NATO. A clearmajorityrejected that the Gaullistalternativeof a WesternEuropeunderFrenchleadership; majorityrejectedthe Gaullistideathatthe possibilityof serioustransatlantic frictioncouldbe accepted. As a result,U.S. administrations assisted a number of key ChristianDemocrat-led governments: financiallyand logistically in theearlypostwarperiod,asin thecaseof Italyat thetimeof the 1948elect i o n ~and , ~ with favourablepublicity,as in the caseof the FederalRepublic of Germany,whenKonradAdenauervisitedthe UnitedStatesin April 1953 in orderto bolsterhisparty’schances in theBundestag elections of September of thatyear.6 But a closerexamination revealsa pronounced ambivalence onthepartof the EuropeanChristianDemocrats towardthe UnitedStates.In no way did supportfor Europeanintegration implyto themthatEuropewas to be unified accordingto the U S . model.For the ChristianDemocrats, the integration processnot only derivedfrom Europeantraditions,collectiveexperiences,andvalues;manyChristianDemocratic leaderswerefranklyhostileto what they regardedas the liberal,competition-driven Americansystem,a systemin theirview markedby excessive Protestant individualism andmaterialism.The ChristianDemocrats wereequallyambivalentaboutU.S. politicalleadership in NATO andin international politicsin general.The EuropeansneededAmericanmilitaryprotection,but they also had distinctive viewson international issues,especially on detenteandon ThirdWorlddevelopment, whenthisincreasingly becamea battlefield of theColdWar. Due totheverytightconstraints imposedby theColdWar andtheWestEuropean need for security,the underlyingculturaldifferencesdid not alwaysspill overinto openpolicyconflict.But the ColdWar is now over,andthesedifferencesmay in the futurecometo havea greaterimpacton relationsbetweenAmericaandEurope.

DEFENSE OF A EUROPEAN MODEL U.S. policytowardWesternEuropeafter1945 wasrootedin a strongbelief to a declining that it was America’smissionto bringpeaceanddemocracy continentthathadcompletelytornitselfapartin two civil wars-a continent thathadlostall senseof directionandthatno longerhada legitimateclaim

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to a world role.’ In contrastto Europe,the UnitedStateswas a shiningexampleof freedomandlibertyenshrined in its federalconstitution, andof a dynamicsocietythat facilitatedtechnologicalinnovationand economic progress, bringingwealthfor all. Thismodelseemedsoobviouslyattractive thattheU.S. government initiallyexpectedaftertheendof theSecondWorld War that it wouldeasilyget transferred throughimitation.It was only after 1949 thatthe Americans intensified theirpropaganda effortsin WesternEurope. The Truman administration firmly believed that WesternEurope shouldoptfor a federalsystemsimilarto theUS. modelandwith a common marketin orderto overcomethe Europeantraditionof nationalconflict.Indeed,it attemptedto inducesucha solutionwith its demandfor a coordinatedEuropeanreconstruction planasa precondition for MarshallPlanaid, butfailedandendedup withtheentirelyintergovernmental Organisation for EuropeanEconomicCooperation (OEEC) createdin 194€K8 In their own collectivememoryandpoliticalpropaganda (aboutKonrad Adenauer,RobertSchumanandAlcideDe Gasperibeingthe “founding fathers”of the “coreEurope”organisations ECSCandEEC), theWestEuropean ChristianDemocratscultivatedthe ideaof themselves asthe avant-garde of a moreintegrated, supranational Europe.Of all the mainpoliticalgroupsin Europe,theyweremostpredisposed towardsomeformof supranationalism, andtheyalsohada certaininterestasa party-and indeedasa transnational groupof parties-in championing sucha constitutional solutionfor Western Europe.Yet giventheir historicaland ideologicalpredispositions and their distinctpartyinterests, theywereby nomeansinclinedto forgea unifiedEuropeon the Americanmodel-a modelthe ChristianDemocrats did not understand well andneverdiscussed asa possiblereferencepointfor Europe. In fact,theirwholeapproach to Europeanunification-an approach rooted in historicalmemoryand long historicalexperience-hadlittle in common with the Americanmyth abouthow theirown unifiednationhad beenesof theirown nation tablished.The Americansthoughtof the establishment asmarkinga sharpbreakwith the past.But the Europeangoalwasto build on the past-to buildon the traditions andvaluesthathaddefinedWestern Europeasa distinctandself-conscious culture. What were thosetraditions,and why in particularwere the Christian Democratsinterestedin buildinga Europewith at leastsomefederalor supranational elements? The ChristianDemocratsneverdifferentiated dogmaticallybetweenfederalistand intergovernmental formsof organising the newEuropeafter1945.In a September 1948resolution, for example,theNEI spokeof an “economic andpoliticalunionof the free Europe,”with an orandwhichwill resultin unity ganisation thatcouldbe “federalor confederal while maintainingd i ~ e r s i t yBut . ” ~the ChristianDemocratswere willing in principleto consider arrangements thathadat leastsomesupranational comto do sowas mainlydueto threefactors:the ponents,and theirreadiness


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everydayexperienceof the mainlyCatholicChristianDemocrats with the “supranational” religiousauthorityof thePopeandthe Catholichierarchy; the idea of a ChristianAbendland,or occidentalEuropeanculturalspace, andthe intellectualandrhetoricalevocationof the “supranational” worldly orderof the CarolingianEmpirein the MiddleAges;and,finally,the principle of subsidiarityin the ChristianDemocrats’economicand social programme-thatis, thenotionof multi-levelgovernance astheidealform of socialorganisation withinthe nation-state. Compared to theinterwarCatholicparties,mostChristianDemocratic partiesafter1945aimedat an interconfessional or nonconfessional structure.’O Yet eventhe FrenchMouvement Republicain Populaire(MRP), whichpublicly distanced itselffrom the CatholicChurchto achieveits full integration intothe Republican consensus andto broadenits electoralappeal,received mostof its votesfrom practicingCatholics.Some75 percentof themvoted for theMRP in theelections of 1945and1946.”In thebiconfessional Netherlands,80 to 90 percentof Catholicsvotedfor the CatholicPeople’sParty.12 The GermanChristianDemocraticUnion and BavarianChristianSocial Union (CDU/CSU) wereformallyinterconfessional, but mostof its leaders, members, andvoterswerestillCath01ics.l~ And supranational European state structures were fully compatible with Catholicreligious“supranationalism,” whichwasregardedasnaturalandlegitimate. More importantly, while experience of the twoworld warswith totalitarian dictatorships led the ChristianDemocratsto fully embracedemocratic ideas,thoseexperiences alsoled themto lookbacktowardtheuniversalism of the religiouslyunifiedEuropeof the MiddleAges.For them,the “supranational”Carolingian Empirehad majorsymbolicimportance. Frenchintellectualsandpoliticians, includingNapoleon,triedto appropriate thisEmpire for thenationalheritageandmemoryof France,andGermannationalists and laterthe NationalSocialists hadopposedit with theirown GermanicSaxon myth. After the war, however,the ChristianDemocratsEuropeanized the Carolingian Empire,whichwaslargelycoterminous with thesmall“coreEurope’’of the ECSC andthe EEC. In theirtransnational meetings,they regularly evokedthe idea of a ChristianEuropeunitedagainstexternalthreats, fromCharlemagne to thedefeatof the Ottomans in thebattleof Kahlenberg nearViennain 1683,asHeinrichvonBrentano,theCDU/CSU factionleader in the Bundestag, did in a speechat theNEI congress in BadEmsin 1951.14 ChristianDemocrat-inspired politicalrituals,suchas the AachenKarls Prizeestablished in 1950to honourpublicfiguresfor their contribution to Europeanintegration,were designedto supportthe relatedAbendland idea.15 TheAbendlandthemewasrootedin theEuropean Catholicdiscourse of the interwarperiod,andit of coursehada stronglyanti-Communist coloration.lb At BadEms,West Germanchancellor KonradAdenauerspokeof the “greatdangerswhichare threatening Christianity, Christiancultureand

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I

all of WesternEurope”; the integration of that“coreEurope”wasessential if “theChristianAbendlandwasto haveanyhopeof surviving theCommunist Sovietthreat.l7 Threeyearsearlier,GeorgesBidault,theFrenchPrimeMinister, hadcharacterised SovietCommunism in oneof the Genevameetingsin a (distorted) analogywith theMiddleAgesas“anewIslamwhichwill notretreatoneinch,but fromwhichwe haveeverything to expectandto fear.”ls In theiranti-Communism, the ChristianDemocrats couldrelateto American Protestants like JohnFosterD u l l e ~ .Their ’~ sharedanti-Communism meantthatEuropeanChristianDemocratic partieshadlittletroubleadopting the American“freeworld”idea and sometimes usedthe terms“European Abendland,”“civilisation,” and “ChristianWest”interchangeably. But the Abendlandmyth had specificallycontinentalEuropeananti-Protestant connotations-connotations that reflecteda deepculturaldividewithinthe “freeworld.”In theirdiscourse on the rootsof totalitarianism andtheworld wars,theChristianDemocrats insistedthatProtestantism promotedrapidindustrialisation, with all of itsadversesocialconsequences, andled to excessiveindividualism andmaterialism. Thishelpedto destroythe old moralorder andleft the interwardemocracies helplessin the faceof the totalitarian challenge.As P. J. S. Serrarens, the Dutchleaderof the EuropeanChristian in Luxembourg in tradeunionmovement,pointedout at the NEI congress 1948,theReformation hadbeenresponsible for “destroying Europeanunity” conflicts.2o LutheranPrussiawassingledoutfor andfor theriseof nationalist criticismin ChristianDemocratic circlesfor itssupposedly catastrophic influenceon thecourseof Germanhistory.21 More generally,the ChristianDemocratstendedto takea negativeview of predominantly non-Catholic countries like Britainand America.CertainCatholicpoliticianswho had taken refugein thosecountries duringthe SecondWorldWar hadcomebackwith Protestantism and the politicaltradia morepositiveview of Anglo-Saxon tionswithwhichit wasassociated, buttheyhadonlya marginalinfluenceon ChristianDemocraticpoliticsafter1945.** The thirdreasonfor the predisposition of EuropeanChristianDemocratic partiestowardsupranational solutions hadto dowith the importance of the principleof subsidiarity in theireconomic andsocialdoctrine.As theformer MRP parliamentarian HenriTeitgeninsistedat the NEI congress in Toursin 1953,the organisation of the new Europeshouldreflectthe principlesof Catholicsocialthoughtas it was laid downin the PapalEncyclicalQuadragesimoAnnoof 1931.23 Teitgensuggested abandoning the dogmaticdebate aboutwhetherEuropeshouldbe organizedon an intergovernmental or on a federalbasis;he wanteda mixedconstitutional structure in whichdecisionmakingwouldtakeplaceeitherby consensus or by majorityvote-that is, in whateverway wasmostappropriate in the circumstances. His preferenceandthiswas in accordance with Catholicsocialthought-was for decisionmakingto takeplaceasa rule at the lowestpossiblelevel.The basicorgan-


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izing principlefor societywas that decision-making wouldnot be concentratedon justonelevel,but thatinsteadgovernance wouldtakeplaceon a numberof levels,fromthefamilyon up to thestate-and thisindeedis what thewholeconceptof “subsidiarity” meant.As a result,it wasmucheasierfor the ChristianDemocratsthanfor the Socialists to adoptthe idea of shared sovereignty exercisedat differentlevels(includingthe supranational level) in WesternEurope;the Socialists were for the mostpart still preoccupied economicpolicy-making at thenationallevel. with the ideaof centralised In addition,certainmoremundanepartyinterests werealsoinvolved.The ChristianDemocrats believedthatbeforethewar, the idealismof theyoung had drawnthemto totalitarian ideologies; youngEuropeans thereforenow wouldbe thatideal,andif the neededa “safe”idealto believein. “Europe” ChristianDemocratscouldestablishthemselves as the “European” parties, they would profit electorally.Supranational structures alsoresultedin the self-exclusion of Britain (without a ChristianDemocraticparty tradition) fromtheneworganisations, asthestoryof theSchuman Planof 1950shows; thisincreasedthe degreeto whichthe sortof Europethatwas beingconstructedwould havea distinctChristianDemocraticflavor.Fromthat point on, the FrenchandGermanChristianDemocrats in particularstronglysupportedthe ideaof a moreintegrated“coreEurope”andcontinued to do so evenaftertheybeganto advocatetheenlargement of theEEC in 1963.24 This wasa Europethattheydominatedpoliticallyuntilwell into the 1960s;their abilityto determinethe sortof Europethat wouldtake shapewouldhave beendilutedif the BritishandScandinavian Socialists hadbeeninvolved.A broadening of Europewouldhaveled alsoto increased US. influence,especiallythroughBritain.The Franco-German rapprochement wentsofar in thiscontextthatFrenchrepresentatives in theNEI andtheGenevaCircleresurrectedthe ideaof an eternalrivalrybetweenFranceandBritain.Of all of theMRP politicians, it wasPierre-Henri Teitgen-a heroof theFrenchresistancewho had beencapturedby the Germansand had escapedfrom the traintakinghim to a concentration camp-who saidto hisGermancounterthefutureof WesternEuropeafpartsat a meetinginJanuary1955to discuss ter the failureof the EuropeanDefenseCommunity:“TheEnglishare our eternalenemy.”25 After 1945 the ChristianDemocratswere thus not simplyinterestedin buildinga “UnitedStatesof Europe”on the Americanmodel.Instead,their policiesweresolidlybasedon Europeantraditions; theywererootedin their ownpoliticalideologyandin theirownunderstanding of history.Suchpoliciesturnedoutmoreor lessby accidentto be compatible with theAmerican preference for a supranational WesternEuropein theearlyColdWar. But the factthatthe small“coreEurope”wasbuilt on traditions andideasthatwere largelyalien to the US. experience(wherethe dominantpoliticalculture wasstronglyinfluencedby Anglo-Saxon Protestantism) meantthattherewas

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alwaysa certainpotentialfor transatlantic conflict.This is especiallytrue, sincetheEuropeanChristianDemocrats not only rejectedthe Sovietideaof a centrallyplannedeconomy,but alsorejectedwhattheysawasthe American laissez-faire philosophy.While the Cold War andthe needfor security forcedthe ChristianDemocraticpartiesto becomemore“pro-American” in foreignpolicythantheywouldotherwisehavebeen,theywerekeento developa domestic European“thirdway.”26 Althoughthe CatholicChristianDemocrats werefully converted to democratic,multipartygovernment after1945,theyremainedquitehostileto Europeanliberalism, justasthePopeandtheCatholicChurchhadopposed liberalismduringthe Europeanculturewarsof the nineteenthcentury.27 As they sawit, liberalismhadnot onlyfacilitatedtheriseof totalitarian ideologies by undermining traditionalvaluesystems, but the overlyrapidindustrialization thatliberalismhad madepossibleled to socialandeconomicinstability-to of wealthandpoverty-and thuspaved massunemployment andtoextremes the way for the totalitarianmovements of the twentiethcentury.And the countrythat,in the eyesof the EuropeanChstianDemocrats, represented theseliberaltraditionsin the mostextremeform was no longerBritain;by 1945at the latest,it hadbecomethe UnitedStates.TheChristianDemocrats rejectedwhat they saw as America’sprevailingideology-its extremeindividualismandmaterialism. The searchfor a “thirdway”betweenliberalismon the onehandandSocialismandCommunism on the otheris reflectedin all the ChristianDemocraticpartyprogrammes after1945.TheMW, whilerelativelyliberalon economicmatters(at leastby Frenchstandards), tendedto takea moredirigiste approach in theareaof socialpolicy.28 The“Christmas programme” of theBelgianParti SocialChrktien(PSC/CVP)was d u e n c e dby the ChristianWorkthestatealongneo-corporatist lines ers’Movementandcalledfor reorganizing as a way of dealingwith the problemsof an excessively polarizedsociety.29 The DutchKatholiekeVolkspartij (KW) entirelysharedtheseneocorporatist ideas.Until 1958,thatpartywaspartof a governingcoalitionwith the Social Democrats; togetherwith theirpartners, they builta welfarestatesecondonly to Sweden’s.The Sociaal-Economische Raad (Social-economic Council) playeda crucialrole in the trilateralcoordination of government policybetweengovernment, tradeunions,andempl0yers.3~ In Italy, theleft-Catholic corrente(win@ of the ChristianDemocratic partygainedmoreandmoreinfluencethroughout the 1950s,with AmintoreFanfaniandAldoMororesponsiblefor moreinterventionist economic policies,includingthenationalisation of theenergyind~stry.3~ Evenin theFederalRepublic,whereEconomics MinisterLudwigErhardtook a neoliberalapproach-that is, wherepolicywas basedontheconceptof a “social marketeconomy”--the left-Catholic winginof thewelfarestateasthe Wirtschaftswunder (ecosistedona rapidextension nomicmiracle)ran itscoursein the 1950sand1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ *

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But the key point to note here is that ChristianDemocratic“thirdway” ideasandpolicieswerenot framedin purelynationalterms:the “thirdway” conceptdevelopedalsoin a transnational context.At the very firstmultilateral meetingof ChristianDemocraticparty representatives at Luzernein 1947,whichresultedin theformationof theNEI, thenationalsecretary of the BelgianPSC,DesireLamalle,emphasized thatEuropean ChristianDemocrats hadto devisea “thirdway”betweencapitalism andstatism,“thatis, to find of individualdevelopment with the the meansto harmonizethe necessities interestsof all,” and that, he thought,would requiresomedegreeof economicplanning.33 In their politicalmessage for 1949,the NEI emphasized that it was essential in the contextof the MarshallPlanto give “allworkers their socialsecuritythrougha statutewhich will guaranteethat everyone, whereverthey are,will profitequallyfromthe resultsof the Europeanand In theireconomic resolution at theNEI coninternational divisionof labour.”34 gressin Sorrento in April 1950theyspokeof a “rightto w o r kanddemanded that the fightagainstunemployment be oneof the “essential objectives” of Europeanc ~ o p e r a t i oThe n . ~political ~ rhetoricof socialsolidarityandsecurity andtheactualwelfarestatemeasures thatwereadoptedcancertainlybe understood asa response towhattheCommunists andSocialists werepromising,but theyalsoformedpartof the ChristianDemocratic beliefsystem. At the Europeanlevelaswell, “thirdway”thinkingwasnot simplya matter of rhetoric.On the contrary,the “coreEurope”organisations implementedpoliciesbasedon theseideasthankslargelyto the influenceof the ChristianDemocrats. Thosepolicies(in theECSC) weredesigned in particular to benefitthe decliningcoalandsteelindustryand(in the EEC fromthe 1960son) to assistthe agricultural Europeanpoliciesfor thesesectorsaimedat a managedtransformation; a reductionin the workforceand with trade improvements in productivity wereto beachievedin consultation unionsandemployers’ organisations. The guidingprinciplein the EEC beginningin the mid-1950swas to avoideventemporaryunemployment and sociallydisruptive,rapidurbanization in orderto protectlocalcommunities and guaranteesocialcohesion.Thesegoalsrequiredhighlyprotectionist policies;thissortof thinkingwasoneof themainfactorsshapingthe EEC’s CommonAgricultural Policy(CAP) in the 1960s.To someextent,theCAP reflectedtheChristianDemocratic parties’fearsof losingruralvotes.Yet it was also in line with their ideologicalpreferencefor small-scale farmingand of a lessindividualistic, medium-sized companies asimportantcornerstones lessmaterialistic culturethanthatof theUnitedStates. The ChristianDemocrats,the dominantpoliticalforce in continental WesternEuropeafter1945,playeda key rolein designing the“coreEurope” organisations that cameintobeingin that period.But in takingthe lead in this area,thosepartiesdid not draw on the US. model.If anything,the ChristianDemocratsdesignedthe new Europein sucha way as to avoid

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what theysawas the socialexcesses of Americancapitalism. “Freeworld” rhetoricwas rootedin a senseof externalthreat.It was the Sovietmenace that pulledEuropeandAmericatogether:the effectwas to de-emphasize the culturaldividethatseparated the UnitedStatesfrom a ChristianDemocraticWesternEurope.It is thusnot surprisingthat ChristianDemocratic “thirdway”policiescouldleadto transatlantic policyclashes whencommon coresecurityinterestswere not involved-specially in trade,where the first“chickenwars”were foughtbetweenthe EEC andthe UnitedStatesin the 1960s.

EUROPEANAUTONOMY AND GLOBAL INFLUENCE ChristianDemocraticambivalence towardthe UnitedStateswas not, however,limitedto domesticpoliticalissues.It alsoextendedto the U.S. leadershiprole in the AtlanticAllianceandto Americanforeignpolicymoregenerally.Withinthesecurityconstraints imposedby theColdWar,theChristian Democraticpartieswere keento retainthe greatestpossibleindependence andinfluence for their“coreEurope.” Despitethetotalitarian experience and thetwo worldwars,theyregardedsuchinfluenceashistorically andculturally justifiedandalsoessential in view of theircriticalappraisalof U.S. leadershipqualitiesandof the danger,astheysawit, of renewedAmericanisolationism.Their claimto a strongerEuropeanrole withinthe “freeWest”is reflected,for example,in theirpolicyon the EuropeanDefenseCommunity (EDC), on the issueof detentein themid-l950s,andon thequestionof policy towardtheThirdWorld. EvenAdenauer, whoveryearlyonoptedfor a policyof alignment withthe West andrejectedthe ideaof a European“thirdforce”equallydistantfrom bothsuperpowers, sawintegration as a meansof establishing Europeas an influential“thirdpowerin the~ o r l d . ”Henri ~ ’ Teitgeninsistedin his speech in BadEmsthat Western Europehadto unitein orderto at theNEI congress achievea substantial degreeof autonomy withintheAtlanticAlliance.ChristianDemocrats hadto protectEuropefromdegenerating intoa mere“vassal state”of the UnitedStates.38 At the NEI congress in Salzburgin September 1955the DutchEconomics MinisterJelleZijlstraarguedthat if furthereconomicintegration, whichwasthenbeingdiscussed in the SpaakCommittee in Brussels, were to fail, Europewould loseall influenceon world affairs. “Theold Europe,”he said,“will be nothingbut a smallborderregionbetweenthe world powers;moreover,it will be a ‘contested territory’which will run the dangerof becomingthe battleground of another‘Koreaconfli~t’.’’~’ Thus,theemerging“coreEurope”hadto becomeintegrated in order to retainits culturalindividuality, protectits socioeconomic systemfromexternalpressures, and continueto exercisesomeinfluencein the world-

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goalsthat impliedthat Europeand America,while both part of the “free world,”wereto a certainextentin competition with eachother.40 The ChristianDemocrats wonderedwhetherthe UnitedStateswas qualified to lead the Westernworld;they wonderedabouthow committedthe Americanswere to the defenseof WesternEurope.It was clearto them, therefore,thatEuropeneededas muchautonomyaspossible.The Catholic ChristianDemocrats, moreover,wereoftenappalledby the moralisticevangelicalanti-Communism, embedded in a predominantly Protestant political culture,of manyU.S. politicians, who tendedto framethe conflictbetween democracy andCommunism in blackandwhiteterms-who tendedto see theconflictasa fightof goodagainstevil.ChristianDemocratic partyactivists with the were usedto the greyertonesof Europeanpolitics:collaborating Communists in theresistance to theGermanoccupation; dealingwith severe socialproblemsby adoptinghighly interventionist policies;and even at timescooperating with the Communists at the locallevel,as in theTuscany of Don Camilloe Peppone, wherethe Catholicpriestand the Communist mayorpracticethe new policyof peacefulc o e x i ~ t e n cThe e . ~persecution ~ of haplessintellectuals andartistswith Communist leaningssuchas in theMcoverto the causeof parCarthyera wasunlikelyto win manyCommunists liamentarydemocracy in muchof WesternEurope.Worse,the Americans’ missionary zeal,ChristianDemocrats feared,couldleadto a crusadeagainst theUSSR theAmericans hadhada fingeron thetriggereversincetheirarrival on thenewcontinent; theymightlauncha preventive war againstRussiaand be tooquickto usenuclearweapons; the resultmightwell be the destruction of Europe.Yet, asthe DutchKvp politicianEmmanuelSassen put it in the GenevaCirclein December1950,“onecannotmaintainpeaceby making war.”42 At the sametime,however,the ChristianDemocrats werewell awarethat WesternEuropedepended on U.S. militaryprotection,andalwaysworried that Americamight returnto isolation,therebypossiblywithdrawingthat protection. As Adenauerput it in the GenevaCirclein June1949,“America doesnotunderstand Europe.” Publicopinionin theUnitedStates, he argued, wasveryunstable. TheAmericans mightsomedayagreeto “anententewith of Europe.”43 WhenU.S.-Sovietrelationsdid theSovietUnion attheexpense improveduring the 1953-1956 period, the ChristianDemocraticparties feared a much-reduced Americaninterestin WesternEurope. Herbert Blankenhorn, Adenauer’s advisorin the chancellory, warnedin the Geneva Circlein June1953afterWinstonChurchill’s summitproposalthatthe isolationistsaroundSenatorRobertTaft were gainingin influenceandthattheir ideashad already,to a certainextent,penetrated the U.S. admini~tration.~ Otto Lenz,a CDU memberof the Bundestag and anotheradvisorto Adenauer,arguedat the NEI congress in Salzburgin September1955that the Americans couldnot be relieduponforever,especially in timesof peaceful

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coexistence, to retainthe sameinterestin WesternEurope,andthatit could by no meansbe takenfor grantedthattheywouldbe preparedto intervene “if andwhenthingsflareup againin Europe.”45 Thesefearsof Americanisolationismlaterbecamea recurringthemein ChristianDemocratic discourse in the contextof thenever-ending debateon burdensharingin NATO.46 The desirefor relativeautonomy andthefearof U S . isolationism weretwo of themaindrivingforcesbehindtheChristian Democratsupportfor theEDC Nationale from 1950 In thefinalnegativevotein theFrenchAssemblee in August1954,theM W wastheonlyparliamentary factionthatvotedalmost unanimously in favourof thetreaty.48 As theformerFrenchM W foreignminto isterRobertSchumanput it at a rally of theWestGermanEuropa-Union, becontentwith theBritishalternative solutionof theintergovernmental Western EuropeanUnion combinedwith West Germany’saccession to NATO of a European solutionto which wouldamountto “thedefiniteabandonment we [Christian Democrats] remainattachedoverandaboveall otherpreoccup a t i o n ~ .Only ” ~ ~ an institutionalised “core Europe”defenseorganisation linkedto theAtlanticAlliancewouldgiveEuropea distinctive voicevis-5-vis theU.S. andprovidea stable,independent structure in thecaseof serious frictionwithinNATO or of U.S. withdrawalfromEurope. The samerationaleexplainsthegeneralChristianDemocratinterestin dein 1956,headed tentebetweentheblocs.TheNEI setup a specialcommittee by theformerBelgianforeignministerPaulVan Zeeland,to discuss andcoordinateChristianDemocratpolicyon detenteissues.50 The partyrepresentatives,it soonbecameclear,couldnot agreeon Van Zeelandsmorefarreachingproposalsfor a demilitarizedCentralEurope.The Germansand Dutch in particularwere concernedthat the withdrawalof NATO troops from West Germanywould reduceNATO’s forwarddefensecapabilities in the eventof war; they alsothoughtthat therewas a real risk that in the medium-termsomesortof disengagement arrangement mightevenleadto US. troopwithdrawals fromWesternEurope.On theotherhand,it wasclear thatthe Sovietblocwasinternallyunstable,asthe unrestin Polandandthe HungarianRevolutionin 1956demonstrated; but with the Sovietleadership preparedto usemilitaryforceto keeptheWarsawPacttogether,it seemed to searchfor alternative waysto inducesomedegreeof liberalisanecessary tion in EasternEurope.For the ChristianDemocrats,the ultimategoal throughout theColdWar remainedto overcome not somuchthedivisionof Germany,whichwas in somewaysconvenient as it reducedthe potential economic strengthandpoliticalinfluenceof theFederalRepublic,but of Europe as a whole. ChristianDemocratdittenteinitiativeswere not only designedto enhancesecurityand to weakenSovietcontrolover EasternEurope,butultimately,asVan Zeelandput it, to allow“thereconstitution of the traditionalEurope,”includingEast-Central Europe,sothatit couldagainexercisemuchgreaterinfluenceon worldaffairs.51

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The ChristianDemocrats’ searchfor autonomyfromtheUnitedStateswas alsoreflectedin theircollectiveattitudestowarddecolonisation andin their views on Third World issuesmore generally;they were particularlyinterestedin workingwith the ChristianDemocraticpartiesin Latin America. Catholicpartieshad not been the main politicalforce behindEuropean colonialexpansionin the nineteenthcentury,but now, after the Second WorldWar, theyrefusedto supportwhattheysawasrusheddecolonisation. They regardedAmericananti-colonialist rhetoricwith deepsuspicion; the U S . aim,theythought,wasto expandAmerica’s globalinfluence at Europe’s expense.52 The ChristianDemocrats insistedfromthe startthattheso-called overseasterritoriesoughtto becomelinked to an economically integrated “coreEurope.”In oneof itsfirstresolutions, theNEI emphasized thatorganic tiesbetweenWesternEuropeanditscolonies(which,it recognized, mightin the futurebecomeindependent states)were crucialandoughtto be maintained.53 The ideaof “Euroafrica”-thatis, of institutionalised economicand politicalbondsbetweenWesternEuropeandAfrica,whichat thattimewas seenas a continentwith greatpotential-was not justa Frenchpreoccupation5*JosefMuller, the BavarianCSU leader,suggested, for example,in March1949thatonlya WesternEuropewith stronglinkswith its coloniescoloniesthat were importantsourcesof raw materialsand that provided growingmarketsfor Europeanfinishedproducts-wouldbe strongenough andindependent enoughto prevent“a clashof the Indeed,a numberof initiativesthat were undertaken-theestablishment of an EEC investment fundfor overseas territories andthen,afterdecolonisation,the policiesthat culminatedin the YaoundeandLomeconventions on tradeand aid betweenthe EuropeanUnion and the formerEuropean colonies-were ultimatelyrootedin thissortof thinking.AndThirdWorldissueswereoftena sourceof frictionin transatlantic relationsduringthe Cold War andbeyond;theAmericans, for example,recentlycomplained aboutthe EuropeanUnion’sbananaregime,whichdisadvantaged someCentralAmerthat controlled theirbanana icancountries andthelargeU.S. fruitcompanies pr0duction.5~ But the ChristianDemocratshave alwaystendedto look at suchproblems in a verydifferentway.Therealissuefor themhasto dowith their formercolonies’socioeconomic development. Duringthe 1950sand 196Os,they resistedthe Americans’ tendencyto view ThirdWorld issuesin confrontational Cold War terms.At the NEI congress in Parisin September 1960,RogerReynaud,a FrenchMRP memberof theECSCHighAuthority,insistedthat Europeshouldconcentrate on fightingpovertyandunderdevelopmentin the ThirdWorld,andnot on opposingthe SovietUnionthere.57 Albert Coppi.,the BelgianPSCKVPVice-president of the High Authority, addedthat the ChristianDemocraticpartiesshouldnot allow themselves to be identifiedwith economic liberalismin theThirdWorld.The “coreEurope” would have to play a crucialrole therebecauseRussianand U.S. policies

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were“equallydeplorable.” The UnitedStateshadnothingto offerbut freer tradethroughtheGeneralAgreement onTariffsandTrade(GAT), whenthe maineconomicproblemof thesecountries hadto dowith theextremefluctuationsin thepriceof raw materials. The UnitedStates, moreover,appeared to supportanyregimeaslongasit wasanti-Communi~t.5~ Coppi.wasespeciallycriticalof therecentUS. threatsagainstCubaandmilitaryintervention in NicaraguaandotherCentralAmericancountries. One year earlier,at the NEI congress in Freiburgin Germany,theBelgianNEI presidentAugustde Schryverhad alreadywarnedthatThirdWorldcountriesshouldbe allowed to developtheirownformsof governance, butthatWesternEuropeandthe UnitedStatesshouldunderno circumstances supportmilitarydictatorship^.^^ The ChristianDemocraticpartieswere especially criticalof U S . policyin LatinAmerica,wheretheyhadcloselinkswith theemergingChristianDemocraticmovement. Theyorganizeda firstintercontinental congress of Christian Democraticpartiesin Parisin November1956.60 Fouryearslater,in the autumnof 1960,the NEI foundedan intercontinental studycenterin Rome with the Bohemian-born DutchKVP politicianKarlJosefHahnasitsfirstdimovements outside rector;the aimwasto reachoutto ChristianDemocratic of Europe.The ChristianDemocratic partiesin LatinAmericawerefar to the left in termsof theirsocioeconomic programme; theysupported far-reaching land reform,nationalisation, and redistributive measures. They had close links with the Catholicmovementfrom below, a movementled by local priestswho regardedsocialactionas importantas religiousservice.61 Their far-leftCatholicprogramme wasregardedby EuropeanChristianDemocratic partiesas legitimatein view of the extremeinequalities of wealthin Latin to a America.The EuropeanChristianDemocrats heldAmericaresponsible considerable extentfor conditionsthere:the Americanssupported socially conservative andoftencorruptregimes,andevensupported militarydictatorshipsas longas thoseregimesservedthe interests of the largelandownersandmajorU.S. companies.62 With Africa it hadbeendifferent:the EuropeanChristianDemocraticpartieswantedto cultivatestrongtieswith that continent,eventhoughthey had no significant partycontactsthere.But in the Latin Americancase,a centerpiece of their policywas supportfor the ChristianDemocraticmovementthere,and they were very criticalof U S . policyin thisregionthroughout theColdWar period.

CONCLUSION SamuelHuntingtonhasarguedthatthe endof the ColdWar markedthebeginningof a new era of conflict.He seesa “clashof civilizations”-aclash, aboveall, betweenthe Christian-inspired anddemocratic“West”and other culturalspaces,especiallyIslam.63 That view appearedto be confirmedby


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theterroristattacksof 11September 2001-which, thanksto themedia,was experienced as a globaleventby peoplearoundthe world.But the Huntingtonview is highlysimplistic: it overemphasizes culturaldifferences (and thusthepotentialfor conflict)between larger“civilizations,” andplaysdown the importance of culturaldifferences withinculturalspaces, andespecially withinthe “West” itself.DuringtheColdWar period,countries withintheAtlanticworlddid sharesomebasicvalues,suchas a belief in humanrights andin democracy, andtheycontinue to do so.But asthe caseof Christian Democratic attitudes towardthe UnitedStatesdemonstrates, belowthe surfaceof “freeworld”rhetoricthe differences weresubstantial. ChristianDemocracyhad indigenous continental European rootsthathad little in common with the US. model.ChristianDemocratsviewedthat modelvery criticallyand wantedto preservea Europeansocioeconomic “thirdway.” TheyknewEuropewasdependent on US. militaryprotection, but stillthey as possiblein the foreignpolicyarea: wantedto retainas muchautonomy theirgoalwasto charta coursein worldaffairsin linewith theirownbelief system-with their own historicalexperiences as they understood them. Theywantedto pursuetheirownpolicytowardtheThirdWorldin general, andtowardLatinAmericain particular. But theChristian Democrats worked closelywith the UnitedStatesthroughout theColdWar period.If eventhey felt suchambivalence towardAmerica,it is onlyto be expected thattheSocial Democrats, currentlythesecondlargestpoliticalgroupin theEuropean Parliament, wouldfeelevengreaterambivalence, albeitfordifferentreasons. as Culturaldifferences withintheAtlanticworldareunlikelyto disappear a resultof globalisation. Despitethe unifyingforcesof globalcompetition andinternational stockmarketsandmergers andacquisitions, theEuropean Unionandmostof its memberstateshaveresponded to thesepressures by adjusting theirestablished patterns of informallycooperative or institutionalized, corporative decision-making, not throughthe wholesaleadoptionof theUS. model.How to devisea new“thirdway”for thetwenty-first century is of coursea contested issuein European politics.Butwhatis notcontested iswhetherEuropeneedsto makeitsownchoices-choices rootedin its own values,itsownculture,itsownhistory.A distinct culturemeansa distinctpolicy: it is not surprising therefore thatEuropeandAmericaclashhead-onon manyglobali s s u e m v ethe r Kyotoprotocolon climatechange,for examCourtof Justice. Thosedifferple, andon issuesrelatedto the International enceshavelittleto dowith geopolitics, andarenotto be explained solelyin termsof varyingeconomic interests; in suchcases,cultureis thefundamental variable.And whatthatmeansis thatin thefutureasin thepast,a certain degreeof tensionis inevitablein US.-Europeanrelations. Thatrelationship wasnevera marriageof love;it wasrootedin necessity andits termshadto be continually renegotiated. Andif thatwassoin thepast,whentheColdWar broughtthetwo sidestogether, it is likelyto remainsoin thefuture.

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NOTES 1. AndrewMoravcsik,irhe Choice for Europe:SocialPurposeand StatePower from MessinatoMaastricht(Cornell:CornellUniversityPress,1998). 2. For a brief theoretical andbibliographical introduction to constructivism asapprocess, seeBen Rosamund, 7heories of EuropeanIntegrapliedto the integration Macmillan,ZOOO), 171-174. tion(Basingstoke: 3. For introductions to EuropeanChristianDemocracyafter 1945,seeMichael in 20th Gehler,WolframKaiser,andHelmutWohnout,eds.,ChristianDemocracy ed., ChristianDemocracy Centuy Europe(Vienna:Bohlau,2001), Emiel Lamberts, (Leuven:LeuvenUniversityPress,1997);Tom in theEuropeanUnion(1945,1995) in Europe1918-1965(OxBuchanan andMartinConway,eds.,PoliticalCatholicism ford:Clarendon Press,1996). structures and contentof the transnational contacts of 4. On the organisational EuropeanCD partiesafter 1945,seeMichaelGehlerand WolframKaiser,EuropuischeChristdemokraten: Transnationale Parteienkooperation in NEI und Genfer undDokumente (forthcoming). Kreis1947-1965.Darstellung 5. On U.S. policytowardItaly afterthewar,seethe articlesin thespecialissue4, no.3 (2002) of theJournalof ColdWarStudies. SeealsoLeopoldoNuti, “TheUnited WorldWar,”Annales duMondeAnglophone StatesandItaly at theEndof theSecond (forthcoming); JamesE. Miller, irhe UnitedStatesandItaly, 194G1950:irhePolitics of Stabilization (ChapelHill: NorthCarolinaUniversityPress,1984); andDiplomacy dell’ltalia,19451948(Bologna:I1 andJohnL. Harper,L’Americae la ricostruzione Mulino,1987). KalterKriegundPropaganda: Die USA,derKampfumdie 6. FrankSchumacher, Weltmeinungund die ideelle Westbindung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945-1955(Trier:WVT, 20001,252-254. On US. policytowardGermanyafterthe Der besetzte Verbiindete. Die amerikanische war, seealsoHermann-Josef Rupieper, Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955(Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag,1991)andThomas America’s Germany: JohnJ.McCloyandtheFederalRepublic of GerAlan Schwartz, Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1991). many(Cambridge, ideology,seealsoH. W. Brands,WhatAmerica 7. On the American“mission” for theSoulof ForeignPolicy(Cambridge: Cambridge Owesthe World:irheStruggle UniversityPress,1998). 8. The “Europeanisation” of the MarshallPlanis stronglyemphasized in Alan S. Milward,irheReconstruction of Western Europe1945-51 (London:Methuen& Co., 1984). For a U S . perspective, seeMichaelJ. Hogan,irheMarshallPlan:America, Britain,and theReconstruction of Western Europe,1947-1952(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1987). 9. NEI, Rksolutions du Congres de la HayesurI’organisation de l’Europe,17-19 septembre 1948,KatholiekeDocumentatieen Oderzoekcentrum Leuven(KADOC), Archiefde Schryver, 7.2.4.3. 10. On the confessional and socialbasisof EuropeanCD partiesafter 1945,see alsothe chapters in part 11 of Lamberts, ChristianDemocracy, andthe chapters on the postwarperiodin Gehleret al., Christian Democracy. 11. PierreLetamendia, LeMouvement Rkpublicain Populaire: Histoired’ungrand partifranGais(Paris:Beauchesne, 19951,281.


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12. Jac Bosmans,“Das Primat der Innenpolitik.Die niederlandische Christdemokratie in dererstenNachkriegszeit,” in Christian Democracy, eds.Gehleret al., 370-384,377. 13. Cf. FrankBosch,DieAdenauer-CDU. Griindung,AufstiegundKriseeinerErfokspartei 1945-1970(Stuttgart: DVA, 2001). 14. Entwurfvon Hasselfir einenVortragGr MdB von Brentanobei der NEITagungin Bad Ems,September 1951,Bundesarchiv Koblenz(BA) N 1351(Blankenhorn)/8a.Brentanodid givethespeechin accordance with thisdraft. 15. Cf. SabineSchulz,Der AachenerKarlspreis(Aachen:Meyer & Meyer, 1988); HelmutReuther,ed., Der internationale Karlspreiszu Aachen.Zeugniseuropai-

1950-1993 scherGeschichte, Symboleuropaischer Einigung:eineDokumentation (Aachen:Transcontact-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993). 16. TheAbendlandmythalreadyplayedan importantrolein Catholic-inspired at-

temptsat Franco-German reconciliation in theinterwarperiod.SeeGuidoMullerand VanessaPlichta,“Zwischen Rhein und Donau.Abendlandisches Denkenzwischen Verstandigungsinitiativen und konservativ-katholischen Intedeutsch-franzosischen grationsmodellen (1923-1957),”Journalof EuropeanIntegrationHistoy 5, no. 2 (19991,17-47. For the postwarperiodseealso,albeitonly in the Germancontext, Axel Schildt,Zwischen AbendlandundAmerika:Studienzur westdeutschen Zdeen1999). landschaft der50erJahre(Munich:Oldenbourg, 17. Stenogramm derRededesHerrnBundeskanzlers anlasslich derNEI-Tagungin 1951,15.30Uhr, Kursaal,BadEms,BA N 1351(BlankenBadEmsam 14.September horn)/8a. 18. GenevaCircle,21 October1948,Protocolby Felix Hurdes,Institutfir Zeitgeschichte Innsbruck, Karl Gruber-Archiv (KGA), Karton4. 19. On Dulles,generally,RonaldW. Pruessen, JohnFosterDulles:7beRoad to Power(New York: FreePress,1982),RichardH. Immerman,ed.,JohnFosterDulles and the Diplomacyof the Cold War (Princeton,N.J.: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1990).On DullesandEuropeseealsoManfredGortemaker, “JohnFosterDullesund die EinigungWesteuropas,” Die Christenund die Entstehung der Europaischen eds.MartinGreschat andWilfriedLoth(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1994), Gemeinschuft, 159-1 87. 20. P.J. S. Serrarens, Le problPmeallemand,sonaspectpolitique,NEI, Session de 30-31 Janvieret ler Fevrier1948,Bundesarchiv Bern (BAR), JII.181 Luxembourg, 1987/52. 21. On the ChristianDemocrats andGermanyafterthe SecondWorldWar, seein greaterdetail Wolfram Kaiser, “Deutschland exkulpierenund Europaaufbauen. Parteienkooperation der europaischen Christdemokraten in den NouvellesEquipes Internationales 1947-1965,”in ChristianDemocracy, eds. Gehleret al., 695-719, 710-714. 22. On Catholicpoliticians in exile and their changingviewsof Britainand the U S . , seeWolframKaiser,“Co-operation of EuropeanCatholicPoliticians in Exile in y Histoy BritainandtheUSA duringtheSecondWorldWar,”Journalof Contempora 35, no. 3 (20001,43-65. 23. HenriTeitgen,L‘Autorit6supranationale et la notionde souverain6t6. Aspects politiques, C0ngri.sde Tours,1-6 septembre 1953,Bundesarchiv Bern(BAR) JII.181 1987/52,2382.

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24. Un Appelpour1’Europe. Declaration de la Conference desPresidents desPartisDemocrates Chretiens de 1’EuropedesSix,8 February1963,AlgemeenRijksarchief Den Haag(ARA), ArchiefDr. W.P. Berghuis,357. The declaration in favourof enfor BritishEEC memlargementin principlewas not motivatedby any enthusiasm bership,but by opposition to de Gaulle’sattempt,astheCD partiessawit, to undermine the supranational characterof the EEC or even to replaceit with entirely intergovernmental structures. 25. GenevaCircle,31 January1955,Protocolby Karl von Spreti,ACDP 1-172-31. 26. For theimportance of their“thirdway”for the electoral success of the CD partiesin WesternEuropeafter1945 seealsoR. E. M. Irving,n e ChristianDemocratic Partiesof Western Europe(London:GeorgeAllen & Unwin,1979),xix. 27. Cf. Christopher Clark,“TheNew Catholicism andtheCultureWars,”in Culture Europe,eds. Christopher Wars:Secular-CatholicConflictin Nineteenth-Century Clark and Wolfram Kaiser (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,forthcoming 2003);JohnW. Boyer,“Catholics, Christians, andthe Challengeof Democracy: The Heritageof the NineteenthCentury,”in ChristianDemocracy, eds.Gehleret al., 23-59. 28. Bruno Bethouart,“Le MouvementRCpublicainPopulaire.L‘entrCe des

catholiques dansla Republique fransaise,” in Christian Democracy, eds.Gehleret al.,

313-331, 324. 29. Ernie1Lamberts,“TheZenithof ChristianDemocracyin Belgium.The Christelijke Volkspartij/PartiSocial Chretien1945-1968,” in ChristianDemocracy,eds. Gehleret al., 332-347, 332-333. SeealsoJean-Louis Jadoulle,“L‘evolution du programmedu PSC/CVP (Noel, 1945-1968),” in Unparti dansl’histoire(1945-1995). 50 a md’actionduPartiSocialChritien(Leuven:Duculot,1996), 343-364. “DerPrimat,”377-379. 30. Bosmans, 31. Cf. CarloMasala,“DieDemocraziaCristiana1943-1963: Zur Entwicklungdes partitonazionale,” in Christian Democracy, eds.Gehleret al., 348-369, 358. 7beSocial MarketEcon32. Cf. AnthonyJ.Nicholls,FreedomwithResponsibility: omyin Germany,1918-1963(Oxford:ClarendonPress,19941,Volker Hentschel, LudwigErhard.Ein Politikerleben (Munich:Olzog,1996). 33. Aussprache, Convenium christlicher PolitikerEuropas,Luzern,27 Februaryto 2 March1947, BAR JII.181 1987/52,2372. derNEI fLir 1949,Ostereichisches Staatsarchiv (OstA),ArchivderRe34. Botschaft publik(AdR), BWAA, 11-pol,Int. 14, 21. 80.755-poV49. EntschlieBung, NEI-Kongref3,Sorrent,12-14 April 1950,Archiv 35. Wirtschaftliche fir christlich-dernokratische Politik St. Augustin(ACDP) E-002-011/4. See also RobertHouben,Der Standder Doktrin,Bericht,NEI-Kongref3,Freiburg/CH,12-14 September 1952,BAR JII.1811987/52,2356. 36. By wayof introduction, seeDirk Spierenburg andRaymondPoidevin,n eHistoryof theHigh Authorityof theEuropeanCoal and SteelCommunity: Supranationalityin Operation(London:Weidenfeldand Nicolson,1994); GiselaHendriks,

“TheCreationof theCommonAgricultural Policy,”in Widening, Deepening, andAc1957-1963,e&. Anne Deighton celeration:n e EuropeanEconomicCommunity Nomos,19991,139-150. andAlan S. Milward (Baden-Baden: 37. Speechby Adenauerat a meetingof theCDU in theBritishzone,19 October 1948, quotedin KonradAdenauerund die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone


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19461949:Dokumentezur Griindungsgeschichte der CDU Deutschlands, ed. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (Bonn:Eichholz-Verlag, 1975), 492-499, 499. See also Erinnerungen 1945-1953 (Stuttgart: DVA, 1965), 211. KonradAdenauer, 38. HenriTeitgen,Der politischeFriede-dersozialeFriede,Bericht,NEI-KongreB, 1951, KADOC; ArchiefA. E. de Schryver, 7.2.4.5. BadEms,14-16 September Integration,Bericht,NEI-KongreB,Salzburg, 39. Jelle Zijlstra, Die Europaische 16-17 September 1955,BAR JII.1811987/52,2383. of the ideaof Europeas a “thirdforce”in foreignpolicywho be40. Proponents cameconvertedto Westernintegration as a resultof the emergingCold War confrontationwere particularly keento retainthe highestpossibledegreeof European WestEuropean autonomywithinthe AtlanticAlliancein orderto sustaina separate of Eusocioeconomic order.See,for example,Wilfried Loth, “GermanConceptions ropeduringtheEscalation of theEast-West-Conflict, 19451949,’’in PowerinEurope? GreatBritain,France,Itah, and Germanyin a PostwarWorld,19451950,eds. JosefBecker and Franz Knipping(BerlidNew York: Walter de Gruyter,19861, 517-536, 530. towardthe non-Communist left in 41. For the gradualsofteningof U.S. attitudes WesternEuropefrom1956,seealso(withregardto thecaseof theItalianPSI andthe DC‘s cooperation with it) the chapterby kopoldoNuti in thisbook. 42. GenevaCircle,11 December1950, Protocolby Victor Koutzine,ACDP 1-009017. 43. GenevaCircle,10 June1949,Protocolby VictorKoutzine,ACDP 1-009-017. 44. GenevaCircle(at Baarn,Netherlands), 29 June1953,ProtocolbyJacques Mallet,ArchivesNationales Paris(AN) 457 AP 59. 45. Aussprache (contributions in Germanonly), NEI-Kongrel3,Salzburg,16-17 September 1955,ACDP IX-002-017. 46. Seein thiscontextHubertZimmermann, MoneyandSecurityTroops,Monetary Policy,and WestGermany’s Relationswith the UnitedStatesand Britain, Cambridge UniversityPress,2001). 195G1971(Cambridge: andEarly Eu47. SeealsoMichaelGehlerandWolframKaiser,“Transnationalism ropeanIntegration: The NouvellesEquipesInternationales and the GenevaCircle 1947-57,” 7heHistorical Journal44, no. 3 (20011,773-798. 48. For MRP and NEI policy on Europeanintegration during1954-1956 see in greaterdetailWolframKaiser,“Unebatailleest perdue,maisla guerreresteP gagner-Das Scheiternder Europaischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft 1954 und der Wirtschaftsintegration,” Die Europuische Unionund Durchbruchzur horizontalen Nomos,20011,79-95, 85-93. ihreKrisen,ed. RomainKirt (Baden-Baden: 49. Quotedin RaymondPoidevin,RobertSchuman,hommed’Etat 18861963 (Paris:Impr. Nationale,1986), 381. Emphasis added. 50. Kommission Ad Hoc I, Paris,11February1956,BAR JII.1811987/52,2362. 51. 0%-West-Kommission, Paris,1 February1957,BAR JII.181 1987/52,2362. 52. See, for example,Geneva Circle, 13 February1950, Protocolby Victor Koutzine,AN 457 AP 59. 53. EntschlieBung, Politischer AusschulJ, NEI-KongreB,Den Haag,17-19 SeptemPolitikMunich(ACSP), NachlaBJosefMuller. ber 1948,Archivfir christlich-soziale 54. For Francesee,by way of introduction andin relationto theEEC treatynegotiations,RenCGirault,“La Franceentre1’Europeet I’Afrique,”in 7heRelaunching of

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Europeand the Treatiesof Rome,ed. Enrico Serra (Brussels:Bruylant,1989), Democratpositionon thisissuebeforethestartof theEEC 351-378. For theChristian negotiations, seealsothe answers of the nationalNEI groupsto question 9 in Robert Houben,Fragebogen zur Wirtschaftsund Sozialpolitik in der europaischen Integration in Vorbereitungauf den NEI-KongreBin Briigge, 10-12 September1954, AntwortenderCDU/CSU,8July1954,andof theFrenchequipe(MRP), no date(July 19541,KADOC, ArchiefR. Houben,246.2./3. 55. JosefMuller,Redezur GriindungderNEI-EquipedesSaarlandes, Saarbriicken, 6 March1949,ACSP,NachlaBJosefMuller. 56. Thisconflictwaseventually resolved in thecontextof theCotonouAgreement countries, whichmadethe betweenthe EU andtheACP (African-Carribean-Pacific) (MTO). Cf. relationship compatible with the rulesof the World TradeOrganization GenevraForwood,“TheRoadto Cotonou:Negotiating a Successor to Lomi.,”Journal of Common MarketStudies 39, no. 3 (20011,423-442. 57. RogerReynaud,Bericht,NEI-KongreB,Paris,22-24 September 1960,ACDP IX002-022. 58. Aussprache, NEI-KongreB,Paris,22-24 September 1960,ACDP IX-002-022. 59. Augustde Schryver, Die aktuellepolitische Lage,NEI-KongreB,FreiburgD,30 May 1959,ACDP IX-002-021. 60. See RobertoPapini, The ChristianDemocratInternational(Lanham,Md.: 19971,chapter3, an accountlargelybasedon the Rowman& LittlefieldPublishers, of KarlJosefHahnin the studycenter author’s personalexperience asa collaborator in Rome. 61. By way of introduction, seethechapters on LatinAmericain ThomasKselman, in Europeand LatinAmerica(SouthBend,Ind.: Notre ed., ChristianDemocracy 2003). DameUniversityPress,forthcoming 62. See,for example,Karl JosefHahn, “EineAufgabefir Europa.Die Anfange Rheinischer Merkur,9 February einer christlichen Demokratiein Lateinamerika,” 1962. 7beClashof Civilizations andtheRemaking of WorldOr63. SamuelHuntington, der(New York: Simon& Schuster, 1996).

