A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East

ALSO

BY

DAVID

F R O M K I N

The

Independence

of

The

Question

Government

of

Nations

DAVID F R O M K I N

A PEACE TO END A L L PEACE T H E

F A L L

AND

T H E

O F

T H E

O T T O M A N

CREATION M I D D L E

O F

T H E

E A S T

AN OWL BOOK HENRY

HOLT AND NEW

YORK

COMPANY

E M P I R E M O D E R N

Henry Holt and Company, L L C Publishers since 1866 115 West 18th Street New York, N e w York 10011 Henry Holt® is a registered trademark o f Henry Holt and Company, L L C . Copyright © 1989 by David Fromkin All rights reserved. Distributed in Canada by H. B. Fenn and Company L t d . L i b r a r y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D a t a Fromkin, David. A peace to end all peace. Bibliography : p. Includes index. I S B N 0-8050-6884-8 1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Middle East. 2. Middle E a s t — F o r e i g n relations—Great Britain. 3. Middle East—Politics and government—1914-1945. I. Title. DS63.2.G7F76 1989 327.41056 88-34727

Henry Holt books are available for special promotions and premiums. For details contact: Director, Special Markets. First published in hardcover in 1989 by Henry Holt and Company First Owl Books Edition 2001 Printed in the United States of America 13

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"After 'the war to end war' they s e e m to have been pretty successful in Paris at m a k i n g a 'Peace to end P e a c e . ' " A r c h i b a l d Wavell (later F i e l d M a r s h a l Earl Wavell), an officer who s e r v e d u n d e r Allenby in the Palestine c a m p a i g n , c o m m e n t i n g on the treaties b r i n g i n g the F i r s t World War to an e n d

C O N T E N T S

List of Illustrations and Maps Photo Credits Acknowledgments A Note on Spelling Introduction

10 11 12 14 15

P A R T I At the C r o s s r o a d s of History 1

T H E L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE

23

2

T H E L E G A C Y OF T H E G R E A T GAME IN ASIA

26

3

T H E M I D D L E E A S T B E F O R E T H E WAR

33

4

T H E YOUNG T U R K S URGENTLY S E E K AN ALLY

45

5

W I N S T O N C H U R C H I L L O N T H E E V E O F WAR

51

6

C H U R C H I L L S E I Z E S T U R K E Y ' S WARSHIPS

54

7

AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E SUBLIME PORTE

62

8

K I T C H E N E R T A K E S COMMAND

9

KITCHENER'S LIEUTENANTS

88 96

P A R T I I Kitchener o f K h a r t o u m L o o k s A h e a d 79

10

KITCHENER S E T S OUT TO CAPTURE ISLAM

11

INDIA P R O T E S T S

106

12

T H E MAN IN T H E M I D D L E

111

P A R T I I I Britain i s D r a w n into the Middle Eastern Quagmire 13

T H E T U R K I S H C O M M A N D E R S A L M O S T L O S E T H E WAR

119

14

KITCHENER ALLOWS BRITAIN TO A T T A C K T U R K E Y

124

15

ON TO VICTORY AT T H E DARDANELLES

130

16

RUSSIA'S GRAB FOR T U R K E Y

137

17

DEFINING BRITAIN'S GOALS IN T H E MIDDLE EAST

146

18

AT T H E NARROWS OF F O R T U N E

150

19

T H E WARRIORS

155

20

T H E POLITICIANS

159

21

THE LIGHT THAT FAILED

163

8

CONTENTS

22

C R E A T I N G T H E ARAB B U R E A U

168

23

MAKING PROMISES TO T H E ARABS

173

24

MAKING PROMISES TO T H E EUROPEAN A L L I E S

188

25

TURKEY'S TRIUMPH AT T H E TIGRIS

200

26

BEHIND ENEMY LINES

27

KITCHENER'S LAST MISSION

216

28

HUSSEIN'S REVOLT

218

29

T H E F A L L OF T H E A L L I E D GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND FRANCE

231

30

T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR

239

PART

IV

Subversion 207

P A R T V T h e Allies a t the N a d i r o f T h e i r F o r t u n e s

P A R T VI

N e w Worlds and Promised

Lands

31

T H E NEW W O R L D

32

LLOYD GEORGE'S ZIONISM

253 263

33

TOWARD T H E BALFOUR D E C L A R A T I O N

276

34

T H E PROMISED LAND

284

P A R T VII

I n v a d i n g the M i d d l e E a s t

35

J E R U S A L E M FOR CHRISTMAS

305

36

T H E ROAD T O D A M A S C U S

315

37

T H E B A T T L E FOR SYRIA

332

38

T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WAYS

39

BY T H E S H O R E S OF T R O Y

P A R T V I I I T h e S p o i l s o f Victory 351 '

363

P A R T I X T h e T i d e G o e s Out 40

THE TICKING CLOCK

383

41

BETRAYAL

389

42

T H E U N R E A L WORLD OF T H E PEACE C O N F E R E N C E S

403

43

T H E T R O U B L E S B E G I N : 1919—1921

44

E G Y P T : T H E W I N T E R O F 1918—1919

417

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A F G H A N I S T A N : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919

421

46

A R A B I A : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919

424

47

T U R K E Y : J A N U A R Y 1920

427

P A R T X S t o r m over Asia 415

CONTENTS

9

48

S Y R I A A N D L E B A N O N : T H E S P R I N G A N D S U M M E R O F 1920

435

49

E A S T E R N P A L E S T I N E ( T R A N S J O R D A N ) : 1920

441

50

P A L E S T I N E — A R A B S A N D J E W S : 1920

51

M E S O P O T A M I A ( I R A Q ) : 1920

52

P E R S I A ( I R A N ) : 1920

4 45 449 45 5

P A R T X I R u s s i a R e t u r n s t o the M i d d l e E a s t 53

UNMASKING BRITAIN'S ENEMIES

465

54

T H E SOVIET CHALLENGE IN T H E MIDDLE EAST

471

55

MOSCOW'S G O A L S

475

56

A D E A T H IN B U K H A R A

480

57

WINSTON CHURCHILL T A K E S CHARGE

493

58

C H U R C H I L L AND T H E QUESTION OF PALESTINE

515

59

T H E A L L I A N C E S COME APART

530

P A R T X I I T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n Settlement o f 1922

60

A GREEK TRAGEDY

540

61

T H E S E T T L E M E N T OF T H E MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION

558

Notes

569

Bibliography

607

Index

621

L I S T

O F

I L L U S T R A T I O N S

AND

MAPS

1 Lord Kitchener 2 Sir Mark Sykes 3 Enver 4 Talaat 5 Djemal 6 Crowds gather outside the Sublime Porte, 1913 7 Turkish soldiers at Dardanelles fort, 1915 8 Allied fleet at entrance to Dardanelles 9 Pictorial map of the Dardanelles 10 H . M . S . Cornwallis 11 Anzac beach 12 Australian troops at Gallipoli 13 Winston Churchill 14 Russian troop column 15 Russian advance-guard in Turkey, 1916 16 Russian occupation of Erzerum 17 Russian troops in Trebizond 18 British camel column in the Jordan Valley 19 British survey party in Palestine 20 Transport camels 21 View of Beersheba 22 The Hejaz flag 23 Prince Feisal 24 King Hussein of the Hejaz 25 T . E . Lawrence with Lowell Thomas 26 David Ben-Gurion 27 Vladimir Jabotinsky 28 Chaim Weizmann with Lord Balfour 29 Union Jack hoisted above Basra 30 Street scene in Baghdad 31 Reading of General Allenby's proclamation of martial law, 1917 32 Australian Light Horse entering Damascus, 1918 33 General Allenby enters Aleppo, 1919 34 Ottoman soldiers surrender, November 1918 35 British sentry, Constantinople, 1920 36 Admiral Calthorpe's flagship, 1918 10

L I S T OF I L L U S T R A T I O N S AND MAPS

11

37 Woodrow Wilson 38 Lloyd George 39 Signing of the Treaty of Sevres, 1920 40 British bluejackets in Constantinople, 1920 41 French quarter of Smyrna after the fall of the city, 1922 42 French troops enter Damascus, 1920 43 Bodies of Greek soldiers in a Turkish field, 1922 44 Mustapha Kemal 45 Reza Khan 46 Amanullah Khan 47 King Fuad of Egypt 48 Zaghlul Pasha 49 Sons of King Hussein of the Hejaz: Feisal, King of Iraq; Abdullah, Emir of Transjordan; and Ali, later briefly to be King of the Hejaz 50 Ibn Saud with Sir Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell Photo Credits 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 80 are reproduced courtesy of The Illustrated London News Picture Library, London. 2, 5, 25 , 45 , 49 are reproduced courtesy of UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos, New York. 26 is reproduced courtesy of the Bettmann Archive, New York. 27 and 28 are reproduced courtesy of the Zionist Archives and Library. Maps (Between pages 20 and 21) The Middle East in 1914 T h e Campaign in Central Asia The Greek-Turkish War The Middle East in the 1920s Cartography by Sue Lawes

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

T h e idea of writing this book c a m e to me in the c o u r s e of a conversation with T i m o t h y D i c k i n s o n in which he asked my views a b o u t the history of the M i d d l e E a s t . L a t e r I p u t my ideas in written f o r m . J a s o n E p s t e i n s u g g e s t e d that the book be s t r u c t u r e d a r o u n d a personality. I took his s u g g e s t i o n a n d c h o s e Winston Churchill. N o w I cannot think of how the book could have been s t r u c t u r e d any other way. As books on my subject a p p e a r e d in L o n d o n , my friend and colleague R o b e r t L . S i g m o n would b u y t h e m for m e a n d s e n d t h e m to me by airmail. A n d Professor S t a n l e y Mallach of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee helped me find b o o k s I could not find elsewhere. Alain Silvera, Professor of H i s t o r y at Bryn M a w r College a n d a lifelong friend, kept me abreast of the latest scholarship by s u p p l y i n g me with articles from learned j o u r n a l s as well as valuable ideas, information, a n d s u g g e s t i o n s . He r e a d and re-read the m a n u s c r i p t and offered detailed marginal corrections and c o m m e n t s . He showed the m a n u s c r i p t also t o his P h . D . student K a y Patterson, who offered extensive a n d careful c o m m e n t s . At my request, Professor E r n e s t Gellner of C a m b r i d g e University kindly arranged for me to meet Professor Elie K e d o u r i e , w h o m I wanted to p e r s u a d e to be the other a c a d e m i c reader of my m a n u s c r i p t . Professor K e d o u r i e read the m a n u s c r i p t and g a v e me the benefit of his i m m e n s e erudition a n d authoritative c o m m e n t s . I am grateful to him, and to M r s K e d o u r i e for her kindness a n d patience in p u t t i n g up with my d e m a n d s on her h u s b a n d ' s time. D r N i c h o l a s R i z o p o u l o s read the G r e e k - T u r k i s h episodes a n d offered valuable s u g g e s t i o n s . I hope I need not a d d that Professor K e d o u r i e , Professor Silvera, D r R i z o p o u l o s , a n d M r s Patterson are not r e s p o n s i b l e in any way for the opinions and conclusions I e x p r e s s in the book. M o r e o v e r , the m a n u s c r i p t has been extensively rewritten since they saw it, so there may well be factual or other s t a t e m e n t s in it they would have advised me to c h a n g e . A c a d e m i c r e a d e r s , in particular, will observe in reading the book 12

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

13

that I owe an i m m e n s e intellectual d e b t to the b o o k s and e s s a y s of m a n y other s c h o l a r s — m o r e , indeed, than there is s p a c e to n a m e here. Chief a m o n g those to w h o m I am thus indebted are Elie K e d o u r i e , for his masterful s t u d i e s of M i d d l e E a s t e r n a n d British history and politics, a n d M a r t i n G i l b e r t , whose great life of Winston Churchill is essential to anyone writing a b o u t this p e r i o d . I have leaned heavily on G i l b e r t ' s v o l u m e s — a s everyone now m u s t . A n d I was inspired by the e x a m p l e of H o w a r d S a c h a r to believe that a history of the M i d d l e E a s t can be w r i t t e n — a s I was a t t e m p t i n g to d o — o n a very b r o a d scale. S a m u e l C l a y t o n , the son of Sir G i l b e r t Clayton, was kind e n o u g h to s p e n d the best part of an afternoon talking to me a b o u t his father. My thanks to h i m , a n d to his wife, the L a d y M a r y , for their hospitality in having me to tea at K e n s i n g t o n Palace. In the c o u r s e of my research in archives in Britain a n d elsewhere over the years, I have benefited f r o m the kindness and patience of s u c h unfailingly helpful librarians as L e s l e y F o r b e s of the University of D u r h a m , Clive H u g h e s of the I m p e r i a l War M u s e u m , N o r m a n H i g s o n of the University of Hull, Alan Bell of R h o d e s H o u s e , O x f o r d , a n d Gillian G r a n t o f the M i d d l e E a s t C e n t r e , S t Antony's College, O x f o r d . My heartfelt thanks to t h e m all. I owe an i m m e n s e d e b t of g r a t i t u d e to R o b Cowley, my editor at H e n r y Holt and an authority on the F i r s t World War, for his knowledgeable a n d helpful s u g g e s t i o n s and for his constant e n c o u r a g e m e n t and e n t h u s i a s m . M a r i a n W o o d at H e n r y Holt and S a r a M e n g u g at A n d r e D e u t s c h saw me through the publication p r o c e s s with unfailing cheer and a w e s o m e efficiency. F o r permission to r e p r o d u c e q u o t a t i o n s from d o c u m e n t s I am indebted to the following: — T h e C l e r k of the R e c o r d s , H o u s e of L o r d s R e c o r d Office, for permission to quote from the L l o y d G e o r g e Papers in the Beaverbrook Collection in the custody of the H o u s e of L o r d s R e c o r d Office; — t h e S u d a n Archive of the University of D u r h a m , on whose extensive collection I have d r a w n freely; — M r s T h e r e s a S e a r i g h t , and the R h o d e s H o u s e L i b r a r y , for permission to q u o t e from the diaries of R i c h a r d M e i n e r t z h a g e n ; — t h e B r y n m o r J o n e s L i b r a r y of the University of Hull a n d S i r T a t t o n S y k e s , B a r t . , for permission to q u o t e from the p a p e r s of Sir Mark Sykes; — t h e M i d d l e E a s t C e n t r e , St Antony's College, O x f o r d , for permission to q u ot e from their extensive collection, including the p a p e r s o f S i r H u b e r t Y o u n g , T . E . L a w r e n c e , L o r d Allenby, William Y a l e , F . R . S o m e r s e t , C . D . B r u n t o n , a n d the K i n g Feisal and Balfour Declaration files; — t h e Warden and Fellows of N e w College, O x f o r d , for per-

14

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

mission t o q u o t e from L o r d Milner's f i l e s ; — t h e T r u s t e e s of the L i d d e l l H a r t C e n t r e for Military A r c h i v e s at K i n g ' s College, L o n d o n , for p e r m i s s i o n t o q u o t e f r o m L o r d Allenby's papers. T r a n s c r i p t s / T r a n s l a t i o n s of C r o w n copyright r e c o r d s in the P u b l i c R e c o r d Office a p p e a r by p e r m i s s i o n of the Controller of H. M. Stationery Office. F o r access to d o c u m e n t a r y material, I wish also to thank the British L i b r a r y , L o n d o n ; Camellia I n v e s t m e n t s , Pic, L o n d o n ; the Weizmann Archives, R e h o v o t , I s r a e l ; the Bodleian L i b r a r y , O x f o r d ; the I m p e r i a l War M u s e u m , L o n d o n ; the H o u g h t o n L i b r a r y of H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y ; a n d the N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y .

A

Note

on

Spelling

In spelling T u r k i s h , A r a b i c , a n d Persian n a m e s a n d titles, I have u s e d whatever form of spelling I am m o s t familiar with f r o m my reading over the years. So there is no s y s t e m or consistency in it; b u t I would g u e s s that the spellings m o s t familiar to me will be the m o s t familiar to the general reader as well.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

T h e M i d d l e E a s t , a s w e know i t f r o m today's headlines, e m e r g e d f r o m decisions m a d e by the Allies d u r i n g and after the F i r s t World War. In the p a g e s that follow I set out to tell in one v o l u m e the wide-ranging story of how a n d w h y — a n d out of what hopes a n d fears, loves a n d h a t r e d s , mistakes a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s — t h e s e decisions were m a d e . R u s s i a n a n d F r e n c h official a c c o u n t s of what they were doing in the M i d d l e E a s t at that time were, not unnaturally, works of p r o p a g a n d a ; British official a c c o u n t s — a n d even the later m e m o i r s of the officials c o n c e r n e d — w e r e untruthful too. British officials who played a major role in the m a k i n g of these decisions provided a version of events that was, at best, edited a n d , at worst, fictitious. T h e y s o u g h t to hide their m e d d l i n g in M o s l e m religious affairs ( p a g e s 96—105) a n d to pretend that they had entered the M i d d l e E a s t as p a t r o n s of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e — a cause in which they did not in fact believe. Moreover, the A r a b Revolt that f o r m e d the centerpiece of their narrative o c c u r r e d not so m u c h in reality as in the wonderful imagination of T. E. L a w r e n c e , a teller of fantastic tales w h o m the A m e r i c a n s h o w m a n L o w e l l T h o m a s t r a n s f o r m e d into " L a w r e n c e o f A r a b i a . " T h e truth has c o m e out over the c o u r s e of d e c a d e s in bits a n d pieces, and now, toward the end, in one great h e a p , with the o p e n i n g of archives of hitherto secret official d o c u m e n t s a n d private p a p e r s . It s e e m e d to m e — i n 1979, when I started my r e s e a r c h — t h a t we h a d arrived at a point where at last it w o u l d be possible to tell the real story of what h a p p e n e d ; hence this b o o k . D u r i n g the past d e c a d e I have w o r k e d in the archives, s t u d i e d the literature, and p u t together the findings of m o d e r n scholarship to show the picture that is f o r m e d when the pieces of the puzzle are a s s e m b l e d . T h e a u t h o r s whose works I cite in the N o t e s at the e n d of the book m a d e m o s t of the new discoveries, t h o u g h I have m a d e s o m e too: what the Y o u n g T u r k leaders m a y have done in order to p e r s u a d e the G e r m a n s to ally with t h e m on 1 A u g u s t 1914 ( p a g e s 60—6), for e x a m p l e , and why the A r a b negotiator a l - F a r u q i m a y 15

16

INTRODUCTION

have d r a w n a line t h r o u g h inland S y r i a as the frontier of A r a b national independence ( p a g e 178). T h e n , too, I m a y be the first to disentangle, or at any rate to d r a w attention to, the m a n y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s which in 1916 set off a hidden tug-of-war within the British b u r e a u c r a c y between S i r M a r k S y k e s , L o n d o n ' s desk m a n in charge of the M i d d l e E a s t , and his friend G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the head of intelligence in C a i r o ( p a g e 193). I found that neither S y k e s nor Clayton ever realized that S y k e s , in the 1916 negotiations with F r a n c e , m i s u n d e r s t o o d what Clayton h a d asked him to d o . S y k e s did the exact o p p o s i t e , believing in all innocence that he was carrying out Clayton's wishes, while C l a y t o n felt s u r e that S y k e s h a d knowingly let h i m d o w n . S i n c e Clayton never mentioned the m a t t e r to him, S y k e s r e m a i n e d u n a w a r e that differences h a d arisen between him a n d his colleague. So in the m o n t h s a n d years that followed, S y k e s mistakenly a s s u m e d that he and Clayton were still at one, when in fact within the b u r e a u c r a c y Clayton had b e c o m e an a d v e r s a r y of his p o l i c y — a n d p e r h a p s the m o s t d a n g e r o u s one. G e t t i n g the b u r e a u c r a t i c politics r i g h t — a n d I hope that is what I have d o n e — h a s been one of my chief endeavors. B u t I have tried to do m o r e than clarify specific p r o c e s s e s and e p i s o d e s . T h e b o o k is meant to give a p a n o r a m i c view of what was h a p p e n i n g to the M i d d l e E a s t as a whole, and to show that its reshaping was a function of G r e a t Power politics at a u n i q u e t i m e : the exact m o m e n t when the waves of western E u r o p e a n imperial e x p a n s i o n i s m flowed forward to hit their high-water m a r k , a n d then felt the first powerful t u g s of the tide that was g o i n g to pull t h e m b a c k . T h e M i d d l e E a s t , as I conceive it, m e a n s not only E g y p t , Israel, I r a n , T u r k e y , a n d the A r a b states of Asia, b u t also Soviet Central A s i a and A f g h a n i s t a n : the entire arena in which Britain, from the N a p o l e o n i c Wars o n w a r d , fought to shield the road to I n d i a from the o n s l a u g h t s first of F r a n c e a n d t h e n of R u s s i a in what c a m e to be known a s "the G r e a t G a m e . " Other studies of the F i r s t World War and its aftermath in the region have t e n d e d to deal with a single country or area. E v e n those dealing with E u r o p e a n policy in the A r a b or T u r k i s h E a s t as a whole have focused solely, for e x a m p l e , on the role of Britain, or of Britain a n d F r a n c e . B u t I place the creation of the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t in a wider f r a m e w o r k : I see what h a p p e n e d as the culmination of the nineteenth-century G r e a t G a m e , a n d therefore show R u s s i a , too, playing a leading role in the story. It was in whole or in part b e c a u s e of R u s s i a that K i t c h e n e r initiated a British alliance with the A r a b M o s l e m world ( p a g e s 9 7 — 8 ) ; that Britain and F r a n c e , though they would have preferred to preserve the T u r k i s h E m p i r e in the region, decided instead to o c c u p y a n d partition the M i d d l e E a s t ( p a g e s 137—42); that the F o r e i g n Office publicly proclaimed British s u p p o r t

INTRODUCTION

17

for the establishment of a J e w i s h National H o m e in Palestine ( p a g e s 184—93); a n d that, after the war, a n u m b e r of British officials felt that Britain was obliged to hold the line in the M i d d l e E a s t against c r u s a d i n g B o l s h e v i s m ( p a g e s 4 6 5 — 8 ) . Yet, so far as I know, this is the first b o o k to tell the story as that of the M i d d l e E a s t in the widest s e n s e : the G r e a t G a m e sense, in which R u s s i a plays a central role. As you will see when you r e a d the book, M i d d l e E a s t e r n p e r s o n alities, c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d political cultures do not figure a g r e a t deal in the narrative that follows, except when I s u g g e s t the outlines a n d d i m e n s i o n s of what E u r o p e a n politicians were ignoring when they m a d e their decisions. T h i s is a book a b o u t the decision-making p r o c e s s , a n d in the 1914—22 p e r i o d , E u r o p e a n s and A m e r i c a n s were the only ones seated a r o u n d the table when the decisions were m a d e . It was an era in which M i d d l e E a s t e r n countries a n d frontiers were fabricated in E u r o p e . I r a q a n d what we now call J o r d a n , for e x a m p l e , were British inventions, lines d r a w n on an e m p t y m a p by British politicians after the F i r s t World W a r ; while the b o u n d a r i e s of S a u d i A r a b i a , K u w a i t , a n d I r a q were established by a British civil servant in 1922, a n d the frontiers between M o s l e m s and C h r i s t i a n s were d r a w n by F r a n c e in S y r i a - L e b a n o n a n d by R u s s i a on the b o r d e r s of A r m e n i a a n d Soviet A z e r b a i j a n . T h e E u r o p e a n powers at that time believed they could c h a n g e M o s l e m A s i a in the very f u n d a m e n t a l s of its political existence, a n d in their a t t e m p t to do so i n t r o d u c e d an artificial state s y s t e m into the M i d d l e E a s t that has m a d e it into a region of countries that have not b e c o m e nations even t o d a y . T h e b a s i s of political life in t h e M i d d l e E a s t — r e l i g i o n — w a s called into question by the R u s s i a n s , who p r o p o s e d c o m m u n i s m , a n d by the British, who p r o p o s e d nationalism or dynastic loyalty, in its place. K h o m e i n i ' s Iran in the Shi'ite world and the M o s l e m B r o t h e r h o o d in E g y p t , S y r i a , and elsewhere in the S u n n i world keep that issue alive. T h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t , which in the M i d d l e E a s t did allow religion to be the basis of politics—even of its o w n — c h a m p i o n e d one sect against the others; and that, too, is an issue kept alive, notably in the c o m m u n a l strife that has r a v a g e d L e b a n o n in the 1970s a n d 1980s. T h e year 1922 s e e m s to me to have been the point of no return in setting the various clans of the M i d d l e E a s t on their collision c o u r s e s , so that the especial interest a n d excitement of the years with which this book is concerned, 1914 t h r o u g h 1922, is that they were the creative, formative y e a r s , in which everything s e e m e d (and may indeed have been) p o s s i b l e . It was a time when E u r o p e a n s , not implausibly, believed A r a b and J e w i s h nationalism to be natural allies; when the F r e n c h , not the A r a b s , were the d a n g e r o u s enemies of the Zionist m o v e m e n t ; a n d when oil was not an important factor in the politics of the M i d d l e E a s t . By 1922, however, the choices had narrowed a n d the c o u r s e s had

18

INTRODUCTION

been set; the M i d d l e E a s t h a d started along a road that was to lead to the endless w a r s (between Israel a n d her neighbors, a m o n g others, a n d between rival militias in L e b a n o n ) a n d to the always-escalating acts of terrorism (hijacking, assassination, a n d r a n d o m m a s s a c r e ) that have been a characteristic feature of international life in the 1970s a n d 1980s. T h e s e are a part of the legacy of the history recounted in the p a g e s that follow. T w o stories are told in the book a n d then m e r g e into one. T h e first b e g i n s with L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s decision at the outset of the F i r s t World War to partition the M i d d l e E a s t after the war between Britain, F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a , a n d with his a p p o i n t m e n t o f S i r M a r k S y k e s to work out the details. T h e b o o k then follows S y k e s d u r i n g the w a r t i m e years, as he worked out Britain's blueprint for the M i d d l e E a s t ' s future. It g o e s on to show that, in large part, the p r o g r a m S y k e s had formulated was realized after the war, a n d w a s e m b o d i e d in d o c u m e n t s formally a d o p t e d (for the m o s t part) in 1922. T h i s was the story that I originally set out to write. It was meant to show that if you p u t together a n u m b e r of the d o c u m e n t s a n d decisions of 1922—the Allenby D e c l a r a t i o n establishing nominal ind e p e n d e n c e for E g y p t , the Palestine M a n d a t e a n d the Churchill White P a p e r for Palestine (from which Israel a n d J o r d a n s p r i n g ) , the British treaty establishing the s t a t u s of I r a q , the F r e n c h M a n d a t e for S y r i a and L e b a n o n , Britain's placing new m o n a r c h s on the thrones of E g y p t a n d I r a q a n d s p o n s o r i n g a new princely ruler for (what was to b e c o m e ) J o r d a n , the R u s s i a n proclamation of a Soviet U n i o n in which R u s s i a would re-establish her rule in M o s l e m Central A s i a — you would see that when taken together they a m o u n t e d to an overall settlement of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n . Moreover, this settlement of 1922 (as I call it, b e c a u s e m o s t of its elements cluster in a n d a r o u n d that year) flowed from the wartime negotiations which S i r M a r k S y k e s h a d c o n d u c t e d with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a to agree u p o n a partition o f the postwar M i d d l e E a s t between them. T h e F r e n c h received a bit less than had been a g r e e d , a n d the R u s s i a n s were only allowed to keep what they had already taken before the war, but the principle of allowing t h e m to s h a r e with Britain in the partition and rule of M o s l e m A s i a was r e s p e c t e d . Within the British s p h e r e , all went a c c o r d i n g to the S y k e s p l a n : Britain ruled for the m o s t part indirectly, as protector of nominally independent A r a b m o n archies, a n d p r o c l a i m e d herself the s p o n s o r of both A r a b a n d J e w i s h nationalism. In addition to establishing that there h a d been a settlement of 1922 in the M i d d l e E a s t , I show that our quarrel with that settlement (to the extent that with hindsight we would have designed the new M i d d l e E a s t differently) is not what we s o m e t i m e s believe it to b e . It

INTRODUCTION

19

is not even that the British g o v e r n m e n t at that time failed to devise a settlement that would satisfy the n e e d s a n d desires of the p e o p l e s of the M i d d l e E a s t ; it is that they were trying to do s o m e t h i n g altogether different. F o r L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his delegated agent M a r k S y k e s the M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n was what it had been for m o r e than a century: where w o u l d the F r e n c h frontier in the M i d d l e E a s t be d r a w n a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , where w o u l d the R u s s i a n frontier in the Middle East be drawn? T h a t , as I say, is the story which I set out to tell. B u t in the telling of it, another e m e r g e d : the story of how, between 1914 a n d 1922, Britain c h a n g e d , a n d British officials a n d politicians c h a n g e d their m i n d s , so that by 1922—when they formally c o m m i t t e d themselves to their p r o g r a m for r e m a k i n g the M i d d l e E a s t — t h e y no longer believed in it. In the c o u r s e of the narrative we see the British g o v e r n m e n t of 1914, 1915, a n d 1916, which w e l c o m e d a R u s s i a n a n d a F r e n c h p r e s e n c e in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , turn into a postwar g o v e r n m e n t that r e g a r d e d R u s s i a in the M i d d l e E a s t as a d a n g e r a n d F r a n c e in the region as a disaster. We see the p r o - Z i o n i s t s of 1917 turn into the anti-Zionists of 1921 a n d 1922; and the enthusiasts for Feisal's A r a b M o v e m e n t turn against Feisal a s untrustworthy a n d against his brother A b d u l l a h as hopelessly ineffectual. A b o v e all, we see Britain e m b a r k i n g on a vast new imperial enterprise in the M i d d l e E a s t — o n e that w o u l d take generations to achieve, if its object were to r e m a k e the M i d d l e E a s t as I n d i a had been r e m a d e — a t the very time that the British p u b l i c was t u r n i n g to a policy of scaling down overseas c o m m i t m e n t s a n d was deciding it wanted no m o r e imperial a d v e n t u r e s . It m a y well be that the crisis of political civilization that the M i d d l e E a s t e n d u r e s today s t e m s not merely from Britain's d e s t r u c tion of the old order in the region in 1918, a n d her decisions in 1922 about how it should be replaced, b u t also from the lack of conviction she b r o u g h t in s u b s e q u e n t years to the p r o g r a m of i m p o s i n g the settlement of 1922 to which she was p l e d g e d . T h e b o o k I intended to write was only about how E u r o p e went about c h a n g i n g the M i d d l e E a s t ; the book that e m e r g e d was also about how E u r o p e c h a n g e d at the s a m e time, a n d a b o u t how the two m o v e m e n t s interacted. L l o y d G e o r g e , Woodrow Wilson, K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m , L a w r e n c e of A r a b i a , L e n i n , S t a l i n , a n d M u s s o l i n i — m e n who helped s h a p e the twentieth c e n t u r y — a r e a m o n g those who played leading roles in the d r a m a that unfolds in A Peace to End All Peace, striving to remake the world in the light of their own vision. Winston Churchill, above all, p r e s i d e s over the p a g e s of this b o o k : a dominating figure whose g e n i u s a n i m a t e d events a n d whose larger-thanlife personality colored and enlivened t h e m .

20

INTRODUCTION

F o r Churchill, a s for L l o y d G e o r g e , Wilson, L e n i n , S t a l i n , and the o t h e r s — a n d for s u c h m e n a s J a n Christian S m u t s , L e o A m e r y , a n d L o r d M i l n e r — t h e M i d d l e E a s t was an essential c o m p o n e n t or a testing area of their worldview. T h e i r vision of the future of the M i d d l e E a s t was central to their idea of the sort of twentieth century they passionately believed would or s h o u l d e m e r g e as a phoenix from the ashes of the F i r s t World War. In that sense, the history recounted in the p a g e s that follow is the story of how the twentieth century was created, as well as the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t .

PART I AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY

1 T H E L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE i In the late s p r i n g of 1912, the graceful yacht Enchantress put out to sea from rainy G e n o a for a M e d i t e r r a n e a n p l e a s u r e cruise—-a carefree cruise without itinerary or t i m e - s c h e d u l e . T h e skies brightened as she s t e a m e d s o u t h . S o o n she was b a t h e d in s u n s h i n e . Enchantress b e l o n g e d to the British A d m i r a l t y . T h e a c c o m m o dation a b o a r d was as g r a n d as that on the K i n g ' s own yacht. T h e crew n u m b e r e d nearly a h u n d r e d a n d served a dozen or so g u e s t s , who had c o m e from Britain via P a r i s , where they had stayed at the R i t z . A m o n g them were the British P r i m e Minister, H e r b e r t A s q u i t h ; his brilliant 25-year-old d a u g h t e r Violet; the civilian head of the A d m i r a l t y , Winston C h u r c h i l l ; and Churchill's small party of family m e m b e r s a n d close colleagues. In the final enchanted years before the F i r s t World War b r o u g h t their world to an end, they were as privileged a g r o u p as any the world has known. Violet A s q u i t h kept a diary of her j o u r n e y . In Pompeii she a n d her friends w a n d e r e d "down the long lovely silent streets" that once had p u l s a t e d with the life of I m p e r i a l R o m e ; now, she noted, those once lively streets were overgrown with g r a s s a n d v e g e t a t i o n . In Sicily her party c l i m b e d to the ruins of an ancient G r e e k fortress a n d , a m i d s t wild lavender and h e r b s , had a picnic lunch, sitting on blocks of stone f r o m the fallen walls. L a t e r they went higher still to watch the sunset over the sea f r o m what r e m a i n e d of the old G r e e k theater on the heights. T h e r e they lay " a m o n g wild thyme a n d h u m m i n g bees and watched the sea c h a n g i n g from b l u e to flame a n d then to cool j a d e green as the s u n d r o p p e d into it a n d the s t a r s c a m e o u t . " 1

2

Rotations and revolutions—the heavenly m o v e m e n t s that c a u s e day to b e c o m e night a n d s p r i n g / s u m m e r to b e c o m e a u t u m n / w i n t e r — were reflected in her observations of the l a n d s c a p e a n d its lighting; but a sense of the mortality of civilizations and of political p o w e r s a n d dominations did not o v e r s h a d o w Violet's cheerful vision of her youthful voyage to the l a n d s of antiquity. H e r father p r e s i d e d over 23

24

AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY

an e m p i r e roughly twice as large as the R o m a n E m p i r e at its zenith; she m a y well have t h o u g h t that her father's e m p i r e would last twice as long too. T h e P r i m e Minister, a n enthusiastic sightseer, was inseparable from his Baedeker g u i d e b o o k . An ardent classicist, he read a n d wrote with ease a n d pleasure in classical G r e e k a n d L a t i n . Winston Churchill, no scholar of ancient l a n g u a g e s or literature, was as jealous as a child. " T h o s e G r e e k s a n d R o m a n s , " he protested, "they are so overrated. T h e y only said everything first. I've said just as g o o d things myself. B u t they got in before m e . " Violet noted that, "It was in vain that my father pointed out that the world had been g o i n g on for q u i t e a long time before the G r e e k s and R o m a n s a p p e a r e d u p o n the s c e n e . " T h e Prime Minister was a n intellectual, aware that the trend a m o n g historians of the ancient world was away f r o m an exclusive concern with the E u r o p e a n cultures o f the G r e e k s a n d R o m a n s . T h e American professor J a m e s H e n r y B r e a s t e d had won wide a c c e p t a n c e for the thesis that m o d e r n civilization—that is, E u r o p e a n civilization—had its b e g i n n i n g s not in G r e e c e and R o m e , b u t in the M i d d l e E a s t : in E g y p t and J u d a e a , B a b y l o n i a a n d A s s y r i a , S u m e r a n d A k k a d . Civilization—whose roots stretched t h o u s a n d s of years into the past, into the soil of those M i d d l e E a s t e r n monarchies that long a g o had c r u m b l e d into d u s t — was seen to have c u l m i n a t e d in the global s u p r e m a c y of the E u r o pean peoples, their ideals, a n d their way of life. 3

4

In the early years of the twentieth century, when Churchill a n d his g u e s t s v o y a g e d a b o a r d the Enchantress, it was usual to a s s u m e that the E u r o p e a n peoples w o u l d continue to play a d o m i n a t i n g role in world affairs for as far ahead in time as the mind's eye could see. It was also not u n c o m m o n to s u p p o s e that, having already a c c o m p l i s h e d m o s t of what m a n y r e g a r d e d as the West's historical m i s s i o n — s h a p i n g the political destinies of the other p e o p l e s of the g l o b e — t h e y would eventually c o m p l e t e it. C o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g the d o m a i n s still to be dealt with were those of the M i d d l e E a s t , one of the few regions left on the planet that had not yet been socially, culturally, a n d politically reshaped in the i m a g e of E u r o p e .

II T h e M i d d l e E a s t , although it had been of great interest to western d i p l o m a t s a n d politicians d u r i n g the nineteenth century as an arena in which G r e a t G a m e rivalries were played out, was of only marginal concern to them in the early years of the twentieth century when those rivalries were a p p a r e n t l y resolved. T h e region had b e c o m e a political backwater. It was a s s u m e d that the E u r o p e a n powers would

THE L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE

25

one day take the region in hand, but there was no longer a sense of urgency about their doing so. F e w E u r o p e a n s of Churchill's generation knew or cared what went on in the l a n g u i d e m p i r e s of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n or the Persian S h a h . An occasional T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e of A r m e n i a n s would lead to a p u b l i c outcry in the West, b u t w o u l d evoke no m o r e lasting concern than R u s s i a n m a s s a c r e s of J e w s . Worldly statesmen who privately believed there was nothing to be d o n e w o u l d go t h r o u g h the p u b l i c m o t i o n s of u r g i n g the S u l t a n to r e f o r m ; there the matter w o u l d end. Petty intrigues at court, a c o r r u p t officialdom, shifting tribal alliances, and a s l u g g i s h , apathetic population c o m p o s e d the picture that E u r o p e a n s formed of the region's affairs. T h e r e was little in the picture to c a u s e o r d i n a r y p e o p l e living in L o n d o n , or P a r i s , or N e w Y o r k to believe that it affected their lives or interests. In Berlin, it is t r u e , planners looked to the o p e n i n g up of railroads a n d new markets in the region; b u t these were commercial ventures. T h e p a s s i o n s that now drive t r o o p s a n d terrorists to kill a n d be k i l l e d — a n d that c o m p e l global a t t e n t i o n — h a d not yet been a r o u s e d . At the t i m e , the political l a n d s c a p e of the M i d d l e E a s t looked different f r o m that of today. Israel, J o r d a n , S y r i a , I r a q , a n d S a u d i A r a b i a did not exist then. M o s t of the M i d d l e E a s t still rested, as it had for centuries, u n d e r the d r o w s y a n d negligent sway of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a relatively tranquil d o m a i n in which history, like everything else, m o v e d slowly. T o d a y , toward the close of the twentieth century, the politics of the M i d d l e E a s t present a completely different a s p e c t : they are explosive. No m a n played a m o r e crucial role—at times unintentionally—in g i v i n g birth to the M i d d l e E a s t we live with today than did Winston Churchill, who before the F i r s t World War was a rising but widely d i s t r u s t e d y o u n g E n g l i s h politician with no particular interest in M o s l e m A s i a . A c u r i o u s destiny d r o v e Churchill and the M i d d l e E a s t to interfere repeatedly in one another's political lives. T h i s left its m a r k s ; there are frontier lines now r u n n i n g a c r o s s the face of the M i d d l e E a s t that are scar-lines from those encounters with him.

* T h e Baghdad Railway project remains the best-known example of German economic penetration of the region. T h e story is a tangled one and often misunderstood, but the British originally encouraged and supported the project, little aware at the outset of the dangers it might pose. Eventually the project became a source of discord between Britain and Germany which, however, was resolved by an agreement reached between the two countries in 1914.

T H E LEGACY OF T H E GREAT GAME IN ASIA i Churchill, A s q u i t h , a n d s u c h C a b i n e t colleagues as the F o r e i g n Secretary, S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , a n d , later, the War Minister, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , were to play a decisive role in creating the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t ; b u t in d o i n g so they were u n a b l e to e s c a p e f r o m a Victorian political legacy that A s q u i t h ' s L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t thought it had rejected. A s q u i t h and G r e y , having turned their b a c k s on the nineteenth-century rivalry with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a in the M i d d l e E a s t , believed that they could walk away from it; b u t events were to prove them w r o n g .

II T h e s t r u g g l e for the M i d d l e E a s t , pitting E n g l a n d against E u r o p e a n rivals, was a result of the imperial expansion ushered in by the voyages o f C o l u m b u s , V a s c o d a G a m a , Magellan, a n d D r a k e . H a v i n g discovered the sea routes in the fifteenth a n d sixteenth centuries, the E u r o p e a n powers went on to vie with one another for control of the rest of the world. E n g l a n d w a s a relatively late starter in the race, but eventually s u r p a s s e d the others. D u r i n g the eighteenth century the British Isles, despite their small size, finally established an e m p i r e that encircled the g l o b e . L i k e the S p a n i a r d s and the D u t c h before t h e m , the British b o a s t e d that their m o n a r c h now reigned over d o m i n i o n s on which the sun never set. By 1912, when Winston Churchill a n d Herbert A s q u i t h cruised a b o a r d the Enchantress, their m o n a r c h , G e o r g e V, ruled a q u a r t e r of the land surface of the planet. Of none of their c o n q u e s t s were the British m o r e p r o u d than those in the storied E a s t . Y e t there was irony in these t r i u m p h s ; for in besting F r a n c e in A s i a a n d the Pacific, a n d in crowning that achievement by winning I n d i a , Britain had stretched her line of transport 26

THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT GAME

IN

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a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s so far that it could be cut at rnany points. N a p o l e o n B o n a p a r t e e x p o s e d this vulnerability in 1798, when he i n v a d e d E g y p t a n d m a r c h e d on S y r i a — i n t e n d i n g , he later m a i n tained, from there to follow the p a t h of legend a n d glory, p a s t B a b y l o n , to I n d i a . T h o u g h checked in his own p l a n s , N a p o l e o n afterwards p e r s u a d e d the m a d C z a r Paul to launch the R u s s i a n a r m y on the s a m e p a t h . Britain's r e s p o n s e was to s u p p o r t the native r e g i m e s of the M i d d l e E a s t against E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n . S h e d i d not desire to control the region, b u t to keep any other E u r o p e a n power from d o i n g s o . T h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth century, successive British g o v e r n m e n t s therefore p u r s u e d a policy of p r o p p i n g up the tottering I s l a m i c r e a l m s in A s i a against E u r o p e a n interference, s u b v e r s i o n , a n d invasion. In d o i n g so their principal o p p o n e n t s o o n b e c a m e the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . D e f e a t i n g R u s s i a n d e s i g n s in A s i a e m e r g e d as the o b s e s s i v e goal of generations of British civilian a n d military officials. T h e i r a t t e m p t to do so w a s , for t h e m , "the G r e a t G a m e , " in which the stakes ran high. G e o r g e C u r z o n , the future Viceroy of I n d i a , defined the stakes clearly: " T u r k e s t a n , A f g h a n i s t a n , T r a n s c a s p i a , P e r s i a — t o m a n y these n a m e s breathe only a sense of utter r e m o t e n e s s . .. To m e , I confess, they are the pieces on a c h e s s b o a r d u p o n which is b e i n g played out a g a m e for the d o m i n i o n of the w o r l d . " Q u e e n Victoria put it even m o r e clearly: it w a s , she said, "a q u e s t i o n of R u s s i a n or British s u p r e m a c y in the w o r l d . " 1

2

3

Ill It a p p e a r s to have been a British officer n a m e d A r t h u r Conolly who first called it "the G r e a t G a m e . " He played it gallantly, along the H i m a l a y a n frontier a n d in the deserts and oases of Central A s i a , a n d lost in a terrible w a y : an U z b e k e m i r cast him for two m o n t h s into a well which w a s filled with vermin a n d reptiles, a n d then what remained o f h i m was b r o u g h t u p a n d b e h e a d e d . T h e p h r a s e "the G r e a t G a m e " was found in his p a p e r s a n d q u o t e d by a historian of the F i r s t A f g h a n W a r . R u d y a r d K i p l i n g m a d e it f a m o u s in his novel Kim, the story of an A n g l o - I n d i a n boy a n d his A f g h a n mentor foiling R u s s i a n intrigues along the highways to I n d i a . * 4

T h e g a m e had b e g u n even before 1829, when the D u k e o f Wellington, then P r i m e Minister, entered into official c o r r e s p o n dence on the subject of how best to protect India against a R u s s i a n * These activities of the rival intelligence services are what some writers mean by the Great G a m e ; others use the phrase in the broader sense in which it is used in this book.

