Ancient Scepticism (Ancient Philosophies)

Ancient Scepticism Ancient Philosophies T h i s s e r i e s p r o v i d e s fresh a n d e n g a g i n g n e w i n t r...

Author: Harald Thorsrud

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Ancient Scepticism

Ancient Philosophies T h i s s e r i e s p r o v i d e s fresh a n d e n g a g i n g n e w i n t r o d u c t i o n s to the m a j o r s c h o o l s o f p h i l o s o p h y of antiquity. D e s i g n e d for s t u d e n t s o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d c l a s s i c s , the b o o k s offer c l e a r a n d r i g o r o u s p r e s e n t a tion o f core ideas a n d lay the i o u n d a t i o n for a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f their subjects. P r i m a r y texts are h a n d l e d i n t r a n s l a t i o n a n d the readers are p r o v i d e d w i t h u s e f u l g l o s s a r i e s , c h r o n o l o g i e s a n d g u i d e s to the p r i m a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l .

Published Ancient Scepticism

Presocratics

Hartilti

fames

Thorsrud

Cynics

Warren

Stoicism

William

Desmond

lohn

Seilars

Neoplatonisni Pnuliina

Rentes

Forthcoming The Ancient Commentators

Epicureanism

o n Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e

Tim

Miira

Tuominen

Aristotle Vasilis

Politis

Classical Islamic Philosophy Deborah

Black

Confucianism Ptini

Goldin

O'Keefe

Plato Andrew

Mason

Socrates Mark McPherran

Ancient Scepticism Harald lhorsrud

ACUMEN

© Harald I h o r s r u d , 2009 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. A l l rights reserved. First published in 2009 by A c u m e n A c u m e n Publishing Limited Stocksfield Hall Stocks field NE43 7 T N www.acumenpublishing.co.uk I S B N : 978-1-84465-130-6 (hardcover) I S B N : 978-1-84465-131-3

(paperback)

British Library Cataloguing-m-Publication

Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in M i n i o n . Printed and bound by Biddies Ltd., K i n g s Lynn.

F o r her p a t i e n c e , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d love, this b o o k is d e d i c a t e d to L a u r a : amicus

certus

in re incerta

cernitur.

Contents

Preface Sources

ix and abbreviations

x.i xv

Chronology 1

Introduction

2

P y r r h o a n d T i m o n ; the o r i g i n of P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m

17

I

3

A r c e s i l a u s ; the o r i g i n of A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m

36

4

Carneades

59

5

C i c e r o : the e n d o i the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y

84

6

A e i i e s i d e m u s : the P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l

7

S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s : the c o n s i s t e n c y of P y r r h o n i a n Scepticism

102 123

8

Pyrrhonian arguments

147

9

T h e ( o r d i n a r y ) life o f a P y r r h o n i s t

173

Nates

201

Guide

to further

reading

215

References

231

Index

239

Index

of passages

245

vii

Preface

W h e n I w a s a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t a slogan w a s p r o p o s e d for a d e p a r t m e n t T - s h i r t : " P h i l o s o p h y . W e V e d o n e less i n 2 , 5 0 0 years t h a n m o s t people d o i n a single d a y " T h e s l o g a n w a s rejected. But it reflects a s e r i o u s s c e p t i c a l s e n t i m e n t . W h e n w e c o n s i d e r the r e m a r k a b l e progress m a d e b y s c i e n c e in the past 400 years, p h i l o s o p h y a p p e a r s i n a n u n f a v o u r a b l e light. A t a m i n i m u m , w e w o u l d like to k n o w w h y there is s o little a g r e e m e n t a m o n g p r o f e s s i o n a l a c a d e m i c s r e g a r d i n g the s o l u t i o n s to p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s , their p r o p e r a r t i c u l a t i o n , a n d e v e n the m e t h o d s suitable to r e s o l v i n g t h e m , M y d e s i r e to f i n d a satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n of p e r v a s i v e d i s a g r e e m e n t has s u s t a i n e d m y interest i n the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s , F r o m their a r g u m e n t s a n d strategies, w e c a n c o n s t r u c t v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s l o r w h y p h i l o s o p h e r s have not a n d p e r h a p s w i l l not r e a c h c o n s e n s u s . T h e r e are, o f c o u r s e , p l e n t y ot n o n - s c e p t i c a l s o l u t i o n s as w e l l , a n d I a m not c o n v i n c e d that I h a v e a satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n yet. But reflecting o n the a r g u m e n t s o i the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s has p r o v e d to be i m m e n s e l y v a l u a b l e i n getting to grips w i t h the b r o a d i s s u e of the l i m i t s of r e a s o n . T h e S c e p t i c s a l s o h a v e s o m e f a s c i n a t i n g t h i n g s to say a b o u t the p r o p e r r e s p o n s e to o u r r a t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e s e r e s p o n s e s are m e a n t to s h o w h o w S c e p t i c i s m is a v i a b l e p o s i t i o n a n d not m e r e l y a set of a r g u m e n t s c o n f i n e d to the s t u d y o r the c l a s s r o o m . W h i l e I

ix

A NCtENT

SCEPTICISM

c a n n o t say that I h a v e t r i e d to live w i t h o u t beliefs, as the S c e p t i c s suggest w e s h o u l d , their p r o p o s a l s have i n s p i r e d me to t h i n k m o r e clearly about f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s r e g a r d i n g the nature o f r a t i o n a l belief a n d a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d the roles they play i n a c t i o n . It is m y h o p e that this b o o k w i l l e n c o u r a g e readers interested i n these a n d related issues to f u r t h e r their o w n e n q u i r i e s . I have t r i e d not to p r e s u p p o s e familiarity w i t h earlier G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s or w i t h the S c e p t i c s ' c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , i n s t e a d s u p p l y i n g the d e t a i l s w h e r e n e c e s s a r y . I h a v e a i m e d at p r o d u c i n g a c o h e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e i n w h i c h to situate the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t r a n s m i s s i o n o f a n c i e n t s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s a n d strategies. N e a r l y e v e r y p o r t i o n of t h i s a c c o u n t , h o w e v e r , is c o n t r o v e r s i a l . T h i s is w h y I have t r i e d to be t h o r o u g h in p r o v i d i n g references to b o t h p r i m a r y a n d secondary- sources. T h e references c a n always be ignored, but they w i l l b e h e l p f u l for those interested i n p u r s u i n g a p a r t i c u l a r i d e a , e s p e c i a l l y given the v a r i e t y ot plausible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that are often a v a i l a b l e . S i m i l a r l y , the g u i d e to f u r t h e r r e a d i n g is p r o b a b l y tar m o r e extensive t h a n m a n y r e a d e r s w i l l r e q u i r e . B u t as it is a r r a n g e d i n s e c t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the m a j o r figures a n d p e r i o d s o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m , I h o p e it w i l l p r o v e u s e f u l for f u r t h e r study. I h a d the g o o d f o r t u n e to be i n t r o d u c e d to the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s by Jim H a n k i n s o n a n d P a u l W o o d r u f f , a n d to H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y m o r e generally b y Stephen W h i t e . T h e y w e r e excellent g u i d e s , as well as m o d e l s , a n d h a v e g i v e n m e a great d e a l of e n c o u r a g e m e n t . I a m v e r y grateful to the p u b l i s h e r s a n o n y m o u s readers w h o p r o v i d e d m a n y detailed a n d i n s i g h t f u l c o m m e n t s , as well as to T i m O ' K e e f e , W i l h e l m N i g h t i n g a l e a n d R a l p h A n s k e , all of w h o m r e a d a n d c o m m e n t e d o n the m a n u s c r i p t . A l s o , m y students i n a s e m i n a r at A g n e s Scott C o l l e g e g e n e r o u s l y offered h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o n e a r l y drafts of the c h a p t e r s . A l t h o u g h it is likely that s o m e e r r o r s or o v e r s i g h t s r e m a i n , this b o o k is far better for the r e v i s i o n s I h a v e b e e n able to m a k e i n r e s p o n s e to this c r i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n . M y t h a n k s to K a t e W i l l i a m s for e x p e r t c o p y - e d i t i n g a n d to S t e v e n G e r r a r d at A c u m e n for s e e i n g t h i s project t h r o u g h a n d for l o c a t i n g the s p e c t a c u l a r p a i n t i n g of C a r n e a d e s o n the cover.

Sources and abbreviations

Anonymous In Tht. = In Tiieaetetum (Commentary

on Plato's Theaetetus)

Aristotle iYE = j\if omachean Ethics Met. = Metaphysics Rh. = Rhetoric Augustine Contra Ac. - Contra Académicos (Against the

Academicians)

Aulus Gellius NA = Nodes Attkae (Attic Nights) Cicero Ac. = Académica (Academic Amic. = De Amicitia (On

Books)

Friendship)

Ait = Epistularwn ad Attiam

(Letters to Attic us)

De Or. = De Oraiore (On the Orator) Div. = De Divinatione (On

Divination)

Fin. = De Finibus Bonorum et Malarwm (On Moral Ends) Fat, = De Fato (On Fate) Inv. = Delnventione

(On [Rhetorical]

Leg. = De Legibus (On the

Invention)

hws)

JVD = De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods} Off. = De Ojficiis (On Duties) x:

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Orat. = Orator Rep. = De Republics (On the Republic) Top. = Topic a Tusc. = Tusculanae Disputationes (Tuscutan Disputations) Diogenes Laertius DL = Lives anil Opinions of Eminent Philosophers in Ten Books Eusebius Praep. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospels) Lactam ius Div. Inst. = Divinae Institutions

(Divine Institutes)

Philo of Alexandria De Ebr. = De Ebrietate (On

Drunkenness)

Philodemus Index Ac. = Index Academicorum (History of the Academy) Photius Bib. = Bibliotheca (Library) Plato Ap. = Apology Gorg = Gorjias Prof. = Protagoras Rep. = Republic Tiit. = Vieaetetus Plutarch Adv. Col. = Adversus Colotem (Against Colotes) Coin. Not. = De Communibus Notitiis (Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions) Prof. Virt. = De Profectibus in Vtrtute (On Moral Progress) St. Rep. = De Stoicorum Repugnantus (On Stoic Self-Coniradsctions) Vit. Alex. = Vitae Parallelae, Alexander (Parallel Lives, Alexander) Vit, Cat. Mai = Vitae Parallelae, Cato Maior (Parallel Lhvs, Life ofCato the Elder) Sextus Empiric us M = Pros Mathematikous (Latin: Adversus Mathematicos; Against the Professors)

SOURCES

AND

ABBREVIATIONS

PH = Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) Many of the passages from these and other relevant sources are excerpted and translated in: IG = B. hiwood & L. P Gerson (eds), Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 2nd edn (Indianapolis, I N : Hackett, 1997). LS = A, A. Long & D. N. Sedley (eds), Vie HeBemstic Philosophers, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

>:ii:

Chronology

Many of the dates below are approximate (see the Oxford Classical Dictionary and Dorandi 1999). The dating of events in the Academy in the first century ucr. is particularly controversial, as are the dates for the later Pyrrhonists. BCE 399

Death of Socrates

3*7

Plato opens the Academy

347

Death of Plato, Speusippus becomes head of the Academy

334-324

Anaxarchus and Pyrrho travel through Asia with Alexander the Great

335

Aristotle opens the Lyceum

300

Zeno opens the Stoa; Timoji becomes a student of Pyrrho

298

Arcesilaus comes to Athens, eventually studies at the Academy

275

Death of Pyrrho Arcesilaus becomes head of the Academy, initiating its sceptical phase

241

Death of Arcesilaus

230

Death of Timon

156/5

Cameades goes to Rome as part of an Athenian embassy, having earlier become head of the Academy

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

L3T :i
4

CARNEADES

T h i s is p r o b a b l y w h a t A r c e s i l a u s w o u l d have us do. H o w e v e r , it is not as c l e a r i n the case o l C a r n e a d e s , w h o i s s a i d to h a v e d e p a r t e d f r o m h i s great p r e d e c e s s o r by c l a i m i n g that we c a n n o t , a n d n e e d not, s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (Praep. 2.59;

Ev. 14.7; see Ac.

PH 1 . 2 2 7 - 3 0 ) . W h a t attitude, t h e n , w o u l d C a r n e a d e s have us

take t o w a r d s o u r i n c o n c l u s i v e e n q u i r y i n t o the nature of the gods? W e s h a l l r e t u r n to t h i s q u e s t i o n later.

Ethical arguments: Carneades divisions 1

C a r n e a d e s e t h i c a l a r g u m e n t s e x h i b i t the s a m e p a t t e r n . H e is not 1

interested i n d i s p a r a g i n g v i r t u e or i n c o n v i n c i n g us to

become

v i c i o u s . O n c e a g a i n he is b e n t o n u n d e r m i n i n g the p o o r l y p l a c e d c o n f i d e n c e o f the d o g m a t i s t s . U n l i k e A r c e s i l a u s , w h o a r g u e d against w h a t e v e r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s actually b e l i e v e d (or w e r e t e m p t e d to b e l i e v e ) , C a r n e a d e s b r o a d e n e d the s c e p t i c a l attack i n s e e k i n g to refute e v e r y p o s s i b l e e t h i c a l t h e o r y {Fin.

5.16), M o r e precisely, he set out i n a " d i v i s i o n " e v e r y e t h i c a l

t h e o r y that h a d b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d o r c o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d i n a c c o r d ance with certain naturalistic assumptions. Since those assumptions w e r e s h a r e d a m o n g h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , he e m p l o y e d h i s d i v i s i o n to u n d e r m i n e the v e r y project o f H e l l e n i s t i c e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ( A l g r a 1997; A n n a s 2001, 2 0 0 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g to the naturalistic a s s u m p t i o n s , a n e t h i c a l t h e o r y m u s t e x p l a i n w h a t s o r t s of g o o d s we n a t u r a l l y desire, a n d w h y , or l o r what e n d , w e desire them. E t h i c a l development is, in one important respect, n o different f r o m the n a t u r a l , p h y s i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t of a n infant i n t o a n adult; the final stage of d e v e l o p m e n t i s , i n s o m e s e n s e , i n h e r e n t in the p e r s o n s initial c o n d i t i o n . S o o u r c o m m o n h u m a n n a t u r e i n c l i n e s us t o w a r d s c e r t a i n t h i n g s a n d a w a y f r o m o t h e r s , a n d it is o n l y f r o m those n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s that we are able to c o n s t r u c t a f l o u r i s h i n g h u m a n life. It o u r i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n is n u r t u r e d appropriately, we fulfil o u r teios: o u r n a t u r a l e n d or f u n c t i o n . But there are m a n y w a y s in w h i c h that d e v e l o p m e n t m a y go w r o n g . Just as a l a c k of g o o d n u t r i t i o n w i l l

65

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

prevent o n e f r o m a c h i e v i n g the n a t u r a l , p h y s i o l o g i c a l e n d , a l a c k o l u n d e r s t a n d i n g about the p r o p e r goals i n life w i l l p r e v e n t o n e f r o m a c h i e v i n g the n a t u r a l , e t h i c a l e n d . T h u s a c r u c i a l task for e t h i c a l t h e o r y is to teach us w h a t the p r o p e r goals are. By contrast, a c c o r d i n g to s o m e n o n - n a t u r a l i s t i c e t h i c a l v i e w s , o u r p r o p e r goal is to t r a n s c e n d the l i m i t a t i o n s o f h u m a n nature. I n s o m e of P l a t o s d i a l o g u e s , we are e n c o u r a g e d to e s c a p e t h i s life as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e by b e c o m i n g like G o d ( A n n a s 1 9 9 9 ) . L a t e r C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s d e v e l o p e d t h i s further, c l a i m i n g that h u m a n nature c a n n o t be perfected b y m e r e l y n a t u r a l m e a n s , but r e q u i r e s s u p e r n a t u r a l intervention. C a r n e a d e s offers three c a n d i d a t e s

for the objects o u r

nature

i n c l i n e s us t o w a r d s : p l e a s u r e , a b s e n c e of p a i n a n d p r i m a r y n a t u r a l t h i n g s (i.e. g o o d s o f the b o d y a n d m i n d s u c h as h e a l t h , beauty or i n t e l l i g e n c e ) . T h e s e s e e m to be the o n l y p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s , a s we c a n see b y t r y i n g to f i n d o t h e r n a t u r a l i s t i c ( n o n - t h e o l o g i c a l ) g o o d s that d o not fit into o n e o f these categories. T h i s i m m e d i a t e l y gives us three possible a c c o u n t s of w h a t we s h o u l d o r g a n i z e o u r lives a r o u n d . W e m a y say the best lite for h u m a n b e i n g s is: ( I ) to o b t a i n pleasure; ( 2 ) to o b t a i n the a b s e n c e o f p a i n ; o r (3) to o b t a i n the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e s e are the s i m p l e s t t h e o r i e s b e c a u s e they h o l d that nature i m p l a n t s i n us a desire for the t h i n g s we m u s t o b t a i n to live w e l l . But p e r h a p s we s h o u l d i n s i s t that it is not e n o u g h m e r e l y to get these t h i n g s , but that we m u s t d o so in the right way, that is, v i r t u ously. S o they w i l l o n l y be c o m p o n e n t s ot a g o o d life w h e n a c c o m p a n i e d w i t h v i r t u e . T h i s w i l l give us three m o r e o p t i o n s . T h e best lite for h u m a n b e i n g s is; (4) v i r t u e plus p l e a s u r e ; ( 5 ) v i r t u e p l u s the a b s e n c e of p a i n ; or (6) virtue p l u s the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e s e theories w i l l h a v e to e x p l a i n w h y it matters h o w w e get the t h i n g s we n e e d to f l o u r i s h . T h e n a g a i n , p e r h a p s w e s h o u l d o n l y t h i n k o l these as targets to be a i m e d at. I n that case, w e get three m o r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h e best life tor h u m a n b e i n g s i s : (7) to strive for p l e a s u r e ; ( 8 ) to strive for the a b s e n c e o f p a i n ; o r ( 9 ) to strive for the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e difficult}" here is to e x p l a i n w h y nature i m p l a n t s desires i n u s that we do not n e e d to satisfy in o r d e r to f l o u r i s h (see F i g u r e 2).

CARNEADES

Ethical ends: objects that human nature inclines us towards

Pleasure

Absence of pain

Primary nature things (mental and physical goods: health, wealth, intelligence)

Corresponding accounts of the good life in accordance with human nature

(l) Obtaining pleasure (EPICUREANS)

(4) Obtaining pleasure in a morally good life

(2) Obtaining the absence of pain

(5) Obtaining the absence of pain in a morally good life

(3) Obtaining (and enjoying) the primary natural things

(6) Obtaining and enjoying the primary natural things in a morally good life (ARISTOTELIANS)

(7) Striving for pleasure

(S) Striving for the absence of pain

(9) Striving for the primary natural things (STOICS)

Figure i. C a m r a d t s ' ethical divisions {Fin. 5.15-23, Turn. 5.64-35: Ac. 2.128-31 ).

T h e s e t h e o r i e s are all s u p p o s e d to give u s a c t u a l , p r a c t i c a l g u i d a n c e i n p l a n n i n g o u t o u r lives. A l t h o u g h they all p l a c e a s i g n i f i cant e m p h a s i s o n g r a s p i n g w h a t the p r o p e r targets are, they are not intellectualist: t h e y d o not m a i n t a i n that b e c o m i n g e t h i c a l l y g o o d is s i m p l y a m a t t e r of a c q u i r i n g the r i g h t s o r t of k n o w l e d g e ; or if it is, t h e n a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s o m e c h a n g e i n o u r d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d d e s i r e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , they all m a i n t a i n that k n o w l e d g e is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for v i r t u e : i f w e d o not k n o w w h i c h targets are t h e right o n e s to a i m at, w e will o n l y hit t h e m h a p h a z a r d l y a n d b y a c c i d e n t . T o c o n s i s t e n t l y a n d reliably hit t h e

right

targets w e m u s t k n o w w h a t w e are to a i m at (see Fuse, 5.15; J V £ 1.2, l 0 9 4 a 2 3 - 2 5 a n d 1.3, I 0 9 5 a 9 - 1 2 ) , T h e comparisons between ethical views implicit in C a r n e a d e s ' d i v i s i o n s h o w s that they c a n n o t all be true. T o d e f e n d one is to attack

&7

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the o t h e r s . B u t rather t h a n t a k i n g the p e r s p e c t i v e of a p a r t i c i p a n t i n these e t h i c a l debates, C a r n e a d e s places h i m s e l f o u t s i d e , s u r v e y i n g the w h o l e Held. T h i s f r e e d o m I r o m d o c t r i n a l c o m m i t m e n t gives h i m a n o n - p a r t i s a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of the s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f the v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s , a n d it gives h t m a c o n v e n i e n t f r a m e for h i s s c e p t i c a l attacks. S u c h is C i c e r o ' s a p p r o a c h i n De Fin/bus

w h e n he argues for a n d

against the three m o s t plausible a n d forcefully d e f e n d e d p o s i t i o n s : the E p i c u r e a n ( 1 ) , the A r i s t o t e l i a n (6J a n d the Stoic ( 9 ) . T h e s c e p t i cal a r g u m e n t s that C i c e r o reports against these v i e w s are n o t a l w a y s e x p l i c i t l y attributed t o C a r n e a d e s , but the context m a k e s it r e a s o n able to s u p p o s e that they are h i s , or at least w e r e i n s p i r e d by h i m ,

I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n E p i c u r e a n a n d Stoic ethics O n e o f C i c e r o ' s central c o m p l a i n t s about the E p i c u r e a n v i e w is that it is i n c o n s i s t e n t . E p i c u r u s , in fact, w a v e r s b e t w e e n (1) a n d ( 2 ) , s i n c e he s o m e t i m e s c o n c e i v e s of p l e a s u r e a s a n active s t i m u l a t i o n of the senses a n d o t h e r t i m e s as the t r a n q u i l a b s e n c e of p a i n / It is clear that m a x i m i z i n g o n e type o f p l e a s u r e d o e s not a l w a y s m a x i m i z e the other. S e e k i n g the a b s e n c e of p a i n w i l l l e a d m e a w a y f r o m m a n y p l e a s u r e s I m i g h t o t h e r w i s e enjoy. A n d s e e k i n g t h o s e active p l e a s u r e s w i l l p r o b a b l y l e a d to s o m e u n w a n t e d p a i n s . W e are b o r n w i t h a n a t u r a l d e s i r e for pleasure. B u t a c c o r d i n g to E p i c u r u s it is the a b s e n c e ot p a i n that c o m p l e t e s or fulfils o u r n a t u r e . I f this is c o r r e c t , n a t u r e s e e m s g u i l t y of m i s l e a d i n g u s . It w o u l d m a k e m u c h m o r e sense to give us a desire l o r the a b s e n c e of p a i n if that is w h a t w e n e e d to f l o u r i s h . E p i c u r u s m u s t e x p l a i n w h y nature s h o u l d i m p l a n t in us a desire for pleasure w h e n the satisfaction ot that desire d o e s not g u a r a n t e e a g o o d life. T h e r e are p o w e r f u l r e s p o n s e s available to the E p i c u r e a n , s o m e o l w h i c h c a n be f o u n d i n C i c e r o ' s defence ( F i n . 1; see also D L 10.121¬ 3 5 ) . H o w e v e r , the s c e p t i c d o e s not n e e d to p r o v i d e irrefutable, c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e that the p o s i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n is false. S c e p t i cal refutation a i m s at s h o w i n g that the d o g m a t i s t s d o not have a n

SB

CARNEADES

adequate d e t e n t e , u s u a l l y b y p o i n t i n g out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s w i t h i n their t h e o r i e s . It is often p o s s i b l e to p a t c h up the i n c o n s i s t e n c y by m o d i f y i n g the theory, but that i n t u r n w i l l p r o v i d e a n e w target for s c e p t i c a l refutation. T h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a l w a y s lies w i t h those w h o are p r o m o t i n g a p o s i t i v e v i e w . C i c e r o ' s m a i n o b j e c t i o n to the Stoic a c c o u n t o f t h e e t h i c a l e n d also points to a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e Stoics c l a i m that the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s are v a l u a b l e , a n d t h u s c h o i c e w o r t h y , but a l s o indifferent w i t h respect to o u r h a p p i n e s s . It is s u p p o s e d l y a m a t t e r o f s t r i v i n g in the right way that c o u n t s ; w h e t h e r or n o t w e s u c c e e d is i r r e l e v a n t . T h e Stoic sage w i l l m a k e e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e effort to m a i n t a i n h i s h e a l t h , for e x a m p l e , b u t this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s f a l l i n g 01 H i s w i s d o m is not m a n i f e s t e d i n o u t c o m e s o v e r w h i c h he has n o ultimate c o n t r o l , but r a t h e r i n a q u a l i t a t i v e state o f m i n d that d i r e c t s h i m to a c t a l w a y s i n the right way. O n c e h e has a c h i e v e d w i s d o m , h i s h a p p i n e s s c a n not be affected b y the p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of health or other s u c h so c a l l e d " p r e f e r r e d indifférents''. T h e qualitative state o l v i r t u e a l l o w s tor n e i t h e r i n c r e a s e n o r d e c r e a s e : a c h r o n i c a l l y ill sage w i l l be no less h a p p y t h a n o n e i n great h e a l t h . I n effect, the Stoics a p p e a r to be s a y i n g that s u c h t h i n g s as h e a l t h , strength a n d b e a u t y are w o r t h c h o o s i n g b e c a u s e t h e y are w o r t h h a v i n g , but a l s o that it does not really m a t t e r w h e t h e r y o u have t h e m . C i c e r o presents the Stoics w i t h a d i l e m m a : e i t h e r t h e y m u s t say that the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s are really g o o d , o r that they are really n e u t r a l , neither good n o r b a d . I f they go w i t h the f o r m e r o p t i o n , their p o s i t i o n collapses into the Peripatetic v i e w that h a p p i n e s s c o m e s o n l y t h r o u g h a v i r t u o u s a c q u i s i t i o n , use a n d e n j o y m e n t of g o o d t h i n g s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , we w i l l see that the Stoics d o not really believe that s t r i v i n g is all w e n e e d for h a p p i n e s s . I f they go w i t h the latter o p t i o n , their p o s i t i o n c a n n o longer offer any p r a c t i c a l g u i d a n c e ; it w i l l no longer matter w h e t h e r I t r y to p r e s e r v e m y h e a l t h s i n c e it c a n n e i t h e r a d d to n o r s u b t r a c t f r o m m y h a p p i n e s s , So it w i l l not m a t t e r w h e t h e r I try to p r e s e r v e m y h e a l t h or not. I n general, s u c h a t h e o r y w i l l give us n o basis o n w h i c h to c h o o s e o n e t h i n g a n d reject another. C a m e a d e s u s e d to get quite w o r k e d u p by the Stoic c l a i m that virtue is sufficient for h a p p i n e s s (Tusc. 5.83J. O n e o f t h e w a y s he

69

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sought to u n d e r m i n e this c o n v i c t i o n w a s to argue i n s u p p o r t of the first h o r n o f the d i l e m m a , that is, to s h o w that their t h e o r y actually c o m m i t s t h e m to the Peripatetic p o s i t i o n . C a r n e a d e s u s e d to j u d g e the c o n t r o v e r s y [between Peripatetics a n d Stoics] a s a respected arbitrator. S i n c e the s a m e things w h i c h the Peripatetics d e e m e d g o o d s , the Stoics r e g a r d e d as advantages, a n d s i n c e the Peripatetics d i d not c o n t e r m o r e value t h a n the Stoics o n w e a l t h , g o o d health, a n d other things of the s a m e k i n d , he s a i d that w h e n the i s s u e is w e i g h e d w i t h respect to the facts, not w o r d s , there w a s n o c a u s e for dispute.

(Tusc.

5.120; see also Fr>t. 3.41 )

C a r n e a d e s is c l e a r l y out to u n d e r m i n e a c e n t r a l c o m p o n e n t in Stoic e t h i c s : the d o c t r i n e of the p r e f e r r e d indifférents. H o w e v e r , he is not t r y i n g to s h o w that Stoic a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n e t h i c s converge in o r d e r to d e f e n d it. I n d e e d , t h i s is o n l y o n e h o r n o l the d i l e m m a . U n d e r l y i n g the a r g u m e n t , at least i n C i c e r o ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n , is the n o t i o n that w h a t really matters is the life o n e leads, the c h o i c e s one m a k e s , the w a y o n e r e s p o n d s to g o o d f o r t u n e a n d adversity, not the w o r d s o n e u s e s to d e s c r i b e t h e m , or the t h e o r y one appeals to i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n oneself. I f the lives o f m o r a l l y u p r i g h t Stoics are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the lives o f Peripatetics, t h e n the d o c t r i n a l differe n c e s a r e i n s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s p r a g m a t i c attitude is not offered as a n alternative to p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . C a r n e a d e s is not s a y i n g that r a t i o n a l e n q u i r y is futile, but r a t h e r that d o g m a t i c

commitment

to p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories is futile. S o it w o u l d be s u r p r i s i n g if the participants h a d invited h i m to sit as j u d g e . It he thought they w e r e all equally w r o n g , there is n o t h i n g for h i m to judge. B u t C i c e r o says that the c o n t r o v e r s y u s e d to be d e c i d e d by C a r n e a d e s [controversiam

sotebat iudica re]. S i n c e it is c l e a r l y a p h i l -

o s o p h i c a l dispute, what needs to be d e c i d e d is w h i c h s i d e presents the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l i n g case. I f C a r n e a d e s j u d g e d that o n e p o s i tion is m o r e plausibly d e f e n d e d t h a n the o t h e r s , it is h a r d to see w h y he w o u l d not a p p r o v e of that side h i m s e l f . W h a t attitude t h e n w o u l d C a r n e a d e s have us take t o w a r d s t h e s e i n c o n c l u s i v e ethical theories?

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W e shall p o s t p o n e this q u e s t i o n o n e last t i m e u n t i l w e have c o n s i d e r e d h i s a r g u m e n t s against Stoic epistemology.

Epistemological arguments A s w i t h h i s s c e p t i c a l attacks o n t h e o l o g y a n d e t h i c s , C a r n e a d e s d i d not a i m to s h o w that n o b e l i e l is true, b u t rather that n o n e o f the available e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theories h a d e s t a b l i s h e d a n y t h i n g about knowledge. O n c e again, C a r n e a d e s was more ambitious than A r c esilaus:

[ H e ] p o s i t i o n e d h i m s e l f o n the c r i t e r i o n not o n l y against the Stoics b u t also against e v e r y o n e before h i m . I n fact h i s first a r g u m e n t , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d against all o l t h e m together, is o n e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h he e s t a b l i s h e s that n o t h i n g is w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n a c r i t e r i o n ot t r u t h - not r e a s o n , not s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n , not a p p e a r a n c e , n o t a n y t h i n g else that there is; for all of these a s a group d e c e i v e us,

( M 7.159)

4

D e s p i t e d i s a g r e e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i a , it w a s agreed a m o n g H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s that the s u c c e s s f u l c a n d i d a t e m u s t play s o m e role i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the t r u e i r o m the false ( S t r i k e r 1 9 7 4 ) . So C a r n e a d e s a t t e m p t s to s h o w that n o t h i n g c a n fill this role, that is, that we have n o reliable w a y to differentiate the t r u e f r o m the false. A s d e s c r i b e d by the Stoics, the c r i t e r i o n is m o r e t h a n j u s t a theoretical a c c o u n t ; it is s u p p o s e d to be the tool that e n a b l e s us to progress f r o m folly to w i s d o m . W e s a w i n C h a p t e r 3 that b e c o m i n g w i s e , for the Stoics, is a m a t t e r of l e a r n i n g to assent o n l y to kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . T h e p o i n t of e x p l a i n i n g the nature of s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s is not s i m p l y to a s s u r e us that s o m e t h i n g is t r u e , but r a t h e r to s h o w h o w w e c a n assent o n l y to w h a t is true, E x t e n d i n g A r c e s i l a u s ' attack,

Carneades makes a distinction

b e t w e e n t w o a s p e c t s ot a n i m p r e s s i o n : o n e i n relation to w h a t it is a n i m p r e s s i o n ot, a n d the o t h e r i n relation to the agent h a v i n g the

"1

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

i m p r e s s i o n . T h e first relation d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r it is true o r false, a n d the s e c o n d w h e t h e r it is c o n v i n c i n g or not. S e p a r a t i n g these aspects m a k e s A r c e s i l a u s ' o b j e c t i o n m o r e v i v i d , a n d it forces

the

Stoics to be m o r e explicit about their p o s i t i o n : a n i m p r e s s i o n w i l l be true or false d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r it agrees w i t h its o b j e c t ( s ) , but this w i l l not d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r not the agent finds the i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g ( A i 7.168), O n the other h a n d , the fact that the agent finds the i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g n e e d not tell us a n y t h i n g about w h e t h e r it is true o r false. The

Stoic c r i t e r i o n ,

the kataleptic

impression, includes

both

aspects in s u c h a w a y that its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s is s u p p o s e d to indicate its t r u t h , B u t , as A r c e s i l a u s h a d a r g u e d , for a n y i r r e s i s t i b l y p e r s u a sive a n d t r u e i m p r e s s i o n we c a n i m a g i n e a false o n e that is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . C a r n e a d e s e m p l o y s a sorites a r g u m e n t to f u r t h e r this o b j e c t i o n , A d v a n c i n g b y m i n u t e degrees we c a n i m a g i n e t r a n s f o r m i n g a kataleptic into a n o n - k a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n , or vice versa, O n e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the a r g u m e n t goes t h i s way.

[ 1]

3

I f G o d c a n present a s l e e p e r w i t h a pe rsuasive i m p r e s s i o n [of w h a t doesn't e x i s t ] , t h e n H e c a n present the sleeper w i t h a n i m p r e s s i o n that is e x t r e m e l y t r u t h - l i k e , i.e. o n e w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e s the t r u t h v e r y closely,

[2]

I f . . . one that is e x t r e m e l y t r u t h - l i k e , then . . . o n e that's difficult to d i s c r i m i n a t e I r o m a true i m p r e s s i o n .

[3]

I f . . , o n e that is difficult to d i s c r i m i n a t e , t h e n . . . one that can't be d i s c r i m i n a t e d ,

[4]

I f . . . o n e that can't be d i s c r i m i n a t e d , t h e n . . . one that doesn't differ at a l l ,

(Ac. 2.47-49)

T h e i m p r e s s i o n retains its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s t h r o u g h o u t

the steps; it

does not b e c o m e m o r e p e r s u a s i v e as we p r o c e e d . W h a t c h a n g e s is the degree of difference b e t w e e n t h i s v a c u o u s i m p r e s s i o n a n d a true one. T h e i m p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s g r a d u a l l y b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e s i m i l a r u n t i l we a r r i v e at i d e n t i c a l , that is, i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , p e r c e p tual contents. I n the e n d , t w o e q u a l l y p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s , one v a c u o u s a n d o n e t r u e , differ in n o t h i n g but n u m b e r .

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CARNEADES

C h r y s i p p u s c u s t o m a r y w a y of d e a l i n g w i t h the sorites is to stop 1

a n s w e r i n g before o n e c o m e s to u n c l e a r cases: " i n the case of a p p e a r a n c e s w h e r e the difference b e t w e e n t h e m is so s m a l l , the w i s e pers o n w i l l h o l d fast a n d k e e p quiet, w h e r e a s i n cases w h e r e a greater difference s t r i k e s h i m , he w i l l assent to o n e of t h e m as t r u e " { A i 7-416; see A c . 2 , 9 1 - 2 ) . S o if the d i f f e r e n c e s are m i n u t e , say b e t w e e n two i m p r i n t s f r o m the s a m e r i n g , the sage w i l l w i t h h o l d assent. R u t i n cases w h e r e there is a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a kataleptic a n d n o n - k a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n , the sage w i l l not hesitate to assent to the former. T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this r e s p o n s e is that it a s s u m e s one c a n a c t u ally d e c i d e w h i c h s i t u a t i o n o n e is i n . S u p p o s e that "fifty is f e w " is the content of a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n , a n d that "ten t h o u s a n d is f e w " is the c o n t e n t o l a n o n - k a t a l e p t i c a n d false i m p r e s s i o n . C l e a r l y , fifty-one is a b o u t as far f r o m ten t h o u s a n d as fifty is. S o the sage w i l l assent to the p r o p o s i t i o n that "fifty-one is f e w " a l s o ( A i 7 - 4 1 6 - 2 1 ) . I f there is a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the e v i d e n t t r u t h of s u c h c l a i m s a n d the falsity of "ten t h o u s a n d is few", there s h o u l d a l s o be a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n " f i f t y - t w o is f e w " a n d "ten t h o u s a n d is few". B u t o n c e he starts d o w n that r o a d , there s e e m s to be n o p r i n c i p l e d place to stop a n s w e r i n g . E v e n i f w e s u p p o s e that s o m e w h e r e a l o n g this r o a d the sage w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y receive the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n that o n e h u n d r e d (or w h a t e v e r the n u m b e r m a y b e ) is not tew, he m u s t be a b l e to r e c o g n i z e it a s s u c h . T h i s i m p r e s s i o n m u s t be q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m the i m p r e s s i o n that n i n e t y - n i n e is few. But this w o u l d be a r e m a r k a b l e feat of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i n c e in e v e r y o t h e r case the a d d i t i o n o f one u n i t is not e n o u g h to t r a n s f o r m tew i n t o m a n y . S o e v e n it the sage receives the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n r e g a r d i n g w h a t is few a n d m a n y , the sorites o b j e c t i o n s h o u l d u n d e r m i n e h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n b e i n g able to c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f y it as s u c h . Similarly, o n e

might be prevented from finding a

kataleptic

i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g d u e to e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n H e r a c l e s s t o o d by A d m e t u s , h a v i n g b r o u g h t A l c e s t i s u p f r o m b e l o w the e a r t h , A d m e t u s d i d

"3

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

catch a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n f r o m A l c e s t i s , yet d i d not trust I t . . . . F o r A d met us f i g u r e d that A l c e s t i s w a s d e a d a n d that a d e a d p e r s o n d o e s not rise u p .

(Ai 7.254-56)

T h e i m p r e s s i o n o f A l c e s t i s s e e m s to meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s for b e i n g k a t a l e p t i c : it is f r o m a real t h i n g , a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h p r e c i s e l y that t h i n g , a n d a c c u r a t e l y depicts all the relevant details. T o deal w i t h s u c h e v e n t u a l i t i e s , s o m e later Stoics argue that the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n c a n o n l y s e r v e as the c r i t e r i o n o l truth il it has no obstacle ( M 7 . 2 5 3 - 5 7 , 7 . 4 2 4 ) . A s the A d m e t u s e x a m p l e illustrates, the s o r t s o f o b s t a c l e s i n q u e s t i o n are beliefs or m e n t a l states. I f I a m i n a n a n x i o u s or f e a r f u l state of m i n d , 1 m i g h t v e r y w e l l receive a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n a n d yet refuse to assent to it. S i m i l a r l y , if I a m f i r m l y c o n v i n c e d o l s o m e false belief, I m i g h t a l s o be r e l u c t a n t to assent to s o m e o t h e r truth. I f t h e r e are n o s u c h o b s t a c l e s , a s s e n t i n g to a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is like the s i n k i n g o f a s c a l e s b a l a n c e w h e n weight is p u t o n it. T h e m i n d n e c e s s a r i l y y i e l d s a n d c a n n o t r e t r a i n t r o m g i v i n g its a p p r o v a l to what is p e r s p i c u o u s ( A c . 2 . 3 8 ) . W h e n the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n l a c k s a n y o b s t a c l e s it p r a c t i c a l l y lays h o l d o f us b y the h a i r a n d d r a g s us to assent ( A i 7.257). W h a t these passages suggest is s o m e sort o f n a t u r a l fit b e t w e e n kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s a n d o u r r a t i o n a l faculty s u c h that

these

i m p r e s s i o n s are, at least potentially, c o m p e l l i n g i n a w a y that false ones c a n n o t be. A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w , kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s affect the p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d m i n d i n a w a y that is quite different f r o m the w a y talse i m p r e s s i o n s affect the s a m e m i n d . T h e sage is the o n e w h o has h a b i t u a t e d h i m s e l f not to b e t e m p t e d to assent to false beliefs. T h e fit b e t w e e n h i s r a t i o n a l nature a n d the truth e x p l a i n s h o w this h a b i t u a t i o n is p o s s i b l e . So p e r h a p s it is possible to a c q u i r e the n e c e s s a r y level o f d i s c e r n m e n t , it w e c a n still c a l l it that. T a k e n this way, the Stoic c r i t e r i o n is s i m p l y a guarantee that o n e m i g h t d e v e l o p one's cognitive a n d p e r c e p t u a l e q u i p m e n t in s u c h a w a y that o n e o n l y finds kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s persuasive. ' 1

S u c h a g u a r a n t e e is still c o l d c o m f o r t to the S c e p t i c . C a r n e a d e s follows A r c e s i l a u s in f o r c i n g the Stoics to live u p to the m o r e a m b i tious p r o m i s e of their e p i s t e m o l o g y : s h o w u s i j o w o n e m i g h t b e c o m e

7t

CARNEADES

a sage. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y urgent given their v i e w that n o t h i n g but w i s d o m is really w o r t h w h i l e . W h i l e w e all l a n g u i s h in o u r v i c e a n d folly, it is of little use to b e t o l d that w i s d o m is p o s s i b l e . C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c a l attack e m p h a s i z e s that the relation of a n i m p r e s s i o n to the agent, its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o r credibility, is p r i m a r y i n o u r

struggle

tor w i s d o m ,

Epoche

and

apmxia

W e c o m e finally to the q u e s t i o n o f what cognitive attitude C a r n e a d e s w o u l d have us take t o w a r d s all this i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s . T h e s i m p l e a n s w e r is that we s h o u l d w i t h h o l d a s s e n t . B u t d e t e r m i n i n g p r e c i s e l y w h a t he m e a n s b y this is c o m p l i c a t e d by the fact that he m a k e s a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o k i n d s o f assent, o n l y o n e o f w h i c h we are s u p p o s e d to w i t h h o l d . T h e o t h e r is s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e (Ac. C i c e r o reports

2.104).

C a r n e a d e s ' distinction as a key move

i n his

response to the s t a n d a r d objection that s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t m a k e s life i m p o s s i b l e (iipraxia).

T h e Stoics c o m p l a i n e d that if there are no

kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , a s C a r n e a d e s argues, t h e n e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d be u n c l e a r (Ac. 2 . 3 2 ) . C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c a l a t t a c k calls into q u e s t i o n the fit b e t w e e n h u m a n c o g n i t i o n a n d the w o r l d . I n o t h e r w o r d s , it suggests that e v e n if we u s e o u r c o g n i t i v e e q u i p m e n t to the best of o u r ability we m i g h t not m a k e a n y progress t o w a r d s s e c u r i n g i n f a l lible j u s t i f i c a t i o n for o u r beliefs. We m a y d e v e l o p this o b j e c t i o n f u r t h e r i n t e r m s of the two aspects of a n i m p r e s s i o n . B y m a k i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n C a r n e a d e s d r a w s o u r attention to the lact that the subjective p l a u s i b i l i t y ot a n i m p r e s s i o n is n o necessary i n d i c a t o r o f truth a n d v i c e v e r s a . T h a t is all he needs to assert for the s a k e of h i s o b j e c t i o n to Stoic epistemology. B u t this leaves o p e n the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r the subjective p l a u sibility of a n i m p r e s s i o n is e v e n a fallible i n d i c a t o r o f t r u t h , that is, w h e t h e r there is any c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p l a u s i b i l i t y a n d t r u t h . It not, s o m e t h i n g s e e m i n g p l a u s i b l e h a s n o greater l i k e l i h o o d of b e i n g true t h a n s o m e t h i n g s e e m i n g w i l d l y i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e c o n v i n c i n g a n d f a m i l i a r sight o f a f r i e n d is j u s t as l i k e l y to be true as the

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

d r e a m - l i k e , h a z y i m p r e s s i o n o f a c e n t a u r . A s far as w e k n o w , the w a y the w o r l d a p p e a r s is not i n a n y w a y a n i n d i c a t o r o f the w a y the w o r l d is, I f that is w h a t C a r n e a d e s m e a n s , it is easy to see w h y the Stoics w o u l d assert that he is o v e r t u r n i n g life itself a n d d e p r i v i n g us of o u r m i n d s (Ac. 2 . 3 1 ) . I n c o u n t e r i n g the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n , C a r n e a d e s m a i n t a i n s that

there is a n i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n a n i m p r e s s i o n b e i n g m e r e l y u n c l e a r a n d it's b e i n g i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e (Ac. 2.32; Prncp.

Ev. 14.7).

E v e r y t h i n g is e q u a l l y i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e : n o i m p r e s s i o n c a n be g r a s p e d or a p p r e h e n d e d i n s u c h a w a y that w e c o u l d not i n p r i n c i p l e be m i s t a k e n about it. But that d o e s not m e a n that e v e r y t h i n g is equally u n c l e a r . C a r n e a d e s o n l y a i m s to d o a w a y w i t h w h a t n e v e r existed, the Stoic f i c t i o n o f kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t h e leaves us w h a t w e h a v e h a d all a l o n g , p e r s u a s i v e o r c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s , as o u r g u i d e i n p r a c t i c a l matters, R a t h e r than give us a d v i c e about h o w w e s h o u l d act i n the a b s e n c e of c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e , C a r n e a d e s m e r e l y d e s c r i b e s h o w w e d o act: . . . j u s t a s i n o r d i n a r y life, w h e n w e are i n v e s t i g a t i n g a s m a l l m a t t e r w e q u e s t i o n o n e w i t n e s s , w h e n it is a greater m a t ter, s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s , a n d w h e n it is a n e v e n m o r e e s s e n t i a l m a t t e r w e e x a m i n e e a c h of the w i t n e s s e s o n t h e basis o f the m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a m o n g the o t h e r s . . .

(Af 7.184)

I n the first level o f s c r u t i n y w e a p p l y the p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n o n its o w n as t h e c r i t e r i o n . I f I receive a n i m p r e s s i o n that is, at first sight, a p p a r e n t l y true, I assent to it a n d act a c c o r d i n g l y ; w e shall c o n s i d e r w h a t is i n v o l v e d i n s u c h assent below. T h e fact that w h a t is a p p a r ently t r u e is s o m e t i m e s false d o e s not b o t h e r u s , a n d n o r s h o u l d it. C a r n e a d e s asserts that:

o n e s h o u l d not, b e c a u s e the rare o c c u r r e n c e o f this [the a p p a r e n t l y true i m p r e s s i o n b e i n g l a l s e ] , d i s t r u s t the o n e that for the m o s t part tells the t r u t h . F o r b o t h o u r j u d g m e n t s a n d o u r a c t i o n s are, as a matter ot fact, regulated b y w h a t applies for the m o s t part.

76

(Af 7,175)

CARNEADES

T h e c l a i m that s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s "tell the t r u t h " for the m o s t part is s i m p l y a w a y o f s a y i n g that they are reliable or trustworthy. I f he h a d meant s o m e t h i n g m o r e , he w o u l d be suggesting a d o g m a t i c alternative to the Stoic a c c o u n t o f t r u t h . H e does not ( a n d s h o u l d not) offer a n y s p e c u l a t i o n as to w h y s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s are l o r the m o s t part reliable. But

i n p r e s e n t i n g the p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n a s a n

alternative

a c c o u n t o f the c r i t e r i o n , he is m a k i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m the s t a n d a r d use of the t e r m " c r i t e r i o n " O n the s t a n d a r d use, if s o m e t h i n g satisfies the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h t h e n it is true. B u t a c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n m a y be t r u e o r false. At the s e c o n d level of s c r u t i n y , w h e r e the stakes are a bit higher, we e x a m i n e the i m p r e s s i o n s that a p p e a r a l o n g w i t h the o n e i n q u e s t i o n . C a r n e a d e s ' m a k e s the o b v i o u s , but i m p o r t a n t , o b s e r v a t i o n that we t y p i c a l l y d o not receive isolated, i n d i v i d u a l i m p r e s s i o n s ; rather, they c o m e i n g r o u p s . W h e n I e n c o u n t e r m y f r i e n d , I receive i m p r e s s i o n s of h e r clothes, her hair, h e r s h o e s a n d the s o u n d of h e r v o i c e , a l o n g w i t h the objects she m a y be h o l d i n g a n d o t h e r t h i n g s i n the i m m e d i a t e vicinity, a n d e v e n the q u a l i t y ot the light. W h e n the c l u s ter of s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s all a p p e a r t r u e a n d m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e , o u r trust is greater. B u t if one o f these i m p r e s s i o n s a p p e a r s false, if m y f r i e n d s v o i c e s o u n d s c o m p l e t e l y u n f a m i l i a r , t h e n I s h o u l d reject the i m p r e s s i o n that this is m y f r i e n d . C a r n e a d e s d e s c r i b e s t h i s w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t that the c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n n o t be " t u r n e d away", that is, t u r n e d a w a y b y a n a p p a r e n t l y false i m p r e s s i o n a c c o m p a n y i n g it. At the t h i r d level of s c r u t i n y , i n matters o f the h i g h e s t i m p o r tance, we t u r n o u r attention to e a c h o f the a s s o c i a t e d i m p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s a n d a c t i v e l y s e e k to d i s c r e d i t o n e o n the basis of the others. C a r n e a d e s c l a i m s that this is the sort of t h i n g we d o w h e n s c r u t i n i z i n g c a n d i d a t e s for p u b l i c office. It is n o t sufficient that the c a n d i d a t e c o n v i n c i n g l y a p p e a r s to be q u a l i f i e d . C o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the i m p o r t a n c e o f the p o s i t i o n , we w i l l e x a m i n e h i s c r e d e n t i a l s a n d references. E a c h of these in t u r n w i l l b e put to s i m i l a r tests. I n the end,

the m o s t w e c a n a c h i e v e is c o h e r e n c e a m o n g the e x a m i n e d

i m p r e s s i o n s , but at t h i s highest level o l s c r u t i n y , we w i l l not settle for the c o h e r e n c e ot the i n i t i a l cluster of i m p r e s s i o n s . T h u s w e get

"7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the f i n a l r e q u i r e m e n t that the c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n that h a s not b e e n t u r n e d a w a y h a s a l s o b e e n gone o v e r i n detail. D e s p i t e the fact that the h i g h e s t level of s c r u t i n y still fails to g u a r antee the t r u t h o l the i m p r e s s i o n , we c o n t i n u e to r e l y o n i t If we d o not, that is, i f w e find n o i m p r e s s i o n s c o n v i n c i n g , C a r n e a d e s grants that life w o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d (Ac. 239,

103.

105).

