60 Years of Leadership: NATO 1949-2009

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60 YEARS OF

leadership NATO 1949-2009

From the publishers of

NATO cover fnl.indd 1

The Year in Defense

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60 YEARS OF

leadership

NATO 1949-2009 Title page NATO.indd 1

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60 YEARS OF

leadership NATO 1949-2009

table of contents BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE NATO’s 60-year history Written by J.R. Wilson

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Secretaries General

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The Gold Standard NATO naval forces Written by Eric Tegler

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Echoes Six decades of history reflected in 21st-century NATO air forces Written by Jan Tegler

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INCREASING COMMITMENTS NATO land forces Written by Eric Tegler

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Quest for Interoperability Written by J.R. Wilson

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the Future of NATO Written by J.R. Wilson

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night vision leadership lighting 60 YEARS OF

NATO 1949-2009

North American Headquarters 701 North West Shore Blvd. Tampa, FL 33609 Tel. (813) 639-1900 Fax (813) 639-4344

Contributing Writers Eric Tegler, Jan Tegler J.R. Wilson Editorial Director Charles Oldham, [email protected]

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©Copyright Faircount LLC. All rights reserved. Reproduction of editorial content in whole or in part without written permission is prohibited. Faircount LLC does not assume responsibility for the advertisements, nor any representation made therein, nor the quality or deliverability of the products themselves. Reproduction of articles and photographs, in whole or in part, contained herein is prohibited without expressed written consent of the publisher, with the exception of reprinting for news media use. Printed in the United States of America. Various images and text in this publication in no way are used to imply an endorsement by NATO for any claims or representations therein. None of the advertising contained herein implies endorsement by NATO of any private entity or enterprise.

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NATO 60th Anniversary

BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE NATO’s 60-year history By J.R. Wilson

On April 4, 1949, a dozen nations met in Washington, D.C., to sign the North Atlantic Treaty (aka “the Washington Treaty”), intended to guarantee long-term military and diplomatic ties between Europe and North America as a means of ensuring the freedom of Western Europe. That treaty came near the end of the June 1948–May 1949

Soviet blockade of West Berlin, broken by the Western Allies’ yearlong Berlin Airlift. The following year, U.S. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had led the Allied victory against Nazi Germany, was named Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The SACEUR’s job was to head the military side of the

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As the Iron Curtain separated Europe into two opposing military and political blocs, the Western Allies from World War II began laying the foundation for a unique new alliance to present a united front against any further territorial ambitions by the resurgent Soviet Union.

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60th Anniversary NATO

Opposite page: Secretary of State Dean Acheson signs the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of the United States in 1949, guaranteeing longterm military and diplomatic ties between Europe and North America. Above: The first NATO Science Committee meeting in Paris 1958. The formation of this committee created an avenue to increase international partnerships and promote security among member nations by scientific cooperation.

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new alliance and coordinate any future need to counter attempts to isolate, threaten, or control member states or territories under its protection. Eisenhower stepped down on May 31, 1952, to launch his successful campaign for the American presidency. His departure followed by one month the appointment of Winston Churchill’s wartime Chief of Staff Gen. Hastings Lionel Ismay (Lord Ismay), NATO’s first secretary general. By the time Ismay left office in 1957, he had clarified the roles and responsibilities of the secretary general, including taking on what is considered

the office’s most important duty – chairing the North Atlantic Council. NATO’s formative years often dealt with resolving long-standing animosities – at least to the point where the nations involved could come together as full members of the alliance’s mutual support mechanism. That effort led to the admission of long-time enemies Greece and Turkey in 1952 and, in 1955, West Germany, although it would remain under slowly relaxing levels of American, British, and French military and political control for nearly half a century.

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THE SOVIET MEMBERSHIP GAMBIT One of the oddest tests of the alliance came in 1954, when the Soviet Union stunned everyone by asking to join NATO, citing a need for closer cooperation on Soviet proposals to prohibit the building of atomic weapons, institute a general arms reduction, control Germany, and institute a Pan-European “system of security based on the collective efforts of all the countries of Europe.” In what may have been a pre-emptive justification for creation of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact the

following year, the USSR petition also warned against “the formation in Europe of antagonistic military groups of countries” that “invariably precipitates corresponding action on the part of other countries to guarantee their security,” thus heightening “the menace of another war.” Further denouncing the North Atlantic Treaty for including all of the anti-Hitler allies except the USSR – and “claiming it could not but be regarded as an aggressive pact directed against the Soviet Union” – the Russians proclaimed the only way to validate Western claims of seeking to reduce world tensions and promote peace would be to open NATO to all of Europe.

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SACEUR Gen. Alexander Haig meets NATO troops in the field during Exercise Arrow Express in 1977.

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“In view of this, the Soviet Government, guided by the unchanged principles of its foreign policy of peace and desirous of relaxing the tension in international relations, states its readiness to join with the interested governments in examining the matter of having the Soviet Union participate in the North Atlantic Treaty,” the letter concluded. In a memo to NATO members, Ismay questioned whether the Soviet Union would abide by NATO treaty obligations for all members to uphold individual liberties and the democratic way of life, to disclose all economic, military, and industrial positions to other alliance partners, and to be “closely cross-examined by his allies on these matters.” “To put it very bluntly, the Soviet request to join NATO is like an unrepentant burglar requesting to join the police force,” Ismay wrote. NATO’s official response was equally blunt: It is unnecessary to emphasise the completely unreal character of such a suggestion. It is contrary to the very principles on which the defence system and the security of the Western nations depend. These nations have bound themselves by close ties of mutual confidence. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is much more than a purely military arrangement, is founded on the principle of individual liberty and the rule of law. The means of defence of its members have been pooled to provide collectively the security which they cannot attain individually in the face of the military preponderance which the Soviet Union has attained in Europe since 1945 and of the westward expansion of a political, economic and military system subject to its sole control. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is wholly defensive. There is free and full exchange of information between all its members. All its decisions are taken by unanimous consent. The Soviet Union as a member of the Organization would therefore be in a position to veto every decision. None of the member states is prepared to allow their joint defence system to be disrupted in this way. Ironically, both the propaganda points raised by the Soviet Union in its request to join NATO and those highlighted in the negative response from NATO were, in large part, ultimately achieved some four decades later. That came with the fall of the Berlin Wall, collapse of the USSR, lifting of the Iron Curtain, admission of most Warsaw Pact nations into NATO, and the rest of Eastern Europe joining the 24-member Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and the 50-member Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

NATO MEMBERS The original NATO signatories 1. Belgium 2. Canada 3. Denmark 4. France 5. Iceland 6. Italy 7. Luxembourg 8. The Netherlands 9. Norway 10. Portugal 11. The United Kingdom 12. The United States Those joining later in the Cold War era 13. Greece (1952) 14. Turkey (1952) 15. West Germany (1955) 16. Spain (1982) Nations joining NATO after the end of the Cold War 17. Czech Republic (1999) 18. Hungary (1999) 19. Poland (1999) 20. Bulgaria (2004) 21. Estonia (2004) 22. Latvia (2004) 23. Lithuania (2004) 24. Romania (2004) 25. Slovakia (2004) 26. Slovenia (2004) Nations pending membership 27. Albania (expected in 2009) 28. Croatia (expected in 2009) 29. Georgia 30. Ukraine

former Warsaw Pact Members 1. Albania (withdrew in 1968) 2. Bulgaria 3. Czechoslovakia 4. East Germany (joined in 1956) 5. Hungary 6. Poland 7. Romania 8. Soviet Union

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A British Army armored vehicle protects a forward airfield during Exercise Reforger Spearpoint in 1984, at the height of the Cold War. A Royal Air Force Harrier GR. 3 is about to take off in the background.

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MORE THAN A MILITARY ALLIANCE While always a part of the agreement, political cooperation among the member states was increased during the 1957 Paris Summit, which also saw the creation of the NATO Science Committee. The latter action stemmed from the previous year’s “Report of the Committee of Three,” which emphasized scientific cooperation as an avenue to increase international partnerships and promote security among member nations. Since then, the Science Committee has sponsored research not only related to Cold War military issues, but also looking into the environment, food supplies, terrorism, and cyber security. As NATO’s relationships with non-member countries, including those previously considered adversaries, improved through the 1990s, scientific cooperation became a major part of its effort to expand international cooperation.

In his 10th anniversary statement on the 1959 meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s second secretary general, Paul-Henri Spaak, noted all of the basic reasons that led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty remained valid, but so did the need to further develop a principle of interdependence to make best use of all available member resources in the future. That applied not only to the central focus of countering the Soviet Union in Europe, but also on consolidating broad realms of Western security to meet the global challenges facing NATO members. Spaak wrote: The Council endorsed the Secretary General’s call for a further impetus to be given to the work of the Alliance and recognized the need for increased collective action in regard not only to political consultation and the common defence effort but also to certain aspects of economic, scientific, cultural and information work. In conclusion, the Council recognized that the Atlantic Alliance has proved its vital importance during the

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A ceremony to mark the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the North Atlantic Treaty, March 1999.

past ten years and has helped to stimulate the sense of community amongst member nations. The Council expressed its confidence that the Alliance will continue to develop as the indispensable basis for the security of the Atlantic peoples and the defence of world peace. Before another such anniversary, however, NATO’s sense of unity would be shaken, even as its claim of being more than just a military organization received a sort of backhanded validation. In the late 1950s, French President Charles de Gaulle began withdrawing French forces from NATO command, beginning with France’s Mediterranean fleet in March 1959 and later the Atlantic and Channel fleets. A June 1959 ban on all foreign nuclear weapons led to the closure and return to French control of 10 U.S. air bases. Under de Gaulle, France concentrated on the formation of a separate military capability, ultimately leading to the nation’s full withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military command in 1966 and an order for all non-French troops to leave the country, forcing the relocation of NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) from Rocquencourt, near Paris, to Casteau, Belgium. Even so, France remained a member of NATO, assuring its support for the alliance and commitment to the defense of Europe. The military separation would remain through the end of the Cold War, however. France rejoined NATO’s Military Committee – but not the integrated military command – in 1995. It was not until June 2008, under the leadership of new French President Nicolas Sarkozy,

Partnership for Peace Members Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet republics) 1. Armenia 2. Azerbaijan 3. Belarus 4. Kazakhstan 5. Kyrgyzstan 6. Moldova 7. Russia 8. Tajikistan 9. Turkmenistan 10. Uzbekistan Countries that (though militarily neutral) possessed capitalist economies during the Cold War 1. Austria 2. Finland 3. Republic of Ireland 4. Malta 5. Sweden 6. Switzerland Other nations that possessed socialist economies during the Cold War 1. Albania 2. Bosnia and Herzegovina (as part of Yugoslavia) 3. Croatia (as part of Yugoslavia) 4. Montenegro (as part of Yugoslavia) 5. Serbia (as part of Yugoslavia) 6. Republic of Macedonia (as part of Yugoslavia) 7. Ukraine (as part of the Soviet Union) 8. Georgia (as part of the Soviet Union)

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Chairman of the Tri-Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Nebojsˇa Radmanovic´ (center) signs the Framework Document for the accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Partnership for Peace program.

that France pledged to rejoin the integrated military command, perhaps in time for the 60th anniversary.

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DéTENTE, PERESTROiKA, AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR The 1980s began with Soviet power seemingly on the rise and American and NATO power in decline. The United States, still trying to recover from its Vietnam experience and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran, was in the midst of an economic crisis. Russia, meanwhile, had invaded Afghanistan in August 1978 with little or no substantive response from the West. Circumstances, however, soon changed, beginning one of the most dramatic reversals of course in human history. The first real crack in the Iron Curtain came in the shipyards of Poland with the 1980 formation of Solidarity, the Eastern bloc’s first free trade union. The election that same year of Ronald Reagan, considered an ardent “Cold Warrior,” to the U.S. presidency increased friction with the Soviet Union, which he branded an “evil empire” while ordering a record rebuilding and

expansion of American – and NATO – military capability. The fruits of that buildup – from GPS and satellite communications to stealth aircraft and precision-guided missiles – would be used by his successor, George H.W. Bush, to rapidly crush the Soviet-equipped Iraqi army in early 1991, forcing Saddam Hussein to retreat from his invasion of Kuwait. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had been forced to abandon Afghanistan (often called “the Russian Vietnam”) after a tumultuous decade that saw a rapid succession of four men in charge at the Kremlin. When the last of those, Mikhail Gorbachev, assumed power in 1985, he began a series of reforms that led to greater individual and national freedoms, both within the USSR and across Sovietdominated Eastern Europe. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, leading to the reunification of Germany 11 months later; the level of Western military superiority displayed in Operation Desert Storm in early 1991; the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991; the resurgence of the U.S. and other Western economies; and rapid technology advances the Soviet Union could not match all played

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major roles in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and, ultimately, of the Soviet Union itself on Dec. 26, 1991. As democracy, if often imperfectly, replaced communism in the former Soviet bloc, the former Soviet republics, and Russia itself, the Cold War ended. And with neither the Warsaw Pact nor a Soviet superpower to confront, many believed NATO, too, had outlived its usefulness and should be disbanded. But what some had dubbed “the end of history” proved instead to be the opening of a new chapter for NATO.

THE UNTHINKABLE MERGER: NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT Many Eastern European nations, freed from Soviet domination and led by former Warsaw Pact members, soon petitioned to join NATO. The idea proved more controversial – and far more complicated to deal with – than the Soviet Union’s request some 40 years earlier. The eventual expansion of NATO’s 16 nations began without a change in the number of members – the acceptance of East Germany following its reunification with West Germany on Oct. 3, 1990. The Two Plus Four Treaty earlier that year had set the stage, placating the Soviet

Union with a pledge not to station foreign troops or nuclear weapons in eastern Germany. With a reorganized and reduced post-Cold War military structure, NATO also began reframing its goals and redefining its interests in Europe and elsewhere. The first challenge came in 1993, when NATO imposed a maritime arms embargo and economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and enforced a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO air strikes helped end the war in Bosnia, but also led to the deployment of a NATO peacekeeping force there from December 1996 to December 2004. During that same period, NATO established the PfP, the EAPC, the Mediterranean Dialogue initiative, and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council to promote greater cooperation between NATO and its neighbors to the east. By 1997, NATO began looking at its former adversaries as potential allies and extended invitations to join the alliance to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The three one-time centerpieces of the Warsaw Pact officially joined NATO in 1999, opening the door for a flood of former communist nations. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO in 2004, and Albania and Croatia are expected to follow suit in time for the

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French Armée de l’Air pilots prepare for a mission during NATO Operation Sharp Guard, which began in 1993 in order to enforce a no-fly zone and support an arms embargo and economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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Regional Command Capital’s Italian Battlegroup responds to reports of a weapons cache in the Musahi Valley area south of Kabul during a medical assistance visit as part of ISAF efforts.

