American Militias: State-Level Variations in Militia Activities (Criminal Justice (Lfb Scholarly Publishing Llc).)

Criminal Justice Recent Scholarship

Edited by Marilyn McShane and Frank P. Williams III

A Series from LFB Scholarly

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American Militias State-Level Variations in Militia Activities

Joshua D. Freilich

LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC New York 2003

Copyright © 2003 by LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC All rights reserved. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Freilich, Joshua D. American militias : state-level variations in militia activities / Joshua D. Freilich. p. cm. -- (Criminal justice : recent scholarship) ISBN 1-931202-53-2 (alk. paper) 1. Militia movements--United States. 2. Radicalism--United States. 3. Right-wing extremists--United States. 4. Government, Resistance to--United States. 5. United States--Social conditions--1980- I. Title. II. Criminal justice (LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC) HN90.R3.F744 2003 303.48'4--dc21 2003000403

ISBN 1-931202-53-2 Printed on acid-free 250-year-life paper. Manufactured in the United States of America.

Table of Contents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

vii

LIST OF TABLES

ix

CHAPTER 1 Introduction

1

CHAPTER 2 Structure and Ideology of the Militia Movement

11

CHAPTER 3 History of the Militia Movement in Michigan

23

CHAPTER 4 Social Movement Theories and the Rise of the Militia Movement

31

CHAPTER 5 Explaining Higher Levels of Militia Related Activities

79

CHAPTER 6 Economic and Social Disorganization, Paramilitary Culture, and Militia Related Activities

87

CHAPTER 7 Findings

109

CHAPTER 8 Economics, Culture, and Militias

119

CHAPTER 9 Conclusion

137

APPENDICES

139

NOTES

145

REFERENCES

153

INDEX

179

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Acknowledgments

This research would not have been possible without the encouragement and guidance of my former professors at the School of Criminal Justice, of the University at Albany. I would like to thank Professors Frankie Bailey, David Duffee, and Nelson Pichardo Almanzar for helpful feedback and comments on earlier drafts of this work. Special thanks go to Professor Colin Loftin who always made time to discuss methodological and other issues with me. I also could not have had a better mentor, or friend, than Distinguished Teaching Professor Graeme Newman. He not only exposed me to a world of ideas, but he taught me how to ‘think’ and ‘read’ as well. Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my colleagues in both the Sociology Department and the administration at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice for providing me a supportive academic environment that afforded me the opportunity to pursue and complete this project. This book is dedicated to my parents, Myra and Dr. Herbert Freilich, who in more ways than one made it all possible.

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List of Tables TABLE I

TABLE II

TABLE III

TABLE IV

TABLE V

TABLE VI

TABLE VII

TABLE VIII

Hypotheses Predicting Whether Particular Theoretical Concepts are Positively Related, Negatively Related or Unrelated to the Level of Militia Related Activity on the State Level

86

Description and Coding Summary for each Dependent Variable

94

Description and Coding Summary for each Independent Variable

100

Operatinalization of Theoretical Concepts into Variables

108

Ordinary Least Squares Regression- Full Model

115

Ordinary Least Squares Regression- Economic Interaction Thesis

116

Ordinary Least Squares Regression- Dyer’s Suicide Thesis

117

Ordinary Least Squares Regression- Dyer’s Child Abuse Thesis

118

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The militia movement first entered the consciousness of American society in the Spring of 1995, following the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City (see for e.g., Barkun 1997; Bennett 1995; Chermak 2002; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Duffy and Brantley 1997; Dyer 1997; Hamm 1997; Karl 1995; Pitcavage 1998a; 2001; Stern 1996). That terrorist incident, which ultimately claimed 168 lives, awakened America to a social movement that had been operating in obscurity on the fringes of American social and political life. For days, months, and even years following the Oklahoma City bombing, the media and others linked the perpetrators (i.e., Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols) to the militia movement (see for e.g., Barkun 1997; Chermak 2002; Duffy and Brantley 1997; Hamilton 1996; Hamm 1997; Karl 1995). The militia movement was subsequently accused of involvement in a number of other crimes, both high profile and otherwise (e.g., the October 1994 shooting outside of the White House, the fatal Fall 1995 sabotage of Amtrak lines in the West, and the deadly 1996 bombing in Atlanta during the Summer Olympics). In addition, a number of militia members throughout the country were arrested by various law enforcement agencies in connection with several planned terrorist incidents (see for e.g., Chermak 2002; Dees and Corcoran 1996, Hilliard and Keith 1999; Jakes, Jakes and Richmond 1998; Karl 1995; Snow 1999; Stanton 2002; The Militia Watchdog Organization 1997; 1998; 1999). In the Spring of 2002, for instance, a militia member from Montana was 1

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arrested on charges of plotting to kill local law enforcement officials (Harden 2002). More significantly, in August 2002, an Ohio police officer was killed in a shootout that followed both a speeding stop and car chase. The perpetrator, who was also killed, was said to be a past member of a militia group (Farkas 2002; Villellia 2002). Not surprisingly, the context of media discussions about the militia movement often employed descriptions which intimated negative value judgments. Indeed, Chermak’s (2002) analysis found that both the news media and popular culture portray the militia movement as a “legitimate threat- monsters worth fearing” (300; see also Anderson 1996; Bennett 1995; Bock 1995; Curkan-Flanagan 2000; Hamilton 1996; Lambert 1995; Marks 1996; Rimer 1995; Schneider 1994; Shapiro1995; Zeskind 1995). Paralleling the media, many private watch groups (e.g., the AntiDefamation League [ADL], the American Jewish Congress [AJC], the Center for Democratic Renewal [CDR], the Coalition for Human Dignity [CHD], Political Research Associates [PRA], and the Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC]) were also alarmed by the upsurge of the militia movement. The watch groups were concerned that the militia movement might link up with violent neo-Nazi and other racist groups. Moreover, the watch groups considered the militias to be a dangerous phenomenon, exhibiting the potential for lethal violence and lawlessness (ADL 1994; 1995;1997 AJC; 1995; CDR 1996a; 1996b; CHD 1995; SPLC 1997; see also Berlet 1995a; 1995b; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Stern 1996). A good deal of evidence exists to support the view that the general public accepts these media and watch group reports about the militias. One poll conducted in April 1995, immediately after the Oklahoma City bombing, found that 80% of Americans believed militias were dangerous and 55% thought militiamen were crazy (Anderson 1996). Similarly, Professor Chermak (2002) argues that the media’s negative framing of the militia movement “solidified the public’s view that militias must reside on the outer boundaries of mainstream society” (301). These perceptions, although prone to exaggeration, may be warranted. Freilich, Pichardo Almanzar and Rivera (1999) conclude that the militia movement explicitly and implicitly promotes deviant and/or criminal behavior through both its ideology (which legitimizes deviance), and its organizational structure (which often fails to control, not only the actions of its members, but also the flow of information generated by the

Introduction

3

movement). Likewise, Dr. Mark Pitcavage (1998a), the founder of The Militia Watchdog Website, believes that “many [militia] members conduct criminal activity. The most common is the collection of illegal weapons and explosives. Sometimes these illegal arsenals are stunning in their size..... some members go further than collecting weapons and actually plan to use them.... As a result.... [the militia movement] includes many people willing to commit criminal acts” (15-16). So too, Robert L. Snow (1999), the former Captain of Detectives for the Indianapolis Police Department, claims that “only skillful, painstaking work by law enforcement agents has prevented... radical militia members from committing... devastating tragedies.... The militia movement presents a very real and imminent threat to everyone” (ix-x; see also Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Cook and Kelly 1999; Duffy and Brantley 1997; Gallagher 1997; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Jakes, Jakes, and Richmond 1998; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Mariani 1998; Pitcavage 2001; Seul 1997). It is clear that the militia movement is perceived by much of the media and public as a deviant and dangerous social movement that is inhabited by deviant individuals1. While it is true that presently the militia movement has declined (Johnson 2002), as many groups adopt lower profiles, there is still much to be gained by scrutinizing this movement (see for e.g., Wood 2002). For one thing, the militia movement has not disappeared; it still exists albeit on a lower level (see for e.g., Chaney 2002; Chermak 2002; Claiborne 1999; Discovery Channel 1999; F.B.I. 1999). Secondly, because the United States has a long history of rightwing paramilitary activity it is prudent to assume that it may only be a matter of time until the militia, or a similar type of movement, reemerges (see for e.g., Barkun 1996; Becker, Jipson and Katz 2001; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Durham 1996; Freilich, Pienik and Howard 2001; Kaplan 1997; Koeppen 1969; Kramer 2002; Lipset and Raab 1970; Masters and Masters 1997; Stock 1996; Pitcavage 2001). Obviously, insights gained from studying the militias could be helpful in understanding and responding to any new groups that arise. Furthermore, as Dr. Pitcavage (2001) points out, even though the militia movement as a whole may have declined, the threat that it poses to public safety may not have: “there is every reason to think that in the new millennium the militia movement... will continue to be a major source of extremist related criminal incidents, up to and including domestic terrorism” (958).

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In sum, since the militia movement may pose a significant danger to the social order, it is apparent that militias are worthy of scholarly attention by criminologists, historians, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists and others (see Duffy and Brantley 1997). However, “despite increased media attention on the new ‘citizen militias’ following.... Oklahoma City, ... [serious] academic study of militias remains in its infancy. This gap in the literature is particularly curious” (O’Brien and Haider-Markel 1998: 456). O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) began filling this void in the literature by examining, on the state level, variation in the distribution of militias and in the level of militia groups activities. Their article is noteworthy because, to date, it is the only quantitative study that has been conducted on the rise of the militia movement (and it will be discussed, in much greater detail, below). All other works that focus on the emergence of the militia movement are either non-scientific journalistic accounts, or qualitative studies that focus on a particular state or region. In short, up to now there has only been a single quantitative national study on the militia movement. The present project also examines the militia movement on the state l level but it builds and expands upon O’Brien and Haider-Markel’s work in several ways. First, O’Brien and Haider-Markel, themselves, note that their study “may not have specified all of the variables important for explaining militia activity” (463). Indeed, their study did not include any variables representing economic dislocation, which is one of the major theses relied upon by many to explain the birth of the movement (see for e.g., Davidson 1996; Dyer 1997). The current study will therefore examine variables, representing concepts from the leading hypotheses on the birth of the militia movement. Second, O’Brien and Haider-Markel compiled and utilized data measuring the level of militia activity from only one source- the ADL (see ADL 1994; 1995). The present project in contrast, will gather information on the distribution and the level of activities of the militia movement from an additional organization- the SPLC. Finally, other outcomes (such as suicide and incidents of child abuse), not studied by O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998), which have been posited by some to be caused by the same social factors which fueled the rise of the militia movement, will be inspected. As was alluded to, it is believed that by ascertaining the correlates of militia emergence, the current study could aid in the

Introduction

5

development and implementation of programs that address the grievances and/or motivating forces of these groups and thereby prevent the rise of these types of organizations. Moreover, a number of social movement scholars point out that a bias exists in their field against studying rightwing movement formation. Instead, many social scientists, and in particular social movement theorists, have been almost exclusively preoccupied with left-wing social movements which, unlike right-wing social movements, tend to engender sympathetic reactions from academics (see for e.g., Aho 1990; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Bruce 1988; Churchill 2001; 1968; Kaplan 1998; Klatch 1999; Lo 1982; Marx and Wood 1975: 364; 413; McCarthy and Zald 1987; Pichardo 1997; Schneider 1999; Smith 1994: 31). Since the militia movement is generally classified as a right-wing social movement (see for e.g., Abanes 1996; Barkun 1997; Hamm 1997; Karl 1995), this study on the emergence of the militia movement begins to fill a void in the social movement literature as well. To these ends, the focus of this investigation is on the militia movement’s distribution and levels of activity across the fifty states of the United States during the years 1994 and 1995. Specifically, this project seeks to answer the following question: What differentiated states that had more militia organizations (which conducted more activities) in the years 1994 and 1995 from those states that had lesser numbers of militia organizations? The goal of this study is to provide some preliminary answers to this question. As an initial step, a number of significant terms that appear repeatedly in the text will be defined so as to avoid any confusion as to their meanings: 1. Social Movement- Regarding the term ‘social movement’ there is no single accepted definition since, “sociology has provided a number of mutually irreconcilable modes of understanding social movements” (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 1; see also Rivera 1997). In fact, each of the major social movement perspectives, which are described below, have set forth their own definitions (see for e.g., McCarthy and Zald 1987: 20; Touraine 1981; Turner and Killian 1984: 4). It does appear though that there are several similarities among the many competing offerings. Most definitions of the term social movement refer to a

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collective or group (as opposed to an individual) that is change-oriented in terms of the structure or culture (Curkan-Flanagan 2000; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Pichardo 1998). In addition, most of the definitions draw a distinction between an overall social movement and a specific social movement organization. The most succinct definition is posited by Dianni (1992) who, after reviewing a number of competing definitions of the term social movement, proffered a unitary amalgamated version: “A social movement is a network of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and or organizations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the basis of a shared collective identity” (13; see also Curkan-Flanagan 2000; Rivera 1997; Touraine 1981). 2. Right-Wing- Hixson, Jr. (1992) notes that even though there is no standardized definition of the term ‘right-wing’, “social scientists.... [still] seem remarkably agreed as to what it [i.e., ‘right-wing’] constituted” (xv). According to many scholars, right-wing social movements tend to be: (a) extremely patriotic and nationalistic in outlook as opposed to internationalistic in orientation (see for e.g., Bennett 1995; Berlet 1998; Chesler and Schmuck 1969; Ebata 1997; George and Wilcox 1996; Himmelstein 1990; Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Ramet 1999), (b) favor individual freedom and liberty as opposed to endorsing collective efforts aimed at achieving greater equality in society (see for e.g., Bjorgo 1995; Himmelstein 1990; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Lo 1982; McGirr 2001; Pitcavage 1998a), (c) are favorably disposed toward religion and traditional values while opposing the agenda of ‘secular humanists’ (see for e.g., Diamond 1995; Eatwell and Sullivan 1989; George and Wilcox 1996; Haridsty 1999; Klatch 1999; Lo 1982; McGirr 2001; Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Ramet 1999; Smith 1994), (d) are strongly anti-communist (see for e.g., Bennett 1995; Berlet 1998; Bjorgo 1995; Chesler and Schmuck 1969; Diamond 1995; Eatwell and Sullivan 1989; Himmelstein 1990; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Klatch 1999; McGirr 2001; McNall 1969; Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Rohter 1969; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt, and Rosenhack 1964), (e) are opposed to the goals of the civil and women’s rights movements (see for e.g., Bjorgo 1995; Diamond 1995; Himmelstein 1990; Hixson, Jr.

Introduction

7

1992; McGirr 2001; McNall 1969; Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Pitcavage 1998a; Smith 1994; Ramet 1999). 3. Extremist- Scholars have propounded that ‘extremist’ movements and groups are those which reject the normal give and take of compromise between competing interests that is necessary for successful participation in our political system (see Bell 1963; George and Wilcox 1996; Lipset and Raab 1970; Lo 1982; Martin 1996; Merkl and Weinberg 1993; Pitcavage 1998a: 9; Ramet 1999; Ribuffo 1983). 4. Militia- A militia organization is defined as an organization that: 1) propagates an ideological message of intense hostility to the federal government and 2) enacts affirmative, group-based activities which include either paramilitary maneuvers, or the espousal and/or dissemination of information concerning such maneuvers (see also Akins 1998; Barkun 1997; Curkan-Flanagan 2000; Freilich, Pichardo Almanzar, and Rivera 1999; Freilich, Pienik, and Howard 2001; Hamilton 1996; James 2001; Katz and Bailey 2000; Mariani 1998; O’Brien and HaiderMarkel 1998; Pitcavage 1998a: 11; 14; 2001; Snow 1999; Tapia 2000). The ideological component refers to an intense fear and hatred of the federal government, often culminating in the espousal of conspiracy theories that accuse the government-- in concert with the United Nations and supported by the media-- of seeking to deprive citizens of their fundamental rights in an attempt to institute a one world government. Such ‘fundamental’ rights consist primarily, but not exclusively, of the prerogative to keep and bear arms. In addition, the group must organize like-minded individuals into an association whose purpose is to prepare defensive strategies (e.g. paramilitary training and maneuvers) against perceived threats, or else disseminate information which calls for such actions. The latter part of the definition is important since some of the most prominent militia organizations do not conduct military training themselves. Instead, many militia groups only lobby and encourage others to engage in such military exercises. Churchill (2001) points out that the influential Militia of Montana “never existed as a formal armed association, since Montana law prohibited paramilitary training” (278; see also Bock 1996; Chaney 2002; Karl 1995).

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5. Militia Related Activities- This term refers to behaviors, and acts performed by militia members and their supporters to further the ends of the movement and/or to promote militia ideology. Such activities may include partaking in paramilitary training, organizational meetings, community service, discussion groups, rallies, leafleting, recruiting, lobbying, educating others, and criminal or terrorist acts (see Akins 1998; Chermak 2002; Dyer 1997; Homsher 2001; Pitcavage 2001; Seul 1997). 6. Status- Since the term status will be examined in detail, it is necessary to define and describe the term. The following definitions and descriptions seem particularly useful. Hofstadter (1963) states that: “The purpose of the term [status] was to heighten our awareness of a constant political struggle arising not out of the real or imagined contest for gain that is familiar in our interest-group politics.... but out of commitments to certain other values..... Such persons believe that their prestige in the community, even indeed their self-esteem, depend on having these values honored in public. Besides their economic expectations, people have deep emotional commitments in other spheres- religion, morals, culture, race relations- which they also hope to see realized in political action. Status politics seeks not to advance perceived material interests but to express grievances and resentments about such matters, to press claims upon society to give deference to non-economic values. As a rule, status politics does more to express emotions than to formulate policies” (87). Similarly, Gusfield (1963) writes: “Social status refers to the distribution of prestige, sometimes also called social honor. By “prestige” we mean “the approval, respect, admiration or deference a person or group is able to command....”..... A status hierarchy tends to develop among groups which differ in characteristic ways of life. It is the essence of a status hierarchy that within it, some groups can successfully claim greater prestige than others” (14). 7. Social Conservative- In general, social conservatives tend to focus their attention, not surprisingly, on social issues such as abortion, gay rights, religious issues in general and public school prayer in particular, education, and other like issues. In contrast, economic conservatives are said to stress economic matters (Hixson Jr. 1992; Lipset and Raab 1970; Lo 1982).

Introduction

9

Now that working definitions of the key terms utilized by this study have been provided, the project first embarks upon a discussion of the structure and ideology of the militia movement. In an effort to provide some descriptive flavor to this discussion, and thereby complement the quantitative methodology employed by this study, a large number of quotations from both militia members themselves as well as observers of the militia movement will be utilized. Second, in a further attempt to provide some richness to the narrative against which the quantitative data of this study may be measured, the history of the militia movement in the state of Michigan- where the militias were, perhaps, most active is outlined. All of this vivid information is drawn from the growing body of literature on the militia movement, much of which utilizes qualitative research methods. The consulted works include scholarly articles and books (see for e.g., Barkun 1996; 1997; Bennett 1995; Chermak 2002; Hamm 1997; Mariani 1998; Pitcavage 2001), Ph.D. and M.A. theses (see for e.g., Akins 1998; Churchill 2001; Labelle 1997; Seul 1997), accounts and analyses by journalists and others (see for e.g., Anderson 1996; Dyer 1997; Kelly 1995; Kramer 2002; Neiwert 1999; Snow 1999; Wood 2002), reports and books by watch groups and their associates (see for e.g., ADL 1994; 1995; AJC 1995; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Dees and Corcoran 1996; SPLC 1997; Stern 1996), transcripts of the June 1995 Senate hearings on the movement (Militia Movement in the United States 1995), and materials produced by the militias themselves (see for e.g., Michigan Militia 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; Militia of Montana 1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 1995d). Following these descriptive chapters, the theoretical and empirical literature on the rise of ‘social movements’ in general, ‘right-wing’ and ‘extreme’ right-wing social movements, and the ‘militia’ movement is reviewed. Next, a number of hypotheses and predictions are set forth which, flowing from the above mentioned theories and empirical findings, could account for observed variations in the distribution and level of activities of militias. The study then discusses the data that were acquired and the necessary methods that were employed in testing these (often) opposing theories and predictions about the rise of the militia movement on the state level in the United States. After examining the results and implications of the of the study’s findings, the text concludes by offering a number of suggestions for future research to pursue.

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CHAPTER 2

Structure and Ideology of the Militia Movement

Interestingly there is no single national militia structure. The movement consists rather of individual local militias that arise where there is a combination of motivated leadership and a population that is receptive to militia ideology. This does not imply that militia groups throughout the country do not interact. On the national level, militias keep in touch with each other, spread their message as well as recruit new members through a wide variety of techniques. Perhaps the most popular of these is the Internet. Robert Snow (1999), the former Captain of Detectives for the Indianapolis Police Department studied the militia movement and, writes that “an increasing amount of militia recruiting is done over the Internet.... Research for this book... found that practically every militia of any size in America has an Internet website... Militias use the Internet because advertising and recruiting this way has two distinct advantages. First, Internet websites can reach many people quickly and cheaply, and second, the information provided does not have to be edited or approved by anyone or any organization” (68)ii . E-mail and fax machines also play a key role in the militia movement’s mobilization strategy. Journalist Jonathon Karl reports that the militia movement created a “shadow media, a sophisticated alternative to CNN and the daily newspapers. The shadow media reach a nationwide audience of alienated Americans by using... tools... [such as] fax 11

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machines” (39). Similarly, militia groups disseminate their message to the general public through both audiotapes and videotapes. Snow (1999) explains that “along with the Internet as a source of information for militia members, videotapes.... play a surprisingly large role. A number of them have sold hundreds of thousands of copies. There are literally dozens of tapes covering every aspect of the militia movement” (148). Reporter Rebecca Shelton’s (1995) description of the birth of the Missouri 51st Militia highlights the important part leafleting and public meetings played in fueling the rise of the movement in the early 1990s. Ms. Shelton relates that the “[Missouri] 51st [militia] began setting up booths at... gun shows, passing out sometimes 1,400 brochures in five hours. Word got around, and by December, they decided to go public. Their first official meeting was at a public library with seating for 180, but that afternoon it was standing room only for the more than 220 people who showed up” (19, but see Chermak 2002 who concludes that public recruitment by militias has waned and that “most [militia] groups [now] rely on members of the public seeking them out after they realize the government is a threat” 73). Others note that militia groups tend to encourage their members and supporters to buy certain books (e.g., The Turner Diaries) and periodicals (e.g., the Spotlight) that feature militia ideology (Akins 1998; Barkun 1997; Gallagher 1997; Michel and Herbeck 2001; Seul 1997; Stern 1996; Tapia 2000). Historian Neil A. Hamilton (1996) argues that talk radio was instrumental to the initial upsurge of militia activity. Hamilton states that “in late summer of 1994, the airwaves in Colorado Springs crackled with rage and chilling sounds. Chuck Baker was hosting his talk show on Radio KVOR,... Baker discussed with listeners forming small militia cells.... Other towns in other states entered the roster- anxious people, scared people, angry people- listening to talk radio and extremist politicians, watching government ineptitude and the passage of gun control laws... and hunkering down, gathering arms, forming militias” (2829). In the same vein, the journalist Sara Rimer (1995) points out that “the anti-government militia movement clearly considers shortwave an important medium for communicating and organizing. At meetings, militia leaders urge their members to buy shortwave radios, and discount radios are hawked in militia newsletters” (A21).

Structure and Ideology of the Militia Movement

13

More importantly, a large number of observers found personal recruiting to be one of the most efficient militia recruiting strategies. The journalist David A. Neiwert contends that “most of the... [militias] real recruiting, however, takes place before the meetings, by word of mouth. It usually works like this: John a Patriot, tells Joe, a co-worker at his plant who’s going through a divorce, that he can find out ‘what’s really going on’ by attending a militia meeting..... Joe attends. He thinks the New World Order theories might be possible. He buys a video tape, maybe a book. It starts to fit together.... Once recruits pass through.... these gateways into the Patriot universe, they are inexorably drawn further along” (33-34; see also Akins 1998; Churchill 2001; Chermak 2002; Hamm 2002; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kramer 2002). In addition, as was noted, militia groups tend to focus their attention and energies on venues, such as gun shows and preparedness expositions, that are thought to attract individuals sympathetic to many of the militia movement’s arguments. Chermak (2002) recalls that he “attended one of these preparedness expositions in October 1997. It was a three day event featuring products, services and information to educate... people... Militia groups also used this exposition to recruit individuals, educate the public, and spread their ideological rhetoric” (40-41). The end result of the militia movement’s recruiting strategies is a decentralized, but loosely affiliated movement of like minded groups which boasts a few figures of national reputation. Neiwert (1999) argues that inspirational figures played a major role in the initial formation of the movement. He claims that since 1994 the militia movement has organized hundreds of public meetings in the Pacific Northwest and that these meetings “usually attract about a hundred participants.... [Militia of Montana leader John] Trochman is the most visible speaker at these events, but the 1990s have produced a whole array of Patriot leaders who travel through the region, leading these meetings, and rallying believers and recruiting new ones. Their backgrounds vary, but all of them are colorful.... [for example, Arizona sheriff Richard] Mack travels the nation giving seminars on how to resist the new world order and its gun-control measures, and he recommends militias as an effective step” (Neiwert 1999: 29-30; see also Akins 1998; Chermak 2002; James 2001; Kramer 2002; Marks 1996; Pitcavage 2001; Seul 1997; SPLC 1997). Seul (1997) adds that much of what occurs at ‘routine’ militia meetings, as opposed to

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specific events designed to recruit new members, is rather mundane. Indeed, “most outsiders would be surprised to discover what kinds of topics are discussed... topics range from herbal therapy to home schooling and voter registration” (67). Most observers claim that at least two types of militia groups, structured differently, have emerged on the local level (Ridgeway 1995). First, there are those militias which follow the route taken by the Missouri 51st Militia and the Michigan Militia. These groups are ‘above-ground’ and generally not only have a centralized military style command but, as will be demonstrated below, tend to be more ‘moderate’ as well (see Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Discovery 1999; Karl 1995; Missouri 51st Militia 1995; Michigan Militia 1996a; 1996c). In contrast, other more ‘extreme’ militias, following the advice of the Militia of Montana, are inclined to operate ‘below ground’. These militias, which have increased since the Oklahoma City bombing (Chermak 2002), believe that rather than making themselves highly visible, militias should draw upon the ‘leaderless resistance’ model. This model argues that militias should organize in autonomous secretive underground cells thereby making it harder for the government to infiltrate them (see Barkun 1997; Bushart, Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Craig, and Barnes 1998; Kaplan 1997; Militia of Montana 1995b). Supporters of the Michigan Militia above ground approach not only criticize the Militia of Montana model because of its obvious similarities to terrorist cell structures3; but they have even communicated with federal law enforcement agencies and the ADL, on occasion, to prevent possible terrorist attacks from occurring. The more ‘extreme’ elements of the militia movement criticize these contacts and accuse the more ‘moderate’ segments of the movement of being dupes and/or traitors to the cause (see Churchill 2001; Duffy and Brantley 1997; Johnson 1999; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Labelle 1997; Mariani 1998; Michigan Militia 1998a; 1998b; 1998c; Seul 1997). Churchill (2001) maintains that in addition to differing in terms of structure, their attitudes toward preventing potential criminal activity, and the threat of government infiltration, the two wings of the movement also have different outlooks toward nativism, racism, and anti-Semitism. Moderate militias repudiate such beliefs and consistently stress that they are open to all as every citizen is a potential victim of the dictatorial federal government. The vision expounded by the founder of the Michigan

Structure and Ideology of the Militia Movement

15

Militia “was of a militia organized as a visible, public institution, a militia capable of deterring or defending against government abuse and a militia that acted as an agent of inter-racial solidarity rather of racial separation” (Churchill 2001: 293). Radical militias, however, do usually embrace messages that stereotype and scapegoat racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. Finally, Chermak (2002) found a third type of militia organization, that is a hybrid of the two just discussed, since some “groups had [both] a public unit that communicated with the public and other militias.... [as well as a] secret tactical unit... [and] only individuals that could be trusted would be invited to join the tactical unit” (103). Although, as was just seen, there are some ideological differences between the moderate and extreme wings, most militias generally share the same world view. For the most part, the militia movement’s ideology is centered around a number of unconventional beliefs concerning the interconnections among governmental authority, technology, modernity, and the media. These beliefs are closely tied to militia members’ feelings of alienation from, and a large amount of resentment toward, the modern world in general and, more specifically, contemporary American society. Many militias share an antipathy not only toward the federal government4, corporate elites, the global economy5, and contemporary progress (Abanes 1996; Akins 1998; Burkett 1998; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Cook and Kelly 1999; Doskotch 1995; Durbin 1995; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Labelle 1997; Mariani 1998; Olson 1996; Pitcavage 1998a; 2001; Seul 1997; Shelton 1995; Tapia 2000; The Militia Movement in the United States 1995), but toward the media as well. John Trochman, the leader of the Militia of Montana, in his Congressional testimony in 1995 bluntly stated that “We the people have about had all we can stand of the twisted, slanted biased media of America” (The Militia Movement in the United States 1995: 84). Similarly, the Indiana Citizens Volunteer Militia (2000) bitterly attacked the news media in their web page by declaring that “For many years now, the liberal elements of the news media have misused their great power of mass communication. They have ignored their responsibility to publish straight news— to give fair coverage to both sides of public controversies— and used their power to attempt to mold public opinion into their own agenda. Those who control the news media have willingly become a force for propaganda. Most of these ‘news’

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peddlers in the national media have portrayed the militias in the worst possible light— focusing on the few law breakers found in militia uniforms, and ignoring the message conveyed by the vast majority” (2-3; see also Akins 1998; Chermak 2002; Curkin-Flanagan 2000; Tapia 2000). There appears to be merit to these complaints as some studies found that the media does tend to stress and link criminal, terrorist, and racist acts to the militia movement (see for e.g., Chermak 2002; Curkan-Flanagan 2000). A large number of militia leaders and their supporters insist that the federal government is out to strip citizens of their most basic rights and to end democratic rule in America. The then militia leader James Johnson, an African American, from Ohio testified to Congress in 1995 that “We have got people out there hungry,... people tired of being terrorized by law enforcement.... What the militia now is a mindset. It is the civil rights movement of the 1990s. It is people sitting there with a ‘don’t tread on me’ stamped across their foreheads. There are people drawing a line in the sand” (The Militia Movement in the United States 1995: 103). Likewise, John Trochman, in his testimony at that same hearing, forthrightly asserted that the “The following are just a few examples as to why Americans are becoming more and more involved in militia/patriot organizations. The high office of the Presidency has been turned into a position of dictatorial oppression... When government.... [allows] our military to label caring patriots as the enemy, and then turn their tanks loose on U.S. citizens to murder and destroy... you bet your constituents get upset” (The Militia Movement in the United States 1995: 84). According to this viewpoint, the United States government, in conjunction with the United Nations [UN], is intent upon instituting a New World Order [NWO] which will ultimately repeal American sovereignty in favor of a one world government. Several militias claim that this global government will eventually be headed by the U.N. and its establishment will be achieved through various international organizations and agreements such as the World Health Organization [WHO], the World Trade Organization [WTO], the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs [GATT], and the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]. It is also predicted that the demise of American independence will be accomplished through the deployment of foreign troops to American soil. These troops, who will undoubtedly be deployed in flocks of black