4 The UnitedStatesandthe Opening to the Left, 1953-1963 Leopoldo Nuti

The politicalsystemthattookshapein theWesternworldafterWorldWar 11 wasnot simplya systemof interstate relations. Thatsystemalsohada major domestic politicalcomponent. For theEuropeans especially, thequestionof theirrelationswith theUnitedStateswasof fundamental importance during the Cold War period-and that meantin particularthat it was boundto be importantevenin domesticpoliticalterms.As for theAmericans, theywere deeplyinterested in whatwasgoingon politicallywithinthemainEuropean countries,and framedtheir policiestowardthem with suchconcernsin mind.Giventhe powerof the UnitedStates,andthe dependence of theEuropeanson Americanpower,it wasnaturalthatthosepolicieswouldhavea majorimpacton domestic politicallife withinEurope. The pointappliesto onedegreeor anotherto all of the Europeancountriesin theWesternbloc-and perhapsaboveall to the FederalRepublicof Germany,in whose domesticpolitical affairs the Americanswere very deeplyinvolvedfromthe outset.But WestGermany,althoughthe mostimportantcase,was alsoa very specialcase.So to understand how the internationalsystem,andin particularAmericanpolicy,affectedthe politicallife of WesternEuropeasa whole,it makessensefor analyticalpurposes to focuson anothermajorEuropeancountry. The aim here,therefore,is to examinehowAmericanpolicyaffectedPOliticallife in Italy.To makethatanalysis manageable, I wantto focuson one specificissue:thequestion of an “opening to theleft” in Italianpoliticsin the periodfrom 1953to 1963.Thiswasperhapsthe mostcentralissuein Italian politicsin thatperiod.In 1953theItalianelections failedto providetheChristian Democratswith the absolutemajoritythat their leader,Alcide De Gasperi,hadsought.Thispartialelectoralfailureof the largestpro-Western 83

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Italianpartymarkedthe endof the firstphaseof the country’s postwarhistory and usheredin a periodof uncertainty.For the next ten years,De to recapturetheir party’s Gasperi’ssuccessors strovewith limitedsuccess hegemonic positionin the Italianpoliticalsystem.But the coalitiongovernmentsthe ChristianDemocratsput togethergenerallyendedup lastingno morethana year. The key issueduringthatperiodwasthuswhethergreaterstabilitycould be introduced intothesystemby broadening thebaseof thegoverning coalition by bringingin PietroNenni’sItalian SocialistParty,the PSI. Until the mid-1950s,that party had beencloselyallied with the Italian Communist Party.The question,therefore,waswhethera fundamental reorientation of thePSI, awayfromtheCommunists andtowardthecenter,couldbe effected. In the mid-l950s,the ChristianDemocrats thusbeganto explorethe possito theleft.”The PSI, for itspart,wastempted bility of somekindof “opening to workoutanarrangement of thatsort:becomingoneof thegoverningpartieswouldclearlybenefitthe partyandits supporters. But at the sametime, theSocialists werereluctant,for bothpoliticalandideological reasons, to cut formerallies.So the process theirtiessocompletelywith theirCommunist took a longtimeto run its course,andthe PSI did not enterintoa coalition government with the ChristianDemocrats untilthe endof 1963. WhatroledidtheAmericans playin all this,andwhatpolicydidtheypursuein thisarea?Accordingto mostscholarlyandjournalistic accounts, the storycanbe dividedinto two very distinctparts.In the firstperiod,the periodof theEisenhower administration, theAmericans firmlyopposed anydialoguebetweenthe ChristianDemocratsand the PSI becauseof the deep mistrustthe administration asa whole-and aboveall, the U S . ambassador to Italy for muchof thatperiod,ClareBoothLuce-felt towardNenniandhis party.In thesecondphase,it is argued,theKennedyadministration founditselfdividedbetweenthosewhowantedto stopinterfering with ItalianpoliticsandgiveItaly moreautonomyin itsdomestic politicalchoices, andthose who remaineddeeplyopposedto any openingto the left. The administration remaineddividedfor almostthe entireKennedyperiod.It was only in mid-1963thattheconflictwasresolved,whentheAmericansupporters of a ChristianDemocrat-PSIrapprochement won out. That group,composed mostlyof highly ideological,liberalKennedyites, saw in the dialoguebetweentheChristianDemocrats andthe PSI a chanceto shakeItalianpolitics loosefromthe perilousconservative stagnation of the 1950sandencourage a repriseof dynamicreformismthatItaly hadexperienced in the earlypostwar period. This type of accountis not entirelyincorrect,but it is somewhatoverschematized andis misleading in particularareas.Many writers,for example, spenda gooddealof timetalkingaboutAmbassador Luceandherblatantly aggressive policytowardthe Italianleft.Mrs. Luceis mostlyremembered for

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herbrashantiCommunist stance,heroftenclumsyintrusions in Italianunion andindustrialaffairs,andher alarmistdeclarations againstthe red peril.She is usuallycriticizedfor a basicincapacity to understand the subtlenuances of the Italianpoliticalsystem,its arcaneandcomplexmechanisms, andthe In short,themostcommon psychology andthementalityof itsprotagonists. portraitof ambassador Luce is something of a caricature, one that can be summedup in the classicimageof the bull in a Chinashop.’But whatever herflaws,herimportance shouldnotbe overstated. Shedidnot,in fact,play a very importantrole in the story.Real policy,in thisas in practicallyevery otherarea,wasactuallymadein Washington. TheU.S. government asa whole,duringtheearlyEisenhower period,did takea hardline on mattersrelatingto the Italianleft. Indeed,theAmericans tooka hardline on manysuchissues throughout theworldat thattime.The mostimportantdocumentlayingout US. policytowardItaly in the 1950s wasNSC 5411/2 of April 13, 1954, andsomeextractsfromthatbasicpolicy documentareworthquotingat length.According to thatdocument, theU.S. government wasto try, using“allpracticable means”:

of theItalianCommunist party a. To reducethestrengthandeffectiveness groups andof pro-communist b. To preventItaly fromfallingunderthe dominationof the ItalianCommunistpartyor of thepresentItalianSocialist party. The Americangovernment wasalsoto: Continueto makefull useof US. politicalmeansand,aspracticable andappropriate,economicandmilitaryaid to: a. inducetheItaliangovernment to adoptmeasures strikingat theorganiCommunistfizationalbasisof Communistpower and undermining nancialandpoliticalstrengths. b. induceprivateItaliangroups,particularly Italianemployers andfreelabor movements, to combatCommunism vigorously. Finally,“whenever possible andadvantageous,” theUnitedStates wasto “seek to accomplish the aboveby conditioning US. assistance on anticommunist actionstakenby theItaliangovernment andprivateItaliangroups.”* Theverytoughandhighlyinterventionist policyoutlinedhereprovidedthe warrantforwhatarecommonly viewedassomeof Mrs.Luce’smostnotorious initiatives,includingher threatto assignUS. OffshoreProcurements (OSP) contracts onlyto thosefactories wherenon-Communist tradeunionists helda clearmajoritywithintheworkers’assemblies. But it is quiteclearthatpolicyitselfwasdecidedon notby her,but by thepoliticalleadership in Washington.

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But doesit makesenseto seethe policyoutlinedin NSC 5411/2 as reflectingthe deep-seated and unchanging view of the Eisenhoweradministration?Did thatdocumentsimplyformalizea policythatwas implemented as soonas that administration cameto powerin January1953,was maintainedintactfor the nexteightyears,andwasonlyabandoned whena new administration tookofficein 1961?Well, not quite,andit is important,when interpretingAmericanpolicyduringthe Eisenhowerperiod,to emphasize certainelementsof changewithin that periodandalsocertainelementsof continuitywith whatcamebeforeandwouldcomelater. First of all, one shouldnotethat the policyof the earlyEisenhower adof US.-Italian policythat hadbeministration had its rootsin a reappraisal gun in the last yearsof the Trumanpresidency. Between1951 and 1953 manyofficialsin theTrumanadministration hadcriticizedan Americanpolicy that encouraged the Italiangovernment to fight the ItalianCommunists onlyby encouraging economic andsocialreforms.Thoseofficialsadvocated the adoptionby De Gasperior hissuccessors of a tougher,moreaggressive line againstthe ItalianCommunists. And the plan thatemerged,the notorious“Demagnetize” (laterrelabeled“Clydesdale”) planapprovedby thePsychological StrategyBoardtowardtheendof theTrumanadministration, was therealsourceof thesubsequent Eisenhower policy;thebasicideaherewas thatthe Italiangovernment shouldbe encouraged by Washington to pursue a politicalandpsychological offensiveagainstthe Communists.3 And asfor the Eisenhower perioditself,policytowardtheendof thatperiodwasratherdifferentfromwhatit hadbeenat thebeginning. On theItalianquestionasin somanyotherareas,Americanpolicyhadmellowedin the courseof the 1950s;by the endof thatperiod,the earlyhardline hadsoftenedconsiderably. The generalassumption thattherewas no basicchange in Eisenhower’s Italianpolicyduringthe eightyearsof his presidency, the commonbeliefthatuntiltheKennedyadministration steppedin, thebasisof Washington’s Italianpolicyremainedfrozenin stone,is quitemistaken. In purelyformalterms,it might,however,seemthatAmericanpolicyhad notchanged. ThebasicU.S. policydocument for Italy,NSC 5411/2,wasonly replacedby a newpolicydocument, NSC 6014,in 1960,andthatnewpolicy documentwas not radicallydifferentfrom its predecessor.* But oneshould not be misledby theformalpolicydocuments. The key pointto noteis that administration adopteda in practice,beginningin late 1956,theEisenhower lessaggressive policy, apolicywhoseprofilewasless clear-cut thanthepreviousone,andlesseasilydefined. That new policywas rootedin the sense,as the numbertwo man in the US. embassy in Romeput it in mid-1956,thatthe “battering ram”approach was no longera suitabletool in the new politicalclimate.That policywas bankruptin anycase,according to thatofficial,for thesimplereasonthatthe governingpartiesin Italy hadsimplyrefusedto adopta policyof directcon-

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frontationwith the left. In suchcircumstances, a subtlerpolicy,a policy that andthe internaltensionsof the Italian wouldtry to exploitthe weaknesses left in orderto disorganize it andgeneratemoreconfusion withinits ranks, mightwell be in order.5 Onekey eventmarkingthebeginningof thatshiftin policywastheAmertheChristianDemicantripof AmintoreFanfani,thenewgeneralsecretaryof ocraticParty,in the summerof 1956.FollowingFanfani’svisit, the Eisenhower administration beganto move away from the old hard line and towarda ratherblandencouragement of a policyof moderatereformism. Fanfani,in fact,becamea kind of privilegedinterlocutor of theUS. government,especially afterthe 1958electionsandtheformationof his cabinetin sawit, whomightbeable Julyof thatyear.He wastheman,astheAmericans to bringaboutmajorreforms-reformsthatmightreducesupportfor theleft while at the sametimegenerating doubtsandconfusion withintheranksof thePSI. So onehasthe sensethat policywas beginningto shlft,albeitgradually andin relativelyminorways,duringthe lateEisenhower period.In 1958,for example,a U.S. embassy officialwasallowedto begina dialoguewith some membersof Nenni’swing of the PSI, the so-calledautonomists. Thosediscussions then becamealmosta daily featureof the embassy’s routine;but This until thatpointtalksof that sorthadbeenutterlyout of thequestion6 doesnot meanthatthe embassyhadsuddenlycometo supportthe ideaof an “opening to theleft”andhaddecidedto helpNennibreakwith theCommunistsandget intothe government. The shiftwasby no meansthatsharp or thatextreme.Butin thefinalyearsof thedecade,theU.S. line,asreflected in day-to-dayembassy practice,hadclearlysoftened. The Socialists wereno longerbeyondthe pale,andtheAmericans werenowencouraging themto taketheirdistancefrom the Communists.’ Anotherpointworthnotingin thiscontexthasto dowith theBritish-both the Britishgovernment andthe BritishLabourParty.The conservative government,while perhapsnot openlyfavoringthe openingto the left, sought to influenceeventsin a moreindirectway: it supported certainkey public figuresin Italy who weredirectlyinvolvedin promotingthe dialoguebetweentheChristianDemocrats andthePSI.TheBritish,for example-unlike the Americansat that point-favored the electionof GiovanniGronchias president of theItalianRepublicin 1955;thisis importantin thiscontextbecauseGronchiwas oneof the warmestsupporters of a rapprochement betweenthe Socialists andthe ChristianDemocrats.8 Britainwas alsothe first government to try to cultivatethe sympathies of EnricoMattei,headof the state-runItalianoil companyENI andan outspoken championof theopening to the left.’ The BritishLabourPartyplayedan evenmoreimportantrole.The Labour Partyhadbrokenwith the PSI a few yearsearlier,whenthe ItalianSocialists

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hadalliedthemselves with theCommunists in the 1948elections.1° But now, in the mid- andlate 1950s,it wasrebuildingits tieswith the PSI, andit was usingthosenewlinkstoencourage Nennitopull awayfromtheCommunists andmovetowardtheChristianDemocrats. LeadingLabourites, for example, went to Italy to try to encourage N e M i to movein that direction.And the LabourPartydid morethanjustofferadviceandmoralsupport:duringthe January1959PSI Congress in Naples,Nennimanagedto scorean outstanding victoryagainsthis opponents insidethe partythanksin part to a substantialLabouritecontribution.” of theseLabourParty TheAmericans seemedon thesurfaceto disapprove initiatives. The US. embassy in Rome,for example,gavea stronglynegative of their possibleimpacton Italian politicsandjudgedthem as assessment hasty,ill-timedandbasedon an impreciseevaluationof Nenni’spolicies.12 The Americans, moreover,decidedeventuallyto takesomedirectcounterandtheycovertly measures. TheymadetheBritishawareof theirmisgivings, warnedsometrustedmembersof the SocialistInternationalagainstwhat theysawasa premature readmission of Nenni’spartyintoitsfold;thePSI, in theirview,wouldfirsthaveto givestronger proofof its loyaltyto theWest.’3 But theAmericanattitudeonthisissueis by no meansclear-cut, andthere mayhavebeenmoretoAmericanpolicythanmettheeye.The LabourParty officialin Rome activitieswere,in fact,in line with whatoneUS. embassy had recommended in 1956.He suggested a plan for helpingthe PSI in a more“socialdemocratic” direction,a planthatin somewaysseemed to foreshadowwhat the LabourPartylaterendedup doing.That officialthought the U.S. governmentmight“consider havingless-than-first rank European (not Italian)SocialDemocrats developinformalandunpublicized but close personalrelations” with leadersof the anticommunist wing of the PSI. The goal would be “toestablisha channelof communication and, if possible, developedsatisgentlyto influencetheir thinking.”If those“relationships factorily,”that official thoughtthat “thepossibilityof somefinancialaid throughthe channelof the Europeanparty in questioncould be considered.”14 Giventhistype of thinking,onewonderswhethera kind of “goodcop, badcop”strategy hadbeenadopted: theBritish,perhaps, wouldtakecareof removingthe roughideologicaledgesfrom Nenni’sparty,helpingguideit towardthe goal of socialdemocraticrespectability, while the Americans wouldbe responsible for makingsurethatan officialcertificateof goodbehaviorwasnot issuedprematurely. Whateverwas goingon here-and not all the evidence,especiallyfrom intelligenceagencysources,bearingon the issuehas been releasedthus far-the pointto bearin mind is thatthe processthatled to the openingto theleft wasquitecomplex,evenin itsinternational dimensions. Americawas not the onlyforeignplayer;governments werenot the onlyactors.And one

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doesget the sensethatthispartof the storywasby no meansof negligible importance: in the late 1950s,the BritishLabourPartyhada majoreffecton Nenniandon the policyof the PSI. The policyof the Britishleft was,asit turnedout,quitesimilarto the policy thatthe moreliberalwingof the Kennedyadministration favored,beginning in 1961.Therewas a debatewithin the new administration aboutthe policyit shouldpursuetowardItaly. Somehavearguedthatthe debatewas centeredon the opportunity to “lifttheAmericanveto”to the Italiannatural inclinationto spontaneously pursuethe openingto the left. In reality,however,the clashcenteredon the desirability of openlyencouraging a centerleft coalitionandof covertlysupporting Nenniin his fight insidethe PSI to Jr., crushthe pro-Communist factionsof the party.15ArthurM. Schlesinger, RobertKomer,AverellHarriman,andothermembersof thenew administration believedthatwithouta clear-cutsignalfromWashington, Italianpoliticianswouldneverdareto bringaboutan openingto the left. In theirview, Nenniwasengaged in a life-and-death, no-holds-barred struggle for thecontrol of hisparty,a strugglewhoseoutcomewouldshapethe politicalfuture of Italy for manyyearsto come.As theysawit, the UnitedStatescouldnot just sit still and watch passivelywhile Nenni lost a fight whoseoutcome couldwell determinethe futureof Italiandemocracy. It wasthusimportant not only thatthe UnitedStatessupportthe openingto the left,but alsothat the Kennedyadministration studywhatcouldbe doneto providethebeleagueredNenniwith somematerialupp port.'^ And this questionof financialsupport,it shouldbe noted,is the crucial partof the story.In mostaccounts it is ignoredor, at best,merelyhintedat, and,giventhe limitations on sourceavailability,muchof thisstoryremains unclear.But in the sources thatareavailable,thereareimportantclueshere andthere:theideaof financingthe PSI wasraisedfirstby ArthurSchlesinger and CIA’S Dana Durandin the summerof 1961,anddebatedbetweenthe StateDepartment, the CIA, the embassy,andthe White Housethroughout the followingmonths.”SomeliberalAmericantradeunionleaders,suchas WalterandVictorReutherof theUnitedAutomobile Workers(UAW) andGus Bellancaof theAmalgamated ClothingWorkers(ACW), thenproposed to the SpecialGroupof theNSC thattheyhelptheadministration implementa major covertplan to build up a PSI-oriented, anti-Communist, tradeunion.I8 Theavailabledocumentation showsthattheprojectwasturneddownby the endof June1962,but oneshouldalsonotethatby the endof 1962the PSI beganto receivea modestamountof financialsupportfrom the UAW and theACW tobuildup its tradeunionsupportandfreeit fromCommunist control.I9While thereis no documentary evidenceof directapprovalof thisiniit is hardlyconceivable thataftera yearanda half of tiativeby the President, heateddebatetheUAW andtheACW couldgo aheadwithouttellingtheadministration andwithoutsometacitapprovalof whattheyweredoing.

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SothepolicythatSchlesinger andhisallieschampioned hadsomeimpact on what was actuallydone,but their viewswere not universallyshared withinthe government. Many diplomats and government officialswere in facton theothersideon thisissue.Theyfelt thatsomeone like Nennicould of a member-state notyet be trustedto becomea memberof a government in the diof NATO, andpreferredtherefore eitherto movemorecautiously rectionof a center-left coalitionor evensupporta returnto a moreconservativeformula.And standing above,or outside, thedebatewasthepresident himself-at leastfor mostof hisbriefperiodin office.Kennedy,duringthat period,neitheropenly supported Schlesinger andhisalliesnorreinedthem in;in effect,he gavethemamplefreedomto maneuver. Theresultwasa policy thatfor quitesometimeoscillated betweentheold andnewapproaches. The greatchangecameonlyin the summerof 1963.At thattime,during his trip to Italy, Kennedyhad a longconversation with Nenniduringa receptionin the Quirinalegardens. He thussignaled hispersonal supportfor the openingto the left.The extraordinary importance of thateventwasreflectedin people’sreactionsat the time: open relief and satisfaction on Nenni’sside,perplexity if notoutrightresentment onthesideof someof the otherItalianpoliticians whowatchedthescene.20 How is thismoveof Kennedy’s to be understood? America’srelations with Europetooka sharpturnfor theworsein January1963.The Frenchleader, GeneralCharlesde Gaulle,wasopenlydefiant,andKennedyneededto rally theEuropeans behindhisnewpolicyof detente withtheSovietUnion.In Italy, by shiftinghis weightin favorof an openingto the left, the U.S. president probablyhopedto kill twobirdswith onestone.Not onlywoulda center-left cabinethopefullystabilizeItalianpoliticsby bringingthe Socialistsinto the government, but it wouldalsohavethebeneficialeffectof makingsurethat theforeignpolicyof thenewItaliancoalition wouldfollowtheU.S. approach De Gaulle’schallenge. towarddetenteandwouldnot be inclinedto support TheFrenchgeneral, asa matterof fact,wastheveritableb&e noireof theItalianSocialists. So, lookingat thisperiodas a whole,whatconclusions are in order?In particular, what impactdid Americanpolicyhaveon developments within Italy?UnderEisenhower, the Americans playeda fundamental role,but essentiallya negativeone.In theearlyEisenhower periodespecially, themain effectof Americanpolicywasto strengthen thoseItalianforcesopposed to a rapprochement betweentheChristianDemocrats andthePSI.The tiesbetweentheAmericans andthemoreconservative Italianswerereinforced by variouscovertactions,especiallyin the financialarea. Even as late as 1957-1958, for example,US. foodaid wasillegallyresoldby the Christian Democrats, whothenusedtheproceeds for electoral purposes.21 But even duringthat period,therewere limitsto what the Americans coulddo.The UnitedStatesmightbe able,in effect,to blockan openingto

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theleft,but it couldnot gettheItaliangovernment to pursuea reallytough anti-Communist policy. De Gasperi’sheirs-Pella, Scelba,and Segni-all shiedaway from the idea of a full-scaleattackon the Italian Communist Party,the largestsuchpartyin WesternEurope.After a puzzlingencounter with the directorgeneralof the ItalianMinistryof ForeignAffairs,Massimo Magistrati,Mrs. Luce herselfremarkedthat the much-vaunted offensive againsttheCommunists wouldbe enactedat thespeedof “coldmolasses.”22 The UnitedStates,moreover,was unableto reducethe influenceof the Communists to the pointwherethey becamean entirelymarginalactorin Italianpolitics.The centralgoal of weakeningthe ItalianCommunist Party, in fact,provedquiteelusive.The resultsachieved, whetherthroughencouragingbold reformisteffortsor throughpressingthe Italiangovernments to adopta harshlyrepressive policy,alwaysfell veryshortof themark.And that strategicfailure was accompanied by a numberof smallertacticalones, whichclearlyshowthe limitsof the Americaninfluence:the failureto prevent the electionof GiovanniGronchias presidentof the Republic,for example,or thefailedattemptto launchFanfaniasthenew,dynamicreformist leaderof the ChristianDemocratic Partyin 1957-1958.23 As for the Kennedyperiod,againAmericanpolicy playeda key role. LimitedthoughAmericansupportfor the PSI was, the new U.S. attitude symbolizedby Kennedy’smeetingwith Nenni in 1963was regardedas a truly momentous shiftin Italianpoliticalcircles,andhelpedpavethe way of the Socialists into the government. By grantfor the eventualadmission ing the PSI a full auraof respectability, andby lettingthe Reutherbrothers andtheACW grantsomelimitedcovertassistance aswell, the Kennedyadministrationunderminedthe positionof thosegroupswithin Italy who to prevent-or,at least,to notfacilitate-the opencountedon Washington ing to the left. But is this how the questionof Americaninfluenceis to be conceptualized?Doesit makesenseto breakthe storydowninto two sharplydefined phases? Perhapsit wouldmakemoresenseto seea morecomplexprocess at work, a processunfoldingovertime, a processin whichAmericanand Italianattitudes interacted with eachother.TheAmericans mayhaveblocked an openingto theleft in the 1950s;butthekey pointto notehereis thatthat attitudealsohelpedbring abouta majorshift in the characterof the PSI. Nenni’spolicieschangeddramatically in the 1953-1963 period;andindeed has the moderateleft in the Westernworld as a whole,as DonaldSassoon shown,was transformed duringthat period.That transformation was characterizedby the marginalization of the neutralistandphilo-Sovietelements within the West EuropeanSocialistparties,and,on domesticissues,by a move towarda reformist,socialdemocraticphilosophy,especiallyin the GermanSocialDemocratic Partyandin the BritishLabourParty,but also,to a certainextent,in the ItalianPSI.24

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Thesefundamental changes areof coursenotto be understood in purely however,to realizethatthe international geopolitical terms.It is important, environment playedan importantrolein bringingthemabout.The Socialist partiesneededto shedtheir neutralist,anti-NATOtrappingsif the United Stateswasnotgoingto throwits veryconsiderable weightintothe political scaleswithintheirown countries, andeffectivelykeepthemfromeverbecomingtrue governing parties.On the otherhand,if theydid evolvein a pro-NATOdirection, theAmericans wouldhavean interestin bringingthem in-that is,in broadening thebaseof thepro-NATOcoalition. Theeffectwas to help pull the Socialists to a moremoderate positionon foreignanddefensepolicyissues; andwhenthathappened, theAmericans-and the Europeanconservatives as well-found it mucheasierto take an accommodatingpositionon thequestion of politicalparticipation at home. One shouldnote,moreover, thatoneof thethingsthatmadeit relatively easyfor thisprocess to run its coursewasthatAmericanobjections to the ideaof bringingthe Socialists intothe government, in Italy as elsewhere in WesternEuropein the 1950s,primarilyhadto do with theforeign,andnot the domestic, policiesthoseleftistpartiescalledfor. In the Italiancase,the Americans fearedthatbringingthePSI intothegovernment wouldhelp push Italianpolicytowardneutralism. ItalyundertheChristian Democrats pursued a strong, pro-Western policy;theAmericans’ mainconcern wasthatanopeningtotheleftmightwell change all that.Thefocus,in otherwords,wasoverwhelminglyon foreignandmilitarypolicy:the U.S. government did not really objectto theideaof bringingthe Socialists intothegovernment because it wasafraidof the sortof domestic policya coalitionthatincludedthe PSI would pursue.Indeed,the Americansgenerallybelievedthat far-reaching politicalandsocialreformswereof vital importance-if onlyto weakenthe of thepopulation. To gripof Communist propaganda onthepoorest sections be sure,U.S. pressure on Italy to pursuea reformistpolicywashaltingand far fromconstant. It sharplydecreased in theearlyEisenhower yearsandbecamestrongagainonlyduringtheKennedyperiod.But theAmericans were neveropposed to reformasa matterof principle,andtheeffectof thisemwasto lowerthe b a r - t o phasison the foreignpolicysideof the question limit thesortof objections theAmericans mighthavehadto theinclusion of theSocialists in thegovernment-andthusmakeit easierfor thePSI to both changeits policyandjoin a coalitionthathadAmerica’s blessing, andfor the UnitedStatesto supporta development of thatsort. Onecanthusseethebasicstructure of theprocess thatwasat work.And the pointneedsto be stressed thatthe fundamental politicalchanges that tookplacewithinItaly in thisperiodareto be understood in process terms. To thequiteconsiderable extentthattheyhadaninternational taproot,those changes arenotto be understood astheproductof one-timeshiftsresulting of administration in Washington. The openingto the left from the changes

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tookplaceat a particular pointin time-after thePSI moderated its position, andafterthe Americanattitudesoftened. But thesethingsdid not happen overnight. Therewasa process at work,a process thattookmanyyearsto run its course. The factthatit tooksolongmeantthatthePSI hadthe time to adjustto new realitiesand movetowarda foreignpolicypositionthat wouldnot jeopardize Italy’sinternational position.And that,in turn,meant thattherapprochement betweentheSocialists andthe Christian Democrats, whenit wasfinallyworkedout,tookplaceon lessslippery andlessdangerousgroundthanit wouldhaveif the “opening” hadtakenplacein theearly 1950s. Throughout the wholeperiodof the openingto the left therewasthusa verycloseconnection betweentheevolution of theinternational system and theevolution of thedomestic Italianone-between thegradualbeginning of detenteon theinternational levelandthefirststepsof thedialogue between theChristian Democrats andthePSI.Manycommentators, especially in Italy, haveclaimedthatthe openingto the left is to be understood in purelydomesticpoliticalterms.EvenNennihimselfarguedalongtheselines.25 But it is quite clearthat the international environment, and externalpressures, playeda fundamental rolebothin the timingof thesedevelopments andin the way theywereimplemented. The Americans in particular playeda crucial role in definingthe environment in whichItalianpoliticianslived and acted.If onewantsto understand eventheinternalhistoryof Italy in thatperiod,onemustneverlosesightof thatfact. Thisis notto say,of course,thatthiswasall therewasto thestory-that everysingleturn or move insidethe Italian politicalsystemcan be explainedby referringto a deusex machina,whichfrom the outsidewas pullingthe stringsand cunninglymanipulating its pawnson the Italian chessboard. The Italians,obviously, wereby no meanssimplypassiveobwhoplayednorealroleof theirown.Thechanjectsof Americanpressure nelsof influenceranbothways,andItalianpoliticians, bothconservatives andmoderates, madeuseof the international situation for theirownpolitical purposes.Many conservatives were afraidof the possibledomestic repercussions of detenteand warnedthe Americansaboutthe effectit wouldhaveon the politicalsituation withinItaly-that is, theywarnedthe Americans that a rushtowarddetentemighthavevery seriousrepercussionsin termsof Italianpolitics,andindeedmightundermine the political positionof America’sbestfriendsin Italy.26 Theycultivatedtheirrelationshipwith the United States,and especially, when they could,with the Americanpresident, in largepartfor domestic politicalreasons. Theyoften usedforeignpolicyarguments instrumentally: thosearguments wereuseful tacticallyin politicalmaneuvering at home.Perhapsthe moststriking exampleof thiswasthe attemptof someconservative Italianpoliticians in late 1963to disruptthe negotiations thatled to thefirstgovernment based

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on an alliancebetweentheChristianDemocrats andthePSI by citing(nonexistent)Americanpressureon Italy to join a US-sponsored Multilateral Force.*’ On the otherhand,thosewho favoredthe openingto the Ieft-Gronchi, Mattei,Nenni, and so on-threw their weight into the scaleson the prod6tenteside,again,in largepart,for domesticpoliticalreasons. Theyunderstoodthat a morerelaxedinternational climatewouldlegitimizetheirown theirgoalsat home. policiesandmakeit easierfor themto accomplish Whatemerges, then,froma studyof thisquestionis a strongsenseof the interconnectedness of thesevariouselements of bothdomesticandinternationalpoliticallife. Onehasthesenseof oneoverarching systemcominginto being,onewith bothinternalandtransnational aspects. The ColdWar politicalsystemdeeplyinfluencedpoliticallife withineverymajorWesterncountry. But the extraordinary politicalchangesthat took place within those countrieshadfar-reaching effectsthatwentwell beyondstateborders. Therallyingof the moderateleft to the NATO systemwas,in particular, a of greatinternational importance. It meantthatthedefenseof development Europecouldnow reston a moresoliddomestic politicalbase.It meantthat theAmericans coulddisengage fromtoogreatan involvement in internalEuropeanpoliticalaffairs.It alsomeantthata certainelementof rigiditywasbeing removedfrom Europeanpoliticallife, andthatan elementof brittleness was beingremovedfrom the NATO systemitself.That systemwould no longerdependfor itsviability,in domesticpoliticalterms,on thesupportof conservative andcentristelements alone.And all of thisultimatelymadefor a more stablepoliticalorderin Europe,both internationally and domestically.But onecanseewhy thatsortof systemcameintobeingonlyby lookingcloselyat howthisprocess ranitscoursewithinindividualWesterncountries.This is why a studyof the openingto the left withinItaly, a casethat showsthatprocessat work in an exceptionally clearway, is of fundamental historicalinterest.

NOTES 1. A strikingexampleis Giangiacomo Migone,“StatiUniti, FIAT e repressione anRivistadi storiacontemporanea, no. 2 (1974).Some tioperaianegliannicinquanta,” of the memoirsof Italianpoliticiansalsotake thisgeneralview. See,for example, GiulioAndreotti,Gli USA vistidi vicino(Milano:Mondadori,1989).Note alsoJames E. Miller, “Roughhouse Diplomacy:The U S . Confronts ItalianCommunism,” Storia Brogi,L’ltalia e l’egedelleRelazioniInternazionali5 , no. 2 (19891,306. Alessandro moniaamericana(Firenze:NuovaItalia,1996)correctlyrelatesMrs.Luce’sbehavior administration. with the strategic choicesof Eisenhower’s 2. NSC 5411/2, U S . policytowardItaly, April 13, 1954, in US. NationalArchives (NA), RecordGroup(RG) 59, RecordsRelatingto StateDepartment Participation in

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the Operations Coordinating Boardandthe NSC: Lot File 62 D 430, box 79, folder “5411memoranda.” 3. Psychological Operations Planfor the Reduction of Communist Powerin Italy Library (codename“Clydesdale”), February15, 1952,in HarryS. TrumanPresidential (HSTPL), papersof Harry S. Truman,recordsof the Psychological StrategyBoard, plan, seeMaria Eleonora folder “091-Italy.”For an analysisof the “Demagnetize” Guasconi, L’altrafacciadella medaglia:Diplomaziapsicologica e sindacalenelle relazioniItalia-Statiunitidurantela primafasedellaguewafredda(1947-1955) (Messina:Rubbettino,1998);Mario Del Pero,L’alleatoscomodo: Gli USA e la DC negliannidelcentrism0 (1948-1955)(Roma:Carocci,2001): 149-156. 4. NSC 6014,Draft Statement of US. PolicyTowardItaly,August16, 1964,in U.S. of theUnitedStates(FRUS), 1958-1960,vol. Departmentof State,ForeignRelations 7, part2, p. 600. Henceforth, references to thissourcewill be citedin the following form:FRUS 1958-60,7(2): 600. After someslightchanges,this documentwas apof policyandwasissuedasNSC 6014/1on December provedasan officialstatement 20, 1960. 5. Jernegan toJones,26 June1956,in NA, RG 59, CentralDecimalFiles(CDF) for 1955-1959, box 3605,765.00/6-2756(documentreleasedthroughthe F.O.I.A.). 6. Author’sinterviewwith GeorgeLister,Washington, June1991. Listerhad his Lombardi.“Memoranfirstmeetingwith a memberof thePSI whenhe sawRiccardo with PSI LeaderRiccardoLombardi,” February3, 1958,in NA, dumof Conversation RG 59, CDF 1955-1959, box 3608,765.00/2-358. 7. Reportby the Operations Coordinating Board:Operations Planfor Italy,July 8, 1959,in FRUS 195%60,7(2): 529. 8. Ilaria Favretto,“La nascitadel centro-sinistra e la GranBretagna: Partitosocialno. 202 (March 1996), 5-43, ista,laburisti,ForeignOffice,”Ztalia Contemporanea, note36. 9. The first stepwas the purchaseby EN1 (EnteNazionaleIdrocarburi)of a Britishnuclearreactorfor its powerplantin Latina,thefirstnuclearreactorto be sold to Italy. The Britishembassyin Rome,in particular,dedicatedmuchattentionto buildingup its relationship with Mattei (to the pointwhereone of Mattei’sopponents,GiuseppeSaragat, calledhim a “Britishagent”).In 1960,the UK ambassador to theforeignofficethatit wasnecessary to try to mediatethe wasthefirstto suggest delicatecontroversies betweenMatteiandtheBritishoil companies: SirAshleyClarke to Sir PaulGore-Booth, August11, 1960,in BritishPublicRecordOffice (PRO), FO 371/153362,RT 1532/10. 10. On thisepisodeseeA. Varsori,“I1 LabourPartye la crisidel socialismo italiano (1947-1948),”in I socialistie l’Europa,ed. Fondazione Brodolini(Milano:Angeli, 1989),159-210. 11. SeePalewskito Mollet,October23, 1958,in OfficeUniversitaire de Recherche Socialiste (OURS),ArchivesGuy Mollet, “Dossier surle PSI avantle 33i.meCongrks du 16 janvier1959”;and Barbourto Dulles,January21, 1959,in NA, RG 59, CDF 1955-1959,box 3609,765.00/1-2159. 12. Ambassador Zellerbachexplicitlydeniedto GiuseppeSaragatthat the U S . embassyapprovedof the Britishmaneuvers. EmbassyRometo the Departmentof State,“Conversation with On. GiuseppeSaragatandNoteson Visit of BritishLabour MP, Alfred Robens,” in NA, RG 59, CDF 1955-1959,box 3608,765.00/7-2458.

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13. In February1959membersof the StateDepartment had a lively exchangeof ideason this matterwith someBritishdiplomats: Memorandum of Conversation, “ItalianPoliticalSituation-Evaluationof Nenni,”February4, 1959;and memorandumof conversation on “ItalianSocialistDevelopments,” February6, 1959;bothin NA, RG 59, CDF 1955-1959, box 3610,765.00/2459and765.00/2-659. 14. Jerneganto Jones,June26, 1956,in NA, RG 59, CDF 1955-1959,box 3605, Act). 765.00/6-2756(documentreleasedthroughtheFreedomof Information 15. Seethe Oral HistoryInterviewwith G. FrederickReinhardt,andSchlesinger’s commenton thatinterview,in theJohnF. KennedyPresidential LibraryOFKPL). “Suggested Lines for 16. Memorandumfor the deputydirectorof intelligence, BriefingPresident KennedyonPendingVisit of PremierFanfani,” June1, 1961;Memorandumto Walt Rostow,“StateDepartment Paperon Italy,”July6, 1961;suggested approachto “OPERATIONNENNI,” 9 August1961;all in JFKPL,ArthurSchlesinger Papers,SubjectFile: Italy,box WH 12. On the issueof financialsupportfor the PSI thereare a few hints in Leo Wollemborg,Stars,Stripes,and Italian Tricolor:7be 1990),andSpencer Di Scala, UnitedStatesandItaZy,1946-1989(New York:Praeger, From Nennito Craxi:Renewing Italian Socialism (New YorWOxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998). 17. LeopoldoNuti, Gli StatiUnitie l’aperturaa sinistra. Importanzae limitidella presenzaamericanain Italia (Roma:Laterza,1999),369-374. For theSpecialGroup meeting,see“MeetingbetweenWalterP. ReutherandBobKennedyat Gen.Maxwell Taylor’soffice,”June21, 1962,WalterReutherLibrary,WalterReutherPapers,Series XVIII, Appointments and Invitations, box 602, and “Minutesof Meetingof Special Kennedy,NationalSecurity Group(CI),”June21, 1962,i n m L , Papersof President Files,box319. SeealsoArthurM. Schlesinger journalentryforJune25, 1962(p. 720). I am gratefulto Professor Schlesinger for allowingme to consultthisvery valuable source. 18. L. Nuti, Gli StatiUnitie l’aperturaa sinistra,467-476. 19. Ibid., 639-655. 20. Thebestaccountof thisepisodeistheonegivenby WilliamFraleighin hisoral historyinterviewat theKennedyLibrary.For Nenni’sversion,seeP. Nenni,Gli anni 19821,entryforJuly1, 1963. del centro-sinistra: Diari 1957-1966(Milano:Sugarco, For a more“bureaucratic” account,seeFRUS 1961-63,13: 8fE-889. 21. Amongthe personalpapersof New York SenatorVictorAnfuso,for instance, thereis an encodedexchange of lettersbetweenAnfusoandoneof Fanfani’sclosest collaborators, RaimondoManzini,whichshedssomelight on the true natureof the of the relief aid providedby the UnitedStatesduring management anddistribution theperiodfrom 1957to 1958in accordance with U.S. PublicLaw 480. With Anfuso’s, and possiblyEisenhower’s, full approval,the food providedaccording to that law wasillegallyresoldby theChristian Democrats, withtheearnings usedto supportthe of differentfactionswithinthe ChristianDemocratic Party.See electoralcampaigns 11, PapersPertaining to Centerfor MigrationStudies, VictorAnfusopapers,Subgroup Anfuso’sActivitiesasa U.S. Congressman, Series31-1TALY, box 13,folder140. 22. Luceto Dulles,April 19, 1954,FRUS 1952-54, 8: 405414.Mrs. Luce had alreadyexpressed her doubtsa few weeksbefore.Luce to Dulles,March 18, 1954, FRUS 1952-54, 8: 383-389.

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23. In the lattercase,the UnitedStatesadoptedthe unusualanddramaticstepof havingthe ambassador openlypraiseanddefendPrimeMinisterFanfaniagainsthis internalcritics,onlyto seethosecriticstriumpha few weekslaterwhenFanfaniwas forcedto resign. 24. DonaldSassoon, A HundredYearsof Socialism: 7beWestEuropean Leftin the Twentieth Cmtuly(London:HarperandCollins,1997). 25. SeewhatNennihimselfwroteabouthistalkwith Kennedy:P. Nenni,Gli anni delcentro-sin istra,1957- 1966,288-289. 26. Seefor instance theremarks by PrimeMinisterSegniandForeignMinisterPella of Conversation, Septemduringtheir 1959visit to the UnitedStates:Memorandum ber 30, 1959 and Memorandum of Conversation, October2, 1959,both in FRUS, 1958-1960,7(2),docs.242 and256. 27. On thispointseeL. Nuti, “Commitment to NATO andDomesticPolitics:The Contempora y European Histoly 7, ItalianCaseand SomeComparative Remarks,” no. 3 (November19981,361-377.


5

Hegemonyor Vulnerability? Giscard,Ball, andthe 1962 Gold StandstillProposal FrancisJ. GavinandErin Mahan

What was the characterof America’sinternational monetaryrelationswith Europeduringthe early 1960s,and how were they relatedto the larger powerpoliticalquestions of theday?Thereis a standard interpretation of this question. Duringthispre-Vietnam war period,theargumentruns,theUnited Statesstroveto maintainhegemonic powervis-2-visWesternEurope“based monetarysystemandon theexon therole of thedollarin theinternational tensionof its nucleardeterrentto includeits allies.”’Sincethis economic dominance resultedfromthestructure andrulesof theBrettonWoodsmonetarysystem,the Americanshadno interestin reformingarrangements that were“aprerequisite for continued Americanglobalhegemony.”z “Because it was interestedin preservingthe privilegesit derivedfrom the operationof the BrettonWoodsregime,”the UnitedStateswould not “condone a structuralreform”of the systemthat threatened “thecontinuedpreeminence of the dollar.”3 And while mostof “America’s alliesacquiesced in a hegemonic systemthat accordedthe UnitedStatesspecialprivilegesto act abroadunilaterallyto promoteU.S. interests,” the Frenchdid not.*TheFifth Republic government, led by Charlesde Gaulle,deeplyresentedthe privilegesthey believedthe systemconferreduponthe Americandollarand activelyexploitedAmerica’sbalanceof paymentspositionin an attemptto forcethe UnitedStatesto abandon theBrettonWoodssystem.TheUnitedStates,conventionalwisdomholds,wasabletothwartthisFrencheffortuntiltheAmericandeficitballoonedin thelate 1960sandearly1970sasa resultof massive “gunsandbutter”i n f l a t i ~ n . ~ Therealstoryis ratherdifferent.Americanpolicy-makers hadno greatlove for the BrettonWoodssystem.It was associated in their mindsnot with Americanhegemony, butwith Americanvulnerability. TheUnitedStateswas 99

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runninga paymentsdeficit;the Europeanswere in effect financingthat to live beyondtheirmeans.But deficitandwerethusenablingtheAmericans the Americans did not view thisas a sourceof strength: the growingEuropeandollarbalances, which,undertherulesof thesystem,couldbe cashed in for goldat anytime,werea kindof swordof Damocles hangingovertheir heads.The US. government felt vulnerableand it did not like it. Kennedy fearedthatif thesystemwasnotreformed,theEuropeans mightcometo the conclusion that“myGod,thisis thetime.. . . [Ilf everyonewantsgoldwe’re thereis not enoughgoldto go around.”6 all goingto be ruinedbecause The mostsurprising factto emergefromFrenchandAmericandocuments is that for a brief periodin 1962,the Frenchappearedwilling to help the UnitedStatesout of its monetarydifficulties.Insteadof hostilitytowardthe dollar,Ministerof FinanceValeryGiscarddEstaing, was,for a time,cooperative. Inspiredby Giscard’s hintsof support,Undersecretary of StateGeorge Advisors(CEA) crafteda Ball andkey membersof the Councilof Economic monetaryplanthatwouldhaveessentially endedBrettonWoodswhile providingthe Americans with time andprotectionto endtheirbalanceof paymentsdeficits.The keyprovisionof thisplanwasa goldstandstill agreement, wherebytheEuropeansurpluscountries wouldagreeto holdUS. deficitdollarsandformallylimit theirgoldpurchases fromtheAmericanTreasury. In return,the UnitedStateswouldmoveaggressively to end its balanceof paymentsdeficit.At the end of the agreement(likely to be two years),a new internationalmonetaryarrangement would be negotiatedwith the Europeans.Surprisingly, manywithintheKennedyadministration werewillingto sacrificethe centralrole of the dollarand its “seigniorage” privilegesin any new system,a positionthatwouldhavehadmuchappealfor theEuropeans. While elementsof the administration were enthusiastic aboutGiscards hintsandBall’splan,the morefinanciallyorthodoxmembersfrom the Departmentof Treasuryand the FederalReservevehementlyopposedthe arrangement. Giventhe poorstateof Franco-American politicalrelationsin the summerof 1962,the Presidentwas himselfunsureof Frenchmotives, andin theendformalnegotiations neverbegan.WasGiscard’s offera missed opportunity? U S . officialsat thetimewereperplexed andscholars sincethen haveneglectedit entirely. The analysishereis brokendown into threeparts.The first sectionprovidesa brief overviewof the monetaryproblemsthatplaguedthe Kennedy administration andtheeffortsin 1961andthefirsthalf of 1962to solvethem. It alsoexploresthe motivations for France’s international monetarypolicyin the early 1960s.The secondsectiondealswith Giscard’s visit to the United Statesin July 1962.The final sectionexploresthe furiousdebatewithinthe Kennedyadministration overthe Frenchfinanceminister’s seemingly cooperativestatements duringhisvisit,andinvestigates why nothingcameof Giscard’sapparent willingness to helpeasethedollarandgoldoufflowproblem.