C a r n e a d e s ' p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i o n a n d the t w o t y p e s o f a s s e n t W h a t exactly are we d o i n g w h e n w e rely o n s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s ? W e m a y n o w u n d e r s t a n d the type of assent C a r n e a d e s a l l o w s a n d the type he w o u l d have us w i t h h o l d . F o r c o n v e n i e n c e we s h a l l refer to these as s c e p t i c a l a n d d o g m a t i c assent, respectively. S c e p t i c a l assent is given to p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s that h a v e r e c e i v e d the appropriate level of scrutiny. ( M o r e strictly s p e a k i n g , assent is g i v e n to a p r o p o s i t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n . I f we d o not f o r m u l a t e s u c h a p r o p o s i t i o n b y i n t e r p r e t i n g the i m p r e s s i o n s s i g n i f i c a n c e , then it is n o t " s a y i n g " a n y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h w e m i g h t agree.) The

distinction between dogmatic

a n d s c e p t i c a l assent

may

be i n t e r p r e t e d in two w a y s . O n e is that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d h a v e us w i t h h o l d assent i n the m a n n e r that w o u l d c h a r a c t e r i z e assent to a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n if we w e r e a b l e to i d e n t i f y it as s u c h . I n o t h e r w o r d s , s i n c e we c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r a n y i m p r e s s i o n we assent to is kataleptic, we s h o u l d n e v e r assent w i t h absolute c o n f i d e n c e . O n this probabilist

view, a l l that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d have us a v o i d

is the r a s h n e s s of t a k i n g o u r s e l v e s to know w h a t w e d o not; he does not o b j e c t to c a u t i o u s l y b e l i e v i n g that s o m e i m p r e s s i o n is p r o b a b l y true. If this is c o r r e c t , C a r n e a d e s d o e s not c o m p l e t e l y sever the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s a n d the t r u t h . H e m e r e l y p o i n t s out that p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s are fallible a n d that a s far as we k n o w they are all we have. A c c o r d i n g l y , s c e p t i c a l assent w o u l d y i e l d fallible beliefs h e l d w i t h the a p p r o p r i a t e l y m o d e s t a w a r e n e s s that they m a y be false. The

o t h e r alternative is that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d h a v e us w i t h -

h o l d assent to the t r u t h o f a n y p r o p o s i t i o n , O n this sceptical

78

view,

CARNEADES

d o g m a t i c assent is s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f t a k i n g s o m e t h i n g to be true, w h e t h e r i n a m o d e s t or c o n f i d e n t m a n n e r . W i t h h o l d i n g this type of assent w o u l d rule out b e l i e v i n g a n y t h i n g , as w e c o m m o n l y use the w o r d belief. T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g type of s c e p t i c a l assent w o u l d be a m a t t e r of g o i n g a l o n g w i t h s o m e i m p r e s s i o n w i t h o u t t a k i n g it to be true, o r e v e n p r o b a b l y true, T h i s i s s u e c o n t i n u e s to be c o n t r o v e r s i a l . A l t h o u g h a n u m b e r of s c h o l a r s i n recent y e a r s have s u p p o r t e d the s e c o n d alternative, I believe the first is the c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C a r n e a d e s , at least w i t h respect to o r d i n a r y , n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l b e l i e f s .

7

A s w e saw in C h a p t e r 3, A r c e s i l a u s offers a v e r s i o n of the s c e p t i c a l r e s p o n s e . A c t i o n does not r e q u i r e assent, all we n e e d is a n i m p r e s s i o n a n d a n i m p u l s e , n e i t h e r o f w h i c h n e e d to be, or e v e n c a n be, w i t h h e l d . W h a t m a k e s c o m p e l l i n g A r c e s i l a u s ' use o f t h i s r e s p o n s e is the n o t i o n that w e often act w i t h o u t c o n s c i o u s l y o r deliberately reflecting o n o u r s i t u a t i o n , C a r n e a d e s i n c o r p o r a t e s s u c h cases in h i s first level o f s c r u t i n y : " i n cases w h e r e the s i t u a t i o n does not give us a n o p p o r t u n i t y for e x a c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the m a t t e r " ( M 7 . 1 8 5 ) . W h e n b e i n g p u r s u e d by e n e m i e s , o n e d o e s not h a v e t i m e to c o n s c i o u s l y deliberate about the e v i d e n c e of one's s e n s e s ; o n e m u s t act o n the b a s i s o f h o w e v e r t h i n g s s t r i k e one at that m o m e n t . But as we r a m p u p the level of s c r u t i n y , this a c c o u n t n o l o n g e r m a k e s sense. Suppose I have carefully a n d thoroughly e x a m i n e d an a p p l e . I h a v e e v e n l e d a bit to m y pet h a m s t e r , w h i c h a p p e a r s fine a f t e r w a r d s . A l l ot m y i m p r e s s i o n s c o n f i r m that it is a g o o d a p p l e s o I take a bite. T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n is that I have c o m e to b e l i e v e the a p p l e is p r o b a b l y o k a y to eat. T h e s c e p t i c a l v i e w w o u l d r e q u i r e m e to say that a l t h o u g h the apple a p p e a r s g o o d after m y c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n , I have n o o p i n i o n a s to w h e t h e r it " r e a l l y " is o r not. But

C a r n e a d e s offers h i s p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s as part o f a

d e s c r i p t i o n about h o w we in fact get a l o n g i n the w o r l d . M o s t p e o ple take the e v i d e n c e of their s e n s e s as g o o d , a l t h o u g h fallible, i n d i cators of the w a y the w o r l d is. T h i s is not to say that they a c c e p t s o m e s o p h i s t i c a t e d m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y a b o u t reality, or e v e n s o m e

~9

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

e x p l a n a t i o n a s to w h y the senses are generally reliable. W h e n w e raise the level of s c r u t i n y , we e x p e c t to i n c r e a s e o u r c h a n c e s of getting t h i n g s right. W e d o not e x p e c t to m e r e l y feel m o r e c o n v i n c e d . The

m a i n p r o b l e m w i t h the s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is that it

requires the C a r n e a d e a n to f i n d s o m e t h i n g c o n v i n c i n g w i t h o u t thereby finding it likely to b e t r u e . Yet these n o t i o n s are s o c l o s e l y l i n k e d that p u l l i n g t h e m apart a p p e a r s to m a k e t h e m b o t h u n i n telligible. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y clear w h e n w e rely o n i m p r e s s i o n s to d e t e r m i n e the best c o u r s e ot a c t i o n . It is quite i m p l a u s i b l e to t h i n k that a n i m p r e s s i o n leads i m m e d i a t e l y to i m p u l s e w h e n w e are s l o w l y and methodically considering possible courses of action along with the relevant e v i d e n c e . S u c h deliberate j u d g e m e n t calls for s o m e k i n d of a s s e n t T h i s is w h e r e C a r n e a d e s persuasive i m p r e s s i o n s a n d h i s variety o l 1

sceptical assent c o m e i n . I n differentiating t w o k i n d s of assent, a n d i n d e s c r i b i n g the levels of s c r u t i n y w e t y p i c a l l y e m p l o y , he s h o w s h o w d e l i b e r a t i o n , a n d not iust a c t i o n , is p o s s i b l e tor the sceptic. W h i l e this m o v e strengthens the s c e p t i c s r e s p o n s e to the apraxia it c o m e s at the p r i c e of l o o s e n i n g u p o n A s a r e s p o n s e to the apraxia

objection,

cpache.

objection, C a r n e a d e s practical crite1

r i o n is o n l y m e a n t to s h o w h o w we m a n a g e i n o r d i n a r y life w i t h o u t kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . W i t h o n e i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n , e x a m p l e s o l C a r n e a d e s s c e p t i c a l assent a l w a y s o c c u r i n the c o n t e x t o f m a k i n g 1

o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y j u d g e m e n t s : for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r this is Socrates (AJ 7 . 1 7 6 - 7 8 ) , w h e t h e r to flee (Af 7,186), w h e t h e r a c o i l e d object is a r o p e or a s n a k e (AJ 7 . 1 8 7 ) , w h e t h e r to go o n a voyage, get m a r r i e d , s o w c r o p s a n d so o n ( A c . 2.100, 109), T h e p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o c c u r s i n r e s p o n s e to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y o b j e c t i o n . C a r n e a d e s w o u l d not n e e d to assert that he k n o w s k n o w l edge is i m p o s s i b l e ; i n s t e a d he m a y say this is a p e r s u a s i v e intellectual i m p r e s s i o n to w h i c h he assents w i t h the p r o p e r m e a s u r e of c a u t i o n (Ac, 2 . 1 1 0 ) . C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l i c i t l y a s s i g n this j u d g e m e n t to h i m , but it w o u l d h a v e b e e n a n o b v i o u s m o v e to m a k e . E x c l u d i n g this case, C a r n e a d e s is n e v e r r e p o r t e d to h a v e s i n c e r e l y a p p r o v e d of a n y of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s he d e b a t e d . S o m e t i m e s he d e f e n d e d a v i e w s o v i g o r o u s l y he w a s t h o u g h t to a c t u a l l y e n d o r s e it ( A c . 2.139;

CARNEADES

see 2 . 1 3 1 ; Fin. 5 . 2 0 ) . B u t C i c e r o m a k e s it clear that he o n l y a r g u e d for these p o s i t i o n s dialectically. E v e n h i s close f r i e n d a n d c o m p a n i o n C l i t o m a c h u s c o u l d never figure out w h i c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s C a r n e a d e s a c c e p t e d {Ac. 2 . 1 3 9 ) . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for this is that he d i d not a c c e p t a n y ot t h e m , but c o n t i n u e d , i n g o o d S o c r a t i c f a s h i o n , to seek the t r u t h . I n the m e a n t i m e , he a l l o w s for the o r d i n a r y p r o c e s s o l d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d a s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e assent to p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d a y - t o - d a y m a i n t e n a n c e of o u r lives.

The dialectical interpretation A s w i t h A r c e s i l a u s , it r e m a i n s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y that C a r n e a d e s d o e s not e n d o r s e a n y o f h i s a p p a r e n t l y p o s i t i v e c l a i m s , but i n s t e a d d e v e l o p s t h e m all o n the b a s i s o f h i s o p p o n e n t s ' v i e w s . O n a p u r e l y d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , C a r n e a d e s s h o w s o n l y that e v e r y positive, d o g m a t i c v i e w is r a t i o n a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e i n t e r m s o f its p r o p o n e n t s own

standards.

But if C a r n e a d e s is s h o w i n g the Stoics w h e r e their p o s i t i o n leads, then o n c e a g a i n the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n w o u l d b e their p r o b l e m , not

his. C a r n e a d e s s h o u l d not r e s p o n d to s u c h o b j e c t i o n s b u t

rather

accept t h e m as f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n of the u n t e n a b l e p o s i t i o n o c c u pied by dogmatists. H o w e v e r , C a r n e a d e s ' d i a l e c t i c a l strategy m i g h t b e m o r e i n d i r e c t . H e m i g h t h a v e s o u g h t to s h o w the Stoics that their p o s i t i o n is not the best available. It he c a n s h o w that Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y is less r a t i o n ally d e f e n s i b l e t h a n s o m e o t h e r a c c o u n t , he w i l l h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d his goal. H e w i l l h a v e s h o w n that the Stoics' c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g y is p o o r l y f o u n d e d . T h e elaborate a c c o u n t of p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s m a y be the c e n t r e p i e c e of t h i s i n d i r e c t strategy. T h i s w o u l d also e x p l a i n w h y the a c c o u n t of p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s is not d e r i v e d strictly o n the basis of Stoic c o m m i t m e n t s . C a r n e a d e s w o u l d not be t r y i n g to s h o w what the Stoics are u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to, but rather that there is a better e x p l a n a t i o n available. S i n c e s u c h a m o d e s t , probabilist alternative w o u l d not be a p p e a l i n g to Stoics, w h o

SI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

b e l i e v e d that w i s d o m requires irrefutable k n o w l e d g e , i n the e n d they w o u l d be left w i t h n o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n ; that i s , they w o u l d be l e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ( A l l e n 1994J. But if this w e r e C a r n e a d e s ' strategy it is u n c l e a r w h y he w o u l d not accept this alternative h i m s e l f H e is n o t c o m m i t t e d i n a d v a n c e to epochs,

n o r is he a t t r i b u t e d a n y u n e q u i v o c a l v i e w a b o u t w h a t w i s -

d o m r e q u i r e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , if h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o l s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o priate assent i s a n a c c o u n t o f h o w p e o p l e d o i n fact deliberate, t h e n he too w i l l deliberate i n this way. H i s a d m i s s i o n that life w o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d w i t h o u t c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s to g u i d e the w a y s e e m s s i n c e r e . I I so, C a r n e a d e s w i l l rely o n c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s j u s t as e v e r y o n e does, T h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o r e q u i r e s that w e e x p l a i n a w a y the e v i d e n c e r e p o r t i n g C a r n e a d e s ' d e p a r t u r e f r o m A r c e s i l a u s ' p o s i t i o n . Sextus m a r k s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , as w e h a v e s e e n , i n t e r m s o f A r c esilaus' M i d d l e A c a d e m y a n d C a r n e a d e s ' N e w A c a d e m y . C a r n e a d e s deviates f r o m A r c e s i l a u s ' m o r e r a d i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n by d e l i b erately c h o o s i n g to y i e l d to s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s rather t h a n f o l l o w i n g a l o n g w i t h o u t a n y s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n o r a d h e r e n c e [PH 1 . 2 3 0 ) .

3

A p p a r e n t l y h i s p o i n t is that C a r n e a d e s violates the s c e p t i c a l s p i r i t o f epoche by b e i n g t o o actively i n v o l v e d o r interested i n getting t h i n g s right, a n d in p r e f e r r i n g o n e i m p r e s s i o n to a n o t h e r o n the b a s i s o f h o w c o n v i n c i n g they are. H i s y i e l d i n g to c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s a c c o m p a n i e s a s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n t o w a r d s t h i n g s b e i n g a s they s e e m . I n o t h e r w o r d s , he a c c e p t s that c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s h a v e s o m e e v i d e n t i a l v a l u e , that they are fallible i n d i c a t o r s o f t r u t h . A n d like e v e r y o n e else, he relies o n t h e m i n the c o u n t l e s s o r d i n a r y j u d g e m e n t s w e m a k e everyday.

Conclusion Carneades w a s both more ambitious and more modest than Arcesilaus. H e w a s m o r e a m b i t i o u s i n e x t e n d i n g h i s s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d e t h i c s to c o v e r e v e r y p o s s i b l e t h e o r y that m i g h t be p r o p o u n d e d , A n d he w a s m o r e m o d e s t i n a l l o w i n g

82

CARNEADES

for a k i n d of p o s i t i v e m e n t a l attitude that w e take t o w a r d s t h i n g s we d o n o t k n o w , at least w i t h r e g a r d to p r a c t i c a l i s s u e s . C a r n e a d e s ' v i e w o f s c e p t i c a l assent m a k e s for a m o r e c o n v i n c i n g r e s p o n s e to the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n s i n c e it leaves in place all the o r d i -

n a r y m e a s u r e s of d e l i b e r a t i o n that p e o p l e i n fact employ. A r c e s i l a u s , as I have i n t e r p r e t e d h i m in C h a p t e r 3, is o n l y able to s h o w h o w a v e r y reactive f o r m of a c t i o n is p o s s i b l e . H i s c r i t e r i o n o f a c t i o n d o e s not e x p l a i n h o w the s c e p t i c m a y a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g h i s i m p r e s s i o n s after h a v i n g reflected o n t h e m . C a r n e a d e s ' v i e w a l s o p r e s e r v e s the sceptic's c o n s i s t e n c y in a l l o w i n g h i m to say that it a p p e a r s c o n v i n c ing, but not c e r t a i n , that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e {Ac. 2 . 1 1 0 ) .

S3

FIVE

Cicero: the end of the sceptical Academy

T h e r e are two n a r r a t i v e s w e c a n tell r e g a r d i n g the e n d ot the s c e p t i cal A c a d e m y . A c c o r d i n g to the first, the fallibilist interpretation o l C a r n e a d e s is h i s t o r i c a l l y w r o n g , a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ill a d v i s e d . It w a s a m i s t a k e to p o s i t i v e l y e n d o r s e the c l a i m s that earlier A c a d e m ics a d v a n c e d dialectically. C o m p a r e d to the o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l a n d p u r e s c e p t i c i s m o f A r c e s i l a u s , the later p r o d u c t is a n e x h a u s t e d a n d degenerate c o m p r o m i s e . A r c e s i l a u s w a s right to insist o n the u n i v e r s a l s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t ; to c o m p r o m i s e o n this p o i n t is to a b a n d o n w h a t is best about A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m . T h i s is the line p u r s u e d by the r e n e g a d e A c a d e m i c A e n e s i d e m u s , w h o m w e shall m e e t i n C h a p t e r 6. A c c o r d i n g to the s e c o n d n a r r a t i v e , o n e v e r s i o n of w h i c h we shall d e v e l o p i n t h i s chapter, A r c e s i l a u s ' s u c c e s s o r s w e r e right to m o d i f y a n d mitigate h i s o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m . I n p a r t i c u l a r they w e r e right to l i m i t the s c o p e of w h a t we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t

about,

a n d to enlarge the s c o p e o f s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e assent. V i e w e d i n this way, their c o n c e s s i o n s constitute progress; the c u l m i n a t i o n of m a n y years of p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate w i t h the Stoics, A t the h e a r t o f t h i s dispute is the issue o f w h e t h e r it is e v e r w i s e to a c c e p t a p r o p o s i t i o n that is not k n o w n to be true. I n o t h e r w o r d s , 1

w h a t w i l l the sage d o in the a b s e n c e of c e r t a i n t y ? A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s agree that he w i l l s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . But by m o d i f y -

Sí

CICERO

i n g w h a t it m e a n s to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , C a r n e a d e s a l s o a l l o w s l o r p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n l e a d i n g to fallible beliefs i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s . F o r e x a m p l e , it s e e m s that the weather is fine a n d the c r e w reliable, so it s e e m s likely that the voyage w i l l be safe. B u t t h i s c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n is n o t the p r o d u c t of a r g u i n g p r o a n d c o n ; it is s i m p l y a m a t t e r of e x a m i n i n g the c o n d i t i o n s a n d c h e c k i n g o n e i m p r e s s i o n against a n o t h e r . C a r n e a d e s f a l l i b i l i s m 1

s e e m s o n l y to e x t e n d to p r a c t i c a l matters a n d is not related to his d i a l e c t i c a l method.-

2

T h e s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y ' s final c o n c e s s i o n is to a c c e p t that d i a lectical a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n c a n p r o v i d e fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n s u p p o r t of o n e s i d e o f the d i s p u t e . T h e o u t c o m e is n o longer the p u r e l y negative o n e of u n d e r m i n i n g c o n v i c t i o n . T h i s final step is the d e v e l o p m e n t o l p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a l l i b i l i s m a s a k i n d ot m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m . O n this view, the A c a d e m i c s c o n t i n u e to reject the Stoic a c c o u n t o l k n o w l e d g e , but they e x p a n d e v e n f u r t h e r the r a n g e of s c e p t i c a l l y appropriate assent.

T h e A c a d e m y after the d e a t h o f C a r n e a d e s A f t e r C a r n e a d e s ' death i n c. 128 B C E , his l o n g - t i m e f r i e n d a n d a s s o c i ate C l i t o m a c h u s b e c a m e h e a d ot the A c a d e m y . C l i t o m a c h u s wrote over 4 0 0 b o o k s , m a n y (it n o t a l l ) of w h i c h c o n t a i n e d a r g u m e n t s he h a d h e a r d f r o m h i s m u c h - a d m i r e d f r i e n d ( D L 4 . 6 7 ) . C a r n e a d e s p r a i s e d h i m , s a r d o n i c a l l y , for s a y i n g the s a m e t h i n g s [as C a r n e a d e s h a d ] , in c o n t r a s t to a n o t h e r student, C h a r m a d a s , w h o s a i d t h e m i n the s a m e w a y (Omt.

5 1 ) . T h i s m a y s i m p l y be a m a t t e r of C l i t o m a -

c h u s ' l a c k i n g the o r a t o r i c a l s k i l l s of h i s teacher. B u t it so, it suggests that C l i t o m a c h u s w o u l d not h a v e b e e n as effective at u n d e r m i n i n g h i s o p p o n e n t ' s d o g m a t i c c o n f i d e n c e . It is w o r t h r e m e m b e r i n g that b o t h A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s c a r r i e d o n their p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k p r i m a r i l y , if not exclusively, t h r o u g h c o n v e r s a t i o n rather t h a n writing. A f t e r C l i t o m a c h u s death in c . l 10 B C E , P h i l o of L a r i s s a b e c a m e 1

h e a d o f the A c a d e m y . H e h a d b e e n C l i t o m a c h u s s t u d e n t for a b o u t 1

S5

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

fourteen y e a r s , a n d w a s o v e r j o y e d at h i s p r o m o t i o n , r e t u r n i n g the favour b y p r e s e r v i n g a n d a u g m e n t i n g the d o c t r i n e s of h i s teacher. So at least i n i t i a l l y he h e l d to the C l i t o m a c h e a n o r t h o d o x y . I n C h a p t e r 4 I h a v e t r i e d to a r t i c u l a t e w h a t that o r t h o d o x y w a s ; a l t h o u g h this c o n t i n u e s to be c o n t r o v e r s i a l , we s h a l l take this p o s i t i o n as the one P h i l o starts w i t h . I n a d d i t i o n to the c o n t i n u e d o p p o s i t i o n to the Stoic a c c o u n t of kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , the c r u c i a l e l e m e n t of t h i s p o s i t i o n , or p r a c t i c e , is that the o u t c o m e o f d i a l e c t i c a l a r g u m e n t is a l w a y s negative: e i t h e r the sceptic o r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t , h a v i n g c o m e to see that r e a s o n p r o v i d e s n o m o r e s u p p o r t for one side of the d i s p u t e t h a n the other. Eventually Philo became disenchanted with Clitomachus

1

(i.e.

C a r n e a d e s ) p r o m o t i o n of epoche b e c a u s e of the c l a r i t y a n d agree1

m e n t o f h i s s e n s a t i o n s {Praep.

Ev. 1 4 . 9 . 1 - 2 ) . P r e c i s e l y w h y P h i l o

b e c a m e d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h epoche a n d c h a n g e d h i s m i n d is as c o n troversial as w h a t h e c h a n g e d h i s m i n d to. Sextus e x p l a i n s w h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e about P h i l o s n e w p o s i t i o n , w h i c h he Labels the F o u r t h A c a d e m y , i n this w a y ( P f f 1.220; see Praep.

Ev. 14.4): " P h i l o a n d

h i s followers say that as far as the Stoic s t a n d a r d (i.e. a p p r e h e n s i v e [kataleptic] a p p e a r a n c e ) is c o n c e r n e d objects are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , but a s far as the nature ot the o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s is c o n c e r n e d they are a p p r e h e n s i b l e " ( P H 1.235; see PH 1.220; Praep. Ev. 14.4). I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h i n g s c a n n o t be k n o w n i n the m a n n e r the Stoics c l a i m , but they c a n still be k n o w n i n s o m e less d e m a n d i n g way. T h i s v i e w w a s set out in d e t a i l i n Philo's R o m a n b o o k s , so c a l l e d b e c a u s e he wrote t h e m s h o r t l y after c o m i n g to R o m e i n 89/8 B C E . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we h a v e o n l y a few r e f e r e n c e s to these b o o k s i n o u r s o u r c e s , n o n e ot w h i c h elaborate the nature ot P h i l o s n o v e l p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to o n e p l a u s i b l e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , P h i l o s i n n o v a t i o n is to d r o p the i n t e r n a l i s t r e q u i r e m e n t that c a u s e d s o m u c h trouble for earlier d e f e n d e r s o f Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y ( H a n k i n s o n 1 9 9 8 a : 1 1 6 - 2 0 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , for P h i l o it is n o longer n e c e s s a r y to k n o w that one k n o w s of a n y p a r t i c u l a r i m p r e s s i o n that it a c c u r a t e l y c o n v e y s the relevant details. I n effect, P h i l o a l l o w s that c e r t a i n i m p r e s s i o n s reveal the nature o f their object but not the tact that they are so r e v e l a tory. N o i m p r e s s i o n is s e l f - c e r t i f y i n g In the w a y r e q u i r e d by ( s o m e

CICERO

a c c o u n t s o f ) S t o i c e p i s t e m o l o g y , but o n Philo's n e w a c c o u n t s u c h selt-certification is n o t n e c e s s a r y for k n o w l e d g e .

3

W h a t e v e r h i s R o m a n v i e w m a y h a v e b e e n , Philo's f o r m e r s t u d e n t A n t i o c h u s w a s o u t r a g e d by it. H e h a d a l r e a d y a b a n d o n e d the s c e p t i c i s m o f the T h i r d A c a d e m y for a f o r m o f S t o i c i s m . A n t i o c h u s c a m e to believe that the Stoic c r i t e r i o n is the o n l y p o s s i b l e , or at least r e a s o n able, a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e (Ac. 2 . 1 8 - 3 1 ) . T h i s is p r o b a b l y w h y he w a s s o put out b y Philo's n e w , n o n - S t o i c a c c o u n t of k n o w l e d g e , H e w a s even m o v e d to p u b l i s h h i s o w n extensive a r g u m e n t s i n o p p o s i tion (Ac. 2 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . D e s p i t e h i s e n d o r s e m e n t of S t o i c i s m , A n t i o c h u s c o n t i n u e d to consider h i m s e l f a n A c a d e m i c because he believed his view w a s a r e t u r n to the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n of Plato a n d h i s i m m e d i a t e s u c c e s sors ( A c . 1 . 1 7 - 1 8 ) . A n t i o c h u s f u r t h e r a r g u e d that the Stoic v i e w e m e r g e d as a d e v e l o p m e n t o l this o r i g i n a l A c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n ( A c . 2,43). S o i n d e f e n d i n g Stoic epistemology, A n t i o c h u s took h i m s e l f to be c o r r e c t i n g the e r r o r s initiated b y A r c e s i l a u s ' s c e p t i c a l t u r n i n the A c a d e m y , A l t h o u g h Sextus associates A n t i o c h u s w i t h the F i f t h A c a d e m y , it is not clear w h e t h e r he s u c c e e d e d P h i l o i n a n y officially r e c o g n i z e d capacity. S h o r t l y after P h i l o a n d o t h e r p r o m i n e n t A c a d e m i c s fled f r o m A t h e n s to R o m e , Plato's A c a d e m y c e a s e d to exist as a n i n s t i t u t i o n . B u t e v e n if it h a d c o n t i n u e d to exist, n e i t h e r of the p o s i t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the F o u r t h a n d F i f t h A c a d e m i e s w o u l d q u a l i f y as s c e p t i c a l i n so far as both a l l o w l o r s o m e k i n d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y c o m e s to a n e n d i n either case.

Cicero's mitigated scepticism T h i s e n d , h o w e v e r , is not a full stop. B e t w e e n 46 a n d 4 4 B C E C i c e r o , w h o h a d s t u d i e d w i t h both P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s , a s well as o t h e r p r o m i n e n t Stoic a n d E p i c u r e a n p h i l o s o p h e r s , w r o t e a series of d i a logues d e f e n d i n g a n d d i s p l a y i n g the p r a c t i c e of A c a d e m i c p h i l o s o phy as he s a w i t . I n r e s p o n s e to h i s c r i t i c s , he insists that he h a s not J

c o m e f o r w a r d as c h a m p i o n ot a lost c a u s e : " W h e n m e n d i e , their

87

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

d o c t r i n e s d o not p e r i s h w i t h t h e m , t h o u g h p e r h a p s they surfer f r o m the loss o i a n authoritative e x p o n e n t " (iYD 1.11), S o m e forty years after the A c a d e m y c l o s e d its d o o r s , C i c e r o presents h i m s e l f as j u s t s u c h a n authoritative v o i c e . T h e p r o b l e m is that C i c e r o ' s m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m is a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m h i s A c a d e m i c predecessors. H e accepts n e i t h e r the Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y o l A n t i o c h u s ' F i f t h A c a d e m y n o r the less d e m a n d i n g a c c o u n t o f k n o w l edge that c h a r a c t e r i z e s Philo's R o m a n b o o k s . N o r d o e s he a c c e p t the severe v i e w o f epocke c h a m p i o n e d by A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s / A s w e h a v e seen, for A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters is c o m p l e t e l y u n r e l a t e d to the issue of apraxia.

T h e i r s c e p t i c a l c r i t e r i a s h o w o n l y h o w we are able to

act i n p r a c t i c a l matters. T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f these c r i t e r i a h a s n o t h i n g to d o w i t h the d i a l e c t i c a l s k i l l s of a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n . F o r e x a m p l e , i n v e s t i g a t i n g s o m e a p p e a r a n c e i n the m a n n e r

proposed

b y C a r n e a d e s is not a matter o f a r t i c u l a t i n g r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s for and against it. W h a t e v e r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n o n e c h o o s e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h these p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i a is not the p r o d u c t of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y . A s far as w e k n o w , A r c e s i l a u s never d e s c r i b e s the c o n c l u s i o n o l a n a r g u m e n t as eulogon,

a n d C a r n e a d e s n e v e r d e s c r i b e s the

c o n c l u s i o n of a n a r g u m e n t a s pithanon

(with one possible exception

to be d i s c u s s e d b e l o w ) , C i c e r o , h o w e v e r , translates C a r n e a d e s ' pithanon probabile

w i t h the L a t i n

(i.e. p r o b a b l e or p l a u s i b l e ) a n d s o m e t i m e s veri simile

(i.e.

t r u t h - l i k e ) , a n d m a i n t a i n s that the s o l e p u r p o s e of the A c a d e m i c a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n is to " d r a w out o r l o r m u l a t e the t r u t h or its closest p o s s i b l e a p p r o x i m a t i o n " ( A c . 2.7; s e e A c . 2 , 6 0 , 2 . 6 6 ; ND Fin,

1.13; Tusc.

1.11;

1,8, 2.9; G l u c k e r 1995), R a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y r e v e a l -

i n g larger p o r t i o n s o f o u r i g n o r a n c e , C i c e r o t h i n k s the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d a l l o w s for p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s the t r u t h * A n d these j u d g e m e n t s w i l l clearly h a v e a m a j o r i m p a c t o n the c h o i c e s o n e m a k e s a n d the k i n d of life o n e lives. S o C i c e r o uses the A c a d e m i c d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d to a c c o m p l i s h b o t h p o s i t i v e a n d negative e n d s : b y r e v e a l i n g the strength o f the o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s it e l i m i n a t e s u n w a r r a n t e d c o n f i d e n c e w h i l e e s t a b l i s h i n g the degree to w h i c h o n e v i e w is m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n another.

88

CICERO

D e s p i t e the a p p a r e n t n o v e l t y o f h i s v i e w o f the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , C i c e r o c l a i m s that it h a d a l w a y s b e e n the p r a c t i c e o l the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y : the m e t h o d o f a r g u i n g against e v e r y t h i n g a n d

openly

j u d g i n g n o t h i n g o r i g i n a t e d w i t h Socrates, w a s r e v i v e d b y A r c e s i l a u s , s t r e n g t h e n e d by C a r n e a d e s a n d f l o u r i s h e d right d o w n to h i s o w n t i m e . T h i s a p p r o a c h r e q u i r e s t h e A c a d e m i c to m a s t e r all the s c h o o l s of p h i l o s o p h y i n o r d e r to m a k e a w e l l - i n f o r m e d j u d g e m e n t w h e r e the truth p r o b a b l y lies (ND

about

1 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . S i m i l a r l y , he c l a i m s

that of all the c o m p e t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l sects that arose f r o m S o c rates, as i m m o r t a l i z e d i n Plato's d i a l o g u e s , he f o l l o w s the o n e that he t h i n k s S o c r a t e s h i m s e l f u s e d ; ' l o c o n c e a l o n e s o w n o p i n i o n , to relieve o t h e r s of error, a n d i n e v e r y d i s c u s s i o n to l o o k for w h a t w a s most probable" (Tusc. 5.11). It is p o s s i b l e that C i c e r o s i n c e r e l y t h o u g h t

he w a s p r e s e n t i n g

a n a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t of t h e h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y . B u t e v e n if he w a s a w a r e o f the extent to w h i c h h i s a c c o u n t w a s r e v i s i o n i s t , it is not s u r p r i s i n g that he d i d not present it a s s u c h . I n t h e H e l l e n i s tic p e r i o d , t h e r e w a s n o p r e m i u m o n o r i g i n a l i t y or novelty. A n d C i c e r o w o u l d p r o b a b l y have s h i e d a w a y f r o m p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n n o v a t o r as he w a s a l r e a d y c o n f r o n t i n g

the

p r o b l e m o f c o n v i n c i n g the r u l i n g c l a s s o f the v a l u e o f R o m a n i z i n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . G i v e n t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y , it w o u l d have b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y u n s u i t a b l e for a s t a t e s m a n o f C i c e r o ' s s t a n d i n g to put h i m s e l f f o r w a r d as a n i n n o v a t o r . T h u s w e f i n d h i m u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y m o d e s t i n this regard, d e s c r i b i n g h i m s e l f as a m e r e t r a n s c r i b e r , p r o v i d i n g o n l y the w o r d s w i t h w h i c h to express the b o r r o w e d ideas (Alt.

12.52).

F u r t h e r m o r e , C i c e r o m a y well h a v e felt j u s t i f i e d s i n c e other p r o m i n e n t A c a d e m i c s h a d p r o v i d e d t h e i r o w n r e v i s i o n i s t a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y . A r c e s i l a u s got the b a l l r o l l i n g b y c l a i m i n g to have r e t u r n e d to t h e o r i g i n a l , s c e p t i c a l v i e w s o f P l a t o a n d S o c rates; P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s later offered quite different a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y , e a c h in s u p p o r t of h i s o w n i n n o v a t i o n ( B r i t t a i n 2001:

169-219).

I n a d d i t i o n to t h e i l l u s t r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s o f this v i e w , C i c e r o defends h i s A c a d e m i c allegiance b y a r g u i n g t h a t it is the o n l y p r u d e n t

89

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p o s i t i o n to take tor t h o s e starting out o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a tions: [ W e A c a d e m i c s ] are m o r e

free a n d u n b i a s e d s i n c e

our

p o w e r o l j u d g m e n t is i m p a r t i a l s o w e are not c o m p e l l e d by a n y n e c e s s i t y to d e f e n d all those t h i n g s p r e s c r i b e d a n d , as it w e r e , d i c t a t e d b y s o m e authority. F o r . , . [the d o g m a t i s t s ] pass j u d g m e n t about matters w h i c h they h a v e not c o m p r e h e n d e d either y i e l d i n g to s o m e f r i e n d o r captivated by s o m e single [ p h i l o s o p h e r ] w h o m t h e y first h e a r d . A n d t h e y are d r i v e n , a s i f b y a s t o r m , to that v i e w w h i c h they c l i n g to like a r o c k . . . A l t h o u g h I don't k n o w w h y , m o s t p e o p l e prefer to go w r o n g a n d to d e f e n d p u g n a c i o u s l y that v i e w w h i c h they h a v e l e a r n e d to love rather t h a n to seek w i t h o u t b e i n g s t u b b o r n for the v i e w w h i c h c a n be m a i n t a i n e d m o s t c o n sistently.

(Ac. 2.8-9}

B e c o m i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y attached to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m is a trem e n d o u s i r o n y s i n c e p h i l o s o p h e r s p r i d e t h e m s e l v e s o n the r a t i o n ality o f t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s . B u t p h i l o s o p h e r s are like e v e r y o n e else w h e n it c o m e s to f i n d i n g c o m f o r t i n w h a t is familiar. A d h e r i n g to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m c a n p r o v i d e the c o m f o r t of m a k i n g sense out of t h i n g s : or at least the i m p r e s s i o n that o n e h a s m a d e sense out of t h i n g s . C i c e r o ' s p o i n t is that the s a t i s f a c t i o n this p r o v i d e s m a y e n c o u r a g e us to d i s c o u n t or i g n o r e o b j e c t i o n s to o u r p o s i t i o n . S u c h s t u b b o r n n e s s is i n n o w a y necessitated b y allegiance to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m . B u t to a l i g n o u r s e l v e s , say to E p i c u r e a n i s m , w o u l d r e q u i r e us to j u d g e that E p i c u r u s h a d b e e n a w i s e m a n . A n d yet, " d e c i d i n g w h o is w i s e s e e m s to be a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n of p e o ple w h o are a l r e a d y w i s e " ( A c . 2.9). S i n c e n o o n e starts out w i t h the k n o w l e d g e a n d w i s d o m he d e s i r e s , w e s h o u l d all b e g i n w i t h the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , a n d c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e the r a t i o n a l m e r i t s ot e a c h competing account belore m a k i n g any judgements. ' 1

E v e n so, w h y s h o u l d we m a k e a tiy j u d g e m e n t s as a result of o u r e n q u i r y ? T h i s is a n e s p e c i a l l y p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n il w e grant, as C i c ero d o e s , that f i n d i n g o n e v i e w to b e m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n a n o t h e r

CICERO

p r o v i d e s o n l y a fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; f u r t h e r e n q u i r y m a y w e l l s h o w that a different p o s i t i o n is m o r e p r o b a b l e , s o p e r h a p s it w o u l d be m o r e p r u d e n t to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t

until we c a n c o n c l u s i v e l y

settle the matter. C l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h this c o n c e r n is a s e c o n d q u e s t i o n : w h y s h o u l d we t h i n k that f o l l o w i n g this m e t h o d w i l l e n a ble us to progress t o w a r d s the t r u t h r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y e x c h a n g i n g o n e v i e w for a n o t h e r ? W e s h a l l take these q u e s t i o n s i n t u r n .

W h y s h o u l d w e accept any p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs? O n s o m e o c c a s i o n s , C i c e r o s e e m s to e n d o r s e the v i e w that it is never w i s e to b e l i e v e w h a t we d o not k n o w for c e r t a i n (e.g. Ac. 2.66).

In

context, we s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h i s as part o l the earlier A c a d e m i c s ' dialectical strategy. C a r n e a d e s u s e d to e m p l o y two related a r g u m e n t s against the Stoics (Ac, 2.59, (A)

67,

78):

If the sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) he w i l l h o l d an o p i n i o n , T h e sage w i l l n e v e r h o l d a n o p i n i o n ( h e is infallible), T h e r e f o r e , the sage w i l l n e v e r assent to a n y t h i n g ( s i n c e there is n o t h i n g w o r t h y o f h i s a s s e n t ) .

A n d he s o m e t i m e s a r g u e d t h i s way, (B)

If the sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) he w i l l h o l d an o p i n i o n , T h e sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) . T h e r e f o r e , the sage h o l d s o p i n i o n s ( a n d is fallible).

N e i t h e r of these options is acceptable to the Stoics, Since they thought that assent is n e c e s s a r y for a c t i o n , ( A ) w o u l d r e n d e r the sage i m p a s sive. A n d since they t h o u g h t a s s e n t i n g to w h a t is u n k n o w n is a m o r a l as well as a n e p i s t e m i c failing (M 7 . 1 5 7 ) , ( B ) w o u l d r e n d e r the sage foolish. W i t h i n the c o n t e x t of this d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, it m a k e s s e n s e for C i c e r o to a f f i r m that the sage is infallible. B u t it w o u l d be v e r y

01

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

s u r p r i s i n g it he b e l i e v e d this h i m s e l f s i n c e the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d o n l y yields fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n . II w i s d o m r e q u i r e s infallibility, C i c ero w o u l d h a v e to c o n c l u d e that h i s favoured m e t h o d is i n c a p a b l e o l p r o d u c i n g w i s d o m . Similarly, s i n c e he believes that h u m a n c o g n i t i o n is i n e s c a p a b l y fallible, he w o u l d h a v e to c o n c l u d e that w i s d o m is u n a t t a i n a b l e . I n tact, he m a i n t a i n s that Stoic w i s d o m is u n a t t a i n able, o r at least s o lar u n a t t a i n e d . D e s p i t e h i s a d m i r a t i o n tor this lofty i d e a l , he often p o i n t s out that there have n e v e r b e e n a n y real lite Stoic sages - it h a p p e n s m o r e often that a m u l e gives b i r t h (Div. 2.61). E v e n the Stoics w e r e reluctant to a c k n o w l e d g e a n y a c t u a l sages (see B r o u w e r 2 0 0 2 ) . U n l i k e the Stoics, C i c e r o a l l o w s for a m o r e m o d e s t c o n c e p t i o n o f w i s d o m , one that is attainable by real, i m p e r f e c t h u m a n beings: T h o s e w h o act a n d live in s u c h a w a y as to p r o v e their loyalty, integrity, l a i r n e s s a n d generosity, in w h o there is n o e x c e s sive desire, l i c e n t i o u s n e s s a n d i n s o l e n c e , a n d w h o have great strength of c h a r a c t e r . . . let us c o n s i d e r g o o d , as they w e r e a c c o u n t e d g o o d In life , . ,

(Amic.

19)

A l t h o u g h C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l a i n w h a t c o g n i t i v e state s u c h real life v i r t u e a r i s e s f r o m , it is clear that the c o n s t a n c y of those d e s c r i b e d i n this passage is not the p r o d u c t o f Stoic w i s d o m . S i m i l a r l y , w h e n he refers to the c o u r a g e or j u s t i c e o f real R o m a n h e r o e s , he d o e s not m e a n for us to u n d e r s t a n d these as perfect m o d e l s o l v i r t u e . T h e y a c h i e v e d o n l y a s e m b l a n c e a n d l i k e n e s s to (Stoic) w i s d o m (Off.

3.16).

But it is virtue n o n e t h e l e s s . I n g e n e r a l , w h a t C i c e r o f i n d s a d m i r a b l e about real people is their ability to b a l a n c e p r i n c i p l e d , r a t i o n a l c o n v i c t i o n w i t h the gentleness a n d m e r c y that a r i s e s f r o m a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h u m a n fallibility. T h e A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , as C i c e r o c o n c e i v e s it, is ideally s u i t e d to p r o m o t e this b a l a n c e . S i n c e there is n o c o n c l u s i v e e n d to e n q u i r y , one m u s t c o n t i n u e to put h i s fallible c o n v i c t i o n s to the test. T h e o p e n - e n d e d nature o f e n q u i r y is s u p p o s e d to prevent us f r o m b e c o m i n g i r r a t i o n ally attached to o u r v i e w s ; it keeps the v i r t u e o f p e r s e v e r a n c e f r o m d e g e n e r a t i n g into the v i c e of obstinacy,*

92

CICERO

But w e have yet to see w h y w e s h o u l d p e r s e v e r e i n the first place. W h y s h o u l d we believe a n y t h i n g as a result o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y ? T h e a n s w e r is i m p l i c i t i n C i c e r o ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s : the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y defensible v i e w is the m o s t likely to be true a n d the m o s t beneficial. S u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t m a y guarantee that o n e a v o i d s error, but it a l s o guarantees that p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y w i l l y i e l d n o positive benefits. T h i s is u n a c c e p t a b l e for C i c e r o , w h o sees the a i m s of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l art of t h i n k i n g a n d the r h e t o r i c a l art o l s p e a k i n g as intimately c o n n e c t e d : w i s d o m a n d e l o q u e n c e s h o u l d not be s o u g h t i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m one another, for " w i s d o m w i t h o u t e l o q u e n c e does too little for the g o o d of states, b u t . . . e l o q u e n c e w i t h o u t w i s d o m is generally h i g h l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s " (Inv. 1.1; see a l s o L o n g 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e s e p a r a t i o n of these arts yields either a n i n a r t i c u l a t e w i s d o m or a b a b b l i n g s t u p i d i t y (De Or. 3 . 1 4 2 ) . I f we r e m a i n u n c o n v i n c e d b y w h a t is true, or at least likely to be true, it does u s n o g o o d O n the o t h e r h a n d , a foolish e l o q u e n c e is like a w e a p o n in the h a n d s o f a m a d m a n . It the natural e n d of p h i l o s o p h y is to not m e r e l y a i m at but to b r i n g about the i m p r o v e m e n t of h u m a n lite, the p h i l o s o p h e r m u s t m a s t e r the art of p e r s u a s i o n . B u t he m u s t also d i s c o v e r what is truly b e n e f i c i a l b y m e a n s of rational e n q u iry. O t h e r w i s e , he w i l l be guilty o f a babbli ng stupidity. S i n c e nature has not e q u i p p e d us w i t h the m e a n s ot a c q u i r i n g certainty, w e c a n a r r i v e o n l y at p r o b a b l e beliefs r e g a r d i n g w h a t is b e n e f i c i a l . H e n c e if p h i l o s o p h y is to a c c o m p l i s h its n a t u r a l e n d , i u c h beliefs m u s t be sufficient to i m p r o v e the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n . But w h y s h o u l d we a c c e p t this p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n ot p h i l o s o phy i n the first place? If, c o n t r a r y to C i c e r o ' s v i e w , p h i l o s o p h y arose s i m p l y as a n e x p r e s s i o n ot o u r natural curiosity, there w o u l d be n o t h i n g o b j e c t i o n a b l e about treating it a s a c o l l e c t i o n o f i n t r i g u i n g p u z zles. I n d e e d , it w o u l d be o b j e c t i o n a b l e to p r e t e n d that p h i l o s o p h y c a n d o m o r e t h a n satisfy, or at least stimulate, o u r c u r i o s i t y a n d s t r e n g t h e n o u r r e a s o n i n g skills. O n this view, p h i l o s o p h y h a s no i n h e r e n t s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . C i c e r o ' s a r g u m e n t d e p e n d s o n the Stoic v i e w that w e a l l h a v e a n a t u r a l s y m p a t h y tor m e m b e r s o f o u r s p e c i e s , despite the tact that this s y m p a t h y is often t h o r o u g h l y c o r r u p t e d (Fin. 3 . 6 2 - 6 8 ; see

Rep.

1.39; Leg. 1.16, 28, 32). It i s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r nature to v a l u e

03

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a n d p r o m o t e the p u b l i c g o o d , B u t this r e q u i r e s s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t is g e n u i n e l y b e n e f i c i a l . A n d this r e q u i r e s p h i l o s o p h y , broadly u n d e r s t o o d as the art ot t h i n k i n g . O n c e w e a c k n o w l e d g e o u r n a t u ral s y m p a t h y a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligation to d i s c o v e r w h a t is g e n u i n e l y b e n e f i c i a l , w e w i l l a l s o be obliged to d e v e l o p a n d p r a c t i s e the art of p e r s u a s i o n . A c q u i r i n g , d e f e n d i n g a n d p r o m o t i n g fallible beliefs about the p u b l i c g o o d is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y part o f d i s c h a r g i n g the s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y , A n o t h e r n a t u r a l e n d ot p h i l o s o p h y is to s e c u r e , a s far as p o s s i b l e , a t r a n q u i l , h a p p y a n d v i r t u o u s life. F o r C i c e r o , t r a n q u i l l i t y d o e s not c o m e f r o m s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t a s P y r r h o p r o m i s e s , but rather t r o m e m b r a c i n g the v i e w that v i r t u e is sufficient for h a p p i n e s s , W h a t is m o s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f C i c e r o ' s real life sage is the c o n v i c t i o n that all h u m a n p o s s e s s i o n s are i n f e r i o r to w i s d o m . W i t h this c o n v i c t i o n , one is able to w e a t h e r a n y s t o r m a n d a v o i d d i s t u r b i n g e m o t i o n s s u c h as tear a n d distress: . . . i f t h e r e is s o m e o n e w h o regards as e n d u r a b l e the p o w e r of F o r t u n e a n d all the h u m a n lot, w h a t e v e r c a n befall, s o that n e i t h e r fear n o r a n x i e t y affects h i m , i f he lusts after n o t h i n g , is c a r r i e d away b y n o m e a n i n g l e s s m e n t a l p l e a s u r e , o n w h a t g r o u n d s is he not h a p p y ? A n d if t h i s is brought about b y v i r t u e , o n w h a t g r o u n d s does v i r t u e of itself a l o n e not m a k e people h a p p y ?

(Tusc.

5.17}

T l i i s is the m o s t a u d a c i o u s a n d i m p o r t a n t p r o m i s e m a d e by p h i l o s o phy, A c c o r d i n g l y , C i c e r o repeatedly s u b j e c t s it to c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y , a r g u i n g b o t h for a n d against it in Tusculanac De Fiisibus

Botiorum

et Maloruin

Disputationes

5 and

3 - 5 . B u t the s u f f i c i e n c y ot v i r t u e

r e m a i n s o n l y a p r o m i s e a n d a p o s s i b i l i t y i n s o tar a s we have failed to g r a s p the t r u t h of this c l a i m w i t h certainty. A l t h o u g h the m o s t effective d e f e n c e against the v i c i s s i t u d e s o f lite w o u l d be the firm c o n v i c t i o n that v i r t u e is sufficient tor h a p p i ness, we c a n n o t d i s c o u n t the o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s . A g a i n , the Stoic v i e w a p p e a r s to be t o o d e m a n d i n g , r e q u i r i n g not m e r e l y a n u n a t tainable e p i s t e m i c ideal, but a d e g r e e o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y that s e e m s

94

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i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o u r tragility. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a c k n o w l e d g i n g o u r v u l n e r a b i l i t y m a y e n c o u r a g e us to set o u r sights t o o l o w a n d treat o u r w e a k n e s s e s as inevitable. I n the e n d , the extent to w h i c h a real p e r s o n c a n p r e s e r v e h i s t r a n q u i l l i t y i n the race o f s u f f e r i n g is an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n . But the m o s t effective defence, a n d the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y defensible view, is to believe either that v i r t u e is sufficient tor h a p p i n e s s , or at least n e a r l y sufficient (Off.

3.31; see a l s o Fuse.

5,3-4; A c . 2.134).

verisimilitude a n d philosophical expertise H o w e v e r , it s e e m s that u n j u s t i f i e d , a n d e v e n false, beliefs m a y be j u s t as c o m f o r t i n g a n d beneficial as j u s t i f i e d , p r o b a b l e o r t r u e beliefs. S o w e s h o u l d not t h i n k that the benefits ot a d o p t i n g s o m e b e l i e l p r o v i d e a g o o d r e a s o n for t h i n k i n g it is t r u e . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m of m i t i gated s c e p t i c i s m is that w e s h o u l d adopt the m o s t rationally c o n v i n c ing, p r o b a b l e v i e w b e c a u s e it is m o s t l i k e l y to b e t r u e , a n d b e c a u s e it is w o r t h r i s k i n g e r r o r i n o r d e r to believe w h a t is t r u e . W i t h o u t this c o n d i t i o n , it w i l l still be r e a s o n a b l e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as long as c o n c l u s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n is l a c k i n g . S o a s s u m i n g that w e s h o u l d b e l i e v e the t r u t h , a n d that we are better oft w i t h p r o b a b l e beliefs, it w i l l follow that we s h o u l d b e l i e v e the m o s t p r o b a b l e view. B u t o n e m i g h t object that a n y attempt to e s t a b l i s h that we s h o u l d a d o p t the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e v i e w begs the q u e s t i o n . M o r e generally, a t t e m p t i n g to r a t i o n a l l y establish the reliability o f r e a s o n s e e m s to p r e s u p p o s e the reliability o f r e a s o n . F o r e x a m p l e , C i c e r o s d e f e n c e o f the v i e w that p h i l o s o p h y a i m s at the i m p r o v e m e n t of the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n relies o n the p r e m i s e that we have a n a t u r a l s y m p a t h y for m e m b e r s of o u r species. B u t w h y s h o u l d we b e l i e v e that, e s p e c i a l l y given the a d m i s s i o n that j u s t i f i c a t i o n a l w a y s fails ( o r at least has tailed so far) to be c o n c l u s i v e ? N o m a t t e r h o w extensively C i c e r o d e f e n d s h i s p r e m i s e s , w e w i l l be left w i t h this b a s i c q u e s t i o n : w h y s h o u l d I adopt a belief o n the basis o f a fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n ? Fortunately, we m a y appeal to the existence o f p r a c t i c a l expertise as a n i n d i c a t i o n that the p r o p e r use o f r e a s o n leads us c l o s e r to the

95

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t r u t h . I n s h o w i n g h o w e x p e r t i s e is p o s s i b l e , we m a y c l a i m that it is a matter o l l e a r n i n g to d i s c e r n w h a t is p r o b a b l e (Ac. 2.146"). T h e best e x p l a n a t i o n for the fact that e x p e r t s are m o r e often s u c c e s s f u l t h a n n o n - e x p e r t s is that w h a t they f i n d p r o b a b l e is in fact true. I f e x p e r t i s e a r i s e s f r o m l e a r n i n g to see w h a t is p r o b a b l e , or l i k e the t r u t h , t h e n t r u t h m u s t exist. C i c e r o a c k n o w l e d g e s t h i s a s s u m p t i o n in h i s d e f e n c e ot the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d . A n t i o c h u s h a d o b j e c t e d that the A c a d e m i c s * w o r s t m i s t a k e ; is to take these two r a d i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t p r e m i s e s to be c o n s i s t e n t , first, [ l ] t h e r e are s o m e false i m p r e s s i o n s ( f r o m w h i c h it f o l l o w s that s o m e are t r u e ) ; a n d t h e n a g a i n , [2] there is n o difference at all b e t w e e n t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t t h e y a s s u m e d the first p r e m i s e as i l t h e r e w e r e a difference - h e n c e the f o r m e r is u n d e r m i n e d by the latter, a n d the latter by the f o r m e r .

