DITOR M V I D G.CHANDLER
THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP CENTRE
BAGRATION 1944 THE DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP CENTRE
STEVEN J ZALOGA
OPPOSITE
Two of the Red Army's finest commanders, Marshals Konsranrin Rokossovskiy (left) and Geoqi Zhukou (rixhtj. Rokossovskiy cotnmanded the 1st Ukrainian Front dunnx Operation Bagration, while Zhukou served as the STAVKA representative to the two southem fronts. (Sovfotoj
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48TH ARMY GenLt. P.L. Rornanenko 29th R i f l e C o r p s G e n M a j . A.M. Andieye" 102 RD. 217 RD
A r m y a r t i l l e r y 2 2 BlAD 6 l S T A R M Y G e n L r P.A. Beduv 9 t h G u a r d s Rifle C o r p s Gen.Maj. M.A. Popov 1 2 GRD, 212 RD 8 9 t h R i f l e C o r p s GenMqi. A.Ya.Yanourkiy 2 3 RD, 5 5 RD, 397 RD, 415 RD 6 5 T H A R M Y Gen.LL. P.I.Baiov 18th Rifle C o r p s G e n M a j I I I v a n o v 37 GllD, 4 4 GKD, 6 9 RD 1 0 5 t h Rifle C o r p s Gen.Mql. D.F. Aleksryev 75 GRD, 15 1111, 193 RD. 354 RD, 356 RD Is1 G u a r d s T a n k C o r p s GenMoj. M.F.Pannv I GMB. 1 5 GTB, 16 GTB, 1 7 GTB
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and included specialised types such as gun artillery, breakthrough artillery, and guards mortar (multiple rocket launcher) divisions. The basic artillery division was a formidable Corce, armed with 108 120mm mortars, 72 ZIS-3 76mm guns, 48 M-30 122mm howitzers. 12 A-19 122mm guns, 24 D-1 152mm gun-howitzers and 24 ML-20 152mm howitzers. The second area or overwhelming Soviet advantage was air-power: 21 fighter divisions (2,318 fighters); 14 strike divisions (1,744 IL-2 Shturmoviks); eight bomber divisions (655 medium bombers); 16 strategic bomber divisions (1,007 medium bombers); six night bomber divisions (431 light bombers): and 179 reconnaissance aircraft. In total, the Red Air Force possessed 5,327 combat aircraft under direct front control and 1,007 bombers under strategic command, outnumbering the LuftwaCre by more than seven to one. The Soviet advantage was all the more effective due to the almost complete lack of German fighters to protect Army Group Centre, which meant that Sovict aircraft could roam at will; conversely German air-support rnissions were I-isky due to thc omnipresent threat of Soviet fighters. Two critical, but often overlooked, Sovict advantages were engineer support and logistics. The forward combat units were reinforced with spccia1 engineer battalions. Due to the extensive fortifications and mincficlds erected by the Germans, specialised engineer units were deployed, including mine-sweeping tank regiments, flame-thrower tank rcgimcnts and assault enginecr battalions. The Red Army commanders appreciated the problems posed by Byelorussia's numerous streams, rivers and swamps, so deployed a particularly large number of special engineer bridging units. In
Prior to the l a r t of Operalion Baxration a key role oJ' the partisan movement was inteiiixence garhering. This was undertaken by local partisun units as well as special deep reconnaissaxc? !inits of Red A m y intelligence, the foreninnerr of the modem Spetsnaz. (Sovfotoj
addition, normal combat units were put through special river-crossing and swamp-crossing training. Several tank units developed novel techniques for traversing swamps, including the use of fascines and ramps carried on the tanks. The scope of Operation Bagration demanded an enormous effort of logistics to keep the Red Army supplied with fuel, ammunition and food. Given the poor road and rail network in Byelorussia, the most important ingredient in this success was the availability of large numbers of Lend-Lease trucks, notably US-supplied two-and-a-half ton Studebaker trucks. The Red Army had another significant advantage; the presence of a large partisan movement behind German lines. Byelorussia was the site of the largest and most vigorous partisan movement in the Soviet Union, actively supported since 1942 by extensive air-drops of equipment and personnel. At the beginning of 1943 partisan strength in Byelorussia had been about 150,000; by June 1944 it had risen to 270,000, organised into 157 brigades and 83 smaller detachments. This tied down a substantial number of German troops. Six security and police divisions - about 15 per cent of German combat strength in Byelorussia - had to be devoted to combating the partisans in a brutal anti-guerrilla war. Russian sources claim that Fhe Byelorussian partisan movement destroyed 11,128 railway cars, 34 arinoured. trains, 18,700 vehicles, 1,355 armoured vehicles and 500,000 enemy p e r s o ~ e lduring the war. These figures seem inflated, but give some inkling of the intensity of partisan fighting in the region. Prior to Operation Bagration the partisans had played an important role in collecting intelligence on German force dispositions, as well as in periodic raiding of German supply columns and bases. In many areas of Byelorussia, the 'Germanscontrolled the cities, towns, and roads, but the partisans were in effective control pf the rural and forested. areas. Prior to the offensive the Red Army dispatched a large number of specialist personnel into the partisan centres to conduct deep reconnaissance and to prepare the partisans for a major campaign against the Byelorussian rail network. These were the forerunners of the modern Spetsnaz troops.