Union on NATO membership for former Warsaw Pact nations. Zoellick termed Gorbachev’s view an apparent “misperception.” In a Jan. 26, 2009, speech in Brussels on “Trans-Atlantic Leadership For a New Era,” current NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer gave the alliance’s most recent clarification on that issue: “Clearly, no one gets a veto over NATO enlargement. That process is central to our aim of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space and it is not negotiable. The pace and direction will be of our choosing. But the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be stuck in never-changing arguments. We need a positive agenda, one that befits the importance of both Russia and NATO.”

SEPT. 11, 2001 The September 11 attacks on the twin towers of New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon,

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alliance’s 2009 anniversary. Still awaiting formal invitations are Georgia and the Ukraine; both were told to expect them as recently as 2008, but the Russian invasion of disputed Georgian territories and ongoing conflicts with the Ukraine have complicated the issue for both nations. The expansion has not been well received by Russia, which sees it as an attempt to isolate and surround it, as noted in repeated rebukes by Gorbachev. In a May 2008 interview with London’s Daily Telegraph, the former Soviet leader insisted “the Americans promised that NATO wouldn’t move beyond the boundaries of Germany after the Cold War, but now half of central and Eastern Europe are members, so what happened to their promises? It shows they cannot be trusted.” However, Robert B. Zoellick, a former State Department official who was involved in the Two Plus Four Treaty negotiations on German reunification in 1990, denies there had been any formal agreement with the Soviet

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Photo by Philippe de Poulpiquet, Le Parisien

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An ISAF French patrol returns to Nijrab forward operating base in Kapisa province, Afghanistan, in October 2008. Today, France appears to be on the verge of rejoining NATO’s integrated military command.

followed by terrorist attacks in London and Madrid and from Moscow to Bali forced yet another review of NATO’s structure and meaning to its members – as did the Russian invasion of potential future NATO member Georgia on the opening day of the 2008 Summer Olympics. The September 11 attacks led to the first-ever invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which defines an attack on any NATO member as an attack on all. Conceived as a protection against a Soviet attempt to take West Berlin, for example, it is unlikely the original signatories ever considered its first use would be in response to non-state terrorism. NATO was among those responding to President George W. Bush’s call for a “coalition of the willing” to help overthrow the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which had provided cover and support for al Qaeda, and Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq, seen at the time as a possible source of funding and even weapons of mass destruction for Islamic terrorists. It was the alliance’s first military action outside of the North Atlantic region. While divided on the subject of Iraq, NATO remained committed to the effort in Afghanistan, with unanimous agreement in April 2003 to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there.

The following year, NATO appointed a senior civilian representative to oversee the alliance’s political and military actions in Afghanistan. In July 2006, a NATOled force replaced a U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition in handling military operations in southern Afghanistan. NATO troops also are working to train and equip the Afghan National Army in its continuing fight against the Taliban. Despite a divided view on Iraq, the NATO Training Mission-Iraq was created in August 2004 to assist the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq in the training of Iraqi security forces. Meanwhile, NATO’s once-improving relations with Russia took another turn for the worse. Shortly after Russia sent troops into the Georgian breakaway region of South Ossetia in August 2008, a note was delivered to Norway that stated Moscow was severing ties with NATO. Relations further deteriorated in 2009, with the announcement of Russian plans to establish military bases in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, another separatist region of Georgia. In NATO’s first political contact with Russia since the invasion, a spokesman reported only a continuing dispute between the two regarding the bases.

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Secretaries General

Lord Ismay 1952-1957 Lord Ismay was the first secretary general of NATO. He began his duties as both secretary general and vice chairman of the North Atlantic Council on April 4, 1952, the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Born in India in 1887, Ismay was educated at Charterhouse School and the Royal Military College of Sandhurst. He served in Somaliland during World War I, and after the war, he served on the staff of the commander in chief of the British forces. Ismay was made deputy secretary to the British War Cabinet at the outbreak of World War II, and was chief of staff to Winston Churchill and later to Clement Attlee when he became prime minister and minister of defense in 1945. He participated in conferences at Moscow, Tehran, and Yalta, and after the war he became chief of staff to Lord Mountbatten during negotiations for India’s independence. Ismay retired from his post as NATO secretary general in May 1957, succeeded by Paul-Henri Spaak. He died in 1965.

Dirk U. Stikker 1961-1964 Dirk U. Stikker was born in 1887. He studied law at the University of Groningen in the Netherlands and worked in banking and industry between 1922 and 1948. He founded the Party for Freedom and Democracy in 1946, and, from 1946-48, was a member of the First Chamber of the States General. He was minister of foreign affairs from 1948-52 and represented the Netherlands in the Round Table Conference on the status of Indonesia and the Dutch West Indies. Stikker became political mediator of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1950, and was later named chairman. He was ambassador in London from 1952-58 and later ambassador to Iceland. Manlio Brosio succeeded him as NATO secretary general in 1964. He died in 1979.

All photos courtesy of NATO

Paul-Henri Spaak 1957-1961 Paul-Henri Spaak was born in Brussels, Belgium, in 1899. He earned his degree in jurisprudence at Brussels University and became a Socialist Member of Parliament for Brussels in 1932, later becoming minister of transport and of PTT. He was prime minister from 1938-39 and spent World War II with the Belgian government in exile in London. Upon his return to Belgium, Spaak became minister of Foreign Affairs and prime minister from 1947-49. He presided over the first General Assembly of the United Nations in 1949 and was chairman of the first session of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Spaak resigned as NATO secretary general in April 1961, succeeded by Dirk U. Stikker. After his resignation, he resumed service to his country as foreign minister. He died in 1972.

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versity before entering the Foreign Service. During World War II, he served in Portugal, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. From 1949-52, Luns represented the Netherlands at the United Nations before resigning to become joint prime minister of foreign affairs of the Netherlands. He won election to Parliament four times and was minister of foreign affairs in several administrations. After serving the longest tenure in NATO history as secretary general, he was succeeded by Lord Carrington in May 1984.

Manlio Brosio 1964-1971 Manlio Brosio was born in 1897. He studied law at the University of Turin and was an artillery officer in an Alpine regiment during World War I. After graduation, he entered politics and became one of the leaders of the “liberal revolution” movement. Going underground during the occupation of Italy, he was a member of the National Liberation Committee from 1943-44. Brosio later became deputy prime minister, and from 1945-46, the minister of defense. From 1947-51, he was Italian ambassador to Moscow, was appointed ambassador to England in 1952, and ambassador to the United States in 1955. From 1961-64, he was Italian ambassador in Paris before he succeeded Stikker as secretary general. Brosio resigned in 1971 and was succeeded by Joseph Luns. He died in 1980.

Lord Carrington 1984-1988 Born in 1919, Lord Carrington was educated in the U.K. at Eton and the Royal Military College of Sandhurst. In 1951, he became parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture and parliamentary secretary to the minister of defense in 1954. Carrington served as United Kingdom commissioner in Australia, and in 1959, he was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty and a Privy Counsellor. In 1962, he became assistant deputy leader of the House of Lords. He was appointed secretary of state for Defense and later secretary of state for Energy in the 1970 Conservative Government, and served as chairman of the Conservative Party between 1972-74. Carrington was appointed secretary of state for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in 1979, and was chairman of the Lancaster House Conference. He was chairman of the General Electric Company from 1983 until becoming NATO secretary general in 1984. He was succeeded by Manfred Wörner in July 1988.

Joseph Luns 1971-1984 Born in Rotterdam, Netherlands, in 1911, Joseph Luns was educated in Amsterdam and Brussels and spent a year as an ordinary seaman in the Royal Netherlands Navy. He later earned a law degree from the Universities of Leiden and Amsterdam and studied at the London School of Economics and Berlin Uni-

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Manfred Wörner 1988-1994 Born in Stuttgart, Germany, Sept. 24, 1934, Manfred Wörner attended the universities of Weidelberg and Paris before studying law at the University of Munich, where he received a doctorate in international law in 1958. Wörner worked as an administrator in the State of Baden-Wurttemberg before becoming parliamentary advisor at the State Diet of Baden-Wurtemerg in 1962. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1965 and served as chairman of the Working Group on Defense of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary party until 1976; chairman of the Defense Committee of the German Bundestag until 1980; and deputy chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party with special responsibility for foreign policy, defense policy, development policy, and German relations until 1982. He also was a member of the Federal Executive of the CDU and deputy chairman of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Wörner was minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1982-88, and remained a member of Parliament until his appointment as secretary general July 1, 1988. Wörner died in office on Aug. 13, 1994. He was succeeded by Willy Claes.

ments headed by Wilfried Martens between 1978-82, and in one headed by Mark Eyskens. He also was appointed five times as deputy prime minister. Claes was appointed minister of state by King Baudouin, and from 1988-92 was deputy prime minister and minister of Economic Affairs in the government led by Martens. He was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs in 1992 under Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene. Claes was elected chairman of the Party of European Socialists in July 1992. Dr. Javier Solana succeeded Claes as NATO secretary general in December 1995. Dr. Javier Solana 1995-1999 Dr. Javier Solana was born in Madrid, Spain, on July 14, 1942. He has a doctorate in physics and was a Fullbright Scholar at several American universities. The author of more than 30 publications in his field, he is a professor of solid-state physics at Madrid Complutense University and a member of the Spanish Chapter of the Club of Rome. He joined the Spanish Socialist Party in 1964, has been a member of Parliament since 1977, and has been a minister of the Spanish Cabinet since 1982. From 1982-88, Solana was minister of Culture, and from 1985-88 he also acted as government spokesman. In July 1988, he was appointed minister for Education and Science, and from 1992-95 served as minister of Foreign Affairs before becoming secretary general of NATO.

Willy Claes 1994-1995 Willy Claes was born in Hasselt, Belgium, on Nov. 24, 1938. He was elected to the Hasselt City Council in 1964 and the House of Representatives in Parliament in 1968. He was appointed to the Department of Education in the government headed by Gaston Eyskens in 1972, and in 1973 and 1977, he headed the Department of Economic Affairs under two Tindemans governments. He was minister of Economic Affairs in four govern-

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Lord Robertson

1999-2003 George Islay MacNeill Robertson, born in 1946 in Port Ellen, Isle of Islay, Scotland, was educated at Dunoon Grammar School and the University of Dundee. He graduated with a degree in economics in 1968. Robertson was an official of the General, Municipal, and Boilermakers’ Union responsible for the Scottish whisky industry from 1968-78. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1978 and later re-elected five times. In 1979, Robertson was appointed parliamentary private secretary to the secretary of state for Social Services. He was defence secretary of the United Kingdom from 1997-99 and a member of Parliament for Hamilton and Hamilton South from 1978-99. He was later appointed an opposition spokesman on Scottish Affairs, then on Defence, and then on Foreign Affairs from 1982-93. He became chief spokesman on Europe in 1983. He served as the principal opposition spokesman on Scotland in the Shadow Cabinet from 1993-97 and was appointed a member of Her Majesty’s Privy Council in May 1997. In 1997, he was appointed defense secretary of the U.K., a position he held until his departure in October 1999 to serve as NATO secretary general. On Aug. 24, he received a life peerage and took the title Lord Robertson of Port Ellen. He is a former chairman of the Scottish Labour Party, was vice chairman of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and served as vice chairman of the British Council for nine years. He served on the Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs for seven years. He now serves as joint president and is a governor of the Ditchley Foundation and a Trustee of the 21st Century Trust. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

2004-present Jakob Gijsbert “Jaap” de Hoop Scheffer was born in Amsterdam, Netherlands, April 3, 1948. He studied law at Leiden University and then served in the Royal Netherlands Air Force from 1974-76. He served in the Foreign Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1976-86. He started in the

spokesmen’s service and served at the Embassy in Accra and then worked at the Permanent Delegation to NATO in Brussels until 1980, where he was responsible for issues relating to defense planning. He was responsible for the private office of four successive Foreign Affairs ministers until 1986. In June 1986, de Hoop Scheffer was elected to the House of Representatives of the States General for the Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA), becoming the party’s spokesperson on foreign policy, asylum and refugee policy, and European justice matters. He also served on the Permanent Committees on Justice, European Affairs, and Defence. He chaired the Permanent Committee on Development Cooperation from 1989-94. From 1986-94 he was a member of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the Western European Union, serving as rapporteur in 1990 during the Gulf crisis. From 1994-97, he was a member of the North Atlantic Assembly. He served as deputy leader of the CDA parliamentary party in the House of Representatives from 1995-97, when he was elected leader. In October 2001, he resigned and then chaired the House Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs from November 2001 to May 2002. He was appointed minister of Foreign Affairs in the first Balkenende government in 2002 and then to the second Balkenende government in 2003. He was a member and deputy chairman of the Atlantic Commission and served on the board of the Foundation on Interethnic Relations. He also served on the board of Leiden Institute of Higher Professional Education. He was a member of the Netherlands Federation of Christian Employers committee for the Netherlands Management Cooperation Programme in Eastern Europe, chaired the Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion, and served on the advisory board of Amsterdam Nyenrode Law School.

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the gold standard NATO naval forces By Eric Tegler

So said Eric Wertheim, a defense consultant, columnist, and author of the internationally acknowledged Naval Institute reference, Combat Fleets of the World. As impressive as NATO’s formation was in reaction to postWorld War II geopolitics, its evolution as a mutually reinforcing, effective, and durable organization is even more significant, Wertheim stressed. Despite occasional internal strains and minor conflicts of interest, the solidarity and cooperation of NATO-member militaries, particularly their navies, have never been threatened. That’s why they have been, and remain, the gold standard of international maritime forces. While the Western Allies and the USSR maintained split dominion over the European landmass after the war, it was the West that controlled the seas globally. Joseph Stalin recognized that Soviet influence could not

be exerted outside Europe without a substantial (and substantive) navy. While Russia had the resources to build a large navy, the task of building a capable one was eased considerably by the Red Army’s seizure of advanced technology as it occupied eastern Germany. The Soviets became the beneficiary of German research and development for ship designs, submarine propulsion, and torpedo technology. The West was aware of what the USSR had found, in part because of the technical treasures it too had discovered. The Soviet submarine force was numerically among the world’s strongest in 1945, but the infusion of new technology combined with Stalin’s directive to build a true ocean-going fleet and the Union’s industrial might made clear the Red Navy’s potential to cut Europe off from its transatlantic ally.

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Rob Gaston

“Working together is second nature for a lot of these navies. NATO is really the gold standard of international cooperation.”

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U.S Navy photo

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Rob Gaston

Opposite page: The German frigate FGS Niedersachsen (F 208), the Dutch frigate HNLMS Jacob van Heemskerck (F 812), the Italian aircraft carrier ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi (C 551), the Moroccan frigate RMNS Lieutenant Colonel Errhamani (F 501), USS La Salle (AGF 3), and the Spanish aircraft carrier Principe De Asturias (R 11) steam through the Atlantic Ocean while participating in the multinational Majestic Eagle exercise off the coast of Morocco in 2004. Countries involved in the NATO-led exercise included the U.K., Morocco, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey. Above: The Norwegian ULA-class submarine Utstein (KNM 302) participates in NATO exercise Odin-One on Sept. 23, 2003. The mission of the North Sea exercise was to hunt allied and NATO submarines. During the Cold War, the Royal Norwegian Navy’s submarines and fast attack craft were tasked with helping to contain the Soviet Northern fleet.