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helicopters, are presumed by militia members to be a necessary component in establishing the NWO, and in expropriating citizens’ rights (see ADL 1994; AJC 1995; Akins 1998; Anderson 1996; Barkun 1997; Bennett 1995; Burkett 1998; Bushart, Craig , and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Cook and Kelly 1999; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Homsher 2001; Junas 1995; Karl 1995; Kelly 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Keith 1994; 1997; Labelle 1997; Marks 1996; McLemee 1995; Pitcavage 1998a; 2001; Schneider 1994; Shapiro 1995; SPLC 1997; Tanner 1995). While militias fear the possibility of the NWO for a number of reasons, the core of their concern revolves around their mistrust of centralized authority and governmental oppression. It is for this reason that many militiamen are anxious over the possibility of losing their Constitutionally protected ‘individual rights’ in general and their highly cherished right to bear arms in particular. They believe that these rights are crucial to preserving American freedom, as well as individual liberty from both foreign and domestic threats. Homsher (2001) reports that female militia supporters she interviewed indicate that those active in the movement “are people who feel that the government is pushing so hard that they don’t want to be pushed anymore. So they’re saying: ‘look this is the line; this is the Constitution, live by it. We intend to’” (150). A number of militias purport that recent legislation proves that the gun confiscation process has already begun. Specific examples include, not only the controversial Brady Bill, which mandates a waiting period before one can purchase a firearm, but also the equally contentious 1994 crime bill, which banned certain types of assault weapons. In fact, many militias believe that foreign troops are already in remote parts of the United States confiscating the firearms of law abiding citizens to insure the success of the coming onslaught by supporters of the one world government NWO6 (see Akins 1998; Barkun 1997; Bennett 1995; Burkett 1998; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Cook and Kelly 1999; Dyer 1997; Hamm 2002; Hawkins 1994; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kittrie 1995; Labelle 1997; Mariani 1998; Michel and Herbeck 2001; Olson 1996; Pitcavage 1998a; 1998a; Seul 1997; Stern 1996; Tapia 2000). Many militia supporters believe that the federal government will carry out the disarmament process by any means necessary. Militia leaders and members consistently point to the federal government’s

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actions at Ruby Ridge in 1992 and Waco in 1993. These two events appear to have taken on a mythological significance within the cosmology of the movement7 and serve as permanent fixtures and rallying cries which militia leaders consistently point to as proof of just how heavy-handed the federal government has become in attempting to crush opponents of gun control8 (see Abanes 1996; ADL 1995; AJC 1995; Bock 1996; Burkett 1998; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Dyer 1997; George and Wilcox 1996; Hamm 1997; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Karl 1995; Kittrie 1995; Labelle 1997; Pitcavage 1998a; 2001; Ronson 2002; SPLC 1997; Tanner 1995; Walter 1995; Wills 1995). Moreover, militias aver that since only they realize the true depraved nature of the current regime, they have been specifically targeted for elimination by the federal government. Some militias claim that following the gun confiscations, foreign invasion, and imposition of the NWO, followers and supporters of the militia movement are to be rounded up and interned at ‘camps’ run by the federal government (see for e.g., Kelly and Villaire 2002; Tapia 2000). As this demonstrates, some militia supporters are so committed to their movement’s ideology that their beliefs feed into, and are in turn fed by, the espousal of conspiracy theories. A number of the more popular of these theories allege that the federal government was not only responsible for the bombing in Oklahoma City and the assassination of JFK, but for countless other atrocities committed throughout the world over the past forty years9. Furthermore, the Militia of Montana contends that the federal government is currently manipulating weather patterns10 and manufacturing natural catastrophes all across the globe to create world wide havoc. It is believed that all these acts (are and) were undertaken by elements within the federal government to further the nefarious agenda of the coming NWO. Tapia (2000) found that “some of the conspiracy theories espoused by the militia patriots are: that the... government is funding both sides of every issue to create a schism in society, trying to provoke a riot so martial law can be declared; martial law will allow all weapons to be seized and dissidents to be locked up [and the NWO to be instituted]” (165-166; see also ADL 1995; Barkun 1996; 1997; Bennett 1995; Bock 1996; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Durham 1996; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Homsher 2001; Keith 1994; 1996; 1997; Kelly;

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1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kramer 2002; Marks 1996; Militia of Montana 1995a; 1995b; 1995c; 1995d; Neiwert 1999; Pitcavage 1998a; 1998b; 2001; Seul 1997; Tapia 2000; The Militia Movement in the United States 1995). It should also be noted though that some claim that the movement’s hostility toward government is only reserved for the federal level and does not always extend to state or local governments. Some militias even loudly trumpet their good working relationships with both state and local authorities as well as the larger community(Abanes 1996; Chermak 2002; Hamilton 1996; Tapia 2000). Considering the religious orientation of its founders, the Michigan Militia and the Militia of Montana- perhaps the two most influential militias in the country- not surprisingly also heavily emphasize social issues. They impugn the federal government’s adherence to the liberal agenda of the political Left, maintaining that this policy threatens to destroy the average American family and the traditional American way of life. Moreover, these groups, as well as many other militias, believe that if this foundation of American culture is uprooted, it will destroy our nation spiritually, and thereby insure the success of the prophesied UN invasion (Castells, Yazawa, and Kiselyova 1996; Labelle 1997; Neiwert 1999; Tapia 2000). According to Barkun (1997), the Michigan Militia “‘calls the Bible the greatest single guiding influence for all nations’ and claims as one of its goals to ‘seek the protection, wisdom, and leadership of almighty God as we submit to him and do his will” (275; see also Kelly and Villaire 2002). Pitcavage (1998a) similarly proclaims that social issues such as abortion loom high on the agenda of many militias: “The most extreme of the anti-abortionists look to militias and other groups for support and for recruits... [and so too] virtually the entire patriot [and militia] movement[s] are ... anti-abortion11”(19; see also Akins 1998; Barkun 1996; Burkett 1998; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Diamond 1998; Gallagher 1997; Hamm 1997; Hawkins 1994; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Karl 1995: 46-47, 140-141; Kifner 1998; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Labelle 1997; Neiwert 1999; Olson 1996; Seul 1997; Stern 1996; Swomley 1995; Tapia 2000). The ideology of the militia movement encompasses other issues as well. Many militias claim that the federal government instituted the federal income tax to abscond with the average citizens’ hard earned money for its own dubious agenda (Burkett1998; Chaloupka 1996;

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Churchill 2001; Durham 1996; Doskotch 1995; Kramer 2002;Pitcavage 1996; Seul 1997). Other militias focus on public education (Burkett 1998; Labelle 1997; Seul 1997), homosexuality (Labelle 1997; Swomley 1995), land use, property rights, and environmental issues12 (Burkett 1998; Chaloupka 1996; Chermak 2002; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Kramer 2002), jury nullification13 (Bennett 1995; Lambert 1995; Seul 1997), and other constitutional issues (Chaloupka 1996; France 1995; Labelle 1997; McLemee 1995), government corruption (Labelle 1997), and feminism (Seul 1997). Right before the end of the last century, some elements of the militia movement began to underscore the possibility that disaster was threatening to strike mankind once the new millennium commenced, due to possible Y2K problems. For example, “Norman Olson, head of the Northern Michigan Regional Militia and one of the founders of the national militia movement, predicted that ‘the Y2K may be the greatest single disaster to hit the world since the Biblical flood of Noah” (Downes 1999: 4). Olson, and other militia leaders, claimed that they would be prepared for the coming catastrophe (Downes and Foster 1999; see also Churchill 2001; Kelly and Villaire 2002; for an in-depth study of the opinions and reactions of New Mexico militia and patriot members to Y2K see Tapia 2000). Finally, an examination of militia web sites and of those who monitor them from 2000 to 2002 reveal that many militia members and their supporters paid a lot of attention to the Elian Gonzalez case (most militia supporters heatedly denounced the federal government for ‘kidnaping’ the child), the standoff between members of a Baptist church in Indianapolis and federal marshals that ended with the Government seizing the church after a Federal Judge ruled against the church for its failure to withhold its employees’ taxes (many militia supporters vociferously lashed out at the government’s conduct in this case), and the 2000 Presidential election (many militia members expressed fear that the ‘liberal enemy’ was going to ‘steal’ the election. Some even went so far as to claim that the whole dispute was a sham engineered by the elites. Many of them predicted that Clinton would step in, annul the election results, and declare martial law and thereby not only perpetuate his dictatorial rule but ultimately cede U.S. sovereignty to the NWO as well). Not surprisingly, the tragic events on September 11, 2001 also impacted the militia movement. Initially many militia groups saw

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“themselves as America’s last line of defense [and therefore] put themselves on alert across the country” (Porter 2001: 1) and promised to aid the country’s defense. As time went on though, a number of militias began to worry that the government was too quick in passing bills like the Patriot Act that greatly expanded the federal government’s power at the expense of individual liberties. While some militias expressed apprehension that the government would use the attacks as an excuse to declare martial law a small number of groups went so far as to claim that the federal government had played a role in the attack.

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CHAPTER 3

History of the Militia Movement in Michigan

The state of Michigan14 was chosen as a case study for two reasons- one relating to relevance and a second relating to practicality. First, since most observers of the militia movement acknowledge that the Michigan Militia, of the 1994 and 1995 time period, was one of the largest and most influential of the various militia organizations then active (see Barkun 1997; Bennett 1995; Cook and Kelly 1999; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Hamilton 1996; Hamm 1997; Karl 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Labelle 1997; Mariani 1998; McLemee 1995; Neiwert 1999; Ridgeway 1995; Snow 1999; Stern 1996), it is clear that Michigan is a state worth focusing on. Not only did the group generate headlines due to its ideology and activities, but the media also focused upon prominent individuals (such as Jim Monaghan the brother of the Chairman of Domino’s Pizza) who were said to be associated with the group (see Struman 1995). Second, the militia movement in Michigan mainly adopted an above ground structure with a centralized command and military style ranks through which it specifically sought to publicize its activities and hence its data are more accessible (see Karl 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Mariani 1998).

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The Michigan Militia, founded in April 1994 by a group of close to thirty armed individuals, was the first known contemporary militia organization in the state of Michigan. The group chose as its leaders two devout Christians; Norman Olson (a Vietnam War veteran) and Ray Southwell. Interestingly, Olson was the Baptist minister of a local church congregation, and Southwell was a deacon at the same church. Olson recalled in an interview, that the group had its first meeting “in the woodsabout 28 of us- and [we] talked about the need to secure the constitutional rights of the people of this nation” (Downes and Foster 1994: 13). Soon afterwards the group began conducting public displays of military training and paramilitary maneuvers. Unlike many other militia organizations of that time period, Olson and his group adamantly insisted that their organization’s activities would remain public events and would not be carried out in secret: “to Olson, the public display of uniforms and guns was central to the militia’s mission... Others had argued that the militia should be a secret underground organization. To go public, they feared, would invite government infiltration. But Olson was firm. ‘We dare not go underground, because then we lose our legitimacy. People become suspicious of that which they cannot see’” (Karl 1995: 45; see also Bennett 1995; Churchill 2001; Dammann 1994; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Downes and Foster 1994; Hamilton 1996; Hawkins 1994; Karl 1995; McQuaid 1995; Schneider 1994; Seul 1997; Stern 1996). During the latter half of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 the group continued with its public activities. The militia organized itself into a military style entity with a centralized officer based command and “uniformed brigades of citizen soldiers” (Karl 1995: 51). In fact, the Michigan Militia not only utilized a paramilitary structure, but also employed military style ranks (Mariani 1998; SPLC 1996; see also Barkun 1997; Michigan Militia 1996a; 1996c; Tanner 1995). The leaders of the Michigan Militia were quick to point out though, that unlike the United States Military, individual members of their organization were free to join or leave the group as they wished. Withdrawing from the group was as simple as ceasing to attend meetings or engaging in other militia activities (Downes and Foster 1994). Indeed, the Michigan Militia proudly noted in 1996 that not only was their leadership democratically elected, but that it was beholden to its membership (Michigan Militia 1996b).

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In any case, the Michigan Militia’s bi-monthly public military style training sessions and activities, including high profile rallies and public protests (such as demonstrations against the United Nations) soon attracted attention from both the local government and the media (Hawkins 1994; see also Dammann 1994; Hamilton 1996; Stern 1996). Some observers contend that the activities conducted by the group invited this negative scrutiny. Bennett (1995) states that “under Olson or his successors, the Michigan Militia was accused of numerous hostile and threatening actions... [for example], Senator Carl Levin.... presented the complaints of law enforcement officers in five Michigan cities who said they had been threatened and stalked by Michigan Militia members” (457; see also Hamilton 1996: 35; Karl 1995: 89-93; Ridgeway 1995: 17). As Southwell and Olson anticipated, the ensuing publicity and controversy resulted in a group expansion encompassing several of Michigan’s eighty-three counties (Hawkins 1994). Bennett (1995) writes that “within six months of its founding... organizers claimed that ‘brigades’ had formed in sixty-three of the state’s eighty-three counties” (456). McQuaid (1995) adds that the Michigan Militia was organized into “four divisions, each corresponding to a division of the state... each county has a corresponding brigade... [which] is the primary operational unitconsisting of one or more rifle platoons... The member-elected brigade commanders are county residents” (51; see also Michigan Militia 1999). Bennett (1995) claims that Michigan Militia meetings were soon “drawing fifty to one hundred people. Within a year, leaders claimed ten to twelve thousand members” ( 456; see also Churchill 2001; Hawkins 1994; Snow 1999). Despite this rapid expansion and growth of the group, Olson and Southwell’s leadership proved to be short lived. Both were purged from their leadership positions, in April 1995, after releasing a public statement which claimed that the Japanese government had carried out the bombing in Oklahoma City. In spite of their ouster Olson and Southwell, at first, continued their affiliation with the Michigan Militia (Bennett 1995; Karl 1995; Mariani 1998; Snow 1999; Stern 1996). However, Olson’s relationship with the militia suffered greatly after he was rebuffed in his attempt to regain control. Olson then resigned from the organization, which he now considered to be too moderate. He went on to found and

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lead another smaller militia, the ‘Northern Michigan Regional Militia’ (Mariani 1998; see also Churchill 2001; Dzwonkowski 1995; Stern 1996). Subsequently, the members of the Michigan Militia, in an election, chose the severely disabled Vietnam War veteran Lynn Van Huizen as their new commander. While the two militias generally shared the same ideology, they appeared to differ both as to their receptiveness to conspiracy theories as well as to their views on the type of tactics that should be employed. The more pragmatic Van Huizen headed Michigan Militia is inclined to pursue conventional lobbying and political activities while somewhat downplaying their emphasis on paramilitary training. In contrast, Olson’s smaller splinter group besides being more open to conspiracy theories also eschewed conventional political activities as useless, and instead placed great stress upon the need for public military training (Churchill 2001; Dzwonkowski 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Mariani 1998; Seul 1997). This dispute, concerning the utility of conventional political activity should not startle us since other right-wing social movements have been plagued by similar disagreements. For example, while Tom Metzger’s white separatist organization dismisses mainstream political activities as a waste of time, other white separatist groups devote a considerable amount of resources and energy to such endeavors (see Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997: 82-85). During the 1990s, challenges to Van Huizen’s leadership of the Michigan Militia persisted. Some observers maintain that part of the problem was that the severely disabled “Van Huizen delegated much of the day to day work of running... [the Michigan Militia] to [his appointed Chief of Staff] Tom Wayne” (Churchill 2001: 295) who had not been elected to any official post. Besides generating resentment this also fostered a leadership void at the top. In March of 1998 segments of the group, with encouragement from Norm Olson, broke away to form a rival organization headed by Joe Pilchak (Mariani 1998; see also Burkett 1998; Churchill 2001; Kaler 1998; Pitcavage 2001). The breakaway faction was disturbed by recent moves by Van Huizen which they claimed “takes power from the county level and takes it up to the command staff and they end up being absolute dictators” (Mariani 1998: 134). However, the Michigan Militia countered that the breakaway faction was too willing to collaborate with elements from the racist Christian Identity movement and other fringe groups (Mariani 1998; see also Churchill 2001; Kelly and

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Villaire 2002; Michigan Militia 1998a; 1998b; 1998c). In addition, disputes broke out over the, previously mentioned, willingness of the Van Huizen faction to work with the ADL and federal law enforcement to forestall criminal and terrorist acts. The Van Huizen led organization, despite protests from Olson and others, not only expelled a group of individuals, led by Ken Carter for being too violent and extreme, but they even notified the authorities. After investigating the expelled individuals, who had by now organized a cell named the ‘North American Militia’, the government arrested the group for plotting to set off bombs. Eventually, with help from Van Huizen and Tom Wayne, the government succeeded in obtaining criminal convictions (see Christoff 1998; Churchill 2001; Haynes 1999; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Pitcavage 2001; Singhania 1998; Tyree 1998). The militia movement’s in-fighting and dissension in Michigan continued. Joe Pilchak resigned as the commander of the anti Van Huizen faction after serving only a few months. He was succeeded by Ron Gaydosh who completed a full one year term. The movement soon suffered yet another blow in April 2001 as Norm Olson folded his splinter militia organization “because membership had plummeted and it no longer had any members with enough military experience to lead training exercises in the woods” (Bradsher 2001: A11). Matters seemed to change for the better though as Gordon Dean was unanimously elected the State Commander of the rebellious faction, in May 2001, after all of the other candidates stepped aside in his favor. One of Dean’s first actions was to announce that Norm Olson had rejoined the group and had agreed to serve as his senior advisor. Any hope for a resurgence of the group, however, quickly fizzled as Van Huizen and Wayne continued to operate on their own. Furthermore, Olson’s participation proved to be short-lived indeed. In August of 2002 Olson announced that not only had the movement floundered but that he himself had become so disillusioned that he had decided to sell his farm and was planning to move with his family to Alaska (Noga 2002; Olson 2002). No discussion of the militia movement in Michigan would be complete without including the inspirational militia figure, Mark Koernke. A maintenance worker at the University of Michigan, Koernke was one of the first individuals to publicly call for militia formation in the early and mid 1990s. Some even claim that it was Koernke who first inspired Olson

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to form the Michigan Militia in 1994 (Karl 1995). As the militia movement flourished, Koernke frequently traveled around the country giving lectures to local groups on how to organize a militia and instructions about proper paramilitary training. Koernke eventually founded his own militia organization entitled the ‘Michigan Militia at Large’ (Dees 1996; Karl 1995). Hamilton states that this organization could best be described as “an armed clandestine group” (1996: 35). Karl (1995: 68) claims that at one point Koernke was “perhaps the single most influential figure in the militia movement. ‘Mark from Michigan,’ as he is known to fellow revolutionaries, has given speeches in forty-four states”. The fiery Koernke also promulgated his message through other media outlets as well. Not only did he host a nationally broadcast short wave radio program, but he also created and distributed thousands of videotapes, featuring militia ideology, all across the country (Karl 1995; see also Bennett 1995; Churchill 2001; Cooper, D. 1995; Cooper, M. 1995; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Hamilton 1996; McQuaid 1995; Seul 1997; Snow 1999; Stern 1996). Seul (1997) writes that he found “Koernke... [to be] a well dressed man who speaks with an urgency in his voice. He is energetic and thrives off his message” (136). Koernke, like many other militia personalities though had to fend off accusations of both racist associations and involvement in criminal activities (see Churchill 2001; Cooper D. 1995; Cooper M. 1995; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Hamilton 1996; Karl 1995; Snow 1999; Stern 1996; Swickard 1997). Eventually, in 2001, following an encounter with county patrol officers on the highway, Koernke was convicted of assault, obstructing an officer, and of fleeing from the scene. Despite support from Norm Olson and other militia figures, as well as public rallies organized by his wife Nancy, Koernke is currently serving a three year prison sentence (Cobbs 2001). In addition to Olson, Pilchak, Dean, and Koernke it should be mentioned that other militia groups also operated in Michigan. Ken Adams not only headed the National Confederation of Citizen Militias but he also testified at the 1995 Senate hearings on the militia movement (Dzwonkowski 1995). Meanwhile, Bailey (2001) informs us that in 2000, Nick Stoner after leaving the Michigan Militia founded yet another splinter group entitled the ‘Michigan Militia Inc” whose main focus was property ownership rights. Finally, Chermak (2002) reminds us that

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Michigan was also the headquarters of the ‘United States Theater Command’ (USTC) that failed in all of its repeated attempts to unify the militia movement nationally.

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CHAPTER FOUR

Social Movement Theories and the Rise of the Militia Movement

Having described the militia movement’s ideology, structure, and history it is appropriate to review those theories that might explain the rise of the militia movement in the United States during the mid 1990s. An examination of the literatures on social movements and the birth of the militia movement reveals that there are three broad types of theories that could shed light on the etiology of the militia movement. This chapter will discuss perspectives that fall under ‘general’ social movement theories (designed to explain the emergence of all social movements), ‘right-wing’ social movement theories (formulated to explain the birth of right-wing movements), as well as theses that are specifically set forth to explain the rise of the militia movement.

I. General Social Movement Theories Although there are disagreements as to how specific theories should be categorized, most scholars agree that there are categories under which most, if not all, general social movement theories could be subsumed. This chapter begins by discussing four such broad perspectives. 1. Collective Behavior School: In the past, the prevailing perspective of the social movement literature was the collective behavior 31

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school which, like all consensus based theories, takes a functionalist view. It is claimed that society’s structural arrangement sets forth rules, values, and norms which specify appropriate behavior. In short, society when functioning normally is like a machine that satisfies the needs of all individuals. The collective behavior school acknowledges that society is imperfect and as with any machine, it sometimes fails. Occasionally dysfunctions arise in the structure which lead to the displacement of societal rules and guidelines (i.e., normlessness) which in turn casts individuals adrift. Because these individuals no longer know how to behave, they become anxious and upset which results in many of them succumbing to an irrational strain. Often times a social movement may arise which relieves the strain by reintegrating these people (Graham 1989; Marx and Wood 1975; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998; Smelser 1963; Toch 1965). In other words, the collective behavior school states that social structural dislocation or rapid social change (produced for e.g., by war, large scale migration, urbanization, industrialization, technological advancement, political revolution, a natural catastrophe, or other large structural upheavals) may lead to the decline of rules and guidelines for behavior. When this occurs, the outcome may be psychological strain in many individuals. A social movement may then arise to release the strain. McAdam summarizes this view by stating that: “.... the motivation for movement participation is held to be not so much on the desire to attain political goals as on the need to manage the psychological tensions of a stressful social situation.... The social movement is effective not as political action but as therapy” (McAdam 1982: 9-10; see also Hoffer 1951). The collective behavior school characterizes social movement participation as noninstitutional, emotional, irrational, disorganized and unstable behavior. It presumes that the least integrated members of society, the most anxious, alienated, and anomic individuals, are the ones most likely to join social movements (see Graham 1989; Hoffer 1951; Marx and Wood 1975; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998; Smelser 1963; Toch 1965). Comparably, consensus theory points to pluralism as a theory of routine politics. Pluralism theory upholds the idea that the political structure is legitimate since it is both accessible to all and is characterized by a variety of interest groups. Political outcomes are determined by a

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process of negotiation and compromise since no single group can become dominant. This theory views the state as a neutral arbiter without interests of its own. If one accepts this perspective, then social movements may be viewed as irrational behavior. Rational actors, after all, would be expected to engage in routine political activity as opposed to joining a social movement which is “seen as proof that the motives behind their actions are somehow distinct from those leading others to engage in ‘ordinary’ politics” (McAdam 1982: 6; see also Dahl 1967; Gamson 1975; Pichardo 1998; Ribuffo 1983). 2. Relative Deprivation Theory: Another well established and related viewpoint is the social psychological perspective. According to this view, psychological frustration or tension is the underlying motivational mechanism that causes individuals to join social movements since joining them reduces the psychological strain within the individual. The state of mind of the participant is the most important determinant of action. One prominent example of frustration aggression is the relative deprivation model which states that peoples’ attitudes and grievances largely depend on the frame of reference employed; the group to which one compares one’s self. Relative deprivation results when “A” has something that “B” wants and believes that he deserves. If this discrepancy cannot be adequately and rationally explained to “B”, frustration will result. This frustration may be then directed outward rather than inward, thereby possibly resulting in aggression and social movement participation (see Bennett 1995; Graham 1989; Gurney and Tierney 1982; Gurr 1970; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Marx and Wood 1975; Pichardo 1998). 3. Resource Mobilization Theory: Yet another social movement theory, the conflict based resource mobilization approach, has currently replaced the consensus based collective behavior school as the reigning paradigm in the social movement field. All conflict theories assume that there is an unequal distribution of resources in society. It is argued that the social structure and its institutions protect and advance the interests of the rich. In particular, resource mobilization theory claims that society is structured in such a way that established groups, which are inside the polity structure, have routine and low cost access to societal resources. These groups rely on lobbying and conventional politics to protect their

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privileged position from incursions by other groups. Those on the bottom of the social structure, in contrast, are outside the polity and are denied regular access to routine political activity. These individuals under some conditions, may turn to non-institutional political behavior (like forming and joining a social movement) in an attempt to obtain more power in society. In sum, social movements are portrayed as efforts of the powerless to gain a greater share of social resources (Pichardo 1998; see also Marx and Wood 1975). According to this perspective, the normal structure of society is responsible for the creation of social movements because the social structure always distributes resources unequally15. If the normal structure of society is unequal, however, then discontent and grievances are always present in society. Consequently, grievances alone cannot account for the rise of social movements. What then gives rise to social movements? What conditions in society would promote a social movement? The resource mobilization perspective answers these questions by highlighting the rational and technical requirements of movements- organization, the role of resources (e.g., money, and manpower), and leadership. Social movements will arise when a group can organize itself, express its discontent and gather the necessary resources to form a social movement. This perspective, in short, “focuses on the organization... [and] how effectively is the movement organization using its resources and sustaining itself across time” (Mahan 1997: 43; see also Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Graham 1989; Marx and Wood 1975; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1987; Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998; Tilly 1978). Resource mobilization theory recognizes that the actions of social control agents and/or other third parties can either hinder or facilitate the rise of social movements. In the same vein, the media is also thought to play an important role. The way the media frames the social movement may be critical. Sensational coverage of a social movement is more likely, for example, to draw attention (see Dalton, Kuechler, and Burklin 1980; Gitlin 1980; Graham 1989; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1987; Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998; Simonelli 1999; Tilly 1978). McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1987), the promulgators of the macrolevel ‘Professional Organizer Model’ variation of resource mobilization

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theory, stress the importance of third parties, who are not part of the aggrieved population. McCarthy and Zald point out that social movements usually arise out of social groups at the bottom of the social structure. These groups are typically comprised of impoverished individuals who lack the resources and skills necessary for social movement formation. In other words, the actions of the indigenous community alone very often are not sufficient to successfully create a social movement. McCarthy and Zald maintain that, because the challenging groups arise out of communities that are weak and powerless, it is the resources donated by third parties (e.g., wealthy middle class individuals) which are critical for the creation of social movements. These third parties obtain emotional rewards by aiding the social movement. Morris and Herring (1985) explain that “modern social movements... cannot generate and sustain movements because of their limited resources. In the organizationalentrepreneurial model .... [third party] conscience constituents provide the money and resources that generate and sustain movements.... These individuals donate money to movements because they get satisfaction by sympathizing with the goals of the underdog” (163; see also McCarthy and Zald 1987; Morris 1984; Pichardo 1998). This model claims that social movements are more likely to arise during times of economic prosperity when there are more resources present in society (McCarthy and Zald 1987: 157; Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985). McCarthy and Zald (1987) further contend that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to support a social movement in that “1) the higher the education, the more likely the giving of time, and 2) people who give more time to volunteer activities also give more money” (157). It is believed that those who join social movements are usually better educated individuals who have the necessary resources (e.g., time, money, and leadership skills) to do so. McCarthy and Zald (1987) also note the importance of professional organizers in the formation of social movements. It is asserted that these individuals, who financially support themselves from their social movement activity, are the ones who, not only establish and direct the social movement, but also conduct the fund raising among third parties that is necessary for the success of the social movement. The dedication of these professional organizers to the cause of the social movement, however, at times may be short lived. It is possible that once the

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professional organizers exhaust the supply of resources from third parties they will migrate on to a new cause (see also McCarthy and Zald 1973; Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998). McAdam (1982), in his macro-level ‘Political Process’ model, offers another variation of resource mobilization theory. He asserts that changes in elite power relations may open up new structural opportunities for action. The changed elite power relations, may create an opportunity that encourages and provides the impetus for the rise of a social movement. McAdam writes that “the opportunities for a challenger to engage in collective action do vary greatly over time. And it is these variations that are held to be related to the ebb and flow of movement activity.... The point is that any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities... such shifts can facilitate increased political activism on the part of excluded groups either by seriously undermining the stability of the entire political system or by increasing the political leverage of a single insurgent group” (1982: 40-42). Disputes may and do arise among different groups of elites. Some segments of the elites may then direct resources to various challenging groups, who are in a position to aid them, (i.e., usually challenging groups which originate from well organized communities), in an attempt to bolster their position in relation to the other elites. The ‘Political Process’ model, like the ‘Professional Organizer’ model of McCarthy and Zald, claims that participants of social movements tend to originate from the most organized, mobilized, and bonded segments of the population. Morris and Herring (1985) contend that “preexisting organization rather than its breakdown, facilitates mobilization... individuals who are well integrated into preexisting community structures constitute the bulk of the early participants of collective action” (168). Oberschall (1973) likewise maintains that “mobilization does not occur through recruitment of large numbers of isolated and solitary individuals. It occurs as a result of recruiting blocs of people who are already highly organized” (Oberscall 1973: 125; see also Berlet and Lyons 2000; Churchill 2001; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Klatch 1999; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1987; Morris 1984; Oberschall 1993; Tilly 1978).

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Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997) point out that “in addition to the structure of political opportunities and indigenous strength, there is cognitive liberation, which refers to the development of a consciousness that the current situation is unjust and the oppressive conditions can be changed through collective action” (19). Klatch (1999) argues though, that cognitive liberation which is “essential to the formation of a social movement occurs long before an individual is exposed to a formal organization or even introduced to a network of other activists” (95). Meanwhile, McAdam and others, unlike McCarthy and Zald (1973; 1987), recognize that the local community of the challenging group does play a role in the emergence of the social movement (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). They nonetheless contend that it is the action of the elites, through their apportionment of resources to the challenging groups, which determine the timing of the emergence of the social movement (see Pichardo 1998; Tilly 1978; but see Morris 1984; Morris and Herring 1985). It should be noted here parenthetically that the various resource mobilization approaches place greater emphasis on structural factors (e.g., resources) as opposed to the consensus based collective behavior school which emphasizes psychological factors (e.g., grievances). In addition, the resource mobilization approach, unlike the collective behavior school, holds that social movements are not only normal features of society but that there are rational reasons that can explain the rise of the social movement. More specifically, resource mobilization theorists, unlike the collective behavior school, view social movements as non-spontaneous, organized entities that are a form of legitimate, rational political behavior arising out of the political aspirations and environment of the oppressed and are directed at perceived social problems since other avenues (for e.g., institutional political behavior) are unavailable or unresponsive (Aho 1990; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998). A growing number of scholars have recently argued that there is no reason to rely upon ‘special’ theories to explain the emergence of rightwing movements. These scholars, as will be demonstrated below, not only criticise traditional ‘right-wing’ social movement theories, but have also begun to employ ‘general’ social movement theories, such as resource mobilization, in their research on right-wing movements (see for e.g. Aho 1990; Berlet 1999; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Bruce 1988; Diamond 1995;

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1998; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Hardisty 1999; Himmelstein 1990: 72-79; Koeppen 1969; Liebman and Wuthnow 1983; McAdam 1982; Miller 1985; Schuparra 1998; Tilly 1978). Morris and Herring (1985) state, that “resource mobilization theorists contend that radical right movements do not differ in essentials (although the goals may differ) from other movements and can be explained within the resource mobilization framework” (170). In the last three decades, in fact, a growing number of scholars have empirically tested the central tenets of resource mobilization on right-wing social groups and movements. Hamm’s (1993) ethnographic field research, conducted during the 1980s on American skinheads, appears to have partially supported resource mobilization theory. Hamm contends that the dramatic increase in the number of skinheads in America in the 1980s can partly be attributed to the leadership (in terms of recruitment strategies and activities) and financial resources deployed by racist leaders like Tom Metzger (Hamm 1993; 1998: 83). Lo (1982) similarly concludes that his examination of empirical studies conducted on socially conservative social movements provide some support for the resource mobilization perspective. Lo found that pre-existing networks, elite support, leadership capabilities, and the activities of activists are all important factors which impact on the strength of socially conservative right-wing social movements (see also Aho 1990: 185-196 on Idaho Christian patriots; Diamond 1995 and Haridsty 1999 on conservative right-wing social movements; Diamond 1998 on the Christian right; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997 on white separatists; Klatch 1999 on the student group Young Americans for Freedom during the 1960s; Liebman and Wuthnow 1983 on the Moral Majority; McGirr 2001on right-wing activists, or warriors, in Orange County, California and other suburban locales; McEvoy III 1969 on the 1964 Goldwater presidential campaign; Oberschall 1993 on the New Cristian Right; Ribuffo 1983 on far-right agitators, such as Pelley, Winrod, and Smith in the 930s and 1940s; Rogin 1967 on McCarthyism; and Simonelli 1999 on George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party for similar findings; see also Berlet and Lyons 2000; Berman 1994; Edwards 1999; Ezekiel 1995; Flynn and Gerhardt 1995; Himmelstein 1990; Martin 1996; Martinez and Guinther 1999; Noble 1998; Schneider 1999).

