1979: The Year that Shaped the Modern Middle East

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THE YEAR THAT SHAPED THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

DAVlD

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LESCH

Trinity University

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A Member of the Perseus Baaks Group

AIl rights resewd. P r h t d in the United Statm of h & m . No part of this publicaGon may

bcl reproduced or trmsmiged in any fom or by any meant;, e l e m ~ or c mechanical, incXuding photocopy, =cordin%, or my information storage md M ~ e v asystm, l without p e r ~ s sion in w ~ t h from g the publkher. Copyright O 2001 by Wshriew Press, A Member of the Pemeus Boukt; Group WesWiew P r ~ books s are avaihble at special dixounb for bulk purdases in the United %at= by coriporations, instihtiom, and other organizatiom, For more idomalion, ptea~e conbd the Special m r k d Deparment at The Perseus Books Group, 11Cambridge?Center, Cambridge MA 021Q, or call (617) 52-5298. hbEsht3d in 2001 in the United $tat= of h e r i m by MlesWiew Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the Unitd Kingdom by Wstvim Press, 112 Hid's Copse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford 0x2 9fl Find us on the?World W e Web at ww.wes&ie~ress.com L i b r a ~of Congms Cataloging-in-PubIimtion Data Lesch*David W. 1979 : the year that shped the modem Middle East / David W t e ~ h . p. m. Includes bibliographical referents and index. ISBPJ 0-8133-3916-2(pbk, : a&. paper); ISBN 0-8133-3942-1 (hc) 1,Middle East-Estoq-19792. Iran-Hktoq-Revolution, 1979. S Eept. T~alies,etc. Israel, 1979 Mac 26, 4, Afgh~sm-HktoqSviet occupahion, 11979-1989. X, Ede.

The gaper used in this publica~onmwts the r q u i ~ m e n %of the h e ~ c a npJafi,onaI %ndard for Pemanence of Paper for P&t& tibrmy Wterials Z39.48-19%.

To m y wife, Suzanne, and m y son, Michael

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Introduction: The Seeular Priesthood and "Anwalization"

The Events

3 Future Past 4

Conclusion Appendix A: The Camp Bavid Accords Appendix B: P e a ~ epeaty between Egypt and Israel Appendix C: Annual S t d e of the Union Msssags (1980) (the Carter Dsctrine) Notes Bibliography Index

I13 W25 W36

141 151 175 181

The Middle East and Central Asia

This is, at least for mel a different sort ad book. The idea for writing it essentially emanated horn three different sources. One was pedagogical. In some of my MddIe East history courses wer the years, I found myself consistently utilizing the year 19'79 as one of the major political, economic, and cultural breaking points in the Middle East in the post-Woxld War II era. Second, I read a book a few years ago by Ray Huang titled 1587, A f7ear of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Dee1ine.f The book is a narrative of typical life during a year in China in tvhich nothing particularly significant happened according to the commonly accepted historical annals, Wowever! in this snapshot treatment, Huang offcrs clem sims of ixreversible decline in the Ming dynasty by examining the breakdovvn of various aspects of what on the surface would seem to be mundane buremcratic and pedestrian developments. I then started to imagine the possibility of examining a ""yeain the lifefJof the Middle East, albeit one that comprised a number of events that would be deemed significant in any history book. In effecb, it is the negative ad Huang's snapshot approach. That is, whereas he detailed primarily the mundane, I outline and examine the spectacular. Finally, and maybe most importantly, my first serious interest in Middle East history, politics, and culture was generated while I was an undergraduate student in the late 1970s and e d y 1980s. The events of 2978 and their direct repercussions in the several years that followed intellectually drew me to this t-urnultuous region of the world.:! Maybe this indicates a certain personal bias toward this period of t;irnej hovvever, I would venture to guess that there is a tvhofe generation of Middle East scholars (and pslicymakers) who might say the same.

This boolc is relatively compxessed, consisting of only four chaptws, ft is, save for the methodological treatment in Chaptw I, not based on ori@nalresearch. f do noe preeend to claim any new proiound discoveries regarding the specific events covered in the book. The three foci of the manuscript, that is, the primary events of 1979-the Iranian revolution, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaq, and the Soviet invasion, of Afghanistan-have all been examined in detail by a host of highly qualified scholars and commmtatars, What I am claiming is that the year 11579 was a watershed in modern Middle East histo% and f explain why. I connect the dots of histmg that in retrospea dearly elevate the Western historical categorization called a solar year, in this case, 1979, to a Itvel that separates it from much of the rest of those historical categorizations called a yem. The efficacy and acceptability of attempting this smt of an examination are delineated in the opening introcluctory chapter, As a historian, I felt obligated to confront this issue head-m and to explicate my ratimale and those in other venues. Although this chapter may be a bit technical in terms of history lexicology and methodological inteupolation for the nonhistorian, f felt it was nwessary to have (or at least put forth) some intellectual underpinning to my historioguaphical -roach and interpretation. Some may view &is book as containing a few peculiarities regmding form and strumre. On several occasions I begin a sentence with the representation. of: a year in i t s Arabic numeral form rather than spelling it out, which, of caurse, is grammatically incorrectj however, I did this in order to emphasize that I am focusing upon the events of one particular year and their short- and long-term repercussions. f also kcquently employ the teum "annualization," espeeidly in ehaptm I, This term and my variant;s of it (such as "annua1izer""fe not listed in any of the Webster's Dictr'mary volumes I a m , so I assume tbey are not generally recognized words, To my knowledge, it has also not been used in any colloquial m a m a or by another scholsrrbriter seeking to convey a thought more Birectly through a w a d construction that: can be somewhat easily digested by the reader yet not be accorded official acceptance, Frankly, I have utilized this term because f could not tkink of any other &at bettcr refieeted my methodological appxoach. It: is not ""priodization" in its tmest farm, since I am examining a block of time that has already been compiled

and categorized in the appropriate form. What I am doing is choosing from a plethora of convenient historicd categories that have come into existence o v a time-era, millenniumf century, score, decade, year; the process of selecting the '"ear" category I elect to call anaualizae_ion, Findly, the book contains only four chapters-and aspawate ones at that. The n a m e czf: and rationde for Chapter 1 I have briefly outlined above, Since I felt that the general reader may have a limited understanding of modern Middle Eastern historyp Chwteu 2 consists of a brief overview of the three signal events of 1979: the Iranian revolution, the Emptian-Israeli peace ueaty, and the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan. Chapter 3, "Future PasttJ3sthe culmination of my armment; that is, the historical dots are connected. Much of the hnture that lay ahead of 1979 is now our past. This is why it is consideralsly longer than the preceding chapters. m a t I attempt to do is simply let the histary flow fonvard and out from the pages in a ""Tarantinoesque" fashion, hopehlly making it obvious to the reader the immense importance of the events of 1979 by virtue of the matrix of inte~connectedand circular repercussions that are still very mu& with us today. There is no prestidigitation involved-it's "just the faces," In Chapter 4, however, I do offer some general statemeats about the subject and reflect on the rdationsbp between time, change, and chance in comection with the events under discussion, To say that the events czf: 1979 did not in a significant and unaltcrable manner change the Midde East-indeed, the wdd-is simply being blind to history. In just the ""P*' secLion of an Aumst 2000 issue of a local newspaper were the following stories: Osama bin Laden, from his sanctuary in Akhanistan, reportedly issued a new threat against American interests abroad; a series of bombs exploded in Indiacontroled bsbmir, with a Pakistani-based Islamist goup dairning responsibility; American and British air force jets bombed a couple of suspected anti-aircraft missile sites in the no-fly zone in southern Iraqi the 'Venezuelan president ignaxed the international ban m visiting Iraq and met with President Saddam Hussein to discuss OPEC matters, particuiaxly continued price stability and cartel solidarity; PNA Resident Yasir Arslfat, Israeli Prime Wnister Ehud Barak, and U.S. officials were feverishly aying to prc=pare the ground and close the negotiating gaps for a possible second Camp David summit meeting

with U.S. President Bill Clinton (after the first one in July failed to produce the desired results); the Lebanese army had finally deployed units in the border zone with Israel following the latterfs precipitate withdravvslf from sauth Lebanon a few months earlier; and in Iran, the new reformist president continued his tussle with consemathe clelTics over the forced closure of pro-reform newspapers. One can trace importam strands of all these stories to the events that transpired in 1979, We are not blind, m d it: cannot be arwed that the events of 1979 &d not significantly alter the m a l e East, f only hape f do juslice to and show the proper respect for such a lively year. As with any idea that comes to fruition, there were many individuals who nurtured its growth along the way, f especially want to thank Robert 0.Freedman, Willianz Quandt, and %eve k t i v for readjng e a lier drafts of this book and for the many helghl comments they made that improved the manuscript. In fact, in a rather intellectually stimulating lunch a cauple of years ago, Bob Freedman helped me crystallize the ideas I had on, the tclpic for the book; for Bob, it led to a conference he organized in November 2000 on a subject linked to the events of 1979, whi& will undoubtedly result in one of his t-ypically outstanding edited works. f wish all lunches were so productive! I also wmt to thank my colleague in the Depxtment of History at ?"rinit). University, John Mautin, our resident intellectual historian, for reading over the introductory chapter and suaesting some things that made the arwment a bit more cohesive. Others who helped develop my ideas andlor suggested various sources were Jonathan Owen, Char Miller, Bilf 'UdelX, and Lou Cantori. Kal hmbert, senior edtos at Westview Press, did a marvelous job of getting this book published in a relatively short s p a of time, It has been a plcasue to work with him on this pxoject. Eunice Herrington, the senior secretary in the Department of History at Txinity University, was, once again, of inestimable help in getting the manuscript into publishable shage and form. Finaly, I could not finish a project of any appreciable l e n ~ h without the sqpost of my wife, Suzanne, and my son, Michael, to whom this book is so appropwiately dedcated.

Some dates seem mute or virtually inaudible, lost in the white noise Crf ch~nology,while others have tremendous resonance and speak volumes, --John Brewer, "The Year of Writhg Dangerorrsfy"

There are certainly mally years in modern history that xesonate louder than others. In the West, the years 1776, f 789, 1848, 1914, 1945, and 1988 immediately evoke historical images and meanings with just their simple enunciation. There are also a number of in&vidual yeas in modern Middle East history that "speak volumes.'The ledger since the end of World W= I1 would invariably include the following: 1948, 1955, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 1991, and 1993. In each of these years, war, realignment, md[or the establishment of frameworks far peace have occurred; that is, some event or series of events engendered a &amatic and lasting period of change by causing shifts in the balance of power andlor ideological and pexcept-ual transformations in the region that kequently also had extraxegiond reverberations, However, at no time in the past-World War E era was dramatic and all-encompassing Ghange more apparent; in the Middfe East than in 1979-so much so that, in my opinion, future m d d e East kistorians and social scientists

will conclude that the year 1979 constituted a maim watershed, if not the major watershed, in modern Middle East history, To begin to understand the sipificance of 1979 one only has to review the more noteworthy events that oeeurred in that year: the culmination of tbe irmim revolution in February when Ayatotlah Ruhdlah Khomeini came to pwev replacing Muhammad Reza Shah; the sigxling of the IJ.S.-brokered Egyptim-Isxaelipeace trea.ty in March; the @king of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Islamist radicals in November (and its bloody end when Saudi troaps regained contrd ad the site); the infamous hostage crisis, when kanian revolutimalcies stormed the U.S. embassy in Teheran in November, captwing and holding Uty-two erieans for 444 days until their relcafe in Jlunuary 1981; and hafly, the Soviet invasim of Afghanistan in December. Although the reeoeition of the year 1979 as simificant might seem obvious, it has not been given anywhere near its p q e r due or analyzed in its totaliq. In st;udies of post-1948 Middle East history, that is, after the creation of the state of Israel, the year 1967 is most often singled out as the watershed.1 This is quite understandable given the fact that the seminal AYab-Israeli war occurred in June of &at year with, inter alia, the following results: the creatian of the occupied teuritories situatim, with Israel acquiring the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the W s t Bank horn Jordan, and the Colan Hei&ts fxom Syria; the estalblishment of the princigle of land for peace, Sewrity Council Resolution. 242 passed in November 1967 and, therefore, the basis for a peace process that is still opexative today; the effective end of secular Arab nationalism with the ccmvincing defeat of its standard-beara, E m t i a n President Gamal Abd alNasseq the resuseitatim of Islamism in the wake of the clear ineffeetiveness ad secular Arab ideologies in confronting Israel and the increasing awareness of the secular Arah regimes' inability to manage their own economies; the intimate involvement of the tvvo q e r p o w ers in tbe Arah-Isratlli conflict, a scenario &at reached its huition in the near nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union duwiag the latter stages of the 1973 &&-Israeli war; and the acceleration of political divisions within Israel revolving around the questian of h w much, if any, of the occupied ten-itories should be returned to the krabs in exchange for peace.

My contention is not that 1967 should necessarily be replaced as a watershed in post-W48 Middle East history, but that the year 1979 should be accorded at least the same historjcal recowidon. The events that occurred in 1979 hnbmentally altered the entire Middle East. A new regonal balance jnzaybe, in view of subsegueat history, it would be mme appuopriate to say imbalance/ of p w e r was created; the events of that year deepened the link between the Axab-Israeli and Persian Gulf arenas, a process that began with the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; before then, the two arenas were separate and distinct in the minds of mast policy maker^^ analysts, and scholars, It is also reasonable to suggest that the events of 1979 accelerated (or, indeed, began in earnest] the '%alkanization"" of the Middle East; that is, there was a return to historical regionalism, where the majority of states in the area began to outwardly pursue policies of national self-interest and/or adhere to subregional groupings. Egynt's decision to make peace with Israel, essentially abandoning the tenets of Arab nationalism for its own professed national interests, epitomized the changing regional landscape. These events had far-reaching consequences, even more so, in my opinion, than the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Altha& many of the sipificmt occurrences in 19'79-most obviously the Enptian-Isradi peace treaty-would not have happened (or certainly not in the fashion they in fact did hag~tenjif not for the 196'7 Arab-Israeli wa3; the 18617 war was essentially the dirtlax of a process that began with the conBicz;ual creation of the state of: Israel. It also did not change the &reetion of this process, as proven by the Arab-Israeli war occurring only six yeas later thatl in essence, completed the military aspect of the Arab-Israeli paraggm in place since 1948. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty completed, in large measwe, the palitieal and diplomatc saands of the 1948 paradigm and set the Axstb-Israeli arena off in a new direction, for better or worse. In addition, the other seminal events of 1979, the Iranian revahtion and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, affected .the Persian Gulf and Central Asian arenas of the Midde East in a direct and overwhelming manner, so that by the end of the year, the elements were in place to effect ctramatic change over the entire Middle East and not ~ u s tplcirnarily in the &&-fsuaeli arena, An impoutant; brealcing point in modern IVliddfe East history had occurredt and a new

paraBigm had been established. Certainly, the previous one no longer applied. 1978 was both an end and a beginmulng. The karninagian OP Onet Year

Perhaps the first question to addvess is why consider just one y e a m d not a block of time. A sirnif.~case could be made for the period 1977-1980 instead of just 1979. This would encompass Egyptian Resident Armwar Sadatis pivol;al trip to Israel in November 1977, which set the Egyptian-Israelipeace process in motion, land the Camp David accords in September 1978, which established the frarneworlc for peace and accelerated, if not saved, the process. This block of time would also include the bulk of the events that constimted the Iranian revolutim, whi& resulted in the werthrow of the Shah in ealy 1979, and the political infighting and systemic breakdown in Afghanistan, which necessilated, from the Kremlin's poim of view the Soviet invasion in late 1979. The km-Iraq war beginning in September 1980, a major aftereffea of the kanian revolution, would be factored into the equation. One could also expand the block of time to 1982 to include the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, wkicfi, many would say, was at least an indirect result of the Egptian-Israeli peace treaty. My view is that the evelzts of 1979 clirnaxed a series of processes that closed the door on previous interwavea paradigms that had established the parameters of interaction in the Middle East and opened the door to new ones. The culmination or climax czf: these processes was not at all assured. We know very well kom the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian "Oslo" accords signed at the White House that agreeing to peace does not necessmily mean actual peace, especially that which is conseerated by intcmationally recognized agueements. The Camp Bavid acemds faciltated and gxobably saved the Egptian-Israeli peace process, but President Jimmy Cart-er had to personally intercede w i n in March 1979 in. oxder to prweat it all from falling apart. By the end of 1978, m e could conclude that the Shah was likely to be overthrown, but it was nor at all inevithle. Until the Shah acmally left, and until Ayatollah Khomeini acmallty secured poweu, there was no fwanian revolutian of wki& to speak. Success made it one, and it only became successful in February 1979. Revolution is supposed to mean change.

We speak of the Hungarian "uprising" in 1956 or the P m e e "spxing" in 1968; they are not called revolutions because they weYe ansuccessful and, therefore, they did not result in revolutionary change. As f a as the events that transpired immediately after 1979, such as the IranIraq war and the Israeli invasim of Lebanon, these will be discussed in their proper context; that is, as events resulting horn ehanges wxougfit by the events of 1979. They do not warrant discussion within the same temporal category as a focal point of chmge. There have been. a number oi books titled with the numerical representaLion of a particulsu:yea, often followed with a subtitle that refers to the sigrrificance of that amum, When somebing is titled with simply a year or same sort of date reference, it usually has overt meaning to a g a t many people [orat least the target alz&eacef.zThe play 1776 needs no hrther description to clue the audience; likewise, one of Steven Spielberg's few film bonzbs, 1941, needs no further eluciclation ta intimate clearly that it has something to do with Warld War fI. 1776 is important, especially to Amewicans, because it is the year in which the United States was born. 1941 is important, again especially to erieans, because with the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States formally entered Warld War 11. To those interested in the W d d e East, I hope to do something similar to the y e a 2979 with this booki we know what happened, and the staadaut individual events themselves have been examined at length, but why is the totality of the 1979 chronology inzpmtmtZ Why is it worthy of similar recognition on at least a regional scale! I do not ask "why did b happen?"and answer ""becarts of a." I postnnlate that because b happened, c, 4 and e happened next. A distinwishing characteristic of this study may already be perceptible: IL. will cwer a sevies of important events that occurred thou&out the year, h e r e a s other books titled with a "nom de year" typically refer to a specific went within that year that had sipiFic=ant repercussions for the future. Indeed, in modern Middle East historiography, the appellation of most books that deal with the events of 1967 ar 197'3 in paw~icularis made in direet relation, to the &ab-Israeli war that occuxued in that year ox its many derivatives. Fox reasons that may ultimately be more coincidence than the result of a linesu:relatanship, the aforementioned seminal events of 1979 w a e neatly packaged into

one year. The PRiddle East after 1979 would be s i ~ i f i c m l ydifferent; from the Middle East prior to 1979. One note is important: This type of temporal =amination is avowedly orientalist; that is, I am utilizing a solar calendar year that has been employed in the VVest (and elsewhere). Since X am examining primwily Middle Eastern events, it would have been entirely appropriate to have employed the Islamic calendar based on the lunar cycle. Hawevex, because it is about ten to eleven days shorter than the solar calendar on an annual basis, the afmementioned events would not have all been neatly packaged into one yew thus undermining the raison @etreof this waxk.3 Additionally, the events of W79 did not haw to all occur in the same year. As will be discussed later, there are same distinct relationships between the various events that did affect each other, some more directly than others; for instance, the taking of the American hostages and most likely the takeover of the Grand Mosque would not have occuxred if not for the overthrow of the Shah. But it was not preordained ar somchow cosmically controlled that the grand events of' that year (the culmination of the kanian revolution, the Egyptian-Israeli p a c e t-reaty, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan)would take place within the same calen&r year. The Soviets could have easily delayed their invasion by a muple of weeks until January 1980, in which case the centraj. theme of this book would be diluted, It just hagpened that way, History (and the historians who catalogue it] has a way of presenting periods of specific categorization, and it is often not mt&ely coincidental. But it would probably take an army of astrologers m d psychologists to come up with even the semblance of a rationale that would explain why a number of significant events, the commencement of which depended on ingvidual whims and tlnou&ts and unrelated nexuses of historical lines of action, happened to take place withbook will not attempt to offer some defining, owrin one year."&$ arching theory on why this was the case. It makes more sense to generalize about the propitious eavironments in which something was more likely to happen than not. Nothing about these events was temporally inevitable. I am more concerned with the changes bwought on by this unusual panoply of events. Most books titled by a year entev directly into a narrative storytelling structure, not unlike a diary of the day-to-by occurrences dur-

ing a particular period of time sem from the v i q o i n t s of t h s e who were participant observers. These books usually do not offer any serious explanation of the simificance of the chosen year or its aitereffects, nor is there any methodtllo@cal justification given, In lames Cameron" 11914, the author even. admits that the book is ""a direct nwrative, without any especial analysis or philosophy; particularly have I txied to avoid too much hindsight." Cameron goes on to state that his book '9s not a work of scholarship, of which there are, for~natelyfor me, already scares." This is acceptable, I imagine, to those who, as Cameron itwates, want "an intpressionist picture of the latter half af a momentous year in the life of a people who, far good or ill, were never to see their w d d agdn as they saw it then.'" It could quite possibly be that the importance of the yeax 1914 is self-evident, or as Cameron intimates, that the overall significance b s been studied ad nauseam, and therefore it needs no further explication. A story from that specific period, &awn from different perspectives, might then be interesting however, the year 1979 has neither been s~zrdiedin its totality (ckronologicdly or otherwise) nor been examined as a focal point of change in the W d d e East. Lyn Macdonald" works, 1914 and 1915: The Death of Imocence, are based essentially on letters, jaurnals, memoirs, and photographs to @ve voice to those who "mi&t athewise have gone unheard.""6he authorfs task is to "'hope that it goes some way t w a r d telling how'' things transpixed during a block of dme without attempting to examine any of the more profound questions associated with this epic would be the last event, such as why the war happened when it &d ("I to try to claim that tkis book comes anywhere n e a supplying an answer to a question which has exercised the minds of countless historianseM"f why the book focused on just one year (and why 1914 and 1915 but not 1914, 1917, or 19181, or what the significance was of the yem 1914 and[or 1915 in bjstorjcd terms (or even in terms of the rest of the wax),7 The fact that the second book has a subtitle inficates at least a willingness to offer some explmation of the yearfs significance, but any hard conclusion, ar purpose is left: up to the reader. In. Virginia Cowles's book, 1923: An End and a Beginning2 the subtitle certainly indicates a break in the usual flw of tkings, obviously just prior to the outbreak of World War I. But other than a few lines in

the opening chapter (there is no preface or introduaion to acclirnate the reader), there is no historically grounded explanation pxoviding context or m e m a for the narrative.8 These are books on World W a I that even focus on a monthly analysis. Immanuel Geiss's edited volume, [sly 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents, gathers documentary evidence that addresses the vexing question, of who was most responsible for the war" outbreak, In this respect, it is similar to those wmks that examine June 1967.9 Ernil Ludwig's fuly 24 expresses itself in prose befitting a hamatic novel or play-it even has "Dramatis Personae of the Great Tragedy."lQ In November 1918, Gordon Brook-Shepherd offers a "panorama of the whole closing scerze" at the end of the war. In his Fonumd, BrookShepherd be@trs,almost reluctantly, to make same connections to the &abdtransformation at hand, but ultimately the book is very similar in form to the ones already discussed, offering a narrative of the events leading up to and through the closing act of the war.11 As one might expect, World VIru E also provided the opportunity for some boolcs to be titled with a ye=. As is the case with those on World War f, these boolcs are essentially in narrative or prose form with little, if any, attempt at historicat cause and effect analysis or exgmatory models. Kchard Collier"s 1940: The Avalanhe, contains no grelace or introduction, and only on page 270 does h e author indicate that the book is "'a narrative of 1940'" in addition (and typically), the chapter titles are all in. the form of quotes &awn from participant obsenrers.l" In. 1 9 4 2 :Our Lives IB a World m the Edge, Williarn Klingaman sptlxrds all of two paragraphs in the epilope answering the self-directed question, "And in the end, what was the meaning of the year 1941?" Othenuife, it is again a narrative of events as seen though, the eyes of cont;emporaries in a stov-telling mode.lWingaman also authored the book 1919: The Year Ouw World Began, which obviously refers to the tremendous Ghange in the wodd, using a measure suitable to our temporally guided lives and history. The books compiled accmding to this format provide snapshots of a particula?: time, no more and no less. This is not to diminish their value or utility, but only to point out the differences in tone, style, and iMmt from this author's work. Thomss Flenuing" 11776: Year of Illusions is very similar in form and purpose to IUingaman and others mentioned. The world was just a bit different on January 1, 1777! when "William Byrd HI arose at

dawn and faced the future.'Q'4 Overall, though, it offers scant treatment of the significance of 1776 in terms of connecling direct strands of histosy irom it, howeves self-evident they may be. This latter point may be the greatest single difference in form and purpose of that book and others like it from this workj that is, the t ~ l i t of y events in the Middle East in 1979 and subsequent change wrought by it is less evident ta the uninitiated, therefme obligaiting more cause and effect extrapdation and analysis. In the field of Middle East: histow, one book that focuses on one year is Torn Segcv's 1349: The First jrs~aelis, initially published in Hebrew and then translated into English in 1986. It is a revisionist examination of the Nfirst Israelis," that is, those Israeli leaders who established the foundation of the modern state of Israel in the year ou so following independence in 1948. In a way, it parallels similar "warts-and-all" K~listoricaltreatments of America's "hounding fathers" "that peeled away the layers of reverential myth and legend surrounding them to, at times, reveal less than idealistic individuals who made mistakes and acted incongruausly to many of the principles they advocated-although they were not neeessmily less heroic. Although the boolc is an excellent h i s ~ r i c aexcal vation, its thrust is puvosely narrow, and the ultimate thesis revolves moue around building blocks and continuity rather than change. In this wity it is similar to Ray Huang"s 1587, A Year of No Significance: The M h g Dynasty in Decline. IS Jean Starobinski" 1789: The Emblems of Reason is an excellent text an the eighteenth centuxy and neoclassicism, diwlging the connections between contemporary visual arts and the French Revolution. Its puqose is gfferent from the aforementioned books, as there is a focus on elements of change beyond the poliLicaUy and militarily &servable. Starobinski demonstrates, as other have, that the world (at least Eusope) was somehow different as a result of a significant went, in this case the French Revolution, Statorobinski also surmises that the English and American revolutions "prevent 1789 from being regarded as an absolute beginningefVithany epic event or period there axe what seem to be equally important a priori events without which the final seyuence in a parahgm. would not have occwred.lb Interestingly, one could also say that the birth of Israel in 1948, the &&-fsuaeli wars of 1967 and 1973, m a host of other happenings in the Mi$dle East in the post-World W;ar 11 era prevent 1979 from being regarded as an

"absolute beginning.'The independent variable, in its truest form, is well nigh impossible to locate* Another work that examines change beyond tbe political realm is James Chandler's outstanding England in 1819: The Politl'cs Qf Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic Histo~cisrrz. f t is a literary history that claims, iMcr alia, that the roots of the new historicism can be traced back to the Romantic era wxitings, primmily to the yea1 18 3 9 (as exhibited in the writings of, inter alias, Shelley, Keats, Byron, Washingtan kving). The "Peterloo'hrnsacre at St. Peter's Fields in Manchester, England, on August 16, I&19, when the gendarme killed a number of men, women, and children who were peaceably protesting the state of parliammtary representation, was tbe political focal point of 1819. The massacre had a variety of cultural repercussions, not the least of which oceurred in the literary sphere. ft is in this arena where the literary weXtanschauung emanating oumf the Napoleonic era gave way after Waterloo in 1835 to a new hista-ricist literary movement that focused on its self-daed place in time, clirnaixing in England in 1819'18 It w s , i n k 4 an "annus mirabilis'3hat forever changed at least British literary culture,lg Chandler%work is one of the few attempts I have b u d that rigorously examines the methodology of analyzing the events of one caleadar year in relation to some overall theme aad/or subject. His work is reflective of a certain genre within literavy history that, on the whole, has been far more advanced on the subject than those of us in the histmy discipline.20 In discussing the relevant methodological aspects of annualization, Chandler relies heavily on Claude LCvi-Strauss" classic work, The Savage Mnd, particularly the final chapter on ""History and Dialeetic.'Gl fn countering Jean-Paul Satre's s ~ ~ o g u e s s i v e - r e g u e ~ s i ~ e t ' method,22 LCvi-Strmss insists that "'there is no history without dates" and that "'dates may not be the whole of history, nor what is most interesting about it, but they are its sine gua non, for history's entire oxiginafity and &st-inctive namre lie in apprehending the relation and aftex, which would perfarce dissolve if its terms between &me could not, at least in principle, be dated" "mphasis the author's).% Levi-Strauss, however, emphasizes that to the ordinal functian of dates must be added a cardinal function, which "indicates chronolog-

ical distances and densities" of equal duraion beyond the sivnple before and after assimation.2WUsing these various " g g a u M af tempogal compartnrentali~ation~ the "'pressure of history" offers up "hot chronologies wbicfi are tbose of periods h e r e in the eyes of the historian numerous events w e a r as differential elements; others, on the ccmtrary, where fox him [although not of course for the men who lived thmugh them) very little or nothing took place.'"s The determination of what is or what is not a ""bt chrondogy" is left up to the individual historian, the compilatian of which may or may not be generally agreed upon. Afler all, the professional historian must have some legitimate license to pick and ehaose, with consensus and evaluation acting as constraints and approbation. As Rabert Gilpin stated, "because history has no starts and staps, one must break into the flow of history at a pwticular point.,'"h As stated earliert annualization is but an ordinal class of historical analysis as opposed to the caxdinal class of, for example, third, fouu~h, or sixteenth centnnry. The level of analysis tightens ax broadens depending upon whet-her the historian travels up or down temporal domains that consist ad representative classes af dates characterized in houdy, daily, annual, secular (third century, the Romance era, and so on), ou millennid terms,z? The l w e r the domain (hourly, daily) the mave specific the infoxmation, and vice vcrsa. For instance, biographical and anedotal Iristmy tends to be in the low= domain mold, or as Levi-Strauss states, a "lw-powered" "story that only becomes historically meaningf~lwhen juxtaposed and integrated into history of a "fiigher pmer than its elf."^^ This LCvi-Straussian categorization is especially relevant to narrative histories and to the choices made by historians af the level ad analysis that will guide the extent of historical intrusion and explication, I am less conmrned with this asgect of historical analysis than with legitimating and justifjring the identification of a "hot chronolow'haad annualizing it in terms of change and cause and effect gelstionships, For LCvi-Strauss, the other end of the spectrum consists of "cold" msacieties that have an internal environment that 'keighbors on the zero of historical temperature," resisting '%ttructu;ralmodification which would affiord history a point of entry into their lives,'"2 This supposition of ""cold" ar "hatsi"' an evduative judgment that provides

appositional juxtaposition and, therefore, identification: ""But a historical date, taken in itself, would have no meaning, far it has no reference outside itself: if I know nothing about modern history, the date 1443 makes me none the wiser. The code can therefore consist only of classes of dates, where each date has meaning in as much as it stands in complex relations of cmelation and opposition with other date~.~'aO He goes on. to state the following: In so far as Etistoq aspires to meaningf it is doomed to select regions, periods, goups of men and individuals in these goups and to make them

stand out, as discontinuous figures, against a continuity barely good enou& to be used as a backdrop. A truly total history would cancel itself out-its product would be nought. What makes histov possible is that a sub-set of events is found, for a @ven p e ~ s d to , have approximately the same sipificance for a ~ontinge~t: of in&viduals who have not necessarily expedenced the events.31

Even if one accepts only part of L&vi-Strausds"historiads code," based on what might be considered a "hat ckronology,'"he yeav 1979, in at least one temporal domain and probably even at the higher secular level domain, would meet the criteria of most historians.32 In view of tbe fact that the post-World W a II era is still recent in terms of historical chronotog, we tend to see many more "hot" years than m i h t be identified t-uvo hundred yeas korn now, This is esgeeially eke ease for the Middle East, a region of the globe that has acquired the sobriquet of "'hot spot" for most of this period. Even so, the "'sub-set'"f events in 1979, in my opinion, far outweighs its "colder" annualized neighbors, or at least is "'bottert9han the rest within its geoguqhical and temporal classification. 1819 had its Peterloo, but 1979 had its ""PterlooJ3n the kab-Israeli arena, in the Gulf arena, in the Central and South Asian arena, and in the abstract armas of ideology and perception. Events and Change Now among the occurrences w ~ 6 must h have taken place in the past a w s t maj024ity cannot possibly interest the ~storian.They

have never earned a place in accepted history; the histodan m21 never need them for his stow, Some occurrences on the other hand spear suitable for inserbon in the stor-y;because &ey possess sigm$caxlce, --G, J. Remier, m*stav:Its -pose a d M d o d

I t is comnzonlJr appreciated that nor all happenings m ' t h h a corntry from day to day are of "Estoriclzl" importance. The subject

matter of story consists of occwrences which me unusual and out of the common, of evexlts which for oEe reason or another compel the attention of men, and wxzickz am held worthy of b e i ~ g kept in remem baance. -Frcsdedek f, T e ~ a r t , Theary arrd Roeesses of History"

W b stgr"sClictl'mary defines the word "eventas'" "ssomelhing that happens: occurrence""armd ""a noteworthy hagpening."a Frangois Furet defines events as "unique paints in time in which something happens that cannot be assimilated to what has come before it or what will come after it. That %oawe&ingt-the historical fact promoted to the rank of event-can never be compared, stnictly speaking, to a preceding or subsequent faet, since it is its empixically unique nature that determines its impoxtmce,"aa Obviously, my emtention is that a number of noteworthy hqpenings occtrx~din 1979 that caused &amatic change in the PRiddle East and beyond, The relationship between events and change has been discussed in a vriety of humanities and social science disciplines, primxily in history, political science, and philosopIry fit has fang been a subject of examination in the physical sciences].The inzgovtaa~eof the event as a factor of change has been renewed among historians within the past twenq years ax so, particulawly in the fovm af naxrative history as a kind of response to the Annales school.as Many would say it is in fact the amounl: of change that determines whether an event of any significance has occurred that could disdnguish it from what normaley essentiality is, that is, an ongoing chain of events, All who discuss the

subject of change-philosophers, politicd scientists, historians, and physicists-admit to two types of change: revolutionary versus evolutionary, or dramatic vevsus slowt substantial versus gadual, m simple change versus transformation, Edgar Morin writes of how one type of event can modify an existing system through distrzrbances that lead to reorganization, whereas others are essentially confined to being elements within. a system that axe at once reeogrzizable at certain levels but ds not alter the system.36 Choosing what is a significant event is a judgment call; some are harder than others to make, Teggart sees events "not as the ernpression of the will-acts of individuals, but as "ntrusions,' of whatever smt, affecting conditions in which the processes manifested in %xity%have been operative without &sturbance."fl He goes on to dixuss overall eqerience, possibly history itself, as being made ug of concentric circles, the largest being the universe, the smallest being the inclividtxal, with a host of measures in between, ranging from the entire globe to nations to local communities. Accor&ngly, an event is an intrusion "from any wider circle into any circle or condition which may be the hjecr of present interest.'""" would submit that an event, ccrtaidy a significant event, affects circles not only within the level of transaction but also in outer circles, especially if the delineation of concentric cixcles is specific to national, regional, and international levels. The selection process for 1879 is not diifficult. Although we must be awme, as Descates states, that "even the mast accwate of' histories, if they do not- cxaetly misrepresmt or exagerate the value of things in order to render them more wmthy of being read, at least omit in them all the circumstances which are basest and least notable," here are frequently events that are traceable backward and forward as both ends and be&innings." In addition, these event;$ are often surrounded by contemporary pomp and circumstance, which only leaves history to deternine whether it was desemed. Indeed, it is the "selection from the available data so arranged as to convey to the reader, not the actual complexity of happenings, but such happenings as the historian considess of impoaance in a pewiod af time or in a series of occurrences.""" m a t might: seem significant to one historian might not- be to another. However, for the significant events I have identaed for 1979, the volume of scholarly examination and papalist treatment of each event

would sugest otherwise. ft seems more likely that the differences of opinion on these events would center on whether each had more positive m negative regercussions over the short and long term. Each event is also made ug of subevents in a time sequence, It is a construction made up of other, smallex constructions, As Peter Mum states: The event called the outbreak of World War E can be broken up into innumerable subevents. That does not mean that it did not take place, It only means that it is not hard and fast. It means, further, that some people (in this case, lots and lots of people) decided to place many subevents together in such a wary as to @five rise to the view that the large event took place, But it is conceivable that other people might have assembled some of the subevents concerned in a different manner and collected others in a different ehain.41

We all know that World War X I is known under different names in the corntries that parti~igatedin it (as is the case with almost any war); even the beginning and closing dates of the w x (as in most wars) are not universally ageed upon.h t I am not examining a pxocess, that is, tbe set of subevents within or that led up to the event. At tbe second that the Ayatollah came to gowes, the fvlidde East changed, as history would show; at the second that ntlenachim Be@nand Anwar Sadat signed the Eaptian-Isxaeli peace treaty with Jimrny Cmter presihng, the Middle East: changed, as history would show; and at the second that the Soviets invaded Af&anistan, the Middle East changed, as history would show. Ultimately, it was not until Khomeini actually acquired power, until the peace treaty was actually siped, and until Afi=banistanwas actually invaded that an event wsrthy of appellation occurred. History would prove these events to be of a higher order. This teleological =roach does not attempt to confirm. &at each of the aforementioned events was significant-tlais is, by and large, selfevident-but that taken together, occurxing within the span of one ealendar year, they forever changed the Midde East and, in, varying degrees, the i ~ e r n a t i o n darena as well, Excluding subatomic temporal and historical philosophy, there was in each case a finite moment, an event, that changed things.