An expansionist Soviet navy threatened the core of NATO – the North Atlantic “bridge” linking the United States and Canada with Europe. This bridge enabled the Allied strategy of World War II, allowing the United States to provide Europe with the equipment and manpower to defeat Germany. After the war, its maintenance was vital to American reinforcement of its European partners in the event of a Soviet offensive against Western Europe. While the Soviet threat was enough in itself to justify the establishment of a NATO naval military framework, it was not the only inspiration for building interoperable sea forces. As NATO historian Dr. Jamie P. Shea, director of policy planning in the Private Office of the Secre-

tary General, pointed out, NATO’s formation was tied as much to the socioeconomic recovery of a Europe utterly devastated by war as the Marshall Plan was. The immediate shortage of ships and submarines could be filled by the transfer of surplus vessels from U.S. and British fleets, but the revival of European shipbuilding, and ultimately self-reliance, could only be achieved by an ambitious joint naval partnership. The partnership initially took shape with the formation of two naval commands: the Atlantic Command, headquartered in Norfolk, Va., and the Channel Command, based at Portsmouth in the U.K. A southern flank opened for NATO with the 1952 accession of Greece and Turkey to the alliance.

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Those countries’ strategic positions, influence upon Soviet access to the eastern Mediterranean, and seafaring traditions made them essential to the construction of a credible NATO Mediterranean naval force. The inclusion of the Federal Republic of Germany as a full NATO partner in 1955 not only recognized the country’s economic and political recovery but brought a highly capable naval practitioner into the fold. With the U.S. Navy constituting the bulk of NATO maritime strength, European NATO members were given specific missions and areas of responsibility (AORs) that remained in place well into the 1990s. With its considerable surface, submarine, and aircraft carrier forces, the Royal Navy (RN) was given the task of protecting shipping in the eastern Atlantic. Bolstered by a smaller Royal Netherlands Navy surface/air force, the RN reinforced the U.S. Navy in the containment of the Soviet Northern Fleet in Murmansk. The Royal Norwegian Navy added submarine and coastal fast-attack craft muscle to the Northern Fleet containment mission, while the Belgian navy took on antimine warfare in the North Sea, keeping the Scheldt estuary and the Port of Antwerp open for resupply shipping. Protecting Europe’s Atlantic coast fell to the French navy, with responsibility for the western Mediterranean as well as the ports of Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Brest. The Portuguese navy was assigned responsibility for the Iberian coast and approaches to Lisbon. Upon joining NATO in 1982, Spain gained responsibility for the control of the sea between the Balearic Islands and the Canaries as well as the western Mediterranean. The Royal Danish Navy and Germany’s Federal Navy were tasked with controlling the exit from the Baltic with fast-attack craft and submarines. The Italian Navy had a major role in the central Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey for the Aegean, and Turkey also guarded the Bosporus and the southern coast of the Black Sea.

This division of responsibility is no longer so delineated. Today, NATO navies send resources where and when they’re needed. “We’ve essentially pooled our resources,” Wertheim explained. “NATO has a standing force and member countries take turns filling it out.” The new, participatory concept is part of a broader structural reorganization undertaken by NATO in the early 2000s. From 2003, the military command structure was streamlined into two major commands: Allied Command Operations (ACO), responsible for all military operations, and Allied Command Transformation (ACT), which oversees the transformation of NATO capabilities, improving training, interoperability, testing, and doctrine. Commanded by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and headquartered at Casteau, Belgium, ACO oversees two Joint Force Commands (JFCs) that provide service-specific land, air, and maritime expertise. The JFCs are located in Brunssum, Netherlands, and Naples, Italy. ACO also overseas a joint operational headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal. Maritime components for JFC Brunssum and JFC Naples are located in Northwood, U.K., and Naples, Italy, respectively. Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), homeported at Gaeta, Italy, augment these. The United States is the lead nation for STRIKFORNATO, which is commanded by the commander, U.S. 6th Fleet (Vice Adm. Bruce W. Clingan). STRIKFORNATO is the only maritime component command authorized to plan and execute expanded roles beyond NATO’s AOR as directed by SACEUR. ACO has at its disposal a joint force of land, air, and naval power contributed by NATO members called the NATO Response Force (NRF), which acts as a stand-alone NATO military force available for rapid deployment as a collective defense, crisis management, or stabilization force. NRF consists of a combined, scaleable joint force package based on a brigade-size land element, an air element, and a joint naval task force. The naval element is comprised of four Maritime Groups, each with different responsibilities. For example, Standing NRF Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1, formerly known

U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Vincent J. Street

From left, the ships of Standing NRF Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) in transit during 2007: Portuguese frigate NRP Alvares Cabral (F331), Canadian frigate HMCS Toronto (FFH 333), guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy (CG 60), German replenishment tanker FGS Spessart (A 1442), Dutch frigate HNLMS Evertsen (F805), and Danish corvette HDMS Olfert Fischer (F355). At the time, Normandy was the flagship for SNMG1, which was conducting NATO’s first maritime out-of-area deployment by circumnavigating Africa.

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U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Elizabeth Williams

The German frigate FGS Sachsen (F 219) is tugged into Naval Station Mayport, Fla., for a port visit. Sachsen was assigned to Standing NRF Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1), a joint allied maritime task force designed to protect the waters of NATO countries, and is representative of a new generation of very highly capable NATO ships.

as Standing Naval Force Atlantic) consists of six to 10 destroyers and frigates, with Canada, Germany, the U.K., the Netherlands, and the United States each contributing one ship on a permanent basis. These are joined by ships from Belgium, Norway, Portugal, Poland, and Spain. Each maritime group operates, trains, and exercises as a unit, honing its capabilities and refining NATO maritime tactics and procedures. Ships are typically attached to an NRF Maritime Group for up to six months on a rotating basis. Units of one nation do not necessarily relieve vessels of the same nation. The force commander and staff are appointed for one-year terms, with the force commander rotating among the participating nations. In early 2009, SNMG1 was under the command of Portugal’s Contra-Almirante José Domingos Pereira da Cunha whose flag flew in NRP Alvares Cabral (F331). Other maritime groups include NRF Maritime Group 2 (SNMG2, formerly Standing Naval Force Mediterranean), NRF Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1), and NRF Mine Countermeasures Group 2 (SNMCMG2). NRF Maritime Groups have proven themselves in humanitarian disaster relief missions and made a persuasive “show-of-force,” as when undertaking exercises during the August 2008 Georgian crisis.

“We saw the value of NATO naval forces specifically when Russia invaded Georgia,” Wertheim pointed out. “As Russian combat operations drew to a close, warships from Standing NRF Maritime Group 1 took part in a Black Sea exercise. Spain’s Aegis frigate Almirante Juan de Borbon along with German frigate Lubeck, Polish frigate General Pulaski, and American frigate USS Taylor entered the region on 21 August and visited Romania and Bulgaria. A Canadian frigate [Ville de Quebec] was also part of the group and went off to escort food aid to Somalia. That’s a very typical example of what a NATO force can do. The force that NATO sent to the area was able to take on anything that the Russians might show.” In addition to demonstrating NATO members’ solidarity, the 2008 Black Sea exercises underlined the distance that non-U.S. NATO navies have come in 60 years. The least capable ship in the SNMG1 force was arguably the American frigate, Wertheim pointed out. “It’s remarkable when you think about how far [NATO navies] have come. Each has been able to acquire antiair capability without having to rely on the U.S. For years, the U.S. was the only country with Aegis-type capability. Now, the U.K., Norway, Spain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands are all investing in the next generation of frigates and destroyers that are able to provide excellent anti-air

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coverage and [in] some cases, ballistic missile defense. If a standing force is deployed, the capital ships aren’t necessarily going to be American anymore.” NATO member navies have developed sophisticated support infrastructures, fleets with significant bluewater reach, and weapons systems that resulted directly or indirectly from cooperative development programs like the Sea Sparrow point defense missile, the Rolling Airframe Missile, and the Trilateral Frigate Agreement. Though such programs evolved, disappeared, and/or were reconstituted in different fashions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, they yielded new and complementary capabilities. NATO membership has spurred the development of the naval arms of its newer members as well. Since joining NATO in 2004, Bulgaria (a founding member of the Warsaw Pact) has worked to increase its presence in the eastern Mediterranean. To facilitate that goal, the Bulgarian navy acquired three Wielingen-class frigates with anti-ship capability from Belgium. In 2006, one of these,

rechristened BG Druzki, joined the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrolling the territorial waters of Lebanon under German command. The deployment marked the Bulgarian Navy’s first participation in an international peacekeeping force. In addition, Bulgaria has ordered one Tripartite minehunter vessel and is purchasing two new corvettes from France. Though its submarine fleet remains largely moribund, Bulgaria’s navy has increased its operational acumen and NATO interoperability through training. Bulgarian understanding of Russian operational philosophy and characteristics is an asset as well. Russian posturing in 2008 proved another catalyst for improvements in NATO-newcomer navies. “A lot of the smaller countries in NATO had planned defense cuts,” Wertheim explained. “But as soon as Georgia was invaded, they completely reversed them. The invasion has awoken much of NATO and changed a lot of things.” Estonia received three minehunters (Sandown class) from the U.K. starting in 2007. In May 2005, Estonian Navy

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate Airman Patrick W. Mullen III

The Spanish corvette SPS Infanta Elena (P-76) crashes through the waves while coming alongside the amphibious assault ship USS Saipan (LHA 2) during Exercise Phoenix Express. The exercise provided U.S. and allied forces an opportunity to participate in diverse maritime training scenarios helping to increase maritime domain awareness, strengthen emerging and enduring partnerships, and revive the Mediterranean Dialogue first agreed in 1994.

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frigate EML Admiral Pitka was assigned as the Command and Support Ship of SNMCMG1. Admiral Pitka was the first vessel from the Baltic navies to be part of the force. Estonia is seeking to acquire further mine hunters from the Dutch and maintains NATO-level readiness along with other Baltic navies (Lithuania/Latvia) through BALTRON (Baltic Naval Squadron), which functions like a mini NRF. Like Estonia, Poland’s concern over Russian actions in late 2008 led to changes in its defense posture. Poland announced an 8.8 percent defense budget increase and is aiming for an all-volunteer force by 2010, a move that would harmonize its force with a number of NATO militaries. The former Warsaw Pact country has sought greater naval capability with the acquisition of four Kobben-class submarines from Norway and two Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates from the United States. The naval air arm has also acquired a number of SH-2G Super Seasprite helicopters. In 2008, NATO sought to enhance naval cooperation in the Mediterranean through exercise Phoenix Express, an exercise incorporating ships of 12 nations with the U.S. 6th Fleet. Paticipants included NATO members France, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal but also nonalliance ships from Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya. The exercise revived the Mediterranean Dialogue first agreed in 1994. Aimed at creating a partnership to fight terrorism and promote cooperation in both civil and military areas, the Mediterranean Dialogue’s revival signaled important geopolitical changes since NATO’s 50th anniversary. Since that time and the attacks of September 11, the United States has engaged foes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and farther afield globally. Much has been written and said about the cooling of U.S.-Europe relations during the period, but from a navy-to-navy and, indeed, military-tomilitary standpoint, little changed, according to Wertheim. “I think that NATO viewed Iraq as almost a separate issue. No matter what the political situation, military-tomilitary cooperation among NATO countries has been pretty strong.” Such cooperation was manifest from the outset of terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. In October of that year, NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was established. It is the only operation ever conducted by the alliance in implementation of the defense clause (Article 5) of the NATO Treaty. Over the years, OAE has evolved from a small-scale deployment providing a modest military presence in an important stretch of sea into a comprehensive, continuously adapting counterterrorism operation throughout the Mediterranean. Its mission is to conduct maritime operations in the OAE area of operations to demon-

strate NATO’s resolve to help deter, defend, disrupt, and protect against terrorism. Elements of NATO’s Standing NRF Maritime Groups cycle through OAE, providing uninterrupted surveillance and deterrence. Initially a purely NATO operation, OAE now involves non-NATO nations that have formally agreed to support the effort with information exchange and/or the provision of ships. Additionally, 46 countries provide information for an information-sharing network – Maritime Safety and Security Information System. To meet this commitment along with other NATO and national responsibilities, the alliance’s more developed navies have continued to raise their capabilities. Belgium acquired two ex-Dutch M-class frigates, the Karel Doorman (F 827) and Willem van der Zaan (F 829), in late 2005. The rechristened frigates (Leopold I and LouiseMarie) entered service in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Denmark is actively looking for more multi-role ships to make up for capability lost with the downsizing of its naval force. With its Maersk Lines moving 10 percent of the world’s goods by ship, Denmark is particularly concerned about piracy, and incorporating escort surface units with global legs is high among its naval priorities. France likewise played a major role in counter-piracy operations in 2008. Uncertain about its own ability to afford a second non-nuclear carrier, it has been involved in discussions about a joint aircraft carrier development effort with the U.K. However, the aircraft carrier program faces questions over delivery dates, cost, and the possible sharing of assets. France has embarked upon replacing its nuclear submarines with six SSNs of the Barracuda class due around 2017. It also is pushing submarine exports to the Middle East and announced a deal for Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) submarines with Brazil in late 2008. The French Navy is in the process of fitting out two new Horizon-class frigates (Forbin and Chevalier Paul) and has ordered eight FREMM multipurpose frigates. Germany is in the process of accepting K130-type corvettes and bolstering its Sachsen-class air defense frigates built under the Trilateral Frigate Agreement with the Netherlands and Spain. It continues to maintain a very capable non-nuclear submarine force, including its AIP Type 212 submarines. Greece has decided against upgrading its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft fleet in favor of buying new Boeing P-8 patrol aircraft. The Greek government has outlined a requirement for new ships, but underlying financial issues have kept it from proceeding with acquisition efforts. Italy has been working to raise its navy to a level near that of France, which remains Europe’s largest naval employer. The Italian navy has partnered with France in the construction of FR-EMM-class frigates (10) and in

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the Horizon (Orizzonte)-class frigates. The Italian naval air arm got a significant boost with the commissioning of the aircraft carrier Conte di Cavour in March 2008. The country’s submarine force will be further modernized with orders for more German Type 212s made in early 2008. The Netherlands’ small but very capable navy continues to operate its De Zeven Provinciën-class air defense and command frigates; Karel Doorman-class multi-role frigates; Walrus-class submarines; and Tripartite minehunters. Upgrades for its Doorman-class frigates, the purchase of new helicopters, and a new Zuiderkruis-class joint support ship are planned for the near term, while improvements for its submarines and other frigates are on the horizon. Norway continues to develop sophisticated maritime weapons systems, including its Penguin anti-ship missile.