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4. New Social Movement Theory: This perspective originates from theorists who were primarily interested in studying left-wing social movements and who mostly ignored right-wing movements (Pichardo 1997). Castells (1997) recently broadened the purview of new social movement theory by enunciating a variation of the theory which directly relates to the emergence of the (right-wing) militia movement. The discussion of Castells’s analysis will be put aside until the section below that examines theories that were specifically set forth to explain the rise of the militia movement. The remainder of this subsection will describe new social movement theory in general. In response to researchers’ claims that contemporary social movements differed from earlier movements, new social movement theory arose in the 1960s. It was widely accepted that the collective behavior school, Marxist and conflict theories were unable to explain the rise of 1960s social movements, since these modern social movements were thought to “represent an entirely newer form of social protest and [to] reflect specific properties of advanced industrial societies” (D’Anieri, Ernst, and Kier 1990: 445). In contrast to earlier social movements which were thought to be comprised of primarily lower and working class individuals who were mainly concerned with economic issues, contemporary social movements were mainly populated by well adjusted middle class actors. It was believed that these individuals pursued cultural quality of life issues, as opposed to economic issues, and emphasized direct participation in the political process. Furthermore, it was emphasized that the examination of culture should take into account the unique context of each movement (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Mahan 1997; Pichardo 1998). The new social movement approach states that all societies are characterized by a single overriding conflict which determines what type of social movement will arise in that society. It is contended that contemporary social movements operate in a post-industrial age which, unlike earlier ages, is able to satisfy most peoples’ economic needs. However, “in contrast to the [earlier... ] phase of capitalism, state control in post industrial society reaches beyond the productive sphere and into areas of consumption, services and social relations” (D’Anieri, Ernst, and Kier 1990: 446). This perspective concentrates on post-industrial movements that put less emphasis on economic matters and instead stress

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that politics should be imbued with identity concerns. Melluci (1985) explains that “social conflicts move from the traditional economic/industrial system to cultural grounds: they affect personal identity, the time and the space in everyday life, the motivation and cultural patterns of individual action” (289; see also Dobratz and ShanksMeile 1997: 19; Mahan 1997; Pichardo 1998; Rivera 1997). More particularly, as Mahan (1997) points out, many new social movement theorists focus intently on the idea of ‘collective identity’ which refers to both the “shared cognitive elements of collective action ... [as well as] a keen attachment to institutions greater than one’s self” (15-19). Finally, new social movements theory asserts that the structure of modern society has become so overarching that it blocks citizen participation, and engenders feelings of alienation in many individuals. It is believed that most people merely vote mechanically and participate half-heartedly in modern society. New social movements not only decry this trend and instead argue in favor of direct democracy, and an increase in personal autonomy, but they also challenge the overriding materialistic orientation of society. It is asserted that since politics now pervades every area of life, every act one engages in has political consequences (see Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Melucci 1985; Pichardo 1998; Rivera 1997; Touraine 1981).

II. Right-Wing Social Movement Theories The prior review of the general social movement literature set forth and summarized the main perspectives on the rise of social movements. This was done to set the foundation and to contextualize the following discussion where social movement theories that are specifically designed to explain and account for the rise of right-wing social movements are reviewed. These theories are all consensus based and fall under the domain of the classical collective behavior school. They will be reviewed for two reasons. First, many of the theories and hypotheses that have been formulated to explain the emergence of the militia movement appear to flow from and can be related back to the earlier right-wing social movement theories. Second, most of the empirical work conducted on

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extreme right-wing social movements, from which some hypotheses will be drawn (and will be empirically tested on the militia movement), have utilized and referred to these right-wing social movement theories. While this discussion on right-wing social movements will briefly review Adorno’s thesis and mass society theory, the bulk of this section will focus on a number of status theories. 1. Adorno’s Personality Theory: Adorno’s authoritarian personality theory (see Adorno, Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950) was formulated in an attempt to explain the rise of fascism and other totalitarian movements. It falls under the rubric of the consensus based collective behavior school in that it views the followers of the “fascist movements of the 1920s and 1930s.... as irrational victims of a sick society” (Gamson 1975: 133). Adorno’s theory maintains that members and followers of extreme social movements are more likely to share a particular ‘authoritarian personality’, as compared to the general population. Individuals with the authoritarian personality are presumed to be submissive people who seek certainty, stereotype others, and join farright groups to satisfy their emotional needs. Hamm (1993) summarizes this view by stating that: “in the view of Adorno and his colleagues, a person with this personality has 1) the strong need to align him or herself with authority and protective in-groups, 2) a strong sense of nationalism, rigid moralism and definitiveness, and 3) a strong tendency to perceive things in absolute terms, i.e, as either all good or all bad” (121; see also Adorno, Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950; Ebata 1997; Fromm 1941; Hixson, Jr. 1992: 85-89; Karvonen 1997; Koeppen 1969; Lofland 1996; Reich 1970). It is alleged that capitalism’s influence on child rearing practices in the home leads to the development of authoritarian personalities. It is claimed that “children raised in hierarchical, exploitive families grow into authoritarian adults” (Ribuffo 1983: 238). Nevertheless, this theory has been criticized by many for generating mixed empirical support and, “for generalizing conclusions that were based on an ideological bias against the right” (Ebata 1997: 23; see also Chesler and Schmuck 1969; Elms 1969; George and Wilcox 1996; Hixson Jr. 1992; Klatch 1999; Koeppen 1969; Ribuffo 1983; Rokeach 1960; Shils 1954; Wolfinger Wolfinger; Prewitt, and Rosenhack 1964). Recently, though, Altemeyer (1996) set forth an

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updated and revised version of the original ‘Authoritarian Personality’ theory which he claims has received strong empirical support (see also Martin 1996: 125; 394) 2. Mass Society Theory: Mass society theory like the authoritarian personality theory, is a specific theoretical construct which falls under the consensus based collective behavior school. It was developed in the 1950s to explain the rise of Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes. More precisely, mass society theory responds to the following question: How could normal average Germans have engaged in such beastly genocidal behavior during the second world war? This theory proposes that German citizens’ actions during the Nazi period were abnormal behaviors that occurred due to abnormal conditions prevalent in Germany at that time (Aho 1990; Pichardo 1998; see also Reich 1970). Mass society theory states that long term social changes (e.g., industry and technology) or sudden events (e.g., wars, economic recessions and natural disasters) result in a breakdown of the social structure which in turn lead to both social and psychological consequences. In terms of social consequences, it is claimed that these changes or sudden events lead to the disruption of natural communities and of intermediate group relations. Halebsky (1976) writes that: “it is precisely where, the mass theorist affirms, ‘intermediate relations of community, occupation and association are more or less inoperative’ that mass society develops” (37). Mass society theory contends that the above mentioned social structural changes result in the psychological consequence of a weakened sense of social integration on both the personal and group level. The ties that bind people to each other and to society are dissipated which results in a growing sense of “anomie” and a situation of normlessness. This leads to individuals not being able to satisfy their personal and social needs and culminates in the creation of a mass society. Halebsky again explains that “the decline of functionally relevant authoritative associations with which the individual has an intimate relationship has meant the deterioration of a firm base for establishing standards of judgment and behavior. In effect, social structural change has seriously weakened the integrative character of contemporary society and of personal and group life.... The disruption and the decline of intermediate relations and of community are viewed as

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having serious consequences.... giving rise to the atomistic society.... it is a bleak picture of man adrift. He is uprooted, displaced, and in a condition of anomie” (Halebsky 1976: 37-38; see also Aho 1990; Kornhauser 1959; McAdam 1982; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998; Rogin 1967). Kornhauser (1959) argues that mass society theory also predicts that individuals from a mass society “lack the resources to restrain their own behavior.... social atomization engenders strong feelings of alienation.... and therefore the disposition to engage in extreme behavior to escape from these tensions” (91-92; see also Halebsky 1976: 53). The resulting irrational demands of the masses are no longer buffered due to the decay and decline of the intermediate groups. Instead, their demands are proffered directly to the elites which results in loss of control by those elites through both an undermining of the pluralist form of government, and a weakening of the constraints placed on the concentration of power. It is claimed that mass society social movements are undemocratic in that they attempt to close the political process to opposing forces. Mass political behavior, therefore, increases the potential for populations to be mobilized by extremist leaders and movements (Aho 1990; Halebsky 1976; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Kornhauser 1959; McAdam 1982; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998; Rogin 1967). To summarize, mass society theory declares that mass society political behavior impairs the culture of democratic discussion and attempts to transfer social and economic conflicts outside of political institutions which culminate in non-institutional behavior (i.e., social movements) with an emphasis on violence. The supporters of mass movements are seen as irrational individuals of whom it has been said that “politics meant to them nothing but escape from their petty existence through collective emotionalism” (Halebsky 1976: 46). Finally, the supporters of mass movements are alleged to be the most apathetic and marginal members of society. Kornhauser (1959) maintains that “considerable evidence shows that the strongest response to the totalitarian appeal.... comes from people with the weakest attachment to class organizations, or any other kind of social group. A totalitarian movement attracts socially isolated members of all classes”16 (Kornhauser 1959: 95; see also Aho 1990; Halebsky 1976; McAdam 1982; Morris and Herring 1985; Pichardo 1998).

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Lipset and Raab (1970; see also Aho 1990; Hixson, Jr. 1992), in an assertion that appears to originate from mass society theory, state that extremist right-wing groups have greater success in areas that are subject to rapid population growth, and/or are characterized by a larger percent of newcomers/migrants. Both types of areas are less likely to produce a cohesive community and more likely to suffer from social stress in that: “[These right-wing groups] may have attracted those enduring the strains of migration. Or, conversely, the relationship may reflect the fact that the most rapidly growing areas suffered from the greatest social tensions flowing from the difficulties of absorbing large numbers of newcomers” (Lipset and Raab 1970: 89) and “the rootless individual, everywhere, is receptive to the appeal of groups with a high sense of social solidarity” (Lipset and Raab 1970: 122; see also Kraft 1992; but see Dyer 1997). Thus, because individuals living in areas suffering from rapid population growth feel less bonded to society they are also more susceptible to appeals from extreme right-wing groups and social movements. This claim is bolstered by Kraft’s (1992) study which found that the John Birch Society was stronger in states that experienced higher rates of population growth: “Elements in the conservative movement such as the JBS [i.e., John Birch Society] can be seen as a response to the structural strain of population growth.... [This study found] moderately strong evidence [which] indicated that state population growth was one of several factors which could have influenced state per capita JBS membership” (22-27; see also Chesler and Schmuck 1969). Aho (1990) focused on a number of theories including mass society theory in his important empirical study on Idaho Christian patriots. Aho argues that contrary to Lipset and Raab’s claims, past empirical tests of mass society theory have not generated much support (147; see also Chesler and Schmuck 1969; Hamilton 1982; Marx and Wood 1975: 392; McAdam 1982; McEvoy III 1969; Morris and Herring 1985: 176; Rogin 1967; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt, and Rosenhack 1964: 275-277). Aho next pondered whether or not “Idaho’s Christian patriots fit the prototypes of the isolated transient of mass theory....?” (147). Aho pursued the answer to this question by attempting to capture and measure the concepts of mass society theory in a number of variables. In response to mass society theory’s claims that “physical mobility tends to loosen local group affiliations and render migrants available to extremist appeals” (149; see

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also Hixson, Jr. 1992), Aho (1990) examined whether or not geographic mobility was related to Idaho Christian patriotism. No support emerged in favor of mass society theory’s assumptions since the patriots, while more mobile than the average American, were not more mobile than their fellow Westerners. In addition, the percentage of patriots born in states different from the one they currently resided in did not differ significantly from that of other Westerners. Aho (1990) also focused on the average age of his sample to ascertain whether or not the patriots of his sample were more middle-aged and male than the general population under the assumption, supported by previous research, that middle-aged males are more involved in community affairs than others. Aho did not find support for mass society theory since the Idaho Christian patriots were found to be eighty percent male and almost fifteen years older than the average American. This finding that males were over represented among Idaho Christian patriots is not an unusual result. Many other studies on the extreme right have found similar results. For instance, Bjorgo (1995), who focused on worldwide violent activists among the radical right, Hamm (1993) who studied American skinheads, Kraft (1992) who examined the John Birch Society, Smith (1994) who reviewed the demographics of indicted right-wing terrorists in America in the 1980s, Watts (2001) who inspected hate crimes and right-wing violence and Germany, and Weinberg (1993) who analyzed the demographics of fifty-five prominent radical rightist leaders, all found males to be over represented (see also Ezekiel 1995; Hamm 1997; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Tapia 2000; but see Burkett 1998; Homsher 2001). In terms of Aho’s finding that Idaho Christian patriots were more likely to be older than average, other studies have found similar results (see for e.g., Bjorgo 1995; Chermak 2002; Karvonen 1997; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Smith 1994; Tapia 2000; Weinberg 1993; see also Hixson, Jr. 1992). Not surprisingly though studies that scrutinized youth cultures, such as skinheads, and hate crimes found young males to be disproportionately represented among the perpetrators (see for e.g., Hamm 1993; Watts 2001). Aho (1990) next queried whether or not Idaho Christian patriots were more likely, (as would be predicted by mass society theory) to have weaker family ties than others. Once again, the results were not supportive

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of mass society theory. Patriots were less likely to be divorced than the average American. In another blow to mass society theory, Aho discovered that the Idaho Christian patriots were not excluded from conventional politics. In fact, “cursory indications, however, are that radical Christian patriots are probably as deeply involved in conventional politicking as they are with its more extreme variants” (154). In spite of these findings, Aho did uncover some limited support for mass society theory. The patriots he examined were “somewhat over represented in isolated occupations” (156). Likewise, although “Idaho patriots are considerably less disaffected from the religious community than their fellow countrymen” (159), their affiliations tended to be with isolated sects. Overall, Aho concluded that mass society theory was not well supported since “out of the seven alienation variables on which information was gathered, statistical support for the theory of mass politics is found for only one” (161). 3. Status/Cultural Theories: In the past, status theories were the most popular and widely used of all the right-wing social movement theories. While the most prominent status theories were initially developed in the 1950s to explain the rise of McCarthy and McCarthyism; they were eventually revised and broadened in order to explain the emergence and rise of radical right-wing movements in general. The scholars who formulated these theories subscribe to a consensus based pluralistic view of the American political system which holds that political life is based upon compromise and the give and take among various interest groups. These scholars contend that extremist right-wing groups and social movements fall outside the boundaries of institutionalized political life in America since they eschew the compromises that are necessary and required in the American political system. Lipset and Raab (1970) explain that “politics is the workings of a pluralistic society. It is the constant process of negotiation through which conflicting interests come to.... compromise..... [However] extremists.... share a contempt for rational political discussion.... They know nothing about the virtue of compromise” (12; see also Bell 1963; George and Wilcox 1996; Lipset and Raab 1970: 18; 428; Lo 1982; Merkl and Weinberg 1993). Status theorists, like Hofstadter (1963), claim that sometimes extreme right-wing groups and social movements arise during times of

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economic prosperity, when economic issues recede and status issues move to the fore. It is argued that structural changes in America result in the rise of some groups and the decline of others in status. Both of these developments at times may lead to an increase in uncertainty and anxiety among the members of both rising and declining groups. Groups newly risen may feel uncertain and not fully secure with their increased position, while groups on the decline may feel anger and bitterness at their ‘dispossession’. In either scenario, there is an increased likelihood that these individuals will form or join an extreme right-wing group or movement as a way to irrationally lash back at both society and the structural changes (which caused their anxiety to begin with) through their barbs at targets that they blame for their anxiety or dispossession (see also Bell 1963; Broyles 1964; Koeppen 1969; Lipset and Raab 1970). According to these theorists, it is the structural changes and the resulting anxiety and irrationality it creates within individuals that help foster the emergence of right-wing social movements. It has been contended that the ideology, stated goals and aims of these right-wing groups and movements are not the cause or the motivating force leading to the creation and emergence of these groups and social movements. Rather, Hosftadter (1963), like other status theorists, believes that “the basic aspirations that underlie status discontent are only partially conscious... it is difficult to give them programmatic expression.... it is the tendency of status politics to be expressed more in vindictiveness.... than in realistic proposals for positive action” (53-54; see also Broyles 1964; Eatwell and Sullivan 1989; Forster and Epstein 1964; Lo 1982: 109; Rogin 1967). Similarly, Bell (1962) claims that individuals who supported the radical right in the 1950s came from groups on the decline in American life. Bell argues that it was the displacement of these individuals and their consequent loss of status, and not their stated fear of communism, which caused the appearance of paranoid and irrational radical right-wing groups and social movements: “In short, the radical right, having a diffused sense of fear, needs to find some story....to.... justify that fear.... One sees among the radical right, particularly among individuals in its upper-middle-class following who have never seen a Communist, the most extraordinary apprehensions about the extent of current Communist infiltration in government.... what the right wing is fighting, in the shadow of

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Communism, is essentially “modernity”.... and what it seeks to defend is its fading dominance” (12; see also Bell 1962: 31; Broyles 1964; Forster and Epstein 1964; Hofstadter 1963: 51-58; 62-64; Parsons 1955: 182-183; 191-192; Viereck 1955; 1962). Perhaps the most influential status theory is offered by Lipset and Raab (1970) in their book “The Politics of Unreason” which examines extremist right-wing groups and social movements in America from 1790 to 1970. Lipset and Raab first assert that it is a belief in ‘preservatism’, described as “maintaining or narrowing lines of power or privilege” (19; see also 20; Aho 1990; Lo 1982; Merkl and Weinberg 1993), which differentiates extremist right-wing groups and movements from all other groups and social movements. Lipset and Raab then offer a theory which seeks to explain why right-wing groups and social movements arise. They contend that sometimes social and structural changes in society result in some: “groups which feel they are losing their power and status.... a diminution of their traditional power..... The fluidity of the American social structure..... has meant that the problem of status displacement has been an enduring characteristic of American life. New areas, new industries, new migrant groups, new ethnic groups, have continually encroached upon the old as important and influential. On these occasions, variously entrenched American groups have felt disinherited. These situations have in America been the typical well-springs of right-wing movements” (23-24; see also 29-31; 118; 131-132; 485). Lipset and Raab (1970) claim that it is individuals, who feel more attached to the past as opposed to the present (i.e., the Quondam Complex), due to structural changes, who are the most prone to feel anxiety and frustration resulting from their declining group status (status preservatism). These individuals are more likely than others to join extreme right-wing groups and movements which are intolerant of opposing views, preach a moralistic philosophy, and promulgate conspiracy theories. They assert that the characteristics discussed above do not cause the emergence of the right-wing social movement. Rather, they are the manifestation (or ‘baggage’) of the anxiety and stress felt by individuals experiencing structural and societal changes that result in a decline in the status of these individuals’s groups (see Aho 1990; Lipset and Raab 1970; Lo 1982).

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Lipset and Raab believe that one of the structural changes that is related to the emergence of right-wing social movements is turmoil in the political system: “Historically, extremist movements are movements of disaffection. Occurring in periods of incipient change, they are addressed to groups who feel.... deprived of something important.... Such deprivation is accompanied by political dislocation..... Party alignments are shifting, and there is much political displacement” (428-429). In other words, rightwing social movements and groups are more likely to arise when the two dominant parties are weakened17 (see also Cook and Kelly 1999; Grupp Jr. 1969; Lipset and Raab 1970: 485-487; Lo 1982; Seul 1997; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt and Rosenhack 1964). After reviewing historical and survey data on earlier right-wing groups and social movements, Lipset and Raab (1970), argue that lower class individuals are the most susceptible to the allure of right-wing groups and social movements (see also Lipset 1960: 97-130). This susceptibility is due to their lack of internalization of democratic values, which results from their lack of education, sophistication, and economic security as well as from their residing in more rural areas that are far removed from the major cultural influences (see also Koeppen 1969; but see Ribuffo 1983). Lipset (1960) states that “these characteristics also reflect the extent to which the lower strata are isolated from the activities.... of democratic society. An isolation which prevents them from acquiring the sophisticated and complex view of the political structure” (112). Lipset (1960), further maintains, that the economic insecurity present in the lives of many lower class individuals cause many of them to experience feelings of anxiety and tension which then need to be released in some fashion. Occasionally right wing social movements and groups will emerge and thereby provide the necessary outlet. Lipset and Raab assert “that the underprivileged frequently constitute the social base of authoritarian movements of the left and right” (1970: xvi; see also Aho 1990; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Lo 1982). Based upon the evidence obtained from their studies, Lipset and Raab hypothesize that one’s economic position, occupation level, educational level and place of residence are all related to right-wing social movement participation. They predict that less educated, and less wealthy individuals, who work in low status

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occupations or are unemployed, and who reside in more rural areas are more likely to seek out a right-wing group or social movement. Lipset and Raab qualify the above hypotheses, however, by pointing out that lower class individuals generally have liberal views regarding economic policy. Right-wing groups and movements, which are generally believed to promulgate conservative economic views popular among upper class individuals, are therefore confronted with a problem. How can they appeal to lower class individuals among the status declining groups and thereby create the nucleus of a mass movement, if their economic views are inimical to their target audience? According to Lipset and Raab, the answer is that, “in the case of right-wing political movements, the natural economic interests of the concerned elite and of the disaffected lower strata were conflicting, and the political appeal had to be made on other than a class basis” (487). The social movement must stress other views and policies (e.g., symbolic social issues, such as nativism, that emphasize the declining power and prestige of the group) which generates agreement among both the upper and lower classes of the declining social group. If the social movement is successful in this endeavor it will be able to obscure the differences between the two classes in terms of economic views by highlighting their agreements in other areas. This will result in a marriage of convenience between both elements of the displaced and status declining group: i.e., the upper and lower classes. Lipset and Raab (1970) add that “the three potential elements in the model of right-wing extremism- low democratic restraint, Quondam Complex, and economic conservatism- fuse together in some form and in some combination when the various populations subject to these elements are politicized and mobilized under a unifying banner of preservatism. But it is a banner of status preservatism, not of economic preservatism, which must be flown if the mass low-income population is to be included. The social strain for such a population is some sense of status loss, felt as a corporate or anomic loss or absence of power, prestige, or way of life” (496-497; see also 39-47; 61-67; 155; Aho 1990; Berman 1994; Martin 1996). Sometimes, a right-wing group is unable to successfully bridge the above mentioned contradictions which results in the group’s membership being limited to higher strata individuals in terms of

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economic and educational level. Lipset and Raab (1970) after reviewing a number of empirical studies conclude, for example, that members of the John Birch Society were better off than the average American in terms of their levels of formal education, professional status, and income18. They explain these findings by noting that because the John Birch Society as an organization advocates extremely conservative economic policies it normally expresses hostility toward both labor unions and proposed social programs (see also Kraft 1992). Lipset and Raab note though, that while the Bircher’s middle class supporters are better educated than the general population, “they are not drawn from those in the top-ranking professions or occupations..... [in addition] Grupp’s examination of the type and quality of education received by Birch members who did attend college or university.... reports that most of the Birchers had studied at schools which fall in the lowest group of American institutions of higher learning in quality” (322). Lipset and Raab maintain that John Birch Society members, despite their affluence, still “may suffer a sense of status discrepancy. They clearly do not have the educational prerequisites to easily become part of the leading social circles of the communities in which they reside” (323). In sum, Lipset and Raab appear to be making two arguments. First, those extreme-right wing groups (i.e., social conservatives) which espouse a non-conservative economic policy or which are able to highlight non-economic, symbolic status issues (such as nativism) should be able to bridge the upper class, lower class divide. Such a group should attract a large lower class following of members and supporters with lower economic and educational levels as compared to the general population. Second, if the group or social movement espouses a conservative economic policy (i.e., economic conservatives) and is not able to highlight non-economic issues then such a group would be expected to follow in the footsteps of the John Birch Society and the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, and attract a largely upper class membership having higher economic and educational levels as compared to the general population. This group’s members, nonetheless, may still suffer from status anxiety due to the lower quality colleges and universities they attended. It is important to be aware of what type of conservative movement one is referring to since, as was stated above, it is asserted that these two different types of right-wing groups, economic vs social

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conservatives, appeal to different constituencies (see Hixson Jr. 1992: Lipset and Raab 1970: 452-456; Lo 1982; McEvoy III 1969). Once again, the key distinction between economic and social conservatives rests on the social conservatives focusing on social issues such as racism, nativism, anti-Semitism, abortion, gay rights, religious issues in general and public school prayer in particular, education and other like issues; while, the economic conservatives stress conservative economic policies (see Hixson Jr. 1992: XXV; Lipset and Raab 1970; Lo 1982: 112). Joseph Gusfield (1963) offers another famous status theory which, while similar in some respect to the other status theories, also critiques and criticizes them as well. In terms of agreement among the theorists, Gusfield’s conception of the term status matches Hofstadter (1963) and Bell’s (1962) use of the term. Gusfield likewise asserts that status issues become more prominent during times of economic prosperity. In addition, Gusfield claims that right-wing groups and social movements arise because of structural changes in the society which have rearranged the allocation of status in society. Finally, Gusfield argues that it is the changed status position, and not the group’s stated goals and ideology that are responsible for the emergence of the right-wing social movement or group. Gusfield (1963) applies these ideas to the temperance movement in the United States in his classic work “Symbolic Crusade”. He writes that “issues of moral reform are analyzed as one way through which a cultural group acts to preserve, defend, or enhance the dominance and prestige of its own style of living within the total society. In the set of religious, ethnic, and cultural communities that have made up American society, drinking (and abstinence) has been one of the significant consumption habits distinguishing one subculture from another. It has been one of the major characteristics through which Americans have defined their own cultural commitments..... We express our approval or disapproval of cultures by reference to the moral position they accord drinking..... The public support of one conception of morality at the expense of another enhances the prestige and self-esteem of the victor and degrades the culture of the losers. In its earliest development, temperance was one way in which a declining social elite tried to retain some of its social power and leadership” (3-5).

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Thus it is the varying degrees of prestige that are accorded to the different social groups in society that spark the rise of social movements. Gusfield asserts that a social group whose status is decreasing will form and join groups and movements in an attempt to reaffirm their cultural values through societal laws. These doomed groups will attempt to forestall their declining level of status and will fight to maintain their group prestige by imposing their cultural values on new groups (for e.g., by enacting their values into law). Other newer groups will likewise attempt to obtain prestige by joining social movements that want to do away with the laws that reflect the cultural values of the older more established group’s cultural values. It is declining or rising status, in short, and not the stated program of the group or social movement, which is responsible for the emergence of the social movement. The program of the social movement is just a tool to be used in an attempt to reassert the dominance of a fading group (or to assert the dominance of a rising group); but it is not the cause of the group: “The fact of affirmation is a positive statement of the worth or value of the particular subculture vis-a-vis other subcultures in the society. It.... is significant for the status of a group. It demonstrates.... the prestige accorded them in the total society” (Gusfield 1963: 116; see also Gusfield 1963: 138; Lipset and Raab 1970: 131). At this point though, Gusfield takes issue with the other status theorists by arguing that the attempt of these individuals and their social movements to fight against their social decline or for their social rise is not, as others have claimed, unreasoned (see Lipset and Raab 1970), irrational (see Bell 1955) or paranoid (see Hofstadter 1963). Rather, “the anger and bitterness of the doomed classes is by no means an irrational reaction. There has been a decline in the social status of the old middle class and the dominance of its values” (Gusfield 1963: 10; see also Gusfield 1963: 179-180; Halebsky 1976; Lo 1982; Ribuffo 1983; Rogin 1967; Tilly 1978). As was noted, status theories emerged as one of the leading perspective’s employed to explain the rise of far right groups and movements. In the 1970s and 1980s though many academics came to doubt both the veracity and efficacy of these theories. Scholars leveled a number of different charges as part of their effort to undermine the then reigning dominance of the status theories. Bruce (1988) claims that the basic foundation of most status theories are rooted in both a political bias

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and an intellectual arrogance. Status theorists, most of whom are leftwing, are said to not only deride the ideological beliefs of extreme rightists, but in most cases to refuse to accept their arguments as worthy of serious scholastic consideration. Instead, the views of far right activists are often labeled as silly, ridiculous, unimportant, superficial, dangerous, evil, unreasoned, or irrational. Bruce (1988), points out that Lipset’s status theory: “begin[s] by denying normal motives to people who engage in uninstitutionalized activities..... [It] rule[s] out the possible alternative that people who accept conspiracy theories of the world, for example, do so because such theories appear reasonable and plausible.... It often seems that the depiction of social movement activity as irrational rests, not on any analytical distinctions, but on taking for granted the dominant beliefs of middle-of-the-road cosmopolitan intellectuals” (12-14; see also Berlet 1998; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Fenster 1999; James 2001; McGirr 2001; Ribuffo 1983; Rogin 1967; Schneider 1999; Schuparra 1998; Watson 1999). Aho (1990) in his book that examines extreme right-wing Christian patriots in Idaho, charges that many academics, in addition to offering nothing but disdain for the views and actions of extreme rightwingers, frequently caricature such views and actions as paranoid. Aho contends that any paranoia exhibited by such extreme right-wingers may be partially attributable to the actions of the intelligentsia, reporters, and activists associated with watch groups. Professors, activists and reporters sometimes engage in interactions with right-wing activists that quickly deteriorate into mutual recriminations being thrown about. Usually this, by then hostile environment, either results in or reinforces the paranoia of these far-right individuals. Aho (1990) explains that, “conventional opinion, bolstered by academic scholarship, holds right-wing radicals to be.... paranoid. My impression, on the contrary, is that much of the paranoia they exhibit may be due in part to conflictual situations in which they often find themselves with liberal reporters, self-righteous academics, the police, and civil rights activists” (30; see also Dobratz and ShanksMeile 1997; Klatch 1999; Rogin 1967; Schoenberger 1969). Ribuffo (1983) believes that many academics find it useful to pejoratively label the supporters of far-right social movements as irrational, paranoid, and unreasoned since they “found some countrymen too despicable to deal with, let alone compromise with. If extremists

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differed tactically, psychologically.... from ‘rational men’ then, without apparent contradiction, liberals could bar them from the ‘open marketplace of ideas’” (241). It is mistaken and shortsighted therefore to derisively label the followers of extreme right-wing social movements as irrational hate filled fanatics. Ribuffoe (1983) concludes, that while many such social movements are indeed intolerant or prejudiced, they simultaneously reflect broader societal concerns in “that the extremism of the far right often converged with the political and cultural mainstream” (XII). In addition, he contends that many of these social movements, at times, maintain links to sections of mainstream society and “attract intermittent support from prominent officials and businessmen” (XII; see also Berlet and Lyons 2000; McGirr 2001). Bennett (1995), in his book that examines far-right groups in American history, bluntly claims that, as unsettling as it may be to admit, many of the assertions promulgated by these groups concerning newly arrived ethnic, and religious minorities were often factually correct- even if their proposed solutions were frequently vicious and repugnant. In particular, Bennett argues that “the rightists are not people who will receive a warm response from intellectuals.... but they do deserve a measure of dispassionate attention.... objective conditions [concerning immigrants] did warrant serious concern. The immigrants of the midnineteenth century appear as innocent victims from the perspective of later generations, but to many people living among the newcomers, only the terrible problems they brought to America seemed important. Spiraling crime rates, growing poverty rolls, and terrifying epidemics were the only characteristics many natives saw as being associated with them. Cities.... became grim and dangerous.... Social disorder was a haunting specter, most often connected to the alien.... [This] disruption of American life was not the product of their overheated imaginations but of objective conditions. Their ‘solutions’ to these problems may have been .... destructive, but their fears were rooted in reality” (5-9; see also Berlet and Lyons 2000: 13-14). Many scholars take issue with the claim made by the status theorists that extremist right-wing groups and social movements originate due to change or breakdown in the structural arrangements of society and that such groups are populated by the most frustrated, anxious and anomic individuals. It is pointed out that “a group may experience a relative