There are those who suggest that the concent of the event is "intithe concept of change; one camot exist withmately bound upi"ith out the otber.42 Many say that history is the "science al change," consisting of a chain of an infinite number of events.@If this is aue, then it stands to reason that simifieant events cause simiAeant change, especially, as mentioned earlieu, if we follow a teleolagieal approach that determines the p w e r of events in terms of the change wrought by them. This anti-Darwinian appoach echoes the comments of some of Darwin" critics in terms of nature taking ""jumps'qrom time to time and not always follotving a melhodical evolutionary proges$ion.& There are historical events or flash points, so to speak, that mave lines of history along at a move accelerated rate and[or in a different direction. The t h e e momentous events of 19'79 are certainly flash points, even thou& they were the culmination of processes at work for many years, if not decades. Change itself is Qfficdt to pinpoint. There have been attempts at mriving at a formula that deflnes change, such as the h c i e n t Criterion. of Chmge a d the Cambridge Criterim of Change, both of which assign variables marking time, space, and poperties framing a befare and after progession h i n g whi& change dearly occwred.4 Simple obsevvation dictates that if sornetbng is different from that which existed before it was different, then it has changed. But it does not always change completety; thexe are usually properties of what had existed beforehand even if what is obsel-ved connotes total ~ansformation. AS Lombizrd states, "in order for an abject to change it must not: ive the change, it must also persist dming it, though perhaps not necessarily at every moment."* This is not a case of a prince turning into a frog, but a tadpofe twning into a frog or a caterpillar into a butterfiy.47 It: is a process that reaehes a climax or flash point that causes a jump ham a to b, in whicb m;m.y of the popesties of a still exist in b, but b is mmked2y different, with unpredictable reslllts to follow. In 1981, Robert Cilgink War and Gharage in World Polil-ics was published. In it, be comments upon and andyzes the aemendous change that bad occurred throughout the world during the 1970s. He states: Political leaders, academic observers, and the eelebmted ""man in the street" were suddenly conscious of the fact that the e n e r e crisis, dra-

matic events in the mddle East, and tensions in the Communist world were navel develqments of a qualitatively different order from those of the preceding decade. These developments and many others in the political, economic, and military realms signaled far-reaching shifts in the international dist~butionof: power' an unleashing of new sociopolitical forces, and the dabal realimmenr of &glamadc relations. Above all, these events and developments revealed that the relatively stable internationd system that the world had known since the end of World war XI was enterj;n.g a perj;od of uncertain political ehmges.48

fn f 981 there was a considerable amount of uncertainty, eonsternation, and instability that painted a foreboding picmre of what might Iie ahead, Many were equating the situation to that which existed prior to the tvvo world wars, fearing another might be on the horizon, with catastrophic results. A great deal of change had oecwred, much of it as a result of events in the Midd-le East. Gilpin sugests three qpes of major internationd political change that, gene~allyspeaking, are "the consequences of the em~unctureof urmique and unpredi~rablesets of developments,'""s"These situations result from vxiations in the distribution of p w e r in the international system, pxodudng disequilibriums in which "eemomic, political, and techological developments have incueased considerably the potential benefits or decreased the potential costs to one or more states of seeking to changc: the international systenz."SQThe &st type is called systerns change, which is a change in the natuxe of aetaxs within the international system, such as nation-states, empires, ou even mdtinaiond eovaradons. The second type is systemic change, in whi& the governance of an international system or form of control is altered throu& changes within the system vather than of the syaem itself, This occurs through the rise m dedine of the dominant states or empires that control the system. Interaction change is the third type. Althocr& it is the most prevalerrt type of chang-e, it is on a relatively lowes level than systerns or systemic change;.; it is ehmaeterized by mohfications in the interactims ammg actors in the international system, but these modifications do not inherently ehange the system."" Zeev Maoz defines global change as the "reaurangement of some or all of the units in the system*""" Whereas Gibin distinpishes

between ineremental and revolutianary change! Maoz writes of si~nple change versus transformationl the latter representing structural change to the system as ogposed to nonstructural or nonfundamental changes witkn the system.sWe have already seen &is demwcation of change under different names, meant to distinguish sudden, &amatic Ghange from evolutionary change. Change takes place all the time, but transformatims do nat; they are especially wort;hy of maminatim because af the implications for global change on varying scales. Maoz also caegorizes t h e e types of approaches to understanding global change: systemic, regional [or subsystemic), and national.5" The first type, systemic, is kind of a combination of Gilgin's systems change and systemic change, focusing on the result rather than the actual dernmts that determixled the result. In this categmy, changes take place ""due to forces that apeuate on a global level," such as global war (Gilpin wodd say hegernonic war), technological breakthroughs, or changes in the decisionmaking of the dominant pfayers in the system* The underlying assumption af this type of change, as Maoz states, is that it is from the top-down, that changes that occur at this global level affect things at lower levels, such as regions and states. This is not unlike Teeat's concentric circles discussed earlier. The second appxoach is the regonal model of change. Here, chmge occurs in a particular region instead of globdJ-y, with repercussions "spilling" aver into other regions. In the Middle East, Maoz pinpoints the pan-ttrabist (ox Arab nationalist) and Islamist movements as examples af ideologies emanating from across a region that ""xshape intexstate interaction not only within the region but also b e ~ e e regional n acbors and outsik actors." Changes in this model are bath top-down and bottom-up; that is, they affect concentric circles above and below the level of interaction, The third level described by Maoa is the national model of global change, wbich "rests on a bottom-\lp causal logic par excellence." In this model, ecmomic, political, and[ox social ehanges within states become a '*springboardof global changes." NNatnal change, esgecially that which is revolutimav or transfoumational, begets regional change, which frequently begets systemic change, particularly when it involves geostrate&ic anqor political matters. The Iranian revolution

is a case in point, where natianal change cevtainly affieaed the regon, leading, inter alia, to the kan-kaq W=, which, as we all know invited the attention of the global powers, eqecially since all of &is was taking place in an area that contains two-thirds of the worldts known oil reserves. Whereas Gilpin focuses on systems change and systemic change as the roots af global change, admmishing the top-down model that was a convenienl: fit for the cold war paradigm, Maoz tends to focus on the bottom-up approach delineated in the naclonal model that has become more apparent in the past-cold war environment, Maoz, hotuever, is quick to emphasize that the t h e e models are not mutually exclusive, that there exists a "cycle of change going horn one level to another."% I.t is, in fact, a muftidirnensional matrix that allows far substantial change to be generated in a vasiety of directions at the same time, with aftereffects that are equally multidirect;iond. The Middle East in 1979 was one such matrix. As we shall see, change, under any ctisciplinawy definition-historical, philosophical, or scientific-did occur, and it was, by January 1, 1880, of a radical, revolutionary, substantial, &amatic, sudden, and transformational type that affcmd concentric circles (especially)above and even betow the level ad activity. Subsequent; history would prove it. Causa end Effaa

There are those who suaest that: all causes and effects are evenes and that mly events can be causes and effeets.56 it is my assation that the salient events of 1879 were primary-level causes whase effects were instrumental and widespread; i n k 4 the mere ernistence of such important repercussions tench to prove the point. One cannot have a cause without an effect or vice vexsa, since the effe~tsa l l w one to trace back and locate the cause(sj and the cause(sj allows one to trace forwasd to identify vaxious regercussiom. tfljually historians and social scientists study an event and then go backward in time in order to determine the cause(sj. f am essentially txaversing in the opposite direction, that is, examining a series of identifiable singular causeslevent;~and extrapolating to future effectslevents, which are already history. Certainly the seleebion of effects narrotvs the choice ad

causes, as does the converse, a pxocess that ultimately is quite arktrary, Michael Stanford identifies criteria fox the selection of a cause (implicitly, that is, a cause worthy of study). Echoing Collinpood, be purgorts that a cause ""i s e a as a point of intervention,'hwhich is ""tat factor in the sirnation which we can mast easily control or manipuiate.'"7 11: is also a '"vawiation from the nowm," something that is exceptional or unexpected, which is ta be $istinwished kom the necessary conditions that enabled the exceptional eventleause to take place." 8. R. Eltm distinf~uishesb e ~ e e n"situatianal causes" that provide the conditions for the "praduaion of a given event" and those causes that directly affect the groduction of an event.59 These types of explanations go a long way toward allovving the historian to separate causes of the first order or grirnary/direct level from other secondary or indirect causes that preceded the event in question, which, in its truest form, is everything that ever happened. And since we cannot trace everything as a linked chain of: events (however indirect: they may be)all the way back to the Big Bang, it is necessary to have this mechanism in order to narrow the historical field of view.ao Stacniford provides an excellent example: In the investigation of a railway accident the inspectors will disregard the speed and load and wei&t of the train, but pick out the bent rail, as the cause of the acddent. Xt is not that the other factors were irrelevant to the crash, but they were present in normal mnrxing of the trains. It was the abnormal condition [the bent rail) that they selected as the cause.61

Events in 1979 created a (or were the)"bent rail," and dthou& some may say that in fact they did lead to a crash, others would agree that they definitely led to cbantges in direction, As W H. R l s b comments on the historian" task: h d what he will want here is to put his Bnger on the particular point at which things began to go wrong [or for that matter to go ri&t), and to identie the circumstance which, from the point of view of the agent concerned, vit_allyinfluenced the outcome. A cause in this sense is a necessary. condition of same result, picked out fram the remaining conditions;

either because it is something which nnight have been produced or prevented at will, or became it was in sorne way unusual or unexpected.62

VVe must be cllseful in assessina; the engendering dernmts of the cause(s).in this case, we are focusing on the "What caused what?" and not necessarily m the " m o caused what?"@ VIJe are examining the oecuxrence ol: events and their histmical repercussions, which were given. appellation (and often different ones by persons fxom a varieq of perspectves) by students and observers of hiaory and politics like myself. They are, within this contm, abstract: terms that connote well bcyond the specific inabstractlon from whi& the terms evdwed, Evea though this is the case, we must never forget the role of individuals and gaups of individ-crals in the construction of the ""what.'The choices of in&viduals, in many cases acting on whims and notions, mold the shape of history, regardless of the strucmral framework of the environment within which the individual choices were made, This compilation, while not quite Shelkakim or British antiquarian empiricist, is anything but determinist. As suaested earlier, things could have been quite different, depending upon the largely unpredictable choices made.& m e n studying cause and effect, one must also be awme of the comter-kmal as an element of identification and substantiality. By comter-kmal f mean the supposition of what might have happened if the eventleause under discussion had nor accuxred.6 This q p e of supposition is based on canjeetuxe at its best (or worst, since ultimaeely we can only guess at what aet;udly &d not happen), but it delineates more clearly the change in direction or "bent; rail" "that did in fact take place. Without this howledge, we would be less able to acquire a good sense of what actually did hagpen and, more importantly, the significlmce of it. A direct cause under exmination can be seen as frroducing a change of direction in which a number of things occurred within a subset, but it is a different subset than that which would have occurred othemise. The &fferent subsets proheed by the elements of substantial change within a particular geosaphic andlor political derivation, may ou may not be intertwined, but history suggests that significant subsets of change are in fact intertwined to at least sorne degee, or else they would not be significant outsidc of their

otvn concentric circle, Historicat causation is, at its root, a subjective exercise, but the idcnt;ifieatim process can be one upon which most people agree, leading to a consenfus of opinion. Anmales end Narrative

h a previous section within this chapter ('The Examination of One Year'", a numbew of books titled in an annualized form were delineated, whieh were, for the most part, in the narat-ive storytelling mode reflective of what some have called a revival of or return to the narrative form in historical writing in the past twenty or so yesurs.M ft has been called by some a reaction to the antinarrative "mw historytf or h n a l e s school of historiogaphy that began in earnest in the 1 9 3 0 ~ ~ particularly with the works of Lucien Febvre and Mare Bloch, and that gained the dominant position within the history profession by the 1960s. Not that the narrative form is again: attaining the position it held fox the more than two thousand years since the time of Homer m d Thuqdides-far from it. But there has been a noLiecable trend in recent yetars, with some prominent young- and old-sehool narraive historians [and even some of the self-professed New Historians ing the way back toward an integration of narration within bistarical amlysis as well as event history though storytelling. In both cases, the importance of tbe event in historical enunciation, explanation, and causatim, a methodoloq (histoke dv4nmmtieX1e) held in so much &dain by French stmctllrral historians (Anndistesf for decades, has been gaining more and more a&erents,67 Evolution within the knnales sehool has made a singular definition &fficult, but essentially, the New Historians jettisoned the traditional focus on war, diplomacy, politics, and the elite classes that carried them out and began to utilize interdisciplinary meehodologies to examine other facets of soGiety that were at least as important in the mavement of h i ~ o r ythat , is, economic, geogaphic, demographic, and social factars-facets of soeiet-y as a whole and not just (or even especially exduding) kings, presidents, and generals. Production of "total history" was the objective not only in: terms of' longimdinacl and latitudinal coverage but also in terms of methodolsgical diversity. As such, political history, which t-ypically encompassed the actlons ad

elite classes, fell into disrepute among Armnalistes." h addition, they emphasized history over the long term (le temps long) rather than the short term (fe temps court), which, de facto, eliminated any examination of singular events or series of events that oemrred during a short span of time, h fact, chronological studies, or any sort of temporal categorizatim, were held in &sfavor, The important questions revolved around not when and what happened but why things happened and, innuenced by expropriation from anthropological methodologies, what it was like at the time-thematic subjeet matter associated with rigorous analysis (or what Franqois Furet would call problem-oriented history) rather than mere listings of events." Characteristic of the Anaales approach were the frreq~zentappearance of graphs, tables, and other forms of data that measured structural shifts; it was not quite as "bad" as the cliometridans who have enveloped economic hismy, but it certainly reflected a new focus on measurable famars (what they temed scientific history) that could produce general theories or laws af history (which could be utilized in a predictive fashion as well)." Narrative history, on the other hand, could be called simply a history of events or an account of what happened. Furet, somewhat derisively, calls history the "child of narrative" that "=ranges all of its cibjects of study in a temporal faamwork: to produce history is to tell a story.ql Fredric fameson would say that "the world comes to us in the shape of stmies."n As Carrard puts it, "the distinpishing feature of narrative is to represent events or sirnations (more precisely, at least two events ax sirnations1 in a time sequenee."73 Certainly the ald nmrative history focused on war, &plomae)r, and politics, or in other words, the great events and a p e s of history, consigning to oblivion the "nonrelevant"klements of soeiee. Lately, however, the naxrative fmm Of historical writing has incorporated anthropological methodologies to frroduce the very cultural and social historical snapshots the exclusion of which in the old nwrativc form the haalistes were so quick to condemn, This is clearly evident in the works mentioned previously that are titled with the name of a year; these are part of what the French have termed mmralirci, a mode czf: narmtion, that details a particular event or short period (oreven an individual in biagrqhieal format)based on the accounts of eyewitnesses and participant observers. fn any event, as fameson,

Carrard, and others advance, the so-called New Historians were "narrating" and telling stories all along, just in economic, demo&raphic, and mathematic form and not in the fashion of typical political bistory.74 Events are not always political, but they can also be economic, demopap2lic, and cultural, and the New Histmims '"equate narrative with the repm of military, political ar diplomatic evens, whereas other types czf: occurrence can be mranged in. a time sequence and mke the form of a stow" "xaudel's La Mkdire~randeheld out as a case in. point;).75 Amaliste studies are never exclusively confined to the synchronic, that is, facused on a specific period of time and all but ignoring historical antecedents, but inevitably delve into the diachonic descriptive mode to at least same degree, As a result of this realization and evolution, hnalistes have been conducting and publishing stud~ ~as Furet ies that would have been anathema in the 1850s and 1 8 6 0 or suggests, "the unreasonable ambitions of 'total histarybhould be loweredeM7Vrue,behirxd their narrative-like titles there is a great deal more interdisciplinary analysis and Geev~zimdetail than, is typical in. straight narrative histarg. Although there is an abundance of measured data, &ere seems to be a synthesis of form, especially among the New Historians, that maintains a level of analytical rigar while broadening the appeal and ac~essibilityof their work. Such has been the metamorphosis within the h a a l e s school that Jean-PierreV: M. HrSrubef, in his bibliographical work on h n a l e s historiography, declared that 'ko longer is it anathema to write historical accounts of political events or to analyse political phenomena. Gev~ainlyBloch never professed an anti-political history bias. . . . So the trend towmd a renewed inte~estin paliti~alevents is propelling Annalisres."77 Thus, as Garrard asserts, there has been "an inereasing int~restin "short time" after more than two decades of almost exclusive preoccupation with l a lozlgtle durde, a growing concern with the event considered as a factor of change, and a renwed awareness of narrative as a pcwverful vehicle for making sense of thing~,'qgStme comments that the ""rvival"' of narrative is not only due to the undermining of economic and demogaphic determinism made possible by the importance reattached to ideas, culture, and individud will but also due to a ""revived recognition that political and milit-ary power, the use of brute force, has very frequently dictated the structure of the society, the dist~ibutionof

wealth, the agrarian system, and even the culture of the eliteet'7g Historiographically, events have again been idendfied as significant and influential elements of history. To lameson, narrative is qistemofag, and it thus demands interp t a t i o n . Narxative form reveals the manifest, yet knowledge is gained only through ctiscovering the latent meanings of events.80 Sometimes this "latent meaning" i s conveyed by the historian; sometimes it is not. Its determination is left up to the reader, fameson" reeammendation of moving from one form of narrative to mather ma)r be closer to the synthesis within the Annales school than the latter would be willing to admit. As AJlan Megill, remasks on the process of integation, "cross-&sciplinary hybrids, held togetber by some combination of theory and eqerience, emere.M81Or as Ranke wrote, "hiseory begins with chonicle and ends with essay, that is, in: refiection on the historical events that there find special resonance."a This present work is a sort of synthesis. It is narrative in its chxonola@calapproach and focus an events in terms ad cause and effect and delineatian of change, Uet it is "annalistic"9n its interpretive and interdisciplinary approach, which attempts to uncover the "latent" meaning of the narrative topic under discussion. The appellation of &is book invites compaxisan and elucidation vvJthin this framevvork. It is &Herent, yet at the same time, it is grounded, as a l history books aret k t h i n previausly e ~ s t i n g historiographical para&gms. In many ways, it reflects a generalion of histarians caught in: transition. Et identifies a watershed in modern Midde East histoq and aeternpts to lay the groundworls. for an alternative mode of historioguapby. Historians are indeed a kind of secular priesthood, seemingly endowed with the pawer and means to select what is land what is not irnpartant for the rest of us.83

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The first major went in the Middle East in 1979 was the culmination of the Iranian revolution, when tbe Ayatollah Kharneini returned to Teheran on Febmaly 1, effectively signaling the end of: the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, othemise known as the Shah of Iran, and the beginning czf: the Islamic Republic of h n . It was, indeed, a momentous occasion, one that would have reverberations the world over, especially in the Persian Gulf region, which contains two-thirds of the world's proven oil resaves [helping, of course, to emplain why the revolution's shack waves were felt on a global scale). As stated in the preface, the aim of this book is not to examine in detail the causes anqor course of the siaiiicmt events of 1979-this is done at 1engt;h in a number of' other woxks, the titles of which can be found in the bibliogaphy. At least a trifling af explmaidm, howeva, is necessq in order to place these events in their proper cantext s s that a more accwate extrapolation Qf cause and e&ct relationships and the nature of the change that took place can be conduaed. Even thou& at the time of these events there was a certain level a f agreement as to their momentous hasacter, only history would grove whether this appeUation was deserved, a subject to be dissected in the follovving chapter, The description of the events outlined in this chapter is mdimenravy at best and should not be taken as anyLhing more than that. The causes of any true revoludon (and not a coup d'etaat masquerading as a revolution! are complex m d mu1tifarious.f Va3.ious explanations of the kanian revolution draw from the historical experience of harm dating back to the Safavid empire of the sixteenth and seven-

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teenth centuries, the Qajar period in the nineteenth century a d Iran's experiences with Russian and BYitish imperialism, and the ravages ad World War I, which paved the way for the Pahlavi dynasty to come to power formally in 1925 with the ascension to the peacock throne of Muhammad Reza Shah's father, known to the world as simply Reza Shah. Other explanations focus on the World War If period and its aftermath, when Reza Shah was removed by the British in 1941 because of his perceived pro-German symp~hies.His young and urmtested teenage son was then placed on the throne in 1945, beholden to the British and soon to the Americans, facing a host of challenges that he was ill-equipped to handle alone, partieulady one emanating from an austere intellectual liberal constitutionalist named Muhammad Mussadiq, whose overthrow in 1953 wm engineeud in Washington and London and foreshadowed what would be a widening gulf between the regime and the Iranian, people as well as the Shah's increasing dependence on the United States. Virtually all of the explmations fou the Imnian revolution, however, touch at least to some degree on the subject of change resulting from the rapid modernization process the Shah had embarked upon in earnest in the early 1940s. This change had econornie, political, and social repercussions, accelerating what Nikki Keddie called the "dual culture" nature of Iranian sociay, which had, in effect, bemn when the Shah%father implemented his own Atatuxk-inspired modernization program in the 1920s and 193Qs.zWhenever there is change of' a significant order brought on by regime policy, there are those who benefit kom it and there are those who do not. Suffice it to say that the environment for revolutions tends to become much mme propitious when the bulk of the populatan consider themselves in the latter category.. In the 1960s and especially in the 1970s, with the available capital fxom increased oil rwemes resulting from the oil price hike following; the 1973 kab-Israeli war, the Shah ernbarked upon an economic pro@am that many other countries, partieulaxly in the developing world, also attempted (and with at least equally bad restalts): import-substituting industrialization or ISI, The idea of IS1was to move nadons that were traditionally dependent upon imports far primary and seconhry products to an industrial footing. In essence, ISI, riding the crest of the

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wave of nationalism that had been sweeping across the post-British and French colonial world, was supposed to create economically independent countries that would no longer be sub~ectto the economic, and thus political, whims of the developed world. In Iran, ISI wodd establish a solid economic foundation for the Shah%dream of making his nation a regional p w e r that also, with the growing dependence of the W s t upon Middle East oil and at the height of OPEC" infiuence, would be a player of global significance. Even though ISI, combined with the Shah" othw economic policies based on high oil revenues, resulted in a growing GNP, and thus frorn the outside Iran seemed to be a Third Wbrld sueeess story, i ~ e r n a l l y the economic, political, and social g p s between dasses only widened. With ISXfsemphasis on heavy industry, the agricultural sector was typically nedected, which directby affected a sipiSicant portion of the population since the vast majoxity of workers wewe still farmers. Therefore, incomes in the agricultural sectar tended to decrease (ox at least not increase at nearly as high a rate as baurgeois and upper-class incomes), Small merchants, the bazaaris, also tended to suffer frorn economic policies desiped to the advantage of large-scde manuiacturers. fn other wards, no adequate consumer base was developed that could keep the factories operating at h I I capacity. As a result, the cast of producing these newly manufactured groducts built in the ISIinduced factories now located in Iran far outstxjgped the ability of the vast majoriq of the population to buy them. The factories, then, with less-than-expecteddemand, began to operate at less-than-full capacity and less-than-full employment, and economies of scale subsequently drove up the price of the products, which, subsequently, could essentially be purchased only by the upger classes, exacerbating the separation of dasses and the fnxstration felt by those who were not, in their own determination, getting a proper piece of the pie. Because these less-than-eific=ientfactories could not reach the produceion levels necessary to generate adequate foreign exchange or a tax base that could continue to fuel the process, mast developing counaies looked to the banks in the United States, Europe, and Japan for loans (and thus began the staggering debt of the 1970s and 1980s that essentially crippled many dcveloping countries), &an, hotuever, with seemingly unlimited revenues from the sale of oil and natural gas, had the capital to con-

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tinue this flawed process that from the outside looked promising, but on the inside was causing various seetors of the population to become increasinfgly disenchanted. It was this disenchantment that the Ayatollah fiomeini and others taptped into and that generated the revolutionary period of 1977-1979, The Shah also enacted policies and adopted measures of a noneconomie natrtxe that further alienated fxanims from the regime and created mme fodder fex revoltltimary propaganda, Most of this stemmed from an intense medomania and his obsession with making kan not only a regional power but a global one. fn terms of his domestic polities, the event singled out most ohen as an indication of the Shah's megalomania and how out of touch he was with the vast majority of his subjects was the $300 million "partyF"e hosted in 1971 to commemasate the 2500th anniversary of the Aehmamid dynasty, held at the ancient site of' Persepolis, one of the capitals of' the dynasry duxing its lmg tenure in pm=. Not only was the lavishness and prodxgality an affront to many Ixanians living in poverty, but the celebration of a pre-blamic entity or event was offensive to the religious classes (ulama)and to a deeply traditional soeiet-yas a whole. The Shah" subsequent adoption of the Persian calen&r to replace the Islamic calendar rdnforced the view that he had an utter disregad and ignormce of the feelings and sensitivities of most Iranians, Beyond the extremely regxessivc activities that had become a hallmak of the Pahlavi regime, policies such as these only positioned the religious opposition, more towad the mainseeam of discontent and brought diverse opposition goups closer together, The Shah's actions in the realm of foreign policy atso created a grea deal of opprobrium from those sectors of the Iranian population who had already aliped themselves against the Pahlavi regime, First and foremost, the Shahls relationship with the United States, which was largely responsible for maintaining the Shah in power during the Mussadiq crisis in the early 1950s, as well as his related strategic rdationship with Israel, fueled the opposition's rallying cries to depose the Iranian monarch. The United States, irdcally, had been one of the few external powers for whom most Imnims had positive feelings prior to and immediately after World W r 11. The faet that the United States did not seem to be interested in the imperialist colonial control

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that characberized the heyday of European encroachment in the nineteenth centrxry (pardcularly, in Iran" case, by Russia, Britain, and Francej, cast Wshington in a favorablc light. Combined with the idealism of Wilsonian self-determination proclaimed during World W a i and the self-described morally based h e i p polic-y that set it apslrt kom Europe, the United States was, in fact, considered a kiendly balancing act to continuing Bxitish and Russian pressure. The presence of American economic and military advisors became more pronounced after World WaY 1, and Wshington" influence in Teheran proportionately increased after World W*ar 11 with the pastwar cmraction of kitish inffuence. W t h the onset of the cold war with the SovJet Union follovving World Wm B, however, Izan's strategic significance in terms of geography (TNith long borders with the U.S.S.R. and on the Persian Gulf] and geology joil and natural gas/ soared from the vantage point of Washington. As such, preventing the expansion of Soviet innuence in the Persian Gtrff and preserving stability in the Gulf xegiion [in order to maintain the steady flw of oil from the Gulf at reasonable prices) became the two hallmarks of U.S. foreign policy in the area* The election in Iran of Muhammad Mussadiq as prime minister in 1951, ostensibly because of his poffular stance wainst the economic usurgation of the hglo-Iranian Oil Company (MOC, later British Petuoleurn) as well as his call for a move independent and neutralise foreign policy, sounded a clear warning bell in London and Washington. Despite the fact that he was an avowed liberal constitutionalist, who on the surface should have appealed to the United States, the Ruman and [patieularly)Eisenhower sdministraions saw him as a potential threat, primxily because of his willingness to associate his National Froat party with the communist Tudeh party tracktionally supported by the Sovia Union, London and Rshington schemed, therefore, to remove Mussadiq from power and secure the Shah's hold on the thone, in the infamous operation engineered by the CIA in 1953, this is exactly what happened, in the prcxess of which the yaung Shah became ever more paranoid and deptlxrdent on the United States. The peqle in general, howeverI were tremendously disilfusioned by Washington's actions, and the United States, in their eyes, now joined the unenviable ranks of the imperialist powers, The

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vicious cycle of the relationship b e ~ e e nthe Shah and successive erican administrations grew to the paint where by the early 1970s opposition to the Shah was the same as tlpposition to the United States-the vehemence attaebed to one was equaled bp the vehemence attached to the other. The strategic n a m e of the Iuanian-U.S, relstimship grew by leaps and bounds with the promulgation of the Vietnam-induced Nixon Doctrine of 1969, which, in essence, called on America's allies to shoulder mare of the burden of defense against communist awession worfdtvide while the United States was bog~eddown in Southeast Asia and suffering from the Vietnam Waris deleterious economic repercussions, In the W d d e East, &is memt more suppart for Iran to act as Washi-ton's gendarme in the Gulf arena as well as more supFtort for Israel in the Axab-Israeli asem, which after the 1970 Jordanian crisis also proved itself to be a worthy recipient of almost limitless U.S. military aid in order to curtail Soviet innuence and that of its allies. This convergence of interests naturally proBuced close Iranian-Israeli strategic ties, especially since both shared a common enemy, Iraq. The Shah proved that he was at least somewhat worthy of U.S. military support when kan successfully helped the S u l ~ n a t eof Oman put down its Marxist-supported (through the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Axab Gulf or PFLOAG) Dhofari revolt. Probably no other fareim official has had such direct and almost limitless access to conventional U.S. military assistance, As someone stated at the time, it was like giving the keys to the biggest liquar cabinet in the world to a confirmed aleoholie, So many more weapons were purchased than was necessary that in one particular year in the 1970s there was a shmtage of cement for housing foundations because most of it was being used to build bunkers for all of the new military hardwae. The oil price hike follovving the 1973 Arab-Israeli war only provided the Shah with m m wherewithal to match his megalomaniac ambitions. Of course, all of this was not last on most Iranisms. Not only was b e r i e a n economic and milimy imperialism rearing its ugly head kern the point of view of many in Iran, but Western cultural imperialism also was seen as a serious threat to Iran's Islamic heritage and tuaditian. The Shah" pparty at Persepolis, his continuing neglect of the

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populace, and his domestic prodigality and spendthrift foreign and defense policies only exacerbated the sowing gulf between the regime and its elite-class support base and the remainder of the franim people. The Shah was seen as doing the bidding of the United States and Israel, and both Washington and Tel Aviv were viewed as instnurnents directing the Shah's policies of: repression and neglect. One only has to scan the speeches of the Ayatollah Khomeini before and during the revolutionav period to understand how effectively he tied the Shah to the United States a d Israel as the focal points of the opposition.3 In most revolutianary environments, there needs to oecu an event or a series of events, what I term flash points, that coalesce elements of the ornosition and fuel the rwolutimary fervor that bxidg.es the oftentimes large gap between a vocal opposition and actually taking the actions necessary to overthrow the rcgirne. These flash paints also often buing to the fore various goups or in&viduals who seize the moment and rise to leadership positions within the movement. This was certainly the case in Iran during the revolulionary period of 1977-1879, First, there was the death of Khomeini" sson, Mustafa, in Iraq in October 1977, which was assumed by the Aycstollah and his followers to be the work of SAVAK, the Shah's security apparms. Them, in January 1978, a gavexnment-sanctioned article appeared in a semi-oflisiaf newspapa attacking fiomeini, who, thou& not the most popular or powerhl of the ayatollahs in km, had substantial and vociferous backing among many of the bazaaris, students, poor city-dwellers, and peasants. Pmtests to the article broke aut the next day in the religious city of Qum, resulting in a riot that left more than seventy protesters killed. Many view this episode as the turning point in the revolutian, when the initiative of the protest movemerat shifted from the secular forces to the rdigious opposition, especially its radical element led by Khomeini. Finaly, in September 1978, an apparent misunderstanding about the timing of a c-urfew announcement fallowing a peaceful march of more than one million, people in Teheran led to the deaths of up to one thousand Xranians killed in a follow-up demonstration;, This tragic event, known in Imn as Black Friday, essentially ended any hope of accommodatian between mast elements of the opposition and the regime. It is also when many ktlnians began to see the value of