Protection of its offshore oil resources has driven its acquisition of Aegis (Nansen-class) frigates and Skjold-class patrol boats. Despite cuts in its defense budget, Spain is only the third country to buy Tomahawk missiles for its navy, enhancing the power projection capability already inherent in its aircraft carrier task force. Plans call for the Spanish navy to add more F100-class Aegis frigates and S80-class submarines. The force will commission its air-capable amphibious assault ship Juan Carlos I in 2009 and is looking for more large multi-role ships. Turkey maintains a large combination frigate/corvette/ patrol craft surface fleet and Type 209 submarine fleet. The Turkish navy is under particular pressure to protect the Dardanelles and allow free movement in and out of the

U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 2nd Class Michael Sandberg

A Royal Netherlands Navy Lynx helicopter, assigned to the HNLMS De Zeven Provincien (F 802), prepares to land on board the dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50) Jan. 27, 2006. The Royal Netherlands Navy is small but very capable.

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NATO photo

The Italian navy destroyer Luigi Durand de la Penne, flagship of NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 2 and of the anti-piracy Operation Allied Provider, prevented a likely attack against the Panamanian-flagged merchant vessel Kirti by two skiffs that were maneuvering on a piracy attack pattern. The ship’s helicopter was immediately scrambled and sent over to the merchant vessel. As soon as the suspected pirates noticed the Italian helicopter, the skiffs changed their course and the Kirti was able to continue her trip.

Black Sea. Turkey’s relations with the United States were complicated by the Iraq war (due to the Kurdish issue) but it remains a key NATO partner and it continued to receive Perry-class frigates from the United States through 2003. Turkey has also acquired six French-built corvettes and begun its own shipbuilding program. Turkey will build 12 Milgem-class multi-role frigates and four TF-2000 air defense frigates in addition to a number of fast attack missile boats and mine hunters. Plans call for the acquisition of six German Type 214 submarines and a variety of landing and amphibious ships. Though the second largest navy in NATO, the RN is struggling to maintain its capability and working toward a two-carrier fleet by 2016. The two recently ordered Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers are to be a new generation of aircraft carrier to replace the three Invincibleclass aircraft carriers. The two vessels will operate the short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 Lightning II, which is planned for both the RN Fleet Air Arm and the Royal Air Force to replace the Harrier. A he-

licopter carrier derived from the Invincible-class aircraft carriers, HMS Ocean, complements the aircraft carrier force. Four Astute-class nuclear submarines are under construction, with a requirement for four more depending upon cost. Six new Type 45 (Daring class) frigates are under construction, the first of which is expected to be commissioned in 2009. Though there still remains a significant gap between U.S. naval capabilities and those of individual NATO members, Wertheim asserted that as a collective force, NATO’s navies are considerably more capable than a decade ago. They are likely to be augmented by new partners (Finland joined the NRF in March 2008) and deployed in places and for purposes (counter-piracy being a prime example) not dreamt of on the alliance’s 50th anniversary. “I think [NATO naval] forces are more capable than any other regional force in the world,” Wertheim said. “NATO navies don’t just put their money into building a ‘Potemkin fleet.’ In addition to warships, they spend money on training and logistics. They’re more than just a hollow force.”

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echoes

Six decades of history reflected in 21st-century NATO air forces By Jan Tegler

But there are historic parallels, echoes, and themes that repeat as NATO’s air forces attempt to cope with the uncertainties of the new millennium. There were naysayers on both sides of the Atlantic at the outset, those who thought a cooperative military alliance between an ascendant America and the war-ravaged countries of Western Europe could never be forged.

As author Robert F. Dorr reported a decade ago during NATO’s 50th anniversary, Pentagon officials initially complained that war-weary European nations had “no money” to invest in collective air defense and “no heart” to work with Americans who still occupied Germany. Six decades later, NATO is viable and larger than ever, but those listening to the comments made by NATO

Courtesy of Eurofighter

Sixty years ago, as the Cold War began, no one knew how long it would last or if a “hot war” could be avoided. Few imagined the role NATO would have in deterring it and none could foresee the challenges and ironies of the post-Cold War world the alliance navigates in the 21st century.

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Courtesy of Eurofighter

Opposite page: Eurofighter Typhoons of four NATO member nations and partners in the Eurofighter program fly in formation. The Eurofighter Typhoon is a twin-engine, canard-delta-wing, multi-role aircraft being designed and built by Alenia Aeronautica, BAE Systems, and EADS working through holding company Eurofighter GmbH. The project is managed by NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency. Left: A NATO Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) aircraft flies with two Italian air force Eurofighter Typhoons as escort. The NAEWF is a fully operational, truly multinational force that provides NATO with air surveillance and early warning capability.

Secretary General Jakob Gijsbert “Jaap” de Hoop Scheffer in his Jan. 26, 2009, speech in Brussels (“Trans-Atlantic Leadership For a New Era”) might hear echoes of some of the concerns the organization faced at its birth in 1949. After welcoming the new U.S. administration’s “determination to work with allies as closely as possible,” the secretary general warned that NATO’s European partners must be ready to meet Washington’s renewed commitment and invest in security once more. “I believe that Europeans have good reason to look forward to a new era of transatlantic dialogue,” said de Hoop Scheffer. “But dialogue means that when Washington calls, Europe should have a unified answer, backed up with the resources to match. Let me put it more bluntly. If Europeans expect that the United States will close Guantanamo, sign up to climate-change treaties, accept EU [European Union] leadership on key issues, but provide nothing more in return, for example in Afghanistan, than encouragement, they should think again. It simply won’t work like that.” It’s a theme central to the success of an alliance that has significantly expanded its membership, roles, missions, and its sphere of influence over the last decade. Significantly, no component of the alliance’s integrated defense has demonstrated more willingness and creativity in confronting similar issues than its member air forces. What’s more, their collective contribution to NATO operations has arguably exceeded that of the organization’s land and sea forces. Echoes of that operational success extend back to the very formation of NATO. By April 4, 1949, the Berlin Airlift had been under way for more than nine months. Its chief contributors, the United States and Britain, were central to the formation of NATO even as the Airlift continued. Fiftysix years later, NATO air forces would perform another

airlift mission, this time in support of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the alliance’s first-ever mission on the African continent. Between June 2005 and Dec. 31, 2007, according to the NATO Web site, NATO air arms (principally the U.S. Air Force and NATO’s Strategic Airlift Interim Solution) helped the African Union (AU) expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur by providing airlift for the transport of additional peacekeepers into the region and by training AU personnel. In August 2005, NATO airlifted nearly 5,000 peacekeepers from African troop-contributing countries into Sudan. Thereafter, NATO also coordinated strategic airlift for the rotation of troops, transporting them in and out of the region. All told, the EU-NATO air movement coordinators harmonized the airlift of some 37,500 troops, civilian police, and military observers in and out of the Sudanese region. NATO alone coordinated the airlift of more than 31,500 AMIS troops and personnel. Further airlift assistance has been provided for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), transporting AU member states’ forces willing to deploy to the country. NATO executed airlift support between Burundi and Mogadishu and is currently providing experts on air movement coordination to the AU Strategic Planning and Management Unit in Addis-Ababa. Airlift has always been an important component of NATO air operations. The need for airlift capability among NATO member air forces is critical as 2009 rolls on, particularly in support of NATO operations such as the on-going, alliance-led effort, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan. The situation is serious enough that de Hoop Scheffer has called for NATO to “have a very critical look at how we finance our operations.”

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The secretary general has advocated creative new methods such as pooling resources to purchase “enablers” (fixed-wing airlifters and helicopters) to address the crucial shortage of these aircraft. NATO has responded with two initiatives – the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability (NSAC) consortium. SALIS, implemented under a three-year contract signed by 15 member countries in 2006, provides two Antonov AN-124-100s on full-time charter, two more on six days’ notice, and a third pair on nine days’ notice. NATO operations employing the AN-124s have included transporting troops to and from Afghanistan, delivering aid to the victims of the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, and the airlift of AU peacekeepers in and out of Darfur.

The NSAC consortium was formed in 2007 to purchase two Boeing C-17s under foreign military sales (FMS) through the NATO Airlift Management Agency. The United States will purchase a third C-17 for the alliance. The ownership entity will be a chartered NATO Weapon System Partnership (WSP) of allied nations, and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) will administer the WSP. The purpose is to provide NATO with its own pool of airlift aircraft. Initial operating capability is expected by mid-2009 and full operating capability by 2010. American aircrews will fly the aircraft initially. Eighteen months on, the C-17 pool is expected to become a fully multinational operation like NATO’s existing E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) pool, wherein aviators from many member states form the aircrews.

U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Marc I. Lane

Rwandan Defense Forces march across the flight line at Kigali International Airport, Rwanda, after returning from Al-Fashir, Sudan, May 3, 2007. As part of NATO’s response to support the African Union’s expanded peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, the 786th Air Expeditionary Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, aided with the movement of Rwandan Defense Force soldiers in and out of Sudan.

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U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Marc I. Lane

The Fiat G.91 “Gina” was an Italian fighter aircraft intended to serve NATO air forces in the ‘60s. It was NATO’s first cooperative aircraft program success, and was operated by Germany, Italy, and Portugal.

The C-17 pool harkens back to NATO’s first common-funded aircraft project, the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEWF). In 1978, NATO’s Defense Planning Committee approved the joint acquisition of 18 Boeing E-3As. The aircraft bolstered NATO air arms’ ability to monitor airspace over great distances and provided sorely needed “look-down” capability to spot low-flying aircraft. Now part of the NATO Response Force, the aircraft (which began operations in 1982) recently completed a comprehensive systems modernization program. Further enhancements are expected in the near future. Over the years, the NAEWF has been a critical asset for NATO crisis management and peace-support operations. As the 1990s dawned, NATO deployed several AWACS to eastern Turkey to help reinforce the alliance’s southern flank during the Gulf War. In the mid-1990s, NAEWF sentries deployed to help enforce

U.N. resolutions in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, seven NATO AWACS were deployed to the United States in Operation Eagle Assist to help defend America against further attacks. More recently NAEWF E-3s deployed to southeastern Turkey during Operation Display Deterrence to protect the country from the threat posed by the conflict in Iraq. While the “pooling of resources” by NATO members is a relatively new idea, support for NATO air forces dates back to the very beginning of the alliance. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) or Military Assistance Program (MAP) was instituted in October 1948 to aid the rebuilding of European armed forces. MDAP and MAP allowed recipient countries to request U.S. assistance and led to the cooperative aircraft programs that NATO planners would develop to enable member air forces to buy and fly common aircraft.

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Courtesy of Lockheed Martin

The F-104 Starfighter served in 10 NATO air forces, with the last example being retired by Italy in 2004.

Fiat’s G.91 “Gina” was the first cooperative aircraft program success. Begun in 1953, the lightweight tactical reconnaissance and strike fighter (based partly on the North American F-86 Sabre) was eventually operated by NATO members West Germany, Greece, Turkey, and Italy. More joint acquisitions followed, including the large buys of the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon. The F-104 must be considered one of the most successful aircraft to be fielded as a result of a cooperative program. The Starfighter, conceived as a pure interceptor in the wake of the Korean War, combined Mach 2 speed with a high rate of climb and impressive ceiling. Entering service with the U.S. Air Force in 1958, F-104A (point defense interceptor) and C (multi-role fighter-bomber) models served until 1967 with active-duty Air Force units before being handed over to the Air National Guard. Poor maneuverability, comparatively meager endurance, limited payload capacity, and a high accident rate hobbled the aircraft in American service and just less than 300 singleand two-seat versions were procured. But improvements made by Lockheed in the mid-1960s transformed the F-104G into an all-weather, ground attack/ reconnaissance/interceptor aircraft. It was just what the Federal German Air Force was looking for and formed the basis of the modern Luftwaffe. Adopted by NATO as a

cooperative program and with U.S. MAP funding, the aircraft would go on to equip the air forces of Italy, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Greece, Germany, Norway, Turkey, the Netherlands, and other non-NATO countries. Licensebuilt in Canada, Italy, and Germany, the last operational Starfighters (F-104S) served with the Italian air force until 2004. In all, more than 2,500 were produced. The F-16 has been nearly as widely accepted by NATO air forces since 1974, when four alliance countries (Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway) agreed to choose a common combat aircraft. The four nations formed the Multinational Fighter Program Group (MFPG), taking advantage of the Light Weight Fighter competition between the General Dynamics YF-16 and the Northrop YF-17 already under way in the United States. Their requirement for an F-104G replacement that could also be license-built in Europe accelerated the effort and led what was termed the Air Combat Fighter (ACF) competition. ACF brought in additional competitors, including Dassault-Breguet’s Mirage F1M-53, the SEPECAT Jaguar, and a Saab V1GGEN variant dubbed the 37E Eurofighter. Referred to as “the arms deal of the century,” ACF was narrowed to four fighters when the Jaguar and a Northrop YF-17 variant called the P-530 Cobra were dropped from consideration by the MFPG. In January

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1975, the U.S. Air Force announced that it had selected the YF-16 as the winner of the ACF competition. Five months later the MFPG (now known as the European Participation Group, EPG) also chose the YF-16 in June 1975. The EPG partners signed a contract for 348 aircraft initially to be produced on two European assembly lines, one in the Netherlands and the second in Belgium. Various parts and subassemblies were constructed in Norway and Denmark. Today, 26 nations operate the Fighting Falcon. The United States, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway are now joined by fellow NATO members Greece, Italy, Turkey, Poland, and Portugal in flying the “Viper.” The bulk of these operators are expected to fly the fighterbomber for years to come. Meanwhile, sales to one of the newest NATO members, Romania, are a possibility. The Dassault-Breguet Atlantique was the result of another NATO design competition. Built by a consortium of firms in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, the patrol/reconnaissance aircraft has served with NATO members including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and soon-to-be reintegrated member, France.

Panavia’s Tornado fighter-bomber is the product of what is viewed as NATO’s most successful cooperative aircraft program. Conceived in the late 1960s as a replacement for the F-104G, the Tornado would be produced by NATO members Italy, the U.K., and Germany as partners in the Panavia consortium. Deliveries to the U.K. and West Germany began in 1979, with Italian Tornados debuting in 1981. Nine variants were ultimately produced before the production lines closed in 1999. The Royal Air Force, AMI (Italian Air Force), and Luftwaffe continue to operate different versions of the aircraft along with one non-European customer, the Royal Saudi Air Force. Two major combat aircraft programs are up and running to equip NATO air forces in the 21st century. The Eurofighter Typhoon, which originated from successive European combat aircraft programs in the late 1970s/ early 1980s, is now in production by partner nations Italy, Germany, Spain, and the U.K. Designed as a twinengine, single-seat multi-role combat aircraft (two-seat trainers are also being produced), the Typhoon is built by a consortium of three partner companies (Alenia Aeronautica, BAE Systems, and EADS) organized under


Poland, one of the newer NATO member nations, operates one of the latest versions of the F-16, another NATO cooperative aircraft program that supports the air forces of 10 NATO nations.