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AMERICANAND FRENCHMONETARY POLICY Most historiansand politicalscientists identifyRichardNixon as “thedestroyerof BrettonWoods.”’In reality,however,the BrettonWoodssystem wasinherentlyunstableandbeganexperiencing potentiallyfataldifficulties asearlyasthe late 1950s.Economists nowrecognizethatthe systemlacked an effectivemechanism to adjustandsettlethe inevitablepaymentsimbalancescausedby shlftingreal currencyvaluesarisingfrom differentialnationalmonetarypoliciesandsavings rates.*Postwarpolicy-makers eschewed the two mosteffectivemeansof adjustment-“flexible” exchangeratesand devaluations a puregoldstandard-n principle.Mindfulof thecompetitive duringthe 1930s,theybelievedthatflexibleexchange rates-where therelativevalueof currencies is determined by purchases andsalesin an open market-were erratic,alloweddestabilizing capitalflows,and gavefar too muchcontrolover the economyto bankersand ~peculators.~ A puregold standard, whichrequiredstateswith a payments deficitto transfergold,was seenas no better.In a countrythat lostgold,the domesticmonetarybase wouldbe decreased andaggregate domesticdemandwouldshrink.Imports would fall, exportswould rise,and the paymentswould balance.But the costwas deflation.’OIn an era where full employmentand robustsocial spending werepromised,it was politicallyinconceivable thatnationalgovernments wouldaccepta process thatdepressed nationalincomeandledto unemployment in orderto balanceinternational payments.” At the time, however,Americanand Europeanpolicy-makers were less concerned with the flawsof the BrettonWoodsadjustment mechanism per seandinsteadfocusedon thegrowingoutflowof dollarsandgoldfromthe UnitedStatesas the biggestproblemin the system.A wholeseriesof facby theEuropeans tors-including the moveto currentaccountconvertibility andthe foreignexchangecostof America’sNATO commitments-haddangerouslyenlargedthe Americanbalanceof paymentsdeficitin 1959 and 1960.Many observers worriedthatthe largedeficitcouldleadto a crisisof confidencein the dollarand sparka massconversion into gold,rendering the dollarunusableas a reservecurrencyand,in the process,destroying a largeportionof the world’sliquidity.Thisproblemhadcometo be known asthe “TriffinDilemma,”aftertheYale economist RobertTriffin publisheda book highlighting the confidenceproblemin his 1960book,Gold and the Dollar Crisis.12 Fearingthe potentialdangers,politicaland economic,of a ballooning deficitand gold outflow,the new Kennedyadministration pursuedan aggressivestrategyto correctthe problem.l3Politicalallies,particularlythe FederalRepublicof Germany,werepressured to spendsurplusdollarspurchasingmilitaryequipmentmadein the UnitedStates.Tradeliberalization becamea key elementof the administration’s foreignpolicy.The federal

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budgetwas scrutinizedfor ways to reduceU.S. government expenditures abroad.Most importantly,the undersecretary of the Treasuryfor InternationalMonetaryAffairs,RobertRoosa,negotiateda wholeseriesof ad hoc arrangements to defendthe dollarandlimit the flow of gold from the U.S. Treasury.Currencyswapandstandbyborrowingarrangements wereimplementedthat alloweddeficitcountriesto staveoff attackson their currencies.’*The mostimportantcurrencyarrangement was the goldpool,a consortiumof industrialnationswho intervenedin the Londongold markets wheneverthe priceof the dollarseemedthreatened. Roosa’seffortswerequitesuccessful in limitingthe amountof gold purefchasedby centralbankersholdingU.S. dollars.But the administration’s fortsto reducethe overallpaymentsdeficitwere far lesssuccessful, which wasa sourceof greatfrustration to PresidentKennedy,as thisexposedthe Achillesheelof America’sinternational monetarypolicy.If thesurpluscountriesof Europe-namely FranceandWest Germany4ooperated with the UnitedStatesby limitingtheirgoldpurchases, thedollarcouldbe protected. But if this cooperation collapsedfor eitherpoliticalor economicreasons, then the countriesholdingsurplusdollarswould haveenormous leverage over the United States.“I know everyonethinksI worry aboutthis too much,”he told advisorTed Sorensen. But thebalanceof payments waslike “a club that de Gaulleand all the othershangover my head.”In a crisis, Kennedycomplained, theycouldcashin all theirdollars,andthen“where arewe?”15 ThismeantthatFrance’s attitudeon international monetaryissues wascritical.As with all questions of Frenchpolicy,thefirstplaceto lookwastheattitudeof the president,Charlesde Gaulle.In the late 1950sandearly1 9 6 0 ~ ~ de Gaullemerelyposedthe overallframeworkfor Frencheconomicpolicy. He realizedthatmilitarypowerrequiredeconomicstrength.Duringthisperiod, whenthe UnitedStatesbeganexperiencing balance-of-payment difficulties,Francewas enjoyingan economicmiracleof financialstability,industrialprogress,and an annualgrowthrate of 4.5 percent.The Fourth Republichadalreadylaidthegroundwork for theupwardsurgein theeconomywhende Gaullecameto power,but prosperity hadoftenbeenmarred by monetarycrisis.16 In December1958,deGaulleappointeda groupof economic expertsunderJacquesRueff,magistrate for the EuropeanCoal and SteelCommunity and a previousministerof finance,who drew up the plansthat put the Frencheconomichousein order.Thesuccessful reforms,however,cameat financeministers, Antoine a politicalcost.Implementedby two successive PinayandWilfrid Baumgartner, theprogramwasbasedon a formulaof austerityandstrictfinancialandmonetaryorthodoxy. Measures includedhigher taxes,a devaluation of thefrancby 17.5percent,strictbudgetary policy,retyingof wagesto a cost-of-living index,andreduced movalof theautomatic

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government subsidies. Selectiveliberalization of tradeallowedmoreforeign goodsinto the country.The currencywasreplacedwith a new francworth theFrenchgova hundredof theold variety.And in theyearsthat followed, ernmentrestricted the growthof creditin orderto slowinflation.Thispracticeof encadrement du cre‘dit,however,discouraged investment becauseit limitedindustry’s accessto capital.The FinanceMinistryalsoimposeda coefficientdetrksorerie thatrequiredbanksto hold30 percentor moreof their assetsin treasurybondsor medium-term rediscountable credits. l7 In thespringof 1961,Rueffbeganhiseight-year campaignagainstwhathe saw as the subtleand insidiouseffectsof the U.S. balance-of-payments deficiton the Frencheconomy.Rueff andmanyFrenchofficials,including FrenchPrimeMinisterMichelDebri.,believedthattheUnitedStatesreliedon “easymoney”andan expansionary monetarypolicythatexportedinflation abroadto countriessuchas France.They alsobelievedthata majorconsequenceof the U.S. capitaloutflowwas encouragement of Americaninvestmentin the Frencheconomy.’* Gaullistofficialsheld what RobertSolomonhas describedas a “schizophrenicview”towardmultinational investment. On theonehand,Frenchofficialssoughtsuchinvestment because theywelcomedthetechnological advancesand influx of capital.On the otherhand,theywishedto seemore national,and lessforeign,investmentin the Frencheconomyandwanted the EEC to adopta commonpolicytowardmultinational investment. They alsourgedtheUnitedStatesto changeits tax codeto eliminatedeferralson taxationof overseas facilities.WhattheFrenchgovernment resented wasthe development of U.S. monetaryseignorage thatallowedthe buyingof Europeancompanies with d o l l a r ~ . ~ ~ Rueff had little patiencefor U.S. complaints aboutbearingthe burdenof Cold War securitycommitments. Beforethe Rueff plan in December1958, many Frenchpoliticiansblamedthe weaknessof the Frenchfrancon the drainingwars in Algeriaand Indochina.Even thoughlefardeaualge‘rien continued, the Frenchfrancbecameoneof theworldsstrongest currencies afterthe Bankof Francestoppedincreasing itsdomesticmoneysupply.Rueff arguedthatU.S. foreigneconomic andmilitaryaidprograms werea small proportionof GNP, hardlyan intolerableburden.A practitioner of strictfiscal andmonetaryorthodoxy,he believedthat a sharpincreasein discount ratewouldeliminatetheUS. deficitovernight,astheFrenchgovernment did in 1958.The Frenchgovernment plannedto raiseits discountrateto 4 percentandthe coefficient de tre‘sorerieto 36 percentto combatits own inflationarycycle.z0 In a seriesof lengthylettersto de Gaulle,publishedin Le Mondein early totakemeasures thatwould June1961,Rueffencouraged theFrenchpresident end the dollar’srole as an international reservecurrency.He imploredde Gaulleto bypassParliamentand invokethe presidential emergency powers

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providedby theconstitution of theFifthRepublicsothathe couldpursuepoliciesthatmightforcethe devaluation of thedollar.Rueff considered thegold exchange standard a “prodigious collective errorthatallowedtheUnitedStates to avoidthe consequences of its economicprofligacy.” His viewsresonated with the nationalistic de Gaulle,who longedto abolishthe privilegesof the dollarandsterlingasreservecurrencies withintheBrettonWoodssystem. Rueff alsobegantourgeconversion of France’s dollarreserves intogoldasanindicationof displeasure with US. abuses of thereserve-currency system, which accelerated Frenchinflation.21 Rueffsviewsweresharedby severalhigh-ranking Frenchofficialscloseto de Gaulle.ForeignMinisterCouvede Murville,an inspecteur desfinances who had workedwith Rueff at theMinistryof Financebetween1936 and 1939,echoedhispolemicagainstthe hegemonyof thedollar.EtienneBurin desRoziers,who becamesecretary generalof E1ysi.ein the springof 1962, was alsowell placedto beginshapingde Gaulle’soutlookon international monetaryrelations.22 OlivierWormser, directorgeneralof economic affairsat theMinistryof ForeignAffairs,arguedthatKennedyandHaroldMacmillan’s strongdesireto stabilizethepoundandthedollarwasconnected to Britain’s bidto join theCommonMarket.America’s international monetarypolicywas a convenient targetfor France’scomplaints aboutthe relationship between Britain’sapplicationfor the EEC and “Anglo-Saxon” balance-of-payments difficulties23 The Ministryof Finance,however,did not sharetheseviewsduringthe early1960s.The Ministrywasa bastionof “Atlanticism” thatbelievedin cooperating with theUnitedStates. Wilfrid Baumgartner resisted theinsistence of Rueffscoterieon endingthe dollaras a reservecurrency.Baumgartner had that quaintsenseof gratitudetowardthe United Statesfor helping Franceunderthe MarshallPlan,which was becomingincreasingly out-offashionin GaullistFrance.He alsodevelopeda closeprofessional andpersonalfriendshipwith DouglasDillon duringhis ambassadorship to France underPresidentDwightD. Eisenhower. Baumgartner and Dillon oftenaddressed theirletterswith “dearfriendasthe salutation.** Duringhis tenureasfinanceminister,Baumgartner managedto muteRueffs influence.Before1962,Francewasoneof the few Europeancountries that did not convertthe bulk of its dollarreservesinto gold. In 1961,the UnitedStatessoldno goldto Francebut 970 milliondollarsof goldto other c0untries.~5 And althoughBaumgartner refusedto capitulateto theKennedy administration’s demandsfor expandinginternationalliquidity,he participatedin Roosa’s ad hocmeasures, includingswaparrangements anda gold pool,whichtemporarilyeasedtherecurringmonetarycrises2‘ In December1961,shortlyafterthe creationof the goldpool,Baumgartner announced hisresignation, effectivethe followingmonth.Financeofficialsrecallthat eventhoughhe was not forcedto retireper se,he felt too


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old to fight the politicalbattlesemergingwithin the Frenchgovernment overinternational monetaryrelations. To theAmericans, hisretirementsugfinancialcooperation gestedthat the halcyondays of Franco-American mightbe over.27

U.S.FEARSAND FRENCH MOTIVES Indeed,in May 1962,it seemedthatthe Frenchmightbe considering a policy of puttingpressure on thedollarfor politicalreasons. DouglasDillontold the presidentthat a Bankof Franceofficialmadea statement “whichcould indicatepossibledifficultiesaheadwith France.He saidthatit mustbe reala politicalas well as an ecoized that France’sdollarholdingsrepresented Kennedy’s greatfearswasthata nationor nomicproblem.” Oneof President groupof nationsmight exploitAmericanmonetaryvulnerabilityfor their own politicalpurposes. If the French,aloneor in collaboration with other surpluscountries, decidedto cashin all of theirsurplusdollars,theycould run down the Americangold supply.Regardless of economicmotives,a French-ledblocmightbelievetheirlargerpoliticalobjectives wereworththe cost.The UnitedStatesmightbe forcedto take politicallyunpopularmeasuresin orderto preventa completemonetarymeltdown,suchastradeand capitalcontrols,troopwithdrawals, or an embarrassing devaluation or even a suspension of dollar-goldconvertibility.28 A widely circulatedStateDepartmentmemosummarized an articlethat appearedin TheStatistwarningof a possibleattackon the dollarby the French.Presidentde Gaulle was “fully preparedto play [the]diplomatic trumpcardhe holdsin form of substantial Frenchholdingsof dollars.”In otherwords,if U.S. policytowardEuropeclashedwith Frenchinterests, de Gaullewould pressureKennedyby continuingto purchasegold from the UnitedStatesz9 The articlewenton to saythatunlessFrancewereaccepted as an equalpower,“hewouldnot hesitateto makehimselffelt by resorting to devicesliableto causegraveembarrassment to the UnitedStates.”30 Whatmadethisscenario evenmorealarmingwasthepossibility thattheincreasingly strongFranco-German blocwaslookingto weakentheU.S. gripon Westernpolicy.It wasno secretthatbothde GauueandWestGermanChancellorKonradAdenauerwere apprehensive aboutelementsof the Kennedy administration’s militaryand politicalpolicyin Europe.If both Franceand Germanycollaborated on monetarypolicy,theycouldusetheirconsiderable supplyof dollarsto initiatea cripplinggoldcrisis.Withoutthehelpof thetwo largestsurpluscountries, the U.S. mightfind it impossible to defendthe dollar.ThisbloccouldforcetheAmericans to endnegotiations with the Soviets overBerlin,or bringabouta changein AmericanmilitarypolicytowardEurope.MaybetheFrenchcouldbargainfor technology to advance theirnuclear

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ambitions. A French-led bloccouldalsohaveconsiderable sayin designing a new international monetarymechanism in itsownterms. Were Kennedy’sfears exaggerated? Franco-American relationshad becomesostrainedthat the president’s advisersbelievedthe possibilityof a French-inspired monetaryattackcouldnot be ruledout. In mid-May1962, theextentof thisstrain,andthelinkagebetweenmilitaryandmonetarypolicy, was revealedin a provocativediscussion betweenPresidentKennedy and the French Minister of State for CulturalAffairs, Andre M a l r a ~ x . ~ Kennedycomplained thatFrancewasdelayingthe UnitedKingdom’sentry to Kennedy,theUS. supported theapintotheCommonMarket.According plicationdespitethe negativeimpactUK entrywouldhaveon theAmerican paymentsdeficit,whichwouldservethefar moreimportantpurposeof creatinga Franco-British counterweight to the Germansin the EEC. Kennedy declaredthatif theFrenchpreferred“a EuropewithoutGreatBritainandindependent of the UnitedStates,” it wouldcreatea situationin whichAmericawasbearingthe enormous costsof defending Europewithoutanyvoice. If thatwere the case,Kennedywouldbringthe troopshomeandsave$1.3 billion,an amountthat “wouldjust aboutmeet our balanceof payments deficit.’’32 Whende Gaullelearnedthedetailsof Kennedy’s conversations with Malraux, the Frenchleaderdismissed the possibilitythat the U.S. couldwithdrawfromEurope,sinceAmericarecognized thatit wouldbe lostif Western Europewere conquered.33 De Gaulleaccusedthe U S . of dictatingto its allies,a line of policythatwasundermining itsleadership. He claimedthatby enteringinto negotiations with the SovietsoverBerlinandby publiclystating thatFranceshouldnot havean atomicforce,the administration riskeda breakdownin the alliance. a veiled Given the climateof mistrust,U.S. officialsinitiallysuspected threatwhen FrenchFinanceMinisterValCry Giscardd’Estaingreminded themthat onlycooperation “ona grandscale”couldhelptheAmericans with theirdollardrainandpreventa speculative a t t a ~ k Giscard .3~ claimedthatthe UnitedStatescouldnot handlea real run on the dollarby itself,evenwith the help of the IMF. Only with the collaboration of thoseEuropeancentral banksthatheldlargequantities of dollarscouldsucha runbe handled.What wasGiscardproposing? He wouldnot say,andtheAmericans did not want to appearweak by asking.Althoughthe Americandeficithad decreased, gold purchases had increased, and the dollarmarketwas weak. Giscards hintsfedintothe administration’s suspicions of Frenchintentions, andcombinedwith worseninggoldoutflowfiguresto stimulatea massiveintergovernmentaleffortto developplansto meeta monetarycrisis. Responding to rumorsof Frenchblackmailoverthedollar,Undersecretary of StateGeorgeBall senta memoto President Kennedyrecommending that theadministration takepreemptiveactionin an upcomingmeetingwith Gis-


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card.“I am seriously concerned aboutthe tendencyof our alliesto view the presentworld financialproblemas a casesolelyof dollarweaknessrather than as a commonproblemfor the Atlanticp a r t n e r ~ h i pIt. ”was ~ ~ time to moveawayfromthe positionthatthe paymentsdeficitwas a narrow,technical problemto be negotiatedbetweenTreasuryand Europeancentral bankers,whoseviewsBall described as“pre-Herbert Hoover.”36 In itsefforts to movetowardpayments equilibriumandarrestthegoldoutflow,American policywasincreasingly “reminiscent of Dr. Schacht”-that is, of the seriesof bilateraldealsandclearingarrangements thatthe Nazi government hadnegotiatedin the mid-1930s.Unlessan explicitlink wasmadebetweenAmerthe US. wouldbe vulnericanmilitarypolicyandthe balanceof payments, able to “blackmail”by the Europeans.Ball believed it was time for fundamental multilateralsystemicreformof the BrettonWoodsedificeand not simplymoread hocmeasures, evenif thatmeantoverrulingthe objectionsof theTreasurydepartment. WouldFrancecooperate? Before Giscard’s July1962visit,contactbetween Kennedyadministration officialsandthefinanceministersentmixedsignals. In May 1962,facedwith an economicslumpat home,Kennedymarveledat theperformance of theFrencheconomyandconsidered transposing aspects of Frenchdirigismeto the UnitedStates.The presidentsentCouncilof EconomicAdvisersWalterHellerandJamesTobinto Pariswheretheymetwith Giscardand financeministryofficialsfor a studyof the Frencheconomic planningprocess.Heller andTobin concludedthat Franceand otherWest Europeaneconomies grewfasterthantheUnitedStatesfor multiplereasons. Theseincludedconsistently higherlevelsof demand,a higherlevelof governmentinvestment,greaterreinvestment of businessearnings,a larger body of skilledlabor,higherlevelsof capitalformation,technology,productivity,and smallerdefenseexpenditures3’ To generateinterestin economicplanningwithinthe UnitedStates,Kennedyarrangedfor Frenchofficialsto speakto laborandbusiness groups.The financialcounselor of the Frenchembassy,for example,gave addresses toutinghis country’seconomicplanasa successful pathto increased Heller and Tobin’sstudyof Frencheconomicplanningwas alsoundertakento convinceGaullistofficialsthatKennedywasseriousaboutmaking the US. economysound,sothattheywouldbe lessworriedaboutthe devaluationof the dollarand lessinclinedto convertits dollarreservesinto gold.Bundytold Heller beforehis departurefor Paristhat “in the current stateof Franco-American relations,anyfriendlycontactis a goodthing.”39 AlthoughHeller andTobinestablished a goodrapportwith Giscardduring theirParistrip, the financeminister’s attitudetowardU.S. investment in the Frencheconomyworried Ball. On severaloccasions,GiscardcomplainedthatAmericaninvestment in Francewas leadingto the lossof conof theeconomy. Withoutspecifying what,he implied trol overkey segments

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that “measures mightbe takenby the Frenchgovernment to establish safeguardsagainstsucha po~sibility.”~~ The Frenchgovernment wantedto pressurethe Kennedyadministration to dissuade Americancompanies from investingin the Frencheconomy.However,the ministryof the economyhad no intentionto exertthatpressure by movingagainstthe dollar.*l The youngfinanceminister,who combinedtechnocratic skill with political savvy,triedto navigatea difficultmiddlecoursebetweende Gaulle’sincreasinganti-Americanism and Atlanticmonetaryc ~ o p e r a t i oLike n . ~ ~his predecessor, Giscarddid not sharede Gaulle’sanimositytowardtheUnited States. Giscardfelt thatit wasin France’snationalinterestto stabilizethe internationalmonetarysituation.The May stockmarketcrashin the United StateshadworriedtheFrenchfinanceminister.If theUS. deficitpersisted or worsened,the Kennedyadministration might devaluethe dollar,which woulddecrease the valueof France’sforeignexchangereservesand make dollarexportsmorecompetitivein Europe.Accordingto de Lattre’smemoirs, his subordinates, namelyClaudePierre-Brossolette, Andre de Lattre, andPierreEsteva,practicedguerrillatacticsto combatRueffsinfluenceon Frenchforeigneconomicpolicies.43 At the sametime, however,Giscardwas politicallyambitiousanddutlful towarddeGaulle.AndredeLattre,whoworkedcloselywith him at theMinistryof Finance,recallsthat “il obkissait.” For Giscard,obeyingmeantconvertingdollarreserves intogoldat the rateof 70 percent.In thefirstquarter of 1962,Franceconverted forty-fivemilliondollars’worthof gold,andin the secondquarter,thatamountincreased to ninety-seven anda half milliondolrepaiditspost-WorldWar I1 debtof 211 millars.He alsosawto it that France lion dollars.44 Giscardrecognized thatde Gaulleregardedthe U.S.-dominated IMF as an “alienand objectionable organization.” The Frenchgovernment preferredto dealwith international monetaryproblems withintheframeworkof theOrgaCooperation andDevelopment (OECD). Thispreference nizationof European hadbeenevidentevenin 1961:the Kennedyadministration got the message that the Frenchmightnot be willingto cooperateon monetarystabilization “exceptperhapsthrougha restricted OECD u n d e r t a h outside g of the It wasnot thatGiscard,in adoptingthisapproach, wastryingto pursuea relatively“pro-American’’ policyfor politicalreasons.He may have been willingto cooperate with the UnitedStates,but his basicideawasthat “cooperation” couldnot be a one-waystreet.In exchange for Frenchcooperation,theAmericans wouldhaveto acceptcertainlimitson theirfreedomof action-a kind of “surueillafice m~ltilat6raIe.”~~ Amongotherthings,Giscardcalculated thatusingWorkingGroup3 withintheOECD insteadof the IMF would give the Frenchgovernment a platformto criticizean overlyU.S. domestic budget,whichhe identifiedastheprimarycause expansionist of theAmericanpaymentsdefi~it.~’


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AlthoughGiscardsvisit to Washington in lateJuly 1962was at President Kennedy’s request,thetimingwaspropitious. De Gaullewaspersonally preoccupiedwith strategicissuesand strengthening the Franco-German entente.AftermeetingwithAdenauerin earlyJuly,deGaullewastryingto persuadethe chancellorthat theirtwo nationsshoulddevelopformallinesof cooperation, a courtship thatbeganin 1958andwouldculminatein January 1963 with the signingof the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship.** De Gaulle and Adenaueralso were preoccupiedwith the resignationof SupremeAllied Commander of EuropeLauris Rueff laterobtainedgreatinfluenceon de Gaulle’seconomicphilosophy. But withoutan officialcapacityto implementpolicyandwith de Gaulleimmersedin defenseissues, Giscardhada relativelyfreehandto negotiate with the UnitedStatesduringthe summerof 1962.To the Kennedyadministration’ssurprise,Giscardwas in a cooperative moodwhen he visitedWashington.Furthermore,he wantedany arrangements to be conductedwith minimalpublicitybecauseit would strengthen his handand not draw de Gaulle’sattention.jo On July20 and21, 1962,Giscardmet with Kennedyaloneandlaterwith Ball, Bundy,and Tobin.The presidentand theseadvisersconveyedtheir concernoverthedeficitandgoldoutflow,andtheirdesireto “manage” these issueson the “political” level.Ball saidthe administration did not haveany should formalplan,butfelt thatin principlesomesortof politicalagreement be reachedto stabilizepaymentsamongthe major industrialcountries.A multilateral, politicalsolutionto thisissuewouldnot only squelchcallsfor protectionism in the US., it wouldalsodemonstrate the solidarityof the Atlanticpartnership. What the US. had in mind,Ball said,was an agreement regardingtheratioof goldto dollarholdings.jl The administration was surprisedwhen the French finance minister agreedwith mostof what the Americanssaidaboutthe problemand appearedto wantlittlein return.Evenso,Giscardtriedto explainthatthepresidentshouldbe as irked at the British,who, before1962,convertedmore dollarsintogoldthanFrance.As longasotherEuropeancountries continued to converttheirreservedollars,Francewouldfeel compelledto followsuit. Giscarddeclaredthat the key was to avoidany unilateralactionby either side.He thoughtthatit wasimportantfor the creditorcountries to establish a commonpayments policywhiletheUS. reduceditspayments deficit.Such an agreement mightsuspend goldtakingsandestablish fixedreserveratios. Francewascertainlywillingto holditsdollarsfor a time,asalongas others agreedaswell. He thoughttheUK mightprotest,but eventheymightcooperategiventheirdesireto join theCommonMarket.j* The administration was delightedthat Giscardappearedto understand Americandifficulties.Giscard’sstatements alleviatedthe fear of a FrancoGermanmonetarybloc. A French-ledinitiativeto reform the payments

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systemwould savethe U.S. the embarrassment of continuedad hocmeasuresthat madethe US. look weak.In orderto be preparedfor suchnegotiation,the administration launchedan enormouseffort to studyand debateexactlywhat form an internationalmonetaryagreementshould take. An interdepartmental committeeon the balanceof paymentswas created,anda “goldbudget”e ~ t a b l i s h e d . ~ ~ Giscardwas hopefulthat he couldconvincede Gaulleto accepta gold standstill arrangement becauseit couldpotentiallymeetthe general’s longtermobjectiveof curbingthehegemony of thedollar.The indications thathe receivedfromBall suggested thataftera two-yeargraceperiod,theG-10 nationscouldmodifyor construct a new international financialstructure. Giscarddidnot intendto endtheuseof thedollarasa reservecurrency, buthe hopedto givethe franca placein a broadened monetaryschemethatused a unit6de &serve additionalcurrencies as reserves. He wishedto establish composite (CRU), whichwouldbe tiedto gold.The creationof a CRU would of curbingglobalinflationwhile meetingdemands address Frenchconcerns for expanded international liq~idity.5~

THE DEBATE OVER MONETARY REFORM WITHIN THE KENNEDYADMINISTRATION Fromdiscussions with Giscard,theKennedyadministration hopedthatthere wasnow an opportunity to solvethe goldoutflowproblemwithina political, multilateralcontext.Giscardseemedto acceptthe needfor a standstill agreement to give the U.S. time to bringits paymentsinto equilibriumand financialsystem.The Treasury begin systemicreformof the international heldover$16billionof gold,butlegally$12 billionwasrequiredto backdomesticcurrency.Therewasmuchtalk aboutrescinding the lawsbehindthe domesticcover,andtheFederalReservecouldtakecertainactionsin a crisis thatwould releasethe goldwithoutlegislativeaction.But Congress would wanta protracted debateon theissue,andthatdebatemightupsetthemarketsandmightquitepossiblysetoff anothergoldcrisis. More importantthanthe goldcoverissuewas the supplyof dollarsheld by surpluscountries, bothofficiallyandin privatehands.Theseliabilitiestotaledover$20 billion,whichcouldbe turnedin at anytime.While thiswas morethanthe gold supplybackingthem,it wasnot, by the historicalstanregimes,a dangerous ratio.Interestratepolicyand dardsof gold-exchange centralbankcooperation couldhandleanyrun on the dollar.But if thiscooperation werenotforthcoming, thenthedollarliabilitieswerea loadedgun aimedat the Americangoldsupply.If a Franco-German blocformed,these overhangdollarscouldbe usedto exposeAmericanmonetaryweakness, andperhapsforcepoliticalconcessions. Therefore,it was importantto take


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the opportunity affordedby Giscardssuggestions to createa mechanism to preventa largeAmericangoldoutflow. Encouraged by theFrenchfinanceminister’s cooperative spirit,Kennedy’s closestadvisersbegan consideringdramaticdeparturesfrom traditional monetarypolicy to solve this problem.Gold guarantees, gold standstill agreements, andraisingthe dollarpriceof gold,eitherin concertwith othersor unilaterally, wereall debated. The Department of Stateevenprepared a draftmemofor the president’s useshouldhe want to endthe American policyof redeeming goldon demand.55 Carl KaysensentKennedyan essay an international paymentssystemthatdispensed by J. M. Keynesproposing with goldaltogether. Kaysenwrotethe president:“Thegreatattentionpaid to gold is anothermyth.. . . As you saidof the Alliancefor Progress, those whoopposereformmaygetr e v ~ l u t i o n . ” ~ ~ Perhapsthe mostdiscussed proposalwasfromGeorgeBall. In hismemo to the president, “A FreshApproachto the Gold Problem,” Ball maintained thattheproblemwasat heartaboutpolitics,not economic^.^' Unfortunately, claimedBall,few peoplein Europe,Wall Street,or eventheU S . Treasury Departmentunderstood this.For them,the gold outflowandpaymentsdeficit weresignsof Americanprofligacy,correctable throughdeflationary policies at homeandmassivecutsin militaryaid expenditures abroad.By pursuing Roosa’s policyof “improvised expedients” andtakingthe postureof supplicantsseekingcredits,offsets,anddebtpre-payments, theadministration crethat erodedAmerica’sauthorityandbargaining ateda pictureof weakness powerwith the Europeans. Ball warned“thisis no way to run the government of any nation-much less to exercisethe leadershipof the Free World.”58 Ball arguedthat the answerto thisproblemwas simple.The strengthof the dollarshouldnot be dependent on the “dailywhimsof privateandofficial ‘confidence’ but to a structure of long-runreciprocalassurances by govthatsuchan agreeernments.” The Europeans mustbe madeto understand mentwasin theirbestinterestaswell asours.The Europeans, Ball claimed, would be just as hurt by a dollarcrisisas the US. More importantly, they mustrecognizethatthecontinued Americandefenseof Europeis dependent uponsafeguarding the Withoutsuchreforms,PresidentKennedy unilateralactionto improvethebalance wouldbe forcedto takeaggressive, of payments,suchaswithdrawingAmericantroopsfrom Europeor imposingcontrolsoncapitalandrestrictions ontourism.Ball arguedthatsuchpolicieswouldnot be in America’sinterest. Instead,Ball advocateda multilateralagreementat the politicallevel, which would “insulateourselves from the dangerof excessive gold losses whilewe areworking,by lesscostlymeasures that will, overa reasonable periodof timerestoreequilibrium.” If thelatterpolicywasnotpursued, theUS. wouldcontinueto be vulnerable to the“confidence” game.Moreimportantly,

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aslongasthecurrentrulesweremaintained, theUS. wouldremain“subject to theblackmailof anygovernment thatwantsto employits dollarreserves as politicalweaponsagainstus.”6o Ball told the president thatif the United Stateswereto “become moreheavilyinvolvedin Southeast Asia”the “West Coastof SouthAmerica”or the“Congo,” theEuropeans mightbe temptedto “exploitourown problems, NATO’sdifficulties, andour ownproblemwith thegoldflightfor politicalpurposes.”61 A multilateral goldstandstill arrangementwouldlimit America’s vulnerability to thiskindof pressure. Why would the Europeans agreeto sucha plan?Ball hintedthattheUnitedStatescould exploitits ownpoliticalleverage. “Central bankers may regardourexpendituresto defendtheFreeWorldasa formof sin,”he argued,“butthepolitical leadersof ourWesternalliesdonot.”62 Ball provideda generaloutlineof a temporaryarrangement to stopthe goldoutflow.Its provisions includeda massiveincrease in Treasuryswaps with foreigncentralbanks,a long-term loanwith a consortium of European allies,largewithdrawals fromtheIMF, andfuredgoldratiosfor centralbank portfolios. The US. wouldhaveto redistribute someof itsgoldandperhaps guarantee dollarholdingsin gold.Ultimately,Ball believedthe U.S. should seeka “thorough-going” revisionof theBrettonWoodssystem, “multilateralizing”responsibility for the creationof liquidityasGiscardindicatedduring his visit. The undersecretary of statewas fully preparedto sacrificethe “hegemonic” roleof the dollarif a new systemreducedAmerica’s vulnerability. The key to anyplanwasgettingtheEuropeans to maintainthesameor a smallerproportion of theirreserves in gold.JamesTobinof the Councilof Economic Advisers (CEA) produced a planto accomplish thk63To meetGiscardsdemandfor similarconversion policiesamongthe European nations, Tobinsuggested thattheleadingindustrial countries determine a uniformratio of goldto foreignexchange to whichall countries wouldhaveto adhere. Thiswouldrequirecountries withgoldin excess of thisratioto sella partof theirgoldfor foreignexchange. Insteadof onlyusingthedollarandsterling as the reservecurrency,the currencies of all participating countries(assumedto be the ParisClub) wouldbe equallyacceptable. That provision wouldsatisfyFrenchdemands thatthefrancbe treatedasa reservecurrency onparwiththedollar.Eachcountry wouldprovidea goldguarantee for their currency againstdevaluation. Tobinlaidoutseveral differentwaysthiscould be done,but they would all involvethe US. sellinggold for foreignexchangeandretiringdollarliabilities.SomeEuropeancountries wouldalso haveto sell or buy gold.Over time,the non-goldcomponent of reserves woulddecrease, andthecurrencies of the participating countries wouldincreasingly sharethe burdenbornesolelyby the dollar.Removingthewide variations in goldratioswouldmaketheinternational monetary mechanism morepredictable andmanageable.


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The presidentwas keenlyinterestedin theseplans,andcommissioned a small,interdepartmental groupfrom the StateDepartment,the CEA, and Treasuryto comeu p with an outlineof an interiminternational monetary agreementbasedon Ball’s andTobin’sideas.The groupproduceda plan thatfocusedon protectingtheAmericangoldsupplyandstrengthening the dollar.Thereportclaimedthatcyclicalforceswouldcombinewith measures alreadytaken to bring America’sbalanceof paymentsinto equilibrium within a few years.The heartof the plan was a proposedstandstillagreementbetweenthe ten membersof theParisClubandSwitzerland whereby the participants wouldagreeto not convertthe officialdollarbalancesthey held at the startof the agreement into gold. In orderto accommodate increasesin the dollarbalancesof the participants overthe two yearsof the This plan,$10billionwouldbe mobilizedfroma varietyof financialsources. wouldinclude$1billionof Americangoldsales,a massive$5 billiondrawingontheIMF, $2.5 billionin swapsanddirectborrowings fromEurope,and up to $1.5billionin forwardexchange operations takenby theTreasuryDe~artment.~* The purposeof thisagreement wastwo-fold:to getthecountries of Western Europeto “extendmorecreditto the U.S. thantheymightvoluntarily,” andto dampenspeculative attackson thedollar.Evenwiththeplanin place, therewereall sortsof potentialdifficulties. Thetwo yearshadto be usedto eliminatethe “basic” deficit,andtherewouldcertainlybe large-scale reshufflinganduncertainty whenthe arrangement ended.To maketheplanwork, it had to be acceptable to the Europeans, andin fact,hadto be initiatedby theEuropeans, sothatit did not looklike an actof Americanweakness. The reportdid not suggesthow the Europeans couldbe broughtto acceptlet aloneproposesucha plan. WalterHeller,the CEA chair,was extremelyenthusiastic aboutthe interdepartmental plan.It would“eliminate thewhimsandprejudices of currency The administraspeculators andbankersfrom the makingof US. tion couldendthebasicdeficitin an orderlyway,withoutdeflationor drastic cutsin programs crucialto Americanforeignpolicy.An international, interimagreement wouldgivetheU.S. far moreprotection thanthetechniques usedby the Treasurydepartment, whichwereemployedon a “secret,dayto-day,piecemeal,ad-hocbasis.”66 An interimagreement would alsogive world leaderstimeto scrapthe BrettonWoodsregimeandcomeup with a world paymentssystemthat defendedall currencies againstspeculative attack, internationalized the burdensof providinginternationalmoney,and providedfor an orderlyincreasein liquidity.Carl Kaysen,theNationalSecurity Councilofficerresponsible for international monetaryaffairs,andKermit Gordon,a memberof theCouncilof Economic Advisers, wentsofar asto argue that devaluationcould remaina potentiallyprofitableactionfor the UnitedStates,evenaftertheguarantee waspaid

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DouglasDillonwasinfuriatedby theseanalyses. In a covermemoto a report written by Henry Fowler, Dillon claimedthat Ball’s interimreserve schemewas simplya reflectionof the StateDepartment’s “reluctance to jobof obtainsquarelytacklethemoredifficultbut fundamentally necessary ing a moreadequate sharingof theburdenby our Europeanfriends.”6s The TreasuryDepartmentarguedthat Ball was treatingthe symptom,the gold outflow,andnotthedisease, thecontinuing balanceof payments deficit.The interimreserveschemewouldgivea greenlightto “loosen up”on all thedisciplinesthatthe administration hadestablished to curethe paymentsimbalance. Fowler agreedthat internationalbalanceof paymentsdiscussions shouldbe raisedto thehighestpoliticallevel,butthefocusshouldbe on increasedburdensharingwithinNATO, notreservecomposition. The U.S. balanceof paymentswould never move to equilibriumuntil the Europeans startedpayinga greatershareof NATO’smilitary Dillon was evenmorecausticin his attackon the interimagreement, despitethe fact that a Treasuryrepresentative, JohnLeddy,had helpedwrite the report.In essence, the actionsproposed wouldclosethe goldwindow for $7.9billionof officialdollarbalances, anabandonment of traditional gold of 1933.70 The Kennedyadpolicysimilarin scopeto the US. devaluation ministration wouldbe renegingon its promisenot to changeitsgoldpolicy, whichwouldshakeprivatefinancialmarketsandscarethosecountriesnot participating in the agreement. Dillon believedthat usingthe word “standstill”wouldevokememoriesof the Germanstandstill agreement of 1931,an eventassociated with the worldeconomiccollapse.A formalgoldstandstill arrangement wouldmeanthat “it would no longerbe sensible” to “expect foreignmonetaryauthorities to continueto hold dollarsas an international reservecurrency,”therebyeliminatingthe “importantsubstantive advantages”theUnitedStatesenjoyedundertheBrettonWoodssystem.71 The plan assumed thatthe Europeans wouldagreeto sucha scheme,an ideaDillon foundpreposterous despiteGiscard’s cooperation. The Secretary of theTreasuryfoundan ally in FederalReserveBoardChairmanWilliamMartin,who saidthe plan for a standstill monetaryagreement would“hitworldfinancial marketsasa declaration of US.insolvency anda submission to receivers to salvage.”72 Dillon alsoforwardeda reportby hisundersecretary, RobertRoosa,to rebut the chargethattheTreasury’s actionshadbeen“adhoc.”Roosaargued that the agreements that had beenreachedin the pasttwo yearsbetween It hadnot beena policyof the U.S. andits allieshadbeenverysuccessful. ad hocexpedients, as manyhadclaimed,but a well thoughtout andinnovativeplan to strengthen the BrettonWoodssystem.It only appearedad hocbecausemanyof the discussions held betweenfinancialofficialswere secretive.But theglobalpayments systemwasmuchbetterpreparedto absorbthe shocksof any futurefinancialdisturbance. The gold pool,swap


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agreements, forwardexchangeoperations,and increasedIMF borrowing privilegespreparedthe U.S. to meetany attackon the dollar.Accordingto Roosa,someof the ideasbeingdiscussed, bothinsideandoutsidethe administration, werefoolish.Devaluation,goldguarantees, or a goldstandstill woulddamageor destroya world paymentssystemthat hadgreatlybenefited the U.S. and its allie~.~3 Dillon believedthesepoliciesweremoreappropriatefor the currencyof a third-worldcountry,not the U.S., andpublicly triedto sabotage the idea.KaysenwasinfuriatedwhenDillon testified beforetheJointEconomicCommitteeon August17 and calledgoldguaranteesa “dangerous experiment.” The Secretary of theTreasurycalledthem “a poor idea and not to be seriouslyconsidered.” Dillon also ruled out changing thevalueof thedollar.McGeorgeBundywasworriedthatDillon’s publicstatements would precludethe changesin international monetary policythattheywereconsidering.’* Surprisingly, the reformerswere unconcerned with Dillon’scontention thattheUnitedStatesmightlosethebenefitsof “seigniorage” in a newinternationalmonetarysystem.Duringa meetingon August20, 1962,Ball told the Presidentthat “we’renot persuaded that it is at all vital to the United Statesthatwe doreturnto a situationin whichthedollarwouldbe theprincipalreservecurrency., , . [Wle canseemanydisadvantages aswell as ad“I seetheadvanvantages.” Kennedyappearedto agreewith Ball’sanalysis. tagesto theWesternworldto havea reservecurrency,andthereforeit’s an advantage to us as partof the Westernworld,but whatis the national,narrow advantage?” WhenDillon triedto spelloutthesebenefits,Kaysenpointedly asked,“youwouldn’tdescribethisas an advantagerightnow,would you Thepresidentseemedto sidewith the reformersagainstDillon.Kennedy arguedthat now was the time to negotiatea monetaryagreement with the Europeans because“wehavemuchmorepoliticalstrengthwith themnow thenwe’ll probablyhavetwo yearsfrom now.”The Europeans “aremuch moredependant uponus militarilythantheymightbe”beforethey“gettogether”to organizetheir own defense.76 The administration had to get the Europeans to agreethatfor “a two yearperiodthatthey’renot goingto a s k for goldwhile “ourbalanceof paymentssituationimprovesandwhile we work on otherarrangernent~.”~~ The presidentconcluded that the administrationshould“pursue” thegoldstandstill arrangement, “because I thinkthis is reallythe areawherewe maybe ableto makesomeprogress.” Kennedy wantedtheEuropeans to agreethat“theyareall goingto goeasyon thetaking of Kennedydispatched AssistantSecretary of StateC. GriffithJohnsonand Assistant Secretary of theTreasury JohnLeddyto soundout thepossibilities of a European initiativeto limit foreignpurchases of U.S. goldandstrengthen the international monetarysystem.Kennedysuggested that an acceptable

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arrangement wouldbefor theCommonMarketcountries andtheUK to each setan absolutetargetfor goldholdings,as opposedto a ratio,whichcould be controversial andmightinvolveincreasing the amountof gold held by certaincountries.Anothersolutionwould be to limit the amountof gold takenfromtheU S . to a smallpercentage, perhaps30 percent,of theoverall paymentsdeficit.But regardlessof the plan, Kennedyinsistedthat that shouldlook like a voluntaryEuropeaninitiative.Any evidenceof U S . pressurecouldshakethe confidenceof financialmarketsandleadto a run on Americangold.79 Giscardappeared readyto negotiate. Whilealwayswaryof theBritishand any“deals” betweenlesAnglo-Saxons thatexcludedFrance,he didinvitethe at the upcoming G-10 finance ministersto participatein discussions IMFAXorld Bank meeting. Anxious to maneuverwithout arousingde Gaulle’sintervention, he askedtheG-10 ministers to limit accompanying officialsto two personsandto conducttheirmeetings withoutpublicity.80 But evenwith theseprecautions, GiscardandtheAmericans foundit hardto engagein seriousnegotiations. For example,whenLeddyandJohnson asked Giscardwhat BritishChancellorof ExchequerMaudling’sthoughts wereon thesubject,Giscardreplied,“thetwo werein agreement thatthereshouldbe high level secretdiscussions of the subject.’@l Giscarddid not tell Johnson andLeddywhatthe “subject” actuallywas.Was it the hoped-forinitiativeto limit goldtakings? Giscardwouldnot say,andtheAmericanrepresentatives thoughtit imprudentto ask.Later,Britishrepresentatives askedthe Americanswhat Giscardhadsaid,and,afterbeingtold,observedthat“thewhole affairwasmysterious.” The nextday,Frenchoflicialssaidthe samething! PresidentKennedywas scheduled to speakto the centralbankersandfinanceministers of theG-10 at theIMFAXorld Bankmeeting.The purposeof themeetingwasto tell theEuropeans thattheunderlying causeof theAmerican deficitwas its disproportionate shareof Westernmilitaryand aid expenditures. This grouphad heardthismessage manytimesbefore,but the meetingwouldgivethepresidentthechance,asKaysenput it, to “givethem a realfeelingof how centralit is to yourthinking.Thisis something thatyou canconveydirectlyin a way no oneelsecan.”82 Kaysenurgedthepresident to tell his audience thatthe administration recognizedthe fact that “thereis morethanoneway thesystemmightevolvein relationto thecentralrole of the dollar,andwe do not forecloseconsideration of alternativeschemes of improvement for the paymentssystem.”83 In otherwords,the U.S. was not weddedto the BrettonWoodssystemand its supposed privileges. A better systemcouldbe createdthatreflectedthenew economic strengthof theEuropeans.This new systemwouldgivethe Europeans an “expanded role in the international monetarysystem.”84 But couldthe administration act withoutthe hoped-forFrenchor Europeaninitiativesuggested by Giscard? Dillon thoughtKaysen’sstrategywas


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far toorisky.“A statement by you thatwe arepreparedto studynew ideas andwelcomenew initiativeswouldin all probabilitybe misinterpreted ... as indicatinga lack of confidence on your part in our abilityto handleour problemwithintheframeworkof theexistingmonetary balanceof payments system.Thiscouldhavedangerous andimmediateeffectsthisfall.”85 Withouta formalproposalfromthe French,Kennedy’s speechwascloserto DilIon’sthanKaysen’s approach, hintingthattheadministration wasopento internationalmonetarydiscussions but offeringno concreteAmericanplans. The Americanteam adoptedthis positionbecauseof the fear that “open pressureon the Frenchmight lead them to think that politicalquestions interjected.”86 couldbe successfully The momentumfor monetaryreformsubsided considerably afterthe IMF meeting.In theweeksahead,theKennedyadministration’s attentionturned to the far more pressingmatterof Sovietmissilesin Cuba. By the time Kennedyreturnedto the dollarandgold outflowissue,America’spolitical relationswith Francehaddeteriorated markedl~.~’ It no longerseemedthat monetarycooperation wasin thecards.Kennedyagainfearedthata FrancoGermanpoliticalbloc would use its surplusdollarsto compelchangesin America’spoliticalstrategies in Europe.88

CONCLUSION France’sinternational monetarypolicywas,at leastthrough1962,far more cooperative thanconventional wisdomholds.But thiscooperative spiritwas not to last.Withoutassurances that otherEuropeannationswould restrict “hoarding” of gold,the Frenchgovernment beganincreasing its conversion of dollars.For eachof the firsttwo quartersof 1963,the saleof US. goldto Francewas $101.1milliond0llars.~9 More importantly, after1962,Rueff and otherswho were againstmonetarycooperationwith the Americansincreased theirinfluence with de Gaulle.In February1965,deGaullelaunched his famousattackon the dollarand its privilegeswithin the international monetarysystem.By January1966,Giscardsinfluencehadwanedconsiderablyandde Gaulle,whohadcometo view him asinsubordinate, forcedhim to resign. Ironically,during the same period official Americanattitudestoward Americanmonetaryreformbecamelesstimid.In 1962,thefinanciallyorthodox membersof Kennedy’sadministration successfully slowedany bold Americanmovetowardinternational monetaryreform.But by 1963andbeyond,Americanofficialsbecamefar more interestedin a whole-scalerestructuring of the system.This strikingshiftin Americanforeigneconomic of the policywas madeevidentin a speechLyndonB. Johnson’s Secretary Treasury,HenryFowler,gavebeforetheVirginiaBarAssociation onJuly10,

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1965.“I am privilegedto tell you thiseveningthatthe Presidenthasauthorized me to announce that the UnitedStatesnow standspreparedto attend andparticipatein an international monetaryconference whichwouldconsiderwhatstepswe mightjointlytaketo securesubstantial improvements in international monetaryarrangement^."^^ The TreasuryDepartment,which threeyearsearlierhad goneto greatlengthsto suppress any programof monetaryreform,nowwarmlyembracedit. But with Franceand the United Statesin vehementdisagreement over bowto changetheglobalpayments system,meaningful changewaselusive. ThisFranco-American monetarydisputeduringthe 1960screateda legacyof bitterness betweenthetwo countries thatlastedwell beyondthecollapseof theBrettonWoodssystemin August1971.It is quitepossible thatthisenmity hadembracedGismighthavebeenavoidedif the Kennedyadministration cardscooperative suggestions duringthesummerof 1962,or if Giscardhad offereda lessvagueproposalto reforminternational monetaryrelations. In thelongrun,thesedisagreements maynot havemattered,because the BrettonWoodssystemwasinherentlyflawedandnot fixable.Giventheexplosionof international capitalflowsduringthe 1960s,market-determined exchange rateswereprobablyinevitable.But it is importantto notethatthe Kennedyadministration wasnot weddedto the BrettonWoodssystemand felt morevulnerablethan hegemonicunderits rules.While theywerenot surewhat theywantedexactly,key officials,includingPresidentKennedy, werewillingto contemplate fundamental changes to thesystem,evenif this meantsacrificingthe dollar’scentralrole in the globalpaymentssystem. What is perhapsevenmoresurprising is that the Frenchwere not monolithicallydetermined to oppose theAmericans in thisareain theearly1960s. EvendeGaullewasopento optionsthatwentbeyonda puregoldstandard, as long as the “exorbitant privileges” of the dollarwere ~ u r t a i l e d In. ~the ~ end, to characterizeAmericaand France’sattitudestoward the Bretton Woodssystemin termsof hegemony or empireis a vastoversimplification. Therewere ambiguities andcontradictions in policieson bothsidesof the Atlantic,asbothsidesstruggled to understand howto pursuetheirnarrower nationalinterests withoutprecipitating a worldwidemonetarycalamity.The storybehindthe gold standstillforcesus to reconsidernot just FrancoAmericanrelations,but alsothe oftenmisunderstood relationship between international monetarypolicyandtransatlantic politicaldevelopments during the “crucialdecade”of the 1960s. NOTES 1. RobertGilpin, 7be PoliticalEconomyof InternationalMonetaryRelations (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,19871, 134.