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attack through A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e best way, it was a g r e e d , was by keeping R u s s i a out of A f g h a n i s t a n . British strategy thereafter was to employ the decaying regimes of I s l a m i c A s i a as a gigantic buffer between British I n d i a a n d its route to E g y p t , and the threatening R u s s i a n s . T h i s policy was associated especially with the n a m e of L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , who developed it d u r i n g his many years as F o r e i g n Minister ( 1 8 3 0 - 4 , 1 8 3 6 - 4 1 , a n d 1 8 4 6 - 5 1 ) a n d P r i m e Minister ( 1 8 5 5 - 8 and 1 8 5 9 - 6 5 ) . T h e battle to s u p p o r t friendly buffer regimes raged with particular intensity at the western a n d eastern e n d s of the Asian continent, where the control of d o m i n a t i n g strategic positions was at stake. In western A s i a the locus of strategic concern was C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ( I s t a n b u l ) , the ancient B y z a n t i u m , which for centuries had d o m i n a t e d the c r o s s r o a d s of world politics. S i t u a t e d above the narrow straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s , it c o m m a n d e d both the east/west p a s s a g e between E u r o p e and A s i a a n d the north/south p a s s a g e between the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d the Black S e a . So long as C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s not in unfriendly h a n d s , the powerful British navy could sail t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s into the Black S e a to d o m i n a t e the R u s s i a n coastline. B u t if the R u s s i a n s were to c o n q u e r the straits they could not merely keep the British fleet from c o m i n g in; they could also send their own fleet out, into the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , where its presence could threaten the British lifeline. T o w a r d the far side of the A s i a n continent, the locus of strategic concern was the stretch of high m o u n t a i n ranges in a n d adjoining Afghanistan, f r o m which invaders could p o u r down into the plains of British India. Britain's aim in eastern Asia was to keep R u s s i a from establishing any sort of presence on those d o m i n a t i n g heights. S o m e t i m e s as a cold war, s o m e t i m e s as a hot one, the struggle between Britain a n d R u s s i a r a g e d f r o m the D a r d a n e l l e s to the H i m a l a y a s for almost a h u n d r e d y e a r s . Its o u t c o m e was s o m e t h i n g of a draw.

IV T h e r e were vital m a t t e r s at stake in Britain's long s t r u g g l e against R u s s i a ; a n d while s o m e of these eventually fell by the wayside, others r e m a i n e d , alongside newer ones that e m e r g e d . In 1791 Britain's P r i m e Minister, William Pitt, e x p r e s s e d fear that the R u s s i a n E m p i r e m i g h t be able to overthrow the E u r o p e a n balance of power. T h a t fear revived after R u s s i a played a crucial role in the final defeat of N a p o l e o n in 1 8 1 4 - 1 5 , but diminished again after 1856, when R u s s i a was defeated in the C r i m e a n War. F r o m 1830 o n w a r d , L o r d P a l m e r s t o n and his successors feared

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that if R u s s i a d e s t r o y e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e the s c r a m b l e to pick up the pieces might lead to a m a j o r war between the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . T h a t always remained a concern. By the m i d d l e of the nineteenth century, British t r a d e with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e b e g a n to a s s u m e a m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e , a n d economic issues were a d d e d to the controversy, pitting free trade Britain against protectionist R u s s i a . T h e d e e p financial involvement o f F r a n c e a n d Italy in O t t o m a n affairs, followed by G e r m a n economic penetration, turned the area in which R u s s i a a n d Britain c o n d u c t e d their s t r u g g l e into a minefield of national e c o n o m i c interests. Oil entered the picture only in the early twentieth century. B u t it did not play a m a j o r role in the G r e a t G a m e even then, both b e c a u s e there were few politicians who foresaw the c o m i n g i m p o r t a n c e of oil, a n d b e c a u s e it was not then known that oil existed in the M i d d l e E a s t in s u c h a g r e a t quantity. M o s t of Britain's oil ( m o r e than 80 percent, before a n d d u r i n g the F i r s t World War) c a m e from the U n i t e d S t a t e s . At the t i m e , Persia was the only significant M i d d l e E a s t e r n p r o d u c e r other than R u s s i a , a n d even Persia's o u t p u t was insignificant in terms of world p r o d u c t i o n . In 1913, for e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o d u c e d 140 t i m e s m o r e oil than d i d P e r s i a . s

F r o m the century, the safety of the of E m p r e s s evolution of Empire and lifeline, b u t the c z a r s .

b e g i n n i n g of the G r e a t G a m e until far into the twentieth m o s t deeply felt concern of British leaders was for the r o a d to the E a s t . When Q u e e n Victoria a s s u m e d the title of I n d i a in 1877 formal recognition was given to the Britain into a species of d u a l m o n a r c h y — t h e British the E m p i r e of I n d i a . T h e line between them was t h u s a over it, a n d casting a long s h a d o w , h u n g the s w o r d of

British leaders s e e m e d not to take into account the possibility that, in e x p a n d i n g s o u t h w a r d s a n d e a s t w a r d s , the R u s s i a n s were impelled by internal historical imperatives of their own which h a d nothing to do with I n d i a or Britain. T h e c z a r s a n d their ministers believed that it was their country's destiny to c o n q u e r the south a n d the east, j u s t as the A m e r i c a n s at the time believed it their manifest destiny to c o n q u e r the west. In each c a s e , the d r e a m was to fill out an entire continent f r o m ocean t o ocean. T h e R u s s i a n Imperial Chancellor, Prince G o r c h a k o v , put it m o r e or less in those t e r m s in 1864 in a m e m o r a n d u m in which he set forth his g o a l s for his country. He a r g u e d that the need for s e c u r e frontiers obliged the R u s s i a n s to go on d e v o u r i n g the rotting r e g i m e s to their s o u t h . He pointed out that "the U n i t e d S t a t e s in A m e r i c a , F r a n c e in Algiers, H o l l a n d in her colonies—all have been d r a w n into a c o u r s e where ambition plays a smaller role than i m p e r i o u s necessity, a n d the greatest difficulty is knowing where to s t o p . " 6

T h e British feared that R u s s i a did not know where to s t o p ; a n d , as

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an increasingly d e m o c r a t i c society e n g a g e d generation after generation in the conflict with despotic R u s s i a , they eventually developed a hatred of R u s s i a that went b e y o n d the particular political and economic differences that divided the two countries. Britons grew to object to R u s s i a n s not merely for what they did but for who they were. At the s a m e time, however, L i b e r a l s in and out of Parliament began to e x p r e s s their abhorrence of the corrupt and despotic M i d d l e E a s t e r n r e g i m e s that their own g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t e d against the R u s s i a n threat. In d o i n g s o , they struck a responsive chord in the country's electorate. Atrocities c o m m i t t e d by the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against Christian minorities were thunderingly d e n o u n c e d by the L i b e r a l leader, William E w a r t G l a d s t o n e , in the 1880 election c a m paign in which he overthrew and replaced the C o n s e r v a t i v e P r i m e Minister, B e n j a m i n Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. C l a i m i n g that the Sultan's r e g i m e was "a b o t t o m l e s s pit of fraud and f a l s e h o o d , " G l a d s t o n e , in his 1880—5 administration, washed Britain's h a n d s of the O t t o m a n involvement, and the British government withdrew its protection and influence from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e T u r k s , u n a b l e to stand on their own, turned therefore for s u p p o r t to another power, B i s m a r c k ' s G e r m a n y ; and G e r m a n y took Britain's place at the S u b l i m e P o r t e . 7

When the C o n s e r v a t i v e s returned to office, it was too late to go back. R o b e r t Cecil, 3rd M a r q u e s s of S a l i s b u r y ( P r i m e Minister: 1 8 8 5 - 6 , 1 8 8 6 - 9 2 , 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 0 0 , 1 9 0 0 - 2 ) , aware that the O t t o m a n rulers were j e o p a r d i z i n g their own sovereignty through m i s m a n a g e ment, h a d thought of u s i n g s u c h influence as Britain could exert to g u i d e a n d , to s o m e extent, reform the r e g i m e . Of G l a d s t o n e ' s having dissipated that influence, he l a m e n t e d : " T h e y have just thrown it away into the sea, without getting anything whatever in e x c h a n g e . " 8

V G e r m a n y ' s entry on the scene, at Constantinople and elsewhere, marked the beginning of a new age in world politics. T h e G e r m a n E m p i r e , formally created on 18 J a n u a r y 1871, within d e c a d e s had replaced R u s s i a as the principal threat to British interests. In part this was b e c a u s e of Britain's relative industrial decline. In the m i d d l e of the nineteenth century, Britain p r o d u c e d about twothirds of the world's coal, a b o u t half of its iron, and m o r e than 70 percent of its steel; indeed over 40 percent of the entire world output of t r a de d m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s was p r o d u c e d within the British Isles at that time. Half the world's industrial production was then Britishowned, but by 1870 the figure had sunk to 32 percent, and by 1910,

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9

to 15 p e r c e n t . In newer a n d increasingly more important industries, such as chemicals and machine-tools, G e r m a n y took the lead. E v e n Britain's pre-eminent position in world finance—in 1914 she held 41 percent of g r o s s international i n v e s t m e n t — w a s a facet of decline; British investors preferred to place their money in dynamic economies in the A m e r i c a s and elsewhere a b r o a d . Military factors were also involved. T h e development of railroads radically altered the strategic balance between land power and sea power to the detriment of the latter. Sir Halford M a c k i n d e r , the prophet of geopolitics, underlined the realities of a new situation in which enemy railroad trains would speed troops and munitions directly to their destination by the straight line which constitutes the shortest distance between two points, while the British navy would sail slowly a r o u n d the circumference of a continent and arrive too late. T h e railroad network of the G e r m a n E m p i r e m a d e the K a i s e r ' s realm the m o s t a d v a n c e d military power in the world, and Britain's precarious naval s u p r e m a c y began to seem less relevant than it had been. 10

Walter B a g e h o t , editor of the influential L o n d o n m a g a z i n e , The Economist, drew the conclusion that, b e c a u s e of G e r m a n y , R u s s i a n expansion no longer needed to be feared: " . . . the old idea that R u s s i a is already so great a power that E u r o p e needs to be afraid of her . . . belongs t o the p r e - G e r m a n i c a g e . " Russia's disastrous defeat by J a p a n ( 1 9 0 4 — 5 ) , followed by revolutionary u p r i s i n g s in St P e t e r s b u r g and throughout the country in 1905, s u g g e s t e d that, in any event, the C z a r ' s a r m i e s were no longer strong enough to remain a cause for concern. 11

T h e C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t o f A r t h u r J a m e s Balfour (1902—5) nonetheless continued to p u r s u e the old rivalry as well as the new one, allying Britain not only with J a p a n against R u s s i a , but also with F r a n c e against G e r m a n y . B u t S i r E d w a r d G r e y , F o r e i g n S e c retary in the successor L i b e r a l administration of Henry C a m p b e l l B a n n e r m a n (1905 — 8 ) , pictured the two policies as contradictory. " R u s s i a was the ally of F r a n c e , " he wrote, "we could not p u r s u e at one and the s a m e time a policy of agreement with F r a n c e and a policy of counteralliances against R u s s i a . " 1 2

G r e y therefore negotiated a treaty with R u s s i a , executed in 1907, that reconciled the differences between the two countries in A s i a . T i b e t was neutralized; R u s s i a gave up her interest in Afghanistan, and left control of that country's foreign policy in Britain's h a n d s ; and Persia was divided into a R u s s i a n zone, a neutral zone, and a British zone. T h e G r e a t G a m e had seemingly been b r o u g h t to an end. It could have been anticipated that the settlement of 1907 would arouse fears in Constantinople that Britain would no longer protect

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T u r k e y against R u s s i a . A P a l m e r s t o n or a S t r a t f o r d C a n n i n g might have allayed such fears, but neither S i r E d w a r d G r e y nor his a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e took the trouble to do s o .

VI T h e r e was an intellectual time lag between L o n d o n and the o u t p o s t s of e m p i r e . G r e y , A s q u i t h , and their L i b e r a l colleagues saw Britain's traditional rivals, F r a n c e and R u s s i a , as British friends and allies in the post-Victorian a g e . But British officers, agents, a n d civil servants stationed along the great arc that s w u n g from E g y p t and the S u d a n to India failed in m a n y cases to a d o p t the new outlook. H a v i n g spent a lifetime countering R u s s i a n and F r e n c h intrigues in the M i d d l e E a s t , they continued to regard R u s s i a and F r a n c e as their country's enemies. E v e n t s in 1914 and the s u c c e e d i n g years were to b r i n g their Victorian political views back into unexpected p r o m i n e n c e . In one respect officers in the field and ministers in L o n d o n were in a g r e e m e n t : both shared the a s s u m p t i o n that what remained of the independent M i d d l e E a s t would eventually fall under E u r o p e a n influence and g u i d a n c e . A s q u i t h and G r e y had no desire for Britain to e x p a n d further into the M i d d l e E a s t , while junior British officers in C a i r o and K h a r t o u m harbored d e s i g n s on the A r a b - s p e a k i n g provinces to their east. Both g r o u p s believed, however, that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the M i d d l e E a s t would collapse one day and that one or m o r e of the E u r o p e a n powers would have to pick up the pieces. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n — t h a t when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e d i s a p p e a r e d , E u r o p e would have to take its p l a c e — p r o v e d to be one of those m o t o r s that drive history.

3 T H E M I D D L E EAST BEFORE T H E WAR i F o r d e c a d e s and indeed centuries before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the native r e g i m e s of the M i d d l e E a s t had been, in every sense, losing g r o u n d to E u r o p e . T h e khanates of Central Asia, including K h i v a and B u k h a r a , had fallen to R u s s i a , as had portions of the Persian E m p i r e . T h e A r a b s h e i k h d o m s along the Gulf coast route from S u e z to I n d i a had been brought under British sway; and C y p r u s a n d E g y p t , though formally still attached to T u r k e y , were in fact occupied a n d administered by Britain. T h e A n g l o - R u s s i a n A g r e e m e n t of 1907 b r o u g h t Afghanistan into the British s p h e r e , and divided most of Persia between Britain and R u s s i a . In the M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t , only the O t t o m a n E m p i r e effectively retained its i n d e p e n d e n c e — t h o u g h precariously, as its frontiers c a m e under p r e s s u r e . I n d e e d , the still-independent T u r k i s h S u l t a n a t e looked out of place in the m o d e r n world. L i k e a ruined temple of classical antiquity, with s o m e of its shattered c o l u m n s still erect and visible to tourists s u c h as those a b o a r d the Enchantress, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was a structure that had survived the bygone era to which it belonged. It was a relic of invasions from the east a millennium a g o : beginning a r o u n d AD 1,000, waves of n o m a d horsemen s t r e a m e d forth from the s t e p p e s and deserts of central and northeast A s i a , c o n q u e r i n g the peoples and lands in their path as they rode west. Pagan or animist in religious belief, and speaking one or other of the Mongolian or T u r k i s h languages, they carved out a variety of principalities and k i n g d o m s for themselves, a m o n g them the e m p i r e s of G e n g h i s K h a n a n d T a m e r l a n e . T h e O t t o m a n (or O s m a n l i ) E m p i r e , founded by T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g horsemen who had converted to I s l a m , was another such e m p i r e ; it took its n a m e from O s m a n , a b o r d e r l a n d ghazi (warrior for the M o s l e m faith) born in the thirteenth century, who c a m p a i g n e d on the outskirts of the E a s t e r n R o m a n (or Byzantine) E m p i r e in Anatolia.

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In the fifteenth century O s m a n ' s s u c c e s s o r s c o n q u e r e d and replaced the Byzantine E m p i r e . R i d i n g on to new c o n q u e s t s , the O t t o m a n T u r k s e x p a n d e d in all directions: north to the C r i m e a , east to B a g h d a d and B a s r a , south to the coasts of A r a b i a and the Gulf, west to E g y p t and N o r t h A f r i c a — a n d into E u r o p e . At its peak, in the sixteenth century, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e included most of the M i d d l e E a s t , N o r t h Africa, and what are now the Balkan countries of E u r o p e — G r e e c e , Y u g o s l a v i a , A l b a n i a , R u m a n i a , and B u l g a r i a — a s well as m u c h of H u n g a r y . It stretched from the Persian G u l f to the river D a n u b e ; its a r m i e s s t o p p e d only at the g a t e s of Vienna. Its population was estimated at between thirty and fifty million at a time when E n g l a n d ' s population was p e r h a p s four million; and it ruled more than twenty nationalities. 1

T h e O t t o m a n s never entirely outgrew their origins as a m a r a u d i n g war b a n d . T h e y enriched themselves by c a p t u r i n g wealth and slaves; the slaves, conscripted into the O t t o m a n ranks, rose to replace the c o m m a n d e r s who retired, and went on to c a p t u r e wealth and slaves in their turn. I n v a d i n g new territories was the only path they knew to economic g r o w t h . In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the c o n q u e s t s turned into defeats and retreats, the d y n a m i c of O t t o m a n existence was lost; the T u r k s had m a s t e r e d the arts of war but not those of g o v e r n m e n t . O t t o m a n leaders in the nineteenth century attempted p r o g r a m s of sweeping reform. T h e i r g o a l s were the centralization of g o v e r n m e n t ; the establishment of an executive branch under the S u l t a n ' s chief minister, the G r a n d Vizier; the rationalization of taxation and conscription; the establishment of constitutional g u a r a n t e e s ; the founding of secular public schools offering technical, vocational, and other training; and the like. A s t a r t — b u t not m u c h m o r e — w a s m a d e along these lines. M o s t of the reforms took place only on p a p e r ; and as an anachronism in the m o d e r n world, the ramshackle O t t o m a n r e g i m e s e e m e d d o o m e d to d i s a p p e a r . T h e e m p i r e was incoherent. Its O t t o m a n rulers were not an ethnic g r o u p ; though they s p o k e T u r k i s h , m a n y were descendants of onceChristian slaves from Balkan E u r o p e and elsewhere. T h e empire's s u b j e c t s (a wide variety of p e o p l e s , speaking T u r k i s h , S e m i t i c , K u r d i s h , S l a v i c , A r m e n i a n , G r e e k , and other languages) had little in c o m m o n with, and in m a n y cases little love for, one another. T h o u g h E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s later were to generalize a b o u t , for e x a m p l e , " A r a b s , " in fact E g y p t i a n s and A r a b i a n s , S v r i a n s and Iraqis were peoples of different history, ethnic b a c k g r o u n d , and outlook. T h e multinational, multilingual empire was a mosaic of peoples who did not m i x ; in the towns, A r m e n i a n s , G r e e k s , J e w s , and others each lived in their own separate q u a r t e r s . Religion had s o m e sort of unifying effect, for the empire was a

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t h e o c r a c y — a M o s l e m rather than a T u r k i s h s t a t e — a n d most of its s u b j e c t s were M o s l e m s . T h e O t t o m a n S u l t a n was regarded a s caliph (temporal and spiritual s u c c e s s o r to the Prophet, M o h a m m e d ) by the majority g r o u p within I s l a m , the S u n n i s . B u t a m o n g others of the seventy-one sects of I s l a m , especially the n u m e r o u s Shi'ites, there was doctrinal opposition to the Sultan's S u n n i faith and to his claims to the caliphate. A n d for those who were not M o s l e m ( p e r h a p s 25 percent of the population at the beginning of the twentieth c e n t u r y ) , but G r e e k O r t h o d o x , R o m a n C a t h o l i c , A r m e n i a n Catholic, A r m e n i a n G r e g o r i a n , J e w i s h , Protestant, M a r o n i t e , S a m a r i t a n , Nestorian Christian, S y r i a n U n i t e d O r t h o d o x , M o n o p h y s i t e , or any one of a n u m b e r of others, religion was a divisive rather than a unifying political factor. T h e extent to which religion g o v e r n e d everyday life in the M i d d l e E a s t was s o m e t h i n g that E u r o p e a n visitors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found r e m a r k a b l e ; for religion had played no such role in E u r o p e for centuries. I n d e e d , E u r o p e a n s visited the M i d d l e E a s t largely to see the past. T h e y c a m e to see Biblical sites, or excavated w o n d e r s of the ancient world, or n o m a d s who lived as they had in the time of A b r a h a m . T h e Porte, too, a p p e a r e d to live in the p a s t . O t t o m a n officials continued to pretend, for e x a m p l e , that Bulgaria formed part of the e m p i r e long after losing control of that territory in 1878, a n d counted E g y p t i a n s as a m o n g its s u b j e c t s even after Britain occupied E g y p t in 1882. F o r this and other reasons, O t t o m a n statistics were unreliable, and it is only in the roughest sense that we can say that the empire's population in the early twentieth century may have been a b o u t twenty to twenty-five million, in a t e r r i t o r y — d e p e n d i n g on how it is d e f i n e d — a b o u t six times the size of T e x a s . It c o m p r i s e d , broadly speaking, most of the A r a b i a n peninsula and what is now T u r k e y , Israel, L e b a n o n , J o r d a n , S y r i a , and I r a q . Until the early twentieth century, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was for most of the time under the absolute personal rule of the S u l t a n . In at least one respect he was quite unlike a E u r o p e a n m o n a r c h : as the son of a w o m a n of the h a r e m , he was always half-slave by birth. U n d e r his rule civil, military, and Holy L a w administrations could be discerned in an e m p i r e carefully divided into provinces and cantons. B u t the a p p e a r a n c e of orderly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — i n d e e d of effective administration of any s o r t — w a s chimerical. As G e r t r u d e Bell, an experienced English traveler in M i d d l e E a s t e r n lands, was later to write, " N o country which turned to the eye of the world an a p p e a r ance of established rule and centralized G o v e r n m e n t was, to a greater extent than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a land of m a k e - b e l i e v e . " T h e r e were army g a r r i s o n s , it is t r u e , scattered about the e m p i r e , but otherwise power was diffuse and the centralized authority was m o r e 2

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myth than reality. G e r t r u d e Bell, in the course of her travels, found that outside the towns, O t t o m a n administration vanished a n d the local sheikh or h e a d m a n ruled instead. T h e r e were districts, too, where b r i g a n d s r o a m e d a t will. T h e rickety T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t was even incapable of collecting its own t a x e s , the m o s t b a s i c act of imperial administration. On the eve of the F i r s t World War, only a b o u t 5 percent of taxes w a s collected by the g o v e r n m e n t ; the other 95 percent w a s collected by i n d e p e n d e n t tax f a r m e r s . 3

F o r e i g n countries exercised v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of influence a n d control within the e m p i r e . It w a s not only that E g y p t a n d C y p r u s were in fact g o v e r n e d by Britain, which had occupied them in the late nineteenth century; a n d that the s h e i k h d o m s along the G u l f coast were u n d e r British control. L e b a n o n , a s e p a r a t e canton u n d e r arr a n g e m e n t s established in 1864, w a s g o v e r n e d by a Christian military governor directly serving u n d e r the Porte which, however, w a s o b liged to act only in consultation with six E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . R u s s i a a n d F r a n c e reserved to t h e m s e l v e s the right to protect, respectively, the O r t h o d o x a n d Catholic p o p u l a t i o n s of the e m p i r e ; a n d other p o w e r s also asserted a right to intervene in T u r k i s h affairs on behalf of the g r o u p s they s p o n s o r e d . What w a s m o r e than a little unreal, then, w a s the claim that the S u l t a n a n d his g o v e r n m e n t ruled their d o m a i n s in the s e n s e in which E u r o p e a n s u n d e r s t o o d g o v e r n m e n t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . What was real in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e t e n d e d to be local: a t r i b e , a clan, a sect, or a town was the t r u e political unit to which loyalties a d h e r e d . T h i s c o n f u s e d E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s , w h o s e m o d e r n notions of citizenship a n d nationality were i n a p p l i c a b l e to the crazy quilt of O t t o m a n politics. E u r o p e a n s a s s u m e d that eventually they themselves would take control of the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s a n d organize them on a m o r e rational b a s i s . In the early years of the twentieth century it w a s reasonable to believe that the d a y s of T u r k i s h dominion were numbered. By 1914 the m u c h - d i m i n i s h e d O t t o m a n E m p i r e no longer ruled N o r t h Africa or H u n g a r y or m o s t of southeastern E u r o p e . It had been in a retreat since the eighteenth century that finally looked like a rout. F o r d e c a d e s , in the O t t o m a n a r m y a n d in the schools, discontented m e n had told one another in the course of clandestine m e e t i n g s that the e m p i r e h a d to be rapidly c h a n g e d to meet the intellectual, industrial, a n d military challenges of m o d e r n E u r o p e . S t i m u l a t e d but c o n f u s e d by the nationalism that had b e c o m e E u r o p e ' s c r e e d , intellectuals a m o n g s t the diverse T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g a n d A r a b i c speaking p e o p l e s of the e m p i r e s o u g h t to discover or to forge s o m e sense of their own political identity. In the final years before the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War, o b s c u r e but a m b i t i o u s new m e n took power in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,

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relegating the S u l t a n to a figurehead position. T h e new m e n , leaders of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, were at once the result a n d the c a u s e of ferment in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the O t t o m a n capital, as they tried to meet the challenge of b r i n g i n g T u r k e y ' s e m p i r e into the twentieth century before the m o d e r n world h a d t i m e to destroy it.

II C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — t h e city originally called B y z a n t i u m a n d today known as I s t a n b u l — w a s for m o r e than eleven centuries the capital of the R o m a n E m p i r e in the E a s t , a n d then for m o r e than four centuries the capital of its s u c c e s s o r , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . L i k e R o m e , C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s built on seven hills a n d , like R o m e , it was an eternal city: its strategic location g a v e it an a b i d i n g i m p o r t a n c e in the world's affairs. C o n s t a n t i n o p l e is a collection of towns located principally on the E u r o p e a n side of the great waterway that links the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to the Black S e a , at a point where the channel s e p a r a t i n g E u r o p e from A s i a n a r r o w s to w i d t h s of as little as a half-mile. T h e site is a natural fortress, difficult to c o n q u e r or even to attack. A b a y s o m e four miles long, known as the G o l d e n H o r n , f o r m s a magnificent natural harbor that p r o v i d e s shelter a n d protection for a defending fleet. In 1914 the p o p u l a t i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e stood at a b o u t a million. It w a s a c o s m o p o l i t a n a n d polyglot p o p u l a t i o n : most residents of the city were M o s l e m , G r e e k , or A r m e n i a n , b u t there w a s also a considerable colony of E u r o p e a n a n d other foreigners. A E u r o p e a n influence w a s evident in the architectural style of the newer b u i l d i n g s , in the style of d r e s s , a n d in s u c h innovations as street lights. R u d i m e n t a r y modernization h a d only just b e g u n . In 1912 electric lighting h a d been i n t r o d u c e d into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e for the first t i m e . A start h a d been m a d e toward c o n s t r u c t i n g a d r a i n a g e s y s t e m for the city's narrow, filthy s t r e e t s ; a n d the p a c k s of wild d o g s that for centuries had patrolled the city were, by decision of the municipal council, s h i p p e d to a waterless island to d i e . S o m e work h a d been done on the p a v i n g of r o a d s , b u t not m u c h ; m o s t streets still t u r n e d to m u d in the frequent r a i n s t o r m s , or c o u g h e d dry d u s t into the air as winds blew t h r o u g h the city. 4

5

Violent alternating north a n d south w i n d s d o m i n a t e d the city's climate, b r i n g i n g s u d d e n c h a n g e s of e x t r e m e heat or cold. T h e political climate, too, w a s s u b j e c t to s u d d e n and e x t r e m e c h a n g e s at the beginning of the twentieth century; and for m a n y years prior to 1914 British o b s e r v e r s had shown that they had no idea where the winds were c o m i n g from or which way they were blowing. Political m a n e u v e r i n g s at the S u b l i m e Porte, the g a t e to the G r a n d Vizier's

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offices from which the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t took its n a m e , were c o n d u c t e d behind a veil of mystery that the British e m b a s s y time a n d again h a d failed to penetrate.

Ill T h e British e m b a s s y , like those of the other G r e a t Powers, was located in Pera, the E u r o p e a n q u a r t e r of the city, which lay to the north of the G o l d e n H o r n . F o r e i g n c o m m u n i t i e s h a d g r o w n up in proximity to their e m b a s s i e s , a n d lived their own lives, separately f r o m that of the city. In P e r a , F r e n c h was the l a n g u a g e of legation parties a n d entertainments; G r e e k , not T u r k i s h , was the l a n g u a g e of the streets. T h r e e theaters offered revues a n d plays i m p o r t e d from Paris. T h e Pera Palace Hotel offered physical facilities c o m p a r a b l e with those available in the palatial hotels of the m a j o r cities of Europe. M o s t E u r o p e a n s s u c c u m b e d to the temptation to live in the isolation of their own enclave. F e w were at home in the narrow, dirty lanes of S t a m b o u l , the old section of the city south of the G o l d e n H o r n , with its walls a n d fortifications c r u m b l i n g into ruin. O n e of the few who felt at ease on either side of the G o l d e n H o r n was an E n g l i s h m a n n a m e d W y n d h a m D e e d e s , who h a d c o m e t o play a n important role in the new Y o u n g T u r k e y administration. D e e d e s was from a county family of K e n t : four centuries of E n g l i s h country gentlemen h a d p r e c e d e d h i m . After E t o n , he took a c o m m i s s i o n in the K i n g ' s O w n Rifles, a n d for twenty-two years thereafter he r e m a i n e d a British officer. (When asked once a b o u t the horrors of the B o e r War, he replied, "Well, anything was better than E t o n . " ) E a r l y in his military career, D e e d e s volunteered to serve in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e , a newly created T u r k i s h police force c o m m a n d e d by E u r o p e a n officers. Its creation was a reform forced u p o n the S u l t a n by the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s , for the old police force h a d b e c o m e indistinguishable from the r o b b e r b a n d s it was s u p p o s e d to s u p p r e s s . D e e d e s a n d his E u r o p e a n colleagues were c o m m i s s i o n e d as officers of the new force while, at the s a m e time, retaining their c o m m i s s i o n s in their respective national armies. 6

As viewed in old p h o t o g r a p h s , D e e d e s looked an oddity in the oriental s u r r o u n d i n g s in which service in the G e n d a r m e r i e placed h i m . S m a l l , painfully thin, a n d light-complexioned, he did not blend into the O t t o m a n l a n d s c a p e . Ascetic a n d deeply Christian, he had little use for sleep, rest, or food. He worked fifteen h o u r s a day, indifferent to comfort a n d careless of d a n g e r ; n o b o d y could have been m o r e unlike the T u r k i s h officers who, if E u r o p e a n accounts were to be believed, were in m a n y cases corrupt a n d cowardly. He

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m a d e a s u c c e s s of his challenging a s s i g n m e n t , a n d won popularity with the T u r k s . D e e d e s was an unknown figure when he entered the G e n d a r m e r i e in 1910. F o u r years later he had achieved s u c h high s t a n d i n g that he was co-opted by the leading figure in the new O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to help run the Ministry of the Interior. By the time of his thirty-first birthday in 1914, D e e d e s , who had learned to speak T u r k i s h fluently, was one of the few E n g l i s h m e n who u n d e r s t o o d T u r k i s h affairs. Y e t his g o v e r n m e n t d i d not m a k e real use of his experience a n d knowle d g e . O n e of the c o n t i n u o u s t h e m e s of the years to c o m e was that D e e d e s was a C a s s a n d r a : his g o v e r n m e n t chose to d i s r e g a r d his warnings and to ignore his accurate analyses of T u r k i s h political motives. T h e minister u n d e r w h o m D e e d e s served i n the O t t o m a n g o v e r n ment in 1914 was M e h m e d T a l a a t . M o s t of what the British government thought it knew at the time a b o u t T a l a a t a n d a b o u t the political party that T a l a a t led w a s e r r o n e o u s ; a n d at least s o m e of it could have been corrected by D e e d e s . B u t the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e believed that it knew the truth a b o u t O t t o m a n politics already, and therefore that it did not have to inquire further.

IV M e h m e d T a l a a t , the Minister of the Interior a n d the leader of the largest faction within the g o v e r n i n g political party, was a figure whom British d i p l o m a t s did not r e g a r d as a gentleman. T h e y believed that he lacked race and b r e e d i n g ; they scornfully reported that he was of g y p s y origin. He had thick black hair, heavy black eyebrows, a hawk-like nose, and what one of the few s y m p a t h e t i c British observers d e s c r i b e d as "a light in his eyes, rarely seen in m e n but s o m e t i m e s in a n i m a l s at d u s k . " 7

T a l a a t was the single m o s t i m p o r t a n t figure in T u r k i s h politics. He was very m u c h a self-made m a n . Little is known of his origins and b a c k g r o u n d except that they were h u m b l e . He b e g a n life as a minor e m p l o y e e of the Post a n d T e l e g r a p h Office a n d is believed to have been a Bektashi, that is, a m e m b e r of the largest of the T u r k i s h D e r v i s h o r d e r s . ( T h e D e r v i s h e s were M o s l e m religious b r o t h e r h o o d s . ) He is believed to have joined a F r e e m a s o n lodge, is known to have organized a secret political society, and to have been i m p r i s o n e d for a time for his u n d e r g r o u n d activities. J o i n i n g a secret organization was a c o m m o n activity in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o f T a l a a t ' s youth. U n d e r the autocratic S u l t a n A b d u l H a m i d , who reigned f r o m 1876 to 1909, open political activity was d a n g e r o u s .

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T h e S u l t a n , who s u s p e n d e d the constitution a n d d i s b a n d e d Parliament, was intolerant of dissent a n d e m p l o y e d a secret police force to deal with it. T h e political life of the e m p i r e was driven u n d e r g r o u n d , where secret societies proliferated. T h e earliest ones took their inspiration f r o m nineteenth-century E u r o p e a n revolutionary g r o u p s , especially the Italian carbonari, a n d organized themselves into cells of a handful of m e m b e r s , only one of w h o m , typically, would know a m e m b e r of another cell. M a n y of t h e m , including the forerunner of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, were f o u n d e d by university and military a c a d e m y s t u d e n t s . T h e a r m y , too, was an especially fertile b r e e d i n g g r o u n d for s u c h societies; its younger m e m b e r s were s h a m e d by their empire's d i s a s t r o u s s h o w i n g on one battlefield after another. A b d u l H a m i d ' s police forces s u c c e e d e d in s m a s h i n g the secret societies in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d elsewhere. B e y o n d their g r a s p , however, was S a l o n i k a , the b u s t l i n g a n d u n - T u r k i s h M a c e d o n i a n port in what is now G r e e c e . S a l o n i k a is where a n u m b e r of the secret societies established their h e a d q u a r t e r s , developing close relationships with m e m b e r s of the O t t o m a n T h i r d A r m y , which had its headq u a r t e r s there. T h e disorder a n d disintegration with which the T h i r d A r m y had to deal in M a c e d o n i a — a frontier region of the e m p i r e — i n itself was a formative experience that helped the secret societies to enlist recruits within the ranks of the a r m y . T a l a a t , who lived a n d worked in S a l o n i k a , was one of the founders of one s u c h secret society which eventually b e c a m e the principal faction within a m e r g e d g r o u p that called itself the C o m m i t t e e of U n i o n a n d P r o g r e s s — t h e C . U . P . as it will be called hereafter. It was known, too, as the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, and later its m e m b e r s were called the Y o u n g T u r k s . U p o n joining it, initiates swore an oath on the K o r a n a n d a g u n . D j e m a l Bey, a staff officer who later played a major role in M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics, was T a l a a t ' s initial recruit a m o n g the leadership of the T h i r d A r m y . O n e day in 1908 a junior a r m y officer n a m e d E n v e r , who was stationed in S a l o n i k a a n d who had also joined T a l a a t ' s g r o u p , was ordered to return to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Afraid that his m e m b e r s h i p had been discovered by the secret police, he s l i p p e d out of S a l o n i k a a n d took to the hills, to which another Y o u n g T u r k e y a r m y colleague had already e s c a p e d . T h e n another a r m y officer followed his e x a m p l e , taking t r o o p s a n d a m m u n i t i o n with h i m . T h e S u l t a n sent t r o o p s against t h e m , b u t the troops joined the rebels. T h e r e was a s p o n taneous c o m b u s t i o n of a bloodless revolution in S a l o n i k a : the C . U . P . took control. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s seized control o f the T e l e g r a p h Office—it m a y have been no coincidence that T a l a a t was one of its officials—and established contact with C . U . P . cells that honeyc o m b e d the a r m y a n d the e m p i r e . When the s m o k e had cleared the constitution had been restored, parliamentary and party politics had

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r e s u m e d , a n d the following year the S u l t a n a b d i c a t e d in favor of his brother. T h e old politicians took office, while the Y o u n g T u r k s r e m a i n e d in the . b a c k g r o u n d . B u t the C . U . P . had b e c o m e a force with which to reckon, a n d not merely b e c a u s e of its s t r o n g representation in the officer c o r p s of the a r m y . In a d i s o r g a n i z e d society, the strength of the C . U . P . was that it had b r a n c h e s everywhere, criss-crossing the empire. T h e leaders of the successful u p r i s i n g at first enjoyed a g o o d enough p r e s s in the western world so that in c o m m o n parlance " Y o u n g T u r k s " c a m e to m e a n any b r a s h g r o u p of y o u n g people with d y n a m i c ideas who rebel against an o u t m o d e d leadership. T h e y were viewed with s y m p a t h y by the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n , but were disliked a n d d i s d a i n e d in the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e a m b a s s a d o r , S i r G e r a r d L o w t h e r , s e e m s t o have fallen completely u n d e r the influence of G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e , his F i r s t D r a g o m a n , or official interpreter a n d adviser on oriental affairs; a n d F i t z M a u r i c e detested the C . U . P . almost f r o m the very outset. F i t z M a u r i c e ' s interpretation of the events of 1908 was colored by the fact that they had o c c u r r e d in S a l o n i k a , a b o u t half of whose 130,000 inhabitants were either J e w s or D u n m e h s ( m e m b e r s of a J e w i s h sect that had converted to I s l a m in the seventeenth c e n t u r y ) . S a l o n i k a was also a city in which there were F r e e m a s o n l o d g e s . E m m a n u e l C a r a s s o (or K a r a s u ) , a J e w i s h lawyer, h a d f o u n d e d an Italian F r e e m a s o n lodge in which he apparently allowed T a l a a t ' s secret society to meet when it was in h i d i n g from the Sultan's secret police. F i t z M a u r i c e concluded that the C . U . P . was a Latin-influenced international J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n c o n s p i r a c y ; and L o w t h e r duly reported this to the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n . L o w t h e r referred to the C . U . P . a s "the J e w C o m m i t t e e o f U n i o n and P r o g r e s s . " 8

F i t z M a u r i c e later c o n d u c t e d an investigation of the C . U . P . , the results of which were reflected in a confidential report sent by Lowther u n d e r his own n a m e on 29 M a y 1910, to the official head of the F o r e i g n Office, S i r C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e . I n his report, L o w t h e r pointed out that "liberie, egalite, fraternite" (liberty, equality, fraternity), words d r a w n f r o m the F r e n c h Revolution, were both the slogan of the Italian F r e e m a s o n s (hence K a r a s u ' s lodge) a n d of the Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t . T h e Y o u n g T u r k s , h e claimed, were "imitating the F r e n c h Revolution a n d its g o d l e s s a n d levelling m e t h o d s . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t s of the F r e n c h Revolution led to a n t a g o n i s m between E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e , a n d should the T u r k i s h revolution develop o n the s a m e lines, it m a y find itself similarly in a n t a g o n i s m with British ideals a n d i n t e r e s t s . " 9

In his detailed report of m o r e than 5,000 w o r d s , L o w t h e r alleged that J e w s had taken over a F r e e m a s o n network ( " T h e Oriental J e w

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is an a d e p t at m a n i p u l a t i n g occult forces . . . " ) a n d t h r o u g h it h a d taken control of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . A m o n g s t the ringleaders of the J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n c o n s p i r a c y , a c c o r d i n g to L o w t h e r , was the U . S . a m b a s s a d o r t o T u r k e y , O s c a r S t r a u s , whose b r o t h e r s owned the N e w Y o r k d e p a r t m e n t stores M a c y ' s and A b r a h a m & S t r a u s . T h e d a n g e r t o E n g l a n d , wrote L o w t h e r , i s that " T h e J e w hates R u s s i a a n d its G o v e r n m e n t , a n d the fact that E n g l a n d is now friendly to R u s s i a has the effect of m a k i n g the J e w to a certain extent antiBritish . . . a consideration to which the G e r m a n s are, I think, a l i v e . " I n d e e d , L o w t h e r c o n c l u d e d , "I have reason to believe that my G e r m a n colleague is aware of the extent to which J e w i s h a n d L a t i n M a s o n r y inspires the C o m m i t t e e , a n d that he has confidentially kept his G o v e r n m e n t informed as to this feature of Y o u n g T u r k e y politics." 10

11

However, when the 2 8 8 - m a n O t t o m a n Parliament was elected in 1908, only four J e w s were elected to it, a n d when the C . U . P . created a Central C o m m i t t e e in 1909, K a r a s u was not elected to m e m b e r ship on it, nor did he ever rise to a leadership position either in the party or in the g o v e r n m e n t ; he was never the influential figure that foreigners s u p p o s e d h i m t o b e . A s d e p u t i e s i n Parliament, K a r a s u a n d the three other J e w s bent over b a c k w a r d s to p r o v e that they were T u r k s f i r s t and J e w s only s e c o n d ; indeed, they s u p p o r t e d the C . U . P . ' s m e a s u r e s against Zionist settlement in Palestine. L o w t h e r explained this away by c l a i m i n g that the new goal of Z i o n i s m was to create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d not in Palestine but instead in a section of what is now I r a q . T h e F i t z M a u r i c e and L o w t h e r report won wide acceptance a m o n g British officials a n d led the British g o v e r n m e n t into at least three p r o f o u n d m i s c o n c e p t i o n s that h a d important c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e first of these concerned the inner workings of the C . U . P . F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r misled their g o v e r n m e n t into believing that the Y o u n g T u r k s were controlled by two m e n . T a l a a t a n d D j a v i d ("who is a C r y p t o - J e w " ) were, a c c o r d i n g to F i t z M a u r i c e and L o w t h e r , "the official manifestations of the occult power of the C o m m i t t e e . T h e y are the only m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t who really count, a n d are also the apex of F r e e m a s o n r y in T u r k e y . " In fact the C . U . P . was split into factions—factions with which the British g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d have intrigued, had it known that they e x i s t e d . It was an ironic coincidence that D j a v i d , w h o m F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r feared as a C r y p t o - J e w , was the leader of the pro-British faction; but F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r did not know that. 1 2

13

A second misconception was that a g r o u p of J e w s wielded political K a r a s u , however, did attempt at various times to reconcile the aims of Zionism with those of C . U . P . nationalism.