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decline in status and yet still possess networks and organization that can be mobilized in collective action” (Lo 1982: 109; see also McAdam 1982; Morris and Herring 1985; Tilly 1978). As was already noted, many scholars sympathetic to the resource mobilization perspective have likewise criticized the status theorists. They challenge the status theorists for stressing mass mobilization and popular support as leading to the creation of right-wing groups and social movements instead of examining the social movement’s strategic utilization of resources, pre-existing social networks, links to elites, and its own organizational makeup (see for e.g., Aho 1990; Berlet 1998; Berlet and Lyons 2000; Churchill 2001; Gamson 1975; Himmelstein 1990; Hixson, Jr. 1992: 29-30; Lo 1982; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1987; McGirr 2001; Morris and Herring 1985; Rogin 1967). Bruce (1988) notes that status theorists over predict both as to when social movements will emerge and as to who will join them. The status theorists contend that individuals from groups on the decline in terms of status may be bitter and confused, while individuals from groups newly risen may feel insecure. Therefore, according to the status theorists, individuals from both groups may be vulnerable to recruitment by rightwing groups and social movements. Bruce contends that promoters of this theory “run into this problem: in such a model, what social groups are not status anxious? If the deprived are anxious about their lack of status, and the majority of those with status fear losing it, who is left contented and secure?” (11; see also Aho 1990: 213-216; Himmelstein 1990; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Kraft 1992; Polsby 1963: 813; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt and Rosenhack 1964: 268). One of the most common criticisms of the status theorists is that they ignore the specific ideologies set forth by right-wing groups and social movements. As was already discussed, status theorists assert that ideology is not necessarily related to the etiology of right-wing groups. Such groups’ ideologies are said to be merely a manifestation of social and structural breakdowns that result in a change in the societal allocation of status. One result of these changes is an increase in individual feelings of stress and anxiety. Status theorists conclude therefore that individual alienation is the real motivator of right-wing movement formation. Nigel James (2001) succinctly counters this thesis by arguing that “[right-wing]

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extremism is rarely the product of pathology, but it is certainly generated by ideology” (66; see also Bruce 1988: 21; Lo 1982: 109-110). Bruce (1988) further charges that most status theorists have not proffered adequate proof to substantiate this core allegation. According to Bruce, it is not enough to just assert that it is status anxiety, and not ideology, which is motivating many individuals to join far-right social movements. Most far-right groups and movements, after all, normally attribute any success they may enjoy to factors not in any way associated with status issues. Since status theorists are rarely able to offer evidence that the leaders or members of the right-wing groups are either lying or unaware of their true motivations, then the only justified conclusion is that the status thesis is incorrect. Bruce (1988) writes that “it is not yet an explanation to show that a group, the status of which was being threatened, engaged in some action which, had it succeeded, would have had the latent function of enhancing the group’s status. Given that motives other than a desire for status enhancement.... remain a possibility, one would have to produce independent evidence that enhanced status was what was actually desired, and was not simply an unintended consequence.... ‘In its absence, Wallis (1979: 98) argues, we can conclude three things: 1) [The members of the group] are dissembling and really do desire status improvement and know this to be the case, although they will not admit it. 2) They are motivated by unconscious desires for status improvement which they fail to recognize. 3) The hypothesis of status discontent is false....’ [The status theorists] present no evidence for (1) or (2), which strongly disposes us to conclude (3)” (3-4; see also Aho 1990; Berlet 1998; Churchill 2001; Eatwell and Sullivan 1989; Halebsky 1976; Martin 1996; McAdam 1982; McGirr 2001; Ribuffo 1983; Rogin 1967; Watson 1999). Many scholars suggest that the concept of ‘status politics’ should be revised to state that right-wing social movements and groups are “attempts to ‘build and sustain moral orders’ rather than angry responses to decline in status ranking” (Lo 1982: 111). Instead of holding to the view of status theorists who claim that culture is a tool which represents the status of a group, these (politics of lifestyle concern) theorists contend that it is precisely the cultural values themselves that are the motivating force in right-wing social movement formation. In other words, this view maintains that when individuals attempt to enact their cultural values into

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societal laws and norms, they should be taken at their word that it is the cultural and moral values that are motivating them, and not some unconscious reaction to their group’s status decline. Bruce (1988) writes, “that it is not personal social status which moral crusaders and their like were moved to defend. Rather.... it is the status of a particular culture which is at issue [i.e., the politics of lifestyle concern- ‘PLC’]. In this view.... [right-wing social movements] would be explained as reactions to changes in the social, moral and cultural, and political environment which threatened to undermine the ability of a particular group to maintain its shared culture” (16; see also Becker, Jipson and Katz 2001; Hixson, Jr. 1992;Lo 1982; Martin 1996; Shupe and Stacey 1983; Simpson 1983; Watson 1999; Zurcher and Kirpatrick 1976). Other scholars have discarded the original concept of ‘status politics’ in favor of what they call ‘status inconsistency’ as a possible explanation for right-wing extremism (see Lenski 1954). In brief, status inconsistency refers to a situation where the status of an individual is not consistent across all the possible “vertical hierarchies of prestige: income, occupation, education, ethnicity, and so on.... [for example] the Italian immigrant who had become a millionaire with only a smattering of education” (Hixson, Jr. 1992). It is claimed that the stress generated by this situation would be alleviated by participation in a right-wing social movement or group. Grupp Jr. (1969) explains that “membership in [rightwing] organizations, it is suggested, may serve to buttress the individual’s sense of self-esteem” (96). Overall though, only mixed empirical support has been found for this hypothesis (see Bruce 1988; Hixson, Jr. 1992; Lo 1982; McEvoy III 1969; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt and Rosenhack 1964). Lo (1982), in addition to critiquing the status theorists, offers some insights and predictions of his own as to what factors are associated with the emergence of right-wing groups and social movements. He contends, after reviewing a number of empirical studies, that more religious people, notably fundamentalist Christians, are especially likely to join extreme right-wing social movements. Likewise, Aho’s (1990) important empirical study on Idaho Christian patriots, also garnered support for the proposition that a relationship exists between belief in fundamentalist Christian doctrines and membership in right-wing social movements (see also Barkun 1997; Carlson 1981; Chesler and Schmuck

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1969; Haridsty 1999; Hixson Jr. 1992; Hofstadter 1963; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Lipset and Raab 1970; Martin 1996; McEvoy III 1971; Minkenburg 1993;Rohter 1969; Wilcox 1987; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt and Rosenhack 1964). Lipset (1960) explains this connection between fundamentalist religious belief and (right-wing) political extremism by claiming that both phenomena are based upon simple notions of right and wrong, which leave little room for ambiguity or nuance. Lipset (1960) states that “the point here is that rigid fundamentalism and dogmatism are linked to the same underlying characteristics, attitudes, and propositions which find another outlet in allegiance to extremist political movements” (108; see also Grupp 1969; Koeppen 1969; Martin 1996; Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt, and Rosenhack 1964: 281-282; but see Ribuffo 1983: 181 who claims that “there was no necessary connection between conservative theology and far right activism”). Some scholars maintain that it is premature to jettison the status theories since they still add to our understanding of the etiology of rightwing movements. Pelz, Marquart, and Pelz (1991) who studied the rise and fall of the Aryan Brotherhood in the Texas Prison System conclude, for example, that “the origin and development of the Aryan Brotherhood in Texas can be mapped using the design developed by Lipset and Rabb” (34-35). Lo (1982) similarly claims that the empirical studies examined by him indicate that individuals with lower socio-economic status [SES], and education levels, and who are older, more religious and live in more rural areas (see also Kraft 1992), as compared to the general population, are more likely to join socially conservative right-wing movements and groups. Overall then, the empirical studies reviewed by Lo, which examined socially conservative social movements such as the anti-bussing movement/the right-to-life movement/and the stop-ERA movement, provide some support for Lipset and Raab’s predictions as to which individuals are more likely to join socially conservative social movements. Other scholars have found support for Lipset and Raab’s thesis as to which individuals are more likely to support socially conservative right-wing social movements in their examinations of the groups that supported the various electoral bids in Louisiana mounted by the racist former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke19. For instance, Powell (1992)

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after analyzing Duke’s support in his runoff race for a state legislative seat, found that districts which had a high percentage of high school graduates as opposed to college graduates and which had high concentrations of skilled blue-collar workers, as predicted by Lipset and Raab (1970), were more likely to support Duke than the other candidate. Moore (1992: 54) similarly discusses a poll which found that the typical Duke supporter was a high school graduate with no college education (see also Howell and Warren 1992: 89; King 1992: 246-247; Rose 1992). In addition, Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997) in their recent study on the far right white separatist movement, found some support for Lipset and Raab’s thesis in that “according to... [their] data... the movement tends to be more working class” (27; see also 269; Canfield 1985; Karvonen 1997; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Martin 1996; Minkenburg 1993; Schneider 1999; Shupe and Stacey 1983; Simpson 1983; Smith 1994). As mentioned above, in the discussion of mass society theory, Aho (1990) conducted, perhaps the most important scholarly empirical work that has focused on the extreme-right- a study of Christian patriots in Idaho20. Aho was interested in answering the following question: “If we assume that the Idaho Christian patriot movement is of the type labeled “right-wing extremism,” then we ask what conditions exist independent and prior to this type of movement are responsible for it” (12). Aho’s study did not rely upon public opinion polls; rather his study consisted of field research and interviews that he conducted with Christian patriots in Idaho. Aho examined Lipset and Raab’s (1970) proposition that because less educated individuals are unlikely to internalize democratic values they are more likely to join far-right groups. Aho not only found negligible support for this assertion, but his study revealed Idaho Christian patriots have higher levels of conventional education as compared to the average American or Idahoan. He explains that “one of the most shocking and perhaps disturbing findings of the sample of [our] respondents [of Idaho Christian patriots] is that on the whole they have attained slightly greater levels of formal education than either their fellow Idahoans or more conventional Americans... In other words, at least in Idaho it appears that years of formal education alone offer little protection against extremist political appeals” (139-142; see also Bruce 1988:11-12; Kaplan 1998). Aho proceeded to examine the type of institutions these Idaho Christian patriots attended and what these Christian patriots studied. He

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found that these individuals attended relatively lower ranking institutions and did not major in liberal arts subjects. Aho concludes that “the sample appears to have entered fields of study and attended institutions of higher learning not particularly noted for instilling a cognitive commitment to democracy. This means that the education theory of extremism is not disproven, but specified. Even highly educated individuals ungrounded in traditional liberal arts disciplines may not remain committed to democratic principles when subjected to social stress” (1990: 146).

III. Theories and Empirical Studies Explaining and Examining the Rise of the Militia Movement The discussion now turns to more recent hypotheses and theories that have been set forth specifically to explain the rise of the militia and other similar contemporary social movements. While scholars recognize the connections among concepts such as economic dislocation, paramilitary culture, and technological progress (see for e.g., Abanes 1996; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Bennett 1995; Castells 1997; Dyer 1997; Gibson 1994; Hixson Jr. 1992: 317; Lamy 1996; Ribuffo 1983), many of them can, nonetheless, be differentiated based upon which one of these three types of factors they consider to be the primary force influencing the rise of the militia movement. This chapter will review in turn each of these three perspectives. 1. Economic: Due to the strong influence that Marx has had on the development of social sciences, it should not come as a surprise that one of the most established traditions in the study of the etiology of social movements focuses on economic inequality. According to Marxists, the importance of material factors in generating class-based social movements cannot be overemphasized. Many posit that the forces of history are destined to impel the exploited masses to form revolutionary social movements in order to overcome their oppressors and establish a socialist state. In his recent book, “Harvest of Rage”, journalist Joel Dyer (1997), while not totally ignoring the role that cultural factors play, builds

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upon works that examine earlier far-right groups (see for e.g., Bell 1963; Koeppen 1969: 77-78) by concentrating on developments in our nation’s rural/farm heartland. Dyer argues that changing economic conditions in general, and the farm economy in particular, fueled the rise of today’s extreme anti-government movements, of which the militia movement is an important component (see for e.g., Dyer 1997: 69; 148-150; 177-180; 200; 239; 249). Dyer believes that rising interest rates, falling prices for farm products and smaller amounts of government aid all combined to cause the severe farm recession that hit rural areas in the 1980's. This recession negatively impacted the livelihood of many farmers and resulted in a dramatic increase in farm foreclosures. Moreover, this economic downturn could not have come at a worse time since, due to the encouragement of the federal government in the late 1970's, many farmers had greatly overextended themselves financially. These developments set up many a farmer for personal ruin. According to Dyer (1997), farming culture has long sanctified the importance of personal honor (see also Corcoran 1990). Many farmers interpreted their inability to stave off foreclosure as a sign of personal failure and were plagued by high levels of stress and anxiety. Dyer posits that while some farmers turned these feelings of anxiety and anger inward which drove up suicide and substance abuse rates, others directed these feelings outward, by either blaming the federal government for their misfortune or by lashing out at others (i.e., by engaging in spousal or child abuse) (see for e.g., Dyer 1997: 29-30; see also Akins 1998: 152). Those who opted for the latter coping strategy were the primary components of the extreme anti-government groups that proliferated in the 1990's. Dyer (1997) states that “in a twisted sort of way, the message of the antigovernment movement is a message of hope. It offers those who feel they’ve been stripped of their way of life the perception that it’s possible to fight back. It allows millions of depressed rural residents to shift the blame for their difficult circumstances from themselves to the government freeing them from their self-destructive guilt and shame” (71; see also Abanes 1996; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Burkett 1998; Cook and Kelly 1999; Davidson 1996; Gallaher 1998; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kramer 2002; Neiwert 1999; Ridgeway 1995; Tapia 2000; see also McAdam 1982 for a discussion on ‘system attribution’)

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During the time he spent among rural Americans, Dyer found that the farm crisis and rural depression (represented by rising unemployment and poverty rates along with increasing economic inequality) were responsible for the rise of the far-right anti-government movement in rural areas (see also Bennett 1995; Davidson 1996). Dyer maintains that this movement was not restricted to those who were active farmers. He discovered that the decline of farms devastated whole rural communities and affected everybody living in these communities, making all such residents, farmers and non-farmers alike, susceptible to the appeals made by anti-government extremist groups. Dyer (1997) again explains that “the ongoing problems in rural America- which started with the farm crisis and the changing global economy- are fueling the growth and volatile nature of the [anti-government] movement. The revolution that began in the wheat fields in the middle of the country has now spread through many other sectors of the population. The one thing these sectors all have in common is a lousy economic future that they blame on the federal government” (5; see also Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Birkett 1998; Coates 1987; Coppola 1996; Corcoran 1990; Davidson 1996; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Dyer 1997: 62-71; Gallaher 1998; Haridsty 1999; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kramer 2002; Lamy 1996; Neiwert 1999; Ridgeway 1995; Tapia 2000). Dyer eventually concludes “that the rural crisis has caused a severe loss of leadership in towns with low populations. Traditional role models, such as Sunday-school teachers, [and] physicians..... have all but disappeared as small towns have been boarded up because of a failing economy... this loss of community leadership coupled with the loss of community institutions such as churches, [and] schools .... which also fell to victim to rural economics.... will ultimately weaken this nation even more than what happened to the United States in the Great Depression” (Dyer 1997: 65; see also Davidson 1996; but see Aho 1990; Lipset and Raab 1970; Kraft 1992). Others point out that farmers are not the only Americans who have proven susceptible to extremist right-wing groups. Many scholars and journalists note that loggers, ranchers and others began to feel increasingly vulnerable in the 1980's and 1990's due to the expanding environmental movement. Many of these individuals who rely on natural resources for their livelihood see the goals of Green Peace, Sierra Club, Earth First, and other green organizations as jeopardizing their economic

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security. For these disgruntled workers, land conservation and environmental regulations translates not only into more public land, but also into major cuts in salary and the potential loss of their jobs: “To some people that [i.e., the agenda of radical conservationist and environmental groups] was going too far- particularly for the growing number of antienvironmentalist activists..... Cushman [an extreme anti-federal government leader] implied that there was a hidden agenda to the environmentalists proposal. ‘Was the spotted owl about saving the owl?’ thundered Cushman. ‘No!’ the crowd shouted. ‘It was about stopping logging, wasn’t it? Yeah!’” (Neiwert 1999: 265; see also Abanes 1996; Burkett 1998; Chaloupka 1996; Davidson 1996; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Durham 1996; Gallaher 1998; Junas 1995; Kramer 2002; Nesbitt 1996; Stern 1996). Many other segments of American society have also displayed apprehension toward the increasing globalization of the economy. Some observers of the contemporary extremist anti-government movement warn that numerous American workers fear that the breaking down of borders between countries, as epitomized by the recent GATT and NAFTA treaties, will lead to a loss of American sovereignty, and more importantly, American jobs. Indeed, many companies have already elected to relocate overseas to exploit low wages. Many of these displaced and disgruntled American workers, it is claimed, are vulnerable to the appeals of militias and other similar organizations which emphasize these economic issues (see Abanes 1996; Akins 1998; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Castells 1997; Davidson 1996; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Dyer 1997; Immerfall 1998; Junas 1995; Kaplan 1998; Lamy 1996; SPLC 1996). Overall, Dyer’s economic dislocation thesis appears to be similar to the arguments made by social disorganization theorists in the criminology literature. These theorists claim that community characteristics strongly impact on individual behavior independently of individual level characteristics such as age, race, gender, and socioeconomic status. The effect of disorganization, which impacts everyone residing in the area, is often used to account for the higher levels of deviant behavior found in some areas rather than other areas (see for e.g., Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942). In many ways, in fact, Dyer’s thesis is congruent with the ideas found in a social disorganization argument. Dyer points out that economic dislocation in

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many instances causes the complete crumbling of whole areas and communities. As a result it should not startle us that in most cases economic dislocation and social disorganization are different labels, which in reality refer to the same social processes (see Loftin 2000; McEvoy IIII 1969; McNall 1969). It should also be noted, that Dyer’s economic dislocation/social disorganization argument is in most respects the aggregate version of the individual level mass society theory which was discussed above21. Mass society theory states that during times of societal breakdown some individuals will latch onto right-wing groups in an attempt to help them manage their stressful situation. McNall (1969) believes that social disorganization could be viewed as an indicator of mass society since: “[Mass society theory believes] that the movements or organizations which people join are a means of handling the disorganization in their environment” (123). Some might parry that the economic dislocation/social disorganization argument enunciated by Dyer cannot be completely reconciled with mass society theory. While mass society theory claims that population growth is associated with extremist groups, Dyer maintains that it is population decline that is associated with such groups. It is quite possible though, to argue, as McNall does, that both phenomena are related to right-wing extremism since “a high degree of migration in either direction can cause a breakdown of stable referents. Community facilities can be strained by an influx of newcomers; strangers with new social and physical needs can cause disruption. As for out migration, this could be caused by unemployment and other factors which also signal potential disorganization” (124). 2. Cultural: Most theorists agree that while cultural factors have important, independent effects on social movements, it is difficult to disentangle them from other factors (i.e., economic or technological). Returning to some of the examples from the prior sub-section, we see that many of the situations which, initially, appeared to be economic in nature also had a cultural component. For example, while the GATT and NAFTA treaties had significant economic effects on many American communities, it would be short-sighted to claim that the impact of these agreements is limited strictly to their economic consequences. It would be more accurate

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to recognize that the globalization of commerce, along with increased legal and illegal immigration, leads not only to the exchange of goods but also to the exchange of cultural models, religions, values and institutions. Such interchanges, according to many, contributes to cultural heterogeneity and, inevitably, to the loss of what they perceive to be a distinctly American culture. Militias appear extremely attractive to those individuals who, having a strong sense of national pride and a view of the past which sanctifies small town rural American values and traditions, fear tendencies toward cultural pluralism and hope to forestall them. Kittrie (1995) even maintains that the escalating number of contemporary worldwide rebellious social groups can be linked to the ever growing intrusiveness of, not only global entities but, national governments into the every day lives of their citizens. Kittrie believes that only the “advocacy of a limited and decentralized government... serves well the needs of modern pluralistic communities and states that face the aspirations and demands of ever disparate and diversified conglomerates of humanity” (255; see also Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berman 1994; Burkett 1998; Castells 1997; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2000; Gardner 1997; Gibson 1994; Junas 1995; Klatch 1999; Kramer 2002; Lamy 1996; Seul 1997; Stern 1996; Tapia 2000). Although it has already been suggested that economic dislocation in rural America made many farmers, loggers, and ranchers susceptible to the militia movement, a closer look reveals that it was not simply negative economic conditions that motivated individuals to join, but also the loss of cultural traditions and ways of life. When people such as farmers and ranchers, who work closely with the land lose work, more than just a job is lost. These professions, more so than many others, become the centerpiece of the workers identity and self image. Thus, in order to restore their identity these individuals are likely to turn to groups (like the militias) which promise to do just that (see Corcoran 1990: 11; Davidson 1996; Dyer 1997: 19-20; see also Bennett 1995; Seul 1997; Tapia 2000). Gibson’s (1994) highly acclaimed work, “Warrior Dreams”, provides the most systematic examination of the role that cultural and structural changes and other social movements (such as the civil rights, feminist and anti-war movements) may have played in the development of the militia movement. In his book, Gibson both describes, and attempts

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to explain, the rise of the ‘paramilitary’ culture that has engulfed America. This paramilitary culture is a belief system that glorifies both physical prowess and a warrior ethos. According to Gibson, examples of this paramilitary culture abound in movies (e.g., “Rambo”), novels (for e.g., by Tom Clancy), comic books (with series focusing on heroes fighting in Vietnam), periodicals (e.g., “Soldier of Fortune”), the sale and purchase of military weapons, the emergence of elite combat shooting schools and the game of “paint-ball”. Since the militia movement has developed as an important, yet radical, fringe of this paramilitary culture, Gibson’s explanation for the rise of the paramilitary culture should, presumably explain the etiology of the militia movement (see Gibson 1994: 127-141; 161; 287-289; back-cover). Gibson’s (1994) basic thesis is that cultural, structural and economic changes and the rise of other social movements since the 1960s all played a major role in the development of the paramilitary culture. More precisely, Gibson, asserts that American males have long believed in both the glory of war and in the moral righteousness of America. Such beliefs prompted many American males to conclude that it was only because of America’s moral supremacy that America had been so successful in its prior military endeavors. Accordingly, America’s loss in Vietnam came as a terrible blow which shocked, puzzled, and unsettled many American males. Many were forced to grapple with a new question: “If Americans were no longer winners, then who were they?” (10). In addition to the failure in Vietnam, the rise of the civil rights movement along with increased immigration from third world countries resulted in white males losing the seeming absolute control that they had formerly held over American public life. Gibson’s thesis further argues that the rise of the feminist movement resulted in significant transformations in the private sphere of family life that in turn also impacted on the birth of paramilitary groups. Gibson postulates that many American males, reeling from these changes, sought refuge in a paramilitary culture22. A world was thus created where America remained triumphant and where traditional roles still reigned. Gibson insists that “these [warrior] dreams represented a flight from the present and a rejection and denial of the preceding twenty years. But they also indicated a more profound and severe distress. The whole modern world was damned as unacceptable. Unable to find a rational way to face the tasks of rebuilding society and reinventing

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themselves, men instead sought refuge in myths” (12). While these myths, according to Gibson, were primarily a response to cultural changes, he does not completely neglect the role that other factors, such as the changing nature of the American economy during that period, may have played (see also Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Berman 1994; Coates 1987; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Ferber 1998; Hamm 2002; Homsher 2001; Junas 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Klatch 1999; Lamy 1996; Martin 1996; McGirr 2001; Michel and Herbeck 2001; Watson 1999). Part of Gibson’s (1994) overall thesis states, in sum, that the structural, cultural and economic changes which occurred since the 1960s in America are representative of the changed power structure in America and the world; namely that America as a country and whites and males as groups had lost status, respect, prestige and power in both the world and American society. It is possible to interpret Gibson’s work as claiming that the paramilitary culture (and the militia movement it encompasses) is a tool employed by some displaced (white) American males, in an irrational attempt, to deal with the current changed situation. When viewed in this way Gibson’s work could easily be categorized as a theory which has updated and applied the classic status theories to a contemporary social movement. 3. Castells’s ‘Technology Based’ New Social Movement Theory: As was already stated, Castells, a new social movement theorist, formulated a thesis that is specifically designed to explain the birth of the militia movement. Castells is perhaps the best known theorist, who, while recognizing the importance and interrelatedness of economic, cultural and technological factors, has championed the causal role that technological factors and globalization, of the contemporary post-industrial age, have played on the rise of the militia movement (Castells 1997; Castells, Yazawa, and Kiselyova 1996; see also Tapia 2000). Castells’s writings suggest that technological innovations, which led to the ‘information age’ of the present post-industrial economy, are the primary catalysts precipitating the rise of many contemporary social movements. Although Castells, like all new social movement theorists concentrates intently on cultural factors, even as he refers to economics in passing, he nonetheless argues that both factors serve primarily as intervening variables. He

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appears to view both culture and economics as mediating the effects of the information age on contemporary identity crises and on the rise of social movements. Castells believes that “Globalization, informationalization, enacted by networks of wealth, technology, and power, are transforming our world.... People all over the world resent loss of control over their lives, over their environment, over their jobs, over their economies, over their governments, over their countries, and, ultimately over the fate of the earth” (1997: 68-69; see also Akins 1998). These developments have encroached upon, and threatened, many peoples’s constructed identities and thereby compelled them to turn to various social movements in an attempt to reassert their threatened identities and fight against their common enemy- the new, alienating, dehumanizing, information-based global order. Castells has not limited himself to theorizing solely about militia groups. He posits that the same dynamics are at play across the globe: “Thus... [many] movements are primarily organized around their opposition to.... the agents of the new global order, seeking to establish a world government that will subdue the sovereignty of all countries and all people.... To such an enemy, each movement opposes a specific principle of identity.... in the case of the militia, American citizens fighting for their sovereignty, and for their liberties, as expressed in the original, godly American Constitution” (Castells 1997: 105; see also Castells, Yazawa, and Kiselyova 1996). Other scholars argue that the tremendous amount of technological advancements in the last decade has resulted in many cultural and economic transformations which in turn have played an important role in the emergence of the militia movement. New information technologies such as the Internet, fax machines, e-mail....etc, have led to a breaking down of borders in the world, and resulted in a decreasing significance of distances, both geographical and cultural. Militia members find this disturbing for a number of reasons, but especially because of the threat it poses to American culture and heritage. Bennett (1995) avers: “In the nineties, there appeared even more reason for those fearful of the forces of modernity to try to stem the tide of change. They had to try and protect their America which seemed very much at risk” (470; see also Abanes 1996; Castells 1997; Gardner 1997; Lamy 1996; Lipset and Raab 1970; Stern 1996. ).

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4. Major Empirical Findings: It is difficult, in one sense, to explain why there needs to be a separate subsection focusing on key empirical findings relating to the militia movement. Many of the most influential hypotheses on the etiology of the militia movement (e.g., Dyer’s and Gibson’s theses), after all, are the product of inductive research and thus are empirical. It is obviously impossible to separate theoretical pieces from empirical works. On the other hand, there have been studies on the militia movement that tested predictions not only from the more recent theses on the etiology of the militia movement, but from the more established general and right-wing social movement theories as well. As was noted, all of these tests, with one notable exception, have been qualitative in nature. Even though many scholars, journalists, and others have theorized, speculated and examined which factors may have played a role in the rise of the militia movement, much of this work has been non-systematic, and/or geographically or theoretically limited. In any case, this subsection will review those findings from the growing empirical literature on the etiology of the militia and other similar movements that impact upon the relevance and explanatory power of the theoretical models that were discussed above. Overall, there are not many surprises as the empirical findings regarding the militia movement are mostly in line with the prior literature. Much like the previous studies in general and Aho’s (1990) work in particular, Akins’s (1998) examination of the militia movement in Florida found little support for the central theses of mass society theory. Most of the individuals interviewed by Akins did not appear to be either alienated or estranged from society. Akins summarizes that “the subjects of this story appear to be connected to their society... for example most are married... many are active participants in local government... others are active in their churches” (149). Turning to Lipset and Raab’s (1970) claims, it will be recalled that they conclude that far right-wing groups and movements can be dichotomized into either social or economic conservatives with socially conservative groups more likely to stress cultural and religious as opposed to economic issues. It appears that the militia movement would best be categorized as a socially conservative movement. After all, not only was the nation’s largest militia group, the Michigan Militia, founded by two

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religious authorities (i.e., Norm Olson and Ray Southwell), but the group explicitly endorses religion while promising to oppose the agenda of the secular humanists. In addition, as the discussion in the ideology section made clear, social issues in general, and opposition to abortion in particular, figure prominently in the stated program of many militias (see Akins 1998; Barkun 1996; 1997; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Gallagher 1997; Hamm 1997; Hawkins 1994; Karl 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kifner 1998; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Labelle 1997; Olson 1996; Seul 1997; Tapia 2000). Based upon this conclusion, it would be expected that the militia movement would be populated by individuals who fit the working class authoritarianism thesis espoused by Lipset and Raab (1970; see also Lipset 1960). Churchill’s (2001) study provides some support for this argument as supporters of the militia movement were found to be more working class in nature. Moreover, consistent with the prior literature in general and Aho’s study in particular, support was found for Lipset and Raab’s contention that a fundamentalist religious outlook is associated with membership in extreme right-wing groups or movements. Akins (1998) “concluded that in Florida, at least, fundamentalism is the foundation of religious ideology for the overwhelming majority of activists in the militia movement, although it is not mandatory for participation. Further it is also apparent that religion plays a key role in militia activism” (116; see also Doskotch 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002). Similar support was found for Lipset and Raab’s claim that individuals who reside in more rural areas are at greater risk of falling prey to the appeals of far-right groups because they are cut off and isolated from mainstream life (see also Dyer 1997; but see Pitcavage 2001). Kelly and Villaire (2002) after interviewing leaders and members of the Van Huizen wing of the Michigan Militia argue that this group espouses a message that “is consistent with the traditional American farmers’ embracing of a ‘go it alone’ political and philosophical framework. It can also be explained in terms of the rural populations isolation from other segments of the American community, an obstacle to an embracing of community values” (287). Cook and Kelly (1999) likewise argue that “it is impossible to understand this political extremism without first considering the social isolation of the extremists themselves. By its eccentric politics, and through its rural, small scale community life, the

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chasms between the militia/patriots nexus and mainstream American politics appear unbridgeable. In short, the militia patriots are cut off... from the larger American cosmopolitan, cultural, and political world. A consequence of this insularity and self induced segregation is that militia/patriot ideas and political theorizing are not forced to compete against other doctrines and attitudes originating outside their socio-cultural milieus and frameworks” (249; see also Seul 1997). Consistent with both Aho’s (1990) study and the prior literature, however, Lipset and Raab’s claim that the members of socially conservative groups would be less educated than others was undermined. Kaplan’s (1998) study of a California patriot group found that patriots had higher educational levels as compared to the California and American general populations. Similarly, Akins (1998) found the militia members he interviewed in Florida to be just as educated, if not more so, than the general population in terms of high school graduation rates (see also Tapia 2000). A great many contemporary theorists and observers echo Lipset and Raab (1970) and the other status theorists (see for e.g., Bell 1963; Hofstadter 1963) by labeling the beliefs and actions of many militia men as irrational or paranoid. While Cook and Kelly (1999 )write that “home grown groups [like militias are]... equipped with seething grievances, obsessions and paranoia” (243), Kelly and Villaire 2002 discuss “the militia movement’s irrational beliefs about the government’s activities and motivations” (293; see also Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Kelly 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Seul 1997; Stern 1996; Tapia 2000). In the same vein, it is quite common to see today’s militias lampooned as out of control or crazy (see for e.g., Anderson 1996; Kelly 1995; Kramer 2002; Snow 1999). Consistent with the current trend of social movement scholarship though, other academics criticize these efforts to demonize the value system and actions of the militia movement. Churchill (2001) concludes his historical study, in fact, by demanding that “we recognize that the motivations of revolutionary libertarianism [militia supporting] insurgents are just as rational and ideological as the motivations of their opponents” (20). Labelle (1997) similarly admits that even though she began her interviews with Michigan Militia members by viewing them as “angry, paranoid, gun fanatics” (5)... real experience...