This Soviet PT-34 minemller tank of the 116th Separate Engineering Tank Regiment was one of a number of specialized armoured vehicles committed to the fighting in Byelorussia. It took part in the savage fighting along the Orsha highway as the Red A m y attempted to breakthrough the heavily fortified defenses of the 78th Sturm Division. (Peter Sarson)
OPPOSING PLANS
A
s early as April and May 1944 Hitler and thc OKH had concluded, incorrectly, that the main Soviet thrust that summer would emanate from castern Galicia (north-western Ukraine), opposite Army Group North Ukraine. The main debate was whether the Soviet objective would be Romania and the Balkans or a bold thrust to the Baltic. Actions in the Byelorussia Balcony were expected to be limited to a holding operation. Onc of the key intelligence indicators was the location of the Soviet tank armies, or which there were six in 1944. It was assumed that the tank armies would be the spearhead of the Soviet offensive, and their location would therefore determine thc direction. German intelligence believed that all six werc in Uliraine. The Soviet strategic bombcr force had six of its eight air armies in IJkraine, furthcr reinforcing this viewpoint. Thc Germans were unable m identify to whcre the three armies participating in the May 1944 Crimea campaign had been shifted. German military intelligence in the summer of 1944 had been deprived of one of its most important assets for strategic assessment, its long-range
A rifle batlalion of the 43rd
Army during fixhting near Vitebsk in June 1944. This is the m a c h i n e p n platoon of an infantry company, armed with a Maxim 7.62mm water-cooled machine-gun, in the background, and a Degtaryev DP 'record-player' squad automatic weapon, in the foreground. (So~foto)
aircraft reconnaissance capability. LuStilotte 6, opposite the Byelorussian Balcony, had 43 strategic reconnaissance aircraft in early June, of which only 26 were serviceable. These were mainly Ju-88s, Ju-188s and Do-217s. Luftflotte 4, opposite Ukraine, had 43 aircraft, of which 31 were serviceable. During the spring months the heavy cloud cover prevented adequate surveys of Soviet rear areas. By the second week of June Soviet air activity was severely impeding operations, and by late that month, immcdiatuly prior to the offensive, Soviet fighter patrols prevented any significant reconnaissance altogether. Gcrman intelligence, the Fremde Heer Ost (Foreign Armies East), headed by Rcinhard Gehlen, was forced to rely increasingly on signals intcrccpts, which could he manipulated. Furthermore, the Soviets had adopted a policy or almost complete radio silence, relying mainly on land lines. The Soviet appreciation of the strategic situation was considerably different. The German resistance in Ukraine Srom the autumn of 1943 to the spring of 1944 had been fierce, and the heaviest concentration of German armour remained in Army Group North Ukraine. Soviet units in the area were badly dcplcted and in need of serious re-equipping. The Byelorussian countryside was nor as favourable for large mechanised opcratiuns as Ukraine, since its extensive forests, rivers and marshes made it difficult to movc armoured Sormations. On the other hand. Byelorussia had a very active partisan movement, which would have a corrosive eKect on German defence. Furthermore, once Byelorussia was liberated, it would place
Soviet infuntry fightin8 on the hcighis o~~erlooking Virehsir in laic .June 1944. By refiszng l o allow the 53rd Corps io breuk out f ~ o m encircled Vit~bslc,Hirler condrrnn~dthe f i > u ~divisions iherr to certain destruction.