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2. Diane Kunz, Butterand Guns:America’sCold War EconomicDiplomacy (New York: The FreePress,19971,99. For similarinterpretations, seeWilliam Borden,“DefendingHegemony:AmericanForeignEconomicPolicy,”in ThomasPaQuestfor Victoy: AmericanForeignPolicy,1961-1963 terson,ed., Kennedy’s (New York: Oxford UniversityPress,19891,83-85; David Calleo,7beImperious HarvardUniversityPress,19821,23; David Calleo,Beyond Economy(Cambridge: Alliance(New York: BasicBooks, AmericanHegemony: TheFutureof theWestern 19871,13, 44-52; FrankCostigliola,“ThePursuitof AtlanticCommunity:Nuclear Arms,Dollars,andBerlin,”in Paterson, ed.,24-56; PaulKennedy,7beRiseandFall of the GreatPowers:EconomicChangeandMilitary Conflict from1500 to 2000 (New York: RandomHouse,1987),434. For interpretations thatseeKennedy’s monetarypolicyas a conservative approachdesignedto maintainthe privilegedplace the dollar held in the postwar“capitalist world-system,” see Borden,57-62, 84; AtCalleoand BenjaminM. Rowland,Americaand the WorldPoliticalEconomy: lantic Dreamsand National Realities(Bloomington:Indiana UniversityPress, 19731,88-89;JohnS. Odell, U.S. InternationalMonetaryPolicy:Markets,Power, andIdeasasa Sourceof Change(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1982),88; SusanStrange, International MonetaryRelations (London:OxfordUniversityPress, 19761,82, 207. Domestic PoliticsandtheEndof Bret3. JoanneGowa,ClosingtheGoldWindow: ton Woods (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1983),52. 4. BenjaminCohen,Organizingthe World’sMoney:7bePoliticalEconomyof Dominance andDependence (New York: BasicBooks,1977),97. 5. It is quitetruethatby 1965,de Gaulleclaimedthe systemallowedfor “l’hegemonieamCricaine.” SeePressConference, February4, 1965,fromCharlesde Gaulle, Discourset messages, vol. 4, “PourI’effort,AoOt 1962-Decembre1965(Paris:Omimpgriale (Paris:Calmann nibus/Plon,1993);seealsoRaymondAron,La Rgpublique Lesrapportspolitico-stratggiques Levy, 1973);GeorgesSoutou,L ’allianceincertaine: franco-allemands, 1954199G(Paris:Fayard,19961,287. But the key pointthatthis articlemakesis thatthe viewsof 1965werenot the basisfor Frenchpolicyin 1962, which is impliedin JeanLacoutre,De Gaulle:7beRuler,1945-1970 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), 380-382. Most Frenchscholarlyinterpretations about de Gaulle’scriticisms againstthe dollarbeginwith the mid-1960s.For a significant but briefexception, seeHenriBourguinat, “LegeneraldeGaulleet la reformedu systgme monetaireinternational: la contestation manqueede I’hegCmoniedu dollar,“ in De Gaulleen sonsikle,vol. 3 (Paris,1992), 110-118. 6. Discussion betweenPresident JohnF. Kennedy,William McChesneyMartin, Chairmanof the FederalReserve,and TheodoreSorensen-August 16, 1962, OfficeFiles(POF),JohnF. KennedyPresidential 5:50-6:32P.M., tape 13, President’s Library(JFKL),BostonMass. 7. Kunz,Butterand Guns,192. 8. Excellentdiscussions of thesequestions canbe foundin RichardCooper,7be InternationalMonetary System: Essaysin WorldEconomics (Cambridge, Mass.:The MIT Press,1987) andPaulde Grauwe,InternationalMoney:Post-WarTrendsand isbeories (Oxford:Clarendon Press,1989). 9. PaulVolckerandToy00Gyohten,Changing Fortunes:7beWorld’s Moneyand (New York: RandomHouse,1992),7-8. theThreattoAmericanLeadership

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10. SeeBarryEichengreen, GlobalizingCapital:A Histoy of theInternational MonPrincetonUniversityPress,19961,7-44. In practice,gold inetarySystem(Princeton: flowsand outflowswere often“sterilizedunderthe goldstandard, whichjustmeant fromthe nationaltreasuries withoutchanging the thatgoldwas addedor subtracted domesticmonetarybase.But even with somesterilization,the gold standardwas nowherenearasstableaswasoncethought.SeeGiulioGallarotti,irheAnatomyof an International MonetaryRegime(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,195).Fortheecoduringthelate-nineteenth andearlynomicandpoliticalvolatilityof the“goldstandard twentiethcentury,and the Americanpropensity to “sterilize” gold flows,seeMilton Friedmanand Alan Schwartz, A MonetaryHistoryof the UnitedStates1867-2960 (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress,19631,83-188,seealsoMilton Friedman, Money the esMischiejEpisodes in MonetaryHistory(N.Y.: HarcourtBrace,19941,especially BryanandtheCyanideProcess.” says“TheCrimeof 1873”and“WilliamJennings 11. Seeespecially DonaldEdwardMoggridge, Keynes: An Economist’s Biography (London:Routledge, 1992). 12. RobertTriffin, Goldand theDollar Crisis:irheFutureof Convertibility (New Haven:Yale UniversityPress,1960). 13. SeeTheodoreSorensen, Kennedy(New York: Harperand Row, 1965),406. SeealsoJohnKennethGalbraith’s letterto the president from October1960,in his LetterstoKennedy(Harvard:HarvardUniversityPress,1998),29-31. to 14. The swaparrangements werestandbycreditlinesthatallowedparticipants drawon otherparticipants’ currencies in orderto defendtheirown exchangerates. The increasedIMF creditwas arrangedthrougha procedurecalledthe General Arrangements to Borrow,whichwerenegotiated at theendof 1961.Whileconnected to the IMF, thesearrangements wereuniquein thattheygavethe lendingcountries of somediscretion overthe sizeand use of the loans.For an excellentdiscussion theseinnovations, see HaroldJames,InternationalMonetaryCooperation since (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),159-165. BrettonWoods 15. RichardReeves,President Kennedy: Profileof Power(New York:Touchstone, 19931,431. Cold WarDiplomacy and theQuestfor 16. William Hitchcock,FranceRestored: Leadership in Europe,19441954(ChapelHill: Universityof North CarolinaPress, and theStatein ModernFrance: 19981,12-71. See,also,RichardKuisel,Capitalism Renovation andEconomic Management in theTwentieth Century (New York: CambridgeUniversityPress,1981). 17. SergeBerstein,irhe Republicof de Gaulle,1958-1969, trans.PeterMoms UK: Cambridge UniversityPress,19931,101-124; MichaelM. Loriaux, (Cambridge, FranceaferHegemony: InternationalChangeandFinancialReform,(Ithaca,N.Y.: CornellUniversityPress),168-174. Proposals for theResolution of the 18. See,generally, Rueff,Balanceof Payments: MostPressingWorldEconomic Problemof Our Time,(New York: MacmillanCo., Rue8 1967). See alsoFranCoisBourricaudand PascalSalin,PresencedeJacques (Paris:Plon,1989),245314. 194519881(New York, 19. RobertSolomon,7beInternationalMonetarySystem, 1982),54.J. Lee,“Kennedy, Johnson, andtheDilemmaof Multinational Corporations: Essaysin Economic andBusiness AmericanForeignEconomicPolicyin the 1960s,” History14 (19961,322.


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20. Rueffto Wilfrid Baumgartner, June26, 1961,Wilfred Baumgartner papers,box 3BA34,folderDR 7, Fondation NationaledesSciences Politiques (FNSP),Paris. papers,box 21. JacquesRueff to Charlesde Gaulle,May 5, 1961,Baumgartner Le 3BA34, folderDr 5, FNSP. For Rueffsarticles,see “Un dangerpour l’occident: LeMonde,June27, 1961;“DeuxPyramides du creditsur Gold-Exchanges standard,” le stockd’ordesEtats-Unis,” ibid.,June23, 1961;and“Comment sortirdu systi.me?” ibid.,June29, 1961. 22. On the Frenchbureaucratic schism,see,Entretienbiographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, interview4, 32-33, ComitCpourl’histoirekconomique et financierede la France,Ministerede I’Economie, desFinances, et dlndustrie, Paris. papers,box 3BA48,folder 23. Note, OlivierWormser,May 30, 1961,Baumgartner Dr 2, FNSP.SeealsoC. W. Sanders (BritishBoardof Trade),“Points for Meeting,”26 June1961,FO 371/158179,PublicRecordOffice,Kew. 4 May 1961,Baumgartner 24. See,for example,DouglasDillon to Baumgartner, papers,box 3BA48,folderDr 1, FNSP.On Baumgartner’s attitudetowardcooperating with the UnitedStates,see,Entretienbiographique de ClaudePierre-Brossolette, number4, 23, Cornit6pourl’historieeconomique et financiere de la France. 25. For Baumgartner’s reactionto Rueffsviews,see,for example,Baumgartner to Rueff,letter,June27, 1961,Baumgartner papers,box 3BA34,folderDr 7, FNSP.For of gold,see“Tableaudestransactions en or desEtatsfigureson Frenchconversion Unis aveclespaysCtrangers,” in Bourguinat, “LegCneralde Gaulleet la reformedu syst&me monetaireinternational: la contestation manqueede l’hegemonie du dollar,” in De Gaulleensonsiecle,125. in InternationalPay26. Triffin, 7be WorldMoneyMaze:NationalCurrencies ments,249. See,also,CharlesCoombs,TheArena of InternationalFinance(New York:Wiley Press,1976),61-62. 27. Entretien biographique de ClaudePierre-Brossolette, number4, 18-22. 28. Dillon,Memofor the President, May 25, 1962,NationalSecurityFiles,DepartmentsandAgencies: Treasury, box 289,JFKL. 29. Jonesto StateDepartment, June13, 1962,UniversityPublications of America (UPA), President’s OfficeFiles(POF),Treasury, 25. 30. Ibid., 1 31. Memoof Meetingbetweenthe President, Ambassador HeweAlphand,Andre of theUnitedStates Malraux,andMcGeorgeBundy,May 11,1962,ForeignRelations (FRUS 196143,13:695-701. 32. The whole tone of this meetingcalls into questionthe idea that Kennedy regardless of cost.“Thegoalof US. policywasto wantedto createa PaxAmericana supportandsustainnationswhichdesiredindependence.” If Francewantedto lead fromtheUnitedStates, thenKennedywould“likenothingbeta Europeindependent ter thanto leaveEurope.”Ibid.,697. 33. Gavinto the StateDepartment, May 28, 1962,FRUS 1961-63,13:705-707. 34. Gavinto Rusk,July 12, 1962,UPA, NationalSecurityFiles(NSF), W. Europe, France.SeealsoHeller,Memoto the President, July 16, 1962,UPA, POF, Councilof Economic Advisers, 9. 35. Ball, Memofor the President, “Visitof FrenchFinanceMinister,” July 18,1962, UPA, NSF,W. Europe,France. 36. Ibid., 2.

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37. Conversation betweenGiscarddEstaingandJamesTobin,June1,1962,Heller papers,reel 24: Europeanbudgetstudyfile. For Heller’sstudyof Frencheconomic planning,see,e.g., Heller, “CapitalBudgetingExperience in Five EuropeanCountries,”May 1962, Heller papers,reel 21: Budget(federal)file; and memorandum, Bundyto Heller,May 14, 1962,Hellerpapers.,reel 24: Europeanbudgetstudyfile. 38. Remarksby RenCLarre(financialadvisorat Frenchembassy, Washington) at a meetingof the AFL-CIO Research Directors, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1962,Fonds bilatkrales aveclesEtats-Unis, B 10917,folder:balancedes trCsor:Tome15, Relations paiments,Archiveskconomiques et financieres, Ministerede I’Cconomieet desfinances,Savigny-le-Temple, France.Giscardsown writingsextolthebenefitsof ecoof theEconomyandSocialDenomicplanning.See,for example,“TheManagement velopment” and“TheNew Growth‘‘in ValCry GiscarddEstaing, FrenchDemocracy (New York: Doubleday,19771,75-92. 39. Memorandum, Bundyto Heller,May 14, 1962,Hellerpapers,reel 24; file Europeanbudgetstudy.For Frenchperception of Kennedy’s motives,seeJacques Rueff to PhilipCortney,31 May 1962,ibid.,Ribicofffile. U S . embassy Paris),circulartelegram, 40. Jacques Reinstein(Minister-Counselor, of Capital. June29, 1962,RG 84, France,box 64, folder:Investment 41. See, for example,Larre to Giscard,“Investissernents des Etats-UnisP I’ktranger,” May 18,1962,FondsTrksor:Vol. 15,Relations bilaterales aveclesEtats-Unis Bl0915,folder:Politiquefinanciere, 1958-1965,ArchivesCconomiques et financieres. 7heAmericanChallenge,trans.RonaldSteel See,generally, J. J. ServanSchreiber, (New York, 1968). 42. J. R. Fears,Francein the GiscardPresidency (London,19811,1-18. See,also, Entretienbiographique de ClaudePierre-Brossolette, interview5, 28. 43. For Giscard’s viewson the BrettonWoodssystem, see,for example,Giscard, SpeechbeforetheNationalAssembly, 17 May 1962,surle projetde loi relatifau renforcement desressources du FMI, DirectiondesAffaireskconomiques et financieres, papiersdirecteurs: OlivierWormser, vol. 63: 388-404.On Frenchconcerns aboutthe U.S. stockmarketcrash,seeNotedinformation, RenCLarre(Conseiller financier, embassyin Washington), June15, 1962,FondsTrksor:Vol. 15,Relations bilatCrales avec les Etats-Unis,C6te B10915,folder:Budget,19561965.On Giscardsdelicatebalancingact,seede Lattre,Seroirazucfinances, 150. 44. For figureson Frenchdollarconversion, seeUnitedStatesNet MonetaryGold Transactions with ForeignCountries andInternational Institutions, 1January1962-30 June 1962, FondsTrCsor:Vol. 15, RelationsbilatCralesavec les Etats-Unis,CBte B10915,folder:Budget,19561965.On debtrepayment, seeNote pourle ministre, July3, 1962,DirectiondesAffaireskconomiques et financieres, papiersdirecteurs: OlivierWormser,vol. 119:252. 45. Memorandum, WalterHeller to President Kennedy,May 16, 1961,Heller papers,Heller/JFK196C-1964 series,box 5, folder:memosto JFK, 5/61, JFKL. Couve hadmetwith Hellerat thefirstmeetingof theexpanded OECD andhadconveyed de Gaulle’sdisdainof theIMF. 46. Andrede Lattre,Seroirauxfinances (Paris:ComitCpourl’histoireCconomique et financierede la France,1999), 150. 47. MauricePerouse(Directeurdu TrCsor)to GiscarddEstaing,Compte-rendu de la 82mereuniondu GroupedeTravailNo. 3 du ComitCde politiqueCconomique de


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Financikres Inl’O.C.E.D.,16-17 April at CMteaude la Muette,Fonds9: Institutions ternationales, cBteB54754. 48. De Gaulleto Adenauer, Secretariat general,Entretiens et messages, 1956-1966, summaryof theFranco-German rapprocheJuly15, 1962,16:218-219. For a concise ment,seePierreMaillard,De Gaulleet IXllemugne:le r&e inached(Paris:Plon, 19901,169-202. 49. For de Gaulle’spreoccupation with Norstad’sresignation, see “Le general Norstadseraitdemissionnaire,” Le Monde,21 July 1962, 1. De Gaulle met with Norstads namedsuccessor, LymanLemnitzeronJuly23, 1962,andcriticizedU.S.nuclearpolicywithinNATO. SeeEntretien de Gaulle-Lernnitzer, 23July1962,Secretariat general,Entretiens et messages, 19561966,16:206-209, Archivesof the Ministryof ForeignAffairs,Paris,France. 50. Hervi.Alphand,L’ktonnement d’gtre:journal(19391973), 381.See,also,Entretienbiographique de Alain Prate,entretien4, Comitepourl’histoireeconomique et financikrede la France.Rueff‘s otherstrongally, ForeignMinisterMauriceCouve de Murville,wasalsopreoccupied with strategic issues. While Giscardwasin Washington,Couvewasin Genevafor talkswith the Sovietson LaosandBerlin.See,Engeneral,Entretiens et tretienCouve-Gromyko in Geneva,July 21, 1962,Secretariat of foreignaffairsin messages, 19561966,16: 179-181. Dinnerof the four ministers Geneva,21 July 1962, Secretariat general,Entretienset messages, 1956-1966, 16: 190-195. 51. No recordof Giscardsmeetingwith Kennedyalonehasbeenfoundin either Kennedymentions someof the pointshe discussed in a later U.S. or Frencharchives. meetingwithFederalReserve Chairman WilliamMartin.Discussion betweenPresident JohnF. Kennedy,William McChesneyMartin, Chairmanof the FederalReserveand TheodoreSorensen-August16, 1962,5:50-6:32P.M., tape13,Presidential Recording, International MonetaryRelations, Presidents Office Files,JFKL,transcribed by Francis J. Gavin.Forthemeetingwith multipleparticipants, seememcon,“Payments ArrangementsAmongthe AtlanticCommunity,” July 20, 1962,FRUS 1961-63,13: 733. And memcon(luncheonmeeting), July21, 1962,JFK NSF, reel 2: 154-155. 52. Ibid. for the Secretary of the TreasuryandAdministrator, Aid, 53. Memo,the President June20, 1962,UPA, POF,Treasury, 25;Memo,Bundyfor thePresident, June22, 1962, of theTreasury, June UPA, POF,Treasury, 25; Memo,the President for the Secretary 22, 1962,UPA, POF,Treasury, 25. 54. In September 1962,Giscardbegantalkingabouta CRU, a proposalthatwas debatedintermittently until 1965.See,for example,Loraix,FranceafterHegemony, 185-186. See,also,SamyCohenandMarie-ClaudeSmoute,La politiquede Val@ Giscard d’Estaing(Paris: FondationNationaledes SciencesPolitiques,1985), 146-148; andBourguinat, “Legeneralde Gaulleet la reformedu systkme monetaire international: la contestation manqueede I’hegemonie du dollar,”in De Gaulleen sonsiecle,116-1 17. 55. Memo,CoppocktoJohnson, August1, 1962,DDC 1993. 56. Memo,Kaysento the President, July6, 1962,FRUS 1961-63,13: 138. 57. Memo,Ball to thePresident, “A FreshApproach to theGoldProblem,” July24, to the President on the 1962,the Papersof GeorgeW. Ball, box 15b,“Memorandum GoldProblem,” SeeleyG. MuddManuscript Library,Princeton University.

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58. Ibid., pp. 4 5 . 59. Ibid., 5. Ball arguedthat “whatwe musttell our Europeanalliesis, therefore,

to carryourheavyshareof theFreeWorldburdens clearenough:if we areto continue whereourexertions in thecommoncausedo we candosoonlyundertheconditions not imperilthe dollarandin fact,thewholeinternational payments system. To create thoseconditions is thefirstandmosturgenttaskfor theAtlanticpartnership.” 60. Ibid., 10. 61. Presidential Recording, Tape 14, August20, 1962:4:OO-530 P.M., International MonetaryRelations, Presidents OfficeFiles,JFKL,transcribed by Francis J. Gavin. 62. Ball, “A FreshApproachto the GoldProblem,”14. 63. JamesTobin,“A Gold AgreementProposal,” July 24, 1962, AchesonPapers, StateDepartment andWhiteAdviser,Reportto the President on the Balanceof Payments,2-25-63, HSTL. 64. Memo for the president,“An InterimInternationalMonetaryArrangement,” August9, 1962,AchesonPapers,StateDepartment andWhiteAdviser,Reportto the 2-25-63, HSTL. President on the Balanceof Payments, 65. Memo,Hellerto the President, “Whywe needan interiminternational monetaryagreement,” August9, 1962,FRUS 1961-1963, 9: 139. 66. Ibid.,p. 140. 67. Carl KaysenandKermitGordon,Memofor the President, “GoldGuarantees,” 25. July18, 1962,UPA, POF,Treasury, 68. Dillon, Memo for the President,August7, 1962, AchesonPapers,StateDepartmentandWhiteAdviser,Reportto the Presidenton the Balanceof Payments, MisFebruary25, 1963, Harry S . TrumanLibrary(hereafterHSTL), Independence, souri. 69. Fowler,Memo for Dillon, “TheNeedto CoupleHigh Level PoliticalNegotiationsfor moreEquitableBurdenSharingDesigned to CorrecttheU.S. Balanceof Paymentswith anyPoliticalNegotiations for InterimArrangements Designedto Defend U.S. Gold Reserves,” August7 , 1962, AchesonPapers,StateDepartment andWhite February25, 1963, Adviser,Reportto the Presidenton the Balanceof Payments, HSTL. Thesememosindicatedthat the Treasurydepartment had no idea how importanttheAmericantroopsstationed in WestGermanywereto the stabilityandsecurityof Europe. 70. “Appraisalof Problemsin the Proposalfor an ‘InterimMonetaryArrangement,’”August16, 1962 (noauthorgivenbut includedwith a coverletterto Ball from AchesonPapers,StateDepartmentand W. N. Turpin, Dillon’sSpecialAssistant), White Adviser,Reportto the Presidenton the Balanceof Payments, February25,

1963.

71. Ibid., 4 5 . 72. William McChesneyMartin,Jr., Chairmanof the Boardof Governors, Federal MonetaryArrangement’ ReserveSystem,“Commentary on ‘An InterimInternational 25, 1. Presented by ChairmanMartin,”UPA, POF,Treasury, 73. Roosa,“TheNew Convertible Gold-DollarSystem,” andRoosa,“International Liquidity.” 74. Bundyto Kaysen,August21, 1962,NSF, Departments andAgencies, Treasury, 6/624/63,box 289,JFKL. BundyaskedKaysen,“IsDougDillonpinningusto hispositionby suchpublicstatements?”


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75. Presidential Recording, Tape 14,August20, 1962:4:00-5:30 P.M.,International MonetaryRelations, Presidents OfficeFiles,JFKL, transcribed by Francis J. Gavin. 76. Presidential Recording, Tape 11,August10, 1962: 11:20-12:30P.M., International MonetaryRelations,Presidents Office Files,JFKL., transcribed by FrancisJ. Gavin. 77. Tape14,August20, 1962. 78. Ibid. 79. Memo,President for theSecretary of theTreasury, TheUndersecretary of State, of theCEA,August24,1962,NSF, Department andAgencies, Treasury, andChairman 6/62-4/63/ 289,JFKL. 80. GiscarddEstaingto the financeministersof the Groupof 10, 12 September 1962,DirectiondesAffairesCconomiques et financieres, papiersdirecteurs: Olivier Wormer,~01.132: 347-350. 81. MemofromDillonandBall to the President, September 12, 1962,with attachment,Memofor DillonandBall fromJohnson andLeddy,September 10, 1962,FRUS 1961-63,9: 146. 18,1962,FRUS 1961-63,9: 149. 82. Memo,Kaysento the President, September 83. Ibid., 149. 84. Ibid., 149. 85. Memo,Dillonto Kennedy,September 18,1962,FRUS 1961-63,9: 152. 86. Ibid., p. 146147. 87. For detailsof the post-Nassau Franco-German revolt,seeMarcTrachtenberg, A Constructed Peace:meMakingof theEuropeanSettlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1999),355-379. 88. For thesefearsin 1963,seeGavin,“TheGold Battleswithinthe Cold War: HisAmericanMonetaryPolicyandthe Defenseof Europe,1960-1963,”Diplomatic tory,Winter,2002,vol. 26, no. 1. 89. UnitedStatesNet MonetaryGoldTransactions with ForeignCountries andIn1Jan. 1963-30 June1963,FondsTrkor,Vol. 19, Relations ternationalInstitutions, d o rmonCtaire moni.taires--Etats-Unis, 1962-1978,C6te2 9984,folder:Transactions avecl’ktranger. of theTreasury, before 90. “Remarks by theHonorableHenryH. Fowler,Secretary theVirginiaStateBar Association at the Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia,Saturday, Papersof FrancisBator,box7, LBJ Library,10. July10, 1965,6:OO P.M.,” 91. SeeG. Grin,“L‘Cvolutiondu systsmemonetaireinternational danslesannkes Znter1960:Lespositions desCconomistes RobertTriffin etJacques Rueff,”Relations nationales, no. 100 (winter1999),389.


6 WesternEuropeandthe AmericanChallenge: Conflict andCooperation in Technology andMonetaryPolicy,1965-1973 HubertZimmermann

Duringhisbriefpresidency, JohnF. Kennedyspentalmostasmuchtime in WesternEuropeas his two immediatesuccessors combined.His tours throughEuropeancapitalsinvariablydrewcheeringcrowdsand createda lastingimagein whichtheAmericanleaderincorporated notonlytheAmericandreambutalsotheinclusion of Europein a transatlantic community that wassymbolised by modernity, technological progress, andeconomic prosperity.LyndonB. Johnson andRichardNixonrarelywentto Europe,andif theydid,thereception wasoftencool.Theywerefrequently greetedby protesters. WhenKennedyaffirmedin a ringingspeechin Philadelphia on Independence Day 1962thatAmericawas“prepared to discuss with a United Europethe waysand meansof forminga concrete Atlanticpartnership, a mutuallybeneficialpartnership betweenthe new unionnow emergingin EuropeandtheoldAmericanunion founded here173yearsago,”politicians all overEurope(exceptfor France)congratulated the president.’ HenryA. Kissinger’s grandiose pronouncement of a “Yearof Europe”in 1973was mostlymetwith disbeliefandscorn.2 Certainly,personality goesa longway in explaining such a difference; however,the contrast alsodenotesa dramaticchangein European attitudes towardtheUnitedStates.Of course, seriousEuropean-American conflictsalsoexistedduringthe Kennedyadministration,but theypaledin comparison with the mutualdisenchantment of the 1970s. How is thisshiftto be explained? Many analysts assume thatit wasa consequence of basicstructural change, thatis thereemergence of a Europethat wasmoreinclinedandableto pursueits own interests, evenif thisresulted in a conflictwiththeUS. Additionally, theypointto an allegedAmericandecline.Suchan interpretation justifiesNixon andKissinger’s assertive policy 127

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towardEuropeas a defensive rea~tion.~ Othercommentators stress the impactof morespecificreasons, suchasLBJ’sandNixon’smistakes in handling theirallies: the consequences of Vietnam,or the Americanneglectof Europein favourof greatpowerdiplomacy with theSoviet Union andChina.5 Certainly,thesefactorswere not unimportant, but suchinterpretations do not adequately capturethe essence of what was goingon in EuropeanAmericanrelationsat that time. The early 1970swere a periodof major reshufflingin the relationsbetweentheWesterncountries. The cardswere remixedandtherulesof thegamewerereformulated. Thesechanges becomevery clearwhenoneshiftsone’semphasis away from the usualconcentration on the “highpolitics”of defenseand grand strategyto the supposed “lowpolitics”of monetaryrelationsand technology.Structural changein thosetwofields,andthewayit washandledin EuropeandtheU.S., wasdecisivefor theshiftingpowerrelations of the1970s asof andbeyond.Moneyandtechnology are not merelyto be considered secondary importance, thatis,asepiphenomena thatreflected whatwenton at the highpoliticallevel6;on the contrary, theeffectsof decisions in these fieldsoftenled to majorpoliticalreorientations, suchastheEuropeanization of FrenchandBritishforeignpoliciesin thelate 1960sor thedissolution of transatlantic cooperation at the sametime. Differentmethodsin the way monetaryandtechnological issueswere handledand intensifiedcooperationin thesefieldsmighthaveledto a qualitatively differentrelationship betweenthe UnitedStatesand the economically reemerging Europe.There mightevenhavebeena directtrade-offbetweenthe two realms,asWashingtonstruggled with a dollardeficitandtheEuropeans worriedabouttheir technological dependence. In 1966,for example,theItalianforeignminister Fanfanipresented the ideaof a technological MarshallPlanin whichEuropeanpayments for Americanadvanced technology wouldhavewipedouta deficit.’However,neisubstantial partof theAmericanbalanceof payments ther transatlantic monetarynor technological cooperation advancedafter 1966;thingsin factmovedin exactlytheopposite direction. Theclosingof thegold-window by Nixonin August1971signaled theend of the so-called BrettonWoodsmonetary system. Alreadyin themid-l960s, thesystemhadbalancedon thevergeof collapse. European andAmerican viewsonmonetary affairsdivergedincreasingly, andwhen,at theEuropean summitin TheHagueat theendof 1969,theEC-countries decided toembark on theroadto a commoncurrency, thiswasa clearsignthattheystrovefor moreindependence fromthedollar,andthatthetransatlantic monetary systemwasabouttobe abolished. How andwhydidAmericans andEuropeans allowthesystem to disintegrate? Servan-Schreiber’s best-seller Le Dc?? The publicationof Jean-Jacques arngricain(Paris1967)wasanothereventthatstandsasa symbolfor a fundamental changein transatlantic relations. Servan-Schreiber urgedEuropean

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politicians to reactvigorously to Americantechnological superiority; otherwiseEuropewouldsoonbe completely dependent on theUS. in themost advanced fieldsof moderntechnology. He proposed thattheEuropeans join their nationalprogramsin an attemptto matchAmericanpreeminence. However,wasit not morerationalfor European nationsto collaborate with thepowerfulpartneracross theAtlanticandbenefitfromtechnological spinoff?Andyet,at theendof the1960s,all European countries exhibited a clear preference for European programmes. Whathadhappened to Kennedy’s visionof transatlantic interdependence? I arguethatthelostchances in monetary andtechnological relations resulted based fromconscious policydecisions thatsignaled theendof a relationship on cooperation andthebeginning of a newonebasedon competition. This had majorconsequences beyondthe 1970s.One of the mostimportantof thosewasa new impetusto Europeanintegration. The Americanchallenge in the monetaryandtechnological field helpedto reinforceEurope’s identity. Or in otherwords,the assertive Americanpolicyin the late 1960s,culminatingin the Nixon-Kissinger period,hadthe samekind of effecton the Europeanunlficationprocessas the hegemonicUS. policy in the early 1950s.*

THE EROSION OFTHE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP Changing Patterns of Transatlantic MonetaryPolicy

Thecentralfeatures of thepostwarmonetary orderin theWesternworld, usuallycalledtheBrettonWoodssystem, arewell known:thecoreroleof the dollarto whosevaluethe othercurrencies participating in the systemwere pegged;the dollar-gold link thatprovideda guarantee of the dollar’svalue andwascoupledwiththepromisethatothernationscouldcashin theirsurplusdollarsfor $35/ounce at theU S . treasury; andinstitutionalised cooperationamongthe majorindustrial economies to keepexchange ratesstable andshieldtheirdomestic economies fromtheimpactof unexpected movementsin financialmarkets.9 Lesswell knownis the stronglypoliticalcharacterof thissystem. It wasbasedon an unintended “bargain” betweenEuropeandtheU.S.’O In the1950stheU.S. profitedfromthereserve roleof the dollarinsofarasit allowedtheAmericans to financetheirhugeColdWar effort withouthavingto worry abouttheir externalbalance;Europe,for its part,acquired theresources it neededto rebuildits industries in thepostwar period.The resulting Americanbalanceof payments deficitswereno problemaslongastheEuropeans hadan economic interestin accumulating surplusdollars.Thissituation changed in thelate1950sanda serious problem emerged. If the Europeans transferred backto the US. treasury thesurplus dollarsthat accruedto them (due to an undiminished Americanmilitary

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presencein Europe,growinginvestments by U S . industries in theCommon Market,anda diminishing Americantradesurplus),theAmericandollar-gold exchange guarantee, andwith it confidence in the dollarastheworld’score currency,wouldsoonbe undermined. A real reversalof Americandeficits, however,wouldhaverequiredfromthe U S . government suchunpalatable policiesasa retrenchment of themilitaryeffortin Europe,limitations on U.S. investments or restrictive tradepolicies.Onlyveryfew politicians in Europe wantedto provokesuchreactions. They still agreedwith thebasicthrustof Americaneconomicandsecuritypolicies.Therefore,theyaccededtoAmerto prolongthe “bargain” by continuing to holdsurplusdollars. icanrequests Thiscooperation, however,restedon two conditions: thattheAmericans, as issuerof the reservecurrency,wouldmanagetheirdomesticeconomyand theirexternalcommitments in a way thatwouldnot underminethe dollar’s value,andthattherewouldcontinueto be a largedegreeof agreement on basiceconomicandpoliticalgoalsamongthe partnerson bothsidesof the Atlantic. TheAmericancommitment to gettheirbalanceof payments undercontrol requireddifficultnegotiations with theirpartnersandcostlyinterventions in currencymarkets.However,the advantages of the systemwere considered largeenoughto offsettheinconvenience of regularconsultation. On theburdenandbenefitsof havinga reservecurrency,Secretary of TreasuryDillon wroteto Kennedy: To date,foreigncountries andtheirnationals acquirednearly$20 billionin dollar accounts. Thisis, in effect,a demandloanto us of $20 billionwhichhasallowedusto pursuepoliciesovertheyearsthatwouldhavebeenutterlyimpossiblehadnot the dollarbeena key currency.”

In a discussion with the president, Undersecretary of theTreasuryRobertV. Roosawasevenmoreexplicitwhenhe emphasised thatthe role of the dollar made it possible for usto,yearin andyearout,andapartfromsituations thatgetcompletelyout of whacksuchaswe’vehadyear in andyearout,to financeevery deficitwe may run very readily,becauseyou havethe world accustomed to holdingdollars.Whenyou run behindfor a yearyou don’thaveto negotiate a credit,theyjustholddollars.12

In addition,the U S . government alsosharedwith the Europeans a major interestin preserving the dollar-consuming securitycommitment in Europe, thoughcertainlynot for eternityandin a sizeit considered excessive. However,as longas the Europeans supported the dollartherewouldbe no imof those mediateneedto changethis situation.This was the background numerousmultilateralinitiativesthat were taken by the major industrial


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countries (includingFrance)in theearly1960sto shoreup thesystem.13 Proposalsby the EuropeanCommission (1962) or by Frenchfinanceminister Giscardd’Estaing for a European currency (1964) wereeitherignoredor dismissedas completely unrealistic.’* BoththeGermanandtheFrenchgovernmentmadeno secretof theirdisapproval for suchplans,andGiscardeven losthispostin 1966.Thus,theworkingof theinternational monetary system still restedon a basicpoliticalunderstanding amongthe countries of the transatlantic alliance. However,thepolicyof “peripheral defenses” for thedollar,whichwasdevisedby the Kennedyadministration, did not resolvethe pr0b1em.l~ In the mid-l960s,it becameincreasingly difficultto keepthebalanceof payments deficitsundercontrol.The first reasonfor this was Vietnam.In February 1965,President Johnson orderedthebombingof NorthVietnam.In Julyof thesameyearhedecidedthatanadditional contingent of fifty-thousand men wouldbe sentto SouthEastAsia.ThewarwasAmericanised andcontinued to absorbmoreandmoreof thegovernment’s attention in theyearsthatfollowed.America’sEuropeanalliesreactedwith alarmto thisdevelopment. Theyhadgreatdoubtsaboutthetheorythatthenew ColdWar borderwas in Southeast Asia and fearedthat the conflictdivertedAmericanenergies awayfromEurope,whichto themstillwastheprincipaltheatreof theEastWestconflict.16 Therefore,theywereratherdismissive whenthe Americans calledfor directhelponthebattlefield, especially sincethewarprovedto be extremely unpopular, notonlywiththe European governments butalsowith the electorate. Even the countrythat publiclysupported the VietnamWar mostemphatically did notreactto a strongcallby theJohnson government for directhelp.Askedby LBJ in January1966what contribution Germany had made,Secretary of DefenseRobertMcNamaragrumbled: “Not a damn thingexcepta hospitalship,”-althoughtheAmericans hadmadestrongeffortsto getat leasta tokencontingent of combattroops.” soonrealisedthatdirectEuropean involvement was TheU.S. government outof thequestion. However,thatledthemto insistwithgrowingvigouron cooperation in international monetarypolicy.The war efforthad led to a sharpincreasein militaryexpenditure abroad(whichhad alwaysbeena majorfactorin Americanbalanceof payments deficits).18 Evenmoredetrimentalto the externalbalancewasJohnson’s unwillingness to increase risingpublicexpenditure in connection with the taxesin orderto neutralise war and the GreatSocietyprograms. Thus,inflationstartedto undermine the dollar,PaulVolcker,Nixon’sUndersecretary of the Treasuryfor MonetaryAffairs,laterwrotethatVietnam“wasthe periodwheninflationreally gainedmomentum in the UnitedStatesandthreatened to spreadto Europe too,andif we weren’twillingto financethewar properly,thenmaybewe Anotherserious problemfor themonetary shouldn’t havefoughtit at all.”19 systemwastheseedof discordthewar plantedin theAtlanticAllianceat a

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crucialmoment.Confrontedwith Europe’sunwillingness to extenddirect in privateandCongress in public supportin Vietnam,the U.S. government increasingly questioned thecontinuation of America’stroopcommitment in Europe.*”The basic,commonpoliticalunderstanding amongEuropeans andAmericans wascomingunstuck. Furthermore, therewas the “deGaulleproblem.”In February1965,the Frenchpresident, in hiscampaignagainstAmericandomination, hadthrown down the gauntletin the monetaryfield. He denounced the transatlantic monetarysystemasan unfairdeal,whichallowedAmericato financeitsexternalcommitments andbuyup Europeanindustries by simplyprintingdollars.Therefore,he invitedall industrialcountriesto follow Franceand exchangeall of their dollarsfor gold in order to bring the systemdown.21 Nobodyfollowedhisexample,but the impression thatAmericawasnot doing enoughto bringits own housein order,thusendangering the internationalmonetarysystem,waswidespread in Europe. In 1965,the Americansrealisedthat it wasnot possibleto savethe postwar international monetarystructure by smallpiecemealsteps,especially becausetheyknew thatVietnamwaswreckingU.S. externalbalancesfor the foreseeable futureto a degreethatbetterremainedhiddento thepublic.22 A comprehensive reformwasnecessary. A majorpoliticalissuerelatingto this reformwashow sucha new systemwouldaccommodate thecall of a resurgentEuropefor a greatervoicein the creationandmanagement of internationalreserves. Thiswouldhavebeenan extremelycontested issueevenin timesof a perfectlyworkingalliance.The growingdistrustaboutfutureU S . policyin Vietnamandthe suspicion voicedin manyquartersthatWashington wasfinancingthewar by printingdollarsmadethattaskevenmoredifficult.Secretary of theTreasuryHenryFowlerhadthe ingenious ideaof proposinga standstill agreement aslongastheVietnamconflictwasgoingon: I proposethatwe give seriousconsideration to askingthe key dollar-holding

nations. . . to pledgenotto conuertdollarstheypresently holdandnotto conuert any additionaldollars[emphasis in original1that may accrueto themas longasthe Vietnamstrugglecontinues. . . .We are bearingvirtuallythe entire burdenof theVietnamconflict.We viewthisascommitment onbehalfof all free nations.We do notaskothersto seeit thisway,butwe do askthattheynotact in a mannerthatwill preventusfrommeetingourcommitments and/ordestroy the international financialinstitutions thataresucha vital partof the worldwe are attempting to defend.23

ThismeantthatEuropewouldhaveto continueextending creditto theU.S., and would have to foregoits principalelementof controlover America’s management of its reservecurrency.Instead,it was askedto trustto an unbindingpromisethat the Americans wouldmanageto controltheirdeficits of thesystem.Thereis no evidencethat in a way thatavoideda breakdown


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a formalproposalalongtheselineswasmadein early1966,but the Americansleft no doubtthat thiswasthe policythey expectedtheiralliesto follow. Indeed,hardlyeightmonthslater,a corecountryhadto decidewhether it would signsucha temporarylimitationof its monetaryauthority.In the contextof negotiations aboutthe costof Americantroopsin Germany,the U.S.sideproposedthattheFederalRepublicsigna pledgeto not exchange dollarsfor gold.Sincethe early 1960s,it had beenoneof the mostimporof monetaryhelpfor the U.S. that Bonn,in the so-called tant mechanisms offset agreements, boughtAmericanweaponsto offset the foreign exchangelossesoccasioned by theU.S. militarypresencein the FRG.24 When the Germangovernment decidedin 1966that it no longerneededto buy Americanweapons,this practiceran into enormousdifficulties.Relentless pressure by LBJ andMcNamarato continue“offset,” andthe seriousthreat of Americantroopwithdrawal,playeda considerable role in chancellor Erhard’sfall frompowerin October1966.The trilateralnegotiations at thebeginningof 1967(includingtheUnitedKingdom,whichalsohada majorbalanceof payments problemlinkedpoliticallyto theBritishtrooppresence in Germany)essentiallyconcerned the questionof whetherthe transatlantic bargainin whichtheAmericans providedmilitarysecurityandtheGermans monetarysupportwould be reaffirmedoncemore.Due to the overriding importanceof American military protection,the German government pressedBundesbank presidentKarl Blessingto agreeto what the Americanswere askingfor; he reluctantlywent alongwith governmentpolicy, and in the so-calledBlessingletter,the Bundesbank pledgedto continue supporting the dollar.25 Thisepisodeof brinkmanship withoutanydoubtcreateddeepresentment in Germany,as later remarksby Blessingshow.Blessingstatedthat he shouldhave startedcashingin dollarsfor gold at that time, until the U.S. Treasuryhadbeendrivento desperation.26 The ministers in theGermancabinet were unanimousin their criticismof Washington’s monetarypolicy; however,theyalsoagreedthattheFrenchpolicywasnotviable.27 Therefore, theystuckto thetransatlantic bargainin thehopethata quietreformof the monetarysystemmightstillbe in the cards.28 Frustrated by Americanpolicy aswell asby the rigidityof the Frenchposition,the Germansdevelopedan increasingpenchantfor unilateralactionin the monetaryfield. Frustration with the US. also ran high in otherEuropeancountries,but, apartfrom France,cooperation with theAmericans wasstillthepreferredoption.29 The Britishwere completelyweddedto the defenseof the poundas a reserve currencyandthiscausedan increasing dependence on Americanmonetary support.30 The smallerindustrialstateswerecloselylinkedeitherto the U.S. terms,andin anycaseweretooweak or to Englandin securityor economic to advocatean alternativemonetarysystem.

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Despitethe increasingly tensesituationin international financialmarkets did not starta vigorous from late 1967onward,theJohnsonadministration andacceptable programfor international monetaryreform.31 Waitingoutthe VietnamWar andthecorresponding inflationwasthestrategy, alwaysin the hopethattheEuropeans wouldcontinueto playthegame.Duringthetrilateralnegotiations, presidential advisorFrancisBatoroutlinedthethrustof the Americanpolicyat the endof theJohnson administration: Thereis no hopefor any sortof new 100 percentmilitaryoffsetdealwith the Germans.However,we may be able to get themto agreeto financialsteps whichwouldbe far morevaluable.Specifically: -thattheywill notusetheirdollars,old or new,to buy gold;-thattheywill join us in pushingthe otherEuropeans,ex-France,to agreeto the samesortof rules;-to supportus against Francein negotiations on longer-range monetaryreform;-to neutralise the militaryimbalance by buyingandholdingsecurities whichwouldcountagainstour balanceof payments deficit.If we canalsoget the Italians,Dutchandthe Belgians,aswell asthe UK, Canada, Japan,to playby suchruleswe will havenegotiatedthe world ontoa dollarstandard. It will meanrecognition of the fact playbankerof the that,for the timebeing,the US. mustnecessarily

The consequence of sucha stepwasthat we will nolongerneedto wonyaboutreasonable balanceof payments deficits. Thisarrangement will notgiveusan unlimitedprintingpress.But aslongaswe run oureconomyasresponsibly asin thepastfew years,it will permitusto live with moderatedeficitsindefinitely.33

The actualtransformation of the systemto a pure dollarstandardhappenedin March1968when,aftera heavywaveof goldspeculation, themajor industrialcountries decidedto splitup the goldmarketin an officialand a privatemarket.Belgium,Germany,Britain,Italy, the Netherlands,and Switzerland agreedto no longerdemandgoldfromtheU.S. Thetransatlantic system,however,wason thebrinkof collapsebecause Europewasincreasinglyrelegatedto a policyof merelyreactingto whattheU.S. wasdoing;Europewasunableto playa majorrole in thecomanagement of the system,a role thatcorresponded to its economic weight.Thehopesof savingthesystem concentrated on the talkson liquidityreformthathadbeeninitiatedin 1965.Theywereto resultin the so-calledSpecialDrawingRights,a formof reservecurrencythatwas to relievethe pressureon the dollar.34 However, Washingtonrefusedto accordEuropea veto right on the new reserve medium,fearingthatthiswouldgiveFrancethe abilityto blockanyAmericaninitiati~e.3~ Essentially, the U.S. wasnot readyto giveup the role of the bankerof theworld,as longasthe Europeans hadno meansto forcethem to do so.When the SDR agreementwas finallysignedin 1968,the result amountedto muchlessthana realoverhaulof thesystem.


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Thusin 1968,the transatlantic monetarybargainwasin deeptroubleand the Europeans beganto look for alternatives. Certainly,their internaldivisions,andparticularly theuncompromising positionof France,hadplayeda bigrolein thefailureof reform.Still,themajorresponsibility lay withtheUS. Lessby deliberate actionthanby neglectanddueto the inflexibilitycaused by the VietnamWar, theJohnsonadministration had allowedthe systemto disintegrate almostto a pointof no return.Theyear 1969,however,seemed to openthe prospectof a freshstart.A new president,Nixon,was installed in January; in April,themainadversary of thetransatlantic monetarysystem, de Gaulle,left thestage.Thecorequestionnowwashowthe reformof the monetarysystem(or the transitionto a new system)wouldbe managed: in a cooperative manneror in a way thatwould setbothsideson a collision course? A Transatlantic Technological Community?