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[soon] provided a new picture” (5; see also Fenster 1999; James 2001; Seul 1997: 74-75). While no study has operationalized all of the claims made by the resource mobilization framework, Akins’s (1998) investigation of the militia movement in Florida did discover that leadership abilities, preexisting networks, and the work done by activists were all important factors that helped spur the growth of the movement (see also Churchill 2001). Similarly, although few studies have systematically investigated the arguments of the economic dislocation view, some findings hint at tentative support. Kaplan (1998) in her study on a patriot group in California found some support for the economic dislocation thesis as “many of the adherents here suffer reversals... as a direct result of corporate restructuring. As many as 49.3 percent compared to 28 percent in a national news survey, said they had been personally affected by business downsizing” (348; see also Akins 1998). In contrast to the relative dearth of work on the resource mobilization and economic dislocation perspectives, much research has examined the relationship between cultural factors and the militia movement. For the most part these examinations have proven supportive. Indeed, Akins (1998), who studied the militia movement in Florida, agrees with Gibson’s contention that growing resentment of foreigners is partially responsible for the growth of the movement. He concludes that “there is reason to believe... that foreigners, immigrants, or the children of immigrants would be extremely unwelcome at most, if not all, militia gatherings (148; see also Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Berman 1994; Churchill 2001; Coates 1987; Junas 1995; Klatch 1999; Lamy 1996; Martin 1996; Watson 1999; but see Seul 1997). Seul’s examination of the militia movement also provides some support for Gibson’s linking the emergence of the ‘paramilitary’ culture to a backlash against female empowerment and feminism. Seul (1997) writes that at one militia meeting he attended the guest speaker later declared to him that “God is male. Our society was founded on patriarchal authority and this is good, contrary to what feminist lesbians tell us” (14). Seul himself eventually concludes, in somewhat flowery language, that some militia members “have a fear of castration... A fear of the loss of male authority over women and other deviations from male authority such as homosexuality” (43 FN1). Katz and Bailey (2000), after conducting a

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content and narrative analysis of a militia manual and an Internet militia newsletter, likewise posit that “addressing militia members as men is related to their construction... of what Ferber (1998) called a new form of white masculine identity which they are attempting to rescue... [they believe] that [a] women’s place is in the home, being a mother and wife, while a man’s place is seen as protecting her through his membership in the militia” (149; see also Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Berman 1994; Coates 1987; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Ferber 1998; Hamm 2002; Homsher 2001; Junas 1995; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Klatch 1999; Lamy 1996; Martin 1996; McGirr 2001; Michel and Herbeck 2001; Watson 1999). Finally, consistent with prior research, a number of scholars found that the militia movement tends to be dominated by males (see for e.g., Seul 1997; see also Chermak 2002; Kramer 2002; Tapia 2000; for descriptive pieces on women in the movement see Burkett 1998: 83-114; Homsher 2001: 146-155). Kramer’s (2002) recent work, in which she spoke with some militia men in the Pacific Northwest, appears to bolster those who interpret Gibson’s thesis as an updated status theory. In this scenario males who join militias (and the paramilitary culture) are viewed as desperate irrational individuals who are blindly and wildly flailing back against the cultural and structural changes that resulted in their fallen status positions. Kramer’s conclusions suggest, in fact, that some men turn to militia groups not just because of the thrill and excitement that they offer, but also because they saw in these groups an opportunity to achieve greater prestige and respect as well (see also Akins 1998; Bell 1963; Bennett 1995; Berlet 1995a; Churchill 2001; Cohen 1955; Gusfield 1963; Hofstadter 1963; Katz 1998; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Lamy 1996; Lee 2002; Lipset and Raab 1970; Miller 1988). A few scholars also inspected the association between technological advances and the militia movement. Tapia’s (2000) work, for example, uncovered some support for Castells’ technologically based thesis as her analysis of some militia periodicals demonstrate that they “viewed technology and computers as something on which a majority of the American population has become dependent... [in addition, technology was viewed] as the major force that had shaped modern society... technology was personified as having caused... horrible problems for the American people” (182). Mahan’s (1997) research that analyzed the video

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rhetoric produced by the Militia of Montana also appears to bolster Castells’s arguments. Mahan writes that her study “affirm[s] the fruitfulness of incorporating the cultural context in social movement research... the [quasi technology advanced] videos... constructs the collective ideology of the movement” (181-182). In addition, Akins (1998) found that some militia members were distrustful of technology since it not only led to “more advanced forms of technological governmental surveillance, and thus control, but... also... to spiritual deficiencies among individuals” (71). Finally, Seul (1997) notes that “economic stressors resulting from rapid technological change have left many insecure about their economic future” (30) which leaves them vulnerable to appeals from militia type organization. As was already noted, all of the empirical works just discussed were either non-systematic journalistic accounts or qualitative studies that only examined particular regions. Until now there has only been one national level, quantitative study that has scrutinized the emergence of the militia movement. O’Brien and Haider (1998) attempted “to [begin trying to] fill this gap by constructing a preliminary statistical model to explain levels of militia activity across the American states.... [specifically,] what are the social political and demographic factors that explain why some states have relatively high levels of militia activity while others have none at all?” (457). The study’s dependent variable of the level of militia activity was created by obtaining the number of militia groups in each state from the ADL (1994; 1995) and then “dividing the number of groups in each state by the state population divided by 100,000 and then by multiplying that figure by 1,000" (O’Brien and Haider-Markel 1998: 458). O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) generate a number of hypotheses from past research and theorizing which they then test for in their study. First, the authors hypothesize that states with lower education levels (Doskotch 1995; Lipset and Raab 1970; Lo 1982, Smith 1994) or more rural areas would be more likely to have higher level of militia activity (see Davidson 1996; Dyer 1997; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Stern 1996; Stock 1996). Second, O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) claim that since many militias are very anti-tax, they would “expect a state’s tax burden to be positively related to its level of militia activity” (458; see also Berlet 1995; Durham 1996; Neiwert 1999; Wills 1995). Third, the study attempts to determine if factors related to the political environment, such

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as the percentage of Democrats and Republicans in the state legislature and the percent of citizens registered to vote in the state, are related to a state’s level of militia activity. Next, it is argued that because the militias are more likely to recruit military veterans and war veterans, states with higher concentrations of such war veterans (especially from the Gulf war due to that war having been fought with an all volunteer army) would have higher levels of militia activity. This prediction is in line with the previous literature as a number of scholars have noted that many of the most prominent leaders of the militia movement are veterans of the armed forces. For instance, Mark Koerneke, Norman Olson, Ray Southwell, John Trochman, and Lynn Van Huizen have all served in our nation’s military (Cooper, D. 1995; Hamilton 1996; Jakes, Jakes and Richmond 1998; Karl 1995; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Mariani 1998). Furthermore, Kimmel and Ferber (1999), after talking to the researchers from a number of the watch groups, claim that “a large proportion of militia members are also military veterans” (29; see also Akins 1998; Bennett 1995; Duffy and Brantley 1997; Homsher 2001; Karl 1995: 3; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Kramer 2002; Seul 1997). Pitcavage (1998b) agrees with this conclusion and points out that not only did some militia leaders specifically attempt to enlist military and law enforcement personnel in the early 1990s, but that the movement “still tries very strongly to recruit from those pools. Several police officers have been arrested within the last year for criminal activities as part of militia groups” (8). In a similar vein, Ensign (1995) avers that many militias have looked to current military personnel as a source for both recruits and material aid. In fact, Ensign believes that “the militias and the military have much in common aside from their predilection for weaponry and the violent resolution of conflict... without understanding these common bonds, as well as physical links, civil society will never be able to understand, much less root out, irrational acts of violence” (4) Similarly, because many militias heavily stress their opposition to gun control, it would be expected that states with higher percentages of gun owners would be more likely to generate higher levels of militia activity (see also Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berlet 1995a; Coates 1987; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Durham 1996; Dyer 1997; Flynn and Gerhard 1989; Gibson 1994; Hamm 1993; 1997; Junas 1995; Karl 1995; Lamy

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1996; Neiwert 1999; Stern 1996; Wills 1995). Finally, it is hypothesized that the number of pounds of explosives stolen per 100,000 state population is indicative of a capacity to engage in violence, which similar right-wing forerunner groups to the militias engaged in, and therefore should be related to higher levels of militia activity (see also Hamm 1997; Smith 1994; Stern 1996). After conducting a number of ordinary least square regressions the authors concluded that “the most significant predictors of militia activity are the number of ardent gun owners, the number of Gulf war veterans, the willingness /capacity to engage in violent behavior as measured by the amount of stolen explosives and the percentage of Democratic representation” (O’Brien and Haider 1998: 462). Not surprisingly (and consistent with Kaplan’s 1998 and Akins’s 1998 findings discussed above) the education variable which, despite generating mixed empirical support in the past, has long assumed a prominent place in some of the most influential right-wing social movement theories was found to be insignificant.

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CHAPTER 5

Explaining Higher Levels of Militia Related Activities

Having reviewed the theoretical and empirical literatures on the etiology of social movements in general and the militia movement in particular, this study is now better positioned to revisit the research question of: What differentiated states that had more militia organizations (which conducted more activities) in the years 1994 and 1995 from those states that had lesser numbers of militia organizations? The literature reviews suggest that there are several different theoretical perspectives that could offer explanations for these observed variations in the distribution of militias across the United States. Some of these theories lend themselves more easily to hypotheses concerning our research questions. The various versions of the conflict based resource mobilization theory, and Dyer’s economic dislocation/social disorganization (mass society theory) argument do allow for testing on the aggregate level. However, relative deprivation theory, Adorno’s psychological theory, most of the status theories, Gibson’s cultural/status theory23 and Castells’ new social movement theory are all more difficult to test because they were primarily formulated for testing on the individual level. In addition, the variables which would be needed to adequately capture the concepts of most of these theories on the aggregate level were, unfortunately, unavailable. The 79

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present study has, therefore, incorporated hypotheses from those perspectives that were outlined in the literature review which either primarily sought to explain behavior on the aggregate level or which can be tested for on the aggregate level. (The contrasting predictions derived from all these theories are summarized in Table I which appears at the end of this chapter). We will now review those economic, cultural, and miscellaneous hypotheses that were empirically tested in this study. 1. Economic/Social Integration Hypotheses: As was mentioned, a number of observers assert that negative economic conditions, social disorganization, and the farm depression that occurred in our nation’s more rural areas were the primary causal factors influencing the rise of the militia and other like movements (see Abanes 1996; Bennett 1995; Berlet and Lyons 1995; Davidson 1996; Dees and Corcoran 1996; Dyer 1997; Lamy 1996; Neiwert 1999). Dyer claims that adverse economic conditions and the resulting social disorganization in more rural areas transcend individual economic hardship and instead affect everyone living in such areas (including middle and upper class individuals). Meanwhile, Lipset and Raab (1970), Cook and Kelly (1999), and Kelly and Villaire (2002) all argue that because those individuals who reside in more rural areas are not exposed to the major cultural influences of society, they are more vulnerable to the recruitment pleas of far right groups. Based upon this, it can be hypothesized that states which were more rural (see also Seul 1997; but see Pitcavage 2001), farm depressed, and economically depressed/socially disorganized in the late 1980's and early 1990's would have had more militia groups in 1994 and 1995 as compared to other states. Dyer (1997), the primary proponent of the economic dislocation argument, claims that negative economic conditions not only lead to the creation of extreme anti-government groups, but are also associated with higher rates of suicide and child abuse. We would therefore expect those more rural states which were also more economically depressed/socially disorganized and farm depressed to have posted higher rates of suicide and child abuse incidents as compared to other states (19-20; 32-40; 62-71; see also Davidson 1996). In contrast, the resource mobilization perspective contends that the availability of resources is one of the most important factors

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influencing the formation of social movements. When resources are scarce, for instance, social movements are less likely to arise. Some resource mobilization theorists state that social movements are more likely to arise during times of economic prosperity when there are more resources present in society (McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1987; see also McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). Many resource mobilization theorists similarly assert that it is well educated and more wealthy individuals who originate from the most organized and mobilized segments of the population and who are themselves well bonded to society who are the most likely to participate in a social movement. Morris (1984) maintains that resource mobilization theory “predicts that social actors who have access to resources and who are well integrated within the institutions of a community are more likely to engage in protest than individuals who are marginal and uprooted” (279; see also Aho 1990: 187; 209-211; Akins 1998; Churchill 2001; Graham 1989: 332; Kaplan 1998; Kelly and Villaire 2002; Liebman 1983; Marx and Wood 1975; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1973; 1987; Oberschall 1993: 347-348). It could be argued that the resource mobilization perspective makes predictions that are somewhat contradictory to the hypotheses just discussed from the economic dislocation/social disorganization argument (see Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997: 23). Resource mobilization theorists would expect states which were more prosperous and socially integrated to have generated more militia groups that conducted more activities as compared to other states. Before proceeding we should note that this hypothesis is only one possible interpretation of resource mobilization theory. Some might argue that resource mobilization theory predicts that movements containing more resources and well integrated individuals will be more likely to succeed as compared to other less endowed movements. In other words, instead of comparing resources and levels of integration across states, this approach would compare levels of integration and resources across social movements and groups (see for e.g., Mahan 1997). It is also recognized that some may claim that greater economic prosperity in state “A” as compared to state “B” will not necessarily translate into state “A” having a greater number of militias than state “B”. Money and resources, after all, are transferable. It is possible to imagine a scenario where the wealth and resources located in state “A” are funneled by wealthy individuals not to support local organizing, but to

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bolster and support militia groups located in State “C”. It is similarly possible to conceive of a situation where professional organizers from state “A” who are more educated and mobile than others, migrate to, found, organize and lead groups in states “B” and “C” as opposed to state A”. This study, however, agrees with the ‘Indigenous Broker Model’, set forth by Morris (1984), which asserts that impoverished and disorganized communities (like the individuals located in our nation’s farm depressed rural areas) can produce social movements on their own without support from external groups. Morris explains that “theories which overemphasize the importance of outside factors can unnecessarily restrict the scope of analysis of social movements.... my research demonstrates that the overwhelming majority of local movements were indigenously organized and financed” (281). Proponents of this view would argue that not only would resources located in state “A” be more likely to be conveyed to (local) organizations located in state “A” as opposed to organizations located in state “C”, but that better educated individuals from state “A” would tend to found and lead organizations in their home state “A”, as opposed to other states. It is possible to conclude that the economic dislocation/social disorganization thesis and the resource mobilization view are not completely contradictory hypotheses. Indeed, it might be in precisely those states where a rural farm depression and general economic prosperity and social integration occur in tandem, that militia groups are most likely to form (see Duffee 1999). In other words, states which enjoy overall economic prosperity and social integration, and also possess large amounts of resources, but which simultaneously suffer from a severe farm depression could present a situation where militia organizing would be most fruitful. It is reasonable to assume that the general availability of resources due to general economic prosperity coupled with the presence of disaffection and strain in the state’s farm economy would interact to produce militia groups. The current study, in short, will either support the economic dislocation/social disorganization argument (and simultaneously undermine the resource mobilization view), offer support for the resource mobilization view (and simultaneously undermine the economic dislocation argument), offer support for the ‘economic interaction’ thesis,

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or conclude that economic conditions and levels of social disorganization had no influence on the rise of the militia movement. 2. Cultural Hypotheses: Gibson (1994) asserts that cultural, structural and economic changes (e.g., the loss of the Vietnam War, the rise of the feminist movement) that occurred since the 1960's in America have led to the emergence of a paramilitary culture (which encompasses the militia movement). This culture is better suited for testing on the individual than on the aggregate level. Gibson is arguing, after all, that the above mentioned changes produced particular psychological reactions in many individual American males which subsequently led to the rise of the paramilitary culture. There are some aspects of Gibson’s writings though, as well as hypotheses from other cultural theorists, that can be tested. Since Gibson and other cultural theorists contend that the militia movement fears and resents current tendencies toward both cultural pluralism and gender equality, they would expect the militia movement to be more active in states experiencing greater levels of cultural diversity and female empowerment (see also for e.g., Akins 1998; Ferber 1998; Katz and Bailey 2000; Kramer 2002). It is possible to extend Gibson’s thesis by arguing that states which exhibited more of the paramilitary culture in the late 1980's and early 1990's would be more likely to have more active militia organizations in the years 1994 and 1995, as compared to other states. According to Gibson (1994), in the paramilitary culture ‘traditional values’ that exalt white, male, American righteousness and domination, reign supreme and are untouched by the momentous changes that have rippled through American society since the 1960s. Gibson also asserts that the paramilitary culture is manifested in certain types of periodicals which idealize war or lay great stress upon military weapons and prowess in general and America’s loss in the Vietnam War in particular (see also Akins 1998; Bennett 1995; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001; Coates 1987; Coppola 1996; Flynn and Gerhardt 1995; Gibson 1994; Hamm 1993; 1998; Jones 1968; Karl 1995; Kimmel and Ferber 1999; Martinez and Guinther 1999; Noble 1998; O’Brien and Haider-Markel 1998; Pitcavage 1998b; Ronson 2002).

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3. Miscellaneous Hypotheses: The purpose of this sub-section is to discuss other possible factors which, while not originating from any of the theoretical frameworks discussed above, still may shed light as to why the militia movement is present and more active in some states. Since militia groups either conduct military style training exercises or lobby for such activities, it seems prudent to consider whether the legal status of such maneuvers impacts upon both militia formation and the level of militia related activity. The SPLC (1995) points out that the fifty United States vary as to the type of statutes on their books which pertain to such military style activities. Some states, for instance, have anti-paramilitary organization laws on their books which forbid private military style organizations, while others do not. So too, some states have antiparamilitary training laws which forbid private organizations from conducting private military style training, while others do not. Even though the SPLC (1995; 1997) claims that many states with such laws on their books do not enforce them, it is still theoretically interesting to examine whether or not the passage of these laws is related to militia related activities. It likewise appears relevant to examine whether or not a particular state has experienced right-wing extremism in the past. Perhaps those states which have continuously ‘hosted’ right wing groups are more susceptible, due to this historical and cultural legacy, to militia formation than other states. Similarly, certain states may have a tradition of turning to right-wing extremism when particular situations arise, or when certain factors occur. It is predicted that states which displayed greater sympathy to right-wing movements and groups in the past would be likely to have more active militia groups as compared to other states. As previously discussed, Lipset and Raab (1970) set forth perhaps the most influential of all of the many theories that have been proffered to explain the etiology of right-wing social movements. They contend that social upheaval leading to changed status positions ‘have been the typical well-springs of right-wing movements’ (24). In particular, political turmoil represented by the weakening of the two major parties is said to be one such structural change that is associated with the emergence of right-wing social movements. States that had greater political turmoil as compared to other states in the early 1990's would be expected to have

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produced more militia organizations than other states in the years 1994 and 1995 (see also Cook and Kelly 1997; McAdam 1982; Seul 1997). Finally, as O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) point out, the militia movement is not only extremely anti-tax, but has latched onto this issue and made it part of their signature calling cards. We predict therefore that a “state’s tax burden.... [will] be positively related to its level of militia activity” (458).

Table I: Hypotheses Predicting Whether Particular Theoretical Concepts Are Positively Related, Negatively Related or Unrelated to the Level of Militia Related Activity on the State Level24 Concept

Ecoomic Disloc./Soc Disorg/ MST

Resource Mobil. (Political Process)

Resource Mobil. (Professional Organizer)

Economic Interaction

Cultural

Misc.

Eco. Dislocation/ Soc. Disorg.

+ (especially in more rural states)

_

_

_

none

none

Adverse Farm Related Eco. Conditions

+ (especially in more rural states)

_

_

+

none

none

Presence of Paramilitary Culture

none

none

none

none

+

none

Female Empower.

none

none

none

none

+

none

Cultural Diversity

none

none

none

none

+

none

Political Turmoil

none

+

none

none

none

+

Tax Burden

none

none

none

none

none

+

Legacy of right-wing extremism

none

none

none

none

none

+

Legal Restrictions

none

none

none-

non

none

_

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CHAPTER 6

Economic and Social Disorganization, Paramilitary Culture, and Militia Related Activities

I. Dependent Variables Obtaining information that accurately and reliably measures the strength of the militia movement on the state level has proven to be a herculean task. Indeed, no variable in this study was more elusive than this dependent variable. As was already discussed, there is no valid or reliable data that measure the number of militia members or supporters on the state level. Neither law enforcement, nor the watch groups possess (or are willing to share) this information. It is in this vein that Wood (2002) comments that “it is very difficult to obtain figures on militias since they are small, [sometimes] secretive and scattered throughout the country” (38). Chermak (2002) similarly remarks that “reliable data on the [militia] movement’s size does not exist- and it is difficult to collect because of the secrecy of closed-cell militias, and the range of structures and strategies employed by militia groups” (86). There is a clear need, in short, for future research to address this issue. Taking into account these limitations the present project sought to obtain information that would shed light on the 87

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primary research question that asked: what differentiated states that had more militia organizations (which conducted more activities) in the years 1994 and 1995 from those states which had lesser numbers of militia organizations? The only sources which possessed data relevant to this question were the two watch groups- the ADL and the SPLC25. As will be explained in more detail, the dependent variable which was eventually utilized consisted of the logarithm of the average of the ADL and SPLC counts as to the per capita number of militia organizations by state (see Table II, which follows at the end of this subsection, for a description and coding summary of each dependent variable). Both the ADL and the SPLC published a number of reports in the mid 1990s, which documented the rise of the militia movement. The SPLC, in June 1995, promulgated a report which listed the number of ‘militia’ and ‘militia support’ groups, then active in America, by state. This study decided to use the SPLC count of the number of ‘militia’ and ‘militia support’ groups, as opposed to just examining the number of militia groups, for a number of reasons. First, the ADL count, which as will be seen below was also relied upon, consisted of a broader domain covering both militia groups and other extreme right-wing patriot groups. The ADL report states that “militias and their patriot supporters (italics added) are operating throughout Florida” (1995: 10). In the interest of consistency, therefore, the broader SPLC measure was used. Second, the social movement theories that this project is seeking to test were not formulated to apply specifically to militia groups, but were rather set forth to explain the rise of far-right movements in general. Finally, the definition of the term militia relied upon by this study may actually encompass many of these ‘militia support’ groups listed by the SPLC. The information contained in this 1995 SPLC report was utilized to create a continuous variable that counted the per capita number of militia groups (taking into account each state’s population in 1995) active in the fifty states as of June 1995. It was decided to take into account the population of each state because more people (i.e., a bigger potential universe) should provide more of an opportunity for militia recruitment which in turn should translate into both more militia groups forming and more militia related activities being conducted (see O’Brien and HaiderMarkel 1998). Both the ADL and SPLC rates as to the per capita number of militia groups by state were compiled by dividing the number of militia

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groups by the 1995 state population, and then multiplying the resulting number by one million. As was already mentioned, data contained in a report distributed by the ADL, which discussed militia related activity by state as of June 1995, was also utilized. After reviewing the ADL report, O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) compiled a count as to the per capita number of militias present in each state as of 1995. Relying upon the rate compiled by O’Brien and Haider-Markel this study was able to create a continuous variable which counted the per capita number of militia groups present in each state26. An inspection of these two dependent variables revealed six states (i.e., Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wyoming) which were poorly measured since the two watch groups disagreed as to whether or not the particular state was subject to militia related activity in 1995. This disagreement is fundamental since it goes to the heart of the present endeavor. One question that immediately comes to the fore is whether the watch groups actually concluded that there was no militia activity in these states, or whether the sources relied upon by the watch groups merely did not know of any militia-related activity in these states. Did the watch group which found no militia related activity base its conclusion upon hard evidence or was the conclusion based upon information provided by sources which did not truly engage the question? After some deliberation, it was decided in favor of the latter possibility and it was concluded that the watch groups had not properly measured the level of militia related activity. After all, the ADL found no militia activity in Hawaii and Nevada) while the SPLC did find such activity. Similarly, the SPLC found no militia activity in Alaska, Kansas, West Virginia and Wyoming) while the ADL did find such activity. It was therefore determined that the measurement errors of the two watch group sources complemented each other. Thus, it was decided to average the two dependent variables together by adding their standardized zscores, and then dividing by two. Following this, 1.65 was added to each value in this index, since the highest negative value was -.65, to insure that the lowest value in the index was 1. The logarithm of this new index was then utilized in order to fix the observed skew in the data by pulling in extreme values.

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It is recognized that this variable does not capture precisely the actual level of militia related activities. It is possible to imagine a situation where in state “X”a single well organized militia organization conducts hundreds of militia related activities over the course of a year, while in state “Y” five militia organizations (together) conduct only fifty militia related activities (see Kaplan and Weinberg 1998; Pitcavage 1998a). It is contended, nonetheless, that in most circumstances a greater number of militia groups should possess more of a potential to conduct militia related activity, which in turn should usually translate into higher levels of militia related activity (see O’Brien and Haider-Markel 1998). Since the information necessary to answer this question was obtained from two watch group organizations (the ADL, and the SPLC), this study would be remiss if it did not note that many militia leaders, supporters, and others all criticize these watch groups. It is claimed that the watch groups (as well as the media and other militia critics) make a number of accusations (such as racism) that both sweep too broadly and exaggerate the ‘threat’ posed by the militia movement and other far right social movements. These critics correctly note that because there is no single national militia, but rather a number of different wings which are themselves composed of many local militias, statements purporting to characterize the movement in its entirety need to be carefully crafted. Dority, a civil libertarian warns that because: “There is no central control or leadership among these ... groups ... wild and unsubstantiated charges that all ‘patriots’ are white supremacists, anti-Semites ... are misinformed and simplistic” (Dority 1995: 13). Seul (1997) adds that the former militia leader James Johnson, an African American, became agitated when the issue of racism in the movement was raised during an interview. Johnson angrily dismissed the claim by asking “when was the last time you saw white supremacists trying to arm blacks with guns?” (109-110; see also Aho 1990; Akins 1998; Bushart, Craig and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001: 97; 266; Diamond 1995; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Dority 1995; George and Wilcox 1996; Homsher 2001; Jasper 1995; Kaplan 1997; Kopel 1996; Marks 1996; Michigan Militia 1996a; Missouri 51st Militia 1995; Ronson 2002: 84-87; Seul 1997: 68-69; Simonelli 1999; SOF 1995; Tanner 1995). Kaplan (1997) points out that the watch-groups by “publicizing the message of the enemy.... accrues for itself some important benefits.

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First, it finds itself in something of the position of the high priest of an esoteric god. By monitoring, interpreting and disseminating the ideology and objectives of the target group, the... [watch group] becomes in itself a key player in the drama;... As the .... [watch group] holds a monopoly on the distant rumblings emanating from the as-yet-invisible god, it becomes sought after by those interested in the oracular wisdom that the selfappointed priesthood is alone in a position to dispense. With the public recognition of this monopoly comes the perception that the.... [watch group] priesthood fulfills a vital social role, a role that must for the common good be performed as efficiently as possible. Thus, funds roll in and the high priests undertake a round of public appearances to enact the timeless role of the “warner” (Ezek. 3:19). In recognition of the demands of modernity, materials must be produced that are suited to a variety of media and to a diverse target audience so as to further spread the message of fear” (128-129). Seul (1997) extends Kaplan’s (1997) thesis, and builds upon the ideas of Durkheim, to argue that when the media and others demonize the militia movement they “aid [all] of us in embodying images of the good citizen” (77; see also Ronson 2002). Others claim that the “private watch groups are known to be somewhat vague in disclosing their methodology, as reflected in the fact that none of them discuss [in depth] their data and methods. For instance, the AJC merely explains in two sentences that its report is compiled from press accounts, militia documents, Internet postings, and information from other groups” (Freilich, Pichardo Almanzar, and Rivera 1999: 662; see also Aho 1990; AJC 1995). Likewise, the many ADL and SPLC reports on the militias (see for e.g., ADL 1994; 1995; 1997; SPLC 1995; 1997), which summarize militia activity state by state, are almost devoid of content explaining where their information originated from. Some scholars conclude that because the watch groups tend to exaggerate the number of members and supporters of the militia movement, the reports issued by the watch groups should be utilized with caution. For example, Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997), who studied the white separatist movement, maintain that while they: “relied on SPLC and ADL reports for general information ... [they also noted] differences between the way events have been reported and what we saw at those rallies. For instance, events were sometimes portrayed [by the ADL and SPLC]... as more militant and dangerous... than we observed. Also,

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“watchdog groups” promote “claims” that are compatible with their political agenda and neglect other ones... The general caution that their literature... needs to be read with care seems to be particularly relevant here” (3; see also Aho 1990: 29-30; Becker, Jipson, and Katz 2001; Bushart, Craig, and Barnes 1998; Chermak 2002; Dority 1995; George and Wilcox 1996; Hamm 1993; Homsher 2001; Jasper 1995; Kaplan 1997; Kopel 1996; Marks 1996; Michigan Militia 1996a; Missouri 51st Militia 1995; SOF 1995; Tanner 1995). Finally, Churchill (2001) asserts that at times the watch groups in their zeal to combat intolerance, actually mimic their enemies. Churchill comments that “[while] civil rights organizations neither organized assaults on members of the far-right nor incited violence against them... there was a rhetorical violence that lay under the ideological edifice, one that surfaced from time to time” (264). It is clear that one needs to be aware of the weaknesses associated with data provided by the watch groups. Even if the accusation that the watch groups tend to exaggerate the number of militias is true this would still, most likely, not affect the watch groups ‘rankings’ of the fifty states in terms of militia related activities. One would expect the watch groups to consistently over emphasize the presence of militia groups in each of the fifty states. More importantly, recognizing the potential problematic nature of the data provided by the watch groups does not necessarily justify the conclusion that this data should never be relied upon. Even Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997), after noting the limitations of the material provided by the watch groups, utilized ‘general information’ provided by these groups. In addition, as was already noted, O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998) relied upon data provided by the watch groups in order to measure the number of militia groups active in a particular state. So too, Hamm (1993) after recounting some of the “obvious limitations to the data [provided by the watch dog groups, nonetheless concluded that].... these limitations do not necessarily preclude our ability to use such data..... Indeed, a rich sociological tradition is built on this sort of tradition” (12; see also Wood 2002). It again bears stressing that the information being sought for this project (i.e., the number of militia groups active in a particular state) is extremely difficult to ascertain (see for e.g., Kaplan and Weinberg 1998; Pitcavage 1998a). Chermak (2002) remarks, in fact, that although the watch groups “data may... [be] limited... no other organization could

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supply any. Law enforcement does not generally collect [such] data... and thus the only source that could estimate the size and strength of the movement using data were the representatives from these watch dog organizations” (138-139). Since the ADL, and SPLC, in short, appear to number among the few, if not only, sources which possess this information, it seems counterproductive not to utilize their data (see also Berlet 2000). Rather, the prudent course of action is to utilize the data, while recognizing the potential problems associated with it. It is now appropriate to turn to the other dependent variables from Dyer’s (1997) hypothesis that negative economic conditions in rural areas not only helped fuel the rise of the militia movement, but also were associated with higher rates of suicide and child abuse. Both of these predictions will be tested on the state level. First, the rate of suicide was captured in a continuous variable which measured the suicide rate per 100,000 residents by state for the year 1994. This information was obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997, which in turn had collected this data from the National Center for Health Statistics (see U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 99). Second, child abuse was represented in a continuous variable which measures the rate of substantiated reports which alleged child abuse and neglect per 100,000 residents below the age of 18 by state for the year 1995. This variable was created by taking the number of substantiated reports, and dividing this by the state population under the age of 18, and then multiplying this number by 100,000. This information was obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1997 (see U.S. Bureau of the Census: 1997: 219).

Table II: Description and Coding Summary for each Dependent Variable Variable

Description

Coding

Source

SPLC Rate

The per capita number of militia and militia support groups by state. This rate was created by dividing the number of groups present in a particular state, by that state’s 1995 resident population and then multiplying that number by one million.

The coded number is the per capita number of militia and militia support groups by state.

SPLC 1995: 7-11.

ADL Rate

The per capita number of militia and militia support groups by state. This rate was created by dividing the number of groups present in a particular state, by that state’s 1995 resident population and then multiplying that number by one million.