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Khomeini"s uncompromising stand, which he had been enunciating for years; the Shah had to go and an Islamic republic had to be formed, More moderate alternative solutions, such as the constitutional monarchy advocated by elements of the reconstitwted National Front, had very little chance of succeeding because of the virulent anti-Shah hostility, which was vividly &splayed in huge demons~atimsm d widespread strikes. By the time the Shah appointed Shahpouw Bakhtiar prime minister in December 1978, someone who had been a vocal critic of the Shah as a member of the Nadonal Front, it was too little, too late*The Shah effectively abdicated by leaving the corntry on January 16, 1979, weak from the cancer that would take his life shortly thereafter and desgondent over haw evexything had gone so wong so quickly, All that was left was for fiomeini to triumphantly return on February I, forcing the Bakhtiar goverment to dismember itself within a few days, and begin the task of' consolidating power and changing Midde East history. Mareh: The Egyptian-lisraeCi Peace Treiwt-y

m e n Israeli Prime Mniaeu Menachern Begin and E m t i a n President h w a r Sadat met at the m i t e House on Mavch 26, 1979, and siped the Egptjan-Israeli peace treaty with Pxesidmt Jimmy Carter presiding over the ceremony and witnessing the agreement, most everyone h e w the Middle East had changed in a pvofound manner, m a r people did not know with complete certainty was the dixeetion of that change and whether it would be for better or worse. Everyone seemed to have an winion, the intensity of which increased as the consequences of the peace ueaty became clear. To understand the origins of tlhe treaty, one has to begin with the decisive Isxadi military victosy during the June I967 Arab-Israeli wax. As is well known, durjng this six-day conflict, Israel acquired the Golan Heights ham Syria, the West Bank horn Jordan, and the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egpt. Israel suddenly had the strategic depth it had been lacking since its creation in 1948. It also had many more Palestinims under occupation, a situation that wwld prove to be more and more politically unpalatable as time passed. In essence, a bzgaining sit-uatim had been established, with the prospect

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of Israel trading back the lands it had occupied duving the war in r e w n for peace, secure borders, and narmalization of relations with its Arab nei&bors. This land-for-peaceformula was crystallized in the now-famms United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 passed in November 196'7 in response to tbe new Arab-Israeli circumstances. Despite its ambiguities, it is a formula that to this day remains the basis for &&-Israeli negotiations. The problem with this new bargainirxg situaion was that it was asymmelrical; that is, Israel held all of the land. The kabs, after being so thorou&ly defeated and humiliated in six days by the Israelis, were not about to engagr: in negotiations from a positian of wealmess, Before negotiatims codd occur, the Arabs needed to imprave their bagaining position and shatter the aura of invincibility that seemed to pervade Isxael fallowing the war. Indeed, contrary to what most thought would be the appropviate p o s ~ mpolicy, Euptts Resident Garnal Abd d-Nasser, long the standmd-bearerof the Arab nationalist, movement, pursued again the war option with Israel instead of peace negotiaclons by initiating what came to be known as the War of Attrition in 1969-1870, the object of which was to fi&t an ineremental and dram-out war that worked to the advantage of Egypt because of its @eater numbers of troops and materiel rather than a short, mobile war that was to Israel's advantage. The generaj. goal of the Wm of Attrition was to improve tbe Arab strategic and bargains position vis-A-vis Israel. konically, the War of AttTition, which led directly to the Jordmian civil war in September 1970, known in Palestinian circles as Black September, resulted in quite the opposite situation.4 It was Israel's timely warnings and movement of a o q s that &erred hrthex Syrian involvement against Jordanian forces in their attempt to chive out the Palestine Liberatim Organization, which by then had become something of a state within a state, with Amman acting as its headqumters. This indicated to the Nixon administration, in paxticular, National Secuwity Adviser Henry Kissingex, that fsrael could be a valuable cold war asset in preventing the expansion of Saviet influence in. the Midde East (in this case, through Syria).This new Israeli role was eonsistent with the Nixon Doctrine, and as a result, the United States began to provide enormous amounts of military aid to R 1 Aviv, simi-

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lar to what Washington was doing with kan. This only stiffened Israeli resolve to hold onto the occupied territories, or at least force the Arab states to come to the bargaiarjng table on Israeli terms, since it seemed obvious that the k a b s could not militarily defeat Israel or even throub military pressure improve their strategc position. A stalemaee on the &&-Israeli front thus ensued, whieh was the situation that Anwar Sadat inherited when he became president of' Egpt soan after Nasserfs death in. 1990 during attempts to mediate the Jordanim situation* f adat h e w that the legitimacy of his regime rested an his ability to r e w n the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control, either though peace or war. Not only was there the political and psyebolo@calnecessity to reacquixe the Sinai, but there were also a number of practical reasons. T h e e of the four pillars of the Enptian economy in. tarns of g-enex;-tting foreign exchange were directly ox indirecdy related to the level of tension on the &ab-Israeli issue. First, since most of the oil reserves in E g p t were located in. ou astride the Sinai Peninsula, this revenueprobeing actlvity was obviously in abeyance while Israel held the teuritory. Second, Egypt relies heavily on Suez Canal tolls, but the canal had been blocked since 1967, and in any event, Israel held the east bank of the Suez Canal in the Sinai and could easily impede passing ships, Thxd, because of its unique pbaraonic and Islamic histoxyt Egypt caunts on tourism to generate revenues and foreip exchange; however, tourism declined sharply after the 1947 war and the War of Attrition, and it remained depressed when Arab-Israeli tensions were high, whieh was e e r ~ i n l ythe ease in the early 1970s.5 Xn addition, if a settlement could be aGhieved with Israel, Egypt could redirect a signifieant portion of its kfense expenajtures toward more productive puqoses-augmented by tremendous amounts of U.S. military and economic assistance. (Empt has, in fact, become the second largest recipient of U.S. foreiw aid, after Israel,) For these economic reasons, Sadat felt compelled to focus the entirety of his efforts on xegaining the Sinai. Sadat, at first, attemped to regain the Sinai through diplom~ic measures by indicating his willingness to accept a negotiated solutim. In one case, direct United Natians mediation though its speeial emissary, Gunnar Jarring, led to the Jarringplan, whieh S a h t accepted and

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Israel rejected. With an increasingly stalemated diplomatic situation by 1972, Srzdat felt the need for a breakthrough. As history would show, Sadat had a frropensity for dramatic and bold moves, and in July 1972 he expelled about 15,000-lk0,000 Soviet advisors, There was certainly an internal rationale for this act, such as appeafing his own miEitaxy by getting rid of the heavy-handed Russian milkay advisors andlor making an initiation of hostilities with Israel a more vialazle option by eliminating the possibility of Moscow tipping off the United States or pressuring Cairo to stand down. But Sadat saw this as primarily an overture to Washington in order to activate the diplomatic process and break the stalemate. The only problem with Sadat's calls for a negatiated seetlement was that the United States and Israel were essentially not listening, and his actions went virtually unnoticed in Wshington md Tel Aviv. The reason for this seemingly negligent posture on the part of the United States relates directly to the events that transpired during the Joxdanian civil war in 1970. The civil war emersd as a contest: for power between the Jordanian monarch, Kjng Husseinl and the Palestine Liberation Organizadon (PLO),which had located its headquarters in Amman and had far all int;ents and puqoses become a state within a state, Since the majority of the population in fordan consisted of Palestinians, that is, those Arabs who had lived in gre-1948 Palestine or in the TNest Bank occupied by Israel in the X967 war md had migrated to Joxdan as refugees, this was a very serious threat to the survival of the Hashemite monarchy, a regime that traditionally had goad relations with the United Sates and an unspoken working relationship -with Israel, In other wards, this was a regime that both Washington and Tel Aviv wanted to remain in power. However, it was also a regime that certain Arab countries, in particular, Syria, would not mind seeing overthown, since Hussein was perceived as being too moderate in his position vis-a-vis Israel and too beholden to the United States, As such, the radical Ba%thist reerne in Syria, which essentially had initiated the events that led to the f 967 war, again took bold steps to impwove its position in the inter-&ab arena by sending forces into Jordtln in suppat of the PLO, The Nixon adminismtion sent the Sixth Fleet to the eastan Medite~raneanin an at-tempt to intimiClate Syria, but since Damascus was ostensibly protected by its

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patron the Soviet: Union, it could, and did, call tlne American bludf. Nixon did not want; this episode to spiral into a supeqower confrontation, especially not when U.S. forces were bol~geddown in Vietnam and Cambodia. An alternative appeaed in the form of an Israeli deterrent. Israeli forces massed on the Syrian boxder, threatening to inwrvene if Syria did not cease and desist its support of the PLO in fordm. Syrian forces paused and eventually retreated, particularly after the then aGting defense minister and commander of the air force, H& al-'Asad, ever the pragmatic strategist, refused to commit the Syrian air force to the wdarmian theater.6 King Husseinis troops, now apevating under what was in effect an Israeli defensive umbrella, could with more fortitude and awessiveness move against the PLO, resulting in the successful equlsion of the PLO out of fordan.7 The utility of Israel was not, lost among policymakers in Washington, particularly National Security Advisa Henry Kissinger, with his brand of realpolitik and cold war zero-sum foreiign policy. It was clear from this episode that Israel could be a valuable cold war ally against Soviet expansionism, especially that wki& might ocew though its own client states in the region, such as Syria, Greater reliance on regimal allies was also consistent with the Nixon Doctrine frrornulgated in 1969, which essentially called on US, allies to shoulder more of the burden of the cold war. Altlroub injtially aimed at the situation in Southeast Asia, the doctrine came to be applied to the Middle East, where kan under the Shah would be the U.S. gendarme of the Persian Gulf, and Israel would be Washington's bulwark against Soviet influence in the heartland of the Arab world. As such, American military and economic aid to Israel exploded, making Israel seem even more invincible than it was following the 1967 kab-Israeli war. Diplomatically, this new strategic partnership translated into a rigd position on negotiations concerning the occupied territories and UN Resolution 242. Because of Israel's military dominance, the ,Arab states would have to come to the bawgaining table on terms that were closer to the Israeli optimum 'bargaining positim; in other words, the idea that the k a b states, individually or in combination, would militarily confront a victorious Israel that. was now enthusiastically

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backed by the United States was barely entertained. The Arabs wwld be forced to negotiate throu& Washington if they hoped to regain Israeli oceupied terfitory, a grocess that would exclude the Soviet Union. In this light, then, Sadat% expulsim of the Soviet advisers, rather than silgrraling a dear message that Empt was xeady and willing to react;ivate &plsmaey, was seen in Washington as a sign that its stand-firm policy was working-that E g p t was moving away from the Soviets and that the policy should therefore continue unabated. In addition, detente between the Soviet-s and the h e r i c a n s was the pimary foreign palicy consideration at this stage in both =sew and Washingtan, including mutual pledges not to take advantage of the other supespower's problems and pxedicarnents in the Third VVorfd. Althoub the Nixon administration clearly had Vietnam in mind, it did not want to be seen as breaking tbese gtedlqes in Egygt so soon after they were exchanged during a summer 1972 summit meeting between President Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The bottom line was that the diplomatic stalemate on the Arab-Israeli fxmt continued, and Sadat felt something had to be done in order to break it, If diplorna~ycould not be reactvizted and the stalemate could not be broken by kicking out Russians, pursuing UN peace missions, or apgealing to Washington, then maybe it codd be accomplished throub wm. h d this is exactly what Sadat did. He wtilized the CairoDsmaseus-Ryadh axis to launch a simultaneaus surprise invasion of Israel. Egypt attacked across the Suez in the south, and Syria mwed through the Galm Heights in the north, all of: which was backed up by Saudi influence in the Organization, of Peaaleurn Exporting Countries [OPEC]to unleash, if necessary, the oil weagon-an oil embargo that would force the United States to intervene either to save the Arabs from total destructian if things twned far the worse ar to enter the f x q r as an active mediator ready to presswe Israel to make the newss a y concessions for peace (or bothj.8 The Israelis wexe cau&t off want by the attack primarjly because they were convinced that the Arabs would not initiat-e an all-a.t war unless they knew they could win. However, Sa&t &d not launch the 1993 kab-Israeli war on October G to defeat Israel ax even to regain the territory lost in the pxevious war; he did it to ackieve the more limited objectives of reactivating diplomacy and improving, if possible, Enptts

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bargaining position with Israel by at least establishing a bridgehead on the east bank of the Suez Gmal.9 This the Euptlans accomplished. Although by the end of the was the Israelis were an the vcrge af routing the Egyptians and SyJrims, the k a b combatants had shown that Israel cmld be bloodied, and Egygt did maintain its hold of the east bank of the Suez Canal in the Sinai. In addition, with the unleashing af the oil weapon dtwing the war and the subsequent quadruple increase in the price per barrel of oil by early 1974, the Arabs now had newfound bargaining pwer. The more symmetrical bzgaining situation created by the war was seized upan by Henry Essinger. By manipulating to a ceytain extent; the outcome, he was able to position the United States as the grirnary bmker of the postwax neptiations while keefing the Soviets on the sidelines and Qawing the Eggfgtians closer to Rshington.lo The tireless shuttle diplomacy, which resulted in the disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt in January 1974 (athawise known as Sinai If, was, in eMect, the first step toward the Egyptim-Israeli peace treaty of 1979.11 Succeeding President; Nixon after his resirnation in Aumst 1974, Resident Gera-ld Ford, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger leading the way! viewed the disengagement weemeats following the 19'73 war as a stewing-stone tovvslrd convening an intexnational conkrace in Geneva that wauld generate a comprehensive Arab-fswaeli peace. Em a variety of reasons, however, an international peace confexence, much less a comprehensive peace aeeord, was not feasible at this time. The many obstacles included the natuxe of Palestinian representation [after the 1974 Arab Learpue summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco, the PLO was declared the sole legiitimate q r e s m a t i v e of the Palestinian people, but Israel ofBcidly viewed it as a terrorist organization and refused ta neptiate with the PLO), &fferences among the k a b states in trying to formulate a unified position, disagreement about what role, if ally; the Soviets wmld play, and tra&tionaf Ismeli opposition ta any international peace conference that would irxcrease the pressure for Israeli concessions, As a result of this impasse, the United States, Israel, and Egypt agreed that another limited disengagement ageement similar to Sinai I was in order-in essence, another step. Even this was terribly difB-

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c d t to achieve, and only after some very tough negotiating on the part of Kissinger, Sadat, and Israeli Prime ITMinister Uitzhak Rabin, as well as a temporary rift in Tf.S,-Isxadi relations in the summer of 1975, was arrything accomgtished. The result was another Egyptian-Isratlli disengagement agueement, otherwise known as Sinai ]I, in whjch it was agreed that Isxaeli forces in the Sinai would pull back beyand the strategically important Giddi and Mitla passes in return for the establishrncnt of a more formal demilitarized buffer betvcreen E e p t m d Israel; these moves would be supervised by the United Nations and monitored by American-controlled and manned sophisticated electronic early wavning stations. E m t also agreed to several clauses cornmitting itself to non-belligermcy, a peacebul, resolution of the As&Israeli conflict, and efforts to draw other Arab states, partiwlarly Syria, into similax agreements. The fact that Syria &d nat follow Egpt's lead at this time clearly indicated that Sadat was willing to stake out his own path apart from the rest of the &ab woxld despite the continued fagade of commitment to the Palesdnian issue, He did not want to seem to be alone among the Arab sr;ates negotiating with Israel, In order to facilitate the deal, the Ford administration inereased U.S, military and economic aid to Israel and pvonnised to assist Egypt in its economic development, which included an opening-up of the economy (infitah) to foreign investment and the grivate sector. Kissinger also w e e d to aa Israeli demand that the United Sates not recopize or negotiate with the PZO until the PLO recognized Israel, accepted UN Secuwity Council resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism, This demand, which seemed innocuous at the time, was ageed to in order to get the Israelis to sim on to Sinai II, but it eventually barnperell Washington's attempts to position itself as an honest broker in the Arab-kraeli arena, However, Kissinger felt the alternative was waq which could result in enhanced Soviet influence and possibly another oil embargo. In addition, it was feared that a regional wau could spiral out of control into another U.S.-Soviet; confrontation. U.S. fmeign policy in the Midde East rested on continuing to pull Egypt into its arbit and supporting Sadat%pursuit of a peaceful resdueion of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the hope that it would draw in other moderate && states such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan,

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Sinai II was immediately criticized and condcmncd by a number of poup~ in the United States. The thinking went as follows: If so much energy was expend&, so many pxomises made, and so much aid given. just to get the Israelis to withdraw some 30 kjlometers in the Sinai, what in the world would it take to bring about a comprehensive peace accord that included Israeli withdrawal to its pre-1967kab-Israeli war borders? In additim, Kissinger" approach seemed only to be averting war by buying time rather than achieving comprehensive peace by addvessing the problems at the root of the conflict, hdeed, a Brookings Institution report issued in late 1975 concluded that the step-by-step approach had exhausted itself, leaving too many issues unresdved, which cmld lead to rising tensions and, subsequently, all-out wm in the region that cmld escalate into a supespower confrontation similar to that which occurred dui- the latter stages of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.a Besides, as Sinai IE: so vividly &splayed, the price paid for these limited ageements became too prohibitive, The time had come for a comprehensive settlement. Jirnmy Carter became president after winning the 1876 electian, and be came into offJce with the IVliddfe East as a high priority within his foreign policy platform* Basing his approaeh to a significant degree upon the 1975 Brookiags Institution xepart, Carter saught at first to convene an international conferace in Geaeva, Switzerland, with the eqressed purpose of seeking a comprehensive settlement in order to avert a superpower standofiE. Unformnately for the Garter administration, many of the same issues that pevented the convening of a conference under the Ford administration still existed, with the added gvisiveness and pxeoccupadon created in the Arab wodd due to the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 1975-1976, In additian, a -window of opportunity may have been lost d e n , in May 1977, Menachem Begin became prime minister of Israel, leading the ri&twing Likud party to power for the first time in Ismeli history. The L i h d party had adapted a haxd-line appxoaeb toward negotations with the k a b states and was much more reluctant to return land for peace than their Labor parry countevarts, wanting to keep most, if not all, of the occupied territories for strategic and[or religious reasons. Begin also @early accelerated the Jewish setdement process in the oecupied terrimries in order to establish facts on the pound, thus

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making it that much more difficult for any hture Israeli government, whet;her Lilwd ar Labar, to trade land for peace. As a result, a stalemate ensued in the Arab-Israeli prospective peace frrocess, As he had done in 1973 during another diplomatic lull, Anwar Sadat in 2977 engineered another bold move in ordcr to break the stalemate. In 1973 Sadat chose war; in November l97"7e made the incredbly h m a t i c gestuxe of visiting Israid, the first official visit by any Arab head of state. With his visit and speech before the Israeli Knesset or parliament;, Sadat implicitly reeogntized Israel, again, the first krab head of state to do so, convinced skeptical Israelis that Egypt was serious about peace, and perforce restored momentum to the peace process, Sadat, and many other Egptians as well, felt that Egypt had spilt enough blood, indeed much mase than its shre, in confxonting Israel. Now the time had come to give primary consideration to Egyptian naiond interests, especially in terms of what an agreement with Israel that remrned the Sinai could do fou Egypt's ailing ecmomy. The Egyptian president had grown impatient with a process that never seemed to get going-it needed a Eek-start. Instead of dealing with Israel en masse, Egypt would show the way, expecting that a sepaate deal would compel countries such as Jor&nl Saudi Arabia, and possibly even Syria to do the same, knowing full. well that they could m longer confront Israel without Egpt. Sadat%historic visit did not elicit the forthcoming response from Begin that was hoped by the Egptian regime. The Israeli prime minister" own militant backpound, as well as his suppm base within Israel that wanted to hold on to the occupied territaries for strategic and/or religious reasons, creaed a reluctance to engage in a process that portended expansion from Egyptian-Israelibilateral issues toward an overall discussion of the Palestinian problem. Begin did not close the door completely, however, for he savv this as a possibly unique oppoutunity to engage in direct, one-on-one negotiations, the type Israelis had tra&tionally pxeferred since it gave them moue leverage over each individual Arab state m d pxevented, as mentioned previously, a coalition of forces gathcred at an in~rnationalpeace conference from pressuring Israel to make concessions it did not want to make or imposing a solution from the outside. In addition, separating E m t from the rest ad the Arab world had hem a long-sr;;mdingIsraeli

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goal as a way to weaken Arab bargaining powa and remove the greatest single military &reat to Israel, which, for many in the Likud party especially, would make it easier to hold onto the rest of the occupied territories (after presumably returfing the Sinai Peninsula to Egpt) and to downgrade, if not totally ip;nore, the Palestinian situation.13 In other words, whik the United States and Egypt savv a possible Egptian-Israeli peace agreement as a stepping-stone toward a comprehensive kab-Israeli peace that resdved the Palestinian problem, Begin and his cohorts saw it as the endgame, which, in their v i e y adequately met the UN Security Council Resolution 242"s ambimous call for a "withdratvd of Israeli armed forces from territories (and not the territories) occupied" h the 1967 June war (parenthetical insert mine). This would also buy time for Israel to build mme settlements in the remaining occupied territories. By the summer of 1978, it was clear that any hope for an EgptianIsraeli peace agreement needed outside intexvention to break the many impasses that had developed bemeen Begin and Sadat.14 Resident Garter, not want;ing to see the process totally derailed, wkich might undermine Sadat" position in Eupr with untold consewences, inserted himself:direelly into the fray by inviting both &gin and Sadilt to the presidential retreat at Camp David in September 1978 to hash out a hamework for peace. For thirteen tumultuous and kamatic days, the particigants basgained extremely hard in order to at least come away with something frorn the effort. The talks came to the precipice of breaking down on numerous occasionsj indeed, after initial meetings between the three leaders, Begin and S a h t did not meet face to face for the remainder of the Camp David talks, with President Cmtw carrying out his own bit of shuttle diplomacy from one cabin to another, W t h Be@nhavJng tess to lose frorn a failuxe to reach ageement, perforce Sadat was the one who made most of the concessions, usually with pressure horn Caxter, since he knew that Begin would be harder to budge. Ultimately, the final result became known as the Camp David accords, which, consisted of two frameworks for peace. One was titled ""A. Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaq bbet.ween E m t and fsrad,'hhich dealt with bilateral Emtian-Israeli issues, including a phased Israeli withhawal f m the remainder of the Sinai

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Peninsula in return for the establishment of full normat diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between the two countries. The second framework was titled ""A. Framework for Peace in the Midde East," which was intended to pxwide for a comgxeheasive settlement to the Arab-Israeli problem based on TfN Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts, ineluding a resdution to the Palestinian pwoblem, After several more months of haggling on all sides, including shuttle diplomacy by Cater in the MLiddZe East, the Egptian-Israeli peace treat5 the first between Israel and an Arab state, was signed in Washingtan with President Cater presiding on March 26, 1879. The treaty essentially reflected the Camp David accords, consisting of the two fTamw(ITksfor peace negotiated at the presiderrtial retreat, which, as the treaty" critics quickEy pointed out, were not indelibly linked with each other; that is, progress on the one track, the Egyptian-Isxaeli bilateral agreement, would not necessarily have to be matched by pwogess on the other track, a compwehensive kab-Isxaeli settlement dealing with. the Palestinian issue. Nevertheless, for better or woxse, the Ril_lddleEast would never be the same. December: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

I.t was geographically fated that the history of &&anistan, a country bordering the sauthern underbelly of Czarist Russia and then the Soviet Union, would be indelibly linked with its large nei&bor to the north. Throughout much &he nineteenth centuxy, Af&anistan was a p m n in the ""great game" k i n g played out between. Gveat M a i n and Gzarist Russia, largely over British concerns about protecting its prized imperial possession, h&af against Russian encroachment due to the latter's perpetual objective of gaining year-round access to warn-wslter ports. This British-Russian rivalry was finally resolved with the 1"37 Anglo-Russian Convention in which Moscow declaued that Mghanistm was formally outside of its %$ere of influence and agreed to concluct relations with the Afghans though the British; in remrn, London agreed not to occupy or annex Af&anistan. The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, exeating the Soviet Union, reignited the tensions between London and Moscow and again heightened the strategic irnportanee of Afghanistan. Increasindy feeling

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urmder siege from the anticommunist West in the period immediately following World War I, Moscow began to see Afghanistan as an important defensive buffer against VVesteun, particularly British, encroachment, In ad&tion, the new Soviet reerne, inspired by its new revolutionary doctrine, determixred that Afghanistan could also be a strategc launching point to foment ins~bilityfor the British in its South Asian possessions. As Leon Trotsky once noted, "the road to Paris and Landon lies through the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab, and BengaL"15 December 1979 was not the first: time in the twendeth century that the Soviet Union had militarily intervened in Afghanistan. Consistent with its st-rategic and ideolo@cd interests, the Soviet Union had crossed the bmder of its southern neighbor on at least three prior occasions: 19225, 1929, and 1930. Although none of these were on the scale of the 1979 invasion (they were move on the level of limited incuxsions to chase down bandits seeking refuge), they do indicate the long-held Soviet interest in Af&ani affairs since the post-World War I period and the desire to ensue the favarable disposition of a suceession of Afghani regimes towaud Moscow. Afghanistan is a country that was essmially farmed by default, that is, whatever was left between the borders of its neighbors. IL. is an e h nicdly diverse country, with Pushtans, Tajiks, and Uzbeks accounting for the t h e e largest gaups. This heterogeneity, compounded by the mauatainous geogaphy of ~ghanistan,has engendered little or no national consciousness and has made it extremely difficult for my Afghani regime to acmally cont-rol the country in anything more than a loose confederation of the plethora of powerful tribes throughout the land. As Thamas Hammond points out, when someone in &&anistan is asked, "What are you?"host, especially those residing outside of the major cities, will respond by identifying themselves as Pushtun, Uzbek, or Tajik rather than Mghani.16 Indeed, it could be said that as long as the ruling regime was bland and s a m d a t indifferent, Afghanistan could exist in relative stability. Whenever the regime attempted to assert itself by insdtuting farreaching reforms, it invariably encountered severe resistance from the tribal-dominated cwntryside, which basically wanted to see the maintenance of the status quo and government authority confined to the cities. This accounts for the long reign of King Muhammad Zahir from

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1933 to 18'73. He was a rather weak and ineffectual monarch, but he also did not get in anybodyis way or stir up trouble with the pwerful tribal leaders. This would Ghange in 2973, h e n a member of the royal family, Prince Muhammad Daoud*ousted King Zahir from power and declared an end to monaschy and the beginlning of the Republic of Mghanistan. The environment that brought about the occasion of the Soviet invasion in 1978 can be t;raced back to this event, Dawd had been the strongman under King Zaihir as prime minister during much of the 1950s and early 1960s until he was foreed out in 1963, pxobably because he was becoming too powerfix1 witkin the gmernment. Daoud was a natural choice for the coup plotters in the militwy since he had been the one primarily responsible fox building up a close strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, which benefited the Mghan armed forces over the ycars,lWe was also initially supported by leftist parties, with considerable conjecture that the Soviet Union, at least to some degree, helped englneer the coup.18 With the prodamaeion of the republic, Daoud assumed the tides of: both president and prime ministe~and was now in a position to implement political, social, and economic refarms that, in his v i e y would lift &&anistan out of its isolated and impoverished condition. Daoud turned out to be a bit more independent than the Soviets wauld have liked. Soon after coming to power, he reduced the p w e r of leftist gaups, particularly the People" Dmocratic Party of Mghanistan (PDPAJ.The PDPA had been formed in 1965, but it split in 1967 into two grows, Rhdq ('kasses") and Parcham ('%bannerHf. Rhdq was led by Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, while Prucham was led by Babrak Karmal, All three men would f i p r e prominently in the events leading up to and thou& the Soviet invasion in 1879, The division between Paveham and n a l q was, in part., ideologically and ethnically based (Khalqwas dominated by Pushtuns, whereas Parcham tended to be non-Pushtunj, but the personal animosity between Taraki and Babrak is what really &we the separation. Both factims enjoyed good relations with the Soviet Union and were supported by Maseow, thus Dawd's aetions against both equally concerned the Rremfin. Daoud also ivnproved Afghanistan's relations with its pro-U.S. neighbors, kan and Pakistan, In fact, in 1974 the Shah of Iran, no

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doubt with U.S. approval, promised to provide Afghanistan over S2 billion worth of economic aid over a ten-year span, which, if carried through, would have made Iran Kabul% bigest donor, even bigger than the Soviet Union.19 In April 1978, Daoud also made trips to several Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt], arranged for a visit by the Shah to take place in June, and announced his intention to travel to VVashington to meet with Pxesident Gawter. In March 1978, Afgfianistan signed an economic protoeol with the Pesple's Republic of China.20 Although the Soviets were still clearly the dominant outside power in Afghanistan, and were acknowledged as such by the United States, these attempts by Baoud to assert a more independent Afghani foreign policy certainly did not sit w e l with the Qemlin leadership. The Soviets were not the only ones becoming disenchanted with Daoud. There were many groups within Afghanistan who apposed his regime. Aside from the opgosition of Parcham and Khdq, there were other sectors of the population from aeross the political spectrum who rejected the Damd re@meiscorrupt and repressive policies amid eeonomic discontent. He tried to centralize power in a country that was practically immune to centralization*Thus, the bloody coup that averthrew Baoud in April 1978, ending the b r r a n i dynasty that had ruled over Mghanisean since 1747, did not come as a major shock. h d one could pxobably have gxedieted Soviet involvement stemming from Moscowfs increasingly negative attitude toward Daoud, Indeed, the Soviets most likely imposed a reconciliation, in 1977 on the two hetions Of: the PDPA, Khalq and Parcham.al Whether the Soviets actively aranged for and participated in the coup or simply gave the green light to their PDPA comrades to move when the oppartunity presented itself is unclear. mat is clear is that the Kremlin was definitely pleased to see Daoud go. On April 30, 1978, a revolutionay council was decreed, with Nur Muhammad Taraki as president and grime minister. H&mllah Amixr was named foreign minister and deputy prime minister, essentially the number two positim in the new regime (Amin would add the post of pime minister by March 1979, while Taraki remained president). Babrak Karmal was appointed vice president of the Revolutionary Council and also deputy prime ministeu; althou& he would be forced

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out of power before too long. The PDPA was basically reconstituted in the form of the new Afghani ruling regime, replete with its cornrnunist ideology and close relationship with the Swiet Union-and also the antagonisms between the three dominant personages in the leaderskg that had plagued the PDPA ever since its farmation. Although the new government went to some lengths to show that in fact this regime was not a puppet af the Saviet Union, many of the actions and pronouncernenes belied their erstwhile claims, For instance: Moscow was first to recopize the new regime; trips were made to Moscow by Afghani leaders soon after the coup amid public expressions of warmth and solihrity; in December 1978, the U.S.S.R. and &&anistan sig;ned a treaty of friendship and cooperation, a majox sim of a ti&tening relationsbp between the Soviet Union and a client-state; the farrnal name of the cauatry was changed to the Democratic Republic of AfgZlanistan, a traditional signal among proSoviet states of at least the outward veneer of a communist: statej and a new red flag-in place of the partially green Islamic one-that was similar to the Soviet flag was adrzpted. All the Garter administration could do to react to the Agril coup was express some consternation*There was little more the United States could have done considering the overwhelmingly dominant position of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. However, the critics believe that Carter" failuxe to respond more forcehlly to the coup led the Bemlin to conclude that mshington cared little about the course of events in Mghanistan and, in combination with subseyuent instances of relative passivity, that the United States would probably not: react very strongly to an actual military invasion. The reconciliation between the Khalqis and the Pluebamis, which had probably been orchestrated by Moscow prior to the coup, was shout-lived. it was not long before ?"araki and Amia started to replace the ParGharnis within the govexnment, including fSabrak Karrnal (who apgarently was put in safekeeping by the Soviets until they could trot him out as the new Afghani leader following the invasion), as well as others who were mspected anticommunists. Sdidariq within the ruling clique bad been achieved for the time being, but at the expense of national solidarity and a number of skilled brrreaucratic pcvsonnel of which the government was in short supply.