The GrandDesignof a European-American transatlantic communitycontainedthe notionof progressiveness, whichin the 1960swasclearlyassociatedwith the field of hightechnology. It is thereforequitestrikinghowlimited the actualextentof technological cooperation betweenEuropeand Americawasduringthe decadeandbeyond.Whatwerethereasons? Probablythemostsensitive issuein transatlantic relations at theendof the 1950swasthe problemof Europeanparticipation in Americannuclearplanning and its accessto advancedU.S. nuclearweapons.The debateconcernednot only questions of nationalpowerand international security.It wasalsoa contestfor accessto themostprestigious technology of thetime. In thesecondhalf of thecentury,nucleartechnology wasseenasthekey for thewealthof nations.America’stop positionin everyaspectof thistechnologywasa coreelementof its preeminence in international politicallife. As a result,Washington’s partnersdepended on Americandecisions relatingto oneof the mostvital sectorsfor theirnationalwealth.No wonderthatthis situationcauseddeepapprehensions, evenduringthe honeymoon yearsof the alliance.The attemptby countriessuchas Britain,France,Germany,or Italyto forgedealswith the US. in orderto closethisyawningtechnological gapwasat thecoreof thenucleardebatein the allian~e.3~ DuringEisenhower’s presidency, thegovernment encouraged nuclearcooperationwith theallies.Collaboration with theUnitedKingdomwasin any casewell developed, thoughbesetwith misunderstandings on bothsides3’ The Britishattemptto preservetheirnuclearautonomyled,however,to increasingdependence o n American technology,particularlyregarding launchers. Nuclearsharingwith France,Germany,andthesmallermembers of the alliancewasa muchmorecontested issue,althoughthe Eisenhower administration was ready,in principle,to moveforwardin thisarea,too.38

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Doubtsin the StateDepartmentaboutthe wisdomof a policysupporting severalindependent nuclearcapabilities, particularlyif this meantGerman access to atomicweapons, led to theproposalof a nuclearforceassigned to NATO. Negotiations aboutwhatwouldlaterbe calledthe MultilateralForce (MLF) werebegunin 1960;the U S . goalwasultimatelyto givea unitedEuropea nuclearforceunderits owncontrol.TheAmericanreadiness to share know-howand resources also includedthe civil usesof nuclearenergy. Eisenhower’s Atomsfor Peaceprogramof 1953was an ambitiousproposal for thecontrolleddissemination of know-howregardingthepeacefulusesof nuclearenergy.39 In 1958,theUS. signedanagreement with EURATOM (the newlyfoundedEuropeanorganisation for collaboration in nuclearresearch), which ensuredthe supplyof Americanenricheduraniumfor Europeanreactors.However,therewas a little snagto thisdeal:mostof thosereactors were built underAmericanlicenceand depended on Americansupplyof uranium.For thisreasonFrance,whichdevelopedits own line of reactors basedon naturaluranium,sawno usein thisagreementandsooncameto considerEURATOM a failure.40 Thiswasan earlyinstanceof the mix of political rivalry, commercialinterest,and industrialcompetitionthat was to plaguetransatlantic technological cooperation all throughthe 1960s. With the adventof the Kennedyadministration, a decisivepolicychange occurred: thereadiness, in principle,of theU.S. to sharecivil andmilitarynucleartechnology wasreversed.The risksof nuclearproliferation, especially to Germany,whichpropagated an anti-status-quo policytowardthe Eastern bloc, were deemedtoo high. Initially,Kennedyand McNamarawere not sureaboutthewisdomof a strictnonproliferation policybecauseof its corrosiveeffecton the alliance41 andbecause the saleof hardwaremightbring in considerable economicbenefit,for examplebalanceof paymentsgains.42 In effect,the above-mentioned offsetagreements with Germanywereto a largeextenta deal tradingGermanmonetaryhelp for the saleof US. advancedmilitarytechnology.Nuclearweaponswere excludeddespitediscreetGermanrequests.43 Finally,however,in 1964,nonproliferation became officialgovernment policy.44 Whatwasruledout included“exchanges of informationand technologybetweenthe governments, sale of equipment, jointresearch anddevelopment activities, andexchanges betweenindustrial andcommercial organ is at ion^."^^ The shiftin policythattook placein 1961 hada verynegativeeffecton cooperation in a numberof otherfields,asthe US. ambassador in Paris,Gavin,explainedin a letterto Kennedy: Francewill spendat least$700millionto builda gaseous diffusionplantwhich will produceenricheduraniumby 1965.We sellenricheduraniumto theUnited in buildinga nuclear Kingdom.We havefailedto give Franceany assistance submarine despitesecretary Dulles’offerto do soto de Gaullein 1958.We are askingFranceto helpusin redressing ourbalanceof payments by makingmore

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militarypurchases in theUnitedStates, butwe will notselltheveryitemsFrance wantsbecausetheyare associated with modernweaponssystems.”46

Gavincitedthe dangerthatthispatternof non-cooperation mightspillover to the wholeeconomicfield. The subsequent Americandecisionto refuse thesaleof an advanced computer system, whichmighthavehelpedFrance’s nuclearprogram,madethe new Americanpolicyvery obvious.*’Though thispolicywasdirectedmainlyagainstFrance,theothermembersof the alliancereceivedno bettertreatment.In early1965,a government committee, chairedby formerDeputySecretary of DefenseGilpatric,recommended in a classifiedreportto tie the stringsattachedto all exportsrelatedto nuclear technologyeventighter.48 The MLF recededmoreandmoreinto the backgroundandwaskeptaliveonlyby theneedto assuage Germany.The longtermobjectivewasto forceeventheBritishoutof thenuclearbusiness, or at leastto providea NATO coverfor theiratomicarsenal. Soonthe Americans startednegotiations with the SovietUnionto implementthisrestrictivepolicyon a globallevel.The nucleartestban treatyof August1963was the first step.However,far moreimportantwas the Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) of 1968.Non-nuclear membersof the alliancerealisedthatthistreatywasdestined to keepthempermanently out of the nuclearweaponsbusiness. But apartfrom the military-political aspectsof the possession of nuclearweapons,anotherseriousissuewas technology. WouldtheNPT alsoinhibitthespreadof nucleartechnology in thecivil field? Wouldit endanger, at somelaterpoint,the continuation of the 1958agreement betweenEURATOM and the United Statesthat presentlyran until 1975?49 Thisturnedout to be oneof the majorworriesof countries suchas GermanyandItaly,whichwerecompletely dependent onAmericandeliveriesof enricheduranium.Very quickly,thesecountries startedto look for alternatives. Thus,in this key technological area,the NATO allieshad turnedaway fromrealcollaboration duringthe 1960s.Thissituationwasto spillover into otherfields.An importantcasein pointis thedevelopment of advanced military technology.The prioritythe PentagonunderMcNamaraaccordedto the saleof militaryequipmentfor balanceof paymentsreasonsimpeded everypossibility of large-scale technological cooperation betweenthe U.S. andEurope.The hugeprojectof theF-104GStarfighter, theprincipalfighter of thealliancebuiltfrom 1959on underAmericanlicenceby a groupof Europeancountries, foundno successor in the 1960~.~O On the contrary,the Americanpolicywasto “movepromptlyto makesurethatEuropeancountriesplaceordersnow for U.S. manufactured equipment, ratherthanmake plansto meettheirneedsfrom theirown production or from otherforeign sources.”51 The salesoffensivewas mainlydirectedtowardGermany,the mostimportantarmsmarketof the 1960s.In effect,Germanarmedforces

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becameincreasingly dependent on U S . weapons. Theneedto continue the offsetagreements sharplycurtailedGermanfundsfor sharedweaponsdevelopments with otherpartners.52 Despitethe enormous amounts involved in thesedeals,no successful jointGerman-American projectwasagreedto, The onlysignificant project,thejointdevelopment of a mainbattletankfor the 1970s(agreedto in 19641,wasstoppedin 1970dueto themutuallack of fundsandinterest.53 Thiswasno exception: therewereno majorAmericancollaboration projectswith otherallieseither.The commercial interest of thearmsindustryandthePentagon, aswell asthelackof politicalinitiawerethe majorfactorsin the conspicuous abtive in the U S . government, senceof Americanproposals. Apartfromnuclearweapons, spacetechnology wasthe mostprestigious betweenEurofield of scientific exploitsin the 1960s.Again,collaboration peanand Americanprograms was extremelysketchy.Althoughthe Europeanshadsetup a European SpaceResearch Organisation (ESRO)in 1962,54 it wastheSovietUnionto which,in September 1963in a speechbeforethe UN GeneralAssembly, Kennedyproposed a jointeffortin spaceresearchwith few practicalconsequence^.^^ In meetings betweenLBJ andthe German chancellor in 1965and 1966,the desirability of joint projectsin space research wasgivenprominentmention;however,thisclearlyderivedfrom theforeignexchange cost Americanhopesto explorenewwaysof offsetting of American troopsin Europe,andthustheideawasnotpursued whenit becameclearthatthe prospects of commercial andmonetarybenefitfor the U.S. were The closelinksbetweenthe nuclearandthe spaceprogramlimitedtheavailableoptionsanyway.57 Americanrestrictions ontheexportof key technologies meantthatoffersby theJohnson administration to expandits cooperation with ELDO (European LauncherDevelopment Organisation) werereceivedrathercoollyin Europe.58 Theseexamples are representative of the generaltrend.In 1966,during severalOECD meetings, the Europeans tookup the question of thewidening technological gap betweenAmerica and Europe.Their delegates lamentedthe restrictiveAmericanpolicywith regardto technological exportsandexpressed thehopethatthispolicywouldbe revisedsothata kind of transatlantic technological community mightdevelop.Italy tooka muchpublicised initiativeat NATO andproposed a technological MarshallPlan.59 However,theseattempts cameto naught.TheAmericanview wasthatonly if theEuropeans were“prepared [to]makeprogress in economic integration, Kennedyroundandon monetaryreform,”couldprogress be madein their obtainingnew technology.60 Thispolicywasreaffirmedat the top level of the StateDepartment: “a technological subsidy would,I think,be doubtful wisdom,sinceit mightserveto perpetuate bad Europeanpractices. Moreover,a substantial partof our favourable tradebalancewith the worlddependson our technological superiority andwe shouldnot give it awayfor


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nothing.”61 In a 1967memorandum for theNationalSecurityCouncilthispositionwasreaffirmed: We cannotaffordto seeourinternational strength reduced furtherthroughcontinueddeficits.. . . Correction of thisbalanceof payments gapbetweenNorth

AmericaandWesternEuropeis of muchgreaterimportance thana reductionof the “technological gap”whichwouldwork in the reversedirection,enlarging the existingimbalance betweenthe two areas.. . . Thus,we shouldnot encourage the strengthening of Europe,andespecially thatof the EEC, until the EEC demonstrates that it can carryout the responsibilities of a surplusarea

wiselyandco-operatively.6’

Thestrainsin thetransatlantic monetarysystemspiltoverto theareaof technologicalcooperation impedingprogress in thisfield. An additionalproblemwasthedifferentrelationship betweenstateandindustryin U S . andEuropeansociety.The decade-long struggleaboutthe organisation of Intelsat,a worldwideregulatoryregimefor telecommunication is a goodexample.Foundedon Americaninitiativein 1964,Inby satellites, telsatwas managedin its firstyearsby a privateAmericancompany(Comsat),createdspecifically for thispurposeby the US. government. However, the Europeans wereapprehensive thatIntelsatwouldmakethe creationof Europeansatellitesvery difficultbecauseit was socloselylinkedwith industrialinterests. In fact,Intelsatordersfor the construction of satellites and to Americanfirms.This,of course, theircomponents wentalmostexclusively tendedto enlargethe alreadyexistingtechnological gapin thisfield.63The Europeansdemandedthat Comsatbe replacedby an intergovernmental bodyin whichEuropeans andAmericans hadequalvotingrights.TheAmericans,however,refusedto accedeto thisrequest.This reflectedthe Americanapproachto the management of high technology in whichgovernment agencies (usuallythe Pentagon)providedinitiativeaswell asstart-upfunds, and lateron becamethe main clients.However,the development, control, and marketingof high-technologyproductswas left to private firms, whereasin Europethe links betweenthe governmentand (often stateowned)firmsweremuchcloser,particularlyin high-techsectors. American potentialcompetitors by collaborating firms were not eagerto strengthen with them. Thus, a mix of competitivestrategies,commercialconsiderations, the Americanbalanceof payments situation,andfinallythe feelingthatthe US. did not havemuchto gainfrom extendedcooperation with smallcountries, was responsible for the lack of Americaninterestin the development of a technological communitywith the Europeans. Kennedy,in his Philadelphia speech, hadspokenof a UnitedEuropeasa possible partnerof theUS. In the technological field,a unitedEuropeseemedratherremoteas longas France and Britainpursuedan expensivestrategyof privilegingnationalprograms.

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However,alreadyin the mid-1960sthe tide was turningagainstnational autonomy-but alsoagainstcooperation with the UnitedStates.Facedby America’s unresponsiveness andby theescalating costof theirnationalchampionsin hightechnology, oneEuropean countryaftertheotherturnedto an alternative solutionto the technological problem:European cooperation, directedexplicitlyagainstAmericansuperiority.

THE AMERICAN CHALLENGEAND THE REAFFIRMATION OF EUROPE TheHagueSummit1969andthe Plan for a European MonetaryUnion A sighof reliefwasaudibleall through Europe whenRichardNixontook overfromLBJ.It wasexpectedthatthe new president wouldendthe fatal involvement in Vietnamand restoreEuropeto its formercentralplacein Americandiplomacy. In fact,thestartof the new administration wasauspicious.Rightafterhisinauguration, Nixonannounced thathe intendedto improverelations with Europe.He mentioned in particular technological quest i o n ~ In . ~ February * 1969,he touredEuropean capitals with themessage that the new administration wouldfightagainstcongressional initiatives for a reductionof theAmericanmilitarycommitment in Europe.He alsoannounced thathe wasreadyto talk with the Europeans abouttheircomplaints in the monetary area.65 However,thesepositivesignswereillusory.As it turnedout,with thedepartureof theJohnson administration, thestillundecided contest withinthe U.S. government betweenadvocates of the transatlantic communityand thosewhooptedfor a moreunilateral policywaswonby thelatter.A major diplomaticeffortto restorethe privilegedpartnership with Europewasnot part of the new administration’s strategicconcept.Nixon’scoreobjective wasto regainfor Americaits freedomof actionin the pursuitof its national in a moreinterdependent transatlantic interests insteadof gettingentangled community. The UnitedStateswouldceaseto assume unnecessary responsibilities, pursuegreatpowerdiplomacyandleaveit to regionalpowersto sortout regionalproblems.@ Europe,in particular,shouldconcentrate on its own internalproblems. This partof Kissinger’s “Yearof Europe”speech was particularlygallingfor the E~ropeans.~’ It explainswhy Germany’s Ospoliti&in its essence a reformulation of Germany’s nationalgoalsandan attemptto gainfreedomof maneuver fortheFederalRepublic-was regarded verysceptically by Washington. East-Westdiplomacy wastheprerogative of theU.S. Othercountries were“welcome to participate” in theEast-Westdialogue,butthey should notplaytheroleof initiators.@ Alreadyin November


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1969,one monthafterBrandthad beenelectedchancellor, the American government wastellingtheGermans that“things arehappening toofast”and thattherewaswidespread disquietin Washington regarding theactivities of thenewgovernment.@ For Nixon,Europewasbutoneelementin a globalbalanceof power,and not necessarily a privilegedpartner.If Americaninterests conflictedwith thoseof Europe,Americawoulduseits full weightinsteadof embarking on long,tortuous negotiations with an oftendiscordant chorusof Europeans. The Nixon administration alsodid not receivewith enthusiasm the reaffirmationof the Europeancommunity, whichwasto be sostronglyaccentuatedin thesecond half of 1969.Theimmediate worrywasthatEuropewould developintoa protectionist bloc,comprising not onlythe Six but,by concludinga seriesof preferential agreements withAfricanandAsiancountries, extending beyondthe bordersof Europe.70 Certainly,the Europeans were stillimportantalliesinsofarastheywerevital to counterbalance the Soviets (afterNixon’sChinatrip thisfunctionwasreducedtoo).BeyondEast-West politics,theEuropeans weresimplyregarded asrivals.TheNixondoctrine’s emphasis onthefutureunwillingness of Americato shoulder “everyburden” spiltoverto the monetaryand technological field. SinceKennedy’s times, Americangovernments andtheCongress portrayed thesupportof themonetarysystemasa burdentheywereassuming for thebenefitof theWestern world.The consequence of the new policywasthatthissupport wasto be stoppedandthat,in casethe Europeans had a problemwith the resulting dollarglut,it wastheirresponsibility to developremedies. Similarly,if they hada problemwith theirtechnological inferiority,it wastheirtaskto reform theirindustrial structures in orderto becomecompetitive. The new policywasnowheremorevisiblethanin the monetaryfield,a formercrownjewelof transatlantic cooperation. The coreobjective wasto regainnationalautonomy in monetary policy,by flagrantunilateralactionif necessary.’lNixon was not interestedin multilateralnegotiations in the framework of theBrettonWoodsinstitutions. His Secretary of Treasury Connallywasfundamentally of theopinionthat“foreigners areoutto screwus. Our job is to screwthemfirst.”’*A recentlydeclassified 1971letterof Connallyto Nixonshowsthebasicoutlook.He warnedthat“thereis a strongelementof thinkingwithinEuropethatwouldtakeadvantage of weakness or clumsiness on ourpartto promotetheCommonMarketnotasa partnerbut asa rival economic bloc,competing vigorously with thedollarandreducing influence froma considerable or shutting out,asbestit can,US. economic portionof the At thesametime,he exhorted Nixonto putpressure onchancellor Brandtduringhisforthcoming visit;Brandtwastobe told“that thecontinuation of Germany’s present policyof holdingdollarsandnotbuying goldis absolutely fundamental to US.-FRG relation^."^^ Thisrecommendationwasparticularly delicateinsofaras theU.S. wasalreadypreparing for

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a stepthatwouldresultin a drasticreductionin the valueof the European dollarreserves: If thingscometo the passof a U.S. suspension of goldsalesandpurchases, we shoulddo all we can-both substantively andcosmetically-tomakeit appear thatothergovernments haveforcedthe actionon us.We wantto portraysuspensionasa lastresortandto presenta publicimageof a cool-headed governmentresponding to ill-conceived, self-defeating actionsof others.75

Thingscameto that passthree monthslater,when, on 15 August1971, Nixon, without any consultation with the allies,closedthe dollar-goldwindowand imposeda 10 percentsurtaxon all U S . imports.The transatlanticmonetarysystemwas dead,and this causedgrowingrifts in the allianceanda rapid lossin the controlof statesover financialmarkets.This wasnot inevitable;it happenedbecauseof the absenceof the politicalwill on the partof the corecountryeitherto preservethe systemor to managea cooperative transitionto a new international financialstructure. It alsohappenedbecauseof the inabilityof Europeduringthe 1960sto reacha commonstance,whichmighthaveforcedtheU.S. to reconsider itspolicy.76 At the endof the decade,the Europeans embarkedon the longroadtowardEuropeanmonetaryintegration. Duringthe HagueSummitMeetingin December1969,the EC membercountries announced theirintentionto create a commonEuropeancurrency.77 At the samemeeting,they invitedthe UnitedKingdomto join thecommunity. By accepting theinvitation,London wasa senalsoaccepted thegoalof monetaryunion.The Haguedeclaration sationalandunexpected leapforwardin thehistoryof Europeanintegration. It hasto be recalledthatin 1967and1968,theUK stillstuckto theworldrole of sterling,Franceshowedno signsof abandoning its policyof monetary autonomy,and Germanywas torn betweenthe continueddefenseof the dollar-goldsystemanda morenationalist monetarypolicy.The explanation for the rapidreorientation is foundin theAmericanmonetarychallenge.By takingan attitudeof benignneglecttowardthe dollar glut, the US. was renegingon the essentialconditionof the transatlantic bargainandpermitteda freeingof financialmarkets,whichturnedout to be extremelydisruptive to Europeandomesticeconomies. It alsounderminedany attemptto pursuea policyof nationalmonetaryautonomyin Europe.The increasing mobilityof capitalandtheabsence of a politicalwill andactivityon a worldwide level to controlthe corresponding effectsmadeautonomous policies increasingly costlyfor the Europeans. The mostspectacular expression of the futility of nationalmonetaryauof 1968.Priorto the meeting, tonomywas the Bonn monetaryconference massivespeculative capitalhad fled from Britainand Franceto Germany. Facedby a drasticlossof theirreserves, whichhadbeenusedto defendthe exchangevalue of their currencies, both Franceand Britainmassivelyde-

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mandeda revaluation of theDM. PrimeMinisterWilsoncalledin theGerman ambassador, HerbertBlankenhorn, in the middleof the nightto impresson himtheneedfor an immediateactionby theFRG.78TheFrenchwereno less outspoken. In May 1968,studentand workerunresthad underminedthe Frenchcurrency.In November,Frenchreserveswere reducedto about50 percentof theirvaluebeforethecrisis.79 Mostof thespeculative moneywent to Germany,which,according to France,for no legitimate reasonstuckto an undervaluedcurrency.On 9 November1968, Prime MinisterCouve de Murville,in a letterto Chancellor Kiesinger, warnedtheGermangovernment of the graveconsequences of continuedinactivity.80 Despitethispressure andthefactthattheUS. joinedthechorusof thedemandersat the Bonn conference, the FRG was not willing to take the reof Frenchfrancdevaluation, questedstep.By speculating on the necessity FinanceMinisterStrauss evenignitednew speculation againstthe battered Frenchcurrency.The prideof de Gaullerenderedit impossible for him to acceptdefeat,and,afterthe conference, he refusedto devalue.However, thisheroicact couldhardlyhide the factthatthe monetaryconference had clearlydemonstrated the failureof de Gaulle’spolicy.The idea of national autonomyhadbeenseverelyundermined, andthereverberations of theausteritymeasures, whichwereadoptedto enableFranceto sustainthe franc, had a huge impacton many areasof Frenchpolicy.This also included France’sambitioustechnological programs. In 1969 the Frenchbalanceof paymentsremainedat the mercyof the Bonngovernment, whichwaspursuingan increasingly unilateralmonetary policy.The Frenchrealisedthattheyhadnot onlybeenunableto dethrone the dollar,but endedup in a situationin whichtheywere at the mercyof Germandecisions (or nondecisions), at leastas longasbothcountriespursueda policy of monetaryautonomy.In addition,the monetaryturmoil threatened to destroythe CommonAgricultural Policy,oneof the coreobjectivesof France’sEuropeanpolicy.Thisrealisation pavedthe way for the acceptance of the Europeansolution,whichbecamegovernment policyafter de Gaullesteppedback in April 1969. It was pushedin particularby Valkry Giscardd’Estaing, who becamefinanceministerin the new French governmentof GeorgesPompidou.81 The questionwas whetherthe Germanswouldfinallyabandonthetransatlantic systemandtheirnewunilateral strategyandagreeto the Europeanization of theirstablecurrency. Oncemore,the Bonnmonetaryconference playeda centralrole in this context.It madevery clearthata monetarypolicybasedmainlyon narrow considerations of the FederalRepublic’s nationalinterests wouldleadto an increasing alienationof its mostimportantpartners.Furthermore, successive speculative wavesin 1969hadshownthatthe pursuitof an anti-inflationary policyunderconditions of increased capitalmobilityandrapidlydecreasing politicalcontrolof financialmarketswasextremelydifficult.And finally,the

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Frenchdevaluation of August1969andtheGermanrevaluation two months of oneof themostimportantpillaterthreatened to leadtothedisintegration larsof Germanforeignpolicy,the EC. Althoughthe Bundesbank andlarge partsof thegovernmental bureaucracy stillhopedfor a reformof thetransatlanticsystem,the politicalleadership considered the chances for sucha reform increasingly sceptically,particularlyin view of the passivityof the Nixon teamin international monetarypolicy. Thekey figurein thiscontextis Willy Brandt.His mostimportantproject Theconceptwasbasedon a long-range perspective leading was Ostpolitik. to thereduction of thehugeinfluenceof thesuperpowers in Europe.”However,the goalwas not Germanunilateralism. A strengthening of European institutions, whichwould be widenedto includeBritain,was an essential to Ostpolitik. The new government in Franceandits proposal complement for a summitof the EC headsof government in late 1969openeda realistic chancefor a hugestepforwardin thisfieldbeforeformaltalksof the Brandt government with the Easterncountries hadevenstarted.TradingBritishEC membership for largeconcessions to Francein the agricultural domainassuredthesuccess of thesummitandendedthelongstagnation of theEC during thepreviousyears.However,Brandtalsowaslookingfor a projectthat wouldprovideEuropewith a positiveincentivefor deeperintegration. Virtuallydaysbeforethe HagueSummitbegan,Brandtseizedon the ideaof a UnEuropeanmonetaryunionthatalsofoundthe approvalof porn pi do^.^^ derthechairmanship of theprimeministerof Luxembourg, PierreWerner,a high-levelcommitteebeganto work on the stepsthat were necessary to achievethisambitiousproject.It presented its final reportalreadyoneyear later.In the form of the WernerPlan,the EC countriesdisassociated themselvesfromthereformof thetransatlantic systemasthefinalgoalof theirinternationalmonetarypolicy.The difficultiesthat lay aheadon the way toward a Europeancurrencywere certainlyunderestimated at the time; however,theideawasthere,andalthoughthirtyyearspasseduntilit wasimplemented,monetaryunionwas to remainthe ultimateobjectiveof Europeanmonetarypolicy. It wasno accidentthatthefinaldeclaration of theHaguesummitalsocontaineda paragraphon technological cooperation, althoughit did not have the symbolicandpoliticalsignificance of the monetaryproject.Disillusionmentwith the Americansandthe hugecostsof the attemptto developnationalcapabilities in hightechnology forcedtheEuropeans to seriously considertheEuropeanroad. Towardsa EuropeanHigh-TechCommunity?

We haveseenhow initiativesfor a closerandmoresystematic collaboracountries withtheUnitedStatesfailed.However,by thelate tionof European


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1960s,it alsobecameclearthatin mostfieldsof advanced technology, single European stateshadno chanceof competing successfully with America. Thisquicklydeveloped intoa majorpoliticaltopic.On 5 July1966,the formerGermandefense ministerFranz-Josef StrauBwrotea longletterto Chanin adcellorErhardin whichhe decriedthe extentof Americaninvestment vancedsectors of European industry. He wasalsocriticalof thefactthatthe FederalRepublic wasbuyingmostof itsmodernweaponryin America,thus undermining any chancefor successful European cooperation in thisfield. According to StrauB,Americantechnological superiority in all important sectors,backedby a cheapdollarthatallowedUS. firmsto buyup European industries, threatened “toturnEuropeintoan intellectual andscientific vacwas thatoneyearlater,StrauBalsowrotethe foreword ~ u m . It ”~ * nosurprise to theGermaneditionof Servan-Schreiber’s best-seller Le D6fi um6ricuin, in whichServan-Schreiber madea passionate callforEuropean collaboration in the faceof Americantechnological andmanagerial superiority. Otherwise, Europewould declineto the statusof an Americancolony.ServanSchreiber’s majorexamplewasthefateof the European computer industry, whichwasaboutto be completely dominated by theAmericans.85 Thebook wasa hugesuccess andEuropean governments, whichhadbeenthinking alongthesamelines,quicklytookup thecall. As earlyas1964,theFrenchgovernment commissioned a reportthatcame to similarconclusioms6 Franceproposedthe creationof an intergovernmentalEuropean bodythatwasto explorepossibilities for technological cooperation. The EC councilsetup a high-levelworkinggroup,theMarkchal group.TheGermanforeignministrynotedwithsatisfaction thatwiththisinitiativeEuropehadembarked on a newfieldof commona~tivity.~’ However, it soonturnedout that ultimatelyde Gaulle’sFranceclearlypreferrednationalstrategies for the mostpromising technologies. Anotherproblemthat impededall progress in thiscommittee wasthattheconflictbetweenFrance andthe otherfive memberstates aboutUK membership in theEC spiltover Britainstillhadthe mostadvanced technointotheworkof thecommittee. logicalsectorof all European countries andit washardto imaginehowEuropecouldconfronttheAmericanchallenge withoutits potential. However, deGaulledidnotbend.He suspected thatproposals to includeBritainin Europeantechnological projects werejuststrategies to getit intotheEC by the backdoor,and that the Britishwould ultimatelypreferAmericanoffersif thosewereforthcoming.88 In February1968,the Dutchblockedfurtherdeliberations in theMarkchalgroup,whichhadachieved almostno results.89 TheBritishfor theirparthadgivenclearsignsthattheywereinterested in Europeancooperation. In November1966,PrimeMinisterHaroldWilson “tocreatea newtechnological community to poolwithEuropethe proposed enormous technological inventiveness of BritainandotherEuropean countries,to enableEuropeon a competitive basisto becomemoreself-reliant

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andneitherdependent on importsnor dominated from outside,but basing itselfon the creationof competitiveindigenous Europeani n d u s t r i e ~He .”~~ repeatedthisproposal, whichwasenthusiastically backedby thesmallerEuropeancountries,frequentlyin the following months,echoingServanSchreiber: [Tlhereis nofuturefor Europe,or forBritain,if we allowAmericanindustry, and so to dominatethe strategic growthindustries of our indiAmericanbusiness vidualcountries, thatthey,andnot we, are ableto determinethe paceanddirectionof Europe’s industrialadvance.. . . [Tlhisis the roadnot to partnership he10try.9~ but to an industrial

Until thenBritainhad pursueda policythat privilegednationaltechnological independence and,if thiswasnot possible,collaboration with theh e r icans(a strategyfollowedby almostall Europeangovernments until 196S).92 Thefew projectsit hadundertaken withEuropean countries suchastheconstructionof the supersonic aircraftConcorde and the fighterJaguarwith A seriesof defeatson world Francehadbeenratherfrustrating experiences. marketsfor British products,which were in competitionwith American goods,led to a reorientation of this policy.Instances in which the United Statesrefusedto sell the UK advancedtechnologyfor commercialreasons castadditionaldoubton thespecialrelati0nship.~3 Furthermore, a longseries of failureswith nationaldevelopments of hightechnology toolsled the UK to abandonthe strategyof nationalautarchy.In 1965,the government approvedthe Plowdenreporton the Britishaircraftindustry,which recommendedthat Britainshouldabandonits attemptto pursuean independent aeronautic programandthatit shouldinsteadcollaborate withtherestof Europein thisarea.94 The majorreasonfor the new openness towardEurope, itstechnological expertisea majorbarhowever,wasthattheUK considered gainingchipin itscampaign to entertheEuropean c ~ m r n u n i t i eThis s . ~strat~ egyfailed.Yet, evenafterdeGaullehadmadeclearin late 1967thathe was not preparedto admit Britaininto the community,the idea of intensified technological cooperation with the restof the EC waspursued.96 A seriesof importantprojectswere initiated.Amongthe mostsignificant of thosewere of a gascentrifuge for the production of enriched the plannedconstruction uraniumandthe development of a MultipleRoleCombatAircraft(MRCA). The formerprojectwasa consequence of Europeandoubtsregardingthe long-termsupplyof Europeancivil nuclearplantswith enricheduranium from the US. Already in April 1967, the Germangovernmenthad approachedLondonfor a solutionto thisproblem.Wouldthe Britishgovernof a Europeanenrichmentplant?” ment be interestedin the construction Germanywasparticularly keenon sucha projectbecause first,thedevelopment of a domesticenrichmentcapacitywas too expensive;second,the


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Frenchroadhadled to nothing because the enrichment plantat Pierrelatte wastoo closelyinvolvedwith the Forcede Frappe;and,mostimportantly, In July the completedependence on U.S. deliverieshad to be reduced.9s 1968,the UK proposed a trilateralworkinggroupfor the development of a uraniumenrichment plantthatshouldalsoincludethenether land^.^^ In November1969,the threecountries reachedan agreement. Negotiations regardingthe participation of Italy andBelgiumstarted.All participants consideredthe project as “of an economic,technologicaland political importance . . . comparable to EURATOM.”1oo Francewasinitiallyverycriticalof theseproposals. Whende Gaullewasin Washington for Eisenhower’s funeralin 1969,he explicitlyreferredto the projectin his talkswith Nixon andwarnedthatit mighthelpGermanygetcloserto thenuclearclub.lO’ This attitudechangedonlywith the reorientation of Frenchpolicyafterthe generalhadleft the stage. A similarpatterndeveloped regardingthe secondproject,theMRCA. In 1968,a groupof Europeancountries (reducedin the end to Britain,Germany,andItaly)agreedto jointlydevelopa European fighterasreplacement for the Sta~ighter.lo2 The projectwasextremelyambitious andplaguedby conflictsaboutthefinalconfiguration aswell asunexpected costexplosion. Nonetheless, the governments stuckto it until completion. Oncemore,the Frenchmadeit clearthattheydid notapproveof theseprojects, mainlybecausetheyweredeveloping a similaraircraftthattheyhopedto sellto other European countries. lo3 The Frenchmistrustof Britain,however,was not unfounded, because Britain’scommitment to joint Europeanprojectsremainedambiguous. In April 1968,for example, theUnitedKingdomsuspended payments for ELDO, foundedin the early1960swith the aim of developing a launcherfor European satellite^.'^^ Thiswasa hardblowfortheEuropean spaceeffortbecause Britainhadbeenthemostimportant contributor. Thewholeprojectentered a deepcrisis.Afterthelunarlandingin 1969,theAmericans invitedtheEuropeansto participate in the development of a reusablespacetransportation system(thelaterspaceshuttle)anda permanent stationin space.However, theyrefusedto guarantee theavailability of Americanlaunching facilitiesfor satellites thatwerenot operatedwithinthe frameworkof 1ntel~at.l~~ Again, commercial interestimpededtransatlantic cooperation from the very start. This weddedthe Europeans together,and they carriedon with their own launcherdevelopment. In the mid-l970s,Britain,which,dueto closeconnections of Britishfirmsto ELDO, hadneverbeencompletely excluded, officially rejoinedthe effort.In 1979,the first Europeanrocket,Ariane,was launched intotheorbit,andit becamea serious competitor for theAmerican spaceshuttle.The development of a European jetliner,Airbus,alsoshowed with France Britain’sinitialambiguity. In 1967,it had signedan agreement andthe FRG for the development of an alternative to the almostcomplete

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US. dominance oncivil aircraftmarkets. As earlyas1970,Britaincancelled its participation. Oncemore, despite manydoubtsasto thecommercial viability of theaircraft,FranceandGermanylabouredon,carryingtheprojectto final

success (togetherwith Britain,whichreentered in 1979).lo6 All of theseprojects sharethreecharacteristics. First,theywereexplicitlydirectedagainstUS. dominance. Second,theydemonstrated thegreatdifficulty of reconciling notionsof nationalautonomywith the necessity of collective projects, particularly in thefirstyears.In 1968andearly1969,theMRCA,Airbus,andELDO wereall in deepcrisis,andit wasonlydueto the reaffirmation of Europeancooperation in 1969and 1970 that they surviveddespite thosegreatdifficulties. In 1970,technological cooperation hadbecomean issuethatwasdiscussed regularly at thelevelof headsof statein Europe.Third, all of theseprojectswere, in the end,successful. Thus,the late 1960sand early1970swasa decisiveperiodfor Europeancollaboration. It wasnotonly thoseintergovernmental projectsthatweregivena newvigour.Collaboration oncommunity levelalsoreceivedrenewedimpetus. TheMarkcha1groupwas reactivated and,in November1971,a programfor Cooperation in Science and Technology(COST) was adopted,which was to coordinate joint European projectsandeventuallytranscend thenarrowconfinesof the EC. On the whole,the courseof technological andmonetarycooperation in thetransatlantic allianceexhibiteda similarpattern.Europeancountries had threebasicoptions-transatlantic cooperation, nationalautonomy,andEuropeanization-whereasthe UnitedStateshad the choicebetweenthe first twopossibilities. The analysis hasshowna cleartrendin Americanpolicytoward increasing autonomyin the periodstudiedhere.The Europeans, for theirpart,movedawayfrom a policyof favoringtransatlantic andnational solutions towarda markedpreference for Europeancollaboration.

THE PRICEOF DISUNITY In 1973,in an editedvolumeon the foreignpolicyof the Nixon administration,RobertOsgoodpredicteda process which,as thischapterhasshown, had alreadybeencompleted: “If the UnitedStatesabandons its role, it will probablybe by neglectratherthandesign;andit will resultin theerosionof the presentstructure of relationships, not in the construction of an~ther.’”~’ What hasbeenarguedhereis thatin the field of moneta y policy,a framework of transatlantic cooperation consisting of a seriesof tacit rulesand commonassumptions abouthow mutualproblems wereto be tackledcame unstuck.Regarding technoloo, aftertimideffortsduringthe Eisenhower period,sucha frameworkdid not evendevelopandno majorinitiativeswere undertaken in the 1960sandearly1970s,despitethe factthat it wasa time of enormoustechnological advance.Whereasduringthe 1960sthe Euro-


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peansgraduallycameto appreciate theroletechnological andmonetarycollaborationmightplay in fosteringa closerrelationship betweentheircountriesand in enhancing competitiveness as well as theirdomesticeconomic welfare,theUnitedStatesdecidedit wouldbe betteroff pursuinga moreindependent policy,renouncing-not in theory,but in practice-the concept of a closetransatlantic partnership. Thereasons weremanifold.Themostimportantonewas thatthe UnitedStates,batteredby Vietnamandits balance of paymentsdeficits,perceiveditselfto be in a kind of decline,andsawin thepreservation of its nationalautonomy, to thelargestdegreepossible, the bestway to reversethistrend.Certainly,dealingwitha disunitedEuropewas a difficultproblemfor Americandiplomacy.Privilegedrelationswith single Europeancountriessuchas they existedwith Britain and as they were wishedby GeneraldeGaullewereextremelydivisivefor the alliance.However,a moredeterminedeffort,particularlyafterde Gaullehad left, might havepreventedthe mutualdisenchantment of the early1970s. Thus, around1969, in monetaryas well as in technological matters,a transatlantic outlookwas replacedby a Europe-centered view in mostEuropeancountries. The resultof the Americanchallenge washighlighted by the decisions of theEuropean summitin TheHaguein December1969.European, not transatlantic, cooperation wasgiventop priorityin the future.Of course, thiswasa muddyprocess withcountless setbacks andnumerous attempts duringthe 1970sto assertoncemoretheautonomy of nationalgovernments or to strikenewbargains with theUnitedStates, whichstillhada lot to offer-most importantly militarysecurity. In a short-term perspective, theEuropeanization of thelate 1960sandearly1970sevenmayseema failure,particularly regarding the fateof the plansfor monetaryunion.However,the ultimateobjective of Europeancooperation remainedparamount for a hugepartof thepolitical establishment (with the exceptionof the UK) andin the publicimagination. Whathappened wasa markedchangein theideological preferences of theEuropeancountries regarding international cooperation, evenif theactualresults of thischangewereto emergeonlymuchlater.In thissense, theyears1965to 1973were decisivefor the futurecourseof Europe,andthe Americanchallengedid playa very considerable role in thisprocess. It is probablyinstructive to speculate on whatwouldhavehappenedhadthe UnitedStatesbeen morewillingto pursuereal collaboration with Europein the 1960s.Perhaps theEuropeanUnionaswe now knowit wouldnothavecomeintoexistence.

1. JohnF. Kennedy,PublicPapers(PP) (Washington: GPO, 19621,538. 2. Text of the speech, in Departmentof StateBulletin(May 14, 1973), 593-598. For the Europeanreaction,seeRonaldE. Powaski,i'heEntanglingAlliance:7be

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U S . and European Security,195@1993(Westport:GreenwoodPress,19941, 102-104. 3. ChristianHacke, Die Ara Nixon-Kissinger (Stuttgart:Klett-Cotta,1983), 178-179. B e UnhingedAlliance(New York: Harper& Row, 1975). 4. J. RobertSchaetzel, 5 . “Western Europe had to remainan ally becauseits safetyand prosperity providedtheUnitedStateswith essential trumpcardsin dealingwith theUSSR,but eventhis suggested that an end-in-itselfhad becomea tool.”StanleyHoffmann, “UnevenAllies,”in CriticalChoices for AmericansWZZ; Western Europe,ed. David Landes(Lexington,Mass.:Heath,1977),64. 6. Seefor exampleSeymourM. Hersh,B e Price of Power(New York: Summit Books,1985);SeyomBrown,B e Crisesof Power(New York: ColumbiaUniversity Mass.: Press,1979);RobertS. Litwak,Dktenteand the Nixon Doctrine(Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress),1984. 7. Meyer-Lindenberg memorandum, “Italianinitiativeregarding international cooperationin the technological field,”September 29, 1966,GermanForeignOffice Archives(Politisches Archiv-Auswartiges Amt; henceforthcited as “PA-AA”),I A 6/83, Berlin. seethe articleby MarcTrachtenberg andChrisGehrz 8. On the latterargument, in thisvolume. 9. In fact,the monetarysystemof the postwarperioddifferedin importantaspects,particularly regardingthe corerole of the dollar,fromwhat hadbeenagreed at BrettonWoods.SeeRonaldI. McKinnon,“TheRulesof the Game:International JournalofEconomic Literature(March1993),1-44. Moneyin HistoricalPerspective,” 10. On the notionof a bargain,seealsoBenjaminCohen,“TheRevolution in AtlanticEconomicRelations: A BargainComesUnstuck,” in B e U S .and Western Europe,ed. WolframHanrieder(Cambridge, Mass.:Winthrop,19741,116-118.A very gooddiscussion of theselinksis Haroldvan B. Cleveland,B e AtlanticIdea and its EuropeanRivals(New York: McGraw-Hill,l966),72-87. 11. Memorandum of 11 February1963,US. Departmentof State,ForeignRelationsof the UnitedStates(FRUS) 1961-63,9: 164. 12. Meetingoninternational monetaryrelations, August20, 1962,tapeno.14,John F. KennedyLibrary(JFKL). 13. Seethe articleby FrancisGavinandErin Mahanin thisvolume. 7beRoadtoMaastricht;Negotiating 14. KennethDysonandKevinFeatherstone, Economicand MonetaryUnion(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1999), 101-102, 274-276. 15. On thispolicy,by oneof its principalarchitects, seeRobertRoosa,B e Dollar and WorldLiquidity(New York: RandomHouse,1967). 16. Alfred Grosser,B e WesternAlliance:European-American Relationssince 1945(London:Macmillan,1980),237-243. 17. For the U.S. request,seeU S . Aide-Memoire to the FRG,July6, 1964,George McGheePapers,1988add.,box 1,Georgetown University Library,Washington, D.C., andJohnson-McNamara telephoneconversation, January17, 1966,FRUS 1964-68,2: 80. 18. For the figures,seeCoraE. SheplerandLeonardG. Campbell,“UnitedStates DefenseExpenditure Abroad,”Surveyof CuwentBusiness (December1969,44.

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19. Paul Volcker and Toy00 Gyoohten,ChangingFortunes(New York: Time Books,19921,62. 20. Phil Williams, 7beSenateand U S . Troopsin Europe(London:Macmillan, 1985). etMessages, vol. 4 (Paris:Plon,1970),332. 21. CharlesDe Gaulle,Discours May 10, 1966,FRUS 1964-68, 8: 269-70. 22. FowlertoJohnson, 23. Ibid., 274-275. 24. For a detailedhistoryof theseagreements, seeHubertZimmermann, Money and Security: Monetay Policyand Troopsin Germany’s Relations to the U S . and the UnitedKingdom,1955-71 (Cambridge,Mass.: CambridgeUniversityPress, 2002). of PoliticalDirectorHarkort,March6, 1967,PA-AA, B 150/1967. 25. Memorandum 26. Leo Brawand,Wohinsteuertdiedeutsche Wirtschaft? (Munich:Desch,1971),

61.

27. ExcerptfromNoteson a Meetingof the Germancabinet,March27, 1969,PAIn early 1967,the Germangovernment discussed the possibilityof AA, 111~1/611. supporting de Gaulle’scall for a changein the priceof goldasexpressed in dollars andveryguardedlyinformedthe Frenchthattheywerenot deadsetagainstconsidletterprevented thispolicyfrombeingfurtherexerationof sucha step.TheBlessing plored.SeeEconomics MinisterSchillerto Chancellor Kiesinger, January12, 1967,PAAA, IIIA1/180. on international monetary policy,Feb28. GermanForeignOfficememorandum ruary5, 1969,PA-AA, 11M5/610. 29. FinanceMinisterDahlgriinto ForeignMinisterSchroder, Resultsof a Meeting of EC-FinanceMinistersonJune20-21, 1966,July7, 1966,ibid. 30. HubertZimmermann, “TheSourFruitsof Victory:SterlingandSecurityin Anglo-German Relations duringthe 1950sand1960s,” Contempora y European Histoy 9, no. 2 (20001,225-243. 31. RobertM. Collins,“TheEconomicCrisisof 1968andtheWaningof theAmericanCentury,’’AmericanHistoricalReview101(April 1990,396422. 32. Batorto President Johnson, U.S. Positionin theTrilateralNegotiations, FebruLibrary(LBJL), Austin, ary 23, 1967,FrancisBatorPapers,box 4, LyndonB. Johnson Texas. 33. Batorto President, 8.3.1967,NationalSecurityFiles(NSF), NSC Histories: Trilaterals,box 50, LBJL. seeStephen D. Cohen,International Monetay Reform 34. On thesenegotiations, 19641969(New York: Praeger,1970). 35. Washington embassy to the ForeignOffice,June27, 1967,PA-AA, B 150/1967. 36. On thiswell-coveredtopic,seeBeatriceHeuser,NATO,Britain,Franceand theFRG: NuclearStrategies and Forcesfor Europe(London:Macmillan,1998) and Histoy and Strategy(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, Marc Trachtenberg, 1991). signedan agreement for “Cooperation on the Uses 37. In 1958,bothcountries of Atomic Energyfor Mutual Defense,”CommandPaper 537 (London:HMSO 1958). 38. Thiswholestoryis extensively analysed by MarcTrachtenberg, A Constructed Princeton UniversityPress,1999),particularly chapters 5 and6. Peace(Princeton:

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39. JosephManzione,“Amusingand Amazing and Practicaland Military: The Legacyof Scientific Internationalism in AmericanForeignPolicy,1945-1963,”DiplomaticHistoy 24, no.1(2000),47-49. 40. RobertGilpin,Francein theAgeof theScientific State(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton UniversityPress,19681,406. 41. The famousNassaumeetingin December1962 resultedin an offerof U.S. nuseeFRUS 196163,vol. clearhelpto boththe LJK andFrance.For thekey documents, 13. However,dueto deepdoubtswithintheAmericanadministration aboutthispolicy of January14, 1963,in whichhe openlychallenged andde Gaulle’spressconference theUS., thisoptionwasnotcarriedthrough. 42. Seefor examplethe discussion amongKennedy,McNamara,Rusk,andBundy on April 16, 1962,in FRUS 1961-63, 13: 377-80. 43. For Germaninterestin advanced rockettechnology andnuclearwarheads, see H. Zimmermann,“F.J. StraulJund der deutsch-amerikanische Wahrungskonflikt,” Vierteljahreshefte f u r Zeitgeschichte 47, no. 1 (1999),63-67. Constructed Peace,307-308. 44. Trachtenberg, 45. NationalSecurityActionMemorandum (NSAM) 294, “US. NuclearandStrateto France,”April 20, 1964, Declassified Documents gic DeliverySystemAssistance (DDRS), 1999,document2312. Reference System 46. Gavinto Kennedy,March9, 1962,FRUS 1961-63,13: 687. Gavinwaspromptly of State.SeeBall to Gavin,March14, 1962,ibid.,688. rebuffedby the Department 47. On this and otherepisodesillustrating the restrictive policyof the American government vis-2-visFrance,seeEdwardA. Kolodziej,FrenchInternationalPolicy underDe GaulleandPompidou: 7bePoliticsof Grandeur(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1974),79-82. in a program48. N m YorkTimes,12 February1965.Thispolicywasemphasised Agencywho armaticarticleby the directorof the ArmsControlandDisarmament to the trafficin fisguedfor a “morewidespread, andstricter,application of controls whichmay be usefuleitherfor peacefulor sionablematerialandto the technology militarypurposes.” SeeWilliam C. Foster,“NewDirections in ArmsControl,” Foreign Affairs43 (July19651,592. 49. On thesedoubts,seea memorandum by PoliticalDirectorRuete,“NPT:Supmaterialto EURATOM,”April 24, 1968,&ten zurduswurtigen Poliply of fissionable (AAPD) 1968, 1: 508-509. tik derBundesrepublik Deutschland 50. The missilesystems “Hawk”(1959-1965) and“Sidewinder” ( 1 9 6 ~ 1 9 6 5were ) alsobuilt in Europeunderlicensefrom the Americans. SeeHanno0. Seydeland Hans-GeorgKanno,“Die Rustung,” in Westeuropaische Verteidigungskooperation eds.Karl Carstens andDieterMahncke(Munich:Oldenbourg, 1972), 163. 51. Dillonto Kennedy,May 13, 1963,President’s OfficeFiles,box 90,JFKL. 52. Memorandumof Political Director Ruete, 15 September1964, PA-AA, B 150/1964.This was explicitlyin U.S. interest.SeeDOS/DOD Messageto Bonn embassy, July 15, 1963, State DepartmentCentralFiles for 1963, DEF 19 USWGER,RecordGroup(RG) 59, U S . NationalArchives(USNA), CollegePark,Maryland. 53. SeydelandKanno,“Rustung,” 205. historyof the Europeanspaceeffort,seeJohnKrigeand 54. For an archive-based ArturoRusso,Europein Space,196&1973(Nordwijk:ESA, 1994).


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55. EugeneSkolnikoff,Science,Technology, andAmericanForeignPolicy(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1967), 23-41. For documents on the historyof thisinitiative,seeFRUS 1964-68, 34: docs.21-62. betweenChancellorErhardand President Johnson, December 56. Conversation 20, 1965, AAPD 1965, 2: 1925-1927; Treasury background paperonthetrilateraltalks, November5, 1966, NSF, NSC Histories,box 51, LBJL. 57. Memorandum on spacecooperation, March23, 1966, FRUS 1964-68, XXXIV: esp.85 n. 3. 58. LorenzaSebesta, “TheAvailabilityof AmericanLaunchers andEurope’s Decision‘To Go It Alone’,’’ESAHistoyStudyReports18 (19961, 21. 59. Meyer-Lindenberg memorandum, September29, 1966, and GermanNATO to ForeignOffice,December7 , 1966, bothin PA-AA, I A 6/83. For an representative “UnNuovoStrumento Politicoper gli analysisof thisinitiative,seeLorenzaSebesta, Anni 60: I1 Technological Gap nelleRelazioniEuro-Americane,” NuovaCiuiltadelle Macchine17, no. 3 (19991, 11-23. 60. Embassy in Franceto Department of State,January14, 1966, FRUS 1964-8, 34: 2. 61. Ball to Rusk,6 June1966, ibid.,3. on US.-EuropeanRelations, May 23, 1967, NSF, NSC Meetings, 62. Memorandum box 2, LBJL. 63. Werner Ungerer,“Satellitenprobleme und Intelsat-Verhandlungen,” AuJ3enpolitik21, no. 2 (19701, 7Eb79. 64. Pauls(Ambassador in Washington) to ForeignOffice,February6, 1969, AAPD

1969, 1: 157. 65. Conversation betweenNixon andKiesinger, 26 February1969, ibid.,286. of the so-called Nixon doctrine,announced by the pres66. Thiswasthe essence identat a newsconference on GuamonJuly25, 1969. SeePP Nixon 1969, 549. 67. Kissingerhimself later doubtedthe wisdomof this assertion.See Henry Kissinger,Yeamof Upheaval(London:Weidenfeld& Nicolson,19821, 151-156. “TheYear of Europe,”Department of StateBulletin(May 14, 68. HenryKissinger, 1973), 598. 69. Memorandum of Political Director Ruete,November27, 1969, AAPD 1969, 2: 1339. embassy to ForeignOffice,“US.positionon futuredevelopment 70. Washington of the EC,”November25, 1969, PA-AA, I A 2/1440. 71. Henry R. Nau, 7beMyth of America’sDecline(Oxford:Oxford University Press,19901, 16C-164. 72. Harold James,InternationalMoneta y CooperationsinceBretton Woods (Washington: IMF, 1986), 209-210. 73. Theletteris dated8 June1971; DDRS 1999, doc.385. for the President, June12, 1971, ibid.,doc.378. 74. ConnallyMemorandum 75. ArthurF. Burnsto Nixon,May 19, 1971, ibid.,doc.2317. in themonetary negotiations of these years, 76. Oneof themostactiveparticipants Bundesbank Vice President Emminger, saidin a speechhe gavein BaselonJune16, pursuedappropriate 1973: “Therecanbe no doubtthathad all the majorcountries

policiesandfully livedup to the rulesof the gamethesystemor for thatmatter,any der DM system-would have functionedwell.” Otmar Emminger,Verteidigung (Frankfurt: KnappVerlag,19801, 228.