( A c . 2.44)

I n o t h e r w o r d s , the A c a d e m i c s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n b o t h that there is a n d that there is not a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n true a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . L u c u l l u s c o n s i d e r s this to be the greatest p o s s i b l e r e f u tation o f the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d . C i c e r o c o n c e d e s that this o b j e c t i o n w o u l d be r i g h t , " i l we A c a d e m i c s d i d a w a y w i t h t r u t h altogether. Yet w e don't, s i n c e w e d i s c e r n as m a n y t r u e as false t h i n g s . B u t o u r d i s c e r n i n g is a k i n d o f a p p r o v a l : we don't find a n y s i g n o l a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( A c . 2 . 1 1 1 ) . T h i s is a n o d d r e s p o n s e if we take it as m e r e l y r e a f f i r m i n g the first p r e m i s e [ l ] , that is, there is a difference b e t w e e n t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . I f 1 a m a c c u s e d o l i n c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n i n g p a n d ~ p , it w i l l n o t d o tor m e to c o n f i d e n t l y reply that this w o u l d be r i g h t except for the fact that I h o l d p. I n o r d e r for this to be a r e s p o n s e to A n t i o c h u s ' o b j e c t i o n , C i c e r o needs to d i s a m b i g u a t e the k i n d of difference i n v o l v e d in e a c h ot the allegedly I n c o n s i s t e n t c l a i m s . I n the s e c o n d p r e m i s e [2], the differe n c e b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n is a matter o f w h a t a c t u a l people are able to d i s c e r n . S o the p o i n t is s i m p l y that there is n o difference that o n e c a n d i s c e r n i n practice. I n the first p r e m i s e [ l ] ,

%

CICERO

the difference b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d i a l s e i m p r e s s i o n is a c a u s a l one. C i c e r o agrees w i t h the Stoics that t r u e i m p r e s s i o n s c o m e f r o m w h a t is the case a n d accurately c o n v e y the relevant details of their object, w h e r e a s false i m p r e s s i o n s do not; he d o e s not d e n y that t r u t h exists. So despite the e v e r - p r e s e n t

p o s s i b i l i t y ot a n i m p e n e t r a b l e

decep-

t i o n , C i c e r o c a n m a i n t a i n that s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s are true a n d s o m e false. So C i c e r o i s not m e r e l y r e a f f i r m i n g the first p r e m i s e

[l|. He

e x p l a i n s w h y A c a d e m i c s d o not do away w i t h t r u t h by s a y i n g that he d i s c e r n s as m a n y true as false t h i n g s . It is likely that s o m e o f the i m p r e s s i o n s he receives are t r u e , e v e n t h o u g h h e is not i n a p o s i t i o n to say w i t h c e r t a i n t y w h i c h t h e s e are. W h e n l i m i t e d to p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r s , t h i s m u c h is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c i s m . B u t C i c e r o believes we c a n d i s c e r n w h a t is p r o b a b l e e v e n i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , a n d e s p e c i a l l y e t h i c a l , matters. T h e A c a d e m i c sage w i l l guide h i s c o n d u c t , w h e t h e r i n o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y matters o r w h e n d e c i d i n g w h a t is m o r a l l y appropriate, b y f o l l o w i n g what appears probable (Ac. 2.110), I n o r d e r to e x t e n d the p r o b a b l e i n this way, w e m u s t a s s u m e t h e r e is a k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d e t h i c a l expertise, a n a l o g o u s to the m o r e t e c h n i c a l varieties, T h e Stoics c e r t a i n l y c o n c e i v e d o l p h i l o s o p h y t h i s way. T h e y m a i n tain that dialectic w a s i n v e n t e d t o e n a b l e us to d i s t i n g u i s h truth f r o m f a l s e h o o d ( A c . 2.91; see D L 7 . 4 6 ) . B u t , C i c e r o a s k s , i n w h a t s u b j e c t is the s k i l l e d d i a l e c t i c i a n able to m a k e s u c h j u d g e m e n t s ? O n e m u s t k n o w m o r e t h a n the p r i n c i p l e s o l d i a l e c t i c to d i s t i n g u i s h t r u t h f r o m f a l s e h o o d . C i c e r o a l l o w s that the d i a l e c t i c i a n m a y judge w h i c h infere n c e s are acceptable, w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s are a m b i g u o u s a n d w h i c h conclusions genuinely follow from w h i c h premises, But this makes dialectic a far m o r e m o d e s t e n t e r p r i s e t h a n the Stoic variety, w h i c h p r o m i s e s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , the d i s c o v e r y of s u b s t a n t i v e t r u t h s . O n the m o r e m o d e s t a c c o u n t , d i a l e c t i c is a m a t t e r o f r e a s o n j u d g i n g about itseli: the p r o p e r a n d i m p r o p e r use o f l o g i c a l inference. O n this v i e w , it is clear that p h i l o s o p h i c a l expertise w i l l have to rely o n s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n d i a l e c t i c i n l e a d i n g us to t r u t h . E v e n if the p h i l o s o p h e r is able to reveal that s o m e justification is i n a d e q u a t e , it w i l l not follow that the v i e w in q u e s t i o n is false. It w i l l a l w a y s be

07

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a m o r e c o n s i s t e n t a n d m o r e c o n v i n c i n g j u s tification o f that s a m e view. B u t i f w e c a n n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y rule any p o s i t i o n out, we s h o u l d h a v e little c o n f i d e n c e in t h o s e v i e w s that h a v e not yet b e e n refuted a n d c o n t i n u e to a p p e a r probable. T h e i r s u r v i v a l m a y s i m p l y be a m a t t e r of not h a v i n g s u b j e c t e d t h e m to sufficient s c r u t i n y . I I so, the p r o b a b l e n o longer s e e m s to p r o v i d e g o o d g r o u n d s for e v e n tentative a p p r o v a l . The

mitigated sceptics prospects

are p a r t i c u l a r l y bleak w h e n

a t t e m p t i n g to a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g p o s i t i o n s that are intern a l l y c o n s i s t e n t . D e t e r m i n i n g w h o h a s the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n sible v i e w i n s u c h a debate m a y reveal m o r e about the o b s e r v e r s ' p r e c o n c e p t i o n s t h a n the p o s i t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s s e e m s to be the case w i t h C i c e r o ' s o w n alleged refutation o l E p i c u r e a n ethics i n De Finibus

Bonorum

et Malorum

2. It is e s p e c i a l l y s t r i k i n g that C i c e r o

h i m s e l f p r o v i d e s the m a t e r i a l , v i a h i s c h a r a c t e r T o r q u a t u s i n B o o k 1 to meet many, if not a l l , o f the o b j e c t i o n s he levels in B o o k 2. So one m i g h t o b j e c t that C i c e r o ' s fallibilist p u r s u i t of truth is really n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the p u r s u i t of p e r s u a s i o n ( I n w o o d 1990), I n s u p p o r t of this o b j e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t a l s o c l a i m that the a n a l ogy b e t w e e n the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s a n d the p l a u s i b i l ity o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s b r e a k s d o w n w i t h regard to the c r u c i a l factor of p r e d i c t i o n . S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n i c a l expertise rely h e a v i l y o n p r e d i c t i v e failure a s a m e a n s of d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n ; t h e a s s u m p t i o n is that the s t r u c t u r e of the p h y s i c a l w o r l d p r o v i d e s a n objective c o n s t r a i n t . I I the engineer's d e s i g n is not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the l a w s of nature, the bridge w i l l collapse. B u t there is a r g u a b l y n o s u c h c o n s t r a i n t available for the p h i l o s o p h i c a l v e r s i o n o f this m e t h o d . O n e c a n s t u b b o r n l y m a i n t a i n one's e t h i c a l o r m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w s , w h e t h e r they t u r n out to be t r u e or false, w i t h o u t suffering a n y a n a l ogous c o l l a p s e ,

Socrates and epistemic optimism W h a t i n i t i a l l y a p p e a r s to be o n l y a m i n i m a l c o m m i t m e n t to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d t u r n s out to r e q u i r e s o m e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w s about

98

CICERO

h u m a n nature a n d r e a s o n . I n o r d e r for C i c e r o to be c o n f i d e n t that the p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d w i l l lead us c l o s e r to the t r u t h , he m u s t s u p p o s e that there are s u c h t r u t h s to b e d i s c o v e r e d i n the first place. H e m u s t a l s o s u p p o s e that h u m a n nature p r o v i d e s the k i n d o f objective c o n s t r a i n t o n ethical t h e o r y that p h y s i c a l nature p r o v i d e s tor s c i e n t i f i c theory. S o m e o n e l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e

with

talse e t h i c a l v i e w s w i l l not i n fact be happy, despite w h a t he m a y say or t h i n k . It is s i m p l y not p o s s i b l e to live w e l l if o n e h a s false beliefs about w h a t is i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r nature, a n d w h a t is g e n u i n e l y w o r t h p u r s u i n g a n d w h a t is w o r t h a v o i d i n g . I n general, C i c e r o needs the e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c v i e w that t h r o u g h s t u d y a n d p r a c t i c e we c a n c o m e to see w h a t is intelligible i n itself a s p e r s u a s i v e (see Rh. 1.1, 1 3 5 5 a ) . T h i s is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r for us to trust that c o n t i n u e d e n q u i r y a n d a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n i n the a b s e n c e of a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h is not a c o l o s s a l w a s t e of t i m e . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x p r e s s i o n o f this o p t i m i s m is the n o t i o n that the t r u t h c a n n o t be retuted, a n d h e n c e that w h a t has not yet b e e n refuted, despite s e r i o u s efforts to d o so, is likely to be t r u e . S u c h o p t i m i s m is a l s o n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r s e v e r a n c e a n d o b s t i n a c y . If nature p r o v i d e s n o c o n straints o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y , that is, if nature n e v e r gives us reliable i n d i c a t o r s about h o w w e l l we are d o i n g , t h e n all p e r s e v e r a n c e is e q u a l l y f o o l i s h ( o r e q u a l l y w i s e ) . T h e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w that there are s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s , h o w e v e r , i n d i c a t e s that if o n e is p r o p e r l y o p e n - m i n d e d a n d d e d i c a t e d to e n q u i r y , if o n e has really a c q u i r e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p e r t i s e , t h e n w h a t o n e finds p e r s u a s i v e w i l l m o r e likely be true t h a n w h a t o t h e r s find p e r s u a s i v e . S h o r t o l c o m m i t t i n g o u r s e l v e s to s o m e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , this fallible, i n d u c t i v e c o n f i r m a t i o n is the best w e c a n a c h i e v e . T h e r e c a n be n o guarantee that the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d l e a d s to t r u t h ; this is w h a t w e s h o u l d expect f r o m a sceptically cautious philosophy. But even w i t h o u t a n y s u c h guarantees, it is n o n e t h e l e s s reasonable to p u r s u e t r u t h w h i l e l a c k i n g a c r i t e r i o n in the full sense. E v e n ii the A c a d e m i c never a d v a n c e s b e y o n d v e r i s i m i l i t u d e , a n d even if he m a k e s n o m e a s urable progress t o w a r d s t r u t h , we m a y still p r e i e r h i s m e t h o d o n the g r o u n d s that it offers a r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n r a d i c a l

:jv,

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

s c e p t i c i s m a n d d o g m a t i s m . It is a n attempt to b a l a n c e the d e m a n d that we d i s c o v e r a n d b e l i e v e the truth w i t h the a w a r e n e s s o f o u r cognitive l i m i t a t i o n s a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n s . K a r l P o p p e r identifies this as the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f e p i s t e m o l o g y : " H o w c a n w e a d m i t that o u r k n o w l e d g e is a h u m a n - a n all t o o h u m a n - affair, w i t h o u t at the s a m e t i m e i m p l y i n g that it is all i n d i v i d u a l w h i m a n d a r b i t r a r i n e s s ? " ( P o p p e r 1963: 16). A n d he attributes the o r i g i n a l d i s c o v e r y of h i s tallibilist s o l u t i o n to Plato's Socrates. C i c e r o s e e m s to have d r a w n a s i m i l a r l e s s o n f r o m Socrates. D e s p i t e s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v i n g that he failed to k n o w the things he m o s t w i s h e d to k n o w , S o c r a t e s r e m a i n s f i r m in h i s r e a s o n e d c o n v i c t i o n s . E v e n w h e n o n trial tor h i s life, he r e f u s e d to p a n d e r to the j u d g e s or c o m p r o m i s e h i s p r i n c i p l e s . H e c o n t i n u e d to investigate t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters to the v e r y e n d ( T u s c 1.71; see Plato Phaedo

107a).

Socrates' w i l l i n g n e s s to abide b y the c o n c l u s i o n s o f h i s a r g u m e n t s is n o w h e r e m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n w h e n C r i t o tries to c o n v i n c e h i m that h e is b e i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e b y s t a y i n g in p r i s o n a n d forfeiting h i s life. S o c r a t e s replies; N o t o n l y n o w , but a l w a y s a m I the k i n d of m a n w h o is p e r s u a d e d b y n o t h i n g except the a r g u m e n t that o n reflection s e e m s best to m e . 1 a m not able n o w to t h r o w out t h o s e a r g u m e n t s I u s e d before just b e c a u s e this m i s f o r t u n e has c o m e u p o n m e ; for they s e e m pretty m u c h the s a m e to m e . 7

A n d I h o n o r a n d value these a r g u m e n t s even as before. S o u n l e s s we are able to p r o d u c e better a r g u m e n t s right n o w , y o u c a n be sure that I w i l l not agree w i t h y o u . . , (Crito

46b [ G r u b e 1997])

W h e t h e r it is a q u e s t i o n about the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the s o u l o r the j u s t i c e o f s t a y i n g in p r i s o n , Socrates refuses to act o n the basis o l a n y t h i n g but the a r g u m e n t s that s e e m m o s t rationally d e l e n s i b l e . W h a t m a k e s Socrates a w o r t h y ideal tor C i c e r o is that he w a s n e i t h e r fanatical i n h i s c o n v i c t i o n s n o r easily s w a y e d f r o m t h e m .

CICERO

Conclusion Cicero's v e r s i o n o f philosophical iallibilism provides a synthesis o f S c e p t i c a l c a u t i o n a n d Stole c o n f i d e n c e . A s s u c h it is subject to o b j e c tions f r o m b o t h s i d e s . R a d i c a l s c e p t i c s c o m p l a i n it is n o t sufficiently c a u t i o u s , a n d c o m m i t t e d Stoics c o m p l a i n it is not sufficiently c o n fident.

In reply to the r a d i c a l s c e p t i c w e m a y say that a l t h o u g h the

fallibilist is not i m m u n e to error, he is still able to a v o i d the e p i s t e m i c v i c e ot r a s h or hasty assent. I f w e are i n e s c a p a b l y fallible, it is u n r e a s o n a b l e to insist w e s h o u l d believe n o t h i n g that falls s h o r t of certainty. R a t i o n a l integrity for s u c h i m p e r f e c t agents s h o u l d not d e m a n d infallibility. A n d i n r e p l y to the c o n f i d e n t Stoic w e m a y say that the fallibilist is a b l e to a v o i d the v i c e ot d o g m a t i c or

arrogant

s t u b b o r n n e s s . A s w e c a n see f r o m the e x a m p l e o f S o c r a t e s , absolute certainty is not n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n the c o u r a g e o f o n e s c o n v i c tions. V i e w e d i n t h i s way, C i c e r o ' s f a l l i b i l i s m is a p o s i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t of the earlier, m o r e r a d i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e of the A c a d e m i c s .

101

SIX

Aenesidemus: the Pyrrhonian revival

W h a t I h a v e d e s c r i b e d as p r o g r e s s i n the last c h a p t e r w a s s e e n as d e c l i n e by at least o n e m e m b e r of the late A c a d e m y . A e n e s i d e m u s c r i t i c i z e d h i s fellow A c a d e m i c s for b e i n g d o g m a t i c .

1

The long dis-

pute w i t h the Stoics h a d effectively c o m e to a n e n d , a n d the S t o i c s h a d w o n . T h e A c a d e m i c s h a d c o m p l e t e l y a b a n d o n e d their o r i g i n a l l y strict s t a n c e o n epoche a n d n o w m a d e firm d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a b o u t a w h o l e r a n g e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues. Aenesidemus committed

h i s s c e p t i c i s m to w r i t i n g , p r o b a b l y

s o m e t i m e in the e a r l y - t o - m i d first c e n t u r y B C E . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , o n l y :

s o m e f r a g m e n t s a n d t e s t i m o n i a s u r v i v e . T h e m o s t extensive reports are about h i s Pyrrhonist

O n e o f these c o m e s f r o m the

Discourses.

n i n t h - c e n t u r y B y z a n t i n e p a t r i a r c h P h o t i u s , w h o is r e m a r k a b l e i n h i s o w n right. I n h i s Bibliotheke, i n c l u d i n g the Pyrrfionist

P h o t i u s s u m m a r i z e s 280

Discourses.

3

books,

It is c l e a r f r o m h i s s u m m a r y

that h e t h i n k s v e r y little o f A e n e s i d e m u s w o r k b e c a u s e it m a k e s n o 1

c o n t r i b u t i o n to C h r i s t i a n d o g m a a n d d r i v e s f r o m o u r m i n d s the i n s t i n c t i v e tenets o f faith (Bib.

170b39-40). Nevertheless, Photius

is a generally reliable s o u r c e ( W i l s o n 1 9 9 4 ) . So despite h i s a s s e s s m e n t o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' s c e p t i c i s m , h e p r o b a b l y p r o v i d e s an a c c u r a t e summary. T h e p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f that s u m m a r y , h o w e v e r , a l o n g w i t h the g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o l A e n e s i d e m u s ' P y r r h o n i s m , is d i s p u t e d . T h e

111

AENESIDEMUS

central i s s u e is w h e t h e r the r e v i v e d P y r r h o n i s m is a type o f relat i v i s m that a f f i r m s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y ot k n o w l e d g e , o r w h e t h e r it is m o r e c o n s i s t en t w i t h S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s ' later s c e p t i c i s m , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h w e c a n n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n y k i n d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e f o r m e r , relativist v i e w y i e l d s v e r y definite c o n c l u s i o n s about o u r cognitive l i m i t s w h i l e the latter, s c e p t i c a l o n e s h o w s o n l y that we are not able to r a t i o n a l l y resolve m a t t e r s , p o s i t i v e l y or negatively. I n this c h a p t e r I s h a l l d é t e n d the sceptical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l a n d offer an e x p l a n a t i o n ot h o w his apparently relativistic a r g u m e n t s are co n si st ent w i t h S c e p t i c i s m . B u t first we n e e d to briefly c o n s i d e r w h a t he f o u n d o b j e c t i o n a b l e a b o u t his c o n t e m p o r a r y

Academics.

T h e late A c a d e m y ' s

dogmatism

A s tar as A e n e s i d e m u s is c o n c e r n e d , the o n l y live d i s a g r e e m e n t that r e m a i n e d b e t w e e n the Stoics a n d A c a d e m i c s of h i s day w a s r e g a r d i n g the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n . A n d s i n c e the A c a d e m i c s h a d t a k e n so m u c h Stoic d o g m a o n b o a r d , e v e n this w a s n o m o r e t h a n a f r a t e r n a l quibble. T h e A c a d e m i c s n o w a g r e e d that the p r o p e r u s e of r e a s o n b r i n g s u s closer to the t r u t h ; they o n l y d i s a g r e e d about w h e t h e r we c o u l d a c h i e v e certainty. W i t h i n the A c a d e m y , A n t i o c h u s d e f e n d e d the Stoic v i e w against Philo's w e a k e r c o n c e p t i o n ot k n o w l e d g e , l e a d i n g A e n e s i d e m u s to d i s m i s s t h e m a s " S t o i c s f i g h t i n g against S t o i c s " (Bib.

1 7 0 a l 4 - 1 7 ; Striker 1997).

I n tact, matters w e r e far w o r s e : the f o l l o w e r s of P h i l o w e r e not o n l y d o g m a t i c , but t h e y u n w i t t i n g l y c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e m s e l v e s 170a28-38). The contradiction J

(Bib.

is to m a i n t a i n that one b o t h c a n

a n d c a n n o t d i s t i n g u i s h the true f r o m the false. T h e fallibilist s e e m s to w a n t it both w a y s : we c a n n o t reliably, or c o n c l u s i v e l y , d e t e r m i n e the t r u t h , but we c a n tallibly or p r o v i s i o n a l l y d o so. O n e difficulty is to e x p l a i n w h y fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n falls s h o r t w h i l e r e m a i n i n g a reliable i n d i c a t i o n ot t r u t h . We c o n f r o n t e d a s i m i l a r p r o b l e m for C i c e r o ' s f a l l i b i l i s m in C h a p t e r 5: h o w is it that we c a n n o t i d e n t i f y the

103

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t r u t h , but w e c a n i d e n t i f y w h a t r e s e m b l e s the t r u t h ? I f w e c a n detect v e r i s i m i l i t u d e , w h y c a n w e not detect t r u t h itself? A e n e s i d e m u s a p p e a r s to be e x p l o i t i n g this p r o b l e m . H e p r o b a b l y argued, m u c h as A n t i o c h u s d i d (Ac. 2 . 3 4 ) , that if we are a w a r e o i the t r u t h o f s o m e s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n or t h o u g h t , there is n o l o n g e r a n y g r o u n d l o r p e r p l e x i t y or d o u b t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , i l w h a t w e are aware of is unclear, w e s h o u l d not m a k e f i r m a s s e r t i o n s r e g a r d i n g it. T h e i n t u i t i o n is that o n l y c o n c l u s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n is g e n u i n e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . It the S c e p t i c s are able to p r o d u c e s o m e c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e or a r g u m e n t against e v e r y c l a i m , then there w i l l a l w a y s be s o m e r e a s o n tor t h i n k i n g the belief i n q u e s t i o n is false. A n d i n so far a s I h a v e g o o d r e a s o n to t h i n k the belief is false, I have g o o d r e a s o n to t h i n k I d o not k n o w it, a n d that I a m not (at least c u r r e n t l y ) able to j u s t i f y it. T h e r e is thus a t e n s i o n b e t w e e n cautious doubt a n d the c o n f i d e n c e that derives t r o m j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; P h i l o a n d h i s followers c a n n o t h a v e it b o t h w a y s .

5

T h e d e f i n i n g m a r k of the d o g m a t i s m that A e n e s i d e m u s rejects is c o n f i d e n t a n d u n a m b i g u o u s a s s e r t i o n a n d d e n i a l (Bib.

l69b38-40).

T h i s is not s i m p l y a m a t t e r ot u t t e r i n g w o r d s w i t h a c e r t a i n i n f l e c t i o n , b u t m u s t i n c l u d e s o m e degree o f c o m m i t m e n t to, o r b e l i e f i n , the p r o p o s i t i o n s asserted. B y a r g u i n g that there is n o f i r m basis for g r a s p i n g the t r u t h , he s o u g h t to reinstate epochê

a s the p r o p e r goal

( o r at least o u t c o m e ) o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n *

Pyrrhonian relativism W h i l e all o f o u r s o u r c e s associate A e n e s i d e m u s w i t h epochê,

many

a l s o attribute to h i m w h a t a p p e a r to be negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s : for e x a m p l e , t h i n g s are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , a n d c a n n o t be k n o w n i n t h e m s e l v e s (De Ebr,

175. 187; D L 9 . 8 8 ) / S i m i l a r l y , he is s a i d to

h a v e a r g u e d that s i g n s ( i n a precise, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s e n s e ) d o not exist, e n d s ( i n the precise sense o f o b j e c t i v e l y c o r r e c t e t h i c a l g o a l s ) d o n o t exist, a n d all s o r t s o f i s s u e s are n e c e s s a r i l y b e y o n d o u r c o m p r e h e n s i o n , i n c l u d i n g the nature of t r u t h , causes, affections, m o t i o n , g e n e r a t i o n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n {Bib. Bett 1997, 2 0 0 0 ) .

104

l 7 0 b 3 - 3 5 ; see also M

11.68-95;

AENESIDEMUS

H o w then are w e to r e c o n c i l e A e n e s i d e m u s ' epochê

w i t h these

negatively d o g m a t i c v i e w s ? A c c o r d i n g to the relativist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , A e n e s i d e m u s w o u l d o n l y have u s s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t a r e s t r i c t e d c l a s s of s t a t e m e n t s , w h i c h does not i n c l u d e the c o n c l u s i o n s to h i s s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s . T h e s e a r g u m e n t s are s u p p o s e d to s h o w that we s h o u l d not b e l i e v e a n y p r o p o s i t i o n of the f o r m "x is byn a t u r e F". I n place o f s u c h a s s e r t i o n s , a n d w i t h a b a c k w a r d glance to P y r r h o , he e n c o u r a g e s us to say o n l y that: " t h i n g s are n o m o r e o f this k i n d t h a n o f that, o r are s o m e t i m e s o l t h i s k i n d , s o m e t i m e s n o t , or for o n e p e r s o n t h e y are o f this k i n d , for a n o t h e r p e r s o n n o t ot t h i s k i n d , a n d for a n o t h e r p e r s o n not e v e n existent at a l l " {Bib.

170al-3).

So it is o n l y c o r r e c t to say a t h i n g has c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s relative

to

s o m e perceiver, or s o m e s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s , N o t h i n g is j u s t w h a t it 1

is simplicter.

H o n e y , w e m a y say, is n o m o r e sweet t h a n n o t - s w e e t ;

but this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s a y i n g that it r e a l l y is sweet relative to a p e r c e i v i n g agent i n the right c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S i n c e acceptable a s s e r t i o n s take the f o r m "x is c o n t i n g e n t l y , or v a r i a b l y F", we m a y s u p p o s e the o b j e c t i o n a b l e a s s e r t i o n ™x is by n a t u r e F " m e a n s "x is invariably, w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , F". S o to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t about the natures of t h i n g s m e a n s to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t f r o m a n y p r o p o s i t i o n o f the f o r m "x is i n v a r i a b l y F". O n the o t h e r h a n d , there are t w o s o r t s o f acceptable beliefs. F i r s t , we m a y b e l i e v e that it is not the case that x is by n a t u r e F; for e x a m p l e , it is not the case that h o n e y is by nature sweet. D e n y i n g that a n y p r o p e r t y h o l d s i n v a r i a b l y ot s o m e object d o e s not c o u n t , o n this v i e w , as b e i n g about the nature ot that t h i n g . A e n e s i d e m u s o n l y w i s h e s to e x c l u d e p o s i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f a t h i n g s nature ( W o o d r u f f 1 9 8 8 ) . S e c o n d l y , we m a y believe that h o n e y is sweet i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . P r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliefs are n o t a b o u t the n a t u r e of t h i n g s either, a n d h e n c e are not i n c l u d e d in the s c o p e of the relativist's epochê.

I n g e n e r a l , w h e n A" a p p e a r s F, we m a y believe

that x is c o n t i n g e n t l y , or v a r i a b l y F : it is F tor m e , at t h i s m o m e n t , i n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A p r o b l e m a r i s e s at this p o i n t . T y p i c a l l y we t h i n k that a b e l i e f is e i t h e r t r u e o r false, w h e t h e r o r n o t we k n o w w h i c h it is. S o it s h o u l d b e at least p o s s i b l e that s o m e p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliefs are t r u e .

105

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

O n e w a y to e x p l a i n h o w this is p o s s i b l e is to say that s o m e t h i n g n e e d not be i n v a r i a b l y F to be r e a l l y F. T h e fact that it is o n l y F i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s d o e s not m e a n that it is not really F. T h e p r o p e r t i e s a t h i n g has are d e t e r m i n e d by the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h we e n c o u n t e r it. H o n e y really is s w e e t for m e as I taste it right n o w e v e n t h o u g h it is not i n v a r i a b l y sweet. S o m y b e l i e f that h o n e y is sweet for m e right n o w as 1 taste it is true. W h a t is attractive a b o u t this interpretation is that it e n a b l e s us to e x p l a i n w h y s o m a n y n e g a t i v e l y d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s are a t t r i b uted to A e n e s i d e m u s , H e really d i d try to e s t a b l i s h that we c a n n o t k n o w a n y t h i n g about the i n v a r i a b l e nature o l t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g t r u t h , causes, m o t i o n , s i g n s a n d e n d s . It is i m p o s s i b l e to k n o w w h a t these t h i n g s i n v a r i a b l y are b e c a u s e t h e y are not i n v a r i a b l y a n y t h i n g . H o w e v e r , s u c h a p o s i t i o n s e e m s too d o g m a t i c to attribute to A e n e s i d e m u s . It is h a r d l y the sort o f v i e w w e s h o u l d e x p e c t to f i n d as a r e a c t i o n to the excessive d o g m a t i s m o f h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y A c a d e m ics. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y the case g i v e n that a s i m i l a r v i e w h a d b e e n e m b r a c e d m u c h e a r l i e r b y the E p i c u r e a n Polystratus i n the t h i r d c e n t u r y (see L S 7 D ) . So it s e e m s u n l i k e l y that this v i e w w o u l d have b e e n p e r c e i v e d as a s c e p t i c a l threat i n A e n e s i d e m u s ' t i m e (first c e n t u r y B C E ) . A l s o , in so far as it suggests a c a u s a l or d i s p o s i t i o n a l a c c o u n t o f p r o p e r t i e s - s o m e t h i n g is the w a y it is at s o m e m o m e n t because o f c e r t a i n c o n t e x t u a l facts - it w o u l d be at o d d s w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s ' o w n a r g u m e n t s a i m e d at u n d e r m i n i n g c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s (PH

1.180-6). A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we m i g h t say that p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliets are

not about t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , but o n l y a b o u t the way t h i n g s appear. T h u s m y b e l i e f that this h o n e y tastes sweet to me right n o w w i l l be true i n v i r t u e o l the a p p e a r a n c e that it is sweet. S u c h a belief is not about h o n e y itself, but o n l y the w a y it a p p e a r s . T h i s a c c o u n t a v o i d s the charge ot d o g m a t i s m i n so far a s it c o m m i t s the sceptic to n o beliefs about the w a y the w o r l d really is. But, w i t h the notable e x c e p t i o n o l the C y r e n a i c s , G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s d o not c o n c e i v e of t r u t h i n t e r m s o f the w a y t h i n g s s u b j e c t i v e l y appear rather than the w a y they o b j e c t i v e l y are ( B u r n y e a t 1 9 8 2 a ) . So if A e n e s i d e m u s m e a n t to p r o m o t e the i d e a that p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliefs

106

AENESIDEMUS

are o n l y about the w a y t h i n g s appear, he w o u l d also have to e n d o r s e a v e r y u n o r t h o d o x v i e w about t r u t h i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n h o w s u c h beliefs c o u l d be true. So it is u n l i k e l y that t h i s w a s h i s view, But e v e n if it w e r e , it w o u l d provide n o h e l p i n e x p l a i n i n g h i s a p p a r e n t l y negative d o g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t s . F o r o n t h i s view, h i s b o l d c l a i m that signs d o not exist w o u l d r e d u c e to the m u c h w e a k e r o b s e r v a t i o n that they d o not s e e m to exist, to h i m , at t h i s m o m e n t , in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d e v e n if that w e r e t r u e , it w o u l d constitute a pretty toothless s c e p t i c i s m . A d o g m a t i c o p p o n e n t c o u l d m e r e l y c o u n t e r that it a p p e a r s to h i m that s i g n s d o exist. So o n e i t h e r attempt to e x p l a i n h o w p r o p e r l y relativized beliefs c o u l d be t r u e it s e e m s we are left w i t h o u t a s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n that w o u l d have s u i t e d A e n e s i d e m u s a m b i t i o n to r e v i v e P y r r h o n i s m i n 1

r e s p o n s e to A c a d e m i c d o g m a t i s m , A m o r e p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h , 1 believe, is to reject the a s s u m p tion that g i v e s rise to the p r o b l e m i n the first place. I f rather t h a n a s s e n t i n g to p r o p e r l y relativized a s s e r t i o n s A e n e s i d e m u s s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t about t h e m , w e d o not n e e d to e x p l a i n h o w s u c h assertions c a n be t r u e . T h i s r e m a i n s a n i n t e r e s t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , but it p o s e s n o p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m for o n e w h o has n o beliefs. F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s negative d o g m a t i s m c a n be d i s s o l v e d by p l a c i n g the s u s p i c i o u s c l a i m s w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o l h i s o p p o s i t i o n a l strategy; h i s a r g u m e n t s for the n o n - e x i s t e n c e of s i g n s , for e x a m p l e , are not e x p r e s s i o n s o f h i s o w n v i e w but part of h i s attempt to balance t h i n g s out. A n d finally h i s r e l a t i v i s m is best e x p l a i n e d as a m o d e s t , s e m a n tic f o r m , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h , w h e n e v e r I say " A a p p e a r s F'\ it m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d that 1 m e a n "A- a p p e a r s F in certain

circumstances"

S e m a n t i c r e l a t i v i s m i n v o l v e s n o m e t a p h y s i c a l or e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s a n d is thus c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a g e n e r a l epoche

(Annas

& B a r n e s 1985). I n w h a t f o l l o w s w e s h a l l develop t h i s s c e p t i c a l interpretation a n d e x a m i n e h o w w e l l it a c c o r d s w i t h the f r a g m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e for A e n esidemus' Pyrrhonism,

107

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Pyrrhonian Scepticism T h e s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o v i d e s a different a c c o u n t o f w h a t it m e a n s for A to be b y nature F , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y w h a t it is w e m u s t -

s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t . O n t h i s v i e w , the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r a n d h o w they are by n a t u r e m a k e s n o reference to i n variability'; it a m o u n t s m o r e s i m p l y to a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality. S o m e s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n is f u n d a m e n t a l to the entire h i s t o r y of W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y a n d , u n s u r p r i s i n g l y , it gets w o r k e d out i n a large n u m b e r of ways, W e d o n o t n e e d to s p e c i f y a precise sense for the d i s t i n c t i o n in t h i s context, T h e c r u c i a l p o i n t is that any p r o p o s i t i o n o l the f o r m "x is (really as o p p o s e d to o n l y a p p a r e n t l y ) F " s h o u l d be r e a d as "x is b y n a t u r e F". T h i s is a w i d e r c o n s t r u a l o l the e x p r e s s i o n " b y n a t u r e F° t h a n its relativist c o u n t e r p a r t s i n c e it d o e s not l i m i t the nature o l t h i n g s to w h a t they i n v a r i a b l y are. A c c o r d i n g l y , the s c o p e o f s c e p t i c a l epoche is a l s o m u c h w i d e r . O n this v i e w , A e n e s i d e m u s w o u l d not a l l o w us to believe that h o n e y is (really, or e v e n a p p a r e n t l y ) s w e e t i n the a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . But n e i t h e r w o u l d h e a l l o w u s to b e l i e v e that n o t h i n g is by nature g o o d o r b a d , that e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s i g n s d o not exist, or that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n as it really is. A l l s u c h beliefs are a b o u t the n a t u r e o l t h i n g s a n d i n v o l v e illicit inferences f r o m h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r to h o w t h e y really are, w h e t h e r c o n t i n g e n t l y or i n v a r i a b l y O n the s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the p u r p o s e o l A e n e s i d e m u s ' a r g u m e n t s is to b l o c k any s u c h inference.

U n d e c i d a b i l i t y a n d the t e n m o d e s A s part of h i s P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l , A e n e s i d e m u s a s s e m b l e d v a r i o u s k i n d s ot s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s , or m o d e s , d e s i g n e d to i n d u c e

epoche.

I n S e x t u s ' p r e s e n t a t i o n o l these m o d e s , the c e n t r a l strategy is to s h o w that we are not rationally able to a d j u d i c a t e b e t w e e n c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s in o r d e r to d e c i d e w h i c h o n e is true.'' T h e first m o d e calls o u r attention to the v a r i o u s w a y s the s a m e t h i n g a p p e a r s to m e m b e r s o f different a n i m a l species. A l t h o u g h we

108

AES'ESIDE.WUS

d o not, a n d p e r h a p s c a n n o t , k n o w w h a t it is like to be a bat, it is o v e r w h e l m i n g l y likely that things a p p e a r differently to bats t h a n they d o to u s . T h e s a m e p o i n t c o u l d b e m a d e r e g a r d i n g any o t h e r a n i m a l species. W e c a n o n l y guess at w h a t it is like to navigate at n i g h t by radar, w h a t a g r a i n o i r i c e l o o k s l i k e to a n ant, h o w it feels for a fish to e x t r a c t o x y g e n t r o m water, o r h o w it feels to have ones feathers ruffled by the w i n d . It is reasonable to s u p p o s e that all a n i m a l s are attracted by pleasure a n d r e p u l s e d b y p a i n , a n d p e r h a p s e v e n that there is s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l s i m i l a r i t y i n the e x p e r i e n c e o l p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n a c r o s s all s p e c i e s . B u t the p o i n t r e m a i n s that the s a m e t h i n g s are objects ot c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e to m e m b e r s of different species. G i v e n t h i s v a r i e t y of c o m p e t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s o f the s a m e t h i n g s , we are i n c l i n e d to w o n d e r w h i c h , il any, are c o r r e c t a n d h o w we m i g h t d e t e r m i n e this. It is u n a c c e p t a b l e to m e r e l y a s s u m e that o u r s e n s o r y e q u i p m e n t p r o v i d e s e x c l u s i v e a c c e s s to the nature of r e a l ity. A n d a c c o r d i n g to A e n e s i d e m u s , a n y attempt to provide r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n l o r s u c h a stance is n e c e s s a r i l y b i a s e d : " w e o u r s e l v e s w i l l not be able to a d j u d i c a t e b e t w e e n o u r o w n i m p r e s s i o n a n d those of o t h e r a n i m a l s : we are o u r s e l v e s parties to the d i s a g r e e m e n t , a n d h e n c e i n n e e d o l a n a d j u d i c a t o r , rather t h a n capable of j u d g i n g for o u r s e l v e s " (PH 1.59J. T h i s is a c l e a r statement o f the u n d e c i d a b i l i t y strategy: b e i n g party to a d i s p u t e c o m p r o m i s e s o n e s j u d g e m e n t T h i s is n o t a m a t t e r of b e i n g s w a y e d by s o m e p r a g m a t i c interest (as often h a p p e n s in legal c a s e s ) ; it is a m a t t e r of c a l l i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n o n e s v e r y ability to c o r r e c t l y a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g the a p p e a r a n c e s . I n the f o u r t h m o d e , S e x t u s o b s e r v e s that w h a t e v e r c o n d i t i o n one h a p p e n s to be i n affects the w a y t h i n g s a p p e a r : tor e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r one is w a k i n g o r sleeping, y o u n g or o l d , i n n e e d o r satisfied, d r u n k or sober, c o n f i d e n t o r f e a r f u l a n d so o n (PH 1.100). B u t if o n e is a l w a y s i n s o m e set o f s u c h c o n d i t i o n s , t h e n h e w i l l be p a r t y to the d i s p u t e . T h e v e r y i s s u e is w h e t h e r , for e x a m p l e , the w o r l d is as it a p p e a r s to a p e r s o n w h o is i n s a n e . S i n c e m y s a n i t y affects h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r to m e , I a m not i n a p o s i t i o n to a d j u d i c a t e . A n y attempt to p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o i m y preference w i l l p r e s u p p o s e the v e r y m a t t e r at i s s u e , n a m e l y , w h e t h e r I a m right to prefer sanity,

] LM

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Sextus s u p p l e m e n t s t h i s p o i n t by c o n s i d e r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y that one m i g h t otter a p r o o f i n s u p p o r t ot o n e of the c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s . I n that case: T h e s o - c a l l e d proof m u s t be either a p p a r e n t to us o r n o n a p p a r e n t . It it is n o n - a p p a r e n t , w e w i l l not p r o p o u n d it w i t h c o n f i d e n c e . B u t i f it is a p p a r e n t to us, s i n c e o u r i n q u i r y is about w h a t is a p p a r e n t to a n i m a l s a n d p r o o f is apparent to us, w h o are a n i m a l s , it w i l l itself i n s o far as it is apparent be subject to i n q u i r y as to its t r u t h . . .

{PH

1.60)

I n o t h e r w o r d s , it the p r e m i s e s a n d inferences c o n t a i n e d in the proof are not a p p a r e n t to us, we have n o proof. A n d if t h e y are apparent to u s , t h e y w i l l not be apparent to s o m e o n e else, or to s o m e n o n h u m a n a n i m a l s . A n d this b r i n g s u s b a c k to the q u e s t i o n of h o w we m a y d e c i d e w i t h o u t b e i n g g u i l t y of i r r a t i o n a l bias. I n effect, any attempt to p r o v i d e a proof w i l l l e a d us to a n infinite regress o r beg the q u e s t i o n . Infinite regress is a n integral part o f the strategy o f a later set of five m o d e s , d e v e l o p e d by A g r i p p a {PH

1.164; D L 9.88; see C h a p t e r 8 ) . It

s e e m s u n l i k e l y that A e n e s i d e m u s e v e r p r o p o u n d e d this a r g u m e n t h i m s e l f . Sextus p r o b a b l y a p p e n d s it to the o r i g i n a l A e n e s i d e m a n m o d e s in o r d e r to s t r e n g t h e n the case. B u t w e d o n o t n e e d to set off an infinite regress i n o r d e r to argue that b e i n g party to a d i s p u t e puts us in the p o s i t i o n of b e g g i n g the q u e s t i o n . T h e o n l y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n n e c e s s a r y is o n e that also plays a central role in Sextus' P y r r h o n i s m ; n a m e l y , that a n a r b i t r a r y p r e f e r e n c e c a n n o t s e r v e as r a t i o n a l justification. I n any case, t h i s u n d e c i d a b i l i t y strategy is c l e a r l y antithetical to m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i v i s m . I n o n e sense, the relativist has n o n e e d to d e c i d e b e t w e e n the a p p e a r a n c e s ; p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d they m a y all be true, a n d h e n c e t h e r e r e a l l y are n o c o n f l i c t s i n the first place. S o it w o u l d be m i s l e a d i n g to d e s c r i b e the relativists a s s e m b l y o f v a r i a b l e a p p e a r a n c e s as a n o p p o s i t i o n a l m e t h o d (as b o t h Sextus a n d D i o g e n e s d o : PH 1 . 3 ] - 3 3 ; D L 9 . 7 8 ) . A t best we c o u l d say the relativist a r g u m e n t a i m s to d i s s o l v e the m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n that s u c h

AENESIDEMUS

a p p e a r a n c e s c o n f l i c t . B u t a g a i n , it w o u l d be o d d to d e s c r i b e t h i s as pitting o n e a p p e a r a n c e against

another.

U n d e c i d a b i l i t y is just a s c l e a r l y a n t i t h e t i c a l to negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e negative d o g m a t i s t refuses to d e c i d e b e t w e e n c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s not because he is u n a b l e to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h is t r u e , but rather b e c a u s e he h a s d e c i d e d that n o n e of t h e m are t r u e . U n l i k e the sceptic he is not e v e n i n p r i n c i p l e o p e n to the p o s s i b i l i t y that he m a y e v e n t u a l l y d i s c o v e r the t r u t h about t h i n g s b e c a u s e he believes there is n o s u c h t r u t h to d i s c o v e r .

Invariability H o w e v e r , P h i l o reports that A e n e s i d e m u s first m o d e p r o v i d e s a clear 1

w a r r a n t that t h i n g s are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e {Dc Ebr. 175). A n d s i m i l a r l y , D i o g e n e s f o r m u l a t e s the c o n c l u s i o n s to s o m e o l the m o d e s i n t e r m s that suggest not m e r e l y o u r i n a b i l i t y to d e c i d e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s but t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d o i n g so ( D L 9.81, 85, 8 6 , 8 8 ) . E v e n it A e n e s i d e m u s is n o t a relativist, he w o u l d n e e d a strategy other t h a n u n d e c i d a b i l i t y to a r r i v e at s u c h c o n c l u s i o n s . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e for s u c h a strategy r e q u i r e s t h e use of an i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to S e x t u s :

A e n e s i d e m u s s a y s that t h e r e is a difference a m o n g a p p a r e n t t h i n g s , a n d that s o m e of these a p p e a r i n c o m m o n to e v e r y o n e , w h i l e o t h e r s a p p e a r p r i v a t e l y to s o m e o n e , a n d that the o n e s that a p p e a r i n c o m m o n to e v e r y o n e are t r u e , w h i l e the o n e s not like this are false,

{M

8.8)

T h e c o n t r a s t suggests that w h a t a p p e a r s i n c o m m o n a p p e a r s the s a m e to e v e r y o n e . T h u s w e m a y articulate a n i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n this w a y :

[C]

A p p e a r a n c e s that a p p e a r in common

to e v e r y o n e [ i n v a r i -

a b l y ] are true, w h i l e t h o s e n o t like this are false.

HI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

S i m i l a r l y , P h i l o states, i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to the m o d e s : if it w e r e the case that the s a m e u n v a r y i n g a p p e a r a n c e s w e r e p r o d u c e d f r o m the same things, then no doubt we should of n e c e s s i t y a d m i r e as u n e r r i n g a n d i n c o r r u p t i b l e t h o s e t w o s t a n d a r d s , p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h o u g h t . . . a n d w e s h o u l d not be in two minds and suspend judgment ...

( D e Ei>r: 169)

Sextus a l s o m a k e s u s e o f s o m e t h i n g v e r y m u c h l i k e t h i s i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n i n h i s a t t a c k o n e t h i c s , w h i c h is a p p a r e n t l y d e r i v e d f r o m Aenesidemus; I f there is a n y t h i n g by n a t u r e g o o d , a n d there is a n y t h i n g b y n a t u r e b a d , this t h i n g o u g h t to be c o m m o n to a l l a n d to be g o o d o r b a d for e v e r y o n e . F o r j u s t as fire, b e i n g by nature w a r m i n g , w a r m s e v e r y o n e a n d d o e s not w a r m s o m e but chill o t h e r s , a n d i n the s a m e w a y a s s n o w , w h i c h c h i l l s , does not c h i l l s o m e people but w a r m o t h e r s , but c h i l l s e v e r y o n e equally, s o that w h i c h is by n a t u r e g o o d o u g h t to b e g o o d for e v e r y o n e , a n d not g o o d for s o m e but b a d for o t h e r s . ( A i 11.69; see PH 3.179; D L 9 . 1 0 1 ) "

1

Lf w e u n d e r s t a n d t h e " a p p e a r i n g i n c o m m o n " i n [ C ] a n d at the b e g i n n i n g o f this passage as "affecting e v e r y o n e t h e s a m e way", w e get: [A]

I f A" is by n a t u r e F , t h e n x affects e v e r y o n e as F .

W e m a y o b s e r v e b y m e a n s o f the o b s e r v a t i o n s a s s e m b l e d i n o n e o f the m o d e s that: x d o e s n o t affect e v e r y o n e as F . A n d w e m a y t h e n c o n c l u d e by matins ioilens that x is n o t b y nature F . S i n c e this a r g u m e n t c a n be a p p l i e d to a n y t h i n g for w h i c h w e c a n a s s e m b l e variable a p p e a r a n c e s , w e m a y c o n c l u d e quite g e n e r a l l y that k n o w l e d g e o f the n a t u r e s o l t h i n g s is i m p o s s i b l e . B u t i n o r d e r to

112

AES'ESIDE.WUS

get the negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that x is not by n a t u r e F , we have to r e a d [ A ] as a s t a t e m e n t not m e r e l y about h o w t h i n g s appear, but r a t h e r h o w they really are. T o c l a r i f y [ A ] ; it x is [and not appears]

b y n a t u r e F , t h e n x affects [and not merely appears

merely

to affect]

e v e r y o n e as F . A l t h o u g h neither [A] n o r [ C ] are explicitly m e n t i o n e d i n reports of the m o d e s , all of t h e m c a n easily be u n d e r s t o o d as l o l l o w i n g this patt e r n . T h e v a r i a b i l i t y o f the c o l l e c t e d a p p e a r a n c e s o f JC w i l l not present us w i t h a n u n d e c i d a b l e conflict, but rather d i r e c t e v i d e n c e that we c a n n o t reveal the n a t u r e of x o n the basis o f those a p p e a r a n c e s , for that w o u l d r e q u i r e that x affect e v e r y o n e in the s a m e way. But i n t e r p r e t i n g the m o d e s in t h i s w a y y i e l d s s t r i k i n g l y feeble a r g u m e n t s . T h e s e v e n t h m o d e , for e x a m p l e , d r a w s o u r attention to the difficulty of d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t q u a n t i t y o f stuff reveals its t r u e n a t u r e . A m o d e r a t e a m o u n t of w i n e benefits, but a large a m o u n t stupefies; b a r s of s i l v e r a p p e a r w h i t e , s h a v i n g s a p p e a r b l a c k ; a n d i n the c o r r e c t p r o p o r t i o n s , d r u g s are b e n e f i c i a l , but m i x e d i m p r o p e r l y they c a n be lethal. H i e m o t i v a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n is that the true nature o f s o m e t h i n g w i l l be e x p r e s s e d i n v a r i a b l y i n a n y q u a n t i t y of it, a n d i n a n y c o m p o u n d . It a d r u g is by n a t u r e b e n e f i c i a l , t h e n it w i l l affect e v e r y o n e b e n e f i c i a l l y regardless o f the q u a n t i t y a n d the p r o p o r t i o n s i n w h i c h it is m i x e d w i t h o t h e r s u b s t a n c e s . S u c h a s i m p l i s t i c v i e w o f c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s w o u l d not be likely to c o n v i n c e a n y o n e ; it d o e s not r e q u i r e a s o p h i s t i c a t e d c a u s a l t h e o r y to o b s e r v e h o w easily the p o t e n c y of d r u g s m a y b e v a r i e d . T h i s line of t h i n k i n g w o u l d be effective at p r o m o t i n g the v i e w that d r u g s really have c e r t a i n p o w e r s o n l y relative to t h e i r c o m p o u n d s a n d quantities. But by the s a m e token it w o u l d a l s o p r o m o t e the idea that this is all there is to b e k n o w n a b o u t the p o t e n c y o f d r u g s . I n other w o r d s , it s i m p l y s e r v e s to reveal the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y ot the i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n i n t h i s context, A p p l y i n g the i n v a r i a b i l i t y strategy to the m o d e s generally p r o d u c e s feeble results. R a t h e r t h a n c o n c l u d e that the t r u t h is b e y o n d o u r g r a s p , w e w i l l p r o b a b l y t h i n k , tor e x a m p l e , that s n a k e v e n o m really is h a r m f u l to o n e p e r s o n , but not to a n o t h e r , a n d p l a y i n g w i t h h o o p s really is s e r i o u s b u s i n e s s for c h i l d r e n , but not for o l d p e o p l e ,

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

and metals really are v a l u a b l e w h e n s c a r c e , b u t not w h e n a b u n d a n t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the fact that n o t h i n g s e e m s to meet the i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n m i g h t be t a k e n a s g r o u n d s to reject that c o n d i t i o n a n d e m b r a c e s o m e sort o f r e l a t i v i s m . T h e t e n t h m o d e , h o w e v e r , is a m o r e plausible c a n d i d a t e for the i n v a r i a b i l i t y strategy. T h i s m o d e c o u l d be r e a d as r e v e a l i n g the c o n tingent a n d v a r i a b l e n a t u r e ot v a l u e b y p o i n t i n g out the differences a m o n g lifestyles, c u s t o m s , l a w s , beliefs In m y t h s a n d d o g m a t i c s u p p o s i t i o n s . I n g e n e r a l , t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f w h a t w e f i n d v a l u a b l e is i n d i c a t e d by the c o r r e l a t i o n of b e l i e f a n d the t i m e a n d p l a c e o f o n e s b i r t h . I n s o m e c u l t u r e s it is a p p r o p r i a t e to tattoo babies: i n others it is not. I f y o u g r e w u p i n a n c i e n t E t h i o p i a y o u w o u l d p r o b a b l y believe it is g o o d to tattoo y o u r c h i l d . B u t il y o u g r e w u p In V i c t o r i a n E n g l a n d y o u w o u l d p r o b a b l y believe it is b a d . H o m o s e x u a l i t y is c u s t o m a r y i n s o m e places, illegal i n o t h e r s . E g y p t i a n s e m b a l m the d e a d a n d R o m a n s c r e m a t e the b o d i e s ( D L 9.83), But if a n y of these practices w e r e g o o d b y nature, they w o u l d affect all of us as g o o d , that is, they w o u l d s e e m g o o d to e v e r y o n e j u s t as fire s e e m s w a r m i n g to e v e r y o n e . H e n c e w e m a y c o n c l u d e that n o t h i n g is g o o d o r b a d by nature. A l l a n c i e n t e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s offer s o m e a c c o u n t o f w h a t is g o o d by nature, a n d they all c o n t e n d that w h a t e v e r it i s , it is b e n e f i c i a l . T h e s e are s u p p o s e d to be o b j e c t i v e l y t r u e a c c o u n t s o f w h a t is g o o d , and b e n e f i c i a l , tor all h u m a n b e i n g s . So, the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n a l w o u l d be c o m m o n l y h e l d b y a n c i e n t e t h i c a l theorists: if x is g o o d by n a t u r e t h e n it is b e n e f i c i a l for e v e r y o n e . I f w e s u p p o s e that i n o r d e r for x to be b e n e f i c i a l for s o m e o n e , it m u s t a c t u a l l y benefit h i m , w e m a y restate t h e r e q u i r e m e n t this w a y :

[B]

I f x is g o o d by nature t h e n e v e r y o n e affected by it w i l l be benefited.

