Advances in Psychology Volume 100 Memory in Everyday Life

MEMORY IN EVERYDAY LIFE

ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY

100 Editors:

G. E. STELMACH

P. A. VROON

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM LONDON NEW YORK TOKYO

MEMORY IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Edited by

GRAHAM M. DAVIES Department of Psychology University of Leicester Leicester, U.K.

ROBERT H. LOGIE Department of Psychology University of Aberdeen Old Aberdeen, U.K.

1993

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM LONDON NEW YORK TOKYO

NORTH-HOLLANDELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V. Sara Burgerhartstraat 25 P.O. Box 211, 1000 AE Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Memory i n e v e r y d a y l i f e e d i t e d b y Graham M. D a v i e s . R o b e r t H. L o g i e . p. cm. -- ( A d v a n c e s i n p s y c h o l o g y ; 1 0 0 ) I n c l u d e s b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e s and i n d e x . I S B N 0-444-88997-3 ( a l k . paper) 1 . Memory. 2. L e a r n i n g . P s y c h o l o g y o f . 3. Memory--Age f a c t o r s . I. D a v i e s , Graham (Graham M . ) 11. L o g i e . R o b e r t H. 111. S e r i e s A d v a n c e s in p s y c h o l o g y ( A m s t e r d a m . N e t h e r l a n d s ) , 100. BF371.M4517 1993 153.1'2--dC20 93-14511 CIP

ISBN: 0 444 88997 3 1993 ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Copyright & Permissions Department, P.O. Box 521, 1000 AM Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Special regulations for readers in the U.S.A. - This publication has been registered with the Copyright Clearance Center Inc. (CCC), Salem, Massachusetts. Information can be obtained from the CCC about conditions under which photocopies of parts of this publication may be made in the U.S.A. All other copyright questions, including photocopying outside of the U.S.A., should be referred to the copyright owner, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., unless otherwise specified. No responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods, products, instructions or ideas contained in the material herein. This book is printed on acid-free paper. Printed in The Netherlands

V

PREFACE This book arose from a concern shared by the Editors to assess the impact of the current surge of interest in practical aspects of memory on our understanding of memory in everyday life. As far as we are aware, it is one of the few to bring together evidence across the very wide spectrum of humdrum human activity that constitutes the everyday uses of memory. We are grateful to our chapter authors and commentators for their willingness to take up our invitation to assemble and review what is known about this burgeoning field. George Stelmach, the Co-Editor for the 'Advances in Psychology' series provided the initial impetus for the project and the technical editors at North Holland have provided valuable advice on manuscript preparation. However, our principal debt is to Rita Benford who carried the major responsibility for the technical preparation of the manuscripts: a formidable task given the bewildering variety of formats and packages in which the different contributions were written. Clare Wilson was responsible for the author and content indexes. Rob Hemmings also provided invaluable computing support. Our wives and families tolerated the bouts of gloom and self-absorption inherent in projects of this kind and it is to them and the younger generation, Emily, Matthew and Andrew, to whom this book is affectionately dedicated.

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CONTENTS Preface List of Contributors Introduction Graham Davies & Robert Logie

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PART 1 - Memory in the Classroom CHAPTER 1 A TALE OF TWO SETTINGS: YOUNG CHILDREN’S MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN THE LABORATORY AND THE FIELD Lynne Baker-Ward, Peter A . Omstein, & Betty N. Gordon Commentaries : On the Collection of Data John Morton Memory and Meaning in the Laboratory and the Field Robyn Fivush Rejoinder: Meaning, Data and the Diagnosis of Cognitive Competence Lynne Baker-Ward, Peter A. Omstein, & Betty N. Gordon CHAPTER 2 THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN LEARNING TO READ, WRITE AND SPELL: A REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH Rhona S. Johnston Commentaries : Memory and Reading: Associated or Dissociated? Philip H . K . Seymour Strategies for Learning and Instruction Linda S. Siege1

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42 47

55

59

78

85

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Contents

CHAPTER 3 FUZZY MEMORY AND MATHEMATICS IN THE CLASSROOM Valerie F. Reyna & Charles J . Brainerd Commentaries : Mathematical Cognition and Fuzzy-Trace Theory Graham J. Hitch Counting on Mathematics in Everyday Life Robert H . Logie

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120 129

PART 2 - Memory and Everyday Life CHAPTER 4 SLIPS AND ERRORS IN LEARNING COMPLEX TASKS Dianne C. Berry Commentaries : Environment versus Cognitions Willem A. Wagenaar Slips and Errors on Learning Complex Tasks Dietrich Dorner CHAPTER 5 WORKING MEMORY IN EVERYDAY COGNITION Robert H. Logie Commentaries: Developing the Model of Working Memory John T.E. Richardson Ecological Perspectives of Working Memory Moshe Naveh-Benjamin CHAPTER 6 THE STRUCTURE O F MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN EXPERTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEMORY IN EVERY DAY LIFE K . Anders Ericsson & Nancy Pennington Commentaries: Expertise and Extended Memory Ken J . Gilhooly Hardware, Software, and Goal Maintenance Neil Charness

137

160 167

173

219 23 1

24 1

213 278

Contents

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PART 3 - Life Skills CHAPTER 7 REMEMBERING OURSELVES Craig R. Barclay Commentaries : Memory of Schemata, Details and Selves Steen F. Larsen Memory, Self and Story John A. Robinson Rejoinder: Reflections on Professors Robinson’s and Larsen’s Comments Craig R. Barclay CHAPTER 8 RECOGNISING FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES Andrew W. Young Commentaries: Dimensions of Facial Appearance Vicki Bruce Accessing Identity Information Bob Johnston CHAPTER 9 WITNESSING EVENTS Graham Davies Commentaries : The Theory Behind Witnessing Events, and the Practice Elizabeth F. Loftus On Aging Witnesses and Earwitnesses A. Daniel Yamey

285

310 316 32 1

325

35 1 360

367

402 408

PART 4 - Deficits in Memory CHAPTER 10 MEMORY AND AGEING Gillian Cohen

419

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Commentaries: The Maze in the Garden Leonard W. Poon Is Memory Something We Have or Something We Do? Elizabeth A . L. Stine CHAPTER 11 COPING WITH MEMORY IMPAIRMENT Barbara Wilson Commentaries: Memory Rehabilitation for Neurological Patients Narinder Kapur Some Guidelines on Memory Rehabilitation Andrew Mayes

439 447

46 1

482 489

PART 5 - Methodology CHAPTER 12 METHOD AND MEANING IN MEMORY RESEARCH Martin A. Conway Commentaries: Faith and Scepticism in Memory Research Robert G. Crowder Holy War or Wholly Unnecessary? Some Thoughts on the 'Conflict' Between Laboratory Studies and Everyday Memory Alan Baddeley

499

525

532

Author Index

537

Subject Index

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS Alan Baddeley MRC Applied Psychology Unit 15 Chaucer Road Cambridge U.K. CB2 2EF

Martin Conway Department of Psychology University of Lancaster Lancaster U.K. LA1 4YF

Lynne Baker-Ward Department of Psychology North Carolina State University 640 Poe Hall, Box 7801 Raleigh, NC 27695-7801. U S A

Robert G Crowder Department of Psychology Box 11A Yale Station New Haven CT 06520, U.S.A.

Craig R Barclay Graduate School of Education and Human Development University of Rochester Rochester, New York 14627, U.S.A.

Graham Davies Department of Psychology University of Leicester University Road Leicester, U.K., LE1 7RH

Dianne C Berry Department of Psychology University of Reading Earley Gate Whiteknights, Reading, U.K., RG6 2AL

Dietrich Dorner Otto-Friedrich Universitat Bamberg Lehrstuhl Psychologie 11 8600 Bamberg, Markusplatz 3, Germany

Charles J Brainerd College of Education University of Arizona Tucson Arizona 8572 1 U.S.A.

Anders Ericsson Department of Psychology Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida 32306- 1051 U.S.A.

Vicki Bruce Department of Psychology University of Stirling FK9 4LA Scotland. U.K.

Robyn Fivush Department of Psychology Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322 U.S.A.

Neil Charness Faculty of Applied Health Sciences University of Waterloo Ontario Canada N2L 3G1

Ken Gilhooly Department of Psychology University of Aberdeen Aberdeen, U.K. AB9 2UB

Gillian Cohen Department of Psychology Open University Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, U.K.

Betty N Gordon University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill North Carolina, U.S.A.

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List of Conrriburors

Graham M Hitch Department of Psychology University of Lancaster Lancaster, LA1 4YF U.K.

John Morton MRC Cognitive Development Unit 17 Gordon Street London U.K.ClH OAH

Rhona Johnston Department of Psychology University of St Andrews St Andrews, KY16 9JU Fife U.K.

Moshe Naveh-Benjamin Department of Behavioral Sciences Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Beer-Sheeva 84 120 Israel

Robert Johnston School of Psychology University of Wales PO Box 901 Cardiff CF1 3YG Narinder Kapur Wessex Neurological Centre Southampton General Hospital Southampton U.K. S 0 9 4 X Y

Peter A Ornstein Department of Psychology The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill CB 3270 Davie Hall Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3270, U.S. A.

Steen F Larsen Department of Psychology University of Aarhus 4 Asylvej DK - 8240 Riskov, Denmark Elizabeth Loftus Department of Psychology University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195 U.S.A. Robert Logie Department of Psychology University of Aberdeen Kings College Old Aberdeen U.K., AB9 2UB Andrew Mayes Department of Psychology University of Liverpool Eleanor Rathbone building PO Box 147, Liverpool L69 3BX

Nancy Pennington Institute of Cognitive Science Department of Psychology University of Colorado at Boulder Colorado 80309-0345 Leonard W Poon Gerontology Center The University of Georgia 100 Candler Hall Athens Georgia 30602, U.S.A. Valerie F. Reyna College of Education University of Arizona Tucson, Arizona 8572 1 U. S . A . John T E Richardson Department of Human Sciences Brunel University of West London Uxbridge, Middlesex, U.K., UB8 3PH John F Robinson Department of Psychology University of Louisville Louisville KY 40208. U.S.A.

List of Contributors

Philip H K Seymour Department of Psychology University of Dundee Dundee U.K., DD1 4HN Linda Siege1 Ontario Institute for Studies in Education 252 Bloor Street West Toronto, Canada, M5S 1V6 Elizabeth A L Stine Department of Psychology Conant Hall, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire 03824-3567, U.S.A. Willem A Wagenaar Unit of Experimental Psychology University of Leiden Hooigracht 15 2300 RA, Leiden, The Netherlands Barbara Wilson MRC Applied Psychology Unit 15 Chaucer Road Cambridge U.K. CB2 2EF A Daniel Yarmey Department of Psychology University of Guelph Guelph Ontario NlG 2W1, Canada Andrew Young Department of Psychology Science Laboratories Durham University South Road, Durham, U.K., DHl 3LJ

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Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) Q 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. AU rights reserved.

1

INTRODUCTION Graham Davies University of Leicester United Kingdom

Robert Logie University of Aberdeen United Kingdom

One method of measuring the progress of research on human memory is to assess its success in predicting behaviour in everyday settings. Judged by this criterion, many would argue that research made few advances in the first 60 years of this century. The zeitgeist was one based on research methods in the physical sciences where simple experiments conducted under laboratory conditions were used in an attempt to understand and uncover universal laws governing the behaviour of objects in the real world. Thus, the use of highly artificial learning paradigms, such as serial and paired-associate learning, were justified on the grounds that only by understanding what was seen as the basic process - the formation of associations - would it be possible to predict the behaviour of humans in more complex settings. This essentially bottom-up approach to understanding memory has been increasingly challenged by those who seek a top-down solution. The view that only through the use of meaningful materials and everyday tasks could the full picture of memory be understood had been championed by Bartlett (1932) and his successors at the Applied Psychology Unit in Cambridge. In the 1970s, these views received powerful transatlantic support, most notably from Neisser (Neisser 1978, 1982; Neisser & Winograd, 1988). In a landmark address to the first International Conference on Applied Aspects of Memory in Cardiff in 1978 Neisser called for a radical shift, both in research aims and methods. Neisser made the bold and oft-quoted assertion that "If X is an interesting and socially significant phenomenon then psychologists have hardly ever studied X" (Neisser, 1978, p.4). The cause of this neglect, he argued, was the attachment of researchers to the quest for universal laws of memory through studying the formation of associations. Neisser saw the direction of research in animal behaviour as a parable for the study of human memory. Here, he argued, the search for universal laws of conditioning and learning had been transformed by the introduction of ethological methods which emphasised the study of the animal in its natural habitat. "The naturalistic study of memory

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Introduction

is a concept whose time has come" (p.3). He urged that researchers should study memory in such natural settings as the school and the home where the opportunity to use past experience in meeting present problems would be optimised. Natural memories of actual experiences should be a principle source of study rather than the artificially contrived, if the full range of memory was to be investigated. Neisser's views were powerfully echoed by other researchers such as Bruce (1985) who argued that not physics or chemistry but biology provided the appropriate route map for the development of psychology as a science. Biological laws emphasise adaptation and change as basic properties of human behaviour. There is a stress upon a diversity of response, dependent upon context or setting rather than universal rules. Biological science emphasises that laboratory methods must be complimented by field study in order to understand behaviour in all its complexity and diversity. Such calls for a greater emphasis upon studying memory in applied settings were amply answered by memory researchers. A journal, 'Applied Cognitive Psychology', set up in 1987 specifically to publish research in this emerging area soon found itself with a large backlog of manuscripts. The second International Conference on Applied Aspects of Memory held in 1988 attracted twice as many papers as the first (Gruneberg & Morris, 1992). Indeed such was the rate of progress in the field that Neisser felt moved to observe in the final plenary session that "If X is an interesting or socially important memory problem the chances are good - though not 100% - that quite a few people are trying to study it" (Neisser, 1988, p.546). The move into research on everyday memory problems may have been encouraged by the calls of Neisser and Bruce, but also owed much to more mundane considerations. In a political climate dominated by free market ideas, funds for basic research in many of the developed Western countries became increasingly elusive. Researchers turned ever more frequently to Government Departments and private companies for finance and they in turn sought answers to applied problems (Davies, 1983; Davies & Logie, 1991; Logie & Bruce, 1990). For these reasons, perhaps, the call for 'applied' research to be conducted in naturalistic settings has been only partially taken up and the demand for more observational studies of the kind popular in biology remains unfulfilled (Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1991; Neisser, 1991). It was perhaps inevitable that the mushroom growth in applied memory

Introduction

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studies would produce an inevitable reaction from researchers of a more traditional persuasion. Banaji and Crowder (1989) produced a critique of this upstart movement with the challenging title of "The bankruptcy of everyday memory". In it, they reaffirmed their commitment to the search for universal laws and saw much of everyday memory research as at best a waste of resource and at worst a source of misleading information. "We have not been able to see any new principles of memory from everyday memory studies ... although we must reserve the possibility that everyday memory research may yield emergent principles ... that supposition is, at present, a prime matter of faith" (Banaji & Crowder, 1989, p.1190). The authors went on to lay great emphasis upon the fundamental importance of control in experimental research and argued, with examples, that this was often sacrificed in the search for authentic settings in which to study memory. However interesting the setting or colourful the population studied, a fundamental lack of control meant that no legitimate conclusions could be drawn from such research. Only a return to the proven, if unspectacular methods of the laboratory could provide real progress in memory research. Banaji and Crowder's robust critique has in turn provoked a wave of reaction from everyday memory researchers. A range of representative views were marshalled by Loftus (1992) in a special issue of the 'American Psychologist'. Predictably these include a wholesale rejection of Banaji and Crowder's views and reaffirmation of the importance of the ecological movement in memory in general (Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1991) and the study of autobiographical memory in particular (Conway, 1981). Equally there are those who seek a consensus that different problems in memory research require different solutions. As Neisser (1991) put it "There are times when a field setting is the first place to study a phenomenon just as surely as there are times when the greater controls of the laboratory make it the strategy of choice" (Neisser, 1991, p.30). His views are echoed in a brief but pithy comment from Tulving (1991). "So let us stop squabbling and go back to more creative work .... Let us identify generally important problems and let us not worry whether someone labels them artificial or real. Let us work on these problems in whatever setting is most natural, using whatever methods are most appropriate" (Tulving, 1991, p.42). While this new-found consensus in methods for studying memory is

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Introduction

encouraging, it does beg a number of questions. Not least the fundamental nature of psychology’s quest: universal laws or functional explanations of more prescribed aspects of behaviour (Bronfenbrenner, 1979)? Or what to do when laboratory research and observation in ’real’ settings lead to conflicting findings (Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Davies, 1992) ? This ongoing debate on the ecology of memory was very much in our mind when we began to develop Memory in Everyday Life. We wished to bring together proponents of both the ’top down’ and the ’bottom up’ schools of memory research within a common framework based on everyday issues in memory. We have adopted a ’lead author and commentary’ formula partly to reflect the debate over method and findings. We believe that only through such exposition and debate can psychologists hope to make progress in understanding memory in real life. The book is divided into five sections. The first section, entitled ’Memory in the classroom’ opens with a paper by Baker-Ward, Ornstein & Gordon which examines the fieldAaboratory debate in the context of memory development. The scope and capacity of memory of children of different ages is a matter of considerable practical as well as theoretical importance with the increasing use of child witnesses in criminal cases. The commentaries of Morton and Fivush focus on the origins of memory growth emphasising knowledge and social interaction respectively as important engines for development. The remaining two papers in this section focus on the ’three Rs’: reading, writing and ’rithmetic. Both Johnston (who concentrates on the first two) and Brainerd (who specialises in arithmetic skills) demonstrate how essentially laboratory based methods have shed important light on the emerging competence of the school child. As the commentaries of Seymour and Siege1 on Johnson, and Hitch and Logie on Brainard make clear, even with the use of the proven methods of fundamental research there is ample room for debate over the interpretation of orthodox laboratory findings. But it will take a more observation-based approach in classroom settings before such fundamental insights are successfully translated into effective teaching methods. The second section of the book, entitled ’Memory and Everyday Life’ looks at the persuasive influence of memory states on daily adult activities. Berry’s chapter on slips and errors in learning complex tasks reminds us that

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in some areas of research the productive integration of laboratory study, field observations and case studies has already reached an advanced level. In this area human memory failure can produce a Bhopal or a Piper Alpha. The commentators Wagenaar and Dorner, both safety advisors as well as practitioners, provide suggestions as to how best to minimise catastrophic error in increasingly complex systems. In his chapter Logie argues that working memory provides a framework where insights about everyday memory can indeed be gained from wellconducted, laboratory studies. He borrows and modifies a phrase from Banaji and Crowder, to suggest that working memory represents an ’area of solvency’ in everyday memory research. In their commentaries Richardson and NavehBenjamin do not disagree with this general philosophy but challenge the implication that the laboratory based studies which Logie reviews comprise a coherent, complete, or unequivocal set of findings. In their view, working memory has come some of the way, and has considerable potential, but has a long way to go. The human capacity to accomplish seemingly astrounding feats of memory is tackled in the chapter by Ericsson and Pennington who invoke the concept of skilled memory which relies on a form of extended working memory. It is well established that experts can retain information better than novices, but only in their domain of expertise. This has been reported in domains as diverse as chess (DeGroot, 1965), electronic circuit diagrams (Egan & Schwartz, 1979), and burglary (Logie, Wright & Decker, 1992). A key topic of debate highlighted by Ericsson and Pennington and in the commentary by Charness is whether or not the memory skills can be acquired by most people given sufficient practice. Gilhooly is generally supportive of Ericsson and Pennington’s argument, but comments on the commonalities and contrasts between the notion of working memory discussed by Ericsson and Pennington, and the concept of working memory discussed in the chapter by Logie. The third section labelled ’life skills’ is concerned with memory used in a social context. Barclay discusses the literature on autobiographical memory, both from the standpoint of orthodox experimental studies but also from a social interactionist perspective. Again, both approaches are seen as mutually valid and each throws light on the other, the whole self being more than the product of the two research halves. Barclay’s view that there is no ’essential self merely a product of our past memories is a controversial one and in their

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Introduction

commentaries, both Robinson and Larsen question this assertion from differing perspectives. A second chapter in this section by Young is concerned with recognising friends and acquaintances. The model of face recognition which Young outlines is based upon orthodox laboratory research, field research and also upon the study of specialised populations who exhibit curious anomolies of perception and naming. By testing the predictions of his model against the performance of such individuals, the model is refined and its generality extended. In separate commentaries, Bruce and Johnston broadly endorse this approach to understanding face recognition. A third chapter by Davies considers our prowess and reporting on witnessed events. Davies asserts that much of the research on eyewitnessing has been driven by legal concerns to the neglect of any comprehensive theory of event recall. Real progress in the area demands integration of theory and evidence, a view broadly echoed in their comments by Loftus and Yarmey. A fourth section of the book is devoted to deficits in memory. The burgeoning of research on memory and aging is reflected in Gillian Cohen’s thoughtful discussion of differing approaches and methods where she points to the apparent inconsistencies in the results from in vitro (lab based) or in vivo studies. There is no doubt as to the importance of this topic given the projected increase in the aged population in Europe and North America, not to mention the personal experiences lying in wait for memory researchers! Poon’s commentary points to the pragmatic solution that the choice of method should be driven by the questions that are being posed rather than on the basis of a priori rules of engagement. Stine also presents a stimulating response to Cohen’s chapter by suggesting that memory is best thought of as something that people do rather than something which they have, and gradually lose with age. Another source of memory deficit is discussed in Wilson’s chapter on coping with memory impairment as a result of brain injury or disease. Wilson is one of the leading proponents of memory rehabilitation and her chapter reflects her practical experiences with memory impaired patients, as well as the growing literature on the topic. She suggests that there are positive practical steps which can be taken to aid such patients, but Wilson cautions that the programme of help should be tailored to the needs of the individual patient, that any improvement may not generalise beyond specific tasks that are the focus of the programme, and there may be some patients where the help offered may not

Introduction

I

be effective. In their commentaries Mayes and Kapur are supportive of the attempts to develop memory aids for clinical settings. Mayes suggests additional means by which our knowledge of normal memory function, of the underlying neurophysiology , and of associated experimental techniques could be employed to foster such development. Kapur also suggests ways forward, but emphasises the need for systematic evaluative studies in this area. A final section on methodology returns to the debate on the appropriate model and methodology for memory research with which this chapter began. Conway contrasts the virtues of the verbal learning tradition and the everyday memory approach and concludes the most valuable contributions will come from the use of extra-laboratory methods. The reactions of the two commentators are broadly representative of other schools of contemporary opinion: a cheerful scepticism as to the claims of everyday memory researchers from Crowder and a plea for continuing eclecticism in methods from Baddeley. Twenty years ago, the authors would have been hard put to compile a book on memory in everyday life. Today, our difficulty has been to restrain the loquacity of our authors and commentators! If vigorous debate and flourishing research are measures of a field’s development, then clearly, the study of everyday memory has made great strides in the last two decades. We hope that those who wish to understand those developments and have some insight into the attendant controversies profitably may begin their search in the following chapters.

References Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A studv in experimental and social psvchology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Banaji, M.R., & Crowder, R.G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psycholopist, 44, 1185-1 193. Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bruce, D. (1985). The how and why of ecological memory. Experimental Psychology: General, 114,78-90.

Journal of

Ceci, S.J., & Bronfenbrenner, U. (1985). Don’t forget to take the cupcakes

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out of the oven: Strategic time monitoring, prospective memory and context. Child DeveloDment, 54, 175-190. Ceci, S.J., & Bronfenbrenner, U. (1991). On the demise of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 46,27-3 1. Conway, M.A. (1991). In defense of everyday memory. Psychologist, g,19-26.

American

Davies, G. (1983). Cognitive psychology in the 1990’s - Looking back on the 80’s. Bulletin of the British Psychological Society, 36, 49-52. Davies, G. (1992). Influencing public policy on eyewitnessing: Problems and possibilities. In F. Losel, D. Bender, & T. Bliesener (Eds.), Psychology and law: International perspectives (pp. 265-274). Berlin: de Gruyter. Davies, G., & Logie, R. (1991). Contemporary themes in cognitive psychology. The Psvchologist, 4,291-292. De Groot, A. D. (1965). Thought and choice in chess. The Hague: Mouton. Egan, D. W., & Schwartz, B. J. (1979). Chunking in the recall of symbolic drawings. Memorv and Cognition, 2,149-158. Gruneberg, M., & Morris, P. (1991). Applying memory research. In M. Gruneberg & P. Morris (Eds.), Aspects of memory: Vol. 1. The practical aspects (pp. 1-17). London: Routledge. The glitter of everyday memory... And the gold. American Psychologist, 46, 16-18.

Loftus, E.F. (1991).

Logie, R. H., & Bruce, D. (1990). Developments and directions in applying cognitive psychology. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 349-358. Logie, R. H., Wright, R., & Decker, S. (1992). Recognition memory performance and residential burglary. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 109-123. Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M.M. Gruneberg, P.E. Morris, & R.N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press. Neisser, U. (1982). Memory observed. San Francisco: Freeman.

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Neisser, U. (1988). Time present and time past. In M.M. Gruneberg, P.E. Morris, & R.N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical asDects of memorv: Vol. 2. Clinical and educational implications (pp. 545-560). Chichester, England: Wiley. Neisser, U. (1991). A case of misplaced nostalgia. American Psvchologist, 46,34-36. Neisser, U., & Winograd, E. (1988). Remembering reconsidered: Ecological and traditional approaches to the study of memory. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tulving, E. (1991). Memory research is not a zero - sum game. American Psvchologist, 46,41-42.

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PART 1

MEMORY IN THE CLASSROOM

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13

CHAPTER 1 A TALE OF TWO SETTINGS: YOUNG CHILDREN’S MEMORY

PERFORMANCE IN THE LABORATORY AND THE FIELD Lynne Baker-Ward North Carolina State University, USA. Peter A. Omtein and Betty N. Gordon University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA. “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times ...” With apologies to Charles Dickens, we find it likely that future historians of our discipline will characterize current research on the development of memory and cognition in this bipolar manner. Studies of memory in ’real-world’ settings have resulted in descriptions of children’s performance, indeed sophistication, that stand in marked contrast to earlier accounts based on remembering in the laboratory (cf. Fivush & Hudson, 1990; Ornstein, 1978). As such, there is no doubt that our understanding of children’s abilities, of the difficulties of cognitive assessment and diagnosis, and of the contexts that promote development, has been enhanced. Yet, in a sense, we feel that the field is at risk. In the rush to examine memory and cognition in situations considered to be ecologically valid, there is a danger that many important findings resulting from laboratory research may be overlooked and that powerful analytic methods may be underutilized. There is, moreover, an additional danger that the research community may be divided nonproductively into polarized ’everyday’ memory and ’laboratory’ memory camps that each negate the value of the other’s contribution (see, e.g., Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Loftus, 1991; Neisser, 1978; Tulving, 1991). These conflicting themes are explored in the present chapter in which we examine the nature of research on the development of memory conducted inside and outside of the laboratory. From our perspective, research on children’s memory carried out at these alternate ’venues’ can be profitably analyzed in terms of a number of fundamental characteristics, such as the degree of experimental control present, the nature of the materials to be remembered, etc.

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Chapter 1

Viewed from this vantage point, we find that it is quite difficult to differentiate precisely between these two bodies of research. We suggest, moreover, that the everyday-laboratory contrast may not be the most productive one for fostering the growth of our understanding of cognitive development.

Changing views of children’s competence There is no doubt that our conceptualization of young children’s memory skills has changed markedly in the last decade. Work by Nelson and her colleagues (Nelson, 1986; Nelson, Fivush, Hudson, & Lucariello, 1983; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981; Nelson & Hudson, 1988) indicates that preschoolers are quite sensitive to regularly occurring events, readily forming scripts for common routines such as getting up in the morning, having snacks at the day care center, and eating out in a restaurant. Moreover, the research of Fivush (e.g., Fivush, Gray, & Fromhoff, 1987; Hamond & Fivush, 1991), Hudson (e.g., Hudson & Fivush, 1991), Ratner (e.g., Ratner, Smith, & Dion, 1986), and others suggests that preschoolers may have fairly good retention of the details of salient, personally-experienced events. Even our earlier views of preschoolers’ deficiencies in using strategies are in the process of flux. There is now considerable evidence to suggest that even young children are capable of strategic activities in the service of memory goals, at least under certain supportive task conditions (Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984; DeLoache, Cassidy, & Brown, 1985; Wellman, Ritter, & Flavell, 1975; see also Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988; Wellman, 1988). The contrast between young children’s memory performance in controlled and everyday environments can indeed be quite striking. For example, in the process of studying young children’s early mnemonic strategies (Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984), we noted a clear distinction between preschoolers’ memory performance during the administration of our task and immediately upon its completion. The laboratory task involved remembering a set of toy objects, and we found that even 4-year-olds engaged in behaviors that made them appear ’studious’ much more so than would have been expected on the basis of the prior literature (e.g., Myers & Perlmutter, 1978). Nonetheless, the recall of the 4-year-olds was unimpressive and their ’strategies’ did not seem to facilitate performance. But these very same 4-year-olds sometimes reported the names of several

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classmates in the order in which they were scheduled to appear in the testing room, information that had been acquired incidentally and was reported spontaneously! Informal follow-up of this observation suggested that the preschoolers had no difficulty in responding to questions concerning “whose turn is it to play the memory game next,” and could frequently generate correctly a list of five or more names. A more systematic study of young children’s enhanced memory for the names of classmates has been reported by Bjorklund and Zeman (1982). Why were our subjects so effective at remembering the children’s names in comparison with the set of toy stimuli? We cannot completely address this question because doing so requires a contextual analysis of settings that support remembering that is not yet available (but see Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Ornstein, 1990). Nonetheless, it is clear that the children’s success with their classmates’ names parallels many demonstrations of quite impressive extralaboratory performance that have recently been documented. Thus, for example, first graders remember the details of a class trip to a museum after one year (Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984) and evidence some recall six years after the event (Hudson & Fivush, 1991). The extensive literature on children’s memory in everyday contexts (see Fivush & Hudson, 1990) that is now available indicates that performance can be quite good when remembering is embedded in real-world activities that have meaning and importance to children. Indeed, their impressive displays of remembering outside of the formal laboratory lead some to suggest that laboratory-based investigations result in an underestimation of preschoolers’ mnemonic competence. Given the extensive accumulation of evidence documenting children’s memory prowess in naturalistic contexts, Mandler (1991) has observed that “there may be no limits to young children’s memory capacity. ”

Should children’s memory be studied in the laboratory? Given the insights gained from the study of children’s memory in everyday environments, what is to be gained by continued exploration in the laboratory? From our perspective, a great deal! We feel that some research questions require the precise control of the laboratory, whereas other issues can be addressed more readily through laboratory research than field observation. Moreover, laboratory studies are clearly necessary for continued progress in

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understanding mechanisms that may be responsible for developmental changes in memory performance. Our analysis of these issues begins with a discussion of some of the problems associated with the study of memory and cognition outside of the laboratory and continues with a treatment of the degree to which everyday and laboratory studies may complement each other. Limitations of field studies. Well-executed studies in the laboratory can compensate for some of the built-in limitations of field studies. For example, despite their clear importance, studies of everyday memory may be limited by such factors as the nature of the events to be remembered, the inability to specify adequately the to-be-remembered event and the lack of precise control. To begin, many explorations of everyday memory test children’s memory for ’stimulus’ events that are somewhat limited by their unusual and salient (either positive or negative) nature. For example, consider the special outings (Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Hudson & Fivush, 1991), family vacations (Hamond & Fivush, 1991), and medical procedures (e.g., Goodman, Hirshman, Hepps, & Rudy, 1991; Peters, 1991; Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & Moan, 1991) that are at the core of many studies of long-term retention of the details of personally experienced events. The degree to which findings of excellent event recall in such settings can be generalized to children’s memory for more mundane occurrences remains unclear. Moving beyond the nature of the event, laboratory investigations permit researchers to answer questions about retention that are at best difficult to address in field studies. Two related issues are of relevance. First, accurate assessment of delayed recall requires knowledge of the event under consideration. Because complete and concurrent records of the child’s actual experiences are not routinely available in everyday memory studies (see, e.g., Fivush, Gray, & Fromhoff, 1987; Sheingold & Tenney, 1982), measurement over time of recall changes becomes quite problematic. Second, interpretation of children’s recall at a delay requires knowledge of their initial encoding of the event. Thus, unless the researcher has documentation of a child’s initial report of an experience, it is impossible to determine if an incomplete later account reflects forgetting or a failure to encode the information in the first place. In addition, the inherent characteristics of everyday environments restrict the possibilities for identifying mechanisms that may underlie memory performance and development. To do this, it is necessary to manipulate those variables thought to be causally related to mnemonic skill. Indeed, at a

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fundamental level, the search for factors that mediate developmental change requires both the imposition of precise control and the use of experimental methodologies. Unfortunately, in most real-world settings, it is impossible to manipulate precisely those features of the context that are hypothesized to be of importance. Thus, for example, even though involvement in a Western-style schooling environment seems to be important for the normal development of skilled remembering (Rogoff, 1981; Wagner, 1978; see also Moely, Hart, Leal, Santulli, Rao, Johnson, & Hamilton, 1992), it is difficult to manipulate experimentally the type of educational experience received by contrasting groups of children. Yet, without experimental intervention, it is very difficult to go beyond what are essentially correlational findings demonstrating a linkage between schooling and cognitive skill. It should be noted, however, that from time to time, when societal changes or community practices present different experiences to similar groups of people, researchers may have the unique opportunity to take advantage of ’experiments of nature.’ For example, Morrison (1987) has been able to disentangle the roles of experience and maturation in remembering by making clever use of a school system’s age-of-entry requirement. His unique ’cut-off methodology’ involves the comparisons of task performance among children who differ in age by only a few weeks but whose birthdays lie on either side of the official cut-off date for school entry. In this way, Morrison is able to capitalize on a fairly arbitrary administrative decision and to create groups of children who are matched on all relevant variables except that of experience in school. Admittedly, relevant natural experiments are quite rare, and most often researchers interested in children’s memory for everyday events must content themselves with more modest manipulations. Thus, for example, investigators who study children’s memory for real-world events have been able to vary the manner in which memory is probed (e.g., Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992; Goodman & Aman, 1990; Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas, & Moan, 1991) and to influence the nature of experiences that intervene in a long delay interval, at least to some extent (e.g., Gordon, Ornstein, Clubb, Nida, & Baker-Ward, 1991). These manipulations can generate a great deal of information about factors associated with the recovery of information thought to be in memory storage, but they are limited in the sense that they do not experimentally control the conditions prevailing during children’s incidental encoding of information

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that is subsequently probed in a deliberate manner (see Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, in press). The advantages of the laboratory. In the discussion above, it was suggested that experimental methodologies could be utilized profitably to compensate for many of the problems that are associated with the study of memory and cognition outside of the laboratory. We now discuss some of the positive features of the laboratory context that make it a very appropriate setting for examining aspects of children’s cognitive development. Research on the development of children’s memory strategies has flourished in the laboratory (see, e.g., Wellman, 1988). Over the past decade, investigations of children’s mnemonic skills (e.g., Baker-Ward, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984; Lange, MacKinnon, & Nida, 1989) have attributed increasing competence to younger and younger children, a pattern that converges with that resulting from studies of everyday memory. Indeed, under some circumstances, children may even demonstrate better memory performance in laboratory settings than in more naturalistic contexts. Newman (1990), for example, varied both the materials (pictures vs. toys) presented to pre-kindergartners and the context in which the task was set (reflecting both remembering vs. play instructions and formal vs. informal administration). Although toys were better remembered than pictures, Newman found that the children’s performance with pictures varied as a function of the setting. Specifically, children who were tested under laboratory conditions actually recalled more items and engaged in strategic activity more often than those who were assessed in a more informal manner. In addition, laboratory investigations have resulted in an enhanced understanding of the contexts that support the use and generalization of strategies (Cox, Ornstein, & Valsiner, 1991; Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Ornstein, 1990) and the delineation of developmental transitions in the efficacy of strategic behaviors (Miller, Haynes, DeMarie-Dreblow, & Woody-Ramsey, 1986). At least two factors seem central to a consideration of why our understanding of children’s memory strategies, in contrast to some other aspects of memory performance, has been significantly advanced by means of sustained and systematic experimentation in the laboratory. First, the application of deliberate memory strategies is influenced most directly by the characteristics of the child, the nature of the to-be-remembered materials, and the instructions provided by the experimenter (see Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988).

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Each of these parameters is at least as salient in the laboratory as in any other context. Second, the laboratory setting clearly has a reasonable degree of ecological validity for any consideration of memory strategies, relative to other aspects of memory (e.g., prospective remembering) because it shares many characteristics with the classroom in which deliberate remembering in children would most likely be observed in situ. For example, an adult directs performance in both contexts, the teacher in the classroom and the researcher in the laboratory; the goal is the deliberate memorization of material in preparation for a test; the to-be-remembered material is presented in a similar manner; and so forth. When the aspect of memory performance of interest can be observed in the laboratory, the enhanced opportunities for experimental control, along with the practical considerations of time and effort, mandate its extensive (although not exclusive) examination in laboratory settings. Possible problems with the laboratory. The above discussion of the advantages associated with laboratory research should not be construed as advocacy for this approach in all situations. Clearly, there are a number of limitations associated with laboratory investigations. At a very basic level, hypotheses are generated through extensive observations and descriptions of behavior, and the degree to which such observation can transpire in the laboratory, at least in the initial stages of investigations, may be restricted. In addition, the issue of the generalizability of the findings is a major concern. As McCall (1977) suggested, laboratory studies can establish that a relation between two variables can exist, at least under some conditions; however, such research cannot support conclusions that the variables are indeed related in more complex situations. Another limitation involves the great extent to which cognitive performance, particularly among young children, is dependent upon the context in which it is observed (see Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Ornstein, 1990; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988). If children’s memory is examined in situations that do not provide the supports typically found in natural settings, it is quite possible that their skill can be underestimated. Important aspects of the assessment context include the nature of the to-be-remembered materials, the mode of presentation, and the nature of the questions that are used to probe recall. Thus, for example, young children appear to be more strategic when presented with strongly associated materials than with unrelated items (Best & Ornstein, 1986) and when they have increased visual access to the stimuli

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Chapter I

(Ornstein, Medlin, Stone, & Naus, 1985). Another example of the need for statements about children’s competence to be contextually framed can be seen in the growing literature on children’s suggestibility. The extent to which children are affected by both misleading post-event information and forceful questioning at recall is the subject of current debate (see, e.g., Ceci & Bruck, in press; Doris, 1991; Ornstein, Larus, & Clubb, 1991). Nonetheless, there is a growing consensus that preschoolers are quite readily influenced by misleading post-event information and direct questioning. For example, Clarke-Stewart, Thompson, and Lepore (1989; see also Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, 1991) have shown that an examiner’s interrogation can readily lead young children to change their accounts of a previously-experienced event. However, Stein, Trabasso, and Liwag (1991) have reported data indicating that 3-year-olds do not alter their reports of emotional personal experiences, even when their parents strongly contradict their accounts. These contrasting impressions of children’s resistance to suggestibility suggest that exclusive reliance on the laboratory may sometimes result in a distorted and incomplete account of children’s remembering. A dangerous dichotomy. Even a brief consideration of the studies described above indicates the difficulties inherent in advocating for research on young children’s memory in laboratory versus naturalistic contexts, or vice versa. We believe, moreover, that the dichotomy between the two settings is a false, and even a dangerous, one. In the analysis below, different contexts are presented as varying along multiple dimensions and as supporting children’s remembering to differing degrees. We suggest that the understanding of memory development can be advanced only by examining performance in multiple contexts, so that the full range of behavior as affected by these factors can be examined. Characteristics of laboratory and field studies At a basic level, the distinction between laboratory and field settings would seem apparent. However, to contemporary developmentalists, the defining features of laboratory and naturalistic approaches clearly involve more than the physical location in which the data are collected. The two research contexts must be defined with reference to several distinguishing attributes. We present each of these characteristics as a continuum, and suggest that research

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conducted in each setting must be examined with reference to at least these dimensions. Control over the subject’s experience. First, the approaches can be characterized by the degree to which the researcher exerts control over the subject’s experience. This control can extend to the very selection of the memory task and the specification of the conditions under which it is performed, including the instructions to the subject and information processing supports. In general, a defining feature of laboratory approaches is that of precise control. It should be noted, however, that control in this case does not necessarily imply an experimental design, in the sense that variables are manipulated (although most laboratory studies in this area are at least quasiexperimental, as age is a factor in the design). The investigator may present children with a selected, structured event in a laboratory setting, and observe the subjects’ spontaneous approaches to the task or reactions to particular stimuli. The relevant feature is the experimenter’s control over the subjects’ experience. Experimental control must be regarded as a continuous rather than dichotomous construct. Investigators who work in laboratory settings cannot, of course, control all aspects of the subject’s experience, and researchers who prefer to examine memory in everyday environments may chose to impose some degree of experimental control, although they must inevitably trade less control for more ecological validity. Recent work by Hamond and Fivush (1991) illustrates a mid-point on the continuum of experimental control. These researchers employed an elegant design in which they examined children’s memory for a salient, personal experience, a family vacation at Disneyworld. Children at two age levels discussed their Disneyworld experience with an experimenter either 6 or 18 months after the event; hence, the effects of age at the time of encoding and age at the time of recall could be examined independently. However, in order to examine these variables in the context of a real-world activity, it was necessary to accept some variability across subjects with regard to both the event (e.g., the specifics of the individual Disneyworld visits) and the children’s intervening experiences. Specification of the event. Another dimension along which the two approaches differ is the extent to which the to-be-remembered event (or other to-be-remembered stimulus) is specified by the experimenter. In laboratory approaches, the target events or stimuli are clearly delineated and carefully

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Chapter I

documented. In contrast, field-based approaches may differ greatly with regard to the specification of the to-be-remembered event (and even the extent to which such definition is considered important). Illustrating one end of the continuum, Fivush, Gray, and Fromhoff (1987) examined children’s recollections of selfselected past experiences. Each of the parent-child dyads discussed a different, unique personal experience, and aside from the parents’ subjective recollections of the events, no documentation of the experience was available. At another end of the continuum, Vandermaas, Hess, and Baker-Ward (in press) explored children’s memories for their dental treatment, and scored the children’s responses to standard questions with reference to videotapes of each child’s dental procedures. Extent to which remembering has meaning. The alternate approaches may also be classified with regard to the extent to which the memory task is meaningful, in the sense that it is embedded in an on-going activity and directed toward the achievement of a goal that is determined, or at least shared, by the child. Activity that is meaningful to the subjects can be studied in controlled laboratory settings. For example, Fivush, Kuebli, and Clubb (1992) have observed children’s development of scripts by guiding their completion of structured art projects on multiple occasions. However, it is almost always the case that naturalistic investigations of children’s remembering examine memory for meaningful activities or materials, in that memory performance is a component of the completion of a task with ascribed importance. The classic example of the importance of meaning, in the sense of functional and goal-directed activity, was provided by Istomina’s work in the Soviet Union in the late 1940s (Istomina, 1975). In her examination of the development of voluntary remembering, Istomina compared young children’s memory performance in two alternative contexts. One task involved the simple presentation of a set of to-be-remembered words in a laboratory setting. In contrast, the second task embedded remembering in a complex game, one in which children were introduced to an elaborate kindergarten setting and subsequently instructed to obtain from a simulated grocery store items that were needed for snacks and meals at the kindergarten. The children’s recall of the list of to-be-remembered items in the laboratory was compared with their recall of the list of groceries, as indicated by their make-believe purchases. Consistent with her predictions, Istomina found that the older group of children, those 4 years and older, demonstrated greater success in voluntary remembering

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in the meaningful context. In contrast, the younger children, who did not understand the goal of obtaining the groceries, performed poorly in both settings, but somewhat better in the laboratory. It should be noted that Istomina’s findings have been the subject of some controversy in recent years. In direct contradiction of Istomina’s findings, replication studies in which a number of methodological controls have been incorporated have sometimes found that laboratory settings are associated with higher levels of recall than more meaningful contexts (Schneider & Brun, 1987; Weissberg & Paris, 1986). Moreover, additional research suggests that a number of features of the tasks are responsible for the conflicting findings. Thus, for example, Hasselhorn and Schneider (in press) report that children recalled more items in the game setting than in the laboratory only when attractive stimuli were used. They also found that higher levels of recall were obtained in the laboratory when the interactions between the child and the examiner were standardized across the two settings. In an effort to understand these divergent patterns of results, FoldsBennett (in press) suggests that the methodological refinements introduced in the replication attempts may have inadvertently rendered the game context less meaningful to contemporary subjects than it was to the participants in Istomina’s original study (see also Rogoff & Mistry, 1990). An alternative but not incompatible explanation of these failures to replicate Istomina’s findings is provided by Hasselhorn and Schneider (in press). They suggest that exploration of specific parameters of the context in which remembering takes place, such as amount of exposure to the materials, is of more relevance to understanding differential performance than is the more global classification of a setting as being game- or laboratory-like. The provision of supports for remembering. Consistent with Hasselhorn and Schneider’s (in press) perspective, recent formulations of memory development from different theoretical traditions have emphasized the importance of supportive task contexts for remembering (see Cox, Ornstein, & Valsiner, 1991; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988). Rogoff (1991) and others following in the tradition of Vygotsky view the guidance and direction provided by more experienced partners as critical features of the context. As conveyed in the construct of the “zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky , 1978), the level of performance observed within one child is expected to vary as a function of the scaffolding for the activity provided across contexts. Other

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researchers working within the framework of information processing (e.g., Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Omstein, 1990; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988; see also Cox, Ornstein, & Valsiner, 1991) have demonstrated the importance of such task variables as the nature of the materials on the observed level of mnemonic competence in children. Thus, for example, children who do not use active rehearsal in preparation for recall in a standard task environment may do so when the to-be-remembered items remain in view during the study period (Guttentag, Omstein, & Siemens, 1987). For researchers within both of these traditions, memory performance is clearly not a static property of the child, but rather is dependent upon the nature of a dynamic subject by context interaction. As indicated above, a child’s performance may vary from setting to setting, resulting in contrasting estimates of competence and mandating assessments in multiple contexts (Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988). Moreover, the same nominal stimulus experience may be differentially encoded, processed, and remembered by children with contrasting abilities and prior experiences. Hence, attention to the specific attributes of the assessment context as well as to the characteristics of the subjects is of critical importance for any examination of memory development. Laboratory studies of memory development may vary widely along the continuum of supports for remembering provided within the particular task. It is not surprising that early intentional memory behavior was identified in tasks that accommodated children’s nonverbal skills by strategically marking to-beremembered hiding places, whereas more traditional verbal rehearsal tasks depicted preschoolers as lacking deliberate mnemonic activity (see Wellman, 1977). In contrast, field settings more routinely provide a variety of supports for remembering, including the guidance of parents and other adults (Rogoff, 1991). It thus follows that the strongest impressions of early mnemonic prowess stem from explorations of performance in socially structured situations (Fivush & Hudson, 1990; Perlmutter, 1980). Knowledge base effects. An additional important dimension concerns the subject’s knowledge of the information or event that is to be remembered. Although knowledge and meaning are related, in that children are likely to acquire an extensive knowledge base through the performance of goal-directed activity, knowledge refers specifically to the large and interconnected cognitive networks of facts possessed by the subject. A variety of research evidence (see Bjorklund, 1985, 1987; Chi & Ceci, 1987; Ornstein & Naus, 1985) indicates

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that prior knowledge of a particular domain (e.g., chess, soccer, etc.) greatly influences the encoding and retention of information drawn from that domain. Indeed, under some conditions, the influence of prior knowledge can override the ubiquitous age differences in memory. Thus, for example, children who are chess experts show better recall for the positions of chess pieces than adults who are novice chess players (Chi, 1978). In a similar fashion, memory for events is influenced by both the subject’s existing scripts (Nelson, 1986; Fivush, 1984) and the extent to which an integrated knowledge structure underlies the activities involved in the event (Baker-Ward, Hess, & Flannagan, 1990). Both laboratory and field-based approaches may vary in terms of the degree to which they involve the recall of information about which subjects are knowledgeable. However, as autobiographical memory involves selfreferencing, by definition, it would follow that the recall of personal experiences would always be supported by the knowledge contributed by the self-schema (see Kihlstrom, Cantor, Albright, Chew, Klein, & Niedenthal, 1988; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986). Hence, some degree of knowledge is always likely to support memory for events in which the child was a participant. Nonetheless, it should be noted that studies of everyday memory frequently examine the retention of novel experiences (e.g., a unique class outing; Fivush, Hudson, & Nelson, 1984; Hudson & Fivush, 1991), and therefore the child’s pre-existing knowledge regarding the event might be quite limited. Similarly, laboratory-based assessments of children’s memory performance may examine their retention of materials that differ with regard to the extent to which they evoke pre-existing knowledge structures. Thus, for example, young soccer fans more easily recall stories about soccer games than do children with less knowledge of the game (see Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1990). Individual interests. Despite long-standing recognition of the potential impact of interest on attention, learning, and memory (Dewey, 1913), researchers have only recently focused on the linkage between children’s interests and their memory performance. Renninger and Wozniak (1985), for example, have reported that preschoolers are more likely to attend to and remember a subset of toys in which they have previously demonstrated interest. However, for a number of reasons, the interest-memory relation would seem to be quite complex. First, although young children may allocate more attention to materials

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Chapter 1

that they find interesting, they may also attend less to other items, with the net result being lowered overall recall (Shirley & Reynolds, 1988). Second, adults may actually devote less attention to materials that they find interesting, because they can memorize them more easily than other items, and elect to concentrate on harder but less interesting items (Anderson, Shirley, Wilson, & Fielding, 1987). And finally, the effects of interest on subsequent remembering may be mediated by attention, as already seen, and other variables such as prior knowledge. Indeed, an individual who is an expert in a particular area not only possesses a great degree of structured knowledge, but is also usually intensely interested in this domain (Ornstein & Naus, 1985). Despite these complexities, which remain to be studied systematically, it is clear that children's level of interest is of considerable importance in understanding their memory performance in both the laboratory and the field. In laboratory studies, it is possible to examine children's memory for materials and activities that are selected to be of differing levels of interest to the subjects. In contrast, opportunities to exert such control are typically lacking in naturalistic settings, but because studies of everyday memory frequently examine the retention of materials that children themselves have selected, it is more likely that these investigations incorporate high levels of interest. The type of memory that is considered. Unless individuals are led to expect that they will be subsequently questioned about their experiences, events are encoded incidentally. However, at the time of the memory interview, as children are asked to "try to remember," the task becomes one of deliberate recall, and strategies for retrieval may come to be utilized. Studies of memory in everyday environments routinely examine incidental encoding and deliberate recall, whereas laboratory investigations vary the circumstances under which encoding occurs (see Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, in press). How might the nature of memory under consideration affect the pattern of results? In general, incidental recall varies as a function of the activities in which the subject engages while information is being acquired, with deeper processing resulting in greater subsequent retention than less semantic encoding (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). Moreover, developmental differences in incidental recall can be reduced or even eliminated when children of different ages are able to process material in an equivalent manner (Ornstein & Corsale, 1979). However, it may be easier to observe comparable performance among children of different ages under conditions of relatively shallow levels of processing than

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in situations calling for more elaborate, knowledge-dependent encoding (Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, in press; Peterson, 1977). Indeed, given developmental changes in underlying knowledge, it is unlikely that children of different ages will spontaneously process information with the same degree of elaboration, although this may be elicited in the laboratory under certain conditions (Corsale & Ornstein, 1980). Regardless of the nature of the initial, incidental encoding, children’s reports of earlier events involve deliberate remembering and, accordingly, developmental changes in performance would often be expected. With increasing age, children are more likely to use conventional narrative structure to construct their accounts of personal experiences to enhance their recall (Mandler, 1990), as well as to employ directed search and other retrieval techniques. There is thus the distinct possibility that younger children’s reports may seriously underestimate the information that they have available in memory. It is likely, however, that these children can benefit from directions to employ techniques that they do not spontaneously produce (see, e.g., Kobasigawa, 1977). Hence, the provision of questions and supports by a sensitive and well-trained interviewer could compensate to some degree for difficulties in retrieval (Ornstein, 1991; Ornstein, Gordon, & Baker-Ward, in press).

A laboratory or a field investigation?: A case study As discussed above, memory studies must be considered with reference to a number of important attributes that are likely to affect children’s performance. Each of these features, moreover, can be conceptualized as a continuum and thus used to represent the degree to which the characteristic is present in a particular study. We do not suggest that these dimensions are independent of each other, but rather that several (e.g., knowledge and interest) are likely to be interrelated. Further, because both experimental and naturalistic investigations vary along these dimensions, we do not find it useful (or even possible!) to classify research simply in terms of the location in which an investigation takes place, or with regard to any other specific characteristic. As an example of the drawbacks of trying to dichotomize laboratory and field approaches, consider our own work on the factors that affect children’s long-term retention of a salient, personally-experienced event: a visit to the

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Chapter I

doctor for a regular, well-child physical examination (Baker-Ward, Gordon, Ornstein, Larus, & Clubb, in press; Gordon, Ornstein, Clubb, Nida, & BakerWard, 1991; Gordon, Ornstein, Nida, Follmer, Crenshaw, & Albert, in press; Ornstein, Gordon & Baker-Ward, in press; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Thus, memory for the features of an actual pediatric check-up is considered, although the follow-up memory interviews are typically conducted in the laboratory. Control and specificity. Our studies of a salient real-world experience would clearly appear to be field-based. In contrast, the concern with control in these studies is very consistent with that observed in laboratory investigations. Subjects are assigned to conditions that represent different levels of the variables of interest, such as the delay between the physical examination and the final interview, and the techniques used for probing memory. It should be noted, however, that we are typically unable to control aspects of the subject's experience during the delay interval and at the time of the follow-up interview, although we do attempt to document children's intervening experiences. Thus, this research program would be placed somewhere around the middle of the dimension of control. Similarly, although we specify the features of the to-be-remembered event for each child, we are dependent upon the completion of check-lists by parents and medical professionals for this information, and acknowledge that this procedure may be subject to some degree of error. Accordingly, this research would once again be placed at some hypothetical mid-point on the continuum of event specification. Meaningfulness of the task. With regard to the extent to which remembering has meaning as a functional, goal-directed activity, our research on children's memory for pediatric examinations would seem to be within the laboratory tradition. The memory assessments take place after the check-up is completed and are thus quite unrelated to the goal of obtaining a physical examination. Nonetheless, the meaningfulness of the memory interview itself likely varies as a function of the age and experience of the children. Thus, the examiner's request to the subject to "help me find out what children your age remember about going to the doctor" may be interpreted differently by younger and older children. For example, when questioned on multiple occasions, younger children may not provide information that they have previously reported, because they assume that the adult examiner already knows the answer! In contrast, older children, because they have been to school,

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understand that adults sometimes ask questions to determine what children have learned. More generally, our older subjects may find our questions about the medical check-up more meaningful because they are more able to share the examiner's perspective about the nature of the interview (see Omstein, Larus, & Clubb, 1991). Supports for remembering. In our research on children's memory for visits to the doctor, we have deliberately varied the extent to which supports are provided for remembering. This variation occurs both within a single study, as we compare the effects of general versus specific probes on children's reports (Baker-Ward, Gordon, Ornstein, Larus, & Clubb, in press; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992), and across investigations, in our comparisons of alternative recall assessment techniques (Gordon, Ornstein, Nida, Follmer, Crenshaw, & Albert, in press). For example, in an on-going study, children are encouraged to act out their physical check-ups in a fully equipped examining room, a context that clearly provides a great deal of memory support. Performance in this setting will be compared with recall assessed in other investigations in which our standard verbal interview protocol was used. Hence, within this one line of inquiry, separate studies can be seen as varying with regard to the extent to which they provide supports for remembering. Knowledge and interest. With regard to the subject's knowledge of the to-be-remembered stimulus event, it seems likely that a visit to the pediatrician would be a quite familiar experience for our subjects, all of whom are established patients within the cooperating medical practices. Nonetheless, there are no doubt age differences in knowledge about the check-up and this variation in understanding is likely related to some aspects of remembering. Moreover, at any age level, the role of individual differences in knowledge about the event remains an important consideration for future research. Further, the extent to which the check-up is of interest to the children could vary markedly among the subjects. Whereas some of the children may enjoy "playing doctor," providing their stuffed animals with examinations, and may ask repeatedly to be read stories about visits to the doctor, others may find the experience aversive and may avoid contact with medical toys and props. In general, we find it difficult to discuss the degrees of knowledge and interest inherent in specific investigations, but rather suggest that these dimensions may be most profitably examined at the level of individual subjects. Incidental vs. deliberate remembering. In examining the type of

30

Chapter I

memory under investigation, the doctor studies consider both incidental and deliberate memory. The encoding of the initial to-be-remembered experience is almost always incidental, in that the children are told simply that they will talk later with the researcher about their examination. However, during the initial interview, the child is instructed to "try to remember," and thus deliberate recall is being tapped. Moreover, when children experience one or more delayed assessments of memory, their deliberate efforts to retain and reconstruct the event over time are of importance in interpreting subsequent performance. Is it laboratory or field-based research? Should the research on children's memory for visits to the doctor be considered laboratory or fieldbased? As discussed above, both, and neither! The investigations in this research program embody distinct characteristics that must be considered separately. In some cases, these attributes are most consistent with laboratorybased investigations, whereas in others, they represent naturalistic approaches. Further, within the same program of research, both specific investigations and individual subjects can be seen to vary in terms of their placement on the defining continua discussed above. As will be discussed below, the direct examination of such variation is of central importance for any systematic study of the development of memory in children. The importance of considering multiple settings The current cognitive zeitgeist emphasizes the competencies rather than the deficits of young children (Gelman, 1978; Flavell, 1992). A major contribution of the work on children's memory in everyday environments has been the documentation of the sometimes astounding capabilities of preschoolers in reporting the past. It is readily apparent that this emphasis on competence has significantly enhanced the understanding of young children's memory. Nonetheless, it is clearly the case that children's performance varies markedly from context to context (Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Ornstein, 1990; Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988). Young children may demonstrate skills in remembering or problem solving in some situations and with some materials, but not others, whereas older children perform competently in a wider range of settings. Moreover, the consequences of children's investment of effort in the service of goals of remembering may also vary considerably with both context

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31

and age. From this perspective, contextual variations in performance must be considered in any assessment of memory competence. Indeed, we suggest that the understanding of memory development can be most effectively advanced when researchers begin to chart the range of performance that can characterize memory development at particular levels. To do so, developmentalists must be willing to accept the differing depictions of the competence that emerge from well-executed investigations in a variety of settings. In our view, for example, preschoolers can simultaneously appear quite competent when asked to recall the names of nursery school classmates, and nonetheless demonstrate limited success when asked to remember a list of to-be-remembered objects (cf. BakerWard, Ornstein, & Holden, 1984; Bjorklund & Zeman, 1982). Similarly, the observation that young children can hold fast to their interpretations of past events despite their parents’ contradictions (Stein, Trabasso, & Liway, 1991) along with the demonstration that preschoolers are misled by an examiner’s forceful questions (Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, 1991) may reflect potentially important influences on performance. We argue that researchers’ efforts should be applied to identifying the reasons for discrepancies in young children’s performance in different contexts, rather than to debating the merits -- and even the validity! -- of findings obtained in different settings. As discussed above, the dichotomy between experimental and naturalistic research is a false one. Both laboratory and field settings vary with regard to the extent to which they embody identified supports for remembering. Accordingly, the laboratory is not a ’meaningless environment’; it is a specific context with particular attributes. Similarly, although many field settings contain important task supports, it cannot be assumed that a context provides young children with a meaningful, interesting memory task simply because it is not in a laboratory. No investigators, regardless of the zeal with which they advocate laboratory or field approaches, can be excused from the responsibility of identifying the important features of the context in which their subjects were observed. Given the perspective that the understanding of contextual variations in young children’s performance is an important task, research in a variety of settings is mandated. Because field settings are likely to provide high levels of many important task supports, assessments in naturalistic settings may be most appropriate for determining the upper bounds of children’s memory

32

Chapter 1

competence. Experimental studies in the laboratory, however, are required to make inferences about causal relations among relevant variables (Klatzky , 1991). It should be emphasized that the focus must not be on where the research takes place, but rather on what specific attributes are provided by the context in which remembering is observed. Further, in order to characterize the full range of mnemonic capability, it is important to incorporate 'field' and 'laboratory' methodologies within any one program of research. In this manner, researchers can begin to develop profiles of performance that characterize memory development at particular levels. The construction of such profiles can result in the specification of variables that are important influences on development. In closing, we are reminded of Endel Tulving's eloquent response to the debate between representatives of laboratory and field-based approaches. He pointed out that memory research in not a 'zero-sum game' as follows (1991, pp. 41-42): . . There need not be, and there usually is not, any conflict between these different approaches . . . So let us stop squabbling and go back to more creative work. Let us identify genuinely important problems, and let us not worry about whether someone labels them artificial or real. Let us work on these problems in whatever setting is most natural, using whatever methods are most appropriate. If we succeed, we will discover something that we find pleasing and worthwhile; if we succeed beyond our most daring hopes, that something will help to shape the future.'' 'I.

In our view, research in memory development must include studies in multiple contexts, including both everyday environments and laboratory settings.

Attention to the attributes of these contexts leads to "great

expectations" for advancing the understanding of cognitive development.

Acknowledgements. Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by grant MH 43904 from the United States Public Health Service.

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Commentary: On the Collection of Data John Morton MRC Cognitive Development Unit London, United Kingdom In their chapter, Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon can be seen as making a conciliatory offering to the debate stirred up by Banaji and Crowder (1989). In the latter paper, and in many of the commentaries on it, the discussion seemed to hinge on whether memory research being in the doldrums could be attributed to collecting data from a natural setting or to collecting data from a laboratory setting. My own view of the debate (Morton 1991) was that the whole discussion was ill-conceived. I agreed that memory research was not making much progress but assigned the responsibility not to excess of one methodology over another but rather to a lack of theoretical anchor to the accumulation of data. In discussing the development of memory in both laboratory and field environments, Baker-Ward et a1 fall into the same trap as many others have done with adult memory, being more concerned with the problem of getting better data than in the task of asking which data might be most productive to collect or why one might want to collect data anyway. What is odd about this is that the work on the development of memory has had a theoretical base for the last ten years or so. Nelson and her colleagues (e.g. Nelson & Gruendel, 1981, 1986) have introduced and developed the idea of general event representations, which, although it has its limitations (Morton 1990) has at least given focus and structure to a great deal of experimental work. Mandler (1988, 1990) has drawn contrasts between perceptual schema and conceptual processing and linked the developmental work to ideas current in adult cognition. However, Baker-Ward et a1 say nothing of general event representations, schemata, or, indeed, any other kind of representation. Their main concern seems to be with what they describe as the 'underperformance' of young children in particular environments and how to correct it, but they do not spend any time drawing inferences about the kinds of processing that might underlie the underperformance they describe. This volume is meant to be about memory in everyday life, and one of the advantages of thinking of memory in this context is that it encourages us to

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consider what our memory system has been designed for. One of the clues to the structure of our memory system would be its evolutionary history, and this perspective does at least encourage one to rule out of primary consideration the linguistic aspects of memory and, possibly, intentional recall. It seems safe to assume that such features are later additions to a much more primitive filing system (Mandler, 1990, on the other hand, seems quite happy to extend the notion of conscious recall and so, presumably, intention, to other species). From this point of view one would hypothesise that memory has the primary functions of enabling us to interpret the perceptual world and helping us to organise our responses to changes in that world. For both of these functions we have to accumulate experience in a memory system in such a way as to enable the productive access of that experience at the appropriate times. The memory we are interested in here, then, can be seen as the repository of experience. Of course, beyond a certain age, we are able to use our memories in different ways, both to store information and to retrieve it. Language is very important in this respect and one could say that much of socialisation and the whole of schooling are devoted to just such an extension of an evolutionary (relatively) straightforward system. Within the view I am framing, general event representations are the basic stuff of memory. However, within this view, memory records are there first of all to be used in the service of the individual in the appropriate situations and not to be interrogated for their own sake. Experiments that capitalise on this are more likely to be productive. Baker-Ward et a1 have spotted this in other people's work as well as in their own and they say "even young children are capable of strategic activities in the service of memory goals". They report their own earlier experiment (Baker-Ward, Ornstein & Holden, 1984) and found that four year old memories for a set of toy objects was rather poor, whilst the spontaneous recall of a number of classmates who were waiting to do the task was, in contrast, impressive. They summarise other work that "indicates that performance can be quite good when remembering is embedded in the real world activities that are of meaning and relevance to children". Such descriptions have theoretical undertones that, alas, the authors never cash. In a similar vein, we read "many explorations of everyday memory test children's memory for 'stimulus' events that are somewhat limited by their unusual and salient ... nature They then question the degree to which findings in such settings can be generalised to children's memory for "more .I'

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mundane occurrences". But such a concern is at the heart of the work by Nelson, Fivush, Goodman and others. For example, Farrar & Goodman (1990) make a clear distinction between schema confirmation and schema deployment. In the first case, the child finds or builds an appropriate schema and then looks for confirming evidence. Recall, which depends on attention, would thus be restricted to the mundane. With complex events , Farrar & Goodman found that three re5eMions were insufficient to allow a 4-year-old child to get past this stage, whereas a 7-year-old child was able to move on to schema deployment, when attention can be directed to new and unusual information which can later be retrieved. The theory may have some problems. Fivush and Hammond (1990) showed that at 2 years, 6 months, children only recall mundane and scriptlike aspects of new and unusual events. This is in line with Farrar and Goodman and might lead one to suppose that only the mundane information had been registered. However, when these children were 4 years old, they were asked to recall the same events. They then tended to recall distinctive aspects of the events that they had not recalled at the earlier age. There is an issue as to whether this is due to increasing facility with language, a more accomplished retrieval mechanism or differences in the way the children were questioned at the two ages. However, it is possible to address these questions within the theoretical framework that Farrar and Goodman use, rather than retreating to an empiricist position. The other, associated, obsession in Baker-Ward et a1 is a psychometric one. They refer to the "underestimation of pre-schoolers' mnemonic competence" and comment that we have to "manipulate the variables thought to be causally related to skill". While it is arguable that, while talking about school work, a generalised notion such as "mnemonic skill" might be a useful one, it is not at all clear to me that such a concept is useful in relation to preschoolers. The qualitative aspects of memory rather than the quantitative ones seem to be of more interest when considering early development. Where Baker-Ward et a1 conclude "It thus follows that the strongest impressions for early mnemonic prowess stem from explorations of performance in socially structured situations", other workers in the area take this as a starting point for exploring the child's memory system. Baker-Ward et al further note that prior knowledge of a particular domain greatly influences the encoding and retention of information drawn from that domain. They even note that the influence of prior knowledge can override the ubiquitous age differences in memory. But

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they do not consider the extent to which these age differences are simply due to accumulated knowledge. Nor do they consider what knowledge is. It is, of course, the accumulation of memories in a structured format. The theory of the accumulation of knowledge must be inextricably related to the theory of memory. When we begin to understand what memory is for, we will begin to understand how it works, and, especially, how it developes.

References Baker-Ward, L. Ornstein, P.A., & Holden, D.J. (1984) The expression of memorisation in early childhood. Journal of ExDerimental Child PSVC~OIOEV, 37, 555-575. Banaji, M. R., & Crowder, R. G. (1989) The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist 44, 1185-1 193. Farrar, M. J., & Goodman, G. S. (1990) Developmental differences in the relation between scripts and episodic memory: Do they exist? In R. Fivush, & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remembering in voung children (pp. 30 - 64).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fivush, R. & Hammond, N. R. (1990 Autobiographical memory across the preschool years: toward reconceptualizing childhood amnesia. In R. Fivush & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remembering in young children (pp. 223-248). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mandler, J. M. (1988) How to build a baby: On the development of an accessible representational system. Cognitive Development, 3, 113-136. Mandler, J. M . (1990) Recall and its verbal expression. In R. Fivush & J. A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remembering in voung children (pp. 317 - 330). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Morton, J. (1990). The development of event memory. The Psvchologist, 3, 3-10. Morton, J. (1991) The bankruptcy of everyday thinking. Psychologist,46, 32-33.

American

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Nelson, K., & Gruendel, J. (1981) General event representations: Basic building blocks of cognitive development. In Advances in developmental psvchology, Vol. 1 (pp 21-46). Academic Press: New York. Nelson, K., & Gruendel, J. (1986) Children’s scripts. In K. Nelson (Ed.), Event knowledge: Structure and function in development (pp 21-46). Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.

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Commentary: Memory and Meaning in The Laboratory and the Field Robyn Fivush Emory University, U.S. A. Over the decades, there has been continuing controversy over the best way to study memory. Should we study memory in the laboratory, where we can exert tight control over all the factors that we think may influence how and what people remember, or should we study memory in the field, where we can explore the rich variety and texture of memory for real events? This dilemma has plagued psychologists from the very beginning of the scientific study of human memory (e.g., Ebbinghaus. 1885/1964 vs Bartlett, 1932) and continues to be hotly contested today (e.g., Banaji & Crowder, 1989, vs Neisser, 1982). It is a particularly thorny question in relation to young children's memory, because so much recent research has demonstrated that young children, who often show poor memory skills in the laboratory, show remarkably good memory skills in the field. Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon argue that the dichotomy between the laboratory and the field may be a false one; rather than focusing on where research takes place, we need to focus on how the research setting and the child's own developing memory skills interact to produce memory performance. I agree with this reconceptualization wholeheartedly. A full description of the specific ways in which memory tasks and materials interact with children's developing memory skills is an essential part of our understanding of memory development. However, I also believe that many of the controversies about memory development research discussed by Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon reflect different underlying beliefs about what memory is and how it develops. It is not simply a question of whether research should be conducted in the laboratory or the field; it is a matter of defining the important questions to ask about memory development. In particular, we need to consider how "meaning" is conceptualized. Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon discuss both the meaningfulness of the material to be remembered, as well as the meaningfulness of the task situation as important factors influencing children's memory performance. I would like to extend their arguments, and discuss the central role of the child's "effort after meaning" (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) as a critical

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component of memory development. As Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon point out, laboratory studies often allow more precise control than field studies. The classic laboratory study of memory presents children of different ages with some material (e.g., a list of words, a set of pictures, a play activity) and then asks children to recall that information after a specified period of delay (e.g., five minutes, an hour, a day, a week) under a specified set of recall conditions (e.g. , free recall, cued recall, recognition). In this way, the researcher can state exactly what children of different ages are able to remember after a specified period of time under a specific set of retrieval cues. This sounds great; a clean, scientific study of memory development. But this must seem a very strange situation indeed to young children. Who is this person asking them to recall information and why is she asking this? Many researchers present the task as a "memory game," but it is not at all clear that young children understand or accept the "game" of remembering. When children do not perform well in these kinds of laboratory situations, is it because they have poor memory skills or are they simply not interested in the task? If we want to understand memory development then we need to assess memory skills in situations that are meaningful for young children; as Margaret Donaldson (1978) has so eloquently argued, young children must be assessed in situations that make "human sense." Notice that this is not a criticism of laboratory studies per se. It is a question of the way in which the situation is structured so that it makes sense to young children, so that they are engaged and interested and willing to participate, and certainly this can happen in a laboratory. For example, much of Nelson's seminal research (see Nelson, 1986, for a review) on developing event representations was conducted in a laboratory setting. In the initial studies, children of various ages were asked to report what happens during routine and familiar events such as going grocery shopping or going to a birthday party. Using this methodology, children are free to select what information to recall and how to organize their account. The guiding assumption of this research is that children are trying to make sense out of their everyday world. The way in which routine events are structured provides a meaningful organizational framework for young children. And, indeed, children as young as 3 years of age give generalized, well-organized accounts in this situation. Similarly, in some of my research on children's memories for unique personal experiences, such as an airplane trip or an outing to the circus,

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even children of 2 years 6 months are able to give accurate and somewhat organized recounts (Fivush, Gray & Fromhoff, 1987; Fivush & Hamond, 1990). So when young children are asked to recall meaningful events and are allowed to organize their accounts in ways that make sense to them, we see sometimes remarkable memory skills. Recent studies of memory that have examined how children are constructing meaning out of their everyday experiences have clearly demonstrated early memory competency. But more important, they have changed the focus of memory development research from examining what memory is to examining what memory is for (Bruce, 1985; Fivush, 1988; Nelson, 1989). Traditional laboratory studies of memory development were based on the assumption that memory relies on a basic capacity and set of skills that develop with increasing age and experience, and that children's memory abilities could be assessed in a more or less straightforward manner by asking children to remember things. In contrast, these more recent studies of memory have highlighted the need to think of memory as a set of skills and processes which are brought to bear on problems and goals faced in ongoing meaningful activity. That is, it very much matters why the child is remembering. In discussing the advantages and limitations of laboratory versus field-based studies, Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon discuss the extent to which the memory task is meaningful as an important factor influencing children's memory performance. But meaningfulness of task is not simply one factor among others that might affect some presumed underlying memory capability. We don't "have" memory -- we use memory to accomplish things in the real world. The emphasis is on a functional analysis of memory development. What is memory being used for in different situations and at different ages? In thinking about the finding that very young children have well-organized memories of familiar events, Nelson (1986) has argued that this kind of memory is used for anticipating and predicting the future. It is easy to see how this would be a useful and important function for a very young child. In fact, even when recalling unique experiences, 2- and 3-year old children tend to recount them in terms of their similarity to more familiar events (Fivush & Hamond, 1990). As children get older and build up a larger base of experience, they begin to become more interested in how certain events are different; now difference is more informative than is similarity (Hudson, 1986). This analysis suggests that part of memory development is due to

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developmentally changing needs for prediction and control over ones' environment. Still, how meaningful the situation is for the young child cannot completely account for preschoolers' poor performance. As Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon point out, even in situations where they seem quite motivated and show evidence of using deliberate memory strategies, preschoolers often do not perform as well as older children. So part of memory development must also be the honing of skills through practice. But why are certain memory skills learned and practiced? How are we to understand the developmental course of specific memory skills? In traditional laboratory experiments, memory is assumed to be a characteristic of the individual; the child either has the memory capacity or she does not, she either uses a particular memory strategy or she does not. But recent research suggests that we need to view memory more as cultural and social practice (see especially Rogoff, 1990, for a discussion of this issue). The way in which memory is used to accomplish goals is of central interest, and the situations in which it is deemed appropriate to use particular memory skills are culturally determined and socially communicated. For example, the development of memory strategies is related to formal schooling (e.g., Kail, 1990; Stevenson, 1982). The very fact that children are in a formal classroom situation is culturally determined, and the skills that are necessary to succeed in such a situation are directly encouraged. Among these skills is the ability to recall information on demand. Children who are "good rememberers" do well in school, and this is an important culturally communicated value. The situations in which children participate promote particular memory skills which are necessary for accomplishing culturally defined goals. Moreover, children do not develop memory skills (or any other skills for that matter) in social isolation. Children are embedded in a social world from the moment of birth and the kinds of social interactions in which they engage are critical for their development. And the way in which memory is used and develops is an outcome of ongoing meaningful social interaction (Vygotsky , 1978; Wertsch, 1985). Again let's take strategies as an example. What happens when the child loses a favorite toy? Most likely, the mother asks where the child played with it last, thus implicitly teaching her child something about search strategies -- look for a lost object the last place you recall seeing it. In fact, Ratner (1984) has shown that mothers who place more of these

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kinds of memory demands on their preschool children facilitate the development of deliberate memory skills. Similarly, in our own research, we have been examining the way in which mothers structure conversations about past events with their preschool children. Those mothers who talk more about the past, and talk about the past in more narratively elaborated ways early in development have children who are able to give more coherently organized accounts of their own past experiences later in development (Fivush, 1991; see also McCabe & Peterson, 1991). These kinds of findings point to the necessity of thinking about memory development in a social context. It is not a simple case of children passively receiving information about memory skills from adults; it is a matter of the way in which the child and adult jointly produce memory performances together. By participating in particular kinds of interactions, children are learning what adults consider to be important and valuable memory goals, and at the same time, children are actively constructing ways of accomplishing these goals. Of course, the ways in which children are able to accomplish these goals also depends on the child’s growing cognitive competencies, as discussed by Baker-Ward, Ornstein and Gordon. But cognitive development is heavily structured by the social environment. Moreover, much of our everyday use of memory is for the express purpose of engaging in social interaction. Everyday conversations abound with stories of our past (see, e.g., Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra & Mintz, 1990). When we meet somebody new, we immediately begin to exchange information about who we are by talking about our past experiences. When we see old friends, we reminisce about old times together as well as filling in the gaps by recounting what has happened to us more recently. Even with people we see everyday, we are constantly talking about what happened -- think about the average family dinnertime conversation, in which each member of the family recounts what they did during the day. Interestingly, these kinds of personal narratives are among the very first memory skills that children learn; children begin engaging in conversations about past events virtually as soon as they begin talking (Engel, 1986; Hudson, 1990). In thinking about what memory is for, then, we need to consider memory as a social activity, as well as memory as a cognitive activity. What have we learned from recent studies of memory focusing on the child’s effort after meaning? Certainly we have learned that preschool children

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are far more competent than traditional laboratory studies of memory had indicated. But much more important than this, we have begun to think of memory in a fundamentally different way. Memory may not be best conceptualized as an internal capacity of the individual that increases with age and experience. Rather, memory is complexly intertwined with engaging in activities and accomplishing goals in meaningful social interactions. Understanding memory development involves understanding the kinds of social interactions that children are involved in and the ways in which memory is brought to bear in these interactions. Most important, we need to consider what memory is being used for, and how the functions of memory may change both across situations and across age.

References Banaji, M.R., & Crowder, R.G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American psychologist, 44, 1185-1193. Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A studv in experimental and social psychology. New York: Cambridge. Bruce, D. (1985). The how and why of ecological memory. Experimental Psychology, 114,78-90.

Journal of

Donaldson, M. (1978). Children’s minds. Glasgow: Collins. Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1964). Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology. New York: Dover. Engel, S . (1986, April). The role of mother-child interaction in autobiographical recall. In J: A. Hudson (Chair), Learning to talk about the past. Symposium conducted at the Southeastern Conference on Human Development, Nashville. Fivush, R. (1988). The functions of event memory. In U. Neisser & E. Winograd (Eds.), Remembering reconsidered: Ecological and traditional approaches to the study of memory (pp. 277-283). New York: Cambridge University Press. Fivush, R. (1991). The social construction of personal narratives. Merrill-Palmer Ouarterly, 32,59-82.

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Fivush, R., Gray, J.T., & Fromhoff, F.A. (1987). Two year olds’ talk about the past. Cognitive Development, 2, 393-409. Fivush, R., & Hamond, N. (1990). Autobiographical memory across the preschool years: Toward reconceptualizing childhood amnesia. In R. Fivush & J.A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remembering in vounp children (pp. 223-248). New York: Cambridge University Press. Hudson, J. A. (1986). Memories are made of this: General event knowledge and the development of autobiographic memory. In K. Nelson (Ed.), Event knowledge: Structure and function in develoDment, (pp. 97-1 18). Hillsdale, NJ.: Erlbaum. Hudson, J. (1990). The emergence of autobiographic memory. In R. Fivush & J.A. Hudson (Eds.), Knowing and remembering in young children (pp. 166-197). New York: Cambridge University Press. Kail, R. (1990). The development of memory in children. Freeman.

New York:

McCabe, A., & Peterson, C. (1991). Getting the story: A longitudinal study of parental styles in eliciting narratives and developing narrative skill. In A. McCabe & C. Peterson (Eds.), Developing narrative structure (pp. 217-253). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum . Miller, P. J., Potts, R., Fung, H., Hoogstra, L., & Mintz, J. (1990). Narrative practices and the social construction of self in childhood. American Ethnologist, 17,292-3 11 . Neisser, U. (1982). Memory observed: Memory in natural contexts. Fransisco: Freeman.

San

Nelson, K. (1 989). Remembering: A functional developmental perspective. In P.R. Solomon, G.R. Goethals, C.M. Kelley, & B.R. Stephens (Eds.), Memory: Interdisciplinary approaches. New York: Springer-Verlag. Nelson, K. (1986). Event knowledge: Structures and function in development. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ratner, H. H. (1984). Memory demands and the development of young children’s memory. Child Development, 55, 2173-2191. Rogoff, B. (1990). Apprenticeship in thinking. NY: Oxford University Press.

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Stevenson, H.W. (1982). Influences of schooling on cognitive development. In D. A Wagner & H.W. Stevenson (Eds.), Cultural perspectives on child development (pp. 208-224). San Francisco: Freeman. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wertsch, J. (1985). Vvgotsky and the social formation of mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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Rejoinder: Meaning, Data, and the Diagnosis of Cognitive Competence

Lynne Baker-Ward North Carolina State University, U.S.A. and Peter A . Omstein and Betty N. Gordon University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, U.S.A. The commentaries on our chapter pose important questions that transcend the laboratory-field debate. Indeed, as they direct our attention to the functions of memory and the nature of underlying representations in memory, Fivush and Morton focus on fundamental issues that must be dealt with in any complete account of cognitive development. Their characterizations of our contextspecificity view of memory, however, prompt a number of comments. Fivush argues cogently that people do not just have memory, but rather that they use memory to accomplish things in the world. Moreover, their success in doing so depends in great part upon their perception of the task or setting as a meaningful one. Given the importance of this 'effort after meaning' Fivush feels that the meaningfulness of the task must be view as more than just one of several aspects of the mnemonic context. It is difficult to disagree with this conceptualization, and with the related perspective on the socialization of skill in remembering. Nonetheless, we must interject a caveat: If memory is approached primarily in terms of the child's making sense of the world, we run the risk of overlooking one of the most critical of developmental acquisitions, namely, the emerging capability to behave intentionally and effectively in a wide range of setting. Indeed, one of the major accomplishments of the elementary school years is the ability to deploy skilfully a broad arsenal of mnemonic techniques in many different contexts, some of which would appear to be quite lacking in meaning. Morton also addresses the issue of uses of memory and, in so doing, focuses on memory as "the repository of experience." From this vantage point, he takes general event representations to be the "basic stuff of memory." One can appreciate Morton's interest in this "basic stuff" (we prefer the term 'prior knowledge'!) because, as we have said, there can be no doubt that what is already known has tremendous implications for perception, response, and,

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indeed, for what can be known. And one can applaud Morton's call for research on memory and cognitive development to be guided by theory. Nonetheless, we are less sanguine than he that the concept of the general event representation can serve effectively as the theoretical base for the study of memory development. Although research on scripts has had profound importance for our conceptualization of young children's understanding (we agree with Fivush's characterization of Nelson's work as seminal), it is important to remember that the general event representation is only one of a number of ways of characterizing knowledge that is stored in memory. Moreover, insights regarding the nature of the storage system, however it is to be construed, do not in any way provide us with an account of how knowledge is used by the child in the service of remembering (or any other goal, for that matter), either deliberately or automatically. And this returns us to the issue of context specificity, because the child's ability to make use of the "basic stuff" will vary from setting to setting. This observation of variability across contexts - which, we submit, must be the building block of any theory of memory development - brings us face to face with what Morton views as our obsession with data. The point is not one of gathering "better data" or of explaining the underperformance of young children in some situations, as Morton incorrectly asserts. Rather, the issue is one of "cognitive diagnosis" (see Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Naus, 1988; Folds, Footo, Guttentag, & Ornstein, 1990) and the observations that are necessary to adequately characterize children's changing abilities. Indeed, given the variability in memory performance across contexts, a child's underlying competence can only be estimated by a profile of performance measures obtained in different settings. And analyses of developmental change require attention to age-related differences in these profiles of performance. From this point of view, variability in children's memory performance can neither be dismissed as unimportant nor regarded as measurement error. Moreover, because or its centrality, a systematic delineation of the factors associated with variability in children's performance becomes essential for cognitive diagnosis and for the identification of the social and cognitive variables for affect memory development. Thus, an examination of the full range of children's memory performance in a wide variety of settings is simply necessary for any understanding of the development of memory. And understanding development is a magnificent obsession.

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References Folds, T.H., Footo, M., Guttentag, R.E., & Ornstein, P.A. (1990). When children mean to remember: Issues of context specificity,, strategy effectiveness, and intentionality in the development of memory. In D.F. Bjorklund (Ed.), Children’s strategies (pp 67-91). Hillsdale, NJ: Er lbaum . Ornstein, P. A., Baker-Ward, L., & Naus, M. J. (1988). The development of mnemonic skill. In F. E. Weinert & M. Perlmutter (Eds.), Memory development: Universal changes and individual differences (pp. 3 1-50). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaurn.

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Memory in Everyday Life G.M.Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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CHAF'TER 2 THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN LEARNING TO READ, WRITE AND SPELL: A REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH Rhona S. Johnston University of St. Andrews, United Kingdom Over the last hundred years, a high proportion of the population of western societies has become literate (Cipolla, 1969), the ability to read, write and spell being a fundamental goal of education. However, not all individuals become literate with equal ease, and there are often heated debates about how these skills should be learnt. The purpose of this chapter is to review studies which examine the memory skills underlying learning to read, write and spell. In the case of reading, much of the work is at a theoretical level, and has little direct application in the classroom at present. The study of spelling and writing, however, has been much more educationally orientated but lacks an overall theoretical framework.

Reading Short-Term Memory, Verbal Rehearsal, and Naming Speed Measures Much of the research on the contribution of memory to the learning of reading has been on immediate or short-term memory, particularly the ability to recall information in serial order. It is necessary to review both models of immediate memory and studies of memory development in order to discuss the insights that have been gained into the importance of memory skills in reading. One of the most influential models of immediate memory has been the working memory model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), which was specifically devised to account for the function of memory in every day tasks such as reading. This model proposes a hypothetical system which processes and temporarily stores information while the individual carries out cognitive activities such as reading and arithmetic. It consists of an attentional central executive which has access to at least two slave subsystems, the articulatory loop and the visuospatial scratch-pad (Baddeley , 1983). The articulatory loop can account for a number of phenomena found in immediate memory. Adults

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(and older children) have been shown to be able to recall words of short spoken duration better than those of long duration. It has also been found that a linear relationship exists between the rate at which an individual articulates words and how many items they can remember (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975, Hulme, Thomson, Muir & Lawrence, 1984). This led to the proposal that the articulatory loop is time-based, articulation rate being taken to be a measure of the speed at which a subject can sub-vocally rehearse. The loop can also account for the phonological similarity effect, which is also found in adults and older children (Conrad, 1963, 1964, 1971), whereby words with non-rhyming names are recalled better than those with rhyming names. Current formulations of the working memory model account for this phenomenon in terms of the operation of a passive phonological store in the articulatory loop (Baddeley , 1983); auditory information has obligatory access to this store, where phonologically similar items become confused. Visual information, however, only gains access to this store via verbal rehearsal. Much of the research on the influence of memory on reading development has concentrated on children who fail to learn to read at the appropriate rate. However, a lot can be learned about the normal process from studies of reading failure; in addition, these studies necessarily include normal children as controls. It has been known for some time that many poor readers suffer from an impairment in serial order recall (Rugel, 1974). In many cases, the memory spans of poor readers have been shown to be appropriate for their reading ability (e.g. Johnston, Rugg & Scott, 1987), although more rarely impairments have been found even for reading age (Holligan & Johnston, 1988). Word recognition ability has also been shown to be correlated with memory span (Johnston, Rugg & Scott 1987a). It is important, therefore, to know what is the nature of this relationship. Shankweiler, Liberman, Mark, Fowler, and Fischer (1979) argued that poor readers’ problems could be explained in terms of a phonological coding deficit. Eight year old poor readers were given a serial order recall task where they had to remember lists of rhyming and non-rhyming letter names. They were found to show a reduced phonological similarity effect compared with their chronological age controls, which led Shankweiler et al. (1979) to argue that the poor readers had either poorer access to a phonetic code or access to a degraded phonetic representation. This lack of a phonological similarity effect

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has been replicated in some studies (Mann, Liberman & Shankweiler, 1980; Siegel & Linder, 1984), but other studies have found normal effects in poor readers (Hall, Wilson, Humphreys, Tinzmann & Bowyer, 1983; Johnston, 1982; Johnston, Rugg & Scott,1987). In order to resolve these contradictory findings, it has been suggested that this problem may only be found in younger poor readers, as Johnston’s (1982) youngest poor reader group was 9 years old, and Siegel and Linder (1984) found that although poor readers aged 7 to 8 showed no phonological similarity effect, those over the age of 8 did. However, there is evidence that the poor readers who did not show phonological similarity effects in these studies had found the task very difficult. The recall scores of the poor readers in the Shankweiler et al. (1979) and Siegel and Linder (1984) studies were around 30% to 40%, whereas the chronological age controls had considerably better recall. The poor readers, given their impaired memory spans, may simply have found that they could not rehearse the five or more items presented to them to remember. In order to test this idea, Holligan and Johnston (1988) gave 8 year old poor readers, and their reading age controls, an immediate memory task where the number of items to be recalled was considerably greater than their memory spans. In this situation, neither group showed a phonological similarity effect. However, when the task demands were appropriate for their memory spans, both groups showed better recall of non-rhyming than rhyming items. Comparable results have also been found in adults (Salame & Baddeley, 1986). There is further evidence which supports the idea that verbal rehearsal is essential for the phonological similarity effect to emerge. As far as adults are concerned, it has been shown that if verbal rehearsal is suppressed by concurrent articulation when presentation is visual, then a phonological similarity effect is not shown (Richardson, Greaves & Smith, 1980). Research on children confirms the importance of verbal rehearsal. Johnston and Conning (1990) showed that when pictures of objects with rhyming and non-rhyming names were presented to 5 year old children, they did not remember the nonrhyming items better, even though verbal recall was used. This is very likely to be due to the fact that young children rarely spontaneously rehearse (Flavell, Beach & Chinsky, 1966). However, when the children were instructed to rehearse verbally, the recall of the non-rhyming items was significantly better than that of the rhyming ones. This was found to be the case even when the children were simply asked to covertly name the items once to themselves as

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the pictures were presented. A similar pattern of results has also been found with the word length effect (Johnston, Johnson & Gray, 1987). It can be concluded, therefore, that poor readers fail to show phonological similarity effects in some studies because they are unable to rehearse the large number of items presented, rather than because they have a deep seated phonological coding deficit. However, the frequent observation of a verbal short-term memory deficit in poor readers still requires explanation. In order to gain any insight into this, it is necessary to know how the well documented increase in memory span with age comes about. Some models of memory development propose that the capacity of temporary memory increases with age (Pascual-Leone, 1970). However, other models hypothesise that it is due to either a) an increase with age in the speed with which incoming stimuli are verbally encoded (e.g. Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982; Dempster, 1981), or b) an increase in the speed with which the items can be articulated (Baddeley, 1986; Hulme et al., 1984; Hitch, Halliday & Littler, 1989). The former model proposes that with faster identification of the items the child has more of its limited memory capacity available for remembering the items. The articulation rate model, on the other hand, argues that with an increase in speed of articulation the child can rehearse more items and so has a better memory span. Case et al. (1982) found that identification times for auditorily presented words correlated well with memory span. They also found that when adults had their identification times reduced to the level of 6 year olds, their memory spans were equivalent to those of the children. However, other studies have not confirmed this relationship. Hitch et al. (1989), studying normal 8 and 11 year olds, found that articulation rate was an excellent predictor of memory span, whereas item identification time was not. Henry and Millar (1991) have also more recently shown that articulation rate is a better predictor of memory span than item identification time in children. Thus the issue of why memory span increases with age has not yet been resolved. However, there is a considerable body of evidence which suggests that poor readers have slow naming speeds. This is the case for words, single digits, letters and colours (Denkla & Rudel, 1974, 1976; Ehri & Wilce, 1983; Spring & Capps, 1974). This impairment may therefore be an important factor in the memory span deficit found in poor readers. However, studies in this area use a variety of techniques to measure naming speed, varying from item

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identification time to measuring the time it takes to name continuous lists of letters, digits, and so on. The list naming studies are generally more successful in finding a deficit in poor readers for their chronological age, but Stanovich, Feeman and Cunningham (1983) argue that item identification time is in fact the better measure of automaticity. However, Swanson (1989) has pointed out that studies using the item identification time measure have less retarded poor readers than the continuous list naming studies, which may account for the apparent difference in the efficacy of the measures. This led Bowers and Swanson (1991) to compare these two methods of measuring naming speed on the same sample of poor readers. They found that the poor readers did have slower identification times for individual digits and letters than their chronological age controls, being particularly impaired when there was a short inter-stimulus interval. However, measures of continuous list naming speed correlated quite well with item identification time (.a to .65), which they suggested indicates that a single speed of naming function underlies both measures. It should also be noted that Hitch et al. (1989) found that continuous list naming speed (or reading rate) resembled the articulation rate, rather than the item identification time, measure in terms of ability to predict memory span. This suggests support for Bower and Swanson’s (1991) argument that these various measures may be associated. It seems likely that the continuous list naming task measures both identification time and articulation rate, and that these factors need to be partialled out in order to gain a clearer understanding of why poor readers have impaired memory spans.

Long Term Memory Although there is persuasive evidence that poor readers suffer from a verbal short-term memory deficit, the fact that they have difficulty in retrieving semantic information suggests that they also have a long term memory problem. Furthermore, their slowness to learn to recognise words is also indicative of deficient long term learning. There is a small but coherent literature which has examined the memory codes used by good and poor readers when retrieving information over longer periods. These studies have used cued recall and recognition memory tasks, in which the children are not given prior warning of the recall task so that they are unlikely to use verbal rehearsal consciously. Mann et al. (1977) found that

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normal readers were more likely than poor readers to falsely identify rhyming distractor words as having been presented earlier. This finding was replicated by Byrne and Shea (1979), who also found that their poor readers made more false positives to semantic distractors. Olson, Davidson, Kliegl, and Davies (1984) were only able to find this lack of sensitivity to rhyme in 8 year olds, but Rack’s (1985) group of 12 year old poor readers was found to choose more orthographically similar foils in a cued recall task, whereas their reading age controls picked more rhyming foils. Holligan and Johnston (1988) showed a similar pattern of results with a group of 8 year old poor readers using a recognition memory task. This group was of particular interest because they were also found to have an unusually severe short-term memory deficit, being impaired even for their reading age. Does deficient short-term memory in poor readers have implications for how well information is laid down in long term memory? It is generally held that this is unlikely to be the case because Craik and Watkins (1973) showed with adults that there was no relationship between the time a familiar item was held in short-term memory and the efficiency of long term learning. However, the learning of unfamiliar items may benefit from greater retention in short-term memory. Mechanic (1964) found that the more nonwords were rehearsed the better they were retained. Furthermore, Baddeley, Papagno, and Vallar (1988) showed that in P.V., an adult with a very pure short-term memory deficit, long term learning was severely impaired when she had to associate an unfamiliar word with a familiar one. Although the studies of recognition memory in poor readers described above used familiar words, it is evident that these items are not as well established in children’s long term memory as they are in adults’. One indication of this is that children take longer to start to say the names of words than adults, indicating less automaticity in retrieving names from long term storage (Case et al., 1982). It may be conjectured, therefore, that the inability of Holligan and Johnston’s (1988) poor readers to store and use phonological information about words in a recognition memory task was closely related to their short-term memory deficit. Evidence supporting this view comes from a study by Gathercole and Baddeley (1990), in which it was found that children with delayed vocabulary development (i.e. long term learning of words) also showed a phonological short-term memory deficit.

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Spelling Short-Term Memory There has been very little interest in studying the influence of immediate memory on spelling in the way that reading has been studied. However, it could be argued that much of the above discussion of the relationship between reading and memory span relates also to spelling. Groups of poor readers tend to have spelling problems (Naidoo, 1972), such that although a group may have been matched to its controls on reading age, a close match with spelling age may also be found (Holligan & Johnston, 1991). However, the relationship is not necessarily a perfect one, and Frith (1980) was able to study a group of good readers with impaired spelling. Current models of spelling development propose that initially spelling is phonetic and only later does the skill become visual (Henderson & Templeton, 1986; Morris & Perney, 1984). It has been shown that early on a child’s spelling is pre-phonetic, there being a limited understanding of the fact that letters represent sounds, e.g.’wh’ for ’wake’. Spelling then becomes phonetic, the child being able to sound its way through the word, representing each sound with a grapheme, e.g. ’wak’ for ’wake’. In the transitional stage, the child shows knowledge of English spelling rules, e.g. ’wacke’ for ‘wake’. Ultimately, the mature speller is thought to spell visually, being able to tell whether a spelling ’looks right’. Frith (1985) has proposed that spelling actually involves a phonological element earlier than reading and that it is the pacemaker for the development of a phonological strategy in reading. However, she suggests that orthographic knowledge is first used in reading, and is only used in spelling as it becomes more precise. This would explain why spelling skills seem to lag behind reading for some individuals, and why spelling problems can often be more difficult to remediate than reading disorders. The early phonetic stage of spelling development seems likely to involve a large immediate memory component. The child hears the word or says the word over to itself, segments the word into phonemes, and then represents these sounds with graphemes. It is regrettable therefore that so little attention has been paid to the use of immediate memory at this stage, the emphasis having been placed instead on analysis of the child’s errors rather than the memory processes underlying those errors.

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Long Term Memory Most of the literature concerning the relationship between spelling and memory is concerned with instruction, that is, with how to teach spelling to normal school children and poor spellers. Traditionally, children have been given long lists of words to learn, being either left to their own devices, or being given exercises such as writing the words in sentences. Often little attempt is made to pre-test the children in order to determine which words they have difficulty with, or to determine whether they have problems with particular orthographic structures. Children with spelling disorders may fare better, being taught orthographic spelling patterns in phonic reading schemes. A number of fashionable literacy schemes eschew the formal teaching of spelling altogether, in the belief that children do not need explicit tuition in order to learn to spell (see Adams, 1990, for a comprehensive review of the debate over how reading and spelling should be taught). Advocates of the whole language approach to literacy development (e.g. Norris, 1989) point to the research showing that spelling develops through stages and argue that the child should merely be assisted through these stages rather being taught spelling. Instruction is seen as being discovery based, the teacher aiming to refine the child’s spelling rather than insisting on it being accurate (Goodman, 1986; Smith, 1982). At the more extreme end of this viewpoint, Gentry (1981) proposes that children should be encouraged to invent the spelling of words they do not know, and James (1986) advocates that children should not be given unsolicited assistance with spelling. Such approaches have yet to be shown to be an effective way of developing spelling skill. Furthermore, there is evidence that exposing adults to the spelling of pseudowords through reading for meaning does not lead to accurate memory for the spelling of those items (Ormrod, 1986), suggesting that even those who have good orthographic skills do not learn how to spell new items without deliberate effort. The idea that spelling development emerges according to stages that unfold naturally, without the need for direct tuition, relies on a rather epigenetic, Piagetian view of development. It is ironic that the advocates of whole language learning follow this view of development so slavishly, when there is such a heated debate about whether there are stages in cognitive development, and when there is evidence that Piaget consistently underestimated the skills of the young child (Donaldson, 1978). The only rapprochement that

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the whole language school has with current theorising about cognitive development is that both believe that children perform abstract tasks better when they are embedded within a meaningful context. However, spelling can be taught explicitly as a meaningful part of learning to read and write without the child having to learn lists of words of little immediate use. Other research is more directly concerned with understanding the memory processes involved in learning how to spell and using this knowledge to inform instructional methods. Brown (1988) argues that in current models of spelling memory (e.g. Ehri, 1980; Morton, 1980) it is assumed that there is one orthographic representation of each word against which a spelling can be checked, and that this representation can be modified by experience. Brown (1988), however, proposes an alternative model in which he hypothesises that adults have a store of multiple orthographic representations for difficult or commonly misspelt words. His research suggests that the correct spellings are represented more strongly in memory, but that exposure to the misspelt words can increase the strength of the incorrect representations for these items. It is certainly the case that many teachers can attest to the fact that their spelling knowledge has been disrupted by exposure to poor spelling. Children’s learning may be more easily disrupted as they do not have such strongly established orthographic representations. In support of this view, Drake and Ehri (1984) have shown that exposing a group of normal 9 year olds to both the phonetic and correct spellings of words led them to learn the words less well than a group of children shown only the correct spelling. How then may the learning of spelling be enhanced? One area of research has concentrated on how many items children, particularly those with literacy problems, should be required to learn each day. Bryant, Drabin and Gettinger (1981) showed that learning disabled children found short lists of words given to them every day easier to learn for a weekly test than a long list given at the beginning of the week. This is likely to overcome interference effects and fatigue in such children, but, as Brown (1990) argues, there are a number of potential confounds. With this sort of practice, the delay between the practice and the testing of most of the lists is shorter, and it is not clear whether it is the shorter length of the word list or the distribution of the practice over several days which is facilitating learning. There is evidence that the acquisition of spelling in the learning disabled is facilitated by immediate feedback (Ollendick, Matson, Esveldt-Dawson &

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Shapiro, 1980). In traditional spelling tests there can be a considerable delay between the child making an error and being shown the correct spelling of the word, which may lead to the wrong spelling being established in memory. It seems likely that the unskilled speller will have relatively few words strongly represented in long term memory, and will therefore be more susceptible to having their spelling disrupted by exposure to incorrect spelling, and to suffer if there is a delay in receiving feedback. Some children’s misspellings are so consistent (e.g. ’siad’ for ’said’) that it seems likely that they have stored the wrong orthographic representations for some words, such that neither experience with the correct spelling through reading, nor the efforts of the teacher, can erase them. Other research has evaluated the efficacy of the various methods used for teaching spelling. Although there is evidence that in the early stages children attempt to spell unfamiliar words phonetically, there is no reason to believe that for normal children this is because they lack the visual skills which underpin skilled spelling. They may spell phonetically because they lack repeated exposure to a wide range of words and orthographic structures. If this is the case, then teaching spelling visually should be effective. Sears and Johnson (1986) trained 9 to 11 year olds to spell words using visual imagery, computer, auditory or kinaesthetic methods. They found significantly better retention of spelling with all except the auditory method, which was the only condition which did not include a visual element. Children with spelling problems, however, may find orthographic spelling patterns particularly difficult to learn, and may therefore over-rely on phonetic spelling (Bruce & Cox, 1983, Holligan & Johnston, 1991). Seymour and Bunce (in press) showed that poor spellers, regardless of the nature of their disorder, benefited from a structured remedial approach which aimed to develop the acquisition of orthographic knowledge. It was also found that the intervention benefited both spelling and reading, regardless of which skill was emphasised in the teaching programme. Fernald (1943) advocated a multisensory method of teaching spelling to children with literacy problems, which involved the child tracing the word and saying it at the same time, and then attempting to spell it from memory. This involves visual, auditory and kinaesthetic experience with words. Gillingham and Stillman (1956) had a similar approach which was more phonics based. Hulme (1981) undertook an in-depth examination of the cognitive mechanisms underlying the efficacy of these techniques. He showed that the tracing of

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visually presented letter strings enhanced recall in poor readers, and that the tracing of abstract visual forms enhanced recall in both children and adults. Hulme suggested that these beneficial effects arose from the operation of a motor memory system, information from which could be stored with the word’s visual appearance. In devising models of spelling memory, we should consider the possibility that visual, kinaesthetic, and phonological information may be jointly represented at some level, and that these interconnections might be enhanced by well-targeted tuition.

Writing The study of writing skills has undergone a renewal of interest over the last few years. Rather than emphasising the child’s ability to read and spell accurately, and to use correct grammar and punctuation, this new area of research has started to try to understand the cognitive processes which underlie the ability to produce coherent written stories. Juel (1988) carried out a longitudinal study where she followed the development of 54 children from the age of around six to nine years. She concluded that word recognition ability underpinned the development of writing skills. Poor readers were found to be very likely to become poor writers, these children at best writing descriptions rather than proper stories. Thus by fourth grade; 17 of the 25 poor readers were poor writers, but only 4 of the 29 good readers were poor writers. This was due in part to being handicapped by poor spelling ability in the early grades, but this was less of a factor by the end of the study. At this later stage, the poor writers were more likely to be held back by a paucity of ideas rather than spelling problems. She argues that this lack of ideas for stories, and the inability to go beyond description to develop stories containing characterisation and episodes, may well come from lack of reading experience. She found that the poor readers in her study were not only exposed to a smaller print vocabulary at school, they also read much less outside school than the good readers, so that they had little exposure to the conventions of story writing. Thus she observed that there was a vicious cycle operating, the child with poor word recognition skills becoming progressively disadvantaged in other areas of literacy development. Lqulch and Jones (1989) have comprehensively reviewed a number of studies concerned with devising effective training programmes to improve poor

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readers’ writing skills. Unfortunately these studies have chronological age rather than reading age control designs and do little to address the issue of whether poor writers perform appropriately for their reading level. It is not clear, therefore, whether these children have a fundamental problem in generating and organising ideas, and in understanding how to structure stories, or whether their problems could largely be explained by lack of reading experience relative to chronological age controls. However, these training studies have shown that poor readers’ writing skills can be improved. Fortner (1986) found that poor readers could be assisted in developing more ideas, in showing greater thematic maturity, and in producing more syntactically complex sentences. Thus although the development of word recognition ability may be the normal route to the development of writing skills, as Juel (1988) proposes, children with problems in this area may also benefit from direct tuition in how to plan and develop written stories.

Conclusion It is evident that memory ability underpins all aspects of literacy development. However, studies of memory skills in reading, writing and spelling have been pursued relatively independently. In the area of reading, the focus has largely been on short-term memory deficits, with a much smaller literature being devoted to the long term memory problems of poor readers. Thus this area lacks conclusive evidence as to why poor readers fail to develop the long term learning of a large sight vocabulary. In complete contrast, very little research has looked at the function of short-term memory in spelling, despite the evidence that initially children spell phonetically by sequentially converting phonemes into graphemes. On the other hand, there is a large literature which examines the long term learning of spelling. However, most of this work is educationally orientated, and there is a need for more work specifically designed to test and refine models of spelling memory. The development of writing skills seems to be a particularly fertile area for further investigation by cognitive psychologists. A number of different approaches are being taken. Juel(1988), as described above, argues that reading and spelling skills are the basis from which children develop the ability to write coherent stories. However, other researchers emphasise the fact that in order

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to write well the child has to learn how to organise and categorise ideas, and to develop sufficient metacognitive skills so as to be able to monitor their work and to produce improvements in the structure of their text (Englert, Raphael, Anderson, Gregg & Anthony, 1989). At the moment, most cognitive research on literacy development looks at how children learn to read and spell individual words. This molecular approach fits well with methods of reading and spelling tuition such as phonics, where there is a concern about children developing better word recognition skills and learning to spell accurately. However, on the whole language theorists are more in sympathy with studies on the holistic and motivational aspects of learning to read, seeing reading for meaning as the fundamental skill. Their underlying philosophy is that children will learn to read if it is a meaningful and enjoyable activity, and that learning to read and spell individual words deprives them of that (Adams, 1990). It is undeniable that some children have no enjoyment of reading; Juel (1988) reports one of her subjects saying "I'd rather clean the mould round the bathtub than read." Advocates of the whole language approach might, however, be more in sympathy with the top down view of literacy development taken by researchers looking at the metacognitive skills used in writing. The gulf between these two educational viewpoints is a wide one at present. However, if future cognitive research followed Juel's (1988) approach, examining the importance of basic reading and spelling skills for being able to write coherent stories, and also investigating the metacognitive skills involved in planning and structuring story writing, then perhaps this rather bitter and unproductive dispute might be resolved. References Adams, M.J. (1990). Beeinnine to read: Thinking and learning about print. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Baddeley, A. D. (1983). Working memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, W ,311-324. Baddeley, A.D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G. A. Bower (Eds.) The Psychology of learning and motivation, Vo1.8 (pp.47-90).