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77. BulletindesPresse-undInformationsamts derBundesregierung 148,December 4, 1969,1262-1263. 78. Ambassador Blankenhorn(London)to Brandt,November20, 1968, AAPD 1968,2: 1498-1500. 79. Kolodziej,FrenchInternationalPolicy,206-207. 80. AAPD 1969,1:doc.13,n. 9. 81. Ambassador vonBraun(Paris)to ForeignOffice,“FutureFrenchMonetaryPolicy,”July24, 1969,PA-AA, I11 A 1/612. 82. Memorandum of PoliticalDirectorBahr,June27, 1968,AAPD 1968,2: 796814. AndreasWilkenssuggests 83. The genesisof thisstepis difficultto reconstruct. thata proposalbyJeanMonnetin November1969causedthissuddeninitiative.See andMonetaryUnion,”lourhis“Westpolitik, Ostpolitik, andtheProjectof Economic nal of EuropeanIntegrationHistory5 , no.1 (1999), 81. The Economics Ministryat thattimehadalreadypresented plansfor a monetaryunionin stages, whichwasto becomethe German negotiatingposition.See PA-AA, Joint Memorandumby MMinistry of Economics: Preparatory Meetingfor HagueSummit,November14, 1969. 84. PA-AA, I1 A 7/1191. Le D q i amBricain(Paris:Denoel,1967),chap85. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, ter 14.Writtenin a similarvein,andalsoveryinfluential,wastheanalysis by ChristoA Programmefor Integration(LonpherLayton,EuropeanAdvancedTechnology: don:Allen & Unwin,1969). 86. “Recherche Scientifique et Independance”, Le ProgrksScientfique, September 1, 1964. 87. ForeignOfficememorandum, November3, 1967,AAPD 1968,1: 277, n.19. 88. De Gaulle-Kiesinger conversation, March13, 1969,AAPD 1969,1:371. 89. Document135,AAPD 1968,1:486,n. 10. 90. See“IntoEuropewith Industry’s Help,”in 7beTimes(London),November15, 1966. 91. Speechin the Guildhall,London,November13, 1967,PREM 13/1851,Public RecordOffice(PRO), Kew. 92. Henry R. Nau, “Collective Responses to R&D problemsin WesternEurope: 1955-1958 and 1968-1973,”InternationalOrganisation29, no. 3 (1975), 632-636. of Brandtwith the ItalianForeignMinisterFanfani,January5, Seealsoconversation 1967,AAPD 1967,1: 39-40, 93. Gilpin,France,53. 94. Reportof the Committeeof Inquiryinto the AircraftIndustry,Cmnd. 2853 (London:HMSO, 1965). 95. Burke-Trendto Wilson, 27 February1968, PREM 13/1851, PRO; Susanna Schrafstetter, Die dritteAtommacht(Munich:Oldenbourg, 19991,200-202. of ForeignMinisterBrandtwith the BritishAmbassador Frank 96. Conversation Roberts,December28, 1967,AAPD 1967,3: 1713. of Brandtwith BritishForeignMinisterBrown,April 13, 1967, 97. Conversation AAPD 1967,2: 584. of PoliticalDirectorFrank,April 28, 1967,PA-AA, I A 6/72. 98. Memorandum of Ministerialdirigent von Staden,12 July 1968,AAPD 1968,2: 99. Memorandum 868.


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100. Reinhard Loosch, “Kernenergieund internationaleZusammenarbeit,” Aussenpolitik 20, no.7(19691,395. 101. HenryKissinger, WhiteHouseYears(London:Weidenfeld& Nicolson,1979), to the Germanam384. FrenchForeignMinisterDebri.voicedthe samesuspicions bassador in Paris,von Braun.Von Braunto Brandt,April 24, 1969,AAPD 1969, 1: 5 15-5 16. 102. Behrends memorandum, December23, 1969,AAPD 1969,1: 1456. to the ForeignOffice,February20, 103. Arnold(Ambassador to the Netherlands) 1969,ibid.,238. “A Brief Historyof the ESA,” 104. JohnKrige,ArturoRusso,andLorenzaSebesta, Historyof EuropeanScientific and Technological Cooperation, eds.JohnKrigeand EC OfficialPublications, 19971,199-200. LucaGuzzetti(Luxembourg: 105. Ibid., 202. 106. Memorandum by Undersecretary von Braun,August15, 1970,AAPD 1970,2: 1482-1483. 107. RobertE. Osgoodet al., RetreatfromEmpire?meFirst NixonAdministration,(Baltimore/London: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress,19731,18.


7 GeorgesPompidouand U.S.-EuropeanRelations Georges-Henri Soutou

In the late 1940s,theWesternpowersorganized themselves intoa political bloc;the policyof buildinga unifiedEuropealsohadits startin thatsame period.And from that pointon, Francelookedin bothdirections: toward “Europe,”but also toward America,the leadingWesternpower. The France-UnitedStatesWestern Europetrianglethus provideda kind of frameworkwithinwhichFrenchforeignpolicywasworkedout.The basic Frenchaimat thattimewasto reestablish a certainpositionin theworld-a positionas one of the worldsmajorpowers,whichhad beenlostwhen Francewasdefeatedby Germanyin 1940.If Francewasto recoverwhatit had,evenin part,it neededbothto assume the leadership of WesternEuropeand cultivatea strongrelationship with the UnitedStates.Thosetwo orientations, moreover,were boundup with eachotherdialectically, for Frenchviewswouldcarrymoreweightwith theAmericans if Francecould presentitself as speaking for WesternEuropeas a whole;and,conversely, if it the otherEuropeans wouldbe morellkely to acceptFrenchleadership coulddevelopa specialrelationship with theUnitedStates. Francecouldthustake advantage of the fact that it occupieda pivotal position-that it stoodat the pointwherethe Atlanticworldandthe Europeanworld overlapped. That positionwould give Francethe leverageit neededto dealwith the Americanson non-European questions: it would andAsianisgivesomeweightto itspolicyonthoseAfrican,MiddleEastern, suesin whichit wasparticularly interested. By takingadvantage of thattriangularstructure-in effect,by balancingbetweenthe “Atlantic” and the “European” orientations-France wouldin moregeneraltermsbe ableto recovera certainfreedomof action.France,in particular, wouldbe ableto avoidlosingits autonomy in a too-tightlyintegrated Atlanticsystem. 157

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This was the basicframeworkwithin which France’spolicytowardthe UnitedStateswas workedout,but thatpolicywasalsoframedwith an eye to certainmoreconcreteproblems.The Frenchmilitaryforcesneededto be modernized; Franceneededaccessto advancedtechnologies, bothnuclear andnon-nuclear. In theseareas,it wasinvariablywithAmericaaboveall that the Frenchsoughtto cooperateduringthe FourthRepublic,for the simple wassoadvanced.’ reasonthatU S . militarytechnology It is oftenassumed that thisaspectof Frenchpolicywas dramatically alteredas soonas GeneralCharlesde Gaullereturnedto powerin 1958.Indeed,it is oftenassumed thatde Gaulle,fromthestart,wasnot interested in cultivating goodrelationswith the UnitedStates.But from 1958to 1962,he toosoughtto cooperate with America,especially in themilitaryarea.*To be sure,from 1963on, de Gaulle’spolicyproceeded alongverydifferentlines, butthepolicyof hissuccessor aspresident, GeorgesPompidou, represented a clearreturnto the traditionthathadtakenroot in the immediatepostwar period.The France-UnitedStates-Western Europetrianglewas to play an absolutely fundamental role in Pompidou’s approach to international issues: thekind of thinkingassociated with thatconceptwasto lie at theveryheart of hisforeignpolicy. is a naturalpointof departurefor an analysisof This sortof comparison Pompidou’s policyaspresident. Indeed,duringtheperiodof hispresidency, Pompidou’s policy,andespecially hisAmericanpolicy,wasconstantly comparedto de Gaulle’s.Therewerethose,evenwithinthegovernment, always policiesmeasured keepinga sharpeyeoutfor howwell thenew president’s up, in orthodoxGaullistterms.’And foreignpolicywasa particularly sensitive area:for thatreasonalone,new approaches hadto be introduced with greatcare.And PompidouhimselfwasdeeplyGaullistin termsof his basic approachto foreignpolicy,no doubtmorethan was oftenthoughtat the time. It is sometimes hard,therefore,to seewhat was distinctive abouthis policy-what exactlydistinguished it from de Gaulle’s.What,then,was de Gaulle’spolicy,especially in thefinal yearsof his presidency, andhowwas Pompidou’s approachdifferent? The questionof relationswith Americawasfundamental in thisregard.It is thusimportantto notethedegreeto which,startingin 1963,deGaullehad with America.To beginwith, there turnedagainstthe idea of cooperation was the famousJanuary14, 1963,pressconference at which he had announcedthatFrancewasvetoingBritain’sentryintothe CommonMarket,a decisionframedin anti-American terms.And thentherewasthequarrelover the MultilateralForce in 1964. But the most importantevent here was France’sdeparture, not from the alliancewith America,but fromthe NATO militaryorganization in 1966.All theseactionsindicatedthatdeGaulle’spolicy hadtakena strongturnawayfromAmerica.Theywererootedin hisview that on all levels-conomically, politically,and militarily-Europe had to

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developindependently of the UnitedStatesandnot in cooperation with her, astheleadersof the FourthRepublichad anted.^And it is strikinghowfar he waswillingto take thatpolicy.Duringhisvisitto Moscowin June1966, de Gaulletold the Sovietleadersthat he acceptedthe principleof a Europeansecurityconference withoutAmericanparticipation. His objective,it seemed, wasto construct a newsecuritysystemon thebasisof a Franco-SovietententeandwithoutWashington-a goalin linewiththeGeneral’s overall international conceptions at thattime.5 The samebasicaimswerealsoreflectedin deGaulle’smilitarypolicy.On January24, 1967,he issueda “Personal andSecretDirective”for the prime ministerand the ministerof defense-a very importantdocumentthat laid outtheframeworkfor militaryprogramming for the 1970s.Previously, ashe pointedout in thisdocument,Frenchdefensepolicyhadbeenworkedout “in the frameworkof the AtlanticAlliance,”but henceforthit wouldbe defined with a view to the “ubiquitousness, instantaneity, andtotality”of the danger.Therewas no longerto be any questionof a privilegedalignment with theUnitedStates6 Thosebasicassumptions impliedthattheFrenchnuclearforceshouldbe ableto retaliateagainstanypower,includingbothRussiaandAmerica,andindeedtheso-calledall azimuthstargetingstrategy was announced by GeneralAilleret,armedforceschiefof staff,in an articlein the RevuedeDqenseNationalein December1967.De Gaullehimself,in a January27, 1968,speechto the CentredesHautesEtudesMilitaires,confirmed thatthatwouldbe the strategy.’Thisclearlymarkedthe endof anytraceof Franco-American strategicand nuclearcollaboration, of the sortde Gaulle hadhadin mindat varioustimesin the 1958-1962 period. How was Pompidou’spolicy different?Before becomingpresidentin 1969,he had servedas de Gaulle’sprimeministerfrom 1962to 1968,and he had withoutquestionbeen a Gaullistin internationalaffairs.Like de Gaulle,he had opposedthe 1962Anglo-American Nassauaccordsas well asthe US.-sponsored plan for a MultilateralForce.8And like de Gaulle,he wanteda “European Europe,”a Europeindependent of the UnitedStates, andhe was concerned aboutthe prospectof a US.-Sovietrapprochement at Europe’sexpense. As he toldtheAmericanjournalistC. L. Sulzberger on January23, 1968, there was a dangerthat an “American-Soviet condominium”would be imposedon Europe-a very Gaullisttheme that he would comebackto time and againas p r e ~ i d e nBut t . ~still, lookingback evenon thatpre-presidential period,onecanidentifycertainnuances, having to do especiallywith his attitudetowardthe UnitedStates,that distinguishedhisthinkingfromde Gaulle’s.Indeed,he declaredhimselfreadyto considermuchmorepositiverelationswith Washington, especiallyon economic questions,and in a conversation with Sulzbergeron October21, 1965,he took a far moremoderateline on NATO issuesthanthe one de Gaullewouldtakein 1966.’O

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Pompidou’s fundamental policycanbe characterized as a kind of pragmaticGaullism-a “rationalized Gaullism.His basicidea,duringtheperiod of hispresidency, wasto keepthespiritof Gaullismintact,butto developit in a waythatwouldfreeit fromcertainencumbrances that,in thenewpresident’sview,wereessentially theproductof thegeneral’s verystrongandocAs Pompidou sawit, if thebasicGaullistapcasionally impulsive personality. proachwasto endure,policyhadto be rootedin reality:therecouldnotbe too greata gap betweenFrenchpolicyand Frenchpower.“My goal,”he wroteinJune1969,“isto try to baseonsolidrealities-conomic, social,and humanrealities-what hasthusfar restedonly on the prestigeof a single man.”” Andthatfundamental approach wasin linewith-and is,toa certainextent, to be understood in the contextof-basicpoliticalrealitiesat home.Pompidou,it is importantto note,did not havethe samehistoricalstatureas de Gaulle:in hiscase,normaldomestic politicalconsiderations therefore played a greaterrole thantheyhadwhenthe generalwasin charge.To governindeed,to win electionas presidentin the first place-Pompidou needed to holdtogether whatwascalledthe “presidential majority,” a blocthatwent well beyondtheGaullists andalsoincludedtheIndependent Republicans and the Centrists, two relativelymoderategroupsthat did not sharethe antiAmericanism commonin Gaullist circles. And so,giventhepoliticalsituation at home(especially aftertheSovietinvasion of Czechoslovakia in August1968, of whichhad turnedpublicfeelingagainstthe USSR), a certainrecentering Frenchpolicywasnatural:a certainmovetowardWashington nowmadegood domestic politicalsense. Indeed,even beforede Gaullehad left office in April 1969, but after RichardNixonhadbecomethe US. president in January, therehadbeena suddenimprovement in Franco-American relations.Nixon’svisit to France basicline mightnot have late in Februaryhad gonewell.’* The general’s changed,but still Americandiplomatsin Paris had the impression that Frenchattitudes hadsoftened: disillusioned withtheSoviets, theFrenchnow wantedto improverelations with theUnitedStates.’3And indeedAmerican policywasalsobeginning to shift.The newU.S. administration waswilling to takea freshlookat thekey question of bilateralrmlitarycoin particular operationwith France.That issue,Nixon decidedon April 15, was to be studiedanew,withoutanya prioriassumptions-that is, withoutanysense thatAmericanpolicyin thisareawasto be boundby assumptions thathad takenrootin thepast.’*And NixonandtheStateDepartment werelooking forwardto a furtherimprovement of relations followingde Gaulle’sdeparturefromofficeon April 28; theythoughtFranceandNATO wouldbe able to work togetherbetter,at leaston a practical1e~el.I~ But HenryKissinger, Nixon’snationalsecurityadvisor,wasnot sosure:he thoughtthatwith de Gaullegone,theinfluence of theleftonFrenchforeignpolicywouldgrow.16

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THE FIRST CONTACTSBETWEEN POMPIDOUAND THE AMERICANS Georges Pompidou tookofficeaspresident in Apd 1969,andhe soonmade it clearthathe wantedto putrelations with theUnitedStateson a newfooting.He metwithAmbassador Shriverin Julyof thatyear,andthetoneof his remarkswasquitedifferentfromwhatde Gaulle’shadbeen.The newpresidenttookit asself-evident thatEuropeneededtheAmericanstrategic umbrellaandthatFrancein particularneededtheAtlanticalliance.The French policyof militaryindependence, he said,wasnotdirectedagainsttheUnited States; it mightin facteasetheAmericandefense burden,andmightalsopromoteAmerica’spolicyof detentewith the East.An understanding wasalso possible in theeconomic area,especially in theagricultural area.Pompidou even suggested that the EuropeanEconomicCommunity’s-the EEC’sCommonAgricultural Policymightbe reconsidered, andthatFrancemight bewillingto movetowarda system whereEuropean agricultural priceswere in linewith thoseon theworldmarket.Sucha move,he said,wouldnotjust be to America’s interest, butwouldbe to France’s interest aswell. (It was,in fact, West Germanythat had demandedhigh pricesfor wheat,and not Paris).”Pompidou, moreover, wasnotopposed in principleto Americaninvestmentin France-anotherstrikingchangefrom the previousperiod.A moreliberalpolicyin thisarea,hesuggested, couldbe putintoeffectassoon as theFrenchelectricandelectronic industries wererestructured. l8 Anotherstrawin thewindhadto dowiththeGermanquestion. On November6, MichelJobert,secretary-general at theElyseeaatis,headof thepresident’soffice-toldShverthatPompidou wouldbe very happyto improve Franco-American relations because he feareda revivalof Germannationalism andwantedAmericansupport to counterbalance thatthreat.’9h reality,Pompidou’sGermanpolicywasmuchmorecomplexthanthat,andit is doubtful thathe viewedthatissuesosimplistically.20 But therealpointto notein ths i contextis thatFranco-American relations werechangingaat theFrenchwere reaching outto theUnitedStates. Americanofficialswerestruckby thechange in atmosphere andwerepleased by thewaythingsweredeveloping.21 It shouldalsobe notedin passing--the subject cannotbe discussed in any detailhere-that underPompidou, theFrenchprovidedconsiderable diplomaticassistance to theAmericans in connection with theVietnamWar, particularlyin its finalphasein 1972.Theywerenoticeably morecooperative in thisareaduringtheperiodof thePompidou presidency thantheyhadbeen whenhispredecessor wasin charge.Thisagainindicates thatattitudes had changedconsiderably.22 Or to give one final example:in 1970,Pompidou appointed Alexandre deMarenches directorof theSDECE,theFrenchsecret service. Marenches’s friendship for Americawaswell knownandhe worked closelywith theCIA andotherWesternservices.23

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But not all wassweetness andlight,andthetwo sidesdid not seeeye-toeyeon a wholeseriesof issues-issuesthatwe aregoingto encounter over andoveragain.Firstof all, therewereproblemshavingto dowith monetary questions, especiallythe Eurodollarproblemand the Americanbalanceof paymentsdeficit.Theseposedspecificproblemsin connection with plans for a Europeanmonetaryunion.And thentherewereproblemshavingto do with the US.-Soviet negotiations on strategic weapons-the Strategic Arms LimitationTalks(or theSALT talks,astheywerecalled).An agreement in this area, the Frenchfeared,might weakenthe Americannuclearguarantee. Thosetalks,moreover, mightleadWashington andMoscowtoviewthirdnuclearpowersas sources of instability,to be controlledin caseof crisis.Anotherissuehadto dowith theproposalmadeby theAtlanticalliancein late 1969for a conference on “mutualandbalancedforcereduction” (MBFR) in Europe.The Americans favoredthe proposal,but the Frenchwere against theidea.AsidefromthefactthatFrancewasopposed in principleto all “bloc to bloc”negotiations (a standardGaullistreflex),Pompidouwas alsoafraid that an agreement in thisareamightactuallyworsenthe conventional balanceandleadto a kind of neutralization of Europe.On theotherhand,Paris favoredthe ideaof a conference on securityin Europe(an old Sovietproposalrenewedin March 1969),partlybecausethe Frenchfelt the desirefor detenteon the part of mostEuropeancountries couldnot be opposedforever,andpartlybecause theythoughtit mightallowcountries like Polandor Romaniato recovera smallmarginfor maneuver.The Americanreactionto thatproposalwasmuchmorereserved. But whatevertheir differences, Pariswas inclinedto talk quiteseriously with Washington aboutall of theseissues.24 And oneshouldalsonotethat Frenchreservations aboutAmericanpolicyon thesemattershad to do essentiallywith thosepointsthatthreatened to weakenthe unityof the West vis-5-visthe USSR,whichwascertainlya new theme.Pompidou, moreover, madeit clearthat in his view it was “natural” that the UnitedStatesshould participatein a conference on securityin Europe.He notedexplicitly,in a letterto Nixon-and this phraseis very important-that Americawas not “foreignto Europeanproblems.”25 This, of course,markedquite a change fromthesortof positionde Gaullehadstoodfor. This shiftawayfrom the de Gaullepolicy-this thawin Franco-American relations-was, rightfromthe start,moststrikingin the areaof defense.Almostimmediately, andat thehighestpoliticallevel,theFrenchexpressed the desireto renewbilateralcontacts with Washington on militaryissuesin general,andespecially on weaponsdevelopment.26 Thiscaughttheattentionof Nixon and Kissingerand set off a whole processof reflectionin Washington.*’ On February23, 1970,just beforePompidouwas scheduled to visit Washington, Kissinger summedup for Nixon the conclusions thathadbeen reached.All questions of a “theological” naturerelatingto Atlanticintegra-

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tionwereto be setaside;thespecialpositionof Francein thealliancewould be accepted; a process of rapprochement shouldbeginandshouldfocuson thingsthat couldbe doneon the practicallevel.If the Frenchwere interested,areasof cooperation mightincludejointplanningor coordinated targetingfor the two countries’ strategic forces.The samesortof planningfor tacticalnuclearforces,giventhatFrancewouldsoonhavesuchforces,was alsopossible.Cooperation on the development andproduction of nuclear weaponsandmissiles wasa morecomplicated issue,if onlybecause for legalreasons Congress wouldhavetobe involved.But if theFrenchrequested it, theAmericans couldindicatethattheywerewillingto consider something of thesort,in certainspecificareas.28 But thiswasbasically Kissinger’s view: it wasclearthatotherelements withintheadministration-theDefenseDepartment, for example-were reluctant to moveaheadsorapidlyin thatdire~tion.~~

POMPIDOU’S FEBRUARY 1970 VISIT TOTHE UNITED STATES

It is well knownthatGeorges Pompidou’s visit to the UnitedStatesin February1970wasmarkedby majoranti-French demonstrations in Chicago; the protesters hadbeenangeredby theFrenchdecision to sellarmsto Lib~a.3~ But therehadbeenwarningsigns,andit seemsthatthisparticular problem wasrootedin the factthat Frenchofficialshad not understood that in the UnitedStates,the municipalauthorities were responsible for securityand publicorder,andthatpreparations for thetriptherefore neededto be made on the localle~el.3~ The filesalsoshowthat,whiletheconsuls in New York andSanFrancisco werevery activein thisarea,the consulin Chicagoapparentlydid less.Pompidou, moreover, clearlyhadnot beenawareof how strongly theAmerican Jewishcommunity felt aboutthesaleof armsto Libya, nordid he do muchto reachoutto thatcommunity. And he refusedto issue a generaldeclaration that took a relativelybalancedpositionon the ArabIsraeliquestion, eventhoughoneof hisadvisors hadsuggested thathe might do In fact,he toldJewishleadersin SanFrancisco on February27 that a carefuldistinction hadto be madebetweenthequestion of Israelasa state of Judaism asa religion;ashe sawit, Israel’sonlychance andthequestion of solvingits securityproblems wasif it cameto seeitselfasa stateamong otherstatesin theMiddleEastandnot asa “religious ~omrnunity.”~~ But at wasboundto fall on deafears. thattime,thissortof language Thatsortof language, moreover, tendedto givea misleading impression of what Pompidou’s own Middle Easternpolicywas.While pursuingand evendeveloping the“Arabpolicy”of hispredecessor, hein facthadsoftened Frenchpolicyin thisarea.The totalembargo on armsto Israelimposedon

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January1,1969,wasrevokedonJune29, 1969.Instead,therewouldbe a returnto theselective embargoestablished in 1967;Francewouldthusbe able to furnishIsraelwith sparepartsfor weaponsthat had alreadybeensold, whichwasin factdone.34 Moreover,he accepted the idea-and thismarked a majorbreakwith de Gaulle’spolicy-that the UnitedStatesandthe USSR couldbeginjointlyto explorethepossibility of a solutionin theMiddleEast, a view thatexplicitlyrecognized America’s role asIsrael’sprotector.35 Sothe sensethattherewasa problemherewasbasedin parton a misunderstanding. Someobservers at the timethoughtthatthe Chicagoincidents hadturnedPompidouagainstthe UnitedStates,andhada realeffecton his laterpolicy.36 But in realityit doesnot seemthatthoseincidents hada major impact:thecourseof Franco-American relationsdepended on structural, not accidental, factors.And it is a mistaketo thinkthatPompidou’s experiences duringhisAmericantrip wereentirelynegative. In fact,the new Frenchleader’smeetings with Nixonon February24 and 26 wentwell. The two menagreedthatinternational politicswasbecoming moremultipolarin character, with America,Russia,WesternEurope,China, andJapanall playing arole.Theyagreedalsoon the needto pursuea cautiouspolicyvis-2-vistheUSSR,onthe importance of notisolatingChina,and on the needfor the Germansto keeptheirpartnersin theWestinformedin detailaboutthe progressof their Ospolitik.3’ Nixon, moreover,recognized the Frenchdesirefor independence. By far the mostimportantpartof theirdiscussion relatedto militarymatters.Theyagreedthatsecretbilateraltalksbetweenmilitaryofficersfromthe two countriescouldtake place-within the NATO framework,but outside theintegrated structures-witha view towardpreparingjointplans.In 1967, in theAilleret-Lemnitzer accords, FranceandNATO hadworkedout certain arrangements in thisarea,butthatagreement hadappliedonlyto thepartof the Frencharmy stationedin Germany.Pompidou,however,was now inclinedto extendthatprincipleandwork outa coordination of forcesagreementthatwouldcoverall of France’s militaryforcesin Europe.He wasalso willingto revivethe committee the two countries hadestablished in 1962to discuss cooperation in the areaof conventional weapons. And he suggested thatwhenitsmissile-launching submarines andtacticalnuclearweaponsbecameoperational two or threeyearsdownthe road,Francemightwant to extendthatcooperation to the nucleararea.The two menagreedthatsuch discussions would not affecteachcountry’s freedomof decisionin a crisis. Theyagreed,moreover,thatconfidential linesof communication wereto be established: betweenKissingerandJoberton politicalissues,andbetween GeneralGoodpaster, theNATO commander andUS. commander in Europe, andGeneralFourquet, the Frencharmedforceschiefof staff,on militaryiss ~ e s The . 3 ~damagethatthe relationship hadsufferedin the 1963-196speriodwasin the process of beingrepaired.Nixon,moreover,hadput France

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on a par with Britain,in termsbothof its international statusandof its relationshipto the United States-a positionthe Frenchhad been trying to achievefor manyyears.

THE DEVELOPMENTOF FRAN’CO-AMERICAN RELATIONSIN 1970-1971 In 1970-1971,ParisandWashington agreedthat,takenas a whole,FrancoAmericanrelationswere developingfavorably,especiallyon Europeanissues.39 Theybothfelt it wasimportantto pay closeattentionto the developmentof WestGermanChancellor Willy Brandt’sOstpolitik,not because they feareda revivalof Germandanger,a fear theybothconsidered outmoded, but ratherbecause theywereafraidthatWestGermanymightgiveawaytoo muchto theUSSR.As Kissinger toldCharlesLucet,theFrenchambassador to Washington, onApril 13,1970,therewasa dangerthatBrandtwouldgivethe Russians“essential things.”*O If therewere to be an East-Westagreement, Kissingercontinued,“it wouldbe madebetweenthe UnitedStatesandthe USSR,andnot betweenthe Germansandthe USSR-a point,however,that touchedon a continuingFrenchconcern.The Frenchgovernment, for its part,did supporttheinitialphaseof Ostpolitik, thephasethatled to thesigning of treatieswith the Easternbloccountries recognizing the de factodivisionof Germanyandthe 1945borders.But theFrenchwonderedaboutthe Germans’ultimategoals;theywereworriedthattheirreal aim wasto bring aboutthereunification of Germanyby creatinga newEuropean security systembasedon whatwasin effecta kindof German-Soviet entente.Pompidou might have beenquite pleasedto seethe Germansaccept-r appearto accept-the postwarstatusquo,but he wasworriedthateventually the Ostpolitikmightdevelopinto a far-reaching Russo-German rapprochementsomething thatwouldleadto Germanreunification, andthatwouldhavea profoundeffecton France’sownsecurity. Ever sincethe 1950s,Frenchpolicyhad beenbasedon the conceptof “doublesecurity”: with Germanydivided,thatcountrycouldposeno threat, and on the otherhandthe securityof Francevis-i-visthe USSR wouldbe guaranteed by thealliancewith theUnitedStates, andalsoby the integration of WestGermanyintoWesternEuropeandintotheWestin general.In 1966, disappointed by the factthatthe Franco-German treatyof January1963had ledto littleof realvalue,deGaullehadbegunto thinkin verydifferentterms. His ideanow-this wastheperiodof histriptoMoscow-was that anewsecuritysystemcouldbe constructed, a systembasedessentially on a FrancoSovietententeaimedat controlling Germanpower,a systemthatwouldmarginalizethe United States.But in this area,Pompidouoptedfor a more traditionalapproach to thesegreatissues,andhis geopolitical visionof the

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futureof Germany,the USSR,andEuropewas morecompatible with good Franco-American relations. Indeed,duringhis trip to the USSR in October1970,Pompidouresisted Sovietleaderk o n i dBrezhnev’s attemptsto get him to in effectrepeatwhat deGaullehadsaidin Moscowin 1966aboutFrance“favoring a gradualeliminationof Americaninfluencein Europe.” Europecertainlyshouldbe ableto “getout from underthe influenceof the UnitedStates” and “befully European,”but the influenceof Americaon the Continentresultedfrom the Soviet militarythreatandfrom the needto counterSovietpowerwith Americanmilitarypowerandindeedwith the militarypowerof thewholeAtlantic alliance.Only a genuinedetentecould changethat situation,but it was mainlyu p to theUSSRto bringthatabout.Therecouldbe noquestionof redomination” with “Soviet placingwhatPompidourefusedto call “American d~mination.”~~ On thisfundamental issueof the Paris-Washington-Moscow triangularrelationship,Pompidou’spositionwas thus quite differentfrom what de Gaulle’shadbeen,evenif he toowanteda “European Europe.”He outlined the rationalefor that new policyin a December1, 1970,conversation with Sulzberger. “Thebasisof my thinking”onthatissue,Pompidousaid,wasthat Francewas boundto move “closerto the UnitedStatesas U.S. superiority overRussiadiminishes. My foreignpolicy,therefore,is less anti-American in itsexpression thande Gaulle’s,becausehe stronglyfelt Americansuperiority overtheSovietUnionandothercountries andbelievedhe hadto oppose thi~.”~3 It is alsoto be noted-and thistoo was new-that Pompidouwantedto talk seriously with theAmericans aboutspecificareasof tensionin Europe, and in particularaboutthe Sovietthreatto Romaniaand to Yugoslavia, something the Westernpowerswere very muchconcerned with in 1971.44 The Sovietswereawareof that,andsuspected the Frenchof deviatingfrom de Gaulle’spolicyof “ i n d e p e n d e n ~ e . ” ~ ~ On themilitarylevel,thingswerealsodeveloping favorably. On March10, 1970, followingPompidou’strip to America,and on Kissinger’s advice, Nixonapproveda wholeseriesof measures. GeneralGoodpaster, firstof all, was authorizedto explorewith GeneralFourquetall practicalwaysof improvingcooperation with the Frencharmedforces.In particular,the two generalscouldconsider whatarrangements werepossiblein theareaof tacmightbe possibleon tical nuclearweapons,andwhat sortof cooperation navalquestions. Theywouldalsodiscuss how plansfor the useof strategic nuclearforcesmightbe coordinated, takingcare,onthisissue,to respectthe Frenchdecisionto rejectthe principleof alliance-wide military“integration,” and with the provisothat any arrangements they workedout would ultiThe Franco-American matelyhaveto be approvedby the two presidents. committee on conventional weapons, setup in 1962butdormantsince1966,


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wouldbe reactivated; thepossibility of assisting theFrenchwiththeirmissile programwouldbe studied;a 1964 decisionof theJohnson administration (NSAM 294), which ruled out all aid to the Frenchrelatingto nuclear weaponsandmissiles, wouldbe putasidefor thetimebeing.46 Not everyone in Washington wasaswillingasNixonandKissinger were to resumemilitary collaboration with the French.,--rptary of Defense Melvin Laird,for example,ostensibly supported the idea of missileassistance,buthe wasin factnotveryeagerto changepolicyin thisarea.In an April 1970 memorandum, he emphasized possible difficulties with Congress andpossible repercussions on the SALT negotiations with the Soviets.And did takeplaceshouldnot “provide he toothoughtthatwhateverexchanges anysignificant technical impetusto Frenchcapabilities’’-at leastnotat first. But if thatwerethecase,theFrenchwouldscarcely find an Americanoffer of assistance particularly attractive! He wantedtheFrench,moreover, to give Americacertainthingsin returnfor whatevertheydid get.Theywould,for example, haveto takepartin thestudyof strategy in thecomingdecadethat NATO hadbegun.*’But thissortof condition wouldbe hardfor theFrench to accept.It wasclearthat theywere determined to stayout of the “integratedNATO system, thesystemtheyhadofficiallyleft in 1966;theytherein exercises of thissort,exercises which, forewereunwillingto participate theywereafraid,mightpull thembackintothe“integrated systemthrough thebackdoor.As Pompidou notedon April 24, Pariswaswillingto discuss theseissuesof strategybilaterallywith the Americans, just not withinthe multilateral NATO framework.48 Thereis no betterillustration of theongoing Frenchconcern for a specialrelationship with Washington, thesamesortof relationship the Britishhad-indeed, for a relationship with the Americans thatwouldallowFranceto playa pivotalandstrategically centralrolein the Westernworldas awhole. Kissinger choseto go aheadwithoutpayingmuchattention to whatLaird hadsaid.On April 24, 1970,he decidedto sendJohnFosterto Paris.Foster, theAssistant Secretary of Defensein chargeof weaponsdevelopment, was told to takeaccount of Lairdsconcerns concerning secrecy, Congress, and thatthepresident wantedto help theSALT talks,butit wasalsoemphasized the French.Foster,moreover, wasto makeit clearthatAmericanassistance would not dependon a rapprochement betweenFranceand NATO.49 Kissingerand Nixon were not goingto let “theological” issuesrelatingto NATO standin theirway. In the summerof 1970,thingsweremovingaheadquitenicely.General Goodpaster hadhadhisfirstdiscussions with GeneralFourquet; therehad been progresson military cooperation in centralEuropein the event of war, evenif the Frenchwere not yet readyto talk abouttheir(future) tacticalnuclearweapons; andAssistant Secretary Fosterhadbegunto talk privatelywith JeanBlancard,a high Frenchdefenseofficialin chargeof

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weaponsdevelopmentand procurement, aboutwhat the Frenchwould like in termsof missilecooperation. At the sametime,andin all sortsof areas,theexchange of scientificinformationwasproceeding at an increasing pace;therewasin factmorecooperation with Francein thisareathanwith any othercountry.jO But,asKissinger’s assistant HelmutSonnenfeldt pointedoutto him onAugust3, 1970,all of thoseissueshadbeendealtwith on an ad hocbasis;now thingshadto be systematized. Therehadto be a doctrineapprovedby the president.A coordinating committeehadto be setup in Washington to supervisetheexchanges with theFrench.A seriesof basicjudgments hadto be supporttheFrenchnuclearprogram,and made:shouldtheU.S. government thus reversethe decisionthe Johnsonadministration had made in 1964? Whateffectwoulda decisionto supporttheFrenchin thisareahaveon the of thisissueimpliedthat he wasin faSALT talks?Sonnenfeldt’s discussion vor of supporting the Frenchprogram,if onlybecauseif therewereno nuclearcoordination with France,theresultin theeventof an armedconflictin Europemightwell be catastrophic for theallianceasa whole.Frenchnuclear forces,moreover,in hisjudgmentwouldnotreallybe largeenoughto stand in theway of a SALTagreement. Clearlythebestthing,in Sonnenfeldt’s view, would be for a programof Americannuclearassistance to be workedout nuclearstratwithin the frameworkof a commonAnglo-Franco-American egy,asBritishleadersnow suggested.51 In the monthsthat followed,NationalSecurityCouncil,Pentagon,and StateDepartment officialscontinuedto considertheseissues.Thesediscussionstookplacewithinan ad hoccommittee responsible for preparinga NationalSecurityStudyMemorandum (whatwasto becomeNSSM 100)on military relationswith France.It was not very easyto work out a new policy. The militaryauthorities wereagainstmakinganyconcessions for Franceunlessit rejoinedthe integratedNATO organization, at leastin practice.And it was alsounderstood that Congress would be reluctantto accepta fundamentalchangeof policy.Someofficialswere alsoworriedabouthow other allies-West Germanyaboveall-might reactif a specialbilateralrelationship with Francetook shapein this area.j2Given all these concerns, Kissingerthereforehadto intervenerepeatedly to keepthingsmoving.j3 Finally,in lateMarch,the committeeagreedon certainrecommendations of ratherlimitedscope,whichwerethenapprovedby the president(in NationalSecurityDecisionMemoranda, or NSDM’s,103and104).Therewould be a certainrelaxationof the rulesgoverningthe exportof supercomputers essentialfor the developmentof nuclearweapons.As for missiles,the Frenchmightbe helpedto improvethe reliabilityof theirexistingsystems, but the Americans wouldnot helpthemdevelopsystems thatwouldallow thoseweaponsto be targetedmoreaccurately. (The Frenchhadbeeninterestedin gettinghelpin thatarea).On warheaddesignproper,theAmericans


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would limit themselves to resumingthe talks,brokenoff in 1963,dealing with the procedures and systemsfor preventingaccidentsand guarding againstunauthorized use.54 A memorandum wasthenhandedoverto theFrenchonMay 5, 1971,proposingdiscussions relatingto missiletechnology, nuclearweaponssafety, andhigh-powered computers.jj That led to a meetingbetweenFosterand Blancardin Parison May 12 on the missilequestion.Blancardagreedcompletelythattheexchanges shoulddealsolelywith the reliabilityof theexisting systems. His main concern,in fact,was to makesurethat the systems thenunderdevelopment, whichapparently were havingcertainproblems, wouldfunctioncorrectly.He was not at that pointinterested in askingthe Americans for help in developinga moreadvancedgenerationof missiles. The two menmet againonJune15, andat thatsecondmeeting,Fostergave Blancarda draft of an agreement for cooperation on missilesand nuclear weaponssafety.jbOn July 22, Blancardwas authorizedto signthat agreement and begindiscussions in thosetwo areas.It is importantto notethat thisaccordwentfar beyondwhathadinitiallybeendecideduponin Washington.It providedthatarrangements couldbe maderelatingto missileguidanceandaccuracy andto thehardening of warheads (sothattheycouldsurvive attackfroma nuclear-based, antiballistic missiledefensesystem, suchas the SovietGaloshABM s y s t e m b major a development, evenif the arrangementsin thoseareaswouldbe subjectto specialrestriction^.^' Onethushas the impression thatsomeUS. officialswantedto go a bit beyondwhatwas generallyacceptable within the government. Therewere morediscussions betweenBlancardandFoster,in Washington thistime,in November.On the 12th,Fosterformallyproposed thatthe two sidesbegindiscussions on nuclearweaponssafety. The Parisauthorities, for theirpart,were quiteinterested in gettinginformationfrom the Americans thatwouldallow themto improvetheirmissile systems-and to gain time and savemoneyin the process.But independencewasstilla fundamental Frenchconcern,andfor themasfor theAmericans,therewerelimitsbeyondwhichtheywouldnotgo.The feelingon the Frenchsidewasthatin no caseshouldthe talksallowtheAmericans to get a clearsenseof eithertheoperational valueof theFrenchmissilesor a clear understanding of the Frenchsystemfor strategiccommandand control. Moreover,underno circumstances shouldtheAmericans be in a positionto intimateto the Sovietsthat thesetechnicalarrangements gave the United Statesany sortof controloverthe Frenchnuclearforce.So eachsideheld back,albeitfor somewhatdifferentreasons.58 But withinthoselimitsthere were still many areasin which a considerable degreeof cooperation was possible.The Goodpaster-Fourquet discussions aboutcoordinating French militaryplanswith thoseof NATO couldproceed.The Ailleret-Lemnitzer accordsof 1967couldbe broughtup to date(and anothermeetingfor that

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purposetook placeon January27, 1971). But noneof thismeantthat the Frenchforceswereto be placedunderNATO command:Frenchindependencewasnotbei.xcnmpromised, andin a crisisFrancewouldremainfree to act as it chose.Finally,the Frenchwere inclinedto limit manyof these arrangements, for thetimebeing,to theFrenchforcesin Germany,andpreferrednotto extendthemrightawayto thewholeFrencharmyin Europesomething that would haveraisedvariousproblemsrelatingto the French short-range Plutonmissileandtheuseof tacticalnuclearweaponsmoregenerallybeforethe Frenchwerereadyto discuss them.59 So by the end of 1970,relationsbetweenthe two countries were better rethantheyhadbeenin years.The only real problemin Franco-American lationswasthe international monetaryquestion: in December,Franceagain startedbuyinggold, and againbeganto criticizeAmericanmonetaryand economicpolicyandcomplainaboutits negativeimpacton Europe.6o

THE LIMITS OF MILITARY COOPERATION: HARDWAREYES, SOFTWARE NO! The Frenchwere inclinedto talk with the Americansaboutweaponryabout“hardware” (and eventhenwith the reservations just notedhrather than about the principlesthat would governthe actualuse of nuclear Thebasic1966decisionto leavethe inweapons-that is, about“software.” tegratedNATO systemwasnot goingto be reversed. To givebut oneexample: aftera seriousandratheranimatedDefenseCouncildiscussion held at the E1ysi.ePalaceon February26, 1971,a 1967decisionrelatingto the oil pipelinesbuilt by NATO on Frenchterritorywas reaffirmed:in peacetime, thosepipelineswouldcontinueto supplyNATO forcesin Germany;but if war broke out, Francewould be free to decidewhetherthosepipelines wouldcontinueto be usedin thatway.Thisostensibly technicalissueraised the whole problemof the interpretation of ArticleV of the North Atlantic Treaty:Pariswasin effectinsisting on preserving itscompletefreedomof action, evenfor an act of assistance (makingthe pipelinesavailable),which wouldnot be a militaryactionin the strictsenseandwouldnot meanthat Francewouldactuallybetaking part in thewar.Thiswasa verylimitedreading of ArticleV, and its legalitywas actuallyquestioned by certainFrench diplomats. Pompidouwasthusupholdingthestrictest possibleinterpretation of France’sfreedomof decisionin the eventof a crisis.61 Beyondits general implications aboutFrance’s relationship with NATO (the steadfast refusalof any automaticcommitment of Frenchforces),the pipelinequestionwas a majorsourceof irritationfor Americans. They couldno longerbe surethat thepipelines, andindeedtheentireFrenchlogisticalsystem,wouldbe availof ablein the eventof war. Thisto themwasthe mostseriousconsequence

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France’swithdrawalfrom NATO in 1966,and they hopedthat the military rapprochement with Pariswould allow this problemto be reconsidered sometime in the future.62 Not everymajorFrenchofficialwantedto remainsoaloof.Certainofficials (like Francois de Rose,France’s representative in theNorthAtlanticCouncil) werestruckby the way Americanattitudeson strategic issueswere changing.TheAmericans, in theirview,wereincreasingly reluctantto contemplate the usenot justof strategic but alsoof tacticalnuclearweapons; theywere alsointerestedin reducingthe Americanmilitarypresencein Europeand seeingtheEuropeans buildup theirownconventional capabilities. Whatthis meant,asthoseofficialsanalyzedthesituation, wasthattheFrenchauthoritiesneededto talk with theirAmericancounterparts aboutthe doctrinefor the useof nuclearweapons,andespecially for the useof France’s owntacticalnuclearweapons, suchasthePlutonshort-range missiles thatweredue to becomeoperational in 1973;whentheyweredeployed,a problemof coordinationwith NATO would naturallyarise.63 Pompidoucategorically refusedto consideranythingof the sort:Francehad to make its “independence”abundantly clear;the prospectof talkswith Washington on nuclear doctrinearousedhis “greatestdistrust.”64 He was afraid the Americans “wouldtry to drawus intoa discussion aboutourrelationswith themin the areaof defenseandnuclearweapons.”65 As for the Plutons,while the plan in 1970hadbeento stationthemwith theFrenchforcesin Germany(thefissionablecoreremainingstockpiled in Francein normaltimes)by thebeginning of 1971,the Frenchwere leaningtowardthe ideaof keepingthemin France.Thatwouldreduceproblemswith the Germans, whowereworried abouthavingtheirownterritorytargetedto an evengreaterextentthanit alreadywas,andwhowereparticularly concerned aboutmissiles with sucha short(seventy-five mile) range.Keepingthe Plutonsin Francewould help preserveParis’sfreedomof decisionin theeventof war,andwouldhelpthe Frenchgovernment delaywhatit knewwouldbe a difficultdiscussion with theAmericans aboutdoctrinefor theuseof thoseweapons.66

POMPIDOUAND THE ARMS CONTROLTALKS WITH THE SOVIETS(SALT AND MBFR) Despitethe militaryrapprochement with Washington, the Gaullistdogmaof nationalindependence wasstillaliveandwell duringthePompidouperiod. But underPompidou,thatdogmatook on a somewhat differentcoloration: Pompidoudid not sharesomeof de Gaulle’slong-termgoals,and for him “independence” wasunderstood in a ratherdifferentway. Thiswill become clearwhenwe examinethe Frenchattitudetowardthe armscontroltalks with Moscow:SALT andMBFR. On theseissues,ParisandWashington did

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not seeeye-to-eye,andthe gapbetweenthemactuallywidened,beginning especially in 1972.But Pompidou’s pointof view on thesematterswasonly partiallyrootedin Gaullistprinciples. His mainconcernin factwasto maintainthestrategic unityof theWestvis-5-vistheUSSR,whichwasnot at all in line with de Gaulle’sbasicthinking. As earlyas 1971,the Frenchrealizedthatthe UnitedStatesandthe Soviet Unionwould probablysoonreachan agreementlimitingthe size of their strategic forces,andthatsuchanagreement mightwell affectFrancein some very basicways.It mightaffectthe politicaland militaryvalueof France’s own nuclearforce,andthe Frenchmightalsohaveto dealwith American of Frenchforcesin theagreement.67 So andSovietpressure for theinclusion the Frenchwereconcerned, andknewthattheyhadto followthe SALT negotiations with greatcare. With regardtotheMBFR negotiations, theirattitudewasfar morenegative. Theyin factrejectedtheveryideaof suchtalks.TheirfearwasthatanMBFR agreement wouldleadto a withdrawalof the Americantroopsstationedin Europe,a constantfear in ParisduringPompidouperiod.It mightalsolead to a neutralization of centralEurope,whichin turnwouldallowtheUSSR to exertcontinuingpressureon Europeas a whole.Again,it is importantto notethatthiswascertainlynot a “Gaullist” way of lookingat things.@ It was alsofearedthatan MBFR agreement wouldrule outthepossibilityof a “European”defenseof Europe,an option that Pompidouwantedto keep open.@ But Pompidou’s greatestworrywas thatthe Americansmightbe leaning towarda policyof disengagement; if thatweretrue,an MBFR accordmight of sucha policy-thatis, it mightleadto well facilitatethe implementation the withdrawalof foreignforcesfrombothGermanies. The feelingwasthat thisin turn mightrapidlyleadto the emergence of a politicallyfree andreunified,and indeednuclearized,Germany;this set of concernswas also linkedto thefearthatreudication wastheultimategoalof WestGermany’s As Pompidousaw the situation,if the West-the U.S. governmentaboveall-did notreinin the Ostpolitik andwasnotverycarefulin the armscontroltalkswith the USSR, one of two t h g swould happen.Either West Germanywouldendup fallingunderSovietinfluence,or a reunified Germany,a nuclearized Germany,wouldagainplaya fully independent role in international affairs.Eitherresultwouldbe a disaster for France.Again,this hadnot beende Gaulle’sview at all: Germany,in the general’s view, could bekeptin lineby workmgwiththeSoviets, andindeedby establishing a new securitysystemin Europe-a systembasedon a kind of Franco-Soviet entente,and one in which the Americanswould play a marginalrole.71Like mostFrenchpoliticalfigures,bothmenwereopposedto Germanreunification, but Pompidouapproached the Germanquestionin a far more“Western”contextandwasmoredistrustful of theUSSR thande Gaullehadbeen.