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power in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — o r indeed anywhere else in the world at that t i m e . A few y e a r s later F i t z M a u r i c e drew an o b v i o u s conclusion from his m i s c o n c e p t i o n : that the world war (in which Britain was by then e n g a g e d ) could be won by b u y i n g the s u p p o r t of this powerful g r o u p . I t s s u p p o r t c o u l d b e b o u g h t , h e d e c i d e d , b y p r o m i s ing to s u p p o r t the establishment of a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine (he h a d by then determined that the Zionist m o v e m e n t desired to return to Z i o n , not to I r a q ) . T h i s reasoning helped to p e r s u a d e the F o r e i g n Office that it o u g h t to p l e d g e British s u p p o r t to the Zionist p r o g r a m — w h i c h it eventually d i d in 1917. F i t z M a u r i c e ' s misinformation led to yet another conclusion with important c o n s e q u e n c e s : that the Y o u n g T u r k leaders were foreigners, not T u r k s , a n d that they served foreign interests. T h i s was the o p p o s i t e of the truth, a n d led British o b s e r v e r s to miscalculate what the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d d o . I n fact, a s even F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r saw, a principal failing of the C . U . P . was its T u r k i s h c h a u v i n i s m . I t d i s c r i m i n a t e d against J e w s , A r m e n i a n s , G r e e k s , A r a b s , a n d others. Its s t r e n g t h was that it was o p p o s e d to all foreign interests; its a n t i - E u r o p e a n bias attracted wide p o p u l a r support. T h e British government never learned that Lowther and FitzMaurice had s u p p l i e d it with a w a r p e d view of O t t o m a n politics. J o h n B u c h a n , who b e c a m e w a r t i m e D i r e c t o r of Information for the British g o v e r n m e n t , d e s c r i b e d the C . U . P . leaders as "a collection of J e w s a n d g i p s i e s , " p i c t u r e d the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t as the tool of world J e w r y , a n d called E n v e r P a s h a "a Polish a d v e n t u r e r " — c o n f u s i n g him with another T u r k i s h officer whose n a m e was similar a n d whose father was Polish t h o u g h not J e w i s h . 1 4

V T h e years after 1908 p r o v e d to be a disaster for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , in a war against Italy a n d in another against a Balkan coalition; a n d , in 1913, it w a s in the p r o c e s s of losing a s e c o n d Balkan War when the C . U . P . s u d d e n l y seized control o f the g o v e r n m e n t . Y o u n g E n v e r — the s a m e officer who h a d precipitated the events of 1908 in S a l o n i k a — i m p e t u o u s l y led a raid on the S u b l i m e Porte; his raiding party killed the Minister of War. E n v e r a n d his friends took office; he was p r o m o t e d to a field c o m m a n d in which he covered himself with glory, a n d on 4 J a n u a r y 1914, he took over the War M i n i s t r y for himself. T h i r t y - o n e years old, E n v e r m a r r i e d the niece of the S u l t a n , m o v e d into a p a l a c e , a n d b e c a m e the center of attention in T u r k i s h politics. D j e m a l P a s h a b e c a m e Military G o v e r n o r of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d

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in that position consolidated the C . U . P . ' s hold on the seat of government. Halil Bey, President of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s , also a s s u m e d an important role, as did M e h m e d D j a v i d , an economics teacher who was a p p o i n t e d Minister o f F i n a n c e . T a l a a t , the principal C . U . P . leader, b e c a m e Minister of the Interior and the real leader of the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e courtly Prince S a i d H a l i m provided respectability as G r a n d Vizier and F o r e i g n Minister. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t sent out a new a m b a s s a d o r , S i r L o u i s Mallet, who was s y m p a t h e t i c t o the Y o u n g T u r k s . H e too, however, was uninformed a b o u t what was h a p p e n i n g in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Where his p r e d e c e s s o r had detected J e w i s h a n d G e r m a n control, Mallet sent d i s p a t c h e s to L o n d o n that radiated a m i s l e a d i n g o p t i m i s m about the Porte's intentions. L i k e the previous a m b a s s a d o r , Mallet failed to u n d e r s t a n d what the C . U . P . leaders believed T u r k e y ' s interests to be. In L o n d o n the C a b i n e t persisted in accepting L o w t h e r a n d F i t z M a u r i c e ' s mistaken notion that the C . U . P . was a monolithic b o d y . L o w t h e r a n d F i t z M a u r i c e had reported that it was controlled by T a l a a t and D j a v i d , while a c c o r d i n g to later reports—followed by most historians—it was ruled by a dictatorial triumvirate of E n v e r , T a l a a t , a n d D j e m a l . In fact, as the G e r m a n archives now show, power was wielded by the C . U . P . ' s Central C o m m i t t e e of about forty m e m b e r s , and especially by its general directorate of a b o u t twelve m e m b e r s who functioned as a sort of politburo, in which personal rivalries a b o u n d e d . D e c i s i o n s of the Central C o m m i t t e e were reflected in the positions taken by party m e m b e r s in the C a b i n e t and in the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s . The faction nature nature

C . U . P . e n c o m p a s s e d a variety of opinions, and was rife with a n d intrigue. T h e r e was, however, a c o n s e n s u s about the of the threat that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e faced a n d about the of the policy that ought to be a d o p t e d to counter it.

4 T H E YOUNG T U R K S U R G E N T L Y S E E K AN A L L Y i T h e Y o u n g T u r k outlook o n current affairs was colored b y the t r a u m a of continuing territorial disintegration. T h e provinces of Bosnia a n d H e r c e g o v i n a (in what is now Y u g o s l a v i a ) , nominally still T u r k i s h , were formally annexed by A u s t r o - H u n g a r y in 1 9 0 8 — a troubling m o v e that p r o v i d e d the b a c k g r o u n d in 1914 to the assassination of the A r c h d u k e F r a n c i s F e r d i n a n d and the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War. Italy, a latecomer to imperial e x p a n s i o n , m a d e no secret of her d e s i g n s on O t t o m a n territory a n d , on a flimsy pretext, attacked T u r k e y and in 1911 — 12 c a p t u r e d the coast of what is now L i b y a , as well as R h o d e s a n d other islands off the T u r k i s h coast. At a b o u t the s a m e time, Albania revolted against O t t o m a n rule, raising a serious question as to whether the e m p i r e could hold the loyalties of its n o n - T u r k i s h s u b j e c t s . Meanwhile, in the F i r s t Balkan War (1912—13) the Balkan L e a g u e ( B u l g a r i a , G r e e c e , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d S e r b i a ) defeated T u r k e y and annexed almost all of the territory the O t t o m a n E m p i r e still held in E u r o p e . In the S e c o n d Balkan War ( 1 9 1 3 ) , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a n a g e d to regain s o m e territory in T h r a c e , immediately across the water from Asiatic T u r k e y ; b u t that looked to offer merely a brief respite in the empire's continuing disintegration. In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the b a n d of Y o u n g T u r k a d v e n t u r e r s who had seized power and who ruled the e m p i r e as the S u l t a n ' s ministers, feared that their d o m a i n s were in mortal d a n g e r and that the E u r o p e a n p r e d a t o r s were closing in for the kill. Only a short time before, the nations of E u r o p e had divided up the African continent a m o n g themselves. S o m e of them were now hungry for new c o n q u e s t s . T h e r e were not many directions in which they could look. M u c h of the surface of the globe was already taken: a quarter by the British E m p i r e a n d a sixth by the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . T h e western h e m i s p h e r e fell within the a m b i t of the M o n r o e Doctrine and thus was shielded by the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e M i d d l e E a s t was

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the only vulnerable region left. T h e r e were r u m o r s of F r e n c h a m bitions in S y r i a ; of Italian a n d R u s s i a n d e s i g n s further north; a n d of rival G r e e k , B u l g a r i a n , a n d A u s t r i a n claims to the west. B e y o n d the eampfires, the C . U . P . leaders c o u l d sense the a n i m a l s in the dark m o v i n g in for the attack.

II T h e C . U . P . leadership w a s convinced that its p r o g r a m o f freeing the empire from E u r o p e a n c o n t r o l — a p r o g r a m that British statesmen, a m o n g others, either did not know a b o u t or did not u n d e r s t a n d — w o u l d precipitate the attack. A m b i v a l e n t in its attitude t o w a r d E u r o p e — s c o r n i n g it as n o n - M o s l e m , while a d m i r i n g its m o d e r n ways and a c h i e v e m e n t s — t h e C . U . P . intended to throw off the shackles of E u r o p e i n order t o imitate E u r o p e m o r e closely. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s s e e m to have had no coherent plan for b r i n g i n g E u r o p e a n economic domination to an end, but they w a n t e d , s o m e h o w , to do it. A vital item on the C.LT.P.'s internal a g e n d a was the modernization of transport and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . E u r o p e a n interests were willing to s u p p l y the networks and s y s t e m s which the O t t o m a n E m p i r e lacked, but of course wanted to own them, preferably on the basis of exclusive concessions. T h e C . U . P . leaders, like other O t t o m a n leaders before them, wanted the E u r o p e a n technologies to be introduced but were determined to avoid E u r o p e a n ownership or control. D u r i n g the nineteenth century, T u r k e y h a d created her own postal service, even though it coexisted within the e m p i r e alongside postal services maintained for themselves by various E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . R e jecting an offer from a British c o m p a n y , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e also created its own telegraph n e t w o r k . A few telephones were in u s e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e and S m y r n a in 1914; a foreign g r o u p had been given a concession to install a telephone s y s t e m in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1911, but had not m a d e m u c h p r o g r e s s . 1

2

3

T h e c o m i n g of the s t e a m s h i p h a d put O t t o m a n m a r i t i m e traffic largely in the hands of foreign i n t e r e s t s . S u c h as they were, the empire's few railway lines were also in foreign h a n d s . * T h e r e were few roads and still fewer a u t o m o b i l e s to m a k e use of t h e m : 110 in Constantinople and 77 elsewhere by 1914. T h e traditional f o r m of transportation w a s the caravan of c a m e l s , horses, mules, a n d animaldrawn carts—and it could not c o m p e t e against the foreign-owned 4

"It is a measure of the iow degree of development of the Ottoman Empire that in 1914, its 1,900,000 square kilometers had only 5,991 kilometers of railways," all of it single-track. 3

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railroads. T h e usual s p e e d of a m i x e d c a r a v a n was between two a n d three miles an hour, a n d its daily s t a g e w a s only between fifteen and twenty m i l e s . R a i l r o a d s p e e d s were at least ten times greater, and the railroad cost of t r a n s p o r t i n g g o o d s was p e r h a p s only 10 percent of the caravan c o s t . T h e C . U . P . d i l e m m a lay in wanting to switch from caravan to railroad without allowing the e m p i r e to p a s s into the control of the E u r o p e a n s who owned the r a i l r o a d s . E u r o p e a n s already exercised an economic p r e p o n d e r a n c e which the C . U . P . resented b u t could d o nothing a b o u t . T u r k e y was in the u n e q u a l position of b e i n g able to s u p p l y only natural r e s o u r c e s a n d having to i m p o r t her m a n u factured needs. Industrialization was necessary in order to r e d r e s s the b a l a n c e ; but the Porte had no p r o g r a m to achieve it. T h e e m p i r e could s u p p l y only unskilled l a b o r ; as the E u r o p e a n s constructed railroads a n d other types of machinery, they b r o u g h t along E u r o peans to maintain t h e m . T e c h n i c a l training for the local population was what was n e e d e d ; again the Porte h a d no p r o g r a m to p r o v i d e it. 6

7

E u r o p e a n s also shared in the control of what is at the heart of a political entity: its finances. B e c a u s e the Porte h a d defaulted on a public d e b t of m o r e than a t h o u s a n d million dollars in 1875, the S u l t a n was o b l i g e d to issue a decree in 1881 that placed a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt in E u r o p e a n h a n d s . A council was created for the p u r p o s e a n d was given control of almost one-quarter of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s revenues. It wielded exclusive authority over the c u s t o m s duties on s u c h b a s i c items as alcoholic spirits, s t a m p s , salt, and f i s h . T h e S u b l i m e Porte was n o longer master even o f its own T r e a s u r y o r C u s t o m s H o u s e . T h e C . U . P . wanted t o take back control in these areas, t h o u g h it had no refinancing p r o g r a m to p r o p o s e . 8

Bitterly resented by all O t t o m a n leaders were the C a p i t u l a t i o n s , the concessions that p r o v i d e d E u r o p e a n s with a privileged economic position within the e m p i r e a n d which placed them for m a n y p u r p o s e s under the jurisdiction of their own consuls rather than of the O t t o m a n c o u r t s . No T u r k i s h policeman could enter the p r e m i s e s of a E u r o p e a n or A m e r i c a n without the p e r m i s s i o n of the latter's consul. T h e C . U . P . wanted t o cancel these Capitulation privileges. A n o t h e r g r o u n d for C . U . P . resentment was that the E u r o p e a n powers h a d , on occasion, violated O t t o m a n sovereignty in intervening in defense of Christian minorities a n d Christian rights. T h e E u r o p e a n disposition to do so p o s e d a threat to the C . U . P . ' s secret a g e n d a , for the Y o u n g T u r k s p r o p o s e d to assert their power not only against foreigners but also against other g r o u p s inhabiting the e m p i r e . T h i s ran contrary to what they had p l e d g e d in 1908. T h e p u b l i c p r o g r a m of the C . U . P . h a d called for equal rights for all the m a n y

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religious, ethnic, a n d linguistic g r o u p s that resided within the e m p i r e . O n c e in power the C . U . P . s h o w e d the d a r k side of its nationalism by asserting instead the h e g e m o n y of T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g M o s l e m s over all others. T h e T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g a n d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n s of the e m p i r e were roughly e q u a l — e a c h a b o u t 10 million people, or a b o u t 40 percent of the total p o p u l a t i o n apiece—yet in the O t t o m a n C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s there were p e r h a p s 150 T u r k s as against only a b o u t 60 A r a b s . ( T h e figures are not exact b e c a u s e it is not clear in every c a s e who was A r a b a n d who was T u r k . ) T h e r e m a i n i n g 2 0 percent of the population, including the important G r e e k , A r m e n i a n , K u r d i s h , a n d J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s , was discriminated against even m o r e severely than were the A r a b s . A c c o r d i n g to the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 1 9 1 0 — 1 1 ) , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at the time was inhabited by twenty-two different "races", yet "no s u c h thing as an O t t o m a n nation has ever been c r e a t e d . " If ever there were a chance of creating one, the C . U . P . leaders threw it away by excluding 60 percent of the population from its purview. T a l a a t , E n v e r , a n d their colleagues were nationalists without a nation. Within the e m p i r e (as distinct from the s t e p p e s to its e a s t ) , even those who s p o k e T u r k i s h were often of n o n - T u r k i s h origin. Sir M a r k S y k e s , a British M e m b e r of' Parliament who had traveled extensively in A s i a , b e g a n one of his b o o k s by a s k i n g : "How m a n y people realize, when they s p e a k of T u r k e y a n d the T u r k s , that there is no s u c h place a n d no s u c h p e o p l e . . . ? " T h e ancient h o m e l a n d of the T u r k i s h peoples, T u r k e s t a n , w a s in the p o s s e s s i o n of R u s s i a a n d C h i n a . M o r e than half the T u r k i s h p e o p l e s of A s i a lived either there or elsewhere outside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , so that the C z a r could lay greater claim to s p e a k for the ethnic T u r k s than could the S u l t a n . E n v e r P a s h a was later associated with the d r e a m of reuniting all the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g peoples a n d d o m a i n s of A s i a , a n d certainly the idea was familiar to him in 1914—intellectually it was in the a i r — b u t , as of then, it did not enter into his plans. A small m a n , m u c h a d d i c t e d to theatrical g e s t u r e s a n d to large p r o g r a m s that b e g a n with the prefix "pan-," E n v e r was also s u p p o s e d to harbor p a n - I s l a m i c a m b i t i o n s . H i s treatment of A r a b fellow-Moslems shows that this, too, was a slogan that he d i d not translate into policy. 9

In the view of the C . U . P . leadership, E u r o p e would not let the e m p i r e survive in any e v e n t — a n d certainly would not allow the C . U . P . to carry t h r o u g h its p r o g r a m — u n l e s s one of the G r e a t Powers could be induced to b e c o m e T u r k e y ' s protector. T h u s the search for a E u r o p e a n ally was the urgent a n d overriding item on the C . U . P . a g e n d a . D j e m a l P a s h a w a s p r o - F r e n c h , but when eventually he heard that E n v e r had p r o p o s e d an alliance with G e r m a n y , he a p p r o v i n g l y c o m m e n t e d that "I should not hesitate to accept any alliance which rescued T u r k e y f r o m her present position of i s o l a t i o n . " 10

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III All s h a d e s of opinion within the C . U . P . were in agreement that the most urgent item on T u r k e y ' s a g e n d a was to secure a powerful E u r o p e a n ally. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s believed that one o f the E u r o p e a n blocs or indeed any one of the leading G r e a t P o w e r s — B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , o r G e r m a n y — c o u l d protect the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against further e n c r o a c h m e n t s on its territory. Other than R u s s i a , the countries that were m o s t likely to invade the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were powers of lesser s t r e n g t h : Italy, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , G r e e c e , or Bulgaria. D j a v i d , the p r o - B r i t i s h C . U . P . Minister o f F i n a n c e , had already appealed to Britain. H i s a p p e a l had been m a d e in 1911, at the time of the initial Italian attack on T u r k e y . Churchill was the only senior C a b i n e t minister who had wanted to r e s p o n d positively. A r g u i n g that T u r k e y ' s friendship was m o r e i m p o r t a n t than Italy's, Churchill wrote to the F o r e i g n Secretary that T u r k e y "is the greatest land weapon wh the G e r m a n s cd use against us." At the end of 1911, when D j a v i d wrote to p r o p o s e a p e r m a n e n t alliance with Britain, Churchill wanted to s e n d an e n c o u r a g i n g reply, but the F o r e i g n Office would not agree to his d o i n g s o . Between M a y a n d J u l y 1914, with increasing urgency the C . U . P . leaders secretly a p p r o a c h e d three other E u r o p e a n G r e a t Powers in search of an a l l y . D j e m a l , the Minister of M a r i n e , who was p r o F r e n c h , m a d e overtures to F r a n c e b u t was rebuffed. T a l a a t , in desperation, a p p r o a c h e d R u s s i a — w h i c h was like asking the chief burglar to b e c o m e chief of p o l i c e — a n d his proposal, too, was rebuffed. Finally, the C . U . P . leaders conferred together at the villa of the G r a n d Vizier a n d authorized E n v e r , who had served in Berlin, to a p p r o a c h G e r m a n y with a r e q u e s t for an alliance. E n v e r m a d e his a p p r o a c h o n 2 2 J u l y 1914. H i s p r o p o s a l was turned d o w n b y H a n s von W a n g e n h e i m , G e r m a n y ' s a m b a s s a d o r i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s diplomatic isolation was c o m p l e t e ; no G r e a t Power would agree to protect it. 11

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T h e O t t o m a n War Minister was q u i t e open in explaining to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r why the Y o u n g T u r k s were seeking an ally. E n v e r explained to von W a n g e n h e i m that the domestic r e f o r m s planned by the C . U . P . could be carried out only if the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were "secured against attacks f r o m a b r o a d . " H e e x p r e s s e d his belief that the e m p i r e could be s e c u r e d against s u c h attacks only by "the s u p p o r t of one of the g r o u p s of G r e a t P o w e r s . " A p p a r e n t l y he was unable to p e r s u a d e the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e had anything of sufficient value to give in return. 1 4

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T h e g o v e r n m e n t of Britain, meanwhile, was unaware of the flurry of T u r k i s h diplomatic activity a n d d i d not realize that the Porte was

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urgently seeking a G r e a t Power alliance. A few days after the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e rejected the O t t o m a n p r o p o s a l , British ministers received their first intimation that a war crisis might arise in E u r o p e that could involve Britain. Between 23 J u l y 1914, when A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y sent an u l t i m a t u m to S e r b i a , a n d 4 A u g u s t , when Britain unexpectedly f o u n d herself at war alongside the Entente Powers ( F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a ) a n d against the Central Powers ( G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) , few thoughts were s p a r e d for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; but to the extent that they were, the c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n was that G e r m a n y m i g h t a t t e m p t to entice the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into an alliance. British leaders at the t i m e never s u s p e c t e d that it was the other way a r o u n d : that T u r k e y was seeking an alliance with G e r m a n y , a n d that G e r m a n y was reluctant to grant it. E v e n after the war was over, when it was discovered that T a l a a t a n d Enver had s o u g h t the alliance, details of how the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d G e r m a n y forged their alliance r e m a i n e d o b s c u r e . C o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d a n u m b e r of historians b l a m e d Winston Churchill, who w a s said to have driven the T u r k s into G e r m a n y ' s a r m s ; but the still-emerging evidence f r o m d i p l o m a t i c archives tells a different a n d m o r e c o m p l e x story—which b e g a n in 1914, on the eve of a s u d d e n war crisis that neither Churchill nor his C a b i n e t colleagues h a d foreseen.

5 WINSTON C H U R C H I L L ON T H E EVE OF WAR i In 1914, at the age of thirty-nine, Winston Churchill w a s a b o u t to begin his fourth year as F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y in the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t o f P r i m e Minister H e r b e r t A s q u i t h . T h o u g h h e a d m i n istered his i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t m e n t a l office ably a n d vigorously, he was not then the i m p o s i n g figure the world later c a m e to know. H i s energy a n d t a l e n t — a n d his gift for publicizing his own e x p l o i t s — h a d b r o u g h t h i m forward at an early a g e ; b u t it was largely the a m u s e d indulgence of the P r i m e Minister a n d the powerful s p o n s o r s h i p of D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , that sustained him in his governmental position. He was a decade or m o r e younger than the other m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t , a n d the opinion was wides p r e a d that he was not sufficiently steady or m a t u r e to have been entrusted with high office. He still s p o k e with the trace of a schoolboy lisp. H i s face h a d just b e g u n to lose its last hints of adolescence. Only recently h a d the belligerent tilt of the head, the b r o o d i n g scowl, a n d the thrusting cigar started to take c o m m a n d ; a n d his s a n d y hair had b e g u n to thin a bit. He h a d put on s o m e weight in recent years, b u t was not yet portly. Of r u d d y c o m p l e x i o n , m e d i u m height, a n d with a hint of r o u n d e d lines, he was physically u n p r e p o s s e s s i n g ; only with hindsight could it have been seen that he would one day a p p e a r f o r m i d a b l e . It was not his p e r s o n b u t his driving personality that fascinated those who encountered h i m . He w a s a mercurial figure, h a u n t e d by the specter of his brilliant, diseased father who h a d died a political failure at the a g e of forty-five. F e a r i n g that he, too, w o u l d die y o u n g , Churchill had shamelessly elbowed friend and foe a s i d e in his d a s h to the top in the short time that he believed still remained to h i m . S o m e s u s p e c t e d that, like his father, he w a s emotionally u n b a l a n c e d , while others r e g a r d e d h i m as merely too y o u n g . He c o m b i n e d a s p e c t s of greatness with those of childishness; b u t his colleagues recognized the childishness m o r e readily than they did the g r e a t n e s s . He was 51

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m o o d y ; he took things personally; a n d he often e m b a r k e d on lengthy tirades when instead he s h o u l d have been listening or o b s e r v i n g . T h o u g h g e n e r o u s a n d w a r m - h e a r t e d , he was not sensitive to the thoughts a n d feelings of others, a n d often was unaware of the effect p r o d u c e d by his own w o r d s a n d behavior. He was noisy; he b r o u g h t p a s s i o n into everything he u n d e r t o o k . Colleagues who a i m e d at detachment and understatement found him tiresome. He often c h a n g e d his views; a n d since he always held his views passionately, his c h a n g e s of m i n d were as violent a n d e x t r e m e as they were frequent. He h a d been a T o r y a n d now was a L i b e r a l . He h a d been the m o s t p r o - G e r m a n of ministers a n d h a d b e c o m e the m o s t a n t i - G e r m a n . He h a d been the l e a d i n g p r o - T u r k in the C a b i n e t and was t o b e c o m e the m o s t a n t i - T u r k . T o his enemies h e a p p e a r e d d a n g e r o u s l y foolish, a n d even his friends r e m a r k e d that he allowed himself to be too easily carried away. Unlike the others, he d i s d a i n e d to play it safe. He had soldiered in I n d i a , seen war in C u b a a n d the S u d a n , a n d b e c o m e a hero by e s c a p i n g from a prisoner-of-war c a m p in S o u t h Africa. T a k i n g risks had b r o u g h t him f a m e a n d h a d c a t a p u l t e d him to the top in politics. He w a s h a p p y in his m a r r i a g e a n d in his high g o v e r n m e n t office, but his t e m p e r a m e n t w a s restless: he s o u g h t worlds to c o n q u e r . T h r e e years before—in the s u m m e r o f 1911—an u n e x p e c t e d o p portunity h a d o p e n e d up for h i m to fulfill s o m e of his a m b i t i o n s . At that t i m e , d u r i n g the c o u r s e of a brief international crisis, the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had been s h o c k e d to learn that the A d m i r a l t y was not p r e p a r e d to carry out w a r t i m e m i s s i o n s in s u p p o r t of the a r m y . To their a m a z e m e n t , C a b i n e t ministers at the time were told that the Royal N a v y was u n a b l e to t r a n s p o r t a British E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e across the E n g l i s h Channel. T h e y also learned that the A d m i r a l t y was unwilling to create a N a v a l War Staff. It b e c a m e clear to A s q u i t h and his colleagues that a new F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y h a d to be a p p o i n t e d to institute basic r e f o r m s . Churchill, then H o m e S e c r e t a r y , angled for the j o b , a n d his mentor, L l o y d G e o r g e , p r o p o s e d h i m for it. Predictably, his c a n d i dacy was h a m p e r e d by his youth. At thirty-six he was already, with a solitary exception, the y o u n g e s t p e r s o n ever to serve as H o m e S e c retary; a n d his m a n y enemies, who claimed that he h a d p u s h e d himself forward with u n s e e m l y haste, a r g u e d that he had run ahead of himself. To t h e m he a p p e a r e d to p o s s e s s in excess the characteristic faults of y o u t h : obstinacy, inexperience, poor j u d g m e n t , a n d i m p u l siveness. T h e other leading contender for the position of F i r s t L o r d e x p r e s s e d w a r m a d m i r a t i o n for Churchill's energy and c o u r a g e , b u t echoed the usual accusation that the y o u n g H o m e Secretary was too apt to act first and think a f t e r w a r d . 1

F o r whatever reason, the P r i m e Minister decided to take a chance

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on C h u r c h i l l ; a n d the record of the A d m i r a l t y from the s u m m e r of 1911 to the s u m m e r of 1914 showed that he had won his wager. Inspired by L o r d F i s h e r , the retired b u t still controversial A d m i r a l of the Fleet, Churchill had t r a n s f o r m e d the coal-burning nineteenthcentury fleet into an oil-burning twentieth-century navy.

II Elected to Parliament for the first time in 1900, Churchill took his seat (in 1901) as a m e m b e r of the Conservative P a r t y : a Unionist (the term usually u s e d at this p e r i o d ) , or a C o n s e r v a t i v e , or ( u s i n g the older w o r d ) a T o r y . B u t on the bitterly d i s p u t e d issue of free t r a d e , in 1904, he c r o s s e d the floor of the H o u s e a n d joined the Liberals. As a political r e n e g a d e , Churchill was distrusted by both p a r t i e s — n o t entirely without r e a s o n , for his political instincts were never wholly at one with either of t h e m . He tended toward L i b e r a l i s m on social a n d e c o n o m i c issues, b u t on q u e s t i o n s of foreign a n d defense policy his instincts were T o r y . Churchill was belligerent by nature a n d out of s y m p a t h y with the streak of idealistic pacifism that ran through the L i b e r a l P a r t y . He inherited a g e n i u s for warfare f r o m Britain's greatest general, his ancestor the D u k e of M a r l b o r o u g h ; he had been schooled at a military a c a d e m y rather than at a university; he had served on active duty as an a r m y officer; a n d he was enthralled by the profession of a r m s . When Violet A s q u i t h , a b o a r d the Enchantress in 1912, looked out at the lovely M e d i t e r r a n e a n coastline a n d e x c l a i m e d , "How perfect!", he replied, " Y e s — r a n g e perfect—visibility p e r f e c t — I f we had got s o m e six-inch g u n s o n b o a r d how easily w e could b o m b a r d . . . " 2

As war c l o u d s s u d d e n l y g a t h e r e d over the s u m m e r t i m e skies of 1914, L i b e r a l pacifists s e e m e d to be out of touch with events while Churchill at the A d m i r a l t y s e e m e d to be the right m a n at the right place at the right t i m e .

C H U R C H I L L SEIZES T U R K E Y ' S WARSHIPS i On the outbreak of war, Winston Churchill briefly b e c a m e a national hero in Britain. A l t h o u g h the C a b i n e t had refused him p e r m i s s i o n to do s o , he had mobilized the fleet on his own responsibility in the last days of peacetime a n d had sent it north to S c a p a F l o w , where it would not be vulnerable to a G e r m a n s u r p r i s e attack. What he had done was p r o b a b l y illegal, but events had justified his actions, which in Britain were a p p l a u d e d on all s i d e s . M a r g o t A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's wife, once wondered in her diary what it w a s that m a d e Winston Churchill pre-eminent. "It certainly is not his m i n d , " she wrote. "Certainly not his j u d g m e n t — h e is constantly very w r o n g indeed . . . " S h e concluded that: "It is of c o u r s e his c o u r a g e a n d c o l o u r — h i s a m a z i n g m i x t u r e of industry a n d enterprise. He can a n d d o e s always—all w a y s p u t s himself in the pool. He never shirks, h e d g e s , or protects himself—though he thinks of himself perpetually. He takes huge risks [original e m p h a s i s ] . " 1

Mobilizing the fleet despite the Cabinet's decision not to do so was a h u g e risk that e n d e d in t r i u m p h . In the days following Britain's entry into the war even his bitterest political enemies wrote to Churchill to e x p r e s s their a d m i r a t i o n of h i m . F o r m u c h of the rest of his life, his p r o u d e s t boast was that when war c a m e , the fleet was r e a d y . At the time, his c o m m a n d e e r i n g of T u r k i s h battleships for the Royal N a v y was a p p l a u d e d almost a s m u c h . A n illustrated p a g e in the Taller of 12 A u g u s t 1914 r e p r o d u c e d a p h o t o g r a p h of a determined-looking Churchill, with an inset of his wife, u n d e r the heading " B R A V O W I N S T O N ! T h e R a p i d Mobilisation and P u r c h a s e o f the T w o F o r e i g n D r e a d n o u g h t s S p o k e V o l u m e s for your Work a n d Wisdom." 2

T h e battleships were the Reshadieh a n d the larger Sultan Osman I. B o t h h a d been built in British shipyards a n d were i m m e n s e l y p o w e r ful; the Osman m o u n t e d m o r e heavy g u n s than any battleship ever built b e f o r e . E a c h originally had been ordered by Brazil, but then 3

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had been built instead for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Reshadieh, though launched in 1913, had not been delivered b e c a u s e the T u r k s had lacked a d e q u a t e m o d e r n d o c k i n g facilities to a c c o m m o d a t e her. With Churchill's s u p p o r t , R e a r - A d m i r a l S i r A r t h u r H . L i m p u s , head of the British naval m i s s i o n , had lobbied successfully with the O t t o m a n authorities to secure the contract to build docking facilities for two British f i r m s — V i c k e r s , and A r m s t r o n g Whitworth. T h e docking facilities having been c o m p l e t e d , the Reshadieh was scheduled to leave Britain soon after the Sultan Osman I, which was to be c o m p l e t e d in A u g u s t 1914. Churchill was aware that these vessels meant a great deal to the Ottoman E m p i r e . T h e y were intended to be the m a k i n g of the m o d e r n O t t o m a n navy, a n d it was a s s u m e d that they would enable the e m p i r e to face G r e e c e in the A e g e a n and R u s s i a in the Black S e a . T h e i r p u r c h a s e had been m a d e p o s s i b l e b y patriotic public s u b s c r i p tion throughout the e m p i r e . T h e tales m a y have been i m p r o v e d in the telling, b u t it was said that w o m e n had sold their jewelry a n d schoolchildren had given up their pocket-money to contribute to the popular s u b s c r i p t i o n . A d m i r a l L i m p u s had put out to sea from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 27 J u l y 1914, with ships of the T u r k i s h navy, waiting to greet the Sultan Osman I a n d escort her back t h r o u g h the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s to the O t t o m a n capital, where a "navy week" had been s c h e d u l e d with lavish ceremonies for the Minister of M a r i n e , A h m e d D j e m a l , and for the cause of B r i t i s h - O t t o m a n friendship. 4

Churchill, who was reckoned the m o s t p r o - T u r k m e m b e r of the A s q u i t h C a b i n e t , had followed with care, a n d had s u p p o r t e d with e n t h u s i a s m , the m i s s i o n of A d m i r a l L i m p u s in T u r k e y ever since its inception years before. T h e British advisory mission to the O t t o m a n navy was a l m o s t as large as the similar G e r m a n mission to the O t t o m a n a r m y , led by the P r u s s i a n G e n e r a l of Cavalry, O t t o L i m a n von S a n d e r s . T h e two m i s s i o n s t o s o m e extent c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e d each other. British influence was thought to be strong in the M a r i n e Ministry. G e r m a n influence was strongest in the War Ministry. In L o n d o n little was known of M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics, but Churchill enjoyed the rare a d v a n t a g e of having personally met three of the five leading figures in the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t : T a l a a t , E n v e r , and the Minister of F i n a n c e , D j a v i d . He therefore had been given an o p p o r tunity to learn that Britain's conduct as naval s u p p l i e r a n d adviser could have political repercussions in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e E u r o p e a n war crisis, however, propelled the newly built T u r k i s h vessels into significance in both L o n d o n a n d Berlin. T h e Reshadieh a n d Sultan Osman I were battleships of the new D r e a d n o u g h t class. As s u c h , they o v e r s h a d o w e d other surface vessels a n d , in a sense, r e n d e r e d them obsolete. By the s u m m e r of 1914 the

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R o y a l N a v y h a d taken delivery of only e n o u g h to give B r i t a i n a m a r gin over G e r m a n y o f seven D r e a d n o u g h t s . S i n c e the E u r o p e a n war was e x p e c t e d to be a s h o r t one, there s e e m e d to be no t i m e to b u i l d m o r e o f t h e m before battle was j o i n e d a n d d e c i d e d . T h e a d d i t i o n o f the two D r e a d n o u g h t s built for T u r k e y w o u l d increase the p o w e r of the R o y a l N a v y significantly. Conversely, their a c q u i s i t i o n by the G e r m a n E m p i r e or its allies c o u l d decisively shift the b a l a n c e of forces a g a i n s t Britain. It was not fanciful to s u p p o s e that the Reshadieh a n d Sultan Osman I c o u l d p l a y a material role in d e t e r m i n ing the o u t c o m e of what was to b e c o m e the F i r s t World War. E a r l y in the week of 27 J u l y 1914, as the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y took precautionary m e a s u r e s in the war crisis, he raised the issue of whether the two T u r k i s h battleships could be taken by the Royal N a v y . T h e chain of events which apparently flowed from Churchill's initiative in this matter eventually led to him being b l a m e d for the tragic outbreak of war in the M i d d l e E a s t . In turn he later a t t e m p t e d to defend himself by p r e t e n d i n g that he had done no m o r e than to carry into effect s t a n d i n g o r d e r s . T h e history of these matters has been confused ever since b e c a u s e both Churchill's story a n d the story told by his detractors were false. A c c o r d i n g to Churchill's history of the F i r s t World War, British contingency p l a n s a d o p t e d in 1912 provided for the taking of all foreign warships b e i n g built in British yards in the event that war should ever occur. When the war broke out in 1914, w a r s h i p s were being built in British yards for T u r k e y , Chile, G r e e c e , Brazil, and H o l l a n d . A c c o r d i n g to Churchill, he d i d nothing m o r e than follow the regulations a d o p t e d in 1912. H i s version of the matter implied that he did not single out the O t t o m a n vessels, but instead issued orders applicable to all foreign w a r s h i p s then under construction; he wrote that the a r r a n g e m e n t s for the taking of such vessels "comprised an elaborate s c h e m e " that had been devised years before a n d had been b r o u g h t up to date in 1 9 1 2 . s

T h i s account was not t r u e . S e i z i n g the T u r k i s h warships was an original idea of Churchill's a n d it c a m e to him in the s u m m e r of 1914. D u r i n g the week before the war, the question of taking foreign vessels was raised for the first time on T u e s d a y , 28 J u l y 1914, in an inquiry that Churchill directed to the F i r s t S e a L o r d , Prince L o u i s o f B a t t e n b e r g , a n d t o the T h i r d S e a L o r d , S i r A r c h i b a l d M o o r e . "In case it m a y b e c o m e necessary to acquire the 2 T u r k i s h battleships that are nearing completion in British y a r d s , " he wrote, "please formulate p l a n s in detail s h o w i n g exactly the administrative action involved in their acquisition a n d the p r o s p e c t i v e financial transactions." 6

A d m i r a l M o o r e looked into the matter, and found no administrative

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or legal p r o c e d u r e that would justify seizing the T u r k i s h s h i p s . He consulted one of the legal officers of the F o r e i g n Office, who told him that there was no precedent for taking any s u c h action. T h e F o r e i g n Office lawyer said that if Britain were at war it could be a r g u e d that national interests take precedence over legal rights, b u t that since Britain was not at war it w o u l d be illegal for Churchill to take the foreign-owned vessels. T h e lawyer advised the A d m i r a l t y that, if it really needed the s h i p s , it s h o u l d try to p e r s u a d e the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to sell t h e m . 7

T h e T u r k s s u s p e c t e d what Churchill had in m i n d , for on 29 J u l y the F o r e i g n Office warned the A d m i r a l t y that the Sultan Osman I was taking on fuel a n d was u n d e r o r d e r s to depart for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e immediately, even t h o u g h u n f i n i s h e d . Churchill immediately ordered the b u i l d e r s of both battleships to detain t h e m . He also ordered British security forces to g u a r d the vessels and to prevent T u r k i s h crews from b o a r d i n g them or from raising the O t t o m a n flag over them (which w o u l d have converted them, u n d e r prevailing international law, into O t t o m a n territory). 8

T h e following day the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l advised Churchill that what he was d o i n g was not justified by statute, but that the welfare of the C o m m o n w e a l t h took precedence over other considerations and might e x c u s e his temporarily detaining the v e s s e l s . A high-ranking p e r m a n e n t official in the F o r e i g n Office took the s a m e point of view that day b u t p l a c e d it in a b r o a d e r a n d m o r e practical political perspective. "I think we m u s t let the A d m i r a l t y deal with this q u e s tion as they consider n e c e s s a r y , " he m i n u t e d , "and afterwards m a k e such defence of our action to T u r k e y as we c a n . " 9

1 0

On 31 J u l y the C a b i n e t accepted Churchill's view that he o u g h t to take both T u r k i s h vessels for the Royal N a v y for possible use against G e r m a n y in the event of war; w h e r e u p o n British sailors b o a r d e d the Sultan Osman I. T h e O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r called at the F o r e i g n Office to ask for an explanation, b u t was told only that the battleship was being detained for the time b e i n g . T o w a r d m i d n i g h t on 1 A u g u s t Churchill wrote instructions to A d m i r a l M o o r e , in connection with the mobilization of the fleet, to notify both Vickers a n d A r m s t r o n g that the O t t o m a n w a r s h i p s were to be detained a n d that the A d m i r a l t y p r o p o s e d to enter into negotiations for their p u r c h a s e . F o r the first time Churchill noted that w a r s h i p s were also being built in British s h i p y a r d s for countries other than T u r k e y . A d m i r a l M o o r e had b r o u g h t this to the F i r s t L o r d ' s attention several d a y s before, but Churchill had not r e s p o n d e d ; n o w — a l t h o u g h the other 1 1

1 2

* T h i s opinion was rendered a week before, the outbreak of war between Britain and Germany.

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foreign vessels were not of equal i m p o r t a n c e — h e ordered them to be detained, too, for completion and eventual p u r c h a s e . On 3 A u g u s t the A d m i r a l t y entered into a r r a n g e m e n t s with A r m s t r o n g for taking the Sultan Osman I into the Royal N a v y i m m e d i a t e l y . T h a t evening the F o r e i g n Office cabled the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with instructions to inform the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t that Britain desired to have the contract for the p u r c h a s e of the Osman transferred to H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t . T h e following day Sir E d w a r d G r e y sent a further cable to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , saying that he was s u r e the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t would u n d e r s t a n d Britain's position, a n d that "financial & other loss to T u r k e y will receive all d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " 13

1 4

15

A key, but overlooked, point is that the O t t o m a n government did not learn for the first time of Churchill's seizure of the battleship when officially informed of it in the 3 A u g u s t cable. T h e T u r k s knew that the battleships were b e i n g taken on 31 J u l y , and on or before 29 J u l y strongly s u s p e c t e d that they were g o i n g to be taken. T h e significance of these dates will b e c o m e clear presently.

II In Berlin the onset of the war crisis on 23 J u l y led to s o m e second t h o u g h t s a b o u t the value of T u r k e y as an ally. On 24 J u l y 1914, K a i s e r Wilhelm II personally overruled the negative decision of his a m b a s s a d o r to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d ordered that Enver's offer of an alliance should be e x p l o r e d . An Austrian u l t i m a t u m to S e r b i a — t h e u l t i m a t u m that initiated the war crisis in E u r o p e — h a d been delivered the previous evening, a n d the K a i s e r decided that "at the present m o m e n t " O t t o m a n interest in contracting an alliance should be taken a d v a n t a g e of "for reasons of e x p e d i e n c y . " ' Secret talks b e g a n at once in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . On the O t t o m a n side, the negotiators were Prince S a i d H a l i m , the G r a n d Vizier and F o r e i g n Minister; T a l a a t Bey, Minister of the Interior; and E n v e r P a s h a , Minister of War. A l t h o u g h E n v e r had told the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r that a majority of the m e m b e r s of the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e were in favor of an alliance with G e r m a n y , the three O t t o m a n leaders kept their negotiations secret from the Central C o m m i t t e e and even from their powerful colleague D j e m a l Pasha, Minister of the M a r i n e . On 28 J u l y the O t t o m a n leaders forwarded their draft of a p r o p o s e d treaty of alliance to Berlin. D e s p i t e the K a i s e r ' s views, the G e r m a n Prime Minister, Chancellor T h e o b a l d von B e t h m a n n Hollweg, remained unenthusiastic a b o u t the potential entanglement. On 31 J u l y , the day the G e n e r a l Staff told him to issue the order to go to war, 6

1 7

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B e t h m a n n H o l l w e g sent a wire to his a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , instructing him not to sign a treaty of alliance with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e u n l e s s he w a s certain that " T u r k e y either can or will undertake s o m e action against R u s s i a worthy of the n a m e . " A u g u s t 1 w a s the crucial day in the negotiations. D e t a i l s of what was said in the c o u r s e of the b a r g a i n i n g are still not known. On the G e r m a n side, von W a n g e n h e i m w a s o p e r a t i n g under direct instructions from the head of his g o v e r n m e n t : the Chancellor in Berlin had m a d e it quite clear that the O t t o m a n p r o p o s a l s h o u l d be rejected unless the T u r k s h a d s o m e t h i n g u n e x p e c t e d l y significant to contribute to the G e r m a n c a u s e in the war. In fact, the T u r k s did not want to join in the fighting at all. As later events were to show, the G r a n d Vizier a n d his associates h o p e d that they would not be d r a g g e d into the war. T h u s on the face of it they h a d little to offer. Yet by the end of the day the three Y o u n g T u r k s had w r u n g an alliance agreement from the G e r m a n s , which both s i d e s s i g n e d the following afternoon. 1 8

N o t merely h a d the negotiations been conducted in secret, b u t Article 8 of the treaty p r o v i d e d that the agreement should continue to be kept secret. Article 4 was what the C . U . P . leaders had chiefly s o u g h t : " G e r m a n y obligates itself, by force of a r m s if need b e , to defend O t t o m a n territory in c a s e it should be t h r e a t e n e d . " G e r m a n y ' s obligation was a c o n t i n u i n g one for the length of the treaty, which w a s s c h e d u l e d to expire on 31 D e c e m b e r 1918. 19

T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n turn u n d e r t o o k t o o b s e r v e strict neutrality in the then current conflict between S e r b i a and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and to go to war only if G e r m a n y were r e q u i r e d to enter the fighting by the t e r m s of her treaty with A u s t r i a . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d in s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s only, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e p l e d g e d that it too would intervene, a n d w o u l d allow the G e r m a n military m i s s i o n in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to exercise "effective influence" over the c o n d u c t of its a r m i e s . T h e day after the treaty w a s s i g n e d , the Porte ordered general mobilization to b e g i n , b u t also p r o c l a i m e d neutrality in the E u r o p e a n conflict. T h e treaty r e m a i n e d a s e c r e t ; and E n v e r a n d his coc o n s p i r a t o r s c l a i m e d that the p r o g r a m of mobilization was not directed against the Allied P o w e r s . T h e O t t o m a n leaders went out of their way in conversations with Allied representatives to stress the possibility of friendly relationships, a n d E n v e r went so far as to s u g g e s t that T u r k e y m i g h t join the Allies.

* T h e treaty was signed the day after Germany had declared war on Russia. Germany had not been required to declare war by the terms of her treaty with Austria; as it happened, Germany declared war several days before Austria-Hungary did. T h e oddly drawn treaty with the Ottoman Empire therefore did not—if read literally—obligate the Turks to enter the war.

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Berlin, hitherto skeptical of what the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could contribute, now b e c a m e a n x i o u s to obtain T u r k i s h a s s i s t a n c e . On 5 A u g u s t the Chief of the G e r m a n General Staff, who only weeks before had said that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at G e r m a n y ' s side w o u l d not be an "asset," b e g a n to p r e s s for T u r k i s h aid against Britain as well as R u s s i a ; b u t the T u r k s refused to be hurried into taking action. Indeed the lack of transportation facilities m a d e it i m p o s s i b l e for the e m p i r e to mobilize swiftly. 2 0

T h e a r m y had been g u i d e d for several years by a G e r m a n military m i s s i o n , s o the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r p r e s u m a b l y had been i n f o r m e d that it would be physically i m p o s s i b l e for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to enter the war until the late a u t u m n or the winter. S i n c e a l m o s t everybody's a s s u m p t i o n on 1 A u g u s t was that the war would be over within a few m o n t h s , von W a n g e n h e i m had g r a n t e d the Y o u n g T u r k s an alliance even t h o u g h he m u s t have believed that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would not be r e a d y to fight until the war was a l m o s t over. Y e t his instructions from Berlin were that he s h o u l d not conclude an alliance unless the Y o u n g T u r k s could p r o v e to him that they had s o m e t h i n g meaningful to contribute to the G e r m a n war effort. What was that "something meaningful"? T h e c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n o f historians s e e m s t o b e that the T u r k s offered nothing new that d a y — t h a t , in effect, von W a n g e n h e i m ignored his instructions f r o m Berlin. If s o , he m a y have been seeking to please the K a i s e r ; or it m a y be that the threatened o u t b r e a k of a general E u r o p e a n war led h i m to view the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as m o r e significant militarily than he had believed ten d a y s before. If, however, von Wangenheim did a t t e m p t to follow the instructions he had received from Berlin, then the q u e s t i o n which historians have not asked b e c o m e s intriguing: what d i d E n v e r offer G e r m a n y on 1 A u g u s t that was so i m p o r t a n t that the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r c h a n g e d his m i n d and agreed that, in return, G e r m a n y would protect the O t t o m a n Empire?