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Photo by SRA Greg L. Davis


A German air force Panavia Tornado of JbG-32, Lechfeld, Germany, with an AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile attached to the wing and an AGM-88 HARM air-to-ground missile attached to the underside of the fuselage, heads back toward its patrol area after refueling from a U.S. Air Force KC-135R Stratotanker of the 100th Air Expeditionary Wing. The Panavia Tornado, the product of another highly successful NATO cooperative aircraft program, was flown by the German air force in support of NATO Operation Allied Force.

the holding company Eurofighter GmbH and managed by the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA). First delivery occurred in August 2003 to the Luftwaffe, followed later in the year by deliveries to Spain and the U.K. Italy gained its first Eurofighter in early 2004. Referred to as a 4.5th generation fighter, the agile Typhoon is being produced in three tranches for partner and customer nations in the project. Customers include the Austrian Air Force and the Royal Saudi Air Force. Each tranche represents a more capable version of the aircraft. However, successive upgrades via software and other improvements, known as “blocks,” within each tranche allow early production aircraft to match the standard of later aircraft.

Tranche 2 Eurofighters are now in production and the partner air forces are gaining full operational capability, with aircraft ready to take on air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Potential customers include other NATO members such as Greece, Denmark, Bulgaria, and Romania. Still under development is the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. This fifth-generation strike-fighter is a single-engine, single-seat, multi-role aircraft with stealth capability. Descended from the Joint Strike Fighter Program, the Lightning II is being developed principally via a joint partnership between the United States and the U.K. Three variants of the F-35 will be common to the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Royal Air Force. Other partner governments providing

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development funding include fellow NATO members Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Norway, and Denmark. Designed to replace the F-16, F/A-18 Hornet, AV-8B Harrier/Harrier GR.7/Sea Harrier, A-10 Thunderbolt II, and numerous other legacy aircraft, F-35 variants are tailored for the environments in which they will operate. The F-35A is the conventional-takeoff-and-landing version and will go into service with the U.S. Air Force and other NATO and allied air forces. The short-takeoff-andlanding version, the F-35B, will equip the U.S. Marine Corps, the Royal Air Force, and the Royal Navy initially. A third model, the F-35C, will operate from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers. Now in the System Development and Demonstration phase, the exact date for Lightning II initial operational capability is unknown, but the aircraft is expected to enter service by 2015. Other cooperative aircraft programs have been proposed recently, including an effort that would pool NATO resources to help cover the alliance’s critical shortage of medium- and heavy-lift helicopters. The deficit in vertical-lift capability is particularly relevant to the ISAF in Afghanistan. An Anglo-French proposal for a Helicopter Trust Fund was discussed at the 20th annual NATO Summit in April 2008. It suggested starting a fund into which money could be contributed by NATO members and then assigned to the upgrade and retrofitting of existing air frames. So far, action on this proposal has been limited. Inaction on the procurement front is contrasted by alliance engagement outside its traditional borders over the last 15 years. Ironically, it wasn’t until after the 40-year stalemate that defined the alliance that NATO reached a turning point. Seeking to come to terms with the end of the Cold War, NATO heads of state and government agreed to

a New Strategic Concept in 1991, enabling the alliance to go beyond collective defense and to conduct new security missions, including peacekeeping, conflict-prevention, and crisis management activities. It didn’t take long for the New Strategic Concept to face its first test – in the Balkans. The Bosnian War had come about as the result of ethnic and nationalist tensions in and around Yugoslavia as the Cold War ended. By 1995, Serbian violations of various U.N. Security Council Resolutions inside Bosnia and Herzegovina led NATO to act to end Serbian aggression with precision air strikes against Bosnian Serb targets in an effort known as Operation Deliberate Force. The two-and-a-half-week campaign began on Aug. 30, 1995, and involved most of NATO’s then-16 member air forces. It proved critical in bringing the 3-year-old Bosnian War to an end and demonstrated that multinational NATO air power could make a crucial difference in achieving objectives transcending collective defense. There were no alliance casualties. However, a French Mirage 2000K was shot down on the first day of the campaign and the crew captured by the Bosnian Serbs. Less than five years later, as NATO marked its 50th anniversary, member air forces were in action again in the Balkans. On March 24, 1999, the alliance launched Operation Allied Force to halt and reverse the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo. The operation came on the heels of a year of fighting within the province between Serbian military, paramilitary, and police forces, and Kosovar Albanians. With the failure of international efforts to resolve the conflict between autonomy-seeking Kosovo and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) came an air campaign that was to last until June 10, 1999. More than 38,000 sorties (10,484 of which were strike sorties) were flown without any allied casualties. NATO air forces involved included those of the United States, U.K., Italy, Spain, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Germany. The operation marked the first time the Luftwaffe had participated in combat operations since World War II. Precision targeting of the FRY’s air defenses and ground forces was key to bringing about the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces by early June. In the aftermath, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo with a 50,000-strong peacekeeping force to protect the provinces of ethnic Albanians and Serbs.

U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Cecilio M. Ricardo Jr.

First Lt. Stephen Thomas (left) and Capt. Lars Holten (an instructor pilot) prepare for takeoff in a T-38 Talon at Sheppard Air Force Base, Texas. Holten, from Norway, and Thomas are in the EU-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training program.

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Finally, as the alliance moves toward the second decade of the new millennium, its command structure is changing once more. At the component or tactical level, the present 13 operational subordinate or Joint Force Component Commands will be reduced to just six, providing service-specific land, maritime, or air force expertise at the operational level. Available for use in any operation, they will be subordinated to one of the two joint force commanders. For the Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, there will be an Air Component Command based at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Serving the Joint Force Command in Naples, Italy, there will be an Air Component Command at Izmir, Turkey. In addition, there will be four static Combined Air Operations Centers (CAOCs) in Uedem, Germany; Finderup, Denmark; Poggio Renatico, Italy; and Larissa, Greece; and two deployable CAOCs in Uedem and Poggio Renatico. With the 21st century well under way and NATO enlargement proceeding, the alliance’s air forces are, despite some challenges, more capable than ever. New concepts for acquisition and pooling of resources should make them collectively stronger as well, ensuring that the mutual defense relationship undertaken by NATO 60 years ago still echoes today.

U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Cecilio M. Ricardo Jr.

With the new millennium came new NATO members. The latest nations to ascend to alliance membership in 2004 (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) together with those that joined in 1999 (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) brought with them air arms of varying capability with a diverse range of equipment. Aligning equipment and procedures with NATO standards has been a primary focus for the new members. Meanwhile, the accession of the Baltic nations brought a new mission to existing members: air policing. Just as NATO’s member air forces used to stand on peacetime quick-reaction alert, capable of launching within minutes, detachments of alliance air forces now guard the airspace over Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the organization’s ongoing Baltic air-policing mission. Since March 2004, 13 member air forces have provided fighters to stand alert at Lithuania’s First Air Base in Zokniai/Šiauliai International Airport, near the northern city of Šiauliai. Deploying with three to four fighter aircraft and support personnel, the detachments rotate on alert every three months. So far, the United States, the U.K., Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Poland, Turkey, and Romania have participated.


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increasing commitments NATO land forces By Eric Tegler

Sharing analysis and developing a plan of common action are essential, de Hoop Scheffer maintained, but, he added, what is more crucial than ever before is “actually stumping up the resources to carry it out.” Though NATO’s 60th anniversary seems an inevitability from our perspective, its foundation was anything but. When it turns 60 in April 2009, NATO will represent the longest-standing alliance in history, overtaking the Athenian League of the 4th century B.C. However, in the late 1940s, the likelihood that anyone would actually “stump up” the resources to render the idea a reality was open to question.

In the first of a series of presentations on NATO history in late 2008, Dr. Jamie P. Shea, director of policy planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General of NATO, reminded an audience that support for the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was far from unanimous. The idea of NATO was quite controversial, in fact, sparking a riot in Iceland and criticism from a cross section of Americans who thought its formation would undermine the recently forged United Nations. The United States had concluded just one prior alliance in its history, and George Washington’s 18th century admonition to “beware foreign entanglements” still carried weight with American policymakers.

U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Krista Carlos

In a January 2009 speech before a Belgian think tank, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed that the alliance’s role had changed within the international system. North America and Europe are no longer the only principal actors on the world stage, the secretary pointed out, but transatlantic action remains critically important in the 21st century.

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U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jim Varhegyi

U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Krista Carlos

Opposite page: A simulated amphibious and land assault conducted in São Vicente, Cape Verde, June 23, 2006, demonstrated NATO’s show of force during Exercise Steadfast Jaguar. The exercise was the first time that the various components of the NATO Response Force (NRF) – land, air, and sea – came together in one exercise. Right: Afghan National Army (ANA) Air Corps crew members mount a door gun on their Mi-17. U.S. Air Force members assigned to U.S. Combined Security Transition CommandAfghanistan (CSTC-A) provide mentorship and training to the Afghan army and police, the forces to which NATO will eventually hand over responsibility for the country’s security.

Apart from the perceived threat emerging from Soviet domination of Eastern Europe after the war, the absolute devastation wrought across the continent by World War II and the resulting sense of hopelessness and despair on the ground argued for some sort of collective security arrangement. There may have been no Atlantic alliance without a previous European alliance. With the signature of the Brussels Treaty in 1948, France, Britain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium gave birth to the Western European Union (WEU) and demonstrated the European willingness to unite for defense. But only the United States could underwrite and execute a truly effective and comprehensive Western European security pact. After much debate, America provided the political, financial, and military resources to launch NATO, along with 11 other signatories in 1949. At first, there was little to organize from a land forces perspective. In 1950, it was decided that the existing WEU military organization would be incorporated into NATO. Despite the U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which gave dollars, equipment, and training facilities to Western European militaries, there were significant equipment and manpower shortages throughout the member forces assigned to NATO. Thus when NATO’s multinational Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) was formally activated near Paris on April 2, 1951, it had at its disposal fewer than 15 divisions and 1,000 operational aircraft to deter any move by 210 Soviet divisions and the USSR’s immense air arm. European armies and U.S. force presence grew subsequently, adding muscle to the bones from which NATO was formed. Ironically, as the forces available to NATO commanders grew, the solidarity of the alliance seemed to waver as the Cold War peaked in the mid1950s. Successive crises in Hungary, Suez, and the Sinai Peninsula divided NATO membership over possible courses of action. But construction of the Berlin Wall in

1961 served to refocus alliance members, who reaffirmed their mutual commitment with the formation of an Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) from units supplied by six different countries. The AMF consisted of a land element of five battalions and an air element of four fighter-bomber attack squadrons. The size of the force may not have been impressive, but its political meaning was. It was the image of the allies’ resolve to face any aggression across their territory. The deployment of the AMF to a crisis area would have demonstrated NATO’s readiness to respond to a threat instantly. The response would, of course, have been backed by the garrison forces that made up the bulk of ground resources available to NATO during the Cold War. Allied Forces Central Europe, which consisted of two army groups – the Northern Army Group, which included the British Army of the Rhine, and the Central Army Group – was the heart of the alliance’s deterrent ground force. Its constituent national formations trained along their own lines, but if and when the Red Army ever crossed the Fulda Gap, they were expected to work together (possibly under a nuclear cloud) to repel the Soviet advance.

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The AMF would merely have acted as the tip of the spear in this expected set-piece scenario, but its early 1960s formation presaged the type of force engagement NATO would one day undertake. On NATO’s 60th anniversary, the symbolic and practical realities of a mobile/deployable force are alive in the NATO Response Force (NRF).

To React and Project The NRF was proposed by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, and created following the 2002 Prague Summit, which countenanced both an expansion of NATO membership and a reorganization of its command structure. NRF became the new stand-alone NATO military force available for rapid deployment as a collective defense, crisis management, or stabilization force.

NRF consists of a combined, scaleable joint force package based on a brigade-size land element, an air element, and a joint naval task force. Its modern roots go back to the NATO Reaction Force created by the alliance’s Defense Planning Committee in 1991 and endorsed by NATO members at the Rome Summit in November of that year. The high-readiness land force component of the NATO Reaction Force was the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Formed in 1992, ARRC was to be ready to deploy rapidly anywhere in the Allied Command Europe theater of operations within seven to 15 days. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the U.K, the United States, and other contributing nations provided the ARRC with staff and troops. It has become the model for a group of NATO rapid-reaction commands that can operate within or without the scope of an NRF.

NATO photo

The inauguration of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Bielefeld, Germany, on Oct. 1, 1992.

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U.S. DoD photo

NATO photo

An IFOR Italian army Centauro armored vehicle guards a road in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. Headquarters ARRC deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to command the land force component of IFOR in Operation Joint Endeavour.

In 1993, NATO’s then-secretary general, Dr. Manfred Wörner, said the ARRC was “… the very heart of the alliance’s new Strategic Concept and is also one of the most innovative exercises in the multinational integration of military forces that we have seen in history.” Not long after Wörner’s declaration, the ARRC would have the opportunity to make history. Following the Dayton Peace Accords in late 1995, headquarters ARRC deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to take command of the land force component of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Operation Joint Endeavour. It was the first NATO ground deployment ever, integrating troops from 35 NATO and non-NATO nations. It also was the first time since World War II that American and Russian soldiers shared a common mission. After entering the region, the American and NATO units of Task Force Eagle enforced the cease-fire, supervised the marking of boundaries and the zone of separation between the former warring factions, and enforced the withdrawal of the combatants to their barracks and the movement of heavy weapons to designated storage sites. Following 78 days of air strikes in Kosovo that tested the alliance’s unity in early 1999, ARRC again took the lead. The command deployed to the Balkans, where it served as the headquarters for Operation Joint Guardian and the force (Kosovo Force, KFOR) of 50,000 multinational soldiers from 39 countries assembled by NATO and the U.N. to build a secure environment within the ethnically divided Serbian province. With the ARRC’s success in operations in both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO identified the need for other, similar high-readiness headquarters, of which the ARRC became the first to undergo the certification process. Today, ARRC fits into the Allied Command Operations structure beside the Joint Force Commands (JFCs) and other rapidly deployable corps headquarters. These are: the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Italy (NRDC-ITA) in Solbiate Olona near Milan; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Spain (NRDC-Spain) in Valencia; the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps-Turkey (NRDC-T), based near

Istanbul; and the Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps, based in Münster, Germany. In addition to these, since 2002, the European Union’s Eurocorps, based in Strasbourg, France, has a technical agreement with NATO and can be used for NATO missions. The JFCs have service-specific air, maritime, and land components. ARRC draws high-readiness land forces from the latter as well as contributing national corps. While the JFCs are located in Brunssum, Netherlands, and Naples, Italy, with a standing joint headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal, ARRC command headquarters are in Mönchengladbach, Germany. However, by summer 2010, ARRC Headquarters and its support elements will move to Innsworth, U.K. NATO describes the ARRC as “a High Readiness Force (Land) headquarters … prepared to deploy under NATO, EU, coalition, or national auspices to a designated area, to undertake combined and joint operations across the operational spectrum as: a Corps Headquarters, a Land Component Headquarters, a Land Component Headquarters for the NRF a Combined Joint Land Component Headquarters for land centric operations.” With a peacetime establishment of 400 personnel, ARRC combines staff from all the contributing nations, plus a French liaison officer officially accredited to the headquarters. As the “framework nation,” the U.K. provides the infrastructure, administrative support, communications, and 60 percent of the staff. Contributing nations change periodically, but include the United States, the U.K., Greece, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Turkey. As with other rapidly deployable corps commands, the operational organization, composition, and size of the ARRC

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would depend on the type of crisis to which it is tasked to respond. The area of crisis, its political significance, the capabilities and availability of lift assets, the distances to be covered, and the infrastructure capabilities of the nation receiving assistance all bear upon the composition of an ARRC. However, it is considered that a four-division ARRC would be the maximum employment structure. The ARRC has a notional pool of combat, combat support, and combat service support units with which to train and execute its mission, but the ARRC command controls no forces until it receives an Activiation Order from the Surpeme Allied Commander Europe. On receipt of that order, forces from troop-contributing nations, generated through the NATO Force Generation process, are passed into ARRC Operational Command for the duration of the operational deployment.