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Wi& its plaee secure, the regime then attempted to implement a communist-inspired political, social, econwic, and even cultural, refom program that would have m d e Lenin proud. But it was making the Kremlin of Leonid Brezbnev extremely uneasy; in a deeply trditional, Sunni Muslim, and tribally based society, it was like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole. As Thornas Hammond states: There seems to be no reason to doubt that the a a l q teaders sincerely wished to institute a number of desirable and tong-overdue reforms-to improve the tot of the peasants, elevate the status of women, eliminate racial disc~mination,wipe out backwardness, and make Aiaanistan a modern, prosperous state. But good intentions are not enou&. As happened in other communist countries, the attempt to impose rapid and arbitrary. change by brute force, against the wishes of the people, p m duced not progress but chaos, bloodshed, and dvil war,22

Such measures as land reform, which was based on Marxist class relatans that undermined the authority and economic position of local village and tribal leaders, the pxohibitian of certain traditional marriage arrangements, and the adoption of atheistic communist discourse and symbols in place of islmic references fueled the opposition to the new leadership. matever the nature of the policies, just the attempt to cenaalize power and authority in Kabul engendered opposition throughout much of Mghanistan, especially outside of the rnajar cities, areas that had become accustomed to a significant amount of autonomy born the central government over the years, As Olivier Roy stated: The spontaneous upxisings against the communist re@me which bmke out in 1978 and 1979 were directed as much against the state itself as against the mrxist government. The imposition of communism on, the countxy may be seen as a new and even more ra&cal phase of the penetration of the countryside by the state bureaucracy, These two dimensions, opposition to the state and the rejection of Mamism, are clasely inter1inked.z"

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The opposition to the government was far great= under n r a k i and in than it had been under Damd. The Kremlin probably did not counsel the new re@me to implement these far-reacbing reforms in such a fsrce-fed manner; in the past Moscow had maintained its distance in terms of its influence upm M&ani domestic policy as long as the country was firmly within its grip. If anything, the new regime's leap toward eommunisrn displayed an independent bent on the p r t of Kabul that made Soviet leaders wary czf: what it would do nexe.24 The opposition to the Kabul regme manifested itself primarily in tvaditiond Islam, by those who happened to &so be the most disrupted by the reform policies. Upxisings in the form of a ;iihad or holy war became commonplace by the summer of 1978, and by the fall of that y w , a full-scale rebellion had been imited." One of the turning points in the buxgeoning civil war came in March 1879 when Afghn. soldiers in Herat, Afghanistan's second lmgest city, joined with the rebels [mufahidem or holy wamiorsf on a rampage thmugh the city that left hundreds of loyalist Afghan soldiers and government officials dead. In addition, a number of Soviet advisors and their families wme bmtdly killed, dismermbered, and their body parts put on display. The cathartic nature of the violence perpetrated against the Soviets clearly revealed the vehemence with which most Afghanis opposed the Soviet presence and those Afghanis who, in their viewpdid Moscow's bidding. The temporary loss of Herat could not but make the memlin nervous about the current regime's ability to quell the rebellion and restore some semblance of oxder. As the rebellion grew, so did the ruthlessness with which the A@an armed forces tried to suppress it, which, in turn, only emboldened the mtrjahz'dee~and added to their ranks. Soon after the debacle in Herat, Amin assumed the title of prime minister from Taraki, while the latter retained his position as presideat and defense minister.26 This was agparently a sign of Amin's growing strensh within the Mghani hierarchy and a more assertive repression of the rebellion. However, the regime s t i l failed to achieve its objectives, The increasing inability of the Afghani m i l i t q to deal with the insurrection compelled Moscow to send mowe and more m i l i t q advisas and military aid to Afghanistan.27 The Qemlin's incremental military involvement;

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in a Third World country to prop up an unpopulau, corrupt, and inefBcient client-state regime was not unlike what the United %ates experienced in the early 1968s in South Vietnam; however, in the M b a n i case, this incremental buildup occurred over months rather than years, Events in Afghanistan began to unravel soon after Taraki returned korn a trip to Moscow to consdt with Bemlin leaders in Septernba 1979. The U.S. State Depaxtment had gathered information, in August which indicated that the Soviets were t-rying to get rid of Amin, wham the Kremlin saw as the heart of the problem*There is some disagreement about exactly what happened on September 14 and 15, but according to most accountsl Taraki, apgarmtly at the behest of the Soviet Union (and possibly the Soviet ambassador to AfiShanjstm, Alexander Puzaaot.J, arranged a meeting in order to ambush Amin, In a ""soot-out" at the People" Palace in Kabul, Arnin emerged unseatbed, but he immediately turned his sights on Taraki, stripping him of authority and assuming his offices on September 14, Taraki was never head from again; according to some reports he was executed in early October, although the official explanation was that he died of a long-standing serious illness. Relations between the Soviet Union and Amin clearly deteriorated after &is episode, as tbe M b a n i leader concluded that the Soviets were definitely out to eliminate him. Know.ing this, the Soviets became even more concerned that Amin would make entreaties to the United States for protection, and possibly some leverage with Moscow. Some diplomatic approaches were initiated by U.S. officials toward in, but nothing really came of them, and despite claims by the Soviets that Amin was a CIA agent, 'Washinson was unable and/or urmwilling to insert itself into the chaotic Af&ani pditieal landscape.28 k n o l d sums up the deterioratixlg environment as follows: His position was not an enviable one, O d y about half of his army's normal. officer corps strength of eight thousand remained; the rest had been killed or had gone over to the rebels. Mutinies in his forces had become commonplace*The PDPA, splintered by the ex-communication of the Parchamis in 1978, was now splitting again as Amin's supporters ranged against those of Taraki. Insurgency was everywhere; the government

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could control in&vidual cities by dispatching its dwindling militav forces to the most; critical danger points, but not even Kabul was safe from insurgent attacks and military rebellions. Afghanistan's economy was in a shambles. And looming over other considerations was the alltoo-evident military solution that the USSR might seek to impose if the Mghans filed to set their own house in order.29

Making Soviet military intervation all too evident was the foreboding presence in Afghanistan from August though Octobcr 1979 of General Alexmder Pavlovskii, the commander in chief of Soviet pound forces and deputy minister of defense. He was experienced in this type of situation, for he had been the head of Soviet gound troops that invaded Czechoslovakia in 1868, The presence of General Pavlovskii suaests that by late summer, the Kremlin was seriously considering an invasion of Afghanistan, m d planning accordingly. Perhaps what Moscow wanted most kern Amin was an official inviwion for Soviet military intervention to restore order. This would lessen any international outcry, at least from the Soviet perspectve, against the military action, and it would bc in off% cial aceoubnce -with Afghan-Soviet agreements, pximarily the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. But Arnin wodd not issue the invitationl probably because he knew he would be removed once the Soviets entered Afghmistan, a suspicion that would prove carreet when the actual invasion oceulxed. ?b the Soviets, this was perhaps the last straw, and it may have convinced any doubters in. the Kremlin that Amin was nor sufficiently subservient and bad to go. An official request for Soviet- intervention was evenwally made by the Afghani government on Deeernber 27, but it was several days &er Sovict militay farces had already entered Afghani territory en masse-and it was not made by b i n f but by his reglacemmt, Babrak Kasmal, who had been kept in cold storage by the memlin for ~ u sthis t occasion. Amin and sever4 members of his family were killed by Soviet special forces on the night of December 27, and then Karma1 made the '"request.'"a The massive nature of: the invasion (more than 80,000 troops with equally impressive supporting matexiell not anly ingcated the urgency felt by the Kremlin but also was calwlated to ensure victory over the rebels and any Af&ani elements of the armed

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forces. IL. was also most likely intended to advertise the pawer of the Soviet Union to any other client states that might have similar rebellious tendencies and to deter any outside paxties horn even entertaining the idea of direct military intervention to counter the Sovia blitzkrieg, It is clear from these events that Afghanistan was very impsrtant to the Soviet Union. The rationale for the invasion usually combines a panoply of offensive and defensive reasons. Among them, the most frequently stated explanations are the fallowing. 1, Since the Soviet Union has been invaded on numcrrous occasions in modern hiaory, most destructively in World War U[, it has had a natural defensive paranoia that produced in the postwax period the need for hiendy states along its bmders to act as a kind of buffer between itself and its real and perceived enemies. This buff= manifested itself initially in Eastern Europe with the Warsaw Pact countries, since the primary threat was seen; to be the United States and Western Europe as embodied in NATO, Howeveu, with the emesgence of China as a theat to the south of the Soviet Union and with increasing Western inte~estsin the oil-rich Persian Gulf, this buffer zone was extencled to include Afghanistan; it had to remain within the Soviet orbit and be cibedient to mernlin designs, The Carter administration" rrappl.ochement with China, hiblighted by the establishment of dinfomatic rdations in Januav 1979, only exacerbated the Soviet fear of being boxed in by the enemy. 2. The fCremlin feared that the unrest in Mghanistan ctluld spread to the Muslirrz-populated Saviet republics of south-central Asia, such as Uzbekiistan, nrkmenistan, and njikistan, enticing like-minded Muslim. grows clamoring for more autonomy or outright independence from Soviet rule. The invasion would supposedly head this off before it had a chance to cross borders and at the same time send a strong message in order to deter any such outbreaks in other parts of the Soviet empire. fn actualit5 the Soviet invasion o d y increased the sympathies of Muslims in Soviet repblics toward their Afghani coreligionists and enhanced the likelihood of unrest spreading across the border, 3. There was serious concern in the &em.lin that if the U+S+S,R. did not act soon, or if it decided to let the civil war play itself out, Amin

would fall from power aand be replaced by an anli-Soviet Islamic fundamentalist regime that would e~tablishclose rdations with collntlcies such as Iran, Pakistan, and possibly even the United States.31 With so much of the Soviet military committed to the long border with China, the Bemlin felt it could ill afford to have another hostile country along its borders requiring an evanded military defcrzse presence and possibly acting as a bridgehead to foment unrest in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union, 4. The Soviet Union believed it had the rigbt to intervene in ader to presevve the sanctity of the communist bloc, as it did in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The so-calledkezhnev Doctrine held that once a st;;rtebecame communist8it would always rmain communist, lest any grecedemt be set for reversing the ist-Le~rzistprocess.32 5. Tradtional Czarist and Soviet expansionism has also been put forward as a more offensive-xnindedrationale fm the invasion. According to this viewt the invasion of 1979 was simply the latest in a series of Soviet invasims of Af&anistan in the twentieth century, and the question that should be asked is not why the U.S,S,R. invarled in 1979 but why it had not done so earlier, With its position in &&anistan secure, the Soviets could then, at the very least, foment instability for Tf.S.-supported regimes in. south Asia and ia the Persian Gulf region [similaf-to what Czaxist Russia d d to the British in In&a in the nineteenth century!. At most, the Soviets could extend their influence through milkay irztirnidation, if not direct miliaxy actLion, t w m d the Persian Gulf, where approximately two-thirds of the world's knovvn oil reserves are located. It was this passibiliq that elicited the Cater Doctrine in January 1980, which anointed the Persian Gulf. as a vital inte~estof the United States that would be defended by any means necessary. 6. The weakness of the U.S. response at a number of different levels may have contributed simificantly to the Qemlin belief that it codd get away with the invasion without too much darnwe to its international stature and to its relationship with the United States. Contributing to this belief was the perceived failwe of Washington to stand by and support its ally, the Shah of Iran, when he was confronted by the nomeini-led opposition. On top of this, the relative weakness of the U.S, response to the talcing of the fifty-two American

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embassy personnel as hostages by Iranian revolutionaies in early November 1979 may have reinforced the view that Cartcr would not respond forcefully to a Soviet invasion of Affianistan. In addition, there were d e a sipals that the Sovias were preparing for a possible invasion of Afghani~anby the fall of 1979, and yet the Carter administration did virtually nothing to attach any seriousness to the situation ar convey what the consequences might be if the Soviets &d invade, No clear public warnings were delivexed (until it was; much too late) that might have at least made the Kremlin think twice about invading its southern neighbar, To the Soviet leadership in hlloseouv, it seemed that the United Sates was still hamstrung by the Vietnam synhome and &d not have any appetite for militav confrontation in far-flung flaces'33 The fact that the Shah was gone and that, after the hostage misis, U.S.-Iranian relations were totally severed must have added to the confidence of the Rrernlin leadership that the United States not only would not: but now, witX10ut assets in Iran, could not do anything to impede the invasion. Nevertheless, the invasion, contrary to what the Soviets had probably thought, did produce a swift:and serious response from the United States, More importantly, however, the Soviets would indeed become enmeshed in their own Vietnam quapixe, with simificaat repercussions regionally and immense consequences dobally.

Perhaps not enaugh time has passed to sderly examine the effects of the year 197%It seems, howevex, that not a day goes by when there is not something in the news on at least one of'rhe following topics: the Midde East peace process, Russian activities in the south-central portions of their country, Islamic "extremist" goups, Saddam Hussein% tug-of-war over smctions with the United Nat-ions, pditical Ghange in or perceived threats from Iran, and heightened tensions between Pakistan and India. Every one of these news stories can be traced to events that transpired in 1979. Some m i h t pastpane an, examination of these events until more w e i h t is added to the history that wodd determine their significance. It is my contention, however, that we need nat wait. Enolrgh histary, enatlgh primary egects have oceurred since f 97"9 to allow a subjective annualization. Although such events seem very distinct now, in five hundued yeas, if not sooner, bistoried texts mi& very well refer to the 1979 Emtian-Israeli p a c e treaty, the 1993 Israeli-PLO accords, and the 1994 Israeli-fordanian treaty [and whatever Arab-f sradi treates lie ahead) in the same sentence. Similarly, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Persian Gulf crisis and war will most likely be mentioned in the same bxeath, This all may be a historian's folly-typieally esoteric historical legerdemain, But it is also histarical euriosity.1 VVe have a natuxal inclination to want to h o w when things began or what caused wh* ta happen-the turning points in history. If possible, we like things neatly ca~egorized.The fact that we are able to at least surmise the importance of a particular year so soon after it hap-

pened, in relative historicd rams, may just reinforce the arprnent for its significance. The repercussions of the events that occurred in the W d d e East in 19'79 have been felt in such a widespxead and influmtial rnanaex and in such a short pesiod of tirne that, in my opinion, there already exist copious amounts of history. The histmieal interc m e c t i m s will become apparent, both in a horizontal and a vertical sense. The links in the chain kom imporant: events and situaions today can be clearly traced backward in tirne to their points of origin in the events of 1979-rhe past as future far the year f 979.

As stated in Chapter 2, the culmination of the kanian revolution occurred in Febmary 1979, when the RyatoUah Khomeini arrived in Teheran after fifteen, years of exile and proclaimed the Islamic Rcpublic of Iran, r e p l a c i ~the U.S,-supported monarchy czf: the Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. As events would show, this change severely disrupted the balance of p w e r in and stability of the Persian Gulf region, an area that contains apprwirnately two-thirds of the world's known oil reserves. This fact: alone preordained &at an event of this mamitude would draw the attention of the international community. Even. though. the Iranian revolution was a Shiite Muslim revolution, Muslims across the Middle East, both Sunni and Shiite, who had become dxsaff-ectedwith secular pan-Arab nationalism and state-building since the effectual death of Nasserist pan-kabism in the 1947 Arab-Israeli wau, hailed the event as a true harbinger of things to come, No longer would the Islamic world have to k w t o w to the West and accept the inevitability of Israel. Islam's cultural identity and heritage need not be replaced by Western cultuxal and economic impexiafism. The Islamists who sur-vived the secular k a b nationalist era of the 195Os, 1 9 6 0 ~and ~ 19'70s could now paint with pxide to a successful exampZe of religious revolution and Islamic rule in the modern era to combat the internal and ex.temal threats to s0cie.t-y. If the defeat of Nasserism and secular Arab nationalism in the 1967 kab-Israeli war weated the ~peningfar a resuscitation of Islamism, the Iranian revolution provided the direction and mornenmm for Islamist guoups. Pan-

Islamism would replace pan-kabism, and if suceesshxl, a Pax Islarnics would reign over the region, with Iran showing the way. VVould Islamic extremism have continued to g o w and expand if the kmim revolution had not occurred? With the continuing exhaustion of the state in the Arab world in political and economic terms, the answer is most certainly yes, Wauld the Islamic altexnative and the adoption of dramatic methodologies to implement this alternative have become as popular ou threatening i f the revolution had not oecurred2 The answer to this is most certainly m. This would have been the case even if the new Islamic Republic in kan had simply served as an example and t m e d inward and concentrated on domestic develapment and internal gurification. But with a chaxismatic and firebrand dernagope such as Hhorneini calling on the export of the Islamic rwohtion, the liberation od Jerusalem, and a confrontation against the Great Satan, the United States, the Midde East wwld never be the same. h an attempt to portxq the revolution as an Islamic rather than simply an Iranian me, the Kharneini regime immediately engaged itself in a variety of issues close to the heart of all Arabs, namely, the Palestinian problem. Symboicdly driving this point home was the fact that within about a week after the Success of the revolution in Februal?~;the Hhameini regime closed down the Israeli embassy in -heran and gave it to the PLO and Yasir Arafat, who was visiting Iran at the time'z The irrzpct of the rcvoltltim was immediately felt in the region. Rcgimes in the Persian Gulf squirmed nervously over the potential domestie repexeussions. In Zraq, the seculax, Sunni, Ba'thist ruling party of Sadhm Hussein saw the revolution as both a threat and an oppaaunity. The revolutian created a theat in that the majority of the population in Iraq was Shiite and, therefore, possibly susceptible to Iranian dktnarebes to werthrow a regime that was neithex appropriately reli@ousnor adequately regresentative. It was an oppartunity in that Iran was seen as vulnerable due to the domestic turmoil in the aftermath of the revolution as the parties that fovmed the coalition opposed to the Shah jockeyed fox posidon within the new government, In, addition, Saddarn was cognizant of the faet that the h n i m armed forces had been depleted as a result of the change of power and were in substantial disarray (and soon to be dearly berefrc of Ameriwn military

support). The situation might just be the conduit for Saddam to achieve his regional hegemonie ambitions, The rest of the Gulf Arab states-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United k a b Emirates, Qatar, B h a i n , and Oman-were equally concevned about this new tbreat emanating horn the east. This was partimlarly true of states that had substantial Shiite minowity popdations (Saudi k a b i a and Hwait) and Bahrain, a ccluntry that, not unlike Iraq, was (and still is) a majority Shiite state ruled by a Sunni minority regnne. It. did not take long for this theat to manifest itself in the region, On November 20, 1979, 225 well-armed Islamic militants took control of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, the holiest site in all of Islam. Even though tbe militants were, by and large, Sunnis, the Iranian revolution had gafvmized fslamists thoughout the Middte East to take the next step toward ac.tim against what they perceived as their combined erremies: the West, Israel, and ce-spted and sycophantic Muslims." This was a very embarrassing episode for the Saudi monarchy, since the Al Saud are officially the Guardiws of the '3"bvoHoly Places (Mecca and Medina), and a sipifleant p a t of their legitimacy stems from the family's coneol and upkeep of the shrines as well as the annual pilg~imagear hajj, The militants w a e led by a Saudi man by the name of bhayman bin Muharnmad bin Sayf al-Utaiba, who had keen openly agtating against the Saudi regime for several years, dernandjng a more pure agplication of Smdi Arabia's VVahhabi strain of Sunni Islam. In fact, the peaceupation, of the Saudi regime with the perceived rising threat of Kh~meinisrnmight have resulted in the Saudi secuxity sexvices paying relatively little attention to hornegotvn opposition movements.4 The apparent inability of the Saudi monarchy to protect the Grand Mosque in the face of continuing accusations of corruption and subservience to the United States amomted to a very serious mommt of vulnerability for the Sau& ruling re@me. Only after an official rdigious ruling ffatwa)from the Grand Mufti in Ryadh did the regime attempt to retake the sbrine throub eautious force so as not to damage the structure itself, which only made it that mueh more difficult to overrun the militants, The resulting blood spilt in Islam" holiest site almost shook the monarchy to the ground.5 However, it was only a foreshadowing of the constant problems Saudi Arabia would have with pilpims (especially from Iran) during the course of the

1980%as Mecca became the target for political ire over Saudi kabia's overt backing of &&dad in the Isan-kaq war, Only a month later, another disturbance occurred that shook the SaudJ. regime and indicated to all iarterested observers that the reverberations ham the Iranian revolution would be more than just fitful. The Shiite minoriq in Saudi Arabia lives, for the most part, in the northeast portion, of the country in the d-Hasa region, where most of the active oil reserves in the country awe located. The relationship is not coincidental; the Shiite population constitutes the lion's share of oil field laborers. Overworked, undcrpajd, and underprivileg@d,the Shiites needed only a spark to cathartically unleash their frustration against the regime. That spark was the annual ashura celebration during the Islamic month of Muharam, which hapgened to f d I in December that year. This event, m passion play, to be move grecise, comrnernarates the mmtyrdorn of the Imam Hussein, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad and one of the central figures in Shiire Islam, in 680 C.E. on the plains outside of Karbda in present-day Iraq (it occurred, according to Shiite theology, on the tenth day of Muharam-t.en in k a b i c is ashura],It is a highly emotional affair, as many f hiiite youths flagellate and Moody themselves in order to emulate and empatkze with the Imam Mussein at Karbala X300 years eaxliea. VV'itb the Iranian revolution still burning in the hearts of many Shiites and with the Grand Mosque episode still fresh in their minds, the emotional atmosphere produced by the ashura celebration namrally led to riots amid loud support fou the &atoll& Khomeini. Again, the Saudi regime had to use force to put down the disturbances-and f addam Hussein loofced on with increasing consternadon.6 The Lranian revolution also presented to Sadhm Hussein an wpmtuaity. Already claiming a leadership posircion in the Arab world in the wake of EgyptFspeace treaty with IszaeZ (evidencedby the fact that the two emergency k a b League summit meetings to condemn Egypt m d assess the new circumstances-one held aftex Camp David and the other following the sigxzing of the treaty in March. 1979-were held in Baghdad], Saddarn leveraged this newfaund influence into the position of pxotector of the Arab world against Persian and xadicd (Shiitef Islamic extremism and expansionism, h one fell swoop, Iraq could fill two vacuums of power in the Middle East-one in the Arab w d d , and

implicitly in the kab-Israeli arena, weated by Emptis departure and the other in the Persian Gulf arena brought about by the fall of the Shah. As a sim of Saddam%heightened ambidons, he nudged aside President Hasan al-Bakr (resigning officially due to "ill health'" and assumed the position of president kmself on July 16, 1979. AIthougb he had been the strongman behind Hasan fou years, Saddam was clearly nsvv coming out of the shadows, Almost immediately Saddam showed his stripes, as prominent members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCG)were arrested and later executed on August 8, Many other ofBcids in the government and in the militay were also executed or imprisoned an charges of "consipiracy against the party and revolutim.'" He was now in position to implement his agenda. Iran was, to most observers, vulnerable. Ayatollab fiomeini had nor yet solidified his position as supreme ruler, and it was still unclear how Islamic this new republic was going to be. Violence in Iran had become so commonpface that "Tonight Showt9hcast Johnny Cawson seemed to always have some sort of a ~ o k ein his opening m o n a l o ~ e referring to the bombs frequently going off in Teheran, reflecting the political infJ&ting among the coalition partners that had overthrown the Shah, With all the &%may witbin the regime and at least as much disruption within the Iranian militmy following the exiles, gusges, defections, and executions that came in the wake of the revolution, it seemed that with only a slight push Iran would tapple altogether. Paramaunt in Saddam's calculations on taking advantage of this situation was making sure the United States would not come to Iran's aid? US, isolaton from Iran became assured on November 4, f 979, when Revolutionaxy Gum&, the shock troops of Khomeini" rrevdutian, stormed the American embassy in Teheran and took ninety persons, including sixty-three Americans, hostage (fifty-tvvoAmexicans wodd be held for 444 days). Rshingtm, inter alia, broke off relations with Iran, froze Iranian assets in the United States, and worked to isolate Iran within the international communit-y, thus inaugurating a period of extreme hostility between the two cauntries.' More impmantly, kom Saddam Hussein's perspective, this meant that the mostly eriean-suppliedh n i a n military would not be able to easily obtain spare pats, ammunition, or other complementary equipment from

erican souces, Bereft of these materials and many of the military personnel trained to use the equipment, the multibillion-dollar US.supplied military arsenal the Shah had amassed would be more vestigial than daunting. All of these new circumstances indicated to Saddam Husseixz a unique opport-uniq with a possible fabulous payoff: the elimination of the threat from Iran and the attainment of personal and national ambitions of' leadership in the Middle East. W t h this in mind, Iraq artacked southwestern Iran in September 1980, and the eight-year kan-kaq war was on* So momentous was the Iranian revolution that even some of its direct regercussions became simificant independat variables in and of themselves. The Ir;mjaa hostage misis is a ease in. point. The United States had been relatively unscathed by international terrorism. k r y few Americans had been Qrectly or indirectly affected by terrosisz, actions. The term '%ostagef' was more k n w n in reference to being held by '"ortune" m t h a than by international terrorists or political1y driven goups. Yet the Iranian revolution int;rodueed the United States to a new era and a heightened level of anti-Americanism and political extremism, The psyeholo@cdbariers and the taboo of striking directly at America seemed to have been lifted, inauprating a period of W d d e East terrorist activity that became inexorably linked with W d d e East politics and confiiets irom Beirut and Cairo to the Persian Gulf and South Asia. And the more the United States became involved in the region dip1omat;ically andlor mililarily, the mme it became a target*Although the storming of the American embassy and the taking of hostages was as mu& a function ad internal power-play pditics within the factian-ridden Teheran regime as a pure act of antiericanism, its repercussions would have at least as much impact on domestic politics in the United States as they did in Iran. As has often been stated, the Carter adminiseration became hostage to the hostage situation. The inability of tbe Garter administration to either obtain the release of the hostages or rescue them enhanced the appearance of American weakness, a national complex that the cauntry was still trying to shed in the afeermah czf: Wetnam. h d world events, such the burning of the Amerjiean embassy in Islamabad shortly after the Mecca incident, the assassination of the U.S. ambas-

sador in Afghanistan earlier in the year, and most importantly, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistarm in Decembev 1879 made the United States seem impotent in the face of renewed Swiet awession and dobal hostility towmd Washington. The Carter administration had seriously contemplated military action to either directly free the hostages or pressure the Iranian government to force their release soon after the actual hostage-taking in November. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the following month changed the calculations dramatically. 'Washington did not want to add to the instability in the Persian Gulf region caused by the Soviet incursion by forcing a military showdown with Iran fa decision witEl which Wshington's Arab allies in the Gulf concurred). In addition, the Soviet invasion had perforce placed the United States and fran on the same side with remarkably similar objectives witEl regard to the situation in Afghanistan. 11 was hoped that Teheran would realize the convergence of secrtriv interests that would in turn lead to a relatively precipitant diplomatic resdution to the hostage crisis. When a diplomatic resolution did not materialize, concuument with the languishing popularity of the administration domestically, Pxesident Carter made the fateful decision to attempt a h i - rescue in April 1979, wbile the hostages wese repoxtedly still kept largely together in one location, The &sastrous failuxe of the Desert One aetion, however, with loss of' American lives and the abandoning of several helicopters in the fwanian desert, only added to the appearance of Ameriean impotence and to the ineptitude of the adminiseration itsdf, and perhaps most important, made it that much more difficult to negotiate the hostages-release in coming months for plan another rescue attempt since the hostages were subsequently dispersed).lo To say that the hostage crisis simificmtly hurt Carter" chances for reelection is quite the uadesstatemeat, With the cold war wainst the Soviets seemingly starting anew the last thing Americans wanted was a weakened pvesident who (along with his secuetary of state, Cyrus Vance) had consistently emphasized human rights and negotiations over strategic caleulatims and military force, The hostage exisis had significantly helped mold the national psyche into yearning for a strong-willed Ameriwn patriot who would repair Amwicais i m ~ e

abroad and rebuild the military into a positive insaument of foreign policy. &&-conservative Ronald Reagan's landslide victory in the 1980 presidential election was the natural resgonse, The crowning blow to Carter delivered by Teheran was the fact that the hostages were released just minutes after Reagan was inaaprated president on January 29, 1981,444 days after they had been taken. In. Iran, the hostage ordeal helped solidify the pawer of Ayatollah Hhsmeini and his mdieal Islamist faction, His influence over the hostage-taking youths and his manipulation of the diplomatic process clearly papularhed his position during this volcanic period of the revolutian, whereas the more moderate officials in the regime, such as the "lay" "Islamic leaders Abolhasan kai-Sa&, the f i s t president of the new Islamic Republic, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, and Brahim Yazdi, were seen to be relatively powertess. Eventually they would be cast aside, cementing the Islamist theocratic natuxe of the regime (hukurnat islami) and the position of: Khonneini as the Supreme Cuide.ll The success of the Iranian revolution galvmized Islamists the world over. The rise ad Khomeini obviously had a direct effect, as noted previously, on the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the riots by Shiites in the eastern oil fields in Saudi Arabia, and, of course, the hostage crisis. Iran. also became the direct sponsm of Hizbullah [the Pasty of Csdf, a Shiite Muslim group that arose in South Lebanon as a result of the Ismeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (particulmly fsraet's decision to stay on and establish a security zone in Seuth Lebanmf.l" The Israeli invasion of Lebanon was a clirect resale of the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty of 1879, as will be shown later in this chapter.13 HizbuHah played a prominent role in the hostage-taking and assassinations of Westerners and hijacking8 in and around Beirut throu&out much of the 1980s. The Iranian conneedon with Hizbullah also led disectfy to the infamous Iran-Contra affaix exposed in late 1986 by a Lebanese newspaper. Hizbullah was, and still is, also suppmted by Syria, a relationship that, in the beginning, increased SyJria"f ability. to dismpt Israeli and Ameriean attempts to exclude Damascus from its power position in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion. And in recent years, Syria's suppswt of the Shiite group has enhanced its leverage with regard to negotiations dealing with a hoped-for fsuaeli withdrawal from the Colm Heights.

As is well k n w n , the Isan-Contua affair was the Reagan administuation's attempt to sell arms to the nomeini re&irne in fran (which was obviously desperate for American weaponry and ammunition by that point in its wm with Iraq) in return for utilizing its influence with Hizbullah in Lebanon, pressuring it to free American hostages, This was in cmtravention of Washington's own Operation Staunch, which was (an attempt at] a worldwide arms embargo of Iran. The money paid by the regime in Teheran fow the arms was then h n e l e d illegally to the U.S.-sugported Contras in Nicauama to support their attempts to overthrow the Mstrxist Sandinista regime in Managua. This was in direct violatian of legisfation passed by Congess that cut ofif covert assistance to the Cantras,l" The irony in this whole episode is rampant. First of all, the Iteagan administration came to office committed to a policy of not dealing with terrauists and not letting any hostage situation captivate the m i t e House--in direct reaction ta the failure of the Garter administration's foibles in kan. Second, the idea of dealing with so-called moderate elements in Teheran in an arms-for-hostagesdeal originated with the Israelis, Despite the animosity emanating from Teheran toward the Jewish state (refrained with the of "libe~atingJerusalem'"), Israel had established a secret channel with -heran, which, as stated earlier, was desperate to receive axms from anyone, partic-ularly a miEitwy whose weaponry was somevvhat compatible with Americm weaponry. From Isxael's perspective, the traditional Arab proverb "ehe memy of my memy is my hiend" "M m e in this instance, as the common. foes of h q made for strange: be&ellows. Yet, it was the Israeli invasion in 1982 that created the environmcrrtt far the birth of HizbuHah (as well as other anti-American and anti-Israeli soups in Lebanon) and the series of kidnapping8 and killings, The scandal rocked the Reagan administration and launched a series of investigations and heaxixlgs. With the subsequent 1983 bombing of the marine barracks in. Beirut, which resulted in. 241. deaths and the eventual U.S. withdrawal from the Lebanese quagmire by early 1984, the Reagm administration, for most of the remainder of its tarn),essentially withdrew from an actjve role in the Arab-Israeli arena. The adnrinistvation did pusue diplomatic initiatives toward the end of its tenure in olfJce, but this was primarily in reaction to PLO

Chairman Yasir kafat's decision in late 1988 to a n d y recomize Israel, accept UN Security Council Resolution 242, and renounce teurorism. This shift allowed the Reagan administration to been a &alogue with PLO officials, which, in the end, &d not proguess substantially before the presidential administration of George Bush took office in January f 989 and events were overtaken by the Gulf crisis and war of 1W9Q-1991.Plgain, the combination af Egypt's absence in the iarcrArab axena as a result of the peace treaty witb Israel, the Isxaeli invasion of Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq war, all of which indelibly split the Arab world into a number of competing camps, ereated an environment that led to a somewhat disint~restedReagan administratian by the ead of 2986. The lack of movemeat on the Palestinian issue (reinforced by the Arab Leame summit meeting held in Ammm, Jordan, in November 2987, which for the first time relegated tbe Palestinian issue to a secondary status on the agenda in light of the hn-Ixaq war) increased the fmstratrion af the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, leading directly to the intifada ox uprising that began in December 1987. This, in turn, compelled Arafat to moderate the PLO%position before the irrelevance pwtended by its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982 and essential exile in n n i s i a became cemented by the Palestinians in the occupied territories taking matters into their own hands., The Iran-Contra affair, however, had the ogposite effect in the Persian Gulf arena. The &ab allies of the United Stares in the Persian Gulf, who had been overtly suppaxting Ixaq to varying degrees in its war with Iran, were obvisusXy shocked and &smayed by the revelations af the arms-far-hostages deal. The United States seemed to be playing both sidcs of the fence. The Reagan adminis~atiodsneed to rei~ainexedibility in the eyes of its Arab friends significantly influenced its decision to begin renagging Kuwajti oil tankers under U.S. flags in June 1987, fallwing the initiation of the so-called tanker war by Iraq and the subsequent response by Iran against those tankers, paxticulaxly Kuwaiti registered ones that were carrying kaqi oil. The United States thus established a direct military presence in the Persian Gulf, which ovextly placed Washingtan on. Xraq's side in the Iran-Ixaq war, leading to a number of military confrontations with Iranian forces in Gulf waters and solidi~inga [hoped-for)strate@c partnership with

Saddam Wussein. Washington was blinded into thinking Iraq could assume Iran's position under the Shah as America" ggenhrme of the Gulf. As Gary Sick states, the reflage;i.ngoperation was a fundamental turning point. For the first time since World War IT, the United States assumed an operationd role in the defense of the Persian Gulf. . . . President ]Reagaa%militav interneation thus conBrmed President Carterrs assertion, that the Gulf was of vital interest to the United States and that the United States was prepared to use militav force in pursuit of that interest. Althou& the Carter Doctrine [announced in Januar)r 19801 addressed the prospective threat fram the Soviet Union [in reaction, to the Soviet invasion, of Afghanistan in December X879], its first major implementation.involved a regonal state, anticipating the massive international coalition that repelled Iraq's soecupadon of Kuwait.1s

All of this stemmed &rectly from the Iranian revolution. The Islamist drive fueled by Khomeini that led to Hizbullah and ultimately to Iran-Contra and subsequent events also was felt elsewhc~ein the Middle East. The success of the revolution and the antipathy toward Israel ovcxtly on &splay in Teheran galvmized growing Islamist opposition in Empt towad h w m Sadatfs re@me, which was seen by Egyptian Islamists as having betrayed Islam by sigfing a peace treaty with Israel and for ernbracillg the West polilically, militmily, economically, and cultuxally, It is d w b t h l that the assassination of S d a t by the Islamic JiBad organization on October 6, 1981, the anniversary of the initiation of the 19.713kab-Israeli war, would have occurred when it did if not for the inspiration from Teheran, Indeed, there were soups in E u p t that needed no reinforcement from Iran to hate the peace treaty, Sadat, and all he stood for-and attempt to kill him-but the revolutim tended to 'kainstaream'"slamist dissent, goffularizingit and genesating the buildup of willing recruits, if not martyrs, for the cause in both Sunni and Shiite circ1es.l" In. combination with a host of other factors, especially socioecenornic discontent, perceived culmral imperialism, and glahalization, significant, serious, and militant Islamist movements sprang up amoss the region, threatening regime survival and eliciting government;

responses that ranged from the militarily extreme Ithe deaths of 20,00040,000 in Hama in Syria in f 9812) to the prudently political fin Jordan and Kuwait, for example, where Islamist tzpgosition parties were legalized and allowed to enter parliament, thus, in the end, moderating the position of many from clamoring to ovcrtbrow the gavexnment to wanting to bring about peaceful change from within] to the illadvised (for instance, the decisim by the Algerian military to cancel the Januxy 1992 parliamentary elections in which the Islamist party, the fslamie Sdvation Front;, was poised to win the largest bloc, thus initiating a bloody civil war that still rages on and has cost 75,000-1 00,000 livesj.17 Although many of the Isfannia groups that arose in the 1980s have splintered into unreeopizable factions or have been successfully contained by tbe repressive agparatuses of a number of regimes, other variants have arisen, many ~ansnationalin nature, parrcicdarly eke goup associated with Osama bin Laden (al-Qaida),which, ironically, is naw actually opposed to the regime in Tehexan. Islamist opposition has obviously taken on new characteuistics, followas, and causes since f 979, affected as they have h e n by a host of intervening events since that time, but it is also clear that none of it could have taken noticeable shape without the Izanian revolution lifting the bar to a whole different level, Indeed, such has been the course of events within this sphere of activity that it has influenced leading scholaus, such as Samuel Huntington, to (mistakenly in. my opinion) cmclude that there exists a "clash of civilizations" along the fault line between Christim civilization and Islamic civifization. The Iranian revolution plays an irnpartant role in the calculations of those who adhere to this point of view, which, unfartunately, if advocated by too many on either side of the so-called divide, might become a self-lulfilling p>roXzhecy,lg The most &ect and immediately significant regercussim of the Iranian revoIutim was, of course, the Iran-haq war, wkeb lasted from September 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, to August 1988, when Iran reluctantly agreed to a UN-brokered cease-Are, The war was less important in and of itself, as it settled down into trench wadme within a year with scant movement on either side of the front for most of the conflict, but more because of its tangential effeas.