Ill A couple of d e c a d e s a g o , a c u r i o u s fact c a m e to light. A student of the G e r m a n diplomatic archives disclosed that they showed that on 1 A u g u s t 1914 E n v e r and T a l a a t , in a meeting with A m b a s s a d o r von W a n g e n h e i m , s u d d e n l y offered to t u r n over to G e r m a n y one of the m o s t powerful w a r s h i p s in the world: the Sultan Osman. Von W a n g e n h e i m a c c e p t e d the offer; a n d B r i t i s h Intelligence r e p o r t s from behind G e r m a n lines two weeks later showed that officers of the G e r m a n fleet had eagerly e x p e c t e d to receive the vitally important 21

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new w a r s h i p — a n d a p p a r e n t l y were bitterly d i s a p p o i n t e d when Churchill seized the vessel i n s t e a d . H i s t o r i a n s have not e x a m i n e d this e p i s o d e in any great detail, p o s s i b l y b e c a u s e on the s u r f a c e it s e e m s so difficult to explain. E n v e r a n d T a l a a t could not p o s s i b l y have intended to give away T u r k e y ' s prize battleship, in which the p o p u l a c e had invested so m u c h emotion as well as money; a n d in which the e m p i r e took s u c h p r i d e ; it would have been political suicide for any O t t o m a n leader to even p r o p o s e to do s o . Y e t the evidence cannot be d i s p u t e d ; in secret, they m a d e von W a n g e n h e i m the offer. In another connection, s o m e twenty years ago a student of the O t t o m a n archives m e n t i o n e d , in p a s s i n g , a conversation that might p r o v i d e a n explanation. O n the s a m e d a y that E n v e r a n d T a l a a t m a d e their offer to G e r m a n y — 1 A u g u s t 1 9 1 4 — E n v e r revealed to fellow Y o u n g T u r k leaders that Britain had seized the Osman. T h u s on 1 A u g u s t he already knew! I n d e e d — s i n c e it is now known that, in L o n d o n , the T u r k s s u s p e c t e d on 29 J u l y that Churchill was a b o u t to seize the Osman, and on 31 J u l y protested that he had already d o n e s o — i t is entirely p o s s i b l e that even before 1 A u g u s t Enver knew that the battleship had b e e n taken by B r i t a i n . 2 2

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M i g h t this not p r o v i d e the answer to an earlier question? V o n W a n g e n h e i m was not s u p p o s e d to g r a n t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e an alliance unless the T u r k s could show that they would m a k e a material contribution to the defeat of the Allies. B u t nonetheless he a g r e e d to an alliance on 1 A u g u s t , when the week before he had not believed that the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces could m a k e s u c h a contribution. Was not the offer of the Osman on 1 A u g u s t , therefore, the material contribution that b o u g h t E n v e r a n d T a l a a t their G e r m a n alliance? If E n v e r a n d T a l a a t knew before m a k i n g their secret offer that they had already lost the Osman to B r i t a i n — t h a t it was therefore no longer theirs to d i s p o s e of—they could have m a d e the offer; they could have m a d e it with impunity. In fact the G e r m a n s never discovered that they had been d u p e d . T h e y s e e m to have a s s u m e d that E n v e r a n d T a l a a t meant to keep their side of the b a r g a i n , a n d only learned they could not do so when they received official notification of Churchill's action several d a y s later—after G e r m a n y h a d already signed a p l e d g e to protect the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against its enemies, largely in return (it is s p e c u l a t e d here) for E n v e r ' s a n d T a l a a t ' s worthless p r o m i s e .

7 AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E S U B L I M E PORTE i In the c o u r s e of the secret negotiations between G e r m a n y and the Y o u n g T u r k s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 1 A u g u s t , E n v e r , the Minister of War, held a private meeting in the G e r m a n e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n tinople with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , H a n s von W a n g e n h e i m , and with the head of the G e r m a n military mission, Otto L i m a n von S a n d e r s . T h e three m e n d i s c u s s e d the form that military collaboration between their countries m i g h t take if T u r k e y a n d B u l g a r i a should contract with each other to join in a war against R u s s i a on G e r m a n y ' s side. It s e e m e d to t h e m that naval m a s t e r y was essential if a successful c a m p a i g n were to be m o u n t e d . T h e y concluded that the G e r m a n M e d i t e r r a n e a n fleet, consisting of the powerful Goeben and its sister s h i p , the Breslau, s h o u l d c o m e to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to strengthen the O t t o m a n fleet in the Black S e a so as to give the T u r k i s h - B u l g a r i a n armies a free hand in invading R u s s i a . Significantly, none of the three m e n a p p e a r s to have believed that the Osman might be available to fulfill that function. P r e s u m a b l y E n v e r already knew that he had lost the battleship to B r i t a i n ; while the G e r m a n s believed that the v e s s e l — u n d e r orders from E n v e r — w a s g o i n g to join the G e r m a n fleet at a N o r t h S e a port, so that the Goeben a n d the Breslau, which already were in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , could m o r e conveniently c o m e t o C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . 1

After the conference, L i m a n a n d von Wangenheim r e q u e s t e d their g o v e r n m e n t to send the G e r m a n s h i p s to T u r k e y . On 3 A u g u s t the G e r m a n A d m i r a l t y d i s p a t c h e d o r d e r s to that effect to R e a r - A d m i r a l Wilhelm S o u c h o n , c o m m a n d e r o f the Mediterranean S q u a d r o n . T h e wireless m e s s a g e reached S o u c h o n in the early m o r n i n g of 4 A u g u s t , when he was close to the coast of Algeria where he intended to disrupt the flow of t r o o p s f r o m F r e n c h N o r t h Africa to the m a i n l a n d of F r a n c e . D e c i d i n g not to turn back immediately, S o u c h o n first shelled two port cities of Algeria, a n d only then t u r n e d back to refuel in the neutral Italian port of M e s s i n a in Sicily, where G e r m a n 62

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coaling-stations awaited him. S l o w e d d o w n by defective boilers on the Goeben, the s q u a d r o n did not reach M e s s i n a until the m o r n i n g of 5 August. At his refueling s t o p , S o u c h o n received a telegram from Berlin apparently c h a n g i n g his o r d e r s again. E n v e r had not consulted his colleagues before inviting the G e r m a n warships to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ; they were by no m e a n s a n x i o u s to be drawn into the fighting, and when the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t learned that the s h i p s were en route, it warned Berlin not to let t h e m c o m e . Berlin cabled S o u c h o n that his call on the O t t o m a n capital was "not possible"; b u t S o u c h o n chose to interpret this merely as a w a r n i n g rather than as an order, and determined to p r o c e e d to T u r k e y to force the i s s u e . T h i s personal decision of the G e r m a n admiral was a turning point in events. Meanwhile, the British, w h o m Churchill had o r d e r e d to s h a d o w the Goeben, had lost sight of her u n d e r cover of night on 4 A u g u s t ; but on the 5th s h e was sighted again, a n d the c o m m a n d i n g E n g l i s h admiral positioned his naval s q u a d r o n to intercept her when she should c o m e out of the straits of M e s s i n a after refueling. He placed his s q u a d r o n west of Sicily, to meet her as she returned to attack N o r t h Africa again, which is what he s u p p o s e d she would d o . A m u c h smaller force was already stationed in the Adriatic S e a , far to the northeast, to block her s h o u l d she attempt to return to her h o m e port of Pola (in what "was then A u s t r i a , b u t is now Y u g o s l a v i a ) . On the British side there was as m a s s i v e a failure of political imagination in L o n d o n , as there was of military c o m p e t e n c e at sea. It s e e m s never to have occurred to the F o r e i g n Office, the War Office, or the A d m i r a l t y that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ought to figure in strategic calculations. Neither in L o n d o n nor in the field did anybody in c o m m a n d consider the possibility that A d m i r a l S o u c h o n might be h e a d e d toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e y a s s u m e d that when he h e a d e d east it was in order to elude them a n d d o u b l e back t o w a r d the west. When the Goeben and her sister s h i p , the Breslau, e m e r g e d from the straits of M e s s i n a on 6 A u g u s t , A d m i r a l S o u c h o n expected to find his way blocked by a superior British force. Instead he found the way clear, a n d set his c o u r s e toward the A e g e a n . "It was all the A d m i r a l s ' fault," the P r i m e Minister's daughter later told Churchill. "Who but an A d m i r a l would not have p u t a battle-cruiser at both e n d s of the M e s s i n a S t r a i t s , instead of p u t t i n g two at one end a n d none at the o t h e r ? " S h e advised him to retire all his a d m i r a l s a n d p r o m o t e captains in their place. S o u c h o n did encounter a British naval contingent as he s t e a m e d eastward, but it withdrew rather than risk battle with the formidable Goeben. After p r o d i g i e s of exertion on the part of the G e r m a n s , a n d of b l u n d e r i n g on the part of the E n g l i s h p u r s u e r s , S o u c h o n ' s force arrived at the entrance to the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s . 2

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II At 1:00 in the m o r n i n g on 6 A u g u s t , the G r a n d Vizier d i s c u s s e d the fate of the Goeben a n d Breslau with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r . T h e British M e d i t e r r a n e a n S q u a d r o n was following close behind the two G e r m a n s h i p s , so that if T u r k e y refused t h e m admittance to the straits, they would be t r a p p e d between the T u r k i s h forts in front of them a n d the British s q u a d r o n behind t h e m . T h e G r a n d Vizier, S a i d H a l i m , a n n o u n c e d that his g o v e r n m e n t had decided to allow the G e r m a n ships to enter the straits so that they could m a k e g o o d their e s c a p e . B u t , he said, conditions were attached to this p e r m i s s i o n ; a n d when he a n n o u n c e d what they were, it b e c a m e clear that his t e r m s were s t e e p . T h e y showed t h a t — c o n t r a r y to what British observers believed—the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t intended t o escape domination by the G e r m a n s , as well as other E u r o p e a n s . T h e Porte d e m a n d e d that G e r m a n y accept six far-reaching p r o p o s a l s , the first of which was high on the list of C . U . P . priorities—abolition of the C a p i t u l a t i o n s , a n d thus of privileges hitherto a c c o r d e d to the G e r m a n s a n d other E u r o p e a n s . Other p r o p o s a l s guaranteed T u r k e y a share of the spoils of victory if G e r m a n y won the war. F r o m a G e r m a n point of view these p r o p o s a l s were o u t r a g e o u s , b u t unless von W a n g e n h e i m wanted to a b a n d o n the Goeben a n d Breslau to the long-range g u n s of the British navy, he had no choice b u t to a g r e e . T h e T u r k s had h i m a t g u n point. At the A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n , T u r k e y ' s decision to admit the G e r m a n w a r s h i p s looked like collusion between Constantinople and Berlin. Churchill a n d his colleagues had no idea that what really was going on was extortion; a n d Churchill angrily d a s h e d off a telegram to his forces ordering them to institute a blockade of the D a r d a n e l l e s . He had no authority to issue s u c h an order on his own a n d , had the order been carried out, it could have been c o n s t r u e d in Constantinople as an act of war. In reply to a request for clarification, the A d m i r a l t y cabled back that there had been a "mistake in wording" a n d "no blockade i n t e n d e d . " Instead the British ships were to wait in international waters for the G e r m a n s h i p s to c o m e out. 3

4

Britain protested to the S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t that under accepted conventions of international law T u r k e y , as a neutral, was obliged either to send the G e r m a n s h i p s b a c k out or to intern t h e m . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t did neither. I n s t e a d , the legal situation p r o m p t e d the Porte to extract further concessions from the G e r m a n s . V o n W a n g e n h e i m h a d barely recovered from the extortionate d e m a n d s of 6 A u g u s t when, on 9 A u g u s t , the G r a n d Vizier had m o r e news for the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r . S a i d H a l i m a n n o u n c e d that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e might join with G r e e c e a n d R u m a n i a in a public pact of neutrality in the E u r o p e a n conflict. If s o , s o m e t h i n g would

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have to be done a b o u t the continuing presence of the Goeben a n d the Breslau in T u r k i s h waters so as not to c o m p r o m i s e T u r k i s h neutrality. T h e Porte p r o p o s e d a fictitious p u r c h a s e of the two w a r s h i p s : the T u r k s w o u l d take over ownership of the vessels, and w o u l d pretend to have p a i d for t h e m . In that way there could be no objection to the s h i p s r e m a i n i n g in T u r k e y ; there w o u l d be no breaching of the laws of neutrality. On 10 A u g u s t the G e r m a n Chancellor cabled von W a n g e n h e i m from Berlin rejecting this T u r k i s h p r o p o s a l a n d u r g i n g i m m e d i a t e T u r k i s h entry into the war. T h e Y o u n g T u r k leaders, however, were reluctant to involve the e m p i r e in the E u r o p e a n conflict. Von Wangenheim was s u m m o n e d that day to the S u b l i m e Porte, where the G r a n d Vizier angrily r e p r o a c h e d him for the p r e m a t u r e arrival of the Goeben a n d the Breslau. I g n o r i n g his own government's c o m plicity in the affair of the G e r m a n w a r s h i p s , S a i d H a l i m repeated his p r o p o s a l that the ships should be transferred to T u r k i s h o w n e r s h i p . Von W a n g e n h e i m refused the p r o p o s a l . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t h e r e u p o n unilaterally issued a public declaration falsely claiming that it had b o u g h t the two G e r m a n cruisers a n d had p a i d eighty million m a r k s for them. Public opinion t h r o u g h o u t the e m p i r e was elated, a n d on 14 A u g u s t a frustrated von W a n g e n h e i m a d v i s e d Berlin that there w a s no choice b u t to go along with the "sale"; to d i s a v o w it risked turning local sentiment violently a r o u n d against the G e r m a n c a u s e . H i s advice was heeded, a n d at a ceremony on 16 A u g u s t the Minister of the M a r i n e , D j e m a l P a s h a , formally received the vessels into the O t t o m a n navy. T h e T u r k s did not have the trained officers and crews that were needed to operate a n d maintain s u c h sophisticated vessels, a n d d e cided that, for the time being, the G e r m a n s should do it for t h e m . A d m i r a l S o u c h o n was a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r of the O t t o m a n Black S e a Fleet, while his sailors were given fezzes a n d O t t o m a n u n i f o r m s , and went t h r o u g h the f o r m s of enlisting in the S u l t a n ' s n a v y . In L o n d o n the entire e p i s o d e was viewed as a calculated G e r m a n m a n e u v e r d e s i g n e d to show that G e r m a n y was generously restoring to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e the type of m o d e r n warships that Churchill had wrongfully taken a w a y ; a n d , even today, historians continue to repeat that account of the affair. 5

It was little m o r e than a week since angry schoolchildren had p o u r e d into the streets of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to protest at Churchill's seizure of the battleships that had been p u r c h a s e d with their m o n e y . British g o v e r n m e n t leaders were certain that there was a connection between the two events. T h e P r i m e Minister's c o m m e n t a b o u t T u r k e y ' s " p u r c h a s e " of the G e r m a n s h i p s was that " T h e T u r k s are very a n g r y — n o t u n n a t u r a l l y — a t Winston's seizure of their battleships here." 6

7

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P r i m e Minister noted that "Winston, in his m o s t bellicose m o o d all for s e n d i n g a t o r p e d o flotilla thro' the D a r d a n e l l e s — t o threaten & if necessary to sink the Goeben & her c o n s o r t . " C a b i n e t opinion, however, was swayed by the views of the Secretary of S t a t e for War and the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , who a r g u e d that it w o u l d be d a m a g i n g for Britain to a p p e a r to be the a g g r e s s o r against the Ottoman Empire. It a p p e a r e d , however, that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was m o v i n g toward the e n e m y c a m p , and the plausible explanation c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d in L o n d o n was that it was Churchill's seizure of the T u r k i s h battleships which had c a u s e d that to h a p p e n . W y n d h a m D e e d e s , who had returned from T u r k e y to E n g l a n d in a daring journey via Berlin, went to see his friend, the O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r , in L o n d o n a n d discovered that, in fact, that explanation was u n t r u e : the battleships were not at the heart of the p r o b l e m . Of course the Porte was u p s e t a b o u t the seizure of the s h i p s , b u t would not change its p r o - G e r m a n policy even if the ships were r e t u r n e d . 8

F e a r of R u s s i a n e x p a n s i o n i s m w a s at the heart of the Porte's policy. T h e T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r told D e e d e s that if the Allies won the war, they would c a u s e or allow the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to be partitioned, while if G e r m a n y won the war, no s u c h partition would be allowed to o c c u r . T h a t was why the Porte had b e c o m e proG e r m a n . D e e d e s denied that the Allies would allow the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to be partitioned, b u t the a m b a s s a d o r had been told by E n v e r that the Allied Powers had given similar a s s u r a n c e s years before but had not kept their w o r d . ( E n v e r did not mention that, in addition, G e r m a n y had given a written g u a r a n t e e to protect O t t o m a n territory. He a n d his colleagues continued to keep their treaty of alliance with G e r m a n y a secret, and its existence was not revealed until m a n y years later.) 9

D e e d e s was a l a r m e d by his conversation with the T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r , a n d warned the new British War Minister, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , that T u r k e y w a s drifting into the enemy c a m p b e c a u s e of her fears of Allied intentions. S i n c e Britain had allied herself with R u s s i a — R u s s i a , which had been a t t e m p t i n g to d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for a century a n d a half—it w o u l d be no easy task to reassure the Porte, but D e e d e s u r g e d that the effort s h o u l d be m a d e . Churchill, meanwhile, was increasingly belligerent toward the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which he r e g a r d e d as b e c o m i n g e n e m y territory. Information reaching h i m in the last half of A u g u s t indicated that G e r m a n officers a n d m e n were m o v i n g overland, through neutral B u l g a r i a , to a s s u m e positions in the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces. As early as 26 A u g u s t A d m i r a l L i m p u s had reported to Churchill that "Constantinople is almost completely in G e r m a n h a n d s at this moment." 10

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Churchill continued to p r e s s for action. On 1 S e p t e m b e r he initiated staff talks between the A d m i r a l t y a n d the War Office to plan an attack on T u r k e y in the event of war. T h e following day he received authority f r o m the C a b i n e t to sink T u r k i s h vessels if they issued from the D a r d a n e l l e s in c o m p a n y with the Goeben a n d Breslau. L a t e r he authorized his D a r d a n e l l e s s q u a d r o n c o m m a n d e r to u s e his own discretion as to whether to turn back T u r k i s h vessels attempting t o c o m e out from the D a r d a n e l l e s b y themselves. T h i s was a b l u n d e r : it drove the T u r k s to strike b a c k with s t u n n i n g effectiveness. P u r s u a n t to Churchill's authorization, the s q u a d r o n s t o p p e d a T u r k i s h t o r p e d o boat on 27 S e p t e m b e r a n d turned it back; for, in violation of O t t o m a n neutrality, it had G e r m a n sailors a b o a r d . In retaliation, E n v e r P a s h a authorized the G e r m a n officer c o m m a n d i n g the T u r k i s h defenses of the D a r d a n e l l e s to order the straits to be sealed off a n d to c o m p l e t e the laying of minefields across t h e m . T h i s cut off the flow of Allied m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g a n d thus struck a crippling blow. T h e D a r d a n e l l e s had been R u s s i a ' s one ice-free m a r i t i m e p a s s a g e w a y to the west. T h r o u g h them she sent 50 percent of her export t r a d e , notably her wheat c r o p which, in t u r n , enabled her to buy a r m s a n d a m m u n i t i o n for the w a r . H a d the Allied leaders realized that the F i r s t World War w a s g o i n g to develop into a long war of attrition, they could have seen that T u r k e y ' s m i n i n g of the straits threatened to b r i n g d o w n C z a r i s t R u s s i a a n d , with her, the Allied c a u s e . 1 1

F r e e p a s s a g e t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s had been a s s u r e d b y treaty; once again the O t t o m a n authorities were violating their obligations u n d e r international law, and once again they a p p e a r e d to have been provoked to do so by the actions of Winston Churchill. Y e t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a d e no m o v e to declare war. Its position of passive hostility left Churchill baffled a n d f r u s t r a t e d . 12

Ill T h o u g h Churchill d i d not know it, f r o m the point of view of the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t , too, the situation was baffling a n d frustrating; G e r m a n military officers a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g T u r k e y into the war found themselves driven to anger a n d d e s p a i r . Berlin w a s bitterly d i s a p p o i n t e d that the continuing presence of the Goeben a n d Breslau did not provoke Britain into declaring war; a n d the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s received repeated d e m a n d s f r o m their h o m e g o v e r n m e n t s to p u s h the T u r k s into taking action. B o t h a m b a s s a d o r s recognized, however, that whatever the Y o u n g T u r k s ' ultimate intentions m i g h t b e , the G r a n d Vizier

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and his colleagues had valid reasons for not m o v i n g toward intervention in the E u r o p e a n conflict immediately. Mobilization of the a r m e d forces was not yet c o m p l e t e d ; a n d it was not clear, once mobilization had been c o m p l e t e d , how the fragile O t t o m a n exchequer could continue to s u p p o r t it. M o r e o v e r , T u r k i s h negotiations with neighboring B a l k a n countries, a n d particularly with B u l g a r i a , had not yet c o m e to fruition. F r o m the beginning, the Porte h a d m a d e clear its view that T u r k e y could intervene in the war only in p a r t n e r s h i p with B u l g a r i a . I n d e e d , the c a m p a i g n plan that had been worked out on 1 A u g u s t by E n v e r , W a n g e n h e i m , a n d L i m a n von S a n d e r s p r e s u p p o s e d that B u l g a r i a a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would c o m b i n e forces. B u l g a r i a sat astride T u r k e y ' s principal land route to the rest of E u r o p e a n d — o f m o r e i m m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e — w a s a n e i g h b o r who coveted additional territory. Were B u l g a r i a to invade T u r k e y while the O t t o m a n armies were away fighting the R u s s i a n s , the e m p i r e would be helpless. " S u r e l y , " the G r a n d Vizier r e m a r k e d to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , " G e r m a n y would not want T u r k e y to c o m m i t s u i c i d e . " 13

T h e B u l g a r i a n s , however, were reluctant to c o m m i t themselves, a n d while T a l a a t s u c c e e d e d in negotiating a defensive treaty with B u l g a r i a , signed on 19 A u g u s t , which p r o v i d e d for m u t u a l assistance in certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s in case either country was attacked by a third party, the t e r m s of the treaty were inapplicable to the situation that would arise if T u r k e y s h o u l d join G e r m a n y in the war against R u s s i a . B u l g a r i a was not p r e p a r e d to intervene in the R u s s o - G e r m a n conflict; a n d , as the G e r m a n s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e had been m a d e to u n d e r s t a n d , this meant that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , too, w o u l d continue to maintain its neutrality. Berlin a n d L o n d o n b o t h viewed C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with d e s p o n d e n c y . Churchill, it will be recalled, no longer believed in T u r k i s h neutrality a n d had p r o p o s e d to the C a b i n e t that a flotilla be sent up to the D a r d a n e l l e s to sink the Goeben a n d Breslau. B u t in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e only two d a y s later, G e n e r a l L i m a n von S a n d e r s — f r o m the o p p o s i t e point of v i e w — d e s p a i r e d of b r i n g i n g T u r k e y into the war a n d sent a r e q u e s t to the K a i s e r that he a n d his military mission be allowed to return h o m e . L i k e Churchill, he r a g e d against the Y o u n g T u r k s ; h e s p o k e o f challenging E n v e r a n d D j e m a l to d u e l s . In his r e q u e s t to the K a i s e r , L i m a n pointed out that Enver's recent statements and military dispositions indicated that the C . U . P . intended to keep T u r k e y on the sidelines until the war was over, or at least until it b e c a m e clear b e y o n d a d o u b t that G e r m a n y was g o i n g to win it. He also pointed out that the O t t o m a n armies might collapse even before entering the war, for lack of m o n e y a n d food, if the Porte continued to keep them in a state of m o b i l i z a t i o n . A t roughly the s a m e t i m e that A d m i r a l L i m p u s was reporting t o 1 4

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Winston Churchill that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s almost completely in G e r m a n h a n d s , G e n e r a l L i m a n von S a n d e r s w a s reporting t o the K a i s e r that the whole a t m o s p h e r e of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e m a d e it a l m o s t u n b e a r a b l e for G e r m a n officers to continue their service t h e r e . T h e K a i s e r , however, refused L i m a n ' s r e q u e s t that h e s h o u l d b e allowed to return to G e r m a n y . G e r m a n y ' s plan to win the war quickly by a r a p i d victory in western E u r o p e h a d collapsed at the first Battle of the M a r n e in early S e p t e m b e r ; a n d thereafter Berlin s t e p p e d u p the p r e s s u r e t o b r i n g T u r k e y into the war. T h e G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , von W a n g e n h e i m , w a s u n a b l e to explain to his h o m e g o v e r n m e n t how unrealistic, at least for the time being, that project a p p e a r e d to be in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . E v e n E n v e r , w h o m the a m b a s s a d o r had once d e s c r i b e d as s t a n d i n g "like a rock for G e r m a n y , " believed that the time for action had not yet c o m e : T u r k e y was not ready militarily a n d , in any event, E n v e r ' s colleagues were still o p p o s e d to intervention. 1 6

1 7

T h e difference between the ultimate objectives of the two g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a m e vividly evident on 8 S e p t e m b e r 1914, when the Porte s udde n l y a n n o u n c e d its unilateral a b r o g a t i o n of the C a p i t u l a t i o n s privileges o f all foreign p o w e r s — i n c l u d i n g G e r m a n y . T h e G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r flew into a rage u p o n receiving the news, a n d threatened that he a n d the military mission w o u l d p a c k up a n d leave for h o m e immediately. In the event, however, neither he nor the m i s s i o n left. T h a t they stayed illustrated the i m p r o v e m e n t in the T u r k i s h b a r g a i n i n g position since late J u l y . I n a n extraordinary m a n e u v e r , the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s joined with their enemies in the war, the British, F r e n c h , a n d R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r s , in p r e s e n t i n g a joint E u r o p e a n protest to the Porte, w h e r e u p o n it b e c a m e evident how skillful the T u r k i s h leaders had been in flirting without c o m m i t t i n g themselves. F o r the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s privately intimated to the Porte that they w o u l d not p r e s s the issue for the time being, while the Allied a m b a s s a d o r s , in t u r n , intimated that they w o u l d accept the T u r k i s h decision if T u r k e y continued to remain neutral. T h e Porte went O c t o b e r all foreign were m a d e s u b j e c t on foreign i m p o r t s

a h e a d to p u t its decision into effect. In early p o s t offices in the e m p i r e were c l o s e d ; foreigners t o T u r k i s h laws a n d c o u r t s ; a n d c u s t o m s d u t ie s not only were taken over, b u t were also raised.

IV C o n s i d e r i n g the tangible benefits that h a d b e g u n to flow f r o m the policy of non-intervention, it s e e m s astonishing that at a b o u t this time E n v e r P a s h a b e g a n to plot against that policy a n d against its

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leading p r o p o n e n t , the G r a n d Vizier. T h e substantial G e r m a n military presence in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , s u p p o r t e d by the Goeben a n d Breslau, m a y have played a role in his calculations; b u t what E n v e r had in m i n d is m o r e likely to have been the c o u r s e of the R u s s o G e r m a n war. I n J u l y a n d A u g u s t his policy had been motivated b y fear of R u s s i a n seizures of T u r k i s h territory; but in S e p t e m b e r , in the wake of the R u s s i a n collapse, he s e e m s to have turned to t h o u g h t s of T u r k e y seizing R u s s i a n territory. He switched f r o m a defensive to an aggressive policy. H i s switch was a turning point in O t t o m a n and M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs. I t m a y b e s u r m i s e d that the spectacular G e r m a n military t r i u m p h s over the R u s s i a n s at the battle of T a n n e n b e r g at the end of A u g u s t , and in the o n g o i n g battle of the M a s u r i a n L a k e s that b e g a n in S e p t e m b e r , p e r s u a d e d E n v e r that, if T u r k e y wanted to win a share of R u s s i a n territory, she would have to intervene s o o n , before G e r m a n y had won an u n a i d e d victory. H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of R u s s i a n t r o o p s had been killed or c a p t u r e d by the G e r m a n s , a n d even a less i m p e t u o u s observer than E n v e r might have c o n c l u d e d that R u s s i a was a b o u t to lose the war. T h e G e r m a n victory train was leaving the station, a n d the o p p o r t u n i s t i c E n v e r s e e m s to have been jolted into believing that it was his last chance to j u m p a b o a r d . On 26 S e p t e m b e r E n v e r personally o r d e r e d the closing of the D a r d a n e l l e s to all foreign s h i p s (in effect, to Allied s h i p p i n g ) without consulting his colleagues. A week later he told von Wangenheim that the G r a n d Vizier was no longer in control of the situation. A b i d for power was taking place in Constantinople behind closed d o o r s . T h e British F o r e i g n Office, which knew next to nothing a b o u t the internal politics of the C . U . P . , took a simplistic view of the affair. S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the F o r e i g n Secretary, later r e m e m b e r e d remarking that "nothing but the assassination of E n v e r would keep T u r k e y from joining G e r m a n y , " a n d a d d i n g "that, in times of crisis a n d violence in T u r k e y , there were a p t to be two classes of p e r s o n — a s s a s s i n s a n d a s s a s s i n a t e d , a n d that the G r a n d Vizier was m o r e likely than his o p p o n e n t to b e l o n g to the latter c l a s s . " 18

W o u l d it have been p o s s i b l e for a well-informed British a m b a s s a d o r to have exerted s o m e influence on the evolution of events in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ? H i s t o r i a n s continue to debate the question, a n d of c o u r s e there is now no way to p u t the matter to the t e s t . O b s c u r e though the details remain, what was g o i n g on in the a u t u m n of 1914 was a p r o c e s s in which rival factions and personalities m a n e u v e r e d for s u p p o r t within the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e . Enver's g r o w i n g influence c a m e from winning over T a l a a t B e y to his point of view, for T a l a a t headed the principal faction in the party. Other C . U . P . leaders, while s h a r i n g Enver's belief that G e r m a n y would p r o b a b l y win the war, until now h a d seen no reason to hazard 1 9

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their empire's future on the accuracy of that prediction. T h e y were politicians, while E n v e r was a warrior, younger a n d m o r e i m p e t u o u s than Churchill b u t filled with m u c h the s a m e passion for glory. As War Minister a n d G e r m a n y ' s best friend, he stood to benefit personally from the m a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s to increase his fame a n d position that war at G e r m a n y ' s side would offer. A d a s h i n g figure who had enjoyed almost unlimited luck b u t had d e m o n s t r a t e d only limited ability, he failed to see that bets can be lost as well as won. In putting his chips on G e r m a n y , he t h o u g h t he was m a k i n g an investm e n t — w h e n he was d o i n g no m o r e than placing a w a g e r . On 9 O c t o b e r , E n v e r informed von W a n g e n h e i m that he had won the s u p p o r t of T a l a a t a n d of Halil B e y , President of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s . T h e next m o v e , he s a i d , w o u l d be to try to g a i n the s u p p o r t of D j e m a l P a s h a , Minister of the M a r i n e . F a i l i n g that, he said, he p l a n n e d to provoke a C a b i n e t c r i s i s ; he claimed, on the b a s i s of his following in the Central C o m m i t t e e — w h i c h , in reality, was T a l a a t ' s following—that he could install a new pro-interventionist g o v e r n m e n t . O v e r s t a t i n g his political strength, E n v e r a s s u r e d the G e r m a n s that he c o u l d b r i n g T u r k e y into the war by m i d - O c t o b e r . All he n e e d e d , he told t h e m , w a s G e r m a n gold to s u p p o r t the army. T h e G e r m a n s , o f c o u r s e , were already aware that the O t t o m a n forces w o u l d need m o n e y ; L i m a n had reported to the K a i s e r that they w o u l d be in i m m i n e n t d a n g e r of collapse without it. 2 0

On 10 O c t o b e r , D j e m a l joined the conspiracy. On 11 O c t o b e r , E n v e r , T a l a a t , Halil, and D j e m a l conferred, a n d informed the G e r m a n s that their faction was now c o m m i t t e d to war a n d would authorize A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to attack R u s s i a as soon as G e r m a n y deposited two million T u r k i s h p o u n d s in gold in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to s u p p o r t the a r m e d forces. T h e G e r m a n s r e s p o n d e d b y s e n d i n g a million p o u n d s on 12 O c t o b e r a n d a further million on 17 O c t o b e r , s h i p p i n g the gold b y rail t h r o u g h neutral R u m a n i a . T h e second s h i p m e n t arrived in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 21 October. T a l a a t a n d Halil then c h a n g e d their m i n d s : they p r o p o s e d to keep the gold b u t , nonetheless, to remain neutral in the war. E n v e r reported this to the G e r m a n s on 23 O c t o b e r , but claimed that it did not matter as long as he could still count on the other military service minister, D j e m a l . T h o u g h h e later a n n o u n c e d that T a l a a t had s w u n g back again to the pro-interventionist c a u s e , E n v e r gave up a t t e m p t i n g to p e r s u a d e his p a r t y and his g o v e r n m e n t to intervene in the war. He could not get T u r k e y to declare war on the Allies so he pinned his hopes on a plan to provoke the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s to declare war on Turkey. E n v e r a n d D j e m a l issued secret o r d e r s allowing A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to lead the Goeben a n d Breslau into the Black S e a to attack R u s s i a n vessels. Enver's plan w a s to claim that the warships had been attacked

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by the R u s s i a n s a n d had been forced to defend themselves. A d m i r a l S o u c h o n , however, d i s o b e y e d E n v e r ' s o r d e r s a n d openly started the fighting by b o m b a r d i n g the R u s s i a n coast. O n c e again the G e r m a n admiral gave history a p u s h . H i s p u r p o s e , he stated later, was "to force the T u r k s , even against their will, to s p r e a d the w a r . " As a result of his actions, it was all too clear that the Goeben a n d Breslau had struck a p r e m e d i t a t e d blow; there was now no lie behind which E n v e r could conceal what he had allowed to h a p p e n . T h e incident led to an o p e n s h o w d o w n in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e G r a n d Vizier and the C a b i n e t forced E n v e r to cable an o r d e r to A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to cease fire. A political crisis ensued that lasted for nearly two d a y s , the details of which were veiled even f r o m the normally well-informed G e r m a n s and A u s t r i a n s . T h e r e were meetings of the O t t o m a n Cabinet a n d of the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e . D e b a t e was joined, threats were issued, coalitions were f o r m e d , resignations were tendered, a n d resignations were withd r a w n . A p p a r e n t l y the c o n s e n s u s a p p r o x i m a t e d the thinking of A s q u i t h in Britain j u s t before the outbreak of war: that the first priority was to maintain party unity. E v e n though a majority in the Central C o m m i t t e e s u p p o r t e d the newly f o r m e d triumvirate of T a l a a t , E n v e r , a n d D j e m a l in the view that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e now ought to enter the war, it deferred to the views of the minority, led by the G r a n d Vizier a n d the Minister of F i n a n c e , rather than allow a party split to occur. 21

On 31 O c t o b e r E n v e r reported to the G e r m a n s that his colleagues in the Cabinet insisted on d i s p a t c h i n g a note of apology to the R u s s i a n s . F r o m the G e r m a n point of view this w a s a d a n g e r o u s p r o p o s a l , b u t E n v e r said that, having " d u p e d " his colleagues a b o u t the attack on R u s s i a , he now found himself isolated in the C a b i n e t ; his h a n d s , he s a i d , were t i e d . T h o u g h E n v e r and his G e r m a n co-conspirators did not yet know it, there was no need for a l a r m : in L o n d o n the British C a b i n e t had already risen to the bait. T h e British were unaware of the deep split in Y o u n g T u r k ranks and believed the Porte to have been in collusion with G e r m a n y all along. R e s p o n d i n g to S o u c h o n ' s attack even before the Porte drafted its a p o l o g y , the C a b i n e t authorized the s e n d i n g of an ultimatum requiring the T u r k s immediately to expel the G e r m a n military mission a n d to remove the G e r m a n officers and m e n from the Goeben a n d Breslau. When the T u r k s did not c o m p l y , Churchill did not bother to refer the matter back to the C a b i n e t ; on his own initiative he dispatched an order to his forces in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n on the afternoon of 31 O c t o b e r to " C o m m e n c e hostilities at once against T u r k e y . " 2 2

2 3

T h e British admiral who received Churchill's order d i d not carry it out immediately a n d , in c o n s e q u e n c e , T u r k e y was u n a w a r e that

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Britain had g o n e to war against her. In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , E n v e r still feared that the T u r k i s h apology t o R u s s i a might b e a c c e p t e d . T o prevent that f r o m h a p p e n i n g , he again foiled the intentions of his C a b i n e t colleagues by inserting into the T u r k i s h note an o u t r a g e o u s allegation that R u s s i a had provoked the a t t a c k . Predictably the Czar's g o v e r n m e n t rejected the allegation, issued an u l t i m a t u m to the Porte, a n d on 2 N o v e m b e r declared war. British naval forces c o m m e n c e d hostile operations against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e on 1 N o v e m b e r . At a d r a m a t i c meeting of the O t t o m a n C a b i n e t on the night of N o v e m b e r 1—2, even the G r a n d Vizier's peace faction was obliged to recognize that the e m p i r e was now at war, like it or not. Yet no declaration of war was issued from London. On 3 N o v e m b e r , on instructions f r o m Churchill, British w a r s h i p s b o m b a r d e d the outer forts of the D a r d a n e l l e s . Critics later c h a r g e d that this w a s a piece of childish petulance on Churchill's p a r t which alerted T u r k e y to the vulnerability of the forts. T h e r e is no evidence, however, that T u r k e y r e s p o n d e d to the warning. At the time, the chief significance of the b o m b a r d m e n t s e e m e d to be its demonstration that hostilities h a d c o m m e n c e d . On 4 N o v e m b e r , A s q u i t h confided that "we are now frankly at war with T u r k e y . " T h e formalities, however, were neglected. It was not until the m o r n i n g of 5 N o v e m b e r that, at a meeting with the Privy Council, the p r o c l a m a t i o n s of war against the Hohenzollern a n d H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s were a m e n d e d to include the O t t o m a n Empire. T h e relative c a s u a l n e s s with which the British drifted into the O t t o m a n war reflected the attitudes of British Cabinet ministers at the t i m e : it was not a war to which they attached m u c h i m p o r t a n c e , and they m a d e no great effort to prevent it. T h e y did not regard T u r k e y as an especially d a n g e r o u s enemy. 24

2 5

V In L o n d o n it was still not k n o w n — i n d e e d it would not be known until years later—that E n v e r h a d taken the initiative in p r o p o s i n g , negotiating, and executing a secret treaty of alliance with G e r m a n y before the A d m i r a l t y had seized the T u r k i s h battleships. It also was not known that it was the Porte that had seized the Goeben a n d Breslau, and that it had done so over G e r m a n protest. In D o w n i n g Street the official account was believed, according to which the K a i s e r had initiated the transfer to T u r k e y of the G e r m a n vessels to replace the Osman a n d Reshadieh in order to win over to G e r m a n y the T u r k s w h o m Churchill had alienated.

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It was the c o m m o n view, therefore, that it was Churchill who had b r o u g h t a b o u t the war with T u r k e y . I n d e e d , L l o y d G e o r g e continued to level the c h a r g e against h i m as late as 1 9 2 1 . S o u c h o n a n d E n v e r had in fact started the war between T u r k e y a n d the Allies, b u t in the public imagination of the British it w a s Churchill who had done so. Churchill, for his p a r t , b e g a n to point out in A u g u s t 1 9 1 4 — a n d continued to point out thereafter—that having the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for an e n e m y had its a d v a n t a g e s . F r e e at last to cut up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to offer portions of its territory to other countries at the eventual p e a c e settlement, Britain could now hold out the lure of territorial gains in order to b r i n g Italy a n d the Balkan countries into the war on her side. Italy, a latecomer to the p u r s u i t of colonial e m p i r e , h a d c o m e to see the vulnerable O t t o m a n d o m a i n s as the principal territories still available for acquisition. S h e r e m a i n e d anxious to a c q u i r e even m o r e O t t o m a n territory. Eventually, the lure of acquisition helped to b r i n g her into the war on the Allied s i d e . T h e Balkan countries, too, coveted additional territorial g a i n s . F o r Britain to forge an alliance with all the Balkan countries by the p r o m i s e of O t t o m a n territory r e q u i r e d the reconciliation of s o m e of their rival a m b i t i o n s ; b u t if this c o u l d be achieved, s u c h a c o m b i nation would b r i n g powerful forces to b e a r against the O t t o m a n a n d H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s , a n d offered the p r o s p e c t of helping b r i n g the war against G e r m a n y to a swift a n d successful conclusion. Already on 14 A u g u s t , A s q u i t h noted that "Venizelos, the G r e e k Prime Minister, has a great s c h e m e on foot for a federation of B a l k a n S t a t e s against G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a . . . " O n 2 1 A u g u s t , A s q u i t h characterized a n u m b e r of his ministers as looking to Italy, R u m a n i a , or B u l g a r i a as potential allies of i m p o r t a n c e ; L l o y d G e o r g e as being "keen for B a l k a n confederation"; a n d "Winston violently antiT u r k . " He himself, however, was "very m u c h against any aggressive action vis-a-vis T u r k e y wh. w d . excite our M u s s u l m a n s in I n d i a & E g y p t . " Churchill was not so i m p e t u o u s as that m a d e him s o u n d . In fact he had taken the time a n d trouble to c o m m u n i c a t e personally with E n v e r and other O t t o m a n leaders who were h o p i n g to keep their country neutral. He had given up on them two m o n t h s too soon; b u t it was only when he had b e c o m e convinced that there was no chance of keeping T u r k e y out of the war that he had s w u n g a r o u n d to pointing out the a d v a n t a g e s of having her in it. 2 6

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By the end of A u g u s t , Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e were enthusiastic advocates of the B a l k a n a p p r o a c h . On 31 A u g u s t Churchill wrote a private letter to Balkan leaders u r g i n g the creation of a confederation o f B u l g a r i a , S e r b i a , R u m a n i a , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d G r e e c e to join the Allies. On 2 S e p t e m b e r he initiated private talks with the G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t to d i s c u s s the form that military cooperation

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between their two countries m i g h t take in an offensive operation against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . At the e n d of S e p t e m b e r , Churchill wrote to S i r E d w a r d G r e y that "in our a t t e m p t to placate T u r k e y we are crippling our policy in the B a l k a n s . I am not s u g g e s t i n g that we s h o u l d take a g g r e s s i v e action against T u r k e y or declare war on her ourselves, but we o u g h t from now to m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s with the Balkan S t a t e s , particularly B u l g a r i a , without r e g a r d to the interests or integrity of T u r k e y . " He c o n c l u d e d his additional r e m a r k s by a d d i n g that "All I am a s k i n g is that the interests a n d integrity of T u r k e y shall no longer be c o n s i d e r e d by you in any efforts which are m a d e to s e c u r e c o m m o n action a m o n g the C h r i s t i a n Balkan S t a t e s . " 2 9

G r e y a n d A s q u i t h were m o r e c a u t i o u s in their a p p r o a c h , a n d less enthusiastic a b o u t the p r o p o s e d B a l k a n Confederation than were Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e , b u t in at least one respect their thinking evolved in a parallel way. In order to p e r s u a d e T u r k e y to r e m a i n neutral, the representatives of the British g o v e r n m e n t eventually h a d been instructed to give a s s u r a n c e s that, if she did s o , O t t o m a n territorial integrity w o u l d be r e s p e c t e d . F r o m this there followed a converse proposition, that G r e y h a d m a d e explicit as early as 15 A u g u s t , "that, on the other h a n d , if T u r k e y s i d e d with G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a , and they were defeated, of c o u r s e we could not answer for what might b e taken from T u r k e y i n A s i a M i n o r . " 3 0

When the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the w a r — p u l l e d into it by Churchill as it s e e m e d then, p u s h e d into it by E n v e r a n d S o u c h o n as it s e e m s n o w — t h e conclusion that British policy-makers drew therefore s e e m e d to be i n e s c a p a b l e . In a s p e e c h delivered in L o n d o n on 9 N o v e m b e r 1914, the P r i m e Minister predicted that the war h a d "rung the death-knell of O t t o m a n d o m i n i o n , not only in E u r o p e , b u t in A s i a . " 3 1

Earlier in 1914, S i r M a r k S y k e s , the T o r y M . P . who was his party's leading e x p e r t on T u r k i s h affairs, had w a r n e d the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that "the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m u s t be the first step t o w a r d s the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of our own." Wellington, C a n n i n g , P a l m e r s t o n , a n d Disraeli had all felt that preserving the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was of i m p o r t a n c e to Britain a n d to E u r o p e . Y e t in a little less than a h u n d r e d days the British g o v e r n ment h a d completely reversed the policy of m o r e than a h u n d r e d y e a r s , a n d now s o u g h t to destroy the great buffer e m p i r e that in times p a s t British g o v e r n m e n t s had risked a n d w a g e d w a r s to s a f e g u a r d . 3

T h e Cabinet's new policy was p r e d i c a t e d on the theory that T u r k e y h a d forfeited any claim to enjoy the protection of Britain. In the turmoil of war the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had lost sight of one of the m o s t important truths a b o u t traditional British foreign policy: that the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was to be protected not in order

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to serve the best interests of T u r k e y b u t in order to serve the best interests of Britain. In t u r n , the British decision to d i s m a n t l e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e finally b r o u g h t into play the a s s u m p t i o n that E u r o p e a n s h a d s h a r e d a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t for c e n t u r i e s : that its p o s t - O t t o m a n political destinies w o u l d be taken in h a n d by one or m o r e of the E u r o p e a n powers. T h u s the one thing which B r i t i s h leaders foresaw in 1914 with perfect clarity was that O t t o m a n entry into the war m a r k e d the first step on the r o a d to a r e m a k i n g of the M i d d l e E a s t : to the creation, indeed, of the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t .