A d m i t t e d l y , t h i s is quite d i s t i n c t I r o m t h e f u r t h e r c l a i m : [R]

I f x is g o o d b y nature, t h e n e v e r y o n e affected by it w i l l recognize

1:1

it as b e n e f i c i a l .

AES'ESIDE.WUS

It c e r t a i n l y s e e m s p o s s i b l e that o n e m i g h t be benefited w i t h o u t r e c o g n i z i n g it. I n d e e d , it often h a p p e n s that w h a t s e e m e d initially like a p r o b l e m t u r n s out to be a b l e s s i n g . A n d m o r e generally, it s e e m s o n e does not have to have a n y p a r t i c u l a r beliefs about w h a t is g o o d or b a d to b e b e n e f i t e d . H o w e v e r , t h i s is not t h e case tor Stoic e t h i c s , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h , o n e m u s t k n o w w h a t is g o o d b y nature to be v i r t u o u s . Y o u m i g h t receive all s o r t s of a p p a r e n t l y g o o d t h i n g s a n d d e v e l o p t h e d i s p o s i tions v a l u e d b y y o u r c u l t u r e , but u n t i l a n d u n l e s s y o u g r a s p the d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e b e t w e e n w h a t is b y nature g o o d a n d w h a t is not, y o u w i l l n o t b e v i r t u o u s a n d n o n e of these a p p a r ently g o o d t h i n g s c a n t r u l y benefit y o u . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the v i r t u o u s Stoic c a n n o t tail to be a w a r e , at least o n r e f l e c t i o n , ot the fact that he is v i r t u o u s a n d that h i s v i r t u e is b e n e f i c i a l for h i m . So, g i v e n the Stoic v i e w o f w h a t it m e a n s l o r x to be g o o d by nature, Stoics w o u l d accept b o t h [ B ] a n d [ R ] . I n that case, if the a r g u m e n t w e r e d i r e c t e d at a Stoic o r a n y o n e else w h o a c c e p t e d these p r o p o s i t i o n s [ A , B , R ] , there w o u l d b e no n e e d for A e n e s i d e m u s h i m s e l f to believe t h e m . H e m a y a r g u e that as a r e s u l t of his i n t e r l o c u t o r s ' c o n v i c t i o n s , n o t h i n g is by n a t u r e g o o d or b a d . T h e c o n f i d e n t a s s e r t i o n o f any o f these r e q u i r e m e n t s takes us w e l l b e y o n d s c e p t i c i s m a n d e v e n a m e r e l y negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, o n the o t h e r h a n d , a l s o a n t i c i p a t e s a n d p r o b a b l y informs Sextus' dialectical use o f ( A ) . It is c l e a r that S e x t u s d o e s not h i m s e l f believe that fire heats byn a t u r e (PH

1.82; see M 9 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 ) , But In t h e c o n t e x t of a r g u i n g

against d o g m a t i c e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s , he finds it u s e f u l to c l a i m that it does; " F i r e , w h i c h heats by nature, a p p e a r s h e a t i n g to e v e r y o n e ; a n d s n o w , w h i c h c h i l l s by nature, a p p e a r s c h i l l i n g to e v e r y o n e " [PH 3.179; see M 8 . 1 8 9 , 1 9 7 - 9 9 ) . T h i s m a k e s it s e e m quite r e a s o n a b l e to expect that the n a t u r a l p r o p e r t y o f g o o d n e s s s h o u l d a l s o affect e v e r y o n e the s a m e w a y . B u t in a n o t h e r passage, S e x t u s otters a n i m p o r t a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n to [ A ] , a p p a r e n t l y i n o r d e r to b l o c k t h e o b j e c t i o n that fire does not w a r m everyone:

115

ANCIENT

[A']

SCEPTICISM

I f x is b y n a t u r e F , t h e n A" affects e v e r y o n e who is in what they cal! a natural

state as F ( P H 3 . 1 7 9 ) .

[ A ' ] m a k e s the n a t u r a l w a r m i n g p o w e r o f fire m o r e plausible. B u t by the s a m e t o k e n it o p e n s the d o o r for the d o g m a t i s t to a r g u e that h i s a c c o u n t o f the g o o d is the r i g h t o n e . T h o s e w h o d i s a g r e e , he m i g h t say, are s i m p l y not i n a n a t u r a l state; so the fact that the g o o d does not s e e m g o o d to t h e m , or affect t h e m beneficially, is e x a c t l y w h a t we s h o u l d expect. A s Sextus c o n c l u d e s the a r g u m e n t h e d r o p s the m o d i f i c a t i o n i n [ A ' ] w i t h o u t c o m m e n t , r e v e r t i n g to [ A ] : "it t h i n g s w h i c h affect u s by n a t u r e affect e v e r y o n e In the s a m e way, w h i l e we are not a l l affected i n the s a m e w a y in the c a s e o f s o - c a l l e d g o o d s , t h e n n o t h i n g is by n a t u r e g o o d " ( P H 3 . 1 8 2 ) . T h e o n l y c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s flexibility i n this regard is that he uses [ A ] a n d [ A ] d i a l e c t i c a l l y to J

u n d e r m i n e h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s c o n f i d e n c e , a n d not to establish any negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s o f h i s o w n . T h e s a m e is p r o b a b l y true for A e n e s i d e m u s as w e l l . I n d e e d , the dialectical use o f [ C ] is the key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s p u z z l i n g c o n n e c t i o n w i t h H e r a c l i t u s . B e f o r e t u r n i n g to t h i s i s s u e , we s h a l l c o n s i d e r w h y r e l a t i v i s m a n d i n v a r i a b i l i t y c a m e to be s o c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s , a n d h o w they c a n be u n d e r s t o o d to be c o n s i s t ent w i t h s c e p t i c i s m .

I n c o r p o r a t i n g relativity a n d invariability w i t h i n s c e p t i c i s m It is p o s s i b l e that u n d e c i d a b i l i t y is a later strategy i n s p i r e d b y d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n , or w h a t e v e r p r i n c i p l e is r e q u i r e d to d e r i v e negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s . L a t e r S c e p t i c s m a y have f o u n d A e n e s i d e m u s ' c o l l e c t i o n s of v a r i a b l e a p p e a r a n c e s a u s e f u l r e s o u r c e . B u t rather t h a n a p p e a l to [ C ] or [ A ] , t h e y m a y h a v e a r g u e d that w e are not i n a p o s i t i o n to d e c i d e a m o n g the v a r i able, a n d c r u c i a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e , a p p e a r a n c e s . S u c h a d e v e l o p m e n t is suggested by c o m m e n t s we f i n d i n two o f o u r s o u r c e s for P y r r h o n i s m that predate its s c e p t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n i n Sextus. A c c o r d i n g to the

116

ABNESIDEMU1

a n o n y m o u s c o m m e n t a t o r o n Plato's Theaetetus ( p r o b a b l y f r o m the first c e n t u r y B C E ) :

The

P y r r h o n i s t s say that e v e r y t h i n g is relative, i n a s m u c h

as n o t h i n g exists in its o w n r i g h t but e v e r y t h i n g relative to o t h e r t h i n g s . N e i t h e r s h a p e s n o r s o u n d s n o r o b j e c t s o f taste o r s m e l l or t o u c h n o r a n y other object o f p e r c e p t i o n h a s a c h a r a c t e r o f its o w n . F o r o t h e r w i s e t h i n g s that are the s a m e w o u l d not affect us differently d e p e n d i n g o n t h e i r i n t e r v a l s a n d the t h i n g s o b s e r v e d together w i t h t h e m . . . (in Tht C o l . 63 [ A n n a s & B a r n e s 1985:

97])

S i m i l a r l y , t h e R o m a n a u t h o r A u l u s G e l l i u s r e m a r k s that:

A b s o l u t e l y e v e r y t h i n g that affects the h u m a n s e n s e s is r e l a tive. T h a t m e a n s that there is n o t h i n g at a l l w h i c h exists i n its o w n right or w h i c h h a s its o w n p o w e r a n d n a t u r e : e v e r y t h i n g is r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g else a n d a p p e a r s s u c h as its a p p e a r a n c e is w h i l e it is a p p e a r i n g , i.e. s u c h a s it is m a d e i n o u r s e n s e s to w h i c h it has a r r i v e d a n d not s u c h as it is i n Itself f r o m w h i c h it h a s set out. (iVA 1 1 . 5 . 7 - 8 , p r o b a b l y m i d - s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E [ A n n a s & B a r n e s 1985: 9 6 - 7 ] ) T h e s e r e m a r k s m a y be i n t e r p r e t e d in s u p p o r t of a m e t a p h y s i c a l relat i v i s m . H o w e v e r , w e m a y a l s o r e a s o n a b l y s u p p o s e that their a u t h o r s m i s t a k e n l y attribute s o m e p r i n c i p l e to A e n e s i d e m u s that w a r r a n t s the i n f e r e n c e f r o m the relativity of a p p e a r a n c e s to the relativity of t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s w o u l d be a n easy m i s t a k e to m a k e i f A e n e s i d e m u s i n fact a r g u e d d i a l e c t i c a l l y for s u c h negatively d o g m a t i c conclusions. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e c a n a c c o u n t for the p r o m i n e n t role o f relativity b y c o n s i d e r i n g S e x t u s ' d i s c u s s i o n o f the relativity m o d e , w h i c h he takes to be the g e n e r i c f o r m for a l l o f the m o d e s (PH

1.135-40,

1 , 3 9 ) . " S e x t u s a p p a r e n t l y s a w relativity a s the c o m m o n feature b i n d i n g this set o f a r g u m e n t s together. A l l of the m o d e s c a n be s e e n as

117

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r e l y i n g o n t w o t y p e s of relativity - v a r i a b l e a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e appearances ot ,v are p r o d u c e d either relative to the s u b j e c t j u d g i n g (e.g. x a p p e a r s F to h u m a n b e i n g s , n o t - F to d o g s ) or relative to the t h i n g s o b s e r v e d a l o n g w i t h x (e.g. x a p p e a r s F w h e n m i x e d w i t h y, n o t F w h e n m i x e d w i t h z). T h e g e n e r a l , a n d m u n d a n e , o b s e r v a t i o n is that t h i n g s a p p e a r a s t h e y d o o n l y relative to c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d the sort o f r e l a t i v i s m at stake is the m o d e s t , s e m a n t i c variety r e f e r r e d to above: w h e n e v e r 1 say A" a p p e a r s F , it m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d that I m e a n x a p p e a r s F in certain

circumstances.

1 cannot meaning-

fully talk about a n a p p e a r a n c e o l x absent a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . H a v i n g s y s t e m a t i c a l l y generated a w e a l t h of i n c o m p a t i b l e a p p e a r a n c e s , the s c e p t i c a l w o r k is d o n e b y the a r g u m e n t that w e are u n a b l e to d e c i d e a m o n g t h e m , that is, that w e h a v e n o r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s o n w h i c h to h o l d one set of c i r c u m s t a n c e s as e p i s t e m i c a l l y p r i v i l e g e d . I f this w e r e A e n e s i d e m u s ' v i e w it w o u l d e x p l a i n w h y he is c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h r e l a t i v i s m , a n d w h y it is a m i s t a k e to s e e this a s a m e t a p h y s i c a l position. I f A e n e s i d e m u s p r o m o t e s the s u s p e n s i o n o l j u d g e m e n t i n the b r o a d s e n s e , r e g a r d i n g a n y c l a i m a b o u t the w a y the w o r l d really is, as o p p o s e d to h o w it a p p e a r s , t h e n it is c o n s i s t e n t for h i m to u s e b o t h the u n d e c i d a b i l i t y a n d i n v a r i a b i l i t y strategies, p r o v i d e d he e m p l o y s s u c h p r i n c i p l e s as [ A ] dialectically.

Aenesidemus and Heraclitus O n e o l the v i r t u e s o f this a c c o u n t is that it l e n d s itself to a v e r y p l a u sible e x p l a n a t i o n of A e n e s i d e m u s ' p u z z l i n g relation to H e r a c l i t e a n ism.

1 1

A e n e s i d e m u s took a n active interest i n H e r a c l i t u s , d e v e l o p i n g

his o w n distinctive interpretations o f the n o t o r i o u s l y o b s c u r e sayings of the P r e s o c r a t i c . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of these, for o u r p u r p o s e s , are h i s s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g H e r a c l i t u s " v i e w o f t r u t h a n d the d o c t r i n e of the u n i t y o f opposites, W e have a l r e a d y e n c o u n t e r e d A e n e s i d e m u s ' statement ( [ C ] ) that a p p e a r a n c e s that a p p e a r i n c o m m o n to e v e r y o n e [invariably]

are

t r u e , w h i l e t h o s e not like t h i s are false ( A i 8.8; cf. A f 7 . 1 2 6 - 3 4 ) . J u d g -

118

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i n g f r o m the context a n d o t h e r related passages, [ C ] appears to be one of A e n e s i d e m u s ' interpretations of Heraclitus. - In another pas1

1

sage, we f i n d a n i m p o r t a n t a p p l i c a t i o n o l [ C ] : A e n e s i d e m u s a n d h i s followers u s e d to say that the Sceptical p e r s u a s i o n is a p a t h to the p h i l o s o p h y of H e r a c l i t u s , because the idea that c o n t r a r i e s a p p e a r to h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g leads to the i d e a that c o n t r a r i e s a c t u a l l y d o h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g ; a n d w h i l e the S c e p t i c s say that c o n t r a r i e s appear to h o l d o f the s a m e t h i n g , the H e r a c l i t e a n s go o n f r o m there to the idea that they a c t u a l l y do h o l d .

(PH

1.210)

T h i s is a reference to H e r a c l i t u s ' f a m o u s , a n d c o n t r o v e r s i a l , u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s d o c t r i n e , illustrated by s u c h c l a i m s a s "sea water is b o t h p u r e a n d p o l l u t e d , b r i n g i n g life to fish a n d death to h u m a n b e i n g s " A n d it is easy to see how, g i v e n [ C ) , o n e c a n r e a s o n f r o m the c o m m o n a p p e a r a n c e that c o n t r a r i e s h o l d o f the s a m e t h i n g to the c l a i m that they a c t u a l l y d o . H o w e v e r , Sextus d o e s not attribute t h i s i n f e r e n c e to A e n e s i d e m u s . It w o u l d be unacceptable

1

d o g m a t i c for a s c e p t i c to e n d o r s e

the u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s d o c t r i n e a s l o n g as w e u n d e r s t a n d it to be a n a s s e r t i o n about the w a y t h i n g s really are. F o r the sceptic, e v e n if it is a c o m m o n a p p e a r a n c e that c o n t r a r i e s h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g , this r e m a i n s a n a p p e a r a n c e . H e is not w i l l i n g to a p p l y [ C ] i n o r d e r to a r r i v e at the b o l d m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c l u s i o n that c o n t r a r i e s

actually

d o h o l d o l the s a m e t h i n g b e c a u s e he d o e s not s u b s c r i b e to [ C ] i n the first place. T h i s m u c h Sextus a n d A e n e s i d e m u s agree o n . But Sextus disagrees w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s ' c l a i m that P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is a p a t h to the p h i l o s o p h y of H e r a c l i t u s . First, Sextus p o i n t s out that the a p p e a r a n c e that c o n t r a r i e s h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g (e.g. h o n e y tastes sweet to h e a l t h y people, bitter to s i c k o n e s ) is n o t i n the least p e c u l i a r to S c e p t i c s or d i s t i n c t i v e o f S c e p t i c i s m . G i v e n the t r u l y

common

nature of this a p p e a r a n c e , it m a k e s n o s e n s e to single P y r r h o n i s m out, r a t h e r t h a n s o m e o t h e r p h i l o s o p h y o r e v e n o r d i n a r y lite, as a path to H e r a c l i t e a n i s m .

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

F u r t h e r m o r e , the t w o v i e w s c o n f l i c t . C l e a r l y o n e c a n n o t b e l o n g to b o t h c a m p s s i n c e that w o u l d r e q u i r e b e l i e v i n g i n the u n i t y o f o p p o sites as well as s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t about it. S e x t u s t h e n c l a i m s "it is a b s u r d to c a l l a c o n i l i c t i n g p e r s u a s i o n a p a t h to the s c h o o l it c o n f l i c t s w i t h " (Phi 1.212). A n d this is the case i l w e take t h e p a t h m e t a p h o r i n either o f the f o l l o w i n g w a y s . I n l o g i c a l t e r m s ; I f A is a path to B, t h e n A entails B. O r m o r e broadly, in r h e t o r i c a l t e r m s : I f A is a p at h to B , t h e n o n e w h o f i n d s A c o n v i n c i n g w i l l f i n d B c o n v i n c i n g also, I n n e i t h e r o f t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the m e t a p h o r is it reasonable to say that P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is a path to H e r a c l i t e a n i s m , S c e p t i c i s m c e r t a i n l y d o e s not e n t a i l H e r a c l i t e a n i s m . A n d if a S c e p t i c w e r e to f i n d Heraclitus" v i e w c o n v i n c i n g , it w o u l d not be b e c a u s e ot h i s s c e p t i c a l p e r s u a s i o n ; just as i f a n a g n o s t i c b e c a m e a theist it w o u l d not b e because of his agnosticism. A m o r e p l a u s i b l e l e a d i n g o f A e n e s i d e m u s " m e t a p h o r is e v i d e n t f r o m PH 1.210, even it Sextus d i d not see it, O n e c a n a r r i v e at a p o s i t i v e v i e w o f the nature o l t h i n g s , the H e r a c l i t e a n u n i t y o f o p p o sites, by a p p l y i n g the p r i n c i p l e [ C ] , w h i c h P y r r h o n i s t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i cally u s e o n l y for the s a k e of u n d e r m i n i n g c l a i m s about the nature of t h i n g s . Sextus m i s t a k e n l y takes A e n e s i d e m u s " m e t a p h o r

i n an

a p p r o v i n g sense, a s it to s a y o n e w o u l d d o w e l l to travel t h i s s c e p t i c a l r o a d to H e r a c l i t e a n i s m , w h e r e a s A e n e s i d e m u s m e a n t it w i t h o u t any s u c h a p p r o v a l ; o n e can get to H e r a c l i t u s ' v i e w by w a y ot a p r i n c i p l e the S c e p t i c s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y u s e .

Conclusion I n c o n c l u s i o n w e s h a l l briefly c o n s i d e r A e n e s i d e m u s " p o s i t i o n i n the h i s t o r y o f S c e p t i c i s m . P y r r h o n i s m , i n w h a t e v e r l o r m it m i g h t

AENESIDEMUS

have t a k e n after T i m o n ' s death i n 2 3 0 B C E , w a s utterly neglected u n t i l A e n e s i d e m u s b r o u g h t it b a c k to p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n (Ptaep.

Ev.

14.18.29). W h a t h e b r o u g h t b a c k w a s not p r e c i s e l y P y r r h o ' s v i e w , but a S c e p t i c i s m c l e a r l y i n s p i r e d b y it. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f i n s p i r a t i o n s e e m s to h a v e b e e n P y r r h o s n o v e l a s s o c i a t i o n o i epoche w i t h tranquillity. A e n e s i d e m u s also a p p r o p r i a t e s T i n i o n s v i e w ( e c h o e d in the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y ) that a p p e a r a n c e s are a d e q u a t e guides t o life. W e [ P y r r h o n i s t s ] a f f i r m the a p p e a r a n c e , w i t h o u t also a f f i r m i n g that it is of s u c h a k i n d . W e too [i.e. like d o g m a t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s ] perceive that fire b u r n s ; b u t w e s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t a b o u t w h e t h e r it is its nature to b u r n . W e see that a m a n m o v e s a n d that h e d i e s ; h o w it h a p p e n s w e d o n t k n o w . W e o n l y object to the n o n - e v i d e n t s u b s t a n c e u n d e r l y i n g appearances.

( D L 9 . 1 0 4 - 5 [ L S 1 H ] ; see 9.106)

W e d o not n e e d a n y s p e c i a l insight into t h e nature of t h i n g s i n o r d e r to live, a n d e v e n to live w e l l . H o w e v e r , d r a w i n g o n the d i a l e c t i c a l t r a d i t i o n o f the early s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y , " A e n e s i d e m u s develops a n o p p o s i t i o n a l m e t h o d d e s i g n e d 4

to u n d e r m i n e anyone's c o n f i d e n c e that h e has r a t i o n a l l y d e t e r m i n e d h o w t h i n g s a r e . S o h i s P y r r h o n i s t r e v i v a l is a c t u a l l y a s y n t h e s i s o f two earlier t r a d i t i o n s , c o m b i n i n g t h e a r g u m e n t s a n d m e t h o d s o f the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y i n the s e r v i c e o f a t t a i n i n g the k i n d o l lite exemplified by Pyrrho. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n also a l l o w s u s t o see t h e later P y r r h o n i s m , as o u t l i n e d b y S e x t u s , a s a m o r e potent v e r s i o n of A e n e s i d e m u s ' v e r s i o n . B y c o n t r a s t , it w e read A e n e s i d e m u s as a relativist, w e are forced to c o n c l u d e that S e x t u s either w i l f u l l y m i s r e p r e s e n t s o r b a d l y misunderstands h i m . B u t , a s w e shall see, S e x t u s ' v e r s i o n o f S c e p t i c i s m h a s m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s ' T h i s is especially i m p o r t a n t w i t h regard to the issue o l the c o n s i s t e n c y o f S c e p t i c i s m . S i n c e A e n e s i d e m u s a c c u s e s h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y A c a d e m i c s of r a s h l y c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e m selves, it is n o s u r p r i s e that h e is c o n c e r n e d t o p r e s e r v e h i s o w n

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c o n s i s t e n c y : " T h e P y r r h o n i s t d e t e r m i n e s a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g , not even t h i s v e r y c l a i m that n o t h i n g is d e t e r m i n e d . . . by e n t e r t a i n i n g d o u b t s a b o u t e v e r y t h e s i s , they m a i n t a i n c o n s i s t e n c y "

(Bib.

I 6 9 b 2 7 - 2 S , 3 9 - 4 0 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , A e n e s i d e m u s ' r e f u s a l to believe a n y p r o p o s i t i o n of the f o r m "JC is b y n a t u r e F" s h o u l d not itself be c o n g e a l e d into a d o c t r i n e . H e b e l i e v e s that it is n e i t h e r possible n o r i m p o s s i b l e to d e t e r m i n e that x is b y n a t u r e F. D e t e r m i n i n g n o t h i n g is n o t therefore a statement o f a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n that o n e m i g h t d e f e n d or attack, but r a t h e r a report of the S c e p t i c s g e n e r a l attitude t o w a r d s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h e n a t u r e o f t h i s attitude is c a p t u r e d i n a m e t a p h o r : s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s are like purgatives that e l i m i n a t e t h e m s e l v e s a l o n g w i t h the o f f e n d i n g s u b s t a n c e ( D L 9.76). T h e self-defeating, o r purgative, nature of s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s , a s w e l l as the nature o l "the o f f e n d i n g s u b s t a n c e " are topics to be e x p l o r e d in C h a p t e r 7 as w e e x a m i n e the later d e v e l o p m e n t o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m ,

122

SEVEN

Sextus Empiricus: the consistency of Pyrrhonian Scepticism

W h a t e v e r b e c a m e ot P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m i n the w a k e of A e n e s i d e m u s , it d i d not m a k e m u c h of an i m p r e s s i o n o n S e n e c a , w h o r e m a r k s in the e a r l y 6 0 s C E that there is n o o n e to h a n d o n the teachings o f P y r r h o (Natural

Questions

732).

O n the o t h e r h a n d ,

l o o k i n g b a c k f r o m the t h i r d c e n t u r y C E , D i o g e n e s d r a w s a lineage of P y r r h o n i a n teachers a n d s t u d e n t s f r o m P y r r h o all the w a y u p to Sextus E m p i r i c u s a n d h i s s t u d e n t S a t u r n i n u s ( D L 9 . 1 1 5 - 1 6 ) . T h e list p r o b a b l y exhibits D i o g e n e s ' p a s s i o n for genealogy m o r e t h a n h i s t o r i cal t r u t h . B u t it is likely that there w a s s o m e c o n t i n u i t y o f s c e p t i c a l practice f r o m the t i m e of A e n e s i d e m u s s i n c e , m o r e t h a n 200 years later, Sextus d r a w s o n a r i c h t r a d i t i o n of s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t that c l e a r l y w a s not the w o r k o f just o n e S c e p t i c .

1

I n d e e d , Sextus h i m s e l t s o m e t i m e s s e e m s not to be j u s t o n e S c e p t i c either. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of s t r a n d s i n h i s w o r k s , not all o f w h i c h fit c o m f o r t a b l y together. T h e m o s t l i k e l y e x p l a n a t i o n is that there were earlier, i n c o m p a t i b l e v e r s i o n s of P y r r h o n i s m r e c o r d e d i n h i s s o u r c e s , a n d that Sextus d r e w f r o m t h e m w i t h little c o n c e r n for c o n s i s t e n c y . W h e t h e r he s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h c o n s i s t e n c y is a topic to be e x p l o r e d later. D e s p i t e these a p p a r e n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t s c e p t i c a l s t r a n d s in S e x t u s ' texts, we c a n d i s c e r n a d i s t i n c t i v e v o i c e at w o r k , a n d w e c a n extract a c o h e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , or rather p r a c tice. T h i s w i l l be o u r task i n t h i s a n d the l o l l o w i n g two chapters.

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The works of Sextus E m p i r i c u s Sextus w a s a p r a c t i s i n g p h y s i c i a n , p r o b a b l y at w o r k i n the late s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E , p o s s i b l y in A l e x a n d r i a o r R o m e , or b o t h .

2

H i s books

reveal m u c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l detail about the p r a c tice of S c e p t i c i s m , but they tell u s v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g about its h i s t o r i cal d e v e l o p m e n t , the i n f l u e n c e a n d s i z e o f the S c e p t i c a l m o v e m e n t or the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n S c e p t i c a l teachers a n d s t u d e n t s . A l s o , s i n c e h i s s o u r c e s are n o w lost w e c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e the extent to w h i c h Sextus is a n o r i g i n a l t h i n k e r a n d the extent to w h i c h he m e r e l y c o m p i l e s a n d a r r a n g e s the a r g u m e n t s o f h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s . W h a t e v e r the case m a y be, h i s b o o k s represent the c u l m i n a t i o n o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m a n d , a l o n g w i t h C i c e r o ' s w o r k , are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s o f t r a n s m i s s i o n for the entire t r a d i t i o n o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m . A n d g i v e n h i s interest i n setting out the a r g u m e n t s o f past p h i l o s o p h e r s o n v a r i o u s topics, h e is o n e of o u r m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s for G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y in g e n e r a l . S e x t u s ' s u r v i v i n g w o r k s c o n s i s t of the Outlines

of Pyrrhonism,

a n d Against

Commentaries

I n the Outlines

the Professors

of Pyrrhonism

w i t h its G r e e k title, Pyrrhoneioi

five b o o k s ot the

Sceptical

(see F i g u r e 3 ) .

( a b b r e v i a t e d as PH in a c c o r d a n c e Hypotyposeis),

S e x t u s sets o u t a

g e n e r a l a c c o u n t a n d a specific a c c o u n t of h i s s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e . T h e g e n e r a l a c c o u n t e x p l a i n s the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of S c e p t i c i s m , its p r i n c i p l e s , m e t h o d s a n d a i m s , a n d h o w it differs f r o m o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i e s w i t h s c e p t i c a l e l e m e n t s . T h e s p e c i f i c a c c o u n t , by contrast, sets out a n a r r a y o f a r g u m e n t s targeting c l a i m s m a d e w i t h i n e a c h of the three t r a d i t i o n a l s u b d i v i s i o n s o f H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y : logic, p h y s ics a n d e t h i c s . H e r e the focus is o n specific a p p l i c a t i o n s ot the g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t f o r m s a n d s c e p t i c a l strategies o u t l i n e d in the g e n e r a l part. Outlines

of Pyrrhonism

is d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e b o o k s . T h e first c o n -

tains the g e n e r a l a c c o u n t , a n d the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d c o n t a i n the s p e cific a c c o u n t . Sextus c o v e r s the s a m e g r o u n d , w i t h the s a m e p l a n , i n h i s Sceptical

Commentaries.

The general account w a s probably

p r e s e n t e d i n m u c h greater d e t a i l i n the first five b o o k s , w h i c h have not s u r v i v e d . H e then f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h w i t h the specific a r g u m e n t s against logic, p h y s i c s a n d e t h i c s i n the r e m a i n i n g b o o k s , w h i c h have

124

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125

ANCIENT

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s u r v i v e d . T h e s e w e r e m i s t a k e n l y thought to c o n t i n u e the six b o o k s titled Against

the Professors

(Pros Mathematikons',

M 1 - 6 ) , in w h i c h

he r e c o r d s S c e p t i c a l a n d E p i c u r e a n a r g u m e n t s a i m e d at s h o w i n g c e r t a i n k i n d s o f t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e to be a s h a m . S o the s u r v i v i n g b o o k s of the Sceptical

Commentaries

are m i s l e a d i n g ] } n a m e d M

7 - 1 1 . M 7 a n d 8 are a l s o k n o w n as Against 10 Against

the Physicists a n d M 11 Against

-

the Logicians,

M 9 and

M a n y of the

the Ethicists.

s a m e t o p i c s a n d a r g u m e n t s t r o m PH 2 - 3 appear, often in greater length a n d d e t a i l , i n the s u r v i v i n g b o o k s o l the Sceptical taries, M

7-ll.

Commen-

3

The means a n d ends of Scepticism: normative versus causal accounts Sextus c h a r a c t e r i z e s S c e p t i c i s m a s a w a y of life (agoge), a n d defines it as a n ability (dynamis)

to b a l a n c e the p e r s u a s i v e force o f a r g u m e n t s

as w e l l as a p p e a r a n c e s for a n d against any d i s p u t e d c l a i m . T h i s b a l ance, or e q u i p o l l e n c e , leads to s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t w h i c h i n t u r n leads to t r a n q u i l l i t y (ataraxia;

(epochs),

PH 1.8). W e shall start

by c o n s i d e r i n g the relation b e t w e e n these three elements in the S c e p tic's p r a c t i c e : e q u i p o l l e n c e , s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t a n d tranquillity. W h a t d o e s it m e a n to say that the first leads to the s e c o n d , a n d the s e c o n d to the third'? I n o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o n e d o e s not start out as a s c e p t i c in a state of epochs

but rather e n d s u p there. Sextus s a y s the c a u s a l p r i n -

ciple, or o r i g i n , o f s c e p t i c i s m is the h o p e of b e c o m i n g t r a n q u i l : M e n o f talent, t r o u b l e d by the a n o m a l y i n t h i n g s a n d p u z z l e d as to w h i c h o f t h e m they s h o u l d r a t h e r assent to, c a m e to investigate w h a t in t h i n g s is t r u e a n d w h a t false, t h i n k i n g that b y d e c i d i n g these i s s u e s they w o u l d b e c o m e t r a n q u i l . (PH

1.12}

O n e m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , w o r r y a b o u t w h e t h e r or not a b e n e v o l e n t G o d exists. It is e a s y to i m a g i n e h o w c o n f l i c t i n g a c c o u n t s o n this

126

S E X T U S £ hi PI h EC US

m a t t e r m i g h t be d i s t u r b i n g ( a l t h o u g h we shall l o o k m o r e closely at the nature of the p r o t o - s c e p t i c s d i s t u r b a n c e later i n this c h a p t e r ) . It is also easy to s u p p o s e that the w a y to relieve s u c h a d i s t u r b a n c e is by d e t e r m i n i n g the t r u t h . O n c e I c o m e to k n o w that G o d exists ( o r does n o t exist ) I c a n stop w o r r y i n g about it. So the p r o t o - s c e p t i c sets a b o u t e x a m i n i n g all the relevant a r g u m e n t s a n d e v i d e n c e they c a n f i n d . I n s t e a d o f d i s c o v e r i n g the t r u t h , however, "they c a m e u p o n e q u i p o l l e n t dispute, a n d b e i n g u n a b l e to decide this t h e y s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t . A n d w h e n they s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t , t r a n q u i l i t y i n matters o l o p i n i o n f o l l o w e d f o r t u i t o u s l y " {PH

1.26). T h e fortuitous a p p e a r a n c e of t r a n q u i l l i t y is a l s o related

i n the f o l l o w i n g story;

T h e y say that [ A p e l l e s ] w a s p a i n t i n g a h o r s e a n d w a n t e d to represent in h i s p i c t u r e the lather o n the h o r s e s m o u t h ; but h e w a s s o u n s u c c e s s f u l that he gave up, t o o k the s p o n g e o n w h i c h he h a d b e e n w i p i n g off the c o l o r s f r o m h i s b r u s h , a n d flung it at the picture. A n d w h e n it hit the picture, it p r o d u c e d a representation of the h o r s e s lather. N o w the Sceptics w e r e h o p i n g to a c q u i r e t r a n q u i l i t y by d e c i d i n g the a n o m a lies i n w h a t a p p e a r s a n d is t h o u g h t of, a n d b e i n g u n a b l e to d o this t h e y s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t . B u t w h e n they s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t , t r a n q u i l i t y f o l l o w e d a s it w e r e fortuitously, as a s h a d o w f o l l o w s a body.

(PH

1.28-29)

Sextus is c l e a r l y not a d v o c a t i n g s p o n g e - t h r o w i n g as a p a i n t i n g t e c h nique, I m a g i n e h o w f r u s t r a t i n g that w o u l d be. T h e c h a n c e s ot hitting the c a n v a s at p r e c i s e l y the right spot w i t h a p r o p e r l y saturated s p o n g e t r a v e l l i n g at j u s t the right s p e e d are v e r y s l i m . It j u s t is not a reliable way ot getting the d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . B y analogy, Sextus is not s u g g e s t i n g that w e j u m p straight epochs

to

a n d give u p o n the e n q u i r y b e l o r e e v e n s t a r t i n g . A p e l l e s '

trustration, just like the proto-sceptic's d i s a p p o i n t m e n t at not f i n d i n g the t r u t h , is a n e c e s s a r y prelude to their u n f o r e s e e n s u c c e s s e s . T h e p o i n t o f the s t o r y is to illustrate the s u r p r i s i n g nature o f the sceptic s i n i t i a l d i s c o v e r y : t r a n q u i l l i t y a r i s e s not i n the w a y she o r i g i n a l l y

127

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

s u p p o s e d it w o u l d , but rather as the u n f o r e s e e n o u t c o m e of b r i n g i n g her intellect to a standstill, H o w then does the s c e p t i c b r i n g h e r intellect to a standstill? W e c a n n o t force the s c a l e s o f j u d g e m e n t to b a l a n c e , i n so tar as we c a n not m a k e o u r s e l v e s feel that b o t h sides have e q u a l r a t i o n a l force i f they d o n o t s e e m to. O f c o u r s e o n e c a n p r e t e n d to f i n d s o m e t h i n g c o n v i n c i n g j u s t as o n e c a n force the scales to b a l a n c e b y p u s h i n g d o w n o n one side; but this d o e s not m e a n the objects w e i g h the s a m e , a n d the p e r s o n w i t h h e r finger o n the s c a l e m u s t k n o w this. S o epochs is b r o u g h t a b o u t in the s c e p t i c a s the effect ot her a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a c t i c e . Sextus indicates this c a u s a l relation b y m e a n s of a v a r i e t y of p a s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s : b e c a u s e o f e q u i p o l l e n c e , the sceptic is brought to, e n d s u p i n , or is f o r c e d to a r r i v e at epochs. b e c a u s e o f e q u i p o l l e n c e , epochs

4

Similarly:

is brought about, is i n t r o d u c e d , or

follows l o r the s c e p t i c / O n the o t h e r h a n d , Sextus s o m e t i m e s indicates the necessity o i s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t w i t h a n active c o n s t r u c t i o n : b e c a u s e ot the s c e p t i c s i n a b i l i t y to d e c i d e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s , o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c c o u n t s , it is n e c e s s a r y to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . * S o m e o f these a s s e r t i o n s are clearly n o r m a t i v e : o n e m u s t , or s h o u l d s u s p e n d judgement. S o w h i c h is it? A f t e r b e c o m i n g a w a r e of the e q u i p o l l e n c e o l o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s , does the s c e p t i c t h e n d e c i d e that the r e a s o n able t h i n g to d o is s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ? O r does b e c o m i n g a w a r e o f e q u i p o l l e n c e s i m p l y e l i m i n a t e all i n c l i n a t i o n to believe o n e w a y or the other, a n d h e n c e b r i n g about epochs w i t h o u t the s c e p t i c d o i n g a n y t h i n g (else) to h e l p it a l o n g ? W e c a n n o t opt for b o t h s i n c e they are i n c o m p a t i b l e , at least in the f o l l o w i n g s e n s e . E i t h e r the s c e p t i c first m a k e s the n o r m a t i v e j u d g e m e n t that s h e s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t before a r r i v i n g at

epochs,

or not. S i m i l a r l y , either s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t a r i s e s i m m e d i a t e l y t r o m h e r p r o d u c t i o n ot e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g , o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s or it r e q u i r e s a l s o a n o r m a t i v e j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h a t o n e s h o u l d d o i n s u c h a case. I f the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t is c o r r e c t , the sceptic s u s p e n d s j u d g e ment i n accordance with a general principle:

128

5 E X T U S £ hi PI h EC US

[I]

It is irrational

or i r r e s p o n s i b l e to believe e i t h e r of t w o

contradictory

p r o p o s i t i o n s that o n e f i n d s e q u a l l y c o n -

vincing.

W h e n c o n f r o n t i n g e q u i p o l l e n c e , it is still p o s s i b l e to opt l o r o n e or the o t h e r s i d e . P e r h a p s a s W i l l i a m James ( [ 1 8 9 7 ] 1979)

suggests

i n " T h e W i l l to Believe", w e m a y assent i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s o m e n o n - r a t i o n a l i n c l i n a t i o n w h e n r e a s o n c a n n o t settle the matter. A n d m o r e p r o s a i c a l l y , m a n y p e o p l e believe in t h i n g s s u c h as a n after!ile o w i n g to n o n - r a t i o n a l factors s u c h a s w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g , e v e n w h e n the a r g u m e n t s o n e i t h e r s i d e o i the m a t t e r are i n c o n c l u s i v e . B u t b e c a u s e she e n d o r s e s [ I ] , a n d b e c a u s e s h e t h i n k s o n e s h o u l d not d o w h a t is i r r a t i o n a l o r i r r e s p o n s i b l e , the s c e p t i c w i l l t h i n k that she s h o u l d not opt for e i t h e r s i d e . W h e t h e r or not she c o n s c i o u s l y s

decides to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h [I], e a c h t i m e she does so is g o v e r n e d by h e r a c c e p t a nee o f this g e n e r a l policy. She m a y still, o n o c c a s i o n , violate the p o l i c y , j u s t as w e a l l s e e m able to act c o n t r a r y to o u r c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n s . B u t o n r e f l e c t i o n she w i l l t h i n k that s h e s h o u l d not believe either o f two c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n s that she finds e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g . O n the other h a n d , it the c a s u a l a c c o u n t is correct, epochs is s i m p l y w h a t h a p p e n s to the s c e p t i c w h e n she e n c o u n t e r s e q u i p o l l e n t a r g u ments. I n that case, the sceptic has n o n e e d o f [ I ] , just as I have n o n e e d of n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s to digest m y l u n c h ; getting f o o d into m y s t o m ach is sufficient ( a s s u m i n g e v e r y t h i n g is w o r k i n g p r o p e r l y ) . I n place of [I] the causa] a c c o u n t offers a d e s c r i p t i o n of the sceptical d i s p o s i t i o n :

[D]

T h e sceptic s disposition

inclines her away from believing

e i t h e r of t w o c o n t r a d i c t o r y

p r o p o s i t i o n s that she finds

equally c o n v i n c i n g .

W h e r e [1] c o n t a i n s a g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e , [ D ] is a n o n - n o r m a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of a v e r y s p e c i f i c sort of p e r s o n ; [ D ] says n o t h i n g about w h a t y o u or I s h o u l d d o , o r e v e n about w h a t the sceptic s h o u l d d o . L a c k i n g a n y i n c l i n a t i o n to b e l i e v e , she s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t ; there is n o t h i n g to tip the s c a l e s o n e w a y o r the other.

129

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

C h o o s i n g b e t w e e n these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s is c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t tor t h e o v e r a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S e x t u s P y r r h o n i s m , for they i n v o l v e 1

d r a m a t i c a l l y different attitudes t o w a r d s r e a s o n . O n the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t , the s c e p t i c s h a r e s w i t h the d o g m a t i s t a c o m m i t m e n t to [ I ] . T h e y are i n v o l v e d i n the s a m e project of s e e k i n g the truth by e x a m i n ing a n d assessing arguments a n d evidence. T h e y will also agree on the c l o s e l y related p r i n c i p l e : [R]

It is rational

a n d r e s p o n s i b l e to believe a p r o p o s i t i o n that

o n e f i n d s c o n v i n c i n g ( i f it is s u f f i c i e n t l y s u p p o r t e d by reason a n d evidence). T h e y o n l y d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h e t h e r a n y c a n d i d a t e s are sufficiently s u p p o r t e d by r e a s o n a n d e v i d e n c e . O n t h e c a u s a l a c c o u n t , t h e s c e p t i c starts o u t c o m m i t t e d to b o t h [I] a n d [ R ] , b u t i n h e r c o n v e r s i o n to s c e p t i c i s m s h e leaves these b e h i n d a l o n g w i t h all the o t h e r d o g m a t i c beliets she m a y h a v e h e l d . After d e v e l o p i n g the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n , she n o longer has any belief a b o u t w h a t r e a s o n d e m a n d s , o r w h a t she s h o u l d d o i n v i r tue ot b e i n g a r a t i o n a l agent. T h i s s c e p t i c is n o l o n g e r e n g a g e d i n the s a m e project that s h e s t a r t e d out w i t h ; s h e is agnostic not o n l y w i t h respect to t h e positive c l a i m s m a d e by d o g m a t i s t s but also w i t h respect to w h e t h e r there are a n y n o r m a t i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s i m p l i c i t i n the use of r e a s o n .

Sceptical e n q u i r y T h e m a i n p o i n t i n f a v o u r o f the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t is that it s u p p o r t s t h e v i e w o f t h e s c e p t i c as a n o p e n - m i n d e d e n q u i r e r . I n o r d e r tor a n y o n e to s i n c e r e l y h o p e to find the t r u t h , s h e m u s t be w i l l i n g , at least i n p r i n c i p l e , to b e l i e v e w h a t r e a s o n establishes. I f s h e is not w i l l i n g to act in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h [ R ] , t h e n it s e e m s s h e is not w i l l i n g to follow w h e r e r e a s o n l e a d s , a n d h a s f o r e c l o s e d o n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s u c c e s s f u l e n d to t h e p u r s u i t o f t r u t h . I n that case, h e r s c e p t i c i s m a p p e a r s to c o l l a p s e i n t o negative d o g m a t i s m .

130

S E X T U S £ hi P l h t e n s

I i so, the c a u s a l a c c o u n t is m i s t a k e n , s i n c e S e x t u s i n s i s t s o n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s c e p t i c i s m a n d d o g m a t i s m , w h e t h e r p o s i t i v e or negative. H e o p e n s the Outlines

of Pyrrhonism

b y r e m a r k i n g that an

i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l e n d in o n e o f t w o w a y s : a d i s c o v e r y o f the t r u t h or a d e n i a l that t h e t r u t h c a n be f o u n d . O t h e r w i s e , the i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e (PH

1 . 1 - 4 ) , A r i s t o t l e , E p i c u r u s a n d the Stoics

are d o g m a t i s t s s i n c e they t h i n k they have d i s c o v e r e d the t r u t h . F o r e x a m p l e , h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d that t h e r e is n o t h i n g but a t o m s a n d the v o i d , E p i c u r u s n o l o n g e r n e e d s to investigate that p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t : he w o u l d not go l o o k i n g for w h a t he h a s a l r e a d y f o u n d . H e m a y go o n to investigate o t h e r matters, but this w i l l not m a k e h i m partsceptic s i n c e he w i l l rely o n the t r u t h s a l r e a d y d i s c o v e r e d i n s e e k i n g to e x p a n d h i s k n o w l e d g e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , all e n q u i r y m u s t a p p e a r futile to t h o s e w h o have d e t e r m i n e d that the t r u t h c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d ; y o u w o u l d not go l o o k i n g tor w h a t y o u have d e c i d e d c a n n o t be l o u n d . T h e negatively d o g m a t i c A c a d e m i c s , for e x a m p l e , have d e t e r m i n e d that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e . A l t h o u g h this is not a fair d e s c r i p t i o n o l C a r n e a d e s (as we h a v e s e e n in C h a p t e r 4 ), it does c l a r i f y Sextus* view. I n c o n t r a s t to b o t h t y p e s of d o g m a t i s m , t h e s c e p t i c has n e i t h e r d i s c o v e r e d the t r u t h n o r f o u n d that it c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d , so she c o n t i n u e s to investigate (PH

1.2). A n d i n fact, Sextus leans o n the e t y m o l o g y of the G r e e k

t e r m skeptike,

p o i n t i n g out that s c e p t i c i s m is so n a m e d f r o m its a c t i v -

ity i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g a n d e n q u i r i n g (skeptesthai;

PH

1.7).

It we u n d e r s t a n d this i n v e s t i g a t i o n as a c o n t i n u a t i o n of h e r o r i g i n a l , p r e - s c e p t i c a l project o f t r y i n g to b e c o m e t r a n q u i l b y m e a n s of d i s c o v e r i n g the t r u t h , t h e n she w i l l c o n t i n u e to a c c e p t [I] a n d [ R ] . But there is n o c o m p e l l i n g reason to s u p p o s e that h e r project r e m a i n s the s a m e after h e r s c e p t i c a l c o n v e r s i o n . O n the c o n t r a r y , there are b o t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d textual r e a s o n s to s u p p o s e that it u n d e r g o e s a r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , like the s c e p t i c h e r s e l i . I n that case, we w i l l n e e d to see h o w S e x t u s c a n p r e s e r v e the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s c e p t i c i s m a n d negative d o g m a t i s m , a n d we w i l l n e e d to c l a r i f y the k i n d of i n v e s t i g a t i o n the m a t u r e s c e p t i c is e n g a g e d i n . H i e first t i m e she s t u m b l e s o n t r a n q u i l l i t y b y b r i n g i n g h e r intellect to a s t a n d s t i l l m u s t be quite a s u r p r i s e . B u t as she repeats the

1.11

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

e x p e r i e n c e it w i l l c o m e to s e e m quite o r d i n a r y . She w i l l c o m e to expect that t r a n q u i l l i t y f o l l o w s epocfie,

a n d to e x p e c t that

epocfie

follows e q u i p o l l e n c e . E a c h r e p e t i t i o n of the cycle o f e q u i p o l l e n c e epoc/ie-tranquillity will reinforce her sceptical disposition [ D ] , At s o m e p o i n t i n this p r o c e s s she w i l l realize that she has n o g o o d r e a s o n to m a i n t a i n h e r o r i g i n a l e x p e c t a t i o n that t r a n q u i l l i t y a r i s e s f r o m rationally r e s o l v i n g the d i s p u t e d issue, s o she w i l l n o longer have the s a m e m o t i v a t i o n to accept ( I ] o r [ R ] , F o r all she k n o w s , d i s c o v e r i n g the truth m i g h t p r o d u c e tranquillity, or it m i g h t p r o d u c e greater d i s t u r b a n c e . N e v e r h a v i n g d i s c o v e r e d the t r u t h , she is u n a b l e to predict or e x p e c t a n y p a r t i c u l a r o u t c o m e , T h e m o r e expert s h e b e c o m e s at b a l a n c i n g c o m p e t i n g a c c o u n t s the m o r e u n l i k e l y it is that she w i l l e v e r d i s c o v e r t h e t r u t h . I n fact, Sextus e v e n envisages t h e possibility' ot a d o g m a t i s t p r e s e n t i n g a n a r g u m e n t that the s c e p t i c c a n n o t refute. H i s a d v i c e is to r e s p o n d i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y : B e f o r e t h e f o u n d e r of t h e s c h o o l to w h i c h y o u a d h e r e w a s b o r n , the a r g u m e n t o f the s c h o o l , w h i c h is n o d o u b t s o u n d , was n o t yet apparent, a l t h o u g h it w a s really there i n nature. I n the s a m e way, it is p o s s i b l e that the a r g u m e n t o p p o s i n g the one y o u have j u s t p r o p o u n d e d is really there i n nature but is n o t yet a p p a r e n t to u s ; so w e s h o u l d not yet assent to w h a t is n o w t h o u g h t to be a p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t .