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Baddeley, A.D., Papagno, C., & Vallar, G.(1988). When long-term learning depends on short-term storage. Journal of Memory and Language, 27, 586-595. Baddeley, A.D., Thornson, N., & Buchanan, M.(1975). Word length and the structure of short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14,575-589. Bowers, P.G., & Swanson, L.B. (1991). Naming speed deficits in reading disability: Multiple measures of a singular process. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 51, 195-219. Brown, A.S. (1988). Effects of misspellings on performance: Why wrong isn’t right. Journal of Educational Psychology, 2, 365-397. Brown, A.S. (1990). A review of recent research in spelling. Educational Tsychology Review, 2, 365-397. Bruce, J.A. & Cox, M.D. (1983). Metamemory and structure: Spelling. Educational Research Ouarterlv, 3, 38-43. Bryant, D.N., Drabin, I.R., & Gettinger, M. (1981). Effects of varying unit size on spelling achievement in learning disabled children. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 14,200-203. Byrne, B., & Shea, P. (1979). Semantic and phonetic memory codes in beginning readers. Memorv and Cognition. 2,333-338. Case, R., Kurland, D. M., & Goldberg, J. (1982). Operational efficiency and the growth of short-term memory span. Journal of Experimental Child Psychologv, 33, 386-404. Cipolla, C.M. (1969). Literacy and develomnent in the west. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. Conrad, R. (1963). Acoustic confusions and memory span for words. Nature, 197, 1029-1030. Conrad, R. (1964). Acoustic confusions in immediate memory. British Journal of Psychology, 55, 75-84.

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Conrad, R. (1971). The chronology of the development of covert speech in children. Developmental Psychology, 5, 398-405. Craik, F.I.M., & Watkins, M.J. (1973). The role of rehearsal in short- term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, l2,599-607. Dempster, F. N. (1981). Memory span: Sources of individual and developmental differences. Psycholoeical Bulletin, 84,63-100. Denkla, M.B., & Rudel, R. (1974). Rapid ’automatized’ naming of pictured o , objects, colors, letters and numbers by normal children. Cortex, l 186-202. Denkla, M.B., & Rudel, R.G. (1976). Rapid ’automatized’ naming (R.A.N.): Dyslexia differentiated from other learning disabilities. Neuropsychologia, 14,471-479. Donaldson, M. (1978). Children’s minds. London: Fontana. Drake, D.A., & Ehri, L. (1984). Spelling acquisition: Effects of pronouncing words on memory for their spellings. Cognition and Instruction, 1, 297-320. Ehri, L. (1980). The development of orthographic images. In U. Frith (Ed.), Cognitive processes in spelling (pp. 107-143). London: Academic Press. Ehri, L.C., & Wilce, L.S. (1983). Development of word identification speed in skilled and less skilled beginning readers. Journal of Educational Psychology, 75, 3-18. Englert, C.S., Raphael, T., Anderson, L.M., Gregg, S.L., & Anthony, H.M. (1989). Exposition: Reading, writing, and the metacognitive knowledge of learning disabled children. Learning Disabilities Research, 5, 5-24. Fernald, G.M. (1943). Remedial techniaues in basic school subjects. New York: McGraw-Hill. Flavell, J.H., Beach, D.R. & Chinsky, J.M. (1966) Spontaneous verbal rehearsal in a memory task as a function of age. Child Development, 32, 293-299. Fortner, V.L. (1986). Generalization of creative productive-thinking training to LD students’ written expression. Learning Disability Ouarterly, 9,

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274-284. Frith, U. (1980). Unexpected spelling problems. In U. Frith (Ed.) Cognitive processes in spelling (pp.495-515). London: Academic Press. Frith, U.(1985) Beneath the surface of developmental dyslexia. In K. Patterson, J. Marshall, & M. Coltheart, (Eds.) Surface dyslexia (pp.301-330). London: Erlbaum. Gathercole, S. E., & Baddeley, A. D. (1990). Phonological memory deficits in language disordered children: Is there a causal connection? Journal 336-360. of Memory and Language,

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Gentry, J. R. (1981). Learning to spell developmentally. The Reading Teacher, 34, 378-381. Gillingham, A.M., & Stillman, B.U. (1956). Remedial training for children with specific disability. New York: Sackett & Williams. Goodman, K. (1986). What’s whole in whole language? Portsmouth, NH: Heinneman. Hall, J. W., Wilson, K. P., Humphreys, M. S., Tinzmann, M. B., & Bowyer, P. M. (1983). Phonemic-similarity effects in good vs. poor readers. Memory and Cognition, 11, 520-527. Henderson, E.H., & Templeton, S. (1986). A developmental perspective of formal spelling instruction through alphabet, pattern, and meaning. The Elementarv School Journal, 86, 305-316. Henry, L.A., & Millar, S. (1991). Memory span increase with age: A test of two hypotheses. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 51, 459-484. Hitch, G., Halliday, M.S., & Littler, J.E.(1989). Item identification time and rehearsal as predictors of memory span in children. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, U,321-327. Holligan, C., & Johnston, R. S. (1988). The use of phonological information by good and poor readers in memory and reading tasks. Memory and Cognition, 16,522-532. Holligan, C., & Johnston, R.S. (1991). Spelling errors and phonemic

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segmentation ability: the nature of the relationship. Journal of Research in Reading, Ifl, 21-32. Hulme, C. (1981). Reading retardation and multi-sensory teaching. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hulme, C.,Thomson, N., Muir, C., & Lawrence, A. (1984). Speech rate and the development of short term memory span. Journal of Experimental Child Psvchology, 38,241-53. James, M. (1986). Self-selected spelling. Academic Theraw, 21, 557563. Johnston, R. S. (1982). Phonological coding in dyslexic readers. British Journal of Psvchologv, 23,455-460. Johnston, R.S., & Conning, A. (1990). The effects of overt and covert rehearsal on the emergence of the phonological similarity effect in 5 year old children. British Journal of Developmental Psycholow, 8, 41 1-418. Johnston, R. S., Johnson, C., & Gray, C. (1987a). The emergence of the word length effect in young children: The effects of overt and covert rehearsal. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 5, 243-248. Johnston, R.S.,Rugg, M.D., & Scott, T., (1987b). Phonological similarity effects, memory span and developmental reading disorders: The nature of the relationship. British Journal of Psvchology, 28,205-21 1. Juel, C. (1988). Learning to read and write: A longitudinal study of 54 children from first through fourth grades. J o u r n a l o f y . 80, 437-447. Lynch, E.M., & Jones, S.D. (1989). Process and product: A review of the research on LD children’s writing skills. Learning Disability Quarterly, 12, 74-86. Mann, V. A., Liberman, I. Y., & Shankweiler, D. (1980). Children’s memory for sentences and word strings in relation to reading ability. Memory and Cognition, 8, 329-335. Mechanic, A. (1964). The responses involved in the rote-learning of verbal materials. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 3, 30-36. Morris, D., & Perney, J. (1984). Developmental spelling as a predictor of first-

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grade reading achievement. The Elementarv School Journal, 84,441-457. Morton, J. (1980). The logogen model and orthographic structure. In U. Frith (Ed.), Cognitive processes in sDelling (pp.43-66). London:Academic Press. Naidoo, S. (1972). Specific dyslexia. London: Pitman. Norris, J.A. (1989). Facilitating developmental changes in spelling. Academic Therapy, 25, 97-108. Ollendick, T., Matson, J. L., Esveldt-Dawson, K., & Shapiro, E. (1980). Increasing spelling achievement: An analysis of treatment procedures utilizing an alternating treatments design. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, l3, 645-654. Olson, R. K., Davidson, B. J., Kliegl, R., & Davies, S. E. (1984). Development of phonetic memory in disabled and normal readers. Journal of ExDerimental Child Psychology, 32, 187-206. Ormrod, J.E. (1986). Learning to spell while reading: A follow-up study. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 63,652-654. Pascual-Leone, J. (1970). A mathematical model for the transition rule in Piaget’s developmental stages. Acta Psycholo~ica,63, 301-345. Rack, J. P. (1985). Orthographic and phonetic coding in developmental dyslexia. British Journal of Psycholow, 76, 325-340. Richardson, J. T. E., Greaves, D. E., & Smith, M. M. C. (1980). Does articulatory suppression eliminate the phonemic similarity effect in shortterm recall? Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 16,417-420. Rugel, R. P. (1974). WISC subtest scores of disabled readers: A review with respect to Bannatyne’s recategorization. Journal of Learning Disabilities, 2,48-55. Salame, P., & Baddeley, A. (1986). Phonological factors in STM: Similarity and the unattended speech effect. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 3,263-265. Sears, N.C., & Johnson, D.M. (1986). The effects of visual imagery on spelling performance and retention among elementary students. Journal

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Seymour, P.H.K., & Bunce, F. (in press). Application of cognitive models to remediation in cases of developmental dyslexia. In G. Humphreys & J. Riddoch (Eds.), Cognitive NeuroDsychology and Cognitive Rehabilitation. London: Erlbaum. Shankweiler, D., Liberman, I. Y., Mark, L. S . , Fowler, C. A., & Fischer, F. W. (1979). The speech code and learning to read. Journal of ExDerimental Psvchology: Human Learning and Memory, 5,531-545. Siegel, L. S . , & Linder, B. A. (1984). Short-term memory processes in children with reading and arithmetic learning disabilities. Developmental Psychologv, 200-207.

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Smith, F. (1982) Writin? and the writer. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Spring, C., & Capps, C. (1974). Encoding speed, rehearsal, and probed recall of dyslexic boys. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66, 780-786. Stanovich, K.E., Feeman, D.J., & Cunningham, A.E. (1983). The development of the relation between letter-naming speed and reading ability. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 21, 199-202. Swanson, L.B. (1 989). Analyzing naming speed-reading relationships in children. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Canada.

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Commentary: Memory and Reading: Associated or Dissociated? Philip H. K: Seymour, The University of Dundee, United Kingdom This paper by Rhona Johnston contributes an excellent review of research on the possible link between reading or spelling development and memory processes. That these two areas should be related seems eminently plausible. Teachers of children with developmental literacy disorders repeatedly complain that, despite all their efforts, their charges do not remember the words they have been taught to read or spell, or the difference between ’b’ and ’d’, or the application of the rule of -e, etc, etc. The suggestion that literacy might be critically dependent on memory is evident in the discussion of children’s writing. Production of a story requires access to knowledge of people, places and events which are part of long-term (or semantic) memory, retrieval of appropriate words from a vocabulary store, deployment of narrative and sentence structures, plus more fundamental requirements, including an orthographic memory for word spellings and conventions of morphology, and, finally, a motor memory for the formation and sequencing of letters. Different kinds of memory process seem to be involved. For example, early attempts at spelling may be phonologically based, requiring segmentation of speech into a sequence of elements, relying perhaps on shortterm or working memory. At the same time competent spelling in a deep orthography, such as English, requires the formation of some kind of permanent (long-term) memory of specific word-forms. As the author notes, practical educational questions arise regarding the way in which spelling knowledge might be built up, or the way in which narrative skills might be encouraged, all of which might benefit from a cognitively oriented analysis. In talking about reading and writing we can identify some aspects which are specific to the skill and others which are more general. The knowledge base which is involved in reading comprehension and story construction may well be influenced by reading experience. Nonetheless, it remains a general, supramodal resource which will be involved in listening and speaking as much as in reading and writing. This part of permanent (long-term) memory is not, therefore, strictly a part of the specialised systems required for reading and

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spelling. The specific systems include components such as: (1) a word recognition process; (2) a store of word spellings; or (3) non-lexical processes of letter-sound or sound-letter translation (see, for example, Ellis & Young, 1988). These systems are themselves forms of memory, since they all rely on the permanent availability of learned information. The question about memory and literacy seems to be one of whether general memory capabilities support the formation of the highly specific orthographic databases required for reading and spelling. If such a dependency does exist, it will follow that a poor memory may well be a factor producing a poor reader. Much of the research discussed in the review is directed towards an attempt to establish a link of this kind. In this commentary, I would like to focus on this particular aspect of Johnston's paper and to consider why the link, which seems so eminently plausible, should have been so difficult to establish empirically. Part of the problem may be that the two sides of the equation 'memory' and 'literacy' - each refer to very complex sets of functions. Bertelson (1987) makes a similar point with respect to 'phonological awareness': "entities such as reading acquisition and the emergence of speech analysis capacities are both too global to expect to observe a unidirectional causal relation between them. Only by analysing both processes into simpler episodes can one hope to reach a level of description at which unidirectional influences would be found". (Bertelson, 1987, p. 11). This comment is certainly equally applicable to the relation between reading (or spelling) acquisition and the various forms of memory (short term, long term, working, etc). Indeed, one of Johnston's points is that the approaches adopted in reading and spelling research seem to have differed, with an emphasis on long-term retention in educationally motivated studies of spelling but on short-term (working) memory in studies of reading acquisition. In both fields it is possible to identify relevant theoretical schemes which might prove helpful. A distinction might be made between: (1) functional models, which specify the overall architecture of a processing system, and, perhaps, the algorithms employed in its various components; and (2) developmental models, which specify the way in which a system, or area of competence, is established and built up. Using the first approach, one might attempt to relate reading to memory by setting out a process model of reading and a process model of memory and by then considering areas of overlap or interaction. Rhona Johnston has followed

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this line in part, since she has referred to the influential ’working memory’ model of Baddeley and Hitch (1974)’ especially the phonological slave system (the articulatory loop) and the procedures and effects by which it is defined (word length, speed of articulation, phonological conhsability, etc). The main point of the research reviewed seems to be to query whether or not ’poor readers’, taken as a group, show these effects, the implication being that absence of the effects might imply a failure to exploit the possibilities of phonological coding. Such a failure, if demonstrated, might stand as a candidate ’cognitive deficit’ playing a possible causal role in the reading disability. As matters stand, the approach has been realised only partially. Not much is said regarding the other components of the ’working memory’ model, the central executive and the visuo-spatial sketchpad. Do poor readers show anomalies in these areas also, and, if so, what might this mean for the causation of reading disabilities? No doubt the silence on this point reflects the current emphasis on phonology as the critical factor in reading development. Further, the functional link between the memory systems and process models of reading, such as the logogen framework of Morton (1989), is not really explored at all. A second approach is to consider reading and spelling development in relation to memory development. As the author notes, Frith (1985) has outlined a stage model of literacy acquisition which identifies three successively deployed strategies, labelled ’logographic’, ’alphabetic’ and ’orthographic’. A scheme of this kind could provide a guide for analysis of reading development into a series of episodes, as recommended by Bertelson (1987). However, in order to relate this progression to memory, we would need a parallel account of memory development. Again, this is something which Johnston has discussed, but not to a degree which would allow explicit bridging between the two domains. For example, one might wish to know what memory demands are imposed by logographic, alphabetic and orthographic learning, and what constraints or adaptations are evident in the concurrent development of general purpose memory systems. Longitudinal studies, such as those reported by Ellis (1990), in which measures of reading and spelling development, phonological skills, and memory processes are obtained during the period of early literacy acquisition, are required in order to map out the two-way interactive relationships between literacy and memory. Baddeley (1986) has also contributed a theoretical discussion of the possible relationship between working

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memory development and reading acquisition. A research programme which seeks to establish a general causal relationship between memory and reading disability rests on certain key assumptions. The first of these might be termed the homogeneity or universality assumption. This is a belief that reading processes in general, and disordered reading processes in particular, fall within a single universally applicable mould. The assumptionjustifies the use of a group study methodology including the practice of attempting general comparisons between samples of 'poor readers' and chronological or reading age matched control groups which has yielded the database of empirical results which the author has reviewed. The assumption may not, in fact, be tenable. There is now much evidence from cognitively motivated case studies that reading disability may be a heterogeneous category (Ellis, 1985; Seymour, 1986). Indeed, recent studies of individuals suggest that differing patterns (e.g. 'phonological' vs 'surface' dyslexia) may be linked to corresponding variations in memory processes (Campbell & Butterworth, 1985; Goulandris & Snowling, 1991). If these intimations of heterogeneity are validated the pursuit of generalisations about reading disability may start to lose its appeal. A second set of assumptions concern what might be called a syndrome mentality. This is the idea that reading disability can be viewed as a recurring combination of deficits, here 'poor reading' impaired phonological memory. The further assumption is that the deficits co-occur because of the presumed causal link between them. Syndrome models of this kind are typically verified by a search for an association of deficits. Problems with syndrome and association methodologies have recently been much discussed in cognitive neuropsychology (see, for example, Shallice, 1988; Ellis, 1987). One difficulty is that it is often impossible to tell whether or not a functional relationship exists between the associated deficits. There is always the possibility that the co-occurrence, though regular in appearance, is non-functional, deriving perhaps from the anatomical proximity and shared vulnerability of the neural substrates of the functions involved in the associated tasks, An additional problem is that syndromes tend to undergo a process of fractionation. This occurs as new cases are discovered who show only part of the defining pattern. Ellis (1987) accordingly argued that syndromes, characterised by associations of deficits, provide an insecure basis for theorising. This point is particularly apposite in the work on reading disabilities

+

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where the syndrome which is the target of theoretical explanation may be little more than a statistical average discernible in a group of subjects. In neuropsychology, the tendency has been to de-emphasise associations and to place greater reliance on dissociations as sources of theoretical insight (Shallice, 1988). It may be worth while to consider whether a switch towards a dissociation methodology might also be helpful in the area of childhood reading difficulties. Some steps in this direction have already been taken, particularly with respect to 'hyperlexia' - effective reading development in the context of numerous cognitive deficits (Cossu & Marshall, 1990; Seymour & Evans, 1992). Under this approach, researchers might start to look for children with severe reading disabilities who display normal memory functions. It would then become possible to identify the cognitive functions which dissociate from reading disability (or from any given pattern of reading disability) in individual instances, and, eventually, to arrive at some idea of the extent of the 'developmental modularity' of the reading process. In conclusion, Rhona Johnston has provided an admirably clear review of the current status of research bearing on the relationship between reading and memory. Her judgement seems to be that the field is incomplete and that this may be blamed, in part at least, on the existence of distinctive and inadequately integrated approaches in both education and psychology. The suggestion of this commentary is that overcoming these inadequacies may require advances in theory (especially, properly articulated and comparable accounts of reading, spelling and memory development) and in methodology (particularly a move away from group studies and the search for associations of deficits and towards a study of dissociations).

References Baddeley, A. (1986) Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baddeley, A.D., & Hitch, G.J. (1974) Working memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), Recent advances in learning and motivation, Vo1.8 (pp. 47-90). New York: Academic Press. Bertelson, P. (1987) The onset of literacy: Liminal remarks. In P.Bertelson (Ed.), The onset of literacv: Cognitive processes in reading acquisition (pp.1-30). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

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Campbell, R., & Butterworth, B. (1985) Phonological dyslexia and dysgraphia in a highly literate subject: A developmental case with associated deficits of phonemic processing and awareness. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 435-476.

m,

Cossu, G. & Marshall, J.C. (1990) Are cognitive skills a pre-requisite for learning to read and write? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 2,21-40. Ellis, A.W. (1985) The cognitive neuropsychology of developmental (and acquired) dyslexia: A critical survey. Cognitive Neuropsvchologv, 2, 169-205. Ellis, A.W. (1987) Intimations of modularity, or, the modelarity of mind: Doing cognitive neuropsychology without syndromes. In M .Coltheart, G.Sartori, & R.Job (Eds.), The coynitive neuropsvchology of language (pp.397-408). London: Erlbaum. Ellis, A.W., & Young, A.W (1988) Human cognitive neuropsychology. London: Erlbaum. Ellis, N.C. (1990) Reading, phonological skills and short-term memory: Interactive tributaries of development. Journal of Research in Reading, 13, 107-122. Frith, U. (1985) Beneath the surface of developmental dyslexia. In K. E. Patterson, J.C. Marshall, & M .Coltheart (Eds .), Surface dyslexia: neuroDsvchologica1 and cognitive analyses of phonological reading (pp.301-330). London: Erlbaum. Goulandris, N.K., & Snowling, M. (1991) Visual memory deficits: A plausible cause of developmental dyslexia? Evidence from a single case study. Cognitive Neuropsvchology, 8, 127-154. Morton, J. (1 989) An information processing account of reading acquisition. In A.M.Galaburda (Ed.), From reading to neurons (pp. 43-66). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Seymour, P.H.K. (1986) Cognitive analvsis of dyslexia. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Seymour, P.H.K., & Evans, H.M. (1992) Beginning reading without semantics: A cognitive study of hyperlexia. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 9, 89-122.

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Shallice, T. (1988) From neuropsvchology to mental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Commentary: Strategies for Learning and Instruction Linda S. Siege1 Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Canada In her chapter, Mona S. Johnston has provided an integrative and succinct summary of studies of the relationship of memory to reading, writing, and spelling. In this brief commentary, I will deal with some of the issues that she raises, including the role of metacognitive processes in memory, the nature and degree of the deficit in phonological coding of children with reading difficulties, the use of stage theory to explain children’s performance on reading and spelling tasks, and how research on memory can be useful in providing clues to appropriate instructional techniques to help children develop reading, spelling, and writing skills. The ideas that Johnston has provided in this chapter can serve as some interesting suggestions for the directions that further research might take. Theorists working in the area of the relationship between memory and reading, spelling, and writing would do well to consider, as Johnston has done, the role of metacognitive processes in the operation of memory. Specifically, the question of whether and in what manner the individual’s use of strategic processes influences performance on memory tasks has been considered by Johnston. Johnston raises issues related to the use of strategies in her discussion of the role of phonological coding in short-term memory. She questions whether the difficulties that children with reading disabilities have in short-term memory tasks are a problem of a basic deficit in phonological coding or a problem of inadequate rehearsal strategies. The inability or failure to rehearse may partially account for the poor performance of children with reading problems in short-term memory tasks. The question of a basic deficit as opposed to a problem with strategy has implications for cognitive theory in terms of understanding the fundamental processes that are involved in reading and also for the treatment of reading difficulties. If the deficit is a result of inadequate strategies, then individuals with memory problems may be able to be trained to rehearse. Investigators have not adequately explored the possibility of training children with memory difficulties to rehearse to see if it would help their

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memory and also their reading skills to develop and be used more adequately. Johnston discusses the concept of phonetic confusability in short-term memory. Phonetic confusability refers to an effect in which non-rhyming words and letters with non-rhyming names are remembered better than those with rhyming names because the latter are acoustically confusable. Presumably, when required to memorize these rhyming stimuli, individuals who are using verbal rehearsal strategies have more difficulty with rhyming than with nonrhyming stimuli because these rhyming items have a greater degree of phonological similarity. While Johnston maintains that there is no definitive evidence to support the proposition that poor readers fail to show a phonetic similarity effect, I think that there is evidence for very inadequate phonological processing in short-term memory in younger poor readers. We have shown that the phonological coding is so inadequate that it is functionally non-existent in younger poor readers. We have found that younger poor readers, aged 7-10, could remember rhyming letters as well as non-rhyming letters in a short-term memory task, although their memory for either type was significantly poorer than normally achieving readers (Siegel & Linder, 1984; Siegel & Ryan, 1988). Johnston claims that it may be that the task was too difficult for them; however, they were achieving scores of 30-50% correct so they do appear to be capable of doing the task and it was not a floor effect. It should also be noted that our subjects were very poor readers and perhaps this is why we have found little interference of phonemic similarity in the performance of poor readers on memory tasks. This lack of consistency in findings is a good illustration of the importance of definitional issues. Shankweiler, Liberman, Mark, Fowler, and Fischer (1979) and Siegel and Linder (1984) and Siegel and Ryan (1988) defined reading disability as a low score on a word recognition test and found little evidence for phonological coding in the younger children with reading disabilities while Hall, Wilson, Humphreys, Tinzmann, and Bowyer (1983) defined a reading disability as a low score on a reading comprehension test and found evidence of phonological coding in the poor readers. There is a possible explanation for the differences in findings among these studies. Siegel and Ryan (1989) have shown that children who have a reading comprehension deficit only and not a deficit in word recognition do not show the same degree of problems as those with a word recognition deficit. It is possible that the reading disabled individuals in

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the Hall et al. study may not have had as severe problems in reading and may not have been as disabled as those in Shankweiler, et al. and those in our studies. In addition, Siegel and Ryan (1988) found that the reading disabled children performed significantly better than reading grade level matched normal readers on the task involving rhyming letters. This pattern of performance is an indication of the lack of sensitivity of children with a reading disability to phonetic confusability because they actually performed better than normal readers on this task which measures the interfering effects of phonetic confusability. Therefore, the reading disabled children were presumably not using adequate verbal rehearsal strategies because they did not show the same strength of the effect that normal readers did. It should be noted that this superiority only occurred on the rhyming letters. It did not occur on the nonrhyming letters. Johnston believes that the failure to find a difference between the memory for the rhyming and non-rhyming stimuli may be a result of a lack of verbal rehearsal because the task is too difficult. She claims that the children may not rehearse in difficult tasks but it is not clear why they could not rehearse at least part of the sequence of stimuli so that phonological coding would be partially effective. Studies of simultaneous vocalization, that presumably suppresses verbal rehearsal during encoding in a short-term memory task, should help provide some answers to these questions. We have shown that the ability to use phonemic coding in short-term memory develops gradually and that reading disabled individuals at any age show less adequate verbal memory skills than normal readers (e.g., Shafrir & Siegel, 1991; Siegel & Linder, 1984; Siegel & Ryan, 1988). It would be appropriate to conceptualize sensitivity to phonetic confusability as an interaction between age and disability. That is, younger disabled readers may not demonstrate this sensitivity because their phonological processing skills are very weak. As they develop and are increasingly exposed to print and instruction, they become more capable of phonological processing so they do show a phonetic confusability effect but, in spite of the development of their skills, they still have significant difficulties on short-term memory tasks and perform at a level significantly below that of normally achieving readers. Therefore, I believe that the evidence shows that it is appropriate to think of the influence of phonetic confusability as a continuous dimension and not as either absent or present.

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In another area, Johnston has attempted to discuss the role of memory in spelling but she notes, quite correctly, that very little is known about this important aspect of early literacy development. As English is not a phonetic language and the correspondence between phonemes and their representation by graphemes is not always predictable, visual memory must be an important component of spelling English words correctly. Yet we know very little about this component and how visual memory develops, particularly in relation to the ability to spell words in English which is such an opaque language. Johnston has made reference to one of the significant controversies in the area of reading and spelling instruction. That is, the dispute between the proponents of the 'whole language' approach and what is sometimes called the 'basal reader' approach is mentioned and briefly discussed. It is a conflict between those who view the only appropriate means of reading instruction as teaching the child to read in context and, on the other hand, those who believe that the teaching of more basic decoding skills and learning how to read and spell single words and sounds of letters and letter combinations is an important component of learning to read in an alphabetic language. As Johnston suggests, these positions might be able to achieve a rapprochement by the examination of the strategies that children actually use in learning to read and spell. That is, rather than assuming the validity of the top down model of the whole language method, we might profit by studying what children actually do in the areas of reading and spelling. For example, instead of allowing children to spell words in any way that they can, as is done in the invented spelling approach, we should consider the data that show that seeing the incorrect spelling of a word disrupts the visual image of that word and may result in incorrect spelling. Johnston suggests that we should use this visual component in training spelling and I think that is a very important suggestion. Johnston makes some very important comments about the use of stage theory in relationship to the development of reading and spelling skills. She discusses several attempts to frame the development of young children in the areas of reading and spelling in terms of discrete stages but is skeptical about the value of this approach. My own position, which I think that she shares, is that it is far more useful to view reading and spelling skills as developing gradually with children using several types of processing strategies at one time rather than exclusively one type of processing. For example, we have found that as children develop spelling skills their errors are increasingly better visual

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and phonological matches to the correct spelling; they do not use exclusively one strategy or the other (Lennox & Siegel, 1991). She also notes that certain previous attempts to explain cognitive development in terms of Piagetian stage theory approaches have tended to underestimate the cognitive capabilities of the young child. (For a further discussion of this issue see Siegel and Hodkin, 1982). This point is a very important one and I hope that theorists in the area of reading and spelling research will not make the same kind of error and assume that the young child will display inadequate cognitive skills in the area of reading and spelling. On the contrary, I am quite impressed by the sophistication of young normal readers in their knowledge of phonics. For example, normal readers after as little as six months of reading instruction can read many pseudowords and by the age of seven or eight are only making very few errors on the reading of pseudowords and these are on three syllable pseudowords (Siegel & Faux, 1989, Siegel & Ryan, 1988). By the age of nine to ten, their knowledge of phonics is almost perfect, assuming, of course, that they are normally achieving readers. Johnston has presented us with a useful summary of the literature in the area of the role of memory processes in relationship to the development of early literacy skills. She has highlighted some important issues. In particular, theorists in the area should consider the possible role of strategic processes and not assume that memory is entirely the result of some fixed and invariant individual difference factors. The investigation of these issues will require some careful and ingenious studies. I hope investigators will seriously consider the issues raised by Johnston.

Acknowledgement. This commentary was written while the author held a Senior Research Fellowship from the Ontario Mental Health Foundation. The research discussed in this commentary was supported by a grant from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.

References Hall, J. W., Wilson, K. P., Humphreys, M. S . , Tinzmann, M. B., & Bowyer, P. M. (1983). Phonetic similarity effects in good vs. poor readers. Memorv and Cognition, 11, 520-527.

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Lennox, C., & Siegel, L.S. (1991). Visual and phonetic errors in good and poor spellers. Unpublished manuscript. Shafrir, U., & Siegel, L.S. (1991). Subtypes of learning disabilities in adolescents and adults. Unpublished manuscript. Shankweiler, D., Liberman, I. Y., Mark, L. S., Fowler, C. A., & Fischer, F. W. (1979). The speech code and learning to read. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 5, 531-545. Siegel, L. S., & Faux, D. (1989). Acquisition of certain grapheme-phoneme correspondences in normally achieving and disabled readers. Reading and Writing: An Interdisciplinarv Journal, 1,37-52. Siegel, L. S., & Hodkin, B. (1982). The garden path to the understanding of cognitive development: Has Piaget led us into the poison ivy? In S. Modgil & C. Modgil, The taming of Piaget: Crossfires and crosscurrents (pp. 57-82). London: National Foundation for Research. Siegel, L. S., & Linder, B. A. (1984). Short-term memory processes in children with reading and arithmetic learning disabilities. Developmental P s Y c h o l o ~ 20, , 200-207. Siegel, L. S., & Ryan, E. B. (1988). Development of grammatical sensitivity, phonological, and short-term memory skills in normally achieving and learning disabled children. Developmental Psycholoev, 24, 28-37. Siegel, L. S., & Ryan, E. B. (1989). Subtypes of developmental dyslexia: The influence of definitional variables. n Interdisciplinary Journal, I,257-287.

Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. h g i e (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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CHAPTER 3 FUZZY MEMORY AND MATHEMATICS IN THE CLASSROOM Valerie F. Reyna and Charles J . Brainerd University of Arizona

"F's in maths? Join the club!" A high school teacher addressing underachieving students, Sept 1, 1991. Despite the global need for workers who are highly skilled in mathematics, most students never progress beyond arithmetic. Students generally fall into one of two groups. They are either one of the lucky few who catches on from the beginning, or they fall by the wayside (though such bimodality k'avoidable). In order not to alienate the vast majority of students, some have suggested that we teach less science and mathematics. However, lowering standards runs counter to the increasing demand for better trained workers. The disparity between achievement and demand has already been felt in worldwide competition for a dwindling pool of savants. For example, U.S. immigration policy has been changed to admit a larger number of scientists and mathematicians because the need cannot be met domestically. Although many factors undoubtedly contribute to the problem of underachievement in mathematics (including low expectations; see the quote above), observers generally agree that, beyond basic arithmetic, mathematics is not intuitive for most learners. Recent research suggests, however, that successful mathematical reasoners call on an intuitive appreciation of the fuzzy, qualitative relationships in problem information (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990a; Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). Thus, by emphasizing a kind of cognitive approach that seems antithetical to mathematics, we may achieve greater success in instruction. The origins of this new approach can be traced to the foundations of mathematics itself, to Brouwer (e.g., 1952) and Heyting (e.g., 1959), who argued that intuition--fluid thinking that operates on the barest senses of ideas-underlies the insights of mathematicians. In this paper, we present an intuitionist account of mathematical problem solving, and some of its implications for learning and teaching. This account is based primarily on research concerning the relationship between memory and reasoning, in particular, between memory for specific problem facts and gist-

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based reasoning (e.g., Reyna, in press-b). We review that research, including the nature of representations adults and children use to solve problems, some counterintuitive findings about factors that facilitate learning, and the implications of distinguishing between competence versus bringing that competence to bear in actual situations. We specifically address computational skills (e.g., mental arithmetic) and quantitative reasoning about probability and expected value (e.g., compensation), the numerosity of sets (e.g., classinclusion reasoning), relative magnitude (e.g., transitive inference), and weights and measures (e.g., conservation).

Reasoning-remembering relationships The usual assumption about memory’s relationship to reasoning is that it is necessary. In other words, the reasoner must have access to the critical information contained in a problem in order to reason correctly. So, for example, if we multiply height by width to compute area, the values for height and width must be held in working memory sufficiently long either to enter those values into a calculator, or to retrieve the correct answer from long-term memory. As problems become more complex, with increasing numbers of intermediate calculations, memory lapses become more likely. Therefore, it is easy to see how the limitations of human memory might prevent us from being able to accurately perform lengthy mental calculations. Even with such memory aids as pad and pencil, however, a common computational error involves omitting an intermediate quantity or operation (e.g., Hitch, 1978). What about the role of memory in quantitative reasoning, such as reasoning about probability, the numerical properties of sets, or physical measurements (Kintsch & Greeno, 1985)? Again, it would seem that holding the problem information in memory, or having an artificial storage device, would be necessary (though not sufficient) for accurate performance. For example, if one urn contains 1 winning ball out of 3 and another contains three out of 12, we cannot be assured of choosing the urn with the greater probability of winning if we forget the total number of balls in each urn. This assumption of necessity can be compared to the straight path of a train, without by-passes or detours. The train must pick up passengers at an earlier point in order to drop them off later. Thinking that operates like this, picking up information and then delivering responses, is similarly linear. The

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idea of maintaining information in memory, and then manipulating it, is intrinsic to information-processing theories of cognitive development (e.g., Siegler, 1983). Analogously, Piagetian and Neo-Piagetian theories presuppose that the logical rules that constitute intelligence operate on premise-like informational inputs. Since it is impossible, in this view, to skip premises and advance directly to conclusions, these theories, too, incorporate the necessity assumption. Research on both computation and quantitative reasoning, however, has challenged the assumption of necessity. Instead of having one path leading to correct responses, it appears that there are multiple, parallel paths; therefore, it is possible to solve problems correctly without remembering specific problem facts (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). A variety of types of memory representations are available to reasoners, ranging from highly precise numerical representations to fuzzy traces incorporating the 'gist' of problem information. Surprisingly, children tend to rely on fuzzy rather than precise representations ('the fuzzy-processing preference'), and thinking becomes increasingly gist-based as development progresses (e.g., Perner & Mansbridge, 1983; Reyna, in press-b). As will become clearer as we touch on specific examples, many classic reasoning tasks can be accurately solved by relying on gist. Moreover, since human memory is particularly ill-suited to remembering and manipulating discrete, precise information (Estes, 1980), the net effect of gist-based reasoning is to enhance accuracy (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b). A key issue for future research is identifying those problems that truly benefit from precise computation, and engineering artificial intelligence that can reliably supplement, and interface with, the fuzzier approach of human beings. Therefore, what is cognitively natural is not necessarily good, but improving human performance requires that we be aware of sources of errors, and that the computational schemes we prescribe can be adopted with reasonable effort. Evidence against necessity Memory independence is the puzzling finding that variations in reasoning are often completely independent of variations in memory for information that is ostensibly critical to reasoning (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1993; Fisher & Chandler, 1991). This result, now demonstrated in virtually all of the classic

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problem solving paradigms of cognitive development, was the major impetus for fuzzv-trace theorv (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b). In particular, the finding of memory independence prompted us to posit separate memory systems, with different developmental trajectories, one specialized for precise, verbatim information and the other for vague gist (e.g., Reyna, in press-b). The crux of fuzzy-trace theory’s explanation of memory independence is that children’s reasoning typically does not draw on representations of problem information (verbatim traces), although such representations are often used to answer memory questions. Instead, problem information is extracted in parallel with more global gist-like patterns, and reasoning problems are solved by processing these gist-like patterns. Therefore, reasoning-remembering independence is really a question of gist-verbatim independence. Subsequent research (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1993; Reyna & Kiernan, 1993) has demonstrated that, by manipulating reliance on these two types of representations, all three possible relationships between memory and reasoning can be produced: independence, positive dependence, and negative dependence (or interference). As we discuss later, this relationship depends on subjects’ ages and characteristics of the task. Thus, the distinction between gist and verbatim memories has been used to account for both the appearance and disappearance of dependence between memory and reasoning. In toto, such findings argue forcefully against the assumption that there is any necessary link between memory and reasoning. Although gist has its advantages, it is clearly insufficient for some problem solving tasks. Mental arithmetic is an example that we have studied (Brainerd & Reyna, 1988). In this paradigm, children might be given a target numeral and asked to increment it by some small amount, such as 2. We can probe memory for the original target numeral, and relate memorial accuracy to arithmetic performance, and, of course, they are dependent. Both questions tap verbatim memory for numbers, and the nature of the problem requires that level of precision. Even here, however, it turns out that children retrieve the sum but compute the target--they subtract--rather than attempting to retrieve rapidly fading verbatim information. So the standard model, that reasoning taps memory representations, is violated. Instead, reasoning, or computation, produces the answers to both the arithmetic and the so-called memory question. Most reasoning tasks require far less precision than mental arithmetic does, however, and reasoners appear to be sensitive to these task

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1. Probability Judgment

2. Conservation: Liquid and Length 3. Class Inclusion (relative numerosity)

4. Missing Digit Identification 5 . Frequency Judgment 6 . Transitive Inference (relative magnitude)

Table 1.

Some Quantitative Reasoning Tasks that Exhibit Memory Independence

characteristics. Table 1 shows a sampling of quantitative tasks in which memory and reasoning have been found to be independent. So, for example, in probability judgment, children are not asked for the exact probability of each alternative; they simply indicate which alternative they prefer. Similarly, in conservation of liquid, children are merely asked whether two alternatives have the same amount or not. Children are not asked to report exact amounts, such as the number of ounces in each beaker. Although Piaget (e.g., 1952) has claimed that such judgments require quantitative compensation, clearly qualitative rules, such as "Nothing added, nothing taken away means its the same," are sufficient to solve such problems (e.g., Campbell, in press). The use of such simple qualitative rules and representations does not imply that children are incapable of quantitative reasoning. Children and adults prefer to gravitate to gist, and to use qualitative heuristics, even when they are capable of more precise reasoning. The most extensive line of experimentation demonstrating this fuzzy-processing preference in adults, for example, has

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involved framing effects in probabilistic decision making (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991c).

Memory interference in reasoning The relationship between memory and reasoning changes with development and with task characteristics. For younger children, there is evidence that enhancing verbatim memory for problem facts can interfere with reasoning (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991a). For example, in the standard classinclusion paradigm, children are presented with two sets, say 7 cows and 3 horses, and are asked about the relative numerosity of various pairs of sets. When asked whether there are more cows or more animals, most children erroneously respond that there are more cows, until the surprisingly advanced age of about 10 (Winer, 1980). Even adults take a suspiciously long time to answer such questions, although they are likely to answer them correctly (Rabinowitz, Howe, & Lawrence, 1989). Despite the question’s focus on relative numerosity, children do better when their memory for the numbers in each set is poorer (Brainerd & Reyna, 1993). That is, when the display containing the number of cows and horses is absent, memory for numerical information is considerably lowered, and reasoning performance significantly improves. Class-inclusion problems can be solved correctly in multiple ways, for example, quantitatively (e.g., by counting) or qualitatively (e.g., reasoning that, since one set properly includes the other, animals must be more extensive than cows). Thus, exact memory for the number in each set is not absolutely necessary; but this does not explain why performance is improved in their absence. Since children who showed the effect could clearly count, Piaget (1952) proposed that deficits resided in an inability to reason about sets. However, studies have demonstrated that, outside the context of this task, children could not only reason about sets, but they could apply the cardinality principle, that more inclusive sets were also more numerous (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). Other researchers claimed that the problem was linguistic, a misinterpretation of the question, but it has been repeatedly shown that linguistic factors account for small amounts of the variance among responses, and adherents of the linguistic view now acknowledge that the effect remains when such ambiguities are eliminated (e.g., Reyna, 1991; Shipley, 1979). I t

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is widely agreed that the typical class-inclusion error involves mistakenly reporting the horizontal relationship between subsets, rather than the vertical one between set and subset (e.g., Campbell, in press; Winer, 1980). Ironically, although counting the number in each sethubset offers a seemingly foolproof method of verification, attempting to solve the problem quantitatively is what gets reasoners into trouble (e.g., Reyna, in 1991). The relative numerosity of the subsets is salient in the display. On the other hand, although the quantitative relationship to more inclusive sets is understood by children, it is implicit. In addition, processing the relationship to more inclusive sets quantitatively presents a problem of mental bookkeeping, keeping track of the cows who count as cows but also as animals, but not as horses, and so on. Meanwhile, in the presence of such a display (e.g., 7 cows and 3 horses), children as young as four automatically encode the salient relationship between subsets--which has more (e.g., Brainerd, 1981). The class-inclusion question then asks about which has more, and children tend to founder in processing the set-subset relationships, and instead report the explicit relationship between subsets. Factors that either decrease the emphasis on quantitative aspects of the problem (and so decrease the salience of the horizontal relationship) or that increase the ease of mental bookkeeping, improve performance (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1993; Reyna, 1991). By removing the display, children are prodded to rely on their fuzzy memories of gist-like relationships, rather than on exact knowledge of numbers in each subset. By tagging the animals, for example by placing a hat on each of them, an explicit placeholder for the set is provided that can be used in processing, and this, too, leads to large gains in performance. Lest we think that class-inclusion problems are unique, it should be noted that quantitative reasoning in general is apt to present problems of processing complexity of the sort we mentioned earlier, namely the necessity to maintain elaborate verbatim distinctions, and to keep track of all of these as processing proceeds (e.g., Hitch, 1978; Siegler, 1983). Note that processing complexity is not the same as memory load. Adding hats to animals in class-inclusion reasoning increases the information to be processed, but decreases complexity. Rather than reinvent the wheel for each quantitative question, experienced reasoners seem to develop the adaptive habit of steering clear of complexity when a satisfactory solution can be achieved in a less precise way. For

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example, Scott Flansburg, "the human calculator, relies principally on various kinds of estimation (e.g., Tucson Citizen, September 16, 1991). His method has been applied to teaching students "a new way to approach mathematics, specifically by discouraging the processing of exact quantities. The interference effects of verbatim memory have been documented in paradigms other than class-inclusion reasoning (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1993; Weismer, 1985). For instance, presenting information about relative magnitude pictorially, although it improves memory for that information, leads to lower performance on reasoning questions. So, children better remember being told that "The yellow rod is longer than the blue rod" and that "The blue rod is longer than the red rod" when pictures accompany words, but they are less likely to acknowledge the inference that "The yellow rod is longer than the red rod." (This assumes that pictures are not schematic, and that relative magnitude is not explicitly represented in the pictures, but must be remembered, as when the bottoms of rods are hidden.) The vivid specificity of such pictures appears to enhance verbatim memory for the exact information given--that a yellow rod was mentioned rather than a green one. But, although pictures that are vivid and concrete facilitate memory for premises, for the same reasons, they appear to inhibit integration across premises (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991a). The more concrete and "verbatim" such pictures become, if you will, the more they should interfere with extraction of gist. Such pictorial representations must be mentally disassembled, and recombined, in order to form inferences. For younger children, such concreteness interferes with recognizing the information contained in the premises when it has been reconstituted into valid conclusions. Interference can also occur for older children and adults, as we alluded by noting that adults show extended response times and, sometimes, errors in the class-inclusion paradigm (Rabinowitz et al., 1989). Adults are especially likely to be lulled into such errors when competing problem facts are 'obvious.' For example, adults are prone to a kind of error that is similar to children's errors in conservation tasks (Winer, in press). In conservation of number, for example, a child will be shown two rows of objects that agree in number. Younger children will claim that one row 'has more' because it extends farther than the other, length being a competing perceptual cue. Winer (in press) found that adults can be induced to use competing perceptual cues in judgments of conservation by changing the wording of questions. Similarly, in alphabetizing names, a common error is to put 'Simmon' after 'Simon' because 'I

I'

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it extends farther. Again, length is a misleading perceptual cue that interferes with adults' ability to apply their competence. In a review of a variety of scientific and mathematical reasoning tasks, Reyna and Brainerd (1991a) noted that mastery was later for those tasks that involved competing perceptions of a problem. Once thinking is misdirected, the effect is analogous to that of perceptual illusions, such as the famous profilesgoblet illusion. Our perception of the two figures in this illusion alternates--we cannot see the profiles and the goblet simultaneously. This is because the figure in one perception, such as the goblet, is the ground in the other. Perception of the goblet as figure interferes with seeing it as ground. Something analogous occurs in cognitive interference. For certain problems, the more vivid one conception of the problem is, the less flexibility reasoners seem to have in reconceptualizing it--in viewing the problem in a different way. So, the presence of competing perceptions of problems is the feature that separates the two quantitative reasoning paradigms in which children do well-transitivity and probability judgment--from the two in which they have more difficulty--conservation and class-inclusion. This ordering of difficulty is not intrinsic to these concepts, but has to do with the manner of testing. In transitive inference and simple probability judgment, perceptual cues are normally consistent with correct performance. In a standard procedure for transitive inference, rods of differing length are placed down in order in front of the child, although the differences in length are not perceptible. The child can use the array to identify items, and need only remember that magnitude ''flowed" from left to right (Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). In conservation and class-inclusion reasoning, on the other hand, visual patterns typically interfere with correct responding (Reyna, in 1991; Winer, in press). As in the example cited above of conservation of number, aspects of the display conflict with the logically correct response. In the class-inclusion paradigm, as we have seen, horizontal relationships are perceptually salient, leading children to assert vertical numerosity relationships that they know to be patently false. Easier tasks can be converted to harder ones by introducing an interfering visual pattern. In transitive inference, for example, performance can be disrupted by using the Muller-Lyer illusion to suggest that the shorter of two rods is really longer (Reyna & Brainerd, 1990). As the examples with adults underscore, a key difference between our account of the interfering effects of visual patterns and Piaget's is that we view interference as a problem of

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execution, rather than as a litmus test for logical competence.

The verbatim-to-gist developmental shift Accompanying problems with vivid pictures, or providing a display incorporating problem information that is consistent with the correct response, are normally assumed to aid reasoning performance, especially for younger children. Clarifying the problem is expected to benefit younger children because they are less likely to understand or remember information, which is true as far as it goes. (The fallacy is that this will improve reasoning.) The presupposition behind such interventions is that children who do remember the problem will have a higher probability of reasoning correctly (relative to the unconditional probability of correct reasoning). This is the necessity assumption, and not only does it fail to hold for elementary schoolers (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1990) and adults (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Fisher & Chandler, 1991), as we have seen, younger children’s performance sometimes deteriorates when such memory is enhanced. Thus, the relationship between memory and reasoning changes developmentally from one of interference to independence. The reasons behind such a shift are not fully known. Younger children appear to be less able to inhibit interference from a variety of sources (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1989; see Dempster, 1992, for a review). As reasoning relies more heavily on gist, it becomes more resistant to interference. The decreasing sensitivity to interference, and the verbatim-to-gist shift, both occur across an age range in which verbatim memory, at least in terms of language development, declines with attendant changes in brain development and lateralization (e.g., Johnson & Newport, 1989; Miller, 1981). Also, the maturation of specific areas of the brain has been linked to development in cognitive interference tasks (Dempster, 1992; Diamond & Goldman-Rakic, 1989). It is not surprising, therefore, that memory interference should diminish with age. The change from memory interference to independence might be due either to a greater generalized ability to inhibit responsiveness, or to an increasing reliance on more resilient gist (or to both). A specific example of the verbatim-to-gist shift is provided in an extensive series of experiments by Olney on memory for order (1991). As is well known, order is among the earliest understood properties of number (e.g.,

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Brainerd, 1979). Olney (1991) applied a recently developed analytical scheme to separate item accuracy from order. Kindergarteners, second graders, and fifth graders were read lists of words, and were required to repeat them back in their order of presentation. Order is more gist-like than verbatim in the sense that an ordinal scale is more primitive than an interval or ratio scale. In both of the strings A B C D and A D B C, for example, A comes before D. Therefore, order can be remembered simply as a relationship among items, a gist-like pattern. Multiple sources of evidence in these experiments converged on the conclusion that order, as opposed to item, memory was more likely to elicit gist-based reconstructive processes, and that this approach was more prevalent among older children. For example, for younger children, as lists became longer, order memory dropped. On an immediate test, these children recapitulated the presentation order, and after a short delay, they read items out in reverse, the most recent items first. (Most theorists would agree that delay and longer lists make verbatim readout more difficult.) Older children resembled younger children on an immediate test. After a delay, however, older children showed a bowed pattern of recall such that order memory declined, and then improved, as the length of the list increased. The oldest children showed a shallower decline on the immediate test, and even more pronounced bowing on the delayed test. Thus, as the number of items increased, there was a shift, presumably to address the increasing processing complexity of longer lists, and this shift was most evident for the oldest children. This strategy (not necessarily a conscious one), invoked when verbatim memory was less accessible, led to superior order memory for longer lists. Reyna and Narter (1991) reported a similar verbatim-to-gist shift in decision-making involving probabilities. Children and adults were given a series of framing and Allais-type decision problems (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). They were asked to choose between a sure outcome, such as receiving $100, versus accepting a gamble in which they had a 50% probability of receiving $200, and a 50% chance of receiving nothing. Subjects also had to choose between negatively framed options. So, for example, they were asked to imagine that they had been given $200, but they had to accept one of two penalties. They must choose between losing $100 for sure versus accepting a 50% chance of losing $200 or losing nothing. From a purely quantitative standpoint, these options are equivalent in the

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sense that their expected values are equal (within problems and across positive and negative versions of problems). One might justifiably choose the sure option or the gamble because of one’s attitude toward risk. However, adults tend to switch their preferences depending on whether the problem is framed positively or negatively (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). They are risk-averse for gains, but risk-seeking for losses, and their confidence in both cases is high (Reyna, 1990). Prior research has supported the interpretation that adults respond to the gist of these problems, rather than quantitatively, which is why they are far from indifferent between options (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991~).The gist of gains problems boils down to something like winning some money for sure versus taking a chance on winning some or winning none. In both cases, winning some is an outcome, so the decisive comparison is between winning some and winning none, and the sure option dominates. Similarly, for losses, the gist amounts to losing some versus losing none, and the gamble dominates. On the other hand, the framing reversal was attentuated for ten-year-olds (Reyna & Narter, 1991). They were much more likely to consistently choose either the sure option or the gamble for both positive and negative problems. Moreover, their preferences between options, according to ratings, were also weaker than those of adults. Such children were old enough to process the quantitative information, although their execution of relevant computations was less reliable than that of adults. Yet, children were less susceptible to the ’cognitive illusion’ that the sure option was superior in one case but inferior in the other. Instead, children’s responses conformed better to a quantitative or expected-value analysis of the problems. A similar verbatim-to-gist shift has been observed in other domains, such as transitive inference (e.g., Perner & Mansbridge, 1983), face recognition (the “piecemeal to configurational shift, “ Carey & Diamond, 1977) and frequency memory (e.g., Marx, 1985, 1986). Marx (1986), for example, found that retention of verbatim event frequencies declined after middle childhood, but retention of global impressions of frequency differentials improved. Such a shift may have to do with experience in a domain, rather than age per se (Carey, Diamond, & Woods, 1980). In face recognition, for example, repeated exposure to stimuli such as inverted faces that are normally processed componentially induces configurational effects (e.g., Sergent, 1984). In adults, expertise has been associated with a similar decrease in the level of details

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involved in processing and in the number of attributes used in making judgments. Expert judgments are described as more global, impressionistic, and intuitive than those of novices (e.g., Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; Shanteau, 1989; Shanteau & Nagy, 1984).

Knowledge versus cognitive style It is important to distinguish between a child’s failure to perform computations, or to make distinctions, that they have no knowledge of, versus the level of specificity of problem representations that children tend to operate on. The verbatim-to-gist shift concerns the latter. Because they are simpler, gist-processing operations may develop earlier in life than specific quantitative operations. For example, in probability judgment, preschoolers can readily process the relational gist that, given one bin with 3 targets out of 4 objects versus another with 2 out of 4, more targets implies a greater probability of drawing the target. The ratio operations that process verbatim numbers are typically not learned until much later (Callahan, 1989). Therefore, older children are more likely to correctly solve problems in which options have unequal denominators (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b; but see below). Many investigators have interpreted such results as demonstrating the opposite of a verbatim-to-gist shift, the foremost example being Piaget (e.g., 1967) who described preoperational thought as ’intuitive’ and later concreteand formal-operational thought as ’logical .’ The implication of such theories is that intuition is a primitive form of thought that is overcome in childhood. Moore, Dixon, and Haines (1991), for instance, argue that intuitive knowledge of proportional reasoning precedes formal computational knowledge. Indeed, they define the latter as the ability to express intuitively understood task components computationally. This characterization of development conflates definite knowledge with the inclination to think intuitively. Since intuitive reasoning operations make fewer specific knowledge demands than quantitative reasoning operations, children can perform the former before they can perform the latter. So, children can say which has more before they can say by how much (until they are taught to subtract). The critical question is whether, given the presence of both types of reasoning operations in some domain, intuitive reasoning tends to become more dominant with age. The literature that we have briefly reviewed

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suggests that maturation and experience encourage more global, impressionistic thinking. If the task demands, however, the mature reasoner is able to progress to finer levels of differentiation (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b, 1991c), just as older children were able to shift within Olney’s (1991) word-span task as conditions changed. What evidence have we that reasoners are sensitive to task demands, and shift the level of gist accordingly? One example is that framing effects in the kinds of problems I have reviewed disappear when one option is made quantitatively superior to the other (COMOIIY& Northcraft, 1987). Another example is provided by numerical comparison tasks with both children and adults (Ashcraft, 1982; Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978; Link, 1990). Subjects are given two numbers, drawn from 1 to 99 for example, and are asked whether they are the same (or whether the left one is larger). There is evidence for two types of processing in such tasks. If the numbers are quite different, a gross magnitude estimation process is used, and response times do not vary with the distance between numbers. If the numbers are similar in magnitude, however, response times vary as a function of the exact difference between them. Similarly, in addition verification tasks, there is also evidence for a twostage process. In verifying whether 10 + 12 = 73, gross estimation yields a quick and accurate answer based on the overall gist of the problem. A problem in which quantities are in the ballpark, however, such as 42 33 = 73, requires a second, more precise stage of processing. Even for numerical comparisons, however, the first (obligatory) stage of processing is gist-based, and the second, optional, stage is numerical. These effects demonstrating processing flexbility, with a gist-level default, have been obtained in both children and adults, although the tendency to rely on gist increases with age. Thus, the availability of multiple representations that vary in specificity confers cognitive options: The same problem can be remembered, and, therefore, solved in multiple ways.

+

Competence versus retrieval and implementation The fuzzy-processing preference refers to the tendency to use a global pattern in reasoning, in spite of the ability to make finer differentiations. So, you may purchase a radio that costs $54.72 rather than one that costs $62.03 on the basis of price, and, nevertheless, be unaware of the exact difference

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between the two prices. A failure to subtract in this case does not imply that the reasoner cannot perform that computation (Reyna & Brainerd, 1 9 9 1 ~ ) .As we have discussed, adopting one of several perspectives on a problem does not necessarily lead to errors. Successful problem solving, therefore, involves selecting from among many relationships given as background facts, retrieving some among many principles that could be applied to such relationships, and, finally, applying the principles coherently. Clearly, ignorance of correct principles is a potential problem. However, of the wide array of problems that have been systematically studied, most seem to be solved using fairly simple representations and principles, such as inclusional gist and cardinality in classinclusion reasoning, or relational gist (which has more) and the relative frequency principle in probability judgment (for details about these and other gists and principles invoked in different paradigms, see Reyna & Brainerd, 1991a). Even apparently complex problems are often reduced to gists and principles familiar to young children (Reyna & Brainerd, in press). Thus, reasoning errors are less likely to spring from ignorance of logical principles. Rather, errors in judgment and decision making tend to occur, for both adults and children, because they fail to discern the relevant gist, or because they have difficulties in accessing and implementing their knowledge (Reyna, in press-a). Of course, noting certain relationships can act as a retrieval cue for principles that process those relationships (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991a). Perceiving a difference in number in class-inclusion, for example, tends to evoke a relative numerosity judgment in younger children (rather than an application of the cardinality principle). Older children get a bit further. Realizing that inclusion bears on the judgment of relative quantity, they retrieve the cardinality principle, but err in its application. For both younger and older children, however, ’correct’ principles are applied to ’true’ facts from the problem, although this does not imply that children’s answers are really correct. On the contrary, no matter how compelling the illusion, animals are more numerous than cows, and, paradoxically, the victims of the illusion know this. Our account indicates that children who make class-inclusion errors encode the relevant relationships, and know the cardinality principle, but either fail to retrieve the principle or have difficulty applying it (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990). Errors occur despite underlying competence. Table 2 contains a summary of our claims about sources of errors not only in this task, but in

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1. Failures to extract relevant gist from verbatim inputs.

2. Failures to retrieve appropriate gist-processing operations. 3. Failures to apply processing operations coherently to stored representations.

Table 2 Major Loci of Reasoning Errors

judgment and decision making generally. Development proceeds roughly from top to bottom. For example, in class-inclusion reasoning, younger children are more likely to have problems accessing the cardinality principle, and older children will access the principle, but have difficulty processing it. So, if we introduce superordinate set tagging, this does not benefit the younger children very much because the principle is not accessed to begin with. Older children benefit more from superordinate set tagging because they access the principle, but their difficulty is in processing it. The large and immediate effect of superordinate tagging suggests that older children’s difficulties are in the mechanics of processing rather than the absence of logic. Even adults, however, may know a principle, but fail to access it in an appropriate context. This suggests that children are not so different from adults, that the difference in many tasks is one of degree. Reyna (1991) has pointed out that the conjunction fallacy in adults can be analyzed as a failure to access relevant knowledge, and that this phenomenon closely parallels children’s class-inclusion reasoning. Here is an example of a problem given to adult subjects by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). Subjects were asked to read the description, and rank the probability of each of the alternatives listed below it. Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Linda is a teacher in an elementary school.

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works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. is active in the feminist movement. is a psychiatric social worker. is a member of the League of Women Voters. is a bank teller. is an insurance salesperson. is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.

Unsurprisingly, most subjects ranked "feminist" as more probable than "bank teller. The interesting datum is provided by the conjunction "feminist and bank teller" which people ranked as more probable than "bank teller." This is called the conjunction fallacy because the class of bank tellers includes the class of feminist bank tellers. Therefore, being a bank teller who is a feminist cannot be more probable than just being a bank teller. Naturally, adults know that this is impossible. Yet, they still fail to apply that competence correctly when faced with compelling qualitative information. So, there is an analogy between the typical class-inclusion error (in children) and the conjunction fallacy (in adults). In both cases, subjects often encode inclusion relationships appropriately; in both cases, a class-inclusion relationship implies a quantitative relationship (relative numerosity in classinclusion and relative probability in conjunction problems); in both cases, subjects know the principle that links class-inclusion to the quantitative principle; and, in both cases, subjects fail to apply that knowledge, and systematically respond at below-chance levels. These problems, class-inclusion and conjunction problems, indicate that some ways of asking about inclusion relations are transparent, and easy to solve, whereas others produce difficulties, even for adults. According to fuzzytrace theory's accounts of these phenomena, adult reasoning is continuous with children's; there is no sudden leap from incompetence to competence. In both class-inclusion and conjunction fallacy tasks, cognitive illusions (systematic errors of gist selection, of access to knowledge, or of processing) prevent reasoners from displaying their competence. There is a similar analogy between adult's and children's errors in probability judgment. Moreover, our analysis of errors in probability judgment is much like our analysis of class-inclusion errors: Overlapping inclusion relationships complicate processing, and horizontal relationships usurp the role of vertical ones. As in class-inclusion, the ratios in probability judgments 'I

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incorporate inclusion relationships since the frequency in the numerator is included in the total frequency in the denominator. However, the focal elements are in the numerators (i.e., the frequency of targets versus nontargets). Consistent with this analysis, adults and children often base probability judgments on comparisons between numerators, and, thereby, avoid having to keep track of the relationship between those numerators and the denominators in which they are included. Neglect of the denominator has been observed in a range of tasks, and processing difficulties have been especially marked for tasks in which there are multiple, nested inclusion relationships, such as in conditional probability judgments (e.g., Baron, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). In a study with children, for example, Spinillo and Bryant (1991) pointed out the importance of 'half' as a categorical marker in judgments of proportion; proportions greater than versus less than 'half' were more easily judged different than 'within-half' comparisons. However, 'half' referred to part-part comparisons ('half white, half blue') rather than part-whole relationships ('half of the box is blue'). Children's interpretations of 'half failed to take into account the whole box, which corresponds to the denominator. Similarly, Offenbach, Gruen, and Coskey (1984) found that children did not take differing denominators into account in judging probability. Thus, given two sampling spaces in which nontarget frequency varied as well as target frequency, children tended to err by responding solely on the basis of horizontal comparisons between the numbers of targets, neglecting part-whole, or vertical, relationships. This sort of error, neglecting the denominator, also occurs in adults. A transparent example is provided by advertising for government lotteries or for diet programs. The number of winners and 'losers,' respectively, are featured in advertisments, with the implication that the chance of obtaining a positive outcome is high. What the 'so many winners' campaigns fail to note, of course, is the total number of participants. Since a great deal of money is spent on advertising of this sort, it is plausible that more than a few people are influenced by it. Even those that note the lack of a denominator may be biased in their judgments of probability because of anchoring and adjustment heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). That is, although some may realize that total frequency must be taken into account, such correction is typically insufficient (allowing programs to seem more successful than they actually are). A more subtle example of denominator neglect is contained in a recent

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news story about playground accidents. Swings were reported to be the most dangerous kind of playground equipment because "The highest probability of an accident is on the swings." During the course of this report, it became clear that, in judging dangerousness, the frequency of accidents on swings had been compared to the frequency of accidents on other playground equipment. Since more accidents involved swings, they were judged 'more dangerous.' However, just as in Offenbach et al.'s (1984) examples with children, unequal denominators had been ignored. In judging the dangerousness of swings, the appropriate probability is the ratio of the frequency of accidents on swings divided by the total number of accidents plus non-accidents on swings. To determine relative dangerousness, this ratio can be compared to the ratio of accidents to usage (accidents plus nonaccidents) for other pieces of equipment. If usage differs across kinds of equipment, as is likely, denominators will be unequal. Therefore, if children played on swings more often than on other equipment, the frequency of such accidents could have been higher, although the probability of an accident on the swings was lower. That is, if we assume for the sake of simplicity a universe consisting only of accidents on A and on B types of equipment, A/(A f B) versus B/(A + B) is not the same as A/(A + not-A) versus B/(B + not-B). The first comparison is appropriate for judging which is the most likely accident, one on swings or one on some other piece of equipment. This would be of interest to, for example, emergency room physicians who wanted to predict the kinds of accidents they would be likely to encounter. Here, the complexity of inclusion relationships between numerator and denominator can legitimately be avoided (for the purpose of making a qualitative judgment) because the denominators are equal. Comparing numerators is sufficient to decide which is the most likely accident. The second comparison has to do with dangerousness, i.e., the risk associated with different pieces of equipment, and would be of interest to, for example, parents and safety engineers. In our view, the way in which these two scenarios are confused is probably not coincidental. Misperceiving a problem so that the denominator can be ignored is a more likely error than wrongly assuming that equal denominators are unequal. A more complex judgment of probability, and one that adults have great difficulty with, is conditional probability (e.g., Baron, 1988; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). The conditional probability of A on B is given by the joint probability of A and B (e.g., the frequency of the present-present cell of a contingency

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table divided by the total frequency) divided by the probability of B. Adults typically limit consideration to the probability of the present-present cell, and, once again, the denominator (the probability of B) is neglected. Although some have claimed that adults do not understand conditional probability, we would argue, instead, that the difficulty is in keeping track of the multiple nested and overlapping inclusion relationships. The reasoner must negotiate several levels of inclusion relationships in order to successfully judge conditional probability. There are overlapping inclusion relationships, just as in class-inclusion reasoning and regular probability judgment--only more so. In class-inclusion, the larger subset is both related to the other subset as well as being part of the overall set. In standard probability judgment tasks, the target subset is similarly related both to the nontarget subset and to the total set in which it is included. In a conditional probability, however, there is an additional layer in the inclusion hierarchy; the intersection of A and B is included both in B, as well as in the total set. The numerator (the frequency of B) of the bottom ratio is included in the denominators of both ratios. The order in which subsets are compared (smallest to largest, and then to intermediate) further complicates matters because the hierarchical order of the three sets (A & B, B, A + B) is violated. Note that processing is complicated not so much because there are two ratios (the ratios for the probabilities of A & B and for B), but because of the overlap of sets within and between ratios. Therefore, conditional probability is more difficult to process than class-inclusion and standard probability judgments. Our analysis of probability judgments of various types differs from previous analyses in several ways. First, although many agree that children make part-part, or horizontal, comparisons to avoid part-whole ones, it is generally assumed that this is because children lack the ability to understand vertical relationships (e.g., first-order relationships, Spinillo & Bryant, 1991). Piaget, for instance, observed that part-whole relationships were difficult to reason about, but he ascribed the difficulty to children's lack of logical competence, and, thus, proposed a discontinuity between children's and adult's reasoning. In contrast, we claim that children who can make vertical comparisons in isolation (e.g. ,"Are there more cows or more animals?") can still have difficulty processing overlapping horizontal and vertical relationships (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990b. Because the issue is processing complexity rather than reasoning competence, adults continue to show neglect of the denominator,

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especially when such neglect does not impinge on the gist of relationships among quantities (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b). Neither do we assume that computational sophistication or better memory for quantities are the keys to improving performance. In class-inclusion, for example, errors are finally avoided in older children by ignoring quantities and concentrating on gist. Because the issue is not competence, we expect framing effects--that different presentations of the same, quantitatively equivalent, probability problem should be more difficult than others. This is because different versions may evoke different qualitative gists, because the salience of cues to relevant knowledge may vary, or because processing is made more or less cumbersome. Regarding the latter, in the many tasks that involve inclusion relationships, such as probability judgment, representational systems that allow the reasoner to keep track of sets and their relationships benefit processing (just as Venn diagrams are helpful in solving categorical syllogisms, Reyna, in pressa).

Implications for teaching It follows from our previous remarks that teaching students how to ignore irrelevant details should be more profitable than having them pay assiduous attention to the information in the problem, as is typically encouraged (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991a). Extensive practice in ignoring interfering details may be necessary (see e.g., Gelman, 1969). Providing explicit retrieval cues, and processing aids, should also allow students to more effectively tap their underlying knowledge. It is important to stress that one implication that does not follow from fuzzy-theory, and associated evidence, is that children should not be exposed to a lot of specific facts on the grounds that they do not think with them anyway. First, as we have noted, the level of specificity that is required varies with the task (e.g., Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b). To prepare children broadly for the variety of problem-solving tasks that they will encounter, they should be presented with representations at various levels on the hierarchy of gist. To understand geopolitics, for example, it is necessary to have some idea of the relative proximity of key countries. Knowing which countries share a border, as opposed to a continent, may be pivotal, although both of these relationships are less specific than knowing the exact length of a shared border. In turn,

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precise measures of the length of a border might be pivotal in wartime, in order to correctly estimate fuel consumption for ground transportation along such a border. More important, a central question in this program of research remains unanswered, What are the origins of gist? It may be that gist derives from extensive experience with highly specific examples. Concrete examples do appear to be important in instruction, and, ironically, their function may be to allow reasoners to extract the gist, the signal from the noise. Examples that are similar with respect to gist, but exhibit a full range of diversity otherwise, seem to be ideal for acquiring learning sets (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991b). On the other hand, Bassok and Holyoak’s (1989) research suggests that the ’abstractness’ of examples matters. They found that mathematical problem solving transferred more readily to problem solving in physics (involving the same quantitative rules) than the other way around. Physics problems tended to vary more with respect to superficial details, whereas mathematics problems were more homogeneous. In sum, according to fuzzy-trace theory, the major determinants of errors in quantitative problem solving are (a) failure to extract the relevant gist (misperceiving the situation), (b) failure to access knowledge, and (c) difficulty in applying that knowledge to the situation. An inability to remember precise facts or to think logically are not likely problems, but the failure to retrieve and implement gist-level knowledge often is. Gist may be acquired by exposing students to an underlying rule or commonality among instances, or exposure to multiple, diverse instances of a category of problems may be necessary to recognize and extract their essential gist. However, problem solving is not made easy simply by multiple exposures to the topic. The concept of probability surfaces frequently in everyday life (e.g., in discussions of health, crime, and environmental risks), yet courses in statistics and probability are considered difficult. In statistics and probability, in fact, our intuitions often seem to work against us, as this final problem illustrates: Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three doors. Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors, opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then says to you ‘Do you want to pick door No. 2?’ Is it to your advantage to switch your choice?

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The correct answer is "yes;" the first door has a 1/3 chance of winning, but the second door has a 2/3 chance. Eight percent of the general public and only 35% of those from academic institutions answered the problem correctly (though 71% of the academics now believe you should switch; Parade Magazine, July 7, 1991). A very small percentage of readers were convinced that people did not realize that the host is opening a losing door on purpose. However, "the great majority of people understand the conditions perfectly, but still get the problem wrong. Such problems are quantitatively simple, the relevant principles are known, and the facts of the problem are apparently fully appreciated. The difficulty is in our intuitions. I'

Summary Fuzzy-trace theory suggests that numerical problems are often solved nonumerically, and that thinking becomes more intuitive (or qualitative) with age. Therefore, encouraging ever greater precision and attention to detail in quantitative reasoning runs counter to the ordinary mode of processing for most reasoners. Moreover, emphasizing verbatim details can interfere with reasoning, especially in younger children (e.g., the picture-interference effect). Representational complexity also interacts with processing complexity, so that more detailed representations tend to require more elaborate processing. Classinclusion reasoning is an example of a task in which a quantitative approach exacerbates processing complexity. As Olney's (1991) data suggest, older reasoners appear to be more likely to invoke qualitative processing in order to overcome the limitations of verbatim memory (the verbatim-to-gist shift). Thus, although a task can compel positive dependence between reasoning and memory for specific quantities (as in mental arithmetic), mature reasoners tend to avoid reliance on verbatim memory. Although intuitive processing leads to inconsistent responses in framing problems for adults, expected outcomes in such problems are equivalent. Overall, greater accuracy and expertise are associated with more global processing. As the parallels between the conjunction fallacy and class-inclusion errors illustrate, children's mistakes are, typically, not fundamentally different from those of adults--failure to construe the problem appropriately (which may make the reasoner blind to solutions that he or she knows), failure to retrieve relevant

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knowledge (to note its relevance in a specific context), and a susceptibility to becoming bogged down in processing complexities. Therefore, for adults and children, errors occur in spite of both logical competence and accurate memory for problem information. Since each problem presentation evokes an intuitive picture of a qualitative pattern, we expect that reasoners will respond differently to formally equivalent problems. Probability judgments, for example, range from intuitively obvious to opaque, even for professional mathematicians. According to fuzzy-trace theory, such judgments can be analyzed much like class-inclusion judgments, in that nested and overlapping sets complicate mental bookkeeping. Predictable errors result from an effort to avoid the complexity of these inclusion relationships. Paradoxically, discouraging reasoning that is mathematical, by reducing memory interference and processing complexity, may lead to greater success in mathematical reasoning.

References Ashcraft, M. H. (1982). The development of mental arithmetic: A chronometric approach. Developmental Review, 2, 2 13-236. Ashcraft, M. H., & Battaglia, J. (1978). Cognitive arithmetic: Evidence for retrieval and decision processes in mental arithmetic. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 4, 527-538. Thinking and deciding. Baron, J. (1988). University Press.

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Bassok, M., & Holyoak, K. (1989). Interdomain transfer between isomorphic topics in algebra and physics. Journal of ExDerimental Psychologv: Learning. Memory. and Coenition, 15,153-166. Brainerd, C. J. (1979). Praeger.

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Brainerd, C. J. (1981). Working memory and the developmental analysis of probability judgment. Psychological Review, B,463502. Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V . F. (1988). Generic resources, reconstructive processing, and children’s mental arithmetic. Developmental Psychology,

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24, 324-334. Brainerd, C. I., & Reyna V. F. (1990a). Gist is the grist: Fuzzy-trace theory and the new intuitionism. Developmental Review, IQ,3-47. Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1990b). Inclusion illusions: Fuzzy-trace theory and perceptual salience effects in cognitive development. Developmental Review. Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (1993). Memorv independence and memorv interference in cognitive development. Psychological Review, 100, 42-67. Brouwer, L. E. J. (1952). Historical background, principles, and methods of intuitionism. South African Journal of Science, 49, 139-146. Callahan, P. (1989). Learning and development of probability concepts: Effects of comouter-assisted instruction and diagnosis. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona, College of Education, Tucson. Campbell, R. L. (in press). Does class inclusion have mathematical prerequisites? Coenitive Development. From piecemeal Carey, S . , & Diamond, R. (1977). configurational representation of faces. Science, 195,3 12-314. Carey, S . , Diamond, R. & Woods, B. (1980). face recognition--A maturational component? Psychology, 16,257-269.

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Clark, H. H., & Clark, E. V. (1977). Psvchologv and language: An introduction to psycholineuistics. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Connolly, T., & Northcraft, G. (1987). The limits of decision framing. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ. Dempster, F. (1992). The rise and fall of the inhibitory mechanism: Toward a unified theory of cognitive development and aging. Developmental Review, 12,45-75. Diamond, A., & Goldman-Rakic, P. S . (1989).

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infants and rhesus monkeys on Piaget’s AB task: Evidence for dependence on dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Experimental Brain Research, 74,24-40. Estes,

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Fisher, R. P., & Chandler, C. C. (1991). Independence between recalling interevent relations and specific events. Journal of Experimental Psvcholow: Learning. Memory and Cognition, l7, 722-733. Gelman. R. (1969). Conservation acquisition: A problem of learning to attend to relevant attributes. Journal of Experimental Child Psvchology, 7, 167-187. Hammond, K. R., Hamm, R. M., Grassia, J., & Pearson, T . (1987). Direct comparison of the efficacy of intuitive and analytical cognition in expert judgment. IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics, SMC-17, 753-770. Hastie, R., & Park, B. (1986). The relationship between memory and judgment depends on whether the judgment task is memory-based or online. Psvchological Review, 93, 258-268. Heyting, H. (1959). Holland.

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Hitch, G . J. (1978). The role of short-term working memory in mental o , 302-323. arithmetic. Cognitive Psychology, l Johnson, J., & Newport, E. L. (1989). Critical period effects in second language learning: The influence of maturational state on the acquisition of English as a Second Language. Cognitive Psycholo~y, 60-99.

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Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under uncertaintv: Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kintsch, W . , & Greeno, J. G . (1985). Understanding and solving word arithmetic problems. Psychological Review, 92, 109-129. Link, S . (1990). Modeling imageless thought: The relative judgment theory

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of numerical comparisons. Journal of Mathematical Psvchology, 34, 241. Marx, M. H. (1985). Retrospective reports on frequency judgments. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 23, 309-310. Marx,

M. H. (1986). More retrospective reports on eventfrequency judgments: Shift from multiple traces to strength factor with age. Bulletin of the Psvchonomic Societv, 24, 183-185.

Miller, G . A. (1981). Freeman.

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Moore, C. F., Dixon, J. A., & Haines, B. A. (1991). Components of understanding in proportional reasoning: A fuzzy-set representation of developmental progressions. Child Development, 62,441-459. Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Offenbach, S . I., Gruen, G. E., & Coskey, B. J. (1984). Development of proportional response strategies. Child Development, 55, 963-972. Olney, C . (1991). Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Arizona, College of Education, Tucson. Perner, J., & Mansbridge, D. G. (1983). Developmental differences in encoding length series. Child Development, 54,710-719. Piaget, J. (1952). The child’s conception of number. New York: Humanities. Piaget, J. (1967). The psychologv of intelligence. New York: Random House. Rabinowitz, F. M., Howe, M. L., & Lawrence, J. A. (1989). Class inclusion and working memory. Journal of Experimental Child _Psvchologv, 48,379-410. Reyna, V. F. (1990). Categorical versus compensatorv reasoning and inconsistent choices. Paper presented at the meeting of the Psychonomic Society, New Orleans, LA. Reyna, V. F. (1991). Class inclusion, the conjunction fallacy, and other cognitive illusions. Developmental Review.

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Reyna, V. F. (1992). Reasoning, remembering, and their relationship: Social, cognitive, and developmental issues. In M. L. Howe, C. J. Brainerd, & V. F. Reyna (Eds.), Development of long-term retention. New York: Springer-Verlag. Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1989). Output interference, generic resources, and cognitive development. Journal of Experimental Child Psvcholog~,47, 42-46. Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1990). Fuzzy processing in transitivity development. Annals of ODerations Research, 23, 37-63. Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1991a). Fuzzy-trace theory and children’s acquisition of mathematical and scientific concepts. Learning and Individual Differences, 3, 27-60. Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1991b). A fuzzy-trace theory of reasoning and remembering: Patterns, paradoxes, and parallelism. In A. Healy , R. Shiffrin, & S. Kosslyn (Eds.), From learning processes to cognitive processes: Essays in honor of William K. Estes (Vol. 2). New York: Academic Press. Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1991~) Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist extraction, truncation, and conversion. Journal of B e h a v o ir a ~ le c s io in 4,,249-262. Reyna, V. F. & Kiernan, B. (1993). Gist versus verbatim memory in children: Understanding. inteFratine. and remembering sDatial and linear relationships. Reyna, V. F., & Narter, D. (1991). Theoretical implications of children’s decision making. Paper presented at the meeting of the Psychonomic Society, San Francisco, CA. Sergent, J. (1984). An investigation into componential and configurational processes underlying face perception. British Journal of Psvchology, 25, 22 1-242. Shanteau, J. (1989). Psychological characteristics and strategies of expert decision makers. In B. Rohrmann, L. R. Beach, C. Vlek & S. R. Watson (Eds.), Advances in decision research. Amsterdam: North Holland. Shanteau, J., & Nagy, G. F. (1984).

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perception: Theory and application. In M. Cook (Ed.), Issues in person perception. London: Methuen. Shipley, E. F. (1979). The class-inclusion task: Question form and distributive comparisons. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 8, 301331. Siegler, R. S . (1983). Information processing approaches to development. In P. H. Mussen & W. Kessen (Eds.), Handbook of child psycholoev: History. theory and methods Vol. 1, (pp. 129-21 1). New York: Wiley. Spinillo, A. G., & Bryant, P. (1991). Children's proportional judgments: The importance of half. Child Development, 62,427-440. Tversky, A . , & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315. Tversky, A . , & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. Journal of Business, 59, 25 1-278. Constructive comprehension abilities Weismer, S . E. (1985). exhibited by language-disordered children. Journal of Speech and Hearing Research, 28, 175-184. Winer, G. A. (1980). Class-inclusion reasoning in children: A review of the empirical literature. Child Development, 51, 309-328. Winer, G . A. (in press). On the uncertainty of conservation: Responses to misleading conservation questions. Developmental Psychology.

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Commentary: Mathematical Cognition and Fuzzy-Trace Theory

Graham .I Hitch . University of Lancaster, United Kingdom Reyna & Brainerd’s chapter describes the fuzzy-trace theory of reasoning-remembering relationships in cognitive development and reviews some of the growing and diverse body of evidence which supports the theory. It goes on to discuss applications of the theory to mathematical reasoning. The full chapter covers a vast amount of remarkably diverse material, and it is obviously difficult to do it full justice in a short commentary. Since fuzzy-trace theory is clearly an important and original contribution to the study of the development of reasoning and memory, I propose to focus upon the theory itself. I begin by summarising briefly some of its most interesting aspects, and I continue by considering its applicability to mathematics. I then go on to discuss some outstanding issues for the theory, and I conclude with a suggestion for an alternative way of capitalizing on its insights. Before starting it may be worth emphasising that fuzzy-trace theory is described more fully in a number of articles (see especially Brainerd & Kingma, 1984; Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Brainerd & Reyna, in press), and I have drawn on these to amplify some of the points made in Reyna & Brainerd’s chapter.

The theory The typical reasoning problem studied by psychologists is such that getting the right answer depends on applying an appropriate set of mental operations to some given information. This is clearly illustrated in an arithmetic problem such as answering whether 6 2 is greater or less than 7. In cases where the given information is not continuously available for inspection, it seems intuitively obvious that finding the right solution will depend on having an accurate memory for the initial statement of the problem. It is therefore somewhat surprising that Piaget largely ignored the role of memory in reasoning in his comprehensive and influential theory of cognitive development. However, Piaget’s omission merely left it open for others to demonstrate that children’s reasoning failures could be due to poor memory for the problem itself, rather

+

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than an inability to perform the necessary mental operations (see e.g. Bryant & Trabasso, 1971). Evidence from adults also suggests the importance of memory for problem information in simple mathematics. For example, patterns of error in mental arithmetic can be predicted by assuming that they reflect the rapid forgetting of the numbers to be entered into the calculation (Hitch, 1978). One of the reasons fuzzy-trace theory is particularly interesting is that it causes us to question seriously what has previously been regarded as the established relationship between memory and reasoning. The theory does this by assuming there are two fundamentally different types of memory trace; verbatim traces which preserve literal information and fuzzy traces which preserve gist. This distinction is not itself new, and can be traced back to Bartlett’s (1932) work on memory. It is also a common feature of more recent discussions of memory and comprehension (see e.g. Clark & Clark, 1977; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). However, the idea that the distinction between verbatim and gist memory traces may be important for understanding reasoning and its development is novel and insightful. According to fuzzy-trace theory, the two types of memory trace are independent of one another and there is a broadly-based preference for reasoning to be based on fuzzy rather than verbatim traces. This preference arises for a number of reasons, not least the greater durability of gist information in memory. Taken together, these assumptions lead to the central, and at first sight counterintuitive claim of fuzzy-trace theory, namely that successful reasoning can be achieved independently of verbatim memory for the problem information. It is maintained that reasoning is dependent instead on memory for the gist of the problem. Reyna & Brainerd refer to the former of these relationships as reasoning-remembering independence. Brainerd & Reyna (in press) cite evidence from a wide range of studies covering class inclusion, conservation, probability judgment, transitive inference and story comprehension in support of reasoning-remembering independence. This extensive range of evidence indicates the broad scope of fuzzy-trace theory and establishes its claim to have extremely general applicability. This is a second reason for thinking of the theory as a potentially important advance. A third feature of the theory is the verbatim-to-gist shift, according to which there is a general trend for the development of memory for gist to lag behind verbatim memory. This assumption is used to account for developmental changes in the relationship between reasoning and remembering, in particular,

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the observation that the relationship can be one of mutual interference in early childhood rather than one of independence (Reyna & Brainerd, 1989). The significance of this aspect of the theory lies in its implications for cognitive development and for efforts to improve children’s reasoning. For example, it leads to such ideas as Reyna & Brainerd’s claim that young children’s reasoning will be facilitated by de-emphasizing the processing of verbatim detail and encouraging a reliance on gist. In the realm of mathematical reasoning, with its traditional emphasis on quantitative accuracy, this is a fairly radical proposal. To sum up, fuzzy-trace theory is concerned with the relationship between reasoning and memory during cognitive development. It proposes that reasoning depends on memory for gist rather than, as has often been assumed, verbatim memory. In this way it accounts for a broad body of evidence suggesting that reasoning and remembering can be independent, and it explains some developmental changes in reasoning-remembering relationships. The theory accounts for mathematical reasoning in terms of principles that are assumed to be applicable to reasoning generally. There are two particular issues that stand out at this relatively early stage in the development of fuzzy-trace theory. The first concerns its applicability to the particular domain of mathematical cognition, the second is to do with conceptual aspects of the theory, specifically some questions concerning its explanatory power.

Is mathematical reasoning special? The first issue is raised by any theory that attempts to explain a specific domain of cognition in terms of principles that apply to cognition in general. Any universal theory is likely to encounter difficulty to the extent that cognitive processes are domain-specific. A number of recent findings on mathematical cognition have been interpreted as arguing in favour of domain-specificity. For example, some ingenious experimental studies involving infants have shown that aspects of numerical cognition appear very early on in development. These include the ability to quantify a set of stimuli (Starkey, Spelke & Gelman 1990) and even the ability to carry out simple arithmetical operations (Wynn, 1992). The suggestion that has been made to account for these data is that numerical cognition may depend on domain-specific mechanisms, that may even be innately-specified. Research

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on selective mathematical underachievement in schoolchildren has also been taken as evidence for domain-specific mechanisms (Siege1 & Ryan, 1989; but see Hitch & McAuley, 1991). Further arguments for the specificity of mathematical processes are supported by neuropsychological data. For example, Warrington (1982) reported the case of brain-damage leading to a selective impairment of arithmetical skills, which was not secondary to any other cognitive deficits. Other neuropsychological studies have demonstrated a variety of different kinds of selective deficit in arithmetical cognition (Caramazza & McCloskey, 1987). In its presently developed form, fuzzy-trace theory fails to say anything about processes that are special to mathematics. Although none of the above findings is necessarily inconsistent with the theory, it is clear that the theory would at the very least require ad hoc extension and modification in order to explain them. One final point before leaving mathematics concerns the extent to which mathematics typically does involve reasoning with fuzzy information, as is claimed by the theory. That fuzzy information can be important is suggested by evidence for the use of approximate, analogue representations of number in judgements about the relative size of pairs of numerals (Moyer & Landauer, 1967). However, a vast range of the arithmetical tasks that children perform involve accurate counting (Ginsburg, 1977). It is very difficult to see how such tasks could be performed without relying on an accurate memory system, and indeed this is argued in one specific instance cited by Brainerd & Reyna (1988). It is therefore crucial for the theory to develop a general understanding of the conditions determining whether fuzzy or verbatim information is used to support reasoning, and to show how this applies in the domain of mathematics.

Conceptual aspects of fuzzy-trace theory Two conceptual issues raised by fuzzy-trace theory concern the basis of reasoning-remembering relationships and the conditions under which independence holds. The standard methodology involves making separate behavioural assessments of memory and reasoning. This has the consequence that finding dependence or independence in the data does not necessarily imply that reasoning and remembering are based on the same or different types of information. Specifically, the identity of the information in memory is only one

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factor influencing reasoning-remembering relationships. In general, performance will also reflect other aspects of the experimental procedures (e.g. delay, and the type of memory retrieval process associated with each assessment). Thus, until the methods themselves are better understood, there is a possibility that interpreting the independence of test data directly in terms of independence of selected underlying processes may lead to the overinterpretation of individual findings. Given the importance of reasoning-remembering independence in the theory, this is a central issue. A second issue concerns the conditions under which to expect reasoning-remembering independence to hold. Fuzzy-trace theory predicts that independence should hold whenever there is a mismatch between the type of memory trace supporting reasoning and the type of trace involved in the test of memory. If reasoning and remembering both involve gist, or if they both involve verbatim information, then the theory predicts reasoning-remembering dependencies rather than independence. Brainerd & Reyna (in press) report data in support of these predictions. The theory is also used to explain the mutual interference between remembering and reasoning that is observed under certain conditions. On one level it is a considerable success for the theory to be able to cope not only with the basic finding of reasoning-remembering independence but also the existence of positive and negative relationships. At another level, however, the theory may be too powerful if it can be used to explain any possible experimental result. The central issue here is whether the theory is sufficiently constrained to provide a convincing explanation for the specific relationship observed in any particular situation. One aspect of this issue concerns the need for independent criteria for assessing what type of memory trace is underlying reasoning in any specific instance, and what type of trace is assessed by the test of memory. Some purchase on this has been obtained in the case of testing memory, where advantage has been taken from previous work on the distinction between gist and literal recall. However, it is not clear what external criteria can be used to determine whether reasoning processes involve gist or verbatim information in any specific instance. In the absence of clearly articulated, independent criteria for determining the type of information used in reasoning, there is a possibility of circularity in using different observed relationships between reasoning and remembering as support for the theory. Furthermore, if the type of information underlying reasoning cannot be independently verified,

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the theory would appear to be untestable. This issue is well illustrated by cases of reasoning-remembering interference. Here, the lurking problem seems to be the appeal to ad hoc explanatory factors. However plausible the suggested explanations may seem in individual studies, the absence of any overt constraints on interpretation in cases where the basic finding of reasoning-remembering independence is not observed could be seen as allowing theoretical ingenuity too much rein. Thus, a general issue for fuzzy-trace theory is whether it is too powerful and can therefore be used to explain any observable pattern of reasoning-remembering relationships. Note however that this is not an inherent drawback of the theory, since it might be possible to develop a more rigorous statement specifying the conditions for determining its applicability.

A modified approach Any theory that postulates general principles must specify how to map from the general statements in the theory to its application in a particular situation. The Levels of Processing approach to memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) illustrates this point nicely in respect of the difficulties that were experienced in ascertaining which of a particular set of encoding tasks involved processing the input to a deeper level (Craik & Tulving, 1975). One way of avoiding this type of problem in the case of fuzzy-trace theory would be to preserve its central insight, namely that reasoning and remembering can depend on independent classes of stored information, but to abandon the assumption that the principles of the theory are globally applicable. This could be achieved by abandoning the strong claim that there is a general preference for fuzzy reasoning across all domains which increases through development. On present evidence this claim seems somewhat premature. A more modest, but potentially fruitful approach might be to adopt a weaker form of the theory which states that reasoning-remembering relationships, based on firm operational distinctions between different types of memory trace, can be used to infer the types of reasoning process used in different types of problem. The research aim would then be to establish through empirical study the conditions under which different types of reasoning process are employed. Such an approach would avoid some of the pitfalls associated with postulating a global theory and then having to patch it up to cope with unprincipled ‘exceptions’ such as those that have

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already been found. The weaker form of the theory would make fewer predictions, but would nevertheless provide a useful and broadly applicable tool for investigating reasoning and its development. It would still require an improved understanding of the methodology used to assess reasoning-remembering relationships. However, it would have the advantage of leaving open for investigation the question of whether mathematical reasoning is systematically different from other forms of reasoning. The current form of fuzzy-trace theory has the disadvantage that it appears to prejudge the answer to this interesting and important question.

Conclusion In conclusion, I have tried to articulate the reasons why fuzzy-trace theory represents a valuable insight into the development of reasoning and memory. I have argued that its global scope is a source of both strength and weakness. The strength is in the broad scope and applicability of the theory. The weakness is that the theory ignores domain-specific factors, which may well be important in the particular case of mathematical reasoning. The theory also carries with it the potential problem of having too much explanatory power. As a possible solution, I have proposed using a weaker form of the theory as a way of preserving its essential insights and at the same time providing a useful empirical tool for investigating reasoning in a more open-ended, and less prescriptive way.

References Brainerd, C.J., & Kingma, J. (1984). Do children have to remember to reason? A fuzzy-trace theory of transitivity development. Developmental Review, 4, 311-377. Brainerd, C.J., & Reyna, V.F. (1988). Generic resources, reconstructive processing, and children’s mental arithmetic. Developmental PsvchologL 24, 324-334. Brainerd, C.J., & Reyna, V.F. (1990). Gist is the grist: Fuzzy-trace theory and 365-403. the new intuitionism. Developmental Review,

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interference in cognitive development. Psvcholoeical Review Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psycholop. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. Bryant, P.E., & Trabasso, T. (1971). Transitive inference and memory in young children. Nature, 232, 456-458. Caramazza, A., & McCloskey, M. (1987). Dissociations of calculation processes. In: G. Deloche and X. Seron (Eds.), Mathematical disabilities: A cognitive neuropsycholoPica1 permective. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Clark, H. H., & Clark, E.V. (1977). Psvcholopv and language. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Craik, F.I.M., & Lockhart, R.S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research, Journal of Verbal Learnine and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671-684. Craik, F.I.M., & Tulving, E. (1975). Depth of processing and the retention of words in episodic memory. Journal of Experimental psychology: General, 104, 268-294. Ginsburg, H. (1977). Children’s arithmetic: The learning Drocess. New York: Van Nostrand. Hitch, G.J. (1978). The role of short-term working memory in mental arithmetic. Cognitive Psvchology, 0 ,302-33. Hitch, G.J., & McAuley, E. (1991).Working memory in children with specific arithmetical learning difficulties. British Journal of Psycholog, 82, 375-386. Moyer, R.S., & Landauer, T.K. (1967). Time required for judgments of numerical inequality. Nature, 215, 1519-1520. Reyna, V.F., & Brainerd, C.J. (1989). Output interference, generic resources, and cognitive development. Journal of Experimental Child Psvcholopy, 47, 42-46. Siegel, L., & Ryan, E.B. (1989). The development of working memory in normally achieving and subtypes of learning disabled children. Child Development, 60, 973-980.

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Starkey P., Spelke, E.S. & Gelman, R. (1990). Numerical abstraction by human infants. Cognition, 36, 97-127. van Dijk, T.A., & Kintsch, W. (1983). Stratepies of discourse comprehension. New York: Academic Press. Warrington, E.K. (1982). The fractionation of arithmetical skills: A single case study. Quarterlv Journal of Experimental Psychology. 34A, 3 1-51. Wynn, K. (1992). Addition and subtraction by human infants. Nature, 358, 749-750.

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Commentary: Counting on Mathematics in Everyday Life Robert H . Logie, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom Reyna and Brainerd present a highly stimulating account of the problem solving and reasoning processes involved in mathematics, by suggesting that there are essentially two forms of reasoning, namely quantitative, and qualitative or fuzzy reasoning. They have argued that fuzzy reasoning matches more closely the form of reasoning that would be adopted naturally by adults and that develops naturally in children. Thus in most cases in everyday life, we use concepts like ’more’, ’less’, ’longer’ and ’shorter’, or more fine grained versions such as ’a little more’ or ’a bit shorter’. Rarely, they argue, are we required to specify an exact quantity. For example when calculating the price of our chosen purchases in the supermarket, normally we would be interested in whether the bill came to around E30 or around S O , but would be less concerned about the whether the exact total came to E31.54 or E32.47 except when it came to writing the cheque. The chapter covers a lot of ground, and it would be difficult to give it a comprehensive treatment in a brief commentary. As such I should like to concentrate on particular aspects of mathematics, namely studies of counting and mental arithmetic, which seem to offer additional support for many of Reyna and Brainerd’s arguments, but which also throw up some interesting caveats. A few years ago Logie and Baddeley (1987) reported a series of studies on counting in normal adults. In these studies subjects were required to count the number of dots in a random array or to count the number of times a square appeared at irregular intervals on a computer screen, and respond with the total using a numeric keypad. Subjects count the stimuli either as a single task or while they were vocalising aloud an irrelevant word, a technique commonly referred to as articulatory suppression. Results were consistent in showing that articulatory suppression while counting produced a substantial disruption in counting performance. However the major disruptive effect of suppression was on the number of errors produced rather than the size of the error. When a subject made an error, their response tended to be numerically quite close to the

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correct total, suggesting that performance was not totally disrupted by articulatory suppression. The technique of articulatory suppression has been widely interpreted as a means to disrupt the use of subvocal speech in verbal short-term memory tasks (see e.g. Baddeley, 1986; Logie, this volume). Thus we tentatively interpreted these results in terms of two separate components of the counting task: one component which maintains accuracy in counting, and relies on subvocalization of a running total, and a different and less well specified component which supports approximations. This latter component would probably rely at least in part on priming of the most recently accessed numbers in a long-term memory representation of the well-learned counting sequence. In some more recent studies of mental arithmetic we have shown very similar results with two-digit mental addition (Logie, Gilhooly & Wynn, in preparation). In this case again, articulatory suppression produced a substantial increase in the error rate, but resulted in error responses that were close to the correct total. That is subjects seem to have some way of knowing the 'ball park' total, but have great difficulty maintaining accuracy under articulatory suppression. Moreover this pattern of disruption did not seem to be due to the general distracting effect of a secondary task, since other secondary tasks such as concurrent hand tapping or presenting tape recorded irrelevant speech had very little if any effect on counting or addition performance. As for counting, mental arithmetic appeared to rely on subvocalisation for accuracy, but perhaps accessed learned strategies for adding, or used a vocabulary of well known sums (see e.g. Campbell & Graham, 1985; Dehaene, 1992) which allow only approximate responses to the specific problems given. For example, most normal adults know that 20 add 40 is 60, and this would be in their 'vocabulary of sums', but many would have to calculate 19 plus 39 to achieve an accurate response. The knowledge that 19 is close to 20 and that 39 is close to 40 would allow subjects to respond with the approximately correct answer 59 without necessarily performing the calculation. Similar conclusions can be drawn from a case study of a neuropsychological patient described by Dehaene and Cohen, (1991). Their patient had a severe acalculia together with poor verbal short-term memory. The counting difficulty was however confined to problems with accuracy, because the patient was able to make reasonable estimates of the correct answer. For example the patient accepted 2 + 2 = 5 as being correct, but rejected gross errors such as 2+2=9. Dehaene and Cohen argued that there are two

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cognitive mechanisms involved in counting, one of which is involved in approximate computations, while the other ensures numerical accuracy. This pattern of data from a patient with a short-term verbal memory deficit, fits well with the suggestion that subvocal rehearsal is involved in maintaining accuracy, but that some other part of the cognitive system can cope with approximations in calculation. Support for this view can also be gleaned from studies of visual imagery in counting. For example Moyer and Landauer (1967) and Restle (1970) argued that in the case of mental addition, subjects use a mental analogue of a number line which is then extended in their mental representation by an amount equivalent to the addend. This allows the subject to 'read off' the answer from the resulting analogue image. More recently, this view has been extended, for example by Dehaene (1992) who suggests that an analogue magnitude representation can be used for arriving at approximate solutions to arithmetic problems. This process of approximation is viewed as distinct from quantification which is associated more closely with accuracy in numerical cognition. However the extent to which people spontaneously rely on visuo-spatial temporary storage or visual imagery is still very much in debate. Indeed it may be that imagery offers one of a number of strategies that are available and only some individuals would choose to use imagery in laboratory studies of mental arithmetic (e.g. Siegler, 1987). Nevertheless this distinction between accuracy and approximation maps on well to the differing approaches to mathematics highlighted by Reyna and Brainerd. These data suggest that the fuzzy versus quantitative reasoning distinction may be useful in so far as it applies to arithmetical problem solving and counting. However it leaves open at least three questions. First there is the issue as to whether we can claim that fuzzy reasoning is the natural form of reasoning. One argument could be that since most reasoning in everyday life only requires 'fuzzy' processing, we get a lot more practice with that kind of reasoning, and become better at it as a result. This fits with the arguments presented by Ericsson and his colleagues (see Ericsson & Pennington, this volume), and suggests that rather than being a 'natural' form of reasoning, it is more of an acquired cognitive skill. The verbatim to gist shift discussed by Reyna and Brainerd would also be consistent with this view in that as children develop they also get more practice with gist based reasoning. Moreover, gist based memory, relies on having available the necessary schema. For example,

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if we have very few experiences and very little information about a topic, then we would have poorly formed schema for that topic, thus forcing us to rely on some form of verbatim trace. Second, there is the issue of how a verbatim to gist shift fits with some of the developmental data on children’s use of subvocalization. We know that children around the age of five or six do not appear spontaneously to use subvocal rehearsal (Hitch, Woodin, & Baker, 1989), and yet this seems to be an important component in skilled, accurate counting and mental arithmetic. Thus despite the fact that young children appear to rely on verbatim memory, at least one of the strategies that supports verbal verbatim recall and that seems to be implicated in accurate counting may not be in place at the time that children are introduced to elementary mathematical concepts. This concurrence of characteristics in the development of verbal cognition could well lead to a number of difficulties in learning mathematics when teaching methods emphasise both an accurate representation of the problem elements and maintenance of accuracy in the associated solution path. Finally, the use of the term ’fuzzy’ to refer to a form of qualitative reasoning appears to lead to something of a conceptual paradox. The everyday sense of the word ’fuzzy’ implies not only that we do not pay much attention to exact quantities, but that the boundaries between classes are somewhat uncertain also. In qualitative reasoning, there is generally a definite answer to the problem posed, and a definite conclusion can be drawn. It is clear from several of the examples described by Reyna and Brainerd, most notably class inclusion problems, that fuzzy boundaries are not intended. In the example they give of presenting children with seven cows and three horses, there are clearly more cows than horses, and the correct answer to the class inclusion question is that there are more animals than cows. The mistake that children make is not based on uncertainty as to which are animals and which are not, nor any grey area between the category ’animal’ and the category ’not animal’. Therefore referring to qualitative or gist-based reasoning, and its independence or otherwise from gist-based memory, rather than using the term ’fuzzy’ reasoning, perhaps would help clarify the insightful concepts in this chapter for application to mathematical reasoning in everyday life.

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References Baddeley, A.D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Campbell, J.I.D., & Graham, D.J. (1985). Mental multiplication skill: Structure, process, and acquisition. Canadian Journal of Psvchology, 39, 338-366. Dehaene, S., & Cohen, L. (1991). Two mental calculation systems: A case study of severe acalculia with preserved approximation. Neuropsychologia, 29, 1045-1074. Hitch, G.J., Woodin, M.E., & Baker, S. (1989). Visual and phonological components of working memory in children. Memorv and Cognition, II, 175-185. Logie, R.H., & Baddeley, A.D. (1987), Cognitive processes in counting. Journal of ExDerimental Psychologv: Learning. Memory and Cognition 13, 310-326. Logie, R.H., Gilhooly, K.J., & Wynn, V. (1993). Counting on working memorv in mental arithmetic. Unpublished manuscript. Moyer, R.S., & Landauer, T.K. (1967). Time required for judgements of numerical inequality. Nature. 215, 1519-1520. Restle, F., (1970). Speed of adding and comparing numbers. Experimental Psychology, 83,274-278.

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Siegler, R.S., (1987). Strategy choices in subtraction. In J. Sloboda & D. Rogers (Eds.), Cognitive processes in mathematics (pp 81-106). Oxford: Oxford Science Publications.

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MEMORY AND EVERYDAY LIFE

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Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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CHAPTER 4 SLIPS AND ERRORS IN LEARNING COMPLEX TASKS Dianne C. Berry University of Reading, United Kingdom Human error has become a focus of interest and intensive study in recent years, both in relation to practical everyday tasks and to cognitive theorising. This chapter is concerned with errors that occur during the learning and performance of complex cognitive skills, particularly in the control and operation of computerised systems. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the role of memory in the production, detection, and reduction of such errors. The chapter begins by outlining some basic distinctions in the field of human error and describes one generic approach to error modelling, that being Reason’s (1987, 1990) Generic Error Modelling System. A number of different types of error study are then described; specifically, naturalistic studies of slips and lapses, laboratory studies of the control of simulated systems, and case studies of accidents or potential accidents. The chapter then looks at the processes involved in detecting different types of error. Finally, it considers ways of reducing error, such as by training, designing systems in such a way as to prevent error, or by providing memory aids and decision support systems.

Limitations of the slips - mistakes distinction For many years a central distinction within the field of human error has been that between slips and mistakes (eg Norman, 1981; Reason & Mycielska, 1982). At the simplest level, slips can be thought of as failures in the execution phase of an action sequence, whereas mistakes have their origins in the planning (or intention) phase. An example of a slip would be where a person intends to buy a new ink cartridge for a pen, but gets sidetracked by the note-books in the shop and buys one of these instead. In contrast, a mistake would be where the person selects and purchases an ink cartridge, only to find that it does not fit the particular pen in question. In terms of more complex systems, if a nuclear power station operator decides to move the control rods into a reactor but

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erroneously begins to move them out, this would be considered to be a slip. If, however, the operator decides to drive the rods in when circumstances do not warrant this action, this would be classified as a mistake. As will become evident later in this chapter, memory limitations play an important role in the occurence of both slips and mistakes. More recent writings on human error (eg Reason, 1990) have included the terms 'lapses' and 'violations'. Lapses are similar to slips in that they result from some failure in the execution and I or storage of an action sequence. However, whereas slips are frequently observable, the term lapses tends to refer to more covert error forms which usually involve failures of memory. Unlike lapses, violations are seen as being different to error. Reason (1990), for example, suggests that there is evidence that errors and violations are mediated by different cognitive mechanisms. The type of violations that are relevant to work on human error are deliberate but non-malevolent infringements of practices deemed necessary to maintain the safe operation of a system. Although these violations are deliberate acts, they may also involve failures of memory. People might be willing to violate a known practice because they have forgotten critical information that will affect the outcome of their actions. For example, a worker might side-step a safety procedure because he has forgotten the reason why the procedure was adopted in the first place. Despite these additions, it has become apparent in recent years that the basic distinction between slips (and lapses) and mistakes is still not sufficient to account for the richness of data on human error. In particular, there appear to be grounds for distinguishing between different types of mistake. Reason (1987, 1990) uses Rasmussen's Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) framework (Rasmussen, 1986) to distinguish between skill-based slips and lapses, rulebased mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes. This distinction forms the basis of his Generic Error-Modelling System (GEMS). The main aim of GEMS is "to provide a simple generic (ie context free) framework within which to locate the principal cognitive limitations and biases that give rise to the more predictable varieties of human error," (Reason, 1987, p.63.) According to GEMS the three types of error can be distinguished on a number of dimensions, such as the type of activity being pursued, the focus of attention, the mode of control, predictability, the influence of situation factors, the ease of detection and the relationship to change. Reason suggests that skill-based slips and lapses are mainly associated with

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monitoring failures. Typically these involve inattention; that is, failing to make a high level check on behaviour at some critical point beyond which actions can take a number of different possible paths. Inattention at these critical points causes the actions to follow frequently used paths, even when the intention was otherwise. Examples of slips caused by inattention include capture slips (eg intending to change a pullover, but taking off a shirt as well), omissions following interruptions, reduced intentionality (eg the 'what am I doing here' experience), perceptual confusions (eg picking up the lemonade instead of the milk bottle) and interference errors (eg spoonerisms and blends). According to Reason, slips can also be caused by overattention; that is making an attentional check at an inappropriate point in an automatised action sequence. Typically, this results in repetitions or omissions (and occasionally reversals) of parts of the action sequence. Although Reason discusses these slips in terms of failures of attention, in most cases they can also be seen as failures of working memory. In contrast to slips and lapses, rule based and knowledge based mistakes are largely associated with problem solving failures. A key feature of the GEMS approach is that when problem solving, humans are strongly biased to find a ready-made solution at the rule based level before resorting to the more effortful knowledge based level. They do this by matching aspects of the problem configuration to the situational elements of stored problem solving rules such as "if (situation) then (system state), if (system state) then (remedial action)". Reason proposes that rule based mistakes fall into two categories. Firstly, many mistakes are associated with the misapplication of good rules (ie strong but wrong rules). Several features of human information processing lead to the selection of strong but wrong rules in many real life situations. Secondly, mistakes are also associated with the application of bad rules, which can arise from encoding difficulties or from deficiencies in the action component. In the latter case, action deficiencies can give rise to unsuitable, inelegant or inadvisable responses. Knowledge based mistakes originate from bounded rationality (ie where decision making is constrained by a restricted view of the problem space) or an incomplete or inaccurate mental model of the problem space. Specific difficulties at this level may be caused by a number of factors. In particular, working memory limitations place severe restrictions on problem solving activities. For example, people are not able to hold multiple hypotheses in mind and evaluate these in the light of current evidence (eg Berry & Broadbent,

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1989). Similarly, they cannot integrate a number of different mental models in order to formulate a conclusion (eg Johnson-Laird, 1983). Problem solvers are also subject to various biases, such as the availability heuristic and confirmation bias. In the former case, people judge the probability of an event by the ease with which instances spring to mind (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the latter case, people seek out evidence that confirms a current hypothesis rather than evidence that would falsify it (eg Wason, 1977). Problem solvers also tend to be overconfident in evaluating the correctness of their knowledge, and show biased reviewing. Further problems at the knowledge based level are discussed in the next section of this chapter which lookes at empirical studies of human error. Studies of human error A number of different types of study of human error have appeared in the psychological literature and it is not possible to provide an exhaustive review here. Instead, three different types of study have been selected in an attempt to cover a range of methods and types of error. The three types of study are naturalistic studies of slips and lapses, laboratory studies of mistakes in the control of complex systems, and case studies of accidents or potential accidents. Wherever possible, particular examples are drawn from complex cognitive domains. Naturalistic studies of skill based slips and lapses Most of the evidence for skill based slips and lapses has come from naturalistic studies of everyday behaviour (eg Reason, 1979, 1984; Reason & Mycielska, 1982; Norman, 1981, 1988; Heckhausen & Beckmann, 1990). Norman has also studied skill based slips in relation to learning and using computer systems (eg Norman, 1983). Although such studies provide rich and varied data about real world error, they do have their drawbacks. In particular, it is difficult for investigators to exert control over the situations leading to error and sometimes over the data gathering process. As Reason (1990) notes, "such studies often raise more questions than they can answer" (p.14). Despite this, a number of categorisations of action slips have been put forward on the basis of these naturalistic studies (eg Reason, 1990; Norman, 1981; Heckhausen & Beckmann,

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1990). Reason’s classification has been covered in a previous section. This section will discuss the categorisations put forward by Norman (1981) and Heckhausen and Beckmann (1990). A comparison of the three different approaches will then be made.