PART II KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM LOOKS AHEAD

8 K I T C H E N E R T A K E S COMMAND

i D u r i n g the s u m m e r a n d a u t u m n o f 1914, a s the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was drifting into the war, an i m p o r t a n t new g o v e r n m e n t a l appointment in L o n d o n w a s b e g i n n i n g to affect British policy in the M i d d l e E a s t . It b e g a n , as so m a n y things d i d , with Winston Churchill. On 28 J u l y 1914, the s a m e day that he initiated the seizure of the T u r k i s h vessels, Churchill held a luncheon meeting with F i e l d M a r s h a l H o r a t i o H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r to d i s c u s s the d e e p e n i n g international crisis. As p r o c o n s u l in E g y p t , the veteran c o m m a n d e r of Britain's imperial a r m i e s was r e s p o n s i b l e for the security of the S u e z C a n a l a n d of the t r o o p s f r o m I n d i a who were to be t r a n s p o r t e d through it in the event of war. Churchill, the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y , was r e s p o n s i b l e for the naval escort of the t r o o p s h i p s on their long voyage to E u r o p e ; a n d over lunch the y o u n g politician a n d the old soldier e x c h a n g e d views. Churchill told K i t c h e n e r that "If war c o m e s , you will not go b a c k to E u r o p e . " It w a s not what the field m a r s h a l wanted to hear. K i t c h e n e r h a d c o m e to Britain intending to stay only long e n o u g h to attend the 17 J u l y c e r e m o n i e s elevating h i m to the rank a n d title of E a r l K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ; he was anxious to return to his post as British A g e n t a n d C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in E g y p t as soon as p o s s i b l e . H i s eyes h a d always been t u r n e d t o w a r d the E a s t ; h e told K i n g G e o r g e that he wanted to be a p p o i n t e d Viceroy of I n d i a when that post b e c a m e available as s c h e d u l e d in 1915, t h o u g h he feared that "the politicians" w o u l d block his a p p o i n t m e n t . T h e c r u s t y , b a d - t e m p e r e d K i t c h e n e r loathed politicians. 1

2

E v e n the disintegrating international situation could not keep h i m in L o n d o n . E a r l y in A u g u s t he traveled to D o v e r to catch a Channel s t e a m e r ; the plan w a s that he w o u l d take the train f r o m C a l a i s to Marseilles, a n d there w o u l d b o a r d a cruiser for E g y p t . S h o r t l y before noon on 3 A u g u s t , he b o a r d e d the s t e a m e r at D o v e r , a n d c o m p l a i n e d 79

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impatiently when it failed to set off for C a l a i s at the s c h e d u l e d departure time. As it h a p p e n e d , his d e p a r t u r e was a b o u t to be cancelled rather than delayed. T h e previous evening, in the s m o k i n g r o o m of B r o o k s ' s , a L o n d o n c l u b , s o m e o n e who fell into conversation with a C o n s e r v a tive M e m b e r of Parliament r e m a r k e d that the War Office was in an absolutely chaotic state a n d that it was a pity that K i t c h e n e r had not been asked to take it over. L a t e r that evening, the M . P . reported his conversation to two of his party's leaders who were in a semi-private r o o m of the club d i s c u s s i n g the international situation. A n d r e w B o n a r L a w a n d S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n — t h e leaders t o w h o m the conversation was r e p o r t e d — t o o k the matter up with A r t h u r Balfour, the former Conservative P r i m e Minister, who p a s s e d the s u g g e s t i o n on to Churchill, with w h o m he was on g o o d t e r m s . On the m o r n i n g of 3 A u g u s t — t h e d a y G e r m a n y declared war on F r a n c e — a n article a p p e a r e d in The Times, written by its military c o r r e s p o n d e n t , u r g i n g the a p p o i n t m e n t of K i t c h e n e r to head the War Office. T h a t s a m e m o r n i n g , Churchill saw the P r i m e Minister a n d p r o p o s e d K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , t h o u g h apparently without indicating that the p r o p o s a l c a m e from the Conservatives as well as from himself. Churchill's notes indicate that he thought that A s q u i t h had accepted the p r o p o s a l at the t i m e ; b u t in fact the P r i m e Minister was reluctant to make the a p p o i n t m e n t , a n d decided instead to keep K i t c h e n e r in Britain merely in an a d v i s o r y position. On b o a r d the C h a n n e l s t e a m e r , which had not yet left D o v e r , K i t c h e n e r received a m e s s a g e f r o m the P r i m e Minister asking him to return immediately to L o n d o n . T h e field marshal at first r e f u s e d ; and it was with difficulty that he was p e r s u a d e d to d i s e m b a r k . H i s fears were justified; back in L o n d o n he found that A s q u i t h did not s e e m to be thinking of a regular position for him, let alone one with clearly defined p o w e r s a n d responsibilities. U r g e d on by his colleagues, K i t c h e n e r decided to force the i s s u e ; he went to see the P r i m e Minister for a one-hour meeting on the evening of 4 A u g u s t — the night Britain decided to go to war, by which time G e r m a n a r m i e s were already o v e r r u n n i n g B e l g i u m — a n d stated that, if obliged to remain in L o n d o n , he w o u l d accept no position less than S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War. P u s h e d by politicians a n d the p r e s s , the P r i m e Minister g a v e way the next d a y , a n d K i t c h e n e r was a p p o i n t e d War Minister. As he wrote: " K . was (to do h i m justice) not at all anxious to c o m e in, but when it was presented to h i m as a d u t y he a g r e e d . It is clearly u n d e r s t o o d that he has no politics, & that his place at C a i r o is kept o p e n — s o that he can return to it when peace c o m e s . It is a h a z a r d o u s experiment, but the best in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I think." A s s u m i n g , as did nearly everybody else, that the war would last no m o r e than a 3

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few m o n t h s , A s q u i t h did not replace K i t c h e n e r as A g e n t and C o n s u l G e n e r a l in E g y p t ; he thought that the field m a r s h a l would be returning to his post there shortly. On 6 A u g u s t K i t c h e n e r took up his new duties in the War Office in Whitehall. L o r d K i t c h e n e r lived in a b o r r o w e d h o u s e in L o n d o n , m a k i n g it plain that he d i d not intend to stay. It w a s located just off the intersection o f C a r l t o n H o u s e T e r r a c e a n d C a r l t o n G a r d e n s , less than a five-minute walk from the War Office, which m e a n t that he could s p e n d almost every waking m o m e n t on the j o b . He arose at 6:00 a . m . , arrived at his office at 9 : 0 0 a . m . , generally took a cold lunch there, returned to his t e m p o r a r y h o m e at 6:00 p . m . to read the evening p a p e r s a n d n a p , a n d then after dinner would r e a d official cables until late at n i g h t . T h e g l a s s or two of wine with dinner and the nightly scotch a n d s o d a that h a d been his c o m f o r t s in E g y p t were forsworn; at the request of G e o r g e V he h a d p l e d g e d to set a national e x a m p l e by drinking no alcoholic b e v e r a g e s d u r i n g the war. 4

Asquith's reluctance to b r i n g the f a m o u s soldier into the C a b i n e t s e e m s to have been p r o m p t e d by the fear that, as S e c r e t a r y for War, K i t c h e n e r , rather than the P r i m e Minister, would e m e r g e as Britain's w a r t i m e leader. No great soldier h a d served in a m a j o r office of state since the D u k e of Wellington's ministry nearly a century b e f o r e ; a n d no serving a r m y officer h a d been i n c l u d e d in a C a b i n e t since G e n e r a l G e o r g e M o n k , who in 1660 restored the m o n a r c h y a n d then was r e w a r d e d with high office. T h e principle of civilian authority had been u p h e l d jealously since then; b u t A s q u i t h felt obliged to s u b o r d i nate it to his urgent need for F i e l d M a r s h a l Kitchener's services. K i t c h e n e r w a s a figure of l e g e n d — a national m y t h w h o s e photo h u n g on walls t h r o u g h o u t the k i n g d o m . After he took up his C a b i n e t a p p o i n t m e n t , large c r o w d s would gather to watch h i m enter a n d leave the War Office each d a y . As the P r i m e Minister's d a u g h t e r later wrote: He w a s an almost s y m b o l i c figure a n d what he s y m b o l i z e d , I think, was s t r e n g t h , decision, and a b o v e all s u c c e s s . . . [Everything that he t o u c h e d 'came o f f . T h e r e was a feeling that K i t c h e n e r c o u l d not fail. T h e psychological effect of his a p p o i n t ment, the tonic to p u b l i c confidence, were instantaneous a n d overwhelming. A n d he at once g a v e , in his own right, a national status to the g o v e r n m e n t . 5

T h e p u b l i c , it w a s s a i d , d i d not reason a b o u t K i t c h e n e r , but s i m p l y trusted him completely, s a y i n g " K i t c h e n e r is there; it is all r i g h t . " In the p a s t he h a d always b r o u g h t things to a successful conclusion. 6

In March 1915 he moved into York House, St James's Palace, a residence provided for him by K i n g George.

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He had avenged the m u r d e r of G e n e r a l C h a r l e s G e o r g e G o r d o n in the fall of K h a r t o u m by d e s t r o y i n g the e m p i r e of the D e r v i s h e s and r e c o n q u e r i n g the S u d a n . T h e F r e n c h had then a t t e m p t e d t o intrude u p o n Britain's imperial d o m a i n s , b u t in 1898 K i t c h e n e r firmly confronted t h e m at the fort of F a s h o d a in the S u d a n , a n d the F r e n c h contingent b a c k e d d o w n a n d withdrew from the fort. In S o u t h Africa the B o e r War h a d b e g u n b a d l y ; then K i t c h e n e r c a m e to take charge and b r o u g h t it to a victorious conclusion. As c o m m a n d e r of the armies of I n d i a in the early twentieth century, he had i m p o s e d his will as decisively as he had d o n e in E g y p t . T h e far-off o u t p o s t s of e m p i r e in which he won his brilliant victories lent h i m their g l a m o r . D i s t a n c e m a d e him s e e m at once magical a n d larger-than-life, like a s p h i n x presiding over the desert. A lone, insecure, and secretive figure who u s e d a small g r o u p of aides as a wall against the world, he a p p e a r e d instead to be the s t r o n g and silent hero of p o p u l a r m y t h o l o g y . H i s painful shyness w a s not seen as s u c h ; his fear of his political colleagues a p p e a r e d to be d i s d a i n . A y o u n g F o r e i g n Office clerk w h o watched the field marshal at a gathering with the P r i m e Minister, S i r E d w a r d G r e y , a n d D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , recorded in his diary that "Kitchener looked like an officer who has got m i x e d up with a lot of strolling players a n d is trying to p r e t e n d he doesn't know t h e m . " 7

T a l l , b r o a d - s h o u l d e r e d , s q u a r e - j a w e d , with b u s h y eyebrows, bristling m o u s t a c h e , cold b l u e eyes set widely apart, a n d an intimidating glower, he towered physically over his fellows and looked the part for which destiny a n d the p o p u l a r p r e s s had cast him. F r o m his earliest c a m p a i g n s , he was fortunate in the journalists who followed his career a n d who created his p u b l i c i m a g e . He was fortunate, too, in the timing of his career, which coincided with the rise of imperial sentiment, literature, a n d ideology in Britain. Disraeli, K i p l i n g , A. E. W. M a s o n (author of Four Feathers), L i o n e l C u r t i s (a founder of the Round Table, the imperialist q u a r t e r l y ) , J o h n B u c h a n , and others created the tidal wave of feeling on the crest of which he r o d e . G e o r g e S t e e v e n s of the Daily Mail, who was p e r h a p s the leading war c o r r e s p o n d e n t of his t i m e , told his readers in 1900 that Kitchener's "precision is so u n h u m a n l y unerring he is m o r e like a machine than a m a n . " S t e e v e n s wrote a book a b o u t the S u d a n c a m p a i g n , telling how K i t c h e n e r (then sirdar, or c o m m a n d e r , of the E g y p t i a n a r m y ) led his a r m i e s south over nearly a t h o u s a n d miles of rock and s a n d , from the waters of the N i l e Valley to l a n d s where rain never falls, to c o n q u e r a country of a million s q u a r e miles. I g n o r i n g the episodes in which Kitchener's generalship was open to criticism, the book dwelt at length on the characteristic organizational ability that derived from the sirdar's b a c k g r o u n d as an engineering officer. A c c o r d i n g to S t e e v e n s , K i t c h e n e r p r e p a r e d his m o v e m e n t s with s u c h 8

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care that "he has never given battle without m a k i n g certain of an annihilating victory . . . " S t e e v e n s wrote that "the m a n has d i s a p peared . . . there i s n o m a n H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r , b u t only the S i r d a r , neither as k i n g affection nor giving it. H i s officers a n d m e n are wheels in the m a c h i n e : he feeds t h e m e n o u g h to m a k e t h e m efficient, and works t h e m as mercilessly as he works h i m s e l f . " When he joined the C a b i n e t , a n d indeed for m a n y m o n t h s afterw a r d , its other m e m b e r s — t o m o s t of w h o m he was a s t r a n g e r — w e r e in awe of h i m . A l t h o u g h they were jolted by his military p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , which ran counter to everything which they had been led to believe, they a c c e p t e d his j u d g m e n t s without d e m u r . T h e y h a d believed the professional British a r m y to be of a d e q u a t e size, but d u r i n g his first d a y at the War Office, K i t c h e n e r r e m a r k e d , " T h e r e is no a r m y . " T h e accepted view was that the war would be a short one, b u t K i t c h e n e r with unerring foresight told an astonished ( a n d , according to Churchill, a skeptical) C a b i n e t that Britain would have to maintain an a r m y of millions of m e n in the field; that the war w o u l d last at least three y e a r s ; a n d that it would only be d e c i d e d by bloody battles on the continent of E u r o p e a n d not at s e a . D e f y i n g the conventional view that a large a r m y could be created only by conscription, K i t c h e n e r instead raised his m a s s a r m y by a volunteer recruitment c a m p a i g n , which s u r p r i s e d his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s as m u c h as it has a m a z e d posterity. 10

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K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d to win the war by organizing his forces as thoroughly as he h a d d o n e in a d v a n c e of the K h a r t o u m c a m p a i g n . He w o u l d s p e n d the first years methodically creating, training, a n d e q u i p p i n g an a r m y of o v e r w h e l m i n g strength, a n d would concentrate his forces, not d i s s i p a t e t h e m in s i d e s h o w s . T h e i m p e n d i n g O t t o m a n war, he felt, w o u l d be a s i d e s h o w ; it w o u l d be a waste of r e s o u r c e s to send additional t r o o p s to fight the T u r k s . He feared a T u r k i s h attack on the S u e z C a n a l — h i s only military concern in the M i d d l e E a s t — but he believed that the British forces in E g y p t could deal with it. T h e M i d d l e E a s t played no role in his plans for winning the war. B u t that did not m e a n that K i t c h e n e r h a d no M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy; as will be seen presently, he held s t r o n g views a b o u t what role Britain s h o u l d play in the region once the E u r o p e a n war was won.

II It was p u r e accident that the military hero brought into the g o v e r n ment to p r e s i d e over the war effort should have been one who r e g a r d e d himself, a n d was r e g a r d e d by others, as having the E a s t for his special province. F r o m that accident c a m e the distinctive outlines of the policy that e m e r g e d .

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M o s t recently, K i t c h e n e r h a d g o v e r n e d E g y p t , a country officially still part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , b u t which h a d in effect been an independent country until the British h a d o c c u p i e d it in 1882, with the stated a i m of restoring order and then leaving. I n s t e a d of leaving, the British stayed on. As of 1914, E g y p t was a relatively recent addition to the British s p h e r e of influence, a n d British officers who served there with K i t c h e n e r h a d b e g u n to develop a distinctive outlook on events. S t a t i o n e d as they were in an A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g country, they had c o m e to r e g a r d themselves, mistakenly, as e x p e r t s on A r a b affairs, a n d were all the m o r e frustrated to be e x c l u d e d from foreign policy m a k i n g by the F o r e i g n Office a n d by the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a — t h e two b o d i e s that traditionally dealt with the A r a b i c s p e a k i n g portions of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Neither K i t c h e n e r nor his aides d e m o n s t r a t e d any real awareness of the great differences b e tween the m a n y c o m m u n i t i e s in the M i d d l e E a s t . A r a b i a n s a n d E g y p t i a n s , for e x a m p l e , t h o u g h both A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g , were otherwise different—in population mix, history, culture, outlook, a n d c i r c u m stances. E v e n had they been the e x p e r t s on E g y p t which they believed themselves to b e , that w o u l d not necessarily have m a d e K i t c h e n e r ' s aides the experts on A r a b i a they c l a i m e d to b e . In the S u d a n c a m p a i g n , u n d e r t a k e n in the face of m i s g i v i n g s within both the F o r e i g n Office a n d L o r d C r o m e r ' s E g y p t i a n a d min is t r a t io n , K i t c h e n e r had greatly e x p a n d e d the area of Britain's control of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. I t m a y have been d u r i n g the S u d a n c a m p a i g n that K i t c h e n e r first b e g a n to d r e a m of carving out a great new imperial d o m a i n for Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t , in which he w o u l d serve as her viceroy. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, British officials were aware that the K h e d i v e — t h e native prince from behind whose throne Britain ruled E g y p t — w a s a m b i t i o u s to e x p a n d his authority. Alt h o u g h in theory he was the O t t o m a n Sultan's viceroy in E g y p t , there were persistent r u m o r s that he considered the possibility of taking the S u l t a n ' s place as temporal a n d spiritual l o r d — S u l t a n and C a l i p h — o f the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces of the e m p i r e , thereby splitting the e m p i r e in half. A variant was the r u m o r that he p l a n n e d to annex the M o s l e m H o l y Places in A r a b i a and establish a caliph there u n d e r his p r o t e c t i o n . T h e British a n d E g y p t i a n officers attached to him would u n d e r s t a n d that the achievement of any s u c h plan would b r i n g greatly enlarged authority to themselves. 13

At the t i m e — t h e end of the nineteenth c e n t u r y — t h e G r e a t Power principally o p p o s e d to the e x p a n s i o n of British E g y p t was F r a n c e , which had aligned herself with R u s s i a . As viewed from Britain's o u t p o s t s b o r d e r i n g the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the alliance s e e m e d to be directed against Britain. B u t R u s s i a was far away; a n d in E g y p t and the S u d a n , F r a n c e was the enemy whose threatening presence was

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felt close at h a n d . Rivalry with F r a n c e for position a n d influence in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g w o r l d : that was the policy in the service of which K i t c h e n e r ' s officers h a d been r e a r e d . L a r g e r c o m b i n a t i o n s a n d considerations in world politics were beyond the range of the typical officer in British C a i r o , an enclave that p o s s e s s e d (wrote o n e of K i t c h e n e r ' s a i d e s ) "all the n a r r o w n e s s a n d p r o v i n c i a l i s m of an E n g l i s h g a r r i s o n t o w n . . . " T h e local c o m m u n i t y o f B r i t i s h officials a n d their families w a s tight a n d h o m o g e n e o u s . I t s life centered a r o u n d the S p o r t i n g C l u b , the T u r f C l u b , and the balls given at a leading hotel six nights out of seven. 14

It was from this provincial g a r r i s o n c o m m u n i t y — i t s views on A r a b policy hitherto ignored by the m a k e r s of British world policy—that L o r d Kitchener emerged.

Ill T h e outbreak of the war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a d e it necessary to clarify the nature of Britain's presence in E g y p t a n d C y p r u s , for both were nominally still part of the S u l t a n ' s e m p i r e . T h e C a b i n e t was in favor of an n e x i n g both countries a n d , indeed, a c c o r d i n g to what officials in C a i r o were told, h a d already m a d e the decision. R o n a l d S t o r r s , the Oriental S e c r e t a r y (which is to say, the staff specialist in E a s t e r n affairs) to L o r d K i t c h e n e r in C a i r o , protested that, in the case of E g y p t , s u c h a decision violated forty years of p r o m i s e s by British g o v e r n m e n t s that the British occupation was merely t e m p o r a r y . T h e A g e n c y (that is, the office of the British A g e n t in E g y p t , L o r d K i t c h e n e r ) a d v o c a t e d a protectorate s t a t u s for E g y p t , with at least token reference to, eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e — a case a r g u e d effectively by Milne C h e e t h a m (acting chief of the A g e n c y in K i t c h e n e r ' s a b s e n c e ) . T h e C a b i n e t a b a n d o n e d its own views in deference to those of the A g e n c y , and thus showed the direction of things to c o m e . T h e C a b i n e t , in this instance, allowed Kitchener's A g e n c y to establish the p r o t o t y p e of the form of rule that the field m a r s h a l and his staff eventually wanted Britain to exercise throughout the A r a b i c speaking world. It was not to be direct rule, s u c h as was practiced in p a r t s of I n d i a . In K i t c h e n e r ' s E g y p t a hereditary prince a n d native C a b i n e t ministers a n d g o v e r n o r s went t h r o u g h the motions of governing. T h e y p r o m u l g a t e d u n d e r their own n a m e decisions reco m m e n d e d to t h e m by the British a d v i s e r s attached to their respective offices; that w a s the form of protectorate g o v e r n m e n t favored by the K i t c h e n e r g r o u p . In the artful w o r d s of R o n a l d S t o r r s : "We d e p recated the I m p e r a t i v e , preferring the S u b j u n c t i v e , even the wistful, Optative m o o d . " 1 5

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T h e E g y p t i a n decision w a s the forerunner of others in which S t o r r s a n d other m e m b e r s of K i t c h e n e r ' s entourage m a d e policy decisions for the M i d d l e E a s t u n d e r cover of the reclusive field marshal's authority. When the views of the g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the E a s t c a m e into conflict with those of L o r d K i t c h e n e r , it was the latter that were likely to prevail. D e c i s i o n s that normally w o u l d have been m a d e by the P r i m e Minister, the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , the Viceroy of I n d i a , or the C a b i n e t were instead m a d e by relatively junior officials who represented K i t c h e n e r a n d p u r p o r t e d to represent his views. Only the field marshal's u n i q u e prestige m a d e this p o s s i b l e . O n one t e l e g r a m f r o m C a i r o , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the F o r e i g n Secretary, m i n u t e d " D o e s L o r d K i t c h e n e r agree? If s o , I will a p p r o v e . " He c o u l d have written the s a m e inscription on t h e m all. K i t c h e n e r was s c r u p u l o u s in clearing foreign-policy decisions with G r e y , b u t G r e y deferred t o him, a n d a p p r o v e d even those p r o p o s a l s of the War Minister with which he d i s a g r e e d . O n e reason that M e m b e r s of Parliament and the C a b i n e t left eastern questions so m u c h to K i t c h e n e r a n d his e n t o u r a g e was that they themselves knew little a b o u t t h e m . To a g o v e r n m e n t official in the 1980s, a c c u s t o m e d to b u l g i n g reference libraries, to worldwide p r e s s coverage, a n d to the o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p p l y of detailed information a b o u t foreign countries g a t h e r e d by the m a j o r g o v e r n m e n t s , British ignorance of the M i d d l e E a s t d u r i n g the 1914 war would be u n i m a g i n a b l e . Shortly after Britain f o u n d herself at war with the Porte, S i r M a r k S y k e s , one of the few M . P . s who had traveled in the E a s t , c o m p l a i n e d that in the E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e there was not so m u c h as one authentic history of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Of the histories then current, none was b a s e d on original research, a n d all were b a s e d on a G e r m a n work that left off in the year 1744, a n d were therefore long out of d a t e . As late as 1917, when British armies were poised to invade northward toward S y r i a , British Intelligence, asked by the a r m y to p r o v i d e a g u i d e to conditions there, reported that there was no b o o k in any E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e that provided a survey of the social a n d political conditions of the area. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t lacked even the most elementary type of i n f o r m a t i o n — i n c l u d i n g m a p s — o f the empire with which it was at war. In 1913 — 14, one of K i t c h e n e r ' s intelligence officers h a d secretly surveyed a n d m a p p e d a wilderness area close to British E g y p t ' s Sinai frontier; it was one of a m e r e handful of s u r v e y s g a t h e r e d by British I n t e l l i g e n c e . F o r the m o s t part, British officers c o n d u c t i n g operations in O t t o m a n territory in the first years of the war were operating in the d a r k . O n e of the m a n y reasons for the failure of Britain's invasion of T u r k e y in 1915 was that the British invasion force was s u p p l i e d with only one m a p of the peninsula it was to a t t a c k — a n d that m a p , it turned out, was inaccurate. When it c a m e to 1 6

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the M i d d l e E a s t , the politicians, like the soldiers, were aware that they were m o v i n g in areas that were literally u n c h a r t e d . B u t the C a b i n e t ministers who deferred to K i t c h e n e r in M i d d l e E a s t e r n matters were unaware of how little was really u n d e r s t o o d about the M i d d l e E a s t either by the War Minister or by the aides in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m on w h o m he relied for advice a n d information.

9 KITCHENER'S LIEUTENANTS i A v o i d i n g not merely w o m e n (as he had always done) b u t the outside world as a whole, the War M i n i s t e r lived in a m a s c u l i n e preserve with his personal Military S e c r e t a r y , L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , a s his a l m o s t sole a n d constant c o m p a n i o n . F i t z G e r a l d c o r r e s p o n d e d a n d conversed on K i t c h e n e r ' s behalf; when p e o p l e said they had written to or heard f r o m K i t c h e n e r , they meant that they had written to or heard from F i t z G e r a l d . K i t c h e n e r had always relied heavily on his staff. N o w that he had m o v e d into the center of power in L o n d o n , not only F i t z G e r a l d , but also the staff remaining in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n m o v e d toward the center o f power with h i m . T h u s L o r d K i t c h e n e r i m p o s e d his design on policy not merely by s h a p i n g a new a p p r o a c h toward the M i d d l e E a s t , b u t also by delegating power to chosen officers in the field who would g u i d e a n d execute that policy. Instead of being ignored or neglected, as they felt they h a d been in the p a s t , British officials in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n were given a chance to m a k e their weight felt. K i t c h e n e r ' s old lieutenants in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world rose with him to p r e - e m i n e n c e in E a s t e r n policy-making. What w a s c o n s p i c u o u s at the end of 1914 w a s that K i t c h e n e r had s t a m p e d his personal b r a n d on the g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies, but what t u r n e d out to be of m o r e lasting i m p o r t a n c e w a s that he h a d chosen the p e o p l e who were to inform a n d to advise the British g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t t h r o u g h o u t the w a r — a n d afterward. By tranferring authority to them, K i t c h e n e r m o v e d m u c h of the evaluation of information and the m a k i n g of policy from the capital city of a world e m p i r e , where officials—even t h o u g h not specifically knowledgeable a b o u t M i d d l e E a s t e r n a f f a i r s — t e n d e d toward a b r o a d and c o s m o p o l i t a n view of matters, to the colonial capitals of E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , where the prejudices of old h a n d s went unchallenged a n d unchecked. T h e British enclaves in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m were the environment to 88

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which the War Minister longed to return a n d f r o m which spiritually he h a d never d e p a r t e d . T h e War Minister's weakness, a c c o r d i n g t o one observer, w a s that "He is m o r e or less a foreigner" in E n g l a n d . To him, L o n d o n was m o r e alien than C a i r o or C a l c u t t a . T h e field marshal was profoundly ill at ease with unfamiliar faces. I n s t e a d of relying on the War Office a n d the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n for information a n d advice a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t , he continued to fall b a c k on his staff in E g y p t . When he was a p p o i n t e d War Minister, he asked R o n a l d S t o r r s , his Oriental S e c r e t a r y , to stay on in L o n d o n with h i m . S t o r r s pointed out that g o v e r n m e n t a l regulations w o u l d not allow it but, when S t o r r s returned to E g y p t , K i t c h e n e r continued to be inspired by his s u g g e s t i o n s . S t o r r s , the son of an Anglican c l e r g y m a n , was an intellectually elegant g r a d u a t e of P e m b r o k e College, C a m b r i d g e , then in his mid-thirties. A l t h o u g h he h a d no m o r e than an u n d e r g r a d u a t e education in E a s t e r n l a n g u a g e s and literature, service as Oriental S e c r e t a r y of the A g e n c y in C a i r o for m o r e than a d e c a d e h a d established h i m as a specialist in M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs. H i s lowly r a n k — a f t e r the o u t b r e a k of war, he finally obtained diplomatic s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h only as a second s e c r e t a r y — g a v e no indication of his high position in the field marshal's esteem. 1

II By the end of 1914, it was clear that the war was not c o m i n g to a quick conclusion, that the field m a r s h a l would not be able to return to C a i r o for s o m e time, a n d that therefore a new British proconsul h a d to be selected for E g y p t . K i t c h e n e r , in order to keep the position in C a i r o vacant for his return, personally selected S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n to serve as his replacement ( u n d e r the-new title of H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , rather than A g e n t ) ; M c M a h o n was a colorless official from I n d i a , on the verge of retirement. D e s p i t e M c M a h o n ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , R o n a l d S t o r r s a n d his colleagues in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n continued to look u p o n the War Minister as their real chief. S i r J o h n M a x w e l l , c o m m a n d i n g general of the British forces in E g y p t , r e p o r t e d directly to K i t c h e n e r at the War Office rather than to, or t h r o u g h , the new H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r . T h e senior figure in the War Minister's following in the M i d d l e E a s t was L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l S i r F r a n c i s R e g i n a l d Wingate, who had s u c c e e d e d K i t c h e n e r as s i r d a r of the E g y p t i a n a r m y and G o v e r n o r G e n e r a l of the S u d a n . Wingate's entire career had been one of military service in the E a s t , principally in Military Intelligence. He p a s s e d for a m a s t e r of A r a b i c . Of his role in K i t c h e n e r ' s K h a r t o u m

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c a m p a i g n , the journalist G e o r g e S t e e v e n s wrote that "Whatever there was to know, Colonel Wingate surely knew it, for he m a k e s it his b u s i n e s s to know everything . . . As for that mysterious child of lies, the A r a b , Colonel Wingate can converse with him for h o u r s , a n d at the end know not only how m u c h truth he has told, but exactly what truth he has s u p p r e s s e d .. . N o t h i n g is hid f r o m Colonel W i n g a t e . " Wingate governed the S u d a n f r o m K h a r t o u m , a s u n - s c o r c h e d capital city of s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 inhabitants that had been completely rebuilt to the specifications of L o r d K i t c h e n e r . By steamer and railroad, it was 1,345 miles away f r o m C a i r o , a n d Wingate felt cut off a n d neglected. On 18 F e b r u a r y 1915, he sent a letter m a r k e d Very Private to his A g e n t in the E g y p t i a n capital that cried out with his sense of hurt: 2

T h e m o r e that I think over the A r a b i a n Policy question & the peculiar situation into which it has drifted owing to the n u m b e r of "cooks" c o n c e r n e d in its concoction—the less I consider it desirable we should show our h a n d s unless we are officially called u p o n for a s t a t e m e n t of our views. S p e a k i n g for m y s e l f — y o u m u s t r e m e m b e r that in spite of my position in E g y p t & the S u d a n & the n u m b e r of years I have been in the country, little u s e has been m a d e of my experience in this, or in other m a t t e r s connected with the situation. As I have often said before, I think that our geopolitical position & our connection with the A r a b i a n Provinces nearest to u s , has given us opportunities for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the situation t h e r e — a n d the views of the M o s l e m s of the Holy P l a c e s — b e t t e r than m a n y others; b u t clearly that view is not s h a r e d by either the H o m e or I n d i a n authorities & therefore, I prefer to keep silent for the time b e i n g . 3

In fact Wingate could not bear to keep silent, a n d only twelve days later he wrote that he had c h a n g e d his m i n d and had decided "that we ought not to keep entirely to ourselves information & views which m a y be helpful" to those r e s p o n s i b l e for m a k i n g p o l i c y . Wingate's A g e n t in C a i r o — t h e official representative in E g y p t of the S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t — w a s G i l b e r t Clayton, who had also served under L o r d K i t c h e n e r in the S u d a n c a m p a i g n . After receiving his c o m m i s s i o n in the Royal Artillery in 1895, Clayton went out to E g y p t a n d had been stationed there or in the S u d a n ever since. F r o m 1908 to 1913 he served as Private Secretary to Wingate. F r o m 1913 onward he served as S u d a n A g e n t in C a i r o a n d , at the s a m e time, as D i r e c t o r of Intelligence of the E g y p t i a n a r m y . C l a y t o n m o v e d into a central position in m a k i n g Britain's A r a b policy on 31 4

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October 1914, when, by decision of the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l in E g y p t , S i r J o h n Maxwell, who r e p o r t e d directly to K i t c h e n e r , he b e c a m e head of all intelligence services in C a i r o — o f the British civil authority a n d the British a r m y , as well as the E g y p t i a n a r m y . T h u s L o n d o n heard only one version of intelligence data from E g y p t — C l a y t o n ' s — i n s t e a d of three. A former a r m y captain, Clayton rapidly m o v e d up the ranks during'the war a n d by the e n d of it was a general. In this fatherly way, C l a y t o n served as mentor to the a d v e n t u r o u s y o u n g archaeologists a n d orientalists who flocked to C a i r o to serve in the intelligence services d u r i n g the war. He m u s t have h a d o u t s t a n d ing h u m a n qualities, for his y o u n g m e n , though diverse in other r e g a r d s , all liked a n d r e s p e c t e d h i m . T h e y saw h i m as s h r e w d , sober, sensible, a n d steady. He was a b o u t ten years older than m o s t of them a n d , whether or not they took it, they listened to his advice. F o r t h e m he was the incarnation of the old h a n d .

Ill A l t h o u g h the F o r e i g n Office a n d the I n d i a Office often d i s p u t e d the views or p r o p o s a l s that Wingate a n d Clayton e s p o u s e d , nobody d u r i n g the war q u e s t i o n e d their professional ability or their expert knowledge b a s e d on long experience in the M i d d l e E a s t . It was not until years after the war h a d e n d e d that D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , u s i n g information that b e c a m e available f r o m the G e r m a n side, m a d e a case for the proposition that they were d a n g e r o u s l y in c o mp e t e n t . A c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , the British authorities in C a i r o were blind to what w a s h a p p e n i n g behind enemy lines. In particular, he wrote, there was a point in 1916 when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was too exhausted to continue fighting. If the British forces in E g y p t h a d launched an attack on Sinai and Palestine t h e n — o r even in 1 9 1 5 — little effort would have been n e e d e d , a c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , to "have c r u m p l e d . . . u p " the T u r k s , which i n turn w o u l d have allowed Britain to m o v e t h r o u g h the Balkans to defeat G e r m a n y . T h e o p p o r t u n i t y was m i s s e d , a c c o r d i n g to him, b e c a u s e the intelligence services either did not know, or failed to report, what was g o i n g on inside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . As a result, he claimed, the British g o v e r n m e n t failed to win the war d u r i n g the years when the war still could have been won on British t e r m s . 5

A m o r e easily p r o v e d failing of C a i r o Intelligence was that it was unaware of the extent to which the E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d been infiltrated by e n e m y a g e n t s . It was not until that expert on O t t o m a n affairs, W y n d h a m D e e d e s , went to work in C a i r o in 1916, a n d

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discovered that the E g y p t i a n police forces were h o n e y c o m b e d with s p i e s , that the T u r k i s h network was s m a s h e d . An early sign of the i n a d e q u a c y of Cairo's intelligence a p p a r a t u s that o u g h t to have sent up a w a r n i n g signal, but d i d not, a p p e a r e d in the a u t u m n of 1914, a b o u t a m o n t h before the O t t o m a n war b e g a n , when the local British a r m y c o m m a n d e r , G e n e r a l Maxwell, wrote from E g y p t to L o r d K i t c h e n e r that "It is very difficult to p u t a true value on all the r e p o r t s f r o m C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , A s i a M i n o r a n d S y r i a . . . I can get n o information direct a s the T u r k s g u a r d the frontier very closely—our agents cannot get t h r o u g h — t h o s e we had on the other side have been b a g g e d . " He a d d e d a d i s q u i e t i n g note a b o u t the intelligence i m b a l a n c e : " T h e E a s t is full of G e r m a n spies a n d they get fairly g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n . " 6

At least Maxwell was aware that he d i d not know what was g o i n g on in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Wingate a n d C l a y t o n fell into the t r a p of believing that they d i d . T h e y a c c e p t e d G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e ' s mistaken theory that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was in the h a n d s of a g r o u p of p r o - G e r m a n J e w s . At the end of 1914 G e n e r a l Wingate b l a m e d the war on "a syndicate of J e w s , financiers, a n d low-born intriguers" in Constantinople. 7

He a n d his colleagues c o m p o u n d e d the error by linking it to m i s l e a d i n g information a b o u t the state of M o s l e m opinion. J u s t after the war b e g a n , S t o r r s sent Maxwell a report of r e m a r k s m a d e by a S y r i a n informant a b o u t p u b l i c opinion b e h i n d enemy lines. A c c o r d i n g to the informant, the inhabitants of S y r i a were filled with hatred of the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t b e c a u s e they believed it w o u l d s u p p o r t Z i o n i s m . " T h e s e Zionists are closely connected with Berlin a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in the policy of Palestine," the informant s t a t e d . T h e false r u m o r that Berlin a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e were a b o u t to back Z i o n i s m echoed back a n d forth through the years, a n d later in the w a r misled the British C a b i n e t into believing that it h a d to issue a p r o - Z i o n i s t Declaration immediately. 8

S t o r r s wrote to K i t c h e n e r (which is to say, to his personal military secretary, L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d ) at the end of the year. H e c o m m e n t e d o n p l a n s for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , a n d claimed that M o s l e m s w o u l d o p p o s e a J e w i s h Palestine b e c a u s e they b l a m e d J e w s for the war. "Again would not I s l a m be extremely indignant at the idea of h a n d i n g over our c o n q u e s t s to a people which has taken no p a r t as a nation in the war, a n d a section of which has u n d o u b t e d l y helped to thrust the T u r k s over the precip i c e . " In fact, as F o r e i g n Office a n d A r a b B u r e a u reports later were to show, M o s l e m opinion, even in n o n - T u r k i s h areas, generally s u p p o r t e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d its alliance with G e r m a n y . S t o r r s w a s w r o n g , too, in s u p p o s i n g that M o s l e m s were o p p o s e d to a J e w i s h Palestine b e c a u s e of the w a r ; M o s l e m opposition to a J e w i s h Palestine 9

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had arisen long before the war, in the w a k e of Zionist colonization at the end of the nineteenth century. A characteristic flaw in the information-gathering c o n d u c t e d by Clayton a n d S t o r r s was that they frequently accepted information s u p p l i e d by a single informant without testing a n d checking it. Instead they seemingly relied on the sort of intuitive ability that S t e e v e n s had a s c r i b e d to W i n g a t e : the gift of b e i n g able to divine the extent to which any native is telling the truth. J o h n B u c h a n , who later b e c a m e w a r t i m e D i r e c t o r of I n f o r m a t i o n in L o n d o n , wrote in the second chapter of his a d v e n t u r e novel Greenmantle that "the truth is that we are the only race on earth that can p r o d u c e m e n c a p a b l e of getting inside the skin of r e m o t e p e o p l e s . P e r h a p s the S c o t s are better than the E n g l i s h , b u t we're all a t h o u s a n d percent better than a n y b o d y else." Wingate, C l a y t o n , and S t o r r s acted as t h o u g h they u n d e r s t o o d the natives of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as well as did the S c o t s hero of B u c h a n ' s novel. As it t r a n s p i r e d , their ability to u n d e r s t a n d the natives w a s quite limited. In evaluating r e p o r t s that there was dissatisfaction with O t t o m a n rule in s o m e sections of the e m p i r e , British Cairo particularly misu n d e r s t o o d one of the salient characteristics of the M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t : to the extent that it was politically conscious, it was not willing to be ruled by n o n - M o s l e m s . B e h i n d e n e m y lines there were M o s l e m s who were dissatisfied with the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t , b u t they p r o p o s e d to replace it with a different T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t , or at any rate a different I s l a m i c g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y r e g a r d e d rule by a C h r i s tian E u r o p e a n power, s u c h as Britain, as intolerable. S t o r r s a p p a r e n t l y believed that he c o u l d get a r o u n d that by p r e tending that it was E g y p t i a n rule that w o u l d be s u b s t i t u t e d for T u r k i s h rule. He p r o p o s e d to create what would a p p e a r to be a new E g y p t i a n e m p i r e to replace the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the A r a b i c speaking M i d d l e E a s t ; it was behind that facade that L o r d K i t c h e n e r w o u l d rule as Britain's viceroy. S t o r r s derived particular satisfaction from reports that O t t o m a n rule h a d b e c o m e u n p o p u l a r in S y r i a ; he believed thai he could offer the S y r i a n s a p o p u l a r alternative. A c c u rate r e p o r t s , received with s o m e frequency, indicated that—other than the M a r o n i t e s , a Christian sect with ties to the F r e n c h — m o s t S y r i a n s who held political views objected to the p r o s p e c t of b e i n g ruled in the postwar world by F r a n c e , and since S t o r r s a n d his colleagues took it for g r a n t e d that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g peoples could not govern t h e m s e l v e s , the only possibility left was the one advocated by S t o r r s : the incorporation of S y r i a into British E g y p t . S e e n in that light, reports that S y r i a n s considered the G e r m a n s and T u r k s to be Zionists a n d the F r e n c h to be detestable meant that the S y r i a n s m u s t be p r o - B r i t i s h . S u m m a r i z i n g a m e m o r a n d u m s u b mitted by a S y r i a n leader who called for A r a b independence, C l a y t o n

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stated that "it is to E n g l a n d , and to E n g l a n d alone, that both S y r i a n C h r i s t i a n s a n d P a n - A r a b s are t u r n i n g . " O n 2 F e b r u a r y 1915, S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that " T h e r e is no d o u b t that local S y r i a n feeling, b o t h C h r i s t i a n a n d M u s l i m , is strongly in favor of our a d d i n g that country t o the E g y p t i a n S u l t a n a t e . . . " T h e question was whether actively to p r o m o t e that feeling. T h e newly arrived H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o , M c M a h o n , writing the s a m e d a y to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r to seek g u i d a n c e , outlined the alternatives as they had u n d o u b t e d l y been d e s c r i b e d to him by S t o r r s a n d C l a y t o n : " T h e S y r i a n s want our intervention and say that unless we can give t h e m s o m e a s s u r a n c e of s u p p o r t they will have to turn to the F r e n c h altho they w o u l d prefer us to the F r e n c h . " W r o n g - h e a d e d a n d professionally a m b i t i o u s , Britain's m e n on the s p o t s u p p o s e d that A r a b s w a n t e d t o b e ruled b y E u r o p e a n s , a n d b u o y e d by this mistaken belief, K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants a i m e d at taking control of S y r i a . F r a n c e ' s m e n on the s p o t were w r o n g - h e a d e d a n d a m b i t i o u s t o o ; a n d they also a i m e d to take S y r i a . 10

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IV D u r i n g the C r u s a d e s , F r e n c h knights w o n k i n g d o m s a n d built castles in S y r i a ; a n d in 1 9 1 4 — a millennium later—there were still F r e n c h m e n who r e g a r d e d S y r i a a s p r o p e r l y part o f F r a n c e . F r a n c e m a i n tained close ties with one of the C h r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t i e s a l o n g the M o u n t L e b a n o n coast of S y r i a , a n d F r e n c h s h i p p i n g , silk, a n d other interests eyed c o m m e r c i a l possibilities in the area. T h u s for religious, e c o n o m i c , a n d historical r e a s o n s , F r a n c e saw herself as h a v i n g a role to play in Syria's affairs. T h e m o m e n t that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, F r e n c h officials in the M i d d l e E a s t (like their British c o u n t e r p a r t s , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s ) therefore f o r m u l a t e d p l a n s t o annex T u r k e y ' s S y r i a n p r o v i n c e s . F r a n c e ' s minister in C a i r o and C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in Beirut immediately joined in u r g i n g their g o v e r n m e n t to invade the L e b a n e s e coast. T h e i r quixotic plan called for a landing of only about 2,000 French troops, who would be joined—they believed—by 3 0 , 0 0 0 local volunteers. S p e e d w a s of the essence, in their view; F r a n c e would have to strike before T u r k e y could raise an a r m y a n d before Britain c o u l d strike f i r s t . 13

T h e i r p r o p o s a l could hardly have been m o r e i n o p p o r t u n e . I t reached the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in N o v e m b e r 1914, when it w a s still in exile in B o r d e a u x , having fled from Paris in the face of the G e r m a n a d v a n c e to the M a r n e . While there were powerful colonialist figures in P a r l i a m e n t , the F o r e i g n Ministry, a n d the C a b i n e t , N o v e m b e r w a s a m o n t h in which everyone's attention was still f o c u s e d

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o n the mortal s t r u g g l e i n northern F r a n c e a n d B e l g i u m . T h e p r o p o s a l to d i s p a t c h troops to S y r i a was rejected. T h e following m o n t h , h o w e v e r — t h e contending a r m i e s i n E u r o p e having settled d o w n in their trenches, a n d the g o v e r n m e n t having returned to P a r i s — t h e p r o p o s a l to invade S y r i a did receive attention. A delegation of colonialist politicians s e c u r e d the agreement, in principle, of A l e x a n d r e M i l l e r a n d , the Minister of War, to s u p p o r t a S y r i a n expedition. F o r e i g n Minister T h e o p h i l e D e l c a s s e , however, r e m a i n e d vehemently o p p o s e d : " N o t h i n g a p p e a r s less desirable than intervention in S y r i a , " he s a i d . D e l c a s s e was one of the m a n y F r e n c h officials who believed that a n n e x i n g S y r i a would be of m u c h less value to his country than p r e s e r v i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d b e . As of 1914 F r a n c e s u p p l i e d 45 percent of the foreign capital in the private sector of the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y a n d 60 percent of the O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt, a n d thus h a d an e n o r m o u s stake in the empire's continued existence a n d v i t a l i t y . 1 4

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O n 30—31 D e c e m b e r 1914, S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , who was a b o u t to take up his duties as K i t c h e n e r ' s replacement in C a i r o , visited Paris. He m e t with officials of the F o r e i g n Ministry and War Ministry but failed to reply coherently to their q u e s t i o n s a b o u t Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy. M c M a h o n was notoriously dull-witted a n d ineffectual, b u t the F r e n c h , who d i d not know him, a s s u m e d he m u s t be clever a n d a s t u t e : his i n c o m p e t e n t replies were interpreted by M i l l e r a n d , the War Minister, as deliberate a n d s u b t l e evasions, m a s k i n g a secret British plan to invade a n d o c c u p y S y r i a by t h e m s e l v e s . 16

Millerand immediately r e p o r t e d these conversations to the F r e n c h C a b i n e t , which authorized h i m to create an expeditionary force to invade S y r i a whenever Britain d i d , whether invited by her to participate or not. In F e b r u a r y 1915, D e l c a s s e went over to L o n d o n and took u p the m a t t e r o f S y r i a with S i r E d w a r d G r e y . T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Minister was r e a s s u r e d that Britain would not invade S y r i a without g i v i n g prior notice. T h e two foreign ministers a p p e a r to have agreed that if the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were to be partitioned, Britain would not o p p o s e F r a n c e ' s d e s i g n s on S y r i a , b u t that it would be far preferable for the e m p i r e not to be broken u p . T h u s the foreign ministers settled the differences between their two c o u n t r i e s — t e m p o r a r i l y . B u t their m e n on the s p o t in the M i d d l e E a s t continued to stir up trouble between Britain a n d F r a n c e ; a n d , m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g the region, K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants also went on to p u r s u e other d a n g e r o u s d e s i g n s there.