[PH

1.34J

S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , s o m e o n e presents y o u w i t h a c o m p e l l i n g v e r s i o n of the p r o b l e m o f e v i l . A s a result, y o u are s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e d to 5

t h i n k that a G o d m e e t i n g the J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s not, and i n fact c a n n o t , exist, A fallible A c a d e m i c w h o is c o m m i t t e d to f o l l o w i n g the n o r m a t i v e r u l e s [I] a n d [R] w i l l tentatively e n d o r s e a t h e i s m w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g that s o m e t h e i s t i c a r g u m e n t s m a y e v e n tually p r e v a i l . E v e n if it is d i s t u r b i n g to t h i n k that he could b e w r o n g , there is n o i n c e n t i v e tor the fallibilist to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . I n fact, it w o u l d be d o w n r i g h t d i s h o n e s t to d o so. T h i s s i t u a t i o n is q u i t e different for the s c e p t i c . H e r i n a b i l i t y to articulate a n effective c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t right n o w d o e s not o v e r r i d e

132

5 E X T U S £ ht PI h EC US

her s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e x t u s a d v i c e , she w i l l 1

say that for all w e k n o w there is s o m e p o w e r f u l t h e o d i c y that c o u l d n e u t r a l i z e the force ot the p r o b l e m of e v i l , or that s u c h a n a r g u m e n t is a w a i t i n g " d i s c o v e r y " T h e m a t u r e s c e p t i c has a l w a y s , or n e a r l y a l w a y s , f o u n d the a r g u m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to a c h i e v e e q u i p o l l e n c e o n the issues she has e x a m i n e d so tar. S o it w o u l d be r a s h a n d precipitous to e n d o r s e s o m e v i e w j u s t b e c a u s e it has not yet b e e n refuted. I n this s i t u a t i o n , t h e s c e p t i c is not i n p o s s e s s i o n o l the c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g a r g u m e n t , a n d yet she s o m e h o w p r e v e n t s the s c a l e s of j u d g e m e n t f r o m t i p p i n g . W h a t , t h e n , is d o i n g the w o r k o l the m i s s i n g a r g u m e n t ? II t h e s c e p t i c a c t u a l l y finds the v i e w in q u e s t i o n c o n v i n c i n g a n d still does n o t assent, the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t c o u l d e x p l a i n the situation t h i s w a y : the sceptic m u s t d e c i d e w h e t h e r o r not to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ; a n d w h e n there is n o c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g a r g u m e n t , s h e w i l l still believe that she s h o u l d not assent. T h i s a m o u n t s to a n i m p o r t a n t e x p a n s i o n o f the n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e :

[I*]

It is i r r a t i o n a l a n d i r r e s p o n s i b l e to believe a n y p r o p o s i t i o n as l o n g as it is p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a n e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t against it,

S i n c e it has, s o far, a l w a y s b e e n p o s s i b l e for the s c e p t i c to c o n s t r u c t an e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t

for a n y v i e w , [I*"] s h o u l d

lead h e r to t h i n k that it w i l l a l w a y s be i r r a t i o n a l a n d i r r e s p o n s i b l e to believe a n y p r o p o s i t i o n . I f so, her c o m m i t m e n t to [I*], a l o n g w i t h a w e l l - h o n e d s c e p t i c a l talent for p r o d u c i n g e q u i p o l l e n c e , m a k e it e x c e e d i n g l y u n l i k e l y that any v i e w w i l l ever be sufficiently s u p p o r t e d by r e a s o n a n d e v i d e n c e . I n that case, t h e n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t ot S e x tus' p r o m i s s o r y note (PH

1.34) leaves t h e s c e p t i c u n a b l e to s i n c e r e l y

e x p e c t that she w i l l ever d i s c o v e r the t r u t h . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the c a u s a l a c c o u n t c a n e x p l a i n S e x t u s ' p r o m i s s o r y note by m a k i n g a p a r a l l e l m o d i f i c a t i o n : [D*]

T h e s c e p t i c s d i s p o s i t i o n i n c l i n e s her a w a y h o r n b e l i e v i n g any p r o p o s i t i o n as l o n g as it is p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a n e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t against it.

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O n t h i s v i e w , not o n l y h a s she b e c o m e h a b i t u a t e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t w h e n the a r g u m e n t s are equally b a l a n c e d , s h e is n o t e v e n i n c l i n e d to a c c e p t v i e w s that are c u r r e n t l y u n o p p o s e d . B e c a u s e of her e x p e r i e n c e , the m e r e p o s s i b i l i t y ot a c o n v i n c i n g c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t is e n o u g h to b a l a n c e the scales of j u d g e m e n t . A n d ( a g a i n ) s i n c e she has so far a l w a y s b e e n able to c o n s t r u c t a n equally c o n v i n c i n g c o u n ter- a r g u m e n t for a n y v i e w , the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n has the effect o l l e a v i n g her u n m o v e d by a n y r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . She h a s d e v e l o p e d a n attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n that is r a d i c a l l y different f r o m the one she s t a r t e d out w i t h . A m a j o r advantage of the c a u s a l , o r d i s p o s i t i o n a l , a c c o u n t is that it p r o v i d e s a m u c h better d e f e n c e against the c h a r g e of negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e [ I * ] c o m m i t s the s c e p t i c to a n e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y h i g h s t a n d a r d o i j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t given the s c e p t i c s p a s s i o n for a r g u i n g against any a n d e v e r y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theory, s u c h a c o m m i t m e n t is s u s p i c i o u s at best, s e l l - r e f u t i n g at w o r s t . If, i n a p p l y i n g her s c e p t i c a l skill, she c o n s t r u c t s e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s for a n d against [ I * ] , a d h e r i n g to this p r i n c i p l e w o u l d r e q u i r e h e r to reject it. B y contrast, a t t r i b u t i n g the d i s p o s i t i o n [ D * ] to the sceptic involves a t t r i b u t i n g n o beliefs, a n d h e n c e p r e s e r v e s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s c e p t i c i s m a n d negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e c a u s a l a c c o u n t a l s o fits n i c e l y w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n Sextus d r a w s b e t w e e n the P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c a n d A r c e s i l a u s , I n o t h e r regards their s c e p t i c a l v i e w s are v i r t u a l l y the s a m e but A r c e s i l a u s says that p a r t i c u l a r s u s p e n s i o n s ot j u d g e m e n t are g o o d a n d p a r t i c u l a r assents b a d (PH 1.232). I n o t h e r w o r d s , A r c e s i l a u s t h i n k s we s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a n d w e s h o u l d not a s s e n t . T h e P y r r h o n ist, b y c o n t r a s t , m a k e s n o s u c h e v a l u a t i v e or n o r m a t i v e j u d g e m e n t about s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t (see PH 1.196 a n d C h a p t e r 3), F u r t h e r m o r e , i n s o m e passages Sextus indicates that the s c e p tic d o e s i n fact a i m at a c q u i r i n g a n d p r e s e r v i n g t r a n q u i l l i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , he says that the s c e p t i c w i l l s t u d y n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , n o t for the sake of m a k i n g f i r m a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t s c i e n t i f i c matters, but " i n o r d e r to be able to o p p o s e to e v e r y a c c o u n t a n e q u a l a c c o u n t , a n d tor the s a k e ot t r a n q u i l i t y " (PH

1.18). So the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s c i -

entific issues is a matter ot c o l l e c t i n g m a t e r i a l a n d d e v e l o p i n g t h e

13-1

S E X T I T S £ hi P l h t C H S

sceptical ability to p r o d u c e e q u i p o l l e n c e . Similarly, w h e n e x p l a i n i n g the a i m (telos) of s c e p t i c i s m , he r e m a r k s : " U p to n o w w e s a y the a i m of t h e S c e p t i c is t r a n q u i l i t y i n matters of o p i n i o n a n d m o d e r a t i o n of feeling in matters f o r c e d u p o n u s " (PH

1.25; s e e a l s o 1.30). W e

s h o u l d not t a k e this s c e p t i c a l teios to be the s o r t o f n o r m a t i v e goal e s t a b l i s h e d by a d o g m a t i c ethical theory. It is rather a d e s c r i p t i o n of the o u t c o m e o f t h e s c e p t i c s p r a c t i c e ; at least so far, s u c h p r a c t i c e , i n Sextus' e x p e r i e n c e , has e n d e d i n epochs a n d t r a n q u i l l i t y ( H a n k i n s o n 1997b). A n d finally, t h e s c e p t i c s i n a b i l i t y to e v e r d i s c o v e r the t r u t h is o n l y a p r o b l e m if w e s u p p o s e that the m a t u r e s c e p t i c s e n q u i r y is a i m e d at t r u t h . S e x t u s never e x p l i c i t l y says that it is despite the fact that a n u m b e r o f passages c a n be r e a d that w a y (see e s p e c i a l l y PH 1 . 3 , 2 . 1 1 ; P a l m e r 2 0 0 0 ) . W h e n w e f i n d , for e x a m p l e , that the sceptic has not up to now d i s c o v e r e d a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h (PH 3.70; see 2 . 5 3 ) , w e d o not n e e d to s u p p o s e that s h e s i n c e r e l y e x p e c t s to s o m e d a y f i n d it. W i t h regard to the d i s c o v e r y of t r u t h , she n o longer has a n y e x p e c t a t i o n o n e w a y o r the other. G r a n t e d , e n q u i r y i n t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e , is n a t u r a l l y a i m e d at r e v e a l i n g the t r u t h . B u t the s c e p t i c is not e n g a g e d i n an o r d i n a r y e n q u i r y after h e r c o n v e r s i o n . W h a t the s c e p t i c investigates:

is not what is apparent, b u t w h a t is s a i d a b o u t w h a t is a p p a r ent - a n d this is different f r o m investigating what is a p p a r e n t itself. F o r e x a m p l e , it a p p e a r s to us that h o n e y sweetens ( w e c o n c e d e this i n a s m u c h a s w e are s w e e t e n e d i n a p e r c e p t u a l w a y ) ; b u t w h e t h e r (as far as the a r g u m e n t goes)-" ! it j a c t u 1

s

ally s w e e t is s o m e t h i n g w e investigate - a n d this is not w h a t is a p p a r e n t but s o m e t h i n g s a i d a b o u t w h a t is apparent. (PH

1.19-20)

Before her s u r p r i s i n g d i s c o v e r y about h o w to a c h i e v e tranquillity, the sceptic is engaged in t h e p u r s u i t of t r u t h [PH 1.12, 1.26). She w a n t s to f i n d out about the t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , n o t w h a t is s a i d a b o u t t h o s e t h i n g s . S h e w a n t s to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r or not a b e n e v o l e n t G o d exists, not m e r e l y w h a t c a n be s a i d about the e x i s t e n c e o f G o d .

135

ANCIENT

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T h e s e m a y s e e m to be i n s e p a r a b l e . W h y , after a l l , w o u l d one investigate w h a t is s a i d about the existence of G o d if not for the s a k e o l d e t e r m i n i n g the truth about w h e t h e r G o d exists? C i c e r o , for e x a m p l e , s e e k s out a r g u m e n t s p r o a n d c o n for the s a k e of m a k i n g the m o s t i n f o r m e d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h e r e the t r u t h lies. S i m i l a r l y , w h e n S o c r a t e s e x a m i n e s the beliefs of h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s , he w a n t s to d i s c o v e r the truth by means of d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r they k n o w the t r u t h . I n S o c r a t e s ' case, h i s s e c o n d - o r d e r e n q u i r y into w h a t people say a n d believe about v i r t u e is still a i m e d at r e v e a l i n g the first-order t r u t h about v i r t u e . W h a t the m a t u r e s c e p t i c w a n t s to d i s c o v e r , h o w e v e r , is n o t the truth about x

t

but rather w h a t t h e o r i e s a n d a r g u m e n t s h a v e b e e n

p r o p o s e d r e g a r d i n g x, a n d h o w they are s u p p o s e d to e s t a b l i s h their c o n c l u s i o n s . Before h e r c o n v e r s i o n , h e r e n q u i r y w a s a i m e d at d i s c o v e r i n g the t r u t h a n d w a s g u i d e d by s u c h n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s as [I] a n d [ R ] , A f t e r h e r c o n v e r s i o n , h e r e n q u i r y takes o n this s e c o n d o r d e r nature a n d is n o longer g o v e r n e d b y a n y n o r m a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; as a matter of h a b i t a n d d i s p o s i t i o n , she c o n t i n u e s to s e e k out w h a t is s a i d o n all s i d e s o f d i s p u t e d issues. A n d a s a matter o f h a b i t a n d d i s p o s i t i o n , her e n q u i r y leaves h e r i n a t r a n q u i l state o l epoche. T h e m a t u r e sceptic's i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s p r o a n d c o n v a r i o u s i s s u e s w i l l a p p e a r i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the investigation o f s o m e o n e w h o a c c e p t s n o r m a t i v e rules g o v e r n i n g e n q u i r y . T h e single, c r u c i a l difference is i n their attitudes towards these rules. ( I n C h a p t e r 9 we w i l l f i n d a s i m i l a r difference b e t w e e n the sceptical a n d d o g m a t i c attitudes t o w a r d s c u l t u r a l , e t h i c a l a n d religious p r a c t i c e s . )

Therapeutic scepticism a n d Sextus' diagnosis T h e s c e p t i c s d i s t i n c t i v e attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n is illustrated b y the s e l f - r e f u t i n g nature o f the attempt to r a t i o n a l l y establish that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s

(see B u r n y e a t 1976J. D o g m a t i s t s s e i z e o n

this p e c u l i a r feature i n the f o l l o w i n g a n t i - s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t 2.185):

136

(PH

S E X T U S £ ht PI h EC US

(1)

I f a n a r g u m e n t establishes its c o n c l u s i o n , then (at least o n e ) d e m o n s t r a t i o n exists.

(2}

T h e s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h e s that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s or it d o e s not.

(3)

II it d o e s not, t h e n the a r g u m e n t h a s not s h o w n there are no demonstrations,

(4)

I f it d o e s e s t a b l i s h its c o n c l u s i o n , t h e n b y ( 1 ), d e m o n s t r a t i o n exists.

So it is s e l l - r e f u t i n g to r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h that t h e r e are n o d e m o n strations. II w e f u r t h e r s u p p o s e that o n e c a n n o t i n fact a c c o m p l i s h s u c h a task, the sceptic w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y fail i n h e r attempt. S i m i l a r l y , one c a n n o t coherently

say in a l o u d a n d clear v o i c e , " I ' m not s p e a k i n g

right now". T h e fact that w e c a n utter these w o r d s d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h that w e c a n c o m m u n i c a t e a n y t h i n g m e a n i n g f u l , or at least c o h e r e n t , by m a k i n g these n o i s e s . Sextus r e s p o n d s by c l a i m i n g that the s c e p t i c finds n o a r g u m e n t s probative, not e v e n the o n e that is s u p p o s e d to e s t a b l i s h that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . S o the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o h e r e n t l y e s t a b l i s h i n g that t h e r e are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s is not a p r o b l e m . B y a c h i e v i n g e q u i p o l l e n c e o n the issue, the s c e p t i c w i l l not be i n c l i n e d to a c c e p t either side. B u t this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h , a n d i n d e e d r e q u i r e s , that e a c h s i d e a p p e a r e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g or p l a u s i b l e . T h e s c e p t i c a l project w i l l o n l y be s e l l - r e f u t i n g i f t h e s c e p t i c s e e k s to p r o v e that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . B u t she d o e s not; she does not s e e k to r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h a n y t h i n g , a n d n o r is she b o u n d by a n y n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t of t r u t h . H e r u s e o f r e a s o n has, so far, o n l y led to e q u i p o l l e n c e ,

epochs

a n d t r a n q u i l i t y . T h e s c e p t i c s e e k s to p u r g e b y m e a n s o f r e a s o n the d o g m a t i c a s s u m p t i o n that the p r o p e r use o l r e a s o n reveals the t r u t h (see PH 1 . 2 0 ) . T h i s is s u g g e s t e d by S e x t u s ' e v o c a t i v e m e t a p h o r s :

. . . there are m a n y t h i n g s that put t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e s a m e c o n d i t i o n as they put o t h e r t h i n g s . F o r e x a m p l e , j u s t as fire after c o n s u m i n g the w o o d d e s t r o y s itself a s w e l l , a n d j u s t as purgatives after d r i v i n g the fluids o u t ot b o d i e s e l i m i n a t e

137

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

t h e m s e l v e s a s w e l l , so t o o the a r g u m e n t against d e m o n s t r a t i o n , after d o i n g a w a y w i t h all d e m o n s t r a t i o n , c a n c a n c e l itself as w e l l . A n d a g a i n , just as it is not i m p o s s i b l e l o r the p e r s o n w h o has c l i m b e d t o a h i g h place by a l a d d e r to k n o c k o v e r the l a d d e r w i t h h i s foot after h i s c l i m b , s o too it is not u n l i k e l y that the sceptic, h a v i n g got to the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o l h i s task b y a sort o f s t e p - l a d d e r - the a r g u m e n t s h o w i n g that there is n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n - s h o u l d d o a w a y w i t h this a r g u m e n t . {M 8 . 4 8 0 - 8 1 ; see a l s o PH 2.188,1.206;

D L 9.76;

PraepEv.

14.18.21)

Sextus is h a p p y to a p p l y h i s negative c o n c l u s i o n s to t h e m s e l v e s , j u s t as h e is w i l l i n g to say that the p h r a s e " n o t h i n g is t r u e " applies to itself as w e l l (PH 2 . 1 8 8 ) . B u t i n that case, w h a t is S e x t u s s a y i n g ? A r e we left w i t h a s c e p t i c a l idiot a b s u r d l y p r o c l a i m i n g that he i s not s p e a k i n g right n o w ? T h i s d e p r e s s i n g a s s e s s m e n t is e a s i l y a v o i d e d . O n m a n y

occa-

s i o n s , Sextus a r g u e s dialectically, r e l y i n g not o n l y o n h i s d o g m a t i c opponents

1

beliefs as p r e m i s e s , but a l s o o n their c o m m i t m e n t

to

n o r m a t i v e , r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . L i k e A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , the P y r r h o n i s t s i m p l y h o l d s h i s o p p o n e n t s to their o w n r a t i o n a l s t a n d ards in o r d e r to s h o w h o w far s h o r t their beliefs fall. S u c h d i a l e c t i cal a r g u m e n t s , i n t h e i r p u r e f o r m , r e q u i r e n o s u b s t a n t i v e or l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s o n the part of the sceptic. O n o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , Sextus s e e m s to insert h i s o w n p r e m i s e s a n d to s p e a k i n h i s o w n voice. But all of these p r o p o s i t i o n s m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h the c r u c i a l q u a l i f y i n g d i s c l a i m e r set out at the b e g i n n i n g of the Outlines:

" B y w a y of preface let u s say that o n n o n e

of the matters to be d i s c u s s e d d o we a f f i r m that t h i n g s c e r t a i n l y are j u s t as w e say they are: rather, we report d e s c r i p t i v e l y o n e a c h item a c c o r d i n g to h o w it a p p e a r s to us at the t i m e " ( P f f 1.4). S i m i l a r l y , Sextus e x p l a i n s that w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d the s c e p t i c s u s e of s u c h characteristic p h r a s e s as " s o m e object or state of affairs is no more this than that" as a r e p o r t o n the w a y he is affected, that is, as a n e x p r e s s i o n of h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r to h i m at that m o m e n t {PH see also PH

138

1.15,

1.187-191;

1.135, 1,193, 1 . 1 9 7 - 1 9 3 , 1.200). T h i s applies to

S E X T U S £ hi P l h t C H S

the sceptic's a w a r e n e s s ot t h e e q u i p o l l e n c e o i o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s . " W h e t h e r they are e q u a l , w e d o not a f f i r m : w e s a y w h a t a p p e a r s to us about t h e m , w h e n t h e y m a k e a n i m p r e s s i o n o n u s " (PH 1.196). T h e sceptic w i l l o n l y report d e s c r i p t i v e l y o n h o w the a r g u m e n t s affect her. She w i l l say n o t h i n g about h o w t h e y s h o u l d affect her, or h o w they s h o u l d affect others. I n this way, reason is s t r i p p e d of the i m p e r s o n a l , n o r m a t i v e force that w e t y p i c a l l y attribute to it (see C h a p t e r 9 for m o r e o n t h e s c e p t i c s r e l i a n c e o n a p p e a r a n c e s ) , F o r e x a m p l e , i f it s e e m s to a d o g m a t i s t that t h e p r o b l e m of evil is a g o o d r e a s o n to be a n atheist, he w i l l h o l d that it is a g o o d r e a s o n for a n y o n e to be a n atheist. R e g a r d l e s s o l w h e t h e r or not a n y o n e finds t h e a r g u m e n t r a t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l i n g , he w i l l h o l d that e v e r y o n e should. By c o n t r a s t , w h e n i n t r o d u c i n g t h e s c e p t i c a l m o d e s , Sextus insists that he is a f f i r m i n g n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r n u m b e r or about t h e i r force: they m a y b e u n s o u n d , a n d there m a y be m o r e than t h e o n e s he d e s c r i b e s (PH

1.35), T h e c o n t e x t m a k e s it clear that he d o e s not

i n t e n d a s p e c i f i c a l l y l o g i c a l s e n s e o f s o u n d n e s s . H e is not s u g g e s t i n g that the m o d e s m a y be i n v a l i d , or that t h e i r p r e m i s e s m a y be false, but r a t h e r that they m a y be i m p o t e n t , they m a y a p p e a r to s o m e to be u n s o u n d . A s to w h e t h e r they are u n s o u n d i n s o m e o b j e c t i v e s e n s e he w i l l have n o o p i n i o n . H e is s i m p l y a c k n o w l e d g i n g that different a r g u m e n t s affect p e o p l e differently, S e x t u s ' c o n c e r n for s u c h v a r i a b i l i t y is best e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s of his t h e r a p e u t i c a n d p h i l a n t h r o p i c a g e n d a . I n the c o n c l u s i o n to the Outlines,

he w r i t e s :

S c e p t i c s are p h i l a n t h r o p i c a n d w i s h to c u r e b y a r g u m e n t , as far a s t h e y c a n , the c o n c e i t a n d r a s h n e s s of the D o g m a t i s t s , lust a s d o c t o r s for b o d i l y afflictions have r e m e d i e s w h i c h differ i n potency, a n d apply severe r e m e d i e s to patients w h o are severely afflicted a n d m i l d e r r e m e d i e s to those m i l d l y afflicted, so S c e p t i c s p r o p o u n d a r g u m e n t s w h i c h differ i n strength - they e m p l o y w e i g h t y a r g u m e n t s , capable o f v i g o r o u s l y r e b u t t i n g t h e d o g m a t i c affliction ot conceit, against those w h o are d i s t r e s s e d b y a s e v e r e r a s h n e s s , a n d they

L39

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

e m p l o y m i l d e r a r g u m e n t s against those w h o are afflicted by a c o n c e i t w h i c h is s u p e r f i c i a l a n d e a s i l y c u r e d a n d w h i c h c a n be rebutted by a m i l d e r degree o f plausibility. T h i s is w h y those w i t h a S c e p t i c a l i m p u l s e d o not hesitate s o m e t i m e s to p r o p o u n d a r g u m e n t s w h i c h are s o m e t i m e s w e i g h t y i n their plausibility, a n d s o m e t i m e s a p p a r e n t l y r a t h e r w e a k . T h e y d o this deliberately, s i n c e often a w e a k e r a r g u m e n t is sufficient for t h e m to a c h i e v e their p u r p o s e .

(PH 3 . 2 8 0 - 8 1 )

H e r e the s c e p t i c s p u r p o s e is c l e a r l y not the d i s c o v e r y of t r u t h , but r a t h e r the a l l e v i a t i o n o f d i s t u r b a n c e b r o u g h t a b o u t b y d o g m a t i c inclinations.

11

B u t i f a b a l a n c e d diet of o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s is the

p r e s c r i p t i o n that leads u s to t r a n q u i l l i t y , w h a t is the d i a g n o s i s ? W h a t is the c a u s e o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e ? Sextus t h i n k s that s o m e d i s t u r b a n c e s are avoidable a n d others are u n a v o i d a b l e . A s a n i m a l s w e are subject to the u n a v o i d a b l e k i n d : h u n g e r , thirst, s e x u a l urges a n d so o n (PH 3 . 1 8 3 ) . S e n s a t i o n s are not all pleasant. B u t a s a n i m a l s w e h a v e a n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n to r e m o v e d i s t u r b a n c e s w h e n e v e r a n d w h e r e v e r they a r i s e . I n c o m b a t i n g a lofty Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of r e a s o n , S e x t u s a p p e a l s to the abilities o l the h u m b l e d o g . H e points o u t that dogs not o n l y r e m o v e

thorns

f r o m their p a w s but a l s o clean their w o u n d s , favour i n j u r e d legs i n k e e p i n g w i t h g o o d H i p p o c r a t i c practice a n d , b y e a t i n g grass a n d v o m i t i n g , relieve a n upset s t o m a c h . T h u s the d o g attains w h a t the Stoic C h r y s i p p u s w o u l d (allegedly} have to a d m i t a s the p e r f e c t i o n of r e a s o n i n c h o o s i n g w h a t is appropriate a n d a v o i d i n g w h a t is d i s t u r b i n g (PH 1 . 7 0 - 7 1 , 1.238). I n this regard, w e are n o different f r o m the o t h e r a n i m a l s : w e too n a t u r a l l y seek to e l i m i n a t e d i s t u r b a n c e s . U n l i k e t h e o t h e r a n i m a l s , h o w e v e r , w e are s u b j e c t t o a h o s t o f u n n e c e s s a r y d i s t u r b a n c e s . T h e s e arise f r o m b e l i e v i n g that s o m e t h i n g is by nature g o o d or b a d , a p p r o priate o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e (PH 1 . 2 9 - 3 0 , 3 . 2 3 6 - 8 ; M 1 1 . 1 1 8 , 1 4 5 - 6 , 1 5 8 ) . F o r s o m e t h i n g to be by nature g o o d m e a n s , a s w e s a w i n C h a p t e r 6, that it is i n v a r i a b l y a n d really so, despite the w a y it m a y appear. I I s o m e t h i n g is g o o d b y nature, d o g m a t i s t s believe, t h e n it is g o o d for e v e r y o n e , at a n y t i m e a n d i n a n y c i r c u m s t a n c e .

140


H a v i n g j u d g e d that m o n e y is b y n a t u r e g o o d , I will teel a s t r o n g i m p u l s e t o w a r d s a c q u i r i n g it. I w i l l teel j u s t as s t r o n g l y about a v o i d i n g p o v e r t y i n so far as I j u d g e it to be b y nature b a d . If I a m poor, I w i l l be d i s t u r b e d by m y poverty. S e e k i n g to e l i m i n a t e this d i s t u r b a n c e 1 w i l l i n t e n s e l y p u r s u e m o n e y . I f I fail to get it, I w i l l be e v e n m o r e d i s t u r b e d by m y poverty. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if I d o get it, I w i l l t h e n live i n fear ot l o s i n g it. S o b e c o m i n g r i c h does not put a n e n d to the d i s t u r b a n c e : it m e r e l y shifts the f o c u s . By s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t about w h a t is really g o o d a n d b a d , the sceptic n e i t h e r p u r s u e s n o r a v o i d s a n y t h i n g intensely. N e v e r t h e l e s s , he is n o t c o m p l e t e l y free t r o m d i s t u r b a n c e . T h e s c e p t i c s

method

is o n l y effective against the " d i s t o r t i o n s o f r e a s o n " a n d " w o r t h l e s s opinion", that is, against v o l u n t a r y m o t i o n s of the m i n d (Af 11.148). T h e a i m o l the s c e p t i c is to be t r a n q u i l in matters o f o p i n i o n a n d to be o n l y m o d e r a t e l y affected b y matters that are forced u p o n h i m (PH 1.30). So he w i l l still suffer f r o m h u n g e r , thirst a n d c o l d , but he w i l l not believe these are b a d . T o d o so m e r e l y m a k e s the d i s t u r b a n c e m o r e severe. W e n a t u r a l l y strive to r i d o u r s e l v e s o f i n v o l u n t a r y d i s t u r b a n c e s , j u s t as a d o g r e m o v e s a t h o r n f r o m its paw. T h e belief that s u c h d i s t u r b a n c e is b a d a d d s n o t h i n g to the effort to be r i d ot it but o n l y m a k e s matters w o r s e (Af 11.158).

Stoic d i s t u r b a n c e s So far the d i a g n o s i s o n l y s e e m s to i m p l i c a t e a s m a l l c a t e g o r y of beliefs: t h o s e that l e a d to i n t e n s e p u r s u i t or a v o i d a n c e . T h e Stoics w o u l d agree, p o i n t i n g out that the r e a s o n s u c h beliefs are d i s t u r b i n g is that the g o o d a n d h a d t h i n g s p u r s u e d a n d a v o i d e d are not w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l , a n d are not i n fact g e n u i n e l y g o o d or b a d . D e s p i t e o u r best efforts, we m a y suffer t r o m hunger, thirst, c o l d , p o v e r t y a n d so o n . T h e t r a n q u i l l i t y of the Stoic sage, h o w e v e r , is as f i r m a n d i n v i o lable as p o s s i b l e . H e is i m m u n e f r o m the w h i m s o f fortune. But t h i s t r a n q u i l l i t y is not the result of s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . Q u i t e the c o n t r a r y , it is ( i n p a r t ) the result of a n irrefutable c o n v i c t i o n that v i r t u e is the o n l y g e n u i n e g o o d , a n d that u n l i k e the

1U

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

apparent g o o d s of f o r t u n e , it is entirely w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l . T h e Stoic sage c a l m l y a n d c o n f i d e n t l y p u r s u e s a p p a r e n t l y g o o d t h i n g s s u c h as w e a l t h a n d health a n d a v o i d s the a p p a r e n t l y b a d o n e s s u c h a s p a i n and poverty, but a l w a y s w i t h the full r e a l i z a t i o n that they are not g e n u i n e l y g o o d or b a d ; the sages p u r s u i t a n d a v o i d a n c e is n e v e r i n t e n s e . H i s k n o w l e d g e that virtue lies e n t i r e l y w i t h h i m s e l f a n d is the o n l y g e n u i n e g o o d p r o d u c e s a state ot p e r m a n e n t t r a n q u i l l i t y . " Yet Sextus t h i n k s that the S t o i c , like a n y o n e else w h o believes s o m e t h i n g is g o o d or b a d b y nature, w i l l suffer u n n e c e s s a r y d i s t u r b a n c e s . T o substitute v i r t u e for the g o o d s o f fortune d o e s not r e m o v e d i s t u r b a n c e , but rather rearranges it: . . . the p h i l o s o p h e r s r e a s o n i n g p r o d u c e s o n e disease i n place of a n o t h e r , s i n c e i n t u r n i n g a w a y the p e r s o n w h o is s t r i v i n g for w e a l t h or g l o r y or h e a l t h as s o m e t h i n g g o o d

towards

p u r s u i n g . . . v i r t u e , he does not free h i m f r o m p u r s u i t , but transfers h i m to a n o t h e r p u r s u i t .

(Af 11.135 [Bett 1 9 9 7 ] )

T h i s is a i m e d not at the i d e a l Stoic sage, but rather at the flesh a n d b l o o d Stoic w h o has not yet attained v i r t u e . L a c k i n g v i r t u e , he w i l l feel c o m p e l l e d to intensely p u r s u e it. A n d he s h o u l d c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f m i s e r a b l e as l o n g as he l a c k s it. T h e c l a i m that v i r t u e is entirely w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l w i l l n o t , or at least s h o u l d not, alleviate h i s d i s t u r b a n c e as l o n g a s he l a c k s this g o o d . T h e Stoics a r g u e that the p r o p e r r e s p o n s e to the r e c o g n i t i o n o f vice is not to b e c o m e d i s t u r b e d a n d d e s p o n d e n t , but rather to r e d o u ble o n e s efforts to attain v i r t u e . B e s i d e s , the Stoics m a i n t a i n that m e n t a l d i s t u r b a n c e c a n o n l y a r i s e w i t h o u r p e r m i s s i o n . S o we m a y a d m i t that we lack the o n l y t h i n g w o r t h h a v i n g a n d set a b o u t t r y i n g to get it w h i l e r e m a i n i n g t r a n q u i l ( W h i t e 1995). But the Stoics a l s o m a i n t a i n that t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s are r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d a n d not m e r e l y a r b i t r a r y preferences. A n d this p r o v i d e s a n o p e n i n g for the sceptic. Sextus r e m a r k s , " A s for those w h o say that g o o d t h i n g s c a n n o t be lost, w e shall b r i n g t h e m to s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g m e n t as a result of the i m p a s s e a r i s i n g f r o m d i s p u t e " (PH

112

3 . 2 3 8 ) . T h e sceptic a c c o m p l i s h e s this b y p r o d u c i n g

SEXTUS

EMPIRtCUS

o p p o s i n g a r g u m e n t s that a p p e a r equally c o n v i n c i n g . T h e Stoic w i l l then be at a loss as to w h a t to believe. H i s f o r m e r p r e f e r e n c e for S t o i c i s m w i l l a p p e a r a r b i t r a r y , a n d h i s i n a b i l i t y to r a t i o n a l l y resolve the p u z z l e as to w h e t h e r g o o d t h i n g s c a n be lost w i l l result in d i s t u r bance. H e m u s t e i t h e r t r y to o v e r c o m e the d i s t u r b a n c e b y f i n d i n g a n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , n o n - a r b i t r a r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s S t o i c i s m , or j o i n the s c e p t i c i n s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . T h e o n l y route to c o n t i n u o u s t r a n q u i l l i t y is to s u s p e n d j u d g e ment

not

merely about

all e v a l u a t i v e matters,

but also

about

w h e t h e r reason is capable of p r o d u c i n g a g o o d life b y s t o c k i n g o u r m i n d s w i t h t r u e b e l i e f s . If, h o w e v e r , the real life Stoic n e v e r d i s covers that h i s preference is m e r e l y a r b i t r a r y ( a s s u m i n g it i s ) , he w i l l n e v e r leel d i s t r e s s e d at v i o l a t i n g h i s o w n c o m m i t m e n t to r e a s o n . T h i s u n d e t e c t e d d e l u s i o n , it s e e m s , w i l l s e r v e j u s t as well a s the s c e p t i c a l s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t i n p r o d u c i n g tranquillity. N e v ertheless, d e l u s i o n a l t r a n q u i l l i t y is a fragile a n d c o n t i n g e n t affair. A n d i n a n y case, there is n o t h i n g a d m i r a b l e about r e f u s i n g to put o n e s beliefs to the test, w h i l e s u p p o s i n g n o n e t h e l e s s that they are rationally justified.

The disturbance of non-evaluative beliefs Not all o f o u r beliefs s e e m to i n s p i r e p u r s u i t or a v o i d a n c e : for e x a m ple, that s e v e n t e e n i s a p r i m e n u m b e r , or that m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y of m y p e r c e p t i o n . I m a g i n e a m o d e s t l y fallihle A c a d e m i c w h o e x a m i n e s the a r g u m e n t s tor a n d against the existence of m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e . L e t us s u p p o s e he d e c i d e s to tentatively a c c e p t the m o r e c o n v i n c i n g c o n c l u s i o n w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g h i s investigations. B e l i e v i n g in the e x i s t e n c e ( o r n o n - e x i s t e n c e ) ot m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y not affect the w a y the w o r l d a p p e a r s . P r e s u m a b l y m y d e s k w i l l a p p e a r as s o l i d to o n e c o n v i n c e d by B e r k e l e y ' s idealist v i e w of s u b s t a n c e as to o n e c o n v i n c e d b y Locke's realist view. B o t h o f t h e m w i l l use the d e s k i n the s a m e way. T a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r beliefs a n d attitudes, b e l i e l s about m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y have n o p r a c t i c a l effect at a l l . So if s u c h beliefs have n o i m p a c t o n

1 13

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

w h a t we p u r s u e a n d a v o i d , w h y s h o u l d we t h i n k a c c e p t i n g t h e m w i l l produce any disturbance? 1

1

W e m u s t note first that s u c h beliefs are the p r o d u c t of the p u r s u i t of t r u t h . A n d e v e n i f w e d o not t h i n k there is a n y p r a c t i c a l v a l u e i n d e t e r m i n i n g the t r u t h of s o m e matters, we m u s t a l s o s u p p o s e that the t r u t h - s e e k e r sees some v a l u e in it. H e w i l l p r o b a b l y see truth as i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e , a n d thus w o r t h a c q u i r i n g regardless of the c o n s e q u e n c e s . I n that case, the d o g m a t i c t r u t h - s e e k e r is s u b j e c t to d i s t u r b a n c e w h e n e v e r he a c k n o w l e d g e s that h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n falls s h o r t . F o r t h i s w i l l a m o u n t to a n a d m i s s i o n that w h i l e he m i g h t be i n p o s s e s s i o n of an i n t r i n s i c g o o d , he m i g h t not be, W h a t , t h e n , about the dogmatist w h o a c k n o w l e d g e s the i m p e r f e c t i o n s in h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f s o m e belief but r e m a i n s t r a n q u i l ? W e m a y e v e n i m a g i n e that h i s greatest j o y lies i n debate w i t h o t h e r d o g m a tists, a n d that he o c c a s i o n a l l y c h a n g e s his v i e w s o n t h i n g s , a p p r o v i n g first o n e v i e w as m o r e t r u t h - l i k e , t h e n another. L a c k i n g w h a t he sees as i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d is s u p p o s e d to be d i s t u r b i n g , a n d yet it is quite easy to i m a g i n e cases i n w h i c h it is not. T o take this as a n o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that S e x t u s

1

diagnosis

is m e a n t to reveal s o m e p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r u t h s about h u m a n n a t u r e . T h i s is c l e a r l y not the spirit i n w h i c h he offers h i s therapy. I n s t e a d , we s h o u l d take h i s d i a g n o s i s as a descriptive report of his past e x p e r i e n c e . It s e e m s to h i m that s o m e h a v e suffered f r o m the intense p u r s u i t s a n d a v o i d a n c e s i n s p i r e d by d o g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t s a n d e v e n b y the v e r y p u r s u i t of t r u t h . W h e t h e r this p u r s u i t m a n i f e s t s itself i n evaluative or n o n - e v a l u a t i v e beliefs, the g o o d that is s o u g h t , k n o w l e d g e , is e l u s i v e . S i n c e the satisfaction of this d e s i r e d o e s not s e e m to be w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l , it s e e m s to l e a d to f r u s t r a t i o n a n d d i s t u r b a n c e , A p r i m e e x a m p l e of this is S e x t u s ' r e m a r k that " G e o m e t e r s are b u r d e n e d w i t h n o s m a l l d i s t u r b a n c e w i t h regard to the existence or c o n c e i v a b i l i t y of a line h a v i n g length w i t h o u t b r e a d t h " ( A i 3.57; see A i 8 . 1 3 0 ) . I f t h i s is the object they w i s h to i n s t r u c t u s a b o u t , a n d i f t h e y h a v e n o clear c o n c e p t i o n o f it, t h e n t h e y w i l l n o t be able to t e a c h u s a n y t h i n g about it. Sextus' o b j e c t i o n is s i m p l y that we c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of l e n g t h w i t h out b r e a d t h . H i s p o i n t is that the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of a line, w h e t h e r

1H


o n a c h a l k b o a r d o r i n someone's t h o u g h t s , p r e s u p p o s e s b r e a d t h . Sextus believes n e i t h e r this n o r the geometer's c o n t r a d i c t o r y c l a i m ; n o r does he believe it is i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d to resolve the issue. S o he w i l l n o t be t r o u b l e d . T h e g e o m e t e r , by c o n t r a s t , w i l l feel c o m p e l l e d to p u r s u e a r e s o l u t i o n ; i n a d d i t i o n to the i n t r i n s i c g o o d at s t a k e , he m a y a l s o sutler f r o m the m o r e m u n d a n e w o r r y that h e is a f r a u d , or that h i s l i v e l i h o o d is at stake. L a c k i n g s u c h beliefs, the sceptic has no worries. T o s u m u p S e x t u s ' d i a g n o s i s : the s o u r c e of p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e is ( s e e m s to be) the e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c b e l i e ! that the p r o p e r use of r e a s o n w i l l l e a d to the t r u t h , a n d that the r e s u l t i n g i m p r o v e m e n t i n o u r beliefs is s o m e h o w i n s t r u m e n t a l to o u r w e l l b e i n g . T h u s w h e n c o n f r o n t e d w i t h c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s that we feel we m u s t resolve, w e are d r i v e n to a t r o u b l i n g a n d intense p u r s u i t . E v e n those w h o are m o t i v a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y by d i s i n t e r e s t e d curiosityare v u l n e r a b l e to d i s t u r b a n c e in so far as they d e e m the o b j e c t of their e n q u i r y to be g e n u i n e l y good. F o r as they e n q u i r e they m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e that they l a c k w h a t they believe to be g o o d , a n d after they c o n v i n c e t h e m s e l v e s that they have o b t a i n e d it, t h e y m u s t a d m i t that t h e i r a r g u m e n t a n d e v i d e n c e m a y e v e n t u a l l y be o v e r t u r n e d .

C o n c l u s i o n : the c o n s i s t e n c y o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m Sextus d e s c r i b e s the P y r r h o n i s t not a s o n e w h o a d h e r e s to c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t i v e beliefs, as a Stoic o r E p i c u r e a n w o u l d , but rather one w h o lives i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the g e n e r a l a c c o u n t o f S c e p t i c i s m ( P H 1 . 1 6 - 1 7 J - I h a v e a r g u e d that t h i s a c c o u n t is p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e , a n d r e q u i r e s us to u n d e r s t a n d the c o n v e r s i o n to S c e p t i c i s m as i n v o l v i n g the a d o p t i o n o l a v e r y different project a l o n g w i t h a r a d i c a l l y different attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n . T h e m a t u r e s c e p t i c s h e d s her o r i g i n a l b e l i e f that the w a y to t r a n q u i l l i t y i s to r a t i o n a l l y resolve the t r o u b l i n g issues. A f t e r d e v e l o p i n g the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n , she n o l o n g e r has a n y e x p e c t a t i o n s or b e l i e l s a b o u t the potential benefits o f t r u t h o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g it b y m e a n s o f r e a s o n . A n d w i t h the r a d i c a l r e v i s i o n of h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , s h e n o longer leels that h e r

1 i?

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

use of r e a s o n is g o v e r n e d b y the n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s s h e o r i g i n a l l y a d h e r e d to, a l t h o u g h h e r b e h a v i o u r m a y still a p p e a r to be i n c o n f o r m i t y to t h e m . I f w e u n d e r s t a n d s c e p t i c i s m as a n activity or set o l practices a i m e d at r e l i e v i n g d o g m a t i c d i s t u r b a n c e , t h e n we c a n see h o w m i s p l a c e d the c h a r g e o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y is. It is s i m p l y a c a t e g o r y m i s t a k e to a c c u s e a practice o l i n c o n s i s t e n c y . Just a s it is n e i t h e r

consistent

n o r i n c o n s i s t e n t to r i d e a b i c y c l e , the p r a c t i c e o f s c e p t i c i s m , i n so tar as it is s o m e t h i n g the s c e p t i c does, c a n be n e i t h e r c o n s i s t e n t n o r i n c o n s i s t e n t , a l t h o u g h it c a n be either effective or ineffective, s k i l f u l or c l u m s y . T h e charge o f s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n is m o r e difficult. I have briefly i n d i cated h o w S e x t u s deals w i t h t h i s i n a r g u i n g that t h e r e are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . W e shall r e t u r n to the i s s u e o f w h e t h e r he c a n s u s t a i n h i s p e c u l i a r attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n . B u t first, i n C h a p t e r 8, we shall c o n s i d e r the s c e p t i c s a r g u m e n t s i n o r d e r to better u n d e r s t a n d the tools w i t h w h i c h Sextus w o u l d p h i l a n t h r o p i c a l l y relieve us of o u r beliefs. I f we s u p p o s e that these a r g u m e n t s are effective, we m a y t h e n c o n s i d e r two final q u e s t i o n s about P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . I n C h a p t e r 9, we shall e x a m i n e h o w the sceptic is able to p r a c t i s e sceptic i s m w i t h o u t beliefs, a n d h o w s h e is able to engage i n the o r d i n a r y b u s i n e s s of life w i t h o u t beliefs.

146

EIGHT

Pyrrhonian arguments

I n this c h a p t e r I h o p e to s h o w that e v e n i f w e are u n i n t e r e s t e d i n the p r o s p e c t s o f t r a n q u i l l i t y , P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m c o n t i n u e s to provide a n important, a n d perhaps insurmountable, challenge. For 1

this c h a l l e n g e to take effect, o n e m u s t s i m p l y accept that a n a r b i t r a r y preference is not a r a t i o n a l b a s i s l o r belief, a n d that w e have s o m e s o r t o f o b l i g a t i o n as r a t i o n a l agents to j u s t i f y o u r beliefs. I f the sceptic c a n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y b l o c k all o f o u r attempts at j u s t i f i c a t i o n , we w i l l be left in the t r o u b l i n g p o s i t i o n o l b e l i e v i n g that w e o u g h t to d o w h a t w e c a n n o t ?

T h e five m o d e s A s w e s a w i n C h a p t e r 6, the m o d e s are t h e S c e p t i c s tools; they are a r g u m e n t f o r m s that m a y b e e m p l o y e d against a w i d e v a r i e t y of c l a i m s . A f t e r p r e s e n t i n g A e n e s i d e m u s ' ten m o d e s , S e x t u s t u r n s to a n o t h e r set of five that he d e s c r i b e s as the p r o p e r t y of " m o r e recent S c e p t i c s " (PH

1.164; see 1 . 3 6 ) .

W h a t all routes to epochs o n e t h i n g to a n o t h e r {PH

3

h a v e i n c o m m o n is that they o p p o s e

1.31): for e x a m p l e , t h e a p p e a r a n c e that

the tower a p p e a r s r o u n d w i t h the a p p e a r a n c e that t h e t o w e r a p p e a r s s q u a r e , or the a r g u m e n t that p r o v i d e n c e exists w i t h the a r g u m e n t

117

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

that p r o v i d e n c e d o e s not exist, T h e o n l y l o g i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t is that the o p p o s e d p r o p o s i t i o n s m u s t be c o n t r a r i e s : they c a n n o t b o t h be true, but they m a y b o t h be false. A s l o n g as they are c o n t r a r i e s , there w i l l be a p r o b l e m l o r the p r o p o n e n t of either s i d e : he c a n n o t a c c e p t that b o t h are true, s o he m u s t e x p l a i n o r j u s t i f y h i s preference. T h e sceptic w i l l t h e n a p p l y a m o d e o r c o m b i n a t i o n o l m o d e s to s h o w this preference is u l t i m a t e l y a r b i t r a r y a n d thus not r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i fied.

D i s p u t e , r e l a t i v i t y a n d t h e sceptic's d i a l e c t i c a l s t r a t e g y T h e first ot the five m o d e s p r o c e e d s by c i t i n g a d i s p u t e o r d i s a g r e e m e n t that has not b e e n d e c i d e d (PH typically uses, aisepikritos,

1,165), T h e adjective Sextus

is a m b i g u o u s : it c o u l d m e a n either u n d e -

c i d e d o r u n d e c i d a b l e . T o d e c i d e a d i s p u t e m e a n s to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h side is r i g h t , o r at least m o r e j u s t i f i e d a n d h e n c e m o r e likely to be right. But S e x t u s does n o t m e a n that c e r t a i n disputes are i m p o s s i b l e to resolve. I f that w e r e the case, it w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e to settle the matter, a n d Sextus w o u l d b e a negative d o g m a t i s t . W h a t he m e a n s is that t h e issue h a s not i n fact b e e n r e s o l v e d to the satisfaction of all interested parties; o t h e r w i s e there w o u l d be n o d i s a g r e e m e n t to s p e a k o l . S o the s c e p t i c w i l l s a y that s u c h d i s p u t e s have p r o v e d u n d e c i d a b l e u n t i l n o w - they are c u r r e n t l y u n d e c i d e d - b u t he w i l l not s a y that t h e y a r e i n p r i n c i p l e u n d e c i d a b l e . H i s s c e p t i c a l ability to a c h i e v e e q u i p o l l e n c e w i l l prevent h i m f r o m e v e r j u d g i n g a n issue, even t h e i s s u e about w h e t h e r s o m e d i s p u t e m i g h t be r e s o l v e d i n the future, T h e t h i r d o f the five m o d e s is relativity (PH 1.167). A l t h o u g h it plays a c e n t r a l role a m o n g A e n e s i d e m u s ' ten m o d e s , p r o v i d i n g the general f o r m for the rest, h e r e it a p p e a r s to be m o r e of a n a d j u n c t to the m o d e d e r i v i n g f r o m d i s p u t e , T h e n o t i o n that e v e r y t h i n g is relative (i.e. a p p e a r s relative) p r o v i d e s a n e a s y f o r m u l a for o p p o s i n g one t h i n g to a n o t h e r t h e r e b y g e n e r a t i n g a d i s a g r e e m e n t . I n a n a l o g y w i t h the first m o d e , w e s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d this as a n u n d e c i d e d relativity.

i

a

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

But w h y s h o u l d I w o r r y i f I have not b e e n able to p e r s u a d e t h o s e w h o disagree w i t h m e ? I f 1 h a d g r a n t e d that the d i s p u t e has n o t yet b e e n r e s o l v e d , I w o u l d have to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , B u t I d o not n e e d to grant this. I m i g h t insist that I have r e s o l v e d the d i s p u t e to m y o w n s a t i s f a c t i o n , a n d that adequate r e s o l u t i o n d o e s not require u n i v e r s a l agreement, M y v i e w m a y still be t h e right o n e e v e n ii it is d i s p u t e d . N o t e v e r y o n e is e q u a l l y w i l i n g or able to f o l l o w c o m p l i cated a r g u m e n t s . S o it is n o s u r p r i s e that not e v e r y o n e s h a r e s m y correct v i e w o l t h i n g s , T h i s r e s p o n s e w i l l s e e m c o n s i d e r a b l y less a r r o g a n t o n c e I present m y d e f e n c e . F o r t h e n it w i l l n o longer s e e m to be a matter of preferr i n g m y beliefs just b e c a u s e they are m i n e . But the sceptic is p r e p a r e d to rebut any p o s s i b l e defence, S u p p o s e I believe that p r o v i d e n c e exists, that is, that t h e w o r l d is g o v e r n e d b y the w i s d o m o f the gods (see ND 2,76). S u p p o s e also that I a m a w a r e that s o m e p e o p l e d i s a gree w i t h m e . W h a t e v e r I a d v a n c e i n s u p p o r t of m y b e l i e ! will be the subject o f a n u n d e c i d e d d i s p u t e , I f I s a y that the u n i v e r s e e x h i b i t s a h i g h degree of o r d e r l i n e s s , I w i l l also have to a d m i t that s o m e believe the o r d e r l i n e s s w e see is the e x c e p t i o n a n d not the r u l e , or that this o r d e r l i n e s s n e e d not be the p r o d u c t of d i v i n e p r o v i d e n c e . A n d if I cite the a u t h o r i t y of s c r i p t u r e as e v i d e n c e I w i l l have to a d m i t that s o m e believe s c r i p t u r e is not a u t h o r i t a t i v e . W h a t e v e r r e a s o n I give for m y b e l i e f w i l l itself be s u b j e c t to d i s p u t e . A n d I w i l l h a v e to p r o v i d e yet a n o t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n this w a y the sceptic w i l l d r i v e m e to a n infinite regress, c l a i m i n g that I have failed to j u s t i f y m y view. W e s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h i s s e c o n d m o d e in greater d e t a i l i n t h e next s e c t i o n . F o r n o w , note that the regress is g e n e r a t e d b y m y d e s i r e to s h o w that m y b e l i e f is n e i t h e r arrogant n o r arbitrary. T h e s c e p t i c is n o t r e s p o n s i b l e for the regress. U n l i k e t h e persistent c h i l d w h o keeps a s k i n g w h y , the sceptic s c h a l lenge a r i s e s f r o m the dogmatist's o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d r a t i o n a l a g e n c y : the s c e p t i c o n l y reflects the dogmatist's e p i s t e m i c ambitions, A s l o n g as I c o n t i n u e to see myself as this sort o f r a t i o n a l agent, I w i l l have to t r y to put a n e n d to the regress. B u t t h e r e a p p e a r to be o n l y t w o o p t i o n s . F i r s t , I m a y assert that s o m e belief is s e l f - e v i d e n t l y

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

true a n d needs n o o t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e s c e p t i c w i l l t h e n a p p l y the fourth m o d e f r o m h y p o t h e s i s a n d argue that this is n o better t h a n a n a r b i t r a r y a s s e r t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , I m a y c l a i m that the r e a s o n s I have cited m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t o n e another. S o e v e r y r e a s o n I have a d v a n c e d is j u s t i f i e d by s o m e other r e a s o n 1 h a v e a d v a n c e d . T h e s c e p t i c w i l l c o u n t e r t h i s w i t h the fifth, r e c i p r o c a l m o d e , a n d argue that c i r c u l a r reasoning provides n o justification. S o we have a b r i e l s k e t c h of the g e n e r a l s c e p t i c a l strategy. T h e d o g m a t i s t asserts h i s b e l i e f P. T h e sceptic p o i n t s out that

others

e n d o r s e s o m e l o g i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e c l a i m P* or they assert that it t

o n l y a p p e a r s P i n s i t u a t i o n S, but P" in s o m e o t h e r s i t u a t i o n S". F o r e x a m p l e , I m i g h t assert m y belief that w e a l t h is the greatest g o o d . S o m e o n e else m i g h t assert that the greatest g o o d is h e a l t h o r that it o n l y a p p e a r s to b e w e a l t h w h e n o n e is healthy, w h i l e it a p p e a r s to be h e a l t h w h e n one is i l l . A s a r a t i o n a l agent, the d o g m a t i s t is c o m p e l l e d to e x p l a i n w h y he h a s d e c i d e d i n favour o l P, that is, he m u s t j u s t i f y h i s belief. T h i s l e a d s to a t r i l e m m a : h i s belief is h e l d o n the b a s i s o f a n infinite s e r i e s ot r e a s o n s , a n a r b i t r a r y h y p o t h e s i s or c i r c u l a r r e a s o n i n g (PH

1 . 1 6 6 - 9 ) . A c c o r d i n g to Sextus, each o f

these three l e a d to s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t (see F i g u r e 4 ) . W e shall consider them in turn.