Germany's Army Group North and Army Group North Ukraine in a very awkward situation, with Soviet units operating to the west of their positions. The fact that it was unexpected by the Germans niade the Byclorussian option particularly attractive to Stalin and the STAVKA. It is still unclear if the Soviets knew about the German stratcgic assessments, cithcr through spies or intercepts of thc compromised ENIGMA code. The decision to strike in Byelorussia was made in mid-April and was codenamed Operation Ragration, named aftcr the Russian prince who had died in battle against Napoleon at Borodino. The Soviet strategic plan was a cascading series of offensives. The Cirst would begin in early June against Finland, to knock it out of the war. This would distract German attcntion, as would the Anglo-American invasion or France which was cxpccted in early June 1944. The cross-Channel invasion would help to drain away Germany's strategic reserves, especially its Panzer units. This would set the stage for Operation Bagration in Byelorussia. Once Bagration was reaching its successful climax, a third offensive would be launched in northern Ukraine. It was presumed that a successCul operation in the Byclorussian Balcony would weaken Army Group North Ukraine by rorcing the diversion of units to bolster the collapsing Army Croup Centre. The key was to ensure that the Germans did not reinforce Byelorussia. The weak force configuration in Byelorussia in the spring of 1944 could be overcome, but this would become much morc problematic if the Germans expected a main offensive in this rcgion and began reinforcing. As a result, the STAVICA began a major maskirovka (deception) campaign, aimed at convincing the Germans that the main blow would come against Army Group North Ukraine (as the Germans already believed). The deception campaign was alsn necessary due to thc enormous scale of Soviet troop movements. The 5th Guards Tank Army and 28th Army would havc to be secretly extracted from southern Ukraine, the 2nd Guards Army and 51st Army moved from the Crimea, and the 6th Guards Army shifted further A G e m a n S t u c 111 Atis]'. G 75mm assault-gun rnovi.5 up to the front. The soldier in the fireground is armed with Lhe 88mm Panzerschr~ck anti-tank rocket Liunuhei: the most potent man-poriublu anti-tank weapon on the Eastern Front. (.lanusz Mapuski)
south, to Byelorussia irom the Baltic. This deception campaign would take a variety of Corms. In Byelorussia the movement of troops into their staging arcas would be conducted at night, and units would bc camouflaged on their arrival. Tactical radio traffic by army units was minimised, and German reconnaissance flights over the area were denied. False train dispatch instructions were broadcast to suggest heavy troop movements south. The Soviets recognised that it would be impossible to prevent the Germans from assessing the correct disposition of Soviet divisions actually deployed along the frontline. Rather, the Soviet effort was aimed at disguising the heavy reinforcements being shipped into Byelorussia and the presence of heavy tank concentrations behind the frontlines. The 3rd Ukrainian Front was ordered t o conduct special deception actions in early June, to convince the Germans that the main Soviet effort was being prepared in Ukraine and not in Byelorussia. A false force concentration was created opposite Kishniev, apparently containing nine rifle divisions, two artillery divisions and one tank corps. Air activity was stepped u p to make it appear that the Soviets did not want the Germans to discover thc conccntration of troops, but in fact German reconnaissance aircraft were periodically allowed to penetrate the air defence belt and photograph the false formations. Furthcrmore, steps were taken to convincc the Germans that key formations such as the 5th Guards Tank Army and 2nd Tank Army were still present in Ukraine.
A Soviet rifle squad enters Vitebsk on 27 June after the withdrawal of rhe German garrison. Hitier insisted that Gen. Hltter'.~206th Infantry Division remain behind to defend the city, but the corps cornmonder evacuated them with the rest of the corps when the Germans attempted to break out, on 26 .June. (.S""f"tOj
By latc May 1944 Army Group Centre intelligence correctly assessed that the Soviets were preparing to strike in mid-to-late June, and the 9th Army intelligence office argued strenuously that it expected a major offensive, not simply a local attack. There were two strong indicators of Soviet build-up, an increase of over 1,850 combat aircraft in Byelorussia since early May and a steady increase in the number of artillery batteries identified. For example, 3rd Panzer Army noted the increase of artillery hatteries in its sector from 243 in mid-April to 340 in midJune. These types of concentrations were the most difficult to conceal, and were obtained by a handful of successful aerial reconnaissance missions which pcnctrated the Soviet fighter defences. On the eve of the Soviet offensive, Army Group Centre's intelligence had identified 140 of 168 division cquivalcnts. However, they had identified only thrcc tank corps when there were in fact eight tank and mechanised corps, and they missed two cavalry corps cntircly. Thcir assessment of Soviet armonr strength was only 400-1,800 tanks, when in fact it was more than double the highest German estimate. The presence of the 5th Guards Tank Army was completely missed, as were several other major formations, including thc cntire 6th Guards Army near Vitebslz. Although some Army Group Centre intelligence officers argued that the Soviets were preparing a major officnsive, the consensus was in support of the view of the German OKH and Fremde Heer Ost. Generalfeldmarschall Bnsch did not. accept the more alarmist assessments, and refused to convey them to the OIu?fap ayl Jo l o ~ ? d L ~ ,woqpd uouua5 a snadsu! uoolajd znox l ~ ? n o xv