The coded number is the per capita number of militia and militia support groups by state.

ADL 1995: 5

ADLSPLC Index

The average per capita number of militia and militia support groups by state. This index was created by averaging together the zscores of the ADL Rate and the SPLC Rate variables. 1.65 was then added to each resulting value to insure that the lowest value would be one.

The coded number indicates the average (of the ADL and SPLC) per capita number of militia and militia support groups by state

ADL 1995:5; SPLC 1995: 7-11.

ADLSPLC Log***

The log of the ADLSPLC Index.

The coded number indicates the log of the ADLSPLC Index.

ADL 1995:5; SPLC 1995:7-11.

94

Suicide Rate***

The rate of suicides per 100,000 state population by state as of April 1, 1994.

The coded number indicates the suicide rate for the particular state.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 99.

Child Abuse and Neglect Cases***

The rate of substantiated reports which alleged child abuse and neglect cases per 100,000 residents below the age of 18 by state for 1995.

The coded number indicates the rate of substantiated child abuse and neglect cases per 100,000 residents below the age of 18 for a particular state . The number was created by taking the number of substantiated reports for each state and dividing this by the state population under the age of 18 and then multiplying this number by 100,000.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 219.

95

96

American Militias

II. Independent Variables The independent variables used to create the data set that was used to test the above mentioned hypotheses were obtained from a number of different sources. While Table III lists the different variables, provides a description and coding summary, and also states the source for each variable, Table IV lists each theoretical perspective, the concepts which flow out of the different theoretical paradigms, and the specific variables used to capture each concept. (Both tables appear at the end of this subsection). To enhance the analysis (e.g., by reducing the potential for measurement error), a number of indexes and interaction terms were constructed. For instance, to reduce colinearity the standardized zscores of the variables, and not the variables themselves, were used to create the interaction terms used in the analysis. Dyer (1997) contends that economic dislocation in general and the farm depression in particular, both of which occurred in more rural states played a major role in fueling both the rise of the militia movement and an increase in suicide and child abuse rates. To properly test Dyer’s hypothesis, various measures had to be obtained which adequately represented his assertions. The concept of farm dislocation was captured in the percent decrease in the number of farms one to sixty nine acres in size from 1987 to 1992 as a percent of the 1987 total, while the concept of more rural states was measured by the percent of the state population residing in rural areas (see Table III). In addition, an economic dislocation/social disorganization index was constructed by taking the mean of fourteen variables- all of which measured various aspects of economic prosperity and the levels of social integration on the state level (see Table III). This index was coded so that an increase in the index measured an increase in the level of economic dislocation and social disorganization in a particular state. The justification for creating an index composed of fourteen variables was that each variable was thought to represent a separate aspect of the economic dislocation/social disorganization concept which we wanted to capture. In other words, even though all fourteen variables were distinct, each conceptually fell under the rubric of the economic dislocation/social disorganization index. Four interaction terms were then created in order to more fully test Dyer’s thesis. First, an interaction term measuring which states were

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more rural, more economically depressed/socially disorganized in general, while simultaneously suffering from a farm depression was created. This interaction term will allow us to empirically examine whether or not Dyer’s contention, that more rural states which also suffered from a farm depression and general economic dislocation/social disorganization would be more likely to generate a higher number of militia groups per capita, is correct. Next, an interaction measuring states which were both more rural and economically dislocated/socially disorganized was created in order to determine whether or not Dyer’s assertion, that states which were both more rural and economically dislocated/socially disorganized would be more likely to have militia groups as compared to other states, is empirically supported. A third interaction term was then created which measured states which were both more rural and farm depressed. This interaction term will allow us to examine whether or not Dyer’s prediction, that states which were both more rural and farm depressed would be more likely to have higher rates of militia groups and militia activity, is supported. Finally, an interaction term measuring states which were both more economically dislocated/socially disorganized and farm depressed was created in order to study whether or not the assertion, that states which were both more economically depressed/socially disorganized and farm depressed would be subject to higher levels of militia related activity (see Table III). As previously discussed, resource mobilization theory makes a number of predictions which are somewhat contradictory to Dyer’s hypotheses. Since resource mobilization theorists state that social movements are more likely to arise in more prosperous and more socially integrated states (which possess more resources) it would be expected that such states would have higher levels of militia activity. To adequately measure the concept of economic prosperity and social integration, it was decided to reverse code the economic dislocation/social disorganization index (composed of fourteen variables), so that an increase in this reverse coded index would indicate an increase in levels of economic prosperity and social integration (see Table III). It is possible though to argue that the economic dislocation/social disorganization thesis and resource mobilization theory are not mutually exclusive views (see Duffee 1999). Instead, it might be claimed that it is precisely in states where rural farm economic dislocation and general

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economic prosperity and social integration occur in tandem, that militia groups are most likely to form. It was decided to create an interaction term composed of the reverse coded economic dislocation/social disorganization index (where an increase indicates an increase in levels of prosperity and social integration) and the farm dislocation variable (see Table III). This will allow the present study to conclude whether or not the assertion that militia formation is more likely when states are economically prosperous in general while also suffering from a farm depression is correct. As was mentioned, Gibson’s individual level theory can be extended into a number of hypotheses which can be tested on the state level. This view would claim that states which exhibited more of the paramilitary culture in the late 1980s and early 1990s would be more likely to produce militia organizations which had more members and which conducted more activities in the year 1994 to 1995. Since Gibson (1994) writes that the paramilitary culture is consumed with weaponry, and military combat and prowess, it is possible to operationalize this concept of ‘paramilitary’ culture by creating an index out of five variables which all relate to the military, weaponry, or law enforcement (see Table III). Gibson and others also argue that the militia movement fears and resents current tendencies toward both cultural pluralism and female empowerment. Based upon this it would be expected that the militia movement would be more active in states experiencing greater levels of cultural diversity and female empowerment. The concept of cultural diversity will be operationalized in an index composed of the percent foreign born and the percent that is NOT non-Hispanic White in each state in 1990, while the concept of female empowerment will be represented by female earning power for each state in 1989 (see Table III). The miscellaneous hypotheses concerning whether or not the legal status of paramilitary organizations or training in a particular state impacted on militia formation will be captured in dummy variables which specify whether or not a state had such laws. All of this information is available from the SPLC (1995). In addition, the hypotheses that states which have a history of right-wing extremism may be considered more likely to have engendered militia groups and militia activities will be measured by the percent of the vote received by Wallace in the 1968

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Presidential elections. Wallace’s third party candidacy was said to have not only run on an extreme right-wing platform (that heavily stressed nativistic and racial issues), but to have also galvanized the extreme socially conservative right-wing. It is possible to argue that those states which granted greater support to his candidacy are states which in the past were more hospitable to extreme right-wing social movements. Lipset and Raab (1970) also advanced a number of hypotheses which sought to explain the rise of right-wing social movements. Their major claim, that political turmoil (and the weakening of the two major parties) usually precedes the emergence of right-wing groups, can be represented in the percent of each state which voted for third party candidates in the 1992 Presidential election (the year Perot received 19% of the vote nationally). Finally, the prediction that states which have a higher tax burden will be more likely to experience higher levels of militia activity will be operationalized by the 1988 per capita state property tax burden (see Table III).

Table III: Description and Coding Summary for each Independent Variable Variable

Description

Coding

Source

% Decrease in the Number of Small Farms***

The percent decrease in the number of small farms (one to sixty-nine acres in size) from 1987 to 1992 as a percent of the 1987 total.

The coded number represents the percent decrease in the number of small farms from 1982-1987 as a percent of the 1987 total. An increase in this variable indicates an increase in farm dislocation. The variable was created by subtracting the number of small farms (one to sixty-nine acres in size) in 1987 from the number of small farms in 1992 and then dividing that number by the number of small farms in 1987. The values were then reverse coded by subtracting each value from 1.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 114120.

% Rural***

The percent of a state’s population which resided in rural areas in 1990.

The coded number was computed by subtracting the percent of a state’s population which resided in urban areas, which was provided by the 1997 Statistical Abstract of the United States, from 100%.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 44.

Infant Mortality Rate

The rate of infant deaths (under the age of one) per 1,000 births for the year 1991.

The coded number is the infant mortality rate per 1,000 births.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 92.

% of Persons Without Health Insurance

The three year average percent of persons without health insurance for the time period covering 1990 to 1992.

The coded number is the percent of individuals without health insurance.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 118.

% of Persons who are Public Aid Recipients

The percent of a state’s population which received public aid in 1992.

The coded number is the percent of individuals who received public aid.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: XVI.

Unemployment Rate

The percent of the civilian labor force, for each state, which was unemployed in 1993.

The coded number is the percent unemployed.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: XVIII.

Annual % Change in Personal Income

The average annual percent change in personal income from 1980 to 1995 in constant 1992 dollars. The income measure “represents a measure of income received from all sources during the calendar year by residents of each state” (456).

The coded number is the average annual percent change in personal income from 1980 to 1995.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 456.

% of Persons Below the Poverty Level

The percent of persons living below the poverty level, by state, in 1993.

The coded number is the percent of persons living below the poverty level.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 477.

100

Variable

Description

Coding

Source

Gini Index

A ratio measuring economic inequality by state for households for the year 1989.

The coded number represents the gini ratio.

U.S. Bureau of the Census (1993).

% Change in a State’s Population

The percent increase or decrease in a state’s population from 1990 to 1993.

The coded number represents the percent change in the state’s population.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 28.

Births to Teenage Mothers

The percent of total births that are born to teenage mothers, by state, in 1990.

The coded number represents the percent of total births born to teenage mothers.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 79.

Births to Unmarried Women

The percent of total births born to unmarried women, by state, in 1990.

The coded number represents the percent of total births to unmarried women.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 79.

Divorce Rate

The rate of divorces per 1,000 state population, by state, for the year 1990.

The coded number represents the rate of divorce.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 108.

% of People in 1990, who in 1985 Were Living in a Different House

The percent of individuals aged five and above, in each state, in 1990 who were living in a different house in 1985.

The coded number represents the percent of individuals living in a different house in 1985.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993: 150.

% of People in 1990, who in 1985 Were Living Abroad or in a Different State

The percent of individuals aged five and above in 1990 who were either living abroad or in another state in 1985.

The coded number represents the percent of individuals living abroad or in a different state in 1985.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993: 150.

% Graduating College27

The percent of individuals aged 25 and older who received a BAas their highest level of educational attainment.

The coded number represents (the reverse code of) the percent graduating college.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 161.

101

Variable

Description

Coding

Source

Economic Disloc./Social Disorg. Index***

An index, measuring economic dislocation and social disorganization, composed of the following fourteen variables: 1) Infant Mortality Rate, 2) % of Persons Without Health Insurance, 3) % of Persons who are Public Aid Recipients, 4) Unemployment Rate, 5) Annual % Change in Personal Income28, 6) % of Persons Below the Poverty Level, 7) Gini Index, 8) % Change in a State’s Population, 9) Births to Teenage Mothers, 10) Births to Unmarried Women, 11) Divorce Rate29, 12) % of People in 1990, who in 1985 Were Living in a Different House, 13) % of People in 1990, who in 1985 Were Living Abroad or in a Different State, and 14) % Graduating College30.

The coded number represents the score that each particular state received on this index. An increase in the index indicates an increase in the level of economic dislocation and social disorganization in a particular state. The index was created by averaging together the zscores of the previously mentioned fourteen variables and then dividing by fourteen. Since the highest negative value of the index was -.85, .85 was then added to each value to insure that the lowest value of the index would be zero.

See above.

Economic Disloc./Social Disorg2. Index***

This index is Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index reverse coded.

The coded number represents the score that each particular state received on this index. An increase in the index indicates an increase in the level of economic prosperity and social integration in a particular state. It was created by subtracting each value of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index from 100.

See Above.

More Rural, More Eco. Depressed/Soc. Disorg., and More Farm Depressed States***

An interaction term which measures which states were more rural, socially disorganized/economically dislocated and farm depressed.

The coded number represents the score that each particular state received on this interaction term. An increase in the variable indicates that a state was more rural while simultaneously suffering from both economic dislocation/social disorganization and a farm depression. It was created by multiplying together the standardized zscores of the % decrease in the number of small farms, the % rural, and the economic dislocation/social disorganization variables.

See above.

102

Variable

Description

Coding

Source

More Rural and More Eco. Depressed/Soc. Disorg. States***

An interaction term that measures states which were more both rural and economically dislocated/socially disorganized.

The coded number represents the score that each state received on this interaction term. An increase in the variable indicates that a state was both more rural and economically depressed and socially disorganized. It was created by multiplying together the standardized zscores of the % rural and the economic dislocation/social disorganization variables.

See above.

More Rural and More Farm Depressed States ***

An interaction term that measures which states were both more rural and farm depressed.

The coded number represents the score that each state received on this interaction term. An increase in the variable indicates that a state was both more rural and farm depressed. It was created by multiplying together the standardized zscores of the % rural and the % decrease in the # of small farms.

See above.

More Farm Depressed & More Eco. Disloc./Soc Disorg. States***

An interaction term that measures which states were both more farm depressed and economically dislocated/socially disorganized.

The coded number represents the score each state received on this interaction term. An increase in the variable indicates that a state was both more farm depressed and economically dislocated/socially disorganize. It was created by multiplying together the standardized zscores of the % decrease in the # of small farms and the economic dislocation/social disorganization variables.

See above.

Eco./Soc. Interaction Term***

An interaction term which measures states which are both economically prosperous /better integrated socially in general while simultaneously suffering from a depressed farm economy.

The coded number represents the score each particular state received on this interaction term. An increase in the variable indicates that a state was both farm depressed and economically prosperous/socially integrated. It was created by multiplying together the standardized zscores of the % decrease in the # of small farms and the (reverse coded) economic dislocation/social disorganization2 variables

See above.

103

Variable

Description

Coding

Source

Ardent Gun Owners

The number of NRA members per 100,000 state population in 1990. The number of NRA members by state was operationalized as the number of subscribers, by state, to ‘American Rifleman’- the NRA magazine. This information was made available by O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998). They persuasively argued, “that American Rifleman can only be received if one is an NRA member, and every NRA member receives the magazine. Subscriptions to the American Rifleman, therefore, should be almost perfectly correlated with NRA membership in a state” (O’Brien and Haider-Markel 1998: 461).

The coded number is the number of subscribers to ‘The American Rifleman’ per 100,000 state population.

O’Brien and HaiderMarkel 1998 who in turn obtained this information from the Audit Bureau of Circulation 1990

Rate of FullTime Sworn Police Officers in State and Local Government

The rate of individuals per 100,000 state population who served as full time sworn police officers in state and local government in 1992.

The coded number was computed by taking the number provided by the 1997 Statistical Abstract of America (which was the rate per 10,000 state population) and multiplying that number by 10.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 213.

Resident Population by State for 1993

The resident state population in 1993.

The coded raw number is the resident population of the specified state for 1993.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 28.

The Raw # of Active Military Duty Personnel, their Family Members, and Civilians Working at Military Installations.

The number of individuals, in each state, who were either active military duty personnel, their family members, or civilians employed at military installations in 1993.

The coded number represents the number of active duty personnel, their family members, and the number of civilians working at military installations in 1993.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 359; 1997: 28.

The Rate of Active Military Duty Personnel, their Family Members, and Civilians Working at Military Installations.

The rate of individuals per 100,000 state population who were either active military duty personnel, their family members, or civilians employed at military installations in 1993.

The coded number was computed by adding together the number of active duty personnel, the number of their family members, and the number of civilians working at the military installation, dividing by the 1993 state population and then multiplying by 100,000.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 359.

104

Variable

Description

Coding

Source

The Raw # of Vietnam era Veterans

The number of individuals in 1993, in each state, who served in our armed forces during the Vietnam War.

The coded number represents the number of veterans in 1993, in each state, who served during the Vietnam War.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 364.

The Rate of Vietnam era Veterans

The rate of individuals per 100,000 state population, in 1993, who served in our armed forces during the Vietnam War.

The coded number was computed by dividing the number of veterans who served during the Vietnam war by the 1993 state population and then multiplying by 100,000.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 364; 1997: 28.

The Raw # of Persian Gulf War Veterans

The number of individuals, in 1993, who served in our armed forces during the Persian Gulf War.

The coded represents the number of veterans in 1993, in each state, who served during the Gulf war.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 364.

The Rate of Persian Gulf War Veterans

The rate of individuals per 100,000 state population, in 1993, who served in our armed forces during the Persian Gulf War.

The coded number was computed by dividing the number of veterans who served during the Gulf war by the 1993 state population and then multiplying by 100,000.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 364; 1997: 28.

Paramilitary Culture Index***

An index, measuring the level of paramilitary influences, composed of the following five variables: 1) Ardent Gun Owners, 2)Rate of Full-Time Sworn Police Officers in State and Local Government, 3) The Rate of Active Military Duty Personnel, their Family Members, and Civilians Working at Military Installations, 4) The Rate of Vietnam era Veterans, 5) The Rate of Persian Gulf War Veterans.

The coded number represents the score that each state received on this index. An increase in the index indicates an increase in the level of paramilitary culture in a particular state. The index was created by averaging together the z-scores of the previously mentioned five variables and then dividing by five. Since the highest negative value of the index was -.97, .97 was then added to each value to insure that the lowest value of the index would be zero.

See above.

% Foreign Born

The percent of each state’s population which was foreign born in 1990.

The coded number is the percent of the specified state’s population which was foreign born.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1994: 54.

% NOT nonHispanic White

The percent of each state’s population which was not nonHispanic White in 1990.

The coded number is the percent of the specified state’s population which was not non-Hispanic White in 1990. It was created by subtracting the non-Hispanic white population 1990 from the 1990 resident state population and then dividing by the 1990 resident state population. This number was then multiplied by one hundred.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993: 323329.

105

Variable

Description

Coding

Source

Cultural Diversity Index***

An index, measuring the level of cultural diversity in each state in 1990, composed of the following two variables: 1) % Foreign Born, 2) % NOT non-Hispanic White .

The coded number represents the score that each particular state received on this index. An increase in the index indicates an increase in the level of cultural diversity in a particular state. The index was created by averaging together the zscores of the previously mentioned two variables and then dividing by two. Since the highest negative value of the index was -.99, .99 was then added to each value to insure that the lowest value of the index would be zero.

See above.

Female Earning Power***

A ratio of female to male earning power in 1989. This ratio was computed out of the following two variables: 1) The median income, by state, of male year round full time workers in 1989, and 2) The median income of female year round full time workers in 1989.

The coded number represents the score that each particular state received on this ratio. The closer the ratio is to one the higher the level of female earning power. The ratio was created by dividing the median income of full time female workers by the median income of full time male workers.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993: 152.

Anti-Militia Organization Statute? ***

Whether or not a state had an anti-militia organization statute.

0= no

SPLC 1995: 15.

AntiParamilitary Training Statute? ***

Whether or not a state had an anti-paramilitary training statute.

% Voting for Wallace***

The percent of the vote received by George Wallace in each state in the 1968 presidential election.

The coded number is the percent of the vote received by Wallace.

Congressiona l Quarterly Inc. 1994: 462.

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties ***

The percent of the vote that was cast for third party candidates in the 1992 presidential election.

The coded number, representing the percent of the vote cast for third parties, was computed by adding up the number of votes cast for the Democratic and Republican candidates in the 1992 Presidential elections (which were obtained from the 1997 Statistical Abstract of the united States) and then subtracting this number from the total number of votes cast (which was also obtained from the statistical abstract) and then dividing this number by the total number of votes cast.

U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997: 273.

1= yes 0= no

SPLC 1995: 15.

1= yes

106

Taxes***

The 1988 state property tax per capita. This information was made available by O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998), who in turn had obtained it from the “State Fiscal Capacity and Effort” (ACIR 1990: 3-16).

The coded number represents each state’s per capita property tax burden in 1989.

*** = IndependentVariables which were used in subsequent analyses

107

O’Brien and HaiderMarkel (1998) who in turn obtained if from ACIR 1990: 3-16.

Table IV: Operationalization of Theoretical Concepts into Variables Theoretical Perspective

Concept

Variable31

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

Adverse Farm Related Economic Conditions

% Decrease in the Number of Small Farms

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

More Rural States

% Rural

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization

Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

Rural States Which are both Farm Depressed and Economically Dislocated/Socially Disorganized

More Rural, More Economically Depressed/Socially Disorganized, and More Farm Depressed States

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

Rural States Which are also Economically Dislocated/Socially Disorganized

More Rural and More Economically Depressed/Socially Disorganized States

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

Rural States Which are also Farm Depressed

More Rural and More Farm Depressed Stater

Dyer’s Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Thesis

States which are both Farm Depressed and Economically Dislocated/Socially Disorganized

More Farm Depressed and More Economically Dislocated/Socially Disorganized States

Resource Mobilization Theory

Economic Prosperity and Social Integration

Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization2 Index

Economic Interaction Thesis

General Economic Prosperity occurring in tandem with Farm Dislocation

Economic/Social Interaction Term

Cultural Thesis

Presence of Paramilitary Culture

Paramilitary Culture Index

Cultural Thesis

Cultural Diversity

Cultural Diversity Index

Cultural Thesis

Female Empowerment

Female Earning Power

Miscellaneous

Impact of Legal Restrictions

1) Anti-Militia Organization Statute? 2) Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

Miscellaneous

Historical Legacy of Right-Wing Extremism

% Voting for Wallace

Miscellaneous (Lipset and Raab 1970; McAdam 1982)

Political Turmoil

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

Miscellaneous

Tax Burden

Taxes

108

CHAPTER 7

Findings

A number of ordinary least square [OLS] regressions were estimated to test the various predictions which were enunciated in the previous chapter. The first full model, testing which factors impacted on the rise of the militia movement, included variables representing Gibson’s cultural thesis, Dyer’s economic dislocation/social disorganization thesis, resource mobilization perspective and the miscellaneous hypotheses. An examination of the results (see Table V which appears at the end of this chapter), assuming the model to be true, revealed tentative support for some aspects of the cultural argument, and Lipset and Raab’s political turmoil prediction, while no support was found for any of the economic/integration hypotheses, or any of the other miscellaneous hypotheses. As was predicted by the cultural hypothesis, the paramilitary culture index was found to be significantly and positively related to the level of militia activity (see Table V and Appendix One). Militias are strongest in those states which overall, on average, have higher levels of ardent gun owners, current military personnel, military veterans and law enforcement personnel. Moreover, another OLS regression model that only tested the cultural argument and the miscellaneous hypotheses provided similar results to the full model just mentioned (see Appendix One). These finding are important since the bulk of Gibson’s (1994) book was devoted to depicting and describing the newly emergent paramilitary culture. Gibson claimed that the paramilitary culture arose as reaction to social changes which occurred in the 1960s. It was claimed that America’s loss in Vietnam, the rise of the feminist movement, the civil rights 109

110

American Militias

movement, and cultural diversity led to a backlash among certain segments of the white male population which then retreated into a paramilitary culture in an attempt to escape from these historic changes. Gibson devotes much space to describing how this paramilitary culture is consumed not only with male supremacy and white dominance, but also with warfare, weaponry, law enforcement and military service- the very concepts represented by the variables in the paramilitary culture index. The fact that this index was significantly positively related to the level of militia related activity provides some basis for concluding that cultural changes may have some influence on the rise of the militia movement. Similarly, female earning power was significantly negatively associated with the level of militia related activity (see Table V and Appendix One). In other words, the lower the ratio of female to male earning power the higher the number of militia groups in that particular state. It appears that states which are patriarchal (where the level of female empowerment is low) are the same states which have higher levels of militia activity. It is possible that these states also have fewer numbers of women participating in the labor force. Many of these women may very well be part of traditional families, where the woman stays home and manages the household activity. In sum, militia activity is more likely to occur in states where the feminist movement has penetrated the least, while, conversely, militia activity is less likely to occur in states where there are higher levels of female empowerment. In the last chapter the opposite result had been predicted, namely that female earning power would be positively related to the strength of the militia movement. It was assumed that an increase in female earning power (which is thought to signify an increase in female empowerment) would lead to a backlash by the male population which would then turn to groups like militias in order to confront this trend. The finding of a negative relationship, (unlike a finding of insignificance), however, does not undermine the cultural viewpoint. Instead it merely indicates a misspecification of the initial prediction. It could be argued, in congruence with the cultural model set forth by Gibson (1994) and others, that in patriarchal states, militias and other like-minded organizations are relied upon to maintain traditional gender relations. This in turn, would translate into higher levels of militia activity in states which are subject to lower levels of female empowerment.

Findings

111

The results provide no support for the claim that increased cultural diversity would be related to increased militia strength (see Table V and Appendix One). The cultural diversity index, which was an average of the percent of each state’s population that was foreign born and NOT non-Hispanic white, was insignificant. Overall though, the findings regarding the cultural thesis appear to demonstrate that cultural change had an influence on the emergence of far right social movements. Lipset and Raab’s (1970) assertion that extreme right-wing movements tend to flourish during periods of political turmoil (see also McAdam 1982), when the two major parties are weakened, also received support from the results (see Table V and Appendix One). The regression models indicated that the percent of the vote going to third party candidates in the 1992 Presidential election was significantly positively related to the level of militia related activity. Those states which were more likely to support third party presidential candidates in 1992 were also more likely to have produced more militia groups in 1994 and 1995 than other states. This indicates that the growth of right-wing political extremism could be viewed as a symptom of the failure of our two major political parties in that “the legitimacy of the political system is at least partially breaking down” (Lipset and Raab 1970: 486). The argument, set forth by some resource mobilization theorists, that wealthier areas which possess more resources and which are populated by more integrated individuals are more likely to produce social movements as compared to other areas received no support from the models. The results revealed that states which enjoyed higher levels of economic prosperity and social integration were not the same states which were characterized by higher levels of militia activity (see Table V and Appendix Two). Similarly, another ordinary least squares regression model was estimated, which only tested resource mobilization theory and the miscellaneous hypotheses, provided similar results to the full model (see Appendix Two). The current study not only failed to support the resource mobilization viewpoint, but it also did not validate the somewhat contradictory predictions made by the economic dislocation and social disorganization hypothesis. Not only were all of the economic and disorganization variables (i.e., the zscore of the % Rural Variable, zscore of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable, and the zscore

112

American Militias

of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index32) insignificant in the first full model (see Table V), but so too all of the interaction terms, which were created in order to more precisely represent Dyer’s concepts, failed to achieve significance in two other models which were estimated (see Appendices Three and Four). Furthermore, more rural states, more farm depressed states, and more economically depressed/socially disorganized states were no more likely to have higher rates of militia activity than any other state. So too states which were simultaneously more rural, more farm dislocated and more economically depressed/socially disorganized, as well as states which were both more rural and economically depressed/socially disorganized, were all found to have no higher rates of militia activity than any other type of state. Likewise states which were both more rural and more farm depressed, as well as states which were farm depressed while also suffering from economic dislocation/social disorganization were found not to have higher rates of militia activity as compared to any other state (see Appendixes Three and Four). In sum, the present project failed to verify Dyer’s predictions regarding the rise of the militia movement. It should be kept in mind though that Dyer’s thesis made a number of other predictions (concerning suicide and child abuse) in addition to his militia argument. As will become clear below these other hypotheses fare much better empirically. Before turning to Dyer’s other predictions, it should be noted that just as with resource mobilization theory and the economic dislocation argument, the economic interaction thesis, which claims that wealthier and more integrated states which simultaneously suffered from a farm depression would be the most likely to produce militia groups, did not receive support from the model (see Table VI which appears at the end of this chapter). Such states were no more likely than any other state to be characterized by higher levels of militia activity. The results indicate, thus far, that economic and social conditions (be they positive or negative) are simply unrelated to levels of militia activity on the state level. The remaining four miscellaneous hypotheses, which intuitively appeared to shed some light on our primary research question, all failed to receive support from any of the models (see Table V and Table VI). Initially it had been thought that the presence of statutes banning paramilitary training or militia organizations might have deterred

Findings

113

individuals from organizing militia groups and from engaging in paramilitary training. However, states with such statutes were no more or less likely than any other state to have greater numbers of militia groups. In addition, the suggestion that states which have a long history of rightwing extremist activity might be more amenable to appeals from militia leaders also failed to garner any support from the models (see Table VI and Appendices and I and II). It is possible that the present study failed to properly operationalize this variable. After all the present operationalization, the percent of the vote received by Wallace in 1968, failed to take into account extreme right political activity which preceded 1968. Finally, the level of a state’s property tax burden was found to be unrelated to the level of militia related activity. It had been assumed that because the militias preach an ideological message which is extremely anti-tax that such a relationship would have emerged. Once again one must consider whether the operationalization of this concept of level of taxation was properly specified. It should be recalled that the current project examined whether a state’s property tax burden was related to militia activity; it did not examine whether a state’s income tax burden was related to levels of militia activity. It is conceivable that such an inquiry may have yielded a different result. As was stated above, Dyer made a number of other predictions in addition to the arguments he enunciated concerning the etiology of the militia movement. Dyer posited that rural areas which were economically depressed and socially disorganized would be characterized by higher rates of suicide and child abuse as compared to other areas (see also Davidson 1996). Dyer claimed that suicide, child abuse, and militia formation were all consequences of the adverse economic and social conditions which prevailed in more rural areas. In particular, Dyer believed that some individuals suffering from economic dislocation externalized their rage at the current situation by blaming the government for their problems. Many of these individuals were believed to have joined militias and other organizations which preached an extremely antigovernment message. Other individuals, it was claimed, externalized their anger at the current situation by lashing out at those closest to them- their wives and children. Based upon this it was predicted that areas in which these individuals resided would post higher rates of child abuse than other

114

American Militias

areas. Lastly, Dyer asserted that some individuals, rather than externalizing, internalized their bitterness at the current situation and blamed themselves for their current misfortune. Such individuals were said to be more likely to commit suicide which would result in their areas of residence having higher suicide rates as compared to other areas. In fact, Davidson (1996) claimed that in the 1980s “suicides [by farmers].... had.... [become]... widespread... and the numbers continued to swell” (94). The regression models revealed some support for these aspects of Dyer’s writings (see also Davidson 1996) in that more rural states which also suffered from a farm depression were more likely to be characterized by higher suicide rates. So too, states which were economically depressed and socially disorganized were more likely to post higher suicide rates as compared to other states (see Table VII which appears at the end of this chapter). Moreover, an earlier model was also estimated which included the three way interaction term of states which were more rural while simultaneously being both more farm depressed and economically depressed/socially disorganized (see Appendix Five). Since the three way interaction term was insignificant it was decided to rerun the model without it (see Table VII). In addition, economically dislocated/socially disorganized states were also more likely to have higher levels of child abuse than other states (see Table VIII which appears at the end of this chapter). An earlier model was also estimated which included the three way interaction term and the three two way interaction terms (see Appendix Six). Since all of the interaction terms were insignificant it was decided to rerun the model without any of the interaction terms (see Table VIII). Before concluding this chapter, a brief discussion of the diagnostic measures associated with the OLS regression models seems fitting. An examination of Tables V, VI, VII, and VIII indicate no severe colinearity problems as the variance inflation factors of the variables were consistently quite low33. Similarly, an inspection of the residual scatterplots revealed no major problems as the error terms appeared to be mostly random with an equal variance.