The commander and chief of staff are U.K. three-star and two-star generals respectively, and the deputy commander is an Italian two-star general. The other appointments, as with the training and exercise costs, are shared among the contributing nations. ARRC was most recently activated as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) IX in Afghanistan in 2006, demonstrating its ability to take the lead in a rotating U.N.-NATO operation. According to NATO’s ARRC Web site, the ISAF area of operations was doubled in size to encompass the whole country during HQ ISAF IX’s nine-month tenure in Afghanistan. ISAF troop numbers grew from 9,500 to more than 35,000. This was a period of intense activity, with continuous and growing ISAF engagement in the political, military, security, humanitarian, and developmental fields at

NRDC-ITA photo

Nato Rapid Deployable Corps-Italy (NRDC-ITA) assisted in ARRC’s Exercise Arrcade Fusion 2007. The exercise was designed to refresh ARRC in its command of warfighting operations and allow NRDC-ITA to observe its sister headquarters’ procedures.

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local, regional, and occasionally international levels. ISAF forces were involved in significant and decisive combat operations against Taliban insurgents as they pressed into the volatile regions in the south and east of Afghanistan. Although combat operations in these areas captured, and continue to capture the majority of headlines, HQ ISAF IX strove to improve security throughout the country, ensuring the synchronization of regional and national operations in the fight against the insurgency. Considerable effort was made to reinforce the relationship of the government of Afghanistan with the commander of ARRC – in his role as commander of ISAF – becoming an active member of the Afghan Presidential Advisory Group, as stated on the ARRC Web site. With the expansion of the ISAF area of operations, NATO forces shared a common border with Pakistan for the first time. HQ ISAF IX was active in strengthening the links with this critical ally. Command for ISAF was turned over to the next NATO command, Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, in early 2007. Since the early 2000s, ARRC has trained for deployment annually in a series of Arrcade Fusion exercises. The exercises help the command refine its processes and hone its operational relationships with contributing nation corps. The possibility that ARRC could assume command of the NRF was addressed in November 2008 in Exercise Arrcade Fusion/Bold Ambition. The exercise saw the ARRC playing the role of a combined joint land component headquarters operating in a counterinsurgency environment like one would find in Afghanistan or Iraq. One of the new training aims for HQ ARRC was to integrate air and maritime assets into the fight, as in the past, the

unit has been primarily focused on corps-level land operations. The exercise also helped HQ ARRC to prepare to assume duties as the NATO Response Force. If a conflict situation arises where NATO is needed quickly, ARRC can deploy within days to take command of the situation. “Our success on this exercise has a direct link to our NRF success and when you look at the possible mission we might get on NRF, then you look at 2011 when we are slated to go to Afghanistan, this exercise becomes a very real operation,” said ARRC Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence Brig. Gen. Michael A. Ryan.

Tools of Leadership As of January 2009, ISAF troops numbered around 55,000 from 26 NATO, 10 partner, and two non-NATO/ non-partner countries, including contributions from Canada, the United States, the U.K., other European countries, Australia, New Zealand, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Singapore. U.S. Army Gen. David D. McKiernan is currently the commander, ISAF, and commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A). Considered by many to be the most significant and demanding operation in NATO’s history, ISAF has been an ongoing challenge for

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NATO forces. ISAF was initially charged with securing Kabul and surrounding areas from the Taliban, al Qaeda, and factional warlords to allow for the establishment of the Afghan Transitional Administration headed by Hamid Karzai. At the time, ISAF command rotated among different nations on a six-month basis. However, it became too difficult to secure new lead nations. To solve the problem, command was turned over indefinitely to NATO on Aug. 11, 2003. The transfer marked NATO’s first deployment outside Europe or North America. The new NATO-led ISAF subsequently expanded the mission in four main stages over the whole of the country. Since 2006, ISAF has been involved in more intensive combat operations in southern Afghanistan, operations that continued through 2007 and 2008. While the United States, the U.K., and Canada have seen the bulk of combat operations in the southern and eastern portions of the country, attacks on ISAF in other parts of Afghanistan have put pressure on NATO partner forces hitherto separated from irregular action.

ISAF forces use much of the array of armaments available to the participating armies, from Canadian Bison and British army Scimitar armed reconnaissance vehicles to French Foreign Legion demining robots, Danish Leopard 2A5 tanks, and American M-777A2 155 mm howitzers (now firing GPS-guided Excalibur artillery rounds). Added to these is a new and largely unheralded class of non-lethal weapons that are giving troops the ability to disable potential foes without irreversible consequences. The U.S. Marine Corps is pioneering the use of nonlethal weapons and devices that intimidate or inflict pain or discomfort, but don’t kill. The weapons range from ear-splitting acoustic devices that project noises a quarter-mile away to pepper spray, sting-ball grenades, plastic bullets, and Tasers®. These devices can be used individually or together, giving troops an alternative to more violent responses. “These weapons won’t kill you, but they’ll sure make you cry ‘uncle,’” Marine Lt. Col. Holden Dunham said.

Photo by Staff Sgt. Jeffrey Duran

Canadian soldiers patrol in the Kandahar province of Afghanistan on the way to deliver donated supplies to a local school.

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U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Randall A. Clinton

U.S. Army Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of ISAF and NATO forces in Afghanistan (left), visits with U.S. Marines deployed with Weapons Company, Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, NATO-led ISAF operating in Garmsir, South Helmand province, Afghanistan, June 9, 2008, during Operation Enduring Freedom.

“The whole idea behind these is that the effects are reversible.” U.S. Marines provide training in non-lethal weapons to U.S. and allied troops throughout European Command. Non-lethal weapons – such as arresting nets that attach to tires and lock up axles – are particularly effective in checkpoint and other security scenarios. They can give troops the critical extra seconds to make the determination whether an individual or individuals have hostile intent. Without them, the default option is the use of lethal force. Non-lethal weapons don’t restrict soldiers’ rules of engagement, but they do offer more options. In addition to utilizing different kinds of weapons, ISAF has sought to change the application of force in Afghanistan by training, equipping, and then supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). In the fall of 2008, the ANSF received a large batch (approximately 75,700) of NATO-standard M-16 rifles plus

2,600 M249 and 1,700 M240B machine guns. The Afghan army will also receive a reported 2,250 M203 grenade launchers, 4,000 armored Humvees, and 660 Humvee ambulances, according to a spokesman for the U.S. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). CSTC-A is responsible for all training and mentoring of the Afghan army and police, the forces to which the United States/NATO eventually intend to hand over principal responsibility for the country’s security. Most of the M-16s are refurbished Marine Corps weapons and about 2,200 were donated by the Canadian government. In February 2009, ISAF Regional Command South Commander Maj. Gen. Mart de Kruif and regional Afghan military leaders signed a new agreement outlining a commitment to aid each other in Afghan-led military operations. ANSF formations in the south had been conducting operations with ISAF over the previous year. In late February, the ANSF recorded success with

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the confirmation of the killing of an insurgent leader during an ANSF-led operation near Ghoresh, in Kandahar province. The operation, supported by ISAF forces, was to apprehend the insurgent Mullah Mahmood. Mahmood facilitated and directed the placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) within Kandahar province. ISAF forces have also invested considerable effort in building organic Afghan security apparatus throughout the country. The opening of a police substation in Uruzgan in late February exemplifies such efforts. Deputy Governor Khoday Rahim and Provincial Police Commander Jumah Guhl opened the Dizak Police Substation Feb. 22, the first police substation in Uruzgan. Commander Task Force Uruzgan Brig. Gen. Tom Middendorp and senior Civil Representative Joep Wijnands participated in the ribbon-cutting ceremony commemorating the opening of the new substation. The Dizak station is the first of 10 new police substations to be built in the province. The replacement of local police checkpoints with more centralized

police substations located in the populated areas of Uruzgan supports the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) in community policing. Members of a Dutch military police mentoring team worked with the ANP in Dizak and Deh Rawod, training them to operate more independently. While Middendorp underlined his pride in the fact that the Dutch military can contribute to the security of Afghanistan, he added, “Security will be achieved with the cooperation of the people of Uruzgan.” Middendorp’s point applies to all of Afghanistan, and ISAF’s presence in the southern Asian country is a reminder that real progress in altering conditions on the ground has typically been made when NATO land forces had their feet upon it. As such, it is vital that the alliance devotes the resources necessary to execute its operations successfully. The message is one that Jaap de Hoop has said bears reiterating at the alliance’s 60th anniversary summit. “Of course, I welcome the intention by the United States to send more troops to the mission. [In early February, President Barack Obama ordered 17,000

ISAF photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Collins, U.S. Navy

Gun trucks from 2nd Platoon, E-Company, Battle Group-7, Task Force Uruzgan move toward an over-watch position near Mirabad. The Dutch military platoon was on a three-day International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission conducting foot patrols through Afghan villages in support of the Afghan National Police.

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U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Andy Dunaway

ISAF photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Collins, U.S. Navy


Afghan National Air Corps Pvt. Hussain Ahmadi and Sgt. Nadar Ahmadi load an Afghan police officer from Mether Lam onto an ambulance May 17, 2008, at Kabul International Airport in Afghanistan during an air medical evacuation mission. The air corps is being trained by the Combined Air Power Transition Force, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).

more troops to Afghanistan, bringing the U.S. total to about 55,000.] It will help us hold where we couldn’t until now, block off infiltration, and let development take root. But I cannot accept that the U.S. has to do all of the extra heavy lifting. Europe too has to step up with more forces and where that is not forthcoming, then with

substantially more on the civilian side. For the political balance and sustainability of this mission, this has to be a true team effort.” NATO’s success in Afghanistan and as a constructive partnership in the 21st century will depend on its members’ willingness to commit for the mission.

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Quest for Interoperability By J.R. Wilson

Throughout its history, a major NATO effort has been to increase the level of interoperability among its members. For the first half-century, that meant the original 12 founders and the four nations that joined later, all Western European or North American, with cooperative (albeit competitive) defense industries and sharing a common goal: Contain the Soviet Union in Europe. With the collapse of the USSR and the Iron Curtain, both the focus and the nature of NATO membership changed significantly. The addition of two new members at its 60th anniversary meeting in April will raise NATO to 28 nations, nearly half in Eastern Europe, most former members of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact – and so still operating at least some Soviet-era equipment. Far more so than their new allies in Western Europe, the new members still have a primary focus on ensuring Russia does not dominate them again – a perspective dramatically reinforced by the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, which is not a NATO member but is on the list of those asking to join. However, NATO officials say the primary change, in terms of interoperability status and requirements, has not been the inclusion of new members but the shift from preparing for high-intensity warfare in Central Europe to operations far from home in Afghanistan, fighting a war so different from the Cold War operations for which the original members trained for half a century – as, in their own way, did the newcomers – that it has placed significantly new and different interoperability requirements on all 26 member states. To deal with that, NATO has adopted a multi-level perspective on planning, from training to equipment to the requirements prospective new members must meet to be accepted into the alliance. That planning works to adapt the force to the current demands of operations in Afghanistan and the Mediterranean, but also to look at what NATO might face in the next conflict or the one after next. A recently launched interoperability enhancement initiative is intended to help make those adjustments, but NATO officials note that there is no perfect solution, because any comprehensive effort to achieve acrossthe-board interoperability will be expensive, and money is in short supply across the alliance. That has led the initiative to concentrate first on what can be done most quickly at the lowest cost. Details of that effort are still being developed and are not being made public until

they are sufficiently complete to be presented to the NATO membership. The Eastern Europeans also came into NATO with a relatively new adoption of English as a second language, complicating their integration with the original 16, who had long ago made English the alliance’s official language. And in addition to hardware, the new members also must abandon two generations of Soviet tactics, techniques, procedures (TTP), and terminology for significantly different NATO TTP and military terms, all of which require a major commitment to training in order to fulfill their military obligations to their new alliance. “The biggest complication for those countries that still have Soviet equipment is [that] it was not designed for use in the sort of operations NATO is mounting today,” said Tim Mahon, a European military affairs specialist who has dealt extensively with both NATO and individual member states’ militaries. “Even Western nations have had to redesign utility vehicles, shrink their ambitions with regard to tank size, make equipment that is readily transportable and can play a role in expeditionary warfare, none of which applies to Soviet-era legacy equipment. So those countries still operating it find themselves unable to participate, especially for the long run, in current NATO operations.” The current global economic crisis has added to NATO’s difficulties, as defense budgets already significantly below that of the United States come under increasing pressure from budget cutters, who also are at work on the U.S. defense budget. This has raised the specter of a growing divide between the bulk of NATO forces and the increasingly high-tech U.S. military, especially in the area of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). However, enabling C4ISR interoperability does not necessarily mean having all NATO members make major investments in cutting-edge hardware. It does require standardization of the data being communicated.

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Northrop Grumman photo

NATO is considering a version of the U.S. Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk Block 40 for its NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance program. Pictured is a full-scale model of the RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned reconnaissance aircraft on exhibit during a meeting of the NATO Air Force Armaments Group held in Melbourne, Fla., Jan. 14, 2009.