10 K I T C H E N E R S E T S OUT T O CAPTURE ISLAM i T h e West a n d the M i d d l e E a s t have m i s u n d e r s t o o d each other throughout m o s t of the twentieth century; a n d m u c h of that m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be traced b a c k to L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s initiatives in the early years of the F i r s t World War. T h e peculiarities of his character, the deficiencies of his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the M o s l e m world, the misinformation regularly s u p p l i e d to him by his lieutenants in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m , a n d his choice of A r a b politicians with w h o m to deal have colored the c o u r s e of political events ever since. To a p p r e c i a t e the novelty of K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p r o a c h to the M i d d l e E a s t , i t m u s t b e r e m e m b e r e d that when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the F i r s t World War, A s q u i t h , G r e y , a n d Churchill did not intend to retaliate by seizing any of its d o m a i n s for Britain. T h e y did p r o p o s e to allow Britain's allies to m a k e territorial g a i n s in E u r o p e a n d A s i a M i n o r at T u r k e y ' s e x p e n s e ; b u t A s q u i t h ' s Britain h a d no territorial d e s i g n s of her own on O t t o m a n l a n d s , either in the M i d d l e E a s t or elsewhere. K i t c h e n e r , however, maintained that when the war was over, it was in Britain's vital interest to seize m u c h of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for herself: the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g part. T h i s would m e a n a total reversal of Britain's traditional policy. K i t c h e n e r , like m o s t B r i t o n s who h a d lived in the E a s t , believed that in the M o s l e m world religion counts for everything. B u t the field m a r s h a l a n d his colleagues in C a i r o and K h a r t o u m mistakenly s e e m e d to believe that M o h a m m e d a n i s m was a centralized, authoritarian s t r u c t u r e . T h e y r e g a r d e d I s l a m as a single entity: as an "it," as an organization. T h e y believed that it o b e y e d its leaders. C e n t u r i e s before, C o r t e z had won control of M e x i c o by seizing the Aztec e m p e r o r ; a n d medieval F r e n c h kings h a d tried to control C h r i s t e n d o m by keeping the p o p e captive in A v i g n o n . In m u c h the s a m e spirit, K i t c h e n e r a n d his colleagues believed that I s l a m could be b o u g h t , m a n i p u l a t e d , or c a p t u r e d by b u y i n g , m a n i p u l a t i n g , or c a p t u r i n g its 96

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religious l e a d e r s h i p . T h e y were intrigued by the notion that whoever controlled the p e r s o n of the C a l i p h — M o h a m m e d ' s s u c c e s s o r — c o n trolled I s l a m . Central to K i t c h e n e r ' s analysis w a s the contention that the C a l i p h might hurl I s l a m against Britain. S i n c e S u n n i M o s l e m s (who p r e d o m i n a t e d in M o h a m m e d a n I n d i a ) r e g a r d e d the T u r k i s h S u l t a n as a C a l i p h , K i t c h e n e r perceived this as a continuing threat. In C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m it was believed that, as of 1914, the C a l i p h had fallen into the h a n d s of J e w s a n d G e r m a n s ; the War Minister worried that once the world war was won, the C a l i p h m i g h t b e c o m e a tool in the h a n d s of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t rivals, particularly R u s s i a . I n enemy h a n d s , the caliphate c o u l d b e u s e d ( K i t c h e n e r believed) to u n d e r m i n e Britain's position in J n d i a , E g y p t , and the S u d a n . Britain ruled over half of the world's M o s l e m s . In India alone there were almost seventy million of t h e m , a n d M o h a m m e d a n s constituted a disproportionately large part of the I n d i a n A r m y . In E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , Britain ruled millions m o r e , who lived alongside the S u e z Canal sea r o a d to I n d i a . T i n y British g a r r i s o n s policed these tens of millions of natives, b u t K i t c h e n e r knew that they could not even begin to deal with a revolt. 1

T h e British imagination was h a u n t e d b y the I n d i a n M u t i n y (1857—9), the m y s t e r i o u s u p r i s i n g , incited by religion, that had b r o u g h t d o w n the rule of the E a s t I n d i a C o m p a n y . M o r e recently the u p r i s i n g in the S u d a n , which K i t c h e n e r had so brilliantly avenged, was inspired by a new religious leader who called himself the M a h d i , a title E u r o p e a n s translated as " M e s s i a h . " P a n - I s l a m i c unrest in E g y p t in 1905—6 had c a u s e d Britain deep concern. F o r K i t c h e n e r a n d his e n t o u r a g e , the possibility of a M o s l e m Holy War against Britain was a recurring n i g h t m a r e . T h e D i r e c t o r o f I n f o r m a t i o n , J o h n B u c h a n , d r a m a t i z e d these fears in his 1916 novel Greenmantle, in which G e r m a n y m a k e s use of a M o s l e m p r o p h e t in a plot to destroy Britain's e m p i r e . T h e prophet a p p e a r s in T u r k e y ; there are portents of his c o m i n g ; there is an ancient p r o p h e c y ; there is a m o d e r n revelation; and the region in which he intends to ignite a rebellion is m a d e explicit. " T h e r e is a dry wind b l o w i n g t h r o u g h the E a s t , and the parched g r a s s e s wait the s p a r k . A n d the wind is blowing t o w a r d s the I n d i a n b o r d e r . " 2

K i t c h e n e r believed that a call to a r m s by the C a l i p h against Britain d u r i n g the 1914 war c o u l d p e r h a p s be offset by the w o r d s or actions of other M o s l e m religious leaders. After Britain had won the war, however, m o r e decisive action w o u l d b e necessary. T h e reason was that when the war h a d been won, R u s s i a was s u r e to take p o s s e s s i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d — u n l e s s s o m e t h i n g were d o n e a b o u t it—of the C a l i p h . K i t c h e n e r saw a G e r m a n - c o n t r o l l e d C a l i p h as merely

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d a n g e r o u s — h e would a t t e m p t to foment unrest in I n d i a to throw Britain off balance in the E u r o p e a n war. B u t he saw a R u s s i a n controlled C a l i p h as a mortal d a n g e r to the British E m p i r e ; for (unlike A s q u i t h a n d G r e y ) . K i t c h e n e r believed that R u s s i a still harb o r e d a m b i t i o n s of taking I n d i a away from Britain. In K i t c h e n e r ' s view, G e r m a n y was an e n e m y in E u r o p e a n d R u s s i a was an enemy in A s i a : the p a r a d o x of the 1914 war in which Britain and R u s s i a were allied was t h a t by winning in E u r o p e , Britain risked losing in A s i a . T h e only completely satisfactory o u t c o m e of the war, from K i t c h e n e r ' s point of view, was for G e r m a n y to lose it without R u s s i a winning i t — a n d in 1914 it was not clear how that could be acc o m p l i s h e d . So the War Minister p l a n n e d to strike first in the c o m i n g postwar s t r u g g l e with R u s s i a for control of the road to a n d into India. K i t c h e n e r ' s p r o p o s a l was that, after the war, Britain s h o u l d a r r a n g e for her own nominee to b e c o m e C a l i p h . M o h a m m e d h a d been an A r a b i a n ; K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d to e n c o u r a g e the view that M o h a m m e d ' s s u c c e s s o r s a s C a l i p h should b e A r a b i a n , too. T h e a d v a n t a g e o f this was that the coastline of the A r a b i a n peninsula could easily be controlled by the British navy; Britain would be able to insulate the C a l i p h f r o m the influence of Britain's E u r o p e a n rivals. O n c e Britain could install the C a l i p h within her s p h e r e of influence in A r a b i a , K i t c h e n e r believed she could g a i n control of I s l a m . A n d even before the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants in C a i r o r e m i n d e d the War Minister that an obvious c a n d i d a t e to be the A r a b i a n c a l i p h — t h e ruler of M e c c a — h a d already been in touch with him.

II T o w a r d the end of the s u m m e r of 1914, as the O t t o m a n war a p p r o a c h e d , G i l b e r t Clayton recalled that A b d u l l a h , the favorite son of H u s s e i n , the ruler of M e c c a , had visited Cairo s o m e m o n t h s earlier and had s u g g e s t e d that A r a b i a m i g h t be ripe for revolt. At the time, A b d u l l a h h a d been afraid that the Y o u n g T u r k s were a b o u t to m o v e against his father; a n d A b d u l l a h , whose indolent disposition hid a bold intelligence, looked a b o u t for p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t from a b r o a d . B u t shortly afterward his father a n d the Porte c o m p o s e d their differences, so that British assistance was no longer needed. E v e n now, it is not certain what A b d u l l a h said in C a i r o a n d what was said to him. A b d u l l a h a p p a r e n t l y first met L o r d K i t c h e n e r there in 1912 or 1913. He met K i t c h e n e r in C a i r o again in F e b r u a r y a n d April 1914, a n d also m e t with R o n a l d S t o r r s . A b d u l l a h s e e m s to have s o u g h t a s s u r a n c e s of British help if the Porte were to seek to

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d e p o s e his father. At the t i m e , K i t c h e n e r , who i n q u i r e d in detail a b o u t the difficulties in A r a b i a , s e e m s to have d i s c l a i m e d any interest in interfering in internal O t t o m a n affairs. A b d u l l a h m a y have been less i m p r e s s e d by the disclaimer of interest than by the e x p r e s s i o n of concern. T o S t o r r s , A b d u l l a h a p p a r e n t l y c l a i m e d — f a l s e l y — t h a t the rival chiefs of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a were p r e p a r e d to follow his father in o p p o s i n g the Porte's d e s i g n s . He s u g g e s t e d a future relationship between A r a b i a a n d Britain similar to that between A f g h a n i s t a n a n d Britain, in which the former exercised internal self-rule a n d the latter a d m i n i s t e r e d all foreign relations. T h o u g h the idea was attractive to him, S t o r r s , like his chief, was u n a b l e to offer A b d u l l a h the encoura g e m e n t that h e s o u g h t . 3

4

Several A r a b i a n e m i r s had indeed been in conflict for years with the Y o u n g T u r k leadership i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . B u t G i l b e r t Clayton failed to appreciate the extent to which religious, dynastic, a n d other differences divided t h e m . A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g e m i g r e s in C a i r o , with w h o m he met, m a y have misled h i m in this connection. In fact none of the A r a b i a n e m i r s was willing to accept one of the others as a leader. Prominent a m o n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g exiles living in C a i r o with w h o m Clayton s p o k e was a colorful former O t t o m a n a r m y officer a n d C . U . P . politician n a m e d Aziz Ali a l - M a s r i . A l - M a s r i , o f C i r c a s s i a n ancestry,* was b o r n a n d b r o u g h t up in E g y p t ; he h a d a t t e n d e d military school in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . After military service in the field, he h a d e m e r g e d as a leader of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party. Y e t he was a m e r e major attached to the G e n e r a l Staff at a t i m e when E n v e r , a c l a s s m a t e of w h o m he held a low opinion, h a d b e c o m e Minister of War. D i s c o n t e n t e d , a l - M a s r i r e s p o n d e d by organizing al'Ahd, a small secret society of a r m y officers who objected to the C . U . P . ' s centralizing policies a n d its failure to give those who s p o k e A r a b i c their fair s h a r e of high office. T h e officers of al-'Ahd were united in their o p p o s i t i o n to the T u r k i f y i n g policies a d o p t e d by the C . U . P . T h e y advocated either a d m i t t i n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u lations to a greater share of power in the central g o v e r n m e n t , or else decentralizing a n d allowing them g r e a t e r a u t o n o m y at the local level, or p e r h a p s b o t h . 5

E n v e r P a s h a was responsible for h a v i n g h a d M a j o r a l - M a s r i arrested and convicted on t r u m p e d - u p c h a r g e s in early 1914. T h u s a l - M a s r i unwillingly f o u n d himself cast in the role of an A r a b r e v o l u t i o n a r y — unwillingly, b e c a u s e he a s p i r e d to leadership of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as a whole, not a m e r e section of it. R e s p o n d i n g to opinion in C a i r o , * T h e Circassians were a people from the Caucasus, once ruled by Turkey and later by Russia.

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L o r d K i t c h e n e r intervened o n his behalf; a n d D j e m a l P a s h a a r r a n g e d to have him p a r d o n e d a n d exiled to his native E g y p t . An o p p o n e n t , since his childhood, of British rule in E g y p t , anti-British, p r o - G e r m a n , a s u p p o r t e r of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e who was o p p o s e d only to its g o v e r n m e n t , a military politician who n u m b e r e d a m e r e handful of colleagues a m o n g his s u p p o r t e r s , a l - M a s r i was m i s u n d e r s t o o d by the British intelligence officers who wrongly r e g a r d e d him both as powerful a n d as a potential ally. In early S e p t e m b e r 1914, it a p p e a r s that a l - M a s r i visited the British A g e n c y in C a i r o , a n d met with C l a y t o n . A l - M a s r i knew that A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d a n d other A r a b i a n leaders had in the p a s t considered rising against the P o r t e . P e r h a p s he told C l a y t o n s o . P e r h a p s Clayton was r e m i n d e d of A b d u l l a h ' s visit and of what he h a d said to S t o r r s a n d K i t c h e n e r . After seeing a l - M a s r i , Clayton met with R o n a l d S t o r r s and m a d e a r r a n g e m e n t s for him to forward a secret m e m o r a n d u m to L o r d K i t c h e n e r . T h e Clayton m e m o r a n d u m was enclosed in a letter that S t o r r s was to s e n d to his old chief on the relatively innocuous subject of c a m e l s . 6

Ill It was a c o m m o n British concern in 1914 that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , if it entered the war, m i g h t launch an attack against the S u e z C a n a l ; a n d , like officials in the war ministries of E u r o p e who analyzed the military potential of n e i g h b o r i n g e n e m y countries in t e r m s of railroad facilities, R o n a l d S t o r r s focused attention on the s u p p l y of c a m e l s available to the O t t o m a n forces. T h e O t t o m a n a r m y , he wrote in his letter to K i t c h e n e r , w o u l d count on obtaining its animals from the c a m e l - b r e e d e r s of the western district of A r a b i a , the H e j a z , and what S t o r r s p r o p o s e d was to e n c o u r a g e the local r u l e r — t h e E m i r of M e c c a — n o t to deliver t h e m . T h e m e s s a g e a b o u t c a m e l s served as his cover: with it S t o r r s forwarded Clayton's secret m e m o r a n d u m of 6 S e p t e m b e r 1914 to K i t c h e n e r which u r g e d h i m to enter into conversations with the ruler of M e c c a for other p u r p o s e s . O n e of the issues raised in Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m was whether the O t t o m a n S u l t a n could b e replaced a s C a l i p h of I s l a m by an A r a b i a n leader friendly to Britain. If s o , the E m i r of M e c c a , the g u a r d i a n of the M o s l e m H o l y Places, was an o b v i o u s c a n d i d a t e , the m o r e so as he was in a position to p r o v i d e Britain with important assistance in the matter of p i l g r i m a g e s . In the r h y t h m of life in the I s l a m i c E a s t , no activity was m o r e important than the m a s s p i l g r i m a g e each year to the H o l y Places of A r a b i a — a p i l g r i m a g e that every M o s l e m able to do so is c o m m a n d e d to m a k e at least once in his lifetime. T h e world war interfered,

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particularly in 1915. E v e n if I n d i a n M o s l e m s were to forgive Britain for g o i n g to war against the only significant i n d e p e n d e n t I s l a m i c power, there was a question as to whether they w o u l d forgive the disruption of the p i l g r i m a g e that played so large a role in their lives. T h e H o l y Places o f A r a b i a , M e c c a , a n d M e d i n a are located i n the H e j a z , whose ruler therefore was in a position to s a f e g u a r d the right of British M o s l e m s to continue visiting their shrines despite the war. C l a i m i n g descent f r o m the Prophet's family, the E m i r of M e c c a — i n addition to b e i n g ruler of the H e j a z — w a s in a position to a s s u m e the mantle of the C a l i p h . In his secret m e m o r a n d u m , C l a y t o n m a d e the erroneous assertion that the rival regional leaders of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a — t h e rulers of Asir a n d the Y e m e n , a s well a s I b n S a u d a n d p e r h a p s I b n R a s h i d o f N e j d — w e r e c o m i n g together with the ruler of M e c c a to work for "an A r a b i a for the A r a b s . " A c c o r d i n g to Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m , the m o v e m e n t was e n c o u r a g e d by the K h e d i v e , the nominal ruler of E g y p t u n d e r the S u l t a n , who also r e g a r d e d himself as a c a n d i d a t e to succeed the S u l t a n as C a l i p h of I s l a m . It is not clear how Clayton intended to reconcile the conflicting a m b i t i o n s of this diverse g r o u p . 7

T h e claim that the other rival leaders w o u l d unite b e h i n d the E m i r of M e c c a was one that A b d u l l a h h a d a d v a n c e d on his father's behalf s o m e five m o n t h s before in conversations with R o n a l d S t o r r s . In presenting it as fresh information, C l a y t o n m a y have been indicating that the information h a d been recently confirmed to him by a l - M a s r i or by s o m e other exiled O t t o m a n figure. T h e novelty of the m e m o r a n d u m lay in the suggestion that the A r a b i a n s could be of service to Britain d u r i n g the war, a n d not merely afterward. K i t c h e n e r r e s p o n d e d immediately. He sent a cable to C a i r o on 24 S e p t e m b e r 1914, in which he o r d e r e d that S t o r r s be told to s e n d a trusted m e s s e n g e r to A b d u l l a h to ask a q u e s t i o n in confidence: in the event of war, w o u l d the H e j a z be for or against Britain? Before s e n d i n g his c a b l e , K i t c h e n e r cleared it with S i r E d w a r d G r e y , who was i m p r e s s e d by Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m , which he t e r m e d "very important." 8

A few weeks later the m e s s e n g e r returned from his undercover j o u r n e y to O t t o m a n A r a b i a with a v a g u e but e n c o u r a g i n g reply. It invited the War Minister to spell out what he h a d in m i n d . C a i r o cabled K i t c h e n e r that " C o m m u n i c a t i o n is g u a r d e d , b u t friendly a n d favourable." 9

Meanwhile the A g e n c y h a d again been in c o m m u n i c a t i o n with M a j o r a l - M a s r i and also other A r a b i c e m i g r e s in C a i r o . T h e s e exiles from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e continued to carry on the d e c a d e s - o l d discussion of who the various a n d diverse A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s of the e m p i r e were, or o u g h t to b e . T h i s question of national identity was one which h a d been raised in the coffee h o u s e s of D a m a s c u s a n d Beirut, and in the student q u a r t e r s of Paris from the nineteenth

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century o n w a r d , a n d h a d given rise to a variety of literary c l u b s a n d secret societies within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . In the context of O t t o m a n politics, the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g exiles in C a i r o were r e s p o n d i n g to those policies of the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n ment which s u b j e c t e d the majority of the inhabitants of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to the h e g e m o n y of the roughly 40 percent of the population who s p o k e T u r k i s h . In one way or another, what the exiles advocated was a greater say in g o v e r n m e n t a l matters, a n d m o r e a n d higher official positions for those who s p o k e A r a b i c — a b o u t the s a m e percentage a s s p o k e T u r k i s h . T h o u g h often referred to as nationalists, these m e n are m o r e accurately d e s c r i b e d as s e p a r a t i s t s . T h e y did not ask for independ e n c e ; they asked for a greater m e a s u r e of participation a n d local rule. T h e y were willing to be ruled largely by T u r k s b e c a u s e the T u r k s were fellow-Moslems. U n l i k e E u r o p e a n nationalists, they were people whose beliefs existed in a religious rather than secular framework. T h e y lived within the walls of the city of I s l a m in a sense in which E u r o p e had not lived within C h r i s t e n d o m since the early M i d d l e A g e s ; for, like the cities built in the A r a b world in medieval times, the lives of M o s l e m s circle a r o u n d a central m o s q u e . T h e y did not represent an ethnic g r o u p , for historically, the only ethnic or "true" A r a b s were the inhabitants of A r a b i a , while the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n s of s u c h provinces as B a g h d a d or D a m a s c u s , or of s u c h cities as Algiers or C a i r o , were of m i x e d ethnic stock a n d b a c k g r o u n d , s p a n n i n g the vast r a n g e of ancient p e o p l e s and cultures that e x t e n d e d from the Atlantic O c e a n to the Persian G u l f . 10

T h e r e were only a few dozen p e o p l e who were active partisans of A r a b i c nationalism ( s e p a r a t i s m ) in O c t o b e r 1914, as m e m b e r s of one or m o r e of the secret societies, s u c h as a l - F a t a t and al-'Ahd, of which the British A g e n c y in C a i r o was b e c o m i n g increasingly a w a r e . A great deal m o r e is now known a b o u t these m e n a n d what they represented than was known to the British at the t i m e . In large part they were m e m b e r s of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g elites who had been well connected with the r e g i m e which h a d been overthrown by the Y o u n g T u r k s and who felt threatened by the p r o - T u r k i s h and centralizing t r e n d s i n C . U . P . p o l i c y . Milne C h e e t h a m , the acting A g e n t and C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in C a i r o , cabled an intelligence m e m o r a n d u m a b o u t the secret societies to K i t c h e n e r on 26 October 1914, as the field marshal p o n d e r e d the t e r m s of his next m e s s a g e to A r a b i a . 1 1

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that "If the A r a b nation assist E n g l a n d in this war that has been forced u p o n us by T u r k e y , E n g l a n d will g u a r a n t e e that no internal intervention take place in A r a b i a , a n d will give A r a b s every assistance against foreign a g g r e s s i o n . " ( B y " A r a b s , " K i t c h e n e r here meant those who lived in A r a b i a . ) In other w o r d s , if the A r a b i a n leaders freed their p e n i n s u l a f r o m the S u l t a n a n d declared their i n d e p e n d e n c e , Britain would help to protect t h e m against any invasion from a b r o a d . At the A g e n c y , C h e e t h a m a n d S t o r r s were r e s p o n s i b l e for s u p e r vising the translation of this m e s s a g e into A r a b i c . A p p a r e n t l y with the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of C l a y t o n , they b r o a d e n e d its l a n g u a g e to p l e d g e British s u p p o r t for "the e m a n c i p a t i o n of the A r a b s . " T h i s went far in the direction pointed out by R e g i n a l d Wingate. Wingate believed in stirring up the tribes of A r a b i a on Britain's behalf. U n l i k e K i t c h e n e r , who p r o p o s e d to deal with A r a b i a at the end of the war, the impatient Wingate u r g e d i m m e d i a t e action at the b e g i n n i n g of the war. H i s goal was to lure the A r a b s away from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d as early as 14 J a n u a r y 1915 he wrote to C l a y t o n that "I fear British action has been so long delayed that it is doubtful if we shall now s u c c e e d i n detaching the A r a b s . . . " H i s familiar c o m plaint was that his s u p e r i o r s h a d not heeded his advice in t i m e . 1 3

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As the K i t c h e n e r m e s s a g e w a s b e i n g sent out in A r a b i c translation, the e m i g r e g r o u p s with which C l a y t o n kept in contact in C a i r o s e e m to have told him that A r a b s in the H e j a z would be s u s p i c i o u s of British intentions, a n d that s o m e sort of clarification of what was b e i n g p r o m i s e d w o u l d be in o r d e r . K i t c h e n e r , with G r e y ' s a p p r o v a l , immediately authorized the A g e n c y to issue a further statement. A g a i n the A g e n c y went b e y o n d its instructions, a n d i s s u e d proclam a t i o n s directed not merely to A r a b i a , but to practically all of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a ("Palestine, S y r i a a n d M e s o p o t a m i a " ) , p r o m i s ing that if their inhabitants threw off the T u r k s , Britain would recognize a n d g u a r a n t e e their i n d e p e n d e n c e . 15

A l t h o u g h the A g e n c y exceeded its instructions in m a k i n g this public offer, the p l e d g e itself was a reasonable one. Britain h a d not yet m a d e any conflicting c o m m i t m e n t to the Allied Powers r e g a r d i n g the future of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a . If the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces, in defiance of all the probabilities, h a d struck a m a j o r blow for the Allied c a u s e by s e c e d i n g from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d by successfully winning their f r e e d o m by their own exertions, there was no reason why Britain s h o u l d not have g u a r a n t e e d help in protecting their future i n d e p e n d e n c e . It would have been in Britain's national interest, with respect b o t h to w a r t i m e a n d to postwar rivalries, to do s o . It was rather the m e s s a g e that K i t c h e n e r had authorized that was troubling, for—reflecting his belief that A r a b i a was important not for the role it c o u l d play in the war b u t for the role it could play after the w a r — h e h a d closed his m e s s a g e to M e c c a with his b o m b s h e l l : "It

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m a y be that an A r a b of true race will a s s u m e the K h a l i f a t e at M e c c a or M e d i n a , a n d so g o o d m a y c o m e by the help of G o d out of all the evil that is now o c c u r r i n g . " R e s t o r i n g the caliphate to A r a b i a , where it a n d M o h a m m e d were b o r n thirteen centuries before, was K i t c h e n e r ' s strategy for p r e p a r i n g for the rivalry with R u s s i a which was b o u n d to follow the conclusion of the war against G e r m a n y . B u t A r a b i a n s , living within the political confines of their own peninsula, were not likely to u n d e r s t a n d what he h a d in m i n d . T h e y would not know that at the outset of one great conflict between E u r o p e a n p o w e r s he was already thinking a h e a d to the next. T h e y would be even less likely to recognize that K i t c h e n e r , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s did not u n d e r s t a n d the nature of the caliphate. 16

S c h o l a r s have been kept b u s y ever since explaining to western s t u d e n t s of the M i d d l e E a s t that the split between t e m p o r a l a n d spiritual authority, that in medieval E u r o p e pitted p o p e against e m peror, d i d not o c c u r in the world of I s l a m . K i t c h e n e r , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s were mistaken in believing that the C a l i p h could be a spiritual leader only. In I s l a m , all of life, including g o v e r n m e n t a n d politics, falls within the g o v e r n a n c e of the H o l y L a w ; so that in the eyes of S u n n i M o s l e m s , s u c h as the O t t o m a n S u l t a n a n d the E m i r of M e c c a , the d o m i n i o n of the C a l i p h as u p h o l d e r of the H o l y L a w is p e r v a s i v e . What B r i t i s h C a i r o d i d not see is that the C a l i p h is also a p r i n c e : a governor a n d a leader in battle as well as a leader in prayer. K i t c h e n e r ' s followers, for all their s u p p o s e d knowledge of the I s l a m i c world, m i s s e d the i m p o r t a n c e of another point: they ignored the extent of I s l a m i c disunity a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n . T h u s the K i t c h e n e r plan called for I b n S a u d , leader of the fierce puritanical Wahhabi sect, to recognize the spiritual authority of the S u n n i ruler of M e c c a ; b u t that was not a realistic possibility, for like so m a n y of the d o z e n s of c o n t e n d i n g sects into which I s l a m is divided, theirs were at daggers drawn. T h e p r o p o s a l which K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers sent off to M e c c a misled its recipient, who read it as an offer to make him ruler of a vast k i n g d o m ; for that, of c o u r s e , is what the new C a l i p h of I s l a m would have been. As will be seen, when the ruler of M e c c a o p e n e d the di s c u s s i o n of what the b o u n d a r i e s of his new k i n g d o m were to b e , S t o r r s w a s a p p a l l e d ; for he a n d K i t c h e n e r had not intended that the area ruled by the E m i r s h o u l d be e x p a n d e d . In the s u m m e r of 1915, S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that if the ruler of M e c c a could conciliate the other ruling e m i r s a n d chieftains of the A r a b i a n peninsula, a n d i m p r e s s u p o n t h e m that "he has no idea of p r e t e n d i n g to any temporal rights within their territories, his chances of a g e n e r a l — t h o u g h hardly yet of a universal—recognition as C a l i p h will be good." 1 7

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T h e British intended to s u p p o r t the c a n d i d a c y of H u s s e i n for the position of "Pope" of I s l a m — a position that ( u n b e k n o w n to t h e m ) did not exist; while ( u n b e k n o w n to t h e m too) the l a n g u a g e they u s e d e n c o u r a g e d him to a t t e m p t to b e c o m e ruler of the entire A r a b w o r l d — t h o u g h in fact S t o r r s believed that it w a s a mistake for H u s s e i n to aim at e x t e n d i n g his rule at all. K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants would have been astonished to learn what their c o m m u n i c a t i o n signified to M o s l e m s in A r a b i a .

11 INDIA P R O T E S T S i A r t h u r Hirtzel, S e c r e t a r y to the Political D e p a r t m e n t of the I n d i a Office, w a s not shown the K i t c h e n e r m e s s a g e s to H u s s e i n until 12 D e c e m b e r 1914—after they h a d reached M e c c a . He was a g h a s t . Hirtzel quickly criticized "a very d a n g e r o u s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " which, in hinting at an A r a b caliphate, "does the very thing which this Office has always u n d e r s t o o d that H . M . G . would not d o . " T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , L o r d C r e w e , privately told the Viceroy that K i t c h e n e r refused to see that the spiritual prestige of the existing C a l i p h — t h e T u r k i s h S u l t a n — r e m a i n e d intact, and that M o s l e m s in I n d i a , who held h i m in high r e g a r d , even if they accepted his being replaced would never accept his b e i n g replaced as a result of foreign meddling. 1

2

W h e n h e saw K i t c h e n e r ' s p l e d g e t o protect A r a b i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , H i r t z e l p r o t e s t e d that it w a s "a startling d o c u m e n t , " "a g u a r a n t e e given . . . i n writing w i t h o u t the a u t h o r i t y o f H . M . G . " H i r t z e l ' s protest was b u t t r e s s e d by an earlier m e m o r a n d u m from the F o r e i g n D e p a r t m e n t of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , forwarded to the I n d i a Office with s u p p o r t from the g o v e r n o r s of A d e n , B o m b a y , a n d elsewhere, which explained that, "What we want is not a U n i t e d A r a b i a : but a weak a n d disunited A r a b i a , split up into little principalities so far as possible u n d e r o u r s u z e r a i n t y — b u t i n c a p a b l e of coordinated action against u s , f o r m i n g a buffer against the P o w e r s in the W e s t . " T h i s m i s u n d e r s t o o d British Cairo's intentions: as Clayton later wrote to Wingate, " I n d i a s e e m s o b s e s s e d with the fear of a powerful a n d united A r a b state, which can never exist unless we are fool e n o u g h to create it." 3

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A t t e m p t i n g to soothe feelings in the India Office and in the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , L o r d C r e w e explained that there had been no prior consultation a b o u t the K i t c h e n e r pledge b e c a u s e "this was a private c o m m u n i c a t i o n of L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s " rather than an official 106

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c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t . B u t the j u r i s d i c tional d i s p u t e that h a d flared up w a s not extinguished by s u c h a s s u r a n c e s ; it flamed on heatedly t h r o u g h o u t the war a n d afterward.

II India's institutional outlook w a s that of a b e l e a g u e r e d g a r r i s o n s p r e a d too thin along an o v e r e x t e n d e d line. H e r instinct w a s to avoid new involvements. H e r strategy for the M i d d l e E a s t w a s to hold the bare m i n i m u m — t h e coastline of the G u l f , to keep o p e n the sea r o a d to a n d f r o m B r i t a i n — a n d t o refuse t o b e d r a w n inland. N o n e t h e l e s s the u n w a n t e d war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o p e n e d u p the possibility o f a n n e x i n g n e a r b y B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d . Colonization a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of these provinces w o u l d b r i n g great riches, it w a s believed; a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a w a s t e m p t e d , even t h o u g h in the p a s t its officials h a d often w a r n e d against a s s u m i n g further territorial responsibilities. Whatever she did, British I n d i a w a s d e t e r m i n e d to identify her interests with those o f her s u b j e c t s , m a n y o f w h o m were M o s l e m ; a n d L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s I s l a m i c policy p o s e d a threat to this vital interest. K i t c h e n e r ' s initiatives also i n t r u d e d into a foreign policy s p h e r e in which the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a jealously g u a r d e d its rights against c o m p e t i t o r s within the British g o v e r n m e n t . T h e F o r e i g n D e p a r t m e n t of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a exercised responsibility for relations with s u c h n e i g h b o r i n g areas a s T i b e t , A f g h a n i s t a n , Persia, a n d eastern A r a b i a ; a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a also a d m i n i s t e r e d Britain's protectorate over A d e n a n d the G u l f s h e i k h d o m s t h r o u g h a network of g o v e r n o r s a n d resident a g e n t s . T h u s when K i t c h e n e r entered into d i s c u s s i o n s with the ruler of M e c c a , he intervened in an area of I n d i a n concern a n d activity. T h o u g h the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a h a d long followed a policy of holding the coastal p o r t s along the Persian G u l f sea route to S u e z , it had avoided involvement in the politics of the interior. E v e n s o , C a p t a i n William H e n r y S h a k e s p e a r , an officer in the I n d i a n Political S e r v i c e , h a d , as Political A g e n t in K u w a i t , entered into relations of political a n d personal friendship with A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , a n emir and a rising p o w e r in central A r a b i a , in the years immediately p r e c e d i n g the o u t b r e a k o f w a r . L i k e A b d u l l a h i n C a i r o , I b n S a u d h a d e x p r e s s e d a willingness for his d o m a i n to b e c o m e a British client s t a t e ; a n d like K i t c h e n e r a n d S t o r r s , S h a k e s p e a r w a s obliged to indicate that his g o v e r n m e n t w a s unwilling to interfere in m a t t e r s of purely d o m e s t i c O t t o m a n concern. T h i s w a s even m o r e t r u e at the time b e c a u s e the F o r e i g n Office b a c k e d the p r o - T u r k i s h H o u s e of 7

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R a s h i d , the p a r a m o u n t rulers of central A r a b i a a n d the H o u s e of S a u d ' s hereditary e n e m y . B u t with the o u t b r e a k of war, I n d i a was free to b a c k her p r o t e g e I b n S a u d , only to find C a i r o b a c k i n g a rival in M e c c a . C a i r o , in turn, found its own projects thwarted by I n d i a . In N o v e m b e r 1914, the m o n t h that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, C a i r o p r o p o s e d (with the a p p r o v a l of Sir E d w a r d G r e y ) to s e n d M a j o r a l - M a s r i on an expedition to organize agitation a n d p e r h a p s revolution in M e s o p o t a m i a . E v e r fearful of igniting a conflagration that c o u l d blaze out of control, I n d i a blocked the p r o p o s a l . I n d i a believed that if the A r a b s ever were to turn against the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t , I b n S a u d s h o u l d lead this revolt; b u t a s o f D e c e m b e r 1914, the Viceroy a r g u e d that action along these lines would be p r e m a t u r e . T a k i n g a contrary view, K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m looked to Sherif H u s s e i n as Britain's important A r a b i a n ally, a n d i s s u e d p r o c l a m a t i o n s u r g i n g A r a b s t o revolt. A p a r t f r o m this difference in overall strategy, S i m l a , on the b a s i s of prewar dealings, was aware of others in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world who might be alienated by British s u p p o r t for the E m i r of Mecca's pretensions. T h e r e w a s S h e i k h M u b a r a k of K u w a i t , long a friend of B r i t a i n ; there was the friendly ruler of the Persian port of M u h a m m a r a ; there was even S a y y i d T a l i b , the m a g n a t e o f B a s r a , "dangerous scoundrel" t h o u g h Hirtzel believed him to b e . A F o r e i g n Office official, in warning of r e p e r c u s s i o n s in A r a b i a , noted that the E m i r o f Mecca's two enemies t h e r e — I b n S a u d a n d S e y y i d M o h a m m e d a l - I d r i s i , the ruler of A s i r — w e r e , in his view, Britain's friends. 8

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I n d i a n officials m a d e the point that Cairo's policies were reckless; worse, they w o u l d not work. Britain's s p o n s o r s h i p of an A r a b caliphate would not only adversely affect M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a ( a n d M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a was, f r o m the British point of view, what the caliphate issue was principally a b o u t ) ; it would also do no g o o d in the A r a b world. Percy C o x , of the Indian Political S e r v i c e , reported in D e c e m b e r 1915 that he h a d held meetings with the S h e i k h of K u w a i t a n d I b n S a u d , a n d that he had f o u n d the caliphate question to be of no interest to t h e m . I b n S a u d said that a m o n g the A r a b i a n chiefs "no one cared in the least who called himself C a l i p h , " a n d claimed that his W a h h a b i sect did not recognize any caliphs after the first four (the last of w h o m h a d died m o r e than a t h o u s a n d years before). 1 1

* "Simla" is often used to mean the Government of India, whose summer capital it was.

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III O d d l y , n o b o d y in L o n d o n or in S i m l a s e e m s to have d r a w n the a p p r o p r i a t e conclusion f r o m art e p i s o d e at the end of 1914 that showed the power of the C a l i p h h a d been put to the test a n d had been shown to be illusory. In N o v e m b e r 1914, u p o n entering the F i r s t World War, the S u l t a n / C a l i p h p r o c l a i m e d a jihad, or H o l y War, against Britain, a m i d s t well-planned d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e r e were c r o w d s , b a n d s , a n d s p e e c h e s . T h e W i l h e m s t r a s s e o r d e r e d copies o f the proclamation to be forwarded immediately to Berlin for translation into "Arabic a n d I n d i a n " (sic) for leaflet p r o p a g a n d a a m o n g M o s l e m t r o o p s i n e n e m y a r m i e s . T h e staff o f the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Ministry predicted that the S u l t a n ' s actions w o u l d "awaken the fanaticism of I s l a m " a n d m i g h t lead to a large-scale revolution in I n d i a . 1 2

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T h e G e r m a n military attache in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e believed that the proclamation w o u l d influence M o s l e m soldiers in the British a n d F r e n c h a r m i e s not to fire on G e r m a n t r o o p s . However, the skeptical G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r p r o v e d a better p r o p h e t : he wrote in a private letter that the p r o c l a m a t i o n would "coax only a few M o s l e m s " to c o m e over to the side of the Central P o w e r s . He was right. The jihad p r o v e d to b e , in a coinage of the F i r s t World War, a " d u d " : a shell that was fired, b u t failed to explode.* 1 4

E n t h u s i a s m for a Holy War was low, even in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e jihad was p r o c l a i m e d , b u t nothing h a p p e n e d . T h e British, however, continued to be wary a n d feared that any jolt might c a u s e the unexp l o d e d shell s u d d e n l y to go off. In O c t o b e r 1915 G i l b e r t C l a y t o n wrote a m e m o r a n d u m a r g u i n g that although the jihad until then had been a failure, it still m i g h t c o m e a l i v e . A c c o r d i n g to L o r d C r e w e , Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , the only reason it had not worked was b e c a u s e the Porte did not control the Holy Places of the H e j a z : "If the C o m m i t t e e of U n i o n a n d P r o g r e s s get control of M e c c a , they might be able to declare a regular J e h a d [sic], p r o b a b l y affecting Afghanistan, a n d g i v i n g serious t r o u b l e in I n d i a . " 15

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Meanwhile Wingate, Clayton, a n d S t o r r s were actively p u r s u i n g the K i t c h e n e r plan that called for an association in the postwar world with A r a b i a a n d with a n A r a b i a n religious p r i m a t e . T h e cautious Clayton w a r n e d that the A r a b caliphate was a delicate matter a n d should b e p r o p o s e d b y A r a b s t h e m s e l v e s ; but Wingate, a s always impatient to m o v e forward, a s s u r e d F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that "We shall do what we can to p u s h the A r a b m o v e m e n t & I have got various irons in the fire in this c o n n e c t i o n . " 17

18

* Troubles caused by groups such as the nomadic Senussi on Egypt's Libyan frontier were minor, and might well have occurred in any event.