Infinite regress T h e r e is n o t h i n g n e c e s s a r i l y p r o b l e m a t i c about the n o t i o n of a p o t e n tial infinity. W e c a n a l w a y s i m a g i n e m a k i n g a f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n o f s o m e t h i n g or a f u r t h e r a d d i t i o n to it, T h e p r o b l e m arises w h e n , as in the c a s e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , we n e e d to c o m p l e t e the task. S e x t u s p r e s e n t s a n o n - e p i s t e m i c v e r s i o n o f this p r o b l e m in r e p o r t i n g a n a r g u m e n t against the reality o f m o t i o n : I f a n y t h i n g is m o v e d , it is m o v e d e i t h e r by itself or b y s o m e t h i n g else. I f b y s o m e t h i n g else, t h e n s i n c e w h a t p r o d u c e s m o t i o n acts a n d w h a t a c t s is m o v e d , that item too w i l l n e e d s o m e t h i n g e l s e to m o v e it, a n d the s e c o n d a t h i r d , a n d so ad

I?'i

PiRRHONlAN

DISPUTE

RELATIVITY

Some assert P,

[1 appears P in situation S,

others assert P*

ARGUMENTS

It appears P* in situation S* —^

Undecided -

f —'

Decided: There is some reason (Q) to prct'er P to P*

' 1 DISPUTE Some assert Q, others assert Q"

INFINITE

HYPOTHESIS

RECIPROCITY

REGRESS

(MERE ASSERTION)

(CIRCULARITY)

Figure 4. T h e five m o d e i : a general sceptical stralegy [PH 1.164-77,2.19-20).

LSI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

infinitum,

s o that the m o t i o n c o m e s to have n o b e g i n n i n g

- w h i c h is a b s u r d . N o t e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h is m o v e d , t h e r e fore, is m o v e d by s o m e t h i n g else. N o r b y i t s e l f . . . (PH

3.67; s e e A f 10.76)

T h e a b s u r d i t y is the n o t i o n that the effects of s o m e p r o c e s s o c c u r w i t h o u t the relevant c a u s e h a v i n g o c c u r r e d to get t h i n g s g o i n g . II there is not a first step i n the p r o c e s s , it has not s t a r t e d . A n d if it has not started it c a n n o t be c o m p l e t e d , But p e r h a p s there d o e s not really h a v e to be a first c a u s e . I f the u n i verse is e t e r n a l , m o t i o n w i l l j u s t be a brute fact, a feature of the w a y t h i n g s are. T h e r e w i l l be n o first c a u s e of m o t i o n b e c a u s e objects i n the u n i v e r s e h a v e a l w a y s b e e n i n m o t i o n . So a n y i n s t a n c e o f m o t i o n that y o u care to n a m e w i l l have a p r e c e d i n g c a u s e . N o i n s t a n c e o f m o t i o n l a c k s a n i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g c a u s e , a n d yet there is n o first c a u s e . It w i l l be futile to seek a first c a u s e of m o t i o n b e c a u s e it does not exist. B u t c l e a r l y t h i n g s are, a n d a l w a y s h a v e b e e n , i n m o t i o n , W h a t e v e r Sextus m i g h t say about this c o s m o l o g i c a l possibility, he w o u l d not accept it i n the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t . H e typically s u m s up h i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s m o d e b y r e m a r k i n g that it is impossible

to

p r o v e infinitely m a n y p r o p o s i t i o n s , to g r a s p a n infinite n u m b e r o l d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , to m a k e infinitely m a n y d e c i s i o n s o r j u d g e m e n t s a n d so o n . We s i m p l y d o not have the t i m e . T h e c o s m o l o g i c a l p r o m i s s o r y note is u n a c c e p t a b l e w h e n s e e k i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . E v e n if I a m able to p r o v i d e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for any r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d b e l i e f in the i n f i n i t e regress, l a m not able to p r o v i d e every j u s t i f i c a t i o n . So, w h i l e we c a n a d m i t that the infinite series is p o t e n t i a l l y j u s t i f i e d , it d o e s not follow that it is a c t u a l l y j u s t i f i e d . F o r e x a m p l e , i n o r d e r to a c t u a l l y d e c i d e b e t w e e n c o n t r a r y appearances, one:

w i l l n e e d a n o t h e r a p p e a r a n c e i n t u r n to j u d g e this s e c o n d a p p e a r a n c e , a n d a n o t h e r to j u d g e that, a n d so ad

infini-

tum. B u t it is i m p o s s i b l e to m a k e infinitely m a n y d e c i s i o n s . T h e r e f o r e it is i m p o s s i b l e to d i s c o v e r w h i c h a p p e a r a n c e s one m u s t use as s t a n d a r d s a n d w h i c h not.

152

(PH

2.78)

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

T h e c r u c i a l p o i n t is that before m y b e l i e f P e a n be j u s t i f i e d , all of the p r e c e d i n g beliefs o n w h i c h it d e p e n d s m u s t t h e m s e l v e s be j u s t i f i e d . T h e defender of the p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s m i s t a k e n l y a s s u m e s that the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f s o m e r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d b e l i e ! d e p e n d s o n l y o n its predecessor. A s l o n g a s there is e v e n o n e a c t u a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d belief i n the series, we c a n n o t c o u n t the final b e l i e f j u s t i f i e d . So i n o r d e r tor a series o f b e l i e t s to p r o d u c e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , it m u s t b e finite, that is, t h e r e m u s t be a first, a s s u m i n g the s e r i e s is not c i r c u l a r . H o w , t h e n , d o e s the m o d e d e r i v i n g f r o m infinite r e g r e s s i o n l e a d to the s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g e m e n t ? S i n c e f e w w o u l d rest their j u s t i fication o n a n i n f i n i t e regress i n the first p l a c e , this m o d e is m o s t c o m m o n l y u s e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the h y p o t h e t i c a l a n d r e c i p r o cal m o d e s . S o for the m o s t part, r e v e a l i n g the u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a n J

infinite regress b l o c k s a l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e r o u t e to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . L i k e e v e r y o t h e r s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t , it a i m s to u n d e r m i n e the d o g m a t i s t s c o n f i d e n c e by b a l a n c i n g o p p o s i n g r e a s o n s i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e equipollence.

Hypothesis O n e t e m p t i n g w a y to put a n e n d to the regress is to set s o m e t h i n g d o w n as true, c l a i m i n g it needs n o f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C o n t e m p o r a r y e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s call s u c h beliefs f o u n d a t i o n a l or basic, a n d s o m e d e s c r i b e t h e m as s e l f - e v i d e n t . A h y p o t h e s i s is, a n d s h o u l d be, a c c e p t e d as t r u e w i t h o u t a n y d e m o n s t r a t i o n ot its t r u t h . S e x t u s ' o b j e c t i o n is o b v i o u s ; " i f they c a n be t r u s t e d o n the basis o f a bare a s s e r t i o n , the p e o p l e viho

say the o p p o s i t e c a n a l s o be

t r u s t w o r t h y w h e n they b r i n g f o r w a r d their e q u a l l y s t r o n g a s s e r t i o n " (Af 8 . 4 3 6 ) . T h e e q u a l s t r e n g t h is a m a t t e r o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the p r o p o n e n t s of h y p o t h e s i s H are j u s t as c o n v i n c e d as p r o p o n e n t s o f a l o g i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e h y p o t h e s i s H*. T h e s c e p t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d w i l l a c k n o w l e d g e the i n t u i t i v e force o f b o t h H a n d F P ; he w i l l see w h y s o m e o n e m i g h t f i n d either h y p o t h e s i s c o m p e l l i n g . T h i s w i l l lead h i m to e q u i p o l l e n c e a n d the s u s p e n s i o n of judgement,

153

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

T h e p r o p o n e n t o f H, h o w e v e r , w i l l not c o n c e d e that H* is e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g . H e m a y i n s i s t that in o r d e r l o r s o m e t h i n g to be selfevident ly true it d o e s n o t h a v e to be s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t r u e for e v e r y o n e . A g a i n , the d o g m a t i s t w i l l not be i m p r e s s e d b y d i s a g r e e m e n t .

He

m i g h t i n v o k e Aristotle's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is better k n o w n to us a n d w h a t is better k n o w n b y nature, o r w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n (Met,

1.1, l S 4 a l 6 - 2 l ) .

5

T h e idea is that the w o r l d is intelligible to

us b e c a u s e of the k i n d s of a n i m a l s w e are. H o w e v e r , it is not i m m e diately intelligible. It d o e s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y reveal its order, p a t t e r n or s t r u c t u r e , or g e n e r a l l y w h y it is the w a y it i s . B u t it d o e s reveal itself to t h o s e w h o are p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d a n d i n the right p h y s i c a l a n d intellectual c o n d i t i o n ( c o m p a r e [ A ' ] I r o m C h a p t e r 6 ) . A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s the t h i n g s better k n o w n b y nature are p r i m a r y features of the w o r l d . T h e y e x p l a i n w h y t h i n g s are the w a y they are, but they a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s e x p l a i n e d in t u r n . So e v e n t h o u g h we c a n o n l y a r r i v e at k n o w l e d g e o f these first p r i n c i p l e s by s t a r t i n g w i t h w h a t is m o r e f a m i l i a r o r better k n o w n to u s , they are not j u s t i f i e d or e x p l a i n e d by a p p e a l i n g to a n y t h i n g else. C r u c i a l l y , they are not f r i v o l o u s or a r b i t r a r y a s s e r t i o n s . In this s e n s e the d o g m a t i s t

does

h a v e a r e a s o n to p r e f e r h i s first p r i n c i p l e s to w h a t others m i g h t set d o w n h y p o t h e t i c a l l y . B u t he is still u n a b l e to p r o v i d e a n y e x t e r n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the t r u t h of h i s h y p o t h e s e s . S u c h p r i n c i p l e s w i l l o n l y a p p e a r c o m p e l l i n g to those w h o h a v e b e e n p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d . A Platonist c o u l d tell a s i m i l a r story, e x p l a i n i n g w h y o n l y s o m e people are able to g r a s p c e r t a i n basic t r u t h s that n e e d n o f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H e w i l l c l a i m that s t a t e m e n t s about F o r m s o n l y s e e m a r b i t r a r y to those w h o have not a c q u i r e d the P l a t o n i c d i s c i p l i n e . A g a i n , the p o i n t is that d i s a g r e e m e n t about s e l l - e v i d e n t l y true p r o p o s i t i o n s n e e d not cause one to a b a n d o n what a p p e a r s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y true. Sextus d o e s not e x p l i c i t l y a d d r e s s this type o l reply, but it is easy e n o u g h to see w h a t he c o u l d say. F i r s t , the n o t i o n o l what is better k n o w n by nature, like the n o t i o n of P l a t o n i c F o r m s , is deeply e m b e d d e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory. I f we b a l a n c e e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t s for a n d against Aristotle's teleology we w i l l have n o i n c l i n a t i o n to believe that there is a n a t u r a l fît b e t w e e n h u m a n c o g n i t i v e e q u i p -

154

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

merit a n d the m e t a p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the w o r l d . T h i s i n t u r n w i l l lead us to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about the intelligibility o l the w o r l d a n d the v e r y existence ot t h i n g s that are better k n o w n b y nature. F u r t h e r m o r e , there is d i s a g r e e m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p e r t r a i n i n g a n d the p r o p e r c o n d i t i o n n e c e s s a r y to g r a s p s e l l - e v i d e n t truths, A n d there r e m a i n d i s a g r e e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g the content of those s u p p o s edly s e l f - e v i d e n t truths. So we f i n d o u r s e l v e s b a c k o n c e a g a i n at the m o d e of d i s p u t e . But p e r h a p s w e c a n differentiate a m o n g c o m p e t i n g h y p o t h e s e s o n the basis o f t h e i r p r e d i c t i v e o r e x p l a n a t o r y s u c c e s s . T h e d o g m a t i s t m i g h t c l a i m that; . . . a n a s s u r a n c e o f the h y p o t h e s i s b e i n g s t r o n g is the fact that the c o n s e q u e n c e that is d r a w n t r o m the t h i n g s a s s u m e d b y h y p o t h e s i s is f o u n d to be t r u e ; for if w h a t f o l l o w s f r o m these is s o u n d , the t h i n g s f r o m w h i c h it follows are a l s o t r u e and u n q u e s t i o n a b l e .

( M 8.375)

So s o m e h y p o t h e s e s are r a t i o n a l l y preferable to o t h e r s b e c a u s e they i m p r o v e o u r p r e d i c t i v e s u c c e s s : the c o n s e q u e n c e s ot the h y p o t h e s i s are true. N o w the p r o b l e m is to e x p l a i n h o w we are able to d e t e r m i n e that the c o n s e q u e n c e s are true. T h e y w i l l not c o n f i r m t h e m s e l v e s ; if that w e r e the c a s e it w o u l d not b e n e c e s s a r y to d e r i v e t h e m f r o m the p r e m i s e or h y p o t h e s i s . B u t they w i l l not be c o n f i r m e d by the p r e m i s e either, b e c a u s e this h a s not b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d as t r u e a n d is itself the p o i n t u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e m i g h t h y p o t h e s i z e that s c r i p t u r e is the literal w o r d o f G o d , a n d then i n f e r that s o m e specific s c r i p t u r a l c l a i m is true. S i n c e there is a d i s p u t e about the h y p o t h e s i s , it is a s u n c o n v i n c i n g as the c o n t r a r y h y p o t h e s i s that s c r i p t u r e is not the literal w o r d o f G o d . S o it c a n n o t w a r r a n t the c o n s e q u e n c e . S i n c e l o r e v e r y h y p o t h e s i s H there is at least o n e c o n t r a r y h y p o t h esis H", the s c e p t i c finds the v e r y act o f h y p o t h e s i z i n g s u s p i c i o u s . N o o n e feels the n e e d to h y p o t h e s i z e w h a t is so e v i d e n t a s to be u n d i s p u t e d . Sextus r e t u r n s to this t h e m e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the hypothetical mode;

L55

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

. . . s i n c e a p p a r e n t t h i n g s d i s p l a y j u s t that - that t h e y a p p e a r - a n d h a v e n o f u r t h e r p o w e r to teach us that they a l s o exist, let it be s u p p o s e d b o t h that t h e p r e m i s e s o l the d e m o n s t r a t i o n a p p e a r a n d s i m i l a r l y that the c o n s e q u e n c e d o e s . B u t i n this w a y the c o n c l u s i o n b e i n g sought w i l l not be d r a w n a n d the truth w i l l not be b r o u g h t f o r w a r d , s i n c e w e are l i m i t e d to bare a s s e r t i o n a n d o u r o w n affection. A n d w a n t i n g to s h o w that they not o n l y appear, b u t also exist, is the m a r k of m e n w h o are not content w i t h w h a t is n e c e s s a r y for n o r m a l use, but are eager a l s o to h e l p t h e m s e l v e s to w h a t e v e r p o s s i b l e . (MS

368)

I f w e a c k n o w l e d g e that reports a b o u t h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r or h o w I a m affected are m e r e a s s e r t i o n s , there is n o p r o b l e m , B u t a h y p o t h e s i s goes further. T o h y p o t h e s i z e is to p r e t e n d that one's m e r e a s s e r t i o n is i n fact true a n d to request that others treat it that w a y as w e l l , w h e t h e r it a p p e a r s t r u e to t h e m or not. I n so far as w e are c o m m i t t e d to a v o i d i n g beliefs that are m e r e l y a r b i t r a r y preferences, w e m u s t not accept any a r g u m e n t that p r o ceeds f r o m h y p o t h e s e s . W h e n e v e r the issue in q u e s t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by h y p o t h e s e s o n b o t h (or a l l ) s i d e s , w e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t .

Reciprocity (circularity) T h e final route to j u s t i f i c a t i o n is to try to c l a i m that one's beliefs are m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of e a c h other. S o n o n e of m y beliefs p r o v i d e the f o u n d a t i o n for the rest, but e a c h is s u p p o r t e d by the o t h e r s . W h e n the sceptic p o i n t s out that there is a d i s p u t e about m y c l a i m P, I m a y r e s p o n d that P is t r u e b e c a u s e o f Q, A n d w h e n t h e s c e p t i c p o i n t s out that there is a d i s p u t e about Q, I r e s p o n d that Q is t r u e b e c a u s e of P . S e x t u s w i l l then i n v o k e the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e , ""The r e c i p r o c a l m o d e o c c u r s w h e n what ought to be c o n f i r m a t o r y of the object u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n n e e d s to be m a d e c o n v i n c i n g b y the object u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n " ( P f f 1.169). I f I w i s h to establish that ( P ) s c r i p t u r e is the literal w o r d o f G o d , I c a n n o t rely o n ( Q ) s c r i p t u r a l

156

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

passages. Before I c a n rely o n the a u t h o r i t y of the passages I have to e s t a b l i s h the o r i g i n a l p o i n t u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n : that s c r i p t u r e is the literal w o r d o l G o d . I f the o n l y w a y I c a n d o that is b y a p p e a l i n g to s c r i p t u r a l passages, I c a n n o t s u c c e e d . I c a n n e v e r be instilled i n b e l i e v i n g P as l o n g as t h i s p r e s u p p o s e s that Q h a s b e e n j u s t i f i e d , b e c a u s e Q c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d u n t i l P is, T h i s applies also to d e f i n i t i o n s . C o n s i d e r the m a d d e n i n g e x p e r i e n c e of l o o k i n g u p the w o r d " p r o f l i g a c y " i n t h e d i c t i o n a r y a n d d i s c o v e r i n g that it m e a n s " d i s s o l u t e n e s s " N a t u r a l l y y o u t u r n to the d e f i n i t i o n o f " d i s s o l u t e n e s s " a n d f i n d that it m e a n s "profligacy". I f these are the o n l y entries, y o u w i l l be f r u s t r a t e d , b e c a u s e y o u n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d o n e i n o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the other, a n d vice v e r s a . Sextus p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f this w i t h " c a u s e " a n d "effect";

I f i n o r d e r to c o n c e i v e o f a c a u s e , w e m u s t a l r e a d y have r e c o g n i z e d its effect, a n d i n o r d e r to k n o w its effect . . . we m u s t a l r e a d y k n o w t h e c a u s e , the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e o l p u z z l e m e n t s h o w s that b o t h are i n c o n c e i v a b l e : the cause c a n n o t b e c o n c e i v e d o f as a c a u s e n o r t h e effect a s a n effect; for e a c h o f t h e m needs to be m a d e c o n v i n c i n g by t h e other, a n d we s h a l l n o t k n o w f r o m w h i c h to b e g i n to f o r m t h e c o n c e p t . H e n c e w e s h a l l not be able to assert that a n y t h i n g is a cause of anything.

(PR 3 . 2 1 - 2 )

W e m a y n o n e t h e l e s s f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f the c o n c e p t s o f cause a n d effect, or at least, as H u m e w o u l d put it, w e w i l l c o n t i n u e to e x p e c t that a c e r t a i n type o f event w i l l be f o l l o w e d b y a n o t h e r type o f event. S e x t u s a l l o w s that the s c e p t i c w i l l expect to f i n d fire w h e n h e sees s m o k e (PH 2.100; see the d i s c u s s i o n o f recollective s i g n s b e l o w ) . W h a t t h e r e c i p r o c a l m o d e b l o c k s i n this case is the attempt to argue that a n y t h i n g is a c a u s e i n t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s e n s e , that i s , s o m e t h i n g that p r o d u c e s its effect n e c e s s a r i l y . T h e s c e p t i c s e x p e c t a t i o n s are n o t the sort o f t h i n g h e w i l l argue tor; h e m e r e l y finds h i m s e l f e x p e c t i n g that s m o k e w i l l follow fire. T h e dogmatist's a s s e r t i o n that P is the c a u s e o f Q , h o w e v e r , w i l l be d i s p u t e d a n d t h u s i n n e e d o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y h i s a c c o u n t o f cause

]?7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a n d effect he first n e e d s to p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of the k e y t e r m s . T h e r e c i p r o c a l m o d e s h o w s t h i s to be i m p o s s i b l e , a s s u m i n g the o n l y w a y to d e f i n e the t e r m s is reciprocally, a n d this b l o c k s the dogmatist's attempt at j u s t i f i c a t i o n . R e c i p r o c a l d e f i n i t i o n s are not a r g u m e n t s . B u t they suffer f r o m the s a m e s h o r t c o m i n g a s r e c i p r o c a l a r g u m e n t s (for m o r e o n d e f i n i t i o n , see PH

2 . 2 0 5 - 1 2 ) . Just as the d e f i n i t i o n s are not i n f o r m a t i v e , the

a r g u m e n t s are not p r o b a t i v e . T h e y d o not p r o v i d e i n d e p e n d e n t reas o n s for a c c e p t i n g the c o n c l u s i o n as true. If I w e r e to collect a n u m b e r of e x a m p l e s of c o u r a g e o u s a c t i o n i n o r d e r to see w h a t they all have i n c o m m o n , it s e e m s that I first n e e d s o m e c r i t e r i o n or d e f i n i t i o n so that I d o not m i s t a k e n l y i n c l u d e a c o w a r d l y act a m o n g m y e x a m p l e s . S o I c a n n o t collect m y e x a m p l e s i n o r d e r to r e a s o n i n d u c t i v e l y to the nature of c o u r a g e s i n c e I m u s t first k n o w w h a t c o u r a g e is i n o r d e r to c o r r e c t l y c h o o s e m y e x a m p l e s (cf. PH 2 . 1 9 7 ) . O f c o u r s e , there m a y a l w a y s be other, n o n - r e c i p r o c a l g r o u n d s o n w h i c h to j u s t i f y one's c l a i m s or define one's t e r m s . T h e charge o f c i r c u l a r i t y d o e s not necess a r i l y lead by itself to epoche. S e x t u s uses it effectively in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the h y p o t h e t i c a l m o d e i n the f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e . I f a n y o n e c l a i m s to h a v e a p p r e h e n d e d s o m e t h i n g that is d i s p u t e d , he w i l l c l a i m either that it is s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t r u e o r that he has e s t a b l i s h e d its t r u t h after h a v i n g investigated it. II h e opts for the former, the s c e p t i c w i l l a p p l y the h y p o t h e t i c a l m o d e . I f h e opts for the latter, the s c e p t i c w i l l a p p l y the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e , a r g u i n g that o n e c a n o n l y a p p r e h e n d w h a t has b e e n investigated, but that o n e c a n o n l y investigate w h a t has a l r e a d y b e e n a p p r e h e n d e d

(PH

2 . 6 - 9 ) . Sextus' a r g u m e n t is s t r o n g l y r e m i n i s c e n t o f Plato's p a r a d o x of e n q u i r y (Meno

8 0 d - e ; cf. P H 3 . 1 7 4 ) . O n e c a n n o t search for w h a t

o n e a l r e a d y k n o w s or for w h a t o n e d o e s n o t k n o w . I n the first case, there's n o n e e d to s e a r c h for w h a t y o u a l r e a d y k n o w . I n the s e c o n d case, y o u c a n n o t s e a r c h for w h a t y o u d o not k n o w b e c a u s e y o u d o not k n o w w h a t to l o o k for, so w i l l not k n o w if y o u h a p p e n b y a c c i dent to find it. F o r e x a m p l e , to investigate the s o u l I m u s t a l r e a d y k n o w e n o u g h to differentiate a s o u l f r o m o t h e r t h i n g s . E i t h e r I w i l l c l a i m that this k n o w l e d g e i s s e l f - e v i d e n t or that I h a v e a c q u i r e d it o n the b a s i s o l

158

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

e n q u i r y . T h e f o r m e r c l a i m invites the h y p o t h e t i c a l m o d e , a n d the latter invites the r e c i p r o c a l : I c a n n o t a p p r e h e n d the s o u l , o r a n y t h i n g about it, u n t i l 1 have investigated what a s o u l is, but 1 c a n n o t i n v e s tigate w h a t a s o u l is u n t i l I h a v e a p p r e h e n d e d e n o u g h to be able to isolate m y object o f study. R e s p o n s e s to this p u z z l e t y p i c a l l y attempt to b r e a k out of the c i r cularity, i m p l i c i t l y a c k n o w l e d g i n g the effectiveness of the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e . F o r e x a m p l e , a c c o r d i n g to the s o l u t i o n that Plato e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h i n the Me no, w e a l r e a d y k n o w ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) w h a t w e w i s h to d i s c o v e r b y i n v e s t i g a t i o n . L e a r n i n g t u r n s out to be a k i n d o f r e c o l l e c t i o n a n d , c o n t r a r y to a p p e a r a n c e s , we d o in fact s e a r c h tor w h a t we a l r e a d y " k n o w " . O f c o u r s e , a n y s u c h s o l u t i o n w i l l c o m m i t the 0

d o g m a t i s t to other c o n t r o v e r s i a l , a n d d i s p u t e d , c l a i m s . S o the sceptic w i l l still have a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y to c h a l l e n g e h i s o p p o n e n t . B u t , we s h o u l d note that Sextus p r e s e n t s this a r g u m e n t initially as a p r o b l e m for the sceptic. I f e n q u i r y is i m p o s s i b l e , it is i m p o s s i b l e l o r e v e r y o n e , a n d the sceptic c a n n o t investigate the d o g m a t i s t s c l a i m s . F o r either he a p p r e h e n d s the t h i n g s the d o g m a t i s t s talk about or not. I f the sceptic a p p r e h e n d s w h a t the d o g m a t i s t s m e a n b y "soul", then he c a n n o t be g e n u i n e l y p u z z l e d by it. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if he d o e s not a p p r e h e n d "soul", t h e n he c a n n o t refute d o g m a t i c c l a i m s a b o u t it. Sextus disputes b o t h h o r n s o f t h i s d i l e m m a b y m a k i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o senses o f " a p p r e h e n s i o n " . I n one sense it m e a n s s i m p l y to t h i n k o f s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t a f f i r m i n g its reality, a n d in a s t r o n g e r sense it m e a n s to g r a s p as true. So the s c e p t i c a p p r e h e n d s " s o u l " i n the w e a k e r sense, but is still p u z z l e d by w h e t h e r s u c h a t h i n g actually exists. H e u n d e r s t a n d s the w a y h i s o p p o n e n t s use their t e r m s , he u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t they t h i n k these w o r d s m e a n . B u t he d o e s not t h e r e b y take h i m s e l f to have g r a s p e d t h e m as t r u e ( P H 2.4-6, M8.334a-336a).

7

Sextus c l a i m s that t h i s d i l e m m a is i n tact e v e n m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c for the dogmatist. W h e n , for e x a m p l e , the Stoic disputes the E p i c u r e a n c l a i m that p l e a s u r e is the o n l y g o o d , he e i t h e r a p p r e h e n d s the t r u t h of this c l a i m o r not. I f h e a p p r e h e n d s it, t h e n h e m u s t reject h i s S t o i c i s m . A n d i f he does not a p p r e h e n d it, he c a n n o t d i s p u t e it,

159

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tor h e does not e v e n k n o w w h a t they are t a l k i n g a b o u t O f c o u r s e , the Stoic c a n appeal to the s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n the s c e p t i c does, c l a i m i n g that he grasps w h a t the E p i c u r e a n m e a n s , a n d not that w h a t the E p i c u r e a n m e a n s is true. S o this d i s t i n c t i o n a l l o w s b o t h d o g m a t i s t s and sceptics to c a r r y o n t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . But it also e m p h a s i z e s the p o i n t that we o n l y investigate w h a t we d o not c o m p r e h e n d I n so far a s d o g m a t i s t s believe they h a v e a r r i v e d at the t r u t h , they have put a n e n d to e n q u i r y {PH 2 . 1 1 ) ,

The specific account of Scepticism I n h i s specific a c c o u n t , S e x t u s investigates a n a r r a y ot p a r t i c u l a r d o g m a t i c d o c t r i n e s . R a t h e r t h a n take these a r g u m e n t s p i e c e m e a l , he a p p r o a c h e s t h e m i n a s y s t e m a t i c f a s h i o n , first g r o u p i n g the t o p i c s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s t a n d a r d d o g m a t i c d i v i s i o n s , a n d s e c o n d l y targeti n g the m o s t b a s i c , f o u n d a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s or c o n c l u s i o n s w i t h i n each division. I n the o p e n i n g passages of M 7 (the first b o o k of Against cians),

the Logi-

Sextus sets out the three s t a n d a r d d i v i s i o n s o f p h i l o s o p h y

i n the H e l l e n i s t i c p e r i o d : l o g i c , p h y s i c s a n d e t h i c s . T h i s p r o v i d e s 3

a u s e f u l , a l t h o u g h c r u d e , f r a m e w o r k for o r g a n i z i n g the h i s t o r y o l G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , for a r r a n g i n g h i s s c e p t i c a l targets i n a s y s t e m a t i c way. A s the s t o r y goes, m o s t o f the P r e s o c r a t ics c a r e d o n l y for the p h y s i c a l part, w h e r e a s Socrates c a r e d o n l y for the e t h i c a l , a n d Plato, A r i s t o t l e , E p i c u r u s a n d the Stoics t u r n e d their attention to all three. T h e Stoics w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y f o n d o i e x p l a i n i n g the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n these three p a r t s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ; for e x a m p l e , e t h i c s is the yolk, p h y s i c s the w h i t e a n d logic the shell ot a n egg ( A i 7 . 1 7 - 1 9 ) . O t h e r s c o m p a r e d p h i l o s o p h y to a l i v i n g b e i n g , c o m p a r i n g logic to the b o n e s a n d s i n e w s , e t h i c s to the flesh a n d p h y s i c s to t h e s o u l , a l t h o u g h s o m e p r e f e r r e d to see e t h i c s as the s o u l a n d p h y s i c s as the flesh. N e v e r t h e l e s s , l o g i c p l a y s either a s t r u c t u r a l or d e f e n s i v e role i n all the m e t a p h o r s . It s h o w s u s h o w we m a y w i n t r u t h tor o u r s e l v e s a n d t h e n h o w w e m a y d e f e n d the g r o u n d .

I in l

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

Sextus d e c i d e s to start w i t h logic s i n c e e v e r y part of p h i l o s o p h y , w h e t h e r Stoic or not, is d e d i c a t e d to the d i s c o v e r y o f t r u t h , a n d this i n t u r n r e q u i r e s reliable m e t h o d s o f differentiating the t r u e f r o m the false (PH 2.17; M 7.24). L o g i c p r o v i d e s the b a s i c tools for all three p a r t s o f p h i l o s o p h y (PH 2 . 1 3 ) . So, il the s c e p t i c s a r g u m e n t s are s u c c e s s f u l , the d o g m a t i s t s w o u l d be u n a b l e to differentiate the true t r o m the false, a n d a fortiori

u n a b l e to d e f e n d their c l a i m s i n

physics a n d ethics. Sextus follows this s t a n d a r d d i v i s i o n not b e c a u s e he e n d o r s e s it, but rather " l o r the s a k e o f a n o r d e r l y a n d m e t h o d i c a l s e a r c h " ( M 7.2). H i s f o c u s o n the m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m s w i t h i n e a c h s u b d i s c i p l i n e is s i m i l a r l y m o t i v a t e d . A p p e a l i n g to a h u n t i n g m e t a p h o r , he notes that just as it is m o r e s k i l f u l to be able to c a t c h m a n y p r e y all at o n c e w i t h a net t h a n to p u r s u e t h e m o n e at a t i m e w i t h a l i n e , so too it is m o r e a c c o m p l i s h e d to b r i n g d o w n m a n y c l a i m s i n c o m m o n w i t h a s i n g l e refutation (M 9.3). A p p e a l i n g to a different m e t a p h o r , he suggests the w a y to d o t h i s is b y u n d e r m i n i n g the f o u n d a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e we w i s h to b r i n g d o w n ( A i 9.2; PH 3.1, 2.84). So, for e x a m p l e , he b e g i n s h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f p h y s i c s w i t h a r g u m e n t s against the intelligibility of the active p r i n c i p l e , G o d . I n s o far as d o g m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l p h e n o m e n a rely o n the intelligibility of the active p r i n c i p l e , Sextus w i l l h a v e effectively b r o u g h t t h e m all d o w n b y m e a n s of h i s a r g u m e n t s against the d o g m a t i c

conception

of G o d . W e s h o u l d be c a u t i o u s about the i m p o r t o f all t h e s e m e t a p h o r s , h o w e v e r . W h e n Sextus " u n d e r m i n e s " o r " b r i n g s d o w n " s o m e d o g m a t i c a s s e r t i o n s , he does not take h i m s e l f to have p r o v e n t h e m false. T h e goal is o n c e a g a i n to b a l a n c e the r a t i o n a l force of a r g u m e n t s o n e a c h s i d e of a n issue, thereby l e a d i n g the reader to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . Sextus h i m s e l f has n o v i e w o n w h e t h e r the d o g m a t i s t s f o u n d a t i o n a l c l a i m s entail other p r o p o s i t i o n s . It is e n o u g h that the dogmatist t h i n k s so, It the v i e w I h a v e d e f e n d e d in C h a p t e r 7 is c o r r e c t , Sextus is not s e a r c h i n g tor the t r u t h a b o u t these d i s p u t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e s , but rather tor w h a t c a n be s a i d about t h e m i n o r d e r to a r t i c u l a t e equally c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t s o n b o t h s i d e s . G i v e n the t h e r a p e u t i c

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a n d p h i l a n t h r o p i c nature o l the S c e p t i c a l project a n d the v a r i a b i l i t y i n w h a t people rind p e r s u a s i v e , Sextus w i s h e s to f i n d a variety of ways of b r i n g i n g about e q u i p o l l e n c e . T h i s e x p l a i n s the c o n c e s s i v e nature of m a n y ot h i s a r g u m e n t s ; in p a r t i c u l a r , it e x p l a i n s w h y , after pres e n t i n g the g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e strategy of the five m o d e s , a n d t h e n u n d e r m i n i n g d o g m a t i c logic, he n o n e t h e l e s s presses o n to attack their s p e c i f i c a r g u m e n t s i n p h y s i c s a n d e t h i c s . E v e n it h i s "patients" are n o t sufficiently i m p r e s s e d by the S c e p t i c a l assault o n the roots ot their d o g m a t i c p o s i t i o n s , he w i l l attempt to c u t off the larger l i m b s or at least the b r a n c h e s . I n the r e m a i n d e r o f t h i s chapter, w e shall f o l l o w h i m o n l y as far as l o g i c .

Logic: criteria, signs and proofs A s Sextus presents it, the m a i n task ot l o g i c is to e x p l a i n the nature of t r u t h , a n d to e x p l a i n h o w w e m a y reliably d i s t i n g u i s h it f r o m w h a t is false. T h e latter, e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! topic, is by far the prominent in both M 7 - 8

( Against

the Logicians)

most

a n d the parallel

text, PH 2. S o i n b o t h , texts, c r i t e r i a , s i g n s a n d proofs are c e n t r a l topics." Before t u r n i n g to s o m e characteristic a r g u m e n t s against e a c h of these, we m u s t note that Sextus d i s t i n g u i s h e s c r i t e r i a a n d s i g n s that are s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e f r o m t h o s e that are not (see F i g u r e 5 ) . N o k i n d ot proof is s c e p t i c a l l y acceptable s i n c e p r o o f is a r a t i o n a l m e a n s ot e s t a b l i s h i n g the t r u t h o l s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n . H o w e v e r , this does n o t p r e c l u d e the s c e p t i c f r o m u s i n g p r o o f s i n h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i cally t h e r a p e u t i c m a n n e r , that is, w i t h o u t p e r s o n a l l y a p p r o v i n g o f the n o r m a t i v e torce o f logical i n f e r e n c e .

Criteria

of action

versus

criteria

of

truth

T h e i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s b e t w e e n a c r i t e r i o n of a c t i o n a n d a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . A c r i t e r i o n o f a c t i o n is m e r e l y a n a p p e a r a n c e , a l t h o u g h it n e e d not be l i m i t e d to s e n s o r y a p p e a r a n c e s . F o r e x a m p l e , the h o n e y m i g h t a p p e a r g o o d to eat. T h i s a p p e a r a n c e , a l o n g w i t h the s c e p t i c s h u n g e r , w i l l e x p l a i n w h y he ate the h o n e y r a t h e r than a n a p k i n . U n l i k e a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , s u c h a p p e a r a n c e s p r o v i d e n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n

162

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

CRITERIA

Clear

•

1

I : I . i

I ••

States of alTairs Figure 3. Criteria, iigns arid p r o o t i P H 2; M 7—8)

163

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

or d e f e n c e . T h e s e g u i d i n g a p p e a r a n c e s tell us n o t h i n g about w h e t h e r the agent s h o u l d have p e r f o r m e d the a c t i o n , i n either the

moral

or p r u d e n t i a l sense o f " s h o u l d " . A n d they are s u p p o s e d to g u i d e the sceptic w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g h i s epochs

(we shall consider in

C h a p t e r 9 w h e t h e r a n d h o w this m i g h t be s o ) . A c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , o n the other h a n d , is the m e a s u r e or s t a n d a r d o n e a p p l i e s i n m o v i n g b e y o n d the a p p e a r a n c e to the u n d e r l y i n g reality, h o w e v e r that m a y be u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e are t h r e e different types: g e n e r a l , s p e c i a l i z e d a n d v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d . T h e g e n e r a l i n c l u d e sight, h e a r i n g a n d taste, a m o n g the others. T h e s p e c i a l i z e d i n c l u d e t e c h n i c a l m e a n s o l m e a s u r e s u c h as s c a l e s , r u l e r a n d c o m p a s s . T h i s g r o u p a p p e a r s to be a subset o f the g e n e r a l In s o far as s u c h c r i t e r i a are extensions o f o u r senses. F u r t h e r m o r e , if we c a n n o t rely o n s e n s a tions, the g e n e r a l c r i t e r i a , t h e n w e c a n n o t rely o n the m e a s u r e m e n t s we r e a d f r o m o u r t e c h n i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s , the s p e c i a l i z e d c r i t e r i a . Sextus has n o c o m p l a i n t against e i t h e r o f these as l o n g as t h e y are e m p l o y e d i n the s c e p t i c a l f a s h i o n , that is, tor the s a k e of a c t i n g and not tor the s a k e of a s s e n t i n g to t r u t h . H e c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e m as o r d i n a r y or e v e r y d a y s t a n d a r d s i n c o n t r a s t w i t h the v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d type (PH 2.15). T h i s set a l s o a p p e a r s to be a s u b s e t of the s p e c i a l i z e d in s o far as the c r i t e r i a are t e c h n i c a l . T h e c r u c i a l differentiating feature is that v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d c r i t e r i a are m e a n t to reveal u n c l e a r or n o n - e v i d e n t matters. S e x t u s p r o p o s e s to deal p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h these s i n c e , u n l i k e the o t h e r two, they are the tools o l d o g m a t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s . ( W e shall r e t u r n to the sceptic's reliance o n a p p e a r a n c e s i n C h a p t e r 9.) H e f u r t h e r d i v i d e s the v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d c r i t e r i a into three k i n d s (PH

2.16; M 7 . 3 5 - 3 7 ; not i n d i c a t e d in F i g u r e 5) in o r d e r to s y s t e m -

atically refute the m o s t f a m o u s a n d p l a u s i b l e a c c o u n t s available (PH 2 . 2 2 - 7 9 ; Af 7 - 8 9 - 4 3 8 ) . H e r e again h e illustrates h i s p o i n t by w a y of a metaphor:

. . . the h u m a n b e i n g , " b y w h o m " the j u d g m e n t o c c u r s , is like the w e i g h e r or c a r p e n t e r ; sense-percept ion a n d thought, " t h r o u g h w h i c h " the j u d g m e n t o c c u r s , are l i k e the scales a n d r u l e r ; a n d the i m p a c t of the a p p e a r a n c e , in virtue o f w h i c h

li-.-l

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

the h u m a n b e i n g u n d e r t a k e s to j u d g e , is l i k e the state of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d tools.

( A i 7.37)

I n t e r m s of the m e t a p h o r , these three a s p e c t s are i n e x t r i c a b l y c o n n e c t e d . I f a c a r p e n t e r is u n r e l i a b l e or u n s k i l l e d , it d o e s not m a t t e r h o w a c c u r a t e h i s s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s m a y be a n d h o w finely t u n e d his tools are s i n c e he w i l l not be able to r e l i a b l y use t h e m to get the d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . S i m i l a r l y , e v e n it the c a r p e n t e r is s k i l l e d he w i l l be h a m p e r e d b y e i t h e r u n r e l i a b l e p e r c e p t i o n s or faulty tools. T h e m e t a p h o r is l i m i t e d , h o w e v e r , s i n c e there is n o c o n t r o v e r s y r e g a r d i n g w h a t a c a r p e n t e r is. I n the a n a l o g o u s case there is n o e n d to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s p u t e s r e g a r d i n g h u m a n nature. S e x t u s c l a i m s that if we c a n n o t resolve these d i s p u t e s a n d m a k e h u m a n nature intelligible, we c a n n o t a p p e a l to it as the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to b e true, But e v e n it we w e r e able to m a k e h u m a n nature intelligible, w e m u s t n o t i c e that the j u d g e m e n t that h u m a n b e i n g s are the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be true is m a d e by a h u m a n b e i n g . So, in a m a n n e r r e m i n i s c e n t o f A e n e s i d e m u s ten m o d e s , the j u d g e h

is p a r t y to the d i s p u t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , to grant t h i s j u d g e m e n t pres u p p o s e s that h u m a n beings are the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be t r u e , w h i c h is the v e r y issue at q u e s t i o n . A n d e v e n if we grant that h u m a n b e i n g s are the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be true, we m u s t t h e n d e t e r m i n e which ones

to trust,

to d i s a g r e e m e n t .