Table V: OLS Regression Full Model** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-3.138E-02

.114

.784

1.159

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

.172

.109

.123

1.226

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

3.213E-02

.012

.012***

1.922

Taxes

-4.998E-04

.000

.099

1.859

Paramilitary Culture Index

.307

.126

.019***

1.406

Cultural Diversity Index

.118

.125

.351

4.853

Female Earning Power

-4.254

2.006

.040***

1.999

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

2.535E-02

.090

.779

3.234

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

3.452E-02

.056

.546

1.272

Standardized version of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index

-3.109E-02

.076

.685

2.331

** Dependent Variable= ADLSPLC Log; R Square= .378; Adjusted R Square= .218; Standard Error of the Estimate= .3486; F= 2.368, P< .027***. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

115

Table VI: OLS Regression- Economic Interaction Thesis** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-9.724E-02

.114

.397

1.087

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

.173

.110

.124

1.170

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

3.817E-02

.013

.006***

2.164

Taxes

-5.250E-04

.000

.098

1.925

% Voting For Wallace

3.343E-04

.006

.958

3.408

Standardized version of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization2 Index

-5.517E-02

.074

.463

2.104

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

5.175E-02

.060

.393

1.360

Economic/Social Interaction Term

-.108

.059

.075

1.352

** Dependent Variable= ADLSPLC Log; R Square= .304; Adjusted R Square= .169; Standard Error of the Estimate= .3595; F= 2.242, P< .044***. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

116

Table VII: OLS Regression- Dyer’s Suicide Thesis** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-.990

.773

.208

1.134

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

-.934

.804

.252

1.410

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

.416

.079

.000***

1.749

Taxes

4.635E-04

.002

.827

2.005

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

.697

.398

.087

1.353

Standardized version of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization2 Index

2.643

.477

.000***

1.944

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

-8.375E-02

.377

.825

1.216

More Rural and More Economically Depressed/Sociall y Disorganized States

-.312

.347

.374

1.338

More Rural and More Farm Depressed States

.838

.394

.040***

1.807

More Farm Depressed and More Economically Dislocated/Sociall y Disorganized States

-.227

.408

.582

1.450

** Dependent Variable= Suicide R Square= .619; Adjusted R Square= .521; Standard Error of the Estimate= 2.3930; F= 6.335, P< .000***. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

117

Table VIII: OLS Regression- Dyer’s Child Abuse Thesis** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

456.878

250.380

.076

1.042

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

-57.444

251.940

.821

1.228

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

52.315

25.255

.045***

1.575

Taxes

.332

.637

.605

1.638

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

12.271

125.818

.923

1.107

Standardized version of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization2 Index

368.694

150.978

.019***

1.727

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

-10.268

125.830

.935

1.164

** Dependent Variable= Child Abuse and Neglect Cases R Square= .243; Adjusted R Square= .111; Standard Error of the Estimate= 787.5341 F= 1.839, P< .106***

.

***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test

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CHAPTER 8

Economics, Culture and Militias

This chapter will attempt to make sense of the previously reviewed results, discuss a number of theoretical and policy implications, as well as briefly suggest some issues that future research should address. To begin, some of the most surprising as well as most interesting findings concern those hypotheses which did not receive support in this study. First, the economic interaction thesis failed to gain any support from the present project. In addition, little support was found for the central tenets of resource mobilization theory. States with higher levels of militia activity were neither better off economically nor were they more socially integrated than other states. This lack of support for resource mobilization theory is important since this perspective has come to dominate the discipline of social movements. Indeed, many empirical studies have supported the claims of resource mobilization theory. Support comes not only from research on left-wing or mainstream social movements, but from studies examining right-wing and extreme right-wing movements as well (see for e.g., Aho 1990; Diamond 1995; 1998; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Hamm 1993). How then can the present findings be reconciled with the results provided by previous research? Perhaps the unit of study, the state level, was too large to adequately capture the assertions of resource mobilization theory. It is highly likely that there is a tremendous amount of variation within states in terms of levels of economic well being and social integration. A state like California, after all, possesses both a land mass and a population which is larger than many nations. It is conceivable that 119

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a smaller unit of study, like the county level or for that matter the individual level, may have obtained findings which were more in line with the general precepts of resource mobilization theory. In fact, many of the studies which did generate support for resource mobilization theory were conducted on the individual level (see for e.g., Aho 1990; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). In addition, as was already mentioned, it is possible that a different examination of resource mobilization theory (which compared levels of resources and integration across social movements) might have garnered more supportive findings. On the other hand, the present study relied on quantitative data and utilized statistical analyses to achieve the results found. Since the prior, supportive studies utilized qualitative methods of research it is possible that the different results might be attributable to both the different methodologies and units of analyses. It is hoped that future research investigates this matter by attempting to ascertain if the present results could be replicated on the individual level. Moreover, future research should attempt to replicate the present findings on the county level using more qualitative methods. Finally, such research should also explore whether different units of analyses and methodologies yield other conclusions. Another consequential finding concerns the lack of support found for the economic dislocation/social disorganization thesis since this goes against the expectations of a considerable number of theorists, journalists, and others. Many of these individuals contend that it was primarily negative economic conditions and social disorganization which fueled the rise of the paramilitary right. Most accounts of the rise of the militia movement have wholly or partly linked the emergence of the movement to adverse economic conditions in general and to the rural farm depression in particular. The journalist Osha Gray Davidson (1996) maintains that “the militia movement... is the latest manifestation of the loosely affiliated rural network that grew up during the [economic] hard times in the 1980s” (182). Richard Abanes (1996) similarly writes that many militia members and supporters “simply want to understand why they can no longer maintain a comfortable standard of living. Their financial security has somehow disappeared overnight.... the increasing disparity between social classes only magnifies this problem.... the economy has dealt even harsher blows to farmers.... [in that many farms] fell prey to foreclosure and bankruptcy” (10-12). Not surprisingly, the journalist Joel Dyer (1997)

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offers the most detailed, and succinct rendition of this view point. Dyer passionately asserts that:“[farmers in the 1980s were] being hammered by the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. Farmers were suffering at the hands of newly unbridled corporations.... [many of these corporations] closed or downsized the factories that working men and women depended on for their existence. Corporate mergers cost millions of people their jobs.... [many of these farmers and workers eventually opted] to establish their own self rule in the form of jural societies [and/or to form and join militia organizations]” (242-243). The widespread popularity of the economic dislocation/social disorganization thesis is understandable since it largely flows out of a long and well established historical tradition. Ever since Karl Marx highlighted the alleged terrible economic and social costs spawned by capitalism (see for e.g., Marx and Engels 1888), it has become common to link adverse economic conditions with both social unrest and the rise of revolutionary social movements. One frequent variation of this view claims that the poorer segments of society (especially the working class) are exploited and oppressed by the wealthier elements of society. It is thought that the oppressed and exploited workers will eventually rise up in revolt against the unjust and evil system which has abused and humiliated them for far too long. Professor Steven Seidman (1998) explains that “the immense wealth produced under capitalism, Marx argued, simultaneously created a rich and privileged capitalist class and extreme poverty and deprivation for the mass of laborers. Marx thought that the material and spiritual impoverishment of the laborers.... would eventually incite them to revolt” (41).Continuing with his summary of Marx’s views, Seidman states, in language which is quite similar to Dyer’s claims concerning the rise of the militia movement, that “driven by competition, capitalists are compelled to modernize... [and this] creates the conditions for the end of capitalism.... it often translates into relatively decreased wages, worker insecurity as machines replace workers... In a word, every effort by capitalists to increase profits intensifies workers degradation and alienation” (44). The years which followed the publication of Marx’s views witnessed an increasing acceptance of the idea that harsh economic conditions result in increased social turmoil. These notions found a receptive audience in the halls and offices of a large number of academic

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institutions. It would be hard to overstate the extent to which the belief that economic exploitation was behind much of contemporary society’s unrest permeated academia. A large number of theorists and scholars published an immense amount of material which sought to explain, apply, refine, and expand upon the beliefs propounded by Marx. To take just one example, the noted historian E. J. Hobsbawm (1959) in his examination of the phenomena of social banditry in the 19th and 20th centuries concludes that economic scarcity and exploitation fostered large numbers of ‘social bandits’. Hobsbawm contends that “Social banditry, a universal and virtually unchanging phenomenon, is little more than endemic peasant protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for vengeance on the rich and the oppressors, a vague dream of some curb upon them, a righting of individual wrongs” (5; see also Hobsbawm 1969). When this long tradition of the adverse economic conditions thesis is taken into account, the finding of no relationship between Dyer’s adverse economic conditions thesis and the militia movement becomes startling. Dyer formulated his argument not on the individual level, after all, but on the aggregate level- the very level examined by this study. There are a number potential explanations for these results. One possibility is that Dyer’s ideas pertaining to the militia movement are simply incorrect. And in fact, these findings do lend merit to the arguments of those who criticize Dyer for ignoring non-farm related factors. Akins (1998) comments that “Dyer ... limits his work by his preexisting assumptions, and fails to explore militias and militia doctrines which do not arise from the farm crisis” (14). Pitcavage (2001) likewise points out that Dyer’s thesis is unable to account for suburban and urban militia members (see also Castells 1997; James 2001). Furthermore, despite an intuitive seductiveness, economic dislocation as a motivator for action has failed to receive support in the past. A number of recent studies, for example, found that economic distress was not related to either lynching or gay bashing (see for e.g., Green, Glaser, and Rich 1998; Reed, Duss and Hulbert 1987). Nonetheless, the immense amount of ethnographic and journalistic accounts which both detail and link the tremendous amount of pain and suffering present in much of rural America to the rise of the militia movement, argue against accepting this possibility too hastily. It is clear that both further deliberation and research are required before a

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firm conclusion can be reached. A second related issue is that since this study was conducted on the aggregate level it only investigated absolute poverty as opposed to relative deprivation. In other words, this project did not get into peoples heads’ to ascertain whether they felt that they were being treated unfairly or whether they were anxious, upset or stressed. Chermak’s (2001) research suggests that relative deprivation may indeed be what is motivating some militia members. One of the militia members he interviewed, for instance, complained about his financial situation even though he was a middle class factory supervisor and drove a nice car. In sum, it appears that some militia members, although middle class themselves, feel that they have been dealt a ‘raw hand’. Again, it is hoped that future research addresses this issue more fully. A third point deals with the fact that the present project is a cross sectional study. This means that if either economic dislocation or paramilitary culture caused the other then our study would fail to note this. To take just one example, if areas which are economic dislocated/socially disorganized or farm depressed generate a tremendous amount of despair and anxiety which find an outlet in a paramilitary culture which in turn fuels the rise of the militia movement, then the importance of adverse economic conditions has been overlooked by this project. The current study only examined whether economic dislocation or the emergent paramilitary culture had a direct impact upon the rise of the militia movement. It did not investigate whether economic dislocation in general or the farm depression in particular generated a paramilitary culture which in turn fostered the rise of the militia movement. It is hoped that future research delves into this issue and adequately tests for this possibility. While this issue can only be properly addressed in a longitudinal study, the current cross sectional study did run correlations among most of the economic dislocation and cultural variables to conduct a preliminary examination. A review of these correlations did not reveal much support for this possibility as none of the economic variables were found to be strongly related to the cultural variables. Another possibility which must be given serious consideration is that the present project may not have properly operationalized Dyer’s concepts. Once again, it needs to be asked if the unit of analysis, the state level, was simply too large to adequately capture Dyer’s predictions. It is possible to ponder if an examination of economic variation on the county

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level would yield a different finding. After all, as was mentioned, there is a tremendous amount of variation within each of the individual United States in terms of economic and social well being in general, and the farm economy in particular. A close reading of Dyer’s book does seem to indicate that an examination on the county level would be more faithful to his predictions. In the same vein, it is possible that the variable measuring the decrease in the number of small farms from 1987 to 1992 was not adequately measuring the magnitude of farm dislocation in the nation’s rural heartland. Future research needs to consider which variables might provide a more accurate measure as to the level of farm dislocation. One possibility might be the per capita number of farms foreclosed in the early 1990s on the county level. There is a pressing need for future research to examine whether or not the results found by this study can be replicated on the county level. The major problem confronted by this study was the dearth of available data on the militia movement. Future research must address this crucial issue head on. It is extremely important for researchers to explore various techniques which might be employed to accurately measure not only the number of militia, patriot, and other far right organizations on the county level, but the level of their activities, and the number of their members and supporters as well. Scholars must think seriously about to how to obtain information on far right organizations. After all, if this information is not found, then there is no dependent variable which can be utilized. And if there is no reliable and valid dependent variable then conducting accurate scientific research is impossible. Before commencing a discussion of the hypotheses which received support from this study’s findings, a brief discussion of those miscellaneous variables which failed to register any support in the current study seems fitting. While neither the anti militia organization nor the anti paramilitary training statutes received any support, the SPLC (1997) has long claimed that many states which have these sort of statutes on their books do not enforce them. It is possible that if states strictly enforced these statutes that the present results may have been different. In addition, the history of right-wing extremism (represented by the percent of the vote received by George Wallace in the 1968 Presidential elections) was, surprisingly, insignificant. But once again, it is possible to wonder if our study adequately captured this concept. By relying solely on the Wallace

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variable this study, by definition, failed to examine if extreme right-wing activity which occurred before 1968 is related to the rise of the militia movement. Perhaps future research could examine whether areas which were subject to high levels of activity by earlier far right paramilitary groups, such as the Minutemen in the 1960s and the Silver Shirts in the 1930s, are the same areas which also produced higher levels of militia activity. Lastly, the level of a state’s property tax burden was found to be unrelated to levels of militia related activity. This result is somewhat unexpected when one considers that the militia movement has been extremely vociferous and passionate in attacking high levels of taxation. It needs to be borne in mind that the current project only examined whether a state’s property tax burden was related to militia activity. It did not investigate if other types of taxation are related to militia activity. It is hoped that future research addresses this issue by examining if other types of taxation, such as a state’s income tax burden, are related to levels of militia activity. It is conceivable that such an inquiry may produce a different result. Turning to a discussion of the hypotheses which did receive support from the current study, some of the most important findings concern the support found for the cultural variables. To briefly recap, the present project found that states which had higher levels of a paramilitary culture were usually the same states which had higher levels of militia activity. In addition, states which had lower levels of female empowerment were also more likely to be characterized by higher levels of militia activity. These findings loom large, especially when they are considered in conjunction with our findings that undermined the economic dislocation and farm depression hypotheses. Moreover, as was discussed above, these findings not only fit with prior studies (focusing on lynching and gay bashing for example) that found culture, as opposed to economic distress, to be a motivating force for action, but also mirror the results of qualitative investigations of the militia movement. Akins (1998) argues that militia members in Florida were “resentful... [of] recent cultural changes... despite their economic success” (105). Meanwhile, Suel’s (1997) study, found feminism to be related to the militia movement. He concludes that “male fantasies are a big part of the symbolic order... militias could be read as ‘groping’ for masculine identity affirmation... in

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short, militias provide both a safe haven for masculine identity and a sanitized space for male bonding” (122-124). In chapter 5 it was noted that it is possible to view Gibson’s thesis as an updated version of the classic status theories. Gibson seems to say that many American males, after reacting with shock and anger to the decline in the status of America as a country in the world and males as a group in the workforce, irrationally retreated into a mythical paramilitary culture. In this paramilitary culture America, whites and males reigned supreme untouched by the just discussed changes which had occurred in the real world. The fact that a number of variables supported the Gibson thesis can therefore be viewed as providing some support for the status theories. It should be recalled that most of the classic status theorists claim that status issues only emerge during times of economic prosperity when economic issues do not loom high on the public agenda. That the current militia movement emerged in the early 1990s when America, as a country, was in the midst of an economic boom, that Pitcavage describes as “low inflation, low unemployment, and [a] healthy economy” (2001: 961) provides additional support for the status theories. These results supportive of Gibson’s thesis, are particularly important when it is considered that in the 1970s and 1980s the status theories were subject to bitter attack by other theorists who questioned their validity and usefulness. Since the present findings seem to bolster the status theories, it is possible to argue that those who dismissed the utility and efficacy of the status theories may have been too hasty in their denunciations. It is hoped that future research continues to investigate this issue in further detail. Perhaps the classic status theories, set forth by Bell, Gusfield, Hofstadter, and Lipset and Raab, could be subject to additional systematic and rigorous analyses. Again, this study was conducted on the aggregate level. This means that one can only declare with some certainty that it is states with low female empowerment, and high levels of paramilitary culture which have higher levels of militia activity. It is still an open question as to whether or not it is individuals who are consumed with paramilitary culture, or who are interested in maintaining traditional (i.e., patriarchal) gender relations, are the same individuals who are joining militias. After all, when one is discussing cultural reactions, one is really discussing psychological reactions which are experienced by individuals (in this case

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individual males). It would be helpful if future research could subject Gibson’s thesis to an empirical examination on the individual level to ascertain if the aggregate levels results just discussed can be replicated. Up until now the discussion has proceeded as if cultural and economic influences are completely distinct from one another. This has partly been done as a heuristic device (i.e., in a Weberian ideal sense) to both better illuminate, as well as provide a more complete understanding of the effects of each of these factors on the rise of the militia movement. But as prior chapters demonstrated, for the most part nobody asserts that culture and economic forces are totally separate from one another. Even Dyer and Gibson recognize that the two are not only related but in some sense are intertwined with one another. Future research needs to carefully consider what, if indeed anything does, classifies an effect as cultural as opposed to economic. At first glance an increase in the number of farm foreclosures would appear to measure an increase in economic dislocation. However, Dyer (1997) argues that such an increase might result in many farmers reacting in ways, due to the distinct rural farmer culture which exists in this country, which would be foreign to many non-farmers. So too, it is possible to classify opposition to the GATT and NAFTA treaties as either economic, cultural, or both in origin. Such opposition might be due to fear that these treaties will result in a loss of American jobs, or that American sovereignty will be whittled away or both. Hopefully, future research will tell us more about the distinct impact of cultural and economic forces on the emergence of the militia movement, or whether ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ are simply different labels for the same process. Another important result is the finding that political turmoil is related to the level of militia related activity across the fifty states. This study found that states which posted stronger support for third parties in the 1992 Presidential elections tended to be the same states which were characterized by higher levels of militia related activity. This variable was not only found to be consistently significant in the statistical analyses which were utilized, but it was quite strongly significant as well. This finding is crucial because a finding that political turmoil was unrelated to militia activity would have cast serious doubt upon the validity of this study’s dependent variable. One common theme which weighs quite heavily on the minds of many militia members is the extreme distaste that many feel for the federal

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government. An examination of the testimony given by a number of militia leaders to Congress in 1995 reveals a tremendous amount of distrust of the current political elites. Furthermore, just taking part in militia activities (such as paramilitary maneuvers which are intended to prepare individuals to be able to defend their country from foreign invaders), as many militia members do, in some sense, is a declaration that one does not have complete trust and faith in the current political system (see Berlet and Lyons 2000). When this is considered it makes intuitive sense that many militia members would be inclined to cast around for alternatives to the current two major parties. The finding that political turmoil is related to militia activity therefore increases our confidence that the dependent variable is a valid measure. This concludes the theoretical implications of the results relating to militia formation. Before moving onto policy implications that flow from the findings, a brief discussion of the findings which supported Dyer’s predictions concerning suicide and child abuse is appropriate. He had claimed that individuals residing in more rural, economically depressed states in general, and farm depressed states in particular would be more likely either to internalize their discontent (by committing suicide) or externalizing their rage (by lashing out at those closest to them in the form of child abuse). The present project found that states which are more rural and which also suffered from a farm depression were indeed more likely to be characterized by higher suicide rates. So too, states which were economically depressed and socially disorganized were more likely to post higher suicide rates as compared to other states. Finally, economically dislocated/socially disorganized states were also more likely to have higher levels of child abuse than other states. These findings regarding suicide and child abuse lead to three possible conclusions. First, we again need to note that because this study was on the aggregate level it is still an open question as to whether frustrated farmers are the ones who are abusing the children. While our results are consistent with this scenario, we cannot rule out the alternative possibility, for instance, that mothers are perpetrating the abuse. Second, assuming that farmers are abusing their children, our findings indicate that Dyer’s thesis is not completely irrelevant. The present study not only found some preliminary support on the state level for the arguments relating to suicide and child abuse, but it also concluded that it is too early

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to completely dismiss the claims relating to militia formation. Future research needs to examine these aspects of Dyer’s claims on the county level. Finally, these findings regarding suicide and child abuse should not startle us since Durkheim found similar results in his classic study over a hundred years ago (see Durkheim 1951). This suggests that if society alleviated the harsh economic and social conditions that currently prevail in many rural locations, it is possible that suicide and child abuse rates would drop accordingly. Dyer (1997) believes that if society truly wants to curb the rising number of suicides and child abuse cases in rural America, it must adequately fund economic assistance programs to alleviate the economic distress of rural Americans. This completes the discussion on the theoretical implications of the results found by this study. We will now turn to a discussion on possible policy implications that might flow from our findings. In the Introduction it was stated that by ascertaining the correlates of militia emergence it might be possible to implement programs that address the motivating forces of these groups and thereby prevent the rise of these types of organizations. But before discussing possible ways to preempt militia formation, one must first accept the idea that militia formation is bad. In other words, is the militia movement a negative development? Are militias ‘bad’? Are they dangerous? Do they foster or engage in terrorism? Are they violent? (See Homsher 2001). In one sense, these appear to be relatively straightforward questions that can be addressed empirically. However, in actuality this is not the case. Instead of careful, serious empirical work, this question has been engaged by partisans from all sides who have participated in a ferocious debate where, at times, personal insults are the norm. As chapter 6 demonstrated, the militias are regarded by the watch-groups as an extremely negative development. The 1995 ADL report is filled with the following harsh comments about the militia movement: “extremists” (1); “incendiary” (1); “the need for ongoing close attention to this movement” (1); “ominous” (2); “a serious danger” (3); “a prescription for disaster” (3); “terrorist threat” (4). The AJC, likewise, pulls no punches in their report: “We issue this background report on the militia movement.... with a sense of urgency... it... has all the ingredients to lead to a disaster: an ideological caldron of disaffection, hate... and violence brewing” (1995: i). The SPLC and the other watch-groups, in their reports, offer more of

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the same name calling and bitter denunciations (see also Dees and Corcoran 1996; Neiwert 1999; Snow 1999; Stern 1996). In contrast, a number of other observers vehemently disagree, and assert that the above characterizations are nothing more than a caricature (see for e.g., Churchill 2001; Dority 1995; Johnson 1995; Tanner 1995). These individuals either claim that the militias are a positive development (Tanner 1995; Williams 1995), or that while to some they may appear be a negative phenomenon, in reality they pose little threat to the social order and are in fact quite harmless- ‘just a bunch of guys running around in uniform playing capture the flag’, to use a common expression (Dority 1995; George and Wilcox 1996). Finally, some claim, that however distasteful militias may appear, it must be recognized that they are a response to legitimate grievances- such as an encroaching federal government, and the grave misdeeds committed by federal law enforcement (Bock 1995; Dority 1995). Others go further and attack the watch-groups and other militia critics for both sensationalism and for overstating their case (see for e.g., Chermak 2002; George and Wilcox 1996; Seul 1997). Soldier of Fortune magazine (1995) even asserts that some of the watch-groups (specifically the SPLC) have deliberately overstated the importance of the militia movement in order to generate fear and thereby provide a boost to their fund-raising efforts (see also George and Wilcox 1996). Moreover, some note that a number of individuals have gone so far as to try and profit from the current preoccupation with the militia movement by attempting to play into the hype. Dobrtatz and Shanks-Meile (1997) point out that “the most recent reprint of The Silent Brotherhood by Kevin Flynn and Gary Gerhardt changed the subtitle from Inside America’s Racist Underground to The Chilling Inside Story of America’s Violent Anti-Government Militia Movement [even though the book was not about the current militia movement, but rather chronicled the rise and fall of the murderous racist criminal terrorist organization called ‘The Order’]”(xii). This study believes that the above mentioned debate has not been helpful since it has obscured other important issues that deserve attention. Rather than engage in a fruitless back and forth debate consisting of mutual (and endless) recriminations, it might be more worthwhile to approach the whole issue anew, from a more detached objective standpoint. It should not be forgotten that chapter 4 demonstrated that until

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recently there had long been a tendency for academics to not only quickly dismiss the claims of right-wing social movements, but to describe their aims in negative terms as well. A more prudent approach would not jump to conclusions but rather would wait until the results of future research endeavors become known. Some issues that future research could address include the following: In terms of militias posing a danger to the social order, future research could investigate if in fact militia members have a higher crime rate than the general population. If militia members do not have a higher crime rate, especially for violent acts, this would lend credence to the view that militia members do not pose a significant threat to society. For instance, Abanes (1996) relates that Aho, in “a limited study.... [interviewed] 368 persons associated with the patriot movement, Aho found that ‘the vast majority of people in the militias are not violent or dangerous’” (25). It is hoped that future research continues to examine this key issue closely. Similarly, F.B.I. agents Duffy and Brantley (1997) claim that distinctions need to be made among different types of militia organizations. They urge local law enforcement agencies to open a dialogue with “local militia leaders so that the two sides can voice their concerns and discuss relevant issues in a non-confrontational way.... such contact should allow law enforcement representatives the chance to gauge and assess the true, or at least unprovoked, nature of the militia leaders” (2). Duffy and Brantley go on to warn that local law enforcement agencies must be extremely careful while communicating with these militia groups “because different groups operating within the same geographic agency may pose varying degrees of threats” (3). This is why local law enforcement agencies must make serious efforts to distinguish among types of militia groups. To aid in this process, Duffy and Brantley outline a typology which consists of four different types of militia groups from the first (least serious) category which “engages in no known criminal activity” (4), to the fourth (most serious) category which “plot and engage in serious criminal activity, e.g., homicide, bombings” (5). It would be most useful if future research investigated this issue to determine empirically if there are militias which differ in terms of their threat to the social order, and specifically to determine if the Duffy and Brantley typology actually

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exists. The present study has already noted the split between relatively moderate militias that utilize a public military style organization (like the Michigan Militia) as opposed to more extreme organizations which organize in secret small cell like structures (as urged by the Militia of Montana). Once again, it would be helpful if future research examined whether the intuitive belief that the underground secret militias pose more of a criminal threat (see for e.g., Seul 1997: 105-106; 168) gains empirical support. If specific militias differ in terms of the threat they pose to the social order, then the appropriate policy might be to ignore some militias completely, while concentrating law enforcement’s attention only on those specific types of militias which do pose a violent threat to the social order. The above has demonstrated that the question of whether or not we should discourage militia formation is at this point still unsettled. With this caveat in mind, the current study will move onto the last major issue of discussion. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that society has decided to preempt militia formation, how should it achieve this goal34? Presently there are two major views on this. Many of the watch groups argue that state governments need to start strictly enforcing their statutes that prohibit militia organizations and/or paramilitary training. Dees and Corcoran (1996) dejectedly state that up until now, “the state laws against militia and paramilitary activity have almost never been enforced. In an effort to address this problem,... letters [were written] to the state attorney generals across the nation.... urging them to use their state laws to put an end to unauthorized militia activity. In those states that did not have applicable laws,... the attorney generals [were asked] to sponsor anti militia and anti paramilitary training legislation” (223; see also ADL 1995; Snow 1999; SPLC 1997). In addition, most of the watch groups have also called for greatly expanding the power of federal law enforcement agencies to monitor groups which might pose a danger to the public. For example, the ADL (1995: 4) “has called for federal legislation to address the terrorist threat associated with.... domestic extremism” (see also SPLC 1997). In contrast, a number of other observers contend that clamping down on the militia movement is counter productive. Dority (1995), for one, objected to proposed legislation, eventually passed by Congress35, which expanded law enforcement’s powers to fight domestic terrorism. Dority, after criticizing the watch groups for enthusiastically supporting

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the legislation, claims that there “was a rush to judgment... accompanied by a near total avoidance of rational analysis” (8). She believes that “the current stepped-up surveillance of patriots and militia groups will only confirm their suspicions of a government out to get them. Extreme actions spark extreme reactions” (15; see also Akins 1998; Berlet and Lyons 2000: 291; Hamm 2002; Wood 2002: 51). Likewise Mariani (1998), states that since some militias, such as the Michigan Militia, do not totally reject the current political system, “strategies that seek to isolate militia members might be the worst of all possible strategies... Increasing a sense of political powerlessness among the leaders of the Michigan Militia seems to make violence a more likely option for certain individuals within that group. This is not a justification of their world-view, but a fact that must be dealt with seriously” (143; see also Berlet & Lyons 2000: 14-15; 17; Chermak 2002; Churchill 2001: 330-331; 341; Fenster 1999; George and Wilcox 1996; James 2001; Mahan 1997: 18). Finally, Seul (1997) reports that his field research indicates that militia membership may be a positive development since it sometimes performs a cathartic function. He explains that “while the government characterizes militias as offensive, militia members define themselves, in their literature and at meetings as defensive. Members see meetings as places where people are calmed down and not riled up” (67). Again, assuming the goal of society is to preempt militia formation, the results of this study could be used to resolve the above mentioned dispute as to how to neutralize the militia movement. Both of these views set forth claims as to how society should respond to already existing militia groups. In contrast, the results of the current study can be used to create the conditions which might be utilized to prevent militia groups from arising to begin with. For instance, the findings which tend to support Gibson’s cultural thesis are noteworthy since cultural change usually has its impact through psychological changes experienced by specific individuals. The current study indicates that if the goal is to stem the tide of right-wing political extremism then it may not be enough to merely correct the adverse social conditions from which some Americans currently suffer. There may also be a need to engage the citizenry on the level of ideas- to not only admit that certain attributes of our culture and society have changed but to educate and to explain to people why these changes have occurred and to also point out the positive consequences of

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these changes. Berlet and Lyons (2000) therefore argue that a more effective strategy would engage and challenge the ideas of militia members. They remind us that in the 1980s a number of groups decided to confront the then active far right paramilitary Posse Comitatus by “rationally refuting their scapegoating... [and that this] strategy was used with partial success” (351). Gibson (1994) at the end of his book offers a number of suggestions as to how we can “create conditions in which warrior mythology and the acts of war they render so alluring will lose their appeal” (303). Since the results of the present project appear to provide some support for Gibson’s hypotheses it would behoove society to pay close attention to his claims. The present project found that the level of female empowerment on the state level was negatively associated with the level of militia related activity. Gibson’s first comment addresses this very issue. He maintains that “first and foremost, masculinity needs to be redefined in a way that will reduce the pull of the warrior on the masculine unconscious. This in turn requires changing the structure of the family, particularly the role of fathers. In patriarchal societies, fathers have not been involved in the care of... young children” (304). Gibson believes that if society redefines gender roles in family life such that “the all powerful mother is replaced by equal parenting- if men too, become child rearersthen perhaps adult masculinity will no longer be defined in terms that are the complete opposite of ‘feminine’ characteristics. Men might become more emotionally expressive and less psychologically distant.... this new connection to... nurturance - to sexuality and child rearing- might finally devalue the idea that killing in combat is the highest expression of masculinity” (304). Likewise, if society is able to restructure expectations as to gender roles in the work force such that men no longer expect themselves to be the primary wage earners, then many men may come to accept the contemporary rise in female empowerment. This in turn may cause these individuals to become less amenable to the appeals of organizations, like militias, which promise to sanctify ‘traditional’ gender roles. The current study also found that states which exhibited higher levels of the paramilitary culture tended to be the same states which had higher levels of militia activity. It should be recalled that the paramilitary index was composed of variables which are linked to military style

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weaponry and combat. Gibson (1994) claims that this “paramilitary culture shows the continuing need for myth and ritual even in the heart of the modern secular world” (306) in that part of the intoxicating appeal of military combat to many men is the sense of purpose, adventure and excitement it seems to offer. Gibson asserts that “if paramilitary culture is to be abolished, then other areas of social life will have to be re-enchanted. Without enchantment- without access to a magical kingdom of some kindthe responsibilities of adulthood are simply too much: people break down and flee in one direction or another” (306). Gibson eventually concludes that if we want “to reduce the appeal of warrior mythologies [we].... must treat the concept of adventure seriously and make actual adventures available to millions, not just a few.... And with care and thought, it should be possible to design adventures that could serve as initiation ceremonies for boys making the transition to manhood” (307-308; see also Cohen 1955; Katz 1988; Lee 2002). Again the results of the current study suggest that if the goal is to preempt the rise of extreme paramilitary organizations, then society must invest the necessary time and resources in designing and implementing alternative programs which will satiate the passion of many males for adventure. The finding that political turmoil was related to militia formation leads to the conclusion that if the major parties started appealing to and addressing the needs and aspirations of our citizenry then it is possible that the growth of right-wing political extremism could be stemmed. This is somewhat encouraging especially if one considers the implications of results which had indicated the opposite- that the growth of the militia movement was unrelated to political turmoil. Such a finding might lead to the conclusion that the current political system is unable to affect the emergence and growth of right-wing extremism. Instead our results lead to the conclusion that the major parties of our political system, by beginning to recognize and address the concerns of average citizens, might still retain the ability to forestall the growth of militias and other similar right-wing groups.