Norman’s (1981) categorisation of action slips Norman’s approach is similar to Reason’s in that the concept of an action schema plays a central role. Action schemata are knowledge structures representing sensorimotor knowledge that constitute an action sequence. With increasing practice, action schemata determine the course of action with only limited reference to conscious attention. Hence, there is a shift from closed loop to open loop processing. A key feature of Norman’s model is that action sequences can be represented at different levels, from a global representation of the overall goal at the highest level to specific subordinate actions at the lowest level. According to Norman, schemata at the highest level of abstraction (parent schemata) represent intentions, whereas subschemata (child schemata) are responsible for controlling individual action sequences. The essential assumptions are that any given action sequence is controlled by a number of child schemata, and that at any one time numerous schemata for a number of different sequences may be active. Schemata only invoke actions when they have been triggered, and this requires satisfaction of trigger conditions as well as a sufficiently high level of activation. Norman proposes that this action system allows slips to be organised into three major categories; namely, slips in the formation of intention, faulty activation of schemata, and faulty triggering.

Slips in the formation of an intention. Clearly, Norman’s categorisation does not cover errors that result from decision making or problem solving aspects of intention formation (ie mistakes). He outlines two classes of intentional problems that lead to action slips; mode errors that result from misclassifying a situation, and description errors that result from ambiguous or incompletely specified intentions. Mode errors occur when a person carries out an operation appropriate for one mode when they are in fact in another mode. Many examples come from the use of computerised

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text editors that have separate modes for entering text (text mode) and for giving commands (command mode). Slips occur when users try to issue commands while in text mode or type text while in command mode. Other examples come from the use of digital watches and video recorders, where typically there are fewer controls than functions and hence multiple functions are allocated to individual controls. Description errors occur when there is insufficient or ambiguous specification of an intention. An everyday example would be putting the salad in the oven and the cake in the fridge. As far as more complex systems are concerned, description errors are relatively common in operating controls and throwing switches, especially when the operations involved are similar.

Slips resulting from faulty activation of schemata According to Norman a schema may be unintentionally activated, thereby causing an action to intrude where it is not expected, or a schema may lose its activation before its appropriate time to control behaviour has occured, thereby leading to omission of its components of the action sequence. A frequent example of unintentional activation is a capture error. Capture errors occur when familiar habits substitute themselves for intended action sequences. A classic example, described by James (1890), is the absent minded person who went to his room to change for dinner, started to undress and found himself in bed. Similarly, users of computer systems who frequently save documents and then exit the editor may erroneously do this when they intend to save the document but carry on working. Other examples of unintentional activation are data driven errors and associative errors. In the case of data driven errors the intrusions result from the analysis of external events. An example that has become a well known psychology test is the Stroop phenomenon (Stroop, 1935). In the case of associative errors there need not be any formal similarity between the action sequences involved, but simply a strong association between them. As far as loss of activation errors are concerned, Norman suggests that when the appropriate schemata for an action sequence are activated, some may lose their activation as a result of the normal decay and interference properties of primary memory. This may take the form of forgetting an intention (but continuing the action sequence), missing steps in an action sequence, or repeating steps in an action sequence.

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Slips that result from faulty triggering

A schema may be properly selected and activated but lead to a slip because it is triggered improperly, either at the wrong time or not at all. Examples of schemata being triggered at inappropriate times include spoonerisms, blends, thoughts leading to action, and premature triggering. In terms of computer systems, errors can result from carrying out the desired result, rather than the action that leads to the result. For example, with some computers pressing the break key terminates the program and leads to the appearance of a % symbol on the screen. Norman (1981) noted that students sometimes typed the % symbol directly, rather than pressing break. Heckhausen and Beckmann’s (1990) classification Heckhausen and Beckman focus more on the role of intentions than do Reason or Norman. They propose that actions are guided by mentally represented intentions and they distinguish between goal intentions and instrumental intentions. They also distinguish between two modes for conscious processing of goal representations; the wide goal span mode (akin to automatic or open loop processing) and the narrow goal span mode (akin to controlled or closed loop processing). Heckhausen and Beckmann propose that these two control modes set the stage for the occurence of action slips. In particular, they identify three error generating conditions (sidetracking, overlapping and interpolation) which they believe correspond with specific action slips. They suggest that sidetracking results in errors of initiation, overlapping in errors of termination, and interpolation in errors of premature triggering (implementation). Initiation errors include sidetracking during related overlapping and missing an opportunity. Both of these relate to what Reason and Norman call capture errors. Other examples of initiation errors include not recognising an opportunity because it is overspecified, pouncing on an inappropriate occasion because it is underspecified, and falsely specifying an action because of related overlapping. Termination slips include prematurely terminating intentionguiding actions and prematurely deactivating initiation intentions. Other examples of termination slips are continuing or repeating superfluous activities. Finally, implementation slips include falsely specified implementation acts (eg

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putting the sugar bowl lid on the coffee pot), triggering slips leading to skipping, repetition and reversals, and behavioural spoonerisms.

Comparison of the three accounts Despite differences in terminology, there are some basic similarities between the Reason, Norman, and Heckhausen and Beckmann accounts. For example, all three accounts centre on the notion that action slips are in some sense the cost of automatisation. Norman’s and Heckhausen and Beckmann’s accounts can be considered to be more fine-grained in that the postulated mechanism for action control is better able to account for the different types of error that are observed. Heckhausen and Beckmann explicitly compare their classification with the earlier categorisations of Reason (eg 1979, 1984) and Norman (1981). They contend that their account is more in line with that of Reason, although they point out that they take a more molar perspective on action than does Reason. They suggest that they extend his analysis by taking into account different modes of action control and the role of intentions during the realisation of an action. As far as a comparison with Norman (1981) is concerned, Heckhausen and Beckmann admit to just a few points of agreement (for example, their sidetracking errors which Norman calls capture errors, and their falsely specified initiating acts which Norman calls mode errors). However, they argue that Norman’s definition of an action slip does not permit classification of several of their types of action slips, such as retarded deactivation of an initiating intention and continuation of an action after the intention has been implemented. Furthermore, they argue that their view of automated activity reducing the load on conscious control and facilitating overlapping parallel activities, plays no part in Norman’s model. It is not clear, however, whether this latter criticism is entirely justified as such a view is consistent with, and in some sense implicit in, Norman’s account (see for example, Norman & Shallice, 1980). At a more general level it seems that all classifications must be treated with some caution. There are numerous methodological problems with observing and recording one’s own slips and those of others (eg Hermann, 1982; Rabbitt & Abson, 1990). Similarly, there are also difficulties in terms of classifying particular slips. Many turn out to be unclassifiable, while others

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fit equally well into several categories. In general, any resulting classification will depend to some extent on the particular situations studied.

Laboratory studies of mistakes in the control of simulated systems The second type of study to be considered looks at the kinds of mistakes that people make when controlling simulated systems. Most of the recent work on the control of laboratory simulated systems has focussed on correct performance rather than on error (eg Berry & Broadbent, 1984, 1987, 1988; Stanley et al, 1989; Sanderson, 1989). Many studies, for example, have measured number of trials either to or on some target and have then examined how this performance relates to what subjects can say about what they have been doing (ie their explicit verbalisable knowledge). Although correct performance and error can be considered to be two sides of the same coin, the emphasis in the above studies has not been on the kinds of error that people make and the particular conditions that give rise to particular kinds of error. An exception to this general style of work has been the Lohhausen and Moro studies of Dorner and colleagues (eg Dorner, 1987, 1989) and the fire fighting studies of Brehmer and colleagues (eg Brehmer, 1987; Brehmer, Allard & Lind, 1983). These researchers have focussed on the types of errors that people make when learning to control complex simulated systems. Most of these errors would fall into Reason’s knowledge based mistakes category.

Lohhausen Studies In the Lohhausen studies subjects took on the role of Mayor of a small (3500 inhabitants) mid European town called Lohhausen. They were told to take care of the future prosperity of the town over the short and long term (in fact, over a simulated 10 year period). They were able to manipulate a large number of variables including production of the local watch factory, rates of taxation, bank stocks, housing construction, number of doctors’ practices, and employment of teachers. Testing was carried out over eight two-hour sessions and resulted in a vast amount of data. Dorner (1987) examined the types of error made by subjects and distinguished between primary mistakes made by most subjects and persistent mistakes of the poor performers. As far as primary mistakes are concerned,

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Dorner identified three types of mistake, which he claimed were made by almost all subjects. Firstly, people showed insufficient consideration of processes in time. That is, they tended to focus on the system at a single point in time. They did not look for existing trends and tended to ignore developmental tendencies. Secondly, people had difficulty in dealing with exponential developments. They seemed to have no intuitive feeling for processes that developed exponentially. Finally, people tended to think in causal series instead of causal nets. For example, they focussed on the main effects of their decisions and ignored side effects and delayed effects. In addition to these primary mistakes made by the majority of subjects, Dorner (1987) noted a number of mistakes made consistently by the poor performers. These included thematic vagabonding and encystment. In the former case the poor performers tended to change the topic under consideration very often and did not follow through a particular line of thinking from beginning to end. However, Dorner also noted that poor performers tended to stick to a single point and focussed their attention on this, ignoring other aspects of what was going on. He referred to this latter type of behaviour as encystment. Dorner also noted three other pathologies of poor performers. These were blaming others (including the system) for one’s failures, delegating responsibility that should not be delegated, and refusing to make any decisions at all. Finally, Dorner also described an extreme type of behaviour that occured when the system was in a ’crisis situation’. In such emergency situations there was a marked reduction in the number of self-reflections, an increase in stereotyping, a reduction in the number of plans and decreasing control over the realisation of plans. Moro Studies

In another set of experiments Dorner and colleagues required subjects to control the fictitious Moro region of West Africa. Variables to be controlled included population, cattle stock, ground water, vegetation area, precipitation, and millet harvest. The system was again very complex and subjects had to formulate their own goals and sub-goals. They were simply told to improve the living standard of the Moros over a given simulated time period (eg 20 years). Dorner identified a number of modes of faulty behaviour observed over

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a set of experiments with the Moro task. Many are similar to those observed with the Lohhausen task. In particular, subjects frequently neglected developmental tendencies of the system, and neglected side effects and long term effects of their decisions. They primarily acted according to a ’repair shop’ principle and focused on obvious errors and conspicuous problems. They often failed to detect wrong hypotheses and inappropriate strategies. They also showed very little self reflection. They did not reflect on their own mistakes and there was no attempt to remedy wrong hypotheses and inappropriate strategies.

Fire-fighting Studies Brehmer and colleagues (eg Brehmer, 1987; Brehmer et al, 1983) have noted similar types of errors in their investigations of how people behave in a complex fire-fighting task. Subjects in this task took on the role of a fire chief who received information about forest fires from a spotter plane. The fire chief had to send out orders to fire fighting units and received reports back from them. The aim was to extinguish the fires and minimise the area that was burned down. The task is very complex as the fires spread exponentially in real time (ie the state of the system keeps changing even if a subject takes no action). Brehmer found that complexity (measured in terms of number and efficiency of fire-fighting units) had little or no effect on performance, so long as the total efficiency of the units as a whole was kept constant. In contrast, delay of feedback had disastrous effects on subjects’ performance. Even when the delay was minimal, performance was poor and there was no improvement with practice. Brehmer has interpreted these results as showing that subjects do not manage to form any truly predictive model of the system, but instead base their reactions only on direct feedback.

Summary of the simulation studies Taking the various studies together, a number of basic mistakes or pathologies can be identified. People have difficulty in dealing with time related events; non-linear processes are seen as being linear; and delayed feedback causes particular difficulties. Related to this, people focus on the here

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and now and fail to take account of side effects and delayed effects of their actions. In many cases they act ballistically; they fire off actions without checking on their effects. They also have difficulty integrating different courses of action and in holding and evaluating multiple hypotheses. These findings are characteristic of those obtained in a number of studies of human problem solving (eg Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: Berry & Broadbent, 1989). Dorner and Brehmer (1990) have argued that most of these errors can be explained in terms of the general characteristics of people as information processing systems. For example, they suggest that some types of faulty behaviour (such as focussing on individual sub-problems in isolation) may result from the tendency to deal with limited resource thinking as economically as possible. Others (such as not checking on the results of one’s actions) could result from the tendency to protect one’s own image of competence, in that in order to act people must be convinced that they can act successfully. Finally, Dorner and Brehmer suggest that many mistakes are due to the basic human tendency to ’forget’ things. It is very difficult for people to understand and deal with temporal sequences if past data have been partly or completely forgotten. Hence, limitations on either long term or working memory play a crucial role in determining the sorts of mistakes that people make when controlling complex systems. Case studies

A third class of evidence for human error comes from studies of actual accidents or potential accidents. Typically, accidents result from a combination of several factors and frequently involve both slips and mistakes. For example, in an examination of British civil aircraft accidents Reason (1976) found a number of instances of pilot error that involved slips of action, as well as errors of judgement. He noted that many of the slips were committed while the crew were dealing with genuine emergencies such as engine failure. An important distinction to come out of accident case studies is that between active errors and passive or latent errors (eg Rasmussen & Pedersen, 1982; Reason, 1988, 1990). Active errors have consequences that are immediately apparent and tend to be associated with front line operators of a system, for example, drivers, pilots, air traffic controllers and process control

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operators. In contrast, passive or latent errors have consequences that may lie dormant within a system for some time. They usually only become apparent when they combine with other factors. They tend to be associated with people who are not front line operators, for example, system designers, managers and maintenance personnel. Recent surveys of the nuclear power industry (Rasmussen, 1980; Institute of Nuclear Power Operators, 1984) have revealed that passive errors are far more common than active errors. In the Rasmussen survey over 40 percent of the problems were due to omissions of one kind or another. Further analysis showed that most omissions occured during test calibration and maintenance activities. There was a close association between omissions and the planning and recalling of procedures. An Institute of Nuclear Power Operators survey (INPO, 1984) came to similar conclusions. Omissions were again identified as being by far the most prevalent error form, and many of these were again associated with maintenance activities. Reason (1990) has argued that detailed analysis of recent accidents such as Flixborough, Three Mile Island, Bhopal, Heysel Stadium, Chernobyl, Zeebrugge, Kings Cross and Challenger have made it clear that latent errors pose the greatest threat to safety of a complex system. According to Reason, "operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in cooking" (Reason, 1990, p.173). He describes a number of case studies of recent disasters, showing the role of latent errors and their interaction with active errors. Two are summarised here.

Three Mile Island Early one morning in March 1979 one of the turbines stopped automatically in one of Metropolitan Edison's pressurised water reactors (PWRs) on Three Mile Island. The cause was a small amount of water (left over from some maintenance work) that leaked through a faulty seal and entered the plant's instrument air system. Hence, the feedwater pumps stopped automatically, which cut the water flow to the steam generator and tripped the turbine. Emergency feedwater pumps came on automatically but the pipes from the feedwater tanks were blocked by valves erroneously left closed after routine

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maintenance. There was a rapid rise in core temperature and pressure which led to further problems. In all, the emergency lasted for sixteen hours. There was no loss of life, although it resulted in the release of small quantities of radioactive material into the atmosphere. Reason identified a number of active and latent errors that contributed to the disaster. In terms of active errors, he described how the operators failed to notice (for over two hours) that an emergency relief valve was stuck open. This resulted in a large quantity of radio active water pouring into the containment area and down into the basement. The water loss caused significant damage to the reactor. Latent errors included maintenance, design and management failures. In particular, maintenance workers forgot to re-open two valves after routine maintenance two days before the incident. Bhopal One night in December 1984 a gas leak from a small pesticide plant devastated the central Indian city of Bhopal. Over 2500 people were killed and another 200,000 seriously injured. It is the worst industrial accident on record. The gas leak was caused by an influx of water into a methyl isocynate (a chemical used to manufacture pesticide) storage tank. Although there has been some dispute over the cause of the disaster (eg Stix, 1989), it seems likely that a combination of operator, maintenance and management errors were to blame. In particular, a worker forgot to insert a water plug that would have prevented water from backing up through the piping during washing. Reason (1990) documents a number of other errors that contributed to the disaster. For example, the operators failed to recognise that the pressure rise was abnormal, they failed to use the empty MIC tank to release pressure, and the warning siren was not switched on at the appropriate time. One question which always arises in relation to case studies such as these, is could these accidents have been predicted and prevented. Lessons to be learned from these and other accident case studies are discussed in the final section of this chapter which looks at ways of minimising error. However, it is necessary to note that hindsight can introduce a considerable bias in interpreting accident reports. Hence Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1988) introduce the term 'impossible accidents' in their analysis of 100 accidents at sea. They argue that most of the accidents were the result of highly complex coincidences

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which could rarely be foreseen by the people involved. "Errors do not look like errors at the time they are perpetrated and the accidents that are caused by them look impossible beforehand" (p. 144.).

Error detection Memory limitations not only play a role in the production of errors, but also in their detection. There are a number of ways in which errors become apparent. Probably the most frequent way in which errors are detected is via self-monitoring. Many slips and lapses, for example, are detected by attention checks after the occurence of the error. Slips can be caught at various levels of action, from the start of the activity to some time after the action has been completed. Norman (1981) suggests that two things are necessary for slips to be detected; firstly, a feedback mechanism with some monitoring function that compares what is expected with what has occurred, and secondly, a discrepancy between expectations and occurrences. He further suggests that errors will only be detected and remedied if the comparison of intention and action is done at the same level of specification. In terms of problem solving, Allwood (1984) has suggested three ways in which errors are detected via self monitoring; standard checks on progress (SC), direct error hypotheses formation (DEH), and error suspicion (ES). Rizzo et a1 (1988) and Bagnara et a1 (1987) have examined the relationship between these three self monitoring detection processes and the three basic error types outlined by Reason. The Rizzo et a1 study involved learning to use a database system, while the Bagnara et a1 study involved testing experienced steel works operators on a simulated production planning exercise. In both studies an association was found between error types and detection modes. Slips were detected mainly by DEH episodes, rule based mistakes by a mixture of DEH and ES behaviours, and knowledge based mistakes by either ES or SC behaviours. Overall, the data also showed that mistakes were more difficult to detect and correct than slips. Allwood, for example, found that the chances of correcting a skill based slip were twice those of correcting a rule based mistake and three times those of correcting a knowledge based mistake. Rizzo et a1 found that knowledge based mistakes were more difficult to detect than either rule based or skill based errors. These findings are in line with those of Woods

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(1984) who studied error detection in experienced nuclear power plant operators. He found that half of the slips and lapses were detected by the crews themselves, whereas none of the rule based or knowledge based mistakes were discovered by unaided crews. The environment may also play an important role in error detection. Many of the types of error discussed by Norman and colleagues (eg Norman, 1981, 1983) only become apparent when the environment signals that something is wrong. One way in which the environment signals error is via forcing functions, that is, something that prevents the behaviour from continuing until the problem has been corrected. Bank teller machines, for example, have been designed so that users have to remove their cash cards before they receive their money. (See Norman, 1988, for other examples.) Lewis and Norman (1986) identified a number of possible ways in which a computer system can signal error. These include forcing functions, visible or auditory warnings, and failing to make any response at all to illegal actions. Systems may also attempt to remedy the error by self correction, or by intiating a limited interaction with the user. Overall, Lewis and Norman suggest that systems should provide the kind of information that helps users to understand the implications of their actions. This is discussed in the next section of this chapter which looks at ways of minimising and dealing with error.

Error reduction So far in this chapter we have seen that memory limitations play an important role in the production and detection of errors. The final section of the chapter looks at a number of ways of reducing error. Given that this section is largely concerned with errors that arise during human machine interaction, a distinction is made between person oriented and system oriented approaches to error reduction. In the former case, various types of training are considered. In the latter case, a number of system oriented approaches are discussed including designing systems to reduce the load on memory and providing users with explicit memory aids. Clearly, the distinction between person oriented and system oriented approaches is a little artificial in that people tend to be trained with systems in mind, and machines are usually designed with people in mind.

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People oriented approaches The most common person oriented approach to error reduction is via training. A number of experimental studies have been carried out to examine whether particular forms of training are better than others. For example, Shepherd, Marshall, Turner and Duncan (1977) studied the effects of training on the number of errors committed by operators while diagnosing failures on a simulated continuous process plant. Three different types of training were given; a brief introduction to control panel instruments (no story group), a theoretical account of the operation and flow of material (theory group), and a combination of theory and rules for diagnosing failures (rules group). It was found that the rules group made least errors, followed by the theory group, then the no story group. In a more systematic study, Mann and Hammer (1986) looked at the effects of two different types of training on particular types of error made. The task involved controlling a simulated generic process plant. One group of subjects was provided with procedures for use in controlling the plant. The other group was provided with procedures, plus instruction in the theory of the plant. Mann and Hammer categorised subjects’ errors into four basic groups; omission (leaving out a required action in a procedure), sequence (proper procedural actions that are out of order by at least two steps), ineffiency (using more commands than necessary to achieve a particular state) and blunder (completely inappropriate actions). They found that the two types of training had differential effects on the types of error committed. Procedure only training resulted in fewer omissions and blunders, whereas inefficiency errors were reduced by principles training.

System oriented approaches Two prevalent system oriented approaches to error reduction are designing systems for error, and provision of memory aids and decision support systems. The term ’design for error’ is most closely associated with the work of Norman and colleagues (eg Norman, 1983, 1988; Lewis & Norman, 1986). Norman has convincingly argued that most errors made by computer users are system induced and are the result of inappropriate system design. He therefore advocates an approach to system design that is aimed at minimising these

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system induced errors. The approach is based on four basic suggestions. Firstly, the state of the system should be clearly visible to the user, ideally in a form that is unambiguous and that makes the set of options readily available so as to reduce the load on memory and avoid mode errors. Secondly, different classes of actions should have dissimilar command sequences (or menu patterns) so as to avoid capture and description errors. Thirdly, where possible, actions should be reversible. Irreversible actions (particularly those of high consequence) should be difficult to do, thereby preventing unintentional performance. Finally, the system should be consistent in its structure and design of command sets so as to minimise memory problems in retrieving the operations. An alternative system oriented approach to reducing error is to provide the user with specific aids to support either memory or decision making.

Memory aids Norman (1983)suggests that memory aids should be provided to prevent memory failures that occur when events intercede between the time of forming an intention and the time an act should be performed. For example, he suggests that systems should redisplay uncompleted sequences (or unanswered questions) whenever there is a chance that they are no longer visible to the user. Reason (1990) identifies a number of task factors that are likely to increase the probability of making an omission error. Firstly, the larger the number of discrete steps in an action sequence, the greater the probability that one or more of them will be omitted (particularly where steps have a greater informational loading). Similarly, procedural steps that are not obviously cued by preceding actions or that do not follow in a direct linear sequence from them are likely to be omitted. Secondly, when instructions are given verbally and there are more than five simple steps, items in the middle of the list of instructions are most likely to be omitted. However, when instructions are given in written form, isolated steps at the end of a sequence are more likely to be omitted. Thirdly, necessary steps in an action sequence are more likely to be omitted during reassembly than during the original disassembly. Finally, unexpected interruptions in well practised automated tasks are likely to cause omission errors. Identification of these task factors allows specific memory aids to be

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developed, for example, an aid that prompts users to remember the middle items of a list. On a more general level, Reason suggests that memory aids can be used to augment either the limited capacity of working memory, or to augment prospective memory. Memory aids in the former case would help people to keep track of progress by relating current data to stored plans in long term memory. Aids for prospective memory would provide an interactive checklist facility to enable the right actions to be performed in the right order at the right time (provided that the user remembers to consult the checklist).

Decision Support Systems An important role for intelligent decision support systems is to support users in those aspects of decision making and problem solving that normally cause difficulty and lead to error. Ideally systems should be able to compensate for bounded rationality, reduce biases (such as availability and confirmation bias), focus attention on important aspects of problems, and generally rectify incorrect or incomplete knowledge. Such possibilities have been considered by the A1 community. Woods (1986), for example, has suggested that an effective way to employ A1 technology is to support those aspects of reasoning at which humans are weak as a result of their built in cognitive limitations. Examples of such weaknesses in human reasoning include failing to take account of negative evidence, difficulty in thinking through the consequences of complex interactions and weaknesses in counterfactual reasoning. Unfortunately, progress to date is limited as far as the development of such systems is concerned (see, for example, Berry & Hart, 1990).

Summary The last two decades have seen a major increase in interest in human error, both in terms of cognitive theorising and in terms of providing practical solutions to everyday problems. This chapter has attempted to reflect much of this general interest by reviewing some of the recent theoretical, empirical and applied research on human error. In particular, the aim on the chapter has been to highlight the role of memory in the production, detection and reduction of error. Evidence has been drawn from naturalistic studies of slips of actions, laboratory experiments on the control of simulated systems, and case studies of

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system disasters. It has been shown that limitations of working memory and / or long term memory play an important role in the production and detection of both slips and mistakes. Finally, the chapter has also considered ways of overcoming our memory limitations, such as by providing explicit memory and decision aids, or by designing systems in such a way as to reduce the burden on memory.

Acknowledgements. I am very grateful to Tony Gillie for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter. References Allwood, C.M. (1984). Error detection processes in statistical problem solving. Cognitive Science, 8, 413-437. Bagnara, S., Stablum, F., Rizzo, A., Fontana, A. & RUO,M. (1987). Error detection and correction: A study on human computer interaction in a hot strip mill production planning control svstem. Paper presented to the First European Meeting on Cognitive Science Approaches to Process Control, Marcoussis, France, October. Berry, D.C., & Broadbent, D.E. (1984). On the relationship between task performance and explicit verbalisable knowledge. Ouarterlv Journal of Experimental Psycholow, 36.209-231. Berry, D.C., & Broadbent, D.E. (1987). The combination of implicit and explicit learning processes. Psycholoeical Research, 49. 7-15. Berry, D.C., & Broadbent, D.E. (1988). Interactive tasks and the implicit explicit distinction. w v , 79. 251-272.

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Berry, D.C., & Broadbent, D.E. (1989). Problem solving and the search for crucial evidence. Psychological Research, 50. 229-236. Berry, D.C., & Broadbent, D.E. (1990). Expert Systems: Human Issues. London: Chapman and Hall. Brehmer, B. (1987). Models of diagnostic judgements. In J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan & J. Leplat (Eds.), New technology and human error. (pp.8796). London: Wiley.

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Brehmer, B., Allard, F., & Lind, M. (1983). Fire-fighting: A paradigm for the study of dynamic decision making. Paper presented at the Ninth Research Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility and Decision Making, Groningen. Dorner, D. (1987). On the difficulties people have in dealing with complexity. In J. Rasmussen, K. Duncan & J. Leplat (Eds). New technology and human error (pp.97-110). London: Wiley Dorner, D. (1989). The logic of failure. In D. Broadbent, A. Baddeley & J. Reason (Eds.), Human factors in hazardous situations. (pp. 15-25) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dorner, D., & Brehmer, B. (1990). Experiments with computer simulated microworlds: Escaping the narrow straits of the laboratory as well as the deep blue sea of the field study. In J. Rasumussen, B.Brehmer, M. de Montmollin & J. Leplat, (Eds), Proceedings of the first MOHAWC workshop (pp .3 1-42). Liege. Heckhausen, H., & Beckmann, J. (1990). Intentional action and action slips. Psychological Review, 97, 36-48. Hermann, D.J. (1982). Know Thy Memory: The use of questionnaires to assess and study memory. Psychological Bulletin, 92. 434-452. INPO. (1984). An Analysis of Root Causes in 1983 Significant Event Reports. INPO 84-027. Atlanta, Ga. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Lewis, C . , & Norman, D. (1986). Erlbaum.

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Hillsdale, NJ:

Mann, T.L., & Hammer, J.M. (1986). Analysis of user procedural compliance in controlling a simulated process. IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man and Cybernetics. SMC-16, 505-510. Norman, D.A. (198 1). Categorisation of action slips, Psychological Review, 88. 1-15. Norman, D.A. (1983). Design rules based on analyses of human error. Communications of the ACM, 26. 254-258. Norman, D.A. (1988). The psychology of everyday things, New York: Basic Books.

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Rabbitt, P., & Abson, V. (1990). 'Lost and found': Some logical and methodological limitations on self-report questionnaires as tools to study cognitive ageing. British Journal of Psychology, 81. 1-16. Rasmussen, J. (1980). What can be learned from human error reports? In K. Duncan, M.Gruneberg & D.Wallis (Eds), London: Wiley . Rasmussen, J. (1986). Information orocessing and human-machine interaction. Amsterdam: North Holland. Rasmussen, J., & Pedersen, 0. (1982). Formalised search strategies for human risk contributions: a framework for further development. Riso-M-235 1. Roskilde, Denmark: Riso National Laboratory. Reason, J.T. (1976). Absent minds. New Society, 4 November, pp.244-245. Reason, J.T. (1979). Actions not as planned: The price of automatisation. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens (Eds), Aspects of Consciousness, Vol. 1. (pp. 67-90) London: Wiley . Reason, J.T. (1984). Lapses of Attention. In R. Parasuraman and R. Davies (eds.). Varieties of Attention. (pp. 515-549) New York: Academic Press. Reason, J.T. (1987). Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS): A cognitive framework for locating common human error forms. Reason, J.T. (1988). Cognitive aids in process environments: Prostheses or tools? In E. Hollnagal, G. Mancini, & D. Woods (Eds.), Cognitive Engineering in Dynamic Task Environments. (pp.7- 14) London: Academic Press. Reason, J.T. (1 990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reason, J.T., & Mycielska, K. (1982). Absent-minded? The psvchology of mental lapses and everyday errors. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Rizzo, A., Bagnara, & Viscola, M. (1988). Human error detection processes. In E. Hollnagel, G. Mancini, & D. Woods (eds), Cognitive engineering in complex dynamic worlds. (pp 99-1 14) London: Academic Press. Sanderson, P.M.

(1989).

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performance; association, dissociation and mental models. Journal of Ex~erimentalPsychology: Learning. Memory and Cognition, & 492-

502. Shepherd, A. Marshall, E. Turner, A., & Duncan, K. (1977). Diagnosis of plant failures from a control panel: A comparison between three training methods. Eryonomics, 21), 347-361. Stanley, W.B., Matthews, R.C., Buss, R., & Kotler-Cope, S. (1989). Insight without awareness: On the interaction between verbalisation, instruction and practice in a simulated process control task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholow, 41. 553-577. Stix, G. (1989). Bhopal: A tragedy in waiting. IEEE SDectrum. June 1989 (pp. 47-50). Stroop, J.R. (1 935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 18. 643-662. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science. 185, 1124-31. Wagenaar, W.A., & Groenweg. J. (1988). Accidents at sea: Multiple causes and impossible consequences. In E. Hollnagel, G. Mancini and D. Woods (Eds). Cognitive engineering in complex dynamic worlds. (pp. 133-144) London: Academic Press. Wason, P.C., & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1972). structure and content. London: Batsford.

Psychology of reasoning:

Wason, P.C. (1977). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses: A second look. In P. Johnson-Laird, & P. Wason (Eds.), Thinking: Readings in cognitive science. (pp 307-3 14) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Woods, D. (1984). Some results on operator performance in emergency events. Institute of Chemical Engineers Symposium Series. 90. 21-31. Woods, D. (1986). Cognitive Technologies: The design of joint human machine cognitive systems. A1 Maeazine, Winter (6),(pp 86-92).

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Commentary: Environment versus Cognitions

Willem A . Wagenaar Leiden University, The Netherlands A basic question concerning theories of error concerns where errors originate: in the environment, which offers the wrong stimuli, or in the mind, through the activity of certain error-producing processes. Norman’s notion of ’design for error’ (Norman, 1988) stresses the idea that the environment is responsible for errors, and that the solution of the problem resides in a change of the environment. Reason’s recent book on human error (1990), in as far as it contains extensive discussions on error-producing processes seems to put more emphasis on the cognitive source of errors. The distinction may look somewhat artificial; one might argue that errors are the result of a wrongly designed environment, triggering unwanted cognitive processes. But from a practical point of view that attempt at reconciliation would be too easy. It can be argued that environments should be designed such that the wrong psychological processes are not triggered; is it equally reasonable to argue that psychological processes must be made compatible with the designed environment? Psychology has wrestled with this distinction for centuries. How should we conceptualize the human mind? A simple stimulus-response box, a reflex machine without will? Or an independent entity, with its own objectives and volitions, for which the environment is on the whole no more than an exploitable and adaptable set of conditions under which those objectives are to be achieved? The distinction is a very practical one, because the two conceptualizations lead to vastly differing strategies. For instance, the prevention of recidevism among young adults with a history of criminal behavior, convictions, and time spent in prison, can be achieved in two different manners: by a change of their environment, or by a change of their cognitions. These two approaches are based upon two different explanations of criminal behavior: sociological and psychological. I propose that for all practical purposes the discussion should be decided by empiricism. Which of the two approaches leads to the desired decrease of criminal behavior? A review by Mark Lipsey (1990) produced a relatively clear answer. Two approaches that

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were supposed to have affect through a change of cognitions do not work, a change of environment has a moderate but not insignificant effect. Changes of cognitions are attempted by either fear for punishment or harsh regimes, which have clear negative effects; or by psychotherapy, which has, on the whole, no effect whatsoever. Changes of environment were achieved by giving young delinquents a steady job, and making sure that they stayed on. The effect is moderate, but worth the effort. This does not prove that cognitions do not matter; it only shows that it is more practical to influence behavior by creating an appropriate environment. Can the same be claimed for the problem of errors in complex operating tasks?

Five ways to influence operator behavior There are five manners in which operator behavior can be influenced, so as to have fewer errors, and fewer accidents. 1. Don’t. The first way seems somewhat odd: don’t try to influence behavior, but anticipate such behaviors, and provide a sufficient number of defenses, so that errors will not result in accidents. This is equivalent to designing a ’fool- proof‘ system. This approach has various drawbacks. One drawback is that there is no limit to what a fool might do. Another is that every defense system can be switched off, even such natural systems as the so-called inherently safe designs, in which nature itself provides the safety mechanism. Or worse, the operation of complex systems usually requires that the safety systems are switched off occasionally. An example is the disconnection of safety systems in the reactor in Chernobyl, for running a test that was supposed to increase safety! 2. Select. Select those people who will make fewer mistakes. This is an approach that is followed by many organizations, and that provides jobs to thousands of industrial psychologists. There is little empirical support for a positive effect of more than the crudest selection. There is a large literature on ’accident proneness’ as an aspect of one’s personality (cf. Shaw & Sichel, 1971), but in many areas of application (e.g. driving) it is not clear that such a concept may constitute a basis for selection, let alone that a selection test can be proved to possess an acceptable degree of validity. 3. Educate. Train operators, so that they will make fewer errors, and convince them of the need to act safely. As far as professional education is

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concerned, it is obvious that many jobs require such training. But professional training does not provide a sufficient protection against slips, lapses, and mistakes. A general safety campaign involving posters or large signs around the plant, also does not have that effect. Unsafe Act Auditing, a technique introduced by the Dupont company, that requests operators to monitor their own and each other’s safety behavior, may reduce the number of violations, but not those errors that are made without intention or even under the illusion that one follows the safest way. 4. Reward and punish. Control the behavior of operators by giving incentives for wanted and unwanted behavior. This may help for the implementation of simple rules, like the wearing of safety belts. But many slips, lapses, and mistakes are not violations of rules; moreover, the resulting accident is often more of a punishment than could ever be provided by an incentive scheme. Hence the likelihood of being caught must be higher than that of causing an accident. Reward schedules have also led to non-reporting, even to the extent that victims did not receive the medical treatment that was urgently needed. 5. Change the environment. Elicit the desired behavior by providing the conditions in which the desired behavior is elicited almost automatically. This is the basic approach of all human factors (or ergonomics) research, and has proved to be very successful in a wide range of applications. The first approach is neutral to the cognitions- environment distinction, as it is not based on influencing behavior. The next three approaches all attempt to change behavior while leaving the environment constant (I don’t count incentives as environment). Only the last approach is based on the reverse: leave cognitions as they are, and change the environment. There are no systematic studies to prove the relative merits of these approaches, which in itself is surprising, as immense sums of money are spent on the basis of ill-founded beliefs, and huge consequences follow from these arbitrary choices. The analysis by Dianne Berry, however, strongly suggests that error is inherent in human nature. Error is not a result of gross malfunction, but falls in the range of normal operation. Those who wish to exclude errors whilst leaving the environment unchanged, are doomed to change human nature. On the other hand, whoever understands human nature, for instance through analyses like the one proposed by Dianne Berry, may succeed in designing an environment such

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that the desired behavior is elicited.

Piper alpha The scenario of the disaster on Piper Alpha may help to illustrate my point (cf. Cullen, 1990). On 6 July 1988 the North Sea production platform Piper Alpha was destroyed by a fire, in which 167 persons died. The first explosion had started in the south-east quadrant of the C-module. The most likely reconstruction is that a pressure safety valve had been removed for maintenance. The resulting opening had been closed by a flange, but the flange was not fastened tightly enough. Then the compressor pump was started by an operator who was unaware of the missing valve, because the permit-to-work system, designed to provide warnings to operators, had been wrongly applied. The maintenance man, who was responsible for the misapplication, was employed by a contracting company, specializing in maintenance on a large number of platforms. Thus he was confronted with many different permit-to-work systems, and did not know the exact procedures used on Piper Alpha. In particular, the procedures for extending permits were unknown to him, although he believed he knew them. The whole accident is extremely complicated, but, concentrating on the maintenance man and the operator, one may ask: which of the five approaches listed above would have changed their behavior? 1. Don't. A fool-proof design is hard to imagine, especially when maintenance is involved. There is no naturally safe way in which one can take apart complex machines on a platform in full operation. Shutdown of the platform during maintenance will not help, since that will involve the notoriously dangerous startups. 2. Selection. There is no reason to believe that the two men were unprofessional. The selection of staff by the contracting company had been carefully inspected. 3. Education. Professional education, as far as it concerns familiarity with the permit-to-work system, might have helped. But it is not a promising option, as working on many different platforms, with many different operating rules, will remain a source of confusion; maybe even more so when previous rules are more intensely imprinted through training. 4. Rewards and punishments. Both operators were under the illusion that

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they were working according to the rules. They would have expected to be rewarded; a fear for punishment would not have changed their behavior. It is true that the maintenance man did not properly tighten the bolts of the blind flange; but, since the whole pump was being revised and therefore isolated from the system, the flanging procedure seemed wholly superfluous. The reward from speeding up the procedure was an early return to the shore, from a mission that had already overrun it’s time. 5. Change the environment. The environment was full of identifiable factors that, sooner or later, would have lead to such errors. Among these were the employment of technicians through contractors with short term contracts. Work was carried out on a large number of platforms built according to different designs, and with different procedures. Such people are constantly working in a kind of jungle with unknown dangers threatening them. Another shortcoming of the working environment was the lack of communication between various departments, which made it possible that a compression system was under maintenance, while the operators were unaware of it. At least it should be made visible to everybody which sections are being maintained. The incomplete flanging procedure was probably a result of time pressure; this job was the last of a long program, and it was the only job that kept the contractor staff on the platform. It is known that problems of helicopter transportation and the constant desire to go home create risks that are not present in more normal working environments. The recommendations made by Lord Cullen’s committee (p. 387-400) are almost exclusively related to changes of the work environment, nothing else. A Systematic approach A systematic approach to analysis of deficiencies in the working environment, based on the ideas outlined above, is presented by Wagenaar, Hudson, & Reason (1990). A formal analysis method called TRIPOD is tested in various domains of activity, and appeared to be highly reliable (Hudson, Wagenaar, Reason, Groeneweg, Van der Meeren, & Visser, 1991), and valid (Hudson, Groeneweg, Reason, Wagenaar, Van der Meeren, & Visser, 1991). Validity is measured through a comparison between TRIPOD assessments and accident analyses. The method identifies factors in the working environment that elicit unsafe behavior, and that can be changed. The importance of cognitions

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is not denied; it is only attempted to create the safest match between existing cognitions and a controlable environment. As a soldier I was taught the following lesson. When digging a ditch for soldiers to urinate in, the problem is always that the men make a terrible mess, because they attempt to hit the other side of the ditch. The effect is that infections are spread through the camp where they cause major problems. My sergeant explained to me that all men are the same in this respect, so that selection would not help. Education made the problem worse. Rewards and punishment meant keeping guard, even when the officers payed a visit; that was deemed impossible. The solution was a simple change of the environment: place an empty tin in the middle of the ditch. That appeals to cognitions which all men possess, and which elicit the desired behavior. It is a lesson that, in my opinion, can also be applied to the operation of complex systems.

References Cullen, the Hon Lord (1990). The public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster. London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, Cm 1310. Hudson, P.T.W., Groeneweg, J., Reason, J.T., Wagenaar, W.A., Van der Meeren, R.J.W., & Visser, J.P. (1991). Application of TRIPOD to measure latent errors in North Sea gas platforms: Validity of failure state profiles. In: Proceedings of the first international conference on health, safety. and environment. (pp. 725-730). Richardson, TX: Society of Petroleum Engineers. Hudson, P.T.W., Wagenaar, W.A., Reason, J.T., Groeneweg, J., Van der Meeren, R.J.W., & Visser, J.P. (1991). Enhancing safety in drilling: Implementing TRIPOD in a desert drilling operation. In: Proceedings of the first international conference on health. safetv. and environment. (pp. 429-435) Richardson, TX: Society of Petroleum Engineers. Lipsey, M.W. (1990). The effects of treatment on juvenile delinquents: results from meta-analysis. Paper presented at the Second European Convention on Law and Psychology, Nuernberg, September 1990. Norman, D.A. (1988). The psychology of everydav things. New York: Basic Books. Reason, J.T. (1990). Human error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Shaw, L.N., & Sichel, H.S. (1971). Accident proneness. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Wagenaar, W.A., Hudson, P.W.T., & Reason, J.T. (1990). Cognitive failures and accidents. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4,273-294.

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Commentary: Slips and Errors on Learning Complex Tasks Dietrich Darner Universitat Bamberg, Germany The evolution of technology extended the range of human action possibilities considerably as well as the range of the effects of human error. Today, the error of one person can mean death or infirmity to thousands (see the disasters of Chernobyl or Bhopal). Therefore the investigation of the forms, conditions and reasons of human error seems to be extremely important. The paper of Dianne Berry reviews the current state of the art of research on human error. Dianne Berry first discusses categories for errors, especially the categories of Reason, Norman, Heckhausen and Beckmann. She draws the well known distinction between slips and lapses on the one hand and mistakes on the other. Slips and lapses occur especially with automated behaviour, whereas mistakes concern the realm of planning and decision making. Adding the category of violation and subdividing the category of slips into capture errors and mode errors however blurrs the clear distinction between slips and lapses on one side and mistakes. Dianne Berry's paper presents an excellent overview of the different categories of human errors. However, the investigation of the processes in the human mind, which obviously produce errors is less developed in contemporary research on human error. Reason proposed the distinction of 'similarity matching' and 'frequency gambling' as basic processes of memory activation. These mechanisms form the basis for many errors. "Frequency gambling" means the tendency to activate an action which frequently has been connected with the respective situation. 'Similarity matching' means the human tendency to activate those forms of behaviour, the conditions of which are rather similar to the given situation. Although the significance of these basic mechanisms is evident, little is known about the conditions for these mechanisms in contemporary research on human error. The research on error tends to consider an error as a stand-alone phenomenon. In addition to the categorization of errors, I think it is necessary to learn more about the background of human error, i.e. to look to those

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characteristics of domains of reality or of psychological states which produce error-prone behaviour. It is characteristic of the cognitive bias of contemporary research on human error that the error preventing strategies, which are reviewed by Berry, are mostly cognitive strategies. This is, for instance, true for strategies of training, of error detection, or of aiding memory. There might exist more indirect strategies for error prevention which adapt humans to the environmental or psychical characteristics of error-prone situations. Look for instance to the fire-fighting situation studied by Brehmer and coworkers. The fire fighting task is typical for those domains of reality that require 'strategic thinking' - and in such domains errors are quite likely. This is due to the fact that generally applicable and correct rules for action in such domains do not exist. For the domain of warfare the elder Moltke favoured the opinion that in strategy general rules or principles are meaningless. "Strategy is a system of aids. It is more than science, it is the transfer of knowledge to practical life, the development of the originally guiding thought in accordance with the ever changing circumstances, and the art of acting under the most difficult conditions" (v.Moltke, according to v. Schmerfeld, 1925, S.241). Moltke believed that in the realm of warfare, principles do not exist, and that therefore decisions about appropriate measures for a given situation have to be made 'on the spur of the moment'. It has been stated that the same applies to politics and business. Here, also, no general rules exist, for managing all possible problem situations within these domains. Instead, it is much more important to grasp the demands of the respective moment. Behaviour, appropriate for one situation is not necessarily suitable for another one, even if this other situation appears similar at first glance. If there are no general rules, this does not mean that there are no rules at all, though. If no rules whatsoever could be applied, there would be no possibility to distinguish valid from invalid measures. Rules in strategic situations - in contrast to 'usual' rules - are, however, 'conditional'. They are not of the form IF a THEN b but instead have the following format:

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(a, AND a, AND...AND q) OR (aj AND akAND AND &) IF

...

...

OR THEN b. The adequacy of a measure depends on a constellation of conditions. Situation Y, quite similar to situation X, can require totally different measures simply because it differs from X in one detail. Pushing the point to the extreme, this means that there may exist as many measures as different situations. In domains in which the appropriateness of measures depends on constellations instead of single features, it will hardly ever be possible to ascertain and rehearse all possible ’constellation-measure’ combinations (as ’production rules’), simply because their number is too high. The ’strategist’ thus has to come up with his decisions at that very moment without being able to refer to some general rule. Such situations are extremely error-prone because it is impossible to implement the correct decision rules in the minds of the actors, simply because there are no decision rules that are always correct. Very similar situations might require very dissimilar decisions and dissimilar situations might require similar decisions. Therefore, tendencies for similarity matching in such strategic domains may prove to be extremely disastrous. Cognitive psychology traditionally has difficulties considering emotional and motivational conditions for human behaviour. With respect to the production of error, however, motivation and emotion are of great importance. Quite a lot of emotions are characterised by a low resolution level. Perception operates in a very coarse way. Thinking and planning only rely on a ’woodcut model’ of the world. Thus, a low resolution level is an excellent prerequisite for similarity-matching mechanisms to produce errors. The more blurred our world view is, the more similar things seem to be and the more likely we will behave similarly in what in fact is a dissimilar situation. Extreme time pressure, informational overload, group pressure, the feeling for the task in hand will all produce emotions which create error-prone conditions for cognitive processes. Under such conditions one will find more dogmatic behaviour, the giving up the control of one’s own behaviour, or dispensing with any action and decision making at all. Or one will find tendencies towards a vicious circle of prolonged phases of information gathering and planning which never end in decision making but in new phases of information gathering and planning, as any new piece of information produces more uncertainty which again results in the need for ever more information.

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The work of Janis (1972) exhibits some of the social conditions for such developments. But the work of Janis is based on single case studies and therefore lacks generality. In my opinion, systematic research on the emotional conditions of human error is essential. It is not sufficient to do research which is centered on error as an isolated phenomenon. Additionally, it seems to be very important to consider the relationships between errors and their emotional and motivational context. According to our results (see Dorner 1989), the connection between the probability of certain errors and feelings of competence seems to be very important. In complex and long lasting tasks of planning and decision making the loss and gain of the feeling of competence plays an important role in triggering error-prone psychicai states. Loss of competence may cause ’dogmatic entrenchment’; that is, subjects stop collecting information, because they know ’what the problem is all about’. Not to look to the world any more is the best means to end all the worries about the differences between the real world and the ’model of the world’ in one’s mind. Dogmatism thus is an extremely errorprone state of the cognitive system. Loss of competence may be the cause for being caught in this trap of steadily refined information collection and planning behaviour: Each new piece of information proves that one has not sufficient knowledge to act. Hence action is delayed more and more. And to avoid acting when action is necessary can be an error too. Rather often the loss of competence can also be responsible for sudden outbursts of ’actionism’ (a lot of quite unplanned actions, often implemented with great vigour). Actionism mainly means a demonstration of competence rather than problem solving behaviour. Another consequence of a loss of control might be that one stops the control of one’s actions, that is, one operates without controlling the effects of one’s actions. And abstaining from self-reflection might be due to the same reasons. All these constellations can result in severe errors or at least errorprone situations. Some difficulties with the prevention of errors result from the fact that errors frequently are the result of thinking habits which are quite reasonable in most situations. For instance it is reasonable not to waste our limited resource for ‘conscious thinking’. Our conscious thinking is slow and capacity is low. So it is quite functional to adopt forms of thinking which don’t exert too much

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strain on this limited resources. So it is actually reasonable to use reductionist strategies just to build 'woodcut-models' of the reality and make models very simple. Otherwise one might not be able to come to a decision at all. "Over simplifications progressively corrected in subsequent development are the most potent or indeed the only means toward conceptual mastery of nature" is a quote by v. Bertalanffy (1968) and this is not only true for nature. But if there is no time for the process of 'progressive correction' oversimplifications become a dangerous source of erroneous behaviour. Dianne Berry's paper presents an excellent overview of the main forms of human error. But it shows too, that a lot has still to be done. Research on human error is restricted to a limited range of human mental activities. It seems to be necessary to widen the horizon and to look to the background of errorprone mental activities, especially to the emotional and motivational conditions of thinking, planning and decision making.

References Bertalanffy, L.V. (1968). General svstems theorv. New York: Braziller. Dorner, D. (1989). Die Logik des Mifilingens (The logic of failure). Reinbek, Germany: Rowohlt. Janis, I. (1972). The victims of growthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

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CHAPTER 5 WORKING MEMORY IN EVERYDAY COGNITION Robert H . Logie University of Aberdeen, Scotland, United Kingdom Much of our everyday life is governed by the need to keep track of what we are doing on a moment-to-moment basis; to remember what we have just done, what we are doing now, and what we plan to do in the immediate future. Without the ability to monitor our activities in this way, a wide range of everyday tasks would become very difficult if not impossible. Such cognitive activity requires some means to store information so that it can be processed or continuously updated. The need for updating suggests that the cognitive mechanisms involved provide temporary storage and 'on-line' processing. It would indeed be unfortunate if cognitive psychology were unable to provide some insight into these crucial aspects of everyday cognitive function. A major aim of the working memory hypothesis is to contribute to this insight. A second aim is to account for a large number of laboratory findings concerned with short-term storage. This book is concerned primarily with everyday cognition. However, I shall argue that the development from traditional laboratory experiments, of a theory of working memory, was a necessary precursor to attempting to test its generality. Much of the motivation for this book derives from the controversy as to the methods and claims of everyday memory studies (e.g. Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Bruce, 1985; Conway, 1991; this volume; Neisser, 1978). However, in their provocative critique of everyday memory studies, 'The Bankruptcy of Everyday Memory', Banaji and Crowder (1989) refer to working memory as an example of a good (i.e. non-bankrupt) way to conduct science. I shall argue that working memory represents a region of 'solvency' in research on everyday memory. It is interesting that Conway, representing the defence of everyday memory (Conway, 1991) has some equally nice things to say about working memory. Unfortunately, he tends to be rather brief and dismissive, (it is hardly mentioned at all in his chapter in this volume) and suggests that working memory studies are unrepresentative of episodic memory tasks. This seems a

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rather curious argument since it is difficult to think of any specific area of episodic memory research that is not individually atypical of this particular methodology. For example, is immediate free recall of an arbitrary list of words any more typical of episodic memory research than is immediate serial ordered recall of an arbitrary list of words in working memory research? Thus working memory may be atypical because of its theoretical coherence and its utility in studying everyday cognition, rather than because there is anything necessarily atypical about the way in which it applies the methodology. I do not intend to pursue other aspects of the debate, but will argue in this chapter that research in working memory has contributed a great deal to the understanding of important aspects of everyday cognition. The working memory model has developed from laboratory studies. The model derived from these studies has then been used to investigate whether working memory has a role in tasks that are encountered outside of the laboratory. This application of laboratory based theory to the real world has the elements of both scientific rigour and of a direct test of ecological validity. The structure of the chapter will follow this approach, describing the evidence that has led to key developments in the theoretical framework, followed by a discussion of the aspects of everyday cognition to which these theoretical developments apply. Thus, I shall start by describing the basic findings and theoretical ideas derived from laboratory studies of each of the components of working memory. For each of these components, I shall then go on to discuss the claim that working memory plays a role in some aspects of everyday cognition such as reading, comprehension, vocabulary acquisition, visual imagery, movement control, reasoning, and mental calculation. The chapter will round off with a brief discussion of possible future directions.

The working memory model Throughout the chapter, I shall refer almost exclusively to the specific model of working memory originally proposed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), and revised subsequently (Baddeley, 1986; 1990). The term 'working memory' has also been used to refer to a single, general purpose system which provides both processing and storage functions. In this latter case, the use of the system for processing reduces the resource available for storage and vice versa. This view is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain against the weight of evidence for

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a multi-component working memory, each component of which has specialised functions (see e.g. Baddeley, 1986; Della Sala & Logie, in press; Klapp & Nettick, 1988; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1984; Wickens & Liu, 1988). Working memory in the form studied by Baddeley and his colleagues comprises broadly three components; the central executive, and two subsidiary or 'slave' systems, the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketch pad. A diagram of the model, showing these three components, is given in Figure 1. The phonological loop, sometimes also known as the articulatory loop, provides temporary storage for speech-based material. The visuo-spatial sketch pad provides a similar function for visual and/or spatial material. The central executive coordinates the activities of these two slave systems, but also is thought to play a role in more complex cognition such as reasoning, problem solving, and decision making. I shall deal with each of these components in turn.

The phonological loop Basic laboratory findings and a theoretical model. By far the most thoroughly researched component of working memory is the phonological loop. The evidence for such a mechanism and its characteristics arose from a number of studies of immediate verbal serial recall of short word lists. Evidence for its phonological nature came initially from studies by Conrad (1964) and by Baddeley (1966a) showing that recall of sequences of phonologically similar items (e.g . b-g-v-c-p-t , or man-mad-matmap) was consistently poorer than recall of sequences where the items were phonologically distinct. This effect of phonological similarity occured even when subjects had to read the words or letters, suggesting that subjects translated the material into some form of internal phonological code. The material was then stored in this code for recall once sequence presentation was complete. Further evidence for phonological coding in temporary memory for verbal material was reported by Salamt and Baddeley (1982) who showed that memory for visually presented digits was significantly impaired when subjects were simultaneously presented with spoken, irrelevant words which they were instructed to ignore.

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- Spatial Sketch - Pad Visuo

I understand Wluchway? 0

Letmethink

0

Play it again

0

I'll do this and then do that

Central Executive

I

the-the-the-the 5462 161 sun-University

Articulatory Loop

FIGURE 1. A schematic diagram of the working memory model. (Adapted from Della Sala & Logie, in press).

The interfering effect was much greater when the irrelevant words were phonologically similar to the digits (e.g. tun, woo, tee, sore, thrive). Salame and Baddeley interpreted this result by suggesting that the memory system

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responsible for storing the digits was both phonologically based, and could be accessed directly through audition. That is, auditory verbal material goes directly into a phonological store which also is used for storing visually presented verbal material. However it seems that there is a role for articulatory or speech-based coding in temporary memory for verbal material. Retention of verbal sequences .is also disrupted when subjects themselves are required to repeat aloud an irrelevant word (e.g. the-the-the) throughout presentation (Levy, 1975; Murray, 1965), a technique known as articulatory suppression. The interpretation of these data is that subvocal rehearsal is used to rehearse verbal sequences, thereby supplementing phonological storage, but that articulatory suppression prevents subvocal rehearsal. Moreover, if the words for retention are presented visually, then concurrent articulatory suppression removes the phonological similarity effect (Estes, 1973; Levy, 1971; Murray, 1968). These findings are interpreted as suggesting that subvocal articulation is used to translate visually presented verbal material into a phonological code for storage. Articulatory suppression (overt articulation) prevents subvocal articulation and hence prevents the formation of the phonological codes on which the phonological similarity effect is based. Finally, subvocal articulation appears to give rise to another laboratory phenomenon, the word-length effect. That is, in groups of normal subjects, sequences of long words are generally less well retained in temporary memory than are sequences of short words (Baddeley, Thomson & Buchanan, 1975). This effect appears to be based on the length of time taken to pronounce the words rather than the number of letters or syllables; words that take a long time to pronounce (e.g. Friday-Typhoon) are more poorly remembered than words that have the same number syllables but take less time to pronounce (CricketBishop) (Baddeley et al., 1975; for a recent critique see Della Sala, Logie, Marchetti & Wynn, 1991). Taken together, these findings have led to a revision of the original model for the loop shown in Figure 1, suggesting that it could be fractionated into two components, articulatory rehearsal and a phonological store. This is illustrated in Figure 2. Further support for the phonological loop hypothesis has come from studies of patients with short-term verbal memory deficits. Typically, such patients can remember sequences of only 2 or 3 digits, but have otherwise

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Auditory Input

V Phonological Store

Visua

Input

V A r t ic u Iat o r y Re h e a r s a l

!

FIGURE 2. A schematic diagram of the phonological loop component of working memory.

normal intelligence, and have spans for visual patterns or sequences within the normal range (Basso, Spinnler, Vallar & Zanobio, 1982; Vallar & Baddeley, 1982; Warrington & Shallice, 1969; for a review see Caplan & Waters, 1990). Such patients typically do not show phonological similarity effects with visual presentation, nor do they show word length effects with either visual or auditory presentation. They do show a small effect of phonological similarity with auditory presentation. This pattern of sparing and impairment has been interpreted in terms of a deficit in the phonological store. Because of this deficit, the phonological loop is not used by these patients in short-term memory tasks. However, with auditory presentation, the information goes directly into the damaged store.

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Everyday cognition Describing a set of robust and replicable laboratory phenomena is useful in terms of developing theoretical models of memory. However since this book is concerned with everyday memory, I shall move on to exploring the generality of the model in some aspects of everyday cognition.

Language differences and memory span.

One very promising application of the phonological loop model has been in explaining the rather curious differences in memory span found in different languages. For example, Ellis and Hennelly (1980) reported that digit span in Welsh is typically lower than it is in English. They demonstrated that this can be explained entirely by the fact that Welsh digits take longer to pronounce than do English digits. A number of other languages have digit spans similar to those found for Welsh, such as Italian (Della Sala & Logie, in press), Arabic and Hebrew (NavehBenjamin & Ayres, 1986). In contrast, digit span in English tends to be lower than it is in a number of Chinese dialects, where the words for digits can be pronounced more rapidly (Elliott, 1991; Hoosain & Salili, 1988; Stigler, Lee & Stevenson, 1986). Since digit span is thought to rely heavily on subvocal rehearsal, this cross-language difference is essentially a form of 'word-length effect'. It fits very neatly within the phonological loop model, and clearly has practical implications for the design of mental ability tests in different languages.

Neuropsychological patients. One

complementary argument for the applicability of the phonological loop model, comes from the reports of two short-term memory patients. If the phonological loop is indeed required in a range of everyday cognitive tasks, we should find that patients with verbal short-term memory deficits have some difficulty in coping with many aspects of day-to-day living. On first inspection, the observations are not very promising. For example, patient PV (Basso et al., 1982) is an Italian woman who runs a small antique shop. She can look after herself and can converse quite well. Another subject (RR) with a severe verbal short-term memory deficit (Logie, Della Sala, Chalmers & Wynn, in preparation) was working as a postman at the time of testing, and was a married man, with a young family. As far as we are aware, he had never sought professional medical help for his

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short-term memory problem. Indeed his memory impairment only came to light when he was recruited onto our panel of volunteers drawn from the ’normal’ general population. He does report having ’a lousy memory’, but he is capable of looking after both himself and his family. The reports of these two individuals suggest that a verbal short-term memory deficit may not have a devastating effect on everyday life. However the importance of phonological short term memory becomes more evident if we look in more detail at the lives of these individuals. Subject RR had only recently taken on his job after having been out of work. He had been attending adult literacy classes prior to being tested by us, and his performance on the National Adult Reading Test (NART-R, Crawford, 1990) was well below the normal range (equivalent verbal IQ =76). I shall describe in more detail below, the association between the phonological loop and tasks such as reading. Although PV runs a shop she has difficulty remembering the prices of items in the stock. In addition, both PV and RR found it extremely difficult to understand long complex sentences or to learn foreign language vocabulary (Baddeley, Papagno & Vallar, 1988; Logie et al, in prep). Thus insofar as some of the above problems can be attributed at least in part to a deficit in verbal short-term memory (I shall argue below why this assumption is reasonable), the deficit certainly places restrictions on the range of everyday activities which can be accomplished.

Reading and reading comprehension. Among the group of basic everyday cognitive skills, the ability to read and to comprehend language is probably the most significant and consequential for everyday living in an industrialised society. It is possible to cope in everyday life with a low level of literacy. However, this severely curtails the range of feasible activities and employment opportunities. Reading and comprehension are ubiquitous forms of cognitive activity that require ’on-line’ processing of continually changing material. As such they comprise the kind of task that ought to involve working memory. There is a very large literature on the psychology of reading, and reading disorders. This is a literature that is well covered elsewhere (Coltheart, Patterson, & Marshall, 1980; Ellis & Young, 1988; Johnston, this volume; Patterson, Marshall & Coltheart, 1985) and I do not intend to repeat that coverage here. Moreover, Rhona Johnston’s chapter in this volume expertly covers the relevant literature on the role of working memory in reading

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development. Thus I shall concentrate on those studies directed at the role of the phonological loop in both reading and in reading Comprehension in normal adults, and adults with verbal short-term memory deficits. One of the first studies on working memory in normal reading was reported by Baddeley and Lewis (1981 ; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) who presented subjects with meaningful sentences such as Rude Jude chewed crude stewed food, or sentences which contained an anomaly such as Rude chewed Jude crude stewed food. Accurate performance on this task (comprehension and spotting semantic anomalies) requires accurate detection of the order of the words in the sentence. Articulatory suppression had no effect on comprehending the meaningful sentences, but did affect subjects’ ability to detect word order errors. This suggests that subvocal articulation is involved in processing the exact syntax of the sentence, and this function is prevented from operating efficiently by articulatory suppression. Baddeley and Lewis also found that sentences with phonologically similar words (Rude Jude etc.) took longer to verify than did sentences with phonologically distinct words (e.g. Dark skinned Ian ate his plain boiled meal). This could be interpreted as suggesting that reading involves phonological coding. However the phonologically similar words are also visually similar, and this makes the interpretation rather complex. This problem was solved in part by McCutchen, Bell, France and Perfetti (1991; see also Hanson, Goodell & Perfetti, 1991; McCutchen & Perfetti, 1982) who asked subjects to silently read and verify ’tongue-twisters’ (e.g. The spacious zoo sits beside a sandy seashore) or control sentences (e.g. The amusement park was beside a rocky beach), where the visual similarity of the words was minimised. Tongue-twisters took longer to verify than did control sentences. McCutchen and his colleagues interpret this as an effect arising from phonological coding. Given the lack of an effect of suppression on reading comprehension (Baddeley & Lewis, 1981; Baddeley, Eldrige & Lewis, 1981), it is likely that the ’tongue-twister’ effect is due to phonological rather than articulatory coding. However, there is a continuing debate about the role of phonology in reading (see e.g. Besner, 1987; Johnston, this volume), and it is most likely only required for some aspects of normal silent reading. Thus, these findings seem to suggest that normal reading comprehension does not rely on the efficient performance of subvocal articulation. Moreover, the debate about the role of phonology in reading comprehension leaves open

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the argument about whether the phonological loop has anything more than a perfunctory role limited to rather unusual laboratory materials, and some aspects of proof reading.

Auditory comprehension. A more positive proposal for the phonological loop is as a 'back-up' store during 'on-line' comprehension (Shallice & Warrington, 1970). The 'back-up' store can be used as a 'second pass' or as a 'replay' function where comprehension has failed the first time around (see McCarthy & Warrington, 1990a, p.292, 1990b; Shallice, 1988, p.63). This possible account of the comprehension deficits has received further support from studies of short-term memory patients. Such patients have particular difficulty in comprehending long, syntactically complex sentences, as found for example in the Token Test (De Renzi & Faglioni, 1978), (e.g. "If there is a blue circle, touch the red square"). This contrasts with clinical observations that short-term memory patients do not, on the whole, suffer from language comprehension deficits. One such patient is TB, described by Baddeley, Vallar and Wilson (1987). TB had an auditory span of around two items and, in common with other such patients, he showed no effect of phonological similarity or word length, with either auditory or visual presentation. Spontaneous speech was virtually normal. Also his ability to understand simple, straightforward sentences was more or less normal. However TB had great difficulty in comprehending long, verbose sentences, such as 'The quickest way to get to America is to cross the plane by Atlantic, although travelling by ship may be pleasant'. Baddeley et al. interpreted this difficulty by suggesting that the long sentences placed too great a load on the patient's verbal short-term memory system. As such, he could not retain a sufficient number of words in the sentence to allow for accurate comprehension or detection of the anomaly. A similar result has been found for patient PV, and with our own subject RR. For both patients TB and PV, the difficulty appeared only when comprehension of the sentence relied on retaining the exact order of words in the sentence. For example, the anomaly in the sentence can only be detected if the words in the sentence are processed strictly in the order in which they are given. The involvement of verbal short-term memory in language comprehension rests on the assumption that subjects have to store the words long enough for

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comprehension to take place. However, in addition to the Baddeley and Lewis (1981) studies, there is a strong argument that normal comprehension occurs 'on-line', with very little reliance on temporary storage (e.g. Butterworth, Campbell & Howard, 1986; McCarthy & Warrington, 1987). This immediately raises the question as to why short-term memory patients such as TB and PV show deficits in some aspects of comprehension, and an impairment on the Token test. The explanation, according to this view, is that short-term storage can be used to 'back-track', where the initial 'on-line' process has failed (McCarthy & Warrington, 1987; Saffran & Marin, 1975; Shallice & Warrington, 1970). This can occur, for example, when the exact syntax is crucial for accurate comprehension, and this is the case with some of the materials used to test PV and TB, and with items in the Token test. What is interesting about this is that where comprehension requires such 'back-tracking', this would only become evident after the material has been presented. This in turn suggests that even in normal auditory comprehension there is, as a matter of course, 'on-line' storage of the most recent string of words, and that the words stored are updated as new material is presented. Thus when 'back-tracking' is necessary, the relevant material is readily available. To summarise, it looks as though the phonological loop is not strictly necessary for most normal reading and auditory language comprehension. However the data from both normal subjects and from patients with deficits of verbal short-term memory, point towards the idea that the phonological loop may be involved in storing the most recently presented text. This temporary 'cache' of text is then used as a contingency reserve when we attempt to comprehend particularly complex material. I shall return to the topic of reading and comprehension when discussing the central executive and the visuo-spatial system in working memory.

Vocabulary acquisition. A recent development in the literature on the phonological loop, has been in the area of learning new vocabulary. For example. Papagno, Valentine and Baddeley (1991) have shown with normal subjects, articulatory suppression causes considerable difficulty in learning foreign language vocabulary. In contrast, articulatory suppression has very little effect on paired-associate learning of familiar words. Their interpretation is that the phonological loop is involved in the process of vocabulary acquisition. Additional support for this view comes from work with learning disabled

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and normal children who are attempting to acquire native language vocabulary for the first time. For example, Gathercole and Baddeley (1989; 1990) have shown an association between efficiency in the functioning of the phonological loop in young children, and their ability to acquire vocabulary in their native language. Finally, Baddeley, Papagno and Vallar (1988) have shown that their STM patient, PV has great difficulty in learning foreign language vocabulary (Russian) relative to matched control subjects. Given the importance of vocabulary acquisition, especially for young children, these findings points to a key, everyday role for the phonological loop.

Counting and mental arithmetic. Despite the ready availability of pocket calculators, counting and mental calculation are prominent among the basic cognitive skills required in everyday cognition. This is reflected in the fact that such skills figure along with reading and writing as part of the core of an elementary education. If we consider the kinds of cognitive processes involved in these tasks, calculation and counting appear to be prime candidates for studying the involvement of the phonological loop in everyday cognition. Although it is possible to estimate numerosity (e.g. Burgess & Barlow, 1983; Ginsburg, 1978), accurate counting of objects or of events would seem to require some means of keeping track of a cumulative total. Similarly mental arithmetic requires some means of retaining and updating partial totals or products, and ’carries’. Although there is an established literature on mental calculation and counting (e.g. Reyna & Brainerd, this volume; Groen & Parkman, 1972; Klahr, 1973; Restle, 1970; Woods, Resnick & Groen, 1975), there have been relatively few studies specifically addressing the role of working memory in these tasks. Given the comprehensive coverage of children’s mathematics in the chapter by Reyna and Brainerd, I shall concentrate largely on adult cognition. One set of studies that specifically explored the role of working memory in mental arithmetic was reported by Hitch (1978). He found that subjects’ mental arithmetic performance involved a series of stages, each of which was maintained in some form of working storage. However the stored material was also prone to forgetting. With relatively short delays, subjects forgot details such as partial solutions and carries, supporting the idea that some form of

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transient memory is used in mental arithmetic. However, these data do not specify which of the components of working memory are involved in these tasks. Some hints were obtained from studies of a related task, namely counting. Nairne and Healy (1983) asked their subjects to count backwards, and noted systematic errors. Specifically, subjects tended to omit numbers having repeated digits (i.e. 99, 88, 77, etc.), and the decade numbers (90, 80, 70 etc.). Nairne and Healy interpreted this pattern of errors by suggesting that the phonological similarity of the decade prefix (e.g. sixty, fifty etc.) to the second digit (e.g. six, five) is sufficient to cause confusion as to the most recent number articulated. Similarly, repeated articulation of the decade prefix (e.g. sixty-five, sixty-four, sixty-three, sixty-two, sixty-one) may cause confusion as to whether the decade (sixty) has already been pronounced. In a second condition where subjects were required to pronounce the decade prefix as a digit (e.g. three-two, three-one, three-zero), the decade number was rarely omitted. However subjects continued to omit the numbers having repeated digits (eight-eight, seven-seven, six-six etc.). Healy and Nairne (1985) followed up their initial studies by showing that articulatory suppression during written backwards counting resulted in a large increase in the number of repetition errors (repeating the same number twice) but with no increase in the number of omission errors. These data were supportive of the idea that some form of phonological coding was involved in counting, with subjects keeping a 'running count' in phonological form. In some of our own studies, we found little evidence for phonological coding in counting (Logie & Baddeley, 1987). In our case, subjects had to count arrays of randomly arranged dots, or the number of times a square was flashed on a screen, and announce only the total. We found that articulatory suppression impaired accuracy in counting an array of dots or a sequence of visual events. In contrast, when subjects had to count while being presented with irrelevant speech, this had virtually no effect on accuracy or error rate. This was true even when the irrelevant speech comprised numbers, or words that were phonologically similar to numbers (tun, woo, tee, sore, thrive etc.). The lack of an effect of irrelevant speech seems to undermine the use of phonological coding in counting, since there are very clear effects of irrelevant speech on memory for digit sequences. This result also contrasts with anecdotal reports that people can 'lose the place' while counting if a colleague calls out

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irrelevant numbers! The presence of a substantial effect of suppression points more towards the use in counting of subvocal articulation or subvocal rehearsal, rather than phonological storage as suggested by Healy and Nairne. An interesting observation from these experiments was that the average size of the errors made was quite small. Although subjects made a large number of errors when counting with articulatory suppression, the error responses were typically very close to the correct total. This implied that subjects had a rough idea as to the correct total, perhaps based on priming successive items of the number sequence in long-term memory. Thus it seemed as if the role for subvocalisation was to maintain accuracy in counting. In some more recent, as yet unpublished studies (Logie, Gilhooly & WYM,in prep), we have also looked at the role which the phonological loop might have in mental arithmetic. The pattern is similar to that found for counting. Irrelevant speech has no effect on mental addition, even when the material comprises spoken numbers. Articulatory suppression impairs accuracy in mental addition tasks. As with counting, the effect is on number of errors, but with answers close to the correct total. Recently Nick Ellis (Ellis, 1992) has shown language differences in the efficiency of mental arithmetic which can be accounted for by the difference in the pronunciation time for the numbers in different languages (see the discussion above on language differences in word length and memory span). Thus, it appears that subvocal rehearsal probably is involved in maintaining accuracy in these tasks. Because subjects can respond with a 'ballpark' figure, it is likely that much of the processing is carried out by other parts of the cognitive system, with only a partial, but important reliance on temporary verbal memory. I shall return to this issue in the discussion of central executive functoning. Given that there is some association between short-term memory, and counting and calculation in normal subjects, it seems worthwhile asking whether patients with short-term memory deficits have difficulties in counting, or alternatively if patients with some forms of calculation and counting deficits also show signs of verbal short-term memory impairment. Although the relevant literature is somewhat sparse McCarthy and Warrington (1990a) have concluded that "...the majority of patients with an impaired digit span have shown weak performance on graded-difficulty arithmetic tests. (p289). Problems in mental calculation (or acalculia) can of course arise for a number of reasons, that are I'

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not primarily associated with deficits in short-term memory. However both Berger (1926) and Grewel(l952) have argued for various forms of 'secondary acalculia' at least one form of which appeared to result from deficits in shortterm memory. Moreover, a recent paper by Dehaene and Cohen (1991) has reported a patient who has a severe acalculia coupled with a poor verbal shortterm memory. The acalculia was however confined to accuracy in counting, as the patient was able to make reasonable estimates of the correct answer. For example the patient accepted 2 + 2 = 5 as being correct, but rejected gross errors such as 2+2=9. Dehaene & Cohen argue that there are two cognitive mechanisms involved in counting, one of which is involved in approximate computations, while the other ensures numerical accuracy. This pattern of data from a patient with a short-term verbal memory deficit, fits well with the suggestion that the phonological loop is involved in maintaining accuracy, but that some other part of the cognitive system can cope with approximations in calculation. In the discussion below, I shall argue that the central executive is a strong candidate for this alternative mechanism. These observations are supportive of an association between deficits in short-term memory and some types of deficits in calculation, but this is clearly an area where much systematic investigation remains to be carried out.

Summary To summarise the discussion of the verbal component of working memory: There is a body of evidence suggesting that the phonological loop does play an important role in a number of aspects of everyday cognition, namely language comprehension, memory span, counting and mental arithmetic, and that it plays a minor role in normal reading.

Visuo-spatial working memory The second slave system of the working memory model deals with visual and/or spatial material. There is little dispute that this mechanism is distinct from the phonological loop (e.g. Farmer, Berman & Fletcher, 1986; Baddeley, 1986; Wickens & Liu, 1988). There is of course a very large literature on the related topic of visual imagery. It is tempting to explore whether a model of

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visuo-spatial working memory could account for many of the phenomena studied in the visual imagery literature, and there is likely to be an overlap in the underlying cognitive mechanisms involved in visual imagery and those thought to comprise visuo-spatial working memory. However, the nature and extent of this overlap is still somewhat unclear, and it is almost certainly the case that there are different concepts involved in the theories developed within these complementary literatures (for a discussion of this overlap see Logie, 1991; Baddeley, 1986; 1990). I do not intend to pursue this issue in detail in this chapter, but will discuss first the studies dealing directly with visuo-spatial working memory, and then shall go on to describe some of the ways in which a visuo-spatial temporary memory function might be of use in everyday cognition.

Basic laboratory findings and a tentative theoretical model The early studies of the visuo-spatial scratch-pad (VSSP) were directed towards studying the possible overlap between visuo-spatial storage and processing, and visual perception. For example, in a number of experiments subjects have been asked to construct a visuo-spatial mental image on the basis of verbal instructions. Brooks (1968) instructed his subjects to form an image of a square matrix, in which they were mentally to insert a series of numbers. Reading the instructions resulted in poorer performance than did listening to the instructions. Moreover Baddeley, Grant, Wight and Thomson (1975) have shown that performance is severely disrupted if subjects concurrently had to track a moving target. However, this disruptive effect was not restricted to a concurrent task involving visual input. When the tracking task involved a blindfolded subject, with auditory feedback on tracking performance, there was an equally large disruption, a disruption that did not occur when tracking was combined with an equivalent verbal processing and memory task (Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980). These data are interpreted as suggesting that the system under investigation was spatial rather than visual. Experiments by Gerry Quinn (Quinn & Ralston, 1986; Quinn, 1988; 1991) and by Mary Smyth (Smyth & Pendleton, 1989) have similarly reported evidence for some form of spatial working memory that is disrupted by a concurrent 'movement suppression' task such as arm movement or tracking. Conversely, there also is evidence for some form of visual temporary

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store. For example Wolford and Hollingsworth (1974) and Hue and Ericsson (1988) have reported visual similarity effects in that sets of characters that are visually similar to one another are less readily retained in short-term storage tasks than are characters which are visually distinct. Graham Hitch and his colleagues (Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal & Schraagen, 1988) have shown that visual similarity effects are also present in young children. Children around the age of five have more difficulty retaining a sequence of pictures which are visually similar to one another (e.g. brush, pencil, comb) than if they are visually distinct (e.g. car, ball, book). Visual similarity effects appear in older children as well, but only if they are prevented from naming the picures by means of articulatory suppression. Further evidence for a visual temporary store came from some experiments which showed that irrelevant visual input can disrupt retention of visual, rather than spatial images (Logie, 1986; Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Matthews, 1983).

One system or two? The evidence from normal cognition thus presents evidence for temporary storage of visual and of spatial material. Clearly there is some debate as to whether the visuo-spatial scratch-pad of working memory is best thought of as a single system, or as two complementary systems dealing respectively with visual and with spatial material (see e.g. Baddeley & Lieberman, 1980; Logie, 1986; 1989; Logie & Baddeley, 1990; Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Ralston, 1986; Reisberg & Logie, in press; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989). There is also some debate as to whether or not the systems involved function independently of some kind of central processing or focussed attention. The evidence is growing in favour of two separate mechanisms that can act in concert, although the link between these mechanisms and the central executive component of working memory is still unclear. I would like to argue that there is one system which deals with retention of sequences of movement, and a second system that can retain a static visual representation. Elsewhere Dan Reisberg and I (Reisberg & Logie, in press) have referred to these systems respectively as the 'inner scribe' and the 'inner eye'. The inner scribe can rehearse a sequence of movements, and is linked

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with the mechanisms of motor planning. The ’inner eye’ holds a static visual pattern, and is linked closely with the visual perceptual system. The inner scribe can feed information into the inner eye to prevent decay, or to allow manipulation and transformation of the images. It is possible that some form of attentional resource is required in some of the operations attributed to these two systems. Also, it is likely that the functions that are thought to be provided in visuo-spatial working memory overlap with those cognitive functions studied in the visual imagery literature (e.g. Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 1980; 1991; Logie, 1991). However, a complete specification of the model is beyond the scope of this chapter, and this is being developed elsewhere (Reisberg & Logie, in press; Logie, in prep). Suffice it to say here that there is a significant body of evidence to support the idea of components of working memory responsible for temporary storage of visual and of spatial information. To avoid ambiguity in the following discussion, I shall use the general term ’visuo-spatial working memory’ (VSWM) to refer to a coherent set of cognitive functions, rather than to a single system (VSSP) that provides these functions.

Everyday cognition Unlike the studies of the phonological loop, there has been much less effort directed as yet to the utility of visuo-spatial working memory functions in everyday cognition. However there are a number of aspects of everyday cognition, in which an ’inner eye’ and an ’inner scribe’ ought to have some involvement. I shall discuss some of the evidence that points towards a role in reading, imagery mnemonics, visual problem solving, movement planning and movement control, and in finding our way around in the world,

Reading. It was clear from my discussion of the phonological loop that verbal short-term storage played only a very minor role in reading, although it did appear to act as a ’back-up’ store to aid language comprehension. There is some evidence which suggests that visuo-spatial working memory has a rather more important role in normal reading. In fact I have already referred to some of this evidence in the discussion of Brooks’ experiments (Brooks, 1968). You may recall that in these experiments, subjects were asked to read or to listen to a series of instructions, and to construct a visual image based on these instructions. Performance was poorer when subjects were to read rather than

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to listen to the instructions. This suggested that the cognitive functions involved in normal reading overlapped with those required for constructing a visual image. Further evidence for this overlap in cognitive function was found in sentence verification tasks (Eddy & Glass, 1981) who presented subjects with sentences for verification. The sentences were either concrete and highly imageable, (e.g. ’The star of David has six points’), or abstract (e.g. ’There are seven days in the week). When subjects had to read the sentences, verification speed was slower for the concrete sentences. When subjects listened to the sentences, verification speed was equivalent for concrete and abstract sentences. An earlier study (Glass, Eddy & Schwanenflugel, 1980) showed that reading verification was impaired when subjects had simultaneously to retain a complex visual pattern. Thus it seems as though there is some support for the idea that visual processes in reading also involve some form of temporary visual store. However visuo-spatial working memory appears to have an additional role related to ’place-keeping’ in text. Studies of eye movements in reading suggest that the ’span of apprehension’ (the amount of text that the reader can perceive at any one time) is quite small and is highly asymmetrical. That is, readers are normally aware of just 3-4 characters to the left of the eyes’ fixation point, but up to 15 characters to the right (for a review see Rayner & Pollatsek, 1987). This means that only a maximum of four or five words can be read at one time. However, subjects can accurately move their eyes to the location on the page of recently read text (Carpenter & Just, 1977, 1983; Just & Carpenter, 1980; Kennedy, 1983)’ suggesting that they can retain accurate information about the spatial layout of the text. This retention of spatial information thus seems to assist a ’back-tracking’ function in reading. However, it is unlike the ’back-tracking’or ’replay’ function that has been suggested for the phonological store (storing the phonology of the last few words) in that only the position of the text need be retained. The text itself remains available on the presented page. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that given the experiments on visual similarity effects in retention of letters, discussed above, it seems likely that a representation of the visual appearance of the text may be retained as well as its position on the page.

Visual Imagery and Mnemonics. Much of the laboratory research discussed

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above has been concerned with the use of a proposed visuo-spatial working memory system in various forms of visual or spatial imagery tasks. In this discussion it was very clear that there is a strong explicit link between visuospatial working memory and the formation and use of visual images. As such, there is little need to reiterate that point here. What is worth adding however is a brief discussion of visual imagery mnemonics. A well known and well-established literature has shown the advantage of using visual imagery as a means to enhance memory (e.g. Paivio, 1971) particularly where the image is unusual or bizarre (e.g. Bower, 1972; although see McDaniel & Einstein, 1991 for limitations of the bizarreness effect). The work on the effects of irrelevant pictures (Logie, 1986; Logie & Marchetti, 1991) looked specifically at the overlap between irrelevant visual input and the use of visual imagery mnemonics. The argument there was that use of the visual ’peg-word’ mnemonic relied on a temporary visual storage system (a visual component of working memory) that was also accessed directly by visual input. Thus it appears that there is an important role for visuo-spatial working memory in visual imagery and in imagery mnemonics, although whether this role is in the generation, retention or retrieval of such images remains to be clarified (e.g. Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Morris, 1987; Quinn, 1991). Hanley, Young & Pearson (1991) have reported a patient, ELD who appears to have a particular difficulty with visuo-spatial working memory tasks such as mental rotation and imagery mnemonics. She also has severe problems with recognising faces, but only those that she has encountered since the onset of her memory disorder. However, she has no difficulty in learning new names or in many other verbal memory tasks. Hanley and Dewick (1991) have followed up the studies of patient ELD with experiments on normal subjects’ immediate memory for faces. They obtained a visual recency effect for faces which they argue reflects the operation of a visuo-spatial working memory system, and it is this same system that is impaired in patient ELD. They argue further that this system may be involved in immediate memory for faces and the learning of new faces, tasks which ELD found particularly difficult. Finally Kosslyn (1991) has incorporated the notion of working memory in his own highly detailed model of visual imagery. In his view, working memory provides a means to transfer information to and from long-term storage and his ’visual buffer’. While I feel that this may not be the whole story, it is

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interesting to note that working memory is beginning to be considered seriously within theories of imagery.

Planning and control of movement. The evidence for an involvement of visuo-spatial working memory in movement control stems largely from the possibility raised above that the visuo-spatial system comprises two complementary components. In the theoretical discussion I briefly reviewed some of the laboratory evidence for a link between movement control and retention of spatial images (e.g. Logie & Marchetti, 1991; Morris, 1987; Quinn & Ralston, 1986; Quinn, 1991; Smyth & Pendleton, 1989; 1990). It is clear that much of movement planning requires the use of visual feedback. Moving your hand to a target requires accurate visual information about the location of the target with respect to the initial position of the hand and arm. It is clear from studies of arm movements that the trajectory taken by the arm during a movement is closely related to an overall motor plan and that this motor plan is based on accurate visual information about location. The movement trajectory is less determined by motor control at the level of the exact movements of the joints and muscles (e.g. Bernstein, 1967; Hollerbach, 1990a; 1990b). At a neurophysiological level, Georgopoulos, Kalaska, Caminiti and Massey (1982; 1983) have shown a correlation between the direction of movement to a target, and the activity of particular neurons in the parietal cortex of monkeys. This finding can be coupled with the report by Anderson, Essick and Siege1 (1987) that the parietal cortex is responsible for transforming the retinal image of an object into a representation of where that object is in relation to the eyes, and subsequently to the body. Evidence from neuropsychology suggests that patients with focal damage in the parietal area suffer from an impairment in locating where an object is in space (e.g. Butters, Barton, & Brody, 1970). This pattern of results is consistent with the view that neural activity related to motor planning for movement towards an object (but not the actual production of the movement itself), is associated with neural activity that is implicated in forming representations of the location of objects in space. The above interpretation is by no means unequivocal (For alternative interpretations see Bizzi & Mussa- Ivaldi, 1990; Mussa-Ivaldi, 1988; McCarthy & Warrington, 1990a, chapter 2). However, it does fit very neatly with findings from the experiments by Quinn, by Smyth and by Logie and Marchetti which

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demonstrate a close link between the cognitive activities involved in representing sequences of movements in space, and those involved in arm movement. Although from the neurophysiological and neuropsychological data, it is the planning of the arm movement rather than the movement itself which seems to be important. Some unpublished data by Idzikowski et al (cited in Baddeley, 1986) further suggest that control of eye movements also involves an overlap with the cognitive mechanisms responsible for representing spatial information. Smyth and Pendleton (1989) have shown that there is a further distinction between retention of a series of arm movement configurations (e.g. moving an arm in a circle, or clenching the fist) and movement of the arms to a specified target. This, together with the evidence we have discussed above, lends added support to the idea that a spatial/movement component of working memory is linked to the planning and control of movement to targets in space. A corollary of this suggestion is that learning routes around unfamiliar environments may rely on such a system. In an unpublished experiment carried out by Valerie WYM and myself, we attempted to test this possibility. Subjects in our experiment were asked to follow the experimenter on a route around a complex, unfamiliar building. After around five minutes, the route ended back at the starting point. The subject had then to follow the route with the experimenter following to check on accuracy of recall. This task was carried out on its own or with one of three secondary tasks, and the tasks were chosen respectively to rely on visuo-spatial working memory (Brooks matrix task), or verbal working memory (Brooks verbal task), or the central executive (random generation - see discussion below). It was clear that the Brooks matrix task produced the largest decrement in route following. Suggesting that visuo-spatial working memory in route learning may well be a fruitful avenue to explore. Support for this view came from a study by Infield, Hunt and Yee (1991) who showed that expert orienteers appear to excel not only at finding their way around, but also seem to be better at a variety of visuo-spatial processing tasks such as mental rotation (e.g. Cooper & Shepard, 1973).

Summary In sum, visuo-spatial working memory appears to contribute to a number of components of everyday cognition, namely reading, imagery mnemonics, and

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movement planning. It may also be involved in navigating in unfamiliar environments.

The central executive The central executive has been the least researched of the three main components of working memory. It is also considered to be more complex and less modality specific than are the slave systems. It is thought to act as a general attentional resource, coordinating the operation of the two slave systems, and to be involved in reasoning, decision making, calculation, comprehension and long term learning. Largely as a result of this complexity, it is also the most difficult to study. Despite these difficulties, there is now a growing literature that throws some light on the characteristics of the central executive, including studies of learning and retrieval in normal subjects, language comprehension, random generation, arithmetic problem solving, and single and dual task performance in patients with Alzheimer’s disease. I cannot cover all of these comprehensively here, and a more detailed treatment is given in Della Sala and Logie (in press). However I shall try to describe briefly the evidence which supports the role for a general purpose central executive in at least some of the above aspects of everyday cognition. Earlier in this chapter I have discussed how the slave systems of working memory appear to provide some of the functionality that would be demanded of a working memory system that had a non-trivial function in everyday cognition. However, there are a number of aspects of cognition that are not readily handled by systems specialised for temporary storage of verbal or of visuo-spatial material. We can make decisions, solve problems, calculate, reason and comprehend. All of these tasks require moment-to-moment monitoring for their successful performance. Yet, from the discussion of the phonological loop it is evident that the verbal storage subsystem accounts for only some aspects of counting, of mental arithmetic, and of language comprehension and has only a minor role in reading. Likewise, reading, movement planning, and visual imagery mnemonics rely only in part on visuospatial working memory. Moreover we can allocate attention to one task rather than another, to one specialised subsystem or another or have more than one subsystem functioning simultaneously. In the literature on the central executive, it has been assumed that this

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rather less well specified system provides those functions which ought to be handled by working memory, but which do not appear to be provided by the subsystems. But there are several recent developments in the literature which offer a more positive approach to ex’ploring the characteristics of a general purpose executive resource. One proposed function of a central executive system is that it should coordinate the activities of specialised subsystems. Given that I have presented the case for a dissociation between these subsystems (visuo-spatial and verbal), some form of coordinating function seems essential. From the evidence gathered thus far, it is unlikely that this coordination could be provided by the subsystems themselves (for alternative views see Barnard, 1985; Newell, 1990). Moreover, a coordinating function appears to have the characteristics of a system involved in allocating attention. Indeed, there are parallels to the working memory model in the literature on attention, specifically the framework of multiple resources (e.g. Wickens, 1984). The idea is that we have available a number of different cognitive resources, each with a specialised function, and each of which can act more or less independently. In common with working memory, multiple resource theory has concentrated on two specific resources, both involved in processing and temporary storage of information, specialised respectively for verbal and for visuo-spatial material. Also in common with working memory, the literature on attention has referred to a ’cost of concurrence’ in dual-task performance (e.g. Navon & Gopher, 1979). Recently Yee, Hunt and Pellegrino (1991) have shown that individual differences in abilities to process either visual-perceptual information or verbal information are unrelated to the ability to perform visual-perceptual and verbal tasks concurrently. This conclusion is supported in a study by Logie, Baddeley, Mane, Donchin and Sheptak (1989). Subjects were first asked to rate the difficulty that they had in performing each of a number of individual tasks (foot tapping, articulatory suppression, Brooks’ matrix and verbal task and so on). Subjects then had to perform each of these tasks concurrently with a complex computer game. Ratings of the difficulty of individual tasks performed singly were poor predictors of dual-task interference effects when tasks were combined with playing the computer game. That is, when subjects perform two tasks concurrently, and each task relies on a different cognitive resource, there is a general overall cost in performance efficiency, in addition to the load on the

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individual resources. Thus it appears that there is some support for a general processing load resulting from the requirement to coordinate the activities of two or more specialised resources. This coordinating function has also been referred to as an ’executive time-sharer’ (Hunt & Lansman, 1981; Moray, 1967; McLeod, 1977), a concept that bears an uncanny resemblance to at least one of the proposed characteristics of the central executive in working memory. Studies of patients with Alzheimer type dementia have offered further support for the idea of a coordinating function. As I have already discussed, normal healthy adults can perform two tasks concurrently, with very little overall cost, providing the tasks rely on separate cognitive mechanisms or resources (e.g. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Farmer, et al. 1986). For example Baddeley, Logie, Bressi, Della Sala and Spinnler (1986) have shown that when healthy elderly people are required to perform a visuo-spatial tracking task, they can perform a concurrent verbal span task with minimal impairment of either task. This is true even when the difficulty of the tracking task is adjusted to make it very demanding (around 70% time on target). Of course, verbal span by its very nature is a measure of maximum short-term verbal memory capacity. In the same study Baddeley et a1 (1986; see also Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie, & Spinnler, 1991) showed that Alzheimer patients can perform either the tracking task or the verbal span task when these are performed singly. However when asked to perform the tasks concurrently, the patients showed a dramatic decrement in performance of both tasks. Since in all cases, the difficulty of the single tasks was tailored to the cognitive abilities of the individual subject, these results cannot be explained by suggesting that the dual-tasks were simply more difficult for the patients than for the healthy elderly. Moreover, Morris (1984, 1986) has shown that the phonological loop, at least, functions quite efficiently in patients with Alzheimer’s disease. The Baddeley et a1 results are therefore readily explained by suggesting that the Alzheimer patients have an impairment in the coordinating function of the central executive. Suggesting that the central executive provides some form of ’coordinating function’ goes some way towards understanding its characteristics, but begs the question as to what such coordination entails. For example, in attempting to perform a task that requires cognitive resources, there must first be an allocation of the appropriate resources, and some means to initiate activity in

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those allocated resources. Presumably, there must then be some means of monitoring the progress of ongoing activities that have been initiated. The concepts of allocating attention and monitoring cognition probably go much further towards a cogent account of the central executive. These latter characteristics are features of a model of attention and control of action proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986; Shallice, 1988). Theirs was a model of thought and action which comprises several different components, and assumes that most ongoing actions are controlled by automatic motor programs. In the Norman and Shallice model, these automatic motor programs are referred to as action schemata. The potential for conflict between several concurrent action schemata is reduced by contention-schedulingprocedures, or the means by which action schemata are selected. The contention scheduling is driven largely by perceptual input. The operation of both contention scheduling and action schemata is thought to be monitored by a supervisory attentional system (SAS) which is able to over-ride ongoing activities when necessary. Baddeley (1986; 1990) has equated the SAS with the central executive system of working memory. This seems a logical approach, and provides a conceptual framework within which to explore the relationship between working memory and automated action. It has proved useful in interpreting the impairments suffered by Alzheimer’s patients, and by patients with damage to the frontal lobes. It has also been useful in explaining the performance of normal subjects in tasks that are thought to involve the central executive, such as card sorting and random generation. Card sorting clearly relies on the subject being able to keep in mind the categories for sorting, and for each card, make a new decision about category membership. It is widely used clinically as a measure of attention planning, which appears to be impaired in patients with frontal lobe damage (Baddeley & Wilson, 1986; Milner, 1963; 1982; Nelson, 1976). Random generation, involves the subject generating in as random a fashion as possible, items drawn from a well learned set such as the alphabet. It requires subjects to speak aloud their responses, but to inhibit well learned sequences such as A-B-C-D-E. Thus it involves the well-learned motor programmes required for speech output, plus continuous monitoring to ensure that other well-learned procedures are kept in check. It appears to be a useful measure of the allocation of attention, and thereby is a useful central executive task (e.g. Baddeley, 1966b; Evans, 1978; Salway, 1991; Treisman & Faulkner,

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1987). I shall return to the use of random generation when discussing the use of the central executive in problem solving. The Norman & Shallice model is a promising approach, but much of its potential utility within the working memory framework remains to be explored. Suffice it to say that the central executive is no longer considered to be a ’conceptual ragbag’ of cognitive functions that cannot be handled by other parts of the cognitive system. Everyday cognition So much for theory, what about everyday life? I have already suggested that the central executive hypothesis may provide an account of some of the cognitive deficits suffered by patients with Alzheimer’s disease, and this is certainly an aspect of the everyday life of a significant proportion of the elderly population, either as sufferers or as carers. There are in addition a number of areas of normal cognition where the central executive is thought to play an important role and I shall discuss three of these; learning and retrieval, language comprehension, and problem solving. Learning and retrieval. In addition to a monitoring function, there is also thought to be a role for working memory in the flow of information between the subsystems and long-term storage. That is, we can learn new information, and we can retrieve information that has been learned. Baddeley, Lewis, Eldridge and Thomson (1984) examined the effect on learning and retrieval, of loading working memory with a concurrent task such as card sorting, which as I have argued above, appears to rely on central executive functioning. Card sorting had a clear disruptive effect on learning in immediate verbal free recall and in paired-associate learning of word lists. Recall accuracy was not affected by the extra load of sorting, although concurrent sorting did affect recall latency. Baddeley et al. concluded that the central executive may be important for long-term learning, and it is likely that this involvement may take the form of selecting and implementing possible learning strategies such as rote rehearsal, imagery mnemonics or semantic associates. Since only retrieval time (but not retrieval accuracy) was affected by a concurrent load, Baddeley et al. concluded that the central executive was less important for retrieval which may be

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relatively automatic. However, there are circumstances when retrieval involves setting up search strategies, for example recalling the details of a summer vacation taken two years ago. When we cannot immediately recall an event, such as in autobiographical memory retrieval, we may set up retrieval strategies, generate candidate events, and so on, and all these activities may place a load on working memory. Using the latter kind of task, Della Sala, Laiacona, Spinnler and Trivelli (1992) have shown that autobiographical retrieval in non-demented patients with frontal lesions and in amnesics, is closely related to performance on a number of tests of executive function. This reinforces the notion that autobiographical retrieval relies on intact functioning of the central executive.

Language comprehension. From the discussion earlier in the chapter, it appeared that the phonological loop was involved in comprehension as a means of 'replaying' recent text. That is, most normal comprehension occurs 'on-line' without a need for temporary storage of the exact syntax. Only when comprehension is dependent on the exact order of the words, does the phonological loop play an active role. You may recall that patient PV (Vallar & Baddeley, 1984) who has a deficit of the phonological loop, had considerable difficulty with complex sentences of this kind, whereas her general auditory and reading comprehension was well within the normal range. Visuo-spatial working memory appeared to be involved in comprehension only when subjects had to generate visual images. Even here, the role of visual imagery was related more to storage of the information contained in the text, or answering some question posed by the text, rather than strictly in linguistic comprehension. For example, it is possible to comprehend a concrete sentence such as 'The star of David has six points' without recourse to imagery. Visual images need only be invoked if we have to verify whether the sentence is true. Thus the role of the working memory subsytems appears to be ancillary to the main task of comprehension. Does Comprehension depend any more heavily on the central executive? One possibility is to explore the suggestion above, that the central executive is responsible for deciding which of the slave systems should be invoked for the task in hand. For example, it is extremely unlikely that the phonological loop could detect when comprehension had failed, and that a mental 'replay' of the text was necessary. Therefore one role for the central executive would be to monitor ongoing comprehension and invoke

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immediate memory for syntax as a strategy when normal ’on-line’ comprehension begins to break down. That is, if we can store the exact wording of the previous phrase in a text, the executive can, when necessary, initiate a ’replay’ of the contents of the phonological store. This idea has some intuitive appeal in that quite often we have the compelling experience of repeating to ourselves the exact wording of a complex sentence whose meaning is not immediately obvious. Another approach to studying working memory in comprehension has been taken by Daneman and Carpenter (1980; 1983) who devised a measure of what they referred to as ’working memory span’. This involved presenting normal subjects with a series of sentences. Subjects had to decide whether or not each sentence made sense, and in addition had to store the last word in the sentence. After presenting a series of such sentences, subjects were required to recall the last word of each sentence in the original order of presentation. The task thus involved processing of each sentence and verbal storage. Daneman and Carpenter reported highly significant correlations between performance on their ’working memory span’ task, and standard measures of reading comprehension. The measure of reading comprehension involved testing subjects’ ability to understand the content of passages of prose comprising several paragraphs of text. This supports a role for working memory in comprehension tasks. I have already argued that the subsystems of working memory do not play a major role in reading. Thus insofar as the Daneman and Carpenter task can be taken as a working memory task, their results seem to point to the central executive of working memory as being responsible for the correlations obtained. I should like to take this argument further and suggest that the central executive plays a role in maintaining the semantic content of linguistic material as comprehension proceeds. This last suggestion has yet to be tested directly. However, there is evidence in the existing literature on mental models which provides indirect evidence for the idea. Mental models are thought to be mental representations used in problem solving, reasoning and comprehension (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; JohnsonLaird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Garnham & Oakhill, 1990). In comprehension of text Garnham and Oakhill argue that subjects form mental models to represent the meaning of the text. A mental model comprises sufficient information for adequate comprehension, but commonly lacks details such as the exact wording of the text. Johnson-Laird (1983) has asserted that

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working memory is heavily involved in the formation of mental models, and the capacity of working memory places constraints on the complexity and number of mental models which can be constructed for any given situation. Sag and Hankamer (1984) have argued that the comprehension of anaphor in text relies on reference to a mental model of the text. Moreover Garnham and Oakhill (1990) have reported that subjects may generate a mental model based on the surface form of text. When detailed attention to syntax is required, this strategy results in longer comprehension times, which Garnham and Oakhill interpret as being required for modifying the original mental model. Take for example one of the sentences with which short term memory patients have difficulty: ’The world divides the equator into two hemispheres, the northern and the southern’. A mental model based on the surface form of the text might result in an incorrect ’true’ response. Subjects can only interpret the statement correctly if they pay close attention to the syntax. The mental models approach is consistent with ideas as to the role of working memory in comprehension for the following reasons. There are repeated references to the involvement of working memory in the formation of mental models. It is clear from the work described above by Garnham and Oakhill, that the mental models approach is proving to be a very fruitful way of understanding key aspects of language comprehension. This leads to the obvious conclusion that working memory, and in particular the central executive, may play an important role in the formation of mental models during comprehension.

Reasoning, problem solving and planning. In the original paper on working memory, Baddeley and Hitch (1974; see also Hitch & Baddeley, 1976) showed that subjects could happily retain a sequence of up to six digits and at the same time perform a logical reasoning test, the AB reasoning test (Baddeley, 1968) (e.g. A follows B - AB: Answer - False). Farmer, et al. (1986) demonstrated that articulatory suppression had an effect on the AB reasoning task, but only for the more difficult problems (e.g. B does not precede A - AB: Answer True). These findings suggested that the phonological loop performed only a subsidiary function in reasoning. However, neither of these sets of studies tested directly the involvement of the central executive. In some recent work with my colleagues Ken Gilhooly, Norman Wetherick and Val Wynn, we have attempted to test whether the central

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executive is indeed involved in reasoning and problem solving. We have done this in two parallel sets of studies concerned respectively with syllogistic reasoning and with mental arithmetic. Johnson-Laird (1983; Johnson-Laird & Byme, 1991) has argued that syllogistic reasoning (e.g. All A are B; All B are C; Therefore? - Answer: All A are C) is constrained by working memory limitations. In particular, in order to solve syllogisms, subjects form mental models, the more mental models that are required, the greater is the load on working memory and the more difficult are the syllogisms. The link between working memory and syllogistic reasoning has rarely been tested, although Evans and Brooks (1981) found that concurrent articulatory suppression seemed to improve reasoning performance. Given the finding that articulatory suppression and concurrent digit span have very little effect on performance of the AB reasoning test, the Evans and Brooks result reinforces the view that the phonological loop component probably is not heavily involved in reasoning. However this leaves open the question as to whether other components of working memory have a role to play in these tasks. We set out to test this possibility by having subjects solve syllogistic reasoning problems while they were suppressing articulation, or were generating random number sequences, or were making unseen arm movements. We found that neither arm movements nor articulatory suppression affected syllogistic reasoning performance, suggesting that neither of the slave systems were used in this task. Random generation did have a significant effect on performance, suggesting a role for the central executive, although subjects were still well above chance levels of performance even in this condition. It appeared that our subjects were not in fact attempting to reason logically at all, but were instead using a strategy based on 'matching' the logical form of the premises of the syllogisms, with the logical form of their conclusions (Gilhooly, Logie, Wetherick & Wynn, in 1993; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990). This experiment undermines the suggestion that syllogistic reasoning relies on the formation of mental models, but it supports the idea that subjects relied to some extent on the central executive component of working memory when confronted by this particular form of reasoning task. However subjects could still perform above chance on this task, even when the central executive was ostensibly otherwise occupied. In a complementary series of studies, we have extended the same

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approach to mental arithmetic, using the same set of secondary tasks that we used for the syllogisms. Here, the phonological loop was involved in maintaining accuracy but clearly was not the only cognitive mechanism involved (see the discussion on the phonological loop and mental arithmetic). A concurrent visuo-spatial secondary task produced little if any disruption. However, random generation of letters of the alphabet had a devastating effect on mental arithmetic. Many subjects could not even guess the correct total in the arithmetic task. Random generation performance was also severely disrupted by concurrent arithmetic. Thus unlike the syllogism task, it appeared that use of the central executive was essential in mental arithmetic (Logie, Gilhooly & Wynn, 1993).

Summary

To summarize this discussion: Recent literature has pointed to some of the theoretical characteristics of the central executive, a system that appears to play central roles in dual-task coordination, long-term learning and retrieval, language comprehension, reasoning and mental calculation.

Conclusions and directions I started this chapter by stating that the working memory framework had two aims, concerned respectively with laboratory phenomena and with real world cognition. I have argued that these aims are highly compatible, contributing both to theoretical development and to accounts of a range of everyday cognitive skills. In so doing, I have also attempted to avoid overstating the case. Clearly, there are many areas of both theory and application, where there are interesting ideas that would benefit from a great deal more evidence. The work on problem-solving and on comprehension immediately springs to mind, as does the hypothesis linking a two-component visuo-spatial working memory system with movement planning. Another area that is ripe for development, and which I have not covered here, is the application of the working memory framework to assessments of mental load and cognitive task analyses. There is considerable potential in applying the dual task methodology and working memory theory to complex tasks such as piloting an aircraft, air-traffic control, or deciding on the best

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therapy for a patient in intensive care (Gilhooly, 1990). For example, where a complex task appears to rely heavily on one component of working memory, the mental load may be eased by redesigning the task such that two components of working memory share the load. We have gone some way towards addressing this issue (Logie et al. 1989; Salway, 1991), and the approach is proving very promising. Thus working memory does indeed seem to offer a region of considerable ’solvency’ in studies of everyday memory, while providing a forceful rejoinder to an earlier epitaph for studies of short-term memory (Crowder, 1982). Rumours of the ’demise of short-term memory’ were greatly exaggerated.

Acknowledgements. I am grateful to Sergio Della Sala, to Ken Gilhooly, and to Alan Baddeley for many fruitful discussions on the topics covered here. I am also grateful to Norman Wetherick who made a number of very helpful comments about earlier versions of this chapter.