10

tor

h u m a n beings are p a r t i c u l a r l y

prone

N o w the p r o b l e m w i l l be that if o n e l a c k s the

expertise to q u a l i f y as the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be t r u e , he w i l l be u n q u a l i f i e d to settle the d i s p u t e s about w h i c h h u m a n b e i n g is the c r i t e r i o n . A s C i c e r o p u t s the p o i n t , it w i l l be the j o b ot a sage to d e t e r m i n e w h o is a sage ( A c . 2.9). O n the o t h e r h a n d , if he c l a i m s to be a sage h i m s e l f , either he m e r e l y asserts t h i s or he b a c k s it u p w i t h s o m e proof. T h e s c e p t i c w i l l not be s w a y e d by m e r e a s s e r t i o n , b u t w i l l h o l d the d o g m a t i s t to h i s o w n s t a n d a r d a n d d e m a n d s o m e r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s i n t u r n w i l l l e a d to a d e m a n d tor a c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h , t h r o u g h w h i c h or i n v i r t u e of w h i c h he m a y assess the proof. B u t in s e e k i n g to j u s t i f y h i m s e l f as

L65

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h t r u t h is r e v e a l e d , the d o g m a t i s t is p a r t y to the d i s p u t e . M o v i n g to the c r i t e r i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be t r u e , S e x t u s n o t e s that o n l y t w o faculties have b e e n p r o p o s e d : the senses a n d the intellect. T h i s p r o d u c e s t h r e e p o s s i b l e a c c o u n t s : w e d i s c e r n the t r u t h t h r o u g h the s e n s e s a l o n e , t h r o u g h the intellect a l o n e o r t h r o u g h b o t h . I f w e s u p p o s e it is t h r o u g h the senses a l o n e , h o w shall w e d e c i d e the d i s p u t e a m o n g t h o s e w h o say the s e n s e s are a l w a y s reliable, n e v e r reliable or o n l y s o m e t i m e s reliable? W e c a n n o t settle the matter b y a p p e a l to the s e n s e s s i n c e this w o u l d b e g the q u e s t i o n at issue. A n d i l it m u s t be d e c i d e d by a p p e a l i n g to s o m e t h i n g else, we w i l l h a v e to reject the a s s u m p t i o n that w e d i s c e r n the truth t h r o u g h the s e n s e s a l o n e . S i m i l a r l y , if we s u p p o s e it is t h r o u g h the intellect a l o n e , h o w s h a l l we d e c i d e the d i s p u t e a m o n g those w h o a r r i v e at i n c o m p a t i b l e v i e w s by the a p p l i c a t i o n of the intellect? We c a n n o t settle the matter by appeal to the intellect since this w o u l d b e g the q u e s t i o n at issue. A n d a g a i n , if it m u s t be d e c i d e d b y a p p e a l i n g to s o m e t h i n g else, w e w i l l h a v e to reject the a s s u m p t i o n that we d i s c e r n the t r u t h t h r o u g h the intellect a l o n e . Sextus next rejects the p o s s i b i l i t y that it is t h r o u g h b o t h o n the g r o u n d s that it w i l l still be t h r o u g h one or the o t h e r i n e a c h case ( a s s u m i n g the t w o d o not b l e n d into s o m e t h i r d , d i s t i n c t type o f faculty ). S o the p r e v i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i l l still apply. A n d we w i l l h a v e to c e r t i f y the reliability o f b o t h the s e n s e s a n d the intellect either t h r o u g h the s e n s e s or t h r o u g h the intellect. T h i s w i l l c a l l for the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e s i n c e e i t h e r the senses or the intellect m u s t first be certified before it c a n c e r t i f y the other. F i n a l l y , S e x t u s c o n s i d e r s a p p e a r a n c e s as the c r i t e r i o n i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h t r u t h is d i s c e r n e d . S i n c e a n a p p e a r a n c e is o n l y the affection of o u r sense organs, it is g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t to be different f r o m the external object that gives rise to it. A s Sextus puts it, " h o n e y is not the s a m e t h i n g as m y b e i n g affected s w e e t l y " (PH 2.72); n o r is a picture o f Socrates the s a m e as Socrates h i m s e l f . T h i s leads to S e x t u s ' v e r s i o n o f w h a t we n o w t y p i c a l l y call the " v e i l of p e r c e p t i o n " It o u r o n l y a c c e s s to the true nature of e x t e r n a l objects o r s t a t e s of affairs is t h r o u g h the

166

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

way they affect u s , we m a y n e v e r c o n f i r m w h e t h e r the a p p e a r a n c e s are a c c u r a t e ; we w i l l n e v e r k n o w w h e t h e r the p i c t u r e of S o c r a t e s is a c c u r a t e s i n c e we c a n never meet S o c r a t e s h i m s e l f (PH

2.74-75),

A n d e v e n if we grant that we c a n g r a s p the u n d e r l y i n g n a t u r e o f t h i n g s i n v i r t u e o i the w a y t h e y appear, we w i l l h a v e to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n , or o n l y s o m e a p p e a r a n c e s . H i e first o p t i o n l e a d s d i r e c t l y to s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n s i n c e it a p p e a r s to s o m e that not e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n . S o I r o m the c l a i m that e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n it w o u l d i o l l o w that not e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n . T h e s e c o n d o p t i o n r e q u i r e s us to e x p l a i n the b a s i s o n w h i c h we c a n m a k e s u c h a j u d g e m e n t . I f we m u s t rely o n s o m e other appearance, t h e n the s c e p t i c w i l l set u s off o n a n i n f i n i t e regress a n d we w i l l n e v e r finish j u s t i f y i n g the i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e s . It is m o r e p r o m i s i n g to c l a i m , as the Stoics do, that c e r t a i n a p p e a r a n c e s are s e l f - e v i d e n t l y true, at least to those w h o h a v e a c q u i r e d the p r o p e r m e n t a l d i s p o sitions. A f t e r s e t t i n g out the Stoic a r g u m e n t s in s u p p o r t of these kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s ( A i 7 . 2 2 7 - 6 0 ) , Sextus tries to l e a d h i s readers to e q u i p o l l e n c e by r e p o r t i n g the A c a d e m i c a r g u m e n t s against t h e m (Af 7 . 4 0 2 - 3 5 ; see C h a p t e r 4 ) . It r e m a i n s p o s s i b l e that s o m e o n e m a y d i s c o v e r a n o v e l a c c o u n t of the c r i t e r i o n . W h a t S e x t u s t h i n k s he h a s s h o w n is that for the m o s t p r o m i s i n g c o n t e n d e r s available the a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t are as c o n v i n c i n g as the a r g u m e n t s o p p o s e d , Signs and

proofs

L o o s e l y s p e a k i n g , s i g n s a n d p r o o f s are j u s t different varieties o f c r i teria s i n c e they are all s u p p o s e d to e x p l a i n h o w w e are able to m o v e f r o m i g n o r a n c e to k n o w l e d g e . T h e Stoic a c c o u n t of s i g n s a n d proofs, w h i c h is Sextus p r i n c i p a l target, is m o r e n a r r o w l y l o g i c a l ( i n o u r 1

sense o f the w o r d ) . Stoics define a s i g n as the a n t e c e d e n t p r o p o s i t i o n i n a s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l that is capable of u n c o v e r i n g the c o n s e q u e n t (a s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l b e i n g o n e i n w h i c h it the a n t e c e d e n t is true, the c o n s e q u e n t is true; A i 8 , 2 4 4 - 5 6 ; PH 2 . 1 0 4 ) . T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s articulate the content ot a r a t i o n a l i m p r e s s i o n ( A i 8,70). P r o o f s , as w e s h a l l see, are a k i n d of s i g n s i n c e the c o n j u n c t i o n o f the p r e m i s e s

167

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

c a n be u n d e r s t o o d as a s i g n of the t r u t h of t h e c o n c l u s i o n (JVÍ 8.277, 299; PR 2 , 1 3 4 ) . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t that a sign ( o r p r o o f ) is c a p a b l e of u n c o v e r i n g or r e v e a l i n g t h e t r u t h ot the c o n s e q u e n t ( o r c o n c l u s i o n ) is c r u c i a l s i n c e not e v e r y antecedent of a s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l u n c o v e r s the truth of the c o n s e q u e n t . A s a n e x a m p l e , S e x t u s offers this: i f it is day, it is light. I n t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l , if they are t r u e , b o t h a n t e c e d e n t a n d c o n s e q u e n t are g r a s p e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o l o n e a n o t h e r , b y m e a n s ot t h e i r o w n m a n i f e s t character. T h i s is not a t e r r i b l y h e l p f u l e x a m p l e , h o w e v e r , s i n c e S e x t u s does not tell us w h a t w e w o u l d a t t e n d to ( o t h e r t h a n the tact that it is l i g h t ) i n g r a s p i n g that it is day. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e p o i n t is that i n s o m e s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l s , the t r u t h o f the antecedent is not causally or e v e n c o n c e p t u a l l y related to the t r u t h ot t h e c o n s e q u e n t a n d h e n c e does not r e v e a l that t r u t h . C o n s i d e r this c o n d i t i o n a l by c o n t r a s t : i f a w o m a n is l a c t a t i n g , she has c o n c e i v e d . H e r e the antecedent s h o w s that t h e c o n s e q u e n t is true. It is s u p p o s e d l y becmtse w e a p p r e h e n d that a w o m a n is lactating that w e a p p r e h e n d s h e has c o n c e i v e d . S i n c e s i g n s a n d proofs are n e c e s s a r i l y revelatory, the c o n s e q u e n t s or c o n c l u s i o n s m u s t be initially u n c l e a r . B e t o r e c o n s i d e r i n g t w o o f S e x t u s ' b a s i c strategies tor retuting s i g n s a n d proofs, w e m u s t c o n s i d e r s o m e i m p o r t a n t d o g m a t i c d i s t i n c t i o n s S e x t u s reports b e t w e e n clear a n d u n c l e a r objects:

O f the u n c l e a r , s o m e are u n c l e a r o n c e a n d for a l l [ a b s o l u t e l y ] , s o m e are u n c l e a r for the m o m e n t [ t e m p o r a r i l y ] , a n d s o m e are u n c l e a r by n a t u r e [ n a t u r a l l y ] . W h a t c o m e s of itselt to o u r k n o w l e d g e , they say, is clear (e.g. that it is d a y ) ; w h a t does not h a v e a n a t u r e s u c h as to fall u n d e r o u r a p p r e h e n s i o n is u n c l e a r o n c e a n d for all (e.g. that the stars are e v e n i n n u m b e r ) ; w h a t has a n evident n a t u r e b u t is m a d e u n c l e a r for us for t h e m o m e n t by c e r t a i n e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s is u n c l e a r for t h e m o m e n t (e.g. for m e now, the city o f the A t h e n i a n s ) ; a n d w h a t d o e s not have a n a t u r e s u c h a s to fall u n d e r o u r evident g r a s p is u n c l e a r by n a t u r e (e.g. i m p e r ceptible p o r e s - for these are never a p p a r e n t ot t h e m s e l v e s

168

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ARGUMENTS

but w o u l d b e d e e m e d to be a p p r e h e n d e d , I f at a l l , by w a y of s o m e t h i n g else, e.g. b y s w e a t i n g . . . ) . (PH

2 . 9 7 - 9 9 ; see M 8 . 1 4 5 - 50)

T i l i n g s that are clear n e e d n o s i g n . A s l o n g as these are r e s t r i c t e d to a p p e a r a n c e s , Sextus w i l l n o t object, for i n that case there w i l l be n o d i s p u t e about t h e m . S i m i l a r l y , n o o n e b o t h e r s to a r g u e that the n u m b e r o l stars is o d d (or e v e n ) s i n c e this is absolutely a n d p e r m a nently unclear;

But t h i n g s u n c l e a r for t h e m o m e n t a n d t h i n g s u n c l e a r bynature are a p p r e h e n d e d t h r o u g h s i g n s - b u t not t h r o u g h the s a m e s i g n s : t h i n g s u n c l e a r for t h e m o m e n t a r e a p p r e h e n d e d t h r o u g h recollective s i g n s , t h i n g s u n c l e a r by nature t h r o u g h i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s . . . . T h e y c a l l a s i g n recollective if, h a v i n g b e e n o b s e r v e d e v i d e n t l y together w i t h the t h i n g it signifies, at the s a m e t i m e as it m a k e s a n i m p r e s s i o n o n us - a n d w h i l e the o t h e r t h i n g r e m a i n s u n c l e a r - it leads us to recall the t h i n g w h i c h h a s b e e n o b s e r v e d together w i t h it a n d is not n o w m a k i n g a n evident i m p r e s s i o n o n us (as i n the case o f s m o k e a n d f i r e ) . A s i g n is i n d i c a t i v e they say, i f it s i g n i f i e s that of w h i c h it is a s i g n n o t b y h a v i n g b e e n o b s e r v e d e v i d e n t l y together w i t h t h e t h i n g it s i g n i fies but f r o m its p r o p e r n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n (as bodilym o v e m e n t s are s i g n s ot t h e s o u l ) . (PH

2 . 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; see A i 8 . 1 5 1 - 5 5 )

T h e c r u c i a l difference is that i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s r e v e a l s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y g r a s p e d . T h e t w o objects o r events l i n k e d byrecollect ive s i g n s are b o t h potentially o b s e r v a b l e . S i n c e I c a n never e x p e r i e n c e the s o u l directly, it c a n o n l y be r e v e a l e d b y w a y of a n indicative sign. Sextus h a s n o p r o b l e m w i t h recollective signs. T h e y are part a n d p a r c e l o f o u r e v e r y d a y activity, i n s p i r e d b y w h a t H u m e later refers to a s o u r i n e s c a p a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n that t h e future w i l l r e s e m b l e the p a s t . " Sextus sees h i m s e l f as the c h a m p i o n ot c o m m o n s e n s e i n

169

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

m o u n t i n g h i s attack o n the d o g m a t i s t s ' private f i c t i o n of i n d i c a t i v e signs. O n e o f h i s c e n t r a l strategies for a r g u i n g against both i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s a n d p r o o f s is to d e r i v e a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f r o m two features that the d o g m a t i s t s c l a i m are e s s e n t i a l to b o t h . S i g n s a n d proof s are b o t h ( i ) relative to s o m e t h i n g . S i g n s are relative to the t h i n g s i g n i f i e d , a n d proofs are relative to the c o n c l u s i o n p r o v e d . But, s i g n s a n d proofs are also b o t h ( i i ) revelatory. N o w s u p p o s e A is a sign of B. O n the Stoics' o w n a c c o u n t of t h i n g s that are relative, A a n d B m u s t be a p p r e h e n d e d together. F o r : just as w h a t is to the right c a n n o t be a p p r e h e n d e d as b e i n g to the right of w h a t is to the left before w h a t is to the left has b e e n a p p r e h e n d e d . . . so s i g n s c a n n o t be a p p r e h e n d e d as s i g n s o f w h a t is s i g n i f i e d before w h a t is s i g n i f i e d has b e e n apprehended.

(PH

2,117)

Sextus' point is that we c a n n o t g r a s p that A is true a n d that it is a sign of B w i t h o u t h a v i n g a l r e a d y g r a s p e d that B is t r u e . O n e m i g h t grasp that A is true w i t h o u t thereby g r a s p i n g that it is a s i g n of B , but that is b e s i d e the p o i n t . C o n s i d e r a red traffic light. I n o r d e r for m e to g r a s p it as a sign to stop, I m u s t see it at o n e a n d the s a m e t i m e as a p h y s i c a l sign a n d as the c o m m a n d to stop. H o w e v e r , if A a n d B m u s t be a p p r e h e n d e d simultaneously, A c a n n o t be revelatory of B , b e c a u s e that w o u l d r e q u i r e that A be a p p r e h e n d e d before B, O t h e r w i s e we c a n n o t say that w e w e r e l e d to a p p r e h e n d B b e c a u s e of A . I n o t h e r w o r d s , for A to reveal the t r u t h o f B , there m u s t be a m o m e n t i n w h i c h w e a p p r e h e n d the t r u t h of A f o l l o w e d b y a m o m e n t i n w h i c h we a p p r e h e n d w h a t w a s p r e v i o u s l y u n c l e a r , n a m e l y the truth of B. B u t a g a i n , this c a n n o t h a p p e n if w e m u s t grasp the t r u t h o f w h a t is s i g n i f i e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h the s i g n . The

second, more

f a m i l i a r s c e p t i c a l strategy is to i n v o k e the

m o d e s . S o m e say that i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s exist a n d others d e n y it: N o w a n y o n e w h o says that there are i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s w i l l s p e a k either s i m p l y a n d w i t h o u t proof,

170

making a

mere

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

a s s e r t i o n , or else w i t h proof. B u t i f he m a k e s a m e r e a s s e r t i o n he w i l l be u n c o n v i n c i n g , a n d i f he w a n t s to give a p r o o f he will take for g r a n t e d the matter u n d e r investigation. F o r s i n c e p r o o f is s a i d to be a s p e c i e s o f s i g n , t h e n as it is c o n t r o v e r s i a l w h e t h e r t h e r e are a n y signs or n o t , t h e r e w i l l be c o n t r o v e r s y too a s to w h e t h e r there are a n y p r o o f s or n o t - j u s t a s , it y o u are i n v e s t i g a t i n g , say, w h e t h e r there are a n y a n i m a l s , y o u are a l s o i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h e t h e r there are a n y h u m a n s . . . it is a b s u r d to try to p r o v e w h a t is u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h r o u g h what is e q u a l l y u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r t h r o u g h i t s e l f . . . . (PH

2.121-2)

A n y p r o p o s e d a c c o u n t o l c r i t e r i a , signs or p r o o f s w i l l be d i s p u t e d . But t h e r e a p p e a r s to be n o w a y to p r o v i d e a n o n - a r b i t r a r y , or n o n q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , r e s o l u t i o n ot s u c h d i s p u t e s , a n d w e c a n n o t p r o v i d e an infinite s e r i e s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . S e x t u s s u m m a r i z e s the a p p l i c a t i o n of the t r i l e m m a a s f o l l o w s :

I n o r d e r for the d i s p u t e that h a s a r i s e n about c r i t e r i a to be d e c i d e d , w e m u s t p o s s e s s a n agreed c r i t e r i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h w e c a n j u d g e it; a n d i n o r d e r for u s to p o s s e s s a n a g r e e d c r i t e r i o n , t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t c r i t e r i a m u s t a l r e a d y have b e e n d e c i d e d . T h u s the a r g u m e n t falls into the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e a n d the d i s c o v e r y of a c r i t e r i o n is b l o c k e d - for w e d o not a l l o w t h e m to a s s u m e a c r i t e r i o n by h y p o t h e s i s , a n d it t h e y want to j u d g e the c r i t e r i o n b y a c r i t e r i o n w e t h r o w t h e m i n t o a n infinite regress.

(PH

2.20)

So it s e e m s w e c u r r e n t l y p o s s e s s n o m e a n s by w h i c h to reveal w h a t is not a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t o r c a n n o t b e c o m e a p p a r e n t t h r o u g h everydaysorts o f p r a c t i c e a n d o b s e r v a t i o n . T h u s d o g m a t i c e p i s t e m o l o g y is s t y m i e d . A l l o f the a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t o f c r i t e r i a , s i g n s or p r o o f s are m e t w i t h e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t s i n o p p o s i t i o n .

171

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Conclusion P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is o n l y a c h a l l e n g e to t h o s e w h o b e l i e v e it is i m p o r t a n t to resolve t h e s e p e r s i s t e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s w i t h s o m e n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g a r g u m e n t s that s h o w w h y o n e s i d e is r a t i o n a l l y preferable. It y o u d o not t h i n k this is i m p o r t a n t , t h e n y o u w i l l have n o m o t i v a t i o n to a d o p t a n d d e f e n d a p o s i t i o n . I n o r d e r for the P y r r h o n i s t ' s s c e p t i c a l c h a l l e n g e to be effective, he m u s t s h o w that y o u h a v e failed to a b i d e by y o u r o w n e p i s t e m i c p r i n c i p l e s . I f y o u are not c o m m i t t e d to these p r i n c i p l e s , y o u w i l l not be c o n c e r n e d w i t h any failure to a b i d e by t h e m , B u t it we accept the c h a l l e n g e , there a p p e a r s to be little h o p e of m e e t i n g it, T h e sceptic's a r s e n a l is impressive.

NINE

The (ordinary) life of a Pyrrhonist

T h e m o s t persistent o b j e c t i o n to P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is that lite is n o t p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t beliefs. T h i s m a y be a p p l i e d to the practice of s c e p t i c i s m as well as o r d i n a r y , d a y - t o - d a y activities. So w h i l e the s c e p tic goes s h o p p i n g , m a k e s breakfast or a r g u e s against d o g m a t i s t s , she is d e l u d e d if she t h i n k s she has n o beliefs, A c c o r d i n g to the o b j e c t i o n , all i n t e n t i o n a l , p u r p o s e f u l a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e sort of belief. T h e r e are t w o different types of r e s p o n s e the s c e p t i c m i g h t m a k e , or that we m i g h t m a k e o n her behalf. F i r s t , we c a n d e n y that a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s belief. I f so, the s c e p t i c is able to act w i t h o u t h o l d i n g any beliefs, a n d the s c o p e of epochs

m a y be u n r e s t r i c t e d . S e c o n d l y ,

we c a n agree that a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s belief a n d c l a i m that this is not a p r o b l e m b e c a u s e the s c e p t i c has the sort o f b e l i e f n e c e s s a r y for the relevant a c t i o n . I n this case, the s c o p e of epoche is l i m i t e d : the sceptic does not s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about everything.

1

I shall follow G a i l

F i n e ( 1 9 9 6 ) in r e f e r r i n g to t h e s e o p t i o n s as the " n o - b e l i e f v i e w " a n d the " s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w " r e s p e c t i v e l y

2

W h e t h e r Sextus offers a n o - b e l i e f v i e w or a s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w r e m a i n s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , T h e versatility o l the c o n c e p t o l b e l i e f c o m plicates the i s s u e f u r t h e r b y a l l o w i n g for v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n

each

c a m p . O n e attractive h y p o t h e s i s is that v e r s i o n s o f b o t h v i e w s a p p e a r i n S e x t u s ' w o r k , reflecting c o m p e t i n g s t r a n d s i n the h i s t o r y of P y r r h o n i s m . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this w o u l d s a d d l e Sextus w i t h t w o

17.1

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

i n c o m p a t i b l e s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e s : one c a n n o t , in p r a c t i c e , believe n o t h i n g a n d s o m e t h i n g . W h i l e 1 t h i n k it is n o n e t h e l e s s likely that b o t h v i e w s s h o w u p in S e x t u s ' w o r k , I also t h i n k the n o - b e l i e f v i e w m a k e s the s t r o n g e r a p p e a r a n c e . I n t h i s c h a p t e r 1 s h a l l a r g u e that the P y r r h o n i s t s reliance on appearances i n h e r sceptical practice as well as i n o r d i n a r y a n d s k i l f u l a c t i v i t i e s c o m m i t s h e r to n o beliefs.

To b e l i e v e or n o t to b e l i e v e T h e e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g force o f o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s or a p p e a r a n c e s l e a d s the s c e p t i c to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . I n o r d e r to o p p o s e a r g u m e n t s o r a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e y m u s t refer to the s a m e t h i n g . If it is not the s a m e tower that a p p e a r s n o w r o u n d a n d n o w s q u a r e , the a p p e a r a n c e s are not really o p p o s e d . S i m i l a r l y , i f t w o people use a key t e r m , s u c h as j u s t i c e , to m e a n different t h i n g s , they m a y have n o real d i s a g r e e m e n t . T o g e n u i n e l y disagree w i t h o n e a n o t h e r w e have to be t a l k i n g a b o u t the s a m e t h i n g s . A p p e a r a n c e s a n d a r g u m e n t s are e a s i l y o p p o s e d l o r the d o g m a tists i n so tar as he takes t h e m to refer to, a n d ideally to reveal, s o m e objective state of affairs. D o g m a t i s t s investigate w h a t e v e r a p p e a r s to be the case i n o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r it really is the case. T h e s c e p t i c , h o w e v e r , d o e s not investigate w h a t is a p p a r e n t , but rather w h a t is s a i d about w h a t is a p p a r e n t (PH 1 . 1 9 - 2 0 ) . W h a t the d o g m a tist t y p i c a l l y says is that s o m e a p p e a r a n c e is t r u e for s u c h a n d s u c h r e a s o n s . H e is not content to m e r e l y say that this is h o w it s e e m s . T h u s t h e object o l s c e p t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n is not the a p p e a r a n c e "that p\ but the a p p e a r a n c e "that p is t r u e " (PH 1.22) a n d , m o r e precisely, w h a t is s a i d a b o u t , a n d i n s u p p o r t of, the a p p e a r a n c e that p is true. Sextus r e m a r k s that t h e sceptic w i l l m e r e l y take the a p p e a r a n c e "that p " for g r a n t e d (PH

1.9).

T h e p r o b l e m is to d e t e r m i n e p r e c i s e l y w h a t the sceptic is d o i n g w h e n she takes a n a p p e a r a n c e for g r a n t e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , d o e s she believe w h a t s h e t a k e s for g r a n t e d or not? I n w h a t f o l l o w s I w i l l a s s u m e t h e s t a n d a r d a n a l y s i s o f belief; it S b e l i e v e s p , t h e n S assents to t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that p is t r u e .

|-|

THE

(ORDINARY)

L I E E OP A

PYRRHONIST

I i w h a t the s c e p t i c finds o b j e c t i o n a b l e about d o g m a t i s m is its i n s i s t e n c e that t h i n g s are as they a p p e a r i n s o m e cases, t h e n the n o belief v i e w is c o r r e c t . F o r i n that case, the sceptic w i l l n e v e r c l a i m that t h i n g s are as they appear. I n o t h e r w o r d s , she w i l l never assent to any a p p e a r a n c e " t h a t p is true". C o n s e q u e n t l y , given the s t a n d a r d a n a l y s i s of belief, she w i l l never b e l i e v e that p .

The s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w a n d j u d g e m e n t a l appearances. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if w h a t the s c e p t i c f i n d s o b j e c t i o n a b l e about d o g m a t i s m is its i n s i s t e n c e that t h i n g s are a s they a p p e a r far the reasons

advanced,

t h e n the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w w i l l be c o r r e c t . F o r i n

that case, the s c e p t i c d o e s not object to a s s e n t i n g to the a p p e a r a n c e "that p is true"; she objects o n l y to a s s e n t i n g o n the basis of s o m e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . S o she m a y b e l i e v e that p is t r u e as l o n g as this b e l i e f is not b a s e d o n r e a s o n s ; for it it is b a s e d o n r e a s o n s , she w i l l be i n c l i n e d by h e r s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n to a r g u e against it i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e e q u i p o l l e n c e a n d be r i d of the belief. A c c o r d i n g l y , the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w e m p h a s i z e s the lact that S e x tus e x p l i c i t l y offers h i s P y r r h o n i a n therapy to d o g m a t i s t s (e.g.

PH

3 . 2 8 0 ) . T h e d i s t u r b a n c e s that s c e p t i c i s m c a n c u r e are all b r e d of d o g m a t i c a m b i t i o n s to reveal the h i d d e n nature o f things. I f w e leave s u c h matters a l o n e , we w i l l not b e d i s t u r b e d , a n d we m a y c o n t i n u e to b e l i e v e in the m a n n e r o r d i n a r y people d o r e g a r d i n g o r d i n a r y t h i n g s , e x c l u s i v e l y o n the b a s i s of h o w they s e e m w i t h o u t a n y r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . O r d i n a r i l y , p e o p l e d o not i n v o k e m e t a p h y s i cal, e p i s t e n i o l o g i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s to s u p p o r t the belief that the cat is o n the mat. A n d they w o u l d p r o b a b l y b e at a c o m p l e t e loss i f one w e r e to c h a l l e n g e t h e m to p r o v i d e s u c h w e i g h t y s u p port for w h a t they find perfectly e v i d e n t . S i n c e t h e r e a p p e a r s to be n o i m m e d i a t e p r a c t i c a l benefit in f i n d i n g r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t for w h a t a l r e a d y w o r k s a n d is a l r e a d y clear, m o s t p e o p l e have n o interest i n d o i n g so. It is o n l y w h e n t h i n g s b r e a k d o w n , c o n t r a d i c t i o n s arise or i n c o h e r e n c e c r e e p s i n that p e o p l e b e g i n to c a l l Into q u e s t i o n w h a t is e v i d e n t l y the case. T h u s b e g i n s the p u r s u i t o f t r u t h , l e a d i n g to

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the d i s t u r b i n g d o g m a t i c beliefs that S e x t u s ' s c e p t i c a l t h e r a p y is s u p p o s e d to e l i m i n a t e . S c e p t i c a l l y acceptable beliefs, o n the o t h e r h a n d , are u n a v o i d a b l e , and i n e l i m i n a b l e . I d o n o t c h o o s e t o b e l i e v e , for e x a m p l e , that the b o o k is g r e e n , that h o n e y tastes sweet o r that I a m b e i n g affected i n w h a t e v e r w a y I a m b e i n g affected. S u c h a d v e n t i t i o u s beliefs m a y be w h a t S e x t u s h a s i n m i n d w h e n he r e m a r k s that sceptics "assent to the teelings forced u p o n t h e m b y a p p e a r a n c e s - for e x a m p l e , they w o u l d not say, w h e n heated o r c h i l l e d , ' I t h i n k 1 a m n o t heated ( o r : c h i l l e d ) " ' l . l 3J. W h a t they resist is a s s e n t i n g to any u n c l e a r object o f s c i -

{PH

entific investigation. S i n c e w h a t is d i s p u t e d i s w h e t h e r o r n o t s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n is true, a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y w h e t h e r the r e a s o n s a d v a n c e d i n s u p p o r t establish this t r u t h , the sceptic o n l y needs to a v o i d a c c e p t i n g that s o m e t h i n g i s t r u e based on rational

considerations.

I f Sextus is u s i n g the t e r m " a s s e n t " i n s o m e t h i n g like the Stoic sense, there m u s t be s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e feeli n g s forced o n t h e s c e p t i c . O t h e r w i s e , t h e feeling o r a p p e a r a n c e s h e receives w i l l not be " s a y i n g " a n y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h s h e m i g h t agree. A n d i n o r d e r to c a p t u r e the i m m e d i a t e a n d i n v o l u n t a r y nature o f the assent, w e m a y t h i n k o f the a p p e a r a n c e s h e receives as judgemental: it w i l l c o n t a i n o r i m p l y the j u d g e m e n t that s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n a r t i c u l a t i n g the content o f the a p p e a r a n c e is true. B u t w h a t i s the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of s u c h a p p e a r a n c e s ? T h e a p p e a r a n c e that the b o o k is green m a y be a r t i c u l a t e d b y t w o distinct propositions: T h e b o o k is g r e e n . H i e a p p e a r a n c e o f the b o o k is g r e e n . T h e s u b j e c t of the first p r o p o s i t i o n is an object in the w o r l d : the b o o k . T h e s u b j e c t o f the s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n i s a m e n t a l state; the a p p e a r a n c e o l t h e b o o k . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n refers to the w a y o n e is affected, w h i l e the first relers to w h a t i s c a u s i n g the affection. W e s h o u l d note t h e difference b e t w e e n w h a t w o u l d have to be the case i n o r d e r for e a c h o l these p r o p o s i t i o n s to b e true. H i e first one w o u l d be true, o n a s t a n d a r d , c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y o f t r u t h ,

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just i n case t h e b o o k i s g r e e n . T h e s e c o n d o n e w o u l d be true, a g a i n o n a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e theory, just i n case t h e b o o k a p p e a r s g r e e n . T h e first p r o p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h a fact about t h e w o r l d that i s e x t e r n a l to the agent w h i l e the s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h the m e n t a l state o n e h a s w h e n the b o o k a p p e a r s g r e e n . Let u s c o n s i d e r each o f these i n t u r n . F i r s t , d o e s t h e sceptic believe that t h e b o o k is green i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the a p p e a r a n c e ? O n at least o n e o c c a s i o n , S e x t u s s e e m s to say that h e j u d g e s h o w p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s are o n t h e basis o f h o w they a p p e a r : N o t h i n g is o f a n a t u r e to be g r a s p e d b y m e a n s o f itself; ever y t h i n g is g r a s p e d b y m e a n s o f a n effect, w h i c h is o t h e r t h a n w h a t p r o d u c e s it, the t h i n g that appears. F o r w h e n h o n e y has b e e n brought to m e a n d 1 h a v e b e e n s w e e t e n e d , I guess that the e x t e r n a l l y e x i s t i n g h o n e y i s s w e e t , a n d w h e n fire h a s b e e n b r o u g h t to m e a n d I have b e e n w a r m e d , I take the c o n d i t i o n in m e as a sign that the e x t e r n a l l y e x i s t i n g fire is w a r m , a n d the s a m e a r g u m e n t applies i n the case o f o t h e r perceptible things.

( M 7.365, e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

By " g u e s s i n g " that h o n e y is sweet a n d by " t a k i n g " the fire to be w a r m , S e x t u s s e e m s to be s a y i n g that t h e sceptic b e l i e v e s these t h i n g s . I f s o , t h i s c o u l d h e l p u s u n d e r s t a n d the sense i n w h i c h Sextus c h a m p i o n s o r d i n a r y life {bios; e.g. PH 2 . 2 4 4 - 6 , 2.254, 2 . 2 5 8 , 3 . 2 3 5 ) . II w e o r d i n a r i l y take the w a y t h i n g s a p p e a r t o i n d i c a t e t h e w a y they are, the b u s i n e s s o f o r d i n a r y life w i l l be c o n d u c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h j u d g e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s . T h i s applies not o n l y to s i m p l e s e n sations, but also to e v a l u a t i v e j u d g e m e n t s a n d p r e d i c t i o n s : it s e e m s , a n d w e believe, that h u r t i n g i n n o c e n t p e o p l e is w r o n g , that r u n n i n g red lights i s d a n g e r o u s a n d that a w i n d o w w i l l shatter w h e n h i t by a rock. Our

ability to m a k e a c c u r a t e p r e d i c t i o n s is a c r u c i a l e l e m e n t

of e v e r y d a y life. A s w e h a v e seen, S e x t u s d e s c r i b e s t h i s i n t e r m s of recollective s i g n s , w h i c h " l e a d us to recall t h e t h i n g w h i c h h a s b e e n o b s e r v e d together w i t h it a n d is n o t n o w m a k i n g a n e v i d e n t i m p r e s s i o n o n u s (as i n the c a s e o f s m o k e a n d fire)" {PH 2 . 1 0 0 ) . A

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recollective sign m a y be u n d e r s t o o d as a j u d g e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e : w h e n 1 see s m o k e , I also receive the a p p e a r a n c e that there is s o m e fire there. T h e s c e p t i c w i l l register h e r tentative b e l i e f by s a y i n g , "there appears to b e a fire". O b v i o u s l y t h i s is not a matter of a c t u a l l y s e e i n g the fire, b u t r a t h e r it s e e m i n g to her that there is s o m e fire c a u s i n g the s m o k e . O f c o u r s e it r e m a i n s possible that things are not what they appear to be. T h e sceptic c a n easily a c k n o w l e d g e this by h o l d i n g h e r beliefs w i t h the a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e s t y . S h e o n l y tentatively b e l i e v e s the a p p e a r a n c e s f o r c e d o n h e r a n d s h e is entirely o p e n to the p o s s i b i l i t y that things m a y not be as they s e e m , I n any case, she is j u s t as r e a d y as a n y o t h e r P y r r h o n i s t to d i s p u t e d o g m a t i c c l a i m s about n o n - e v i d e n t matters. W h i l e there is m o r e that c a n be s a i d i n s u p p o r t of this view, there are p o w e r f u l o b j e c t i o n s to be r a i s e d . F i r s t , o n at least two o c c a s i o n s Sextus says that sceptics affirm n o t h i n g about e x t e r n a l objects, w h i c h he explicitly contrasts w i t h what is apparent a n d w i t h the w a y the sceptic feels (PH 1.15,

1.208). I n r e p o r t i n g h o w she feels t h e n she is

not s a y i n g a n y t h i n g about the e x t e r n a l objects. A n d , m o r e generally, S e x t u s i n s i s t s that w h e n e v e r he talks about things he s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as t a l k i n g about h o w they a p p e a r (see e s p e c i a l l y Sextus i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k at PH

1

1.4).

S e c o n d l y , the p e r s i s t e n c e o f the apmxhi

objection strongly s u g -

gests that the S c e p t i c s o p p o n e n t s d u g i n their heals o n p r e c i s e l y 1

this p o i n t : a c t i o n is i m p o s s i b l e l o r o n e w h o h a s n o beliefs. If the S c e p t i c s a c t u a l l y c l a i m e d to assent to the t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about the externa] w o r l d i m p l i c i t in a p p e a r a n c e s , they w o u l d have h a d a s i m p l e a n d c o n c l u s i v e r e s p o n s e : a c t i o n is possible tor us b e c a u s e we have all the o r d i n a r y beliefs that e v e r y o n e else h a s . B u t we have n o e v i d e n c e that a n y P y r r h o n i s t offered this response, S o it s e e m s that at least s o m e P y r r h o n i s t s w e r e r e c o m m e n d i n g a lite w i t h o u t b e l i e f i n the o r d i n a r y sense. Let us t u r n to the s e c o n d k i n d o l p r o p o s i t i o n to w h i c h the s c e p t i c m i g h t assent. D o e s the s c e p t i c believe that the a p p e a r a n c e of the b o o k is g r e e n ? If so, her belief is solely about the m e n t a l state she is i n at that m o m e n t a n d not about the e x t e r n a l object that is s u p -

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p o s e d l y the c a u s e o f h e r e x p e r i e n c e , T h i s m a y be w h a t Sextus has i n m i n d w h e n he identifies p a s s i v e a n d u n w i l l e d feelings a s the s t a n d a r d a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the sceptic g u i d e s her a c t i o n s {PH

1.22,1.13).

A s w i t h the first v e r s i o n o f t h i s v i e w , the a p p e a r a n c e that the b o o k is g r e e n c a r r i e s w i t h it a j u d g e m e n t - but in t h i s case, it is the j u d g e m e n t that the b o o k a p p e a r s g r e e n , or that o n e is affected greenly. We m a y apply this interpretation to the sceptic's reliance o n recol¬ lective s i g n s as w e l l . H a v i n g o b s e r v e d a scar, s h e says that a w o u n d w a s i n f l i c t e d , or "there appears to h a v e b e e n a w o u n d here". S h e m i g h t m e a n that s h e c a n n o t h e l p but to t h i n k o f w o u n d s w h e n she sees s c a r s . I f so, s h e is s i m p l y r e p o r t i n g h o w the o b s e r v a t i o n affects her. S i m i l a r l y , we m a y say that s m o k e serves as a sign o n l y i n d r a w i n g the m i n d o n to expect a n o t h e r sort of a p p e a r a n c e . A n advantage of this v e r s i o n o f the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w is that it a l l o w s us to e x p l a i n w h y the Sceptics' o p p o n e n t s c o n t i n u e d to raise the s p e c t r e of apraxia.

I f the o b j e c t i o n is that a c t i o n r e q u i r e s belief

about e x t e r n a l objects, it w i l l c o n t i n u e to apply to those w h o c l a i m not to h a v e s u c h beliefs, T h i s v i e w also a l l o w s us to u n d e r s t a n d h o w the sceptical reply m i g h t go. S e x t u s w o u l d be c l a i m i n g that a l t h o u g h the s c e p t i c l a c k s beliefs about e x t e r n a l objects, she n o n e t h e l e s s has beliefs (about her o w n m e n t a l states) that are sufficient for a c t i o n , A n o t h e r a d v a n t a g e is that it reveals just h o w strange a c h a r a c t e r the s c e p t i c i s . T h i s is fitting, s i n c e S e x t u s s o m e t i m e s presents h i m s e l f as the c h a m p i o n o f s c e p t i c i s m i n o p p o s i t i o n to o r d i n a r y life a s w e l l as d o g m a t i s m . S c e p t i c s are indifferent to the o p i n i o n ot the m a n y ( A i 1,5); i n d e e d , P y r r h o is a m o d e l o f sceptical eccentricity. M o r e i m p o r tantly, o r d i n a r y people are o n l y m a r g i n a l l y less likely to be d i s t u r b e d than p h i l o s o p h e r s (e.g. PH

1.30), I n t e r m i n a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y is not

the exclusive d o m a i n ot intellectuals [PH

1,165). O r d i n a r y people

disagree about; w h i c h g o d s exist; w h e t h e r h e a l t h , w e a l t h or w i s d o m is the greatest g o o d ( A i 11.49), u n l e s s it is sex, gluttony, d r u n k e n ness or g a m b l i n g ( P H 3 , 1 8 0 ) ; a n d even w h e t h e r apparent t h i n g s are intelligible o r p e r c e p t i b l e ( A i 8 , 3 5 5 ) . T h e p o i n t is that the d i v i d e b e t w e e n o r d i n a r y p e o p l e a n d d o g m a t i s t s is not n e a r l y a s w i d e as the o n e b e t w e e n t h e m a n d the S c e p t i c s . T h e Sceptic's r e f u s a l to believe a n y t h i n g about e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s h e l p s to e x p l a i n t h i s d i v i d e .

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T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m w i t h this v i e w . W h e n Sextus d i s c u s s e s the q u e s t i o n ot w h e t h e r s c e p t i c s h o l d beliefs, he r e m a r k s that " i f y o u h o l d beliefs, then y o u posit a s real the t h i n g s y o u are s a i d to h o l d beliefs a b o u t " (PH 1.14). It f o l l o w s i m m e d i a t e l y that if the sceptic h o l d s beliefs a b o u t her m e n t a l states, she posits m e n t a l states as real. B u t c l e a r l y the s c e p t i c s h o u l d a v o i d s u c h d o g matic commitments. M e n t a l states are theoretical entities that are hotly d i s p u t e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s . U n d e r s t o o d as objective features o f the w o r l d , about w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s m a y b e true o r false, they are not i d e n t i c a l to p e r c e p t u a l a w a r e n e s s , u n d e r s t o o d f r o m the f i r s t - p e r s o n p e r s p e c tive. W h i l e s o m e d e n y the v e r y existence of m e n t a l states, n o one s i n c e r e l y d e n i e s that she feels a s she d o e s . So if the b e l i e f that she is b e i n g p e r c e p t u a l l y s w e e t e n e d c o m m i t s the s c e p t i c to the existence of m e n t a l states ( o r s o m e o t h e r s u p p o s e d l y real entity c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the p r o p o s i t i o n a l content o l her b e l i e f ) t h e n she s h o u l d not h a v e s u c h beliefs. A s i m i l a r p r o b l e m arises if we a s k the s o m e - b e l i e l s c e p t i c w h y she b e l i e v e s she is p e r c e p t u a l l y s w e e t e n e d w h e n she tastes h o n e y . T h e r e are two k i n d s of r e s p o n s e she c a n m a k e , n e i t h e r of w h i c h are sceptically suitable. C l e a r l y s h e w i l l not r e s p o n d w i t h a n a c c o u n t o l the r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s i n s u p p o r t o f h e r belief; a s w e h a v e s e e n , she w o u l d o n l y d o that i n o r d e r to b a l a n c e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l force o f the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t o f the o p p o s i n g view. B u t n e i t h e r s h o u l d she offer a p u r e l y c a u s a l a c c o u n t s h o w i n g h o w she c o u l d not h e l p b e l i e v i n g as she d o e s . I f she a p p e a l s to the s u p p o s e d fact that she c o u l d not resist b e l i e v i n g that the h o n e y a p p e a r s sweet, she w i l l o n c e again m o v e b e y o n d w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y apparent a n d stray i n t o the d o g m a t i c territory ot u n c l e a r a n d d i s p u t e d matters.

The no-belief v i e w and phenomenological appearances O n the o t h e r h a n d , if the s c e p t i c h a s n o beliefs she w i l l not have to a n s w e r a n y q u e s t i o n s about w h y s h e believes as she d o e s . I n o r d e r to s e e h o w this is p o s s i b l e we w i l l n e e d to a r t i c u l a t e a n o n - c o g n i t i v e ,

THE

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v i e w of a p p e a r a n c e s . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s v i e w ,

a p p e a r a n c e s c o n t a i n or i m p l y n o p r o p o s i t i o n s e i t h e r a b o u t e x t e r n a l objects o r e v e n about m e n t a l states. W h e n the s c e p t i c r e p o r t s o n the a p p a r e n t s w e e t n e s s o f h o n e y , she is o n l y telling us a b o u t t h e w a y t h i n g s are c u r r e n t l y affecting her. She w i l l be u s i n g l a n g u a g e not to express s o m e fact but rather s i m p l y to c o n v e y h o w she is feeling. It w i l l still be p o s s i b l e to a r t i c u l a t e s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n to c o r r e s p o n d to t h e c o n t e n t o f h e r feeling. B u t il the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i a c c o u n t is c o r r e c t , it is n o t n e c e s s a r y for h e r to d o so. S u c h a r t i c u l a t i o n is a c o g n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n that is d i s t i n c t f r o m b e i n g p a s s i v e l y affected by the w a y t h i n g s appear. It she a r t i c u l a t e s the p r o p o s i t i o n a n d assents to it she w i l l h a v e m o v e d b e y o n d w h a t is e v i d e n t a n d t a k e n a s t a n d o n w h a t is really t h e case, regardless o f w h e t h e r she h a s a n y r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s for that s t a n d . B u t again, s u c h a step is not n e c e s s a r y ; s i m p l e o r g a n i s m s , for e x a m p l e , are affected b y the w o r l d w i t h o u t a r t i c u l a t ing any propositional content. It the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i v i e w o f a p p e a r a n c e s is c o r r e c t , n o beliefs are u n a v o i d a b l e a n d i n e l i m e n a b l e , a n d n o b e l i e ! is i m m u n e f r o m s c e p t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s . It w i l l still be the case that I c a n n o t help feeli n g p a i n w h e n I d o or tasting s w e e t n e s s w h e n I do, but I a m never c o m p e l l e d to believe anythingijfcouf these feelings. O n the p h e n o m enologicai v i e w , a p p e a r a n c e s d o not c o m e b u n d l e d w i t h j u d g e m e n t s . O n c e I take the c o g n i t i v e attitude that s o m e part of the w o r l d is d e t e r m i n a t e l y o n e w a y rather t h a n a n o t h e r , that is, that p is t r u e , I m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y c l a i m n o t - p is true. A n d o n c e these p r o p o s i t i o n s have b e e n o p p o s e d , I w i l l be led b y the s c e p t i c to see, regardless of w h e t h e r I c u r r e n t l y have any r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s for m y b e l i e ! that p, that there is as m u c h to b e s a i d i n s u p p o r t of the o n e as for the other. T o a v o i d s u c h p r o b l e m s , the P y r r h o n i s t s h o u l d h o l d n o beliefs. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i a c c o u n t of a p p e a r a n c e s h o w s h o w she m a y a v o i d d o i n g so w h i l e n o n e t h e l e s s p a s s i v e l y a c q u i e s c i n g , that is, not resisting, t h e n a t u r a l p u s h a n d p u l l o l a p p e a r a n c e s , T h i s v i e w e n j o y s the advantages I have attributed to the last, s o m e belief, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : it s h o w s j u s t h o w strange a c h a r a c t e r the P y r r h o n i s t is; it e x p l a i n s the p e r s i s t e n c e of the aprnxia

objection; a n d

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it p r e s e r v e s the r a d i c a l n a t u r e o f P y r r h o n i s m . It a l s o p r e s e r v e s the a p p a r e n t l y u n i v e r s a l r e a c h ot the P y r r h o n i s t s a r g u m e n t s , a n d a l l o w s us to take S e x t u s at h i s w o r d w h e n he repeatedly insists that the sceptic s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g .

External world scepticism To c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n this v i e w , we w i l l have to a d m i t that r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m challenges beliefs about the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a l o n g w i t h t h i n g s s u c h as m e n t a l states a n d c a u s a l l a w s . A t M 7.366, Sextus argues that aIIexternal

t h i n g s are u n c l e a r a n d u n k n o w n

to u s . I f w e interpret this quite b r o a d l y it w i l l i n c l u d e not o n l y the p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i n g s , but also their v e r y e x i s t e n c e .

3

I f the e x t e r n a l

w o r l d is p e r m a n e n t l y a n d i r r e v o c a b l y u n c l e a r , w h a t entitles u s to t h i n k that it exists i n the first place? Sextus attributes to the C y r e n a i c s the v i e w that e v e r y o n e is i n f a l lible w i t h respect to the w a y t h i n g s affect t h e m . O n e c a n n o t b e m i s t a k e n that she is affected greenly, or sweetly, but it is i m p o s s i b l e to ever k n o w w h e t h e r the c a u s e of the affection is g r e e n or s w e e t * " F o r the effect that h a p p e n s i n us r e v e a l s to u s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n itself. H e n c e . . . o n l y the effect is apparent to u s ; the e x t e r n a l t h i n g p r o d u c t i v e of the effect is p e r h a p s a b e i n g , but it is not a p p a r e n t to u s " ( M 7.194). S e x t u s differentiates the s c e p t i c f r o m the C y r e n a i c o n p r e c i s e l y this k e y p o i n t : " W e s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t (as far as the a r g u m e n t g o e s ) a b o u t e x t e r n a l e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , w h i l e the C y r e n a i c s assert that they have a n i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e n a t u r e " (PH 1.215). A s F i n e ( 1 9 9 6 : 2 8 1 ) p o i n t s out, w e m a y take the s c e p t i c h e r e to be s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t o n l y a b o u t the e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s of t h i n g s , or m o r e b r o a d l y about w h e t h e r they e v e n exist. T h e s c e p t i c s epochs r e g a r d i n g t h e external w o r l d poses n o p a r t i c u lar p r o b l e m p r o v i d e d we r e m e m b e r that it is not the s a m e as C a r t e s i a n doubt. T h e P y r r h o n i s t does not hypothetically entertain, o r w o r r y about, the p o s s i b i l i t y that n o t h i n g exists except her m e n t a l states. N o r d o e s she i n v o k e the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality i n o r d e r to c l a i m that a p p e a r a n c e s reveal o n l y themselves, as the C y r e n a -

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ics d o . It m a y be the case that f r o m the t h i r d - p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , we n e e d s o m e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e to m a k e sense of the v e r y i d e a o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l , or e v e n j u d g e m e n t a l , appearances. But the sceptic d o e s not need to m a k e sense out ot the ontological status of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l entity s h e is a s s e n t i n g to. She d o e s not, a n d n e e d not, take a p o s i t i o n o n w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l or j u d g e m e n t a l v i e w o l a p p e a r a n c e is the right one. B e i n g m o v e d b y the way t h i n g s a p p e a r r e q u i r e s n o c o m m i t m e n t to the n a t u r e of m e n t a l states, or the m e c h a n i c s o l h u m a n p e r c e p t i o n a n d b e h a v i o u r , as long as she d o e s not take it to be true that she is s o affected. So, o n o n e h a n d , the P y r r h o n i s t w i l l not be s c e p t i c a l about the existence ot the e x t e r n a l w o r l d in so far as that p r e s u p p o s e s a n o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality. E x t e r n a l w o r l d s c e p t i c i s m , u n d e r s t o o d as s o l i p s i s m , d e n i e s that c e r t a i n k i n d s of entities exist: m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t objects a n d agents. It is a k i n d of negative d o g m a t i s m . B y contrast, the P y r r h o n i s t will s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r s o m e object really exists in s o far as real existe n c e is s u p p o s e d to be s o m e t h i n g b e y o n d w h a t is apparent. B u t e v e n if we grant that the s c e p t i c c a n navigate t h r o u g h the w o r l d b y r e l y i n g o n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p e a r a n c e s , it is n o t so e a s y to see h o w s h e c a n c o n d u c t h e r a r g u m e n t a t i v e practice w i t h o u t h o l d i n g a n y beliefs. A n d e v e n if we c a n s h o w that the s c e p t i c is i n d e e d able to d o e v e r y t h i n g s h e c l a i m s to be able to d o w i t h o u t any beliefs, we s h o u l d still w o n d e r w h e t h e r s u c h a life is e v e n remotely d e s i r a b l e . H o w , for e x a m p l e , c a n the sceptic ever a c q u i r e a n y m o r a l v i r t u e s w i t h o u t evaluative c o m m i t m e n t s ? H o w c a n she d e v e l o p any p r a c t i c a l skills? A n d h o w c a n she l e a r n a n y t h i n g i f she refuses to believe?

The fourfold observances I n o r d e r to a n s w e r these q u e s t i o n s , a n d f u r t h e r d e v e l o p the n o - b e l i e f view, w e shall e x a m i n e Sextus' fourfold observances: A t t e n d i n g to w h a t is apparent, w e live i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h e v e r y d a y o b s e r v a n c e s , w i t h o u t h o l d i n g o p i n i o n s - for we

LS3

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

are not able to be utterly i n a c t i v e . T h e s e e v e r y d a y o b s e r v ances s e e m to be f o u r f o l d , a n d to c o n s i s t i n (ij g u i d a n c e by nature, [ii] n e c e s s i t a t i o n by feelings, [iii] h a n d i n g d o w n o l l a w s a n d c u s t o m s , a n d [iv] t e a c h i n g o f k i n d s o l expertise. B y n a t u r e s g u i d a n c e we are naturally capable of p e r c e i v i n g a n d t h i n k i n g . B y the n e c e s s i t a t i o n of feelings, h u n g e r c o n d u c t s us to l o o d a n d thirst to d r i n k . B y the h a n d i n g d o w n o l c u s t o m s a n d l a w s , we accept, f r o m a n e v e r y d a y p o i n t o f v i e w , that piety is g o o d a n d i m p i e t y b a d . B y t e a c h i n g o f k i n d s o l e x p e r t i s e w e are not inactive i n t h o s e w h i c h w e accept, (PH

1.23-4}

It is p o s s i b l e to interpret these o b s e r v a n c e s as a c t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the tentative, s o r t s of beliefs c o u n t e n a n c e d o n the s o m e - b e l i e l v i e w s . W e c o u l d say that s o m e o n e s e e k s f o o d b e c a u s e h e feels, a n d t h u s b e l i e v e s , he is h u n g r y . A n d we c o u l d say that s o m e o n e obeys the laws b e c a u s e it s e e m s to h i m , a n d thus he believes, it is right or at least p r u d e n t i a l to d o so. O n the o t h e r h a n d , it is a l s o possible to interpret these o b s e r v ances

as a c t i o n

in a c c o r d a n c e

with

the

sceptics

dispositions,

w i t h o u t a p p e a l i n g to a n y beliefs. T h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f s u c h i n t e r p r e tations, to be d e v e l o p e d b e l o w , a l o n g w i t h the o b j e c t i o n s to the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w o u t l i n e d above, s h o u l d w e i g h in favour o l the n o belief view.

Sceptical

assent and pathological

(i) nature's

guidance

and

detachment:

(ii) the necessitation

of

feelings

T h e feeling of t h i r s t leads u s to seek s o m e t h i n g to d r i n k a n d h u n g e r to f o o d , j u s t as p a i n leads a d o g to r e m o v e the t h o r n f r o m its p a w {PH

1.238). T h e n e c e s s i t y is j u s t a matter of n a t u r a l reflex. C l e a r l y a

d o g d o e s not n e e d beliefs about t h o r n s a n d p a i n to b e h a v e t h i s way. A n d s i m i l a r l y , o n e does not n e e d beliefs about f o o d a n d d r i n k to seek t h e m o u t . Sextus e x a m p l e s of the necessitation of feeling all deal w i t h a c t i o n s 1

we have i n c o m m o n w i t h n o n - r a t i o n a l a n i m a l s . S u c h a c t i o n s are r o o t e d i n o u r natures: a d o g d o e s not n e e d to be t r a i n e d to favour a n

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i n j u r e d leg, n o r d o h u m a n b e i n g s n e e d to b e taught to seek f o o d a n d shelter. S i m i l a r l y , w e d o not n e e d to be taught to p e r c e i v e s e n s i b l e qualities; b y o u r n a t u r e we are able to see the c o l o u r w h i t e , to taste sweet or to feel heat ( A i 8 . 2 0 3 ) . O b v i o u s l y w e are far m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n this. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the first o b s e r v a n c e , o u r n a t u r e g u i d e s us not o n l y to perceive, but also to t h i n k . A n d here we c o n f r o n t a p r o b l e m : h o w c a n we c o n t i n u e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t w h i l e nature guides us to t h i n k ? Belief appears to be a n essential part o f t h i n k i n g , b o t h as c a u s e a n d as effect. T h i n k i n g leads us to b e l i e v e s o m e t h i n g s a n d reject others. A n d beliefs i n t u r n i n s p i r e t h o u g h t . T o sever the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g a n d b e l i e v i n g s e e m s to u n d e r m i n e b o t h . T h e s c e p t i c d o e s not n e e d to sever t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , h o w e v e r , s i n c e it is n o t n e c e s s a r y to t h i n k a b o u t o n e s own beliefs to b e t h i n k i n g . O n e m a y have all sorts of thoughts about w h a t o t h e r s believe. I m i g h t reflect o n the beliefs o f C h a l d e a n astrologers w i t h o u t a c c e p t i n g a n y o f t h o s e o d d c l a i m s myself. M e r e l y t h i n k i n g about these t h i n g s d o e s not n e c e s s a r i l y entail b e l i e f - a g a i n o n the s t a n d a r d v i e w of belief - as l o n g a s I d o not have the a d d i t i o n a l t h o u g h t that the a s t r o l o g i cal c l a i m s are true o r false. F u r t h e r m o r e , the s c e p t i c w i l l not a c c e p t that the p u r p o s e of t h i n k i n g is to i m p r o v e one's s t o c k o f beliefs. S h e w i l l have n o beliefs a b o u t w h y we t h i n k , or w h y w e s h o u l d t h i n k ; s h e m e r e l y f i n d s h e r s e l f c a p a b l e of thought, j u s t a s she finds h e r s e l f c a p a b l e o f p e r c e p t i o n . B u t b e i n g a w a r e o f the f l o w ot t h o u g h t s d o e s not require h e r to c o m m i t to the truth or talsity o f a n y of t h e m ; h e n c e sceptical t h i n k i n g occurs without believing. E v e n g r a n t i n g this r e s p o n s e , there is still o n e p r o b l e m a t i c difference b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g a n d p e r c e i v i n g . It m a k e s s e n s e to say, " I t s e e m s to m e that there is a p u d d l e of w a t e r o n the r o a d , but I s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as to w h e t h e r it is really there". I n t h i s a n d o t h e r f a m i l i a r s c e n a r i o s , w e suffer n o c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e in e n t e r t a i n i n g a p e r c e p t i o n w i t h o u t a s s e n t i n g to it. B u t the s a m e a n a l y s i s does not s e e m to h o l d tor t h i n k i n g , or tor s t a t e m e n t s o f h o w t h i n g s s e e m to us intellectually/ Sextus insists that s u c h intellectual s e e m i n g s s h o u l d be u n d e r stood m e r e l y as feelings rather t h a n p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n s . O n c e a g a i n

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he is o n l y r e p o r t i n g h o w he is c u r r e n t l y affected, this t i m e b y the arguments: W h e n S c e p t i c s say "I d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g " w h a t they say is this: "I n o w feel i n s u c h a w a y a s n e i t h e r to posit d o g m a t i cally n o r to reject a n y of the t h i n g s t a i l i n g u n d e r this i n v e s t i g a t i o n " W h e n they say this they are s a y i n g w h a t is apparent to t h e m about the subject p r o p o s e d - not d o g m a t i c a l l y m a k i n g a c o n f i d e n t a s s e r t i o n , but d e s c r i b i n g a n d r e p o r t i n g h o w they feel.