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CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

This study began by asking what factors distinguished states which were subject to higher levels of militia activity from other states. It then reviewed the literature on social movements, right-wing social movements, and the militia movement. The literature review demonstrated that, while a number of theorists and journalists had formulated hypotheses as to which factors were related to militia activity, there was a relative paucity of empirical work on this subject. Since it is relatively easy to formulate an argument or a prediction, it is important to systematically investigate whether or not a particular assertion garners support. This is exactly what the present project has attempted to do- it conducted a preliminary investigation, on the state level, as to whether or not the major theoretical perspectives on militia (and right-wing movement) formation received empirical support. The results, assuming the models were correctly specified, revealed a number of interesting findings. First, neither resource mobilization theory, which is currently the dominant theoretical perspective in the social movement field, nor the economic interaction thesis was supported. Furthermore, it was revealed that both of the major theoretical frameworks (i.e., cultural and economic dislocation/social disorganization) had something to offer. The cultural thesis received support in that while female empowerment was found to be negatively related, the level of paramilitary culture was found to be positively related to levels of militia activity. In addition, while the economic dislocation thesis, quite surprisingly, did not receive support from our study in terms of militia formation, it did receive support in regard to its claims 137

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pertaining to suicide (and to a lesser extent child abuse). Areas which were economically dislocated/socially disorganized were more likely to have higher suicide and child abuse rates. In addition, while most of the miscellaneous hypotheses failed to gain support from the findings, Lipset and Raab (1970) and McAdam (1982) were all correct in predicting that political turmoil would be related to social movement emergence. Finally, the current study not only discussed the theoretical and policy implications which flowed from its findings, but it also laid out a number of issues that are still unresolved. It is hoped that future research begins to fill these gaps by addressing these remaining unresolved issues.

Appendix Number One: OLS Regression Model Testing Gibson’s Cultural Thesis and the Miscellaneous Hypotheses** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-3.066E-02

.109

.780

1.113

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

.154

.102

.139

1.119

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

3.532E-02

.013

.009***

2.261

Taxes

-4.088E-04

.000

.130

1.558

Paramilitary Culture Index

.285

.116

.018***

1.250

Cultural Diversity Index

8.055E-02

.071

.265

1.643

Female Earning Power

-3.797

1.788

.040***

1.660

% Voting for Wallace

2.427E-03

.005

.630

2.349

** Dependent Variable= ADLSPLC Log; R Square= .374; Adjusted R Square= .252; Standard Error of the Estimate= .3409 F= 3.066; P< .008***. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

139

Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-.128

.118

.284

1.076

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

.150

.116

.204

1.199

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

4.074E-02

.014

.005***

2.142

Taxes

-3.258E-04

.000

.290

1.711

% Rural

-8.044E-06

.004

.998

1.187

% Decrease in the Number of Small Farms

.278

.867

.750

1.253

Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization2 Index

-8.106E-02

.149

..588

2.148

% Voting for Wallace

4.714E-03

.006

.459

3.111

** Dependent Variable= ADLSPLC Log; R Square= .248; Adjusted R Square= .101; Standard Error of the Estimate= .3739; F= 1.686; P< .131. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

140

Appendix Number Three: OLS Regression Model Testing the Full Model (with Interaction Terms Representing Arguments from Dyer’s Thesis) and the Miscellaneous Hypotheses36 ** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-4.202E-03

.116

.971

1.199

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

.170

.121

.171

1.509

% of Vote Cast for Third Parties

3.406E-02

.013

.015***

2.326

Taxes

-5.686E-04

.000

.092

2.286

Paramilitary Culture Index

.263

.137

.062

1.657

Cultural Diversity Index

.106

.131

.420

5.246

Female Earning Power

-4.719

2.201

.039***

2.398

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

2.977E-02

.093

.752

3.504

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

3.171E-02

.062

.614

1.557

Standardized version of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index

-1.304E-02

.087

.881

3.027

More Rural, More Economically Depressed/Socially Disorganized, and More Farm Depressed States

2.817E-02

.052

.593

1.835

More Rural and More Economically Depressed/Socially Disorganized States

-1.300E-02

.057

.821

1.705

More Rural and More Farm Depressed States

3.146E-02

.062

.617

2.126

More Farm Depressed and More Economically Dislocated/Socially Disorganized States

7.724E-02

.063

.230

1.635

** Dependent Variable= ADLSPLC Log; R Square= .440; Adjusted R Square= .216; Standard Error of the Estimate= .3491; F= 1.964; P< .053. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

141

Appendix Number Four: OLS Model Testing the Full Model (with Interaction Terms Representing Arguments from Dyer’s Thesis) and the Miscellaneous Hypotheses37** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-3.344E-04

.115

.998

1.195

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

.179

.119

.141

1.479

% Vote for Third Parties

3.338E-02

.013

.016***

2.304

Taxes

-5.563E-04

.000

.095

2.275

Paramilitary Culture Index

.253

.134

.067

1.627

Cultural Diversity Index

.9.075E-02

.126

.476

4.986

Female Earning Power

-4.369

2.082

.043***

2.189

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

3.399E-02

.092

.714

3.480

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

4.291E-02

.058

.465

1.384

Standardized version of the Economic Dislocation/Social Disorganization Index

-1.218E-02

.086

.888

3.026

More Rural and More Economically Depressed/Socially Disorganized States

-2.149E-02

.054

.695

1.576

More Rural and More Farm Depressed States

2.812E-02

.061

.650

2.105

More Farm Depressed and More Economically Dislocated/Socially Disorganized States

8.865E-02

.059

.142

1.452

** Dependent Variable= ADLSPLC Log; R Square= .435; Adjusted R Square= .231; Standard Error of the Estimate= .3457; F= 2.135; P< .036. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

142

Appendix Number Five: OLS Model Testing Dyer’s Suicide Hypothesis** Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

-.909

.780

.251

1.150

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

-.801

.821

.336

1.460

% of the Vote for Third Parties

.409

.080

.000***

1.766

Taxes

4.894E-04

.002

.818

2.005

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

.795

.414

.062

1.459

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

4.907E-02

.407

.905

1.411

Standardized version of the Eco. Disloc./Soc. Disorg. Index

2.573

.485

.000***

1.997

More Rural, More Eco.Depressed /Soc. Disorg., and More Farm Depressed States

-.300

.341

.385

1.657

More Rural and More Eco. Depressed/Soc. Disorg. States

-.417

.368

.264

1.497

More Rural and More Farm Depressed States

.781

.400

.059

1.856

More Farm Depressed and More Eco. Disloc./Soc Disorg. States

-.106

.432

.807

1.613

** Dependent Variable=Suicide; R Square= .627; Adjusted R Square= .518; Standard Error of the Estimate= 2.400; F= 5.795; P< .000. ***= Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test.

143

Appendix Number Six: OLS Model Testing Dyer’s Child Abuse Thesis (With all Four Interaction Terms) Variable

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standard Error

Significance Level (P)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)

Anti-Militia Organization Statute?

484.262

263.923

.075

1.124

Anti-Paramilitary Training Statute?

-85.553

277.237

.759

1.444

% of the Vote Cast for Third Parties

56.236

27.715

.050***

1.841

Taxes

.645

.704

.366

1.942

Standardized version of the % Rural Variable

141.783

151.474

.356

1.558

Standardized version of the % Decrease in the Number of Small Farms Variable

3.195

137.222

.982

1.344

Standardized version of the Eco. Disloca/Soc. Disorg. Index

418.977

164.163

.015***

1.983

More Rural, More Eco. Depressed/Soc. Disorg., and More Farm Depressed States

-176.583

143.013

.225

1.933

More Rural, and More Eco. Depressed/Soc. Disorg. States

34.708

130.628

.792

1.489

More Rural and More Farm Depressed States

27.069

163.603

.870

2.206

More Farm Depressed and More Eco. Dislocated/Soc. Disorg. States

-47.916

144.526

.742

1.439

** Dependent Variable= Child Abuse and Neglect Cases; R Square= .299; Adjusted R Square= .084; Standard Error of the Estimate= 799.2841; F= 1.393; P< .218. *** = Statistically significant at the .05 level in a two tailed test

144

Notes

1. The media, watch groups and the government’s preoccupation with the militia movement’s alleged potential for violent criminal activity did not emerge out of a vacuum. A number of scholars and journalists have examined and documented many violent political criminal acts committed in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s by individuals who emanated from the same far-right political environment which spawned the contemporary militia movement (see for e.g., Aho 1990; Berlet 1999; Bjorgo 1995; Coates 1987; Coppola 1996; Corcoran 1990; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997; Dyer 1997; Flynn and Gerhardt 1995; Hamm 1993; 1997; 2002; Hilliard and Keith 1999; Jones 1968; Kaplan 1997; Martinez and Guinther 1999; Norden 1969; Pelz, Marquart and Pelz 1991; Ridgeway 1995; Sargent 1995; Simonelli 1999; Smith 1994). 2. For an in-depth discussion on how extremist organizations use the internet “to transmit ideologies and facilitate communication” see Schafer (2002: 69). 3. Karl (1995) relates that “Olson [the then leader of the Michigan Militia] recall[ed] what he told his troops.... ‘I said, if we are going to do this right, we are going to have to be proud Americans. Proud enough to wear our uniforms and carry guns wherever we go, to practice in public and let the public see who we are.’.... [However,] while the Michigan Militia expanded as a public, uniformed brigade of citizen soldiers,..... the Militia of Montana used a more secretive approach. Militias, the group’s manual instructed, should be formed in a sevenman ‘cell structure.’ Unlike the public brigades of the Michigan Militia, these cells should be secretive underground operations. This approach according to the manual, ‘will allow security from infiltration and subterfuge.’ .... Advocates of the public militia didn’t like the underground approach. ‘When John Trochman [the leader of the Militia of Montana] showed me his diagram of cell organization, I said, that’s the organization of a terrorist group. That’s the way the Irish Republican Army is organized. The militia must be public’.... said Sam Sherwood, the founder of the United States Militia Association in Blackfoot, Idaho” (44-52).

145

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American Militias

4. Militia leader Robert Fletcher in his testimony to Congress thundered that “We must look at the overriding important point, being what is the concern of the actually several million American citizens that are involved with patriot groups, and whose concerns basically are an out-of-control government, an overly oppressive government, a government that utilizes a secret shadowy means” (The Militia Movement in the United States 1995: 90; see also Niday 2001 for an indepth academic analysis of the 1995 Senate hearings on the militia movement). 5. Journalist David A. Neiwert (1999) emphatically claims that “Globalization has ... brought little but misery to people who make their living from the land. It has hit them hard on two fronts: by enhancing the growth of massive corporate operations at the expense of small family farms; and secondly by expanding the scope of their market... the process of globalization, by reducing local economies to rubble, has transformed thousands of rural communities from the golden-hued repository of upstanding American values they once were into hard scrabble, increasingly mean spirited and hollowed out shells” (325-326). 6.The former militia leader James Johnson has contended that “I have heard more and more people say if one of these black-suited, armor wearing, state sponsored terrorists comes kicking down my doors, I am going to blow somebody away..... For those who think that this is just primarily an angry white male movement, if our ancestors had been armed they would not have been slaves. That is why people are getting armed” (The Militia Movement in the United States 1995: 93). Likewise, Homsher (2001), who interviewed female militia supporters, reports that after she told them that she “found it difficult to follow the links between these wide ranging issues- bicycle helmets, NAFTA, [and] guns. [one female militia supporter] Sue immediately responded: ‘The guns are the main issue. If they take away our rights to keep and bear arms, then we lose all other rights in the Bill of Rights’. [Another militia supporter] Sherry agreed, ‘The 2nd Amendment is the backbone of all the Amendments that guard civil liberties’” (148). 7. Karl (1995) relates that “the Waco firestorm was a wakeup call: The redcoats are coming only this time they are still wearing dark uniforms bearing the initials FBI and ATF. ‘Waco was the shot heard round the world. It woke us up to a very corrupt beast,’ explained Russel Smith, the Dallas commander of the Texas Constitutional Militia. ‘The Waco siege really did it for me. The feds came after these people to get their guns. Who would be next? I knew there was something deeply wrong in America,’ said Brad Alpert, a forty-two year old computer

Notes

147

operator and member of the 51st militia in Kansas City, Missouri. Smith and Alpert, like thousands of other Americans, responded by joining a militia. They vowed to be well armed and prepared for the next government attack” (31-32). 8. This development should not come as a surprise considering Klatch’s (1999) contention that it is “not just government intransigence but also government repression and police brutality that radicalized people.... [this] is what Klandermans refers to as consciousness-raising during episodes of collective action” (115). 9. Norm Olson, the founder and former leader of the Michigan Militia, unabashedly testified to Congress “that the Central Intelligence Agency has been the business of killing people in the United States and around the world since 1946” (The Militia Movement in the United States 1995: 100). 10. The Militia of Montana (1995d) boldly declared in one of their newsletters that “a bill... is before Congress [which] will eliminate the Department of Commerce.... [and] if the Commerce Department were indeed eliminated there would no longer be a National Weather Service... what is so interesting to MOM [i.e., the Militia of Montana] is if the National Weather Service is no longer providing up to the minute reports to the public and if the public no longer has access to weather related information, then the Socialists will be able to escalate their electromagnetic weather manipulation program to a grand scale without having the fear of exposure” (23). 11. Nonetheless the Michigan Militia (1999) recently contended on its web page, in response to the question of: “Is the MMC [Michigan Militia] a religious organization? [that] Religious discussions are kept to a minimum at MMC meetings due to the fact that everyone has their own religious beliefs. The purpose of the MMC is to stand up for people of all religions and races. We do not discriminate on the basis of belief” (4; see also Seul 1997: 92 for a similar finding regarding the Tippecanoe County Indiana Citizens Volunteer Militia). 12. Abanes (1996) writes that “Dean Compton, co-founder of the National Alliance Christian Militia in North Carolina, complains that in his local area three lumber mills were closed within one year thanks to the spotted owl. He additionally notes that because of environmental statutes he cannot even dig up the manzanita bushes on his own property. ‘But,’ he adds cynically, ‘you sure better pay taxes on it, or they’ll take it all away from you’” (14-15).

148

American Militias

13. Snow (1999) explains that “many... militia members... believe that the present court system is legal and valid but that jurors do not know their real rights. Some militia members believe that jurors do not have to listen to a judge’s instructions about the law when deciding a case, but can decide for themselves whether a law is just or constitutional, and, in doing so, can find a defendant innocent regardless of the evidence. The argument for this position is included in the Citizens Rule Book... When I heard militia leader Koernke speak at the preparedness/survival expo in Atlanta, he told the audience that he gives copies of the Citizen Rule Book to police officers” (115-116). 14. The state of Michigan has a long history of extreme right-wing political activity. See for e.g., Berlet (1999) on neo-Nazi related activity in the late 1970s and early 1980s; Brinkley (1983) on Father Coughlin’s political activities in the 1930s and 1940s; Carter (1995) on the success of the 1972 Wallace presidential campaign; Ezekiel (1995) on the activities of neo-Nazis, and Skinheads in the 1980s; Lipset and Raab (1970) on the K.K.K. of the 1920s; Martin (1996) on the surprising strength of the 1988 Robertson Presidential campaign; Ribuffo (1980) on Henry Ford’s role in publicizing anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in his Dearborn newspaper, under the editorship of William J. Cameron, in the 1920s; Ridgeway (1995) on Robert Miles’s K.K.K. related activities in the 1970s and 1980s; Toy, Jr. (1989); and Lipset and Raab (1970) on Gerald L.K. Smith’s political crusade in the 1930s and 1940s, and Churchill (2001) and Lipset and Raab (1970) on the violence prone Black Legion of the 1930s; see also Ribuffo (1983); Rohter (1969). 15. There are similarities between resource mobilization theory and the labeling perspective in criminology which holds that to some extent deviance is socially constructed by those holding the reigns of power in society (see for e.g., Becker 1963) 16. The conceptual scheme underlying mass society theory is similar to the world view expressed by criminologists who subscribe to social control theories (see for e.g., Hirschi 1969; Kornhauser R. 1978). 17. McAdam’s (1982) ‘Political Process’ version of resource mobilization theory makes a similar prediction. Unlike Lipset and Raab (1970), however, who maintain that political instability only provides opportunities for extremist groups, McAdam believes that political instability provides a potential opening for all types of social movements: “Generalized political instability destroys any

Notes

149

semblance of a political status quo, thus encouraging collective action by all groups sufficiently organized to contest the structuring of a new political order. The empirical literature offers numerous examples of this process” (42; see also Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997: 284). 18. A number of other scholars have found similar results. For example, Kraft’s (1992) study of the John Birch Society of the 1980s yielded analogous findings, while Wolfinger, Wolfinger, Prewitt, and Rosenhack (1964) obtained similar results from their 1962 survey of supporters of the right-wing Christian AntiCommunism Crusade. 19. Since Duke’s message is heavily centered on the issues of race and religion it is clear that he should be classified as preaching a socially conservative message. 20. Aho (1990) states that all Idaho Christian patriots “assent to faith in Jesus Christ as savior.... and to the exclusive monopoly of Christianity over the means of eternal life.... and consider their religion to be far more than an adjunct to life celebrated one hour weekly”(13; for a fuller and more complete description of Aho’s definition of the term ‘Christian Patriotism’ see Aho 1990: 13-21). Because religious issues assume such a prominent place in the ideology and concerns of Idaho Christian patriots they would best be categorized as promulgating a predominately socially conservative message. 21. This association between the individual level mass society theory and the aggregate level economic dislocation/social disorganization thesis, not surprisingly, mirrors the relationship found between Hirschi’s individual level Control theory and the aggregate level Social Disorganization theory in the criminology literature. 22. Bennett (1995) likewise claims that the collapse of the Soviet Union along with other social disruptions played a role in the emergence of the militia movement: “The collapse of communism, the breakup of the Soviet Union..... suddenly eliminated the enemy whose menacing presence had shaped American.... public life for two generations. One important consequence.... was the need.... for some..... activists to identify new enemies [such as the federal government], around which.... to create new movements” (469; see also Akins 1998; Barkun 1997; Chermak 2002; Tapia 2000; Watson 1999; Wood 2002).

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American Militias

23. Even though Gibson’s cultural theory is better suited for testing on the individual level, some aspects of his thesis can be extended into formulations which can be tested for on the aggregate level. 24. The symbols + (positive) and - (negative) refer to whether or not the concept in question is positively or negatively related to the emergence of militia organizations and to the level of militia activities, on the state level, according to the specific theory. 25. Information concerning the distribution of militia groups across the United States was also sought from a number of other watch groups (i.e., the AJC, the CHD, the CDR, and PRA). None of these groups possessed any data concerning the number of militia groups or the level of their activities by state. It was also decided not to review newspaper archives from across the country since, as a sample review of Michigan newspapers indicated, not much militia related information was expected to be found. It appears that the only sources which possess data concerning the distribution of the militia movement nation wide, by state, are the the ADL, and the SPLC (see Berlet 2000; Chaplouka 1996; Wood 2002). Finally, it should again be noted that the only other quantitative study on the rise of the militia movement just relied upon the ADL data. The current study by also inspecting SPLC data builds upon and adds to the work of O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998). 26. The ADL rate as to the per capita number of militia groups by state, created by O’Brien and Haider-Markel (1998), might, at times, lack internal consistency. Unlike the SPLC report (1995) which simply listed the number of militia and militia support groups present in each state, the ADL (1995) report provided a state by state summary description of the militia movement which varied by state. When discussing Alaska, for instance, the report just noted that there was militia activity, but it did not list the number of groups active in the state. In its discussion of Florida, the ADL report stated that the militia movement was active in two counties, but when it discussed Georgia, the report said there five militia groups operating. In short, the report may not have measured the exact same phenomenon in each state, since sometimes the ADL provided a count of the number of militia groups, while other times the ADL reported the number of counties where there was militia related activity. Since it was believed that the ADL rate variable still provided a rough measure as to the number of militia groups and the level of militia related activity it was decided to retain the variable for the study.

Notes

151

27.Since this variable was used in our economic dislocation/social disorganization index (see below) it was necessary to reverse code it. 28. Before using this variable in the economic dislocation/social disorganization index it was necessary to reverse code it. 29. Originally the Divorce variable had two missing values (i.e., Indiana and Louisiana). To insure that the economic dislocation/social disorganization index would consist of fifty values and not forty-eight, it was decided to substitute the mean (4.97) of the divorce variable for the two missing values. 30. Before using this variable in the economic dislocation/social disorganization index it was necessary to reverse code it. 31. See Table III for a complete description and coding of each listed variable. 32. Zscores of the original variables and not the variables themselves were included in this equation because previous models which were estimated, and which are listed in Appendices Three and Four, included interaction terms. In order for a model which includes interaction terms to be correctly specified it must include, not only the interaction terms, but the additive terms (which are used to compose the interaction terms) as well. Oftentimes this results in severe problems with colinearity. One way to avoid this potential pitfall of colinearity is to use zscores of the variables as opposed to the variables themselves. 33. A variable’s variance inflation factor is computed by dividing the number one by that variable’s tolerance level (which is the number one minus R square, or, in other words, the number one minus the amount of variance explained in that specific independent variable by all of the other independent variables). In short, variables which have smaller variance inflation factors have lower levels of colinearity as compared to variables which have higher variance inflation factors (see Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman 1996). 34. Haider-Markel and O’Brien (1997) conducted one of the only empirical studies which examined how state governments responded to the recent proliferation of militia organizations. They found that “states where the ADL is strong are more likely to adopt broad anti-paramilitary laws, while states where “pro gun” supporters have more strength are less likely to adopt these laws. Broad anti-paramilitary laws are also more likely in states with a strong law enforcement bureaucracy and states with a history of similar legislation” (563). In addition,

152

American Militias

Haider-Markel and O’Brien found that when militia groups are perceived as a threat, then the passage of anti-paramilitary training laws are more likely, but that “conservative Republicans decrease the probability that these laws will be adopted” (563). 35. Akins (1998) claims that this “Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Bill, passed in response to the Oklahoma City bombing, authorized closer cooperation between various law enforcement agencies, established a computer database to track suspected militia members, monitors the Internet and permits law enforcement personnel to perform surveillance operations without the necessity of a court order” (11-12). 36. This model contains one three way and two way interaction terms plus the additive variables from which he interaction terms were created. As stated above, the interaction terms were included to more precisely operationalize the concepts contained in Dyer’s arguments. 37. This model contains three two way interaction terms plus the additive variables from which the interaction terms were created. The three way interaction term, examined in appendix three, was not included since it was found to be insignificant.

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Index

Christian Anti Communism Crusade, 51, 148 Christian Identity, 26 Christians, 23, 58 civil liberties, 146 civil rights, 16, 55, 66, 67, 92, 110, 146 Clancy, Tom, 67 Clinton, Bill, 20 collective action, 36, 40, 49, 146 collective behavior, 31-33, 37, 39, 41, 42 Commerce Department, 147 communism, 48, 51, 52, 68 conflict based, 33, 79 Congress, 2, 15, 16, 18, 128, 133, 145, 147 consensus based theories, 31 conspiracy theories, 7, 18, 19, 23, 26, 48, 54 Constitution, 17 control theory, 65, 148, 149 corporate elites, 15 Coughlin, Father Charles, 148 crime, 17, 56, 131 crime bill, 17

abortion, 8, 19, 20, 52, 71 Adams, Ken, 28 Alfred P. Murrah federal building, 1 alienation, 15, 40, 43, 46, 57, 121 Alpert, Brad, 146 American Nazi Party, 39 anomic, 32, 50, 55 anomie, 42, 43 Aryan Brotherhood, 59, 60 ATF, 146 authoritarian personality, 41, 42 Baker, Chuck, 12 Baptist, 20, 24 Bible, 19 black helicopters, 17 Black Legion, 148 Brady Bill, 17 Cameron, William J, 148 capitalism, 39, 121 Carter, Ken, 27 Central Intelligence Agency, 147 child abuse, 4, 62, 80, 93, 95, 96,112-113, 118, 128, 129, 138, 144 179

180 criminal, 2-4, 8, 14, 16, 26-28, 76, 130-132,145 culture, 2, 6, 8, 19, 39, 43, 53, 58, 61, 65-69, 73-75, 83, 86, 87, 98, 105, 108-110, 115, 119, 123, 125-127, 134, 135, 137, 139, 141, 142,149 Cushman, 64 Dean, Gordon, 27 deviant, 2, 3, 65, 148 Duke, David, 59, 149 economic conservative, 8-9, 71 economic dislocation, 4, 61, 64-66, 73, 79-82, 96-97, 101-103, 108, 109, 111-113, 115-118, 120-123, 125, 127, 137, 140-142, 150, 151 economic distress, 122, 125, 129 economic inequality, 62, 63, 101 economic interaction, 86, 108, 112, 116, 119, 137 economic prosperity, 35, 47, 52, 81, 82, 96-98, 102, 108, 111, 126 education, 8, 20, 35, 49, 51, 52, 58, 60, 61, 76, 78 environmental, 20, 64, 147 extremism, 50, 55, 57-59, 61, 66, 71, 84, 86, 98, 108, 111, 124, 133, 135 extremist, 4, 7, 11, 12, 43-46, 48, 49, 54, 55, 59, 61, 6365, 113, 145, 148 far right, 53-55, 59, 60, 70, 80, 90, 111, 124, 125, 134,

Index 145 farm depression, 80, 82, 96-98, 102, 112, 114, 120, 123, 125, 128 farm dislocation, 96, 98, 100, 108, 124 farms, 15, 63, 96, 100, 102, 103, 108, 112, 115-118, 124, 140-144 fascism, 41, 172 fax machines, 11, 69 FBI, 18, 146 federal government, 7, 15, 1621, 62-64, 128, 130, 146, 149 feminism, 20, 73, 125 firearms, 17, 163 Fletcher, Robert, 15, 145 freedom, 6, 17, 38 Ford, Henry, 148 functionalist, 31 fundamentalism, 58, 59, 72 GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tarriffs), 16, 64, 65, 127 gay bashing, 122, 125 Gaydosh, Ron, 27 global, 15, 16, 63, 66, 69 globalization, 15, 64, 66, 68, 69, 146 Goldwater, Barry, 38, 168 Gonzalez, Elian, 20 grievances, 5, 8, 33, 34, 37, 73, 130 Gulf War, 76, 77, 105 gun control, 12, 18, 76 gun shows, 12, 13

Index guns, 14, 17, 18, 24, 90, 146 homosexuality, 20 Idaho Christian Patriots, 38, 44-46, 54, 59, 60, 149 identity concerns, 40 Indiana Citizens Volunteer Militia, 15, 20, 147 Indigenous Broker Model, 82 Internet, 11, 12, 69, 73, 91, 133, 145, 152 JFK, 18 John Birch Society, 44, 45, 51, 148 Johnson, James, 16, 17, 90, 146 journalist, 11-13, 15, 62, 120, 121, 145, 146 jury nullification, 20, 147 Koernke, Mark, 28, 147 Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 59, 148 labeling theory, 148 land use, 20 law enforcement, 1, 3, 14, 16, 25, 26, 76, 87, 93, 98, 109, 110, 130-132, 152 leadership, 11, 19, 24-26, 34, 35, 38, 64, 73, 90 left-wing, 5, 19, 39, 54, 119 Levin, Carl, 25 liberty, 6, 17 local government, 24, 70, 104, 105 loggers, 63, 66 lynching, 122, 125 Mack, Richard, 13 martial law, 19, 21 Marx, 5, 32-34, 44, 61, 81, 121, 122

181 mass society, 41-46, 60, 65, 70, 79, 148, 149 McCarthyism, 38, 46 McVeigh, Timothy, 1 media, 1-4, 7, 11, 15, 16, 23, 24, 28, 34, 90, 91, 145 Metzger, Tom, 38 Michigan Militia, 9, 14, 15, 18-20, 24-28, 70-72, 90, 92, 132, 133, 145, 147 Michigan Militia Inc., 28 Michigan Militia at Large, 28 military training, 7, 25, 26 Militia of Montana, 7, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 75, 132, 145, 147 militiamen, 2, 17 millennium, 4, 20 Minutemen, 125, Missouri 51st Militia, 12, 14, 90, 92, 146 Monaghan, Jim, 23 Moral Majority, 38 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), 16, 64, 65, 127, 146 National Alliance Christian Militia, 147 National Confederation of Citizen Militias, 28 National Weather Service, 147 nativism, 14, 50-52 neo-Nazi, 2, 23, 148 New Mexico Militia, 20 new social movement theory, 39, 68, 79 Nichols, Terry, 1

182 normlessness, 32, 42 North American Militia, 27 Northern Michigan Regional Militia, 20 NWO (New World Order), 16-20 Olson, Norm, 20, 24, 26-28, 71, 145, 147 Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Bill, 152 one world government, 7, 16, 17 patriarchal, 73, 110, 126, 134 Patriot Act, 21 patriot movement, 61, 131, 145 personal recruiting, 13 Pilchak, Joe, 26, 27 pluralism, 32, 66, 83, 98 political activities, 23, 26 Political Process Model, 36, 39, 86, 148 politics of lifestyle concern, 58 population growth, 44, 65 Posse Comitatus, 134 preparedness expositions, 13, 147 Professional Organizer Model, 34 property rights, 20 qualitative, 4, 9, 70, 75, 120, 125, 150 quantitative, 4, 9, 75, 88, 120 racism, 14, 52, 90 racist, 2, 16, 26, 28, 38, 59, 130 ranchers, 63, 66 relative deprivation, 33, 79, 123 resource mobilization, 33-38, 49, 56, 73, 79-82, 97,

Index 108, 109, 111, 112, 119, 120, 137, 148 resources, 26, 33-38, 43, 56, 64, 81-82, 97, 111, 120, 135 right to bear arms, 17 right-wing, 3, 5, 26, 31, 37, 3861, 64, 65, 70, 71, 77, 84, 88, 98, 99, 111, 113, 119, 124, 125, 131, 133, 135, 137, 148 Robertson, Pat, 148 Rockwell, George Lincoln, 38 Ruby Ridge, 18, 155, 162, 171 rural, 15, 49, 50, 60, 62, 63, 66, 72, 75, 80, 82, 86, 93, 96-98, 100, 102, 103, 108, 112-115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 124, 127-129, 140-144, 146 secular humanists, 71 Second Amendment, 146 Senate hearings, 9, 15, 16, 28, 145 Sherwood, Sam, 145 short wave radio, 28 Silver Shirts, 125 Skinheads, 23, 38, 45, 46, 148 Smith, Gerald L. K., 38, 148 Smith, Russell, 146 social conservative, 8, 38, 51, 52, 60, 70, 72, 149 social disorganization, 64, 65, 79-83, 87, 96-98, 101-103, 108, 109, 111, 112, 115, 120, 121, 137, 141, 142, 149-151 social integration, 42, 80, 82,

Index 96-98, 102, 108, 111, 119 social order, 4, 130-132 Soldier of Fortune, 130, 168, 174, 177 Southwell, Ray, 24, 71, 76 Soviet Union, 149 status, 8, 41, 46-60, 65, 68, 72, 74, 79, 84, 98, 126 strain, 32, 33, 44, 51, 82 structure, 2, 6, 9, 11, 14, 23, 24, 31-35, 37, 40, 42, 48, 68, 134 suicide, 4, 62, 80, 93, 94, 96, 112-114, 117, 128, 129, 138, 143 talk radio, 12 taxes, 20, 21, 107, 108, 115-118, 139-144, 147 technology, 15, 42, 68, 74, 75 terrorism, 129, 133, terrorist, 1, 8, 14, 16, 26, 130, 132, 146 Texas Constitutional Militia, 146 The Spotlight, 12 The Turner Diaries, 12 Trochman, John, 13, 15, 16, 76, 145, 151 UN (United Nations), 7, 16, 19 United States Militia Association, 145 Van Huizen, Lynn, 25-7, 76 Vietnam, 23, 25, 67, 83, 105, 109 violence, 2, 23, 43, 45, 77, 92, 130, 133, 148 Waco, 18, 146

183 Wallace, George, 106, 124, 148 watch groups, 2, 3, 9, 54, 87-93, 132, 133, 150 Wayne, Tom, 27 white separatists, 38 WHO (World Health Organization), 16 working class, 39, 72, 121 WTO (World Trade Organization), 16 Y2K, 20 Young Americans for Freedom, 38