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McCutchen, J.W., Bell, L.C., France, I.M., & Perfetti, C.A. (1991). Phoneme-specific interference in reading: The visual tongue-twister effect revisited. ReadinP Research Ouarterly, 26, 87-103.. McDaniel, M.A., & Einstein, G.O. (1991). Bizarre imagery: Mnemonic benefits and theoretical implications. In R.H. Logie & M. Denis (Eds.), Mental images in human cognition (pp 183-192). Amsterdam: Elsevier. McLeod, P (1977). A dual task response modality effect: Support for multiprocessor models of attention. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholo~y,29, 65 1-667. Milner, B. (1963). Effects of different brain lesions on card sorting. Archives of Neurology, 9, 90-100. Milner, B. (1982). Some cognitive effects of frontal-lobe lesions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B, 298, 21 1-226. Moray, N. (1967). When attention is limited. A survey and a model. &a Psychologica, 21, 84-92. Morris, N. (1987). Exploring the visuo-spatial scratch pad. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, U,409-430. Morris, R.G. (1984). Dementia and the functioning of the articulatory system. Cognitive Neuropsycholog, 1, 143-158. Morris, R.G. (1986) Short-term memory in senile dementia of the Alzheimer type. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 3, 77-97. Murray, D. (1965). Vocalization-at-presentation, with varying presentation rates. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 17,47-56. Murray, D. (1968). Articulation and acoustic confusability in short-term memory. Journal of ExDerimental Psycholo=, 28,679-684. Mussa-Ivaldi, F.A. (1988). Do neurons in the motor cortex encode movement direction? An alternative hypothesis. Neuroscience Letters, 9 l , 106-111. Nairne, J.S., & Healy, A.F. (1983). Counting backwards produces systematic errors. Journal of Experimental Psychologv: General, 112, 37-40.

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Naveh-Benjamin, M., & Ayres, T.J. (1986). Digit span, reading rate, and linguistic relativity. Ouarterlv Journal of Experimental Psychology, 38, 739-75 1. Navon, D., & Gopher, D. (1979). On the economy of the human processing system. Psvchologicalw,86, 214-255. Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: What are the important questions? In M. Gruneberg, P.E. Morris, & R. Sykes, ( U s . ) , Practical aspects of memory. Vol.1 (pp 3-24). London: Academic Press. Nelson, H.E. (1976). A modified card sorting task sensitive to frontal lobe deficits. Neuropsvchologia, 12, 313-324. Newell, A. (1990). Unified theories of cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Norman, D. & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior. In R.J. Davidson, G.E. Schwartz, & D.E. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation, Vol. 4 (pp. 1-18). New York: Plenum Press. Paivio, A. (1971). Imagerv and verbal processes. Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Papagno, C., Valentine, T. & Baddeley, A. D. (1991). Phonological shortterm memory and foreign-language vocabulary learning. Journal of 331-347. Memory & Language, 3, Patterson, K., Marshall, J., & Coltheart, M. (1985). Surface dvslexia. London: Erlbaum. Quinn, G. (1988). Interference effects in the visuo-spatial sketchpad. In M. Oenis, J. Engelkamp, & J.T.E. Richardson (Eds.), Cognitive and (pp. 181-189). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Nijhoff. Quinn, J.G. (1991). Encoding and maintenance of information in visual working memory. In R.H. Logie & M. Denis (Eds.), Mental images in Human Cognition (pp 105-115). Amsterdam: Elsevier. Quinn, J.G., & Ralston, G.E., (1986), Movement and attention in visual working memory, The Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 689-703.

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Rayner, K., & Pollatsek, A. (1987). Eye movements in reading: A tutorial review. In M. Coltheart (Ed.) Attention and Performance, V01.12, (pp. 327-362). London: Erlbaum. Reisberg, D. & Logie, R.H. (in press). The in’s and out’s of visual working memory. Overcoming the limits on learning from imagery. In M. IntonsPeterson, B. Roskos-Ewoldsen, & R. Anderson (Eds.), Imagerv, creativitv and discoverv: A cognitive approach. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Restle, F. (1970). Speed of adding and comparing numbers. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 83, 274-278. Saffran, E.M., & Marin, O.S.M. (1975). Immediate memory for word lists and sentences in a patient with deficient auditory short-term memory. Brain and Laneuag, 2, 420-433. Sag, I. A., & Hankamer, J. (1984). Toward a theory of anaphoric processing. Lineuistics and Philosophy, 2,325-345. SalamC, P., & Baddeley, A.D. (1982). Disruption of short-term memory by unattended speech: Implications for the structure of working memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, U , 150-164. Salway (1991). Random generation in the working memory dual-task paradigm. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom. Shallice, T. (1 988). From neuropsychology to mental structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shallice, T., & Warrington, E.K. (1970) Independent functioning of verbal memory stores: A neuropsychological study. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 22, 261-273. Smyth, M.M., & Pendleton, L.R. (1989). Working memory for movements. The Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 235-250.

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Commentary: Developing the Model of Working Memory John T. E. Richardson Bnulel University, United Kingdom Logie has fulfilled a valuable and timely function in reviewing what is now an extensive body of research on the theory of working memory, and in indicating at least in broad terms the kinds of everyday task to which the various components of the model might be said to make a contribution. He has nicely summarized the function of working memory as that of helping people to keep track of recent events in time (the phonological loop) and space (the visuospatial sketchpad). I do not want to take issue with any of Logie's suggestions regarding the application of the model to everyday cognition, because these seem to me eminently sensible. I want instead to consider how the model has evolved in the light of laboratory research and then turn to the question that prompted the study of working memory in the first place: Exactly what are the mechanisms underlying immediate memory?

The origins of the model The concept of working memory (as opposed to the specific theory put forward by Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) is over 30 years old. In Plans and the Structure of Behavior, Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) talked of the need to posit ''some special state or place" in which activated plans could be held while they were being executed: "We should like to speak of the memory we use for the execution of our Plans as a kind of quick-access, 'working memory"' (p. 65; and see also p. 207). With the development of twocomponent theories of human verbal memory during the 1960s, Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) proposed that one component was a limited-capacity short-term store that acted as a working memory in the sense that it could deploy a number of control processes in various tasks such as learning, reasoning, and comprehension. This notion of working memory as a general informationprocessing system rapidly found acceptance amongst cognitive psychologists in North America (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; Newell, 1973; and see Klapp, Marshburn, & Lester, 1983).

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The central axiom in all these accounts was that the limited span of immediate memory was the consequence of the limited processing capacity of working memory. However, Klapp et al. (1983) noted that this was hard to reconcile with the poor correlations which are typically found between digit span and full-scale general intelligence, and with the existence of neurological patients who showed a selective deficit in verbal short-term memory in the absence of any wider reduction in their cognitive abilities. This might in fact have been expected in the light of Miller's (1956) much earlier observations that the limited processing capacity of human beings reflected the information content of the messages presented, whereas their limited storage capacity represented a number of discrete 'chunks' and was largely unrelated to the information content of the stimulus material. These findings and others presented by Klapp et al. cast considerable doubt upon the existence of a unitary mechanism of working memory that has both processing and storage functions. As Logie points out, this view has subsequently become even more difficult to sustain in the face of evidence for a system that contains several specialized components. In particular, there appears to exist a limited-capacity store which supports short-term verbal retention but is not involved in general cognitive processing.

Short-term verbal storage Baddeley and Hitch (1974) proposed that the span of immediate verbal memory depended upon "a phonemic response buffer which is able to store a limited amount of speech-like material in the appropriate serial order" (p. 77). In other words, the chacteristic form of encoding employed by this component was assumed to be 'speech-like' or phonemic in nature; and the characteristic form of organization that it employed was assumed to be temporal and serial. In addition, the characteristic function of this component was to serve as a buffer store that was responsible for holding verbal responses until they could be emitted; Baddeley and Hitch described it as a "phonemic rehearsal buffer" (p. 86) and a "phonemic loop" (p. 78) through which stimulus items could be recycled and maintained in memory. In a subsequent study, Baddeley, Thomson, and Buchanan (1975) found that the word length effect was obtained even under conditions of visual

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presentation, but not when subjects engaged in articulatory suppression. These results seemed to rule out an explanation of the word length effect in terms of an auditory memory system. Baddeley et al. interpreted their findings in terms of the model of working memory put forward by Baddeley and Hitch (1974), except that the phonemic response buffer was described as an "articulatory rehearsal loop" or an "articulatory loop system" (p. 587) linked to the mechanisms underlying speech production. This system was taken to be sufficient to explain effects of articulatory suppression, phonemic similarity, and word length in recall as well as the existence of neurological patients with selective deficits of verbal short-term memory. Nevertheless, Colle and Welsh (1976) demonstrated that the immediate serial recall of visually presented items was impaired if subjects were exposed to irrelevant speech sounds which they were instructed to ignore, and this effect was specific to sequences of phonemically distinct items. With auditory presentation, Baddeley, Lewis, and Vallar (1984) found that articulatory suppression during both presentation and recall abolished the word length effect but not the phonemic similarity effect. These findings imply that the storage capability of the articulatory loop is based upon an abstract phonological code that is neither articulatory in nature nor contingent upon the process of articulatory rehearsal. Baddeley et al. concluded that the word length effect reflected the use of an articulatory control process, but that the phonemic similarity effect and the effect of unattended speech reflected the contribution of a short-term phonological store to which spoken material would gain direct access without the mediation of articulatory rehearsal (see also Baddeley, 1986, pp. 84-85). This store was thus conceptualized as a passive input register, rather than as a response buffer for verbal output. Since the effects of phonemic similarity can persist even when those of word length have been abolished, the capacity of the phonological store seems to be a constant number of words, quite regardless of the number of syllables or phonemes that they contain. Hence, the functional units of phonological storage are discrete words, not their constituent phonemes or syllables. The contents of this short-term phonological store are assumed to be vulnerable to rapid decay over the course of 1-2 s, unless they can be "refreshed" by means of the control process of articulatory rehearsal (see Baddeley, 1986, pp. 92-96; 1990, p. 72). Hence, an important function of

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covert articulation is to maintain the contents of the phonological store. However, articulatory suppression abolishes the phonemic similarity effect with visual presentation but not with auditory presentation. This implies that a second function of covert articulation is to translate orthographic stimuli into a phonological trace within working memory. Logie, Cubelli, Della Sala, Alberoni, and Nichelli (1989) described a patient whose recall performance under visual presentation was affected by phonemic similarity but not word length, which implies that the two functions of articulation might be separable. (Incidentally, this example suggests that the patient population with short-term retention deficits is more heterogeneous than Logie implies). Recent research has shown that patients with acquired or congenital anarthria (who lack the capacity to articulate speech sounds) may fail to show the effects of phonemic similarity and of word length. It is equally interesting that some anarthric patients do show these effects, at least under certain conditions (Baddeley & Wilson, 1985; Bishop & Robson, 1989; Vallar & Cappa, 1987). This is perhaps unsurprising in cases of acquired anarthria, who may have retained some capacity for subvocal articulatory gestures. It is however significant in cases of congenital anarthria, who may never have produced a single intelligible utterance, and to whom it would be highly implausible to ascribe any capacity at all for subvocal articulation. Baddeley (1990) therefore concluded, “It appears then that inner speech is not dependent on outer speech for either its development or its operation. This suggests that the term ’phonological loop’ is perhaps preferable to ’articulatory loop’, since the latter seems to imply a direct involvement of articulation” (p. 87; cf. Baddeley & Logie, 1992). This argument is singularly unconvincing, since it flies in the face of the substantial evidence that (in normal subjects, at least) the word length effect does indeed imply a direct involvement of articulation, not least because it is abolished by articulatory suppression. It is equally misleading of Logie to gloss over the distinction between a ’phonological loop’ and an ’articulatory loop’ as if this were only one of terminology. It seems to me that Bishop and Robson’s findings in congenital anarthrics can only be resolved with the established research in normal subjects by assuming that the vocabulary of articulatory gestures can be established in the absence of overt intelligible speech. Baddeley and Logie (1992) recently accepted this conclusion, and suggested that anarthric children acquired the link between audition and speech automatically. This

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seems improbable because they would have no information beyond heard sounds to afford the establishment of such a link. An alternative view is that the vocabulary of articulatory gestures is in fact innate; this would not be a totally extraordinary suggestion, as it would be consistent with the view of Chomsky and Halle (1968) that the phonological structure of all human languages is based upon a common set of distinctive articulatory features. Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) original account of a phonemic response buffer suggested a relatively unimportant mechanism which supplemented the storage capacity of the central executive processor but which did not have a central role in human cognitive functioning. This would explain why it could hold a concurrent memory load of up to three items with no apparent reduction in performance in a range of cognitive tasks. More recent work has produced evidence that this store only contributes to performance in tasks which require the accurate retention of serial-order information (e.g., Klapp et al., 1983; Richardson, 1984). Nevertheless, all human languages depend on sequential information to a greater or lesser extent, and Logie has been able to identify a wide range of linguistic abilities that appear to involve the resources of the articulatory loop (see also Baddeley, 1992). In some cases, to be sure, its function seems to be to assist in dealing with excessively complex or verbose material. It is unclear whether it is involved when dealing with more simple text, since articulatory suppression only impairs performance in ’reading’ tasks that demand the phonological segmentation of words (see Richardson, 1987). However, the effects of unattended speech indicate that the phonological store may well have a crucial, though as yet largely uninvestigated, role in speech perception. Recent research has indicated that no disruption is produced by a single speech sound that is repeated either continuously or intermittently (see Jones, Madden, & Miles, 1992), but that an effect of roughly the same magnitude as that produced by naturally occurring speech is produced by a continuous stream of vowel sounds and even by continuous random pitch glides if these are interrupted by short periods of silence (Jones, Macken, & Murray, 1991). This would imply that the phonological store is accessed by a changing stream of irrelevant acoustic stimuli that are segmented either physically or categorically.

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Other forms of short-term verbal storage Baddeley and Hitch (1974) showed that a concurrent memory load of six items produced impaired performance in a number of cognitive tasks. The fact that the magnitude of this impairment was only relatively modest even with a memory load approaching the immediate memory span was taken to mean that there exists "a considerable component of working memory which is not taken up by the digit span task" (p. 75). However, the impairment itself was explained by supposing that the memory load had exceeded the capacity of the phonemic response buffer and thus placed demands upon the resources of the central executive processor beyond the routine recycling of items held in the phonemic response buffer. As a result, there would be fewer resources available for the successful performance of the criterion tasks. It is in passing worth noting exactly which these tasks were. One group of experiments required the subjects to decide whether a sentence correctly described the order of occurrence of two letters (for example, 'A is not preceded by B: AB'), and this was described as a 'reasoning' task (an appellation which, incidentally, Logie appears to accept). A second group of experiments either evaluated the subjects' retention of the meaning of prose passages or required subjects to judge the syntactic and semantic regularity of individual sentences; these were described as 'comprehension' tasks. Finally, a third group of experiments investigated performance in free recall. One might seriously question whether it was really appropriate to refer to the first two sorts of procedure as tests of 'reasoning' and 'comprehension', or whether either had much in common with the relevant everyday ability. Even Baddeley (1979) himself, in describing the second 'comprehension' paradigm, was inclined towards the view that "it would clearly be unwise to generalize too much from this somewhat curious task" (p. 361). Fortunately, as Logie has shown, nowadays a greater variety of paradigms contributes to the research base on working memory, including tasks that are far more typical examples of reasoning and comprehension. Regardless of the typicality or ecological validity of these tasks, however, it is agreed that their performance is impaired by a concurrent memory load of six items because it exceeds the capacity of the phonemic response buffer. But where precisely are these additional items stored? Baddeley (1976, p. 179; 1979; Hitch & Baddeley, 1977) suggested that the central executive processor

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might itself serve as an information store. Similarly, Baddeley et al. (1975) said that, when access to the phonemic response buffer is prevented by articulatory suppression, memory depends entirely upon the capacity of the executive working memory system. They added that the latter component “is not phonemically based, and does not have the same temporal limitation as the articulatory loop” (p. 587), but this leaves the coding used by the central executive entirely mysterious. Nevertheless, the more recent accounts of the central executive processor (including that which has been given by Logie) describe it as a general attentional resource that coordinates the contributions of the different storage subsystems rather than having any storage capability itself. A second possibility is that performance in immediate serial recall depends upon a contribution from the resources of long-term memory. The account which has been given by Logie does not specify the output routes from working memory, nor in particular how the material to be remembered finds its way into long-term memory. It is however usually assumed that long-term memory is directly accessed by the central executive processor (e.g., Gregg, Freedman, & Smith, 1989). Craik (1968) had originally put forward the notion that immediate memory span involves both a short-term component and a longterm component. More recently, Gregg et al. (1989) came to a similar conclusion from a detailed consideration of the effects of word frequency upon performance. Direct evidence for a semantically based, long-term component in the span of immediate memory was provided by Hulme, Maughan, and Brown (1991), who showed that memory span was greater for words than for nonwords, and that subjects’ memory span for words in an unfamiliar foreign language was increased by learning the translations of those words into their native language. However, the latter research confounded the meaningfulness of the stimuli with their familiarity and their pronouncability. Richardson (1979) found no overall difference in the serial recall of auditory items between subjects who were told that the items in question were letters of the alphabet (F3, C, D, P, and T) and subjects who were told that they were words (bee, sea, Dee, pea, and tea). The third possibility is that the immediate serial recall of verbal material involves a contribution from the visuospatial sketchpad. While only a few years ago the structure and function of this store were still quite unclear, recent

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research has tended to converge upon a picture that is pleasingly symmetrical with current accounts of the articulatory loop. As Logie has explained, it seems likely that it consists of a short-term visual store which has a direct link with the processes underlying visual perception (the 'inner eye'), and which is refreshed by a form of spatial rehearsal that can be blocked or suppressed by irrelevant movements (the 'inner scribe'). It is true that visual storage appears to be used by brain-damaged patients with selective deficits of verbal short-term memory (see, e.g., Shallice & Warrington, 1970), and (as Logie has pointed out) by young children in remembering sequences of pictures. However, older children and adults only appear to make use of visual coding under conditions of articulatory suppression (Hiles, 1974; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Schraagen, 1988). There is certainly no independent evidence that any short-term visual store is employed by normal, intact adult subjects in order to carry out the immediate serial recall of verbal materials under conditions of silent learning.

Conclusion Baddeley and Hitch (1974) began their investigation of working memory by studying one characteristic of the mechanism responsible for short-term memory about which all researchers would be agreed: its limited capacity. The task which they took to demonstrate this characteristic was immediate serial recall. (Baddeley and his colleagues tended to refer to this as a "memory span" task, but this is of course misleading since memory span is strictly measured by a different, quite specific procedure which has been used in only a small proportion of research studies into working memory.) We now know a great deal about one subsystem that is responsible for part of subjects' performance in this task, the articulatory loop system. More than 30 years after Miller et al. (1960) used the phrase 'working memory' and nearly 20 years after Baddeley and Hitch first addressed this problem, it is puzzling that we know so little about the subsystem (or subsystems) that are responsible for the residual portion of subjects' performance on this paradigmatic task. This must inevitably weaken Logie's claim that the account of everyday cognition offered by the theory of working memory is the more reliable because it rests upon a solid foundation of rigorous and coherent laboratory-based research.

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References Atkinson, R. C., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its control processes. In K. W. Spence & J. T. Spence (Eds.), The psvchology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory: Vol. 2, (pp. 89-195). New York: Academic Press. Baddeley, A. D. (1976). The psycholoev of memory. Books.

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Baddeley, A. D. (1979). Working memory and reading. In P. A. Kolers, M. E. Wrolstad, & H. Bouma (Eds.), Processing of visible language Vol. 1, (pp. 355-370). New York: Plenum Press. Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Press.

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Baddeley, A. (1990). Human memory: Theory and practice. Hove, Sussex: Erlbaum. Baddeley, A. D. (1992). Is working memory working? Ouarterlv Journal of 1-31. ExDerimental Psvchology,

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Baddeley, A. D., & Hitch, G. (1974). Working memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The Dsycholoey of learninp and motivation: Advances in research and theory Vo1.8, (pp. 47-89). New York: Academic Press. Baddeley, A. D., Lewis, V. J., & Vallar, G. (1984). Exploring the articulatory loop. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholoev, 233-252.

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Baddeley, A., & Logie, R. (1992). Auditory imagery and working memory. In D. Reisberg (Ed.), Auditorv imagery (pp. 179-197). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Baddeley, A. D., Thomson, N., & Buchanan, M. (1975). Word length and the structure of short-term memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 14,575-589. Baddeley, A. D., & Wilson, B. (1985). Phonological coding and short-term memory in patients without speech. Journal of Memorv and Laneuaee, 24, 490-502.

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Bishop, D. V. M., & Robson, J. (1989). Unimpaired short-term memory and rhyme judgement in congenitally speechless individuals: Implications for the notion of "articulatory coding. " Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 41A, 123-140. Chomsky, N., & Halle, M. (1968). The sound structure of English. New York: Harper & Row. Colle, H. A., & Welsh, A. (1976). Acoustic masking in primary memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 15, 17-32. Craik, F. I. M. (1968). Two components in free recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 2, 996-1004. Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 450-466. Gregg, V. H., Freedman, C. M., & Smith, D. K. (1989). Word frequency, articulatory suppression and memory span. British Journal of Psycholo~y,8Q, 363-374. Hiles, D. R. (1974). Visual encoding in short-term memory. Abstracts International, 34, 6241B.

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Hitch, G. J., & Baddeley, A. D. (1977). Working memory. In Cognitive psvchologv: A third level course (Unit 15). Milton Keynes: Open University Press. Hitch, G. J., Halliday, M. S., Schaafstal, A. M., & Schraagen, J. M. C. (1988). Visual working memory in young children. Memory and Cognition, 16, 120-132. Hulme, C., Maughan, S., & Brown, G. D. A. (1991). Memory for familiar and unfamiliar words: Evidence for a long-term memory contribution to short-term memory span. Journal of Memorv and Language, 30, 685-701. Jones, D. M., Macken, W. J., & Murray, A. C. (1991). Disruption of visual short-term memory by changing state auditory stimuli: The role of segmentation. Unpublished manuscript, University of Wales College of Cardiff, School of Psychology.

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Jones, D. M., Madden, C., & Miles, C. (1992). Privileged access by irrelevant speech to short term memory: The role of changing state. 645-669. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology,

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Klapp, S . T., Marshburn, E. A., & Lester, P. T. (1983). Short-term memory does not involve the "working memory" of information processing: The demise of a common assumption. Journal of ExDerimental Psycholow General, 112, 240-264. LaBerge, D., & Samuels, S. J. (1974). Toward a theory of automatic information processing in reading. Cognitive Psychology, 6, 293-323. Logie, R., Cubelli, R., Della Sala, S . , Alberoni, M., & Nichelli, P. (1989). Anarthria and verbal short-term memory. In J. R. Crawford & D. M. Parker (Eds.), DeveloDments in clinical and experimental neuroDsvchology (pp. 203-21 1). New York: Plenum Press. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97. Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. New York: Holt. Newell, A. (1973). Production systems: Models of control structures. In W. G. Chase (Ed.), Visual information processing (pp. 463-526). New York: Academic Press. Precategorical acoustic storage and Richardson, J. T. E. (1979). postcategorical lexical storage. Cognitive Psycholow, 11,265-286. Richardson, J. T. E. (1984). Developing the theory of working memory. Memory and Cognition, 12,71-83. Richardson, J. T. E. (1987). Phonology and reading: The effects of articulatory suppression upon homophony and rhyme judgements. Language and Cognitive Processes, 2, 229-244. Shallice, T., & Warrington, E. K. (1970). Independent functioning of verbal memory stores: A neuropsychological study. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psvchology, 22, 261-273. Vallar, G., & Cappa, S. F. (1987).

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Commentary: Ecological Perspectives of Working Memory Moshe Naveh-Benjamin Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel The chapter by R. H. Logie, "Working memory in everyday Cognition", provides an updated review of the suggested components for a working memory (WM) system and the empirical evidence in support of the differentiation of the components. The chapter also includes an interesting discussion of the components' role in everyday cognition. My commentary addresses both the WM system and its ecological relevance.

The working memory model One of the important characteristics of the WM approach is its vital influence not only on memory research, but also on other areas of cognition. In this respect the WM conceptualization parallels earlier work on levels of processing (Craik and Lockhart, 1972) which was offered as a framework for memory research, but later turned out to be relevant to other domains in the psychology of cognition and beyond (Lockhart & Craik, 1990). From an ecological perspective, a major difference between the two approaches is that the levels of processing framework was focused, at least originally, on the relationships between perceptual analysis and memory outcomes, while the WM framework was centered, from its inception, on the role the WM mechanisms play in other cognitive activities. In this sense the latter approach was more ecological in nature. There are several advantages to the WM hypothesis as advanced in Logie's chapter. It is a coherent approach that specifies the various mechanisms that might be involved in ongoing mental activity and provides ample empirical support, based on laboratory research, for the operation of such mechanisms. Particularly impressive is the extensive use of neuropsychological data that provide corroborative evidence to support the various suggested components. AS is to be expected from a framework that is still evolving, there are

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several aspects that require hrther development. First, as stated by Logie, most of the research was done on the peripheral slave systems (the Phonological Loop - PL and the Visuo-Spatial Sketch Pad - VSSP). Much less theoretical development and empirical work has been done on the core of the system, the Central Executive (CE). This is to be expected, considering that the slave systems are more modular in nature and more peripheral (closer to the input or the output stages). The greater accessibility of these slave systems facilitated progress in developing methods to investigate them, in contrast to the slower progress in developing paradigms to investigate the CE. As Bahrick (1979) already noted, progress is usually determined by the availability of convenient techniques. More troublesome, however, is the fact that whenever results are not compatible with the suggested operation of the slave systems (e.g., reading comprehension), the explanation is based on CE involvement in these tasks. These inferences are supported only modestly by research directed at the CE functions. Interestingly, in most recent versions of the WM formulation (Baddeley, 1986, Baddeley, 1990, and Logie’s chapter), the model for the C E component is not developed within the framework but is derived from other research. The current conceptualization draws, probably not coincidentally, from the attention and control of action literatures (e.g., Wickens, 1984 - multiple resources; Norman and Shallice 1986 - supervisory attentional system), which were at least partially developed with an ecological, everyday orientation. These recent formulations of the CE are welcomed. They are based on well-researched areas in attention and use such concepts as automatic versus controlled processes, supervisory control, monitoring, and allocation of attention. In contrast to the modal model of memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968) that included attention processes whose role and nature were not well specified, the role of the CE is more explicit in regard to monitoring, scheduling, and coordinating activities. This fits with the concept of WM as a center for mental activity involving interactions among various mechanisms. Such characterization of the CE, however, is not necessarily related to what we ordinarily call ’memory.’ In this sense, a better title for the WM system might be ’ongoing activity centre.’ Another issue relates to the proliferation of mechanisms in the system. A few years ago, an acoustic store was added to accommodate findings that challenged earlier conceptualizations of the system. Logie suggests a new

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differentiation within the VSSP component, between the ‘inner eye’, which holds a static visual pattern, and the ’inner scribe’ which is involved in rehearsal of sequences of movements. Although the differentiation of these subsystems may be justifiable, (and a future line of research could relate the operation of the suggested inner scribe component to everyday activities, e.g., playing the piano.), the addition of other comparable mechanisms to store and process olfactory, tactile, and taste information, would lead to a very complex and unparsimonious system. Other issues that so far have not been investigated extensively within the framework pertain to capacity limitations and semantic analysis. One of the major characteristics of a memory system is its limited capacity for processing and storage. We know very little, however, about the capacity limitations of the CE. In regard to semantic analysis, a pervasive human activity, no explicit mechanisms are provided; in contrast, the system includes mechanisms to deal with auditory and visual aspects of information. The CE might be a natural candidate to perform semantic analysis, but its description in Logie’s chapter appears to be content free . It is important to note that while semantic analysis in text comprehension models was related in the past to limitations of working memory (e.g., Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978), this was done using a general concept of WM, rather than the specific componential model reviewed by Logie. Future developments of the WM hypothesis we hope will deal more specifically with semantic analysis.

Ecological relevance of working memory I agree with Logie’s claim that research about WM is a good example of how laboratory research could contribute to understanding everyday activities. Early on, ecological concerns motivated the search for the role of the various mechanisms of WM in other cognitive tasks. Thus, Baddeley and Hitch (1974) used everyday activities, e.g., reading, auditory comprehension, and reasoning in their investigations. Logie describes well the research regarding the role of the PL in vocabulary acquisition, counting and mental arithmetic, and to a lesser degree its role in normal reading. Logie’s review also indicates the role the VSSP system plays in everyday cognitive activities, e.g., reading, movement planning, and imagery mnemonics. I appreciate his effort to relate the visuo-spatial component to learning routes around unfamiliar environments

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(navigation). The preliminary study by Logie and Wynn mentioned in the article is stimulating. In this study, subjects followed the experimenter on a route around a complex, unfamiliar building while performing a secondary task. It turned out that performance decrement in route following was larger when the Brooks matrix (which relies on VSSP) served as the secondary task, than when other secondary tasks, that involve the PL (Brooks verbal task), or the C E (random generation task), were used. Definitions of ecologically relevant research vary. As the recent debate about the topic (American Psychologist, 1991) demonstrates, there is even a disagreement about the appropriate terminology (ecological, everyday, applied, etc .) . One suggested criterion for evaluating the ecological validity of the research is consideration of the ecological validity of the method (Banaji & Crowder, 1989), i.e. the extent to which research applies to behavior in real-life settings, depends on differences in relevant parameters between the conditions under which the research was conducted and the real-life settings. The relevant dimensions include those pertaining to materials (i.e., the similarity between the stimuli used in research and those encountered in everyday activities), settings, subject populations, and tests. Low ecological validity could arise from deviations of individual research dimensions from comparable everyday parameters, as well as from interactions among various parameters of these dimensions ( e.g., specific combinations of materials and tests relevant for everyday activity; see Jenkins, 1979; Naveh-Benjamin, 1990). Using this criterion, WM research falls in the middle of the scale. This research generally involves a variety of tests (e.g., comprehension, recall) and fairly relevant materials. Strong advocates of the ecological validity of the method, however, may argue that the laboratory settings are artificial and context-free, and that the almost exclusive use of intentional learning instructions differs from naturalistic situations in which learning occurs in a specific context and is frequently incidental. In addition, some of the tasks and manipulations used are unlike those encountered in everyday activity. The degree of ecological validity of the method used may not provide a satisfactory indication of ecological validity. Let us take two tasks, such as digit span and working memory span (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980), and compare the ecological validity of the respective methods. If we focus on deviations from everyday tests, it is not clear which task has more ecological

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validity. On the one hand, digit span may be highly ecological, in that it resembles a specific everyday activity (e.g., remembering a phone number for a short time). Working memory span, however, does not resemble any specific everyday activity. On the other hand, working memory span involves more complex tasks that may resemble various activities that require simultaneous storage and processing of information. It is not clear whether a task is ecologically more valid if the type of cognitive activities involved are limited but the task is similar to some everyday activities (digit span), or if the task comprises a variety of cognitive activities but does not resemble any specific everyday activity (working memory span). Another criterion of ecological validity suggested by Banaji and Crowder (1989) is that of high generalizability of the results. Banaji and Crowder claim that the key concern is control (see also Roediger, 1991). The use of various manipulations under controlled settings in the laboratory, a characteristic of almost all studies on WM, provides high generalizability to results obtained within the WM framework. A third suggested criterion is functional relevance (Bruce, 1985, 1991). This criterion is quite independent of the previously discussed criteria of method or generalizability of the results. Research may be generalizable and high in methodological validity, but not address functional considerations. Investigations of WM that aim to establish how WM mechanisms are involved in everyday activities and the function they play in reading, comprehending, calculating, etc. are a prime example of functionally relevant research. One attribute of the functional analysis is consideration of individual differences. As Bruce (1985) stated, “individual differences are one of the hallmarks of ecologically oriented research. Although neuropsychological evidence based on individual case histories was used extensively in research within the WM framework, other individual differences data were not considered extensively. One exception are studies relating individual differences in capacity of WM to reading comprehension, as exemplified by the research by Daneman and Carpenter (1980, 1983). Several other areas addressing individual differences rely heavily on the concept of WM (e.g., aging, Hasher & Zacks, 1988). As previously discussed, however, researchers in these areas tend to use the general concept of WM, rather than address specifics of the componential model as reviewed by Logie. Research focused on individual differences may help both in constraining

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and in supporting theoretical formulations. Bruce’s (1991) suggestion to examine how variations in the suggested mechanisms and tasks assumed to be subserved by these mechanisms are correlated, is relevant here. Although neuropsychological evidence can be examined in regard to such correlations, such evidence typically involves the extreme points along the continuum of individual differences, and needs to be supplemented by testing the entire range of individual variation in the mechanisms and in performance of related everyday activities. Considerations of individual differences are relevant for non-cognitive variables, as well. Motivational and emotional factors and their involvement in WM activities have not been extensively investigated. Their relevance for tasks dependent on attentional mechanisms was demonstrated in the past (e.g., Eysenck, & Keane 1990), and future research should give more emphasis to these variables, given that attention is a major component of the CE. We should distinguish functional considerations from practical applications, a distinction not always apparent in Logie’s discussion. Functional analysis looks at the functions the mechanisms serve, while practical applications refer to the technological applicability of the findings. The results of an investigation may be relevant to one of the above but not to the other. For example, the bilingual word-length effect is cited by Logie as ecologically valid because it has implications for standardizing the memory span task in different languages and cultures. Although the effect may have potential applicability, it does not provide understanding of the function served. Certainly the effect was not conceived for the purpose of standardizing I.Q. tests, as implied in Logie’s chapter. Finally, a few comments about the functional role of WM mechanisms in other cognitive activities. First, the ecological relevance of the WM framework is related to the coherence and the empirical support of the underlying theoretical formulations. When the theoretical ideas are relatively vague (as in the case of the CE), it becomes more difficult to relate the WM to other cognitive activities. More explicit formulation should lead to more restrictive and less speculative analyses. Second, while impressive and intensive research programs were carried out to investigate the role of the PL in other mental activities, it is a bit disappointing to read the bottom line in Logie’s chapter indicating the relatively limited role of the PL in activities such as reading, comprehension, counting,

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and mental arithmetic, where it should be expected to be closely involved, Third, most of the research discussed by Logie was devoted to the way the WM system deals with external events; very little research addressed internal activities that may play an important role and form an integral part of mental life. One prime candidate here is conscious thought. Major activities in everyone’s life are retrospecting - thinking about the near or the distant past, and prospecting - thinking about upcoming events and planning for the future. These activities are pervasive, but have not been explicitly related to the WM framework. Certainly, the C E is involved in such activities, but the discussions so far have been largely speculative. It will be useful to look more fully at the use of WM in conducting thought experiments to discriminate specific episodes from general knowledge (Lockhart, 1989). Another line of relevant research could explore the role of WM in intentional recollection of personal past (Ross, 1989). Some of these activities clearly involve interaction of various components of the WM system essential for everyday performance. For example, reality monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981) probably involves an interaction between the C E and the VSSP. Exploring of interactions among various subsystems in performance of various tasks should be a major focus of future research. This task has theoretical importance and it is crucial for understanding everyday activities. Many activities that we may think of (e.g., reading) involve the use of multiple sources of information and complex processing demands. As such, the way the PL and the VSSP interact and are coordinated by the CE is essential for understanding the behavior underlying these activities. To summarize, I tend to agree with Logie’s claim that: “WM seems to offer a region of considerable solvency in studies of everyday memory.” But so far we have made just the first steps. There is much work ahead on WM as a center of ongoing mental activity that relates both the outer to the inner world and the past to the future.

References Atkinson, R.C., & Shiffrin, R.M. (1968). Human memory: A proposed system and its control processes. In K. W. Spence and J.T. Spence (Eds.), The psvchology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory, Vol. 2. (pp.89-105) New York: Academic Press.

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Baddeley, A.D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baddeley, A.D. (1990). Human memorv: Theory and application. Hove, Sussex: Erlbaum. Baddeley, A.D., & Hitch, G.J. (1974). Working memory. In G. Bower (ed.), The psycholow of learning and motivation, Vol. 8, (pp. 47-90), New York: Academic Press. Bahrick, H.P. (1979). Maintenance of knowledge: Questions about memory we forgot to ask. Journal of Experimental Psvchology: General, 108, 296-308. Banaji, M.R., & Crowder, R.G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 44, 1185-1193. Bruce, D. (1985). The how and the why of ecological memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114,78-90. Bruce, D. (1991). Mechanistic and functional explanations of memory. American Psychologist, 46, 46-48. Craik, F.I.M., & Lockhart, R.S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11,671-684. Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 450-466. Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. (1983). Individual differences in integrating information between and within sentences. Journal of Experimental Psvchology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 9, 561-584. Eysenck, M.W., & Keane, M.T. (1990). Cognitive Dsycholopy: A student’s handbook. Hove, Sussex: Erlbaum. Hasher, L., & Zacks, R.T. (1988). Working memory , comprehension, and aging: A review and a new view. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psvchologv of learning and motivation,Vol.22 (pp. 193-225). New York: Academic Press.

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Jenkins, J.J. (1979). Four points to remember: A tetrahedral model of memory experiments. In L.C. Cermak and F.I.M. Craik (Eds.), Levels of processing in human memory (pp.429-446). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Johnson, M.K., & Raye, C.L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psvchological Review, 88, 67-85. Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T.A. (1978). Toward a model of text comprehension and production. Psychological Review, 85, 363-394. Lockhart, R.S. (1989). Consciousness and the function of remembered episodes. In H. L. Roediger I11 & F. I. M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays in honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 423-429). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Lockhart, R.S., & & Craik, F.I.M. (1990). Levels of processing: A retrospective commentary on a framework for memory research. Canadian Journal of Psvchology, 44, 87-1 12. Naveh-Benjamin, M. (1990). The acquisition and retention of knowledge: Exploring mutual benefits to memory research and the educational setting. Applied Cognitive Psvcholoey, 4,295-320. Norman, D., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior. In R.J. Davidson, G.E. Schwartz, & D.E. Shapiro (Eds.), Consciousness and self-regulation, Vol. 4 (pp 118). New York: Plenum Press. Roediger, H.L. (1991). They read an article? A commentary on the everyday memory controversy. American Psychologist, 46,37-40. Ross, M. (1990). Relation of implicit theories to the construction of personal histories. Psychological Review, 46, 341-357. Wickens, C.D. (1984). Engineering psycholow and human performance. Columbus OH: Merrill.

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Memory in Everyday Life

G.M.Davies and R.H. Logie (JXtors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

24 1

CHAPTER 6 THE STRUCTURE OF MEMORY PERFORMANCE IN EXPERTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEMORY IN EVERYDAY LIFE K. Anders Ericsson Nancy Pennington University of Colorado at Boulder, U S A Experts are individuals who are able to perform tasks at an exceptional level in an intellectual domain such as chess, bridge, physics, or medicine. Experts have spent years and even decades working full-time in their domains of expertise. During this time they have acquired a large amount of experience and knowledge. With the recent interest in experts and expertise the use of the terminology has spread, and individuals with superior performance acquired after extensive practice are labelled experts in sports and arts, such as music and dance. The goal of psychology is to uncover general laws that account for performance and related phenomena in human adults ranging from peasants in India to computer scientists in the USA. Experts are by definition very different from normal adults. The differences in performance between experts and other adults who are able to complete a task are among the largest stable differences recorded in psychology. In spite of these large differences we will argue that the study of expert performance provides unique insights into the psychology of everyday activities. We will first outline briefly three possible views of the relation between expert and ordinary performance. Our empirical review supports a view of expert performance where experts acquire both knowledge and skills. Among the acquired skills, there are memory skills that allow experts to extend their working memory, thus circumventing the basic limits of short-term memory. A review of memory performance in experts show that these memory skills closely reflect the particular memory needs of the corresponding type of expertise. In our final sections, we will consider the implications of our conclusions about expertise for memory in everyday life.

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Three views of the relation between expertise and everyday activity

In this section, we present an overview of three views of expert performance relative to everyday and laboratory performances: the talent view, the knowledge view, and the acquired mechanisms view (see Figures 1, 2, and 3). One dimension of relationship that is common to the three views is the amount and complexity of relevant knowledge that is brought to bear in performing a task. Everyone agrees that individual differences are to a large extent due to the accumulated effects of very diverse experiences and activities during development. For unfamiliar activities the amount of relevant experience and knowledge is by definition small, and hence individual differences in knowledge on such tasks should be minimal. At the other extreme the activities of experts in their domain of expertise are mediated by a vast amount of acquired knowledge and skill, and the performance differences between experts and novices have always been among the largest recorded under standardized conditions. With this dimension in common, the three views of expertise differ in the hypothesized cognitive processes thought to be driving or limiting the performances of novices and experts. According to the talent view of expert performance (see Figure l), experts and expert-level performers are believed to have special talents and in-born capacities which would make their basic information-processing capacities systematically superior in certain respects. For example, the vastly superior memory performance of Luria’s (1968) subject S and Binet’s (1894) mental calculator Inaudi have led psychometricians (Wechsler, 1952) to Laws of memory and information processing capacity ****%* **** **. ** ***** **. *. **** ***** **. Laboratory performance

*b Everyday performance

Special talent and processing capacities **

*** **.

** ***

Expert performance

Amount and complexity of relevant knowledge and experiences

FIGURE 1. Talent view of expertise

b

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attribute a qualitatively different type of memory system to such individuals. The performance of experts under this view is irrelevant to the understanding of everyday and laboratory performances because a different set of processing mechanisms and capacities would apply. Hence any qualitative differences between the mediating mechanisms of experts' and novices' performance would be due to innate differences. Under this view, efforts to study experts' superior performance would be irrelevant to understanding general laws of normal human cognition.

Invariant laws of memory a n d information processing capacity

...*... ....... ...*. "....'.....-... ...* ..*... *..... ,...*. :

a '.

I

**..*.

'.a ' a #

I I

I I

I

I

Laboratory performance

Everyday performance

Expert performance

Amount and complexity of relevant knowledge a n d experiences

b

FIGURE 2. Knowledge view of expertise

According to the knowledge view of expert performance (see Figure 2), general laws and invariant human information capacities should hold across these three types of activities by definition. Ever since Ebbinghaus' introduction of the nonsense syllable, the main approach to the study of cognition has been to use unfamiliar material under controlled laboratory conditions. This approach assumes that when no relevant knowledge and experience is available to aid performance, the basic capacity limits of performance will be revealed. Furthermore, it assumes that the revealed capacity limits will be the critical constraints in all other activities except for availability of increasingly complex knowledge. Hence performance in everyday activities at expert levels, according to this view, are believed to be directly derivable from our

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knowledge about performance on unfamiliar tasks with the addition of knowledge and increased processing efficiency. However, when we want to determine the influence of knowledge on performance, the converse argument would be made. Studying laboratory performances would be unrewarding because of minimal differences in knowledge. Everyday activities with small associated individual differences in knowledge and experience would seem to provide the most difficult arena for extracting general laws. The domains of most everyday activities are quite diffuse with respect to criteria of performance and relevant knowledge. Individuals also differ in their personal goals for these everyday activities. In contrast, most domains of expertise are highly constrained in terms of their relevant knowledge and skills, and experts tend to approach these activities with the motivation of attaining their own maximal performance. According to the acquired mechanisms view of expert performance (see Figure 3), the relationship among laboratory, everyday, and expert performances is more complex. Recent reviews of general characteristics of expert performance across many different domains, such as chess, physics, medicine, sports and music (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Salthouse, 1991) show

Laws of memory and information processing

capacity

*****'::----. ****

**** **** ******

Laboratory performance

Acquired knowledge dependent mechanisms

**** --. -- -. --- -- --- -_ ********* *;***-----I-_

***.*** --*.,***

Everyday performance

**

** *** ** **5** -------- .___--__ Expert performance

Amount and complexity of relevant knowledge and experiences

FIGURE 3. Acquired mechanisms view of expertise.

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that experts are able to acquire mechanisms which circumvent basic capacity limits of the human information processing system. In typing and athletic sports experts overcome the limits of sequential reaction time by anticipating and preparing for future actions and keystrokes ahead of time. By limiting the preview of a typed text, the typing speed of an expert typist can be reduced to the level of the novice. Hence a critical aspect of expert typists is the skill of preparation for typing keys several keystrokes ahead of time (Salthouse, 1991). Similarly experts are able to circumvent the limits of short-term memory by acquired skill to rapidly store information in retrievable form in long-term memory consistent with Chase and Ericsson’s skilled-memory theory (Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989). In a recent paper, Ericsson and Kintsch (199 1) have generalized skilled-memory theory to account for increased working memory capacity (long-term working memory) during problem solving and planning in experts and text comprehension in adult subjects. According to the acquired mechanisms view expert performance involves not just accumulation of knowledge and experience but the acquisition of new mechanisms to overcome relevant constraints due to basic information processing limits.

The talent view of expertise Given that experts have been found to have remarkably good memory for information in their domain of expertise it would seem likely that they are endowed with a generally superior memory. However, recent research has shown that the superior memory performance of experts is not due to an innate superiority in memory capacity. Examination of individuals with alleged exceptional memory shows that the superior memory performance is limited to certain types of materials (Ericsson, 1985; Thompson et al., 1991; Wilding & Valentine, 1988). The superior memory of chess experts was found by Chase and Simon (1973) to be limited to meaningful chess positions, and the superiority of memory performance vanished when the location of chess pieces on the board were rearranged randomly. Subsequent research with experts from a wide range of domains (see Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989 for a review) has replicated the finding that the superiority of experts’ memory performance is restricted to meaningful stimuli in their domains of expertise. For a given type of material, normal adults can dramatically improve their memory

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performance through practice, and after 50-100 hours of practice their performances match and in some cases even surpass individuals with alleged exceptional memory (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Ericsson, 1988) and chess masters (Ericsson & Harris, 1991). Finally, the memory performance of mentally retarded savants has been shown to depend on extensive practice and acquired memory skill (Charness, 1988; Ericsson & Faivre, 1988; Sloboda, 1991). Thus, the available evidence from systematic laboratory studies of superior memory performance consistently implicates the role of experience and the acquired nature of this memory performance. In summary, two lines of reasoning have led us to minimize the role of innate talent as the explanation for the occurrence of expert-level performance. First, numerous studies have failed to find task-independent, general abilities are possessed by experts (see also Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Tyler, 1965). Second, expert level achievements are invariably associated with the highest levels of practice. The differences in performance between experts and novices must, therefore, be due to acquired knowledge and skills attained as a result of extensive experience and knowledge. The knowledge view of expertise Expertise and expert performance have been traditionally viewed as an accumulation of massive amounts of knowledge during at least a decade of full-time experience. The expert has been described as someone who knows more and more about less and less. The importance of knowledge is obvious in most tasks that define expertise in a particular domain. Some example tasks, for which a certain amount of knowledge is absolutely necessary, are illustrated in Table 1. Without the knowledge of the rules of chess, no one could consistently find the best move for a set of chess positions. Without the knowledge of all relevant diseases and their symptoms, a correct diagnosis of a patient with a certain set of symptoms is impossible. Hence comparing the performance of experts on these tasks to other adults lacking this necessary knowledge is meaningless. Instead, the standard design has been to compare groups of individuals with the necessary knowledge but differing in their amount of experience and attained performance level. Individuals who have just attained the necessary basic knowledge are called novices. The knowledge of experts differs from that of novices in a few important

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respects. First, experts have stored a lot more than the knowledge absolutely necessary to be able to solve the problems. They have stored organized categories of types of problems with particular plans for solutions. In chess, several thousands of pages are required to describe current knowledge about openings and other phases of the chess game (Charness, 1991). Scores on tests

Domain

SitUatiOIl.9

ACtiOnS

Medical

Description of a patient's

Correct diagnosis of

symptoms and medical history

medical problem

A physics problem

Generate the

Physics

correct answer

Chess

A chess position

Selection of the best move

TABLE 1. Knowledge necessary for Novice and Expert Performance in Example Domains

of such extended chess knowledge are highly correlated with chess performance (national chess rating) (Pfau & Murphy, 1988). Even in performance on mathematical problems by high-school students, tests of mathematical knowledge have been found to be highly predictive (Webb, 1975). Even knowledge about how to play basketball is highly correlated with actual ability to play basketball for young athletes (French & Thomas, 1987). High levels of performance in a domain of expertise are associated with more knowledge about the domain. An analysis of expert performance shows that it is not sufficient to have stored the knowledge in long-term memory; it is also critical that relevant knowledge can be efficiently retrieved when needed. Studies of physics

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problem solving show that novice college students have all the prerequisite knowledge necessary for generating a solution, but this knowledge has to be retrieved piece by piece starting with the statement of the problem. If a problem asks for the velocity of an object, a novice starts to retrieve formulas yielding velocity and then checks whether each formula is consistent with the given information. This method of starting with the question is called backward reasoning. In contrast, experts proceed by forward reasoning and, as part of the comprehension of the physics problem, generate a representation of the problem with a plan for solving it. When experts categorize physics problems, they rely on underlying physical principles (e.g., Newton’s second law and conservation of energy), whereas novices categorize problems by surface features, such as ’problems involving pulleys’. This finding suggests that experts form an immediate representation of problems that systematically cues their relevant knowledge, whereas novices do not have this kind of orderly access to their knowledge (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982). The rapid formation of a problem representation that integrates presented information and relevant background knowledge also appears to be a characteristic of experts in chess, medicine, and sports (Pate1 & Groen, 1991). In addition to having vastly larger and more organized amounts of knowledge than novices: experts have reliable and rapid access to their knowledge, while novices retrieve individual facts in a piecemeal fashion and generate results sequentially. According to theories of skill acquisition (Anderson, 1982) sequential processes are replaced by rapid and direct retrieval of results as a function of extensive practice. For example, children initially solve addition problems by counting on their fingers, and with sufficient experience and practice this process is converted to direct retrieval from memory (Ashcraft, 1982). Similarly with a lot of experience of algebra word problems students recognize types of problems and can thus retrieve a solution plan from memory instead of generating the equations in step-by-step fashion (Hinsley, Hays, & Simon, 1977). Experts in a wide range of domains, such as chess (de Groot, 1946/1978) are able to select the appropriate action after a very brief period of exposure to a problem situation. The ability of experts to retrieve rapidly and reliably appropriate plans and solutions from the vast body of information in long-term memory implies that the expert encodes the presented problem in terms of several patterns which, in combination, serve as cues for the retrieval of the corresponding plan (Chase & Simon, 1973).

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The traditional theory argues that with extensive experience sequential processing is replaced by direct retrieval of plans and actions using recognized patterns for tasks and situations that are very familiar to the experts. The acquisition of expertise can thus be described as the incremental increase of knowledge (pattern-action pairs) within the limited information-processing capacity of human adults.

Limitations of the knowledge view It is now becoming clear that the traditional theory of skill acquisition and expertise on the basis of knowledge alone is incomplete (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). This theory accounts well for a monotonic increase in performance as a result of further practice and experience (Newel1 & Rosenbloom, 1981). However, in many tasks, improvement in performance requires the subject to create an adequate strategy through problem solving or instruction (Ericsson, Krampe & Tesch-Romer, 1991). Without such discovery, improvement with further practice is slow or non-existent (Chase & Ericsson, 1981), and performance after many years of practice is vastly inferior to that obtained by other subjects using better strategies (Ericsson & Polson, 1988a; Lewis, 1981). A comprehensive theory of expertise also needs to be able to account for the ability of experts to plan and reason about a presented problem which goes beyond the simple retrieval of past solutions or general problem schemas (Ericsson & Smith, 1991). Experts in chess spend considerable time analyzing a chess position during which they explore and evaluate the consequences of promising chess moves by planning 5 - 10 moves ahead (Charness, 1981b; de Groot, 1946/1978). During this period of evaluation, chess experts at an international level often discover even better chess moves than those that occurred to them during the initial perception of the chess position (de Groot, 1946/1978). These limitations of the traditional approach could be consistent with the view that expertise and expert performance reflect acquired knowledge without any violations of general information processing limits. However, some research seems to imply that experts’ working memory can exceed the capacity limitations of short-term memory (Miller, 1956), raising the possibility of strong violations of general information processing limits.

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Short-term memory limitations have been shown to play an important limiting role in memory for lists of arbitrary items (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). More importantly, performance in complex cognitive activities such as problem solving (Atwood, Masson, & Polson, 1980; Newel1 & Simon, 1972), concept formation (Levine, 1966), text comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) and decision making (Payne, 1976) also seems to be constrained by the amount of information that can be concurrently kept in an active short-term memory. In their classic research on chess expertise, Chase and Simon (1973) proposed that the rapid performance of experts was consistent with the traditional memory model relying on intermediate storage in a limited-capacity STM. They argued that the well-known ability of chess masters to rapidly identify a superior chess move for a presented chess position was mediated by the recognition of complex familiar patterns of chess pieces already stored explicitly in LTM (chunks). They proposed the same mechanism, relying on recognized chunks, to account for the empirical finding that chess masters were able to recall most of the locations of chess pieces in a briefly presented meaningful chess position, but only a few locations when pieces had been randomly placed on the chess board. In these studies a presentation time of five seconds was used, which is about half of the time believed necessary for storage of a chunk in LTM (Simon, 1974). Hence Chase and Simon (1973) argued that the superior memory performance of chess masters was due to the availability of a very large number of chunks of chess pieces in LTM which allowed them to encode the chess pieces in the chess position with a limited number of chunks in STM. Subsequent research has shown that superior memory performance for briefly presented chess positions cannot be explained solely in terms of transient storage in STM. Charness (1976) demonstrated that interpolated tasks, which eliminate the influence of information stored in short-term memory, have minimal influence on recall performance, implying that information about the chess position was stored in long-term memory. Requirements for storage of intermediate problem-solving results also indicate an expanded working memory. For example, experts in mental multiplication have to keep several intermediate results in working memory while they complete a complex multiplication problem (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; Staszewski, 1988). These and related results, showing a substantial incidental memory for meaningful stimuli, (Charness, 1981a; de Groot, 1946/1978; Kintsch, 1974; Lane & Robertson,

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(Charness, 1981a; de Groot, 1946/1978; Kintsch, 1974; Lane & Robertson, 1978; Norman, Brooks & Allen, 1989) imply that experts and ordinary individuals in highly familiar activities can store information in LTM very rapidly and retrieve that information later.

Acquired mechanisms view of expertise The evidence reviewed above casts doubt on the claim that the cognitive processes of experts are constrained by the same limitations on information processing as other human adults. To examine the mechanisms more closely, we turn to situations in which individuals display exceptional memory performance. We want to focus on the documented instances of individuals (Binet, 1894; Luria, 1968) who display exceptional memory performance for material, such as digits and foreign vocabulary items, that are meaningless for normal adults. We then proceed to a discussion of superior memory of domain experts.

Memory experts and exceptional memory Many different studies have shown that even after only a few hours of practice of memorization of meaningless materials, the speed of memorization is dramatically improved (Ericsson, 1985). With extended practice, Chase and Ericsson (1981, 1982) showed that memory performance on tasks designed to measure STM with fast presentation rates could be improved over lOOO%. In their training study with digit-span they found that before the start of practice their subjects had normal digit spans (around 7 digits) and relied on short-term memory rehearsal strategies consistent with behavior in laboratory studies. However, with extended practice these subjects were able to rely on LTM for storage and retrieval and hence increased their ability to recall correctly sequences of seven digits to sequences of over 80 digits. The subjects segmented longer lists of digits into groups of three or four digits that were encoded and stored in long-term memory, as demonstrated by the subjects’ ability to recall virtually all of the digit groups from all the presented lists of digits during post-session recall (amounting to between 200 and 300 digits). From this empirical evidence and other empirical evidence on exceptional memory performance, Chase and Ericsson (1982, Ericsson, 1985) proposed

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Skilled-Memory Theory to account for when and how subjects could acquire memory skills relying on LTM for storage and retrieval of presented information. In order to achieve rapid storage in long-term memory, Skilled-Memory Theory claims that it is necessary to encode the presented information in terms of associations to pre-existing knowledge in long-term memory. Several of Chase and Ericsson’s subjects were collegiate runners, who reported using their knowledge about running times to meaningfully encode groups of three and four digits. For example, 3493 could be encoded as world-class running time for the mile, e.g., 3 minutes 49.3 seconds. Other subjects with exceptional memory had extensive knowledge about numbers and mental calculation (Binet, 1894; Muller, 1911, 1917; Thompson et al, in press). Yet other subjects relied on methods to recode digits phonemically to access concrete words that readily elicit images (Susukita, 1933, 1934; Wilding & Valentine, 1985). Even Luria’s (1968) subject S and Hunt and Love’s (1972) subject VP reported relying on meaningful (mnemonic) associations for memorization of ’meaningless’ materials. In all these cases mnemonists retrieved knowledge relevant to the presented information and used this knowledge to form new memory traces in LTM. Such a sequence of events provides more flexibility and power than the traditional chunk model developed in the chess memory studies where the presented information has to perfectly match a chunk already stored in LTM. In order to effectively use long-term memory as an extended working memory the critical issue is how to retrieve the information once it is successfully stored in long-term memory. Unlike the limited information kept in short-term memory, information stored in long-term memory has to be associated with specific retrieval cues before it can be retrieved again. According to Skilled-Memory Theory, this problem is solved by associating the encoded information with special retrieval cues belonging to a retrieval structure at the time of the original presentation. Any time the stored information needs to be recalled, the special retrieval cues are activated to retrieve the encoded information from long-term memory. The theoretical notion of a retrieval structure is very general and is instantiated in different ways to accommodate different demands on subsequent retrieval. For example, in the laboratory task of serial list learning the subject has to reproduce the exact sequence of presented items. The retrieval structures

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LEVEL 3

LEVEL 2

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2315 7548 5901 8370 554 554 554 10537

FIGURE 4. Proposed hierarchical organization of S.F.’s memory encoding 01 30 presented digits. The first level contains mnemonic encodings of digit groups, and the second level consists of supergroups in which the relative location of several digit groups are encoded.

consist of a well-known sequence of cues either in the form of a hierarchy or a list (e.g., method of loci or peg words). As items are presented subjects associate cues in the retrieval structure with their encodings. For example, in the method of loci the presented item (e.g., shoe) is integrated with the corresponding physical location (e.g., kitchen) into an interactive image (e.g., shoes distributed across the kitchen floor). For a hierarchical scheme subjects associated a 4-digit group encoded as, for example, a running time for a mile with the second location in the first collection of 4-digit groups (see Figure 4). At the time of recall subjects regenerate the location from their stable knowledge about the retrieval structure and use these cues to retrieve the stored item. Exceptional memory for lists is invariably associated with these types of retrieval structures (Ericsson, 1985, 1988). The same type of retrieval structures can yield very flexible access of

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information from presented matrices. Ericsson and Chase (1982) found that their trained subjects encoded a matrix of 25 numbers (originally used by Binet (1894)) in terms of five rows consisting each of five digits encoded together as illustrated in Figure 5. The trained subjects could then retrieve the digits in any of the illustrated recall orders by retrieving the corresponding row and directly accessing the corresponding digit within the row. The trained subjects’ storage and flexible recall matched exceptional subjects studied by Binet (1894) and Luria (1968) and would thus meet the specified criteria of these investigators for exceptional visual-photographic memory. As we move away from expertise in memory tasks requiring literal reproduction of presented information to tasks focused on calculation, problem solving, and other more complex mental activities, the idea of retrieval structures is still valid although the structure of the retrieval cues will change. In order to attain subsequent direct retrieval of some information, the initial encoding of that information must include associations with retrieval cues appropriate for future retrieval contexts, in which retrieval of that information is desired. For example, during complex mental multiplication intermediate products have to be encoded and associated with unique retrieval cues. Later in the calculation process, when that product is needed again, it can be directly accessed by activating the corresponding retrieval cue (Chase & Ericsson, 1982; 4

7

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FIGURE 5. A 25-digit matrix of the type used by Binet (1894) to test his memory experts. He asked subjects to repeat the whole matrix in the various orders shown or to repeat individual rows as five-digit numbers.

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Staszewski, 1988). Ericsson and Polson's (1988a, 1988b) analysis of a waiter with exceptional memory for dinner orders revealed encodings relating items across customers yielding a category-based organization. Chase and Ericsson (1981) showed that for their trained memory experts specific information about encoded digit groups in memorized lists of digits could be accessed through cued recall in less than a second. During their encoding of digit sequences previously encoded digit groups (part of earlier memorized sequences) with similar mnemonic encodings were automatically retrieved and relied on for the encoding of the current digit group. Thus with the appropriate retrieval cues, recently-stored information can be retrieved from LTM with speeds comparable to retrieval of other knowledge. The skilled-memory account of extended working memory in skilled complex activities is completely consistent with the established capacity limitation of attention, short-term memory and sensory stores based on laboratory studies, and with current theories of storage and cue-based retrieval in long-term memory. In fact, detailed analyses of the encoding processes of memory experts show that the number of independent items encoded into a single group is virtually always 3 or 4, and larger groups of items are nearly always broken down into hierarchically joined subgroups (Ericsson, 1985).

Superior memory performance in domain experts The superior memory performance of problem-solving experts in their domains of expertise, unlike memory experts, occurs even though domain experts do not explicitly train their m e m ~ r yabilities. We will argue that the superior memory of domain experts is nonetheless a reflection of acquired memory skill and that many expert activities, such as planning, evaluation, and the selection of correct actions, require an integrated representation of the current situation, which is stored in directly accessible form in long-term memory. Ericsson and Kintsch (1991) have recently extended the skilled memory framework to account for extended working memory seen in expert performance. This implies that the experts' representations of the current situation selectively encode those aspects that are important for the experts' successful performance of the task. This type of selective encoding in terms of "chunks" is consistent with Chase and Simon's (1973) original account of the selection of a chess move for a presented chess position based on direct

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retrieval from long-term memory. In this section we will review the rather diverse evidence on when experts do and do not display superior memory as well as evidence on the experts’ mediating cognitive processes and acquired cognitive structures. First, we will discuss the critical factor of selection of important information relevant to the concerns of the expert. Then we will discuss the role of the experts’ knowledge in rapid storage of accessible information in long-term memory. Finally, we will review the evidence on retrieval structures and their role in planning and reasoning in experts.

Selective encoding of relevant information by experts. Expert decision makers, such as financial analysts, auditors and graduate admissions officers, are more selective in the information about a case that they consider than less experienced decision makers (see Camerer & Johnson, 1991, for a review). It is frequently found that experts have no better memory for certain types of information in their domains of expertise than novices and less experienced individuals, e.g., memory of non-contour maps (Gilhooly, Wood, Kinnear, & Green, 1988) and memory of medical information (see Patel & Groen, 1991, for a review). There are even examples where experts’ memory is inferior to novices and medical students, e.g., x-rays of healthy subjects (Myles-Worsley, Johnston & Simons, 1988), memory for texts on diseases (Patel & Groen, 1991). Other studies have found that experts recall different kinds of information than less experienced individuals, thus leading to an interaction of type of information with expertise. Expert computer programmers tend to recall the structure of programs better at the expense of details, whereas novice computer programmers show the reverse pattern (Adelson, 1984). A subject without knowledge of chess was trained to memorize chess positions and was able to match the superior memory for briefly presented chess positions by chess experts within 50 hours of training. However, the subject recalled less about the pieces in the important center of the chess board and more of the less relevant pieces on the periphery, whereas a chess master showed the reverse pattern (Ericsson & Harris, 1991). All of the studies we know of, with one possible exception from the domain of music, are consistent with the claim that experts have better memory for important and relevant information. When experts on maps are given

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advanced contour maps, their superior memory is demonstrated (Gilhooly, et al, 1988). When an analysis of recall is limited to the important new information in a medical text, the medical experts show superior recall (Pate1 & Groen, 1986). Memory for x-rays of patients with pathological conditions are better recalled by experts (Myles-Worsley et al., 1988). Incidental memory of information about a medical patient after a diagnosis is higher for experts than medical students (Norman, Brooks, & Allen, 1989). When music is presented visually in standard form, experts in music show superior recall (Sloboda, 1976). Only when music is presented auditorily, have investigators been unable to demonstrate superior memory of experts in music. The memory task of reproducing music after a single hearing is not exhibited by normal musicians. Consistent with the acquired skill framework, musicians with exceptional performance on this task are usually blind and memorizing music by hearing is their only opportunity to learn new musical pieces (Charness, 1988).

The role of knowledge in the superior memory of experts. Knowledge is essential to meaningfully encode configurations and relations between elements in a stimulus. The pattern of superior memory of experts for meaningful stimuli, but not randomly arranged versions has been observed in a wide range of domains beyond chess (Chase & Simon, 1973) including bridge (Charness, 1979; Engle & Bukstel, 1978); GO (Reitman, 1976); music notation (Sloboda, 1976); electronic circuit diagrams (Egan & Schwartz, 1979); computer programming (McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter, & Hirtle, 1981); dance, basketball, and field hockey (Allard & Starkes, 1991); and figure skating (Deakin & Allard, 1991). However in some domains such as volleyball (Allard & Starkes, 1991) and chess (Holding, 1985) experts have displayed superior memory performance for both meaningful and random stimuli. These anomalous findings can be accounted for within skilled-memory theory, where a larger body of relevant knowledge can facilitate memory in two ways. Additional knowledge of acquired higher-level units, can facilitate the 'chunking' of presented information. For example, combinations of letters are perceived as familiar words, notes are perceived as chords. Mental calculation experts (Smith, 1983) are familiar with 3-digit numbers as distinct units and

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know, for example, how all these numbers can be factored into primes (e.g. 799 = 17 x 47). Chess masters know distinct verbal labels for fixed configurations of chess pieces and medical experts have concepts for distinct combinations of symptoms. When stimuli are rearranged randomly the probability that a meaningful configuration will emerge is low in most domains. However, if a mental calculation expert knows all numbers between OOO - 999 then all possible numbers can be represented as sequences of familiar numbers. Similarly a wide range of "random" combinations of notes can be interpreted musically (Halpern & Bower, 1982). Second, additional knowledge can facilitate the creation of new memory traces in LTM. Any normal adult can store the association between two arbitrary concrete words by forming an interactive image of the two objects. Bellezza and Buck (1988) showed that subjects with expert knowledge in a domain, such as football or clothing, were better able to recall paired associates when the cues were words from their field of expert knowledge. The amount of knowledge of soccer was found to be a powerful determinant (r > 0.8) of subjects' recall of newly presented scores for recent soccer matches (Morris, Tweedy, & Gruneberg, 1985). Even for lists of simulated soccer matches, where the score was randomly assigned, accuracy of recall increased with more knowledge of soccer, but the strength of the relation was weaker. When subjects have expert domain knowledge (e.g., baseball) their recall corresponding domain (Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979; Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979). When investigators in a 2 x 2 design contrasted high and low reading comprehension (Recht & Leslie, 1988) or high and low IQ (Schneider, Korkel, & Weinert, 1989) with high and low expert knowledge they found that memory and comprehension of a text about the corresponding domain was dramatically superior for expert subjects with no additional influence of IQ or level of reading comprehension. Most intriguingly Bellezza and Buck (1988) found that expert knowledge led to superior recall of texts about the domain even when the stories were 'crazy' and contradicted factual knowledge about the domain. Finally, Norman, Brooks and Allen (1989) found that with an instruction to memorize information about patients the recall of medical students matched that of the experts in contrast to the earlier mentioned finding that experts have superior incidental memory after diagnosing a patient with the same presented information.

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Retrievability of information stored in LTM--the importance of retrieval cues and structures. T o acquire extended working memory it is necessary not only to store the relevant information rapidly in LTM, but to encode it in such a manner that it remains retrievable later. Subsequent retrieval of information in LTM requires retrieval cues, which, according to skilled-memory theory, are associated with the stored information at the time of the initial encoding and storage. In this section we will describe the empirical evidence for the mediation of retrieval cues and retrieval structures in the extended working memory of experts. The most direct evidence for the mediation of retrieval cues and retrieval structures comes from concurrent and retrospective verbal reports from experts. However this evidence needs to be supplemented with experiments and other direct tests using cued-recall procedures. We will focus on memory for drink and dinner orders, for maps, and for chess positions, and summarize findings from some other areas of expertise. Superior memory for drink orders (Bennett, 1983) and dinner orders (Ericsson & Polson, 1988a; 1988b) by experienced waiters and waitresses has been studied with laboratory analogues of the real situation in restaurants. From interviews at the end of the experimental sessions, Bennett (1983) found that expert waitresses encoded drink orders by linking the order to the corresponding person and his or her location at the table. At the time of recall the drink orders could be retrieved by using the specific table with its seating locations as direct cues for the drink orders or for the individuals which in turn allowed access to their drink orders. The same kind of encoding methods were revealed in concurrent verbal reports (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) of skilled waiters and waitresses collected by Crutcher and Ericsson (Ericsson & Polson, 1988a). Ericsson and Polson (1988a, 1988b) found that a waiter (JC) with exceptional memory for dinner orders used an encoding strategy that capitalized on the similarity between dinner orders of customers, at a table which for less experienced waiters and waitresses creates a lot of interference. JC was found to use mnemonic codes to relate categories of items together across subjects. Hence salad dressings were encoded as a sequence of letters according to the first letter of each salad dressing, (e.g. B for Bleu Cheese), and cooking temperatures of ordered steaks were ’visualized’ as illustrated in Figure 6. JC’s encoding strategies allowed him to overcome the interference due to the

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similarity of the dinner orders and the category- based encoding allowed him to capitalize on the redundancy by encoding across-order patterns. Like other waiters and waitresses, JC relied primarily on a retrieval structure based on the customers’ locations around the table. Individual differences in memory for maps can be attributed to similar differences in the encoding processes found to underlie the skills of expert waiters and waitresses. An analysis of concurrent verbal reports from college students while they memorized schematic maps showed that the subjects with the best recall encoded relations between the details of the maps and organizing features such as rivers and main streets (Thorndyke & Stasz, 1980). There are clear similarities between this type of hierarchical encoding and the waiters’ encodings based on locations around dinner tables. Using the same paradigm Gilhooly et al. (1988) compared expert and novice map users for both schematic maps (mainly used by tourists) and more advanced contour maps. They found superior recall by experts compared to novices for the contour maps but no differences in recall for the more common schematic maps. In accord with this finding, an analysis of the concurrent reports from the memorization of the maps showed that experts differed from novices in their more elaborate encodings using the additional relationships provided by the contour maps. The most elaborate and integrated encodings of presented information are still those found for highly skilled chess players. On the basis of retrospective verbal reports of grand masters and masters after brief exposures of chess position, de Groot (1946/1978) found clear evidence of perception of chunks, or complexes, as well as of encodings relating chunks to one another to form a global encoding of the position. Chi (1978) showed that frequently a chess piece can belong to more than one chunk, a finding that suggests higher order relations among the chunks of a board. It appears necessary to assume that global and integrated encodings account for the ability of chess experts to recall accurately more than one briefly presented chess position at a single trial (Charness, 1976; Frey & Adesman, 1976). Further evidence for the storage of chess position as a unit is given by a long retrieval time to recall the first chess piece of a position after STM had been disrupted experimentally, followed by fast recall of the remaining chess pieces (Charness, 1976). A selection of a move for a chess position by a chess master is very memory demanding as the chess masters explore the consequences of future

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Customers

Starches

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FIGURE 6. A retrieval structure for dinner orders. The actual seating of five customers is shown at the top. Below JC's category based encodings for starches, salad dressings and temperatures are illustrated with an example of dinner orders. moves to considerable depth by planning (de Groot, 194611978). The depth to which a possible move sequence for a chess position was explored was related to the level of chess skill, at least for chess players below the level of chess experts (Charness, 1981b). In support of the finding of remarkable capacities to explore chess positions mentally, it is well known that chess players at the master level can play while blindfolded with only a minor reduction in chess capability and without prior specialized practice (Holding, 1985). During blindfold chess and normal planning of chess moves the chess master must have direct access to information about the complete chess position. Ericsson and Oliver (in Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989) found that under those conditions a candidate chess master could recall the chess piece at any cued location about as quickly as when cued with a perceptually available

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chess board. More complex judgments, such as a report of the number of chess pieces in a given row, took much longer mentally than perceptually. Ericsson and Oliver found the data consistent with the use of a spatial retrieval structure corresponding to the 64 squares of the chess board (Ericsson & Staszewski, 1989). The specific mechanisms used to represent and integrate large amounts of presented information internally in other domains of expertise are less well documented but the phenomena are similar. Charness (1989) showed that expertise at the game of bridge was closely linked with the capacity to generate successful plans for playing the cards in the optimum order. In medical diagnosis, the medical expert has to integrate many different pieces of information that are not simultaneously available perceptually. The internal representation of the presented medical information must be sufficiently precise to allow extensive reasoning and evaluation of consistency, but also must be sufficiently flexible to allow reinterpretation as new information becomes available (Lesgold et al., 1985; Pate1 & Groen, 1991).

Implications for everyday performance In the introduction we presented three views of the relationship between expertise and everyday performances. We have argued that the talent view is unsupported and that the knowledge view is incomplete. Based on our review of performance by memory and domain experts we will reject the assumption of the knowledge view that the expert is limited by the same information processing constraints as the novice. As expert performance is acquired, the expert is no longer constrained by the limits of short-term memory capacity and is able to acquire skilled memory to circumvent this limitation and to rely on rapid storage of information in retrievable form in long-term memory. These acquired memory skills are integral aspects of the expert performance itself and are acquired through extended practice to meet specific needs to store relevant information. In expert performance the traditional short-term memory does not apply directly to performance, rather the acquired constraints of skilled memory can be substituted. The most intriguing issue that now emerges is whether the concepts of skilled memory and long-term working memory also applies to memory in

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everyday life. It is important to realize that the capacity of short-term memory is always available; but that extended working memory should be available for those activities in which the individual has sufficient knowledge to rely on skilled memory. According to skilled-memory theory, extended working memory occurs only in those activities where subjects have the sufficient knowledge for efficient encoding and storage in long-term memory and the acquired retrieval structures and procedures for reliable and fast retrieval of relevant information. It is important to realize that a meaningful encoding of a stimulus implies an implicit selection of one of several possible meanings or aspects. Hence, unlike storage in short-term memory where presented stimuli can be stored with a limited semantic commitment, storage in long-term memory would imply a semantic disambiguation, which would make a subsequent re-interpretation of the meaning impossible unless the ambiguity and the alternative interpretations were explicitly encoded. Similarly, the encoding of the information and associations with a retrieval structure impose clear limits on how the information can be retrieved. At the time of encoding, considerable skill is required in order to determine in what contexts the information is relevant and should be efficiently retrieved. Only under these limiting conditions subjects can use long-term memory as an extension of their working memory. In many of our everyday activities at work or leisure we have enough experience and knowledge to make it plausible that one would see evidence for acquired mechanisms like those identified for expert performance. Some of the studies discussed earlier showed that low ability readers with a lot of knowledge about baseball or soccer recalled a text about a sports event better than high-ability readers with less domain knowledge. In fact, text-comprehension appears to be a typical everyday activity, in which the amount of information about the previously read text that has to be kept available in working memory to comprehend subsequent sentences is remarkably large. In a recent extensive review, Ericsson and Kintsch (1991) showed that during text comprehension subjects rely primarily on long-term working memory to integrate the sentences and to construct a coherent representation of the text. Knowledge and schemas are critical to the successful encoding of the information in long-term memory as well as to allow efficient subsequent retrieval of this information using a small number of retrieval cues in short-term memory. According to this view text comprehension should be relatively

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unimpaired by interruptions, where the information in short-term memory is lost due to another memory-demanding activity. This is exactly what Glanzer and his colleagues (see Glanzer & Nolan, 1986 for a review) have found. Text comprehension is not impaired when subjects are forced to read an unrelated sentence or perform arithmetic calculations between consecutive sentences of the text. Reading times of the first sentence after the interruption are somewhat longer and the increased reading time is consistent with the time required to reinstate the retrieval cues providing access to the representation of the previously read text stored in long-term memory. Thus, normal text comprehension reflects the same acquired mechanisms as found in memory of experts. Similar ability to integrate and store information rapidly is found in many everyday activities. Interruptions of these activities are not devastating and these activities can be resumed at a delay with few problems. One reason that the memory performance of experts appears so striking is that for many domains of expertise most individuals have a minimum of relevant knowledge, in contrast to the vast knowledge and acquired skills of the masters in that domain. Such extreme differences in knowledge are rarely encountered in everyday activities. Furthermore, most experts have dedicated more than ten years to perfect their performance on a single activity. This single-minded focus is also rarely observed for everyday activities. In this light one can view expert memory performance as an extreme adaptation to the particular demands of certain tasks. The most impressive expert memory performances are found for types of expertise where extensive planning of future move sequences is critical, such as in chess, bridge and GO. In these tasks experts must acquire skilled memory to mentally represent situations with sufficient details to allow accurate evaluation of consequences. In conclusion, studies of expert performance reveal the full range of cognitive mechanisms governing memory capacity and thus provide us with more adequate models of memory in everyday life.

Acknowledgements. The thoughtful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this chapter by Reid Hastie and Alice Healy are gratefully acknowledged.

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Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R., & Tesch-Romer, C. (1991). The role of deliberate Dractice in the acauisition of exDert performance. Institute of Cognitive Science Technical Report #91-6, University of Colorado at Boulder. Ericsson, K. A., & Polson, P. G. (1988a). An experimental analysis of a memory skill for dinner-orders. Journal of Experimental Psycholoev: Learning. Memory. and Cognition, 14,305-316. Ericsson, K. A., & Polson, P. G. (1988b). Memory for restaurant orders. In M. Chi, R. Glaser, & M. Farr (Eds.), The nature of expertise (pp. 23-70). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1984). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press. Ericsson, K. A., & Smith, J. (1991). Prospects and limits of the empirical study of expertise: An introduction. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Towards a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 1-38). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ericsson, K. A., & Staszewski, J. (1989). Skilled memory and expertise: Mechanisms of exceptional performance. In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon (pp. 235-267). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. French, K. E., & Thomas, J. R. (1987). The relation of knowledge development to children’s basketball performance. Journal of Sport Psychology, 4, 15-32. Frey, P. W., & Adesman, P. (1976). Recall memory for visually presented chess positions. Memory and Cognition, 4, 541-547. Gilhooly, K. J., Wood, M., Kinnear, P. R., & Green, C. (1988). Skill in map reading and memory for maps. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. M A , 87-107. Glanzer, M., & Nolan, S. D. (1986). Memory mechanisms in text comprehension. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, V01.20 (pp. 275-3 17). New York: Academic Press. Halpern, A. R., & Bower, G. H. (1982). Musical expertise and melodic structure in memory for musical notation. American Journal of

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Hinsley, D. A., Hayes, J. R., & Simon, H. A. (1977). From words to equations: Meaning and representation in algebra word problem. In M. A. Just & P. A. Carpenter ( a s . ) , Cognitive processes in comprehension. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Holding, D. H. (1985). Erlbaum.

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Hunt, E., & Love, T. (1972). How good can memory be? In A. W. Melton & E. Martin (Eds.), Coding processes in human memory (pp.237-260) New York: Holt. Kintsch, W. (1974). The remesentation of meaning in memory . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T. A. (1978). Toward a model of text comprehension and production. Psycholoeical Review, 85, 363-394. Lane, D. M., & Robertson, L. (1979). The generality of levels of processing hypothesis: An application to memory for chess positions. Memory and Cognition, 2,253-256. Lesgold, A., Rubinson, H., Feltovich, P., Glaser, R., Klopfer, D., & Wang, Y. (1985). Expertise in a complex skill: Diagnosing X-ray pictures. LRDC, University of Pittsburgh Technical Report. Levine, M. (1 966). Hypothesis behavior by humans during discrimination learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 71, 33 1-338. Lewis, C. (1981). Skill in algebra. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp. 85-1 10). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Luria, A. R. (1968). The mind of a mnemonist. New York: Avon. McKeithen, K. B., Reitman, J. S., Rueter, H. H., & Hirtle, S. C. (1981). Knowledge organization and skill differences. in computer programmers. Cognitive Psychology, 13,307-325. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits of our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97.

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Morris, P. E., Tweedy, M., & Gruneberg, M. M. (1985). Interest, knowledge and the memorization of soccer scores. British Journal of Psychologv, 76, 415-425. Muller, G. E. (1911). Zur Analyse der Gedachtnistatigkeit und des Vorstellungsverlaufes. Teil I [Studies of memory and cognitive processes. Part I]. Zeitschrift fur Psychologie. Ereanzungsband, 5, Muller, G. E. (1911) Zur Analyse der Gedachtnistatigkeit und des Vorstellungsverlaufes. Teil I1 [Studies of memory and cognitive processes. Part 111. Zeitschrift fur Psycholoeie. Ereanzungsband, 9. Myles-Worsley, M., Johnston, W. A., & Simons, M. A. (1988). The influence of expertise on X-ray image processing. Journal of Experimental Psvchologv: Learning. Memorv. and Cognition, l4, 553-557. Newell, A., & Rosenbloom, P. S. (1981). Mechanisms of skill acquisition and the law of practice. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp. 1-55). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human problem solving . Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall. Norman, G. R., Brooks, L. R., & Allen, S. .W. (1989). Recall by expert medical practioners and novices as a record of processing attention. Journal of Experimental Psycholoev: Learning. Memory and Cognition, 15, 1166-1 174. Patel, V. L. & Groen, G. L. (1986). Knowledge-based solution strategies in medical reasoning. Cognitive Science, 1Q,9 1- 1 16. Patel, V. L., & Groen, G. J. (1991). The general and specific nature of medical expertise: A critical look. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 93-125). New York: Cambridge University Press. Payne, J. W. (1976). Task complexity and contingent processing in decision making: An informational search and protocol analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16,366-387. Pfau, H. D., & Murphy, M. D. (1988). Role of verbal knowledge in chess skill. American Journal of Psychology, 101,73-86.

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Recht, D. R., & Leslie, L. (1988). Effect of prior knowledge on good and poor readers’ memory of text. Journal of Educational Psychology, 80, 16-20. Reitman, J. (1976). Skilled perception in go: Deducing memory structures from inter-response times. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 336-356. Salthouse, T. A. (1991). Expertise as the circumvention of human information processing limits. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits, (pp. 286-300). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schneider, W., Korkel, J., & Weinert, F. E. (1989). Domain-specific knowledge and memory performance: A comparison of high- and 306-3 12. low-aptitude children. Journal of Educational Psychology,

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Sloboda, J. (1976). Visual perception of musical notation: Registering pitch 28, , symbols in memory. i 1-16. Sloboda, J. (1991). Musical expertise. In K. A. Ericsson & J. Smith (Eds.), Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and limits (pp. 153-171). New York: Cambridge University Press. Smith, S . B. (1983). The Freat mental calculators. New York: Columbia University Pres’s. Spilich, G. J., Vesonder, G. T., Chiesi, H. L., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Text processing of domain related information for individuals with high and low domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18, 275-290. Staszewski, J. J. (1988). Skilled memory and expert mental calculation. In M. T. H. Chi, R. Glaser, & M. J. Farr (Eds.). The nature of expertise (pp. 71-128). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Susukita, T. (1933). Untersuchung eines ausserordentlichen Gedaechtnisses in Japan. (I). (A study of an exceptional memory in Japan (I)). Tohoku Psychologica Folia, 1,111-154. Susukita, T. (1934). Untersuchung eines ausserordentlichen Gedaechtnisses

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in Japan (11). (A study of an exceptional memory in Japan (11)). Tohoku Psychologica Folia, 2, 14-43. Thompson, C. P., Cowan, T., Frieman, J., Mahadevan, R. S . , &Vogl, R. J., (1991). Rajan: A study of a memorist. Journal of Memorv and Language, 702-729.

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Thorndyke, P. W., & Stasz, C. (1980). Individual differences in procedures for knowledge acquisition from maps. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 137-175. Tyler, L. E. (1965). The psvchologv of human differences. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Webb, N. L. (1975). An exploration of mathematical problem-solving processes (Doctoral dissertation, Standford University, 1975). Dissertation Abstracts International, 36, 2689A. (University Microfilms NO. 75-25625). Wechsler, D. (1952). The range of human capacities. Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins. Wilding, J., & Valentine, E. (1985). One man’s memory for prose, faces and names. British Journal of Psychologv, 26,215-219. Wilding, J., & Valentine, E. (1988). Searching for superior memories. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Memory in everyday life, Vol.1 (pp. 472-477). Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons.

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Commentary: Expertise and Extended Memory

K.J Gilhooly Aberdeen University, United Kingdom Ericsson and Pennington’s paper in this volume represents a welcome attempt to form bridges between the study of memory and that of problem solving. Too often these areas of study are pursued largely in isolation from one another. It is clear that in real ’everyday’ problem solving, memory processes must be implicated and equally that memory tasks in everyday life often have marked problem solving components. Expert problem solving has been extensively studied over the last 25-30 years and certain broad generalisations that seem to hold over a number of domains have been identified. Salient among these generalisations is the statement that experts remember new information in their fields better than do novices. This result was initially established in the area of chess by De Groot (1965) and has subsequently been replicated in a broad range of areas. As Ericsson and Pennington point out, such memory advantages are highly specific to the particular domains concerned and do not reflect any general superiority in basic memory capacities for experts. The specificity of such memory advantages goes against the view of expertise as a result of superior basic capacities (the ’Talent’ view). Rather, the memory results have been taken as support for the ’Knowledge’ view that expertise results from the accumulation of a large repertoire of domain-specific schemata which enable ready categorisation of problems into familiar types and support memory for fresh information in the domain. However as Ericsson and Pennington point out, sheer knowledge accumulation is unlikely to be the whole story and the development of memory skills are also very likely to be involved. Consideration of memory skills, as in Ericsson and Polson’s (1988a, 1988b) studies of waiters and Chase and Ericsson’s (1981; 1982) studies of practice effects in digit span tasks, has led to Skilled Memory Theory (Ericsson, 1985), which is applicable to expert memory performance also ( Ericsson & Kintsch, 1991). According to Skilled Memory Theory, skilled memory involves rapid storage of presented information in long-term memory via associations to existing information and retrieval via appropriate cues. Thus, in the digit span task subjects with extensive prior knowledge of running times associated chunks

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of digits with typical times for various distances and recalled via those distancetime links. It is suggested that experts have incidentally developed skilled memory for their domains. Experts have extensive background knowledge in long term memory to which new information can be readily linked; retrieval is by appropriate cues determined at time of encoding. Since it has been repeatedly shown that experts readily store and retrieve new domain information which has been externally presented it is plausible that during mental search in problem solving, self-generated information (e.g. on intermediate results/ evaluations etc.) is also rapidly stored in long term memory and readily retrieved as needed. One fruitful outcome of Ericsson and Pennington's analysis would be research directly bearing on expert memory for intermediately derived information during the course of problem solving. Experts should recall their intermediate steps and results more accurately and faster than should novices. Ericsson and Pennington's analysis is consistent with the traditional 'modal' model of human memory as consisting of a limited capacity short term or working memory backed up by an essentially unlimited capacity long term memory. What they have proposed is that experts circumvent the limitations of short term working memory by rapid storage in and retrieval from long term memory. Presumably, however, short term working memory is still a bottleneck in that information has to be retrieved into short term working memory in order to play a role in processing. I am assuming here that symbolic processing operates by the firing of rules that receive their inputs from short term working memory and place their outputs there also, the rules themselves being stored in long term memory (eg. the 'Process of Induction' model proposed by Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard, 1986). Thus it seems worth distinguishing the extended working memory of readily available information in long term memory and the focal short term working memory. For reasons of cognitive control it would not seem desirable to suppose that the contents of extended working memory could activate rules in competition with the contents of focal short term working memory. Ericsson and Pennington appear to use the term 'working memory' in a basically functional way as referring to "internally held, readily available information". There is, of course, a different approach developed by Baddeley and colleagues which takes a structural view. On this approach working memory is regarded as a multicomponent system rather than as a homogeneous storage system. At present, three main components are distinguished, viz., a

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visuo-spatial subsystem, a verbal-phonological subsystem and a central executive subsystem for coordination and decision making. It is envisaged that each subsystem may require unpacking into component sub-subsystems (e.g. the visuo-spatial subsystem may require to be split into separate visual and spatial sub-subsystems). A key methodology has been the use of dual tasks held to load just one of the subsystems. So, for example, if a primary task can be carried out without decrement while the visuo-spatial subsystem is loaded by a secondary task then it can be inferred that the task does not involve the visuospatial subsystem (and vice versa). A considerable number of studies have supported the utility of this approach (see Baddeley, 1986; 1992; Logie, this volume for extensive reviews). How might the Baddeley et al. working memory model and Ericsson and Pennington’s extended working memory theory relate to one another? It could be argued that since Ericsson and Pennington’s ’extended working memory’ refers to long term memory use while Baddeley et al. are referring to focal short term working memory, the two groups are using similar terms but not in the same way and so there is no useful connection between the approaches. However, I suggest that Ericsson and Pennington are concerned with links between long term memory and focal short term working memory and that Baddeley et al.’s analyses and results are relevant to that linkage. As a specific example, if a task invokes a visuo-spatial strategy then information should be stored in that visuo-spatial form in the extended working memory as well as in the focal short term working memory in the interests of efficiency and compatability. Interestingly, there are some recent results bearing on this point. Saariluoma (1991) has carried out move-generating tasks in chess with concurrent secondary tasks aimed at loading the visuo-spatial or verbal components of working memory. The results indicated that visuo-spatial interference had the largest effect on rate of move generation, which implicates the visuo-spatial component of working memory in chess problem solving. A similar dual task study by Baddeley et al. (Baddeley, 1990, p.134) found that memory for briefly presented chess positions was most affected by a visuospatial secondary task (and by a central executive loading task) but not by a verbal subsystem loading task. Together these results suggest that visuo-spatially coded information is implicated both in the focal short term working memory during move-generation and in the extended working memory system which is tapped by the memory task.

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As a final comment, I would note that the extended working memory concept may be applicable to the processing of difficult problems at the edge of expertise. Such problems can tax scientists and artists for months or even years and any solutions are often regarded as creative. Helmholtz in 1896 (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954, p.838) noted that for successful solution of difficult problems "It was always necessary, first of all, that I should have turned my problem over on all sides to such an extent that I had all its angles and complexities 'in my head' and could run through them freely without writing." In other words, the complex problem representation had to be in extended working memory to overcome the limitations of focal short term working memory, before solution was possible. Thus, the notion of extended working memory looks promising in the analysis of extremely difficult problem solving as well as in cases of more routine expert problem solving.

References Baddeley, A. D. (1986). Working memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baddeley, A. D. (1990). Human memory: Theory and practice. Hove, Sussex: Erlbaum. Baddeley, A. D. (1992). Is working memory working? Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44, 1-32. Chase, W. G. & Ericsson, K. A. (1981). Skilled memory. In J. R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp. 141-189). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Chase, W. G. & Ericsson, K. A. (1982). Skill and working memory. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psycholoev of learning and motivation, Vol. 16 (pp. 1-58). New York: Academic Press. De Groot, A. (1965). Thought and choice in chess. The Hague: Mouton. Ericsson, K. A. (1985). Memory skill. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 39, 188-231 . Ericsson, K. A., & Kintsch, W. (1991).

Memory in commehension and . (Report No.91-13) Boulder, Co: Institute of Cognitive Science, university of Colorado. p

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Ericsson, K. A. & Polson, P. G. (1988a). An experimental analysis of a memory skill for dinner orders. Journal of Experimental Psycholow Learning. Memory and Cognition, 14,305-316. Ericsson, K. A. & Polson, P. G. (1988b). Memory for restaurant orders. In M. Chi, R. Glaser, & M. Farr (Eds), The nature of exDertise (pp.23-70). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J., Nisbett, R. E., & Thagard, P. R. (1986). Induction: Processes of inference, learning. and discovery. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Saariluoma, P. (1991). Visuo-spatial interference and apperception in chess. In R. H. Logie & M. Denis (Eds.), Mental images in human cognition (pp.83-94). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Woodworth, R. S . , & Schlosberg, H. (1954). Experimental psychology (3rd ed.). London: Methuen.

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Commentary: Hardware, Software, and Goal Maintenance Neil Chamess University of Waterloo, Canada All sciences make the explicit assumption that there are laws governing the behavior of their subject matter. Most social sciences progress by defining the limiting factors in performance. They typically differ in their units of analysis. Economics deals with the behavior of nations (macro) or firms (micro). Sociology deals with the behavior of groups. Psychology typically deals with the behavior of individuals. As Simon (1969) pointed out, one of the limiting factors for rational human behavior is the inability of people (or firms) to optimize due to limited information processing capacity. They are forced to satisfice, find good enough rather than optimal solutions to the problems that they confront. Experts, on the surface, seem to escape from these limits and perform at levels that most of the population view as near miraculous (and at salaries in North American sport that closely match this level of admiration). How do they do so? As Ericsson and Pennington point out, there are three main candidates for explanation of such expertise: talent, knowledge, and acquired mechanisms. To label someone as being talented is to view their superior performance as the result of some innate, genetically-determined advantage. In this view experts are mutations of some sort, with faster reflexes (sports) or better learning ability, or superior perceptual capability. I don’t necessarily agree that if this were the case, that there is little to be learned about everyday performance by studying experts. Comparative cognition (Gilhooly, 1989) would still be a useful route, much as is the case in biology for studying multiple organisms to understand, for instance, the advantages of sexual versus asexual reproduction. If we knew that Inaudi was not different than Ericsson in memorizing word lists, but was superior only in mental calculation that would tell us something about the requirements of the two tasks. Then we might be led to search for the brain structures, and at the next level, the part of the gene sequence, that differentiated them. Ericsson and Pennington make the usual strong case that talent fails the test of parsimony and that it is unnecessary to evoke it to explain expert-novice

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differences. I want to point out a few exceptions to the case, though. In domains where physical characteristics set limits for performance, such as in sports, genetics does play a role, though it is often subtle. You are very unlikely to ever see the bushpeople of the Kalahari competing successfully in the National Basketball Association, at least not at the very highest level. Although with practice they would undoubtedly be able to perform as well at the free throw line, they would not have the necessary height to pass and shoot from the floor in competition with taller counterparts. My colleague, Fran Allard, phrases the constraint rather colorfully as "I can teach you how to shoot, but not how to be 6 feet tall." Similarly, by reason of size and correlated strength differences, males and females are unlikely to compete against each other on equal terms in weightlifting. Hardware makes a difference. What of the knowledge view, that expert performance does not call on fundamental differences in hardware, and that experts are merely novices with the right stuff, the software necessary to drive performance from the mediocre to the magnificent? To bring us back to Inaudi, mental calculation is a matter of knowing the tricks of the trade, the shortcuts that make it seem that working memory limits have been expanded. You too could do the same with the right course and a few hours per day of practice (offered on cassettes with a study guide and advertised on national television in North America). Again Ericsson and Pennington argue that the situation is not that simple. Comparisons of intermediate level performers with experts sometimes reveals that the knowledge base is equivalent in some respects. Novice physics problem solvers can solve the problem posed, eventually, and through a rather lengthy meansends search. Experts get there three times as quickly with a forward search. Experts sometimes perform either the same or less effectively than novices on memory for domain material. Ericsson and Pennington cite work in medical diagnosis, where memory for protocols is sometimes worse in experts, though it should be noted that age and expertise are sometimes confounded in this area. Older chess players have been shown to remember less about briefly shown structured chess position than their younger counterparts (e.g., Charness, 1981). So they opt for their third alternative, the acquired mechanism view. Experts really do have somewhat different information processing capability, though it is specific to their domain of knowledge. They indeed can bypass the limits of intendedly rational behavior that the non-expert must contend with,

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specifically working memory limitations, by developing what Ericsson and Pennington call extended working memory. The key here is to construct links between existing (acquired) knowledge and current inputs. There are two processes. The first is to recode the information into small numbers of rich units (chunks), usually a pattern-recognition driven process drawing on familiarity. The second is to hold these chunks together by (effortfully) associating them to prestored retrieval structures via relevant retrieval cues (e.g., in the method of loci, the association of encoded units to locations via an interacting image). This distinction is similar to one I once made between two types of chunks, familiar and meaningful (Charness, 1976), in explaining why interpolated tasks failed to dislodge the chunks that chess players had supposedly stored in short-term memory. The number sequence 1992 for most English-speaking people, particularly in the context of dates, is automatically recognizable as the current year (at this time of writing). The sequence 3579 while containing the same number of digits, may not be recognizable in the same effortless fashion, though after a bit of work, you could recode it as the increasing sequence of 4 successive odd numbers starting with 3. My claim is that both would be highly memorable, once recognized or recoded (George Miller’s 1956 recounting of Sidney Smith’s study on memory for binary digits comes to mind here). It also accounts for the fact that even unskilled chess players can remember an entire position as well as skilled ones if the exposure duration is made long enough (Lories, 1987), and that after successful problem solving on pseudo-random chess positions, memory favours the more skilled players (Holding & Reynolds, 1982). Ericsson and Pennington go on to claim that extended memory can sometimes be seen in everyday memory, giving text comprehension as a prime example. Thus, those with high soccer knowledge but low verbal ability can beat their high verbal IQ, low soccer knowledge counterparts on text recall when the subject matter is soccer. Similar to the findings with chess players in Charness (1976), skilled readers are not badly disrupted by interpolating unrelated sentences or arithmetic calculation between related sentences of a text. We can all cite cases of even very aged television viewers who have no difficulty applying earlier constructed schemas about television characters to bridge yesterday’s and today’s sequence of events in ’soap operas’. Here I think Ericsson and Pennington have put their finger on a little explored, though

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highly critical human ability: reinstantiation of context/goals after interruption. Although short-term memory limitation is often discussed as the 'telephone constant' because of how easily an interruption can dislodge an unfamiliar digit sequence (the Brown-Peterson task), it is probably equally important to note how stable our daily goal structure remains under constant interruption. We rarely forget who we are and where we live and that we should go home at day's end. This ability to reinstate long-term memory context (or is it to maintain stable goal structures?) is an under-appreciated aspect of everyday life. Disease (e.g., Korsakoff's syndrome) can effectively destroy this ability to link past and present over the time span associated with short-term memory, at least in the sense of direct/conscious linking, though perhaps not indirectly/unconciously (Charness, Milberg, & Alexander, 1988). As those in the personality field are fond of pointing out, such contextual memory is necessary to ensure continuity of the self. When such context disappears, as in the case of multiple personality disorders, or severe retrograde amnesia, you can have disastrous results. Fortunately, unlike our computer counterparts, we don't have to 'reboot' every morning when we awaken and regain consciousness. Rather, perhaps with a little support from our recognizably familiar environments (Craik, 1986), we arise and go about our everyday tasks effectively, if not expertly.

Acknowledgements. This work was supported by grants from NSERC A0790, and the Canadian Aging Research Network, a National Networks of Centre of Excellence grant administered by SSHRCC. References Charness, N. (1976). Memory for chess positions: Resistance to interference. Journal of Experimental Psycholoev: Human Learning and Memory, 2, 641-653. Charness, N. (1981). Visual short-term memory and aging in chess players. Journal of Gerontology, 36,615-619. Charness, N., Milberg, W. P., & Alexander, M. P. (1988). Teaching an amnesic a complex cognitive skill. Brain and Cognition, 8, 253-272. Craik, F. I. M. (1986). A functional account of age differences in memory.

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In F. Klix & H. Hagendorf (Eds.), Human memory and cognitive capabilities: Mechanisms and performances (pp. 409-422). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Gilhooly, K. J. (Ed.) (1989). Human and machine problem solving. New York: Plenum. Holding, D. H., & Reynolds, R.I. (1982). Recall or evaluation of chess positions as determinants of chess skill. Memorv and Cognition, lo, 237-242. Lories, G. (1987). Recall of random and non random chess positions in strong and weak chess players. Psvchologica Beleica, 27, 153-159. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63, 81-97. Simon, H. A. (1969). The sciences of the artificial. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

PART 3

LIFE SKILLS

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Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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REMEMBERING OURSELVES

Craig R. Barclay University of Rochester, USA Claiming that we can remember ourselves implies that there are selves to be remembered. My view is that there is no one stable self or collection of selves to be remembered; instead, I believe we compose ourselves anew through a process of remembering that is constrained by historical, sociocultural, emotional, psychological and momentary inter- and intrapersonal factors, especially the flow of affect in-between people that creates an intersubjectivity (Barclay, in press; Barclay & Hodges, 1990; Barclay & Smith, in press, Stern, 1990; Trevarthen, 1990). Accordingly, I distinguish remembering ourselves in the sense of recalling 'a self and remembering ourselves in the sense of reconstructing ourselves for some contemporary purpose. On this latter view, the notion of a coherent self (Epstein, 1973) is seen as a consequence or artifact of historically contextualized sociocultural experiences that can be made coherent through the use of socially agreed upon canonical narrative forms or reflect a coherent life-course; an incoherent self is also seen as an artifact of such experiences that are, in fact, not understandable or do not fit neatly into known narrative forms (Langer, 1991). My view results in part from distinguishing between two different types of questions we can ask about memory and remembering. On the one hand we can ask about the nature of memory; on the other, we can ask about the functions, uses or purposes of memory and remembering in our everyday lives. If we ask about the nature of memory, we are immediately drawn into an analysis of the structure of the memory system, and the neurological basis of memory. Surely, such questions are important to gain a full understanding of memory, and have important consequences in the diagnosis and treatment of neurological dysfunctions. However, knowing about the nature of memory tells us little about remembering as an emergent property of mind and interpersonal interactions, and how remembering is used adaptively (or maladaptively in the case of certain psychological dysfunctions), for example, to form friendships or

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love relationships, or to serve as tokens to savor during times of felt loneliness or abandonment. It is also possible and useful to make similar distinctions regarding the nature and functions of autobiographical remembering (note l), and to note that the emphasis of this chapter is more on the functions of autobiographical remembering and the relation between autobiographical remembering and self, than on memory as a faculty. I assume that any present self is a momentary objectification emerging in autobiographical memories that serves some adaptive purpose in the here and now. Given this assumption it is important to explore the conditions that make any memory an autobiographical recollection. This chapter is organized by first distinguishing (autobiographical) memory as a faculty from remembering as an adaptive process. Here I consider recent research on autobiographical memory, with an emphasis on relationships between theory and data. Next, the concept of autobiographical memory is reconsidered and elaborated in a theoretical argument that claims autobiographical memories are memories that have acquired personal significance and meaning through embodied experiences (e.g., movements) associated with feelings that are interpreted within the context of cultural models that provide explanatory systems for understanding our everyday experiences and emotions (Johnson, 1987; Linde, 1987; Quinn & Holland, 1987, see also note 2): these memories not only objectify self but are the fabric of self-knowledge (Neisser, 1988). In the closing section, I explore the consequence of conceptualizing remembering ourselves as the objectification of autobiographical memories, in particular, I examine the notion of an essential self or existential selves with a special concern for the historical and sociocultural conditions that yield coherent or 'divided selves'. The case of Holocaust victims is used to illustrate the notion of potentially divided and incoherent selves.

Memory as a faculty and remembering as an adaptive process The study of memory as a mental faculty is concerned with specifying the nature of mental representations (e.g., schemas, scripts, propositions) and the processes used to acquire those representations--kinds of knowledge acquisition devices, e.g., strategies (see Siegler, 1986 for a discussion), intercoordination (Fisher, 1980), schematization (Barclay, 1986) or assimilation and

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accommodation (Piaget, 1952). Barclay and Wellman (1986) for instance, working from a theoretical perspective that autobiographical memories were memories for self-referenced information (Brewer, 1986; Markus, 1977), attempted to demonstrate how autobiographical recollections were represented by asking the question, “how accurate are autobiographical memories”? A recognition memory paradigm was used because it allowed us to manipulate certain aspects of the subjects’ reported memories. We reasoned that if autobiographical memories were represented in a form isomorphic with how events actually occurred (from the subjects’ standpoint), they would be accessed and remembered without error; however, if such memories were represented in a more schematic form, then subjects would make systematic memory errors such that they would falsely recognize as memorable events confabulated ’events’ that were semantically similar, but different in important ways from what had actually occurred. Six adult subjects were asked to keep written daily diary records of three memorable events a day for a period of 4 consecutive months. Once the records were completed, we used them to create different kinds of ’foil items’ to be presented on 5 delayed recognition memory tests given 3, 6, 9, 12 and 31 months following the completion of data collection. Foil items were constructed from the subjects’ actual records by changing either the evaluation (’foil-evaluation’ items) the person gave to a particular memorable event or the descriptive details (’foil-description’ items) associated with the event. (In contemporary narrative analytic terms changing the evaluation of an event changes its meaning.) These foils were presented together with foil items taken from the records of another person not participating in the study (’foil-other’ items) and ’original’ items which were the subjects’ unchanged records. The foil-evaluation, foil-description and original items were selected randomly for each test from the corpus of each subject’s diaries without replacement. In testing, each subject was required to read each test item separately and decide whether or not the item was an actual event from everyday life. We told the subjects that we were interested in their memory for events, not for written records of events. The results tended to support the view that autobiographical memories were represented in a schematic form, and the degree of recognition accuracy varied directly with the degree of semantic similarity between the test items and the events that actually occurred and recorded, i.e., the greater the similarity

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the greater the memory accuracy. Specifically, on foil-evaluation items the false alarm rates (i.e., falsely identifying a foil item as an actual record) over the delay intervals were .38, .47, .62, .52 and .48, respectively; corresponding rates for foil-description items were .42, .47, .47, .56 and .52. The lower false alarm rate on foil-evaluation items relating to that found for foil-description items suggests that meaning changes were more easily detected than were changes in details. The overall hit rates (i.e., correctly identifying original items as actual events) for each test were .92, .94, .95, .95 and .79. Surprisingly, the false alarm rate for foil-other items averaged .22. Focusing on the results from the foil-evaluation and description items suggests that false alarm rates increased significantly between the first and second test and remained consistently high for the remainder of the tests. Interestingly, the hit rate on original items decreased from an average of .95 for the first four tests to .79 on test five, indicating some loss in memory access even when test items were identical representations of events as written. The high false-alarm rate on foil-other items may be attributed to the fact that the subjects in this study shared similar cultural and social contexts with the people from which the foilother items were chosen, thus leading to the reporting of foil-other records for events that could have occurred in the lives of the subjects studied here. In subsequent analysis aimed at exploring how autobiographical knowledge was acquired, Barclay (1986) showed that the false alarm rates on foil-evaluation and foil-description items taken together, high in semantic similarity to the meaning represented in the original records jumped from approximately .38 on the first memory test to approximately (on average) .66 for the next three tests, whereas the false-alarm rates for items low in semantic similarity only gradually increased over the first four tests (approximately .21, .32, .41 and .72 for tests 1-4, respectively). It was argued that test items high in semantic similarity to original events created a sense of uncertainty for subjects, thereby leading them to make inaccurate plausibility judgements regarding the authenticity of these test items: thus, a high rate of false claims of authenticity were made for items high in semantic similarity. Likewise, low similarity items were not falsely recognized at a high rate at first because the subjects could detect semantic changes easily; however, with time, forgetting and the experience of more events like those originally reported, the subject’s performance certainty declined, their plausibility judgements became less precise, and the false-alarm rates thus increased even for these low similarity

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items. It was argued that a process of schematization accounted for all of these results in that, with time and varied everyday experience, the essential features of everyday life were abstracted resulting in more or less generic autobiographical recollections (Brewer, 1986). Schematization was thus a knowledge acquisition device that distilled the essence of semantically similar events. Schematization reduced the memory storage load (via forgetting or assimilation), but also lead to considerable inaccuracies in remembering as the details and associated evaluations of events needed to be reconstructed at the time of recollection. In four subsequent studies designed along this line of inquiry, (Barclay & DeCooke, 1988; Barclay, Hodges & A. Smith, in press; Barclay & Subramaniam, 1987; Barclay, Petitto, Labrum & Carter-Jessop, 1991) the findings reviewed thus far were replicated and extended. In particular, it was shown that people were (a) extremely sensitive to semantic changes in recorded events but less so to syntactic changes; (b) a priori assessments of attitudes and beliefs about oneself were predictive of the kinds of memory errors made during both free recall and recognition, e.g., changes in recorded events that are congruent with a person’s beliefs about herself tend to be identified falsely as actual events, and; (c) mood and affect-congruency between confabulated events and actual events led to false recognitions of foil events that were congruent in affect with actual events--the actual events reported in these studies had evaluative components that were incongruent with the person’s typical mood states, and thus were modified to be congruent as recognition test items. The mood-congruity effects were found regardless of whether or not the evaluative changes in original records were made by the experimenters or the subjects. Autobiographical memory has been seen by many memory researchers as a special case of memory that would hopefully inform cognitive theory about the nature of representation and knowledge acquisition devices, and lend ecological validity to laboratory findings. Currently, there is much controversy regarding the contribution of research on autobiographical memory (and other forms of everyday memory) to our understanding of memory as a faculty (Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1991; Conway, 1991; Morton, 1991; Roediger, 1991; Tulving, 1991). Much of this controversy is over whether or not studies done outside of the controlled conditions available

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in laboratory settings can produce generalizable findings, i.e., a strong concern for certainty. The rhetoric of the controversy over everyday memory is reminiscent of fundamental arguments over the authenticity (natural phenomena vs laboratory created artificial phenomena) and certainty criteria (the degree of confidence you have in saying an observed effect is real or not) needed to establish psychology as a ’science’ (see Gibbs, 1979). From my vantage point, the study of everyday autobiographical remembering has already shown that any cognitive theory of human mentation must be broadened to account for affect-cognition relationships (e.g., Barclay, Petitto et al. 1991) within the same theoretical system; formal knowledge is not independent of the personal significance of that knowledge to the individual (Yoos, 1991). Therefore, the promise of autobiographical memory research is in its contribution to theories of mind that include ’warm’ cognitions in everyday contexts. If this promise is fulfilled we will also have a new and more complete understanding of the origins, development and emergence of self than is currently available. An emphasis on the study of remembering as an adaptive process is somewhat different, but complementary to the study of memory as a faculty. Here, remembering is seen as a reconstructive process whereby what is reconstructed is done so to justify feelings (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) internal to the person or emergent through interaction (Barclay & Smith, in press). Such reconstructions make everyday life possible, especially in interpersonal relations with others. Autobiographical remembering is concerned more with a sense of the past in the present to serve some function or goal, than with the accuracy of some specific recollection that would inform us about how such a recollection is represented cognitively (Lowenthal, 1985; Neisser, 1982). On this view, remembering can be seen as serving both social and psychological functions; namely, the establishment and maintenance of intimacies through the sharing of autobiographical memories and collective remembering as in families (Halbwachs, 1925; Middleton & Edwards, 1990), and the maintenance of a psychological and emotional well-being (Barclay & Smith, in press). Remembering as an adaptive process brings us to issues of how such a process works and why. I address these issues briefly by focusing on remembering (a) one’s personal history (Barclay & Hodges, 1990) and (b) in the context of social interactions (Fivush, in press; Gergen & Gergen, 1988;

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Hudson & Shapiro, 1991; Miller & Sperry, 1988; Miller, Potts, Fung, Hoogstra, & Mintz, 1990; Smith & Barclay, 1990). It is argued elsewhere that autobiographical memories that give form and context to a life history or emerge in interpersonal relationships are the objectifications of deep memories and motivations that can function as ’transitional objects’, i.e., signifying past relationships, in the present (Barclay & Smith, in press); autobiographical memories in this way can comfort us during times of anxiety, or excite us when bored. In a recent qualitative case study, Barclay and Hodges (1990) reported their analysis of the personal history of a close friend (R.F.) of the first author. R.F. was 35 years old at the time his personal history was recorded. He was married with two young children, held advanced post-graduate degrees and was professionally employed. R.F. was asked to tell his life story in any way he wanted, but to give as much detail as possible: no questioning was done, and there was no structure to the interviews. His personal history was taken during three 1 1/2 hour sessions over a 2-month period. Transcriptions of R.F.’s history were then analyzed (by two judges working independently) by first identifying contextualized events, second, sorting these events into thematic units, and third, giving an overall interpretation to the thematic groups to characterize R.F.’s sense of himself at this particular time in his life. The results showed that R.F. used a chronological form (childhood to adulthood) structuring his personal history. More importantly, he reconstructed contextualized events that formed themes exemplifying intra- and interpsychological functions of autobiographical remembering. The first example (p. 62) illustrates an intra-psychological use by providing a coherent scaffolding for remembered events--the theme is ’Not A Liability, Not A Star’: [Context] “When I was ten years.. .we had a pack of good friends and our basic mission in life ...was ...p laying ball. And I was always average to lousy.. .but I learned to live with my limitations ’cause that’s something you just can’t deceive yourself about ...I wasn’t a good hitter and I was slow-was a good fielder and [event]. ..we would play ball.. .in the summer from four to five to six ...after school in the early summer--in New York up to June thirtieth when school was out and after that we would play thirteen hours a day.. .”