As previously mentioned, Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion for defensive and offensive reasons. Most of all, he saw an apportunityIran was vulnerable and isolated, and the regional and international situation seemed to be in Iraq's davor. The war lasted as long as it did, with more than a million casualties, for a number od reasons. 1. The advantages of: one cauntry were offset by the advantages of the other. That is, Iran's population, advaneage (approximately 55-60 million to Iraq% 17-20 million) was offset by Iraq's technological advantage in military hardware, especially since Iran did not have access to American resupply and Iraq continued to receive materiel from the Soviet Union and Franee.14 2. The international community and even the countt.ies in the r e e m itself were not terribly motivated to end the wax any time soon. Indeed, R s h i n g t m and Moscow were primwily interested in making sure the conflict remained insulated and did nor escalate into a superpower confromation [especially with the Soviets mived in A1Fgkanistan). Evidence oflen given to support this is the faet that the UN Security Council waited a whole week to discuss the Iraqi invasion. It seems that kanis isofation, accelerated internatianally by the hostage exisis, was coming home to haunt Teheran, and having the Khomeini regime cut down to size was not inconsistent with the wishes of a number od countries. Ad&tionally, the Arab Gulf countries were not at all unhqgy to see Iran and Iraq occupied with each other and weakening over the course of time. Because Ivan was more of an immediate threat, the Arab Gulf states were compelled to monetaily support Iraq for most of: the war. But they also were cognizant of the ambitions of Saddarn Hussein and were k a h l of his attempts to tvanslate these ambitions into an attempted hegemmic position in the Gulf, espeeidly if he emerged victorious-a fear that was confirmed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. 3. A host of miscafcutations on both sides prolonged the conflict. Iraq attacked southwestern Iran not only far geogaphical and strategic reasons but also because that part of the country was host to the majority of Iran's Arab minority. Indeed, the Arabs living there call it hahistan, instead of the official name of this province, Khuzistan. Saddam Wussein hoped that the Arabs in kan wauld support his invasion, making his putseh that mueh more effective and depleting Iran's

ability to counterattack." Unfortunately for Bagfidad, the Arabs in Khuzistan weYe largely ambivalent to the outcome, kaq's strategic lilnitatims grobably would have forced it to &W back its initial offensive anyhowt but tbe failure of the k a b s in Iran, to come to Iraq's aid at this point made a swift knock-out punch all but impossible. Similarly, when lran went on the offensive in 1982, it too thought that 'Yellow ~ a v d e r s "in enemy territory would suppout its cause, in this case, the Shiite Arab Muslim majoxity in Iraq, most of whom lived in. the southern part of Iraq tatvard the Iranian border. &in, however, a combatant bad badly miscalculated. Although there were certainly some groups ad fhiite Arabs that in fact did support Teheran acbively, the expected en masse Shiite uprising never materialized, primarily because of the edfective repressive agparatus of the Babdadi regime and the $istaste many, mostly secularized, Iraqi Shiites had for Khorneini's hand of Skiism and theo~xaticregime. 4. The Manickean ideological qposition of the regimes [secular Arab versus Islarnig Persian] and the personal aninnus and mutual recriminations and boasts invested in the war by the two leaders, which only g e w as the war draged on, geatly complicated attempts at diplomatic resolution throu&out the conflagration. In additian, it seemed that anytime one side or the other gained a bit of an advantage in militmy terms, instead of utilizing that advalztage to achieve immediate .political results, it vvas seen as an oppartunity to press for more in order to obtain full, rather than partial, waw aims. By 1882, Iran had beaten back kaq%initial attack and had gone on the offensive, Teheran, trying to take abantage of its superior numbers, established multiple fronts against the Iraqis, hoping to extend kaqi forces beyond their defensive capacity and to wear down Baghdad through attrition: in the north (with the help of anti-Srzddam kaqi Kurds), in the center toward Bagkrdad, and in the south toward Basra. To the extent that Iraq had a strategy aft- 1882, Baghdad wanted to internationalize the conflict by bringing in the supeapowers, especially the United States, so that they could exert presswe on. Iran to cease and desist, kaq would eventudly accomplish this through its initiation of the tanker war in the Persian Gull, but as stated previously, direct American involvement with the rdagging of Kuwaiti tankers was as much a political decision in response to the repercussions od

the &an-Contra affair as a strategic decision to overtly back Iraq*In addition, the Kuwaitis had deftly played the superpowers against one another, having goine to Moscow when VVasIaington at first displayed some reluctance to the reflage;i.ngplan. After the Kremlin ageed to reflalj some tankers, the United States then wholeheatedly came in with its bufiEeted offa to renag Kuwaiti tankers. Other than internationalizing the c d i c t , Baghdad was simply hoping to hang on as long as passible until the octagenmian Khomeini died, which, unfortunately for the kaqis, Bid not come soon e n o u b (the Ayatallah passed away in 1989, almost a year after the w;ur ended), Indeed, it was the arms provided to Iran in the arms-for-hostages deal that sigfificantly elevated Teheran's ability to launGh a major offensive in 1956. With the rearganiaatim of its militmy structure, which placed decisionmaking with the professional sol&ery rather than with the militarily inexperienced revolutionary wads, the offensive was very successful. klzn took the Fa0 f F m j Peninsula, thus cutting Iraq off from the Persian Gulf, and threatened to take Basra, Iraq's second largest city. With the embanssing revelation of the hn-Contra affair and the existing desire not to see Iran victorious in this war, the United States was openly supporting Iraq, most ostentatiously displayed by the reflaang operation. In fact, Vtrashington had reestablished &plomatic relations with Iraq (broken off since 2967') in late 1984, clearly betraying the pro-Iraqi disposition, of the Reagan administration, There were some in policy circles who were advocating buildng up Saddam Hussein as the next '"end;rwme'"f the Gulf-taking the place of the fallen Shah-and continuing the balance of p w e r approach to the regim. Furthermore, there were more than a fcw who suggested &at Saddarn Hussein could additionally take the place of h w a r Sad& and finish what the Egygtian president was wmble to accomplish, that is, lead a moderate k a b consenms into a comprehensive peace with Israel. It seems pxegosterous now, considering the extremely antagonigie relationship between Iraq and the United States since the Gulf war, but at the time, Khomeinism was the point of: focus, and Iran was at least as ostracized and held in as much contempt by Washinson as Lraq has been in recent yeus, The common threat emanating from Lran after 1979 brought Baghdad and Washington closer together, establish-

ing the foundation of the strategic relationship toward the end of the km-kaq war that so colored the environment in which the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 took place. In telling ironyt it was the American accidental shooting-down of an Iranian airbus in July 1988 by the USS Vincennes stationed in. the Gulf, killing more than m o hun&ed kanian passengers, that compelled Ayatollah Khomeini to reluctantly accept UN Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a cease-he. Khomeini Awred that the whale world was against Iran; there were more than one million casualties, and the revolution was petering out-best save what was left before all was lost* Later in July, Khomeini, in what he described as "taking a pill msre bitter than poison," accegeed Resolution 598, Saddam f-lussein, now having the advantage (and foreshadowing characteristics put to more notable use in Au$ust 19901, continued to haggle and stall until finally succumbing to internationd pressure the Mlowing month, thus ending the fwan-Iraq war, In. a &reet reaction to the hn-Lwaq war, the remaining Gulf statesSW& Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman-agueed in February 1981 to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GC@).It was the culmination, in the face of the heightened instability in the region braught about bp the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq wax, of increasing cooperation among these six k a b Gulf states in prevJous yeas, particularly in the area of internal security. The GCC, as oxiginally conceived, was supposed to be more of a security and defense organization than anything else. A number of GCC leaders had called for a joint defense capabiliq that: would make the GCG cowtries as a whole less dependent on external powers, namely the United States. Despite some advanees in this sphere, the failure of the GCC to achieve these goals in terms of sdf-reliant deknse became manjfest with the Kuwaiti renaming operation and, most poimantly, the entry of the IJ.S,-led coalition in 1990-1991 to evict Iraq from K~waie. IYoIlieally, the GCC has been most successful in the economic sphere, with the lowexing ax abolishment of customs duties, the enactment of trade agreements, and the facilitation, of freer movement of people and goads within and among the GCC mernbership.al It has also pxovided a forum for the GC@states to &bate land discuss peace-

fully some of the potentially volatile problems between vaviws members, pmticularly concerning border demarcation disputes. In addition, the GCC has allowed Smdi Arabia to play a dominant role within the orpnizatioa, cementing its new status as a vital player not only in the Persian Gulf area but also in the entire NLiddle East equation (and forming the triad of' powers in the Gulf: Iran, kaq, m d the Saudi-led GCCf. Ryadh has used this position to coordinate m d uniiy the okea clispalate positions of the CCC members when neeessary, particularly when the Iran-Iraq war spilled over into GCC territmy, mostly in Kuwait.zz This invariably led to a general tilt toward kaq in the wx, more noticeable with Kuwait, Saudi kabia, and Bahrain, and less so with Qatar, the UAE, and Oman, the latter three trying to maintain at least cmdial relations with Teheran. Most impmtantly in the long term, what the formation of the GCC indicated was the beginning of what I call subre@onalorganizations in the Arab world. No longer could the Arab League deal with all of the divergent issues in the Middle East;. The Arab woxld had become too divided as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli peace t-reaty, the Lebanese civil w x (and subsequent Israeli invasion in 19821, and of cause, the kan-ksq war, In the case of the Iran-Iraq war, the most striking example vvas the fact that Syria supported non-hals Iran. against Iraq in what at first seemed to be a questionable policy decision on the part of Hafiz al-%sad. However, considering the long-standing territorial and water-sfiming disputes between Iraq m d Syria, the ideola@caland personal hostility between the regimes and leaders, and the chance for Damascus to assert itself in the inter-&ab arena with Egypt on the sidelines and kaq busy looking in the other direetion, it was perfectly logcal, The @CC countries felt that their concerns could not be adequately a a e s s e d by the k a b Leawe as a whole, given its divided composition; they needed strength in numbess among those who b d shared geostrateac and economic interests, Ironically, as the 1980s wore on, and as the Iran-haq wax and the Lebanese debacle continued to divide the Axab world, the GCC gat stronger, while the Arab League became paxdyzed, This was most evident at the November 1987 Arab League summit meeting held in Ammm, Jordan, at the behest of the GCC states. The GCG agenda, that is, the km-Iraq warf was given priority over other issues. Indeed,

it was the Brst time since the creadon of the state of Israel that the Arab-Israeli agenda, namely, the Palestinian issue, was not given top frriority. It was also at this summit meeting that the GGG pushed for the re-admittance of Egpt into the Arab fold, for Cairo had been supporting Iraq and Kuwait in the Iran-Iuaq wax, and its manpower and military capabilities were deemed necessary in order to stem the Iranian tide after 1982. Ironically, Egypt's dqarture from the Arab fold in 1979 contributed, in my opinion, dixeetly to the Iraqi invasion of km, yet it would be that very same war that would rehabilitate Egypt in the Arab world by the late 1980s. The GCC had flexed its muscles, and the k a b League gave way to a subregional grouping. The "bdkanization'bf the Middle East had begun in earnest in the wake of the failure of Arab nationalism, resulting in a number of Arab states, Egypt, Syria, and the GGG states the most prominent among them, mapping out their w n paths, This did not mean that certain countries and subregions became mutually exclusive of' each other. Quite the contrary, this evolved into a more integrated matrix, for no area or guouping could be excluded completely from m y equation dealing with any significant issue in the region.= The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the ensuing Gulf crisis and war for tbe remainder of that year and into early 1992 represented the next significant repercussion of the Iranian revolution of 1979-tfirraugb the iartervening prism of the Iran-haq war. It has often been said that with the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hlxssein was simply tahng up where he had left: off in 1980 with the invasion of: Iranexcept that he, and many others, did not expect Iraq to get bogged down in an eigfit-year conflict. One of the reasons the Arab Gulf states hesitatingy, and sometimes reluctantly, supported kaq in its war with km was the fact that they understood the ambitions of Sadbm Hussein, and if he emerged victorious from the war he migbt turn his ixredentist eyes southward toward Kuwait and attempt to dominate the Gulf. It was a prophetic notion, During the Iran-Iuaq war, Teheran. was the more immediate threat, so the choice of supportirrg Iraq was clear, in addition to the hope that Baghdad's mending of fences with Washington signded a more moderate course in the future, But Saddam" obstinacy after Iran accepted UN Resolution 598 in July 1988 as well as his use of chemical weapons against his own people,

the Kurds, and the indiscriminate missile attacks against Iranian cities in the latter stages of the war revealed in many peaple" eyes [but, importantly, not Washington's] the kaqi patesidcnt's true wlors, The causes and Gourse of the Guff crisis and war have been amgty delineated elsewhere, sa it is not my puspose to rehash well-worn ground.2"n the region itself, howeverI the kaqi invasion of Kuwair and subsequent U.S,-led United Nations response is often referwed to as the Second Gulf War, clearly betraying the links with the hn-Lwaq war [or the "fistt' Gulf war) and the regional instability initiated by the Iranian revolution. These are the connections upon which I will be focusing. The kaa-Iraq war set the stage for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iraq's "victoryt?io. its war with Iran vvas more a matter af Teheran, rclentirrg first and acceptiw the UN cease-fire rather than a result of Iraq%military prowess, a1thougl.t Baghdad did launch a suceesshl counteroffensive in early 1988, retaking the Fao Peninsula, but not without considerable help korn the United States and other Western powers. But f addam Hussein claimed it a victory nonetheless, and therefore he created heightened expectatians within the military and among the populace who antiGipated some sort of a victory dividend. The problem was that Iraq was severely in debt, having gone from a more than $60 billion surplus before the Iran-frq war to a $48 biilim debt. As sameone once said, diceators need money. Saddam Hussein saw the bank to the south called Kuwait and its lucrative oil fields (which would have given h q contrd of' 21 percent of the woxld's known oil reserves) and wanted to initiate his own type of merger and acquisition, A significant portion of that debt was owed to Kuwait, which, unlike the fatltdis, was unwilling to erase it, although the h q i s a w e d that they had, in essence, protected Kuwait with their blood and the physical destruction af a good part of Iraq-surely that was worth more than what they owed Kuwait, In addition, Iraq had same outstanding territorial issues with the Kuwaitis that had not been satisfactwily put to rest, including the hmaylah oil field that sat astwide the bordcr (claiming, apparently aceuwately, that the Kuwaitis were slant-drilling into the kaqi side] and the Bubiyan and Warba islands belonging to Kuwait just off its northern coast. The kanian conquest of the Fao Peninsula had in&-

cated to the kaqis just how easily they could be cut off from the Gulfand how crippling this was to its oil industry, and thus its ability to carry out its expansionist desips, eqecially considering the fact that its overland oil pipelines traversed hostile territory in Syria and Turkey. Iraqi control of the islands would provide it with better access to the Gulf; indeed, the taking of Kuwait itself would expand the Iraqi coastline, thus making it less wfnerable in the future to any Iranian thrust across the Shatr al-kab waternay, the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in southern Iraq that f l w s into the Persian Galf .zs Perhaps the main reason Saddam Wussein invaded Kuwait is because he thought he codd get away with it. In fact, he c m e very close to it, Why he felt this way also sterns from the kan-kaq w a , particularly the strong strate@c and comrnerciaI relationship Baghdad built up with the United States during the course of the war, brought together by the mutual desire for preventing an Iranian victory, As mcrntioned pweviously, Washington and Baghdad reestablished diplomatic xelations in 1984, and the Reagan and Bush adminiseations believed Iraq could be a very useful suvrogate in both the Persian Gulf and ArabIsraeli arenas, filling the empty shoes of both the Shah and Anwar Sadat. Because of this carryover from the frrevious administxsttion, Bush officials tended to overlook the excesses of Saddam Hussein's actions in the latter part of the war with Iran and in the interim pesiod after the war and precedng the iavasim of' Kuwait. Indeed, President Bush and his seexetary af state, farnes Baker, admitted in the aftermath of the Gulf wax that they "stayedtbwith Sacldarn toe long, hoping to moderate his policies and to essentially make him into what they wanted, h doing so, they failed to appreciate signals that in fact ingcated that he had not changed his colors from 1979-1980: He was an expansionist &ctatm determined to achieve his national and reemat ambitions. Saddam concluded long before Washington $id that his ambitions codd only be achieved at the cost of his relatimship with the United Seates.26 The Iraqi president, an the other hancl, in a ease of possibly heaxing mly what he wanted to hear, also failed to read VVashingtan"s signals ingcating its wasition to his policies, preferring instead the ambiguous statements that U,$. ambassador to Lraq, April Glaspie, and

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs John Kelly made during the Iraqi military buildup along the Kuwaiti bwder, which seemed on the surface to portend erican disinterest in the affairas long as the oil continued to flow at reasonable pxices, sornahing that Saddam made clear he would do, althougXl the price would rise somewhat from its then glut-induced low level, The U.S. reaction, ar apparent lack thereof, tended to confirm to Saddam that at least from the American point of view, the stxategie relationship was still alive and thus would hamper8if not totally inhibit, a farceful U.S. response. &&dad apparently concluded that the United States was still harnstrung by the Vietnam syndvome and that with the end of the superpower cold wm (the Iraqi, incursion was clearly not &rected by Moscow or communist farces, vvhich had been the only occasions since World War T I that the United States had sent hundreds of thousands of troops halfway across the wowld-Korea and Vietnamf, Washington had no stomaeh and little domestic or congressional support for military intervention to protect a nondemocratic regime with which it had not had a particularly close relationship.27 f addam obviously miscalculated. The Bush adminiseation led the Gharge to liberate Kuwait for a variety of reasons: f l ) it did not want; Iraq controlling 22 percent of the world's known oil reserves; ( I t ) Iraq had directly threatened Smdi Arabia, an American ally whose borders me the reddest of all red lines in, the Middle East-in fact, the decision to move Iraqi troops to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border may have been Saddam Hussein" biggest strategic erroq28 (3)the Bush administration realized as the ~xisiswore on that it would be a strategic nightmare for the United States to have Iraq" million-man army and weapons-ofmass-destruction cagability as a perpetual menace in one of the most vital areas of national inteyest; (4)unfortunately for Saddam Wussein, President Bush's strategic thinking was not shaped by the Vietnam war synhonne, but by the Munich mentality that emerged out of World War 11, in which Bush fought and was decorated. This experience taught Bush and others of this generation not to appease aggressors, as the Europeans had appeased Hitler following his appropriation czf: the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia-aggessisn of this order must not be allowed to stand, and (51 President Bush wanted to implement his New World Order, a new era in the wake of the end of the cold war that

would usher in a cooperative intevniltional framework to rein in acts of "naked aggressiontibuch as the one perpetrated by Saddam Hussein. m a y felt that the United States was e&austed horn a half century of cold was and fadng what was thought to be tbe rising economic powers of Euxage, led by a united Germany, and East Asia, cmried along by the Japanese juggernaut. Many in the administration believed that an assertive respmse in this sirnation. would reinforce the leadership role czf: the United States, since it was the d y country capable of such a large-scale actian.29 As is well known, Operation Desert Storm was launched in January 1991 with an intense aerial bombardment campaign and with. the pound wav commencing in February, a 108-hour thrust that successfully expelled the Iuaqis horn Kuwllit. The (Second)Gulf war was over. In the aftermath of the war, a Pax Ames;icana had been clearly established in the Persian Gulf region, fmmally (and finally)supplanting the Pax Britannia that had enveloped the area for over a cenmry until Briain's evacuation in 1971. From the Nixon Doet;rine to the Garter Doctrine to the Kuwaiti rdagging aperatian, the United States inereasingy reeopized the value of the Gulf region, and it inwementally enhanced its position in the Persian Gulf zone until the clirnactic interlude of 1990-199 1 inserted American might straight into the mix. It spelled the end of bralance-of-powerpolitics; the United States would no langex rely on either Iran m Iraq to be its gmdame in the Pexsian Gulf. Instead defense coopexation agreements were cmsurnmated beween Wshington and rnosz, of the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia did not formally sign since it already had an intimate strategic defense relationship with the United States) and equipment and materiel were prepositioned just in case military action again became necessary-for althau& defeated, Saddam remained in power. Because the GCC had ataeady shown it was incapable of frroviding for its own defense, the United States adogted a forwavd policy in the re@m that requixed a significant direct presence. The flip side of this new strategic environment was the ""dual containmentf' of Iraq and kan. The t e r n "'containment," of course, was quite popular in the early 1"$90s, since the policy it described was deemed suecesshl in winning the cold war with the Soviet Union. Why not apply it at the regional level in the Persian Gulf against two so-called rogue coun-

tries? It was hoped that containment, throu& economic, pditied, and military pressure, would compel a chang@of regime-type, if not idcol00, towmd a msre compliant, cooperative, and interrnationaly acceptable status, Although dual containment has come under intense scrutiny, and even criticism, in recent years, espeeidly as a more moderate regime came to power in 1C"ehermin the form ol: Muhammad Rhatami"s stunning presidential victory in 1997 and as the cat-and-mouse game with. Saddam Hussein has continued over the erntent of Iraq's compliance with post-Gulf war UN resolutions, the enhanced Ameuicm presence in the region has remained, ohen producing a negative backlash among the Gulf k a b goputations who had before the Gulf was become accustomed to, at best, a detached relationship with the United States.30 This backlash has become more gronounced in recent years sanctions against kaq, kept in place largely through eke determined efforts of Washington, are increasiagly seen in the Gulf and elsewhere as unnecessarily punitive and political, hurting only the kaqi people rather than undcrrnining the regime of Saddarn Wussein. Even during the Gulf crisis, when the United Nations coalition was building up its forces in the region, there were mrnblings in the Muslim w d d regz&ng the presence of ""irrAdelsMin SW& Asahia, the site of Islam's two holiest sites-Mecca and Medina, In fact, it was this perceived affxont that initiated Osama bin Laden%quest against the United States, What was at first a a l l to remove all foreign troaps from Saudx Arabia and bring down what bin Laden viewed as a corrupt, subsenrient, and un-Islamic Saudi regime later g e w into a transnational terrorist network eqounding a global jihad against the United f tates, Israel, and their allies, hdced, it has evolved into a jihad against a11 identified godless and infidel regimes that regxess Muslims, as evidcnced by bin Laden%agparent involvement in aseas as diverse as the Chechnyan separatist movement against Russia, the Muslim Ui&urs in the XjNimg province of China, and the Moros in the Philippines. Despite this negative backlash, the Gulf war had a salutaq effect upon the kab-Israeli arena. When the Bush adminisaatim began to meticulously piece together the UN coalition against Iraq, it was expected that the Gulf Arab states as well as Waslzington's traditional allies in the Arab world, Eupt and Morocco, would join up. With the

end of the cold war and the Soviet Union desperately needing economic assistance from the West, it was also not surprising that Moscow, and even Beijing, supported the coalition by not utilizing their vetoes in the U N Security Cauncil. Saddam Hussein's flouting of international norms and the reported atrocities pepetrated inside Kuwait made it &fficuft for any country ta come out openly againsl: the U.&-led multinationd force, The partieipadon of Syria, however, was most important of all the Arab staees in the coalition, and it was this par-t.icipationthat prepared the foundation for the pastwar Madrid peace process. Syria's inclusion made it seem like it was almost the entire Arab world against Iraq rather than the usual pro-West suspects, especially since Damascus had been the vanguwd of the anti-Israeli front for decades'31 Even though Isxael was not a member of the coalition, despite Saddarn Husseinfs attempts to draw it into the fray by lobbing S C W missiles into Israeli prqer, hoping to turn a Persian Gulf conflict: into an kab-Israeli one, the Arab states in the coalition and Tel Avi-v were with similar objectives. This de facto on the same side in the political and straegic reorganization and, maybe most impartantly, the brolcen psgcholo@calbarriers-combined, of course, with the decisive coalition victory-altered the regional balance of power, with Washington as the clear dominant outside farce, The comprehensive peace frrocess lacrnched at Madrid in October 1981, eosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, was the natural outcome. Even though the Madrid meeting initiated an oftentimes halting pwocess that on several occasions made more pwogxess in its tangential application than in the proscribed pathways, it was the first time that Israel and the bordering Arab states (still a c i d l y at w x with Israel) met publidy face to face, The Israeli-PLO accords signed on the White Hause lawn in September 1993, although negatiated for the most part outside of tbe Madrid process, and the Israeli-farhian peace treaty of 1994 both owe their consummations to the repexcussions of the Gulf war, An Israeli-Syrian peace process alsa began as a result of the Madrid meeting that at times came very close to kuitim (parrcieularly in early 1996 and in late 1999-eaxly20001. Although negotiatims were broken off in spxing 2000, the strate@c choice for peace, including a r e w n of the Gdan Heights to Syria, was made by both sides.

The Egypgian-lsraeti Peace TreaPy

A sine qua non of Arab stratelLy and hope far successfully confronting Israel for t h e e decades pxioe to 1979 was the active leadaship of Egypt, trdtionally the most populaus and militarily the strongest state in the Arab wowld, VVithout Egypt, the Arab states could not hope to defeat Israel in battle, and various countries and groups would be resigned to a strategy of pinpieking the Jewish state anwar adopting a defensive deterrent posture, Not uncoineidentally, it had been one ad the primaxy objectives ad a succession of Israeli (andAmerican] leaders to somefiow pry Egypt apart horn the rest of the Arab warld, isolating it and drawing it into an alliance with the Wst. Egypt had been a gelative newcomer to the Arab nationalist kant anyway; it vvas a country that had its own proud heritage and saw itself stradding North &ica and Southwest Asia. If Tel h i v cwld somehow engineer this, then the permanency of: the Tewish state would be tmdeniable-and its ahiliq to counter any other Arab threat, either from an individual state or a coalition of states, would be unquestioned. In essence, the 1979 Euptian-Israeli peace treaty ended the ArabIsraeli conflict in its original form; that is, there would be no more coalitions of Arab states attempeing to defeat Israel, An all-out regional eonfiict charactesistic of the 2967 and 1973 kab-Israeli wars was a moot point in the foreseeable future-m as long as Isratll and Egypt remained m relatively good terms. Exom the &ab perspective, achieving the full and just rights of the Palestinians became infinitely more difficult the moment Anwar Sadat s i a e d along the dotted line-the Arab world had just lost most of its leverage. The removal of Ewpt from the Arab fold ereated a vacuum of powu in the Arab world and significantly disturbed the reional order. Instantly, the mlnexability of Arab countries such as Syria and Iraq was, in their view, hei&tened considerably, and the Israeli regime of Prime Minister Menacbim Begin belfaa to think that it muld ace agressively an a number czf: honts with impunity, It was not a s u ~ r i s e that Syria and Iraq bot-h ruled ofAcidly by the socialist: Bakh party, cooperated for a short time following the signing of the peace Meaty in an attempt to present a united front against Israel, The Iraqi-Syrian entente would break wart shortly thereafter because of the inherent;

gfferences and territorial squabbles between the two countries. The respective regimes merged from rival branches of the Ba'th party and water-sharing issues concerning the downstream riparim status of the Euphates River remained a nagging sore between Damascus m d Baghdad. In additim, historically in the post-Wadd Vtrar II period, whenever E g y p decided to follow its own course based on nationalistic interest rather than pan-Arab unity, Iraq andlor Syria would attempt to fill the perceived void and vault into the leadership position within the krab world, Indeed, the Arab cold war in the late 1950s and thoughout much of the 1960s was based largely on the inter-AYab rivalry bctween this triad of powers.32 W t h Egypt on the sidelines sites abandoning its traditional lead=ship role, both Spia and Iraq would desperately try to fill its shoesand this could not be done together. The rivalry betvveen Damascus and Baghdad, subsumed to a large degree undl 1979, would come out into the open after the peace treaty, affecting inter-&ab relationships and alliances to the present day and shaping the tremendously important decisions by Syrian President WaBz al-'Asad to support Lran against Iraq in the Iran-lsaq war and to support the UN coalition against kaq in 1990-1991. konicdly, it would be the latter Syrian deeision that was so significant in fomulating the Madrid peace grocess, one that in many ways took its cue from tbe Egyptian-Israeli exampte. h fact, with Iraq's understandable preoccupation with matters to its east, Eept's isolation within the Arab world, brought about by the peace treat-y, immediately thmst Syria into the limelight in the conkonmtion with Israel. It also compelled the Sovia Union ta deepen its relatanship with Damascus: "Assad would henceforth be adopted by both the USSR and the krab majnstream as the undisputed leader of the strualc against: Israel, This regional and internatianal consecraticm had substantial legitimizing effects on this minority-led reerne,"% With E g p t out of the picture for the time beina;, the Arab world began to disintegrate into regional blocs, whether willingly or unwillingly, As Ghassan Salarne writes, ""A. North African (maghribi) or a Gulf k a b (MaIijI')identi-try,which had once been an anathema, was no longer so, and the %mpt firsti slogan that had once been held in check g~aduallybcearne acceptable." He continues by stating,

The geagapbical disintegration of the reeonaf system into local subsystems also had a legitimizing ideology but not a vocal am. Subsystems were ostensibly founded on realism, wbich is an idtealog in itself. In fact, this ideologFsdiscourse was produced after these internally integrated but loosely comeeted Xoeal subsystems were established. More often than not, local goupings were formed aromd a newly assertive local gowew.34

Saudi h a b i a took the lead in forming the GGC not only because of the Iranian revdution and subsequent Iran-kaq war but also because E m t was no longer there as a parmer, pxotector, m patron in the interArab arena, The GCG could better rwesent Saudi and Gulf Arab interests than an Arab League bereft of the moderating and unifying influence of E g p t , Syria, with its self-anointed rote as the last stand against Israeli expansionism and hegemon~a;began its trek to dominate the politics of the Levant, includng Lebanon, Jordan, and the PLO, It would begin a very complicated political matrix with regard to peace plans and negotiations, and it seemed throughout the 1980s Joxdm and the PLO were looleng over their shoulders at the Syrian response to any moves they made t w a r d negotiations with Israel over the Palestinian pxoblem as a result of intense pressure from the United States and moderate k a b states. With intervening events, such as the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebmon, the end of the superpower cold was, and the 199G1991 Gulf erisis and was, Syria would ernesge victorious in Lebanon, but the PLO and Jordan would eventually tread their own paths towad peace, as evidenced by the 1993 Israeli-PLO accmds and the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, Two comtuies, or at least the regimes nxling them, seemed to be emboldened by Egypt's departure from the active playing field in the Middle East: Iraq and Israel. Subsequent actions by each, unfortunately; would have devastating results, Iraq" situation in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has largely been discussed earlier in this chapter. As stated, the faet that the two emergency Arab League summit meetings convened in reaction to both the Camp David accoxds in September 1978 and the signing of the treaty in March 1979 were held in Baghdad symbolized the new inter-Arab future Saddam. Wussein hoped to mold.35 On October 30, 11579, Iraq renounced the 1975 Algiers Agveement with Iran, by wbich fran pledged to curtail its support of Kurds in Iraq in

return for concessions on determining the border along the Shatt alArab waterway. The agreement had, at least for a few years, ameliorated tensions between Baghdad and Teheran; its renunciation certainly indicated the more bellicose directim in which Saddarn was headed. His pan-Arab charter enunciated in early 1980 supplied further evidence of his self-anointed leadership role within the Arab world. With the effective removal of Egypt from the Arab equation, there was no brake on Iraq's attempts to achieve its dual ambitions of obtaining a hegemonic posirion in both the Arab-Israeli and Persian Gulf arenas. Even if Ewpt had not signed the treaty with Israel and had remained an active player in iarter-Arab politics and djglamacy, Saddam Hussein's quest far power may still have gone unchecked, But without Cairo%moderating influence (which may have been less aligned with Washington's objectives hacf it nor signed the treaty and officially continued the state of war with Israel), the opport-unity to take advantaw of the appment post-revolution chaos in Iran and to expand his power base in the region was that much mare enticing. h d Egypt, rather than utilizing the Iran-kaq war, as it dragged on and on and Iraq" pposition became more and more vulnerable, to rebuild its Arab credentials and reentes the Arab fold by sending thousands of ""volunteers'2o defend Arab Iraq from non-&ab Iran, might have been able to play a different role in relation to the war, one that could have evolved into a constructive me&at;ing position that might have contained Ba&dad and shoxtened the confiiet. Of course, these are all hypothetical "what if%," On the other hand, benefits derived from Egypt's continuing leadership role in the Persian Gulf arena might have been off.set by the still festering Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated the escalatmy nature of the conflict, having come close to a q e r power nude= confrontation in its waning moments, Fear of what another conflict might look like in the wake of this close call vvas a significant part of the motivation of all the parties involved to let the air out of the expan&ng 'ballom of miliary destructiveness, The IranIraq war remained relatively contained, even. though the final results of the war laid the foundation for Iraq" 11990 invasion of Kuwait. But the thought of another all-out Arab-Israeli conflict, ~ u s twhen the supeqwer cold war was heating up again in the late f 970s and early