la[l~ qYnoqqv ~ .an~suajjola!noS au~nuaYE rnq 'uo!lse iE~euo!s~an!pauros IOU seM s!ql ieql13e3 aqi idama 01 u!%aq ol HXO aqi p a ~ ~ a d m i(11euy o ~ peq e!ssn~olaLa u! uo!lenl!s aql jo ssausnopas aqL .Le~qS!q ysu!y\l-~o3soy\l nql Ieau ' y s u ! ~ sprewoi r s a ~ - q p o s Su!nom Tie ' s d ~ oyueL ~ spien3 puz aql OSIE inq ,LmJv y u e ~ spient) q l s aql L ~ u oIOU Su~pnpu!'uo!ie18ea u o ~ z e ~ a d8upnp o JnomJe jo u o q e i ~ u a n u oia!noS ~ isa!neaq aqr paluas axdar s l q ~.aseqd uo!le~!oldxs nqi or Lmiv yueL spJen3 qrs s,noirs!mro\d 11UltU05 01 UO!S!JJp S,A!YSAOYZ~(UJJ~~ 01 i(l!3 iq1 30 qlJOU SUO!l -eqauad q l ! ~pauFqmoJ 'eqsro re uo!lsun[ [!el Lal1 aqz jo arnide:, aqL 'amoi ames s!ql 8uole M O J S O ~ \ ~mnJJ realla1 s,uoa[ode~[ p a l O ~ M aSoq1 ol re![!wej aq I~!M salxs Su!ssoi~ aql jo Luem jo saureu aqL .Jan!J eu!zaiag aql seM LWV
I.1.s.osl . , 7 3 ~ 3 ,ya?m snoiuLuouiCs auuJaq ,iayoqapn~s,p ~ o m at,] 'Lorn a y ~ i a l J ~n!rsnx ur -run8 lauo!r!n!p u u y ~ s~ayoqapn~s Y-sn Jo rind o 2Ja.q om ayl jo ~ a a X2svi alp u! syJna sn uo papiradap puo '11 roM p l r o ~ 8u!dnp sap?yan iCzuno~-ssod3 ma[ p a ~ n p o ~uosuil d ?+nos r-srz
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The Tiger I heavy tanks of ~ P z A b t 505 . attempted to halt the Soviet advances on Minsk starting with a skirmish with M4A2 Sherman tanks of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps near Krupki rail station on 28 June 1944. This battalwn claimed to have destroyed 128 tanks of the 3rd Byelorussian Front, and the Soviet heavy losses led to Marshal Pave1 Rotmistrov's relief from the command of the 5th Tank Amy after the campaign. But by the end of the campaign, all the Tiger's of this unit were lost in combat and the unit had to be reformed with new vehicles. (Peter Sarson)
and the OKH still believed that the main blow was yet to come in northern Ukraine, they began to shift some resources taken away in late May back to Army Group Centre. The first of these reinforcements was the 5th Panzer Division, which began arriving in Minsk from Ukraine on 26 June. It was given the unenviable task of stopping the major armoured onslaught now pushing down the Moscow-Minsk highway. By German standards, the 5th Panzer Division was a formidable force, with 70 Panther tanks,. 55 PzKpfwIVs, as well as the subordinate sPzAbt. 505 (Heavy Tank Battalion 505) with 29 Tiger I tanks. The division's tanks had to be moved by rail, and so were the last to arrive. A blocking force was put into position to the north-east of Borisov, consisting of the Tiger tanks, the division's reconnaissance battalion (AA 51, its infantry regiments and its engineers (Pi.89). The aim was to hold the Berezina river line and to permit the 4th Army's retreating units to withdraw in safety. The scene that greetedthe 5th Panzer Division was demoralising. Large numbers of German troops, often without their weapons, streamed over the Berezina bridges. .The bridge crossings were littered with abandoned equipment and vehicles, as Red Air Force aircraft repeatedly attacked the retreating German columns. The first contact with the advancing 3rd Byelorussian Front took place near Krupki, when M4AZ Sherman tanks of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps fought a sharp engagement with the Tigers from sPzAbt. 505 in the early evening of 28 June. The fighting continued through the night, with the Krupki station being captured by the Russian tankers around 0700 on 29 June after suffering heavy losses. The lead reconnaissance elements of the 3rd Guards Tank Corps skirted past Krupki but ran into the engineer troops of 5th Panzer Division preparing demolition of key bridges on the Borisov approaches; North of the highway. reconnaissance companies of the Soviet 29th Tank Corps tried to force a river crossing of the Berezina at Studenka but were rebuffed by the reconnaissance battalion (AA 5). With this route blocked, lead tank units from the carp continued westward through the swampy areas north-west of Borisov, skirting the 5th Panzer Division's defensive perimeter, ",
A pair "f 88mm Hornisse
self-propelled anti-tank guns move forward during the f i g h t i q in 1944. These poiverful tank destroyers were first committed to aclion in 1943 in special heuvy regiments and there were 131 in service on the Easlern Fronl in the early summer of 1944. (Janu.92 Magfluski)
The rive rifle divisions of the l l t h Guards Army caught u p with the lead tank forces on 29 June, clashing with the 5th Panzer Division's 31st Pz.Gren.Regt. near the village of I