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In this recollection R.F. is making self-evaluations about his physical abilities; however, it is symbolic of other reported events in which he describes both strength and weaknesses in terms of his intellectual and professional life and family. The next example (pp. 62-63) highlights an interpersonal use of autobiographical remembering by showing how shared activities of common interest can be the basis of friendships. The theme is entitled ’Trouble-makers Club.’ [Context] “ I had my little group of friends and we all came from the fringe part of town ...W. and F. and a guy named B. and a couple of others of lesser importance and we just were always on the fringe of things in junior high and high school. And we developed a kind of deviant little subculture.. .and. ..when we got old enough, we’d just hang out ...we’d drive around, we’d put on 300 miles on a Friday night doing nothing.. .we’d go from burger place to burger place and [Theme] we’d just kind of see what little kind of trouble we could get in; we had a lot of funny escapades, we were so bored, we were so desperate for somethin’ to do, we would do anything for a little stimulation. [Event] Once we, when Sergeant Berry Saddler’s great hit the ’Ballad of the Green Beret’ was hot, they had it on the juke box ...at the White Castle.. ..We went in there--you could preprogram that thing.. .we played Sergeant Berry’s tune something like. ..eighty times and then we went and stood on the opposite corner outside the White Castle and watched. It was one of the funniest things I’ve ever seen. People just go nuts. After like ten minutes.. .and we laughed so hard we couldn’t breathe.. . “

In each one of these examples it’s clear that talk is the medium through which autobiographical memories are reconstructed, and these reconstructions can serve different purposes. Why R.F. might recount such stories (which according to his wife, he tends to repeat to his family) appears at one level to place himself in social and physical contexts representative of his culture; more importantly, each of these themes considered together illustrate how R.F. considers himself a marginal person, sort of a 35 year old adolescent. It was for this reason that our overall interpretation of R.F.’s personal history was that he believed himself to be ’The King of the Fringe’.

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Questions regarding the social interactional basis of autobiographical remembering can be addressed through examining some examples from the developmental study of scripts and narrative forms in young children. Consider Vygotsky (1978) as an orienting theorist to an understanding of the social origins and uses of autobiographical remembering. Vygotsky argues that cognitive development (the development of higher psychological functions, especially the psychological combination of tool and sign use, p. 55) is the consequence of learning, instead of learning being a byproduct of development. He claims that learning is largely a social activity that occurs between a "cultural novice" and "cultural expert" (Barclay, in press); such social activities become internalized as social speech acts that are coordinated with tool use, thereby transforming an interpersonal process into an intrapersonal one (p. 57). In sum he writes, "The internalization of socially rooted and historically developed activities (e.g., collective autobiographical remembering) is the distinguishing feature of human psychology, the basis of the qualitative leap from animal to human psychology" (p. 57). Consider the following empirical example. The social-interactional origins of personal narratives (in autobiographical remembering) is being studied by Robyn Fivush (1991) (and others, e.g., Hudson & Shapiro, 1991; Snow, 1990), who examined mother-child talk about the past. Six mother-child dyads were studied when the children were 2-years 8-months old on average at an initial interview, and 3-years 8-months at a second interview. Both interviews were conducted in the childrens' homes, and, in the first interview mothers were asked to prompt childrens' recollections about some novel events (typically 10 different events), e.g., an airplane ride. The mothers were first told that the experimenters were interested in "...how much young children could remember about personal experiences.. ." (p. 67); at the end of the interview the mothers were told that the real focus of the study was on how mothers .structure conversations about the past with their young children" (p. 67). Approximately 13 months following the first interview a second interview was conducted by a different interviewer who had little knowledge of the content of the first interview other than what events were talked about. In the second interview, the experimenter asked prompt questions, e.g., "Do you remember taking an airplane ride?", about two or three of the events discussed in the first interview along with approximately seven new events. A narrative coding scheme was used to analyze the children's talk about 'I..

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events. This scheme was derived largely from the work of Labov and Waletzky (1967) and adapted to the purpose of this study. In brief, the coding scheme for the children's personal narratives involved analyzing the amount of information and narrative organization of their responses to questions. Amount of information included the mention of people, locations, objects, activities and attributes involved in the remembered activities. Narrative organization included temporal organization (as indexed by the frequency of use of temporal terms, e.g., 'then', 'first', 'next' etc. and causal-conditional terms, e.g., 'because', 'if', 'so' etc.), narrative density (the frequency of propositions, i.e., subject-verb clauses) and narrative functions. Three narrative functions were analyzed: an orienting function or context specifying the setting of remembered events, a referential function that specified the remembered event, that is, what actually occurred and an evaluative function which indicated how the person felt about the event and how the event should be understood by others (Note: these three functions were the ones used by Barclay & Hodges', 1990 in their analysis of R.F.'s personal history.). The evaluative function is seen by me as that element of personal narrative which gives meaning to remembered events, thus marking them as autobiographical in kind. The major findings from this study were that (a) both mothers and children remembered much information about the past, (b) more temporal terms were used in mother-child conversations than causal-conditional terms, (c) mothers who used more propositions during the first interview had children who used more propositions in conversations with the interviewer during the second interview, thus leading Fivush to conclude that some mothers provide more elaborate dialogue with their children than do other mothers which has consequences for how children recount personal narratives in the future, (d) no relations were found between the amount of referential information offered by mothers in the first interview and that offered by the child in the second interview; however, if mothers offered more orienting information when their children were 2-years 8-months old, their children provided more orienting information a year later and (e) the more evaluative information mothers gave during the first interview was related positively to children's use of such information during the second interview. Fivush concluded from these findings that " ...mothers who provide temporally complex and informationally dense narratives about the past with their 2 years 8 month old children, have children

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who recount temporally complex and informationally dense accounts of the past a year later" (ms p. 2). The point is that children learn personal narratives through social interaction, and the form that those narratives take depends on the quality of that interaction. It could be argued further that the forms children's personal narratives take vary with historical period, culture (e.g., see Olney, 1973), class, race and gender. Other evidence on the interactional origins of autobiographical remembering comes from the work of Peggy Miller and her colleagues (e.g., Miller & Sperry, 1988; Miller et a]., 1990). In one recent study (Miller, Mintz, Hoogstra, Fung, & Potts, in press) she recorded 'co-narrations', or collective remembering incidents, in the personal storytelling practices of 2 years 6 month old and 5-year-old children. Co-narrations were 'episodes of talk' about the past between the children and another person in which the children characterized themselves and 'protagonist[s]', i.e., the children used language that was self-referential. Miller, Mintz et al. (1991) reported that (a) co-narrations were common conversational forms for both the younger and older children with 2 years 6 month olds producing between .60 and 20 conarrations per hour, and 5-year-olds producing 2.3-13.3 per hour; (b) a large proportion (Averages of .85 and .67 for the 5 and 2 years 6 month olds, respectively) of the youngsters' co-narrations were interpersonal in nature, i.e., stories in which the child and one or more other people were involved, and; (c) when the children made social comparisons between themselves and others they consistently included evaluative information. In sum, contemporary research on the social origins of personal narratives in autobiographical memories and remembering has shown that parents index and contextualize 'important' events as memorable, e.g., in looking through family photo albums parents point out what is important to remember from the pictures and what information can be inferred (Edwards & Middleton, 1988; Middleton & Edwards, 1990); children's affective reactions to events are collectively reconstructed and recalled, and open for public discussion; very young children can communicate their feelings (2-year-olds) regarding interpersonal experiences that occurred in the past (Miller, Potts, et al., 1990; Miller & Sperry, 1988); socially and culturally conventionalized narrative forms for storytelling are available to young children to talk about past events (Bruner, 1987, 1990; Fivush & Fromhoff, 1988; Snow, 1990); and Gergen and Gergen (1988) have suggested that self is created in relationships, in part by recounting

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the past through the use of emotional scenarios that may provide structure around which personal life events are organized and objectified.

What is autobiographical memory? A reconsideration of what it means to remember ourselves. The terms "autobiographical memory" and "autobiographical remembering" have been used loosely throughout this paper to refer to recollections and coreconstructions of self-referenced information (note 1); such a concept of autobiographical memory implies that an a priori self exists and, for some, an existential self. From my point of view, I see autobiographical remembering as a sociocultural phenomenon that can take different forms depending upon cultural and interpersonal contexts (e.g., Obeyesekere, 1990). Any memory is potentially an autobiographical one; a memory becomes autobiographical in its use which specifies the personal significance and meaning of that memory for the person. On this view, meaning is acquired through embodied experiences that become "metaphors to live by" (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); experiences that are embodied are those that are actually felt by the person and are associated with movement and perception. These embodied experiences are the grist from which knowledge emerges as representations in the form of image-schemata (Johnson, 1987). Johnson writes (pp. 28-29) : "image-schemata.. .are not.. .propositions that specify abstract relations between symbols and objective reality.. .[they] do not have the specificity of rich images or mental pictures. They operate at a level of generality and abstraction above concrete rich images. A schema consists of a small number of parts and relations, by virtue of which it can structure indefinitely many perceptions, images and events.. .@]he view I am proposing is this: in order for us to have meaningful, connected experiences that we comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions and conceptions. A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in , or of, these ongoing ordering activities. These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of bodily movements through space our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual interactions".

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Image-schemata are subsequently projected and objectified in metaphors, e.g., "His mind is like an empty vessel" is a projection of an image-schemata that allows the person using the metaphor to conceptualize and describe in commonly understood terms an inside-outside relationship separated by a boundary which can be imagined as a container (see also Lakoff, 1986). I believe this same kind of reasoning can be generalized so as to understand the acquisition of meaningful memories by viewing the metaphoric projections of feelings in public idioms, e.g., "I blew my top", or "I was happier than a clam", as evaluative statements around which autobiographical memories are reconstructed. I have proposed elsewhere (Barclay, in press) that it is through the objectification of feelings and associated memories in public idioms and metaphors used by oneself and others (who I refer to as 'cultural experts') that we create autobiographical memories which subsequently become subjectified as self-knowledge. The strong form of this position is that self is created as knowledge derived from objectification and subjectification processes. More specifically, Obeyesekere (1981) defines objectification as .the expression (projection and externalization) of private emotions [e.g. guilt, anger, happiness] in a public idiom" (p. 77), and subjectification as "...the process whereby cultural patterns and symbols are put back into the melting pot of consciousness and fashioned to create a culturally tolerated set of images that [can be] designated [as] subjective imagery. Subjective imagery is often protocultural, or culture in the making" (p. 169). An example of this process would be the reconstruction of memories in light of an impending divorce (Riessman, 1991). Such memories may objectify one's feelings of loss to others that are expressed in terms like "I can't imagine getting to know another person so well; we shared so much of ourselves in the things we did together and that won't be possible any more. It's like a part of me taken away and put on a shelf, a part I can look at but never experience again." Subsequently, this public expression is subjectified by the person getting the divorce and represented in schema-form as an element of self-knowledge regarding certain kinds of relationships--1 have referred to this process as the creation of protoselves (Barclay, in press). Taken together, this reconsideration of what makes a memory an autobiographical memory suggests autobiographical memory is rooted in embodied experiences, associated with feelings that give meaning to those 'I..

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experiences; these feelings are objectified and subjectified to form not only selfknowledge but also collective autobiographical knowledge about oneself and others as memories are used to forge relationships and maintain a sense of psychological well-being (at least within a certain cultural context). Thus the self, if remembered, is not a description of a pre-existing essential self somehow discovered and described in terms of 'who I am', but a reconstruction and expression of self-knowledge in the context of feelings and relationships that serve some contemporary sociocultural, interpersonal or psychological purpose.

Essential and existential selves: The problem of self-coherence The notion of an essential self is represented, for example, in the writings of Richard Ryan (1991) who argues from a developmental perspective that the deep motivations of human beings are irreducible needs for autonomy and relatedness (also see Obeyesekere, 1990 on deep motivations). He claims that human agency is explained by these motives, and these motives underpin developmental sequences that reflect intentionality and willfulness. Ryan claims .from an organismic perspective, the self...is both the agent that that integrates and the structure to which new functions, values and propensities are integrated" (p.212). The emphasis from this perspective is that there is a self that provides for coherence and integration of experiences; that the development of an essential self precedes the acquisition of self-knowledge, and is a necessary preexisting structure that accounts (i.e., is) human agency and the scaffolding upon which experiences are formed. Thus, our autobiographical recollections would be coherent objectifications of ourselves to the extent that our self is coherent. The alternative view is that our sense of self (selfknowledge) is as coherent as our autobiographical recollections afford--a more existential perspective. I believe that a strong essential-self position underestimates the impact of everyday experiences (many of which are unexpected, unplanned and uncontrollable), and believe that the coherence of self is a reflection of the coherence in one's life experience, where coherence is structured largely by sociocultural practices and historical events (see below)--thus an existential self emerges from experience and autobiographical recollections of those experiences to serve some present goal. 'I..

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In making my case, I consider the extreme inhumanity accorded Jews (and others, e.g. Poles, Gypsies, the disabled) in the Nazi death camp practicing before and during World War 11. Here it can be argued that an essential self was destroyed, if it existed at all (1933-1945) where any needs for autonomy and relatedness were systematically extinguished. My source material for most of my argument comes from the recent writings of Lawrence Langer (1991), " Holocaust testimonies: the ruins of memory". I argue two points after Langer (1991), one is that Holocaust victims cannot reconcile their memories from their camp experiences because they do not fit neatly into socially acceptable narrative forms thus leading to an incoherence in self (a 'buried and divided self), and two that the unexplainable, but deeply embodied memories of Holocaust experiences, coexist with contemporary memories of everyday life--the first without any narrative form or explanatory system, the other with a form and cultural model within which life can be interpreted and understood. This coexistence underlies a sense of experiencing oneself in the third person while at the same time being aware of the reality of current, ongoing relationships that are enjoyed only to a point, e.g., the victim who sees his son from his second marriage (his first wife and children did not survive the Holocaust) and calls him by his first son's name. It is important to keep in mind here that victims believe in the accuracy of their memories, even though it can be demonstrated that even memories of such atrocities and disasters, e.g., the Challenger disaster, can be filled with certain kinds of inaccuracies (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Wagennaar & Groeneweg, 1990). This said, it needs to be noted that most victims who survived the Holocaust tell the truth about what happened to them, especially if they were not priviledged in some way in the camps by carrying out 'orders' from Nazi soldiers, e.g. in selections. The victims of the Holocaust, as a group, are not classic heros in the mythical sense of common narrative accounts, showing the invulnerability of the human spirit under the harsh conditions of the Nazis in death camps like Auschwitz. Cannibalism (e.g., eating the hand of a victim blown to pieces in an air raid), or stealing bread from a bunkmate on the verge of starving to death, too weak to eat without assistance, are not markers of an invulnerable human spirit. Instead, they are strategies that delayed the seemingly inevitable and unpredictable death, made likely by the way the Nazis organized the death camps. One example should suffice to make this point, when victims would

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arrive at the camps they were sent to the left or to the right or formed into multiple groups based on age, sex, physical condition upon arrival etc. (selection). Those sent to the left were immediately put to their death in the gas chambers; those sent to the right were used by the Nazis, in part, to provide the labor needed to process so many corpses, i.e., to move the dead from the gas chambers to the ovens, and then remove and scatter the ashes creating fields of human ash, many feet deep, e.g. Dachau. From the survivor's point of view, who was selected to live or die could not be predicted. In such a context victims did what they needed to do in order to stay alive; memories of these events and what they did to stay alive are not experiences that fit known narrative structures which would help the victims comprehend and resolve their past in the camps, thereby leading to a coherent present self. Accordingly, as Langer (1991) points out, Holocaust victims are "...less concerned with the past than with a sense of the past in the present" (p. 40). This concern accounts partly for what Delbo (1985) describes as "doubling", or the creation of a divided self. Illustrating her point I quote from her Auschwitz memoir (from Langer, 1991, pp. 41-42):

"I stand in the midst of my comrades and I think that if I return one day and want to explain this inexplicable thing, I will say: 'I used to say to myself: you must stand, you must stand for the entire roll call. You must stand again today. It is because you will have stood again today that you will return, if you do return one day.' And this will be false. I did not say anything to myself. I did not think anything. The will to resist no doubt lay in a much deeper and more secret mechanism which has since broken; I shall never know."

Or consider the following oral testimonies, the first from a victim of Auschwitz (quoted by Langer, 1991, p. 53)' the second from a woman on a train from Auschwitz to a labor camp in Germany (Langer, pp. 54-55): "I feel my head is filled with garbage: all these images, you know, and sounds, and my nostrils are filled with the stench of burning flesh. And . ..you can't excise it, it's like--like there's another skin beneath this skin and that skin is called Auschwitz, and you cannot shed it ...and it's a constant accompaniment. And though a lot of survivors will deny this,

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they too felt it the way I do, but they won't give expression to it. I mean I will tell you that it's harder in many ways because.. .because we carry this. I am not like you. You have one version of life and I have two." "One morning, I think it was morning or early afternoon, we arrived. The train stopped for an hour; why, we don't know. And a friend of mine said, 'Why don't you stand up?' There was just a little window, with bars. And she said, 'I'm going to sit down and you're going to stand on my shoulders.' And I did; and I looked out. And ...I...saw...paradise! The sun was bright and vivid. There was cleanliness all over. It was a station somewhere in Germany. There were three or four people there. One woman had a child, nicely dressed up; the child was crying. People were people, not animals. And I thought; 'Paradise must look like this!' I forgot already how normal people look like, how they act, how they speak, how they dress. I saw the sun in Auschwitz, I saw the sun come up, because we had to get up at four in the morning. But it was never beautiful to me. I never saw it shine. It was just the beginning of a horrible day. And in the evening, the end--of what? But here there was life, and I had such a yearning, I still felt it in my bones. I had such yearning, to live, to run, to just run away and never come back. And I told the girls, I said, 'Girls, you have no idea how beautiful the sun is, and I saw a baby crying and a woman was kissing the baby--is there such a thing as love?"' Each of these examples, together with many others on record (Fortunoff Video Archives) clearly demonstrate the notion of a divided self or a doubling in which the personal reality of one's camp experiences stand apart from the rest of 'civilized' human experience. The experience of doubling seems to be the subjective sense that life in the camps cannot be reconciled with known and believed explanatory systems operating at a sociocultural level. Now, consider two additional examples I think show the coexistence of different selves within the same person, one coherent, the other not, one, memories of the Holocaust which serve as the ground for the other, memories of contemporary life. Trying to describe his current feelings 'Leo G.' says. "I envy people that can get out of themself for one minute

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sometimes ...They can laugh, enjoy. You know, you see a movie. Anybody in my situation cannot laugh and enjoy, though inside, you know. Only superficially. There's always in the back of your mind everything. How can you, how can you enjoy yourself? It's almost a crime against the people that you lost [in his case, mother, father, and six brothers and sisters], that you can live and enjoy yourself [He acknowledges the joy that he receives from his family, his children, their marriages, their accomplishments, but continues]. ..Enjoyment is cut to the end of my days. I just can't get out of myself" (Langer, 1991, p.

146). Or consider the witness who shows the coexistence of selves resulting from staying alive and surviving, and witnessing the Holocaust and the struggle to lead a contemporary conventional life, "I was working hard, and also I was trying to forget myself, forgetting the past. It came back to me like a recording in my head. After we got married, for the longest time--we were already then in a family way, and things were looking up for me. During the day I was working, working hard and studying and trying to get ahead and establish myself, and at night I was fighting the Germans--really fighting. And the S S were after me all the time, and I was striving to save my mother and sister [both gassed in Auschwitz]. And I was jumping off from building to building and they were shooting at me, and each time the bullet went through my heart. " Taken together, the above examples suggest that the coherence of a private or public self as autobiographical recollections is as much a reflection of the coherence of everyday experience as it is a reflection of the narrative forms available within some culture which makes possible a sense of coherence. The lesson from the case of Holocaust victims is that efforts after 'staying alive' cannot be fitted easily, if at all, into a socially acceptable, coherent selfnarrative. It is for this reason, as Langer (1991) argues (together with the fact that most of us were not victims) that I believe we can never fully understand the experience of the Holocaust, and must remain only witnesses to the memories of the victims without trying to regularize their experiences.

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Oral Holocaust testimonies challenge recent conceptions of self and selfknowledge in autobiographical recollections as coherent and well-structured. Strong versions of coherent selves seem to be rooted in an ideology of coherence being the outcome of intellectual and social development, e.g., identity crisis and commitments (as is true in much of my own work, e.g., Barclay, 1988, in press; Barclay & Smith, in press) than careful attention to the voices of individuals like Holocaust survivors, or perhaps victims of sexual or physical abuse or neglect. As Langer puts it, "Oral testimony is a living commentary on the limits of autobiographical narrative, when the theme is such unprecedented atrocity. It also reveals the limits of memory's ability to recreate that past. The issue is not merely the unsharability of the experience but also the witness's exasperated sense of a failure in communication" (p. 41). In conclusion, the notion of remembering ourselves can be examined from two complimentary perspectives. First, remembering ourselves can be viewed within the traditional rhetoric of the psychology of memory, i.e., inputmediation-output models, which attempts to specify the nature of mental representations of self and the knowledge acquisition devices used to gather self-knowledge (cf. Brewer, 1986). This perspective is concerned largely with the accuracy of self-knowledge. Work in this tradition must inform us about the nature of autobiographical memory representations (assuming remembered selves are objectified personal memories) and how those representations are learned. The promise of this type of research is in specifying how cognition (memory) and affect (feeling) may constitute a single, unified representational system. The second perspective on remembering ourselves focuses on why and how emergent objectifications of selves in autobiographical memories are used-the social, interpersonal and intrapersonal function of autobiographical remembering. This perspective is a contextual one, and the phenomena studied, research methods used apd theories built are frequently rooted in narrative traditions that focus on the discursive properties of remembering. These properties are characterized by a concern for the social actions that remembering affords, especially in the forging and nurturing of relationships and communities (Edwards & Middleton, 1988). On this view, remembering ourselves serves a basic human need to be social, and connected emotionally and intellectually with others. In ending where 1 began, 1 do not believe that there is a self to be remembered; instead, remembering ourselves is a

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contextualized, social-cognitive activity and skill that informs us both about the nature of memory and the everyday adaption purposes for remembering ourselves.

Notes 1. Autobiographical memory has been defined by Brewer (1986) as "...memory for information related to the self" (p. 26). (Also see Dritschel, 1991). This definition is taken as a preliminary conceptualization of autobiographical memory because it does not specify (a) a theory of self, (b) the origins of self and (c) because it treats self as an entity separate from the remembering of self-referenced information without proposing how memories acquire personal significance, thereby becoming autobiographical (also see Larsen, 1991 for a discussion of relationships of autobiographical memory to episodic memory). 2. Quinn and Holland (1987) argue that cultural models are .presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared by members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it" (p. 4). Linde (1987) claims that cultural models share a family resemblance with "explanatory systems" which is .(a) a system of beliefs and relations among beliefs that provide the environment in which one statement may or may not be taken as a cause for another statement ...(b) a system of beliefs that occupies a position midway between common sense, the beliefs and relations among beliefs that any person in the culture may be assumed to know, if not to share, and expert systems, which are beliefs and relations among beliefs held, understood, and used by experts in a particular domain" (p. 343). 'I..

'I..

References Banaji, M.R., & Crowder, R.G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psvchologist, 44, 1185-1 193. Barclay, C.R. (1986). Schematization of autobiographical memory. In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), AutobioeraDhical memory (pp. 82-89). New York: Cambridge University Press. Barclay, C.R. (1988). Truth and accuracy in autobiographical memory. In M.M. Gruneberg, P.E. Morris, & R.N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects

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of memory: Current research and issues Vol. 1: Memorv in everyday

life (pp. 289-294). New York: Wiley. Barclay, C.R. (in press) Composing protoselves through improvisation. In U. Neisser, & R. Fivush (Eds.), The remembered self: Construction and accuracv in the self-narrative. New York: Cambridge University Press. Barclay, C.R., & De Cooke, P.A. (1988). Ordinary everyday memories: So me of the things of which selves are made. In U. Neisser & E. Winograd (Eds.), Remembering reconsidered: Ecological and traditional amroaches to the study of memory(pp.91-125). New York: Cambridge University Press. Barclay, C. R., & Hodges, R.M. (1990). La composition de soi dans les souvenirs autoiographiques. Psychologie Francaise, 35, 59-65. Barclay, C.R., Hodges, R.M., & Smith A. (in press). Authenticity and accuracy: Self-schemata and the vicissitudes of autobiographical memories. Applied Cognitive Psychology. Barclay, C.R., Petitto, A., Labrum, A.H., & Carter-Jessop, L. (1991). Mood-related self-schemata and mood-congruity effects in autobiographical memory: A study of women with premenstrual syndrome. w i v e Psychology, 5, 461-481. Barclay, C.R., & Wellman H.M. (1986). Accuracies and inaccuracies in autobiographical memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 25, 193103. Barclay, C.R., & Smith, T.S. (in press). Autobiographical remembering and self-composing. International Journal of Personal Construct Psvcholow . Barclay, C.R., & Subramaniam, F. (1987). Autobiographical memory and self-schemata. &died Cognitive Psychologv, 1,169-182. Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering : A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brewer, W.F. (1986). What is autobiographical memory? In D.C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 25-49). New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Bruner, J. (1987). Life as narrative. Social Research, 43, 11-32. Bruner, J. (1990). Acts University Press.

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Ceci, S.J., & Bronfenbrenner, U. (1991). On the demise of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 46, 27-31. Conway, M.A. (1991). In defense of everyday memory. Psychologist, 46, 19-26.

American

Delbo, C. (1985). La memoirie et les iouns. Paris: Benz International. Dritschel, B.H. (1991). Autobiographical memory in national discourse: A methodological note. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4, 3 19-330. Edwards D., & Middleton, D. (1988). Conversational remembering and family relationships: How children learn to remember. Journal of Social and Personality Relationships, 5, 3-25. Epstein, S. (1973). The self-concept revisited: Or a theory of a theory. American Psvchologist, 28, 404-41 6. Fisher, K.W. (1980). A theory of cognitive development: The control and construction of hierarchies of skills. Psvchological Review, &, 477531. Fivush, R. (1991). The social construction of personal narratives. MerrillPalmer Quarterly, 37, 59-82. Fivush, R., & Fromhoff, F.A. (1985). Style and structure in mother-child conversations about the past. Discourse Processes, 11,337-355. Gergen, K.J., & Gergen, M.M. (1988). Narrative and self as relationship. Advances in Experimental Social Psycholow, 2 l , 17-56. Gibbs, J.C. (1979). The meaning of ecologically oriented inquiry in contemporary psychology. American Psvcholocist, 3, 127-140. Halbwachs, M. (1925). Les cadres sociaux de la memoire. Paris: Alcan. Harsh, N., & Neisser, U. (1989). Substantial and irreversible errors in flashbulb memories of the Challenger exDlosion. Paper presented at the

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Psychonomic Society Meeting. Hudson, J.A., & Shapiro, L.R. (1991). Effects of task and topic on children’s narratives. In A. McCabe & C. Peterson (Eds.), Developing narrative structure (pp. 89-136). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meanine imagination. and reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Labov, W., & Waletzky, J. (1967), Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience. In 3. Helm (Ed.), Essavs in the verbal and visual arts (pp. 12-44). Seattle: American Ethnological Society. _ .

Lakoff, G. (1986). Women. fire and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Langer, L.L. (1991). Holocaust testimonies: The ruins of memory. Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Larsen, S. (1991). Personal context in autobiographical memories. Paper presented at the NATO Advanced Research Workshop: Theoretical aspects of autobiographical memory. Grange-over-Sands, England. Linde, C. (1987). Explanatory systems in oral life stories. In D.Holland & N. Quinn (eds.), Cultural models in language and thought (pp. 343366). New York: Cambridge University Press. Lowenthal, D. (1985). The past in a foreign country. New York: Cambridge University Press. Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psycholoev, 35, 63-78. Middleton, D., & Edwards, D. (Eds.). (1990). Collective remembering. London: Sage, Miller, P.J., Mintz, J . , Hoogstra, L., Fung, H., & Potts, R. (in press). The narrative self young children’s construction of self in relation to others in conversational stories. Merrill-Palmer Ouarterly. Miller, P.J., Potts, R., Fung, H., Hoogstra, L., & Mintz, J. (1990). Narrative practices and the social construction of self in childhood. American Ethnologist, l7, 292-31 1.

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Miller, P.J., & Sperry, L.L. (1988). Early talk about the past: The origins of conversational stories of person experiences. Journal of Child Language, 15,293-315. Morton, J. (1991). The bankruptcy of everyday thinking. Psychologist, 46,32-33.

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Neisser, U. (1982). Memory observed: Remembering in natural contexts San Francisco: Freeman.

Five kinds of self knowledge. Neisser, U. (1988). Psychology, 1,35-59.

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Neisser, U., & Harsch, B. N. (in press). Phantom flashbulbs: false recollections of hearing the news about Challenger. In E. Winograd and U. Neisser (Eds.), Affect and Accuracv: studies of "flashbulb memories". New York: Cambridge University Press. Obeysekere, G. (1981). Medusa's hair: An essay on personal symbols and religious experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Obeysekere, G. (1990).

The work of culture: Symbolic transformation in

p Chicago: . University of Chicago Press. Olney, J. (1973). Tell me Africa: An approach to African literature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in children. New York: International Universities Press. Quinn, N. & Holland, D. (1987). Culture and cognition. In D. Holland and N. Quinn (Eds.), Cultural models in language and thought(pp. 340). New York: Cambridge University Press. Riessman, C. K. (1991). Beyond reductionism: Narrative genres in divorce accounts. Journal of Narrative and Life History, 1,41-68. Roediger 111, H.L. (1991). They read an article? A commentary in the everyday memory controversy. American Psvchologist, 46, 37-40. Ryan, R. M. (1990). The nature of the self in autonomy and relatedness. In J. Strauss, & G.R. Goethals (Eds.), Multidisciulinary persuectives on the self (pp.208-238). New York Springer-Verlag.

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Siegler, R.S. (1986). Children’s thinking. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Smith, T.S., & Barclay, C.R. (1990). Memory and interaction: Emotional regulation through joint reconstruction of autobiographical knowledge. Unpublished manuscript, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. Snow, C. E. (1990). Building memories: The ontogeny of autobiography. In D. Cicchetti & M. Beegly (Eds.) The self in transition: Infancy to Childhood (pp.213-242) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Stern, D.N. (1990). The role of feelings for an interpersonal self. Paper presented at Emory Cognition Project Conference on the Interpersonal Self, Emory University, Atlanta, GA. Trevarthen, C. (1990). The self born in intersubjectivitv: Dvadic states of mind and communication before language. Paper presented at the Emory Cognition Project Conference on the Interpersonal Self, Emory University, Atlanta, GA. Tulving, E. (1991). Memory research is not a zero-sum game. American Psychologist, 46, 1-42. Vygotsky, L.S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psvcholoeical orocesses. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wagenaar, W.A., & Groeneweg, J. (1990). The memory of concentration camp survivors. Applied Cognitive Psychologv, 4, 77-87. Yoos, H. (1991). Knowledge representation of a chronic illness: a studv of kinds of expertise. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY.

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Commentary: Memory of Schemata, Details and Selves Steen F. Larsen University of Aarhus, Denmark Remembering ourselves is a curious phrase; it suggests that we can also do the opposite, forget ourselves. If this is taken to mean that one is completely unable to recall any information about oneself, then it occurs only in the most extreme circumstances. For instance, in Fromholt & Larsen's (1991) study of the life history narratives of old people suffering from Alzheimer's dementia, subjects in the most severely demented group at least knew their names and could tell about a few events from their lives. The subject's own self was, in fact, the last person to disappear from the narrative, together with children and spouse. However, even mildly demented subjects could remember fewer events, gave less detail about each of them, and their narratives were less ordered than the largely chronological stories given by healthy old people. Thus, when "remembering ourselves" is understood as the recollection of what we have done in the past, it is certainly affected by forgetting. Craig Barclay's stimulating account of memory and self is based on such an understanding. He emphasises, in my opinion rightly, the importance of one's autobiographical memories in forming a sense of self and the social significance of this process (cf. Neisser, 1988). Furthermore, he claims that there simply is no self beyond what is given by the memory of one's past experiences -- there is no 'essential self' to remember, or forget. This is a strong view, but it is a natural point of departure for a memory theorist; and some measure of 'disciplinary imperialism' may be useful, at least as a working hypothesis. Barclay's position on the self only becomes really radical due to his uncompromisingly reconstructive view of autobiographical memory. In accordance with the pioneering theories of Bartlett (1932) and others, memory is seen as the result of a process of schematisation of experiences and subsequent reconstruction from the schemata at the time of recollection. This strong form of the reconstructive view is problematic as a theory of the nature of memory in general, which is elaborated in the next section. The strongly reconstructive view also runs into difficulties in understanding the uses or functions of memory, including the use of memory to support our sense of

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self. Bluntly stated, the implication is that there are no memories to remember, just like there is no self. As discussed in the final section, it therefore becomes hard to explain not only the relative stability of one's self-image, but also the individuality we perceive in people and ourselves.

Reconstructive theory and memory of detail According to a strongly reconstructive theory, the specific details of particular experiences are not remembered because the schematisation process abstracts only the recurrent or essential features of events. When we recollect the events, however, the details may be constructed anew from the generic schema to fill the gaps and provide a coherent narrative. Thus, the theory predicts that memories will tend to be distorted in the direction of what is usually the case. Similarly, new events (or descriptions of events) that differ from remembered ones only in such details should be mistakenly recognised as having previously occurred ('false alarms'). Barclay cites results from several studies in support of this theory. For instance, Barclay & Wellman (1986) found that the false alarm rate when details of subjects' diary records were changed and presented to them again almost three years later was .48 and .52 (for two different kinds of details, descriptive and evaluative), much higher than the chance rate of .22 when records of entirely new events were given. This does indeed suggest that a substantial amount of detail is lost from memory and therefore can be changed in a diary item without the person noticing it. However, with just a slight change of focus it appears that an equally large share of details are preserved, as seen from the much higher rate of recognition of unchanged records (.79), even after three years have passed. If schematisation and reconstruction were the sole processes involved, the change of single details in the records should have gone unnoticed, resulting in a level of (false) recognition comparable to that of the original records. The preservation of apparently insignificant details in our memories of the past has been a continuing problem for schema theories. Already Bartlett (1932) was forced by his own data to admit that "the immediate return of certain detail is common enough and it certainly looks very much like the direct re-excitation of certain traces" (p. 209). In a lengthy review of laboratory studies bearing on schema theory, Alba & Hasher (1983) concluded with greater certainty that "the

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stored record of any event is far more detailed than prototypical schema theories imply" (p. 255). Finally, Brewer (1988) concluded several theoretical papers on autobiographical memory and an extensive empirical study by proposing a limited version of schema theory, which I find quite sensible. This "partially reconstructive view" holds that recent memories retain a large amount of specific details from the original event (e.g., location, point of view). With time, however, events may be merged by reconstructive processes, though still preserving much phenomenal detail, as in the 'repisodes' described in Neisser's (1981) study of the testimony of John Dean in the Watergate trial.

Remembering particular things and persons The basic stumbling-block for explaining our everyday memories, including our memories of ourselves, by schema theories is precisely that schemata lack details. Of course, we do need and possess generic knowledge of the regularities, rules and roles of the world. ,But my recollection of an event of the past must go beyond such schematic generalities; its particularity is what makes it a recollection. It concerns what I actually did, in contrast to what I regularly do (cf. Neisser, 1988) and also in contrast to what I did on another occasion; it happened in a particular place, not in a type of place.('a restaurant') or in a place looking just like the actual one; and it involves particular people, like my mother, my wife and my colleague Jens, not "a mother" or "a wife" or "a bearded Danish psychologist around 50". I may not recall all the particulars of every event, but some details are needed to distinguish the event from other events that have happened -- to particularise the event. To the extent that schema theory deals with the problem of particularity at all, it assumes that the general categories in a schema (like "mother", 'customer' or 'owner') are replaced with a specific instance of the category in each particular case, as an open slot is filled with a card. That begs the question of how the instances are particularised, however: How do I tell my mother, my wife and my colleague Jens apart from all other mothers, wives and bearded Danish psychologists? Philosophers call this the problem of objects' numerical identity -- the problem being that any material entity is identical only to itself, strictly speaking, and that the numerical identity can never be caught by a representation of the object's observable properties because of the principled infinity of objects in the world.

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This problem has recently been discussed by my colleague Jens (Mammen, 1993) who inspired the following example. Suppose I have two new ECU-coins, one in each hand. They are well made (German probably) so no inspection or shrewd test of their properties will enable you to tell them apart. However, one of the coins is much more valuable than the other because it was the first one ever made. The only way to identify this priceless coin is by remembering that it was my right hand, not the left, I used to take the coin from the box labelled 'The first ECU'. For the coin to really be the first ECU, it must be possible to follow it further back in time -- by the memories of people who have handled it and by other evidence -- to the moment it came out of the minting machine. To take a simpler example: how can I know that my pencil and my coat are mine (that is, different from others of the same appearance), except by knowing that I had some particular encounters with them in past, ultimately indicating an unbroken path to the moment I bought them and thus established the social relation of ownership to them? The examples show that the only certain way to determine an object's numerical identity is through its history, as we know it from our memory and from other evidence. And to thus particularise objects (including other persons), the memories must be particular, that is, contain details that convince us of the specificity of the events. Moreover, to perceive the numerical identity of objects is a necessary condition for relating to them individually; for instance, to see certain things as possessions and certain people as friends or relatives, irrespective of how similar they may be to other objects and how much they may change appearance. The most significant object which is particularised by taking part in my memories is myself. In this respect, the present view is therefore in agreement with Barclay's analysis of self-composition. However, I assume that much of the detail in memory is sufficiently permanent to allow remembering of particular events from the past -- as the recollections of concentration camp memories and war memories demonstrate (see Robinson's comments). The (apparently) great stability of one's self image is therefore not surprising. Even "divided selves" due to multiple bases of irreconcilable memories may be persistent, which is hard to understand if selves can be constructed at will. The above argument implies that the basic function of autobiographical memories is to particularise objects and persons by preserving the path each of them have travelled through the history we know. This function is not opposed

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to Barclay’s and Neisser’s (1988) suggestion that such memories serve to establish and maintain social relations. It is rather a prerequisite of such relations, because enduring social relations presuppose that particular individuals can be distinguished. Furthermore, the basis for relating to people and to material objects of affection (possessions, locations, etc.) is one and the same: the existence of a particular history relating oneself to these persons and objects in the past. How do I know which particular occasion a memory refers to? A vital source of information is probably memory of one’s personal circumstances when the event occurred, that is, details of the context of the event (e.g., location, lighting, weather, mood). A similar view is proposed by Pillemer (1992) in a broad analysis of the instrumental, psychodynamic and communicative functions of memories of personal circumstances. Studies by the present author (Larsen, 1992) are beginning to suggest that memory of contextual details is important for our ability to reconstruct the chronology of everyday events, and thus for maintaining a coherent historical structure in our knowledge of the past. In sum, when the details disappear, one’s history suffers, and ultimately the self is reduced to the name of an empty schema.

Acknowledgements. This work was supported by a grant from the Danish Research Council for the Humanities. The author is grateful for comments from Kirsten Nielsen and John Robinson. References

Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Bulletin, 93,203-231.

Psvcholoeical

Barclay, C. R., & Wellman, H. M. (1986). Accuracies and inaccuracies in autobiographical memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 25.93-103. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering. A study in experimental and social psvchology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brewer, W. F. (1988). Memory for randomly sampled autobiographical events. In U. Neisser, & E. Winograd (Eds.), Remembering reconsidered: z v (pp. 21-90). New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Fromholt, P. & Larsen, S. F. (1991). Autobiographical memory in normal aging and primary degenerative dementia (dementia of Alzheimer type). Journal of Gerontology: Psycholoeical Sciences, 46.85-91. Larsen, S . F. (1992). Personal context in autobiographical and narrative memories. In M. A. Conway, D. C. Rubin, W. Wagenaar, & H. Spinnler (Eds.), Theoretical perspectives on autobiograDhica1 memorv. (pp.53-71). Amsterdam: Kluwer. Mammen, J. (1993). The elements of psychology. In N. Engelsted, M. Hedegaard, B. Karpatschof, & A. Mortensen (Eds.), The societal subject (pp.29-44). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. Neisser, U. (1981). John Dean's memory: A case study. Cognition, % 1-22. Neisser, U. (1988). Five kinds of self-knowledge. Philosophical Psychology, L 35-59. Pillemer, D. B. (1992). Remembering personal circumstances: A functional analysis. In E. Winograd & U. Neisser (Eds.), Affect and accuracy in recall: The problem of "flashbulb" memories. (pp.236-264). New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Commentary: Memory, Self and Story

John A. Robinson University of Louisville, USA Barclay has woven together in a persuasive manner many strands of theorizing in cognition, social theory, and developmental psychology. The legacies of Bartlett, Vygotsky, Mead and Cooley are joined to more recent theorizing about discourse processes to fashion an account of personal memory and personal identity. It is a stimulating and provoking essay. I want to engage in a dialogue with Craig about his essay. I will freely mix Craig's actual statements with replies and questions I would expect from him. CB: My view is that there is no one stable self or collection of selves to be remembered. JR:Not ever? In "On being a self forever" John Updike (1989) writes about "pet selves", personas whose affective claim on us may last a lifetime. These selves are perhaps best construed as schemata, organized patterns of needs, interests, and experiences. Is it unthinkable that some of these schemata can be sustained for long periods with little modification? CB: You seem to think that we can 'preserve the past' or some of it. Research on schematization and implicit theories clearly shows that personal memory is fallible. JR: In one of your papers you remarked that memory may be inaccurate but veridical, that is, correct about the pattern if not the details. Doesn't veridicality count? Updike's reminiscences suggest to me that we can encapsulate valid, if not incorrigible, portraits of ourselves at former times. The 'deep memories and motivations' you invoke may account for these encapsulations. CB: Now you've changed focus. You're claiming that recollections are consistent even though you concede they may be inaccurate. Give up these ideas of stability: we weave our past anew as we need to. JR: You would agree with John Eakin. There are no fixed points of reference in one's life history: " ...autobiography is better understood as a ceaseless process of identity formation in which new versions of the past evolve to meet the constantly changing requirements of the self in each successive present

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(1985, p. 36).“ What would you say about this case? In ’Archives of Memory’ Alice and Howard Hoffman (1990) report the results of a study of Howard’s memories as a combat soldier in World War 11. Like your subject R. F., Hoffman was simply asked to “tell about the war”. His recitation produced a 44 page transcript. He did this again four years later. During the intervening years Hoffman made every effort to avoid situations which could produce rehearsals, elaborations, or new war memories. He stayed away from reunions with veterans and avoided books and movies about the war. Alice Hoffman analyzed the transcripts of the two sessions. There were minor differences in wording, detail, and chronological ordering between them, but length, organization, and content were remarkably stable. A detailed daily log of the activities of Howard’s company was found in a US Army archive. It provided striking verification of most of Howard’s recollections. He made mistakes and omitted some important events, but his reliability and accuracy were impressive. I find the Hoffmans’ conclusion compelling: “We think that our findings ...imply that there is a subset of autobiographical long-term memory which is so permanent and largely immutable that it is best described as archival. From this perspective archival memory consists of recollections that are rehearsed, readily available for recall, and selected for preservation over the lifetime of the individual ...PIhey define the self and constitute the persona one retains, the sense of identity over time. They enable us to see ourselves in the image of a sturdy youth, even though the mirror now reveals only the remnants of what once was (1990, p. 145).” CB: It’s a mnemonic trick. Hoffman has rehearsed these memories until they have become a ’canned story’. Anyone could do that, but usually we don’t. JR: We are all storytellers. In fact, you say that narrativity is an indispensable component of remembering. So it’s hard for me to see a difference in principle between Hoffman and any other instance of autobiographical recall. Some stories are truer than others. There is a different argument you could make which would be harder for me to rebut: Memories which are uncommonly stable are simply those which we have never had a need to alter. Veterans form a social community dedicated to preserving and sanctioning their war experience. Social constructionists argue that stories (memory stories, self stories) are just a language game, that ’memory’ and ’self are reifications of

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linguistic practices. War memories may be examples of a memory genre distinguished by the value placed on unvaried recapitulation. CB:Exactly. Remembering is an interpersonal process constrained by socially sanctioned forms of discourse. JR: I don’t deny that. But social practices are rooted in the biological development of the species. They are not just contingent historical phenomena. We tell stories about ourselves and our world because it is the nature of our minds to construct models of our world (Humphrey, 1986; Donald, 1991). How else can we relate past, present, and future? Episodic memory is limited in its usefulness. In order to construct patterns from experience, memory must be coupled with powers of abstraction, generalization, and representation. It’s hard for me to credit any claim that all of our cognitive powers are simply internalizations of social practices. A social constructionist approach commits the same conceptual sin that it attacks--reducing all phenomena to one level or type. Could we explore a slightly different way of describing these questions? Let’s call it narrative competence. The idea is that people can be more or less skillful at discursive remembering. I am not talking about self-disclosure. Some people just have a hard time giving a coherent account of their experience. Do we want to say they necessarily have a diminished identity or memory for experience? We do wonder. I wonder too, how often the impoverished autobiographies which we attribute to repression are a result of being socialized with different narrative norms. Narrative skill probably impacts encoding as much remembering. Perhaps families should be typed according to memory cultures, e.g., a culture of silence, a culture of candor, a culture of reminiscence etc. CB: I agree that competence is an important issue. Fivush’s research on maternal styles and children’s recall shows the roots of narrative competence. But I would stress the creative role of narrative: we can adapt any experience to our present needs. That is what I meant by claiming that any memory could be autobiographical. JR:I find this point obscure. Are you saying that a memory of a newspaper headline becomes autobiographical when it is found useful for a personal problem? Perhaps you are simply saying that although all experience is personal not all of it is personally relevant, though it has the potential to become relevant. Agreed. But what about those experiences which we regard as meaningful or relevant when they happen? Isn’t that because they are

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relevant for me? Why not call them self-relevant? I see a possible value for your way of putting it: some life experiences can become almost impersonal; we grow indifferent to them. They are still mine, but not me. CB: I don't see what is gained by talking about a present self reacting to a remembered or former self. A past self is a construction in the present not a self-of-record which can be consulted. JR:The point of argument here is whether we can conclude that using the past adaptively necessarily entails modifying it. I can imagine Hoffman's war memories being useful for many things: they could be relevant in a variety of social interactions; they could provide hints to solutions of technical problems in his research on perception, or how to fix his car. But given the evidence of constancy in his recollections we should conclude that such uses reaffirm rather than revise his former self. I think you underestimate the importance of a stable life history. CB: Autobiographical remembering is deeply engaged with our feelings and needs, especially for nurturing relationships. I think our present needs are more important to us than our past experiences. JR:Reading your essay I was reminded of a paper by Erica Haimes (1987). She has studied adoption and describes two contrasting patterns of reaction when adults discover they are adoptees. Some readily assimilate this surprise into their life story and seem to maintain their sense of identity largely unchanged. Others experience a crisis. They believe that there is a 'truer self' which has been hidden from them and go through a difficult process of revising and reintegrating their sense of personal identity. Such cases should have much to tell us about memory, self, and story. First, they remind us that possible selves can be retrospective as well as prospective. Second, they show the power of stories. The person who experiences crisis believes that s/he would have had a different life, be a different person. A resolution requires reconciling possibility with actuality. These people must experience dramatic shifts of perspective. Their experiences, interests, accomplishments, and relationships may all be questioned. They will never be able to remember themselves in the same way as they had before. How do family members and friends help this process to a successful completion? Are memories altered? Can we distinguish changes which reflect a new point of view from those which revise 'fact' or substance? CB: Adoptees face the same problems we all face, just in a more extreme form.

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How do you feel when your parents tell you what you were like as a child and describe things you don’t remember and don’t like? How do you feel when a friend or lover argues with you about what you ’really said’ or ’really did’? Discontinuity is a constant threat. JR: You may be right. However, I am still puzzled about something. Why is it valid to speak of selves co-existing in some instances and not others? The case of Holocaust survivors is clear. You observe that victims of other traumatic assaults like rape may have similar difficulties. Why draw the line with trauma? Perhaps multiplicity is the norm but the contesting selves are rather ordinary (cf. Humphrey & Dennett, 1989). Few people “have it all together”. Most people have several narrative lines out concurrently. If we focus on the moment, it may make sense to talk about self as a momentary objectification, a contextually distinctive construction. But if we take a wider view, a longer time slice, it seems to make as much sense to talk about multiple selves or self-stories.

References Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. Eakin, J. P. (1985). Fictions in autobiography: Studies in the art of self-invention. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Haimes, E. (1987). ‘Now I know who I really am.’ Identity change and change and redefinitions of the self in adoption. In T. Honess & K. Yardley (Eds.), Self and identitv (pp. 359 - 371). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Hoffman, A. M. & Hoffman, H. S. (1990).. - A KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Lexington

Humphrey, N . (1986). The inner eve. London: Faber & Faber. Humphrey, N. & Dennett, D. (1989). Speaking for ourselves: An assessment of multiple personality disorder. Raritan. 9, 68 - 98. Updike, J. (1989). Self-consciousness: Memoirs. New York: Knopf.

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Rejoinder: Reflections on Professors Robinson’s and Larsen’s Comments

Craig R. Barclay

University of Rochester, USA John Robinson and Steen Larsen have always had a special acumen for my work on autobiographical remembering and self. Their welcomed insights come, I believe, from two sources: their intense curiosity regarding the nature and role of thinking (e.g., remembering) in the context of everyday life and their genuineness. It appears that they are both deeply concerned primarily with a single issue: the accuracy of autobiographical memory. I share this concern and recognise under certain conditions autobiographical memory can be both highly accurate and inaccurate. How can this be? One approach to answering this question is ask “Why study autobiographical memory, and how does autobiographical remembering relate to a theory of self?“ I am currently studying autobiographical memories, instead of for instance, the development of an executive control system (e.g., Barclay, 1979), because autobiographical memories are meaningful to the person, i.e., they are infused with personal significance associated with affect or how the person feels and evaluates embodied experiences (Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Obeyesekere, 1981, 1990). Accordingly, there is a welding of cognition and affect in a unique phenomenon, and not the deconstruction of the person into component parts. Much autobiographical remembering is therefore motivated by affect and emerges as a process of justifying feeling (Bartlett, 1932; Zajonc, 1980). If autobiographical memories are meaningful, then their accuracy can be manipulated by changing the affect or evaluation of experiences. The evaluation can be changed a little or a lot depending on how well the person is known to the researcher or by the person him-or herself (what U. Neisser and R. Fivush have labelled the ‘spin theory’ of autobiographical memory accuracy, personal communication), thereby increasing or decreasing accuracy. Such a phenomenon is similar to the impact of leading questions on eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1979).

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Answering the second part of the question about autobiographical memory and a theory of self is a bit more complicated. I never imagined when I began this work that I would be arguing for an existential theory of self (e.g., Sartre, 1964)! However, the empirical finding reported by Barclay and Wellman (1986) seemed to push us in that direction (see also Barclay, Petitto, Labrum, & Carter-Jessop, 1991). In particular, as Larsen has pointed out, there is a high recognition accuracy after 2% years for unchanged events; and--not emphasized by Larsen--this level of recognition accuracy is coupled with chance performance on changed events - especially for events with detail changes (recognition accuracy was above chance for events with evaluative changes at the 1-3 month memory test, indicating the correct rejection of these test items). What is not mentioned is that regardless of whether or not an event was changed, the participants were overconfident in the accuracy of their memory. Thus, the phenomena to be explained were both accuracies and inaccuracies in autobiographical memory, coupled with overconfidence. We reasoned that a stable sense of self 'engenders' confidence in memory, especially if what is being presented for recognition is highly similar in detail and evaluation to the kinds of experiences one has in daily life. All of this work, however, was concerned with questions regarding the nature of representation of autobiographical memories. It is not surprising that we would turn to schema theory when using a recognition-test paradigm with self-selected and written diary records of memorable events in which we manipulated the amount and kind of evaluative spin. The comments made by Professors Robinson and Larsen have helped me rethink my position on the nature of memory in general and the question of representation4 seems reasonable to assume that autobiographical remembering is partially reproductive under some task conditions and mostly reconstructive when a person is trying to convey the meaning of an experience to others, or to psychologically comfort oneself in times of stress. "Remembering ourselves" is concerned with another strand of work, namely, the social-psychological and cultural uses of contextualized autobiographical remembering, and the inadequacy of narrative skill as a tool for objectifying self in canonical story forms, given experiences like trauma. An attempt is made not to reify "autobiographical remembering" or "the self"; that is why each are discussed as contextualized emergent phenomena that allow us to adapt in the present rather then archive the past (Barclay & Smith, in

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press; Lowenthal, 1985).

References Barclay, C.R (1979). The executive control of mnemonic activity. Journal of Experimental Child Psycholopv, 27, 262-276. Barclay, C.R., Petitto, A., Labrum, A.H., & Carter-Jessop, L. (1991). Moodrelated self-schemata and mood-congruity effects in autobiographical memory: A study of women with premenstrual syndrome. ApDlied Cognitive Psychology, 5,461-481. Barclay, C.R., & Smith, T.S. (in press). Autobiographical remembering and self-composing. International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology. Barclay, C.R., & Wellman, H.M. (1986). Accuracies and inaccuracies in autobiographical memories. Journal of Memory and Language,, 25.93103. Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A studv in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Johnson, M. (1987). The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning. imagination. and reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G. (1987). Women. fire and dangerous things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Loftus, E. (1979). Eyewitness testimony, University Press.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard

Lowenthal, D. (1985). The past in a foreign land. New York: Cambridge University Press. Obeyesekere, G. (1981). Medusa’s hair: An essav on personal symbols and religious experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Sartre, J-P. (1964). The words. New York: Vintage Books. Zajonc, R.B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American Psychologist, 31, 151-175.

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Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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CHAPTER 8 RECOGNISING FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES Andrew W. Young University of Durham, United Kingdom Species which depend heavily on social interaction need to be able to recognise other individuals. Without this ability, we would not be able to react differently to different people, modifying our behaviour according to what we know about them. For humans, face recognition is particularly important. It provides a way of identifying people which is usually effective (there are not so many identical twins in the world), which is not affected by changes in clothing, and which can cope with a reasonable range of other transformations, such as altered hairstyles, beards, and so on (at least for highly familiar people). Of course, what we are primarily concerned to do is to identify people, so we also rely on voice, gait, clothing, context and any other appropriate source of information to some extent, and occasionally (for example, on the telephone) one of these will play a primary role. The apparent ease with which we recognise faces can be deceptive. Searle (1984, p.52) used face recognition as an example of an ability that happens quite effortlessly and which he considered may not require complex computation. Instead, Searle argued that it could be “as simple and automatic as making footprints in the sand”. However, there are quite serious problems with this view, not the least of which is that there is no evidence that sand can recognise your footprints (Ellis, Young & Hay, 1987). In fact, there are many occasions in everyday life when misidentifications and other forms of error can happen (Young, Hay & Ellis, 1985). Although these mistakes mostly occur outside our conscious control, they reflect the organisation of a system which is nothing like as simple as Searle implied. A variety of different sources of evidence can be used to gain insight into the organisation of the recognition system. These include everyday errors, errors induced in the laboratory, errors due to brain pathology, and performance in ’real-life’ or laboratory-based tasks. I will draw on all of these methods. None of them is free from problems of interpretation, but such

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interpretive problems are mostly quite different between one method and another. This allows us to be reasonably confident about conclusions which are supported by more than one source of evidence, and it is pleasing that these divergent types of study have pointed toward consistent conclusions.

Long-term memory for people Important examples of the ’real-life’ approach come from the work of Bahrick, Bahrick and Wittlinger (1975) and Bahrick (1984), who have reported studies of memory for people across long intervals, using faces or names of former students or classmates. Bahrick et al. (1975) examined recognition of the names and faces of people taken from high school yearbooks. In this way, they were able to test the recognition abilities of groups of subjects across mean intervals ranging from 3 months to 48 years since graduation. Subjects were tested on several tasks, including their ability to recognise whether or not names were of former classmates, to recognise whether or not faces were of former classmates, and to name a given face. Table 1 shows percentages of faces and names correctly recognised, and of faces which could be named by groups of subjects in Bahrick et al.’s (1975) study. These percentages have been statistically adjusted to take into account what would otherwise be uncontrolled variables, such as differences in the sizes of the classes in different years. It is clear that the ability to recognise faces and names of former classmates remains good for many years after graduation. For faces, there is virtually unimpaired performance across a 34 year interval, whereas performance for names begins to fall after 15 years. Face naming is never as good as face recognition, and shows a gradual decline as the years go by. Of course, face naming can be considered a recall task, and recall is often poorer than recognition, but as we will see later there are other reasons which also contribute to the difficulty of face naming. Although one cannot but be impressed by the levels of performance achieved across such long retention intervals, there is no doubt that the faces and names used in Bahrick et al.’s (1975) study would mostly have been very thoroughly learnt at high school, and some subjects may have engaged in modest amounts of rehearsal during the retention interval (by reminiscing, or even consulting their yearbooks, though this was one of the variables Bahrick

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Years since graduation: 0.25

Name recognition: Face recognition: Face naming:

0.75

2

4

7

15

26

93 94 64

87

92

93 92

57

41

91

91

79

89

91 59

78 36

68

34

48

78

74

T7

9.3

90

73

53

47

18

TABLE 1. Percentages of faces and names correctly recognised, and of faces which could be named, by subjects in Bahrick, Bahrick and Wittlinger’s (1975) sfudy .

et al. took into account). Subsequent work by Bahrick (1984) looked at what happens when the people have been much less well learnt, by using an introductory University class which had met 3-5 times per week across a 10 week period. Table 2 gives percentages of faces and names of former students which could be correctly recognised by people who had taught this class, and percentages of faces which could be named. As might be expected, there was much poorer retention for these less familiar people. The better recognition of names than faces probably reflects the fact that the teachers would come across the students’ names more often than their faces (in class lists, and when marking essays, tests, and so on).

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Years since class was taught:

0.03

1.13

4.15

8.08

Name recognition:

88 69 36

76

59 31 3

52

Face recognition: Face naming:

43 6

26

0

TABLE 2. Percentages of faces and names of former students correctly recognised, and of faces which could be named, by college teachers in Bahrick’s (1984) study.

Recognition errors and their implications Bahrick’s work demonstrates that people who have initially been very thoroughly learnt can be recognised across remarkable periods of time. In everyday life, however, we are often dealing with people who are much less well-known to us, or who can crop up in different or unusual contexts. Errors and mistakes in recognition therefore occur with appreciable frequency, though they are often quickly corrected. Young et al. (1985) collected a corpus of everyday errors by carrying out a ’diary’ study in which 22 people took notes on mistakes they made in recognising people across an eight-week period. To standardise these records, they were made on forms which provided a checklist of things to note. After discounting the records made during the first week (this was considered to be the time needed to learn how to use the record sheets properly), there were 922