1980%sent shudders down the spines of anyone who feared the classic case of a regional conflagation escalating to a supergotvu standoff, not to mention what would surely be catastrophic repercussions for the parties directly involved in battle in tbe region itself. The Lebanese, however, might diswee with any analysis that implied that the Ewptian-Israeli peace txeaty, while severely flawed and dismptive, was overall a positive event simply because it prevented a cataclysm. For Lebanon, the cataclysm came just the same, Predictions of doom and gloom by the many exitics of the EgyptianIsraeli peace treaty were, at least in their eyes, proven true: Israel became much more awessive. h 1981 Israel bombed a suspected nuclear reactor in kaq, extended Israeli law over (de hcto annexing) the Golm Heights, and accelerated the building of Jewish seetlements in the remaining occupied territories, primarily in the VVest Bank. But it was the 1982, Israeli invasion of Lebanon that clinched the case. As with the other significant events described in this book, the Israeli invasion has been examined ad nauseam. Critics of Israeli. policy, particularly those arraigned against the right-wing LikuQ regime ad Menachern Begin, contend that the removal of Empt from the Arab battle plan allowed Israel to pursue its interests vis-a-vis its northern nei&bors, since the southern flank had been secured througIz peace. Whethex this was a specific intention of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is another matter. But surdy the Israelis knew the isolation of Egpt would significantly weaken the &ab world as a whole. The PLO, now o p e r a t i ~out of' Lebanon and feeling left: out in. the cold by Sadat's separate peace, intensified their guerrilla operations against Israel in order to, at the very least, block any sort of emerging Arab moderate consensus that Sadat and the United States had half-heartedly been trying to generate toward a comprehensive peace accordwerations that were supported vigorously by cauntrjes such as Syrja and Iraq. To say that there was no gravacatim horn Lebanese soil would misrepresent the simatim. The Israelis had invaded southern Lebanm in. 1978 in. an attempt to clear out PLO positions that had been threatening novthern Israeli settlements. Howevert the question is whether the operation in 1982, the extent of which would become lrnm in short order, greatly exceeded the actual &reat. The "hidden agenda'bd

Begin and his defense minister, k i e l Sharon, quickly answers the preceding question in the affirmative, laying the groundwork for what many have called Israel" biggest foreil;gn policy mistake. Alrmdy reeling from years of civil war, Lebanon would experienm more destruetion, ruin, divisiveness, and pain, and a generation would be hrtfier lost in the agony of a Middle East battlegrowd. What was anticipated as a sweep of PLO positions in sou& Lebanon, B la 1978, som devolved into the Israeli government's uultirnate goal: the removal of the PLO (and hopefully Syria) entirely from Lebanon and the placement; of a Lebanese Marmite Chistian ally as pxesidcnt; who would sign a peace treaty with Israd.36 Begin and Sharon were playing kinpaker, a purely offensive role that was uncharacteristic of the Israelis. That is, all of the major wars involving Israel up to that point, while taking greemptive action on a number of occasions, were all logically ratimalized as necessav for the survival of the state. This was different, and most Israelis, especially as the Lebanese quagmire became evident, vehemently opposed this type of great powa imperialism. The PLO was prepared to fi&t to the last before being escorted out of Beirut fand into effective exile in Tunis) by a multinational farce led by the United States. The Syrians would also fight back, in the grocess usually bein; obliterated when direetly confronting the Israelis. But Damaseus would a4ust and adopt more cavert an4 as it turned out, move effective measuwes against both the Israelis and the Western multinational force that increasingly became identified as simply a srtppawt system to aehieve through international peacekeeping and diplomacy what the fsvaelis could not accomplish through. brute force." In Octaber 1983,241 U.S. marines and scores of other Western military personnel, officials, and civilians paid for this cbanige of tactics with their lives. The chaotic repercussions of the Israeli invasion and occupation, the subsequent withdrauval of the multinational force in February 1984 [and having been burned in Lebanon, the Iteagan Administsation, until the last year of its tenure in power, essentially withclwew from Middle Eastern affairs and focused on its obsession with the Soviet Unimf, and the retreat by Israel hrther south in 1985 heled the fractiousness of Lebanese religio-political society that was already an ideal reeeptor to extcmal interference. As long as Lebanon

remained relatively doof from the kab-Israeli conflict, compromises could be arranged and the inherent divisiveness could be papered over. But events in the 1 9 7 0 ~ beginning ~ with the relocation of the PLO to Beirut after being expelled from Jordan in 1970, capped off with the Israeli invasion in 1982, invariably entanded what had been a peaceful and prosperous nation into conflict at d l levels. Soon enolrgh Lebanon, became a proxy fsr almost evesy conceivable dispute in the area. The Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli confiict, and to a lesser extent, the supeqower cold war would all be fought simultaneously in Lebanon. Implosion and destmetlon would be the natural results. Some of the more infamous repercussions of the Israeli invasion have already been discussed, such as the Iran-Contra affair, the radicalization of the Shiite comrnunjty in Lebanon that created an opening for the entrance of Iranian influeo~eand the meation of Hizbtzllah, and the subordination of the country to Syria, which aftex all was said and done, emerged as the victor and power broker. This was in no small part due to the decision by the Gulf war allies to essentially "give" Lebanon to Damascus as the quid pro qua for the latter" participation in the coalition against kaq* Having been so squarely attached to Syria, the Lebanese situation has become even more a hnction of the Israeli-Syrian eguation and negotiations. Waflz al'Asad saw Wizbullah as a necessary lever against Israel in Lebmon that could be traded in for a h l l Israeli withdrawal from the Colan Heights, The unilateral Israeli withdrawal from its security zone in south Lebanm in Mzty 2000 has removed this lever for the time being from the Syrian basket, but it is still undear as of this writing whet.her this has effectively restored Lebanon" desired aloofness from the &&-Israeli conflict. A new president in Damascus, moderate forces improving their pasition in Teheran (and the apparent urging of Hizbtzllah to rein in its military activity against Israel and develop its political role in Lebmon following the Israeli withdrawal), and Hizbtzllah"s own enhanced popularity and 1egitrnac-y in Lebanon in the wake of its success in forcing Israel to retreat (in effect, being the &st Arab contingent to defeat IsraelJ still leave many questions unanswered as to the relationship between the Jewish state and its multifaxiws neighbor to the north, and indeed, the overall future of Lebanon itself.

There has hem a @eat deal of criticism aimed at the Ewptlan-Israeli peace treaty over the years, mu& of which has revolved around the disruptive afteveffects ~ u s tdiscussed: the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iran-irq war. But it has also been criticized-ou more to the point, Anwar Sadat has been vilified in the k a b world-for essentially abandoning the Palestinian cause. The Camp David accords were composed of two drarnewoxks for peace, one of' which dealt with Egptian-Israeli bilateral issues such as the return af the Sinai Peninsula, secwity measures, and normalization, and the othcr of tvhieh dealt with progress toward a comprehensive ageemat, including the Paleslinian issue. The major flaw in the accords was the fact that the two frameworks were not linked; that is, progess on the Egyptian-Isrwli framework did not necessarily have to be matched by frrogress on the Palestinian issue, So while Begin and Sadat hurfied to consummate the one, the other tended to lmmish andim be ignaxed. The Israeli prime minister was in the strongest negotiatirrg position at Camp David, unlike S d a t and President Carter, who both went far out on the pxoverbial limb and had to show something coming out of the Maryland presidendd retreat-a medioexe &l was better than no deal at all. Begin, on the other hand, was in the catbird seat. He and his regime wauld survive intact refl;axdessod whether a deal was had, and on at least the issue of linking the Egptian-Israeli framework with an overall Arab-Israeli peace, he could sit back and wait for his demands to be met and for Sadat to make mast of the concessions, Sadat at least wanted to make sure that he did not give the outwad appearance that he had downgraded the priority of the Palestiniruz issue; that is, he wanted cover. And although he would aaempt to revive the Palestinian issue with Israel after the siming of the treaty, a truculent; Begin was not about to negoLiate away any more land. In his w n mind and in those of his supporters, Resolution 242 had been met and territories [and not "the" territories) had been retuxned; now his regime could go about consolidating Israel's position on the remainder of the oecupied territories, especially the West Bank, with a systematic acceleration of building and expanding Jewish settlements. So although the chances of a regional cmfiagration lessened as a result of the treaty, Paleslinian frust-ratian inexeased, combining -with the PLO's predicament in Lebanon to produce the fury of the intifada by the late

1980s. As was Begin's intent, more Israeli settlements in the occupied territories made it that much more difficult to trade any more of the ""Lnd of Israel" b r peace with the Palestinians or Ismel's Arab neighbors. The Egyptian-Ismeli peace treaty; in the minds of many Israelis, certainly more within Likud than Labm, let the air out of the balloon of pressure buildng on the Jewish state to relinquish oceupied territory in accordance with UN resolutions. The rewrn of: the Sinai bought time, and the distraction of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the gvisiveness in the Arab world brought about by the kan-kaq war also bou&t time. The delay, however, produced the complicaed and tortuous negotiations between successive Israeli leaders and the PLO (PNA)since the signing of the Israeli-PLO accords in 1993. On the other hand, the Egpeian-Israeli peace treaty has lmed, despite many serious bumps on the road, particularly the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which almost ruptured the relationship, Normalization of relations between the two countries has not occurred, certainly not anywhere near the extent many had hoped for when the treaty was signed, At times it seems the only element maintaining the peace is the close (some would say bounded) relationship each country has with the United States, The fact that Jordan.signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, only a year after the Israeli-PLO accords, along with a plethora of other Arab nations that have de facto, if not de juxe, established relations with Israel at a variety of levels, lessened the perceived isolation within the Arab world that many Egyptians felt in being the only Arab nation to make peace with Israel for fifteen years. Indeed, Egypt became a major partner of the United States in Washing~n'squest to broker peace agreemen& between Israel and the remainder of its Arab neighbors; in a sense, Cairo was assuming its traditional leadership position in the Arab world, although this time around in a much different fashion than in the Nasserist era, But tension between Egypt and Israel, and more specifically between Egyptians and Israelis, has remained, and to some degree it has even grown in recent years as frustration over lack of progress on the Palestinian and Syrian peace fxonts have led to further disilllusionment in Arab quasters and as Cairo and Tel h i v increasingly see each other, politically and economically, as reiJional rivals.38

However, the peace treaty has somehw survived, And by doing so, it has, despite its acknowledged flaws, provided somelhing of a template fox succeeding &-Israeli agreements and destrwed psychdogical barriers, This last point may be the most important long-term development. As Saad Eddin %rahim states: Most Egntians may be disenchanted, disillusioned, or outraged at Israeli behavior, Some organized political. forces have continuousll-ycalled for the abmgatian of Camp David and the treatyl and several have called for the s e v e ~ n gof relations and an end to normalization, But none has reitexated the pre-197'1 Imguage of existentid negation. None Etas suggested a declaration, of wax ox a return to the state of war with the Jewish, state. Camp David "normalized the feelings" of most Emtians toward Israel across the spectmm-hate, anger, d;isapproval, acceptance, accommodation, and even &sposition for cooperation-but no negation.39

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty has had enarmous influence at a priz~ticdlevel as well. The ideas of phased withdrawals, interim w e e ments, and secluded settings for negotiations among the respective leaders, such as Camp David and the Wye Plantation, have all found their way into the l e ~ c o nand process of peace; the "modalities'kof peace often became as important as the frrospective peace agreement itsetf . Security arrangements, border demarcations, and early warning systems are all a part of the discussion in, recent and cuwrent Middle East peace negotiarions; all of these items owe a significant part of their wigins to the Egptian-Israeli peace treaw and the process that led up to it. In addition, the role af the United States in rVliddle East peace negotiations was inestmably enhanced. It became clear &at Washingtan was the only power able to extract even the tiniest of cancessions faom Israel. Its role as a broker at some Icvel in. htuxe k a b Israeli negotiations, which today is somewhat taken for ganted, became formalized with the treaty. As Quandt wites, Whatever one thought of the wntenrs of the Camp David Accords, all saw that the United States had played an essential part. On his own, Sadat wodd probably have gatten. far less from Israel, and indeed it is questionable whether a deal could have been stmck at all. This realiza-

tian raised the question of whether or not the United States could be brought back into the game to do for the Palestinians-and pehaps the Smians as well-what it had done far Sadat.40 It is, of course, no coincidence that PLO Chairman Yasix k a f a t and

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak were summoned by President Clinton to Camp David in July 2000 in a last-ditch effort to settle the troublesome final status issues before the Clintsn administration left office-41 Even sorne of the events within the 1978 version were s p bolically replicared in the 2000 version, such as a visit by the respeetive delegations to nearby Gettydurg, obviously meant as an implicit message to avoid the carnagcs of the Americarr civil war, and the "suitcase'"p1.omacy, whereby delegations would overtly make arxangements to abrugtly leave the meetings, thereby inducing a crisis atmosphere that would hopefully jump-start stagnant talks to anather level. Cfimon officials were obviously hoping to recreate sorne czf: the magic of September 1978. The Egyptian-Israeli peace process has even negatively affected, to sorne degree, the current status of Arab-Israeli negotiations. One of the reasons Syria's President Hafiz al-"sad and, apparently, his successor son, Basbar, have doggedly insisted on a retuxn of the entire Golan Heights to the June 4, 1967 line (restoring the preI967 war boundaries) is their desire to get back more land than Sadat retrieved through the 1979 peace treaty, a treaty that, as discussed previously, "sad vehemently rejected, In the Sinai, the 1923 international border drawn by the British mandatory power between Egypt and then PaleslLine was the border established betvveen Israel and Egypt in 1979 (and actually put into effect when the last portion of the Sinai was returned in April 1982).The 1923 international border drawn by the British and French mandatory power between Syria and then Palestine is some 20 meters off of the Sea of Galilee in the northeastern portion of the area bordering the southern; portion of the Golan Heights. This was, of course, purposely done by the British to keep the French away fiom this important water source that today provides approximately 30 percent of Israel's water needs. The June 4, 1967, line represents Syrian advances to the Sea of Galilee

acquired in the 11547-W49 Arab-Israeli war and though. sporadic fighting with Israel in the years between the creation of Israel in 1948 and the 1967 war. The importance of this small sliver of territory is more symbolic than anything else, but Syrian leaders have repeatedly stated publicly that they are absolutely committed to accepting nothing less than this. In this way, at least Syrians can point to the fact that holding out for a mueh longer period of time than Empt netted a bit more in return. One could also speculate that Arafatis intransigence at the Camp David negotiatians in July ZOO0 was, in part, due to the overwhelming perception in the Arab world that Sadat gave up too much in 1978.42 Since Sadat had already relinquished his main bargaining chip by traveling to Israel in 1977 and d e a ly committed himself to a peacehl settlement, he felt compelled to come away from Camp Dwid with an Israeli commitment to remrn the entire Sinai. Sadat was, therefore, in a weak bargaining positim, and he was subsequently pressured by the Amlerieans to make the most concessions. One sensed a great deal of apprehension in the Arab world over whether Cantp David ZOO0 would be a repeat of Camp David 1978, only this time with the Palestinians. One must remember that the 1978 Camp David acemds and I979 peace treaty are not viewed nearly as positively in the Arab worfd as they are in the United States and Israel. There vvas no "magic" in the Catoctin Mountains of lMarylazl4 indeed, most Arabs called the treaty a eapitdation and heretical abandonment. k a h t did not want to repeat the perceived mistakes of Sadat, In. a way, kafat's position during the meeting in Marylanci, which was based on the exhortations of the PLO chairman's constituency in the occupied teuritories, was more akin to Beginis in 1978-1979; that is, he would be vilified if he siped onto a deal that conceded too much. In other words, he would win if he settled the final status issues in the Palestinian favor, and he would win if he was perceived to be standing fast in the face of Israeli and Amexican gressure and not giving in on those issues that are sacred to the Palestinian cause, such as Jerusalem and the return of: Palestinian refugees. Sadat paid for the peace t;reaty with his lifej &&fat wanted to make sure the same &d not happen to him.

The Soviet lnvasOon of Afghanlstan

Though at first samwhat peripheral to the W d d e East, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan m;ly have had the most influential dobal repercussions of all of the significant events of 19'79. Not o d y was change brought abotlt in the Middle East, which would become mare and mare evident as time passed, but the domestic fronts in bath the Soviet Union and the United States were d r a m ~ i c d l yaffeaed (rrot to speak of the utter dcstructlon of the country of Algharmistanf*And when the two superpowers aye so damateally affected, perforce, the rest of the world also experiences the repercussions. Moscow's involvement in Afghanistan became known as the Soviet Union's ""Tlietnam,'Qand it lasted until the Geneva Accords were simed in Aprif 2988, with the last Soviet troops exiting in February 1989.a It was a war that grew mare and mare unpopulax with the Soviet public as it dragged on yeav after year, with the gowing unlikelihood of any real chance of a conclusive victory.& Even. though the Soviets lost "only" about a quarter of the number of soldiers f 13,00&15,000/ that the United States lost in Ketnam, the social and economic drain was readily agparent. The Swiet economy, already reeling from tpieal socialist ineficieaey, corrupton, and statist intrusion, could ill afford the quagmire that Afghanistan became, In a very red sense, the Soviet Unim's entanglement in AfiShanjstm was the last straw for the Soviet system. It was the penultimate chapter of Soviet communism, overloadxng the system toward implosionGeorge Kennan was finally proven correct. In respmse to Amcrican pressure against Soviet activities in Third W d d cold w;ur hot spots, such as Central erica, Africa, and the rvr_iddleEast, a new generation of Soviet leaders, feding little if any responsibility for the M&ani mistake, chief among them Soviet Ilremier MikhaiI Cmbachev, decided that rather than try to keep up with the United States in maintaining the supeapower standoff, they would just end the cold war. With the end of the cdd war also, not smprisingly, came the end of the Soviet Union-in eMect the Soviet empire-by late 199 1. The experience of Afghanistan also had a sobering effect upon Soviet foreign policy ideology, which has cmtiarrued to have reverbmations in the new Russia. IVlany of the assumptions of the Stalin/Khrushchev/

Bxezhncv evas regmding the socialist transhmation oi Tkird World countries were rewdusted (or encountered a more cfidcal audjenee), wInich became a crucial formative element in Gorbachm"s ""nwpolitjcal thin.kng,'Wmy Soviet academics and policymakers had for a number of years sugested "that quite specific conditions might be necessav for a c m t v to jump successhlfy fvarn a ferrdal m pre-feudal.soeiety to socialism, bypassing capitalism, They a p e d the importance of: the cultud and stmctural pecdiarities of particular comrries, and they warned against 'leftist' miscalculatians that could lead to debacles."& With the w a n i s b a n episode hlfliting this prophecy, Moscow p e r h e became mueh more cautious in terms of T k d World intervention. Foreign policy became a much more prac.tjcal ifigajr; in esseme, the Soviet Union$ fmeip policy p a r a & p progessed thou& a stage of what Ceor@y Mksky a f l s "de-ideologizatim."'" As Rchard Falk sates: Soviet withdrawal from Mghanistan is ~onsistentwith the ovemll thrust of Gorbacfire-v" leademhip as embodied especially in the proceedings of the histofic 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party-namely! according p ~ o ~ to t yperestroika [i.e., domestic reform]; reducing EastWest tensions; and eliminating by. unilateral initiative expensive and unsuccessfd Soviet commitments overseas, especially in the Third World . . . and to take account of an intense, if provisional, process of internal self-criticism that repu&ates virtually all aspects of Bxezhnev era foueim policy.47

With economic necessity and practicality &iving foreign policy in. the late 1980s a d early 199Os, the Swiet Union/Russia, in cooperation with the Wst, supported diplomatic resolutions to a host of confliers, such as in the km-lrsq war, Namibia, and hgola-; even the United Nations was entrusted by Moscow with a central role in. these and other diplomatic sett2ements.48 The h i t i o n of this transformation was, of course, the &emlin% support, even. if somewhat passive, of the UN-mandated Gulf war coalition to evict from Kuwait a country that had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow and had had a long economic and military relationship with the Soviet Union as one of the bastions of socialist-style Third World development.

Both the Soviet invasion of and withhaural fram Afghanistan had at least tangential influence on the perception of the Soviet Union by a variety of quarters, which may have affected policy decisions. For instance, some have suggested that the Soviet entrenchment in the Afghani mess emboldened opposition. movemats in Eastern European countries, paxticularly in Poland; it was felt the Soviets would not be able, in faet: would not dare, to launch a Czech-like operation of military suppression while entangled in the mountains, valleys, and ravines around Kabul and Werat. Certainly the repeucussions of Afghanistan and the new political thinking loosened the Soviet embrace of Eastern Europe toward the symbolic end of its dominance with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1988. In addition, it is possible that the Reagaa administration may have been encouraged to intervene against leftist regmes and groups in Central America (and elsewhere1 not only because of what was perceived to be an enhanced Soviet t h e a t as demonstrated by its actions in Central Asia but also because it too possibly believed that the Soviets would be less able to fight the cold wau globally while ensconced in Mghanistan.49 The flip side of this supposition is that leftist regimes and goups ascertained from the Soviet withkawal from AfPhanistan that the days of earnest political, military, and economic suppat from Moscow were over; therefore, alternative paths toward resolution of their respective situations had to be mare seriously considered, especially diplomatic solutions rather than military ones, In the Middle East, this resulted in countries, such as Syria, and groups, such as the PLO, feeling compelled to moderate their positions visa-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and the United States, as they were now basically bereft of energetic Soviet support. This, in combination with the pose-Gulf w x envimnment in the regon, laid the foundation for the MadaLid peace process and the ongoing Arab-Israeli negotiations. In the short tern, however, Moscow's gambit in Afghanistan back&ed on its position in the Middle East, sornetkiag the Hrernlin obviously considered but felt was wmth the risk, The Soviet leadership possibly did not envision how deleterious the invasion was to become for the U.S.S.R. in the region. As Robert 0. Freedman states:

At the time of the invasion, the k a b world was basically. united in opposing the U.S.-supported Camp David accords, and, except for its ties with Egypt and Israel, the U.S, position in the Middle East was a weak one, Pro-Soviet regmes had erneged in Ethiopia and South Yemen, America's ally, the Shah of Iran, had fallen, to be replaced by the virulently antiAmedcan Hhomeini re@me that was holding Amedcan diplomats hostage, and even in Arab couatxies that had once been close to the United States, such as Saudi kabia and Jordan, there were deep misavings about the nature and steadfastness of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Given the fact that Moscow had looked upon the k a b wodd as a re@on of zero-sum game innuence competitian with the United States, it appeared clear that the Soviet Union was winning, and the United States was losing the influence competition.50

For Moscow's position in the Middle East, the invasion. was terribly bad timing, just as most of the Arab world was uniting behind it in the post-Egptim-Israeli peace treaey environment, symbolized by the formation of the Steadfastness Front-a league of Arab states opposed to the peace pxoeess, The invasion was something that most Arab states were compelled to oppose on pounds of Muslim solihrity analor anti-imperialism. Even though Steadfastness Front states such as Syria, Libya, and South Yemen cautiously suworted the invasion, other members such as the PLO and Algeria questioned MoscawJs actions." And a possible opportunity to make some inxoads in h n , now that it was thoroughly at odds with the United States, crumbled, as the new Islamic republic also was compelled to vehemently oppose the invasion. in addition, as will be described in more detail below the move into Mghanistan awakened the United States from its postVietnam slurnber, reheusing Waslzington's radar sereen to the Persian Gulf, which led to a systematic buildup of U.S, power in the region, exactly what the Soviets were honing to avoid.52 Ironically, although the AfIghani imbroglio accelerated the breakup of the Soviet Union, and helped king an end to the cold war, it was this very Sovia intervention that for one last gasp reignited the cold war and led to dramatic changes in tine direction, of American politics. As mentimed in Chanter 2, the United SI.ates was caught somewhat urmaware regarding Soviet intentions in Afghanistan until it was much

too late to do anything that migfit farestall the invasion. The perceived passivity of the Carter administuatian regading the Iranian revolution as well as the hostage crisis m i h t well have embaldcned &emfin leaders to sanction the invasion, the fear of a strong American response having been relatively downgraded as a result. To many in Moscow, the dktente that had defined the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the early 1970s had been unraveling for several years, and the Gmer administration's establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China earlier in January 1979 heightened the theat to the Soviet Unim a d contributed mightily to its perceived isolation. Therefore, security concerns, not diplomaclc ones, seemed to move to the forehont, and if a withering detente became a victim, so be it.53 The Carter administration reacted strongly to the Soviet invasion, and the president became a belated cold warrior. Feaxing that the Soviet action could be a prelude towad establishing a hegemonic position in Gulf (the invasion themetically put the Soviets only 500 kilomet-ers from the kabitsn Sea), taking advantage of the fall of the Shah and subsequent: American exit from Iran, the president amouneed in January 1980 what came to be known as the Garter Doctriine, The Soviet invasion was viewed by Garter administration officials not as a defensive action meant to create a cordoa sarzitahe along its smthexn belly, much like Eastern Europe on the Sovia Uniods eastern flank, but as an. aggressive offensive move toward the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, in line with the old Gzarist- Russian model.s"n Gater's Sta-t of the Union adhess on Janua~y23, 1980, outlining the Garb= Doctrine, he sr;ated the following: "Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be rei~ardedas an assauk on the vital interests of the United States of erica, and such an assadt will be regelled by any mems necessary, including militaxy force."% As Gary Sick has pointed out, this enunciation was quite similar to the ""classic" "statement by Lord Lansdowne in 1903 describing British policy t w m d the Gulf in which he said that the United Kingdom would "regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any oher power as a very aave menace to British interests," and that it would be resisted "with all the means at our disposal*""" With Garter's

proclamatian, the United States was officially putting the world on notice that it was, indeed, assuming the traditional British role of protector in the Gulf region, one that London had abdicated with its withdrawal ;fromthe area in 197G1971.S' The capability of the United States at the time to match words with deeds was barely existent, however, and it would be several yeas into the Reagan administration before the relatively anernie Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force develsped by the doctrine evolved into the much more effective Central Command located at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. It was the Centval Commmd that was militarily in charge of operations in the Gulf:erisis and war. It was a150 the Central Command that pided the Kuwaiti refiaging tlperation in 1987, which, as melztioned previously, was the first sexious militasy commitment, as grescribed by the Carter Doctrine seven years earlier, and the precursor ta U.S. invofvemenl: in the Gulf in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1998. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put: the United States on a war footing in a way it had not k n m since the days of the Vietnam W=. The sdeetive service system was activated just in case a &aft: became necessary. Armalysts, authors, and pundits were dreaming up Third World W a scenarios, all foeusing on the Persian Gulf region as the likely iwition point, The country seemed weaker than ever, still hamstrung by the Vietnam syndrome and even incapable of r e s c u i ~ American hostages in Iran. It seemed as though news magazines were publishing frightening numbers every week in the fmrn of graphs depictring how the Soviet Union had moved so far ahead of us in tcrrns of nuclear and conventional military might. A second cold war had bemn, but the United States appeared ill pxepared to fight it. This set the stage for Ronald Reagan and a dramtic shift in erican polities, One could say that the times had h a l l y caught up (or regressed, depen&ng on one%view of progxess and the cold war/ with the former governor of California and foxmeas presidential can&date. His view of the Soviet Union was a throwback to the Manichean ourlook that predominated in the 1950s. Communism was an ideology that had to be resisted by the free nations of the world at all costs, and the Sovia Union was the "evil empire" that was bent on expmding communist influence at the expense of the West all over the globe,

fn this sense, the guerrillalcivil wars in places like El Salvador, Niea~agua,Angola, and especially Afghanistan were just as impm-t.ant; as NATO" confrontation with the Wasaw Pact, and an active U.S. posture in these Third W r l d proxy conflicts underginned what came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine. The United States had to build up its military to match (and possibly exceed) Soviet capabilities, but mowe importantly, a countsy still suffering from a bit of an inferioriq complex after Vietnam and Watergate had to build up its imae;e. President Carter's election was a reaction against the debacles of the early 1970s. He was a Washington outsider who preached human rights and emphasized a foreip policy based on North-South rather than East-Wst issues, AJthough the tremendous increase in military sgen&ng of the 1980s actually began during the latter portion of Garter's tenure in office, Ronald Reagan and the Republicans were seen as much better suited to fight the revived cold war. The Soviets had to be mrned back at every turn, and Afghanistan became not only the potential launching ground for Moscow%primary theat to Western interests but also the main vehicle far the Reagan adminimation" sesistmce to communist expansion, that is, an intensified containment policy. Turnabout is fajr play in polities and &plomacy; and the United States would do what it could to deegea the Afghani quagmire for the Soviets, much as the Soviets did to Americans in Vietnam. But there was one majar difference: The dilapiclated Soviet economy could not withstand the global pressure that the Reagan adminiswation applied, which only exacerbated the constant drain of the Af&ani conllict. As a result, the Soviet Union would first retreat from w a n i s t a n , and then it would implode. In retrospect, the Soviet invasion in 1979 turned out to be the be@nning of the end of the superpower cold war, although at the time there were few who would have gredicted this to be the case. Doubt and fear cast a long shadow over the Ufited States in December 2979, pxepari- the way for an old cold warrior and the Grand Old Party to reenter the mainstream of American pdities m d foreign, policymaking. konicafly, it was the end of the cold war and &sinlegration of the Soviet Union, largely broubt on, or at least greatly accelerated, by the quagmire in Afghanistan, that allwed the United States to assemble

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the United Nations-mandated Gulf war coalition in f99&1991, Gorbachev, in the last days of the existence of the Swiet Union and in the throes of economic and political upheaval, could ill afford to alienate a VVest that he hoped to tag far investmeat, aid, and debt relief. Therefore, the Soviets did not veto the alzti-Iraqi resolutions in the Security Council and thus enabled the caafition to form, This stands in cmtrast to the U.S.-led Multinational (not UN) Farce that was formed to intenrene in Lebanon in 1982, because the Soviets blocked any attempt by the United Nations to sponsor militay actian that might furher reduce their influence in the region and weaken the position of its client-state Syria, &thou& the Soviet Union did not actively suppmt the UN coalition during the Gulf crisis and was, it did not play the t d t i o n a l spoilex role ebaraeteristic of the cold war, and by default, its relative passivjty was a boon to the Bush administration's diplomatie egorts to isolate Iraq in the international cammunity. m a t the United States determined to be a serious threat to its vial interests in the Gulf region in 1979, as refiected in the Gartcr Doctrine, actually contributed to the dominant position of the United States in the Persian Gaff area as a result of the Gaff war. dthough a l"ax Americana, or something close to it, has been established in the Middle East as a result of the primary events of 1979 and their repermssions o v a the follovvJng ten to mteen years, new theats have emerged in &&rent forms to combat what is seen by same as the political, ecsnamie, and sociocdtuml impexialisrn of the United States, which has challenged not: mly political and economic independence on a national s a l e in the region but also cultural nourns and heritqe. A pxirne exarnple of this was a direet result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent American respmsq many would say that this has developed into Washingon" own "Frankenstein.'" The United States was ungrepared and unwilling to d;irectly ehalleage Moscow's intervelztian in &&anistan. This may have been part of the rmson for the Carter administration% relative passivity amid signs of a possible Soviet invasion; that is, the United Stares did not want any empty-theait bluff called by the Rrernlin. In. oxder to make it as dlffiwlt as possible for the Soviets in Afghanistan, the United States began to suppart though militay and economic aid the mujahideen, who had already been figbting the Soviet puppet regimes in Kabul

since 1978. The intelligence services of the United Staes and Saudi Arabia reportedly poured in some $6 billion worrh of weqons to the Mghan resistance.sg Our primary ally in the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan, then under the rejgn of General Zia al-Haq, became the conduit for U.S. assistance to the mujaha"deen.5" konically, fwan and the United States shared similar goals in Afghanistan, and as stated previously, Washington hoped fow a time that this might ereate a mare propitious environment for the release of the hostages. But Muslim countries the world over rallied to the cause of the mujahideen, and Muslim "volunt;eers'"from a plethora of nations bemn arriving in Afghanistan to lend a hand to the resiaance, something the Garter and Reagan administrations encouxaged, if not faciltated. Hand-held Stinger anti-aircxafi missiles were among the bevy of sophisticated U.S. weaponry that found its way into mujahl'dsm hands, anything that would give the rebels a Agheing chance, and moxe imporantly from the vievoint of Washington, enscmce the Soviets deeper into their labyrinth, making it mme expensive for the Kremlin to fight the war, much less win it.@A Cmdeveloped "undcrgomd railroad" of military aid, primarily throu& a series of bases established on the Pakis~aniside of the border with Mghanistan, became a weft-honed system of relief and hope for the bedraggled mu jahideen fighters, The Soviet Union realized within a few y e m that it would be nearly impossible to achieve total victory aigainst the rebels in a mountainous terrain that provided perfeet cover for guerrilla warhe. The Soviet Army might have controlled the major cities, though it was questionable at various times, but it could never subdue the countryside, As is well h o w , with the rise to power of rvlikhail Gorbschev in 1985, symbolizing a new generation of Soviet leaders who recognized the futility of the conflict and the tremendous economic and increasingly social drain it had on the country, Moscow began to downgrde its invoilvement in Afghanistm toward total withdrawal by early 1989. Despite oftentimes bitter differences between various mujahideen tribal groups, the resistance was successful, due to their tenacity, mot-ivarion, strategic knowledge and use af the tapogwaphy, and substantial aid from the United States as well as other Muslim countries.Al