(PH

1.197; see a l s o 1.7, 15, 193, 198,

200)

T h e s e passages all reterto a specifically intellectual feeling, w h i c h leads the sceptic to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , o r rather prevents her f r o m m a k i n g a j u d g e m e n t . C o n s i d e r the P y r r h o n i s t s r e m a r k that it s e e m s to m e that o p p o s e d to e v e r y a c c o u n t is an e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l o n e , b u t I s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as to w h e t h e r this is really the case {PH

1.202-5).

H o w c a n that b e ? H o w c a n it s e e m to the s c e p t i c that, for e x a m p l e , h o n e s t y is the best p o l i c y w h i l e she n o n e t h e l e s s s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r it is the best p o l i c y ? W h a t c a n the s e e m i n g a m o u n t to i n s u c h cases if n o t b e l i e v i n g ? M o r e to the point, h o w c a n s u c h a s s e r t i o n s as " I d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g " a n d " o p p o s e d to e v e r y c l a i m is an e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l o n e " g u i d e the s c e p t i c s a r g u m e n t a t i v e practice unless she believes them? A c c o r d i n g to this o b j e c t i o n , in o r d e r for m e to t r u t h f u l l y d e n y that 1 believe w h a t s e e m s to be the case, I w o u l d have to be s c h i z o p h r e n i c . 1 w o u l d literally have to be o f two m i n d s : it c o u l d t h e n s e e m to o n e o l m y m i n d s that h o n e s t y is the best policy, a n d to a n o t h e r ot m y m i n d s that I have n o beliel o n the m a t t e r s i n c e the a r g u m e n t s f o r a n d against are equally b a l a n c e d . I f s o the s c e p t i c c a n c o n t i n u e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h a t s e e m s , intellectually, to be the case o n l y at the cost of a p a t h o l o g i c a l d e t a c h m e n t f r o m h e r o w n m e n t a l states, T r a n q u i l lity w o u l d c o m e at the c o s t o f s e r i o u s m e n t a l illness. S o w h i l e it m i g h t be p o s s i b l e to c a r r y o n that way, n o o n e i n h i s right m i n d w o u l d . W e m a y t r y to meet this o b j e c t i o n , o n b e h a l f o f the s c e p t i c , by a p p e a l i n g o n c e a g a i n to p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p e a r a n c e s a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , T h e o b j e c t i o n a r i s e s f r o m the a s s u m p t i o n that

186

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w h e n it s e e m s ( i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ) to m e that p, I represent this as my appearance.

S o w h e n it a p p e a r s to m e that h o n e s t y is t h e best p o l i c y

I a m not m e r e l y d i s p o s e d to h o n e s t b e h a v i o u r , I a m a l s o c o n s c i o u s l y a w a r e of t h e fact that I a m so d i s p o s e d , p e r h a p s b y a r t i c u l a t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the a p p e a r a n c e . I f so, t h e j u d g e m e n tal v i e w o f a p p e a r a n c e s has crept i n t o t h e a c c o u n t . F o r n o w , w h e n the s c e p t i c a c k n o w l e d g e s the i n t e l l e c t u a l a p p e a r a n c e that honestyis the best policy, she a l s o assents to the fact that she is c o g n i t i v e l y d i s p o s e d in this way. B u t the s c e p t i c m a y be caught u p i n t h e f l o w o f t h o u g h t s to s u c h a n extent that she does not b e c o m e a w a r e o f a n y o f t h e s e i n t e l l e c tual a p p e a r a n c e s as h e r o w n . T h i s is a f a m i l i a r e x p e r i e n c e : w h e n w e are totally e n g a g e d i n s o m e project, all w e are a w a r e of are the thoughts t h e m s e l v e s , a n d n o t o u r r a t i o n a l o r c o n s c i o u s r e l a t i o n to those t h o u g h t s . T h e c o n s c i o u s agent b e c o m e s w h o l l y e n g r o s s e d i n the activity. W e c a n f i n d this line of thought in the s t o r y about t h e p a i n t e r A p e l l e s (PH

1.23; see C h a p t e r 7). A s l o n g a s he struggles to get the

d e s i r e d effect of f o a m o n the h o r s e s m o u t h , he is f r u s t r a t e d . T h e d o g m a t i c u s e of reason s i m i l a r l y l e a d s to f r u s t r a t i o n , w h i l e the s c e p tical p r a c t i c e y i e l d s tranquillity. W h a t A p e l l e s a n d the s c e p t i c have i n c o m m o n is that they get t h e i r d e s i r e d results in u n e x p e c t e d w a y s ; s u c c e s s c o m e s o n its o w n , i n d i r e c t l y . T h i s suggests a s i m i l a r i t y w i t h Z e n m e d i t a t i o n . C o n s c i o u s l y s t r u g g l i n g to c l e a r t h e m i n d is c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . S u c c e s s o n l y c o m e s b y w a y of a different s o r t of effort. R a t h e r than actively s t r i v i n g , w e m u s t s i m p l y a l l o w the d e s i r e d result to o c c u r . T h i s is not a matter of c o m p l e t e l y g i v i n g up, but rather p u t t i n g o n e s e l f in t h e right c o n d i t i o n to a l l o w t h e d e s i r e d result to o c c u r . A n d that i n t u r n r e q u i r e s first d e v e l o p i n g the r i g h t s o r t s of dispositions through practice. It the P y r r h o n i s t s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t i n r e s p o n s e to a n a r g u m e n t that s h e has not yet m a n a g e d to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e , she n e e d not c o n s c i o u s l y i n v o k e the p r i n c i p l e that o p p o s e d to e v e r y a c c o u n t is a n e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l o n e . T h e a c c o m p l i s h e d s c e p t i c w i l l have n o n e e d to refer to s u c h p r i n c i p l e s , j u s t a s a g r a n d m a s t e r w o u l d n e v e r i n t e r r u p t h i s g a m e to c o n s u l t a r u l e b o o k . W h e n S e x t u s d i s c u s s e s the s c e p t i c a l

187

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SCEPTICISM

p h r a s e s , h e offers t h e m a s descriptions

of s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e f r o m the

o u t s i d e , as it w e r e . T h i s s o l u t i o n s h o w s h o w it c a n s e e m to the s c e p t i c that p , w i t h out h e r b e l i e v i n g that p. R a t h e r t h a n r a d i c a l l y d i s s o c i a t i n g h e r s e l f t r o m h e r o w n m e n t a l states, she w i l l be totally e n g r o s s e d in t h e m . I n d e e d , the v e r y n o t i o n of d i s s o c i a t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that the agent d i s t a n c e s h e r s e l f u n d e r o n e d e s c r i p t i o n f r o m her sell u n d e r a d i f ferent d e s c r i p t i o n ; a n d that In t u r n r e q u i r e s at least i m p l i c i t l y that she i d e n t i f y the relevant m e n t a l state as h e r o w n . It this is c o r r e c t , it e m p h a s i z e s again j u s t h o w e x t r a o r d i n a r y the s c e p t i c s m e n t a l life w i l l be w h i l e still a l l o w i n g for w h a t l o o k s like o r d i n a r y b e h a v i o u r .

Sceptical

virtue:

(Hi) laws and

customs

A n o t h e r s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n to the n o - b e l i e f v i e w targets the s c e p t i c s m o r a l character. M a n y p e o p l e f i n d a l a c k o f m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n to be h i g h l y s u s p e c t ; it suggests a f r i g h t e n i n g d e g r e e o f flexibility. A r i s t o cles r a i s e s this spectre w h e n he a s k s u s to c o n s i d e r ; W h a t sort o f c i t i z e n or j u d g e or a d v i s e r or f r i e n d w o u l d he [the sceptic] be? W h a t sort o f p e r s o n i n g e n e r a l w o u l d he be? W h a t evil t h i n g w o u l d he not d a r e to do, t h i n k i n g that n o t h i n g is really e v i l or s h a m e f u l , j u s t or u n j u s t ? O n e can't e v e n say that the s c e p t i c s are a f r a i d of l a w s a n d p e n a l t i e s . H o w c o u l d t h e y be w h e n they are, a s they c l a i m , unaffected and tranquil?

(Praep.

Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 8 }

A c c o r d i n g to t h i s o b j e c t i o n , w h i c h w e have a l r e a d y

encountered

m a n y t i m e s , the sceptic is not o n l y incapable ot v i r t u o u s a c t i o n , she is m o r e likely to b e h a v e in v i c i o u s w a y s . She will h a v e n o m o r a l beliefs to guide her. She w i l l be u n a b l e a n d u n w i l l i n g to j u s t i f y a n y of h e r a c t i o n s , or even h e r m o t i v a t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s . She m i g h t still t r y to prevent i n n o c e n t s u f f e r i n g , but not b e c a u s e s h e believes it is b a d . T h e n a g a i n , s h e m i g h t j u s t as w e l l inflict i n n o c e n t s u f f e r i n g s i n c e she d o e s not believe it is b a d . But Sextus c l a i m s that the s c e p t i c is not o n l y able to live, but to live correctly, " w h e r e c o r r e c t l y is u n d e r s t o o d not o n l y w i t h regard

188

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(ORDINARY)

to v i r t u e but m o r e g e n e r a l l y " (PH

1.17).

LIEE

OP A

PYRRHONIST

It is c r u c i a l to p o i n t out

that Sextus says o n l y that the sceptic is able to live correctly,

not

that she will. I n r e s p o n s e to the o b j e c t i o n , t h e n , I w i l l e x p l a i n h o w it is p o s s i b l e for the s c e p t i c to live v i r t u o u s l y ; i n o t h e r w o r d s , I w i l l e x p l a i n the k i n d o l v i r t u e that is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the s c e p t i c s lack of moral conviction. T o this e n d , w e shall c o n s i d e r the s c e p t i c s b r a n d ot piety. Sextus r e m a r k s that f r o m a n e v e r y d a y p o i n t o f v i e w the s c e p t i c d e e m s piety to be good a n d i m p i e t y b a d (PH 1.24, q u o t e d a b o v e ) . A n d , " f o l l o w i n g o r d i n a r y life w i t h o u t o p i n i o n s , w e say that t h e r e are gods a n d w e are p i o u s t o w a r d s the gods a n d say that they are p r o v i d e n t " [PH

3.2J.

T h e s c e p t i c even engages i n religious c e r e m o n y , p e r f o r m i n g acts that c o n t r i b u t e to the reverence a n d w o r s h i p o f the gods ( A i 9.49). E v e n so, Sextus is k e e n l y a w a r e o f the r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g religious r i t u a l s : s o m e t h r o w the d e a d for the fishes o r dogs or v u l tures to eat, others pelt the b o d y w i t h stones u n t i l it is completelyc o v e r e d , a n d s o m e e v e n sacrifice people over s i x t y a n d eat

them

t h e m s e l v e s . T h e s c e p t i c s a w a r e n e s s of t h e s e a p p a r e n t l y u n d e c i d a b l e d i s p u t e s does n o t h i n g to prevent h e r f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i n g in h e r r e l i g i o n s rituals. H a v i n g n o belief as to w h e t h e r they are a n y better or w o r s e , m o r e or less p l e a s i n g to the gods, s h e s i m p l y c a r r i e s o n . Piety, like the o t h e r v i r t u e s , s e e m s to r e q u i r e the p r o p e r i n t e n tional state. II the s c e p t i c has n o b e l i e f about w h e t h e r G o d exists or not, it is h a r d to see w h a t s i g n i f i c a n c e there c o u l d be i n h e r reverence. She m i g h t just as w e l l be p r e p a r i n g a m e a l , or s p i n n i n g a i m l e s s l y i n c i r c l e s . H e r c o n f o r m i t y to l o c a l religious c u s t o m a p p e a r s to be a c a r i c a t u r e o i piety. T h e charge that the s c e p t i c s piety is h y p o c r i t i c a l or i n s i n c e r e , h o w e v e r , is not fair. I n e n g a g i n g i n religious rituals, the s c e p t i c is not t r y i n g to a d v a n c e h e r o w n self-interest, o r deceive a n y o n e about her i n t e n t i o n s . N o r is s h e t r y i n g to belittle h e r fellow w o r s h i p p e r s . S u c h i n s i n c e r i t y or d u p l i c i t y w o u l d r e q u i r e h e r to c o n c e a l h e r real m o t i v e s a n d beliefs; but she h a s n o t h i n g to c o n c e a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s c e p t i c a l piety m a y still s e e m to be a n u n i n t e n t i o n a l p a r o d y ot the g e n u i n e article. T h i s i m p r e s s i o n is u n a v o i d a b l e f r o m the d o g m a t i c b e l i e v e r s s t a n d p o i n t - I f g e n u i n e piety r e q u i r e s h a v i n g

189

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the right t h e o l o g i c a l beliefs, t h e n the s c e p t i c c a n n o t be p i o u s . B u t t r o m the s c e p t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e t h e r e is r e a l l y v e r y little s e p a r a t i n g h e r religious o b s e r v a n c e s f r o m the d o g m a t i c b e l i e v e r s . T h e d o g m a t i s t w i l l ha% e to agree that h i s s i n c e r e piety is b a s e d n o t just o n a n y o l d r

belief, but rather o n j u s t i f i e d belief. I f true piety w e r e s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f b e l i e v i n g some th ing a b o u t g o d , w e w o u l d have to c o n t e n d w i t h a n embarrassing wealth ol incompatible pieties* But it s e e m s to the s c e p t i c that n o o n e is able to j u s t i f y the beliefs that m i g h t be s u p p o s e d to be e s s e n t i a l to g e n u i n e piety. If so, all that really differentiates the p i o u s s c e p t i c f r o m the pious d o g m a t i s t is that the o n e a c t s o n the b a s i s o f u n j u s t i f i e d beliefs ( w h i c h he takes to be j u s t i f i e d ) , w h i l e the o t h e r acts i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the f o u r f o l d o b s e r v a n c e s a n d h a b i t u a l d i s p o s i t i o n s . A l l piety is t h u s r e d u c e d to c e r t a i n k i n d s o f c o n v e n t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r a l o n g w i t h the relevant d i s p o s i t i o n s . B e l i e f o r l a c k of b e l i e f is n o l o n g e r essential, Moral

and political

conformistn

M o r a l i t y often requires us to go against c o n v e n t i o n a l n o r m s . N e a r l y all of us w o u l d like to t h i n k that we w o u l d not have c o n d o n e d s l a v e r y i n the early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , or the b u r n i n g of " w i t c h e s " i n the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . S u c h s p e c u l a t i o n s are p r a c t i c a l l y w o r t h l e s s i n so far as w e w o u l d not be the s a m e p e o p l e u n d e r s u c h r a d i c a l l y d i f ferent c o n d i t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is w o r t h t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t m o t i v a t e s p e o p l e to d o s u c h t h i n g s , A large part o f t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , or at least e x p l a n a t i o n , w o u l d p r o b a b l y have b e e n i n t e r m s o l a c c e p t e d c u s t o m s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s , O u r w i l l i n g n e s s to o b e y a u t h o r ity, w h e t h e r i n the p e r s o n of w h i t e - c o a t e d s c i e n t i s t s , c h a r i s m a t i c leaders or a c c e p t e d c o n v e n t i o n s , is the d a r k s i d e o f o u r s o c i a l n a t u r e . S u c h c o n f o r m i s m is the b r e e d i n g g r o u n d for w h a t H a n n a h A r e n d t has a p t l y n a m e d the b a n a l i t y of eviL V i c i o u s n e s s c a n c o m e to s e e m quite o r d i n a r y a n d a c c e p t a b l e g i v e n the r i g h t c o n d i t i o n s . A n i m p o r t a n t part of the d o g m a t i c attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n is the n o t i o n that the a u t o n o m o u s a p p l i c a t i o n o f c r i t i c a l r e a s o n is the m o s t potent antidote to t h i s u n f o r t u n a t e t e n d e n c y . T h e p r o p e r use of r e a s o n c a n i m p r o v e not o n l y o u r c h a r a c t e r s as i n d i v i d u a l s , but also the c h a r a c t e r o f a people o r society. T h e f e w brave i n d i v i d u a l s

190

THE

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LIEE

OP A

PYRRHONIST

w h o first s t o o d u p to past i n j u s t i c e s w e r e able to see h o w u n f a i r a n d u l t i m a t e l y i r r a t i o n a l these a c c e p t e d p r a c t i c e s are. A n initial step i n r i g h t i n g these w r o n g s is to e x p o s e the flaws in the a r g u m e n t s that are s u p p o s e d to w a r r a n t u n j u s t a c t i o n s . W h i l e the sceptic w o u l d b e h a p p y to d e c o n s t r u c t s u c h a r g u m e n t s , s h e w o u l d n o t d o s o for the s a k e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g the c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n . I n fact, it s e e m s s h e w o u l d be w i l l i n g to a r g u e b o t h l o r a n d against the injustice of slavery, for e x a m p l e . A s a result she n e i ther believes n o r d i s b e l i e v e s that s l a v e r y is u n j u s t , that it is w r o n g to cause i n n o c e n t suffering, that all h u m a n beings d e s e r v e to be treated the s a m e u n d e r the law, o r a n y o t h e r m o r a l p r o p o s i t i o n that m o s t of us f i n d i n d i s p u t a b l y t r u e . F u r t h e r m o r e , she n e i t h e r b e l i e v e s n o r d i s b e l i e v e s that c a r e f u l rational scrutiny of our social a n d political institutions will produce a n y i m p r o v e m e n t s . I n d e e d , i n so far as the f u n d a m e n t a l issue o f w h a t c o u n t s as a n i m p r o v e m e n t is itself d i s p u t e d , the sceptic s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t o n t h i s p o i n t a s w e l l . L a c k i n g a n y belief a b o u t h o w to m a k e the w o r l d a better place is h a r d l y a recipe for s o c i a l a c t i v i s m , o r e v e n for s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t . T h e s c e p t i c s i n a b i l i t y to d e n o u n c e e v e n s u c h o b v i o u s l y u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s a s s l a v e r y i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e . B u t it d o e s not follow f r o m this either that she w o u l d or w o u l d not c o n d o n e s l a v e r y in p r a c t i c e . W h e n it c o m e s to c o m b a t i n g s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e , p u b l i c p r o c l a m a t i o n s a r e u s u a l l y far less effective t h a n a c t i o n . T h e sceptic m i g h t w o r k just as h a r d as a d o g m a t i s t in s e e k i n g a n e n d to slavery, a l t h o u g h she w i l l be far less likely to d o s o if she h a p p e n s to be b o m into a f a m i l y of slave-traders in the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . O n the o t h e r h a n d , it is also u n l i k e l y that a d o g m a t i s t b o r n i n t o a f a m i l y o f s l a v e - t r a d e r s w o u l d be a n abolitionist. I n either case, the d e c i s i v e factor w o u l d be an u n u s u a l event, or series of e v e n t s , that gives rise to the m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n that slavery is u n j u s t (for the d o g m a t i s t ) or to the d i s p o s i t i o n to treat e n s l a v e d people w i t h the s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d respect that e v e r y other h u m a n b e i n g d e s e r v e s (for the s c e p t i c ) . I n general, the best r e s p o n s e to the c o m p l a c e n c y o b j e c t i o n is to s h o w that the sceptic is not in fact m o r e easily c o r r u p t e d or m o r e w i l l ing to c o m m i t m o r a l atrocities t h a n those w h o have f i r m c o n v i c t i o n s .

H I

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , a tyrant has d e m a n d e d , that y o u m u s t either h e l p seize a n d k i l l a n i n n o c e n t p e r s o n or be k i l l e d y o u r s e l f . Sextus m e n t i o n s this e x a m p l e i n o r d e r to c o m b a t the o b j e c t i o n that the s c e p t i c s c h o i c e w i l l re% eal h e r true m o r a l c o m m i t m e n t s ( M 1 1 . 1 6 4 - 6 ; see r

D L 9 . 1 0 8 ) . H i s r e s p o n s e is s i m p l y that the s c e p t i c acts i n a c c o r d a n c e with ancestral laws a n d customs without taking a stand o n whether the action is really, i n its nature, m o r a l l y g o o d o r b a d . A l t h o u g h Sextus does not d r a w this point f r o m the tyrant e x a m p l e , we s h o u l d note that there is n o o b v i o u s l y correct s o l u t i o n available to a n y o n e . W e c a n find a r g u m e n t s to s u p p o r t e i t h e r c o u r s e of a c t i o n , but i n the e n d there m a y s i m p l y be n o g o o d c h o i c e , there m i g h t not e v e n be a lesser of t w o e v i l s . If there are s u c h g e n u i n e m o r a l d i l e m m a s , r e a s o n w i l l not h e l p us out. W e m u s t s i m p l y c h o o s e a n d t h e n deal w i t h the c o n s e q u e n c e s , S e x t u s c l a i m s the s c e p t i c w i l l be able to b e a r these h a r s h realities m o r e e a s i l y t h a n the d o g m a t i s t w h o feels that he m u s t rationally d e t e r m i n e the p r o p e r c o u r s e . E v e n if the d o g matist c o n v i n c e s h i m s e l f that he has m a d e the m o r a l l y better c h o i c e , he w i l l p r o b a b l y sutler p a i n f u l d o u b t s o n future reflection. F r o m the s c e p t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e , d i l e m m a s are not e x c e p t i o n a l ; a n y s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r i n g a m o r a l j u d g e m e n t p r e s e n t s us w i t h a r a t i o n a l l y i r r e s o l v a b l e p r o b l e m , or at least t h i s has a l w a y s b e e n the s c e p t i c s e x p e r i e n c e , R e a s o n fails us not o n l y w h e n tyrants m a k e u n a c c e p t able d e m a n d s but w h e n e v e r we have to c h o o s e a c o u r s e of a c t i o n w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s . I f Sextus is right about o u r i n a b i l i t y ( s o tar) to r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f y e v e n the m o s t s e e m i n g l y o b v i o u s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e n t h o s e w i t h m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s are really n o better off t h a n the sceptic, T h e s a m e is t r u e w i t h respect to o u r a b i l i t y to r e v i s e o u r p r i o r i t i e s or m a k e progress t o w a r d s b e c o m i n g v i r t u o u s . If m o r a l progress p r e s u p p o s e s the efficacy of r e a s o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g the p r o p e r e n d s , a n d i f the s c e p t i c s attack o n r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n is s u c c e s s f u l , we c a n n e v e r be c o n f i d e n t that w e are m o v i n g i n the right d i r e c t i o n .

Teaching

and learning:

(iv) technical

expertise

Sextus d o e s , h o w e v e r , rely o n a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is b e n e f i c i a l a n d h a r m f u l in e v e r y d a y life. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a r i s e s f r o m o u r

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o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e of the w o r l d . E v e r y o n e agrees that w h a t is g o o d is b e n e f i c i a l . A n d e v e n t h o u g h we d i s a g r e e v e h e m e n t l y about the n a t u r e o f the g o o d , there is a great d e a l o f c o n s e n s u s that c e r t a i n arts or k i n d s of e x p e r t i s e (techne)

are b e n e f i c i a l . T h e c o b b l e r s art p r o -

v i d e s u s w i t h s h o e s (Af 1.294), n a v i g a t i o n m a k e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m e r c e p o s s i b l e ( A i 1.51), h e r d s m e n k e e p o u r f l o c k s safe (Af 2 . 2 0 ) , a s t r o n o m y p r e d i c t s the w e a t h e r ( A i 5.2; at least, its m e t e o r o l o g i c a l s u c c e s s o r d o e s ) , m u s i c is able to distract u s f r o m u n p l e a s a n t tasks a n d m a k e t h e m easier to p e r f o r m ( A i 6 . 2 1 ) , a n d Sextus o w n t e c h n i h

cal e x p e r t i s e , m e d i c i n e , h e a l s the s i c k ( A i 2 . 4 9 ) . I n so far a s there are n o d i s p u t e s about the utility o l g o o d s h o e s , w e m a y take the b e n e f i c i a l n a t u r e o f the c o b b l e r s art a s e v i d e n t . F o r the m o s t part, e v e r y o n e w o u l d r a t h e r h a v e g o o d s h o e s , sate t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a c c u r a t e w e a t h e r p r e d i c t i o n s , pleasantly d i s t r a c t i n g m u s i c a n d g o o d h e a l t h than t h e i r o p p o s i t e s . It is o n l y w h e n we see these benefits a s p r o p e r l y m o d e s t that we f i n d c o n s e n s u s . E v e r y o n e agrees that w e l l - m a d e s h o e s are g o o d for w a l k i n g a n d p r o t e c t i n g the teet, n a v i g a t i o n is g o o d tor getting s o m e w h e r e safely a n d k n o w i n g w h a t the w e a t h e r is likely to be is g o o d for p l a n n i n g o n e s day, a n d s o o n . S o w h a t is h a r m f u l a n d b e n e f i c i a l i n e v e r y d a y life is a matter o f w h a t we all i m m e d i a t e l y r e c o g n i z e as instrumciitaily

g o o d or b a d . E x p e r i e n c e

is e n o u g h to s h o w u s that w e l l - m a d e p r o d u c t s a n d e x p e r t s e r v i c e s are g o o d for a c c o m p l i s h i n g o u r f u r t h e r e n d s . Plato c a p t u r e s this m o d e s t s p i r i t i n h i s reflections o n the s k i l f u l navigator s attitude t o w a r d s h i s art (Gorg.

51 i d - 5 1 2 a ) . H a v i n g safely-

t r a n s p o r t e d h i s p a s s e n g e r s , a l o n g w i t h t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n s , it is not clear to the navigator w h e t h e r he has really benefited t h e m , that is, w h e t h e r they are better off as a result o f h a v i n g b e e n t r a n s p o r t e d safely. A f t e r a l l , the passengers are n o different w i t h respect to b o d y o r s o u l t h a n w h e n the j o u r n e y b e g a n . T h e n a v i g a t o r has d o n e t h e m a v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e , but he refuses to speculate as to w h e t h e r the c h a n g e o f l o c a t i o n is b e n e f i c i a l in s o m e deep, or n o n - e v i d e n t , m a n n e r . F o r all the m o d e s t navigator k n o w s , s o m e p a s s e n g e r s m a y h a v e b e e n better off i f t h e i r s h i p h a d not c o m e i n , B y c o n t r a s t , the m a s t e r s of the liberal arts that Sextus targets for refutation i n Af 1 - 6 , e x h i b i t a n a r r o g a n c e p r o p o r t i o n a l to the

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

disutility of their "art" C h a l d e a n astrologers,

for e x a m p l e , a d o r n

t h e m s e l v e s w i t h i m p o r t a n t titles a n d try to s u p p o r t their p r e d i c tions o n the b a s i s of elaborate t h e o r i e s l i n k i n g the m o t i o n o f the stars to w h a t h a p p e n s o n earth ( A i 5 ) . S o m e m u s i c i a n s c l a i m their art is n e c e s s a r y for h a p p i n e s s s i n c e it h a r m o n i z e s the s o u l a n d p r o d u c e s the p r o p e r d i s p o s i t i o n s ( A i 6 ) . G r a m m a r i a n s also c l a i m their art is n e c e s s a r y for h a p p i n e s s s i n c e o n l y they c a n p r o v i d e the c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the w i s e s a y i n g s of the p o e t s ( A i 1 . 2 7 0 - 7 1 ) . A n d the c l a i m s o f P y t h a g o r e a n a r i t h m e t i c i a n s are i n h e r e n t l y i m m o d e s t , if not o u t r a g e o u s : the n u m b e r ten, b e i n g the result of a d d i n g one, two, three a n d four, is the m o s t perfect n u m b e r a n d the s o u r c e o f the e t e r n a l roots of nature s i n c e the a c c o u n t of the s t r u c t u r e o f all t h i n g s lies w i t h i n it ( A i 4.3), T h e p a r a d i g m for all o f these is the e x p e r t i s e i n l i v i n g , p r o m o t e d m o s t e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y b y the S t o i c s . T h e g o o d , the b a d a n d indifferent are the basic c o n c e p t s a p p l i e d b y p r a c t i t i o n e r s o f t h i s art. B u t s i n c e , Sextus c l a i m s , he has s h o w n that these c o n c e p t s are i n c o h e r e n t , a n d t h u s c o r r e s p o n d to n o t h i n g real, the art of l i v i n g is u n r e a l as w e l l (PH 3 . 2 3 9 ; A I 1 1 . 1 6 8 - 8 0 ) , B u t w e m u s t r e m e m b e r that these refutations are offered to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the S t o i c a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t . T h e p r o p e r s c e p t i c a l attitude is to n e i t h e r believe n o r d i s b e l i e v e that there is a n art o f l i v i n g . W e f i n d the s a m e a p p r o a c h i n h i s a r g u m e n t s against the liberal arts, For e x a m p l e , S e x t u s a r g u e s that points, l i n e s a n d p l a n e s d o not exist s i n c e we c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of the g e o m e t e r s ' d e f i n i t i o n s (e.g. Af 3 . 2 9 - 3 0 ) . A p o i n t is s u p p o s e d to be a sign %vithout d i m e n s i o n s , a n d line is length w i t h o u t b r e a d t h . B u t w e really h a v e n o i d e a w h a t we are t a l k i n g about w h e n we utter these w o r d s ; the p o i n t I c a n c o n c e i v e has d i m e n s i o n s a n d the line I c a n c o n c e i v e h a s b r e a d t h ; I f the g e o m eters' d e f i n i t i o n s fail to identify a n y t h i n g that really exists, t h e n their e x p e r t i s e is u n r e a l as w e l l . C o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s against the g e o m e t e r s ' r e a s o n s i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r e x p e r t i s e s h o u l d l e a d us to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . T h e sceptic's basic a r g u m e n t against all f o r m s o i i m m o d e s t e x p e r tise is that they l a c k the e p i s t e m i c f o u n d a t i o n s they c l a i m to have; note that the m o d e s t f o r m s d o not c l a i m a n y s u c h f o u n d a t i o n s . S o

THE

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LIEE

OP A

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we c a n see S e x t u s ' attack o n the l i b e r a l arts a s a n e x t e n s i o n of his g e n e r a l s c e p t i c a l a g e n d a , I n fact, i n h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k s , he c l a i m s that the sceptic initially u n d e r t a k e s the study of the l i b e r a l arts j u s t as he d i d p h i l o s o p h y w i t h the d e s i r e to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h (AÍ 1.6). B u t he is s i m i l a r l y f r u s t r a t e d a n d d i s c o v e r s o n l y e q u i p o l l e n t conflict a n d d i s p u t e . H i s study o f the l i b e r a l arts t h u s e n d s like his s t u d y o f p h i l o s o p h y , at least for the time b e i n g , in

epoche.

G i v e n this c o n t e x t , w e s h o u l d interpret all o f h i s s e e m i n g l y d o g m a t i c c l a i m s that s u c h - a n d - s u c h a n art d o e s not exist as o n e side of the e q u i p o l l e n t conflict. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is c o m p l i c a t e d b y S e x t u s ' a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a r g u m e n t s f r o m E p i c u r u s , w h o "took the p o s i t i o n that the l i b e r a l arts are n o help i n p e r f e c t i n g w i s d o m " ( M 1.1). W h a t motivates E p i c u r u s ' a r g u m e n t s is h i s o w n p o s i t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f w i s d o m . Not s h a r i n g t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , Sextus c a n onlyretail these a r g u m e n t s to c o m b a t the professors' c l a i m that their arts are b e n e f i c i a l it n o t essential for a t t a i n i n g v i r t u e a n d h a p p i n e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Sextus' r e l i a n c e o n b o t h E p i c u r u s a n d p r e v i o u s S c e p t i c s gives the i m p r e s s i o n of two d i s c o r d a n t v o i c e s i n M

1-6

( B a r n e s 1 9 8 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g to the first, m o d e r a t e , E p i c u r e a n v o i c e , s o m e arts are u s e l e s s a n d o t h e r s are u s e f u l . T h e u s e f u l studies are b a s e d o n e v e r y d a y o b s e r v a t i o n a n d m a k e n o pretence o f u n c o v e r i n g the h i d d e n n a t u r e of t h i n g s . A c c o r d i n g to the s e c o n d , r a d i c a l l y s c e p tical, v o i c e , there are n o arts at a l l ; rather, we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t r e g a r d i n g the e x i s t e n c e of the arts, w h e t h e r u s e f u l or useless. B u t as l o n g as the s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r of u s e f u l arts refuses to justify h i s p r a c t i c e by a p p e a l i n g to s o m e theory, n o t h i n g p r e v e n t s h i m f r o m a c k n o w l e d g i n g a n d a d v e r t i s i n g h i s expertise, H e d o e s not n e e d to believe a n y t h i n g about the objects a n d p r i n c i p l e s of h i s art. W e d o not n e e d a t h e o r y o f n u m b e r s i n o r d e r to c o u n t t h e m , o r of lines a n d s h a p e s i n o r d e r to d e s i g n a n d b u i l d t h i n g s , or o f m u s i c a l notes a n d t e m p o r a l i n t e r v a l s i n o r d e r to play a n i n s t r u m e n t . T h e s c e p t i c m a y l e a r n a n d p r a c t i s e a n y art in s o far as it i s m e r e l y a c o l l e c t i o n a n d a r r a n g e m e n t o f o b s e r v e d regularities, that is, r e c ollect i ve r a t h e r t h a n i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s (PH

2.102; M 8 . 1 5 6 - 5 8 ) . I n

d o i n g so, he w i l l m a k e use of the two s o r t s of c r i t e r i a of a c t i o n that Sextus a p p r o v e s of: the s e n s e s , a n d t e c h n i c a l d e v i c e s s u c h as r u l e r

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

and c o m p a s s (PH

2 . 1 4 - 1 5 ) . A l l o l this c a n be b r o u g h t u n d e r the

h e a d i n g o f the f o u r t h type ot o b s e r v a n c e ; the t e a c h i n g ( a n d l e a r n i n g ) o f k i n d s of expertise. T h e sort o f t e a c h i n g a n d l e a r n i n g a v a i l a b l e to the sceptic c a n n o t be a matter o f t r a n s f e r r i n g true beliefs I r o m t e a c h e r to student. It is a matter ot l e a r n i n g h o w to d o s o m e t h i n g rather t h a n l e a r n i n g that s o m e t h i n g is t r u e , l i k e a n a p p r e n t i c e i m i t a t i n g the master.* The

scepticpftysician

T h e s c e p t i c w h o s t u d i e s m e d i c i n e , for e x a m p l e , w i l l not e n d u p w i t h m e d i c a l k n o w l e d g e , but r a t h e r a m e d i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n (see M 11.188, 255). A l t h o u g h S e x t u s grants that b o t h the c o m m o n p e r s o n a n d the s k i l l e d p h y s i c i a n p e r f o r m a c t i o n s that restore h e a l t h , the p h y s i c i a n does so in a n o b s e r v a b l y m e d i c a l f a s h i o n : quickly, p a i n l e s s l y a n d i n an o r d e r l y m a n n e r ( A i 11.204). T h e d i s p o s i t i o n f r o m w h i c h these a c t i o n s arise is not itself o b s e r v a b l e , but the features that differentiate his a c t i o n s f r o m the o r d i n a r y p e r s o n s are. S o we m a y d i s t i n g u i s h the expert f r o m the n o n - e x p e r t i n the s a m e way that o r d i n a r y people d o : o n the basis o f their a c t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the s c e p t i c p h y s i c i a n p e r f o r m s these s k i l f u l a c t i o n s w i t h o u t a n y reference to u n o b s e r v a b l e , theoretical features ot h u m a n physiology. I n tact, he w i l l not p r o v i d e a n y sort ot c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n tor the p a t i e n t s c o n d i t i o n . I n s t e a d , he w i l l be g u i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by the p h e n o m e n a , that is, h i s o b s e r v a t i o n of events a n d c o n d i t i o n s , T h i s is the a p p r o a c h t a k e n by m e d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s . E m p i r i c i s m arose i n r e s p o n s e to the apparent failure of rationalist t h e o r i e s about p h y s i o l o g y a n d the h i d d e n c a u s e s ot illness, N o n e ot the t h e o r i e s p r o d u c e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y better results a n d , like the S c e p t i c s ,

the

e m p i r i c i s t s d o u b t e d that these theoretical disputes c o u l d be r e s o l v e d . A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w , m e d i c a l theories p r o v i d e n o better g u i d a n c e than e x p e r i e n c e : they are p r a c t i c a l l y useless. T h e rationalists c o u n t e r e d , a r g u i n g that e x p e r i e n c e by itself c a n not a c c o u n t for o b s e r v e d regularities. W e h a v e to rely o n reason to d i s c e r n the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s a n d s t r u c t u r e s that regulate the body, S o r e a s o n is n e c e s s a r y to establish a n d e x p a n d m e d i c a l k n o w l edge. B u t a c c o r d i n g to G a l e n , the d i s p u t e g r a d u a l l y b e c a m e i r r e l -

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evant, at least f r o m a p r a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , s i n c e b o t h rationalist a n d e m p i r i c i s t p h y s i c i a n s t e n d e d to agree o n the a p p r o p r i a t e t r e a t m e n t . I n the e n d they m e r e l y d i s a g r e e d a b o u t h o w the c o r r e c t d i a g n o s e s a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n s are a r r i v e d at ( W a l z e r & F r e d e 1985). S e x t u s ' n a m e i n d i c a t e s that he w a s a m e m b e r o f the e m p i r i c i s t s c h o o l . A n d a l t h o u g h t h e r e is a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y w i t h P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m , S e x t u s insists that they are not the s a m e in s o far as e m p i r i c i s t s m a k e a f f i r m a t i o n s about the i n a p p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f u n c l e a r matters (PH 1.236). I n o t h e r w o r d s , they are negatively d o g m a t i c i n i n s i s t i n g that the r a t i o n a l i s t s c o u l d not p o s s i b l y get the k n o w l e d g e they a i m e d at. T h e proper sceptical attitude is to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as to w h e t h e r the b o d y is c o m p o s e d of theoretical entities s u c h as a t o m s a n d invisible p o r e s a n d as to w h e t h e r w e c o u l d e v e r k n o w t h i s . R a t h e r t h a n r e a d i n g this as a c o m p l e t e a b a n d o n m e n t o f e m p i r i c i s m , it is m o r e l i k e l y that Sextus is o n l y c r i t i c i z i n g o n e v e r s i o n of e m p i r i c i s m . I n r e s p o n d i n g to the rationalists, s o m e e m p i r i c i s t s p r o b ably p r e s e n t e d their side as a n alternative e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theory, one that relies d o g m a t i c a l l y o n e x p e r i e n c e as a k i n d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t s i n c e Sextus a r g u e s against all f o r m s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , e x p e r i e n c e is n o m o r e acceptable t h a n r e a s o n . T h e o b j e c t i o n a b l e k i n d o f e m p i r i c i s m w o u l d be b o t h negatively d o g m a t i c i n d e n y i n g the rationalists' c l a i m s , a n d positively d o g m a t i c i n s u p p o r t i n g their o w n . W h a t the sceptic n e e d s i s not a t h e o r y to u n d e r w r i t e h i s expertise, but rather a n e x p l a n a t i o n o l h o w he is able to l e a r n a n d p r a c t i c e it w i t h o u t u n w i t t i n g l y a c q u i r i n g d o g m a t i c beliefs. W e c a n see this i n Sextus' praise f o r a t h i r d s c h o o l , m e t h o d i s m (PH 1.236,238J. I n agreem e n t w i t h e m p i r i c i s m , the m e t h o d i s t s rejected the d o g m a t i c viewthat we m u s t r e l y o n u n o b s e r v a b l e , theoretical entities i n s e a r c h i n g for a n d j u s t i f y i n g m e d i c a l k n o w l e d g e . H o w e v e r , t h e y disagree w i t h e m p i r i c i s m i n s o far as it leads to the negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that w e c a n never u n c o v e r the h i d d e n c a u s e s a n d u n d e r l y i n g natures of t h i n g s r e l a t i n g to h e a l t h a n d d i s e a s e . I n c o n t r a s t to b o t h , m e t h o d ists c o n s i d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t the c a u s a l h i s t o r y o f the d i s e a s e a l o n g w i t h tacts about the patient's age, habits a n d p r e v i o u s c o n d i t i o n . D i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n of the patient's c u r r e n t c o n d i t i o n is sufficient to indicate the p r o p e r t r e a t m e n t ( E d e l s t e i n 1 9 6 7 ) .

H7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Sextus c o m p a r e s the m e t h o d i s e s practice to the s e c o n d o b s e r v a n c e : n e c e s s i t a t i o n o i feelings. B e i n g c h i l l e d , we feel c o m p e l l e d to seek w a r m t h ; so too w h e n the s c e p t i c p h y s i c i a n o b s e r v e s that part of the b o d y is c o n s t r i c t e d , he w i l l try to l o o s e n or e x p a n d it

(PH

1.238). I n s o tar a s s u c h t r e a t m e n t s restore a n d p r e s e r v e h e a l t h , he w i l l c o n t i n u e to use t h e m . T h e i d e a is that expertise is a d i s p o s i t i o n to r e s p o n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e a n d effective w a y s . Just as nature gives us the d i s p o s i t i o n to seek w a r m t h w h e n c o l d , e x p e r i e n c e that is p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d b y a d e s i r e to h e a l gives u s m e d i c a l e x p e r t i s e . One

last p o i n t i n t a v o u r of m e t h o d i s m is that it r e d u c e d the

extensive a n d c o s t l y c o u r s e ot m e d i c a l t r a i n i n g to six m o n t h s . T h i s effectively o p e n e d up the field o f m e d i c i n e to a m u c h w i d e r s t r a t u m of society w h i l e u n d e r m i n i n g the n o t i o n that m e d i c i n e is a n e x t r e m e l y difficult a n d abstruse art. I n h i s role as c h a m p i o n of o r d i n a r y life, Sextus m a y w e l l have b e e n attracted b y this attempt to reveal the p r e t e n s i o n s o l m e d i c a l t h e o r i e s . B u t despite h i s s y m p a thy for m e t h o d i s m , Sextus w o u l d not have a d o p t e d it as the right theory, b e c a u s e , a g a i n , the s c e p t i c has n o n e e d for theories, a n d i n fact rejects t h e m all.

T h e sceptic's p h i l a n t h r o p y T h e r e is n o d i f f e r e n c e i n k i n d b e t w e e n s c e p t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a n d s c e p t i c a l m e d i c i n e . T h e y are b o t h t h e r a p e u t i c p r a c t i c e s d e v e l o p e d over t i m e o n the basis o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e y are b o t h a i m e d at r e l i e v i n g the patient ot p h y s i c a l d i s e a s e or m e n t a l d i s t u r b a n c e o n the b a s i s o f o b s e r v a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of the b o d y or m i n d . T h e f o r m e r are revealed to the p h y s i c i a n by d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n a n d the latter are revealed to the s c e p t i c by m e a n s ot the patient's statement o f h i s beliefs a n d the k i n d s ot r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s he f i n d s p e r s u a s i v e . B o t h of these practices p r o c e e d f r o m d e v e l o p e d d i s p o s i t i o n s but w i t h o u t any refere n c e to g u i d i n g beliefs, p r i n c i p l e s o r r a t i o n a l j u d g e m e n t s . S o S e x t u s ' p h i l a n t h r o p y m a y be r e v e a l e d either t h r o u g h h i s attempt to c u r e the conceit a n d r a s h n e s s ot the d o g m a t i s t s (PH 3 . 2 8 0 ) , or t h r o u g h h i s attempt to alleviate the p h y s i c a l s u f f e r i n g o f h i s patients.

198

THE

(ORDINARY)

LIEE OP A

PYRRHONIST

But there is at least o n e i m p o r t a n t d i s a n a l o g y that c a n s e r v e as an o b j e c t i o n to the sceptic's d i a l e c t i c a l p r a c t i c e . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l dogmatist i s , typically, not like a m e d i c a l patient s e e k i n g h e l p f r o m a p h y s i c i a n . T h e patient is often quite s u r e he has a p r o b l e m a n d he trusts that h i s p h y s i c i a n c a n h e l p . T h e s e two b e c o m e e n g a g e d i n the s a m e project, a n d w o r k together to a c c o m p l i s h their s h a r e d goal. T h e d o g m a t i s t , by c o n t r a s t , w i l l p r o b a b l y see t h e sceptic as the one w i t h t h e p r o b l e m . A t the v e r y least, he w i l l be reluctant to c o n c e d e to the sceptic's a r g u m e n t s . So, f r o m a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , the sceptic's b e n e v o l e n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y be m e t w i t h r e s i s t a n c e , if not hostility. T h i s w i l l be e x a c e r b a t e d it the d o g m a t i s t u n d e r s t a n d s that they are engaged in two quite different p r o j e c t s . T h e sceptic a i m s at e l i m i n a t i n g beliefs, the d o g m a t i s t at a c q u i r i n g or i m p r o v i n g t h e m , A l t e r n a t i v e l y , w e m i g h t s a y that I r o m t h e s c e p t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e the d o g m a t i s t is l i k e a m e n t a l patient w h o is not a w a r e that he needs therapy, T h i s p r e s e r v e s the m e d i c a l analogy, b u t it a l s o reveals j u s t h o w i n s u l t i n g the sceptic s v i e w is f r o m the d o g m a t i s t s p e r s p e c t i v e . It also e m p h a s i z e s the fact that they are engaged i n v e r y different projects, a r i s i n g f r o m v e r y different attitudes t o w a r d s r e a s o n . A l t h o u g h the P y r r h o n i s t sees h i m s e l f as a p h i l a n t h r o p i s t , the d o g m a t i s t , if a w a r e o f what the sceptic is u p to, w i l l see h i m as a d u p l i c i t o u s s n e a k . T h e d o g m a t i s t is e n g a g e d i n a project that the sceptic is t r y i n g to get h i m to give u p . T h i s m a k e s for a n o d d r e l a t i o n s h i p ; the d o g m a t i s t m i g h t m i s t a k e n l y t h i n k he is a r g u i n g against his o p p o n e n t , a n d t r y i n g to get her to see t h e r a t i o n a l s u p e r i o r i t y of his p o s i t i o n , but h i s s c e p t i c a l o p p o n e n t h a s n o p o s i t i o n to d e f e n d , a n d does n o t feel b o u n d b y t h e s a m e r a t i o n a l , n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . I c a n t h i n k of n o r e s p o n s e that w o u l d satisfy t h e d o g m a t i s t o n this p o i n t . A s l o n g a s he is engaged i n the project ot s e e k i n g the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e v i e w , he w i l l f i n d the s c e p t i c s offer of t h e r a p y i n s u l t i n g ; i n d e e d , he s h o u l d . B u t i r o m the sceptic's p e r s p e c t i v e , t h i s is j u s t w h a t w e w o u l d expect i r o m " m a d " d o g m a t i s t s w h o have b e e n c a p t i v a t e d b y the a l l u r i n g p r o m i s e o f r e a s o n . But e v e n if the d o g m a t i s t rejects the offer of therapy, he w i l l h a v e a s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e to engage the sceptic i n a r g u m e n t . H e d o e s not n e e d to see the p r o c e e d i n g s as t h e r a p e u t i c . H e s h o u l d see it, i n a c c o r d a n c e

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

w i t h h i s a c c e p t a n c e of the obligations of r a t i o n a l agency, as a n o p p o r t u n i t y to put h i s p o s i t i o n to the test. R e f u s i n g to debate the s c e p t i c , the d o g m a t i s t a b a n d o n s h i s o w n r a t i o n a l standards.

Conclusion U n l i k e o r d i n a r y people, the s c e p t i c h a s n o beliets. It is h a r d to i m a g ine w h a t s u c h a life w o u l d b e like i r o m the i n s i d e . H o w e v e r , I have a r g u e d that it c a n be c o h e r e n t l y d e s c r i b e d a n d d e f e n d e d f r o m the outside. I f S e x t u s s e l f - p u r g i n g attack o n rationality is s u c c e s s f u l , we m u s t 1

c o n c l u d e that n o n e o f the t h i n g s we typically t h i n k of as c o n s t i t u t i n g progress are the fruit of r e a s o n . E v e r y v i r t u o u s a c t i o n , e v e r y t e c h nically skilful action, a n d every socially beneficial action

proceeds

f r o m c e r t a i n sorts o f d i s p o s i t i o n s . A n d we have n o g o o d g r o u n d s o n w h i c h to t h i n k r e a s o n , as e m p l o y e d by e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c d o g m a t i s t s , is better a b l e to p r o d u c e these d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a n e n v i r o n m e n t a l or o t h e r n o n - r a t i o n a l forces. C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e are n o better off t h a n the s c e p t i c w i t h regard to o u r ability to live happy, fulfilling a n d e v e n v i r t u o u s lives. A n d as l o n g as we are u n a b l e to meet the s c e p t i c a l challenge, we are far m o r e p r o n e to suffer u n n e c essary disturbances.

Notes

1 . Introduction 1. i h e d i s t i n c t i o n between ancient a n d m o d e r n forms of scepticism is a very controversial topic. M . P. Burnyeat, " ' I h e Sceptic in his Place a n d t i m e * in Philosophy

in History:

Essays on ihe Historiography

of Philosophy,

R . Korly,

J. B. S c h n e e w i n d St Q . S k i n n e r (cds), 2 2 5 - 5 4 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r sity Press, 19841 introduces a n d explores the metaphor o f insulation to describe the practice of separating philosophical arguments a n d their conclusions from the activity o f o r d i n a r y life. See also ). A n n a s , " D o i n g W i t h o u t Objective V a l ues: A n c i e n t a n d M o d e r n Strategies" in the Norms of Nature:

Studies in Hel-

lenistic Ethics, M . Schoheld & G . Striker (eds), 3 - 2 9 { C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19 86) a n d "'iceplici sra, O l d a n d New", in Rationality

in Greek

thought. M . Prede & G . Striker (eds), 23

Ancient Scepticism (Ancient Philosophies)

Ancient Scepticism (Ancient Philosophies)

Ancient Scepticism (Ancient Philosophies)