“At NATO’s annual industry conference in Brussels [March 2009], Lt. Gen. James Soligan [U.S. Air Force], the deputy chief of staff for Allied Command Transformation [ACT], explained his philosophy by saying he doesn’t want to own equipment or boxes or even the network; he wants to own the data,” Mahon reported. “For example, you can buy a thousand different digital cameras with different characteristics, but they all have JPEG in common. And that’s what he wants to control – the JPEG. “In addition, the issues of replacement of existing hardware when new members joined NATO were quickly eclipsed by recognition that the alliance more urgently required upgrading and, where appropriate, replacement of middle-ware – communications, network, air defense, etc.” Upgrades and simplifying the path to interoperability for C4ISR, however, still do not eliminate the need for NATO’s new members to replace their outmoded equipment to ensure their involvement in combat operations enhances rather than inhibits those missions. And all NATO forces must make certain what they now have or buy in the future has a common foundation – the physical equivalent of Soligan’s JPEG. For example, a U.S./U.K. program to develop a 155 mm howitzer was abandoned by Great Britain in favor of a European-built weapon, but so long as all are capable of

firing the same 155 mm shell, that level of interoperability is met. The same is true for common small arms ammunition, regardless of weapon manufacturer, or common connectors and command and control software for aircraft missiles and other precision-guided munitions. As early as 2000 – shortly after most of the new members were admitted to NATO and more than a year before September 11 brought about the first-ever invocation of NATO’s Article 5, requiring all members to come to the aid of any member under attack – RAND analyst David Ochmanek defined a new reality that proved prescient with respect to NATO missions and requirements. In a monograph entitled “NATO’s Future: Implications for U.S. Military Capabilities and Posture,” he predicted the alliance would transform to cover a wider range of missions, from dealing with stability issues around the periphery of the NATO treaty area to intervening in civil conflicts and projecting NATO power into expeditionary combat operations far from the borders of its North American and European states, all of which would require expanding and modernizing NATO’s member forces, especially those from the former Warsaw Pact. “The future will demand effective and coordinated action by nations with common interests,” Ochmanek wrote. “A key factor will be the Europeans’ willingness to accept greater responsibility for the defense of common interests

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outside of the treaty area, perhaps beyond Europe itself. Investment in military capabilities as needed is called for.” Ochmanek’s views were validated through the first decade of the new millennium, as evidenced by the focus of the October 2008 biannual Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) on meeting capability requirements for NATO operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the Mediterranean. That meeting also reflected the expansion of NATO’s sphere of influence, involving not only the 26 alliance members, but also Albania and Croatia (the two incoming new members) and 11 nations from NATO’s Partnership for Peace. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and Gen. Karl-Heinz Lather, chief of staff for Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), emphasized the critical need for supporting NATO troops in the field through the modernization of helicopters and strategic lift, greater speed in the acquisition of the new Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, improvements to joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities – such as the addition of full-motion video cameras on alliance-operated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – moving forward with defending deployed troops and critical infrastructure against missile attacks, and practical ways to improve armaments cooperation with the European Union. The EU reference also highlighted what Peter C.W. Flory, NATO assistant secretary general for Defense Investment and permanent chairman of CNAD, emphasized as a need for multinational approaches to address both current and future capability requirements. “In today’s environment, with levels of national defense spending that in many cases do not match the demands of real world alliance operations, there is a need for costeffective solutions,” he said. “NATO and other multinational approaches can develop and deploy capabilities that may otherwise be too expensive or not represent efficient solutions for individual nations.” With a wholesale replacement of everything from small arms ammunition to communications systems to aircraft facing its newest members, NATO also has taken steps to provide guidance to individual state procurement programs. While recognizing the sovereignty of its members to spend their defense budgets as they see fit, the alliance has encouraged all of its members to concentrate on those items that will best address NATO needs and requirements and enable each member to contribute the most to its role in alliance operations. “Almost everybody asks when NATO will procure the same stuff, but NATO actually buys very little, except airborne early warning aircraft, ground surveillance, and strategic airlift, which are not common programs across

NATO but for ‘coalition of the willing’ forces within the alliance,” Mahon explained. “The idea of NATO buying common equipment on behalf of member nations won’t happen. And that’s why you have the setup of organizations such as the European Defence Agency and OCCAR [the Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation], which are still relatively toothless, but are managing to get some things done at a glacial pace. “The more you cooperate, the higher degree of interoperability you get. The requirements for enhancement and tweaking of C4ISR that have come out of Afghanistan in the past two or three years – more than 100 of them – and the initial responses a few agencies have been able to field is due to the degree of cooperation coming from the nations involved. It is that operational requirement that has driven several ‘coalition of the willing’ nations to collaborate on equipment programs, particularly in the rollout of a very sophisticated communications network in Afghanistan, the biggest ever fielded by NATO.” In The Future of NATO, John C. Hulsman, a Heritage Foundation Research Fellow for European Affairs and transatlantic and Middle East specialist at the German Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that NATO proved itself adaptable to change during the Cold War and must be even more so now. He wrote: All NATO members must share military risk if the alliance is to continue to flourish. NATO instituted the Prague goals in an attempt to see that more European countries are capable of being at the thin end of the spear, able to be deployed quickly in high-end war fighting for longer periods of time. As NATO considers the possibility of further enlargement or the emulation of missions in troubled states such as Afghanistan, the alliance’s robust and flexible nature could well be under threat if these massive discrepancies in defense spending are not addressed adequately. Often cited as NATO’s ‘transformation’ conference, the 2002 Prague Summit sought to tackle the challenges of the 21st century, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Each member state pledged to take the appropriate steps to upgrade its military capabilities to face these daunting challenges. However, this will require significant investment in military technology, which is a dilemma for NATO with 65 percent of European defense budgets spent on personnel compared to the 36 percent designated by the United States [which represents about 85 percent of NATO military capacity]. Nevertheless, aside from the United States, only the U.K. and France are capable of fulfilling all of these obligations.

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NATO photo

A Polish Sukhoi Su22M4 at the NATO Air Meet 2000 in Karup, Denmark. While newer NATO member nations have a preponderance of former Soviet equipment, emphasis today is on interoperability of C4ISR assets.

An upcoming report from NATO’s North Atlantic Council, entitled “A Common Commitment,” addresses the wide range of issues facing the alliance, especially interoperability. While not publicly available as this publication went to press, an outline of the report noted coverage of planning, training, and force structures in terms of embedding interoperability and common standards wherever possible, along with efforts to ensure appropriate force structures and equipment to undertake NATO’s evolving role. Mahon attended the NATO industry conference in March and spoke with a number of alliance military leaders about interoperability concerns. “Dag Wilhelmsen, general manager of NATO’s Consultation, Command, and Control Agency [NC3A], recently said that there will inevitably continue to be stovepipes in the future, but that this could be addressed by a commitment to federating systems in smaller pieces and providing an overarching implementation methodology,” Mahon reported. “In order to make that happen, there needs to

be better coordination aimed at encouraging the member nations to adopt standardization more easily and to implement agreed policies. “Focus too much on today’s operations, however, and you could run into trouble. Fighting today’s war to the exclusion of all else entails running the risk of never being fully prepared to fight tomorrow’s. The challenge, therefore, is to keep examining the concepts surrounding all types of warfare that we may be called on to conduct. That is difficult to achieve in an environment in which funding and capability at national levels are, in some cases, severely restricted by circumstances outside NATO’s control.” Interoperability at the equipment level covers a wide range of issues, including being able to share ammunition in a firefight, repair someone else’s aircraft or vehicle, pass control of a UAV to another unit beyond your own operating range, or understand the range and accuracy of artillery support. Having common systems or components also greatly simplifies and compresses the logistics chain supporting troops in the field, not only saving money but

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reducing the number of convoys, individual trucks, aerial resupply, and forward supply operations, which, in turn, limits the number of personnel in harm’s way. But NATO also looks at interoperability in terms of communication, which includes terminology and English as the common language, not only for senior officers and NCOs, but at all ranks and positions; the equipment to communicate freely, yet securely, among individuals and units from different countries; common doctrine and TTPs and the training to ensure those are understood and employed. Once considered enhancements to interoperability, those are now seen as vital to its success, not only with a greater number of NATO members in the field, but also because of increasing use of Southwest Asian-style “coalitions of the willing,” which add to the mix non-NATO warfighters and an even greater range of languages, TTPs, and equipment. Modern technology also has pushed information and even command decisions much further down the command chain than was true during the Cold War, while at the same time, the integration of personnel from different countries has moved from division to company levels. This means all levels of interoperability-based training – and especially language proficiency – also have moved down, from commanders to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine. True language proficiency, both understanding and following common doctrine and procedures and the technology to communicate, is vital to reducing “friendly fire” and other serious problems, not only in the heat of combat but during routine operations in a potentially hostile environment. “In terms of lower-level integration of units, we’re still doing a lot of training at the mid- and junior-officer level, while putting more pressure on the corporal and squad leader without extending the same training regime to

him or her,” Mahon said. “This is more the Facebook than Nintendo® generation, which is being pushed into an environment in which they need to make very swift decisions. “I see a parallel with the airline pilot who put his aircraft down in the Hudson [River]. He does not train routinely for a water landing, but the synthetic environment training he did have helped him learn to make time-critical decisions under great stress when things happen. I don’t think we’re doing enough of that with the lower levels of command – especially with language training.” Overcoming those shortfalls is one of the goals of ACT, which was created as part of the Prague Summit’s reorganization of NATO’s military command structure to make it leaner and more efficient. As the lead for the alliance’s military transformation, ACT was given the strategic objective of improving relationships, interaction, and practical cooperation with partners, nations, and international organizations. To that end, it focuses on areas such as training and education, concept development, comprehensive approach, experimentation, research, and technology, using ongoing operations and working with the NATO Response Force to improve the alliance’s military effectiveness. Headquarters-Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (HQ SACT), the only NATO command in North America and the only permanent NATO headquarters outside of Europe, provides the conceptual framework for the conduct of future combined joint operations, defining how those will be conducted and the capabilities they will require. Using new operational concepts – either adapted from others or self-generated – HQ SACT assesses their viability and value to that effort, then brings them to maturity through doctrine development, scientific research, experimentation, and technological development. The results are then implemented through a combination of persuading nations – individually or collectively – to acquire the capability and providing the education and training needed to get the concept implemented by NATO forces. At the beginning of 2008, a conference analysis report from the ACT Chiefs of Transformation outlined a number

U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Keith Brown

One upside of Soviet-era equipment owned by nations that are now NATO members is that such equipment can be passed on, such as this “Hind” helicopter donated to the Afghan National Army Air Corps by the Czech Republic.

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of steps ACT would undertake to achieve those goals. Those included: • concentrate military defense planning advice to smaller NATO nations that more heavily rely on it than larger members; • reduce both the number of scenarios in NATO’s Defence Requirements Review (DRR) and its analytical complexity to facilitate better understanding among nations; • provide options for NATO nations to make trade-offs during the fulfillment phase of defense planning; • examine the possibility of providing tailored DRR and other assistance to give nations the different level of detail they may require; • decide the correct direction for “most likely” and “most demanding” scenarios in future DRR process discussions; • standardize NATO and partner nation Lessons Learned reports and include non-military actors in the process; • conduct an unclassified study of lessons learned from Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Operation Active Endeavour (NATO’s Article 5 response to September 11) to aid partner integration into NATO operations; and • incorporate partner nations’ experiences in capability management or transformation programs. All of NATO’s interoperability concerns, efforts, and successes have come to a head in Afghanistan, where the alliance took command of the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003. Since then, the ISAF mission has expanded from the Afghan capital of Kabul to cover the entire nation, with a corresponding growth in troops from 5,000 initially to about 50,000 today, coming from all 26 NATO members and 15 other nations, many of them NATO partners. With such a broad spectrum of military forces working in unison, the issue of C4ISR compatibility has been paramount in Afghanistan. “The sad fact is, as soon as ISAF became a NATO mission, no one had the capability to talk to anyone else on the radio; there was no common communications

protocol,” Mahon said. “An urgent operational requirement was issued with a quick response called ‘Overwatch,’ which was a simple and quickly turned around switching system that allowed various national level communications to talk at a NATO level in theater. “Blue Force tracking initiatives also have been more visible in Afghanistan, driven more by events there than in Iraq, at least insofar as NATO is concerned. Avoiding friendly fire, knowing where all your own forces are, is very difficult if you are not totally interoperable.” Even the basic communications network NATO set up requires the development and adoption of basic standards for the operation of necessary gateways. Each nation has been asked to comply with those standards and NATO has created a project to support and track its implementation. In the end, however, even some NATO officials acknowledge – off the record – that the day is coming when the alliance will need to look beyond strict adherence to sovereignty – which most doubt will ever be acceded – take a greater role as a common procurement center, or find some other way to assure standardization, commonality, and interoperability. “NATO has acknowledged there are some things it is not good at – and acquisition and insertion of technology in a problem-solving manner is one of them. Yet that cannot be left to the individual nations – 28 answers to the same question are not an answer to problem solving,” Mahon concluded. “Therefore, we have to find a different way of acquisition and development, which is why various agencies are now pushing down the path of spiral development and, by doing so, have brought acquisition cycle time down from three or four years, which is of no use to anyone in Afghanistan, to about 18 months, which is still pretty poor but infinitely better and almost on the margin of acceptability.” Wilhelmsen raised the same point at the NATO industry conference: “There is a definite need to improve the acquisition process in NATO, to provide a better response. And there is a much lower cost penalty when something is born interoperable.”

U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Dayton Mitchell

Staff Sgt. Lars Agricola, of the German delegation, uses a battery monitor to check for connectivity during Exercise Combined Endeavour 2007 at Lager Aulenbach, Baumholder, Germany. The exercise was a U.S./European Command-sponsored exercise, bringing NATO, Partnership for Peace, and other nations together to plan and execute interoperability testing of command, control, communications, and computer systems from participant nations in preparation for future combined humanitarian, peacekeeping, and disaster relief operations.