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With the Sovie withdrawal from w a n i s t a n and U+S.-U.S.S.R. cooperatian in developing resolutions in the United Nations to bring to a close the irm-kaq war, the cold war was effectivcfy west officially consummated with the fall of the Berlin VVall in 1959. The Sovia Tfnioa continued to crumble, until out of the ashes of the Soviet empire a new Russia emerged at the end of 1991. Born kom the rump of the Soviet Union were a host of new nations in. the Baltics, Eastern Europe, and, most importantly for the hture of the Middie East, in. south-central Asia bordering the traditional regional confines of Turkey and ]Iran. Muslim countries such as Kaakbstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijm became new players in isfannic and Middle East politics. Given their strategic position along the old silk route to China and the fact that after the Persian Gulf this region may contain the laqest oil reserves in the world, the area inevitably became entangled in a web of irxtexnatimal politics, pipelines, and multinational oil companies. The pxoblem was that not only did the Soviet Union cmtinue to a m b l e but so did Afghanistan, thoroughly devastated and divided by the war, not unlilce Lebanon following the Israeli invasion; more than a million Afghanis perished during the ten-year Sovigt occupation, or almost 10 percent of the population. What little inhastructure that existed prior to December 1979 was in tatters, The only real power left after the pugpet regime folded upon the Soviet exit was a variay of religious tvibal blocs who essentially '"duked it outfJwith one another for a number of years, each group backed by a different coalition of external patrons. Ultimately, the power arising out of this frenetic mix was a g o u p calling itsdf the Taliban (students), a puritanical Sunni Muslim. regime that was ktwrnined to restore order to Afghanistan, even if it meant stripping away the heretofore existing freedom and tlpportunities of &ghani women and the more semlasized classes that had emerged during the yems of xist-Lminist leadership, The breakdown od society had been so thorough that peopte, at least at first, tended to accept the Taliban simply because they reduced the chaos. Having cast off one decadent secular ideofogy and supewo-tver already, the aeettmulated legitimacy of being involved in. doing so mdded the Taliban into an outpost of Islamic extremism and a lightning rod of Muslim discontent with the West, pauticularly with the one rernain-

ing supergotver.6z The Taliban are the children of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as is "talibanization'9he "destabilizing export ad Mghan-style rst$ical Islam. Osama bin Laden, a member of one of the wealthiest families in Saudi kabia, was one of those volunteers in the 1980s who went to Afghanistan to fight for Islam-and he was also one of those volunteers who were supported by the CM operations. Now one of the ten most wanted fugitives in the United States, he has allegedy built up a transnationd terrorist net-work (called al-Qaida) and has been aceused of numerous terrorist acts against American and h e r Western targets, most notoriously the bombing of the American embassy compounds in Kenya and Tanzania in 2988 and possibly the al-fiobar bombing on an American base located in Dhahran in the eastern grovince of Saudi Arabia in 1996, killing nirraeen U.S. military personnel." The al-Qaida nework has been accused of pZanning and/r>rbacking operations from China, Chechnya, and India to Jordan, Isxael, Saudi &;rbia, and even the United &ales, It is no surprise that after k i n g exiled from Saudi Arabia and hounded out ad several other countries, he has now established his safe haven somewhere in Afghanistan, The incident that transported bin Laden from being a well-known member of the mujahideen to an infamous international terrorist was the Western presence in Sau& Airabia during the Cuff crisis and wax. Many devout Muslims considered the presence of large numbers of non-Muslims in the country that houses the two most sacred sites in all of Islam (Mecca and Medinaf an abomination, To these same Muslims, it only underlined what they viewed as the subservience of the corrupt and hypocritical Saudi regime to the United States and the 'MTest*From this fight to rid Saudi Arabia of its infidel pxesenee sew an all-out war wdnst the Ufited States, Israel, and their presumed cohorts in and outside of the Middle East, m e n the United States dcgarts tbe Middle East in total and when Israel is destroyed and Ternsalem, the third holiest site in Islam, is restoxed as the capital of Palestine, then the war will end, This type of transnationd terrorism, intertwined with international weapons smuggling and procwement hnanced by opium production in Afi=banistarm,Pakistan, and Lebanon and intcmacional money launder-

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ing from Russia through E u q e and the United States, has ehanged the natwe of global threats in the postr>ressionby the superpowers and discredit plans like those of Sadat and [Saudi King] Fahd." Quoted in ibid., p. 23,

3. It should be noted, however, that although it is my opifion (as well as many others) that the Iranian revolution at least to some degree stimulated like action elsewhere in the Middle East, such as the Mecca incident, the extent to which Khomei~smactually appealed to Sunnis is debatable. Indeed, some contend that it &rove the wedge between Sunnis and Shiites deeper, despite the attempts by the re@me in Teheran to attract and inspire Sunni movements. As Olivieu Roy w ~ t e s "The : dominance of Shiism prevents Iran from laying claim to overall Isfannic radicalism, for the Sunnis cannot identify with it, The vimlexlt activism of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wahhabis [and the Taliban] is qenly anti-Shiite (and vice versa]. Iran's revolutional-y influence extended to Shiism and not to Islamic ra&calism.'Wliviex Roy, Tbe Failme of Palitical Islam (Cambridge:Haward University Press, 2 9943, p, 1191. 4, William B. Quandt, Sazrdz: Arabia h the 2 980s: Poreign Policy, Security, and Oil (Washinson, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 94, 5, Interior Mint.ster Prince Nayif stated in January 1980 that 127' Saudi sol&ers had been killed as a result of the siege at the Grand Masque, while 75 of the infiltrators also died. The French provided ""modest assistance" to the Sau&s during the incident; the French had been providing the Saudi securiv forces with =Pious types of assistance, inclu&ng counterterrofist traifing, Quandt, Saudi k a b i a in the 1880s, p. 83. 6. Saddam also digested 5l)O Sbiite demonstrators in Bahrain in August 2979 calling for the release of:one of their religious leaders and the establishment of: an Islamic state. As mendoned in the text, Bhrain, like Iraq, mnsisted of a m a j o ~ t yShiite population ruled by a Sunni minority. 7, Chronolom, Mid&e East Journal 33, no, 3 (Autumn 1979f:48'7. 8, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd asserted that prior to Iraq" attack on Iran in 1980, Saddam Hussein told him, ""Iis more useful to hit them Ithe Iranians] now because they are weak. If we leave them until they become strong, they will overmn us." See text of: interview with Kiw Fahd in London" slHawad-ith,Foreign Broadcast Informatian Sewice: Near East and Sou~hAsia, February 14, 1892, p. 21. (My thanks to Steve Yetiv at Old Daminion University for finding this quote for me). B. The Carter administration nonetheless initiated contacts with the a o m e i n i re@me, hoping to open up a dialope and possibly some sort of a relationship, 'The administration had no illusions about recreating anything dose to the relationship Washington had built up with the Shah, but since the new Islannic Republic was also vehemently anticommunist [and therefore not inclined to pursue relations with the Soviet Union], it was felt that a modus vivendi of sorts might be attainable. IQ,For more on this episode, see Gary Sick, AII Pal1 Dam: I"lmc?ricak Bagic Encomter 1Traa [New York: Penpin Books, 1986))pp, 3129-356, 12, For more on the makeup of: the v a ~ o u sfactions in the Iranian revolutionr see Nikki R, Keddie, Roots of RevoluL11"an:An htepretive History of n/40dern Iran (New Haven: Yale University PressJ 1981j. 112, By December it was clear that Iran had targeted Lebanon, with its Shiite majofity; as a p ~ m area e of inpess into the heartland of the Middle East and smack into the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was reported on December 10, 1979,

that "Lebanon closed its airspace to Iranian planes in order to prevent Iranian 'volunteersr from entefing the country to B&t against Israel alongside Palestinian ~errillils"[lehronolom, Middle East mzlrnal 34, no. 2 [Spring 19801: 173). On December 19, a second goup of Iranian volunteers had a r ~ v e d in S y ~ hoping a to make their way to Lebanon, (Ibid.] Earlier in the year, in September, Iranian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Ymdi met with President Wafiz al-"sad in Damascus. In October, S y ~ hosted a another Iranian high-level ofBdaf, this time Vice Prennier Sadiq Tabataba?. "sad then met with Iranian Remier Mehdi Baargan in Agiers in November. Obviously, Lebanon was a major subject of &scwsion, and it seems that the foundation for Iranian influence in Lebanon as well as the Iranian-Syri.an alliance was being laid. 13. Interestingly; most Shiite Muslims in southern Lebanon at first welcomed the Israeli invasion, since they, too, shared the initial Israeli objective of ridding the area of the PLO. To Shiite Muslims, the PLO had established a state within a state, often treating them with &sdain and inviting Israeli reprisals for guerfil'la activities that more often than not led to Shiite rather than PdestinJan casualties, It was the decision by Israel to stay on in south Lebanon that, in retrospect, was a monumental error and led directly to the radicalization of the Shiite community in Ldanon, which qened the door for both Iranian and Syri.an iduence. 14. Ironlcally; the Sanltinista regime came to power aftw overthrowing the U.S.-supported re@me of Anastasio Somoza on July 19, 1979. 15, Gary Sick, "The United States in the Persian Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment," in The Mddkg East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 2nd edition, ed, David W. Lesch (Boulder: Westview Press, 19991, p, 282. 16, This was not the Brst time an Islamist movement in E g s t attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president, By the end of 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been allied with revolutionary elements in the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952, had become &sillusioned by the seculafist Nasserist re@rne, especially after it simed in October 2954 what the Muslim Brotherhood thought was an inadequate agreement with Britain over BPitish withdrawal from E m t . In December, M3 loyalists tried to assassinate Nasser, and they. came very close to doing so, Thereaftel; the Nassedst regime arrestloyalists, effectively snuffing out ed, executed, and athewise repressed the movement: until the debacle of 1967, along with the w ~ t i n g sof executed Islannist ideologue Sawid Qutb and the economic dislocation and cormption of the Sadat years, resuscitated the movement in the late 1970s. 17, On the socioeconomic roots of Islarnisrn since the 2970s, see an excellent article by Philip S. fioury, '"slamic Revivalism and the Crisis of the Secular State in the k a b World: h Histo~caXAppraisal," in Arab Resomces: The Barzsformatioxz of a Sodety, ed. Ibrahim Ibrahim (London: Croom Helm, 19831, pp. 213-U4,In the Syrian case, it was an event in 1979 that exponentially raised the level of tension between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood, essentially foreclosing on the possibility of a peacehl resolution of the confrontation. On June 16 Islamists stormed a milita~cyacademy in Meppo killing 32 cadets and i n j u ~ n g54 others. On June 22, S y ~ a nInterior

Minister Adnan Dasagh stated that the government would "liquidate them mercilessly." Three years later at Hama, it did. Chronolom, M d d f e East Journal 33, no. 4 (Autumn 1979):491. 18. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Givgizations: Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster; 1996). 19. It is important to note, however, that the Soviet Union did not send any siaificant ~ l i t aid w to Iraq for about 18 months after the invasion in a show of &spleasure toward the Iraqi regime's decision to invade: at a time when the Soviets were involved in Afghanistan and in a position to improve relations with Teheran now that the United States was clearly on the outs with the Imnian, regime, 20, Inducing this line of thinking were pefiodic skirmishes between Arabs in Khmistan and Iradan government troops over the demand for more autonomy. A particularly bloocly- eonfxontation occurred in May 19'79, when at least 21 people were killed when Arab demonstrators engaged government troops in aorramshahr. Eadier, in April, representatives ham Khwistan had offidally demnded more autonomy for the province. Saddam had obviously taken notice of these events, 21, Mthaugl?. the GCG has made itself into a more formidable trading bloc than its constituent parts could have accomplished on their own, there are those who sugest that re@onal trade blocs such as this m y be comteqraductive to overall liberalization, and integration into the &lobal market, As Pierre Sauve and Amind Subramanitxn state, "The systemic effects of these regonal agreements far multilaiterali bargaining are penrerse: c o u n t ~ e sin a re@onal arrangement may actually oppose broad-based liberalization in the W O because their prefermtial access to each other's main e q o r t markets is likely to be eroded." "Weakness at the Heart of World Trade," RnanciaJ? Times, June 7, 2W, p. 17. 22. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States [London: Ithaca PressJ 19983, pp, 159-184. 23,The GCC would take this one step further in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war. In March 1991, the CCC c o u n t ~ e ssigned an ageemeat in. Damascus with Syria and Egmt that became known as the Damascus Declaration. The new organization, sometimes called the ""CCC Plus Two," intended to create an all-Arab security contingent [called the Arab Peacekeepixlg Force), with E m t and Syha provi&ng the bulk of the muscle and the ECC pmviding most of the financial support. Although the Damascus Declaration exists today mare in theory than reality, the partie;ipants still meet on occasion, whi& reminds evevane in the re@on of how inept the Arab League as a whole has been in providing security for its members, 24. See, for instance, Lawrence Freedman and Efraixn. Kasf.1,The Gulf Con&~t,2 :,a991 991 :Diplomacy and War in the New World Or&r (P1.-iraceton: Mnceton University Press, 1993); for a shorter treatment on the U.S.-Iraqi relationship &at led up to the waq see Amatzia Baram, "U.S. Input into Iraqi Decisionmaking, 1988-1990," in ixle Middle East and the United States: A Historicd and PoLz"tica1 Reassessment, 2nd ed,, ed. David W Lwch (Boulder: Westview Press, 19991, pp. 313-340; and far an excellent examination of the

decisionmaking prwess of the Bush adrninistratian in going to war to liberate Kuwait, see Steve A. Yetiv's upconning book, at the present time tentatively titled, Fateh1 Decisions: ExpIahing the Last Major Middle East Crisis of the 2at-h Ce;ratmy.

25. There were a number of other Iraqi claims as well, such as accusing the Kuwaitis of puposely exceeding their OPEC oil production quota in order to flood the oil market and drive down the price of oil, which inhibited the ability of Iraq to recover from the war with Iran. Although this may have been a serendipitous result from the Kuwaiti point of view, the p~mauy.reason for Kuwaiti ove~productionwas economic; by 1990, Kuwait actually received more revenue from its investments abroad than from its considerable oil production, investments that would bring a hi&er return with boistemus emnomies fueled by low oil p&.icesand subsequent low inflation rates. Saddam Hussein also made the rather spufious claim, as did one of his predecessors, Colonel Abd al-brim Qassirn, in. 1961, that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq; indeed, it was called the nineteenth province of Iraq, based on the fact that Kuwait had been a part of the province of Basra in the Ottoman Empire. The Iraqi president obviously ovedooked the fact that, if anything, Iraq is more of an artificial creation than Kuwait, having been pieced together by. the viictorious Entente powers following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire: in World War I. 26. See Amatzia Baram, "U.S. Input into Iraqi Decisionmaking, 1988-1990," in The Mid&& East aad the United States: .A Histori~aland PoIitieaX Reassessment, 2nd ed., ed. David W Lesch (Boulder:Westview Press, 19991, pp. 3 13-340. 27, It is important to remember, however, that even if the Bush adrninistration had been so inclined, it would have been &facult, if not counteuproductive, to move a deterrent force into the Gulf in an attempt to force Iraq's massing troops to retreat. Washingtonr$allies in the Gulf, including Kuwait and Saudi habia, had resumed their arms-lenah relationship with the tTnited States, preferring to distance themselves for fear of domestic backlash-espedally since the U,S, presence in the Gulf had been demonstrably enhanced d u ~ n the g Iran-Iraq war. Gulf leaders, in addition to E m t i a n President Wosni Mubarak, who met with Saddam just prior to the invasion, were assufing the Bush administration that Iraq was just sslber rattling in order to intimihte Kuwait to make concessions on some of the outstan&ng issues between them. tl;(l the Bush administration could do at the time, in terms of concrete action in the Gulf, was to hold a joint refueling exercise with the UAE. 28. Until that time, most analysts predicted Saddam would remain in Kuwait City and not spxing the proverbial trip wire by moving to the Saudi border, Many figmed that Iraq would withdraw after securing Kuwaiti concessions, keeping the Rumaylah oil field and offshore islands and possibly darna@ngor destroying Kuwait" oil production capability in. order to h v e up the price of oil. Most of the active Saudi oil fields are in the northeast portion of the cowtry nearest to the Kuwaiti border and, therefore, are particularly vulnerhle to quick incursian, which is something that actmlly could have been amomplished before U.S. troops a r ~ v e den nnasse, thus dramatically &iving

up the price of oil, Oil was a major factor, of course, in U,$. calculatians. Underlining this importance was the fear in the m i t e House that the countries emerging from under the Soviet yoke at the end of the cold war desperately needed a moderate oil price. If the price of oil continued to rise or stay at hei&tened levels in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion, it could have severely curtailed the ability of: these countries to stabilize themselves economically. and sumive the break from the Soviet bloc, The oil markets needed the United States to take dramatic action in order to correct the oil price imbalance, Indeed, the day the United States launched @eration Desert Storm, the price of oil dropped. 24;).See Yetiv, Patefsrl Decisions. 30- On the pros and cons of "ha1 containment,'"ee Graham Fuller et al., ""Smposium on Dual Containment: U.S. Policy Toward Iran and I r a ~ " Middle East Policy 3, no. 3 11994): 1-26; Robext S, Deutsch er al., ""Smposium: From Containment to Stability," Middle East Policy 5, no. 2 (19971: 1-21; and Robert S, Deutsch et al., "Diferentiated Containment,'" Foreign Affairs '7fi3no. 3 (May-June 1997):20-52. 3 1, Similar to hesidexlt Haaz al-1sad"s decision to support Iran against going against the grain in support of the U.S,-led coalition was not Iraq, S y ~ a % all that illoacal when one considers the circumstances, The same differences between Syria and Iraq that compelled Damscw to support Teheran in the Iran-Iraq war still existed. On top of that, with the end of the cold war and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union, it was clear that S y ~ a "supewower patron would be unable to provide it with the political, economic, and military support to which it had become accustomed. In a sense, HaBz al-*Asadrs decision to join the coalitian was Syfia's conaing-out party to the West in the hope of gaining more favorable csnsideration from the European Union in economic termsJ build bridges to the United States, acquire much needed aid from what would certainly be a most gateful set of &ab countries in the Gulf, and, as a quid pro quo, solidify its position in Lebanon-and, indeed, all of these thiws occurred to a @eater or lesser degee. 32. On the Axab cold war, see MaXcolm Herr" classic work, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Rash and His Rivals, 2958-4870 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971j. Mso see Fawaz A. Gerges, The Supepowers and the M d d l e East: Regianal and International Polilrics, 1955-4%7 [Boulder: Westview Press, 1994). On the Sy~an-Iraqirelationship, see Malik Mufti, Sovereig~Greatians: Pan-Arab_ism and PoIil-ical Q d e r in SyPla and Iraq (Xtkraca: Cornell Udversity Press, 1996). 33. Gkassan Sdame, "Inter-hab Politics: The Return of Geography;" in The Middle East: Ten Ears Afier Camp David, ed. William B. Quandt (Washington, D-C.: Br~okingsInsdtution, 19881, p. 3312. See also David W. Zesch, "Flanks, Balances, and Withdrawals: The Parameters of Syrian Policy in the Middle East Since the 1979 Emtian-Israeli Peace Treaty," in The Middle East Bnae2.s the 21st Gentuq2ed. Robert O. Freedman (farthconaingj. 34, Ikid., pp. 322-323, Salame adds that in addition to the CCC led by Saudi kabia, and the Levant tving to be led by Syfia, the North &ican states had been relatively ""neutralized" in inter-&ab affairs after displaying considerable

innuence, especially Momcco and Algefia, in the early to nnid-297Qs, Part of the reason for this was the eruption of the Western Sahara issue in 19'75, which pitted Momcco against Aleria, and Libya's growing mavefick behavior (Salome, '"nter-kab Politics" pp. 336-338).Ila addition, in my o p i ~ o nEgypt , acted as not only a geogapfnical b ~ d g ebetween the M a & ~ b[the i'westernf' Arab states, that is, North M ~ c aand f the Mashriq [or Arab East, which may or may not include Egmt j but also a political one, something of a conduit into mainstream Arab affairs. One must remember that Nasser touted E m t as the link or center of three concerxtric circles; the Middle East, Ahca, and the Islannic world. after the peace, the Egwtian link was severed. 35, Saddam also delivered the opening address at the Arab Leame summit meeting in Tknis on November 20, 1979, 36. Interestingly, in May 1979 Begin had proposed that Lebanese President Xlyas Sarkis meet with him to discuss the '*si@ing of a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon." Althou& the Lebanese rejected the proposal, this may have been the first public instance of the Be@n government focusing on Lebanon in the afterrnth of the peace treaty with E m t , presagng a similar attempt, by a &fferent methodology, in 1982. Also in 1979, in Apel, Lebanese Christian militia leader Colanet S a g daddad met with Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, and soon after he announced the creation of an independent "Free L&anon.'9n south Lebanon. under the control of Cluristlian nnilitias. The foundation for the South Lebanese Army [SLAj, a mostly Ckafistian army initially under Haddad's smmand, was thus being laid, and it would remain allied to Israel all the way until its &ssolution upon Israel's unilateral withdrawal ham Lebanon in 20QQ. 37. The multinational effort can be divided into two parts, the one relatively successful, the other a disaster. Multinational Force I (MNF I) had the well-defined goal of escorting the PLO out of Beirut, with a clear exit strategyj this was viewed as a success. The chaos in Lebanon that followed the September 1982 assassination of L&anese President Bashir Gemaye1 and the subsequent Phalangist retribution against Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps compelled, in a knee-jerk reaction, the multinational force to re-enter Beirut JMNF IIf under the rather undefined rubric of somehow restoring stability and order in Lebanon, It was this ambiwous objective, with no clear exit stratlegy; that helped create the environment for the disasters that would soon befall MNF XI and its eventual retreat from Lebanon by early 2984. See Anthony McBermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, eds., The Madti~ationarTForce in B e h t , 1982-2984 (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1981). 38. For instance, a former Emtian deferrse minister, Abd al-Walim Abu Ghmala, who also semed Presidexl~Hosnji Mubarak as an adviser until 1993, stated the following: ""lPeae with Israel is impossible. The peace we refer to is the just and stable peace that is rejected by Israel, which Bnds shelter in its arsenal of weapons of mass destmction. and in the unconcealed American pmtection it receives, However, we should not be intimidated by this. Expe~ence shows that we are capable of dekating it, The [Israeli] nuclear threat can be neutralized if the Arab states, especially those borde~ngIsrael, succeed in

obtaining weapons capable of striking the Israeli depth, cawing significant casualties and damage." Middle East Newsline, July 18,2000, 39, Saad Eddin &rahirn, "Domestic Developments in E m t t f 9 nThe MdlZIe East: T ~ Yeam B Afier Camp David, ed. WiIliann B. Quandt [Washington,D.G.: Brookings Institution, 19881, p. 60, 40. William B. Quandt, ""Xtroduction," in inbe Mid& East: Ten Ears Af-ter Camp I)avlz"d, ed, William 13;. Quandt (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 19881, p. 5. 41, The so-called final status issues wnsisted of the following: border dewreations between Israel and a presumed independent Palestinian state; the disposition of the more than 3.6 million UN-re@stered Palestinian. , Arab East refugees; the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza S t ~ pand Jemsalem; water-sha~ngof scarce water resources; and the question of Jerusalem, that is, whether it would remain the un&videh capital of Israel, or whether Arab East Jerusalem would become the capital of a new Palestinian state (as demanded by the PLO), or whether there would be some sort of complex sovereignty-sha~ngformula, 412. Interestingly; Hilde Hen~ksenWaage, deputy director of the Peace Research Institute in Qsla, Nomay; in his report titled ""NamegiansZ VVho Needs Norwegians?" commissioned by the Norwe@an Department of Foreign Affairs in 2000 and presented in January 2001, asserts that Yasir k a f a t first envisioned the idea of utilizing Oslo as an intermediary with Israel in 1979 following the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, &afar reportedly saw Norway as a perfect choice since it had excellent relations with Israel, the United States, and the Palestinians, Reported in Middle East Newsline, January.2 0,200 1, 43. OfBciall~;the accords were s i a e d by representatives of the Soviet puppet government in Qbul and the Pakistani government. Conspicuous by their absence, and foreshadowing the internal Afghani conflict to come, were any representatives from the mujahideen, As J. L. Richardson noted, "T%eAccords were negotiated at arm" Ilengh between a government highly dependent on its supelrgower protector (some obsemers would insist that it was totally dependent] and a government which informally controlled the supply of arms to the Mujahideen but had limited influence over their actions and represented their interests only to a limited extent. The exclusion of the Mujahideen from the &plomatic process, of course, points to the p~ncipalanomaly of the Accords. To constmct a paralld in the Vietnamese case one would have to e n ~ s a g ae third party, say China, negotiating on behalf of North Vietnam with the government of South Vietnam,'j 1. L, Richardson, ""Conclusions: Management of the Afghan Crisis,'Yn The Soviet W i t h d r a w l from Afghanistan, ed. Amin Saikal and William Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19891, p. 162, 44, An opinion poll taken in X985 stated that only one in four of the Soviet adult urban population approved of Soviet policy in Mghanistan, William Maley; "The Geneva Accords of April 1988," in The 3ot.l"et Witb&awal from Afghanistan, ed. Amin Saikal and William Maley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19891, p, 15.

45. T. H. Rigby; "The Afghlan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics," in me Soviet W i t h d r a w l from Afghankstan, ed, Amin Saikal and William m l e y (Cambridge:Cambridge Uaiversiv Press, 19891, p. 73. 46, See Geor@yMirsky, "The Soviet Perception of the U.S. Threat," in The Mddle East aad the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 2nd ed., David W. Lesch (Boulder:Westview Press, 19991, pp. 395403, Mrsky was one of those Soviet academics warning the Kremlin, as he has been an. ad.visor to several SovietlRussian leaders and is one of Russia's most Bistinwished scholars. He states: ""Een before the final collapse, there was a sea change in foreign policy. hti-impefialism as a guideline disappeared; pmmoting socialism worldwide became a futile task. Diplomatic relations with Israel had to be restored, De-ideolo@zationmeant that our relations with the Arab world were no longer dictated by the commitment to leftist Arab xe@mes and the need to deny the United States the dominant role in the area" (p. 401j. 417. %chard A. Falk, "The Afaanistan %ettlement%nd the Future of World Polities," in in:e Sot.l"et Withdrawal from Afghanistan, ed. Amin Saikal and Williarn Maley (Cambfidge: Cambridge University Press, 1989j, p. 144. However, as Mirsky comments, when Corbachev "gave the geen light to deStalinization, little did he think that very soon it wodd turn into deZelliniaation and de-Bolshevization.""Mirsky, "The Soviet Perception of the U.S. Threat," p, 401. On elements of the new political thinking, see Robert O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since the 1nvassx"on of Afgl;zanl'stan 1Cambl.idge: Cambedge University Press, 198l),p. 206, 48. Falk, "The Af6anistan %ettlement,"". 152. 49, aid., pp. 14-145. SQ.Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East, pp. 3 17-3 18. 51. aid., p*318, 52, %id, 53. There are those who contend that the warming of:relations between the two superpowers that c h m c t e ~ z e ddetente policy as carried forward by the Nixon administration actually began to unravel with the close confrontation at the end of the 1973 kab-Israeli war, simaling a renewed wld war evalry in the Third World, which reached its fruition in Afghanistan. See Janice Gross Stein, ""Flawed Strate&es and Missed Simals: Crisis Bargainixlg Between the Supeqowers, October 1973," in The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessmeat, 2nd edition, ed, David W. Lescb (Boulder:Westview Press, 19991, pp. 206226. 54. As Geoffrey fukes states, "Abstention from direct involvement in conflicts that they could not be sure of winning, such as Karea and Vietnam, helped the Soviet armed forces to aquire in the eyes of potential adversaries, and perhaps also in their own, a reputation for great capability; based on the one hand upon their undoubted achievements in the Second World War, and on the other upon their sheer size and estimates of the scale and quality of their equipment. So when Soviet farces entered tlfghanistan, non-communist governments initially took their ability to dominate it for granted, and drew far-reaching strate@cconclusions about Soviet designs an Gulf ail resources am sea-borne oil, traffic." Geoffrey jukes, "The Soviet Armed Forces and the

M&an Waq'9n The Soviet Withkawal from A f g h ~ ~ s t aed. n , &in Saikal and William Maley (Cambxidge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),p. 82, As Jukes notes, however, Soviet armed forces were mainly prepaed and trained to fi&t a more traditional war against the United States and its NATO allies and not the type of guerrilla and comterinsurgency warfare characte~sticof the Afghani conflict (pp. 84-85), It also should be mentioned here that the Soviet: invasion equally alamed China, particularly so soon after the Sovietbacked Vietnamese invasion of Gannboaia ealier in the year, who perceived the invasion as an attempt; to encircle, if not isolate, Beijing, 55. For a text of the Carter Doetfine, see Appendix C. For other statements made by President Carter in reaction, to the Soviet invasion, see Edward W. Judge and John W Langdon, eds., The Cold War: A Hist~l"y.Through Documents (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Half, 19991, pp. 198-206, 55. G a v Sick, " n e United States in the Pemiart Gulf: From Twin Pillars to Dual Containment," in The Middlk: East and the Um'ted States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 2nd ed., ed, David W. Lesch [Boulder: Westview Press, 19991, p. 280, 57. &id. 58, "Af&an Camps, Hidden in Hills, Stymied Soviet Attacks for Years," New York Times, Auwst 2Ltl 1998, p. A1. 59- Before the Soviet invasion, VVashinson had actually been quite &Spleased with events that had been transpiring in Pakistan, especially the lack of democratic processes. Indeed, after Zia al-Haq had former president Zulfikar Bhutto executed on April 4, 1979, the United States two days latex announced it had cancelled ecsnomic and militav assistance to Pakistan after concluding that Islamabad was building a plant to produce weqons-grade enriched uranium. The invasion of Afghanistan, therefore, clearly reversed this trend, as mutual interests made for a much closer relationship between Washington and Islamabad. 60. The United States began to send Stinger and Blowipe anti-aircraft missiles by mid-1986, which proved to be a turning point in mujahideen. capabilities. Accor&w to one sowee, the Soviets lost 512 aircraft and helicopters between January and November 188'7, a dramatie increase from the per/iod prior to the arrival of the anti-missile weagonx3r, Male5 "The Geneva Accords of Apfil 1988," p 116, in n e S~Trl'etWithdrawal from Afghanistan, 61. The vacous Islamist groups did succeed in formixlg a loose csalition in May 1985 known as the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen, which, along with crucial AmeI-ican military aid by 1986, better coord;inated and enabled mujahideen military. activities against the Soviets. 62. As Olii~exRoy stated in 1994, clearly presagng the rise of a goup bike the Taliban, "Tawxd the end of the 1 9 8 0 ~ the ~ failure of the Islamist revolutionav idea [as in &an]brou&t about the drift of a revolutionary, political, Third World type of Islamism, incarnated in. the kanian revolution, toward a pu~tanical, preackng, populist, conservative neofmdarnentalism, fimnced until recently by Sau& kabia but violently anti-Western, pafiicularly since the end of the East-West confrmtation has ceased to east ~ornrnunismas a foil," Roy, Ilrte Pailwe of Political Islam, (Cambcdge: Harvard Univ. P,, 1989)p. 25.

63. The Taliban is pfimarily composed of Pushtun tlf&anis, It emerged in late X994 as a messianic movement made up of students (taliban) who had been studying in Islannic malrrasas (religiousschools) in Pakistan as refugees from the Soviet invasion. They adopted a corrupted form of Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam that arose in hdia to wnkont British wlonialism. Pakistani Deobandis had established by then a political party in Pakistan called the Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Islam(JUI),an extremist Islamist group that had an anti-Amefican bent. The JUI attached itself to the alliance that brou&t Prime Minister Ileaazir Bhutto to power in 1993, thus b~ngingthe party into mainstream politics. From there it increasindy established strong links with the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (IS11 and with numerous military officers, especially those brought in during the days of Zia al-Haq, who had systematically begun the funhmentalist upsurge (and as many contend, with the support of Washington, which did not mind seeing gowing worldwide Islamist ornosition to Soviet interests]. The strength of the JUI has gown in recent years and has become intimately linked with the Pakistani confrontation with India over Qshmir. As a resulit, the Taliban has been strondy. supported by the Pakistani government unwilling to break its links with the JUI or Taliban (as demanded by the Clinton ad~nistrationf,which lends it necessary le@timacyand popularity in the inflammatory issue of Kashmir and in other aspects of the tense relationship with hdia. See &med Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," "reign Affairs 78, no, 6 (NovemberDecember 1989):12%35, 64. The identification, of the perpetrators of the al-Khobar bombing is still pending. The Clinton administration, in response to the embassy bombings, launched a surprise cmise missile attack on August 21) against a suspected bin Laden base in Afghmistan, Apparently the primary target, bin. Laden himself, had left the compomd just before the nnissiles hit, 65. Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extxennismrrfpp. 22-B. 66. Ibid., p, 3 1. 67. As Rashid states, "The joint venture between the Taliban and the JUX, funded by Saudi Wabhabis and supported by the Pakistani 1st has become an ever-eqanding enterprise, seeking new markets in Central Asia and beyond" (Rashid, "The Taliban: Eworting Extremism," p. 27). With the abundance of new oil resemes being discovered in Central Asia, particularly in places such as bzakhstan, herbaijan, and Kyxmzstan, and being exploited by Western multinational ail corporatians, oil politics has inevitably become intertwined with this rising threat of instability; which many arme just enhances the need for a more active and fornand foreigrr policy by the frVest, led by Washington, toward the regon-and not ~ u s focusing t on Osama bin Laden. 68. As one of the commanders under Gulbud&xl:Hekmatyax, the head of the t d u ~ the g Soviet mupation who eventustrongest coalition of I s l a ~ sparties ally took over Kabul( in the early x;tineties, stated in 1994, "The whole m m t v is a university for jihad. . . . We haw had Emtiains, Sudanese, habs, and other fareipers trained here as assassins," New York T h e s , Aumst 124, 1898, p. Al69. Sumit Ganmly.,"'Pakistan's Never-Ending Staq: m y the October Coup Was No Suqfise," "reign Affaks 79, no. 2 (March-Apfil2000):2-7,

70. Rashid, "The Taliban: Eqorting Extrennismrt". 28, 71. En addition, as Rashid notes, the ""Ilamicization" of the Kashmiri conflict Etas "undernzined both the Rashnnifis%wn. demand for self-determination Erom India and Pakistan's bid to win international me&ation of the dispute." And the longer the conflict is supported by Arab and Af&ani recruits turning it into a "Taliban jihad," the more they lose world sympathy. Rashid, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," p 228, 72, Associated Press report, San An tsnio Express-News, August 10,2000. 73. As a sign of' this new phenomenon, I receive on-line daily reports on Middle East activities from a service in Israel called Middle East Newsline. More often than not, there is a daily report on some aspect of tf.S.-CKnese relations regarding Beijing's exportation to what Washinsan. calls ""sates of concern" of long-range missiles or teehnolom that could be utilized in weapons of mass destructionr or discussions in Congess over concerns the United States has in general: regarding Chinese policy, Afghanistan brou&t China straight into the Mddle East. 74, Rashid, "The Taliban: Eqorting Extrennismrt". 33. 75, Ibid. Rashid naees that the opposition Northern Aliance also imposes a similar tax on q i u r n production and shipments under its control, 76, Ibid., p. 34. 7"7 Ibid. 78. Ibid., p. 35, 79,Actually it was OMEC (the Organization of Axab Evorting Petroleum Countries) that launched the embargo, that is, the Arab members of OPEC, The embargo was first placed upon the United States and the Nethedands; later added to the list were Rhodesia, Portugal, and South Afrlica. In addition, in November 1973, OAPEC announced a 25 percent reduction in production from the September 1973 levels. 80. Mohammed Abu Al Khail, "The Oil Price in Pmpective," in The PsIitics sf MddIe Eastern Oil,ed. J. E. Peterson [Wlashingon, D.C*: Middle East Institute, 19831, p. 72. 8 1, Ibid. 82, Dankwart A. Rustowf Oil and mrmoil: America Faces OPEC and the M d d l ~East [New York: vvl W Norton, 19821, p, 183. 83- Ibid., p, 184.