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THE AZORESSUMMIT AND ITS DISAPPOINTING AFTERMATH Nixon and Pompidoumet in the Azoresin December1971.The famous “Nixonshocks”-theannouncement in July that the Americanpresident wouldsoonvisitPekingandthe suspension of dollarconvertibility on August15-had comeearlierthatyear.Parishadwelcomedthe U.S. decision on China;thatmoveseemed to implythattheFrenchhadbeenrightto recognizePekingin 1964,and it madeobviousgeopolitical sense.72 But the U.S. decision to endconvertibility-theU.S. decision, thatis, to put an end to theBrettonWoodsmonetary system-was viewedin an entirelydifferent light.And indeedthe monetaryissuewasto be a majorsourceof FrancoAmericandiscordin thisperiod. It wasin facttobe oneof threemajorareasof disagreement, theothertwo beingthe questionof a conference on securityin Europe(which Paris wantedbutwhichWashington stillopposed), andtheMBFR issue(on which positions werereversed).’3Thecomplexdiscussions Pompidou, Nixon,and Kissingerhad on December13 and 14 will not be reviewedin detailhere, but it is important to givesomesenseof whatwenton at theAzoresmeeting.’* The Frenchpresident hadsoughtthatsummit,andhe presented himselfthereasa sortof spokesman forEurope.His wholestrategy at theAzores meeting,ostensibly accepted by NixonandKissinger, wasto placethemonof theWestas etaryproblemin thebroadercontextof thepoliticalsolidarity a whole.“France,” he told hisAmericanpartners, “isa westerncountry,for thatreason,andfor historical reasons aswell, sheis determined to maintain theallianceandremainfriendlywith theUnitedStates.” The monetary issue wasto be dealtwith in thatframework. And for Pompidou, a formerbanker who was resolvedto modernizeFranceand placeit firmly in the world importance in its own economy,the monetaryissuewas of fundamental right.But the way he framedthat issuetypifiedthe basicPompidouapproachto foreignpolicy:Francewantedto developtheEuropean Economic Community and soughtto play a decisiverole in the EEC, but that “Euroby thecultivation of a certainrelationpean”orientation wasto be balanced ship with Washington, a relationship that would actuallystrengthen the Frenchpositionin Europe.Thegoalwasto put “theology” asideandstrikea balancethatmadepracticalsense-not justa balancebetweenEuropeand America,but a balancein France’s relationship with America.Francewould be neithersatellitenorchallenger-indeedit madelittlesenseto try to competewith America,sinceif forcedto choose, no onein Europeat thattime wouldfollowFrance. On thepoliticalissues, thetwoleaders thusreachedagreement rathereasily. DetentewiththeUSSR,theybothfelt,wasnecessary, butonehadto proceedcautiously in thisarea, andthe Ostpolitikalsohadto be pursued with

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greatcare;U S . troopshadto be keptin Europe,andcongressional pressure forwithdrawalneededto beresisted; theSino-American rapprochement was to be pursued.In the monetaryarea,however,the talkswereverydifficult, but endedin compromise. The dollarwouldbe devalued(sincethe French balanceof tradewith theUnitedStatesshoweda 50 percentdeficit,thatwas an importantconcession for Paris),but therewouldbe a returnto a system of fixedexchange rates.Thosefixedrateswouldbe differentfromwhatthey hadbeen,but oncesettheywouldbe defended. Thispointwasessential for France.It wasconnected bothto theproblemof its internaleconomicequilibriumand to the very delicateproblemof the relationshipbetweenthe francandthe Germanmark.Moreover,in a secretagreement, theAmericans promisedeventually to restoretheconvertibility of thedollar,whichwasobviouslyessential if a newandsolidfixedexchange ratesystemwasto be put in place,a systemin whichtheAmericans wouldplaya key role. As it turnedout,thoseU S . commitments werehonoredonlyin part.The so-calledSmithsonian Agreementof December18, 1971,whichwas supposedto implementtheAzoresdecisions, did setnew exchange rates.(The dollarwasdevaluedby 7.9 percent,the poundandthe francretainedtheir oldvalueandwere,in fact,revaluedby 8.57percentwith respectto thedollar, the markwas revaluedby 13.58percentandstoppedfloating,andthe yen was revaluedby 16.88percent.)But the dollarremainednonconvertible andthe Americansmadeno promiseto defendthe dollarat that new level.It followedthatthemaintenance of thatnewexchange ratedepended on thewillingness of the centralbanksoutsideof the UnitedStatesto accumulateunlimitedquantitiesof dollars.So the Smithsonian Agreementwas veryfragile.Floatingthedollarwasthusinevitable,for if thedollarwasnot convertible intogold,itsdevaluation with respectto goldno longerhadany meaning. Indeed,with the floatingof the poundin 1972,the limitedvalueof the SmithsonianAgreementbecameapparent.A new monetarycrisis that of the eruptedin February1973led to an additional10 percentdevaluation dollar.That in turnled on March16 to the historicdecisionto allowthe Europeancurrencies to floatjointlyagainstthe dollar.TheBrettonWoodssysfuredrates,as they were tem of fixed exchangerates-even“adjustable” calledfor a time-had thusbeeneffectivelyabandoned, evenbeforeit was officiallyabandoned at theJamaicaConference in January1976.The Americanshadthusachieveda goalthatat leastsomeU S . officialshadbeenaiming for since1971:freedof the constraints imposedby a systemof fixedexchangerates,theUnitedStatescouldhenceforth allowthedollarto movein accordancewith America’scommercialinterests;at the same time, the UnitedStateswouldbenefitfrom the fact thatthe dollarwouldcontinueto serveas a transnational currency,andthatmeantthatthe chronicU.S. paymentsdeficitcouldcontinue,andthatevenU S . capitalexportsdidnot have


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to be limited.75 Thisrepresented a fundamental shiftin the policytheAmericanshadfollowedsince1947:fromthispointon,the strictlynationalinterestsof theUnitedStates, in a verybasicarea,werenowmoreimportantthan America’sresponsibilities asleaderof theFreeWorld.76 The failureof theAzoresConference wasa failurefor the Pompidouconceptof a Europeled by Francethatcollaborates with Americaon an equal footingin a basicallyunitedWesternworld.Pompidou,whohadbeenmore accommodating on monetarymattersthan de Gaullehad been,was well awareof whathadhappened. He complained to Nixonon February4, 1972, thattheUnitedStateshadnotkeptitspromises: “Whenwe metin theAzores,” he wrote,“I of courseunderstood thattherewasno longeranyquestionof a returnto full convertibility for yourcurrency[intogold,whichtheFrenchhad previously sought].But, as I indicatedthere,if you agreedto controlcapital movements, if you developed a systemthatwouldstabilizetheforeigndollar balances, if you agreedto establish a system thatwouldenableyouto defend thevalueof yourcurrency by buyingdollarsin exchange for othercurrencies, thenfor all practicalpurposes we wouldhavefull currency-to-currency convertibility.” Nixon,Pompidoucontinued, had alludedin a message to Congressto a growingacceptance of flexibleexchange rates,but thatgeneralattitude,theFrenchpresident pointedout,“didnotappearto be in linewith the commitments you andI made”at theAzoresmeeting.77 Washington hadnot takenanystepsto controlUS. capitalexports,a keyissuefortheFrench,who criticizedtheAmericans for buyingup Europeanfirmswith dollarsthatwere acceptedabroadbecauseof that currency’s international role-dollarsthat were acceptedin spiteof the factthattheUnitedStateswas runninga paymentsdeficityear afteryear,andwere thus,in a sense,devoidof real exchangevalue.Oneimportant pointto be notedhereis that Pompidou didnot demanda returnto the goldstandard, as de Gaullehaddonein 1 9 6 S a n d that fact meantthat compromise was not out of the question.But Nixon’s rathervagueFebruary16replyshowedthattheU.S. government wasnot really interested in reachingone.Reviewingthatexchange on March28, 1973, in thelightof whathadsubsequently transpired, Jean-RenC Bernard,whofollowedissuesof international financeat the ElysCe,noted:“thesedocuments showthattheAmericans do not reallythinkthemonetarycommitments they madeat theAzoresareto be takens e r i o u ~ l yThe . ” ~deterioration ~ of FrancoAmericanrelations thatfollowedhada gooddealto dowith thefactthatsuch beliefshadtakenholdin Paris. Frenchofficialswerein factfullyawareof thefragilityandtemporary characterof the Smithsonian Agreement. At a meetingon monetaryissuesheld on February7, 1972,financeministerValCry Giscardd’Estaing outlinedthe situation.Eitherthe Smithsonian Agreementwouldbe implemented, or the crisiscouldserveasan occasion to takeanothersteptowardEuropean economicandmonetaryunion.Pompidoustronglyexpressed hispreference for

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that lattersolution,sincechoosingthe firstwouldbe tantamount to “admitting that the UnitedStateswas in chargeof world economicandmonetary policy.”The Germanswouldalsohaveto makethesamechoice:theywould notbe ableto go againstEuropedespitetheirtendencyto followtheUnited States.79 Pompidouhadthuscrossed a certainthreshold: in thefinalanalysis, a European monetaryagreement wasmoreimportantthangettingtheAmericansto accepta fixedexchange ratesystem.FortheFrench,thiswasa completeconceptual about-face. An agreement of thatsortcouldnow be negotiated,and,asnotedabove,a very importantagreement thatprovidedfor a commonfloat of the Europeancurrenciesagainstthe dollarwas actually signedthe followingyear. The monetaryquestionwasthusoneof the key factorsthatled to thereAmericanpolicy in 1973. From that point on, the castingof Pompidou’s Frenchsoughtlessto playtheroleof intermediary betweentheUnitedStates andEurope.It wasmoreimportantnow to try to organizeE u r o p e a a is, t to createa strongEuropeancounterweight to Americanpreponderance withintheWesternworld-and thismarkeda certainreturnof Gaullism.The US. embassy in Paris,for its part,notedthe damagethemonetaryquestion hadcausedandsensedthatFrenchpolicywascomingto havea more“European”orientation.80

POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONS IN 1972 The Frenchmay havebeendisappointed by theresultsof the AzoresSummit,butin thermlitaryarea,Franco-American relationscontinued to improve in 1972.DefenseministerMichel DebrC,for example,was struckby how forthcoming theAmericans werein the Foster-Blancard talks.TheU.S. government,he wrotePompidouin March,was offeringtechnicalinformation of the utmostimportance.“We are justified,”he said,“in thinkingthat the Americanleadersintendto provideuswith veryvaluableassistance+hat is, that they considerit in their interestto supportand improvethe developnothingin rementof our nuclearforce.They are askingus for absolutely turn.”81 The Americans had clearlygonemuchfurtherthanwhat had been officiallyagreeduponin Washington. OnJuly7 and12, DebrChada seriesof conversations in Washington with Kissinger,Laird,andNixon.82 Thosediscussions developedalongverypositive lines;indeed,theFranco-American relationship in thisareawasmarked by a certainintimacy.DebrC askedfor informationaboutthe Sovietradar systemandSovietABM defenses; thatinformation wasessential if theFrench nuclearforcewas to be able to attackSoviettargetseffectively.Kissinger promisedto providethatinformationto him directlyif the relevantgovernmentagencies provedunwillingto turnit overthemselves. This,incidentally,


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againindicates thatthepresident’s advisorhadmovedwell beyondthecautiouspolicythattheadministration asa wholehadbeenableto agreeupon. Laird,for his part,promisedthattheMacMahonlaw aboutatomicsecrecy As a wouldbe interpreted liberallyafterNixon wasreelectedin November. resultof thesediscussions, GeneralWalters,thedeputydirectorof the CIA, wouldmeetwith Debri:in September to providehim with the information aboutthe SovietABM defenses; thishighlytechnicalinformationwas extremelyconfidential, andhadbeenobtained by Americanintelligence agenciesusingveryadvanced methods.83 The SALT issuewas,of course, moreof a problem.The basicSALT agreementsweresignedin May 1972;the Frenchwereworriedabouthow their countrymight be affected.On June 13, the Frenchpresidentwondered aloud,in a meetingwith SovietforeignministerGromyko, whethertheSALT agreements “didnotcorrespond moreor lessto a kindof desireto establish theme a condominium over the rest of the world.”This “condominium” wouldrecurfrequently lateron.@Moreover,Francerantherisk of beingat leastindirectlyinvolvedbecause of its own nuclearforce.Nixon wroteto Pompidou onJune9 to tell him abouthistrip to Moscow,andin thatletter he alludedto the SALT agreements. The Sovietshad demanded the right, Nixonsaid,to increase thenumberof theirnuclearsubmarines if Franceand Great Britainwent beyondtheir programmed total of nine nuclearsubmarines(fourBritishandfive French;therewasa stronginterestin building sothatat leasttwo wouldalwaysbe at a surthFrenchnuclearsubmarine sea).Nixon had categorically rejectedthat demand,but it was clearthat Moscowwouldbringit up againduringthe nextphaseof the negotiations andthatParisandWashington wouldhaveto reacha commonview on the subject. Pompidou answered onJuly1in a waythatmadeFrance’s verycautiousattitudeon thatpointquiteclear.85 Anotherpointof greatconcern to FrancewastheSoviet-sponsored ideaof a treatyin whichtheUnitedStatesandtheUSSRwouldeachpromisenotto usenuclearweaponsagainstthe other.Obviously,theAmericans werenot inclinedto accept something thatwassototallyat variancewith basicNATO in a purelynegativeway. strategy, buttheydid notthink theycouldrespond Brezhnev andhisdktentepolicy-apposed, in their view,by elements within theSovietleadershipwere to be supported; a simplerejection wouldthereforenotbe a goodidea.86 ThatUS. positionworriedthe Frenchquitea bit: theWest,in theirview,couldnotruleoutthepossibility thatit mightusenuclearweapons first.And therewasanotherpointin thedrafttreatythatthey particularly disliked,the pointabouthow AmericaandRussiashouldcooperatein preventing situations fromdeveloping in whichthirdpartiesmight bringabouta US.-Soviet nuclearconfrontation. This mightwell applyto France,and it againraisedthe specterof a kind of US.-Soviet “condominium”-a themethatwouldbecomeparticularly importantthe following

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year.87 Pompidouwouldexpresssuchconcerns when Kissingervisitedhim on September15, 1972;on that occasionKissingerassuredhim that the UnitedStateswouldsignonly a verygeneraldeclaration aimedat rulingout theuseof militaryforceagainstanycountry.% The French,of course,alsoremainedopposedto the MBFR talks.They werequiteconcerned thatthe U.S. government, underpressure from Congressandpublicopinion,wasincreasingly inclinedto contemplate a reduction in US. forcelevelsin Europe.89 Pariscontinued to refuseto takepartin thosetalks,evenindirectly. In early1973,eventhoughbilateralFrench-American relations weregood, thebesttheyhadbeenin a longtime-this wasreflectedin thefactthatantiAmericanrhetorichaddisappeared bothin officialdiscourse andin thegovernment-controlled media-there werestillimportantdifferences of opinion oncertainmultilateral problems. Therewere,in particular, problems relating to the SALT andMBFR negotiations andto the preparations for the Conferenceon SecurityandCooperation in Europe(CSCE):theFrench,aswe have seen,were concerned aboutthe SALT talksanddislikedthe whole ideaof an MBFR agreement; on the otherhand,they were moreenthusiastic than theAmericans aboutthe CSCE.But therealareaof conflict-the threeissues that woulddominateFranco-American relationsin the 1973-1974 periodlay elsewhere. First,therewasthe monetaryproblem.And thentherewasa seriesof economicproblems,relatingspecificallyto the EEC’s Common AgriculturalPolicyand the questionof specialeconomicarrangements betweenEuropeandAfrica.Suchissues wererootedin a moregeneralconflict betweentheparticulareconomicstructures the Europeans hadput in place, andtheAmericanpressure for the dismantling of suchstructures in orderto bringabouta moreliberalinternational tradingsystem.Finally,andmostimportantly,therewastheAmericangoalof creatinga frameworkwithinwhich theUS. government could“dealwith WesternEuropeasa wholeon a basis whichpermitsa comprehensive, closelylinkeddiscussion of theentirerange of questions-security, political,monetary,trade, and investment-which compriseourinterestin Europe.”9o And it waspreciselythatidea-the ideaof a moreor lessformalrestructuringof theUS.-Europeanrelationship on thebasisof anAmericanplanthatthe Frenchwere to opposesoforcefullyin 1973and 1974.The United States,for its part,wasquitedetermined in 1973to resolvethe international questions stillon theagenda.The Americans intendedto pursuethed6tente policy withtheSovietsandlay thebasisfor a stableanddurableUS.-Soviet bilateralrelationship, andtheyalsointendedto redefinetheirbasicrelationshipwith Europe.TheFrench,theAmericans hoped,mightbe inducedto go alongwith thatpolicy,but in no eventwouldtheybe allowedto standin its way.91The two sideswerethusseton a collisioncourse:fromthatpointon, a clashwith Pariswasinevitable.


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THE REYKJAVIK CONFERENCE(MAY 31-JUNE 1,1973) In thespringof 1773,developments proceeded asWashington hadforeseen at thebeginning of theyear.On April 23, Kissinger hadannounced the“Year of Europe”: duringthatyear,US.-Europeanrelations wereto be redefined arounda newAtlanticCharter.92 It shouldbe notedat thispointthatPompicameup with the douwasindirectlythe sourceof thatinitiative.Kissinger idea right afterone of his meetings with Pompidou, and afterthe French president hadsuggested, in an interviewwithJamesRestonof theNew Yo& Times,thatregulartalksbe heldamongtheWesternleaders“atthe highest level.”But Kissinger did not handlethe “Yearof Europe” initiativein a particularlyskillfulway,andthat-combined with thefactthathisrealreasons for pressing thatinitiativewereunderstood perfectlywell in Paris-led to a majorcrisiswith France.93 Duringthistime,the Americans togetherwith the Sovietswereworking outtheagreement “fortheprevention of nuclearwar,”whichBrezhnev was dueto signin CaliforniaonJune22. Furthermore, asKissinger andtheSovietshad agreedin September 1772,negotiations on securityin Europehad begunin HelsinkionNovember22, andtheMBFR talkshadbegunin Vienna onJanuary30, 1973.In July,the ministers of foreignaffairswerescheduled to meetin Helslnkito preparefor a CSCE.The international scenewasthus quiteactive. Georges Pompidou andtheveryGaullistMichelJobert,whohadbecome ministerof foreignaffairsin April, wereworriedaboutwhatwasgoingon. WeretheAmericans goingto reachan agreement with theUSSRat Europe’s expense? On April 23, Kissinger gavea speechin whichhe hadreferredto Europeasa “regional entity”with limitedinterests. WasWashington out to dominatetheWesternworld?Were theAmericans tryingto createa system in whichEuropewouldfall in behindAmerica’sglobalpolicy,and indeed accommodate the Americanson economic issues(whereEuropewasin a relativelystrongpositionvis-i-visthe United States)in exchange for the Americansecurity guarantee? Wasn’ttheplanfor a newAtlanticCharter-for a restructuring of the US.-Europeanrelationship-justa kind of coverthat wouldhelpAmericaachieveits real goals? Jean-Bernard Raimond,Pompidou’sdiplomatic advisor,characterized thatKissinger speechasan “imperioustext,onethatfundamentally expresses thethirstfor powerof theUnited it wasreminiscent, he thought,of Kennedy’s Philadelphia speechof States”; July 4, 1762. The dangerwas that France’sEuropeanpartnersmightbe temptedto go alongwith thatAmericanpolicy:“theirpreference wasfor an Atlanticworld underAmericancontrol.”94 Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, the Frenchambassador in Washington, was worriedaboutthe agreement the Americans andtheSovietswerenegotiating on preventing nuclearwar:with “theAmericans seekingin effectto avoidanyuseof nuclearweapons, and

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with the Russiansat the sametime trying to denuclearize and neutralize WesternEurope,by cuttingit off fromtheUnitedStatesanddismantling the systemof theAtlanticalliance,” theroadthat thatagreement wasopeningup mightwell leadto disaster for Europe-and for Francein p a r t i c ~ l aJeanr.~~ BernardRaimondsharedthosefearsand,in earlyMay, evenwent further. “Strengthening cooperation betweenthe USSR and the United States,”he told Pompidou,wouldthreaten“theworld politicalbalance,” andcouldresultin “thepoliticalneutralization of thirdpowers.” He advisedPompidouto undertakea majorpolicyinitiativeandapproach France’s European partners with thegoalof openingup a seriousdiscussion of thesefundamental issues with the UnitedStates.96 The Frenchwere increasingly worriedaboutthe specterof a “U.S.-Soviet condominium” (a termthat,aswe haveseen,Pompidoualsoused,butin his mind was directedat leastas muchagainstthe USSR as againstthe United States),but that was not their only concern.Therewas alsothe monetary question; Frenchofficialsobjectedto the U.S. government’s refusalto submit to theslightest discipline in thatarea,andsomeof themcontinued to believe a returntothegoldstandard waspossible. With regardto tradepolicyandthe “NixonRoundof tradenegotiations, theynotedWashington’s opposition to theEEC’sCommonAgricultural Policy.In theareaof energypolicy-an area of growingtensionevenbeforethe 1973Yom KippurWar-they notedthe U.S. government’s wish (whichNixon’sApril 18 energymessage had made clear)to forma blocof oil-consuming nationsto dealwith theproducers’ cartel, something they viewedas very dangero~s.~’ But the Frenchauthorities seemeddividedamongthemselves asto whatline to followon theseareas. TheWashington embassy recommended negotiation andsuggested possible compromise^.^^ Others,like OlivierWormser,governor-general of the Bank of France,thoughtit wasnecessary to remainfirm:theUnitedStatesitself,he thought,wouldsomeday returnto thegoldstandard asthebasisof theinternationalmonetarysystem.99 As we have seen,GeorgesPompidoudid not sharethatillusion. A new Pompidou-Nixon summitmeetingwasscheduled to take placein Reykjavikat the endof May, andto preparefor that meetingKissingerand Pompidoumeton May 18.Io0 Thatmeetingwasveryimportant: it was,in my view, the mostopenandmostsignificant meetingthat evertook placebetweenPompidouandan Americanleader.The Frenchpresidentin thatMay 18 meetingwasquiteaccommodating. With regardto the “Yearof Europe,” he wasnot shockedby Kissinger’s ideaof Europeasa regionalpower(the regionin question,however,would includethe Mediterranean andAfrica). He wasnotagainsttheideaof bringingtheEuropeans andtheAmericans togetherto talk aboutall of the problemstheyfaced,botheconomicandpolitical-in otherwords,he wasnot againsttheideaof establishing a political frameworkwithinwhichUS.-Europeaneconomicproblemscouldbe dealt

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with. He wasthusnot opposedin principleto thenotionof a “newAtlantic Charter.”He was willing to talk aboutwheatat the Reykjavikmeetingand was preparedto proposean ententeamonggrain-exporting countries. The internationalmonetaryquestionwould obviouslyhave to be discussed, sincethingscouldnot justbe left as theywere,but on thisissueaswell he clearlywaspreparedto approach the problemin a verypragmatic way. On onepointhe was firm:therecouldbe no questionof involvingthe United Kingdomas a third partyin Franco-American militarydiscussions. And he raisedan excellentquestionconcerning the impendingUS.-Soviet agreement on preventingnuclearwar. The problemwas not so much one of avoidingwar,butratherpreventing a seriesof movestheSovietscouldmake below the thresholdof a war-the sort of move they had made against Czechoslovakia in 1968,thesortof actiontheymighttakeagainstYugoslavia whenTito died,or againstChinawhenMao died.If thefearof war hadheld thembackin the past,wasn’tit possiblethat reducingthatfear mightlead themto moveforwardmoreactivelyin thefuture?“Brezhnev,” he said,“isa pleasantman and a bon vivant,but he is not easyto stopwhen he moves forward.”How did theAmericans proposeto halt “acamouflaged Sovietadvance,”onethattookplacewithouttheactualuseof force,like a streamthat kepton moving? He thoughttheAmericans did notrealizethethreatthatthe SovietUnionstill posedto theWest;he warnedKissinger againstoptingfor theUSSR overChina. Kissingerresponded by unveilingthe real strategyof the United States. Therewasabsolutely no question, he said,of establishing a U.S.-Sovietcondominiumor of choosing MoscowoverChina.The US. goalinsteadwasto supportChina-that is, to preventthe USSRfrom crushingChina.If the Sovietswereallowedto crushthatcountry,theywouldgo on to “Finlandize” Europe;the UnitedStateswouldthenbe isolated.But to preventthe SinoAmericanrapprochement, whichwasgoingto deepenin theyearsto come, fromservingasa pretextfor a Sovietattackon China,it wasnecessary to pursuea policyof detentewith Moscowat thesametime.Theaimwasto “gain time,to paralyzethe USSR.”The Americanstrategywas “perhaps complex, but it wasnot stupid.” TheAmericans, in pursuingthatpolicy,werenot givingway to theUSSR.Theirgoalwas“tocatchherin a net.”Oneshouldnote at thispointthattheexplanation of AmericanpolicyKissinger gaveherewas the samesortof explanation he gavethe Chineseat thetime.lO’ In thiscontext,a strongEurope,Kissinger added,onein whicha “pivotal role”wouldbe playedby France (and not Germany,whichwastooopento Sovietpressure), suitedtheUnitedStates.It wasfor thisreason,he said,that the US. government waspreparedto helptheFrenchdeveloptheirmilitary capabilities. The Nixonadministration, he pointedout,hadneverlaid outits thinkingsoopenlywitha foreignleader.Pompidourepliedby notingtheimportanceof whatKissinger hadsaid,andpromised“toconsiderit carefully.”

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That thesewere Kissinger’s real viewsseemsquiteclear,and internal WhiteHousedocuments showthathe reallydidwantto reacha greatoverarchingagreement withtheEuropeans onpoliticalandeconomic issues-an agreement thatwouldsetup a system in whichFrancewouldplaya keyrole. Not onlydo thesesources echothesamepointsaboutChinaandthe USSR thatKissinger hadmadein hisMay 18meetingwithPompidou, buttheyalso showhow important the European question wasin the eyesof Americans, andhow importantit wasin theirview to developthe US.-Europeanrelationshipin orderto combatisolationist trendson bothsidesof theAtlantic. (Oneshouldnotein thiscontextthattheU.S. administration wasquiteworried aboutan amendment introduced by Senator Mansfieldto reduceAmericantrooplevelsin Europeby 75,000to 100,000men). As theAmericans sawit, thefirststeptowarda formalrestructuring of the US-Europeanrelationship wouldbe theestablishment of an informalhighlevel group composedof representatives from the United States,Great Britain,France,andWestGermany,whichwouldtackleall themajorpolitical andeconomic problems thattheWesternworldfaced.After hisMay 18 meetingwith Pompidou, Kissinger thoughtthatthe Frenchpresident-with theMarchelections behindhim,with a newgovernment composed of men loyal to him, and no longerso dependenton Gaullistsof the orthodox school-was someonehe coulddo business with. Pompidoumightbe a toughnegotiator, buthewasbasically a pragmatist, andhe wouldbe willing to cooperate with thesortof policytheAmericans hadin mind,providedit was consistent with France’sautonomy and wouldnot preventthe emergenceof a “European personality.” Frenchsupportmightbe moreeasily gainedif the UnitedStatesofferedgreaterassistance in weaponsdevelopmentandin the hightechnology areain general(especially with regardto aircraftengines). lo2 Kissinger’s May 18visitthusled to a certaineasingof relations, at leastat theElyske,whereEdouardBalladurhadreplaced MichelJobertassecretarygeneral.Theimpending US.-Sovietagreement wasstilla source of concern, sinceit mightmakeit easierfor theUSSR to maneuver belowthethreshold of war-thatis, it mightmakeit easierfor theSovietsto useall sortsof indirectmethods, methodsthattookadvantage of localCommunist partiesand revolutionary movements. But thatagreement wasno longerconsidered an expression of anAmericanwill to power;in fact,it didnotseemto be in line with America’s owninterests. As for the “Yearof Europe” andthe “newAtlanticCharter,” it wasimportant to takecareto avoidbeingpulledbackinto the integrated NATO systemthroughsuchchannels, but the Frenchhadno of principles” thatKissinger hadproposed on objectionto the “declaration April 23.1°3 The Frenchforeignministry-the QuaidOrsay-specially whenMichel Jobertwasin chargethere,seemsto havetakena muchharderline.And a


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certainsegment of the press,andGaullistelements who sawthe evolution of U.S. policyas confirmingstandard Gaullistarguments about“American imperialism,” alsotendedto takea relativelyhardline on thesequestions.104 So from the springof 1973on, Pompidou wasgettingrathercontradictory adviceaboutwhat attitudeto adopttowardthe Americans. Peopleat the aboutall of theseissues, soPompidou hadtobe quite timefelt quitestrongly carefulin expressing hisownviews;thus,it is hardat timesto knowfor sure whathispositionreallywas,a problemcomplicated by thefactthathe was veryill. But the president seemsto havebeenquiteintriguedby whatKissinger hadtoldhim.He metwith BritishPrimeMinisterEdwardHeathon May 21; in thatmeeting,he appeared to wantanagreement with theAmericans, and he thoughtsuchan agreement waspossible. HavingheardwhatKissinger hadhadto say,he wasclearlynotaspessimistic assomeof hisadvisors. The keythingin hisviewwasthatAmericanotallowitselfto disengage fromEurope,buttherewerelimitsto whathe wouldagreeto. Pompidou andHeath recognized that the US. contribution to the defenseof Europewas indispensable, andtheydid not thinkthatMansfield’s viewswouldprevail.But still theydid consider the possibility of cooperating on the nextgeneration of theirstrategic nuclearsystems, dueto be deployedaround1985.1°5Pornpidou,however,was very cautiouson this issue.He did not takeAngloFrenchcooperation in thisareaas a given;he viewedit insteadasa possibility thatcouldbe exploredmorecarefullywhenthe timecameto decide on thenextgeneration of weapons.lo6 The Reykjaviksummititself is generallypresented as a failure,but that judgment seemsratherone-sided; it in factdeserves a morenuanced assessment.To be sure,thetwosidesexchanged viewson a wholerangeof internationalissues, andthediscussion at Reykjavikwentaroundin circlesa bit. Therewascertainlyno progress on monetaryissues. Pompidou triedto reopenthatquestion thefollowingmonth.In a June25 letterto Nixon,he insistedon theimportance of thestruggle againstinflationandon theneedto defendthenew exchange ratessetin March1973.He thoughtit wasessential thatshort-term capitalmovements be controlled. With regardto thegold problem,Pompidouthoughtthe deadlockcouldbe endedby allowingthe centralbanksto buyor sellgoldon thefreemarket,whichwouldhaveput anendonce and for all to whathadbecomethepurelytheoretical goldprice of thirty-fivedollarsanounce.(It shouldbenotedat thispointthatfrom1968 on,a two-tieredgoldmarkethadbeenin place;therewastheopenmarket, wheregoldwasboughtandsoldat a pricesetby supplyanddemand,and a system limitedto thecentralbanks,whoexchanged goldat theofficialrate of thirty-fivedollarsan ounce.)But implicitin Pompidou’s proposal wasthe ideathatgoldwouldstill play a specialrole in the international monetary system. To givegolda specialrolewouldbenefitcountries llke France,who

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hadlargegoldreserves, andgoldproducers like SouthAfrica andthe Soviet Union,but it wouldhurt thoseEuropeancountrieswho had kept theirreservesin dollars.And therewasno chanceat all thatWashington wouldacceptsucha plan:Nixon,in hisAugust6 reply,simplyavoidedthe issue.lo7 One shouldalsonotethat Pompidouwas now takinga somewhatharder line thanhe hadtakenat theAzoresmeeting,wherethe goldquestionhad not beenraised.Indeed,he waslessflexiblenow thanthe Frenchhadpreviouslybeen:in the 1967-1969period,theyhadbeenwillingto contemplate an international monetarysystemnot basedon gold,as longas thatsystem hadsomereal structure to it-as longas it providedfor a certaindegreeof monetarydiscipline,as long as the dollar’srole was broughtinto balance with the restof the system.’Os This shlftagainmarkeda certainreturnto a of thislateron. harderversionof Gaullism;we shallseefurtherexamples With regardto theproposalfor a new AtlanticCharter,theway thisissue was dealtwith at Reykjavikshouldnot be countedas eithera success or a failure.Pompidouwasmuchmorereservedthanhe hadbeenon May 18.In particular,he rejectedthe US. proposalfor a four-powerpreparatory meeting.lo9 He insistedin effectthatthe preparatory work be doneinitiallyin bilateralmeetings,andnot in a multilateral groupthatwastoocloselylinked in his mind with NATO. But discussions did take placebetweenKissinger (who had becomesecretary of statein August)andJobert;the Frenchhad It is alsoimportantto thusnot optedfor a simplepolicyof obstructionism. bear in mind in this connection that Pompidouhad to keepthe majority coalitiontogetherwithinFrance.To thatend,he hadto pursuea policy that wasbalancedin domestic politicalterms-and in particular hadto takehardline Gaullistviewsinto accountto a greaterdegreethatKissingerhadsupposed. On the otherhand,with regardto the militaryissues,the summitwas a real success. Pompidoustatedto the pressfollowingthe meetingsthat he favoreda continuingAmericantroop presencein Europe.This corresponded to a deepconvictionon his part,but a publicpronouncement of thissortwas quitenew for the Fifth Republic!Evenmoreimportantwas a highlysecretagreementrelatingto nuclearweaponstechnology that was reachedat thethirdmeetingat Reykjavik,a meetingspecifically devotedto militaryissues.lI0 (One shouldnotein passingthat the fact that the agreeto the impression thatthe summentwaskeptsecretno doubtcontributed mit wasa failure.)PompidouandNixon at thatsession agreedthatthetalks would be extendedto includenuclearweaponstechnologyas such.The Franco-American discussions up to that point had been limited to what were,in thefinalanalysis, secondary issues,suchasmissiletechnology and SovietABM capabilities. But now cooperation would be extendedto the area,the designof the nuclearwarholy of holies,the mostfundamental headsthemselves. “I am happyto agree,”Pompidoudeclared,“thatour ex-

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pertswill goto Washington andthattheexchanges will be speeded up.”On theAmericanside,Kissinger wouldbe in chargeof thosetalks. It is quiteclearthatfor theAmericans, theoffertheymadein thisareawas designed in partto facilitatetheacceptance by Parisof America’s wholeEuropeanprogram.And indeedthat programhad a numberof featuresthat were ratherattractivefrom the Frenchpointof view. France,in the great Euro-Atlantic system NixonandKissinger envisioned, wouldenjoythesame specialpositionas Britain.”’And the Americans werealsowillingto guaranteethatWestGermanywouldnotacquirenuclearweapons, a subject that worriedGeorges Pompidou a greatdeal.All of this,theFrenchpresident understood, was of considerable value,but he was surethat the Americans wouldaskfor something in return.Thecentralquestion waswhatthatprice wouldbe.“Naturally,” hesaid,“giventheprogress we aremakingin thearea of defense, our principleis to not sellour soulfor a bowl of porridge,no matterhowgoodit is.”’12

POMPIDOU REJECTSTHE “BOWLOF PORRIDGE”: THE COLLAPSE OFTHE MILITARY TALKS RobertGalley,the ministerof defense,andJeanBlancard,in accordance with theReykjavikagreement, wentto theUnitedStatesin lateJulyandlate August1973to discuss militarycooperation.”’ Up to that point(as noted above),the talkshad dealtonly with existingFrenchmissilesand Soviet ABM defenses. Now the Frenchproposed thatthe talksalsodealwith the missilesystems stillbeingdeveloped andwiththedesignof thenuclearwarheadsthemselves. Whilerecognizing thatprevious exchanges hadprovided the Frenchwith veryvaluableinformation-it helpedthemimprovethereliabilityof theirexistingmissiles andunderstand thevulnerability of theirexistingnuclearforceto Sovietdefenses-theFrenchnow wantedhelpwith thedevelopment of a newgeneration of weapons: missiles with multipleindependently targeted reentryvehicles (or MIRVs, astheywerecalled),hardenedthermonuclear warheads, and“clean” tacticalnuclearweapons. “Many solutions are possible,” Galleypointedout, “butfindingthemwill takeup endless amounts of timeandmoney.It wouldbe veryvaluableif Frenchscientistsand technicalpeoplecouldlearnthe bestwaysto developstrategic weaponsandcleantacticalweapons.” The Americans werereluctantto go alongwith theseratherfar-reaching requests. They werenot willing for the time beingto talk aboutadvanced programs like the M4 missilethatwasplannedfor the 1980s.(Thiswasan MIRVed missilecarryingsix hardenedthermonuclear warheads.)They woulddiscuss onlythesystems currently deployedandthosedueto be deployedin the nearfuture(thatis, in the 1970s).They questioned whether

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FranceneededMIRVed weapons thatcouldattackseveralwidelydispersed targets,and thoughtsimpleMRVed missiles(that is, missileswith multiple warheads, but whichcouldnot be independently targeted)shouldsuffice. Indeed,theydidnothidethefactthattheydidnotwantat thatpointto complicatethe SALT negotiations with Moscow:the assumption was that if it wererevealedthatAmericawashelpingFrancedeveloptheseverydestabilizingweapons, the SALT talkswouldbe affected.Theyinsisted, moreover, thattheFrench(like theBritish)conduct theirtestingat theNevadatestsite. And theyemphasized the needfor an effectivewarningsystem: giventhe prospectthat the Sovietswouldhavean MIRVed forceby the end of the 1970s,in theabsence of sucha system, theUSSRmightbe ableto destroy the entireFrenchnuclearforcein a singlestrike.But theonlyeffectivewarning systemin placeat thattime wasthe Americansystem,sothatpoint,along with the pointaboutthe Nevadatestsite,implied-unambiguously in the Frenchview-that theAmericans, in exchange for theirtechnical assistance, anddespiteeverything, reallywantedto establish a certaincontroloverthe Frenchnuclearforce.And the assumption was that that policyhad been framedwith the SALT talksin mind. Hencethe militarytalkssimplyended,at leastfor the periodof Pompidou’spresidency. On December20, 1973,Kissingerproposed resumption to Pompidou,but the Frenchpresidentignoredthe suggestion.114 At the sametime,the talksbetweenthe Frencharmedforceschiefof staff(now GeneralMaurin)andthe U.S. commander in Europe(GeneralGoodpaster) movedinto very low gear.The two generals were supposed to work out arrangements thatwouldallow Frenchandotheralliedforcesto fight togetherin the eventof a Europeanwar. The basicprincipleof conducting suchtalkshadbeenapproved by theFrenchDefenseCouncil,andarrangementsof thatsorthadbeenverymuchin linewith Pompidou’s originalpolicy.Yet onOctober30, Pompidou decidedto slowdownthosetalks,at least untilthe situation broughton by theYom KippurWar hadbecomeclearer. Thenegotiations wouldproceedat a veryslowpace:firstMaurinandGoodpasterwouldgettogether justto exchange information; politicaldiscussions wouldfollow;a discussion of militarycooperation at a moredetailed,technical level mightthen “possibly” take place.The Frenchwere just as reservedwhen AdmiralMoorer,chairmanof the U S . JointChiefsof Staff, cameto Francein December.l15 The Pompidou line in themilitaryareahadthushardened sincethesummer:therehadbeena certainreturnto “Gaullist orthodoxy.” As proof,let me citea veryimportant document, Pompidou’s “strategic testament.” The exishaslongbeenknown,but not its content. The text tenceof thisdocument waswrittenby Pompidou himselfon February1, 1974;copieswentonlyto PrimeMinisterPierreMessmerandto Ministerof DefenseRobertGalley.116 To be sure,in thisdocument certainextremenotions weredroppedthathad

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been includedin the last documentof this sorta Frenchpresidenthad drafted,namelyde Gaulle’s“Instruction personnelle et secrkte” of 1967-for defense,andthe relatedpointabout example,the ideaof an “allazimuths” the needfor intercontinental missiles.But the documentas a wholehad a ratherpessimistic tone.The US.-Sovietconflictwouldcontinue,Pompidou thought,butat thesametimeWashington andMoscowwoulddealwith each otheron a purelybilateralbasis;the Europeans wouldnot be involved.The Americans, he believed,mightbe impetuous and unpredictable, or Americanactionsmightbe highlycalculated; in eithercase,onewasstruckby the “imperious” characterof Americanpolicy.Therewas, moreover,a certain to the defense tendencyon theAmericans’ partto reducetheircommitment of Europe.Then,of course,therewasthemonetaryproblemandtheenergy problem.All of that,takentogether,madefor “a permanentstateof uncertaintyandanxiety.” If thatwastheproblem,whatthenwasthesolution? TherecouldbenoreFrance’sfreedomof actionhadto be preserved, turnto Atlanticintegration: evenif it waslikely thatin the eventof war it wouldfightside-by-side with its NATO allies,all themoresogiventhattheGermanattitudein caseof crisiswas quiteuncertain.An Anglo-French nuclearforcewasno solutioneither, becauseBritainhad no freedomof actionvis-g-visthe UnitedStates, and becauseboth Germanyand the USSR would react negativelyto an arrangementof that sort.The only remainingsolutionwas to build up France’sown deterrentforce:six nuclearballisticmissilelaunchingsubmarinesshouldbe produced,insteadof the five that were planned.The stockpileof tacticalnuclearweaponsshouldalsobe built up: this was essentialif France’s deterrentthreatwasto be credible.(Thiscorresponded to thedoctrineof the “finalwarning”laid outin the 1972DefenseWhitePaper, providingfor a tacticalnuclearstrikeas a last warningbeforea strategic strike.)More generally,France’sarmedforcesin Europewouldhaveto be strengthened: the Frenchcombatcorpswouldmostlikely be partof the alliance’sreserveforce,but whenit wascommitted to battle,it hadto be providedwith nuclearsupport,theFrenchhavingruledoutthe ideaof a purely conventional war in Europe.Onceagain,it is importantto notethat NATO militarycohada differentdoctrinefor the useof tacticalnuclearweapons; ordinationin thisareawasquitedifficultfor thatreasonalone. The document’sconclusionreflectedits basic Gaullistspirit-although againthiswas a kind of rationalizedGaullism.It alsoreflectedthe fact that talkswith theAmericans hadgroundto a halt-orat leastthatthe brakehad beenpulleddownhardon thepolicythosetalkshadcometo represent. “We mustpursuethis effortaloneand withoutcompromises,” Pompidouwrote, “untdwe areforcedto dealwith theproblemof thealert[meaning thenecessityof acquiring meansto geta timelywarningof animpending Sovietattack]. Althoughthealliesandespecially theAmericans tendto inflatetheimportance

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of thisproblemfor reasons thatcanbe imagined,theremustbe no informationgivenaboutourplans,and there mustbe no negotiations with anyoneat all withoutmy personal authorization.”

THE FINAL PHASE: THE PERIOD FROM THE SUMMER O F 1973O N The bilateralmilitaryrelationship that had begunsopromisingly had thus beenbroughtto an end.Thedecisionto do sohadbeenmadefor reasons of generalpolicy:Pompidou’s February1,1974,“testament” makesthisquite clear.Whathadhappened? It shouldbe recalled,firstof all, thatthe Soviets on the prevention of nuclear andtheAmericans hadsignedan “agreement war”duringBrezhnev’s visitto the UnitedStatesin June1973.According to thatagreement, the two signatories wouldnot threatenoneanotheror use forceagainstoneanother,andtheywouldconsultwith eachotherif there wasa dangerof nuclearwaror if therewasa riskthata conflictbetweentwo otherpowersmightleadto nuclearwar.It wasthislastpointespecially that in thiscontextthatas causedconcernin Paris.It is importantto remember lateasSeptember 15, 1972,Kissingerhadassured Pompidou thattheagreementproposed by Moscowwouldhaveonly a very generalscope;Washingtonwas,in fact,awareof the“condominium” overtones of theSovietproposal. But as it turned out, the Sovietshad held out for a more precisely-worded text,andduringa meetingwith Brezhnevin Moscowin earlyMay 1973,theAmericans gaveway andagreedthatthetwo countries wouldact in concertanddo everything theycouldto preventthe riskof a nuclearwar developingfrom a conflictbetweenthird parties.’17The text wentwell beyondwhattheAmericans hadoriginallyhadin mind,andthe Frenchdislikedwhatit seemed to imply:Pompidou, ashewroteto Nixonon July13,sawthedangerof a “kindof tutelage” beingimposed on Europe.”* His suspicion thatsomesortof US.-Sovietcondominium wastakingshape, whichhadbeenpartiallyallayedby hisMay 18meetingwith Kissinger, now welledup again.Whatgaveparticular forceto thatfearin Pariswastheway all of thesedevelopments-the“prevention of nuclearwar”agreement, the SALT talksandwhattheyimpliedaboutthedilutionof theAmericannuclear guarantee to Europe,theMBFR talks,which,it wasfeared,mightendup giving the USSR an importantright of oversightover centralEurope-all seemedto fall intoa pattern.“Everything washappening,” the foreignminof isterwrote,“asthoughthe Russians andAmericans were in the process definingtherulesof a worldwidegamein whichtheywouldbe theonlyreal players.” “In thisframework,” he thought,“eachsuperpower seemswilling to grantthe otherthe rightto reorganize its own camp.”119 CertaindistinctivelyGaullistwaysof lookingat thingshadthusresurfaced in Paris.

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But the developing U.S.-Soviet relationship was not the only problem here,andsoonotherissues werelinkedto it-especiallytheAmericanplan for a “Common Declaration of Principles fortheAtlanticAlliance.” On thisissue,theAmericans miscalculated. Theythoughtthatthe French,eversince Reykjavik,acceptedthe US. plan in principle-that they wishedonly to makesurethatthisbusiness did notappearto be tiedto NATO, butwasinsteaddealtwith in a seriesof bilateraldiscussions. Kissinger, moreover, in generaltendedto thinkthattheFrenchgovernment’s reserved attitudewith regardtotheJune22 agreement andto theproposed AtlanticCharterwasfor publicconsumption only,anddid not reflecttheactualthinkingof thegovas ernment.lzO But in Paris,the realissueposedby theAtlanticDeclaration, Jean-Bernard Raimondstressed in a July4, 1973,memorandum for thepresident,wassubstantive andnotjusta question of procedure. Kissinger’s draft declaration gavetheUnitedStatestheleadingrolein everyareaof policy.It implieda de fact0returnof Franceto NATO, andit wouldleadthe EEC to giveup anyhopeof “gradually establishing its ownautonomy or of creating a politicalpersonality of itsownvis-3-vistheUnitedStates.” Kissinger’s concernwasto maintainAmericanleadership in a periodof profound change in international relations,but his planneddeclaration was not “acceptable.” TheFrenchresponse shouldnot,however,Raimondthought, be purelynegative:“themaintenance of westernsolidarityis necessary for us.”The solutheistionmightbe for Franceto presenta draftof its ownasan alternative: suemightwell be negotiable. The StateDepartment had in fact prepared anotherdraft that was “quitereasonable,” not as “ b a d for Franceas Kissinger’s. Kissinger’s “excessive” text did not necessarily reflecta fixed Americanposition.lZ1 And on October3, 1973,aftermeetingwith Pompidou thepreviousday, Jobertdid submitto theNorthAtlanticCouncila Frenchcounterproposal for a Fifteen-Power Declaration. lZ2The text reflected the Frenchgovernment’s basicthinkingon all of thekeyissues of theday.Theimportance of Atlantic solidarity andthecontinuing needfor anAmericantrooppresence in Europe werereaffirmed, andsowasthecontinuing needfor aneffectivenucleardeterrent.(Here againtheFrenchweretakinga standagainstwhattheysuspectedwas a tendencyon the Americans’part to move towarddenuclearization, something theyfearedtheSALT talksespecially mightleadto.) TheJobertdraftalsocalledonAmericato notlet Europebe exposed “toexternalpoliticalor militarypressure that might destroyits freedom.”This to thedefense againreflected theFrenchfearthattheAmericancommitment of Europewasweakening, andthattheAmericans weremovingawayfrom nucleardeterrence, a fearlinkedin theofficialmindat PariswiththeJune22 U.S.-Sovietagreement. TheJoberttext,moreover, explicitlyrecognized the importance of the Europeancontribution to the defenseof Europe-their as conventional contribution and,in two cases,their nuclearcontribution

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well. HeretheFrenchhadtwogoals.Firsttheywantedto securerecognition of thevalueof theirForcede Frappe-their nuclearstrikeforce-for the allianceasa whole.Theyalsowantedto giveformalexpression to the possibilitythatan essentially Europeandefensesystem-a systemwith a distinctly Europeanpoliticalpersonality-mighttake shapeat somepoint in the future, a possibility Jobertwould alsodiscussin his famousNovember21, 1973,speechto theWesternEuropeanUnion. The Frenchcounterproposal was a majorsuccess, a point that was obscuredat the timeby the crisesof autumn1973andwinter1973-1974, and by the much publicizedrivalry betweenKissingerand Jobert (which Kissinger, to my mind,alsooveremphasizes in hismemoirs).The Americans were,of course,well awareof thebasicallyveryGaullistsortof thinkingthat lay behindwhattheFrenchweredoingin thisarea,buttheyunderstood that the Frenchtext was the mostthey couldhopefor andthat it had “theimmenseadvantageof comingfrom the leadingNATO dissident.” They decidedat onceto withdrawthe Kissingerdraft,which openedthe way for Jobert’sdraft.lZ3 The Declarationon AtlanticRelationsthatwasfinallyadoptedafterPompidou’sdeathby theNorthAtlanticCouncilin OttawaonJune19,1974,was thusbasedessentially on a Frenchtext.Indeed,the firstten articlesin that documentwere carriedover almostverbatimfrom the Jobertdraft. The Frenchhadmanagedtheaffairbrilliantly.On theonehand,theyhadgotten rid of the objectionable Kissingerdraftandat the sametimetheyhadused the occasionto get the allianceto formallyacceptsomeof theirbasicpositionson nucleardeterrence, on detente,andon the “condominium” issue. And finally-and thisis lesswell-known-they hadreaffirmedthesolidarity of theallianceat whathappened tobe a crucialtime:beginning inJune1973, the Germangovernment (or at leastChancellor BrandtandForeignMinister Scheel)hadbeenconsidering thepossibility of establishing a new European securitysystem,a systemwhich,theyhoped,mightopentheway to German reunification; in thatcontext,theyhadsuggested to theFrenchthata purely Europeandefensesystemmightbe setup outsideof NATO.”* The Atlantic Declarationaffairthusprovidesa very strikingexampleof GeorgesPompidou’srationalized Gaullism:a toughdefenseof Frenchindependence, but a fundamental solidarity with the UnitedStatesin dealingbothwith the Soviet threatandalsowith the risk of a Germandrifttowardneutralism. The issueof a “newAtlanticCharter” hadthusbeenresolved, butthesame sortof problemsooncroppedup in anotherarea:the questionof relations betweenthe UnitedStatesandtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity. During the summerof 1973,the Belgiansand Germans,concernedaboutthe AtlanticCharternegotiations (which at the time were beingheld up by the French),hadproposedthat anotherdocumentbe draftedat the sametime, one dealingwith relationsbetweenthe UnitedStatesand the EEC. Their


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thinkingwas that therewere certainproblemsin US.-Europeanrelations thatwerenot coveredby theA l 1 i a n ~ eThe .l~~ Americans likedtheidea.They might have had to droptheir own ratherdemandingtext, but they might nowbeabletogetwhattheywantedthroughthebackdoor-that is,by having France’sCommonMarketpartnersput pressure on it in a purelyEuropeanframework.The U.S. authorities wantedthisdocumentin particularto reaffirmthe “centrality of transAtlantic relationships”; the documentshould to consultwith the UnitedStatesbeforeanyecoalsocallon theEuropeans nomicdecisionwasmadeby the EEC.’*(j The Frenchagreedthata U.S.-EEC declaration couldbe drafted,but only if a texton “European identity”wasworkedout at the sametime.The goal herewasto keepthatlatterissuefrombeingdilutedby toostronga doseof At1anti~ism.l~’ In fact,in the autumnof 1973,a new effortto “buildEurope” seemedin Paristo be theonlyway to dealeffectivelywith the uncertainties of the international situation-the onlyway, aboveall, to dealwith the Germansituation,with all of its ambiguities.lz8 At hisSeptember 27, 1973,press conference, Pompidouhad proposed thatthe Europeanheadsof stateand thewaystheymightcoopergovernment meeton a regularbasisto discuss ate politically,probablyadoptingone of JeanMonnet’sideas.On October 31, followinga councilof ministers meetingdevotedto thatquestion, PompidousentBrandta letterin whichhe laidouthisthinkingon thisissue.The headsof stateandgovernment, he thought,shouldmeetjustby themselves, with no agenda,forveryopendiscussions aimedat “harmonizing theirviews in theframeworkof politicalc ~ o p e r a t i o nThis . ” ’ ~French ~ initiativeledto the of the nine CommonMarketcountriesheld in Copensummitconference hagenon December15-16, 1973,a meetingthatwas the forerunner of the EuropeanCouncilof Headsof Stateand Government. On that occasion,a “Declarationon EuropeanIdentity”was adopted.The text affirmed“the closeties”betweenthe Nine andthe UnitedStatesandcalledfor thatrelationshipto becomeeven closer.But at the sametime, and in accordance with theFrenchthesis,it alsostatedthattheNineformeda “distinct andoriginalentity.”Thedocument laidoutthemainlinesof European policyonvariousworldproblems,includingdetente,theMiddle East,China,andunderdevelopment. The languagewasverygeneral,but the pointwas madethat Europewasnotjusta regionalpower. The October1973Yom KippurWar andthe oil crisisthatfollowed,as is well known,hada majorimpacton Franco-American relations.The French disagreed with America’s MiddleEastpolicyandwereagainsttheAmerican ideaof organizinga groupof oil-consuming countries. Thisissuecannotbe dealtwith in detailhere,but it shouldbe notedthatfor the French,Nixon’s January9, 1974,call for a conference in Washington on energyproblems was viewedas, amongotherthings,a way of revivingKissinger’s original plan for an AtlanticDeclaration.For them,America’sunderlyinggoal here

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wasto create“a UnitedStates/Europe/Japan community” underAmerican control.ButPompidou’s advisers at theElyskeweredividedastohowtorespond.Somethought Jobert shouldnot go to Washington, othersthought thathe couldbut shoulddo nothing more therethansimplydiscuss the issue;in no eventshouldthe meetingactuallysetup an organization of oilconsuming countries. In theend,at a February6 Councilof Ministersmeeting, Pompidoutook EdouardBalladur’sadviceand optedfor a relatively moderatecourseof action:Jobertwouldgo to the Washington conference five dayslater,but only for a simpleexchange of views.The government alsoannounced, moreover,that its “decision shouldnot be interpreted as implyingthat Franceagreedto the establishment, by a certainnumberof largeindustrialized countries, of an institutional framework for dealingwith a whole rangeof politicaland economicis~ues.”’3~ It is true that,in the wakeof the oil crisis,Francewasin a particularly weakposition; onJanuary 19, Parishadto leavetheEuropean monetary “snake” thathadbeenset up the previousyear and announced that the francwouldbe allowedto floatfor sixmonths.131 Thiswasa majorblowto France’s European policythe onlypolicy,it seemed, whichmightallowFranceto dealnot justwith thegrowingproblemwithWashington, butwith BonnandMoscowaswell. In March 1974, the questionof a US-EEC declaration returnedto center stage.Washington wason themarchagain,andpressed for a textthatwould reflectcertainAmericanviews.TheNine,theUS. government thought, should consult with theUnitedStatesbeforemakinganyimportant decision, andthe two sidesshouldwork out an “organicconsultative arrangement.” Michel Jobertandthepoliticaldirectorof theQuaidOrsay,Francois Puaux,thought thatthatbasicideaneededto be firmlyrejected.At most,a verylimitedversionof thatnotion-ne thatprovidedfor consultation on a simplecase-bycasebas&might be acceptable. Theywereprepared to takeh s lineevenif it ledto a crisis.Butat theElysCe,GabrielRobinthoughtthatwhilesafeguards werenecessary, a lessnegativeattitudewascalledfor. And that,it soonbecameclear,wasalsoPompidou’s view:whileFrancehadto be “fmn,”he also couldaccept“theprincipleof con~ultation.”’~~ As it turnedout,theplanfor a US.-EEC declaration wasput aside;it wasdecidedthatit wasenoughto includethesubstance of whathadbeenagreedon in Article11of theOttawaof June22, 1974.Thisarticlecalledfor “close consultation” between Americaand Europe:in theirdealings with eachother,eventstakingplacein otherpartsof the world,andthe linkagebetweensecurityquestions andeconomic questions,wouldeachbe takenintoaccount. And thatwasall thatremainedof Kissinger’s ambitious planfor a fundamental restructuring of the Atlanticalliance:in thistoneddownform,theideawasperfectlyacceptable to Paris.In thisareaaswell, final agreement wasreachedonlyafterPompidou’s death, buthehadclearedthewayforcompromise by accepting theprincipleof transAtlanticconsultation andby resisting thetemptation to escalate theconflict.