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B u t the I n d i a Office continued to fear that, as a result of these activities, M e c c a would be d r a w n into the vortex of world p o l i t i c s — a n eventuality that might d i s t u r b opinion in I n d i a at a time when any d i s t u r b a n c e could prove fatal. D u r i n g the c o u r s e of the war, S i m l a was g o i n g to s e n d m a n y of its E u r o p e a n soldiers to E u r o p e , a n d large n u m b e r s of I n d i a n t r o o p s as well. F o r the duration of the war it was in a weak position to quell whatever u p r i s i n g s m i g h t occur. C a i r o a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e both s e e m e d to S i m l a to be p u r s u i n g policies that threatened to inflame M o s l e m p a s s i o n s in I n d i a a n d t h u s to imperil the I n d i a n E m p i r e . As the war p r o g r e s s e d , British officials who ruled I n d i a increasingly c a m e to believe that their m o s t d a n g e r o u s adversaries were neither the T u r k s nor the G e r m a n s , b u t the British officials g o v e r n i n g E g y p t ; for despite India's p r o t e s t s , B r i t i s h C a i r o went a h e a d with its intrigues in M e c c a .

12 T H E MAN IN T H E M I D D L E i M e c c a , where M o h a m m e d was b o r n , a n d M e d i n a , t o which h e e m i g r a t e d , are the holy cities that for M o s l e m s everywhere give u n i q u e i m p o r t a n c e to the m o u n t a i n o u s H e j a z , the long a n d narrow western section of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a b o r d e r i n g the R e d S e a . H e j a z m e a n s " s e p a r a t i n g " — a reference to the highlands that divide it f r o m the plateau to the east. In the early twentieth century A r a b i a was an e m p t y a n d desolate land, a n d the H e j a z , in the w o r d s of the 1910 Encyclopaedia Britannica, w a s "physically the m o s t desolate and uninviting province in A r a b i a . " Whole sections of it were u n watered a n d u n i n h a b i t e d wilderness. A b o u t 750 miles long a n d , at its widest, a b o u t 200 miles a c r o s s , the H e j a z precariously s u p p o r t e d a population estimated at 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , half-Bedouin a n d half-townsmen. A l t h o u g h it f o r m e d part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , its distance f r o m C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , magnified by the primitive state of transportation a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , h a d always lent it considerable a u t o n o m y . D a t e s , of which a h u n d r e d varieties were said to grow, were the staple c r o p ; but the real industry of the province was the annual p i l g r i m a g e . A b o u t 7 0 , 0 0 0 p i l g r i m s m a d e the journey t o M e c c a each year. Protecting the p i l g r i m s from m a r a u d i n g B e d o u i n tribes was a principal function of the local representative of the O t t o m a n government ; a n d the authorities m a d e a practice of offering s u b s i d i e s to the tribes in the hope of p e r s u a d i n g t h e m that there was better pay in s a f e g u a r d i n g than in molesting the visitors. M e c c a was a two-day camel j o u r n e y , or a b o u t forty-five miles, f r o m the nearest coastal p o r t . It lay in a hot a n d b a r r e n valley, a n d controlled the p a s s a g e s t h r o u g h the s u r r o u n d i n g hills. Its population was estimated at 6 0 , 0 0 0 . E n t r a n c e into its precincts was prohibited to n o n - M o s l e m s , a n d exercised the powerful lure of the f o r b i d d e n . Only a few E u r o p e a n travelers had s u c c e e d e d in penetrating the city in d i s g u i s e a n d b r i n g i n g back detailed descriptions of it.

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T h e s e E u r o p e a n s reported that even in the holy city certain dark practices lingered from a primitive p a s t . A c c o r d i n g to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, " T h e u n s p e a k a b l e vices of M e c c a are a scandal to all I s l a m , a n d a constant s o u r c e of wonder to pious p i l g r i m s . T h e slave trade has connexions with the p i l g r i m a g e which are not thoroughly clear; b u t u n d e r cover of the p i l g r i m a g e a great deal of importation a n d exportation of slaves g o e s on." Y e t E u r o p e a n travelers also r e p o r t e d that the people of the H e j a z , and indeed of all A r a b i a , were a m o n g nature's aristocrats. A c c o r d i n g to the Britannica: Physically the A r a b s are one of the strongest a n d noblest races of the world . .. T h u s , physically, they yield to few races, if any, of m a n k i n d ; mentally, they s u r p a s s m o s t , a n d are only kept b a c k in the m a r c h of p r o g r e s s by the r e m a r k a b l e defect of organizing power and incapacity for c o m b i n e d action. L a x a n d imperfect as are their f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t , it is with impatience that even these are b o r n e . . . T h e j o b of the E m i r of M e c c a , if the Britannica was to be believed, was not an easy one. F o r M o s l e m s , M e c c a had always been the center of the world. N o w , the a m b i t i o n s of K i t c h e n e r ' s C a i r o a n d of the C . U . P . ' s C o n s t a n t i n o p l e b r o u g h t the arid H e j a z into the center of twentieth-century politics. T h e new attentions that M e c c a received in the 1914 war b r o u g h t it into the center in other ways, less welcome to its E m i r ; he found himself caught in the m i d d l e . H u s s e i n ibn Ali, who ruled the H e j a z on behalf of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n , was styled the Sherif of M e c c a a n d its E m i r . To be a sherif, or notable, was to be a d e s c e n d a n t of M o h a m m e d ; a n d H u s s e i n , like M o h a m m e d himself, was a m e m b e r of the H o u s e of H a s h e m . F o r s o m e time it had been the practice of the O t t o m a n regime to appoint the E m i r of M e c c a from a m o n g rival sherifs. In 1908 H u s s e i n , of the D h a w u - ' A w n clan, was personally selected by the S u l t a n , over the opposition of the C . U . P . , which backed the candidate of a rival clan. H u s s e i n , like his courtly friend the G r a n d Vizier and like the S u l t a n himself, w a s a m a n of old-fashioned b r e e d i n g a n d learning whose style of expression was ornate. Of m e d i u m height, with a white b e a r d , a n d a b o u t sixty years of a g e in 1914, he had spent m u c h of his life in glorified captivity at the court in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e r e , even the p r y i n g eyes of enemies were unable to detect him in any i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t ; he spent his time in meditation. H u s s e i n continually e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g personal loyalty to the S u l t a n . T h e S u l t a n , however, was a figurehead. Real power at the Porte was Hussein referred to himself and his family as "Hashemites."

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wielded by the Y o u n g T u r k s , new m e n without family b a c k g r o u n d , with w h o m he was out of s y m p a t h y . T h o u g h loyal to the S u l t a n , he found himself increasingly at o d d s with the Sultan's g o v e r n m e n t , a n d in particular with its policy of centralization. Hussein's a m b i t i o n was to m a k e his position as E m i r s e c u r e for himself a n d , in perpetuity, for his family. He strove to increase his independence, while the centralizing C . U . P . g o v e r n m e n t c o n s p i r e d to decrease it. T h e g o v e r n m e n t p u s h e d forward with construction of the H e j a z railroad, a i m e d , a m o n g other things, at curtailing the E m i r ' s a u t o n o m y . T h e railroad already ran from D a m a s c u s , capital of what is now S y r i a , to M e d i n a in the H e j a z . What the g o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e d was to extend the line to M e c c a and to the port of J e d d a h . T h i s was a threat to the c a m e l - o w n i n g B e d o u i n tribes of the H e j a z and to their lucrative control of the pilgrim routes to the Holy Places. U s i n g the railroad and also the t e l e g r a p h , the C . U . P . threatened to exercise direct rule over M e d i n a , M e c c a , and the rest of the H e j a z . If carried into effect, the T u r k i s h government's plan would make H u s s e i n into a m e r e s u b o r d i n a t e functionary. H u s s e i n res p o n d e d by inspiring civil d i s t u r b a n c e s . F o r H u s s e i n , who h a d b e g u n his administration of affairs by u s i n g T u r k i s h t r o o p s against the A r a b i a n tribes, this represented a c h a n g e in policy, b u t not a c h a n g e in allegiance. He remained in the a m b i g u ous position of s u p p o r t i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e while o p p o s i n g its government. In the years just before the b e g i n n i n g of the E u r o p e a n war, the secret societies in D a m a s c u s a n d the various rival lords of A r a b i a were in frequent touch with one another; they explored the possibility of uniting against the Y o u n g T u r k s in s u p p o r t of greater rights for the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g half of the e m p i r e . At one time or another most of the principal A r a b i a n chiefs were involved in s u c h conversations. In 1911, the A r a b d e p u t i e s in the O t t o m a n Parliament asked H u s s e i n to lead the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s in throwing off the T u r k i s h yoke; he r e f u s e d . A year later the secret societies s e e m to have a p p r o a c h e d his rivals, b u t not H u s s e i n . By 1913 A r a b nationalists apparently r e g a r d e d him as "a tool in the hands of the T u r k s for striking the A r a b s . " Y e t the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t also strongly distrusted him, a n d e x p l o r e d the possibility of d e p o s i n g h i m . 1

T w o of H u s s e i n ' s sons were active politically. A b d u l l a h , his favorite, was a d e p u t y from M e c c a in the O t t o m a n Parliament, while Feisal was a d e p u t y from J e d d a h . A b d u l l a h counselled his father to resist the g o v e r n m e n t ; he believed that with the s u p p o r t of the secret societies a n d of Britain it could be d o n e . F e i s a l advised against o p p o s i n g the g o v e r n m e n t . A b d u l l a h , a short, heavy-set, astute man with a politician's conciliating manner, was for b o l d n e s s . Feisal, tall, quick, a n d n e r v o u s , was for caution.

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H u s s e i n , who h a d played off his enemies against one another for years, was inclined to t e m p o r i z e a n d delay. With each year in office as E m i r he had increased his prestige and his m a s t e r y over the c o m p l e x web of personal, family, a n d tribal relationships that m a d e for authority in the H e j a z . He h a d r e d u c e d the political influence of the local C . U . P . l o d g e s in M e c c a a n d M e d i n a . H i s p r i m a c y within his own emirate was established firmly. In 1913 a n d 1914, however, he found himself s u r r o u n d e d by external enemies. T h e r e were his neighbors a n d traditional rivals, the A r a b i a n lords to his south a n d east, w h o m he h a d threatened a n d who threatened him. T h e r e were the A r a b nationalists, s o m e of w h o m r e g a r d e d him as an essentially T u r k i s h official. T h e r e were the British, whose navy could easily d o m i n a t e the long coastline of the H e j a z once they went to war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — a n d he knew that they w o u l d b e c o m e his enemies if he threw in his lot with the e m p i r e . Finally, there was the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t which threatened a s h o w d o w n on the issue of the E m i r ' s a u t o n o m y . N o w , for the duration of the war, the C . U . P . p o s t p o n e d completion of the railroad a n d the a d o p t i o n of its new governmental regulations, as well as its secret plan to a p p o i n t a new emir in H u s s e i n ' s p l a c e . B u t it o r d e r e d H u s s e i n to s u p p l y m a n p o w e r for the a r m y . H u s s e i n a n d A b d u l l a h m a y well have s u s p e c t e d a C . U . P . p l o t : the m e n of the H e j a z w o u l d be sent as soldiers to distant battlefields, while regular T u r k i s h t r o o p s would be sent to take their place in g a r r i s o n i n g the H e j a z , a n d would then seize control of it. H u s s e i n a s s u r e d all his d a n g e r o u s neighbors that he would a c t in a c c o r d a n c e with their w i s h e s — b u t p u t off d o i n g so until s o m e time in the f u t u r e . He asked the advice of A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , his rival a n d a powerful warlord to the east, as to whether or not he s h o u l d associate M e c c a with the S u l t a n ' s call for a Holy War against Britain a n d her allies; a n d he d i s c u s s e d with A r a b i c nationalist leaders from D a m a s c u s the possibility of joint action against the Porte. In reply to r e q u e s t s a n d d e m a n d s from the Porte, he asked for mo n e y to raise t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , but continued to postp o n e s e n d i n g any contingents to the T u r k i s h a r m y . He gave Kitchener's messages and promises a warm response. At the s a m e t i m e — a t the e n d of 1 9 1 4 — w h e n D j e m a l P a s h a p r e p a r e d to attack the British at the S u e z C a n a l , H u s s e i n wrote to him, p r o m i s i n g to s e n d t r o o p s to join in the attack; while A b d u l l a h replied to S t o r r s in British C a i r o that the H e j a z h a d d e c i d e d to side with Britain in the war. A b d u l l a h explained, however, that this would have to be kept a secret. F o r the m o m e n t , it was not p o s s i b l e for the E m i r to reveal his intention of allying with Britain, nor could he take action. A c c o r d i n g to A b d u l l a h a n d H u s s e i n , the time was not yet ripe.

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II S t o r r s w a s p l e a s e d that his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e h a d p l a c e d the R e s i d e n c y , the office of the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , on t e r m s of close cordiality with M e c c a . O n 2 7 J a n u a r y 1915, h e wrote F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that "I am still in very friendly a n d intimate contact with the Sherif of M e c c a , a n d am firmly convinced that he is a m o r e p a y i n g p r o p o s i t i o n for our care a n d attention than any purely local Chieftain (however powerful in himself) who cannot enjoy the p r e s tige of receiving the annual h o m a g e of the representatives of I s l a m t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . " 2

F o r the m o m e n t all that K i t c h e n e r a n d the R e s i d e n c y really asked of H u s s e i n was neutrality. S i n c e H u s s e i n ' s desire was to avoid b e i n g d r a w n into the perilous war, the two parties to the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e were in a c c o r d . H u s s e i n d i d nothing to associate himself or M e c c a with the p r o c l a m a t i o n of a H o l y War. F o r the R e s i d e n c y , the corres p o n d e n c e therefore h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d everything that could reasonably have been d e s i r e d . T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , r e p o r t e d to K i t c h e n e r on 2 F e b r u a r y 1915, that "there is no need for i m m e d i a t e action . . . as all that is necessary for the m o m e n t , with the Sherif of M e c c a — h a d been d o n e . " 3

T h e War Minister w a s satisfied. H e did not share Wingate's belief that a tribal revolt in A r a b i a could affect Britain's fortunes in the war; he g a v e no sign of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t when H u s s e i n d i d not p r o p o s e to lead s u c h a revolt. K i t c h e n e r believed that G e r m a n y was the enemy that m a t t e r e d and that E u r o p e w a s the only battlefield that c o u n t e d . H i s long-term plan to c a p t u r e the caliphate w a s d e signed for the p o s t w a r world. In his view, he a n d i t — a n d the M i d d l e E a s t — c o u l d wait until the war w a s over.

PART III BRITAIN IS DRAWN INTO THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE

13 T H E T U R K I S H COMMANDERS A L M O S T L O S E T H E WAR i At the time of his a p p o i n t m e n t as War Minister, K i t c h e n e r did not intend Britain to be d r a w n into any involvement in the M i d d l e E a s t d u r i n g the war. When he started a l o n g the road that led to s u c h an involvement, he was not aware that this was what he was d o i n g . L a t e r , in 1915—16, when he found his country fully e n g a g e d in the M i d d l e E a s t , he m u s t have w o n d e r e d how he had allowed such a situation to c o m e a b o u t . F r o m the outset of the war, it had been his unwavering doctrine to d i s r e g a r d the E a s t while focusing on the western front. K i t c h e n e r ' s opinion that T u r k e y a n d the M i d d l e E a s t c o u l d safely be ignored for the duration of the E u r o p e a n conflict derived in part from the a s s u m p t i o n that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e d i d not p o s e a significant military threat. T h i s was an a s s u m p t i o n that was widely shared. British officials viewed O t t o m a n military capability with c o n t e m p t ; a n d the record of the first six m o n t h s of warfare in the E a s t confirmed them in their view. F r o m O c t o b e r 1914, when the Goeben a n d Breslau o p e n e d fire on the R u s s i a n coast, until F e b r u a r y 1915, when an a v e n g i n g British fleet b e g a n its b o m b a r d m e n t of the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s a n d then s t e a m e d t o w a r d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the O t t o m a n a r m i e s b l u n d e r e d f r o m one defeat to another. T h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r o f the T u r k i s h a r m e d forces was E n v e r P a s h a , who a week before the war b e g a n had p r o c l a i m e d himself "vice-generalissimo." In theory this placed h i m s e c o n d only to the figurehead S u l t a n . In practice it placed h i m second to none. E n v e r h a d the qualities of a lone adventurer, not those of a general. T h o u g h a u d a c i o u s a n d c u n n i n g , he was an incompetent c o m m a n d e r . L i m a n von S a n d e r s , the P r u s s i a n a r m y adviser with w h o m he frequently f o u n d himself at o d d s , r e g a r d e d E n v e r as a buffoon in military m a t t e r s . E n v e r , however, pictured himself as a leader of a wholly different 119

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character. He portrayed himself as an heir to the founders of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e : the b a n d of ghazis—crusading warriors for the Islamic faith—who in the fourteenth century had galloped f r o m the obscurity of the Byzantine frontier onto the center stage of history. At the outset of the war, he hastened to attack the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . T h e r e was an obstacle in his p a t h : the forbidding C a u c a s u s mountain r a n g e , which formed the land frontier between the two e m p i r e s . Against the advice of L i m a n von S a n d e r s , he d e t e r m i n e d to launch a frontal attack across that d a u n t i n g natural frontier, which the R u s s i a n s , in secure p o s s e s s i o n of the high g r o u n d , had heavily fortified—and to do so in the d e p t h s of winter. He p r o p o s e d initially to g r o u p his forces along an e n o r m o u s territory within T u r k e y , 600 miles long a n d 300 miles wide, t h r o u g h which there was no railroad to t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s or s u p p l i e s . T h e few roads were steep a n d narrow. T h e rivers could be c r o s s e d only by fording, the b r i d g e s having collapsed long before a n d having never been repaired. B e c a u s e the nearest railhead was over 600 miles away, every bullet, every shell, had to be t r a n s p o r t e d by c a m e l — a journey of six weeks. M u c h of the territory was without track or habitation, unexplored a n d uncharted. L o n g winters a n d m o u n t a i n s n o w s t o r m s m a d e whole sections of it u n p a s s a b l e m u c h of the year. 1

E n v e r ' s plan, as he explained it to L i m a n von S a n d e r s , was to then m o v e out of this s t a g i n g area, cross the frontier into Czarist territory, a n d attack the fortified R u s s i a n position on the C a u c a s u s plateau by the sort of orchestrated m o v e m e n t pictured in military textbooks, with s o m e c o l u m n s attacking directly, and others m o v i n g out at an angle and then wheeling a b o u t to flank or encircle. He was u n m o v e d by the reminder that, without railroads or other t r a n s p o r t , the strategic mobility r e q u i r e d for the military m o v e m e n t s that he envisaged would be unavailable. He entertained no d o u b t s of his s u c c e s s . H a v i n g c r u s h e d the R u s s i a n s , said E n v e r , he would then m a r c h via Afghanistan to the c o n q u e s t of India. On 6 D e c e m b e r 1914, E n v e r left Constantinople a n d on 21 D e c e m b e r took c o m m a n d of the O t t o m a n T h i r d A r m y . He led the attack on the C a u c a s u s plateau in p e r s o n . T h e R u s s i a n s were terrified and appealed to Britain to help s o m e h o w ; they had no idea they faced a foe who was utterly inept. E n v e r left his artillery behind b e c a u s e of the deep snow. H i s troops were forced to bivouac in the bitter cold (as low as m i n u s thirty degrees Fahrenheit without t e n t s ) . T h e y ran short of food. An epidemic of t y p h u s broke out. With routes blocked by the winter snows, they lost their way in the tangled mountain p a s s e s . Enver's plan was for his forces to launch a coordinated s u r p r i s e attack on the R u s s i a n b a s e called S a r i k a m i s h , which blocked the invasion highway;

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but, having lost touch with one another, the various T u r k i s h c o r p s arrived at different times at S a r i k a m i s h to attack a n d to be destroyed piecemeal. T h e r e m n a n t s of what had once been an a r m y s t r a g g l e d b a c k into eastern T u r k e y in J a n u a r y 1915. Of the p e r h a p s 100,000 m e n who took part in the a t t a c k , 86 percent were lost. A G e r m a n officer attached to the O t t o m a n G e n e r a l Staff d e s c r i b e d what h a p p e n e d to the T h i r d A r m y by s a y i n g that it h a d "suffered a disaster which for rapidity a n d c o m p l e t e n e s s is without parallel in military history." Y e t even as he r o d e back f r o m the catastrophe in the northeast, E n v e r o r d e r e d another ill-conceived offensive. In c o m m a n d was D j e m a l P a s h a , the Minister of the M a r i n e . J e a l o u s of E n v e r , whose prestige a n d power had b e g u n to o v e r s h a d o w those of the other Y o u n g T u r k s , D j e m a l took the field as c o m m a n d e r of the O t t o m a n F o u r t h A r m y , b a s e d in S y r i a a n d Palestine. On 15 J a n u a r y 1915, he b e g a n his m a r c h toward E g y p t to launch a s u r p r i s e attack across the Suez Canal. 2

3

A g a i n , the logistical p r o b l e m s were ignored. T h e r o a d s of S y r i a and Palestine were so b a d that not even horse-drawn carts could m o v e along m a n y of t h e m ; a n d the wastes of the 130-mile wide Sinai desert were trackless. T h e O t t o m a n soldiery nonetheless perf o r m e d p r o d i g i e s of e n d u r a n c e a n d valor. S o m e h o w they t r a n s p o r t e d themselves a n d their e q u i p m e n t f r o m S y r i a t o S u e z . K r e s s von K r e s s e n s t e i n , a G e r m a n engineering officer, d u g wells along the route, which enabled t h e m to survive the m a r c h through the desert. T h e time of year, for once, was well c h o s e n : J a n u a r y is the best m o n t h in E g y p t for avoiding the terrible heat. 4

B u t when the F o u r t h A r m y reached the b a n k s of the S u e z C a n a l , D j e m a l d i s c o v e r e d that m o s t of his t r o o p s could not use the b r i d g i n g p o n t o o n s that were meant to t r a n s p o r t t h e m to the other side. T h e G e r m a n engineers h a d b r o u g h t the p o n t o o n s from G e r m a n y , b u t the troops had not been trained in their u s e . D j e m a l o r d e r e d the attack to c o m m e n c e nonetheless. E a r l y in the m o r n i n g of 3 F e b r u a r y , while the sky was still half-dark, it b e g a n . T h e British, from b e h i n d their fortifications, awoke to discover an O t t o m a n a r m y on the o p p o s i t e b a n k of the e n o r m o u s d i t c h ; a n d with their superior w e a p o n r y they o p e n e d fire u p o n it. In the battle a n d the s u b s e q u e n t rout, 2 , 0 0 0 O t t o m a n t r o o p s — a b o u t 10 percent of D j e m a l ' s forces—were killed. D j e m a l o r d e r e d a retreat; a n d kept on g o i n g all the way b a c k to Syria. 5

T u r k i s h g e n e r a l s h i p b e c a m e a j o k e . A u b r e y H e r b e r t wrote from S h e p h e a r d ' s Hotel in C a i r o to his friend M a r k S y k e s that the latest O t t o m a n plan was "that the T u r k s are to b r i n g t h o u s a n d s of c a m e l s down to the C a n a l a n d then set a light to their hair. T h e c a m e l ,

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u s i n g its well known reasoning p o w e r s , will d a s h to the C a n a l to put the fire out. When they have done this in sufficient quantities the T u r k s will m a r c h over t h e m . " I n L o n d o n the P r i m e Minister lightly d i s m i s s e d the O t t o m a n invasion by saying that " T h e T u r k s have been trying to throw a b r i d g e across the S u e z C a n a l & in that ingenious fashion to find a way into E g y p t . T h e poor things & their w o u l d - b e b r i d g e were blown into smithereens, and they have retired into the d e s e r t . " 6

7

II E n v e r had a s s u m e d that the war w o u l d be short, a n d that it would be decided in a few lightning c a m p a i g n s . He had neither a plan for a war of attrition nor an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what s u c h a war m i g h t entail. He had no gift for organization, no head for logistics, a n d no patience for administration. As War Minister he thoughtlessly led his country into c h a o s . He b e g a n by o r d e r i n g all eligible m e n throughout the imperial d o m a i n s to report for induction into the a r m y immediately, b r i n g i n g with t h e m enough food for three d a y s . When they reported as o r d e r e d — w h i c h is to say, all at the s a m e time—their n u m b e r s dwarfed the conscription offices, which could not deal with so m a n y at once. H a v i n g flooded in from the countryside, the draftees ate up their three d a y s ' s u p p l y of food a n d then had nothing to eat. S o o n they b e g a n to drift away, labeled as deserters, afraid to return either to the conscription offices or to their h o m e s . B r i n g i n g in the m a n p o w e r f r o m the countryside ruined what w o u l d have been the bountiful harvest of 1914. It set a terrible p a t t e r n : t h r o u g h o u t the war, the draft of m e n a n d pack animals b r o u g h t famine in g o o d years as well as b a d . D u r i n g the war years, the s u p p l y of draft animals fell, horses to 40 percent and oxen a n d buffaloes to 15 percent of what they had been. T h e shrinkage in agricultural activity was equally d r a m a t i c : cereal acreage was cut in half, a n d cotton fell to 8 percent of its prewar p r o d u c t i o n level. Control of the scarce s u p p l i e s of food a n d other g o o d s b e c a m e the key to wealth a n d power. In the sprawling metropolis of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a Chicago-style political b o s s with g a n g l a n d connections fought against E n v e r ' s G e n e r a l Director of the C o m m i s s a r i a t for effective control of the e c o n o m y . T h e transportation s y s t e m of the e m p i r e was also shattered by the war. In the a b s e n c e of railroads a n d u s a b l e r o a d s , in the past g o o d s had been mostly s h i p p e d by sea. N o w the empire's 5,000 miles of coastline were u n d e r the g u n s of the Allied navies. In the north the G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s pulled back the Goeben and Breslau for the 8

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defense of the D a r d a n e l l e s , a b a n d o n i n g the Black S e a to the newly built battleships o f the R u s s i a n s . T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was d o m i n a t e d by the F r e n c h a n d British navies. Allied s h i p s cut off the O t t o m a n coal s u p p l y ; thereafter the e m p i r e d e p e n d e d for its fuel on the m e a g r e s u p p l i e s that could b e b r o u g h t overland from G e r m a n y . On the eve of war, there were only a b o u t 17,000 industrial workers in an e m p i r e of 25 million p e o p l e ; for practical p u r p o s e s , the country h a d no i n d u s t r y . All that it h a d was agriculture, which was now ruined. By the e n d of the war, the export trade was down to a q u a r t e r a n d the i m p o r t trade d o w n to a tenth of what they had been. T h e Porte ran u p h u g e b u d g e t deficits d u r i n g the wartime years, a n d helplessly ran p a p e r m o n e y off the printing p r e s s e s to pay for t h e m . D u r i n g the war prices rose 1,675 percent. Before long, the war h a d b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y a l m o s t to its knees; a n d the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t had no idea what to do a b o u t it. 9

14

K I T C H E N E R ALLOWS BRITAIN TO ATTACK TURKEY i T h e British g o v e r n m e n t , too, e n c o u n t e r e d u n e x p e c t e d p r o b l e m s with which it h a d no idea how to deal. At the outset of war n o b o d y in Britain h a d foreseen that the w a r r i n g a r m i e s w o u l d d i g trenches across western E u r o p e . N o w that they had done s o , n o b o d y in Britain had any idea of how to b r e a k t h r o u g h enemy lines. As 1914 turned into 1915, the British C a b i n e t b e c a m e increasingly u n h a p p y a b o u t the direction of the war. L o r d Kitchener's strategy of concentrating all forces in western E u r o p e s e e m e d to offer no hope of victory in the foreseeable f u t u r e . T h e wiliest politician in the C a b i n e t — D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e — w a s c o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g those who looked for a way out. L l o y d G e o r g e , after A s q u i t h the m o s t powerful politician in the L i b e r a l Party a n d in the C a b i n e t , was not one who willingly goes down with a sinking s h i p . He was, a b o v e all, a s u r v i v o r : years later it could be seen that he was the only B r i t i s h minister who s u c c e e d e d in staying in the C a b i n e t from the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War until its e n d . T h e glowing, d y n a m i c political wizard from Wales was the s u p r e m e s t r a t e g i s t — o r , s o m e w o u l d say, o p p o r t u n i s t — o f his time. " T o L l o y d G e o r g e no policy was p e r m a n e n t , no p l e d g e final," wrote one of his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s ; the zig-zags in his policy forced him to seek s u p p o r t first f r o m one g r o u p then from another, so that "He b e c a m e like a trick rider at the circus, as he w a s c o m p e l l e d to leap from one b a c k to another H i s d e v i o u s n e s s was a b y w o r d , so that even an admirer said that his truth w a s not a straight line but "more of a c u r v e . " T h e way he himself p u t it was that, "I never believed in costly frontal attacks either in war or politics, if there were a way round." No minister felt m o r e greatly frustrated than he did by the way Allied c o m m a n d e r s were fighting the war in F r a n c e a n d F l a n d e r s : hopeless direct assaults on entrenched enemy positions. E v e r y time 2

3

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that he s o u g h t a way out or a way a r o u n d , he f o u n d the route blocked either by the War Office on behalf of Britain's generals, or by the F o r e i g n Office on behalf of Britain's allies. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , L l o y d G e o r g e looked for a solution in the E a s t . He was a m o n g those who favored entering into Balkan alliances, notably with G r e e c e , in order to defeat the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to turn the G e r m a n flank. Other C a b i n e t ministers a g r e e d . S o did M a u r i c e H a n k e y , Secretary of the War C a b i n e t a n d m o s t influential of the civil s e r v a n t s . Hankey's m e m o r a n d u m of 28 D e c e m b e r 1914, p r o p o s i n g an assault on the D a r d a n e l l e s in collaboration with Balkan allies, cogently outlined the a r g u m e n t s underlining the Cabinet's belief that " G e r m a n y can p e r h a p s be struck m o s t effectively, a n d with the m o s t lasting results on the p e a c e of the world through her allies, a n d particularly through T u r k e y . " 4

T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , blocked this a p p r o a c h . It was G r e y , a c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s associates in the left wing of the L i b e r a l Party, who had closed off Britain's alternative of remaining neutral in the war; he h a d d o n e this, they c l a i m e d , by his secret prewar a r r a n g e m e n t s with F r a n c e . ( T h e philosopher B e r t r a n d Russell later w r o t e : "I h a d noticed d u r i n g previous years how c a r e fully S i r E d w a r d G r e y lied in order to prevent the p u b l i c from knowing the m e t h o d s by which he w a s c o m m i t t i n g us to the s u p p o r t of F r a n c e in the event of w a r . " ) N o w again it was G r e y , who h a d entered into secret p r e w a r a r r a n g e m e n t s with R u s s i a r e g a r d i n g the D a r d a n e l l e s , who a r g u e d that Allied claims to postwar territorial gains p r e c l u d e d b r i n g i n g the Balkan states into the war. It was the F o r e i g n Office's view not only that Bulgaria's rivalry with R u m a n i a a n d G r e e c e rendered an alliance that included all three states unfeasible, but that G r e e k help in c a p t u r i n g C o n s t a n t i n o p l e was unacceptable b e c a u s e it w o u l d offend the R u s s i a n s . 6

Y e t it was a g r e e d by the A d m i r a l t y , the War Office, a n d "the C a b i n e t alike that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e could not be c a p t u r e d by the Royal N a v y alone. An a r m y , they a r g u e d , w a s needed as well. If the G r e e k army or another B a l k a n a r m y were not to be allowed to help, then the British a r m y w o u l d b e n e e d e d ; b u t L o r d K i t c h e n e r s u p p o r t e d those Allied field c o m m a n d e r s who decreed that no t r o o p s s h o u l d be diverted f r o m the trenches of the western front until the war in E u r o p e was won. Yet, notwithstanding the field, nothing in the to the leading m e m b e r s war was b e i n g won or

the hopeful views of Allied c o m m a n d e r s in first m o n t h s a n d years of the war s u g g e s t e d of the C a b i n e t that on the western front the even could be won. As early as 7 O c t o b e r 5

* T h e historical evidence now shows that this was not t r u e . But the left wing of the Liberal Party continued to believe that it was.

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1914, A s q u i t h noted that K i t c h e n e r "thinks it is not i m p r o b a b l e that . . . the b i g o p p o s i n g a r m i e s m a y i n s o m e months' t i m e c o m e t o s o m e t h i n g like s t a l e m a t e . " By the end of D e c e m b e r , Winston Churchill (as he informed the P r i m e Minister) thought it "quite p o s s i b l e that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the other's lines in the Western theatre"; while, at the s a m e time, L l o y d G e o r g e , in a m e m o r a n d u m to C a b i n e t colleagues, d i s m i s s e d the p r o s p e c t s of a b r e a k t h r o u g h on the western front as an "impossibility." History had seen nothing like the trench warfare that s p o n t a n e o u s l y e m e r g e d in the a u t u m n of 1914; a n d K i t c h e n e r , t h o u g h he quickly divined the p r o b l e m , a d m i t t e d that he saw no solution. T h e E n t e n t e Powers a n d the Central Powers m a n n e d parallel lines of fortifications that soon stretched all the way f r o m the Atlantic O c e a n to the A l p s . E a c h side thus decisively b a r r e d the way to the other. T r e n c h warfare b e g a n as an e n d u r a n c e contest a n d e n d e d as a survival contest. Beneath the g r o u n d , in the p e r h a p s 3 5 , 0 0 0 miles of trenches that they eventually d u g , the o p p o s i n g a r m i e s lived in bloody s q u a l o r a n d s u b j e c t e d one another to p u n i s h i n g a n d almost ceaseless artillery b a r r a g e s , p u n c t u a t e d by suicidally futile charges against the other side's b a r b e d wire a n d machine g u n s . Alternately executioners a n d executed, one side played the role of the firing s q u a d whenever the other side launched one of its frequent attacks. No g r o u n d was g a i n e d . It was a deadlock. 7

8

T h e civilian ministers turned for g u i d a n c e to the military oracle in their m i d s t , but the oracle s o m e t i m e s was awkwardly silent a n d at other times s p o k e a g i b b e r i s h that u n d e r m i n e d belief in his p o w e r s of divination. In the C a b i n e t , unfortunately, F i t z G e r a l d was not available to s p e a k a n d listen for h i m . F i e l d M a r s h a l K i t c h e n e r always had f o u n d it immensely difficult to explain his military views, even to close colleagues; in the c o m p a n y of those w h o m he f e a r e d — s t r a n g e r s , civilians, politicians—he w a s s t r u c k d u m b . T o break the silence, h e s o m e t i m e s launched into long d i s c o u r s e s on nonmilitary s u b j e c t s of which he knew little or nothing. He s p o k e of Ireland to the Irish leader, C a r s o n , and of Wales to L l o y d G e o r g e ; both m e n were s u r p r i s e d to find him ignorant a n d foolish. T h e r e was genius within h i m , b u t it manifested itself only on occasion. Y e a r s after the war, having remarked that K i t c h e n e r "talked t w a d d l e , " L l o y d G e o r g e took it back by a d d i n g : N o ! He was like a great revolving lighthouse. S o m e t i m e s the b e a m of his m i n d u s e d to shoot out, s h o w i n g one E u r o p e a n d the a s s e m b l e d a r m i e s in a vast a n d illimitable perspective, till one felt that one was looking along it into the heart of reality— a n d then the shutter w o u l d turn a n d for weeks there w o u l d be nothing b u t a blank d a r k n e s s . 9

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K i t c h e n e r ' s failure to show t h e m a way out of the d e a d l o c k on the western front led the country's civilian leaders to devise p l a n s of their own. T h e plans r e s e m b l e d one another in p r o p o s i n g to swing a r o u n d the fortified western front in order to attack from the north, the south, or the east. T h e doctrine of the generals was to attack the enemy at his strongest point; that of the politicians was to attack at his weakest. L l o y d G e o r g e ' s m i n d inclined t o w a r d collaboration with G r e e c e in the vulnerable southeast of E u r o p e . Churchill, inspired by A d m i r a l L o r d F i s h e r ( w h o m he had b r o u g h t b a c k f r o m retirement to serve as F i r s t S e a L o r d ) , p r o p o s e d a landing in the northwest of E u r o p e , on an island off G e r m a n y ' s Baltic S e a coast. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , however, carried all before him with his p e r s u a s i v e m e m o r a n d u m of 28 D e c e m b e r 1914. Hankey p r o p o s e d that Britain s h o u l d m o v e three a r m y c o r p s to participate with G r e e c e , B u l g a r i a , a n d R u m a n i a in an attack on T u r k e y at the D a r d a n e l l e s that w o u l d lead to the occupation of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the s u b s e q u e n t defeat of G e r m a n y ' s two allies, the O t t o m a n and H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s . T h e political p r o b l e m o f reconciling B u l g a r i a with G r e e c e a n d R u m a n i a , he pointed out, would have to be o v e r c o m e ; b u t he believed that this could be done as a result of Allied military participation in the c a m p a i g n a n d Allied g u a r a n t e e s that all three states would receive a fair s h a r e of the spoils of victory. When shown the m e m o r a n d u m , Churchill c o m m e n t e d that he himself had a d v o c a t e d an attack at the D a r d a n e l l e s two m o n t h s earlier, but that K i t c h e n e r had refused to s u p p l y the needed m a n power; a n d that such an action w o u l d be m u c h m o r e difficult to m o u n t in J a n u a r y than it would have been in N o v e m b e r . Churchill continued to believe that the Baltic S e a project was a m o r e p r o m i s i n g m o v e , but recognized that he a n d H a n k e y thought alike in e s p o u s i n g s o m e sort of flanking attack. Hankey's plan, however, was never put to the test. It foundered on the usual s h o a l s : K i t c h e n e r ' s unwillingness to divert t r o o p s from the west, a n d S i r E d w a r d G r e y ' s worry that a G r e e k m a r c h on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e might be t r o u b l i n g to R u s s i a . G r e y was not hopeful of reconciling B u l g a r i a n claims with those of the other B a l k a n states b u t , a b o v e all, what led h i m to o p p o s e a G r e e k attack at the D a r d a n e l l e s was the fear that it m i g h t s u c c e e d ; for if the G r e e k s were to c o n q u e r their old imperial capital, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the B y z a n t i u m of their great d a y s , they would be unlikely to give it u p ; while R u s s i a , rather than let any other country seize it, m i g h t well (in G r e y ' s view) c h a n g e sides in the war. T h e situation in A t h e n s was that the P r i m e Minister, Venizelos, who at the outset of the world war h a d offered to enter into a war

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with T u r k e y , was still inclined to join the Allies, while his political a d v e r s a r y , the K a i s e r ' s brother-in-law, p r o - G e r m a n K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e , acted to prevent him f r o m d o i n g so. I n s t e a d of throwing its weight behind Venizelos, the British F o r e i g n Office, like K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e , o p p o s e d G r e e k entry into the war. In retrospect it s e e m s clear that if the G r e e k a r m y h a d m a r c h e d on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in early 1915, a l o n g s i d e the British navy, the O t t o m a n capital w o u l d have been defenseless. T h e a n g u i s h of Winston Churchill when this w a s not allowed to h a p p e n is evident in the p h r a s e s of a letter that he wrote to G r e y in the winter of 1915 b u t never sent: I beseech you . . . Half-hearted m e a s u r e s will ruin a l l — & a million m e n will die t h r o u g h the prolongation of the war . . . [ N ] o i m p e d i m e n t m u s t be p l a c e d in the way of G r e e k c o o p e r a t i o n — I am so afraid of your losing G r e e c e , & yet paying all the future into R u s s i a n h a n d s . If R u s s i a prevents G r e e c e helping, I will d o m y u t m o s t t o o p p o s e her having C p l e . . . P S If you don't back up this G r e e c e — t h e G r e e c e of Venizelos—you will have another who will cleave to G e r m a n y . 1 0

II When 1915 b e g a n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r s u d d e n l y c h a n g e d his m i n d a n d p r o p o s e d that Britain s h o u l d attack the D a r d a n e l l e s . T h e R u s s i a n high c o m m a n d h a d urgently asked h i m to stage a diversionary attack there, a n d he was fearful that if he did not c o m p l y R u s s i a might be driven out of the w a r — w h i c h at that point would have been fatal for Britain a n d F r a n c e , for it w o u l d have allowed the G e r m a n s to concentrate all their forces in the west. K i t c h e n e r insisted, however, that the attack h a d to be m o u n t e d by the Royal N a v y on its o w n : he would m a k e no troops available. No m a t t e r ; civilian m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t leaped at the chance to e s c a p e f r o m the western front strategy which they (unlike the Allied generals) r e g a r d e d as hopeless. Enver's attack on the C a u c a s u s was responsible for the R u s s i a n plea a n d hence for K i t c h e n e r ' s c h a n g e of m i n d . R u s s i a ' s cry for help c a m e before her quick, easy, a n d decisive victory over Enver's T u r k s in J a n u a r y 1915. L o g i c a l l y , after c r u s h i n g the O t t o m a n invaders that m o n t h , the R u s s i a n s s h o u l d have told L o r d K i t c h e n e r that it was no longer necessary for h i m to launch a diversionary attack on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — o r K i t c h e n e r s h o u l d have drawn that conclusion for himself. I n s t e a d , t h r o u g h o u t J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y , Britain's leaders considered how best to attack C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in order to relieve R u s s i a from a T u r k i s h threat that no longer existed.

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T h u s b e g a n the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n , which was to so alter the fortunes o f Churchill a n d K i t c h e n e r , A s q u i t h a n d L l o y d G e o r g e , Britain a n d the M i d d l e E a s t .