1, The Palestinjan uprising began when Likud party leader Afiel Shamn, who is despised by Palestinians far his role in an attack on a fordanian village in the 1950s and his role in the Sabxa and Shatila massacres in X982 in Lebanon, visited the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Shafif, one of the holiest sites in all of Islam, containing the Dome of the Rock and the al-Agsa mosque, both of which were built in commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad" legey to heaven, and it is certainly the holiest site in all of Judaism, being the location. of the destroyed First and Second Temples, origi-

nally constmcted by Solomon and later rebuilt by Herod the Great. The Western VIlalZ (or Wailing Wall] is all that remains of the Second Temple. Why Sharon made such a gesture in such a volatile atmosphere is left to speculation, but many suggest that by reasserting Israel" claim to all of fernsalem Sharon was trying to solidify his position within Likud prior to probable new elections for prime minister (elections were indeed held in February 2001, and Sharon was elected peme minister in a landslide victory over Ehud Barak). f i e Palestinians, who were intensely frustrated by the failure of Camp David in July and indeed by the whole Oslo process, and possibly spurred on by the example of Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, cathartically vented their anger following the Sharon visit-an anger that most agee was exploited by Yasir kafat to some degree in an attempt to solidify his political position and increase his negotiatirrg leverage. There followed attacks by Palestinians on Israelis and Jewish sites and Israeli military comtermeasures that most described as nothing less than a mini-war. 2. Underscoring this recowition, amid discussions between Emtian and b e r i c i m officials concerning a free trade ageernent between the two cauntuiies, House representatives in Congress sent a letter of support to President Clinton in which it was stated: " E m t , one of berica's most important k a b allies, is essential to our re@onal security interests. Egypt was the first Arab nation to conclude a peace agreement with Israel and is fundamental ta moving peace negotiations fomard between Israel, the Palestinians, and other Arab states.'Widde East Newsli~e,November 6 , 2 W , p. I I, 3. On November 20, 2000, Egmt withdsew its ambassador to Israel in protest of a very intense Israeli milital-y response against PNA targets in the Eaza Strip, follawing a Palestinian bomb attack against an Israeli school bus full sf children the previous day, 4. As one scholas noted, "The overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979-seen by Muslims as a vindication of: Islam against the corrupting influence of the West-was a watershed for Islamic acthists. It demonstrated the vitality of Islamic political ideology as an independent force and inspired like-minded activists throughout the Muslim world. The successes in Af&anistan against the Soviet foxes further strengthened the idea of: Islam as a viable political ideology. Consequentlyt Islamic acdvists came to understand the political utility of religion and the effectiveness of using the mosque as a center of protest in countries where oy>r>ositionwas othewise banned." "ott W. Hibbard and David Little, Islamic Activlism and U,$. Foreign Policy (Waskngton, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 19971, p. 10, 5. Louis f, canto^, ""Svereignty Is with God and His Kklafa Are the Ulama,'WasIim Demoerat 2, no. I (February 20001: p. 8. 6, Middle East NewsBne, Aupst 28, 2000, 7. Terrorist experts, however, point out that the timing of the attack on the USS GoJe was only wincidental with the al-Aqsa intffadah since the general consensus is that the relatively sophisticated operation required at least several months of planning, probably be@nningwell before even the fuly Camp David surndt. It is also interesting to note that Qsama bin Laden's family is Sau& but of Yemeni o ~ @ and n that Yemen was one of the lea&ng

contributors in the Arab world, in terms of the nunnber of volunteers, to the mu jaJlicJee~war effort in Mghanistan. 8. The term "erassing" has reverential connotations within E m t . It refers to what in the Egyptian, view was the almost miraculous military crossing of: the Suez Canal at the be@nnixlg of the 1973 hab-Israeli war amid h e a v Israeli artillery fire from the Israeli-controlled east bank of. the canal. The audadous operation was successful and preceded the establishment of the E m t i a n bfidgehead on the east bank. It is k n o w in E m t simply as "The Crossing" and is celebrated eveuy year in on October 6, the day when the military operation was launched in 1973. Ironically; it was also the day that &war Sadat was assassinated by Xslarnie extremists in X881 amid the annual ceremonial pageantry. commemorating the event

Hiatary and Annualization

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Amirahma&, Hooshang, and Nadar Entessar, eds. &an and the Arab World, New York: St. mrtinrs Press, 1993. Bakhash, Sbaul. The Reign of the Ayat~llahs:Iran and the IsTslamic Revolut;z"on, New York: Basic Books, 1984. Freedman, Lawrence, and Efraim Harsh, The Gulf Conflict, 1890-1 992 3 Diplomacy and War .in the New World Oxdex. Princeton: Princeton ZTnivexsiw Press, 1993. Halliday; Fred. Islam and the Myth of Confrontation:Religisn and Polil_icsin the Middle East. London: I, 3. Tauris, 1995. Hume, Cameron R. The U ~ i t e dPJatioas, Ixarz, and kaq: How Peacemaking Changed. Bloominson: Indiana ZTniversiw Press, 2994. Heddie, Nikki It. Roots of RevoJ~tion:AB In terpretive History of Modern ban. New Haven: Yde University Press, 1981, Hhomeini, Xmam. &lam and Revslution. Translat ed by Hamid Algar. Berkef ey: Mizan Press, 1981. King, Ralph. "The Iran-Iraq War: The Political I m p l i e a t i o n s , ' ~ d e pPapers ~ 219, Sprj;ng 1987. Zesch, Daivid W., ed. The Middle East and the United States: A Historical and Political Reassessment, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, Milani, Mohsen M, The ntfaking of 1ra~'sIslamic Revolutiozl:Prom Moaarckry to Islamic Republic. Boulder: Watview Press, 1994, Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Polil_icsin Iran, New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, Parsa, msa&. Social Qdgin of the Iranian Revolutian, New Bmnswlck: Rutgers University Press, X 989. Peterson, J. E., ed.. The PolilCics of Middle Eastern Oil, VVashington, D.C.: Mddle East Institute, 1983, Quandt, Wifliam B, Saudi Arabia in the 298Cls: Fareign Polic;y, Scsculr"ty,and Oil. Washington, D.C.: Brooking3 Institution, 198X. Ramazani, R. K., ed. Iran's Revolul.l"on: The Search fox Consensus, Blo o ~ n g t o nIndiana : University Press, 1990. Rubin, Barry. Paved m'th Good Intentions: The Ame&can Experience and Iran, New York: Penguin Books, 1982.. Rustow, Dankwart A. 0i1 arzd m m o d : America Faces OPEC and the Middle East. New York: W. W. Norton, 1982. Shawcrass, William. The Shahflast Ride: The Fate of an sly. New York: Sirnon and Scf-ruster, 1988. Sick, Gary, A_lk Farfl D o w : America m a g i c Encounter w'tka Iran. New York: Penguin Books, 1986. U.S. News Ik. VVorld Report. Tdumph Without Victov: The Hi~t02"y. of the Persian Gu# Mrar, New York: Times Books, 1993. Voll, J o b Qbert. Islam: Csnthuity and Cha~ge.in the Modern World, Boulder: Westview Press, 1982. Uetiv; Steve. Fateful Decisions: E ~ l a i & g the Last Major Msfdle East Cdsis of .the 20th Ceatary, Unpublished manusc~pt.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said. The n/4akkg of the m d e m Gulf States, London: Ithaca. Press, 1998.

Bickerton, Xan J., and Carla L, Klausner. A Concise Histom of' the Arab-Israeli Confict. Upper Saddle River, N.1,: Prentice Hall, 1898, Freedman, Robert Q., ed. The Middle East S h c e Camp DaTrjd, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. Freedman, Robert Q., ed. m e MdlZIe East Afier the Israe& Invasion of Lebanon. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986, jureidini, Paul A,, and R, D, McLaufin, Beyond Camp Da-vZd: Emergjag Alignments and Leaders i n frkre Middle East. Syraeuse, NIX.: Syxaeuse University Press, 1981, Khouri, Fred J. The Arab-hraefi Dilemma, 3rd ed. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syxaeuse University Press, 1985, Lwch, David W., ed. Ilzc: Middle East and the United States: A Histoxica_7and Political Reassessment, 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998, Lorem, josqh I), Egypt and the Ara6s: Foreign PQ&GY.and the Search ;for National I d e ~ t i t y Oxford: . Westview Press, 1990, Quandt, Williarn B. Camp DarrZd: Peacemakhg and P&tics. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986, Quandt, Wifliam B. Decade of Decisions: A m e ~ c a nPoficy Toward the ArabIsraeli Con&ct, 1967-1976. Bexkeley: U~versiryof California Press, 1977. Quandt, William B, Peace; Process: American Diplomacy and the Axa b-l;sxael;i Conpct gince 196 7. Berkeley: University of California Press, 19%. Quandt, WiXliam B,, ed. The Middlfs East: Ten Years Afiex Camp Dadd. VVslsfiington, D,C-: Brookings Institution, 1988, Rabinovich, ]Etamar. The War fox Lebanon, 2 970-2 985. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. Reicb, Bernard, ed. h a b-Israeli 6021flict an8 Concdiation: A Documentary Histom. Westport, Conn,: Praeger, 1995. Safran, Nadav, Israel: The Embattled Ally. Cannb~dge:Belknap Press of: Hamard University Press, 1982. Smith, Charles D, Palestine and the Arab-IsraeI' Conflict. New York: St. Martin" Press, 200 1, Spiegel, Steven. L. The Other Am b-Israeli Conflict: Makhg America's MidcZle East Policy, from Truman t o Reagan, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Stein, Kenneth W. Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissingeu, Carter, Begifz, and the Quest, New York: Routledge, 1999.

hnold, h t h a n y . Afghanistan: The Soviet hvasion in Perspective. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985.

Freedman, Robert 0. Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Poljcy gince the Invasion of Afgbanr;Ftarz,Camb~dge:Cambridge University Pxess, 1991, Ganguly, Sumit. ""f"akistanfs Never-ending Stoq: Why the October C o q Was No Surprise," h r e i g ~Affairs 79, no. 2 (March-Apfif 2OEX)J:2-7. Hammond, Thsmas T. Red Hag over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Go~seqzxences,Boulder: Westview Press, 1984. Kakar, M, Hassam, Afghanistan: me Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, l 979-1982. Berkeley: University of Califorfia PressJ 3,995. mndelbaum, Michael, ed. C e n a d Asia and the World. New York: Council on Foreip Relations Press, 1994, Rashid, Ahmed, "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism," "reign Afffairs '78, no. G (November-December19991: 2 M 5 . Ray, Olivier. The Fadare of Political Isjam, Translated by Carol Yolk. Camb~dge:Hamard University Press, 1994, Sdkal, Amin, and William Maley, eds, The Soviet W i t h d r a w l from LCZfgha~ll'stan.New York: Camb~dgeUniversity Press, 3,989.

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Achmaenid dynasty; 30 Afghanistan: the assassination of a U.S, ambassador in, 63-64 Soviet invasion of, X-xi, 2, 4, 45-56,64,94-109,

119, 123

and the siping of the EmtianIsrael peace treaty, 15 strate@cimportance of, 4 5 4 6 al-"sad, Wafiz, 38, 74, 83, 88, 92 al-Bahf Hasan, 62 Algeria, 97 Mgiers Ageement, 84 al-Waq, Zia, X 02, 105 al-Nassex; Carnal Abd, 2, 35,36 al-Qaida terrorist network, 104, 106-107, 118

n, Hafiizullah, 47-49, 51-55, X 60n28 h e i e n t CTitefion of Change, 16 Ando-Iranian Oil Company (AOIC), 31

Angola, 95 hntales school, 13, 221-25 h n a n , Kofi, ll 4 hrxualization, X, 1, 10-12 h t h r ~ p o l 23-24 o~~ AOIG jhglo-Iranian Oil Company], 31

Arab-Israeli war ( 1967j, 2-43,9-1 0, 44/58

and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 3 6 3 5 and oil shocks, 109 Arab-Israeli war 1 19731, 2-43,5, 9-10, 122c123

and the Emtian-Israeli peace treat% 3940, 86-87 and the Iranian revolution, 28, 68 and oil shocks, 32, X09 Arab Leawe, 61,67, 74-75, 84 Arafat, Yasix, xi, 59, 67, 82, 1l 4 Arnold, hrkrony, 52-53 lilslfiura celebration, 61 B&r&n, 60, 73, 117 Baker, Tames, 77 Bakhtiar, Shahpour, 34 ""Bikanization,""of the Mddle East, 3

Baleies, X03 Barxi-Ss& Abolhasarx, 65 Barak, Ehud, xi, 92, X 13-1 X4 Ba%hparty, 37, 59,82-83 Begn, Menaehern, 14,34,4M4,82, 86-89, 99, 125-135 ""Bnt rail,'' use of the term, 20-41 Berlin Wall, 96, X03 Big Bang theaq' 21) bin Laden, Osama, xi, 69, 80, 104, 106fO7, 118

Black Friday.,33 Black Sea, 120 Blach, Marc, 22, 24 Bolshevik Revolution, 4 5 4 6 Brewer, fohn, 1 Brezhnev Doctrine, 55, 16 In32 Brezhnev; Leonid, 39,50, 55, 161n32 Bfitain, 3 1,45-46, 92,98-99 Brookings Institution, 42 Brook-ShepherdfGardon, 8 Bush, George Herbert Walker, 67, 77-8 1 and the Carter Doct~ne,101 and the invasion of Kuwait, 78-79 Carnbo&tia,38 CambricZge Crite~onof Change, X6 Carnemn, James, l Camp David accords ( 1978),4, 61,84,89,91-93, 225-135 Camp David summit (2000j, xi-xii, 92-93, 120- 121. canto^, Lou, 117 Cmard, Phillippe, 23-24, X 561267 Carson, Johnny, 62 Cater Doctrine, 55, 68, 79, 9S-9gl 2 41-149, See also Carter, Jimrny Carter, Jimmy: and the Camp David accords, 4,4645, 89, 125 and the Desert One action, 64 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 15, 42, 44 election of; as president, 42, XW and the Iranian revolution, 63-66 and the Soviet invasion of Af&anistan, 4849, 54-56, 98-99, 101-102, See also Carter Doctrine Caspian Sea, 124) Causejsj: and effect, 19-22 and narrative, 22 selection of, criteGa fox, 20 situatianal, ZQ of true revolutions, 27-28 Central Intelligence k e n c y (CM/, 102, 106105, 108

and the Shah of Iran, 31 and the S o ~ einvasion t of: Mghanistan, 52, 160n28 Chandler, James, I0 Change: and events, 12-1 9 dobal, 17-18 incremental, 18 science of, histoq as, 26 systemic, 17-19 versus transformation, 2 CC Checlnyna, 80, 104 China, 48,5&55,98, 203-104, 107-109, 220 CIA 1Central Intelligence Agency], 102, 104-105, 108 and the Shah of Iran, 31. and the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan, 52, X60n28 Clinton, Bill, xii, 92, 108, l 19 Cold war, 3 1,35-38, 89, 88, 121 paradim, 19 and the Persian Gulf War, 79, 81 t of: and the S o ~ einvasion, Mghanistan, 9'7, fO0, 105 Collier, Wiehard, 8 Collinmood, R, G,, 20 unism, 49-50,55,99-100. See also Mamism Containment, use of the term, 79-80, 1661730 Contras, 66 Counter-factual, use of the term, 21. Cowles, Virgna, 7-8 C z a ~ s Russia, r 45, 55, 98, See also Russia Czechoslovakia, 553, 55, '77 Daoud, Muhannmand (prince),4L48, 51. Dasvvin, Charles, I6 De-ideologlization, use of the term, 95 Descartes, Rene, 14 Desert One action, 64 Det erminism, 24

Dhofar-i revolt, 32 Diachronic desc~ptivemade, 24

French Revalution, 9 Furet, Frangois, 13, U , 24

E m t J 3,6142, 115-1 17 and the cold war, 35-36 expulsion. of Soviet advisers by, 39 and the Persian Gulf War, 80. See aka Emtian-Israeli peace treaty Emtian-Israeli peace treaty; x-xi, 3, 3 U 5 , 5'7,82-93, 109 o~f5ins of, 3 4 4 5 text of, 125-1 40. See also E m t ; Israel Eisenhower, I)wWi&t I),, 31 Elections, 42, 65, 100 Elton, G. R,, 20, 155259 Emblems of Reason, n e [ Starobinskif,9 Ennpi~cism,2 I End and a Begirz&g, An (Cowls), 7-8 England in 18.19: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic Historidsm [Chandler],10 Epistemoloe, 25 Euphrates Rver, 83 Event(sf:and cause and effect, 19-22 and change, 12-1 9 as mmposed of subevenits, X 5 as intrusions, 14 use of the term, 13 Evolutionary. change, 14, 18

Gaza Stz.ig, 2,34, 67, 113 GCG (CullCooperation Gsuncilj, 75, "i7-80,83-84, 119 GDP (goss domestic product), 108 Geertz, CliBord, 24 Geiss, Xmmanuel, 8 Geneva Accords, 94 Germany, 27" See also Berlin. Wall. Gfiotbzadeh, S a d e ~ 6 5 Gilpin, Robert, 11, 16-19 Glaspie, Apel, 77-78 Gtobalizatisn, 68 GNP (grossnational productj, 29, 122 Golan Heights, 2, 34, 65, 8 1, 86, 92, Gorbachev; Wkhail, 94-95, 101- I Q2 Grand Mosque, 2,6,6&61,65 Grand Mufti, 60 Great B~rain,3 X, 4546, 92, 98-99 Guardians of the Two Holy Places,

Falk, Riehard, 95 Faa Perrinsula, 72, 767'7 Febvre, Lucien, 22 258 7: A Year of No Significance: The Ming Dynasty in Decline [Wuangl, 9 Flash points, 16, 33 Flenning, Thornas, 8 Ford, Gerald, 40, 42, France, 9,3 1 Freedman, Robert Q., 9 6 9 7

60

Guatemala, 1123 Gulf VVatr, 67; 7&'72, 75-82, 101 Hammondt Thornas;, 46$550 Hashemite monarchy; 37 Hegemony, 84 WerubeX, Jean-PierreV. M-, 24 Historicism, 10 Wistariogaphy, 25 Histop: Its Fwose and Mind (Reinierj, 13 Hitler, Adolft 77" Hizbullah [Party of God], 65, 66, 88 "Hot chronolom," use of the term, 11-12 Wuang, Ray, h,9 Hungav, 5 Huntinsan, Samuel, 69 Hussein [king of Jordan),38 Wusseirr, Saddarn, 57,623, 116, 120-121 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treat% 84-85

invasion of Kuwait by, 75, 77-78 and the Iranian revolution, 59-62, 68, 70-71 and the Iran-Iraq war, 71, 73, 76 and Resolution 598, 75-76 and the United Nations, 80, El 1. See dso Iraq

IS1 (Inter-SemicesIntelligence bency), 105 Islamic calendar, 6,30, 1 5 b 3 IsIQ~G {ihad . (holy war), 51, 68 Islamic Salvation Front, 69 Islamism, 2, 58-59 Ismell, 81, 113-1 16 birth of, in 1948, 9 Ibrahim, Saad Ed&n, 91 invasion of Lebanon by; 5,65,67, Imperialism, 30,32-33, 58, 68 84,8689, 104 and the Iranian, revolution, 30, 32 India, xi, 57, 104, 106, 108, 120 Interdisciplinary methodologies, 22, Labor party in, 43, 90 24,25 Likud party in, 4243, El6# 90, h t i f a d a upGsing, by. Palestinians, 113-1 X4 67, 89-90, X X 4, 115-1 19, 1 7 3 ~ 7 and the Nixon Doct~ne,35-36 Intrusions, events as, 14 and the Soviet invasion of Iran, 108, 123 trifghanistan, 104 treaty with Jordan (1994j, 57, 84, M@ersAgeement with, 84 121, See also Emtian-Israeli Contra affair, 6668, 72-73, 88 hostage crisis in, at the U.S. peace treaty; Israeli-PLO embassy; 2,62-65 accords and the Soviet invasion, of Israeli-PLO accords, 57, 8 1, 89, 90 Af&mistan, 47-48. See also Iranian revolution; Iran-Iraq war Jameson, Fredric, U-25 Iranian revolution, X-xi, 4, 57-81, Japan, 29 Jarring#Gunnar, 36-3 7 98, 115, 119 Jarringplan, 3 M 7 causes off 27-28 Jiibad (holy war), 51, 68 and ISI (import-substituting industrialization), 28-28 Jordaxl, 38, 41, 43, 88 civil war in, 37 and models of change, 18-1 9 ovemiew of, 2L34, See also Iran and the Iranian revolution, 32 and the Soviet invasion of Iran-Iraq war, 4, 57, 6748, 86, X 17 end of, 73 Mghanistan, 104 as the "fist" Gulf War, 76 treaty with Israel, 119941, 57, 84, l21 and the GCC, 74-75 and Lebanon, 88-89 Jukes, Geoffrey., 169n54 July 'l14 [Ludwig),8 and models of change, 19 and oil shocks, 111 fuly 2 914: mls Outbred of the First and Sadhm Hussein, 71, 73, 76 World War* Selected and the United Nations, 103 Docurnents [Geissj, 8 Iraq: and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 82, 83, 8 6 8 5 , 88 Kabul, 96, 101 Harbafa, 61 no-fly zone in, xi, See also Hussein, Saadam; Iran-Iraq war; Karal incident, 107 Persian Gulf War Harmal, Babrak, 47-49, 53 Kashmir, xi, 107 IS1 (impart-substituting iradust~alhation),28-29 Haz;akhstan, 103

Keddie, Nikki, 28 Belly, John, 78 Kennan, George, 94 Khslq party, 47, 48 a a t a m i , Muhammad, l f 7 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 2, 4, 2"7 ,S5, 5848 and Black Friday., 33-44 death of, 72, I l 7 and the Iran-Contra affair, 66, 68 power of, solidification of, 65 and the signing of the Emtian-Xsmel peace treaty, 15 and Resoluton 598, 73 and Skisuni, 71 speeches oft 33 Kissingel-,E l e n ~ 35,38,4M2, ~ 110 aingamant William, 8 Kwds, 71, 76, 84 Kuwait, 60, 74 invasion of, by Iraq, 69-72, 75-77, 85

and the Xran-Iraq war, 7'3, 75 and oil shocks, 111 oil tanken from, r e a a a n g of, 6748, 71-72, 73

Kyr~zstan,103 Labor party, 43, 90 Lebanon, xii, 101, 117 civil war in, 42 invasion of, by Israel, 5, 65, 67, 84, 8 6 8 9 , X04 PLO in, 67,87-89 and the Iranian revolution, 65 Lenin, 'Vla&mir, 50. See also Leninism Lellinism, 55, 103, See also Lenin, Vla&timir Levi-Strauss, Claude, 1% f 2, Likud party; 42-43, 86,90, X 13-1 X 4 Line of Control, 107 Lombard, Lawrence Brian, 16 Ludwig, Emil, 8 MacDilf A i m Farce Base, 99 Macdonald, Lyn, 7

Mmichean i d e o l o ~71,99, ~ 119 m o z , Zeev, 17-18, 19 Manism, 32, 50,55, 66, 1103. See also Communism Mecca, taking of the Grand Mosque in, 2, 6, 6 0 4 f , 65 Me@n, AJlan, 25 Mrsky, Gmr@y;95 Mssile TechnsXolly Control Regme, 108

Morin, Edgar, 14 Muharram, I s l a ~ month c of, 61

Mujahideexl holy w a ~ o r s )5, 1, 101-107, 128, 120, 168nrt.3

Mum, Peter, 15 Mmharr"lf, Pervez, 106 Mussadiq, Muhammad, 28,3 1 Namibia, 95 Napoleonic era, 10 Narrative: and the h n a l e s schml, 22-25

and annualization, 6-12 as epistemoloe, 25 r e ~ v aof, l W25 National Front party; 3 f , 34 Nationalism, 29,35, 58, 84 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization],54, l OO Neoclmsicism, 9 New Histo~ans,22-24 New World Qsder, 77-78 N i c a r a ~ a 66, , 123 2940: The Avalarz~e[Collier], E: 1949: The First Israelis (Segevj, 9 1944: OUPL ~ WiS n a World on the Edge [Klingamaaj, 8 1P2 4 (Cameron],"I 2914 and 2925: The Death of Innocence (Macdonaldj, 7 2929: The Year Our WorId Began (aingaman),8 1973 Arab-Israeli war, 2-23! 5, 9-1 0, 122-1 23 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treat% 3940, 86-87

and the Iranian revolution, 28, 68 and oil shocks, 32, 109 1967 kab-Israeli ww, 2-3, 9-10, 44, 58

and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 34-35 and oil shocks, 109 Nixon Doctfine, 32,35,38, 79. See also Nixon., Richard M, Nixon, Richad M., 35,3849. See also Nixon Doctrine Novembep 192 8 (Brook-Shepherd],8 Oil ixzdustq, 54, 109-1 12, 1f 9 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 33, 40 and the Iranian revolution, 27, 29, 31,67-68 and the Persian Gulf War, 76-77. See also OPEG (flrganization.of Petroleum Exportil3g Countfiesf Oman, 60, 74 OPEG (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Cowtxiesf, xi, 39, X 19 and the Iranian revolution, 28 and oil shocks, 109-112. See also Oil industry Operation Desert Storm, 79 Operation Staunch, 66 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza (Shah.of Iran), 2,27-34, 38, 58, 63, 77 and Black Friday, 33-34 departure of, from Iran, 4,34 fall o&27, 117 foreim policy. off 3 Nf and the Soviet invasion of Maanistan, 4748, 55 and the U.S., 31-33,68 Pakistan, xi, 4748, 57, 104-108, 120 Izalestianianls):and the EgntianIsraeli peace treatgS 44 and the Iranian revolution, 67 refugeesE93 up~singof [iatifada),67, 89-90, 114, 115-119, 173~7.See also Palestinian Liberation. Organization (PLO/

Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 41,96, 97 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 35, 38, 40, 84, 8&93 and the Iranian revolution, 59, 6647 in Lebanon, 67, 87-89 Likud party; 113- 114. See also Xsraeli-PLO accords; Palestinjans Paradigms, 9, X9 Parcham party; 47,48, 49 Pavlovskii, AJexander, 53 Pax Americana, 79, 101 Pax Britannia, 79 Pax Islamica, 59 Pearl E-farbor, bombing of, 5 People's Democratic Party of Mghanistan (PDPA),47-49? 52, PeoplersRepublic of China, Seks China Persian calendar, 30 Persian Gulf War, 67, 7&712, 75-82, 101 " P e t e r l ~ ~massacre, " 10, X2 Philippines, 123 PLO (Palestin;ian;Liberation Organization], 41, 96, 97 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 35,38,80, 84, 8 6 9 3 and the Iranian revolution, 59, 6647 in Lebanon, 67, 87-89 and the Likud party, 113- 114, See also Israeli-PLO accords; PdestiIlians Poland, 96 Prawe "~puing~" "5 Progressive-repessivemethod, of Sartre, X0 Qatar; 60, 73, 74 Quandt, William B,, 91-92, Rabirx, Yitzhak, 41 Rapid Deployment joint Task Farce, 99 Rashid, fimed, 105

Reagan Doctrine, 100, See also Reaigain, RonaXd Reagan, Ronald, 6546, 77, 2 16 and the Iran-Gontra scandal, 72 and the Iranian revolution, 67 and Lebanon, 87 Sick on, 68 and the Soviet invasion of Afaanistaa, 99-1 00, 102 Reinier, E, 2, 13 Resolution 242, 2,35,38, 4 W 5 , 67, 89 Resolution 338, 41 Resolution 598, 73, 75-76 Revisionism, 9 Revolution: and flash points, 16,33 Russian, 4546 true, cause of, 27-28. See also Iranian revolutian; Revolutionary change Revolutianaq change, 4-5, 14, 2 8. See also Revolution Revolutionary Council, 48-49 Revolutionary Guards, 62-68 Romantic era, 10, 12 Roy; Oliviem, 50, 2 ?On62 Russia: Bofshevik Revolution in, 4546 Cza~st,45, 55, 98, See also Soviet Unian. Rustow, Dankwart, 110-2 11 Sadat, &war, 4, 7'i", 125-1 35 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty, 15, 34-44 82, 89, 93 expulsion of Soviet advisers bx 39 and the Iranian revolution, 68 and oil shocks, 109 Safavid empime! 27-28 Salanre, Glrassan, 83 Saa&xzista re@me, 66 Sartre, jean-Paul, 10 Sau& kabia, 43, 73-74'80 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty; 84 and the Iranian revolution, 60, 61, 6 and oil shocks, 109-1 12

and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 101, 104 Savage MhsZ, The (Levi-Straws], X 0-1 2 S C m missiles, 8 1. Sea of Galilee, PS93 Secafity Coundl [United Nations j: Resolution 242, 2,35, 38, 4445, 67, 89 Rasolution 338, 42 Resolution 598, 73, 75-76, See also United Nations Sef;ev, Tom, 9 1 776: Year of Illzjtsiians (Fleming),8-9 Shah of Iran (Muhammad Reza Pahlavif,2, 2744,38, 58, 63, 77 and Black Ffiday, 3 3 4 4 departure of; from Iran, 4,34 fall of, 27, 117 foreifl policy of, 30-3 X and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 4748, 55 and the U.S., 31-33,GR Sharif, Nawaz, l06 SEnaron, h e l , 87, X 72a 1. Shas party, X 13 SEnatt al-Arab wareway, 85 Shiites, 59, 61, 71, 263n13 Sick, Gaxyl 68, 98 Sinai Peninsula, 2, 365,36, 41-45,92 Sinai 11 disengagement ageement, 41,42 Solar calendar, 6 Soviet Union, 3 X, 37-39 and the Brezhnev Doctrine, 55, l6ln32 invasion. of Af&anistan by, X-xi, 2;,4,45-5% 64,96109, 119, l 23 and the Persian Gulf War, 81, See also Russia Spielberg, Steven, 5 Stanford, Michael, 2% 155x160 Starabinski, Jean, 9 Stone, Lawrence, 24 St. Peter's Fields, 10 Suez Caad, 36,40, 1474218 Sunni Muslims, 50, 59-60, 117

S y ~ a66, , 123, 108 and the Emtian-Israeli peace treaty; 37-38, 41, 11.3, 88, 82, 92-98

and the Persian Gulf War, 81 Ta~ikistaxl,46, 54, X03 Taliban, 105- 106, 109, l17-1 18, 171x163

Taraki, Nur Muhammad, 47-49, 5 1-52

Teaart, Fredefick J.,13, 18 Teleology, X 5-1 6 Theom and Processes of History. (Tegartk X3 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, 49, 53, 95 Trotsky; Leon, 46 Tudeh party; 31 Tunisia, 67 Turkmenistan, 54, 103 United Arab Emirites, 60, 73-74, X X X United Nations, 57, 70 Drug Control Program, 108 and the Emtian-Israeli peaee treaty, 3&37,38, 41, 4 4 4 5 and the Gulf Wlaf;80 and the Persian Gulf War, 80-8 X, 83

Resolution 242, 2,35,38, 4445,

Vance, Cyms, 64 Vietnam Warf 32, 38 and the Iranian revolution, 63 and the Persian Gulf War, '78 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 52, 56, 94, 97, 99-100

Walsh, W. H., 2Q-21 War and Change in World Polil_ics (Gilpin), 16-1 8 War of Attrition, 35-36, 157124 VIlarsaw Pact, 100 Waterloo, 10 Webster's Dictionary, X, 13 West Bank, 2, 34, 67, 86, 113 World Bank, 108 Worfd Trade Center bombing, 105 World War I,7-8,28,31, 46 World War If, 1, X2 books on, 8 and the Egyptian-Israelipeaee treat% 83 and Wusseinrsinvasion of Kuwait, 78 and the Iranian revolution, 28,30, 31,68

Munz on, 15 and the Soviet invasion of Af&anistan, 54//U.S, entry. into, 5 Wye Plantation, 91

67'89

Resolution 338, 41 Resolution 598, 73, 75-76 and the Soviet in-vasion of Afghanistan, 101, X03 U.S. Embassy (Iranianhostage crisis], 2, 62-65 USS Cole, f 18, 173n7 Uzbekstan, 46, 54, X03

Yazdi, firahim, 65 Year of No Significa~ce:The Ming D p a s t y h Decline (Wuangj, i x Year of Writing Dairrgerstssly, The [Brewer/,1 Zahir, Muhammad (king], 46-47 Zero-sum foreie policy; 38