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the FUTURE of NATO By J.R. Wilson

The concept and need for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization grew out of the ashes of World War II and the growing threat of the Soviet Union, which had consolidated its Eastern European victories over Nazi Germany into a tightly controlled block of nations behind what Winston Churchill famously dubbed the Iron Curtain. Six decades later, both the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain are gone and most of those Eastern European nations are now full members of NATO, doubling the original size of the alliance. As that new paradigm evolved during the 1990s, there were many calls for the dissolution of NATO as a Cold War remnant with no place in the “new world order.” However, ancient ethnic, tribal, cultural, and geographic conflicts the Soviets had kept in check quickly gave NATO new missions. That came first in the Balkans, but September 11 raised to global levels an even older threat from non-state terrorists with cells and operations throughout all NATO nations and beyond, including attacks against NATO’s original foe, Russia. “For NATO, the nature of warfare, in a classic ebb and flow of strategies and tactics that stretches back through the ages, has shifted significantly from the bilateral competition of the Cold War to the more complex challenges of the present and future,” noted the NATO Chiefs of Transformation Conference final report, “Multiple Futures: Military Consequences, Implications and Way Ahead,” in December 2008. The report cited a number of areas NATO must address as it responds to those challenges: • need for flexibility driven by unpredictability/ adaptability of opponents; • need for new types of deterrence beyond traditional conventional force and nuclear deterrence; • rapid changes to public opinion that will constrict options to respond; • difficulties of NATO’s consensus model to challenge the changing nature of conflicts; • use of the cyber domain to attack energy infrastructure, radio frequency spectrum and to create deception; • ability of super-empowered individuals/organization to exploit NATO; • non-military threats; • denial of access to outer space for communications and surveillance;

• opponents who do not face the same rules of engagement as outlined by NATO leadership; and • scarce financial and manpower resources that will drive future changes in the nature of military operations. Today’s NATO would be unrecognizable – even unthinkable – to many of the alliance’s founders. “NATO today is no longer the NATO of 1966, nor even that of 1995 when France first began her rapprochement,” NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer told the French National Assembly on Feb. 12, 2009. “The alliance has given up its Cold War posture, focused on the defense of territory – while, of course, maintaining its mission, its very raison d’etre, which is collective defense in case of aggression – Article 5. It has begun to contribute to international stability and to defend the interests of its members beyond NATO’s borders – in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and also quite recently off the coast of Somalia to combat piracy. In most cases, furthermore, it is doing these things under United Nations mandate. “These developments are logical and, make no mistake about it, in no way mean that NATO has suddenly developed the ambition of becoming the world’s policeman. NATO has to evolve because the world itself is changing, because the threats have changed. Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational trafficking, piracy, [and] cyber attacks are just so many new threats to the members of NATO. NATO would have failed in its mission if it had not adapted to meet these challenges. And in many regards this process is still under way, as the alliance must properly identify the value it can add. “It is also a process which NATO is undergoing in acute awareness of the need to mesh in with the whole broad constellation of international and regional organizations in a ‘global approach.’ NATO cannot and will not do everything. This is a current constraint in Afghanistan – we can only stabilize the mission of NATO if we reconstruct the mission of the United Nations, the European Union, the Afghan government itself, the World Bank, the NGOs [nongovernmental organizations]. NATO must

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U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Jim Varhegyi NATO photo

Above: A military coalition honor flight marches onto the parade ground at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, July 31, 2007, for an historic change-of-command ceremony that culminated a yearlong effort to bring Kandahar under NATO control. The ceremony marked the first time NATO has taken full control of a large airfield and operational staging base in an active operational theater using a multinational team. Right: Georgian Vice Prime Minister Giorgi Baramidze (left) and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (right) at the first NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) meeting in Brussels, Feb. 4, 2009.

learn to work consistently with all these players in an integrated manner.” During a January 2009 press conference, de Hoop Scheffer said he was looking forward to welcoming Albania and Croatia as NATO’s 27th and 28th members and seeing France resume its role in the alliance’s military structure, from which it withdrew in 1966. He also outlined his hopes for NATO’s future and relevancy to a 21st-century world far different from the post-World War II/Cold War environment of its creation. “I’m working now on a declaration on alliance security ... which I hope will be adopted by heads of state and government at that summit,” he told reporters. “And I hope that this declaration on alliance security will be

the ‘launch pad’ for a new strategic concept, which I consider to be overdue, to reaffirm NATO’s enduring purpose and to set the direction for NATO’s new missions and NATO’s new task. “When I speak about NATO’s new missions and NATO’s new tasks, the core function – the core responsibility of

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NATO – will always stay the same. That is the Washington Treaty. That is Article 5. That is the integrated military structure. That is the integrity of NATO territory. Let’s not forget that.” Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty signed by the original dozen founding nations on April 4, 1949, in Washington, D.C., remains the essential bedrock upon which the alliance was built and continues to function. By requiring all members to come to the aid of any member under attack, Article 5 established an unassailable commitment by all signatories to longterm military and diplomatic ties between Europe and North America. In 1949, the goal was to ensure the freedom of Western Europe; four decades later, that expanded to all of Europe. But the first invocation of Article 5 in the alliance’s long history was triggered not by tanks rolling across Europe, but by hijacked commercial aircraft crashing into the twin

towers of the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Controversial decisions by the new American president to crush the radical Taliban government in Afghanistan – and its support for Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist organization – then topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq, were open to debate and criticism, but a member nation had been attacked and, as required by Article 5, all NATO members presented a unified stance of support. The same would have been true eight years later had Georgia achieved its long-sought NATO membership prior to Russia’s recognition of the “independence” of two breakaway Georgian provinces and sent troops into Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Even without membership to invoke Article 5, Georgia still received NATO backing. As Russian forces moved into Georgia while the world was preoccupied with the 2008 Summer Olympics in China, the fragile new NATO-Russia relationship built

Photo by Sgt. James Elmer ABIPP RLC

Royal Marine Commandos take part in Operation Sond Chara, launched by ANSF and ISAF troops in the Nad-e Ali district of Helmand province, Afghanistan, to bring stabilization to the district, increase security to Lashkar Gah, and set safe conditions for voter registration in 2008.

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Photo by Sgt. James Elmer ABIPP RLC

up during nearly 20 years of change seemed shattered. Saying there could be no “business as usual” with Moscow so long as Russian troops were in Georgia, NATO suspended the NATO-Russia Council, created in 2002 to give Russia and NATO an equal role in determining policy regarding counterterrorism and other security threats. Russia, in turn, halted all military cooperation with NATO. The Russian action was seen by many as a wake-up call for Europe – one that evoked unpleasant memories of the continent’s long history of internal conflict. While an imminent threat of Soviet nuclear warheads hitting European capitals is gone, Russia had added a major power to the return to Europe of conventional warfare. After agreeing to halt military action, Moscow further aggravated matters by announcing plans to maintain a significant presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. “This issue of the possibility of building Russian bases inside Georgian territory is one of real concern to the NATO allies, because it does seem to be or would be in violation of Georgia’s territorial integrity,” NATO Spokesman James Appathurai told reporters on Feb. 4, 2009. “A political decision has been taken for a gradual re-engagement, principally through the NATO-Russia Council, but that does not mean we’re going to shy away from having very frank discussions where we disagree and where the Russian Federation can and should hear where they do things which are at the very least of profound concern to the NATO allies, including this.” For NATO, the end of the Cold War was far from “the end of history” some claimed at the time. Instead, it was the beginning of a new history, in which old foes are new allies and new foes demand new technologies, new types of alliance cooperation, and an expansion of the concept of “North Atlantic” security beyond the borders of Europe and North America. It also is a world in which Churchill’s 1939 assessment of Russia rings as true as ever: “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” It is a key NATO also is using in forging new relationships in Africa and the Middle East. The first major test of the alliance’s new expanded view of what it will take to ensure the security of its members is Afghanistan, which long ago ceased to be an “American war.” “We need to have a frank discussion about the future of NATO,” Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay told the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London in mid-February. “Afghanistan tests the ability of the alliance to execute its most basic mission in the 21st century and

in a global context. If NATO cannot deter or defeat the real physical threat facing alliance members – and, indeed, contribute to the building of security for the larger international community – then we have to ask ourselves, what is NATO for?” NATO has put itself directly at the heart of what has become a singularly international effort, involving not only the alliance’s 26 members, but 14 other nations, which in total, have some 53,000 troops in Afghanistan. Nearly 38,000 of those are from the United States, about evenly divided between the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and the original U.S.led Operation Enduring Freedom. With the addition of another 17,000 American warfighters President Barack Obama has pledged to commit in 2009, the United States was positioned to end the year with more troops in Afghanistan than all nations combined had there at its beginning. The U.K., with the second-largest contingent at 8,700, Canada, and the Netherlands, along with the United States, have taken the most casualties among NATO and all international forces as they battled for the heavily contested southern and eastern regions of Afghanistan. The secretary general and others have called for a significant increase on both the military combat and civilian reconstruction arenas from all NATO members, whom de Hoop Scheffer has said must “step up, with more forces, but also with more civilian aid. It is fair, and I think politically healthy, if we have a fair balance of burdens in this mission between the allies.” Just as Obama, whose presidential campaign had called for a greater effort in Afghanistan, took office, Italy announced a 40 percent increase in troop strength – to 2,800 – Poland indicated it will send more soldiers, the Dutch that they may extend their mission beyond a planned August 2010 withdrawal, and Great Britain that it might send more soldiers if others in Europe do the same. “The fact is, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has become an international problem solver. There is a recognition that threats to European security can occur outside Europe and a realization we need to be a more positive factor, tackling problems wherever they arise,” according to Jamie P. Shea, NATO’s director of policy planning. “NATO has the assets to send forces wherever necessary, including trainers and advisors helping the African Union [AU] get on its feet and set up a so-called standby rapid response force, using our experience having done those things in Europe. “So NATO is not today in a position to say in-area or out-of-area is more important than the other. To be a serious security organization, we must be able to operate

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both inside and outside our immediate territory and find a balance between the two. In the 1990s, the apparatus that NATO built up to confront the Soviet Union was applied to the Balkans. The key to the future is having a military structure that allows you to do both, whether that is sending forces 6,000 miles to Afghanistan or 600 miles to Kosovo.” Some of the old threats also remain, albeit in new hands. To some extent, NATO members are just as concerned about missile defense on the alliance’s 60th anniversary as they were on its 20th – perhaps more so. Some nations with or soon expected to have long-range missiles – and, in some cases, nuclear warheads – are seen as more likely to use them than was the Soviet Union. The United States and the USSR, with their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies, maintained the peace for decades through a MAD policy of Mutual Assured Destruction that the leaders of some belligerents in today’s multipolar world are considered too mad to accept. But a missile exchange or even conventional air and ground warfare are not the only threats NATO now faces. “There also are more problems – cyber security, terrorism, piracy – than in the Cold War. So NATO must deal with a lot of different threats, some big, some small. We must define NATO’s added value, not duplicating what others do, but finding the niche where we can do what others can’t and where military power is a major part of achieving a solution,” Shea said. “We must define what are the most threatening priorities where we can really add value, because we can’t be everywhere, acting as everyone’s cop. And that is where the debate will really lie in the next few years. “Where during the Cold War the Soviet Union was everyone’s top priority, the challenge to the future is the allies all have different priorities, depending on their geographic location. The focus in the Balkans is a lot different than in the U.S. or in the far north or in the south. So there is a premium now on give and take and leadership in the alliance, rallying everyone’s capabilities around meeting those priorities.” In some ways, the first few decades of the 20th century more closely resemble the start of the last century than its end, with a few “great powers” cooperating one day, saber-rattling the next as ethnic and tribal conflicts combine with a global economic meltdown to threaten all sides. The economic aspect is threatening to significantly reduce the funding NATO’s newest Eastern European members need to modernize their forces to be interoperable with their new allies in the West, while also reducing the funds those nations need to provide the top level of military capability for the defense of all.

“Everyone is under strain at the moment. The global financial crisis is eating into defense budgets in Europe and we just don’t yet know how severe that will be in its impact on our commitment to Afghanistan, for example,” Shea said. “Some countries, such as the Dutch, already have spent a lot of money replacing helicopters they sent to Afghanistan, an environment where it was used up much faster than had it only operated over Europe. So everyone is in the squeeze of deploying on missions and at the same time transforming their forces, which means investing in transport helicopters, satellite communications, special forces, etc. “That is not an easy combination and we have to muddle through as best we can. Everyone would like a time out to devote their resources exclusively to modernization, but the opposite is happening. We’re still in Kosovo, and the Balkans remain a big operational priority, which no one would have predicted 10 years ago. How long will we be in Afghanistan? We now have forces on anti-piracy operations and deployed to Africa. We tend to multiply rather than terminate missions and there are no quick-fix, cheap solutions. The need to balance things without finding an ideal solution will continue for some time to come.” That incoming new members such as Albania and Croatia cannot match the types of equipment routinely fielded by Germany or France is obvious. And in the 1990s, NATO made it clear to the first of its new allies from the former Soviet bloc that they should spend their defense dollars on what would enable them to best help NATO, not on aircraft or other systems of no real value to their militaries and already provided to NATO by others – which does not mean every member cannot contribute fully to the alliance and its efforts. “Europeans often make up for military involvement by their roles on the civilian side, such as police training, which also are necessary to be successful,” Shea noted. But there also is now growing agreement to change the old NATO policy that members who provide assets to the alliance also must bear all the costs of acquiring, deploying, maintaining, and repairing those assets. “The new premium is on more specialization, more common funding of operations. As everyone doesn’t have high-tech assets, those countries that do are called on more frequently than anyone else to use them. But before long, you have to replace those, which is costing a lot in Afghanistan. So there is a tendency now in NATO to have everyone who participates in the use of an asset help pay for it, which encourages those with the assets to use them because they aren’t solely responsible for the cost,” Shea said. “But we can’t take 10 or 15 years on that effort because we have to generate forces to Afghanistan today. Even

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KFOR photo

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (second from left in foreground) met with Commander KFOR Lt. Gen. Xavier Bout de Marnhac (third from left in foreground), June 2008, to assess the security situation and ensure NATO’s commitment to maintain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo.

more than the Cold War, we have to sort this effort out, rationalize it, get countries to spend more money on the collective needs rather than what it may want to spend on themselves. NATO is under greater pressure to steer the defense spending and priorities of its individual states. “However, we’re not a super-national organization; NATO nations are free on their procurement decisions. We can try to influence that and have something called defense planning, involving all but France, which may reintegrate into that soon, but we can’t stop a member from procuring this or that. We can make it uncomfortable for them, requiring them to justify why they are deviating from ministerial guidance, which they have accepted to set out the priorities for defense planning and spending. In that respect, NATO is mostly a management effort, to keep as many allies as possible behind a common goal.”

As that common goal expands to combating piracy at sea and terrorists wherever they may strike against a member nation or its interests – including cyberspace – NATO also may continue to grow in numbers. The admission of Greece and Turkey shortly after the alliance was created took it beyond the confines of the North Atlantic; operations in Afghanistan have established a precedent for sending troops far from any member state’s borders. “The alliance clearly has no shortage of useful things to do; there is not a lack of post-Cold War function, but an abundance of riches in terms of potential missions. I doubt Afghanistan will be the last time we are asked to do such an effort,” Shea said. “To continue to be seen as an effective, efficient firstresponder means NATO must act responsively and with a common and accepted goal. It already is seen as an

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incredible international organization, one people trust. And it is very important we maintain that credibility. People have to invest so we are seen as successful, but we also must be seen as successful to get people to invest.” As NATO prepared to celebrate its 60th anniversary with summits in Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany, NATO Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero reflected on what he termed “the most successful alliance in history.” “Its enduring success lies in the fact that it is different from all other alliances. NATO offers a permanent framework for transatlantic political dialogue, consultation and effective decision-making. And it also offers an integrated military structure that is able to back up and implement those political decisions when and where necessary,” he told the Kuwait Diplomatic Institute on Jan. 27, 2009.

“But there is one other reason for the alliance’s success. And that is a common mind-set to address security challenges together. In the past, this common mind-set may have been shared only by the allies. But today, there is a common spirit of security cooperation that extends far beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, all the way to the Mediterranean and the Gulf region – and even further.” As de Hoop Scheffer told the Munich conference, “NATO’s core business, for 60 years now, has been securing, stabilizing, and promoting democracy in the Euro-Atlantic area. It will continue to be our core business, as NATO looks to its future. And I share the view of many here that we are at an important moment of transition in how we ‘do’ security in the 21st century.”

U.S. Navy photo

The South Korean-flagged fishing vessel Dong Won (628), foreground, requested assistance via bridge-to-bridge communications from coalition ships after it had been fired upon approximately 60 nautical miles off the Somalia coast April 4, 2006. Combined Forces Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC), based in Bahrain, immediately directed the Dutch frigate HNLMS De Zeven Provinciën (F802) and the guided-missile destroyer USS Roosevelt (DDG 80) to respond as they conducted maritime security operations in the area. In late 2008, NATO sent three ships to conduct an anti-piracy operation, Operation Allied Provider, protecting food shipments in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia, due to this growing problem.

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Untitled-1 6

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