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~~

~

~~~~

Number of records Person misidentified: "I was driving under a bridge in Lancaster: it was a bit dark. I saw a person with a dog and I thought it was a dog owner I sometimes see there. It was the wrong type of dog: I thought he must have got a new one!" Person unrecognised: "I was going through the doors to B floor of the library when a friend said, 'Hello'. I at first ignored him, thinking that he must have been talking to the person behind me." Person seemed familiar only: "I was in the bank, waiting to be served. I saw a person and I knew there was something familiar immediately. After a few seconds I realized she was from a shop on campus or a secretary of one o f the departments. I eventually remembered by a process of elimination." Difficulty in retrieving full details o f person: "I saw a poster advertising a film. I knew what films the actress was in and knew she does a lot of Beckett, but it was another minute before I could remember her name." Decision problems: "I was going into m y house, when I thought I saw Steve Duck outside. I wouldn't expect to see him there, and I decided it wasn't him. I became sure it wasn't him, but then he spoke to me.

314

114

233

190

35

TABLE 3. Examples of main types of everyday error noted by Young, Hay and Ellis (1985).

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records of difficulties and errors. Most of these records could readily be grouped into different types, and Table 3 gives examples of the main types. The most common form of error (314 records) involved misidentifications of one person for another. In most of these cases (272 records), an unfamiliar person was misidentified as someone familiar, and often highly familiar (54%). A substantial proportion of such misidentifications of an unfamiliar person as someone familiar (55%) were associated with poor viewing or hearing conditions, and were quickly corrected (69 % within 10 seconds), usually when a better view was obtained (76%). Other common types of error noted by Young et al. (1985) can be considered to reflect breakdown at different levels of recognition: 1. Failure to recognise a familiar person, who is mistakenly thought to be unfamiliar (1 14 records). This type of error is readily understandable when the person was of low familiarity, seen under poor conditions, or when the error was quickly corrected, but there were also a proportion of records for which such factors did not seem to apply (42% involved familiar people, for 82% conditions were not described as poor, and 58% lasted more than 10 seconds). 2. Recognising a person as familiar, but being unable to bring to mind any other details, such as her or his occupation or name (233 records). This problem was often felt to be due to meeting someone who was not very well-known in an unexpected context. In the cases where the person's identity was successfully discovered (135 records) only 13% involved highly familiar people, and only 16% happened in contexts where that person would be expected. Recognising the person as familiar and remembering appropriate semantic 3. information about them, whilst failing to remember certain other details, such as her or his name (190 records). Of the cases where this problem was successfully resolved (135 records) the overwhelming majority (99 %) involved inability to remember the person's name. This could happen even to highly familiar people (33% of these records), and usually lasted for some time (71 % over 10 seconds). Young et al. (1985) pointed out that the orderliness of these types of everyday error is consistent with the idea that the recognition system uses some form of sequential access to different types of information, in the order

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familiarity then semantics then name retrieval. This had first been suggested by Hay and Young (1982), and it has since been more fully developed by Bruce and Young (1986) and partially implemented in slightly modified form as an interactive activation model by Burton, Bruce and Johnston (1990) and Burton and Bruce (1992). We will return to consider this interactive activation simulation later. The model suggested by Young et al. (1985) is shown in Figure 1. They proposed that representational systems create descriptions of the person encountered (face, build, clothing, voice, etc.). These are used to activate recognition units that signal the degree of resemblance to known people, and can access information about the person’s identity, and then additional information such as the person’s name. Recognition of a person thus involves sequential stages of perceptual classification as a familiar visual or auditory pattern (by domain-specific recognition units for faces, voices, seen or heard names, etc.), semantic classification (involving domain-independent person identity nodes which can access previously learnt semantic information from the

REPRESENTATIONA SYSTEMS

RECOGNITION UNITS

encountered

IF COGNITIVE SYSTEM

A PERSON IDENTITY NODES

Jl

J t

4 A

FIGURE 1. Outline of model of person recognition proposed by Young, Hay and Ellis (1985).

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person's face, voice, or name), and access to additional but less essential information, which would include name retrieval. This is only meant as an idealised sequence, and would be compatible with a 'cascade' mode of operation. Note that in this model, recognition from facial and non-facial sources of information (such as hearing the person's voice, or hearing or reading their name) is achieved by domain-specific input systems (for faces , voices, names, etc.) which can feed into the common set of domain-independent person identity nodes. Young et al. (1985) also suggested that the cognitive system is involved in evaluating information given by the recognition system. A number of the records arising from their 'diary' study involved decision problems. For example, diarists were sometimes uncertain about whether or not they had correctly identified a particular person (35 records), often because the context made that person unlikely (see Table 3). Hence, we can see that we are constantly monitoring the results of more automatic aspects of recognition, to correct errors we sometimes make, and also because different types of information must sometimes be intentionally combined and evaluated. Inappropriate context is a particularly clear example of this, but so is the encountered person's behaviour. Thomson (1986) mentions a field study, in which the daughter of an Australian couple was asked to stand outside a London hotel when her parents thought she was in Australia. They recognised their daughter, but when she (deliberately) did not respond, her father apologised; "I am terribly sorry, I thought you were someone else". A further reason for emphasising the importance of decision processes involves the phenomenon of resemblance. Young et al. (1985) found that most of their diarists noted experiences which were not really errors as such, but based on 'resemblance only'. Table 4 gives examples, which parallel some of the types of everyday error noted in Table 3. Most diarists commented that they could not keep systematic records of these 'resemblance' experiences, because the criterion for what was or was not a noteworthy resemblance tended to shift around. But the fact that they happen at all is of interest. In general, they seem to be based on correct rejections of resemblances signalled by outputs from recognition units or person identity nodes. The basis of such rejections could involve an insufficient degree of resemblance ("it didn't look quite like her"), conflict between resemblances ("her hair was like her but the face wasn't''), or inappropriate context ("I knew she was abroad"). The descriptions of these experiences often pointed out that

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under different circumstances a genuine error might have been made, which is consistent with our suggestion that they reflect decision processes.

Errors in the laboratory We have seen that everyday errors can be readily assimilated to the model shown in Figure 1. However, diary studies suffer a number of limitations which might affect this conclusion (Reason & Lucas, 1984). The most important of these are that diarists' reports might show biases, perhaps because they only report the errors they find particularly striking or easy to interpret themselves, or because they deliberately or unintentionally distort the errors in ways that make them seem more clear-cut than was actually the case.

Person misidentified:

"Z saw someone Z didn't know in the town centre in Preston. Z thought he looked very like Mike Read (a disc jockey and television personality). Z might have thought it was Mike Read i n different circumstances where Z might have expected to see him" Person seemed familiar only:

"Z thought he looked like someone Z knew, but Z couldn't think who. Z t took me a couple o f minutes to work out who he looked like." Difficulty in retrieving full details of person: "I was watching a f i l m on television. An actor reminded me o f someone; Z knew i t was a n American actor he reminded me ofi but Z couldn't get the name. Z thought of Cary Grant and Gregory Peck. Z finally had to ask the

name of the actor Z was thinking o f (Rock Hudson)."

TABLE 4. Examples of experiences involving 'resemblance' which paralleled some of the types of everyday error noted by Young, Hay and Ellis (1985).

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Additional confirmation of the findings of diary studies of everyday errors has therefore been obtained from studies of errors made under laboratory conditions (Hanley & Cowell, 1988; Hay, Young & Ellis, 1991). These studies can eliminate reporting biases, because errors can be systematically examined as they are made, yet still find the types of error predicted by the sequential access view. Hay et al. (1991) showed 190 slides of famous and unfamiliar faces to 12 subjects who were asked whether or not each face was a familiar person, what the person’s occupation was, and what the person’s name was. All of the errors made fell into patterns which would be expected from a ’sequential access’ model (such as Figure l ) , and examples were found for all of the types of error predicted by such a model. More importantly, there were no examples of any of the types of error which would be incompatible with a sequential access model. For example, the sequential access model does not permit errors in which a subject can name a particular face without being able to give the person’s occupation. Reassuringly, this never happened (such errors were not found in Young et al.’s diary study, either). In a further study, Hay et al. (1991) examined more carefully just what information was available when subjects made different types of error, and explored the types of cue needed to correct difficulties arising at each stage. Results were again compatible with a sequential access model.

Initial knowledge state Face unfamiliar

Semantic cue Initials cue

41 12

Face familiar only 52 22

Face familiar, and occupation known

35 47

TABLE 5 . Percentages of names successfully retrieved after cueing by semantic information or initials in Hanley and Cowell’s (1988) study.

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A similar cueing technique had been used very effectively by Hanley and Cowell (1988), and Table 5 shows some of the data from their study. Subjects who found a face they should have recognised to be unfamiliar, familiar only, or who knew who the person was but couldn't remember the name, were cued by giving them semantic information about the person (e.g., "Brilliant cavalier Spanish golfer whose raw ability and adventurous play have carried him to the top of the sport") or a card containing the initials of four famous people (one being the person in question), with blank spaces for the remaining letters ( S - - - B - - - - - - - - - -, etc.). As is clear from Table 5, the semantic cue was most effective at promoting correct naming when subjects found the face familiar only, whereas cueing with the initials was more effective when the occupation was already known. This is exactly as would be expected from a sequential access model, since people who find the face familiar only would be 'blocked' at the stage where semantic information would normally be retrieved (and hence assisted by a semantic cue more than an initials cue), whereas people who can already access the occupation but are still searching for the name should derive more benefit from an initials cue than a semantic cue (they have the semantic information already). An interesting extension of the cueing technique was made by Brennen, Baguley, Bright and Bruce (1990), who induced tip-of-the-tongue states by asking subjects to name famous people from snippets of semantic information (e.g., "The nervous man with the knife, in the shower scene in Hitchcock's 'Psycho'"). When subjects felt sure that they knew the name, but could not recall it (the tip-of-the-tongue state, or TOT; see Brown, 1991) they were cued either by giving the target person's initials, by showing the person's face, or by repeating the question (to control for the possibility that more time, or a second attempt, is all that is required). Results are shown in Table 6. The important point is that cueing from seeing the person's face had no effect, since no more TOTS were resolved by this than by simply repeating the question. This is as a sequential access model would predict (the face can only access the same pool of semantic information as the original question, but the 'block' occurs later).

Experiments with normal subjects Studies of everyday and laboratory errors have produced a number of findings which fit a sequential access model of recognition. Experiments with normal subjects have also given strong support to this suggestion (for reviews

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see Bruce & Young, 1986; Bruce, 1988; Young & Ellis, 1989). For example,

Initials cue 47

Face cue

Repeat question

15

11

TABLE 6. Percentages of tip-of-the-tongue states resolved by different types of cue in Brennen, Baguley, Bright and Bruce’s (1990) study.

speeded reaction time tasks have shown that faces can be classified as familiar more quickly than they can be classified by occupation, and that categorisations based on occupations or other semantic properties can be achieved more quickly than categorisations which require access to the person’s name. Such findings hold even when task demands and response requirements are carefully equated (Young, McWeeny, Ellis & Hay, 1986; Young, McWeeny, Hay & Ellis, 1986a; Young, Ellis & Flude, 1988; Johnston & Bruce, 1990). Another way to explore the sequential access model is through its implications for ability to remember faces. Bruce (1982, 1983) suggested that episodic memory for faces would depend on the number of different memory codes available at test. One could consider activation of a face recognition unit as requiring a structural code, accessing occupation and other biographical information as involving semantic codes, and name retrieval as requiring access to a name output code. If access to each of these codes from the face occurs in a fixed sequence, we would expect better retention when people are asked to name faces than when they are asked to decide their occupations, and that this would in turn lead to better retention than merely assessing the face’s familiarity, since fewer distinct codes need to be generated in each case. Exactly this result was found by Hanley, Pearson and Howard (1990), both in recall and recognition tests.

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As Hanley et al. (1990) note, this result is less easy to reconcile with some other views about memory. For example, there is no particular reason (other than the sequential access model) for proposing that naming a face would lead to more ’deep’ processing than accessing the bearer’s occupation, so that a levels of processing framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) can only apply if the properties of the sequential access model are assumed. Similarly, transfer appropriate processing (Morris, Bransford & Franks, 1977) does not provide an adequate account, because the same advantage for named faces was found when subjects had to recall their occupations at test (i.e., memory for faces that have been named on initial presentation is better regardless of whether one is tested on recalling names or occupations). Although there is evidence of sequential access within the face recognition system, other types of facial information may be determined independently from identity (Bruce & Young, 1986; Parry, Young, Saul & Moss, 1991). It is not necessary to analyse the facial expression before a person’s identity can be known, or vice versa; there are parallel systems for extracting these different types of information from seen faces. Studies of normal subjects and people with brain injuries support this conclusion (for reviews, see Bruce & Young, 1986; Young & Bruce, 1991). For example, Young, McWeeny, Hay and Ellis (1986b) and Bruce (1986) found that analysis of expressions was no faster for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces, whereas familiarity did influence decisions when the person’s identity was involved (faster matching of the identities of photographs of familiar than unfamiliar faces, etc.). As has been pointed out, Figure 1 emphasises not only sequential access to different types of information from seen faces, but also the importance of decision processes. Further support for this view has come from the work of Bartlett and Fulton (1991) and Bartlett, Strater and Fulton (1991), who have shown how it can help to account for age differences in recognition memory for faces.

The particular difficulty of name retrieval Everybody recognises the irritating tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) state, when we seem to know everything relevant except the word we are looking for, and it does seem that inability to bring to mind people’s names is a common cause of TOTS (Brown, 1991).

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Diary and laboratory studies have been able to reveal a number of interesting features of TOTS involving problems in name retrieval (Yarmey , 1973; Williams & Hollan, 1981; Read & Bruce, 1982; Reason & Mycielska, 1982; Reason & Lucas, 1984; Young et al., 1985; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986; Hanley & Cowell, 1988; Brennen et al., 1990; Maylor, 1990). Like other TOTS, they often involve partial information states in which quite a lot is known about the intended target name. Cohen and Faulkner (1986) described a person searching for the name ’Kepler’ who managed to generate the candidates Keller, Klemperer, Kellet, and Kendler. Although all of these were rejected, this person knew that the target was foreign-sounding, and that Keller was the closest to it. Another feature of many TOTS is that recall of the correct name is blocked by an incorrect name that is persistently brought to mind. Reason and Lucas (1984) have shown that these blocking items usually share structural, contextual or semantic features with the target, but tend to be items that have been more recently and more frequently encountered than the target itself. They suggested that blocked TOT states thus show the susceptibility to strong habit intrusions previously noted in several other types of everyday error by Reason and Mycielska (1982). Why should it be so hard to remember names? The question is deceptively simple, and we still don’t have a definitive answer. Although I have emphasised here the importance of the sequential access account, which holds that information is accessed from seen faces in the order familiarity then semantics then name, this does not in itself account for why name retrieval should come last in this sequence. Bahrick’s work (Bahrick et al., 1975; Bahrick, 1984) showed that there is no evidence of anything like comparable difficulty for name recognition; when we read or hear the name ’Buddy Holly’, we don’t usually have any trouble remembering who he was. Bruce and Young (1986) therefore drew a careful distinction between name input codes which allow us to recognise a seen or heard name, and the name output codes involved in saying (or writing) that name. Problems arise when we have to generate a name output code in response to a face, voice, or some other cue which contains no information about what the name might be. Of course, we noted earlier that face naming can be considered a recall task, and recall is often poorer than recognition. However, remembering an arbitrary fact, such as that Buddy Holly was American rather than British, is

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just as much a recall task, yet it does not usually cause the same type of problem (Johnston & Bruce, 1990). A satisfactory explanation must be sought elsewhere.

First names

Surnames

Places

Occupations

Hobbies

31

30

62

69

68

TABLE 7. Percentages of each type of target correctly recalled by 26 yearolds in Cohen and Faulkner’s (1986) study.

One promising approach has been to study how names and occupations are learnt in the laboratory. Cohen and Faulkner (1986) constructed brief biographical descriptions of fictitious people. Each biography contained a person’s name, the name of a place associated with that person, the person’s occupation, and the person’s hobby; for example, ”a well-known amateur photographer, Ann Collins, lives near Bristol where she works as a health visitor”. As Figure 7 shows, recall of the people’s names from these biographies was poorer than recall of the other types of information. Notice, too, that the place names were recalled relatively well; it is not simply the fact that names are proper nouns which somehow accounts for our problems in remembering them. A similar study was carried out by McWeeny, Young, Hay and Ellis (1987), who taught subjects a fictitious surname and occupation to each of 16 unfamiliar faces. The surnames were found to be much harder to learn than the occupations, and this was true even for items which can be used as names or occupations (Baker, Cook, etc.). It is more difficult to recall that a person’s surname is Farmer than to recall that she or he is a farmer. Hence the explanation of differences between the ease of recall of names and occupations does not lie in properties of the items themselves, such as imageability, frequency and so on. Cohen and Faulkner (1986) suggested that occupations, hobbies, and

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place names like Glasgow or Bristol may be semantically richer than people’s names, which remain essentially arbitrary labels. There are some points in favour of this view. Cohen (1990) found that subjects could remember people’s possessions (e.g., that Mr. Hobbs has a dog) as well as they could remember their occupations (Mr. Hobbs is a pilot), but that recall of nonsense possessions (Mr. Hobbs has a blick) was as poor as recall of names. Furthermore, when Cohen (1990) paired potentially meaningful names (e.g. Mr. Baker) with meaningless occupations (Mr. Baker is a ryman), it was the occupations which were worse recalled. Hence, subjects can make use of the imageability and meaningfulness of names, but only if this does not conflict with other semantic information about the person. A related view was suggested by Young et al. (1988), who proposed that names are stored separately from other semantic information because they are nowadays arbitrary labels which are only occasionally required; when we see a face, we want to know who that person is, but it would be unnecessary and inconvenient if the name were constantly brought to mind. An alternative possibility has been suggested by Burton and Bruce (1992), based on the interactive activation simulation of the Bruce and Young (1986) model developed by Burton et al. (1990). The basic architecture of this simulation is shown in Figure 2. For present purposes, its key features are that it allows input systems for recognising seen faces (FRUs) or names (name input) to converge on a common set of person identity nodes (PINs) which are in turn linked to items of semantic information. Unlike the type of model shown in Figure 1, this implementation proposes a clear separation of PINS and semantic information; decisions about a face or name’s familiarity are then taken at the PINs. Burton et aL(1990) were able to show that this implementation can simulate several reported results on face recognition. However, at first sight there is no mechanism to account for problems in accessing name output codes, since a separate store for these is not built in to the model. In fact, Burton and Bruce (1992) noticed that the model shown in Figure 1 can already account for problems in name retrieval, if it is assumed that names are stored along with other types of semantic information. A name like ’Richard Nixon’ would then be linked to a single PIN (for Richard Nixon), whereas most items of semantic information would be linked to several PINs (e.g., ’politician’ to PINs for Richard Nixon, John Major, Neil Kinnock, etc.). It is a property of this type of architecture that the less interconnectivity an item

Recognising Friends and Acquaintances

34 1

Basic architecture of Burton, Bruce and Johnston’s (1990) FIGURE 2. interactive activation model of face recognition.

has, the less easy it is to boost its activation. Hence, Burton and Bruce (1992) point out that problems of name retrieval may simply reflect the status of names as relatively unique items of semantic information. This proposal is appealingly simple. More importantly, it makes clear predictions which can be confirmed or falsified. For example, it suggests that people will be as poor at recalling other facts which are unique to individuals as they are at remembering names, and this could be tested in TOT states or brain-injured patients. The results of such studies are awaited with interest.

Normal and pathological errors The point that errors can correspond to breakdowns arising at different stages or levels of recognition can also be demonstrated in cases of

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neuropsychological impairment (Young, 1992). In such cases, a brain-injured patient will make characteristic errors to many seen faces. To investigate this, my colleagues and I have developed ’line-up’ tasks in which faces or names are presented one at a time, and subjects are asked to rate familiarity, provide information about the person’s identity (such as occupation), and (for faces only) give the person’s name. The tasks we have used most often include faces and names of 20 highly familiar famous people, 20 less familiar people, and 20 unknown people. Table 8 presents data from the highly familiar faces and names in these line-up tasks for 3 cases with contrasting patterns of impairment. PH (who had occipito-temporal lesions caused by a closed head injury; de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1987) shows the ’prosopagnosic’ pattern of impaired recognition of faces with relatively well-preserved recognition of familiar people from their names. For ME (vasculitic disorder; de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1991a) the sense of familiarity of faces or names was well-preserved, but access to semantic information and name retrieval (from the face) were severely compromised. For EST (surgery to remove a left temporal lobe tumour; Flude, Ellis & Kay, 1989) only name retrieval seemed to be affected. The published reports on these cases present other data to substantiate the patterns seen in Table 8. The findings are consistent with a hierarchy of impairments corresponding to the idea that access to familiarity, occupation, and name retrieval involve sequential stages. There are breakdowns at each level, but those at the earlier levels affect later stages: without a sense of the face’s familiarity, occupation and name cannot be retrieved (PH); if the face is familiar but the occupation cannot be retrieved, then it can’t be named either (ME); and name retrieval impairments can exist even when familiarity and occupation are available (EST). These neuropsychological impairments thus parallel some of the patterns of error which arise as transitory phenomena for normal people in everyday life (Young et al. 1985). Turning to the names line-up, ME shows the same pattern of impairment as for faces, whereas PH does not. Hence there is a difference between impairments which primarily affect the recognition of faces, and those which seem to involve person recognition regardless of the input domain. In line with Bruce and Young’s (1986) suggestion that it is the earlier stages of recognition that are domain-specific, when there is a problem with recognition from faces and not names (as for PH) all stages of face recognition (familiarity, occupation, and name retrieval) are affected.

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Also important are patterns of impairment which do not occur. As for everyday and laboratory errors, we have never found a brain-injured person for whom name retrieval was normal from seen faces but access to occupations was impaired. Such a case would clearly violate the proposed hierarchy, and therefore be of considerable theoretical importance. There may also be neuropsychological cases which involve impaired decision mechanisms. Young, de Haan and Newcombe (1990) reported the case of SP, who showed severe impairments on face recognition tasks yet did not think that she had any problems in face recognition. SP continued to show lack of insight into this impairment even when directly confronted with its consequences on formal testing.

Faces line-up Familiarity Occupation (1-7 rating scale) (max = 20)

PH: ME:

1.2*** 5.7

EST

5.2

0.5 1

Name Familiarity Occupation (max = 20) (1-7 rating scale) (max = 20)

O***

O*** 7***

6.0 6.2

19

7***

3***

6.9

19

16.25

6.27

19.66

2.81

0.63

0.84

17

Control subiects (N=28): Mean 5.98 18.86

SD

Names line-up

1.15

8***

TABLE 8. Recognition of highly familiar people in line-up tasks by PH (de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1987), ME (de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1991a), and EST (Flude, Ellis & Kay, 1989). (Asterisked scores are more than 3.10 standard deviations below the control mean, p < .001).

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Her errors mostly involved either failures to find a face familiar at all, or misidentification as another familiar person. In contrast to her unawareness of her face recognition problems, SP showed adequate insight into other physical and cognitive impairments produced by her illness. Young et al. (1990) proposed that her lack of insight into her face recognition problems was due to impairment of domain-specific monitoring abilities needed to monitor our own performance in everyday life. As we have seen from everyday errors, monitoring is necessary to correct the mistakes we sometimes make, and also because different types of information must sometimes be intentionally combined and evaluated. As Bisiach, Vallar, Perani, Papagno and Berti (1986) point out, the existence of such a deficit-specific loss of insight suggests that this monitoring does not involve a common central monitoring mechanism, but is to some degree decentralised.

Overview We have seen that there is a rich interplay between naturalistic and laboratory studies of person recognition, and that it is possible to arrive at closely comparable conclusions from studies of everyday errors, errors in the laboratory, effects .of brain injury, and laboratory experiments involving learning or speeded decisions. This interplay is highly desirable, and greatly enhances the confidence we can place in the conclusions reached. Computational studies and simulations (Burton et al., 1990; Burton & Bruce, 1992) are now adding enhanced precision and predictive power. I have discussed in detail the sequential access model of recognition derived initially from Hay and Young’s (1982) proposals (see Figure 1). This model may not necessarily be correct, but it has proved valuable in stimulating studies whose results will have to be encompassed by any more adequate theory, and the sequential access view remains readily consistent with most of the available findings. Many of the properties of person recognition revealed by these investigations show obvious parallels to other forms of recognition and memory. For example, although TOT errors seem to be very common in person recognition, there are no obvious differences between TOTS involving people’s names and TOTS caused in any other way. Similarly, the sequential access model shown in Figure 1 has parallels with more general models of object

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recognition (see Bruce & Young, 1986). So is there anything special about recognition of people? To some extent, it depends on what one means by special (Hay & Young, 1982; Ellis & Young, 1989). However, there are some clear pointers from the neuropsychological literature, where quite specific deficits are occasionally reported. In most cases of brain injury involving impaired recognition of people, there are also other problems. Considering the cases shown in Table 8, PH was poor at recognising stimuli from other visual categories with many similar exemplars (e.g., cars and flowers; de Haan et al., 1987; de Haan, Young & Newcombe, 1991b), ME showed long-term memory deficits on several tasks, though her other cognitive abilities were well preserved (de Haan et al., 1991a), and EST had severe word-finding difficulties (Flude et al., 1989). However, it is always risky to infer that one deficit causes the other in cases with co-occurring neurological impairments, and more powerful evidence comes in the form of fractionation of deficits which often co-occur, showing that their association is not inevitable (Ellis & Young 1988; Shallice 1988). Such fractionations have been reported for face and person recognition impairments. De Renzi (1986) and De Renzi, Faglioni, Grossi and Nichelli (1991) described prosopagnosic patients whose problems did seem to affect faces only, and Ellis, Young and Critchley (1989) investigated a patient who showed impaired recognition of familiar people despite good performance of many memory tests. Semenza and Zettin (1988, 1989) described cases of impaired name retrieval for proper names only, and McKenna and Warrington (1980) reported a case of impaired ability to retrieve people’s names with relatively well-preserved retrieval of other proper names. Thus there is some evidence that recognition impairments can take face or person-specific forms. As we began by noting, the brain may develop specialised recognition and memory systems to underpin the need to be able to interact differently with different individuals.

Acknowledgements: I gratefully acknowledge the support of ESRC project grant ROO0233091 to Andy Ellis, Andy Young, Mike Burton and Brenda Flude. I would also like to thank the British Psychological Society for permission to reproduce Figure 2 (from Burton, Bruce & Johnston, 1990).

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Ellis, H.D., & Young, A.W. (1989). Are faces special? In A.W. Young & H.D. Ellis (Eds.), Handbook of research on face processing (pp 126). Amsterdam: North Holland. Flude, B.M., Ellis, A.W., & Kay, J. (1989). Face processing and name retrieval in an anomic aphasic: names are stored separately from semantic information about familiar people. Brain and Cognition, U, 60-72. Hanley, J.R., & Cowell, E.S. (1988). The effects of different types of retrieval cues on the recall of names of famous faces. Memorv and Cogition, 16,545-555. Hanley, J.R., Pearson, N.A., & Howard, L.A. (1990). The effects of different types of encoding task on memory for famous faces and names. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholoev, 741-762.

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Johnston, R.A., & Bruce, V. (1990). Lost properties? Retrieval differences between name codes and semantic codes for familiar people. Psychological Research, 52, 62-67. McKenna, P., & Warrington, E.K. (1980). Testing for nominal dysphasia. Journal of Neurology. Neurosurgery. and Psychiatry, 43, 781-788. McWeeny, K.H., Young, A.W., Hay, D.C., & Ellis, A.W. (1987). Putting names to faces. British Journal of Psychologv, 28, 143-149. Maylor, E.A. (1990). Recognizing and naming faces: Aging, memory retrieval, and the tip of the tongue state. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 45,215-226. Morris, C.D., Bransford, J.D., & Franks, J.J. (1977). Levels of processing versus transfer appropriate processing. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16,519-533.

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Parry, F.M., Young, A.W., Saul, J.S.M., & Moss, A. (1991). Dissociable face processing impairments after brain injury. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 13,545-558. Read, J.D., & Bruce, D. (1982). Longitudinal tracking of difficult memory retrievals. Cognitive Psychologv, 14,280-300. Reason, J., & Lucas, D. (1984). Using cognitive diaries to investigate naturally occurring memory blocks. In J.E. Harris & P.E. Morris (Eds.), Everyday memory. actions and absentmindedness (pp 53-70). London: Academic Press. Reason, J., & Mycielska, K. (1982). Absent-minded? The p s v c h o l o u f mental lapses and evervday errors. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Searle, J. (1984). Minds. brains and science: The 1984 Reith lectures. London: British Broadcasting Corporation. Semenza, C., & Zettin, M. (1988). Generating proper names: A case of selective inability. Cognitive NeuroDsvchologv, 5, 71 1-721. Semenza, C., & Zettin, M. (1989). Evidence from aphasia for the role of proper names as pure referring expressions. Nature. 342, 678-679. From neuropsychologv to mental structure. Shallice, T. (1988). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Face recognition: more than a feeling of Thomson, D.M. (1986). familiarity? In H.D. Ellis, M.A. Jeeves, F. Newcombe, & A. Young (Eds.), Aspects of face urocessing (pp 118-122). Dordrecht: Nijhoff. Williams, M.D. & Hollan, J.D. (1981). The process of retrieval from very long-term memory. Cognitive Science, 5, 87-1 19. Yarmey, A.D. (1973). I recognize your face but I can’t remember your name: Further evidence on the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon. Memory and Cognition, 1,287-290. Face recognition impairments. Philosophical Young, A. W. (1992). Transactions of the Royal Society of London, U,47-54. Young, A.W. & Bruce, V. (1991). computation of ’grandmother’. P s v c h o l o ~3, , 5-49.

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Young, A.W., de Haan, E.H.F., & Newcombe, F. (1990). Unawareness of impaired face recognition. Brain and Cognition, 14,1-18. Young, A.W., Ellis, A.W., & Flude, B.M. (1988). Accessing stored 111-1 15. information about familiar people. Psychological Research, 3, Young, A.W., & Ellis, H.D. (1989). Semantic processing. In A.W. Young & H.D. Ellis (Eds.), Handbook of research on face processing (pp 235-262). Amsterdam: North Holland. Young, A.W., Hay, D.C., & Ellis, A.W. (1985). The faces that launched a thousand slips: Everyday difficulties and errors in recognizing people. British Journal of Psychology, 24,495-523. Young, A.W., McWeeny, K.H., Ellis, A.W., & Hay, D.C. (1986). Naming and categorizing faces and written names. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholoev, 297-3 18.

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Commentary: Dimensions of Facial Appearance Vicki Bruce Stirling University, United Kingdom There are several stages involved in the recognition of friends and acquaintances, and Andy Young has done an excellent job of describing what is known about the information-processing operations which are involved. These stages can be tapped in normal adults by studying errors and aids to identification, and by experiments investigating the speed of access to different types of information. Additional evidence is provided by patterns of neuropsychological impairment. Rather than criticising the account provided, I here intend to elaborate upon it, and in particular to consider what is known about the very first stage of the person identification route - the stage which allows us to know that a particular visual pattern corresponds to the face of a person we know. It is this first stage - the visual analysis and storage of face patterns which is of interest to computer scientists and engineers attempting to provide automated facial recognition for various security applications, and which interests police who try to elicit descriptions of faces from witnesses to crimes. At present, human abilities to store and recognise the faces of large numbers of well-known individuals far outstrip that of any machine system (though this is not to deny that errors of identification occur). If we could understand more about how the visual system achieves this task, it would not only satisfy our scientific curiosity, but might yield important clues which would help in the automation of these same tasks.

Distinctiveness and caricature. Although we can all recognise hundreds of faces known to us - whether personally or via the media - not all faces are equally easy to identify. Faces which are 'distinctive' in appearance are recognised more easily than those which are more 'typical' - even when the faces are very well known. For example, Valentine and Bruce (1986a, 1986b) showed that faces which were rated as having appearances which would make them 'stand out in a crowd'

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were recognised as familiar in a speeded classification task more rapidly than those which were rated as less distinctive in appearance. This advantage for distinctive faces has been shown using ’media’ faces (thus faces such as Jimmy Saville’s, rated as distinctive, are recognised more quickly than those such as Prince Philip’s, which are rated as typical - Valentine & Bruce, 1986a), and also using faces which were personally familiar to subjects (Valentine & Bruce, 1986b). However, if the task was changed from one of deciding whether faces were familiar, to one of deciding whether each face was a face or not (where the non-faces had rearranged facial features), then decisions to distinctive faces were made more slowly than those to typical faces. One way to account for results such as these is to suggest that faces are stored in some way that captures their deviation from an average or ’prototypical’ face. A face that deviates a great deal from the facial norm will be easier to distinguish from unknown faces, but harder to recognise as a face at all (since it will by definition share fewer of the characteristics of ’faces in general’). Valentine (e.g. 1991) has suggested that each known face may be represented as a point within a hypothetical ’space’ of faces, where the dimensions of the space correspond to different dimensions along which faces vary. The idea that faces may be stored in a way which particularly emphasises their relationships with the ’average’ face is given additional support by studies of the effects of caricaturing an individual face. We are all familiar with the political caricatures that appear in our newspapers or in full 3D ’spitting images’. Caricatures are interesting because the impression is that by distorting a face it can be made to be more recognisable. However, newspaper or TV caricatures are not themselves good evidence that caricaturing enhances recognition. Their appearance is supported by a good deal of context, and at least some aspects of such caricatures appear to involve the use of stereotyped ’conventions’ for depicting an individual (e.g. Gorbachev’s birthmark drawn as a hammer and sickle). However, in recent years, an ingenious computer program written by Susan Brennan in the USA has been used in studies which do show much more convincingly that a caricatured representation can be better than the original for facial recognition. Brennan’s ’caricature generator’ (1985) works as follows. An outline of a face is drawn and the locations of a large number of particular key ’points’ (such as the inner and outer corners of each eye) are measured. If this operation

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is repeated for a large number of faces then it is possible to calculate the average locations of each of these points and thus create a sketch of an 'average' face. In order to produce a caricature of a particular face, the locations of its individual points are compared with those of the average, and their locations are shifted by multiplying the deviation by a constant factor. The sketch of the face can then be redrawn by linking up the locations of these new key points. Rhodes, Brennan and Carey (1987) produced line drawings of a set of familiar faces, and produced different degrees of positive and negative caricatures of these line drawings (negative caricatures are produced by reducing the difference between the individual face and the norm to make it more average in appearance). They showed that slight positive caricatures were recognised more rapidly than veridical line drawings of the same faces, and that subjects also rated moderate degrees of positive caricature as producing as good a likeness as the uncaricatured version. More recently, Benson and Perrett (1991) have extended the Brennan et al technique to produce photographic caricatures, and provide evidence that for some faces such caricatures can also yield benefits in terms of perceived likeness and identification. An example of a computer-generated photographic caricature produced by Phil Benson is shown in Figure 1. This shows an original image of myself, with a positive caricature produced by exaggerating the distances between key points on my face and those of an average face. Note the worried expression in the caricature, suggesting that my normal face is more worried in appearance than the norm (cf. Bruce, 1988, p.24)! From the work on distinctiveness and caricature, it looks as though faces may be stored in a way which makes their variations from the norm particularly salient, though at present it is not clear which of a number of storage mechanisms might produce such effects. For example, although Valentine suggested a norm-based coding model on the basis of early experiments, a model in which incoming faces were compared against all stored facial exemplars might predict these effects (Valentine, 1991; Valentine & Endo, 1992). It is also possible that certain connectionist architectures in which recognition results from a competition between different units might show caricature effects (cf. Tanaka, 1990 cited by Carey, 1992).

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The dimensions of faces The work on distinctiveness and caricatures sidesteps the question of what aspects of faces are used in our internal descriptions of these patterns. If faces can be represented within a multidimensional face 'space', how may we characterise the 'dimensions' along which facial appearance varies? In recent years, some influential theories of visual object recognition have addressed the problem of how we are able to recognise different categories of object despite the fact that objects look very different in different viewpoints (e.g. see Marr & Nishihara, 1978; Biederman, 1987 - see Bruce & Green, 1990 for a review). For example, a front view of a horse and a side view of a horse

FIGURE 1. An original (0%)and positive caricature (+50%)of the author, produced by Phil Benson, University of St. Andrews, and reproduced with permission.

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yield very different visual images, and yet each can readily be identified as belonging to the same object category. These theories have suggested that what we store in memory are quite abstract descriptions of the different 'parts' or components that form the building blocks of objects, and their spatial arrangements. A horse and a giraffe can each be described as comprised of a set of essentially cylindrical components corresponding to head, neck, body, legs and tail. What distinguishes one from the other are the relative lengths and arrangements of these components. The task of the visual system, according to these theories, is to extract from differing viewpoints an abstract description of the basic components and their arrangement, so that the description can be matched against that stored in memory. For faces, we have tended also to assume that their recognition must involve a description of some set of component parts, and their spatial arrangements or configuration. The importance of the relationships between different facial features is illustrated in work by Young, Hellawell and Hay (1987). They showed that subjects found it very difficult to name the top half of a famous face when it was paired up with the wrong bottom half face, even though they were quite able to name the top half shown on its own or when it was not aligned with the bottom half. It seemed that the features of the top half were seen differently when with the wrong bottom half - a new configural identity emerged from the relationship between the two sets of features. When the faces were turned upside down, however, it became easier to name the famous halves. This demonstration is consistent with other work showing that the perception of configuration is impaired by inversion, in this case to the benefit of the task which is required of subjects. However, though numerous studies now point to the use of both isolated features and their interrelationships in face perception, few actually allow us to make further progress in specifying what the important features are. The trouble is, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between a component feature and a configuration. If the eyes are moved apart in a face, this may be seen to change the configuration of the features, but the visual system itself may treat interocular distance as a simple feature. There is no necessary equation between the facial features that we happen to have labels for, and those that the visual system treats as primitive elements in internal descriptions of faces. A second problem in this area is that research into the 'dimensions' of

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facial descriptions has tended to treat the face as though it were a flat pattern, rather than as a bumpy surface. In such treatments it tends to be assumed that the key dimensions of the face reside in two-dimensional spatial layout of the features of the face. However, this does not explain why accurate line-drawings of faces, which preserve the spatial layout of facial features such as eyes, nose and mouth, are difficult to recognise (Davies, Ellis & Shepherd, 1978; Bruce, Hanna, Dench, Healey & Burton, in press). Perhaps the visual system measures aspects of the surface shape, which will not be well depicted by simple line drawings?

FIGURE 2. The three-dimensional surface of the author’s face, measured by laser and displayed as a solid surface courtesy of the department of Medical Physics, University College, London.

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In some research conducted at Nottingham, we demonstrated the complexity of the information which seems to be used to make one of the simplest possible classifications to faces. We chose the problem of how people decide whether faces are male or female. This is a task which can be performed with a very high degree of accuracy (typically 95% or better) even when usual cues from hairstyle, cosmetics and so forth are minimised. Burton, Bruce and Dench (in press) explored, using a statistical technique called discriminant function analysis, whether a set of measures taken from a large number of male and female faces could be used to categorise the sex of the faces correctly. It was found that in order to produce discrimination which approached the accuracy of human perception, a rather complex set of measures had to be incorporated, including measures of three-dimensional shape as well as twodimensional spatial layout of the features. In parallel work, Bruce, Burton et a1 (in press) explored what information is used by human perception for this task by investigating the effects of reducing or eliminating potential cues. For example, we compared how accurately sex could be judged from photographs of people wearing swimming caps (to conceal hair) with the accuracy obtained when the same head shapes were shown devoid of any normal surface markings from facial hair (eyebrows, stubble) or texture. This was achieved by measuring the shapes of heads using a laser system, and displaying the resulting measurements using a computeraided design package (see Figure 2). Subjects were reasonably accurate at judging the sex of these 'laser' heads from 3/4 images, but much less accurate from profile and full face views. We argue, on the basis of these and other results, that the human visual system makes use of aspects of the threedimensional shape (e.g. the protruberance of the nose and brow region) in addition to other cues, to discriminate male from female faces. In ongoing projects we are investigating whether the facial dimensions that render faces more or less distinctive in appearance likewise include aspects of their threedimensional shape. It is too early to give an answer to the question of how faces are represented by the visual system in a way that allows us to recognise them across transformations of view and expression. However, theories of the representational process must provide an account of the phenomena outlined in this article, which therefore provide important constraints for the future development of such theories, and tests of the psychological validity of existing

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computer models of facial identification.

Acknowledgements. Research described in this article has been supported by grants from the ESRC and SERC. References Benson, P.J., & Perrett, D.I. (1991). Perception and recognition of photographic quality facial caricatures: Implications for the recognition of natural images. EuroDean Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 3, 105-135. Biederman, 1.(1987). Recognition by components: A theory of human image understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115-145. Brennan, S.E. (1985). Caricature generator: Dynamic exaggeration of faces by computer. Leonardo, l8, 170-178. Bruce, V. (1988). Recognising faces. London: Erlbaum. Bruce, V., Burton, A.M., Dench, N., Hanna, E., Healey, P., Mason, O., Coombes, A., Fright, R., & Linney, A. (in press). Sex discrimination: How do we tell the difference between male and female faces? Perception. Bruce, V., & Green, P.R. (1990). Visual perception: Physiology. psychology and ecology. (2nd ed.). London: Erlbaum. Bruce, V., Hanna, E., Dench, N., Healey, P., & Burton, M. (1992). The importance of "mass" in line drawings of faces. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 619-628. Burton, A.M., Bruce, V., & Dench, N. (in press). What's the difference between men and women? Evidence from facial measurement. PerceDtion. Carey, S . (1992). Becoming a face expert. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London, B, 335, 95-103. Davies, G.M., Ellis, H.D., & Shepherd, J.W. (1978). Face recognition accuracy as a function of mode of represention. Journal of Applied Psychologv, 63, 180-187.

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Marr, D., & Nishihara, H.K. (1978). Representation and recognition of the spatial organization of three-dimensional shapes. Proceedines of the Royal Society of London, E3, 200, 269-294. Rhodes, G., Brennan, S . , & Carey, S. (1987). Identification and ratings of caricatures: Implications for mental representations of faces. Cognitive P s ~ c h o l o ~ 19, y , 473-497. Valentine, T . (1991). A unified account of the effects of distinctiveness, inversion and race on face recognition. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychologv, 161-204.

m,

Valentine, T., & Bruce, V. (1986a). The effect of distinctiveness in recognising and classifying faces. Perception, 15,525-535. Valentine, T., & Bruce, V. (1986b). Recognising familiar faces: The role of distinctiveness and familiarity. Canadian Journal of Psychology, 40, 300-305. Valentine, T., & Endo, M. (1992). Towards an exemplar model of face processing: The effects of race and distinctiveness. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 44A, 671-703. Young, A.W., Hellawell, D., & Hay, D.C. (1987). Configural information in face perception. Perception, 16,747-759.

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Commentary: Accessing Identity Information Bob 2ohnsron University of Wales College of Cardiff, United Kingdom. The expertise which people exhibit in recognising faces can be very misleading. The seeming automaticity of the processes involved tend to seduce one into the belief that the task is a simple one. Searle (1984) is not alone in dismissing the complexities of the task. Churchland (1988, p150) in his otherwise discerning exploration of cognitive science ’explains’ face recognition in three paragraphs. What are the aspects of face recognition which inspire such confidence in simple explanations for the uninitiated? In part the situation may stem from the prodigious skill which humans display at this task. From earliest infancy we are predisposed to attend to faces and no formal training or tuition seems necessary for the proper development of face recognition ability during childhood. Adult performance is remarkable. It ranges from being able to remember friends over intervals of up to thirty years (Bahrick, Bahrick and Wittlinger, 1975), to being able to add a seemingly unlimited number of faces of new acquaintances and celebrities to our face memory store. An alternative explanation, and one which I think accounts for Churchland’s abbreviated description of face recognition, is that people fail to realise that a number of different processes are involved. Consequently there is a tendency to over emphasize the ’front end’, perceptual processes, and to overlook the later cognitive stages. Andy Young’s chapter provides an excellent remedy for this misconception. He presents an integrated review of face recognition as a multi-stage process. His chapter provides a functional account of the different components underlying face recognition by collating evidence from a variety of approaches. These include naturalistic studies, laboratory-based experiments, computer simulations and case studies of brain-damaged individuals. The explanatory power of his thesis is increased by its stress on a holistic perspective. In many areas of cognitive psychology, invoking a clear-cut distinction between perceptual and cognitive processes would be theoretically weak, as well as being largely unhelpful in generating directions for research. The study of face

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recognition might also encounter this problem. Young presents work which has tackled the topic with a more open-minded approach and which builds on theories designed to understand the process as a whole (e.g. Bruce & Young, 1986). Bruce and Young (1986) present the most extensive model of face recognition to date. They provide an infrastructure for the understanding of a variety of tasks such as expression analysis and lip-reading in addition to identification. However, it is the serial route to identity information, which their model incorporates as part of its modular organisation, to which I will give my attention. I will focus my commentary on the central and later stages of recognition, rather than the initial stages of perception and visual analysis.

The sequential access model The sequential access model justly deserves the emphasis Young places on it. The original models (e.g., Hay & Young, 1982; Bruce & Young, 1986) had together provided a focus for face recognition research for over a decade. Such was the extent of their influence that I am always surprised when it is pointed out that work on faces before then (e.g., Ellis, 1975; Bruce, 1979) was conducted in the absence of this theoretical framework (Bruce, Burton and Craw, 1992). Bruce and Young (1986) proposed that when a known face is recognised, there is a particular sequence of identification. First the face is recognised as familiar through activation within the correct Face Recognition Unit (FRU), then semantic information becomes available through access to a Person Identity Node (PIN) and then, lastly, name information (if it is held) can be retrieved. Young opens with the idea that efficient face recognition is necessary so that we can react differently to different people. It is no less important with regard to our long term memory for people that we are allowed the ability to react consistently to the same people. The Bahrick studies provide strong testament to this ability (Bahrick, 1984; Bahrick et al., 1975). The name recognition data from Bahrick et al. (1975) is difficult to interpret (see Young, this volume, Table 1). I do not think it represents a real comparison with faces since the same names will inevitably crop up time and time again. Can we have confidence when a subject makes a familiarity judgement to the name 'Mary Jones' from eight years ago that it was not in fact erroneously made to a

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different ‘Mary Jones’ from six years ago? Faces, on the other hand, tend to be more individual. I am more impressed by the figures relating to face recognition as they stand alone. They represent a phenomenal retention of face memories. The pattern of errors collected by Young, Hay and Ellis (1985) appear to favour a system where it is better to have false positives than recognition failures. Setting aside the category of ’decision problems’, because these are difficult to interpret, it is clear that total recognition failures occur only relatively infrequently. In many everyday situations even the faintest notion of familiarity may suffice until we can make a more certain decision based on additional cues or extra context. However, it is interesting to speculate that when we do have difficulty in remembering people who we think are familiar, it will cause less of a problem if the errors we make in retrieving biographical information are those of omission rather than commission. An examination of the diarists’ errors committed later into the recognition process reveals that they report a failure to retrieve details, rather than the incorrect access to inappropriate ones. Inevitably ’diary’ studies will have their weaknesses. However, these will generally be distributed in a particular direction. Diarists will under-report some findings, they will forget things occurred, or not know how to interpret an occasion and so omit it. Nevertheless, while the overt data are interesting in themselves, there is also additional mileage in what diarists do not mention. Functional models like the one described here will predict particular types of error, but they will also expressly prohibit the manifestation of others. The empirical absence of these theoretically forbidden mistakes proffers further support for the model advanced.

Connectionist modelling The specification of the sequential access model has moved on since 1986. A more recent version proposed by Burton, Bruce and Johnston (1990) has shown how computer implementations can permit a greater flexibility in what we interpret as sequential. Burton et al. implemented the Identity route of the Bruce and Young ’paper’ model as an Interactive Activation and Competition (IAC) network. This formulation preserves the spirit of the original, but the stages of the model are represented as pools of units which may be connected

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by excitatory or inhibitory links. While there is still a fixed sequence to the order of access to FRUs, PINS, and semantic information, the model allows activation to flow through the system so that processing need not be completed at one stage before processing begins at the next (i.e. in cascade). The stages are discrete, but processing is not. This model explicitly separates semantic information from the PIN. This was not the case with the Bruce and Young (1986) version, but had been proposed by Young et al. (1985). This type of revision highlights the ongoing developmental nature of work on face recognition. We see a situation where the theory directs research and in turn is modified by the findings of the latter. The Burton et al. IAC formulation was able to account for a number of common face recognition phenomena (e.g. semantic priming, identity priming, and distinctiveness effects). Since then we have constructed several IAC models which we have artificially 'lesioned' (Burton, Young, Bruce, Johnston & Ellis, 1991). Simulations run on networks which have been systematically 'injured' show a number of impairments characteristic of prosopagnosic patients. Burton and Bruce (1991) extended this approach to include the representation of name information. Strictly speaking their particular model deviates from the previous ones in that it explicitly dispenses with the idea of serial access to semantic and then name information. Burton and Bruce (1991) offer an explanation for the straightforward, but still elusive, question of why names are so difficult to retrieve. Their model exhibits a difference between its 'latencies' for the retrieval of name information and the retrieval of other semantic information. However, the distinction between these two types of information is predicated on the architecture of the model rather than any intrinsic differences between them. In the 'paper' models, semantic information and name information were simply slotted into separate boxes on the basis of empirical findings. The separation was prescribed by research data; the model did not explain those results, it just embodied them. In Burton and Bruce (1991) the preferential access to semantic information emerges because there are generally fewer common connections to name nodes than to semantic nodes. I find this especially pleasing since a rigourous distinction between the two sorts of information is hard to specify. Our knowledge that David Frost is a TV presenter is clearly semantic, but how so the information that his middle name is Paradine? I would make a strong claim that the latter 'name detail' is in fact

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more like semantic information than name information. So what exactly is the difference? It would be hard to believe that, if we had a fair way of testing this state of affairs, the more obscure fact would not take longer to access than the name ’David Frost’. The Burton and Bruce (1991) model would accommodate this easily. This type of phenomenon is also in keeping with Cohen’s (1990) findings that some semantic information was harder to learn than some name information. This was especially the case if the semantic information was largely arbitrary or ‘meaningless’ (e.g. the person was the owner of a ’blick’, or was a ’ryman’ by occupation). It may also be able to explain the few exceptions found by McWeeny, Young, Hay and Ellis (1987). They asked subjects to learn fictitious surnames and occupations to a set of unfamiliar faces. Generally their results favoured the preferential access of occupations over surnames, but there were some occasions when the surname was remembered when the occupation details were not. We need merely appeal to idiosyncrasies within peoples’ cognitive systems for particular names to account for these few unpredicted cases. Individual subjects may have more associations for some names, they may be acquainted with whole families of people with the same name. In addition it can also cope with findings that show semantic information other than occupation details can be accessed more easily than names (Johnston & Bruce, 1990; Flude, Ellis & Kay, 1989). I think we are all making very much the same point here, but the importance of the Burton and Bruce contribution is that it presents an explanation for why this occurs. These connectionist models represent the continuing advancement of work in this area, but they are not the complete story. They are wholly localised models with little to say about how the representations they utilize are formed. These programs are also incapable of learning and so are effectively ’snapshot’ models of adult cognition. Future modelling will need to attend to both these issues of representation and learning if it is to advance. At present weights and variables within the simulations are hand-crafted, but in time it is reasonable to expect models which determine their own system parameters on the basis of the ’faces’ they have been exposed to. A concern common to many cognitive psychologists must be the strength of their conviction that their research is more than merely a set of ingenious experiments. The work which Andy Young has presented here provides a firm bulwark to that belief. We see a cohesive framework for a multidisciplinary

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approach where cognitive research from both inside and outside of the laboratory plays a pivotal role. In addition to this we see it applied to an activity with an undeniable relevance to everyday life. Cognitive psychology is used not only to provide a central theory, but also to suggest suitable directions for focussing research in other areas, whether that is neurology, computerized recognition, or forensic science.

References Bahrick, H.P. (1984). Memory for people. In J.E. Harris & P.E. Morris (Eds.), Everyday memory. actions and absentmindedness (pp. 19-34). London: Academic Press. Bahrick, H.P., Bahrick, P.O., & Wittlinger, R.P. (1975). Fifty years of memory for names and faces: A cross-sectional approach. Journal of Experimental Psychologv: General, 104,54-75. Bruce, V. (1 979). Searching for politicians: an information-processing approach to face recognition. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psycholoev, 31, 373-395. Bruce, V., Burton, A.M., & Craw, I. (1992). Modelling face recognition. PhilosoDhical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B335, 121-128. Bruce, V. & Young, A.W. (1986). Understanding Face Recognition. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 305-327. Burton, A.M., & Bruce, V. (1991). I recognise your face but I can’t remember your name: A simple explanation? British Journal of Psychology, 83, 45-60. Burton, A.M., Bruce, V., & Johnston, R.A. (1990). Understanding face recognition with an interactive activation model. British Journal of Psychology, 8l, 361-380. Burton, A.M., Young, A.W., Bruce, V., Johnston, R.A., & Ellis, A.W. (1991). Understanding covert recognition. Cognition, 39, 129-166. Churchland, P.M. (1988). Matter and Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

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Cohen, G. (1990). Why is it so difficult to put names to faces? British Journal of Psychologv, 8 l , 287-297. Cohen, G., & Faulkner, D. (1986). Memory for proper names: Age differences in retrieval. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 187-197. Ellis, H.D. (1975). Recognizing faces. British Journal of Psychology, 66, 409-426. Flude, B.M., Ellis, A.W., & Kay, J. (1989). Face processing and name retrieval in an anomic aphasic: Names are stored separately from semantic information about familiar people. Brain and Cognition, 11, 60-72. Hay, D.C. & Young, A.W. (1982). The human face. In A.W. Ellis (Ed.), Normalitv and Dathologv in cognitive functions. London: Academic Press. Johnston, R.A., & Bruce, V. (1990). Lost Properties? Retrieval differences between name and semantic codes for familiar people. Psychological Research, 52, 62-67. McWeeny, K.H., Young, A.W., Hay, D.C., & Ellis, A.W. (1987). Putting names to faces. British Journal of Psychology, 78, 143-149. Searle, J. (1984). Minds. brains and science: The 1984 Reith lectures. London: British Broadcasting Corporation. Young, A.W., Hay, D.C., & Ellis, A.W. (1985). The faces that launched a thousand slips: Everyday difficulties and errors in recognizing people. British Journal of Psychology, 76, 495-523.

Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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Graham Davies University of Leicester, United Kingdom On May 20, 1979, the body of Helen Smith, a 23 year old nurse was found outside an apartment block in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Helen’s body lay beside that of Johannes Otten, a Dutch employee of a diving company. Although Otten’s body showed every sign of having fallen from a considerable height - his body was impaled on the railings surrounding the flats - that of Helen Smith showed no such signs. The bodies had been discovered in the early morning by Dr Richard Arnott and his wife who lived on the sixth floor of the apartment building and who had hosted a party the previous night at which both Helen and Mr Otten had been guests. Police investigations centred around the theory that both victims might have fallen from the balcony of the flat at the height of the party. Yet no one had seen them fall and the other guests - who included a group of 5 German divers who had left when the party was breaking up around 3.00 in the morning - had noted nothing suspicious. Helen’s father, Ron Smith, flew to Jeddah to investigate his daughter’s death and became increasingly dissatisfied with the ’accidental fall’ theory. Post mortem examination revealed not only were there few marks on Helen’s body consistent with a fall from a height but also there were other signs suggesting she might have been beaten and raped prior to her death. From this point, Ron Smith fought a hard and persistent battle to have his daughter’s death properly investigated. Over the next three years, witnesses from the party were traced and interviewed and the Arnott’s and their friends made repeated statements concerning events at the party. The statements attributed to the guests were inconsistent on the most fundamental details: the number of guests present, the time at which the main participants left, whether the party was quiet or a wild affair, or the position of the bodies on the following morning. Ron Smith persisted in the face of what he claimed was a

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Government inspired cover up designed to protect UK-Saudi relations. Eventually Mr Smith’s relentless campaign succeeded and a full inquest into Helen’s death was convened in November 1982. Once again, the inconsistencies in the witness’ statements were paraded in public. Once again Dr Arnott denied all knowledge of Helen Smith’s death. The Coroner, sweeping aside the pathological evidence summed up for an accidental death. The jury mindful of the conflicts and contradictions in the statements of the witnesses which had grown with the passing of years, returned an Open Verdict: death due to unknown cause (Foot, 1983). The precise circumstances under which Helen Smith and Johannes Otten met their deaths remain a mystery. What is less in dispute is that this case is one more memorial to the vagueries of eyewitness testimony. Not only were the statements made by what was a large group of participants incomplete and frequently contradictory, they also changed somewhat over time. The fragmentary and shifting nature of human memory is well known to all those who must interview witnesses to crime in an attempt to gather precise information about past events. It is an issue, however, not only for police officers but also doctors seeking information about their patient’s medical histories, journalists and historians writing of stirring events and investigators charged with understanding accidents. All must try to piece together a plausible account on the basis of the objective evidence on the one hand and the human statements on the other. Sometimes, as in the Helen Smith enquiry, the two cannot be reconciled. All such investigators, however, faced daily with the fallibility of human memory, look to psychology to understand its mechanisms and consequences. In this chapter I begin by examining some alternative theories of the processes underlying event memory. I then go on to survey what is known about eyewitness memory as demonstrated by research studies, and discuss techniques for eliciting full and accurate recall. Finally, I return to the theories of event recall and consider how well they fit the facts of eyewitness memory for events.

Theoretical underpinning In this section I describe three representative theories of remembering which have strongly influenced contemporary debate over the processes of witness

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recall. Schema-based theories of the kind originated by Bartlett (1932) view memory as an essentially abstractive and constructive process. Morton’s ’headed-records’ approach (Morton, Hammersley & Bekerian, 1988) and the multiple entry modular theory (Johnson, 1983) on the other hand see all errors as failures of memory retrieval. The followers of Bartlett tend to emphasise that error and confabulation are the inevitable product of the mechanisms of recall while Morton and Johnson believe that all individual memories can in principle be retrieved given appropriate circumstance.

Schema-based Approaches The origins of schema theory are well known. Through his research on the recall of stories and other narrative material, Bartlett (1932) came to the conclusion that repeated attempts at recall involved not access to ’fixed lifeless traces’ (Bartlett, p.213) as he termed the then pervading view of memory, but rather reference to an abstract representation of the event he termed a ’schema’. Such abstract representations were built up through experience of similar material (so his subjects would have an expectation of the main constituants of a fairy story through reading many fairy stories). They served a dual function of both mediating comprehension of the material and serving as a vehicle for later recall. Errors in report would reflect the operation of schema-based processes. First, material which was incompatible with the schema aroused would simply not be assimilated into memory. Thus, in his best known example, Cambridge students recalling the American Indian folk tale ’the War of the Ghosts’ omitted or distorted large parts of the narrative because of their unfamiliarity with the conventions and symbolism of North American Indian culture. A second source of loss, according to Bartlett occurred at the time of recall where observers recalling the target passage did not access a specific memory of the event but rather an amalgam of that event and all other elements associated with experiences of that kind: the total schema rather than the individual trace guided recall. Hence, the view of Bartlett that remembering involves not passive reproduction but active reconstrvction based on the totality of information available to the observer. Bartlett’s views made little impact in North America in his lifetime, perhaps because of the frailty of the empirical base of his theory, which drew only on commentaries on individual subject protocols. Bartlett’s views were

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also challenged in the United Kingdom by critics who disliked the vagueness of the ’schema’ conception (Zangwill, 1972). Others pointed to the hidden assumption that the narratives that subjects wrote at recall necessarily represented the state of the underlying memory (Gomulicki; 1956; Kay, 1953). Subjects could produce more accurate accounts of experiences if the method of testing memory was changed (Zangwill, 1939) or the instructions given to the subject were altered (Gauld & Stephenson, 1969). However, the Cognitive revolution in psychology ushered in by Neisser (1967) laid great emphasis upon constructionist ideas and claimed Bartlett as its founding father. Schemata, which has undergone considerable conceptual refinement in the hands of Minsky (1975) and Schank (Schank & Abelson, 1980) were once again the subject of serious experimental research. Much of this research concentrated not on event recall but rather the more Bartlettian alternative of prose passages. Throughout the 1970’s studies appeared which provided concrete empirical back-up for the dynamic processes of abstraction assimilation and construction which had been posited by Bartlett (see Bransford, 1979 for a useful review). One example must suffice for the flavour of such research. Pitchert and Anderson (1977) had subjects read a prose passage about a house either from the perspective of a burglar or a prospective buyer. Recall of the passage by the two groups showed marked differences in emphasis and omission consistent with the persona adopted. Just as it seemed schema theory was poised to sweep all before it, evidence began to emerge which was more consistent with a trace dependent view of memory. First, there was the demonstration that subjects were capable of literal memory, for the words or phrases spoken by a lecturer (Kintsch & Bates, 1977) or the oath of allegiance sworn at school many years previously (Rubin, 1977). Second, there was the belated rediscovery of the truism uncovered by British researchers of the Bartlett era that a proclaimed inability to recall further did not preclude a continuing record of events. Thus, Anderson and Pitchert (1978) replicated their original perspective-taking study but after subjects had exhaustively recalled, they now offered them the alternative perspective. Under these circumstances, further information from the original passage was recovered. This and many other studies suggesting that subjects could retain low level detail which might be tapped under appropriate circumstances was brought

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together in a seminal review by Alba and Hasher (1983) entitled 'Is Memory Schematic?', On the basis of the existing evidence, the authors concluded that "memory for complex events is far more detailed than schematic processes would allow" (p.225). As a result of such findings, researchers have increasingly been driven to produce alternative conceptions of memory which, while acknowledging our very human ability to omit and confabulate, allow for the potential of more literal recall.

A multiple-entry modular memory system The multiple-entry modular memory system was developed by Johnson (1983). It arose from her work on 'reality monitoring': examining the ability of individuals to distinguish between what they have actually experienced and what they had been told or merely thought about themselves (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Johnson was able to demonstrate that confusions between such different sources of information readily did occur for both adults (Johnson, Raye, Wang, & Taylor, 1979) and children (Johnson & Foley, 1984), under laboratory conditions. Johnson (1983) hypothesised that subjects made decisions as to the source of memories on the basis of the characteristics associated with the memory record. Thus, subject-generated memories would tend to be abstract and lacking in specific detail while externally generated information would contain sensory and perceptual detail often irrelevant to the core 'meaning' of the event. On the basis of these findings, Johnson proposed that memory might consist of three modular sub-systems, each charged with registering, storing and reviving events. The first two systems, the Sensory and Perceptual, deal with externally generated experiences, while the third, the Reflective, deals with internally generated thoughts and inferences. Events in the external world are likely to harness all three systems leading to independent and different representations of the experience. As an example, Johnson cites a person reading a story. According to her model, sensory entries arise from the discrimination of individual word configurations and the scanning operations involved while perceptual entries are represented by the words themselves and their pattern on the page. Finally, Reflective entries might include imagery aroused by the text, reflections and other embellishments to the base meaning of the story. Tests for memory in the various domains require different

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techniques. The sensory entries might be reflected in lowered thresholds for words included in the story, while the perceptual entries might be discriminated by good verbatim recognition for isolated passages taken from the text. Finally, retention of these lower level records would not preclude errors being committed due to confusions between what the story actually said and inferences and elaborations made by the reader. Notice two features of Johnson’s model which distinguish it from the schematic approach of Bartlett and his successors. First, all records at the three levels are retained indefinitely and can in principle be accessed given an appropriate test. Second, constructionist errors can and will occur but are entirely a function of subject-generated inferences which are themselves separate memory records. Thus, there is no assimilation of records into a composite representation and each act of inference creates its own separate and identifiable record. What of the abstractive nature of memory? Johnson argues that memory retrieval is inevitably selective, not because information once stored is not available, but because only a portion of the memory system can be activated at any one time. Moreover, records of the same or similar events can serve to inhibit or blur retrieval of a relevant record within a sub-system. Forgetting is always due either to a failure to retrieve a record or to the retrieval of an inappropriate record (in the example above, confusing an inference with a veridical perceptual or sensory entry). Moreover, forgetting can occur at a number of levels; broad and general where an entire episode or system of knowledge is lost or narrow and specific when particular details are not recorded due to inhibition of other related records, which are then given priority for recall. In this way, Johnson seeks to account for the seemingly paradoxical features of event memory: the accurate recall of specific detail which may be accompanied by gross errors concerning actions and purposes. Thus, Johnson’s theory can accommodate a range of phenomena in event memory and memory research in general. However, its very comprehensiveness betrays a certain vagueness and ambiguity, such as where the various processing domains Nevertheless, Johnson’s framework provides a useful and begin or end. powerful alternative to the schematic approach when fundamental questions are asked about witness memory.

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A 'Headed-Record' Theory Like Johnson, Morton et al(l983) argue that all memory events, whether externally or internally generated, leave records and these records are immutable and in principle accessible. Access to a record is achieved not directly but indirectly via its 'heading' or tag. Two features of the 'heading' make Morton's system different from earlier tag theorists. First, the information defining the heading is not accessible to conscious awareness, only the memory itself can be directly retrieved. Second, there can be a mismatch between the content of the memory and the description on the tag. The proposal of a potential mismatch allows Morton to explain some features of event memory which would otherwise be difficult to explain by schema theory. As an example, he instances the inability to recall a person's name, even though other autobiographical information is available, such as their profession, where they work and so on. Schema theory, so Morton et al. argue, should assume that the name would lie at the very centre of any schema formed around the individual concerned. According to Headed Records, the name forms part of the heading rather than the record. As a match between the information in a heading and that forming the search parameters does not have to be perfect, access is gained to the autobiographical information while the name remains unobtainable. What happens if, later on, the name is recalled? Here, the theory draws upon the assumption of multiple records. Searching memory, argue Morton et al., involves a recursive process where the search parameters are continuously changed and refined on the basis of information retrieved from previous searches. Finding the name involves recovering a different record with a somewhat different heading which nevertheless contains the vital information (note the assumption that the same information may be represented more than once in memory). What kind of information forms the headings of our memory records? Morton et al. suggest "each heading is made up of a mixture of content in more or less literal form and context, the latter including specification of environment and of internal states (including drug states and mood)" (Morton et al., p.1). Thus like Johnson, there is great emphasis upon the role of context reinstatement as a facilitator of memory (Davies & Thomson, 1988). For instance, infantile amnesia, the failure of adults to recall childhood experiences, is attributed to the inability under normal circumstances to formulate appropriate

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search parameters. Only if the material has been periodically retrieved in the interval and new records created are such early memories likely to be recovered. Where multiple records of the same event exist with similar headings, Morton shares the assumption with Johnson that the most recent record is the one which enjoys priority of access (Morton, 1990).

Conclusions Schema theory, Multiple Entry Memory and Headed Records represent three perspectives on the memory process. All make many theoretical assumptions and their parameters are sometimes incompletely specified. Nevertheless they are important and useful in providing ways of looking at the memory process and at what occurs when it breaks down. They are also capable of generating rival expectations as to the outcome of experiments on eyewitness memory. My intention in introducing them at this stage is largely illustrative as a theoretical backdrop to the empirical findings. While many studies of eyewitness recall have been theoretical and problem oriented in nature, others have been framed explicitly or implicitly within one or other theoretical framework. I shall return at a later stage to consider how well the facts revealed by research on eyewitness recall complement the three representative viewpoints sketched in this section.

Factors influencing eyewitness memory Information on eyewitness memory can be gleaned from a variety of sources. These include (i) orthodox laboratory experiments (ii) more problemoriented studies which aim to simulate real life events and (iii) studies of actual crimes and eyewitness reports. As will be shown, no one approach enjoys a monopoly of virtue: ecological validity has often been bought at the expense of precision in the control of variables (Davies, in press). This review follows the conventional tripartite division of memory into encoding, storage and retrieval processes, though it is readily acknowledged that some effects cannot be unequivocally attributed to one particular phase or stage of the memory process (Deffenbacher, 1991).

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Encoding phase Research suggests that the circumstances of the event may influence how well it is recalled though these effects are modulated by the nature of the observer and it is the interaction between observer and event which most determines quality of recall. Most people will be aware that the physical characteristics of an event will influence subsequent recall. Since 1976, Judges in the United Kingdom are mandated in their summing up to the jury in cases involving identification to mention such factors as duration of observation, lighting conditions and distance of the observer from the suspect, all of which have demonstrable influences on quality of memory (see Deffenbacher, 1991 for a recent review). Witnesses, however, typically do not take sufficient account of such factors in calibrating their own memories. Yarmey (1986) asked students to observe a simulated assault and rape which was depicted in a series of slides. Four different sets of slides were employed, each under different lighting conditions. Predictably, performance was best under daylight or early evening lighting. However, under night time conditions, where witnesses recalled less than 1 % of suspect characteristics accurately, they nonetheless claimed their memories were 65 % complete and 74% accurate! Similar errors occur in estimates of time. Loftus, Schooler, Boone and Kline (1987) showed a tape of a simulated bank robbery lasting 30 seconds to students who were subsequently asked to estimate its duration. Subjects over-estimated the duration by a factor of five, an effect which was greater in females than in males and in violent as opposed to nonviolent versions of the film. Surprisingly, British judges are not mandated to refer to the state of the witness at the time of the event. As in the Helen Smith affair, many witnesses to crucial events will be under the influence of drink or drugs. Yet, surprisingly few studies have explored their influence in any systematic way. Yuille and Tollestrup (1990) had subjects ingest mild amounts of alcohol before witnessing a simulated robbery. Relative to sober controls, the alcohol group were able to recall fewer details about the incident, both when tested immediately and one week after the event. In many criminal incidents witnesses will be under stress or even in fear of their lives. Ethical considerations place constraints upon the levels of stress which can be inflicted upon subjects in an experiment. When Deffenbacher

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(1983) reviewed 21 such studies, he found that in 11 stress resulted in a decrease in accuracy, while in a further 10, stress either increased accuracy or had no effect. Deffenbacher proposed that an inverted U function might relate stress to accuracy of report with the highest accuracy at moderate levels of arousal. However, the stress levels achievable in experiments are never very high and given the absence of any agreed metric for measuring arousal, Deffenbacher’s theory is inevitably speculative, More recent research has utilised naturally occurring stressful incidents to explore the impact of higher levels of arousal than are possible in conventional experiments. Peters (1988), for instance, measured heart rate before and after adults received a series of inoculations at a health clinic. Memory for the nurse who administered the shots was significantly worse than for a researcher who interviewed the patient immediately afterward. Moreover, the 20 least physiologically reactive patients (as attested by heart rate) were consistently better at identifying the nurse than were the 20 most affected. Much higher levels of stress were explored by Christianson and Hubinette (in press) who investigated the memories of bank tellers and customers who had been witnesses to armed robbery. Contrary to many findings in the literature, these researchers reported high levels of accuracy among witnesses for the details of hold ups when compared to contemporanious police records. Moreover the accuracy of the bank tellers who confronted the gunmen was higher than those for the bank customers. However, Christianson and Hubinette’s data may say more about the way in which vivid events tend to be retained over time than the quality of initial encoding (see Christianson & Loftus, 1987). Moreover, the finding that bystanders have poorer memories of events than participants holds for innocuous as well as traumatic events (Yuille, Davies & Gibling, 1992). ’Weapon focus’, the tendency of victims of hold-ups to report details of the weapon used to the detriment of descriptive information about the robber is an example of the way that patterns of attention influence event memory. Loftus, Loftus, and Messo (1987) monitored the eye movement of observers watching a slide sequence showing a customer approaching a cashier at a fastfood counter. Subsequently, the customer produced either a cheque book or a gun. Those subjects who saw the slide depicting the gun spent longer looking at this portion of the picture than did subjects who saw the cheque book slide and were poorer at identifying the customer in a recognition test. Later

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research suggests that the mere presence of a threatening object in the observer’s view is sufficient to produce the effect, even when there is no direct threat (Maass & Kohnken, 1989). As might be expected from schema theory, patterns of attention can be influenced by interests and training. Thus, police officers are generally no better than the general public at eyewitness memory tasks (Clifford, 1976) but do show better recall for vehicle licence plates (Yuille, 1984). Likewise, men and women show little difference in their overall levels of recall in memory tasks but tend to focus on different aspects of an event. Thus, when shown a sequence of slides depicting a purse snatching, men outperformed women in recall of details of the thief whereas the women were superior in their recall of the female victim’s clothing (Power, Andriks & Loftus, 1979). Finally, a comparison of a group of professional thieves with law-abiding controls showed that the thieves were more likely to notice and remember the presence of security precautions on pictures of houses than were members of the general public (Logie, Wright & Decker, 1992). Interest invariably overlaps with knowledge which has been shown to have a powerful influence on event memory. Baseball affectionados recalled far more from a commentary on a baseball game than those with a passing interest. Analysis demonstrated that while the groups did not differ in their knowledge of the final score, the experts recalled far more of the detailed play (Spillich & Voss, 1979). Likewise, British soccer fans were much superior to uninterested controls in recalling a list of league results. Interestingly, a strong effect occurred only for actual results; randomly generated scores produced little difference between the two groups (Morris, Tweedy & Gruneberg, 1985). Differences in knowledge are one explanation for differences in recall due to age; youngsters know less, and consequently remember fewer details compared to adults (see Baker-Ward, Ornstein & Gordon; Morton, this volume). Interest and knowledge, however, are not the inevitable corollary of accuracy, especially when partisanship is involved. Boon (1988) obtained a film of a controversial soccer match between England and Scotland, focusing on 25 (!) incidents when players from the two sides clashed and were penalised. When the film was shown to Scottish supporters in Aberdeen, subjects judged English players responsible for 57% of the infringements and Scotland for 10%. When the film was shown to English public schoolboys in London, the position reversed: 10% were judged the fault of English players and 61% due to the

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Scots! Another form of partisanship is stereotyping, expectation based not on real knowledge but on prejudiced attitudes. One study frequently sited as an example of this process is the Allport and Postman (1947) rumour experiment. According to popular mythology, observers who viewed a picture of an altercation between a black man and a white on a subway falsely reported that a razor was being held by the blackman. However, this conclusion was based on a misreading of the original study which was then repeated verbatim by subsequent authors (Treadway & McCloskey, 1987). Actual attempts to show such gross transfer effects have proved fruitless (Boon & Davies, 1987; Treadway & McClosky, 1988). More subtle stereotyping effects have been demonstrated. Boon and Davies (1988) found evidence of stereotypical attitudes toward pickets and police officers at the height of the British Miner’s strike while Diges (1988) found that reports of actual road traffic accidents were coloured by the stereotypical attitudes of those involved toward female and aging drivers.

Retention over time It is a truism that memory deteriorates over time, though the rate of loss and whether all experiences are lost at the same rate are matters of continuing controversy. As regard the rate of loss, the classic studies of Ebbinghaus (198511964) might suggest rapid initial loss followed by a more gentle decline: the J shaped curve. However, Ebbinghaus’ data are fatally contaminated by his use of multiple lists, all learned and recalled after varying intervals by himself, a procedure which produces massive pro-active interference (Underwood, 1960). A better guide perhaps are the results from those researchers who have noted down personal experiences from their own lives which they have later attempted to recall after varying intervals (Linton, 1975; Wagennaar, 1986). These studies suggest a more uniform rate of decline which varies as a function of the distinctiveness and emotional tone of the event concerned. Thus, Linton played many games of racquet ball, most of which were rapidly forgotten with the exception of one where she accidentally hit her partner who had to be taken to hospital! Singular events which evoke powerful emotions have been termed ’Flashbulb memories’ (Brown & Kulik, 1977). While no one doubts their

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personal significance to the individual, much debate continues as to their inevitable accuracy of report. Certainly, the degree of affect associated with an event is not in itself a guarantee of veridical recall, as is demonstrated by the memories of concentration camp survivors. Dutch survivors of the notorious Camp Erika were interviewed 27 years after the event by Wagenaar and Groeneveg (1990). While 94% could remember the name of their chief persecutor, De Ryke, 27% could not recognise him from a contemporanious picture, a figure which nearly doubled among those who had not watched a documentary on the camp in the interim. Such findings are of obvious relevance to the trial of John Demjanjuk, identified by survivors over 30 years later as the infamous 'Ivan the Terrible' of the Treblinka death camp (Wagenaar, 1988). Thus, all memories it seems, become less available to us over time with the most mundane and trivial suffering more than the affect-laden and unique. However, as McGeoch (1932) first emphasised, not only time but what occurs during that time can accelerate memory loss. In the Helen Smith affair, witnesses at the inquest were not only testifying about distant events, they had also read about the event in newspapers and talked to fellow witnesses. The work of Loftus has played a major role in furthering our understanding of how such post event information can serve to distort our original memories (see Fruzzetti, Toland, Teller & Loftus, 1992, for a recent review). Loftus was responsible for two classic experiments which have set the stage for much subsequent debate. In the first (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), subjects viewed a brief film of a road traffic accident before being asked a series of questions, including one on vehicle speed. For some subjects the question referred to cars which 'smashed' into each other while for others the question mentioned cars which 'hit' each other. When subjects returned a week later to the laboratory they were asked more questions including one which asked whether there was broken glass at the locus of the accident. Some 32% of subjects who had the 'smashed' question answered positively compared to only 16% who had the 'hit' version. Following schema theory, Loftus argued that when experimental subjects searched their memory for details of the accident they recalled not merely their original memory, but also the information they subsequently acquired regarding the severity of the accident. At recall, they drew upon the totality of information they had learned about the accident, including the severity implied by the verb 'smashed', and so were

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prepared to agree that broken glass must have been present at such a major collision. The Loftus and Palmer study served as a powerful catalyst for research on the misleading question effect. Doubts have been raised over the generality of its findings (Reid & Bruce, 1984), though other research has found parallel phenomena, as for instance in the way that face memory may be contaminated by misleading detail from verbal descriptions (Loftus & Greene, 1980) or composite pictures (Jenkins & Davies, 1985). However, much greater research activity has been provoked by a second classic study by Loftus: the ’Stop/Yield sign’ study. Loftus, Miller and Burns (1978) again showed subjects a road traffic accident, this time depicted in a series of slides. The critical slide showed a vehicle emerging into a main road marked for some subjects by a stop sign, but for others by a yield (give way) sign. In subsequent questions reference was made to the sign either consistent with the previously seen slide or inconsistent (e.g. the question referred to a stop sign when the subject had in fact seen a yield sign). After completing the questionnaire, subjects took part in a twoalternative forced- choice recognition test to select the original slides, including the critical stop/yield pair. When slide and question information had been consistent, 75% of subjects selected the original slide, but this figure was reduced to 41% for those fed the misleading information. Loftus et a1 also manipulated the delay between study and questionnaire and found the effect was maximised when a long delay (1 week) was combined with completing the questionnaire immediately prior to test. Loftus et a1 interpreted their findings in terms of memory integration: the new information in the question overwrites any pre-existing information, affecting a permanent alteration to the existing memory record. The process is accelerated when the original record is weakened by time prior to the arrival of the incorrect information. Subsequent research suggested, however, that the effects observed by Loftus might not be explained in such a straightforward manner. The effects were by no means automatic: they were more readily achieved on subsidiary detail than central features of events (Loftus, 1979) and where the source of misinformation was perceived as reliable rather than dubious (Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980). Moreover, Loftus et al’s original study has become a focus for at least three rival interpretations of the effect which seek to undermine a schema-based explanation. One alternative offered by Bekerian and Bowers (1 983) is based upon the

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’Headed Records’ approach of Morton et al. If Morton’s approach is correct then the misleading information cannot have destroyed the original memory of the sign but must coexist with it and be in principle retrievable under appropriate circumstances. Bekerian and Bowers ascertained that Loftus et al had used a random sequence for their final forced-choice test. They hypothesised that such a procedure might prevent subjects gaining access to their original memories of the event and instead ensure that they relied upon their most recent - and misleading - information from the questionnaire as a guide to choice. Accordingly they replicated the original Stop/Yield sign study, but contrasted a random testing order with one which followed the sequence of events. True to the original result, some 40% of subjects in the random condition chose the incorrect sign, but only 13% chose it in the ordered condition, a figure no higher than for controls who were not exposed to the misleading information. The authors concluded that misleading information may override but not destroy an original memory record. This conclusion has in turn been challenged by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a, 1985b). They argued that the original findings of Loftus et al did not reflect any memory distortions but rather were a product of response bias compounded by an absence of encoding for the critical material. If only a minority of subjects noted the detail, then the remainder would be forced to guess. Guessing among experimental subjects would be heavily biased toward the erroneous slide by reason of the information recalled from the questionnaire. Control subjects on the other hand, would guess at random, ensuring a higher rate of correct choosing among the latter group. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) suggested that the way to test their hypothesis would be to eliminate the misleading slide from the array and replace it with a plausible foil (e.g. if the target item was a coke tin and the question referred to ’7 Up’, the test would be to discriminate the coke tin from a tin of ’Sunkist’). In this way, any response bias would be eliminated, but choice of the foil slide should still be much higher among misled subjects if the original memory has been significantly degraded. In a series of 6 studies, the authors were unable to find any difference between control and misled subjects in choice performance. The authors concluded that the original findings of Loftus et a1 were artifactual and of little relevance to memory theory. This view was disputed by Lindsay and Johnson (1989a) who placed the misleading question effect firmly within the domain of Memory Monitoring

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theory and its predictions. Like Bekerian and Bowers they rejected the view that earlier memories were overwritten and believed that incompatible information could coexist in memory. However, the reason why subjects chose the erroneous slide was because they failed to identify the source of the misleading information: they attributed what they had read to what they had seen. Support for this viewpoint is derived from studies which show that subjects are better able to discriminate objects they have seen in a picture as opposed to reading about in a subsequent caption if they are given instructions to assign items by source (picture/description) than simply asked whether they were in the picture (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a). Likewise the more similar the circumstances in which the original and misleading information are presented, the larger the misleading information effect observed (Bowman & Zaragoza, 1989, Lindsay, 1990). Memories are not replaced, they are simply confused (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989b). Rarely can two traffic signs have created such a massive gridlock in the literature! For her part, Loftus has continued to maintain that while other explanations may contribute to the mis-information effect, there is still good evidence that memory alteration occurs and is of practical significance (Loftus & Ketcham, 1991). She acknowledges that source confusions may accompany the misinformation effect but sees it as a symptom of forgetting rather than an independent phenomenon in its own right (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989). She also cites evidence that the qualitative features of memories based on misinformation differ from those of real events, a finding equally compatible with a memory monitoring or constructionist approach. She remains sceptical of the role of guessing in producing the effect, given that experimental subjects who chose the misleading slide do so faster and with more certainty than do controls (Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989). Loftus also allows that coexistence of traces of the kind proposed by Bekerian and Bowers may occur under certain circumstances, a view explicitly rejected by McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a). McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985a) claim to have been unable to replicate the Bekerian and Bowers result. Certainly, demonstrations of the recovery of unavailable information following context reinstatement, while not totally absent from the literature (e.g. Gibling & Davies, 1988), have not been routinely reported. Nor, on the other hand, has the McCloskey and Zaragoza paradigm invariably led to the finding of no effect on the choice of experimental subjects. At least one study with children has reported a decrease in the choice of the

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correct slide even in the absence of a foil depicting the misleading information (Ceci, Ross & Toglia, 1987). Research continues on the misleading question effect. In the meantime, there is every danger that the Loftus et a1 (1978) paradigm will achieve the status of one of Newell’s (1973) ’phenomena’: a readily demonstrable effect whose ramifications are increasingly studied in their own right rather than for the broader insights they offer for understanding the vagaries of event memory. A number of authors have drawn attention to the parallels between the theoretical mechanisms involved to explain the misinformation effect and those used in interference theory a generation ago: the Loftus position equates to the unlearning hypothesis, Headed Records to response competition and Memory Monitoring to the differentiation hypothesis (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989a). One of the lessons of that literature was that small changes in procedure produced effects which were not readily explainable by any one theory. The pattern of findings was in part determined by such factors as degree of learning of the original and misleadinghnterfering material and the temporal relationships between them. Another lesson (which presumably McCloskey and Zaragoza would endorse) was that some effects were closely tied to the use of particular experimental procedures and the use of ecologically relevant settings was essential for representative findings (Mandler, 1967). In this context it is notable that Yuille and Cutshall (1986) were unable to confuse actual witnesses to a violent crime through the misleading question procedure. One general conclusion, however, from research on the misinformation effect to date, is that the initial rather pessimistic view, that original memories were subject to inevitable contamination and distortion which in principle could not be rectified has not been borne out by subsequent research. In the next section, studies on methods for facilitating the recovery of such original memories are reviewed.

Retrieval Phase Police officers charged with interviewing witnesses are normally trained to divide their interview into two phases: an opportunity for spontaneous or free recall followed by direct questioning (Fisher, Geiselman & Amador, 1989). Free recall tends to be incomplete but generally accurate. Lipton (1977), for instance, showed student subjects a video of a simulated murder and found that

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they subsequently recalled 21 76 of the facts but were 91 % accurate in what they said. When, however, subjects were asked questions, more information was elicited - but accuracy was lowered. The more direct and specific the questions, the higher the price paid in error. Thus, open ended questions ('What was the man wearing?') recovered 32% of the facts, multiple choice questions ('Were his shoes black or brown?') yielded 75% with leading questions ('I suppose he would have been wearing brown shoes?') averaging 79%, but these were accompanied by accuracy rates of 83 % , 56% and 72 % ! respectively. Are professional questioners in the real world like police officers any better able to escape from this error-information trade-off! Dent (1978) staged an incident in a schoolroom and asked a range of interviewers to question the children to establish what had occurred. Police Officers as a group elicited the most information - but also accumulated the most errors and misunderstandings. Fisher, Geiselman and Amador (1988) studied the transcripts of street interviews with witnesses conducted by a group of Los Angeles police officers who averaged over 10 years experience on the job. Most followed the established pattern of asking for free recall but interruptions were frequent: the first interruption occurred on average 7.5 seconds into the interview and none of the Officers allowed a witness to complete a description of events uninterrupted! Given the high accuracy of such spontaneous statements, such a procedure can only be judged counterproductive. When questions were asked they tended to follow a rigid and inflexible order and only 1 in 9 was open ended. Given the paramountcy of accurate eyewitness accounts as a means of solving crime (Rand Corporation, 1975) and the impact of misleading questions on memory, effective questioning procedures are crucial. Much recent research has explored possible alternative methods of interviewing. Hypnosis. Does hypnosis offer a short cut to exhaustive and accurate recall? As a specialised technique for eliciting information, hypnosis has enjoyed something of a seesaw reputation in recent years. In 1974, Martin Reiser, Director of Behavioural Science Services for the Los Angeles Police Department initiated training for detectives in the use of hypnosis to recover witness memory. Reiser (1980) espoused what he termed the 'cybernetic theory' of memory, the view that all experiences are stored and in principle recoverable, given appropriate circumstances, a view much closer to that of Morton than to the schematic approach of Loftus. Reiser's training emphasised

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the role of relaxation and visualisation (witnesses were encouraged to imagine the critical events occurring on their home television set) together with strong suggestions that they could and should recall all the events they had seen. Interviewers also employed contextual reinstatement: urging witnesses to mentally place themselves back into the setting where the events occurred. Hypnotic interviews were conducted with witnesses only when orthodox interviewing failed to elicit the necessary information. A survey conducted one year after the start of the new training claimed that, in the 600 serious cases in which it had been employed, detectives had elicited new information in some 75% of cases and that when the new facts could be checked (around half fell into this category), the accuracy was over 90%. Further, it was claimed that at least 16% of.these cases had been solved entirely as a result of the new information elicited by the technique (Reiser, 1989). The apparent success of Reiser’s methods led to hypnosis being taken up by other police forces, notably Israel (Kleinhauz, Horowitz & Tobin, 1977) and Canada (Yuille & Kim, 1987). Why then today have the three major organisations for professional hypnosis condemned its use by police officers and Reiser’s home state of California effectively prohibited witnesses who have been hypnotised from taking the stand (People vs Shirley, 1982)? The answer lies chiefly in concerns over the possibility of the contamination of witness memory under hypnotic conditions and the results of the naive application of the ’cybernetic theory’ of memory. The work of Loftus has demonstrated how potentially malleable details of human memory can become under conventional questioning. Ome (Ome, Soskis, Dinges & Orne, 1984) has emphasised the heightened suggestibility of subjects when questioned under hypnotic instructions and the difficulties that they experience in distinguishing real memories from suggestions made by the hypnotist or the products of their own imagination. A number of experimental studies suggest witnesses may be more vulnerable to post event misinformation effects (Putnam, 1979; Zelig & Beidleman, 1981) or display greater confidence in erroneous information (Sheehan & Tilden, 1983) than conventionally interviewed subjects. A striking example of the investment of great confidence in a non-existent memory was the case of People vs Kempinsky (1980), where detectives seeking evidence on a fatal stabbing incident interviewed the driver of a vehicle who had been situated some 250 feet from the crime. The motorist was unable to provide any useful detail under conventional questioning. However, when

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hypnotised and assured that he would be able to see the assailant in great detail, he identified the man as an old school friend who he subsequently selected from mugshots. No other evidence as to his guilt was forthcoming but nonetheless the man was arrested and tried for murder. At trial the defense called an optometrist who demonstrated that with the distance involved and prevailing lighting conditions, identification would have been difficult if not impossible at 30 feet, let alone 250! Clearly, here a naive understanding of memory had combined with the dynamics of the hypnotic interview to produce a potentially fatal miscarriage of justice. As a result of several such cases, many countries including Britain and the United States limit hypnosis to a method of last resort to be used only by qualified medical personnel and with the total interview recorded on videotape (Orne et al, 1984; Reiser, 1989). Meanwhile considerable research has been undertaken as to whether certain features of the hypnotic interview might profitably be introduced to conventional interviewing to assist witness recall. The cognitive interview. Like Reiser’s hypnotic interview, the cognitive interview seeks to derive an effective questioning procedure from theories of memory. In its original form (Geiselman, Fisher, Firstenberg, Hutton, Sullivan, Aretissian & Prosk, 1984), the cognitive interview attempted to exploit four principles derived from memory research and theory. The first of these, the reinstatement of context will be familiar from the hypnotic interview. The idea that reinstating the conditions under which events were encoded ensures maximal recall is a principal emphasised by a number of memory theories including those of Morton et al. and Johnson (see Davies & Thomson, 1988 for a detailed review). The second elements is an injunction to report everything no matter how trivial. Here the hope is that recall of trivial detail may spark the recall of more significant information (Geiselman & Fisher, 1989). Though not explicitly stated, this principle seems readily relatable to Morton’s model where information in a heading can be tangential to information in the memory record and multiple records of events may exist (Morton et a]., p.4). The third component to recall events in a different order is also compatible with Headed Records in that different descriptions may elicit different sets of information about the same event. Finally, the fourth instruction is to change perspective. Geiselman et al. (1 984) relate this explicitly to the previously mentioned study of Anderson and

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Pitchert, who demonstrated that changing mental perspective during recall significantly increased the information retrieved. An early study (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon & Holland, 1985) compared the effectiveness of the cognitive interview relative to (i) a hypnotic interview conducted in the manner recommended by Orne et al. (1984) and (ii) what they termed ’a standard police interview’. The latter consisted of the normal request for free recall followed by specific questions. The witnesses, who were students, watched an FBI training film depicting an armed robbery, prior to being interviewed by professionals, all of whom had detective experience. Relative to the standard interview, both the cognitive interview and the hypnotic interview elicited about 35% more information with no statistical difference between the latter. Moreover, the increased information was not accompanied by any increase in error and confabulation, a finding which has proved typical of cognitive interview research (Bekerian & Dennett, in press). The promise of this study that the cognitive interview might offer improvements in witness recall without the negative side effects associated with hypnosis has generally been supported by subsequent research. The facilitation effects associated with the cognitive interview apply to non-student as well as student populations (Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon & Holland, 1986) and to live as well as televised incidents (Geiselman, Fisher, Cohen, Surtes, & Holland, 1986). The latter study also explored the impact of leading questions on the cognitive interview. Following Headed Records theory, Geiselman et al argued that the impact of misleading questions might be reduced in the cognitive interview in that instructions to reinstate context might facilitate witness’ ability to retrieve the original memory record rather than the misleading information embodied in the subsequent questions. Consistent with the theory, cognitive interview instructions did reduce the impact of the misinformation, though the effect of the latter was still strong: 60% of the cognitive interview group compared to 49% of control opted for the misleading alternative. Geiselman and Fisher, the main proponents of the cognitive interview have gone on to develop the interview in an effort to increase its power. Particular tips on how to remember such specifics as people’s names (’search through the alphabet’) or licence plates (’were the numbers high or low? How many digitslletters?’) were added (see MacKinnon, O’Reilly & Geiselman, 1990). However, the major change occurred in 1987 following a prolonged

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period of training and observation with working police officers (Geiselman & Fisher, 1989). The Revised cognitive interview retained context reinstatement and reporting everything but downgraded changed perspective and different ordered report in favour of a general emphasis upon the use of repeated recall. In addition there was a also a new stress upon listening skills: Interviewers should adapt their pace and style of questioning to the perceived needs of the witness and the order of their recall process. When Fisher, Geiselman, Raymond, Jerkevich, and Warhaftig (1987) compared the original with the revised version of the cognitive interview, they reported a 45% increase in the effectiveness of the new version, again with no concomitant rise in error rate. A group of 7 experienced detectives trained in the use of the revised version and sent out to conduct interviews with actual victims of crime on the streets of Miami were able to elicit 47% more useful information than they had done previously. The cognitive interview is one of the best examples of the transfer of the principles derived from laboratory research to practical interviewing problems. Its use has been taken up not only in the United States but also in Germany and the United Kingdom (Bekerian & Dennett, in press). It is worthy of note that this extension to practical use has been achieved at some sacrifice of theoretical principle in favour of mundane practicalities, such as listening skills. Indeed, there is a cynical school of thought which argues the success of the revised interview is more a reflection of the poverty of general police training than the psychological principles which gave rise to it! Certainly, the further the Cognitive Interview strays from its conceptual roots, as in the recent development of a juvenile version (Saywitz, Geiselman & Bornstein, in press), the more it resembles a general training in best practice for interviewing than a specific extension of memory theory. The supply of mnemonic principles proven in the laboratory has been by no means exhausted by the cognitive interview. This is confirmed by the recent 'Memorandum of Good Practice' (Home Office, 1992) prepared as a guide for child witness interviews by police officers and based on an extensive search of both the child development and memory literatures and the practical tips of experienced interviewers (Bull, 1992). In interviewing, as in other aspects of eyewitness memory, theory is often very imperfectly interlinked with research findings. In the final section of this chapter, I return to theories of event

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memory sketched at the outset and examine their relationship to factors known to influence eyewitness recall.

Putting theory into practice How do theories of event memory map onto the findings of eyewitness research? Broadly, schema-based theories espouse the negative view of memory: it is subject to assimilation and distortion over time which is not readily redeamable. Non-constructionalist theories like Headed Records or Memory Monitoring generally take a more optimistic view: all encoded events are in principle retrievable, given appropriate circumstances. In the light of the findings on eyewitness recall it seems unlikely that either viewpoint can be correct in its purist form. Nor can any one theory encompass all of the established facts so far uncovered. A schema-based approach accounts for some features of witness memory very effectively and has provided a useful heuristic for generating research ideas. In particular, many of the findings on the influence of knowledge and interest on distribution of attention and patterns of recall follow readily from the Bartlett tradition. The influence of prejudice and partisanship on systematic errors in recall and recognition also sits neatly within a constructionalist approach. The idea of scripts - stereotypical sequences of actions for wellpracticed events - has proved a particularly rich resource for understanding errors of omission and commission in children (see the chapter by Baker-Ward, Ornstein & Gordon), though it still remains underutilised as a concept in framing research with adults. For all this, however, there are still aspects of witness recall which do not sit easily within a schema approach. Two criticisms originally levelled at Bartlett’s work have come back to haunt witness researchers of a later generation. First, the argument put forward by Zangwill(l972) and others that Bartlett’s choice of material might have over estimated the amount of forgetting and confabulation shown by subjects in everyday tasks finds echoes in the contemporary witness literature. Yuille has argued that the use of slide or video presentations of events to witnesses may increase considerably the amount of confabulation subjects show relative to a live physical confrontation (Yuille & Cutshall, 1985) or, more importantly, an actual crime (Yuille & Cutshall, 1986). Likewise, the use of incidents where witnesses are passive bystanders

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rather than active participants may underestimate the amount of literal recall which witnesses are capable of relating at a later time (Yuille, Davies & Gibling, 1992). A second still relevant criticism would be the dangers of assuming that the content of recaIl necessarily represents the state of the underlying trace. As has been demonstrated in the studies of post-event information and in research on the cognitive interview, changing the perspective of the rememberer or the way in which questions are asked has a strong influence on the amount and veridicality of the information retrieved. Yet, for all these criticisms, the influence of Bartlettian conceptions on witness research still proves valuable and persuasive. One aspect of his seminal contribution which is still growing is Bartlett’s view that remembering is as much a social as a cognitive process. Remembering in groups, long written off as inevitably error prone (Hollin & Clifford, 1983) is now being examined afresh. Research on discourse analysis (Middleton & Edwards, 1990; Edwards, Potter & Middleton, 1992) and collaborative recall (Clerk, Stephenson & Rutter, 1986) has emphasised that witness interviews are social interactions which can have a profound influence on the quality and quantity of recall, though there are those who remain unconvinced that such group processes are invariably more than the sum of the recollections of the individuals involved (Meudell, Hitch & Kirby, 1992). Do the two non-constructionalist theories fair any better? Clearly, both Morton et al. and Johnson’s views are compatible with the findings on the Cognitive Interview and their influence on the great misleading questions debate have significantly changed conceptions of the mechanisms underlying the effect. Beyond this, however, the two theories make rather different predictions on some key issues. Of the two, Headed Records offers the more radical perspective on memory. It makes the bold assumption of independent and indefinite records of experience which are in principle accessible over time. This immediately raises the question of whether it satisfactorily predicts that most basic of witness findings, the deterioration of memory over time. The assumption that retrieval failure reflects the loss of the appropriate heading via which the memory is reached begs the question as to why headings should become inaccessible; it substitutes the problem of heading loss for memory loss. Its emphasis upon contextual reinstatement as the key to effective recall has had some dazzling successes (Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; Morton 1990) but there are, equally,

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instances where such types of cue have had neutral or even negative effects upon recall (see Davies & Thomson, 1988; Nash, 1987 for relevant reviews). The most acute problem area for the theory is probably in the recall of a specific instance from a series of regularly repeated events. An example would be of a patient with long-term health problems trying to remember a particular visit to a physician (Means & Loftus, 1991). Here instructions to use contextual cues may assist recall but errors and omissions are still the norm. It is, of course, always possible to argue that the contextual information provided was not compatible with the required heading, though the problems of circularity here are obvious. Until more satisfactory ways of defining heading characteristics independent of levels of recall are uncovered, Headed Records is likely to remain a perspective on memory rather than a coherent theory. Similar criticisms have been levelled at the Memory Monitoring view, though the latter acknowledges that constructionalist errors do occur at the time of encoding and do play a part in the production of confabulations. The finding that bystanders have generally better memories of events than participants also fits well with the theory in that participants are likely to have memories which are stronger in the Sensory and Perceptual registers and weaker in the Reflective. Differences should also follow from the theory in the characteristics of memories reported by confabulating and accurate witnesses, a finding for which there is direct support (Alonzo-Quecuty, 1990). Finally, there are variables which influence eyewitness performance which do not as yet seem to be addressed by any event theorist. Both are highlighted by the Helen Smith case. The first is the impact of witnesses’ internal state upon performance. Why does the ingestion of alcohol influence the mechanisms of recall? Or high levels of stress? At present, psychologists appear more concerned with arguing over empirical relationships than seeing how such effects might be integrated into proposed memory mechanisms. The second is deliberate lying by witnesses. Research on witnessing too often assumes that the witness is the disinterested citizen whose only mistakes reflect honest error. However, this is far from the case: many persons who start as witnesses end up as suspects. More research is required on the impact of lying on the memory record: is it literally true, passe post-event effects, that some witnesses lie so much they cease to recognise the truth? These and other questions are likely to be addressed more profitably if researchers place

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eyewitness testimony within the wider context of event memory theory.

Acknowledgement. I am grateful to Julian Boon for access to his unpublished doctoral thesis and, in particular, his discussion of theories of event memory. References Alba, J. W., & Hasher, L. (1983). Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin. 93, 203-23 1. Allport, G. W., & Postman, L. (1947). The osycholopv of rumor. New York: Holt. Alsonso-Quecuty, M. L. (1990). Deception detection and reality monitoring: A new answer to an old question. Paper presented to the Second European Law and Psychology Conference, Nuremburg, Germany. Anderson, R. C., & Pilchert, J. S. (1978). Recall of previously unrecallable information following a shift in perspective. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, l7, 1-12. Bartlett, F. C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bekerian, D. A., & Bowers, J. M. (1983). Eyewitness memory: Were we mislead? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning. Memory and Cognition, 9, 139-145. Bekerian, D. A., & Dennett, J. (in press). The cognitive interview technique: Reviving the issues. Applied Cognitive Psychology. Boon, J. C. W. (1988). Social and affective influences on memorv accuracv. Unpublished doctoral thesis. University of Aberdeen. Boon J. C. W., & Davies, G. M. (1987). Rumours greatly exaggerated: Allport and Postman’s apocryphal study. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 14, 436-440. Boon, J. C. W., & Davies, G. M. (1988). Attitudinal influences on witness memory: Fact and fiction. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory: Current research and issues, Volume 1 (pp. 53-58). Chichester: Wiley.

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Bowman, L. L., & Zaragoza, M. (1989). Similarity of encoding context does not influence resistance to memory impairment following misinformation. American Journal of Psychology, 102, 249-264. Bransford, J. D. (1979). Human cognition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Brown, R., & Kulik, J. (1977). Flashbulb memories. Cognition,

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Bull, R. H. C. (1992). Obtaining evidence expertly: The reliability of interviews with child witnesses. Expert Evidence, 1,5-12. Ceci, S. J., Ross, D. F., & Toglia, M. P. (1987). Suggestibility of children’s memory: Psycholegal implications. Journal of Experimental Psvcholopy: General. 116, 38-49. Chiesi, H. L., Spilich, G. J., & Voss, J. F. (1979). Acquisition of domainrelated information in relation to high and low domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, B,257-274. Christianson, S. A., & Hubinette, B. (in press). Hands up! A study of witnesses emotional rections and memories associated with bank robberies. Applied Cognitive Psychology. Christianson, S. A., & Loftus, E. F. (1987). Remembering emotional events: The fate of detailed information. Cognition and Emotion, 5, 81-108. Clark, N., Stephenson, G. M., & Rutter, D. R. (1986). Memory for complex social discourse: The analysis and prediction of individual and group remembering. Journal of Memory and Language, B,295-313. Clifford, B. R. (1976). Police as eyewitnesses. New Society,

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Deffenbacher, K. (1991). A maturing of research on the behaviour of eyewitnesses. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 5, 377-402. Dent, H. R. (1978). The effect of interviewing strategies on the results of interviews with child witnesses. In A. Trankell (Ed.), Reconstructing (pp. 279-298). Stockholm: Norstedt & Soners. Diges, M. (1988). Stereotypes and memory of real traffic accidents. In M. M. Gruneburg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memorv: Current research and issues, Volume 1 (pp. 59-65). Chichester: Wiley. Dodd, D. H., & Bradshaw, J. (1980). Leading questions and memory: Pragmatic constraints. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 19, 695-704. Ebbinghaus, H. (1964). Memorv: A contribution to experimental psychology. New York: Dover (original work published 1885). Edwards, D., Potter, J., & Middleton, D. (1992). psychology of remembering. The Psycholoeist,

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Fisher, R. P., Geiselman, R. E. & Amador, M. (1989). Field tests of the cognitive interview: Enhancing the recollection of actual victims and witnesses of crime. Journal of ApDlied Psycholow, 74, 722-727. Fisher, R. P., Geiselman, R. E., Raymond, D., Jekevich, L., & Warhaftig, M. (1987). Enhancing enhanced eyewitness memory: Refining the cognitive interview. Journal of Police Science and Administration, Is,29 1-296. Foot, P. (1983). The Helen Smith story. London: Fontana. Frazzetti, A. E., Toland, K., Teller, S. A., & Loftus, E. F. (1992). Memory and eyewitness testimony. In M. M. Gruneburg & P. E. Morris (Eds.), Aspects of memory, Vol. 1 (pp. 18-50). London: Routledge. Some experiments relating to Gauld, A., & Stephenson, G. H. (1967). Bartlett’s theory of remembering. British Journal of Psychology, 58, 3949. Geiselman, R. E., & Fisher, R. P. (1989). The cognitive interview technique for victims and witnesses of crime. In D. Raskin (Ed.), Psychological methods in criminal investigation and evidence (pp. 191-216). New

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York: Springer. Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., Cohen, G., Surtes, L., & Holland, H. L. (1986). Eyewitness responses to leading and misleading questions under the cognitive interview. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 14, 31-39. Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., Firstenberg, I., Hutton, L. A., Sullivan, S . , Artissan, I., & Prosket, A. (1984). Enhancement of eyewitness memory: An empirical evaluation of the cognitive interview. Journal of Police Science and Administration, l2, 74-80. Geiselman, R. E., Fisher, R. P., MacKinnon, D. P., &Holland, H. L. (1985). Eyewitness memory enhancement in the police interview: Cognitive retrieval mnemonics versus hypnosis. Journal of Applied Psvcholoev, 70, 401-412. '

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Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88,67-85. Johnson, M. K., Paye, C. L., Wang, A. Y., & Taylor, T. H. (1979). Fact and fantasy: The roles of accuracy and variability in confusing imaginations with perceptual experiences. Journal of Experimental Psvcholoey: Human Learning and Memory, 3, 229-240. Kay, H. (1955). Learning and retaining verbal material. British Journal of Psycholoe~,46, 81-100. Kintsch, W., & Bates, E. (1977). Recognition memory for statements from a classroom lecture. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Learning and Memory, 3, 150-159. Kleinhauz, M., Horowitz, I., & Tobin, Y. (1977). The use of hypnosis in police investigation: A preliminary communication. Journal of Forensic Science Society, l7, 77-80. Lindsay, D. S . (1984). Misleading suggestions can impair eyewitnesses’ ability to remember event details. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning. Memorv and Cognition, 16, 1077-1083. Lindsay, D. S . , & Johnson, M. K. (1989a). The eyewitness suggestibility effect and memory for source. Memory and Cognition, 12,349-358. Lindsay, D. S . , & Johnson, M. K. (1989b). The reversed suggestibility effect. Bulletin of the Psvchonomic Society, 22, 11 1-113. Linton, M. (1975). Memory for real-world events. In D. A. Norman & D. E. Runelhart (Eds.), ExDlorations in cognition (pp. 376-404). San Francisco : Freeman. Lipton, J. P. (1977). On the psychology of eyewitness testimony. Journal of Applied Psychology, 62,90-93. Loftus, E. F. (1979). Reactions to blatently contradictory information. Memorv and Cognition, 2,368-374. Loftus, E. F., & Greene, E. (1980). Warning: Even memory for faces may be contagious. Law and Human Behavior, 4,323-334. Loftus, E. F., & Hoffman, H. G. (1989). Misinformation and memory: The

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Loftus, E. F., Schooler, J. W., Boone, S. M., & Kline, D. (1987). Time went by so slowly: Overestimation of event duration by males and females. ,1,3-13. Logie, R., Wright, R., & Decker, S. Recognition memory performance and residential burglary. Applied Cognitive Psychologv, 6 , 109-124. Maass, A., & Kohnken, G. (1989). Eyewitness identification: simulating the ’weapon effect’. Law and Human Behavior, 13,397-408. MacKinnon, D., O’Reilly, K., & Geiselman, R. E. (1990). Improving eyewitness recall for licence plates. Amlied Comitive Psvcholow, 4, 129-140. McCloskey,M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985a). Misleading post-event information and memory for events: Arguments and evidence against the memory impairment hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 114,1-16. McCloskey, M., & Zaragoza, M. (1985b). Post event information and memory: Reply to Loftus, Schooler and Wagenaar. Journal of Experimental Psycholow: General, 114, 381-387.

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Commentary: The Theory Behind Witnessing Events, and the Practice Elizabeth F. L o j h University of Washington, USA From the point of view of a psychologist interested in the subject of memory, the topic of eyewitness testimony could not be more ideal. It faces, Janus-like, in at least two directions. It relates inward, to some of the most fundamental theoretical issues in the study of memory. It relates outward, to the resolution of some of the most fundamental practical problems with which our society must grapple - problems of crime and punishment. The witnesses to events surrounding the death of Helen Smith in Saudi Arabia recounted versions that were incomplete, contradictory, and changing over time. Their versions, like the millions that are collected in ongoing investigations of crimes, accidents, and other legally relevant events, are nothing more than memories, begging to be analyzed and understood. Davies shows an exemplary appreciation for this Janus-like aspect to the study of eyewitness testimony. He begins his chapter with underlying memory theory. His discussion of several current theories of forgetting reveals just how closely tied eyewitness testimony is to one of the most fundamental issues in the study of memory, namely whether the errors made by witnesses occur because memory representations (or traces) have been partially or completely lost from the memory system or because those traces can simply not be located at the time the memory event is recounted. Those who wish to read more deeply about this critical issue have ample sources to consult. Brainerd, Reyna, Howe and Kingma (1990), for example, provide an excellent review of some early theoretical positions. They begin with Hoffding in 1891, and then move on to Freud, Kohler, Wulf and others in the early part of the 20th century. As Brainerd et al. correctly note, Hoffding, Freud and others believed that representations, once formed, do not get changed by subsequent events. Rather, errors or omissions are a matter of retrieval failure. Conversely, other prominent early theorists assumed that representations do not remain crystallized, but rather degenerate through decay, reorganization, substitution or some other mechanism. Interest in nature of forgetting continued throughout the 20th century, as

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noted by Brainerd and Ornstein (1991). Associationists claimed that memory traces remained intact once they got into long-term memory. This idea constituted an important feature of models from a quarter-century ago, like that of Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) who conceived of long-term memory as a permanent system and attributed forgetting to retrieval failure. Gestalt psychologists, on the other hand, thought the traces were altered with time. Related ideas can be seen in the writings of memory theorists through the century (eg., Bartlett, 1932; Alba & Hasher, 1983) who felt that forgetting occured in part because people were continually processing new information through mental structures that were built up from the knowledge and beliefs that they already had about the world. A number of very recent formal models, even those heavily based on associationistic ideas, seem to favor storage changes. For example, consider CHARM (Composite Holographic Associative Recall Model, Metcalfe, 1990). CHARM demonstrates a formal mechanism by which new inputs can truly impair a person's ability to remember earlier details. Although the mathematics underlying this model are unique to holographic memory models (Schooler & Tanaka, 1991), the representations that result from the model are similar to that of other distributed memory models such as those developed by McClelland and Rumelhart (1986) (See also, McClelland, 1988). In the more contemporary memory literature, investigators are now asking questions analogous to those posed 50 years ago. Davies explores this issue in some depth when discussing retention of memories over time. When people are exposed to postevent information (particularly misinformation) about an event, is the original memory impaired at all? After all, people can give an erroneous response for reasons that have nothing to do with impairment of original memories, such as demand characteristics. If impairment of event memories can be shown to occur, what kind of impairment is it? As Brainerd et al. (1990) and Belli et al. (1992) note, two classes of memory impairment hypotheses have been addressed in the literature. The first is"retrieva1-based memory impairment", and it holds that the stored representation of an event remains intact, but misinformation renders it more difficult to access. On the other hand, the "storage-based memory impairment" hypothesis holds that misinformation changes the storage of the event information in some way. If evidence is found for storage-based memory impairment, the next question to be answered is how this process should be characterized? (Brainerd & Ornstein, 1991). Does it principally involve a mechanism of trace destruction, trace

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fading, reorganization, or what? These are some of the fundamental memory issues that are currently being tackled by researchers who are focusing on the theoretical side, and they resemble the questions being asked by an earlier generation of scholars. Questions about the fate of once-stored memory traces have also, in a rather novel way, recently been investigated in infants (Greco, Hayne & Rovee-Collier, 1990). In one study, researchers exposed three-month old infants to postevent information, and found that their performance changed. The investigators concluded that "postevent information.. .must have been integrated with the prior memory ..." (Greco, et al., p. 625). They later offered speculations as to the mechanism of change: "postevent exposure.. .did significantly impair infants' ability to retrieve the (original) memory representation.. ...It could have been weakened through neural competition or disintegration, for example, or a new memory that incorporated all of the information in working memory at the time of the postevent exposure could have been formed." (p. 630). While Greco et al. speculated about the possibility of a weakening of original memories, others have developed the idea more fully. One particularly sophisticated approach is that of Brainerd & a1 (1990). According to these theorists, a trace for some event detail is conceived of as a bundle of loosely integrated features. The forgetting mechanism in the theory is called "disintegration. " Over time the features begin to unravel, and especially so when misinformation is presented. Put another way, there is a progressive dilution in the cognitive glue that holds the features together. In short, this theory adopts a degradation-like position on storage failure. It is a theory that assumes that impairment of previously stored traces occurs. Belli et al (in press) expanded on the idea that misinformation acts in a way to weaken the bonds that connect the features of a memory. When the event memory is fresh, bonds are strong, and misinformation while weakening the bonds, leaves bonds that are strong enough to resist any loss of features. As Ceci & Bruck (1992) put it, intrusions are less likely when a trace's features are tightly bundled. However, after time has passed and the bonds are naturally weakened, a more hospitable environment is created for misinformation to further weaken the bonds, resulting in lost features. These theoretical ideas extend the initial theorizing that Bartlett did over a half century ago, raise its level of sophistication, and simultaneously enhance the empirical base

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significantly. This contemporary empirical work and theorizing is not necessarily in contradiction to Davies' conclusion that memories do not undergo inevitable contamination and distortion. Rather, it suggests that there may be some circumstances where such contamination does occur. Who (other than memory psychologists) cares about memory theory in general, or whether memories are impaired by subsequent events more specifically? One significant group is those who are devoted to finding ways of improving the accuracy and completeness of eyewitness testimony. Helen Smith's father, who wished nothing more than to fully understand her death, has in common with all of us a need to see justice done. We all have an interest in not convicting the wrong people of crimes they didn't do, although most people are not aware of how common such errors are. Wells (1993) identifies 1000 cases of wrongful conviction prior to 1986, and some other fairly reputable estimates are even more staggering (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1986; Loftus & Ketcham, 1991). As important as it is to minimize the devastation that befalls an innocent person, it is, of course, important too to correctly identify genuine criminals and punish them appropriately. Who wants to live in a world where criminals don't get identified, don't get caught, and continue to rob and rape? This is why the involvement of psychological scientists in the development of techniques for enhancing eyewitness testimony, as seen in the original work on the Cognitive Interview and its subsequent refinements, is so critical. These investigators got their original ideas from basic research in memory. And they need to worry about memory theory so they know what memory beasts they are chasing. The eyewitness researchers are not the only group of psychologists who care about theories of memory. One other significant group is psychotherapists, many of whom have adopted their own conceptions of memory that may need to be revised in light of current research. Pillemer (1992) provides several examples of psychotherapeutic beliefs in the unchanging nature of memory, at least traumatic memory: 1) "Original situational memories are unlikely to be changed" (Brewin, 1989, p. 387); 2) traumatic events create lasting visual images ... burned-in visual impressions: (Terr, 1988, p. 103) .memory imprints are indelible, they do not erase -- a therapy that tries to alter them will be uneconomical." (Kantor, 1980, p. 163). It is not so clear that the research on witness memory in general, and the fate of once-formed memory traces more specifically, supports these psychotherapeutic conceptions. Whether 'I..