15 ON TO VICTORY AT T H E DARDANELLES i When L o r d K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d that an expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s should be m o u n t e d by the Royal N a v y alone, Churchill's reply from the A d m i r a l t y echoed what every informed p e r s o n in the military and in g o v e r n m e n t s a i d : that the D a r d a n e l l e s could be forced only by a c o m b i n e d operation in which the navy was joined by the a r m y . A glance at the m a p w o u l d show why. T h e 38-mile-long straits are at no point m o r e than 4 miles w i d e . W a r s h i p s a t t e m p t i n g to force their p a s s a g e against the s t r o n g current w o u l d face lines of m i n e s in front of t h e m a n d a crossfire of cannon b a r r a g e s from the E u r o p e a n a n d A s i a n s h o r e s . T h i r t e e n miles after entering the waterway, s h i p s reach the N a r r o w s , a m e r e 1,600 y a r d s a c r o s s , which can be d o m i nated by the g u n s of the forts on shore. Only if an attacking a r m y took p o s s e s s i o n of the coastline could it silence the artillery on shore a n d give its fleet a chance to s w e e p the m i n e s ahead of it; the forts, in other w o r d s , h a d to be s t o r m e d or destroyed to allow the navy to get t h r o u g h . K i t c h e n e r m e t with his advisers at the War Office to ask t h e m to reconsider their position a b o u t the opening of the new front, but they were a d a m a n t in reiterating that no troops could be m a d e available. In t u r n , Churchill, on the m o r n i n g of 3 J a n u a r y 1915, met with his War G r o u p at the A d m i r a l t y to reconsider whether, given the i m p o r t a n c e of keeping R u s s i a in the war, it really would be out of the question to m o u n t a wholly naval operation. T h e idea of employing only w a r s h i p s that were old a n d e x p e n d a b l e was r a i s e d ; and the War G r o u p decided to ask the c o m m a n d e r on the spot for his views. S o o n after the m e e t i n g a d j o u r n e d , Churchill sent an inquiry to the c o m m a n d e r of the British naval s q u a d r o n off the D a r d a n e l l e s , A d m i r a l Sackville C a r d e n . In his cable Churchill a s k e d : " D o you consider the forcing of the D a r d a n e l l e s by s h i p s alone a practicable o p e r a t i o n ? " — a d d i n g that older s h i p s would be u s e d , a n d that the i m p o r t a n c e of the operation would justify severe l o s s e s . 1

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T o everybody's s u r p r i s e , A d m i r a l C a r d e n replied t o Churchill that, while the D a r d a n e l l e s could not be "rushed"—in other w o r d s , could not be seized in a single a t t a c k — " T h e y might be forced by extended operations with a large n u m b e r of s h i p s . " C a r d e n h a d been in c o m m a n d at the D a r d a n e l l e s for m o n t h s , a n d his views carried the day. T h e C a b i n e t overruled C h u r c h i l l — w h o a r g u e d in favor of a naval strike in the Baltic i n s t e a d — a n d authorized him to put C a r d e n ' s D a r d a n e l l e s plan into operation. Churchill was not o p p o s e d to the D a r d a n e l l e s p l a n ; it was s i m p l y that he preferred his Baltic p l a n . O n c e the D a r d a n e l l e s decision h a d been taken, he m o v e d to carry it out with all of his energy and e n t h u s i a s m . 2

II T h o u g h gifted in m a n y other ways, Churchill was insensitive to the m o o d s a n d reactions of his colleagues, and oblivious to the effect he p r o d u c e d u p o n others. When he g a v e o r d e r s that naval officers felt ought properly to have been i s s u e d by one of t h e m s e l v e s , he inspired a collegia] a n d institutional hostility of which he was una w a r e ; he did not know that they viewed him as an interfering a m a t e u r , a n d that his imprecision in the u s e of their technical l a n g u a g e fueled their resentment. He also did not know (for they did not tell him) how m u c h his colleagues in the C a b i n e t were alienated by his other traits. He b u b b l e d over with ideas for their d e p a r t m e n t s , which they r e g a r d e d as m e d d l i n g . He talked at s u c h length that they could not e n d u r e it. Neither s u b o r d i n a t e s nor colleagues d a r e d to tell h i m to his face that he was often i m p o s s i b l e to work with. E v e n F i s h e r , his naval idol a n d mentor, w h o m he had chosen as F i r s t S e a L o r d , found it difficult to c o m m u n i c a t e with h i m ; t h o u g h , it s h o u l d be said, the p r o b l e m was m u t u a l . L o r d F i s h e r , w h o s e intuitive g e n i u s a n d extreme eccentricity were rather like K i t c h e n e r ' s , h a d a s u d d e n h u n c h , on or before 19 J a n u a r y , that s e n d i n g a naval expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s was a m i s t a k e . B u t he was never able to articulate the basis for his foreboding, so he could not p e r s u a d e Churchill to c h a n g e c o u r s e . S u p p o r t for the D a r d a n e l l e s expedition initially h a d been unanim o u s , b u t from that rising high tide of e n t h u s i a s m there h a d been a turn, an e b b i n g , so that within d a y s the tide had reversed direction a n d was flowing swiftly the other way. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , to w h o m F i s h e r h a d c o m p l a i n e d of Churchill in J a n u a r y , b e g a n establishing a record that he, too, w a s o p p o s e d to the expedition unless the a r m y participated in it. As the m o s t skillful

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b u r e a u c r a t of his t i m e , H a n k e y w a s m o r e sensitive to the currents of opinion that prevailed in Churchill's A d m i r a l t y than was Churchill himself. He was aware that by the m i d d l e of F e b r u a r y , A d m i r a l t y opinion h a d t u r n e d against the idea of a purely naval venture, although the attack was s c h e d u l e d to begin in a matter of d a y s . * On 15 F e b r u a r y , S i r H e n r y J a c k s o n , who a m o n t h earlier h a d u r g e d Churchill to i m p l e m e n t C a r d e n ' s p l a n s immediately, circulated a m e m o r a n d u m in which he said that the purely naval plan "is not r e c o m m e n d e d as a s o u n d military o p e r a t i o n . " C a p t a i n H e r b e r t William R i c h m o n d , Assistant D i r e c t o r of O p e r a t i o n s , w a s also a s sociated with this criticism, h a v i n g written a m e m o r a n d u m of his own along similar lines the day before, a copy of which he had forwarded to H a n k e y . 6

E a r l y in the m o r n i n g of 16 F e b r u a r y F i s h e r sent a similar warning to Churchill, who was t h u n d e r s t r u c k : he was driven to seek an i m m e d i a t e e m e r g e n c y session with whatever m e m b e r s of the War Council of the C a b i n e t were available. T h e dire situation was this: the British naval a r m a d a off the T u r k i s h coast was d u e to c o m m e n c e its attack within forty-eight to seventy-two h o u r s ; the a r m a d a could not p o s t p o n e its attack while r e m a i n i n g in the area, for enemy s u b m a r i n e s m i g h t soon be sent to sink i t ; b u t if the a r m a d a p r o c e e d e d to attack, it w o u l d fail, a c c o r d i n g to this s u d d e n l y revised opinion of the naval leadership of the A d m i r a l t y , unless a substantial b o d y of troops was sent to s u p p o r t i t — t r o o p s that K i t c h e n e r h a d repeatedly refused to s e n d a n d which, in any event, could hardly be expected to arrive in time even if d i s p a t c h e d immediately. 7

Before attending the War C o u n c i l , K i t c h e n e r s p o k e with W y n d h a m D e e d e s , the officer who had s e r v e d in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e before the war, now a captain in intelligence serving in L o n d o n , and asked his opinion of a naval attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s . D e e d e s replied that in his view s u c h a plan w o u l d be fundamentally u n s o u n d . As he b e g a n to explain why that w o u l d be so, an enraged K i t c h e n e r cut him short, told h i m he did not know what he was talking a b o u t , and a b r u p t l y d i s m i s s e d h i m .

* He told the Cabinet so; he told the Prime Minister so; and he recorded his opinion in letters and memoranda. In a diary entry for 19 March he recorded that "On the first day proposal was made I warned P. M . , Lord K, Chief of Staff, L. George and Balfour that Fleet could not effect passage and that all naval officers thought so." Hankey indeed had issued such warnings, but a month later than he claimed. It was not on 13 January (when the Cabinet committee decided on the Dardanelles expedition) but on 10 February that he wrote to Balfour along those lines. Later still he spoke to Asquith. On 13 February, the Prime Minister noted that "I have just been having a talk with Hankey, whose views are always worth hearing. He thinks very strongly that the naval operations . . . should be supported by landing a fairly strong military force. I have been for some time coming to the same opinion .. . " 3

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Y e t the interview with D e e d e s c h a n g e d K i t c h e n e r ' s m i n d . A few h o u r s later, K i t c h e n e r told m e m b e r s of the War C o u n c i l that he would agree to send the 29th D i v i s i o n — t h e only regular a r m y division that r e m a i n e d in B r i t a i n — t o the A e g e a n to s u p p o r t the navy's attack. In addition, the new A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d t r o o p s who had arrived in E g y p t c o u l d be d i s p a t c h e d if necessary. T h e plan, which now met the r e q u i r e m e n t s of F i s h e r , J a c k s o n , R i c h m o n d , a n d the others, was that once the navy's ships had won the battle for the straits, the t r o o p s w o u l d c o m e in behind t h e m to o c c u p y the adjacent shore a n d , thereafter, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . A c c o r d i n g to a diary entry, " L o r d K ' s w o r d s to Winston were: ' Y o u get t h r o u g h ! I will find the m e n . ' " 8

T h e plan was f l a w e d . I f the T u r k i s h defenders h a d c o m p e t e n t leadership a n d a d e q u a t e a m m u n i t i o n , a c o m b i n e d assault w a s called for. I n s t e a d of waiting for the navy to win the battle, the a r m y o u g h t to have helped by attacking the D a r d a n e l l e s forts. T h e civilian M a u r i c e H a n k e y saw this clearly; the a d m i r a l s a n d generals did not. On 22 F e b r u a r y , the A d m i r a l t y i s s u e d a public c o m m u n i q u e announcing that the D a r d a n e l l e s attack h a d b e g u n a n d d e s c r i b i n g it in detail. T h e n e w s p a p e r s took up the story, focusing attention on the attack a n d a r o u s i n g public expectations. The Times noted that " b o m b a r d m e n t f r o m the sea will not carry s u c h a project very far unless it is c o m b i n e d with troops"; a n d w a r n e d that " T h e one thing the Allies d a r e not risk in a persistent attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s is failure." K i t c h e n e r i s s u e d a similar w a r n i n g of his own to C a b i n e t colleagues. A l t h o u g h he had originally p r o p o s e d to "leave off the b o m b a r d m e n t if it were ineffective," when L l o y d G e o r g e a r g u e d in favor of a d h e r i n g to that plan ("If we failed at the D a r d a n e l l e s we ought to be immediately ready to try s o m e t h i n g else"), K i t c h e n e r c h a n g e d his m i n d . At a meeting of the War Council on 24 F e b r u a r y , the War Minister cited the A d m i r a l t y ' s public c o m m u n i q u e as his reason for the c h a n g e . " T h e effect of a defeat in the Orient w o u l d be very s e r i o u s . T h e r e c o u l d b e n o g o i n g b a c k . T h e publicity o f the a n n o u n c e m e n t had c o m m i t t e d u s . " If the fleet failed, he s a i d , "the a r m y o u g h t to see the b u s i n e s s t h r o u g h . " 9

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F i r s t he had s u g g e s t e d s e n d i n g in the navy. N o w he h a d decided to send in the a r m y . S t e p by s t e p , without m e a n i n g to, K i t c h e n e r was allowing Britain to be d r a w n into a major e n g a g e m e n t in the Middle East.

Ill T h e T u r k s expected Churchill's attack o n the D a r d a n e l l e s ; b u t for the m o m e n t they had no m e a n s to defend against it. N o t even

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W y n d h a m D e e d e s — u s u a l l y so well informed on O t t o m a n a f f a i r s — knew this secret, although the G e r m a n s were well aware of it. At the outset of the war, the O t t o m a n forces a n d their G e r m a n advisers h a d b e g u n to strengthen the forts on b o t h sides of the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t saw their efforts nullified by the lack of a m m u n i t i o n . At the end of 1914 a n d at the b e g i n n i n g of 1915, Berlin learned that the s u p p l y of a m m u n i t i o n at the straits was e n o u g h to fight only a b o u t one e n g a g e m e n t , a n d that s o m e of the O t t o m a n g u n b o a t s h a d e n o u g h shells to fire for a b o u t one m i n u t e each. D u r i n g the next six weeks, the O t t o m a n high c o m m a n d received a n u m b e r of intelligence r e p o r t s indicating that an Allied naval attack on the straits was i m m i n e n t . On 15 F e b r u a r y 1915, detailed information was received on a concentration of British a n d F r e n c h war vessels in the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n . On the m o r n i n g of 19 F e b r u a r y , A d m i r a l C a r d e n ' s British w a r s h i p s fired the o p e n i n g shots i n the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . T h e U . S . a m b a s s a d o r to T u r k e y noted that the s u c c e s s of the Allied forces s e e m e d inevitable, a n d the inhabitants of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e thought that their city w o u l d fall within d a y s . It was a m e a s u r e of the Porte's despair that it even considered seeking help f r o m R u s s i a , its age-old enemy. T h e d a y after the British attack b e g a n , the T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r t o G e r m a n y s u g g e s t e d the creation of a R u s s i a n - T u r k i s h - G e r m a n alliance: R u s s i a , he p r o p o s e d , s h o u l d be offered free p a s s a g e through the D a r d a n e l l e s in return for switching s i d e s in the w a r . As the G r a n d Vizier explained to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , "One o u g h t to m a k e peace with R u s s i a so that one could then hit E n g l a n d all the h a r d e r . " T h e G e r m a n s relayed the p r o p o s a l t o R u s s i a , b u t nothing c a m e of it. F o r the T u r k s there s e e m e d to be no way out of a losing battle for the straits. 1 2

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T h e roar of the British naval g u n s at the m o u t h of the D a r d a n e l l e s echoed politically t h r o u g h the capital cities of the strategically crucial Balkan countries. In A t h e n s , in B u c h a r e s t , a n d in Sofia politicians started m o v i n g toward the Allied c a m p . It was evident that all of them, even B u l g a r i a , w o u l d enter the war alongside the E n t e n t e Powers i f the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n were w o n . A s L l o y d G e o r g e had repeatedly a r g u e d , with the B a l k a n countries as allies, Britain could b r i n g the war to an end by m o v i n g through the disaffected A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e to invade G e r m a n y from the relatively undefended south. 1 5

When the a r m a d a of British w a r s h i p s , s u p p o r t e d by a F r e n c h s q u a d r o n , o p e n e d fire at long r a n g e on the m o r n i n g of 19 F e b r u a r y , the T u r k i s h shore batteries at the m o u t h of the D a r d a n e l l e s lacked the range even to reply. In order to inflict greater d a m a g e on the T u r k i s h shore fortifications, C a r d e n m o v e d his w a r s h i p s closer to

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shore. T h a t night the weather t u r n e d , a n d the navy was o b l i g e d to discontinue operations for five d a y s b e c a u s e of poor visibility a n d icy gales. On 25 F e b r u a r y the attack r e s u m e d . British m a r i n e s who were put on shore at the tip of the peninsula found the forts at the entrance of the straits d e s e r t e d ; the T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s h a d withdrawn to the N a r r o w s , where the artillery defenses of the D a r d a n e l l e s were concentrated. T h e British mission in Sofia r e p o r t e d that the Bulgarian a r m y might join in the attack on T u r k e y . T h e P r i m e Minister of R u m a n i a indicated to the British representative in B u c h a r e s t that not only was his own country a friend to the Allies b u t that "Italy would m o v e s o o n . " In early M a r c h a joyful a n d excited Churchill received a secret cable from Venizelos-—still serving as Prime Minister—-promising G r e e k s u p p o r t , including three a r m y divisions for G a l l i p o l i ; a n d , a c c o r d i n g to Venizelos, even the p r o - G e r m a n K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e was p r e p a r e d to join the A l l i e s . 16

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Victory was in the air. T h o u g h suffering from influenza, Churchill was elated. He confessed to Violet A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's daughter, that "I think a c u r s e s h o u l d rest on me b e c a u s e I am so h a p p y . I know this war is s m a s h i n g a n d shattering the lives of t h o u s a n d s every m o m e n t — a n d y e t — I cannot help i t — I enjoy every second I live." A c c o r d i n g to a cable from A d m i r a l C a r d e n to Churchill dated 4 M a r c h , the fleet could expect to arrive at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , weather permitting, in a b o u t fourteen d a y s . T h e postwar fate of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e leaped to the t o p of the international a g e n d a ; even the Italians, who had not yet entered the war, b e g a n to claim their "share in the eventual partition of T u r k e y . " Churchill s e e m s to have sensed that such claims were p r e m a t u r e : in a confidential letter to the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , he p r o p o s e d that E u r o p e a n T u r k e y should be c a p t u r e d but that the Allies s h o u l d dictate an armistice that would leave O t t o m a n A s i a in O t t o m a n h a n d s at least t e m p o r a r i l y . 8

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Only F i s h e r r e m a i n e d skeptical for a few d a y s m o r e . "The more I consider the Dardanelles, the less I like it I" (original e m p h a s i s ) , he w r o t e . B u t on 10 M a r c h , even he was converted when intercepted G e r m a n wireless m e s s a g e s revealed that the remaining D a r d a n e l l e s forts, including the key ones d o m i n a t i n g the N a r r o w s , were a b o u t to run out of a m m u n i t i o n . Shifting s u d d e n l y to great e n t h u s i a s m , F i s h e r p r o p o s e d to go out to the A e g e a n a n d personally a s s u m e c o m m a n d of the a r m a d a . T h e rush to take credit for the i m p e n d i n g victory was on. 2 2

O n e evening after d i n n e r — a rare social occasion for the War Minister—Violet A s q u i t h s p o k e with L o r d Kitchener, and told him that it was Churchill who would deserve the accolades of t r i u m p h . S h e said that "If the D a r d a n e l l e s c o m e s off W. will deserve full and

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almost sole credit. He has shown s u c h c o u r a g e a n d consistency in taking the responsibility t h r o u g h o u t all the vacillations of F i s h e r and others." I n her diary she r e c o r d e d that " L o r d K . replied indignantly: 'Not at a l l — I was always strongly in favour of it.' " 2 3

16 RUSSIA'S GRAB FOR T U R K E Y i It was at R u s s i a ' s u r g i n g that K i t c h e n e r a n d Churchill h a d launched the expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t when it looked as t h o u g h that expedition m i g h t s u c c e e d , the C z a r ' s g o v e r n m e n t p a n i c k e d . An Allied victory at the D a r d a n e l l e s m i g h t s e e m an occasion for rejoicing; b u t it w o u l d m e a n that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e would fall into British h a n d s — a n d s udd e n l y a century of G r e a t G a m e fears a n d jealousies revived in R u s s i a n m i n d s . T h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t worried that once the British c a p t u r e d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e they m i g h t decide to keep it. On 4 M a r c h 1915 the R u s s i a n F o r e i g n Minister, S e r g e i S a z a n o v , sent a secret circular t e l e g r a m to L o n d o n a n d Paris conveying a m e s s a g e f r o m C z a r Nicholas I I , d e m a n d i n g that the Allies turn over C o n s t a n t i n o p l e and the s t r a i t s — a n d also adjacent territories—to R u s s i a . In return, the C z a r and S a z a n o v p r o m i s e d to listen with s y m p a t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g to British a n d F r e n c h plans to achieve their own national a m b i t i o n s in other regions of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e and elsewhere. In Paris the R u s s i a n d e m a n d was received with d i s m a y . Afraid that p o s s e s s i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w o u l d enable R u s s i a to b e c o m e France's rival in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t att e m p t e d to put off the R u s s i a n s with v a g u e expressions of "goodwill." D e l c a s s e s u g g e s t e d that a detailed territorial settlement s h o u l d await the eventual peace conference. 1

Sir E d w a r d G r e y u n d e r c u t the F r e n c h position. I n his s y m p a t h y for the susceptibilities of his country's Allies, G r e y , who h a d allayed F r e n c h s u s p i c i o n s of British intentions in S y r i a , now m o v e d to allay R u s s i a n s u s p i c i o n s of British intentions at the D a r d a n e l l e s . In d o i n g so he o p e n e d P a n d o r a ' s box. If R u s s i a n claims were g r a n t e d in a d v a n c e of the peace conference, then F r a n c e would be m o v e d to s u b m i t her claims, and L o r d K i t c h e n e r would b e m o v e d t o s u b m i t his. H o w e v e r alive he m a y have been to s u c h d a n g e r s , G r e y g a v e priority to t h e need to reassure R u s s i a . H7

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II A c c o r d i n g to the British F o r e i g n Office, the position of the p r o Allied ministry in P e t r o g r a d might be u n d e r m i n e d by p r o - G e r m a n o p p o n e n t s if R u s s i a were not given satisfaction in the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e matter. G r e y later explained how p r o - G e r m a n elements at the R u s s i a n court-—whom he s e e m s to have genuinely f e a r e d — w o u l d m i s r e p resent British military operations at the D a r d a n e l l e s if s u c h an a s s u r a n c e were not given: It had always been British policy to keep R u s s i a out of Constantinople a n d the S t r a i t s . . . of course it was our policy still. Britain was now g o i n g to o c c u p y Constantinople in order that when Britain a n d F r a n c e h a d been enabled, by R u s s i a ' s help, to win the war, R u s s i a should not have Constantinople at the peace. If this were not s o , why were British forces being sent to the D a r d a n e l l e s at a time when the F r e n c h and British armies were being so h a r d p r e s s e d in F r a n c e that the R u s s i a n A r m i e s were m a k i n g u n h e a r d of sacrifices to save t h e m ? 2

G r e y a n d A s q u i t h , the leaders of the L i b e r a l administration, were, in any event, d i s p o s e d to m a k e the concession that Britain's wartime ally r e q u e s t e d . H e i r s to the political tradition of G l a d s t o n e , they were a n t i - T u r k a n d sympathetic to R u s s i a n aspirations; a n d they could point to the conclusion of the C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e , arrived at in 1903 d u r i n g a C o n s e r v a t i v e administration, that to exclude R u s s i a from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s no longer a vital British interest. At the outset of the O t t o m a n war, the P r i m e Minister wrote that " F e w things wd. give me greater pleasure than to see the T u r k i s h E m p i r e finally d i s a p p e a r from E u r o p e , & Constantinople either b e c o m e R u s s i a n (which I think is its p r o p e r destiny) or if that is i m p o s s i b l e neutralised .. . " In M a r c h 1915, when the issue a r o s e , he wrote of Constantinople and the straits that "It has b e c o m e quite clear that R u s s i a m e a n s to incorporate them in her own E m p i r e , " and a d d e d that "Personally I have always been & am in favour of Russia's claim . . . " 3

4

U n b e k n o w n s t to the rest of the C a b i n e t , S i r E d w a r d G r e y had already c o m m i t t e d the country to eventual R u s s i a n control of Constantinople, having m a d e p r o m i s e s along these lines to the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 0 8 . H i s view was that if R u s s i a ' s legitimate aspirations were satisfied at the straits, she would not p r e s s claims in Persia, eastern E u r o p e , or elsewhere. T h e month before, G r e y had refused t o encourage a n a n t i - G e r m a n coup d'etat in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , aimed at taking T u r k e y out of the war, b e c a u s e it would have prevented him from giving C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to R u s s i a . What he had done w a s in line with British decisions 5

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regarding G r e e c e a n d the Balkan s t a t e s , not b r i n g i n g t h e m into the war on the Allied side b e c a u s e d o i n g so m i g h t have meant, in G r e y ' s w o r d s , "the unsettlement of R u s s i a ' s wholeheartedness in the w a r . " Churchill d i s s e n t e d . H e was o p p o s e d t o issuing anything m o r e than a general statement of s y m p a t h y for R u s s i a n a s p i r a t i o n s , a n d wrote to G r e y that he h a d instructed the A d m i r a l t y to u n d e r t a k e a s t u d y of how R u s s i a n control of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the straits would affect British interests. H e u r g e d looking b e y o n d i m m e d i a t e w a r t i m e concerns: " E n g l i s h history will not e n d with this war," he c a u t i o n e d . D e s p i t e Churchill's counsel, the g o v e r n m e n t , m o v e d by an overriding fear that R u s s i a m i g h t seek a s e p a r a t e p e a c e , a g r e e d to the t e r m s p r o p o s e d b y S a z a n o v and the C z a r . T h e British ( 1 2 M a r c h 1915), belatedly followed by the F r e n c h (10 April 1915), formally accepted the secret p r o p o s a l , reiterating that their a c c e p t a n c e was conditional on their own desires with respect to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e being realized, a n d on the war b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d by all of t h e m to a final successful conclusion. 7

8

In an additional British m e m o r a n d u m , also dated 10 M a r c h 1915, G r e y p r o v i d e d S a z a n o v with a n u m b e r of other B r i t i s h c o m m e n t s a n d qualifications. O b s e r v i n g that R u s s i a h a d originally asked only for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the straits b u t was now a s k in g for adjacent territories as well, G r e y also p o i n t e d out that before Britain h a d been given a chance to decide u p o n her o w n war g o a l s , " R u s s i a is a s k in g for a definite p r o m i s e that her wishes shall be satisfied with r e g a r d to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war." G r e y repeatedly e m p h a s i z e d that in a g r e e i n g to the C z a r ' s p r o p o s a l s , the British g o v e r n m e n t was g i v i n g the greatest p o s s i b l e proof of its friendship and loyalty to R u s s i a . It w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e , wrote G r e y , for any British g o v e r n m e n t to do any m o r e than A s q u i t h was d o i n g in meeting R u s s i a ' s desires, for the c o m m i t m e n t into which he h a d j u s t entered "involves a c o m p l e t e reversal of the traditional policy of H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t , a n d is in direct opposition to the opinions a n d sentiments at one time universally held in E n g l a n d a n d which have still by no m e a n s died out." G r e y went on to outline what R u s s i a m i g h t be expected to concede in return. He m a d e it clear that his g o v e r n m e n t h a d not yet f o r m u lated m o s t of its o w n objectives in the E a s t , b u t that one of t h e m would be revision of the 1907 A n g l o - R u s s i a n A g r e e m e n t so as to give Britain the hitherto neutral third of Persia in addition to the third she already o c c u p i e d . He e m p h a s i z e d , too, that the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a g r e e m e n t they h a d just reached was to be kept secret. T h e a g r e e m e n t was t o b e kept secret b e c a u s e G r e y was worried a b o u t the effect on M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a if its t e r m s were revealed. He feared that Britain w o u l d be seen as a party to the destruction of the last r e m a i n i n g independent M o h a m m e d a n power

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of any c o n s e q u e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , G r e y told the R u s s i a n s that if the t e r m s of their a g r e e m e n t were to b e c o m e known, he w o u l d want to state publicly "that t h r o u g h o u t the negotiations, H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t have stipulated that the M u s s u l m a n Holy Places a n d A r a b i a shall u n d e r all c i r c u m s t a n c e s remain u n d e r independent Mussulman dominion." As G r e y viewed it, Britain w o u l d have to c o m p e n s a t e I s l a m for destroying the O t t o m a n E m p i r e by establishing a M o s l e m state elsewhere, a n d M e c c a a n d M e d i n a m a d e it unthinkable from a religious point of view that it s h o u l d be established anywhere b u t in A r a b i a . B e s i d e s , the p r o m i s e was an easy one to m a k e ; it was a territory that none of the G r e a t Powers coveted. D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e later wrote that "no one c o n t e m p l a t e d that foreign t r o o p s s h o u l d o c c u p y any p a r t of A r a b i a . It was too arid a country to m a k e it worth the while of any ravenous Power to o c c u p y as a p e r m a n e n t p a s t u r e . " It w a s not then known that there were i m m e n s e deposits of oil in the region. 9

1 0

Ill A r a b i a d i d , however, play a role in the postwar plans of the powerful British S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War. R u s s i a ' s d e m a n d s of 4 M a r c h 1915, a n d their a c c e p t a n c e by Britain on 12 M a r c h , led L o r d K i t c h e n e r to warn the C a b i n e t in a m e m o r a n d u m dated 16 M a r c h that after the war "old enmities a n d jealousies which have been stilled by the existing crisis in E u r o p e m a y revive" and that Britain m i g h t be "at enmity with R u s s i a , or with F r a n c e , or with both in c o m b i n a t i o n . " What he anticipated was no less than a revival of the G r e a t G a m e . H e , too, u r g e d the creation o f a n independent A r a b i a n k i n g d o m to include M e c c a a n d M e d i n a , but he a d d e d that it s h o u l d exist u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . It w a s essential that it s h o u l d do so in order to give Britain a hold on the spiritual leadership of the M o s l e m world. 11

In K i t c h e n e r ' s c o m p r e h e n s i v e design for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , Britain, f r o m its recently a n n e x e d M e d i t e r r a n e a n island of C y p r u s , would control a convenient land route to India safe from disruption by F r a n c e or R u s s i a . T h e War Minister's plan was for Britain to take p o s s e s s i o n of Alexandretta, the great natural port on the A s i a n m a i n l a n d o p p o s i t e C y p r u s , a n d to construct a railroad f r o m it to the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces (now in I r a q ) , of which Britain would also

* Now called Iskenderun, and located in the extreme south of what is now Turkey, near the frontier of what is now Syria.

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take p o s s e s s i o n . It was generally believed (though not yet p r o v e n ) that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces contained large oil reserves which were d e e m e d i m p o r t a n t by Churchill a n d the A d m i r a l t y . It was believed, too, by K i t c h e n e r a n d others, that the ancient M e s o p o t a m i a n l a n d s watered b y the T i g r i s and E u p h r a t e s rivers could be developed so as to p r o d u c e agricultural riches; b u t in K i t c h e n e r ' s view the principal a d v a n t a g e s of his p r o p o s a l were strategic. T h e British railroad from the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to the head of the Persian G u l f w o u l d enable t r o o p s to m o v e to a n d f r o m I n d i a rapidly. T h e b r o a d swath of British-owned territory it w o u l d traverse w o u l d p r o v i d e a shield for the Persian Gulf, as well as a r o a d to I n d i a . If Britain failed to take p o s s e s s i o n of it, he feared that R u s s i a would. S i r A r t h u r Hirtzel of the I n d i a Office wrote a similar m e m o r a n d u m at a b o u t the s a m e time, with one significant difference in e m p h a s i s : he u r g e d that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces should be incorporated into the I n d i a n E m p i r e . He viewed it as an area that could be irrigated and m a d e rich by colonists f r o m I n d i a . In his s c h e m e , the administration of the area would be e n t r u s t e d to the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a a n d w o u l d fall within the jurisdiction of the I n d i a Office. It was b e c o m i n g increasingly clear that in L o n d o n two of the c o n t e n d i n g rival p o w e r s fighting one another for a s h a r e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o a n d the British Viceroy in Simla. 1 2

U n d e r l y i n g b o t h Hirtzel's a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s m e m o r a n d a w a s the a s s u m p t i o n , s h a r e d by m o s t m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t , that it was now in Britain's interest to carve up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to take a large piece of it. T h e P r i m e Minister was practically alone in seeing a need to e x a m i n e that a s s u m p t i o n in a critical light. He a d m i t t e d , however, that politicians s u c h as Churchill, who felt that Britain ought to do as well out of the war as her allies, s p o k e for practically everybody else on this i s s u e . A s q u i t h wrote: I believe that, at the m o m e n t , G r e y a n d I are the only two m e n who d o u b t & d i s t r u s t any s u c h settlement. We b o t h think that in the real interest of our own future, the best thing w o u l d be if, at the e n d of the War, we c o u l d say that . . . we have taken & gained nothing. A n d that not from a merely moral & sentimental point of view .. . b u t from purely material considerations. T a k i n g on M e s o p o t a m i a , for instance—with or without Alexandretta . .. m e a n s s p e n d i n g millions in irrigation & develo p m e n t with no i m m e d i a t e or early r e t u r n ; keeping up q u i t e a large a r m y white & coloured in an unfamiliar c o u n t r y ; tackling every kind of tangled administrative question, worse than we have ever h a d in I n d i a with a hornet's nest of A r a b t r i b e s . 1 3

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T h e P r i m e Minister told m e m b e r s of his C a b i n e t that when they d i s c u s s e d the future of the O t t o m a n territories, their "discussion h a d r e s e m b l e d that of a g a n g of b u c c a n e e r s . " B u t it was typical of h i m that he did not take a s t a n d against t h e m . What he told the C a b i n e t was that, while he was in s y m p a t h y with G r e y ' s view "that we have already as m u c h territory as we are able to h o l d , " he did not r e g a r d himself a n d his colleagues as "free a g e n t s " who were entitled to hold back f r o m taking m o r e . If "we were to leave the other nations to s c r a m b l e for T u r k e y without taking anything ourselves, we s h o u l d not b e d o i n g our d u t y . " 14

15

In the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e that c o m p r i s e d the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a g r e e ment, R u s s i a in effect h a d challenged the western p o w e r s to formulate their own territorial d e m a n d s . A s q u i t h took up the challenge: he appointed an interdepartmental g r o u p under the c h a i r m a n s h i p of a career d i p l o m a t , S i r M a u r i c e de B u n s e n , to study the matter a n d to r e c o m m e n d what Britain o u g h t to ask from an O t t o m a n peace settlement. L a r g e l y unnoticed a n d u n d i s c u s s e d , another m a j o r step had been taken. In the 100 days between the o u t b r e a k of the G e r m a n war a n d the outbreak of the O t t o m a n war, Britain h a d overturned the foreign policy of m o r e than a century by a b a n d o n i n g any c o m m i t m e n t to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . N o w , in the 150 d a y s since the o u t b r e a k of the O t t o m a n war, the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t h a d c o m e a r o u n d to the view that dividing up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was positively desirable, a n d that Britain w o u l d benefit f r o m taking part in it.

IV T h e A s q u i t h government's m o v e to plan the b r e a k u p of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was p r o m p t e d b y the R u s s i a n d e m a n d for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . L o r d K i t c h e n e r h a d anticipated that d e m a n d at the outset of the war. M o n t h s before A s q u i t h a p p o i n t e d the interdepartmental c o m m i t t e e chaired by the d i p l o m a t S i r M a u r i c e de B u n s e n to outline Britain's a i m s in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , K i t c h e n e r h a d initiated informal inquiries of his own along these lines, which his lieutenants p u r s u e d before, d u r i n g , a n d after the de B u n s e n proceedings. K i t c h e n e r turned to his former staff in C a i r o to elaborate the details of his p l a n s for the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t , with special reference to the possibility that R u s s i a a n d F r a n c e might r e s u m e their traditional hostility to Britain in that part of the world. A p p a r e n t l y O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , K i t c h e n e r ' s aide, wrote t o S t o r r s asking for c o m m e n t s on the role of Palestine after the war with

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respect to a p r o b a b l e F r e n c h a n d / o r R u s s i a n position further north. It was one of the first t i m e s that Z i o n i s m — t h e m o v e m e n t to create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine—entered into British wartime s p e c u lations. S t o r r s replied at the e n d of 1914: With r e g a r d to Palestine, I s u p p o s e that while we naturally do not want to b u r d e n ourselves with fresh responsibilities as would be i m p o s e d u p o n us by annexation, we a r e , I take it, averse to the p r o s p e c t of a R u s s i a n a d v a n c e S o u t h w a r d s into S y r i a , or of a too great extension of the inevitable F r e n c h Protectorate over the L e b a n o n , etc. F r a n c e would be a better n e i g h b o u r than R u s s i a , b u t we cannot count on the p e r m a n e n c e of any E n t e n t e , however C o r d i a l e , when the generation that is full of war m e m o r i e s p a s s e s away. A buffer S t a t e is m o s t desirable, but can we get one u p ? T h e r e is no visible indigenous elements out of which a M o s l e m K i n g d o m of Palestine can be c o n s t r u c t e d . T h e J e w i s h S t a t e is in theory an attractive idea; but the J e w s , t h o u g h they constitute a majority in J e r u s a l e m itself are very m u c h in a minority in Palestine generally, a n d form indeed a b a r e sixth of the whole p o p u l a t i o n . After considering the alternatives, S t o r r s c o n c l u d e d that the m o s t attractive a p p r o a c h w o u l d be to annex a n d incorporate Palestine into E g y p t . H e e n d e d b y saying, "Please r e m e m b e r m e t o the Chief. E g y p t i a n s are h o p i n g that he will continue to direct their fate from afar." S t o r r s wrote again at the b e g i n n i n g of M a r c h 1915, p r o p o s i n g that after the war K i t c h e n e r s h o u l d return to a new " N o r t h African or N e a r E a s t e r n Vice-Royalty including E g y p t and the S u d a n a n d across the way from A d e n to A l e x a n d r e t t a . " T h i s , he s u g g e s t e d , w o u l d offer K i t c h e n e r an attractive alternative to b e c o m i n g Viceroy of I n d i a . In effect he was p r o p o s i n g that m o s t of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world s h o u l d be o r g a n i z e d into a confederation that would be a British protectorate ruled b y K i t c h e n e r from C a i r o . 16

7

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As he developed a M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy for Britain, the War Minister b a s e d it on the S t o r r s p r o p o s a l . On 11 N o v e m b e r 1914, K i t c h e n e r wrote to S i r E d w a r d G r e y that the F r e n c h s h o u l d be p e r s u a d e d to forego their traditional interest in S y r i a , a n d s h o u l d in exchange be given m o r e of N o r t h Africa after the w a r ; while S y r i a should be nominally independent under a British protectorate a n d should be joined to A r a b i a u n d e r the spiritual leadership of an A r a b caliph. ( T h i s w a s the matter a b o u t which K i t c h e n e r h a d c o r r e s p o n d e d with H u s s e i n of M e c c a m o n t h s b e f o r e . ) K i t c h e n e r later s u g g e s t e d to G r e y that negotiations might be opened with A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g leaders without telling the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t ; b u t L o r d C r e w e , the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , told

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G r e y that s u c h a course of p r o c e e d i n g s would not be "feasible." In any event, K i t c h e n e r , S t o r r s , a n d S i r M a r k S y k e s , the T o r y M . P . who joined the K i t c h e n e r e n t o u r a g e in 1915, all wrongly believed that the F r e n c h could be p e r s u a d e d to a b a n d o n their interest in S y r i a (except for the C h r i s t i a n a r e a s of M o u n t L e b a n o n , where their presence m i g h t prove to b e , a c c o r d i n g to S t o r r s , " i n e v i t a b l e " ) . As to the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s , it long had been an article of faith a m o n g the British officials who dealt with oriental affairs that they were incapable of g e n u i n e i n d e p e n d e n c e . G e r t r u d e Bell, the most f a m o u s of prewar British travelers in A r a b i a n lands, repeated what was r e g a r d e d as o b v i o u s when she wrote that "the A r a b s can't govern t h e m s e l v e s . " A s u s e d b y B r i t i s h officials a m o n g themselves d u r i n g the war, "independence" for A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a r e a s merely meant independence from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d indicated that such areas would m o v e instead into the orbit of s o m e E u r o p e a n 20

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power. T h r o u g h o u t the next two years, K i t c h e n e r and his colleagues continued to p r e s s their s c h e m e . On 26 A u g u s t 1915, the field marshal's colleague, R e g i n a l d Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of the S u d a n , wrote the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a that "I conceive it to be not i m p o s s i b l e that in the d i m future a federation of s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n t A r a b S t a t e s might exist u n d e r E u r o p e a n g u i d a n c e a n d s u p p o r t , linked together by racial a n d linguistic g r o u n d s , owing spiritual allegiance to a single A r a b P r i m a t e , a n d looking to G r e a t Britain as its patron a n d p r o t e c t o r . " T a k i n g the lead in p u s h i n g for an A r a b caliphate, Wingate corr e s p o n d e d with K i t c h e n e r ' s c a n d i d a t e for the p o s i t i o n — H u s s e i n , the ruler of M e c c a a n d M e d i n a — t h r o u g h an A r a b religious leader in the S u d a n , S i r S a y y i d Ali a l - M i r g h a n i . C a p t a i n G . S . S y m e s , Wingate's private secretary, p r o d u c e d a detailed m e m o r a n d u m outlining the p a n - A r a b s c h e m e of which the caliphate would be p a r t ; and S t o r r s s u b m i t t e d another m e m o r a n d u m s u p p o r t i n g the A r a b caliphate on 2 M a y 1915. G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the C a i r o Intelligence chief, s u p p o r t i n g the plan for Britain to take S y r i a a n d for the caliphate to be brought to A r a b i a , m a d e it s e e m that m a n y voices were urging the s c h e m e , when in fact it was only a single faction s p e a k i n g , t h o u g h with several v o i c e s . I n L o n d o n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r explained t o his c o l l e a g u e s — i n c l u d i n g the representative of I n d i a , which h a d been a l a r m e d by his corres p o n d e n c e with H u s s e i n m o n t h s b e f o r e — w h y the m o v i n g of the caliphate was central to his strategy for the postwar world. At a meeting of the War C o m m i t t e e of the Cabinet on 19 M a r c h 1915, L o r d C r e w e said that two different views were taken in the India Office about the future of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Political D e p a r t m e n t wanted to sacrifice T u r k e y to A r a b i a , while the Military 23

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D e p a r t m e n t wanted to make T u r k e y as s t r o n g as possible as a barrier against a potential R u s s i a n threat. M i n u t e s of the m e e t i n g record that L O R D K I T C H E N E R objected to the Military D e p a r t m e n t ' s p l a n . T h e T u r k s , h e s a i d , would always b e u n d e r p r e s s u r e from their s t r o n g R u s s i a n n e i g h b o u r , with the result that the K h a l i f a t e m i g h t be to a great extent u n d e r R u s s i a n domination, and the R u s s i a n influence m i g h t indirectly assert itself over the M o h a m m e d a n part of the p o p u l a t i o n of I n d i a . If, on the other h a n d , the K h a l i f a t e were transferred to A r a b i a , it would r e m a i n to a g r e a t extent under our i n f l u e n c e . 25

T h e F o r e i g n Office d e e m e d it unwise to interfere in M o s l e m religious affairs; the I n d i a Office went further and called it dangero u s . B u t the F o r e i g n Office would not, and the I n d i a Office could not, overrule the j u d g m e n t of H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r . He was m o r e than the head of the War Office, m o r e than a C a b i n e t minister, m o r e than an old hand at African a n d A s i a n affairs, m o r e than the empire's greatest soldier. He was a living legend west a n d east of S u e z . He was K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ; a n d in the sunset of his career, the tall old soldier cast a long s h a d o w over the future of the M i d d l e E a s t .

T h e image is one used by Lord Beaverbrook.

17 D E F I N I N G BRITAIN'S GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST T h e d e B u n s e n c o m m i t t e e — t h e interdepartmental g r o u p that A s q u i t h created to a d v i s e the C a b i n e t as to what Britain o u g h t to want in the M i d d l e E a s t — w a s a p p o i n t e d on 8 April 1915, a n d p r o d u c e d its report on 30 J u n e 1915. T h e committee was c o m p o s e d of one representative each from the F o r e i g n Office, the A d m i r a l t y , the India Office, a n d other relevant d e p a r t m e n t s . K i t c h e n e r ' s War Office was represented on the c o m m i t t e e by G e n e r a l Sir C h a r l e s Calwell, D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of Military O p e r a t i o n s . In addition, K i t c h e n e r placed S i r M a r k S y k e s on the c o m m i t t e e as his personal (as distinct from his d e p a r t m e n t a l ) representative; a n d t h r o u g h S y k e s , the War Minister d o m i n a t e d the committee's p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e r e a f t e r S y k e s remained the L o n d o n b u r e a u c r a t charged with responsibility for M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs t h r o u g h o u t the war. S y k e s , a wealthy, 36-year-old R o m a n Catholic T o r y baronet, had been elected to the H o u s e of C o m m o n s in 1911. D u r i n g and after his u n d e r g r a d u a t e years at C a m b r i d g e , he h a d traveled widely in Asiatic T u r k e y a n d h a d p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s o f his j o u r n e y s . T h i s h a d m a d e him one of the Conservative Party's experts on O t t o m a n affairs, b u t as O t t o m a n affairs had not played any significant role in British politics between 1911 a n d 1914, a n d as his party was out of office, S y k e s was not well known either to the public or to his fellow politicians. S y k e s was the p r o d u c t of a c u r i o u s b a c k g r o u n d . He was the only child of an u n h a p p y m a r r i a g e : his w a r m - h e a r t e d b u t wanton mother a n d his harsh elderly father lived a p a r t . At the age of three, when his mother converted to R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m , he b e c a m e a Catholic, too. When he was seven his father took him on a trip to the E a s t . H i s religion a n d his travels in the E a s t remained lifelong p a s s i o n s . H i s education was fitful. He was m o v e d from school to school a n d there were times when he was not at school at all. He spent two years at J e s u s C o l l e g e , C a m b r i d g e , b u t d i d not stay to take his d e g r e e . He was restless. T h e vast estates that he inherited a n d his horse-breeding stables did not keep him at h o m e . He r o a m e d the E a s t , and spent 146

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four years attached to the e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . He was welc o m e d everywhere for his talents. He w a s a caricaturist a n d a m i m e , in both cases of almost professional quality. He was a m u s i n g a n d m a d e friends easily. H e held opinions strongly, b u t c h a n g e d t h e m rapidly. When the war c a m e , S y k e s m a d e an effort to find a j o b that w o u l d m a k e use of his M i d d l e E a s t e r n e x p e r t i s e . In the s u m m e r of 1914 he wrote a letter to Winston Churchill a s k i n g for a j o b "on the spot" working against T u r k e y , offering to "raise native scallywag c o r p s , win over notables, or any other o d d m e n t . " He wrote that "I know you won't think me self-seeking if I say all the knowledge I have of local tendencies a n d possibilities, are at your d i s p o s a l but Churchill either d i d not have a position for h i m or did not offer it. S y k e s fell into K i t c h e n e r ' s orbit as a result of meeting L i e u t e n a n t Colonel O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , the field marshal's close friend a n d personal military secretary. F i t z G e r a l d a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to be b r o u g h t into the War Office early in 1915, where he served u n d e r Calwell p r e p a r i n g information booklets for troops in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n area. While there, he m a d e an especial friend of G. M. W. M a c d o n o g h , a fellow R o m a n Catholic who h a d attended the s a m e p u b l i c school; as D i r e c t o r of Military Intelligence, M a c d o n o g h p r o v e d a valuable ally in a d v a n c i n g S y k e s ' s career. S h o r t l y after his arrival at the War Office, S y k e s was given his de B u n s e n a s s i g n m e n t . K i t c h e n e r r e q u i r e d a y o u n g politician who knew the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d y o u n g S i r M a r k S y k e s was one of the handful of M e m b e r s of Parliament who knew the area. As a T o r y , he s h a r e d m a n y of K i t c h e n e r ' s sentiments a n d p r e j u d i c e s . In every sense they were m e m b e r s of the s a m e c l u b . Y e t , at the t i m e of his a p p o i n t m e n t , he barely knew K i t c h e n e r ; and was never to know him m u c h better. S y k e s was directed to call F i t z G e r a l d every evening to give a full report of the de B u n s e n committee's d i s c u s s i o n s . F i t z G e r a l d would later tell him what K i t c h e n e r wanted him to say or do at the meetings that followed. H i s few a t t e m p t s at actually seeing the reclusive national legend evidently p r o v e d unsatisfactory; S y k e s later c o m m e n t e d that " T h e less I saw of him, the easier it was to do what he required . .. " 2

F r o m the outset, t h o u g h , the other m e m b e r s a s s u m e d that he spoke with the full weight of L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s authority. T h e relatively inexperienced M . P . controlled the interdepartmental c o m mittee. H e was o u t s p o k e n a n d opinionated. H e was the only m e m b e r of the c o m m i t t e e who h a d been to m o s t parts of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; he alone could speak f r o m first-hand knowledge. T h e n , too, * Both belonged to the Other Club, founded by Winston Churchill and F. E. Smith.