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Nevertheless, despitethissolutionto the problemof the U.S.-European declaration, Franco-American relationshad clearlydeteriorated sincethe summerof 1973.But at thesametime,theE1ysi.ewasgrowingincreasingly concerned aboutthegrowthof Sovietpowerandinfluence. It wasclearthat relationswith Moscowwere deteriorating; Sovietpressure on Francewas growing; thefactwasthattherealpartners of theUSSRin theWestwerenow the UnitedStatesandWest Germany.133 And yet, because Pompidouwas worriedaboutWest Germanyand unhappywith America,the sortof languagehe usedwith theSovietsremained rootedin theold Gaullistformulas aboutindependence andequidistance betweentheblocs.But thisveryfact suggested that Frenchpolicyhad reacheda certainimpasse-that France wasnowsomewhat isolated.’34 On October30, 1973,theStateDepartment notedthatParisandWashington had beenmovingapart;it was particularly criticalof France’sattitude duringtheMiddleEastcrisis.It listedfor Kissinger a wholeseriesof “possible pressurepointson France,”but madeit clear that the United States on thatcountry-if only neededto be verycarefulif it triedto putpressure because U.S. pressure mightbe usedto justlfytheFrenchpolicyof independencein theeyesof France’s European partners.135 In June1974,afterPompidou’sdeath,the StateDepartment reviewedthe recentcourseof FrancoAmericanrelations. The way it summedup whathadhappened wasby no meansentirelyoff-base. It notedhowrelations haddeteriorated sincethebeginningof 1973,how theFrenchattitudehadhardened, how neo-Gaullism wason therise,andhowFrenchpolicyhadcometo havea stronger “Euroit noted,hadevidently cometo theconclusion that pean”flavor.Pompidou, thosemorestrident Frenchgoals“couldbe reached onlyby adopting a more distantandsometimes hostilestance towardtheU.S.”136

CONCLUSION When GeorgesPompidoubecamepresidentof France,he had a certain senseof whathe wantedto accomplish. France,in hismind,wasonepoint in a triangle;its relations with theothertwo points-EuropeandAmericawere of fundamentalimportance, and each of thoserelationships was closelylinkedto the other.The goalwas to carveout a specialnichefor Francein thattriangularstructure-to allowFranceto playa centralrole,a pivotalrole,in theWesternworld,andthusin theworldasa whole.A sort of specialrelationship with theUnitedStateswasthusof majorimportance, andPompidouhadsoughtto improveFranco-American relations. His goal, in fact,hadbeento putthemon an entirelynewfooting. In 1970-1971, a real Franco-American understanding of thissort-a faron political,economic, andmilitaryissues-did not reachingunderstanding

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seemby anymeansoutof thequestion.Nixonwasin effectpreparedto acceptthepragmaticGaullismof hispartner;he waswillingto view Franceas an importantlink betweenthe UnitedStatesandEurope.But theattemptto reachsuchan understanding was to fail-the December1971AzoresConferencewas the key turningpoint here-and it failedfor essentially structuralreasons. To be sure,problems like thenuclearquestionandthemonetaryquestion wereinherentlycomplex,andtheirverycomplexitymadecompromise difficult.But the fundamental problemwas politicalin nature.Pompidouwas more“Gaullist” thanwasoftenthoughtat the time,andwasnot inclinedto maketheslightest concession whenthe principleof nationalindependence was involved.Nor was he preparedto cooperatewithin the NATO framework exceptwithinvery narrowlimits,or to acceptan international monetaryagreement thatgaveAmericaa privilegedpositionbutgaveFrancenoththeycertainlyhada morepositive ing in return.As for Nixon andKissinger, attitudetowardFrancethanKennedyandJohnson hadhad,butdespitetheir proclaimed visionof a multipolarworldin whichEuropewouldplayitsrole, theyneverin realityabandoned the notionof a U.S.-ledAtlanticworld. But therewere alsocauseshavingto do with the changinginternational situation. The crisesof the autumnof 1973playeda certainrole.And there was the more basicfact that with the end of the VietnamWar, with the changes producedby theNixonshocksof 1971,with theSALT talksandimprovedUS.-Sovietrelations, theUnitedStateshadlessneedfor Frenchhelp. It couldnowpursuea moreunilateralpolicybothin Europeandin theworld asa whole,andcouldaffordto be lessaccommodating towardFrance.From thatpointon, US. policytowardthe SovietUnionandChinawas far more importantthananythingelse;as the globalsystemwasrecast,America’sallies had to be kept on a shortleash;the politicaldevelopment of an economicallypowerfulEuropeanCommunity alsohadto be keptundercontrol. of the internaBut Pompidou,at thesametime,facedwith the uncertainties tionalsituation,andconcerned in particularaboutSoviet,andGerman,policy, was drawnbackto a morepurelyGaullistconception of what French foreignpolicyshouldbe. But in spiteof everything, GeorgesPompidouneverwanteda breakwith Washington. Evenat theworstmoments(theautumnof 1973andthewinter of 197519741,hisinstinctwasto reachfor compromise. In comparison with other French leaders-Michel Jobert,for instance-his inclinationwas to take a relativelymoderateline. And his policyof rapprochement with Washington did bearfruit afterhisdeath.Nuclearcooperation wasresumed by his successors; the Ottawa agreementwas signedin June 1974; the Valentin-Ferber accords,the productof talksthat had beengoingon since signedby thecommander 1972,weresignedonJuly3, 1974.Thoseaccords, of the Frencharmedforcesin EuropeandtheNATO commander for central

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Europe,extended the 1967Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement to theentireFrench forcein Europe,whichhadappliedonlyto Frenchforcesin Germany.137 RelationsbetweenFranceandNATO remaineddefinedby thesetextsuntilthe 1980s. More generallyspeaking, onehasthe sensethatthe heartof Pompidou’s policy,the goal of bringingthe variouskey elementsof Frenchforeign policy-policy towardWashington, towardMoscow,towardBonn,toward theAlliance,andtowardEurope-into balancewith eachother,wasnot in anyfundamental way repudiated by hissuccessors. His basicvisionof a rationalizedGaullism,but onethat did not rejectthe ideaof goodrelations on a biwith Americaon principle,onethatsoughtto putthatrelationship lateral,ratherthanonan “Atlantic,” basis,remained at thecoreof Frenchforeignpolicyfor the restof the ColdWar period.Pompidouinfluenced even was thestyleof Frenchdiplomacy in the1970sand1980s:hisbasicapproach carriedoverevenintothesortof language thatwastypicallyused;it wasembodiedin the way Frenchofficialsreflexivelyreactedto developments. His policywasnuanced; therefore, its impactmightat timesbe hardto detect. But in fundamental terms,hisinfluence waslasting.

NOTES 1. G.-H. Soutou,“La Franceet 1’Allianceatlantiquede 1949 P 1954,”Cahiemdu Centred’Etudesd’Hktoiredela Dqense,3 (1997). 2. See Georges-HenriSoutou,L ’Alliance incertaine: Les rapportspoliticostratggiques franco-allemands, 1954199G(Paris:Fayard,1996). 3. For Pompidou’s foreignpolicyand his relationswith the Americans, seeEric Georges Pompidou(Paris:J. C. LattGs,19941,andAssociation GeorgesPomRoussel, Complexe,1995), especially Pierre pidou,GeorgesPompidouet I’Europe(Brussels: Mitlandri’sessay,“UnerelationtrGsspeciale: la France,les Etats-Uniset 1’Anni.ede I’Europe,1973-1974.”For Franco-American militarycooperation in thePompidou period, seePierreMitlandri,“Aux originesde la coopitration nuclitairefranco-amitricaine,”in La Franceet I’Atome(Brussels: Bruylant,1994).Thebasicmemoirsources importance here:HenryKissinger,WhiteHouseYears are obviouslyof fundamental (Boston:Little, Brown, 1979); Henry Kissinger,Yearsof Upheaval(Boston:Little Brown,1982);MichelJobert,Mhoiresd’uvenir(Paris:Grasset,1974); and Michel JobertL’autreregard(Paris:Grasset, 1976). 4. SeeSoutou,L’Allianceincertaine. 5. Ibid., andprivatearchives. 6. Box 1040,fonds5AG2, Archivesnationales, Paris.Thissourcewill henceforth be citedin theform:5AG2/1040. 7. InstitutCharlesde Gaulle,L’aventuredela Bombe(Paris:Plon,19851,210-211. 8. Alain Peyrefitte,C’6taitde Gaulle,vol. 1 (Paris:de Fallois/Fayard, 19941,339; andCyrusL. Sulzberger, A n Age of Mediocrity(New York: Macmillan,1993) 133 (a veryusefulsource).

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9. Sulzberger, Ageof Mediocrity, 406. 10. Ibid., 216217. 11. Philippede SaintRobert,Le secretdesjours(Paris:J. C. Lattgs,19951,33. 12. SeeKissinger, whiteffouse Years,106-111. 13. Americanembassy in Paristo StateDepartment, April 3, 1969;andSonnenfeldt to Kissinger, April 8, NationalSecurityCouncilFiles(NSCF),box674, folder“France, vol. I,’: Nixon Presidential Materials(NPM), U.S. NationalArchives,CollegePark, Maryland.Henceforthcitedin the form:NSCF/674/Francevol. I. 14. Kissinger memorandum, April 15, 1969(approvedby the president); andnote April 22, 1969,NSCF/674/Francevol. 11. Secretary of Stateto Kissinger, 15. Martin Hillenbrand(AssistantSecretary of Statefor EuropeanAffairs) memocovering note,May randumfor thepresident, April 29, 1969,Kissingerto Hillenbrand 3, 1969, thanking Hillenbrand for the memorandumon Nixon’s behalf, NSCF/674/France vol. 11. 16. Kissinger to Nixon,April 28, 1969,NSCF/674/Francevol. 11. 17. Pompidou-Shriver meeting,July23, 1969,5AG2A022. 18. Pompidou-Rogers meeting,December8, 1969,5AG2/1022. vol. 19. Parisembassy to StateDepartment, November8, 1969,NSCF/676/France, IV. 20. G.-H. Soutou,“L‘attitude deGeorges Pompidou facei l’Allemagne,” in Georges Pompidou et I’Europe. 21. See,for example,the conversation betweenSecretary of StateRogersandAndr6 Fontaineof Le Monde,December15, 1969,in NSCF/676/Francevol. N. 22. H. Froment-Meurice, Vudu Quai;Mbmoires19451983(Paris:Fayard,1998), 321ff. Meetingof Kissinger with MauriceSchumann (Frenchforeignminister),September22, 1972,and notefrom Kissingerto Nixon concerning a conversation betweenGeneralWaltersandPompidou,October30, 1972,both in NSCF/679/France vol. x. 23. C. Ockrent,Comtede Marenches, Dunsle secretdesprinces(Paris:Stock, 1986),1OOff. 24. Pompidou-Rogers meeting,December8, 1969,5AG2/1022andParisembassy to StateDepartment,December12, 1969, Subject-Numeric Files for 1967-69,box of State,RecordGroup(RG) 59, 2103,POL FR-US 1/1/69, Recordsof theDepartment U.S. NationalArchives,CollegePark,Maryland.Thatlattersourcewill henceforth be cited in the followingform: Subject-Numeric Files 1967-69/2103/RG59. Notesof Jean-Bernard Raimond,diplomatic adviserat theElysCe,for thepresident of November 18,1969,andJanuary21, 1970,5AG2/1041. 25. Pompidouto Nixon,July1, 1972,5AG2/1021. 26. Pompidou-Shriver meeting, July23, 1969,5AG2/1022;andmeetingof Schriver with Beaumarchais, politicaldirectorat the Quai dOrsay,July 29, 1969, Subjectof MichelJobert,Secretary Generalof NumericFiles1967-69/2103/RG 59. Comments the Elysee, in Paris embassyto State Department,November 8, 1969, NSCF/676/France vol. N. Note from Michel Debri.,Ministerof Defense,for Pompidouin February1970,5AG2/1021. 27. Memorandum of conversation, June27, 1969,NSCF/675/France vol. 111. 28. Kissinger-Shriver-Sonnenfeldt meeting, June27, 1969,NSCF/675/France vol. 111.


197

29. One high Pentagonofficial,for example,thoughtthat the Frenchoughtto be askedto reimburse the UnitedStatesfor the relocationcostsFrance’s departure from the NATO military organizationhad causeda few yearsearlier.He also thoughtthe questionof the useof Frenchmilitaryfacilitiesby the UnitedStatesin an emergency shouldbe broughtup with Pompidou,andwas reluctantto share advancedAmerican computertechnologywith the French. David Packard (DeputySecretary of Defense)memorandum for thepresident, February12, 1970, NSCF/676/France vol. V. 30. For a full accountof the trip,seeRoussel, Pompidou, 349-367. 31. Seethefile for thetrip, 5AG2/1022. 32. Annotations on a noteof Jean-Louis Lucetof February11,1970,5AG2/1022. 33. Quotedin Roussel, Pompidou, 362-364. on a noteof June29, 1969,andthe entirefile, 5AG2/1040. 34. Annotation 35. Conversation with Shriver, July23, 1969. 36. SeeRoussel, Pompidou, 366367. after the meeting,Nixon statedthat he was very 37. In privateconversations pleased.SeeSulzberger, Ageof Mediocrity, 614-615. 38. Roussel, Pompidou, 350ff. 39. Kissinger to Nixon,November11, 1970,beforeNixon’smeetingwith Pompidouat de Gaulle’sfuneral;anda memorandum fromKissinger for Nixon of January 25, 1971,NSCF/677/France vol. VII. 40. Lucetto MauriceSchumann, April 14, 1970,5AG2/1021. 41. SeeSoutou,“L‘attitude de GeorgesPompidoufaceP 1’Allemagne.” 42. Pompidou-Brezhnev conversation, October13, 1970,5AG2/1018. Ageof Mediocrity, 690. 43. Sulzberger, onJuly26, 1971,telegram,5AG2/1041.For a complete 44. Pompidouannotation dossierdealingwith a possible Sovietintervention in Yugoslavia(datedFebruary21, 19721,see5AG2/1040. 45. See,for example,the conversation betweenSovietambassador to ParisZorin andMichelDebre,Ministerof Defense,January16, 1971,5AG2/1018. 46. NSCF/676/France vol. V. 47. Lairdto Kissinger, April 2, 1970,enclosing draftmemorandum for thepresident on “Possible Assistance to FrenchBallisticMissileProgram,” NSCF/676/France vol. VI. 48. 5AG2/1041. 49. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, June23, 1970,NSCF/677/Francevol. VI. 50. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger,December11, 1970,NSCF/677/France vol. VII. 51. NSCF/677/France vol. VI. 52. Kissinger to Nixon,January25, 1971,NSCF/677/France vol. VII. 53. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, January9, 1971,NSCF/677/France vol. VII. 54. Kissingerto Nixon,March25, 1971,NSCF/677/France vol. VII, and Kissinger to the Secretaries of StateandDefense,April 15, 1971,NSCF/678/Francevol. VIII. 55. MichelDebri.,Ministerof Defense,to Pompidou,early1972,5AG2/1040. 56. Packardto Kissinger,May 25, 1971,NSCF/678/Francevol. VIII. 57. Debri.to Pompidou, early1972,citedin n. 55. 58. 5AG2/1040. 59. Debri.to Pompidou, early1972,citedin n. 55.

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60. Bergsten to Kissinger, onFrenchgoldpurchases, December10,1970,anda series of documents relatingto the visit to Washington of Hewe Alphand,Secretary December Generalof the Quai dOrsay,in particularto hismeetingswith Kissinger, 10 and 11, 1970,all in NSCF/677/Francevol. VII. 61. Seetheentirefile in 5AG2/1041. 62. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, August3, 1970,NSCF/677/Francevol. VI. 63. FrancoisdeRosenotes,February1 andSeptember 22, 1971,5AG2/1041. 64. Pompidouannotation on the noteon the September 22, 1971,de Rosenote, 5AG2/1041. 65. Annotationon a note from Jean-Bernard Raimondof January28, 1971, 5AG2/1041. 66. Notefrom Pompidou’s privatestaff,February22, 1971,5AG2/1041. 67. Annotationof GeorgesPompidouof May 13, 1971,5AG2/1041. 68. Jean-Bernard Raimondto Pompidou,October8, 1971,5AG2/1018. 69. Jean-Louis Lucetto Pompidou, January12, 1973,5AG2/1041. 70. Pompidou-Brezhnev meeting,October29, 1971, 5AG2/1018; and a remark Pompidouprivatelymadeto thejournalistAndreFontaine,quotedin Roussel, Pompidou,394. 71. G.-H. Soutou,L’Allianceincertaine, 301-305. directorfor Asia at the Quai d’Orsay,of July 72. Note of Henri Froment-Meurice, 19, 1971,5AG2/1021. 73. Raimondto Pompidouon December7, 1941,5AG2/1022. 74. For the minutes,see5AG2/1022.For anothercopy,seeRoussel,Pompidou, 464ff. For the Americanminutes,seeWilliam Burr,ed., 7heKissingerTranscripts, (New York:The New Press,1998),33ff. 75. On theseissues,the bestaccountis thatof J. Denizet,Le Dollar(Paris:Fayard 1985). 76. SeeRobertLitwak,BtenteandtheNixonDoctrine(Cambridge UniversityPress, 19841,136-137; William Bundy,A TangledWeb:7heMakingof ForeignPolicyin the NixonPresidency, (London:Tauris,198),261-269; Denizet,LeDollar, 109125. 77. 5AG2/1021 78. 5AG2/1021 79. 5AG2/1011. of State,September 20, 1972,POL FR-US 1-10-72, 80. Parisembassyto Secretary Subject-Numeric Files197&73/2278/RG 59. 81. 5AG2/1040. 82. Debre-Kissinger meeting,July 11, 1972, NSCF/678/Francevol. M; Debri. to Pornpidou, July 13, 1972,5AG2/1040. 83. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, September 7, 1972,NSCF, HenryA. Kissinger Office Files(HAK OfficeFiles),box 24. 84. An accountof the meetingis in 5AG2/1018. 85. 5AG2/1021. 86. Conversation of Kissinger with theFrenchambassador of September 7, 1972; anda noteof September 3, NSCF/HAK OfficeFiled24 87. Raimondto Pompidou,September 12, 1972,5AG2/1021. 88. Roussel, Pompidou, 524-528.


199

89. Debrk-Kissinger meeting,July7, 1972,citedin n. 82 above;Pompidouannotation,December28, 1972,5AG2/1041. 90. Parisembassyto Secretaryof State,January1, 1973 (an importantgeneral overview),POL FR-US 1-10-73,Subject-Numeric Files1970-73/2278/RG59. 91. Ibid. TheJanuary1 documentwasveryclearon thatsubject. 92. On theproblematic of the“Yearof Europe”asan issuein Franco-American relations,seeMklandri,“Unerelationtr6sspkciale.” 93. Bundy,A TangledWeb,41-19. 94. Noteof May 3, 1973,for Pompidou,5AG2/1021. toJobert,May 4, 1973,5AG2/1021. 95. Kosciusko-Morizet 96. Raimondto Pompidou,May 10, 1973,5AG2/1021. 97. File sentby Kosciusko-Morizet toJoberton May 11,5AG2/1023. 98. Ibid. 99. OlivierWormernote,May 10 (returningto the gold standardwould be no moredifficultfor Washington thangoingto seeMao!), 5AG2/1023. 100. 5AG2/1022. 101. See,for example,thenotesof Kissinger’s meetingwith Mao onNovember12, Transcripts, 179-199. 1973,in Burr,Kissinger Pompidou:Ice102. Kissingermemorandum for Nixon, “Meetingwith President land,”n.d.,but writtenin lateMay 1973,NSCF/949/Pompido~-Nixon meeting. 103. Two notesfromRaimondfor Pompidouof May 18and29, 1973,5AG2/1021. 104. For a typicalexample,seeSaintRobert,Lesecretdesjours. 105. Roussel, Pompidou, pp. 548-549. 106. Pompidouto Heath,June29, 1973,5AG2/1040. 107. 5AG2/1021. internationale 108. Seemy comments in RaymondAron,Lesarticlesdepolitique dansLe Figarode1947a 1977,vol. 111, LesCrises@vrier1965a avril1977),presentationandnotesby G.-H. Soutou(Paris:Editionsde Fallois,19971,29-31. 109. The minutescanbe foundin 5AG2/1023.SeeRoussel, Pompidou, 549-571. 110. Thiswasthe 10A.M. session onJune1;thenotesarein 5AG2/1023. 111. SeeKissinger’s pre-Reykjavik memorandum for Nixon,citedin n. 102 above. 112. Thirdsession, June1, 10 o’clock,citedin n. 110. 113. Minutesof two meetingswith Kissinger,Secretaryof DefenseSchlesinger, andGeneralWalters,July27 andAugust31, 5AG2/1040. 114. Minutes in 5AG2/1023, and publishedby Roussel,Pompidou,611. On this whole affair, seeMklandri, “Aux originesde la coopkration nucleairefrancoamkricaine.” Mislandriwonderswhetherdespitethisdeadlock,the two sidescontininformation in deepsecrecy, evenduringPresident Pompidou’s time. uedto exchange The Frenchand Americandocuments now availablelead me to think that the exchanges aboutnuclearmissilesandwarheads did in factstop,andthatthiswasrelated to thegeneraldeterioration of Franco-American relations fromthesummerof 1973on. 115. Two notesfromGeneralThenoz,headof theprivatestaffat theElyske,of October30 andDecember5, 1973,with the president’s annotations, 5AG2/1040. 116. 5AG2/1040. Yearsof Upheaval, 274-286. 117. Kissinger, 118. 5AG2/1021.

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119. Notefromthe Ministerof ForeignAffairs,June20, 1973,5AG2/1019. 120. Kissinger to Nixon,June29, 1973,NSCF/679/Francevol. XI. 121. 5AG2/1021. 122. 5AG2/1021. 123. Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger,October3, 1973,NSCF/679/France vol. XI. 124. Soutou,“L’attitude de GeorgesPompidouface2 I’Allemagne.”I cannotdisand cussthe detailsof theGermanpositionat thetime,whichwasverycomplicated evencontradictory-a positionrootedin Atlanticismbutat thesametimetemptedby neutralism. But thesecontradictions themselves worriedParisa greatdeal. Yearsof Upheaval,183ff. 125. Kissinger, 126. Walter Stoessel to Kissinger,October5, 1973,POL FR-US 1-10-73,SubjectNumericFiles 1970-73/2278/RG59. to Kissinger, September 20, 1973,NSCF/679/France vol. X I . 127.Sonnenfeldt 128. SeeSoutou,“L’attitude de GeorgesPompidoufacei I’Allemagne.” 129. 5AG2/1009. of January10, 130. Note fromGabrielRobin(Jean-Bernard Raimondssuccessor) 1974,for Balladur,with Balladur’s annotations, andannexes,5AG2/1021. 131.Jobert,Memoires d’avenir,283-287. 132. Puauxnotesof March19 and20, 1974,andRobinnoteof March28, andannotations by Pompidou, 5AG2/1021. 133. GabrielRobinnotesof February13andMarch6, 1974,5AG2/1019. on 134. The notesof his meetingswith Brezhnevon thissubject(in Pitsounda March12 and 13, 1974)areveryrevealing.Theyareto be foundin 5AG2/1019. 135. GeorgeSpringsteen to Kissinger, October30, 1973,POL FR-US 1-10-73,SubjectNumericFiles197&73/2278/RC 59. 136. StateDepartment BriefingPaper,“Issues andTalkingPoints:U.S.-FrenchRelations,June1974,”ExecutiveSecretariat, BriefingBooks1958-76, box 190,“Secretary’sTrip to MoscowandEurope25 June1974-9 July,10thof 10,”RG 59, U.S. NationalArchives. 137. Fri.di.ricBozo,La Franceet I’OTAN(Paris:Masson,19911,117.

Index

AachenKarlsPrize,67 AtomicEnergyCommission, 45 Acheson,Dean:concerns with an “old Atomsfor Peace,136 AzoresConference, 173-76, 194 Germanpower,”10;hardline characteristics of, 17-20, 29n68, 29n73,30n86;proposalof a German BadEms,67,72 rearmament by, 1-2, 4, 5-6,7, 1C-11, Ball, George,100,106-7, 109,111-15 20, 30n87;on the StateDepartment Balladur,Edouard,182, 192 “package plan,”6, 24n24 Bankof France,105 Adenauer,Konrad:on theAmerican Bathel,Charles,ix Bator,Francis,134 planfor rearmament, 4; concerns Wilfrid, 102,104 with the U.S. monetarycrisis,105;on Baumgartner, BavarianChristianSocialUnion(CSU), a European“thirdforce,”72, 73; asa foundingfatherof a “coreEurope,” 67 Bellanca,Gus,89 66; on the “RadfordPlan,”4647; speakingat Bad Ems,67-68;during Berard,Armand,4, 231114 Bernard,Jean-Re&,175 the SuezCrisis,41, 48, 51, 52, 53, Bevin,Ernest,1 601172 Bidault,Georges, 68 Ailleret,Charles,159 Ailleret-Lemnitzer accords,164,169,195 Blancard, Jean,167, 169,176,185 Blankenhorn, Herbert,4, 73, 143 Airbus,147,148 Amalgamated ClothingWorkers(ACW), Blessing, Karl, 133, 151n27 Bourges-Maunoury, Maurice,50 89, 91 “Americafactor,”vii Bradley,Omar:concerns with a German Anglo-American Nassauaccords,159 10-11;on a East-West rearmament, militarybalance,2; on the hard-line Ariane, 147 characteristics Assemblke Nationale,74 of Acheson,17;work Assemblyof the Councilof Europe,64 on the EightQuestions document AtlanticAlliance,72 by, 15 201

202

Index

Brandt,Willy, 141,144,165,191 BrettonWoodssystem: American vulnerability with, 99, 101,107,112; of, 118,128, 142, discontinuation 173, 174;Kennedyadministration trade andthe,ix, 116;multilateral andcurrencyconvertibility in, 38; politicalcharacter in the, 129; privileges of the dollarandsterling in the, 104;transatlantic monetary policyandthe, 129,150n9 Brezhnev,Leonid,166,177, 188 Britain:in theAtlanticalliance,3; policy towardItaly, 87-89;technological independence in, 14546 BritishLabourParty,87-89, 91 Brussels Treatyof 1948,9 Bulganin,Nikolai,33 Bundy,McGeorge,19, 107,115 Byroade,Henry,8-9, 10, 13-14 CatholicChristianDemocrats, 70, 73 CatholicPeople’sParty,67 CentralIntelligence Agency(CIA), 3, 89 CentredesHautesEtudesMilitaires,159 Charlemagne, 67 Christian Abendland, 67, 68, 791-116 ChristianDemocrats: attitudes toward the U.S. duringthe ColdWar, 64-82; on a “coreEurope,”66, 69, 71, 72, andviewsof 76; on decolonisation theThird World,75, 76, 77; detente initiatives of, 74; on a European “thirdway”of policies,70-71, 72, 77; role in Italianpolitics,83-84,83-94 “Christian West,”68 “Christmas programme,” 70 Churchill,Winston,73 “Clydesdale” plan,86, 95n3 coefficientde trksorerie,103 Cornitt?dedkfensenationale,45 Commission on ForeignEconomic Policy(CFEP),38 CommonAgricultural Policy(CAP), 71, 143,161 of Principles for “Common Declaration theAtlanticAlliance,”189

Comsat,139 Concorde, projectof, 146 Conference on Securityand Cooperation in Europe(CSCE), 178 Connally, John,141 constructivist view,definitionof, 64 containment, strategy of, 17 Cooperation in ScienceandTechnology (COST), 148 CoppC,Albert,75,76 “coreEurope,” 66, 69, 71, 72-73 Advisors(CEA), Councilof Economic 100,112, 113 Cuba,76, 117 currency swap,102, 115,120n14 Czechoslovakia, 160 Debre,Michel, 103,176,177 of AtlanticRelations,190 Declaration on EuropeanIdentity,”191 “Declaration DefenseWhitePaper,187 de Gasperi,Alcide.SeeGasperi,Alcide de de Gaulle,Charles.SeeGaulle,Charles de “Demagnetize” plan,86, 95n3 Dillon,Douglas,104, 105,114-17, 130 Don Carnilloe Peppone, 73 Dulles,JohnFoster,68 Durand,Dana,89 Eden,Anthony,50 EightQuestions document,14-15, 26271144 Eisenhower, DwightD.: Acheson’s of opinionof, 17-18; endorsement “Trade,not Aid,”38;“NewLook militarystrategy by, 37; nuclear cooperation with alliesby, 135-36; policytowardItaly by, 84, 85, 86-87, 90, 92; on a WestEuropean bloc,37 encadrernent du crkdit,103 EnteNazionaleZdrocarburi(ENI), 87, 95n9 Erhard,Ludwig,40, 51, 70, 133 Esteva,Pierre,108 “Eurafrican” bloc,43

Index “Euroafrica,” 75 Europa-Union, 74 “European Abendland,” 68, 79n16 EuropeanAtomicEnergyCommunity (EURATOM): agreements with the U.S., 136, 137; duringthe SuezCrisis, 38, 41, 46, 48, 51-52

EuropeanChristianDemocrats. See ChristianDemocrats EuropeanCoal andSteelCommunity (ECSC),34, 37, 64, 71 EuropeanCouncilof Headsof Stateand Government, 191 EuropeanDefenseCommunity (EDC), 34, 69, 72, 74

“European DefenseForce,”9 EuropeanEconomic Community (EEC): ChristianDemocratmembership in, 64, 71; CommonAgricultural Policy of, 161, 178; concerns with the AdanticCharter,19C-92; events position leadingto, 33-34; France’s in, 173 Europeanintegration, originsof, viii EuropeanLauncher Development Organisation (ELDO), 138, 147, 148 Europeanmonetaryunion,144, 154n83 EuropeanPayments Union(EPU), 36, 39

203

with the BrettonWoodssystemof payment,99-125; on German rearmament, 2, 4-5; impactof the SuezCrisis,3 5 3 6 , 48-53; policiesand economic order, rolein European 39-40; rejection of theEuropean 39; relations DefenseCommunity, with theUS. andEurope,157-200; response to NATO’snuclearization 43-46; technological strategies, independence in, 146-47 Franco-German Treatyof Friendship, 109

FrancZoneof trade,36 FreeTradeArea,35, 37, 39, 40, 42, 49, 51

FrenchDefenseCouncil,186 “A FreshApproachto the Gold Problem,”111 Galley,Robert,185, 186 Gasperi,Alcidede:asa Christian 83-84; asa Democratcandidate, foundingfatherof “coreEurope,”66; role againstItaliancommunists by, 86; successors of, 91 Gaulle,Charlesde:challenge toward a U.S. detente,90; relations with the U.S., 158, 159; rolein Franco-American monetarydispute,

EuropeanPeople’s Party(EPP),64 EuropeanSpaceResearch Organisation 99, 102, 105, 132 Gavin,Francis,x i (ESRO), 138 EuropeanUnion(EU), 149 Gavin,JamesM., 1 3 6 3 7 Gehrz,Christopher, viii GeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade Fanfani,Amintore,70, 87, 128 (GAIT), 41, 76 Faure,Edgar,41 Faure,Jacques, 45 GenevaCircle,69, 73 Faure,Maurice,50 GermanChristianDemocratic Union F-104G Stagighter, 137, 147 (CDU), 67, 73 Fifteen-Power Declaration, 189 GermanSocialDemocratic Party,91 Germany,FederalRepublicof: “forward Flamer,Janet,33 defense” optionof, 43; joiningof Forcede Frappe,147, 190 NATO by, 41, 42; policiesandrolein Foster, John,167, 169, 176 Europeaneconomic order,4 U 2 ; Fourquet,M., 164, 166, 169 rearmament of, 1-11; relationships Fowler,Henry,114, 117, 132 with Franceby, 4-5; duringthe Suez France:Assernblke Nationalein, 74; Crisis,34-35, 40-43, 46-52 Comitede defensein, 45; concerns

204

Index

Gilpatric,Roswell,137 GiscarddEstaing, ValCry:role in Franco-American monetarydispute, 100, 106-12,114,116-18,1221143, 131;on the transatlantic monetary system,143,175 Gladstone, William, 21 Goldand theDollarCrisis(Triffin), 101 goldstandard, 101,120n10 of, 100,114, goldstandstill, agreement 115, 132 Goodpaster, AndrewJ., 164, 166, 169, 186 Gordon,Kermit,113 GreatSociety,131 GreenPool,40 Gromyko,AndreiA,, 177 Gronchi,Giovanni,87, 91, 94 Gruenther, Alfred,44

Johnson, LyndonB.: Acheson’s opinion of, 18;changesin transatlantic monetarypolicyby, 131,133-35; on spaceresearch, 138;workingwith Europeanallies,127-28 JointChiefsof StaffUCS), 5 , 12-13,

15-16

Journalof European Integration Histoy,ix

Kaiser,Wolfram,vii Katholieke Volkpartij(KVP), 70, 73 Kaysen,Carl, 111,113,115,116,117 Kennedy, JohnF.: Acheson’s opinionof, 18;changes in transatlantic monetary policyby, 13C-31; duringthe Franco-American monetarydispute, 100,101,102, 106-11, 115-18, 121n32;on a nonproliferation policy, 136;policytowardItaly by, 84, 89, TheHagueSummitMeeting,128,142, 138; 90, 91, 92; on spaceresearch, 144, 149 visitsto WesternEurope,127 Keynes, JohnM., 111 Hahn,KarlJosef,76 Kissinger, Henry:duringU S . relations Harriman,Averell,89 with Pompidou,160, 162-64,166, Heath,Edward,183 176, 179,180-85;on the “Yearof Heller,Walter,107, 109,113 Europe,”127,140 Heusinger, Adolf,47 Komer,Robert,89 Hungary,33, 74 KoreanWar: impacton European Huntington, Samuel,76-77 economy,36; outbreakof, 5, 7; role plan,’’13 in the“package “Instruction personnelle et secrete,187 Intelsat,139 Kosciusko-Morizet, Jacques, 179 International Courtof Justice,77 Kusters, HannsJurgen,34 International MonetaryFund(IMF), 106, Kyotoprotocol,77 112, 113,115,116,117 Islam,76-77 Laird,Melvin, 167 ItalianCommunist Party,91 Lamalle,DCsirC,71 ItalianSocialistParty(PSI), 84, 87 h t i nAmerica,76, 77 Italy, U S . ColdWar policywith,83-97 Lattre,Andrede, 108 Leddy,John,114,115,116 Jaguar,projectof, 146 Le Dqi ame‘ricain (Servan-Schreiber), Jobert,Michel:with PompidouandU S . 128, 145 relations,161,164,179, 182, 184, lefardeaualge‘rien,103 LeMonde,103 192,194;proposing the Fifteen Lenz,Otto,73 PowerDeclaration, 189,190 liberals,definitionof, 63 Johnson, Griffith,115, 116

Index Libya, 163 “LittleEurope,”39, 42, 50, 51 Lome,75 Luce,ClaireBooth,84-85,91 Lucet,Charles,165 Lynch,Frances, 34, 35 MacMahonlaw aboutatomicsecrecy, 177 MacMillan,Harold,104 Magistrati, Massimo,91 Mahan,Erin,ix Malraux,Andre,106 Marechalgroup,145,148 Marenches, Alexandrede, 161 Marjolin,Robert,50 MarshallPlan,38-39, 66, 71,104, 128 Martin,William, 114 Mattei,Enrico,87, 94 Maudling,Reginald,116 Maurin,Frangois,186 McCarthyera,73 McCloy,John,2-3, 13, 16, 281163 McNarnara,Robert,131, 133,136,137 Messrner, Pierre,186 Milward,Alan, 34, 48 missiles with multipleindependently targetedreentryvehicles(MIRVs), 185-86 M 4 missiles,185 Mollet, Guy: duringthe SuezCrisis,48, 49, 50,52; in supportof European integration, 41-42, 46, 56n31 Monnet,Jean,50 MonnetPlan,39 Moorer,Thomas,186 Moravcsik, Andrew,35 Moro,Aldo,70 MouvementRaublicainPopulaire (MRP), 67, 70,73,74 Miiller,Josef,75 MultilateralForce(MLF), 94, 136, 158, 159 MultipleRoleCombatAircraft(MRCA), 146,147,148 Murville,Couvede, 104,143

205

“mutualandbalancedforcereduction” (MBFR), 162,178 Napoleon,67 Nasser,GarnalAbdul,33 NationalSecurityCouncil(NSC), 89, 139, 168 NationalSecurityDecisionMemoranda, NSDM 103 and104, 168 NationalSecurityStudyMemorandum, NSSM 100,168 NATO: creationof a EuropeanDefense Forceby, 9-10, 25-26n36;debateof burden-sharing in, 74;on German rearmament, 1,3; MC-48 strategic doctrineof, 44, 46; militarysystem of, 2; MultilateralForce(MLF) in, 94, 136, 158,159;nuclearization strategies of, 42-46;Standing Group of, 47 Nenni,Pietro,84, 87,88-94 “NewLook militarystrategy, 37 New Yorkq33 New YorkTimes,46 Nicaragua, 76 TheNine CommonMarketcountries, 191 of Nitze,Paul:on a strategy containment, 17, 19, 20;work on the EightQuestions documentby, 14-15, 16 Nixon,RichardM.: Azoresmeetingwith Pornpidou by, 17576;changes in international monetarypolicyby, 140, 141;closingof the Bretton Woodssystemby, 101,128,142, 173; relations with Europeby, 127-28; trip to Chinaby, 141,173 Nixondoctrine,140,153116 Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT), 137 Norstad,Lauris,109 NorthAtlanticCouncil,190 NouvellesEquipesInternationales (MI), 64, 66, 71,75 NSAM 294, 167 NSC 68, 17

206

Index

NSC 82, 14-15, 15 NSC 5411/1, 85-86 NSC 6014,86, 95-14 nuclearcapability: cooperation between the U.S. andEurope,135-40;NATO nuclearization strategies for, 42-46; nucleartestbantreatyof 1963,137; US. nonproliferation policyof, 136, 153n41 Nuti, Leopoldo,ix

Psychological StrategyBoard,86 Puaux,FranGois,192 QuaidOrsay,182-83,192

Radford,ArthurW., 46 “Radford Plan,”46-47 Raimond, Jean-Bernard, 179, 180, 189 realists,definitionof, 63 relanceeuropkenne, 41 Reston, James,179 OffshoreProcurements (OSP),85 Reuther, Victor,89, 91 Organisation for European Economic Reuther, Walter,89, 91 Cooperation (OEEC),35, 36,41,42,66 RevuedeDgenseNationale,159 of EuropeanCooperation ReykjavikConference, Organization 179-85 andDevelopment (OECD), 108 Reynaud,Roger,75 Osgood,Robert,148 Robin,Gabriel,192 Ospolitik,140,144,164, 165,172, 173 Romania,166 Ottawaagreement of June1974,192 Roosa,Robert,102,104, 111,114-15, 130 “package plan,”originsof, 11-16 Rose,Frangois de, 171 ParisAccords, 34, 36, 41 Roziers,EtienneBurindes,104 PartiSocialChrktien(PSC/CVP),70 Rueff,Jacques, 102,lo%, 108,109, 117 Pella,Giuseppe, 91 Russia:in East-Westmilitarybalance,2; Pentagon, 5, 14, 168 GaloshABM systemof, 169;invasion Perkins,George,14 of Czechoslovakia, 160;suppression Pierre-Brossolette, Claude,108 of revolutionin Hungary,33 Pierrelatte, 147 Pinay,Antoine,102 Sassen, Emmanuel, 73 Pineau,Christian,50 Sassoon, Donald,91 Pitman,Paul,vii Scelba,Mario,91 of WestGerman Scheel,Walter,190 “Planfor Development SecurityForces,” 11,26n41 Schlesinger, ArthurM., Jr.,89, 90 Plowdenreport,146 Schryver, Augustde,76 Plutonmissiles,171 Schuman, Robert,1, 2, 8, 22-2317, 66, Poidevin,Raymond,3 74 Poland,74 Schuman Plan,69 Azoresmeeting Segni,Antonio,91 Pompidou,Georges: with Nixonby, 17576;foreign September 11,terroristattacksof, 77 policyof, 157-200;Middle Eastern Serrarens, P.J. S., 68 Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, 128-29, policyof, 163-64;objectiveof a 145,146 Europeanmonetaryunionby, 143, 144;“rationalized” Gaullismof, 160; Shriver,R. Sargent,161 duringthe SALT andMBFR talks, Smithsonian Agreement of December 171-72, 178;trip to Russiaby, 166 1971,174 Sociaal-Economische Raad(Social“Possibilities Plan,”44 PSI. SeeItalianSocialistParty(PSI) economicCouncil),70

Index Solomon,Robert,103 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut,168 Sorensen, Ted, 102 SouthEastAsia,ColdWar borderin, 131 Soutou,Georges-Henri, viii, ix, 231112 sozialeMarktwidscbajl,41 spaceprogram,138-39 SpaceShuttle,147 SpecialDrawingRights(SDR), 134 7beStatist,105 SterlingArea of trade,36 Strategic ArmsLimitationTalks(SALT), 162, 167, 168,177,186 Strauls,FranzJosef,46, 47, 51, 145 Strauss, Dominique,143 SuezCrisis,33, 34, 48-50, 52-53 C. L., 159 Sulzberger, “supranationalism,” 67 SupremeAllied Commander, Europe (SACEUR),44-45 surveillance multilat&ale,108 Taft, Robert,73 68, 69, 72 Teitgen,Pierre-Henri, Temple,Emmanuel, 45 ThirdWorld,37, 75, 76, 77 Tobin,James,107,109, 112-13 transatlantic monetarypolicy,129-35 Treatiesof Rome,vii “TriffinDilemma,”101 Triffin, Robert,101 Truman,HarryS: intervention on a policyof EuropeanDefenseand Germanrearmament, 11;on the “StateDepartment package” plan,7, 14;U.S. policytowardItaly,86

207

UnitedAutomobile Workers(UAW), 89 unit6de rkservecomposite (CRU), 110 of, UnitedStates: DefenseDepartment 6-7, 8-9, 14-15; StateDepartment of, 5-7, 9, 11-16, 168;Strategic Air Commandof,44 “US.-Soviet condominium,” 180,188, 190 Valentin-Ferber accords, 194 Valluy,Jean,44-45,47, 50 Van Zeeland,Paul,74 Vietnam,war in, 128,131,132, 134,135, 161,194 Volcker,Paul,131 von Brentano,Heinrich,50, 67 Walters,Vern A,, 177 WarsawPact,74 Welpolitik,51 Werner,Pierre,144 WernerPlan,144 WestGermany.SeeGermany,Federal Republicof Wilson,Harold,143,145 Wirtschaftwunder (economicmiracle), 70 World Bank,116 Wormer,Olivier,104,180 Yaounde,75 “Yearof Europe,”127,140,179 Yom KippurWar, 186,191 Yugoslavia, 166 Zijlstra,Jelle,72 Zimmermann, Hubert,viii


Aboutthe Contributors

FrancisJ. Gavinis an assistant professor of publicpolicyat theLyndonB. Johnson Schoolof PublicAffairsat theUniversityof Texasat Austin. ChristopherG e h nrecentlyreceivedhis Ph.D.fromYale Universityafter completing his dissertahon on “reeducation” in occupiedwesternGermany afterWorldWar 11. Wolfram Kaiser is a professorof Europeanstudiesat the Universityof Portsmouthin Britainand visitingprofessorat the Collegeof Europein Bruges,Belgium.

Erin R. Mahan, a historianat the U.S. Departmentof State,receivedher Ph.D.in HistoryfromtheUniversityof Virginiain May 2000. kopoldoNuti is a professor of the historyof international relationsat the Universityof Rome3. PaulM. Pitmanis a researchfellowat theMiller Centerof PublicAffairsat theUniversityof Virginia. George-HenriSoutouis a professor of contemporary historyat the Universityof ParisIV-Sorbonne. Marc Trachtenbergis a professorof politicalscienceat the Universityof Californiaat LosAngeles. HubertZimmermannis anassistant professor at theChairfor International Relations, Ruhr-University, Bochum. 209


Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War

Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War

Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War

The Baltic Question during the Cold War (Cold War History)

NATO enlargement during the Cold War: strategy and system in the Western alliance

The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946

The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance and the Emerging Cold War, 1943-1946

The United States and Europe after the Cold War: a new alliance?

Religion and the Cold War

Religion and the Cold War

Eisenhower and the Cold War

Corporations and the Cold War

Congress and the Cold War

After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy, Europe and Asia

Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Crisis and Containment, 1944–1948

The Cold War and Postwar America 1946-1963

The Presumed Alliance: The Unspoken Conflict Between Latinos and Blacks and What It Means for America

Allies At War: America, Europe and the Crisis Over Iraq

Memoranda During The War

Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II

Churchill's Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II

Europe, Cold War and Coexistence, 1955-1965 (Cass Series--Cold War History, 4)

The Ottoman Empire and early modern Europe

The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe

The press and the cold war

The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe

The War on Terrorism and the American 'Empire' after the Cold War

War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes' Athens

Pursuing Privacy in Cold War America

The Inevitable Alliance: Europe and the United States beyond Iraq

Mao's China and the Cold War

Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War