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event memories are impaired or not, there still remains the issue of the extent to which people in general, and clinical patients more specifically, believe in the accuracy their false memories. Johnson (1988) has suggested that certain mental dysfunctions (eg., schizophrenia) can be discussed in terms of reality monitoring failures in general, and, more specifically, in terms of patient difficulty in discriminating between internal thoughts and memories, on the one hand, and external information on the other hand. Put another way, the patients believe in their false memories. Knowledge of how people in general come to do this would potentially be very useful in this applied setting.

References Alba, J.W. & Hasher, L. (1983) Is memory schematic? Psychological Bulletin, 93, 203-23 1. Atkinson, R. C. & Shiffrin, R. M. (1968) Human memory: A proposed system and its control processes. In K.W. Spence & J.T. Spence (Eds.) The psvchologv of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory vol. 2 (pp.89 -195). New York: Academic Press. Bartlett, F.C. (1932) Rememberine: A study in exDeri.menta1 and social psychology. London: Cambridge University Press. Belli, R. F., Windschitl, P.D., McCarthy, T.T. & Winfrey, S.E. (in press) Detecting memory impairment with a modified test procedure. Journal of ExDerimental Psvcholopv: Learning. Memory & Cognition. Brainerd, C. & Ornstein, P. A. (1991) Children’s memory for witnessed events. In J. Doris (Ed.) The Suggestibility of children’s recollections. (pp. 10-20). Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Brainerd, C.J., Reyna, V.F., Howe, M.L. & Kingma, J. (1990) The development of forgetting and reminiscence. Monoeraphs of the Society for Research in Child DeveloDment, 55. (2-3, Whole No.222). Brewin, C.R. (1989) Cognitive change processes Psvchological Review, 96, 379-394. Ceci, S. J. & Bruck, M. (in press). Psvchological Bulletin.

in psychotherapy.

Suggestibility of the child witness.

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Greco, C., Hayne, H., & Rovee-Collier C. (1990) Roles of function, reminding, and variability in categorization by 3-month old infants. Journal of Experimental Psychology, Learning. Memory & Cognition, 16, 617-633. Huff, R., Rattner, A., & Sagarin, E. (1986) Guilty until proven innocent. Crime and Delinquency, 32, 518-544. Johnson, M. K. (1988) Discriminating the origin of information. In T. F. Ohmanns & B. A. Maher (Eds.) Delusional beliefs: Interdiscidinarv perspectives (pp. 34-65). NY: Wiley. Kantor, D. (1980) Critical identity image. In J. K. Pearce & L. J. Friedman (Eds.), Family therapy: Combining psychodynamic and family systems approaches (pp. 137-167). NY: Grune & Stratton Loftus, E.F. & Ketcham, K. York: St. Martin’s Press.

(1991) Witness for the defense.

New

McClelland, J. L. (1988) Connectionist models and psychological evidence. Journal of Memory and Language, 27, 107-123. McClelland, J. L. & Rumelhart, D.E. (1986) processing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Parallel distributed

Metcalf, J. (1 990) Composite holographic associative recall model (CHARM) and blended memories in eyewitness testimony. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119, 145-160. Pillemer, D.B. (1 992) Remembering personal circumstances: A functional analysis. In Winograd, E. & Neisser, U. (Eds). Affect and accuracv in (pp.236-264). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schooler, J. W. & Tanaka, J. W. (1991) Composites, compromised, and CHARM: What is the evidence for blend memory representations? Journal of Experimental Psvchologv: General, 120, 96-100. Terr, L. (1988) What happens to early memories of trauma? A study of 20 children under age five at the time of documented traumatic events. J. Amer. Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 27, 96-104. Wells, G. (in press). What do we know about eyewitness identification? American Psychologist.

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Commentary: On Aging Witnesses and Earwitnesses A . Daniel Yamey University of Guelph, Canada

Understanding the vagaries of eyewitness testimony has important implications for the justice system and for psychological theories of practical memory. In the anecdote provided by Graham Davies it is clear that statements of large groups of witnesses can be incomplete, are frequently contradictory, and inconsistent over time. The ambiguity of witness reports, of course, depends upon a number of personal, situational and systemic factors. These vagaries of visual identification have been known to scholars and philosophers for some time and present a significant problem in the administration of justice. For example, .In the fifth century B.C., Thucydides (195 1) recognized the magnitude of the problem when he despairingly noted a 'want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by different eyewitnesses, arising from imperfect memory,. sometimes from undue partiality for one side or the other' ..." (Levine & Tapp, 1982, p.101). 'I..

Early observers noted that it is not only eyewitness identification that is susceptible to error but also earwitness identification. The pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus stated that the "Eyes and ears are bad witnesses for men, since their souls lack understanding" (Donner, Eble, & Helbling, 1967, p.65). In the mid-19th century, Henke (1838), a legal scholar, wrote in his handbook of criminal law and criminal justice: "Above all, the identification process has to be preceded by a comprehensive interrogation of the witness, wherein he is to describe the characteristic features which could facilitate recognition of the persons or objects to which his testimony or statements refer" (p.705) (translated by Sporer , 1982). What has changed from early philosophical writings and nineteenth

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century legal writings to the present is the fact that the psychology of eyewitness testimony is based on scientific foundations. Psychology is a science, a biological as well as a social science. Logical analysis, objectivity, controlled observations, experimentation when possible, and replication of empirically verified and theoretically interrelated knowledge is, as Davies demonstrates, the hallmark of contemporary eyewitness research. Persistent criticisms of eyewitness research, such as Wigmore’s (1909) satirical critique of Munsterberg’s (1908) book On the Witness Stand, to more contemporary critics such as Konecni and Ebbesen (1986), McCloskey and Egeth, 1983, and Pachella (1986), suggest that findings are not conclusive or applicable to trial situations. In fact, it has been argued that knowledge obtained by eyewitness researchers is not beyond the common knowledge of ordinary persons (for a discussion of these issues, see Noon & Hollin, 1987; Yarmey & Jones, 1983). In the United States (and Canada) the courts will accept novel scientific evidence from experts if the testimony is scientifically reliable, that is, the evidence is based on techniques that are generally accepted by the relevant scientific community (Frye v. United States, 1923; United States v. Amaral, 1973). (See Davies, 1984, for a discussion on how research findings indirectly influence the Judiciary in Britain.) In order for scientific principles to be admitted, the court must decide that the testimony would assist the trier of fact. Scientific principles must have a generally accepted theoretical basis, and the empirical evidence to support the theory must be gathered under accepted rules of scientific procedure. Davies argues that we are committed to theory-generated studies. The bulk of research on eyewitness reports follows orthodox laboratory experimental procedures and more problem-oriented studies of actual crimes. These findings are relevant and can be generalized to the legal community because the empirical support is abundant within and across research centres throughout the world, the data is being gathered more and more frequently in realistic simulations, and the data fit consistently with theory (Kassin, Ellsworth, & Smith, 1989). However, as Davies shows, no one theory claims to explain the total variability in eyewitness reports. Davies has written eloquently and there is little point in repeating what he has said far better than 1 in a commentary could offer. Instead, I will introduce some additional observations from my research program.

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Ageing and eyewitness reports Elderly and young adults probably focus on many of the same features of an event but do not attend equally to peripheral details, and do not equally notice fine details. Young adults have been found to be significantly superior, on average, to the elderly in accuracy of free recall, prompted recall, and completeness of suspect descriptions. Errors of omission for critical legal factors also occur more frequently with the elderly. For example, in one of our studies 80 per cent of the elderly failed to report that an assailant wielded a knife, in contrast, only 20 per cent of the young omitted this critical detail (Yarmey, 1984). Age differences in witness recall also have been found among three age categories: 19-29 year-olds, 30-44year-olds, and 45-65 year-olds. As part of a research program studying showup (one-person) identification in real-world settings, 651 white citizens were randomly approached in public places and asked for directions by one of two female experimenters (Yarmey, 1992a). The duration of exposure to the target was approximately 15 seconds. Two minutes later each citizen was approached by a female investigator and asked to participate in a field study for person memory. Subjects were given an 8question cued recall test for the target’s physical appearance, e.g., what was her age? height? etc., asked to estimate the amount of time they interacted, and completed a photo showup (one-person) identification or a voice showup identification test. Young adults were significantly superior (M = 66%) to middle-aged witnesses (M = 62%), who in turn were significantly superior to older adults (M = 52%) in cued recall. Analyses of subjects’ confidence in their cued recall revealed that both the youngest group (M = 4.60,on a 7-point scale) and the middle group (M = 4.66) were significantly more confident than the oldest group (M =3.97). Witnesses’ confidence in their accuracy of cued recall was significantly correlated with performance for all three age groups (r’s of .40, .34, and .44,respectively). No significant differences were found among age groups in duration estimates, or in photo showup identification or voice showup identification. Research is currently being conducted to determine if cued recall in contrast to free recall influences showup identification and lineup identification over time.

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Descriptions of voices

As part of an on-going research program on earwitness identification, this writer recently completed a study on descriptions of distinctive and nondistinctive voices over time (Yarmey, 1991). According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the more accurate the initial description of a suspect by a witness, the greater the likelihood of identification accuracy (Neil v. Biggers, 1972). There are some crimes, such as obscene phone calls, hooded rape, or crimes committed in darkness, in which witnesses’ memory of the perpetrator’s voice is the only evidence available to guide the police investigation. However, suspects’ voices are very difficult to describe: witnesses typically describe them in very brief, imprecise and superficial ways. One way to overcome the imprecision of language in the description of voices is to use rated descriptions of voice characteristics. Two hundred and ninety-five undergraduate students played the role of mock kidnap victims and heard the tape-recorded voice of their abductor for 36 seconds. The witnesses were asked to rate either the voice of a highly distinctive speaker or non-distinctive speaker (experimentally predetermined) on 10 selected voice characteristics (rate, rate variation, pitch, expressive style,age, enunciation, inflection, tremor, pauses, nasality). Except for rate of speaking, the results showed that ratings of highly distinctive voices were reliable over a one week retention period. In contrast, ratings of nondistinctive voices showed a reliable decrement over one week for rate of speech, rate variation, tremor, pauses, and nasality. Furthermore, all of these five voice characteristics showed a reliable change in memory between 24-hours and one-week retention. These results suggest that witness rated descriptions should be given, if possible, within 24 hours of a incident.

Collaborative recall The investigation of Helen Smith’s death continued for a period of three years. It is not surprising that witnesses’ statements changed over time because of post-event information and other causes of forgetting. Discussion among witnesses to a crime is difficult, if not impossible, to prevent prior to the arrival of police at the scene of a crime. Also, the police may or may not separate witnesses prior to information-gathering interviews, and they may not instruct them to refrain from discussing the event with each other.

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Although witnesses’ testimony at trial is supposed to have an independent basis in perception, researchers have also studied the effects of collaborative or joint responses by groups of witnesses in contrast to individual recall (e.g., Hollin & Clifford, 1983; Warnick & Sanders, 1980). Collaborative responses by groups can produce more complete descriptions than individual responses, but joint responses can also produce more errors of commission (Alper, Buckhout, Chern, Harwood, & Slomovits, 1976). In a series of studies focusing on collaborative recall by two- to four-person groups, Stephenson (1990) concluded that although collaborative testimony from two witnesses is more comprehensive and factually correct than from a single individual, the practice is unwarranted. Stephenson (1990) states that “much straightforward evidence that would have surfaced is excluded from group accounts. ..Evidence of all kinds - facts and wider-ranging observations - are excluded as groups compile a partial, conventional version of events” (p. 313). Following this line of research, this writer (Yarmey, 1992b) investigated the effects of dyadic discussion on recall of 112 undergraduate students. Subjects in groups of 2-4 persons overheard a telephone discussion by a perpetrator discussing his crime, and were tested for their reconstructions of the event either 10 minutes later or two days later. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) a dyadic-collaborative condition, i.e., subjects discussed the incident and gave a joint response at the test; (2) a dyadic-individual condition, i.e., subjects discussed the incident but individual responses were given; and (3) a no-discussion individual condition, i.e., subjects did not discuss the event with anyone else. The text of the perpetrator’s dialogue was parsed into 54 constituent propositions or “idea units”. Dyadic discussion recall was not found to increase the overall accuracy compared to individual’s reconstructions of the incident. However, significantly more errors of commission were found in the dyadic-individual condition than in the no-discussion individual condition and the dyadic-collaborative condition. Collaborative dyads were significantly less verbose in their immediate recall of the event, were reliably more concise in correct statements, and made significantly fewer fabrications than subjects in the discussion-individual-recall condition. Collaborative dyads also produced fewer fabrications in recall than individuals, but this difference fell short of statistical significance. Collaborative reconstructions appeared to minimize gratuitous comment and focused recall more strictly on the evidential matters at issue. Remembering clearly is both

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a social process and a cognitive process. These data suggest that the courts should consider the evidentiary value of collaborative-dyadic recall. Finally, one last comment. Davies correctly emphasizes that witnesses reports of crimes and other types of events are influenced by stereotyping. However, just as facial stereotypes of criminals are known to influence eyewitness behaviour ( e.g., Goldstein, Chance, & Gilbert, 1984; Shoemaker, South, & Lowe, 1973) voice stereotypes of criminals can influence earwitness behaviour. Stereotypes exist about the relationship between physical appearance, voice characteristics and personality characteristics. Given only the face, or the voice, or both the face and the voice of targets persons, people select targets to fit stereotypical images of criminals and non-criminals in a non random manner. Furthermore, processing target persons into these two categories influences the accuracy of recognition memory performance (Yarmey , in press). I totally agree with Davies’ call for future research on eyewitness testimony to be placed in the wider context of event memory. This research will benefit from the theoretical integration of studies on social, emotional, and cognitive behaviour.

References Alper, A., Buckhout, R., Chern, S., Harwood, R., & Slomovits, M. (1976). Eyewitness identification: Accuracy of individual vs. composite recollections of a crime. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 8, 147149. Davies, G.M. (1984). The legal impact of psychological research on eyewitness testimony: British and American experiences. Journal of the Forensic Science Society, 24, 165-175. Donner, M., Eble, K.E., & Helbling, R.E. (Eds.), (1967). The intellectual tradition of the west: Readings in the history of ideas (Vol. 1): Hesiod to Calvin. Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman. Frve v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Goldstein, A.G., Chance, J.E., & Gilbert, B.J. (1984). Facial stereotypes of good guys and bad guys: A replication and extension. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 22, 549-552.

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Henke, E. (1838). Handbuch des criminalrechts und der criminalpolitik. Vierter Theil. Berlin: Nicolai. Hollin, C.R., & Clifford, B.R. (1983). Eyewitness testimony: The effects of discussion on recall accuracy and agreement. -y. 234-244.

u,

Kassin, S.M., Ellsworth, P.C., & Smith, V.L. (1989). The "general acceptance'' of psychological research on eyewitness testimony. American Psvchologist, 44, 1089-1098. Konecni, V.J., & Ebbesen, E.B. (1986). Courtroom testimony by psychologists on eyewitness identification issues: Critical notes and reflections. Law and Human Behavior, 10,117-126. Levine, F.J., & Tapp, J.L. (1982). Eyewitness identification: Problems and pitfalls. In V.J. Konecni & E.B. Ebbesen (Eds.), The criminal justice svstem: A social-psycholoyical analvsis (pp.99-127). San Francisco: Freeman. McCloskey, M., & Egeth, H.E. (1983). Eyewitness identification: What can a psychologist tell a jury? American Psychologist, 3, 550-563. Munsterberg, H. (1908). On the witness stand. New York: Doubleday Page. Neil v. Bieeers, 409 US 188 (1972). Noon, E., & Hollin, C.R. (1987). Lay knowledge of eyewitness behaviour: A British survey. Applied Cognitive Psycholow, 1. 143-153. Pachella, R.G. (1986). Personal values and the value of expert testimony. and Human Behavior, 1Q, 145-150.

Law

Shoemaker, D.J., South, D.R., & Lowe, J. (1973). Facial stereotypes of 427-433. deviants and judgments of guilt or innocence. Social Forces,

a,

Sporer, S.L. (1982). A brief history of the psychology of testimony. Current Psvchological Reviews, 2, 323-340. Stephenson, G.M. (1990). Should collaborative testimony be permitted in courts of law? Criminal Law Review, 302-314. United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir.), 1973.

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Warnick, D.H., & Sanders, G.S. (1980). The effects of group discussion on eyewitness accuracy. Journal of Applied Social Psvchology, N, 249-259. Wigmore, J.H. (1909). Professor Munsterberg and the psychology of evidence. Illinois Law Review, 3, 399-445. Yarmey, A. D. (1984). Accuracy and credibility of the elderly witness. Canadian Journal on Aging, 3, 79-90. Yarmey, A.D. (1991). Descriptions of distinctive and non-distinctive voices over time. Journal of the Forensic Science Society, 31,421-428. Yarmey, A.D. (1992a). Accuracy of eyewitness and earwitness showup identifications in a field setting. Poster presented at the biannual meeting of the American Psychology-Law Society, San Diego, CA. Yarmey, A.D. (1992b). The effects of dyadic discussion on earwitness recall. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 13,25 1-263. Yarmey, A.D. (in press). Stereotypes and recognition memory for faces and voices of good guys and bad guys. Applied Coynitive Psycholog. Yarmey, A.D. & Jones, H.P.T. (1983). Is the psychology of eyewitness identification a matter of common sense? In S.M.A. Lloyd-Bostock and B.R. Clifford ( a s . ) , Evaluating witness evidence: Recent psvchological research and new perspectives, (pp 13-40). Chichester: Wiley.

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PART 4

DEFICITS IN MEMORY

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Memory in Everyday Life

G.M.Davies and R.H.Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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CHAPTER 10 MEMORY AND AGEING Gillian Cohen The Open University, United Kingdom

All of us have a vested interest in understanding how memory is affected by ageing. Either sooner or later we shall all find out at first hand. Meanwhile, in the developed countries, the proportion of elderly people in the population continues to increase and many aspects of social policy and practical provision require an accurate assessment of how well this ageing population can cope with the demands of everyday life. Two kinds of question dominate research on memory and ageing. First, we need to know what tasks and activities are adversely affected by ageing and to what extent. Secondly, in order to predict and explain the observed age deficits, and to devise remedial therapies, we need to understand the causes. Age effects have been examined in very many aspects of memory in everyday life ranging from playing bridge, shopping, dialling telephone numbers, watching television, keeping appointments, studying a new language and planning a journey. This chapter selects a few of these activities and collates and compares the findings that have emerged when different research methods are used to investigate the same phenomena. In many cases different methods have produced different results. The aim is to assess the usefulness and validity of each method and, where the findings are inconsistent, to try to explain why they have failed to converge. A wide range of methods have been employed in the study of memory and ageing. These can be divided into three basic approaches, the phenomenological, the psychometric and the experimental. The three methodologies differ in power and scope and each is designed to answer different questions. Each has its own problems and limitations. Phenomenological research includes observations, self-reports and the use of questionnaires. This in vivo approach reveals how people perform in natural everyday activities which involve memory and how people feel about their own memories. Since it is based on performance in real life situations, this method has high ecological validity and it has undoubted practical importance.

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Knowing what level of performance is typical for elderly people in natural contexts is essential for practical purposes such as determining the appropriate retirement age for a job or structuring the information in a leaflet. Knowing what is a normal level of performance for a particular age group is essential for the assessment of the degree of memory impairment when pathological changes occur. We also need to know how elderly people assess their own memory ability and react to changes because their beliefs and expectations determine what activities they are willing to undertake and what goals they set themselves. However, the phenomenological method has serious limitations. People’s subjective beliefs about their own abilities, and hence their self-reports and their answers to questionnaires, are not necessarily an accurate reflection of their own ability. Researchers’ observations of naturally occurring behaviour are more objective but are of limited value because it is difficult to generalize from one situation to another. The fact that one group of 70 year olds can learn Russian does not mean that all people of this age can do so, and the fact that some elderly people have difficulty in remembering routes does not necessarily mean this is true for everybody over a certain age. There are very substantial individual differences in the effects of ageing. Phenomenological research is descriptive rather than analytical. It reveals and highlights age-related changes but yields little information about causal factors. The researcher has no control over the circumstances in which memories are acquired, encoded, retained and retrieved and can usually draw no conclusions about how or why age differences arise. Psychometric research addresses the problems posed by individuadifferences in the effects of ageing. Rowe and Kahn (1987) pointed out that comparisons between age groups mask substantial heterogeneity within age groups. They drew attention to the differences between individuals in the effects of ageing and the difficulty of separating ageing from other factors, such as education, health status, physiological changes, or lifestyle differences, which tend to co-vary with age. Rowe and Kahn have distinguished between ’usual’ and ’successful’ ageing. In usual ageing the effects of age are exacerbated by additional factors such as poor diet or unstimulating lifestyle; in successful ageing the effects of ageing are mitigated by an optimal lifestyle. Psychometric studies reveal individual differences by means of batteries of standardized tests such as tests of digit span and vocabulary. The pattern of age differences in performance across tests indicates which abilities are affected

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by ageing. Psychometric tests have the advantage of producing precise measures for a range of verbal, spatial, mathematical and reasoning abilities. Large numbers of people are tested and the results show clear age-related trends for different types of test. For example, tests of verbal ability show little effect of ageing, whereas tests of spatial ability, and tests in which speed of performance is scored, show an age-related decline (Salthouse, 1982). The main advantage of this method is that statistical techniques, such as multiple regression analyses can be used in conjunction with psychometric testing to explore the sources of individual differences in memory tasks. The contributions of factors such as age, level of education, socioeconomic background, and health status can be separated out and calculated. The effects of chronological ageing can be isolated. This method can also be used to identify clusters of factors, such as, for example, high verbal ability and good memory for texts which are associated. However, the ecological validity of psychometric tests is low. Elderly people are handicapped by tests which are unfamiliar, divorced from any natural context and which are often scored on the basis of speed as well as accuracy. The results may therefore be an underestimate of their true level of ability. The experimental, or in vitro, approach is designed primarily to generate causal explanations for the effects of ageing, rather than simply discovering whether memory deficits exist. Current models of cognitive processing are applied to try to interpret age-related changes in memory function. Experiments are designed to identify the particular component structures and processes in the cognitive system which are affected by ageing. For example, an experiment may be designed to show whether the memory deficit lies in encoding or retrieval; in the articulatory loop or in the central executive. Experiments are also designed to identify particular factors which increase or diminish the age effects. For example, the imageability , familiarity or complexity of the to-be-remembered material may be varied systematically. The findings can then be interpreted in terms of models of cognitive processing to yield causal explanations for the observed effects of ageing. Experiments on ageing involve comparisons of performance at different ages, either cross-sectionally or longitudinally. Cross-sectional comparisons are made between groups of different ages such as young, middle-aged and elderly. For the observed differences to be attributable to age, the groups need to be matched as closely as possible on all the other variables which may influence

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memory performance such as level of education, IQ, socioeconomic background and health status. Even if this is done, and matching is rarely perfect, there remain other group differences which are cohort specific. To take one example, elderly people typically received an education which employed training in rote learning whereas the education received by younger people puts more emphasis on skills of selection and extraction of information. Such cohort differences in training or in life experience can affect performance and masquerade as genuine age effects. The longitudinal method compares performance of the same people tested repeatedly at different ages over long periods of time. Inevitably, considerable numbers of subjects will drop out and those who remain may constitute a biased sample consisting of people who did well in the tests. Another problem is that repeated testing means that any decline in performance may be masked by accumulating practice. Some experimenters attempt to minimise these problems by employing both cross-sectional and longitudinal methods in conjunction. Alternatively, the experimenter can abandon all attempt at matching groups and simply extract individual difference variables by means of post hoc multiple regression analyses. This method substitutes statistical control for experimental control but is only possible if large numbers of subjects are tested. Experimental studies of memory in everyday life generally try to devise memory tests which are more or less analogous to practical memory tasks in real life situations, but it is always necessary to make a compromise. Exercising experimental control over the relevant variables entails sacrificing some degree of ecological validity, while maintaining strict equivalence to everyday life entails abandoning some control (West, 1986).

2. Prospective memory: plans and actions Prospective memory is memory for a future act, or a future sequence of actions. It includes remembering what the planned action is; remembering to perform it and when and where to do it. In terms of being able to cope successfully with the demands of everyday life, this is, arguably the most important aspect of memory. People need to remember to take medicine, to put tea in the pot, feed the cat, keep appointments and post letters. Several different research methods have been employed, but studies of age effects in prospective memory have produced results which are contradictory and difficult

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to interpret. Experimental studies of prospective memory have generally required subjects to perform a verifiable action, such as making a phone call or mailing a postcard to the experimenter, on a specified day at a specified time. Poon and Schaffer (1982) found that elderly subjects (mean age 73 years) remembered to make more telephone calls than a young group (aged 25 years) and the timing of their calls corresponded more closely to the target times. Similar results, with the old outperforming the young, were obtained in studies by West (1984); Sinnott (1984, 1986) and Moscovitch (1982). In the Moscovitch study de-briefing of the subjects yielded a valuable clue to the superior performance of the elderly. They reported using external memory aids to a greater extent than did the younger subjects. External memory aids include notes in diaries or calendars, or placing the instructions beside the telephone or in a prominent strategic position. In follow-up studies, when the use of external mnemonics was discouraged, the age difference disappeared. Similar findings were reported by Maylor (1990) in another telephone call task. She asked subjects to report their strategies and classified these as conjunction cues (linking making the telephone call to another routine event); external cues (including memoranda and the use of alarm clocks or watches); and internal cues (reliance on memory). In this study, the oldest subjects performed worse than the middle-aged subjects, but only when they relied on internal cues. It seems, therefore, that the appearance of well-preserved prospective memory in old age is illusory. Prospective memory declines with increasing age, but most elderly people are able to offset this decline by spontaneously adopting highly effective ways of using external cues to remind themselves of prospective tasks. The earlier studies provide an example of a case where the task had high ecological validity, but the experimenter had no control over what the subjects did during the retention period and this lack of control produced a misleading result. West and Walton (1985) opted for an experimental design which was less closely analogous to an everyday task, but which allowed better control of the conditions of encoding and recall. They varied the memory load in a prospective memory task by requiring young and older adults to carry out a sequence of up to 14 actions (e.g. Get your comb and toothbrush; Put the comb on the table; Put the toothbrush in the bag, etc.) The older group completed fewer actions and made more order errors than the young and these results indicated a clear age decrement in ability to hold a sequence of actions in

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working memory. The conclusion that there is an age decrement in prospective memory is reinforced by results from a psychometric test battery, the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Tests (Wilson; Cockburn & Baddeley, 1985). These tests were constructed for use with brain-damaged patients, but have also been used to assess the elderly (Cockburn & Smith, 1988). The tests are objective measures of performance but are designed to be close analogues of everyday situations. The test battery consists of 13 items including recognition of faces and pictures, memory for a story, memory for names, memory for a route around a room, and two prospective memory tasks, remembering to make an appointment and remembering to ask for the return of a personal possession that was surrendered and hidden at the beginning of the interview. Multiple regression analyses were used to investigate the relationship of the test scores to factors such as age, IQ, health, and scores on the Frenchay Activities Index, a measure of participation in social, domestic and leisure activities. Significant effects of age, when other factors were partialled out, were found for both the prospective memory tasks, for story recall and for names. Phenomenological studies of prospective memory ought, it might be supposed, to yield an accurate picture of age effects. Surely old people should know if they are experiencing an increased frequency of memory failures? Hultsch, Herzog and Dixon (1987) reviewed a number of studies using different types of metamemory questionnaire which ask people to assess their own memory function. The results were very mixed. Some studies found an age-related increase in reported incidence of memory failures; others found a decrease. Their own large scale study cross-validated different questionnaires and found a significant age-related decline in reported memory efficiency. However, there is evidence that the magnitude of the age effects varies with the type of questionnaire and the specific questions that are asked. Where they are found, age differences tend to be small. Cutler and Grams (1988) in a large scale correlational study, found that reported frequency of memory problems increased after the age of 65, but even at 85+ only 23% of subjects were reporting that memory problems were very frequent. Poor health, sensory handicaps and mobility limitations proved to be better predictors of memory problems than age. Very large scale psychometric studies generally show that responses to memory questionnaires are reliable and internally consistent, but pure age differences are small. Gilewski, Zelinski and Schaie (1990) reported

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results of analyses of the responses of 778 subjects to the Metamemory Questionnaire comprising 92 items. Stepwise multiple regressions were used to partial out effects of age, health and number of years of education. Age accounted for a small but significant amount of the variance in frequency of forgetting. Martin (1986) asked two groups of subjects, young and old, to complete two memory questionnaires. The Everyday Memory Questionnaire (EMQ) asked subjects to rate their memory for 37 different types of things, relative to most other people, on a scale of 1-5, from very poor to very good. The questions queried memory for faces, shopping, books, songs, telephone numbers, routes, dates, prices and some prospective memory items such as paying bills, keeping appointments and taking medicine. The old group rated their memory better than did the young for four of the items, appointments, colours, paying bills and taking medicine, but poorer for names of people, telephone numbers and sports results. There was no age difference for the other items. The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes,1982) asked subjects to rate how often everyday errors occurred. Forgetting people’s names was the only type of cognitive failure which was rated as more frequent by the elderly. Cohen and Faulkner (1984) reported a similar pattern of results from a questionnaire similar to Martin’s EMQ. They also found that old subjects claimed to have better memories for the prospective memory items and poorer memory for all items involving names and numbers. Seeking some objective validation of her findings, Martin examined the attendance records of all her subjects over an eight year period. These appeared to confirm self-reports. The number of appointments missed without warning was significantly higher in the young group than in the older group. How can these self-reports and Martin’s attendance records be reconciled with the results of objective testing with the Rivermead Behavioural Memory tests? Herzog, Dixon and Hultsch (1990) have demonstrated the relationship between metamemory and memory efficacy. People’s beliefs about their own memories are based on their experience of success and failure in everyday life. In daily life elderly subjects habitually use external memory aids to remind themselves to keep appointments and therefore have a high success rate. Similarly, they might achieve a high success rate in remembering to take medicine by strategies like putting the medicine in a prominent place. So

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performance, and beliefs about memory based on performance, are maintained at a high level even though memory may be declining. These considerations illustrate some of the weaknesses of questionnaires as measures of ability. People’s beliefs are influenced by many other factors as well as by performance. These include negative stereotypes of ageing, self-image and emotional states such as depression. These factors may cause the elderly to underestimate their own ability, but other factors may cause overestimation. The metamemory paradox may operate so that people who have the poorest memories are more likely to forget their own memory failures and so less likely to report their occurrence. Memory performance in everyday life must also be highly dependent on lifestyle. A person with a very busy life has more things to remember and so more opportunities for error. A person with a very undemanding routinized life is less likely to forget things. Age effects may be confounded with differences in lifestyle and also with differences in motivation. Remembering to pay bills, answer letters or take medicine may be deemed more important by older people. Cohen (1989) in an unpublished study, administered a questionnaire on mental planning to young and elderly subjects. They were asked to rate the amount of time spent in prior planning and mental rehearsal, and the level of detail in the plan, before undertaking a complex non-routine activity like a journey. Older people, especially women, spent more time planning and planned in greater detail. The reasons they gave for planning were to reduce anxiety and to avoid errors. These findings suggest that, in everyday life, performance of prospective memory tasks is preserved in old age by increased compensatory use of mental rehearsal as well as by external memory aids. Questionnaire responses are also likely to be influenced by age-related differences in beliefs about memory. Erber (1989) and Erber, Szuchman & Rothberg (1990) found evidence of a double standard in judgements about memory failures. Their subjects read vignettes in which Mrs X (designated in some examples as a young woman and in other examples as elderly) experienced an everyday memory failure, such as forgetting a telephone number, a name, an item from a shopping list or what had been said in a conversation. The results showed that young subjects judged memory failures more harshly and evinced a double standard because they were more likely to attribute errors made by an old person to ’mental difficulty’ needing remedial therapy, whereas the same errors when made by a young person were attributed

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to 'being distracted'. Older people made more lenient judgements and were less likely to ascribe failures to mental difficulty or to think remedial intervention was required. Erber concluded that older subjects have a greater tolerance of memory failures. Such age differences in attitudes to memory are likely to influence ratings in questionnaires, so that the results reflect attitude differences which might be masking real differences in everyday memory ability. Prospective memory cannot be considered in isolation from retrospective memory. In remembering what actions to perform in the future it is also important to remember what actions have already been performed. Acting must be monitored so that when an intended action has been performed, the plan is revised and updated. Reality monitoring is the ability to distinguish between memories of actions or events that really occurred and memories of actions or events that were only planned or intended (Johnson & Raye,1982). This ability is important in everyday life and failures of reality monitoring are a common experience. People forget whether they locked the door, took the medicine, added salt to the soup, or only thought about doing so. Two kinds of error can be made. False positive errors (e.g. believing you did lock the door when you only thought about it) produce response omissions. The door does not get locked because you think you already did it. False negative errors (e.g. believing you only thought about an action when you actually performed it) result in response repetitions. The medicine is taken twice over because you forget you already took it. Similar confusions between intended and actual utterances underlie omiting to say something or saying it more than once. Cohen and Faulkner (1989) presented people with a series of actions (e.g. Put the button in the cup; move the stamp next to the paper clip) with instructions to perform the action, or to imagine performing it, or to watch while the experimenter performed it. In a subsequent recognition test subjects had to discriminate these actions from foils and indicate which actions had been performed, imagined or watched. There was no age difference for performed actions, but the oldest group made more false positive errors, misidentifying actions which had been imagined or foil actions which had never occurred, as ones they had watched or performed. Signal detection analyses indicated that the elderly had a lower criterion for deciding that an action had been performed. Backman (1985) found an age deficit in memory for verbal lists of actions but, like Cohen and Faulkner, he found no age deficit in memory for

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the same actions when they had been performed. He concluded that performance necessarily produces richer multimodal encoding which supports memory effectively. It seems, therefore, that elderly people have no difficulty in remembering what they have done, but are liable to decide they have done something which they had only thought about. Following this line of reasoning, Cohen and Faulkner asked their subjects to supply ratings of the frequency of reality monitoring failures in everyday life ("How often are you uncertain whether you have actually done something like locking the door or switching on the kettle, or whether you have only thought of doing it?") Rated frequency was significantly greater in the 70+ age group. The age-related increase in false positive errors observed in the experimental task is a finding which generalizes across a wide range of memory tasks including verbal learning, text memory and eyewitness testimony. It suggests that elderly people cope with a reduction in sensory acuity and in memory accuracy by adopting a lower criterion for 'yes' responses; this compensatory shift has the effect of minimizing false negative responses and, arguably, this strategy is an effective coping device. It may be safer to make false alarm responses than not to respond at all. Prospective memory also encompasses spatial memory. Remembering to do things involves remembering where to do them. Spatial memory is an essential aspect of everyday behaviour. It includes the ability to remember the location of objects, including landmarks, and to remember routes and to navigate sucessfully inside buildings and outdoors in cities, on highways and in the countryside. Anecdotal self-reports (Kirasic, 1989) by elderly people mention difficulties such as mislaying objects around the house, disorientation in shopping centres, and difficulty in remembering where the car had been parked. Psychometric tests (reviewed by Salthouse, 1982) reveal a decline of 510% per decade after the age of 30 in performance on spatial sub-tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Experiments which focus on spatial memory have often used tasks with little ecological validity. Memory for routes in natural situations involves associating multiple views of environmental features with movement sequences, so experiments which test ability to memorize maps and models are not necessarily analogous, A general finding has been that elderly people have difficulty in integrating and co-ordinating different perspectives, but Kirasic (1991) examined age differences in a real world setting with a series of spatial

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cognition tests involving a novel supermarket and a familiar supermarket. Fifteen minutes were allowed to explore the novel supermarket. The tests were scene recognition (identifying photographs taken in the supermarket; distance ranking (for the distances of specified items from a specified start point); route execution (walking the shortest route to pick up a list of seven items) and map placement (placing pictures of items onto a floor plan in the correct locations). For the familiar supermarket there were no age differences for route execution, distance ranking and map placement but the young were better at scene recognition. For the novel supermarket the older women were poorer than the young on all the tests, and, although the young group did equally well on both supermarkets, the old were significantly more impaired in the novel supermarket. It was concluded that the young acquire spatial information in a novel environment faster and more effectively than older people, and that differences in working memory capacity may underlie this finding. What emerges from these studies of spatial memory is that experimental and psychometric tests bear little relationship to the ability of elderly people in familiar environments. The in vitro situation is too different from the in vivo situation. In the real world the environmental context is a good deal richer; the subject is mobile and can employ motoric coding; there is strong motivation for remembering; and learning is usually accumulated over repeated experiences. Experiments with simulated materials allow analytic decomposition of the processes involved in spatial memory, but are nevertheless largely irrelevant to performance in the real world. Taken together, the results show that spatial memory in real world situations appears to show much less age decrement than either psychometric tests or experimental tests carried out with simulated materials. Familiarity appears to be a critical factor. Older people take longer to learn novel environments, but are relatively unimpaired in familiar surroundings. To summarize, experimental evidence reveals an age-related decline in prospective memory which is apparent when external aids are not used. Both experiments and questionnaire studies suggest that the elderly habitually make effective use of memory aids and mental rehearsal to counteract this decline. Multivariate analyses indicate that age is only one of several correlated factors that produce self-reports of frequent memory failures, and the validity of self-reports is questionable. Correlations between self-reports and actual performance on objective tests are generally low (Herrman, 1982) and there are

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many reasons why self-reports are unlikely to be accurate. Experimental studies of prospective memory have, in many cases, lacked control over rehearsal and reminding strategies employed in the retention period. None of the methods has succeeded in shedding much light on the cognitive mechanisms underlying prospective memory failures. One suggestion is that prospective memory is an example of controlled, effortful processing which is known to be age-sensitive, as opposed to automatic processes which are relatively immune to ageing. A relationship between prospective memory failures and a reduction in working memory capacity has also been suggested and is supported by West and Walton’s findings. Studies of reality monitoring show that there is an age-related increase in confusion between memories of performed actions and memories of planned actions which necessarily affects prospective memory. An important lesson to emerge from research on this topic is that in the study of memory and ageing we need to ask two questions: Is there an age-related decline? And, if so, how is it managed in everyday life? There may be a measurable decline which has negligible effect in real life.

Memory for discourse: Texts, conversations and names Being able to remember what has been said is just as important in everyday life as being able to remember what to do. Age-related changes in memory inevitably affect language skills, but in this area the three methodologies also produce some conflicting results. The experimental approach has yielded a great deal of information about the effects of ageing on language in vitro, but its relevance to the everyday situation is questionable. Experimental studies have concentrated on identifying and analyzing deficits in terms of a cognitive model of language processing. Age differences in memory for discourse arise mainly at the encoding stage, and have been attributed to an age-related reduction in the capacity of working memory and in speed of processing (Cohen, 1988). Because reading is self-paced and the reader can backtrack and re-read, memory for written information tends to be less affected by ageing than memory for spoken information. Experiments varying the rate of speech and the type of material show that the elderly listener has problems when the speech rate is fast and the topic unfamiliar. In these circumstances, comprehension and memory are likely to be superficial or fragmented. Some aspects of the discourse may not be

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processed at all, or may be processed so sketchily that they are not retained. The elderly listener may not have sufficient processing capacity to carry out the deeper levels of analysis that are necessary to extract meanings which are implied, but not stated explicitly. Elderly people have difficulty in holding the phrases they are currently processing in working memory and, at the same time, linking them to what has gone before, so they may be unable to integrate different pieces of information that are not adjacent in the discourse. This can cause problems, for example, in resolving anaphoric reference (Light & Albertson, 1988) when the pronoun and the referent noun are widely separated, or in perceiving logical relationships and contradictions (Cohen, 1979). McIntyre and Craik (1987) tested the ability of old and young subjects to remember new factual information presented by one of two speakers. After a week's delay older people showed 'source forgetting'. Correctly recalled facts were attributed to the wrong source. This deficit has also been attributed to a shortfall of the processing capacity required to integrate information within its context. Several experiments have compared the memory of young and old listeners for information from television news broadcasts (e.g. Stine, Wingfield & Myers,l990). This task has much greater ecological validity since it draws on the daily experience of most elderly people. However, the results showed that the older group recalled 23% less information than the young. Although young people benefited from bisensory inputs, so that listen-and-watch or listen-and-read conditions yielded higher recall, older subjects obtained no benefit from bisensory inputs. Stine et al. concluded that they lacked the working memory capacity to process both sources and this conclusion was supported by high negative correlations between age, measures of working memory and recall scores. Some age-related changes in language production are also attributed to memory impairment. Working memory capacity is required to assemble and order language elements before they are uttered or written. Kemper (1988) found that the elderly typically use shorter sentences and less complex syntactic structures. As one example of this, she reported a decline in the use of left-branching clauses, (like "The train that ran to Springfield which I took to see the President's funeral train now goes all the way to Chicago") which place a severe load on working memory. (Here's one example, surely, of an age-related change for the better!) In spontaneous narratives about events in their past lives, Winthorpe and Rabbitt (1988) found that elderly people were

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more likely to initiate themes and forget to complete them, which is also attributable to a reduction in working memory capacity. But do these findings have any practical significance? Do they apply to performance in naturally occurring conversation? Do they affect ability to communicate in everyday life? We do not know the answers to these questions because very little research has been undertaken on age effects in naturally occurring discourse. Coupland and Coupland (1990) claim that experimental research on ageing is, explicitly or implicitly, based on what they call ’the deficit paradigm’. That is, results are biased because research starts from the assumption that abilities decline with age. They would prefer to see more use of discourse analysis techniques which could be employed to study the communication efficiency of elderly people in naturally occurring conversations, but, so far, there has been little research using this method. On commonsense grounds it is apparent that many of the subtle deficits found in experiments would have little or no effect in everyday situations. In natural conversation shorter sentences and simpler syntax will do just as well, or better. The ability to produce left-branching clauses is not an asset. Memory failures are less likely to occur because conversation is interactive: memory is supported by cues and prompts from the other speakers. It usually includes a good deal of redundancy and repetition so that demands on speed of processing and on memory are reduced. Moreover, speakers usually adapt the content, style and rate of speech to the hearer’s understanding, even to the extent of using a kind of baby talk (Caporael, Lukaszewski & Culbertson, 1983). The experimental studies typically test memory for small gobbets of language divorced from any linguistic or social context and unrelated to the past knowledge or experience of the listener, whereas real world conversation takes place in a framework of shared experience. For all these reasons, age-related deficits in language processes are likely to be much less evident in the natural situation. Psychometric studies of verbal abilities such as the verbal sub-tests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale have produced mixed results (Salthouse, 1982). Some tests show little or no effect of ageing and are therefore in conflict with the experimental findings. In the Vocabulary test it is common to find that elderly people have higher scores than young people. The Information test also shows age invariance. However, these tests involve semantic memory for the meaning of single words or short phrases, or for general knowledge.

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They do not make the same demands on working memory or on speed of processing as listening to discourse. The discrepancy is therefore not surprising. Psychometric tests, like analogies, which do impose a working memory load have more often been found to show an age decrement. Phenomenological evidence from questionnaire responses suggests that people do not report any age-related impairment of language skills. Cohen and Faulkner (1 984) and Martin (1 986) found only slight nonsignificant age differences in rated ability to recall the gist of conversations or the exact words spoken, and in recall of radio and television programmes. Similarly, there were no age differences in rated frequency of the respondents forgetting to say something they intended to say. However, there is one aspect of language ability where self-reports and experimental findings are in good agreement. When older people are asked informally what aspect of memory they find to be most affected by ageing they almost invariably cite memory for proper names. They report that temporary retrieval blocks, in which a name that is known cannot be recalled, occur with increasing frequency. This kind of memory lapse begins to be apparent earlier, and subjectively appears to be more severe, than any other age-related memory problems. Phenomenological evidence of name blocking comes from diary studies in which subjects of different ages record the incidence of naturally occurring name blocks and details about the nature of the blocks (Cohen & Faulkner, 1986; Burke, Worthley & Martin, 1988). These diaries confirm that the incidence of name blocks is higher in older people. They also reveal qualitative differences in the nature of the blocks. When young people experience a block they often know the first letter of the name or the number of syllables, and often recall similar sounding but incorrect names. By contrast, elderly people typically recall no phonological information about the target name, and no similar names come to mind. Whereas the young have partial information about the target name, the elderly are more likely to experience a complete blank. In experimental studies name blocks are induced by presenting subjects with photographs of famous people (e.g. Maylor, 1990) or with descriptions of well-known people (Burke & Laver,1990) and asking them to name the people depicted or described. The results were in striking agreement with the findings from the diary studies. Crook & West (1990) showed videotapes of individuals introducing themselves to 1205 subjects aged between 18 and 90. In a subsequent test subjects had to name the individuals shown on the video. From

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each set of six individuals the 18-39 age group recalled an average of 3.6 names; the 70-90 age group recalled only 1.5 names. Multiple regression analyses were carried out to assess the contribution of demographic variables including age, gender, educational level; psychometric test scores for vocabulary and IQ; and cognitive test scores for face recognition, reaction time and paired associate learning. Age emerged as by far the strongest predictor of name recall. The reason why, in this particular case, experimental and phenomenological measures are in such good agreement is that the name recall deficit detected in experiments is one which cannot be easily masked, ignored or side-stepped in everyday life. It is difficult to devise strategies or memory aids which will prevent name blocks occurring. Although other words can be replaced by synonyms if memory fails, it is very difficult to avoid the use of proper names. Failure to recall a name when face to face with a known person is frustrating and socially embarrassing. Failure to recall a name in order to refer to a person not present means that a description must be substituted and this may be ambiguous and imprecise. Discourse analysis studies have not yet been undertaken to examine the way name blocks affect conversation, how they are managed by speaker and hearer and whether they contribute to the negative stereotypes of older people described by Giles (1991). It seems obvious, though, that blocking must disrupt the ease and flow of conversation and the efficiency of communication of information. It is not surprising, therefore, that older people are well aware of this problem and that their reports agree with the experimental evidence.

Conclusions In the study of memory and ageing in everyday life different research methods have frequently produced conflicting results. So which method is best? The answer is that it depends on what you want to know. Objective experiments and psychometric tests reveal some deficits, but these are often counteracted in real life by effective coping strategies, and by the richer context which supports remembering Phenomenological methods provide the best evidence for levels of memory performance in everyday life situations: psychometric methods provide the best evidence for individual differences and the associated factors; experimental methods provide the best evidence for changes in

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underlying cognitive mechanisms.

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elderly adults, paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC . Rowe, J. W., & Kahn, R. L. (1987). Human ageing: Usual and successful. Science, 237, 143-149. Salthouse, T.A. (1982). Adult Cognition. New York: Springer Verlag. Sinnott, J. D. (1984). Prospectivehtentional and incidental everyday memory. Paper presented at the American Psychological Association Meeting, Toronto. Sinnott, J. D. (1986). Prospectivehtentional and incidental everyday memory: Effects of age and the passage of time. Psychology and Aging, 1, 110-116. Stine, E. A., Wingfield, A., & Myers, S. D.(1990). Age differences in procesing information from television news: The effects of bisensory augmentation. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 45, 1-8. West, R. L. (1984). An analysis of prospective everyday memory. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Toronto. West, R. L. (1986). Everyday memory and aging. Developmental Neuromychology, 2, 323-344. West, R. L., & Walton, M. (1985). Practical memorv functioning in the elderly. Paper presented at the National Forum on Research on Aging, Lincoln, NE. Wilson, B., Cockburn, J., & Baddeley, A. D. (1985). The Rivermead behavioural memory test. Fareham, Hants: Thames Valley Test Company. I

Winthorpe, C. & Rabbitt, P. M. A. (1988). Working memory capacity, IQ, age and the ability to recount autobiographical events. In M.M. Gruneberg, P.E. Morris, & R.N.Sykes (Eds.) Practical aspects of memory: Current research and issues, V01.2 (pp. 175-179). Chichester: Wiley.

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Commentary: The Maze in the Garden Leonard W. Poon The University of Georgia, U S A "We do not like to look out of the same window, and see quite a different landscape. We do not like to climb a stair, and find that it takes us down. We do not like to walk out of a door, and find ourselves back in the same room. We do not like the maze in the garden, because it too closely resembles the maze in the brain." T . S . Eliot 'The Family Reunion' This was a favorite verse of the late George Talland (1965) who was noted for his creative application of experimental psychological techniques to shed light on memory problems associated with normal aging, Korsakoff syndrome, and dementia. Talland was a systematic thinker. He was frequently challenged by the bulk of memory performance data either looking for some explanations or driven by some extant hypotheses of the time. The verse by T.S. Eliot perhaps reflected his frustration in looking for parsimonious explanations on memory functioning. Since the days of George Talland some 20 years ago, there has been a substantial amount of research on memory and aging (see reviews by Craik, 1977, Poon, 1985, and Hultsch & Dixon, 1990). Has the state-of-the-art advanced substantially? The summary of research explicated by Dr. Cohen in her chapter shows that there is much remained to be learned in memory and aging. In reading Dr. Cohen's review on memory and aging, two themes emerged. One, in the quest to understand changes in memory mechanisms with aging, there is confusion on when to exert rigorous control in the laboratory and when to employ analogues of everyday situations. Two, conflicting

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findings on similar phenomena often result between well controlled laboratory methods and methods mimicking everyday situations. Cohen's review of findings from prospective, spatial, and discourse memory all seem to indicate that the magnitude of age difference is minimized when ecological methods are employed. One possible answer to reconcile the discrepancy is that 'the in vitro situation is too different from the in vivo situation.' That is, the task demands are different in the laboratory and the naturalistic setting, and further these differences may exert differential effects on the young and old adults. In examining the results of language production of young and old adults, Dr. Cohen asked 'But do these findings have any practical significance? Do they apply to performance in naturally occurring conversations? Do they affect ability to communicate in everyday life?'

Laboratory versus life. The controversy on the best methods and settings to examine cognitive processes has been brought into focus in the last decade. The debate is not only applicable to the interpretation of findings in memory and aging, but it also has a profound impact on future research directions. Understanding the issues underlying this controversy is essential to answering some of the questions on experimental control, generalization, and validity posed by Dr. Cohen in her chapter. The controversy of 'lab versus life' research methods can be illustrated by two papers representing these disparate points of view. In the one corner, Ulric Neisser (1978) presented an eloquent key note address at the 1978 Conference on Practical Aspects of Memory in which he argued for ecological research. In the other corner, Banaji and Crowder (1989) provided an equally eloquent attack on ecological research while re-establishing the necessity for laboratory controlled experiments. It is noted that both proponents (opponents) have since tempered their views (Loftus, 1991), however, these papers are representative of the extreme positions. The following is a summary of their main arguments. The title of Neisser's (1978) paper, "Memory: What are the important questions?", summarizes the focus of his criticisms toward the traditional mode of investigation. He pointed out that laboratory based memory research has little to show for a hundred years of effort for three general reasons. One,

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laboratory psychologists do not study interesting questions. "If X is an interesting or social significant aspect of memory, then psychologists have hardly ever studied X." (p. 4) Two, the reason laboratory-based researchers do not study interesting questions is that they feel they should study more fundamental questions that should lead to broader generalizations. However Neisser charged that any grade school child already knows these broad generalizations about memory. Three, the reason traditional learning theory research collapsed is because its proponents failed to study ecologically relevant questions. Neisser argues that the modern information processing school will likely suffer the same demise for the same reason. He concluded that as naturalistic study of animal behavior has proven to be more rewarding than traditional research on learning, so a naturalistic study of memory may be more productive than its laboratory counterpart. Banaji and Crowder's (1989) response in their paper "The bankruptcy of everyday memory" was equally forceful. They made five counter points. One, the goals of scientific study in natural and behavioral sciences are similar. Other sciences would have been hopelessly paralyzed in their effort to understand basic mechanisms if they had attempted to place equal emphasis on everyday applications. Two, laboratory controlled procedures are important to scientific methods. This level of control is frequently lacking in ecological research. Three, everyday memory research has yet to uncover new psychological principles. Four, the purpose of scientific methods is to expose invariant mechanisms whose detection should not be left entirely to naturalistic observation, retrospective analysis and the like. Finally, a systematic knowledge is needed to separate the myths from the facts, and well controlled experimental techniques are needed to accomplish this goal. Reconciling lab versus life Cognitive researchers should be grateful for these polemics for they lead us to question the basic assumptions of our research. Many of these questions are summarized in Dr. Cohen's chapter. Perhaps it is possible to reconcile the extreme positions by clarifying four often-confused issues surrounding laboratory and naturalistic research (Poon, Welke, & Dudley, in press). One, both laboratory and naturalistic studies of memory are part and parcel of laboratory-based research. It is erroneous to assume that tight control

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can only be achieved in the traditional laboratory. In fact, the selection of stimuli, subjects, and manipulation of dependent and independent variables in both types of studies all follow basic experimental psychological principles. Although laboratory investigations need not employ everyday stimuli, it does not preclude the use of these stimuli (Poon, Welke, & Dudley, in press). On the other hand, although naturalistic studies employ realistic stimuli to simulate actual everyday conditions, it is rare that these studies completely simulate all the everyday parameters. The important classifying dimension is not whether the study is conducted in or out of the traditional laboratory but how the substantive questions are asked. Some questions may necessitate a similar design independent of where the study is conducted. Two, ecological validity and generalization of results can be achieved in both laboratory and naturalistic studies. Banaji and Crowder (1989) argued that ecological validity of the methods is not important and that it can even work against generalization of results. They argued that as long as generalization is achieved the level of ecological validity of stimuli and method is not a concern. Since the goal of all research strives for high generalization, then one’s preferred method, whether it is ecologically valid or not, really should not be a concern. In fact, convergence of findings using different methods is preferred. Three, control and generalization could exert similar effects in laboratory and naturalistic studies. It is noted earlier that some degree of control is exercised in both types of studies. The traditional notion of experimental psychology is that tighter control can lead to higher generalization in specific domains. Contrary to this perspective, there are differe5 views regarding control and generalization (Poon, Rubin, & Wilson, 1989) which could support theoretical reasons for a choice between laboratory and ecological research designs (Rubin, 1989a). Two examples are provided here. Rubin (1989b) argues for the demonstration of regularities against control. He notes that given the present state of knowledge of cognitive mechanisms it is more important to establish and uncover regularities of phenomena than to exert experimental control. Once regularities are uncovered, then theories of cognition could be evoked or developed to understand that behavior. He argues that the naturalistic environment is the preferred laboratory since people display more regular behavior in less controlled situations. From this perspective, no control is preferred; lower control is

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related to higher regularity which in turn relates to higher generalizability. Mook (1989) also advises against the traditional laboratory control in sampling subjects, stimuli, and situations. He reasoned that for most questions asked in research conducted outside the laboratory, control is neither needed nor desired. He has demonstrated by case studies that published laboratory studies regularly violate every one of the canons of external validity in research. For example, published examples could be found in which a) assumptions of representativeness of subjects, manipulations, and settings are violated in relation to the research question, b) prediction of real life from experimental findings is assessed but not easily demonstrable, and c) the aim of accounting for a lot of real world variance is not met. He suggested that the notions of representativeness, prediction, and external validity must be dependent on the questions asked and not on some over-arching rules of research. These perspectives challenge the traditional ways researchers are taught about imposing control in experimental designs and in thinking about the generalization of results. Finally, the selection of a research setting or method should be dependent on whether the goal is to predict or understand a phenomenon. Again, we borrow from the work of Mook (1989) who demonstrated how the traditional laboratory and naturalistic methods could supplement and complement our extant knowledge. Mook describes an 'analogue' model of research in which representative samples are drawn to generalize to a population. Agricultural research falls in this domain. An 'analytic' model represents most of the work done by experimental and cognitive psychologists. This type of research begins and ends with a research question. In this model, there is no 'population' so that the notion of representativeness does not apply. Generalization is often not necessary since the sample is not measured to estimate what the general case is like. Rather the researcher asks: How do these subjects, in this setting, respond to this manipulation? Examples of traditional laboratory and naturalistic studies could be found to fit in both analogue and analytic models of research. Medical research would fall in laboratory analogue research. Survey and marketing research would fall in naturalistic analogue research. Experimental psychology would fall into laboratory analytic research, and psychological field studies and correlational studies would fall into naturalistic analytic research.

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There are indeed specific models of traditional laboratory and naturalistic methods to answer specific research questions. The important questions are not whether studies should be performed in the laboratory or the naturalistic environment, but rather when the conditions are most favorable to perform an experiment in a laboratory or an ecologically valid setting, and why a particular setting should be selected (Rubin, 1989a; Landauer, 1989). If the study of cognitive mechanisms is approached from this perspective, then there is no need to artificially divide laboratory and ecological research.

Back to the future Let us now return to the questions posed by Dr. Cohen regarding the conflicting results in memory and aging research. How could we begin to resolve conflicting findings? I would suggest that we, the researchers, are fortunate that the data show systematic bias between traditional laboratory and naturalistic methods. That is, there are demonstrable regularities in the data from which a systematic investigation could be initiated. What task characteristics in the varying settings produce differing performance outcomes in young and old adults? Are there similarities and differences in the stimuli employed in the different methods? Could different samples of subjects selected for the different studies influence the performance outcome, and what concomitant sampling characteristics are responsible for the differing outcomes? In experiments that seek to understand aging mechanisms, are the mechanisms robust enough to be replicated in different paradigms, situations, and samples? Could we be confident enough to predict memory performances of young and old adults in the laboratory and naturalistic settings? Since we have begun to ask meaningful substantive questions, we should be well on our way to find our way through the maze in the garden.

References Banaji, M. R.,& Crowder, R. G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 44. 1185-1 193. Craik, F. I. M. (1977). Age differences in human memory. In J. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of aging (pp 384-420). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

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Hultsch, D. F. & Dixon, R. A. (1990). Learning and memory in aging. In I. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of (pp 258-274). New York: Academic Press. Landauer, T. K. (1989). Some bad and some good reasons for studying memory and cognition in the wild. In L. W. Poon, D. C. Rubin, & B. A. Wilson (Eds.), Everyday cognition in adulthood and late life (pp. 116-125). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Loftus, E. (1991). The glitter of everyday memory and the gold. American Psychologist, 46, 1, 16-18. Mook, D. G. (1989). The myth of external validity. In L. W. Poon, D. C. Rubin, & B. A. Wilson (Eds.), Evervday Cognition in Adulthood and Late Life (pp. 25-43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Neisser, U. (1978). Memory: what are the important questions? In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 3-24). London: Academic Press. Poon, L. W. (1985). Differences in human memory with aging: Nature, causes, and clinical implications. In J . E. Birren & K. W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of the mychologv of aging (pp 427-462). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Poon, L. W., Rubin, D. C., & Wilson, B. A. (Eds.). (1989). Everyday cognition in adulthood and late life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Poon, L. W., Welke, D., & Dudley, W. (in press). What is everyday cognition? In J. M. Puckett & H. W. Reese (Eds.), Life-span development psychologv: Mechanisms of everyday cognition. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Rubin, D. C. (1989a). Introduction to Part I: The how, when, and why of studying everyday cognition. In L. W. Poon, D. C. Rubin, & B. A. Wilson (Eds.), Everyday copnition in adulthood and late life. (pp. 3-7). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rubin, D. C. (1989b). Issues of regularity and control: Confessions of a regularity freak. In L. W. Poon, D. C. Rubin, & B. A. Wilson (Eds.), Everyday cognition in adulthood and late life. (pp. 84-103). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Talland, G. A. (1965). Deranged memorv: A psychonomic studv of the amnesic syndrome. New York: Academic Press.

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Commentary: Is Memory Something We Have or Something We Do? Elizabeth A. L. Stine University of New Hampshire, U S A As Cohen accurately observes, the focus in much of the published research on memory and aging has been to characterize the conditions which engender age deficits in performance. An assumption underlying much of this literature is that memory is an endogenous trait, something one has, much like hair color or income or a car with an engine of a certain horsepower or a house of a particular size, and that the predominant task of cognitive aging has been to describe ’how much memory’ one has left in late adulthood. In the next few pages, I will use Cohen’s excellent chapter as a starting point from which to argue that memory is not only something we have, but that it is also something we do. While we may possess a home of a certain size and style, the point of having a home is to live in it; we arrange fuiniture and shelving and pictures and flower gardens so that it accommodates our lifestyle. Similarly, at any point in the life-span, our memory systems have certain limits (at a younger age these tend to be limits of knowledge base, while at an older age these tend to be limits of processing capacity), but somehow we manage to live within these limits so as to function in everyday life. While focusing on localization of deficits, memory and aging research has substantially neglected what it is that one must do in order to effectively use one’s memory capabilities into later adulthood. Thus, even though it is clear that there is substantial heterogeneity in the elderly population (Nelson & Dannefer, 1992), and that for some, aging is indeed ’successful’ (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Rowe & Kahn, 1987), it is not at all clear how this is accomplished in the cognitive domain.

Methodological diversity Cohen aptly notes the wide variety of methods used in the study of memory and aging, categorizing them into phenomenological, psychometric, and experimental approaches. Such diversity will certainly prove to be an asset in untangling the phenomenon of successful cognitive aging. Cronbach (1957) noted some time ago that experimental psychology, which relies on tight control

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of situational variables, and correlational psychology, whose "mission is to observe and organize the data from Nature's experiments" (p. 672), seemed to represent two distinct disciplines within psychology ("The personality, social, and child psychologists went one way; the perception and learning psychologists went the other; and the country between turned into desert" (p. 675)). As he wrote this, he noted some tenuous lines of rapprochement, but called for a "true federation" (p. 675) that would acknowledge that "organism and treatment are an inseparable pair" (p. 683). The field of cognitive aging may well represent the psychology of Cronbach's dreams: growing from the experimentally-driven information processing tradition and the correlationally-driven tradition of developmental psychology, it must necessarily inhabit what used to be that desert in between. Perhaps one of the simplest ways in which this divide has been bridged is through the application of a psychometric (individual differences) approach to cognitive constructs. This has been a notable turn within the field of cognitive psychology whose overriding mission had been to describe general principles for the structure and process underlying mental phenomena. For example, Hunt's work demonstrating processing differences between high- and low-verbal adults (Hunt, Lunneborg, & Lewis, 1975) and Daneman and Carpenter's development of the 'listening span' task as a measure of the efficiency of working memory processing (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) were critical in leading the field away from almost exclusive focus on the 'generic cognitive processor.' That is, it is not simply the case that short-term memory has a limited capacity of '7+2.' Rather, the more general principle is that processing capacity is limited, and that the value of this limit is variable in the population -- and that this limit has implications for the effectiveness of more general cognitive functioning (Daneman & Carpenter, 1983; Daneman & Tardif, 1987; Hunt et al., 1975; Otero & Kintsch, 1992). In cognitive aging research, this blend of experimental and psychometric approaches is apparent in research which compares age effects among subgroups varying in the efficiency of working memory processing. For example, age differences in memory for language have been found to be reduced or negligible among those who are similar in working memory performance (Stine & Hindman, in press; Tun, Wingfield, & Stine, 1991). Similarly, Salthouse and colleagues (e.g., Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) have shown that measures of simple processing speed can account for a substantial

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portion of age variance in working memory processing, which in turn may mediate age deficits in language memory performance for single sentences (Stine & Wingfield, 1987), for television news (Stine, Wingfield, & Myers, 1990), and for extended radio narratives (Stine, Lachman, & Wingfield, in press). Thus, while the ecological validity of some psychometric tests may be low (as Cohen notes), theory-driven process measures may, in fact, be very useful in accounting for age deficits in memory for language under more naturalistic conditions. Finally, with respect to methodological issues, I wish to affirm Cohen's inclusion of phenomenological approaches, though I would depart somewhat from her position that these methods are necessarily limited or nonanalytic. While it is, of course, true that subjective beliefs of one's ability or memory performance may have little contact with reality, there has been a growing literature in the last few years exploring the relationship between the phenomenological experience of memory and memory performance. For example, in their review of the literature, Cavanaugh and Greene (1990) note that self-confidence in one's ability (self-efficacy) is predictive of perseverance in the face of challenges, the efficiency of analytic thinking in complex cognitive tasks, the tendency to visualize and rehearse strategies for successful performance, and the tempering of perceived stress in a challenging situation. To be sure, (as Cohen points out) our perceptions of memory ability may be optimistic, but Cavanaugh and Greene argue that such a rosy perception of cognitive ability is adaptive. In fact, beliefs about one's memory are often predictive of actual memory performance (e.g., Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989). In a similar vein, Lachman (1983) has shown that believing one's cognitive performance is controlled by internal factors is positively related to memory performance while believing that one's performance is affected by external factors is negatively related to performance. When a measure of working memory span is partialled from the correlation between perceived control and memory, this correlation is negligible (Stine et al., in press), suggesting that control beliefs may affect memory performance by modulating working memory processing. Thus, it is probably the case that phenomenology affects process. This methodological interplay is important since it carries phenomenological methods from the realm of the "merely descriptive" into a position of being an analytic tool. One might envision the strongest strides in

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memory and aging research being made by creative blends of experimental, psychometric, and phenomenological methods.

A word about deficits All three methodological approaches have been used to isolate age-related capacity limits, which must be accommodated in order to age successfully. For some time now, the field of cognitive aging has been driven by the search for an adequate metaphor to capture the empirical findings of loss, with the primary candidates revolving around some loss of capacity. Thus, the causal locus of age deficits in memory has been alternatively postulated to reside in a relative decline in effortful processing (Hasher & Zacks, 1979), a dearth of attentional resources (Craik & Simon, 1980), a slowing of component processing operations (Salthouse, 1980), or a reduction in the capacity of the workspace in working memory (Baddeley, 1986). Each one of these positions has been productive in the sense of generating testable hypotheses, though it has never been clear that these are distinctive proposals. Rather, they seem to represent conceptual systems that translate easily into one other (Salthouse, 1991), and thus, show considerable overlap in their predictive power. The Inhibition Hypothesis (Hasher & Zacks, 1988), however, represents a significant departure from this state of affairs. Within the Inhibition framework, aging does not entail a decrease in capacity per se, but rather a failure of inhibitory mechanisms that regulate into working memory the entrance of information that is relevant to current comprehension goals. The upshot of this formulation is that a lack of efficiency in later adulthood is thought to be the result of too much information residing in working memory rather than too little! Interestingly, the Inhibition Hypothesis can handily account for any data that a reduced-capacity model (e.g., working memory, slowing, attentional capacity) can, since an ineffective modulation of the kind of information admitted into working memory would functionally decrease capacity by allowing irrelevant ideas to consume resources needed for 'goal-relevant' activities. In addition to accounting for the large body of data supporting the notion of age-related capacity limits, the Inhibition Hypothesis makes the rather unintuitive prediction that older adults will remember some things that younger adults would not, since the contents of their working memories are in some ways more 'enriched.' There is a growing body of

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literature which supports this. With respect to discourse processing, older adults seem less facile than the young in revising their memory representations (Zacks, Hasher, Doren, Hamm, & Attig, 1987). For example, Hartman and Hasher (1991) presented a series of sentences with highly predictable endings (e.g., "She ladled the soup into her -.'I), asking subjects to generate their own endings before the sentence-final words were presented. For some of the trials, these words were not the predicted ones (e.g., bowl), but were unexpected endings (e.g., lap). While younger adults demonstrated retention of only the presented endings in a subsequent test of indirect memory, older adults seemed to retain both endings. A similar finding was shown at the passage level in a study by Hamm and Hasher (1992). Subjects read passages which implied an inference (e.g., the reader is led to believe that the main character is in a hospital: she was ill, called her friend who was a nurse, and subsequently entered a large building) which is inconsistent with the later text (e.g., the fact that she goes to the main desk to check out a book). By the end of the passage, younger adults, when explicitly asked, have revised their previously incorrect inference (e.g., they report that she is in a library); in contrast, older adults were equally likely to report both the first inference suggested and the second (e.g., she is in a library and a hospital). Such age differences in discourse memory are hard to explain simply in terms of reduced capacity, but are easily explicable within the Inhibition framework. This notion is also consistent with the observation that older adults show disproportionate recall of less memorable idea units in high load conditions (Stine & Wingfield, 1990) and tend to produce more elaborations during text recall (e.g., Gould, Trevithick, & Dixon, 1991). One question that remains to be fully addressed is whether the failure of inhibition represents an inability to discriminate between the relevant and the irrelevant or an inability to focus on that which exceeds a threshold for relevance (cf. Stine & Wingfield, 1990). The Inhibition Hypothesis might also be useful in accounting for age differences in prospective memory. Certainly in planning what we are going to do and how we are going to accomplish it, we generate many alternatives. The Inhibition Hypothesis would predict that inadequate suppression of rejected alternatives would make it difficult to sort out and enact in due course the selected action or sequence of actions without some external aid. The finding by Cohen and Faulkner (1989) that older adults are more likely than the young to believe that they had actually performed actions which they had in fact only

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imagined performing is certainly consistent with this view. To sum up, any account of memory and aging must ultimately account for the reliable age differences found in performance. Many of the empirical findings in both discourse memory and prospective memory can be accommodated by the assumption that older adults have less effective inhibitory mechanisms. While intuitively it might seem that memory and aging research will best proceed by finding the cause of deficits and subsequently developing remediations, in the next section it is argued that this process also works in reverse; that is, effective remediation may give us some insight into cause.

Molar equivalence-molecular decomposition Almost a decade ago, Salthouse (1984) made a forceful case for the use of a research strategy he termed "molar equivalence-molecular decomposition. " The general principle is to measure a molar behavior among a sample of individuals for whom there is no change in performance as a function of age, and then to measure a set of molecular processes which presumably contribute to the molar behavior. Given molar equivalence across age groups, the research question then becomes what changes in the balance of the molecular processes enable age equivalence at the molar level. Note that this strategy of understanding molecular change in the face of molar stability departs from the strategy of localizing deficits in order to develop remedial strategies. In order to localize deficits we typically consider the consequences of variations in stimulus materials, subject characteristics, and task requirements on performance. Thus, we control and manipulate the former three sets of variables and treat level of performance (as speed or accuracy) as a dependent variable. This research strategy is, of course, a sound one for detailing the conditions under which age differences are exacerbated or minimized. An alternative approach is to consider the conditions which engender particular performance levels. A case in point is psychophysics in which the search for "molar equivalence" is the normative approach. For example, auditory sensitivity is described in terms of the sound pressure level (in dB) required in order to detect a pure tone of a particular frequency. That is, the dependent variable is the intensity required to achieve molar equivalence (i.e., threshold) which must be relatively greater for the detection of frequencies

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outside an intermediate range ( 5 2 k H z ) for young and old and especially great for high frequencies among the old (cf. Fozard, 1990). This parametric approach to understanding the limits of the information processing system is something that we take for granted in the area of psychophysics, and it is clear that our understanding of the auditory system would be very meager if we presented tones of varied frequency at a single arbitrary intensity level and simply reported the existence of relative 'deficits' for some frequencies which are exacerbated among the elderly. The difference in perspective is perhaps subtle. For example, while I agree with the substance of Cohen's account of age differences in prospective memory, I wish to take issue with the characterization that "the appearance of well-preserved prospective memory in old age is illusory." To the contrary, prospective memory is preserved in later adulthood, and this is accomplished by a skillful reliance on external aids. It is the assumption that memory is something one has that leads us to conclude that the elderly are wanting, while the assumption that memory is something one does would lead us to the conclusion that the older adult who has to remember a doctor's appointment is doing what is required to accomplish that goal. The objection is not merely an issue of rhetoric, but rather of framing the research agenda for memory and aging. Memory as doing can be seen in the literature on discourse memory. For example, in a self-paced word-by-word reading task, younger and older adults have been found to allocate time very similarly, with both groups slowing down to accommodate longer words as well as the organizational requirements of major and minor syntactic boundaries (Stine, 1990). With this similarity in on-line processing, subsequent memory performance for these single sentences show the typical memory advantage favoring the young. Age differences exist, however, in the patterns of reading time among those who show flawless recall of the sentences with older adults allocating differentially more time to the minor syntactic boundaries relative to major boundaries. Thus, in order to be successful in recall, the older readers may need to organize on-line into smaller chunks that are manageable within capacity limits. A more recent study (Stine & Cheung, unpublished data) demonstrates that older adults who show good recall of short narratives also handle the introduction of new concepts differently as well. In this study, subjects (n=24 in each age group) read three short narratives word-by-word for immediate

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recall. In order to focus on the effects of new concepts on reading time, reported times are those adjusted for the effects of word length, word frequency, and line breaks; thus, in these data these effects were statistically controlled to give cleaner estimates of new concepts effects. For younger and older adults, reading times for individual words systematically increased as a function of the number of new concepts that had been introduced into the text up to that point. This finding is consistent with the literature (Haberlandt, Graesser, Schneider, & Kiely, 1986) and illustrates the on-line processing effort that is required to assimilate new information into the current text representation. Interestingly, readers slow down to accommodate new concepts as soon as they are encountered (supporting an immediacy hypothesis), as well as at subsequent syntactic boundaries (supporting the notion that some information must be buffered, for example to organize the interrelationships among these new concepts). In the Stine and Cheung experiment, reading times were examined separately for young and elderly adults who showed higher and lower levels of recall performance, as determined by a median split on recall scores. Younger adults whose recall was below the median allocated an extra 8 msec per new concept at non-boundary sites within the sentence, an extra 21 msec per concept at constituent boundaries within sentences, and an extra 80 sec per concept at sentence boundaries. Younger adults who demonstrated higher levels of recall allocated an extra 28 msec per concept at non-boundary sites, an extra 135 msec per concept at constituent boundaries, and an extra 170 msec per concept at sentence boundaries. Thus, successful processing among the young entailed more thorough processing of new concepts at every level of the discourse hierarchy. Older adults who showed lower recall allocated 16 msec per concept at non-boundary sites, 38 msec per concept at constituent boundaries, and 55 msec per boundary at sentence boundaries (though this latter value was only marginally significant). Older adults with relatively higher levels of recall showed a non-significant effect of concept at non-boundary sites of 5 msec per concept, but allocated 56 msec per concept at constituent boundaries and 40 msec per concept at sentence boundaries (though again this sentence effect was only marginally significant). Unlike success among the young, successful memory performance of the old entailed additional processing at syntactic constituents within the sentence without further integration of new concepts at sentence boundaries.

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One caveat with respect to these findings is that the older adults' recall was lower than that of the young within each of the recall groups, thus "success" is necessarily defined within each age group. One might speculate as to the effects that various modes of instruction or structural supports (e.g., headings, signalling) might have on the allocation of reading time and subsequent recall and the adaptations that would be necessary among the old to bring their recall performance to be on par with the young; these issues will be important in future research. To this point, the discussion has been focussed on adaptations in strategy over the life-span that would have to accommodate capacity limits; we could call these 'constructed strategies. ' Expertise within a domain also represents development of constructed strategies. While expertise has been shown to mitigate age effects in some domains (e.g., older typists maintain their level of typing speed by looking farther ahead in the text, thus compensating for a slowing in choice reaction time), there has been very little research done on the role of domain expertise in text processing. The literature on the use of schematic information generally shows either the same or greater reliance on conceptually-driven processing among the older as among the young (Arbuckle, Vanderleck, Harsany, & Lapidus, 1990; Hess, 1990; Zelinski & Miura, 1988). In a recent study of the role of expertise in aviation on the processing of aviation narratives, Morrow, Leirer, and Altieri (1992) demonstrate similar effects of expertise across age groups; that is, even though expertise did not reduce age differences, older adults were able to take advantage of their expertise in aviation in order to process narratives relevant to their domain of expertise. In contrast to strategies that are developed over the course of the life-span, there are strategies that are essentially in place from very early on, which take on more importance later in the life-span (cf. Wingfield & Stine, 1991); we could call these 'default strategies.' For example, in speech processing, older adults appear to especially rely on the prosodic contour (e.g., intonation, pauses) for comprehension and syntactic analysis (Stine & Wingfield, 1987; Wingfield, Lahar, & S h e , 1989; Wingfield, Wayland, & Stine, 1992). Similarly, older adults are particularly dependent upon sentential context for word recognition (Madden, 1988; Wingfield, Aberdeen, & Stine, 1991). It is certainly not the case that prosodic and semantic contextual support suddenly take on importance in the cognitive system in later adulthood. Rather,

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such top-down processing strategies are in place much earlier in the life-span; as the quality of the product of bottom-up analysis is degraded (e.g., by sensory failures of the sensory system or by less effective inhibition), default strategies enable functional processing capacity to withstand (to some extent) the assaults of biological aging (cf. Wingfield & Stine, 1991).

Conclusions Thus, it is encouraging to note the diversity of methodologies applied to the study of adult age differences in prospective memory and discourse memory. The startling fact about these two domains of functioning is that in many ways they appear to be fairly well preserved into later adulthood. Perhaps, the extension of the study of expertise into these domains as well as a wider application of the molar equivalence-molecular decomposition strategy will shed light on the extraordinary level of competence that is maintained well into late life.

Acknowledgements. This commentary has been supported by Grant R29 AGO8382 from the National Institute on Aging. I am grateful to Daniel Henderson, Ken Fuld, and Bob Logie for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. References Arbuckle, T. Y., Vanderleck, V. F., Harsany, M., & Lapidus, S . (1990). Adult age differences in memory in relation to availability and accessibility of knowledge-based schema. Journal of ExDerimental Psvchology: Learning. Memory. and Cognition, 16,305-315. Baddeley, A. D. (1986). University Press.

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Baltes, P. B., & Baltes, M. M. (1990). Psychological perspectives on successful aging: The model of selective optimization with compensation. In P. B. Baltes & M. M. Baltes (Eds.), Successful aging (pp. 1-34). New York: Cambridge University Press. Cavanaugh, J. C., & Green, E. E. (1990). I believe, therefore I can:

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Self-efficacy beliefs in memory and aging. In E. A. Lovelace (Ed.), Aging and cognition: Mental Drocesses. self-awareness and interventions (pp. 189-230). Amsterdam: North-Holland. Cavanaugh, J. C., & Poon, L. W. (1989). Metamemorial predictors of memory performance in young and old adults. Psychologv and Aging, 4, 365-368. Cohen, G., & Faulkner, D. (1989). Age differences in source forgetting: Effects on reality monitoring and on eye witness testimony. Psychology and Aging, 4, 1-8. Craik, F. I. M., & Simon, E. (1980). Age differences in memory: The role of attention and depth processing. In L. W. Poon, J. L. Fozard, L. S . Cermak, D. Arenberg, & L. W. Thompson (Eds.), New directions in memory and aging: Proceedings of George A. Talland memorial conference (pp. 95-1 12). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Cronbach, L. J. (1957). The two disciplines of scientific psychology. American Psychologist, 12, 671-684. Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1980). Individual differences in working memory and reading. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, B, 450-466. Daneman, M., & Carpenter, P. A. (1983). Individual differences in integrating information between and within sentences. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning. Memory. and Cognition, 9, 56 1-584. Daneman, M., & Tardif, T. (1987). Working memory and reading skill re-examined. In M. Coltheart (Ed.), Attention and Derformance. Vol. 12: TheDsychology of reading (pp. 491 -508). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Fozard, J. L. (1990). Vision and hearing in aging. In J. E. Birren & K . W. Schaie (Eds.), Handbook of the psychologv of aging (pp. 150-170). New York: Academic Press. Gould, 0. N., Trevithick, L., & Dixon, R. A. (1991). Adult age differences in elaborations produced during prose recall. Psychology and Aging, 6, 93-99. Haberlandt, K. F., Graesser, A. C., Schneider, N. J., & Kiely, J.

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(1986). Effects of task and new arguments on word reading times. Journal of Memory and Language, 25, 314-322. Hamm, V. P., & Hasher, L. (1992). Age and the availability of inferences. Psvchologv and Aging, 2,56-64. Hartman, M., & Hasher, L. (1991). Aging and suppression: Memory for previously relevant information. Psychologv and Aging, 6, 587-594. Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1979). Automatic and effortful processes in memory. Journal of Experimental Psycholoev: General, 1Qs,356-388. Hasher, L., & Zacks, R. T. (1988). Working memory, comprehension and aging: A review and a new view. In G . H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation, Vol. 22 (pp. 193-225), New York: Academic Press. Hess, T. M. (1990). Aging and schematic influences on memory. In T. M. Hess (Ed.), Aging and cognition: Knowledge organization and utilization (pp. 93-160) Amsterdam: North-Holland. Hunt, E., Lunneborg, C . , & Lewis, J. (1975). What does it mean to be high verbal? Cognitive Psycholoev, 7, 194-227. Lachrnan, M. E. (1983). Perceptions of intellectual aging: Antecedent or consequence of intellectual functioning. DeveloDmental Psycholoa, 19, 482-498. Madden, D. J. (1988). Adult age differences in the effects of sentence context and stimulus degradation during visual word recognition. Psychology and Aging, 3, 167-172. Morrow, D. G., Leirer, V. O., & Altieri, P. A. (1992). Aging, expertise, and narrative processing. Psvchology and Aging, 2,376-388. Nelson, E. A., & Dannefer, D. (1992). Aged heterogeneity: Fact or fiction? The fate of diversity in gerontological research. The Gerontologist, 32, 17-23. Otero, J., & Kintsch, W. (1992). Failures to detect contradictions in a text: What readers believe versus what they read. Psychological Science, 3, 229-235.

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Rowe, J. W., & Kahn, R. L. (1987). successful. Science, 237, 143-149.

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Salthouse, T. A. (1980). Age and memory: Strategies for localizing the loss. In L. W. Poon, J. L. Fozard, L. S . Cermak, D. Arenberg, & L. W. Thompson (Eds.), New directions in memory and aging: Proceedings of the George A. Talland memorial conference (pp. 47-65). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Salthouse, T. A. (1984). Effects of age and skill in typing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113,345-371. Salthouse, T . A. (1991). Theoretical DersDectives on cognitive aging. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Salthouse, T . A., & Babcock, R. L. (1991). Decomposing adult age differences in working memory. Developmental Psychology, 22, 763-776. Stine, E. A. L. (1990). On-line processing of written text by younger and older adults. Psychology and Aging, 5, 68-78. Stine, E. A. L . , & Hindman, J. (in press). Age differences in reading time allocation for propositionally dense sentences. Aging and Cognition. Stine, E. A. L., Lachman, M., & Wingfield, A. (in press). The roles of perceived and actual control in memory for spoken language. Educational Gerontology. Stine, E. A. L., & Wingfield, A. (1987). Process and strategy in memory for speech among younger and older adults. Psychologv and Aging, 2, 272-279. Stine, E. A. L., & Wingfield, A. (1990). The assessment of qualitative age differences in discourse processing. In T. M. Hess (Ed.), Aeing and cognition: Knowledge organization and utilization (pp. 33-92) New York: Elsevier. Stine, E. A. L., Wingfield, A., & Myers, S. D. (1990). Age differences in processing information from television news: The effects of bisensory augmentation. Journal of Gerontoloev: Psychological Sciences, 45, P1-8.

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Tun, P. A., Wingfield, A., & Stine, E. A. L. (1991). Speech processing capacity in younger and older adults: A dual-task study. P s v c h o l o g v g , 6, 3-9. Wingfield, A., Aberdeen, J. S., & Stine, E. A. L. (1991). Word-onset gating and linguistic context in spoken word recognition by young and elderly adults. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 46,P127-129. Wingfield, A., Lahar, C. J., & Stine, E. A. L. (1989). Age and decision strategies in running memory for speech: Effects of prosody and linguistic structure. Journal of Gerontology: Psychological Sciences, 44, P106-113. Wingfield, A., & Stine, E. A. L. (1991). Expert systems in nature: Spoken language processing and adults aging. In J. D. Sinnott & J. C. Cavanaugh (Eds.), Bridging paradigms: Positive development in adulthood and cognitive aging (pp. 237-258). New York: Praeger.

Wingfield, A., Wayland, S. C., & Stine, E. A. L. (1992). Adult age differences in the use of prosody for syntactic parsing and recall of spoken sentences. 1 47, P350-356. Zacks, R. T., Hasher, L., Doren, B., Hamm, V., & Attig, M. S. (1987). Encoding and memory of explicit and implicit information. Journal of Gerontology, 42, 418-422. Zelinski, E., & Miura, S. (1988). Effects of thematic information on script memory in young and old adults. Psvcholopy and Aging, 3, 292-299.

Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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CHAPTER 11 COPING WITH MEMORY IMPAIRMENT Barbara Wilson, Cambridge, United Kingdom Memory problems are frequently associated with neurological conditions. Severe head injury, stroke, encephalitis, anoxia and the degenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's, Huntington's and multiple sclerosis are just some of the conditions likely to result in significant memory impairment. Consequently, there are large numbers of people in the community who are handicapped by memory impairment following cerebral insult. For many of these, little help, advice or treatment will be given to enable them to understand, compensate for or manage their problems. The prevailing attitude among many medical personnel is that little or nothing can be done to 'treat' memory deficits. Although it is true that, for the majority of brain injured people, recovery or restoration of memory functioning is impossible, this does not mean that nothing can be done to help them and their families. I have argued elsewhere (Wilson, 1989a, 1992) that it is possible to reduce everyday memory problems through such measures as by-passing or avoiding problems through environmental restructuring or finding alternative ways to remember through the use of external memory aids or enabling memory impaired people to make more efficient use of their residual (albeit damaged) skills. Memory impaired people and their families may also cope better with their difficulties if they are provided with information about a) the nature of memory impairment (e.g. that it is usually harder to remember events that happened a short time ago than it is to remember events that happened several years before the cerebral insult); b) why certain problematic behaviours (such as constantly repeating a question) occur; c) what to expect in the future and d) self help and support groups for both the memory impaired person and the carers. A useful reference providing much of this information is Wearing (1992). The National Head Injuries Association also provides a booklet for relatives entitled "Memory Problems After Head Injury" (Wilson, 1989b).

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Is recovery possible? "A deficient memory cannot be cured" (Berg, Koning-Haanstra & Deelman, 1991, p.101) This is the advice given to memory impaired patients tested in Groningen. The patients are also told: "However, you can make more efficient use of your remaining capacities" (ibid). If we accept that a deficient memory cannot be cured does this mean that we can expect no recovery or no improvement of memory functioning? The answer to this depends in part on the cause of the memory impairment. For someone with Alzheimer's disease, we would not expect any recovery or improvement. In this case we can ask another question - "Is it possible to slow down the rate of deterioration?" The answer here is probably "No, at least not at present, but we do not really know." On the other hand, a patient who has sustained a severe head injury and is in Post Traumatic Amnesia (FTA) may expect considerable improvement and possibly even complete recovery. In a recent long-term follow up of 54 patients (from several diagnostic groups) referred for memory therapy between five and ten years earlier, (Wilson, 1991), I looked for evidence of improvement in memory functioning. Using the Rivermead Behavioural Memory Test (RBMT-Wilson, Cockburn & Baddeley, 1985) to measure improvement in memory, it was found that just under a third of the subjects had improved, a small number had deteriorated and about 60 per cent showed little or no change since leaving rehabilitation. Although only a third showed marked improvement most people had learned to use a number of coping methods to bypass or compensate for their memory problems. These subjects were originally seen several months post injury so were not in the acute stage. The long term follow up study showed that a small but significant number of people continued to improve over a period of time. Head injured people were more likely to improve than other diagnostic groups. However, as most of the improvers showed residual memory deficits I would be hesitant to apply the term 'recovery' in their case. One exception was TB, who was 55 years old when he developed a short term memory deficit after a series of epileptic seizures. He was seen for a period of a year and throughout this period his immediate memory span was 2 (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988). When seen at follow up, his span (both forward and backward) had increased to 8. This is above average for his age: His

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ability to do other working memory tasks had likewise improved (Wilson & Baddeley, (in press). TB thought his recovery was due to a) his wife (who had been very supportive), b) his computer (on which he played chess and exercised his intellectual abilities) and c) a relaxation tape made for him at the rehabilitation centre several years earlier. TB, however, is not typical of people with memory difficulties. His was a rare and unusual disorder and the true explanation for his 'recovery' is probably physical, e.g. a resolution of some electrical abnormality associated with his original seizure. For the most part it would appear that, after the acute stages, memory functioning improves in a minority of brain injured people. For the majority, however, marked improvement is unlikely to occur and, on the whole, the best way forward for these people is that recommended by Berg et al. (1991) and quoted above. This conclusion is supported by other studies. Schacter and Glisky (1986), for example, reviewed the literature on memory rehabilitation and concluded that there was no evidence to suggest it was possible to improve the memory functioning of amnesic patients. Robertson (1990) in a review of the effectiveness of computerised cognitive rehabilitation looked at computerised programmes for language, memory, visuospatial skills and attention. For the memory programmes he concluded that "there is no evidence that computerised memory therapy is effective and no justification for the distribution for purely clinical purposes of such software." (p.391). This does not mean, of course, that computers have no role to play as prosthetic aids or for assessment, recreation and vocational purposes. Glisky and Schacter (1986; 1987); have demonstrated that it is possible to teach computer terminology and other skills to densely amnesic patients. Computers can also be used as a prosthetic memory. Bergman and Kemmerer (1991), for example, describe how a computer programme enhanced self-sufficiency in a 54 year old memory impaired, head injured woman. Group studies, too, suggest that although treating people in groups has certain advantages, improving memory functioning per se is not one of them. Wilson and Moffat (1992) point out that memory groups may have indirect therapeutic value because a) participants (and their relatives) think or believe such treatment is effective and this creates optimism, b) it is possible to ensure that every individual succeeds on some occasions and c) the groups are enjoyable. As memory impaired people frequently fail and are often bewildered

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and confused by what is happening to them, such indirect value is not to be sneered at. Perhaps the most beneficial aspect of memory groups is the social function they fulfil. Many memory impaired people are lonely and isolated and enjoy the contact with other similarly impaired people. Evans and Wilson (1992) found that anxiety and depression decreased for some members of the weekly outpatient group they organised and ran for several months. Use of external memory aids increased but there was little evidence of improved memory functioning per se. To summarise this section, although some improvement in memory functioning may occur in the early stages for those without degenerative diseases, and some head injured people may continue to improve over a long period, it is unrealistic to expect that the majority of memory impaired people will recover. In consequence, I would recommend that ways should be sought to help them and their carers cope with their disability.

General guidelines for helping people with memory problems Memory can be regarded as comprising of three stages: input, storage and retrieval (Baddeley, 1990). Some researchers believe amnesia is a deficit of input (or encoding), others that it is primarily a deficit of storage and others argue it is a deficit of retrieval. Baddeley (1982) believes that none of these explanations is sufficient to account for all characteristics of the amnesic syndrome. Nevertheless, from the work carried out by cognitive psychologists in attempting to prove each of these theoretical points of view, we can obtain some useful guidelines for helping memory impaired people. For a more detailed discussion of these guidelines see Wilson (1992).

Improving input (encoding) 1. Simplify the information you want the memory impaired person to remember. Most people remember information better if technical terms and polysyllabic words are avoided (Wilson, 1 9 8 9 ~ ) . Reduce the amount of information to be remembered. 2. Make sure the person has understood the information by repeating 3. it back in his or her own words. Encourage the person to link the information to something she or 4.

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he already knows i.e. make associations. 5. Use the "little and often" rule. Generally it is better to work at something for a few minutes several times a day than to spend the same amount of time in one chunk. 6. Encourage the memory impaired person to organise the information. For example, when trying to remember a shopping list, group items from the same category together e.g. vegetables, dairy foods or cleaning items. 7. Avoid, if possible, trial and error learning. Some preliminary work by Wilson and Baddeley (Wilson, 1992) suggests that once amnesic subjects have generated an error, they find it difficult to eliminate the error because of an impaired episodic memory. If prevented from making errors during learning, learning appears to be better.

Improving Storage Once information has entered the memory store, we can help keep it there by practising, testing or rehearsing the information at intervals. One of the best methods for doing this is to use the method known as Expanding Rehearsal (Landauer & Bjork, 1978) otherwise called Spaced Retrieval (Schacter & Glisky, 1986). In this method, the information to be remembered is presented (e.g. a new telephone number) then tested immediately, tested again after a short delay (say 2 or 3 seconds), then after a slightly longer delay. This extension of test intervals is continued, until the information is learned.

Improving Retrieval Once information has been stored, it is not always easy to retrieve from memory when required. Most of us will have been in situations where we cannot retrieve a word or a name that we are sure we know. Sometimes this occurs because of a change in context. For example, a colleague from work seen when on holiday may not be easy to 'place' because she is out of the usual environmental context. This sort of situation is even more likely to occur with memory impaired people. To reverse the argument, they might remember information better when they are in the same room with the same people as they were when they originally learned the information (Baddeley , 1992).

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In order to avoid dependence on ’context specificity’, we should teach new information in a number of different settings and social situations. Thus, if we want to teach a patient to retrieve information stored on an electronic memory aid, we might begin by teaching him or her in the psychologist’s office. Once the patient is skilled in retrieving the information, we might decide to move the teaching session to occupational therapy, the ward or the patient’s own home. Without such planning we might find the aid is used in the psychologist’s ofice but nowhere else. Prompts such as the first letter or sound of a person’s name are good retrieval cues but the problem is that somebody has to be available to provide the cue. A few memory impaired people can be taught to go through the alphabet systematically to try to find their own first letter prompt but for the majority this method is not very effective. Berg et al. (1991), described above, provided general guidelines for a group of people referred for memory rehabilitation. They gave each patient an information book that contained the following simple rules: Use external aids when possiolr. Pay more attention Spend more time Repeat Make Associations Organize Link input and retrieval situations Patients undergoing training in these strategies showed significantly greater improvement on objective memory tests four months after training than a control group whose treatment consisted of drilling and repetition. Many patients referred for treatment, however, will need more specific and individualised programmes designed for their particular needs. Some of these are described below.

Environmental adaptations For people who have severe intellectual handicaps in addition to their memory deficits (for example those with Alzheimer’s disease), it might be

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necessary to accept that such patients are unlikely to learn compensatory strategies. In these cases the best that can be done is to change or restructure the environment in some way in order to reduce the load on the patient's memory. Harris (1980) gives an interesting example when he describes a geriatric unit in the USA with a high rate of incontinence among the inmates. The rate of incontinence dropped sharply when somebody painted all the lavatory doors a distinctive colour. Presumably the improvement resulted from the fact that the patients could now remember which doors led to the lavatories. Similar approaches can be used in a variety of settings. Signposts can be strategically placed in home or in hospital, doors can be labelled to direct people to the dining room, bathroom and so forth. Patients' beds can be labelled. Whoever prepares the labels should ensure the print is large enough to be legible, that the labels are discriminable against their backgrounds and that the terminology is familiar to the memory impaired person. Signposts and labelling are strategies used in Reality Orientation (R.0). This is a process that attempts to teach or maintain awareness of time, place and person for confused individuals. Holden and Woods (1988) describe R.O. in considerable detail. A survey of published studies using R.O. by Moffat (1989) shows that this form of therapy results in significant but weak improvement. It should be noted that these studies included the whole range of R.O. techniques and not just the environmental adaptations of signposts and labelling. A variation on this theme is to avoid problem behaviour through changing the verbal or physical environment. Wilson (1984) describes a young head injured man who was densely amnesic and physically impaired. Like many amnesic patients he repeated the same joke over and over. In his case the 'joke' always occurred in the following way. In order to ensure he was attending in the therapy session, I said "Are you ready, M.C.?" He always replied "Ready, willing and disabled". Amusing at first, this soon palled with constant repetition. The solution was simple: instead of saying "Are you ready?" I changed to, "We are going to start now, M.C." Another densely amnesic man showed an unusual form of epileptic seizures. These appeared to occur with greater frequency when he was under stress or agitated. A behavioural analysis undertaken by his psychologist Avi Schmueli (personal communication) showed that the seizures were far more likely to occur when there was a change in activity (for example when changing from one test to another during assessment), or when an additional person

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entered the room. Obviously, it was not possible to prevent changes of activity or personnel but it might have been possible to reduce the frequency of the seizures by minimising the number of changes. This man was also unable to remember any of the people who came into contact with him since the onset of his amnesia, even those who have been involved in his care for the past 6 years. Demonstrations of affection or familiarity (such as calling him by his first name) either frightened or irritated him. He could not understand why complete strangers (as the hospital staff appeared to him) were behaving in such an inappropriate manner. To reduce some of this irritation, staff interacted with him in a more formal manner than they would have with other long stay patients. In no sense are these environmental adaptations memory training, but they might relieve some of the distress of severely memory impaired people and those caring for them. For those whose intellectual functioning precludes more sophisticated compensatory measures, then perhaps the best we can do is structure the environment so they can survive in it without adequate memory functioning.

External aids Most people without memory impairments make frequent use of external aids (Harris, 1992). Wilson and Moffat (1984) suggested that head injured memory impaired people made less use of external aids than those with no serious problems. However, the group referred to by Wilson and Moffat were part of the long term follow up study of Wilson (1991) and at follow up i.e. 5 to 10 years after rehabilitation they were using significantly more memory aids and were not very different from .the general population. Given that external memory aids are probably the most important means of compensating for memory deficit, then it is worthwhile for therapists, teachers and relatives to investigate as wide a range as possible, and to be prepared to put considerable effort into teaching the use of such aids. Harris (1992) divides external aids into a) cueing devices that access internally stored information and b) systems that record information externally. The former category would include alarm clocks, timers and tying a knot in one’s handkerchief (or string on one’s finger). All of these would remind a person to do something, but they would not specify what it was that had to be

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done. The latter category would include notebooks, diaries, computers and tape recorders, all of which record the information a person would wish to recall. Different external aids can be used to remember different information or different aspects of the same information. For example if you need to go to the airport to meet a friend next Saturday you could a) write the information in your diary and on a wall calendar, b) write instructions in your notebook for the best route to take, c) ask a friend to telephone you Saturday morning to remind you, d) set your alarm clock after the friend has telephoned so that it will ring just before you need to leave and e) put the notebook with instructions in your coat pocket so you do not leave it behind. In the long term follow up study described earlier, notebooks and notes were the most commonly used aid, being used by 29 of the 43 people interviewed. Such simple written aids are inexpensive but it should be noted that some memory impaired people may need to be taught to use them in an efficient and systematic manner. I will return to this topic shortly. For those memory impaired people who have difficulty reading or writing, or who have visual problems, taperecorders and microcassettes are worth investigating for their potential usefulness. One of our patients with cortical blindness and amnesia was unable to read but used a pocket dictaphone to record messages from his wife to staff at the rehabilitation centre and vice versa. He also recorded instructions about tasks he was to carry out in occupational therapy, and explanations about memory therapy techniques. Another young man, who was unable to remember how to do certain activities in the woodwork department, recorded the instructions on a personal stereo and wore this during his woodwork sessions. His work rate increased and the number of questions he asked decreased considerably. Such machines may also be used, of course, by those who can read and write perfectly well. One young man with a pure amnesic syndrome lives alone and attends a furniture making college. He is able to function independently because he uses a number of external aids very efficiently. One of these is a microcassette. He records ongoing information into this machine at frequent intervals during the day. In the evening at home he listens to the tape and transcribes information he considers to be important into a journal. In addition to his microcassette he uses a watch with an alarm and a filofax (a personal non-electronic organiser). He is exceptionally adept at compensating for his severe memory difficulties.

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External aids can also be pictorial for patients with aphasia or dyslexia. One example provided by Lincoln (1989) describes how recipes were presented pictorially for a 36 year old head injured housewife who could not remember how to cook and prepare meals for her family. Wilson (1992) provided a pictorial aid to help an aphasic woman remember how to transfer from her wheelchair to her bed. I have also known a globally aphasic man use pictures to refer to the past and to the future with relative ease. This man had no words at all, he could produce one sound "ba" and his comprehension of spoken words was at the level of a two year old. Yet once he had been taught a simple communication method using a mixture of pictorial and abstract symbols, he could use these to refer to the past and the future. For example, during one of our treatment sessions we tried singing. The patient hummed the melody. A card was made using the 'symbols'. The message drawn on the card said 'B.. . did some singing with Barbara and Philippa'. He often retrieved this card from his book to remind us of the occasion. Similarly, he frequently referred to another card 'saying' 'I am going to stay with my son at Christmas'. Further description can be found in Wilson (1990). The past few years has seen an enormous growth in the use of electronic memory aids. These are essentially electronic calculators or digital watches with extra functions such as alarms or the facility to accept written messages. Harris (1992) describes some of them in detail and lists their advantages and disadvantages. These aids range from the simple alarm systems to the complex pocket microcomputers such as the Sharp electronic organizer. The main disadvantage for memory impaired people is that such electronic aids are difficult to learn how to use. In order to programme the organisers, most people need to remember their previous errors, and it is this, of course, which is beyond the capacity of most memory impaired people. However, advances are constantly being made and some aids are becoming easier to manage. A useful catalogue, in which a number of aids are listed, described and evaluated is provided by Kapur (1991). One of the biggest problems with external aids is that many patients are reluctant to use them. Some feel it is cheating and believe they should not rely on aids. This idea should be discouraged. Most non brain injured people use memory aids and anything that helps the memory impaired person to remember must be regarded in a good light. There is no evidence to suggest that using aids will result in less recovery of memory. If anything, they may result in

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more efficient use of the memory skills the person does possess. In the long term, memory study described earlier (Wilson, 1991) I found that those people using 6 or more different kinds of aids or strategies were more likely to be independent. Those using none at all were those with the most severe intellectual impairments, and were all in long term hospital care. For those people who are reluctant to use, or forget to use, or who are inefficient at using memory aids, alternative aids can be tried in the hope that they will be more congenial or acceptable. Examples here might include the use of a tape recorder instead of a notebook, or the use of a timer on a stopwatch combined with a printed card. Following on from this, the systematic and efficient use of the aid in question should be taught. Teaching the use of an external aid requires patience and ingenuity. For most memory impaired people it is not enough to simply provide a notebook, organiser, tape recorder or whatever and expect this to be used. Remembering to use the aid is, in itself, a memory task, so of course problems are to be expected. The people who seem best able to get round such difficulties and use the aids spontaneously are those with a pure amnesic syndrome i.e. those without additional cognitive deficits such as attention, reasoning and word finding problems and with slow thinking processes. Unfortunately, people with a pure amnesic syndrome are relatively rare. Most of those requiring help will have such additional cognitive deficits, making it harder for them to compensate for their problems without help. Sohlberg and Mateer (1989) describe a detailed and thorough programme to train the use of compensatory memory books for people with severe memory impairments. The programme is in 3 stages: acquisition; application and adaptation. In stage one (acquisition) subjects are taught how to use the book, in stage two (application) they are taught when and where to use the book and in stage three (adaptation) they are expected to adapt and modify their skills and use the book in novel situations. The books themselves are divided into sections each of which is colour coded (e.g. "things to do" pages might be green, "calendar section" might be blue and "names of people section" might be yellow). In stage one subjects are taught the meaning and names of the different sections, in stage two subjects are prompted and encouraged to record information in the appropriate section. Role playing is also used during this stage. In stage three the subject is monitored to see whether the book is used in everyday situations.

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Sometimes it is possible to use an aid as a simple reminder and avoid a lengthy teaching process. For example, some calculators are provided with a repeat alarm that can be programmed to sound every 10 minutes or every half an hour or some other interval. These can be used to remind spinal patients to lift regularly (i.e. push with their arms so their buttocks leave the wheelchair for several seconds) in order to prevent pressure sores. Dysarthric patients who might 'forget' to swallow their saliva can be reminded by a buzzer or alarm that sounds every few seconds. Further discussions on the use of external aids can be found in Wilson and Moffat (1992).

Internal strategies Harris (1992) believes there are two kinds of internal strategies: those that are learned naturally, and the artificial mnemonics. Naturally learned mnemonics include the tendency to recall the last few items first when asked for free recall of a word list, i.e. most adults capitalize on the recency effect. We also tend to allocate more time on difficult to remember items when learning new information. Such natural strategies are not seen in young children. These strategies are not usually considered to be memory aids as they are so much a part of our normal everyday memory behaviour. Artificial mnemonics are systems that help us organise, store and retrieve information more efficiently. Some people use the term 'mnemonics' to refer to anything that helps people to remember, including external memory aids. Here the term will be used to refer to those methods involving mental manipulation of material. Most people use mnemonics at,times to learn or remember material. For example, most British and American people use a rhyme to remember how many days there are in each of the calendar months. In other parts of the world the knuckles of the hand remind people of the long months (the knuckles themselves) and the short months (the dips between the knuckles). Rhymes are useful for remembering information such as dates or rules. To remember the date Christopher Columbus discovered America we can learn the rhyme "In fourteen hundred and ninety two Columbus sailed the ocean blue". Alan Baddeley and I invented a rhyme to enable us to convert centigrade to fahrenheit:

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"From centigrade to fahrenheit Will keep you puzzling day and night. A simple rule that you can state Is multiply by one point eight The final thing which you must do Is add another thirty two". Another verbal mnemonic strategy is to use the initial letters of the information to be remembered, and convert these into a word or sentence. For example, many people learn to read music by remembering the notes in the spaces spell out FACE while the notes on the lines EGBDF can be remembered by the sentence Every Good Boy Does Fine. I remember the meninges - the linings of the brain through the following sentence "Seven Sisters Dance Around Seven Priests" from which I convert the initial letters to Scalp, Skull, Dura, Arachnoid, Sub-Arachnoid space and Pia. Using the initial letters to make words or sentences is one of the most widely used internal strategies among students (Gruneberg, 1973; Rawles, 1978). Other verbal methods include the story method and turning numbers into words. The story method involves the creation of a story incorporating information to be remembered. Crovitz (1979) employed this method with brain injured people to improve their recall. His story went something like this: "The first word is airplane and you can remember that anyway you like. The second word is giraffes because the airplane was full of giraffes. The third word is bologna because the giraffes were all eating bologna sausage.. . There were 10 words altogether. I have used this method with control and memory impaired subjects (Wilson, 1987) and found both groups remembered significantly more words using the story method than they did using three other mnemonic strategies or using no strategy at all. The problem with the method is that it is difficult to apply to everyday life material. The only real-life example I know of is from a colleague of mine and not from a memory impaired person. The colleague wanted to remember the way from St Paul's Cathedral in London to Liverpool Street Station. He had no map and nothing to write with. Somebody gave him directions - go to Cannon Street, then Queen Victoria Street, Threadneedle Street and Broad Street. His story was "A Cannon was fired for Queen Victoria's birthday. She was Threading a needle to do her mending before going Abroad. 'I

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The final verbal method to be described is turning numbers into words in order to make the numbers more meaningful and therefore easier to remember. Baddeley (1983) describes how this method can be used to remember the value of 'pi' to the first 20 decimal places. Each number is converted into a word with the number of letters in each word representing the number itself. The words are arranged as a poem entitled PIE,

"I wish I could determine pi Eureka cried the great inventor Christmas pudding, Christmas pie Is the problem's very centre". This can be decoded back into numbers giving 3.14159265358979323846. This method is useful for remembering telephone numbers, bank card numbers and so forth. "Sealions can jump through big hoops" can, for example, represent the telephone number 834735. Another major group of internal strategies includes the visual mnemonics. Some of these have been in existence for a long time (Yates, 1966). One of the most commonly used in memory therapy is the simple procedure of turning a word or name into a picture. Martin Adeney, for example, can be drawn as a house martin and a band aid on a knee. Julian Campbell could be drawn as a jewel on a line together with a camp and a bell. This method is useful for teaching a few names of staff, neighbours and friends to even severely amnesic patients. However, you should not expect the amnesic person to use this method spontaneously. The value in the method is that people learn quicker using it than they do using repetition or rote rehearsal. (See Wilson, 1987 for research findings using this procedure). A word of caution is provided for those employing this method. Make sure the drawings are not ambiguous. I once tried to teach a memory impaired man the name of his social worker Mary Thorne. I drew a picture of a merry thorn. The man looked at the picture carefully and understood what was required of him. However, when I next asked him the name of his social worker he closed his eyes, thought about the drawing and said confidently "Gay Holly". A more sophisticated version of visual imagery to learn people's names is to use the face-name association procedure. This involves four stages:i) select a distinctive feature of the person's face (for example large ears).

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transform the name to one or more common nouns (e.g. Mr Crossley could be imagined as a cross leaf or a leaf on a cross) link the distinctive feature with the transformed name (for example imagine the cross leaf sticking out from the large ears) Next time you need to remember the person's name search the face for the distinctive feature. This should remind you of the image which in turn should help you recall the name.

Although research with control subjects has shown this method works best when all stages are followed (McCarty, 1980), I believe that most of the memory impaired people I work with find it too complicated. Yates (1966) describes one of the methods used in Ancient Greece, the Method-of-Loci or remembering by locations. Rawles (1978) tells of an even more complex version of the Method-of-Loci used in the Middle Ages. "S" the man with the supernormal memory studied by Luria (1968) used the method frequently. Many locations can be used such as rooms in one's house, parts of the body, the engine and carriages of a railway train and places at work. Each item to be remembered is imagined at a different location. When recall is required the subject thinks of each location and recalls what is placed there. For example if you wanted to remember to 'phone the dentist, take your shoes to the menders, fill up the car with petrol and buy some flowers, you could adopt the following procedure:Imagine Imagine Imagine Imagine

the dentist sitting on your head holding a telephone your shoes walking up your body to your neck your right arm pulling the petrol pump and your left arm holding a bunch of flowers

In the Wilson (1987) study referred to earlier, I found control subjects were helped considerably by the Method-of-Loci, although this was inferior to the story method. The brain damaged, amnesic subjects found Method-of-Loci only marginally better than a no-strategy condition. Nevertheless, a few individuals within the group did appear to benefit. One of the most complicated of the visual methods is the Peg Method whereby a standard set of peg words are learned and items to be remembered are linked to the pegs by means of visual imagery. One of the best known is

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the rhyming peg method in which the numbers one to ten are associated with rhymes (for example one-bun, two-shoe, three-tree, four-door on so on). The first item to be remembered is linked with a bun, the second with a shoe and so forth. Other systems are described in Moffat (1992). Patten (1972) reported that 4 out of 7 memory impaired patients benefited from this procedure, but the lack of data in this paper makes it difficult to assess the true value of its findings. There is no satisfactory evidence that this procedure has been successfully applied to everyday problems faced by memory impaired people. The fact that mnemonics achieve some degree of success, particularly with people who do not have severe memory impairment is probably due to the following reasons :a) They encourage a deeper level of processing. Craik and Lockhart (1972) demonstrated that deeper processing results in better recall. b) Previously isolated items are integrated with one another (Bower, 1972). c) They provide in-built retrieval cues in the form of initial letters, locations or pegs. There is considerable misunderstanding about the value of mnemonics in memory therapy. Some people think that memory impaired people have been taught to use mnemonics and apply them in novel situations. There is little evidence that this happens. In my own publications about the use of mnemonics in memory therapy I have never claimed to teach amnesic people to use mnemonics, although my work has been interpreted in this way. The value of mnemonics is that they are useful for teaching new information. They are usually better than rote rehearsal. Relatives, teachers, therapists or psychologists are the ones who use the mnemonics to help the memory impaired person learn. When using them we should only teach one thing at a time and not expect memory impaired people to learn several pieces of information at once. We should take individual styles and preferences into account and we should plan for generalisation. That means we should not expect memory impaired people to use the strategy, aid, technique or newly learned information in other situations unless we have actively taught and encouraged this.

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Conclusion Memory impairment is common after cerebral insult. For the majority of those affected it is unrealistic to expect recovery or significant improvement. This does not mean that nothing can be done to help. Memory impaired people and their relatives can be given information and counselling and put in touch with self help groups. Environmental adaptations can alleviate some of the difficulties. These are particularly appropriate for those with severe intellectual difficulties. Probably the most useful way to compensate for memory impairment is to use external memory aids. It may be necessary to teach their use as many brain injured people will have difficulty in using aids spontaneously or efficiently. Internal strategies or mnemonics should also be considered when it is necessary to teach new information. It is unrealistic, however, to expect memory impaired people to use mnemonics spontaneously and apply them in novel situations.

References Baddeley, A.D. (1982). Implications of neuropsychological evidence for theories of normal memory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London, B, 298, 59-72. Baddeley, A.D. (1983). Your memory: Harmondsworth, London: Penguin.

A

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guide.

Baddeley, A.D. (1990). Human memorv: Theorv and practice. Hove, Sussex: Erlbaum. Baddeley, A.D. (1992). Memory theory and memory therapy. In B. A. Wilson, & N. Moffat (Eds.), Clinical management of memory Droblems f2nd Ed.) (pp.1-31). London: Chapman & Hall. Baddeley, A.D., & Wilson, B.A. (1988) Comprehension and working memory: A single case study. Journal of Memory and Language, 22, 479-498. Berg, I . J . , Koning-Haanstra, M., & Deelman, B.G. (1991) Long term effects of memory rehabilitation: A controlled study. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 1,97-1 11.

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Bergman, M.M., & Kemmerer, A.G. (1991). Computer-enhanced self sufficiency: Part 2. Uses and subjective benefits of a text writer for an individual with traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychologm, 5, 25-28. Bower, G.H. (1972). A selective review of organizational factors in memory. In E. Tulving, & W . Donaldson, (Eds.), Organization of Memory. (pp.93-145). New York: Academic Press. Craik, F.I.M., & Lockhart, R.S. (1972) Levels of processing: a framework i r , for memory research. f 11, 671-684. Crovitz, H. (1979) Memory retraining in brain damaged patients: the airplane list. Cortex, 15,131-134. Evans, J.J. & Wilson, B.A. (1992). A memory group for individuals with brain injury. Clinical Rehabilitation, 6, 75-81. Remediation of organic Glisky, E. L., & Schacter, D. L. (1986). memory disorders: Current status and future prospects. Journal of Head Trauma Rehabilitation, 1,54-63. Acquisition of domainGlisky, E. L., & Schacter, D. L. (1987). specific knowledge in organic amnesia. Training for computer-related work. Neuropsvchologia, 25, 893-906. Gruneberg, M.M. (1973). The role of memorization techniques in finals examination preparation - a study of psychology students. Educational Research, 15.134-139. Harris, J.E. (1980). We have ways of helping you remember. Concord: The Journal of the British Association for Service to the Elderly, l7, 21-27. Harris, J.E. (1992). Ways to help memory. In B. A. Wilson, & N. Moffat (Eds.), Clinical management of memory problems (2nd Ed.) (pp.56-82). London: Chapman & Hall. Holden, U.P. & Woods, R.T. (1988). Realitv orientation: Psychological approaches to the 'confused' elderly (2nd Ed.) Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone. Kapur, N. (1991). Memory aids catalogue. (Available from Memory Aids Unit, Southampton General Hospital, Southampton SO9 4XY).

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Landauer, T.K., & Bjork, R.A. (1978). Optimum rehearsal patterns and name learning. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical -psa (pp.625-632). London: Academic Press. Lincoln, N.B. (1989). Management of memory problems in a hospital setting. In L. Poon, D. Rubin, & B. A. Wilson, (Eds.), Evervday cognition in adulthood and later life, (pp.639-658). Cambridge University Press. Luria, A.R. (1968). The mind of a mnemonist. New York: Basic Books. McCarty, D. (1980). Investigation of a visual imagery mnemonic device for acquiring face-name associations. Journal of Experimental Psychologv: Human Learning and Memory, 6, 145-155. Moffat, N. (1989). Home based rehabilitation programmes for the elderly. In L. Poon, D. Rubin, & B. Wilson (Eds.) Evervdav coFnition in adult and later life (pp.659-680). New York: Guildford. Moffat, N. (1992) Strategies of memory therapy. In B. A. Wilson, & N. Moffat (Eds.), Clinical managment of memory problems (2nd Ed) (pp.83-116). London: Chapman & Hall. Patten, B.M. (1972) The ancient art of memory. Archives of Neurology, 2_6, 25-3 1. Rawles, R.E. (1978). The past and present of mnemotechny. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris, & R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory (pp. 164- 171). London: Academic Press. Robertson, I. (1990). Does computerised cognitive rehabilitation work? A review. Aphasiology, 4, 381-405. Schacter, D.L. & Glisky, E.L. (1986). Memory remediation: restoration, alleviation and the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge. In B. P. Uzzell, & Y. Gross, (Eds.), Clinical neuropsycholow of intervention (pp .257-282). Boston: Nijhoff. Sohlberg, M.M., & Mateer, C.A. (1989) Training use of compensatory memory books: A three stage behavioral approach. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Psvchology, 11, 871-891. Wearing, D. (1992). Self help groups. In B. A. Wilson, & N. Moffat (Eds.), Clinical management of memorv problems: (2nd Ed.) (pp.271-301).

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London: Chapman & Hall. Wilson, B.A. (1984). Memory therapy in practice. In B. A. Wilson, B.A. & N. Moffat (Eds.), Clinical management of memory Droblems (pp.89111). London: Croom Helm. Wilson, B.A. (1987). R

m

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f

. New York: Guilford.

Wilson, B.A. (1989a). Models of cognitive rehabilitation. In R. L. Wood, & P. Eames (Eds.), Models of brain iniury rehabilitation (pp. 117-141) London: Chapman & Hall. Wilson, B.A. (1989b) Memorv Droblems after head injury. National Head Injuries Association.

Nottingham:

Wilson, B.A. (1989~)Improving recall of health service information. Clinical Rehabilitation, 3, 275-279. Wilson, B.A. (1990) Cognitive rehabilitation for brain injured adults. In B. G. Deelman, R. J . Saan, & A. H. van Zomeren, Traumatic brain in-iury (pp. 121-144). Lisse, The Netherlands: Swets & Zeitlinger. Wilson, B.A. (1991) Long term prognosis of patients with severe memory disorders. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 1, 117-134. Wilson, B.A. (1992). Memory therapy in practice. In B. A. Wilson, & N. Moffat, (Eds.), Clinical management of memory problems (2nd Ed.) (pp.117-150). London: Chapman & Hall. Wilson, B.A. (1992). Rehabilitation and memory disorders. In Squire, L. & Butters, N. (Eds.), NeuroDsychology of memory (2nd Ed.). (pp.315321). New York: Guilford. Wilson, B.W., & Baddeley, A.D. (in press). Spontaneous recovery of digit span: does comprehension recover? Cortex. Wilson, B., Cockburn, J . & Baddeley, A.D. (1985). The Rivermead behavioural memory test manual: Bury St. Edmunds, Suffolk: Thames Valley Test Company. Wilson, B.A. & Moffat, N. (1984). Rehabilitation of memory for everyday life. In J. Harris, & P. Morris, (Eds.), Everyday memory: Actions and

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absent mindedness (pp.207-234). London: Academic Press. Wilson, B.A. & Moffat, N. (Eds.), (1992). Clinical management of memory problems. (2nd Ed.). London: Chapman & Hall.

Yates, F.A. (1966). The art of memory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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Commentary: Memory Rehabilitation for Neurological Patients Narinder Kapur Wessex Neurological Centre, Southampton, United Kingdom "Feats can be performed with mnemonic devices that are marvellous and prodigious, but nevertheless it is a barren thing for human uses. It is not well contrived for providing assistance to memory in serious and business affairs". Francis Bacon If one compares the condition of human memory disorder following neurological disease or injury with an analogous physical condition such as human movement disorder, there are some interesting parallels and divergencies. One of the divergencies concerns what is actively offered to help patients overcome their disability - in the case of human memory disorder, this has tended to be rather limited, whereas patients with movement disorder have a range of drug and non-drug therapies to which they can turn. Wilson's chapter is therefore welcome in drawing attention to the fact that some positive steps can nevertheless be taken to help memory disordered patients. What standards should we set when evaluating the efficacy of procedures to help in the management of human memory disorder? There are at least six criteria which must be met (i)

(ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

The intervention needs to be shown to bring about a meaningful change in the patient's memory functioning This change should be permanent It should have minimal side effects It should be cost-effective and easy to administerhse It should be applicable to a large number of patients The intervention should be beneficial over and above any general or incidental effects associated with the intervention having occurred.

By 'meaningful change', I mean one which has a significant beneficial impact on the everyday adjustment of the individual patient, whether or not this

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change is large in statistical terms. Since psychological sequelae of brain damage seldom leave the patient’s family and friends untouched, it is also useful to document the beneficial or adverse effects of memory therapy on these individuals. The management of memory disorder must at present remain a largely psychological exercise. It is possible that sometime in the future drug therapies or even neural transplant procedures may prove beneficial in improving memory functioning in some neurological patients, but at present there is no immediate prospect of their meeting all of the criteria outlined above. It is also worth bearing in mind that the overall goal of memory therapy should be the reduction of everyday memory lapses, and not necessarily an improvement in memory ability per se. Thus, in some cases it may not be possible to improve learning efficiency or retrieval strategies in a particular individual, but by the provision of a memory prosthesis or external memory aid the patient may be able to reduce the number of everyday memory lapses which he or she suffers. As Wilson points out, memory functioning will often spontaneously improve as part of the general recovery process after an insult to the brain. We do have some understanding of a few of the parameters of recovery - with most recovery of memory after severe head injury taking place within the first year after injury (Lezak, 1979), but we do not have any clear understanding of recovery processes. Neither do we know how active attempts at memory rehabilitation, or for that matter memory-related drug therapies, interact with this recovery process - is it best to wait for a plateau of recovery before attempting intervention, or should we introduce therapeutic procedures as early as possible? Before offering specific advice on memory strategies or memory aids, patients need to be reminded that memory lapses are a normal phenomenon (i.e. they may be perfectionist about having a good memory) and that the pattern of memory lapses in their own case may not be particularly pathological, that a high anxiety level or depressed mood can result in impaired memory (and if these are present, the precipitating factors need to be addressed), and that poor concentration or - more commonly - trying to absorb too much information from too many sources at the same time, may have an adverse effect on memory. A further set of factors which need to be borne in mind are - the

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pre-morbid skills and talents of the individual; the severity, pattern and purity of the memory loss; the motivation to improve memory; the everyday demands on memory; and family SupPoit in the implementation of memory improvement procedures.

Cognitive and behavioural strategies In general, trying to make patients change their ’cognitive strategies’ or other ways in which they assimilate or retrieve information is less likely to succeed than changing their environment and encouraging the use of particular external memory aids. However, some patients may benefit from changes in their ’memory behaviour’, and the guidelines offered by Wilson for encoding, storage and retrieval are certainly of value in any memory rehabilitation programme. In the case of encoding strategies, it is worth bearing in mind that the human brain will by nature tend to readily store that which is highly novel, especially if it is also highly meaningful. To the extent that material can be manipulated to stand out in this way, and by implication to the extent that interference effects can be reduced in respect of similar material or the context in which the material is presented, then there is a greater likelihood of the information being consolidated into long-term storage. In the case of retrieval strategies, an interesting area of research which may have some implications for memory rehabilitation is that relating to eye-witness evidence and ways in which it can be augmented, using ’cognitive interview’ techniques by which individuals are encouraged to reinstate the original context, report everything no matter how minor it may seem, recall the events in different orders and try to recall the information from different perspectives (Roy, 1991). In the case of both encoding and retrieval strategies, especially if they involve complicated mnemonics, there is a certain degree of motivation, concentration, problem solving ability and (dare I say it) memory which may be required for successful acquisition and everyday use of the strategy in question. There is the additional question touched on by Wilson of transfer of encoding and retrieval strategies to situations different from those of the training environment, though this also applies to some extent to external memory aids.

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Environmental memory aids The structure and design of one’s environment can play a major role in determining behaviour. This is especially important in individuals with handicap, and Wilson rightly points to this rather neglected area of neuropsychology, and to its implications for memory rehabilitation. Environmental memory aids can be divided into three categories (a) (b) (c)

Personal environmental cues Proximal environmental cues, including equipment in the immediate environment Distal environmental cues

Personal environmental cues

A form of commonly used memory aid is to introduce a novel change to aspects of one’s attire/personal appearance to remind one to do something. Examples of the use of personal cues to act as memory aids include putting one’s ring/watch on the wrong hand, putting a wallet in a different pocket, putting an elastic band around one’s finger, writing a message on the palmhack of one’s hand, tying a knot to the inside of one’s tie, etc. As effective memory aids, they have the limitation that some form of sensory habituation may set in, with the result that the memory aid may simply be ignored. In addition, the cue may fulfil its ’alerting role’, but the person may then forget what the particular memory cue was for! Proximal environmental cues By proximal environment, I mean the lay-out within a room or vehicle, and the design of machines with which the patient interacts in everyday domestic or work settings. Norman’s (1988) excellent book focuses on some of the practical manifestations of poor ergonomic design in our everyday environment, and hopefully more research will be carried on the design of our environment as it relates to everyday memory functioning. A proximal environment which is well structured and well organized is conducive to a lower probability of occurrence of memory lapses such as forgetting where

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something was put. In some circumstances, tactile memory aids may be useful to help locate a particular item. For example, when one is driving a car it is often not possible to glance in the direction where various switches are located. As Norman (1988) has pointed out, the layout of such switches often pays little respect to how and when they are used as part of driving behaviour. If, as is often the case, switches of a similar design are in close proximity, or are particularly useful to locate, then it is useful to attach a distinctive tactile cue such as a Velcro pad onto one of the switches, Similar applications may well arise for settings other than driving a car, or where the individual is visually impaired in addition to having a memory handicap.

Distal environmental cues By distal environment, I mean the design of a home or work building, the design of streets and towns, and the design of transportation networks. I would also include here people in the individual’s environment - in clinical settings, the occurrence of memory lapses such as loss of memory for names may often be determined by factors such as whether they wear distinctive uniform, if they use name-badges, etc. Remembering to do something may relate to the retrieval of a well-established rule or piece of knowledge that is already in long-term storage rather than remembering to act on information which has just been recently acquired. The use of simple labels to help with this form of memory lapse is often ignored in the design of everyday settings - as Norman (1988) has pointed out, we all know of doors where there is no indication whether to PULL or to PUSH (the present unit where I work has only recently installed such signs on its entrance doors after 25 years!). The carefully planned use of such signs can clearly be of benefit as preventative measures - e.g. signs near stairs in homes for the elderly, road traffic warning signs, etc. Other forms of visual cues may be of similar value - e.g. having distinctive visual cues on steps to remind someone who is visually impaired/absent-minded that the steps actually exist. As Wilson points out, in the case of residential homes or hospitals where memory impaired subjects may reside, having markers on the floor or walls to indicate the direction to somewhere and having relevant rooms clearly labelled or distinctively coloured is important for helping residents to find their way

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about. It is obviously important for the therapist to carry out a ’site visit’ to a patient’s residence in order to obtain a first-hand perspective of both distal and proximal environmental cues, how they might best be usedkhanged, and how new ones might best be introduced. A final form of environmental memory aid which one should never forget is a carer/family member who can act as a storage device and a reminder for the memory disabled person.

External memory aids Although environmental design represents a form of external memory aid, the more common form of external memory aid is some portable device used by an individual which may act as a memory prosthesis. There may often be some overlap between good environmental design and a portable external memory aid - a simple way of distinguishing the two is to note whether the item (or part of the item, in the case of a computer disk) can be moved from place to place, or whether it is integral to the particular environment of the subject - if the former is the case, it would qualify as a portable external memory aid. Computers and good filing systems act as external memory aids to the extent that they improve the speed and accuracy of retrieval operations. Once a memory lapse occurs, such as forgetting where something was put, then certain devices may help to rectify this error - this may range from labels on items which can help in locating and notifying their owner, to detection devices which activate a sonic or infra-red acoustic alarm contained within the item. A range of commercial memory aids have been reviewed by Herrman and Petro (1990), and a more detailed review of external memory aids is provided by Intons-Peterson and Newsome (1992). More resourceful neurological patients with milder memory difficulties may benefit from self-help booklets (e.g. Wilson, 1989; Kapur, 1991). As Wilson points out in her chapter, the successful use of an external memory aid may often require a considerable amount of forethought and training by the therapist. In our unit, we have found ourselves having to prepare special-purpose ’help-cards’ and manuals to replace those which accompany commercial memory aids. In summary, there is a good deal we can do to help patients and carers cope with memory difficulties following neurological disease. The extent of this help will depend on the particular background and life-style of the patient and

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carer; the severity, pattern and purity of his/her memory disorder; and the motivation and other resources which the patient and carer can bring to the memory rehabilitation setting. There is need for a combination of enthusiasm and healthy scepticism when considering interventions to alleviate memory disorder. As has been pointed out by a number of authors (e.g. Miller, 1992), there is also a pressing need for systematic research on the efficacy of particular forms of intervention to alleviate human memory disorder as it is manifest in patients’ everyday lives.

References Herrman D. J., & Petro S . J. (1990). Commercial memory aids. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 4: 439-450. Intons-Peterson, M. J., & Newsome, G. L. (1992). External memory aids: effects and effectiveness. In: D. J. Hermann, H. Weingartner, A. Searleman, & C. McEvoy (Eds.), Memory Improvement: Implications for Memorv Theory (pp. 101-121). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. Kapur, N. (1991). Managing your memory: A self-helr, guide to improving everydav memorv skills. Southampton: Wessex Neurological Centre. Lezak, M. (1979). Recovery of memory and learning functions following traumatic brain injury. Cortex, l5,63-72. Miller, E. (1992). Psychological approaches to the management of memory impairments. British Journal of Psychiatry, 160. 1-6. Norman, D. A. (1988). The psychology of everyday things. New York: Basic Books

Roy, D. F. (1991). Improving recall by eye-witnesses through the cognitive 4, 398-400. interview. ThePsvcholog Wilson, B. (1989). . ( National Head Injuries Association.

Nottingham:

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Commentary: Some Guidelines on Memory Rehabilitation Andrew Mayes University of Liverpool, United Kingdom Memory impairments caused by brain damage not only disrupt the lives of the victims, but also put stress on victims’ families. In the United Kingdom and other countries, inadequate provision has so far been made to reduce these problems by offering rehabilitative support to the victims and their families. The excuse that might be offered for this neglect is that unfortunately nothing can be done. Is there any justification for this excuse? A careful reading of Barbara Wilson’s chapter should make it clear that the lives of amnesic patients and that of their families can be improved by appropriate kinds of intervention. The main issue that I wish to consider in this commentary concerns the limits to these improvements that currently apply and the extent to which advances in knowledge may reduce these limits in the foreseeable future. After an injury that causes brain dysfunction, amnesics are impaired at learning to recall and recognize facts and events and are also impaired at recalling and recognizing facts and events memorized before their brain injury. Do these memory impairments diminish with time and can anything be done to increase any such tendency? As Wilson’s (1991) long-term follow-up study shows, about a third of memory impaired patients show marked diminution of their deficits over a period of five to ten years and this tendency is perhaps greatest in patients with head injury. The reasons for recovery remain unknown, but probably relate in part to the nature of the brain injury. Certain kinds of injury may permit greater degrees of recovery of affected neural tissue. When the injury has caused the death of most neurons in the regions critical for memory, then recovery may be minimal. Even so, some recovery is occasionally reported, even in cases of amnesia caused by Herpes Simplex encephalitis where there is usually massive destruction of neurons. But rate of recovery is probably far higher in cases with Korsakoff s syndrome where amnesia has been caused by chronic alcoholism associated with thiamine deficiency. Although this disorder does cause neural destruction, it also causes more reversible metabolic derangements that may underlie some of the memory deficits. Victor, Adams and Collins (1989) found that 74% of a sample of 104

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Korsakoff patients showed some degree of recovery over a period of up to three years following admission, and 21 % of the sample seemed to show more or less complete recovery. Several features of this study are of interest. First, as with Wilson’s study, recovery sometimes took place over long periods of time (I have seen recovery in Korsakoff patients over periods longer than three years). Second, in this condition, there appears to be a higher level of recovery than occurs with amnesias that are caused by massive neural destruction. Third, extent of recovery was probably dependent on the use of thiamine replacement therapy. Korsakoff‘s syndrome may well be an amnesic condition in which extent of recovery is a function of how early thiamine replacement therapy is initiated. It remains to be shown to what extent recovery from other amnesic conditions can be facilitated by the early application of appropriate chemotherapy or of appropriate kinds of stimulation of cognitive activity. After several years following their brain injury, as Wilson indicates, there is unlikely to be any further improvement in patients’ memories nor is there any evidence that behavioural rehabilitation techniques lead to a diminution of the basic memory deficit. It remains an open question, however, whether the severity of this basic deficit can be reduced by drug treatments. There is, of course, no accepted kind of drug treatment for amnesia as there is for Parkinson’s disease. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that some drugs may improve memory at least in some amnesics. In my view, it is bizarre that so much drug related research has been done on the progressively deteriorating condition of Alzheimer’s disease whereas so little has been done on the stable amnesic conditions where positive effects should be far easier to maintain. Even so, there has been some research and there is some evidence that cholinergic agonists, noradrenergic agonists, serotonergic agonists, and vasopressin may improve memory in some amnesics (see Mayes, 1988; McEntee & Mair, 1990). If chemotherapy has a rationale, it must surely be that the intervention improves the functioning of some damaged regions that are critical for memory. There is evidence that Korsakoff‘s syndrome is associated with a reduction in noradrenalin metabolism and damage to the locus coeruleus, which contains noradrenergic neurons that modulate activity in many forebrain sites, including regions, such as the hippocampus, that are involved with memory (McEntee & Mair, 1990). It has also been claimed that Korsakoff patients show reduced levels of cholinergic and serotonergic activity although these claims are disputed (see McEntee & Mair, 1990). Structures like the hippocampus, that are

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involved in memory, have their activity modulated by neurons that release noradrenalin, acetylcholine or serotonin and which project from brain stem structures, such as the locus coeruleus. It is assumed that modulation means that the target structures will work more efficiently when modulated. If the memory-related structures are impaired and if the levels of the modulating neurotransmitters are reduced, then memory functions may be partially restored by agents that boost the effective levels of the modulating neurotransmitters. With Korsakoff's syndrome there is conflicting evidence that the noradrenergic agonist, clonidine, improves memory, no evidence that the anticholinesterase, physostigmine, improves memory, and conflicting evidence that serotonergic agonists improve memory (McEntee & Mair, 1990). The effectiveness of intervention with agonist drugs may depend on the extent to which activity of the relevant neurotransmitter is reduced in treated patients as McEntee and Mair's work with clonidine strongly suggests. Although there has been little research on the effects that drugs have on amnesics, most work has been done on cholinergic agonists, such as the anticholinesterase, physostigmine. In one study, Catsman-Berrevoets, VanHarskamp and Appelhof (1 986) treated a 20 year old post-encephalitic amnesic with physostigmine and the acetylcholine precursor, lecithin, for 75 weeks and claimed that the patient showed a marked improvement in amnesic behaviour and test performance. This study is of interest because the therapy was carried out over an extended period and so was clearly tolerable for the patient. Long-term use of cholinergic agonists is problematic because these agents often have unacceptable effects on peripheral autonomic activity. Other studies have reported positive effects on post-encephalitic amnesics, who generally have damage to both medial temporal lobe structures and cholinergic basal forebrain regions, but the drugs have only been used for short periods. Recent work by Chatterjee, Morris, Hammond and Meador (1991) showed that oral physostigmine treatment of a densely amnesic patient with a lesion that was claimed to be primarily confined to the diagonal band of Broca, a part of the cholinergic basal forebrain that projects to the hippocampus, produced some improvement in memory. Future work with these agents needs to ascertain which patients are most likely to respond and how to minimize the undesirable side effects of treatment. In the foreseeable future, chemotherapy is likely only to produce partial improvements in memory and these will vary considerably from patient to

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patient. In the longer term, neural transplantation may become feasible as there is some evidence that certain memory deficits caused by basal forebrain lesions can be ameliorated by implanting grafts rich in cholinergic neurons into their target sites in the neocortex and hippocampus. In the meantime, what can be done for patients? Wilson makes clear that the environment can be adapted so as to place fewer demands on the memory of amnesics. Most importantly, amnesics can be taught how to use external aids to memory such as prospective diaries. Patients become independent to the extent that they are able to learn to use these aids. A major aim of therapy should be to teach the effective use of external memory aids. Another closely related aim should be to teach certain critical pieces of information such as the names of new, but frequently encountered people or the location of things in a new house or neighbourhood. Wilson argues that, as yet, there is little evidence that patients can be taught on their own initiative to use their diminished memory in more efficient ways, but the two aims just described can be most effectively achieved by using the same kinds of principle that enable normal people to use their memories more efficiently. In principle, the output of a damaged memory system should be better if the most efficient strategies for encoding, storage and retrieval are used. This principle is probably true and is certainly plausible, but most of the evidence for it is indirect. For example, Heinrichs (1989) tried to teach a Korsakoff amnesic ten target words related to recent personal history by embedding them in an accompanying storyline. Thirty training sessions were run over an eight week period. At the end of each session there was some improvement in recall, but delayed recall for the material remained nil throughout although it was claimed that after a year's delay following the last training session there was some "implicit" retention of the material. The point is that not only did this study fail to find strong evidence of good learning in the amnesic by using this "optimal" encoding procedure, but it also failed to use a comparison condition in which spontaneous learning strategies were used. There is an urgent need for more studies that compare amnesic learning under conditions that are intended to optimize the operation of the memory system with a spontaneous learning condition. In this context, Wilson's comments about learning procedures that minimize the tendency to make errors and also those that gradually expand the delay before recall is required are of particular interest. Wilson already has

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evidence that learning without error in amnesics is markedly more effective than learning with error. This effect is important because amnesics have typically been encouraged to guess (and therefore to produce errors) and, if genuine, could relate to the hypothesis that amnesics have particular problems with episodic memory. If so, they may benefit from errorless learning to an even greater extent than normal people. The most effective learning strategy for amnesics may involve gradually expanding the delay before testing so that errorless learning can be maintained and encouraging the use of encoding strategies that are believed to be optimal for the target material. Research on rehabilitation techniques could usefully focus on testing this possibility. Four final comments are worth making about the development of optimal learning strategies for enabling amnesics to use external memory aids in reliable ways and to remember important new facts about their daily environment. First, as amnesia becomes more severe it will be essential to use very long training sessions even if optimal learning strategies are employed. If this is not done, changes are likely to be inconsistent and transitory. Second, the degree to which benefits accrue from the use of optimal learning strategies may well be compromised by the presence of other cognitive deficits caused by brain damage, particularly those deficits associated with frontal lobe lesions. Third and related to the previous point, it is important to develop assessment procedures not only to determine the precise needs of individual patients and their families, but also to enable therapists to predict which training procedures are most likely to work for particular patients, and which are almost sure to fail. Fourth, in addition to using strategies for optimizing the performance of patients’ damaged memory systems as stressed by Wilson, there is also scope for the exploitation of their preserved memory abilities. Patients should have the ability to acquire new motor, perceptual and even intuitive cognitive skills however severe their amnesia and this ability may be of great use in developing skills applicable to the social environment or simple work situations. Undesirable behaviours associated with brain damage that is unrelated to their amnesia or even excessively repetitious behaviour that is associated with their amnesia may be reducible through the use of procedures that have much in common with those employed in animal conditioning work. Finally, it may be that the processes underlying priming can be used to train patients to do such things as learn the meanings of new words or develop simple programming

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skills. Indeed, exactly this has been claimed by Glisky and Schacter (1987; 1989), who trained a severely amnesic post-encephalitic patient to develop computing skills by using the method of vanishing cues. After training, the patient was able to perform a complex computer data-entry job as well as controls although the training took a long time and there were signs that the learning was hyperspecific in that it could only be reliably produced when the training stimuli were present. It still needs to be shown conclusively, however, that this procedure leads to more rapid and stable learning in amnesics than do other procedures, that it necessarily leads to hyperspecificity , and that, although it leads to cued recall of learned material, it depends mainly on the automatic, unaware memory processes that are believed to underlie priming.

References Catsman-Berrevoets, C.E., Van-Harskamp, F., & Appelhof, A. (1986) Beneficial effect of physostigmine on clinical amnesic behaviour and neuropsychological test results in a patient with a post-encephalitic amnesia. Journal of Neuroloey. Neurosurgerv and Psychiatry, 49, 1088- 1090. Chatterjee, A., Morris, M.K., Hammond, E.J., & Meador, K.J. (1991) P3 evoked potentials in an amnesic man with a basal forebrain lesion. Journal of Clinical and Experimental NeuropsycholoFy, 14, 103. Glisky, E.L., & Schacter, D.L. (1987) Acquisition of domain-specific knowledge in organic amnesia: Training for computer-related work. Neuropsychologia, 25, 893-906. Glisky, E.L., & Schacter, D.L. (1989) Extending the limits of complex learning in organic amnesia: Computer training in a vocational domain. Neuropsychologia, 27, 107-120. Heinrichs, R.W. (1989) Attempted clinical application of a technique for promoting robust free recall to a case of alcoholic Korsakoff's syndrome. Brain and Cognition, 9, 151-157. Mayes, A.R. (1988) Human organic memory disorders. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. McEntee, W. J., & Mair, R.G. (1990) The Korsakoff syndrome: a neurochemical perspective. Trends in Neurosciences, 13, 340-344.

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Victor, M., Adams, R.A. & Collins, G.H. (1989) The Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome and related neurologic disorders due to alcoholism and malnutrition. (2nd Ed.). Philadelphia: F.A. Davis. Wilson, B.A. (1991) Long-term prognosis of patients with severe memory disorders. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 1, 117- 134.

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PART 5

METHODOLOGY

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Memory in Everyday Life G.M. Davies and R.H. Logie (Editors) 0 1993 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved.

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Martin A . Conway, University of Lancaster, United Kingdom. "When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense." (Kuhn, 1962, p.94) This is an exciting time for memory research. In the past 15 years the range of memory research (and the number of memory researchers) has massively expanded exploding out from the laboratory to take in topics as diverse as memory for bicycling trips (Bruce & Van Pelt, 1989) to memory for courses taken in high school and university (Bahrick, 1984; Bahrick & Hall, 1991; Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1991). However, not all memory researchers have welcomed this diversification (in fact most have ignored it perhaps in the hope that it will simply fade away) and unease has recently turned into vociferous attack upon what has now become know as everyday memory (EM). The assault upon EM has been led by researchers who are firmly in the laboratory tradition of memory research (e.g. Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Roediger, 1991) and, I will argue in this article, is based on a religious belief in the sanctity of experimental method. I shall refer to the tradition of laboratory based experimental research as verbal learning (VL) and much of what follows will be an exploration of the basic nature and assumptions of VL. In preview, my argument will be that VL uncritically adopted the methodology of the natural sciences and that a zealous and narrow belief in this methodology has hindered the development of theoretical thinking about human memory. Indeed, I will argue that, paradoxically, VL is a science with a method but no theory. The current debate about EM has arisen because EM research, by its very nature, forces researchers to consider the function and purpose of human memory. In contrast, issues concerning the function and purpose of human memory have a rather jaundiced status within VL - after all (or so the story goes) when one has a method with which to study human memory why preempt the issue of what

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memory is, surely the data will reveal the function and purpose?

In the beginning was the (non)word: The theocracy of verbal learning and the sacred text of Ebbinghaus. Verbal learning has been the predominant approach to memory throughout the 20th century and constitutes a clearly identifiable body of scientific thought, indeed VL may even be a paradigm. The notion of a paradigm was introduced by Kuhn (1962) in his analysis of the process of change in scientific thought. Unfortunately, Kuhn used the term 'paradigm' in many different ways (Masterman, 1970) and, consequently, its meaning is not without ambiguity. Nevertheless, at a general level a paradigm might be thought of as a model, law, or philosophy which guides scientific thought in a particular area at a particular time. For instance, Kuhn wrote that paradigms might be thought of as .universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners" (1962, p.10). Kuhn likened paradigms to political ideologies which come to be institutionalised in the bureaucracies of a society. Change occurs through a process of revolution in which, by persuasion and force, the ideology and institutions which represent the prevailing system of thought are overthrown and replaced by a new ideology. In terms of change in scientific thought this occurs when one paradigm replaces another and, needless to say, such change always entails conflict. However, the characterisation of VL as a paradigm, where 'paradigm' is analogous to the operation of a totalitarian state, seems inappropriate for number of reasons. First of all VL constitutes a particular way of studying memory rather than a body of law-like knowledge. Secondly, VL is not configured conceptually in such as a way as to be open to refutation by contradictory empirical findings and/or anomalous empirical phenomena. Allegiance to VL tends to be a matter of faith and one either believes in the VL approach or one does not. Consequently, it seems that the paradigm of VL might best be likened to a theocracy rather than a totalitarian state. A theocracy is typically organized around a sacred text which specifies the central beliefs of the sect or religion.The sacred text is interpreted by a set of high priests (note 1) who determine the 'correct' reading of the text and regulate theorocratic discourse between the faithful. Needles to say the priests train 'I..

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acolytes in correct readings of the text, ensuring continuity of the theocracy, suppress apocryphal teachings, punish blasphemies and desecrations, and so ensure the integrity of the theocracy In the theocracy of VL the sacred text is Ebbinghaus's famous book 'Memory: A contribution to experimental psychology', (1 885/1964). In this book Ebbinghaus reports a series of ingenious studies of his own memory using experimental method. Indeed Ebbinghaus opens his book by arguing that most of what was known about memory at the time he was writing was drawn from the study of 'exceptional' cases (see for example Ribot, 1882). He also spends some time acknowledging that memory in everyday life is subject to so many influences that it is usually impossible to determine the cause and identify the processes underlying the influence of memory upon behaviour. Ebbinghaus's aim, then, was to study 'ordinary' rather than 'exceptional' memory and to do so in such a way as to be able to identify the probable causes and processes of memory. Indeed he comments: "We must try in experimental fashion to keep as constant as possible those circumstances whose influence on retention and reproduction is known or suspected, and then ascertain whether that is sufficient. The material must be so chosen that decided differences of interest are, at least to all appearances, excluded; equality of attention may be promoted by preventing external disturbances; sudden fancies are not subject to control, but, on the whole, their disturbing effect is limited to the moment, and will be of comparatively little account if the time of the experiment is extended" (Ebbinghaus, 18891964, p. 12). The emphasis is upon control of as many aspects of the experimental setting as possible and the assumption is that by excluding 'differences of interest' on the part of the subject and/or materials, memory can be studied in a comparatively pure way. Indeed, Ebbinghaus hit on the great idea of using nonsense syllables as materials in his experiments - he used three letter combinations of consonant-vowel-consonant, or CVC strings as they became known, and his enthusiasm for these materials is expressed in the following passage: "The nonsense material, just described, offers many advantages in part

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because of this very lack of meaning. First of all, it is relatively simple and relatively homogeneous. In the case of the material nearest at hand, namely poetry or prose, the content is now narrative in style, nov descriptive, or now reflective; it contains now a phrase that is pathetic, now one that is humorous; its metaphors are sometimes beautiful, sometimes harsh; its rhythm is sometimes smooth and sometimes rough. There is thus brought into play a multiplicity of influences which change without regularity and are therefore disturbing. Such are associations which dart here and there, different degrees of interest, lines of verse recalled because of their striking quality or their beauty, and the like. All this is avoided with our syllables." (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964, p.23). Yet even this was not enough and Ebbinghaus introduced one further refinement of experimental method: "When, however, we have actually obtained in such manner the greatest possible constancy of conditions attainable by us how are we to know whether this is sufficient for our purpose? When are the circumstances, which will certainly offer differences enough to keen observation, sufficiently constant? The answer may be:- When upon repetition of the experiment the results remain constant. (Ebbinghaus, 18891964, p. 12). 'I

The sacred text, then, specifies two major principles of scientific research into memory. First, the methods employed must not be ambiguous and, second, the findings must be replicable. Finally, following a trend in 19th century psychology, Ebbinghaus strongly. proposed that the data collected in his experiments must be quantitative data that could be treated statistically and particularly in terms of probability. These three tenets, unambiguous method, replicability, and quantitative data, form the central belief system of VL and have been propagated by the high priests of the theocracy as the unquestionable commandments to which all research must submit. Memory researchers who's papers have been subject to the peer review process will immediately recognise these three commandments and also acknowledge that transgression of any one of them leads to suppression of a paper, (in 'journalese' - an arcane language employed by reviewers and

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journal editors in the secret rite of anonymous reviewing - suppression is called 'rejection'). Let us briefly consider the consequences of the three commandments of VL. The idea of unambiguous method has forced memory researchers to employ reified settings for their research. This is because it is difficult (but not impossible) to study memory using scientific method anywhere expect the laboratory. Within the laboratory the use of scientific method is, however, extremely simple: The researcher simply selects some suitably meaningless stimuli which can yield quantitative data, ensures that the subject can have little idea about what's going on, and ensures that the same clearly identified conditions pertain to the testing of all subjects. One experiment, however, is never enough to form a journal paper and within VL papers comply with what we might call the 'replicate-and-extend' model. Thus, a researcher conducts one experiment and then conducts the same experiment usually with a new condition tacked on. In this way the second commandment of replicability is satisfied. Finally, VL journals rarely if ever include papers containing qualitative data and certainly never publish papers based only on qualitative data - such data seem to be regarded, at best, as uninteresting epiphenomena. Following the three commandments has its benefits. For instance, the concept of unambiguous method really is a godsend for what method could be unambiguous? Ambiguity is only limited by the imagination of the researcher and within VL great debates about specific procedures have been a blessing on the productivity of whole generations of psychologists. (For examples see any memory text book, most of which trace the history of such debates with commendable zeal). Obviously, replicability (as the name suggests!) has proved particularly fecund in generating endless sequences of journal articles although by far its largest influence has been in expanding the length of journal papers -just how many times should one replicate and extend a finding? Finally, the sacred text and theocracy of VL have been revered in recent publications. Nineteen eighty-five marked the centenary of the first issue of the sacred text (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964) and this was commemorated in a number of publications. For instance the then editor of the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Henry Roediger, published a special edition of the journal (Roediger, 1985) in celebration of the centennial, and thirteen leading memory researchers provided various comments on the text and its effects. In a somewhat larger ceremony Gorfien and Hoffman convened

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an Ebbinghaus Centennial conference and subsequently published the proceedings (Gorfien & Hoffman, 1987). Moreover, Banaji and Crowder (1989) launched a major attack on EM research which they judged to have violated the three commandments. Thus, the theocracy of VL appears to be highly active, supporting the orthodoxy of scientific method and attempting to suppress new creeds. Moreover some fundamentalists within VL have recently advocated a return to strict interpretations of the commandments. For instance, Roediger (1991) has argued that the issue of experimental control should be the overriding concern for all memory researchers and Watkins (1990), in crusading fashion, has proposed that researchers should minimise theorizingperhaps by dropping ’Discussion’ sections of papers altogether - and instead highlight the empirical content of their studies. Indeed, Ebbinghaus is often admiringly credited with not letting his interpretations run too far ahead of his findings (e.g. Bahrick, 1987). Thus, it might be argued that the church of VL having renewed itself in rereadings of the sacred text has reinvigorated itself and righteously scattered the infidel rabble. This, however, is not the case and the hegemony of VL continues to diminish - why?

Say a little prayer for me: Verbal learning in the valley of darkness According to Ebbinghaus ’meaning’ was a pollutant, it corrupted and obscured pure memory processes, it prevented the researcher from gaining unambiguous data, and the only way to sharpen the focus of research, to close in on those unpolluted pristine memory processes, was to control meaning out of the (experimental) observation of memory. But what’s left of memory once meaning has gone? The answer seems to be ’not much!’ (note 2). In the hundred year history of VL only a small number of largely unrelated phenomena have been discovered in the laboratory and here I list some which came fairly rapidly to mind: generation effects, modality/suffix effects, serial position effects, word frequency effects, proactive and retroactive inhibition, massed vs. spaced practice, phonological similarity effects, word length effects, categorization effects, unattended speech effects, and (to be fair to Ebbinghaus) savings in relearning. Other phenomena much investigated by researchers within VL can be found in Baddeley (1976), Crowder (1976), and Murdock, (1974). Undoubtedly I have omitted a few effects generally regarded as being significant but even if we were to add those in, the list could only be regarded as a very

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modest haul after a hundred years of research by myriads of VL researchers. More importantly, and even more amazingly, not a single one of these phenomena has an uncontested theoretical interpretation (no wonder some fundamentalists want to banish theory!). But perhaps the most telling criticism is that these phenomena, such as they are, do not cohere together to form a developing picture of memory, they remain as isolated phenomena which manifest under certain unusual conditions or not all. Hardly surprising then that the faithful have turned to new gods and new beliefs, after all even memory researchers need a little meaning in their lives. Thus, despite exhortations to return to strict experimental methods VL cannot escape the fact that such methods have failed to deliver anything approaching a general understanding of memory. Let’s take a step back for a moment and remind ourselves that Ebbinghaus assumed that the methods of the natural sciences - which had been so spectacularly successful in gaining control of the physical world - could with equal profit be applied to the human mind (or as Ebbinghaus called it ’higher mental processes’). But why should we accept this assumption? Can we in any sense equate psychological phenomena with physical phenomena? The usual reductionist answer to this question (sometimes known as eliminative reductionism) is that psychological phenomena take place in the human brain (a physical object) and therefore must be subject to the physical laws governing that object (note 3). To suppose anything else is to assume that there is something mysterious (note 4) about the human brain. Thus, the argument goes, as we develop our understanding of the brain we will be able to ’eliminate’ explanations at a higher level - psychological explanations - and finally identify those pristine memory process hidden for so long by meaning. However, the human brain is mysterious and the assumption that mental states can be reduced to physical states a matter of controversial and often unconvincing debate. Moreover, meaning is central to human cognition and any account of human memory must confront rather than bypass the problems raised by meaning. Consider the following. At the moment I have in mind an image of the computer I have at home. Is my image the same as the computer itself’? I look at the computer on my desk here at work - is my perception the same as the computer before me? Obviously one wants to answer ’No!’ to both questions, my memory image and my perception are clearly not the same thing as the

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actual objects themselves. So how do my cognitions differ from the two objects? The philosopher Brentano (1 874/1973) proposed that the difference lies in the fact that my computer at home and my computer at work are just what they are and nothing more - two computers. However, my memory and perception of these computers are something more, my cognitions are about the computers. This idea of 'aboutness' or the intentionality of mental states has provoked much (sometimes acrimonious) debate between philosophers, not least because it makes mental states 'mysterious'. For psychology, however, the proposition does not appear so threatening the basic idea being that mental states have content, that they are about something. The problem is that if one accepts the idea that mental states have content then this makes the whole reductionist enterprise very unattractive. For it follows that even if we knew the exact and complete dynamic configuration of my brain when I recalled my computer at home this still would not provide us with a complete understanding of my memory. (It would, of course, provide us with a far more complete understanding than anything we have, or even approach, at the moment). In order to develop the complete explanation, model, or theory, we would also need to know just what this detailed map of the configuration of my brain was about. Intentionality is one of the major problems facing VL and there are two reasons for this. First, if memory is intentional, has content, is meaningful, then it is a mistake to assume that the methods of the physical sciences will, by happy accident, provide us with the appropriate means to study memory. Scientific method was developed in order to study nonintentional physical objects not intentional systems and it seems that in order to pursue our studies of memory we will have to confront this fact and develop new methods appropriate to the investigation of human cognition. Few researchers in VL would articulate their discontent with the straightjacket of experimental method in this way, nevertheless I suggest that the problem of intentionality is at the heart of current attempts to diversify memory research. Second, intentionality forces the researcher to consider just what the content of mental states might be and this inevitably involves considering meaning, personal meaning for the individual, of cognitions. The consideration of personal meaning and the theorizing that this involves is, of course, anathema to VL which still clings to belief that it is an empirical science (rather like 19th century biology). Again, however, I suggest that the issue of intentionality and notion of personal

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meaning lie at the centre of recent attempts to broaden the scope of memory research - at least some memory researchers are now on the track of meaning. The incoherence of phenomena discovered within the VL tradition critically relates to the unthinking acceptance of the experimental method and the concomitant reductionist assumption that there are 'pure' memory processes waiting to be discovered. These assumptions have also given rise to a mistaken belief in the generalizability of laboratory findings: a belief which conflates replicability and generalizability. Thus, the phenomena much studied by VL occur only under certain specific laboratory conditions but not under others and this is surely an advantage because knowing the circumstances under which a phenomenon manifests and the circumstances under which it is absent is at least part way to gaining an empirical hold upon the phenomenon under investigation. Also, making an effect appear and then disappear complies with the second commandment of replicability because the effect must be produced time and again in order to compare it with conditions under which it does not appear - replications show that the effect is 'real'. But does this show that the effect is general, that is to say that it represents the operations of some ubiquitous aspect of memory? The assumption within VL is that 'real' effects do generalise and, of course, that such effects can only be identified by the use of scientific method (see Banaji & Crowder, 1989; Roediger, 1991).This assumption, however, is as questionable as the assumption that physical objects can be equated with mental states. One of the spectacular failures of VL is that 'real' effects discovered in the laboratory typically have no obvious or direct implications for cognition outside the laboratory. Moreover, in the very few cases where 'real' effects discovered in the laboratory have been further explored in everyday settings the laboratory effects have not emerged (see Conway, 1991, for examples). But how can this be? Physical scientists and VL memory researchers use broadly comparable experimental method but in the former, findings sometimes single observations - generalise almost universally, whereas in the latter generalisation is low. The answer is simple and goes right back to Ebbinghaus. In the physical sciences the object under investigation has essentially the same properties whether studied in the laboratory or anywhere else. In the psychology of memory the object under investigation (the human mind) is reactive, it adapts to changing circumstances, and consequently the properties displayed by this object may disappear, alter, be attenuated, or

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exaggerated, in response to changing circumstances. Thus, the properties of memory manifest in the laboratory will typically be different from the properties manifest in some other environment. For example, the processes inferred from laboratory studies may simply not be used in everyday cognition or may dynamically combine with other processes to form some quite different attribute of memory. In general it seems that the effects discovered in the laboratory do not generalise to everyday memory because the laboratory is not a good exemplar of the environment(s) in which memory is typically employed. Indeed, quite the reverse may be the case and the properties of memory manifest in the laboratory might be the properties of a system adapting to an alien environment. Thus, in studying a dynamic and reactive system such as human memory it is essential that the system is primarily examined in the environment which shaped and developed it - only then will general properties of system become apparent. Improving the validity of the ecological settings in which memory is studied has been one of the principal developments in current memory research and stems directly from Neisser’s (1976) original ecological critique of cognitive psychology (see also Bruce, 1985, 1991). In the light of my earlier arguments obviously I would claim that raising the ecological validity of the environment in which memory is studied may improve the generalizability of research findings because ecologically valid investigations engage more directly the intentionality of human memory. There are, however, many ways in which to improve the ecological aspect of research into human memory and very few of them require either the total abandonment of experimental method or the rigour which this brings to research. I will consider some examples of research with higher levels of ecological validity in a later section. The uncritical, even unthinking, use of the methods of the physical sciences by VL is one of the main causes of current disillusionment with research in the VL tradition. The over reliance on experimental method as both a method and a philosophy of memory has given rise to poor quality theorizing, distracted research activities from confronting central problems, and led to research of very low generalizability. The challenge is to find new methods which will allow us to investigate the intentionality of human memory and develop a broad understanding of human memory. But does this mean that the methods and findings of VL can now be considered worthless? Can we by a process of eliminative intentionality discard a hundred years of research? This undoubtedly is one of the great anxieties of VL and it arises because of the

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hegemony of the VL theocracy. As Kuhn (1962) noted, such anxieties, often manifest as aggression, characterise a period of change in scientific thought and practice.Yet the current diversity in memory research constitutes more an attempt to improve the methodology, perhaps by increasing ecological validity, rather than an attempt to replace scientific method. Moreover, there is no question that findings obtained in laboratory settings are both 'real', of significance, and require an explanation. Rather the questions are, What sort of reality? What sort of significance? What sort of explanation?

The grape withering on the vine: Implicit memory Glance through the current major journals featuring memory research and you will find that by far the majority of papers address a topic called implicit memory. If you happen to be reading this article in the year 2001 (ten years from the time of writing) I predict that you will be hard put to find more than a handful of journal papers investigating implicit memory. The history of VL is a list of effects that at one time everyone investigated but which later interested no one. Indeed, Lockhart (1989, p.5) comments that "it is a sobering exercise to skim the journals devoted to human learning and memory, published between say 1950 and 1970, and to estimate the percentage of experimental results that hold any interest for, or exert any sustained influence on, contemporary memory theory". Many of these abandoned topics were listed in the previous section but to them we should add levels of processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) which generated the majority of papers published in memory research in the mid- to late-1970's. It might be thought that a particular phenomena once thoroughly investigated is thoroughly understood and so the decline in research activity is a natural corollary of the 'progress' of scientific endeavour. In the case of VL such a view would be completely mistaken. Or it might be thought that research eventually establishes that the phenomena or effect under investigation turns out to be an artifact of something else (perhaps the experimental procedure itself) and so research activity in that area tails off. Again this would be a mistaken view. The phenomena discovered within VL are real phenomena the problem is that there are no acceptable explanations for them. Typically, following the replicate-and-extend model, such phenomena are subject to intense investigation for a short number of years and gradually as a body of knowledge

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about a phenomena increases it becomes clear that subsequent findings are contributing little to understanding the original phenomena. As this insight dawns, disinterest in the phenomenon grows and the topic is slowly abandoned as an active research area. I propose-that this is a classic symptom of a science with method but no theory. Let’s see how this process is beginning to unfold in the study of implicit memory. Implicit memory refers very loosely to the fact that when people are exposed to knowledge, or when they actively acquire new material, the effects of the prior exposure can be manifest in behaviour even though the individual does not consciously, actively, recollect the material. Implicit memory is contrasted with explicit memory which refers to situations in which a person actively and consciously recollects knowledge previously acquired. The fascinating empirical fact about implicit memory is that manipulations which effect explicit memory do not effect implicit memory (Jacoby, 1983). Much of the research into implicit memory has documented this general finding in, by now, probably hundreds of journal papers. More recently, it has been found that the phenomenological experience of remembering - recollective experience - appears to be influenced by manipulations which effect explicit memory (Gardiner 1988), whereas items which are responded to appropriately but which are not accompanied by the experience of remembering do not show the same sensitivity to manipulations influencing explicit remembering. These findings are, of course, fascinating, of wide ranging significance, and must surely speak to the issue of consciousness and memory. Indeed, the study of implicit memory has at least some of its antecedents in the study of anterograde amnesia (Warrington & Weiskrantz, 1982). Anterograde amnesics are patients who, after head injury, are impaired in the conscious recall of events occurring after their injury or illness. Often such patients can recall events occurring before their illness. However, research in the VL tradition found that anterograde amnesics show behavioural signs of having retained knowledge acquired in the post-injury phase even though they cannot actively, consciously, recollect this knowledge. Thus, implicit memory looks like an area that might rekindle interest in the whole VL tradition offering as it does an experimentally tractable way to study consciousness with obvious widespread implications and applications in the area of brain damage. The findings are not in doubt the question is: What do they mean? The suggestions emerging from VL researchers reflect the

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sterility of a science that sees personal meaning as a pollutant masking the study of human memory. One idea which has received some attention is that implicit memory reflects the operation of data driven process whereas explicit memory reflects the operation of conceptually driven processes (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987). No one has any idea of what 'data driven' and 'conceptually driven' processes are but the attraction of the model lies in the fact that 'data driven' and 'conceptually driven' can be operationalised in terms of experimental tasks (Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989). For example, perceptual identification (responding to words presented so quickly as to be perceptible on only 50% of presentations) is viewed as the paradigm data driven memory task. A person exposed earlier to some of the words included in a latter perceptual identification task identifies more previously seen words than new words and this is regardless of whether the original words were processed for meaning or surface attributes (Jacoby, 1983). In contrast, free recall is seen as the paradigm conceptually driven memory task and in this task words previously seen and originally processed for meaning are better remembered than words originally processed for surface features. This type of theorizing is typical of the VL tradition which, in the grand tradition of not letting theory 'run ahead of data', has nearly always sought to model findings by classifying the tasks which produced the findings. The inherent circularity in these explanations is one of the main reasons why the research effort so often falters and eventually runs out of steam. A second, and related reason, is that task-classification theories tend to be arbitrary and offer no way in which to provide a coherent picture of the rapidly accumulating set of findings demonstrating minor fluctuations in the basic effect. Indeed, the impression one gains looking back at the abandoned areas of VL research - for example, levels of processing - is of incoherent sets of findings some few of which were singled out by researchers at the time as being of significance but many of which, if not the majority, were simply ignored. There are many examples of this incoherence of findings in implicit memory research and a particularly telling case is provided by Peynircioglu and Watkins ( 1 986) who make no attempt whatsoever to interpret their findings. For the selective use of findings in support of task-classification types of theory see any of the papers dealing with implicit memory in the collection edited by Roediger and Craik, ( 1989). An alternative to the grand (and circular) task-classification type of

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theorising is the task-specific purely local model. In this case a theoretical account is provided purely for one type of task and usually in the context of a short series of experiments. As Watkins (1990) has pointed out these theories last as long as their originators chose to keep writing about them once the writing stops, however, the favoured task-specific theory disappears from the current literature. Implicit memory, then, has all the symptoms of previous VL research interests, circular task-classification theories, numerous task-specific theories (see the collection of papers in Lewanowsky, Dunn, & Kirsner, 1989), and a large rapidly expanding incoherent data base. When it is assumed that memory is a pure process just waiting to yield up its secrets to the appropriate methodology and that is the only assumption allowed about memory then it is, perhaps, unsurprising that no sense can be made of diverse findings. Dense anterograde amnesics are often unimpaired in other intellectual functions. Their IQ remains the same and their comprehension and use of language appears to be intact. But although an anterograde amnesic can comprehend a sentence, after a delay of a few minutes s/he will not only not recall the previous conversation but may even fail to recognise the person with whom s/he had been conversing - anterograde amnesics sometimes state that their phenomenal experience is like that of a person constantly waking from a dream. So it is with the history of VL, waking from the dream of modality effects to the reality of generation effects, from the dream of levels of processing to the reality of implicit memory, ad infinitum. Without any theoretical ideas about the ecology and function of memory it is not possible to integrate research findings within an area and similarly impossible to integrate findings across areas. This 'amnesic' incoherence which stems directly from Ebbinghaus 'keeping close to his data' is also one of the main reasons for current disillusionment with the rigidity of the three commandments of VL and, as I suggested in the title of this section, the main reason why implicit memory research seems doomed to fade into an inaccessible past.

Born again! The study of everyday memory Everyday memory (EM) is the term currently used to refer to memory research which attempts to examine memory in its natural habitat - everyday cognition. However, conducting actual experiments in everyday settings is virtually impossible both practically and in principal - for as soon as a memory

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researcher intervenes in everyday cognition the cognition is no longer 'everyday'! And it seems that little is to be gained by simply observing people in their everyday lives (but see Neisser, 1981) and trying to infer the nature of memory. If this were a viable project no doubt we would have solved the problems of memory many centuries ago and the issue would now be closed. Even worse, from the perspective of this article, all EM researchers are also VL researchers either concurrently or by past training. Like VL researchers EM researchers are experiment-tropic and where possible clearly feel much happier when their experiments fit the replicate-and-extend model. So what's different? What's all the fuss about? Why are venerable VL researchers starting a jihad against EM? As always the problem goes back to Ebbinghaus and the uncritical use of experimental method. Recall that Ebbinghaus decided on the use of meaningless materials as appropriate stimuli with which to tap 'pure' memory processes. As we have seen the use of meaningless stimuli is critical to experimental method and this is because (or so the story goes) meaning itself is like a smog obscuring the operation of memory. The major current difference between EM and VL research is that EM research attempts to use stimuli which are meaningful for the people who take part in their experiments. The consequence of this is a loss of control over part of the experimental situation - an outrageous violation of the first commandment of VL (see Banaji & Crowder, 1989, for an example of VL outrage at this transgression). This loss of control relates primarily to stimuli selection which in EM research must be based on the knowledge domain of interest (e.g. sites visited on a cycling holiday, layout of car parks, football scores, events experienced in everyday life, public events, or knowledge acquired at school). The stimuli of EM are radically different from the much used CVC strings or short common words employed in VL research and are more like the very form of stimuli which Ebbinghaus originally rejected: poems and prose passages. The stimuli of EM research are polluted with meaning. But let's turn our attention to meaningless stimuli for a moment. Was Ebbinghaus correct in assuming that CVC strings.really were meaningless? Consider the following passage from Wittgenstein: "I say the word "tree", then I say a nonsense-word. They feel different. To what extent? - Two objects are shown me: One is a book, the other

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a thing unknown to me with a peculiar shape. I say: they not merely look different, but I also have a different feeling on looking at them. The first thing I 'understand', the other I don't understand. "Yes but it is not only the difference between familiarity and strangeness." Well is there not also a difference between kinds of familiarity and strangeness? A stranger walks into my room, but it is a human being, so much I see at once. Some swathed thing walks into my room. I don't know if it is man or beast. I see an unfamiliar object on my table, an ordinary pebble, but I never saw it before on my table. I see a stone on the path; I am not astonished, although I do not remember having seen just that stone before. I see on my table a queer shaped object whose function is unknown to me and am not surprised: it was always there, I never knew what it was and was never interested to know, it is thoroughly familiar to me." (Wittgenstein, 1980, p.84e). Ebbinghaus's CVC strings are like the stranger who walks into Wittgenstein's room in that they look like words rather than something totally unfamiliar. Indeed it now seems that adult subjects try to process such stimuli by analogy with actual words (Kay & Marcel, 1981) as do even comparatively young children (Gathercole, Willis, Emslie, & Baddeley, 1991). In general, this 'effort after meaning' (Bartlett, 1932) is characteristic of all human cognition. People on encountering a 'swathed thing' do not just have the cognition 'ah! a swathed thing', rather they try to understand what the thing might be, how it came to be here, and what it's intentions are. Yet, VL researchers do not seek to learn what interpretation a person placed on a 'meaningless' stimuli and the consequences of this for memory, rather more simply they only ask, 'Was there a swathed thing in the list?'. Clearly, Ebbinghaus was wrong in imagining that CVC strings and other minimal stimuli (i.e. unrelated short words) are meaningless - the system which processes these stimuli (the human mind) confers meaning upon them. The effort after meaning must clearly be more strained, more effortful, more cognitively demanding, in strange and unusual situations which feature familiar but curiously combined items, such as the letters making up a nonword. How memory operates under such strange conditions will undoubtedly tell us great deal about normal memory functioning but we will never be able to understand what the findings obtained in these circumstance signify unless we already have at least some idea of normal

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memory functioning. One researcher who did attempt to understand what happens when people try to remember strange and familiar stimuli was Bartlett (1932). Bartlett developed a number of innovative methods for studying memory one of which he call the method of repeated reproduction. In this method a subject studies a story, prose passage, or, perhaps, a set of pictures. After a delay the subject then recalls the previously studied materials. The innovation comes in that the subject is then required to recall the material at further delays - sometimes over periods of years. Bartlett’s aim was to examine how memory for the original materials changed over time and in the case of ’strange’ materials he found that the stories he used became more conventional, rational, and much shorter. For instance, one of Bartlett’s stimuli was a North American folk-tale called ’The War of Ghosts’ which he selected primarily because it differed so radically from the culture of the 1920’s Cambridge University undergraduates (who were Bartlett’s subjects). After repeated recalls over long delays subjects recalled a culturally sanitised version of the story in which irrational elements and supernatural occurrences had disappeared and been replaced (i.e.conventionalised or rationalised ) by events acceptable to the minds of the undergraduates. As VL researchers what are we to make of Bartlett’s method and findings? What happened was that VL could make nothing of Bartlett’s work which was totally ignored until the advent of cognitive psychology in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Cognitive psychology with its emphasis on the representation of knowledge obviously found Bartlett’s work conducive as it implied (actually ’demonstrated’ would be a better word) that memory was shaped by the existing knowledge base of the rememberer. Thus, those ’interests’ and passing ’fancies’ which Ebbinghaus had argued should be controlled out of studies of memory suddenly seemed far more significant than previously thought. Within VL some studies did pursue what became known as ’context effects’ but obviously VL could make no sense of such effects as they required an account in terms of the knowledge of the remember rather than an account in terms of pure, unpolluted, knowledge-free memory processes. And ’context effects’ are now another ’abandoned’ area of VL memory research. In the early 1970’s the hegemony of VL if not under threat by the growing interest in Bartlett’s work, and with the emphasis in cognitive psychology on prior knowledge (and ultimately meaning), at least felt

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uncomfortable with this type of thinking. Luckily the day was saved by Tulving (1972) who introduced the episodic-semantic distinction. According to this distinction memory researchers concerned with the nature of knowledge and its role in memory were studying a separate memory system called semantic memory. In contrast, VL researchers were studying memory for episodes, episodic memory, and remarkably this was conceived as a memory system separate from the meaning, knowledge, system - semantic memory. The, study of memory then divided into VL as it always had been, essentially atheoretical assuming memory to be a thing in itself with ’pure’ processes, and the study of conceptual knowledge. Occasionally the two would intersect as, for example, in Bower, Black, and Turner’s (1979) work on scripts but VL has been successful in maintaining it’s distance from studies of conceptual knowledge despite widespread disillusionment with the episodic-semantic distinction. Successful that is until the advent of EM, One of the best current (EM) papers using the method of repeated production was a naturalistic study reported by Neisser (I 98 1). Neisser noticed that during the Watergate scandal which led to the downfall of the American President Richard M. Nixon many conversations between Nixon and his aids were, unknown to them, tape recorded. John Dean, one of Nixon’s chief advisers who later testified before the senate Watergate Investigating Committee, was credited as having a remarkably detailed and accurate memory. When the Nixon tapes were released it was possible to compare Dean’s testimony against his actual conversations with Nixon during the period of the cover-up. Neisser found that Dean’s testimony, much of which related to repeated meetings in which he and Nixon had discussed the cover-up, was incorrect in almost all the details which Dean recalled. However, Dean’s testimony was highly accurate in terms of Nixon’s intentions and knowledge in other words in terms of the meaning of their conversations. This study is important for a number of reasons. First it demonstrates the reconstructive nature of memory; second, it shows how studying memory in the ’real’ world (with all its pollution) can produce systematic observation; and third, it has obvious implications for understanding witness testimony. Within the VL tradition such a study would have been inconceivable and the findings incomprehensible. Very briefly, consider two other areas of EM research. Bahrick and his colleagues (e.g. Bahrick, 1984; Bahrick & Hall, 1991) have reported a series

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of impressive studies into the very long-term retention of knowledge acquired at school through formal education. These studies use stimuli which are specific to the courses ex-students actually studied and have to take into account many factors which might affect memory (i.e. original depth of learning, subsequent contact with the studied materials, even gender of the student). In these studies, then, there is no control over the original learning environment and the little control over stimuli - indeed the stimuli are the very type of stimuli Ebbinghaus judged to be inappropriate, they are meaningful. Note also, that the studies are directed at the very place where memory takes place, our everyday lives. The findings of Bahrick and his colleagues are remarkable in that they demonstrate that retention rapidly diminishes over the first few years after learning but then stabilises and remains at an above chance level for many years. And this is the case even though the ex-students have not rehearsed the knowledge in the intervening period. These findings simply could not have been discovered in the laboratory and their theoretical and applied significance is wide ranging. Moreover, in recent work we (Conway, Cohen, & Stanhope, 1991) have been able to replicate and extend Bahrick’s findings in a new knowledge domain (well I did say that all EM researchers are VL’s at heart!). The study of autobiographical memory (memory for the events of one’s life) is one of the major areas of EM research and an area recently under attack from the high priests of VL (see Banaji & Crowder, 1989). One research strand in this area focuses on the distribution of memories recalled across the life-span. Subjects are asked to recall memories to cue words or simply to list as many memories as they can in, say, 15 minutes. Subjects then go back and date their memories.The question of interest is ’how will memories be distributed across the subject’s life span?’ For instance, will most memories be recalled from recent times and least from more remote times? - an obvious prediction from VL laboratory studies. It turns out that this is the case, but only for subjects of about 20 years in age. For older subjects (over the age of about 35 years) the distribution is quite different and there are three identifiable portions to the curve. First, there is a period of childhood amnesia (from birth to 5 to 7 years of age) from which very few memories are recalled and, second, for the most recent 20 years (e.g. for 70-year olds, the period 50 to 70 years of age) there is a rapid decline in the number of memories recalled and fewer memories are recalled from older time periods. Third, there is a bump in the curve which occurs when the subject was aged between 15 and 30 years and many memories

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are recalled from these years (Rubin, Wetzler, & Nebes, 1986; see Conway, 1990, 1991, for reviews, and Conway, Rubin, Spinnler, & Wagenaar, 1992, for recent findings). This period is often known as the 'reminiscence' bump and is thought to reflect the retention of personally significant life events. Again this pattern of retention could never have been discovered in the laboratory and although it does not entail the use of meaningful stimuli it does entail the subject accessing highly meaningful personal knowledge - memory for the events of one's life. EM research can, then, use experimental method and discover phenomena which could never have emerged in the laboratory. The particular experimental methods used by EM, which are designed to tap everyday aspects of memory, require some relaxation of control on the part of the experimenter. Clearly, the onus is upon EM researchers to justify this relaxation and to ensure that the resulting data are not artifacts of the method employed or open to plausible competing explanations. As Bartlett (1932, p.238) commented "psychology can make steady and sure advance only as it keeps closely in touch with direct and relevant observation". However, this "sure advance" requires a flexibility of method and thinking which has not been a hallmark of the VL approach to memory. My claim is that as the field focuses more and more closely on the problem of meaning and memory then new methodologies will be required, particularly as we are compelled to examine memory in its natural setting, and scientific method as currently formulated by VL may have to change completely. Moreover if, as I have argued, the issue of meaning does come to the fore in memory research then current theorizing (such as it is!) will also change completely, particularly if one accepts, as Bartlett did, that "Remembering is thus only one special form of the general problem of meaning, and occurs when the setting of a particular group of stimuli is treated and described as belonging to the past life of the remembering subject", (1932, p.237).

Ships in the night: Theory 8~method Part of the argument I have developed above is that VL because of its uncritical allegiance to experimental method is unable to theorise effectively and it is this which has given rise to what Wittgenstein called the "confusion and barrenness of psychology" (1953, p.232e). Indeed Wittgenstein went on to

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comment:

..

in psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion . . . The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving problems which trouble us: though problem and method pass one another by. " (Wittgenstein, 1953, p.232e). 'I.

Within VL the problem and method pass each other by because there is no problem! Memory is out there, a set of pure process obscured by meaning, all we have to do is clear away the undergrowth with our method and then we can explore the memory system unhindered. Yet if we start to consider the function and occurrence of memory in everyday life we, perhaps, begin to realise that there is a problem and that the problem is how to characterise the purpose of memory (a problem that Bartlett was well aware of). My claim is that EM research should lead to a reconnection of theory and method and for this reason alone it is worth pursuing. As always, however, the future is uncertain and there is no guarantee that this potential of EM will be realised or that even any explicit attempt to bring about a connection of theory and method will be made. However, in a real and pragmatic sense the reconnection of theory and method is already under way in that EM experiments investigate knowledge which is specific to individuals and so methods must, at least in terms of stimuli construction and selection, reflect the theoretical thinking lying behind the experimental design. But this is merely a beginning and in most cases is not articulated as a reconnection of theory and method. It is something that worries the VL researcher and something that just 'seems natural' to the EM researcher. It is an implicit reconnection of theory and method. One reason why the use of more 'real world' stimuli worries the VL researcher, and should worry all of us, is that if the EM approach is taken at face value then the only change in research is that more and more 'real' stimuli are employed. Or, possibly, it may turn out that experimental method is abandoned altogether as naive EM researchers attempt to get closer and closer to the world of everyday cognition. This is indeed is one of the dangers that EM research faces and those seriously interested in the EM approach clearly must resist such a move. I suggest that this can best be achieved by concentrating on linking theory and method. After all the EM researcher, unlike

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the VL researcher, is not fettered by a belief in pure content-neutral memory processes.

The future of memory research: Heaven or hell? Although this is an exciting time for memory research it is not a time of irrevocable decisions heralded by a portentous clash of paradigms. Decisions about the future direction of memory research made now will neither lead to the doom nor salvation of memory research. The progress of scientific thought is not like the plot of a spy novel where making the wrong choice leads to capture, torture, or even death. The situation is altogether simpler. After many years of VL research it is now apparent that our progress in understanding memory has been slow. It seems that this may be because in our haste to find a method with which to explore memory we have overlooked critical aspects of the phenomena we wish to study - its role in everyday cognition and the fact that it is part of a whole system of meaning for the individual rememberer. Now we have reminded ourselves of these facts we cannot simply forget them. Either we try to repress them as best we can (bearing in mind the pathological state that memory research may end up in) or we try to incorporate them into our work. I have suggested that if we take this latter course then there are distinct benefits. We will improve our theorising about memory and may be able to connect theory to method in such a way as to have a very potent approach to the study of human memory. But, the road to hell is paved with good intentions and if we fail to develop the rationale for EM research then we can confidently expect to look back in 10 or 20 years time at a classic VL epoch where, after a period of intense research activity, the project was abandoned. Of course at that point we will not mind overmuch, being occupied with some other, more current, and equally temporary dream of memory.

Notes 1. Even the high priests may themselves suffer a reprimand from time to time. See Tulving’s (1983, p.173) account of the response to his attempt to introduce new terminology into VL research. 2. Related to this, note Ebbinghaus’s puzzlement that he remembered

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approximately 10 times more poetry than CVC strings! It’s no mistake that the 1964 edition of Ebbinghaus’s book fronts a 3. drawing of the human brain. 4. The accusation of being ’mysterious’ is commonly used in philosophy to derogate an opponent’s argument - although, of course, mysteries are the very things that most interest scientists and, indeed, philosophers!

References Baddeley, A.D. (1976). The psychology of memory. New York: Harper & Row. Banaji, M.R., & Crowder, R.G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 44, 1185-1 193. Bahrick, H.P. (1984). Semantic memory content in permastore: 50 years of memory for Spanish learned in school. Journal of Experimental Psychologv: General, 113,1-29. Bahrick, H.P. (1987). Functional and cognitive memory theory: an overview of some key issues. In D.S. Gorfein & R.R. Hoffman (Eds.), Memory and learning: The Ebbinghaus centennial conference (pp 387-396). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Bahrick, H.P., & Hall, L.K. (1991). Lifetime maintenance of high school mathematics content. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 120, 20-33. Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering: A study in experimental and social psycholoqy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bower, G.H., Black, J.B., & Turner, T.J. (1979). Scripts in memory for text. Cognitive Psychologv.1 I , 177-220. Bentano, F. (1973). Psychology from an empirical standpoint. London: Routledge & Keegan Paul. (Original work published 1874) Bruce, D. (1985). The how and why of ecological memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114,78-90.

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Kay, J., & Marcel, A. (1981). One process, not two, in reading aloud: Lexical analogies do the work of lexical rules. Ouarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, &A, 397-414. Kuhn, T.S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lewandowsky, S . , Dunn, J.C., & Kirsner, K. (1989). ImDlicit memory: Theoretical issues. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Lockhart, R.S. (1989). The role of theory in understanding implicit memory. In S. Lewandowsky, J.C. Dunn, & K. Kirsner, (Eds.). Implicit memory: Theoretical issues (pp 3-16). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Masterman, M. (1970). The nature of a paradigm. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge (pp.55-90) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Murdock, B.B. (1974). Human memory: Theory and data. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and reality. New York: W.H. Freeman. Neisser, U. (1981). John Dean’s memory: A case study. Cognition, 4, 1-22. Peynircioglu, Z.F., & Watkins, M.J. (1986). Cue depreciation: When word fragment completion is undermined by prior exposure to lesser fragments. Journal of Exuerimental Psvcholoev: Learninp. Memory. and Cognition, l2, 426-43 1. Roediger, H. (1985). Introduction to special issue on Ebbinghaus. Journal of ExDerimental Psvcholoev: Learning. Memory. and Cognition, 11, 413. Roediger, H. (1991). They read an article? Commentary on the everyday memory controversy. American Psychologist, 46, 37-40. Roediger, H., & Blaxton, T.A. (1987). Retrieval modes produce dissociations in memory for surface information. In D.S. Gorfein & R.R. Hoffman (Eds.), Memory and learning: The Ebbinghaus centennial conference (pp 349-379). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Roediger,

H., & Craik, F.I.M.

(1989). Varieties of memory- and

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consciousness. Essays in honour of Endel Tulving. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Roediger, H., Weldon, M.S., & Challis, B.H. (1989). Explaining dissociations between implicit and explicit measures of retention: a processing account. In H. Roediger & F.I.M. Craik (Eds.), Varieties of memory and consciousness. Essays in honour of Endel TulvinP (pp. 11-37) Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Rubin, D.C., Wetzler, S.E., & Nebes, R.D. (1986). Autobiographical across the lifespan. In D.C. Rubin, (Ed.) AutobioeraDhical Memory (pp. 202- 221). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. Donaldson (Eds.), Organization of memory (pp.381-403). New York: Academic Press. Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. New York: Oxford University Press. Watkins, M.J. (1990). Mediationism and the obsfucation of memory. American Psychologist, 45,328-335. Warrington, E.K., & Weiskrantz, L. (1982). Amnesia: A disconnection syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 16,233-249. Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L. (1980) Remarks on the philosophy of psychologu, Vol. 1. Oxford: Blackwell.

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Commentary: Faith and Skepticism in Memory Research

Robert G. Crowder Yale University, USA Throughout his chapter, Conway writes in the tone of an ecclesiastical historian. His purpose is no doubt to suggest a rigidity and orthodoxy among the followers (he would say disciples) of Ebbinghaus. (Evolutionary biology may have held Darwin in a similar position.) But of course this affectation also suggests that Conway supposes Ebbinghaus to have been of Messianic stature. Now, I am a great admirer of Ebbinghaus, to be sure, but I never would have gone that far!

Faith and evidence A closer look reveals that the ecclesiastical metaphor backfires, and with thundering impact: Whereas matters of religion are necessarily based on faith and authority, the generation of verbal learning workers after Ebbinghaus got to work, almost without delay, at revising and correcting what he had claimed. Most especially, a vigorous skepticism set in regarding exactly the one premise that Conway (incorrectly) holds to be fundamental to the whole verbal learning tradition --- the goal of Ebbinghaus to leave 'meaning' aside by using nonsense syllables as learning materials. Whether anybody, including Ebbinghaus himself, ever really believed that these materials were true nonsense, we may never know, but before very long the measurement of meaning (meaningfulness) in nonsense syllables was at the forefront of research in verbal learning (Hull, 1933; Glaze, 1928). By the time Underwood and Schulz published their book 'Meaningfulness and Verbal Learning' (1960) the integration of laboratory habits with what we would now call world knowledge was absolutely central to the dominant theoretical fabric of the times, the interference theory of memory. Early in the first chapter of that book (Underwood & Shulz, 1960, page 4) the authors declare that meaningfulness is "by far the most powerful" variable affecting verbal learning that they have ever seen. Accordingly, to claim that the verbal learning tradition had no use for meaning is just misinformed.

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And the skepticism about what Ebbinghaus had said continued beyond the issue of meaning: Within my professional memory, theoretical assertions were still being debated, and experimental evidence being offered, about an experiment that Ebbinghaus had claimed was sufficient to prove the existence of remote associations in serial verbal learning (Bugelski, 1965; Dallett, 1965; Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964; Slamecka, 1964). The merits of the matter are not important here, and even sound arcane to modern ears, but this episode shows that (1) authority and (2) faith have nothing to do with arguments about how memory works. Rather, skepticism and the empirical methods of natural science --- the very tools Ebbinghaus first showed us how to use for human memory --are the currency of the realm. Conway chooses to designate us who uphold these commonplace standards for any science, as followers of 'the verbal learning' (VL) tradition. Indeed, from the time of the Great Depression until sometime around 1970, verbal learning was a dominant influence on our field. Around the latter date, cognitive theory supplanted the puzzle of biological adaptation as the animating problem for explaining human memory, much as Broadbent had anticipated years earlier by naming his book, which was largely about memory, Perception and Communication (Broadbent, 1958). The verbal learning tradition was thus rejected about a decade ago, and from within. But no matter, if Conway wants to call attention to a formative but archaic phase of our history, by naming us after it, so what? It would be like naming the emerging 17th century science of chemistry "the alchemy tradition. " No-one much cares.

The three commandments More serious is Conway's derisive preoccupation with the "three commandments" of our own emerging science. These are, "First, the methods employed must not be ambiguous and, second, the findings must be replicable. Finally,. ..the data collected.. .must be quantitative data.. ." (Conway, page 502) Conway's impatience with these three principles is abundantly clear as he dismisses them as fussy dogmatism, "propagated by the high priests of the theocracy." (Page 502) By the most simple-minded logic, we may then

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conclude that Conway himself would prefer working in an enterprise where the results were ambiguous, not replicable, or qualitative rather than quantitative. (Here, I presume that even Conway would believe in sacrificing only one or two of these at a time, rather than going for research that is ambiguous, nonreplicable, and qualitative all at once.) If such are the goals of the everyday memory movement, they have only partially achieved them, so far, and I suspect many published workers in this new area would be reluctant to embrace Conway's manifesto.

Intentionality and slime The heart of Conway's brief against the effort to develop a natural science of memory is the philosophical problem of 'intentionality' --- the consideration that memories are about something. He says, "Intentionality is one of the major problems facing VL [verbal learning, or scientific memory research] and there are two reasons for this: First, if memory is intentional, has content, is meaningful, then it is a mistake to assume that the methods of physical science will, by happy accident, provide us with the appropriate means to study memory. ..Secondly, intentionality forces the researcher to consider just what the content of the mental states might be ..." (Conway, page 506). Not "by accident" will the methods of science be applied to memory, we may say, but by careful and clever experimentation! Consider the following experiment: Experimentally naive Limax Maximus (everyday garden slugs) are at first indifferent to the taste/flavor of carrot as opposed to potato. Not so after a short training episode in which one of these flavors, but not the other, is paired with a strong jolt of quinine, which is aversive to untrained slugs. On testing, after this training, when the previously-neutral flavor, carrot or potato, depending on the animal's training protocol, is introduced, the slug exhibits hood withdrawal and emits slime. No such reaction occurs to the flavor that was not paired with quinine. A simple learning-memory experiment if ever there was one, this is. But who would say it is not an experiment on memory? Surely the mollusc is somehow different after the training experience than before it and

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that difference must be called memory, whether it matches the richness of how Conway thinks of his home computer or not (nor do I have sufficient intuitions to tell how either Conway or the slug feels about past experiences). If we concede that the slug has a memory, say for the flavor of carrot, deriving from the training episode, then surely it is about something. It is about the carrot taste. And it is obviously a personal, intentional, memory too, as Conway stipulates. To see that the carrot taste has this "personal meaning" for that slug, just consider a companion slug who happened to have been assigned to the group with quinine paired with potato taste, rather than carrot taste. Now this example does not mean that I believe the key to analyzing memory is to conquor the problem of how slugs can remember a noxious association to carrot flavor. We all select a level of reductionism at which we feel comfortable working. Thus a sociologist might believe that, in the final analysis, the human nervous system, and ultimately even small-particle physics, lie at the root of sociological principles. Yet he might still choose to work at the level of attitude surveys to make his living. What unites the physical sciences and the life sciences (such as physiology, psychology, and biology) is the inductive method applied with skepticism and rigor. Whatever the level of analysis, without that, one simply has learned nothing at all.

Generality Further to argue that memory psychology could never become a physical science (one never knows what happened to the other life sciences) Conway states that "In the physical sciences the object under study has essentially the same properties whether studied in the laboratory or anywhere else" (Conway page 502). If this were true, then since the invention of test tubes, we have been misled. But perhaps chemists have always known that chemical reactions would occur just as readily in the palms of their hands as in test tubes, but have employed test tubes for centuries only for cosmetic reasons. In modern times, though, either Conway is wrong about the identity of physical reactions in and out of the laboratory, or, alternatively, we taxpayers have been the victims of a hoax

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that is absolutely monstrous. If environments like bubble chambers and accelerators are unnecessary for science, why have we taxpayers been pouring money into building them for so long? Compared to the behavior of matter in such exotic environments, the phonomena of memory seem to be the more stable ones, whether studied inside the laboratory or outside. Banaji and I (1989) judged that studies from the everyday memory movement, so far, have mainly confirmed what we had reason to believe before. There may be exceptions now and exceptions may come forward in the future. That is why she and I wrote that we favored sound research from natural settings over equally sound research from the laboratory. But when such exceptions (to the generality of laboratory studies) come forward, our first priority must be to isolate what variable is different in the former context than in the latter context and then to test the influence of that specific variable on its own, until we get to the bottom of the matter. This strategy is in contrast to the tendency of some to throw up their hands, roll their eyes, and declare that human memory is inherently mysterious and just can't be studied properly outside of an everyday context, whatever that is. Implicit memory Conway guardedly admits that he finds the new research in implicit memory to be "fascinating" and promising for the future evolution of our science. [We can immediately overlook the fact that Ebbinghaus himself was the first to invent a measure --- savings --- for the study of implicit memory without regard to the elusive (epiphenomenal?) stamp of 'recollective experience. '1 Conway then criticizes the circularity of defining implicit memory operationally on the basis of tasks used to measure it, and explicit memory defined correspondingly by the tasks used to measure it. In this context he cites the chapter by Roediger and Blaxton (1987). Now of course Roediger and Blaxton were calling attention exactly to how irresponsible it was to define these two kinds of memory by the tasks used to measure them. They observed (Roediger & Blaxton, 1987, page 236) that across the literature these tasks have been confounded with two sorts of information being tested. When the confounding is corrected, it is the kind of information, not the tasks, that seem to control the results. Thus, to complain of a task-classification approach to theory in this area is very much worse than misleading.

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Reprise What seems to bother Conway, at heart, is the possibility that human memory, as a field of study, might one day be taken away from intuitive speculation. No wonder he finds himself quoting the philosopher Wittgenstein repeatedly. The history of science is a steady process of such carving away of segments from philosophy, segments centered on the nature of the universe (astronomy), the nature of matter (chemistry and physics), and even more recently, the very nature of life (biology). At each stage, the forces of religion, philosophy itself, and superstition fought tooth and nail at first. Creationism today is a vestigial trace of that resistance in biology. Mental operations are only the most recent phenomena to begin --- very slowly --- to yield to scientific analysis. We not only have primitive answers so far, we may even be asking all the wrong questions. But, like the alchemists of the middle ages, the verbal learners from mid-twentieth century and modern cognitive theorists may well have picked up some very useful information on which others can build. But not by casting aside the scientific method.

References Banaji, M. R., & Crowder, R. G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 44, 1185-1 193. Broadbent, D. E. (1958). Pergamon.

PerceDtion and communication.

New York:

Bugelski. B. R. (1965). In defense of remote associations. Psycholoeical Review, 71, 169-164. Dallett, K. M. (1965). In defense of remote associations. Review, 72, 164-168.

Psychological

Ebbinghaus, H. (1885/1964). Memory: A contribution to experimental psycholow. New York: Dover. Glaze, J. A. (1928). The association value of nonsense syllables. Journal of Genetic Psycholow, 35,255-269. Hull, C. L. (1933). The meaningfulness of 330 selected nonsense syllables.

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American Journal of Psvchologv, 45, 730-734. Roediger, H. L., & Blaxton, T. A. (1987). Retrieval modes produce dissociations in memory for surface information. In D. S. Gorfein & R. R. Hoffman (Eds.), Memory and learning: The Ebbinghaus centennial conference (pp.349-379). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sahley, C. L., Gelperin, A., & Rudy, J. W. (1981). One-trial associative learning in a terrestrial mollusc. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 78, 640-642. Slamecka, N. J. (1964). An inquiry into the doctrine of remote associations. Psychological Review, 11,61-76. Underwood, B. J., & Schulz, R. W. (1960). learning. Philadelphia: Lippincott.

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Commentary: Holy war or Wholly Unnecessary? Some Thoughts on the "Conflict" Between Laboratory Studies and Everyday Memory Alan Baddeley MRC Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, United Kingdom In 1978, in response to a growing interest in studying memory outside the laboratory, Gruneberg, Sykes and Morris organised a conference on Practical Aspects of Memory. The opening address was given by Dick Neisser (1988); and comprised a splendid rousing speech arguing, among other things, that all the interesting questions had expressly been avoided by psychologists studying memory. This was followed by several days of talks by psychologists on many topics of considerable intrinsic interest. The fact that this was inconsistent with the initial message of course troubled no one, nor should it have since the tendency to move out of the memory laboratory was a relatively recent one, and in any case opening addresses are supposed to be rousing. Unfortunately however, rhetoric tends to stimulate counter-rhetoric, which in turn generates yet more rhetorical flights of fancy. Banaji and Crowder (1 989) were prompted by the second everyday memory conference, to bewail "the bankruptcy of everyday memory". They selected a few of the numerous papers for special castigation as typical of the iniquities of everyday memory research. This in turn led to a number of cogent rejoinders, the whole controversy proving a convenient topic for undergraduate essays that was, no doubt, a godsend to harassed teachers looking for suitable novel exam questions. We now have in Martin Conway's chapter another rhetorical flight of fancy in which a mythical entity is conjured up and labelled 'verbal learning'. A history is invented, complete with claims of persecution, and the dawn of a new age is declared. One of the problems about such papers is that they tend to encourage yet more rhetoric in an area in which the ratio of light to heat is already depressingly low. There is also a danger that the history, reinterpreted with a large pinch of poetic license, might perhaps be taken more seriously than the author probably intended. I would therefore like to say simply and boringly what I personally think the situation is, and why I think the picture painted by Martin Conway is misleading. The psychology of memory is an extremely rich and complex area of

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research. Ebbinghaus realised this and in the year or two in which he worked on memory, chose to tackle a very constrained sub-area. He avoided meaning by using, not only nonsense syllables, but also a much more rapid rate of pronunciation than has been used subsequently, a rate at which finding meaningful associations is likely to have been virtually impossible. Furthermore as his only subject, he could ensure that conscious strategies of semantic association were not used. His results were important because they showed that it was possible to carry out controlled experiments on memory, and his findings, including the relationship between learning time and amount acquired, distribution of practice effects, the forgetting curve, and the demonstration of implicit memory via the savings method, remain as both laboratory findings and results that are applicable in the real world. Not a bad achievement for a couple of years work. Unfortunately those who followed Ebbinghaus tended not to have his degree of ingenuity. They also used slower rates of presentation and large numbers of subjects, and by the 1920s realised that under these conditions meaningful associations were important (Glaze, 1928);. In the next 30 years the study of verbal learning was preoccupied with meaning, although typically using a simple associationist model (it is not clear that we have enormously better models available now). However, Conway’s suggestion that the verbal learning tradition of memory research was not concerned with meaning is simply incorrect. Noble (1952), Archer (1960), and Osgood (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957) were all deeply concerned with the role of meaning in learning. Indeed as someone who studied nonsense syllables in the late 1950s and early 1960s in connection with the practical problem of designing postal codes, I found that my observation of the importance of phonological language habits in verbal memory, rather than semantic associations, was distinctly unfashionable. I think it does make sense to apply the term ’verbal learning’ to a group of functionalist researchers who attempted to understand human memory using laboratory methods during the 1930s to 1960s. As a group, they were preoccupied with the phenomenon of interference, a phenomenon that continues to be important and is currently presenting one of the major challenges to connectionist models of learning. Far from being totally disinterested in memory outside the laboratory, the group subsequently became preoccupied with what they termed ’extra-experimental interference’. In a rather quixotic

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attempt to both develop theory and also link their work with everyday learning, they postulated links between language habits and forgetting within the laboratory. They derived clear predictions from these models, and the predictions were spectacularly unsuccessful (Underwood & Postman, 1960), after which the verbal learning movement largely faded from the scene. The approach was replaced by a cognitive approach to learning and memory which had two separate roots. One came from the earlier European Gestalt tradition with its emphasis on subjective organisation, with Mandler and Tulving being its most active proponents. The other derived from the information processing tradition developed by Broadbent and Conrad in Britain, and Miller and Fitts in the U.S. Both of these approaches have roots in real world problems; the Gestalt tradition both in problem solving and learning (c.f. Katona, 1940), while the information processing approach was heavily influenced by practical problems such as those of air traffic controllers and telephonists. There is however a tendency for problems that originate in the real world to be domesticated and turned into neat laboratory paradigms. This is just as true of topics such as flashbulb memory or eyewitness testimony as it was for the attempt to capture the phenomena of interference. For that reason, it is important that the field continues to be enriched by new questions and problems, and checked out by extrapolating laboratory findings to real world situations. In short, we need a natural history of memory, just as much as we need methods of formally developing and precisely testing adequate theories. But what then of the two warring factions of "verbal learning" and everyday memory? I would suggest that this war is really a phoney war. It is no less appropriate for a psychologist to study cycling holidays or memories of one's high school class than it is for a biologist to study hedgehogs or snails. At present in the psychology of memory we still need more natural history, and we certainly need a better understanding of general principles. Selecting a problem will be influenced by both the intrinsic interest of the work, and also the probability that it will bear fruit. That is why some of us like to study both the natural history of memory where the challenges are typically methodological, and also to tackle more broadly theoretical issues, where the difficulty is moving beyond the standard experimental paradigms to give definitive answers to important questions. Interestingly, the protagonists in the rhetorical battle surrounding

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everyday memory also typically do both types of research. Bob Crowder is interested in applying his laboratory-based methods to questions such as the perception of music, or remembering U.S. Presidents, while Martin Conway works not only in the currently relatively unconstrained area of autobiographical memory, but also carries out excellent work in what I would regard as an extension of the verbal learning tradition, studying the retention of material by students (Conway, Cohen & Stanhope, 1991). The methodology here was developed by a fellow verbal learner who retained an interest in the classical area of long-term forgetting, namely Harry Bahrick. One of Martin Conway's other interests, the role of presentation modality in learning (e.g. Conway & Gathercole, 1987), uses techniques that would be close to the heart of even the staidest old verbal learner. In conclusion then, might I suggest that we pause before we next lambaste what we do on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, in favour of whatever we do on Tuesdays and Thursdays, and bear in mind that someone might actually be listening. For example a student might be trying to decide whether the area of memory is worth tackling, or a colleague on a funding body, wondering where limited resources should be placed. Rhetoric may be fun, but it can also be expensive.

References Archer, E. J. (1960). A re-evaluation of the meaningfulness of all possible CVC trigrams. Psychological MonograDhs, 74. Banaji, M. R., & Crowder, R. G. (1989). The bankruptcy of everyday memory. American Psychologist, 44, 1185-1193. Conway, M. A., Cohen, G., & Stanhope, N. M. (1991). On the very long-term retention of knowledge. Journal of Experimental Psvchologv: General. 120, 395-409. Conway, M. A., & Gathercole, S. E. (1987). Modality and long-term memory. Journal of Memorv and Language, 26, 341-361. Glaze, J. A. (1928). The association value of nonsense syllables. Journal of Genetic Psycholoa, 35, 255-269. Katona, G. (1940). Organizing and remembering.

New York: Columbia

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University Press. Neisser, U. (1988). Time present and time past. In M. M. Gruneberg, P. E. Morris and R. N. Sykes (Eds.), Practical aspects of memory: Current research and issues. vol. 2 (pp. 545-560). Chichester: John Wiley. Noble, C. E. (1952). An analysis of meaning. Psychological Review, 59, 421-430. Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Underwood, B. J., & Postman, L. (1960). Extra-experimental sources of interference in forgetting. Psychological Review, 62,73-95.

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AUTHOR INDEX Abelson, R., 370 Aberdeen, J.S., 455 Abson, V., 144 Adams, M.J., 66, 71 Adams, R.A., 489 Adelson, B., 256 Adesman, P., 260 Alba, J.W., 311, 371, 403 Alberoni, M., 222 Albert, G., 27, 29 Albertson, S.A., 431 Albright, J.S., 25 Alexander, M.P., 281 Allard, F., 145, 257 Allen, S.W., 251, 257, 258 Allport, G. W., 378 Allwood, C.M., 151 Alper, A., 412 Alsonso-Quecuty, M.L., 391 Altien, P.A., 455 Amador, M., 383, 384 Aman, C., 17 Anderson, J.R., 248 Anderson, L.M., 71 Anderson, R.A., 193 Anderson, R.C., 26, 370, 386 Andriks, J.L., 317 Anthony, H.M., 71 Appelhof, A., 491 Arbuckle, T.Y., 455 Archer, E.J., 533 Artissan, I., 386 Ashcraft, M.H., 104, 248 Atkinson, R.C., 219, 232, 250, 403 Attig, M.S., 451 Atwood, M.E., 450 Ayres, T.J., 179 Babcock, R.L., 448 Backman, L., 427 Baddeley, A.D., 7, 59, 60, 62, 64, 80, 129, 130, 174-178, 180-185, 187-189, 194, 196-206, 232, 233, 274, 275, 424, 430, 462-465, 472,

474,504,514 Bagnara, S., 151 Baguley, T., 335, 336 Bahrick, H.P., 232, 326, 338, 360, 361, 499, 504, 516, 517, 535 Bahrick, P.O., 326, 360, 361 Baker, S., 132 Baker-Ward, L., 4, 17-19, 22-31, 42-44, 47-51, 56, 377, 389 Baltes, M.M., 447 Baltes, P.B., 447 Banaji, M.R., 3, 5, 13, 42, 47, 173, 234, 235, 289,440-442, 499, 504, 507, 513, 517, 529, 532 Barclay, C.R., 5,285-291,293,294,297, 303, 310, 311,313,314, 316,321, 322 Barlow, H.B., 184 Barnard, P.J., 196 Baron, J., 68, 109 Bartlett, J., 337 Bartlett, F.C., 1, 47, 121, 290, 310, 316, 321, 369,372,389, 390,403,404, 514, 515, 518, 519 Barton, M., 193 Basso, A., 178, 179 Bassok, M., 112 Bates, E., 370 Battaglia, J., 104 Beach, D.R., 61 Beckmann, J., 140, 141, 143, 144, 167 Beidleman, W.B., 385 Bekerian, D.A.,369, 380-382, 387, 388, 390 Bell, L.C., 181 Bellezza, F.S., 258 Belli, R.F., 403, 404, 408, 409, 413 Bennett, H.L., 259 Benson, P.J., 353, 354 Berg, I.J., 462, 463, 465 Berger, H., 187 Berman, J.V.F., 187 Berry, D.C., 4, 139, 145, 148, 155, 162, 167, 168, 171 Bemstein, N., 193

538

Author Index

Bertalanffy, L.V., 171 Bertelson, P., 79, 80 Berti, A., 344 Besner, D., 181 Best, D.L., 19 Biederman. I, 354 Binet, A., 242, 251, 252, 254 Bishop, D.V.M., 222 Bisiach, E., 344 Bizzi, E., 193 Bjork, R.A., 465 Bjorkland, D.F., 15, 24, 31 Black, J.B., 5, 16 Blaxton, T.A., 511, 529 Boon, J.C.W., 377 Boone, S.M., 375, 377 Bomstein, G.K., 388 Bower, G.H., 192, 258, 476, 516 Bowers, J.M., 380-382, 390 Bowers, P.G., 63 Bowman, L.L., 382 Bowyer, P.M., 61, 86 Bradshaw, J., 380 Brainerd, C.J., 4, 91-93, 94, 96-105, 110112, 120-124, 129, 131, 132, 184, 402- 404 Bransford, J.D., 337, 370 Brehmer, B., 145, 147, 148, 168 Brennan, S.E., 352, 353 Brennen, T., 335, 336, 338 Bressi, S., 197 Brewer, W.F., 287, 289, 303, 304, 312, 403 Brewin, C.R., 405 Bright, J., 335, 336 Broadbent, D.E., 140, 145, 148, 425, 526, 534 Brody, B.A., 193 Bronfenbrenner, U . , 3, 4, 289 Brooks, L.R., 188-190, 251, 257, 258 Brooks, P.G., 203 Brouwer, L.E.J., 91 Brown, A.L., 14 Brown, A S . , 67, 335, 337 Brown, G.D.A., 225 Brown, R., 378 Bruce, D., 2, 49, 173, 235, 236, 338, 380, 499, 508 Bruce, J.A., 68

Bruce, V., 331, 335-342, 344, 345, 351354, 356, 357, 361-364 Bruck, M., 20, 404 Brun, H., 23 Bruner, J., 295 Bryant, D.N., 67 Bryant, P.E., 108, 110, 121 Buchanan, M., 60,177, 220 Buck, D.K., 258 Buckhout, R., 412 Bugelski, B.R., 526 Bukstel, L.H., 257 Bull, R.H.C., 388 Bunce, F., 68 Burgess, A.L., 184 Burke, D.M., 433 Burns, H.J., 380 Burton, M., 331, 340, 341, 344, 356, 357, 361-364 Butters, N., 193 Butterworth, B.L., 81, 183 Byme, B., 64 Byme, R., 201, 203 Callahan, P., 103 Camerer, C.F., 256 Caminiti, R., 193 Campbell, J.I.D., 130 Campbell, R.L., 81, 95, 97, 183 Cantor, N., 25 Caplan, D., 178 Caporael, L.R., 432 Cappa, S.F., 222 Capps, C., 62 Caramazza, A . , 123 Carey, S., 102, 353 Carpenter, P.A., 191,201,219,234,235, 448 Carterdessop, L., 289, 322 Case, R., 62, 64 Cassidy, D.J., 14 Catsman-Berrevoets, C.E., 491 Cavanaugh, J.C., 449 Ceci, S.J., 3, 4, 20, 24, 289, 383, 404 Challis, B.H., 511 Chalmers, P., 179 Chance, J.E., 413 Chandler, C.C., 93, 100

Author Index

Chamess, N., 5, 246, 247, 249-251, 257, 260-262, 279-281 Chase, W.G., 245-266, 248-252, 254, 255, 257, 273 Chatterjee, A., 491 Chern, S . , 412 Chew, B.R., 25 Chi, M.T.H., 24, 25, 248, 260 Chiesi, H.L., 258 Chinsky, J.M., 61 Chomsky, N., 223 Christianson, S.A., 376 Churchland, P.M., 360 Cipolla, C.M., 59 Clark, E.V., 121 Clark, H.H., 121 Clarke-Stewart, A . , 20, 31 Clifford, B.R., 377, 390, 412 Clubb, P.A., 17, 20, 22, 28, 29 Cockburn, J., 424, 462 Cohen, G., 6, 338, 339, 340, 364, 387, 425-428, 430, 431, 433, 439, 441, 444, 451, 453, 499, 517, 535 Cohen, L., 130, 187 Colle, H.A., 221 Collins, G.H., 489 Coltheart, M . , 180 Conning, A., 61 Connolly, T., 104 Conrad, R . , 60, 175, 533 Conway, M. A . , 3, 7, 173, 289, 499, 507, 517, 518, 525-528, 532, 535 Cooper, L.A., 194 Cooper, P.F., 425 Corsale, K., 26, 27 Coskey, B.J., 108 Cossu, G., 82 Coupland, J . , 432 Coupland, N., 432 Cowell, E.S., 334, 335, 338 Cox, B . , 18, 23, 24 Cox, M.D., 68 Craik, F.I.M., 26, 64, 125, 225, 231, 281,337,431,439,450,476,419, 511 Craw, I., 361 Crawford, J . , 180 Crenshaw, M.C., 27, 29 Critchley, E.R.M., 345

539

Cronbach, L.J., 447 Crook, T.H., 433 Crovitz, H . , 473 Crowder, R.G., 3, 5, 7, 13, 42, 47, 173, 205, 234,235, 289, 440-442,499, 504, 507, 513, 517, 529, 532 Cubelli, R., 222 Culbertson, G.H., 432 Cullen, Hon Lord, 163 Cunningham, A.E., 63 Cutler, S.J., 424 Cutshall, J.L., 383, 389 Dallet, K.M., 526 Daneman, M . , 201, 219, 234, 235, 448 Dannefer, D., 447 Davidson, B.J., 64 Davies, G.M., 2, 4, 6, 356, 373, 374, 376,378, 382, 386, 390, 391, 402, 403 Davies, S.E., 64 De Groot, A., 5, 248,249,251,260,261, 273 De Haan, E.H.F., 342, 343, 345 De Loache, J.S., 14 De Renzi, E., 182, 345 Deakin, J.M., 257 Decker, S., 5, 377 DeCooke, P.A., 389 Deelman, B.G., 462 Deffenbacher, K.A., 374-376 Dehaene, S . , 187, 130, 131 Delbo, C., 300 Della Sala, S., 175-177, 179, 195, 197, 200, 222 Demarie-Dreblow, D., 18 Dernpster, F.N., 62, 100 Dench, N . , 356 Denkla, M.B., 62 Dennett, D., 320 Dennett, J . , 387, 388 Dent, H.R., 384 Dewey, J., 25 Dewick, H.C., 192 Diamond, R., 100, 102 Dickens, C., 13 Diges, M . , 378 Dinges, D.F., 385 Dion, S., 14

5 40

Author Index

Dixon, J.A., 103 Dixon, R.A., 424, 439, 451 Dodd, D., 380 Donald, M., 318 Donaldson, M., 48, 66 Donchin, E., 196 Donner, M., 408 Doren, B., 451 Doris, J., 20 Darner, D., 5, 145, 146, 148, 170 Drabin, I.R., 67 Drake, D.A., 66 Dntschel, B.H., 304 Dudley, W., 441, 442 Duncan, K., 153 Dunn, J.C., 512 Eakin, J.P., 316 Ebbinghaus, H., 47, 243, 378, 500-505, 507, 512-515, 517, 520, 521, 525, 526, 529, 533 Eble, K.E., 408 Eddy, J.K., 191 Edwards, D., 290, 295, 303, 390 Egan, D., 5, 257 Ehri, L., 62, 67 Einstein, G.O., 192 Elderidge, M., 181, 190, 191 Elliot, J.M., 179 Ellis, A.W., 79-81, 180, 325, 329, 333, 334,336,337,339,342,343,345, 362, 363, 364 Ellis, H.D., 336, 345, 356, 361 Ellis, N.C., 179, 186 Ellsworth, P.C., 409 Emslie, H., 574 Endo, M., 353 Engal, S . , 257 Engle, R.W., 5 1 Englert, C.S., 71 Epstein, S . , 285 Erber, J.T., 426, 427 Ericsson, J.R., 189 Ericsson, K.A., 5, 131,244-246,249-256, 259, 261-263, 273-275, 278-280 Essick, G.K., 193 Estes, W.K., 93, 177 Esveldt-Dawson, IS.,67 Evans, F.J., 198

Evans, H.M., 82 Evans, J.J., 464 Evans, J.St.B.T., 203 Eysenck, M.W., 236 Faglioni, P., 182, 345 Faivre, I., 246 Farmer, E.W., 187, 197 Farrar, M.J., 44 Faulkner, A., 198, Faulkner, D., 338, 339, 425, 427, 428, 433, 451 Faux, D., 89 Feeman, D.J., 63 Fernald, G.M., 68 Fielding, L.G., 26 Finke, R., 190 Firstenberg, I., 386 Fischer, F.W., 60, 86 Fisher, K.W., 286 Fisher, R.P., 93, 100, 383, 384, 386-388 Fitzgerald, P., 425 Fivush, R., 4, 13-16, 21, 22, 24, 25, 44, 49, 51, 55, 56, 290, 293, 295, 318, 321 Flannagan, D.A., 25 Flavell, J.H., 14, 30, 61 Fletcher, Y.L., 187 Flude, B.M., 336, 342, 343, 345,364 Folds, T.H., 15, 18, 19, 24, 30, 56 Folds-Bennett, T.H., 23 Foley, M.A., 371 Follmer, A . , 27, 28 Foot, P., 368 Footo, M.M., 15, 18, 19, 24, 30, 56 Fortner, V.L., 70 Fowler, C.A., 60,86 Fozard, J.L., 453 France, I.M., 181 Franks, J.J., 337 Frazzetti, A.E., 379 Freedman, C.M., 225 French, K.E., 247 Frey, P.W., 260 Frith, U., 65, 80 Fromhoff, F.A., 14, 16, 22, 49, 295 Fromholt, P., 310 Fulton, A., 337 Fung, H., 51, 291, 295

Author Index

Galanter, E., 219 Gardiner, J.M., 510 Garnham, A., 201, 202 Gathercole, S.E., 64, 184, 514, 535 Gauld, A., 370 Geiselman, R.E., 383, 384, 386, 387 Gelman, R., 30, 111, 122 Gentner, D., 201 Gentry, J.R., 66 Georgopoloulos, A.P., 193 Gergen, K.J., 290, 295 Gergen, M.M., 290, 295 Gettinger, M., 67 Gibbs, J.C., 290 Gibling, F., 376, 382, 390 Gilbert, B.J., 413 Giles, H., 434 Gilewski, M.J., 424 Gilhooly, K.J., 5, 130, 186, 202-205, 256, 257, 260, 278 Gillingham, A.M., 68 Ginsburg, H., 184 Ginsburg, N., 123 Glanzer, M., 264 Glaser, R., 248 Glass, A.L., 191 Glaze, J.A., 525, 533 Glisky, E.L., 463, 465, 494 Goldberg, J., 62 Goldman-Rakic, P.S., 100 Goldstein, A.G., 413 Goodell, E.W., 181 Goodman, G.S., 16, 17, 20, 31, 44 Goodman, K., 66 Gopher, D., 175, 196 Gordon, B.N.,4, 17, 18, 26-29, 42, 4751, 377, 389 Gorfein, D.S., 504 Gormulicki, B.R., 370 Goulandris, N.K., 81 Graesser, A.C., 454 Graham, D.J., 130 Grams, A.E., 424 Grant, W., 187 Grassia, J., 103 Gray, C., 62 Gray, J.T., 14, 16, 22, 49 Greaves, D.E., 61 Greco, C., 404

541

Green, C., 256 Green, P.R., 354 Greene, E., 380, 449 Greeno, J.G., 92 Gregg, S.L., 71 Gregg, V.H., 225 Grewel, F., 187 Groen, G., 184, 248, 256, 257, 262 Groeneweg, J., 150, 164, 299, 379 Grossi, D., 345 Gruen, G.E., 108 Gruendel, J., 14, 42 Gruneberg, M.M., 2, 258, 377, 473, 532 Guttentag, R E . , 15, 18, 19, 24, 30, 56 Haimes, E., 103 Halbwachs, M., 290 Hall, L.K., 499, 516 Hall, J.W., 61, 86 Halle, M., 223 Halliday, M.S., 62, 189, 226 Halpern, A.R., 258 Hamilton, L.B., 17 Hamm, R.M., 103 Hamm, V.P., 451 Hammer, J.M., 153 Hammersley, R.H., 369 Hammond, E.J., 491 Hammond, K.R., 103 Hamond, N.R., 14, 16, 21, 44, 49 Hanely, J.R., 334-338 Hankamer, J., 202 Hanley, J.R., 192 Hanna, E., 356 Hanson, V.L., 181 Harris, J.E., 467, 468, 470, 472 Harris, M., 246, 256 Harsany, M., 455 Harsch, B.N., 299 Hart, S.S., 17, 155 Harwood, R., 412 Hasher, L., 235, 311, 371, 403, 450, 451 Hasselhorn, M., 23 Hastie, R., 100 Hay, D.C., 325,329, 331,334, 336, 337, 339, 344, 345, 355, 361, 362, 364 Hayes, J.R., 248 Hayne, H., 404 Haynes, V., 18

542

Author Index

Healey, P . , 356 Healy, A.F., 185, 186 Heckhausen, H., 140, 141, 143, 144, 167 Heinrichs, R.W., 492 Helbling, R.E., 408 Hellawell, D., 355 Henderson, E.H., 65 Henke, E., 408 Hennelley, R.A., 179 Henry, L.A., 62 Hepps, D., 16 Hermann, D.J., 144 Herrman, D.J., 487 Herzog, C., 424, 425 Hess, T.M., 22, 25, 455 Heyting, H., 91 Hiles, D.R., 226 Hindman, J., 488 Hinsley, D.A., 248 Hirshman, J.E., 16 Hirtle, S.C., 257 Hitch, G.J., 4, 59, 62, 63, 80, 92, 97, 121, 123, 132, 174, 181, 184, 189, 197, 202, 219-224, 226, 233, 390 Hodges, R.M., 285, 289, 290, 291, 294 Hodkin, B., 89 Hoffman, A.M., 317, 319 Hoffman, H.G., 382 Hoffman, H.S., 317, 319 Hoffman, R.R., 504 Holden, D.J., 14, 18, 31, 43 Holden, U.P., 467 Holding, D.H., 257, 261, 280 Hollan, J.D., 338 Holland, D., 286, 304 Holland, H.L., 387 Holland, J.H., 274 Hollerbach, J.M., 193 Holligan, C., 60, 61, 64, 65, 68 Hollin, C.R., 390, 409, 412 Hollingsworth, S., 189 Holyoak, K.J., 112, 274 Hoogstra, L., 51, 291, 295 Hoosain, R., 179 Horowitz, I, 385 Howard, D., 183 Howard, L.A., 336 Howe, M.L., 96 Hubinette, B., 376

Hudson, J.A., 13-16,24,25,49,51, 291, 293 Hudson, P.T.W., 164 Hue, C., 189 Huff, R., 405 Hull, C.L., 525 Hulme, C., 60,62, 68, 225 Hultsch, D.F., 424, 425, 439 Humphrey, N., 318, 320 Humphreys, M.S., 61, 86 Hunt, E., 194, 196, 197, 252, 448 Hutton, L.A., 386 Infield, S., 194 Intons-Peterson, M.J., 487 Istomina, Z.M., 22, 23 Jacoby, L.L., 510, 511 James, M., 66, 142 Janis, I., 170 Jerkevish, L., 388 Jenkins, F., 380 Jenkins, J.J., 234 Johnson, C., 62 Johnson, D.M., 68 Johnson, E.J., 256 Johnson, J., 100 Johnson, M.K., 237, 286, 296, 321, 369, 371-374, 381-385, 427 Johnson, T., 17 Johnson-Laird, P.N., 140, 148, 201, 203 Johnston, R.A., 4, 6, 331, 336, 339, 341, 362-364 Johnston, R.S., 60-62, 64, 65, 68,78, 85, 180, 181 Johnston, W.A., 256 Jones, D.M., 223 Jones, H.P.T., 409 Jones, S.D., 69 Juel, C., 69-71 Just, M., 191 Kahn, R.L., 420, 447 Kahneman, D., 101, 102, 106, 108, 140, 148 Kail, R., 50 Kalaska, J.F., 193 Kapur, N., 7, 470, 487 Kassin, S.M., 409

Author Index

Katona, G., 534 Kay, H., 370 Kay, J . , 342, 343, 364, 514 Keane, M.T., 236 Kemper, S., 431 Kennedy, A . , 191 Ketcham, K., 382, 405 Kiely, J., 454 Kiernan, B., 94 Kihlstrom, J.F., 25 Kim, C.K., 380 Kingma, J., 120, 402 Kinnear, P.R., 256 Kintsch, W., 92, 121,223, 245,250,251, 255, 263, 273, 370, 448 Kirasic, K.C., 428 Kirby, P., 390 Kirsner, K., 512 Klahr, D., 184, Klapp, S.T., 175, 219, 220, 223 Klatzky, R.L., 32 Klein, S.B., 25 Kleinhauz, M., 385 Kliegl, R., 64 Kline, D., 375 Kobasigawa, A . , 27 Kohnken, G., 377 Konecni, V.J., 408 Koning-Haanstra, M., 462 Korkel, J., 25, 258 Kosslyn, S.M., 190, 192 Krampe, R., 249 Kuebli, J., 22 Kuhn, T.S., 500, 509 Kulik, J., 378 Kurland, D.M., 62 M e r g e , D., 219 Labov, W., 294 Labrum, A.H., 289, 322 Lachman, M.E., 449 Lahar, C.J., 455 Laiacona, M., 200 Lakoff, G . , 296, 297, 321 Landauer, T.K., 123, 131, 444, 465 Lane, D.M., 251 Lange, G., 18 Langer, L.L., 285, 299, 300, 301, 303 Lansman, M., 197

543

Lapidus, S., 455 Larsen, S.F., 6, 304, 310, 314, 321, 322 Larus, D.M., 17, 20, 28, 29 Laver, G.D., 433 Lawrence, A., 60, 96 Leal, L., 17 Lee, S.Y., 179 Leirer, V.O., 455 Lennox, C., 89 Lepore, S . , 20 Lesgold, A . , 262 Leslie, L., 258 Lester, P.T., 219 Levine, F.J., 408 Levine, M., 250 Levy, B.A., 177 Lewandowsky, S., 512 Lewis, C., 152, 153, 249 Lewis, J., 448 Lewis, V.J., 181, 183, 199, 221 Lezak, M., 483 Liberman, I.Y., 60, 61, 86 Lieberman, K., 188, 189 Light, L.L., 431 Lincoln, N.B., 470 Lind, M., 145 Linde, C., 286, 304 Linder, B.A., 61, 86, 87 Lindsay, D.S., 381-383 Link, S., 104 Linton, M., 378 Lipsey, M.W., 160 Lipton, J.P., 383 Littler, J.E., 62 Liu, Y . , 175, 187 Liwag, M., 20, 31 Lockhart, R.S., 26, 125, 231, 237, 337, 476, 509 Loftus, G.R., 376 Loftus, E.F., 3, 6, 13, 321, 376, 377, 379-383, 391, 405, 440 Logie, R., 2, 4, 5 , 129, 130, 175-177, 179, 180, 185, 186, 188-190, 192, 193, 195-197, 203-205, 219, 220, 222, 224-226, 231, 233, 234, 236, 237, 275, 377 Lories, G., 250 Love, T., 252 Lowe, J . , 413

544

Author Index

Lowenthal, D., 290, 327 Lucariello, J., 14 Lucas, D., 333, 338 Lukaszewski, M.P., 432 Lunneborg, C., 448 Luria, A.R., 475 Lynch, E.M., 69 Maass, A., 377 Macken, W.J., 223 MacKinnon, D.P., 387 Madden, C., 223 Madden, D.J., 455 Mair, R.G., 490, 491 Mammen, J., 313 Mandler, G., 383 Mandler, J., 15, 27, 42, 43 Mane, A., 196 Mann, T.L., 153 Mann, V.A., 61, 63 Mansbridge, D.G., 93, 102 Marcel, A., 514 Marchetti, C., 177, 189, 192, 193 Marin, O.S.M., 183 Mark, L.S., 60, 86 Markus, H., 287 Marr, D., 354 Marshall, E., 153 Marshall, J.C., 82, 180 Marshburn, E.A., 219 Martin, J., 433 Martin, M., 425 Marx, M.H., 102 Massey, J.T., 193 Masson, M.E., 250 Masterman, M., 500 Mateer, C.A., 471 Mathews, W.A., 189 Matson, J.L., 67 Maughan, S., 225 Mayes, A.R., 7, 490 Maylor, E.A., 338, 423, 433 McAuley, E., 123 McCabe, A., 5 1 McCall, R.B., 19, McCarthy, R.A., 182, 183, 186, 193 McCarty, D., 475 McClelland, J.L., 403 McCloskey, M., 123, 378, 381-383, 409

McCutchen, J.W., 181 McDaniel, M.A., 192 McEntee, W.J., 490, 491 McGeoch, J.A., 379 McIntyre, J.S., 431 McKeithen, K.B., 257 McKennna, P., 18, 345 McLeod, P., 197 McWeeny, K.H., 336, 337, 339, 364 Meador, K.J.,491 Means, B., 391 Mechanic, A., 64 Medlin, R.G., 20 Messo, J., 376 Metcalf, J., 403 Meudell, P., 390 Middleton, D., 290, 295, 303, 390 Milberg, W.P., 281 Miles, C., 223 Millar, S., 62 Miller, D.G., 380 Miller, E., 487 Miller, G.A., 100, 219, 220, 226, 249, 280 Miller, P.H., 18 Miller, P.J., 51, 291, 295 Milner, B., 198 Minskey, M., 370 Mintz, J., 51, 291, 295 Mistry, J., 23 Miura, S., 455 Moan, S.F., 16, 17 Moely, B.E., 17 Moffat, N., 463, 467, 468, 472, 476 Mook, D.G., 443 Moore, C.F., 103 Moray, N., 197 Morris, C.D., 337 Moms, D., 65 Morris, M.K., 491 Morris, N., 192, 193 Moms, P.E., 2, 258, 377, 532 Morris, R.G., 197 Morrison, F.J., 17 Morrow, D.G., 455 Morton, J.4,42,55,56,67, 80,289,369, 373, 374, 379, 381, 386, 390 Moscovitch, M.C., 423 Moss, A., 337

Author Index

Moyer, R.S., 123, 131 Muir, C., 60 Muller, G.E., 252 Munsterberg, H., 409 Murdock, B.B., 504 Murphy, M.D., 247 Murray, D., 177 Mussa-Ivaldi, F.A., 193 Mycielska, K., 137, 140, 338 Myers, N.N, 14 Myers, S.D., 431, 449 Myles-Worsley, M., 256, 257 Nagy, G.F., 103 Naidoo, S . , 65 Nairne, J.S., 185, 186 Nakamura, G.V., 403 Narter, D., 101, 102 Nash, M., 391 Naus, M.J., 391, 14, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 26, 30, 56 Naveh-Benjamin, M., 5, 179, 234 Navon, D., 175, 196 Nebes, R.D., 518 Neisser, U., 1-3, 13, 47, 48, 173, 286, 290,299,310,312,314,321,370, 440, 441, 508, 513, 516, 532 Nelson, E.A., 447 Nelson, H.E., 198 Nelson, K., 14-16, 25, 42, 44, 49, 56 Nettick, A., 175 Newcombe, F., 342, 343, 345 Newell, A., 196, 219, 249, 250, 383 Newman, L.S., 18 Newport, E.L., 100 Newsome, G.L., 487 Nichelli, P., 222, 345 Nicholas, E., 16, 17 Nida, R.E., 17, 18, 27, 29 Niedenthal, P.N., 25 Nisbett, R.E., 108, 109, 274 Nishihara, H.K., 354 Noble, C.E., 533 Nolan, S.D., 264 Noon, E., 409 Norman, D.A., 137, 140-144, 151-154, 160, 167, 198, 199,232, 485, 486 Norman, G.R., 251, 257, 258 Noms, J.A., 66

545

Northcraft, G., 104 O’Reilly, K., 387 Oakhill, J., 29, 202 Obeysekere, G., 296-298, 321 Offenbach, S.I., 108, 109 Ollendick, T., 67 Olney, C., 100, 101, 104, 113 Olney, J., 295 Olson, R.K., 64 Ormrod, J.E., 66 Orne, E.C., 385 Orne, M.T., 385, 386 Ornstein, P.A., 4, 13-15, 17-20, 23, 24, 26-31, 42, 43, 47-51, 56, 377, 389, 403 Osgood, C.E., 533 Otero, J., 448 Paivio, A., 192 Palmer, J.E., 379, 380 Papagno, C., 64, 180, 183, 184, 344 Paris, S.G., 23 Park, B., 100 Parkes, K., 425 Parkman, J.M., 184 Parry, F.M., 337 Pascual-Leone, J., 62 Patel, V.L., 248, 256, 257, 262 Patten, B.M., 476 Patterson, K., 180 Payne, J.W., 250 Pearson, N.A., 192, 336 Pearson, T., 103 Pedersen, O., 148 Pellegrino, J.W., 196 Pendleton, L.R., 188, 189, 193, 194 Pennington, N., 5, 131, 273-275, 278-280 Perani, D., 344 Perlmutter, M., 14, 24 Perner, J., 93, 102 Perrett, D.I., 353 Peters, D.P., 16, 376 Peterson, C.R., 27, 50 Petitto, A., 289, 290, 322 Petro, S.J., 487 Peynircioglu, Z.F., 511 Pfau, H.D., 247 Piaget, J., 66, 95, 96, 103, 120, 287

Author Index

546

Pilchert, J.S., 370 Pillemer, D.B., 314, 405 Pitchert, J.W., 387 Pollatsek, A., 191 Polson, P.G., 249, 250, 255, 259, 273 Poon, L.W., 6, 423, 439, 441, 442, 449 Postman, L., 378, 534 Potter, J., 390 Potts, R., 50, 291, 295 Powers, P.A., 377 Pribram, K.H., 219 Prosket, A., 386 Putnam, W.H., 385 Quinn, J.G., 188, 189,192, 193,286,304 Quinn, N., 286, 304 Rabbitt, P.M.A., 144, 431 Rabinowitz, F.M., 96, 98 Rack, J.P., 64 Ralston, G.E., 188, 189, 193 Rao, N., 17 Raphael, T., 71 Rasmussen, J., 138, 148, 149 Ratner, H.H., 14, 50 Rattner, A., 405 Rawles, R.E., 473, 475 Raye, C.L., 237, 371, 427 Raymond, D., 388 Rayner, K., 191 Read, J.D., 338 Reason, J.T., 137-140, 143, 144, 148150, 154, 155, 160, 164, 338 Recht, D.R., 258 R e s , E., 248 Reid, J.D., 380 Reisberg, D., 189, 190 Reiser, M., 384-386 Reitman, J.S., 257 Renninger, K.A., 25 Resnick, L.B., 184 Restle, F., 131, 184 Reyna, V.F., 91-94, 96-106, 120-124, 129, 131, 132, Reynolds, R., 26, 280 Rhodes, G., 353 Richardson, J.T.E., 5, 61, 223, Riessman, C.K., 297

167, 333,

Ritter, K., 14 Rizzo, A., 151 Robinson, J.A., 321, 322 Robertson, I., 463 Robertson, L., 251 Robson, J., 222 Roediger 111, H.L., 235, 289, 499, 503, 507, 511, 529

Rogoff, B., 17, 23, 24, 50 Rosenbloom, P.S., 249 ROSS,D.F., 383 Ross, L., 108, 109 Ross, M., 237 Rothberg, S.T., 426 Rove-Collier, C., 404 Rowe, J.W., 420, 447 Roy, D.F., 484 Rubin, D.C., 442, 444, 518 Rubinson, H., 6 Rudel, R.G., 62 Rudy, L., 16 Rueter, H.H., 257 Rugel, R.P., 60 Rugg, M.D., 60, 61 Rumelhart, D.E., 403 Rutter, D.R., 390 Ryan, E.B., 86, 87, 89, 123 Ryan, R.M., 298 Saariluoma, P., 275 Saffran, E.M., 183 Sag, I.A., 202 Sagarin, E., 405 Salami, P., 61, 175, 176 Salili, F., 179 Salthouse, T.A., 244, 245, 421,428,432, 448, 450, 452

110-112, 184, 402

225

Salway, ?., 198, 205 Samuels, S.J., 219 Sanders, G . S . , 412 Sanderson, P.M., 145 Santulli, K.A., 17 Sartre, J-P., 322 Saul, J.S.M., 337 Saywitz, K.J., 16, 17, 388 Schaafstal, A.M., 189, 226 Schacter, D.L., 443, 463, 465, 494 Schaie, K.W., 424 Schank, R.C., 370

Author Index

Schlosberg, H., 276 Schneider, N. J., 454 Schneider, W., 23, 25, 258 Schooler, J.W., 382, 403 Schraagen, J.M.C., 189, 226 Schulz, R.W., 525 Schwanenflugel, J., 191 Schwartz, B.J., 5, 257 Scott, T., 60,61 Searle, J., 325, 360 Sears, N.C., 68 Semenza, C., 345 Sergent, J., 102 Seymour, P.H.K., 68, 81, 82 Shafrir, U., 87 Shallice, T., 81, 82, 144, 178, 182, 183, 198, 199, 226, 232, 345 Shankweiler, D., 60, 61, 86 Shanteau, J., 103 Shapiro, E., 68 Shapiro, L.R., 291, 293 Shaw, L.N., 161 Shea, P., 64 Sheenan, P.W., 385 Sheingold, K., 16 Shepard, R.N., 153, 194 Shepherd, J.W., 356 Sheptak, R., 196 Shipley, E.F., 96 Shirley, L.L., 26 Shoemaker,D.J., 4 13 Shiffrin, R.M., 219, 232, 250, 403 Sichel, H.S., 161 Siegal, L.S., 61, 86, 87, 89, 123 Siegal, R.M., 193 Siegler, R.S., 93, 97, 131, 286 Siemens, L., 24 Simon, E., 450 Simon, H.A., 245, 248, 250, 255, 257, 259, 278 Sinnott, J.D., 443 Slamecka, N.J., 526 Sloboda, J., 246, 257 Slomovits, M., 412 Slovic, P., 108 Smith, A., 289 Smith, B., 14 Smith, D.K., 225 Smith, F., 66

547

Smith, J., 244-246, 249 Smith, M.M.C., 61 Smith,P.T., 424 Smith, S.B., 257 Smith, T.S., 285, 290, 291, 303, 322 Smith, V.L., 409 Smyth, M.M., 188, 189, 193, 194 Snow, C.E., 293, 295 Snowling, M., 81 Sohlberg, M.M., 471 Soskis, D.A., 385 South, D.R., 413 Spelke, E.S., 122 Sperry, L.L., 291, 295 Spilich, G.J., 258, 377 Spinillo, A.G., 108, 110 Spinnler, H., 178, 197, 200, 518 Sporer, S.L., 408 Spring, C . , 62 Stanhope, N . M . , 299, 517, 535 Stanley, W.B., 145 Stanovich, K.E., 63 Starkes, J.L., 257 Starkey, P., 122 Stasz, C., 260 Staszewski, J.J., 245, 250, 255, 261, 262 Stein, N.L., 20, 31 Stephenson, G.M., 390, 412 Stem, D.N., 285 Stevens, A.L., 201 Stevenson, H.W., 50, 179 Stigler, J.W., 179 Stillman, B.U., 68 Stine, E.A.L., 431, 448, 449, 451, 453456 Stix, G., 150 Stone, B.P., 20 Strater, L., 337 Stroop, J.R., 142 Subramaniam, F., 289 Suci, G.J., 533 Sullivan, S., 386 Surtes, L., 387 Susukita, T., 252 Swanson, L.B., 63 Szuchman, L.T., 426 Talland, G.A., 439 Tanaka, J.W., 353, 403

548

Author Index

Tannenbaum, P.H., 533 Tapp, J.L., 408 Tardif, T., 448 Taylor, T.H., 371 Teller, S.A., 379 Templeton, S., 65 Tenney, Y.J., 16 Tesch-Romer, C., 249 Terr, L., 405 Thagard, P.R., 274 Thomas, J.R., 247 Thompson, C.P., 245, 252 Thompson, N., 60, 177, 188, 199, 220 Thompson, W.C., 20 Thomson, D.M., 332, 373, 386, 391 Thorndyke, P.W., 260 Tilden, J., 385 Tinzmann, M.B., 61, 86 Tobin, Y., 385 Toglia, M.P., 383 Toland, K., 379 Trabasso, T., 20, 31, 121 Treadway, M., 378 Treisman, M., 198 Trevarthen, C., 285 Trevithick, L., 451 Trivelli, C., 200 Tulving, E., 3, 13, 32, 125, 289, 516, 520, 534 Tun, P.A., 448 Turner, A., 153 Turner, T.J., 516 Tversky, A., 101, 102, 106, 108, 140, 148 Tweedy, M., 258, 377 Tyler, L.E., 246 Underwood, B.J., 378, 525, 534 Updike, J., 316 Valentine, T., 183, 351-353 Valentine, E., 245, 252 Vallar, G., 64, 178, 180, 182, 184, 200, 221, 222, 344 Valsiner, J . , 18, 23, 24 Van Dijk, T.A., 121, 223, 250 Van Pelt, M., 499 Van der Meeren, R.J.W., 164 Van-Harskamp, F., 491

Vanderleck, V.F., 455 Vandermaas, M.O., 22 Vesonder, G.T., 258 Victor, M., 489 Visser, J.P., 164 Voss, J.F., 258, 377 Vygotsky, L.S., 23, 50, 293, 316 Wagenaar, W.A., 5, 150, 164, 299, 378, 379, 518 Wagner, D.A., 17 Waletzky, J., 294 Walton, M., 423, 430 Warhaftig, M., 388 Warnick, D.H., 412 Warrington, E.K., 123, 178, 182, 183, 186, 193, 226, 345, 510 Wason, P.C., 140, 148 Waters, G.S., 178 Watkins, M.J.; 64,504, 511, 512 Wayland, S.C., 455 Webb, N.L., 247 Wechsler, D., 242 Weinert, F.E., 25, 258 Weiskrantz, L., 510 Weismer, S.E., 98 Weissberg, J.A., 23 Weldon, M.S., 511 Welke, D., 441, 442 Wellman, H.M., 14, 18, 24, 287, 311, 322 Wells, G., 450 Welsh, A, 221. Wertsch, J., 50 West, R.L., 422, 423, 430, 473 Wetherick, N.E., 202, 203 Wetzler, S.E., 518 Wickens, C.D., 175, 187, 196, 232 Wight, E., 188 Wigmore, J.H., 409 Wilce, L.S., 62 Wilding, J., 245, 252 Williams, M.D., 338 Willis, C.S., 514 Wilson, B., 6, 182, 198, 222, 424, 442, 461-465, 467, 468, 470-475, 483487, 489, 492, 493 Wilson, K.P., 61, 86 Wilson, P.T., 26

549

Author Index

Winer, G.A., 96-99 Wingfield, A . , 431, 448, 449, 451, 455, 456

Winograd, E., 1 Winthorpe, C., 431 Wittgenstein, L., 514, 518, 519 Wittlinger, R.P., 326, 360 Wolford, G., 189 Wood, M., 256 Woodin, M.E., 132 Woods, B., 102 Woods, D . , 151, 155 Woods, R.T., 467 Woods, S.S., 184 Woodworth, R.S., 276 Woody-Ramsey, J., 18 Worthley, J.S., 433 Wozniak, R.H., 25 Wright, R., 5, 377 Wynn, K., 122 Wynn, V., 130, 179, 186, 194, 202-204, 234

Yarmey, A.D., 6, 338, 375, 409-413 Yates, F.A., 474, 475 Y e , P.L., 194, 196 Yoos, H . , 290 Young, A . , 6, 180, 192, 325, 328-334, 336-345, 351, 355, 360-364

Yuille, J.C., 376, 377,383, 385, 389, 390 Zacks, R.T., 235, 450, 451 Zajonc, R.B., 321 Zangwill, O.L., 370, 389 Zanobio, E., 178 ZaragOZa, M., 381-383 Zelig, M., 385 Zelinski, E.M., 424, 455 Zeman, B.R., 15, 31 Zettin, M., 345

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551

SUBJECT INDEX Age effects, 419-435, 439-444, 447-456; deficits, 450-452; experimental, 421, 422, 432, 434, 447; eyewitness reports, 410; inhibition hypothesis, 450-452; memory for discourse, 430-434, 451-455; methodological diversity, 447-456; molar equivalence-molecular decomposition, 452-456; phenomenological, 419-420, 424, 433, 434, 449; prospective memory, 422-430; psychometric, 420, 421, 424, 428, 432, 448; socioeconomic considerations,421, 422 Alzheimer’s dementia, 310, 462 (see also neuropsychological patients) Amnesia, 467-470, 490 (see also neuropsychological patients) Articulatory loop, 59, 60,85, 86, 221 (see also phonological loop) Attention patterns, 376 Auditory comprehension, 182, 183 Autobiographical memory, 285-304, 31 1314, 316-322, 517; contextualized events, 291, 292; mental representations, 286-289; personal narratives, 294-295; protoselves, 297; reconstructive theory, 286304, 311-314; schemata, 287-289, 296-298, 310-314; self-coherence, 298-304; social-interactional origins, 293-296; thematic units, 291, 292 Caricatures, 35 1-353 “Central executive”, 59, 175, 195-203; learning and retrieval, 199, 200; language comprehension, 200-202; reasoning, problem solving and planning, 202-204 CHARM (Composite Holographic

Associative Recall Model), 403 Children’s memory, 13-133; cultural influences, 50, 51; deliberate recall, 26, 27, 29, 30; effect of context, 18, 19, 23, 30-32; effect of delay, 17; experimental control, 21, 28; general event representations, 56; generalization of memory strategies, 18, 24; incidental encoding, 26, 27, 29, 30; knowledge base, 24, 25, 27, 29, 78, 103; maturation in remembering, 17; mathematics, 91133; meaningful remembering, 2226, 28, 47, 49; mnemonic strategies, 14, 15, 44; schemata, 42-44, scripts, 14, 15, 22, 49; strategies for retrieval, 26; suggestibility, 20; reminiscence in children, 51; retrieval cues, 63, 64 (see also Reading, Mathematics, Spelling and Writing) Cognitive Interview, 386-388, 485 Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, 425 Collaborative recall, 411, 412 Computerised cognitive rehabilitation, 463 Connectionist Modelling, 362-365 Cultural influences, 50 Deliberate recall, 26, 29-30 Diary Studies, 328-333 Discourse memory, 430-434, 453 Ecological validity, 423 Encoding, 375-378, 404; incidental, 26, 27, 29, 30 Episodic memory, 173, 174, 493 Error detection, 151, 152 Errors in learning, 137-156, 160-165, 167171-; action slips, 141, conjunction fallacy, 107; Generic Error Modelling System, 137-139; initiation errors, 143; laboratory studies, 145-155; slips-mistakes

552

Subject Index

distinction, 137-140, 167; slips in formation of intention, 141; slips from faulty activation of schemata, 142; reasoning errors, 105-106 Errors in recognition, 328-333 Error reduction, 152-155, 161-165, 493; decision support systems, 155; memory aids, 154, 155; person orientated approaches, 153; system oriented approaches, 153, 154 Error simulation studies, 145-147; Lohhausen studies, 145, 146; Moro studies, 146, 147; Fire-fighting studies, 147 Everyday Memory Questionnaire, 425 Expertise, 241-264, 273-276, 278-281; acquired mechanism, 242, 244, 245, 251-264, 273, 279-281; domain experts, 255-256; children, 25, 103; exceptional memory, 251264; implications, 262-264; knowledge, 242-244, 246-25 1, 257, 258, 273, 274, 279; retrieval cues, 259-262; selective encoding, 256, 257; skilled-memory theory, 252-255, 273; talent, 242, 243, 245, 246, 273, 278, 279; working memory, 241, 274, 275 Eyewitness Memory, 367-392, 402-406, 408-414; ageing and eyewitness reports, 410; cognitive interview, 386-388; collaborative recall, 411, 412; context reinstatement, 388; encoding factors, 375-378; free recall, 383, 384; "Headed Record" theory, 373, 374, 390, 391; hypnosis, 384-386; multiple-entry modular memory system, 371, 372, 389-391; post event information, 379-383; schema based approaches, 369-371, 389391; retention factors, 378-382; retrieval factors, 383-389; voice descriptions, 41 1 Experimental control, 21, 28 Face recognition, 102, 325-345, 351-357; distinctivenessand caricature, 351353; Face Recognition Units

(FRU's), 340, 363 Flashbulb memories, 378, 379 Free recall, 383, 384 Fuzzy-trace Theory, 94-1 12, 120-126, 129-133 General event representations, 42, 48, 49, 55, 56 (see also schema and scripts) "Headed-Record"Theory of memory,373, 374, 384-391 Herpes simplex encephalitis, 489 Hyperlexia, 82 Hypnosis, 384-386 Implicit memory, 509-512, 529 Inhibition Hypothesis, 450-452 Interference, 67, 94; memory interference in reasoning, 96-100 Interviewing Techniques, 386-389 Knowledge base, 24, 25, 29, 377 Korsakoff's syndrome, 489-492 Laboratory versus Life debate, 18-26, 42, 173, 174, 233-237, 440-444, 5005 19 Language comprehension, 200-202 Long-term memory, 63, 66-69, 78, 326328 Mathematics, 9 1- 114, 120-126, 129-133, 184-189; class-inclusion paradigm, 96-99, 105-108, 121; cognitive illusion, 107; fuzzy processing preference, 93, 95, 96, 104; fuzzy trace theory, 94-112, 120-126, 129-133; gist, 93,94,97-101, 103105, 121; implications for teaching, 111-113; knowledge, 103-104; memory interference in reasoning, 96-100; probability, 107-110, 112, 113, 121; quantitative reasoning, 92-98, 102; retrieval cues, 105; special mathematical reasoning, 122, 123; verbatim memory, 94-98, 100-103, 121

Subject Index

Meaningful remembering, 22-26, 28, 49, 533 Memory impairment, 403, 404, 461-477, 5 10; computerised cognitive rehabilitation, 463; group therapy, 463, 464; improving input, 464, improving storage, 465; improving retrieval, 465-466; environmental adaptations, 466-468, 485, 486: external memory aids, 468-472, 492, mnemonics, 472-476, 484, chemotherapy, 490-492; episodic memory, 493 Memory aids, 429,468-472,46488,492 Memory span, 62 Misleading post-event information, 379383, 404 Mnemonics, 191-193, 472-476, 484; in children, 14, 15, 16, 44 Molar equivalence-molecular decomposition, 452-456 Multiple-entry modular memory system, 371, 372, 389, 390; perceptual, 371; reflective, 371; sensory, 371 Name recognition, 325-345; tip-of-thetongue, 337, 338, 341 Narrative competence, 3 18 Neuropsychological patients, 179, 180, 192, 222, 235, 461-476, 482-494, 510 (see also Alzheimer’s dementia, amnesia, Korsakoff‘s syndrome and Herpes simplex encephalitis)

553

effect, 177; vocabulary acquisition, 183; verbal rehearsal, 61 (see also articulatory loop, reading and working memory) Prospective memory, 422-430 Psychotherapeutic concepts of memory, 405 Reading, 59-64, 80-82, 85-89, 180-182, 190, 454; developmental models, 79, 80; functional models, 79, 80; hyperlexia, 82; long-term memory, 63, 79; naming speed measures, 62; phonological coding deficit, 60-62; short-term memory, 59,60, 79; verbal rehearsal, 61 (see also articulatory loop, phonological loop and working memory) Reality monitoring, 427 Reasoning, 202-204 Recognition, 63, 64, 325-346, 360-365 ; Errors, 328-346; laboratory studies, 334-346; person identity nodes (PIN’S), 340, 341, 363 (see also face recognition and name recognition) Reconstructive theory Rehabilitation, 461-476, 482-494 Reminiscence, 385-404, 517; in children, 51 Retention, 378-38 Retrieval, 26, 199, 200, 383, 465 Retrospective memory, 427 Rivermead Behavioural Memory, 424, 425, 462

Orthographic representations, 67, 68 Phonological coding, 65, 85, 86; deficit, 60-62 Phonological Loop, 175-187, 232-234; auditory comprehension, 182, 183; counting and mental arithmetic, 184-187; language differences and memory span, 179; neuropsychological patients, 179, 180, 235; phonological similarity effect, 60, 61, 87; reading and comprehension, 180-182; subvocal articulation, 177, word length

Schema and scripts, 14, 15, 22, 42, 44, 56, 142, 287-289, 310-314, 369371, 389, 390; confirmation, 44; deployment, 44 (see also general event representations) Sequential Access Model, 331-345, 361, 362 Short-term memory, 59, 60, 62, 65, 78 (see also working memory) Spatial memory, 428, 429 Spelling, 65-69, 79, 88, 89; learning disabled spellers, 67; long-term memory, 66-69, 78, 79;

554

Subject Index

orthographic representations, 6668; phonological coding, 65, 68, 69, 85, 86, 88; short-term memory, 65, 78, 79; visual memory, 65-68, 88 Stress effects on memory, 375, 376 Theories of memory Tip-of-the-tongue, 337, 338, 341 Verbal Learning Paradigm, 499 Visual memory, 65-68, 88, 191-193 Visuo-spatial memory, 175, 187-195; one system or two, 189, 190; planning and control of movement, 193, 194; reading, 190, visual imagery and mnemonics, 191-193 Visuo-spatial sketchpad, 59, 225, 226, 232-234

Vocabulary acquisition, 183 Voice descriptions, 41 1 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 428, 432 Word length effect, 177 Working memory, 173-205,219-227,231237,499,512-520; definition, 174, 175; origins of model, 219, 220; short term verbal storage, 220-226; ecological relevance, 233-237 (see also central executive, phonological loop and visuo-spatial memory and sketchpad) Writing, 69, 70, 78; Literacy development, 69, 70, 78; word recognition, 69, 79